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Sent: Friday, March 18, 2005 3:41 PM
To: CCJ3-OPE; [redacted] b 3 b 6 CCJ3-P AUS; [redacted] b 6 (O-6);

[redacted] (b)(6)

Subject: RELEASED - - PLANORD: Posturing for the Long War

All - PLANORD released... v/r [redacted] (b)(6)

v/r

[redacted] (b)(6)
USCENTCOM J3-PP (Tampa)
Arabian Peninsula Plans
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> Originator: DOD, CENTCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, USCENTCOM CCJ3 (MC),
USCENTCOM
> CCJ3-P (MC)
> DTG: 181210Z Mar 05 Precedence: Immediate DAC: General
> Subject: USCENTCOM PLANORD: POSTURING FOR THE LONG WAR (S/REL USA AUS
> GBR)
>
> SECRET//REL TO USA,AUS,GBR.//DB
> OPER/IRAQI FREEDOM AND ENDURING FREEDOM//
> MSGID/ORDER/CDRUSCENTCOM//

[redacted] (b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

> TIMEZONE/Z//
> NARR/(S/REL USA AUS GBR). THIS IS A USCENTCOM PLANNING ORDER. THIS
ORDER
> DIRECTS CJTF5 AND FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS TO DETERMINE POSTURING
> REQUIREMENTS OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS FOR LONG TERM OPERATIONS IN THE
> CENTCOM AOR. CDRUSCENTCOM ENVISIONS TRANSITIONING TO A SIGNIFICANTLY
> SMALLER, MORE AGILE, AND EXPEDITIONARY US FORCE STRUCTURE THAT
MAXIMIZES
> REACHBACK CAPABILITY TO CONUS DURING THIS PERIOD. NLT 25 APR 05,
USCENTCOM
> CJTF5 WILL DEVELOP CONPLANS TO SUPPORT REPOSTURING US FORCES OVER THE
NEXT
> TWO YEARS. NLT 10 MAY 05, COMPONENTS WILL DEVELOP CONPLANS TO SUPPORT
THIS
> REPOSTURING OF US FORCES OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS. EACH CONPLAN WILL
> INCLUDE US FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS AND CONDITIONS ON WHICH
> RESTRUCTURING IS FOUNDED, BASING REQUIREMENTS, SUPPORT AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
> REQUIREMENTS, OPTIONS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL AND HEADQUARTERS, WITH
AN
> ENDSTATE TO SUPPORT USCENTCOM LONG-TERM AOR OBJECTIVES. CONPLANS
SHOULD
> ACCOUNT FOR CONDITIONS SUCH AS MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS, POSSIBLE
CHANGES IN
> THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, AND EXPECTED DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-RELIANT
> INDIGENOUS FORCES. THE RESULT OF THIS PLANNING EFFORT IS THE FIRST
STEP
> TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THE USCENTCOM INTEGRATED GLOBAL POSTURE AND
BASING
> STRATEGY (IGPBS) TO SUPPORT USCENTCOM LONG TERM AOR STRATEGY.//
> GENTEXT/SITUATION/
> 1. (U) SITUATION.
> 1.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) GENERAL. USCENTCOM FACES SIGNIFICANT LONG
TERM
> SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE AOR. THESE CHALLENGES RANGE FROM
INTERNATIONAL
> TERRORISM TO INTERRUPTION OF VITAL ENERGY SUPPLIES TO POTENTIAL
> STATE-ON-STATE CONFLICT. USCENTCOM WILL RESPOND TO THESE CHALLENGES
BY
> CONDUCTING JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE AOR TO DEFEAT
ADVERSARIES,
> PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY, SUPPORT ALLIES AND FRIENDS, AND PROTECT
US
> INTERESTS. NEAR TERM OBJECTIVES ARE:
> 1.A.1. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) STABILIZE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN TO SUSTAIN
> POLITICAL PROGRESS AND PROMOTE SELF-RELIANCE.
> 1.A.2. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) BUILD LOYAL, WELL-TRAINED, INDIGENOUS
SECURITY
> FORCES ACROSS THE AOR CAPABLE OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM
> OPERATIONS.
> 1.A.3. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) DEFEAT AL-QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED IDEOLOGICAL
> MOVEMENTS IN THE AOR BY DENYING SAFE HAVEN AND SUPPRESSING THEIR USE
OF
> THE VIRTUAL REALM.
> 1.A.4. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) HELP PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA HELP
THEMSELVES

> IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST EXTREMISTS.
> 1.A.5. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) SUSTAIN THE FLOW OF OIL BY PROTECTING KEY
> INFRASTRUCTURE AND SEA LOCS.
> 1.A.6. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) 1.4b
> 1.A.7. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) DEVELOP WAR-FIGHTING NETWORKS TO OPTIMIZE
> JOINT, COMBINED AND INTER-AGENCY CAPABILITIES.
> 1.A.8. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) PROTECT THE FORCE AGAINST ASYMMETRIC
THREATS,
> WITH PRIORITY AGAINST IEDS AND INDIRECT FIRE.
> 1.A.9. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) SEIZE THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
INITIATIVE -
> WIN THE PERCEPTION BATTLE.
> 1.A.10. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) CONDUCT PLANNING TO GUARD AGAINST
STRATEGIC
> SURPRISE WITH PRIORITY TO COUNTERING 1.4a PROLIFERATION IN THE AOR.
> 1.B. (U) THREAT.
> 1.B.1. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) THE MAIN ENEMY WITHIN THE AOR IS THE AL
QAIDA
> NETWORK. THIS GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERRORIST CELLS CONTINUES OPERATING
> SUPPORTED BY WEAPONS MAKERS, FINANCIERS, SAFE HAVENS, FACILITATORS,
> EDUCATORS AND TRAINERS, AND RECRUITERS. WHILE THE NETWORK LEADERSHIP
HAS
> BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED AND ISOLATED, THE OVERALL NETWORK
CONTINUES TO
> IMPROVE. IT USES PHYSICAL LOCATIONS EXTENDING INTO EUROPE AND THE
PACIFIC
> WHILE SPREADING THROUGHOUT THE AOR, RECRUITING, TRAINING, GATHERING
> FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND IDENTIFYING SAFE HAVENS. SUPPORT FOR THE
NETWORK
> RANGES FROM SAFE HOUSES IN METROPOLITAN AREAS TO REMOTE, UNGOVERNED
SPACES
> IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, CENTRAL ASIA, AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. OVER
THE
> NEXT TWO YEARS THE ENEMY WILL EXPAND UPON ITS VIRTUAL COMPONENT
> SIGNIFICANTLY USING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION. COLLECTIVELY,
> WITHIN THE MINDS OF ITS ADHERENTS, THE NETWORK FUNCTIONS AS A
"VIRTUAL
> CALIPHATE" GUIDED BY AN EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY FUELED WITH A UNIQUE
STRAIN OF
> MILITANT ISLAM. TRADITIONALLY, COUNTRIES IN THE AOR HAVE BEEN
SUPPORTIVE
> OF US INITIATIVES DURING TIMES OF REGIONAL CRISES, BUT THE REGION IS
NOT
> TOLERANT OF A LARGE OR PERMANENT US PRESENCE. THE PRESENCE OF LARGE
COMBAT
> FORMATIONS THROUGHOUT THE AOR FEEDS THE ENEMY'S PROPAGANDA THAT US
> INTENTIONS IN THE REGION ARE SELF-SERVING AND IMPERIALISTIC.
ADDITIONALLY,
> DEPLOYED US FORCES PROVIDE A VISIBLE AND READILY AVAILABLE TARGET FOR
THE
> ENEMY TO ATTACK IN LOCATIONS WHERE THEY HAVE DISTINCT ADVANTAGES IN
> KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENVIRONMENT, SUPERIOR CULTURAL AWARENESS, ACCESS TO
> RESOURCES AND SUPPORT, AND THE ABILITY TO HIDE AMONG THE POPULATION.
> 1.B.2. (S/REL USA GBR AUS) THE CLASH OF IDEAS WILL CONTINUE TO DEFINE
THE
> AOR THROUGH THE NEXT TWO YEARS. THE DECISIVE TERRAIN IN THIS WAR IS
THE

> VAST MAJORITY OF THE AOR POPULATION WHO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE RANKS OF
> HARD-CORE FIGHTERS AND LEADERS, BUT WHOSE SUPPORT IS NECESSARY TO ANY
> EXPANSION OF THE NETWORK OPERATIONS. THE ENEMY NETWORK SURVIVAL
REQUIRES A
> STEADY FLOW OF WILLING RECRUITS WITH FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ITS CAUSE
> COUPLED WITH A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR EXTREMIST GROUPS TO OPERATE.
THE
> COMBINATION OF WEAK OR UNPOPULAR REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS, WITH
POPULATIONS
> ACTIVELY SEEKING CHANGE, OFFERS THE ENEMY OPPORTUNITIES TO GAIN
RECRUITS
> AND GEOGRAPHIC Footholds. THE ENEMY SHAPES THE ENVIRONMENT USING
VARIOUS
> FORMS OF PROPAGANDA, FOMENTING DISCONTENT BY EXPLOITING THE INTERNET,
> PROSELYTIZING TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS, AND
> MANIPULATING LEGAL BUSINESS SYSTEMS WITH THE AIM OF PUTTING THE
> GOVERNMENTS THEY HAVE TARGETED ON THE ROAD TO COLLAPSE. THIS PROCESS
IS
> POTENTIALLY ALREADY UNDER WAY IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE
AOR,
> MOST NOTABLY [REDACTED] 1.4b [REDACTED]
> 1.B.3. (S/REL USA GBR AUS) THE NETWORK WILL FURTHER DISPERSE AND
> METASTASIZE AS WE PUSH INTO ITS GEOGRAPHIC SANCTUARIES, ADAPTING IN
ORDER
> TO SURVIVE. YET, TO EXPAND ITS OPERATIONS ON THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
> LEVELS, THE NETWORK MUST FIND ADDITIONAL FOOTHOLDS THROUGHOUT THE AOR
FOR
> USE AS BASES OF RECRUITING, FINANCING, AND PROPAGATING ITS IDEOLOGY.
THIS
> EXPANSION INTO FOOTHOLDS AIMS AT ESTABLISHING A PAN-ISLAMIC, PHYSICAL
> CALIPHATE. DOING THIS WILL REQUIRE THE NETWORK TO ACHIEVE THREE GOALS.
> FIRST, IT MUST DRIVE OUT WESTERN NATIONS BY ATTACKING THE US AND ITS
> COALITION PARTNERS. SECOND, IT MUST ATTACK AND SUPPLANT GOVERNMENTS
IT
> VIEWS AS TOO MODERATE OR WESTERN-ORIENTED. THIRD, IT MUST GAIN
CONTROL OF
> TERRITORIES WHERE GEOGRAPHY, NATURAL RESOURCES, OR CULTURAL
SIGNIFICANCE
> WILL YIELD THE PREPONDERANT SHARE OF POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE
REGION.
> 1.B.4. (U) REGIONAL SITUATIONS.
> 1.B.4.A. (S/REL USA GBR AUS) IRAQ. IN IRAQ, OUR ADVERSARIES WILL
CONTINUE
> THEIR CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION AGAINST THE IRAQI PEOPLE AS THEY
ATTEMPT TO
> DERAIL THE ONGOING CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS UNDER THE IRAQI
TRANSITIONAL
> GOVERNMENT. THEY WILL INTENSIFY ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQI SECURITY
> INSTITUTIONS AND IRAQI CITIZENS WHO HAVE STEPPED FORWARD TO WORK FOR
THE
> NEW GOVERNMENT IN AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE WILL OF THE IRAQI SECURITY
> FORCES, TO PREVENT SUNNI INTEGRATION INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS, AND
TO
> GENERATE POPULAR ANTAGONISM AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. THESE
> ENEMIES OF PROGRESS AND DEMOCRACY WILL WORK TO UNDERMINE THE
> CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION, AND WILL CONTINUE

> THEIR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO PORTRAY COALITION OPERATIONS WITHIN IRAQ AND
> SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AS PART OF A US DESIGN TO ESTABLISH
> PERPETUAL INFLUENCE OVER THE COUNTRY. BY COMBINING THE EFFECTS OF FEAR,
> INTIMIDATION, AND A SENSE OF IRAQI NATIONALISM, THESE ENEMIES SEEK TO
> SUSTAIN A POOL OF WILLING RECRUITS FOR THEIR OPERATIONS AS WELL AS A
> PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT TO CONTINUE GROWING THE INSURGENCY. EXPECT LITTLE
> CHANGE IN THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THEIR PLANNED INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACKS.
> FURTHER VIOLENCE IS EXPECTED AS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY FORCES
> ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY IN THE FACE OF
> CONTINUED EXTREMIST VIOLENCE. HOWEVER, IRAQ IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE ON ITS
> PATH OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND ITS SLOW REBUILDING OF CIVIL SOCIETY
> BUT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES AND RIVALRIES REMAIN. STABILIZATION WILL OCCUR
> AS THE CITIZENRY EMBRACES THE FACT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE AND TIMES ARE
> CHANGING FOR THE BETTER. POLITICAL VIOLENCE MAY BE CURTAILED SIGNIFICANTLY
> IF SUNNI ARABS PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT BUT INTENSE INTERNAL
> SECTARIAN RIVALRIES AND EXTERNAL FOREIGN INFLUENCE ARE POTENTIAL SOURCES
> OF NEW VIOLENCE.
> 1.B.4.B. (S/REL USA GBR AUS) AFGHANISTAN. ATTACKS COMMITTED BY THE TALIBAN
> (TB) AND HEZB-E ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) HAVE BEEN GREATLY REDUCED SINCE THE
> OCTOBER 2004 ELECTIONS AND MAY BE FURTHER REDUCED AS THE NASCENT
> RECONCILIATION PROGRAM IS IMPLEMENTED. THE NUMBER OF TB AND HIG ATTACKS
> WILL REMAIN BELOW THE RATES OF 2003-2004. HOWEVER; ATTACKS, ESPECIALLY BY
> HIG, MAY BECOME MORE INDISCRIMINATE AND SPECTACULAR AS THE MORE EXTREMISTS
> HIG ELEMENTS STILL ACTIVE AFTER RECONCILIATION BECOME MORE DESPERATE TO
> PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS RELEVANT AND POTENT. WARLORDS AND IRREGULAR MILITIAS
> POSE A STANDING THREAT TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. AS
> SUCH FORCES ARE DISARMED AND DISBANDED THEY MAY STRIKE OUT AT GOVERNMENT
> AND INTERNATIONAL FORCES AS WELL AS LOCAL POPULATIONS SUPPORTING THOSE
> FORCES. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, GROWERS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WILL ALSO POSE
> A THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY AS THEIR LUCRATIVE LIVELIHOOD IS
> ERADICATED. INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN WILL CONTINUE TO FACE
> THREATS FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES, BOTH CRIMINAL AND MILITARY IN NATURE.
> IN ADDITION TO THE CONTINUING INSURGENCY, SUPPORTED BY REGIONAL AND
> TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIC MILITANT GROUPS, THE INCREASE IN SMALL-SCALE

> IRREGULAR MILITIAS AND NARCOTICS PRODUCERS AND TRAFFICKERS WILL CONTINUE
> TO THREATEN STABILITY AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN, AS WELL AS POSE A
> THREAT TO THE INTERNATIONAL FORCES INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND STABILITY
> OPERATIONS. ALL OF THESE GROUPS TEND TO OPERATE IN SMALL, DECENTRALIZED
> GROUPS THAT CONDUCT OPERATIONS BASED ON THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES AND
> ASSESSMENTS OF THE LOCAL SITUATION. WHILE THESE GROUPS DO NOT CURRENTLY
> REPRESENT A COHESIVE, ORGANIZED THREAT TO OPERATIONS, THE CUMULATIVE
> EFFECT POSES A THREAT TO STABILITY AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN.
EXTREMIST
> ELEMENTS WILL REMAIN THE MAJOR THREAT TO COALITION FORCES AND THE
> GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. THESE ELEMENTS INCLUDE LOCAL INSURGENT
GROUPS
> SUCH AS THE TALIBAN, REGIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS SUCH AS THE ISLAMIC
> MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN, ISLAMIC JIHAD GROUP AND BRANCHES OF
INTERNATIONAL
> TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS AL QAIDA. SMALL GROUPS OF AL QAIDA
> FIGHTERS, JOINING FORCES WITH OTHER ANTI-COALITION MILITIAS, CONTINUE
TO
> CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN EASTERN AFGHANISTAN. SENIOR-LEVEL AL QAIDA
> LEADERSHIP, PROBABLY LOCATED IN THE AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN BORDER
> REGION, WILL CONTINUE TO RECRUIT FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND SOLICITING
FINANCIAL
> BACKING TO SUPPORT THEIR OPERATIONS.
> 1.B.4.C. (S/REL USA GBR AUS) HORN OF AFRICA. ACTIONS BY HORN OF
AFRICA
> GOVERNMENTS HAVE IMPEDED THE AL QAIDA NETWORK AND AFFILIATED
EXTREMIST
> GROUPS FROM CONCENTRATING AND CONDUCTING SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS IN
THE
> REGION, ALTHOUGH THEY REMAIN ACTIVE AND RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO
EXPAND.
> UNABATED EXTREMELY NEGATIVE ECONOMIC FACTORS RESTRICT REGIONAL
> GOVERNMENT'S ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH EXTREMISTS WHO ARE
OFTEN
> BETTER EQUIPPED AND FUNDED THAN GOVERNMENT FORCES. CONTINUING US
PRESSURE
> ON, AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THOSE GOVERNMENTS TO CREATE A REGIONAL
> ENVIRONMENT THAT IS LESS CONDUCIVE TO RADICAL EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES
HAS
> DRIVEN THE SUCCESSES WE HAVE REALIZED THUS FAR. UNFORTUNATELY, FUTURE
> SUCCESSES WILL LIKELY BE PREDICATED ON CONTINUING US INVOLVEMENT AND
> SUPPORT. IF INTERNATIONAL ENCOURAGEMENT AND INVOLVEMENT CONTINUE
EXPECT
> THE REGION TO REMAIN RELATIVELY STABLE.

1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d

- > WESTERN ACCESS ALLOWS THE AL QAIDA NETWORK RELATIVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT,
- > ACCESS TO MONEY, FIGHTERS, AND CRITICAL COMMUNIQES BETWEEN REGIONAL AND
- > TRANSNATIONAL EXTREMIST GROUPS.
- > 1.C. (U) ASSUMPTIONS.
- > 1.C.1. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ POLITICAL PROGRESS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN IS
- > SUSTAINED.
- > 1.C.2. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ THE GOVERNMENTS OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ WILL
- > PROGRESS TOWARDS INCREASING SELF-RELIANCE FOR SECURITY.
- > 1.C.3. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ ESTABLISHMENT AND RECONSTITUTION OF STRATEGIC
- > THEATER RESPONSE FORCES WILL REDUCE THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCING
- > FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE CENTCOM AOR.
- > 1.C.4. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ A LARGE US FORCE POSTURE IN THE AOR PROMOTES
- > ANTI-US SENTIMENT AND ENEMY PROPAGANDA.
- > 1.C.5. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ THE LONGER LARGE US FORCES REMAIN IN IRAQ AND
- > AFGHANISTAN, THE MORE THESE COUNTRIES WILL DEPEND ON US FORCES FOR THEIR
- > SECURITY.
- > 1.C.6. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE AOR WILL INCREASE,
- > PRIMARILY IN IRAQ AND SUDAN.
- > 1.C.7. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ NATO INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION WILL CONTINUE TO
- > INCREASE IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ.
- > 1.C.8. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ COALITION NATION INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND
- > IRAQ WILL DECREASE.
- > 1.C.9. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ USCENTCOM WILL ACTIVELY SOLICIT COALITION
- > SUPPORT FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS IN CJOA-HOA.
- > 1.C.10. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ TRADE OF FOSSIL FUELS WILL CONTINUE TO
- > UNDERPIN ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA REGION.
- > 1.C.11. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS IN THE REGION WILL
- > CONTINUE TO DEVELOP ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT.
- > 1.C.12. ~~(S/REL USA AUS GBR)~~ KURDISH INDEPENDENCE WILL BECOME AN ISSUE
- OF

1.4b, 1.4d

> 1.C.16. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) US BUDGET DEMANDS WILL REQUIRE A REDUCED
US
> PRESENCE IN THE AOR.
> 1.C.17. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) GOVERNMENT OF 1.4b REMAINS RELATIVELY
> STABLE.
> 1.C.18. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) SUSTAINED IMPROVEMENT IN INDIGENOUS
SECURITY
> FORCES THROUGHOUT THE REGION.//
> GENTEXT/MISSION/
> 2. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) MISSION. USCENTCOM RESTRUCTURES US FORCES IN
THE
> AOR IN ORDER TO CONDUCT JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE LONG WAR
> AGAINST AL QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS.//
> GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
> 3. (U) EXECUTION.
> 3.A. (U) COMMANDERS INTENT.
> 3.A.1. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) PURPOSE. RESHAPE OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE IN
THE
> AOR FOR THE LONG WAR.
> 3.A.2. (U) METHOD.
> 3.A.2.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) DEVELOP, TRAIN, AND INCREASE SUPPORT TO
> INDIGENOUS SECURITY CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND
> COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS.
> 3.A.2.B. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) REDUCE OPCON CONVENTIONAL US FORCES
WHILE
> INCREASING CONVENTIONAL US FORCES PLACED ON PREPARE-TO-DEPLOY ORDERS
> (PTDO) AT HOME STATIONS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE USCENTCOM AOR ON
> SHORT NOTICE. OPCON FORCES REMAINING IN THE AOR WILL BE MAINLY THREE
> TYPES: CONVENTIONAL IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FORCES (GROUND, AIR AND
MARITIME),
> TRAINERS FOR INDIGENOUS FORCES, AND SOF FOCUSED ON COUNTER-TERRORISM.
> 3.A.2.C. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) DEVELOP INFRASTRUCTURE, LOGISTIC
CAPABILITY,
> AND C4I TO PROVIDE AN RAPID RESPONSE AND FORCE EXPANSION CAPABILITY.
> 3.A.2.D. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) DEVELOP A SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE
EXPENDITURE
> AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
> 3.A.3. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) ENDSTATE. THE ENVISIONED STRATEGIC
ENDSTATE IS
> A REGION WITH SELF-RELIANT INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES SUPPORTED BY
> EXPEDITIONARY US FORCES TO DEFEAT AL QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS,
DETER
> CONVENTIONAL THREATS, PREVENT STRATEGIC SURPRISE, AND PROTECT US
INTERESTS
> IN THE REGION.
> 3.B. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) CONCEPT OF OPERATION. USCENTCOM POSTURES FOR
THE
> LONG WAR BY TRANSITIONING THE LEAD FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS TO CAPABLE
> PARTNER STATES AS MUCH AND AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE WHILE RETAINING
SPECIFIC
> ENABLING CAPABILITIES TO PROTECT US INTERESTS. IN PARTICULAR,
USCENTCOM
> TRANSITIONS COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS TO INDIGENOUS
> FORCES AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES WHILE
RETAINING
> US COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITY. CJTF5 AND COMPONENTS BUILD
INDIGENOUS

- > CAPABILITIES AS THE MAIN EFFORT, WHILE TRANSFORMING THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF
- > THE US FORCE POSTURE IN THEATER. THE KEY FEATURE OF THIS CONCEPT IS TO
- > MOVE FROM A LARGE, FIXED US FORCE POSTURE THAT OCCUPIES BATTLESPACE IN
- > IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN TO A US FORCE POSTURE THAT RELIES ON PRECISION
- > INTELLIGENCE AND STRIKE CAPABILITIES STATIONED IN THE AOR BACKED UP BY
- > RESPONSE FORCES AT MULTIPLE LEVELS: TACTICAL QUICK REACTION FORCES,
- > THEATER OPERATIONAL RESERVES, AND STRATEGIC REACH-BACK TO ADDITIONAL US
- > FORCES ON PREPARED-TO-DEPLOY-ORDERS TO THE AOR FROM HOME STATIONS. US
- > FORCES IN THE AOR BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE, SUPPORTED BY
- > EFFICIENT INFRASTRUCTURE DESIGNED FOR EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS AND CAPABLE
- > OF RAPID EXPANSION AS REQUIRED. THE CONCEPT RELIES ON IMPROVEMENTS IN
- > TARGET DEVELOPMENT AND INTELLIGENCE FUSION CAPABILITY THROUGH
- > INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS COORDINATED WITH
- > OTHER USG AGENCIES, OUR COALITION PARTNERS, AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS. THIS
- > RESHAPING OF US FORCES WILL AVOID THE PERCEPTION OF US OCCUPATION, REDUCE
- > THE DEPENDENCY OF INDIGENOUS FORCES ON LARGE US CONVENTIONAL FORCES,
- > ENABLE MODERATES IN THE REGION, AND POSTURE USCENTCOM FOR A SUSTAINABLE
- > EFFORT IN THE LONG WAR.
- > 3.C. (U) TASKS TO SUBORDINATES.
- > 3.C.1. (U) CDRMNF-I.
- > 3.C.1.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) DEVELOP A PLAN WITH EXECUTION-LEVEL DETAIL TO
- > TRANSITION US FORCE STRUCTURE FROM 17 COMBAT BRIGADES TO 13 COMBAT
- > BRIGADES NLT DEC 05 AND TO 9 COMBAT BRIGADES NLT JUN 06. INCLUDE
- > WITHDRAWAL OF ONE HEAVY BRIGADE FROM IRAQ TO KUWAIT TO BE ESTABLISHED AS A
- > USCENTCOM THEATER RESERVE. PLAN CAN INCLUDE BOTH EARLY REDEPLOYMENT OF
- > ASSIGNED BRIGADES AND DELETING BRIGADES PROGRAMMED TO DEPLOY. INCLUDE THE
- > CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO BE MET FOR EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN, SPECIFIC
- > TIMINGS, AND SPECIFIC BRIGADES AFFECTED.
- > 3.C.1.B. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE PLACED ON PTDO TO
- > REDUCE RISK. ADDITIONALLY IDENTIFY RESPONSE TIMELINE FOR PTDO FORCES AND
- > RATIONALE. CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR PRE-POSITIONING BRIGADE SETS OF EQUIPMENT,
- > SO THOSE UNITS ON PTDO CAN FALL IN ON FORWARD-BASED EQUIPMENT.
- > 3.C.1.C. (S/REL USA AND MCFI) IDENTIFY CS AND CSS FORCES THAT MAY BE
- > REDUCED OR CONTRACTED AS COMBAT FORCES REDEPLOY.
- > 3.C.1.D. (U) DEVELOP A MASTER BASING PLAN THAT SUPPORTS 3.C.1.A. ABOVE.
- > SUBMIT MASTER PLAN IAW THE TEMPLATE FOUND AT USCENTCOM J4-P WEBSITE:
- > [REDACTED] CCJ4/PLANS/WEB/BASING/BASING.HTM) .
- > 3.C.1.E. (S/REL USA AND MCFI) INCLUDE AN ASSESSMENT OF REQUIRED
- > ADJUSTMENTS TO THE MNF CJOA AND TO COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE.
- > 3.C.1.F. (S/REL USA AND MCFI) PROVIDE AN ALTERNATE COA FOR SOURCING

> TRANSITION TEAMS AFTER DEC 05 THAT DRAWS TEAMS FROM BRIGADES ASSIGNED TO
> MNF. ADDITIONALLY, PRESENT AN ANALYSIS OF THE MISSIONS AND COMMAND
> RELATIONSHIPS OF MNSTC-I, MNC, AND THE PROPOSED IAG AND THE REQUIREMENT
> FOR EACH OF THESE INDIVIDUAL HEADQUARTERS AFTER DEC 05. REVIEW THE CURRENT
> 365-BOG REQUIREMENT FOR TRANSITION TEAMS PROVIDED BY ASSIGNED USMC UNITS
> THAT WILL CONTINUE TO ROTATE ON A 7-MONTH BASIS.
> 3.C.1.G. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) ICW CFSOCC, DEVELOP A PLAN TO REDUCE CJSOTF
> IN IRAQ.
> 3.C.1.H. (S/REL USA AND MCFI) ACCOUNT FOR ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN COALITION
> CONTRIBUTIONS OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
> 14b, b 3 BRIGADE IN 2005. INCLUDE AT LEAST ONE COA THAT ASSIGNS
> GEOGRAPHIC BATTLESPACE NOT TO COALITION OR US FORCES BUT TO SELF-RELIANT
> ISF FORCES, OR TO NO FORCES AT ALL, WITH MNF ABLE TO RESPOND IN SUCH AREAS
> AS REQUIRED.
> 3.C.1.I. (S/REL USA AND MCFI) AS FORCE POSTURE IS REDUCED, CONSIDER UNIT
> ROTATIONS THAT WILL ALLOW A DISTRIBUTED FORCE FLOW THROUGHPUT TO KUWAIT IN
> ORDER TO REDUCE NOV 05 TO FEB 06 SURGE PERIOD. DISTRIBUTED FORCE FLOW IS A
> KEY FACTOR FOR CFLCC POSTURE REDUCTIONS.
> 3.C.1.J. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) IAW REF J, CONTINUE PLANNING FOR THE TRANSFER
> OF CONTROL OF DETAINEES HELD BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AND
> RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETENTION OPERATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ.
> 3.C.1.K. (S/REL USA AND MCFI) ESTABLISH AND MONITOR METRICS (INDICATORS
> AND CONDITIONS) TO DETERMINE IRAQI SECURITY FORCE (ISF) CAPABILITY ON
> THEIR PATH TO SELF-RELIANCE
> 3.C.1.L. (S/REL USA AND MCFI) PROVIDE CONPLAN TO CDRUSCENTCOM NLT 25 APR
> 05 WITH FORCE POSTURE ESTIMATES BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DATES: 15 JUN 05,
> 15 DEC 05, 15 JUN 06, 15 DEC 06, AND 15 JUN 06.
> 3.C.2. (U) ODRFC-A. DRAWING UPON THE WORK ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED IN REF I:
> 3.C.2.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) DEVELOP AN EXECUTION-LEVEL PLAN TO TRANSITION
> FORCE STRUCTURE FROM 3 BRIGADES (1 TRAINING BRIGADE AND 2 COMBAT BRIGADES
> WITH 5 INF BNS) TO 2 BRIGADES (1 TRAINING BRIGADE AND 1 COMBAT BRIGADE)
> NLT DEC 05. INCLUDE THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO BE MET FOR EXECUTION OF
> THIS PLAN, SPECIFIC TIMINGS, AND SPECIFIC BNS AFFECTED.
> 3.C.2.B. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE PLACED ON PTDO TO
> REDUCE RISK. ADDITIONALLY IDENTIFY RESPONSE TIMELINE FOR PTDO FORCES AND
> AND

- > RATIONALE. CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR PRE-POSITIONING BATTALION SETS OF
- > EQUIPMENT, SO THOSE UNITS ON PTDO CAN FALL IN ON FORWARD-BASED EQUIPMENT.
- > 3.C.2.C. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) IDENTIFY CS AND CSS FORCES THAT MAY BE
- > REDUCED OR CONTRACTED AS COMBAT FORCES REDEPLOY.
- > 3.C.2.D. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) IDENTIFY CONTINGENCY BASE LOCATIONS AND
- > ASSOCIATED INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS. PROVIDE SCREENING AND EVALUATION
- > CRITERIA WHICH SUPPORT THE PROPOSED BASING TRANSITION PLAN.
- > 3.C.2.E. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) INCLUDE AN ANALYSIS OF EXECUTING A SIX-KANDEK
- > MODEL WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL EXTERNAL RESOURCES.
- > 3.C.2.F. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS AND TIMELINE TO
- > TRANSITION COMMAND AND CONTROL FROM THE CURRENT CFC-AFGHANISTAN TO
- > CFC-CENTRAL ASIAN STATES RESPONSIBLE ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS, ASSISTANCE,
- > AND THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE SEVEN STATES IN THE REGION.
- > INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HEADQUARTERS MANNING, LOCATION AND ADJUSTMENTS
- > TO THE CJOA.
- > 3.C.2.G. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) ICW CFSOCC DEVELOP A PLAN TO REDUCE SOF IN
- > AFGHANISTAN.
- > 3.C.2.H. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) AS FORCE POSTURE IS REDUCED, CONSIDER UNIT
- > ROTATIONS THAT WILL ALLOW A DISTRIBUTED FORCE FLOW THROUGHPUT TO KUWAIT IN
- > ORDER TO REDUCE NOV 05 TO FEB 06 SURGE PERIOD. DISTRIBUTED FORCE FLOW IS A
- > KEY FACTOR FOR CFLCC POSTURE REDUCTIONS.
- > 3.C.2.I. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) LAW REF J, CONTINUE PLANNING FOR THE TRANSFER
- > OF CONTROL OF DETAINEES HELD BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AND
- > RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETENTION OPERATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.
- > 3.C.2.J. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) ESTABLISH CRITICAL METRICS (INDICATORS AND
- > CONDITIONS) TO DETERMINE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) CAPABILITY TO
- > RELIEVE COALITION FORCE REQUIREMENTS.
- > 3.C.2.K. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) PROVIDE PLAN TO CDRUSCENTCOM NLT 25 APR 05
- > WITH FORCE ESTIMATES BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DATES: 15 JUN 05, 15 DEC 05,
- > 15 JUN 06, 15 DEC 06, AND 15 JUN 06.
- > 3.C.3. (U) CDRCJTF-HOA.
- > 3.C.3.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) ASSESS THE REQUIREMENT FOR US FORCE STRUCTURE
- > THROUGH JUN 06.
- > 3.C.3.B. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE PLACED ON PTDO TO
- > REDUCE RISK. ADDITIONALLY IDENTIFY RESPONSE TIMELINE FOR PTDO FORCES AND
- > RATIONALE. CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR PRE-POSITIONING EQUIPMENT, SO THOSE UNITS
- > ON PTDO CAN FALL IN ON FORWARD-BASED EQUIPMENT.
- > 3.C.3.C. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) IDENTIFY FORCES THAT MAY BE REDUCED OR
- > CONTRACTED.

- > 3.C.3.D. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) IDENTIFY CONTINGENCY BASE LOCATIONS AND
- > ASSOCIATED INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS. PROVIDE SCREENING AND EVALUATION
- > CRITERIA WHICH SUPPORT THE PROPOSED BASING TRANSITION PLAN.
- > 3.C.3.E. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) IN COORDINATION WITH USNAVCENT, ADDRESS THE
- > OPTIMAL LIMITED DETERRENCE POSTURE IN THE CJOA TO DETECT AND DETER TTN
- > FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.
- > 3.C.3.F. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) ADDRESS IMPROVED CAPABILITIES AND PROCESS TO
- > SUPPORT THE HOST NATIONS' ABILITY TO INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY DETECT,
- > DETER, AND DEFEAT TTNS.
- > 3.C.3.G. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) IDENTIFY MISSIONS THAT COALITION FORCES COULD
- > EFFECTIVELY EXECUTE ISO USCENTCOM OBJECTIVES.
- > 3.C.3.H. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) ADDRESS METHODS AND MECHANISMS TO INTEGRATE
- > AND EMPLOY INCREASED COALITION SUPPORT IN THE CJOA.
- > 3.C.3.I. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) ESTABLISH METRICS TO DETERMINE HOST NATION
- > AND REGIONAL CAPACITY TO CONDUCT COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS, CONTROL
- > BORDERS AND UNGOVERNED SPACES, AND RESPOND TO DISASTERS, AND THEREBY
- > RELIEVE COALITION FORCE REQUIREMENTS.
- > 3.C.3.J. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) PROVIDE CONPLAN TO CDRUSCENTCOM NLT 25 APR 05
- > WITH FORCE ESTIMATES BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DATES: 15 JUN 05, 15 DEC 05,
- > 15 JUN 06, 15 DEC 06, AND 15 JUN 06.
- > 3.C.4. (U) TF 1.4a
- > 3.C.4.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) DEVELOP A PLAN TO POSTURE US FORCE STRUCTURE
- > THROUGH JUN 06 FOR THE COUNTER-TERRORISM MISSION FOR THE LONG WAR.
- > IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVENTIONAL US FORCES TO SUPPORT TF 1.4a
- > MISSION.
- > 3.C.4.B. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) IDENTIFY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS THAT COULD BE
- > CONTRACTED AS US FORCES CURRENTLY SUPPORTING TF 1.4a REDEPLOY.
- > 3.C.4.C. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE PLACED ON PTDO TO
- > REDUCE RISK. ADDITIONALLY IDENTIFY RESPONSE TIMELINE FOR PTDO FORCES AND
- > RATIONALE.
- > 3.C.4.D. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) DEFINE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR FORCE
- > RESTRUCTURING AND BASING CHANGES, AS APPLICABLE.
- > 3.C.4.E. (S/REL USA AND GCTF) PROVIDE CONPLAN TO CDRUSCENTCOM NLT 25 APR
- > 05 WITH FORCE ESTIMATES BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DATES: 15 JUN 05, 15 DEC
- > 05, 15 JUN 06, 15 DEC 06, AND 15 JUN 06.
- > 3.C.5. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) CFLCC.
- > 3.C.5.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR) DEVELOP A PLAN TO REDUCE US SUPPORT FORCE
- > STRUCTURE IN KUWAIT OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS, BASED ON THE PLANS FOR
- > REPOSTURING OF MNF-I AND CFC-A. DEFINE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR FORCE

> RESTRUCTURING AND BASING CHANGES, AS APPLICABLE.
> 3.C.5.B. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE PLACED ON PTDO TO
> REDUCE RISK. ADDITIONALLY IDENTIFY RESPONSE TIMELINE FOR PTDO FORCES
AND
> RATIONALE. CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR PRE-POSITIONING EQUIPMENT, SO THOSE
UNITS
> ON PTDO CAN FALL IN ON FORWARD-BASED EQUIPMENT.
> 3.C.5.C. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY CS AND CSS FORCES THAT MAY BE
> REDUCED OR CONTRACTED.
> 3.C.5.D. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY CONTINGENCY BASE LOCATIONS AND
> ASSOCIATED INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS. PROVIDE SCREENING AND
EVALUATION
> CRITERIA WHICH SUPPORT THE PROPOSED BASING TRANSITION PLAN.
> 3.C.5.E. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH A
HEAVY
> BRIGADE THEATER RESERVE IN KUWAIT TO SUPPORT THEATER RESPONSE OPTIONS.
> 3.C.5.F. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IAW REF J, CONTINUE PLANNING FOR THE
TRANSFER
> OF CONTROL OF DETAINEES HELD BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AND
> RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETENTION OPERATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAQ
AND
> AFGHANISTAN.
> 3.C.4.G. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). PROVIDE CONPLAN TO CDRUSCENTCOM NLT 10
MAY 05
> WITH FORCE ESTIMATES BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DATES: 15 JUN 05, 15 DEC
05,
> 15 JUN 06, 15 DEC 06, AND 15 JUN 06.
> 3.C.6. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). CFACC.
> 3.C.6.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). DEVELOP A PLAN TO REPOSTURE US AIR
FORCES AND
> SUPPORT STRUCTURE IN THE AOR OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS FOR THE LONG WAR.
> 3.C.6.B. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE PLACED ON PTDO TO
> REDUCE RISK. ADDITIONALLY IDENTIFY RESPONSE TIMELINE FOR PTDO FORCES
AND
> RATIONALE. CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR PRE-POSITIONING EQUIPMENT, SO THOSE
UNITS
> ON PTDO CAN FALL IN ON FORWARD-BASED EQUIPMENT.
> 3.C.6.C. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY CS AND CSS FORCES THAT MAY BE
> REDUCED OR CONTRACTED AS COMBAT FORCES REDEPLOY. DEFINE CONDITIONS
> REQUIRED FOR FORCE RESTRUCTURING AND BASING CHANGES, AS APPLICABLE.
> 3.C.6.D. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY CONTINGENCY BASE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
> THEATER BASED COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT. PROVIDE SCREENING
AND
> EVALUATION CRITERIA WHICH SUPPORT THE PROPOSED BASING TRANSITION PLAN.
> 3.C.6.E. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). PROVIDE CONPLAN TO CDRUSCENTCOM NLT 10
MAY 05
> WITH FORCE ESTIMATES BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DATES: 15 JUN 05, 15 DEC
05,
> 15 JUN 06, 15 DEC 06, AND 15 JUN 06.
> 3.C.7. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). CFMCC.
> 3.C.7.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). DEVELOP A PLAN TO POSTURE US NAVAL
FORCES AND
> SUPPORT STRUCTURE IN THE AOR OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS FOR THE LONG WAR.
> 3.C.7.B. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE PLACED ON PTDO TO
> REDUCE RISK. ADDITIONALLY IDENTIFY RESPONSE TIMELINE FOR PTDO FORCES
AND

> RATIONALE. CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR PRE-POSITIONING EQUIPMENT, SO THOSE UNITS

> ON PTDO CAN FALL IN ON FORWARD-BASED EQUIPMENT.

> 3.C.7.C. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). ICW CFACC ASSESS REQUIREMENT FOR 1.0 CSG AS

> AN ENDURING REQUIREMENT.

> 3.C.7.D. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). PLAN TO SUSTAIN 1.0 ESG as the theater

> operational reserve AS AN ENDURING REQUIREMENT.

> 3.C.7.E. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY CS AND CSS FORCES THAT MAY BE

> REDUCED OR CONTRACTED IF COMBAT FORCES REDEPLOY.

> 3.C.7.F. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS FOR

MARITIME

> ASSETS TO SUPPORT FON OPERATIONS, MIO, DETERRENCE, AND CRISIS

RESPONSE.

> 3.C.7.G. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). DEFINE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR FORCE

> RESTRUCTURING AND BASING CHANGES, AS APPLICABLE.

> 3.C.7.H. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). PROVIDE CONPLAN TO CDRUSCENTCOM NLT 10

MAY 05

> WITH FORCE ESTIMATES BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DATES: 15 JUN 05, 15 DEC

05,

> 15 JUN 06, 15 DEC 06, AND 15 JUN 06.

> 3.C.8. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). CFSOCC.

> 3.C.8.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). ICW MNF-I AND CFC-A, DEVELOP A PLAN TO

> POSTURE US SOF AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE IN THE AOR OVER THE NEXT TWO

YEARS

> FOR THE LONG WAR.

> 3.C.8.B. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE PLACED ON PTDO TO

> REDUCE RISK. ADDITIONALLY IDENTIFY RESPONSE TIMELINE FOR PTDO FORCES

AND

> RATIONALE. CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR PRE-POSITIONING EQUIPMENT, SO THOSE

UNITS

> ON PTDO CAN FALL IN ON FORWARD-BASED EQUIPMENT.

> 3.C.8.C. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY CS AND CSS FORCES THAT MAY BE

> REDUCED OR CONTRACTED IF COMBAT FORCES REDEPLOY.

> 3.C.8.D. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY CONTINGENCY BASE LOCATIONS AND

> ASSOCIATED INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS. PROVIDE SCREENING AND

EVALUATION

> CRITERIA WHICH SUPPORT THE PROPOSED BASING TRANSITION PLAN.

> 3.C.8.E. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). IDENTIFY CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS FOR SOF

TO

> ENABLE OPE, TO FACILITATE CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS, EXECUTE

INEXTREMIS

> OPERATIONS, AND FID.

> 3.C.8.F. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). DETERMINE THE BEST LOCATION FOR THE CRE.

> COORDINATE THIS ISSUE WITH CFC-A.

> 3.C.8.G. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). DEFINE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR FORCE

> RESTRUCTURING AND BASING CHANGES, AS APPLICABLE.

> 3.C.8.H. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). PROVIDE CONPLAN TO CDRUSCENTCOM NLT 10

MAY 05

> WITH FORCE ESTIMATES BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DATES: 15 JUN 05, 15 DEC

05,

> 15 JUN 06, 15 DEC 06, AND 15 JUN 06.

> 3.C.9. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). MARCENT.

> 3.C.9.A. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). PLAN TO SUSTAIN 1.0 ESG AS THE THEATER

> OPERATIONAL RESERVE AS AN ENDURING REQUIREMENT.

> 3.C.9.B. (S/REL USA AUS GBR). ICW CJTF-HOA ASSESS SUPPORT TO THE CJOA-

HOA

- > OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS.
- > 3.C.9.C. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) ICW MNF-I AND CFC-A, ASSESS USMC
- > CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPCON CONVENTIONAL US FORCES AND ASSESS ROLES FOR USMC
- > FORCES IN PTDO STATUS.
- > 3.D. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
- > 3.D.1. (U) PLANNING GUIDANCE.
- > 3.D.1.A. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) COMPLETE DELIBERATE PLANNING THROUGH CONCEPT
- > DEVELOPMENT (PHASE II) IAW JP 5-0.
- > 3.D.1.B. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) REQUIRED PRODUCT IS A WRITTEN CONPLAN (NOT
- > POWERPOINT BRIEFING) WITHOUT TPFDD, WITH THE FOLLOWING ANNEXES:
- > 3.D.1.B.1. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) ANNEX A, TASK ORGANIZATION.
- > 3.D.1.B.2. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) ANNEX C, OPERATIONS.
- > 3.D.1.B.3. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) ANNEX D, LOGISTICS.
- > 3.D.1.B.4. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) ANNEX E, PERSONNEL.
- > 3.D.1.B.5. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) ANNEX J, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.
- > 3.D.1.B.6. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) ANNEX K, C4 SYSTEMS.
- > 3.D.2. (U) PLANNING TIMELINE.
- > 3.D.2.A. 1-5 MAR, OPT TO DETERMINE AOR FORCE REQUIREMENTS ENDSTATE.
- > 3.D.2.B. 7-11 MAR, DEVELOP USCENTCOM PLANORD.
- > 3.D.2.C. 12-16 MAR, STAFF PLANORD.
- > 3.D.2.D. 17-20 MAR, REFINE AND REQUEST APPROVAL FOR PLANORD.
- > 3.D.2.E. NLT 21 MAR, ISSUE PLANORD.
- > 3.D.2.F. 21-23 MAR, USCENTCOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS CONFERENCE, QATAR.
- > 3.D.2.G. AS REQUIRED: WEEKLY PLANNER IPRS VIA VTC TO GENERATE CROSS-TALK
- > AMONG CJTFs AND COMPONENTS, AND TO GENERATE CONCURRENT PLANNING BY THE
- > COMPONENTS FOR SUPPORT REQUIRED BY THE CJTFs.
- > 3.D.2.H. 25 APR, SUSPENSE FOR CJTF CONPLANS.
- > 3.D.2.I. 26-30 APR, USCENTCOM REVIEW OF CJTF CONPLANS.
- > 3.D.2.J. 10 MAY, SUSPENSE FOR COMPONENT CONPLANS.
- > 3.D.2.K. 10-21 MAY, WRITE USCENTCOM ORDER.
- > 3.D.2.L. 21-30 MAY, STAFF USCENTCOM ORDER WITH CJTFs, FUNCTIONAL
- > COMPONENTS, AND SERVICE COMPONENTS.
- > 3.D.2.M. NLT 15 JUN, ISSUE USCENTCOM ORDER.
- > 3.D.3. (U) DIRLAUTH FOR PLANNING BETWEEN ALL CJTFs AND COMPONENTS.
- > GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOGISTICS/
- > 4. (U) ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. TBP.//
- > GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
- > 5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
- > 5.A. (S/REL/USA AUS GBR) USCENTCOM COMMUNICATION THEATER INFORMATION GRID
- > HAS EXPANDED SIGNIFICANTLY TO SUPPORT BOTH OEF AND OIF. COMPONENTS WILL
- > CONTINUE TO PROGRAM FOR AND POSTURE C4I CAPABILITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
- > THE USCENTCOM INTEGRATED GLOBAL POSTURE AND BASING STRATEGY AND IN SUPPORT
- > OF CCJ6 VALIDATED MNF-I, CFC-A, AND CJTF-HOA EXPEDITIONARY REQUIREMENTS.
- > COMMERCIALIZATION EFFORTS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN WILL FOCUS ON THOSE BASES
- > THAT ARE COVERED WITHIN THE USCENTCOM IGPBS AND, IN IRAQ, CONSISTENT
- > WITHIN THE CENTCOM VALIDATED MNF-I BASING STRATEGY.

> 5.B. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT.
> 5.B.1. (U) CCJ3-PP. LTC RICH KLEIN OR LTC SHAYNE ELDER, DSN 312-651-1245.
> VOIP: 1875. SIPRNET: KLEINRP @CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL OR ELDERDS.AUS
> @HQ.RELA.CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL.
> 5.B.2. (U) CCJ2-P. MR JAMES BRILEY, DSN 312-651-1299. SIPRNET:
BRILEYJR
> @CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL.
> 5.B.3. (U) CCJ4-P. CDR GRISELL COLLAZO, DSN 312-651-5827. SIPRNET:
> COLLAZGF @CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL.
> 5.B.4. (U) CCJ5-P. LTCOL STEVE TERRELL, DSN 312-651-5152 OR MAJ
MICHAEL
> DISHMAN, DSN 312-651-1925. SIPRNET: TERRELSE @CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL OR
DISMAMD
> @CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL.//
>
> DeClassBy: BRIGADIER GENERAL DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA, DIRECTOR OF
> OPERATIONS
> DeclassReason: 1.4 (A)
> DeclassDate: 252359Z MAR 15
>
>
> TOP OF MESSAGE
> Details
> TO Addressees
> (OR1) MNFIRAQCG
> (DN1) DOD, ARMY, DEPLOYED, MNF IRAQ, MNF IRAQ CG (MC)
> (OR2) CFC, CFCAJOCSC
> (DN2) DOD, ARMY, DEPLOYED, CFCA, CFCA JOC (SC)
> (OR3) NVZR1, CDR COMUSMARCENT (MC)
> (DN3) DOD, CENTCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, CDR COMUSMARCENT (MC)
> (OR4) NVZR1, CDR SOCCENT (MC)
> (DN4) DOD, CENTCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, CDR SOCCENT (MC)
> (OR5) HOA, CJTF HOA (SC)
> (DN5) DOD, CENTCOM, DEPLOYED, CJTF HOA, CJTF HOA (SC)
> (OR6) RGJS4, COMSCCENT (SC)
> (DN6) DOD, NAVY, ORGANIZATIONS (SC), COMSCCENT BAHRAIN (SC)
> (OR7) VLSB2, V3USCENTAF
> (DN7) DOD, AF, ORGANIZATIONS, USCENTAF (SC)
> (OR8) HEFL21, TASK FORCE 1.4a
> (DN8) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, T, TASK FORCE 1.4a
> (OR9) VLSB78, AUABCAOCCFACC
> (DN9) DOD, AF, ORGANIZATIONS, AUAB CAOC CFACC (SC)
> (OR10) VLSB78, AUABAFFORCC
> (DN10) DOD, AF, ORGANIZATIONS, AUAB AFFOR CC (SC)
> CC/Info Addressees
> (OR1) MNFIRAQTMS1ADMIN
> (DN1) DOD, ARMY, DEPLOYED, MNF IRAQ, MNF IRAQ TMS1 ADMIN (MC)
> (OR2) RGJS1MFI3, COMFIFTHFLT
> (DN2) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, CE-CS, COMFIFTHFLT
> (OR3) RGJS1MFI3, MARCENT FWD
> (DN3) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, I-M, MARCENT FWD
> (OR4) NVZR1, SOCCENT J3 (MC)
> (DN4) DOD, CENTCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, SOCCENT J3 (MC)
> (OR5) NVZR1, USCENTCOM CCJ3-O (MC)
> (DN5) DOD, CENTCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, USCENTCOM CCJ3 (MC), USCENTCOM
> CCJ3-O (MC)

> (OR6) NVZR1, USCENTCOM CCJ3-P(MC)
> (DN6) DOD, CENTCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, USCENTCOM CCJ3(MC), USCENTCOM
> CCJ3-P(MC)
> (OR7) XNLA3, C3ORDERMANAGERSC
> (DN7) DOD, ARMY, ORGANIZATIONS, CFLCC ARIFJAN KWT, C3 ORDER
> MANAGER(SC)
>
> (OR8) TAYZ17, TAYZ20, CPXTAYZ05, JSJ3JOINTOPSDIV
> (DN8) DOD, JCS, ORGANIZATIONS, JOINT STAFF(SC), JOINT STAFF J3(SC),
JOINT
> STAFF J3 JOINT OPS DIV(SC)
> (OR9) VLSB78, AUABAFFORA3
> (DN9) DOD, AF, ORGANIZATIONS, AUAB AFFOR A3(SC)
> (OR10) VLSB78, AUABAFFORA5
> (DN10) DOD, AF, ORGANIZATIONS, AUAB AFFOR A5(SC)
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USCENTCOM
> CCJ3-P(mc)
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> CCJ3-P(MC)
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