

PSF Great Britain 1944-45

735- U. Britain folder  
1-44

(2310)

*hmo*

**THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON**

**January 4, 1944.**

**MEMORANDUM FOR**

**H.L.H.**

**Does this need an answer?**

**F.D.R.**

Letter from Lord Halifax, British Embassy, Washington, D. C., 12/24/43, to the President, stating that Mr. Eden has asked him to let the President know that the question of Italian ships for the Russians, which was dealt with in the President's telegram No. 422 of 12/21 to the Prime Minister, has been considered in London in the light of the telegram which the President sent to Mr. Harriman. Gives background regarding this matter and makes various suggestions in re above.

PSF Great Britain folder  
1-44

FROM

The White House  
Washington

# TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

January 31, 1944.

His Excellency  
Lord Beaverbrook  
London, England

Ever so many thanks for your very thoughtful birthday  
message, which I deeply appreciated. *I do hope to see you here soon.* With my warm regards,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

# Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

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JANUARY 28, 1944

WHITE 31:

LORD BEAVERBROOK TO THE PRESIDENT:

"I SEND YOU MY WARMEST GOOD WISHES FOR THIS AND MANY  
BIRTHDAYS TO FOLLOW ENJOYED IN HEALTH AND HAPPINESS. WITH  
GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCES AS EVER FOR ALL THAT YOU HAVE MEANT  
TO A TROUBLED WORLD AND WITH AFFECTIONATE PERSONAL DEVOTION. "

MAX

282033Z



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

The President told me to send him a copy of the message from Lord Beaverbrook, which is attached, as he wishes to acknowledge it.

As something to shoot at, I suggest the following:

Many thanks for your welcome message of January twentyeighth. I appreciate greatly the friendly sentiments and look forward to continued association with you in our joint labors.

(Signed) ROOSEVELT.

  
WILSON BROWN.

28 January 1944

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LORD BEAVERBROOK.

I send you my warmest good wishes for this and many birthdays to follow enjoyed in health and happiness. With grateful remembrances as ever for all that you have meant to a troubled world and with affectinate personal devotion,

MAX

2578  
(bms)

*Mr. Britain folder 1-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1944

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

To read and return.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Let to the P. 2/22/44 from Halifax  
re correction from the Foreign Office  
in the tele. sent to the P. by the  
Prime Minister on Polish-Soviet affairs.

Upon its return, let. should be given  
to Admiral Wilson Brown for his files.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date

FEB 14 1977



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Received  
2/26/44 -  
12:30 AM

Lincoln  
Bill Keighan  
for Admiral  
Brown to file  
2/26/44


February 25, 1944

My dear Miss Bachelder:

I return herewith the letter to the President from Lord Halifax dated February 22 regarding corrections in the Prime Minister's cable No. 584 to the President dated February 20. Lord Halifax's letter was sent to me with the President's memorandum of February 23.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

  
Acting Secretary

Miss T. M. Bachelder,  
The White House.



PSF Mr. B. J. ...  
file  
Personal


THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE G. TULLY

SUBJECT: British Dollar Balances

When I saw the President on February 22, I discussed the attached memorandum with him. At the time he approved the message on British dollar balances to the Prime Minister. Inadvertently I did not leave the memorandum with him and I return it herewith for your files.



Enc.  
Memorandum on British  
Dollar Balances,  
February 22, 1944

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
February 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. In connection with the attached, I am certainly mindful of the political dangers inherent in the accumulation by the British Government of very large dollar balances as a result of the lend-lease program. However, may I recall certain facts which may make a proposal such as this one equivocal at this time?

2. Negotiations have been conducted with the British on the termination of certain lend-lease transfers which we regard as embarrassing, and no longer necessary. The British were assured by the Secretary of the Treasury and by Mr. Crowley that the changes submitted on January 7 were all we were going to undertake for the present, and that our proposals were being made in the light of domestic political considerations, not British assets. The British have not delayed these negotiations. Research on certain items being submitted was not completed by the Foreign Economic Administration until the middle of January, and some important items were not submitted to the British until about February 1. It is expected that the lists will be wound up by March 1. At a meeting in my office on February 15, Mr. Crowley told Lord Halifax it was his thought that at the


conclusion

conclusion of the present series of negotiations, the British lend-lease program could be stabilized in all major aspects until mid-Summer at least.

3. The question is more than one of embarrassment. The present British dollar balances must be considered as the only reserve for their growing financial commitments, especially in the Middle East and Far East. An ordering of their affairs which will reduce those holdings may gravely weaken their machinery of war finance. Against that background, the balances do not seem too high. Furthermore, they have risen largely because of our troop expenditures, a source of dollars which may well decline after the next few months. If the British are to be able to cooperate with us in multilateral solutions of trade and financial problems, they must finish the war with enough assets to carry through such a program. Even as things stand now, it would be difficult for the British to consider unfreezing sterling at or near the end of the war, or giving up many of their other economic controls. If the financial side of the war is run in such a way as to keep British balances at or about \$1 billion, we thereby reduce our chance to achieve the basic economic policy we want and need.

Attachment:

Draft of letter from  
the President to the  
Prime Minister



Feb 22, 1944

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, COPY TO THE  
FOREIGN SECRETARY

May I ask your help in solving a troublesome problem which is of deep political concern both for you and for us? Officers of our Government have lately discussed with Lord Halifax, Mr. Ben Smith and Sir David Waley the possible termination of certain lend-lease transactions which we have found to be embarrassing, and no longer necessary. Your people have, as I understand it, promptly agreed to take over the purchase of goods which cost about \$400 million in 1943. Final agreement on the whole list of articles is expected soon, and the negotiations, in view of their complexity, have gone very well.

Quite apart from these lend-lease negotiations, I have been wondering whether it would be feasible for you to consider so ordering your financial affairs as to reduce your gold and dollar holdings available to this country to the neighborhood of about \$1 billion.

What do you think should and can be done?

*of Roosevelt*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1944.

MEMO FOR GGT:

The Secretary of the Treasury called with reference to the attached memo from Mr. Stettinius, protesting against the sending of draft re dollar balance to the Prime Minister. The Secretary would like to see Mr. Stettinius memo in order to have more background before preparing draft of cable to the P.M. on this subject. Is it O.K.?

djb

OK  
go do

(copy of E. R. S. 2/22/44 memo. sent to the Secy. of the Treasury, 3/16/44.)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ March 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

To read and return for my  
files.

F.D.R.

(When returned it is to go to  
Admiral Brown for his files)

*(Has been sent to Adm. Brown)*

Personal letter to the President, 3-2-44,  
from Hon. Ronald I. Campbell, British  
Embassy, Washington, enclosing copy of a  
message sent by the Prime Minister to  
Marshal Tito, and a copy of Tito's reply,  
dated 2-9-44.



*in Britain folder 7-40*  
**DECLASSIFIED**

SCA/516/P

SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND HEADQUARTERS.

28th March, 1944

*File  
Per  
JWR*

Dear Mr. President,

You told me to write to you from time to time and since your forces in my theatre have been doing so particularly well lately I felt I should write to you briefly about their doings.

To begin with, General Stilwell is having a really great success in the Hukawng Valley. I have allotted to him the lion's share in the aircraft supply dropping missions and this has enabled him to push ahead with his Chinese forces without waiting for the road to catch up.

I visited him at his Advanced Headquarters and went up to the front with him and was most impressed by all I saw.

I had allocated the American Long Range Penetration Group to General Stilwell and there is no doubt that it has been of the utmost value to him in going ahead and cutting the Japanese lines of communication, although this could more properly be called "Short Range Penetration".

Wingate has now three Brigades in Burma whose function it is to cut the Japanese communications at long range and Stilwell is as confident as I am that Wingate's operations will have a profound effect on the future prospects of success of the Ledo force.

It was when I was visiting Arnold in Washington after the Quebec Conference that I suggested to him the formation of an Air Commando to help Wingate. This new formation has proved the most unqualified success and has revolutionised jungle warfare. Colonel Cochran and his Second in Command, Lieutenant Colonel Alison, have made a really grand job of No. 1 Air Commando. I sent two military observers to witness the fly-in of Wingate's brigades. The British observer, Major Dunn, was killed; the American observer, Lieutenant Colonel Bellah, survived and has written a most dramatic account of the fly-in, which I am taking the liberty of enclosing, as it seems to me such a very vivid account. I think it shows the splendid spirit which exists between Wingate's and Cochran's forces.

I also enclose an extract from an account from Air Marshal Baldwin which gives a vivid idea of how excellently air control of this landing field was exercised by Alison.

I have always been cautious in my claims but optimistic in my outlook of what could be done in Burma and as a result of Wingate's and Cochran's exploits I am even more optimistic than I was.

I hear that we are going to get a lot more transport aircraft and Air Commandos. I really feel we may be able to get a move on when we have these. Without air transport and air supply we are tied to roads which we have to build behind us across the most wild and desolate mountain jungle I have ever seen. Without overwhelming air support it would take years to drive the Japanese out of Burma.

On the 15th April I am moving my Headquarters to Kandy, as originally suggested to me by the Prime Minister. It will be a great blessing being able to get my Headquarters away from the political and social atmosphere of Delhi and to get away from being lodgers in India to Ceylon, which is actually within the South East Asia Command.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY RT, DATE SEP 21 1973

It is not generally realised that the time to fly to the 14th Army Headquarters at Comilla from Delhi is about six hours and from Kandy to Comilla about eight hours so that I shall remain in good touch with the Burma front. When it comes to any other part of my theatre, Kandy is of course immeasurably nearer than Delhi.

I shall leave a small Rear Headquarters in Delhi and shall of course visit it regularly myself.

I hope you are keeping well and will be grateful if you would give my kindest regards to Mrs. Roosevelt and Jimmy.

Yours very sincerely,

*Dickie Mountbatten*

The President of the United States of America,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

P.S. I have just received the shattering news that Wingate is missing. He was flying from Imphal to Sylhet in a B. 25 which crashed. The search party were unable to identify any human remains so, unless he escaped by parachute, I fear he is dead. I am, however, reporting him as missing and hope that we shall succeed in making the Japanese think that this is a blind and that he is really alive and engaged on another secret operation.

His death is indeed a blow to me, not only because I have made personal friends with him since Quebec, but because he was one of the few really dynamic and forceful leaders in the Burma war and although I shall do my very best to keep the enthusiasm at fever heat it is not so easy doing it from above as when you have a colleague to keep the heat on from below.

*K*  
*W*



SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND HEADQUARTERS.

This report is classified ~~TOP SECRET~~  
and has NOT been censored. Any  
publication should be arranged  
between London, Washington and  
South East Asia Command Headquarters,  
so as not to conflict.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
BY RT, DATE SEP 21 1973

THE PASSWORD WAS MANDALAY

by

Lt. Col. James W. Bellah, Inf.

*File  
Purs  
JWR*

This is how Phil Cochran and his gang flew the vanguard of General Wingate's forces over the mountains in bright moonlight and put it down deep in the heart of Jap held Burma. This is how some men died, but hordes of men lived to strike a vital master stroke to save China and to help Stilwell and Wingate conquer Northern Burma.

Seven months of back-breaking, mind-searing work ended abruptly that last morning. Only hours were left - slow hours until take-off. Jerry Dunn kept talking about death and I kept shutting him up. He'd smile and say: "If you talk about it, it won't happen."

There were two open spaces on the map: open spaces ringed with jungle and mountain. Let's call them Fifth Avenue and Bond Street. Nobody had even been on the ground at either place - but there were photographs. The troop-carrying gliders would start down into those places shortly, and the first ones down would pop a red flare if they drew enemy fire - that would warn all the endless succeeding waves to turn back - only it wouldn't - for enemy fire or no enemy fire that red flare wouldn't be popped. Fifth Avenue and Bond Street had to be taken and held at all costs because the gliders couldn't go back. The two ships, stripped bare to haul the heavy loads, had barely gas enough after release to get themselves back through the hostile night miles. So it was agreed and so it was known by everyone. Nobody would fire the flare.

You would hit the ground and go into action and behind you in wave after wave would come the American combat engineers and more British troops and bulldozers and graders and jeeps and mules to build an airport between dawn and dusk, so that the next night huge troop-carrying power planes could fly in and start landing the army.

In the vast glider park there were voices from Brooklyn and Carolina, London and the North Country, Liverpool, Texas and Nepal. But nobody seemed to have any nationality suddenly. Phil Cochran must have felt that complete loss of all the non-essentials of life. He closed the briefing with "Tonight you're going to find out you've got a soul. Nothing you've ever done or nothing you are ever going to do counts now. Only the next few hours. Good luck".

Dunn and I lay down on the ground in the shade of a glider wing while I loaded his Tommy gun clips with tracers. We were first wave. Dunn talked about his wife in London. Every once in a while as he talked the whole thing would surge up inside me like a dental appointment when I was a kid. If it ever breaks, it spatters like blood into the outer reaches of your soul - and you run screaming. You have to stop it and when you do, you feel good inside. Damn good.

The time drew on, Dunn slapped me lightly on the shoulder "See you" he said and he walked back to his glider. Chaplain Marlin F. Kerstetter came by and we talked for a minute. It was Sunday night. "As soon as you take off" he said, "I'm going back to hold my service, but I'll be in the second wave."

All the rank - Slim, Stratmeyer, Baldwin, Old, Wingate, Cochran and Allison were in a huddle. It was coming up on time. Our troops were lined up to go aboard. Doc Talloch, co-piloting with John Allison looked over his medical equipment and suddenly Cochran called a quick, emergency briefing.



"We've got late afternoon reconnaissance photos. It looks as if the Japs have obstructed Bond Street, as if they were wise - so we're all going to pile into Fifth Avenue. Alright - get going! And just remember the dope on Fifth Avenue - forget all the rest."

John Allison came over on the run - John is a fighter pilot but he had checked out on gliders a few days before just to make this flight for he is Cochran's second in command with the job of making an airport in twelve hours out of a jungle clearing. He got in and Doc Tulloch crawled in beside him. Magoffin and I climbed in and the detachment from the Kings Liverpool Regiment under Wilson filed in behind us. Everyone of us was in full field kit and armed to the teeth with carbines, tommy guns, pistols, knives and grenades. Uminaki, with admirable enthusiasm had fitted a tommy gun stock to an air cooled 30 cal machine gun for hip and shoulder firing. A pirate crew, Wingate's army and Cochran's Air Commandos, in mottled camouflage suits, with broad brimmed rakish, paint dabbed jungle hats - most of them with a growth of rank beard, which seemed to be one of the few local conceits. There was no excitement, no eager babbling to quiet screaming nerves, no bravado - for this was no quickly cooked up raid. This was an army, filling the great gliders row on row behind us - a force in heavy strength with hundreds of miles of night flying ahead of us over trackless jungle and jagged mountains - night flying completely over a formidable Jap force to let down far behind it and to operate on an extensive scale in its rear. It was history in the making.

The gliders are towed in pairs on long ropes. Seese was flying the left glider in our tow. He carried Brigadier "Mad Mike" Calvert with most of one of the Brigade staffs aboard. Ground crews rigged the ropes as our tow ship taxied out like a great waddling duck. We were being hooked in when the Doc touched me and pointed ahead, "First tow air borne!" - there it was clear of the tree tops in the late afternoon sun with its two lumbering gliders weaving behind it. The second tow was roaring down the strip raising an enormous dust cloud, struggling and howling for flying speed, bouncing slightly, straining, straining and then tearing free of the earth and its own cloud of yellow dust and coming into clear silhouette above the tree tops.

Our glider jerked and shuddered as our tow ship took up the slack on the ropes. Then we began to move down the strip into the dust. On both sides of the field the long line of troops were still filing in endlessly to fill the other gliders behind us. Suddenly as our tow ship came to full throttle everything blotted out in the dust - everything but John Allison at the controls and the faces of the men in the glider - a little bit drawn at the mouth, a little bit tightened around the eyes. We were racing to take-off, bouncing slightly, straining on the end of the long tow rope, shouldering heavily for flying speed. Ahead of us the great tow ship was up a few feet to the left and slightly ahead, Seese's glider was air borne. So were we, with Allison bearing down heavily on his right rudder, sweating over it and shouting directions to Doc Tulloch to trim ship. We came up over the trees fighting for altitude and presently we settled into the long, slow, grind of wide circling to get our height for the mountains ahead.

The soldier beside me handed over his maps, "Will you circle Fifth Avenue with your pencil - we're the Bond Street party." Everyone unclipped their safety belts and eased packs. The Doc and I went into a huddle over the map and got Fifth Avenue lined in for everybody. Then we settled to the long flying hours ahead - long, cramped, smokeless hours with God knew what at the end of them.

All of that vast activity that had been around us for days, was gone now, and we were alone, in the setting Assam sun. It flooded the glider and tinted the inside of its fabric with rose gold. It picked

out the red in the stubby beards of our party and shone in high lights on rifle barrels and knife hilts. It was quite glorious for a few minutes as we climbed for the mountains, then it faded into the quick jungle purple below and all of our faces were gone in the shadows of evening.

Ahead then - all we could see was the blue blob of exhaust from the tow ship's starboard motor - the ship itself was shrouded in haze. All we could feel was the breathing of tightly packed men on either side and the animal shudder of the glider as it swung into the prop wash and swung out again, weaving at many miles per hour on its long snaking tow rope. All we could hear was the thundering noise of our thrust through the air - gliders are as noisy as power planes.

Doc Tulloch touched me, "Four thousand feet" and I looked at my watch. We had been off for some time, with still a very long time to go. The moon was high over the clouds now - a great three quarter moon - and presently it broke through its own silver wash into magnificent light above us and the bearded faces came out of the shadows into pale life again.

"Seventy one hundred feet" Doc grinned exultantly, "That clears the mountains!" Then in a moment we hit turbulence and began to kick around and bounce like hell. The tow rope looped back toward us and eased over our port wing. We bumped up and swayed out to the right and the rope snaked off straight ahead again toward the flame of the tow ship's exhaust. We were alone as far as we could see, but we knew that the rest of the wave was behind our spear-point - that the succeeding waves would take-off on schedule as their time came up - that the show was on and that it would go through.

We were at eighty five hundred feet now and in a few moments we were across the Burma frontier, with the mountains behind us. There had been village lights dotting the way as we crossed Assam, but once in enemy held Burma, the ground was completely blacked out. The thought flashed through my mind that if the Japs had even one night fighter pilot half as good as Cats Eyes Cunningham, that we could all be done-in like sitting birds, for we were sneaking the invasion in without fighter cover and in unarmed ships - counting entirely on audacity and surprise. The moon was very bright and very high over Burma, with its almost forgotten war, far away from the rest of the world and very unimportant to millions of people. If we died - was it worth the sacrifice? Purely academic thinking - all thinking is, once you are committed to action. But suddenly from it the whole reason behind all of the war was as clear as a bell stroke. For centuries my part of the world has dreamed and thought and worked and fought for government owned by the individual - and to some extent has attained that ideal - and therefore dead or alive the individual doesn't count except insofar as he attempts by all his acts to maintain that individual ownership! That's what John Allison and the Doc and Magoffin and all the thousands of men behind us were doing up here and out here tonight - maintaining individual ownership - and the thinking stopped as if a door had closed on it with a loud crash.

John turned his head and shouted "The Irawaddy River!" We crossed it and passed within a few miles of a Jap airfield and for minutes afterwards all of us who could, plastered our faces to the windows watching for tracers or pursuit aviation. But they let us through that bottleneck - they must have thought us a night bombing mission in force.

There was a bright fire presently far off to the right of us on high ground and somebody passed the word that we were ahead of schedule - God bless tail winds on nights like this!



"Target in twenty minutes." All of us in that glider came alive - broke from our tight-packed, cramp-locked huddles. Bolts snicked sharply as cartridges snapped into chambers. Hangers on pistols crashed back and slid home again. Men straightened and got their packs adjusted - heavy jungle packs that would carry us out the whole way on foot if need be. The word passed for safety belts and the catches clicked to.

Ahead, the tow ship banked larly and suddenly John Allison and the Doc called out together, "Lights - they've got the smudges lit!" The first glider was already down then - and there was no red flare. Half way around in the bank, Allison hit the cut-off at a thousand feet and we were gliding free, coming in sharply for a landing in complete darkness. Seese's glider was free beside us and slightly ahead. Here we go - packed to the guards - with no power but gravity to bring us in. Here we go into a blind clearing at better than a hundred miles an hour, howling down the night wind, deep in the heart of enemy territory, with a whole Jap army between us still and our following waves - with little John Allison fighting the controls and Doc Tulloch calling out his altitude and his flying speed to him. Trees - and we're over them! The lights - and they've shot past under us! A long flat shadowland ahead and we flatten for it, level off, sink toward it, strike it and bounce. The skids tear into it and the dust blots us out, streaming behind us across the clearing like the tail of a meteor. Then suddenly we have swung slightly right and stopped and the doors fly open and the security party is off on the run, fanning out on a perimeter of 360° - moving toward the jungle that is all around us and that may burst into shattering enemy fire at the next breath.

"Gliders!"

Another tow ship is over us with its gliders cut off. You can see them over the distant trees, losing altitude fast, diving towards us, helpless to turn back or to go on beyond their glide - howling down into the clearing with their heavy loads - one of them with death reaching for it. It banks slightly before it quite clears the trees and a split second later there is a splintering crushing thunderclap echoing across the night silence and the glider is gone. We start a party toward the edge of the jungle, running toward the sound of the crash, passing the word back for the doctor. Paddy birds chirp sleepily in their nests and the moon is still high and white above - but in there, somewhere deep in the tangled growth, there is nothing but silence. We cut in part way and call - but no answer comes back. We circle down a fish tail in the clearing and call again. No answer - and not a sound - but the roar of more motors overhead and the slicing sigh of two more gliders cut free - and again two more - until the air above seems full of them for a moment.

The word is passed that the bulldozers are not down yet - plowed ground and buffalo wallows and a log or two have taken wheels off some of the landed gliders - all hands to manhandle them and clear the landing space for the gliders coming in. Everybody turns to on the disabled ships, horseing and tugging frantically to get them out of the way. But a big glider with one wheel off is a helpless thing and a damned thing to move, "Turn her port wing to the north, then and keep her red wing tip light on! Lay on the next one. Heave! Here comes another tow".

Fifty men strain at the wreck but she doesn't budge. Skids dug in. "Haul up on the wing - hold her shoulder high - around with her tail. Sweet, you bloaters - lay on!"

"Gliders!"

Two more are howling down over the trees, roaring toward the congestion. One of the two sees it in time, zochs over it with the last of its speed and plows in safely just beyond. But the other crashes head on and welds two gliders into a ball of scrap. Screams tear the night and the wrecker crew claws into the wreckage with bare hands to get at the injured. A British surgeon is already inside doing something under a flashlight, something quite frightful with his kukris after his morphine has stilled the screaming.

And there is a quiet Worth Country voice in there "Don't move me - this is where I hit - and this is where I die." And somebody's damned good sergeant goes out on the tide.

You don't have heroes in armies any more. You just have men.

John Allison was changing the lights, re-rigging them with Magoffin to give the following gliders a better runway to come in on. Indefatigable John tearing all over the lot on his short legs - no longer the fighter pilot or the glider pilot - but the airport manager - sweating himself soggy.

Brigadier Calvert had his command post set up in the jungle edge and his security patrols out in all directions. Quiet Calvert - with his soft English voice masking the most civilized of killers. Stringy Shuttleworth deep in the Burma jungles, unshaven, but with his polished monocle stuck firmly in his left eye - well-bread jungle stalker.

The first, short range ground patrols were back now - no enemy. There had been one distant shot - but there was no enemy in force as yet. John Allison had the landing strips laid out again to avoid the wrecked gliders and the lights re-rigged for the second wave. In the pause between, Doc Tulloch set up his dressing station and it began to fill up. Men hobbled in singly and between two pals. Men were carried in on stretchers. There was no sound from them. There seldom is after the first shocked screams. Across the field, the British surgeon fought all night to save two men - and lost with the dawn light - and that angered him for he had fought well.

The breather was over and again the roar of tow ships filled the night skies - and again the gliders swooped in two by two - one with a bulldozer aboard to miss the strip in the darkness and to dive headlong between two trees that barely cleared the fuselage, to take off both wings and howl onward into the clear with the murderous bulldozer torn loose inside to slam onward unhinging the nose, heaving pilot and co-pilot up into the air, ricocheting out under them and letting the two men drop back unhurt!

There was now enough of a security party down to hold that clearing for thirteen daylight hours - the thirteen hours necessary for the Combat Engineers to make an airport for power ships, so Allison got on the radio and stopped the final waves of gliders.

With the first fish-belly light, the bulldozers began to growl and the Engineers were at it, grading and filling, levelling off hummocks, cutting the rank buffalo grass, hauling disabled gliders under the trees.

A British captain hobbled in on a broken foot. He had found his way in from a deep jungle crash with his sergeant weaving along behind him - both of them dazed. Two more men were alive in that crash they said, so Doc Tulloch got the position from the captain and machete in hand and stretcher-bearers behind him he started across the clearing to cut his way in to find them.

Word came over from the other clearing station that there would be a burial of British and Americans shortly because the jackals were already howling - the first time I have ever heard them howl in daylight. There was a burial in one grave regardless of rank or nation, with John Michael Matthew, the little Burmese Chaplain from Rangoon diocese attached to the King's, reading the service and everyone fervently following in the Lord's prayer - with motors high in the air suddenly but nobody looking up or moving to take cover until the rough wooden cross was planted and the last spadeful of earth was in - then scattering in all directions. But it was only our top cover, cruising far above, during the daylight hours, according to careful plan.

All through the forenoon the engineers toiled in the gathering heat. Doc Tulloch was back empty handed. The captain with the broken foot had been too dazed to keep his directions straight. Doc got another set of directions from the injured sergeant and went in again. But again the directions were wrong and again Tulloch came out empty handed and dead-beat with cutting through jungle growth for upward of ten miles.

Brig Calvert roughed in the casualty list as it was known to us and as we could guess it farther from known factors of missing gliders and suddenly it was amazingly small for what it had purchased. In another six hours thousands of troops would pour in in power ships on this airport of ours - that some of the first wave men had died to secure.

There was the hum of light motors in the sky suddenly and over the treetops came the tiny planes of Major Rebori, jaunty, frail and insolent in their perfect formation. They had come across the vast enemy-held terrain at tree-top level, with belly tanks to get them there - the Maytag Helldivers come to take out the injured. We got one of them to cruise the jungle and located Doc's crash. He brought in the exact bearing. We shot the azimuth and cut into the rank growth of jungle and after an hour of it, we found the crash. Two men had survived it and we got them out. Jerry Dunn was in there - to stay. So were the rest. He had been wrong - you mustn't talk about it - you mustn't think about it. When you have an appointment in Samara, you will keep it, whether you talk or not.

The American Engineers toiled on throughout the long, steaming afternoon, smoothing the strip for the power ships, lengthening it - making the airport. Their officer lay in there in that jungle crash with the rest of them - the third officer they have lost to date. "Everytime we get a job in Burma we lose an officer". They stood around for a moment, helpless, bewildered, angry deep inside themselves, then young Brackett, the last lieutenant they had, said "O.K. - two more hours of daylight. Get going!"

The Combat Engineers - shovels and machine guns and all the toughest jobs in war to do - but with the holy fires of something in their souls to carry them on with it - something that only a combat engineer can understand - and nobody else need try to,

The sun was low, sinking to the tree tops and the shadows were pooling deep across the clearing - that clearing far in enemy territory - so far that when you looked at it on a map you still couldn't quite believe that you were there. But you were - and it was no longer enemy territory - it belonged to us! It was an airport, ringed now with enough men to hold it for the time that was left to wait - test lighted for the troop-carrying power ships as the sun went down - and the lights worked.

A wrecked glider was the control tower - John Allison was ready in it, with his control radio.

Page Seven

All that air strip needed was a name. Then suddenly it didn't need a name. It had many names - names from Brooklyn and Carolina, London and the North Country, Liverpool, Texas and NePal - names of the men who had paid off to make it. Men who were there with it deep in the Burma jungle - who would stay there with it forever, watching over it.

There was a motor roar far up the evening sky - the first of the troop ships. They came in and circled for Allieone green landing beam and got it, roaring down in Johnson landings, taxing off the strip to disgorge the army. They came in faster than they ever could at La Guardia field - one after another, circling, cutting in their landing lights, roaring down on the lighted strip. You could count for awhile, then you lost count, and you asked someone and the figure was unbelievable - and it still is if you will look it up in the official records.

General Wingate's Army! And Phil Cochran and his gang flew it over the mountains in the bright moonlight and put it down deep in the heart of Jap held Burma - and the password was Mandalay.

Extract from Air Marshal Baldwin's letter  
to the Air Commander-in-Chief, South East  
Asia of 10th March, 1944

At General Wingate's advanced airfield (200 miles inside the Japanese lines) control was magnificent and it might have been a civil airport running under peacetime conditions. I first located the strip by an aircraft taking off and a second took off as we approached; we were given a green as we came into the circuit and landed straight away. The Captain was at once signalled by torches and led to his pen without any danger of collision from obstacles on the ground, or other aircraft. As he moved in, the prior occupant was moved out; we turned round within seven minutes and in this period a further two aircraft had taken off. We were then held up while three aircraft came straight in without having to orbit and all were led to their pens with equal efficiency. As we cleared the flarepath taking-off another aircraft was accepted and was already committed to its final approach.

I cannot speak too highly of the drill and organisation displayed at this airport. Guides had been selected and trained from the personnel of the Regiment who had arrived in the initial glider landing.

I feel that this control, both at the home and advanced bases, is the major issue when conducting any future operations of this nature.

With regard to the control at the home base, the Commanding Officer had got this worked out to the most minute detail. His system of dividing the strip into two equal halves so that aircraft took off alternatively, first north then south, worked without a hitch and certainly got rid of the dust bogey. By so doing, the runway north was completely clear for No. 3 to take off by the time No. 2 had departed south.

His organisation of the pens and his system of numbering was such that he could immediately substitute an aircraft to take the place of any one that went unserviceable or was delayed due to difficulty with its cargo. I think I am right, however, in saying that last night only in one case was an aircraft prevented from taking off due to cargo difficulties. In this case it was yet again a mule which broke away on the ramp and insisted on jumping on the aileron.

Our Transport Squadrons put up a first class show and I think this is true of both British and American. Our crews were in exceptionally good heart, although last night was the fourth night for all and in certain cases the fifth night of operations. Everybody last night did two trips bar the few who went unserviceable.

C  
O  
P  
Y

PSF: Great Britain folder  
1-44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telegram from Mr. Landis Regarding  
the Present Political Crisis in Egypt.

Reference is made to telegram no. 973, April 20, noon  
addressed to you by Mr. Landis regarding the present political  
crisis in Egypt.

The nature of this crisis may be summarized briefly as  
follows:

The King of Egypt has informed the British Ambassador that  
he desires the dismissal of Nahas Pasha, the present Prime Minister  
because of alleged attempts on the part of the Prime Minister  
to undermine the King and on account of the alleged corruption  
of the present regime. The King proposed the establishment  
of a government headed by the present Chief of the Royal Cabinet.  
The British Ambassador notified his Government of this develop-  
ment and received a message from Mr. Churchill stating that this  
matter is of such importance that it must be submitted to the  
British Cabinet and instructing the British Ambassador to request  
the King not to take any action which might disturb the existing  
situation. As may be noted, the British Ambassador informed  
the King of Mr. Churchill's request.

It may be noted that, in the telegram under reference,  
Mr. Landis states that he assumes that this Government has given  
consideration to the question of consulting with the British  
Government in regard to the political crisis in Egypt. Egypt  
is within an area of primary British military responsibility.  
Furthermore, the British Government has a treaty of close mili-  
tary alliance with Egypt. In as much as the defense of Egypt is  
a primary British responsibility, it is considered that in view  
of the security angle, the present Egyptian political crisis is  
of primary concern to the British Government rather than to this  
Government. It is believed, therefore, that recent developments  
in Egypt, at their present stage at least, need not be discussed  
with the British by this Government. Since it is the primary  
military responsibility of the British it is considered that  
the British should assume the initiative in dealing with the  
present crisis.

C.H.

Enclosure:

Paraphrase of telegram no.  
973, April 20, 1944, noon,  
from Cairo.

(Orig. copies filed - State Dept. folder, 2-44.)



P  
Y

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMLEGATION, Cairo.  
TO: Secretary of State, Washington.  
DATED: April 20, 1944, noon.  
NUMBER: 973

U. S. URGENT

FROM LANDIS FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AND PERSONAL.

Last night King Farouk insisted on calling on me in secret at my home in order to discuss the political crisis which has arisen in Egypt. The King has been endeavoring to get in touch with me ever since last Friday; however, I was on a visit to Iran. The King provided me with copies of his communication to the British Ambassador and the verbal reply from Mr. Churchill which the British Ambassador had given him. The King also stated that it is his determination to bring to a head the issue between the Prime Minister and himself even though it might result in the exile and forced abdication of the King.

The reply of Mr. Churchill states that the question is to be considered early in the week by a special meeting of the War Cabinet. In this reply the King is requested to refrain from any violent action in the meantime. The

reply

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By RHP Date FEB 14 1972

reply continues to state that Mr. Churchill has instructed the British Ambassador to take all possible steps to make sure that the Egyptian Prime Minister refrain equally from action of this kind. The British Government almost assuredly would line itself up against whichever party might be the first one to strike.

As already you know it is a domestic issue which has arisen between the Prime Minister and the King. However, it is an issue which may have repercussions in the entire Middle Eastern area. The interview which I had with the King was entirely of a personal character, and the King requested deliberately nothing more than personal friendship on my part. It is assumed that as a result of reports regarding the crisis received from the Legation the question of consulting either in London or in Washington with the British Government prior to action on the part of the British Government has been considered and that the possibilities of the situation have been studied with respect to the responsibility which the Government of the United States may consider itself to assume or not to assume.

KIPK



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THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM WAS RECEIVED "VIA COMMERCIAL"

FORM CCC-24-WH-LONG

JB81 VIA CIAL G158 LONDON 174 BG 825P 10 =

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WASHN=

I AM GREATLY MOVED MR PRESIDENT BY THE TERMS OF THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN SO KIND AS TO SEND ME ON THE OCCASION OF MY BIRTHDAY STOP THE DESTINIES OF MANKIND HAVE INDEED ENTERED ON AN HISTORIC HOUR STOP I AND MY PEOPLES ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEVER FAILING SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT WHICH THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE EXTENDED TO US IN THE YEARS OF PERIL THROUGH WHICH WE HAVE PASSED STOP AS OUR NATIONS STAND SHOULDER TO SHOULDER IN THE VANGUARD OF THE GREAT STRUGGLE WHICH WILL FINALLY FREE THE WORLD FROM THE MENACE OF SLAVERY IT IS MY CONSTANT PRAYER AND CONFIDENT HOPE THAT THE BONDS BETWEEN THEM TRIED IN THE FIRE OF DANGERS JOINTLY ENDURED AND JOINTLY SURVIVED WILL LINK THEM INDISSOLUBLY IN THE HIGH TASK OF BRINGING TO MANKIND THE BLESSING OF PEACE STOP IT IS IN THAT BELIEF THAT I ASK YOU MR PRESIDENT TO ACCEPT MY WARMEST THANKS AND PERSONAL GREETINGS STOP =

GEORGE RI •

*Bill Swannell*

*PSP Great Britain feeder  
1-44*

July 20, 1944.

Dear Max:

This is dictated in California where I am on my way on another "inspection trip". These good people out here seem to feel a little neglected for to them the Pacific operations seem at least as important as those in Normandy. They turn will come soon, I hope, and they do not realize that most of the Navy, plus over a million men are now fighting in the Pacific. Incidentally, this last operation of taking Saipan has been an outstanding success in spite of 15,000 casualties. From there, we will be within thirteen or fourteen hundred miles of the industrial part of Japan --- easy bombing range.

I do hope the flying bombs will slow down for I can fully realize that they are more than annoying. I hate to have you all compelled to go through this at such a late time in the war.

The day before I left Washington, the collection of Roosevelt papers arrived and I had little more than time to glance through them. I have them safely looked up in my desk and I am eagerly awaiting a chance to go through them all. They are most truly interesting and give me new leads in some family researches I am making. I am very grateful to you.

My own great grandfather had slaves at Hyde Park. He manumitted them about 1822, but the slave quarters were in existence when I was a small boy.

- 2 -

I am counting on seeing you when you come  
over, though I do not know the date of your  
arrival yet.

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

The Right Honorable Lord Beaverbrook,

Lord Privy Seal,

Gwydyr House,

Whitehall, S.W.1

England.

From: Lord Beaverbrook.

Stuydyr House,  
Whitehall, S.W.1.

21st June, 1944.



Dear Mr. President,

A few days ago I found a collection of Roosevelt papers suitable for the Hyde Park collection.

I am sending them with this letter in the hope that you will accept them and give them a place there.

You will see that most of them relate to land titles. One Roosevelt, however, bought a black woman named Judith, but he only made a payment on account.

We are all thrilled by the American advance on Cherbourg.

The Prime Minister spent most of last night in the map-room. He gave us a fine picture of the hope in days to come.

We are very much under the spell of the flying bomb at the moment. We expect the rocket shortly.

The explosives silence the voices of criticism and complaint. Political issues die down when the war comes to London.

The House of Commons could be closed up for a month, for all the impression on the nation that body will make in the immediate future.

I hope you have good news of your boys. It must be a constant preoccupation with you.

And with my admiration and devotion,

Yours ever,

The President,  
White House, Washington, D.C.

1312 Gr. Britain-1964



WINDSOR CASTLE

July 29<sup>th</sup> 1944.

Dear Mr. Roosevelt,  
I am deeply  
grateful to you for  
your letter of June 27<sup>th</sup>.  
I cannot tell you  
how very much I  
appreciate your  
writing to me -

WINDSOR CASTLE

It was such a pleasure to me to attend the luncheon at Peterborough and to have the privilege, together with the heads of the British Women's Services, of welcoming the



## WINDSOR CASTLE

American nurses,  
members of the Women's  
Army Corps and the  
Red Cross workers  
at present in this  
country. I am  
always so glad  
of the opportunity  
of meeting any  
of them and only



WINDSOR CASTLE

wish I could see  
more of them. I  
realize how im-  
portant it is for  
our countrymen  
and women as  
well as those  
of the Services  
to cement a bond  
of friendship with





WINDSOR CASTLE

3

the American Service  
Men and Women  
over here. I only  
wish there was  
more we could  
do but times  
are sometimes difficult.  
How good of you  
to ask after my  
eldest son. We have

WINDSOR CASTLE

he is wounded in  
the thigh and abdomen  
and that he was  
taken prisoner on  
June 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> but have  
not heard any  
news for over a  
month. We long  
to know how  
and where he  
is and pray



## WINDSOR CASTLE

all may go well  
with him —

I look forward to  
staying with my  
mother at Badminton  
in a week's time.

I know she has  
been seeing a  
good many of  
the Americans

OK FOR  
TRANSMISSION  
BY AIR MAIL

WINDSOR CASTLE

in her neighbour-  
hood and is much  
interested in them.

I trust you and  
the President are  
well and not  
very tired -

With again many thanks

Believe me

Yours sincerely  
Mary

O.K. For  
Transmission  
BY AIR MAIL

Air Pouch

Mr. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington

11.

# TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

COPY

Lord Beaverbrook

London.

Basil O'Connor who is Chairman of the American Red Cross and my very old friend will be in London sometime this week. I hope much that it will be possible for you to see him. Regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

*(Orig filed - O'Connor folder, 4-44.)*

PS = Great Britain folder  
1-44

FROM

The White House  
Washington

October 2, 1944.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

**DECLASSIFIED**

**DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)**

Date- 6-29-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

Secret

Oct. 31-44

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

Dear Admiral Leahy

Attached are the drafts  
of the D.S.M. citation for  
D.D. and your memo. to  
the President regarding its  
announcement. If acceptable  
you can have this available  
for prompt action.

W. H. H. H.





THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



5 November, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached herewith is the citation proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the award of the Army Distinguished Service Medal to Field Marshal Sir John Dill. It is suggested that you release this with some such personal comment as the following:

"I am deeply distressed to learn of the death of Field Marshal Sir John Dill whom I regarded not only as a great soldier but as a most important figure in the remarkable accord which has been developed in the combined operations of our two countries. In deploring his loss and expressing our sympathy to his Government and to his widow, Lady Dill, I have directed the award of the Army Distinguished Service Medal to him, with the following citation: "

*William D. Leahy*

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander-in-Chief  
of the Army and Navy.

10/31/44

PROPOSED CITATION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

While serving as Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission to the United States and Senior British Representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff from December, 1941 to the hour of his death, Field Marshal Sir John Greer Dill, K.C.B., G.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., rendered a distinguished service to the common cause of the Allies. In the conferences in Washington, and at Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo, and Teheran, his services were of first importance in securing the necessary cooperation between the British and American military forces as represented by their Chiefs of Staff.

The good will and concert of action which have characterized the combined achievements of the Allied forces must be attributed in an important measure to his integrity of purpose, his freedom from prejudice and his selfless devotion to the common cause, together with the warm humanity which characterized all his actions. Possessed of these rare qualities, Sir John Dill made an enduring contribution toward the victorious conclusion of the war and also to that harmony of purpose which is essential to our security in the years to come.

BSF Great Britain folder

4-44

*file  
personal*

December 5, 1944.

Dear Edward:-

I am sorry, indeed, to learn from you that Ronnie Campbell is being moved away from Washington and I shall miss him a lot.

As you know, he was here as a rather Junior Secretary in the days of the first World War. I am sure, however, that his new berth in the Foreign Office will give him an excellent opportunity to do us all a lot of good.

I shall be back in about a week and I hope to see you then.

Always sincerely,

Right Honorable  
The Earl of Halifax,  
British Embassy,  
Washington, D. C.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

4th December, 1944.

PRIVATE:

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to tell you that I had a telegram from Anthony Eden yesterday, to say that they want to move Ronnie Campbell to take charge of the near Eastern Department in the Foreign Office, in place of Peterson who has gone to Ankara.

Anthony had thought of sending Ronnie to Warsaw, but the way Polish affairs have gone has not made that possible; anyhow for the present.

We shall be very sorry to lose Ronnie here and I shall miss him a lot. It  
will/

The Honourable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.


4th December, 1944.

will be useful having him in the Foreign Office, where he will be touching a good many things with reactions on this side, and where his knowledge and viewpoint will be useful.

He is to be replaced in two or three months time by Jock Balfour, now No.2 to Clark Kerr in Moscow. You may know him. He was here under Ronnie Lindsay.

I hope you are having some good days away from Washington and that they are being a holiday. We have just got back from a week in Iowa, Wisconsin and Chicago which was, I think, useful. I have come to the conclusion that when all else leaves me, I shall apply for an Iowa farm!

Yours very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Edward", with a horizontal line underneath it.

Care of Miss Tully

BY SAFE HAND.

The Honourable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

President of the United States

The White House,

Washington, D.C.

Halifax

BRITISH EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 9, 1944.

Dear Dickie:

It was mighty nice to get yours of November twentieth. Apparently, I am to stay on this station for another four years which is not wholly perfect to contemplate, but probably during that period you will be sailing your Flagship up to Chungking. We will put wheels or rollers under her.

I do hope you can start those amphibious operations. Those people in China are having a truly hard time.

I, too, was sorry about Joe Stilwell but you know the story of that, and Wedemeyer has inherited a tough problem.

I am down in Georgia getting ten days relaxation but I hope we shall all have another conference in January or February.

Harry is coming along very well and has taken over quite a number of additional duties.

Jimmy is headed for the Southwest Pacific again and is on the staff of Admiral Davis as Amphibious Officer.

My best to you. Keep up the good work!

As ever yours,

Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten,  
Supreme Allied Commander,  
South East Asia Command Headquarters.





SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND HEADQUARTERS.

20th November, 1944

My dear Mr. President,

I have deliberately refrained from writing before, knowing how terribly inundated you would be with congratulatory messages. However, I do feel that as one of your Allied Commanders, who has the honour to have so many American forces in his command, it is my privilege to write and offer you my most heartfelt congratulations on your re-election.

It makes a tremendous difference to me personally to know the head of the State I am serving, as it gives one such an extra feeling of confidence.

Although I think the separation of the American Command between the China theatre and my own theatre is a very logical step, I was sorry to see Stilwell go, not only because I personally liked him but because it meant that I lost my beloved Al Wedemeyer, who has been such a tower of strength to me during the last year.

I should like to pay a tribute to the way Stilwell led American, British and Chinese forces on the Ledo front in person. May I say that I consider he thoroughly well earned the K.C.B. for which I recommended him.

The operations in North Burma on all fronts have been going according to programme and are along the lines which you have always indicated to me to be in accordance with your wishes.

I am making every effort to scrape together sufficient forces to start amphibious operations in this theatre with whatever landing craft and landing ships you and the Combined Chiefs of Staff can see your way to letting me have. I think I may truly say that everyone in the Command has kept their tails well up, in spite of our annual October disappointments in the way of resources.

I am so glad that you have appointed Lieutenant General R.A. Wheeler to be my Deputy. We all love and trust him and I am sure that he and Lieutenant General D.I. Sultan and my Commanders-in-Chief between them will help to raise the good feeling between the British and American forces in this theatre to the same high level as Eisenhower has always attained.

Lieutenant General Leese has already arrived and has taken over the Allied Land Forces with his customary energy.

The death of Air Chief Marshal Leigh Mallory when flying out to take over the air command has been a bitter blow to me, but I have no doubt that the Chief of the Air Staff will soon send us another young and aggressive Commander-in-Chief to take his place.

I am most sorry to be losing Admiral Fraser from the South East Asia theatre, as he has been a very good friend to me; however, I am certain that Vice Admiral Power will do very well in command of the new East Indies Fleet which will support my amphibious operations.

Please remember me to Mrs. Roosevelt and to Harry and Jimmy if they are with you.

Yours very sincerely,

Dickie Howarth



1952


FR

WAR DEPARTMENT

HQ., SACBA.,

A.P. 432, c/o Postmaster, N.Y.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS



*CEY #2046*

The President of

The

*667*

*2/10 WPT'S*

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Great Britain folder 1-44  
Dec. 27/44

~~TOP SECRET~~

E. R. S., Jr.  
O.K.  
F. D. R.

*[Handwritten initials]*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Desire of British Government to Assist in Re-equipping the French Air Force

A communication has been received from the British Embassy relative to the desire of the British Government to make an immediate offer to the French authorities to assist in re-equipping the French Air Force. A copy of the communication in question is attached herewith.

As indicated in the British aide memoire, the specific proposal now advanced was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy informed the Secretary of State that "from the military point of view there is no objection" to the British proposal whereby the British would undertake to equip certain French air units.

The "certain French air units" referred to in Admiral Leahy's letter are the same as those described in the attached aide memoire.

The British attach importance to proceeding with this matter as soon as possible and in view of the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is recommended that we notify the British that we approve.

The question of our supplying equipment for French land forces, which was the main subject of Admiral Leahy's letter under reference, is being dealt with in a separate memorandum.

Enclosure:  
From British Embassy.

*[Handwritten signature]*

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By RHP Date FEB 14 1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

AIDE MEMOIRE

His Majesty's Government are very anxious to make some positive move towards the French authorities about the future of the French Air Force. During his recent visit to Paris, the Prime Minister undertook to do his best, after consultation with the United States Government, to help in meeting General de Gaulle's request for the re-equipment of the French Land Forces. The possibility of supplying British equipment for this purpose is being examined but it will inevitably take some time to formulate and agree proposals with the United States Government. In the meantime His Majesty's Government would like, as a token of their interest and good will, to make an immediate offer to the French authorities to help with the re-equipping of the French Air Force.

2. His Majesty's Government desire to know whether the United States Government agree to their opening technical discussions with the French authorities, in the course of which they would offer to provide and maintain the aircraft, and to train the personnel, for the squadrons mentioned in the British proposals on policy for the equipping of the forces of the Western European Allies (Paragraph 8 of the enclosure to CCS. 653). For convenience of reference the appropriate extract is enclosed. The supply of additional aircraft without any undertaking to replace them or to train personnel to man them, would be considered when the time arises. This offer would, of course, be without prejudice to the wider issues raised in the British Embassy's Aide Memoire of August 19th at present under examination by the State Department.

3. In the absence of any agreement with His Majesty's Government it is to be feared that the French authorities will start constructing German-type aircraft to which their plants are already adapted.

4. The French

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of British

Soviet telegram, 1/12/72

By RHP Date FFB 14 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

- 2 -

4. The French authorities are understood to have approached the State Department as well as the Foreign Office for authority to send missions to the United States and the United Kingdom for the purpose of acquiring the right to manufacture aircraft and equipment under license. His Majesty's Government intend to welcome this mission so far as they are concerned.

British Embassy  
Washington, D.C.  
December 12th, 1944

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By Authority of British  
Unit telegram, 1/12/72  
By RHP Date FEB 14 1972



~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Extract from C.C.S. 653

(8) The British Chiefs of Staff would be prepared to provide for the following from British sources. The 2 columns below show:-

(1) Those squadrons probably remaining immediately after the defeat of Germany.

(2) The build-up during the following 12 months.

	(1)	(2)
	Squadrons	Squadrons
France	2 H.B.Sqs. 5 S.E.F. 1 G.R. 1 F.B. 2 Transport	4 H.B.Sqs. 10 S.E.F. 2 G.R. 1 F.B. 2 Transport

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JCS 33-71

1-18-72 JS



Miss

PSE Great Britain folder

1-45-

January 11, 1945.

Dear Edward:-

Ever so many thanks for telling me about that new film. I am going to try to see it, if it is convenient to you, next Tuesday evening.

I count on seeing you before I leave.

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Right Honorable  
The Earl of Halifax,  
British Embassy,  
Washington, D. C.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

8th January, 1945.

Dear Mr. President,

I have just had flown over to me, the new film - "Henry V.", produced by some of our people in England and, I think, in colour. This was sent to me as a token of gratitude from the producers for my having managed to get one or two of their people home quickly on their ship. It has not been released yet, but I am told is really first class, and I am wondering whether you would care to have me send the film down to you any evening at the White House to see? It would be available any night except the 13th.

I am told I really can safely recommend it to you without any misgivings.

May/

The Honourable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.


BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

-2-

8th January, 1945.

May I, without presumption, say how admirable I thought your message to the Congress was on all the general and International side? I am sure it will have done much good over in England and, I have no doubt, here.

Yours very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Edward", with a horizontal flourish underneath.

*General Watson  
Sols to sent to  
see them*

*RSE Great Britain folder  
1-43*

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14th January, 1945.


Dear Mr. President,

I am arranging to have the film sent down to you for Tuesday.

I saw it last night, and it certainly is a remarkable production as regards its photography and colour, variety and quality. But it is pretty stiff Shakespeare, and I should doubt whether it would have at all a popular appeal here, though it appears to have been very well received in England. I should be afraid that the idea with which it starts off about Henry V's war being the personal fancy of the King would confirm many of your countrymen in their worst suspicions of British policy to-day!

I shall very much look forward to seeing you before you start off on your Odyssey. I am going off myself on Sunday next, after going up to New York for a night this week with Oliver Stanley, who proposes to make a speech about Colonial Policy. I will accordingly get in touch with Pa Watson, and will find out from him what may be possible for you.

Yours very sincerely,



The Honourable  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States.

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

PSF Great Britain folder 1-45  
INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

NML-340

PLAIN

London

Dated January 19, 1945

Rec'd 10 p.m. .

*Inf file*  
*Confidential*

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

680, Nineteenth

Reference Embassy's 669, Eighteenth

Following is full official text of Mr. Eden's  
speech summing up for the Government at conclusion of  
second day's debate on war situation:

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
(Mr. Eden): Much of this debate has concerned itself  
with the affairs of southeastern Europe and the  
Honorable Gentleman who has just spoken has concentra-  
ted almost exclusively on that sphere. Therefore, I  
propose to devote the greater part of what I have to  
say also to these same topics. Before I come to  
southeastern Europe there are one or two other matters  
raised in the debate to which I want to refer.

In particular I want to say something about two  
Allied countries of ours that are suffering at the  
present time perhaps more than they have done at any

time in this

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time in this war - Holland and Norway. They are two countries that set perhaps some of our Allies something of an example in political unity, two countries which have contributed always to the fullest extent in their power to the Allied effort, and I think that the House would wish that, in this time of their greatest trial, a message from us should go to these people to tell them that everything that it is within our power to do to alleviate their suffering will be done and that we shall not forget, either now or in future years, the glorious part that they have played.

My Honorable and gallant friend, the member for North Newcastle (Lt. Col. Sir C. Headlam) in opening his speech made the observation that sometimes he was doubtful whether or not these debates served a useful purpose. He will not be surprised if I tell him that, from time to time, that thought also flits across the mind of the Foreign Secretary when he listens to the debates. It is not so much always what is said; it is the difficulty in which the government spokesmen sometimes are in saying all that they would like to say in reply; but, about this debate, in the two days in which it has lasted and in particular the speech of the Prime Minister, I think the House will feel that it has done a real and much needed national service. We must all have felt, in these last weeks -- I know I have -- how  
much easier

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much easier it is to imperil a grand coalition than to fortify it.

Mr. Eden speaking:

Yet the problems which are now confronting us in liberated Europe have not come altogether as a surprise. The advance of victorious Allied armies is going to present us with many more such problems. I only pray that each one of them is not going to arouse quite the intensity of passion which this Greek issue has developed. If so, I frankly say that I shudder to think how we are going to be able to play our part in the councils of Europe. There will be differences in respect of policy in all these countries, differences in this House and differences in the countries which have been under a foreign yoke for a period of years. Man is a political animal and, therefore, he likes controversy and does not always agree with his neighbour. And so it is in this House, and so it is going to be in those countries. If we are going to handle the situation we shall need a measure of patience and understanding, tolerance and goodwill between the greatest Allies. We need something more. Several speeches in this debate have referred to the machinery of Allied cooperation, for dealing with political issues. My Right Honorable friend, the member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha)

in a very



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In a very forceful speech asked whether we thought everything had been done about this situation and whether we had any plan and the Right Honorable Baronet the member for S. W. Bethnal Green (Sir P. Harris) spoke in much the same strain and so did other members also. I must say, speaking I think for the government in this, that we are not fully satisfied with the existing machinery for international cooperation on the political plane. We have been troubled about this for some time. It was we also more than a year ago at the Moscow conference first suggested the need for some further machinery. We first proposed a setting up of what has now become the European Advisory Commission to which the Right Honorable Baronet referred. That commission has done invaluable work. The fruits of that work will be seen after the defeat of the enemy and of the satellite countries when these problems will have to be dealt with, but they have neither the authority nor the representation sufficient to deal with many of the other problems that confront us. It may be that he can improve on that machinery and that there ought to be more frequent contacts, not necessarily between the heads of governments, who have heavy charges to bear and who cannot be constantly meeting, but perhaps between the foreign secretaries. The contacts might be very frequent, I do not know, but

I can tell

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I can tell the House in answer to the question which has been put that this issue of the machinery of our collaboration will certainly be among those which will have to be examined at the meeting which rumor has it - I do not know - is to be held at some time or other somewhere or other. I would only add that as far as our contribution is concerned we are prepared bodily to place ourselves at disposal to any extent which may be required in order that machinery may function. Before I turn to the Greek issue let me reply to some of the questions which were put by the Right Honorable Gentleman, the member for Wakefield (Mr. Greenwood) yesterday. He showed some anxiety as to the part that my Right Honorable friend might play at this meeting of the heads of government and he said he thought my Right Honorable friend was in danger of appeasing some of his great Allies too much. I do not know. It is always questionable how far it is wise in war time to express on the public platform on the floor of this House exactly what you feel about the various political problems on which you are in controversy with your Allies.

It is a question of appreciation. Sometimes it is good and sometimes it is not so good. I am bound to say that though I have seen my Right Honorable friend in many roles I have not so far seen him in the role  
of the timid

of the timid fawn. I do not think that the Right Honorable Gentleman, the member for Wakefield need to be too anxious lest my Right Honorable friend, the Prime Minister's known diffidence of expression should in any way hamper the case of His Majesty's Government at the next meeting. We have many international anxieties, but I admit frankly that that is about the least of those which beset me.

I come to the vexatious problem which has been the theme of almost all this debate - the problem of the situation in Greece. As I listened to the speeches which have been made today and to some of the speeches that were made earlier, I was forced to the conclusion that some Honorable members of this House painted themselves a picture of EAM that really bears no resemblance to reality. I want to put the position of that organization in what I think as fair a perspective as I can. Nobody has suggested that this movement at its outset did not enlist under its banner numbers of men who joined for purely patriotic motives. Of course, that is so; but it is no less clear that from the very early days of the movement the leaders who control the EAM were not prepared to tolerate rivals in the political field of resistance in Greece. It was that which first brought about our difficulties in the guerrilla movement. General Sarafis, himself, at one  
time tried

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time tried to lead another rival guerrilla band and he was brought in by force to EAM and was a prisoner for some time until he was good enough to be their general. This rivalry between EDES and ELAS cannot be explained on the ground that ELAS were purely democratic and EDES bands were purely reactionary, that is not so. I have read the charter of EDES. I should say that it was as near as can be an attempt to describe a socialist heaven if such a conception can be expressed by anybody who is a member of the Tory Party. As near as might that seemed to be their program and yet there was from the outset this rivalry - a rivalry which, I believe, is large based on the determination of some of EAM leaders that no one was going to share with them the resistance movement in Greece.

Petty Officer Herbert (Oxford University): Will the Right Honorable Gentleman lay it on the table?

Mr. Eden: We are preparing a White Paper and I hope that we can make it quite interesting. There was another organization, a military band called EKKA which was another guerrilla organization. This is worth noting as an indication of developments which take place. In February of last year our officers in Greece who played a really magnificent part in trying to hold these warring guerrilla elements together secured a truce and all these various bands agreed to  
join together

join together and to think only about the Germans for the time being. What happened? A very few weeks after that ELAS broke this agreement and they attacked and destroyed this guerrilla band of EKKa. They murdered its leader, one Col. Pasros against whom, as far as I have been able to discover, no plausible charge has ever been brought, even by ELAS itself.

(Mr. Eden speaking)

So sir, I say even before the German withdrawal there were, it appeared to us, unmistakable signs that it was the ambition of ELAS to seize control of the country by force. Here let me add His Majesty's Government have never been opposed to EAM becoming the government of Greece, but what we have said and what we do say is that they have no right to that position except from the medium of the ballot box, whereas their attempt has been, as we see it, to seize power with the weapons provided for them to do battle against the Germans.

Mr. Cocks rose.

Mr. Eden: I have all the notes of the Honorable Gentleman's speech and I will answer him as I go along. If I do not, by all means let him interrupt. As I said this evidence of the tendency of ELAS to seize power rather than to be elected to power had its effect upon the organization itself. There were many in the ranks who



ranks who did not like it and who began to see the effect of that even before the fighting broke out in Athens and after the fighting broke out all the more moderate elements of what is called the EAM organization flaked away. That was very noticeable to me, who had been to Athens before when I returned with the Prime Minister at Christmas time, because when this conference which he summoned took place to which the ELAS representatives came, I thought that they would do their best to show as broad a representation as possible; obviously, in order to impress us and the world of their representative character. It was not so. Their representatives to the conference were three Communists led and dominated by the Secretary General of the Communist Party. Those were the men who came to negotiate at this meeting. What I submit, and I have little doubt of it myself but I cannot prove it, that in the progress of the fighting all the elements except the hard Communist core flaked away in disapproval of the policy which the Communist leaders were adopting. (An Honorable member: "What proof have you?") No proof, but I will try to give some. I will try to prove to the satisfaction of the House that the policy we have pursued was the only policy open to us and was a just and correct policy.

Sir Richard Acland

Sir Richard Acland rose.

Mr. Eden: I am going to answer the Honorable Gentleman's question too. I cannot answer all at once, they come in turn. Why do I say that there has been this flaking away? I submit to the House that the Socialists, the Agrarians and the Popular Democrats, all of whom formed part of EAM in the earlier stages, have announced their decision to break away and have in one form or another denounced the activities of their former associates.

Mr. S. O. Davies (Merthyr): By whom?

Mr. Eden: I am just going to say by whom. The Honorable Gentleman is in a hurry and wants to make my speech for me. I am going to tell him by whom and, in particular, I am going to take the Greek Socialist Party, which is the most important of these parties and one which I hope will appeal to the Honorable Gentleman who interrupted. It is the SKE. That party issued a manifesto and I shall trouble the House by reading it because I think it is important that we should try to assess what is the true feeling of the organization and the whole basis of my contention is that EAM, as such, does not exist any more and what is left is just a hard Communist or, if you like, Trotskyite core.

Mr. Stokes rose.

Mr. Eden:

Mr. Eden: The Honorable Gentleman wants to hear what is the manifesto of the Greek Socialist Party and I will tell him. It says:

"The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party in Greece, after succeeding in restoring its organization which it had not succeeded in doing owing to the recent tragic events, assembled with almost a full meeting and with the cooperation of representatives of the party organization in Macedonia and Thrace examined the situation as transformed by the rupture of the government of national unity and after detailed discussion by members of all the burning political questions of the day resolved as follows:

(1) It utterly condemns the civil war and hostilities between Greeks and Allies. These unhappy events took place in our country contrary to the desires of the SKE which did all that it could to prevent them. It considers that the civil war was organized solely by deadly enemies of our country and is contrary to our national claims and the interests of the Greek working people and to the common anti-Fascist goal of the United Nations. The Party adopts and approves the resolution of the Regional Party Organization of Macedonia and Thrace, which had the courage to take the initiative in disapproving the civil war immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, in view of the

fact that



fact that the central leadership of the party was unable to meet. It declares that it refused all responsibility for and withdrew itself from the E.M. bloc as soon as it was informed of the armed breach which took place without consultation with the SKE. It appealed to all kindred parties and organizations in the manual and clerical working class to contribute to the cessation of civil war with a view to the return of political (\*) in the country...." And so on in the same strain.

Mr. S. O. Davies: By whom was that document signed?

Mr. Eden: Of course, I am going to tell the Honorable Gentleman by whom it was signed; did he think I was going to read out a document like that without checking where it came from?

Mr. Davies: I only wanted to make a comment that documents are being read out here and most persons in this House know that they have never been authentic documents and that is one of them.

Mr. Eden: The Honorable Gentleman says it is not an authentic document. I will tell him who are the persons behind this document and I will leave it to the House to judge. I have been into this matter with some trouble because we do not want to give the House incorrect information. What earthly advantage is it to the Government to do that? Let the Honorable

Gentleman

Gentleman look back to the debates of last December and he will be able to judge whether his information was correct or not. The Greek Socialist Party is directed by a Political Bureau of eight members.

Mr. Gallagher: It is a fake. There is no Socialist Party in Europe.

Mr. Eden: I know the Honorable Member does not like Socialist parties anyway.

Mr. Gallagher: I put this to the Secretary of State: that this demonstrates it to be a fake - there never has been a Socialist party in Europe which had a political bureau.

Mr. Eden: Perhaps the Honorable Gentleman will let me describe who these people are.

Mr. Gallagher: It is a fake.

Mr. Eden: - and then the people who know the Socialist Party better than me can speak about it. This party is directed by a political bureau of eight members all but one of whom are now in Athens - I know where the one who is not in Athens is but I do not propose to say - and by a central committee of twenty all but two of whom are also in Athens. Now it so happens that representation of this party at the moment is especially full because there are also in Athens four delegates from northern Greece (\*) were all members of the Central Committee. I will give their names so that

they can be

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they can be checked if anybody knows them. A gentleman called Mr. Stavirides Mr. Papanikolaou Mr. Mylonas and Mr. Dimitrakopoulos - my Greek is not very good - those four are all the representatives who came down from Macedonia and the manifesto to which I have just referred was voted by all the members - that is 20 of the Central Committee in Athens - and three of them went up to our Ambassador and handed it over to him.

Mr. Gallagher: I still think it is a fake.

Mr. Eden: I admit that the conditions in Athens are disturbing. I admit the difficulty of substantiating exactly what this or that section of political opinion feels in a city which has been through what Athens has been through but I submit to the House that the document I have read out and the circumstances which I have described of its presentation to us is at least a strong prima facie case that it represents something of substance in Greek Socialist opinion.

Mr. S. O. Davies: Can the Foreign Secretary explain why the names of Professor Svolos and Professor Angelopolous are not among the names he read out because they are and have been accredited leaders of the Greek Socialist Party?

Mr. Eden: I will say why those two names were not there. Professor Svolos was a member of E.A.M but I do not know his present whereabouts and I cannot tell why

he was not

he was not a signatory to this document. All I can tell the committee is that this is the report which came to us through our Ambassador. There is no secret about this. We ourselves asked Sir Walter Citrine and others to go to Athens and see for themselves what was the position of the trade unions there. During the last 24 hours we have suggested that the party of members of Parliament now in Italy should themselves go on to Greece.

Mr. Gallagher: Oh.

Mr. Eden: Are not members of this House to be trusted except the Honorable Member himself? Have we reached a point of dictatorship when only the Honorable Gentleman can represent members of this House? We suggested that that party should go to Greece simply because they are half way there already in Italy.

Mr. Gallagher rose.-

The Chairman (Major Milner): The Honorable Gentleman must not interrupt. He makes interjections which on occasions he is entitled to do but he is not entitled to make continuous comments.

Mr. Eden: We are anxious that Honorable Members should get information about the situation. Apart from the delegation which as I have already said may go on from Italy to Greece we are ready as opportunity offers for

offers for perhaps a further delegation to go from this House to Greece. We have nothing to hide. If Honorable Members here had seen what the Prime Minister and I had seen I am sure that many of the speeches and criticisms we have heard would never have been made. What I have said about the Greek Socialist Party applies also to the Agrarian Party and to the Popular Democrats. I believe that they too have flaked away from E.A.M. I cannot prove it; I have not the documents to show it but I can tell the House that that is our belief which the House will find justified in the next few weeks. But what I do know is that representatives of the Agrarian Party from Salonika have definitely broken away from E.A.M and have taken refuge in Athens.

Mr. James Griffiths Llanelly: I gather that these defections if they be so must have taken place since the Right Honorable Gentleman last spoke. The last time he spoke he wanted E.A.M in the government.

Mr. Eden: They have taken place since we were in Athens. Now I come to the events on which I have been challenged and the position of the government in the present situation. I must remind the committee that for months before we went into Greece we laboured to bring about unity in the Greek political parties. We got all the parties together and we got a document signed at Caserta agreed by the rival commanders-in-chief.

We have been



We have been challenged as to the course of events  
(shake?)  
which brought about the evak up of the government.  
The Honorable Gentleman the Member for Barnstable  
(Sir R. Acland) the Honorable Member for Broxtowe  
(Mr. Cocks) and the Honorable Member for Ebbw Vale  
(Mr. Bevan) referred to that in the course of their  
speeches. I will again tell the committee briefly  
the events so far as we know them. It has been sug-  
gested that the arrival of the Greek brigade the Rimini  
Brigade was the cause of the trouble. So far as I can  
test the evidence there is not a shadow of justification  
for that statement and I will show why. The Greek  
brigade arrived in Athens on 9th November not 19th  
November as the Honorable Member for Broxtowe stated in  
the debate yesterday.

Mr. Cocks: The Right Honorable Gentleman himself  
earlier said 17th November.

Mr. Eden: No 9th November is the right date. Its  
arrival was universally applauded by all sections of  
the Greek population. I know that because we were told  
in Athens that they were the only people who had a bigger  
reception than the British troops did when they arrived  
in Athens. After the arrival of this brigade the  
Greek EAM Ministers in the Greek Government could have  
objected if they had wished. Nothing would have been  
easier but no objection was made. On the contrary eight  
days afterwards

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days afterwards - on the 17th agreement was reached with the Greek Government to which the EAM Ministers subscribed that all guerrilla formations should be disarmed and no mention was made at all of the Rimini Brigade. Later the EAM Ministers began to argue that if the guerrillas were to be disarmed the Rimini Brigade ought to lay down their arms too. But the other members of the Greek Government would not accept that and I do not think that is very surprising either in the light of the record of the brigade or in the light of the fact of how few Greek troops there were under arms. Still they wanted to reach agreement and M. Papandreou asked the EAM Ministers who were complaining of the existence of this brigade to draft a decree for the demobilization of the guerrillas in which it was provided that a brigade of ELAS should be retained under arms in order to balance the Rimini Brigade. That compromise was offered that draft was produced by the EAM Ministers themselves. They drew it up brought it to their colleagues and it was accepted by all the other members of the government on 27th November. How is it possible to say that the Rimini Brigade was the cause of the break.

Next day the EAM Ministers went back on the draft which they themselves had drawn up and demanded that all forces should be disarmed including the Rimini Brigade.

The government

The government refused and matters reached a deadlock. But it was not even this that brought about the final split in the government. The final split was this: that on 1st December the next day the EAM civil police refused to hand over their arms to the national guard. It is worth looking at this because the decision that they should over their arms had been reached unanimously by the government including EAM Ministers as long ago as 5th November. At this point the EAM police had not been an issue during the negotiations about the disarmament of the guerrilla armies at all. It was also known that the same morning EAM were going to call a general strike. It was faced with this that M. Papandreou circulated to all his colleagues a draft decree re-affirming the government's decision that the EAM police should hand over their arms a decision nearly a month old. The EAM Ministers refused to ratify the decision and that night resigned.

Mr. Driberg (Maldon): rose -

Mr. Eden: I want to say one more thing about the EAM police because I want the committee to note that it is my contention that it was over this issue of the EAM police that the break occurred and that it was the police themselves who were largely responsible for taking hostages and the methods of their custody. I must say that during the long negotiations about a truce when



truce when every effort was being made to try to get agreement the ELAS representatives said that they could not release their hostages because they could not answer for the actions of the EAM police who had taken those hostages.

Mr. Driberg: While the Right Honorable Gentleman is dealing with these very crucial dates will he explain about M. Papandreou's broadcast of 27th November when he denounced sections of the right for fomenting civil war?

Mr. Eden: I cannot deal with his broadcast. I do not carry all these matters in my mind. I have tried to give a fair account of what happened and I believe it is approximately a just one.

Sir R. Acland: Will the Right Honorable Gentleman confirm the Scobie leaflet? There is no reference in it to the agreement or to the steps that were taken.

Mr. Eden: General Scobie's broadcast was made on the afternoon of 1st December. (Honorable Members: "The Leaflet.") The leaflet and the broadcast were the same. The stated desire is to maintain law and order and to assist in the distribution of relief and nothing in that leaflet could possibly have been construed as to inflame passion but it was a warning that if it came to force we should do our best to maintain law and order. I do not know what else a general in that position would be supposed to say.

Mr. Cocks:

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Mr. Cocks: Does the Right Honorable Gentleman deny my statement about what happened at 4:30 on 1st December?

Mr. Eden: I really cannot. (Interruption) I could not hear what the Honorable Member said.

Mr. Cocks: Does the Right Honorable Gentleman deny what I say on column 476?

The Chairman (Major Milner): The Honorable Member has had his reply. I heard the Right Honorable Gentleman say he could not answer the question.

Mr. Eden: Now I want to come to the present position and to the matter of hostages and to General Plastiras' position. Some Honorable Members do not seem quite to understand why we spoke with such strength in condemnation of hostages. It was even suggested that the Greek Government have themselves arrested a number of people in Athens. I want to clear that up. As far as the arrests that we have made are concerned a decision has been taken as the result of agreement between General Scobie and the Greek Government that all civilians arrested by British forces for bearing arms against us should be released with the exception of those who will be exchanged to fulfill the terms of the agreement reached with them. As far as arrests by the Greek Government are concerned it has already been made clear that prosecutions will only be instituted against those who have violated the penal code or the rules of war  
on charges

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on charges such as murder rape or looting. In other words the act of bearing arms against the state will not be regarded as a crime in itself and will not be punished. I say this to make it plain that there is no question of hostages being held either by the Greek Government or by ourselves. We have not got one. I now demand in the name of all parties and all members of the House that EAM should release those hostages forthwith.

I now come to deal with reports in the press that warrants have been issued in Athens for the arrest of prominent EAM and ELAS leaders. This story first appeared on 8th January and was contradicted by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by us at the Foreign Office. Subsequent investigation has shown that a police interpreter was responsible for the report. The story was revived two or three days ago. I have today received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador in Athens which states that no such warrants have been issued. He has obtained personal confirmation of this from the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. There have also been references to a statement made by General Plastiras to press correspondents that he could not agree to an amnesty. I have stated that the declared intention of the Greek Government is to take action only against those guilty of crimes against the penal code

penal code or the rules of war. General Plastiras yesterday confirmed this to our Ambassador. He said it was still the policy of the Greek Government and he specifically authorized me to tell that to the House of Commons today. Therefore the only rebels liable to prosecution are those guilty of ordinary crimes against the criminal code. He repeated this instruction which is an instruction of the Greek Government to the Military Governor of Attica to the head of the gendarmerie and the head of the police. He told them that no political arrests are to be made. People charged on such charges as murder rape and looting are having their cases investigated immediately and if no prima facie case exists they are to be discharged. A panel of 75 judges or magistrates is already at work to effect that. I have only one thing to add about the various Plastiras reports. The report in the press that General Gonatas is appointed Governor of Macedonia is not accurate. I think I have covered all the realm of charges.

Mr. Bevan: The Right Honorable Gentleman's statement is exceedingly important and so far has been satisfactory in detail but I read out a statement made by the Greek Minister to British press representatives in Athens in which he said they were going to release all prisoners except those who bore arms. Does the Right Honorable Gentleman assume that

the Greek

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the Greek Government is going to make a statement which will satisfy opinion here on that point?

Mr. Eden: I could not have dealt more fully with the matter. I have explained that our Ambassador saw General Plastiras himself and it is on his authority and that of General Plastiras that I have made this statement which covers precisely the issues which have been raised today. The position could not be clearer and the Honorable Member has really no right to complain that I am not clear. He asks us to be objective on this matter. I have never heard anyone import so much prejudice into the subject of debate.

(Eden speaking)

He threw taunt after taunt at General Plastiras. Who is this very wicked man who is held up like that? He was the man who after the collapse of Greece in 1922 took over the government pulled his country together arranged for a general election and retired after the election which resulted in the return of Venizelos. He was the man who was Prime Minister when Greece alone among the European countries accepted refugees hundreds of thousands of Armenians and helping to relieve a problem which was haunting Europe. He is the man we are told now who played about with the German in France. He was in France in exile and he was there approached by the SS who said "come and be our Quisling in Greece." He refused to



refused to have anything to do with it. All these stories are brought to the House to create prejudice. We are told that we wanted to deny freedom in Greece. Why should this country wish to deny freedom in Greece this country which is fighting because it believes in just those very things. When I hear the Honorable Gentleman speak like that I say to him what do we in this country desire in Greece and in all these countries? We desire a decision by the ballot box and I give the House this pledge. Wherever Britain's authority can carry the decision will be by the ballot box. We cannot pledge ourselves that our power or authority will reach over every land. Our authority is limited but where it can be exerted the decision will be by the ballot box and not by the bullet or by attempts to seize power because by fortuitous circumstances you have the arms at that moment. Let me sum up. We have discussed this matter we have debated it now three times at great length. I have had some experience in my life of international affairs and I have never known an issue where I have been more absolutely certain we are right and I am convinced that if Honorable Members could have seen what I saw in Athens last time their reaction would be exactly the same as mine. I am sure that it was our action and only our action unpopular and difficult as it was hard as it was to explain to  
our American friends

-26- #680, Nineteenth, from London

our American friends I admit which prevented a massacre in Athens. That is my absolute conviction and I believe it is shared by virtually everybody who saw the situation as it then was. I have something to say to the committee. The government have been criticised, they have been maligned they have been taunted for the policy they have pursued in Greece. In that matter it has admittedly done us some injury in other lands where it is not easy in all respects to understand the issue. I think that this afternoon I have for the government the right to say to the committee "have we your support or have we not?" I have set out our case as fully and fairly as I can. I have made plain that the whole of our authority will be used to see that there is nothing in the nature of proscription and no punishment because these people in their folly if you like have taken arms against the state. We will do our best to ensure that at the earliest moment there are free elections in Greece but meanwhile we must have an expression of the views of this House. We are entitled to know whether as a result of this discussion the world is to believe we are supported by the overwhelming majority of this House or not. It is difficult sometimes when you read as I have to despatches from abroad. I read reports that the government's position is shaken on account of its policy in Greece. We all know that that is not true. We



-27- #680, Nineteenth, from London

true. We know that the more it is explained the more it will be understood and the stronger our position will be. But foreign countries do not know. It is all too easy for Goebbels and Company to make use of the reported state of public opinion here and of the gossip of some journalist in some column or other which says that we are tottering to our fall. I ask the committee this afternoon to pronounce whether or not the government are tottering to their fall and to give us on the programme I have outlined on the pledges I have given and on my Right Honorable Friends speech a vote of confidence so that the nation as a whole may know where we stand so that this policy which we have pursued throughout - let me say with patience and with only the one purpose to bring freedom to Greece - may be finally fulfilled.

WINANT

(\*) apparent omission

MRM

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States of America,  
THE WHITE HOUSE,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

*Halifax*

~~BRITISH~~ EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CPs FIGB, 1914-45  
Att, 1-14-45

Miss Turner  
Does this come  
to you for  
filing?  
Roberta

PUBLISHED IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

THE CONFERENCES AT MALTA  
AND YALTA 1945.

pp. 130-133

*This document retired for  
preservation. Copytron copy  
in open file.*

PSF 6B

February 22, 1945.

To Miss Tully for my personal file.

F.D.R.

London, January 28, 1945.

~~SECRET~~  
Dear Mr. President,

At a conference called by Mr. Eden at the Foreign Office nearly three years ago, to which he invited Maisky and myself, the idea of a coordinated policy of the three great Powers in relation to Europe was discussed. At that meeting Maisky stated that there were two ways of approaching the European problem. One was to agree that all questions affecting Eastern Europe and within the area of Russian military action could be the primary consideration of his country and that problems affecting Western Europe within an area of future Anglo-American military control could be a responsibility of Great Britain and the United States, or (two) that the three nations should work together to destroy Fascist and Nazi domination and to restore and rehabilitate Europe to conditions of peace. Maisky went on to say that his Government supported the concept of tripartite action.

I believe it was in part as a result of these informal conversations that the idea of the Moscow Conference emerged. One of the results of that Conference was the establishment of the European Advisory Commission. It was while we were at Teheran, fourteen months ago, that you made me a member of that Commission. The Russians were not members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the creation of the European Advisory Commission gave them representation on a continuing body to study and recommend joint policies for the treatment of Germany and Austria and of the satellite states.

Each of the three countries appointed Advisers to their respective representatives from their State

Departments

The President.

Departments and from the three branches of their armed services - Army, Navy and Air. The responsibility for appointment of the Advisers rested on the respective services. The conclusions and recommendations reached by the Commission have been by unanimous agreement and with the concurrence of the Advisers.

When I returned to London to take up my duties on the Commission, I understood from you that there was agreement at Teheran on the basic principle of unconditional surrender, and that you supported the principle of tripartite responsibility following unconditional surrender. You also told me that you wished United States troops to occupy the northwestern zone in Germany following unconditional surrender. These directions which you gave me as guidance I followed without compromise. Holding to your instruction to insist on the northwestern zone was responsible for delay in reaching agreement on zones of occupation.

By last November 14 three basic agreements had been reached in the European Advisory Commission: the Unconditional Surrender Instrument, the Control Machinery for Germany, and the Protocol on Zones of Occupation. The Control Machinery Agreement and the Protocol on Zones also provide for the assignment of areas for occupation in Greater Berlin and for tripartite control of the administration of Berlin. Each and all of these Agreements contains a larger share of the United States' position than of those advanced by the British or the Russians.

All three Governments have agreed on the Unconditional Surrender Instrument. The United States Government and the United Kingdom have agreed on the Control Machinery. U.S. approval of the Protocol on Zones in Germany and Areas in Berlin has been waiting until the British conceded the control of Bremen and Bremerhaven and of rail, road and canal facilities for our use in supplying our troops in the southern zone. I understand that the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff have now reached agreement on these facilities. It is my hope that you and the Prime Minister, or the two Secretaries of State, will get Russian governmental confirmation of the two Agreements on Zones and on Control Machinery.

Other



Other matters that are before the European Advisory Commission I hope I will have an opportunity to discuss with you after your meeting at ARGONAUT. Harry Hopkins told me, while in London, that you were arranging for my meeting you before your return to the United States.

Control machinery was worked out within the Commission with the understanding that in the first phase of occupation after unconditional surrender there would be military control in Germany. It was understood that the commanding general of each of the three forces would both serve as a member of the Control Council and be in command of his own zone with, of course, authority to delegate such powers as he saw fit. If the French, who have been admitted to the European Commission, are to sign the Unconditional Surrender Instrument and be admitted to the Control Council and be given a zone of occupation, you would then have quadripartite instead of tripartite participation. The British have conceded this; neither the Russian representative nor myself has as yet been authorized to state a position on the French proposal.

The theory on which we have proceeded is that broad overall policies in matters affecting Germany as a whole would be arrived at by agreement between the participating Powers, either in the form of general orders or directives, and that the residue of powers would remain with the commanders in the zones. These general authorities affecting Germany as a whole would be agreed between the Governments in broad terms, leaving all detailing to the Control Council. The necessity for governmental agreement is due to the fact that neither the Russians nor the British are willing to delegate political authority to generals in the field. You can do this because you are not only the Chief of State but also, under the Constitution, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. Stalin might do so but does not choose to do so. An illustration of this is the authority given by him to Vyshinsky in supervising the execution of the armistice terms in Rumania. This fact has also been made very clear to me by Gousev in the European Advisory Commission.

The

The converse of this is that agreements by the generals, even in the Control Council, would be subject to interference by the Governments. It is true, the generals could ask for governmental agreement, but our experience in dealing with the Russians has shown that it is easier to get agreement prior to occupation than after occupation.

If the position stated by the British and Russian Governments in the European Advisory Commission is in any way a criterion of the position of their respective Governments, they mean to force the central German government agencies, after stripping them of Nazi political leadership, to carry out their will in Germany. The question of an orderly decentralization of political Germany can come later. Both the Russian and British concept is to prevent disorder and disease, for the protection of Allied occupying forces, by making full use of German administrative functionaries. This has nothing to do with a "hard" or "soft" policy that may be adopted toward Germany.

The suggestion in the overall Civil Affairs Directive (revised JCS 1067), which has just been sent to me, runs counter to this concept, and, as far as I can understand it, sets up an economic control within each of the three or four separate military zones without taking account of the existing nationalized transport system and without prior provision for common utilization of the food surpluses, most of which will be in the Russian zone, and of coal, all of which will be in the British and Russian zones. These are only examples of problems that must be faced.

There are two other considerations that I believe should not be lost sight of. One, that contradictory basic regulations in the separate zones are likely to lead to serious friction between the Allied forces of occupation and would encourage the Germans to try to play one Ally against another. Two, since we have insisted in the Surrender Instrument that the signatory Powers are "acting in the interests of the United Nations", we have taken on a trustee obligation to other European United Nations which we will fail to

discharge

discharge unless we get agreement, for example, on freezing of property until equitable arrangements can be made to protect the rights of our other Allies to restitution and reparation.

I hope I may have an opportunity to discuss these problems with you when we meet.

Sincerely,

*John Gilbert Wmairt.*

*file* *G. Britain - 1945*  
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

February 9, 1945

IMMEDIATE AND ~~SECRET~~

Ref: G3/ /45

150

My dear Miss Tully,

I have been asked by Mr. Eden to communicate to the White House the text of a statement on U-boat warfare in January to be issued on February 10, which the President and the Prime Minister have agreed to give. Mr. Eden explains that he is sending the text in this way as he is not sure whether it will have reached you direct from the Three Power meeting.

The following is the text:

"Throughout January the enemy's U-boat activity was slightly greater than in December but losses of merchant shipping were not substantially different. The U-boats making use of their new devices penetrated further into focal areas of shipping close in shore. Results of our counter-measures have been encouraging."

*x.b. State*  
*x20*  
*x4675*  
*x99*

Miss Grace Tully,  
The White House.

Yours sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of *British*

*Govt., Telegram 12/12*

By *RHP* Date FEB 14 1972

*Halifax*

*x48*

From: Lieut-General Sir Oliver Leese, Bt, KCE, CBE, DSO,

240

*file*

**TAC H.Q.  
ALLIED LAND FORCES  
SOUTH EAST ASIA**

Personal

27 February 1945

*My dear Mr President.*

At a simple ceremony here, General Dan Sultan invested me last week with the insignia of Commander of the Legion of Merit, which you were good enough to confer upon me.

I would like you to know my deep appreciation of the honour you have done me. I particularly value the gracious terms of the Citation, with its generous references to the Eighth Army's achievements.

This decoration will always remind me of my happy associations with American Commanders and troops in this War, both as Commander of the Eighth Army and in my present Command. In Sicily we operated closely with General Bradley's Corps, and in the 1943 Italian Campaign, the partnership between General Mark Clark's Fifth Army and ourselves was close and successful.

With General Dan Sultan and his N.C.A.C. Command our relations are equally happy. His Forces have done a splendid job in opening the Burma Road and he is now exerting a powerful influence on our battle for Mandalay, by his Southward drive on Lashio.

TAC H.Q.  
ALLIED LAND FORCES  
SOUTH EAST ASIA

-2-

General Stratemeyer's Eastern Air Command provides magnificent support for our ground operations in Burma. He gives us unfailing aid with his transport aircraft in the carriage of our stores and supplies and in flying-in our formations. As you know, the whole of our campaign here depends on air supply, and we place the greatest reliance on Eastern Air Command.

With my grateful thanks and appreciation of this Honour, and my respectful good wishes to yourself,

*Yours very sincerely,*

*Oliver Luse*

---

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Esq.,  
President of the United States of America,  
The White House,  
Washington D.C.

O.H.M.S.

By air

REGISTER

Personal

MA. 220.

(1)

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Esq.,

President of the United States of America,

The White House,

Washington D.C.

U. S.

**REGISTER**



*M. Vanev*

Lieut-Col  
MA/C-in-C.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
ALLIED LAND FORCES  
SOUTH EAST ASIA.



1945  
Mar  
4

PS F Great Britain

London, March 4, 1945.

My dear Mr. President:

In Barrie's great Rectorial Address to the students of St. Andrews he told them quite frankly that he could not provide them with a staff for their journey in the world that lay before them but perhaps that he could tell them a little about it, "how to use it and lose it and find it again, and cling to it more than ever". "You shall cut it", he said, "as is ordained, every one of you for himself, and its name is Courage."

The other day in London in trying to find a Christmas present for you I found George Washington's walking stick which he gave to Jerome Bonaparte. You will see it carries the thirteen stars which symbolize the unity of the original thirteen states.

It is a gift to you personally - not for any museum - because you symbolize to me personally the charming virtue - Courage.

With affectionate regards,

Sincerely,

John Gilbert W. Mack

The President  
The White House,  
Washington.

PSF Gr. Britain-1945



BUCKINGHAM PALACE

March 12<sup>th</sup> 1945

My dear President Roosevelt,

I am very glad to hear that it may be possible for you to make your long promised visit to my Country after the conclusion of the Conference at San Francisco.

You may be sure that you will get a very warm welcome from the people of Great Britain, & I send you & Mrs. Roosevelt a very

cordial invitation to be  
our guests at Buckingham  
Palace.

We are still under daily  
enemy bombardment at  
the moment but we hope  
& trust the situation will  
be better in a few months  
time.

We shall do our best to  
make you comfortable here  
& it would be a real  
pleasure to the Queen &  
myself to have you with us  
& to continue that  
friendship which started  
so happily in Washington  
& at Hyde Park in 1939.  
So much has happened  
to us all since those days.



BUCKINGHAM PALACE

I hope you had a good voyage home from the Crimea, but I was very sorry to hear of the death of your aide Gen. Watson. He will be a great loss to you I fear.

Hoping to meet you here in the not too distant future

With all good wishes to you & Mr. Roosevelt

Believe me

Yours very sincerely

George R. I.

The  
President of the United States

The White House

Washington

D.C.

~~1872~~

5 23000

GA

PS F Great Britain

*Mrs Eben  
no word  
yet - Will  
check again  
tomorrow*

APRIL 5, 1945

MEMO FOR MISS TULLY:

LORD HALIFAX JUST PHONED WHAT ABOUT THE REPLY TO THE  
KINGS MESSAGE.

WHAT DATE MAY LORD HALIFAX ADVISE THE KING HE CAN EXPECT  
REPLY.

EBEN.

PSF: Great Britain folder

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file  
confidential*

April 9, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President:

Subject: Note from British Ambassador to  
State Department re Treatment  
by the Soviet of British Liberated  
Prisoners.

Forwarded by mail for information.  
No action is considered necessary.

*William D. Leahy -*





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

I am enclosing a copy of a note which the Secretary received from the British Ambassador on April 7 relative to Soviet execution of the British-Soviet prisoner of war agreement which is identical with our prisoner of war agreement with the Soviets. I am sending this to you in view of the last paragraph in which the Ambassador says that the Prime Minister is not communicating this information to the President and asks that we do so. You may, therefore, care to send down the attached note to the President for his personal information.

*Charles E. Bohlen*  
Charles E. Bohlen



PSF quot Stalin

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.,  
April 7, 1945.

My dear Ed

The Prime Minister and Anthony have received replies to personal messages which they addressed to Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov respectively regarding the failure of the Soviet authorities to repatriate liberated British prisoners of war and to permit visits of British contact officers and furnishing of supplies to certain hospitals and other places under Soviet control where British subjects are collected for repatriation.

The reply from Marshal Stalin states that there are no grounds for anxiety about liberated British prisoners of war since they are living in better conditions than has been the case with Soviet nationals in British camps where they are alleged to have suffered persecution and, in some cases, blows. The Marshal adds that all recaptured British prisoners of war are now on the way to Odessa or on the homeward voyage. The reply from M. Molotov states that he cannot agree that the Yalta agreement had not been satisfactorily carried out by the Soviet authorities, nor could he agree to exaggerated claims which did not follow from the agreement. He concluded with the assurance that the liberated British prisoners of war are enjoying good conditions and that the Soviet authorities will continue to care for them in future.

I understand that the President has also received a reply to a message which he sent to Marshal Stalin on the subject of the treatment of liberated American prisoners of war in the hands of the Soviet authorities.

/Anthony

The Honourable  
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,  
Secretary of State,  
United States Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Anthony is of the opinion that it would be better for the present not to renew the attempt to secure permission for contact officers to enter Poland proper in order to visit liberated British prisoners of war, chiefly because the British contact officers have now proceeded to camps at Lwow and Volkovysk where they will report whether points of concentration exist west of the Curzon Line, the estimated number of ex-prisoners remaining to be evacuated to these two camps and also the general condition of the ex-prisoners. So far the Soviet authorities have denied that there are any points of concentration or any prisoners of war in hospitals in Poland west of the Curzon Line. The above-mentioned replies from Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov ignore this aspect of the question and there is an obvious advantage in waiting for reports from contact officers before deciding whether to return to the charge, since if these reports bear out what has already been said to the Soviet authorities, a better position will have been obtained for renewing the attempt to secure permission for contact officers to enter Poland proper. Anthony has no doubt that this would be strongly opposed, because the Soviet Government suspects that the contact officers would, under cover of dealings with prisoners of war, proceed to contact Polish leaders, and, in fact to convert themselves into the proposed Observation Mission.

Anthony has requested me to communicate to you his views set forth in the preceding paragraph regarding the next step to be taken in these discussions with the Soviet authorities and to enquire whether the United States Government are in agreement.

/The

The Prime Minister is not communicating the above  
to the President and I have been asked to enquire if you  
will be so good as to do so in view of his personal  
interest in the matter.

HALIFAX