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A. J. D. Biddle, Jr.

1992-94

Biddle Folder

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Confidential

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.,1.

January 30, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

- 1/ In handing me the enclosures (a) copy of a "Survey
- 2/ of the situation on the Eastern Front", and (b) report on the "Morale among the Germans based on information received from Poland in December 1941", General Sikorski said he believed you might be interested in their contents.

I am aware that John Winant has already sent you General Sikorski's Survey of the Eastern Front. This he did following his conversation with General Sikorski at the time when he, John, was trying to appraise the reaction of the Eastern and Central European Allied Governments to M. Stalin's expressed ideas on post-war Europe. In giving this report to John, General Sikorski felt that it might
serve

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

serve to clarify his Polish viewpoint vis-à-vis
M. Stalin's expressed intentions.

3/ Furthermore, in that recent months have brought
to light the value of Dr. Benes' as well as General
Sikorski's confidential information on Germany and
Russia, I am also enclosing a copy of a report which
Dr. Benes has just handed me, "Report from Berlin re-
garding the situation and the conflict between the
High Command of the Army and Nazi Party".

With warmest regards and every good wish,
I am

Faithfully yours

Tony Biddle

Enclosures:

as stated 1/ 2/ 3/

C O P Y

~~TOP SECRET~~

A SURVEY OF THE SITUATION ON THE EASTERN FRONT

At the time of their attack on Russia the Germans were more efficiently organized and better equipped than the Russians. Their discipline and training were superior. A spirit of success and confidence in their leaders prevailed throughout the German Armies. These advantages, in addition to the blunders committed at the outset by the Soviet High Command, accounted for the initial superiority of the Germans over the Russian Army during the first months.

Since the outbreak of the German-Russian war repeated information tended to indicate that the purpose of the German offensive operations was to attain in 1941 a line between Archangel and Astrachan. The success of such an achievement was expected not only to signify the doom of Soviet Russia. It would moreover bring about Russia's downfall upon which Hitler grounded political schemes on a tremendous scale which he intended to disclose in conquered Moscow. Had the Germans been successful, they would have acquired the most vital agricultural and industrial areas of the Russian Empire including the Donetz and Krivorog Basins, the capital towns of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, and particularly the oil-fields of the Caucasus. In accordance with their plan the Germans originally deployed their action in three directions: Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev. The progress of the German offensive extenuated their armed forces and obliged them to limit their main thrusts at first to two and finally to one direction. Moreover, the brunt of their main effort was more than once transformed from one strategic direction to the other.

During the latest phase of the campaign the Germans conducted offensive operations on the southern sector in the direction of Rostov on the Don, with the purpose of severing communications between Russia and the Caucasus, and north-eastwards in the direction of Moscow.

An offensive in the south led to a partial control of Rostov. It was met however by a Soviet counter-action which was launched from the north-east against the flank and the rear of the German Forces fighting for Rostov. It was directed against Taganrog and even as far
far

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date

FEB 4 1972

far in depth as Mariupol. The Russian counter-offensive succeeded in driving the Soviet Army forward as far as Taganrog and compelled the Germans to withdraw from the Rostov area where they suffered heavy losses. The next main Soviet effort was transferred further westward in the direction of Mariupol, with the object of intercepting the withdrawal of German forces operating in the region of Taganrog.

The German manoeuvre against Moscow was executed according to the old "Schlieffen" formula by means of a bilateral encircling movement with simultaneous engagement of the enemy in a frontal attack. The southern German wing struck in the direction of Tula-Ryazan, while at the same time carrying out an operation in depth towards Orel and Jelec. This thrust resulted in the occupation of the region north-east of Tula and Jelec. The northern German wing, attacking along the line Kalinin-Jaroslavl, occupied the region of Kalinin-Maly Jaroslavec. It is difficult to ascertain along which of their wings the Germans directed the main effort. It seems probable that the main weight was transferred from one direction to the other, in accordance with the gravitation of Russian resistance. The encircling operations in the Moscow area did not bear signs of a general large scale success along a broad front. They merely resulted from the system, adopted by the Germans in this campaign, of piercing through enemy concentrations by driving wedges of panzer units followed up by mechanized forces. These operations produced the formation of deep pockets whose flanks were threatened in permanence by the Russian Forces occupying the territory which had not been directly overrun by the thrusts of the panzer divisions. The Russians took advantage of this situation, counter-attacked the exposed German wedges and wiped out in turn the pockets in the regions of Jelec, Kalinin, and Tula.

Except for the counter-offensive in the Rostov area, the Soviet counter attacks have so far been successes rather of a tactical nature. There has not as yet been a grand style counter-offensive of serious strategic importance. Fresh Siberian divisions, transported by rail from the Far East, as well as large quantities of cavalry were brought to the Moscow area and thrown into action near Kalinin and Tula. As a result of these operations the German Forces embarked on their retreating manoeuvre along the whole front. The Soviet Supreme Command and the Soviet Army are resolved to take every advantage presented to them by the conditions of winter in order to continue offensive.

Unless the Germans prepared adequate defensive positions in their rear during the offensive on Moscow and Rostov, it will be extremely difficult for them to
fortify

fortify a defense line sufficient to withstand Russian offensive action.

The terrain west of the line attained by the Germans during their offensive is not favourable to defensive operations. There are no natural obstacles which might facilitate a stand. The first advantageous line from the point of view of defence runs along the river Luga, the river Lowat, the "gate" of Smolensk, the eastern border of the Polesie marshes and the river Dnieper. The Germans are said to have prepared some extent of defence along that line.

Their withdrawal however to those positions would equal the surrender of vast areas which had previously been conquered against a particularly heavy toll of blood. Hitler's last speech, delivered on the occasion of his taking over the supreme command, seems to indicate that the Germans, after rectifying their front, would at all costs endeavour to hold as large as possible a part of the conquered areas. It remains to be seen whether and how far they may be successful. There is no doubt however that the further the Germans retire westward the more distant will become the purpose of their campaign and the less will be afforded them for the reorganization of their extenuated land and air force units.

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SOVIET ARMY

During the present campaign the Soviet Army has suffered enormous losses in men and equipment. Owing to the fact that Russia has almost boundless human resources, loss of life is less important than loss of war material which is expected to be replaced by Britain and the U.S.A. Russia is incapable of absorbing all-men of military age in the ranks and reserve centres of fighting forces on account of the technical impossibility of providing sufficient food, equipment and maintenance for such tremendous masses of soldiers.

The losses in armoured and mechanized equipment are particularly grave and should be completed during the winter months. The Russian is a good fighter. So far the morale of the Red Army has not been shaken. This circumstance is a proof of the exceptional power of resistance of the Russian soldier, who has not only managed to withstand the long retreat in passive resistance, but furthermore proved his ability to fight on the offensive.

The Soviet Supreme Command, or more precisely Stalin, has been throwing and will go on throwing huge masses of troops into battle with complete disregard for human life. So far the discipline of the soldiers has not been shaken, nor does it seem likely to be weakened in spite of heavy losses. The bolshevik régime has stood the trial of war and would have stood even the fall of Moscow. The officers of middle and lower ranks are efficient. This is not always the case with the senior O.C.s and staffs, who seem to be inadequately prepared for conducting large scale offensive operations.

With the progress of the war, however, the Soviet High Command is acquiring experience and Field-Marshal Timoshenko has

has come to the fore as a leader. I have had the opportunity to see for myself that the Russian Army is well prepared for a winter campaign in the heaviest possible climatic conditions.

One of the weakest points of the Soviet Army is the communication problem. The railway over the whole of Russian territory is extremely scarce and its transport capacity is very limited. Owing to insufficient organization of transport and lack of rolling stock it cannot be put to its full advantage. Motor-transport is also deficient owing to shortage of vehicles and especially of spare parts, which limits the possibilities of repair. At the present moment climatic conditions also greatly reduce the efficiency of rail and motor transport.

After the ultimate recapture of areas held by the Germans, who before retreating would have destroyed all means of communication, the Russians will be obliged to put themselves to a tremendous effort in order to prevent a deterioration in their transport service which would directly endanger the supply and the maintenance of the fighting forces at the front. Notwithstanding serious losses suffered during the first days of the war, especially from the bombing of air-fields, the Soviet air force is still powerful. It has proved itself capable of dealing with the Luftwaffe and lately has even acquired a certain degree of superiority in the air. The supply system has so far been working satisfactorily and the Soviet soldier is well clothed and sufficiently fed to keep going. On the other hand the civilian population of Russia this year will be threatened with famine. The Army and the Government as well as the war industry will not be affected, since Stalin has sufficient reserves at his disposal for these purposes.

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GERMAN ARMY

It is the opinion of neutral observers who visited the eastern German front, that the Germans have so far suffered very heavy losses both in men and war material. These losses are estimated at 1,500,000 killed and missing, and over 2,000,000 wounded. Numerous cases of frostbite among the soldiers have lately been confirmed in hospitals behind the lines and throughout the country. The problem of completing their losses in human material is becoming to the Germans a cause of growing anxiety. The material losses of the panzer units are estimated to equal the establishments of 12 panzer divisions. In spite of the fact that almost the whole of the European continent is toiling for the production of armaments for the German Forces, their losses are so heavy that they will be extremely difficult to replace. The German Army has not been sufficiently equipped for a Russian winter campaign. During our conversation Stalin compared the German Armies to those of Napoleon in 1812 when they were retreating from Moscow. He stated that the Germans who were taken prisoners in the Moscow area wore civilian and even women's clothing. The German soldier, unaccustomed to the severe Russian winter, is more seriously affected by the cold than the Soviet soldier. So far the operational

operational achievements of the Germans resulted chiefly from the great superiority of their panzer and motorized units over the Russians. The conditions established by the Russian winter have greatly diminished the power of their armoured forces, reducing their efficiency and thereby transferring the advantage to the Russians.

My visit to Moscow occurred at a crucial moment of the eastern campaign of 1941. At that time the battles for Moscow and Rostov, which strategically governs the entrance to the Caucasus, were reaching their decisive stage.

The history of warfare will no doubt recognize these battles as examples of determination and of skilful resistance during a grave crisis. The will-power of Stalin, the Supreme Commander, and his unshaken obstinacy to persevere, together with the bearing of the Russian soldier prevented Moscow from being surrendered and accounted for the recapture of Rostov.

It was not only the Russian winter however, that checked the German offensive, as Hitler and Goebbels endeavoured to explain. Hitler recognized his defeat before the gates of Moscow and ordered a retreat. The Soviet counter-attack on Rostov, which was carried out with much talent, took General von Kleist's army completely by surprise and forced it to a disordered retreat.

The battles for Moscow and Rostov will bear decisively upon the eastern campaign and considerably influence the progress of the war against Germany.

It would be difficult to anticipate the consequences of these events. There is no doubt, however, that they brought about the defeat of the Germans during the campaign of 1941. For the time being it can be assumed that the interruption of the German offensive in the east and the resulting breach in the faith of the nation in ultimate victory, have given cause to serious ferment within the Reich. With the British successes in Africa, these disorders will become serious. If the North African campaign is brought by the British to a successful ending, which is not an easy task, their "second front" in the country would be shaken and defeatism would spread. Anticipation of defeat may already be observed especially among the German troops.

According to information which I received upon my return to London, there are signs of growing dissatisfaction, slackening of discipline and morale among the German Army and people. There also appears to be a breach between the leaders of the Army and the National-Socialist party.

It is doubtful whether the German General Staff still lays much confidence in Hitler or his strategic genius. It is more likely that the bulk of the German troops are beginning for the first time to question the merit of the decisions of their Supreme Commander. The
German

German Command is at present faced with the problem as to where and how they will succeed in halting their armies in the East in order to withstand the winter and reestablish their decimated, weakened, inadequately supplied and ill-equipped forces, and prepare their stand for a fresh offensive in the spring or even for defensive action. It is possible that the future months will give a clearer picture of the consequences of Hitler's defeat during the first year of his campaign against Soviet Russia.

The Russians will no doubt employ the winter months to solidify their gains and prevent the enemy from establishing winter billets behind an organized front. At the present moment the initiative along the entire front line is passing to the Soviet Supreme Command. This fact has been proved by the daring operations in the Crimea. It is difficult, however, to establish the extent and the consequences of this initiative, owing to the scarcity of accurate information.

The Soviet Army disposes of highly trained ski-units and masses of well-equipped cavalry which may play a significant part in winter operations when mechanized equipment and to a certain extent the air force are severely handicapped.

The eastern front will continue to engage the main German forces hindering their movements in other directions and probably preventing the German Army from undertaking any major operation during this winter. The Germans are purposely spreading various rumours on this subject in order to conceal the present weakness and embarrassment of Hitler. Nevertheless efforts of minor counter-action and organized diversion may be expected (for instance in the direction of Tripolis, with the object of restoring Hitler's prestige).

In spite of heavy losses the German Army has not yet been broken and still represents a great operational force which has not yet so far suffered a single decisive defeat. It failed however to deal a final blow to the Red Army in 1941, according to Hitler's plan. It is the first frustration and may become a turning point. If, on the other hand, the Russians were to commit a similar blunder by underestimating the enemy's forces, they would expose themselves to all consequences.

In connection with the developments on the eastern front, it is most expedient to lay stress upon the great importance of organizing a second front on the European continent. The Allied Forces, in the first place British and American, should enter in the spring of this year, when Hitler is likely to commence a new offensive against Russia.

London, January 8th, 1942.

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

POLISH GENERAL STAFF
6-th Department.

Ref.310.

22nd January, 1942.

Morale among the Germans -

based on information received from Poland in December, 1941.

I. ARMY.

1. Front line units:

Information obtained from:

- a. Soldiers' correspondence during the period from 9th September to 6th October, 1941, from 165 different units, mostly from the central front and, to a lesser degree, from the southern and northern ones.

If the two thousand letters examined only approximately 15% were of a general nature. It is interesting to note that the correspondence between soldiers serving in different units gives more information about the fighting and general military situation than letters to and from home. It would appear that the censorship in the first case is more lenient, or less careful.

- b. Man returning from the front.

General fatigue caused by the excessive efforts to which the Armed Forces had been subjected during the last few months of the Russian campaign, seems to prevail in the Army. Owing to primitive conditions in Russia, made even worse by thorough destruction, the Germans have to bear with extremely poor living conditions, bad food and difficult communications. Fear of lice, disease, poisoning, as well as a yearning for a more cultural life, affects the nervous resistance of the soldiers. Morale is further affected by the increasing fear at the approach of winter.

The tremendous losses borne by the Germans have a similar effect. Hitler's proclamation read to the soldiers before the beginning of the Moscow campaign was received with complete silence, - in contrast to the great enthusiasm which usually greeted the Commander-in-Chief's appeals.

Discipline is, however, unaffected and the Army continues to fight very well. This is, undoubtedly, due to German propaganda which has succeeded in convincing the entire Army that it is fulfilling an historic mission by saving not only Germany but the entire World Civilization from the menace of Bolshevism. "The Democracies and the U.S.A. should be grateful to us for spilling German blood in their cause" - writes General Zeits.

The success of German propaganda has, to a certain extent, been

been due to the fact that German soldiers have, themselves, come into contact with the reality of Soviet life. "What was written about Russia before the war is nothing, compared to reality" - writes one of the soldiers - "The slight bombardments which you from time to time have, are infinitely better than if you were overrun by the Bolsheviks - they are animals" - writes another.

Having convinced the German nation of its historic mission, German propaganda now is engaged in convincing the Army of the necessity of enduring a winter campaign in Russia. The fruitful results of this propaganda are already manifest in recent letters from the Leningrad front. "It is possible that we may have to spend the winter here, because we are not going to spill any more blood, but will starve them out. It will be a hard winter, but **better** than for these animals to invade you".

Such letters are frequent, particularly from the Northern front and it is interesting to note that many of them speak of starving Leningrad out.

Naturally, there are many letters expressing discouragement and nervous exhaustion. "You cannot imagine our misery" - writes a soldier to his colleague - "there is no joy in living, it rains, one is constantly knee-deep in mud, and one's clothes never dry, and it is so cold at night that one cannot sleep".

"I can't imagine what the winter is going to be like". - "We all curse this land whose vastness is so oppressive". - "Psychologically and nervously we are exhausted....three weeks of hardest imaginable fighting and inconceivable sacrifices is really too much". "I hope we do not have to remain here for the winter, or we shall go slowly but surely mad" - writes a soldier from the Southern front as far back as the 6th Of September.

Occasionally information points to the losses being as high as 60%, and there is mention that N.C.O.s of such and such a unit have been completely wiped out, etc.

Open criticism of the Party is also more and more frequent. "We are like the Communists, where everybody is watched by a G.P.U. agent. If you say anything, you at once fall into disfavour and no matter whether you are an officer or a soldier, you are punished. What is happening here is similar to what happens in the German Army - Communist instruction from books. What do you think of that? We who were in hospital were left behind as a punishment" - writes one officer to another. A soldier to his family: "if this denouncing at the base and spying at home does not stop, I shall start such an upheaval that these "gentlemen" will think twice".

Enthusiasm,

Enthusiasm, pathos and boastfulness which until recently were so prevalent, have now disappeared almost entirely. Even so, it would appear that the great majority of the German Army is still well disciplined and, should the German Command be able to give the men a respite and better living conditions for the winter, they will for some considerable time yet be a powerful fighting force.

II. BASE

There are no material changes since our last report. There is one new point of interest - the ever increasing number of Soviet prisoners of war.

Evidence of the bestial treatment of Bolshevik prisoners of war by the guards of prisoners' camps is further substantiated by a letter written by one of the soldiers - guard at a camp. The writer of this letter shows complete lack of understanding that the prisoners are hungry and his only feeling for them is that of a deep scorn. This letter is worthy of quotation:

"My colleague and I are to organize a prisoners' of war camp. 10 thousand of them were sent to us in two days. Can you imagine, what it was like! The hoard was hungry and exhausted. Short time ago we had another transport. These were really wild animals let loose. One evening they tried to raid the kitchen and even set fire to the building. They were unlucky - six of them pay for it with their lives. They were beaten while clearing up the debris and beaten again, when driven back to the camp at night. This appears to have cured them of the desire for further outrages. The Asiatics are the worst of them. They are a tribe of murderers. Things which are happening here are beyond belief and if one had not experienced them oneself, one would imagine them to be the ravings of a madman. During the first two days we had frequently to shoot into them. The moment one of them fell the hoard rushed at him and took all he had, even though they might not have needed these things themselves. This is Gospel truth! On two occasions they devoured the bodies. On one occasion a man was murdered and eaten, bit by bit. They are a hoard of wild beasts. Nothing will satisfy them, nothing will improve them. They only respond to force. What would have happened to our towns and women, if these hoards had been allowed to penetrate into Germany. How fortunate that our Leader in his wisdom was able to foresee and forestall it".

III. THE REICH

The enthusiasm of the German people seems completely to have vanished and their belief in their ultimate victory is on the wane. The anxiety for their near ones and dear ones and the ever increasing problems of every-day life are becoming all-absorbing. In spite of the very efficient distribution of food and clothing stolen from occupied countries, the 'Black market' transactions are becoming more and more popular; the villages are engaged on barter, and every Sunday the inhabitants of towns make mass excursions to far away provinces to buy food.

In

In other words the hitherto well-disciplined population is beginning to break food regulations, which fact may have serious consequences in the future.

Discord and friction between the Party and the population over which they so ruthlessly and brutally rule, is ever growing. Internal terror is almost as bad as in occupied countries. Letters, either genuine or forged, purporting to have been written by the Bishop of Muenster, condemning methods used by the Gestapo, are circulated among the Catholic population.

News of the successes of German armed forces are greeted with growing indifference. Fewer and fewer people believe in the permanence of their conquests, and more and more express the hope for a speedy end of hostilities while Germany is still on top and in a position to pay for peace. Even the greatest enthusiasts are willing to make far-reaching concessions. Religion is gaining ground. On the other hand, demoralisation and a tendency to fast living is growing, particularly among the youth.

Considerable nervous strain is noticeable in bombed areas. It is said in Berlin that three or four consecutive nights of bombing are bearable, but nerves would certainly give way under the strain of longer periods of bombardment.

The comparatively small amount of damage caused by bombardments has helped to maintain the spirits of the population. The German propaganda attributes this to the efficiency of their anti-aircraft defence, which, they allege, causes the enemy to unload their bombs at random.

Discontent is growing among the workers, one of the reasons being longer working hours.

The Communist Party is in process of organization; no other activity is, however, perceptible.

The alleged sabotage is rather the result of over-strain and under-nourishment of the workers, than of any conscious anti-war movement.

In conclusion it should be stated that within the Reich enthusiasm is gradually diminishing and a desire for a speedy end of hostilities, even at the price of far-reaching concessions, is ever growing. Antagonism between Party and population is increasing, as are the whispered rumours of an internal coup being organized by the military. The new Leader, to be chosen by the Army /Marshal Reichenau's name was mentioned/ would be charged with concluding a speedy peace "with honour".

Fear of the collapse of their Italian ally is ever growing. Interesting remarks on this subject are to be found in Enclosure No.1. They originate from Lt.Colonel Les or Lerich of the German Intelligence Service, whose main interest is the morale of their allies. He expressed his views

views very frankly to a man in whom he had implicit faith.

Nevertheless, the German people are well aware that in order to avoid complete defeat they must unreservedly obey the dictates of their War Leaders. An internal disruption of Germany is, therefore, at present quite out of the question. It is, of course, conceivable that concentrated effective bombardment coupled with land successes of the Allied Armies, or the collapse of Italy, might bring about a change of attitude of the German people, at present, however, the foregoing would appear to be a true picture of the present state of Germany.

C O P Y

Report of a German Intelligence Officer, dated
October, 1941.

According to rumours current in military circles, the offensive on Moscow was planned personally by Hitler, and was not the idea of the Wehrmacht. Prestige and the necessity to improve the morale of Germany and, what is even more important, in Italy, were supposed to be the dominating reasons for this step. Great importance was attached to this offensive; its success might have far-reaching results, whereas its failure may be a signal for defeat.

It was considered that the occupation of Moscow and other important centre in Russia would release some of the German armed forces which might be needed in Italy in the event of a collapse of that country. Should the offensive on Moscow succeed, further activities on the Eastern front would, most likely, have been postponed until spring. In the event of the position in the East become difficult, the Germans are prepared to use gas.

The offensive was launched with incredible power and ruthlessness. Small groups of prisoners are not taken; even if they surrender, they are shot.

Similarly - this rule of terror is applied to the resisting civilian population.

Success appears to have gone to the soldiers' heads and they no longer believe in the true value of their victories.

Generally speaking, informant maintains that the Germans will not lose the war by a military defeat - they have sufficient supplies of ammunition, armament and aircraft to last them for a long time yet and the morale of the soldier is good - trouble might, however, start from within and surprises from their own population and, principally, that of Italy, are possible.

The situation in Italy is carefully watched by the Germans; it is fairly difficult and hunger demonstrations took place in certain sectors of the front. The Gestapo consider them of little importance and easy to deal with, Mussolini, however, exaggerates their importance and uses them as a political argument.

The recent conversations between Hitler and Mussolini were of a sharp nature, - Mussolini demanded economic assistance and larger supplies of anti-aircraft artillery, whereas Hitler asked for better armed forces to be sent to the eastern front. Both parties refused, and Hitler was alleged to have stated that he had been misled by an over-estimation of the Italian military power. A Colonel of the Gestapo was present at all the meetings of the two dictators.

Both

been due to the fact that German soldiers have, themselves, come into contact with the reality of Soviet life. "What was written about Russia before the war is nothing, compared to reality" - writes one of the soldiers - "The slight bombardments which you from time to time have, are infinitely better than if you were overrun by the Bolsheviks - they are animals" - writes another.

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Enthusiasm,

C O P Y

REPORT FROM BERLIN REGARDING THE SITUATION AND THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMY
AND THE NAZI PARTY.

Berlin, 26th December, 1941.

1. The serious crisis in the higher administration of Germany which was first of all kept from the German army and people and was later aduabrated through the retirement of Field Marshals Brauchitsch and Bock, and which has now finally become known in all its extent through the spread of rumours, is engaging the attention of public opinion in Germany - in so far as such a thing can be said to exist - to an extreme degree. The crisis has produced the greatest confusion and general state of depression. There are increasing indications of the fact that what is involved is a cleft between the Party and the Army which is unbridgeable and which has been maturing for a long time past.

2. The versions of the course of this development are being circulated in well-informed military circles:

One considers Brauchitsch as being the victim of a far-reaching intrigue of the Nazi Group amongst the generals /List, Jodl, Reichenau, etc./, based upon the decision of Brauchitsch and the more moderate generals /Bock, Rundstedt, Leeb, etc./ to fall back upon the line Smolensk-Kharkov after the failure of the last offensive against Moscow. The Nazi Group protested against this step, advancing the argument that the Red Army also was too exhausted, and too deficient in material reserves, to sustain a counter-offensive. As proof of their assertion they pronounced secret reports from the German espionage service which had been withheld from Brauchitsch and his General Staff. Violent disputes, in the course of which Hitler charged the Supreme Commander with having fallen back when he really knew better, led to Brauchitsch's retirement and to new operational orders being issued, according to which the retreat was to be stopped on the line Vyazma-Bryansk.

3. The second version is based upon the circumstance that the offers of resignation by Brauchitsch, Bock, Leeb, Rundstedt, Guderian, Schmidt, etc. had practically all been made in the early days of December. This leads to the conclusion that what is involved is a planned "revolt" of the whole group of the Army Commanders, who were not willing to assume the responsibility for the winter offensive which had been forced upon them by
Hitler

Hitler and his sycophants for reasons of prestige and with poor results and who wanted to avoid having the retreat which they foresaw laid at their own door.

4. Further, the Generals considered that, in view of the deprivations which the German people are undergoing and the difficulties in occupied Europe, the moment was propitious for a break with the Party circles, who were thoroughly opposed to exclusive command being in the hands of the Army. Of the worthy army leaders only List was outside the circle of the "conspirators", probably simply because he was at the time inaccessible in Bulgaria, and probably also because of his long-standing personal links with his one-time subordinate, Hitler. Keitel remains neutral and would seem not to have fallen into disgrace with his more enterprising comrades.

5. Both versions - although apparently contradictory - can however be seen to be reconcilable with one another. Their point of intersection is the fact that Hitler in his stormy discussions with Brauchitsch and the others made the allegation that the generals had failed to carry out his grandiose strategical plans and that the breakdown of the Moscow offensive was to be attributed to this fact.

There can be no doubt that the event will have far-reaching consequences as the sudden and simultaneous retirement /there can no longer be any question of being "released from one's services"/ of army leaders who had previously been valued by Hitler as war heroes of a historical stature, and who had been rewarded by him with titles and decorations, has increased to an extraordinary degree the feeling of uncertainty in the German masses and shaken their confidence in his own leadership.

6. Whether it is a question of the intrigues of a group of Nazi generals of an ambitious and pushing type who are not tested leaders / such as Jodl and Reichensau/ against their senior comrades, or of the "strategic withdrawal" of these last from an intolerable responsibility, and at the same time of an attempt / as in 1918/ to save the prestige of the Army and to sacrifice thereto the prestige of the Führer, and perhaps also his person, it remains true that there is now an open crisis and also an open conflict between the field grey Army of the Generals and the "brown" Army of Adolf Hitler of which the Germans have already taken account.

The consequences of this crisis will certainly be far-reaching, although it cannot yet be said when its nature will become fully apparent to the general public.

PS F: Kiddle Folder
142

file
Personal

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W., 1.

February 16, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

1/

I am attaching hereto for your information the recent report, which Dr. Benes received from what, he tells me, is a highly placed and usually dependable source in Germany. As his reports have hitherto proven interesting and enlightening, I thought you might like to have this one, as well as those I have previously sent you.

With warmest regards and every good wish, I
am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Kiddle

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

Enclosure:
1/ as stated.

C O P Y

REPORT FROM BERLIN

End of January
1942

The serious disagreements between the generals and Hitler are becoming increasingly marked. The first contemplate with a certain malicious satisfaction the strategic errors which are being committed. The German losses in men and material are gigantic, while the cold is an even more severe factor than the Russian tanks. Although there has been a great deal of propaganda regarding the collection of clothing, according to the information here available it has had a very poor moral success among the people. Compared with earlier collections it was in no sense voluntary; on the contrary the Party in different places extorted their last supplies of winter clothing from the population under threats. As also the clothes, and particularly the shoes, are deteriorating more and more in the remote districts many civilians, particularly amongst the working classes, were reluctant to hand over their worn clothing, which was often better than the new. But they were forbidden to do so as in the individual districts precise lists of names were drawn up and checked either by the Party or by especially appointed functionaries. Many who were hesitating were threatened with being publicly exposed.

2) The view is held in Berlin that the Russians will increase their offensive as the cold becomes more acute, and fears are expressed that the German power of resistance will weaken. Those troops who have been stationed at the front since the beginning of the campaign and who are familiar with the Russian style of fighting, have become worn out by terrible hardships and cold, and the new reserves which have been drafted from Germany and France etc. simply cannot exist under the Russian climatic conditions.

3) The German Air Force is no longer able to go into action with the power demanded of it. All reports agree in stating that there is a lassitude and war weariness amongst the German population which has never been observed previously. And here we must take account of the fact that tens of thousands of families have had no news of their relatives since November last, while they all hear the messages sent from all the broadcasting stations addressed

addressed nightly to the field hospitals in Russia, which, however, for the most part remain unanswered, and, therefore, have a bad moral effect. The transmissions were first of all prohibited, but finally the High Command, as a result of the pressure exercised upon it by the German women's organizations, was obliged for prudential reasons to permit these messages, which are transmitted from 4 a.m. onwards. There are reliable grounds for believing that they have a very demoralizing effect upon German women, who have no news of their relatives.

4) Almost all the soldiers between 20 and 40 from Germany itself and the occupied territories have been transferred, formed up into new units, and after a brief training sent to the Russian front. At least 25 divisions, whose training, particularly in the tank and motorized detachments, was still completely inadequate, and who should normally have gone into action only in the spring, were precipitously entrained and despatched to different parts of the front. In the same way thousands of imperfectly trained pilots were drafted to squadrons operating at the front in order to make up for the severe losses which have taken place.

5) Although the munition and armament industries are working in Germany and all the occupied territories, according to the reports of our informants in spite of all efforts and expenditure the production figures, particularly in the occupied territories, are declining. On the other hand, the damage done in the Ruhr and other industrial regions through bombing is greatly exaggerated in the British reports. Ports and dockyards in France, Holland and Germany, however, are suffering severely.

6) In Russia Hitler, regardless of losses in men and material, using every means to stabilize the front at any price, so as to keep up his own prestige and it is hoped in Germany this will be possible along the line Leningrad - Velikie Luki - Smolensk - Kharkov, while everything will certainly be done to retain command of the Crimea. When the great winter frosts are over an offensive is to begin at a number of points.

7) One must allow for the fact that in Libya Rommel, of whom Hitler has an enormously high opinion, will receive sufficient reinforcements and that, probably at the beginning of February, he will proceed to a major counter-offensive. It is believed that if it is successful a new attack will follow, perhaps via Bulgaria, so as, if possible, to attack Egypt from two sides. But this will fundamentally depend upon the situation on the Russian front.

8) The situation with regard to America - in so far as one can make a picture thereof by combining reports from Europe and the East - would seem to be that her preparations for war are completely inadequate, and that we must therefore expect serious losses for America, England and Holland in the Far East. One must believe that

that the Phillipines, the Dutch colonies and also Singapore cannot be held unless America risks her navy and air force - which, according to our trusted informants, she will not do. It is not believed that Australia is in serious danger, as Japan has not sufficient shipping accommodation to undertake such a large-scale action so far from her home ports, although after the possible occupation of different island groups Japan could acquire vital air and naval bases - which would have a marked influence on the Australian morale.

9) It is expected that America, both in respect of ships as well as of tanks and aircraft and their manning, will acquire an ultimate superiority, although this will require from 12 to 18 months. It is further stated in Berlin that Germany will put into service in the spring a large number of small and magnificently equipped submarines which have partly been built in Italian yards, and which will finally operate on the Atlantic coast of America and Canada from secret bases (Alaska).

10) The psychological atmosphere in Italy is very dim, and in every respect Italy represents only a debit for Germany. This works back upon Spain, and it is not believed that the Germans will succeed in engaging her in the world conflict without resorting to military measures, although all indications are in favor of the fact that German influence, which is exercised by gold and resourceful propaganda, remains very powerful both in Portugal and Spain.

Biddle Folder

March 7, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

You may remember that I talked to you about this telegram when Admiral Standley and I were having lunch with you and that you suggested that London be informed along the lines laid down in your memorandum to me of March 7.

As a result of our talk I sent on March 6 a telegram to Biddle of which I enclose a copy for your information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Telegram to London,
March 6, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

Note: See Sumner Welles folder for complete corres. re above.

PSF: Biddle Folder
1-42

March 13, 1942.

Dear Margaret:-

I think it is horrid that your present to me was stolen from you! Nevertheless, the idea was definitely yours and when you get back your name will go in Volume I, with the added thought "Original Patentee".

I am glad to hear that Sally sees you often and that she is well.

You and Tony should know that I think I have saved you from the Governorship of Pennsylvania! The fact is that to-date nobody has agreed on anybody and, as the situation was extremely chaotic, I told them that I much preferred to have you both remain in the most unique diplomatic post -- or rather posts -- in all history!

Thank you ever so much for the stamps. I had not seen them before.

Affectionately,

Mrs. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle,
Ritz Hotel,
London,
England.



Ritz Hotel,
Piccadilly,
London, W.1.

February 16th, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

Many thanks for your letter of December 24th. Having duly informed you of what your Christmas present was, I do not quite know how to explain what has happened to it since.

It comes down to this. When the Prime Minister returned from his visit with you, he set about looking for first editions of his books for you. He has now found that I had been ahead of him, and had literally scoured not only London but England to get the complete set, which I had been successful in doing. These books are now at the binders being bound for you in a lovely red leather. The Prime Minister sent word to me that that was what he wished to give to you and that he would appreciate it very much if I would be kind enough to turn the books over to him, so that he could send them to you as a personal remembrance from himself. Naturally, there was nothing else for me to do but to agree and I am really very distressed that we won't have the opportunity of giving you something which we knew you wanted.

I do not think the Prime Minister knows that you have been told you were getting this present from me. Anyway, it is all very complicated, but the net result is that I have been left high and dry regarding your Christmas present, but that you are receiving the books from the Prime Minister himself.

Tony and I are very well and manage to keep busy. I can quite honestly say I have never had as interesting a time in my life as I am having now, and I am thoroughly enjoying it.



- 2 -

Sally spends most weekends with us. As you know, she is now in the American Red Cross, where I am part of each week. She is working hard and doing an awfully good job.

I am enclosing two sets of Free French stamps which have just been issued by the Free French forces here. I do not think they are on the market as yet, and I thought you might be interested in having them. I understand there will be two more sets coming out shortly. These stamps were designed by the man who did the beautiful lacquer work in the "Normandie". I think his name is Edmond Dulac.

Our thoughts are so often with you, and we pray that you are keeping well in spite of your busy life in such difficult times.

My love to you,
Affectionately,

Margaret Biddle

PSF: Biddle

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1942.

REMINDER

Give the attached to the
President just before General
Sikorski comes in to see him.

G.

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

Vol. 111 Europe

1942

Pages 108-110

File
PSF, Biddle
Folders
Confid. 1-42

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.

February 20, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

In the thought that it might serve as a useful reference, I am sending you the attached indexed survey (a) on the reactions of Allied government circles here to M. Stalin's reported post-war ideas; and (b) on the views of leading officials of these circles on the shape of things to come.

No sooner had I found that the Polish Government had learned of M. Stalin's post-war ideas, than I became apprehensive lest the Poles initiate some action which might prove offensive to the Russians. I had not long to wait. On March 31 General Sikorski proposed, at a lunch which he gave for the representatives of the Belgian, Greek and Yugoslav Governments, that a declaration be made by all Allied Governments here, looking towards post-war collaboration. The enthusiastic reception accorded his proposal on this occasion spurred him to further efforts. Unfortunately, his and his associates' thirst for publicity resulted in a press notice the following day to effect that he had given this luncheon for the purpose of discussing a post-war European reconstruction plan.

This, in turn, drew the attention and suspicion of the Russian Embassies here and served to antagonize his colleagues in Allied governmental circles, who thus suspected him of seeking leadership of their circles.

Subsequently, the General and several of his associates asked me what I thought of the proposal

for/

for a declaration, stating the envisaged terms thereof, in only the most vague way. I replied that I personally believed that before launching any such move at this time, it should be put to the "acid test": would it in any way prove offensive to the Russians? - could it be interpreted by the Russians as a move to form a bloc against them? I added that it might be best to consult the Russians themselves in the matter. I subsequently made the same reply to similar questions asked me by representatives of the Norwegian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Belgian Governments.

In response to my observations on this score, the Norwegian Foreign Minister said that my remarks had served to convince him that his own first impression was right: he considered that the making of a declaration at this time, such as was proposed by General Sikorski, would only incite Russian suspicions; he would advise Russian authorities of his Government's invitation to join the declaration, and of his disinclination to accept.

The Yugoslav Foreign Minister, in response to my observations, said that he had hitherto been in a quandary, since the Poles had urged him so strongly to join the declaration. My observations, however, had confirmed his own second thoughts in the matter. He believed, therefore, that his Government should do everything possible to dispel Russian suspicion, and, rather, to create an atmosphere of collaboration.

Judging by General Sikorski's and his associates' reactions, at this stage, to M. Stalin's reported post-war intentions, I should look for them to become more and more exercised, the closer the Russians draw to the Polish border.

In this connection, I am aware that Sikorski and his associates consider British public opinion as a whole, "too much at Russia's feet", and that by comparison, the attitude of the "United States towards Russia is better balanced"; they have failed to conceal their interest in what they appraise as a

"division/

"division of American opinion vis-á-vis Russia". Accordingly I feel it would be only a wise precaution to keep an eye open for traces of any possible attempt, inspired by Polish circles here, to exploit this aspect to the advantage of Poland's interests and perhaps to the detriment of Russia in the eyes of American public opinion.

In advising this I feel that I should give you my following impressions concerning General Sikorski's frame of mind: while he is a thoroughly honest, sincere and courageous character, he has gained, during the past few months, an inordinate ambition, and thirst for publicity. He pictures himself on the one hand as leader of post-war Poland, on the other hand, now that France has disappeared as a dominant influence on the continent, the leader of continental Europe. I mention the foregoing because I feel that his ambitions, his thirst for publicity, and his characteristically Polish suspicions of Russia, might possibly some day cloud his otherwise comparatively clear perspective - and lead him to permit some of his compatriots to launch some form of subtle anti-Russian play amongst the Polish-American community in our country.

I believe you might be interested in reading Dr. Benes' views, pages 7 to 11, and General Sikorski's views, pages 18 to 20 - also my observations as to the differences between their respective opinions, page 30.

With warmest regards and every good wish, I am,

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bidder

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

Biddle Folder
1-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

TO READ AND RETURN.

F.D.R.

Cable London March 3, 12:58 P.M.
from Biddle Polish Series re Biddle's
dispatch 119, Feb. 20th

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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Near the Polish Government

LONDON, February 20, 1942.

Polish Series

No. 119

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Survey of reactions of Allied Government circles to M. Stalin's reported post-war intentions, and their forward-looking views. (see attached index).

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington

Sir:

Supplementing my despatch Polish Series No. 115, January 30, 1942, depicting the tendency of the Allied Governments of Eastern, Central and Southeastern/

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78

By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

Southeastern Europe to "huddle together" in face of what they understood to be M. Stalin's post-war intentions, I have the honor herein to report (a) evidence of their fresh concern over developments which have taken place both before and since the signing of the Greeko-Yugoslav and Polish-Czechoslovak treaties; and (b) the reactions and forward-looking views of Dr. Benes, of General Sikorski, and of Yugoslav and Greek authorities, as well as of Allied Government circles in general.

FACTORS MOTIVATING FRESH CONCERN.

Fresh concern arose from the following factors:

- (a) General Sikorski's and his associates' indignation over what they understand to be M. Stalin's intentions (1)(2) to include Lithuania as well as Latvia and Esthonia

(1) In an article by Polish Ambassador and Acting Foreign Minister, Count Raczynski, which appeared in "The Sunday Times", January 11, he mentioned Poland's historic interest in Lithuania, adding in effect that Poland and Lithuania would be bound in the future by friendship and mutual interest. The following day, Russian Ambassador to the Polish Government Bogomolov, protested, pointing out to Raczynski in effect that Lithuania lay in Russia's post-war orbit. At the same time M. Bogomolov drew attention to another recent article by a prominent Pole; Bogomolov protested against the inclusion of a photograph of Vilno and references to past and possible future connections with Poland. In response to these protests, General Sikorski made it clear in a stiff note to Bogomolov expressing his Government's astonishment over the latter's protests on the above scores.

(2) The question put to the Acting Secretary at his February 13 Press conference, as to whether the Department had any knowledge of reported conversations in London between the British and Russians which indicated agreements had been tentatively reached, including among others, post-war territorial settlements whereby Russia would be given the Baltic States, Bessarabia, and Bukowina, recalls to mind the following: (a) my July conversation wherein Mr. Eden agreed with my

within Russia's post-war orbit; (b) General Sikoraki's apprehension over his report of January 6, ⁽³⁾ from Polish Embassy, Kuibyshev, definitely indicating that, contrary to his understanding of the spirit and terms of his recent agreement with M. Stalin, the Russian authorities are restricting enrolment in the Polish ⁽⁴⁾ forces to racial Poles, thus excluding the enrolment of Polish nationals of other origin and extraction; (c) the Polish, the Yugoslav, the Greek, and perhaps to a lesser degree, the Czechoslovak, Governments' concern over what they believe to be M. Stalin's intention to include at least the coastal area of Bulgaria within Russia's post-war strategic area.

I am aware, moreover, that these circles, at least in part, look with some concern upon the implications of the recent Russian proposal that the

expressed opinion that more and more pressure might be expected for territorial commitments (see Polish series No. 31, July 27, 1941), and (b) my recent conversation with an official of the Polish Government wherein he said that the Baltics looked to the United States as their only hope for the future. If, he said, the United States did not intend to help them towards restoration of independence of their respective states, this should be made clear to them so that the people of the Baltic States might fight out their battles on their own. Hence the aforementioned inquiry at the press conference would seem to bear the earmarks of combined Polish and Baltic inspiration.

(3) The Polish Government's apprehension over this report was reflected in the publication of an article entitled "The Curzon Line" in the January 16 issue of "Free Europe". In effect, the article stated that the "Curzon Line", which was brought up whenever the question of Poland's Eastern frontier was discussed in the British Press or in certain British political circles, was usually referred to as an equitable frontier based on the ethnographical principle. After going into considerable detail as to various decisions and treaties bearing on the post-great-war settlement of the Polish-Russian frontier, the article ends by stating a number of conclusions which might be drawn therefrom:

Lieth-Ross Committee extend the scope of its studies to that of post-war price policy. Recalling that when the Lieth-Ross Committee was formed, the Russians made a number of reservations, these circles are inclined to regard this proposal as significant. Their preliminary reaction is that it would be premature to discuss this aspect now. They feel that the study of post-war price-fixing would open up many other channels of far-reaching considerations of important bearing upon the whole fabric of post-war reconstruction plans. Moreover, some with whom I have discussed the matter, emphasize the importance of bearing in mind what a psychologically strong trading position the Russians, due to their current wave of military successes, would have at this time; were they to press their point in this respect.

-
- (1) The "Curzon Line" was never intended to be a frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia;
 - (2) A delimitation made by the Supreme Council reserves Poland's right to territorial claims east of this Line;
 - (3) Soviet Russia consistently refused to recognize this line, and even denounced it in official documents;
 - (4) Throughout the Polish-Soviet peace negotiations neither side ever mentioned this Line. The "Curzon Line", the article continued, was in no way connected with the question of nationalities in their adjoining territories.

In the British press, however, the article continued, the view had been expressed that this line equitably divided the areas inhabited predominantly by Poles and Russians (or Ukrainians). It had furthermore stated in the British Press that Russia had occupied Polish territories up to the Curzon Line in September 1939, and then had deliberately stopped because of the ethnographical character of this line. This was inaccurate. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland had been actuated by strategic rather than ethnographical motives. The German Soviet Line of demarcation connected with the "Curzon Line" only in the middle reaches of the River Bug.

GENERAL SIKORSKI'S EFFORTS TO FORM AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TWO CONFEDERATIONS, AND TO BRING ABOUT A DECLARATION BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS LOOKING TOWARDS POST-WAR COLLABORATION.

Yugoslav, Greek, and Czechoslovak, as well as Polish official circles, each to a greater or lesser degree, discernibly suffered a fresh wave of apprehension over the foregoing factors. General Sikorski promptly initiated moves (1) to form an alliance between the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greeco-Yugoslav confederations; (6) and (2) to bring the other Allied Governments, established here, into a joint declaration of principles, looking (5)(6) towards some form of post-war collaboration.

Personal observations (a) as to unlikelihood of Sikorski's succeeding in rallying all Allied Governments to his proposed declaration at this time; (b) on the reactions thereto; and (c) on opportunity afforded by the proposal to gain fresh insight to forward-looking views of Governments concerned.

(4) In raising the point with Russian Ambassador Bogomolov, General Sikorski received what he considers an evasive reply to the effect that the Russian authorities are carrying out the agreement, and are placing no obstacles in the way of "Poles" joining the forces. Sikorski's suspicion as to the implications of Bogomolov's use of the word "Poles" was, in the General's opinion, borne out by his very recent report from his Ambassador in Kuibyshev. This indicated that the Russian authorities were understood to be issuing Russian passports to the former inhabitants of the Polish eastern provinces, in which the Russians had held plebiscites in 1940 to show that 99.9% of the populations thereof wished to be incorporated in the U.S.S.R. This turn of events, I am aware, does not facilitate Sikorski's position vis-à-vis those who formed the opposition last July to his signing the Agreement with Russia, for it was apprehension on this very score which was one of the main causes of their bitterness (see my Polish series No. 31, July 27, 1941).

(5) In effect, according to General Sikorski and his closest associates, his proposal envisages a statement of principles along lines of the Atlantic Charter.

Notwithstanding General Sikorski's energetic efforts, I do not look for him to succeed in rallying all the Allied Governments to his proposal at this time. Judging by the preliminary reactions of certain officials in these circles, I perceive that the General's suggestions neither as to substance nor as to timing of the declaration, accord with their respective views.

Notwithstanding its unlikelihood of succeeding, Sikorski's proposal not only has evoked some enlightening and interesting reactions, but also has afforded a valuable opportunity to gain a fresh insight to the forward-looking views of the Governments approached.

Moreover, this statement would call for post-war military as well as economic collaboration, in terms of tariff and transportation considerations (a draft of the General's proposals is, I understand, still in the process of preparation).

(6) I should be definitely inclined to look for the Russian authorities to take an unfavorable and suspicious view of these moves at this time - especially in event that they perceive traces of Polish initiative. In that case, moreover, General Sikorski might run the risk of a complete set-back in his recent agreement with M. Stalin. Furthermore, since I personally feel that everything possible should be done to dispel Russian suspicion of her Allies and associates, any move at this time which might prove offensive to her should be avoided. In response to informal questions from Polish, Norwegian, Czechoslovak, Belgian and Yugoslav officials, I have informally made my private opinion clear, emphasizing that I thought that any contemplated mover of the above character should be submitted to the "acid test": Could it in any way be construed by the Russians as a move directed against them in terms either of the near or long range outlook.

DISCERNIBLE PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENT
CIRCLES TO GENERAL SIKORSKI'S PROPOSAL, AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE FORWARD-LOOKING VIEWS.

Czechoslovak Government's preliminary reactions and
forward-looking views.

In connection with General Sikorski's initiative in the matter of the proposed declaration by the Allied Governments, I have the impression that while Dr. Benes is no less opposed than the General to any plan implying eventual Russian encirclement of Czechoslovakia, as well as of Poland and of other states in that area, he has thus far been careful not to show his hand in any moves which the Russians might interpret as efforts to build up a block against them. Accordingly, I have the impression that, desiring to avoid the risk of incurring Russian suspicion and ire, he usually confines expression of whatever apprehensions he might have to discrete (7) conversations with the British authorities and ourselves.

(7) In this connection, it may be recalled that, in my despatch Czechoslovak series No.7, January 27, 1942, I reported Dr. Benes' view that it was Russia alone which had thus far conceived a definite post-war plan applicable to certain areas in Europe. It was highly important, therefore, that the United States and Britain together consider and formulate, at least in principle, a clear-cut plan of their own. This was urgently necessary in order to be prepared for the moment when Russia might possibly bring pressure to bear on Washington as well as on London for commitments in light of her own plan. He felt, moreover, that once the United States and Britain had agreed between themselves, they would be in position to meet with the Russians, to discuss their respective plans. He had, he said, energetically striven in the years leading up to the outbreak of the war to bring about an understanding between Russia and France and Britain in preparation for the war. Now he was earnestly hopeful of an understanding between the United States, Britain and Russia, in preparation for the peace.

Dr. Benes and Foreign Minister Dr. Ripka, are both of the firm belief (a) that the degree both of justice in a durable post-war European settlement, and of order or chaos in a post-war Europe, depend upon the degree of understanding between the United States, Britain and Russia; and (b) that towards such understanding an agreement in principle at least, between the United States and Britain on a post-war plan for Europe, is an essential preliminary to eventual American-British-Russian conversations looking towards a three-cornered accord on this and other post-war aspects. Hence, since they would not want to run the risk of incurring Russia's doubts and suspicions, meanwhile, they would be averse to participating in a move which the Russians might interpret as envisaging a bloc directed against them. They moreover both share the firm view that, since experience has shown that the only way to hold an ever ambitious Germany in check is to convince her that she would face a two-front war, it is necessary for the future to create a durable bridge of understanding between the major Western Powers and Russia, as well as the states between the Baltic and the Aegean. Great care, they hold, should be taken in creating and maintaining such a bridge, with view to preventing the Germans from ever again thinking it possible to isolate one side from the other. Moreover, in my recent talks with Dr. Benes and Dr.

Ripka/

Ripka, they disclosed that in suggesting that their Government join in the proposed declaration, General Sikorski had spoken only in the vaguest terms concerning the envisaged substance thereof. However he had emphasized his view that the declaration would be helpful both to President Roosevelt and to Prime Minister Churchill. It would give important evidence of efforts in the direction of their jointly expressed hopes for post-war cooperation; adherence to the policy set forth in the "Atlantic Charter"; it would strengthen their hands in focussing attention of their respective peoples on Hitler as "Enemy No.1". Moreover, Allied Governmental initiative in the matter would serve to allay possible Russian suspicions that the declaration had found its inspiration in "Anglo-American scheming". In response to the General's remarks, Dr. Benes and Dr. Ripka had told him that before taking action in the matter they would want first to consult the three major powers. Dr. Benes thereupon significantly remarked to me that, from the Czechoslovak Government's standpoint, a cardinal condition for the Polish-Czechoslovak Pact was a friendly relationship between Poland and Russia.

Dr. Benes' views on means of dispelling Russia's doubts and suspicions.

Further clarifying his views, Dr. Benes went on to say that in order to dispel Russian suspicions it was necessary (1) to avoid giving any impression either that the Allied Governments concerned were forming a bloc against Russia, or that Britain and the United States were encouraging this; (2) to

dispel/

dispel Russian apprehension lest Britain and the United States would refuse to grant Russia even a hearing on what Russia considered to be matters purely of Russian interest. These were: the 1941 Russian frontier with Finland, the Baltic States, the Eastern frontier of Poland, and Bessarabia. As regards the Finnish-Russian frontier question, the Russians would more than likely take the position that they would not care again to risk Finland's becoming the instrument of German military policy against them. With regard to the Baltics, the Russians would likely adopt a similar line of argument, claiming in addition that these states lay within their natural economic as well as strategic orbit.

Concerning Poland's Eastern frontier with Russia, they would probably take the position that in certain areas along the Polish side of the 1939 frontier, peoples of Russian origin and extraction were predominant.

In further connection with the Polish-Russian frontier, Dr. Benes continued, General Sikorski had already given him the impression that he was confident that he and Stalin could settle this question between themselves. Benes felt, moreover, that although, for obvious reasons, Sikorski would hesitate to divulge it to his associates at this time, Sikorski was entertaining the thought at the back of his head that he might succeed in working out some "rectification" along this frontier,

provided/

provided Poland were compensated elsewhere. This, of course, Benes said, meant primarily the elimination of the East Prussian enclave, and consequently the "corridor" question.

As for Bessarabia, Russia would undoubtedly argue that this lay within her natural orbit.

Dr. Benes went on to say that in considering these questions realistically, he did not overlook the remoteness of Britain and the United States from these areas of Europe. Nor did he overlook the possibility that if the United States and Britain differed with Russia concerning these areas, and were at the same time not in the mood to support their views with force, Russia might settle the matter in her own way. In this connection, he had in mind the proximity of Russia to these areas, and the swiftness with which Russia might move, should she decide to take matters in her own hands.

Dr. Benes' views on the necessity of an Allied, not a Russian victory, to insure an Allied not a Russian peace.

Speaking of the prosecution of the war, Dr. Benes held that, in event the Russians broke through, and headed in the direction of Berlin, it would be necessary that the Polish and Czechoslovak forces join up the Russian drive, in order to be at hand in their respective countries at the time of Russian penetration. It would be, moreover, equally necessary that the forces of the western powers drive towards Berlin at the same time. In brief, an allied, not a Russian victory, was essential

in

in order to insure an allied, not a Russian peace. (8)

Dr. Benes' views as to the likelihood of post-war revolutions on European continent, and a possible means of "canalizing" them.

Of the possible immediate aftermath of war in Europe, Dr. Benes expressed his opinion that the cessation of hostilities would find an outbreak of revolutions in most European States. He felt, however, that, in event of a friendly understanding between Britain and ourselves and Russia, these uprising could be "canalized".

Even in Czechoslovakia a revolution was inevitable, Dr. Benes said, but in milder form than that which was likely to take place in other countries. By comparison with the other smaller states of Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe, Czechoslovakia had enjoyed a more balanced social and economic structure. (9)

(8) Of connected bearing, Dr. Benes said that in recent friendly and informal talks with Russian Ambassadors Maisky and Bogomolov he had stated his frank opinion that Russia would make a fundamental mistake if she were ever to move her troops into Prague. In the first place, the Czechoslovaks would react towards the Russians as they were now reacting towards the Germans. Moreover, through the tragic results of German occupation of Prague, he had pointed out the world had learned the full meaning of Bismark's statement that whoever mastered Prague would be master of Europe. The world had learned its lesson on this score - and it was well for them to bear this in mind, in case the Russians were ever tempted to occupy Prague. Indeed, he had stressed, the presence of Russian troops in Prague would no doubt eventually provoke a consolidation of world forces against her. (Russia)

(9) As for his country's future, he had already conceived a "new deal" programme envisaging broad agrarian and economic reforms. He earnestly hoped thereby to re-invigorate the social and economic structure of the country, and to improve working and living conditions for the people as a whole. They must, he said, be made to know they were well off and that revolution would lead only to something worse.

As for Poland, a revolution there was also inevitable, but, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, of minor degree. The end of the war would probably find Poland no longer able to continue her hitherto unbalanced social-economic life: the great disparity between the large landowners and the peasants. Hence, Poland might be expected to emerge from the war better prepared to develop a more balanced national structure.

In Hungary, the revolution would assume a more violent form: the masses against the large landowners.

In Rumania, the revolution would likewise assume a more violent form.

In Bulgaria, the masses, who by nature were naturally pro-Russian, would probably rise against the King and his followers.

As for France, she would more than likely pass through what the Germans called a "blood bath". Moreover, due to her continued tragic condition, together with the inevitable revolution, she would not be likely to take her place again as a first class nation for perhaps seven to eight years or more. This would alter the historic balance in Europe, and would tend to make all the more necessary a group of strong regional confederations of independent states in East and Central and Southeast Europe.

At this point Dr. Benes again stressed his opinion that an American-British-Russian understanding was a pre-requisite to the "canalization" of these anticipated revolutions.

As regards the post-war internal political structure of France, he said he considered it might best be directed under the leadership of a strong Left bourgeoisie. This might succeed if supported by the friendly interest of Britain, the United States and Russia. As for General de Gaulle's part in the early period of reconstruction, Benes considered that he might be expected to play an important, yet perhaps not the leading role.

Dr. Benes' hopes concerning Czechoslovakia's future.

As regards Dr. Benes' views on post-war Czechoslovakia, he would like the British Government as soon as possible to repudiate "Munich" formally and juridically, reserving at the same time rights to discuss with the "Great Powers" and Czechoslovakia, the latter's future frontiers and their implications. Pending British action along these lines, Dr. Benes does not feel in position to go further in his negotiations with the Poles.

Moreover, he would like to cede territory on the West (Egerland), North and North-east territory, territory which contains 600,000 to 700,000 Sudeten Germans. He also would want certain "rectifications" on the strategically weakest portion of the frontier on the North, North-east, in order that he could describe these modifications as an "exchange" rather than a cession of territory. In order to rid himself of as many Sudeten Germans as possible, he would like to expel two "without territory" for every one "with territory

territory". Accordingly, of the total of approximately 3,200,000 within the old frontiers, he would be left with 3,200,000 less 650,000 "with territory", less twice 650,000 "without territory".

In connection with the above views, I may add that I am aware that British authorities have told Dr. Benes that due, among other factors, to promises to us, they could make no commitments of this nature.

Speaking of Czechoslovakia's future, Dr. Benes said that his country wanted to be friends with Russia, but not her slaves. He was, therefore, earnestly hopeful of American as well as British friendly interest not only in the restoration of his country but also in the reconstruction of Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe as a whole.

This is the gist of Dr. Benes' considered views and hopes in connection with the future of his country and of his part of Europe in particular, and of Europe in general.

Dr. Benes' views regarding the Comintern after the war.

As regards Dr. Benes' views on the Comintern after the war, he told me that on frequent occasions Russian Ambassadors Maisky and Bogomolov had both taken pains to emphasize that M. Stalin had no intentions of interfering in the internal affairs either of Czechoslovakia, Poland or other states of Europe. Dr. Benes said that while he welcomed these assurances, there was, to his mind, at the moment, no certainty that the policy of "world-revolution" would not be revived after the war.

Czechoslovak

Czechoslovak Minister without Portfolio Ossusky's views
on possibility of post-war Comintern activities

Doctor Stephan Ossusky, of Slovak origin, formerly Ambassador to France and presently Minister without Portfolio in Doctor Benes' Cabinet, stated to me in effect the following:

As regards the possibility of a post-war revival of the Comintern's activities, he felt that while Stalin had dispensed with the policy of world revolution, there was no certainty that he would not revive these tactics after the close of the war. As compared to Dr. Benes' activities, Dr. Ossusky stated he is convinced that the Soviet Government had in mind solely a post-war settlement which would allow it to develop its own country in peace. Moscow he held had no illusions about the standard of living which remained desperately low. Moreover, the signs of imperialism now clearly emerging did not presage any attempt at world conquest, but had their origin in reaction against the Comintern and Communism. Everyone in power in Russia was fully aware that there was no communism left in that country, even if there ever was any. With the Comintern it was different. When Lenin, he continued, who with Trotsky was a man of theories as well as action, as opposed to Stalin, who was a shrewd Georgian peasant opportunist, began arranging the educational system for the U.S.S.R. he charged Lunacharsky to burn every Russian history book and substitute a new history of Russia which would gloss over patriotism of any kind and would glorify the revolutionaries who had from time to time appeared in the history of the country. Whoever they were and
however

however obscure, these revolutionary leaders were to be written up as heroes. This astonishing history book had been the sole one in use in schools and universities up to 1937. He, Ossusky, had a copy. In 1937 Stalin sent for his Minister of Education and ordered the destruction of every copy of this book. A new history of Russia was to be written, based on the principal revolutionary histories, glorifying all the conquerors and any man whose patriotism stood out beyond the average. Certain members of the Ministry of Education brought up themselves on Lunacharsky's history of Russia protested at this staggering volte-face and the violation at what they had been taught to believe. They were liquidated. The new history of Russia, which is surprisingly similar to the writings of such persons as Professor Von und zu Almedingen had formed the basis of historical instruction in the U.S.S.R. since the beginning of 1938.

At the same time, Lenin had ordered the destruction of all the works of the Great Russian patriot poet, Pushkin. It was a criminal offence to possess a copy. Stalin heard of this writer in 1937; ordered his resurrection and the translation of his works into sixty odd languages spoken in the U.S.S.R. This had been done. Up to the outbreak of the present war, 32,000,000 copies of Pushkin had been sold in Russia. Finally up to 1939, the Soviet Army had taken an oath to defend the Communist Party and Communist ideas anywhere and everywhere. Stalin was then Secretary General of the Communist Party. In 1940, the Red Army oath was
altered

altered to the same one taken in the days of the Czar, though naturally amended in a suitable fashion. They were sworn to defend the sacred fatherland and the Government of the U.S.S.R. Stalin had then placed himself at the head of the Army.

GENERAL SIKORSKI'S APPREHENSIONS AND FORWARD-LOOKING VIEWS.

Motive behind Sikorski's desire that Raczynski visit Washington.

As I cabled, following Polish Acting Foreign Minister Raczynski's request for a visa for the United States, it became increasingly clear (a) that the main reason behind General Sikorski's eagerness that Raczynski visit Washington, was his concern over the implications of M.Stalin's reported post-war intentions vis-à-vis Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe; (10) (b) that the General accordingly hoped that Raczynski might be given a hearing in Washington concerning his Government's views on these intentions, before we might have determined our position in the matter; and (11) (c) that in thus stating his Government's views, Raczynski might obtain, in effect, some form of "reinsurance" against any possible tendency to yield to pressure for commitments, in connection with M.Stalin's reported intentions.

(10) Refer page 2, Despatch Polish Series 104, January 10, 1942.

(11) In contemplating visiting Washington himself, General Sikorski regards Raczynski's visit in the light of "paving the way" for him subsequently to develop in greater detail certain views of his Government.

Authoritative assurances here as to ^{no} contemplated commitments to Russia.

I am aware that General Sikorski has already received authoritative assurance here of no contemplated commitments on the above score. In fact, he confidentially told me that Mr. Churchill had assured him in effect that he did not consider this the time to discuss the question of frontiers. ⁽¹²⁾ This could be settled in good time. However, if it eventually became necessary to come to some arrangement with Russia on this question, it would have to be settled on a basis of justice.

Sikorski's sense of relief on learning Molotov not expected here until later than formerly reported.

Mr. Churchill had told him, moreover, that M. Molotov's proposed visit to London, in return for Mr. Eden's visit to Moscow, would probably not take place until about May-June. General Sikorski greeted this information with a sense of marked relief, for he had previously understood that M. Molotov might be coming here about February-March. He had been deeply apprehensive lest so early a visit as February-March might have far-reaching, unhappy consequences. To engage in conversations when the Russians were at the height of a wave of successes, he felt, would be risky. It would be better to "wait and see" the course of the anticipated "spring drive".

(12) See page 10 last paragraph this despatch for Dr. Benes' observations re General Sikorski's back-of-the-head thought on post-war Polish-Russian frontier. Also refer my despatch Polish Series No. 117, February 2, 1942, page 4 for my observations re same subject.

He would be inclined to construe any Russian search for commitments before that time, as an effort to obtain "reinsurance" in form of minimum claims, in case an allied victory found the Caucasus in German hands, and the Russian forces pushed beyond the Volga.

Personal observations re background for impression that Sikorski hopes for some form of "reinsurance" from us against any tendency to yield to possible Russian pressure for commitments.

In connection with my above stated impression that General Sikorski entertains hopes of some form of "reinsurance" from us against any tendency to yield to possible Russian pressure for commitments on M. Stalin's intentions, I feel that either consciously, or unconsciously, the General is motivated by M. Stalin's remarks in their last conversation in Moscow. According to the General, M. Stalin had told him that by comparison with his satisfaction over the favorable trend of British public opinion regarding Russia, the underlying division of American opinion as regards Russia was for him a cause of considerable concern. I recall that when General Sikorski imparted this to me following his return from Moscow, he (13) remarked that, to his mind, the British as a whole, were inclined to be "too much at the feet of Russia" - and he thought that the United States had a more balanced point of view regarding Russia.

(13) The General and his associates are constantly vigilant as to all shades of British opinion, especially in regard to Poland, and the Continent in general.

Sikoraki's conversation with Sir Stafford Cripps; the latter's observations; Sikoraki's reactions thereto.

In further connection with his reactions as to the trend of British opinion, the General more recently confided to me that his talk with Sir Stafford Cripps, immediately after the latter's return here, had been for him a source of considerable disappointment. The General said that judging by Sir Stafford's remarks, the latter seemed, in his opinion, overly-impressed by Russia - to the point where he was apt to lose sight of other important considerations.

Substance of Sir Stafford Cripps' views on Russia and her potential bearing on post-war European reconstruction, as expressed to General Sikoraki.

The General went on to say that Sir Stafford had made the following observations:

If the United States intended to take decisions with Britain, on European reconstruction, it was essential that these decisions must not be delayed any longer than possible. Russia was already suspicious both of the United States and Britain, and delay would only serve to sharpen these suspicions. A clear, friendly, and durable understanding with Russia was a pre-requisite to cooperation between the Western powers and Russia in the reconstruction of Europe. Without this cooperation the world could look forward to little short of chaos. If, provided she intended to cooperate in post-war European reconstruction, the United States and Britain did not find themselves in cooperation with Russia before Russia might have reached Berlin, the smaller European nations would have to take their orders from the Soviet Union. The perspective of many people/

people was still clouded by old conceptions, old fears of the spread of "world revolution". He did not believe Russia would treat communism as an export item after the war. The danger of this possibility would be more likely to arise if the western powers were either to attempt to isolate Russia or to adopt a hostile attitude. The Russian Government would find a tremendous task of its own after this war, and would have to devote a great part of its energies to reconstruction within its own frontiers. Its paramount aim would naturally be to rebuild a strong Russia. He was convinced that the Russian Government had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of other European countries. Moreover, he did not look for imperialistic expansion. He felt, however, that the Russian Government would want strategically sound frontiers.

General Sikorski's reactions to Cripps' remarks.

Immediately following this conversation General Sikorski asked me to come to see him. I found him in a discernibly exercised state of mind. He repeated Sir Stafford Cripps' foregoing remarks, emphasizing his own opinion that Sir Stafford was overly-impressed with Russia.

Referring to Sir Stafford's remarks about the Comintern, the General said that in a very recent talk with Ambassador Maisky, the latter had said that he shared M. Stalin's opinion that the Poles could not be "Russified", and he could moreover assure Sikorski that Russia would not interfere in Poland's internal affairs/

affairs. He, personally, would like to see the world profit by Russia's experience in the social economic fields - but he did not believe that this could become a reality during his life time.

The General added that the Comintern was at present headquartered at a remote point in Siberia. He said he refrained from drawing attention to this fact, however, since he was apprehensive lest it give us, as well as the British, a false sense of repose. He personally was of the opinion that there could be no certainty that M. Stalin and his associates would not revive the world revolutionary policy of the Comintern after the war.

General Sikorski's further reactions to Cripps' observations; and observations as to his forward-looking thoughts regarding Poland.

In connection with Sir Stafford's reference to frontiers, I recall that General Sikorski told me, soon after his return from Moscow, that he felt confident the question of the Polish-Russian frontier could eventually be settled directly between the Poles and the Russians. However, as pointed out in despatch Polish Series No. 117, February 2, 1942, I do not believe that he is optimistic as to a satisfactory outcome, in terms of Poland's claims; he is sufficiently realistic not to count upon a settlement of the question on basis of 1939 frontier. I furthermore have the impression that, at the back of his head, he has linked the question of possible "rectifications" of the frontier with post-war compensation elsewhere: incorporation of East Prussia, some
form

form of union with Lithuania, and perhaps inclusion of part of pre-war German Silesia within Poland's frontiers. He would, to my mind, hesitate, however, to divulge such views to his associates or to Polish army circles here. In this connection, it is unlikely that he has forgotten the views of former Foreign Minister Zaleski, during the course of the negotiations for the Polish Russian Agreement. Zaleski, voicing the opinion of those who opposed the terms of the Polish-Russian agreement, held that the negotiations leading up to the signing thereof had clearly revealed that Russia had no intention of returning all, but only certain portions of Polish territory occupied by Russian forces.

Sikorski's disappointment over Cripps' views revived his unhappy impression of various shades of British reaction to Polish-Russian agreement.

I am aware that Sikorski's disappointment over Sir Stafford's views was the sharper for its having reawakened his hitherto lingering doubts as to what attitude British public opinion might eventually assume with regard to Poland's position in a post-war settlement. These doubts, which for months have been gnawing at the back of his mind, arose mainly from the unhappy impression he had gained from the implications of the following publications, as to the reaction of various shades of British opinion to the Polish-Russian Agreement in July: (1) The implications of an editorial, "Peace and Power", in the "Times" of August 1, 1941, to effect that after this war leadership

ship in Eastern Europe could fall only to Germany or Russia, Neither Britain nor the United States could exercise, or would aspire to exercise, any predominant role in these regions; and it would be fatal to revive the allied policy of 1919, which created a bond of union between Germany and Russia against Western Europe. There could be no doubt that British and Russian - and it might be admitted, American - interests alike, demanded that Russian influence in Eastern Europe should not be eclipsed by that of Germany; (2) the implications of an article in "Truth" of August 8, 1941, to effect that the real value of the Polish-Russian Agreement to Britain was that it enabled Britain, with a clear conscience, to wash its hands of the Russo-Polish problem. Now that Russia and Poland had come to terms, Britain was mercifully spared of its obligation in its pact with Poland to restore Poland. This would have meant that after beating Germany, Britain would have been obliged to wrest the remaining Polish provinces from Britain's Russian allies.

His thoughts, furthermore, flashed back to Minister of Labor, Mr. Bevin's, disclosure⁽¹⁴⁾, in July, to effect that he shared the attitude of a large portion of his party towards the question of fixing frontiers at this time; that the question of Poland's frontier should be left in a fluid state until a general peace settlement; that they had, moreover, never looked with favor upon the territorial changes which had taken

(14) See page 2 despatch Polish series No.31, July 27,1941.

place along the Polish-Russian border after the designation of the Curzon Line; that he personally was utterly opposed to Britain's making any commitment regarding frontiers in general.

Further and more current causes of irritation, contributing to Sikorski's concern over British opinion as regards Poland's potential position in a European settlement, were the following: (1) a recent open letter to the weekly periodical "Free Europe", from Commander Stephen King-Hall, M.P., in which he stated that the man who was as likely as anyone to decide what would happen to Germany was M. Stalin. The writer would make a guess that M. Stalin would not split Germany, but would arrange for a Communist Germany; and (2) G.D.H.Coles' recently published book "Europe, Russia and the Future", wherein the writer, in spite of his confession of unhappiness, preferred a post-war Europe based on the Soviet Union. Accordingly, his ideas envisaged the inclusion of Central Europe, the Baltic, Danubian and Balkan countries in a greater U.S.S.R. Even a socialist Germany might form part of it. As for the exiled Governments of the Allied countries, the writer expressed the charitable hope that they would never see their native lands again.

In connection with the foregoing causes of Sikorski's concern, I am aware that he is deeply appreciative of Mr. Churchill's assurances as to no contemplated commitments in connection with M. Stalin's expressed post-war ideas. At the same time, however, the aforesaid indications, I am equally aware, caused Sikorski and associates to feel none too

too confident of public opinion here, in event that a possibly war-weary people eventually found victory at hand.

FURTHER LIGHT ON VIEWS OF POLISH GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE.

Further light was thrown on the views of the Polish Government as a whole (a) as to the importance of a post-war "cooperative Great Power" between the Baltic and Aegean, and (b) as to the factors essential to the creation thereof; by the following observations of several leading Polish officials in my recent talk with them:

They said that British press comment on the recent Agreements between the Polish and Czechoslovak, and the Yugoslav and Greek Governments, was on the whole favorable, though restrained as far as the role of the great powers was concerned. Any efforts, they held, of the nations of Central and Southeastern Europe to form an area of strength between the Baltic and the Aegean would be thwarted unless supported by the great powers. Europe had to be rebuilt in such a way as to prevent Germany's starting a third war. The line Danzig-Salonika was the spinal cord of the lands east of Germany. The interests of the English speaking nations demanded that those nations must take an active part in creating a "cooperative Great Power" in that area. A "strong bloc" east of Germany, lay also in the interests of Russia. Russia could take exception to such a block, if, on the one hand, she could reasonably believe that its policy could be hostile to her, or, on the other hand, if she designed to bring these countries under her own domination. It was obvious that the first possibility was unthinkable. As for the second possibility, that was, that Russia might
want

want to shift her frontier westwards, it was well to recall the Soviet experiment of 1940, when "sham plebiscites" were held in the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, Bukovina and Bessarabia, to prove that 99.9 percent of the populations of these districts wanted to be incorporated in the Soviet Union. Such plebiscites, my informants held, could not be recognized and the Polish Government had to have the certainty that Moscow would not resort to such experiments in the future. Any solutions based on them could not make for a just and durable peace in Europe. Russia, Europe, and the rest of the world, had to be spared the sufferings and upheavals which were bound to follow this type of imperialism.

GENERAL SIKORSKI'S IRRITATION OVER GENERAL DE GAULLE'S RADIO BROADCAST FAVORABLY REMARKING UPON RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE FUTURE.

An illustration of General Sikorski's agitated state of mind as a result of the aforementioned causes of irritation and events, was his action following a recent radio broadcast of General de Gaulle. The latter had spoken of the future "equilibrium" in Europe, declaring that it was possible only with Russia taking an active part in the future organization of European security. Accordingly, he hoped for a Europe composed of two main security blocks, closely cooperating - one based mainly on Russia, and the other on Britain and France. The very next day following the broadcast, General Sikorski told me, he had "called General de Gaulle to account, over the contents of his
address

address, stating that it seemed to him that de Gaulle was playing into the hands of the Russians - and emphasizing that de Gaulle would be merely a tool in Russian hands, only to be cast aside when he would have served Russia's purpose.

I am aware that in response General de Gaulle good naturedly replied that what he had said was only good common sense. Russia meant business; her energies were admirably devoted to a total effort to win the war. Moreover, Russia was serious and would have to be taken into serious consideration in connection with any post-war reconstruction plan. He in fact believed in Russia's sincerity of purpose to the extent of having already sent a combined diplomatic and military Mission to Moscow. He concluded by stating that he felt a durable peace could be attained best by an understanding between the major powers of western Europe and Russia.

Another cause of recent irritation for General Sikorski, was the radio broadcast views of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Ripka, on January 23, to effect that Russia would hereafter be a decisive factor in world politics, and in the organizing of Central Europe. He held moreover, that the closer collaboration between Czechoslovakia and Poland had been facilitated by the rapprochement between Poland and Russia. He further spoke of his country's future "friendly cooperation with the great powers of western Europe, and particularly with the Soviet Union".⁽¹⁵⁾

(15) In this connection since this broadcast, I have discerned Sikoraki's characteristically Polish tendency to worry lest his Czechoslovak colleagues' friendly relations with Russia prove a disadvantage to Poland's interest. On the other hand, I am aware that the keynote of Ripka's as well as Benes' policy is "to be friends but not slaves of Russia".

COMPARISON OF BENEŠ'S AND SIKORSKI'S VIEWS AS TO METHODS
AND TIMING OF PROCEDURE IN CONSULTATION BETWEEN MAJOR
WESTERN POWERS AND RUSSIA.

While Beneš and Sikorski share the view that an agreement between the United States and Britain as to a post-war European reconstruction plan is a pre-requisite to an understanding between these two major powers and Russia, they differ as to the methods and timing of procedure. Beneš would like to see early three-cornered conversations after the Americans and British had agreed upon a plan. Sikorski would like to see an early Anglo-American agreement on a European post-war plan, but he considers it would be better to wait and see the turn of events in the spring, before these two powers discussed such a plan with Russia.

Sikorski, characteristic of the attitude of his Government as a whole, would like to see built up in the quickest possible order, a great cooperative power with western support. Beneš, on the other hand, wishing to dispel Russian suspicions, tries discretely to soft-pedal any moves by his colleagues which might prove offensive to the Russians, hoping meanwhile that after the major western powers might have agreed upon a post-war European plan, they would enter into conversations with Russia looking towards a durable peace. Accordingly, he endeavors to exercise a quiet, restraining influence on any discernible tendency on part of the Poles to give vent to their recurrent waves of distrust of Russia. On the other hand, Beneš in his cautiousness, is at times apt to strike Sikorski as being unduly passive.

PRELIMINARY

PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO SIKORSKI'S
PROPOSED DECLARATION, AND ITS FORWARD-LOOKING VIEWS.

As for the Norwegian Government, I am aware that in the first place, M. Stalin already sent word to Foreign Minister Lie, through Ambassador Maisky, that he had no post-war designs on Norway. While the Norwegian Government greeted with a sense of discernible but unexpressed concern information concerning M. Stalin's desire to reestablish Russia's 1941 frontier with Finland, it has derived a sense of comfort from M. Stalin's message regarding Norway. Hence, I do not believe that the Norwegian Government would be likely to join in any move which might at this time incite Russian doubts and suspicions. Nor would it care to join in any move of exclusively Allied governmental membership - it would want Britain and, if possible, the United States as well, included. On the other hand, the present Norwegian Government has, since its coming to office in 1935, been opposed to alliances and other commitments aside from those of cultural nature, with states beyond Norway's sphere of interests. Moreover, Foreign Minister Lie in an address on November 18, 1940, envisaged Norway's post-war position as one of the "Atlantic States".

In line with this policy, the Government feels that, due to its extensive interests as a shipping and seafaring nation, any future cooperation should be especially intimate with the United States and the British Empire. It is moreover, willing to participate in an international order in Europe, if the United States and Britain are
willing

willing to cooperate, and if Russia and China join them amicably.

PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF BELGIAN GOVERNMENT TO SIKORSKI'S
DECLARATION AND ITS FORWARD LOOKING VIEWS.

As for the Belgian Government, while there is a tendency on the part of some of its members to "flirt" with the idea of an Allied governmental declaration as proposed by General Sikorski, I believe that the Government as a whole would more than likely be guided mainly by whatever decision the Netherlands Government might take in the matter.

PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT TO SIKORSKI'S
PROPOSED DECLARATION AND ITS FORWARD LOOKING VIEWS.

As for the Netherlands Government, it is at this time considering exchanging diplomatic representatives with Russia, and is unlikely to look with favor upon any Allied governmental declaration which might conceivably incite Russian suspicion. Looking on the other hand towards the future, in terms of post-war reconstruction the views of the Netherlands Government might be characterized as cautiously hopeful. The Prime Minister, reflecting the trend of opinion amongst his associates, confidentially expressed to me his opinion that "things had not yet sufficiently taken form" (16) to warrant the setting up of post-war confederations.

(16) Although the leading members of the Netherlands Government have hitherto discouraged efforts to interest their Government in Dutch participation in a post-war regional grouping, Foreign Minister van Kleffens has, in the course of the past several months, had a number of exploratory conversations with representatives of the Norwegian and Belgian Governments, regarding the possibilities of post-war collaboration in the economic field. These talks, however, have been motivated mainly by apprehension lest Article 4, "Atlantic Charter" imply a post-war revival of the Ottawa Agreement. Hence, I am inclined at this stage, to consider these talks in the nature partly of a tactical move (care has been taken that the British authorities were not kept in the dark regarding the discussions and the purpose thereof) and partly of a serious search for a workable formula in case of a post-war return to "Ottawa"

I am aware, that his Government has already replied to this effect to the Belgian Government's several soundings on the possibility of a post-war Netherlands-Belgian grouping. As to planning for post-war reconstruction, the Prime Minister emphasized the importance of setting up any post-war international machinery on the basis of a realistic conception. He could see no durability in an unreal conception such as a purely European grouping of nations.

As in the case of the Norwegian and Belgian Government's views regarding the positions of their respective countries, it is clear that in the Netherlands Government's point of view, there is a greater community of interest between the Netherlands and the United States, Britain and other overseas states, than between the Netherlands and purely European groupings.

YUGOSLAV AND GREEK GOVERNMENTS PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S PROPOSED DECLARATION.

As for the Yugoslav and Greek Governments, their apprehension over the reportedly rapid growth of Communism in their respective countries, coupled with their uneasiness over Russia, tends to overshadow other considerations at the moment. This moreover, leads them to lend a receptive ear to proposals, such as that of General Sikorski, looking towards the strengthening of their area in particular and the continent in general.

In recent conversation with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nintchitch, I gained the impression that while the preliminary inclination of his associates as a whole was to lend a

receptive

receptive ear to Sikorski's proposal, he personally did not overlook the importance of considering Russia's possible reactions in the matter. In line with my impression on this score, he outlined his forward looking views, stating that experience over the past 25 years had shown that the peace of Europe was indivisible. To insure a durable peace there would have to be found a formula allowing for measures to prevent peace's being jeopardized in any section of Europe. This would be possible only if Britain play her role as a part of Europe. It was equally essential that there be a friendly understanding and collaboration between Britain and Russia. Therein would lie the only real hope of dispelling mutual doubts and suspicions arising out of differences in internal political systems as between Russia and certain other states. Regional groupings were helpful towards establishing closer political and economic ties between the states concerned and thus towards diminishing the causes of war. However, regional groupings were helpful mainly as a basis upon which to create the essential broader structure: a European organization.

In recent conversation with the Greek Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Tsouderos, he stressed the interdependence of continents as well as of states and individuals. Like Dr. Nintchitch, he believed that the regional confederations were a step forward in the direction of a broader basis for the maintenance of peace:

a European structure. Emphasizing that economic collaboration was essential to political stability, he was hopeful that the scope of closer economic and political ties which might result from the establishment of regional grouping, would eventually be extended on a broader scale not only between the states of Europe - but also between the continents. Also like Dr. Nintchitch, Dr. Tsouderos feels that Britain's participation in the reconstruction of Europe is an essential to peace and that equally important is a friendly understanding and collaboration between Britain and Russia.

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN OVER IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT IT BELIEVES TO BE M. STALIN'S POST-WAR INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS BULGARIA.

Concerning Bulgaria, the Yugoslav Vice Premier recently told me that previous to signing the Treaty with the Greek Government, he and his associates had been disturbed by reports concerning M. Stalin's post-war intentions in connection with Bulgaria, among other states. Further indications received subsequent to the signing of the Yugoslav-Greek Treaty, had served to increase his Government's concern. He and his associates had thus gained the distinct impression that M. Stalin envisaged the inclusion of the Black Sea coastal area of Bulgaria in the Russian strategic orbit. Moreover, he said, not long ago, an official of the Russian Government in Kuibyshev had hinted to the Yugoslav Minister that if Russia, for strategic purposes, found it necessary to include the Bulgarian ports in her defense system, Yugoslavia and Greece might do well to divide the rest of Bulgaria between them.

My

My informant went on to say that anxiety over the implications of the foregoing had led to lengthy meetings of his Government during the past days. It was the consensus of opinion that if Bulgaria went Communist, nothing would prevent Serbia, where Communism had gained considerable ground during the past year, and subsequently the rest of the Balkans, from following suit. Quite aside from concern over these intentions, with regard to Bulgaria, his Government was worried lest, in the event of a Russian victory over Germany, Bulgaria might immediately declare itself a part of the U.S.S.R. This she might do, they feared, in order to be on the side of victory. Recent reports indicated moreover, that the Communists in Bulgaria were decidedly on the increase, and better organized than the Agrarians. Besides, he continued, there were the sentimental links between the Bulgarian masses and Russia. The former still regarded Russia as "Matjuchka Russia": "Grandmother Russia" - irrespective of Russia's current political complexion.

Reverting to conditions in Serbia, my informant reiterated his and his associates' alarm over the rapid strides of communism in Serbia. Like the Bulgarians, the Serbs had historically looked to Russia in the light of "Grandmother Russia". Now, even the Orthodox Clergy continued in this leaning, regardless of the Communist aspect. Several months ago, former Premier and Minister of Defense, General Simovitch, had deemed it necessary to ask Moscow to use its influence towards bringing the Serb insurgents to take orders from

General

General Mihailovitch. The reply had clearly been evasive. More recently, newly appointed Premier Jovanovitch had made a similar request of Russian Ambassador to the Allied Governments, Bogomolov; the latter had answered that nothing could be done in the matter. My informant said he had pointed out these facts to me, in order to show the extent of his Government's cognizance of Moscow's influence inside Yugoslavia.


With further reference to influences at play inside his country, my informant said that in Croatia sabotage and atrocities had broken out only after Germany's attack on Russia. Germany had seen to this in order to reawaken old friction.

In Serbia, Mihailovitch had at the outset opposed sabotage, and had embarked on a plan to organize all villages for action at an opportune moment. However, the Communist agents had imposed sabotage at the outbreak of the Russian-German war. My informant concluded, by stating it was his, and his associates' opinion that Russia wanted to be the direct master of the Balkan area. For this reason, he believed, Moscow was opposed to the Yugoslav-Greek Treaty. In fact, Vishinski had told the Yugoslav Minister in Kuibyshev, in response to the latter's inquiry as to the Russian Government's reaction, that he had nothing to say.

Respectfully yours,

A.J.Drexel Biddle, Jr.

AJDB:EMC@:GMT:MWMCK
(In Quintuplicate)



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Journal

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942


My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your information a secret message I have received today from General Sikorski through the Polish Ambassador in Washington.

I am sending a copy of this message to Secretary Stimson with the request that he let me know what reply I may make to the request contained in the last paragraph of the message from General Sikorski.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure.

The President,
The White House.

~~SECRET~~

Before leaving Canada for England, General Sikorski sent me the following very secret information, received by me on April 5. requesting me to communicate it to Secretary Sumner Welles:

" During the stay of General Sikorski in Washington the Polish Military Authorities carried through three secret flights into Poland. In the course of these flights 18 specialists for Diversion work and sabotage were landed, one million dollars in gold and paper currency, half a million German marks and considerable quantities of diversion material. Several more flights are contemplated. The British Authorities have been most efficiently helpful. These flights will have to be abandoned in the end of April on account of the short nights.

The evacuation of the Polish troops from Soviet Russia is progressing rapidly. The first transports of soldiers are already in Iran. The evacuation of the civilians, of women and children is causing great difficulty. The number of the latter evacuees reaches some 10,000 at present.

In view of the above mentioned facts, General Sikorski would be grateful for the favorable decision concerning the granting to the Polish High Command of the *6/six* long distance bombing planes which he asked for and for the speeding up of the credits so urgently needed to carry on the secret work in Poland and the aid to the civilians, women and children being evacuated from Russia.

J. Ciechanowski

Washington, Polish Embassy, April 6. 1942.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PSF: Biddle Folder
~~(Biddle)~~ 1-42

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter dated April 3 from Ambassador Ciechanowski in which the appreciation of General Sikorski is expressed for the sympathetic understanding shown by you for the problems of Poland as presented personally by General Sikorski. Mr. Ciechanowski's letter has been acknowledged by me.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

From Polish Ambassador
April 3, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted **4/7**

ADDRESSED TO

The President

Eu:AMR)
RED: af)

AMBASADA
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ
W WASZYNGTONIE

—
POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
2640 - 16th Street, N. W.

April 3, 1942.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have today received a telegram from General Sikorski who left Canada this morning, requesting me to ask you to convey to the President the General's most sincere thanks for the sympathetic understanding which The President showed him regarding all the problems of Poland which he had the honor of discussing with The President and with you.

General Sikorski would like especially to express his gratitude for the President's support of these matters in Moscow and London.

At the same time General Sikorski asks me to convey to you personally his thanks for all your kindness and your favorable attitude in all the questions which he submitted to you. He would like you to know that, according to cable information received by him yesterday from the Polish Ambassador in the U.S.S.R., the effect of the support granted to him during his visit in Washington is already apparent in improving the present situation between Poland and the Soviet Union.

This has been evidenced by the cooperation on the part of the Soviet authorities in the evacuation of part of our army from Russia to Iran.

General Sikorski foresees that the British authorities in Iran will have a difficult task in looking after the families of our military, a limited number of whom have already arrived in Iran. He would be most

grateful

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State.

grateful if the United States Minister in Iran would lend his valuable assistance to the British authorities in this matter.

General Sikorski concludes by expressing the conviction that the method of friendly and frank dealing pursued by him in his relations with Premier Stalin and the U.S.S.R. Government has proved effective and best calculated to serve the interests of the United Nations.

With warm regards, I am, dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours very sincerely,

J. CIECHANOWSKI

*file
personal*

PSF; Biddle Folder

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.

April 24, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

1/

Coincidental with the receipt of your letter to Queen Wilhelmina, which I immediately transmitted to her, she gave Harry a letter to transmit to you. You were very thoughtful to have sent me the copy of your letter to the Queen, which I read with the utmost interest and which, knowing her frame of mind and her sincere esteem for you, I am confident has touched her deeply. In fact, no sooner had she read it than she told me that she wanted to write another letter to you. Accordingly, I have the honor to transmit it to you herewith - and while I do not know its contents, I believe you will find that it is a spontaneous expression of enthusiastic appreciation of your magnificent letter to her.

Harry's and General Marshall's visit here had a very wholesome and stimulating effect on British mass opinion, as well as on British official circles.

I accompanied Harry on his visits to Queen Wilhelmina and to King Haakon, and thoroughly enjoyed my lengthy, interesting talks with him in addition. You may be sure that his visits both with the Queen and the King, and his messages to them from you, were for them a source of real gratification and encouragement.

With warmest regards and every good wish, I am,

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

Enclosure:
1/ as stated.

PSF: Biddle Folder

file
personal

40 Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.

April 25, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

It was a great pleasure for me to meet General Marshall. I find him just as fine a fellow and officer as I had been previously led to believe. I want you to know how much I appreciate his cooperation in having received, during his crowded hours, General Hansteen, recently appointed Commander-in-Chief of Norwegian land, air and sea forces. Though rushed in his time, General Marshall accorded General Hansteen a friendly welcome, and I am aware that the latter was very much touched not only by General Marshall's cordial reception, but also by the confidential and helpful exchange of views.

In the course of conversation, General Hansteen said that Mr. Churchill, on his return here from Washington, had confidentially mentioned to Norwegian Foreign Minister Lie, that in discussing various projects with you, he, Mr. Churchill, had mentioned the possibility of an eventual combined military, naval and air operation to regain Norway; that you had expressed your interest in this possibility; that you felt the Norwegian Government might lend a helpful hand in lining up Norwegian-American interest and support for such an eventuality.

In

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

In this connection General Hansteen went on to say that during Prime Minister Nygaardsvold's forthcoming visit to the United States, he would be prepared to discuss with you, all aspects of this project, and to offer the cooperation of himself, of his Government, and of his armed forces, in any way you might require.

As I previously wrote you, Nygaardsvold, whom I have personally known since he came to office in 1935, was formerly an unrealistic dreamer of Norway's ability to remain neutral under all conditions. Events, however, have disillusioned him. He has come down to earth, and is now a realist. I believe the story he has to tell the Norwegian-Americans amongst whom he used to live and work, may go far towards awakening in them a sense of real interest in the land of their forbears.

With warmest regards and every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Biddle



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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May 12. 1942

My dear General Watson:

There is enclosed herewith a copy of Mr. Biddle's strictly confidential despatch no. 142 of April 22, 1942, which was marked for the President. The despatch is concerned with Anglo-Russian conversations which began early in April of this year.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

From Ambassador Biddle
April 22, 1942.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.



Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted **5/11**

ADDRESSED TO

Major General Watson

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Near the Polish Government

LONDON, April 22, 1942.

No. 142

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Referring to telegram No. 30, April 13;
transmitting strictly confidential
letter from General Sikorski to Mr. Eden.

FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my telegram Polish Series No. 30,
April 13, I have the honor to report that following
the Polish Government's notification by the British
Government that Anglo-Russian conversations looking
toward an accord would commence on April 13, General
Sikorski addressed a letter to Mr. Eden, April 16,
copy and translation of which are enclosed herewith.
In handing me a copy of this letter, General Sikorski
stressed the importance of treating it in utmost con-
fidence. I expect to learn at an early date the sub-
stance of Mr. Eden's reply, and I shall promptly inform
you thereof.

1/ & 2/

Respectfully yours,

ANTHONY J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

Enclosures:
1/ & 2/ as stated.
AJDBJr:EMcQ:GMT
Forwarded in quintuplicate.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 142, April 22, 1942,
Polish Series, from the Embassy, London.

INFORMAL TRANSLATION

London, April 16, 1942

~~Strictly confidential~~
and personal.

In thanking you for the frankness with which you yesterday provided me with information regarding the negotiations in progress with the USSR, I desire to summarize my own viewpoint with the same sincerity. Permit me to communicate to you confirmation of the conversation which we have had both with you yourself and your collaborators, the following considerations.

Never, either in the USSR itself - by the creation there of a Polish army - or elsewhere - have I ever ceased to give proof of my ardent desire to collaborate loyally with the USSR. I am nevertheless obliged to object in the most decided manner, to the ambitions of Soviet Russia which is striving to follow the road followed by Czarist imperialism and which the policy of Peter the Great symbolizes, to which M. Stalin refers. It is this imperialism, which moreover has caused such grave prejudice to Europe and the entire world, that Poland owes its partitions. It is this same imperialism which is at the bottom of the demands of the Soviet Government in the negotiations in question. The proposed agreement between the British Government and the USSR does not, helas, constitute an act directed against our common enemy, Germany, as should be the case in simple justice, but rather against the vital interests of Poland, the earliest ally of Great Britain.

The scope of a general formula dealing with the maintenance of our pre September 1, 1939 frontiers, to which you have alluded, Mr. Minister, would not meet either our interests, or your own, even on the hypothesis that M. Stalin would be disposed to accept them.

I do not yet have knowledge of the tenor of the note which His Majesty's Government is in process of communicating to our Minister for Foreign Affairs; I am nevertheless convinced, that in spite of your observations of yesterday, you will agree with me that the Polish viewpoint is entirely consistent with the spirit of the Anglo-Polish Agreement of August 23, 1939.

I consider

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78

By J. Schauble Date FEB 1 1972

I consider the proposed Anglo-Soviet agreement, as I have already indicated to you, as susceptible of giving rise to very grave consequences for the subsequent conduct of the war.

If it is concluded, it would be tantamount to the definitive encirclement of Poland. Enemy propaganda would seize the opportunity to explain to all the interested countries that the U.S.S.R. has obtained from Great Britain, a signature analogous to that which the German Reich had given it in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement of 1939. To sacrifice not only vital interests of Poland, but also to give over a considerable part of Europe to Soviet Russia, whose final object is to provoke a world revolution rather than to subdue Germany, constitutes in my opinion an error capable of engendering incalculable consequences. All the countries of Europe - stretching from Norway to Greece - defend an identical and united point of view when it concerns the safeguarding of their independence and of their internal regime. And I do not doubt for an instant that the hopes placed in Russia of seeing her fulfilling the role in Europe which formerly had fallen on France are most illusory not only because of reasons of a social nature but also of a geo-political nature. The Federation blocs called to hold in check the German state, from west to east, in my opinion should assume this role.

Moreover the future federation of the countries of Central Europe would in principal be destroyed by the agreement. Soviet Russia would give it a direct blow, by demanding for herself in a manner equally artificial and cynical, Bukovina, just as on the other hand she claims Lithuania.

The proposed agreement is essentially contrary to the stipulations that Poland concluded with the U.S.S.R. in 1941. The Polish-Russian Agreement of July 30 last annulled the past conventions between Soviet Russia and the German Reich regarding the partition of Poland. It annulled precisely the German-Soviet demarkation line of October 4, 1939, to which the U.S.S.R. refers today as her 1940 frontier and which the draft Anglo-Soviet agreement confirms.

It is self-evident that Poland cannot be a party to this negotiation nor can she give her consent to the Agreement itself, but as I ascertained yesterday with painful emotion, this fact is not susceptible of influencing negotiations which are at present taking place between His Majesty's Government and the U.S.S.R.

It is not for me to pre-judge the policy which the United States will follow in this matter although it is true that President Roosevelt and his Government have entirely shared the point of view and attitude of Poland in the matter of the claims of the U.S.S.R.

But

But I must express my fears, based upon personal observations and conversations, that the Agreement in question risks strengthening considerably the action of Isolationists and all elements hostile to Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., which should not be a matter of indifference to the last mentioned Power.

I am firmly convinced that the Polish attitude so clearly expressed on such a complex and difficult problem will cast no shadow, my dear Minister, on our personal relations, which are founded upon mutual respect.

Accept, my dear Minister, the assurance of my very devoted sentiments.

His Excellency
Anthony Eden,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London.

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Confidential

Tony Biddle
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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


May 13, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I believe you will be interested in reading a despatch of May 6 from Tony Biddle, of which I am enclosing a copy herewith. This despatch relates to the present negotiations between the British and the Soviet Union.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,
The White House.

DUPLICATE

No. 144

Near the Polish Government
London, May 6, 1942.

~~DIRECTOR GENERAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDERSECRETARY

Subject: Confidential disclosure by usually well-informed Polish official concerning a recent resolution by "Watching Committee" of British Conservative Party, regarding contemplated Anglo-Russian Agreement.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

Referring to my cable No. 42, April 27, 12 midnight, I have the honor to report that in connection with the interest of Polish circles here in the contemplated Anglo-Russian Agreement, a highly placed Polish official disclosed


disclosed to me in strictest confidence the following:

He said that he had just learned confidentially that the "Watching Committee" of the British Conservative Party had passed a resolution on April 30 to the effect that the British Government should enter into no agreement with other powers which was not in accord with the policy of the United States. In revealing this to me my informant said that this indicated that there was an important element at least in Conservative Circles, which was definitely opposed to Britain's contracting an agreement with Russia if it did not enjoy the full approval of the United States. He added his opinion that this resolution, by so influential a group within the Conservative Party ranks, might possibly serve as a check rein on what he considered had hitherto been a wave of blind enthusiasm here for the aforementioned agreement.

Respectfully yours,

A.J.Drexel Biddle, Jr.

AJDBJR:EMCQ
(In Quintuplicate)





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Confidential*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1942

My dear General Watson:

There are enclosed herewith copies of Mr. Biddle's strictly confidential despatches, nos. 158, June 2, 1942 and 159, June 2, 1942 which were marked for the President.

The despatches are concerned with conversations which took place in May between Ambassador Biddle and General Sikorski regarding, respectively, missing Polish officers in Russia, and the evacuation of Polish children from Russia.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

From Ambassador Biddle,
nos. 158 and 159 of
June 2, 1942.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU }
DIVISION }

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ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted **6/20**

ADDRESSED TO

Major General Watson

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

near the Polish Government
LONDON, June 2, 1942.

No. 158

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: General Sikorski's conversation regarding
missing Polish officers in Russia.

FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER-SECRETARY

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Supplementing my despatch Polish Series No. 157, June 2, 1942, I have the honor to report that in recent conversation with General Sikorski he said, in effect, the following:

MISSING OFFICERS. In summer 1940 several thousands of Polish officers prisoners of war, who were kept in 3 camps in Central Russia (Ostashkov, Starobyelsk, Kozelsk) were taken to an unknown destination in the Far North of Russia. Since then they have not been heard of. Their number has been variously described but is usually accepted as 8,300; 1/3 of whom are professional officers and 2/3 reserve officers. The latter are for the most part professional men including about 800 physicians and many University professors and lecturers as well as a number of distinguished specialists. The Polish Military authorities have lists covering over 4,800 of these officers. These lists have been communicated to Stalin. The Soviet Government have many times been requested to release them. They invariably replied that every available prisoner of war in Russia had already been released. This statement is obviously inaccurate. There are reasons to believe that the officers in question have been deported to Franz-Joseph Islands, North of Spitzbergen, and to North-Eastern Siberia to camps on the River Kolyma, in the North of the Yakut Republic. It is more than probable that most of them have died of hunger,

scorbut

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

scorbut and cold. If the supposition as to their places of imprisonment is correct, there are but two months of summer when for technical reasons they could be brought back to Russia. Or, on the other hand, they could either be brought via the Kolyma River to Alaska or from Franz-Joseph Islands to Iceland. The absence of these officers is the principal reason of the shortages of officers in the Polish Forces in Russia, whither officers from Scotland had to be sent lately. The possible death of these men, most of whom have superior education, would be a severe blow to the Polish national life. Their evacuation during the present summer seems to be the last chance to save those who may still be alive.

In concluding his remarks, the General said that he felt confident that if in the course of pending conversations with the Russians in Washington, our authorities concerned were to express an interest in the above-mentioned problem, the Russians might act favorably in the matter.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

AJDBJr:GMT

(In quintuplicate).

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

near the Polish Government
LONDON, June 2, 1942.

No. 159.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: General Sikorski's remarks concerning the
evacuation on Polish children from Russia.

FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, AND THE UNDER-SECRETARY

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Supplementing my despatch Polish series No. 158, June 2, 1942, I have the honor to report that General Sikorski has asked me to express to you his heartfelt thanks for your kind interest and great help in connection with the Polish children in Russia. He said that there wasn't a Pole throughout the world who would not be everlastingly grateful for this human act on your part.

1/ He had already sent Ambassador Ciechanowski all the information available, and by way of keeping me informed in the matter he took occasion to hand me a memorandum, copies of which are attached hereto.

In conclusion the General said that as in the questions of further recruiting and of the search for missing Polish officers, so the question of evacuating the children from Russia depended on the goodwill of the Soviet Government. He felt, moreover, that if our authorities express their interest in the question of evacuation these children, during the course of pending conversations, the Soviet Government would give the matter its favorable consideration.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

ALDBJr:GMT

(In quintuplicate)

Enclosure

1/ as stated

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch Polish Series No. 159,
June 2, 1942, from the Embassy, London.

POLISH CHILDREN. According to latest despatches from Russia, the food situation there has lately deteriorated to a very great extent. In the Southern parts of Russia (Central Asia) rations for those who are at work have been limited to 4 oz. of flour daily. Those who do not work receive no rations. Prices on the free market are astronomical and only a small number of privileged people can afford to buy non-rationed food. In consequence many cases of death from starvation are reported and it is likely that their number will increase. The children are the first to succumb. In the Republic of Uzbekistan (Central Asia) between 5 and 14% of Polish children have died of hunger within the last few months.

In these circumstances, if these Polish children in Russia are to be saved from certain death, the evacuation of 50,000 of them, together with several thousands of mothers and guardians (a large proportion of these children are already orphans) is a paramount necessity. The Soviet Government would raise no objection to their evacuation if it were effected in a very discreet manner. They naturally do not want to disclose hunger conditions in Russia. Therefore if these people were evacuated, any information regarding conditions in Russia should be altogether withheld.

Even before receipt of this latest news on hunger conditions in parts of Russia, Ambassador Ciechanowski submitted to Mr. Sumner Welles the desire of the Polish Government to begin a large-scale evacuation of children from Russia. President Roosevelt has very generously taken a personal interest in the matter and instructed the Department of State and the American Red Cross to prepare the evacuation of 10,000 children from Persia to South Africa. Should this evacuation be effected there would be room in Persia for another 10,000 children from Russia. This, however, would mean the salvation of only a small number of the children in question. Truly heroic measures are needed if Polish children, belonging to all classes of society and representing a valuable part of the nation's future, are to be saved.

DHN

PSF; Biddle Folder

July 30, 1942.

Private and Confidential

Dear Tony:

A lot of good people in Pennsylvania are anxious to have you and Margaret come home to make one or two speeches in behalf of the ticket in Pennsylvania this Fall -- in September, if possible.

I leave it wholly to you. It would help the ticket and perhaps you both would like to be home for six weeks or so -- you deserve it -- but I leave it wholly to you.

As ever yours,

Honorable Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
Ritz Hotel,
London, England.

fdr/ggt
dj

file
personal

PSF: Biddle Folder
1-42

40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, July 31, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I have just received two telegrams, one from the Department of State, granting me, by your authority, leave of absence when and as I consider conditions permit; another one from Joe Guffey, stating he had discussed this matter with you and that he hoped I would take advantage of your authorized leave of absence.

On the one hand, I want you to know how very much both Margaret and I appreciate your thoughtfulness; on the other hand, I want you to know that Joe's suggestion to you on this score was done without his having discussed it with me in advance. Otherwise, I should have told him that circumstances in connection with the business of my Mission here are such as to prevent my taking advantage of a leave of absence at this time.

As you know, relations between the Poles and the Russians have become very tense in the past few weeks, and in my opinion, the situation requires daily attention. Very fortunately, there has been a turn for the better in Russia's attitude, namely: that Moscow has just promised the Polish Government to commence the evacuation, on August 1, of the three organized
Polish

The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Polish Divisions, consisting of 45,000 men, as well as 25,000 civilians -- making a total of 70,000 Poles. While I am very hopeful that this will serve to tranquilize growing Polish anger, I believe that our Polish friends will need some one to "hold their hands" daily until the present crisis will have been liquidated. I am hopeful, moreover, that with careful attention we can bring the Poles to approach a possible liquidation of this crisis with a spirit of compromise. In connection with this very recent agreement on Russia's part to evacuate the aforementioned 70,000 Poles, I feel confident that it is due to your own grand influence.

This situation, together with outstanding matters relating to the affairs of other Governments, and which require careful and personal watching and treatment, would make this a difficult period in which to absent myself from here.

Margaret joins me in warmest regards and in every good wish.

Faithfully yours,

Tony Biddle

P.S. I am communicating the foregoing to Joe Guffey.

*Faithfully
Tony*

Biddle Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Let from Biddle, London, Aug. 12 enclosing
secret memo regarding certain matters which
General Sikorski took up with Biddle after
Harriman's departure for Moscow.

Biddle Folder

August 26, 1942.

Dear Tony:-

Many thanks for yours of the
seventeenth in regard to the Argentine.
I have only shown it to the Secretary
and Under Secretary of State.

My best to you and Margaret.

Always sincerely,

Hon. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle,
Ritz Hotel,
London,
England.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 25, 1942.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY. PLEASE
RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F.D.R.

*Thanks -
CH*

DECLASSIFIED

By Depu'y Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, August 17, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

1/

For your information, I am attaching hereto, a copy of a strictly confidential report dated "Buenos Aires, August 7", which the authorities of a Government to which I am accredited, have just received from their secret sources in the Argentine. In that these particular authorities have hitherto proven a usually reliable source of intelligence; (especially as regards the European Continent), I am inclined to attach importance to the contents of the attached.

In handing me this report, my informants urged me most earnestly to guard their identity in utmost secrecy, due to the delicate position
of

The President

The White House.

- 2 -

of their secret sources in the Argentine.

With my warmest regards and every good
wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Bidder

Enclosure:

Copy of strictly confidential
report as stated.

Buenos Aires, 7th August, 1942.

~~SECRET~~ REPORT FROM CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES IN
ARGENTINE.

In connection with the military situation and especially that in Russia a number of confidential conferences of higher officers was held in the Argentine. It is considered that the situation of the Germans is exceptionally favorable and that it is useful to show profound sympathies to the Axis cause. It has been decided in the event of the situation developing unfavorably for the Allies to carry out an entire change of the Argentine Cabinet in the sense appropriate to the new situation. This new Cabinet will have a temporary character and will be followed up by a next one which will be entirely totalitarian. The interior affairs will pass into the hands of the army. A campaign against Communism is proposed and also an antisemitic movement. The foreign policy will remain under strict control of military circles. In general it is planned to keep up a strong course on the whole continent of South America including support for any totalitarian "putsch" in neighbouring countries. Conferences of military leaders and the Germans are continuing with the aim of creating a South American block with an unified foreign policy and inimical attitude towards the USA. The Germans suggest the classification of South American countries according to the attitude adopted by them during the war. With regard to Uruguay heavy sanctions are foreseen. The

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

atmosphere of the talks is well illustrated by the details already discussed, as f. inst. that Uruguay will have to pay 40 million pesetas damages in connection with the sinking of the Graf von Spee.

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942 Vol. 111 Europe

September 10, 1942

Pages 183 - 184

Biddle Folder
1-42

Dear Tony:

Thank you very much for your letter of August 12 and its attached memorandum of your conversation with General Sikorski regarding the alleged discrimination against Polish citizens by the Soviet authorities.

I have learned from the Department of State that similar allegations have been made by the Polish Ambassadors in Washington and Kuibyshev and while it is believed that there may be considerable truth to the allegations, no direct confirmation has been received from other sources.

In regard to General Sikorski's request that the question of according equal treatment to Polish Jews in the USSR be taken up with Mr. Stalin, I agree with your suggestion that, in view of the general deterioration of Polish-Soviet relations during the past months, it would be more politic to limit such an appeal to the general question of bringing about an improvement in these relations rather than citing too many specific problems. In this way, if our efforts to bring about a better basis of understanding and cooperation between the two Governments are successful, specific problems may then be discussed if the facts so warrant.

In this connection, you will be interested to learn that on the basis of urgent appeals made by the Polish Government I again asked Admiral Standley on August 19, in his discretion,

*Signed original of this letter sent to the
Secy. State for delivery.*

9/11/42

hm

to bring up the question of Polish-Soviet relations with the Soviet authorities and express the hope of the United States Government that no avenue will remain unexplored which might lead to a solution of these problems satisfactory to both the Soviet Union and Poland.

Furthermore, I have asked Mr. Willkie, after consultation with Admiral Standley, to express to Mr. Stalin the hope of this Government that an improvement in Polish-Soviet relations may be effected.

With every good wish, I am

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
American Embassy,
London.

ah
9/10/42

40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, August 12, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

Shortly after Averell Harriman's departure for Moscow, General Sikorski came to see me regarding certain matters covered in the attached memorandum, which I am forwarding for your confidential information. (In view of the confidential character of the subject matter, I am keeping no copies either of this letter or of the attached memorandum).

With warmest regards and every good wish,
I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bidder

Enclosure:

Memorandum as stated.

The President

The White House,

Washington, D.C.

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942 Vol. 111 Europe

Pages 171 - 173

August 12, 1942.

SECRET MEMORANDUM

Shortly after Averell Harriman's departure for Russia, General Sikorski told me he understood that the President had requested him to urge, in the course of his conversations with M. Stalin, the release of the arrested Polish Welfare personnel. The General, moreover, wanted me to let the President know of his deep gratitude.

The General went on to say that he had cabled instructions to Mr. Sokolnicki, Chargé d'Affairs of the Polish Embassy, Kuibyshev, (a) to contact Averell Harriman, and (b) to ask him whether he might see his way clear to mention, among other matters, in his conversation with M. Stalin, the question of the Polish Government's desire that the Soviet authorities' grant the Jewish Polish citizens residing in the USSR, treatment equal to that granted the Polish citizens of other religious categories.

Sikorski thereupon pointed out to me that he had received alarming telegrams from American Jewry concerning this problem. Moreover, the Polish Jews in Russia had strongly appealed to him for defense of their rights as Polish citizens.

His

His own interventions thus far, however, had proved of no avail, in view of the negative attitude of the Soviet authorities.

I told him I thought that any appeal addressed to the Soviet Government on behalf of the Polish citizens in Russia, might best be applied to the Polish citizens as a whole, rather than to any particular group among them.

In response, he said that his instructions to his Chargé d'Affairs were motivated by the same thought; that he stood by the principle of equality of rights, irrespective of creed, color et cetera. As regards the attitude of the Soviet authorities, however, experience had shown that in treating with Polish citizens, they discriminated against Polish citizens of the Jewish faith.

In this connection, the General said that in disclosing their point of view, the Soviet authorities had emphasized that all too frequently, the Polish Jews make trouble for the Soviet, following their release from confinement -- especially those enjoying wide contacts with American Jewry. By way of illustration, the Soviet authorities had cited the following case (of about seven months ago): following their release from confinement, a Mr. Alter and a Mr. Ehrlich, leaders of the Polish Bund, had
cabled

cabled from Kuibyshev, to the Bund in the United States, a message stating that they had been badly treated. This message had been picked up by the Soviet censor, and had led to an investigation of the activities of these two men. The investigation had brought to light that they were "Trotskyists", and they were consequently promptly placed in prison again.

In connection with the question of the Soviet authorities' recognition of Polish citizens, I feel that it is well not to lose sight of the fact that previous to the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement, Moscow, according to General Sikorski, regarded as Soviet citizens, all Poles from areas east of the then envisaged Soviet post-war "security frontiers". I mention this, as I have received insufficient information since the signing of the aforementioned Agreement, upon which to form a definite opinion as to whether or not this might possibly be the case even now. (For further details see my despatch Polish Series No. 137 of March 30, 1942).

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

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ENCLOSURE
TO

Letter drafted 9/1/42

ADDRESSED TO

The President


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

There is attached a draft reply to Ambassador Biddle's letter of August 12. If you should approve the draft and have it returned to us we shall see that the letter is dispatched to Ambassador Biddle.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name "Cordell Hull".

Enclosures:

1. To Ambassador Biddle.
2. From Ambassador Biddle, August 12, 1942, with enclosure.

The President,
The White House.

Biddle Folder

File
Personal

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.
September 28, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

1/ In forwarding you the attached copy of a secret report which General Sikorski just handed me, I share his belief that the contents would be of interest to you.

In brief, the report treats largely with the morale of the German people and German armed forces. The information is based upon 5832 letters exchanged between German troops and "home", as well as upon close observation by the Polish reporters.

Of connected bearing, you may recall that in my Despatch Polish Series No. 205, September 16, 1942, I reported the substance of information and observations on the morale both of the German people and the German armed forces, as imparted to me by General Kleeberg, (former Polish Military Attaché in Paris, and now chief of Polish underground forces in France.) In short, General Kleeberg, based upon his secret reports from inside Germany and upon his examination of Frenchmen and Poles escaping from German prison camps, was of the very definite opinion (a) that, underlying the morale of the German "home front", there were, today, all the makings in terms of depressing factors for an abrupt decline; (b) that, while the situation was thus "all set" for the decline, certain additional forms of pressure were needed to "touch it off"; (c) that the most effective weapons for this purpose would be a program of intensified, merciless aerial bombardment, synchronized with an organized campaign of sabotage and terrorism by foreign labour, (4,500,000 - 6,000,000) in Germany,

In examining the attached report, General Sikorski and I find that the information, therein, concerning German morale corresponds, in large measure, with General Kleeberg's aforementioned disclosures. This is particularly interesting, in that General Kleeberg's disclosures are based upon his observations from France, while the information contained in the attached report comes from confidential sources inside Poland.

With warmest regards and my every good wish,
I am

Yours faithfully,

Tommy Bidder

The President,
The White House,
Washington

Enclosure
1/ as stated

AJDBJR:TH

~~SECRET~~ MEMORANDUM HANDED ME BY GENERAL SIKORSKI

September 24, 1942

I. MORALE IN THE GERMAN ARMY.

This estimate is based on oral statements and 5832 letters, of which some 500 were written by soldiers of detachments marching up to the front, about 1000 from hospitals and the immediate and deep rear, and the remainder from the central sector of the front, (VITEBSK, SMOLENSK, VIAZMA, BRIANSK, OREL, HOMEL, KURSK). They were written to BERLIN, HAMBURG, BREMEN, SAXONY, HESSEN, NASSAU, THURINGEN, BADEN, LORRAINE, SILESIA, EAST PRUSSIA. They cover the period from the end of May to the end of June. About 300 of these letters were written by the police, some by STRALO. About 490 letters (8.3%) did not contain exclusively personal matters. As compared with the previous period, the percentage of letters has increased containing estimates of events and expressions of views. This happened in spite of further restrictions as regards censorship, and as such must be taken into account in gauging the candour of this type of correspondence.

The troops have been informed of these new regulations concerning censorship; This is demonstrated by such remarks as: "We are forbidden to write how we are and what we are doing."

"Recently quite a number of letters have been rejected and severe fines imposed."

"We must write that our food is good, that we are fine, and that we rarely meet the Bolsheviks. You will not learn the truth from the wireless either."

"Recently a number of letters were opened and two of our comrades were punished."

These regulations were received with great dissatisfaction. The soldiers write: "Letters are the only link with our families and even this has been forbidden us."

Some suggest: "In future we shall learn to read between the lines." "Never carry my letters on you, remember to burn them always."

Out of all those who discuss the censorship, only one agrees with fate: "It is better for you to know less, at least you do not worry unnecessarily."

1 STRASSEN TRANSPORTLEITUNG OST.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

1. Morale of soldiers on the Eastern Front.

- a) The beginning of operations brought in its wake a considerable detente of the atmosphere among the troops, including also units which did not take a direct part in the operations.

One may conclude from these enunciations that the German soldier is determined to see the end of it all, is anxious to: "See the ultimate great decision".

No enthusiasm was, however, created by the beginning of operations.

In some detachments there is considerable self-assurance. The majority of soldiers speak of the certainty of victory, but doubts are frequently expressed as well; the time factor plays its part in their fears; "Time is flying, and winter is nigh." "One cannot foresee anything in this situation, because one does not know where the front is - before us - or behind us." "The Russians will exhaust themselves quickly - but we shall do so before them."

So far these letters lack an estimate of the operations on the CRIMEA and near KHARKOV. There were only two mentions of these matters:

A private wrote: "I thought we should advance quicker, and meanwhile the resistance is too strong."

A doctor writes: "According to the opinion of officers, the operations are not taking the favourable turn which was expected. The losses are too heavy." 4.6.42, during an air raid: "Gosh, how we are getting it, and we have no defences."

Many of the writers realise the influence of the Russian campaign on the whole of the war, but they all stress their own moral and material exhaustion.

A second winter is regarded as the symbol of defeat. They keep on repeating: "We do not give up hope."

It is interesting to note the following views:
"We must finish, and finish as soon as possible, otherwise we shall fare badly; you people at home do not realise what is going on here, how many are killed, how much material is destroyed."

The High Command fully realises that the war must end this year, no matter how. We do not know their thoughts, but the ordinary soldier who is in touch with the front, has the worst forebodings: "If we lost the war, then those soldiers who are in the East would never see their fatherland again."

"We should have seen the end of the war a long time ago, but the Fuhrer cannot withdraw any longer, and there is no other way out, so we must endure."

The estimate of the Soviet soldier and Soviet culture has not undergone any changes, but at present guerillas are worse than the Soviet front-line soldiers, they are the purest personification of Bolshevik culture - they fight to the bitter end.

It is noteworthy that for the first time a justification of their tenacity and a criticism of German behaviour was voiced, although the majority of German soldiers fully approve of their own cruelties:

"After all they have the same faces as we have and such faces as we were shown on pictures. Our gentlemen are surprised that they should defend themselves - but in reality they are only paying us back in our own coin." (A letter by a chauffeur of the STRALO)

"Only the scum associate with our men. All the better Russians treat us as intruders."

The German soldiers are much more concerned about news from Germany than about the offensive and the "Endsieg". They beg for the truth, they despair at not knowing it: "I prefer to starve, provided I have some news from home."

"The lack of mails, which are so frequently destroyed by the guerillas, upsets us."

"The most important thing is that our nerves should not give way - and the worst to bear is our anxiety about you at home."

The raid on COLOGNE created the strongest impression, next to it, the raids on ROSTOCK and BREMEN.

One soldier curses the English: Let us only finish off the Russians, and the day of revenge will dawn; still it is irritating to learn that the Flak cannot deal with the English."

"When we have bad news, we are incapable of fighting. Sometimes I try to calm myself with the thought, for instance, that DRESDEN can only get very light bombs, and the shelters should prove sufficient protection against them" - but nevertheless he advises his family to take all valuables to the shelters with them and to look after fire-fighting equipment."

The C.O. of one unit complains that all his men want to go back to Germany to defend their families, and he has a very difficult time trying to keep them in check.

The raids have pushed aside all the other internal troubles of Germany, which had until now preoccupied the soldiers, even hunger, about which they now write less, though they frequently remark that men returning from leave in Germany are lean of face and come back with pleasure even to the Russian front, because here one may still requisition food.

Another subject engrossing the German soldiers, to a degree almost equal to the raids, is the behaviour of German women. The tone of their utterances is increasingly vehement: "Today the soldiers ask you to behave - tomorrow they will very likely threaten you."

"The German woman of today must needs be degenerate if she can betray her husband with a Pole or a Bolshevik."

"Comrades returning from leave fall straight into the arms of Russian women; I do not wonder at it; something has happened to the proverbial faithfulness of the German woman."

Events on other fronts create but small echoes so far. The capture of TOBRUK was greeted with disbelief; "This must be some English trickery". "Can one really believe?"

One man expressed curiosity as to what mischief CHURCHILL was up to in America and thinks that Turkey will shortly enter the war.

Events in the PROTECTORATE are only touched upon by those freshly arrived from there (chiefly police units).

"It is a good thing we are not there; occupying a country is one of our plagues."

Reprisals are approved of on the whole, e.g. one man writes to PARIS on 16.6.: "I thought the French were more intelligent; I wonder they still try to kill off our soldiers. This looks almost like our dealings with guerillas."

Daily complaints and grumblings about the plague of mosquitoes (spreading malaria and frequently mortal infection through typhoid), lack of sleep due to continuous raids and guerrillas attacks, unjust promotion and decorations, sometimes ill treatment by officers: "I feel the difference between an officer and a Nazi soldier. If these people only realised how they are wronging us they would stop to think."

The most frequently encountered word is "leave". It is the subject of a humorous letter entitled "Return of one division from Russia in 1980" in which soldiers

returning from Russia have forgotten all their German with the exception of the one word "leave" - the meaning of which they have, however, forgotten.

Complaints of bad food have decreased. Not that food has improved, but the soldiers can supplement it by barter, which is strictly forbidden, or by requisitions. Hence there are frequent thefts of parcels from home, and the reason given by the perpetrators when caught is - hunger.

The writers actually mention five cases of suicide and two death sentences in that connection; and an allusion is made to larger numbers of suicides.

Occasionally one comes across sentences which might be the echo of communist propaganda or opposition views, such as: "We are living like coolies". "It is the leaders of the states and not we soldiers, who are responsible for this horrible carnage which is going on." "We are fed up with everything."

The wounded brought to hospitals frequently have appeals to workers and soldiers sewn into their clothes.

Their experiences during the winter have deepened the soldiers; the long sojourn at the front has taught them to think. This evolution continues.

The subjects of meditation are limited to their own front, the course of the war and its outcome. They wonder about the object of wars. The soldiers become introspective, grow critical of everything outside those things which they see and experience themselves. With the exception of what is going on in Germany, they lose interest in all other matters, even in other fronts; and they have not even become aware of the problem of the Second Front.

2. Morale in detachments going up to the front.

Units marching towards the front are taciturn and reserved. They suffer serious losses en route owing to

raids and guerrilla operations. This is their hardest experience on the threshold of Russia.

These units are now composed for the most part of older people, in despair at having been called up, who learned only on arriving at the goal of their journey that they were destined for the front and who are given strenuous training in the immediate rear of the front.

Observation from outside shows an entire lack of enthusiasm, even a state of depression.

Older soldiers at the front estimate the fighting value of the youngest and the oldest elements as very poor.

3. Morale in units in the rear.

Morale depends on the course of events at the fronts. TOBRUK and SEBASTOPOL created demonstrations of joy among garrisons stationed in Poland.

Soviet diversion is acutely felt. The soldiers realise their own helplessness and its main reasons: "We are definitely too few to cover the areas in which we have found ourselves; there should be at least three times as many of us. For this reason we do not see any end to it."

It was these feelings which caused the O.C. the LNOW garrison to issue an order to the troops ordering them to behave in a proper and non-provocative manner towards the local population.

Observation shows that morale is gradually, although very slowly, going down. This finds expression, so far, only in an increasing wave of thefts and embezzlements (several senior officers were arrested in VILNO) and in drunkenness.

There were sporadic cases of breaches of discipline, such as leaving a sentry post, etc.

We have insufficient data dealing with desertion to estimate this phenomenon, which occurs fairly frequently, but not en masse.

We may quote as an example: on 21.5. twenty men were shot in VILNO whose nerves had given way and who had to be removed for the sake of example.

Orders No.s 17 and 18 of the Kommandantur at BRZESC n/B mention nine death sentences for desertion, carried out during March 1942.

It was rumoured that during April there were two executions daily for the same reason.

4. Morale of the Axis-Allied troops.

To judge by the conversations held with them, they are informed in an entirely misleading manner by German propaganda about conditions in Polish lands (they are led to believe that the Poles are very satisfied with the occupation, etc.). Nevertheless, on many occasions Italian soldiers ostentatiously showed their friendliness to the Poles, stepped forward in defence of beaten and robbed travellers, visited Polish churches (which the Germans are forbidden to do;) the Italians confess to Polish priests, etc.

There are no data about other German satellite countries.

Otherwise, morale is the same as in previous periods.

II. MORALE AMONG THE GERMAN CIVILIAN POPULATION.

1. In occupied territories.

No changes in the general situation.

More important events and symptoms: the round-up of German officials who are trying to evade the call-up; this has caused great dissatisfaction and depression, especially in Pomerania and DANZIG and has also affected Party members.

The raids on Germany have caused the following:

A circular issued on 1.6.42 by the WARSAW Bahndirektion, destined for Reichs - and Volkdeutsche, limiting the use of the official telephone services and forbidding any conversations to be held "on the subject of enemy operations and their results" as well as "about the state of the weather in the country or in occupied territories". All such conversations to be treated as aiding the enemy or "treason to the country due to negligence".

The Landrat of SIERADE, in his instructions to the mayor of ZDUNSKA WOLA instructs him to report any panic being spread by refugees from ROSTOCK and, should a raid occur, to forbid the passage of any information about the results of the raid and to forbid access by civilians to any damaged places.

Considerable anxiety is caused by Soviet diversion.

Under the influence of these events Volkdeutsche in some centres have become humbler in their behaviour - to a visible extent. They have again begun to speak about Poland.

2. Inside the Reich.

This estimate is based on the press, oral statements, 400 letters written to the front during June 1942; 10% of these letters are of a nature to lower morale, in spite of censorship restrictions of which the writers were aware and which are mentioned in the letters. The letters were written from BADEN, MANNHEIM, LUDWIGSHAFEN, KIEL, MUNICH, AUGSBURG, BERLIN, EAST PRUSSIA.

The factors affecting the state of mind of the people inside the Reich are in order of importance: air raids, losses on the fronts, successes in the CRIMEA and in Africa, hunger. Otherwise all factors mentioned in previous reports are also operative.

The dominant features are still: fatigue, depression and anxiety.

Since the summer the people have been fed methodically with stimulating propaganda; they have been accustomed to bewildering successes and need new stimuli all the time in order to maintain their morale.

The first injection of optimism, after the winter, was the capture of KERCH. It was less exploited by propaganda than other victories, but it immediately improved the general temper of the people by awakening hopes for a speedier ending of the war.

Letters dated from that period contain repeatedly the word "wieder": "Again we have the hope that the war will end some time, possibly better than we have come to expect."

African victories were fully exploited by propaganda. We lack data about the reaction of the people.

There have been no echoes of the KHARKOV battle, not even in the letters from the front.

Another stimulus is the realisation of the slogan: "Victory at any price". One of the elaborations of this slogan is: "To work, to endure, to restrict oneself in everything, to win."

The third stimulus is enforcement.

The regulation about "those unfit for social life" has been enforced in some of the "Gau's" only up to the present; it has now been extended over the whole of Germany. The execution of this regulation has now been entrusted to administrative authorities and the decisions to the Party.

In spite of counteraction, tension does not disappear. It is fostered by the mass-training of reserve forces for A.A. defence and by thousands of refugees from the bombed cities.

It is said that more than 80,000 fled from COLOGNE alone; they scattered all over the Reich and the occupied countries, spreading panic.

The spring did not bring the great events which were awaited with such anxiety; these events are now anticipated for the autumn, and even, as one letter puts it: "Everybody is making forecasts, to such an extent that one becomes breathless: peace is to be concluded by August, but how can one believe it?"

Others, on the other hand "believe that things cannot go on for long like this, because we have nothing left to eat."

Letters dated 18.5.42: "People are depressed and look gloomily into the future."

News is continually arriving from the fronts about relatives killed and inside the country, too, there are many casualties.

Prophecies saying that the war will end this year are definitely wrong. The raids are disorganizing the life of the various centres and to some extent the life of those places where the refugees have fled. Hence the authorities do their best to try and stop them from flight.

The authorities tried to stem the panic spread by the scattering of tales about the raids by conciliatory measures; in ROSTOCK, for example, free meals were served and additional bread and tobacco ration-cards were issued. The people were upset and terrified and for two weeks after the raid continued to descend every night into the shelters.

Letter from KIEL: "No one laughs any more in Germany."

Letter from Hamburg: "People are going away, if only for a few days, to calm down a little."

There is energetic recruiting of young men for the WAFFEN S.S. There are cases where compulsion is applied. This recruiting is aimed at strengthening the foundations of the regime. The recruits are taught: "You must do your duty regardless of what may be going on
round

you: even if you saw your mothers and wives dying of starvation and destitution, you must endure bravely to the end."

Those going to the front are told that under no conditions may an S.S. man be taken prisoner.

III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

The events in Africa roused slumbering hope only in the rear and inside the Reich; these were fully exploited by propaganda in order to allay fear of the second front which was gnawing at the people. There was a distinct tendency to quiet all discussions on this subject. On the eastern front these events created no repercussion whatever.

As far as the offensive campaign in Russia is concerned, propaganda approached the subject warily, avoiding promises of victory. In this respect it chimes with the mood of the army. Only KERCH and SEBASTOPOL were exploited to some extent, and the importance of these victories was based chiefly on calculations as to the forces of the enemy.

The press demonstrated the sensitivity of the German people and army to British and Soviet propaganda and launched a campaign against these influences; their method was irony, and a combatting of the enemy's arguments.

The authorities in Germany are distinctly alarmed at the diminishing resistance of the German people, which is manifested, among other things, in increasing demoralisation.

The army continues to be morally strong - in spite of exhaustion, irritation and depression.

The main organs of the press continually stress the unshaken heroism of the nation.

The raids and the food situation have a greater influence on the shaping of morale than has been exerted

by the victories won in 1942; they weaken and disorganize the people and deflect the attention of the soldiers from their tasks at the front.

The troops greeted the beginning of operations in the east with relief. The soldiers wish for a speedy defeat of Russia, because they wish to return home to defend their families and they are afraid of another winter, which they identify with defeat.

The slogan of a "Victory at all costs" is being realised materially inside the Reich and in occupied lands. But allied to this realisation, there are very discreet attempts to prepare the people for possible failures.

IV. PROPAGANDA.

This estimate is based on the press in the Reich and the occupied territories in the east, for the period 15.6. - 15.7.42., Party publications (DAS VERFELD - a training publication of the S.N.D.A.P. in the General Gouvernement and others) HITLERJUNGEN, MITTELUNGEN FUER DIE TRUPPE Nos. 181, 188, 190, 193, 195, 196, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203 from April, May and June 1942.

The main facts exploited by German propaganda during that period of time were:

The Anglo-Soviet agreement and the successes in Africa - which were brought into prominence while the beginning of the offensive in Russia was left in the shade; the fighting on the DON was overshadowed by the smashing of a British convoy in the ARCTIC, which was represented as "the greatest defeat of England".

All these facts were used for the underlining of the slogans used during the last few months.

1. a) The first information about the Anglo-Soviet was given by the WARSCHAUER ZEITUNG. In the press inside the Reich this treaty caused great misgivings and it was discussed in all newspapers along lines

officially laid down for the press. The alleged "secret clauses" were especially stressed and were said to threaten the "small nations" betrayed by the British. The essence of the treaty, i.e. the danger of a second front, was entirely glossed over.

b) The opportunity was exploited to start a new and powerful campaign against the Anglo-Saxon countries, as the only perpetrators of the war. Four consecutive articles by GOEBBELS launched this campaign.

The main press organs and the "MITTEILUNGEN" took a very prominent part in this campaign, while the press in occupied countries was rather reserved in its enunciations.

In the mass of statements about the disintegration of the British Empire, one notices the attitude of the FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG, which said that the "British were tough opponents and an unusually talented nation", as well as the careful sentence of GOEBBELS, ending a series of victorious fanfares: "We know that the chances of a submarine war are changeable."

2. a) The African successes were exploited to the full and brought forth a series of assurances about the invincibility of the German Army and the decisive bearing of this victory on the outcome of the whole war.

Next to it, CHURCHILL'S speech and the debate in the Commons created an outbreak of violent indignation at the whole of the British people, who are immature and misled and proved unable to overthrow the Prime Minister. Although the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER of 5.7. stated that the defeat of England was complete, the press of the occupied countries remained very reserved.

WARSCHAUER ZEITUNG gave assurances that the Axis does not make any prophecies concerning the future course of the campaign, because in this fight for the future of Europe, it is assured of ultimate victory.

In another article entitled "This is different from 1918" it says that it is a mistake to compare the present war with the Napoleonic campaigns (not only his Egyptian campaign).

b) The fall of TOBRUK was used as a proof of the impossibility of creating a second front. Feverish discussion of this subject, kept up for a number of weeks, was ended by two enunciations for a compromise character:

- Such a front had existed on several occasions, but it never last long.
- According to GOEBBELS (5.7.42) the Germans "are prepared for all Allied experiments, and anyway they are not interested in this one."

After this date we do not encounter any further mention of the second front.

The "HITLERJUNGEN" has so far not touched on this subject, and devoted more space to the successes of German submarines.

3. The anniversary of 22.6. was hardly mentioned in the press. No sayings of HITLER or appeals of last year were quoted.

The beginning of the offensive was announced by:
a) WARSCHAUER ZEITUNG, which acts as the chief informant on Russian matters.

According to this paper the aim of the offensive is to solve those problems, which had been left unsolved since November 1941. The paper makes no prophesies for the future, although "the dice are cast" but "no one knows whether the war will end owing to the present decisions, and when this will happen."

b) The press within the Reich discusses the present fighting in Russia with less reserve, although it continues to stress the strength of Russian resistance; then it announces the complete annihilation of TIMOSHENKO's army and the approaching decisive moment of the war.

a) MITTEILUNGEN, in a discussion of the May operations, stresses the importance of the capture of KERCH, where more prisoners were taken than in the famous battle of TANNENBERG in 1914 (this is a frequent example used by this paper). The article ends: "This May has again rendered us secure in the trust and assurance that the ultimate victory will be ours."

4. There were fewer enunciations during that period on the subject of war aims, nor were any new formulas on the subject drawn up.

Only MITTEILUNGEN tried to adapt former aims to the present requirements and to the latest official statements.

For them the aim of the war is an economic and political unity of Europe, which will assure for her freedom in raw material supplies. The word "freedom" has a specific meaning in German minds; it means to assure for our ever-growing nation the possession of sufficient food, and the Lebensraum of Europe is the Lebensraum of the German nation.

Considerations about the re-building of Europe continue to be the subject of Party publications of the type destined for educational purposes and in books, which depend to a lesser degree on the current mood of the people and events at the front.

5. The slogan "Victory at all costs", formulated in the spring, has reached the General Gouvernement in the shape of posters.

GOEBBELS returns to this subject on 21.6., giving the keynote to the whole press, by announcing the possibility of temporary setbacks and appealing for a proper appreciation of the enemy. "There is nothing left for us to do, but to strengthen unto the ultimate limits, our direction of the war until the absolute exhaustion of our war potential. War, as such, must needs pass through various stages."

a) This slogan is now used for the preparation - moral and material - of the wide masses of the people for a protracted and difficult war.

Now propaganda confesses to the winter failures in Russia and Africa.

b) The imperative orders for economy in every walk of life explain the gradual limitation of the production of various articles. The use of arguments about the superiority of National-Socialist economies over the capitalist system is aimed at calming public opinion, which realises the economic potential of the Anglo-Saxon countries, and which is irritated by the ceaseless limitations of consumption.

At the same time the people are told that in spite of her possibilities, the UKRAINE cannot assure bread supplies for Germany.

The thesis is also being developed about the pre-historical "Germanness" of the whole of eastern Europe, for which the Germans alone can ever secure an economic and cultural development.

Under this group of arguments comes the acute problem of labour. Inhabitants of towns are encouraged forcibly to spend their leaves in the country on land work. School children have all been regimented for it, the teaching programmes being adapted to this end.

Under this head the MITTEILUNGEN appeals to the soldiers to regard each Soviet prisoner of war as a valuable labourer, necessary for victory, and not only as an enemy who will no longer fight.

6. Several new subjects have made their appearance:

a) The identity of aims of Germany and Japan and the importance of the part played by Japan in this war - the possibility of a Russo-Japanese conflict.

b) The rebellion of the conquered nations, mentioned by GOEBBELS in the FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG and by the

main press organs. They all agree that it is just an invention of enemy propaganda, impossible to put into practice, and quite contrary to the earnest wishes of the peoples concerned. At the same time they threaten reprisals.

This subject was brought up at the same time as V. GAYDA revealed the position of Italians in JUGOSLAVIA.

a) Propaganda and its significance. The press has betrayed the present sensitivity of the German people to foreign influences and all negative moods in Germany and the distrust of German propaganda are, as a matter of fact, ascribed to these foreign influences.

The FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG started the campaign of depreciating British propaganda and ridiculing Soviet propaganda by answering its arguments; this policy has now been adopted by the MITTEILUNGEN.

It is perhaps particularly noticeable in the letter publication, that five articles out of 11 issues were devoted to this problem as well as the whole of No. 193. The official German thesis has again been resuscitated that the defeat in 1918 was the result of extremely brilliant and efficient Allied propaganda and not of a military defeat.

STANDARD FORM NO. 14A
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
MARCH 10, 1926

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

CABLEGRAM

BIDDLE
LONDON

PLEASE TELL GENERAL SIKORSKI I SHALL BE DELIGHTED TO SEE HIM
BETWEEN NOVEMBER THIRTIETH AND DECEMBER TENTH

ROOSEVELT

FROM

PSF; Biddle folder 1-42
The White House
Washington

OCTOBER 28 1942

...

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am enclosing herewith
a letter from Ambassador Biddle
for your information. I wired
Biddle last night telling him that
I should be delighted to see
General Sikorski between November
thirtieth and December tenth.

Please return Biddle's letter
when you have finished with it.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Let to the President 10/12/42 from Amb.
Biddle re the proposed visit of Gen.
Sikorski possibly late in November.

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

*File
Personnel*

October 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am enclosing herewith
a letter from Ambassador Biddle
for your information. I wired
Biddle last night telling him that
I should be delighted to see
General Sikorski between November
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Please return Biddle's letter
when you have finished with it.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

*Thanks
CH*

Biddle folder
1-42.

40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, October 12, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I was happy to receive your letter of September 23, which arrived shortly after my receipt of the State Department's cable No. 26, 7 pm., concerning General Sikorski's proposed visit to the United States. I promptly conveyed your message to him. He was very much touched by your kind expression of appreciation of the friendly spirit which had prompted his proposal. He wanted me to assure you, in his behalf, that he fully understood the reasons for your desire that he postpone his visit.

He now wondered, whether you might find it convenient to receive him at some date in late November. He earnestly hoped so, for he would be ready by that time to submit to you, as he likewise intended to submit to Mr. Churchill, a plan of attack on the Axis forces.

He had just had a message from Ambassador Ciechanowski, indicating that your time would be completely taken up during the month of December; that you had therefore kindly intimated you would be prepared to see him at some date between January 5th and 30th.

The January suggestion, the General said, unfortunately conflicted with his scheduled visit to his forces in the Middle East. It was therefore, for this reason, that he had asked me to find out whether a date in late November would be convenient to you.

As

The President

The White House.

As regards his "plan of attack", he told me that, in collaboration with his General Staff, he had recently been engaged in preparing a plan for attacking the Axis forces in the early part of next year. He had given study to this question, and in order to accelerate the drawing up of the plan, he had appointed his Corps Commander, General Kukiel, to the post of Minister for War, hitherto occupied by himself. He said that, generally speaking, the plan envisaged (a) action against the western part of the Continent from Britain; synchronized with (b) action against southern coasts of the Continent from North Africa; and with (c) action from the Middle East. The plan envisaged, moreover, action through the Balkans, counting with the active support of Turkey. He was most anxious to submit his plan to you and to Mr. Churchill as soon as he and his collaborators would have completed it.

For your further information, I have discreetly ascertained that, in his next meeting with you, the General hopes to discuss the following points:

1. The general trend of the conduct of the war (besides submitting to you his plan of campaign).
2. Polish post-war problems bearing on frontiers, claims, et cetera.
3. The Polish-Czechoslovak Federation.
4. Polish-Russian relations.

With warmest regards and every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bridle

PPH

7543

September 23, 1942

My dear Tony:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of September second relative to the invitation extended by Dr. Swietlick to General Sikorski to speak at a Polish-American mass meeting to be held at Soldiers' Field, Chicago, on October sixteenth.

I am deeply appreciative of the generous offer made by General Sikorski and especially of the fine spirit prompting it. We do have, however, such overwhelming support of the people in the prosecution of the war that I do not deem it necessary at this time to take advantage of General Sikorski's highly valued offer of cooperation.

It is with the deepest regret that I thus venture to suggest the postponement of General Sikorski's visit but I am sure that you will understand the situation.

With every good wish, I am

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable

Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
American Embassy,
London.

x 1667
x PP7554

x PP778
x 463-A

September 25, 1942

Respectfully referred to the Secretary
of State.

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

Letter to the President-9-19-42 and D. B. Biddle

From: Cordell Hull

cap

Enclosing a draft to the President to sign to
Hon. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., American Embassy, London.
which he signed.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 9/18/42

ADDRESSED TO

The President



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

File 23

September 19, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

There is attached a draft reply to Ambassador Biddle's letter of September 2. If you should approve the draft and have it returned to us we shall see that the letter is dispatched to Ambassador Biddle, and a summary of the letter will be sent by cable advising him that the letter is en route.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. To Ambassador Biddle.
2. From Ambassador Biddle, September 2, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

B

September 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF STATE: x20

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Tony Biddle, Jr., Embassy of the U.S.A., 70 Berkeley Square, London, 9/2/42, to the President, in re talks with General Sikorski concerning his earnest hope that the President might indicate his approval of his accepting an invitation from Dr. Swietlick, Dean of the Law School of Marquette University, to address a Mass Meeting of Polish-Americans at Soldiers Field, Chicago, on October 16. Mr. Biddle asks that if the President sees his way clear towards indicating in some way, that he would welcome General Sikorski's visit to the U.S., he notify Mr. Biddle to this effect.

40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, September 2, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

x I have just had one of a series of lengthy talks with General Sikorski concerning his earnest hope that you might indicate your approval of his accepting an invitation from Dr. Swietlick, Dean of the Law School of Marquette University, to address a Mass Meeting of about 200,000 Polish-Americans at Soldiers Field, Chicago, on October 16. He considers that this would offer an excellent occasion to rally the enthusiastic support of American citizens of Polish extraction and origin, behind your "banner" in the coming elections. He said, moreover, that if this idea met with your approval, he would like to propose, for your further approval, his making five other speeches in the key Polish-American centers -- perhaps Milwaukee, Buffalo, Scranton, and two other places to be named. He has agreed to my preliminary suggestion, subject of course to your approval, that in constructing his proposed speeches, he direct the major portion thereof along lines of informing his audiences concerning the general trend of events, and of the role of the Polish Forces in connection therewith; that having thus engaged his listeners' interest, he end up with focussing their attention upon you, and all that you stand for, as champion of the cause against the forces of aggression; as the great leader of the cause of freedom, and the cause of the common man. This, I emphasized, would serve to bring about the desired results, with the minimum of provocation of suspicion by the opposition, that he was interfering in internal politics.

He

The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

He tells me that in discussing with Mr. Churchill the possibility of his going to the United States for this purpose, Mr. Churchill's preliminary reaction was highly enthusiastic. Mr. Churchill too, had cautioned him to guard against giving any impression of delving in internal politics.

In the event that you approve of General Sikorski's coming over, I wonder whether you might see your way clear towards indicating in some way, that you would welcome his visit to the United States. He is, as I have previously told you, a sincere admirer of yours; moreover, as he is highly sensitive, he would not be likely to make any plans to go, unless he had some encouraging word from you. I shall await word from you, before saying anything further to the General regarding this matter.

With my warmest regards and my every good wish,
I am

Yours faithfully,

Tommy Bidder

*file
personal*

*Biddle folder
1-42*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES. •

F. D. R.

Letter from Ambassador Biddle
to the President, dated October 1,
1942, enclosing memorandum re
Argentine Political Developments.

Tony Biddle folder
1-42

*file
personal*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


October 30, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning to you herewith Tony Biddle's letter to you of October 1, with which he enclosed a memorandum which he had obtained with regard to certain features of the present political situation in Argentina. I have read this with much interest and, in accordance with your request, I am returning it for your files.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



A Nelson
0/8

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.
October 1, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I beg to refer to my letter of August 17, and enclosed memorandum containing secret information regarding political developments in the Argentine, as imparted to me by a usually reliable allied governmental source here.

1/ In connection therewith, I am attaching, hereto, a copy of a confidential memorandum, containing further information on the same subject and which I just received from the same aforementioned sources.

With warmest regards and every good wish,
I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Blair r

The President,
The White House,
Washington

Enclosure
1/ as stated

AJDBJR:TH

~~SECRET~~ MEMORANDUM RE ARGENTINE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

(Supplementing information contained in my letter
August 17, 1942.)

In Argentine the leadership of the totalitarian movement has been taken over at present by Dr. Frasco who remains in closest relations with President Castillo. Lately, in the Argentine totalitarian circles, great nervousness has been noticed, which was caused, first of all, by the steadily proceeding isolation of that country.

On the 26th of August at Dr. Frasco's, in Moron, a meeting took place in order to define the policy of the totalitarian movement in connection with the existing situation. At the meeting Dr. Frasco reported on the situation in Europe and on the totalitarian movement in South America. He stated that, according to his information from Berlin, a few weeks after the expected occupation of Stalingrad, a conference will be called in Berlin, in order to establish the new order in Europe. The totalitarian movements in America, however, must not expect any financial help from Berlin.

With regard to the internal situation in Argentina, Dr. Frasco stated that plans, aiming at winning over Paraguay have failed, which was proved on the occasion of General Tomazzis's (Paraguayan Minister of War) visit in Asuncion. Also, the situation in Chile is unfavourable for the Argentinian nationalism. In conclusion, the meeting has decided to try to create a secret fund in the Argentinian Ministry of War, for

the/

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

the purpose of financing revolutionary movements in neighbouring countries. With regard to Bolivia, it has been decided to force the entry into the Cabinet by means of an agreement with the National Government, in order to take up the role of the Fifth Column inside the Government. As to Paraguay, it was decided to try to find ways for the recapture of the lost ground.

Dr. Fresco is to present the decisions of the conference to the President of the Republic.

In connection with the existing situation in the Argentine military circles, two groups have been formed: one which aims at a speedy and radical solution; the second is rather desirous of awaiting the developments in Europe.

October 30, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning to you herewith Tony Biddle's letter to you of October 1, with which he enclosed a memorandum which he had obtained with regard to certain features of the present political situation in Argentina. I have read this with much interest and, in accordance with your request, I am returning it for your files.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

*file
personal*

40, Berkeley Square,

London, W., 1.

November 4, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I beg to refer to the Department's Cable Czechoslovak Series No. 2 of October 24, 1942 (2 p.m.) wherein I was instructed to inform the Czechoslovak Government that you intended to address Dr. Benes as the President of the Czechoslovak Republic in a message on the occasion of Czechoslovakia's National Day, October 28; that we would henceforth drop the term "Provisional" when referring to the Czechoslovak Government; that we found no necessity for exchanging writings in connection with this matter or for revising my credentials accordingly.

Immediately upon receipt of this cable I called upon Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, Dr. Benes being absent from town. When I imparted the substance of your message he leapt into the air like a boy, embraced me warmly and, with tears in his eyes, stated with genuine earnestness that your action had touched him very deeply; that it was for him, and would be for Dr. Benes and their fellow countrymen a source of real gratification. He wanted me to send you an expression of his warmest thanks.

Subsequently, on Czechoslovakia's National Day, when Dr. Benes received all the Chiefs of Missions accredited to his Government, he made it a point to come across the room to shake my hand warmly and to ask

The President,

The White House,

Washington.

ask me to convey to you an expression of his deep gratitude. As he went on to tell me how profoundly touched he and his associates were and how much this would mean to his countrymen in Czechoslovakia, I could discern that he was sincerely moved. As formerly in the case of Minister Masaryk Dr. Benes did not attempt to conceal his tears. I never before saw him show so much emotion. I only regret that you yourself could not have witnessed how much your message meant to these two men and their associates.

With my warmest regards and every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle r

PSF: A. J. W. Bidde
File
Personal 1-42



Dear Mrs. President,
I am so
delighted and
happy to receive
the photograph
and I can
not begin to
tell you how
proud I am



1974

To have it
on my desk.
This time I
have been very
selfish and
have not been
willing to share
it with Tony.

Many, many
thanks.
The other



photograph of
you which we
have had for
many years
has one of the
very few
things which
accompanied
me in my

travels during
the Polish War
and then there
France until
at last a little
covered with dust
but still intact
I got it back
home. When
we came over
here I put it
in my safe



deposit W4.
I am so happy
to have this
very good
photograph
now.

I am kept
busy these
days directing
the D.R.C. Club

103 Army
Muraes. It is
quite a lot
of work but
great fun
also. Last
evening we
had a party
at the Club
and little
1 Pm Peter was



with no. His
francie is
going to work
in Mr Cartier.
He certainly
is a great
admirer of
Yours.
Tony is fine

but I am afraid
that this job you
have given him
has also given
him a
permanent

"anxious mother"
COTR.

again many
thanks for my
picture which
I shall always

with the
m...



Treasure.

Tony joins
me in sending
you our affectionate
greetings -

As always
Margaret Bidd

PASSED BY
NAVAL CENSOR

gms

U. S.
NOV
24
1942
M.
NAVY



The President
The White House
Washington
D.C.

*A. J. D. Biddle folder
1-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Returned
July 7, 1943*

December 3, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ~~Secretary~~ of State
THE Under ~~Secretary~~ of State

For your information. Please
return for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date ~~FEB~~ 4 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE Secretary of State
THE Under Secretary of State

For your information. Please
return for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Let to the President from Amb.
A. J. Drexel Biddle, London, England
11/23/42 re the reactions to the
North Africa offensive and the
assumption of authority of Admiral
Darlan, etc.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

My dear Mr President:-

This has been probably the most strenuous week I have experienced since assuming my duties here - this from the standpoint of having to reassure a rather panicky, bewildered group of "clients".

Following events in North Africa, their emotions ran from one extreme to another: from exaltation over the successful landings of our expeditionary forces - to apprehension, anxiety over the short-term bearing and the long-term implications of Admiral Darlan's assumption of authority. In view of the high pitch of their initial enthusiasm, their reaction to the latter event was all the more acute.

I did my utmost to allay their apprehension by pointing out that we were witnessing a phase wherein military considerations were bound to be paramount; that the prime aim of our military authorities was to secure occupation of the territories concerned with the maximum speed, and with the minimum of bloodshed. This was as I personally saw the picture, and the light in which I, accordingly, conscientiously endeavored to bring my "clients" to see it. I fully realized, moreover, that there were important considerations of far-reaching bearing which could not be made clear at that time.

Then came your November 17th declaration that the arrangement with Admiral Darlan was only a temporary expedient. I lost no time in emphasizing the substance of your statement, and in driving home the importance of its bearing.

I believe that these efforts succeeded to the point whereat even some of the "clients" fret no more.

However, in all of them, including the latter category, there has been engendered a sense of lingering apprehension (in some cases it is more apparent than in others):

- (a) as to the next steps in North Africa;
- (b) as to the effect of Admiral Darlan's present role upon their respective fellow-countrymen under Axis occupation - and even more so, as to what their reaction would be, should the next steps prove a cause for alarm rather than for reassurance;
- (c) as to the possibility that the same technique of "military expediency" might be applied in the case of their own respective countries.

I furthermore, gained an insight to Swedish reaction in the course of a very recent three-cornered talk between the Swedish Minister to Britain, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself. The Swedish Minister emphasized that were he a member of any of the Allied Governments here, he would be decidedly apprehensive on the above score (subsections (a); (b); (c)). On this, as on like occasions I did my utmost, of course, to dispell his and Minister Lie's apprehensions.

In addition, I have encountered one other aspect which, to my mind, calls for watching: the Russian attitude towards the Darlan politics. I understand that my Russian vis-a-vis has already had some unfavorable things to say on this score, and whether or not this is a "flash-in-the-pan", or the out-croppings of serious objection ^{pending} to be seen. I am aware, however, of the strength of the Communist organization in Continental France, as described in the recent secret report from experienced agents of the Polish underground organization in France (see this report of October 30th, and under title of "Communist Activity", page 12, attached to my despatch NO. 228, near the Polish Govt., November 6, 1942). I feel, moreover, that the observations of M. Garreau, Chief of the Fighting French diplomatic Mission to Russia, upon the activities of certain Communist centres on the European Continent, are deserving of attention. (See page 2, paragraph 2 to end of despatch No 30, near the Yugoslav Govt., Oct 15, 1942.)

3. In a word, Tarreau believes these centres are deliberately being "kept stoked up" in order to serve as instruments of possession and/or infiltration, when and as required. He states, moreover, that he is convinced that Moscow maintains close contact with these centres in general, and with the organization in France in particular.

In considering the various aspects of the new turn in developments, I believe the moment may arrive when I may serve you and the general effort to greater advantage with the Army in the field. I do not think this would be unwelcome to my "clients," since they have already seen the important role the military authorities have been playing in recent events. Moreover, as regards the military authorities, my recent association with that group has led me to believe I would not be an unwelcome addition.

Moscow, I sincerely believe I have the confidence of my "clients". Therefore, when, in the future situations arise, which for strategic reasons, cannot be explained, it might be reassuring to them, if someone who fully understood their points of view and problems were on the spot.

I have written you the foregoing in the thought that you might wish to know the "clients'" reactions, as well as those of other factors mentioned - also to tell you what has been passing through my own mind in connection with developments in-the-making.

With my warmest regards and my every good wish I am

Faithfully,

Tony Riddle

November 23-1942.

STANDARD FORM No. 14A
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
MARCH 10, 1926

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

VIA STATE DEPARTMENT

CABLEGRAM

AMBASSADOR BIDDLE
LONDON

Can you give me any information about plans of Mr. Smith
and Colonel Brown? Many thanks to you and Margaret for your
telegram. Best of New Years to you both

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

FROM

*PSF: a. J. D. Biddle folder
1-42*
The White House
Washington

*** 16-6481

TELEGRAM

DEC 24 10 44 AM 1942

The White House
Washington

W5PO RA. 19-

NY. LONDON, DECEMBER 23, 1942

LC. PRESIDENT AND MRS. ROOSEVELT,
WASHINGTON.

HEARTIEST CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR GREETINGS.

MARGARET AND TONY BIDDLE.

file
presumably
A. J. D. Bidder, 1-43
January 5th

Dear Mr. President -

The enclosed
cartoon came out
a short time ago
and I thought it
might amuse
you -

Tray and I are
well and continue
busy - Tray with
his "seven children"
and I with my

Red Cross Club jobs
Army Nurses -
I am operating
8 houses on the
street where the
Nurses, the American
Ferry Pilots and
Red Cross Women
Personnel stay -
We also had the
first WAC Officers
there - they were

a very fine group
of women. I was
greatly impressed
by them. After
that was with all
my present
experiences I
feel that I will
be qualified
to run a club.
Hotel BZ "night
Club"


I am so proud of
the picture you
sent us. It is
sitting on my
desk - I won't
even share it
with Tony.

My love to you.

As always,

Margaret Biddle

Attention
Mrs. Eber



Free

The President
The White House
Washington
D.C.

O.K. FOR
TRANSMISSION
BY POUCH

do

Lt. (jg) G.P. Woodard, USNR

**U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE'S OFFICE,
AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON, ENGLAND.**



RUNNING AWAY WITH SANTA SCHICKELGRUBER.

(165)

am

Signed original of the letter sent to the Secy. State

am

A. Biddle
folder

January 9, 1943

Dear Tony:

I refer to your letter of December 4, 1942 concerning King Zog's desire to draw against his accounts in this country. I have made inquiries and find that while King Zog has an account with the Guaranty Trust Company of some \$242,000, the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company could find no record of an account with him. I see no objection to permitting King Zog access to his account in this country although for various reasons I believe that the amounts withdrawn at any one time should be limited. Consequently, I suggest that you advise him to request the Guaranty Trust Company of New York to make application to the Treasury Department for the necessary license to permit withdrawals from the account. You should inform King Zog that it will not be possible to release more than \$30,000 semi-annually from the account and his instructions to the bank should embrace these limitations.

With best wishes for the New Year, I am

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
Care of American Embassy,
London.

authd
1/9/43

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W., 1.

December 4, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

In the course of recent confidential conversation with the King and Queen of Albania, they expressed their sense of concern over their inability to draw on funds in the name of "His Majesty Zogou I, Hotel Ritz, London, W.1. England". The King said that his Diplomatic and Information Services were entirely dependent upon his own private funds; that he was willing to continue defraying all expenses in connection therewith until his country had regained its independence. As a matter of fact, he added, his private funds were the only means in sight for carrying on the work. He, therefore, asked me whether I might be able to ascertain discreetly, whether it was possible to make arrangements whereby he might draw on his funds in New York to the extent of covering the aforementioned expenses. He most earnestly hoped that some formula might be found.

While I did not mention to him that I intended to address you personally in the matter, I thought it advisable to take it up directly with you, and to quietly seek your reaction. For your information, the King has \$242,288.40 to his account as of July 30, 1942 at the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, as well as \$82,408.58 at the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, New York.

With warmest regards and every good wish, I am
Yours faithfully,

Tommy Riddle

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE
TO

Letter drafted 1-6-43

ADDRESSED TO

The President

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your confidential memorandum of December 19, 1942 enclosing a letter from Ambassador Biddle. I am submitting a draft reply for your signature if you approve.

While I perceive no objection to granting King Zog access to his funds in this country, I consider it the wiser course, since we cannot be assured of the purpose for which the funds will be used, to limit the amounts of withdrawals. The question of application for a license and related matters have been discussed with the Treasury Department which has agreed to give favorable consideration to an application for the release of a portion of these funds when it receives a request in this sense from the Guaranty Trust Company of New York.

You will remember that King Carol has been


permitted

The President,

The White House.

permitted to draw upon his accounts in this country
with certain limitations as to amounts and periods.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed closing "Faithfully yours,".

Enclosures:

1. From Mr. Biddle,
returned.
2. Draft reply.

a. j. Biddle folder
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For personal and informal
reply by me to Tony Biddle.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Let to the P. 12/4/42 from Tony Biddle
40 Berkeley Square, London, W., 1.
re financial arrangements for King and
Queen of Albania,

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

file personal.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

40, Berkeley Square,

London, W., 1.

January 21, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

Immediately upon receipt of your letter of January 9, 1943, I had a meeting with King Zog. Following my disclosure of the substance of your letter, the King asked me to write you that he was profoundly touched by your kindness in this matter. He realized, he said, that you had given the matter your personal attention, and he was deeply grateful for this further proof of your "bigness", and your human understanding. He would follow your suggestion and would accordingly request the Guaranty Trust Company of New York to make application to the Treasury Department for the necessary licence to permit withdrawals from this account. Moreover, he assured me that his instructions on this score would embrace the limitations of semi-annual withdrawals of \$30,000 from the account.

He furthermore explained that as regards his former account at the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, this dollar account, since he had first discussed the matter with me, had been exchanged for a sterling account through arrangements with the British Government.

I am aware that your kindness in this matter is for the King a source of genuine gratification.

With warmest regards and my every good wish,
I am

Yours faithfully,
Tony Blair

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

COPY

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

40, Berkeley Square,

London, W.I.

10th March, 1943.

My dear Joe:

Both Margaret and I are delighted to receive your very thoughtful and newsy letter which brought us well up-to-date both with the activities in the political arena at home, and with the activities of the Guffey family. I want you to know, moreover, that both of us deeply appreciate your confidence and friendship for us, as indicated by your reference to our possible role in the future political picture of our State. This, coming from you, really touches us a great deal and is a source of encouragement and gratification to us.

Now as concerns the bearing of such a move on our political picture at home, both Margaret and I have carefully considered this aspect - and we both agree that the situation boils down approximately as follows:

We took up this job in the spirit of helping, not only these governments, but also the peoples in their respective Occupied Countries, to regain their self-respect, to continue the struggle to regain independence. This is known not only by these governments here but also by the unfortunates in the Occupied territories. I believe, furthermore, that the American citizens of the extraction or origin of these countries are well aware of what we have personally felt and represented in behalf of our country. The war in Europe has now reached a stage whereat drastic decisions will soon have to be made as to the immediate treatment not only of these Allied Governments established here, but also of their respective countries. The decisions in all cases may or may not be to the liking of the Nationals concerned. The chances are that in some cases decisions will be taken that will be decidedly unfavorable in the eyes of some, which may in turn produce unhappy repercussions among some of the descendant groups at home. This may prove to be the case especially as regards the Slavic groups. Therefore, facing the situation and its possible turn, I believe that if I were to step out of the picture at this point - up to which I have established a record of doing my all in the interests of each Government and country concerned - I would be of greater political value to our party eventually, than if I were to remain, and possibly become the agency of "bad news" for those concerned - which would only serve to undo in their minds the record thus far maintained. In other words, taking a long range view, I believe it would be politically astute thus to keep our record clear and to hold us up the sleeve for the future.

a. J. W. Biddle Folder
file
personal
1-48

(Sheet Two)

Margaret shares my belief that you will understand this reasoning and will agree with our point of view in the matter.

The purpose of this letter is to let you know our inner and every thought, and to ask you to please let us know your own reaction. If I do not hear in the near future from the President, I may cable you to ask you to be good enough to talk to him about it.

Margaret has written recently to Pauletta giving her our personal news over here. She joins me in sending you and the family our affectionate regards.

Sincerely yours - your friend -

TONY BIDDLE (SIGNED)

COPY

March 9, 1943

Dear Tony and Margaret,

Enclosed please find copy of a speech I delivered on the floor of the Senate last Friday. I hope that both Margaret and yourself will approve.

I delivered this speech in view of the fact that the Republicans, ever since this session opened, have been playing politics of the meanest and smallest way, and I thought it was time to say something.

I wouldn't be surprised at all if I saw both Margaret and yourself in this country about the time the robins nest and the bluebirds sing.

Porry Laucks' farms, including 1,085 acres, the house with which you are familiar, the barn with all the livestock, amounting to approximately 400 head of Holstein-Friesian and Jersey cattle, and his magnificent herd of Duroc Jersey hogs with the necessary building, and his plant for raising Holland White turkeys. The Chase National Bank Executors are asking \$265,000. for the property. I believe it can be bought for \$40,000. or \$50,000. less, and now that it is run as a farm and not as a fad, I am glad to say it is in the black.

On the floor of the Senate recently I stated that Pennsylvania would go Democratic in 1944 and after that I would have a Democratic colleague. When I said that I had only one man in mind.

With kindest personal regards to Margaret and yourself, and with the hope of seeing you both soon,

Believe me to be

Very sincerely yours,

Honorable and Mrs. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle
American Embassy
London, England

Enclosure

Via Diplomatic Pouch

A. J. S. Biddle

JF

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1943

SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 17 1943
NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
and
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE ✓

To read and return ✓

Enclosures

F. D. R.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 17 1943
MR. WELLES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JUN 16 1943
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.

June 2, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

In the belief that it may be of interest and possibly helpful in connection with problems arising from the suspension of Polish-Russian relations, I beg to mention the following thoughts which have occurred to me, and which might possibly correspond to General Sikorski's views.

In the first place, it now seems clear that the three main points upon which Moscow would insist as conditions for a resumption of relations are: 1/ changes in the composition of the Polish Government; 2/ suppression of part, and a friendly attitude of the remaining section of the Polish press; 3/ tranquilization of the anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish armed forces both here and in the Middle East.

As regards the first condition, it might, in my opinion, be possible for Sikorski to meet this without impairing the dignity and prestige of the Polish position* provided (a) he carried it out by stages over an extended period, say 6 to 8 weeks, and (b) the changes were effected on the pretext both of differences in matters of internal policy, and of the General's belief that a "change of guard" is from time to time a wholesome move.**

Furthermore/

* "change of guard" is an expression conceived and used by the late Marshal Pilsudski and subsequently used by other Polish leaders, to explain to the people changes they were making in the composition of their respective Governments.

** In further regard to the question of a change in the composition of the Polish Government, I have long felt that Sikorski would do well to replace at least several of his Cabinet Ministers. I have in mind particularly Minister for Information Kot, and Minister without Portfolio, in charge of the Department of Post-War Planning, Marian Seyda. For your further information, the attached memorandum contains additional details on this score.

Furthermore, by proceeding thus Sikorski would be the less likely to appear to be acting under direct pressure from Moscow.

It seems to me, moreover, that provided this procedure were conducted quietly, with a minimum of publicity, and provided the Russians were sincerely willing to accept the fulfilment of the foregoing, among other conditions, as a basis for the renewal of relations, the way might thus possibly have been cleared for a resumption, perhaps by late Summer - early Fall.

In talks with General Sikorski, previous to his very recent departure for the Middle East, where he expects to remain about six weeks, I gained the impression that he was inclined to keep an open mind in the matter. I therefore believe that if he could be brought to feel reasonably sure of obtaining effective results from the application of a formula somewhat along the above suggested lines, he might give it his favorable consideration.

As regards the Russian conditions for a resumption of relations, both Russian Ambassadors Maisky and Bogomolov, in their conversations respectively with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk and with me, concurred in their insistence upon the reconstruction of the Polish Government. In comparing their statements on this aspect, however, I note a difference in detail. Bogomolov insisted upon a "replacement of the Sikorski Government" by one which would be friendly and more realistic towards the USSR; Maisky told Masaryk he considered that his Government might find its way clear to working with Sikorski and Raczynski; that they were more realistic than other members of the Polish Government. I am inclined to feel that Maisky's statement corresponds more than Bogomolov's with the terms upon which Moscow might be willing to settle. In appraising the difference between the statements of the two Ambassadors, I am inclined to ascribe Bogomolov's more drastic tone partly to the quarrelsome relations which he has personally experienced with the Poles over recent months.

As regards the Polish press, the two Ambassadors were in effect alike in insisting upon its suppression except for one official organ.

As regards the question of tranquilizing the openly anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish armed forces, here again the Ambassadors differed, for, I believe, the same reasons as above cited. Maisky said there

would/

would have to be a tranquilization of the anti-Soviet attitude among the Polish armed forces both here and in the Middle East, and the elimination of the sources of inspiration of this attitude, in view of the long-range as well as of the immediate bearing thereof on Polish-Russian relations. Bogomolov, for his part, said that the Polish military authorities would have to rid the army of the "militantly anti-Soviet, Pilsudski-ist officers" from the forces both here and in the Middle East.

As regards the frontier question, Maisky said this might best be left for discussion later on, or even after the war. Bogomolov said this was a closed question as far as those parts of Soviet White Russia and Soviet Ukraine which had formed part of pre-war Poland, were concerned.

With warmest regards and my every good wish,

Faithfully yours,

Tommy Riddle

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

Enclosure:

1/ as stated.

~~SECRET CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Background, 1/ Professor Kot,
Polish Minister of Information;
2/ Minister in charge of Post-
War Planning, Marian Seyda; and
3/ Professor Grabski, President
of the Polish National Council.

1/ The present Minister of Information, Professor Kot, following his replacement as Ambassador to Moscow, served as Minister of State in Iran, before returning to London to take up his present post in the Cabinet. Previous to his appointment to Russia he had served in Sikorski's Cabinet in France, and subsequently here following France's capitulation.

Kot is a pronounced egoist, ambitious in the extreme. His bitterness, which finds its roots (a) in his deep hatred of the late Marshal Pilsudski during the latter's lifetime, and now of his "ghost"; and (b) in his failure to achieve political distinction during the ten years leading up to the outbreak of war in Poland; leads him to avenge his feelings on all who had anything to do directly or indirectly with the Pilsudski regime, whether it was in military or political circles. From the day he first joined Sikorski's cabinet in France, his activities proved costly to the latter in terms of internal politics.* At that time Kot prevailed upon Sikorski to permit him to go forward with a purge of all officers and N.C.O's,

and/

*At about the same time, in the course of the last war, that the late Marshal Pilsudski was forming his secret organization, which laid the groundwork for Poland's liberation, there was being formed another secret Polish group in Cracow, but under the surveillance and even, it was suspected by other sections of Poland, the secret inspiration and influence of the Austrians. In glancing over the list of this group, Pilsudski said he would like to have Sikorski join his organization; he was a good patriot and a good artillery man. Word came back that Sikorski was on his way, but what about Professor Kot? (then a Professor of History at Cracow University). In response, Pilsudski sent back word that Professor Kot had better stick to teaching history. This enangered Kot, and he has, ever since, been embittered against the name and even memory of Pilsudski. Unfortunately, in the old days together in Cracow, Sikorski developed a complex about Kot. It seems that at the outset of their association, he came to regard Kot in the light of his intellectual superior. Conscious of this influence, Kot has never failed to take advantage of it at moments when he requires Sikorski's support.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

and even men in the private ranks who had been identified directly or indirectly with Pilsudski. As regards the officers, he arranged to have them sent to an isolation camp in southern France. He thereupon made two lists, a "black" and a "grey". Those on the black list were forbidden to join any of the Polish units either at the front or in the back areas. Those on the grey list, few in number, were put under surveillance for many months at the camp, and in some cases were eventually allowed to rejoin their respective units. The aforementioned category of N.C.O's were reduced to the rank of private, and the aforementioned category of privates were expelled from the army. While the officers' pay was maintained in full, the privates thus expelled were given no means of support directly or indirectly by the Polish Government. At the same time Kot let it be known throughout Polish political and military circles in France that the Government would not countenance even the mention of Pilsudski's name. Later, when the Polish forces came to Britain, the above-cited officers from the isolation camp in France were likewise treated in Scotland; they were sent to an "isolation area" on the Island of Bute.*

Sikoriski's acquiescence to Kot's persistence in carrying forward both the purge of the officers and men and the tabooing of reference to the late Marshal has proved costly to the General's personal popularity among the armed forces, as well as certain sections of Polish political circles. For aside from the older men who had formerly served with Pilsudski, and who liked and admired him, the younger men have been brought up since childhood to revere Pilsudski's name. Both categories have deeply resented the attitude thus apparently adopted by the Government as a whole.

Another political move which Kot conceived and urged upon Sikorski, was the formation in France of a refugee Parliament, the present Polish National Council.

No sooner had this body been formed than Kot, together with several of his close associates, deliberately inspired it to proceed with the sentencing to death of the former regime. It was only through the most energetic and discreet efforts on part of the British Ambassador, Sir William Howard Kennard, and myself, with

the/

* a large proportion of these officers are graduates of the Ecole de Guerre in Poland, and, in addition, a number of them received courses at the Ecole de Guerre in France. All of them are veterans of the 1939 war in Poland, and many of them, in addition, are veterans of the Great War.

the cooperation of the French Government, that instructions were eventually given the National Council to drop the matter. In brief, the Polish National Council may, to my mind, be characterized mainly as a debating society. Moreover, the utterances of many of its members manifest more of a "demagogic" tendency than of an understanding of democracy. Like Kot, many of the members are embittered by the fact that they did not succeed during the ten years or more, leading up to the outbreak of this war, in playing a more important role in their country. It may be recalled that in previous writings from Poland, I pointed out that while there was much opposition throughout the country to the former regime, no one appeared on the political horizon sufficiently strong to consolidate and lead that opposition against the regime.

In brief, Kot has no particular liking either for the United States or for Britain; he has a deep distrust and hatred of Russia, and regards the war as the business mainly of us three from now on, permitting him to go on playing his own "game of political marbles". His actions are motivated mainly by personal ambitions, and he works, in my opinion, with his eye, so-to-speak, "around the corner", dreaming of the day when, perhaps, he may become the leading political figure in his own country. In this connection, I have been advised by our Liaison Officer with the Polish forces in the Middle East, that Kot, while he was in Iran as Minister of State, and even at this time, was undermining Sikorski with the Polish Underground organization in Poland; that Kot was placing his own men in important positions with a view to his own personal forward-looking interests.

When recently sounded out by a close associate of Sikorski as to my reaction to the possibility of Kot's replacing Ambassador Ciechanowski, in case it became advisable to replace Kot in the present Government, I emphasized my opinion that it was highly inadvisable to consider changing their Ambassador at this stage. The question was sufficient to indicate the trend of thought in the back of Sikorski's mind. Indeed, any future developments may cause Sikorski to try even perhaps to invent some posts for Kot and Seyda in the United States. Having observed their activities over the past three years, I should earnestly recommend that in the event that requests are eventually made for their visas to go to the United States, some reason be found for suggesting in effect that their services might be more useful to Poland in some other country. In short, they are both trouble-makers, and if allowed to circulate among the Americans of Polish origin and extraction, would undoubtedly become "political headaches" for us in the United States. Particularly Kot is the type of Pole, which, to my mind, is very

apt,/

apt, in permitting his personal ambitions and his emotions to cloud his perspective, to lose sight of the broader objective. In playing one force against another to gain its own ends, this type of Polish mind is apt to overlook the potential danger of the effect of its inspired activities upon the broader aspect of the struggle. Moreover, I believe that if Kot and Seyda are eventually replaced in the Government, it would be well for the British authorities to see that they are not permitted to stay here where they would undoubtedly engage in intrigue amongst Polish circles; it would be better to send them to some distant land with a healthy climate and where there are no other Poles with whom they could intrigue.

2/ Minister Seyda, in charge of post-war planning, and a prominent member of ENDEK (National Democrats - Right Wing) is considered by the Poles here as a representative of the moderate faction of his party. It may be said that he is a reactionary of the "old" school, in contra-distinction to the "younger", and what Russian diplomatic quarters here consider the more Fascist-minded ENDEK faction, headed by Thadeusz Bielecki. This faction holds that the old party is not sufficiently militant (Bielecki, in his weekly "Mysl Polska" - "The Polish Thought" - has been vigorously attacking the Sikorski Government on the grounds that it has fallen under the influence of "Jewish Liberalism" and "Freemasonry").

It may be recalled that Minister Seyda resigned from his post as Minister of Justice as a result of his opposition to the signing of the Polish-Soviet Agreement. He was later "forgiven" by Sikorski on the grounds that he had acted impulsively under severe pressure from General Sosnkowski and a group of intriguers around the General. Later he drew the fire of severe criticism of Russian diplomatic quarters here by his pamphlet entitled "Poland and Germany and the Post-War Reconstruction of Europe" published in September 1942 for "Private Circulation". In my talks with Ambassador Bogomolov, he has on numerous occasions made it a point to throw off on this pamphlet. He was particularly scornful of Seyda's remarks that, even if the Polish frontiers were modified quite rationally, and if Poland were to obtain all the sea coast to which she naturally gravitated, this would not be sufficient to secure territorially her peace, if she were not simultaneously assured the freedom of the roads leading from the Baltic to the North Sea. Bogomolov said that this was just another example of the "big eyes" through which so many Poles saw the future. Bogomolov was equally critical of Seyda's remarks that Poland must in particular retain the eastern frontier she had hitherto possessed, as the result of the voluntary compromise between her and the USSR. No less annoyed was Bogomolov over Seyda's reference to the formation of post-war blocks or

associations/

associations of states in Central and South Eastern Europe. In this connection, Seyda wrote that the region of Central and South Eastern Europe comprised: Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and, to a certain extent, Turkey; that the block of the aforementioned states of Central and South Eastern Europe may be organized either as one federation or confederation, or as two associations closely collaborating with one another. Seyda added that while they must cooperate with Russia in the task of maintaining peace, this did not in the least mean that they should be left under Russia's leadership. Bogomolov said that these statements, including the cool mention of Lithuania, a member Republic of the USSR, as a future partner or member of the envisaged grouping, was sufficient to indicate the real character of the dish being served. These and like views expressed by other Polish reactionaries in various sections of the Polish press brought to light their aims to create from the Baltic to the Aegean a vast confederacy of reaction, and with the purpose of maintaining, even increasing, the power of the former ruling circles of Poland, working hand-in-glove with sympathetic regimes in other states. These and other points in Seyda's pamphlet had, according to Bogomolov served to antagonize Moscow.

3/ I am aware that, in addition to the aforementioned Cabinet members, Professor Stanislaw Grabski, President of the Polish National Council, has through certain public utterances, writings in "UTRO" - "Tomorrow" - as well as by certain activities, drawn the fire of severe criticism from Russian diplomatic quarters here. Ambassador Bogomolov has on several recent occasions imparted to me his annoyance over the anti-Soviet tone of Grabski's recent utterances and writing. He furthermore emphasized his irritation over certain Polish activities, directed by Professor Grabski, aimed at contacting the Right Wing of the Orthodox Church in Russia through certain Balkan Orthodox circles. This, Bogomolov said, could be aimed at only one thing and that was to stir up trouble.

*A. J. D. Biddle folder
1-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
and
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

To read and return.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Let to the P. 6/2/43 from Amb. Biddle
40, Berkeley Square, London, W. 1,
enclosing strictly confidential memo
re background Professor Kot, Polish
Minister of Info; Minister in charge
of Post-War Planning, Marian Seyda;
and Professor Grabski, President of the
Polish National Council

Copies in Poland folder 1-43.

A. J. Biddle folder
1-44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 4, 1944.

file
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

The work of Tony Biddle in London is assuming and will assume more and more the aspect of military liaison between the governments he is accredited to and the American-British operations this spring. This means that he will, of necessity, be closer to General Eisenhower's staff. The latter would be glad to see him as part of the staff and it would be much easier if Biddle could have a commission in the Army.

I think there is no reason why he cannot have such a commission and at the same time remain as Ambassador to the various countries to which he is accredited. He would draw, of course, only one salary -- that of Ambassador.

It is my thought that the Army would commission him as a Lieutenant Colonel or perhaps a Colonel. This would make his work easier and at the same time would make no difference in his relationship to the State Department.

F.D.R.

FDR
cc to Jack McCloy

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am informed that Ambassador Biddle is about to be commissioned as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army and will be assigned to act as liaison between General Eisenhower and various authorities of the exiled Governments residing in London. Since I understand that it would be contrary to existing statutes for Mr. Biddle to retain his post as Ambassador, and since I believe it important that a successor be promptly appointed to fill the post, I should like to suggest that Mr. Joseph C. Grew be named. Will you let me know if this suggestion meets with your approval.

CH

No - he can I am
sure hold both posts.

F. D. R.



a. J. D. Biddle folder
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Will you speak to me about
this?

F.D.R.

Memo from Gen. Marshall returning letters from Tony Biddle which the President recd. and Gen. Marshall suggests that he be given a commission of Lt.Col. to be connected with Civil Affairs Division in London with Gen. Devers.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 7, 1943.

I attach a suggested
reply to Ambassador Biddle's
letter of March 6. I hope it
will serve to induce him to
carry on as Ambassador.

CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Anthony J. Biddle, Jr.
file
not sent
11-43

September 7, 1943

Dear Tony:

I have given long and careful thought to your letter of March 6 and appreciate the fullness and frankness with which you have set forth your problem as you see it. I have every sympathy with your desire to transfer your services to the Army; in fact, knowing you as I do I should have been much surprised if you didn't feel that way. As I keep turning the matter over in my mind, Tony, and look at it primarily from the point of view of where your services will do the most good toward winning the war and also toward winning the peace, I come back always to the conclusion that you can't be spared from your present job. I know how irksome and trying it must be and how at times you must get some feeling of futility, but I can't agree with you that the job is done and that our relations with the Exiled Governments may safely be entrusted to less capable hands. In fact I have had in mind speaking to Cordell about building up your staff so that you will have high ranking assistants to help you deal with each of your countries in preparation for the day when separate Missions will move into their respective countries. Your job I feel will grow more important, not less. Looked at from the perspective of Washington it seems to me that as the war progresses we are reaching the very stage where your knowledge of the innermost thoughts of the London Exiles would be of the greatest practical help and I don't think if we consider the complications involved in their relationships that you could give me the same degree of help as a Civil Affairs officer on General Devers staff. I have tried to think of someone with your background and understanding of our Exiled friends who could take your place without a dangerous time lag at this critical stage but frankly no one comes to mind. So, much as I

The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
Care of American Embassy,
London.

should like to release you for a more soul-satisfying job, I really feel I need you as Ambassador to the Exiled Governments. Please think it over and talk it over with Margaret -- and then write me that you will carry on.

All the best to you both.

Very sincerely yours,

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.

October 18, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

On several occasions recently Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk has asked me whether I thought you might find it convenient to receive him at some time in the not distant future. I told him the first time he asked that I was confident that you would be glad to see him, and that if he wished me to enquire discreetly as to what would be the best time I should be glad to do so. He has accordingly just asked me to ascertain whether you might find it possible to receive him at some date in late November - early December. If so he would immediately make preparations to arrive in Washington about that time.

You may possibly remember him as having accompanied General Sikorski on his first visit to you at the White House. At that time Mikolajczyk was Deputy Prime Minister with the portfolio of Minister of the Interior. Having long played a prominent role in the Polish Peasant Party, he has come to be regarded as the Party's chief representative outside the country. He has broadened perceptibly in perspective during the past four years, and might today be considered middle road in political outlook. Moreover he takes a considerable pride in claiming to represent continuity in policies conceived and pursued by the late General.

He/

The President
The White House,
Washington.

He is a great admirer of yours, and I know it would mean a great deal to him if he were afforded the opportunity of having a talk with you. In the event that you may see your way clear to set a date, I should send you well in advance of his departure an outline of the main points which he might be expected to bring up in the course of discussion.

With warmest regards and my every good wish,
I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle. r


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 5. 1943

My dear Mr. President:

There is enclosed for your approval a reply to Mr. Biddle's letter of October 18, 1943 relative to the desire of the Polish Prime Minister to visit Washington.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "E. A. Tamm". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Edwin A. Tamm".

Enclosures:

1. To Mr. Biddle.
2. From Mr. Biddle,
October 18, 1943.

The President,
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted **11/2/43**

ADDRESSED TO

The President

*file
for mail*

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.

October 20, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

Even in these trying times a laugh turns
up every once in a while. The latest one I
have run across is contained in the attached
1/ copy of "THE WEEK" edited by one Claude
Cockburn, who incidentally writes in the London
"DAILY WORKER" under the name of Pitcairn. This
is the first time he has ever to my knowledge
ventured from the field of political commentary,
and in this deviation he seems to have gone out
in a big way on farm livestock. I thought it
might give you a good laugh.

With my warmest regards and every good wish,
I am

Yours faithfully,

Tom Biddle

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

Enclosure:
1/ as stated.

21 BLOOMSBURY WAY
LONDON, W.C.1

TELEPHONE
CHANCERY 4563

October 15th, 1943.

THE PRICE OF MODESTY

What might have been one of the fruitiest libel actions in years was settled out of court at a cost of around £2,000 to a leading newspaper proprietor, following the discovery that the modesty of his lady wife had led unwittingly to the libelling of a stud bull.

The case threw a sufficiently eerie light on the present state of the British libel laws.

What happened was that there came into the office of one of the newspapers concerned a picture of a prize-winning stud bull.

Nothing very unusual in that. Unusual was, naturally since the beast was a prize-winner, the size of the creature and in particular the size of the organ which had carried it to the top of the list.

Her Ladyship has for some time been playing an increasingly important role in the general conduct of her husband's newspaper. "Intervention" has become her middle name. And on this occasion her influence had to be exerted to the full.

She took the view that a family newspaper designed for circulation among the masses of the British public, quite certainly could not publish a picture of that nature.

A picture of a bull, yes. A picture of that section of the bull which made him worth picturing at all--no.

So they castrated the photograph.

And the next thing they knew, after publishing the no longer offending picture of the poor brute, was that they got a letter from the farmer-owner of the said bull declaring that his bull had been the victim of a monstrous libel, that he had been depicted in a physical condition which could not be considered otherwise than gravely humiliating and damaging to his prestige, and that restitution must be made or else.

It worked out at £2,000 for the farmer.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.

To prepare reply, but noting that I may be away from Washington until the end of December. It is O.K. with me after that time.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 10-18-43, from Tony Biddle, Jr., 40 Berkeley Square, London saying that the Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk has asked him to ascertain whether the Pres. could receive him in late Nov. - early Dec.

(2087)

hms

*Signed original of this letter sent to the Office
of the Under Secy. State for delivery.*

hms

*A. J. B. Biddle folder
1-43*

November 8, 1943

Dear Tony:

Thank you very much for your letter of October 18 regarding Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's desire to visit me in Washington.

I remember the Prime Minister very well from his previous visit here, and I am looking forward to having the pleasure of seeing him again particularly since I feel it is most desirable when possible to maintain personal contacts between the various leaders of the United Nations.

While I am anxious to see the Prime Minister at the earliest convenient time, I have a rather full schedule for the next two months. Consequently I should prefer, if the Prime Minister is agreeable, to receive him sometime subsequent to the reopening of Congress after the Christmas holidays. I would appreciate it, therefore, if you could explain this to the Prime Minister and ascertain whether it would be convenient for him to delay his visit to Washington until sometime after January 15.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable

Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
American Ambassador to Poland,
Care of American Embassy,
London.

November 12, 1943.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

The President directs me to forward to you the enclosed envelope, with the request that you be good enough to deliver it to the Norwegians.

With all good wishes to you and Mrs. Biddle,

Very sincerely yours,

Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary

Honorable A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
The American Embassy,
London, England.

Enclosure.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

January 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have received your memorandum of January 14 indicating your feeling that it would be more satisfactory for Mr. Biddle to serve as a military liaison officer only, rather than to continue as Ambassador to the several governments in exile. I should be glad to make the necessary arrangements and in accordance with your suggestion will see that Mr. Rudolph Schoenfeld is left as Chargé d'Affairs of our Embassy to the exiled governments.

With regard to Mr. Biddle's suggestion that additional officers be assigned to that Mission, each to work on the problems of a specific country, you will be glad to know that we have been giving the desirability of this procedure careful consideration for some weeks and are taking the necessary steps to put it into effect.

In accordance with your request, Mr. Biddle's letter to you is returned herewith.

CH

Enclosure:

Mr. Biddle's letter to
the President, dated
January 13, 1944.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

January 13, 1944.

My Dear Mr. President:

One thing that I did not mention in the memorandum which I asked Miss Tully to be so kind as to transmit to you, is the following point:

That the more I consider the matter from every angle, the more convinced I am that in order to carry out effectively the constructive ideas we discussed the other day, my contemplated assignment as Liason Officer between our military authorities and the Allied Governments should be separated from the role of Ambassador. Accordingly, I earnestly believe that my retirement as Ambassador and assignment as Liason Officer would permit me to be employed in the most useful way possible in our interests as well as in those of the governments and their respective peoples concerned. As the forthcoming stage will, in the eyes of these governments, be mainly military in character, at the same time involving political considerations, I feel I could better serve our and their interests in the position of Liason Officer than as Ambassador during that stage. For, as far as the diplomatic functions of my Mission are concerned, they have already given way mainly to military and connected considerations.

Therefore, I feel that the main task of the diplomatic section of my Mission, during the coming months, leading up to the liberation of the occupied territories concerned, will be one of constructive preparation to meet eventual requirements. Accordingly, I strongly suggest, that in order to preserve the continuity of established contact and manner of conducting the business of the Mission, Rudolf Schoenfeld, my capable and experienced Counsellor, be designated Charge d'Affairs, and be known as Acting Chief of Mission during the forthcoming mainly military stage; that there be assigned to the Mission, under his direction, a number of diplomatic officers, each or several of whom would study a given country preparatory either to heading or accompanying a Mission to that country as it is liberated.

Knowledge of these constructive preparations would be gratifying and encouraging to the Allied Governments concerned, and they would, in my opinion, comprise the main functions of the diplomatic section of the Mission in the forthcoming stage. Meanwhile, as Liason Officer, I would be in position to put my experience with, and understanding of the mentality and problems of the governments concerned, to the maximum advantage to ours and their interests.

In making the foregoing recommendations, I do so only after most careful consideration of all aspects of the question, and in the strongest belief that the constructive objective in mind may be served the more effectively by your withdrawing me as Ambassador and appointing me Liason Officer.

With my affectionate regards and my every good wish,

I am

Faithfully yours,

Tommy Biddle

The President,
The White House.

A. J. D. Biddle for [unclear] 1-14-44
Biddle
pres not

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This letter from Tony Biddle (please send it back) puts a new phase on the matter of his remaining as Ambassador and serving, at the same time, as military liaison officer.

I wish you would let me know what you think. Biddle has, of course, accomplished a wonderful job in handling all these governments-in-exile without any friction and in a way which has brought him the real regard of the heads of these governments.

However, there is something to be said for his suggestion, especially in that Schoenfeld would become the Charge d'Affairs and that Biddle would continue his connection with them as liaison officer. In fact, it would mean only that he would transfer from civilian clothes to a uniform.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-2-

I hope the governments themselves would understand the new relationship and not be insulted because we did not appoint a successor as Ambassador.

F. D. R.

P.S. I am also enclosing a memorandum from Biddle, together with copy of one which he sent to Jimmy Dunn. Will you let me know what you think?

F. D. R.



THE
Carlton
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 11, 1944.

Miss Grace Tully,
Secretary to the President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Miss Tully:

Following our telephone conversation of this morning, I take pleasure in forwarding you the attached memorandum containing certain suggestions which I venture to offer in the hope that they may prove helpful in the matter of procedure, in connection with my contemplated new assignment.

As you may percieve, I am making the suggestions only in the thought that the President should, and justifiably so, derive all possible "political profit" from this assignment, that he so richly deserves. We are passing through a phase involving considerable political anxiety on the part of the "smaller nations" in general, of the Poles in particular. It, therefore, occurred to me that something along the line of the contents of my attached memorandum might prove of psychological benefit at this time.

I am at the Carlton Hotel and shall await orders from our magnificent Chief.

With warmest regards and with my every good wish,

Very sincerely yours,

Anthony Biddle

P.S. For the President's information I am also attaching copy of a Memorandum which I am handing Mr. James C. Dorn at the State Department.

apb

*file
personal*

*Tony Biddle folder
1-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF

January 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I gave your message -- that you thought Tony Biddle should be made a Colonel -- to General Marshall.

General Marshall asked as a special favor that he be allowed to appoint him first a Lieutenant Colonel, at the same time giving instructions to promote him to full Colonel, he said, within the month. General Marshall believes this quite important and he felt the President would allow him to do it. I wanted you to fully understand the situation, as I told the General you believed Biddle's rank as Ambassador entitled him to a full Colonelcy.

General Marshall tells me, incidentally, that this is what Eisenhower wants and that Biddle is very happy with the arrangements, and understands his promotion is in the bag.

Emw
E.M.W.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

PSF
A. J. Biddle folder
File
Personal
1-44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have just received a message from General Eisenhower in which he stated he would like to have Tony Biddle on his staff in London without announced portfolio. He plans to use Biddle as his contact with the governments of the various countries for whom he is now responsible. The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, informs me this is agreeable to him.

I recommend that Biddle be commissioned a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army and assigned to duty in this capacity. If this meets with your approval, I will proceed accordingly.

W. H. H. H. H.
Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-17-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*



~~SECRET~~