

Woodby Report

7/3/63

COPY NO. 2
of 3 copies

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July 3, 1963

Elements For a Package Deal With Moscow

Following is a tolerably well-balanced package for a detente at this stage of the cold war. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that it is a transitional package unlikely to be viable over any substantial period of time unless it was followed by:

- a first phase disarmament deal with inspection of residual arms;
- a version of the 1959 package deal for eventual German reunification;
- denial of a nuclear capability to China or an agreed policy for countering it.

1. Berlin. Solution C: Explicit Soviet acknowledgment of Western access rights, plus Western acceptance of East Germany to perform present Soviet functions on transport routes, each side maintaining its own theology as to whether or not the East Germans are acting as Soviet agents.

2. Germany. Technical commissions to expand German economic and cultural contacts as soon as Ulbricht is replaced by a more Gomulka-like German. Bilateral talks on unity not to be part of present package.

NSA/365 / PCOP Disarm : ~~SECRET~~
Harmon Trip
Part 10

DECLASSIFIED
 State 11/5/75 NLK-76-117
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 3(d) of (c)
 By: MED NARS, Date 12/5/75

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-2-

3. Non-Aggression. NATO and Warsaw Pact declarations.
No pact.

4. Non-Proliferation Declarations. U.S., USSR, and U.K. declarations of intent not to transfer nuclear weapons to other nations; declarations by as many non-nuclear nations as possible eschewing possession of nuclear weapons. [This is of doubtful negotiability with the Soviets in view of their position regarding the MLF, which should not be sold out. If the Soviets hold to that position, non-proliferation can be dropped from this package.]

5. Test Ban Treaty. Ban on testing in three environments, if adequate on-site inspection for underground testing not negotiable.

6. Safeguards versus Miscalculation. Setting up of technical commission to carry forward hot-line agreement in new directions; e.g., exchange of permanent on-the-spot missions in Moscow and Washington to verify actions reported over hot line.

7. Cuba. Phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba in next twelve months.

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8. Laos. Honoring of Laos Geneva Accord now in gross violation: removal of Viet Minh from Laos, cessation of infiltration via Laos into South Viet Nam.

9. Presidential trip to USSR. JFK and JBK could leave a permanent impact on Russian history.

In general, this package gives Khrushchev quite a lot of status quo in Eastern Europe, short of GDR recognition; it gives us a status quo agreement on Berlin and a restoration of the status quo ante in Laos and Viet Nam; it gives the Soviets and us some progress on arms control. It might be painful in Germany and exploitable by de Gaulle without the Ulbricht provision. It would be exploitable in U.S. politics without Russian troop withdrawals and execution of Laos agreement, for which we should not have to pay twice.

We cannot freeze Western Europe out of the MRBM business unless and until Moscow is willing to go much deeper into reduction of nuclear forces (with inspection) and face up to the Chinese Communist nuclear problem, either by removing the potential capability or providing for its effective deterrence. The MLF is a major pressure for such movement forward.

JUL 5 1963

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Chip:

Recent reports from several posts indicate a French initiative in seeking German and possible Italian participation in the French gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte. I am enclosing a condensation of a joint CIA-AEC Report on the French Gaseous Diffusion Project and a copy of identical letters sent by Secretary Bush to Dr. Seaborg and Mr. McCone outlining the Department's conclusions respecting Pierrelatte and other aspects of Franco-German nuclear cooperation. I would like to emphasize the highly sensitive nature of the information contained in these documents which should be given limited distribution.

As you will note, we have a high priority interest in obtaining additional information concerning possible European nuclear weapons cooperation on a bilateral basis. Nonetheless, it is important that our continuing information-gathering activities be conducted discreetly. In staff level discussions of pertinent technical or economic questions, we do not wish to create the impression that we have doubts about the intentions and assurances of any of our European allies.

You will be interested to know that during his recent visit to Washington German Science Minister Jens volunteered that Germany would not take any action which would strengthen the French effort.

to develop

The Honorable
Charles E. Bohlen,
American Embassy,
Paris.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

RV 59

ECR, AM, VBE + EC M A, VEC re atomic energy

Box 2 / Brown

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to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Specifically, he noted that "Germany had nothing to do with the Pierrelatte plant". As a result of this and other considerations, we have no present intention to make representations to the Germans on this subject.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Robert Schastuel
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Atlantic Affairs

Enclosures: As stated.

Concurrences:

WE - Mr. Beigel
GER - Mr. Brandin
RPM - Mr. Popper

W - Mr. Hartman
G/PM - Mr. McKay
INR - Mr. Foley

EUR:RPE:REKaufman:eps/jm
July 2, 1963

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7/5/63
Jacobs
with Admin. File

July 5, 1963

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Dear Averell:

In accordance with our discussion, I am attaching a draft instruction for you. This is a first try, and probably needs a good bit of polishing. My present thought is that Paragraphs 4 under I. and 1 b. under III. should be further supplemented by Memoranda for the Record which would respectively state our present understanding of the results of the Rusk-Dobrynin discussions and the limits within which the arrangements for declarations of non-aggression would be acceptable. I will see that these memoranda are drafted early next week.

I also attach a copy of the letter from me to Mayor Brandt which I wrote at the President's suggestion. I have some acquaintance with Brandt, and we have had a little correspondence. This seems a good way to keep him posted on what we're up to.

I also attach a copy of my note to John McNaughton transmitting a copy of the instructions.

11/2/67

Cordially,

Carl

Carl Kaysen

Honorable W. Averell Harriman
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
REVIEWED BY <u><i>JK</i></u>	DATE <u>3/25/67</u>
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- but Ban Treaty

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DRAFT

July 5, 1963

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN
SPECIAL AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW

The purposes of your mission are three:

1. To negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.
2. To explore what other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking.
3. To probe Soviet intentions in related areas, including those mentioned in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.

I. TEST BAN

1. Our judgment that a test ban treaty is in the national interest rests on two grounds. First, it may be a significant first step toward the halting of the arms race and thus reduce international tensions. Second, and more important, it is an indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. The prospects of a further increase in the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons poses a potentially serious threat to our security and to world stability and peace. Therefore, a test ban treaty must be viewed in relation to the problem of checking the further diffusion of nuclear weapons.

2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective.

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HP/539/TBT

July 8 draft w/ DR-7. ~~But~~ (B) in Box 540.
 differences, this plays up "Ean oec" exploration +
 diffusion / non-disarmament in - industry US response
 non-industrial rest - oec all.

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However, Chairman Khrushchev's speech makes it unlikely that we can reach agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time. Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

Should we sign it? ...

3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. You should therefore initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. You may also explore other possible means of extending the scope of the treaty such as limiting the number of underground tests to an agreed quota.

I don't want to sign it as it would be a major step towards disarmament

4. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and control of the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin.

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II. OTHER MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT

1. Our talks on general and complete disarmament in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva have made little progress. Recently Foreign Minister Gromyko made a proposal which at least raises the question of whether or not the Soviets are willing to consider serious first stage disarmament measures not tied to an agreement to proceed rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always found unacceptable. You should accordingly explore the possibility that the Gromyko proposal is intended to open a serious discussion of separable first stages.

2. In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures not necessarily part of a general disarmament treaty. These include:

- a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit.
- b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards.
- c. In combination with (b.), the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be

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prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.

- d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47's and BADGERS at a rate to be agreed.

In exploring these and other possibilities, you will be guided by the paper, _____, recommended by the Committee of Principals and approved by the President.

III. OTHER MEASURES

1. Chairman Khrushchev, in his speech, stated a connection between the test ban treaty and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. Neither the degree of this connection nor the nature of the proposals to which Chairman Khrushchev referred are clear. In exploring Soviet intentions in this respect, you should be guided by the following objectives:

- a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression pact from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of the non-aggression pact. We would prefer to conclude the three environment test ban treaty first, get the discussion on other measures of disarmament under way, and discuss the Soviet

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proposals for a non-aggression pact in the context of our discussions of further disarmament measures.

b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, "non-aggression pact," has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies, on the other, are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which renounces the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal. *Within* these constraints, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes.

you

Also safe guards our position in West + East

2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of reducing tensions between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Discuss Jaws in depth.

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DRAFT

July 8, 1963

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

Your mission involves both negotiating and exploratory aspects.

On the negotiating side, you should seek to negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.

On the exploratory side, you should canvass, insofar as appears practical, the range of issues involving peace and security which divide us from the Soviets. You should give especial attention to two points:

1. What other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking;
2. What are Soviet intentions in dealing with the problems related to European security, as raised in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.

I. TEST BAN

1. Our judgment that a test ban treaty is in the national interest rests on two grounds. First, it may be a significant first step toward the halting of the arms race and thus reduce international tensions. Second, and more important, it is an indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. The prospects of a further increase in the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons poses a potentially serious threat to our security and to world stability and peace. Therefore, a test ban treaty must be viewed in relation to

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*N.P. mem
9/11*

extract mem 7/8 draft - bur 8/11 / [unclear] (3)

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II. NON-DISSEMINATION

1. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and our desire to control the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin. You may indicate that the U.S. is willing to take some responsibility in respect to non-dissemination with relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding obligation for the powers with which it is associated.

III. OTHER MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT

1. Our talks on general and complete disarmament in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva have made little progress. Recently Foreign Minister Gromyko made a proposal which at least raises the question of whether or not the Soviets are willing to consider serious first stage disarmament measures not tied to an agreement to proceed rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always found unacceptable. Gromyko's proposal still presents serious problems, including the question of reducing strategic nuclear forces without any reduction in other forces. Nonetheless, you should explore the possibility that the Gromyko proposal is intended to open a serious discussion of separable first stages, on terms to which we can respond.

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arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies, on the other are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which renounces the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal. Further, we can make no arrangements which do not insure the present Western position in Berlin. In all these matters we must take into account the interests of our allies. Within these constraints, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes.

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re: W

2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of reducing tensions between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the context of such a discussion, you may wish to raise the problem of enforcing the Geneva Agreements in Laos.

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7/15/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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July 5, 1963

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mayor Brandt:

I am sure from all accounts that the President's visit to Berlin was a most memorable occasion for him, and I know you contributed greatly to making it so. I appreciate the greetings you conveyed to me through Mr. Bundy and trust that I can soon find an occasion to return them in person.

As you may have heard, I shall soon be going to Moscow with Governor Harriman to explore the meaning of the extraordinary speech that Chairman Khrushchev made on the other side of the wall on the second of July. We here feel that it is clearly a statement that deserves careful examination. Its timing, just after the President's visit to Berlin and just before the Chinese delegation was to arrive in Moscow, shortly to be followed by Governor Harriman's own mission, underlines its potential importance. It is clear that Khrushchev was talking to more audiences than his listeners in East Berlin.

The two parts of Khrushchev's offer are, of course, of quite different value. A nuclear test ban treaty is something we have sought earnestly for some time. The President considers it of the highest importance for two reasons. First, it is desirable in itself, both because of the wide popular feeling about nuclear tests all over the world and because it could be an important first step in the urgent process of halting the arms race. More important, it is the indispensable condition of any successful effort to limit the further diffusion of nuclear weapons to states that do not now possess them. An increase in the number of nuclear powers can only make less stable the security of all nations. While what Khrushchev has offered is less than a comprehensive ban, it could go a long way toward helping to close the door to further diffusion of nuclear weapons. We have a special concern in this connection with China. The fact that the Soviets are perhaps feeling the same concern may be of great importance as a symptom of the depth of the cleavage within the Communist camp. The President is sure that it would be unwise for us to ignore the opportunity that this signal might present.

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The other half of Khrushchev's proposal is of course another matter. The offer of a non-aggression pact raises many questions. As we have repeatedly said, we will never enter into an arrangement which is detrimental to German interests. It may well be possible, however, that, framed in a context which insures the present Western position in Berlin, some form of non-aggression arrangement can be advantageous to us. Such an arrangement might reduce further the danger of more Berlin crises, with the threats they bring to you in West Berlin, to all of Europe and to us. In our thought, the security of the Western position in Berlin is an indispensable condition of any acceptable arrangement in this field.

Our mission will in the main, except for the matter of the test ban, be exploratory. Any indications we receive which suggest the possibility of something useful in our common relations with the Soviet Union will be discussed with all the parties concerned before we come to any conclusions in our own minds.

Sincerely yours,

Carl Kaysen

The Honorable Willy Brandt
 Mayor of Berlin
 1 Berlin 62 (schoneberg)
 Germany

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 NAP = driving a wedge
 between Berlin =
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REVIEWED BY JK DATE 7/25/87W. R. Taylor

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July 7, 1963

DRAFT SCOPE PAPER OF HARRIMAN-HAILSHAM MISSION
WITH REFERENCE TO NON-AGGRESSION PACT

I. Introduction

Originally your mission with Lord Hailsham to Moscow was conceived as one last major effort to obtain agreement on a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear testing. Premier Khrushchev's speech on July 2nd in East Berlin where he indicated a willingness to conclude a partial test ban but linking it with a NATO-Warsaw Non-Aggression Pact, has changed the original character of your mission. By the introduction of this wide-ranging proposal, the Soviets have thrown on to the bargaining table new elements which will require most careful exploration not only with them but with our Allies. Mr. Khrushchev's link, however firm or tenuous it may turn out to be, to a non-aggression pact (NAP) opens up most delicate issues affecting

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HP 1539/TWTC

the security of Central Europe and the problem of Germany, including Berlin. This proposal has within it the potential for splitting the NATO Alliance and driving the French and Germans together in opposition to American policy as a whole toward Europe.

II. Soviet Objectives

While the full extent of Soviet objectives cannot be foreseen at this moment, Mr. Khrushchev's new proposal appears to herald the opening of a new phase in negotiations between East and West. The maximum Soviet goal may be to obtain a partial test ban with French adherence, and agreement on a NAP which would in effect constitute international acceptance of the permanent division of Germany, and the separate status of West Berlin which they have long sought through their

German peace treaty and "free city" proposals. The minimum Soviet goal may be to obtain a partial test ban without relation to possible French or Chinese adherence, and a NAP which would enhance the international acceptance of the GDR and at the same time confirm the status-quo in regard to Germany and Berlin.

III. U.S. Objectives and Tactics

1. Our objective is to secure a comprehensive or partial test ban in isolation from other matters. If the Soviets insist upon a linkage to a NAP, you should make clear that this is a matter which concerns the whole NATO Alliance and that you are not in a position to negotiate on this question.

2. You should indicate a willingness to listen to Soviet proposals. These would be subject to further discussion between ourselves and our Allies.

3. While it should be our purpose to obtain if possible an agreement on a test ban during your mission, this cannot be done at the price of commitments by the U.S. Government to the Soviets which might endanger the solidarity of the NATO Alliance.

4. It is essential, therefore, that you avoid making any commitment on matters outside the test ban.

5. On NAP, you should undertake preliminary soundings as to Soviet objectives, on the assumption that your mission is a preliminary round in what might be further extensive negotiations in a broader and more appropriate forum.

7/9/63
= 177

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC
ACTION

2468. INSTRUCTIONS FOR HARRIMAN MISSION
(Revised draft July 9 instructions for the
Harriman Mission)

Following discussion by the Council of the
draft instructions for the Honorable W.
Averell Harriman's mission to the USSR,
the President approved the attached re-
vised text.

DECLASSIFIED
NSC 15 - (NLSK-79-177)
By 77977 NARS, Date 5/13/87

July 9, 1963
515th NSC Meeting
NSC Action No. 2468



NSC Control No. 139

MSF / 714 / # NSC 515

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July 10, 1963

INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

Your mission involves both negotiating and exploratory aspects.

On the negotiating side, you should seek to negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.

On the exploratory side, you should canvass, in so far as appears practical, the range of issues involving peace and security which divide us from the Soviets. You should give especial attention to two points:

1. What other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking;
2. What are Soviet intentions in dealing with the problems related to European security, as raised in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.

I. TEST BAN

1. Our judgment that a test ban treaty is in the national interest rests on two grounds. First, it may be a significant first step toward the halting of the arms race and thus reduce international tensions. Second, and more important, it is an indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. The prospects of a further increase in the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons poses a potentially serious threat to our security and to world stability and peace. Therefore, a test ban treaty must be viewed in relation to the problem of checking the further diffusion of nuclear weapons.

2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective. However, Chairman Khrushchev's speech makes it unlikely that we can reach agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NLK-91-145
By <u>SF</u> NARA, Date <u>1/31/92</u>

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Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. You are authorized to carry such negotiations as far as you can.

3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. If the Soviets show an interest in pursuing the topic, you should initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the other, on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. The Soviets may, in one way or another, raise the issue of a moratorium on underground tests. If the Soviets do this, you may explore the usefulness of responding to such an initiative by means of a limited quota of underground tests in addition to the total prohibition of testing in other environments, but without discussing specific numbers, unless on further instructions.

II. NON-DISSEMINATION

1. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and our desire to control the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin. You may indicate that the United States will endeavor to secure adherence to or observation of any non-dissemination agreement by those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to undertake a parallel responsibility for those powers associated with it. In this connection, you should maintain our position that the MLF proposals now under discussion are not inconsistent with the goal of a non-dissemination agreement.

stronger than earlier draft (same title) following discussion

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III. OTHER MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT

1. Our talks on general and complete disarmament in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva have made little progress. Recently Foreign Minister Gromyko made a proposal which at least raises the question of whether or not the Soviets are willing to consider serious first-stage disarmament measures not tied to an agreement to proceed rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always found unacceptable. Gromyko's proposal still presents serious problems, including the question of the extent of reduction of strategic nuclear forces in relation to the reduction of other forces. Nonetheless, you should explore the possibility that the Gromyko proposal is intended to open a serious discussion of separable first stages, on terms to which we can respond.

2. In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures previously authorized as separable measures. These include, but need not be limited to:

a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit. This is a matter of particular interest to the United States.

b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards, and in combination with the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.

c. An agreement to establish nuclear free zones in areas where nuclear weapons do not form an integral part of the security arrangements upon which the countries in the areas rely. (This refers to Latin America and Africa.)

d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47's and BADGERS at a rate to be agreed.

e. Measures on the reduction of risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.

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IV. OTHER MEASURES

1. Chairman Khrushchev, in his speech, stated a connection between the test ban treaty and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. Neither the degree of this connection nor the nature of the proposals to which Chairman Khrushchev referred are clear. In exploring Soviet intentions in this respect, you should be guided by the following objectives:

a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression arrangements from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of non-aggression arrangements. We would prefer to go as far as possible in discussing the three environment test ban treaty first, and then explore other measures of disarmament, as well as the Soviet proposals for non-aggression arrangements.

b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, "non-aggression pact", has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies, on the other are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which is inconsistent with the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal. Further, we can make no arrangements which do not insure the present Western position in Berlin. In all these matters we must take into account the interests of our allies. Within these constraints a non-aggression arrangement could be advantageous to the West by reducing the possibility of further Berlin crises. Accordingly, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes.

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2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of improving relations between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the context of such a discussion, you may wish to raise the problem of enforcing the Geneva Agreements in Laos.

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GERMANY

EXEMPT
NLK-25-26

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

Control: 7202

Rec'd: July 9, 1963

8:05 p.m.

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FROM: Bonn

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 95, July 9, 6 p.m.

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 95, INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 41, LONDON 45, BRUSSELS 9, THE HAGUE 11, ROME 26, LUXEMBOURG 11.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC; PARIS ALSO FOR USRO.

De Gaulle Visit.

Reference: EMBTELS 70, 71, 86.

I called on Erhard Monday to get his impression of De Gaulle visit. Following are highlights of conversation reported in MEMCON being pouched.

1. Erhard said his personal discussions with De Gaulle had taken place in good atmosphere. He had acknowledged his respect for the General and the unique character of the General's friendship with Adenauer. Erhard had expressed to De Gaulle the need that they have confidence in one another.

2. Erhard recalled warm reception De Gaulle received during visit to Germany last year. He noted, however, that more recent reception for Kennedy amounted to plebiscite in favor of "one power in the world" that can defend Germany. He contrasted U.S. concept of Europe as a growing and increasingly united economic and social and political force with French concept of a Europe with common institutions would have narrowly limited responsibilities.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

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PDF/117/Germany Summary 4/63

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-2- 95, July 9, 6 p.m. From Bonn.

3. De Gaulle expressed strong resentment against UK and Erhard expects no change in De Gaulle attitude toward UK.

4. Erhard said that, according to Adenauer, atmosphere of De Gaulle-Adenauer private discussions had been less than lukewarm. Agreement on youth exchange program failed concern lack of agreement on other issues.

5. Agriculture was central issue of negotiating sessions. In saying he would omit discussing question of grain price where "we are at fault," Erhard commented: "as I have told you, I intend to do something about this when I am Chancellor." (EMBIEL 3563). French wished give high priority to beef, rice and dairy market regulations. Germans replied they willing discuss in general terms but not yet ready fill in precise figures. Citing Rome treaty provisions re trade relations with third countries, Germans thought existing CAP regulations should be studied to see whether third country trade had been damaged. In fact, Erhard said, third country trade in some instances not only disturbed but destroyed. Erhard believes French want to settle CAP issues before discussing other common market questions. Germany, however, wants foreign trade policy determined before CAP is decided, and also wants act on trade distortions within EEC, such as subsidies. Erhard said he sometimes thinks that if France can obtain CAP, they will lose interest in all remaining aspects of EEC.

6. Erhard said he had told French EEC had to agree on position for Kennedy round before end 1963. EEC must take flexible view re across-the-board tariff cuts and tariff disparities, in order room for maneuver. Erhard made parenthetical remark that he understood recent Geneva talks had gone surprisingly well.

7. Erhard told French that EEC would have to accept quota system in connection world-wide commodity arrangements. His own preference would be for system of tariff quotas, which would assure third countries reasonable access to common market. Only after in-qu quantities had been imported from third countries would greater /preferences

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-3- 95, July 9, 6 p.m. From Bonn.

preferences for EEC countries come into play. French position was that such arrangement inconsistent with common market. Erhard said he countered that something along lines his proposal would be necessary in preparing for Kennedy round if agreement eventually to be reached. For Germany, problem was not merely agricultural, since they export to whole world. Pointed out German exports to common market make up only one-third of total German exports. Erhard said French swallowed hard when he said "I do not believe French policy really different from German. Your policy serves your interests as long as you can expand within common market. Germany has reached its limit in common market. When you reach that point, you will have same policy we do".

Comment:

Erhard's remarks are particularly interesting for the glimpse they afford of the nature of the future relationship between the French President and German Chancellor. On his account, at least, German interests as he sees them--and basically he sees them in accord with US interests--will be pressed in Franco-German meetings.

Though Erhard's account contains nothing new about common market matters, it is useful confirming evidence. More important is his statement about the need to accept a system of quotas or tariff quotas in connection with world-wide commodity arrangements, and his reiteration of his intention to "do something" about the German grain price after he becomes Chancellor.

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Summary Record of the National Security Council Meeting
July 9, 1963 - 6:00 PM -- Harriman Instructions for Mission
to Moscow

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In response to the President's question, Mr. Foster said he believed we could accept a quota of twelve underground tests without inspection. However, he pointed out that if the treaty provided for a fixed number of underground tests, other States would feel free to conduct tests and we would thereby lose the benefit of restricting proliferation of nuclear weapons. He agreed that we should accept a treaty with a quota of underground tests if that was all we could get from the Russians. He believed the Soviets could gain an advantage out of an arrangement permitting them a number of underground tests because the Russians stand to gain more from testing than we do.

Secretary Rusk said our objective is to continue to try for a comprehensive test ban treaty, accepting a three-environment treaty only as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive treaty. He repeated his concern about proposing any quota of underground tests to the Russians prior to consultation with our allies and appropriate Congressional leaders.

Mr. Harriman said his understanding of the instructions was that he was limited to exploring the idea of a quota of underground tests.

General Taylor asked whether the Government as a whole had considered a proposal to accept a limited quota of underground tests. He acknowledged that such a proposal had some good and some bad points, but he urged that, before approving any offer, the entire idea of a quota should be examined in detail.

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NSF/265/ACDA Harriman Trip
Part 2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-92-9
By SE NARA, Date 4/14/93

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- 2 -

The President responded by acknowledging that there might not be much for us in a quota of underground tests. He asked whether within the next week we could give detailed consideration to this idea.

In response to a question, Mr. Foster said our present test program involved twenty-five to thirty underground tests.

Secretary Rusk mentioned a second point, i. e. how we define underground tests and atmospheric tests in such a way as to make clear when an underground test becomes an atmospheric test. He said we must define precisely the cut-off point between the two types of tests.

Mr. Foster said definitions of these tests are contained in the draft treaty, and he read the following:

Article I, Section 1 - Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction and control . . . in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

Chairman Seaborg replied that our present underground tests would be legal under this definition. Little radioactive debris from our underground tests falls outside the test area and none outside the State in which the test site is located. He said it would be feasible for us to continue our underground test program under such a limitation.

Secretary Rusk said the acceptance of this definition would mean that we were prepared to limit ourselves to weapons tests which produce no fallout outside the U.S.

Secretary Rusk mentioned the third point which he suggested should be incorporated in the revision of the instructions, i. e. in a discussion of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the Harriman mission should maintain our position that our multilateral force (MLF) proposal is not inconsistent with the goal of a non-dissemination agreement. If we did not maintain this position, we would cause great confusion among our allies and wreck NATO. He said the mission should point out that our MLF proposal actually means greater control of nuclear weapons

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and therefore is consistent with our effort to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The President suggested that the pertinent sentence in the non-dissemination section of the instructions be revised to reflect Secretary Rusk's point. He asked what our position would be on a proposal to ban dissemination of nuclear weapons to powers which are now nuclear powers. He wished to avoid any clause which would prohibit us from giving weapons to France if we so desired.

Secretary Rusk responded by saying that the draft treaty covered this point and that the Russians had accepted our definition of the nuclear powers as being the U.S., U.K., France and the USSR. In discussion with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Secretary Rusk had obtained Soviet acknowledgment that the four named States were nuclear powers. Mr. Bundy added that in our discussions with the Russians we should continue to take for granted that we are agreed on the four nations as being the only nuclear powers.

Secretary Rusk raised the fourth point. He asked that the instructions be revised so that there was no link between discussion of a non-aggression pact and progress in other disarmament missions. He believed that we should not now limit our discussion as to a non-aggression pact. At a later time, we may wish to tie it to Soviet acceptance of other proposals such as a settlement of the Berlin question.

Mr. Harriman asked that the phrase in his instructions be changed from "non-aggression pact" to non-aggression arrangements." The President suggested that the present wording of the sentence on non-aggression arrangements should be revised to clarify its meaning. Mr. Bundy pointed out that Governor Harriman should make clear that all discussions about non-aggression arrangements would be ad referendum to our allies.

The President suggested that the sentence referring to the desirability of an agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit should be strengthened. He thought that such an agreement would be useful to us. Secretary McNamara agreed with the President's observation.

In response to Secretary Dillon's question as to what areas we were referring to in the sentence mentioning nuclear-free zones, Secretary Rusk said we were thinking of Latin America and Africa -- not the Far East.

The President raised the question as to our dealings with the British on matters arising from the Harriman mission. Mr. Bundy acknowledged that there was considerable suspicion of British motivation. He said many believed that Macmillan wanted a tripartite summit conference, even if there was very little substance for the three principals to discuss and agree upon. He said we should discuss with the British and reach a procedural agreement with them in an effort to hold to an absolute minimum the amount of information made available to the press about the Moscow negotiations. He suggested a procedure whereby each day a joint statement would be made about the developments in Moscow.

The President recalled a conversation with Lord Hailsham who took the position that the British could sign what the Russians proposed and they could sign what the Americans proposed. The President concluded that Hailsham clearly envisages himself as a mediator between us and the Russians. Mr. Bundy mentioned Ambassador Bruce's nervousness about the personal attitude of Hailsham.

The President said the reports of the negotiations should be held to a minimum distribution. He agreed that we should limit ourselves to press guidance once a day. He suggested that a personal letter be drafted for him to send to Prime Minister Macmillan calling attention to the importance of keeping the negotiations out of the press. (Copy of the letter is attached.)

Secretary Rusk agreed that Harriman's reports should be held very closely. He suggested that a special category of "EYES ONLY" messages be established which would result in his receiving reports in a single copy. Further distribution in the State Department would be his decision.

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Secretary Rusk said we should conclude an atmospheric test ban treaty if the Soviets agreed and sign it in Moscow if they wished. He shared the President's view that the Soviets would not sign at any meeting other than a summit conference.

Mr. Bundy raised the question of how we deal with the French in connection with an atmospheric test ban. Secretary Rusk said we would keep the French informed. Mr. Bundy felt that de Gaulle would find it almost impossible to sign any agreement which had been reached by the U.S., U.K. and the USSR at a summit conference.

Secretary Rusk stated he believed that it might be necessary to hold a general conference at which other States would sign the test ban treaty. The President agreed that it might be necessary to hold such a conference in order to get other States to sign. Secretary Rusk said we should not permit the French to have a procedural veto on such arrangements.

The President asked how we thought the Russians would discuss a test ban treaty with the Chinese. Mr. Harriman replied that he would try to raise this subject with the Russians but he was personally doubtful that they would discuss this subject with us.

In response to the President's question, Secretary McNamara said he accepted the Harriman instructions and had no comment to make. He added that he felt General Taylor had some views which he wished to express as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Taylor said that the Chiefs individually had taken the position that a limited test ban treaty, as well as a limited test ban treaty with a quota of underground tests, was not in the national interest. Two of the Chiefs, General LeMay and Admiral Anderson, had already expressed their personal views to the Stennis Committee. General Taylor asked that a governmental review be made of the atmospheric test ban treaty to determine now whether it was in the national interest. He asked that the Committee of Principals review the entire proposal again in the light of developments during the past year. Such a review would include a review by the Chiefs as well as by other agencies of the Government.

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General Taylor repeated his request for a review of the test ban treaty in order to take into account developments during the past year.

Secretary McNamara again stated his opposition to such a review on the grounds that there was wider diversity as to the advisability of a treaty this year than there was last year. He feared that any such review would leak to the press while Harriman was en route to Moscow.

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The President suggested that following the meeting Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor discuss this point further with him in his office.

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Mr. Foster read from the draft treaty the provisions covering the explosion of a nuclear weapon by a non-treaty power. (Article III states that if a nuclear explosion has been conducted by a State not a party to the treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the

determining parties' national security or if a nuclear explosion has occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions, a State may request a conference of the treaty parties. At the conclusion of this conference, or after sixty days after the request for a conference, a treaty power can withdraw from the treaty by giving notice. (The withdrawal takes place sixty days after notification of intent to withdraw.) Mr. Foster added that one advantage of the treaty was to advance toward our goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said our signature to a proposed draft treaty created no threat to the existing military balance. He believed that opinion within the Government was heavily in favor of going ahead with the effort to get a test ban treaty.

In response to the President's request to Mr. McCone for comment, Mr. McCone said he had none.

Bromley Smith

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-92-9
NARA, Date 4/14/93

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NIP 317 1/1/63 w/Pres: Harv
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- 4 -

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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July 9, 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons

*7: Sullivan
Foreign Office
directly
v. ...
SDB AP*

1. Secretary Rusk had two conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, one on August 8 and the other on August 23, 1962. In the course of the second conversation, Ambassador Dobrynin delivered orally a message from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary Rusk. Some of the same ground was touched on briefly in the course of an earlier conversation between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva on March 26, 1962. This conversation was mostly on Berlin and Germany. Out of these interchanges the following points emerged:

a. The U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed it would be in the interest of both nations for no further nuclear powers to develop.

b. The U.S. and the Soviet Union both recognized four present nuclear powers: themselves, the United Kingdom and France.

c. The U.S. suggested that we try to obtain an international agreement under which the nuclear powers would undertake not to transfer to the non-nuclear powers weapons or design information, and the non-nuclear powers undertook not to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

d. The Soviets asked for a specific prohibition of nuclear weapons for the "two Germanies." It was not clear whether or not the general arrangement proposed by the United States would satisfy them if the "two Germanies" were covered by it.

e. The Soviets talked about excluding the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliance to those states which do not possess them in the following terms: "the transfer of nuclear weapons in an indirect manner, irrespective of whether or not national

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armed forces of these states are component parts of the armed forces in any military alliance." Secretary Musk made it clear that we thought that a multilateral force in which we retained a veto would not constitute an indirect transfer, and was in fact a barrier to transfer. It is not clear from the record whether the Soviets flatly refused to accept this assertion or not.

2. If we continue the discussion of non-dissemination, we must face the following questions:

a. If the Soviets make explicit the argument that the MLF is inconsistent with their concept of a non-transfer arrangement, under what circumstances are we willing to continue the discussions?

b. If we are willing to continue the discussion only under the condition that the Soviets are prepared to assume a positive obligation to see that China abides by the terms of the non-diffusion arrangement, whether or not it is a signatory of that arrangement, in what form do we wish to see this obligation recorded? The draft instructions now contain the phrase, "The U.S. is willing to take responsibility in respect to non-dissemination with relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding obligation for the powers with which it is associated." Is this a strong enough statement, or do we need more?

c. If we need more, can we discuss either or both of some degree of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in terms of positive inducements or sanctions? Among the former, we could possibly offer a nuclear free zone in the Western Pacific, which we would agree to observe so long as there was no aggression by the Chinese. In respect to sanctions, we could discuss further restrictions of trade with China by both sides, and by the Allies of both sides.

C. K.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 10, 1963


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The President met with W. Averell Harriman in his office at 9:30 A. M. on July 10 for a final discussion of Governor Harriman's mission to the Soviet Union. Messrs. Bundy and Kaysen were also present.

The President opened the discussion by remarking on the relation of the Harriman exploration to U. S. -German ties. He felt that as a result of his visit the Germans and we had come to a better understanding, and they were less anxious about us. Further, this was reflected strongly in popular feeling, as well as on a governmental level. He was willing to draw on this feeling as much as seemed useful if there was something to be achieved by it. On the other hand, he thought it was futile to repeat the experience of the '61 discussions on Berlin. These lengthy talks with the Soviet Union had achieved nothing tangible, and aroused great suspicion in Germany.

The President then raised the question of whether or not he wished to meet at the summit with Khrushchev. He recognized that Macmillan would push strongly in this direction.


For his part, the President thought a summit, especially a summit involving Macmillan as well as himself, would create difficulties in the U. S., in Germany and France. A bilateral meeting between himself and Khrushchev, such as the one in Vienna, would be less troublesome in this respect. However, in spite of the troubles, the President would be willing to pay the price if it proved necessary. In response to Governor Harriman's question, he said, if necessary, he would go to a summit meeting just to sign the test ban treaty covering three environments, although he was concerned about the effect such an action would have on our relations with France.

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
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NW-84-186

NARA DATE 9/85

NSP/265/ACVA Harriman TV Part D

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Governor Harriman raised the question of our trade with the Soviet Union, and pointed out that Khrushchev would like to increase it further. The European nations supply much of what they want anyway, but it was a matter of pride with Khrushchev. The President agreed that we should be forthcoming on this issue if it came up.

Our position on the MLF then came up. The President said that our first response to this issue should be to repeat our argument that it was consistent with the purposes of non-dissemination, in accordance with the agreed instruction. If, however, there seemed to be some purpose in going beyond this in terms of the China problem or otherwise, Harriman should be guided by his judgment of how useful it was to indicate to the Soviets that in certain circumstances we might not need to go forward with this proposition. But in no event should Governor Harriman give any specific assurances on the MLF.

Governor Harriman reported Secretary McNamara's views on how far McNamara thought it would be wise to go on a first stage disarmament proposal. The President thought it was rather unlikely

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that there would be any serious discussion on this point.

The President raised the question of Laos and indicated the importance of repeating our dissatisfaction with the present situation and our desire for the Soviets to live up to their commitments there. Governor Harriman responded that this of course brought up all the questions of Soviet-Chinese relations, and whether or not the Soviets were able to influence the situation in Laos. Again the President said that Governor Harriman's judgment should govern his action.

Carl Kaysen

- Cy 1 - Mr. Bundy
- 2 - Governor Harriman
- 3 - Mr. Kaysen
- 4 - Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

7/13/63

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Action
SS

Control: 19103
Rec'd: JULY 13, 1963
3:57 PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

008

TO: Secretary of State

REVIEWED BY QJL DATE 7/14/63

NO: 292, JULY 23, 8 PM

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE _____
TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS
DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE
RELEASE DENIED
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

FROM HARRIMAN

IN PRIVATE TALK WITH HAILSHAM AND MYSELF, GROMYKO PRESSED US AS HARD AS HE COULD FOR A COMMITMENT ON OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS NAP. I CAREFULLY STATED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT, THAT I WOULD REPORT OUR DISCUSSIONS FULLY ON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, AND THAT I WAS SURE WE WOULD CONSULT OUR ALLIES. I KNEW THAT MY GOVERNMENT WAS INTERESTED IN EXTENDING THE GOOD WILL THAT HAD BEEN CREATED BY THE PRESENT TALKS TO INCLUDE ALL OF EUROPE BOTH THE MEMBERS OF THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT, AND THAT MY GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT THE TEST BAN AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH HAVING GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE IN ITSELF, WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER UNDERSTANDINGS. HAILSHAM MADE A SIMILAR STATEMENT, PERHAPS A BIT MORE DEFINITE.

THEREUPON GROMYKO SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM OUR STATEMENTS THAT OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS WERE READY TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT REGARDING NAP AND INTENDED TO CONSULT ALLIES. TAKING THIS INTO ACCOUNT, SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED NOT TO LINK DIRECTLY THE SIGNING OF TEST BAN WITH NAP. HE HOPED THIS WOULD BE DULY APPRECIATED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS. HOWEVER, GROMYKO SAID LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE PROPOSED BY HAILSHAM WAS NOT FULLY SATISFACTORY, AND HANDED US HIS PROPOSED DRAFT.

WE AGREED TO CONSULT OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS AND ADVISE HIM TOMORROW. AT HIS REQUEST, I EXPLAINED TO HIM THE DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURES WE PROPOSED FOR SIGNING TEST BAN TREATY. HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT HIS GOVERNMENT SINCE THIS QUESTION I QUOTE THE LEVEL AND THE TIMING UNQUOTE. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD INITIAL THE TREATY TOMORROW, OR AS SOON THEREAFTER AS WE COULD AGREE ON COMMUNIQUE. COMMUNIQUE AND TEXT OF TREATY SHOULD BE GIVEN OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THREE CAPITALS PROMPTLY AFTER INITIALING. ADVISE IF THIS PROCEDURE SATISFACTORY.

GROMYKO'S SUGGESTED REFERENCE TO NAP IN COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWS:

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HP/540/1976

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-2- 292, JULY 23, 8 PM FROM MOSCOW

QUOTE: THE HEADS OF THE THREE DELEGATIONS DISCUSSED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL RELATING TO A PACT OF NON AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE WARSAW TREATY. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED FULLY TO INFORM THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES IN THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNING THESE TALKS (PEREGOVORY, TRANSLATED BY SUKHODREV AS "TALKS"; IT COULD ALSO BE TRANSLATED AS "NEGOTIATIONS") AND TO CONSULT WITH THEM ABOUT THE MANNER OF CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS (OBSUZHDENIYA) ON THIS QUESTION WITH THE OBJECT OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT.

AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ALSO TOOK PLACE WITH REGARD TO OTHER MEASURES, LEADING TO A RELAXATION OF TENSION, AFFECTING THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE WARSAW TREATY. UNQUOTE.

GROMYKO STATED THAT IF WE WISHED TO WE COULD LIST SOME OR ALL OF THE SUBJECTS RAISED IN THE DISCUSSIONS. NEITHER HAILSHAM NOR I COMMENTED, AND I WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST IT.

OUR COMMENTS ON COMMUNIQUE FOLLOW SEPTTEL. ALSO FULL ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATION.

GP-1.

KOHLER

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
7/18/63

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MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 18, 1963 - 6:30 PM -- Instructions to Governor Harriman

Others present: Secretary Rusk
Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. William Foster
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Smith

Prior to the arrival of the President, the group discussed Harriman's reports and his request for instructions on several points.



The President participated in a discussion of the three proposed versions of the withdrawal article (see attached paper). Mr. Bundy said that Ambassador Thompson, as well as the others present, agreed that the Soviets want a test ban agreement. Hence, if we wait, the Russians will accept what we want.

Mr. Ball said he doubted we could obtain Senate approval of the agreement if it contained the withdrawal clause proposed by the Russians. He felt that a withdrawal provision so broadly phrased would lead Senators to conclude that the treaty was illusory and that the commitment meant nothing if it could be denounced for reasons not connected with the test ban treaty at all. He added that when the Soviets resumed testing in 1961, their justification of their action was approximately the same as that proposed in the withdrawal clause.

The suggestion that Senators go to Moscow to sign the agreement led to several comments that many Senators would want to attend a signing ceremony.

The Harriman instructions were revised to reflect a more affirmative position on trade between the USSR and the West.

The President agreed to see Senator Pastore and to telephone Senator Anderson in an effort to reassure them about the course of negotiations and avoid their taking a position in opposition to the treaty before the negotiations had been concluded.

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NW-84-186
BY msm NARA DATE 9/85

in letter / ACDA. Harriman Trip Part B

There followed a discussion of how to deal with the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President asked that the military disadvantages of the treaty be listed so that we would be in a better position to deal with opposition to the treaty based on military grounds. A suggestion to hold a Committee of Principals meeting with the Chiefs was not approved.

The instructions were amended to reflect the decision that Harriman was not authorized to agree to any summit meeting without further instructions from Washington.

In response to a question about the arms control plan which Khrushchev had mentioned to Harriman, Mr. Foster said the simplest way to describe what the Russians were talking about was to recall the Norstad plan. The proposal involved static control posts and did not involve the thinning out of military forces. It did involve a kind of neutralized zone, often described as the Rapaki plan.

In connection with the Khrushchev proposal on reduction of military budgets, the President authorized the addition of a sentence, later approved by Secretary McNamara, which stated that if there is no increase in international tensions, it is our current expectation to put forward a 1964 military budget in the same range as that submitted for 1963.

Bromley Smith

DUS seems out to sabotage anything w de la

7/18/63

37

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

SECRET

Action

Control: 14887
Rec'd: JULY 18, 1963
10:01 AM

Info

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 285, JULY 18, 1 PM

Qwa 285
7-18-63

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 285, INFORMATION LONDON PRIORITY 35.

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR BRUCE

REF: DEPTTEL 350 TO PARIS, 418 TO LONDON

DEF 18-6

IT IS TOO BAD THAT AN OPPORTUNITY WAS NOT GIVEN TO ME HERE IN PARIS TO COMMENT ON THIS MESSAGE BEFORE IT WAS SENT TO THE PRIMIN. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO IMAGINE A WORSE METHOD OF APPROACH TO THE FRENCH THEN A JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN VISIT TO DE GAULLE. ANY SUCH APPROACH WOULD CERTAINLY AROUSE ALL OF FRENCH DISLIKE OF SPECIAL ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD CERTAINLY DIMINISH WHATEVER SLIGHT CHANCES THERE WERE OF SUCCESS BY THE FACT OF BOTH AMBASSADORS CALLING ON DE GAULLE AT THE SAME TIME.

MY FIRST SUGGESTION IS THAT IF THIS IS TO BE DONE BY BOTH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES WE SHOULD MAKE OUR CALLS SEPARATELY. SECONDLY I AM EXTREMELY DUBIOUS IF WE WOULD BE IN ANY POSITION TO OBTAIN THE FRENCH SIGNATURE IN RETURN FOR ASSURANCES OF SO VAGUE A NATURE AS IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 OF REFTEL. FROM POINT OF VIEW OF FRENCH ATOMIC PROGRAM THE ASSURANCES CONTAINED IN THESE TWO PARAGRAPHS ARE EXTREMELY IMPRECISE AND WOULD HARDLY BE ADEQUATE FOR THE FRENCH TO GIVE UP INFORMATION WHICH THEY WOULD OBTAIN FROM FUTURE TESTING. IN ANY EVENT IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO RELINQUISH THEIR RIGHT TO

RE: POL FR-US

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This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

ACTION SECRET

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MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 22, 1963 - 6:00 PM -- Harriman Mission

Others present: Secretary Rusk
Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. William Foster
Mr. Smithy
Mr. Smith

The President asked about the details of formalizing the draft test ban treaty. Following a discussion of these formalities, it was decided that Ambassador Harriman would initial the agreement in Moscow, return to Washington, and then go again to Moscow as part of a delegation to be headed by Secretary Rusk and including several Senators. Secretary Rusk would expect to sign the agreement a week after the initialing ceremony. The purpose of the Senate delegation is to interest them as well as to provide additional opportunities to direct public attention to the benefits of a test ban treaty. The week's delay also provides time for consultation with allies. The plan to send a delegation to Moscow is to be put to Prime Minister Macmillan in the hope that he would agree and name a comparable level British delegation. Ambassador Harriman is to be instructed to suggest the procedure to Gromyko.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Ball said that to "initial" an agreement means no more than that the negotiators accept as accurate the text of the agreement.

There followed a discussion as to whether it would be better to initial the agreement before de Gaulle has his press conference next Monday. The President decided that de Gaulle's actions would probably not be influenced by the initialing of the test ban treaty.

Consideration was then given to the draft letter to de Gaulle. The President suggested several revisions. He asked that the sentence dealing with the non-aggression pact make clear to de Gaulle that we have told the Russians that any non-aggression proposals would require not only consultation but also agreement among the Western allies before any action at all could be taken. In order to avoid appearing to be condescending, the President suggested that the words "protect

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
NLK-84-186

DATE 9/85

ACHA / Planner Trip

the interests of our allies" be changed to read "to make clear" so that the sentence would read: "We would take pains in any communique on the present discussions to make clear the interest which our allies, especially France and the Federal Republic, have in this matter." (The sentence was later revised to delete reference to France and the Federal Republic.)


There was a discussion of the following sentence: "As we have already indicated through Ambassador Bohlen, the United States Government would be willing to explore alternatives which might make French testing in these three environments unnecessary." Ambassador Thompson suggested deleting the reference to Ambassador Bohlen on the grounds that the British Prime Minister, in an earlier letter to the President, had said he did not know what we had told Ambassador Bohlen to tell the French. Mr. Ball commented that we were not certain whether the conversation between Bohlen and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had actually been reported to de Gaulle. Therefore, we did not know whether the offer Bohlen made to Couve was actually known to de Gaulle. The President agreed to delete the reference to Bohlen.




The President suggested changing the word "believe" to "hope" in the sentence which reads: "While there are both political and technical problems here, we hope they are capable of solution. "

There was no discussion of the following sentence which was bracketed in the President's reading copy: "We must not take any course that would dismay our allies since it is the strength and unity of the alliance as a whole that matters most." (This sentence was later deleted by the President who feels that mention of our allies in the initial communication will only be a red rag to the General. We obviously will have to talk about their views at some stage, but he thinks it is a matter which need not be mentioned explicitly now.)

The discussion turned to the situation which would exist if the French refused to sign the treaty and announced that they would continue testing. The President suggested that instructions to Harriman prepare the Russians for what de Gaulle might say at his press conference next Monday. Secretary Rusk suggested, and the President agreed, that Harriman make the point to the Russians that we were looking at what the French would do rather than paying too much attention to what they said. Secretary Rusk suggested that the Russians be told that while we did not react sharply to the Chinese statement that they would not sign the treaty, we would reconsider our situation if the Chinese actually tested a nuclear weapon.



The President was concerned about what we would do if, having announced that Secretary Rusk and the Senators would go to Moscow to sign the agreement, de Gaulle, on Monday, flatly refused to associate himself with the treaty and the Russians thereupon said they would reconsider their agreement to the test ban. Later, it was agreed to allow a week to elapse between Harriman's initialling the agreement in Moscow and the signature. This provides an interval after de Gaulle's press conference during which we would re-examine the situation, if necessary. With the publication of the text of the agreement, we would be in a position to know French reaction.



Two letters to the Prime Minister were approved. The first transmitted a copy of the letter to de Gaulle. It also covered the point raised by the President, namely, our instruction to Harriman to forewarn the Russians about the possible French attitude toward the test ban agreement, calling special attention to the difference between what the French say they are going to do and any actual French testing, which is some time off in the future.

The second letter to the Prime Minister urged him to accept our proposed language for the communique dealing with the Russian proposal for a non-aggression pact. In our view, the language proposed by Hallsham would, in effect, be a non-aggression declaration by the U.S., U.K. and USSR.

In response to Mr. Foster's question, the President said he had talked to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually. He said General LeMay was solidly opposed to the test ban treaty while the Marine Corps Commandant, General Shoup, saw in the test ban treaty a major turning point. General Taylor's view takes into account considerations other than purely military ones.

There followed a discussion as to the prospects of obtaining Senate approval for the treaty. Secretary Rusk and Mr. Foster reported increasing Senate opinion favoring the treaty. Lewis Strauss is now in favor of an environmental test ban. Mr. McCone was praised by both Mr. Ball and Mr. Foster for the support which he is developing in favor of the treaty.

There was discussion of the Senators who would be asked to go to Moscow to sign the agreement.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Foster said there was a problem arising out of the scheduled reconvening of the Geneva arms conference this summer. He said that the Moscow negotiations would not be completed in time to convene this conference as scheduled. The Russians had indicated that they would prefer not to reopen the Geneva talks but to discuss disarmament in the fall in connection with the General Assembly meeting. Mr. Foster favored a short session in Geneva during which we could discuss the details of several of the disarmament suggestions made by Khrushchev to Harriman in Moscow.

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- 5 -

The President's view was that we should ask Harriman to ask the Russians whether they favored holding the session. If the Russians insisted on postponing the session, the President saw little profit in our trying to force them into a meeting because we would be unable to draw them out if they did not choose to be drawn.

Bromley Smith

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7/22/63

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MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 22, 1963 - 6:00 PM -- Harriman Mission

Others present: Secretary Rusk
Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. William Foster
Mr. Smith
Mr. Smith

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
NLK-84-186

DATE 9/85

NTP 217 / M/oy w/ Pres
Harriman Mission

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
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
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- 5 -

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Bromley Smith

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Harriman
7/23/63

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 23, 1963 - 5:15 PM -- Instructions to Ambassador Harriman

Others present: Secretary Rusk
Mr. McCone
Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Foster
Mr. McCloy
Mr. Sorensen
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Smith

The first item concerned the wording of that part of the communique to be released at the conclusion of the Moscow discussions which dealt with the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty powers and the NATO powers. The President approved a telegram which told Harriman that he must insist on acceptable wording lest it appear that we had committed ourselves to achieve a non-aggression pact when all we had done in Moscow was to discuss the suggestion and agree to discuss it further with our allies. Harriman was reminded that the Washington assessment of the situation in Moscow prompted us to insist on our wording in view of our belief that the Russians wanted the test ban treaty and would not break off the negotiations if we refused to accept their wording of the communique. Harriman's reports reveal that he felt we had to meet the Russians on their wording of the non-aggression pact communique paragraph because they had agreed to drop their insistence on linking a test ban treaty to a non-aggression pact.

There followed discussion of the composition of the Senatorial delegation which would accompany Secretary Rusk to Moscow to sign the test ban treaty. The President's view was that if Senators Fulbright and Hickenlooper did not go, the entire plan should be abandoned.

Secretary Rusk, accompanied by Mr. Foster, joined the group after having testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Rusk said there was a good chance that all of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee members except Senator Lausche would vote to approve the test ban treaty as now drafted.

A telegram to Ambassador Bohlen was discussed. The President shared the view of those present that the wording in the President's letter to

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
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NW 84-186
BY *RAM* NARA DATE 9/85

more complete: FRLS 61-63 7:835
17-65 / ACB A. Harriman JVK

de Gaulle [REDACTED] should not be made more precise as Bohlen had suggested. The draft de Gaulle letter was modified slightly. Ambassador Bohlen is to deliver it shortly before the announcement of the initialling of the test ban treaty.

Another telegram to Harriman instructed him to urge the Russians not to comment if de Gaulle, in his Monday press conference, announced his refusal to sign the test ban agreement. The President suggested that Harriman urge the Russians not to comment on any French statement about testing which was not related to an actual French nuclear weapons test. We will not withdraw from the treaty on the basis of a Chinese announcement that they will not sign the treaty. However, if it appears that the Chinese are actually about to test a weapon, we will reconsider the situation at that time.



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- 3 -

Following a presentation by Mr. Foster, the President agreed we should inform the Russians that we thought the disarmament committee of eighteen should resume its sessions in Geneva this summer as scheduled. The Russians had indicated a desire to postpone this session. However, many of the eighteen States, especially Canada, have told us they wish to resume the disarmament talks to discuss developments since their last meeting and to prepare a report for the UN General Assembly. In view of the strong desires of the others, except the Russians, the President accepted the recommendation favoring resumption of the Geneva talks.

Bramley Smith

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7/10/63

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 10, 1963


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The President met with W. Averell Harriman in his office at 9:30 A. M. on July 10 for a final discussion of Governor Harriman's mission to the Soviet Union. Messrs. Bundy and Kaysen were also present.

The President opened the discussion by remarking on the relation of the Harriman exploration to U. S. -German ties. He felt that as a result of his visit the Germans and we had come to a better understanding, and they were less anxious about us. Further, this was reflected strongly in popular feeling, as well as on a governmental level. He was willing to draw on this feeling as much as seemed useful if there was something to be achieved by it. On the other hand, he thought it was futile to repeat the experience of the '61 discussions on Berlin. These lengthy talks with the Soviet Union had achieved nothing tangible, and aroused great suspicion in Germany.

The President then raised the question of whether or not he wished to meet at the summit with Khrushchev. He recognized that Macmillan would push strongly in this direction.



For his part, the President thought a summit, especially a summit involving Macmillan as well as himself, would create difficulties in the U. S., in Germany and France. A bilateral meeting between himself and Khrushchev, such as the one in Vienna, would be less troublesome in this respect. However, in spite of the troubles, the President would be willing to pay the price if it proved necessary. In response to Governor Harriman's question, he said, if necessary, he would go to a summit meeting just to sign the test ban treaty covering three environments, although he was concerned about the effect such an action would have on our relations with France.

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
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NSF/265/Harriman Trip IV

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Governor Harriman raised the question of our trade with the Soviet Union, and pointed out that Khrushchev would like to increase it further. The European nations supply much of what they want anyway, but it was a matter of pride with Khrushchev. The President agreed that we should be forthcoming on this issue if it came up.

Our position on the MLF then came up. The President said that our first response to this issue should be to repeat our argument that it was consistent with the purposes of non-dissemination, in accordance with the agreed instruction. If, however, there seemed to be some purpose in going beyond this in terms of the China problem or otherwise, Harriman should be guided by his judgment of how useful it was to indicate to the Soviets that in certain circumstances we might not need to go forward with this proposition. But in no event should Governor Harriman give any specific assurances on the MLF.

Governor Harriman reported Secretary McNamara's views on how far McNamara thought it would be wise to go on a first stage disarmament proposal. The President thought it was rather unlikely

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that there would be any serious discussion on this point.

The President raised the question of Laos and indicated the importance of repeating our dissatisfaction with the present situation and our desire for the Soviets to live up to their commitments there. Governor Harriman responded that this of course brought up all the questions of Soviet-Chinese relations, and whether or not the Soviets were able to influence the situation in Laos. Again the President said that Governor Harriman's judgment should govern his action.

Carl Kaysen

Cy 1 - Mr. Bundy
2 - Governor Harriman
3 - Mr. Kaysen
4 - Mr. Bundy

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7/23/63

INCOMING TELEGRAM

59

Department of State

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Action
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Control: 23114
Rec'd: JULY 23, 1963
9:40 AM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 274, JULY 23, NOON
FROM HARRIMAN.

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July 4 Note

MOSCOW 274

SUBSEQUENT TO REGULAR MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (JULY 22), HARRIMAN AND HAILSHAM MET WITH GROMYKO PRIVATELY.

HARRIMAN REFERRED TO GROMYKO'S REMARKS RE FRANCE IN LARGER MEETING COMMENTING HE HAD WANTED TO RAISE SUBJECT HIMSELF. SAID PRESIDENT ANXIOUS GET FRANCE TO JOIN IN AGREEMENT, BUT THIS DELICATE SITUATION. BELIEVED HE WOULD GET WORD FROM PRESIDENT RE THIS AND OTHER MATTERS BEFORE MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV. SAID HE AWARE OF IMPORTANCE SOVS ATTACH TO FRENCH PROBLEM AND WONDERED WHETHER GROMYKO BELIEVED USEFUL ADD TO WITHDRAWAL ARTICLE LANGUAGE IN SAME SENSE AS CONTAINED FIRST SENTENCE US DRAFT WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE SUBMITTED EARLIER. QUOTE AND IT IS EXPECTED (OR HOPED) THAT TREATY WILL BE ADHERED TO BY ALL (OR OTHER) COUNTRIES UNQUOTE. SUGGESTED GROMYKO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THIS, AS SUCH LANGUAGE WOULD INDICATE ALL THREE WOULD WORK TOGETHER IN GETTING OTHER COUNTRIES TO ADHERE. SAID WE HOPED AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE WOULD JOIN. WE BELIEVED LANGUAGE WOULD BE HELPFUL AS INDICATION BELIEF OF THE THREE THAT ALL STATES SHOULD ADHERE. GROMYKO SAID WOULD STUDY BUT REMARKED HIS FIRST IMPRESSION WAS THAT USEFULNESS SUCH ADDITION DOUBTFUL.

HARRIMAN INQUIRED WHETHER SOVS BELIEVED THE THREE SHOULD WORK ON OTHER COUNTRIES TOGETHER.

GROMYKO REPLIED IN AFFIRMATIVE BUT NOTED FRANCE WAS SPECIAL CASE, AS IT WAS NUCLEAR POWER ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT VERY IMPORTANT ONE.

HARRIMAN REITERATED HE WOULD PROBABLY GET SOMETHING FROM PRESIDENT BEFORE SEEING KHRUSHCHEV. SAID OTHER QUESTION HE WISHED RAISE WAS SIGNING. IF SOVS READY SIGN TB AND THEN GO TO WORK IN SINCERE MANNER ON NONAGGRESSION PROBLEM, HE PREPARED DISCUSS WITH GROMYKO HOW US PROPOSED SIGNATURE OF TEST BAN. SINCE TB TREATY REQUIRED RATIFICATION BY SENATE, US WOULD BRING A FEW SENATORS ALONG.

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July 4
2/23/63
MOSCOW 274

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-2- 274, JULY 23, NOON FROM MOSCOW

GROMYKO SAID PREPARED HEAR HARRIMAN'S VIEWS ANY TIME. AS TO NON-AGGRESSION PACT, WHEN TB TREATY TEXT COMPLETED -- HE HOPED TOMORROW -- HE WOULD REPORT SITUATION TO HIS GOVT IN FOLLOWING MANNER. TB TREATY HAD BEEN AGREED AT THIS LEVEL BUT US/UK REPS WERE NOT READY NOW TO AGREE FINALLY ON NAP AND HAD SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR INCLUSION IN COMMUNIQUE. SOV GOVT WOULD THEN CONSIDER SITUATION IN THIS LIGHT, BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT DECISION WOULD BE REACHED. HOWEVER, HE WISHED STRESS IMPORTANCE SOVS ATTACHED TO NAP. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, SOVS WERE CERTAIN THAT EVERYONE REPRESENTED HERE WOULD BENEFIT FROM NONAGGRESSION PACT. AS TO TB, IT WOULD ALSO HAVE CERTAIN IMPORTANCE THOUGH NOT VERY GREAT, IF IT WERE NOT ACCOMPANIED BY NAP.

HARRIMAN OBSERVED NO USE DISCUSSING PROCEDURE FOR SIGNING UNTIL SOVS READY SIGN TB. POSITION OF US GOVT WAS CLEAR THERE WAS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN TB, WHICH AFFECTED ALL NATIONS OF WORLD, AND NON-AGGRESSION ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING EUROPE. TB WOULD CREATE ATMOSPHERE WHICH HE BELIEVED, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT, WOULD MAKE EASIER GET AGREEMENT ON OTHER MATTERS. COULD NOT SEE HOW NAP COULD BE NEGOTIATED HERE, AS AGREEMENT ON THAT SUBJECT WOULD, AT BEST, REQUIRE LONG NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD PUT IT ON ICE AND BE EMBARRASSING TO ALL. IF THE TWO MATTERS HAD ANY CONNECTION, THAT WOULD BE ANOTHER MATTER BUT THEY WERE DIFFERENT, EXCEPT PERHAPS IN SENSE OF REDUKTION OF TENSIONS. HARRIMAN ASSUMED SOV GOVT READY SIGN TESTBAN ASAP, AND, IF SO, HE WOULD BE PREPARED DISCUSS PROCEDURE FOR SIGNING. EXPRESSED HOPE SOVS WOULD NOT OBJECT TO OUR BRINGING SENATORS, ALTHOUGH GROMYKO WAS ACCUSTOMED TO HAVING THEM AROUND. WE WERE THINKING OF BRINGING ONE SENATOR FROM EACH PARTY TO ATTEND BUT NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN SIGNING. REITERATED NO USE DISCUSS THIS UNTIL SOV GOVT MADE UP ITS MIND.

GROMYKO SAID HAD NOTHING TO ADD EXCEPT THAT HE WISHED STRESS SOVS SINCERE IN STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF NAP.

HARRIMAN SAID GROMYKO SHOULD NOT THINK WE MINIMIZE THIS MATTER; WE WOULD TAKE IT IN SINCERE SPIRIT.

WELSHAM SAID PM FELT PRESENT POLITICAL CONJUNCTURE SHOULD BE USED TO PROMOTE RAPPROCHEMENT. TB COULD USHER IN FURTHER TENSION REDUCING ARRANGEMENTS BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE NAP WOULD BE EASY TO SELL TO ALLIES. AT SAME TIME, IF TB WERE SIGNED PUBLIC OPINION IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE VERY FAVORABLY IMPRESSED FOR THAT WOULD BE FIRST TIME AGREEMENT OF SUCH IMPORTANCE REACHED.

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-3- 274, JULY 23, NOON FROM MOSCOW

THAT TRUE PARTICULARLY OF PUBLIC OPINION IN UK, BUT ALSO IN FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY. INDEED SIGNING OF TB DOCUMENT WOULD HAVE PUBLIC OPINION EFFECT OUT OF PROPORTION WITH INTRINSIC VALUE OF TEST BAN, WHICH ADMITTEDLY NOT VERY GREAT STEP TOWARDS DISARMAMENT. BUT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT WOULD BE VERY GREAT.

HARRIMAN OBSERVED IMPACT MIGHT BE EVEN STRONGER THAN IN CASE OF AUSTRIAN TREATY.

HAILSHAM REFERRED TO SUSPICIONS EXISTING AMONG ALLIES RE HARRIMAN MISSION AND STRESSED US/UK MUST SHOW TO ALLIES THAT THEY KEEPING THEIR WORD. HE WAS SURE IT WOULD BE EASIER CONVINCING ALLIES RE NON-AGGRESSION ARRANGEMENTS IF US/UK PROVED THEIR GOOD FAITH. STRONGLY URGED GROMYKO NOT BE DISAPPOINTED IF BOTH TB AND NAP WERE NOT SIGNED AT SAME TIME, BUT TO CONSIDER THIS AS STEP TOWARDS OBJECTIVE SOVS REGARDED SO IMPORTANT. REITERATED GREAT IMPORTANCE OF TB WITH RESPECT PUBLIC OPINION. EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THERE WOULD BE CHANCE GETTING AGREEMENT ON THAT AND OTHER MATTERS. POINTED OUT IF THIS OPPORTUNITY WERE MISSED FOR REACHING AGREEMENT, THERE MAY BE NO OTHER CHANCE. UK BELIEVED THIS AGREEMENT WOULD LEAD TO OTHER ONE AND FURTHER AGREEMENTS.

GROMYKO REFERRED TO FRG PRONOUNCEMENTS IT WOULD NOT USE FORCE TO CHANGE BORDERS AND DEGAULLE'S POSITION ON GERMAN BORDERS. US AND UK OF COURSE KNOW EACH OTHER'S POSITION ON THIS MATTER BUT THEY ALSO APPEARED BE AGAINST USE OF FORCE. THUS ON PRINCIPAL POINT OF NAP, I.E., NON-USE OF FORCE FOR SOLVING OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS, THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBTS AMONG ANYONE AS TO POINT FREQUENTLY RAISED BY SOME PEOPLE AND GROUPS IN FRG, AS WELL AS FRANCE, THAT PROBLEM OF GDR RECOGNITION WOULD ARISE AS A RESULT OF NAP, HE WISHED POINT OUT RECOGNITION WAS SEPARATE PROBLEM, RELATING TO FORM OF NAP. AS SOVS UNDERSTOOD SITUATION, IT SHOULD NOT BE VERY DIFFICULT RESOLVE PROBLEM OF FORM.

II

HAILSHAM EXPRESSED VIEW QUESTION OF FORA WAS POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE.

HARRIMAN COMMENTED KHRUSHCHEV HAD GIVEN US VERY IMPORTANT AMMUNITION IN DISCUSSING THIS QUESTION WHEN HE SAID FORM COULD BE REFERRED TO LAWYERS. POINTED OUT GERMANS WERE EMOTIONAL ABOUT THIS MATTER

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AS IT RELATED TO REUNIFICATION. AS TO DE GAULLE, HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT HIS PROBLEMS WERE BUT NOTED DE GAULLE HAD GONE FARTHER THAN ANYBODY WITH RESPECT TO ODER-NIESSE. IN ANY EVENT, DE GAULLE WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT IF SOMETHING WERE DONE BEHIND HIS BACK. GROMYKO HAD TALKED TO SPAAK WHO WAS ON RECORD AS BEING IN FAVOR OF NON-AGGRESSION ARRANGEMENT.

GROMYKO COMMENTED PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR COMMUNIQUE PLACED CONDITIONS EVEN ON DISCUSSION OF NAP.

HARRIMAN OBSERVED THE MORE FLUID WE REMAIN THE BETTER CHANCES WOULD BE OF GETTING ALLIES ALONG.

HAILSHAM SAID HIS POSITION VERY POSITIVE BUT WOULD NOT WISH PUT IT IN COMMUNIQUE. SUGGESTED COMMUNIQUE INCLUDE REAFFIRMATION BY THE THREE THAT THEY WOULD NOT USE FORCE IN SETTLING OUTSTANDING ISSUES. ANYTHING MORE THAN THAT WOULD CREATE GREAT PROBLEMS. REFERRED TO FRENCH APPREHENSIONS RE US/UK WORKING VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER, WHICH AT LEAST IN PART DUE TO FACT THAT BRITISH AND AMERICANS SPOKE SAME LANGUAGE.

GROMYKO WISHED HARRIMAN AND HAILSHAM UNDERSTAND SOV POSITION. SOVS BELIEVED REFERENCE IN COMMUNIQUE NOT ENOUGH, THEY BELIEVED AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED HERE. HOWEVER, PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR COMMUNIQUE DID NOT EVEN REFLECT POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS NAP.

HAILSHAM WANTED ASSURE GROMYKO UK POSITIVE. PERHAPS LANGUAGE COULD BE STRENGTHENED, BUT SHOULD NOT CREATE IMPRESSION OF AGREEMENT.

GROMYKO WONDERED WHETHER HARRIMAN AND HAILSHAM WOULD STATE THEIR OWN POSITIONS IN THIS INFORMAL CONVERSATION.

HAILSHAM SAID UK WOULD FAVOR ARRANGEMENT, PROVIDED THEY WERE RELIEVED OF CERTAIN THINGS. PM WANTED BRING ABOUT SITUATION WHERE SUCH ARRANGEMENT COULD BE SIGNED, BUT THAT COULD NOT BE DONE HERE AND NOW.

HARRIMAN COMMENTED THIS HAD NOT BEEN AREA HIS PRIMARY CONCERN FOR QUITE A WHILE AS HE HAD BEEN DEALING IN FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, HE KNEW PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON WERE CONCERNED ABOUT ATTITUDE OF FRANCE, TO WHOM WE WERE COMMITTED. DID NOT WISH TO BE NEGATIVE BUT WE WOULD SUPPORT CONCERN EXPRESSED WITH RESPECT EFFECT ON UNIFICATION. THUS LANGUAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND

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WHICH WOULD BE SATISFACTORY NOT ONLY TO THOSE PRESENT HERE BUT TO OTHERS AS WELL. HOWEVER, US HAD CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. REFERRING TO HIS REMARKS RE BERLIN IN EARLIER MEETING, HARRIMAN SAID THERE WAS CONCERN AS TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF SUDDENLY THE EAST GERMANS STOPPED ACCESS TO BERLIN. FOR THIS REASON, WE WOULD PROBABLY RAISE THIS QUESTION. AT SAME TIME POINTED OUT WASHINGTON VERY KEEN USE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE TO HAVE IT PERMEATE INTO ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, BOTH THOSE BELONGING TO NATO AND WARSAW. THUS, ONLY THING HE COULD SAY WAS THAT WE WOULD TAKE OUR WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY TO BRING ABOUT AND EXPAND CONSTRUCTIVE RESULTS.

GROMYKO SAID SINCE HARRIMAN BROUGHT UP WEST BERLIN AND GERMANY, HE WISHED SAY THAT TO LINK ACCESS TO NAP WOULD MEAN BURYING NAP. HARRIMAN AND HAILSHAM WERE FAMILIAR WITH PROGRESS IN US/USSR, AS WELL AS OCCASIONAL US/UK TALKS ON GENERAL QUESTION OF GERMAN PEACE TREATY. IDEA OF PACT WAS INVOLVED THERE AND WAS ONE OF QUESTIONS US/USSR BELIEVED SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN CONNECTION WITH GERMAN PEACE TREATY AND SETTLEMENT WEST BERLIN PROBLEM. HOWEVER, SINCE NOW THERE WERE PRACTICALLY NO NEGOTIATIONS ON THAT SUBJECT, SOVS WERE ATTEMPTING CONVINCING US/UK THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL RESOLVE NAP IN CONNECTION WITH TB. THERE WAS NO POINT DISCUSSING LOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN TEST BAN AND NAP, BUT SOVS BELIEVED NAP WOULD BE USEFUL FROM STANDPOINT IMPROVEMENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. ONE STEP, I.E., TB WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL FROM THAT STANDPOINT BECAUSE OTHERWISE SOVS WOULD NOT HAVE SUGGESTED IT IN KHRUSHCHEV BERLIN SPEECH. HOWEVER, TWO STEPS WOULD BE BETTER.

HAILSHAM SAID TB COULD BE SIGNED QUICKLY, WHEREAS HE WAS CERTAIN NAP WOULD TAKE LONG TIME. TB WOULD HELP GET OTHERS WITH RESPECT NAP. HE UNDERSTOOD SOVS DID NOT WANT ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN TO BE INCLUDED IN NAP. HOWEVER, IF SOVS COULD DO OR SAY SOMETHING OUTSIDE WHICH WOULD GIVE REAL ASSURANCES TO PEOPLE, RE ACCESS, THAT WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP.

HARRIMAN HOPED GROMYKO WOULD STUDY OUR SUGGESTION RE COMMUNIQUE, WHILE WE WOULD PROCEED AS ENERGETICALLY AS POSSIBLE WITH ALLIES. STRESSED CHANCES WOULD BE BETTER IF TB WERE SIGNED THAN IF IT WERE HELD BACK. POINTED OUT EVERYBODY REGARDED TB AS STANDING ON OWN FEET; IF TB WERE CONNECTED WITH SOMETHING ELSE IT WOULD GET INVOLVED IN LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN THOUGH SUCH NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE SUCCESSFUL.

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HAILSHAM SAID WISHED ASK BEFOR BREAKING UP WHEN SOVS INTENDED
MAKE STATEMENT RE FRANCE GROMYKO HAD REFERRED TO IN LARGER
MEETING.

GROMYKO REPLIED THAT HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED BUT WOULD BE
DONE AT APPROPRIATE TIME.

HARRIMAN SAID WE INTERESTED IN WHAT SOVS HAD IN MIND.

HAILSHAM RECALLED KHRUSHCHEV HAD SAID SOVS WOULD EXAMINE SITUATION
IN CASE FRANCE SHOULD SET OFF NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, BUT GROMYKO
HAD SAID SOMETHING DIFFERENT TODAY.

GROMYKO SAID SOVS WOULD STATE AT SOME POINT BEFORE TREATY
ENTERED INTO FORCE THAT IF FRANCE ENGAGED IN CERTAIN ACTIONS
SOVS WOULD HAVE TO EXAMINE SITUATION. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT HAVE
TEXT OF SUCH STATEMENT.

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Control: 19166
Rec'd: JULY 23, 1963
5:30 PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 295, JULY 23, 9 PM

MOSCOW 295

BAN FROM HARRIMAN

AT GROMYKO'S SUGGESTION HARRIMAN, HAILSHAM AND GROMYKO MET PRIVATELY AFTER REGULAR SESSION.

GROMYKO OPENED BY COMMENTING THAT AS FAR AS TB TREATY CONCERNED, PROGRESS HAD CERTAINLY BEEN MADE. INQUIRED WHETHER HARRIMAN AND HAILSHAM HAD ANY VIEWS TO ADD TO WHAT THEY HAD SAID ON NAP YESTERDAY.

NAP

HARRIMAN SAID WASHINGTON FELT LANGUAGE FOR INCLUSION IN COMMUNIQUE AS PROPOSED BY HAILSHAM WAS ABOUT RIGHT. VIEW IN WASHINGTON WAS THAT MORE GENERAL THAT LANGUAGE THE BETTER CHANCE FOR AGREEMENT. GROMYKO HAD BEEN RIGHT IN MENTIONING CERTAIN COUNTRIES WE MIGHT HAVE TROUBLE WITH. GROMYKO KNEW THAT DEGAULLE HAD A PERSONAL REACTION TO THIS MATTER. HARRIMAN ASSURED GROMYKO WE WOULD MOVE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE AFTER AGREEMENT ON TB FOR WE WOULD NOT SIGN COMMUNIQUE UNLESS WE WILLING PROCEED WITH ENERGY. STRESSED PRESIDENT TOOK VERY SERIOUSLY SOV CONCERN RE FRANCE'S ADHERENCE TO TEST BAN TREATY, AND HOPED GET LITTLE MORE DETAILS BY TIME OF HIS NEXT MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV. POINTED OUT THIS WAS INDICATION OF PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE THAT THERE WAS NOW RPT NOW OPPORTUNITY OF MAKING PROGRESS IN AS MANY DIRECTIONS AS POSSIBLE. CERTAINLY US WISHED GOOD WILL EMANATING FROM TB AGREEMENT TO BE SPREAD TO AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING NATO AND WARSAW TREATY MEMBERS. HOWEVER, WE HOPED SOVS WOULD HELP US IN THAT ENDEAVOR BY ACCEPTING LANGUAGE ON LINES HAILSHAM'S SUGGESTION, WHICH HAD BEEN APPROVED BY WASHINGTON.

NAP

HAILSHAM STATED THERE WERE DEFINITE LIMITATIONS IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS, AND THEY HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BY PRIME MINISTER PUBLICLY. HOWEVER, HAVING SPENT THIS TIME IN MOSCOW HE DEEPLY CONVINCED ABOUT SINCERITY SOV PROPOSAL AND IMPORTANCE SOV GOVT ATTACHED TO IT. PM WOULD ALSO BE IMPRESSED FAVORABLY BUT HE CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WISH HIM,

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-2- 295, JULY 23, 9 PM FROM MOSCOW

HAILSHAM, SAY ANYTHING ON THIS PUBLICLY OR IN COMMUNIQUE. HAILSHAM DID NOT KNOW WHAT PM WOULD SAY IN PUBLIC AFTER HE REPORTED TO HIM. IN ANY EVENT, WOULD REPORT TO PM FULLY AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY AND PM WOULD TAKE COUNSEL WITH CABINET. REITERATED PM WOULD NOT WISH HIM SAY ANYTHING PUBLICLY UNLESS THERE WAS DEFINITE AGREEMENT BETWEEN OTHER TWO PARTIES PRESENT HERE, WHICH WAS DOUBTFUL.

NAP

GROMYKO SAID THAT AS HE HIMSELF HAD STATED REPEATEDLY, AND AS KHRUSHCHEV HAD ALSO SAID, SOVS ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THAT. SOVS UNDERSTOOD SITUATION AS FOLLOWS: US/UK NOT PREPARED AT THIS TIME FINALIZE SOLUTION THIS PROBLEM AND REFERRED TO NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE WONDERED WHETHER HE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY THAT US AND UK GOVTS WERE PREPARED REVIEW THIS QUESTION AND EXPRESSED READINESS CONTINUE DISCUSSION THIS QUESTION AND SEEK UNDERSTANDING.

NAP

HARRIMAN AND HAILSHAM REPLIED IN AFFIRMATIVE.

GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER IDEA OF NAP WAS THUS ACCEPTABLE.

HAILSHAM SAID IT WAS UNDERSTANDING THAT, AS KHRUSHCHEV HAD SAID, IT WOULD NOT INVOLVE RECOGNITION AND THAT WE COULD NOT BE COMMITTED PUBLICLY BEFORE CONSULTING ALLIES. REMARKED, HOWEVER, HE HAD READ NAP DRAFT AND BELIEVED IT WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP. HE COULD NOT COMMIT PM BUT LATTER WOULD CONSIDER MATTER WITH ALLIES AND COLLEAGUES.

NAP

HARRIMAN SAID HAILSHAM'S REMARKS, IF HE UNDERSTOOD THEM CORRECTLY, STATED WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD WAS VIEW HIS GOVT. US WOULD CONSIDER MATTER PROMPTLY, CONSULT WITH ALLIES, AND THEN SEE HOW TO PROCEED. ASSURED GROMYKO PRESIDENT WANTED GOODWILL PREVAILING IN THESE TALKS TO SPREAD OVER EUROPE. IN ADDITION TO WHAT HE HAD SAID RE NONAGGRESSION, HE WISHED STATE US WANTED DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN ADHERENCE BY FRANCE TO TB TREATY. AS TO NONAGGRESSION, THERE HAD BEEN RECENT STATEMENTS BY FRG PERSONALITIES REFLECTING MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDES. HARRIMAN SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY ENCOURAGED BUT WOULD NOT WANT PREDICT DEGAULLE'S ATTITUDE. HE SAID WOULD REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND FELT CERTAIN PRESIDENT WOULD ATTEMPT REACH UNDERSTANDING TO CARRY THROUGH WHAT SOV GOVT HAD IN MIND, WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD FEELING AMONG ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

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-3- 295, JULY 23, 9 PM FROM MOSCOW

GROMYKO CONFIRMED THIS WAS SOV GOAL. NAP WOULD ASSIST IN REDUCING TENSIONS. MOREOVER, IT WOULD FACILITATE TAKING A NUMBER OF FURTHER STEPS, INCLUDING STEPS IN DISARMAMENT FIELD AND ABOVE ALL WITH RESPECT TO GERMAN PROBLEM, TO RELIEVE TENSIONS AND INCREASE CONFIDENCE BETWEEN OUR STATES. WE WISHED TO STRESS AGAIN SOV BELIEF ABSENCE OF NAP WOULD CONSIDERABLY WEAKEN TB TREATY. US/UK COULD NOT DENY TB WAS NOT DISARMAMENT; IT WAS NOT EVEN BEGINNING OF DISARMAMENT AND COULD NOT THEREFORE BE REGARDED AS DISARMAMENT STEP. TB WOULD ONLY ASSIST TO CERTAIN EXTENT IN CREATING FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE FROM STANDPOINT OF BROADER DISARMAMENT PROBLEM.

GROMYKO CONTINUED HE UNDERSTOOD FROM HAILSHAM'S AND HARRIMAN'S REMARKS THAT US/UK GOVTS WERE READY MAKE PROGRESS RE NAP AND INTENDED CONSULT THEIR ALLIES. TAKING THIS INTO ACCOUNT, SOV GOVT PREPARED NOT LINK DIRECTLY SIGNING OF NAP WITH SIGNING OF TB. SOV GOVT PREPARED NOT TO MAKE ONE CONTINGENT UPON OTHER. SOVS HOPED THIS WOULD BE DULY APPRECIATED BY US AND UK. SOVS TRUSTED STATEMENTS BY US/UK RESPONSIBLE REPRESENTATIVES THAT THEIR GOVTS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONSIDER POSITIVE SOLUTION OF NAP. GROMYKO THEN REFERRED TO LANGUAGE SUGGESTED BY HAILSHAM FOR INCLUSION IN COMMUNIQUE AND SAID SOVS NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH THAT TEXT. THEREFORE, THEY PROPOSED SOMEWHAT MODIFIED TEXT WHICH THEY BELIEVED SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US/UK. HANDED TEXT AND EXPRESSED HOPE AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THAT PORTION OF COMMUNIQUE.

HARRIMAN APPRECIATED POSITION EXPRESSED BY GROMYKO. HE UNDERSTOOD IMPORTANCE SOV GOVT ATTACHED TO THIS PROBLEM. SOVS TOOK OUR WORD IN GOOD FAITH AND WE GAVE IT IN GOOD FAITH. AS TO TB, WHILE TECHNICALLY IT MAY NOT BE VERY IMPORTANT IT WOULD BE HAILED BY EVERYONE AS IT WOULD RELIEVE APPREHENSIONS OF WORLD ABOUT CONTAMINATION OF ATMOSPHERE AND BE INDICATION OF EVEN MORE IMPORTANT UNDERSTANDINGS TO COME.

HAILSHAM THANKED FOR GROMYKO'S STATEMENT, COMMENTING IT WAS HELPFUL. OBSERVED THAT IN ADDITION TO REPORTING TO PM HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO MAKE SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT IN WHICH HE WOULD EXPRESS IN REASONABLE WAY THIS GRATITUDE; THIS, WITHOUT FORMAL STATEMENT BY GOVT, WOULD ASSIST IN ACHIEVING OBJECTIVE GROMYKO HAD IN MIND.

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-4- 295, JULY 23, 9 PM FROM MOSCOW

GROMYKO EXPLAINED LAST PARAGRAPH SUGGESTED TEXT COULD BE EXPANDED BY INCLUDING MENTION OF SOME QUESTIONS RAISED BY PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TALKS, BUT SOVS COULD ACCEPT PARA BOTH IN ITS PRESENT FORM AND IN EXPANDED FORM. BELIEVED PARA WOULD BE USEFUL TO ALL. DID NOT WISH SUGGEST PROPOSED TEXT BE DISCUSSED NOW AS US/UK MIGHT WANT STUDY IT AND PERHAPS CONSULT CAPITALS. TEXT COULD BE DISCUSSED TOMORROW.

HAILSHAM SAID TEXT WOULD HAVE TO BE SENT TO LONDON AND WASHINGTON AND WE WOULD SEE WHAT WE COULD SAY ABOUT IT.

GROMYKO RECALLED HARRIMAN HAD ^{Formalizing} REFERRED YESTERDAY TO PROCEDURE FOR SIGNING OF TB TREATY AND WONDERED WHETHER HE STILL WISHED DISCUSS IT.

HARRIMAN SAID IF SOVS AGREED TB TREATY COULD BE INITIALED BY PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TALKS AND THEN SECSTATE WOULD COME HERE TO SIGN. SECSTATE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY SENATORS, PERHAPS ONE FROM EACH PARTY. THIS WOULD LEND MORE DIGNITY TO SIGNING CEREMONY AND WOULD GIVE SENATE SENSE OF PARTICIPATION, WHICH VERY IMPORTANT FOR WELL KNOWN REASONS. WHILE NOT INSTRUCTED DO SO, HE WISHED SAY PERSONALLY THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN INFLUENCES IN SENATE WHICH WERE NOT VERY HELPFUL AND THEREFORE IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT HANDLE SENATE WITH CARE AND DIGNITY. THIS WAS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FROM INTERNATIONAL STANDPOINT BUT ALSO FROM US INTERNAL STANDPOINT. KHRUSHCHEV HAD REMARKED PRESIDENT'S JUNE 10 SPEECH HAD REQUIRED GREAT DEAL OF COURAGE, AND THERE WERE SOME DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN US WHICH EVEN RAISED TENSIONS. HARRIMAN CONTINUED HE WOULD GO TO REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND SENATE AND A FEW DAYS OR A WEEK LATER SECSTATE WOULD COME IF SOVS HAD NO OBJECTION. PRESIDENT BELIEVED SUCH PROCEDURE WOULD GREATLY HELP IN GETTING APPROVAL OF TREATY IN SENATE. HARRIMAN SAID PRESIDENT WANTED HIM STRESS HE DID NOT WISH DELAY SIGNING FOR ONE DAY, BUT SUGGESTED PROCEDURE WOULD HELP HIM IN GIVING RECOGNITION TO ROLE SENATE IS SUPPOSED PLAY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS UNDER US CONSTITUTION. ADDED PRESIDENT ANXIOUS GET NOT ONLY TWO-THIRDS IN SENATE BUT MAXIMUM POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF GREAT EFFECT OF TREATY ON WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

SECRET

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SECRET

-5- 295, JULY 23, 9 PM FROM MOSCOW

GROMYKO THANKED AND SAID WOULD INFORM HIS GOVT. THIS QUESTION INVOLVED LEVEL AND TIMING OF SIGNING; IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AND HE WOULD INFORM US/UK OF SOV GOVT VIEWS. BELIEVED INITIALING ACCEPTABLE AND INQUIRED WHEN THIS COULD BE DONE.

HARRIMAN THOUGHT IT COULD BE DONE TOMORROW.

HARRIMAN AND HAILSHAM BELIEVED TREATY SHOULD BE ^{Release} RELEASED TOGETHER WITH COMMUNIQUE, SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ALL CAPITALS.

GROMYKO THOUGHT PERHAPS BETTER PUBLISH TREATY WITH DELAY OF SAY ONE DAY AFTER INITIALING TREATY AND PUBLICATION OF COMMUNIQUE. SUCH PROCEDURE WOULD BUILD UP PUBLIC INTEREST IN TREATY. NOTED THAT IF INITIALING TO TAKE PLACE TOMORROW HE HAD IN MIND TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE AGREED BY THEN.

HARRIMAN POINTED OUT DANGER OF LEAKS AND EXPRESSED STRONG PREFERENCE FOR SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE COMMUNIQUE AND TEXT. BELIEVED WOULD GET WASHINGTON REACTION TO SOV PROPOSED TEXT FOR COMMUNIQUE TOMORROW, BUT NOTED DID NOT KNOW WHETHER AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED AT THAT TIME.

GROMYKO SUGGESTED TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BE MADE THAT INITIALING SHOULD TAKE PLACE EITHER TOMORROW OR DAY AFTER.


HARRIMAN EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR INITIALING TREATY AND RELEASING BOTH COMMUNIQUE AND TREATY TEXT TOMORROW, IF AGREEMENT REACHED.

HAILSHAM AGREED, POINTING OUT IT BECOMING INCREASING DIFFICULT RESIST PRESS INQUIRIES RE STATUS OF TALKS.

GP-1

KOHLER

SECRET



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DATE 1/4/67

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Research Memorandum
RSB-104, July 25, 1963

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - George C. Denney, Jr.

SUBJECT: Soviets Declare Political War on Chinese Communist Leadership

The Soviet Party's July 14 "open letter" to communists of the Soviet Union signaled the transformation of Moscow's reaction to Peiping's challenge from a containment operation to a direct politico-psychological onslaught on the Chinese Communists. This report consolidates our earlier brief comments on the letter and discusses its implications in greater detail.^{1/}

ABSTRACT

The Soviet letter is a document of far-reaching significance on several counts. Its massive and direct attacks on the Chinese Communists almost precludes the possibility of any significant reconciliation between the two countries while the present Soviet and Chinese leaderships remain in power.

Furthermore, the strong appeal to Soviet nationalist sentiment, and injection into the Sino-Soviet conflict of the race issue, could well open wounds so deep as to prevent restoration of any meaningful Sino-Soviet accord regardless of what kind of regime is in power in either country. Such appears to be the outlook for the immediate future, in any case.

The letter presages an intensified and bitter Sino-Soviet rivalry throughout the communist world and in international affairs generally.

On matters of substance, the Soviet letter covers almost no new ground. Ideologically the Chinese Communists -- who are in the role of fundamentalists defending the true faith -- have the Soviets on the run. However, on the paramount question of the day -- avoidance of war in the nuclear age -- the Soviets may well have an issue that

1. A further paper, reviewing the now suspended Sino-Soviet talks and the implications of the situation now reached, is in preparation.

GROUP 4

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will give them the better cause even within the communist world. Certainly this is true of the Soviet Union itself, the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the communist parties of the West.

Other noteworthy points in the letter are its strong assertion of Soviet readiness to defend Cuba, and its new formulation on first use of nuclear weapons which could serve as the basis for a Soviet attempt to negotiate an agreement with the West on this issue.

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I. THE SOVIET LETTERNature and Contents

The lengthy document published in the July 14 Pravda is entitled "Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to All Party Organizations and All Communists of the Soviet Union." It was, of course, equally designed for worldwide communist (and noncommunist) consumption, was promptly reproduced with supporting statements in the Soviet bloc countries, and is being given similar treatment by Soviet-oriented foreign communist parties in the free world.

The letter is a reply to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) June 14 letter to the CPSU attacking the domestic and foreign policies of the Khrushchev leadership¹ which was published in the same Pravda as the Soviet reply. However, while the Chinese letter had attacked Soviet policies on 25 specific issues, the Soviet reply -- reflecting Moscow's vulnerability in a debate on communist orthodoxy -- asserts that "we do not intend in this letter to analyze all their /Chinese Communist/ arguments in detail," and sets forth a rebuttal in six numbered but untitled sections.

These sections are devoted in the main to a discussion of the following topics: (1) Sino-Soviet relations and alleged Chinese undermining of same; (2) the issue of war and peace; (3) the struggle against the "personality cult" -- destalinization -- and Soviet internal affairs; (4) the strategy and tactics of international communism, with special emphasis on the "national liberation struggle" in the underdeveloped areas; (5) alleged Chinese Communist splitting activity and subversion within the bloc and international communist movement; and (6) a brief recapitulation calling for restoration of Sino-Soviet unity but making clear this will have to be on Soviet terms.

The Soviet letter dropped all restraint in directly attacking the "leadership of the CCP," "the Chinese leaders," "the Chinese comrades," "slanderous" and "offensive" attacks on the CPSU and its policies, their "subversion" within the international communist movement, etc. The Soviet attack was more indirect in naming Chinese leaders, but specifically criticized Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, and Teng Hsiao-ping by contrasting their previous statements approving Soviet policies with the "180-degree turn" against those same policies by the Chinese leadership.

Nationalist Overtone to Anti-Chinese Campaign

The Soviet letter contained passages that were obviously designed to arouse strong nationalistic feeling among the Russian people against the Chinese. It referred not only to "slanderous attacks" on the CPSU, but also on "the Soviet country" and "the historic significance of our people's struggle,"

1. For a discussion of this letter and its implications, see RFE-54, Peiping Increases Pressure on Moscow, June 19, 1963, CONFIDENTIAL.

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"fabrications" about "cowardice in face of the imperialists," and "moral disarming" and "degeneration" of Soviet society. The Chinese Communists were also charged with ingratitude for benefits received from the USSR's advanced economy, "which the Soviet people generously shared with their Chinese brothers," and the Soviet people were told that the Chinese leaders had started stirring up "anti-Soviet sentiment...among the Chinese Communists and even among the population."

Another theme sure to arouse the Soviet people against the Chinese was the letter's charge that the latter disapproved of destalinization (elimination of the "personality cult") and, by implication, wanted the Soviet Union to return to a Stalinist system. In a strong passage designed to stir the emotions of the Soviet people on this score, the letter rejected Chinese skepticism toward destalinization in the Soviet Union and asserted:

"The atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and uncertainty which poisoned the lives of the people in the period of the personality cult is gone, never to return....Ask thousands upon thousands of people who undeservedly suffered from reprisals in the period of the personality cult and to whom freedom and good repute have been restored and you will know what the victory of the course of the Leninist 20th CPSU Congress means for the Soviet people practically. Ask the people whose fathers and mothers were victims of the reprisals in the period of the personality cult what it means for them to get the recognition that their fathers, mothers, and brothers had been honest people and that they themselves are not outcasts in our society but worthy, full-fledged sons and daughters of the Soviet homeland."

In short, the Soviet reader was presented with the picture of a full-scale onslaught on the entire fabric of Soviet society and achievements. Furthermore, the letter has served as the basis for a nationwide campaign of agitational-propaganda work to disseminate its message throughout the Soviet Union -- factories, collective farms, the armed services, etc. The end result cannot but be the fomenting of national hostility toward the Peiping regime and the Chinese in general.

Racial Issue

Injection of racial antipathy cannot but reinforce the national antagonism already exacerbating the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Soviet letter charged that at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, last February the Chinese Communists opposed participation of the European bloc countries and told the Soviet representative, "Whites have no business here."

These charges are substantially accurate. It is uncertain whether or not this specific statement was made by the Chinese; but it is known that at the Moshi conference the Chinese made a strong anti-European pitch along blatant racial lines.

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This marked the first emergence of the racial issue as a question of significance in the Sino-Soviet dispute, although there has been fragmentary evidence of Sino-Soviet racial antipathy, and previous Chinese efforts to eliminate Soviet influence from Afro-Asian communist-front organs because the Soviets were not Asians has racial as well as geographic overtones.

The racial issue was first pointedly raised in an official document in the Soviet March 30, 1963 letter to the Chinese which argued that communist solidarity must be based on class and not on racial or geographic factors. From that time until the present letter making the point explicit, Soviet polemicists have increasingly referred to the inadmissibility of letting skin color become a factor in communist doctrine and strategy, which are avowedly supra-racial as well as supra-national.

It seems highly unlikely that the Chinese would openly wage their struggle against the Soviet Union on a racial basis, as this is clearly an "anti-Marxist" principle. Nevertheless, the fact that they have taken a racial line privately, and that the Soviets have surfaced the fact in retaliation, makes the racial issue a more significant one than heretofore.

Other Recriminations

The Soviet letter is full of other charges and recriminations against the Chinese Communists, some true or partially true, others pure fabrication:

--In what is probably a concoction designed to conceal Soviet economic sanctions and pressures on the Chinese, it is charged that at Peiping's initiative the volume of China's trade with the USSR was cut by almost 67 percent in the past three years.

--The alleged Chinese curtailment of economic and trade relations with the Soviet bloc countries is said to have inflicted "serious damage" on their economies. (Although not made explicit in the letter, this is especially true of the Czechs, who produced industrial equipment for the Chinese according to certain specifications and then saw the contracts cancelled because Peiping could not pay.)

--The Chinese are accused of lying to their own population about the responsibility for damage caused the Chinese economy by these actions.

--The letter hints in a scarcely veiled passage at contempt and derision for Peiping's economic failures.

--The Soviets charged that Peiping's demand for economic "self-reliance" is aimed at undermining bloc solidarity, and that the Chinese are encouraging others to follow the same path -- a sure reference to the North Koreans, and very likely also the North Vietnamese and Rumanians.

--The Soviets accuse the Chinese of not having stood by them as an ally during the Cuban crisis.

--The letter jibes at Peiping's failure so far to develop a nuclear capability and sneers at the piling up of Chinese "serious warnings" in the Taiwan Strait area: "Curses and warnings -- even if these are called 'serious warnings' and are repeated two and a half hundred times over -- have no effect on the imperialists."

--Moscow charges that in Soviet letters of February 22 and May 31, 1962 proposals were made to take steps to preclude "imperialist" exploitation of Sino-Soviet differences and that, in addition, the Soviets moved "to take more effective measures on such questions as exchange of internal political information" -- a possible reference to coordination on border incidents or domestic political issues such as the Chinese Communist commune program -- but that these proposals met with no response from Peiping.

--Finally, the letter observes that the Chinese have taken a "number" of unspecified measures in addition to the curtailment of economic contacts aimed at "aggravating relations with the Soviet Union."

The net effect of these accusations -- true, false, and in between -- can only be to inflame nationalist passions and antipathies in both countries.

War and Peace the Central Issue

The Soviets have clearly attempted to make the issue of war and peace the key issue in their conflict with the Chinese. Choice of this issue is motivated by reasons of self-interest and tactics.

On the first count, the Soviet leaders appear fully aware of the consequences of war in the nuclear age, and they do not wish to expose their considerable domestic achievements to nuclear attack. As a tactical move, they probably calculate that their pose of defenders of peace against the horrendous prospects of nuclear war will, more than anything else, offset the extremely disruptive effect of the Chinese challenge and rally the Soviet people behind the leadership. They also probably believe that this posture will serve them well in winning supporters against the Chinese within the communist world and embellish Moscow's image in international affairs generally. Although Soviet charges of Chinese bellicose intent are exaggerated out of proportion, Peiping's belligerent statements make it vulnerable to such charges.

The Soviets have placed special emphasis on the war and peace issue ever since the Cuban crisis late last year, and the open letter draws the issue even more emphatically and sharply. Over one-fourth of the Soviet letter -- section II -- is directly devoted to the issue, and it pervades other sections of the message.

The letter makes strenuous efforts to tar the Chinese as the war party within the communist world -- an initiative first undertaken by Khrushchev personally in his December 12, 1962 report to the Supreme Soviet on Soviet policy during the Cuban crisis.

The Chinese are accused of diverging from international communist policy "first and foremost on the question of war and peace," an issue on which "there can be no uncertainties or reservations, for this involves the destinies of peoples, the future of all mankind." The destructive consequences of nuclear war for the communist and capitalist worlds alike are graphically juxtaposed against the Chinese thesis advanced in April 1960 that "on the ruins of destroyed imperialism the victorious peoples /i.e., communists/ will create with tremendous speed a civilization a thousand times higher than under the capitalist system, will build their really bright future." The Soviet response is to "ask the Chinese comrades if they realize what sort of 'ruins' would a world nuclear rocket war leave behind."

The Soviet letter strongly and repeatedly implies that the Chinese wish to achieve victory in communism's struggle by means of thermonuclear war. It also strongly implies three times that the Chinese are trying to provoke a Soviet-US nuclear war with the selfish, nationalistic purpose of extracting advantage from the outcome -- a charge also implied slightly less strongly at the aforementioned Supreme Soviet session last December.

This alleged Chinese position is rejected with the assertions that: the Chinese do not appreciate the destructiveness of nuclear weapons; "the atomic bomb does not distinguish" between classes; the workers of the capitalist countries could never approve such a policy, which would result in their own destruction; and, for domestic consumption, the statement that such a policy would never be accepted by the Soviet people as "nobody knows better than they do how much sorrow and suffering war brings, what difficulties and sacrifices it costs the peoples."

Extensive exploitation of this theme in Soviet domestic propaganda is illustrated by the "letters-to-the-editors" campaign now being waged in the Soviet Union against the Chinese. The July 16 Izvestiya quoted a collective farm chairman as expressing perplexity over the Chinese position and asking rather categorically, "What are they after - can it be war?"

Primacy of West Over East

In attempting to contain the challenge Communist China has raised against Soviet leadership in the underdeveloped areas, the Soviets in effect assert the primacy of the developed Western world over the underdeveloped countries. Forcing the Soviets into this admission may be Communist China's major gain in the polemics as it is likely to adversely affect Moscow's interests with the very forces to which Peiping is making its major bid.

The letter accuses the Chinese Communists of trying to win cheap popularity in the underdeveloped areas by attaching priority to the "national liberation movement" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviets insist in response that "the decisive force" in communist strategy is the communist bloc -- "the world system of socialism" -- and that the struggle in the underdeveloped countries must be subordinated to it: "Marxists-Leninists always stress the epochal significance of the national liberation movement and its great future but they regard as one of the main requisites for its further victories a solid alliance and cooperation with countries of the world socialist system." (Emphasis added.)

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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMMUNIST WORLD

The Soviet letter and the exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet conflict that it heralds will probably have a far-reaching impact throughout the communist world.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Soviet relations with Peiping on the state level will probably continue to deteriorate. The major factor of cooperation remaining between the two powers -- the treaty of alliance and mutual assistance -- apparently still remains operative, although more questionable than before. The Soviet letter spoke in present terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty, "which is a mighty means of rebuffing the encroachments of imperialism, a factor consolidating peace in the Far East and in the whole world." However, this reference to the alliance treaty was contained in a context making the manifestly false claim that Moscow was still "rendering substantial aid to the development of the economy of People's China" -- a prevarication that tends to call into question the validity of the statement about the treaty's value.

In the economic field, total trade between the two countries had declined to a volume of \$750 million in 1962, and there has been evidence of a further decline this year. Although the embittered relations between the two countries may not lead to a total rupture in trade, it seems almost certain that neither will render economic assistance to the other and that trade will be confined solely to what they find mutually and economically profitable.

Other Sino-Soviet exchanges will probably also be curbed. In view of the nationwide public indoctrination campaigns being conducted in each country against the other, it is difficult to envisage how tourist and cultural exchanges would be continued. The same is true of student and technical training exchanges. A Chinese Communist spokesman has already expressed his "concern" over the welfare of Chinese students studying in Soviet institutions following Moscow's expulsion of two students for agitational activity, and there have been reports that the Chinese intend to withdraw their students from the Soviet Union. However, any planned withdrawal has not yet become total as there were Chinese students on hand at the Moscow airport July 20 on the departure of the Chinese Communist delegation for home following a "recess" in the Sino-Soviet talks.

The situation along the Sino-Soviet border will very likely become more tense and may lead to substantial reinforcement of the border areas in both countries. Although border incidents have probably occurred from the founding of the Chinese Communist regime in 1949, they apparently were no matter of great concern as long as Sino-Soviet relations were reasonably harmonious. However, now that they have deteriorated to a point of national hostility, such incidents assume a greater magnitude for tension-raising.

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Within the Communist Bloc

The deepening intensity of the Sino-Soviet conflict will have a correspondingly increasing long-term disruptive impact within the communist bloc, although the immediate effect may be just the reverse. "

As the Chinese intensify their attacks on the Soviet Union and their rivalry with it for influence within the communist world, Moscow will feel all the more acutely a need for manifestations of loyalty and obedience from its supporters. The USSR will thus probably be initially more demanding in its relations with the bloc countries susceptible to its influence and less tolerant of any manifestations of divergence. Awareness of this likelihood has contributed to the uneasiness of the East European bloc regimes, "Stalinist" and "liberal" alike, over the deepening of the Sino-Soviet schism.

At the same time, the USSR's increased need for loyal supporters gives the latter some leverage over Moscow and an opportunity to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute for their own advantage. Rumania's resistance to Soviet economic policies in East Europe and its simultaneous adoption of a slightly pro-Chinese posture already testifies to the likelihood that this game will be played. The Sino-Soviet schism will thus probably continue to contribute to attenuation of Soviet control over the bloc regimes of Eastern Europe.

It also seems likely that the Sino-Soviet conflict will have disruptive ramifications within the individual bloc regimes and contribute to the chronic factionalism endemic to the communist system. The existence of two warring power centers within the bloc, and the likely maneuvering of the bloc regimes between them, provides factions within these regimes with both the rationale and the opportunity for waging opposition to established authority.

The de facto division of the communist bloc will be more sharply drawn. Neutrality will be increasingly difficult, if not impossible; and an institutionalized split in the bloc may be in the offing. The Chinese Communists, no less than the Soviets, will wish to line up their loyal supporters. Peiping already appears to have persuaded, or pressured, the North Vietnamese into a partial retreat from their neutral position. The Mongolians have drawn their disagreements with the Chinese and support of Moscow even more sharply. The Chinese, either as an initiative or in reaction to Soviet pressures, may thus give organizational form to their Asian bloc faction, plus Albania, by holding joint meetings with these regimes.

International Communist Movement

The Sino-Soviet schism will probably produce a corresponding rift throughout the international communist movement. The open letter, one section of which was devoted to Chinese Communist splitting activities (the communist parties of the US, Brazil, Italy, Belgium, Australia, India, and Ceylon were specifically mentioned), indicates Moscow will urge much stronger efforts by its supporters to purge their ranks of pro-Chinese elements. This is clearly

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the intention of the passage in the letter to the effect that Moscow will wage an "implacable struggle" both at home and abroad against deviationists "from whatever quarter." Aware that Peiping will then seek to back those purged, the Soviet letter takes the offensive to denounce such backing as "subversive." It thus seems likely that, as has already happened with the Belgian Communist Party, two separate communist parties -- one oriented toward Moscow, one toward Peiping -- will be formed in many, if not most, countries of the world.

Front Organizations

There also appears to be a good likelihood that dual communist front organizations will be formed. The Soviets could continue to admit the Chinese Communists to Moscow-dominated forums and give them the old-style Bolshevik "parliamentary" tactics -- hoot and shout them down, turn off the microphones, turn out the lights, etc. -- as happened at the Women's Congress in Moscow in June.

However, the Soviets do not control all these forums, especially the Afro-Asian solidarity organizations where the Chinese have the upper hand and, in some instances, have drastically curtailed Soviet activity. Furthermore, even in those fronts where Moscow dominates and can organize a humiliating demonstration against Chinese representatives, the dissension thereby created overshadows and even obliterates the very purpose the front is designed to serve -- propaganda for Soviet policy lines.

The more likely possibility thus appears to be that the Soviets will deny the Chinese opportunity even to attend Moscow-dominated communist-front meetings, and that the Chinese will retaliate in kind, creating their own front organizations where necessary and expedient.

In sum, the deepening Sino-Soviet schism presages a full-scale, institutional split throughout the international communist movement. Awareness of this likelihood was reflected in a July 16 Izvestiya comment on the Soviet letter, which rhetorically asked if the Chinese were attempting to create a "second international communist center" -- a situation which in fact already exists.

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III. OTHER ISSUES

The Soviet letter raised several other issues which are of only peripheral immediate interest in Sino-Soviet relations but are of considerable intrinsic interest.

Soviets Strengthen Commitment to Cuba.

The Soviet letter asserted that if the US broke its "promise" and invaded Cuba, Moscow would fulfill its "commitment to the Cuban people /and/ come to the assistance of the Cuban people from Soviet territory" with rockets which "would be in flight slightly longer /than those based last year in Cuba/ but /whose/ precision will not be impaired."

This is the strongest authoritative commitment the Soviets have undertaken to defend the Castro regime with missiles -- and thus, logically, nuclear weapons. The most forceful prior statement of this nature was made by Khrushchev on July 9, 1960, when he asserted as a "warning" that "Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire" should the US intervene in Cuba; and even this statement of capability, rather than of intention, was subsequently described as "symbolic." Khrushchev's impromptu statement at a Moscow reception for Castro last May that an attack on Cuba would be considered an attack on the Soviet Union was deleted in Soviet accounts of his remarks.

At the same time, Soviet Defense Minister Malinovskiy's assertion last February that a US attack on Cuba would mean the "outbreak of world war," and Khrushchev's election speech statement the same month to the effect Moscow would defend Cuba like East Germany, Communist China, or any other bloc country, constituted strong affirmations of the Soviet commitment to defend Cuba even if missile support was not specifically mentioned.

Moscow has customarily been more forward in promising support for Cuba in inverse proportion to the Soviet estimate of the likelihood US action was imminent, and this appears to be the case at present. In answer to Chinese Communist assertions that "imperialists" cannot be trusted, the Soviet letter confidently stated that "the US Government is keeping its word: there is no invasion of Cuba." The necessity of defending Soviet conduct in the Cuban crisis from Chinese attacks thus combined with Moscow's sanguine present assessment of the unlikelihood of a US move against Cuba to produce the strong statement of missile support for Cuba contained in the Soviet letter.

New Soviet Formulation on First Use Of Nuclear Weapons

The Soviet letter contained a new formulation of the Soviet position on not being the first to use nuclear weapons. Cast in terms which would not preclude the first use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack, the new formulation could serve as the basis for a Soviet attempt to negotiate an agreement with the West on this issue.

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The new formulation states that "...if we [the Soviets] are not attacked [it does not specify whether with conventional or nuclear weapons], we shall not be the first to use this weapon." By not explicitly ruling out the possibility of nuclear response to conventional attack, the Soviets might hope to offer a formulation which the US could accept as the basis for an agreement. The US in the past has proposed a ban on the use of nuclear weapons except in defense against aggression. For the present, however, we have but one phrase in a lengthy document, and it remains to be seen whether it was a matter of passing rhetoric or whether the new formulation reflects a considered change in policy.

There also appears to be some inconsistency between the Soviet statement on first use and the commitment undertaken with regard to Cuba. Since the context suggests that the word "we" refers to the Soviet Union, the statement about using Soviet missiles to defend Cuba is clearly inconsistent. The Soviets could, of course, argue that an attack upon Cuba is tantamount to an attack upon the Soviet Union, and that there was no inconsistency.

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7/26/63
C. Johnson - WH

7/26/63

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Dear Row:

I am responding to your letter of 17 July and the accompanying proposed request for the President's authorization of additional nuclear weapons to support

..... We have reviewed the proposed dispersal in the light of the considerations underlying National Security Action Memorandum 143 and the President's Policy Directive of April, 1961 on Policy Toward NATO and the Atlantic Nations. We believe the proposed dispersal is consonant with those policies although the State-Defense study of 13 May 1961 is somewhat ambiguous as to whether one or

..... were agreed to be supported in a strike role. Since the apparently has been led to expect the weapons and the squadron is completing a training program for the nuclear strike role, denial of the weapons would undoubtedly create political liabilities for us.

..... In connection with this review, we have noted that in its reporting under the 1962 NATO Triennial Review has indicated plans for a third squadron in the strike role. This would clearly go beyond the levels we have previously agreed. Before

..... invests any further funds or training time in this plan, I believe we should review the requirement and agree on our intentions. If we should decide we will not provide weapons in support of a third strike squadron, it would seem the best time to so advise would be at the time of activation of the second squadron.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson

The Honorable,
Roswell L. Gilpatric,
Deputy Secretary of Defense.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-93-88
By MMK NARA, Date 6/12/95

No additional material released as a result of this review.

NSR 1335 / NSAM 143

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not distributed
File in my personal
papers. Wally*

7/28/63

July 28, 1963

*v version same day
was sent to Ball,
Kampfen,
Huntley,
Scales
for comment*

MEMORANDUM

OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH USSR

Conversations with Khrushchev and Gromyko during recent negotiations made it clear that the only subject the Soviets wish to discuss at the present time is NAP. They would, I believe, be willing to talk about control points, forced levels and budget freeze in connection with NAP negotiations, but probably not separately. I believe it would be a mistake to attempt to negotiate anything else until we have at least begun explorations regarding NAP. This should not, of course, inhibit Secretary Rusk from raising any questions he wishes with Gromyko or Khrushchev during his forthcoming visit. I would recommend, however, that he indicate that we take seriously what was agreed to in the communique and what I said to Gromyko during the test ban negotiations. I took no commitment, but I stated unequivocally that we would consult our allies and attempt to negotiate in good faith nonaggression arrangements. I was unable to find out just what the Soviets have in mind since I had made it plain I was not authorized to negotiate. Although I personally do not see how nonaggression arrangements can be entered into without some assurance that interference in West Berlin and access thereto will be considered aggression, I got an immediate and emphatic adverse reaction when I took this up first with Gromyko and later Khrushchev.

In spite of the difficulties and failure to see what's in it for us, I recommend strongly that we induce our allies to join in discussions regarding nonaggression arrangements. I believe it is an odds-on bet that if we fail to do this and fail to undertake serious negotiations with the Soviets, we will sink back into the pre-test ban situation. If, however, we can find something to do in the nonaggression field, including establishment of control points, it is conceivable that we might make further progress in other directions. Although my talk with Khrushchev was unproductive, it was not threatening. The points he mentioned of stepping on our toes

were not

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MP/541/TBT (8)

NAP -
+ Berlin

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- 2 -

were not the violent threats I had heard before that "your tanks will burn and the rockets will fly." They were:

- (1) Turning down proposals for commercial flights. Kaysen, Akalovsky and I gained the impression that this referred to new flight arrangements, possibly Austrian or German.
- (2) Avoiding of East German duties.
- (3) Increased payments for communication lines, which he maintained were unfairly low.

Negotiations regarding NAP are going to be difficult. If it is decided in advance that there is nothing to be done, they will fail; on the other hand, if they are approached with an open mind, attempting to find out what the Soviets' objective is, which is not now clear, it may be that some mutually desirable arrangement can be obtained. I differentiate between what is desirable from the standpoint of the United States and what is now considered by the German Government -- by Adenauer and his colleagues -- as in their interests.

*E. Or
4/10/44
L.*

A certain stability for East Germany is, I believe, in our interests as well as the Soviet Union, and probably in the long run very much in the German interest. I believe that Khrushchev is concerned over possible recurrence of 1953 which with West German armament might bring on West German intervention with all the risks of broader war which that entails. From my standpoint I believe it is equally advantageous to attempt to forestall such events as in the interest of USSR. I must confess that I have for some time felt that we have permitted ourselves (Dulles period) to be used by the Germans for their interests rather than our own. Certainly every other country in Europe, with the possible exception of DeGaulle, would like to see some greater stability in relations between East and West Germany. Brandt and the social-ists have indicated they take that point of view and I don't know how many of the Christian Democrats privately agree. This is the

Information for

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- 3 -

time for some new thinking in regard to Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe. We will certainly gain with Poland and Czechoslovakia and help loosen the bonds between them and Moscow if they no longer fear attack by force on the Oder-Neise line. These bonds have been loosened considerably more rapidly than I had thought would be the case.

Greater stability will tend to loosen them still further and permit them to look more to the West than they have in the past. West Germany has consistently tried to improve its relations with East Germans, but has insisted that we hold an umbrella over these agreements in order to cover up the pretense that they are against any acceptance of the existence of East Germany. In my opinion the situation for East Germans will improve with somewhat greater stability. This might include the removal of Ulbrecht succeeded by more of a Polish type regime. Relations between East and West Germany might perhaps improve and there could be greater intercourse between the two, not only in trade and cultural exchanges but in personal and family contacts.

What this would lead to I would not want to predict. Certainly it is not to our interests to keep the tensions high in hopes that this will force the Soviets to give up Eastern Germany. They will not do that in the foreseeable future. I do not see why we should worry about greater stability in Eastern Europe. From past experience, more stability will lead to a better life with somewhat more independence for the people of Eastern Europe and will reduce the possibilities of war. There are, of course, certain emigres in this country who want to see tensions remain because it is only under such conditions that they think they can get back in power in their country. The interests of the people of the United States as well as the people of those countries do not, however, conform with this view.

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2/30/67

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	The Documents in this folder are numbered from 1 - 9b.	(Page 1 of 2)	
<u>Item #</u>			
1	2pp TS State Deptel 378 (London)	7/18/62	A
	DECLASSIFIED 5/98		
2	8pp ... WH Handwritten notes of a meeting/..../..	A
	DECLASSIFIED FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 286, 2/47		
3	2pp S WH Jerome Wiconer memo for the President	5/16/63	A
3a	1p ... WH Map attached to item 3/..../..	A
	DECLASSIFIED		
4	2pp S State Embtel 443 (Paris)	7/27/63	A
	DECLASSIFIED State Guidelines, 2/47		
5a	3pp S State Memo for Carl Kayson from Averell Harriman	7/28/63	A
	DECLASSIFIED		
6	1p TS WH "Political questions"/..../..	A
	DECLASSIFIED 9/98		
7	3pp TS (WH?/ACDA?) "Answers to Questions Enclosed with General Taylor's Letter of July 27, 1963"	7/30/63	A
	DECLASSIFIED State Guidelines, 2/47		
8	4pp S State Averell Harriman memo: "Outlook for Future Discussions with USSR"	7/30/63	A
	DECLASSIFIED State Guidelines, 2/47		
9a	3pp S State Deptel 298 (Bonn)	7/30/63	A

FILE LOCATION From NSF: Carl Kayson: Nuclear Energy Matters: Test Ban and Related Negotiations, 7/62 - 7/63, Box 376.

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July 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM

OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH USSR

Conversations with Khrushchev and Gromyko during recent negotiations made it clear that the only subject the Soviets wish to discuss at the present time is NAP. They will, I believe, be willing to talk about observation posts but would probably not be willing to reach agreement separately from non-aggression arrangements. I believe it would be unavailing to attempt to negotiate anything else until we have at least begun explorations regarding NAP. This should not, of course, inhibit Secretary Rusk from raising any questions he wishes with Gromyko or Khrushchev during his forthcoming visit. I would recommend, however, that he indicate that we take seriously what was agreed to in the communique and what I said to Gromyko during the test ban negotiations. I took no commitment, but I stated unequivocally that we would consult our allies and in good faith attempt to negotiate non-aggression arrangements.

I was unable to find out just what the Soviets have in mind since I had made it plain I was not authorized to negotiate. Although I personally do not see how non-aggression arrangements can be entered into without some assurance that interference in West Berlin and access thereto will be considered aggression, I got an immediate and emphatic adverse reaction when I took this up first with Gromyko and later Khrushchev. They took the position these subjects should be dealt with by a general German settlement.

In spite of the difficulties and failure to see what's in it for us, I recommend strongly that we induce our allies to join in discussions regarding non-aggression arrangements. I believe it is an odds-on bet that if we fail to do this and fail to undertake serious negotiations with the Soviets, we will sink back into the pre-test ban situation. If, however,

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Guidelines
By <u> </u> NARA, Date <u>1/13/77</u>

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-2-

we can find something to do in the non-aggression field, including establishment of control points, it is conceivable that we might make further progress in other directions. Although my talk with Khrushchev was unproductive, it was not threatening. The points he mentioned of stepping on our toes were not the violent threats I had heard before that "your tanks will burn and the rockets will fly." They were:

- (1) Turning down proposals for commercial flights. Kaysen, Akalovsky and I gained the impression that this referred to new flight arrangements, possibly Austrian or German.
- (2) Avoiding of East German duties.
- (3) Increased payments for communication lines, which he maintained were unfairly low.

Negotiations regarding non-aggression arrangements are going to be difficult. If it is decided in advance that there is nothing to be done, they will fail; on the other hand, if they are approached with an open mind, attempting to find out what the Soviets' objective is, it may be that some mutually desirable arrangement can be obtained. I differentiate between what is desirable from the standpoint of the United States and what is now considered by the German Government -- by Adensuer and his colleagues -- as in their interests.

I assume that one of Khrushchev's objectives is to achieve more stable conditions in East Germany. A certain stability for East Germany is, I believe, in our interests as well as that of the Soviet Union, and probably in the long run very much in the German interest. I believe that Khrushchev is concerned over possible recurrence of 1953 which with West German rearmament might bring on West German intervention with all the risks of broader war which that would entail. From my standpoint

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I believe it is equally advantageous for us to attempt to forestall such events as it is in the interest of the USSR. I must confess that I have for some time felt that we have permitted ourselves (Dulles period) to be used by the Germans for their interests rather than our own. Certainly every other country in Europe, with the exception of de Gaulle, would like to see some greater stability in relations between West and East Germany. Brandt and the Socialists have indicated they take that point of view, and I don't know how many of the Christian Democrats privately agree. This is the time for some new thinking about Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe. We will certainly gain with Poland and Czechoslovakia and help loosen the bonds between them and Moscow if they no longer fear attack by force on the Oder-Neisse line. These bonds have been loosened considerably more rapidly than I had thought would be the case.

Greater stability will tend to loosen them still further and permit these countries to look more to the West than they have in the past. West Germany has consistently tried to develop its relations with East Germans, but has insisted that we hold an umbrella over their activities in order to maintain the pretense that they are against the acceptance of the existence of East Germany. In my opinion the situation for East Germans will improve with somewhat greater stability. This might in time include the removal of Ulbricht succeeded by more of a Polish type regime. Relations between West and East Germany might improve and there could be greater intercourse between the two, not only in trade but in cultural exchanges and in personal and family contacts.

What this would eventually lead to I would not want to predict. However, it is not to our interests to keep the tensions high in hopes that this will force the Soviets to give up Eastern Germany. They will not do that in the foreseeable future. Also I do not see why we should worry about greater

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-4-

stability in Eastern Europe. From past experience, more stability will lead to a better life with somewhat more independence for the people of Eastern Europe and will reduce the possibilities of war. There are, of course, certain emigres in this country who want to see tensions remain because it is only under such conditions that they think they can get back in power in their country. The interests of the people of the United States as well as the people of those countries do not, however, conform with this view.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3

Rec'd: AUGUST 4, 1963
9:13 PM

NNO 96668
By NRV/IT Date 6/27/96

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 3, AUGUST 5, 1 AM

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June 1994

PRIORITY

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US-UK BILATERALS -TACTICS IN GROMYKO /KHRUSHCHEV MEETINGS.
(AUG. 4)

AT BRITISH EMBASSY TODAY, SECRETARY AND LORD HOME HAD
GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON TACTICS TO BE FOLLOWED
IN SEPARATE BILATERALS AS WELL AS TRILATERALS WITH GROMYKO
AND KHRUSHCHEV.

SECRETARY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT PRINCIPAL PURPOSE IN UPCOMING
TALKS WITH SOVS SHOULD BE TO PROBE WHETHER SOVS GENUINELY
INTERESTED IN MOVING TOWARD DETENTE OR SIMPLY AT THIS
POINT CONCERNED WITH ATMOSPHERICS. AT SAME TIME,
PARTICULARLY IN CONTEXT SOV PREOCCUPATION WITH NON-
AGGRESSION PACT, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR WE EXPECT SOV
COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING COMMITMENTS - E.G., LAOS AS
WELL AS SOV AVOIDANCE AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN OTHER
POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS - E.G., BERLIN. IN ANY CASE WE
MUST BE CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION OF COMMITMENTS
RE NAP OR PARTIAL MEASURES AFFECTING ALLIES WHICH WOULD
CAUSE TROUBLE PARTICULARLY WITH BONN AND/OR WOULD HAMPER
TB RATIFICATION PROCESS IN US. MEANWHILE, WE SHOULD
ATTEMPT IN OUR TACTICAL HANDLING OF PROPOSALS IN WHICH
SOVS HAVE INDICATED PRIMARY INTEREST TO AVOID SEEMING
COMPLETELY NEGATIVE AND THUS KEEP BALL IN PLAY.
SECRETARY'S RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE:

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/(1) SEEK

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MOSCOW SECTO 3 POL US-USSR XR POL UK-USSR

XR DEF 18

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-2- SECTO 3, AUGUST 5, 1 AM, FROM MOSCOW

- (1) SEEK ASCERTAIN REAL SOV MOTIVATION FOR VIGOROUS NAP CAMPAIGN;
- (2) STRESS NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES AS PRECONDITION TO FURTHER DISCUSSION BEYOND PROBING STAGE;
- (3) EXPRESS INTEREST IN SOME SOV PARTIAL MEASURES AND SEEK CLARIFICATION PARTICULARLY ON SOV PROPOSALS FOR EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AND FIXED-CONTROL POSTS, POINTING OUT OUR RELUCTANCE TO GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION SUCH STEPS IF NARROWLY CONFINED - E.G., TO GERMANY; AND
- (4) SUGGEST FURTHER EXAMINATION BOTH SOV AND WEST PARTIAL MEASURES COULD BE MOST USEFULLY PURSUED IN ENDC. (TO ASSUAGE POSSIBLE GERMAN AND FRENCH CONCERN AT DISCUSSION MEASURES AFFECTING THEM IN FORUM WHERE THEY NOT REPRESENTED, SEC SUGGESTED DESIRABILITY ESTABLISHING IN NAC DISARMAMENT STEERING COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF 4 GENEVA POWERS PLUS FRANCE AND GERMANY AND POSSIBLY SMALLER NATO ALLY ON ROTATING BASIS.)

LORD HOME SAID BRITISH HAD HOPED IN UPCOMING TALKS WE COULD TAKE MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE IN ORDER "MAINTAIN MOMENTUM" AND THAT IMPRESSION OF PROGRESS COULD BE REFLECTED IN COMMUNIQUE. HOWEVER, HE PREPARED BUY SECRETARY'S FORMULA IN VIEW OF OBVIOUS UNEASINESS ON PART OUR ALLIES, PARTICULARLY BONN. HOME SAID HE FELT COMPELLED RAISE NON-DISSEMINATION ISSUE SINCE HMG PUBLICLY COMMITTED DO SO. SOVS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY COUNTER WITH INSISTENCE ON ASSURANCES AGAINST SPREAD TO GERMANY VIA MLF, AND, IF SO, HOME PROMISED VIGOROUS SUPPORT MLF CONCEPT AS DEVICE FOR CONTROLLING SPREAD DESPITE KNOWN BRITISH LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR IDEA. ON LAOS, HOME, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CO-CHAIRMAN, WOULD PRESS FOR MORE ACTIVE SOV ROLE AND PARTICULARLY FOR ASSURANCE MORE COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR ON PART OF POLISH MEMBER ICC ALTHOUGH IN VIEW KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENTS IN HARRIMAN'S TALKS DOUBTED IF THEY WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. SECRETARY URGED HOME TO TAKE PARTICULARLY STRONG LINE WITH SOVIETS ON LAOS; HE HIMSELF INTENDED TAKE VIGOROUS ISSUE WITH

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-3- SECT

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-3- SECTO 3, AUGUST 5, 1 AM, FROM MOSCOW

SOVIET CONTENTION, CONVEYED TO HARRIMAN, THAT THEY CONSIDERED THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN LAOS AT END.

IN DISCUSSION POSSIBLE COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING TRILATERAL TUESDAY TALKS IT WAS AGREED WE SHOULD PRESS FOR BLAND FORMULATION STATING THREE PARTIES HAD ENGAGED IN USEFUL PROBING EXERCISE AND EACH SIDE NOW HAD CLEARER IDEA OF OTHERS PROPOSALS, AND NOW IN BETTER POSITION TO CONSULT WITH ALLIES ON FURTHER STEPS.

GP-1.

RUSK

AAL/21

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ACTION: Amembassy PARIS ^{66/} OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
RPT INFO: Amembassy MOSCOW TOSEC 15

AUG 11 11 53 AM '63

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EYES ONLY FOR BOHLEN FROM BUNDY
EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

Paris 66/

President is glad you are seeing Couve and thinks you should use occasion to clarify President's position. You could begin by remarking that now that the two press conferences have occurred, next step presumably is reply from deGaulle to President's letter. If Couve presses for further info on US position, you should say simply US would welcome a serious discussion but does not yet know whether this is what deGaulle wishes.

You should point out that President in press conference presented USG views on differences of opinion between France and US on various strategic matters but President was careful not to state that there were specific conditions on the offer of cooperation in President's letter. USG awaits French answer to President's letter to see if a dialogue can be commenced. USG view is that dialogue should begin but we are not suitors in the matter.

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RE DEF 18-4

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June 1964

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Drafted by: White House - Mr. Bundy:emb 8/4/63

Telegraphic transmission and Classification approved by:

S/S - John McKesson

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JUL 1964
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to Amembassy PARIS

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FYI In press guidance here we are expressing some surprise at negative French reaction to President's press conference. We are pointing out that essence of matter is not routine restatement of US position in later answers of conference, but clear suggestion of cooperation within test ban and expectation of French reply. President desires a clear record both public and private of US offer of dialogue unencumbered by prior explicit condition.

ACTING

GP-3

BALL

Handwritten signature
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Action

Control: 3509
Rec'd: AUGUST 5, 1963
4:28 PM

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FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 583, AUGUST 5, 7 PM

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June 1964

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 583, INFORMATION MOSCOW PRIORITY 34

EYES ONLY BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR

MOSCOW EYES ONLY SECRETARY

REF: DEPTEL 661, CAP 63421, EMTL 575

Handwritten: FR-MS

Handwritten: POL FR-MS

I DISCUSSED AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH TODAY WITH COUVE DE MURVILLE DE GAULLE'S REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF JULY 25. ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN RETTELS I CONCENTRATED UPON THE TWO ASPECTS OF DE GAULLE'S LETTER. I TOLD COUVE DE MURVILLE THAT WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT LAY BEHIND DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT THAT FRANCE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE TESTS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. COUVE DE MURVILLE IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT THIS WAS OF PURELY TECHNICAL NATURE, THAT DE GAULLE DID NOT WANT TO SEE HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MANUFACTURE ATOMIC WEAPONS FROM A FORMULA OR INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY WITHOUT TESTING TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERYTHING HAD TURNED OUT RIGHT. HE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER THE INFORMATION OR THE FORMULA HAD BEEN CORRECTLY FOLLOWED BY THE RECIPIENT POWER EXCEPT BY THE MECHANISM OF TESTING. HE WAS QUITE CLEAR IN DENYING THAT THERE WAS ANY IMPLICATION OF DISTRUST OF THE U.S. PURPOSE IN THIS BUT THAT DE GAULLE'S REPLY WAS BASED ENTIRELY ON TECHNOLOGY.

I ALSO TOOK THE OCCASION TO POINT OUT TO COUVE THAT DE GAULLE'S ASSERTION THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER IMPLIED CONDITIONS WAS DIFFICULT FOR US TO UNDERSTAND. THE PRESIDENT

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OFFICE SYMBOL:		

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-2- 583, AUGUST 5, 7 PM FROM PARIS

HAD BEEN VERY CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY STATEMENT OR EVEN IMPLICATION OF CONDITION IN THE OFFER WHICH HAD BEEN IN THE EIGHTH PARAGRAPH OF HIS MESSAGE OF JULY 25. COUVE SAID AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT DE GAULLE WAS MERELY STATING WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE AN INHERENT CONDITION WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE AND ALSO TO SOME EXTENT ON PRECEDENT. I TOLD COUVE THAT I HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED TO TELL HIM THAT THE OFFER HAD BEEN WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC CONDITIONS AND THAT PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE SHOULD BE REGARDED IN THE SAME LIGHT. I ALSO ASKED COUVE WHAT HE MEANT BY PRECEDENT, TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT THE NASSAU OFFER WAS CONDITIONAL UPON FRANCE MAKING THE SUBMARINES AVAILABLE TO NATO.

COUVE DE MURVILLE AND I THEN DISCUSSED RATHER BASICALLY THE QUESTION OF FRENCH ATTITUDE. I TOLD HIM AS A PERSONAL VIEW THAT I FELT THAT DE GAULLE'S REJECTION OF ANY FORM OF DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT MIGHT EASILY BE REGARDED BY THE PRESIDENT AS COMPLETELY CLOSING THE SUBJECT. THAT WHILE I COULD UNDERSTAND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TWO POINTS WE HAD DISCUSSED IT DID SEEM TO ME THAT DE GAULLE WAS JUMPING RATHER WIDELY TO CONCLUSIONS. IN FACT I SAID THAT WHAT I WAS INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT WAS WHETHER OR NOT RPT NOT DE GAULLE IN HIS LETTER WAS TRYING COURTEOUSLY TO PUT AN END TO ANY FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR MATTER OR WHETHER CONCEIVABLY HE WAS HINTING AT A DESIRE TO OBTAIN MORE PRECISE OR CLARIFIED INFORMATION. COUVE SAID FRANKLY HE WAS NOT RPT NOT ABLE TO GIVE ME AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION SINCE HE HAD NEVER RPT NEVER DISCUSSED THIS ASPECT OF NUCLEAR QUESTION FULLY WITH DE GAULLE. HE DID SAY HOWEVER HE THOUGHT IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT NEITHER SIDE IN THIS MATTER SHOULD LAPSE INTO BITTERNESS OR RECRIMINATION AND THAT PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA IF THE PRESIDENT WERE IN DUE COURSE TO MAKE A REPLY TO DE GAULLE, POINTING OUT THE MISINTERPRETATIONS CONTAINED IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF DE GAULLE'S LETTER. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT GUARANTEE DE GAULLE'S REACTION BUT THAT HE FELT THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THIS PARAGRAPH REALLY INVITED SOME MEASURE OF RESPONSE IF WE WERE DISPOSED TO MAKE IT.

COMMENT: I CONSIDER THAT COUVE DE MURVILLE'S EXPLANATIONS OF THE TWO POINTS AT ISSUE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY GENUINE. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT AT LUNCHEON LAST TUESDAY DE GAULLE ALSO MADE THE SAME REMARK TO ME ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF TESTING.

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ALSO I MUST ST
THE INSTRUCTIO
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IONS

-2- 583, AUGUST 5, 7 P

SECRET

-3- 583, AUGUST 5, 7 PM FROM PARIS

ALSO, I MUST STATE THAT WHILE I CARRIED OUT COMPLETELY THE INSTRUCTIONS I RECEIVED I DO FEEL THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE LENDS ITSELF TO THE INTERPRETATION OF CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET OTHERWISE THE PORTION OF HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH HE SAYS THAT THE PROBLEM DOES NOT REST NOT REST SOLELY WITH INTERPRETATION OF THE MACMILAN ACT BUT REALLY IS THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE OF THE WEST FOLLOWED BY REFERENCES TO NATO.

MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE SHOULD GIVE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO REPLYING TO DE GAULLE'S LETTER ALONG THE LINES INDICATED BY COUVE BUT I DO NOT REST NOT CONSIDER THAT THERE IS ANY HURRY IN THIS MATTER, A POINT WHICH COUVE HIMSELF EMPHASIZED TODAY. IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO WAIT UNTIL DE GAULLE IS THROUGH WITH HIS HOLIDAY AND TAKE UP THIS MATTER THEN AT THE SAME TIME WE FIRM UP THE TIME OF HIS VISIT. INCIDENTALLY, COUVE AT ONE POINT EMPHASIZED HIS VIEW THAT NUCLEAR COOPERATION WAS NOT REST NOT A SUBJECT THAT COULD BE SATISFACTORILY DEALT WITH UNTIL THE TWO MEN MET. HE WAS, HOWEVER, EMPHATIC IN SAYING THAT DE GAULLE'S AGREEMENT TO COME TO THE U.S. NEXT WINTER WAS COMPLETELY FIRM.

I ALSO SAW A COPY OF DE GAULLE'S MUCH SHORTER REPLY TO MACMILAN WHICH SPEAKS OF THE NECESSITY OF TESTING IN A SOMEWHAT MORE PRECISE MANNER.

COUVE SAID FRENCH DO NOT REST NOT INTEND TO GIVE PUBLICITY TO REPLY BUT IF ASKED A SPECIFIC QUESTION WOULD MERELY STATE THAT REPLY HAD BEEN DELIVERED WITHOUT REST WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF CONTENT. WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE HERE AS TO HOW WE PROPOSE TO HANDLE INQUIRIES AS TO CONTENT IF AND WHEN DELIVERY BECOMES KNOWN.

GP-3

BOHLEN

RG

NOTE: RELAYED W.H. PER S/S 8-5-63 CWO-L

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37
DUMING TELEGRAM

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Action
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Control: 3170
Rec'd: AUGUST 5, 1963
10:18 AM

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 575, AUGUST 5, 2 PM

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QW 575
8-5-63
POL FR-NS

ACTION DEPARTMENT 575, INFORMATION MOSCOW 32.

MICROFILMED

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY
EYES ONLY BUNDY

KENNEDY

APR 5 1964

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE, DEPTTEL 661, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY USEFUL IN CLEARING UP AT LEAST PRIVATELY ANY MISUNDERSTANDING INDUCED BY PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN REGARD TO CONDITIONS ON NUCLEAR OFFER.

HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF CONTENTS OF DE GAULLE'S REPLY, A COPY OF WHICH WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED FROM QUAI D'ORSAY, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE VERY LITTLE TO DISCUSS ON THIS POINT. DE GAULLE'S ANSWER IS ENTIRELY NEGATIVE IN THAT HE 1) EXPRESSES GREAT DOUBT AS TO VALUE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIANS, 2) GIVES FRENCH REFUSAL EVEN IN ADVANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY FORM OF NON-AGGRESSION ARRANGEMENT, AND 3) REJECTS WITHOUT SO STATING OFFER OF DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR INFORMATION BY POINTING OUT IN THIS CONNECTION THAT "TESTS WOULD BE NECESSARY UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES" AND IMPLYING THAT ANY OFFER WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE CONDITIONS LIMITING FRANCE'S RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF ITS ARMS.

WHEN I SEE COUVE DE MURVILLE THIS AFTERNOON HOWEVER I INTEND TO POINT OUT THAT THIS REFERENCE TO CONDITIONS IS COMPLETELY FRENCH INTERPRETATION NOT JUSTIFIED BY LANGUAGE OF THE OFFER OR BY ANY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS WHICH THE U.S. HAS MADE, AND ENDEAVOR TO DRAW HIM OUT ON THIS POINT.

FOR THE MOMENT IT LOOKS AS THOUGH ANY HOPE OF DIALOGUE WILL HAVE TO BE PLACED ON ICE AND NEXT POINT OF INTEREST WILL BE QUESTION OF DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO U.S.

GP-3

BOHLEN

SECRET

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• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

ACTION ASSIGNED TO		ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	
OFFICE SYMBOL			

TELEGRAM

140 1510
Department of State

File NLK 78-188 #5
W J

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Action

Control: 4260

SS
Info

Rec'd: AUGUST 6, 1963
12:10 PM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 20, AUGUST 6, 4 PM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

EYES ONLY

FIRST SESSION TRIPARTITE TALKS HELD AT FONMIN 1030 AUG. 6, ADJOURNED AT 1305, TO CONVENE AGAIN AT 1530 TODAY. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE 1) ANTI-SURPRISE ATTACK MEASURES 2) NAP AND RELATION TO BERLIN 3) REDUCTION MILITARY BUDGETS 4) NON DISSEMINATION. FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED BRIEF SUMMARY SUBJECT TO REVISION. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS.

1. ANTI-SURPRISE ATTACK:

FOSTER AND STELLE WITHDREW TO REPRESENT US ON SUBGROUP.

2. NAP:

SECRETARY RAISED SERIES OF QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS: A) DID SOVIETS HAVE TREATY OR PARALLEL DECLARATIONS IN MIND B) RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY C) PURPOSE OF NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT D) RELATION TO UN CHARTER E) WHAT CONSTITUTES AGGRESSION F) RELATION TO BERLIN.

SECRETARY STATED HE COULD REAFFIRM WHAT HARRIMAN HAD SAID ON INSTRUCTIONS AND EMPHASIZED WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES WHICH WE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO DO.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SANITIZED

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Dept. of State (NLK-78-188 APPEAL)

BY [Signature] NARS, DATE 3/16/79

NSP 1187 / USSR. Orin, K. Tallos (Leark)

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-2- SECTO 20, AUGUST 6, 4 PM; FROM MOSCOW

3. REDUCTION MILITARY BUDGETS.— DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT GENERAL IN NATURE, SECRETARY MAKING POINTS WHILE REDUCTION MILITARY BUDGETS OBJECT OF OUR POLICY THIS DEPENDED LARGELY ON AGREEMENTS ON OTHER MEASURES SUCH AS ANTI-SURPRISE ATTACK PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT REDUCTION. QUESTIONED PRACTICALITY OF THIS PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD INVOLVE DETAILED INSPECTION WHICH MIGHT CREATE GREATER IRRITANT RATHER THAN REDUCTION OF TENSIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. CITED PROPOSED INCREASE IN PAY TO US MILITARY AS EXAMPLE OF INCREASE IN BUDGET WHICH ADDED NOTHING TO US MILITARY STRENGTH..]

4. NON DISSEMINATION. [

SECRETARY SAID HE MUST EXCUSE HIMSELF SHORTLY BECAUSE OF APPOINTMENT WITH SENATORS BUT WOULD LIKE MAKE FEW OBSERVATIONS. EMPHASIZED IT FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF US, UK, USSR AND EVEN PERHAPS FRANCE THERE WAS COMMON INTEREST. DEVELOPMENT BY

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-3- SECTO 20, AUGUST 6, 4 PM; FROM MOSCOW

OTHER NATIONS NOT NOW POSSESSING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY NOT REPEAT NOT IN INTEREST OF US. WE WOULD NOT TRANSFER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OR ASSIST IN THEIR ACQUISITION BY ANY COUNTRIES NOT NOW POSSESSING A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

B-3
B-1

THE US WOULD NOT BE A PARTY TO ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR NON-NUCLEAR POWERS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR A SINGLE SOLDIER OF A NON-NUCLEAR POWER TO FIRE A WEAPON ON INSTRUCTIONS HIS GOVERNMENT OR WHICH WOULD REVEAL TECHNICAL SECRETS TO SUCH GOVERNMENT.

B-3

SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THERE MAY BE OTHER OBJECTIONS ON SOVIET SIDE. EXPRESSED HOPE WE COULD ISOLATE THIS QUESTION AND REACH AGREEMENT WHILE OTHER ISSUES COULD BE TAKEN UP IN OTHER WAYS FOR SETTLEMENT.

MORNING DISCUSSION CONCLUDED AT THIS POINT.

GP-1.

RUSK

JTC

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

#7b

Action

Control: 4746

Rec'd: AUGUST 6, 1963

9:07 PM

SS

FROM: MOSCOW

Info

TO: Secretary of State

1 by John S...

NO: - SECTO 26, AUGUST 6, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

Person...

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

EYES ONLY

SECOND SESSION TRIPARTITE TALKS HELD AT SPIRIDONOVKA BEGINNING 1545 AND ENDING 1725. SESSION WAS ENTIRELY DEVOTED TO GERMANY AND BERLIN. FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED SUMMARY SUBJECT TO REVISION. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS.

DAMAGED

Dept. of State (NLK-78-188 APPEAL)
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE 3/16/79

SECRETARY SAID HE HAD ONE OR TWO OBSERVATIONS. FIRST, LOOKING AT OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF TENSION, THESE HAVE SHOWN CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT

~~SECRET~~

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1963/12/1 USSR. Germany to talks. later

~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTO 26, AUGUST 6, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

IMPROVEMENT IN THE LAST ONE TO THREE YEARS. SOME OF ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE CAUSED TENSIONS BETWEEN TWO GERMANIES AND THEREFORE BETWEEN COUNTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR GERMANY HAVE BEEN EASED AND THEREFORE TENSIONS HAVE SLACKENED.

THERE WAS MORE NORMAL ATMOSPHERE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS WHOLE REFERRING TO BOTH SOCIALIST AS WELL AS CAPITALIST PARTS THAT AREA.

SECRETARY CONTINUED WE STILL BELIEVE VALID APPROACH EXPRESSED IN OUR MARCH 22, 1962 DRAFT OF PRINCIPLES HANDED GROMYKO. ASKED MR GROMYKO IF HE DID NOT THINK PROCEDURES AND APPROACH SUGGESTED THEREIN STILL HAD SIGNIFICANCE. WE DON'T BELIEVE MATTER IS URGENT OR CRITICAL UNLESS ONE CHOOSES TO MAKE IT SO. EXPRESSED READINESS TO SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS WAYS TO PREVENT TENSION ARISING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8/6/63

LECTO 26, AUGUST 6, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

SECY SAID, AS HE HAD MENTIONED TO GROMYKO IN PAST, QUESTION WAS MORE OF ACCESS TO WHAT AND THIS INVOLVES PRESENCE WESTERN TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN. ALMOST WASTE OF TIME TO GO ON IF THIS IS NOT ACCEPTED. WE READY TO EXPLORE WHAT ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS ARE POSSIBLE. RECALLED THAT WESTERN POWERS HAD ONCE TALKED AMONG THEMSELVES ON THIS PROBLEM AND STORY HAD BROKEN IN PRESS WHEREUPON MOSCOW RADIO HAD REJECTED PROPOSALS EVEN BEFORE RECEIVING THEM.

SECY EMPHASIZED WHAT HE HAD SAID BEFORE -- NEED FOR GENUINE RECIPROCITY. HARD BELIEVE FEW THOUSAND TROOPS IN BERLIN THREATENED SEVERAL SOVIET DIVISIONS IN EAST GERMANY. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD EAST GERMANY WAS GONE EAST BERLIN NONE OF OUR BUSINESS AND INSTEAD ALL DEMANDS WERE CONCENTRATED ON DIMINISHING WESTERN POSITION IN WEST BERLIN. WE SEE NO RECIPROCITY IN THIS. WE READILY CONCEDE SOVIET UNION IS GREAT POWER BUT SO ARE WE. WE NOT INTERESTED ON THEORETICAL BASIS ON MAINTAINING REMNANTS WORLD WAR II BUT HAD LIVING COMMITMENT TO MORE THAN TWO MILLION PEOPLE. WE SHOULD LIKE TO REMOVE REMNANTS OF WORLD WAR II BUT WE DO NOT WANT THIS TO BECOME SEEDS OF WORLD WAR III. TENSIONS HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN BOTH PARTS OF CENTRAL EUROPE BY DEVELOPMENTS IN LAST TWO YEARS.

RUSK

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NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE PER S/S, 8/6/63

~~SECRET~~

NSA/187/

USSR Gromyko Carlos (Kissinger)

~~SECRET~~

Control: 4748
Rec'd: AUGUST 6, 1963
9:22 PM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 26, AUGUST 6, MIDNIGHT (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

EYES ONLY

SECRETARY COMMENTED

IF FAR REACHING FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED. AS RESPONSIBLE POWERS WE OUGHT TO FIND WAY TO HANDLE PEACEFULLY. HENCE OUR PRINCIPLES PAPER 1962 TRIED TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ELEMENTS AFFECTING USSR NOT ONLY IN REGARD TO QUESTION WEST BERLIN AND ACCESS THERETO BUT ALSO CONCERNING NO USE OF FORCE CHANGE BORDERS AND QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN SHORT, ONE SMALL WORD COULD TRANSFORM NATURE WHOLE PROBLEM. THIS WORD WAS "RECIPRICITY".

SECRETARY SAID WOULD BE GLAD HEAR ANYTHING GROMYKO WOULD WISH TO SAY WHILE HE IS HERE, BEFORE OR DURING GA.

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

140 75 10
Department of State

File NLK 78-188

WJ

8/6/63

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

31
Action Control: 4260
SS Rec'd: AUGUST 6, 1963
Info FROM: MOSCOW 12:10 PM

TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 20, AUGUST 6, 4 PM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

EYES ONLY

FIRST SESSION TRIPARTITE TALKS HELD AT FONMIN 1030 AUG. 6, ADJOURNED AT 1305, TO CONVENE AGAIN AT 1530 TODAY. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE 1) ANTI-SURPRISE ATTACK MEASURES 2) NAP AND RELATION TO BERLIN 3) REDUCTION MILITARY BUDGETS 4) NON DISSEMINATION. FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED BRIEF SUMMARY SUBJECT TO REVISION. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS.

1. ANTI-SURPRISE ATTACK: [

FOSTER AND STELLE WITHDREW TO REPRESENT US ON SUBGROUP.

2. NAP: [

[SECRETARY RAISED SERIES OF QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS: A) DID SOVIETS HAVE TREATY OR PARALLEL DECLARATIONS IN MIND B) RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY C) PURPOSE OF NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT D) RELATION TO UN CHARTER E) WHAT CONSTITUTES AGGRESSION F) RELATION TO BERLIN.

SECRETARY STATED HE COULD REAFFIRM WHAT HARRIMAN HAD SAID ON INSTRUCTIONS AND EMPHASIZED WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES WHICH WE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO DO. [

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SANITIZED

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Dept. of State (NLK 78-188 APPEAL)

BY [initials] NARS DATE: 8/16/79

NSF/187 / USSR. Subject: Gromyko talks (bank) 8/5/63 - 8/7/63

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-2- SECTO 20, AUGUST 6, 4 PM; FROM MOSCOW

3. REDUCTION MILITARY BUDGETS. DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT GENERAL IN NATURE, SECRETARY MAKING POINTS WHILE REDUCTION MILITARY BUDGETS OBJECT OF OUR POLICY THIS DEPENDED LARGELY ON AGREEMENTS ON OTHER MEASURES SUCH AS ANTI-SURPRISE ATTACK PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT REDUCTION. QUESTIONED PRACTICALITY OF THIS PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD INVOLVE DETAILED INSPECTION WHICH MIGHT CREATE GREATER IRRITANT RATHER THAN REDUCTION OF TENSIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. CITED PROPOSED INCREASE IN PAY TO US MILITARY AS EXAMPLE OF INCREASE IN BUDGET WHICH ADDED NOTHING TO US MILITARY STRENGTH.

4. NON DISSEMINATION.

SECRETARY SAID HE MUST EXCUSE HIMSELF SHORTLY BECAUSE OF APPOINTMENT WITH SENATORS BUT WOULD LIKE MAKE FEW OBSERVATIONS. EMPHASIZED IT FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF US, UK, USSR AND EVEN PERHAPS FRANCE THERE WAS COMMON INTEREST. DEVELOPMENT BY

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UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-3- SECTO 20, AUGUST 6, 4 PM; FROM MOSCOW

OTHER NATIONS NOT NOW POSSESSING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY NOT REPEAT NOT IN INTEREST OF US. WE WOULD NOT TRANSFER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OR ASSIST IN THEIR ACQUISITION BY ANY COUNTRIES NOT NOW POSSESSING A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

B-3
B-1
13-5

THE US WOULD NOT BE A PARTY TO ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR NON-NUCLEAR POWERS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR A SINGLE SOLDIER OF A NON-NUCLEAR POWER TO FIRE A WEAPON ON INSTRUCTIONS HIS GOVERNMENT OR WHICH WOULD REVEAL TECHNICAL SECRETS TO SUCH GOVERNMENT.

SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THERE MAY BE OTHER OBJECTIONS ON SOVIET SIDE. EXPRESSED HOPE WE COULD ISOLATE THIS QUESTION AND REACH AGREEMENT WHILE OTHER ISSUES COULD BE TAKEN UP IN OTHER WAYS FOR SETTLEMENT.

MORNING DISCUSSION CONCLUDED AT THIS POINT.

GP-1.

RUSK

JTC

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~~SECRET~~

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Action

Control: 4746

Rec'd: AUGUST 6, 1963

9:07 PM

SS

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

1 by John S...

NO: - SECTO 26, AUGUST 6, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

Rem...

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

EYES ONLY

SECOND SESSION TRIPARTITE TALKS HELD AT SPIRIDONOVKA BEGINNING 1545 AND ENDING 1725. [] SESSION WAS ENTIRELY DEVOTED TO GERMANY AND BERLIN. FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED SUMMARY SUBJECT TO REVISION. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS.

DANNIAGED

Dept. of State (NLK-78-188 APPEAL)
BY *Indm* NARS, DATE 3/16/79

SECRETARY SAID HE HAD ONE OR TWO OBSERVATIONS. FIRST, LOOKING AT OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF TENSION, THESE HAVE SHOWN CONSIDERABLE

IMPROVEMENT

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~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTO 26, AUGUST 6, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

IMPROVEMENT IN THE LAST ONE TO THREE YEARS. SOME OF ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE CAUSED TENSIONS BETWEEN TWO GERMANIES AND THEREFORE BETWEEN COUNTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR GERMANY HAVE BEEN EASED AND THEREFORE TENSIONS HAVE SLACKENED.

THERE WAS MORE NORMAL ATMOSPHERE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS WHOLE REFERRING TO BOTH SOCIALIST AS WELL AS CAPITALIST PARTS THAT AREA.

SECRETARY CONTINUED WE STILL BELIEVE VALID APPROACH EXPRESSED IN OUR MARCH 22, 1962 DRAFT OF PRINCIPLES HANDED GROMYKO. ASKED MR GROMYKO IF HE DID NOT THINK PROCEDURES AND APPROACH SUGGESTED THEREIN STILL HAD SIGNIFICANCE. WE DON'T BELIEVE MATTER IS URGENT OR CRITICAL UNLESS ONE CHOOSES TO MAKE IT SO. EXPRESSED READINESS TO SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS WAYS TO PREVENT TENSION ARISING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4- SECTO 26, AUGUST 6, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

SECY SAID, AS HE HAD MENTIONED TO GROMYKO IN PAST, QUESTION WAS MORE OF ACCESS TO WHAT AND THIS INVOLVES PRESENCE WESTERN TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN. ALMOST WASTE OF TIME TO GO ON IF THIS IS NOT ACCEPTED. WE READY TO EXPLORE WHAT ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS ARE POSSIBLE. RECALLED THAT WESTERN POWERS HAD ONCE TALKED AMONG THEMSELVES ON THIS PROBLEM AND STORY HAD BROKEN IN PRESS WHEREUPON MOSCOW RADIO HAD REJECTED PROPOSALS EVEN BEFORE RECEIVING THEM.

SECY EMPHASIZED WHAT HE HAD SAID BEFORE -- NEED FOR GENUINE RECIPROcity. HARD BELIEVE FEW THOUSAND TROOPS IN BERLIN THREATENED SEVERAL SOVIET DIVISIONS IN EAST GERMANY. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD EAST GERMANY WAS GONE EAST BERLIN NONE OF OUR BUSINESS AND INSTEAD ALL DEMANDS WERE CONCENTRATED ON DIMINISHING WESTERN POSITION IN WEST BERLIN. WE SEE NO RECIPROcity IN THIS. WE READILY CONCEDE SOVIET UNION IS GREAT POWER BUT SO ARE WE. WE NOT INTERESTED ON THEORETICAL BASIS ON MAINTAINING REMNANTS WORLD WAR II BUT HAD LIVING COMMITMENT TO MORE THAN TWO MILLION PEOPLE. WE SHOULD LIKE TO REMOVE REMNANTS OF WORLD WAR II BUT WE DO NOT WANT THIS TO BECOME SEEDS OF WORLD WAR III. TENSIONS HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN BOTH PARTS OF CENTRAL EUROPE BY DEVELOPMENTS IN LAST TWO YEARS.

RUSK

UMT

NOTE:-- PASSED WHITE HOUSE PER S/S, 8/6/63

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Control: 4748
Rec'd: AUGUST 6, 1963
9:22 PM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 26, AUGUST 6, MIDNIGHT (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

EYES ONLY

SECRETARY COMMENTED

IF FAR REACHING FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED. AS RESPONSIBLE POWERS WE OUGHT TO FIND WAY TO HANDLE PEACEFULLY. HENCE OUR PRINCIPLES PAPER 1962 TRIED TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ELEMENTS AFFECTING USSR NOT ONLY IN REGARD TO QUESTION WEST BERLIN AND ACCESS THERETO BUT ALSO CONCERNING NO USE OF FORCE CHANGE BORDIERS AND QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN SHORT, ONE SMALL WORD COULD TRANSFORM NATURE WHOLE PROBLEM. THIS WORD WAS "RECIPRICITY".

SECRETARY SAID WOULD BE GLAD HEAR ANYTHING GROMYKO WOULD WISH TO SAY WHILE HE IS HERE, BEFORE OR DURING GA.

~~SECRET~~

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URGENT TELEGRAM

Department of State

W H

Action
SS
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 5150
Rec'd: AUGUST 7, 1963
8:58 AM

9

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

003

NO: SECTO 27, AUGUST 7, 9 AM (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

?
SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT IF US AND USSR WERE TO AGREED ON MAKING JOINT EFFORT TO GET TO MOON, US WOULD CERTAINLY NOT DIVERT SAVINGS RESULTING THEREFROM TO MILITARY PURPOSES.

SECRETARY REITERATED IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES EXISTED BETWEEN OUR RESPECTIVE BUDGETARY SYSTEMS AND EXPRESSED DOUBT BUDGET WAS VERY RELIABLE MEANS OF WEIGHING MILITARY STRENGTH. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESS NOW CONSIDERING INCREASE IN MILITARY PAY WHICH WOULD ADD ANOTHER BILLION DOLLARS TO OUR BUDGET; HOWEVER THIS INCREASE IN BUDGET WOULD NOT INCREASE OUR MILITARY STRENGTH BUT ONLY INCREASE BURDEN ON TREASURY.

~~SECRET~~

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SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

-2- SECTO 27, AUGUST 7, 9 AM (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE) FROM MOSCOW

NON-DIFFUSION.

SECRETARY NOTED HE HAD APPOINTMENT WITH SENATORS AND WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE SOON BUT SAID COULD MAKE SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS AND PERHAPS RETURN TO SUBJECT LATER. STRESSED IT FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF US GOVT. TO OPPOSE FURTHER PROLIFERATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BELIEVED ON THIS SINGLE POINT INTERESTS OF US, UK, AND USSR, AND PERHAPS EVEN FRANCE WERE IDENTICAL, BECAUSE IT WAS ALMOST IN NATURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT IF SOMEONE HAD THEM HE DID NOT WANT OTHERS TO HAVE THEM. CERTAINLY LOOKING INTO FUTURE PROSPECT OF OTHER NATIONS ACQUIRING SUCH WEAPONS IN NEXT 10 OR 20 YEARS WAS NOT ATTRACTIVE. THUS OUR FUNDAMENTAL VIEW WAS THAT PROLIFERATION WAS NOT IN INTEREST OF US, WAS NOT IN INTEREST OF OTHERS, AND WAS NOT IN INTEREST OF PEACE. SUGGESTED PERHAPS WE COULD START FROM THIS JOINT POINT.

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SAID US WOULD NOT BE PARTY TO ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE

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-3- SECTO 27, AUGUST 7, 9 AM (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE) FROM MOSCOW

IT POSSIBLE TO TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ANY ALLY ON OUR SIDE WHICH NOT NUCLEUR LOWER; LIKEWISE WE WOULD NOT ENTER INTO ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ANY SUCH ALLY GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO A SOLDIER IN ITS FORCES TO FIRE A NUCL SAR WEAPON YK NOR WOULD WE HAVE ARRANGEMENT MAKING TECHNICAL SECRETS AVAILABLE TO NON-NUCLEAR POWERS BY MEANS OF ANY MLF.

SECRETARY THEN SAID HE BELIEVED THERE WAS ADVANTAGE IN HAVING SIMPLE AGREEMENT AS WE HAD SUGGESTED PROVIDED THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING THAT IT MEANT AND WHAT IT DID NOT MEAN. SAID HE PREPARED DISCUSS THIS QUESTION, OBSERVED SOVS MAY HAVE OTHER REASONS. NOT RELATED TO PROLIFERATION, FOR THEIR OBJECTING TO MLF IF IT CAME INTO BEING. HOWEVER, AS HE HAD SAID IN GENEVA, HE HOPED QUESTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION, IN WHICH WE BOTH INTERESTED, COULD BE ISOLATED WITHOUT HAVING OTHER, IRRELEVANT QUESTIONS BEAR ON THIS. NON-PROLIFERATION WAS IMPORTANT QUESTION TO BOTH SIDES; PERHAPS WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON IT AND DEAL WITH OTHER QUESTIONS IN OTHER WAYS.

MEETING ENDED ABOUT 1 P.M.

GP-1.

RUSK

.TP

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 8-7-63 10 A.M. WVC.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

31
Action

SS
Info

SECRET
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

ALK 78-188 #7

Control: 5194
Rec'd: AUGUST 7, 1963
9:24 AM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

*10. 2. 1963
[Signature]*

NO: SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) *[Handwritten]*

PRIORITY

003

EYES ONLY

AFTERNOON SESSION TRIPARTITE TALKS AT SPIRIDONOVKA 3:45 P.M.
AUG. 6. US GROUP SAME AS IN A.M. EXCEPT STEVENSON, FOSTER,
(#) UK AND SOV GROUPS ALSO REDUCED, AND LATTER INCLUDING
SEMENOV.

AS AGREED IN MORNING *[Handwritten]*
DEVOTED TO GERMANY AND BERLIN.

! SESSION ENTIRELY

SANITIZED

Dept. of State (ALK-78-188 APPEAL)
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE *3/16/79*

SECRET

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-2- SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR), FROM MOSCOW

SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED MAKE ONE OR TWO COMMENTS. FIRST, HE BELIEVED IT QUITE APPARENT THAT WHAT COULD BE CALLED OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS IN TENSION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY AND BERLIN HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT IN LAST ONE OR TWO YEARS. SOME OF ELEMENTS WHICH HAD CAUSED CONSIDERABLE TENSION BETWEEN TWO GERMANIES AND CONSEQUENTLY BETWEEN COUNTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR GERMANY HAD BEEN EASED AND THEREFORE TENSIONS HAD REDUCED. SECRETARY BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS TOWARD MORE NORMAL ATMOSPHERE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS WHOLE AND NOTED HE MEANT BOTH SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST PARTS CENTRAL EUROPE.

SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT IN LOOKING BACK TO SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR HANDLING THIS PROBLEM, PRINCIPLES WE HAD GIVEN GROMYKO ON MARCH 22, 1962 IN GENEVA, IT SEEMED THAT APPROACH CONTAINED IN

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-3- SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR), FROM MOSCOW

THOSE PRINCIPLES WAS STILL VALID. WONDERED WHETHER GROMYKO DID NOT BELIEVE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF SUGGESTED PROCEDURES AND APPROACH TO THESE QUESTIONS STILL HAD SIGNIFICANCE. SAID DID NOT SEE WHY, GIVEN REDUCED TENSION IN THAT PART OF WORLD, PROBLEM UNDER DISCUSSION SHOULD BE URGENT OR CRITICAL UNLESS SOMEONE WANTED MAKE IT SO. EXPRESSED READINESS DISCUSS VARIOUS MATTERS INVOLVED AND FIND WAYS OF PREVENTING THEM FROM DISTURBING GROWING CONFIDENCE AND RELAXATION BETWEEN PRINCIPAL POWERS. ASKED WHETHER GROMYKO BELIEVED, AS HE DID, PRINCIPLES SUGGESTED IN '62 WERE STILL VALID IN '63.

GP-1.

RUSK

BAP

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 8/7/63 10:45 AM
(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-3- SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM. (SECTION 2 OF 4) FROM: MOSCOW

SECRETARY SAID SINCE HE WAS PART OF SEQUEAKY MACHINERY WHICH HAD BEEN REFERRED TO HE WISHED TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS. GROMYKO WOULD REMEMBER THAT FOLLOWING SUBMISSION SOV PAPER ON ACCESS THERE HAD ARISEN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY QUESTION OF ACCESS TO WHAT. THIS INVOLVED QUESTION OF PRESENCE WESTERN FORCES IN WEST BERLIN. SINCE THIS QUESTION WAS FUNDAMENTAL AND IN THE MAIN NOT RESOLVED, IT SEEMED THEN ALMOST UNNECESSARY EXPLORE ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS. SAID WE PREPARED EXPLORE WHAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE, RECALLING WESTERN POWERS HAD AT ONE TIME DISCUSSED AMONG THEMSELVES POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EAST GERMAN INTERESTS. HOWEVER STORY HAD BROKEN IN PRESS AND MOSCOW RADIO HAD REJECTED PROPOSALS GIVEN EVEN BEFORE WE COULD MAKE THEM. THEREFORE WE STOPPED PURSUIT THIS MATTER.

GP-1.

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NOTE: PASSED-WHITE HOUSE 8/7/63, 11:45 AM.

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Action

Control: 5397
Rec'd: AUGUST 7, 1963
12:13 PM

SS

EYES ONLY

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

SECRETARY THEN STRESSED THAT AS REGARDS WEST BERLIN GENUINE SENSE RECIPROCITY WAS REQUIRED. IT WAS HARD FOR US TO UNDERSTAND THAT FEW THOUSAND WESTERN TROOPS CONSTITUTED SOME THREAT TO SOMEONE ELSE WHILE TWENTY SOV DIVISIONS WERE TO BE REGARDED AS GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF AND ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN.

IT WAS CERTAINLY NO RECIPROCITY TO SAY EAST BERLIN WAS GONE AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH US, THAT EAST GERMANY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH US, AND THEN HAVE ALL THIS DISCUSSION RE DEMINISHING WESTERN POSITION ON WEST BERLIN. WE READILY RECOGNIZED USSR GREAT POWER, BUT SO ARE WE. WE REALIZED SOVS WISHED DO AWAY WITH REMNANTS WW II, BUT THIS SITUATION WAS MORE THAN THAT, IT INVOLVED TWO MILLI LIVING PEOPLE AND WAS REALITY TO THEM. WE SHOULD LIKE REMOVE REMNANTS WW II-BUT WE DID NOT WISH THIS TO BECOME SEEDS OF WW III. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION. SECRETARY REITERATED TENSIONS HAD BEEN REDUCED IN THAT AREA IN PAST FEW YEARS. FRG HAD INCREASED ITS CONTACTS WITH COUNTRIES TO EAST; THERE WAS MORE TRADE AND MORE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS; AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE APPEAR TO BE GROWING IN THIS ENTIRE PART OF EUROPE. IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST TO FURTHER THIS DEVELOPMENT.

SECRETARY CONTINUED HE BELIEVED THESE MATTERS MUST BE DISCUSSED, EVEN THOUGH DISCUSSIONS MAY HAVE BEEN REPETITIOUS. THE REASON FOR THIS WAS THAT FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WERE INVOLVED. AS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS WE MUST DISCUSS THESE MATTERS AND WE OUGHT FIND WAY TO HANDLE THEM PEACEFULLY. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVED OUR SUGGESTED


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
EYES ONLY

OK

PRINCIPLES PAPER OF MARCH 19, 1962 TRIED TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL ELEMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE; IT TOOK ACCOUNT NOT ONLY WEST BERLIN AND ACCESS THERETO BUT ALSO SUCH QUESTIONS AS NO USE OF FORCE, REBOUNDARIES AND QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEREFORE WE BELIEVED PAPER PROVIDED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT FOR DISCUSSIONS WHICH COULD DETERMINE HOW TO ARRIVE AT CONCRETE CONCLUSIONS. TO THIS EXTENT OUR PAPER CONSTITUTED A REPLY TO SOV PAPERS. SECRETARY THEN ADDED THAT ONE SMALL WORD COULD TRANSFORM VERY NATURE OF WHOLE PROBLEM, AND THAT WORLD WAS RECIPROCALITY.




SECRETARY SAID HAD TO CONFESS DOBRYNIN AND HIMSELF HAD AT LEAST SUCCEEDED IN ONE THING -- IN BORING EACH OTHER. PERHAPS BASIC REVIEW OR FRESH INSTRUCTIONS WERE NECESSARY, FOR CERTAINLY NEITHER DOBRYNIN NOR HIMSELF ENJOYED BORING EACH OTHER. PERHAPS PROBLEM COULD BE DISCUSSED WHILE HE HERE OR PERHAPS FRESH LOOK COULD BE TAKEN DURING UNGA, WHEN MANY FOREIGN MINISTERS GATHER IN NEW YORK. IN ANY EVENT, SECRETARY SAID, HE WAS AT GROMYKO'S DISPOSAL.




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-2- SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM, (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR) FROM MOSCC.



MEETING ENDED AT 5:25 P.M.

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TELEGRAM

Department of State

8/7/63

W H

SECRET

Control: 5150
Rec'd: AUGUST 7, 1963
8:58 AM

9

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

003

NO: SECTO 27, AUGUST 7, 9 AM (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

? SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT IF US AND USSR WERE TO AGREE ON MAKING JOINT EFFORT TO GET TO MOON, US WOULD CERTAINLY NOT DIVERT SAVINGS RESULTING THEREFROM TO MILITARY PURPOSES.

SECRETARY REITERATED IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES EXISTED BETWEEN OUR RESPECTIVE BUDGETARY SYSTEMS AND EXPRESSED DOUBT BUDGET WAS VERY RELIABLE MEANS OF WEIGHING MILITARY STRENGTH. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESS NOW CONSIDERING INCREASE IN MILITARY PAY WHICH WOULD ADD ANOTHER BILLION DOLLARS TO OUR BUDGET; HOWEVER THIS INCREASE IN BUDGET WOULD NOT INCREASE OUR MILITARY STRENGTH BUT ONLY INCREASE BURDEN ON TREASURY.

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-2- SECTO 27, AUGUST 7, 9 AM (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE) FROM MOSCOW

NON-DIFFUSION.

SECRETARY NOTED HE HAD APPOINTMENT WITH SENATORS AND WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE SOON BUT SAID COULD MAKE SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS AND PERHAPS RETURN TO SUBJECT LATER. STRESSED IT FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF US GOVT. TO OPPOSE FURTHER PROLIFERATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BELIEVED ON THIS SINGLE POINT INTERESTS OF US, UK, AND USSR, AND PERHAPS EVEN FRANCE WERE IDENTICAL, BECAUSE IT WAS ALMOST IN NATURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT IF SOMEONE HAD THEM HE DID NOT WANT OTHERS TO HAVE THEM. CERTAINLY LOOKING INTO FUTURE PROSPECT OF OTHER NATIONS ACQUIRING SUCH WEAPONS IN NEXT 10 OR 20 YEARS WAS NOT ATTRACTIVE. THUS OUR FUNDAMENTAL VIEW WAS THAT PROLIFERATION WAS NOT IN INTEREST OF US, WAS NOT IN INTEREST OF OTHERS, AND WAS NOT IN INTEREST OF PEACE. SUGGESTED PERHAPS WE COULD START FROM THIS JOINT POINT.

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SAID US WOULD NOT BE PARTY TO ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE

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SECRET

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-3- SECTO 27, AUGUST 7, 9 AM (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE) FROM MOSCOW

IT POSSIBLE TO TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ANY ALLY ON OUR SIDE WHICH NOT NUCLEAR POWER; LIKEWISE WE WOULD NOT ENTER INTO ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ANY SUCH ALLY GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO A SOLDIER IN ITS FORCES TO FIRE A NUCLEAR WEAPON NOR WOULD WE HAVE ARRANGEMENT MAKING TECHNICAL SECRETS AVAILABLE TO NON-NUCLEAR POWERS BY MEANS OF ANY MLF.

SECRETARY THEN SAID HE BELIEVED THERE WAS ADVANTAGE IN HAVING SIMPLE AGREEMENT AS WE HAD SUGGESTED PROVIDED THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING THAT IT MEANT AND WHAT IT DID NOT MEAN. SAID HE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION, OBSERVED SOVS MAY HAVE OTHER REASONS, NOT RELATED TO PROLIFERATION, FOR THEIR OBJECTING TO MLF IF IT CAME INTO BEING. HOWEVER, AS HE HAD SAID IN GENEVA, HE HOPED QUESTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION, IN WHICH WE BOTH INTERESTED, COULD BE ISOLATED WITHOUT HAVING OTHER, IRRELEVANT QUESTIONS BEAR ON THIS. NON-PROLIFERATION WAS IMPORTANT QUESTION TO BOTH SIDES; PERHAPS WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON IT AND DEAL WITH OTHER QUESTIONS IN OTHER WAYS.

MEETING ENDED ABOUT 1 P.M.

GP-1.

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NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 8-7-63 10 A.M. WVC.

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NLK 78-188 #7

Control: 5194
Rec'd: AUGUST 7, 1963
9:24 AM

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State

*1 copy to [unclear]
[unclear]*

NO: SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

PRIORITY

003

EYES ONLY

AFTERNOON SESSION TRIPARTITE TALKS AT SPIRIDONOVKA 3:45 P.M.
AUG. 6. US GROUP SAME AS IN A.M. EXCEPT STEVENSON, FOSTER,
(#) UK AND SOV GROUPS ALSO REDUCED, AND LATTER INCLUDING
SEMENOV.

AS AGREED IN MORNING /
DEVOTED TO GERMANY AND BERLIN.

SESSION ENTIRELY

SANITIZED

Dept. of State (NLK 78-188 APPEAL)
BY [signature] NARS, DATE 3/16/79

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-2- SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR), FROM MOSCOW

SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED MAKE ONE OR TWO COMMENTS. FIRST, HE BELIEVED IT QUITE APPARENT THAT WHAT COULD BE CALLED OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS IN TENSION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY AND BERLIN HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT IN LAST ONE OR TWO YEARS. SOME OF ELEMENTS WHICH HAD CAUSED CONSIDERABLE TENSION BETWEEN TWO GERMANIES AND CONSEQUENTLY BETWEEN COUNTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR GERMANY HAD BEEN EASED AND THEREFORE TENSIONS HAD REDUCED. SECRETARY BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS TOWARD MORE NORMAL ATMOSPHERE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS WHOLE AND NOTED HE MEANT BOTH SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST PARTS CENTRAL EUROPE.

SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT IN LOOKING BACK TO SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR HANDLING THIS PROBLEM, PRINCIPLES WE HAD GIVEN GROMYKO ON MARCH 22, 1962 IN GENEVA, IT SEEMED THAT APPROACH CONTAINED IN

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-3- SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR), FROM MOSCOW

THOSE PRINCIPLES WAS STILL VALID. WONDERED WHETHER GROMYKO DID NOT BELIEVE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF SUGGESTED PROCEDURES AND APPROACH TO THESE QUESTIONS STILL HAD SIGNIFICANCE. SAID DID NOT SEE WHY, GIVEN REDUCED TENSION IN THAT PART OF WORLD, PROBLEM UNDER DISCUSSION SHOULD BE URGENT OR CRITICAL UNLESS SOMEONE WANTED MAKE IT SO. EXPRESSED READINESS DISCUSS VARIOUS MATTERS INVOLVED AND FIND WAYS OF PREVENTING THEM FROM DISTURBING GROWING CONFIDENCE AND RELAXATION BETWEEN PRINCIPAL POWERS. ASKED WHETHER GROMYKO BELIEVED, AS HE DID, PRINCIPLES SUGGESTED IN '62 WERE STILL VALID IN '63.

GP-1.

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BAP

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 8/7/63 10:45 AM
(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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-3- SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM. (SECTION 2 OF 4) FROM: MOSCOW

SECRETARY SAID SINCE HE WAS PART OF SEQUEAKY MACHINERY WHICH HAD BEEN REFERRED TO HE WISHED TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS. GROMYKO WOULD REMEMBER THAT FOLLOWING SUBMISSION SOV PAPER ON ACCESS THERE HAD ARISEN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY QUESTION OF ACCESS TO WHAT. THIS INVOLVED QUESTION OF PRESENCE WESTERN FORCES IN WEST BERLIN. SINCE THIS QUESTION WAS FUNDAMENTAL AND IN THE MAIN NOT RESOLVED, IT SEEMED THEN ALMOST UNNECESSARY EXPLORE ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS. SAID WE PREPARED EXPLORE WHAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE, RECALLING WESTERN POWERS HAD AT ONE TIME DISCUSSED AMONG THEMSELVES POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EAST GERMAN INTERESTS. HOWEVER STORY HAD BROKEN IN PRESS AND MOSCOW RADIO HAD REJECTED PROPOSALS GIVEN EVEN BEFORE WE COULD MAKE THEM. THEREFORE WE STOPPED PURSUI THIS MATTER.

GP-1.

RUSK

JJE/25
NOTE: PASSED-WHITE HOUSE 8/7/63, 11:45 AM.

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Control: 5397
Rec'd: AUGUST 7, 1963
12:13 PM

Action
SS
Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR)

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

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
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
EYES ONLY

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-2- SECTO 28, AUGUST 7, 10 AM, (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR) FROM MOSCO

MEETING ENDED AT 5:25 P.M.

GP-1

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RUSK

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Approved in S
8/28/63

Date: August 9, 1963
Time: 10:15 a.m.
Place: Mr. Khrushchev's
dacha at Pitsunda

Participants: US: The Secretary
Ambassador Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Richard Davis, EUR
Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR

US/MC/5

USSR: Mr. Khrushchev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Vinogradov

CATEGORY "A"

Completely de-sensitized
Transferred to O/FADRC
by S/S-I date 9/6/73

Subject: Part II - Germany and Berlin

Copies to: S/S	S/Al-Ambassador Thompson	ACDA-Mr. Foster
U-Mr. Bail	EUR-Mr. Tyler	Embassy MOSCOW-
M-Mr. Harriuan	BTP-Mr. Ausland	Ambassador Kohler
G-Mr. Johnson	S/P-Mr. Rostow	Embassy BONN-
White House-Mr. Bundy	INR/OD-Mr. Hughes	Ambassador McChes

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Using as a springboard the discussion of the sequence of events leading to a non-aggression pact, Mr. Khrushchev launched into a discussion of Germany and Berlin.

He said the USSR believed it would be useful for our two countries and for the world at large to resolve the most difficult, and at the same time the easiest question, because all the difficulties surrounding it were contrived, i.e., that of a peace treaty with Germany. He thought this was both a basic and quarrelsome problem. He thought it was quarrelsome because it reminded him of a story in which some official was asked whether or not he believed in God; the official replied "not at the office but at home". Thus if one asked the US whether it was for a peace treaty it would reply "in confidence yes, but not in public". Khrushchev recalled that in his conversation with President Eisenhower he had not gained the impression that the latter was opposed. The same went for De Gaulle, who had only insisted that West Germany should remain part of the Western alliance. To this, Mr. Khrushchev said, he had replied that would be all right and it was West Germany's own business. As to Germany's division, De Gaulle had said two parts were fine and three would be even better. However, De Gaulle had said things should be left as they were and we should not hurry as there would be nothing to gain. Yet such a provision could not be understood by the peoples of the world. Also, as Ambassador Thompson would remember, he, Khrushchev, had asked Eisenhower why the US was arming West Germany and thus was creating a

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dangerous situation. Eisenhower had replied West Germany was competing with the US in the economic field and therefore the US wanted to make West Germany spend money on arms. This, he thought, was a straightforward answer by a soldier. Khrushchev believed it was paradoxical that De Gaulle should be the most negative with regard to the negotiations, for it was De Gaulle who had gone farthest with respect to the question of borders. De Gaulle had stated borders should stay as they were, and he had stated publicly what others only whispered.

Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that if one looked at the US NATO allies Adenauer was the only one to oppose a peace treaty in substance. De Gaulle agreed in substance but was opposed in form. The reason for his opposition was that in struggling against the United States he needed a strong supporter in Europe; therefore, he placed his stakes on Adenauer. While he needed a strong state to support him, De Gaulle had assured the USSR he was against West Germany's having nuclear weapons and that he did not want war against the Soviet Union. This course was in effect political speculation, but it could provoke bloodshed among the peoples of the world. It was also a sign of imperialist degeneration, but he, Khrushchev, did not wish to get involved in a discussion of this kind now and would prefer to leave this matter aside for awhile.

Khrushchev said that as far as the UK was concerned, the Conservatives were in favor but they did not wish to introduce discord in the Western orchestra. The Laborites agreed with the Soviet position on this point. Spaak too had said on several occasions that in those European countries where workers' parties were in the government the governments were in favor of a peace treaty. Spaak was also in favor of a non-aggression pact and had stated so in public. Denmark, Norway, Holland and Luxembourg held the same position. Thus only West Germany remained, and also France. France was opposed in the interest of a struggle for leadership in Europe. France wanted to kick the United States out of political leadership in Europe and take its place. However, France was too weak to do so alone and needed West Germany's support.

Thus Khrushchev believed the United States' position was the same as that of the UK. If it were not for such speculations by France, the United States could sign a peace treaty. Nothing would be lost although the gain would not be great either, but the cause of peace would benefit and the cold war would be liquidated. Adenauer has now become a leading figure in world politics, because he wanted to impose an aggressive policy on the Western powers; thus victors were now on the leash of the vanquished.

If one were to analyze the Soviet and the US position, Khrushchev continued, one would see that all NATO countries, including Adenauer, had come to the conclusion that borders could not be changed by force now, and were prepared to record this publicly but not formalize it. The objectives of a peace treaty were the same. Ten years after Dulles had spoken of rolling

back socialism eastward, the West had recognized this but was not prepared to formalize this juridically. Khrushchev said he did not know what would happen ten years hence, but the USSR and other socialist states might lose patience and sign a peace treaty unilaterally. The US said this would mean war, but he believed the US would have more wisdom than stupidity, because wars were waged only when basic interests were involved. In this case Adenauer's interests were involved, but then Adenauer might be dead by that time for all of us were mortal.

The Secretary said he wished to comment briefly on the situation. First he wanted to make two general observations since they had some bearing on the German problem. He said his deepest impression on this short visit to the Soviet Union was to see Soviet people at work and pursuing their daily affairs. He had also driven by automobile between New York and San Francisco on several occasions and had seen American people at work. On the basis of what he had seen in Moscow, Leningrad, and during his very brief stay here in the south, he had no doubt that the Soviet people, just as the American people, had no greater desire than to work in peace. Therefore, it was up to our respective governments to ensure such opportunity to their peoples. Another observation he wished to make was that, in his view, Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy were perhaps the only people who realized what modern war was. There were others, of course, who knew about the military and other aspects of modern war, but it was Mr. Khrushchev and the President who carried the ultimate responsibility. It was therefore important for the two leaders to find a possibility of collaborating on as many points as possible. The Secretary noted that the President had quoted Mr. Khrushchev's remarks on the nature of modern war. He continued that our two countries had a common historical background with respect to this situation, although the Soviet Union had perhaps greater experience because it had suffered so much from Hitler's Germany. However, it was a fundamental fact that our two countries had fought together against Hitler and they must not permit this problem to divide them. A peace treaty as such did not bother us. In 1954, the Western powers had declared solemnly that they would not seek change of the borders by force; while the circumstances in which that declaration had been made were somewhat different, the pledge still stood and this was fundamental.

The Secretary continued that while Mr. Khrushchev might not agree with what he was going to say, he hoped Mr. Khrushchev would take his remarks seriously and accept that we are genuine in our belief. We believed that any settlements if they were to be secure and safe had to be related to the wishes of the peoples involved. The Secretary said he had no sure knowledge of how the East Germans would express themselves if they were permitted to do so, but he believed that if the Soviet Union and we separated the Germans without their consent and then walked away, this would only sow seeds of great danger and perhaps of eventual conflict in Central Europe, because the Germans were restless and wished to organize themselves according to their own desires. We agreed and held the same view as the Soviet Union that the Germans should not have a national nuclear capability; indeed we felt very

strongly that there were enough nuclear powers in the world and our strong pursuit of this policy had resulted in considerable strain in our relations with France. We saw no desire whatsoever of having West Germany equipped with nuclear weapons, either through its own efforts or by somebody else. }

The Secretary then said this situation should be examined. He believed that if we allowed things to develop in the proper direction, more normal relations would be brought about not only between the two parts of Germany, but also between West Germany and the socialist countries to the east. He wondered whether Mr. Khrushchev would agree that considerable improvement in this respect had already taken place as compared to the situation two or three years ago.

The Secretary also thought we could make some advance in the disarmament field. There were a number of steps which could in a significant and practical way bring us closer to the solution of the real problems of disarmament. Such steps could remove some problems in the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We believed there were difficulties at this time with respect to sweeping disarmament but we could take a number of smaller steps to begin the momentum towards real disarmament. The Secretary hoped that over the next several months points could be found on which agreement could be reached, because whatever the arrangements in Central Europe they were based on the hope for disarmament, and we hoped we could find disarmament arrangements which would apply to both the capitalist and the socialist parts of Europe.

The Secretary believed that the governments of today, indeed all of us, have inherited some problems from the immediate post-war period. Those problems were difficult and each side had inherited its own difficulties. As to the United States, we had withdrawn considerable forces from what was now East Germany and had introduced our forces in West Berlin. We had done so to abide by the provisions of the agreement which had been previously reached with respect to Germany. At that time, some people felt there would be difficulties in connection with our presence in West Berlin and some had insisted that a territorial corridor to West Berlin be established. This had not been pressed because it had been felt that it could be interpreted as lack of confidence in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Berlin blockade occurred; after access had been restored, the arrangements were again such as did not reflect lack of confidence in the Soviet Government. Our two sides must find ways of attempting to increase confidence by moving ahead on measures in such fields as humanitarian, trade, and cultural. Steps in these fields would all increase confidence and strengthen the hopes for the future. However, at the moment--and perhaps Mr. Khrushchev would agree--acceptance of substantial responsibility by both the Soviet Union and the United States and our presence in Germany was an element of stability and not instability. For we did not know who might do what to whom if we were not there and if we did not accept responsibility for stability and peace in that part of the world.

Mr. Khrushchev nodded but said a peace treaty should nonetheless be signed. The signing of such a treaty was an unavoidable act after any war. He said he agreed with what the Secretary had said, and the Secretary's remarks contained many reasonable points. However, the conclusion to be drawn was that a peace treaty should be signed. In the absence of such a treaty, there would always be frictions. For example, if one took the GDR, the Western Powers had communications going through the GDR territory, for the use of which the Western Powers did not pay. The GDR was obviously discontented and it could break the cables; what could be done in such a case, for the GDR would have the right to take such action. Furthermore, the US had encouraged West Germany not to pay reparations; even plants which were subject to disassembly and transfer under the Potsdam agreement had not been disassembled or transferred. While other countries, such as East Germany, Rumania, Finland, Hungary, etc., had paid their reparations, West Germany, the richest country of them all and the most responsible one for the war, had not paid and in refusing to do so had leaned on US support.

Khrushchev said the USSR agreed that a peace treaty should state that the way for a reunification of Germany remained open and that each party to the treaty would facilitate this effort. However, we should stand aside and leave it to the two German states to resolve the problem. While he said that we should stand aside, he wished to point out that naturally we had our respective positions and sympathies: the Soviet Union was for the system in East Germany. However, the West could not change the system in the GDR, nor could the Soviet Union change the system in West Germany. It was not as the Secretary had said that the people of the whole of Germany could decide their destiny; it was a question of the peoples in the two German states to decide what their future would be.

Khrushchev continued the West had corns in the GDR. They should be removed so that there would be no temptation to step on them. It was Walter Lippman who had invented this expression, and it was a wise expression. So, a peace treaty should be signed.

The Secretary observed this was one of the problems. These corns were tempting given the geography of the situation. However, it was important to resist such temptation for it would be hard for us to apologize if our corns were under someone's foot.

Khrushchev interjected he who stepped on corns apologized but then stepped again grinding his heel. The Secretary observed this was not very polite. Khrushchev asked whether it was polite not to sign a peace treaty and to have corns in foreign territory. The Secretary said we had withdrawn from Thuringia and Saxony to abide faithfully by our agreement. Khrushchev said the USSR did not want West Berlin. West Berlin should be a third German state with a special status to be respected by all.

The Secretary continued that with regard to the principle of unification, that was a very important point and the Chairman himself had said on several occasions that the way should remain open.

Khrushchev commented it was necessary to leave it open.

The Secretary wondered whether it was really important from the Soviet's viewpoint to ask the two parts of Germany individually about unification, rather than to ask the German people as a whole. In saying this he was not asking that West Germany outvote East Germany, but there was an important difference here. He was not talking in terms of short-range problems or tactics, but rather in terms of long-range problems relating to the Continent. In referring to the Continent, he had in mind what De Gaulle had called Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, i.e., the entire continental area.

Khrushchev believed this matter was not subject to discussion, because both parts of Germany had their governments, their parliaments and elections. The GDR would hold elections in the near future, elections which ensured the most democratic way of soliciting popular opinion. There was no question of asking the two States again. Furthermore, had the US asked the people of Pakistan before it recognized Ayub Khan, who had dismissed the legitimately-elected government and used armed force to seize power. Also, in Guatemala bandits had seized power and thrown out the legitimately-elected president, and they had done so with the support of the US intelligence service. He wondered whether the people of Guatemala had been asked about it. Another example was Diem, who was persecuting the people of Viet Nam; the United States had recognized Diem without consulting the people, but if it were to ask the people, both Diem and the United States would be kicked out. Therefore, we should not dwell on this matter. He wished to add, however, that the United States had voted with force: it had used force to kick out the British and it had been right in doing so. The USSR had done the same; it had kicked out the White Guards and the US, UK, and Polish interventionists who had been helping the Whites. Thus, peoples had their own ways of settling their affairs. He would suggest that we do not get involved in such a discussion, because that would only lead us into a jungle. He wished to note, however, that nobody had asked the Spanish people about Franco; this bandit-like government had seized power without anybody's consulting the will of the people. There were many governments like this.

The Secretary pointed out there was substantial difference between situations where the form of government was an internal matter, and, of course, we could have a lively discussion about many governments in the world, and the situation, such as the one under discussion, where the question was what was the state, who was to live where, and who was to live together or separately. He believed the people had to be asked these questions.

Mr. Khrushchev said he wished to interrupt the Secretary and make an unpleasant point. Under the 1954 agreement all of Viet Nam had to have elections four years later. However, the US had not allowed those elections.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 7 -

Consequently the US was interpreting this problem in a mercantile way, namely, it regarded as democratic everything that was profitable.

The Secretary continued he did not wish to press this point, for he realized that Mr. Khrushchev had his own position and that as much as he regretted it, it did not appear to be possible to resolve this particular point this morning.

Khrushchev agreed and suggested it would be better to put this matter aside. He did not believe the Secretary's and his efforts would be sufficient to resolve the problem and thought history would have to come to assistance.

Khrushchev then suggested that the discussion should turn to more innocent matters, such as trade (covered in part III of the memorandum of conversation).

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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8/10/63

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

F789905-0461
Department of State

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Action

Control: 8731

Rec'd: AUGUST 10, 1963

SS

FROM: BONN

10.56 P.M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

8/10/63

Info

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 59, AUGUST 10

PRIORITY

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FOLLOWING SUMMARY BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

AFTER SECRETARY AND CHANCELLOR HAD CONFERRED PRIVATELY FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR LATE IN AFTERNOON, THEY JOINED LARGER GROUP FOR DISCUSSION OF TEST BAN TREATY WHICH LASTED ANOTHER HOUR AND A HALF.

Bonn Sec 10 24

Dec 18-3 USIA (12/1)

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-2- SECTO. 59, AUGUST 10. FROM: BONN.

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B1

B2

B3

SECRETARY RESPONDED BY STRESSING:

1. US BELIEVES VERY STRONGLY THAT HUMAN SURVIVAL DEPENDED ON FINDING SOME WAY, STEP BY STEP, TO BRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER CONTROL. WE SIGNED TREATY BECAUSE WE THOUGHT IT WAS IN US INTERESTS. WE WERE NOT TRYING TO DICTATE TO FEDERAL REPUBLIC WHICH HAD TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISION REGARDING ADHERENCE TO TREATY. WE ALSO BELIEVED SIGNATURE OF TREATY WAS IN INTEREST OF GENERAL COMMUNITY OF STATES, AND HOPED FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD FIND ITSELF ABLE TO JOIN MANY STATES WHICH WOULD SIGN OR ADHERE TO IT.

2. ONE FACTOR WHICH MOVED US TOWARD MORE GENERAL TYPE OF DISARMAMENT ARRANGEMENT, SUCH AS TEST BAN TREATY, WAS DESIRE TO AVOID ANYTHING THAT WOULD DISCRIMINATE SPECIFICALLY AGAINST GERMANY. THAT IS WHY WE WOULD WANT WORLD-WIDE AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. AS CHANCELLOR AWARE, SOVIETS HAD PRESSED US ON THIS LATER POINT REPEATEDLY WITHIN GERMAN AND BERLIN CONTEXT.

/3. ANOTHER

SECRET

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F78325-0463

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-3- SECTO 59, AUGUST 10. FROM: BONN.

3. ANOTHER ASPECT OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO US WAS MAINLAND CHINA. WE LOOKED TO DAY WHEN COUNTRY OF 700 MILLION PEOPLE WOULD ACQUIRE OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE WERE PRACTICALLY ONLY POWER WHICH HAS EXISTING COMMITMENTS TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM WHEN IT ARISES. THEREFORE WE HAD STRONG INCENTIVE TO TRY TO BRING ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON RED CHINA TO TRY TO AVOID ITS DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS HAD, HOWEVER, CONFRONTED US WITH CERTAIN COMPLEXITIES WHICH ALSO HAD BEARING ON GDR PROBLEM. WE DID NOT RECOGNIZE PEIPING, BUT WOULD NOT WANT FORMAL CONSIDERATIONS TO GIVE RED CHINA AN EXCUSE FOR NOT ADHERING TO TEST BAN. WE BELIEVED THAT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE IS CLEAR ON POINT THAT ADHERENCE TO MULTILATERAL TREATY DOES NOT INVOLVE RECOGNITION OF SIGNERS WHO ARE NOT RECOGNIZED.

4. WE ARE AND HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH PROBLEM OF SOVIET ZONE, NOT JUST BECAUSE OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC BUT ON OUR OWN ACCOUNT. OF ALL NATO MEMBERS, WE HAD LEAST TO DO WITH GDR AND HAVE DONE LEAST TO GIVE IT STATUS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE ITS STATUS WOULD BE CHANGED BY THIS TREATY OR BY DEPOSIT OF SIGNATURE ONLY IN MOSCOW.

5. RE POINT ON ARTICLE 4, THIS WAS A SHORTENED SUBSTITUTE FOR ARTICLE 3 OF EARLIER DRAFT. ACTUALLY SOVIETS HAD OBJECTED STRONGLY TO ANY CLAUSE IN TREATY ON WITHDRAWAL, CLAIMING THAT ANY SIGNATORY COULD EXERCISE ITS NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND SIMPLY DENOUNCE TREATY. WE WANTED TO PUT SOME LIMIT ON SUCH EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND FELT ABILITY TO WITHDRAW FROM TREATY SHOULD BE QUALIFIED IN ADVANCE. THEREFORE WE VALUED SOME WITHDRAWAL PROCEDURE. IF SOVIETS RESUMED TESTING, WE WOULD NOT LIMIT OUR ACTION TO WITHDRAWAL BUT WOULD REGARD TREATY AS SO INJURED IN CENTRAL POINT THAT WE WOULD NOT BE BOUND BY IT. WORDS "IN EXERCISING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY" THUS WERE REMNANT OF SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT SOVEREIGNTY ITSELF GIVES

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-4- SECTO 59, AUGUST 10. FROM: BONN.

RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL. THESE WORDS DID NOT COME UP IN ANY WAY IN CONNECTION WITH EAST GERMAN PROBLEM. WE MADE CLEAR THROUGHOUT DISCUSSION THAT NOTHING IN THIS TREATY COULD AFFECT OUR NONRECOGNITION POLICY TOWARDS GDR. SOVIETS ON THEIR PART HAD SOME HARSH THINGS TO SAY RE NATIONALIST CHINA.

6. WE EXPECTED TO MAKE OUR ATTITUDE ON THESE MATTERS CLEAR IN PRESENTATION TO SENATE.

ADENAUER SAID THERE SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT THAT FOUR WORDS "IN EXERCISING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY" WERE FULLY SUPERFLUOUS IN TEXT. THEIR INCLUSION WAS GOOD EXAMPLE OF SOVIET MASTERY OF DIALECTICS, WHICH SHOULD BE STUDIED BY ALL OFFICERS OF FOREIGN MINISTRIES.

AT THIS POINT THE SECRETARY ASKED CHAYES TO READ PORTIONS OF STATEMENT TO BE MADE BEFORE SENATE IN ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE REVIEW OF PROVISIONS OF TREATY. AFTER CHAYES HAD CONCLUDED, CHANCELLOR COMMENTED THAT MENTAL ACROBATICS INVOLVED IN FORMULATIONS WHICH HE HAD JUST HEARD WERE EXCELLENT. WHOEVER HAD WRITTEN THEM DID NOT NEED ANY FURTHER STUDY OF DIALECTICS. CHANCELLOR QUESTIONED SPECIFICALLY WHAT US WOULD DO IF SOVIETS TRANSMITTED GDR ADHERENCE. CHAYES QUOTED TEXT OF PROPOSED STATEMENT TO SENATE THAT WE WOULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH NOTIFICATION. ADENAUER QUERIED AS TO WHAT SPECIFIC REPLY TO SOVIETS WOULD BE. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, CHAYES POINTED OUT THAT OUR THINKING WAS THAT IT WOULD BE ALONG LINE OF REPLY WHICH WE HAD GIVEN SWISS AT TIME OF TRANSMISSION OF GDR ADHERENCE TO GENEVA PRISONERS OF WAR CONVENTION. WE SAID THAT WE DID NOT RECOGNIZE GDR BUT, BECAUSE OF KIND OF AGREEMENT IT WAS, WE TOOK NOTE OF FACT THAT GDR HAD STATED INTENTION TO ABIDE BY PROVISIONS OF CONVENTION. FEDERAL REPUBLIC, HE POINTED OUT, HAD SENT PRACTICALLY IDENTICAL NOTE TO SWISS AT THAT TIME.

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-5- SECTO 59, AUGUST 10. FROM: BONN.

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H5

ADENAUER WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPRESSED BY CLEAR US POSITION. HE ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED UK HELD SAME VIEWS. CHAYES RESPONDED THAT ALL THESE POINTS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED SPECIFICALLY WITH BRITISH, SINCE IN TALKS WITH GERMAN LEGAL EXPERTS PENETRATION INTO PROBLEM HAD BEEN MUCH DEEPER. HOWEVER, HE SUPPOSED BRITISH WOULD NOT HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THIS ANALYSIS AS THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THREE-DEPOSITARIES ARRANGEMENT. SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT UK HAD PARTICIPATED IN MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS ON RECOGNITION WHICH FORESHADOWED THIS RESULT.

CARSTENS ADDED THAT US WOULD ALSO TRANSMIT POSITION WHICH HE HAD EXPLAINED TO THIRD COUNTRIES TO HELP INFLUENCE THEIR ATTITUDES ANALOGOUSLY.

CHANCELLOR COMMENTED THAT, ON BASIS OF THIS ANALYSIS, HE THOUGHT HE COULD CARRY THROUGH GERMAN ADHERENCE WITH HIS PEOPLE. SECRETARY SAID HE WAS HAPPY TO HEAR THIS. WE WERE

/PREPARED TO

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-6- SECTO 59, AUGUST 10, FROM: BONN.

PREPARED TO WORK FURTHER ON POINTS THAT MIGHT ARISE. WE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH WE TRIED TO ANTICIPATE ALL QUESTIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE HEARINGS MIGHT BRING OUT A FEW WE HAD NOT THOUGHT OF. HE URGED COMPLETE SECRECY AS TO HIS INTENDED REMARKS TO SENATE, SINCE IT WOULD BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSING TO HAVE MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE READ WHAT HE WAS GOING TO SAY TO THEM BEFOREHAND IN PRESS. CHANCELLOR CONCLUDED DISCUSSION BY REMARKING THAT SECRETARY HAD NOT COME TO BONN IN VAIN.

COMMENT: AT DINNER THIS EVENING, CHANCELLOR DURING TOAST NOTED THAT VISIT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PRODUCING A BASIS FOR POSITIVE GERMAN ACTION ON ADHERENCE. FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS PRESENT WERE OBVIOUSLY ELATED. SOME WERE TALKING IN TERMS OF GERMAN SIGNATURE OF TREATY BEFORE IT WENT INTO EFFECT RATHER THAN MERE ADHERENCE. GERMAN CABINET MEETS ON MONDAY, AND THEY HOPE DEFINITIVE DECISION WILL BE TAKEN THEN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF BUNDESTAG WILL CONVENE ON FRIDAY.

RUSK

UMT/BA

NOTE: RELAYED TO THE WHITE HOUSE 8-10-63 11:30 P.M. AJH.

SECRET

8/28/63

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 28, 1963

PERSONAL -- SECRET

Dear Mr. President:

I am submitting herewith the report on the balance of payments which you requested.

While I realize you are not without reading material, I venture to urge your attention for the document as a whole.

The report takes an unsanguine view of the prospect. There is no solid reason for expecting the situation to improve. The consequences of unabated drain, which unhappily must be assumed, will be manifold and grave.

In the report, I examine at some length the nature and shortcomings of past action. By its nature this involves a good deal of second-guessing and hindsight. I would hope this would not be thought critical of individuals. It is important to see why, through errors of optimism and the desire to contract out of difficult action, we have erred in handling this problem in the past.

The heart of the strategy I propose is to suspend capital exports for a minimum period of six to nine months, with possible extension. This is imperative and requires supplementing recent Treasury action by stronger executive measures. The existing steps are not sufficient for the task.

The present course of trade negotiation is sadly inconsistent with our balance of payments position. I recommend as the next step the effective postponement of the existing negotiations with the Common Market Countries. I would personally like to go much farther for I do not believe that we have sufficiently reconciled our trade policy with our

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)

NSC MK-74-4

By MFD NARS Date 6/20/75

POF/90/ Treasury 9/63

balance of payments position. However, I am restrained by the lack of public or even governmental preparation for such a reversal.

Further, I urge certain steps on tourist travel, military deployment, and the deeper tying of aid. None of these, the military proposals excepted, will have a very prompt yield. All will be important in the slightly longer run.

The person who comments responsibly on the payments problem is like the herald who brings bad news: He is a figure for popular execution, and in this case each department will have its own gibbet. There are, indeed, grave difficulties with everything here urged. I hope these will not be considered decisive for they must now be measured against the alternative courses of action, which are few and worse, and the consequences of inaction, which would be worse yet.

Yours faithfully,



John Kenneth Galbraith

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL -- SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 28, 1963

PERSONAL -- SECRET

Dear Mr. President:

This is the first of two papers that I am sending you on the balance of payments problem.

1. The companion paper is concerned with problems and remedies. This deals with the more serious question, as I measure matters, of how to handle the problem. There is at present no mechanism for enforcing the continuing action on the wide front that the problem requires. Since I must speak frankly about persons and departments, I plead that this particular memorandum be held in strict confidence.

2. The heart of the matter is that for everyone concerned with the balance of payments problem it is subordinate to another concern. For the Council of Economic Advisers, it is subordinate to the domestic economy. Tobin, although his views were not typical, was perilously close to the conclusion that there is no problem at all. Other members, in fighting off measures which were considered, in my view quite correctly, to have a bad domestic impact, failed to develop a solidly affirmative position. All economists unduly emphasize international liquidity, which is a fashionable conversation piece of the economists union. The State Department, though it suffers from the effect of a weak balance of payments position on its bargaining position, is primarily concerned with protecting trade, troops and aid. The Commerce Department views the trade balance largely as an opportunity to get more money for trade promotion and foreign tourist travel. These are negligible in their possibilities. The Treasury has responsibility for the problem as a whole, but until recently its sacred cow has been the capital market. Even now, the checking of long-term capital outflows, and the stopping of avenues of escape around the proposed tax, is being handled in a highly unwilling way.

The picture is not entirely black. Bob McNamara has made a loyal and substantial effort to ease the problem. On the dollar-saving side, his is the only area of substantial achievement.

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MFO 6/20/75


Now as to remedies. Something over a year ago I urged you to set up a Cabinet Committee to have jurisdiction over this problem and to be responsible for its solution. This hasn't worked. It has been a place where those responsible have sought to shift the buck. There is no further hope for action here.

I gather you have been sufficiently pressed as regards the Treasury and Dillon. The Treasury hasn't done well. It waited too long on long-term capital movements. It is subject to the banker syndrome, which is to foresee disaster but prefer inaction. However, the Treasury cannot exercise real jurisdiction over the other Government Departments. The latter will always find it easier to organize against Dillon than to follow his lead. An appeal to you is inherent in the situation, so the problem comes to your office in any case.

Accordingly, I see no alternative to better organization of the Executive Office for continuing pressure and action. This means, I believe, that you must have someone of stature, fully seized of the seriousness of the problem, who will do in this critical matter what Bundy does for you on foreign policy and Sorensen on domestic policy. (You might reflect that nothing in the areas they so competently now cover is as important as the balance of payments, yet neither can function with real confidence on this issue.) Such a solution will cause sadness in the Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisers. But every President since Roosevelt has had to have an economist or economic figure who was his man to help him in combatting the excessive parochialism of departmental policy. (Currie served Roosevelt in this way, David Bell so served Truman, and Randall and Gabriel Hauge so served Eisenhower.) The man is all-important. Carl Kaysen, who is perhaps the ablest all-around economist in the country, is unfortunately susceptible to the economists' union. As a result, he is overly impressed by the international liquidity escapism. In any case, you need someone full time. I suggest that, whatever the implications, you attach Charles Hitch to the White House Office for nine months for this job. He is highly intelligent, has a pragmatic view of the issue, takes it seriously, and you can rely completely on his judgment. He would act largely through you, but he would command respect as your adviser. This need not be a permanent assignment. He need stay only until the present bleeding is decisively reversed.

As I argue in the accompanying memorandum, the present trend can be reversed. It is this, as well as the urgency of doing so, that leads me to urge that the powers of the President be decisively engaged.

Yours faithfully,



John Kenneth Galbraith

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: John Kenneth Galbraith

THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

I have now reviewed the papers on the balance of payments and have talked at some length with those principally concerned. The following assessment is divided into three parts: the problem; the past and present efforts to deal with it; and the action we should now take. We are, I fear, faced with the need for serious and difficult steps. Those who now urge further postponement may wish to recall the effect of similar urging in the past and to consider that the steps we now face could have been avoided by lesser but earlier action. Further delay will mean yet more severe measures.

Such delay will mean continued accumulation in foreign hands of dollar assets convertible into gold or the conversion of these assets into gold. Gold withdrawals at any time during the next 14 months could occur with damaging political effect on the Administration. It might be promoted for political purposes; indeed, the issue is already being eyed by necessitous politicians with obvious interest. We are taking unacceptable risks as long as the imbalance continues.

There are more deep-seated costs. You have heard sufficiently of the restraints that the payments weakness imposes on domestic employment policy. I am persuaded that it is far more notably a factor undermining our foreign policy. Bargaining strength is more intimately related to the balance of payments than to any other factor. Our troubles this past year with our European allies, France in particular, are not because we are militarily weaker than they or have less eloquent negotiators than in the past. Nor should too much be attributed to personalities. We are having trouble because we are financially weak and our allies are strong and more than a trifle arrogant as a result. If our weakness continues we will be able to keep our military and economic aid commitments only by borrowing. It will help us little if we have military power at the cost of the economic and political posture of a needy borrower. And it will soon be noticed here at home that our foreign policy lacks the power, certainty and confidence of the past. This also will have political overtones, for the weakness will be attributed one way or another to the Administration.

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E. O. 11652, SEC. 2(E), GPD, SEC. 1 AND 11

NSC ULR-74-4
BY SGP NARS, DATE 2/1/79

It has been suggested in the past that if the worst came to the ultimate worst these various consequences could be eliminated by devaluation. One cannot speak of devaluation, but one can do it. So we have an ace in the hole. We have not. Prior to any decision to devalue in our system of checks, news leaks and balances there would be vast press disturbance, huge gold outflows, and deep suspicion of the competence of those concerned, all with the most disastrous political effects. And economists, even the men of reputation, persist in thinking of devaluation (or floating exchange rates) in terms of a small country viz-a-viz the United States. In fact, the devaluation by the United States would bring prompt and immediate devaluation by every other country, including currencies as hard as the Swiss franc. All this would soon restore the previous exchange and trading relationships, the previous imbalance, and the previous dependence on external credits. We have no alternative but to reverse the present accumulation of short-term claims by eliminating the factors contributing to it.

In turning to measures, we must see first (a) why past action has not worked and (b) what prospective action is needed. For purposes not of criticism but of analysis, it is important that we see the defects of past action.

SHORTCOMINGS OF PAST ACTION

Much useful work has been done on the balance of payments problem and both the underlying problem and the possible course of action have been much clarified in the last two and one-half years. However, there have been weaknesses in our past handling of the problem, as follows:

1. We have naturally sought to maintain confidence in the dollar. Accordingly (and this tendency antedates the present Administration), we have been perpetually optimistic about the prospects for turning the balance in our favor. In the course of persuading others that all is well, we have too easily persuaded ourselves. Each remedial step -- to tie aid, reduce dollar outlays for defense, stimulate trade and tourist travel, and (more recently) to tax access to the domestic capital market -- has been presented as a total remedy. This optimism has then become the basis of policy until it was evident that something more was needed. There have been so many optimistic forecasts that none would now be taken seriously. This is not good public procedure.

September 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From : James Tobin

Subject: The Galbraith Proposals

1. Ends and Means

Galbraith ~~assumes that~~ the U. S. has no choice but to maintain the convertibility of dollars held by foreign governments into gold at \$35 an ounce. Therefore he proposes to limit drastically the convertibility of privately owned dollars into foreign currencies. But why have we considered it important to maintain the dollar as good as gold, specifically as good as 1/35 of an ounce of gold? In the final analysis, it is for this reason: This commitment, we believe, is the foundation of a system of fixed exchange rates that permits efficient international trade and investment, leading to a world in which individuals are as free to make transactions across as within national boundaries. Progress toward such a world has been the guiding principle of U. S. foreign economic policy for almost thirty years, and it has been for much longer the aim of the Democratic party. Whether this aim is important or trivial, noble or foolish, it is the sole ultimate raison d'etre of gold-dollar convertibility. The purpose of convertibility of official dollars into gold at a fixed price is to assure convertibility of private dollars into other currencies at fixed rates. It makes no sense to sacrifice the ends to preserve the means, to destroy the goal to save the instrument.

Neither God nor the Founding Fathers said dollars must be convertible into gold at \$35 an ounce. It was FDR. If he had not had the courage to suspend gold convertibility for a while and to reestablish it with a devalued dollar, we might still be in the Great Depression.

But Galbraith says we now have no choice. We have no "ace in the hole," he says, because other countries will not let us devalue the dollar relative to their currencies. If we raise the price of gold, they will do likewise, so that currencies will still exchange at the same rates and the imbalance of payments now existing at these rates will continue.

If this is true, we would at least increase our gold reserves, and theirs, in the same proportion as we mark up the price of gold. But much more important, Galbraith has forgotten our real "ace in the hole." That is to suspend the automatic convertibility of dollars into gold. Then European central banks would have to choose between two courses of action, either of which would take us off the hook: (a) If, as Galbraith assumes, they are unwilling to let the dollar fall in value relative to their currencies, they would have to buy and hold all the dollars offered them at existing exchange rates. They -- not we -- would have the entire burden of maintaining the current rates. (b) To the extent that they are unwilling to buy dollars for this purpose, the dollar would depreciate in exchange value as much as necessary to balance our accounts. For it would become cheaper for foreigners to buy U.S. goods, services, and securities, and more expensive for Americans to buy things abroad.

Let there be no misunderstanding. I do not propose that we play this ace. The situation is not that desperate. But I do firmly believe that it would be far preferable to play it than to impose a battery of far-reaching direct controls over international transactions. If the situation ever requires that we severely limit dollar convertibility, then it would be far less disruptive of the world economy and for less damaging to our own national objectives to suspend convertibility into gold than to try to limit by administrative fiat the convertibility of dollars into foreign currencies.

Furthermore, I believe we can and should use the threat of the ultimate ace in the hole to obtain from European governments the cooperation and financing we need to maintain the system as is. For they have more to fear than we have from a suspension of gold sales, cutting the dollar loose from gold. Neither of the two choices with which this action would confront them is an attractive one. Galbraith is right that they do not want us to gain in competitive position by dollar depreciation; neither do they want to prevent this by buying dollars indefinitely. Faced with this prospect, which scarcely needs to be spelled out very explicitly to them, they would surely prefer to make the long-term financing arrangements needed to tide us over. This probably requires on their side political decisions and actions by governments, not just by central banks. The U.S. is certainly credit-worthy, more so than those same governments were in the days of dollar shortage when we financed their deficits by grants and long-term loans. Unfortunately, we have given them the

impression that we are more scared of our ace than they are. This attitude enables them to keep us where they like us, over the barrel.

2. Strategy Against Temporary and Permanent Payments Deficits

Either the causes of our present payments deficit are temporary or they are permanent. No one can know for sure, and policy has to admit both possibilities. If they are temporary, which is better -- to use reserves and to borrow abroad or to impose à la Galbraith direct controls over the foreign transactions of our citizens and further crippling restrictions on government programs overseas? The costs of these controls -- in our foreign aid programs, in our defense posture, in administrative difficulty and confusion, in political opposition -- are not worth the gold they could save in one, two, or three years. If the causes of our difficulties are permanent, which is better -- to impose permanently Galbraith's controls or to face the reality that the dollar is priced too high? We probably could not maintain such controls permanently -- they would crumble. But if we could, they would cause untold damage to our national objectives and to the world economy. Do we really want to recreate the world of Hjalmar Schacht, just to maintain the shadow of convertibility without the substance?

I conclude that Schachtian measures are poor strategy either as temporary or permanent policy. If our difficulties are temporary, better to use reserves and credit. If they are permanent, better to let the dollar float.

3. Bargaining Power

Galbraith is right that the weakness of the dollar impairs our national prestige and bargaining strength in many lines, financial, economic, and diplomatic. He is wrong to think that achieving a paper balance by his control measures will restore our prestige and our bargaining power.

If deGaulle and other Europeans can scare us, it is because they have dollars we are afraid they will convert into gold. They will still have them after Galbraith's measures take effect. His proposals do nothing to protect us from the dagger which thus hangs over our heads so long as we acquiesce in the view that suspension of gold convertibility is a worse calamity for us than for them. The best his proposals can do is to arrest the growth of these dollar claims. And very likely his program will accelerate this growth, by causing dollars now lodged in private hands abroad to be sold to foreign central banks. These dollars -- some \$8.6 billion of them -- are the residue of our past deficits. By scaring these dollars out of private into official hands, Galbraith's measures could worsen our gold position even while it reduces the current deficit as statistically recorded.

Galbraith appears to believe that our bargaining power will miraculously improve as soon as our statistics show a balance, however the balance is achieved. Why? Will his measures hurt the Europeans so much that they will suddenly become cooperative? I think not. Galbraith's actions would work mainly by cutting U.S. capital exports and U.S. government outlays in foreign currencies. These are precisely the outpayments the Europeans want us to cut one way or another. They want us to save them the trouble of retarding the growth of American ownership of European enterprise, and they do not share our interest in development and defense assistance around the world. They will not be anxious for us to reverse these measures. But they will be very skeptical that pressures within the U.S. will permit us to maintain them for very long.

What the Europeans fear -- and therefore what would give us bargaining power -- is an improvement in the U.S. surplus in trade and services. This is, of course, why they fear dollar devaluation. The only parts of Galbraith's program which work in this direction are his tentative suggestions to raise our tariffs (or at least to go slow in negotiating reductions) and to limit American tourist expenditures. And it is fairly easy for the Europeans to neutralize these steps by retaliation in kind.

Conceivably our bargaining strength could be increased by threatening to withdraw the U.S. military umbrella which now protects Western Europe from the Soviet Union. It is hard to make such a threat credible, and I do not understand Galbraith to have suggested this tactic.

Otherwise our principal source of bargaining power is the "ace in the hole" already discussed. We have not exploited this in the past, and Galbraith's program announces to the world even more emphatically that we will go to any lengths to avoid playing this card. In this way, it weakens rather than strengthens our position.

3. Feasibility of capital controls. All experience tells us that effective control over capital movements requires policing of all international transactions. If this has been true of small countries with simple transactions and with experience and tradition in capital controls, how much more will it be true of the U.S.? Capital exports can occur in many guises: (a) Americans can over-pay for imports, or pay for them early (b) Americans can accept under-payment or late payment for exports (c) tourists can buy foreign assets (d) Americans can invest abroad

through remittances to friends and relatives (e) American firms can fail to repatriate foreign earnings (f) American individuals and firms who earn foreign currencies abroad can sell them for dollars to other Americans. And so on. The ingenuity of man in such matters is boundless; the conscience of man is not. As the structure of controls is eroded, the policing net has to be cast ever wider. The inevitable loopholes opened for reasons of equity and hardship -- for deserving Americans or deserving foreign clients like Canada and Japan -- will further undermine the whole structure.

Consider that in 1962 unrecorded transactions led to a net outflow of over \$1 billion (compared with a "normal" net inflow of \$0.5 billion in the 1950's). It is safe to predict that this mysterious outflow will greatly increase if capital controls are imposed.

Galbraith says his controls would have saved \$.5 - .75 billion in the deficit last year. This is an optimistic estimate considering the inevitable exceptions that would have to be made and the numerous possibilities for evasion. Considering also that each dollar saved on the deficit means only a fraction of a dollar saved in gold, I think the saving in gold is small for the costs involved.

Among the costs, incidentally, would be an internal political outcry which would far exceed in decibels the bitter reaction to the mild proposals of 1961 for prompter taxation of subsidiary earnings abroad. It will be said that we are shortsightedly killing geese that lay golden eggs -- and with some justice, for the growth of earnings on U.S. investments abroad is one of the hopeful omens of eventual improvement in our balance of payments.

ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DEF 18-4 USSR (MC)

AIRGRAM

JR-6

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6/4 memo and 9/13/63

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NO. A-301

TO : Department of State ^{1963 SEP 13 AM 8:41}

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 3/15/76

PER J. Armitage OFFICE Eu & ACDA ^{ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION}

FADRC FOL CASE NO. 5-C-125

FROM : Amembassy, MOSCOW

DATE: September 6, 1963

SUBJECT: Soviet Signature of Test Ban Treaty

REF :

EUR INDEX

The enclosed memorandum examining the motivation for Moscow's signature of the test ban agreement was prepared for internal Embassy use. It is recognized that the Department will have undertaken the same analysis in a more thorough fashion, with the greater resources at its disposal. The memorandum may be of some interest, however, to Departmental officers concerned with the problem.

For the Ambassador:

Malcolm Toon

Malcolm Toon
Counselor for Political Affairs

Enclosure: 1

1. Memorandum entitled "Motivation for Moscow's Signature of the Test Ban Agreement"

Declassified following September 1, 1968

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:TRBuchanan:mjb:9-5-63

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:MToon

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MOTIVATIONS FOR MOSCOW'S SIGNATURE OF THE TEST BAN AGREEMENT

The Chinese have taunted the Soviets with inconsistency in their willingness to accept in July 1963 a partial test ban agreement which they had denounced only a year ago. The Soviet retort that conditions have changed fails to answer the question: what new conditions or pressures convinced the Russians that they should support today an agreement which they could have had last year, or even as a result of the test ban negotiations last January.

1. Economic and Military Considerations.

The Embassy is not qualified to judge the full military or economic significance of the agreement. There are certain obvious remarks, however, which should be made, if only to help distinguish what are essentially useful by-products of the agreement from the driving motivation for its conclusion.

The Soviets were presumably prepared to accept the military disadvantages of abandoning further tests in the three environments because their 1961-62 tests series had convinced them that (a) they were not anywhere approaching a technical breakthrough e.g., in the field of anti-missile defense, and (b) they had learned sufficiently from the series not to have to test again for some time. The Soviets may have concluded that neither side is likely to develop a lasting decisive military advantage by testing, and that whatever advantage the US may have, it is relatively meaningless so long as the USSR is able to inflict crippling damage on the US and its allies. In short, each side must content itself with a policy of deterrence. Since the US did not resume testing in the atmosphere after the Soviet 1962 series, the USSR may have also seen some military advantage in blocking a new US test series. This was a form of advantage, however, which the USSR could have had at any time in the past year.

Soviet officials have periodically referred to the burden of nuclear arms. FOGLIATTI is reported by Izvestiya on August 26 to have defended the test ban agreement with the argument that the burden of overtaking the US in the nuclear field distorted the economic development of the socialist bloc as a whole. The savings from a test ban agreement, however, would seem relatively minor compared to the savings of real measures of disarmament. KHRUSHCHEV implied in the spring of 1959 that the USSR might cease producing atomic bombs because it had enough, and more recently he told the Secretary that the USSR was considering cutting back on the production of rockets -- in each case areas where more meaningful savings might be accomplished. There can be no doubt that the USSR is seeking to free resources for investment -- but it seems reasonable to assume that it sees real savings resulting not from the absence of tests, but rather from a deceleration in the arms race as a consequence of an improvement in the political atmosphere. The Soviets evidently regard an atmosphere of detente as one of the happy by-products of a test ban agreement which they hope to exploit. They could have used the test ban agreement, however, to achieve a detente at different times during the past year. The interesting question is: why now?

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The political and economic advantages of a test ban agreement help explain what appears to have been Moscow's interest in negotiating an agreement -- but Moscow's continuing refusal to make more than a token payment in the form of inspection to secure such an agreement suggest that it did not rate the political and economic gains as being of any compelling importance. Rather, it has appeared to regard the agreement as something rather easy to attain, which should be kept on the shelf for the moment when it could be used with greatest political effect.

The extreme sensitivity of Peiping to the nuclear test ban issue -- which has been driven home in recent weeks -- pointed logically to a connection between the Soviet attitude toward the test ban and Moscow's relations with Peiping. The overriding importance of Sino-Soviet relations to the nuclear test ban talks becomes fully clear, however, only when an attempt is made to trace the fate of negotiations on the test ban agreement against the background of Moscow's changing policy toward Peiping and the West over the past year.

2. Rejection of the 1962 Test Ban Offer.

The US offer of a partial test ban treaty in August 1962 found the USSR in no mood for compromise. After a brief halt in polemics, Peiping had renewed its attacks on "revisionist" trends in the USSR, reflected in a soft policy toward the West. Soviet officials were also concerned with the widespread impression abroad, based on LACHAKERA's briefing of NATO, that the USSR was substantially weaker militarily than the West. They were hence reluctant to make any concessions which might be regarded as an admission of weakness, feeding assumptions of military superiority which contributed in turn to the West's "stubborn refusal to recognize the reality" of the Soviet position on Berlin and Germany. Peiping's known sensitivity on the question of nuclear weapons was a perhaps even more important consideration at that moment, precluding serious consideration of compromise on the test ban question; for Khrushchev still apparently had hopes that he could force MAC to toe the line, by a combination of pressure and conciliation tactics.

The placement of rockets on Cuba was the deus ex machinae which was apparently intended simultaneously to force the US to negotiate the political settlement, notably involving West Berlin, which it had hitherto refused, and to reassert dynamic Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement in a manner which Mao would have had to acknowledge or risk isolation.

The disastrous failure of Khrushchev's bold gamble sharply accelerated the political struggle with Peiping. It also drove home to an initially panicky Khrushchev the need for a settlement with the US, which would both preclude similar fiascoes in the future, and would stop short a new round of tension and arms race, putting off still further the day when the USSR could hope to divert resources from armaments. Sobered by his icy confrontation with US power, and infuriated by China's charges of "capitulation," Khrushchev initially gave priority to an improvement in relations with the US, which by its very nature precluded rapprochement with Peiping. His bitter anti-Chinese attack at the Supreme Soviet on December 18 and his letter to President Kennedy of December 19, in which he proposed to accept three inspections as the basis for a test ban treaty, were logical developments in a move

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toward rapprochement with the West. Khrushchev was in bad need of something which he could more legitimately describe as a victory for his policy of "peaceful co-existence" than the "reasonable compromise" negotiated over Cuba. The test ban treaty may have seemed in December like the least painful and most acceptable way of trying to turn a humiliating defeat into some sort of victory.

3. Cause of the Failure of the January Talks.

Something appears to have occurred between agreement in late December 1962 to renew discussions of a test ban treaty in January and the actual opening of the talks, to modify the optimistic atmosphere surrounding the talks. Several factors combine to explain their failure. In the first place, there may well have been surprise on the part of the USSR that its three-inspection offer was not accepted, resulting from a genuine misunderstanding of the remarks of Arthur DEAN. This misunderstanding, if it occurred, need not have been decisive if it had not apparently coincided with a shift in attitude within the Presidium, if not an actual shift in power alignment.

It is not unreasonable to speculate that this shift was the product of the combined pressure of: China's bitter attacks on the Soviet policy of "capitulation" (notably in the December 15 and 31 People's Daily); insistence by anxious Communist leaders throughout the world that the two leading Communist powers compromise their differences, and a mood of mounting anger in the Presidium over the humiliation suffered in October -- a mood which found opponents of different aspects of Khrushchev's policies joining forces. The result was a period of sharp reversals of policies identified with Khrushchev and of indecision lasting several months, which prevented all progress in the direction of improved relations with the US. The January 7 Pravda leading article reflected the ascendancy of a mood favoring some gestures toward compromise with China, to which Khrushchev apparently felt the need to make at least tactical concessions. His January 16 speech to the VI SED Congress calling for an end of polemics was the signal for an at least ostensible effort to find some formula which would permit the two giants of the Communist world to disagree in "comradely" fashion. This was not the moment for any agreement with the West -- let alone an agreement affecting the vital interests of Peiping. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that KUZNETSOV should have shown so little interest in his talks with FOSTER in negotiating a compromise number of inspections, or in reverting to the possibility of a partial test ban.

4. The Decision to Discount Peiping's Reaction.

Assuming that Soviet willingness to consider a test ban agreement was related to the state of Sino-Soviet relations, and to the conviction in some Soviet circles that nothing must be done to strain further Moscow's tenuous ties with Peiping, the question then arises: at what point did Moscow decide that there was little hope of achieving a modus vivendi within the world communist movement with Peiping and become more interested in reaching an agreement with the West?

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The series of bitter attacks on Moscow printed in the Chinese press in late February and early March, and Chinese behavior at the Moshi Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference could account for the change of tone of Soviet remarks about relations with Peiping. Whereas the February 10 Pravda leading article accused the Chinese of exaggerating the dangers of a split, the March 30 CPSU letter to Peiping warned that the question confronting the international communist movement is whether "we go forward together in a single system" or "permit ourselves to be drawn into a split."

The pattern of events in April and May was confused. It included on the one hand some signs of an improvement in relations with the Chinese. The 1963 trade protocol was signed on April 20 and an agreement reached on May 14 to hold bilateral talks in Moscow on July 5. With the talks scheduled, it would seem logically to have been tactically unwise for the USSR to press for an improvement in relations with the West.

Yet there were also indications that the USSR was playing an ambiguous game, carrying on muted polemics with Peiping and indicating in part no doubt as a form of pressure on Peiping, that it reserved the option to improve relations with the West, even at Peiping's expense. It was interesting, for example, that Pravda on April 11 carried an expurgated version of a statement by US scientists which both credited President Kennedy with "sincere efforts" to achieve a feasible test ban agreement, and presented the Soviet readers with forceful arguments on why a test ban agreement was in the interest of both countries. Soviet officials were also very cooperative in their relations with Dr. SEIBERG on his May 19-30 visit to the USSR to discuss the peaceful uses of atomic energy; KHRUSHCHEV asked Dr. Seiberg on May 29 to tell the President that the USSR sincerely sought cooperation with the US.

One may speculate on the reasons for the shift which occurred in Soviet tactics toward the Chinese in the early part of June from one of hypocritical cooperation to one of increasingly blatant provocation. (Factors in the shift may have been Khrushchev's apparent reassertion of strong leadership, conceivably linked with the convenient incapacitation of KOSLOV in April; on accretion of confidence after the CASTRO visit and consultation with a wide range of visiting foreign Communists; and simply a growing conviction that bilateral talks would only be a formality, and the Chinese would misinterpret a continuation of Soviet restraint for weakness.)

In any event, the US-JR bid to the USSR at the end of May to renew test ban talks had some chance of being heard. Khrushchev's response, however, was no more than grudging acquiescence and he was no more forthcoming in his June 15 interview with Pravda and Investiya, putting the burden of concession in each case on the US and UK. Pravda in mid-June also continued to discuss the problem of underground tests. It seemed at this point, therefore, that Khrushchev saw the talks essentially as a means of pressure on the Chinese, and a fall-back position in the probable event that bilateral talks with the Chinese failed. It was interesting, in this latter connection, that Pravda also reported in mid-June Foster's statement that the US Senate would accept any test ban agreement concluded between the US and USSR. The delivery of the Chinese Communist letter of June 14 was the most obvious cause for the change in Soviet tactics on the test ban issue. The letter would seem, however, simply to have crystallized a trend toward disregarding Peiping's reactions, already reflected in the publication on June 12-13 of the President's June 10 speech to Congress.

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Expectation that Peiping will explode a nuclear device within a year, and US efforts to develop some form of multilateral nuclear force are added factors which have their place in the equation, but they would seem no more than contributing considerations arguing in favor of some agreement which could be used to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and embarrass those countries prepared to ignore the "referendum" of world public opinion.

5. East-West Aspects.

With its prime purpose of isolating Peiping on its way to partial achievement, the East-West aspects of the test ban agreement probably begin to take on increasing importance in Moscow's eyes. The Soviets are always mindful of any opportunity to sow distrust among the countries of the West -- protests to the contrary notwithstanding. At a time when the USSR shows increased interest in arousing nationalist suspicion within the FRG of its NATO allies, as a first step toward encouraging FRG interest in a "new Rapallo," the by-product value of the test ban as a source of friction in relations between the FRG and the US and UK is certainly not being overlooked. The wedge-driving value of the test ban agreement would still seem, however, to be secondary.

Similarly, Moscow obviously looks on the treaty as a first step toward a relaxation of tension in relations with the West -- in a sense, a compensating policy for the deterioration in its relations with Peiping. Tactically, however, it would be unwise for Moscow to appear to vindicate all of Peiping's accusations by pushing too eagerly into the arms of the West.

Competition for influence in foreign Communist parties constitutes an additional impediment to any far-reaching rapprochement with the West -- to those many obstacles which already exist in the form of ingrained suspicion, conflicting interests and outlook, and reluctance to alter long-held positions.

The Soviets have shown, in fact, by their recent statements on the occasion of the Secretary's visit to Moscow, that they feel under no real compulsion to seek a major accommodation with the West, with all the concessions which such an accommodation would inevitably require. They seem to envisage instead a gradual removal of specific points of friction, and an exploitation of the atmosphere rather than the substance of detente.

The day is still very far off, even after the Chinese explode their first bomb, before Communist China becomes a sufficiently real military threat to the US to persuade the Soviet leaders that they must pay the price of far-reaching concessions to the West for the sake of the added protection which close relations with the West might provide.

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Department of State Advisory

✓ McNamara, Robert S.

September 16, 1963

Dear Bob:

Several times I have started to send you the memorandum you suggested at our last luncheon on possible help in testing or otherwise which we might offer to General DeGaulle for, say, his agreement to sign the test ban treaty.

Although I gather the matter is dormant, I am going away for some weeks and so shall still leave with you my testament of thought.

I begin with some reminiscence. When, in the 1940's, we rescued Germany from Henry Morgenthau's plans for industrial dismantling and a pastoral Germany, one of our cardinal purposes was to integrate Germany into the West so as to prevent a revival of German nationalism.

At my first meeting with Adenauer in November, 1949, he cited a German proverb that the Germans take on the color of the wall; they tend to conform to their environment. It was not good for people to be isolated, he said; it accentuated their least desirable characteristics. He indicated that Germans, like other Europeans, would profit from escaping from a purely national environment into a wider one -- one in which their more liberal traditions would find strength through companionship.

The Honorable
Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense,
The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C.

Replied to McNamara, Box 22, Folio 275, Arthur Papers, Yale

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Robert S. McNamara,
September 16, 1963,
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For the past fifteen years this policy of integrating and "de-nationalizing" Germany has achieved considerable success. This now seems, for the first time, to be in jeopardy.

The reasons are various: The emergence of a new German generation, untroubled by war guilt; increasing German preoccupation with the unity issue, and some doubts as to US intentions on this score; the retirement of the Chancellor and resulting vacuum in German politics; the heady example of DeGaulle's nationalism across the Rhine; and the slow-down at Brussels -- all contribute to make vocal those who are not in the way of grace and who believe that the Federal Republic now has a right and duty to look more to its own national interests.

The results are evident in several ways. The emergence of Strauss and Guttenberg, both able and attractive men, as leaders of a right wing nationalist challenge to the present CDU leadership is perhaps the most notable. Two such canny politicians would not be disputing for the privilege of heading this challenge unless they thought that the climate in Germany was propitious.

What I fear from all this is nothing like a revival of the Nazi movement, but rather the emergence of a Germany whose leaders are dedicated to national goals in the same sense that DeGaulle is.

I see four major dangers in such a development, the first three creating great probability of the fourth:

First: It would probably spell the end of the European unity movement. That movement can survive one curmudgeon among

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The Six, but, if both the major continental nations succumb to nationalism, Brussels will become about as significant politically in Europe as Geneva was between the wars. And for the same reason: It will be discredited. Since European unity is essential to greater European strength, this would be a major setback to the United States.

Second: The British reaction to an increasingly nationalist Germany would be suspicious and hostile. Impulses toward British neutralism would be reinforced. And German hostility toward the UK would be strengthened as a result.

Third: If vitality and cohesion go out of the Western European-North American nexus, German reunification can come about only through a Russian-German deal

*involves strong NATO
could bring it
about another way*

Fourth: A more nationalist German government would try independent negotiations with the Soviets, as Von Seeckt did after World War I.

In trying to avert a revival of nationalism in Germany, we have one major asset: The Germans look to us for leadership, and they know that their security is dependent on us. A German government will only follow courses of which the United States disapproves if trends in German domestic politics make it difficult to do anything else.

United States nuclear help to France would, over the long run, stimulate trends which could have just this effect. Not that the Germans want a national nuclear capability; I don't believe most of them do. But they are more sensitive than they were a few years ago to any implication of discrimination and

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second class status. They do not now see their nuclear situation in this light. They expect the MLF to get them as favorable a nuclear position as France can achieve single-handedly through its faltering nuclear program.

But US nuclear aid to France would change this situation. Not because the Germans would resent it; some of them might welcome it as a step to ease alliance tensions. But because it would set up an evident comparison between the independent nuclear forces which we would be helping France and Britain to achieve and the combined and dependent force which we would be asking Germany to join.

Nationalist groups would condemn the Government for having willingly accepted an arrangement which so clearly discriminated against Germany. They would suggest alternative approaches, more geared to national goals. Moderate German leaders (von Hassel, Schroeder) who have committed themselves to the multilateral route would be placed on the defensive. In this debate the nationalist elements would have the advantage. The contrast between what we were doing for France and offering to do for Germany would be just too glaring. A Versailles-type sense of "discrimination" could be aroused.

German opinion is not now excited about the nuclear issue. What is significant, however, is that it is more concerned about this issue and about Germany's "equal status" than a few years ago. This suggests a trend in which the nuclear issue and the question of "non-discrimination" seems to me a "comer"; it is attracting somewhat more German attention each year, and could raise an issue which nationalist groups could exploit to the domestic disadvantage of present moderate leadership.

The Honorable
Robert S. McNamara,
September 16, 1963,
Page 5.

You know my theme song only too well -- that Germany is the most important country in the world to us. It both holds, if not the key to Europe, at least a key, and is subject to be influenced by us in its use as the Soviet Union, France, and Britain are not. Khrushchev and De Gaulle will go their own ways, deflected only by events or forces which they cannot change. With a people conscious of weakness and unwilling to accept any burden or risk, British leaders will drift into the position of a slightly more world-conscious Sweden. But Germany can be influenced only if moderate leaders stay in control. They will not stay in control if, like the allies after World War I, we create such liabilities for them at home that the people see them as failures and turn to extremists.

No concessions De Gaulle would likely give us in return for nuclear help would compensate for such an adverse trend in German domestic affairs. Rather, if moderate leadership in Germany can be strengthened during the years of Gaullist temptation, progress toward our goals in Europe will again be feasible when De Gaulle leaves power, if not sooner.

The hardest job in foreign policy is to hold to a sound course in heavy weather, for the sake of long run objectives. The temptation is always to compromise with the most pressing problems, hoping that the distant future will somehow take care of itself. But that is how the most serious mistakes are made. The French Government which peacefully accepted Germany's occupation of the Rhineland was commended in most of the French press at the time; now it is a by-word for improvidence. The future judges us by how it comes out in the end.

The Honorable
Robert S. McNamara,
September 16, 1963,
Page 6.

In the case of our European policy this judgment will, I believe, hinge on whether moderate leadership in Germany can hold its own in the next few years. We ought to be prepared to suffer the slings and arrows of an outrageous General for some time, to ensure that this is the case, rather than seek an ephemeral "success" through actions to remove this source of tension; which will lose Germany.

Sincerely yours,

Robert S. McNamara

9/19/63

GERMANY

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Info: PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

359

G TO CHANCELLOR ADENAUER:

SP
L QTE

SAL
BTF Dear Mr. Chancellor:

IO I have your letter suggesting that in my speech before
DAC the United Nations I should once again state the view of the
INR United States toward the reunification of Germany. Your
RMR recommendation coincides with my own judgment, and I trust
that you will find the reference in my speech satisfactory.
I agree that it is useful to keep this position clearly stated
before the world and before the Soviet Union.

I have been sorry to note that in your recent Television
interview you appear to connect my personal commitment to a
test ban treaty -- a commitment that goes back to 1961 -- with
the fact that there will be elections in the United States
more than a ~~XXXXXX~~ year from now. I can assure you that
neither this commitment nor my view of any future negotiations
with the Soviet

Drafted by: WH - Mr. Bundy
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Carol Moor

Clearances:

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

White House Guidelines

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POF / 117 / Germany - Security 4/63 - 11/63

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with the Soviet Union is determined by this sort of consideration. As I have said at a number of our meetings, I ^{believe} ~~believe~~ in keeping it clear that the responsibility for any failure to make progress does not rest with us but ^{with} the Soviet Union, and I ^{believe} ~~believe~~ also that the agreement on even a limited test ban is a matter of real importance for the preservation of peace. I have noted with interest the general agreement of the German people on this point, and since you yourself have called the test ban a useful forward step, I hope that it may be possible for you to find an occasion to prevent any possible misunderstanding of your interview.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely, ~~UNQTE~~

John F. Kennedy UNQTE

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9/20/63

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REF: GER:RCE:real:gr.

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This document consists of 3 pages.
Number 2 of 10 copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 20, 1963

SUBJECT: German Attitude Toward Western Initiatives with the Soviets

PARTICIPANTS:

GERMANS

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister, Federal Republic of Germany
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
Minister Georg von Lilienfeld, German Embassy
Dr. Albert Reinkemeyer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
Dr. Klaus Simon, Counselor, Personal Aide to the Foreign Minister
Mr. Heinz Weber, Counselor-Interpreter

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

AMERICANS

The Secretary
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, S/AL
Ambassador George C. McGhee, American Embassy, Bonn
Assistant Secretary William E. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Robert C. Greal, Director, GER
Mr. John C. Ausland, Deputy Director, STP

After welcoming Foreign Minister Schroeder and his colleagues, the Secretary said he was looking forward to thorough talks with Schroeder both here and in New York. He would be happy to hear Schroeder's comments on the subjects he had in mind.

Schroeder said he wanted to discuss first a basic question -- the German attitude toward the current situation in East-West relations. This posed a number of political and psychological problems from the German standpoint. The policy of trying to arrive at certain agreements with the Soviets on problems on the periphery while leaving the major problems at the center to be attacked later was one which could have a strong effect on public opinion throughout the world, especially if this were to result in the Soviet Union no longer attacking the West as a whole and the US in particular. But a problem would be created if Gromyko in the process concentrated his attack on the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of China; this sort of thing could tend to lead everyone to say that these were the only people making trouble.

Schroeder said he also wished to underscore the danger that by concentrating on problems at the periphery the major problems at the center might tend to get "covered up". There was a real risk that two things might be forgotten: (1) that there had been no change in basic Soviet objectives and basic Soviet demands; (2) that what the West was fighting for was not relaxation of tensions in isolation

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b) declassified.

Department of State Guidelines

By mmc NARA, Date 5/3/97

POF/117/Germany - Security 4/63-11/63

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but within the context of the concepts of freedom and liberty for mankind. Although it might be the objective of Western policy to move ahead from problems at the periphery to major problems at the center, the effect on world opinion in the process could be just the contrary of what was desirable. He felt that such a policy could be pursued effectively only so long as (1) basic Communist objectives were kept clearly in mind, and (2) Western objectives on the problems at the center were constantly kept in sight. A relaxation of tensions must not permit us to lose sight of these objectives.

Schroeder said that the German perspective on this whole matter must necessarily be to consider that each and every arrangement with the Soviets which did not have the effect of improving the German situation would create problems for German public opinion. He asked under what conditions Germany could participate in such a policy. He thought there were two criteria to be applied: (1) whether or not a particular step led to a hardening or an amelioration of the status quo; (2) an objective assessment of whether the step worked to the overall detriment or advantage of the West. Application of the second criterion could lead to differences of views, as for example among military experts, but these could be dealt with in an objective way. The first criterion was more difficult. Here he thought two points should be kept in mind: (1) it must be visible at all times to the public that there is complete and thorough consultation on basic problems; (2) it must be clear to all that basic Western objectives are being kept constantly in mind. This concept of keeping Western objectives constantly in mind and out in the open was basic to German support of Western initiatives with the Soviets. In this context Schroeder stated that he was very happy over the President's speech to the UN this morning which had emphasized these objectives, in particular the unification of Germany. It should be consistent Western policy to have all our spokesmen constantly emphasize publicly the basic objectives of the free world. He was confident that Lord Home would do so, and he would be grateful if the Secretary could stress to his other friends the importance of such public statements. It would make it much easier for the Germans to support any initiatives with the Soviets as long as they were conducted within this framework of constant reiteration of basic Western aims and purposes.

Schroeder said he wished to say a few words on the subject of consultation. He felt there were three levels at which this should take place--the bilateral framework, the Four-Power Ambassadorial Group, and the North Atlantic Council. We should try to make the best possible use of these mechanisms. There was always both a formal and substantive aspect to the process of consultation. There was no particular problem about the formal aspect, since this was done by the exchanging of formal information. The substantive aspect was more difficult and he felt this was best done at the bilateral level or in a small group. Schroeder expressed the view that in the months to come, which would see a new German Government, we should study on both sides how we could strengthen contact between leading personalities. At the same time he did not wish to exclude the Ambassadorial Group or the NAC from being used as appropriate in order to avoid difficulties within the Alliance.

Schroeder said he wished to make a further comment on the central problem in East-West relations, the question of the status quo. He was convinced, and his view was widely shared, that the status quo could be consolidated just by doing nothing. A consolidation of the status quo worked to the advantage of that side

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which was satisfied with the status quo, but this could in turn lead to erosion of the German position. He had tried to make this point clear to the French when he was in Paris.

Schroeder said he could sum up the basic German viewpoint by stating that they were in favor of getting some movement into developments and trying new ways provided the basic objectives and aims of the West were not lost sight of or overshadowed. Within this context the specific problem of Germany should be considered. One specific illustration was the non-aggression pact. In its essence a non-aggression pact should amount to a final solution or confirmation of a situation which was generally satisfactory to all concerned. If this concept were correct, then it was important that within the process leading up to a non-aggression pact a satisfactory solution of the German problem should be found.

Schroeder said he wished to conclude by mentioning the danger that some people in Germany and elsewhere could always criticize any new arrangements being made on the ground they did not take account of German interests. The most effective way to counter this was the repeated and constant affirmation of Western objectives, as has just been done in the President's speech to the UN.

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9/20/63 269 (7)

September 20, 1963
1 PM

International Situation

Germany

US

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder
Mr. Knapstein
Mr. von Lilienfeld
Dr. Reinkenmeyer
Mr. Simon
Mr. Weber

The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador McGhee
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Creel
Mr. Ausland

The following conversation took place during the course of the Secretary's lunch for Foreign Minister Schroeder on September 20, 1963:

East-West relations and NATO

The Secretary opened the conversation by commenting on the remarks made by Foreign Minister Schroeder during the discussion which took place in the Secretary's conference room prior to the luncheon. (See separate Memorandum of Conversation) The Secretary said he would like to comment on Schroeder's remarks regarding the danger that the relaxation of tensions would lead to a consolidation of the status quo. Our experience since the war has indicated that tension has a tendency to lead to a consolidation of the status quo. As we move into a more completely nuclear world, this tendency will increase. It is possible that at present the situation in Eastern Europe is changing in favor of the West. Therefore one can't necessarily say that a reduction of tensions will lead to a consolidation of the status quo. After all, since 1945 we have not moved one inch toward the reunification of Germany. We of course are committed to the reunification of Germany -- the question is how. It was not likely that we will achieve it through an increase in tension. The Secretary then said he would like to comment on a double standard which seems to exist within the alliance. If, for example, the US were to move toward more trade with the Soviet Union, some Europeans would accuse the US of softness toward the Soviet Union, even though the US has only a fraction at present of the trade of many other countries. Another example was the excitement caused by the announcement of the withdrawal

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Department of State Guidelines

By NARA, Date 6/30/97

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of 600 men from Berlin. Who, on the other hand, had raised his voice about the reduction by France of its armed forces by 200,000 men? On the withdrawal of Belgian forces from Germany? With regard to the "next steps" to be taken with the Soviet Union, the Secretary said he saw no dramatic steps that would be taken in the immediate future. It was, however, possible that certain bilateral steps, such as consular and civil air agreements, would be taken. Agreements on nonaggression arrangements and observation posts would, on the other hand, only be possible if there were agreement within the alliance. NATO should continue to try to reach agreement but had not reached one as yet. With regard to consultation, the Secretary noted that the methods of consultation can cause great difficulties. Right now the abstention of France was causing difficulties. We can't, for example, get French agreement even to make factual studies because of the French fear that the information might be misused. The Secretary said he was referring, for example, to the cost of communications to Berlin. We must consider how we can work together to draw France back into the consultative process.

Schroeder agreed that we were no nearer reunification now than at the end of the war. Tension had, however, perhaps had the advantage of keeping the question open. If we had a relaxation of tension, people might have a tendency to forget about the problem of reunification. People might think that the present situation was the normal situation. If there were a relaxation, people might charge the Germans with being an obstacle to understanding, if they kept raising the question of reunification. With regard to more trade between the US and the Soviet Union, this would of course be considered a change and might cause some suspicion in Europe -- even though unjustified. Objectively, the change in the Berlin garrison was not significant, but this is a psychological problem. The reorganization of the French army is not important because no one takes the French armed forces seriously. The same is true of the withdrawal of the Belgian brigade.

The Secretary said that this double standard creates great difficulties for the US. If it began to look as though American forces were mercenaries rather than a part of an allied effort, there would be serious objections in the US.

Schroeder said he agreed we should not take the US effort for granted and agreed that there should be an allied effort. He thought, however, the Secretary should understand that in Germany the US effort was the only one which counted. He added that he didn't agree with those who believe that Germany must choose between France and the US.

The Secretary said he hoped the situation would never develop in such a way that Germany had to choose between France and the US.

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Schroeder said he had discussed in Paris with Couve de Murville the fact that Couve was not coming to New York. Couve said that France did not want to participate in East-West talks. Consultation in the Ambassadorial Group can proceed -- France has no proposals to make but is prepared to discuss the proposals of others. France does not expect any progress to be achieved by our efforts, so it will not take any part in them.

The Secretary noted that the French will not participate in the discussion of disarmament but are prepared to reduce their forces without getting anything in return.

Schroeder commented that France had not lost much by demobilizing the Algerian forces since they were not worth anything. He added that in his discussion with De Gaulle in December, 1961, De Gaulle had remarked that once talks started with the Soviet Union it would not be possible to allow them to break down. They would result in agreements hurting Germany. France did not want to participate in any agreement at the expense of Germany. Schroeder noted, however, that the Quai d'Orsay has somewhat different views than De Gaulle.

The Secretary noted that high circles in France seem to believe that no war is possible. They believe, therefore, that it is not necessary for NATO to concern itself so much with defense problems and that the US is using its interest in NATO defense problems to extend its influence in Europe. It is for this reason that France abstains in NATO.

Schroeder said that the reason France believes that no war is possible is that it takes American superiority for granted and wants to utilize American superiority to build up Europe. (The translator originally translated this as "to build up the position of France," and Schroeder corrected him.)

The Secretary commented that we could have a love affair with de Gaulle if we were prepared to consider France Europe.

Schroeder laughed and said he understood this but this would not make Germany very happy.

Multilateral Force

The Secretary said he wanted to raise the problem of the MLF. It was important that we go ahead with the MLF and the October discussions were aimed in this direction. The US would like the UK to participate, but the UK was paralyzed at present between the idea that if the UK stands aside, the

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MLF will fail, and the idea that, if the MLF should succeed, the UK must participate. The President feels strongly that we must proceed with the MLF. The US believes that if the MLF goes ahead, the UK will join.

Schroeder recalled a discussion he had with Lord Home on August 14 during which the British Foreign Minister had tried to get Schroeder to agree to take a softer line on the MLF. Schroeder said he tried to emphasize the damage that a failure of the MLF would do to Germany, the Alliance, and Britain. If the MLF fails, the French Forces de Frappe would appear to many in Europe as the only alternative. Home emphasized the financial and political problems for the UK and suggested it might contribute bases instead of money.

The Secretary said the UK Cabinet told the military that any contribution to the MLF must come from the defense budget. The British also would like to have a non-dissemination agreement with the Soviet Union and have not wanted the MLF to be an obstacle. The Secretary added that he hoped the UK would drop any idea of abandoning the minute which covers the MLF in the US draft on non-dissemination, since the US can't agree to drop it.

Schroeder commented that the British Government is in a difficult position since it finds it difficult to argue at the same time vis-a-vis the Labor Party for the UK nuclear force and the MLF. Although this may appear illogical, we need not necessarily allow logic to dominate what we do. The Chancellor had supported the MLF in the face of efforts by the French and Dutch to discourage him. He had recently supported the MLF in Rome.

Mr. Tyler commented that Andreotti had recently made a statement in Parliament during the budget debate in favor of the MLF.

Schroeder noted that the Italians would like a clause in the MLF agreement that provided that at a later stage it might be European. The Federal Republic would be able to support such a clause. The US had previously supported the idea of a European force if it were integrated with the US effort.

The Secretary remarked that he thought this idea could be held open until Europe was in a position to develop its own nuclear force. It should be remembered, however, that if European forces were independent, this would work both ways. In other words, a separate European force would mean a separate American force. He thought, however, this was for Schroeder's and his successors to worry about.

Schroeder said the Italians didn't have in mind an independent European force at this time but would like in any agreement on an MLF to emphasize the idea of Europe.

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The Secretary said he wanted to make clear that he was not objecting to the organization of an independent Europe. It should, however, be recognized that if Europe were independent of the US, the US would also be independent of Europe.

Schroeder laughed and remarked that it would be a long time before Europe would have to come to the assistance of the US.

Ambassador McGhee remarked that in Germany the idea of a European force is sometimes considered an alternative to reliance on France.

Schroeder replied that some people see this as an alternative who don't understand French policy. He thought that France would cause more difficulties regarding the question of "many fingers on the trigger" than the US. In his experience it was easier to get an agreement with a large country than among small countries -- at least this seemed to be the case in Europe.

The Secretary said that since World War II the US has tried to take into account the views of small and middle powers. He noted that De Gaulle had said he would consider a four power conference on disarmament only if the discussions in Geneva ended. There were too many people in Geneva for the French. France would have supported a US-French-UK effort in the Congo but was bitterly opposed to a UN effort.

Schroeder said the objectives of French policy were to rebuild French power. It is easy to predict French policy if you grasp this fundamental fact. The basic difficulties with France shared by the Federal Republic and the US related to the organization of Europe and problems related to agriculture.

European problems

The Secretary asked if an agreement on agricultural questions would be reached this year.

Schroeder said he had discussed this question in Paris and pointed out that under the Rome Treaty the transition period was to last until 1969. It would, therefore, not be possible to settle these problems by the end of this year. It is true that it would be necessary to make adjustments in the price sector. It would be possible to pass certain regulations regarding meat, dairy products and the like. Agreement was also needed on cereal prices in 1964-1965, but agreement would only be needed for the Kennedy Round upon those points which played a role. France, however, will obviously still press for the development of an agricultural system before the Kennedy Round commences.

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Germany, however, does not agree with this approach. It is clear that there will be a great many difficulties in Brussels in the coming months.

Economic relations with the Soviet bloc

Schroeder then asked for an assessment of the reaction in the US to the Soviet-Canadian wheat deal.

The Secretary said that in general it had been well received. It appeared that the Soviets may be in the world market for about ten million tons of wheat this year, compared with the Soviet production normally of 93 million. There has been no formal approach by the Soviets to the US as yet regarding wheat. We are considering this question against the possibility of an approach. We have about 30 million tons of surplus wheat in storage. The Secretary also noted that as a result of the Canadian deal with the Soviets we would probably sell more wheat in the open market.

Schroeder addressed himself to Ambassador Thompson and said the Chancellor had noted in Cadorna that nuclear superiority had not enabled us to make any progress with the Soviet Union. He wondered if we might try to utilize more our economic superiority.

Mr. Tyler noted that there was now going on in NATO a study on credits to the Soviet Union.

Schroeder said he knew about this but wanted to draw attention to certain orders being placed in Germany for various factories by the Soviet Union. The Chancellor wondered if we might be able to get some concessions if we showed more reserve. ??

Ambassador Thompson replied that Soviet shortages arose essentially from Soviet goals and that he did not think the Soviet Union would pay a very high price for increased trade. The Soviet Union could in fact, if it had to, get along pretty well without trade. ???

The Secretary noted that, as a result of his trip to the Soviet Union, Secretary Freeman had reached the conclusion that agriculture was no longer a serious problem for the Soviets and that they can take care of their basic needs. In view of experience in COCOM the Secretary thought it unlikely that we would take initiatives to discourage European trade with the Soviet Union.

Schroeder laughed and said he realized that the Chancellor was probably too late with his suggestion. He also noted that it is sometimes suggested

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in Germany that financial means be used to get reunification. He would appreciate the Secretary's reaction to this idea.

The Secretary replied that he doubted that we could get any broad concessions like reunification as a result of credits. There may, however, be opportunities in the period ahead for the Soviet Union to use its powers of attraction on Eastern Germany. It was obvious that reunification would require many changes in Eastern Germany. While this was unlikely, it might even be possible at some point to make a change from the Ulbricht regime to a regime more like that in Poland. The Federal Republic should interest itself in the situation of the people in Eastern Germany and try to strengthen its ties with them. The Secretary noted that recent defectors from the East German army had said that the East German army would not fight against West Germany. The Secretary said he was not sure how to exploit the attitudes in East Germany but that we should work for changes in Eastern Europe including East Germany.

Schroeder said that efforts by the Federal Republic to get concessions with credits had not been very successful, since the GDR rejects credits if political concessions are asked. Trade missions which the Federal Republic is now establishing in Eastern European capitals may be helpful. Missions are already established in Warsaw and one is soon expected in Budapest. There has not been much progress in Romania and Bulgaria, but the Czechs have indicated publicly an interest in a trade agreement. Increased trade relations may have a helpful effect on relations between the satellites and Pankov and lead the Eastern European countries to try to influence the course which Pankov takes.

The Secretary noted that the satellites dislike the Soviet Union but fear Germany. If the fear of Germany could be removed, this might be a step toward reunification.

Extension of Test Ban Treaty to Berlin

Schroeder then said he wanted finally to discuss briefly three specific points. He noted that he and the Secretary had already discussed in the private session the question of the extension of the Test Ban Treaty to Berlin. The attitude of the Federal Republic was clear, and the subject should be discussed further.

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Poultry

Secondly, Schroeder noted that an agreement had been reached in Brussels to reduce the tariff on poultry by 11 pfennigs. This was no doubt not satisfactory to the US, but the US should consider carefully whether it should reject this and engage in a tariff war, which would be bad on the eve of the Kennedy Round.

Mr. Tyler said that 11 pfennigs was not satisfactory. He thought we would be able to accept this as a token solution, if the Council could also agree to continue negotiations directed toward a solution which would be acceptable to the US. By itself, however, the 11 pfennig reduction was not adequate.

Schroeder agreed but noted that there was not much chance of getting the other five to agree to any change. He foresaw similar problems regarding milk and dairy products and the like. The French, for example, provide large subsidies to French producers and are not interested in any basic change in the situation.

The Secretary said it would be best to work this out by negotiation rather than in a tariff war. He was not entirely up to date on this question but thought we should take advantage of Schroeder's presence in the US to discuss the problem further.

Aircraft for Pakistan

Schroeder then moved to the third question, which was the supply of airplanes to Pakistan. The Defense Ministry in a generous moment had promised about 80 F-86's to Pakistan. This of course would make India unhappy. Germany would like to make these planes available to Pakistan but wondered if it might not be possible to accomplish this through the US.

The Secretary said it would be difficult for us to act as middleman, since we are already having difficulties with India and Pakistan. Recently our relations with Pakistan almost reached the breaking point. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Tyler discuss this question with Mr. Talbot, since if the Soviets had increased their military aid to India it might be possible for Germany to furnish some planes to Pakistan. He saw, however, no advantage in doing this through the US, since this would only transfer the problem to the US and in fact intensify it.

Finally, Schroeder noted that the Olympic Committee would soon be meeting and that the question of separate membership for the GDR was likely to arise.

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He hoped it would be possible for the President or someone to write to Brundage and reiterate the attitude of the US toward separate GDR membership.

The meeting concluded with a discussion of what to say to the press.

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DR. GER. RCCreel:gw.

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Number 1 of 10 copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S
9/24/63

Memorandum of Conversation

11420

DATE: September 20, 1963

SUBJECT: German Attitude Toward Western Initiatives with the Soviets

PARTICIPANTS: GERMANS

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister, Federal Republic of Germany
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
Minister Georg von Lillienfeld, German Embassy
Dr. Albert Reinkemeyer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
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AMERICANS

The Secretary
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, S/AL
Ambassador George C. McGhee, American Embassy, Bonn
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER
Mr. John C. Ausland, Deputy Director, BTF

September 26, 1963

FOR DISTRIBUTION SEE PAGE 3

After welcoming Foreign Minister Schroeder and his colleagues, the Secretary said he was looking forward to thorough talks with Schroeder both here and in New York. He would be happy to hear Schroeder's comments on the subjects he had in mind.

Schroeder said he wanted to discuss first a basic question -- the German attitude toward the current situation in East-West relations. This posed a number of political and psychological problems from the German standpoint. The policy of trying to arrive at certain agreements with the Soviets on problems on the periphery while leaving the major problems at the center to be attacked later was one which could have a strong effect on public opinion throughout the world, especially if this were to result in the Soviet Union no longer attacking the West as a whole and the US in particular. But a problem would be created if Gromyko in the process concentrated his attack on the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of China; this sort of thing could tend to lead everyone to say that they were the only people making trouble.

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but within the context of the concepts of freedom and liberty for mankind. Although it might be the objective of Western policy to move ahead from problems at the periphery to major problems at the center, the effect on world opinion in the process could be just the contrary of what was desirable. He felt that such a policy could be pursued effectively only so long as (1) basic Communist objectives were kept clearly in mind, and (2) Western objectives on the problems at the center were constantly kept in sight. A relaxation of tensions must not permit us to lose sight of these objectives.

Schroeder said that the German perspective on this whole matter must necessarily be to consider that each and every arrangement with the Soviets which did not have the effect of improving the German situation would create problems for German public opinion. He asked under what conditions Germany could participate in such a policy. He thought there were two criteria to be applied: (1) whether or not a particular step led to a hardening or an amelioration of the status quo; (2) an objective assessment of whether the step worked to the overall detriment or advantage of the West. Application of the second criterion could lead to differences of views, as for example among military experts, but these could be dealt with in an objective way. The first criterion was more difficult. Here he thought two points should be kept in mind: (1) it must be visible at all times to the public that there is complete and thorough consultation on basic problems; (2) it must be clear to all that basic Western objectives are being kept constantly in mind. This concept of keeping Western objectives constantly in mind and out in the open was basic to German support of Western initiatives with the Soviets. In this context Schroeder stated that he was very happy over the President's speech to the UN this morning which had emphasized these objectives, in particular the unification of Germany. It should be consistent Western policy to have all our spokesmen constantly emphasize publicly the basic objectives of the free world. He was confident that Lord Home would do so, and he would be grateful if the Secretary could stress to his other friends the importance of such public statements. It would make it much easier for the Germans to support any initiatives with the Soviets as long as they were conducted within this framework of constant reiteration of basic Western aims and purposes.

Schroeder said he wished to say a few words on the subject of consultation. He felt there were three levels at which this should take place--the bilateral framework, the Four-Power Ambassadorial Group, and the North Atlantic Council. We should try to make the best possible use of these mechanisms. There was always both a formal and substantive aspect to the process of consultation. There was no particular problem about the formal aspect, since this was done by the exchanging of formal information. The substantive aspect was more difficult and he felt this was best done at the bilateral level or in a small group. Schroeder expressed the view that in the months to come, which would see a new German Government, we should study on both sides how we could strengthen contact between leading personalities. At the same time he did not wish to exclude the Ambassadorial Group or the NAC from being used as appropriate in order to avoid difficulties within the Alliance.

Schroeder said he wished to make a further comment on the central problem in East-West relations, the question of the status quo. He was convinced, and his view was widely shared, that the status quo could be consolidated just by doing nothing. A consolidation of the status quo worked to the advantage of that side

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-3-

which was satisfied with the status quo, but this could in turn lead to erosion of the German position. He had tried to make this point clear to the French when he was in Paris.

Schroeder said he could sum up the basic German viewpoint by stating that they were in favor of getting some movement into developments and trying new ways provided the basic objectives and aims of the West were not lost sight of or overshadowed. Within this context the specific problem of Germany should be considered. One specific illustration was the non-aggression pact. In its essence a non-aggression pact should amount to a final solution or confirmation of a situation which was generally satisfactory to all concerned. If this concept were correct, then it was important that within the process leading up to a non-aggression pact a satisfactory solution of the German problem should be found.

Schroeder said he wished to conclude by mentioning the danger that some people in Germany and elsewhere could always criticize any new arrangements being made on the ground they did not take account of German interests. The most effective way to counter this was the repeated and constant affirmation of Western objectives, as has just been done in the President's speech to the UN.

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September 26, 1963

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VISIT OF GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER SCHROEDER

TALKING POINTS

Background

Schroeder will be the first prominent German political leader to visit the United States since the President's trip to Germany last June, which marked a new highpoint in US-German relations. In the interval Schroeder has come under sharp personal attack from Brentano, Strauss and others within his own party for his alleged failure to safeguard German interests in connection with the Test Ban Treaty. Although this episode created some temporary strain in US-German relations, Schroeder appears to have weathered the storm relatively intact and is almost certain to remain as Foreign Minister under Erhard.

Schroeder will be arriving here fresh from two important encounters-- one with Chancellor Adenauer (Erhard, Brentano and Krone also in attendance) at Cadenabbia on September 14 and the other with Couve de Murville in Paris on September 17. Prior to his scheduled meeting with the President he will have had extensive discussions with the Secretary and other U. S. officials.

Objectives

Schroeder will have several objectives in mind: (1) to obtain our assessment of where we now stand in the general area of East-West relations; (2) to discourage us from pushing ahead with the Soviets more rapidly than the German traffic will bear; and (3) to bolster his own personal position and prestige within Germany.

It would appear in our own interest to be as helpful to Schroeder as possible. He is probably more in basic sympathy than are some of his domestic critics with U. S. policies and objectives in Europe and, in particular, with the long-range approach to the reunification issue suggested by the President's Berlin Free University speech. He will in any event play a key foreign policy role under Erhard.

Specific Problems and Issues for Discussion

At Schroeder's Initiative

1. Schroeder will probably want to discuss two specific issues now under discussion in the North Atlantic Council: observation posts and a non-aggression pact. His main thrust is likely to be, as agreed by the

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

Germans
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)
Department of State Guidelines

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By MMK NARA, Date 5/5/97-

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- 2 -

Germans at Cadenabbia, that from the FRG standpoint no arrangements should be made on these points which would enhance the prestige of the East German regime or tend to harden the existing division of Germany. Couve indicated to Schroeder that the French take a negative attitude toward discussions of observation posts and a non-aggression pact with the Soviets. Schroeder is not expected to raise the German "revised Peace Plan" proposal, although he may press for some concrete and specific demonstration of Allied interest in German reunification; your reference to reunification in your UN speech will undoubtedly be very well received by the Germans.

2. Schroeder may inquire about recent press reports of imminent U. S. troop withdrawals from Europe. He can be expected to stress the undesirable political impact within Germany of any such development and the risk of misinterpretation by German public opinion.

3. Schroeder may mention the point of Berlin's being included in the Test Ban Treaty under the Federal Republic's signature, despite the fact that the subject matter falls with the Allied reserved powers. This matter is being discussed in Bonn on a quadripartite basis.

At United States Initiative

1. Schroeder would undoubtedly welcome our appreciation of where we now stand on the MLF project and how we envisage future developments.

2. As the strongest supporter among the Six of the trade negotiations, Germany appears prepared to take the lead in formulating EEC positions on tariff reductions for most industrial products (except steel), but not for agricultural items. We feel strongly agriculture must be included in the negotiations. Much will depend on the levels of internal prices set by the EEC for farm goods, especially grains. They should be set at the lowest possible levels. Anything above the present French levels gives us troubles.

3. You will be seeing Schroeder just at the time the EEC Council of Ministers is meeting and considering the poultry problem. The German Cabinet has been unable to go further than the EEC proposal for an 11 pfennig reduction in levies. The EEC Council must either make a specific offer for a reasonable settlement or give the EEC Commission an adequate mandate to negotiate a settlement--otherwise, we will have no choice but to proceed with the withdrawal of concessions.

4. If time permits, it would be useful to commend the German performance in providing monetary compensation for victims of NAZI persecution and express the hope that the final amendments to the Federal Compensation Law, to be considered by the Bundestag this fall, will enhance the German reputation in this area. (Leading American members of the Jewish Claims Conference consider these amendments to fall short of what the FRG should do.)

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NLK NSF 77

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

ZBF139/1

430

DATE: September 24, 1963

SUBJECT: East-West Talks

PARTICIPANTS: GERMANS

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister, Federal Republic of Germany
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
Dr. Albert Reinkemeyer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
Mr. Heinz Weber, Counselor-Interpreter

AMERICANS

The President
Acting Secretary Ball
Ambassador George C. McGhee, American Embassy, Bonn
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Richard B. Finn, Deputy Director, GER

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The President opened the meeting at 10:35 a.m. by saying there were three subjects he would like to talk about: where we go from here with the Soviets, the Multilateral Force, and consultation between the Federal Republic and the US on matters such as US troop reductions in Europe.

Regarding the first point, the President stated that there is no significant prospect of substantial agreement with the Soviets on the three questions of major interest to the United States--Berlin, Germany and Cuba. The US initialled a civil air agreement with the Soviets some time ago, but this has been on the table for over a year. The US will of course proceed in the UN on matters which also have a bearing on its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. The President asked what is the German view on where we go from here.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said that under present conditions there are clear limitations to the possibility of agreements with the Soviets. He referred to the 1959 Peace Plan. This was recently revised by the German Foreign Office, and its presentation would, in the German view, show the public that new initiatives are being taken but that old objectives remain firm. This approach would provide a good psychological basis for talks with the Soviets.

The President

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after 12 years

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The President asked how Mr. Schroeder saw the Soviet Union making changes in its policy on Germany and Berlin. Mr. Schroeder replied that no basic changes are evident in the Soviet position on Germany and Berlin. The Soviets wish, however, to have a better relation with the United States and to relax tension. At the same time the Soviets want to bridge over the difficulties posed by Germany and Berlin; they do not wish to go to the core of these problems. Mr. Schroeder said that an example of this is the Soviet approach to a possible non-aggression agreement; such an agreement would be positive and useful if a satisfactory basis can be established. The Soviets have, however, made it clear that they will not make satisfactory agreements which could be the basis of an exchange of non-aggression declarations. The Soviets want to go ahead with their own plans for Germany and Berlin.

The President said he agreed and asked how progress could be made toward German reunification under these circumstances.

Mr. Schroeder replied that he felt an atmosphere of detente would be positive for Berlin since the Soviets would not take military steps involving Berlin in such an atmosphere. This would not, however, solve the basic problem. (At this moment the President received a note giving the Senate vote on ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. He showed the note to Mr. Schroeder, who offered his congratulations). Mr. Schroeder observed that the Chinese are exerting pressures on the Soviets against any relaxation of tensions. He said that the Federal Republic is interested in improving relations with Eastern European countries. A West German trade mission has been established in Warsaw, and negotiations for an exchange of trade missions are now going on with Hungary. The Germans hope to have similar negotiations with other countries in Eastern Europe.

The President agreed that no basic accord with the Soviets appears likely. He said that nevertheless the situation as regards Berlin is better. The Soviets would have to change their present policy before the situation regarding Berlin became less secure. The President said, however, he could not see any agreement in prospect which would improve the chances for reunification. He agreed with Mr. Schroeder that the West should continue to make its objectives clear. The President said that the Federal Republic's policy toward Eastern Europe is in the common interest of Germany and the United States. This policy serves to weaken the Soviet hold and may have an effect on East Germany. This approach is better than an increase of tensions would be.

Foreign Minister Schroeder expressed agreement, commenting that there would be no progress in an atmosphere of tension. It is preferable to bring about a relaxation in tensions and to seek a change in Soviet intentions. At the present time the Soviets must concentrate on China and thus they are unable to keep up the pressure on Eastern Europe.

Mr. Schroeder

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Mr. Schroeder emphasized that a policy of relaxation poses internal difficulties in Germany. If East-West agreements are reached but do not touch on the German problem, it will look as if all problems except Germany are being settled. Gromyko, instead of attacking all Western nations, may attack only the Federal Republic. This would make it seem as if Germany was the only bad nation in the West. Over time such a Soviet approach would have an effect in Germany. To meet this approach, there is need for intensive restatement of Western policy. The Federal Republic therefore appreciated the President's remarks in the UN regarding German reunification. Mr. Schroeder added that he has already predicted that the Parliament of the Federal Republic will approve the Test Ban Treaty by at least as large a majority as the United States Senate and he remains of this view.

Mr. Schroeder said that there are two schools of thought in Germany. One school believes that the cold war makes the situation clear; although there is no prospect of solutions, Western unity remains strong and objectives are held clearly in view.

The President said that this view might be comforting in retrospect but it lost sight of the very real dangers the West had undergone. In 1961 at Vienna Khrushchev had said he would make a peace treaty with East Germany before the end of the year. This had required a very substantial military build-up, which had cost the US \$5 billion. Soviet interference with the Allied air corridors to Berlin in 1962 and the Cuban affair had also posed great danger. The President emphasized that the important thing now is that the prospect of Soviet military action has been reduced. This is important for Berlin. We are now farther from the threat of war than we had been.

Mr. Schroeder said that he shares this point of view. He went on to say that the second school of thought in Germany believes that new methods should be tried since former methods had failed. He said that the status quo is valuable only to the side that wants the status quo and profits from it. At the same time it must be clear that if the West tries new methods, it is not certain that there will be early, tangible results. People in Germany might then say that despite considerable negotiations with the Soviets, there had been no progress toward German reunification. This is why it is important to keep stressing Western goals.

Mr. Schroeder then recounted the history of US consultation with the Federal Republic at the time of the Test Ban agreement. Initially the Federal Republic had sought to insure that the Test Ban agreement was disassociated from the idea of a non-aggression pact but was not concerned over the substance of the Test Ban agreement because Germany was not directly involved. It also

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supported the effort of the United States and the Soviet Union to relax tensions. On July 23, 1963, the US Charge at Bonn visited Mr. Schroeder and stated that the US expected the Federal Republic to sign the agreement. Mr. Schroeder asked the Charge about Pankow. The Charge replied that Pankow would also sign. On July 26 Mr. Schroeder read the agreed text of the Test Ban agreement in the Bonn newspapers. He learned then that it was planned to have three depository nations. There were people in Germany who thought that its Government had been caught napping and that its friends had failed to keep it informed.

The President said that he was under the impression Secretary Rusk had communicated with the Federal Republic several times on this subject. Mr. Schroeder agreed that several communications had been received during that period.

The President said that consultation had not been adequate at that time. He commented that he wished Red China would sign the agreement. The President added that he did not believe the status of East Germany had been increased by the Test Ban Treaty although its status may have increased afterwards by the alarm raised over its signature. The President observed that this is now a matter of the past. The important thing is that the Federal Republic receives our views on such matters as soon as we have formulated them and vice versa. The President noted that some people in the US are not sympathetic to the Test Ban agreement.

Mr. Schroeder emphasized that there will always be people in Germany, even in his own party, who will say that solutions are being reached between the US and the Soviet Union behind the backs of the Federal Republic. It is essential, therefore, for the West to restate its objectives and goals.

The President said that he was glad to hear the German viewpoint. He said that the US has objectives which are also vital such as Cuba; the US is no closer to a Cuban settlement than a year ago. Nevertheless steps should be taken to make war less possible. The German problem has not been solved during the last 18 years, nor has the Cuban problem been solved.

Mr. Schroeder commented that it is often easier to take a negative position as regards negotiations with the Soviets. This is why the Federal Republic requires US support.

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CONTROL: 19259
RECD: SEPTEMBER 25, 1963, 3:09 P.M.

FROM: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

1465, SEPTEMBER 25, 6 P.M.

SECRET

EYES ONLY SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE ACCOUNT OF MY DISCUSSION WITH COUVE DE MURVILLE THIS MORNING (EMBTTEL 1455). I COVERED THE MAIN OUTLINE OF WHAT HE SAID ABOUT US POLICY IN REGARD TO ALLEGED ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY, ETC., BUT I AM NOT SURE THAT I CAN SUCCESSFULLY CONVEY TO YOU THE EXACT FLAVOR OF HIS ATTITUDE. IN THE FIRST PLACE ALTHOUGH AS USUAL HE WAS PERSONALLY COURTEOUS TO ME IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT COUVE WAS VERY MUCH CONCERNED AT THE GENERAL STATE AND POSSIBLE PROSPECTS OF FRENCH POLICY. IT WAS CLEAR HE WAS SEEKING TO THROW OFF ON THE US THE DIFFICULTIES THAT THE FRENCH HAVE ENCOUNTERED WITH GERMANY. COUVE'S ATTITUDE, WHICH WAS MOST UNCHARACTERISTIC OF HIM, TOGETHER WITH POMPIDOU'S BAD TEMPERED REMARKS AT THE RECENT UNR CONFERENCE IN REGARD TO "INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY" AGAINST THE FRENCH ATOMIC PROGRAM (EMBTTELS 1415 AND 1409) AND HABIB-DELONCLE'S STATEMENT AT STRASBOURG OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FRENCH FORCE PROVIDING A NUCLEUS FOR A EUROPEAN FORCE WHICH GREAT BRITAIN COULD JOIN (ALTHOUGH ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE EQUATION)(EMBTTELS 1422, 1430, 1441) WOULD SEEM TO BE EVIDENCE OF A PROFOUND FRENCH MALAISE AT THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING. DE GAULLE IS EXPECTED TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT SPEECH ON SUNDAY AT LYON DEALING WITH THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND WE HAVE HEARD RUMORS THAT THIS MAY BE QUITE A SPEECH WITH CERTAIN INHERENT ANTI-AMERICAN OVERTONES.

IN MY DISCUSSION TODAY WITH COUVE I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS VERY SERIOUS THAT A RESPONSIBLE FRENCH OFFICIAL SHOULD ENTERTAIN VIEWS OF THIS NATURE IN REGARD TO US POLICY WHEN HE COULD PROVIDE NO EVIDENCE, BUT HE STUCK STOUTLY TO HIS VIEWS.

I WOULD VENTURE TO SUGGEST THAT YOU AND POSSIBLY THE PRESIDENT, SHOULD BE MOST FORTHRIGHT AND EVEN VERY BLUNT WITH COUVE IF HE IS IN ANYTHING LIKE THIS MOOD WHEN THIS COPY MUST BE FURNISHED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WITH A LETTER TO THAT EFFECT.

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EYES ONLY

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Vertical handwritten notes: "POL FR-US", "POL FR-WGER", "XP"

ALMOST EVERY ACTION WHICH HAS TROUBLED FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN FRENCH INITIATIVE, THAT IF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD ANY SERIOUS COMPLAINTS IN REGARD TO THE US GOVERNMENT THEY OWED IT TO US AND THE ALLIANCE AS A DUTY TO BE EXPLICIT AND TO SET IT FORTH IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. INCIDENTALLY, AT ONE POINT COUVE MENTIONED THAT THE ATOMIC QUESTION WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE BETWEEN US BUT QUICKLY STATED THAT HE FELT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WHICH COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. IN ANY CASE I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF YOU AND POSSIBLY THE PRESIDENT WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS VISIT TO HAVE A FRANK AND SERIOUS CONVERSATION WITH HIM, PERHAPS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION OF DE GAULLE'S PROPOSED VISIT NEXT YEAR. IF THERE IS ANYTHING FURTHER YOU WOULD LIKE FOR ME TO DO BEFORE HE ARRIVES PLEASE LET ME KNOW.

GP-3.

CFN 1455 1415 1409 1422 1430 1441 3

BOHLEN

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9/25/63

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EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY
RE EMETEL 1333

EYES ONLY

Following is highest level guidance for your conversation with General de Gaulle. If there is time before your appointment, highest level would be glad to consider any amendments or additions which you wish to suggest. In particular, we need your judgment on Item 3, the test ban matter. Ball and Bruce raise questions whether this is a dangerous noise to make, while White House inclines to believe that since General will reject any offer, it is useful to have the record of his responsibility very plain. We are also consulting with the Prime Minister on this paragraph, and therefore you should not use it in any case until we signal that we have his response.

1. General guidance.

Disapproval of General de Gaulle's policy, and belief

EYES ONLY

Drafted by: Text rec'd from WH:mj 9/25/63	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Mr. Read
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NLV-SS-24

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FORM DS 200

BY

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that it is largely animated by anti-American prejudice, are unavoidable here, and you should not conduct the discussion in a way which leaves it open to the General to suppose that USG is unaware of his attitudes. At the same time we do not wish him to think that he has "got our goat;" he should understand that we find his narrowness more damaging to France than to us. This general instruction is not intended to inhibit your personal charm or diplomatic courtesy. Guidance on specific topics follows:

2. Relations with the Soviet Union

We believe it would be useful for you to discuss frankly with General de Gaulle our thinking on relations with the Soviet Union. We do not anticipate any major agreements with the Soviets at this time. We may, if developments appear to warrant such action, conclude a Civil Air Agreement and proceed with negotiations for a consular convention. We are also hopeful of improving communications with our Embassy in Moscow, and may be able to increase trade to a small extent, but these are, of course, minor matters.

In the field of disarmament, it may be possible to make some progress, particularly in the area of measures against surprise attack.

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In the light of Gromyko's DN speech, the most likely subject of agreement would appear to be a declaration against the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. It is difficult at this stage to judge whether or not the Soviets are serious in proposing to discuss an agreement on static observation posts. As their proposal now stands, it is, of course, linked to unacceptable conditions and at this stage we intend merely to explore the Soviet position.

The President's proposal for exploration of the possibilities of cooperation in going to the moon is designed to ensure that no opportunity is missed in this field, but does not embody any unsophisticated optimism about real possibilities. Cooperative exchanges of information of the most limited kind already exist in the field of space, and there is a wide range of further possibilities between existing situation and full partnership in moon landing. President believes in importance of exploring these possibilities and present offer rests on solid U. S. progress in last two years so that it is no longer a matter of trying to climb on board Soviet space ship. If Soviets accept, good; if they do not, also good, and our effort will continue on present course.

From the foregoing, it will be clear that we have no illusions that any major breakthrough in relations with the Soviet Union is in

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ht, and Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have made clear that their definition of coexistence envisages continued political, economic, and ideological struggle. Apart from the U-2 incident, previous periods of relaxation have broken down over German problem and over the commitment of the Soviet leadership to Communist ideology. These obstacles will remain as far as we can see ahead, and we now have added to them, at least so far as the United States is concerned, the Cuban problem.

In our view, Soviet motives in seeking a detente at this time include a desire to diminish the danger of nuclear war, to ease the strains on Soviet resources, and to demonstrate that the policy of coexistence has some viability. Their struggle with the Chinese for dominance over the world Communist movement doubtless gives emphasis to their interest in this latter point, and in calming down their relations with the West in order to avoid a virulent cold war on two fronts simultaneously. The Soviets are, of course, also not unaware of the possibility of exacerbating the differences of opinion within the Western Alliance, particularly with respect to West Germany. They would obviously like to develop an atmosphere of detente at the lowest cost to their own interests but we will naturally weigh our

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own interests in any agreements we reach. In our view, to reject all Soviet approaches and to advance no proposal ourselves could engender reactions adverse and perhaps dangerous for the West. The President is convinced that tension has been lowered de facto by successful resolution of Cuban crisis last year, and that this lowering of tension is to advantage of the West though it does appear to have encouraged some division among us. U. S. readiness to negotiate is essential both in order to discover whether further progress can be made and in order to keep it clear that responsibility for any renewed crisis would rest with the Soviet Union.

1 For our part, we share the present Soviet desire to diminish the danger of war and would hope to avoid any more Cuba-like confrontations. We would also be glad to see a leveling off, if not a downturn, in the arms race, although this probably cannot be accomplished through any specific agreement.

While we should not exaggerate the Soviet economic difficulties, we are convinced that they cannot achieve the economic goals they have set for themselves and carry the mounting costs of an all-out arms race. We think, therefore, it possible, if not probable, that if we continue on our present course, the Soviets will cut back their military expenditures and perhaps their troop strength. General de Gaulle

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is of course familiar with our view that if this does not happen, NATO must build up its own conventional strength. With the exception of the West Germans, our allies have so far shown little disposition to do this. We doubt that a period of relaxation would have a serious effect upon NATO programs and certainly need not do so. In any event, as indicated above, we doubt that such relaxation is likely to go very far in view of the obstacle of the German and Berlin problems upon which there appears to be little prospect of any real progress.

Apart from these factors, the major gain we see from a period of relaxation is the furtherance of the evolution which is taking place within the Soviet Union itself as well as in the Communist Bloc, and in which probably lies our only hope of eventually reaching a status of genuine coexistence. This probably lies well in the future, but we think it important to continue the trend in this direction and are encouraged by the developments of recent years.

In all these matters, United States policy must also take into account our world-wide responsibilities and burdens and we see only advantage to the West in the continued development of the

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current Sino-Soviet quarrel. We are not, however, motivated by any desire to back one Soviet faction against another, if indeed such exist, nor do we consider that we have the knowledge or capability of doing so. We believe, however, that our willingness to explore any possibility of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on subjects in which we have genuine mutual interest in doing so, can assist in furthering the Sino-Soviet split and in further opening up Soviet and satellite societies to contact with the West. The cessation of the jamming of Western broadcasts has, for example, been of considerable value to us. We have no doubts about the fundamental community of interests within the Western Alliance and its basic strength, and we can only regret that at a time when opportunities appear to be opening up because of developments in the East, that we should have so many differences of opinion upon tactical and operational matters. We shall continue to do our best to diminish and eliminate these and are always prepared to discuss our policies openly and frankly.


3. The test ban treaty.

You should express our regret that French Government has not chosen to accede to the limited test ban treaty. You should

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refer back to the President's letter to General de Gaulle and make it clear that there are two quite different elements to the problem of any possible nuclear cooperation between our countries, as the President sees it. While we believe that cooperation in major nuclear weapons technology would clearly require a level of agreement on related political problems which does not currently appear to be possible, the particular question of the French need for atmospheric testing seems to us quite different. It is our belief that underground testing by the most modern techniques would in fact permit France to assure herself of the satisfactory development of her current plans in the nuclear field,



You should express the President's hope that General de Gaulle may wish to give renewed consideration to this possibility.

4. Southeast Asia.

You should seek clarification of General de Gaulle's purpose and policy in this area. President recollects the general opinions which President de Gaulle expressed in the Paris meeting of June 1961, but he does not understand just how General de Gaulle

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envisages the development of a unified and neutralized Vietnam without the successful development of a strong non-Communist society in the southern part of that country. Since external support and cooperation appear to be essential for such development, in the face of Communist subversion, the President does not see how Western withdrawal could now have any other result than the abandonment of Vietnam to the Communists. If General de Gaulle has a different view of the possibilities, it would be very helpful if he would explain it to you, since private discussions are less likely to lead to misunderstanding than public declarations with respect to an area where an ally is carrying the major responsibility.

5. U. S. policy toward Europe.

We have increasing evidence that General de Gaulle and Couve see U. S. policy as aimed somehow at the maintenance of U. S. influence or control of Europe. You should therefore take the occasion to make it very clear again that our policy is as stated by the President in Frankfurt, and that in our view there is in the deepest sense no opposition between the real interests of France and the United States on this point. It is simply an illusion to suppose that we are trying to divide or dilute the great European states which are moving toward closer unity. A

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central purpose of U. S. policy is to encourage the European states to attain that strength through unity which would enable them to play their full and proper role in world affairs. We think it important to develop this theme fully because of our growing sense that at the top political levels the French regard their relations with us on European questions in terms of adversary gamesmanship. This is not the direction in which we wish to move and it lies with France to decide how close and effective our relations will develop.

6. Future discussions.

While we are skeptical of the possibility of really useful conversations with General de Gaulle, we do believe that it would be helpful to establish a pattern of regular and perhaps increasingly candid discourse with him, and you are authorized to interpret these instructions as guidance for more than one meeting and to draw from them selectively in the initial encounter in your discretion.

7. De Gaulle's visit.

In our last exchange with General deGaulle, we agreed that this matter need not be discussed until autumn. Since the announcement was held up at French request, we are inclined to wait a while before reopening this question, and suggest that you not raise the

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matter on your own initiative in your first conversation with de Gaulle. If he should raise it, however, you should indicate that President does indeed still expect the General early in 1964 and would be glad to make arrangement firm and announcement at whatever time is convenient to the General.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin: ACTION: Amembassy PARIS 1507
SS RPT INFO: USUN TOSEC 51
Info:

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR
EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY
RE EMETEL 1333

EYES ONLY

Following is highest level guidance for your conversation with General de Gaulle. If there is time before your appointment, highest level would be glad to consider any amendments or additions which you wish to suggest. In particular, we need your judgment on Item 3, the test ban matter. Ball and Bruce raise questions whether this is a dangerous noise to make, while White House inclines to believe that since General will reject any offer, it is useful to have the record of his responsibility very plain. We are also consulting with the Prime Minister on this paragraph, and therefore you should not use it in any case until we signal that we have his response.

1. General guidance.

Disapproval of General de Gaulle's policy, and belief

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Text rec'd from WH:mj 9/25/63	S/S - Mr. Read
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that it is largely animated by anti-American prejudice, are unavoidable here, and you should not conduct the discussion in a way which leaves it open to the General to suppose that USG is unaware of his attitudes. At the same time we do not wish him to think that he has "got our goat;" he should understand that we find his narrowness more damaging to France than to us. This general instruction is not intended to inhibit your personal charm or diplomatic courtesy. Guidance on specific topics follows:

2. Relations with the Soviet Union

We believe it would be useful for you to discuss frankly with General de Gaulle our thinking on relations with the Soviet Union. We do not anticipate any major agreements with the Soviets at this time. We may, if developments appear to warrant such action, conclude a Civil Air Agreement and proceed with negotiations for a consular convention. We are also hopeful of improving communications with our Embassy in Moscow, and may be able to increase trade to a small extent, but these are, of course, minor matters.

In the field of disarmament, it may be possible to make some progress, particularly in the area of measures against surprise attack.

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In the light of Gromyko's DN speech, the most likely subject of agreement would appear to be a declaration against the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. It is difficult at this stage to judge whether or not the Soviets are serious in proposing to discuss an agreement on static observation posts. As their proposal now stands, it is, of course, linked to unacceptable conditions and at this stage we intend merely to explore the Soviet position.

The President's proposal for exploration of the possibilities of cooperation in going to the moon is designed to ensure that no opportunity is missed in this field, but does not embody any unsophisticated optimism about real possibilities. Cooperative exchanges of information of the most limited kind already exist in the field of space, and there is a wide range of further possibilities between existing situation and full partnership in moon landing. President believes in importance of exploring these possibilities and present offer rests on solid U. S. progress in last two years so that it is no longer a matter of trying to climb on board Soviet space ship. If Soviets accept, good; if they do not, also good, and our effort will continue on present course.

From the foregoing, it will be clear that we have no illusions that any major breakthrough in relations with the Soviet Union is in

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sight, and Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have made clear that their definition of coexistence envisages continued political, economic, and ideological struggle. Apart from the U-2 incident, previous periods of relaxation have broken down over German problem and over the commitment of the Soviet leadership to Communist ideology. These obstacles will remain as far as we can see ahead, and we now have added to them, at least so far as the United States is concerned, the Cuban problem.

In our view, Soviet motives in seeking a detente at this time include a desire to diminish the danger of nuclear war, to ease the strain on Soviet resources, and to demonstrate that the policy of coexistence has some viability. Their struggle with the Chinese for dominance over the world Communist movement doubtless gives emphasis to their interest in this latter point, and in calming down their relations with the West in order to avoid a virulent cold war on two fronts simultaneously. The Soviets are, of course, also not unaware of the possibility of exacerbating the differences of opinion within the Western Alliance, particularly with respect to West Germany. They would obviously like to develop an atmosphere of detente at the lowest cost to their own interests but we will naturally weigh our

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is of course familiar with our view that if this does not happen, NATO must build up its own conventional strength. With the exception of the West Germans, our allies have so far shown little disposition to do this. We doubt that a period of relaxation would have a serious effect upon NATO programs and certainly need not do so. In any event, as indicated above, we doubt that such relaxation is likely to go very far in view of the obstacle of the German and Berlin problems upon which there appears to be little prospect of any real progress.

Apart from these factors, the major gain we see from a period of relaxation is the furtherance of the evolution which is taking place within the Soviet Union itself as well as in the Communist Bloc, and in which probably lies our only hope of eventually reaching a status of genuine coexistence. This probably lies well in the future, but we think it important to continue the trend in this direction and are encouraged by the developments of recent years.

In all these matters, United States policy must also take into account our world-wide responsibilities and burdens and we see only advantage to the West in the continued development of the

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current Sino-Soviet quarrel. We are not, however, motivated by any desire to back one Soviet faction against another, if indeed such exist, nor do we consider that we have the knowledge or capability of doing so. We believe, however, that our willingness to explore any possibility of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on subjects in which we have genuine mutual interest in doing so, can assist in furthering the Sino-Soviet split and in further opening up Soviet and satellite societies to contact with the West. The cessation of the jamming of Western broadcasts has, for example, been of considerable value to us. We have no doubts about the fundamental community of interests within the Western Alliance and its basic strength, and we can only regret that at a time when opportunities appear to be opening up because of developments in the East, that we should have so many differences of opinion upon tactical and operational matters. We shall continue to do our best to diminish and eliminate these and are always prepared to discuss our policies openly and frankly.

3. The test ban treaty.


You should express our regret that French Government has not chosen to accede to the limited test ban treaty. You should

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refer back to the President's letter to General de Gaulle and make it clear that there are two quite different elements to the problem of any possible nuclear cooperation between our countries, as the President sees it. While we believe that cooperation in major nuclear weapons technology would clearly require a level of agreement on related political problems which does not currently appear to be possible, the particular question of the French need for atmospheric testing seems to us quite different. It is our belief that underground testing by the most modern techniques would in fact permit France to assure herself of the satisfactory development of her current plans in the nuclear field,



You should express the President's hope that General de Gaulle may wish to give renewed consideration to this possibility.

4. Southeast Asia.

You should seek clarification of General de Gaulle's purpose and policy in this area. President recollects the general opinions which President de Gaulle expressed in the Paris meeting of June 1961, but he does not understand just how General de Gaulle

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envisages the development of a unified and neutralized Vietnam without the successful development of a strong non-Communist society in the southern part of that country. Since external support and cooperation appear to be essential for such development, in the face of Communist subversion, the President does not see how Western withdrawal could now have any other result than the abandonment of Vietnam to the Communists. If General de Gaulle has a different view of the possibilities, it would be very helpful if he would explain it to you, since private discussions are less likely to lead to misunderstanding than public declarations with respect to an area where an ally is carrying the major responsibility.

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SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: September 28, 1963

The Secretary's Lunch with Foreign
Ministers Home and Gromyko

Time: 1:00 p.m.

Place: The Secretary's
Suite, Waldorf
Towers

Subject: World Reaction to Test Ban Treaty;
LA Denuclearized Zone;
Disarmament;
Non-dissemination and MLF;
Military Budgets;
Soviet Proposal for 18-Nation Summit
on Disarmament;
Observation Posts.

Participants:

United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Ambassador Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Patrick Dean
Lord Hood
Mr. J. Oliver Wright
Mr. K.B.A. Scott

USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister
Semenov
Ambassador Fedorenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. A. G. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhodrev

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At the table, the Secretary suggested that the group discuss, between courses, one or two matters. For example, he thought it would be useful if impressions were compared as to the situation regarding the signing of the limited test ban treaty by the various nations in the world. The Secretary said the United States has been encouraged by the favorable reaction the treaty had received thus far and our impression was that everybody would sign it with the

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The Secretary observed we should not attach importance to some delay in the signing of the treaty by some of the African countries. The Conference of African States in Addis Ababa had supported the test ban treaty and he was confident that all African States would sign it.

Lord Home agreed with the Secretary.

Mr. Gromyko said it would be good if all African States signed the treaty because that would place those not wishing to sign it in an even more difficult position. He wondered whether Cambodia would sign the treaty; or, he asked facetiously, did Cambodia intend to become a nuclear power?

The Secretary remarked that perhaps both sides should send an envoy to talk to the Cambodians, though he was not sure whether that envoy should be a diplomat or a psychiatrist.

Mr. Gromyko then inquired whether all Latin American countries were going to sign the treaty.

The Secretary said we expected all Latin American countries, with the possible exception of Cuba, to sign the treaty. He noted that the delay in signing by some Latin American countries was due to their constitutional processes or the fact that some of them had no diplomatic relations with the USSR and therefore had to make special arrangements for the signing in Moscow. In this connection, he observed that Ambassador Kohler had signed the treaty in Moscow for Costa Rica. He reiterated that we expected all Latin American countries to sign, though we did not know about Cuba. Also, we believed all African States would sign. As to Asia, our impression was that everybody would sign except North Vietnam, North Korea and Peking.

that
Lord Home commented the United States and the United Kingdom did not have any particular pull in any of the three places.

that
The Secretary said while he had no information and no basis for such a statement, he did not abandon the idea that the French would sign the treaty before they conducted further atmospheric tests.

Mr. Gromyko said it would be a very good thing if the French did sign.

The Secretary remarked that if the French were to hear the statement he had just made they would bitterly deny it.

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Mr. Gromyko wondered whether the French would conduct underground tests in the Sahara.

The Secretary noted the French had conducted something like four atmospheric tests and perhaps about the same number of underground tests in the Sahara.

Mr. Gromyko recalled Ben Bella's protests against French testing.

The Secretary agreed and reiterated ^{that} Australia, New Zealand and Chile had also protested against possible French tests in the Pacific.

Lord Home wondered why Prince Sihanouk was unwilling to sign.

The Secretary thought Sihanouk's attitude was apparently due to his desire not to irritate Peking; in fact, Sihanouk had made a statement on this subject in which he had placed the primary burden on Red China.

Mr. Gromyko observed that the Cambodian Representative to the United Nations had spoken of the limited test ban treaty in very critical terms. The Cambodians appeared to take an all-or-nothing approach, because their main criticism with regard to the limited treaty was that it did not ban all tests.

The Secretary doubted that this was their real position.

Mr. Gromyko then commented that de Gaulle appeared to be full of ideas these days. Indeed, de Gaulle had been saying something new almost every week.

The Secretary said that we did not have a clear idea of what de Gaulle had been suggesting, but we felt it important to bring France into these discussions. Indeed, we had been very regretful that France had decided not to participate at Geneva. De Gaulle had made a statement about nuclear delivery vehicles, but our impression was that he was unwilling to discuss this matter further unless and until the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee was closed.

Mr. Gromyko wondered whether de Gaulle's statement was actually an attempt to find for France a way out of the situation. He commented this was just a guess on his part. While it would be good if France were to participate in discussions, he did not expect this would make things go smoothly right away. In this connection, he recalled the French proposal regarding nuclear delivery vehicles during Khrushchev's visit to France in 1960. The USSR

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had reacted positively to this suggestion but had got the impression that the French had lost taste for their own approach. In this, he did not blame the French alone.

The Secretary said we had not the slightest idea of what de Gaulle's proposals actually were but believed we ought to take a look at them.

Mr. Gromyko noted the French had been very vague in making their proposals even at the time of Khrushchev's visit to France.

Lord Home agreed with the Secretary that we should make an attempt to see what the French had in mind. He also felt the French would be unwilling to engage in any discussions so long as the 18-Nation Committee was operating.

The Secretary expressed the view that the question of the forum should not stand in the way of progress. We should see how France could be brought into the discussions.

that
Mr. Gromyko observed the discussion had now turned to such matters as forum. However, generally speaking, things had been going very badly in the field of disarmament. He was distressed to note that people, even at the General Assembly, were speaking of disarmament as of something very distant in the future. People were speaking in these terms not only as regards disarmament itself, as a specific process of occurrence, but also as regards the influence the termination of the arms race and disarmament would have on international life.

The Secretary thought this was a very important and very interesting subject to discuss, because the arms race was going on not only between the United States and the USSR but also between other nations in the various parts of the world and there was very little interest in those other arms races. He stressed that those other arms races could be equally important as the one between the United States and the USSR. In this connection, the Secretary said, the United States was in favor of a Latin American denuclearized zone, although we knew that some of the Latin American countries were not enthusiastic about it. Such a zone could include Guantnamo and the Panama Canal Zone but not any U.S. territory. We hoped Cuba could be induced to join such a zone.

Mr. Gromyko asked the Secretary to repeat his remark about Guantnamo and the Panama Canal Zone and also inquired whether Puerto Rico could be included.

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The Secretary reiterated/Guantanamo and the Canal Zone could be included and said we were prepared to accept full inspection in Guantamano. As to Puerto Rico, it was U.S. territory and was not subject to inclusion.

Mr. Gromyko thought denuclearized zones and all this talk about them were all right, but they did not mean disarmament. Indeed, the present situation reminded him of Nero playing the lute while Rome was in flames.

The Secretary said there were other things that could be done as well. For instance, we believed destruction of B-47's by the United States and of Badgers by the USSR would be a useful step. True, both B-47's and Badgers would become obsolete in our respective weapons systems but there was temptation on both sides to give these weapons to underdeveloped countries, and this was not useful in that it led to arms races between those countries. Thus, the Secretary believed it was important to make clear that as we were moving into more sophisticated weapons, the less sophisticated weapons would not go into the hands of third parties. Progress could be made if we destroyed rather than distributed obsolete weapons.

that

Lord Home commented/he had always been keen on having some visible destruction of weapons. Recalling Gromyko's statement at the General Assembly that nuclear delivery vehicles could be retained in Stage III of the disarmament process, he said it was important to know whether the USSR was prepared to begin with the implementation of Stage I before we saw our way clearly to Stage III, i.e., before a complete plan was fully agreed/and before commitments with respect to the total plan were undertaken. If the USSR was prepared to adopt such an approach, we could perhaps start by immobilizing, though perhaps not destroying, a certain agreed number of delivery vehicles on both sides.

that

Mr. Gromyko asserted/the Soviet proposal on nuclear delivery vehicles should meet the concern expressed by the Western Powers with respect to a possible breach of peace before the end of the disarmament process. He hoped the United States and the United Kingdom would appreciate or at least understand properly this proposal.

The Secretary said our attitude was positive and we were giving close study to the Soviet proposal in the hope that progress could be made at Geneva.

The Secretary continued that there was another approach, which he had mentioned to Chairman Khrushchev

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at Gagra. He noted that the two sides were not yet in a position where they could trust each other; therefore, whenever an agreement was to be reached, the fine print of such an agreement had to be worked out very carefully and this created obvious difficulties. Indeed, the great advantage of the partial test ban treaty was that it was a simple agreement. He thought Mr. Gromyko must have noted reports in the press that the United States was reducing its troops here and there. On our side, it had been intimated to us that the Soviet military budget might be smaller next year. Thus, perhaps we could proceed on a de facto basis without the need for developing agreements and the fine print thereof.

Mr. Gromyko said such an approach was possible. However, he believed difficulties would increase in a situation where the parties concerned were to act as if an agreement existed, because such a situation would provide for no obligations and would constitute only an understanding.

The Secretary responded that between World War I and World War II disarmament discussions had been swamped in technicalities and the effort had been frustrated because of their complexity. It would be well if we could find relatively simple steps with which we could proceed.

Lord Home said he could see what the Secretary meant but did not believe confidence would increase in a situation where the parties concerned acted as if an agreement existed.

Mr. Gromyko believed such understandings could be violated because the mood of the various statesmen could easily change in the absence of definite commitments. Thus, the situation would be less stable and more delicate.

that

Lord Home noted/the USSR had been insisting on having the whole disarmament program developed and agreed/before Stage I could be initiated. Such an approach had never attracted him, and he thought it would be well if we could start destroying or at least impounding nuclear delivery vehicles in Stage I without necessarily having reached agreement on the whole process of disarmament.

that

Mr. Gromyko contended/this was contradictory to the West's response to the Soviet 1962 proposal regarding nuclear delivery vehicles. At that time, the West kept asking what would happen in Stage III. As far as steps with which we could proceed were concerned, Chairman Khrushchev had listed a number of such steps, e.g., reduction or freeze of military budgets, nuclear free zones, etc.

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Lord Home agreed that at least an idea of the whole plan was necessary but did not believe it was necessary to have all details of the program agreed before Stage I could be initiated.

Mr. Gromyko then raised the question of non-dissemination. He thought everybody present attached importance to the subject but wondered how this could be reconciled with the proposed MLF. The USSR believed that if we really wanted to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons we must be honest and draw a line under the list of present nuclear powers. The USSR favors an agreement on non-proliferation, but not just half, one-third, or perhaps merely ten percent of an agreement.

The Secretary stressed the great importance the United States attached to this matter. The United States believed we had common interests in this field. Indeed, it was in the nature of nuclear weapons themselves that states possessing such weapons did not wish to see them get into the hands of other countries. He emphasized that the United States' policy was fundamentally opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons to national governments. In this connection, he observed that our relations with France would be much different had we given the French what they wanted in this field. He also stressed that the United States had no intention of giving the Germans a national nuclear capability, either by law or by practical arrangement. He said he understood the USSR could be suspicious in the absence of any knowledge of what the arrangement would be, but then we ourselves had not yet developed any specific MLF arrangement. He wished to point out, however, that any possible MLF arrangement would not give the right to any individual country, be it West Germany or Italy or any other country, to have one of its soldiers fire a nuclear weapon.

The Secretary continued that the difficulty of the situation now was that if these countries did not have a consultative voice in nuclear matters they would start taking national decisions in that field. After all, what France had done others could do also; not only West Germany but also such countries as Sweden, Switzerland, Egypt, Israel, perhaps Brazil, etc. What we needed was Soviet help to erect barriers to national nuclear capabilities, and this not only within NATO. In view of the fact that all of the present nuclear powers, including France, were interested in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and would not wish to transfer control of or technical information about nuclear weapons to other national governments, the problem of non-proliferation was in one sense not an urgent problem. However, it was an urgent

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problem in the sense that certain countries may wish to embark upon a nuclear weapons program on their own, without any outside assistance.

The Secretary went on to say that if the Soviet Union was concerned that an MLF would be just a first step towards proliferation of national nuclear capabilities, the best way to ensure that an MLF would not be such a step was to sign a non-proliferation arrangement. We understood that the Soviet Union had misgivings about an MLF now but we were sure they would be dispelled eventually.

that

Lord Home commented/the United Kingdom had certain misgivings as regards an MLF and all of them were public knowledge. However, those misgivings were not the same the USSR had. Indeed, the United Kingdom believed that an MLF should alleviate Soviet fears concerning West Germany.

Mr. Gromyko thought the Secretary was very optimistic. He said the USSR looked at this problem from the standpoint of lessening the danger of nuclear war. It was no great consolation to the Soviet Union that West Germany would have nuclear weapons together with the United States, though he did not wish to deny that there was a difference between a pool arrangement and individual possession of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union knew the Germans very well, and the fact remained that the Germans would take part in making political decisions with respect to nuclear weapons. He continued that the Soviet Union understood the U.S. position when the United States said it was in its interest not to have other countries possess nuclear weapons. The USSR understood the U.S. motives and believed this was a realistic approach. The only difference was that the USSR wished to go all the way, whereas the United States was trying to go halfway, or perhaps 60 or 75 percent of the way, but in any event not all the way. Agreement on this matter could be possible if the interests of both sides were taken into account. There was no reason why agreement should be impossible if the United States took into account the special interests of the USSR.

Mr. Gromyko said he could go even further and say that essentially the United States and the Soviet interests in this area coincided. There was no doubt that individual possession of nuclear weapons by additional states would constitute the greatest danger.

Lord Home suggested that an MLF, about which the United Kingdom had some misgivings of its own, would create for the USSR a situation safer than the one obtaining now, because there would be many fingers on the trigger and no single finger could fire the weapon.

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Mr. Gromyko said the USSR was not saying the situation would be worse; perhaps it would even signify some improvement. However, the problem would not be resolved all the way from the standpoint of averting the danger of nuclear war.

that
The Secretary commented the situation in the West had changed somewhat since the USSR had developed a large strike capability against the West in the mid-50's. It was normal and natural that nations who would be the object of incineration wanted to be consulted on and involved in nuclear matters. The other point he wished to make was that, in his view, perhaps only three people in the world fully knew the meaning of a nuclear exchange. They were the President, Chairman Khrushchev, and Prime Minister Macmillan, because they had not only the knowledge about these matters but also the responsibility. The Secretary felt there had been too much tea table conversation on this subject. It was sufficient to see what Peiping was saying, and Senator Goldwater had also been making statements suggesting that this or that should be done. It was therefore important that governments be educated about the realities of the situation, and we certainly hoped that the USSR was educating its allies.

that
The Secretary continued it was important to make clear that any MLF would not involve transfer of weapons to individual countries or the divulging of technical information about nuclear weapons inside the MLF. Any overhaul or repair of nuclear weapons would be done by the nuclear power which had supplied the weapon to the MLF. The Secretary then recalled the United States had given the USSR two papers on non-dissemination. One of them was a simple agreement both sides could agree upon, whereas the other was a minute concerning the meaning of the word "indirectly", contained in the first. The purpose of the minute was to be fully candid with the Soviet Union and to avoid any possible misunderstandings concerning some arrangements within the Western alliance, such as, for instance, an arrangement where U.S. owned and controlled warheads were carried on planes belonging to another nation.

The Secretary then commented that perhaps the USSR had some misgivings not related to the problem of dissemination as such. For example, perhaps the USSR would not welcome West Germany's participation in the decision-making process or the fact that three or four nations would be sharing the cost. The Secretary said he did not believe there was basic disagreement between the United States and the USSR on the question of non-dissemination and thought perhaps the gap on details could be closed in further discussions. In any event, he suggested, we should not assume that this question was closed.

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Mr. Gromyko said he understood, although he did not share, the Secretary's argument that some countries should be consulted in a joint pool arrangement. He wished to point out, however, that the United States was at the same time proposing a universal non-dissemination arrangement which would exclude the possibility lying at the foundation of the Secretary's argument in favor of an MLF, because such an arrangement would not allow individual states to achieve the objective the United States is striving to preclude by an MLF.

that
The Secretary reiterated/we wished to avoid any misunderstanding regarding the meaning of the terms "indirectly" or "through alliances", referring again to the fact that the United States was determined, in any intra-alliance arrangement, not to make it possible, by law or by physical arrangement, for any national government to acquire U.S. nuclear weapons. He also noted that the Soviet Union had a similar problem since it had nuclear weapons located in third countries.

that
Mr. Gromyko asserted/the Secretary's remark did not answer his observation.

Lord Home commented that if a non-proliferation arrangement had been concluded before anybody had even thought about an MLF, one could suppose that we could have an MLF because it would not involve transfer of control or information.

Mr. Gromyko inquired whether there was any possibility of French participation in a non-dissemination agreement.

The Secretary replied he did not know but commented that if the Soviet Union were to say that this was a basis for serious negotiations, he believed the French would be interested. France had interests similar to ours but it had not believed the USSR would negotiate on this matter seriously.

Mr. Gromyko said French non-participation would not lessen the importance of an agreement, although, of course, it would be better if the French participated. Since the non-proliferation problem involved both the giving and the receiving countries, if France did not participate but West Germany did, an agreement would still be valuable, though again it would be better if both of them participated.

The Secretary said he wished to make it clear that the positions he had stated to Mr. Gromyko were U.S. positions and not those of France.

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Mr. Gromyko commented he had just wanted to make it clear that any variant would be good.

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The Secretary then noted the West European Union had a commitment from West Germany that it would not manufacture ABC weapons. (Mr. Gromyko interjected this covered only manufacture.) The Secretary continued he hoped that Mr. Gromyko would not be offended, but the USSR had lost its virginity in that it had gone further with the Chinese than we had gone with anyone with respect to nuclear weapons, except the United Kingdom, with whom we had made joint efforts in the nuclear field during World War II. The Soviet Union had put the Chinese on the path of technological development in the field of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the Soviet Union now regretted this, but the fact remained that the Soviet Union was now unable to stop that development short of forceful action.

that

Mr. Gromyko noted the USSR had publicly stated it had not given the Chinese any nuclear weapons and the Chinese had also publicly stated they had not received any such weapons. Thus, who knew better what the situation was?

The Secretary replied he had not said the USSR had given actual weapons to the Chinese but that it had provided the Chinese with technical assistance, although we knew that assistance had been stopped in 1959 or 1960. In any event, he did not wish to raise the Chinese problem in any difficult way and when Mr. Gromyko came to Washington perhaps we could consult about the Chinese capability. The remark about Soviet assistance to the Chinese was not a reproach; this had been a Soviet decision and perhaps the Soviet Union regretted it now. The important point, however, was that we had a common interest with respect to non-dissemination.

Mr. Gromyko thought it was good we had a common basic interest in this matter.

The Secretary commented Mr. Gromyko would agree this had nothing to do with ideology; this dealt only with weapons.

Mr. Gromyko said he, of course, agreed.

The Secretary stated it would be good if agreement were reached among the three if it could not be reached among the four, although he believed that agreement among the four should be possible. He observed that Mr. Gromyko would surely admit it would have been terrible if some of the personalities in charge of the various governments

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on both sides, ours and Soviet, during the post war period had had nuclear weapons. Some of them had been simply nuts and it would have been really terrible if they had had nuclear weapons.

Mr. Gromyko laughed and said there had been more nuts on the Western side than on the Soviet side.

Lord Home wondered how these discussions should proceed.

The Secretary thought we should first discuss with Mr. Gromyko how France could be brought in.

Mr. Gromyko said the United States was disregarding the basic Soviet point, namely, that a sweeping arrangement would do away with the situation the United States had been saying it wished to remedy with an MLF.

The Secretary pointed out we knew, though admittedly the USSR did not, that West Germany would not develop a national nuclear capability. Thus, to us 90% of the problem was China, and perhaps in some years this would also apply to the USSR. He wondered whether the USSR could bring in China into a non-dissemination arrangement and noted that without Red China such an arrangement would serve no useful purpose.

Mr. Gromyko replied that the United States knew China's position. He believed, however, an agreement without China would be better for the United States than no agreement at all.

The Secretary thought it was worthwhile to take notice of the fact that this matter was in our common interest.

Lord Home reiterated his observation that an MLF should be better from the Soviet standpoint than the present situation and noted the USSR had mixed crews with the Poles, etc., though presumably the weapons were in Soviet hands.

Mr. Gromyko then changed the subject and asked for views on the matter of military budgets.

The Secretary said there were several problems involved in this matter. For one thing, the Soviet military budget was a mystery. (Mr. Gromyko denied this, saying he could provide us with copies of the Soviet budgetary report.) Also, the Secretary continued, there was the problem of comparability of the military budgets of the various countries. In this connection, he recalled his remark at Gagra about the fact that the military pay increase in

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the United States, which incidentally had been passed by Congress yesterday, would increase the U.S. military budget by one billion dollars but this increase would not add a single bullet to the U.S. military capability. While this matter of military budgets could be looked at, we believed the implementation of any such arrangement would involve such inspection as the USSR would probably be unwilling to accept. He noted he did not dismiss the matter but only foresaw difficulties. In addition, there was another difficulty as far as the United States was concerned, i.e., the fact that under the Constitution the United States Congress had special prerogatives with respect to budgetary matters. The Secretary said he was not sure Congress would relinquish those prerogatives, although perhaps it would.

Mr. Gromyko then asked for U.S. and U.K. views on the Soviet proposal at the General Assembly for a summit meeting. In this connection, he noted Lord Home had mentioned in passing the question of a nuclear umbrella through Stage III, which had also been advanced by the USSR at the General Assembly.

that
The Secretary observed this latter point could be the subject of further discussion.

Lord Home referred to observation posts, commenting they could be useful provided they were not linked with such measures as would create obvious difficulties. He hoped progress could be made on this matter in Geneva so that it could then be taken up either at the Foreign Ministers level or the Heads of Government level. Referring to the matter of prohibiting the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, he said such an arrangement would be welcome, provided other nations, such as the United Kingdom, could join in the arrangement when they attained the capability of engaging in outer space activities.

that
Mr. Gromyko observed Khrushchev had stated observation posts, along with other measures, would be useful to prevent surprise attack. He had noted that President had also stated observation posts would be useful.

that
Lord Home pointed out Khrushchev had not linked observation posts to any other measures.

that
Mr. Gromyko replied Khrushchev had been speaking in general terms, and said that to be effective observation posts should be coordinated with other measures.

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The Secretary said we did not reject in principle a Heads of Government meeting, but he believed both Khrushchev and the President shared the view that a summit meeting should produce results. He hoped that progress could be made in Geneva so that prospects for results could open up. While he did not wish to be undemocratic, the Secretary wondered whether a meeting of 18 Heads of Government would be as useful as one with fewer participants.

Mr. Gromyko said the USSR had no special interest in this matter and he had mentioned this idea at the General Assembly only because he believed all of us had an interest in it.

Lord Home said ^{that} if sufficient progress were reached either on observation posts or non-dissemination, perhaps a summit meeting would be appropriate, but he did not think a meeting of 18 Heads of Government could get into the necessary details.

The Secretary remarked that as to observation posts, we believed this matter should be fully explored. We were interested in it on a wide basis, and there were some points which could perhaps be tied in, e.g., advance notification of major military movements; however, such things as reduction of troops or nuclear free zones were not appropriate.

After this discussion at the table, the Secretary, Lord Home, and Mr. Gromyko had a brief discussion while standing in the living room. Mr. Gromyko continued to press his point that a non-dissemination arrangement would do away with the basic assumption advanced by the United States in favor of an MLF, with the Secretary and Lord Home replying along the lines of their remarks at the table. Mr. Gromyko contended neither the Secretary nor Lord Home had answered his point and suggested they give it some further thought. The Secretary inquired whether Mr. Gromyko wished to continue the discussion of such matters as observation posts here, with both sides designating their disarmament specialists for that purpose, or would prefer to have those discussions in Geneva. Mr. Gromyko said he had no objection to having a discussion among disarmament experts here although he would rather have further discussion of these matters among the Foreign Ministers first.

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CATEGORY "A"

Completely declassified
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Approved in S
10/4/63

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October 4, 1963

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1963

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

EYES ONLY

Date: October 2, 1963
Time: 8:00 p.m. - Dinner
Place: Soviet Mission,
New York

Subject: Germany and Berlin; NAP.

Participants:

United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister
Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador Fedorenko
Ambassador Novikov
Mr. Zamtsov, Head of the
Historical Division,
Foreign Ministry
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhdrev

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After some discussion of Laos, Mr. Gromyko changed the subject and said he wished to draw the Secretary's attention to the German problem, which had been touched upon briefly when the Secretary, Lord Home and himself had met with Secretary-General U Thant.

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Mr. Gromyko thought there was no need to repeat what the Soviet Government, and Mr. Khrushchev personally, had said about the importance the USSR attached to the solution of the problem of a German peace treaty. He wished, however, to stress again that importance. The USSR believed the problem was as important as it had been before, although, as stated by the USSR previously, as a result of certain arrangements with respect to borders, the situation had changed considerably in favor of the GDR. Yet, this was no solution of the problem and the problem still remained. The Secretary would surely remember where he, Mr. Gromyko, and the Secretary had left the discussion of this problem. Mr. Gromyko thought both he and the Secretary could probably recite by heart each other's arguments used in those discussions; indeed, they probably referred to those arguments by number.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the question of the presence of Western troops in West Berlin had been discussed. The USSR had advanced certain ideas as to how the situation could be improved and had put forward certain variants. However, the United States had not believed at the time that those variants were satisfactory. Mr. Gromyko suggested that it would be useful to recall the latest developments on this point. At his meeting with the President last fall, the President had mentioned the possibility of legal changes in the status of West Berlin. While in Moscow for the signing of the test ban treaty, the Secretary had referred to the possibility of taking a "fresh look" at the problem; the Secretary had not mentioned any specifics, and perhaps he had some new points to make. Mr. Gromyko said he would like to learn the views of the United States Government as to where we stood on this problem and as to the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the German problem, and in particular as regards the presence of Western troops in West Berlin. The Soviet Union still believed that this problem was still problem number one, in spite of the fact that some agreements had been or might be reached in the disarmament and other fields. From the standpoint of the security of Europe and of the Soviet Union, this problem was problem number one. Mr. Gromyko wondered whether any advance was possible in this area.

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The Secretary said he agreed that the German and the Berlin problems were number one in the relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; there was certainly no question about that. He believed that nothing could transform those relations more dramatically than a final solution of that problem. Certainly this was the point of confrontation and thus problem number one. However, the very fact that this problem was so important made it all the more difficult to resolve if a solution would change the basic relations between the two sides. The Secretary then recalled that the President had outlined our basic consideration on this problem at the Vienna meeting, and commented that no basic change had occurred in those considerations since that time. Since four or five years ago, the Soviet Union had advanced some proposals regarding a peace treaty and Berlin. On our side, we maintained the attitude fundamental to the belief held by the American people ever since the 18th Century that any settlement involving the desires of people should be based on a determination by those people; in other words, we were for self-determination in its broadest sense. The Secretary continued that this problem was difficult for both sides. However, he believed that over the past two years changes had occurred which had taken out the fever of the situation. East Germany was no longer bleeding as it had before because of emigration, and thus the situation was now more stable. Also, he believed that the development of the relations between the USSR and the Socialist States on the one hand, and the United States and the West on the other had an important bearing on this problem. In this connection, the Secretary noted the development of trade relations between West Germany and the East and the development of more normal relations between the West and Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. This seems to indicate a lessening of the fear of Germany in those countries which, on the basis of their history over the past fifty years, had come to fear Germany.

The Secretary continued that he believed it was important to reach agreement on a peace treaty with Germany, but pointed out that he saw no basis now for the solution

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of this problem. He stressed the importance of reaching a solution and again stressed the importance the development of East-West relations had in this respect. He also emphasized that the solution should not be at the expense of Germany's neighbors.

The Secretary then pointed out that the United States did not envisage a permanent stationing of US troops forever, but stressed the importance of keeping those troops so long as security demanded it. He thought there was no need to repeat the United States' view regarding the need of keeping Western forces in West Berlin so long as we were responsible for its security. The Secretary then noted that a situation where the Germans were not allowed to express themselves left an unstable and potentially dangerous problem. We would prefer a permanent solution which would involve a strengthening of security. At the same time, we were prepared to explore the possibility of entering arrangements based on mutual recognition^{and} that both sides had an interest in this matter. The United States could not accept the view that East Berlin and East Germany were of no interest to us, that they were gone, and that the only question was how to divide responsibility in West Berlin. He said he did not wish to repeat what he had said on previous occasions concerning the lack of reciprocity inherent in such an approach, and stressed again that both sides must recognize each other's interests.

The Secretary said he was curious why the USSR and its allies were stressing their distrust for Germany just as we were moving towards improved relations and a change of government in Germany. He would have thought that the Soviet side would wait and see how the new government would act. He believed that West Germany was interested in improved relations with the East and that the new German government would be prepared to move in that direction, in both small and large areas. The Secretary reiterated he did not see any solution to the problem now and believed our task was to contain it and to prevent any dangerous developments. Meanwhile, we must see what we could do to alleviate the problem, and perhaps improved climate would be a very important factor.

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Mr. Gromyko said that an improvement in the climate between East and West Germany had occurred, and both the Secretary and himself knew what had caused this. As to the improvement of the climate on the international plane, it was the test ban agreement which had brought it about. As to relations between East and West Germany, he did not know to what extent they had improved, and also experience had shown that those relations tended to fluctuate. No one could tell what would happen, and the situation remained unstable. There remained such problems as those of borders, traffic, and appropriate and due respect for the sovereign rights of the GDR as a state. Thus, in spite of the fact that the tensions in the world and between the two German States had lessened, the situation was not safe, was still delicate, and was charged in long-range terms with many dangers and imponderables, and all this was because there was no peace treaty.

As to West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko continued, the United States had said it was difficult or even impossible to resolve that problem because the main problem had not been resolved. The United States was right in saying that the Berlin question was part of the total problem, but it might be useful to go back and look at the order in which the various questions had been taken up. Those questions had been discussed one after another and the question of troops had been finally reached. All those questions had been taken up in the light of the main problem, but the Secretary would not wish to deny that we had come very close to agreement on many of them. If we had reached agreement on the question of troops and on their withdrawal, we probably would have overcome the difficulties we had encountered in relation to other points. Thus it was difficult to understand the logic of the argument that it was difficult to resolve this matter in the absence of a solution of the main problem.

Mr. Gromyko then referred to the Secretary's remark about a possible interim arrangement. Noting the Secretary had refrained from being specific, he wondered what this remark meant. Did the United States envisage an interim arrangement for a period of two, four, five or ten years?

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It was quite clear that there was a great difference between an arrangement covering a shorter period of time and one covering many, many years. Thus, the Soviet Government would like to know what the US Government meant when it referred to the possibility of some interim arrangement for West Berlin. At the same time, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to stress that any interim arrangement would not resolve the main problem in that it would not draw the line under World War II and would not resolve the question of a peace treaty. Consequently, an interim arrangement could be only temporary, while the long-range problem was that of the state of affairs with respect to the two German States and to the situation in Europe. The Secretary had mentioned the division of Germany. That division was, of course, a fact but if we were to engage in a discussion of that matter, there would be no end to it. Mr. Gromyko believed that the United States, the United Kingdom and the French positions on this particular situation contained many realistic elements. The fact was that the whole world was faced with this situation and if one wished to change it, that would mean war. However, he believed that neither side wanted war. As to the Secretary's remark that East Berlin was no different, he wished to remind the Secretary of how the problem of West Berlin had arisen. That problem was due to the fact that West Berlin was a special, different entity as a social unit in its environment; it was different from East Berlin from the standpoint of its social order. The Secretary had said Western presence in West Berlin was required to protect what the West called freedom of West Berlin, but East Berlin had the same social system as East Germany. In any event, he was making this comment only in passing since the Secretary had raised the point.

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to sum up his remarks as follows. First, what did the United States mean by interim arrangement? Second, he wished to stress the view of the Soviet Government that any interim arrangement would not eliminate the long-range problem, which would remain. And finally, it would be good to explore the problem in the light of the new situation which had now developed. Perhaps this new situation would lead to

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different conclusions. He thought the more favorable situation obtaining now and the improved relations between the two Germanys could improve the chances for a solution of the problem. In any event, the USSR regarded this problem as very important and very acute from the standpoint of European security.

The Secretary pointed out that as to interim arrangements, all arrangements arrived at at the time of and since the German surrender were interim arrangements pending a final settlement. These arrangements had resulted in the present situation, and in particular in the presence of Western forces in Berlin. The Soviet proposals on this latter point, of which there had been several variants, contained two elements: one, they sought a reduction of our position in West Berlin by providing for a situation where our troops would be joined by either Soviet or Ghanaian forces or by forces from the Ivory Coast or Denmark; and two, they provided for a time limit, without agreement on what would happen after the expiration of that limit. The Secretary agreed that both sides had been approaching agreement on a number of points, and commented that if the Soviet Union had accepted a year and a half ago the presence of Western forces in West Berlin pending a final settlement, then a number of other points, such as access, etc., could have fallen into place; however, this had not been the Soviet position.

The Secretary went on to say that he did not believe the present situation in Germany was permanent so long as the Germans wanted to live together. If our view on this was wrong, this should be found out by letting the Germans themselves say so. The Germans could express their view themselves or perhaps with the help of their neighbors. In fact, the Soviets themselves had said that a two-Germany situation was not a permanent solution, because they had stated that the two Germanys should work such a solution between themselves. In any event, the Secretary continued, he did not see why the German problem was acute, unless, of course, the USSR wanted to make it such in which case, this would be the USSR's responsibility. Many things had

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occurred over the past few years, such as, for example, the increase in trade between West Germany and the East. That trade is now something like five billion dollars a year, and Mr. Khrushchev himself had said that trade meant peace. The Secretary also believed that the change of the West German Government would lead to improved relations between West Germany and the East, and recalled the remark he had made on previous occasions that similar progress could result from a change of government in East Germany.

The Secretary then stressed that one basic fact could be recognized, namely, that Four Powers were in Germany and Berlin, and suggested that we try to find some solution on that basis. The Soviet side had made certain proposals, and so had our side, but neither side's proposals were acceptable to the other. What we must do is avoid a crisis from which neither side would benefit.

Mr. Gromyko noted the Secretary had said many points would have fallen into place if the Soviet Union had agreed to Western forces remaining in West Berlin pending a final solution of the German problem. However, if by "final solution" the Secretary meant German unification, that meant that Western forces would stay in West Berlin indefinitely, and agreement was impossible on that basis.

The Secretary pointed out the Soviet Union had agreed to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin without any time limit. Our forces had pulled out of Saxony and Thuringia in order to comply with the arrangements which had been agreed upon regarding Berlin. Those arrangements had been under great strain in 1947 and 1948, but subsequent to that the Soviet Union had agreed to have the arrangements continue.

Mr. Gromyko commented there had been no agreement that there should be no time limit.

The Secretary responded that this was correct but stressed that neither had there been an agreement that the Soviet Union would set the time limit.

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Mr. Gromyko said that no agreement was possible on the basis of an indefinite stay of Western forces in West Berlin; it would be insincere to say otherwise.

As to Soviet-West German relations, Mr. Gromyko went on, he did not know whether the United States was interested in those relations being good, although he believed that good West German-Soviet relations should be in the United States' interest. If his assumption was correct, then there was no basis for criticism of the Soviet Union by the United States, because it had been the Soviet Union who had made the greatest number of proposals designed to improve relations with West Germany. Nevertheless, Soviet relations with West Germany, including trade, political, and other relations, were not good. Perhaps this was because the United States wanted them to be so. As to the Soviet Union, it would not stand with its hand stretched out for good relations with West Germany; the Soviet state ship would move ahead even without good relations with West Germany. Mr. Gromyko asserted that West Germany had always created obstacles in the various areas where progress should be possible, such as disarmament, non-dissemination, denuclearized zones, etc. The West Germans had always come out against any proposals; they had been trying to arouse the West German population against the Soviet Union, and had been attempting to provoke incidents on the East German border. All this had been done in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union had demonstrated great restraint vis-a-vis West Germany. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to note that it would be the easiest thing in the world to arouse the sentiments of the Soviet population against West Germany, because almost every Soviet family would wish to raise its voice in such an event, especially as regards a West German foreign policy. However, the Soviet Government and the Central Committee were not doing this. Even though it was difficult to erase the pages of history, the Soviet Union was still trying to look forward rather than backward and was attempting to build new relations with West Germany. The Soviet Union had no reason not to continue this policy which was part of the general Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. Mr. Gromyko said he believed that policy would continue.

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The Secretary referred to Mr. Gromyko's remark about disarmament, nuclear-free zones and non-dissemination, and said he wished to assure Mr. Gromyko that the United States was not simply a voice of West Germany. Indeed, the United States spoke for itself. If the USSR and the United States could reach agreement on some of these points, West Germany would certainly not stand in the way. Noting that West Germany had signed the test ban agreement, the Secretary pointed out that West Germany was also the only non-nuclear power which had signed, as far back as ten years ago, a pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Perhaps some people in Moscow thought so, but the United States was no monkey on the stick manipulated by West Germany.

Mr. Gromyko interjected such a description would be an exaggeration.

The Secretary continued that the United States was very interested in disarmament and was earnestly seeking areas of agreement in that field. He reiterated that if some agreement were reached between the United States and USSR in those areas, West Germany would not stand in its way.

Mr. Gromyko contended that in previous discussions, particularly those relating to disarmament, the United States had very often said that its allies, and specifically West Germany, did not agree to this or that proposal. He said he agreed with the approach the Secretary had just stated and that he believed the United States should adhere to that approach. However, what the United States had been saying elsewhere could not be reconciled with that approach.

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to make a few remarks about why the Soviet Union was critical of the West German policy, and particularly of Adenauer's policy. The Secretary had noted the West German Government would soon change, but he would be justified in wondering why the Soviet Union was critical of the West German Government if the present West German Government had not been erecting obstacles and had not been pursuing an obstructive policy.

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The fact was that no matter what proposal was advanced by the Soviet Union, or even from the rostrum of the United Nations, the West German Government always raised objections. Even on such matter as retention of a certain number of missiles by the United States and the USSR, a matter which should be of no concern to them, the West Germans appeared to say that it was not useful to discuss it. He wondered whether this was perhaps due to some provision in the Franco-German agreement since France was against disarmament. In any event, Mr. Gromyko asserted, the present German Government, Adenauer's Government, had been using the harshest words existing in the classical German language when referring to the Soviet Union and its proposals. This was done in spite of the fact that the only thing the USSR was seeking was to defend the truth.

Mr. Gromyko then said he liked the Secretary's remark on a previous occasion to the effect that Khrushchev, the President and Macmillan knew best what nuclear war would mean. The Secretary was absolutely correct in saying this. It followed from this statement that these three countries, and perhaps particularly the United States and the USSR, must approach the problem of security and peace with greatest responsibility. This was why the Soviet Union believed that the gap existing between the two sides on nuclear matters, such as non-dissemination and MLF, was very dangerous. Mr. Gromyko then also recalled the Secretary's remark that he did not believe either the United States or the USSR would launch a nuclear attack on the other side. He felt that this was absolutely correct; indeed, it was the cornerstone of the world situation. If this was so, Mr. Gromyko went on, we should try to find the possibility for the solution of as many problems as possible. He felt there was no need to speak of the importance of the test ban treaty as the President and the Secretary had done that very ably. Mr. Gromyko said he had been present when Khrushchev was commenting on the President's and the Secretary's statements regarding the test ban treaty and had heard him say that both the President and the Secretary had displayed a very realistic approach and that he liked their statements. Thus, Mr. Gromyko said, he believed a final solution of all the problems standing before us

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should be in the interest of both sides. He did not wish to say that all of them should be resolved at once; they should be taken up one after another, and the policy of the Soviet Union was ripe for this.

The Secretary commented he wished to add a postscript to Mr. Gromyko's remark about "you said, we said". He said he believed that it was true that the United States and the USSR would not attack each other. However, he felt it was dangerous if two sides came to the table with each being convinced that the other would not wage nuclear war under any circumstances, because then it might press on the vital interest of the other side. He said that the assumption was basically true, but stressed that there were these considerations of reciprocity.

The Secretary continued that there were many points where agreement should be possible. Perhaps, he remarked facetiously, both sides were interested in having a direct communications line to Paris. Agreement should be possible in those areas where the interests of the two sides were similar; indeed, the test ban agreement was important because it involved no concession by one side to the other, although, of course, 19 Senators in the US Congress believed that the United States had conceded too much to the Soviet Union. The Secretary expressed the hope that while Mr. Gromyko was here and in Washington areas of possible agreement, including those he had mentioned at the table, could be explored. Both of our peoples would welcome agreement between our two countries, and West Germany would not stand in the way if we could agree.

Mr. Gromyko said he agreed and asserted that the Soviet Union believed in this approach even more than the United States.

The Secretary pointed out that this, of course, did not mean that we could reach agreement at the expense of our allies, just as the Soviet Union would probably not agree at the expense of its allies.

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Mr. Gromyko then inquired about an NAP.

The Secretary said this was our problem.

Mr. Gromyko said the United States had stated this problem had to be dealt with by its allies.

The Secretary responded that perhaps tomorrow he would return the question he and Lord Home had asked Mr. Gromyko yesterday. This was our problem because, as he and Lord Home had said yesterday, if Lord Home were a member of the US Congress and asked whether an NAP would apply to West Berlin, what would the Soviet answer be? Yesterday, Mr. Gromyko had been unable to answer this question.

Mr. Gromyko said he could only repeat what he had said yesterday. The Soviet Union believed that all questions, both minor and major, should be negotiated peacefully. If a reference to Berlin were included in an NAP, that would drown the NAP in the very broad and difficult problem of Germany and Berlin. The Secretary would be justified in asking this question if he, Gromyko, had said that an NAP should include the provision that the West Berlin problem should be resolved by all means, including the use of force. However, this was not the situation.

*Soviet
in Berlin
h*

The Secretary asked Mr. Gromyko whether he saw in that area of the world any real issue other than Berlin that could involve the use of force.

Mr. Gromyko responded that the Soviet Union was asking for no exception. Its view was that all questions should be resolved peacefully.

At this point, the Secretary suggested that the conversation be ended as he had to catch his train for Washington.

USDel:AAkalovsky:ck 10/4/63

Cleared by: Ambassador Thompson

SECRET - EYES ONLY

10/4/63
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Approved in S
10/4/63

SECRET - EYES ONLY
SecDel/MC/93 (see MC/68)
October 4, 1963

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1963

6

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 2, 1963
Time: 8:00 p.m. - Dinner
Place: Soviet Mission,
New York

Subject: Germany and Berlin; NAP.

Participants:

United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister
Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador Fedorenko
Ambassador Novikov
Mr. Zamtsov, Head of the
Historical Division,
Foreign Ministry
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhdrev

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After some discussion of Laos, Mr. Gromyko changed the subject and said he wished to draw the Secretary's attention to the German problem, which had been touched upon briefly when the Secretary, Lord Home and himself had met with Secretary-General U Thant.

SECRET - EYES ONLY
Group 1

NSF 187 / Gromyko talks

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Mr. Gromyko thought there was no need to repeat what the Soviet Government, and Mr. Khrushchev personally, had said about the importance the USSR attached to the solution of the problem of a German peace treaty. He wished, however, to stress again that importance. The USSR believed the problem was as important as it had been before, although, as stated by the USSR previously, as a result of certain arrangements with respect to borders, the situation had changed considerably in favor of the GDR. Yet, this was no solution of the problem and the problem still remained. The Secretary would surely remember where he, Mr. Gromyko, and the Secretary had left the discussion of this problem. Mr. Gromyko thought both he and the Secretary could probably recite by heart each other's arguments used in those discussions; indeed, they probably referred to those arguments by number.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the question of the presence of Western troops in West Berlin had been discussed. The USSR had advanced certain ideas as to how the situation could be improved and had put forward certain variants. However, the United States had not believed at the time that those variants were satisfactory. Mr. Gromyko suggested that it would be useful to recall the latest developments on this point. At his meeting with the President last fall, the President had mentioned the possibility of legal changes in the status of West Berlin. While in Moscow for the signing of the test ban treaty, the Secretary had referred to the possibility of taking a "fresh look" at the problem; the Secretary had not mentioned any specifics, and perhaps he had some new points to make. Mr. Gromyko said he would like to learn the views of the United States Government as to where we stood on this problem and as to the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the German problem, and in particular as regards the presence of Western troops in West Berlin. The Soviet Union still believed that this problem was still problem number one, in spite of the fact that some agreements had been or might be reached in the disarmament and other fields. From the standpoint of the security of Europe and of the Soviet Union, this problem was problem number one. Mr. Gromyko wondered whether any advance was possible in this area.

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The Secretary said he agreed that the German and the Berlin problems were number one in the relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; there was certainly no question about that. He believed that nothing could transform those relations more dramatically than a final solution of that problem. Certainly this was the point of confrontation and thus problem number one. However, the very fact that this problem was so important made it all the more difficult to resolve if a solution would change the basic relations between the two sides. The Secretary then recalled that the President had outlined our basic consideration on this problem at the Vienna meeting, and commented that no basic change had occurred in those considerations since that time. Since four or five years ago, the Soviet Union had advanced some proposals regarding a peace treaty and Berlin. On our side, we maintained the attitude fundamental to the belief held by the American people ever since the 18th Century that any settlement involving the desires of people should be based on a determination by those people; in other words, we were for self-determination in its broadest sense. The Secretary continued that this problem was difficult for both sides. However, he believed that over the past two years changes had occurred which had taken out the fever of the situation. East Germany was no longer bleeding as it had before because of emigration, and thus the situation was now more stable. Also, he believed that the development of the relations between the USSR and the Socialist States on the one hand, and the United States and the West on the other had an important bearing on this problem. In this connection, the Secretary noted the development of trade relations between West Germany and the East and the development of more normal relations between the West and Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. This seems to indicate a lessening of the fear of Germany in those countries which, on the basis of their history over the past fifty years, had come to fear Germany.

The Secretary continued that he believed it was important to reach agreement on a peace treaty with Germany, but pointed out that he saw no basis now for the solution

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of that problem. He believed that time was working towards a solution and again stressed the importance the development of East-West relations had in this respect. He also emphasized that the solution should not be at the expense of Germany's neighbors.

The Secretary then pointed out that the United States did not envisage a permanent stationing of US troops forever, but stressed the importance of keeping those troops so long as security demanded it. He thought there was no need to repeat the United States' view regarding the need of keeping Western forces in West Berlin so long as we were responsible for its security. The Secretary then noted that a situation where the Germans were not allowed to express themselves left an unstable and potentially dangerous problem. We would prefer a permanent solution which would involve a strengthening of security. At the same time, we were prepared to explore the possibility of entering arrangements based on mutual recognition^{and} that both sides had an interest in this matter. The United States could not accept the view that East Berlin and East Germany were of no interest to us, that they were gone, and that the only question was how to divide responsibility in West Berlin. He said he did not wish to repeat what he had said on previous occasions concerning the lack of reciprocity inherent in such an approach, and stressed again that both sides must recognize each other's interests.

The Secretary said he was curious why the USSR and its allies were stressing their distrust for Germany just as we were moving towards improved relations and a change of government in Germany. He would have thought that the Soviet side would wait and see how the new government would act. He believed that West Germany was interested in improved relations with the East and that the new German government would be prepared to move in that direction, in both small and large areas. The Secretary reiterated he did not see any solution to the problem now and believed our task was to contain it and to prevent any dangerous developments. Meanwhile, we must see what we could do to alleviate the problem, and perhaps improved climate would be a very important factor.

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Mr. Gromyko said that an improvement in the climate between East and West Germany had occurred, and both the Secretary and himself knew what had caused this. As to the improvement of the climate on the international plane, it was the test ban agreement which had brought it about. As to relations between East and West Germany, he did not know to what extent they had improved, and also experience had shown that those relations tended to fluctuate. No one could tell what would happen, and the situation remained unstable. There remained such problems as those of borders, traffic, and appropriate and due respect for the sovereign rights of the GDR as a state. Thus, in spite of the fact that the tensions in the world and between the two German States had lessened, the situation was not safe, was still delicate, and was charged in long-range terms with many dangers and imponderables, and all this was because there was no peace treaty.

As to West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko continued, the United States had said it was difficult or even impossible to resolve that problem because the main problem had not been resolved. The United States was right in saying that the Berlin question was part of the total problem, but it might be useful to go back and look at the order in which the various questions had been taken up. Those questions had been discussed one after another and the question of troops had been finally reached. All those questions had been taken up in the light of the main problem, but the Secretary would not wish to deny that we had come very close to agreement on many of them. If we had reached agreement on the question of troops and on their withdrawal, we probably would have overcome the difficulties we had encountered in relation to other points. Thus it was difficult to understand the logic of the argument that it was difficult to resolve this matter in the absence of a solution of the main problem.

Mr. Gromyko then referred to the Secretary's remark about a possible interim arrangement. Noting the Secretary had refrained from being specific, he wondered what this remark meant. Did the United States envisage an interim arrangement for a period of two, four, five or ten years?

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It was quite clear that there was a great difference between an arrangement covering a shorter period of time and one covering many, many years. Thus, the Soviet Government would like to know what the US Government meant when it referred to the possibility of some interim arrangement for West Berlin. At the same time, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to stress that any interim arrangement would not resolve the main problem in that it would not draw the line under World War II and would not resolve the question of a peace treaty. Consequently, an interim arrangement could be only temporary, while the long-range problem was that of the state of affairs with respect to the two German States and to the situation in Europe. The Secretary had mentioned the division of Germany. That division was, of course, a fact but if we were to engage in a discussion of that matter, there would be no end to it. Mr. Gromyko believed that the United States, the United Kingdom and the French positions on this particular situation contained many realistic elements. The fact was that the whole world was faced with this situation and if one wished to change it, that would mean war. However, he believed that neither side wanted war. As to the Secretary's remark that East Berlin was no different, he wished to remind the Secretary of how the problem of West Berlin had arisen. That problem was due to the fact that West Berlin was a special, different entity as a social unit in its environment; it was different from East Berlin from the standpoint of its social order. The Secretary had said Western presence in West Berlin was required to protect what the West called freedom of West Berlin, but East Berlin had the same social system as East Germany. In any event, he was making this comment only in passing since the Secretary had raised the point.

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to sum up his remarks as follows. First, what did the United States mean by interim arrangement? Second, he wished to stress the view of the Soviet Government that any interim arrangement would not eliminate the long-range problem, which would remain. And finally, it would be good to explore the problem in the light of the new situation which had now developed. Perhaps this new situation would lead to

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different conclusions. He thought the more favorable situation obtaining now and the improved relations between the two Germanys could improve the chances for a solution of the problem. In any event, the USSR regarded this problem as very important and very acute from the standpoint of European security.

The Secretary pointed out that as to interim arrangements, all arrangements arrived at at the time of and since the German surrender were interim arrangements pending a final settlement. These arrangements had resulted in the present situation, and in particular in the presence of Western forces in Berlin. The Soviet proposals on this latter point, of which there had been several variants, contained two elements: one, they sought a reduction of our position in West Berlin by providing for a situation where our troops would be joined by either Soviet or Ghanaian forces or by forces from the Ivory Coast or Denmark; and two, they provided for a time limit, without agreement on what would happen after the expiration of that limit. The Secretary agreed that both sides had been approaching agreement on a number of points, and commented that if the Soviet Union had accepted a year and a half ago the presence of Western forces in West Berlin pending a final settlement, then a number of other points, such as access, etc., could have fallen into place; however, this had not been the Soviet position.

The Secretary went on to say that he did not believe the present situation in Germany was permanent so long as the Germans wanted to live together. If our view on this was wrong, this should be found out by letting the Germans themselves say so. The Germans could express their view themselves or perhaps with the help of their neighbors. In fact, the Soviets themselves had said that a two-Germany situation was not a permanent solution, because they had stated that the two Germanys should work such a solution between themselves. In any event, the Secretary continued, he did not see why the German problem was acute, unless, of course, the USSR wanted to make it such in which case, this would be the USSR's responsibility. Many things had

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occurred over the past few years, such as, for example, the increase in trade between West Germany and the East. That trade is now something like five billion dollars a year, and Mr. Khrushchev himself had said that trade meant peace. The Secretary also believed that the change of the West German Government would lead to improved relations between West Germany and the East, and recalled the remark he had made on previous occasions that similar progress could result from a change of government in East Germany.

The Secretary then stressed that one basic fact could be recognized, namely, that Four Powers were in Germany and Berlin, and suggested that we try to find some solution on that basis. The Soviet side had made certain proposals, and so had our side, but neither side's proposals were acceptable to the other. What we must do is avoid a crisis from which neither side would benefit.

Mr. Gromyko noted the Secretary had said many points would have fallen into place if the Soviet Union had agreed to Western forces remaining in West Berlin pending a final solution of the German problem. However, if by "final solution" the Secretary meant German unification, that meant that Western forces would stay in West Berlin indefinitely, and agreement was impossible on that basis.

The Secretary pointed out the Soviet Union had agreed to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin without any time limit. Our forces had pulled out of Saxony and Thuringia in order to comply with the arrangements which had been agreed upon regarding Berlin. Those arrangements had been under great strain in 1947 and 1948, but subsequent to that the Soviet Union had agreed to have the arrangements continue.

Mr. Gromyko commented there had been no agreement that there should be no time limit.

The Secretary responded that this was correct but stressed that neither had there been an agreement that the Soviet Union would set the time limit.

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Mr. Gromyko said that no agreement was possible on the basis of an indefinite stay of Western forces in West Berlin; it would be insincere to say otherwise.

As to Soviet-West German relations, Mr. Gromyko went on, he did not know whether the United States was interested in those relations being good, although he believed that good West German-Soviet relations should be in the United States' interest. If his assumption was correct, then there was no basis for criticism of the Soviet Union by the United States, because it had been the Soviet Union who had made the greatest number of proposals designed to improve relations with West Germany. Nevertheless, Soviet relations with West Germany, including trade, political, and other relations, were not good. Perhaps this was because the United States wanted them to be so. As to the Soviet Union, it would not stand with its hand stretched out for good relations with West Germany; the Soviet state ship would move ahead even without good relations with West Germany. Mr. Gromyko asserted that West Germany had always created obstacles in the various areas where progress should be possible, such as disarmament, non-dissemination, denuclearized zones, etc. The West Germans had always come out against any proposals; they had been trying to arouse the West German population against the Soviet Union, and had been attempting to provoke incidents on the East German border. All this had been done in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union had demonstrated great restraint vis-a-vis West Germany. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to note that it would be the easiest thing in the world to arouse the sentiments of the Soviet population against West Germany, because almost every Soviet family would wish to raise its voice in such an event, especially as regards a West German foreign policy. However, the Soviet Government and the Central Committee were not doing this. Even though it was difficult to erase the pages of history, the Soviet Union was still trying to look forward rather than backward and was attempting to build new relations with West Germany. The Soviet Union had no reason not to continue this policy which was part of the general Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. Mr. Gromyko said he believed that policy would continue.

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The Secretary referred to Mr. Gromyko's remark about disarmament, nuclear-free zones and non-dissemination, and said he wished to assure Mr. Gromyko that the United States was not simply a voice of West Germany. Indeed, the United States spoke for itself. If the USSR and the United States could reach agreement on some of these points, West Germany would certainly not stand in the way. Noting that West Germany had signed the test ban agreement, the Secretary pointed out that West Germany was also the only non-nuclear power which had signed, as far back as ten years ago, a pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Perhaps some people in Moscow thought so, but the United States was no monkey on the stick manipulated by West Germany.

Mr. Gromyko interjected such a description would be an exaggeration.

The Secretary continued that the United States was very interested in disarmament and was earnestly seeking areas of agreement in that field. He reiterated that if some agreement were reached between the United States and USSR in those areas, West Germany would not stand in its way.

Mr. Gromyko contended that in previous discussions, particularly those relating to disarmament, the United States had very often said that its allies, and specifically West Germany, did not agree to this or that proposal. He said he agreed with the approach the Secretary had just stated and that he believed the United States should adhere to that approach. However, what the United States had been saying elsewhere could not be reconciled with that approach.

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to make a few remarks about why the Soviet Union was critical of the West German policy, and particularly of Adenauer's policy. The Secretary had noted the West German Government would soon change, but he would be justified in wondering why the Soviet Union was critical of the West German Government if the present West German Government had not been erecting obstacles and had not been pursuing an obstructive policy.

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The fact was that no matter what proposal was advanced by the Soviet Union, or even from the rostrum of the United Nations, the West German Government always raised objections. Even on such matter as retention of a certain number of missiles by the United States and the USSR, a matter which should be of no concern to them, the West Germans appeared to say that it was not useful to discuss it. He wondered whether this was perhaps due to some provision in the Franco-German agreement since France was against disarmament. In any event, Mr. Gromyko asserted, the present German Government, Adenauer's Government, had been using the harshest words existing in the classical German language when referring to the Soviet Union and its proposals. This was done in spite of the fact that the only thing the USSR was seeking was to defend the truth.

Mr. Gromyko then said he liked the Secretary's remark on a previous occasion to the effect that Khrushchev, the President and Macmillan knew best what nuclear war would mean. The Secretary was absolutely correct in saying this. It followed from this statement that these three countries, and perhaps particularly the United States and the USSR, must approach the problem of security and peace with greatest responsibility. This was why the Soviet Union believed that the gap existing between the two sides on nuclear matters, such as non-dissemination and MLF, was very dangerous. Mr. Gromyko then also recalled the Secretary's remark that he did not believe either the United States or the USSR would launch a nuclear attack on the other side. He felt that this was absolutely correct; indeed, it was the cornerstone of the world situation. If this was so, Mr. Gromyko went on, we should try to find the possibility for the solution of as many problems as possible. He felt there was no need to speak of the importance of the test ban treaty as the President and the Secretary had done that very ably. Mr. Gromyko said he had been present when Khrushchev was commenting on the President's and the Secretary's statements regarding the test ban treaty and had heard him say that both the President and the Secretary had displayed a very realistic approach and that he liked their statements. Thus, Mr. Gromyko said, he believed a final solution of all the problems standing before us

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should be in the interest of both sides. He did not wish to say that all of them should be resolved at once; they should be taken up one after another, and the policy of the Soviet Union was ripe for this.

The Secretary commented he wished to add a postscript to Mr. Gromyko's remark about "you said, we said". He said he believed that it was true that the United States and the USSR would not attack each other. However, he felt it was dangerous if two sides came to the table with each being convinced that the other would not wage nuclear war under any circumstances, because then it might press on the vital interest of the other side. He said that the assumption was basically true, but stressed that there were these considerations of reciprocity.

The Secretary continued that there were many points where agreement should be possible. Perhaps, he remarked facetiously, both sides were interested in having a direct communications line to Paris. Agreement should be possible in those areas where the interests of the two sides were similar; indeed, the test ban agreement was important because it involved no concession by one side to the other, although, of course, 19 Senators in the US Congress believed that the United States had conceded too much to the Soviet Union. The Secretary expressed the hope that while Mr. Gromyko was here and in Washington areas of possible agreement, including those he had mentioned at the table, could be explored. Both of our peoples would welcome agreement between our two countries, and West Germany would not stand in the way if we could agree.

Mr. Gromyko said he agreed and asserted that the Soviet Union believed in this approach even more than the United States.

The Secretary pointed out that this, of course, did not mean that we could reach agreement at the expense of our allies, just as the Soviet Union would probably not agree at the expense of its allies.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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Mr. Gromyko then inquired about an NAP.

The Secretary said this was our problem.

Mr. Gromyko said the United States had stated this problem had to be dealt with by its allies.

The Secretary responded that perhaps tomorrow he would return the question he and Lord Home had asked Mr. Gromyko yesterday. This was our problem because, as he and Lord Home had said yesterday, if Lord Home were a member of the US Congress and asked whether an NAP would apply to West Berlin, what would the Soviet answer be? Yesterday, Mr. Gromyko had been unable to answer this question.

Mr. Gromyko said he could only repeat what he had said yesterday. The Soviet Union believed that all questions, both minor and major, should be negotiated peacefully. If a reference to Berlin were included in an NAP, that would drown the NAP in the very broad and difficult problem of Germany and Berlin. The Secretary would be justified in asking this question if he, Gromyko, had said that an NAP should include the provision that the West Berlin problem should be resolved by all means, including the use of force. However, this was not the situation.

The Secretary asked Mr. Gromyko whether he saw in that area of the world any real issue other than Berlin that could involve the use of force.

Mr. Gromyko responded that the Soviet Union was asking for no exception. Its view was that all questions should be resolved peacefully.

At this point, the Secretary suggested that the conversation be ended as he had to catch his train for Washington.

USDel:AAkalovsky:ck 10/4/63

Cleared by: Ambassador Thompson

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

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~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~
SecDel/MC/93 (see MC/68)
October 4, 1963

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SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Date: October 2, 1963
Time: 8:00 p.m. - Dinner
Place: Soviet Mission,
New York

Subject: Germany and Berlin; NAP.

Participants:

<u>United States</u>	<u>USSR</u>
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Stevenson	Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Thompson	Semenov
Assistant Secretary Tyler	Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Akalovsky	Ambassador Fedorenko
	Ambassador Novikov
	Mr. Zamtsov, Head of the
	Historical Division,
	Foreign Ministry
	Mr. Kovalev
	Mr. Sukhdrev

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~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~
Group 1

SANITIZED

Dept. of State (MLK-78-191 APPEAL)
BY MLH NARS, DATE 3/16/79

NSF/187 / USSR subjects Gromyko Tarkov (Kovalev) 10/2/63
(only their names were in file document)

October 4, 1963

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The Secretary said he agreed that the German and the Berlin problems were number one in the relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; there was certainly no question about that. He believed that nothing could transform those relations more dramatically than a final solution of that problem. Certainly this was the point of confrontation and thus problem number one. However, the very fact that this problem was so important made it all the more difficult to resolve if a solution would change the basic relations between the two sides. The Secretary then recalled that the President had outlined our basic consideration on this problem at the Vienna meeting, and commented that no basic change had occurred in those considerations since that time. Since four or five years ago, the Soviet Union had advanced some proposals regarding a peace treaty and Berlin. On our side, we maintained the attitude fundamental to the belief held by the American people ever since the 18th Century that any settlement involving the desires of people should be based on a determination by those people; in other words, we were for self-determination in its broadest sense. The Secretary continued that this problem was difficult for both sides. However, he believed that over the past two years changes had occurred which had taken out the fever of the situation. East Germany was no longer bleeding as it had before because of emigration, and thus the situation was now more stable. Also, he believed that the development of the relations between the USSR and the Socialist States on the one hand, and the United States and the West on the other had an important bearing on this problem. In this connection, the Secretary noted the development of trade relations between West Germany and the East and the development of more normal relations between the West and Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. This seems to indicate a lessening of the fear of Germany in those countries which, on the basis of their history over the past fifty years, had come to fear Germany.

The Secretary continued that he believed it was important to reach agreement on a peace treaty with Germany, but pointed out that he saw no basis now for the solution

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of that problem. He believed that time was working towards a solution and again stressed the importance the development of East-West relations had in this respect. He also emphasized that the solution should not be at the expense of Germany's neighbors.

The Secretary then pointed out that the United States did not envisage a permanent stationing of US troops forever, but stressed the importance of keeping those troops so long as security demanded it. He thought there was no need to repeat the United States' view regarding the need of keeping Western forces in West Berlin so long as we were responsible for its security. The Secretary then noted that a situation where the Germans were not allowed to express themselves left an unstable and potentially dangerous problem. We would prefer a permanent solution which would involve a strengthening of security. At the same time, we were prepared to explore the possibility of entering arrangements based on mutual recognition^{and} that both sides had an interest in this matter. The United States could not accept the view that East Berlin and East Germany were of no interest to us, that they were gone, and that the only question was how to divide responsibility in West Berlin. He said he did not wish to repeat what he had said on previous occasions concerning the lack of reciprocity inherent in such an approach, and stressed again that both sides must recognize each other's interests.

The Secretary said he was curious why the USSR and its allies were stressing their distrust for Germany just as we were moving towards improved relations and a change of government in Germany. He would have thought that the Soviet side would wait and see how the new government would act. He believed that West Germany was interested in improved relations with the East and that the new German government would be prepared to move in that direction, in both small and large areas. The Secretary reiterated he did not see any solution to the problem now and believed our task was to contain it and to prevent any dangerous developments. Meanwhile, we must see what we could do to alleviate the problem, and perhaps improved climate would be a very important factor.

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occurred over the past few years, such as, for example, the increase in trade between West Germany and the East. That trade is now something like five billion dollars a year, and Mr. Khrushchev himself had said that trade meant peace. The Secretary also believed that the change of the West German Government would lead to improved relations between West Germany and the East, and recalled the remark he had made on previous occasions that similar progress could result from a change of government in East Germany.

The Secretary then stressed that one basic fact could be recognized, namely, that Four Powers were in Germany and Berlin, and suggested that we try to find some solution on that basis. The Soviet side had made certain proposals, and so had our side, but neither side's proposals were acceptable to the other. What we must do is avoid a crisis from which neither side would benefit.

The Secretary pointed out the Soviet Union had agreed to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin without any time limit. Our forces had pulled out of Saxony and Thuringia in order to comply with the arrangements which had been agreed upon regarding Berlin. Those arrangements had been under great strain in 1947 and 1948, but subsequent to that the Soviet Union had agreed to have the arrangements continue.

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The Secretary referred to Mr. Gromyko's remark about disarmament, nuclear-free zones and non-dissemination, and said he wished to assure Mr. Gromyko that the United States was not simply a voice of West Germany. Indeed, the United States spoke for itself. If the USSR and the United States could reach agreement on some of these points, West Germany would certainly not stand in the way. Noting that West Germany had signed the test ban agreement, the Secretary pointed out that West Germany was also the only non-nuclear power which had signed, as far back as ten years ago, a pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Perhaps some people in Moscow thought so, but the United States was no monkey on the stick manipulated by West Germany.

The Secretary continued that the United States was very interested in disarmament and was earnestly seeking areas of agreement in that field. He reiterated that if some agreement were reached between the United States and USSR in those areas, West Germany would not stand in its way.

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October 4, 1963

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The Secretary continued that there were many points where agreement should be possible. Perhaps, he remarked facetiously, both sides were interested in having a direct communications line to Paris. Agreement should be possible in those areas where the interests of the two sides were similar; indeed, the test ban agreement was important because it involved no concession by one side to the other, although, of course, 19 Senators in the US Congress believed that the United States had conceded too much to the Soviet Union. The Secretary expressed the hope that while Mr. Gromyko was here and in Washington areas of possible agreement, including those he had mentioned at the table, could be explored. Both of our peoples would welcome agreement between our two countries, and West Germany would not stand in the way if we could agree.

The Secretary pointed out that this, of course, did not mean that we could reach agreement at the expense of our allies, just as the Soviet Union would probably not agree at the expense of its allies.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

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10/4/63

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~
SecDel/MC/93 (see MC/68)
October 4, 1963

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1963

Segregated?

5

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Date: October 2, 1963
Time: 8:00 p.m. - Dinner
Place: Soviet Mission,
New York

Subject: Germany and Berlin; NAP.

Participants:

United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister
Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador Fedorenko
Ambassador Novikov
Mr. Zamtsov, Head of the
Historical Division,
Foreign Ministry
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhdrev

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White House-2

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~
Group 1

SANITIZED

Dept. of State (MLK-78-191 APPEAL)
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE 3/16/79

NCF/187 / USSR
Gromyko cables (Park) 10/2/63

October 4, 1963

- 3 -

The Secretary said he agreed that the German and the Berlin problems were number one in the relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; there was certainly no question about that. He believed that nothing could transform those relations more dramatically than a final solution of that problem. Certainly this was the point of confrontation and thus problem number one. However, the very fact that this problem was so important made it all the more difficult to resolve if a solution would change the basic relations between the two sides. The Secretary then recalled that the President had outlined our basic consideration on this problem at the Vienna meeting, and commented that no basic change had occurred in those considerations since that time. Since four or five years ago, the Soviet Union had advanced some proposals regarding a peace treaty and Berlin. On our side, we maintained the attitude fundamental to the belief held by the American people ever since the 18th Century that any settlement involving the desires of people should be based on a determination by those people; in other words, we were for self-determination in its broadest sense. The Secretary continued that this problem was difficult for both sides. However, he believed that over the past two years changes had occurred which had taken out the fever of the situation. East Germany was no longer bleeding as it had before because of emigration, and thus the situation was now more stable. Also, he believed that the development of the relations between the USSR and the Socialist States on the one hand, and the United States and the West on the other had an important bearing on this problem. In this connection, the Secretary noted the development of trade relations between West Germany and the East and the development of more normal relations between the West and Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. This seems to indicate a lessening of the fear of Germany in those countries which, on the basis of their history over the past fifty years, had come to fear Germany.

The Secretary continued that he believed it was important to reach agreement on a peace treaty with Germany, but pointed out that he saw no basis now for the solution

OK

of that problem. He believed that time was working towards a solution and again stressed the importance the development of East-West relations had in this respect. He also emphasized that the solution should not be at the expense of Germany's neighbors.

The Secretary then pointed out that the United States did not envisage a permanent stationing of US troops forever, but stressed the importance of keeping those troops so long as security demanded it. He thought there was no need to repeat the United States' view regarding the need of keeping Western forces in West Berlin so long as we were responsible for its security. The Secretary then noted that a situation where the Germans were not allowed to express themselves left an unstable and potentially dangerous problem. We would prefer a permanent solution which would involve a strengthening of security. At the same time, we were prepared to explore the possibility of entering arrangements based on mutual recognition that both sides had an interest in this matter. The United States could not accept the view that East Berlin and East Germany were of no interest to us, that they were gone, and that the only question was how to divide responsibility in West Berlin. He said he did not wish to repeat what he had said on previous occasions concerning the lack of reciprocity inherent in such an approach, and stressed again that both sides must recognize each other's interests.

The Secretary said he was curious why the USSR and its allies were stressing their distrust for Germany just as we were moving towards improved relations and a change of government in Germany. He would have thought that the Soviet side would wait and see how the new government would act. He believed that West Germany was interested in improved relations with the East and that the new German government would be prepared to move in that direction, in both small and large areas. The Secretary reiterated he did not see any solution to the problem now and believed our task was to contain it and to prevent any dangerous developments. Meanwhile, we must see what we could do to alleviate the problem, and perhaps improved climate would be a very important factor.

JLK

The Secretary pointed out that as to interim arrangements, all arrangements arrived at at the time of and since the German surrender were interim arrangements pending a final settlement. These arrangements had resulted in the present situation, and in particular in the presence of Western forces in Berlin. The Soviet proposals on this latter point, of which there had been several variants, contained two elements: one, they sought a reduction of our position in West Berlin by providing for a situation where our troops would be joined by either Soviet or Ghanaian forces or by forces from the Ivory Coast or Denmark; and two, they provided for a time limit, without agreement on what would happen after the expiration of that limit. The Secretary agreed that both sides had been approaching agreement on a number of points, and commented that if the Soviet Union had accepted a year and a half ago the presence of Western forces in West Berlin pending a final settlement, then a number of other points, such as access, etc., could have fallen into place; however, this had not been the Soviet position.

The Secretary went on to say that he did not believe the present situation in Germany was permanent so long as the Germans wanted to live together. If our view on this was wrong, this should be found out by letting the Germans themselves say so. The Germans could express their view themselves or perhaps with the help of their neighbors. In fact, the Soviets themselves had said that a two-Germany situation was not a permanent solution, because they had stated that the two Germanys should work such a solution between themselves. In any event, the Secretary continued, he did not see why the German problem was acute, unless, of course, the USSR wanted to make it such in which case, this would be the USSR's responsibility. Many things had

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~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

SecDel/MC/93

October 4, 1963

- 8 -

occurred over the past few years, such as, for example, the increase in trade between West Germany and the East. That trade is now something like five billion dollars a year, and Mr. Khrushchev himself had said that trade meant peace. The Secretary also believed that the change of the West German Government would lead to improved relations between West Germany and the East, and recalled the remark he had made on previous occasions that similar progress could result from a change of government in East Germany.

The Secretary then stressed that one basic fact could be recognized, namely, that Four Powers were in Germany and Berlin, and suggested that we try to find some solution on that basis. The Soviet side had made certain proposals, and so had our side, but neither side's proposals were acceptable to the other. What we must do is avoid a crisis from which neither side would benefit.

The Secretary pointed out the Soviet Union had agreed to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin without any time limit. Our forces had pulled out of Saxony and Thuringia in order to comply with the arrangements which had been agreed upon regarding Berlin. Those arrangements had been under great strain in 1947 and 1948, but subsequent to that the Soviet Union had agreed to have the arrangements continue.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

OK

The Secretary referred to Mr. Gromyko's remark about disarmament, nuclear-free zones and non-dissemination, and said he wished to assure Mr. Gromyko that the United States was not simply a voice of West Germany. Indeed, the United States spoke for itself. If the USSR and the United States could reach agreement on some of these points, West Germany would certainly not stand in the way. Noting that West Germany had signed the test ban agreement, the Secretary pointed out that West Germany was also the only non-nuclear power which had signed, as far back as ten years ago, a pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Perhaps some people in Moscow thought so, but the United States was no monkey on the stick manipulated by West Germany.

*implies
US controls
FRG on
agreement*

The Secretary continued that the United States was very interested in disarmament and was earnestly seeking areas of agreement in that field. He reiterated that if some agreement were reached between the United States and USSR in those areas, West Germany would not stand in its way.

JK

The Secretary continued that there were many points where agreement should be possible. Perhaps, he remarked facetiously, both sides were interested in having a direct communications line to Paris. Agreement should be possible in those areas where the interests of the two sides were similar; indeed, the test ban agreement was important because it involved no concession by one side to the other, although, of course, 19 Senators in the US Congress believed that the United States had conceded too much to the Soviet Union. The Secretary expressed the hope that while Mr. Gromyko was here and in Washington areas of possible agreement, including those he had mentioned at the table, could be explored. Both of our peoples would welcome agreement between our two countries, and West Germany would not stand in the way if we could agree.

The Secretary pointed out that this, of course, did not mean that we could reach agreement at the expense of our allies, just as the Soviet Union would probably not agree at the expense of its allies.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

SecDel/MC/93

October 4, 1963

- 13 -

At this point, the Secretary suggested that the conversation be ended as he had to catch his train for Washington.

USDel:AAkalovsky:ck 10/4/63

Cleared by: Ambassador Thompson

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

10/7/63

13

File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1963



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Couve's Meeting with the Secretary of State.

Couve met for two and one-half hours this morning with the Secretary of State -- two hours at a general meeting, and a half hour privately.

The Secretary may have already called you to report the talks. However, just in case he has not, and in Mac Bundy's absence, I thought it might be useful to report to you the substance of the discussions of the general meeting as I have it.

Attention apparently focused almost entirely on East-West relations with no perceptible give in the French position. Couve insisted that there were no differences between us as to goals but only as to tactics. France was not opposed to detente but in Paris' view real detente was not possible and could not be achieved so long as the Western behavior was defensive. And in this regard he insisted the present situation was not different from that of late 1961 when the United States undertook to engage the Soviets in "exploratory talks".

Moreover, Couve repeated several times, the talks now being conducted with the Soviets in the wake of the Test Ban agreement were being had at a high price -- German nervousness -- which could produce German neutralism and undermine the Western position. This might not bother the British (who seem to prefer German neutralism), but in the French view, Germany had to remain firmly attached to the West and this in fact was the rationale for the Franco-German treaty -- to keep Germany closely tied to Europe and the West.

In this context, Couve said France did not believe for a minute that the present East-West negotiating exercise -- in which there seemed to be




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10/11/63 - 10/7/63

- 2 -


an overwhelming desire to reach agreement for agreement's sake -- would further the Sino-Soviet split. The West's major contribution to the split was non-interference in intra-bloc problems. But our present actions were tantamount to direct interference which could hurt rather than help the West. It was one thing to exploit the Sino-Soviet split and another to try to save one of the involved parties -- Khrushchev.


What France deplored most -- according to Couve -- was the alleged U.S. effort to force Germany to choose between France and the United States. This would only serve to release and strengthen those German forces which were ready to exploit neutralist sentiment in Germany. (The Secretary denied that this was the United States' intention, and went on to tell Couve that the real problem was the evident differences between France and the United States which were reflected in Western councils, and the important point here was the resolution of those differences.)

There also was some discussion of Vietnam in which Couve took the position that ultimately Vietnam should be united and neutral, but that would only be possible with elimination of the Communists and clearly the Communists were not yet prepared to take themselves out of the picture.

With reference to the possible sale of wheat to the Soviet bloc, Couve said Adenauer was mixing up two different things -- strategic goods and food. France was not opposed to the sale of food. In fact France itself was selling food not only to the Soviet Union but also to Communist China. Moreover, he agreed that it was better to have the Communists tie up their available foreign exchange in food than in military hardware and related goods.

The Secretary plans to meet with Couve again tomorrow afternoon.

David Klein



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10/17/63
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France

Approved by White House *Memorandum of Conversation*
10/15/63

Approved by U.
10/11/63

The White House
DATE: October 7, 1963

SUBJECT: Franco-American Relations and Europe

15451

PARTICIPANTS:	<u>US</u>	<u>France</u>
	The President	Mr. Couve de Murville
	Mr. Ball	Ambassador Alphand
	Ambassador Bohlen	Mr. Lucet
	Mr. Tyler	

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*Author: 13: 782 PR
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10/7/63*

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E.O. 13526 REC. BY: ED, LR AND D
Dept. of State (W.K. 77-905)
BY: *(initials)* NARA DATE 5/9/78

GPO 502582

The President said that one of the unintended results of the Franco-German Treaty of last January was that it made it appear as though France and the United States had basically different aims. The treaty really looked as though it were something more than the healing of old wounds, but rather as though it were outside of, and directed against, NATO. The President said he shared the desire to bring Franco-US relations closer. If these appeared to diverge on defense and European problems this was certainly bad for Germany. It would be good if we could normalize our relations on NATO and economic matters. The President asked how far apart we really were.

The Foreign

The President went back to the subject of NATO and said he could not see where the disagreement lay. He did not disagree with anything Couve had said about NATO so far. He said it was true there was less danger of war but at the same time it was difficult to do anything in the way of reduction of forces because of German nervousness. He wondered where all this took us in our relations with France. The Foreign Minister said that with regard to France and NATO there was only one sensible thing to do: To leave things as they were and never to speak about them. France was being reproached for having only two divisions instead of four and for having a nuclear program. But this did not weaken NATO. If war were to come, French divisions and her ships would be fighting on the side of the United States. The President said that when the United States does anything people worry about it. He thought that this principle should work both ways and not just against us. Ambassador Bohlen said that what really counted were new acts by France taken without consultation with her allies and contrary to the spirit of NATO, e.g., her latest withdrawal of ships, and earlier initiatives. Mr. Ball said that this point should be stressed. If we move or shift troops, then we do it against a considerable background of doubt and apprehension which has been stimulated by France claiming that we have it in mind to withdraw from Europe.

Mr. Ball said that one of the difficulties with General de Gaulle's statements on the defense of Europe was that although they sounded precise, the time factor was not defined, so that he made it sound as though the United States was going to pull out now.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

The White House
DATE: October 7, 1963

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
SUBJECT: Franco-American Relations and Europe

15451

PARTICIPANTS:	<u>US</u>	<u>France</u>	
	The President	Mr. Couve de Murville	
	Mr. Ball	Ambassador Alphand	
	Ambassador Bohlen	Mr. Lucet	
	Mr. Tyler		
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The President asked the Foreign Minister about the state of Franco-American relations and whether they were improving.

relationship should be looked at, not merely Franco-US relations. The President asked how the Foreign Minister thought that our approaches differed.



GROUP 1


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
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The President said that whenever we even looked as though we were contemplating reducing the extent of the US contribution this had gotten us into difficulties with our allies.

The President referred to the concern in Germany at the prospect of our withdrawing a cavalry regiment which had only represented part of the increase at the time of the Berlin crisis.

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[REDACTED]

Mr. Ball referred to the recent measures which the French government had taken facilitating US exports of fruit to France. He said that these had been very helpful.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The President said that what really mattered was not so much trade as the problem of the balance of payments. For the United States, foreign trade was, relatively, less important than this. He said that we should create a system within the West which would result in a relatively even flow of international payments. He said, for example, that France was increasing her reserves by \$25 million a month. We should look to see what can be done to avoid this kind of situation. New steps were needed to bring the balance of payments problem under control. He said that it was of course related to trade.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The President said that US foreign investment was an American problem but he asked what about tourism.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The President said we had tried to do something about long-term investment abroad. This was very difficult because every time we did something it had caused widespread concern. He said we had increased interest rates domestically which should help the problem.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The President went back to the subject of NATO and said he could not see where the disagreement lay. He did not disagree with anything Couve had said about NATO so far. He said it was true there was less danger of war but at the same time it was difficult to do anything in the way of reduction of forces because of German nervousness. He wondered where all this took us in our relations with France.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Mr. Ball said that one of the difficulties with General de Gaulle's statements on the defense of Europe was that although they sounded precise, the time factor was not defined, so that he made it sound as though the United States was going to pull out now.

The President asked the Foreign Minister about the significance of the recent speech by the State Secretary in the Foreign Office, Habib Deloncle.

[REDACTED]

(c) HW

[REDACTED]

The President asked how Europe was going to organize herself in nuclear matters.

[REDACTED]

The President said he didn't see on what we differed with France. Was it deficiency in liaison? Why do we give the appearance of having friction with France, which is an unhealthy condition? He said he thought that we were quite close on Laos, but General de Gaulle's statement on Vietnam had been unhelpful, particularly with regard to its timing.

[REDACTED]

Mr. Ball repeated that the timing had been unfortunate.

The President said he thought it was being made to appear worse than it is.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The President asked about the possible nuclear role of Israel, and the French position.

[REDACTED]

The President asked the Foreign Minister how he suggested that France and the United States manage their affairs in the next few months to indicate a greater harmony between them. He said he thought that this would be useful for France too.

[REDACTED]

The President asked what Prime Minister Pompidou had meant when referring to a certain "economic press" being sold out to US interests.

[REDACTED]

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2	EXEMPT 5/78 NLK 77-905 2pp. S Embtel 1576 (Paris)	10/1/63	A
6	EXEMPT 5/78 NLK 77-905 2pp. C Embtel 1627 (Paris)	10/3/63	A
7a	Sanitized 5/78 NLK 77-905 2pp. C Memo from Francis E. Healey to Mr. Tyler re: appointment with Mr. Xavier Deniau, French leader Grantee on Tuesday 10/1/63	9/30/63	A
7b	Sanitized 5/78 NLK 77-905 3pp. C Biographical Data form on Xavier Deniau	3/28/63	A
8	Declassified 5/78 NLK 77-905 2pp. S Intelligence Note re: French Progress on Thermonuclear Weapons	10/03/63	A
9a	Exempt 3/78 NLK 77-906 5pp. S Message	10/03/63	A
10	Sanitized 5/78 NLK 77-905 7pp. S MEMCOM between the President, Mssrs. Ball and Tyler, Amb. Bohlem, Amb. Alphan, M. Lucet and Couve de Murville.	10/07/63	A
12	Declassified 5/78 NLK 77-905 2pp. C EMBTTEL 4230 (Paris)	10/05/63	A
13	Declassified 3/78 NLK 77-907 2pp. S Memo for the President re: Couve's Meeting with the Secretary from Klein	10/07/63	A

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in U
10/16/63

Memorandum of Conversation

15677

Part II of V parts.

DATE: October 8, 1963
TIME: 10:30 a.m.
Mr. Ball's office

SUBJECT: Germany, the MLF and NATO

U.S.

France

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Ball
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Schaetzel
Mr. Beigel

Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphan
Mr. Lucet, Director, Political
Affairs, French FonOff
Mr. Pelen, French Embassy

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OCT 23 1963

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Mr. Ball turned to Germany and asked how the consultative procedures were developing under the January 23 treaty. The Foreign Minister said that there are contacts at the level of Lucet and Wormser and their counterparts in the German Foreign Office. They meet monthly. In addition, the Foreign and Defense Ministers meet regularly, as well as representatives in the field of education. He said that things are going both well and badly: well in the sense of many common questions and much general goodwill; badly for the reasons he had mentioned yesterday, due to the rift between the U.S. and France which is apparent to the Germans, and their notion that they must therefore choose between the Gaulois and the Anglo-Saxons. Mr. Ball said that we have discouraged any idea that such a choice confronts the Germans. The Foreign Minister said that the idea is stupid, that there is no contradiction between good relations with both the U.S. and France, even if they may not be of the same nature. He said that there is a scare in Germany that the U.S. will leave Europe.

Mr. Tyler said that he was struck by the way in which Chancellor Adenauer had been indulging himself in recent days in speaking of his letter to Khrushchev, referring to any detente as pernicious, criticizing wheat sales to Russia, and calling for the resignation of Macmillan. He thought that Adenauer was playing into the hands of Soviet propoganda. It is quite regrettable that by striking this posture Adenauer opens the Germans to the Soviet charge that Germany is impossible to deal with, all of which does not help the West in general, nor Germany, nor France. He said that there is no choice in this matter and that we are all in it together.

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The Foreign Minister said that he also regrets these statements, pointed out that Adenauer is leaving office and added that this is another manifestation of the German scare to which he had referred. He recalled the Radford episode of July 1956. Mr. Tyler interjected that our relations with Germany have never been quite the same since that episode.

Ambassador Bohlen asked whether the French had earlier heard about the Adenauer proposal to Khrushchev for a ten-year political truce. The Foreign Minister said his recollection was that this had been a matter between Adenauer and Ambassador Smirnov. Ambassador Bohlen said that Carstens had mentioned this when he was here and later the Germans said that no such proposal existed. The Foreign Minister said that the idea probably originated with Ambassador Kroll in Moscow. He said that the French were looking into their files on this. He went on to say that domestic politics are a part of this picture and that the Germans are fighting with each other. He thought the internal bickering would become more pronounced, and that it involves both the U.S. and France. It results from the German obsession with the idea that the U.S. is going to let them down, which is not a very realistic idea on their part. The whole thing is exacerbated by the appearance of dispute between the U.S. and France.

Mr. Ball said it is further exacerbated by the French justification that their nuclear force is required by the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from Europe. We understand what the French mean, but if France does not make clear to others what it means in terms of the time span, these German fears will be reinforced. The Foreign Minister said there is always neighborly rivalry in Europe but the Germans should be reassured by these French efforts. He thought that neighborly rivalries are considerably less in Western Europe now than in the past.

Mr. Ball said that we are concerned about a revival of the inter-war German psychosis that they are being discriminated against. When the French nuclear force is tangible and in being, the German sense of being left out might become acute. We are trying to provide a political answer to this German problem through the MLF. The Foreign Minister responded that the only possible answer is to have a European arrangement and France had discreetly suggested this recently. Mr. Ball said that the U.S. recognizes as does France that there is no political basis in Europe now to decide on the question of federalism, and that we are both saying the same things in different ways. The U.S. recognizes this is not an overnight affair. We have always contemplated that the MLF might become a strictly European force at some point in time. Ambassador Bohlen noted that there is no contradiction between the French concept and the MLF. The Foreign Minister said

that

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that there is no great desire in Europe to have such responsibilities, that most Europeans do not want to do more and prefer to reassure themselves and have a safe conscience by being in NATO.

Mr. Ball recalled that the Foreign Minister had said to the President yesterday that NATO had been conceived when the distribution of power was different. He wondered if this meant that France had some proposals to make regarding NATO. The Foreign Minister said that at present there is no "European policy" and therefore it is hard to change things in NATO now. There is need for a consensus among European countries first. He said that France had taken certain measures, such as pulling back its divisions, withdrawing its fleet and beginning its atomic program, all for one purpose: to build something in defense terms in order to establish a sense of national responsibility. It is impossible in the French philosophical system to have a selective service, and since there are too many men coming into the armed forces, a reduction is being made in the length of service. All of these measures should not be taken to mean that France will not participate in the battle should war come. He said that later on, if more union develops and there is a desire to do something, then France will see what should be done. The future would also depend upon what the U.S. wants to do or to change. He had the impression that the U.S. does not wish to change anything except perhaps the logistics system, but nothing of greater moment. He concluded that it might be wise to stay where we are and not raise new problems, but rather to try to calm things. Mr. Ball agreed with this conclusion.

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Part II of V parts.

October 8, 1963
TIME: 10:30 a.m.

Germany, the EEC and NATO

U.S.

France

Mr. Ball
Ambassador Bollen
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Schestak
Mr. Feigel

Couve de Murville
Ambassador Albrand
Mr. Inest

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EUR	Amembassy LONDON	Amembassy MOSCOW
WE	Amembassy PARIS	USMission BERLIN

Mr. Ball turned to Germany and asked how the consultative procedures were developing under the January 23 treaty.

Mr. Tyler said that he was struck by the way in which Chancellor Adenauer had been indulging himself in recent days in spelling of his letter to Khrushchev, referring to any detente as pernicious, criticizing wheat sales to Russia, and calling for the resignation of Macmillan. He thought that Adenauer was playing into the hands of Soviet propaganda. It is quite regrettable that by spelling this posture Adenauer is giving the Germans to the Soviet charge that Germany is impossible to deal with, all of which does not help the West in general, and Germany, and France. He said that there is no choice in this matter and that we are all in it together.

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Ambassador Bohlen asked whether the French had earlier heard about the Acheson proposal to Khrushchev for a ten-year political truce.

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Mr. Ball said that we are concerned about a revival of the inter-war German psychosis that they are being discriminated against. When the French nuclear force is tangible and in being, the German sense of being left out might become acute. We are trying to provide a political answer to this problem through the NEP.

Mr. Ball said that the U.S. recognizes as does France that there is no political basis in Europe now to decide on the question of federalism, and that we are both saying the same things in different ways. The U.S. recognizes this is not an overnight affair. We have always contemplated that the NEP might become a strictly European force at some point in time. Ambassador Bohlen noted that there is no contradiction between the French concept and the NEP.

PR Smith

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10/8/63

EUR:GER:RC:creel: gw.
(Attaching Office and Officer)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

431

NLK
NSF 77
ZBF 14011

DATE: October 8, 1963
10:00 a.m.
PLACE: White House

SUBJECT: Germany After Adenauer

PARTICIPANTS: GERMANS

Dr. Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, President of German Bundesrat and Minister-President of Baden-Wuerttemberg
Minister Georg von Lillienfeld, German Embassy
Herr Rundel, Dr. Kiesinger's Chef de Cabinet

~~MEMORANDUM~~

AMERICANS

The President
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER

White House	S/P	G
S/S	INR/OD	AmEmbassy BONN
S/AS	WHE - A	PARIS

Following opening amenities, in which the President inquired about Dr. Kiesinger's wife and daughter (whom he had received at the White House last summer) and made reference to a series of lectures being given in this country by Kiesinger on the subject of Germany after Adenauer, the President asked for Dr. Kiesinger's appreciation of the situation in Germany after Adenauer's retirement.

Kiesinger said he had recently had a long talk with Foreign Minister Schroeder just after the latter's return from his US visit. He had also listened to Schroeder's speech to the Bundestag reporting on his visit, which Kiesinger said was the best speech by a German Foreign Minister he had ever heard. Schroeder held very firm views on the present situation, and the great majority of the CDU membership in the Bundestag stood behind him. Schroeder was also supported by the other parties in Germany. Even Max Brauer, the old SPD Burgermeister from Hamburg, had enthusiastically applauded Schroeder's speech. In the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, no one opposed Schroeder. It was not clear just what the Chancellor wanted from the future, or whether he was angry because he had to leave office. Kiesinger was convinced that if the Chancellor should really try to oppose the foreign policy of Schroeder and Erhard (Kiesinger interpolated that Erhard would have to be careful at the outset "since he had much to learn"), Adenauer "would be called to order". This could do much damage to Kiesinger's own party and hurt Kiesinger personally, since he must face elections next Spring in Baden-Wuerttemberg. He was, therefore, very hopeful that no such split would take place and that peace could be maintained within the CDU. But it was hard for a man like Adenauer to become inactive; he was still astonishingly fresh on the threshold of his 86th birthday.

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The President commented that most people did not realize what a real phenomenon Chancellor Adenauer was, but this would be appreciated in retrospect. It was remarkable to think of a man of his age retiring and yet not wanting to leave the field of activity.

Kiesinger said that if Adenauer would really go into retirement and tend his roses at Rhondorf, he would gain greatly in respect. But, he added, "He just can't do it. We must wait and see".

The President said he had the feeling there were some differences between the viewpoint of the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister as they looked to the future. While they both fully agreed on the common objective of German reunification, there were some differences in emphasis as concerned dealing with the Soviets. The President said he was not too optimistic over the outlook in this regard. The Test Ban Treaty might lead to some de facto easing of the situation in Berlin, but he doubted that the Soviets would sign any agreement which would make our position in Berlin better. There was no prospect of the threat of any military clash in Berlin as in 1961, to be sure, but he saw no agreements or real detente in the offing. He was aware of some concern in Germany that the Test Ban Treaty marked the beginning of a series of agreements leading to a detente with the Soviets but, the President said, "I don't see it". Nevertheless, we should keep talking to the Soviets.

Kiesinger commented that any agreement with the Soviets would raise the question of de facto recognition of the East German regime.

The President said that in retrospect it appeared that the German alarm over this aspect of the Test Ban Treaty had not been justified. There had in fact been no increase in the recognition of Pankow. We were sensitive to German feelings on this aspect of the matter, the President said, and he wished to emphasize that he did not see in sight any real agreement of substance with the Soviets which would reintroduce the danger of increased stature for the GDR.

The President then asked how Dr. Kiesinger saw German reunification coming about. Kiesinger replied that he "had no idea". Prior to German entry into NATO some Germans used to think the Soviets would prefer a reunified Germany to a Federal Republic in NATO. Others thought that detente with the Soviets might be the best way. In any case nobody in Germany believed in force. Some day, as the President had said in Berlin, the Soviets might see that it was to their real own interest to allow the Germans to come back together.

The President commented that it was possible that some day we might find a gradual thinning out of Soviet troops in East Germany, which could lead to a "change in tempo" of the East German regime. At the same time, he could understand the Chancellor's point of view that it was necessary to maintain tension in order to keep the Federal Republic firmly tied to the West and that a relaxation of tensions might make some Germans prone to seek out the Soviet price for reunification and neutralization.

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Kiesinger

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The President said he thought there was not much danger of this. The Federal Republic was vital to the survival of NATO. France considered it essential to have good relations with the FRG. No one would be indifferent to Germany's problems. There were further factors such as the MLF. The President had recently stressed to Couve de Murville that we welcomed and wanted improvement in German-French relations. We were of course worried about some aspects of French policy, but most of our differences seemed based on the peculiar psychology of de Gaulle. We had to learn to live with these differences and try to bring France back into the Western Community. We were in favor of French-German friendship, but not outside of NATO and an integrated Europe.

Kiesinger said he thought it would be possible to find a middle way with de Gaulle but it would take a long time. De Gaulle was a stubborn man. The only person who could convince de Gaulle was de Gaulle himself, but the main thing was that de Gaulle could also be convinced by facts. De Gaulle's complex about Western European countries being satellites was a recent development. This feeling had not existed when France needed foreign aid. Whereas the FRG had had its problems right from the beginning, France encountered its real problems only later, as for example, Algeria.

The President commented that it was not quite clear which country was which in this satellite relationship. We had not been able to withdraw 600 troops from Berlin without provoking a big incident. At the present time the US was dependent on German cooperation and assistance in the monetary field. It was true we were contributing six divisions in Germany, although this was maybe more than could be expected at a time when the military threat had been reduced. In any case our relationship at the present time was much more on the basis of a true partnership as compared with ten years ago.

Kiesinger said it was a common task of the Europeans and Americans to overcome ill feeling, and for this realism was needed. For example, Great Britain must realize that its greatness of the past was finished.

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Kiesinger

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- 4 -

Kiesinger closed the 30-minute talk by stating that his own outlook was not pessimistic. The President agreed we were better off than two years ago, as is witnessed by the situation in Berlin.

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(Issuing Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

NLK
NSF 77

2BF140/1

431

DATE: October 8, 1963
10:00 a.m.
PLACE: White House

SUBJECT: Germany After Adenauer

PARTICIPANTS: GERMANS

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Minister Georg von Lilienfeld, German Embassy
Herr Rundel, Dr. Kiesinger's Chef de Cabinet

~~AMERICANS~~

AMERICANS

The President
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER

White House	S/P	G
S/S	INR/OD	AmEmbassy BONN
S/AZ	FIR	PARIS

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Kiesinger

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- 3 -

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Kiesinger

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FORM NO. 64 (REV. 5-22-64) OF 4 PAGES
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Memorandum of Conversation

432

DATE: October 10, 1963

ZBF141/1

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Vladimir Semenov, Deputy Foreign Minister, USSR
William K. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

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	SOV - 5		USRER BERLIN - 13
	GER - 6		

October 16, 1963

16

During the Secretary's lunch for Gromyko on October 10, I had a talk with Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, who is the senior Soviet expert on Germany.

I told him I could not understand what advantage there could be to the Soviet Union to refuse to move toward a mutually acceptable modus vivendi on Berlin, unless it were the case that the Soviet Government wants to use Berlin as an instrument of pressure on the United States, as Chairman Khrushchev is reported to have told Foreign Minister Spassk last May.

Semenov said that we could easily achieve an agreement on Berlin on the basis of three conditions: (1) an increase in rates and charges on communications between West Berlin and the FRG, including cable charges, railroad freight and passenger rates, and upkeep of the Autobahn. Semenov said that if the rates could be brought into conformity with those which we pay to the FRG for comparable services, this would be very helpful to the prospects of a settlement. He himself volunteered the statement that this could be done without being in any way politically beneficial to the GDR. He said the Soviet Union did not intend to use this issue in order to try to raise the political status of the GDR. He said that there already existed arrangements whereby payments for these services were made by the Western authorities into

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(2) The nature of the present commercial air traffic through the corridors to and from Berlin should remain unchanged. He said the status quo should be respected in this field. He said this should apply also to international airlines, e.g., the Austrian airline service which had been started between Vienna and Tempelhof. He said that the present services by British, French and US planes should not be added to by those of other countries. He also referred to a Hamburg air taxi advertisement for flights from Hamburg to and from Berlin through the northern corridor. Semenov said that this kind of thing was very bad.

(3) He complained about what he called "provocations by the West" in East Berlin. He did not refer to propaganda or subversive activities but to alleged actions by cars coming into East Berlin from the West, and causing disturbances by the behavior of the occupants. He mentioned specifically a car with several US soldiers in it which, he said, had driven through the streets of East Berlin shouting at the bystanders and trying to make speeches just ten minutes before Khrushchev was due to pass by. He said that if there were evidence of greater desire on the part of Western authorities to prevent this kind of thing happening, this would also facilitate matters with regard to the possibility of reaching agreement on Berlin.

Comment: This conversation should be read in conjunction with the conversation which Semenov had with Mr. Scott of the UK Foreign Office, in New York (see Memorandum of Conversation dated October 3, 1963). ^{attached} Semenov spoke earnestly and soberly, and avoided both propaganda and ideological arguments. It was possible to infer from the way he presented his views that the Soviet Government would find it easier to move on Berlin if some satisfaction could be given to the GDR by the West, which would however not be expected to go so far as to constitute recognition or significant political advantage.

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CONVERSATION WITH MR. SEMENOV

I met Mr. Semanov, the senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official dealing with Germany, in the U.N. Delegates' Lounge and we talked for about three-quarters of an hour. The main point he made was that it was necessary to make some progress on the German question which could not be left on ice for much longer. I said that the German problem was the most difficult one with which we had to deal, since the long term interests of the Soviet Union and the West in Germany were much further apart than in other fields. The Western objective was ultimately to end the division of Germany, which was a constant source of tension; the Soviet Union did not seem to want this. Mr. Semanov said that a united Germany had caused nothing but trouble for the rest of the world in the past and, while he admitted that a divided Germany caused tension, he thought that a united Germany, whatever the circumstances of reunification, would be worse. Nonetheless, the situation in Germany must be normalized.

2. I said that the Western right of access was a question of vital interest to us, and that the apparent Soviet unwillingness to give us any assurances on this question was the main point of difficulty about the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact, to which the Russians had seemed to attach much importance during the talks in Moscow. Mr. Semanov said that a non-aggression pact was only a piece of paper, and would not advance matters in any way. If we were worried about access, then the Russians would be prepared to discuss this with us and reach an agreed solution. In connection with the non-aggression pact proposal, Mr. Semanov said that the Soviet Government was putting proposals on various subjects to the West with the object of "taking the temperature," i.e. in order to find out whether the West wished to reach agreement. If the temperature was bad, then they would have to wait until it improved. I said I hoped that, in cases where the West was unable to accept Soviet proposals, the Russians would listen carefully to the reasons we gave and realize that they were genuine reasons and did not mean that we were unwilling to reach agreement. He said he appreciated this, and repeated that the difficulties about Western access to Berlin could be solved.

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3. Mr. Semenov remarked at one point that "the West had its Chinese too," but that whereas the Soviet/Chinese dispute was now out in the open (He added that it had been going on in private for several years), American and British arguments with their allies were conducted in secret. I said that this could hardly be said of the disagreements between us and General de Gaulle. Mr. Semenov said he was thinking of the Germans. I said that there were signs of a certain evolution in German thinking about East/West relations, and I did not think this was the moment to focus too much public criticism on Germany. The German Government must be given time to work out the consequences of the new situation in East/West relations.

4. Mr. Semenov said he could not understand why the West was proposing to allow the Germans to participate in the control of nuclear weapons. If we once allowed them to be involved in nuclear weapons, they were bound sooner or later to acquire control over them. I said that the Americans and we were determined to retain exclusive control over our own nuclear weapons and not abandon our veto over their use. The object of the multilateral force was to give the Germans a sense of participation in the nuclear defence of the West, thereby educating them in the realities of the nuclear age, without giving them control over the use of nuclear weapons. We thought this was the safest way of bringing them to realise the full implications of nuclear war, and that this would be in the general interests of peace. The Germans were much more likely to co-operate in improving the international situation if they were treated as a responsible and mature nation than if we tried to keep them in leading strings; but this did not mean that they should at any time acquire a nuclear capability of their own. This would be against all our interests.

5. On the possibility of China acquiring nuclear weapons, Mr. Semenov remarked at one stage that if the Chinese manufactured two or three bombs this would cause no trouble to anyone; that situation could be dealt with. In order to be a nuclear power in the full sense of the word, any country required an enormous industrial base and there was no danger of China acquiring this for some time.

(K. B. A. Scott)
October 3, 1963

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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10/10/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

432

DATE: October 10, 1963

ZBF141/1

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Vladimir Semenov, Deputy Foreign Minister, USSR
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

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(2) The nature of the present commercial air traffic through the corridors to and from Berlin should remain unchanged. He said the status quo should be respected in this field. He said this should apply also to international airlines, e.g., the Austrian airline service which had been started between Vienna and Tempelhof. He said that the present services by British, French and US planes should not be added to by those of other countries. He also referred to a Hamburg air taxi advertisement for flights from Hamburg to and from Berlin through the northern corridor. Semenov said that this kind of thing was very bad.

(3) He complained about what he called "provocations by the West" in East Berlin. He did not refer to propaganda or subversive activities but to alleged actions by cars coming into East Berlin from the West, and causing disturbances by the behavior of the occupants. He mentioned specifically a car with several US soldiers in it which, he said, had driven through the streets of East Berlin shouting at the bystanders and trying to make speeches just ten minutes before Khrushchev was due to pass by. He said that if there were evidence of greater desire on the part of Western authorities to prevent this kind of thing happening, this would also facilitate matters with regard to the possibility of reaching agreement on Berlin.

Comment: This conversation should be read in conjunction with the conversation which Semenov had with Mr. Scott of the UK Foreign Office, in New York (see Memorandum of Conversation dated October 3, 1963). ^{attached} Semenov spoke earnestly and soberly, and avoided both propaganda and ideological arguments. It was possible to infer from the way he presented his views that the Soviet Government would find it easier to move on Berlin if some satisfaction could be given to the GDR by the West, which would however not be expected to go so far as to constitute recognition or significant political advantage.

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CONVERSATION WITH MR. SEMENOV

I met Mr. Semenov, the senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official dealing with Germany, in the U.N. Delegates' Lounge and we talked for about three-quarters of an hour. The main point he made was that it was necessary to make some progress on the German question which could not be left on ice for much longer. I said that the German problem was the most difficult one with which we had to deal, since the long term interests of the Soviet Union and the West in Germany were much further apart than in other fields. The Western objective was ultimately to end the division of Germany, which was a constant source of tension; the Soviet Union did not seem to want this. Mr. Semenov said that a united Germany had caused nothing but trouble for the rest of the world in the past and, while he admitted that a divided Germany caused tension, he thought that a united Germany, whatever the circumstances of reunification, would be worse. Nonetheless, the situation in Germany must be normalised.

2. I said that the Western right of access was a question of vital interest to us, and that the apparent Soviet unwillingness to give us any assurances on this question was the main point of difficulty about the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact, to which the Russians had seemed to attach much importance during the talks in Moscow. Mr. Semenov said that a non-aggression pact was only a piece of paper, and would not advance matters in any way. If we were worried about access, then the Russians would be prepared to discuss this with us and reach an agreed solution. In connection with the non-aggression pact proposal, Mr. Semenov said that the Soviet Government was putting proposals on various subjects to the West with the object of "taking the temperature," i.e. in order to find out whether the West wished to reach agreements. If the temperature was bad, then they would have to wait until it improved. I said I hoped that, in cases where the West was unable to accept Soviet proposals, the Russians would listen carefully to the reasons we gave and realise that they were genuine reasons and did not mean that we were unwilling to reach agreement. He said he appreciated this, and repeated that the difficulties about Western access to Berlin could be solved.

3. Mr.

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3. Mr. Semenov remarked at one point that "the West had its Chinese too," but that whereas the Soviet/Chinese dispute was now out in the open (He added that it had been going on in private for several years), American and British arguments with their allies were conducted in secret. I said that this could hardly be said of the disagreements between us and General de Gaulle. Mr. Semenov said he was thinking of the Germans. I said that there were signs of a certain evolution in German thinking about East/West relations, and I did not think this was the moment to focus too much public criticism on Germany. The German Government must be given time to work out the consequences of the new situation in East/West relations.

4. Mr. Semenov said he could not understand why the West was proposing to allow the Germans to participate in the control of nuclear weapons. If we once allowed them to be involved in nuclear weapons, they were bound sooner or later to acquire control over them. I said that the Americans and we were determined to retain exclusive control over our own nuclear weapons and not abandon our veto over their use. The object of the multilateral force was to give the Germans a sense of participation in the nuclear defence of the West, thereby educating them in the realities of the nuclear age, without giving them control over the use of nuclear weapons. We thought this was the safest way of bringing them to realise the full implications of nuclear war, and that this would be in the general interests of peace. The Germans were much more likely to co-operate in improving the international situation if they were treated as a responsible and mature nation than if we tried to keep them in leading strings; but this did not mean that they should at any time acquire a nuclear capability of their own. This would be against all our interests.

5. On the possibility of China acquiring nuclear weapons, Mr. Semenov remarked at one stage that if the Chinese manufactured two or three bombs this would cause no trouble to anyone; that situation could be dealt with. In order to be a nuclear power in the full sense of the word, any country required an enormous industrial base and there was no danger of China acquiring this for some time.

(K.B.A. Scott)
October 3, 1963

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

12287
MICROFILMED
KENNEDY LIT
June 19

Oct 22 8 25 PM '63

Origin
EUR
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy PARIS TOPOL
INFO: AmEmbassy MOSCOW
AmEmbassy BONN
(PASS TYLER)
DELIVER FINLETTER 8:00 A.M. OCTOBER 23

IMMEDIATE 518
ROUTINE 1306
ROUTINE 1197

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Following is summary of Kennedy-Gromyko October 10 conversation re Nonaggression Pact (NAP), Observation Posts (OPs), Military Budgets, Non-dissemination and Disarmament which you may convey to NAC:

NAP

Gromyko said he understood US made NAP contingent on having understanding on other matters, i.e. access to West Berlin. He reiterated Soviets would not accept linking of NAP with ~~Berlin~~ Berlin settlement since it would transform NAP into problem of peace settlement. Gromyko stated USSR might, however, be willing make simultaneously with NAP following statement, which he read from prepared text:

QUOTE: The Soviet Government has been invariably opposed and continues to be opposed to the use of force in settling all disputed international questions, including the questions connected with a German peace settlement and the normalization on its basis of the situation in West Berlin. It believes that ~~settlement~~ settlement of such issues by negotiation is the sole correct approach which served the cause of consolidating universal peace. Of course,

EYES ONLY

the

Handwritten notes on right margin: "215-2155R", "X R. [unclear] 18", "X R. [unclear] 14", "NAP", "the Berlin [unclear]".

Drafted by: CV [unclear] [unclear]
EUR: RFM, TG [unclear] 10/22/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

EUR - Richard H. [unclear]

S/AL - Amb. Thompson
S/S - Mr. Hilliker
SOV - Mr. Henry

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the USSR has never contemplated, nor does it contemplate, resort to force in settling disputed international issues. It is only in reply to application of force from one quarter or another to it, or to its friends and allies, that the USSR could find itself compelled to respond with force. The Soviet Government had repeatedly stated this in ~~the~~ ^{the} past and confirms it now, for this is precisely what constitutes one basis of Soviet foreign policy, which is a policy of peaceful coexistence and of maintenance and consolidation of peace. It goes without saying that the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that the conclusion of an NAP between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in no way erases the task of concluding a German peace treaty and normalizing the situation in West Berlin on its basis in the interest of strengthening security in Europe and in the world. On the contrary, with the intensification of the arms race, and with the concentration in the center of Europe of the armed forces of the Great Powers, including nuclear weapons and rockets, the accomplishment of a German peace settlement is becoming even more urgent from the standpoint of consolidating both European and world peace. The Soviet Government will proceed from the need to bring this to a conclusion. UNQUOTE

Gromyko read from second document that Soviet Union would maintain position set forth in draft declaration provided there was no invasion of Cuba. This was for information of the President. It was not a condition for NAP or would it be part of declaration.

Gromyko stated Soviet Union open minded as to form of NAP. ^{Mentioned some people said} ~~same~~ NAP would in effect recognize GDR. However, Soviet Union believed recognition and conclusion ~~of a treaty~~ ^{of a treaty} were two different matters. ^{1954 examples of Soviet agreements with Portugal and Spain,} Cited examples of Soviet agreements with Portugal and Spain,

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and Spain, although Soviets do not recognize them. Gromyko made point that if West did not want NAP, USSR could live without it. However, USSR liked idea of NAP as step forward after Moscow Treaty. Recalling that in Moscow conversations Mr. Harriman said US would consult allies, Gromyko asked whether President had any comment. President replied US still stood where Mr. Harriman said we stood. Could not say whether NAP would be more acceptable to allies as result of Soviet declaration.

OPs

Gromyko stated Soviet Government believed establishment of observation posts in NATO and Warsaw Pact Areas would be very important step provided that it was not merely a formal step but was accompanied by certain practical or physical measures. He recalled that he had mentioned two such measures: 1) reduction of ^{Germanys.} by one-third or some other proportion, and 2) withdrawal of nuclear weapons from two/ foreign troops in two Germanys/ Gromyko stated he raised this matter not because U.S. position unclear, but because he wished to state Soviet view once again and to stress sincere desire of USSR to have effective observation posts.

President commented that this seemed to indicate that observation posts were one package in Khrushchev's mind together with such things as reduction of forces and withdrawal of nuclear weapons. Gromyko said this was correct.

Military Budget

Gromyko acknowledged Soviet proposal to reduce military budgets was not disarmament, but it would slow arms race. Stressed great ^{importance} ~~importance~~ Soviet Union attached to matter. USSR believed even informal or tacit understanding or perhaps gentleman's

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n's agreement in this area would help.

President said we intended keep ~~XX~~ our military budget constant, unless some crisis ~~XXXX~~ should develop. Asked if Khrushchev could indicate his intentions in ~~this~~ Soviet budget as regard/and suggested this perhaps as far/we could go now. Noted formal agreement would raise difficulties in view of inspection problem.

Non-Dissemination and MLF

Gromyko said views of US and USSR coincided to extent that it was agreed that no nuclear weapons should be distributed to countries which do not now possess such weapons. But it was here that disagreement began. US appeared to limit non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to states. USSR believed that states should not have access to nuclear weapons either indirectly or through Alliance. Obstacle to non-dissemination agreement was US plan for MLF.

President ~~XXX~~ said we do not believe MLF would create situation worse than the one existing now. However, if MLF plan failed there would be a ~~XXXXXX~~ vacuum in which countries would seek independently to attain nuclear capability.

Gromyko asserted that if there were universal non-dissemination agreement, to which West Germany adhered, task of non-dissemination would be resolved. He could see no ~~XXXXXX~~ vacuum if there were no MLF.

Secretary commented that if China should explode bomb other countries would press for nuclear weapons for themselves. Gromyko said that under broad non-dissemination ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ arrangement, without MLF, all nuclear states would undertake not to give weapons or information to other states. If Chinese did not join, their ~~XXXXXX~~ ion would be more difficult and delicate. President asked when Gromyko thought

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would explode bomb. Gromyko said he did not know, adding that USSR nothing to Chinese. President stressed need for continuing efforts with regard to non-dissemination agreement.

Disarmament

Gromyko said Soviet Government sometimes wondered whether there was any use discussing disarmament in ENDC. Pointed out this remark should not be interpreted as meaning USSR would not continue participate in work of ENDC, but USSR believed situation in this field could not be worse. He wondered what the President's view was as to what could be done in this area. Although ~~ENH~~ perhaps/^{not} ~~max~~ all problems in disarmament field could be resolved right away, Soviet Union believed that approach of general and complete disarmament was realistic.

President agreed that since both our countries had subscribed to concept of general and complete disarmament, they ought to stay at Geneva, although not much progress made so far. Hoped Soviet Union would stay. Said not very optimistic that we would ~~EX~~ disarm totally in one or even three stages. However, believed it psychologically good to keep working at this problem because this did have some influence on levels of arms.

~~EXCIX~~ ~~ENIX~~

In conveying foregoing, suggest you ~~ENH~~ observe that our impression was that having already discussed most of these subjects with ~~SECRETARY~~ Secretary and Lord Home, and separately with Secretary, Gromyko was merely raising these subjects for record and did not appear to expect any real negotiations with President.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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October 29, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 270

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, Thursday, October 24, 10:30 a.m.,
in the Cabinet Room, on European Matters

1. Based on Secretary Gilpatric's summary of recent Presidential decisions concerning the redeployment of US military forces from Europe and the schedule for implementing the approved actions, the President reaffirmed that:

a. Possible redeployments of US forces under consideration within the government should not be discussed publicly nor with our allies until a decision has been made and a politico-military plan for action approved. Following these steps, we should consult as appropriate with our allies before any public announcement is made, and then proceed with our intended actions. Wherever possible action of low visibility should be taken without public announcement.

b. The United States will maintain in Germany ground forces equivalent to six divisions as long as they are required, and this policy is to be reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk in Frankfurt.

2. The following actions were approved by the President, to take place under the above guidelines.

(1) The three C-130 squadrons permanently stationed in France will be returned as scheduled; two squadrons will be maintained in France on rotation.

(2) US Army lines of communication forces in France will be reduced by approximately 5400 as scheduled.

(3) The inactivation of the Lacrosse and 280mm gun battalions will proceed as scheduled.

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(4) A plan for the further reorganization of the Army's European logistics forces, entailing an additional reduction of about 30,000 personnel over the next two calendar years, will be developed by the Department of the Army for review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

(5) The specific 10% reduction in headquarters staff of 7th Army and USAREUR and the over-all 15% reduction worldwide in headquarters staffs (which may involve further adjustments in Headquarters, 7th Army, and USAREUR) will go forward as scheduled.

(6) The President approved the return to the United States, commencing early in 1964 and to be completed within FY 1964 with the minimum explanation practicable, the six Berlin "Roundout" units consisting of three artillery battalions, two armored battalions, and one cavalry regiment, with its support units. The schedule of this action and the manner of disclosure to the FRG were left for later decision by the President.

(7) The redeployment of the second LONG THRUST battle group will not be discussed until January, although planning should go forward for its probable return to the United States in early spring.

(8) B-47 units will be withdrawn from Spain and the United Kingdom as scheduled by the spring of 1965. The President reaffirmed this decision after being informed that although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against this action the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary of Defense strongly supported it.

(9) The President approved in principle the proposal to withdraw three fighter squadrons from France and seven fighter squadrons from the UK by the end of FY 1966. Defense should urgently prepare, in connection with State, a plan of action to carry this out, with an estimate of the political and military problems (including the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) involved for final approval of the President before any implementation.

3. On the basis of the above guidelines and decisions, section IV of Secretary Rusk's draft speech for Frankfurt on 27 October was reviewed and appropriate modifications were made. The President approved the attached revised draft.

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4. At the conclusion of the meeting, the President set forth the following rationale for use by US officials publicly, with the guidance that it should be used only as required, and only in such detail as is necessary.

a. The United States intends to keep the equivalent of six divisions in Europe as long as they are required. The United States will continue to meet its NATO commitment.

b. Operation BIG LIFT should be viewed as an example of our ability to add rapidly additional forces to Europe. Were it a replacement division, it would use the equipment of one of the divisions now in place. Instead, it is using one of the two division sets of equipment prestocked in Europe. In reality, the US thus will have over seven divisions in Europe over the next month or more.

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Col. Smith
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

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*Revised by 2/2/64
The original version signed
by Mr. Bundy*

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EXCERPT FROM PROPOSED SPEECH BY SECRETARY RUSK AT
FRANKFURT, GERMANY, ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1963.

IV. DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP

I turn now to the second field in which President Kennedy indicated that the principle of European unity and Atlantic partnership can be given new meaning -- that of defense.

We need substantial and diversified western power to protect the Atlantic area.

This power must include both nuclear and non-nuclear components.

The NATO military authorities have approved force goals whose attainment would help to give us a balanced force structure. It is important that these goals be attained. Then no one anywhere could conclude that the West is lax or indifferent to the defense of its vital interests.

I hope that the alliance as a whole can meet its goals. In a genuine partnership, burdens must be equitably borne; all countries must contribute their fair share to the total strength of the alliance.

The United States is making, and will continue to make, its full contribution to this partnership. It is a source of pride that the United States has generally met or exceeded its goals, and a source of regret that certain others in the alliance have not. It is our strong conviction that the alliance as a whole should meet its commitments and we earnestly hope it will do so.

Since you of the Federal Republic and we of the United States are carrying the heaviest burden of NATO, let me speak to you very frankly. You and we are working in the closest partnership in NATO. We consult each other intimately. When we say that your defense is our defense, we mean it. We have proved it in the past. We will continue to demonstrate it in the future.

We have six divisions in Germany. We intend to maintain these divisions here as long as there is need for them -- and under present circumstances there is no doubt that they will continue to be needed.

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Our forces in Germany are supported by the world's largest logistical system, which maintains these forces in the highest state of readiness with the most modern and powerful equipment. And they are backed by nuclear forces of almost unimaginable power.

And let me remind you that the central NATO front is not the only frontier of freedom on which the forces of the United States stand guard. We have more than 2,700,000 men under arms. Of these, we maintain nearly one million outside the continental United States, ashore or afloat.

As a nation with more than 40 allies and with worldwide defensive commitments, we are naturally very much interested in the mobility of our forces.

In this connection, let me say a word about the airlift of a United States armored division to Germany for maneuvers. This exercise was an experiment and demonstration arising directly from the airlift capability we committed ourselves to create in 1961, in the context of the Berlin crisis. Its fundamental objective was to permit the swift deployment of reinforcements in the face of a major crisis. It was thus the testing of a new and important additional capability which strengthens the military partnership between the United States and Europe.

Does the airlift of an armored division mean the withdrawal of American troops from Germany? The answer is "No," -- the opposite is the case. Because of this airlift we have at the moment a seventh division temporarily in Europe. Moreover, equipment is in position for still another division. Thus, the airlift capability developed by the United States at such great expense provides a major source of added strength to the Alliance.

The partnership among the North Atlantic Allies must extend to nuclear defense.

The occasion to do so arises, as in the case of political consultation, from the need to meet a specific problem. That problem is posed by a growing Soviet nuclear power, reflected in hundreds of Soviet missiles aimed both at Western Europe and at the United States.

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It has seemed to two successive United States administrations that the most effective way to meet this threat was by a combination of United States missiles and of MRBM's deployed to Allied forces under multilateral manning, control and ownership.

Such a multilateral missile fleet would be militarily effective. Its accurate and well-protected missiles would be counted toward the total needs of Western deterrence.

It would strengthen Atlantic partnership by binding the United States and Europe in an inextricable nuclear tie. The missiles and warheads would be jointly owned and controlled; they could not be unilaterally withdrawn.

And it would strengthen European cohesion by providing the presently non-nuclear powers an opportunity to share in ownership, manning and control of a powerful nuclear force on the same basis as other members of that force.

It would thus be an effective means of giving effect to the principles of which General Marshall spoke within the present political framework of Europe.

As that framework progresses, there must, of course, be room for evolution in this field, as in the field of political consultation. The President spoke clearly of this possibility in relation to the missile fleet when he said here last June that as Europe moves toward unity it can and should assume greater responsibility in this field.

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-2- 2114, October 30, from Paris (Section, 2 of 4)

We feel ourselves strengthened in this position when we consider the subjects suggested for East-West discussions. With about one exception, that of nondistribution of nuclear weapons, they are proposed by the Soviets: the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Organization, the setting up of control stations against surprise attacks by land, the reduction of the foreign forces in Germany, the denuclearization of Central Europe. Actually, in the guise of formal disarmament, the subject of all of them is Germany, her status, her future. All tend either to crystalize the present situation, i.e., to recognize the Communist state of East Germany, or to prepare for the neutralization of Germany, that is, its detachment from the West. But going about it in this fashion — I mean seeking to break the precarious balance that for fifteen years has tended to develop between a Communist Eastern Europe and a Western Europe united in freedom — is not the way to prepare for genuine peace.

Nothing illustrates this better than the following simple remark. To legalize the status quo in Germany is manifestly Russia's objective, but with one exception, almost a major exception: Berlin. On this subject, on the contrary, nothing must be done, according to her, to consolidate what exists, namely, the Western presence. Any discussion of this subject is denied to the Americans, and periodically incidents occur with the sole result of reminding us of the still precarious character of our position. The most recent of these incidents — regardless of their origin, which is irrelevant — occurred just in time to emphasize this persistent precariousness. In the same manner, with regard to Germany as a whole, the statements of the highest Soviet authorities, often repeated and again quite recently, are a constant reminder that there has been no change in the determination of the Soviets to make us finally accept the program which they have planned.

But, someone will say, our Allies who are negotiating are fully aware of these elements of the problem, and there is no reason to think that, in the discussions they are holding for their own account, they are likely to compromise what we -- and they with us -- consider the fundamental interests of the West. I fully concur in this view, and the talks I recently had occasion to have with my American and British colleagues confirmed this conviction of mine. Furthermore, did not the United States Secretary of State recently give a speech on this subject in which he cautioned against illusions in unequivocal terms?

Then there are the facts. In the three months that the talks have gone on, nothing has been concluded, no basis of agreement has been found. I will not be risking much if I say that no basis of agreement, even for the time being, seems likely to be forthcoming.

Actually, we of the West are in a situation very like that in which we found ourselves in the fall of 1961, when there were passionate discussions of the question whether it was desirable to have a meeting with the Russians on the subject of Berlin. All of us at that time took positions similar to the ones we are taking today, and for the same reasons. The Americans made

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Revised 12/6/63
(10. a. 12/16/63)

BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT

NOTES ON THE MLF: STATUS AND NEEDED DECISIONS

Ret'd from
Pres office 12/6

Purpose of Meeting:

- No fundamental decisions are needed now.
- We should inform the President concerning the status of the discussions in Paris and obtain his approval to continue along present lines and for:
 - (1) bringing key Members of Congress up to date;
 - (2) informing President Eisenhower of the current status.

Status of Discussions: President Kennedy had previously approved undertaking detailed discussions of the Basic Elements of the MLF with a Working Group of interested NATO allies.

- Purpose: Resolution of differences on how, not whether, to set up MLF and drafting of specific language suitable for a Charter.
- Seven nations, US, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey and later Belgium and the UK have been meeting in Paris since early October. The Netherlands has just informed us it will join.
- The Working Group discussions are expressly understood to be without commitment and the results are subject to review by governments, which will then reach decisions re MLF.
- The Working Group established a Military Sub-Group in Washington under US Adm. Ward. It plans to finish its work and report by about February 1. Its work is going well, with strong allied cooperation, and is leading to conclusion surface ship MLF would have even higher degree of invulnerability than we expected.

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- The Paris Working Group is well-advanced in a first round of discussions of all of the significant aspects of the MLF. The work is going smoothly without any indication of insuperable problems.
- Ambassador Finletter now hopes to complete this first round of discussions by early January. The Working Group will then take up those matters which as a result of the first examination require further consideration.
- It appears possible that the Working Group will be able to make a report to governments by mid-February.
- The possible next steps (review by governments and the Paris Working Group proceeding to detailed drafting) need not be considered now. Such future steps should be considered after the first round is completed and we know more clearly what, if any, the problems are.

United States Interest in the MLF:

- It has been described publicly as intended to meet European requests because we did not want to appear publicly to be seeking it until we had reasonable assurance our allies would support it.
- Actually the MLF is of great significance to the US. It was developed to serve US interests through helping to solve several major, serious foreign relations problems:
 1. To provide a way for the two major European non-nuclear countries (Germany and Italy) to participate in their nuclear defense without allowing national nuclear weapons proliferation.

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2. Specifically, to support those proponents of moderate, democratic government in Germany who want to forestall pressures for a national nuclear weapons program, Strauss and others are already pushing views which portend possible eventual aspiration for national nuclear power. The moderates must be able to counter with something strong. Schroeder and von Hassel believe the MLF is essential.
 - They have said plainly that if the MLF does not go through, they will be pressed to accept solutions more geared to national goals. (Erhard seems rather indifferent to the issue; in this, as in some other respects, he does not seem as politically sensitive an animal as some of his colleagues.) Erler (Socialist) has warned us, however; Germans will not be content indefinitely with second class nuclear status.
3. To strengthen the vital NATO Alliance when it is faltering -- by creating a closely knit force in which some major (and smaller) members would take part and have pride.
 - To give confidence to Alliance members by closely associating US with them in ownership, control and manning of a major nuclear force.
4. To provide part of MRDMs desired by SACEUR without placing them in Germany where potential danger of national seizure would create grave political problems with other allies and with Soviet Union.
5. To provide a practical means of countering De Gaulle's proposals for creating a French-organized Europe by inducing Germany to support the force de frappe. (The success of the MLF would destroy this strategy. Its failure would greatly strengthen his chance of success.)

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6. To create a powerful alternative to UK and French national forces and a force into which they might eventually be drawn.
7. To promote European cooperation and unity within an Alliance Partnership, drawing major European nations together in a real working force of major military, political and psychological importance.
8. To share a part of heavy US cost of nuclear weapons with allies. (Should save US about \$2 billion of construction costs for 200 missiles, plus about 2/3's of annual operating expenses.)
9. To confront Soviets with harnessing of European resources to US in nuclear force -- with possibility of persuading them of hopelessness of nuclear race.
10. Will also confront Soviets with another mode of nuclear deterrence, extremely difficult to counter.

Present Acceptance in Europe:

Germany: The moderate majority of the Government strongly favors earliest creation. Socialists have indicated they will support. Many parliamentarians indifferent because no real campaign of information has been conducted. Some oppose because of pro-De Gaullist nationalism.

Italy: President Segni, Prime Minister Moro, Saragat, Andreotti, and other leaders support. Socialist majority (Nenni) probably will reluctantly go along, but may wish to await UK Labor action. Socialist Minority (Lombardi) against. Agreed coalition accord contains favorable statement. Likely possibility, but not certainty, Italian Government could commit Italy after period of some months for new government to shake down.

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UK: Little real support in government circles. Home has vigorously urged joining Paris talks because afraid to see Germany go ahead with US and afraid of nuclear force without UK finger on safety catch. Military, with exaggerated idea of costs, fear inroads on own projects. Conservatives unable to support because of campaign emphasis on national nuclear force. Labor ostensibly opposing all nuclear forces, but probably has not yet decided its policy. Some younger men of both parties realize UK national force meaningless and MLF is sensible course. UK unlikely to commit itself before elections but will be severely pressed if US-Germany-Italy and others go ahead. Associate membership a possible out for a year or so.

France: Has specifically declined to join, but -- ostensibly at least -- does not oppose. Couve de Murville has recently discussed MLF as likely to come into being, with other countries as members.

Others: Greece and Turkey anxious to join. Belgium and Netherlands have been following British lead. (Nevertheless, might join if US and others take strong enough lead.)

NATO Parliamentarians' Conference rejected efforts, both to condemn and approve. Left to further study by governments.

WEU Assembly showed scant sympathy for idea. It favors over-all alliance consultation about use of nuclear forces; Schroeder has already made clear this would not meet German needs.

(Note: It should always be borne in mind that whatever the apparent defects of the MLF -- and no solution to nuclear problem is perfect -- no other serious alternative to solve the major problems has been offered.)

Need for US Leadership:

In the present state of the Alliance, US leadership is imperative to obtain action on the MLF. Moreover, MLF is major issue on which our constancy will be appraised, in view of extent of our past commitments.

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Protection of US Interests:

Nuclear weapons, transferred to Force would be held under terms satisfactory to US.

Warhead design data would be protected from unauthorized access.

Arming and firing will be only with US consent; other nations would participate as agreed. Possibility of eventual evolution in control formula held open, as Europe moves toward unity.

Specific arrangements would be made to preclude unauthorized firing.

Safety provisions would conform to US standards and be enforced with participation by US personnel.

Financing would be shared: US, 35-40%; Germany, 35-40%; Italy, 15%; UK, 10%; Belgium, 5%; Greece and Turkey nominal.

- Construction and all first six-year costs estimated at \$2.2-\$2.8 billion.
- Annual operating costs thereafter \$150-\$170 million.

Personnel would remain loyal to native country.

- Returned to own governments for major disciplinary action.
- Retain status, pay, promotion rights, etc.

Procurement of missiles and warheads in US. Ships probably in Europe.

Mixed-Manning Demonstration:

At President Kennedy's suggestion a plan for demonstration

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of mixed-manning on a US guided missile destroyer and, possibly, a US fleet service ship has been prepared and is being considered by governments.

- Plan has been recommended by the Military Sub-Group.
- The Working Group has asked member governments to notify US Government of desire to participate.
- None yet formally received. UK affirmative (von Hassell.) Belgium negative.

Situation in US Congress:

There has been no briefing of Members in six months or more, except by Secretary and Ricketts to NATO Parliamentarians and recent briefing of 12 House Republicans (NATO Policy Group) at their request.

We are holding off fulfillment of an offer to brief Senator Pastore made two weeks ago and accepted by him.

Paris discussions now approaching such matters of great Congressional interest as access to missiles and warheads, safety and security, personnel and discipline. Dangerous to go on longer without briefings.

Approvals by President Needed Now:

1. Informal, low key briefings of Congressional and Committee leaders having responsibilities in relation to NATO matters -- and others who ask. (A program and outline was approved by the White House November 19 in response to Secretary Rusk's request.)

2. To bring General Eisenhower up to date. The basic MAF concept originated in his administration, and he showed strong personal interest in it. This is highly important.

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because bipartisan understanding and support will be essential for the necessary treaty. General Eisenhower is now out of touch with the matter and it is imperative that he feel that he is being kept informed. It would be disastrous if, for lack of information, he should take an adverse stand which would be difficult for him to reverse. This is particularly significant because there is now in the House a Republican Policy Committee group on NATO matters which shows some possibilities of attempting to make a political issue of the conduct of NATO affairs. Eisenhower support for MLEF would help to keep NATO -- as well as MLEF -- out of politics.

Later Action:

After the first run-through in the Paris Working Group is completed, we should consider what further action should be taken.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

NATO 312/1/1
~~FOR 7 NATO/FAA~~ 12/16/63
6-3

EUR-6

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CA-6352

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : AmEmbassies ANKARA, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LONDON, LUXEMBOURG, MOSCOW, OSLO, OTTAWA, PARIS (FOR EMBASSY AND USRO), ROME REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE. PARIS FOR JAMES, SAACLANT FOR POLAD, SAC FOR POLAD, BRUSSELS FOR USEC, BONN FOR PARELMAN, ROME FOR BURRIS. ALSO Amembassies STOCKHOLM, MADRID, HELSINKI.

FROM : Department of State

DATE: Dec 20 8 25 PM '63

SUBJECT : Secretary Rusk's Remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting and Final Communique

REF :

Attached for the information of addressees is the text of Secretary Rusk's remarks at the NAC Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 16, under Agenda Item I, "Review of the International Situation", also attached are the Secretary's introductory remarks as President of the North Atlantic Council for 1964, and a message to the Council from President Johnson, which the Secretary read. In addition, a text of the final communique is enclosed.

Remarks by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara on the military situation are being circulated in a separate airgram under Top Secret cover.

Four summary reports of the morning and afternoon sessions/the two day meeting (December 16-17) have been sent by USRO/Paris to all NATO capitals. References are as follow: POLTO 864 to Department; POLTO Circulars 49, 50, and 51.

RUSK

Attachments: As stated.

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In Out

Drafted by: EUR/RPM; TGustafson:gmf;bje 12/20/63

Contents and Classification Approved by: David H. Tupper

Cleanances: EUR/RPM - Mr. Van Hollen

S/S -S Mr. Moore (subs)

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Attachment 5

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NATO 182/d

Communist world? I shall not attempt to speak completely formally as a government on this matter, but to expose to you what might be called some personal observations, as a partial contribution to the discussion which ought to proceed in the North Atlantic Council so that we can come, if possible, to considered consensus about these possibly historic questions, because I do believe that we are at the front edge of very important events in the world scene. I think it is too soon yet to know in which directions those changes will go, but the situation is in flux, things are not going to remain what they were, there is movement and, therefore, both danger and opportunity.

For example, what does the Moscow-Peiping discourse really mean? How deep does this division go? We are inclined to think it goes very deep indeed but we must start with the recognition that the leaders of these two great Communist giants can reconcile their differences. Being the kinds of system they are, they can reconcile their differences if it becomes vital for them to do so if they approach the brink of a complete break and the consequences of a complete break. With that reservation, it seems to us that this breach is fundamental and far-reaching, embracing ideology, state relations, border conflicts, economic interests, a struggle for influence in other parts of the world and what appears to be a deep personal enmity of the top leaders of the present two systems.

What is our own interest in this dialogue between Moscow and Peiping? I should think we have an initial interest in their not getting together again and co-operating. I cannot imagine that they can reconcile their present differences, except on a basis which would be bad news for the free world - a massive monolith, committed to an active and more progressive policy than we have seen in recent months, presenting us with a massive confrontation in the different parts of the world. So I think that we have an interest in their staying separate. And I would also suppose that, in the ideological quarrel between militancy and peaceful coexistence, that it would be in our interests that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence prevail.

Now that does not mean that what Moscow calls peaceful coexistence is satisfactory to us. Mr. Schroder has just pointed out that, after all, it was the Soviet Union that had brought us nearest war in these past two years,

/in Berlin

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12/17/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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FROM : Department of State

DATE: Dec 20 9 11 PM '63

SUBJECT : Secretaries Rusk's and McNamara's Remarks at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 17, under Agenda Item II,

REF : "Military Questions"

Attached for the information of addressees are remarks by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara on the military situation, delivered at the NAC Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 17. Secretary Rusk's statement on the international political situation has been pouched under cover of a separate airgram.

RUSK

Attachments: As stated.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: EUR:RFM:IGustafson:gmf 12/20/63

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DOD/ISA - Col. Forsyth(subs)

S/S-S-Mr. Moose (subs)

Not to back slip Washington
8/31/65 - wdh

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NATO 182/1

TOP SECRETAttachment BREMARKS BY SECRETARY McNAMARA, DECEMBER 17, 1963

The new President of the United States has unambiguously reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to the principles of the North Atlantic Alliance and the defense of its member nations. No change of Presidents could weaken that commitment, for it is a direct response to two hard facts that confront any man who looks at the world from the White House. First, the security of the United States depends upon the security of all the nations of the North Atlantic Alliance. Second, against the whole range of threats that may be posed by the Soviet Bloc neither the United States nor any other nation or regional group in the Alliance can provide adequately for that security in isolation.

2. The basic principle of the Alliance - that each nation regards an attack upon any member as an attack upon itself - rests on firmer foundations than sentiment or altruism. Because any development in the world that endangers one member of NATO raises risks for all, it is obvious that the co-ordinated use of our joint resources offers greater security to each of us than we could achieve separately.

3. Much has changed in the last decade, in the nature of the threat and in the resources available to meet it. Of course, there is no simple, ideal formula for the security of the Alliance. But we do know that an adequate posture and strategy must be fashioned from the resources of the whole Alliance. A strategy tailored to the limited resources of any one country - even if that country were the United States - could not reflect the advantages to each of us of the existence of the Alliance.

4. But if we are to exploit those advantages in our decision-making and our programs, we must have the fullest exchange of information on the military resources of our opponents and our own national programs and strengths.

5. To this end, I shall bring up to date my earlier reports on the progress of the United States programs which support the Alliance, and make some comments on the adequacy of the Alliance posture in the light of Soviet capabilities.

I. Soviet Strength

6. Regarding Soviet and satellite strength, you have just heard the Standing Group intelligence appreciation given by Admiral Douguet.

7. Our estimate of the Soviet ICBMs and IREM/MRBMs that have become operational as of this month shows figures somewhat higher than those you have heard, but the difference is not significant for this discussion.

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will become increasingly restless about a situation in which the United States maintains qualitative standards - manning levels, stocks and force readiness - generally higher than those of our Allies. It is most important that we adopt a common standard in fact, as well as in principle

IV. The Balance of Payments Situation

36. I must turn now to a problem that continues to be of concern to the United States Government: our unfavorable balance of international payments. The average annual deficit during the period calendar year 1958-60 was \$3.7 billion. In 1961 and 1962, the deficit in each year was reduced to about \$2.3 billion, primarily through pre-payment of governmental debts and other transactions which have involved co-operation by a number of members of NATO. The deficit for the first nine months of 1963, counting all receipts from these special co-operative measures, remained approximately at this level.

37. The gross foreign exchange cost of our military operations abroad amounts to about \$2.7 billion a year, of which about \$1.7 billion is in NATO Europe. The budgetary cost of maintaining these forces is, of course, many times greater. Since the main region of the world in balance of payments surplus with us is also the region where we have our largest military deployments abroad, I feel it appropriate to bring these facts to your attention.

38. In order to reduce the impact of defense spending on the balance of payments, we have embarked on a program both to reduce our military expenditures overseas and to increase receipts. During this period, fiscal year 1961-1963, our defense expenditures abroad were held relatively constant despite the increase due to the Berlin crisis and higher price and wage levels overseas. We have already brought the over-all net adverse balance attributable to United States defense activities abroad down by about \$1 billion between 1961 and 1963, primarily because receipts from sales of military equipment, supplies and services approximately quadrupled.

39. While all NATO countries to some extent are purchasing equipment from the United States, the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, which provides for an offset of our defense outlays in Germany, has been particularly helpful. Italy is also making substantial efforts to offset our defense expenditures in that country, and this we appreciate.

40. President Kennedy, in his message to the United States Congress on balance of payments last July, announced a series of actions designed to reduce the overall deficit. One of the actions was a projected reduction in the annual rate of Department of Defense expenditures abroad by \$300 million below the calendar year 1963 level, by measures to be put into effect before the end of calendar year 1964.

41. The actions being carried out will include extending programs already under way; for example, increasing procurement of goods and services in the United States, eliminating or deferring construction on projects overseas not

/operationally

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