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CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT  
MARCH 1944

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*copy will be prepared*  
*WAT* →

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 597

Filed 02/1026Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~██████████~~.

Here is a suggested item for your draft of our monthly anti U boat war statement. Provided later information about sinkings in February 1944 does not considerably increase the figure shown below:

February 1944 was the best month since the United States entered the war. The total sinkings of all Allied shipping in February by enemy action only were less than one fifth of the sinkings in February 1943, and less than one ninth of the sinkings in February 1942.

The figures in British notation are:

February 1944, 70,000 tons;

February 1943, 378,400;

February 1942, 659,500.

We have a very good haul of U boats, too.

No Sig

12202 - Pub  
y asku - 0212402. Pub

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Govt. State Dept. tel., 8-29-  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

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0100

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	597	DATE	2 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	02/1026Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	02/1220Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	February monthly Submarine Warfare Statement.		

ACTION

To President via usher, 02/1240Z.

Statement prepared by Navy Department, dispatch dictated by Captain Wood in Map Room; approved by President in Doctor's office; answer sent to PM as #484.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Submarine Statement</i>	

0101

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*W.R.*

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 598

Filed 02/1118Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and most secret.

Your 454.

I have now received a report by air mail from the Viceroy on the working of the Port of Calcutta and the Bengal-Assam lines of communication. The Chiefs of Staff have reported to me as follows:

Para 1. As regards the Port of Calcutta, a man of unquestioned standing and ability will shortly be appointed as Port Director to control the whole working of the Port and all the Agencies therein. He will have working under him two deputies, one of whom will be American.

Para 2. Operational control of the metre gauge section of the Bengal-Assam Railway is being taken over by the U.S. Army Railway Units. Machinery, which will be linked with that set up under the Port Director at Calcutta, is being established for the allocation of priorities and the control of movement over all sections of the lines of communication. The allocation of priorities will be determined after consultation with representatives of all interests

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-2-

concerned, including those of the U.S. Forces. The allotment of traffic and the energetic implementation of this allocation will be the responsibility of picked executives.

Para 3. These measures have been worked out with the personal collaboration of the Viceroy and have been agreed with the United States Authorities in India. No effort will be spared to gain the maximum efficiency on the Bengal-Assam lines of communication which is fully recognized to be vital to our joint operations in Burma and the U.S. Army Air Forces operating in China.

I trust this will be satisfactory to you.

No Sig

*Recd: 021220Z. RUK  
In Per via ushuk. 021240Z. RUK*

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By R. H. Parks , Date MAY 6 1972

0103

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	598	DATE	2 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	02/1118Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	021220Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Working of port of Calcutta and the Bengal-Assam line of communication.		

ACTION

Further reply to POTUS #545, 29 Jan 44.

To President via usher.

Not acknowledged in POTUS #489; no further action.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:		
<i>Chinn</i>			

0104

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WDCC  
03 Mar  
1820 Z

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States

No. 599 Filed: 3/1805Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and  
~~Most Secret~~

Reuter announces the message in my immediately  
following. Can this be true?

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Recd 03 1926 Z Hand  
To Pres via Miss Jolley.*

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0105

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	599	DATE	3 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	03/1805Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	03/1926Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Release to press of Italian ship transfer.		

ACTION

To President via Miss Tully,

The President's msg #486, informing the PM that the story on transfer of Italian ships to Russia had been released to the press, was dispatched from Washington at 1636Z, 3 Mar 44. The PM's #599 and #600, requesting information on the same subject, were received in the Map Room at 1926Z. The messages crossed in transition. Therefore, this message (PM 599) is answered in POTUS 486.

\*(Msg identical to POTUS 486 sent to Stalin, 3 Mar 44)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>Italian ships</i>	FILED:
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0106

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WDCC  
03 Mar  
1829 Z

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 600 Filed: 3/1805Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~rest~~

Reference my immediately preceding telegram. Washington Friday from Reuter. Time of receipt 1720 3rd March. Msg begins:

President Roosevelt today announced that Italian warships are ready to be sent to the Russian Navy. Discussions for transferring roughly 1/3 of the Italian Fleet to Russia, the President said, were about half completed.

President Roosevelt said that the U.S. and Britain are already using some Italian tonnage. Efforts are now being made to determine how many of these ships or their equivalent can be turned over to the Russian Navy. Marshal Stalin had raised the question through his Ambassador in Washington.

President Roosevelt stressed that so long as the war lasted the Allies will use everything afloat against the enemy. After the war something more permanent would have to

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be decided. Asked whether the ships would be manned by Italians, the President replied that some may and some may not. Italian ships which had escaped to the Balearic Islands, he said, were a Spanish problem.

President Roosevelt explained that since Italy surrendered to the U.S., Britain and Russia, it was thought advisable to distribute the Italian Fleet roughly on the basis of 1/3 each. He would not say how much tonnage was involved.

No Sig

*Recd 031926Z Hvy  
To Pres. via Miss Tully*

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FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	600	DATE	3 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	03/1805		
TOR MAP ROOM	03/1926Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Release to press of Italian ship transfer.		

ACTION

To President via Miss Tully.

The President's msg #486, informing the PM that the story on transfer of Italian ships to Russia had been released to the press, was dispatched from Washington at 1636Z, 3 Mar 44. The PM's #599 and #600, requesting information on the same subject, were received in the Map Room at 1926Z. The messages crossed in transition. Therefore, this message (PM 600) is answered by POTUS 486.

(Msg identical to POTUS 486 sent to Stalin, 3 Mar 44)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>Italian Ships</i>		

0109



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WDCC  
Mar 4  
1853 Z

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

WAB

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States

No. 601 Filed: 041925 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Your number 485. Thank you very much for your assurances about no sheeps eyes at our oilfields at Iran and Iraq. Let me reciprocate by giving you the fullest assurance that we have no thought of trying to horn in upon your interests or property in Saudi Arabia. My position on this, as in all matters, is that Great Britain seeks no advantage, territorial or otherwise, as the result of the war. On the other hand she will not be deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her after having given her best services to the good cause-at least not so long as your humble servant is entrusted with the conduct of her affairs. I will bring the matter before the Cabinet on Monday and hope to telegraph you immediately thereafter.

About the India Ocean situation. I hope the enemy

File 04 22352-000  
TPVU File Copy

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0110

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fleet will stay at Singapore, as this should give you fine opportunities in the main Pacific theatre. Thank you very much for the carrier. I shall be sending you a signal shortly on the wider aspects of our joint action against Japan.

About U.J. and the Poles. I am waiting to receive the official answer of the Soviet Government before attempting to make up my mind whether there is anything else we can do.

About the Italian ships et cetera. I was much startled by the press accounts of your talk with them. The Russians have never asked for one-third of the Italian ships. But only for the specific vessels mentioned at Moscow and agreed to by us at Teheran. See list which follows. <sup>#602</sup> We have never agreed, as you know, to anything beyond this. We shall now see what the Italian reaction will be and whether the Combined Chiefs of the Staff were right in their apprehensions set forth in J.S.M. 1372 dated 28th-12-43. From your 483 I infer that we are to go on with the policy of loaning U.J. some British and American ships till we can get the Italians'. I therefore suggest the following joint message to U.J. from you and me: Begins.

Although the Prime Minister instructed Ambassador Clark Kerr to tell you that the destroyers we are lending you were old, this was only for the sake of absolute frankness. In fact they are good, serviceable ships, quite efficient for escort duty. There are only 7 fleet destroyers in the whole

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MAY 6 1972

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0111

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Italian Navy, the rest being older destroyers and torpedo boats. Moreover these Italian destroyers, when we do get them, are absolutely unfitted for work in the North without very lengthy refit. Therefore we thought the 8 which the British Government have found would be an earlier and more convenient form of help to you. The Prime Minister regrets that he cannot spare any new destroyers at the present time. He lost 2 last week, one in the Russian convoy; and for the landing at OVERLORD alone he has to deploy, for close inshore work against the batteries, no fewer than 42 destroyers, a large proportion of which may be sunk. Every single vessel that he has of this class is being used to the utmost pressure in the common cause. The movement of the Japanese fleet to Singapore creates a new situation for us both in the Indian Ocean. The fighting in the Anzio bridgehead and generally throughout the Mediterranean is at its height. The vast troop convoys are crossing the Atlantic with the United States Army of Liberation. The Russian convoys are being run up to the last minute before OVERLORD with very heavy destroyer escorts. Finally there is OVERLORD itself. The President's position is similarly strained, but in this case mainly because of the great scale and activity of the operations in the Pacific. Our joint intentions to deliver to you the Italian ships agreed upon at Moscow and Teheran remain unaltered, and we shall put the position formally to the Italian Government at the time when it is broadened and the new ministers take over their

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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responsibilities. There is no question of our right to dispose of the Italian Navy, but only of exercising that right with the least harm to our common interests. Meanwhile, all our specified ships are being prepared for delivery to you on loan as already agreed. Signed: Roosevelt. Churchill. Message to Stalin ends.

I must send you my warmest congratulations on the grand fighting of your troops, particularly the United States Third Division in the Anzio bridgehead. I am always deeply moved to think of our men fighting side by side in so many fierce battles and of the inspiring additions to our history which these famous episodes will make. Of course I have been very anxious about the bridgehead where we have so little ground to give. The stakes are very high on both sides now and the suspense is long-drawn. I feel sure we shall win both here and at Cassino.

We certainly do have plenty to worry us now that our respective democracies feel so sure the whole war is as good as won.

No Sig

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By R. H. Parks Date WAI 6 25/2

0113

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	601	DATE	4 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	041925Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	042235Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Oilfields at Iran and Iraq; Indian ocean situation; Polish-Russian relations; Transfer of Italian ships.			

ACTION

To President via usher. Answers PRES #485, 3 Mar 44.

Answer prepared by Admiral Brown; approved by President 7 Mar 44; sent to Pa. as #489, 7 March 44.

See message from Winant, 6 Mar 44, containing mes-  
sage from Prime Minister.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Copy of joint POTUS-Pa message to STALIN filed in POTUS-STALIN file.		

ACTION COMPLETED:

*Polish-Russian Relations; Oil;  
Italian ships*

FILED:

~~SECRET~~

4 March 1944

*WJ*

From: MA London  
For: The President of the United States

Number 602 Filed 041925Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~██████████~~ Number 601. Number 602.

My immediately preceding telegram. The Admiralty  
state that one third of the Italian ships in our possession  
would amount to:

- 1.7 battleships
- 2 6 inch cruisers
- 0.7 5.3 inch cruisers
- 3.3 destroyers
- 7.7 torpedo boats
- 6.7 corvettes
- 7.3 submarines

Whereas what the Russians ask for and what the

British agreed to was:

- 1 battleship
- 1 cruiser
- 8 destroyers
- 4 submarines

40,000 tons of merchant shipping.

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*Rec'd 042235Z-05C*  
*TPV 22*  
*File Copy*

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Govt.. State Dept. tel., 8-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

0115

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 602	DATE 4 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 041925Z	
FOR MAP ROOM 042235Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Transfer of Italian ships to Russia; press release.	

ACTION

(Further to Pm #601.)

To President via usher.

Answer prepared by Admiral Brown; approved by President 7 Mar 44; sent to PM as #489, 7 March 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED: <i>Italian Shipping</i>	FILED:
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0116



~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

4 March 1944

WAS

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 603

Filed 042245Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret. Number 603.

I have just received the following from Mountbatten which I forward to you knowing the interest you take in these parts.

"At one time, I had every hope even after the cancellation of 'PIGSTICK' <sup>(Advance in Padoh Kacha)</sup> that advance in Arakan would be pressed to the south of Mayu Peninsular in time to give a sporting chance of taking Akyab. Japanese counter offensive has imposed a vital three weeks delay which I fear will prevent us from reaching the south of Mayu Peninsular in time to cover the passage of landing craft round Foul Point into river before swell conditions which become rapidly worse from now on prevent it. Wingate's operations are proceeding to plan as follows:

"A. 16 Brigade has crossed the Upper Chindwin about 30 miles southwest of Taro and will operate against communications of 18 and 31 Divisions.

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Govt. Secy. Dept., tel., S-22-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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0117

~~SECRET~~

From: London  
To: The President of the United States  
Number 603 Filed 042245Z

Page 2

"B. 77 Brigade due to be flown into Okkyi Valley between March 6 and March 9 to operate against communication of 18 Division.

"C. 111 Brigade due to be flown into same air strip as 77 Brigade between March 10 and March 13 to operate in area Wuntho Katha against communications of 15 Division."

No Sig

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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Und: 050130Z. AUB  
To Pres via Uthar.

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0118

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	603	DATE	4 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	042246Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	050130Z	VIA	
SUBJECT	Burma operations. Quotes letter from Mountbatten.		

**ACTION**

To President via usher.

Acknowledged in POTUS #489. 7 Mar 44; no further action.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Shira</i>	

0119

~~SECRET~~

4 March 1944

*WR*

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 604 Filed 042310Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~SECRET~~. Number 604.

1. I have now received Stalin's reply about Poland which I send in my immediately following. I find it most discouraging. I will send you a copy of my answer as soon as it has been approved by the Cabinet.

2. There is now no reason in my opinion why the Polish Prime Minister should not visit the United States as you invited him to do. It may at any rate make the Russians more careful if they see that Poland is not entirely without friends.

No Sig

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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*Recd: 050130Z. KWS  
to Pres via usher.*

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0120

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	604	DATE	4 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	04/2310Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	05/0130Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Forwards Stalin's reply on Russian-Polish relations.			

ACTION To President via usher. (See also 605)

Acknowledged by POTUS 489; further reply in  
POTUS 609.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:

*Polish-Russian relations*

FILED:

0121

~~SECRET~~

4 March 1944

W25

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 605 -

Filed 042310Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Number 605.

Following is Stalin's reply referred to in my number 604.

"I received both your messages of the 20th February on the Polish question from Sir A. Clark Kerr on the 27th February.

"I have studied the detailed account of your conversations with the members of the Emigre Polish Government and have come more and more to the conclusion that such people are not capable of establishing normal relations with the USSR. Suffice it to point to the fact that not only do they not wish to recognize the Curson Line but they still lay claim to Lvov as well as Vilna. As regards designs to place under foreign control the administration of certain Soviet territories, we cannot accept for discussion such aspirations since we consider even the very raising of a question of such a kind insulting for the Soviet Union.

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By R. M. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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0122

~~SECRET~~

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 605 Filed 042310Z

Page 2

"I have already written to the President that the solution of the question of Soviet-Polish relations has not yet matured.

"It is necessary once more to affirm the justness of this conclusion. 3d March, 1944."

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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*Recd: 050130Z. RUB  
40 Pres via Laker.*

0123



FROM	The President	TO	The Prime Minister
SERIAL	605	DATE	4 Mar 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER		042310Z	
FOR MAP ROOM	050130Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Stalin's reply on Russian-Polish relations.			

ACTION

To President via usher.

(Continuation of PM #604.)

~~PM~~ Acknowledged by POTUS 489; ~~Further reply in PM #609.~~

(See further PM #609)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY:	DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Polish-Russian Relations</i>	

0124

~~SECRET~~

WSZ

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

No: 606, Filed 05/1822Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Your number 484. We agree. We should prefer to leave out the last sentence but we do not press the point.

No Sig

*Last sentence -*

*The lack of aggressiveness on the part of the U. boat continues*

*Recid-051900Z-06C*

*TPVU*

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0125

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	606	DATE	5 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	05/1822Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	05/1900Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	February submarine warfare statement.		

ACTION

To President via usher.

Answers POTUS 484. After consultation with the President, Admiral Brown draft reply; sent to PM as #488.

For complete action on February submarine warfare statement, see "MR 000.7 (3) Sec. 2"

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:		
<i>Submarine Statement</i>			

0126

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*W.I.*

5 March 1944

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 607 Filed 052040Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and personal. Number 607.

Your number 487.

We agree about this being in General Wilson's sphere. But I think that the mission should in the first place be received by representatives of the three Allies and a military representative of General Wilson and the first contacts established through diplomatic channels. General Wilson would, of course, be kept informed and would be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff if and when it came to dictating armistice terms. No doubt you will instruct your representative to keep in touch with Mr. MacMillan who will act for us. I think it most important, however, that you and I should watch this from day to day and settle on the highest level, of course in conjunction with U.J.

No Sig

*Rec'd 052240Z-08c  
TPVU*

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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*Paragraph sent to State Dept 6 Mar  
together with copy of President's 487-  
for preparation of reply after consultation  
with SC5*

0127

6 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 607 from the Prime Minister be furnished to the Department of State for preparation of reply after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order that you may be fully informed, a paraphrased copy of the President's message No. 487 to the Prime Minister is also furnished.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incls.  
Incl 1-PM-President #607,  
5 March 1944.  
Incl 2-President-PM.#487,  
6 March 1944.  
3

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	607	DATE	5 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	052040Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	05/2240Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Bulgarian surrender.			

ACTION

To President via usher. Answers POTUS #487, 3 Mar 44.

By direction of the President, copy sent to State Department, together with copy of POTUS #487, for preparation of reply after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Proposed reply given to President by Admiral Leahy 8 Mar 44; approved; sent to PM as #491, 8 Mar 44.

(See "MR 370 BULGARIA (1)")

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
State Department	6 Mar 44	The President
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>Bulgaria</i>		

0129

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WDCC  
7 Mar  
1432 Z

WR

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 608 Filed: 071236 Z

~~SECRET~~  
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and  
About the Italian ships.

1. I have never agreed nor have you ever asked me to agree to a division of the Italian Fleet into 3 shares. If this claim were to be based on the fact that we 3 Powers signed the Italian Armistice together, what about all the other Powers that fought Italy? Greece for instance would have an irrefutable claim. It was not until after the Cairo conference that I heard you had mentioned about the 1/3 for Russia. Averell was however able to assure you that nothing of the sort had been said to the Russians. See your number 437. You are therefore quite uncommitted so far as they are concerned.

2. His Majesty's Government would not be able to agree to a division of the Italian Fleet by 1/3 or a pro rata division among signatories to the Armistice. We hold very strongly that losses entailed in the Italian war must be

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0130

considered. We bore the whole weight of that war from 1940 onwards until British and American troops entered Tunisia as the result of "TORCH". Our Naval losses alone have been very heavy indeed. For instance, from Italy's declaration of war until her unconditional surrender, the Royal Navy lost in the Mediterranean the following major warships:

1	Battleship
2	Aircraft Carriers
1	Monitor
14	Cruisers
48	Destroyers
13	Escorts
3	Fast Minelayers
2	Depot Ships
40	Submarines

and the following merchant shipping: 129 vessels of 780,000 gross tonnage. We certainly feel that we are entitled to have our claims for replacements duly considered by our closest Ally.

3. Here I must mention that excepting only Vanguard we have suspended our whole battleship programme including the four 16-inch battleships authorized by Parliament even before the war began in order to concentrate upon short-term war necessities freely expended in the common cause. We have borne the whole burden of warship losses in the Russian convoys, to wit:

2	Cruisers
5	Destroyers
3	Minesweepers
1	Fleet Oiler.

4. Up to the present I have been content to leave

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972



~~SECRET~~

these matters for adjustment at the end of the war when His Majesty's Government would certainly have represented that they were justly entitled to the 2 surviving Littorios on account of their heavy battleship losses. I do not wish to prejudge this question at the present time. We must however bear in mind that about 100 Italian Warships have been and up to the present moment are still doing useful and important work for both our countries. I therefore suggest that all further discussion of a division of the Italian Fleet apart from what we agreed with Stalin at Teheran, stand over till the end of the war, when no doubt the Japanese Fleet will also come into consideration.

5. At the Moscow conference the Russians asked for certain specified types of Italian ships, namely

1	Battleship
1	Cruiser
8	Destroyers
4	Submarines

and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping. At Teheran we assented to this. The Combined Chiefs of Staff subsequently became alarmed lest the announcement that we meant to turn over Italian ships to the Soviets should impair cooperation by the Italian Naval Forces and possibly lead to scuttling. You and I then agreed to propose to Russia that we lend her the same quantity of ships until the matter could be adjusted with the Italians after the present critical stage of the war in Italy and in the Mediterranean was over. This was accepted by the Russians. I am sure you will recognize that

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1973

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the British Admiralty made a generous contribution to the plan by providing in fact 13 warships out of 14 and half the merchant tonnage. This plan is in actual process of being carried out.

6. Our relations with the Italian Government in this matter must also be considered. They surrendered their fleet and there is no doubt of the ultimate right of the Allies to dispose of it as they may decide. However Admiral Andrew Cunningham, with General Eisenhower's full assent, made an agreement at Taranto in consequence of which the Italian Fleet, which had bravely escaped from the clutches of the Germans not without heavy loss, thenceforward became actively employed in the Allied interest. A relationship has been established between the Italian Fleet and the British and American Fleets alongside of whom they are operating which certainly implies that we should treat them properly and with due consideration. A prisoner of war is one thing but once you accept a man's services and he fights at your side against the common enemy, a different status and relationship are established. I hope this may be patiently looked into because at present the British Admiralty feel uncomfortable about the position into which we have got.

7. I shall no doubt have to make a statement to Parliament in the near future and would propose, subject to your agreement, something as follows:

As President Roosevelt has said the question of

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

the future employment and disposal of the Italian Fleet has been the subject of some discussion. In particular consideration has been given to the immediate reinforcement of the Soviet Navy either from Anglo-American or Italian resources. On these discussions I have no statement to make other than to say that at present no change is contemplated in the arrangements with the Italian Naval Authorities under which Italian ships and their crews take part in the common struggle against the enemy in the theatres where they now operate. It may well be found that the general question of enemy or ex-enemy fleet disposal should best be left over till the end of the war against both Germany and Japan, when the entire position can be surveyed by the victorious Allies and what is right and just can be done.

No Sig

*Reid 071610Z - usc*

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By R. H. Parks Date **MAY 6 1972**

~~SECRET~~

0134

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	608	DATE	7 Mar 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	07/1236Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	071610Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Transfer of Italian ships.		

ACTION

(See "MR 450 ITALY")

To President by Admiral Brown.

Acknowledged in last paragraph of POTUS #489 (see action sheet). Further answered in POTUS #492.

(Statement to Commons mentioned in PM #608 was made on morning of 9 Mar 44.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>Italian ships</i>		

0135

*Admiral Brown  
to file  
P. J. R.*

~~SECRET~~

WDCC  
7 Mar  
1824 Z

*fm*

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 609 Filed: 071730 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Following is text of reply which I have sent, at the desire of the War Cabinet, to UJ in reply to his message of March 3rd repeated to you in my No. 605.

1. I thank you for your message of March 3rd about the Polish question.

2. I made it clear to the Poles that they would not get either Lwow or Vilna and the references to these places, as my message shows, merely suggested a way in those areas in which the Poles thought they could help the common cause. They were certainly not intended to be insulting either by the Poles or by me. However since you find them an obstacle pray consider them withdrawn and expunged from the message.

3. The proposals I submitted to you make the occupation by Russia of the Curzon Line a de facto reality in agreement with the Poles from the moment your armies reach it,

~~SECRET~~

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By R. M. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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0136

~~SECRET~~

and I have told you that, provided the settlement you and we have outlined in our talks and correspondence was brought into being, His Britannic Majesty's Government would support it at the armistice or peace conferences. I have no doubt it would be equally supported by the United States. Therefore you would have the Curzon Line de facto with the assent of the Poles as soon as you get there, and with the blessing of your Western Allies at the general settlement.

4. Force can achieve much but force supported by the goodwill of the world can achieve more. I earnestly hope that you will not close the door finally to a working arrangement with the Poles which will help the common cause during the war and give you all you require at the peace. If nothing can be arranged and you are unable to have any relations with the Polish Government, which we shall continue to recognize as the Government of the Ally for whom we declared war upon Hitler, I should be very sorry indeed. The War Cabinet asks me to say that they would share this regret. Our only comfort will be that we have tried our very best.

5. You spoke to Ambassador Clark Kerr of the danger of the Polish question making a rift between you and me. I shall try earnestly to prevent this. All my hopes for the future of the world are based upon the friendship and cooperation of the western democracies and Soviet Russia.

No Sig

*Rec'd 07/1930Z  
To Pres in office*

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 609	DATE 7 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 071730Z	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT PM's msg to Stalin on Polish-Russian relations.	

ACTION

(Further to PM #604 and 605.)

To President via Miss Tully.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 8 Mar 44; sent to PM as #493.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:

<sup>c-</sup>  
"052 Polish-Russian Relations"

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Polish-Russian relations</i>	

0138



~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

MSB  
Mar 6

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

No: 610, Filed 08/1244Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

1. Your number 490 causes me concern. It is a departure from your agreement with me of February 11 (your 464) which you kindly reaffirmed in your number 483 describing the matter as "finished business". On the strength of the first assurances I made my statement to Parliament.

2. My advices do not lead me to believe that any new facts of importance have arisen or that the Allied forces are not capable of maintaining order in the regions they have occupied as the result of the "unconditional surrender" of Italy. It would in my opinion be a very serious mistake to give way to agitation especially when accompanied by threats on the part of groups of office seeking politicians. We should then be liable to set up in Italy an administration which might not command the allegiance of the armed forces, but which would endeavour to make its position with the Italian people by standing

~~SECRET~~  
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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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0139



~~SECRET~~

up to the Allies. In fact we should have another but more intractable version of the De Gaullist Committee. Meanwhile in the midst of a heart-shaking battle we are to get rid of the tame and helpful government of the King and Badoglio, which is doing its utmost to work its passage and aid us in every way.

3. I readily admit that the course you recommend would be the more popular and would have at least a transitory success. But I am sure that for the victorious conquerers to have their hands forced in this way by sections of the defeated population would be unfortunate. So also would be the obvious open division between you and me and between our two governments. I gave you and the State Department loyal and vigorous support over the Darlan affair. Unity of action between our two governments was never more necessary than at the present time considering the great battles in which we are engaged and which lie ahead.

4. I am quite ready to take up with you now the proposals put forward by General Wilson set out in his number <sup>NAF</sup> 634, whereby the Crown Prince becomes lieutenant of realm. I have no confidence in either Croce or Sforza for

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by R. M. Parks Date

~~SECRET~~

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

-3-

this job. MacMillan tells me Croce is a dwarf professor about 75 years old who wrote good books about aesthetics and philosophy. Vyshinsky who has tried to read the books says they are even duller than Karl Marx. Sforza has definitely broken his undertakings given in his letter to Mr. Berle of September 23. I hope therefore we may open discussions with you on the basis of the Foreign Secretary's telegram number 1783 to Halifax. I repeat I am most anxious to see a broadly based government assume power in Italy, but this ought not to be done under duress by the Allies and can certainly be done with far better advantage when the battle has been gained or, best of all, when Rome is taken. MacMillan is returning at once.

No Sig

*Red. 1423Z*  
*Per Col Matthews*

*Paraphrased copy to State. RUB*

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-73  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0141

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	610	DATE	8 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	08/1244Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	08/1423Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Italian Political situation.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS #490.

To President by Col Mathewson. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown in Map Room; approved by President with minor changes; sent to PM as POTUS #494.

Copies of POTUS #490 and PM #610 sent to State Department, 8 March 1944. Further reply draft by State Department, approved by President; sent to PM as #498.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
State Department	8 March 1944	The President.
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
370 Italy		

0142

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

WAT  
/

9 March 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 611 Filed 090100Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~SECRET~~

No. 611.

\* I am most grateful to you for all your four telegrams just received.

No Sig

Rec'd 09/0210Z  
T.P.V.U. B.P.P.

Four messages referred to are:

1. POTUS #491 - Mr. MacVeagh to represent us in Bulgarian surrender negotiations.
2. POTUS #492 - Transfer Italian ships.
3. POTUS #493 - Polish-Russian relations.
4. POTUS #494 - Italian political situation.

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~~SECRET~~

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By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

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0143

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	611	DATE	9 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	090100Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	09/0210Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Acknowledgment of message #491 thru #494.		

ACTION

Acknowledged messages #491 (Mr. MacVegh to represent us in Bulgarian surrender negotiations); #492 (Transfer of Italian ships); #493 (Polish-Russian relations); #494 (Italian political situation).

To President via usher.

No answer.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED:

*Bulgarian surrender; Italian ships; Polish-Russian relations; Italian Government.*

FILED:

0144

~~SECRET~~

*WAT*

From: London  
To: The President of the United States  
No: 612, Filed 09/1620Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal.

Your 489 for confidential information of Italian officers. We entirely agree and have signalled Wilson accordingly as from Combined Chiefs of Staff for use at his discretion.

No Sig

*Rec'd 091700Z - usc  
To Pres via News Tally.*

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

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0145

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 612	DATE 09/1620Z March 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM 09/1700Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Transfer of Italian ships; statement for confidential information of Italian officials.	

ACTION

Answers POTUS #189.

To President via Miss Tully. Memorandum sent to Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards to be sent to our commanders in Mediterranean. (See "MR 450 ITALY (2) Sec 1")

No answer.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>Italian shipping</i>		

0146

To State and Treasury  
Departments for action,  
10 Mar 44. [REDACTED]

9 March 1944

WAC

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 613

Filed 092000Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number  
613. Personal and [REDACTED] Your 474.

1. You will remember that we discussed the dollar  
balances in Cairo on December 8th and that I gave a memo-  
*(Miss Gully has copy)*  
randum to Harry. I certainly understood that you felt  
we ought not to be treated worse than France or Russia  
in these matters. France has at least two billions and  
no overseas liabilities against them. So has Russia.  
These dollar balances are not, as your telegram might  
suggest, a particular part of our assets which is available  
in the United States, but our total reserves. Against these  
reserves we have incurred for the common cause liabilities  
of at least ten billions on the other side of the account.

2. Since our talk, Lord Halifax met Mr. Hull and  
Mr. Morgenthau as recently as January 8th, when the matters  
mentioned in the first paragraph of your telegram under  
reply were discussed. Lord Halifax reported to us that  
Mr. Morgenthau stated to him that it was not at present  
intended to reduce our dollar balances in any other way,  
and in reliance on this personal assurance to Lord Halifax,

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0147



~~SECRET~~

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 613 Filed 092000Z

Page 2

we agreed to the exclusion of the politically difficult item from Lend-Lease.

3. Will you allow me to say that the suggestion of reducing our dollar balances, which constitute our sole liquid reserve, to one billion dollars would really not be consistent either with equal treatment of Allies or with any conception of equal sacrifice or pooling of resources. We have not shirked our duty or indulged in an easy way of living. We have already spent practically all our convertible foreign investments in the struggle. We alone of the Allies will emerge from the war with great overseas war debts. I do not know what would happen if we were now asked to disperse our last liquid reserves required to meet pressing needs, or how I could put my case to Parliament without it affecting public sentiment in the most painful manner and that at a time when British and American blood will be flowing in broad and equal streams and when the shortening of the war even by a month would far exceed the sums under consideration.

4. I venture to put these arguments before you in order that you may be fully armed with our case, for my confidence in your sense of justice and, I may add, in

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

0148

[REDACTED]

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 613 Filed 092000Z Page 3

that of the American people is unshakable.

5. But see also my immediately following.

No Sig

*Recd: 092245Z*

*Re Pres " via Ad. Brown in Mr's office.*

*MB.*

*Paraphrases added to Sectop Staff & Trg*

*10 14 15 Z*

[REDACTED]  
SECRET

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

0149

14 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Furnished herewith are copies of references made in the Prime Minister's message No. 613 of 9 March 1944 to the President which you requested.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incls.

Incl 1 - Msg, PM-President,  
#474, 22 February 1944.

Incl 2 - Memo, Cherwell to  
Prime Minister, 12 Nov 1944.

- 1 -

0150

10 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached messages from the Prime Minister, dated 9 March 1944, be referred to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury for comment and recommendation.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

- 2 Incls -  
Incl 1. Prime Minister to President,  
#613, 9 March 1944.  
Incl 2. Prime Minister to President,  
#614, 9 March 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

PARAPHRASE

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 613, 9 MARCH 1944.

1. In Cairo on December 8th, you will recall, we had a discussion on the dollar balances and I gave Harry a memorandum. In these matters I surely understood that you felt that we should not be treated worse than Russia or France. France has against her at least two billions and no overseas liabilities, as has Russia. These dollar balances are our total reserves and not, as your telegram might suggest, a certain part of our assets which is available in the United States. On the other side of the account, we have incurred for the common cause liabilities of at least ten billions against these reserves.

2. Following our discussion, Mr. Hull and Mr. Morgenthau met with Lord Halifax as recently as January 8th, at which time the matters dealt with in the first paragraph of your telegram under reply were considered. According to Lord Halifax's report to us, Mr. Morgenthau stated that at present there was no intention to reduce our dollar balances by any other means. Our agreement to the exclusion of the politically difficult item from Lend-Lease was based on this personal assurance to Lord Halifax.

3. Will you permit me to state that the proposal to reduce our dollar balances, which form our only liquid reserve, to one billion dollars really would not be consistent either with any conception of

*U.S. State and  
Sec. Treasury*

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT,  
#613, 9 MARCH 1944.

pooling of resources or equal sacrifice or with equal treatment of Allies. Our duty has not been shirked nor have we indulged in an easy way of life. Already in this struggle we have expended almost all our convertible foreign investments. Of the Allies, we alone will emerge from the war with heavy war debts overseas. If we were now requested to disperse our final liquid reserves needed to meet urgent requirements, I do not know what would happen or how I could report to Parliament without affecting public feeling most adversely at a time when the shortening of the war by even a month would far outweigh the sums under discussion and when American and British blood will be flowing in broad and equal streams.

4. So that you may be fully informed of our case, I venture to bring these arguments to your attention, for I have unshakable confidence in your sense of justice, and I may add, in that of the American people.

5. My immediately following message continues.

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 613	DATE 9 March 1944
DATE/TIME 09/2000Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Dollar balance. (Continued in #614)	

ACTION

Answers POTUS #474.

Shown to President by Admiral Brown; President directed that paraphrased copies be sent to the Sec of State and Sec of Treasury for comment and recommendations. Referred by memo on 10 Mar 44, with copy of PM #614.

Draft message, approved by Sec State, Sec Treasury, and Mr. Crowley approved by President 24 Mar 44; sent to the PM as PRES's #509, 24 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>Dollar Balance</i>		

0154

To State & Treasury Departments  
for action, 10 Mar 44.

9 March 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 614

Filed 092000Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number  
614. Personal and [REDACTED].

1. Further to my number 613. I have laid before you our case about dollar balances in its full strength, but from the informal way in which you refer to it in your number 474, I have wondered whether you might be meaning only that we should search for some arrangement to enable us to put a portion of our balance less conspicuously in the limelight. If this is so, and if you desire it, we will go into this very carefully with Stettinius when he visits us.

2. Since we received your telegram, we now learn that Mr. Crowley on March 8th promised to give Congress the amount of our dollar balances now and at the outbreak of war. This raises serious dangers. I am confident in the justice of our case if it could be stated as a whole, and of course if the matter becomes public property, we shall have to justify ourselves in public. The disclosure

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By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

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0155



~~SECRET~~

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 614 Filed 092000Z

Page 2

of the vast debit balance which is growing up against us outside the United States would certainly have most injurious effects upon our Sterling position, and consequently upon the whole strength of the Allies at this period. We therefore ask that there shall be no disclosure. If this is not possible, that the disclosure shall be in strict confidence, and also that the substance of our case should be stated to the body to whom the disclosure is made.

No Sig

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Recd: 092245Z.*

*To Pres " via Ad. Brown in Rector's office.*

RUB.

*Paraphrase del'd to Recty [redacted]  
State & Treas 10/14/52 [redacted]*

0156

~~SECRET~~

10 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

The President has directed that the attached messages from the Prime Minister, dated 9 March 1944, be referred to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury for comment and recommendation.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

- 2 Incls -  
Incl 1. Prime Minister to President,  
#613, 9 March 1944.  
Incl 2. Prime Minister to President,  
#614, 9 March 1944.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0157

PARAPHRASE

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 614, 9 MARCH 1944

1. In addition to my number 613. I have presented to you our complete point of view about dollar balances, but from the informal manner in which you allude to it in your number 474, I have been wondering whether your meaning might be only that we should seek some means to make it possible to place a portion of our balance less strongly in the spotlight. If this be true, and if you wish it, when Stettinius visits us we shall consider this most carefully.

2. We have learned since we received your telegram that on March 8th Mr. Crowley promised to present to Congress the amount of our dollar balances at the start of the war and now. The dangers of this are serious. If our case could be stated as a whole, I am confident of the justice of it, and of course we shall have to justify ourselves in public if the matter becomes the property of the public. To reveal the large debit balance which is mounting up against us outside the United States would surely affect our Sterling position most injuriously, and would consequently affect the whole strength of the Allies at this point. We request, therefore, that no disclosures be made, and if this is impossible, that the content of our case should be presented to the group to whom the disclosure is made and that the information shall be in strict confidence.

PARAPHRASE

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 614, 9 MARCH 1944.

1. In addition to my number 613. I have presented to you our complete point of view about dollar balances, but from the informal manner in which you allude to it in your number 474, I have been wondering whether your meaning might be only that we should seek some means to make it possible to place a portion of our balance less strongly in the spotlight. If this be true, and if you wish it, when Stettinius visits us we shall consider this most carefully.

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~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

9 March 1944

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 615 Filed 092155Z  
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number  
615. Personal and ~~SECRET~~.

You will be glad to hear that the latest Russian  
convoy has now got safe home, and that four U-boats out  
of the pack that attacked it were certainly sunk on the  
voyage by the escort.

No Sig

*Your 615 Congratulations Well done.*

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Recd: 092250Z  
To Pres via Adm Brown  
in his office.  
AUB.*

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

*Forwarded in President  
495 of 9th March.*

0161

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 615	DATE 9 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 092155Z	
TOR MAP ROOM 092250Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Russian convoy; sinking of 4 U-boats.	

ACTION

To President in Dr's office by Admiral Brown.

Answered in POTUS 495.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

44-

0162

~~SECRET~~

WLT

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 616

Filed 10/0906Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I am sending you to-day by courier an inscription I have had drawn up for Harry about his boy who was killed. It would be very kind of you to have it sent him wherever he is recuperating. How does the operation stand now?

No Sig

Rec'd 10/1010Z. B.P.P.  
Held for AM.  
To Pres via Tray 0845

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

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0163



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*May Room  
files*

March 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Pink dispatch from the Prime  
March 10 - No. 616

*ans. by #496*

*File  
WT*

0164

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	616	DATE	10 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	10/0906		
FOR MAP ROOM	10/1010Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Inscription to Mr. Hopkins about Stephen. Requests information on Mr. Hopkins' illness.		

ACTION

To the President on tray, 08450.

Answer prepared by the President; brought to the Map Room by Miss Tully; sent to the PM as POTUS #496.

(Also see message sent to Miss Tully by the Prime Minister's Secretary, requesting that the PM be informed when inscription was delivered to the President and to Mr. Hopkins. Filed "MISCL-OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL")

President acknowledged receipt, and informed PM that inscription was being forwarded to Rochester in POTUS-PM #500. 15 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
100 HOPKINS, STEPHEN		

0165

~~SECRET~~

WDCC  
10 Mar  
1734 Z

*Adm. Leahy  
has seen.*

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States

No. 617 Filed: 101706 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal.

1. In the final report of the Cairo conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported that they had "Approved in principle as a basis for further investigation and preparation" an overall plan for the defeat of Japan. This plan contemplated the despatch to the Pacific of a detachment of the British Fleet which was provisionally scheduled to become operational in the Pacific in June 1944. Although you and I both initialled the final report, neither of us had had the opportunity of going into these matters personally as we were concerned with affairs of more immediate urgency. Since then the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff have been "investigating" and we have not so far reached united conclusions. Meanwhile the Japanese Fleet has arrived at Singapore which constitutes in my mind a new major fact.

2. After the surrender of the Italian Fleet in September 1943 I was very keen on sending a detachment of

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vt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-78  
R. M. Parks Date *MMI 6 1972*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

our fleet as quickly as possible to the Pacific, but when I opened this to Admiral King he explained to me how very strong the United States Navy was already in those waters compared to the Japanese, and I formed the impression that he did not need us very much. I have also seen several telegrams from our Naval representatives in Washington which tend to confirm the above impression. On the other hand, I am told that Admiral King has informed the First Sea Lord that he would like to have our detachment, provided it did not arrive until August or September, when its logistic requirements could more easily be met. I am, in the upshot, left in doubt about whether we are really needed this year.

3. Accordingly I should be very grateful if you could let me know whether there is any specific American operation in the Pacific

(A) Before the end of 1944 or

(B) Before the summer of 1945

which would be hindered or prevented by the absence of a British Fleet Detachment.

4. On the other hand the movement of the Japanese Fleet to Singapore, which coincided inter alia with their knowledge of the movement of our battleship squadron into the Indian Ocean, seems to show their sensitiveness about the Andamans, Nicobars and Sumatra. It would surely be an advantage to you if, by keeping up the threat in the Bay of

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Bengal, we could detain the Japanese Fleet or a large portion of it at Singapore and thus secure you a clear field in the Pacific to enable your by-passing process and advance to develop at full speed.

5. General Wedemeyer is able to unfold all Dickie's plans in the Indian Theatre and the Bay of Bengal. They certainly seem to fit in with the kind of requests which Chiang Kai-Shek was making which you favoured but which we were unable to make good before the monsoon on account of the Mediterranean and OVERLORD operations. I am personally still of opinion that amphibious action across the Bay of Bengal will enable all our forces and establishments in India to play their highest part in the next 18 months in the war against Japan. We are examining now the logistics in detail and prima facie it seems that we could attack with two or three times the strength the islands across the Bay of Bengal and thereafter the Malay Peninsula than we could by prolonging our communications about 9000 miles round the south of Australia and operating from the Pacific side and on your southern flank. There is also the objection of dividing our fleet and our effort between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and throwing out of gear so many of our existing establishments from Calcutta to Ceylon and way back in the Suez Canal zone.

6. Before however reaching any final conclusions in

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

(4)

~~SECRET~~

my mind about this matter, I should like to know what answer you would give to the question I posed in paragraph three, namely, would your Pacific operations be hindered if, for the present at any rate and while the Japanese Fleet is at Singapore, we kept our centre of gravity in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal and planned amphibious operations there as resources come to hand.

No Sig

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Red. 10/20/57 z

To President via  
Miss Gully

Copy prepared for & given to  
Admiral Leahy at his request 11/13/55 z

~~SECRET~~

0169

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	617	DATE	10 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	101706Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	10/2050Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Operations in Pacific and Indian Ocean.		

ACTION

To President via Miss Tully.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with alterations; sent to the PM as #497.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
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ACTION COMPLETED: <i>300 Japan</i>	FILED:
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0170

~~SECRET~~  
13 March 1944

17  
MAY

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 618

Filed 132118Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~SECRET~~

Number 618. Your number 494.

1. I should be most grateful if you would read Eden's number 1783 to Halifax, which shows the kind of policy we should like to embark upon. I am entirely at one with you in the big objective of self-determination. All I plead for is "timing". I do not believe the ambitious wind-bags, now agitating behind our front that they may themselves become the government of Italy, have any representative footing. I fear that if we drive out the King and Badoglio at this stage, we shall only have complicated the task of the armies.

2. I see that this is also the Soviet view. They are certainly realistic but of course their aim may be a Communist Italy, and it may suit them to use the King and Badoglio till everything is ready for an extreme solution. I can assure you that this danger is also in my mind. My

~~SECRET~~  
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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0171



~~SECRET~~

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 618 Filed 132118Z

Page 2

idea remains that we should try to construct a broadly-based government, taking into account the opinion of the democratic North of Italy and seeking representatives from there. Of course, if we cannot get Rome for several months, we shall have to act earlier, but without the favourable conditions which will be open to us once we are in possession of the capital. We shall then have much better chances of finding a really representative footing.

No Sig

13/2255 Z

To President via Adm. Brown

(BCL)

President directed send paraphrase copy to State with copy of his 494.

This has been sent already (3 Nov 62)

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0172

14 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Enclosed herewith is a paraphrased copy of a message dated 13 March 1944 from the Prime Minister to the President. The President has directed that this message be delivered to the Secretary of State. On 8 March the Secretary of State was furnished with a paraphrased copy of the President's message Number 494, referred to by the Prime Minister.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to this message be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

Enc: PM to Pres. #618

0173

13 March 1944

Number 618 to the President from the Prime Minister dated 13 March 1944.

Eden's number 1793 to Halifax shows the kind of policy we should like to embark upon. I should be most grateful if you would read it. I am in complete agreement with you in the big objective of self determination. "Timing" is all I plead for. The ambitious wind-bags, now agitating behind our front that they may themselves become the government of Italy, I do not believe have any representative footing. We shall only have complicated the task of the armies, I fear, if we drive out the King and Badoglio at this stage.

This is also the Soviet view, I see. They are certainly realistic but of course their aim may be a Communist Italy, and it may suit them to use the King and Badoglio till everything is ready for an extreme solution. That this danger is also in my mind I can assure you. My idea remains that, taking into account the opinion of the democratic North of Italy and seeking representatives from there, we should try to construct a broadly-based government. If we cannot get Rome for several months of course, we shall have to act earlier, but without the favourable conditions which will be open to us once we are in possession of the capital. Chances of finding a really representative footing will then be much better.

0174

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	618	DATE	13 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	132118Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	13/2255Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Italian political situation.		

ACTION Answers POTUS #494.  
To President by Admiral Brown

By direction of the President, paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State, 14 Mar 44. (Sec State already has copy of #POTUS #494.)

*Answered by POTUS # 502.*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>370 Italy</i>		

0175

~~SECRET~~

WR  
1/11/48

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

No: 619, Filed 14/1148Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Your 498 has crossed my 618. Meanwhile the Russians have announced that they have sent a fully-accredited ambassador to the present Italian Government with whom we are still technically at war. I do not think it would be wise, without further consideration, to accept the programme of the so-called six parties and demand forthwith the abdication of the King and the installation of Signor Croce as Lieutenant of the Realm. I will however, consult the War Cabinet upon what you justly call a "major political decision". Our war with Italy has lasted since June 1940 and we have suffered 232,000 casualties in men, as well as the losses in ships which I mentioned in my number 608. I feel sure that in this matter our view will receive consideration from you. We ought to make every effort to act together. Pray remember that on the strength of your number 464 I committed myself in public and that any divergence will certainly become known.

No Sig

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Recd: 141300Z  
To Pres via ushur.

RRB

~~SECRET~~

Phrase to state  
for action.

File COPY

0176

14 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In accordance with the telephone conversation this morning with Mr. Renchard, there is enclosed herewith a paraphrased copy of the Prime Minister's message Number 619 to the President dated 14 March 1944 which is being forwarded to you upon the instructions of the President.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to this message be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

Robert H. Myers,  
Lieut. (jg) USNR

0177

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 619	DATE 14 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 14/1148Z	
TOR MAP ROOM 14/1300Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Italian political situation	

ACTION

Answers POTUS #498.

To President via usher. By direction of the President, copy sent to the Secretary of State by memorandum 14 Mar 44.

*Answered by POTUS # 502.*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
370 Italy		

0178

WDCG  
14 Mar  
1638 Z

~~SECRET~~

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 620 Filed: 141622 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

I feel you will be interested to hear about the operation just completed to fly two of Wingates Long Range Penetration Brigades into enemy territory in North Burma. Landing strips in two areas were selected, one 60 miles north of Katha and one 20 miles south of it, from which the Brigades could advance westwards primarily to interrupt the Japanese lines of communication and so assist the American/Chinese operations taking place further north. The strips were 100 miles inside enemy territory and 260 miles from the transport base.

First landings were made by gliders whose occupants then prepared the strips to receive transport aircraft. Between March 6th and March 11th, 7500 men with all their gear and with mules were successfully landed. The only losses were a number of gliders, and some of these should be repairable. The Brigades have now started their advance but a

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0179



~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
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small holding party has been left at one of the strips to receive a flight of Spitfires and a squadron of Hurricane fighter/bombers which were to fly in to protect the base and provide air support.

Only serious mishap occurred on the first night. One of the strips in the northern area was found to have been obstructed by the Japanese, and surface of remaining strip was much worse than expected, causing crashes which blocked the strip and prevented further landings that night. A few of the gliders had to be turned back in the air and failed to reach our territory. Another strip was immediately prepared in this area and was ready for landings two days later. The total of killed, wounded and missing is at most 145.

The operation appears to have been a complete surprise for Japanese. There has been no enemy air action against the strips in the northern area, and the one in the south was only bombed on 10th March after our men had left it. As it happened, the enemy were concentrating aircraft at airfields in the Mandalay area as part of their own plans. In consequence, the strong air forces we had collected to protect the landings had a very good bag, and in 2 days destroyed 61 enemy aircraft for the loss of only 3 of our own.

We are all very pleased that Wingates venture has started so well, and the success of this flying-in operation augurs well for the future. Your men have played an important ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

(3)

~~SECRET~~  
part both in the transport squadrons and in the supporting  
air operations.

No Sig

*Ref: 1417452. RAB  
Per case with a very narrow  
made no comment.*

~~SECRET~~  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0181

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	620	DATE	14 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	141622Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA		
SUBJECT	Flying of two of Wing t's Long Range Penetration Brigades into enemy territory in North Burma.		

ACTION

President saw with evening news, 14 Mar 44. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy, but was not used by the President. President wrote dispatch, which was sent to the PM as #499, 15 Mar 1944.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED: 300 C.B.I.	FILED:
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0182

~~SECRET~~

WDC  
15 Mar  
1530 Z

*W.H.T.*

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States

No. 621 Filed: 151507 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

1. I consulted the War Cabinet this morning on the proposal that the British and American Governments should accept the six party programme without further delay. The War Cabinet asked me to assure you that they agree fully with your wish to establish a more broadly based government in Italy and that the future form of government of the Italian people can only be settled by self determination. They also agree with you that the point to consider is the timing. On this they have no doubt that it would be far better to wait till we are masters of Rome before parting company with the King and Badoglio, because from Rome a more representative and solidly based administration can be constructed than is possible now. They feel that nothing could be worse for our joint interests and for the future of Italy, than to set up a weak democratic government which flopped. Even a settlement reached at Rome could not be final because it would be necessary to review it when the northern provinces

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. M. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

0183

and great industrial centres favourable to us and essential to a democratic solution, like Milan and Turin have been liberated. They do not consider that the six parties are representative in any true sense of the Italian democracy or Italian nation or that they could at the present time replace the existing Italian government which has loyally and effectively worked in our interests.

2. In reaching these conclusions the War Cabinet have of course had before them the telegrams sent by the Allied Commander in Chief whose views on this subject they do not share. Meanwhile we should be quite ready to discuss the suggestions put to the State Department in Paragraph 3 of the Foreign Secretary's number 1783. It is also of course recognised that should the capture of Rome be unduly protracted, say for 2 or 3 months, the question of timing would have to be reviewed.

3. Finally they ask me to emphasize the great importance of not exposing to the world any divergencies of view which may exist between our two governments, especially in face of the independent action taken by Russia in entering into direct relations with the Badoglio government without consultation with other Allies. It would be a great pity if our respective viewpoints had to be argued out in Parliament and the press when waiting a few months may make it possible for all three governments to take united action.

*Recd: 151045Z. RUB  
To Rus via Miss Gully,  
151050Z. RUB*

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you talk with Cordell  
about this and prepare a reply?

F. D. R.

Prime Minister's No. 621 to  
the President, dated March 15, 1944,  
re future form of government for  
Italy.

*answered by our 502,*

*F.D.R.*

0185

16 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the State Department be furnished with the attached copy of message No. 621 from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 15 March 1944.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to this message be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,  
1st Lieutenant, AGD.

1 Incl.  
Msg, PM-POTUS, #621,  
15 March 1944.

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 621, 15 MARCH 1944

The proposal that the American and British Governments should accept without further delay the Six Party programme was taken up by me this morning with the War Cabinet. The Cabinet asked me to give you my assurance that they are in full agreement that the future Italian government can only be settled by self-determination and also agree with your wish to establish a more broadly based government in Italy. They also agree with you that timing is the point to consider, but on this they have no doubt that before parting company with Badoglio and the King it would be far better to wait until we have taken Rome. From Rome a more representative and solidly based administration can be set up than is possible to construct now. The Cabinet feels that nothing could be worse for our joint interests and for the future of Italy than to set up a weak democratic government which flopped. Because it would be necessary to review it when the provinces in the north and great industrial centers favorable to us and essential to a democratic solution, like Milan and Turin, have been liberated, even a settlement reached at Rome could not be final. The Cabinet does not think that the six parties could now replace the existing Italian government, which has worked in our



interests loyally and effectively, nor that they are in any true sense representative of the Italian democracy or Italian nation.

The telegrams sent by the Allied Commander in Chief were before the War Cabinet while reaching these conclusions, but they do not share his views. Meanwhile we are quite ready to discuss the suggestions put to the State Department in paragraph 3 of the Foreign Secretary's number 1783. Also it is of course recognized that the question of timing would have to be reviewed if the capture of Rome should be unduly delayed, say for two or three months.

They ask me, finally, to emphasize the great importance of not exposing any differences of opinion between our two governments to the world, especially now that Russia has taken independent action without consultation with other Allies in entering into direct relations with the Badoglio government. When waiting a few months might make it possible for all three governments to take united action, it would be a great pity if our respective viewpoints had to be argued out in Parliament and the Press.

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	621	DATE	15 Mar 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	151507Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	151645Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Italian political situation		

ACTION

Further to PM #618 & 619.

By direction of the President, copy to State Dept 16 Mar 44. Draft reply prepared by State Dept; approved by the President 17 Mar 44; sent to the PM as #502, 17 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
376 Italy	

0189

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

17 March 1944

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 622 Filed 170100Z  
Prime Minister to President, ~~██████████~~ and  
personal. Number 622.

We have had a most immediate telegram from  
Mountbatten operative part of which I am sending you in  
my immediately following.

2. Upshot is that Japanese are staging an offen-  
sive with the apparent object of capturing Imphal plain.  
Mountbatten thinks he has a good chance of inflicting a  
sharp defeat on the enemy greater than that achieved in  
recent Arakan operations.

3. Everything depends on flying up from Arakan  
the operational portion of 5 Division, ordering the troop  
to stand fast in places where they cannot be supplied by  
ordinary means and supplying them by VING any opportunity  
offered to use Wingate's two remaining brigades to harass  
the enemy in the rear. These brigades also would have to  
be supplied by air.

④ - note - with reference to continuity of this portion of message  
and spelling of VING, checked with Army Code  
They informed me that they had requested

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

a service on this and message, exactly as  
was verified - However, obvious error in line 2. p.  
also stated to be correct on attempt to verify - Possibly garbled

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Govt., State Dep. Sec., 3-28-78  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

FILE COPY

~~SECRET~~

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 622 Filed 170100Z

Page 2

4. To do this, Mountbatten needs 30 C47's or the equivalent in load carrying capacity of C46's to be diverted from the Hump for about a month starting 18 March. He is going ahead unless contrary instructions are issued. The stakes are pretty high in this battle and victory would have far reaching consequences.

5. British Chiefs of Staff have telegraphed their entire agreement with Mountbatten's proposals to Washington. We trust that US Chiefs of Staff will agree.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

Recd 170404Z Hurl  
To Pres. via waker 170408z  
170408z

~~SECRET~~

0191

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


18 March 1944

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

When I showed the attached message (CM-OUT-6853, dated 16 March 1944) to the President last evening, he asked if its contents had been made known to the Prime Minister. I interpreted his remark to mean that the action recommended in this message should be used as a basis for reply to the Prime Minister's No's. 622 and 623.

  
L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

3 Attachments

CM-OUT-6853, 16 Mar 44.  
PM-POTUS #622, 17 Mar 44.  
PM-POTUS #623, 17 Mar 44.

DECLASSIFIED  
By ~~Identy~~ Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0192

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

AC/AS Plans AFALP  
Operational Plans Division  
Colonel Loutzenheiser

March 16, 1944

COMMANDING GENERAL  
ARMY AIR FORCES  
INDIA BURMA SECTOR  
NEW DELHI, INDIA

NUMBER: 5043

COMMANDING GENERAL  
US ARMY FORCES  
CHINA, BURMA & INDIA  
FORWARD ECHELON  
CHUNGKING, CHINA

NUMBER: 4755

From Arnold to Stilwell action Stratemeyer signed  
Marshall, reference SEACOS 112 and 113.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff are recommending action sub-  
stantially as follows:

1. That Admiral Mountbatten should be authorized  
immediately to divert 30 C 47 or equivalent C 46 aircraft  
(at discretion of General Stratemeyer) with crews from the  
Air Transport Command and directed to return them at the  
earliest possible time.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff should be urged to  
provide immediately the additional transport aircraft re-  
quired by the SEAC to support operations during the remain-  
der of this dry season and

3. In view of the provisions of paragraph 2, the  
US Chiefs of Staff should not agree to grant Admiral Mount-  
batten authority to divert aircraft from the ATC without

GM-OUT-6853 (16 Mar 44)

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER

SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720464

By PLP Date APR 28 1972 28

COPY No.

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

BOOK MESSAGE

(MARCH 16, 1944)

PAGE - 2 -

reference to the US Chiefs of Staff, since the transport aircraft supplied from British sources should meet his normal requirements and you are authorized to take appropriate action on these instructions and communicate substance of this message to Admiral Mountbattan and advise Sultan.

New subject. Reference our message 5021 March 13, the first squadron of ATC aircraft for attachment to the 20th Bomber Command will be expedited as much as possible in an effort to assist in making good MATTERHORN target dates.

No sig

ORIGINATOR: General Arnold

INFORMATION: OPD  
General Bissell  
JCS  
Adm King  
Col. Mathewson ✓  
Log

CM-OUT-6853 (16 Mar 44) 2258Z mem

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of OROR

SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720464

By RM Date APR 28 1972

COPY No. 28

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

epo 16-8394-1

0194

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

*answered 19 March  
WHL*

*Incl  
#622*

0195



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Pink No. 622 from the PM to the President  
March 17th.

*Answered by Pres's # 503,  
19 March 44.*

0196

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	622	DATE	17 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	170100Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	170404Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Jap offensive at Imphal; reassignment of 30 C47's.			

ACTION

(This message is continued in Pm 623.)

Referred to Admiral Leahy by memo from Col. Mathewson to Admiral Leahy, 18 Mar 44, which pointed out that the President wished War Dept message Cm-OUT-6853 (Copy attached) to be used as basis for reply.

Message drafted by Admiral Leahy in the Map Room 18 Mar; approved by President on 19 Mar; sent to the PM as POTUS #503, 19 Mar 44. (POTUS #503 answers both Pm #622 and #623.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED: MR 300 Burma, India, China	FILED:
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Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

0197

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

17 March 1944

WAL

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 623

Filed 170122Z

Prime Minister to President. [REDACTED] and  
personal. Number 623.

Following is extract referred to in Para 1 of my  
immediately preceding telegram. Begins.

"Transport aircraft.

"1. Japanese offensive intentions on the IV Corps  
front have been previously reported in my SEACOS 93 and 96.  
Enemy has concentrated three divisions with presumed in-  
tention capturing Imphal Plain. First phase of offensive  
has already begun with encircling movement to east and  
west of 17 Division threatening to cut Tiddim Road and  
there are now indications that main offensive may start  
about 20 March. Capture of Imphal Plain would give enemy  
abundant food and two all weather landing grounds and would:

"A. Constitute direct threat to traffic on  
air ferry route and Assam L of C and

"B. Jeopardise whole air position in northern  
Burma.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. M. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

FULLY COPY

0198

~~SECRET~~

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 623 Filed 170122Z

Page 2

"2. The Japanese plan appears to be similar to his plan for Arakan in that he is exploiting ability of Japanese troops to advance carrying own supplies for several days and gambling on defeating our forces and reaching food supplies in Imphal Plain quickly. There is thus an opportunity which I welcome of inflicting on him a defeat similar to that he has sustained in the Arakan but on a much larger scale. Enemy does not yet appear to have appreciated the size of Wingate forces behind him which should prove additional factor in achieving his defeat.

"3. Our success in Arakan was due to our ability to order troops to stand fast because we could supply them by air even when encircled. Lethbridge mission emphasized supply by air as essential factor in MacArthur's successes against Japanese and successes of Stilwell's advance from the Ledo area support this view. It is relevant to note that during February Ledo combat troops had over 10,000,000 pounds dropped while total for Arakan and Kaladan together was some 6,500,000 pounds.

"4. Best answer to present Japanese move to Tiddim area would be to order 17 Division to stand fast and to

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 623 Filed 170122Z

Page 3

supply them by air. I cannot, however, afford to do this as I have insufficient reserves within striking distance of Tiddim to enable me to make the necessary counter attacks, nor have I sufficient transport aircraft both to supply troops holding Tiddim area and fly reserves up. 17 Division have therefore been ordered to withdraw northwards about half way towards Imphal. Much as I dislike this, I do not consider it essential to protection of ferry route to hold so far forward as Tiddim and do not therefore consider that I should be justified in asking for diversion of aircraft from the ferry route for this purpose alone.

"5. I do, however, regard it as vital to the ferry route and to the Assam L of C by which it is nourished, and indeed to our whole position in Assam to hold the Imphal Plain. Immediate requirement is to fly up from Arakan ASP reinforcements essential operational portion of 5 Division. This fly in should be started 18 March. It may also be necessary to order troops to stand fast in places where they cannot be supplied by ordinary means and to supply them by US air. At the same time, an opportunity may offer of using Wingate's two remaining brigades of his second wave behind Japanese formations. These too must of course

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By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0200

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~~SECRET~~

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 623 Filed 170122Z

Page 4

be supplied by air.

"6. The dangers of Japanese successes and the magnitude of the defeat which we may inflict upon them are both greater than in the case of Arakan. Troop carrier command are already committed to support of Kaladan Division three LRP brigades and Ledo force and cannot carry out the requirements indicated in my Para 5 without the addition of up to 30 C47's or the equivalent in load carrying capacity of C46's with combat and maintenance crews from 18 March for about a month. All the aircraft borrowed from ATC for Arakan emergency were returned with least possible delay but since the emergency is even greater than in the case of the Arakan and since it is clear that Imphal attack and Arakan are both part of one Japanese plan I think it is justifiable to regard the period of emergency as continuing. I should be glad to receive your confirmation that my interpretation is correct. Unless I receive instructions to the contrary from you, aircraft will have moved by March 18."

No Sig

Recd 170404 Z Huf  
to Pres via usher 170408 Z Huf

21  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-28-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

0201

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

*answered 19 March*  
*WAC*

*Incl*  
*#623.*

0202

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Pink No. 623 from the PM to the President

*Answered by Pres's #503,  
19 March 44.*

0203



FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	623	DATE	17 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	170122Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	170404Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Jap offensive at Imphal; reassignmet of 30 C47's.		

ACTION

This message is continuation of PM # 622, which see for complete action.

Answered by POTUS #503, 19 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: MR 300 Burma, India, China	FILED:
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0204

~~SECRET~~

WDCC  
Mar 18  
1727 Z

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 624 Filed: 181715 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt most secret and personal.

1. Winant gave me your letter <sup>\*</sup>this morning. As you are so keen for the company of Inonu, I wonder whether you would care to spend Easter with me at Bermuda. I can arrive there on the 5th and we could separate on the 11th or earlier if you are pressed. I would not suggest bringing the great staffs but only the principals on the scale with which we went to Teheran. It is not so much that there are new departures in policy to be taken but there is a need after more than 90 days of separation for checking up and shaking together.

2. I am hardening for OVERLORD as the time gets nearer. Perhaps Marshall will show you a telegram I sent him.

No Sig

*Rec'd 18Y0102 OSC*

*To also Winant*

*\* See msg, Winant to President, filed 190140Z,  
19 March 44. (President-Winant folder)*

FILE COPY

0205

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL #624	DATE 18 Mar 44
DATE/TIME 181715Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM 18/2010Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Conference at Bermuda.	

ACTION

To the President via Admiral Brown.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with changes; sent to the PM as POTUS #506, 20 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: MR 210 BER&VOA. <i>Area 1 - 601 Chron.</i>	FILED:
--	--------

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

WDCC  
Mar 18  
1741 Z

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 625 Filed: 181714 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal.

Following is latest from UJ about Poland. No leakage has occurred for which we are responsible. We did not tell the Poles anything. On the other hand the "Observer" newspaper was unduly well informed about Stalin's attitude. This we think could only have come from the Russian Embassy. The matter is of relative unimportance. What matters is that our talks with him on this subject are at an end. He has definitely avoided seeing Ambassador Clark Kerr. Presently I shall have to make some statement in Parliament which I do not expect he will like very much. Meanwhile I do not propose to send any answer. Telegram from UJ begins

I received from Sir A Clark Kerr on March 12th your message of March 7th on the Polish question.

Thank you for the explanations which you made in this message.

In spite of the fact that our correspondence is

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. M. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

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0207

~~SECRET~~

considered secret and personal the contents of my letter to you have for some time begun to appear in the English press, and, moreover, with many distortions which I have no possibility of refuting.

I consider this to be a breach of secrecy. This fact makes it difficult for me to express my opinion freely. I hope that you have understood me.

Telegram from UJ ends.

No Sig

*You do not care to answer this.*

*hu*

*Recd 1820102 - osc  
J. Adam Brown.*

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0208

~~SECRET~~

29 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The President has directed that the Department of State be furnished with the attached copies of messages Numbers 625 and 630 from the Prime Minister to the President for its information.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

Chester C. Wood,  
Captain, USN,  
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

Enc: Mag. Prime Minister  
to President, #625. ✓  
Mag. Prime Minister  
to President, #630.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
MAY 6 1972  
By W. J. Stewart Date \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

0209

~~SECRET~~

March 18, 1944

SECRET  
PARAPHRASE

From: The Prime Minister

To : The President

No. : 625

The latest from Stalin concerning Poland is as follows:

QUOTE. On March 12 I received your message of March 7 on the Polish situation from Ambassador Kerr. Thank you very much for the explanations which you made in this message. The contents of my letter to you have been appearing in the English press for some time despite the fact that our correspondence is considered personal and secret. Moreover there are many distortions which I have no possibility of refuting. This in my opinion is a breach of secrecy and makes it hard for me to express freely my opinion. I trust that you have understood me. UNQUOTE.

We have told the Poles nothing. No leakage has occurred for which we are responsible. The "Observer" however, was too well informed on Stalin's attitude. We think that this information could have come only from the Russian Embassy. However it is of relative unimportance. The chief matter is that our discussions with him on this subject are now concluded. Stalin has definitely avoided seeing our Ambassador, Clark Kerr. In the near future I shall be required to make some sort of a statement in Parliament which I do not think Stalin will like very much. In the meantime, I do not propose to send a reply.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0210

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 625	DATE 18 Mar 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 181714Z	
FOR MAP ROOM 182010Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Russian-Polish relations.	

ACTION

To President by Admiral Brown.

"President does not care to answer this" -- Colonel Mathewson, 20 Mar 1944.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED: WR 052 Polish-Russian (1)	FILED:	

0211



~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

19 March 44.

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Nr. 626

Filed 19/1130Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SEACOS 117\* from Dickie repeated to Joint Staff Mission will show you all the possibilities that are open in this theatre and the enormous power of air transportation applied to actual fighting.

No Sig

Rcid 19/1245 Z  
~~FRVU. (SPP)~~  
To Pres via Ad Leahy.

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

\*For SEACOS 117 and 118, see POTUS #505.

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~~SECRET~~

File Copy

0212

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 626	DATE 19 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 19/1130Z	
TOR MAP ROOM 19/1245Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Re Mountbatten's SEACOS 117, and possibilities of operations in Far East.	

ACTION

To President via Admiral Leahy.

Admiral Leahy dictated reply in Map Room, 20 Mar 44; approved by the President; sent to the PM as POTUS #505, 20 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED: MR 300 Burma, India, China	FILED:	

0213



~~SECRET~~

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that  
the attached messages be sent to the Depart-  
ment of State for preparation of reply.

OGDEN S. COLLINS,  
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.

3 Incls.  
PM-POTUS, #627, ✓  
19 March 1944.  
PM-POTUS, #628,  
19 March 1944.  
WINANT-POTUS, #191700,  
19 March 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0215

~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
NO : 627, 19 MARCH 1944

As a result of a conference on your proposed message to Inonu, Eden has these comments:

"We are even now studying the best way to induce Turkey to limit the supply of chrome to Germany. I doubt whether a personal appeal to Inonu would help at the present stage as the question is a very complicated one owing to existing Turco-German agreements. An appeal to their better feelings might have the opposite effect to what we desire since as you know the Turks at present are in a very selfish and obstinate mood. It is all a question of timing. Until we have decided what we want the Turks to do and have ascertained how far they will go, I would suggest that the President's message should be held in reserve. At this juncture there is a danger that they will regard such a friendly message as an indication of weakening on our part."

Possibly you will give this point of view some consideration.

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0216

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	627	DATE	19 Mar 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER		191700Z	
FOR MAP ROOM	191850Z	VIA Army Code Room	
SUBJECT Chrome to Germany.			

ACTION

(See PM-POTUS #624, Para 1; WINANT-POTUS, Unno, 19 Mar 44; WINANT-POTUS, Unno, 19 Mar 44 (2nd msg).)

To President via usher.

By direction of the President, sent to State Department 20 Mar 44 for preparation of reply.

On 15 Apr 44, Map Room called Sec State's office for check on action. Following information given: State Department embassies in Moscow, London, and Ankara have been informed that the letter referred to in #627 will be indefinitely withheld. The British Ambassador in Washington was informed that it would not be sent; and it was assumed by the State Dept that he would inform the Prime Minister. The State Dept considers this matter closed, and has filed the message. ((OVER))

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED: mk 601 CHROME	FILED:
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0217

On 29 Apr 44 Admiral Leahy stated, "In view of turn of events, believe no reply now necessary or appropriate."

See news release, 20 Apr 44, quoting Prime Minister Naman Menemencioğlu of Turkey as announcing that his country would stop chrome exports beginning 21 Apr 44.

0218

To State Department  
for action, 20 Mar 44.

WDCO  
Mar 19  
1845 Z

*W.H.P.*

19 March 44

From: MA London England  
To: The President of the United States

No. 628 Filed: 191830 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

See State Department's message through Winant  
dated March 14.

1. We have followed Gray's lead in Ireland and  
it is early days to start reassuring De Valera. There is  
not much sense in a doctor telling a patient that the  
medicine he has just prescribed for his nerve troubles  
is only colored water. I think it would be much better  
to keep them guessing for a while.

2. I do not propose to stop the necessary trade  
between Britain and Ireland or to prevent anything going  
into Ireland. I do propose to stop ships going from Ireland  
to Spain and Portugal and other foreign ports until OVERLORD  
is launched. One must remember that a ship may start out  
in one direction and turn off in another. There is no  
difficulty in stopping ships. The above also applies to  
outward bound airplanes which we shall try to stop by every  
means in our power. The object of these measures is not

1

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

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0219



~~SECRET~~

spite against the Irish but preservation of British and American soldiers' lives and against our plans being betrayed by emissaries sent by sea or air from the German Minister in Dublin. Since the beginning of 1943 only 19 Irish ships have left Irish ports, some several times, so the evil is not very great. We are also cutting off telephones and restricting communications to the utmost and also stopping the Anglo-Irish Air Line from running. I repeat, all our actions will be taken from motives of self preservation and none from those of spite.

3. If however the Irish retaliate by doing something which in no way helps them but merely annoys us, such as stopping the Foynes Airport facilities, I should feel free to retaliate on their cross channel trade. They would have opened a new chapter and economic measures of retaliation would be considered. I would tell you about these before we took them.

4. It seems to me that so far from allaying alarm in De Valera's circles we should let fear work its healthy process. Thereby we shall get behind the scenes a continued stiffening up of the Irish measures which even now are not so bad to prevent a leakage.

5. I gather that the State Department will probably not disagree with the above, for Mr Hull says in the message

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~ (3)

above quoted: Begins.

I am inclined to believe however that for the time being at least we should not make any statement to the press or commit ourselves to the Irish Government that we have no intention of instituting economic sanctions. Ends.

And I hope this may also be your view.

No Sig

Recd 192005Z OSC  
TPVU.

~~SECRET~~

1

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0221

~~SECRET~~

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that  
the attached messages be sent to the Depart-  
ment of State for preparation of reply.

OGDEN S. COLLINS,  
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.

3 Incls.  
PM-POTUS, #627,  
19 March 1944.  
PM-POTUS, #628, ✓  
19 March 1944.  
WINANT-POTUS, #191700,  
19 March 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0222

~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
NO : 628, 19 MARCH 1944

Refer to message of 14 March from State Department through Winant.

1. Gray's lead in Ireland has been followed by us and it is too soon to begin reassuring De Valera. A doctor telling his patient that medicine prescribed for his nerve trouble is only colored water is senseless. To keep them guessing for a while would be much better in my opinion.

2. My proposal is not to prevent anything going into Ireland or to stop the necessary trade between Britain and Ireland. Until OVERLORD is launched I do propose to stop ships from going to Spain, Portugal and other foreign ports from Ireland. It must be remembered that a ship can start in one direction and turn in another. We have no trouble stopping ships. Outward bound airplanes are also included in the above which we shall do our utmost to stop. Spite against the Irish is not the intention of these measures but rather provision against our plans being betrayed by emissaries sent by sea or air from the German Minister in Dublin and preservation of British and American soldiers' lives. The evil is not very great. Since the beginning of 1943 only 19 Irish ships, some several times, have left Irish ports. Also we

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0223

~~SECRET~~

are stopping the Anglo-Irish Air Line from running, cutting off telephones and restricting all communications to the utmost. I reiterate that motives of self-preservation and not spite dictate our actions.

3. I would feel free to stop their cross channel trade if the Irish should retaliate by doing something which would not help them but only annoy us, such as stopping the Foynes Airport facilities. Economic measures of retaliation would be considered since they would have opened a new chapter. Before we did any of this I would inform you.

4. I think that we should let fear work its healthy process rather than to allay alarm in De Valera's circles. In that way we shall get a continued stiffening up of the Irish measures behind the scenes. At the moment these are not so bad to prevent a leakage.

5. I don't think the State Department will disagree with the above since Mr. Hull says in part in the message mentioned above:

"I am inclined to believe however that for the time being at least we should not make any statement to press or commit ourselves to the Irish Government that we have no intention of instituting economic sanctions."

It is my hope that this is your view also.

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. M. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	628	DATE	19 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	191830Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	19/2005Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Ireland.		

ACTION

To the President via usher.

By direction of the President, copy sent to State Department 20 Mar 44 for preparation of reply.

Reply sent from State Department to Ambassador Winant for delivery to Prime Minister (State #2591, 3 Apr 44, filed herein by date.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:  
MAR 052 IRELAND

FILED:

0225

~~SECRET~~

21 March 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 629 Filed: 21/1516Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

Number 629 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and personal. Your 506.

1. I am indeed grieved and trust rest will do you good.
2. I do not think the staff meeting worthwhile without our being there.
3. I hope you are still planning your visit here for the great event after you are fully recovered.

No Sig

*Recd r116552  
TPVU*

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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0226

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	629	DATE	21 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	21/1516Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	21/1655Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Bermuda meeting.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS #506.

To President via usher.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President with alterations; sent to PM as POTUS #507, 22 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED: MR 210 BERMUUDA	FILED:
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0227



~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1944

*WSP*

From: MA London, England  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 630, Filed 211052Z.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~SECRET~~

Reference my telegram number 625.

I have today sent following reply to Uncle J.

So what!

Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. "Personal and  
most secret.

Your telegram of March 16th.

1. First of all I must congratulate you again  
on all the wonderful victories your Armies are winning and  
also on the extremely temperate way in which you have dealt  
with the Finns. I suppose they are worried about interning  
the nine German Divisions in Finland for fear that the nine  
German Divisions should intern them. We are much obliged to  
you for keeping us in touch with all your action in this  
Theatre.

2. With regard to the Poles, I am not to blame  
in any way about revealing your secret correspondence. The  
information was given both to the American Herald Tribune

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

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0228

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-2-

correspondent and to the London times correspondent by the Soviet Embassy in London. In the latter case it was given personally by Ambassador Gusev.

3. I shall have very soon to make a statement to the House of Commons about the Polish position. This will involve my saying that the attempts to make an arrangement between the Soviet and Polish Governments have broken down; that we continue to recognize the Polish Government, with whom we have been in continuous relations since the invasion of Poland in 1939; that we now consider all questions of territorial change must await the armistice or peace conferences of the victorious powers; and that in the meantime we can recognize no forcible transferences of territory.

4. I am repeating this telegram to the President of the United States. I only wish I had better news to give him for the sake of all.

5. Finally, let me express the earnest hope that the breakdown which has occurred between us about Poland will not have any adverse effect upon our cooperation in other spheres where the maintenance of our common action is of the greatest consequence".

No Sig.

*Prod: 2200152.  
" Pub " via usku.  
Pub.*

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0229

~~SECRET~~

29 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The President has directed that the Department of State be furnished with the attached copies of messages Numbers 625 and 630 from the Prime Minister to the President for its information.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President

Very respectfully,

Chester C. Wood,  
Captain, USN,  
Assistant Naval Aide to the President

Enc: Msg. Prime Minister  
to President, #625.

Msg. Prime Minister  
to President, #630. ✓

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0230

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET  
PARAPHRASE

March 21, 1944

From: The Prime Minister

To : The President

No. : 630

See my number 625. Today I made the following reply to Stalin.  
So what!

QUOTE. Reference your telegram of March 16, let me congratulate you once more on the very temperate way in which you have dealt with the Finns and also on the marvelous victories your Armies are winning. The internment of the 9 German Divisions in Finland worries you, I imagine, because you fear that the Finns might be interned by the 9 German Divisions. We must thank you very much for keeping us up to date on all your actions in this theater.

With reference to the Poles, you cannot blame me in any way concerning the revealing of your secret correspondence. The Soviet Embassy in London gave the information to both the London Times correspondent and the American Herald Tribune correspondent. In the case of the London Times correspondent, Ambassador Gusev gave this information personally.

Very soon I shall be required to make a statement concerning the Polish situation to the House of Commons. In this statement I shall be obliged to say that attempts to negotiate an arrangement between the Soviet and Polish Governments have broken down; that we now consider all questions of territorial change must await the armistice or peace conferences of the victorious powers; that we continue to recognize the Polish Government with whom we have been in continuous relation since

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0231

the invasion of Poland in 1939; and that we can recognize no forcible transferences of territory prior to an armistice or peace conference. Since a copy of this telegram is being sent to the President, I wish for the sake of all I had better news to give him.

Lastly I earnestly hope that the breakdown which has occurred between us on the Polish situation will not effect adversely our co-operation in other spheres where the maintenance of our common action is of the greatest importance. UNQUOTE.

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	630	DATE	21 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	211052Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	220115Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Russian Polish relations.		

ACTION

(Further to Pm #625)

To President via usher. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President without change; sent to PM as POTUs #508, 22 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
MR 052 Russian-Polish relations	

0233

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To State  
preparation  
of policy  
1/22/44  
March 30, 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 631,

Filed 30/2325Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. ~~TOP SECRET~~

and personal.

Para 1. In the messages we exchanged last month about Spain, ending with your Nr. 478 of February 23rd, you indicated your agreement with my view that we should reach a rapid settlement with the Spanish Government on a basis which would obtain for us the political and military requirements to which we have always attached great importance, and at the same time secure in effect a cessation of Spanish wolfram exports to Germany for the first half of this year.

Para 2. In the subsequent negotiation conducted by our two ambassadors at Madrid, in which Sir S. Hoare has given the strongest support to your representations, it has become clear that, while we can still obtain full satisfaction of our other requirements, we cannot within the next few months obtain a complete embargo on Spanish wolfram exports for the whole of this year, which is what I understand you are now expecting of the Spanish Government. There

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By R. L. Parks Date MAY 6 1972



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-2-

has, however, been a temporary embargo since early January.

Para 3. We have, therefore, reached a situation in which we must either accept some slight compromise over wolfram or prolong the present deadlock. This would mean running certain serious risks, quite apart from postponing our enjoyment of such valuable benefits as the closing of the German consulate at Tangier and the cleaning up of the German espionage system throughout Spanish territory.

Para 4. I have no doubt that by increasing our economic pressure we can eventually bring Spain to heel. In fact, with reasonable people the mere threat should be enough. The Spaniards are not, however, reasonable and they have a capacity for tightening their belts in resistance to foreign pressure. This would, I am convinced, postpone any settlement for several months. Meanwhile, we should run the following serious risks:-

(1) Between 700 and 1000 tons of wolfram representing Spanish stocks now on the Pyrenees, might be handed over to the Germans in exchange for important supplies, including gasoline, which the Germans are now offering to Spain. This would be a far greater help to the German war effort than the 100 or 200 tons on which our present dis-

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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cussions are centered;

(2) The Spaniards will clearly apply economic counter measures. This would mean that we should lose the Spanish iron ore which at present provides 42% of British requirements at a great economy in shipping and fuel. We should also lose Spanish potash, which is essential for the maintenance of British agriculture. Finally, our purchases in Spain are only made possible by Spanish financial facilities, without which we should run out of funds in a few weeks. Although these considerations have been put to your government I am not aware of any satisfactory method by which these essential needs could be replaced from other sources.

Para 5. I understand that the State Department have suggested that the Spaniards might be brought to accept a total wolfram embargo now by the offer of a long term economic agreement. Our view which is, I understand, shared by all our experts in Madrid, is that such a prospect is illusory. Such a settlement would mean replacing the very important supplies which Spain now gets from German-controlled Europe, including in particular machinery and arms. It would, in any case, take several months to negotiate during which we should run all the risks I have mentioned above. Nor do I think we should be well advised to enter into any long term commitments with the present Spanish Regime. Surely what we should

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Govt. Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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aim at is a short term arrangement which will secure important tangible benefits now at a very small cost in wolfram exports to Germany. When we have, as we hope, established the second front successfully, the whole picture will change. The supply of even 50 tons of wolfram a month to Germany meanwhile, which is what is now in question, can be of little real assistance to the German war effort and can certainly not be balanced against the much greater advantages Germany would probably obtain if we fail to break the deadlock now.

Para 6. I hope, therefore, you will agree that, having tried unsuccessfully to obtain a total wolfram embargo but having nevertheless made more satisfactory progress than might originally have been expected, we should now authorize our ambassadors to secure immediately the most favourable wolfram settlement they can obtain. This should be on the basis of not more than 50 tons of wolfram a month being allowed through to Germany during the next few vital months.

Para 7. In making this proposal I would venture to remind you that we have gone along with you in Argentina and that we feel entitled to ask you to take our views seriously into account in the Iberian Peninsula, where our strategic

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by R. H. Parks Date 6/6/72

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-5-

and economic interests are more directly affected than are those of the United States.

Para 8. It seems to me that we should make a fatal mistake if we risk throwing these 750 to 1000 tons of wolfram into German hands as well as losing all the other advantages which are now open. I earnestly hope that you will give your consideration to our appeal without which we shall be in very serious difficulties. Among other things Ambassador Hoare who has held most of our offices of state and is a member of Parliament now evidently wishes to resign. I could not support in public the policy which is now being enforced upon us. Do please consider the arguments of this telegram.

No Sig

*Recd. 310300 Z RUB*  
*To Pres via usher 311200 Z RUB*

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0238

31 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached message No. 631 from the Prime Minister, dated 30 March 1944, be forwarded to the State Department for preparation of reply.

Very respectfully,

ODDEN S. COLLINS,  
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.

1 Incl.  
Prime Minister to President,  
#631, 30 March 1944.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

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FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
NO : 631, 30 March 1944

1. You indicated your agreement with my view in the messages we exchanged about Spain last month, ending with your No. 478 of February 23, that we should reach with the Government of Spain a rapid settlement on a basis which would obtain the military and political requirements for us to which we have always attached great importance, and secure at the same time in effect a stoppage of exports of Spanish wolfram to the Germans for the first six months of 1944.

2. It has become clear in the subsequent negotiation conducted by our two ambassadors at Madrid, during which the strongest support to your representations has been given by Sir S. Hoare, that, although we can still obtain complete satisfaction of our other requirements, we cannot obtain within the next few months a complete embargo on exports of Spanish wolfram for the whole of this year, which I understand is what you are now expecting of the Government of Spain. Since early in January there has been, however, a temporary embargo.

3. Therefore we have reached a situation in which we must either accept some slight compromise over wolfram or we must prolong the present deadlock. Quite apart from postponing our enjoyment of such valuable benefits as the closing at Tangier of the German consulate and the cleaning up throughout Spanish territory of the German espionage system, this would mean running certain serious risks.

4. That we can, by increasing our economic pressure, eventually bring Spain to heel, I have no doubt. With reasonable people, in fact, the mere

*Paraphrased by  
Capt. J. C. [unclear]*

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Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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threat should be enough. However, the Spanish are not reasonable, and in resistance to foreign pressure they have a capacity for tightening their belts. I am convinced this would postpone for several months any settlement. Meanwhile, the following serious risks should be run by us:

(1) Spanish stocks of wolfram now on the Pyrenees, totalling between 700 and 1000 tons, might to the Germans be handed over in exchange for important supplies, gasoline included, which are now offered to the Spanish by Germany. This would be a far greater help to the German war effort than the 100 or 200 tons on which are centered our present discussions.

(2) Economic counter-measures will clearly be applied by the Spanish. This would mean that the Spanish iron ore which provides at present, at great economy in shipping and fuel, 42% of British requirements; and Spanish potash, which is essential for the maintenance of British agriculture, we should lose. Finally, purchases which we make in Spain are made possible only by financial facilities of the Spanish, without which, in a few weeks, we should run out of funds. Although to your government these considerations have been put, I am not aware of other sources from which these essential needs could be replaced by any satisfactory method.

5. That the Spaniards might be brought to accept a total wolfram embargo now by the offer of a long term economic agreement, I understand has been suggested by the State Department. Such a prospect is illusory in our view, which I understand is shared by all our experts in Madrid. Such a settlement would mean replacing the very important supplies, including in particular arms and machinery, which the Spaniards now get from German-controlled Europe. In any case, it would take several months to

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0241

negotiate, during which time we should run all the risks mentioned above. Nor do I think we should be well advised to enter into any long term commitments with the present Spanish regime. Surely a short term arrangement which will secure important tangible benefits at this time at a very small cost in exports of wolfram to Germany is what we should aim at. The whole picture will change when we have, as we hope, successfully established the second front. Meanwhile, the supply of even 50 tons of wolfram to Germany a month, which is what is now in question, can be of little real assistance to the war effort of the Germans and can certainly not be balanced against the much greater advantages Germany would probably obtain if we fail to break the deadlock now.

6. Therefore, I hope you will agree that we should now authorize our ambassadors to secure immediately the most favorable settlement on wolfram they can obtain, now that we have tried unsuccessfully to obtain a total embargo on wolfram but nevertheless having made a more satisfactory progress than might have been expected originally. During the next few vital months we should put this on the basis of not allowing more than 50 tons of wolfram to be shipped monthly to Germany.

7. I would venture to remind you, in making this proposal, that we have gone along with you in Argentina and that we feel entitled to ask you to take our views seriously into account in the Iberian Peninsula, where our economic and strategic interests are affected more directly than are those of your country.

8. To me it seems that a fatal mistake should be made by us if we risk throwing these 750 to 1000 tons of wolfram into the hands of the Germans as well as losing all of the other advantages now open to us. I earnestly hope that to our appeal you will give your consideration, without

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Sect. 1, State Dept. (1) 8-28-78  
BY W. E. Parks Date MAY 6 1977



which we shall be in very serious difficulties. Ambassador Hoare, among other things, now evidently wishes to resign. He has held most of our offices of state and is a member of Parliament. Do please consider the arguments of this telegram. I could not support in public the policy which is now being enforced upon us.

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972



FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	631	DATE	30 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	30/2325Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	31/0300Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Wolfram exports from Spain		

ACTION

(For previous exchange of msgs on this subject, see  
Pm #577; PRES #467; Pm #586; PRES #478; PM #590)

To the President via usher.

By direction of President, copy sent to State  
Department, 31 Mar 44, for preparation of reply.

Draft reply sent directly to the President by State,  
4 Apr 44; approved by President without change, 4 Apr  
44; sent to PM as PRES #512, 4 APR 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED: 601 WOLFram	FILED:
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