

Operational Environment Assessment (OEA): Afghanistan



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TRISA-THREATS
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM



INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

An operational environment is the “composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of commanders.” (JP 3-0)

The purpose of an operational environment assessment (OEA) is twofold. First, an assessment provides a detailed description and analysis of an operational environment (OE); second, it presents a methodology for the application of the OE framework to any real-world OE.¹ The OEA framework is an analytical construct developed to explore the complex and ever-changing combination of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect real-world military operations within a given OE. The framework provides a method to describe the conditions of military operations and capabilities, and is applicable across leader development, education, and training environments as well as real-world contingency planning or predeployment exercises.

OEA's are intended to support the Army training community in the development and execution of mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs), training exercises/events, and general cultural awareness training. This OEA, focused on Afghanistan, presents a discussion of the PMESII-PT variables, a trends analysis across variables, and a list of potential and realistic events in Afghanistan.

Every OE is different. Each one is dynamic and multi-dimensional with its own degree of complexity. To better understand each OE's uniqueness, one needs to study and understand the variables, their synergy, and their overall influences on military operations. An OEA helps define the OE's nature and characteristics and seeks to present an understanding of the variables and their impact across the OE.

Each OEA discusses the **political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment** and **time** (PMESII-PT) variables and their related effects, as well as exploring potential trends across the specific OE being analyzed. The analysis presented in this OEA is based upon open-source research, and all information contained herein is UNCLASSIFIED. This OEA is not an official intelligence assessment or intelligence product, nor should it be used in such a manner.

An OEA contains three key sections. Each section provides a comprehensive and complimentary look at the variables as they apply to Afghanistan. The three sections are: 1) **Variables of the OE**, 2) **Trends Analysis**, and 3) **Events List**.

SECTION 1: VARIABLES OF THE AFGHANISTAN OE

This section provides a detailed look at the OE in terms of the PMESII-PT variables. The discussion will focus on the key dimensions of each variable as well as its operational impacts. The variables are not limited to simply providing an understanding of an OE; they also represent a compendium of conditions that require management within an OE. Commanders and Soldiers must understand and manage the conditions of the variables and their effects.

Each variable contains information gathered from various unclassified sources. Sources include government research reports, academic analysis, key think-tank publications, and other credible news sources.

The **political variable** describes the political system in Afghanistan as it exists today. Hamid Karzai serves as president of Afghanistan's central government, the Government of the Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The variable explicitly demonstrates that a central government and a president do not equal a strong government. The nature of Afghanistan's social makeup, physical environment, lack of infrastructure, and limited methods for information dissemination prevent any level of unity among its citizens. The traditional system of governing, which is primarily at the tribal level, still exists today. Loyalty is to family first, then clan, then tribe. Loyalty to a central government is a concept beyond the comprehension of most Afghans.

The **military variable** explains that although the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) demonstrate significant improvement and continue to pursue an increase in numbers, their skill level still has not reached the stage necessary to fight the insurgency alone. Illiteracy and retention remain serious barriers to achievement and reliability. The ANA and ANP do not yet successfully demonstrate the consistent ability to protect the GIROA and the Afghan people from insurgents. The planned US troop withdrawal will surely impact ANSF operations, although it does not mean that no US troops will remain in country to provide support. In fact, the US recently promised that US forces will remain in Afghanistan until 2014, although the role may change. General David Petraeus commented that "The momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important areas However, while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible."²


The **economic variable** demonstrates Afghanistan's lack of economic development and how that deficiency undermines the GIROA while the poor economy allows the insurgency and drug culture to thrive. Although a modern banking system exists, *hawala* still serves as the preferred method to transfer money. The inability to track money exchange allows for the extreme level of corruption that occurs throughout every transaction, from the government, to the military, to the Taliban and insurgents, to the average citizen. Although Afghanistan possesses potential resources to exploit for economic gain, the country currently imports more than it exports, and it consumes all its internal oil production.

The **social variable** highlights the significant role that the Islamic religion plays in every aspect of Afghanistan's culture, from family structure, to business dealings, to warfighting. Muslims in Afghanistan view Islam as a way of life, not simply something they think about at a weekly religious service, in contrast to many people in Western cultures. Troops deployed to Afghanistan must understand Islam's principles and how the religion will affect the military's interactions with Afghan people at all levels of society.

The **information variable** attests to the ever-growing importance of information warfare (INFOWAR) in Afghanistan. Perception management serves as a key aspect of any INFOWAR campaign, and this applies particularly in Afghanistan. The Taliban operates a skilled INFOWAR campaign with techniques such as night letters and YouTube videos to sway the population to their desires, while they simultaneously discredit the GIROA. The coalition must continuously strive to counter these messages and implement messages of its own that boost the GIROA's value in the eyes of its people.

The **infrastructure variable** reveals that, despite billions of dollars in aid for infrastructure development throughout the country, not much has changed from how Afghanistan looked 100 years ago. Many development projects suffer from a lack of maintenance. Large distances separate Afghanistan's largest cities, with poor roads, few railroads, and air travel available only to the richest citizens. The capital, Kabul, is the largest Afghan city, followed by Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kunduz. Of the 24% of Afghans who live in urban areas, only 20% of those can access basic utilities such as clean water and electricity on a regular basis. Afghanistan's high annual urbanization rate of 5.4% strains these scarce resources and pressures the GIROA to show it can provide for its people.

The **physical environment** variable depicts Afghanistan's difficult terrain, full of mountains and deserts that suffer winter snow storms, summer droughts, year-round windstorms, and earthquakes that can occur at any time. The terrain puts the insurgent at a significant advantage over any outsider due to his familiarity with the mountains, which is especially critical for survival. Locals also hold a physical advantage to outsiders because of their acclimation to both the summers' extreme dry heat and the winters' harsh cold. Soldiers who know where the enemy might hide and can effectively use vehicles and equipment on inhospitable ground will be critical for mission success.



The **time variable** comprehensively portrays Afghanistan's past and the significance of the country's history on its present. This variable enables the reader to understand how Afghanistan came to its current situation today as a community, which really is not much different than 2,000 years ago. Afghans perceive time quite differently than Westerners. Most Afghans demonstrate little sense of urgency for punctuality or to complete tasks by an imposed deadline. The Afghan people will spend as much time as necessary to intimately know those they conduct business with; and until the Afghans establish that trust, very little actual business will occur. The time variable includes an extensive **time annex** listing the history of events that shaped the country into its current condition.

STRATEGIC VARIABLES OF THE OE

PMESII-PT Variable	OE: Afghanistan
Political	Islamic Republic; centuries-old tribal politics dominate and make the central government weak; dozens of political parties further weaken any attempt at a sense of national identity; strong Islamic influence; democratic elections held for president and parliament; GIRoA receives fickle support from Afghans; seeks independence yet relies heavily on support from US/ISAF and multiple NGOs
Military	Developing Afghan National Security Force (ANSF); personnel numbers reached 240,000 in 2010; illiteracy negatively affects the Army, Air Force, and Police; ethnic tensions, corruption, low pay, and equipment maintenance issues predominate; Army contains primarily light infantry
Economic	Weak economy; 2010 GDP: \$23.35 billion; GDP per capita: \$800; 35% unemployment; 36% population below the poverty line; exchange rate: ~45 Afghanis to US\$1; official/formal banking system exists, but hawala still serves as the primary means of money exchange within the country
Social	Muslim culture; 80% Sunni Muslim, 19% Shia Muslim, 1% other; tribal culture; ethnically 42% Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, and 13% other; 28% literacy rate; 24% urban with a 5% average annual increase
Information	Monitored information environment; word of mouth serves as the primary means of communication, followed by radio and TV; any anti-Islamic material or broadcast will be shut down; Internet is highly used by Taliban as an effective INFOWAR tool
Infrastructure	Undeveloped; most Afghans (80%+) cannot access electrical power, potable water, or modern sewage treatment methods; population is 76% rural, 24% urban; most travel conducted over poor roads; cell phones dominate due to scarcity of landlines; potential development of natural gas pipeline in planning stages
Physical Environment	Landlocked; bordered by Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; approximately 60% of terrain is mountainous; limited natural water resources; wide temperature fluctuations; prone to natural disasters such as flood and earthquakes
Time	Not sensitive to Western sense of urgency; relationships take precedence in business, politics, and all other matters; uses solar Islamic, lunar Islamic, and Gregorian calendars; five-year election cycle for president; harvest cycle is May-September, with poppies harvested in the spring

SECTION 2: TRENDS ANALYSIS

This section provides a look at possible near-term (three, six, and 12 months out) trends across the OE as they apply to each variable. They describe potential actions and results for each variable in Afghanistan according to analysts' best assessments. The trends will provide the user with a set of expectations across each variable that can be used to support training events and exercise design.

KEY THEMES FOR AFGHANISTAN

Several issues in the country of Afghanistan dominate across all variables of the OE. Most prevalent, and hindering Afghanistan's development into a self-sustaining nation, are its drug culture, endemic corruption, the history and mindset of the people, and insufficient security.

Afghanistan's drug culture pervades and is supported by many facets of society. Afghanistan's terrain and weather, combined with poor infrastructure (which limits access to water), signify that many legal crops are difficult to grow. Poppies, on the other hand, grow easily in Afghanistan's climate, are inexpensive for poor farmers, and bring the greatest return on investment. Despite the fact that poppy growing is illegal and drug production is considered immoral by most Afghans, they see it as the best way to provide for their families. Perpetuating the drug culture from another angle are the insurgents who encourage the crop by offering farmers money for it. The insurgents, of course, turn around and sell it for a much greater price. The third element contributing to the drug culture is the GIRoA. Although the government is explicitly against it, enforcement is sparse.

The endemic corruption throughout Afghan society is perhaps the most difficult problem to solve. It truly is a way of life for the Afghan people, no matter one's social class. It is so much a part of society that most Afghans accept it without question. Even if some key leaders decide to attempt to eradicate this practice, enforcement would be nearly, or completely, impossible.

The history and mindset of the people encompasses multiple aspects of Afghan society, from the drug culture and corruption already discussed to other issues such as religion and what can be described as a "wait and see" attitude. The concept of time for Afghans is vastly different than how Westerners perceive time. Afghans believe that certain things will happen regardless of their actions. They also have a unique survival instinct. Conflict is a never-ending part of life for them, so they will choose to support whichever side is winning as a means of self-protection. So, even if the Taliban, for instance, has proven to bring harm to them in the past, they can be easily swayed to believe that it was the fault of an outside force, and therefore ally themselves with Taliban forces. This type of capricious behavior has caused a never-ending cycle of untrue allegiances, which ultimately means the Afghans are loyal to no one outside of their own families and tribes.

Finally, lack of or insufficient security stifles progress in Afghanistan. Infrastructure developments, some costing inordinate sums, are often destroyed or fall into disrepair because of lack of security. Unsecured infrastructure is an easy target for insurgents. This becomes a situation of one step forward, two steps back. Lack of security for infrastructure translates to lack of progress for the Afghans. Security concerns also affect education of young Afghan people. On many occasions the Taliban has threatened and even harmed school children and their families to the point that parents choose to keep their children home where they are safer. Ultimately, poor security translates to lack of confidence in the GIRoA, which is yet another hindrance to the success of a unified, national government for Afghanistan.

SECTION 3: EVENTS LIST

This section provides a list of realistic yet fictional potential events that could occur in Afghanistan. The list supplies the reader with specific examples of the significance of the PMESII-PT variables in relation to a myriad of events that do and could occur in Afghanistan. Each event is tied to the

Mission Essential Task List (METL) to clearly show the tactical-level connection between the event, its related activities, and possible OE variable conditions. Events from the list may be used to aid scenario development or to script events to support scenarios.

Each event is listed at the top of the table, with three to four potential related activities, followed by their likely OE variable conditions. The bottom of each table links possible METL tasks, but is not necessarily all inclusive. Events were analyzed to ensure that the details of each variable in Section 1 support the possibility of the event, and that each event requires tactical intervention to make it useful to units in training.

POINTS OF CONTACT AND PRODUCT LOCATION

Comments, suggestions and feedback on this OEA are welcome. Please send comments to penny.mellies@us.army.mil. All OEAs and related products are posted on AKO at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389>.

OEAs available include:

- OEA 1: Iraq
- OEA 2: Afghanistan
- OEA 3: North Korea
- OEA 5: Iran
- OEA 6: Horn of Africa
- OEA 7: Pakistan (PowerPoint)

¹ See TRADOC G2, *Operational Environment 2009-2025*, <https://dcsint-hreats.leavenworth.army.mil/COE/default.aspx>.

² Associated Press, [“Petraeus: First US Cuts Will Include Combat Forces.”](#) Yahoo News, 16 March 2011 (accessed 16 March 2011).

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SECTION 1: VARIABLES OF THE OE

POLITICAL

“Having tea with three whitebeards in the *Jirga* doesn’t do you any good if they are the village idiots.”

U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL)

Political

The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance – formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers.

KEY FACTS:

- Blood (in terms of both relations and revenge) creates a stronger force by far than politics or even ethnicity in Afghanistan. This is at odds with Western-style political constructs.
- The omnipresent political and social power is *namus* (honor). *Namus*, however, relates to the Western concept of social control, *not* the Western perception of honor.
- The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) *de facto* behavior resembles a tribe, albeit a dysfunctional, warlord-dominated tribe.
- Most GIROA power manifests itself in a force of arms and economic favoritism.
- Popular support for the GIROA is uneven at best, and dependent largely upon local security and economic conditions.
- Most political loyalty (to GIROA or to Taliban) originates from Afghans as a function of survival. Political loyalty of any flavor, however, remains subordinate to sub-state loyalty, like that to family, clan, or tribe.
- GIROA offers primarily security and infrastructure to favored groups in Afghanistan. This pales culturally to the Taliban's offer of pride and *namus* to the dominant Pashtuns.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE POLITICAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

- Information engagements or talking points that champion loyalty to one's country usually fall on deaf ears and, at present, are illogical to most Afghans.
- Most Afghans see any argument where an Afghan suborns himself to the GIROA as a loss of honor; unless it comes with, and becomes balanced by, some increase in *namus* for the Afghan.
- Security and infrastructure constitute GIROA's political currency. The GIROA currently spends its capability in urban areas where most of the population lives (think votes) and leaves the non-urban areas alone, making the rural Afghans susceptible to insurgent influence. Historically, Afghanistan's rural population decides Afghanistan's destiny.
- For Afghan leaders, corruption or the appearance of corruption remains politically survivable and even mildly accepted. Any Afghan successfully painted as a foreign puppet becomes unendurable for the Afghans, and that person loses credibility with his people.
- Afghans see any leader who does not provide for his tribe, even by corrupt means, as immoral.
- The costs of political failure possess more dire consequences, such as the threat of death or exile, in Afghanistan than in most ISAF home countries. ISAF leaders must take into account when they see Afghan political involvement.
- The Taliban, through its religious ties to Islam, offers security, pride, and *namus*, which appeal especially to the Pashtun population.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW:

GIRoA operates as a friendly (shifting toward neutral), tribal, representative, but vulnerable government. Most Westerners find Afghanistan's concept of governance unfamiliar. The chief blunder remains the Western world's refusal to accept that the tribes dominate Afghanistan politically, and continued focus on "national" level government. Newcomers, with a Western perspective where political failure simply requires you to "move on" to other work or perhaps "spend more time with family," usually cannot envisage an environment where political failures typically involve death for both the politician and his extended family.

Since Afghanistan's history involves violence intertwined with politics, it comes as no surprise that local politicians and leaders make seemingly nonsensical alliances, since failure generates more permanent personal consequences than Western political failures. The absolute dominance of family and tribe, the power of *namus*, and an intense but justified xenophobia, create a very complicated political environment.

TIMELINE OF KEY POLITICAL EVENTS

1856-1919: Afghanistan serves as a buffer zone between the British Empire in India and the Russian Empire.

1973: Afghanistan's King Zahir Shah, in power since 1933, is deposed in a coup led by his cousin, Daud Khan. The military coup abolishes the monarchy and the Republic of Afghanistan strengthens ties with the Soviet Union.

1978: President Daud Khan is killed in a political/military takeover. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) overthrows the government and declares the founding of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a communist state.

1979: Soviet forces enter Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. US-backed Islamic fighters (*mujahideen*) take up arms against the Soviets.

1989: Soviet troops pull out of Afghanistan. After the Soviets leave, a number of Afghan *mujahideen* factions continue to fight for control of the country, paving the way for the rise of the Taliban.

1994: A new militia, the Pashtun Taliban Militia, rises up against the *mujahideen* and takes control of the South and, soon, most of Afghanistan.

1998: The US strikes Osama bin Laden's training camps following al-Qaeda's bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The Taliban massacres thousands of civilians in Mazar-e Sharif. Earthquakes and floods kill more than 13,000 Afghans. Afghanistan becomes the world's leading producer of opium.

2001: After the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban refuses to hand over Osama bin Laden. US military strikes begin in October 2001 with the support of the Northern Alliance. The Taliban is quickly defeated. However, Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar evade capture.

2004: The Constitution of Afghanistan is approved. The Constitution provides for an elected President and National Assembly. Hamid Karzai becomes the first democratically elected president. Elections for the National Assembly are delayed until 2005.

2005: Parliamentary and provincial elections are held and the new parliament holds its inaugural session.

2006: Taliban violence surges, ISAF takes over all security operations.

2009: Presidential elections install President Karzai for an additional five-year term.

2010: Afghan parliamentary election occurs in September after postponement from the original May schedule. The Afghan election commission awards all 11 seats in Ghazni Province to Hazara candidates due to insurgent intimidation of Pashtun voters.

2010: In November, NATO announces a planned end of combat operations in 2014.

2011: Mutual recriminations stemming from electoral irregularities create tension between President Karzai and the newly installed Afghan parliament.

2011: President Karzai accuses international reconstruction efforts and private security elements of undermining the growth of Afghan government institutions.

CENTERS OF POLITICAL POWER

The tribes and clans serve as the nexus of political power in Afghanistan.¹ After a hundred-plus years of outside attempts to connect the various governmental levels, a complete split between the national-level judicial and legislative branches and their respective local variants still exists. The tribal structure creates this schism. If one viewed the national government as merely another tribe, by extension its power would naturally stop at the next tribe's sphere of influence in what a Westerner would mistakenly call local. This political system should not take a giant leap of logic for Westerners, who generally ascribe to the "all politics are local" approach. Just a minor modification makes the phrase "all politics are tribal" valid for Afghanistan. Until recently, even Pakistan, with its strong, central government reinforced and bound by religion, historically called its northwestern frontier with Afghanistan its Federally Administered Tribal Areas instead of a normal province. This concedes a lack of normal control within its own country, something Pakistan would avoid if possible in light of its clashes with India.

Afghans embrace the concept of political independence, but not in the Western world's traditions. The Afghan concept includes independence from neighboring tribes, not just freedom from foreign influence or "outsider" control. Imagine if the 50 US states engaged in continuous, armed power struggles with each other, financed by the wealthiest and strongest families that parceled out land and power. If a foreign force invaded the US, Americans would certainly desire independence from the foreigners, but local independence would remain the ultimate goal.

PASHTUN

Pashtuns make up about 42% of the total Afghan population and constitute one of the major ethnic groups of neighboring Pakistan. Pashtuns currently hold the Afghan presidency and other key positions. They do not compose one united and monolithic group. Pashtun political support functionally splits itself among local and regional tribes, warlords, and chiefs. Pashtuns almost completely constitute the Taliban movement with the heart of the insurgency in the Pashtun homeland. Both Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns serve in the Taliban's ranks. Many Taliban leaders received their education at Islamic *madrassas* (religious schools) in Pakistan. Because of the Pashtun link to the Taliban, and their history as the dominant ethnic element of Afghanistan, many non-Pashtun Afghans find themselves reluctant to recognize the Pashtuns as legitimate GIRoA leaders.

TAJIK

While Tajiks make up 27% of the Afghan population, the Taliban severely oppressed the Tajiks when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan. Several key government positions belong to Tajiks, but regional

leaders within their community still typically withhold total support from the central government. The Tajik political leaders generally find themselves associated with each other through their Northern Alliance connections in their 1980's resistance against the Soviet invasion. Much Tajik political power derives from their major participation in the Northern Alliance, the prime anti-Taliban front between the fall of the Soviet backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the installation of the GIROA in 2001.

UZBEKS

Afghan Uzbeks make up about 9% of the population and in the past, usually ally themselves with the Tajiks against common enemies such as the Taliban (Pashtun) militias. General Dostum, the principal Uzbek leader, serves as one of Karzai's chief political and military advisors.

HAZARAS

Hazaras make up about 9% of the population and historically, past regimes, to include the Taliban, oppressed this ethnic group more than any others. The Hazaras hold an interest to ensure the GIROA's success, yet they see the corrupt administration as a primary reason to resist Afghan central government authority in Hazara regions. Hazaras practice the Shia version of Islam, and other Afghan factions consider them to be religiously suspect.

TURKMEN

Afghan Turkmen compose only about 3% of the Afghan population and hold no key positions at GIROA's top levels. The Turkmen usually align themselves with other similarly small groups in hopes that the GIROA will address their issues. Afghan Turkmen also maintain a close relationship with their countrymen in Turkmenistan.

POLITICAL PARTIES/SYSTEM

Afghanistan possesses numerous political parties that must cooperate to form functional coalition governments because no one party can obtain a majority on its own. The GIROA bases its governance on Islamic law and practice and allows no party to advocate anything deemed against Islamic morality. Afghan political parties find themselves extremely fluid as political alliances, coalitions, and fronts form and dissolve quickly. Individual parties split, reunify and/or rename themselves constantly, creating confusion in party names and even existence. There are also considerable connections shared at the highest levels of the party leadership; for example, Ahmad Masood is married to a daughter of Burhanuddin Rabbini.

Political parties spawned from mujahideen groups that fought the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s dominate Afghan politics today. Although the Constitution prohibits political parties from operating military wings, many of the largest parties still possess military components or operate more as militias than political parties. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) operates a political party registration department to approve parties that meet Constitutional guidelines, but can do little to prevent the militarization of the parties.

Political parties in Afghanistan appear extremely fluid; political alliances, coalitions, and fronts form and dissolve quickly. Individual parties split, reunify, and/or rename themselves constantly, and lead to confusion about party names or even a party's existence. While the MOJ approved and registered over 80 parties, hundreds more claim existence in Afghanistan today, though the majority possess little to no political power.

This is due to a relatively unique element, the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV). The SNTV essentially truncates the power of political parties within Afghanistan as it forces the voter to choose

only one candidate, regardless of the number of seats available in his constituency. As many as 50 candidates may stand for 30 seats in just one constituency. With SNTV, candidates can easily win with less than 1% of the vote.² Combined with the fact that candidates stand as individuals and are not affiliated with political parties, the rise of strong political parties remains highly doubtful.

Party Name	Current Leadership
Islamic Society of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Jamihat-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan)	Burhanuddin Rabbani
Afghanistan's Islamic Mission Organization (Tanzim Dawat-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan)	Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf
Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan)	Second Vice President Abdul Karim Khalili
Afghanistan National Liberation Front (Hezb-e-Tanzim Jabha Mili Nejat-e Afghanistan)	Zabihullah Mujaddedi
Afghan Social Democratic Party (Hezb-e-Afghan Melat)	Anwar ul-Haq Ahady
National Movement of Afghanistan (Nahzat-e-Mili Afghanistan)	Ahmad Zia Masood

Selected Official Political Parties, Afghanistan, TRISA, 2011

OTHER DOMESTIC INFLUENTIAL GROUPS

Party Name	Current Leadership
New Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Afghanistan-e-Naween)	Muhammad Yunis Qanooni
The United National Front (UNF) (Jabhe-ye-Motahed-e-Mili)	Possibly Burhanuddin Rabbani
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)	Mawlawi M. Yonus Khalis
Party of Islam (Hezb-e-Islami)	Zabihullah Mujaddedi
National Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Mili Islami-e-Afghanistan)	Sayed Muhammad Akbaree
Party of Islamic Unity of the People of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami Mardom Afghanistan)	Muhammad Mohaqeq
National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Junbish Mili Islami-e-Afghanistan)	Sayed Noorullah

Other Influential Groups, Afghanistan, TRISA, 2011

MILITARY AUTHORITY

While the official legal military authority runs through the military chain of command to the Ministry of Defense and then to the President, a significant ethnic influence still permeates the concept of “authority” in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) finds itself still highly influenced by its Northern Alliance roots. While the ANA enlisted ranks contain approximately the national population proportions, non-Pashtuns dominate the officer ranks to the Pashtuns’ detriment of those Pashtuns that do serve as ANA officers; Eastern Pashtuns dominate vice Southern Pashtun.³ The current Afghan National Army Chief of Staff is Afghan Chief of Staff General Shir Mohammad Karimi.⁴ The National Security Advisor is currently Rangin Dadfar Spanta.⁵

FAMILY AUTHORITY

Family authority undergirds the structure of everything political in Afghanistan. Familial authority, especially in the Pashtun context, dominates this concept. Namus bases itself on the ideas of personal control of one land, valuables, women, and subordinates in regard to honor. One's ability to control, protect, and acquire valuables is the measure of honor, and by direct extension is the measure of political gravitas. This further extends itself on clan, tribal, and even national levels.

Western	Afghan
Cannot be taken, only thrown away	Can be taken
Is won	Is guarded
Is limitless	Is zero-sum
Tied to an event	Exists independent of actions
Meaningless if changes hands (e.g. olive wreath)	Retains value if transferred, even if stolen
Ethereal	Physical quantity (women, land, influence)

Western Honor in Contrast to Namus, TRISA, 2011

RELIGIOUS/CLERICAL AUTHORITY

Religious and clerical authority is a significant factor in Afghanistan, especially in Pashtun areas. Despite the lack of a large, codified religious structure, Islam's strictures govern life throughout Afghanistan. This religious authority finds itself irreducibly tied to family authority. In the absence of strong government or other greater societal ties, the absolute authority of religion and family provide much of the social stability in the country. The religious authorities themselves possess loose ties with each other and lack any organized structure. Some experts believe that "fundamentalists," "Islamists," and "neo-fundamentalists," support the insurgent side, while moderate Islam and Shias generally support the GIROA.⁶ This breakdown creates significant internal tension within the government itself that could fatally hobble government negotiation efforts. Religious leaders are local in nature, and like their civil society counterparts, their influence reaches as far as they can effectively employ it. Moreover, local religious figures are often caught between local government and nongovernment political authorities, outside actors like ISAF, and the insurgency.⁷

CLANS/SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Clans operate as an extension of the Afghan family/clan/tribe social system and their connections make the local area's non-state/familial politics critically important. Full understanding of tribal dynamics becomes difficult due to its dazzling complexity and can take several months to piece together the basic local politics, let alone understand the how the dynamics interplay on even a provincial level. Afghan self-identification remains extremely fungible throughout the country, and Afghan self-identification, like one's nationality, tribe, family, or clan occurs on many levels, sometimes concurrently.⁸

Generally, the clan operates as a primary mechanism for survival and security for many Afghans, and thus engenders Afghans' political clout. Corruption often serves as the mechanism for those employed by the government to provide for a large "extended family" on generally inadequate government salaries. Corruption often becomes simply about family survival and not personal aggrandizement for lower governmental officials. In a historical context of nearly constant warfare, the survival of one's family, both immediate and extended, serves as an Afghan's primary consideration.

TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

The GIROA identifies itself as a presidential democracy, a concept difficult for most Westerners to understand. The key difference between the GIROA and other Western-based democracies is that the president is not only the head of the executive branch, but that of the entire government. The GIROA generally lacks the checks and balances seen in Western representative models.

The design of the GIROA blends a form of political Islam, the recognition of the power of internal non-state actors (such as tribes), and the requirement by foreign supporters to introduce Western-style democracy to Afghanistan. As can be expected from the combination of these wildly divergent constructs, the GIROA continues to suffer significant growing pains. In many ways, the West expects a brutalized and generally pre-literate tribal society to accept the unwritten demands of Western political philosophy centuries old.⁹

CONSTITUTION/GOVERNING DOCUMENTS

Due to the lack of international recognition of the Taliban government when in power, the international community, led by the US, convened an interim collection of Afghans and created an interim political entity. This entity, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” or unsurprisingly known as the Bonn Agreement, called for the creation of international forces to assist Afghanistan, which was codified by the UN as the International Security Assistance Force. It also called for the creation of the grand council, or *Loya Jirga* in 2003, and a Constitution that took effect in 2004.


The Constitution created controversy from the start, as commentators pointed out a number of defects in the document. The Constitution of Afghanistan provides for a very strong central government, a moderately representative legislative branch, and a judiciary highly dependent on the executive branch. This makes Afghanistan’s government essentially an executive one. While justified on the grounds of wartime exigency and the lack competent governmental officials, it presents a chicken-and-egg problem; namely, how to develop other branches of government when those branches are hobbled from birth?

BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

The GIROA possesses three main branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. While this form of government reflects a Western mentality of proper government, the relationship between the standing roles of government and the overall tribal nation of Afghan society remains contentious. The Constitution also grants considerably more authority to the executive than the other branches.

Legislative Authority

The Afghan Constitution requires both Houses of the National Assembly to convene for two regular sessions for total of nine months annually. These two houses hold their sessions concurrently. The GIROA’s structure, with its strong executive branch, limits the legislative branch’s real powers, especially of oversight on executive branch operations.



Afghan President Hamid Karzai, US Government, 2006

PARLIAMENT

The National Assembly consists of an upper and lower house and composes the GIRoA's legislative branch. The GIRoA calls their upper house the *Meshrano Jirga* (MJ) or the House of Elders and the lower house the *Wolesi Jirga* (WJ) or the House of People. No Afghan can serve in both houses simultaneously. The National Assembly in its current form convened for the first time in December 2005. The most recent elections in 2010, sat the current Parliament, and the next elections are scheduled for 2015.

Meshrano Jirga (MJ) Roles – House of the Elders

The MJ serves as the upper house of the GIRoA National Assembly with 102 members, some elected and others appointed. The 34 directly elected provincial councils elect two members each for a total of 68 while the president appoints the other 34 members. Currently 22 women serve in the MJ. Intended to serve as an advisor to the WJ, the MJ can veto legislation. The president's power to appoint a third of the MJ means the president has a significant influence on MJ and, by extension, WJ proceedings.

Wolesi Jirga (WJ) Roles – House of the People

Afghans elect representatives to the WJ through direct elections for five-year terms with subsequent elections held 30-60 days before the end of each term. The nomadic Kuchis elect through a single ethnically based constituency, while the other seats represent geographic districts. The WJ currently contains 249 members with women apportioned 64 seats. Each province receives proportionate representation in the WJ based on its population. The last WJ election occurred in August, 2010. The WJ's specific duties include the following:

- Set up special commissions to inquire into government policies and procedures.
- Endorse and enforce bills not approved by the president, with a two-thirds majority.
- Make decisions about government programs and the government's annual budget.
- Approve or reject appointments according to the Constitution.

By constitutional design, the currently elected WJ represents a highly fragmented institution. The absence of strong and effective political parties, and a dominant executive, makes the effectiveness of the WJ somewhat circumscribed. Members of the WJ often become targets of assassination, intimidation, and violence.

Executive Authority

The GIRoA finds itself highly centralized with significant power vested in the office of the president. The presidency, a directly elected position, appoints many other governmental officials with executive authority and, in the cases of justice and defense, significant ground combat power. Additionally, the executive maintains a large staff, and 25 ministries.



**Afghan Vice President,
Abdul Karim Khalili,
USAID, 2010**

Ministry	Minister
Ministry of Agriculture	Asif Rahimi
Ministry of Border & Tribal Affairs	Asadullah Khalid
Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Anwar Ul-Haq Ahady
Ministry of Communications (Acting)	Amirzai Sangin
Ministry of Counternarcotics	Ahmad Moqbel Zazar
Ministry of Defense	Abdul Rahim Wardak,
Ministry of Economy	Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal
Ministry of Education	Faruq Wardak
Ministry of Energy & Water (Acting)	Ismail Khan
Ministry of Finance	Omar Zakhilwal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Zalmay Rassoul,
Ministry of Hajj & Islamic Affairs	Mohammad Yusuf Niazi
Ministry of Health (Acting)	Suraya Dalil,
Ministry of Higher Education (Acting)	Mohammad Sarwar Danesh
Ministry of Information & Culture	Sayed Makhdum Rahin
Ministry of Interior	Bismullah Muhammadi Khan
Ministry of Justice	Habibullah Ghaleb
Ministry of Martyred, Disabled, Labor, & Social Affairs	Amena Afzali
Ministry of Mines	Wahidullah Shahrani
Ministry of Public Works	Abdul Qodus Hamidi
Ministry of Refugees & Repatriation	Jamahir Anwari
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development	Jarullah Mansoori
Ministry of Transportation (Acting)	Daoud Ali Najafi,
Ministry of Urban Development (Acting)	Sultan Hossain Hesari
Ministry of Women's Affairs (Acting)	Hasan Bano Ghazanfar

Afghan Executive Ministries, CIA, 2011

President

The president, currently Hamid Karzai, serves as the head of the GIRoA's executive branch. The president is the head of state and the commander of Afghanistan's armed forces. The executive branch contains the Offices of the President, the First Vice President, the Second Vice President, the Attorney General, the Chief Justice, and an additional 25 ministers, as well as several independent bodies and other central government agencies.¹⁰

Two vice presidents serve under the president: a first and a second vice president. The current vice presidential incumbents are Mohammad Qasim Fahim, an ethnic Tajik, and Abdul Karim Khalili, a Hazara. Both men served in the anti-Soviet mujahideen.

Courts and Judicial Authority

Judicial authority in Afghanistan comes from two sources—the Constitution and Islamic legal teaching. In conflicts between the Constitution and Islamic law, the latter takes precedence over the former. Afghanistan normally uses the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence for its decisions.

The Afghan court structure reflects a variety of historical and legal influences. Because of this confluence of influences, Afghanistan maintains several highly unique elements to the legal process and the court structure. Generally speaking, the closer an Afghan lives to the capital or a city, the more formalized the legal structure in existence. Afghans consider Islamic jurisprudence co-equal to civil jurisprudence, and graduates of either education system can serve as judges. Like much of the GIRoA, the legal system suffers from a generalized perception of corruption and incompetence from the local population.¹¹

NATIONAL

The Constitution of Afghanistan provides for a Supreme Court, *Stera Mahkama*, comprised of nine members, appointed by the president and confirmed by the WJ. These Justices serve for ten year terms. In addition to maintaining the classic role of high court, the *Stera Mahkama* is responsible for the administrative support to its subordinate courts at the national, provincial, and district levels. The GIRoA national level judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court, High Courts, and Appeal Courts. The Supreme Court contains nine members appointed by the president for a period of ten years with the approval of the WJ. Most members of the Court will be up for reappointment in 2016. The president appoints one of its members as the Head of the Supreme Court. Abdul Slam Azimi serves as the current Supreme Court Chief Justice. The current Supreme Court includes:

- Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi



**Afghan Vice President
Mohammad Qasim Fahim,
Department of Defense, 2004**



**Afghan Chief Justice Abdul
Salam Azimi, US Government,
2011**

- Justice Muhammad Qasem Hashemzai
- Justice Abdul Rashid Rashed
- Justice Gholam Nabi Nawai
- Justice Bahuddin Baha
- Justice Zamen Ali Behsudi
- Justice Muhammad Qasem
- Justice Muhammad Alim Nasimi
- Justice Muhammad Omar Barakzai

Also, the Afghan high court possesses four subordinate subdivisions called *dewans* that handle specific criminal, national security, civil rights, and commercial matters.¹²

LOCAL/REGIONAL

Like the national court, the district courts contain four *dewans* as above, plus a court for traffic offences. An additional subset of courts, referred to as Primary Courts, handles security, civil cases, and other cases. Security concerns, however, make the administration of justice problematic in many areas.

A prosecutor's office initiates criminal cases while an attorney at the appropriate Ministry of Justice (MOJ) office files civil cases. These cases start at a Primary Court, with the ability to appeal to the Courts of Appeal. The Courts of Appeal, as in most legal systems, can have their decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court, who can either overturn or uphold the rulings of lower courts, or return the decisions for review. In addition, captured insurgents are remanded to the MOJ.

The insurgents attempt to make the distribution of justice a prime element of their civil military affairs campaign. In the absence of GIRoA judicial systems that possess an unenviable reputation for corruption within many areas, the insurgents often use their administration of law and the application of *Sharia* law to bolster their concurrent INFOWAR messages of central government corruption/indifference and the Islamic purity of the insurgency.

LOCAL/REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

The decentralized structure of Afghanistan's government complicates and frustrates national governance from Kabul. Afghanistan is subdivided into 34 provinces, 300 districts, and more than 30,000 villages. Despite the introduction of a new Constitution, Afghanistan continues its history as a nation without strong central government. Local authorities, be they tribal, religious, or warlord, tend to possess significant influence over the local population. Combined with a wide dispersion of combat power and a variety of actors with significant military power at their disposal, the GIRoA finds it obviously difficult to govern effectively from Kabul, if at all.

President Karzai appoints the governors that lead each Afghan province. This appointment serves as a means for the central government to put a direct voice in provincial affairs, but the appointment also tends to alienate local populations who see the governors as Karzai stooges. Although Karzai seeks to gain increased control over the provinces through his governors, Afghanistan historically operated with a decentralized government and Afghans find it difficult to adapt to a strong central government. Karzai continuously changes provincial governors, like ministers in a classic Afghan political play, to both ensure continued adherence to Karzai's policies and to deny any Afghan

governor a chance to create an independent power base from which to threaten the existing executive authority.

Province	Governor
Badakhshan	Baz Mohammad Ahmadi
Badghis	Delbar Jan Arman
Baghlan	Delbar Jan Arman
Balkh	Atta Mohammad Noor
Bamiyan	Habiba Sorabi
Daikondi	Qarban Ali Uruzgani
Farah	Rohul Amin
Fariyab	Abdul Haq Shafaq
Ghazni	Musa Khan Akbarzada
Ghor	Dr. Abdullah Hawaid
Helmand	Mohammad Gulab Mangal
Herat	Daoud Saba
Jowzjan	Mohammad Hashim Zareh
Kabul	Zabihullah Mojaddidi
Kandahar	Tooryalai Wesa
Kapisa	Khoja Ghulam Ghous Abubaker
Khost	Arsala Jamal
Kunar	Syed Fazal Ullah Wahedi
Kunduz	Mohammad Anwar Jagdalak
Laghman	Mohammad Iqbal Aziz
Logar	Atiqullah Ludin
Nangarhar	Gul Agha Sherzai
Nimruz	Ghulam Dastageer Azad
Oruzgan	Mohammad Omar Sherzad
Paktia	Juma Khan Hamdard
Paktika	Mohib Ullah Samim

Province	Governor
Panjshir	Keramuddin Keram
Parwan	Abdul Basir Salangi
Samangan	Khairullah Anosh
Sar-i Pol	Syed Anwar Rahmati
Takhar	Abdul Jabar Taqwa
Wardak	Mohammad Halim Fidai
Zabul	Mohammad Ashraf Nasari

Afghan Provincial Governors, AfghanWeb.com, 2011

Local political power finds itself highly fractured, with the players in perpetual conflict with each other. The national government, outside the ANA and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), do not serve as significant players in most of Afghanistan. When combined with, or due to the lack of a strong central legal system, tribal structures fill the vacuum of power. Regional leaders and warlords exert substantial control over some provincial governors in their area of influence. Some governors maintain direct associations with known warlords in their provinces or even serve as warlords themselves.

Districts

Each Afghan province further subdivides its territory into districts with administrative arrangements between province and districts similar to those between Kabul and the province. Provincial officials, however, operate with relatively little discretion with regard to districts, as the central ministry in Kabul determines district staffing allocations. The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) oversees municipalities with significant influence by the governor in some provinces. The MOI approves staffing numbers and budgets in each municipality, despite the fact that municipalities can collect and retain their own taxes. In some provinces, such as Herat and Kandahar, rural municipalities also possess a reporting relationship with the provincial municipality, although this is contrary to the established government structure.


The central government finds itself especially weak at the local level as former warlords, corrupt officials, and even drug traffickers dominate the politics. Because of failures in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, many regional warlords continue to possess local militias that allow them to maintain their political power and force their way into new democratic institutions.

The Karzai government still lacks the political will and capacity to increase accountability and service provision at the local level. Thus, the Afghan people suffer from the predatory practices of their officials and become increasingly disillusioned with the current central government. The Taliban successfully exploits these grievances to their own advantage.

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY

The GIRoA, despite significant tangible successes and rising approval numbers in polling, still faces significant issues in the eyes of its own citizens.¹³ Many Afghans view the Kabul government with suspicion due to their historical fear of centralized authority, yet many Afghans search for a guarantor of their security outside the traditional warlord system. The GIRoA, because of its shortcomings of corruption, fractionalized control, and a viable insurgency with a clear and attractive INFOWAR message, will continue to maintain a low level of effectiveness and concerns about its legitimacy.

On a cultural-political level, if control equates to honor and honor equate to namus, and the centralized GIRoA demonstrates no control over actions within its own borders, then the GIRoA possesses no honor in the eyes of its people. This makes the Taliban message very powerful, since they advertise as part of their INFOWAR message the model of ever-increasing control/honor/namus and a weak GIRoA, doomed to defeat as a puppet to a series of outside powers.¹⁴ This idea appeals to a frustrated, generally Pashtun population. In the eyes of the Afghans, the GIRoA operates as just another *de facto* tribe. The GIRoA calls jirgas, the GIRoA makes deals, the GIRoA exercises power. Unfortunately, many Afghans consider the GIRoA a dysfunctional and unorganized tribe. The Taliban will then attempt to leverage the absence of GIRoA strength by leveraging political and religious leaders and by overwhelming any local attempt to provide for its own security or autonomy.



Jirgas themselves can be described as highly democratic town-hall style meetings, where the affected population, usually local, can discuss issues. Jirgas are usually without formal structure, but those with significant influence will generally command and drive the discussion. When engaged in a jirga, it is essential that the political power of the assembled group be judged, or the effects and decisions that result from the jirga will be minimal.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

Because of constant war for nearly 40 years, Afghan civil societal growth finds itself retarded, corruption remains rampant, the rule of law is limited, and legal authorities are extremely distrusted. This makes governance, as



Afghan Presidential Polling Station, UN, 2009

experienced cradle-to-grave in the West, a nearly inconceivable and very foreign concept to many Afghans. Despite this, Afghans continue to brave violence to vote in fraud-ridden elections, demand changes from their government, and attempt to fashion a civil society that maintains their political and cultural traditions.

Personal Rights and Liberties

After centuries of struggle, the general Afghan view of personal rights and liberties is something you make, rather than something granted by an external authority or an inherent condition. Liberty for the weak is a luxury item that the strong parcel out as they see fit. This fits perfectly with the concept of *namus* for the Afghans, and generally supports their ideal to keep a strong central authority that intrudes upon individual autonomy as far away as possible.

Elections

Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC) administers elections throughout the country, but insurgents often target the IEC members while they perform their duties. While the IEC requires their members to operate in a non-partisan fashion, some reports accuse IEC members of electoral irregularities. Issues of fraud marred the 2009 Presidential Election that reaffirmed President Karzai for a second five-year term and the most recent 2010 Parliamentary Elections. The next elections, scheduled in 2014, will undoubtedly be highly contested politically.

Rule of Law

One of the greatest failures of GIRoA governance remains the absence of rule of law throughout much of Afghanistan, a crucial issue for the Afghan government's legitimacy. Basic lawlessness pervades much of the country. These deficiencies result in large part from a lack of trained judges, lawyers, and a competent police force. Much of the Taliban's INFOWAR credibility comes from the inability of the GIRoA to adequately provide a legal framework untouched by either incompetence, corruption, or both.



An Afghan National Police Officer discussing matters with locals, US Army, 2009

Due to both a lack of government-based alternatives, and an adherence to tradition, the informal and traditional judicial structures continue to fill the gap in Afghanistan. *Jirgas* and *shuras* – traditional decision-making assemblies – provide the most accessible and trusted conflict-resolution mechanisms for Afghans. These informal mechanisms can and do play a positive role since the Afghan people find them more accessible, efficient, and trustworthy than formal legal mechanisms. But the informal system also poses serious problems: women cannot participate in decision-making roles, male elders dominate, and some settlements violate both Afghan and Sharia laws.

Where informal and formal legal mechanisms do not exist, lawlessness reigns, especially outside the capital. Insurgents continue to make inroads in these areas, especially in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban also runs courts in the areas it controls. The insurgent courts lend credence to Taliban claims as the functional rulers of large parts of Afghanistan.

Corruption

Corruption serves as the prime cause of GIRoA weakness as it permeates the entire country.¹⁵ By every international standard, the GIRoA operates as one of the most corrupt national governments on the planet. Despite heroic work to stem corruption from both inside and outside, high levels of corruption will likely exist in Afghanistan for many years. Corruption undermines faith in the government, the rule of law, and taints nearly every interaction between the public and the government.

While levels of corruption vary by location, sector, and ministry in the Afghan government, corruption remains endemic and undermines the government's overall effectiveness.¹⁶ The influx of drug money and international aid into historically weak institutions creates massive opportunities for corruption. A recent report by Integrity Watch Afghanistan found that the majority of Afghans believe that the Karzai government is more corrupt than the Taliban, mujahideen, or Communist periods of rule, and that corruption directly contributes to a lack of trust in the government. In addition, Transparency International reports that Afghanistan scores 1.4, or highly corrupt, on the latest corruption perceptions index ranging from 0 to 10.¹⁷ Afghan citizens have complained for years about corruption at all levels of government, claiming nothing can be done without paying bribes to officials.

Corruption also pervades law enforcement and counternarcotics work due to the possible profits, low police pay, significant risk to police and little support from the central government. Drug interests compromise Afghan agencies at the local, provincial, and national government levels as drug money permeates every level of the government. Some call the MOI, which is responsible for law enforcement, corrupt, ethnically factionalized, and complicit in the illegal drug economy.¹⁸ While a small group of individuals controls the drug trade, they connect to the politically powerful in Afghanistan or hold politically important positions themselves. Furthermore, police and militias in Afghanistan mete out arbitrary justice, often based on the ability of the offender to pay graft.

Political Dissent and Civil Unrest

Both civil and political dissent manifest themselves in Afghanistan, especially among populations that do not support the Islamist goals of the insurgents but possess serious misgivings on the goals, means, and use of power of Karzai and the GIRoA in Kabul. Many Afghans find themselves "caught in the middle" between two opposing forces, neither of which can claim a moral high ground.

At the local level, mass demonstrations serve as a popular means to express displeasure and mobilize the community. Demonstrations often become about the organizer's ability to demonstrate their power to local officials or NATO forces, versus any specific grievance. Grievances often become either greatly magnified or manufactured in order to turn out people in the street for political reasons. The recent deaths of ten UN workers in Northern Afghanistan in response to the burning of a Koran in the US illustrate the power of local grievance to drive the tactical and operational landscape.

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US

From an Afghan perspective, the US and its allies appear as just another in a long string of foreign interests in the region. Politically, the history of Afghanistan reveals the utilization of outsider combat and political power to achieve very local political ends. The tribes themselves do not demonstrate monolithic objectives. The tribes possess a long history of the corruption of outsiders to

further their own internal power struggle, such as the struggles between Durrani and Karlanri Pashtuns or the larger struggles between the Pashtuns and the Uzbeks. Afghanistan likely wants continued American and Western support, especially financial, but seeks increased control over international military forces deployed in Afghanistan.

The GIROA seeks military control for a variety of reasons, primarily to show the Kabul government as its own man and not a puppet of the West. Additionally, with Western resources come Western demands, often political in nature that, while popular with Western pressure groups, can cause considerable backlash in the generally conservative Afghan population. President Karzai will also likely judge the political winds of the region, and weigh the desires of regional and domestic interests heavily when US forces withdraw when deciding his future courses of action. The GIROA response to ISAF caused civilian casualties is also indicative more of the GIROA to be seen in the eyes of its citizens as their advocate, versus as a shell for ISAF.

In the south, recent reports indicate the existence of a significant perception gap between ISAF and the local population. A recent International Council on Security and Development study reported that 31% of the inhabitants of key provinces in Regional Command (RC)-South believe that ISAF protects civilians, with 65% believing that ISAF kills more civilians than the insurgency.¹⁹ Obviously, the requirement to bridge that gap remains for the US to successfully complete its mission.

SUPPORT TO US AND NON-US ALIGNED COUNTRIES

The GIROA is generally supportive toward US interests and makes a point to maintain cordial relations with all of its neighbors. As an exceedingly poor and violence-wracked nation, Afghanistan's foreign policy generally focuses on its internal requirements or negotiations with large donor organizations and nations. As a function of self-preservation, Afghanistan will attempt to maintain cordial relations with states opposed to US interests, if for no other reason than to prevent these states from manufacturing a *casus belli* to go to war with Afghanistan.

ATTITUDE TOWARD US TRADE

Short of development assistance and military-related expenditures, US trade with Afghanistan lags behind regional neighbors like Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian States. While Afghanistan would presumably welcome increased US economic trade ties, the isolation of Afghan geography and the current security situation precludes wide-scale US investment. Future US trade will likely focus on the fields of mining and petroleum transshipment. In 2010, the US enjoyed a two billion dollar trade balance with Afghanistan.²⁰

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Afghanistan's key international relationships involve the nations of Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian nations Russia, China, and India. These countries differ in name from the historical empires that used Afghanistan as a buffer zone, but for many Afghan political actors the endstate, and therefore the engagement approach, remains the same as centuries before. Afghans desire these international actors to engage in support of their particular tribe or element of Afghan society in order to gain access to the foreign country's economic and combat power.

REGIONAL ACTORS

More than it's reputed past as the "Graveyard of Empires," Afghanistan serves as the football field where empires push against one another. These battles are rarely over Afghanistan, as historically, Afghanistan would be a prize of dubious worth, but function to either threaten or secure more important strategic venues such as the British defending their interests in India during the British

Raj.²¹ Currently, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China and India are the regional actors with the clearest stakes in Afghanistan. With the potential of mineral wealth and oil transport routes, the value of controlling or maintaining influence in Afghanistan could rise significantly.

Pakistan

Complications cloud Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan. Afghanistan's border with Pakistan extends to a distance longer than its border with any other neighbor. The Afghan economy finds itself extremely and tightly tied to that of Pakistan, and the two countries share a common culture and history. The division of the region's large Pashtun population between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains responsible for both uniting and dividing the two countries.

Pakistan views Afghanistan as crucial to its strategic defense against India.²² In some respects, Afghan instability helps achieve short-term goals for Pakistan as it defers any efforts toward an independent Pashtun state. Virtually all of Pakistan's western territories remain unstable, from Baluchistan in the south to the newly formed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province that was formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). This instability allows sanctuary to criminal groups and terrorist organizations that operate in Afghanistan. Many experts view Afghanistan's instability as a consequence of Pakistani weakness, if not its outright complicity with militants in the Pashtun border areas.²³

Afghans broadly suspect Pakistan secretly supports the Taliban. The US government suggested that elements of the Pakistani government support extremist actors in this region, despite the efforts of the Pakistani Army to engage the extremist elements found in this region since 2009.²⁴

The Afghan border stretches along 1,491 miles and comprises Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and parts of KP in Pakistan. These areas remain beyond the total control of the Pakistani government. US, Afghan, and Indian sources believe that al-Qaeda (AQ), the Taliban, and Central Asian militants systematically penetrated these ungovernable areas since 9/11 and that the border districts continue to serve as important bases and recruiting grounds for extremists. The tribal areas continue to form the home and safe rear of the al-Qaeda network, and allegedly include the base for elements to prepare for and coordinate major anti-Western attacks.

To create a stable Afghanistan, some country or countries must address the insurgency's safe haven in Pakistan. Both AQ and the Taliban use Pakistan as a staging ground for operations in Afghanistan and around the world. In the absence of any strong government, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border will likely remain the epicenter for Islamist violence worldwide.

Iran

Iran's national interests lie in the exercise of traditional influence over western Afghanistan, once part of its own empire, and to use Afghanistan's Shia minority to extend and promote its interests. Most of Iran's financial support flows to western Afghan towns to rebuild schools and roads; and provide electricity to border towns. The Iranians, however, also provide aid to Shia insurgents like the Taliban, in an effort to damage the Western military forces.

President Karzai continues to claim Iran's importance as a neighbor. The Iranian government claims to assist Afghan law enforcement with counter-drug operations along their joint border. Drugs, however, continue to flow across the Afghan border into Iran. More than one million Afghans remain in Iran; many have integrated well into the society and serve as an important source of income to their relatives in Afghanistan.

In addition, Iran intends to create an economic sphere of influence in Afghanistan. Iran's consumer goods already compete with those from Pakistan. Hundreds of Iranian trucks cross the Afghan border daily and Iranian-Afghan total trade has expanded to roughly \$1.5 billion per year.²⁵

To facilitate this trade growth with Afghanistan, Iran opened banks and other trade facilitators such as road improvement projects to the Iranian border and proposals to link Afghanistan with the Iranian port towns. Combined with the previously mentioned expatriate labor, Iran seeks not just to influence Afghanistan, but to tie it economically to the Iranian Republic. As the Iranians engage in Afghanistan in a variety of way, few of them will serve as any assistance to the US.

Kabul's relationship with the US increasingly dictates Afghan-Iranian relations. Tehran remains uneasy about the Afghan government's strong reliance on the US but feels unable to do much about it. Iran hopes that a stable Afghanistan and a politically secure Karzai will allow Afghanistan to rely less and less on the US, and thus increase the ability for Tehran to influence and control its eastern neighbor.

Tajikistan and Other Central Asian States

Afghanistan's northern neighbors Tajikistan and Uzbekistan remain key elements in the external political calculus. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan feel a duty to its ethnically related cousins in Afghanistan and suffer the direct effects of Afghan instability. Rampant illicit trafficking of Afghan opium and humans through Tajikistan remains a serious long-term threat to the region's stability and development. The Tajikistan government claims drug trafficking from Afghanistan fosters corruption, violent crime, and the spread of powerful narco-syndicates.

Positively, Tajikistan can potentially play a key role in a regional energy plan with Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Iran offered to fund a hydroelectric power project in Tajikistan that would provide for high-voltage transmission lines to both Afghanistan and Iran. Together with a companion Russian-built plant, Tajikistan's energy production could more than double and thus increase electricity exports to its Afghan neighbor, spurring economic growth.

The increasing differences among the Central Asian states rule out a single approach for Afghanistan to engage them as regional players. In the recent past, these states shared a continuing dependency on Russia and a perceived threat to their sovereignty from Moscow's exploitation. Over time, their relationships with Russia became more complex, and their politics and economic destinies diverged from each other with differences in natural resources, demographic mix, cultural imperatives, and leadership styles. Unchanged, however, is the Central Asian states' need for external sources of development assistance and a common fear of insurgency, mainly from Islamic extremists.²⁶

Most of the Central Asian states face a number of unclear choices as the situation in Afghanistan develops. All possess a clear incentive to see positive change in Afghanistan, though the countries must balance their hopes and desires with the wishes of larger regional and international actors. Additionally, the Central Asian states must balance these desires with the wishes and demands of their internal populations.

Russia

Over the last 200 years, Russia played a significant role in Afghan affairs and that relationship remains unlikely to change any time soon. Russia's most recent entanglement in Afghanistan, from 1978 to 1992, included major combat operations between 1980 and 1988, and set the stage for the current Afghan political map. While Russia remains generally supportive of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, Moscow clearly does so for its own reasons, especially the need to combat Islamist extremism.

Russia must balance its support to Western efforts in Afghanistan with its desire to limit or eliminate functional US influence while raising its own regional political and economic stature. Russia wants to expand its infrastructure profile with hydropower and electricity distribution projects and updates to the Salang Tunnel, one of Afghanistan's critical links to the outside world.²⁷ Russian support to the ISAF effort in Afghanistan will occur proportionately to fear of Islamic terrorist activity in the South Caucasus.

China

In 2001, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), partly as a response to the crisis in Afghanistan. The SCO, also called the Shanghai Six, originally came together to discuss regional issues such as security, stability, and trade. China increasingly uses the SCO to advance its interests in the region. Partially through the SCO, China leases large plots of land in Kazakhstan; conducts joint counterterrorism operations with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia; and continually seeks new petroleum sources, especially those under its direct influence. China reportedly considered the construction of its own pipeline to move oil out of Central Asia with Afghanistan as a logical transshipment point. The Chinese undoubtedly want inclusion on any economic development in Afghanistan, especially the potential mineral wealth.

China fears American expansion into Central Asia more than Islamic fundamentalism and initially opposed the invasion of Afghanistan. US military officials report a number of Uyghurs (Chinese Muslims) among the Taliban and al-Qaeda ranks, and China recently became increasingly wary of Islamic fundamentalism expansion. In Xinjiang Province, Uyghur separatists have conducted cross-border operations into Afghanistan.²⁸ China likely fears a safe haven for Uyghur separatism, and wishes to ensure Uyghur origin violence stays at controllable levels.

China will continue to tacitly approve American military presence in Afghanistan as long it clearly benefits Chinese interests. These interests include both Afghanistan security and economic development and Afghan military operations, which provide the added benefit of tying down US military forces that cannot deploy directly against Chinese interests elsewhere in the Pacific. China will continue to support the US efforts while Beijing attempts to create its own direct relationship with Kabul, likely through economic venues.

India

Indian involvement in Afghanistan represents nearly the polar opposite of Pakistan's position. Where Pakistan supported the Taliban, India supported the Northern Alliance. One key component to Indian support involved fear of the eventual migration of radical Islam to India itself. Pakistan maintains close ties to radical Islamist elements and finds itself dedicated to the end of Indian control over parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Several major Islamic terrorist acts, probably executed by perpetrators that originated in Pakistan and Afghanistan, have occurred in India

In pursuit of its own agenda, the Indian government established strong diplomatic ties with Karzai and the GIRoA. India helped develop a new land trade route for Afghanistan through Iran to the Arabian Sea to outflank the established routes through Pakistan. India also serves as a significant financial partner with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) on key power projects throughout Afghanistan. As long as the Afghan government remains democratic, India will continue to play a major role to rebuild the country.

Continued Indian engagement with the Karzai government will concurrently alarm and motivate the Pakistanis, who wish to curtail Indian engagement at every turn. The Indian government will likely continue to engage the GIRoA, both to create a bulwark against extremism and to support a perceived natural ally against Pakistani adventurism.²⁹

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Almost all major financial international organizations, aid groups, and intergovernmental/nongovernmental organizations operate in Afghanistan. Much of the organizations' work centers on the development of Afghan-based and -staffed organizations capable of working to resolve the raft of issues that face Afghan society. Afghan-based charities, NGOs, and subsidiaries of the international actors continue to increase in number and prominence in Afghanistan.

Deployed forces will likely see a variety of international organizations in their area of operations. While many of these organizations will work with US forces toward common goals, they each possess their own agendas and desired end states. As with much of Afghan life, direct communication serves as the key to successful outcomes.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Despite the enormous challenges of security, funding, and mission parameters, NGOs and international government organizations actively work throughout Afghanistan. The Taliban or criminals often target NGO civilians for ransom kidnapping or for spreading Western ideals. While over 1,500 NGOs operate in Afghanistan, from small organizations to large international bodies, the GIRoA began proceedings to close down over 260 illegal organizations.³⁰ As Afghan government capabilities mature, and the GIRoA demands more oversight of NGO activities, the overall number and impact of NGOs is likely to lessen over time.

UN and Intergovernmental Agencies and Organizations

The UN operates a robust and complex engagement plan in Afghanistan, as UN organizations assist in a variety of areas that include health, education, political development, and economic programs. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan oversees the entire UN operation to include the UN Development Program, the UN World Food Program, plus many other UN organizations. At any given time, as many as 32 different UN agencies operate in Afghanistan with a total yearly budget of over \$168 million.³¹

Almost every large international economic association maintains a presence within Afghanistan. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and other large international donors all operate sustained programs in Afghanistan, most that began in 2002. In most cases, these programs benefited the Afghan people while they reached their developmental goals. Some experts, however, faulted the international organizations for siphoning off highly-qualified Afghans for employment as local representatives and over injecting capital into Afghanistan without sufficient oversight.³²

International NGOs

A wide variety of International NGOs operate in Afghanistan on projects as varied as phone-aided microfinance and agriculture. The GIRoA recently tried to get a greater handle on the numerous projects with a requirement for government approval for all NGO operations. The GIRoA also complained that the high salaries offered by NGOs draw Afghan talent away from the government; and that NGO grants create conditions for fraud, waste, and corruption on projects of little value.³³ The GIRoA would like to slowly reduce the number of NGOs that operation in Afghanistan and place those services under direct Afghan execution.

Afghan NGOs

Most NGOs that operate within Afghanistan want to train local personnel to administer the programs in the absence of outside technical assistance. Afghan NGOs generally stay out of politics to the greatest degree possible in order to preserve their ability to operate. Like the international NGOs, the security situation makes many of their programs both unpopular with some segments of

the population and dangerous.³⁴ Over 2,500 Afghan NGOs are operating, though that number is likely to decrease over time.³⁵ It is also likely that many of the NGOs are non-operational.

MILITARY ALLIANCES

US and ISAF forces do not operate under the rubric of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Afghan government.³⁶ Like much else, a series of vague and elastic diplomatic notes, signed by the Provisional Afghan government in 2002, guide the relationship between the GIRoA and ISAF military forces. In 2005 President Karzai and US President George W. Bush updated the diplomatic notes.³⁷ While both Afghan and US political elements continue to call for much more expansive and specific SOFA, the current SOFA remains in draft status after nearly five years. Both the US and the GIRoA, however, likely benefit from the flexibility of the current arrangement, and see the threat of an updated SOFA as more politically useful than the SOFA itself.

INSURGENT GROUPS/TERRORISTS

The continuing insurgency, generally Pashtun, centers on the Pashtun heartland in south and east Afghanistan. Currently, the insurgency's political aims include the negation of the current Afghan political framework and a return to Taliban governance. Despite the significant misgivings that most Afghans possess about the GIRoA, the Afghan people do not desire a political retrograde to the 1990s. While the GIRoA lacks significant support due its corruption and other problems, most Afghans, to include the critically important Pashtuns, do not want a return to the past.

The prime insurgent groups remain the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), Haqqani Network (HQN), Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda. Mullah Omar is the political head of the QST. HN is led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani. HiG is commanded by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. TTP is blanket organization, with a number of emirs commanding its various elements.³⁸

The insurgents have yet to arrive at a viable national political strategy that unifies the Afghan people. The insurgents, however, do make gains when they act justly in the eyes of citizens, hold sharia courts, and point out the obvious flaws of the far away and foreign-backed Kabul government. Thus the majority of the population, especially the Pashtuns, remain uncommitted to either side. While this fact underscores the GIRoA's weakness, it also demonstrates that an eventual Taliban government is far from a foregone conclusion.³⁹

Insurgent Group Political Goals

The primary political leadership of the insurgents remains the QST and other major armed parties such as the HQN, HiG, TTP, and al-Qaeda. Each insurgent group operates mainly as a military force dedicated to the complete defeat of the GIRoA, rather than espousing any policy of long-term political accommodation or participation. All the insurgent groups are generally Islamist in nature and thus committed to Islamist based governance, either in Afghanistan in the case of the QST, HiG and HQN; in Pakistan in the case of TTP; or regionally and internationally in the case of al-Qaeda. All groups see the value of cooperation with one another, though all remain focused on their specific group goals.⁴⁰

The GIRoA recently embarked on a strategy to co-opt elements of the insurgency through participation in negotiations.⁴¹ This strategy, an initiative of Karzai's government, attempts to use intermediaries to directly negotiate with insurgent senior leadership, versus the "reintegration" programs generally intended to woo primarily low-level insurgents out of the senior insurgent leadership's orbit. The direct negotiation strategy generated criticism within the US government and Afghan society, but President Karzai seems committed to a political settlement of some description with the insurgents.

Summary

Afghanistan remains an extremely fragmented country whose people always defined themselves by their ethnicity, tribe, and class status. Afghans demonstrate loyalty to local elders and tribal chiefs, who in turn align themselves with leaders at the regional level. Stated simply, Afghans possess a limited national identity, and that lack of unity creates a political culture that sustains the current conflict. Nearly 40 years of fighting exacerbates the problems, but most issues stem from a fragmented society.

In order to meet these challenges, Afghans need to develop a greater sense of unity that might translate into political stability, yet this is the problem. How do you develop unity when the country's culture and problems seemingly reinforce the reasons that none currently exists? For hundreds of years, regional leaders competed for limited resources against other Afghan groups. The resultant corruption that rewarded support or bought influence became systemic throughout Afghanistan. Afghans still settle their disputes by tribal councils that use tribal custom as a source of law. Rule of law changes from one district to another dependent upon local custom and interpretation of Islamic law. Without basic nationwide rule of law, Afghanistan cannot generate adequate provisions that universally protect all societal segments. These problems create a self-sustaining cycle that empowers regional leaders and encourages public dependence upon them. All these problems are difficult enough in the absence of corruption and a competent insurgency. When combined with these factors, the challenge remains both clear and daunting.

On an international level, regional stability would benefit most of Afghanistan's neighbors. Some of Pakistan's policies, however, seem at odds with its public support for counterinsurgency operations. The Taliban and Pashtun tribes developed a mutual support system based on shared beliefs. Because the Pashtun tribes wish to continue to be virtually autonomous from government control, the Pakistani government cannot effect long-term change. Pakistan's military possesses a long history of Taliban support, both in the Taliban's initial grab for power in Afghanistan and during their subsequent rule. Pakistan's public statements and military efforts notwithstanding, either current or former members of the Pakistani government continue to aid the Taliban.⁴²

Local support for an Afghan central government will only appear after the GIRoA proves it can manage its problems – so far an elusive concept. Reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and stability operations will not become totally effective until the average Afghan buys into the central authority. Until local influences change, security will continue as a hopeful yet doubtful goal. In Afghanistan, though, security serves only as the first step. Even if the Afghan government successfully curbs corruption, establishes a fair and practical legal system, and begins to provide security to its citizens, the threat of long-term violence still exists because its source of power is no longer (or perhaps never was) Afghanistan.

Thus, both the GIRoA and international community face a politically uncertain present and doubtful future for Afghanistan. The lack of a better alternative, however, gives the GIRoA the possibility that slow political development and refinement, progress against corruption, economic growth, and security gains could provide the stability that many people in currently unstable Afghanistan desperately desire.

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MILITARY

“I remain determined that our Afghan national security forces will be responsible for all military and law enforcement operations throughout our country by 2014.”

Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan President, International Leaders Conference in Kabul, Afghanistan, 20 July 2010.

“Partner with the ANSF. Live, eat, train, plan, and operate together. Depend on one another. . . . Hunt the enemy aggressively, but use only the firepower needed to win a fight. We can’t win without fighting, but we also cannot kill or capture our way to victory.”

General David H. Petraeus, Commander, International Security Assistance Force/United States Forces-Afghanistan, COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance to U.S. Soldiers, 1 August 2010.

Military

The military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. Relevant actors may include terrorists, militias, criminals, gangs, and insurgents. Such capabilities are a function of equipment levels, adaptive tactics, and leadership issues.

KEY FACTS:

- As of 19 January 2011, the Afghan National Army (ANA) fielded 150,000 soldiers and the Afghan National Police (ANP) 120,000 policemen to reach their 1 October 2010 goal of 240,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) three months early.
- The current personnel goals for October 2011 include 171,600 ANA soldiers and 134,000 ANP policemen, but the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) wants to increase the number 42% to 378,000 ANSF personnel by October 2012.
- Only 1,000 females serve in the ANP; Afghan President Hamid Karzai wants to add an additional 5,000 to the ANP.
- Although the ANA attempts to maintain an ethnically balanced force at the *kandak* (battalion) level, the Tajiks fill the officer corps at a higher percentage than their share of the general population.
- Light Infantry dominates the Afghan military as only one armored and one mechanized infantry battalion exists in the ANA. Maintenance issues and lack of spare parts force these kandaks to serve as infantry.
- Both the ANA and ANP reduced the length of their basic training courses to increase throughput. Due to a longer training day and more efficiency, the recruits receive 65 hours of literacy training in addition to the original curriculum.
- The Afghan National Army Air Force (ANAAF) shows improvement as it flies 90% of the ANA transport missions instead of 10% it did a year before.
- The number of units rated fully mission capable continues to increase, but not as quickly as expected; constant deployment of units instead of training may account for a slower than expected increase.
- Civilian companies move 70% of all supplies needed by American military units. Most companies pay bribes to local warlords or insurgents to ensure their load's safety as they travel over the Afghan road system.
- The US and other countries increased their troop commitment to Afghanistan in the fall 2010. Additional military personnel will conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and serve as advisors to the ANA.
- Insurgent attacks continued to rise in 2009-2010 and the attacks follow a seasonal cycle with the most active period in the fall months.
- Insurgents now find it difficult to replace the over 900 leaders and technical experts killed or captured over the last year; some insurgents now refuse higher leadership roles to avoid becoming an ANA/Coalition force target.
- Insurgents fight as light infantry with focus on ambushes, raids, and IED attacks where the insurgents do not face the overwhelming firepower of the ANA/Coalition forces.
- Insurgent groups now seem to emphasize their illegal activities to finance their cause, which caused some ideological Afghans to leave the insurgent groups.
- Polls indicate that the Afghan people now support the GIROA instead of the Taliban.
- To regain civilian support, the Taliban issue their fighters rules of engagement to reduce collateral civilian casualties from their actions.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE MILITARY VARIABLE IN THE OE:

- In the past two years, insurgents conducted more attacks than ever before, many directed against the ANP instead of the ANA; the number of attacks continues to rise.
- Force protection remains a primary concern for soldiers who deploy to Afghanistan.
- Soldiers may serve on a Focus District Development (FDD) Team to provide security for civilian advisors to ANP units.
- Illiteracy limits the ability to train the ANSF. While Afghanistan addressed this issue with 65 hours of literacy training in basic training, it will likely not overcome problems generated from the Afghans' lack of formal education.
- Over 80% of ANA recruits and 75% of ANP recruits suffer from illiteracy and require trainers to limit their instruction to only hands-on training.
- While the ANA shows signs of an improvement in their attrition rate, it still remains high at 16-25%. High attrition means that new soldiers require constant retraining in basic soldier skills.
- The ANP suffers from a higher attrition rate than the ANA, probably due to higher casualty rates in firefights against insurgents.
- The ANP suffers a higher casualty rate than the ANA and this likely creates a higher attrition rate than expected. Higher attrition rates increase training requirements to replace police officers and soldiers who quit.
- Incompetency, drug use, and corruption permeate some ANSF units and ruin their credibility in the eyes of the Afghan people.
- Some ANP units may not want to cooperate with ANA personnel due to their ethnic differences; local ANP may not want to turn over Afghans of their same ethnic background to those of other ethnic groups and instead, release them.
- Insurgents will likely increase their attacks on ANSF and Coalition forces as the July 2011 deadline for the start of US troop withdrawals begin.
- Insurgents probably believe that if they hold out long enough, the Coalition forces will eventually leave and once gone, the insurgents possess the ability to defeat the ANSF and eliminate the GIROA.
- Despite the increased positive perception of the GIROA, the insurgents possess enough supporters in Afghanistan to gain the human intelligence (HUMINT) required to conduct their military operations.
- Insurgents will continue to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to find "safe areas" where they can rest and refit before their next military operation.
- Insurgents will continue to use their illegal activities, especially from the drug trade, to finance their operations.
- Insurgents will continue to conduct centralized planning and decentralized execution for most military operations.
- Insurgents will likely increase the amount of "taxes" collected in supplies usable in the insurgency to avoid sending cash back to their group's leaders back in Pakistan. This may create some tension between an insurgent group's leadership and their subordinate commanders.

MILITARY OVERVIEW:

While the ANSF have shown significant progress over the last few years, both the ANA and the ANP still demonstrate shortfalls in recruiting, retention, and, most importantly, the ability to operate effectively against the insurgents' fight against the elected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) led by its President, Hamid Karzai. Many Afghan units lack the ability to

operate independently without foreign advisors or without foreign logistical support. The ANA lacks the ability to conduct multi-unit, conventional operations and must restrict their activities to limited counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The GIRoA found it impossible to implement Karzai's 2010 decree that outlawed any national military force other than the ANA and many warlords still maintain their own private armies—some show more strength and effectiveness than the ANSF.¹

While the US plans to begin the withdrawal of American troops by July 2011, American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made it known that the date did not mean the end of American support to the ANSF, but would start a new phase in Afghanistan's move to an independent force capable of protecting their own country from both outside and inside threats.² Vice-President Joe Biden promised on a January 2011 visit to Kabul that the US would remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014.³ Like Iraq in August 2010, the US military will most likely change the name for its presence in the country and modify the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) mission than actually remove all combat forces from Afghanistan. The goals set by the Americans for the ANSF remain quite high and the Afghans will need to demonstrate significant tactical and technical improvement, increased professionalism, and more aggressive attitudes to reach the benchmarks by the desired dates.

TIMELINE⁴

1919-1929: King Amanullah rules Afghanistan and cuts military to only 11,000 soldiers.

1928-29: Afghanistan Civil War; King Nadir Shah modernized army after he took power.

1933: Afghanistan army reaches 70,000 after King Nadir Shah introduces conscription.

1941: More comprehensive conscription program diversifies the army.

1947: Conflict with Pakistan over the Durand Line, the western directed boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

1954-1955: After Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Afghanistan began to look toward the Soviet Union for military aid.

1956-1965: The Soviet provides military aid to Afghanistan that included T-34 and T-54 tanks and over 100 aircraft while they trained over 3,700 Afghan military personnel in the Soviet Union.

1965-1979: Afghan military remains relatively weak and vulnerable to outside influences.

1979: The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan and supported the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Sunni Islamist parties and other anti-Soviet groups launched a "jihad" by the mujahideen.

1989: The Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan and the mujahideen forces grown to 340,000 by 1991.

1992. The PDPA government collapses without Soviet support.

1994. The Taliban movement begins (supported by Pakistan) and starts to take control of cities in southern Afghanistan while they form a relationship with al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden.

2000: Anti-Taliban forces that included India, Iran, and Russia support and fund the Northern Alliance in its Civil War with the Taliban.

11 September 2001: Al-Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

October 2001: United States led Coalition supported the Northern Alliance and its attack on the Taliban.

2002: Taliban defeated and the Petersburg conference outlined the program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the ex-Afghan combatants.


2003: The 60,000 troops from the Northern Alliance formed the base of the new Afghan Military Forces (AMF), but the AMF shrinks to 45,000 troops from 75,000 in the previous year. The United States used Embedded Training Teams (ETT) to train the renamed Afghan National Army (ANA).

2005: The United States deployed Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) to train the ANP.

2009: Only 54 of 65 OMLTs possess 100% of their authorized trainers. The United States deploys an extra brigade to make up the shortfall, but security issues prevent the brigade from actually serving as planned.

January 2010: Polls indicate that Afghan civilians now support the GIROA more than the Taliban.

July 2011: The US plans to start reducing combat units in Afghanistan.



MILITARY FORCES

Together, the ANA and ANP form the ANSF that continues to lead the majority of the counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan with some assistance from the ISAF military personnel.⁵ The ANA consists of an army ground force and a small air force. The ANP also participates in the war against the insurgents and suffered more casualties between 2008 and 2010 than the ANA.⁶ The

ANSF, however, continued to struggle with a myriad of problems to include a high AWOL/desertion rate, drug use, and a lack of Western-style military professionalism. ISAF continue to assist in the construction and improvement of the ANSF into a semi-capable entity, but the ANSF still faces serious short-term problems. Overall, the Afghan civilians respect the ANA more than the ANP because of a slightly higher level of professionalism and the perception of less corruption.⁷


MILITARY STRATEGY

The American and Afghan military strategy changed in December 2009 when the ISAF commander's review of the situation suggested that increased insurgent activities in Afghanistan required new actions. These changes included a joint effort by the Afghan and ISAF militaries to shift from offensive military operations to a more comprehensive COIN program that would protect the Afghan civilian populace from both insurgent violence and allied friendly fire. At the same time, the ANSF would increase its role in the overall effort against the insurgency.⁸ In August 2010, the new ISAF commander, General David H. Petraeus, pledge to continue the same basic strategy as his predecessor, General Stanley A. McChrystal.⁹ The new ISAF report sums up this strategy as the protection of population centers, improved governance, and a sustainable security environment for the GIRoA.¹⁰ Officially, the ANA serves four roles in Afghanistan: deter external threats as the ANA secures the country's borders; defeat terrorists; disband, reintegrate, or imprison illegally armed bands; and to assist the ANP to manage internal security threats or emergencies.¹¹

ARMY OVERVIEW

The ANA continues to grow in quantity, quality, and capability as it contains at least 16 combat brigades and 99 infantry kandaks.¹² As of 19 January 2011, the ANA had 150,000 soldiers and the ANP fielded 120,000 policemen.¹³ On 11 August 2010, NATO announced that the ANA reached its October 2010 goal of 134,000 soldiers three months early.¹⁴ In April 2010, only 113,800 soldiers served in the ANA ground forces and another 2,700 in the aviation corps—an increase of over 1,000 soldiers from the previous month. At the start of 2010, the ANA fielded just over 100,000 soldiers.¹⁵ Currently, the ramp up to the approved ANA end-strength of 171,600 personnel by October 2011 appears achievable.¹⁶ As of January 2010, the Afghan government planned to raise the ANA to a total of 240,000 soldiers in four years.¹⁷ The ANA's final end strength may grow to 325,000 or even 400,000 soldiers, but monetary shortfalls exist for equipment and personnel.¹⁸ In January 2011, due to the previous recruiting success and the need for additional security forces, the Afghan government backed by the US military wanted to increase the ANSF numbers to 378,000 personnel, a 24% increase from previously stated goals and 42% higher than previously approved end strength figures.¹⁹ US White House officials put a hold on the discussions for the new numbers based upon the cost, the perceived need for the larger force, and the ability that a poor country such as Afghanistan could sustain such a huge military and police force.²⁰ Currently, the ANA remains an all-volunteer force, but Afghan President Karzai previously stated that the government may implement conscription.²¹ In February 2010, the Afghan government invited females to join the ANA where they could serve in military hospitals or in combat support service units.²² Afghan females can now attend the Qalat Police Training Center and the first five females graduated from the course that ended in January 2011. Despite the attendance at the course, the Afghan females received a slightly different course due to the lack of female instructors and Muslim qualms with females working with males during the practical exercises. To compensate for less field training, the female police recruits received additional classroom training.²³ The Muslim religion and traditional taboos against females who want to work outside the home, however, will likely keep Afghan females that volunteer for military service to only token numbers.

Size and Structure



In 2010, the ANA contained five group corps headquarters billeted in separate locations throughout the country. Unlike most Western military units, the ANA corps headquarters possess a geographical responsibility as well as the command and control (C2) of their subordinate units.²⁴ The ANA contains 16 brigades and 99 kandaks.²⁵ There is no standard ANA corps structure, but the ANA bases each corps' structure on regional requirements. Each corps may contain anywhere from two to four brigades.²⁶ The largest corps, the 201st, operates in Kabul, Afghanistan's capital city, where relatively few major incidents occur.²⁷ The entire ANA possesses only one armor kandak—the 3rd Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps.²⁸ The 203rd Corps, based in Gardez, also operates in eastern Afghanistan.²⁹ The 205th Corps maintains its headquarters in Kandahar and operates in southern Afghanistan. Recently, the ANA activated the 215th Corps that will assist the 205th Corps in their area of operations.³⁰ In western Afghanistan, the 207th Corps operates from Herat. At Mazar-e Sharif, the 209th corps conducts operations in northern Afghanistan.³¹ Each ANA brigade contains four infantry kandaks, one combat support kandak, and one combat service support kandak.³²

The 1st Commando Brigade serves as a bright spot in the ANA for its professionalism, training, and operations. Currently, seven commando kandaks serve in the ANA with an eighth kandak in training. The ANA considers each 751-soldier commando kandak as an elite unit capable of the most difficult COIN missions. The commando kandaks operate out of bases at Pol-e Charki, Gardez in RC-East; Kandahar and Camp Bastion (Helmand) in RC-South; Shindand in RC-West; and Mazar-e Sharif in RC-North. The other commando kandak acts as the National kandak and co-locates itself with the Commando Training Center at Rish Kvor, southwest of Kabul. Several of the commando

kandaks maintain company-size forward elements in active insurgent areas.³³ Seven thousand Afghan soldiers serve in the Commando Brigade and 2,400 traveled to Jordan for commando and special operations training. Eventually, the Commando Brigade wants to field four Special Forces battalions that contain 18 Special Forces A-Teams each. The first Afghan SF soldiers graduated from their training on 12 May 2010 and these units now resemble the US SF more than American Rangers as the ANA used them as elite combat forces for direct action.³⁴ As long as the ANA maintains the current standards, the 1st Command Brigade will remain an elite force. The ANA faces the difficult mission to raise the standards of its other non-elite units without degradation in the quality of its commando units.

Army Doctrine and Tactics

Due to the presence of American and other NATO military personnel, the ANA Army doctrine reflects a NATO influence. The ANSF created Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs) to synchronize Afghanistan's security forces activities that included ANA, ANP, and ISAF units. The National Police Command Center (NPCC) and the National Military Command Center (NMCC) serve as the ANSF's primary C2 elements at the national level. The ANSF operates five regional and 34 provincial OCCs that report through the provincial brigade or regional corps headquarters to the ANA.³⁵ The OCCs primarily focus on administrative (S-1), intelligence (S-2), operations and training (S-3), logistics (S-4), aviation support, and coordination. The OCCs operate in fairly small elements that contain only 15 ANA, 15 ANP, and eight ISAF mentors.³⁶ As long as some Western military personnel remain behind in Afghanistan to mentor the ANA, Afghanistan's military will continue to move away from Soviet doctrine and closer to the doctrine of Western armies.

Training and Readiness

The ANA faces a number of challenges when it comes to the training and readiness of its military forces, especially drug addiction, illiteracy, and corruption. Estimates for drug addiction for ANA soldiers range from 15-85%.³⁷ While most of the poppy production occurs in Afghanistan's southern region, soldiers from that area exhibit a lower percentage of addiction—only 20% to 25%.³⁸ Drug addiction causes a variety of problems such as medical issues, higher absentee rates, and increased corruption to pay for their drug habit. Until the ANA significantly reduces drug usage within its soldiers, the force will continue to fight an uphill battle to become a professional military force.

Illiteracy also prevents increased ANA professionalism. Various sources estimate the functionally illiterate in the ANA range from 70% to 90%.³⁹ Currently, experts estimate only about 14% of ANA recruits meet basic literacy standards.⁴⁰ The ANA considers only about 11% of soldiers—30% of non-commissioned officers, but 90% of officers—as literate.⁴¹ To combat the high Afghan illiteracy rate, the ANA instituted a two-week pilot literacy program during pre-basic training, added 65 hours of literacy training in the Basic Warrior Training Course, and additional literacy training at their NCO Academy.⁴²

Corruption, an Afghan societal problem, manifests itself throughout the ANA. In 2009, ANA desertion rates ranged between 16% and 25% while corrupt commanders attempted to capitalize on the “ghost soldiers” to collect the soldiers' pay.⁴³ In early 2010, the desertion rate dropped to about 10% from a high of nearly 50% in 2003 probably because the units became more organized, better trained, and received improved Afghan leadership.⁴⁴ In October 2010, ISAF determined that the ANA faced an average desertion rate of about 1.6% monthly.⁴⁵ Corruption remains rampant throughout the ANA from high-ranking officers to local commanders.⁴⁶ Corruption, however, usually exhibits itself more at the mid-level echelons such as supply sergeants selling goods on the black market.⁴⁷ As the ANA increases its size, the Afghan government will find it more difficult to screen out anti-government insurgents that want to infiltrate the ANA.⁴⁸

While the ANA enacted an Afghan Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 2008 that addressed the drug and corruption issues, the Afghan UCMJ's administration remains random and subject to the commander's whims.⁴⁹ As the ANA soldiers find more allegiance to their country instead of an individual, the ANA should become more professional.

In units, garrison training time remains a precious commodity. Units receive only 3 days of available training time and even that becomes further reduced by limited daylight in the winter months and the Islamic requirement to break five times a day for prayers.⁵⁰ When units do train, they must do it efficiently and to standard if they want to become fully mission capable.

Day of Week	Morning	Afternoon
Sunday	Religion/Literacy Training	Religion/Literacy Training
Monday	Available for Training	Available for Training
Tuesday	Religion/Literacy Training	Religion/Literacy Training
Wednesday	Available for Training	Available for Training
Thursday	Maintenance/Cleaning	Off
Friday	Off	Off
Saturday	Available for Training	Available for Training

ANA Training Time Availability, DOD, 2010⁵¹

While the Afghan Ministry of Defense attempts to ensure the ANA remains ethnically balanced at the kandak level, certain ethnic groups participate in the ANA at a higher percentage than the general population while other groups remain underrepresented. Tajiks find themselves over-represented in all ranks of the ANA. The Pashtuns, while over-represented in the NCO Corps and under-represented in the enlisted, serve in the entire ANA at almost the same percent as found in the general Afghan population. Uzbeks and the other small minority ethnic groups find themselves under-represented in the ANA compared to the general population.⁵² In the past, the ANA found it difficult to recruit Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan, the insurgency's stronghold. The ANA's ethnic makeup becomes an important factor when the general population considers the ANA's legitimacy and its operations, especially in Pashtun-dominated areas.⁵³ Until the GIRoA can attract soldiers throughout the country without regard to their ethnicity, the ANA will remain ethnically imbalanced.

Rank	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Overall Population	42%	27%	9%	9%	13%
Officer Corps	42%	41%	8%	4%	5%
NCO Corps	46%	36%	10%	4%	3%
Enlisted	38%	31%	14%	10%	7%
ANA	41%	34%	12%	8%	5%

Afghan Army Ethnic Breakdown, DOD, 2010⁵⁴

Training Facilities

All new ANA army recruits take their Basic Warrior Training Course at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) or one of six remote sites in the corps' areas. The remote sites include Darulaman/South Kabul (201st Corps), Gardez (203rd Corps), Kandahar (205th Corps), Herat (207th Corps), and Mazar-e Sharif (209th Corps). The KMTC and the satellite locations can train 8,000 ANA recruits simultaneously with an annual output of 30,000 soldiers.⁵⁵ The ANA conducts NCO courses at the Bridmal Academy in Kabul.⁵⁶ The Commando Training Center Garrison operates out of Rish Kvor, southwest of Kabul.⁵⁷ As the ANA continues to expand in size, the ANA will need additional barracks and training areas to conduct their military exercises.

Basic Soldier Training

The length of ANA basic training for new soldiers continues to change based upon the needs of the GIRoA. The over 4,000 recruits that join the ANA monthly complete a 12-week training course followed by six additional weeks during which the new soldiers train with their noncommissioned and commissioned officers.⁵⁸ By the end of 2010, the ANA operated 10 branch schools that included ones for signal, artillery, and combat services support.

Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Training

The ANA selects recruits that demonstrate good soldiering skills and leadership qualities in their Basic Soldier Training or in the follow-on specialized training for immediate follow-on NCO training.⁵⁹ Recently, more of the soldiers selected for the NCO training come from the field instead of soldiers straight from basic training with little military experience. Now, the KMTC receives over 3,000 applications a year for NCO training for over 400 positions. In 2010, the ANA began a new three-month NCO course that targeted Afghans with a high school diploma.⁶⁰

Officer Training

Afghans can pursue any of three routes to become an ANA officer. Currently, ANA's enlisted soldiers provide the largest number of candidate officers, passing through a screening process to apply to the KMTC. Candidates must possess a high school diploma and demonstrate greater physical endurance than the average ANA soldier. The KMTC currently produces about 2,000 officers each year, but expects its future production to rise to 2,600 officers annually.⁶¹

Equipment and Weapons

Originally, due to the Soviet influence, the ANA primarily operated Russian and Chinese weapons, vehicles, and equipment. With NATO's role in the ANA's creation, the ANA began the conversion to American/Western equipment and armaments. Soviet-era equipment operated by the ANA includes T-62 and T-55 tanks; BRDM-1 and BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles; BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles; BTR-60, BTR-70, and BTR-80 armored personnel carriers; and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers.⁶² Since 2005, the ANA began to receive American made M113A2 armored personnel carriers and M577 command post vehicles.⁶³ As of March 2010, the ANA possessed 2,914 armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) with plans to increase the number to 5,407 by late 2010.⁶⁴ The ANA also uses soft skinned HMMWVs and pickup trucks.⁶⁵ Most artillery comes from Russia or former Soviet allied countries, but the ANA does possess a small number of American 155mm howitzers.⁶⁶ (*See Annex A for current estimates of ANA weapons and equipment.*)

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AIR FORCE (ANAAF)

The ANAAF finds itself well on its way to becoming a functional air force in support of the ANA with most of its focus on cargo operations. To reflect the new capabilities, the Afghan National Army Air Corps changed their name to the ANAAF on 14 June 2010.⁶⁷ The ANAAF possesses no fixed wing attack aviation and only a small number of attack helicopters. Currently, the ANAAF contains limited assets for airborne or air assault operations. At the start of 2008, the ISAF needed to fly over 90% of the ANA transport requirements for cargo and passengers. Before the end of the same year, however, the ANAAF met 90% of the ANA's aviation transport requirements.⁶⁸ The ANAAF's expansion should allow for the ANA to eventually support its own aviation requirements without outside support.

Size and Structure

Unit	Est Strength	Supports	Lt Atk Aircraft	Fixed-Wing Cargo Aircraft	Transport Helicopters	Medevac Helicopters	Attack Helicopters
Kabul Wing	3,700	201st Corps & Capitol Division	14	14	16	3	3
Kandahar Wing	2,500	205th Corps	14	14	4	2	2
Gardez Regional Spt Sqdn	TBD	203d Corps	0	0	4	2	2
Herat Regional Spt Sqdn	TBD	203d Corps	0	0	4	2	2
Mazar-e Sharif Regional Spt Sqdn	TBD	203d Corps	0	0	4	2	2

Planned 2015 ANAAF Structure⁶⁹

In April 2010, the ANAAF fielded about 3,100 military personnel, a 25% increase from the year before.⁷⁰ Eventually, the ANAAF will field approximately 7,400 personnel and operate 126 aircraft.⁷¹

Air Force Doctrine and Tactics

Like the rest of the ANA, the ANAAF finds itself in a conversion from Soviet airframes and doctrine to a NATO-based doctrine. The emphasis for the ANAAF will likely remain on logistical transport, VIP transport, and limited close air support (CAS)/close combat attack (CCA) capability. Currently the ANAAF uses Mi-35s for CAS, but they will eventually convert to Mi-17s that can operate both for logistical missions and CAS.⁷² For the immediate future, ANAAF doctrine will continue to focus on cargo operations.

Training and Readiness

Currently, the ANAAF possesses only two operational airfields located at the Kabul International Airport and the Kandahar airfield. The other airfields and air wings will continue to increase in readiness as the ANAAF obtains additional aircraft and pilots and crews become trained. Besides the KACTC in Kabul, the ANAAF will also train pilots at the Shindand airfield.⁷³ As of February 2009, the ANAAF possessed 301 trained pilots with another 46 pilot candidates in 2-year training courses in the US, Canada, and India that began in 2008.⁷⁴

Equipment and Weapons

Aircraft Nomenclature	Type	Quantity
MI-17 Hip	Transport Helicopter	61
MI-17v5 Hip	Troop Transport Helicopter	58
MI-17DV Hip	VIP Transport Helicopter	3
MI-35 Hind	Attack Helicopter	9

Aircraft Nomenclature	Type	Quantity
Fixed-Wing Cargo Aircraft	Cargo Airplane	20
C-27 Spartan	Transport Airplane	18
C-27 Spartan	VIP Transport Airplane	2
AN-32 Cline	Transport Airplane	6
AN-26 Curl	Transport Airplane	2
Fixed-wing single-engine turbo props	Light Attack Aircraft	28

Planned 2015 ANAAF Aircraft Inventory⁷⁵


In April 2010, the ANAAF operated a fleet of five AN-32s, one AN-26, and two C-27 fixed-wing cargo planes that provided lift capability for the ANA. This represents a 44% increase in operational aircraft from May 2009, less than a year before. The current plan envisions an additional 20 C-27s on hand by the end of 2012. The ANAAF also operates several types of rotary wing aircraft that include 25 MI-17 and 9 Mi-35 helicopters.⁷⁶ Russia recently announced that they would supply Afghanistan with 21 Mi-17 helicopters to replace the ANAAF Mi-35s.⁷⁷

GOVERNMENT PARAMILITARY FORCES

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)

The ANP operate under the auspices of the Afghan Minister of Interior (MOI) to enforce Afghanistan's laws. As of March 2010, the ANP fielded 102,138 police officers divided into three separate forces. By October 2011, the MOI expects to field 134,000 policemen with the possibility for another increase by October 2012.⁷⁸ The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) represents the largest force with 81,842 police officers. The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) comprises another 5,802 police officers and the Afghan Border Police (ABP) constitutes the remaining 13,912 officers.⁷⁹ On 11 August 2010, NATO announced that the ANP then fielded 109,000 policemen, a goal originally set for October 2010.⁸⁰ The Afghan MOI charges their three police forces to enforce the laws of the land that include:

- Reinforce and improve Afghanistan's security organizations, provide public safety and civil order, law enforcement, and border coverage.
- Counter any threats from al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups.
- Collect weapons and ammunition from irresponsible individuals and illegal groups.
- Eliminate corruption throughout the country.
- Enforce laws related to the cultivation, production, and trafficking of drugs.
- Reinforce and develop Afghan government jurisdiction.
- Provide security for political, economic, social, and cultural institutions.
- Provide the atmosphere necessary for investment and commerce opportunities.
- Help improve relationships with the international community by the adherence to accepted international standards.
- Respond to natural and human made disasters to assist the Afghan public.
- Create an environment to enable and advance all people's human rights.
- Protect the rights of the people and ensure that all citizens are equal before the law.⁸¹



The ANP operates as light infantry as often as it serves as a traditional police force. When the ANP engages insurgent forces, they do so without the support capabilities associated with the ANA or ISAF. In addition to the insurgent threat, the ANP faces several internal problems that make their jobs very difficult. First, most of the three ANP elements remain undermanned. While the AUP fielded over 3,000 more police officers than their goal for March 2010, the ANCOP operated at about half of their requirements of over 10,000 officers and the ABP fell almost 3,500 personnel short of their 17,500 requirement.⁸² The ANP reached their October 2010 goal of 109,000 police by 11 August 2010, but these policemen will need time to gain the experience necessary to operate as an effective police force.⁸³

Second, the ANP suffers from a high attrition rate. In the 11 months from May 2009 to March 2010, the ANP lost over 1,000 officers in every month except for one. In two of the months in the same period, the ANP lost more officers than they recruited.⁸⁴ The ANP high attrition rate could occur because the ANP suffers from a higher casualty rate than the ANA. In 2007, the ANP suffered three times more combat deaths than the ANA.⁸⁵ Between 2008 and 2010, the ANP continued to suffer higher casualty rates than the ANA.⁸⁶ When an ANP commander leaves his position, whether to join the ANA or if removed for cause, the commander typically takes 10 to 15 additional ANP subordinates with him.⁸⁷ The high and constant turnover rate deters the ability of the ANP to become a professional police force. The lack of long-term stability in the ANP will continue to decrease the Afghan civilian populace's confidence in the local police, and force the new police officers to continually learn their new patrol areas.

Third, the ANP contains too many high-ranking officers and not enough common policemen. In the ANP officer corps of just 18,000 personnel, over 3,000 ANP held the rank of general or colonel.⁸⁸ Fourth, many of the ANP officers suffer not only from incompetence, but also from corruption that ruins their credibility.⁸⁹ The low pay that the ANP receives encourages police corruption. Before 2008, pay ranged from \$66 a month for a second lieutenant to \$107 a month for a lieutenant general. After the pay reforms, each officer received from a 218% to 601% pay increase so a second lieutenant then received \$180 a month while a lieutenant general received \$601.⁹⁰ At the same time, however, rank reforms took place to make the ANP officer structure into a pyramid instead of a block. The

MOI almost cut the ANP officer corps in half as they reduced 17,796 officers to only 9,018.⁹¹ (See *Annex B for actual reform changes.*) Often the MOI does not fire corrupt or incompetent police officials, but just moves them to another precinct.⁹² Until the ANP significantly reduces internal corruption, many Afghan civilians will not believe the police's legitimacy.

Finally, the ANP suffers from a 75% illiteracy rate and a 13.7% positive test rate for illegal drugs.⁹³ The lack of literacy causes problems in the logistics system as the officers cannot complete the forms properly to request supplies and maintain equipment accountability.⁹⁴ To combat the lack of literacy, each ANP recruit now completes 65 hours of literacy training while in basic training and the long term goal remains to bring each ANP policeman up to at least a third grade education level.⁹⁵ To combat the ANP illegal drug problem, the MOI developed a four-step program that includes drug awareness, testing, enforcement, and referral for treatment.⁹⁶ Due to a failure to properly mark the urine samples, ANP supervisors would often just select random officers to attend rehabilitation.⁹⁷ Until the average ANP policeman can complete basic reports and stay away from illegal drugs, the Afghan public will still remain cautious about the legitimacy and competence of any ANP policeman they encounter.

Currently, only about 1,000 females work in the ANP and represent just over 1% of the entire force.⁹⁸ These female ANP officers, however, play an important role in a society that frowns upon interaction between males and females not from the same family. Normally, the female officers work at the local police headquarters and respond to calls when the police need to conduct searches of female suspects. After the female police officers complete the search, the female police officers return to their station.⁹⁹ The ANP wants to hire an additional 5,000 females by 2014. President Karzai hopes that the additional female officers will not only aid in the searching of female suspects, but will increase the public's trust in their government's police force.¹⁰⁰ Due to the female's place in Muslim society, it will remain likely that Afghan women who choose to serve in the ANP will continue to suffer from negative public opinion, low pay, and lack of support from most of their male family members.¹⁰¹

Training

Like the ANA, ANP recruits now spend fewer weeks in training under the current system than before the reforms initiated by the MOI. ANP recruits attend a 6-week Initial Entry Training (IET) to become a police officer. This represents less than 1/4 of the time allocated to train the Haitian police force (28 weeks) and some criticize that the training focuses on more military skills than police work.¹⁰² Due to an extension of the duty day and despite the inclusion of 64 new hours of literacy training, actual training increased from 265 to 329 hours.¹⁰³ The IET training takes place at the Central Training Center in Kabul; seven regional training facilities located in Bamiyan/Kabul, Gardez, Herat/Shouz, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Kunduz, or Mazar-e Sharif; or 15 other mini-training centers spread out throughout the country. To become a commissioned officer in the ANP, the *saran* (officer) must possess a 12th grade education and three years of training at the Kabul National Police Academy (KPA). An ANP *satanman* (non-commissioned officer or sergeant) needs at least a 9th grade education and a 9-month course at the KPA. In order for ANP policeman to become an ANP officer, the individual must possess a 12th grade education and three years of training at the KPA.¹⁰⁴ The ANP personnel's regional flavor may cause problems when the ANP work with the ANA in COIN operations as the leaders for the two elements may belong to different ethnic groups.

Weapons and Equipment

The majority of the ANP's weapons consist of Smith and Wesson Sigma 9mm pistols, AK47 assault rifles, and PKM medium machine guns. The ANP primary vehicles consist mostly of light trucks (Ford F-350 pickups) and a few larger vehicles (International Harvester trucks).¹⁰⁵ The ANP and ABP possess some heavy machine guns and armored HMMWVs.¹⁰⁶ Currently, the ANP only possesses 425 armored HMMWVs out of the 3,500 required to complete their missions.¹⁰⁷ The ANP

will need to continue to upgrade their equipment and obtain the quantity of support necessary for success. If the ANP continues to fight insurgent groups, however, the GIRoA may need to provide the ANP with heavier weapons.

Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)

Currently, the AUP comprises over 80% of the ANP and will continue to dominate the ANP numerically as the MOI increases its police forces to 134,000 by October 2011.¹⁰⁸ When the ANP reaches its final end strength, the AUP will field at least 82,000 policemen.¹⁰⁹ The AUP organizes itself into six regional, 34 provincial, 365 rural districts, and 46 urban precincts with 50 to 200 policemen in each district.¹¹⁰ The AUP locates their regional headquarters at the same locations as where the ANA maintains their regional military headquarters. The AUP responsibilities include general police patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and other general police activities.¹¹¹ Specific duties for the AUP include:

- Maintain the rule of law.
- Respond to emergencies and maintain public safety.
- Prevent crimes, promptly detect crime, and investigate minor crimes.
- Secure and preserve evidence; gather and process criminal intelligence.
- Identify and protect witnesses and victims.
- Arrest and detain suspects and perpetrators.
- Build public confidence in the GIRoA.
- Gather intelligence that supports COIN operations.
- Carry out general police activities.
- Provide fire suppression, prevention, and rescue.
- Ensure road safety; prevent accidents, and investigate accidents.
- Maintain road traffic flow and conduct vehicle safety inspections.
- Provide drivers' education courses; issue driver's licenses and vehicle registrations.
- Enforce appropriate domestic violence legislation that supports Islamic and Afghan family values.¹¹²

Afghan Border Police (ABP)

The Afghan MOI established the ABP in 2007 with a primary mission to secure Afghanistan's porous borders and police the country's airports.¹¹³ In March 2010, the ABP only fielded 13,912 policeman of their goal of 17,482. The ABP continued to miss both its recruiting and attrition goals over the last several months. Recently, the Afghan MOI initiated several unnamed initiatives to improve the ABP's recruiting and reduce its losses.¹¹⁴ The ABP operates 122 border companies within 50 miles of Afghanistan's borders with plans to eventually expand to 150 companies. The ABP divides itself into zones that correspond with the five ANA regional commands. The ABP operates 13 border checkpoints and 18 border outposts that will eventually expand to a total of 165.¹¹⁵ The Afghan MOI tasks their ABP to perform the following duties and responsibilities:

- Safeguard Afghanistan's borders against external aggressions.
- Control entry and exit of individuals at the borders and international airports.
- Deter insurgency and criminal activities within the 50 mile Border Security Zone.
- Take immediate action against any border incursions.
- Ensure the security of border crossing points and international airports.
- Prevent smuggling.
- Control entry and exit of refugees and emigrants.
- Cooperate with neighboring countries' police forces as directed by treaties.¹¹⁶

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

The Afghan MOI established the ANCOP after the May 2006 riots in Kabul when the AUP failed to respond effectively. The ANCOP primarily concentrates on the maintenance of civil order in Afghanistan's seven largest cities, provides a mobile police presence in remote areas, and serves as a quick reaction force to support other police forces in an emergency.¹¹⁷ In March 2010, the ABP fielded 5,802 personnel, slightly ahead of their goal of 5,365 policemen. The Afghan MOI plans to add an additional 5,000 ABP as the ANP expands to 134,000 personnel by October 2011.¹¹⁸ The Afghan MOI outlines the ANCOP's specific duties and responsibilities as the following:

- Provide intelligence information and tactical support to the ANA in the “shape” and “clear” phases and act as the lead police organization in the “hold” phase of COIN operations.
- Replace the AUP in high-threat and unstable areas or when required for augmentation.
- Maintain and restore civil order.
- Conduct public order operations during civil disturbances and riots.
- Conduct operations that require higher levels of training such as hostage rescue and counterterrorism operations.
- When required, support counter-narcotics operations and assist in poppy eradication.¹¹⁹

As of April 2010, the ANCOP fielded 48 companies in two separate and distinct units—rural and urban. Rural units patrol the countryside while the urban units operate as a combination SWAT and Civil Disturbance units.¹²⁰

Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)

The Afghan MOI began the APPF program as a means to free up trained AUP policemen for other missions while it created a sense of police legitimacy in certain tribal areas. The MOI does not consider the APPF as a militia, but as a regular state security force.¹²¹ Currently, 1,010 trained APPF Guardians out of a planned force of 1,212 operate in the Wardak Province in RC-East.¹²² If successful, the APPF program would expand to 40 other critical districts centered on the Ring Road. Each district would recruit approximately 200 tribesmen for a total of about 8,000 APPF members.¹²³ APPF units report to the district ANP commander for C2.¹²⁴ In July 2010, General Petraeus convinced President Karzai to institute a program that would arm local militias based on the success of the “Sunni Awakening” groups in Iraq during the surge. It remains unclear whether this program expands the APPF program or consists of a new initiative to put an additional 10,000 soldiers under MOI control into rural areas with a sparse number of other government forces.¹²⁵

ANSF MILITARY FUNCTIONS

A military function is a group of related tasks, activities, capabilities, operations, processes, and organizations that fulfill the specific military purpose for which they all exist. When integrated with other such functions, they contribute to the accomplishment of larger missions.

JOINT CAPABILITIES

As a military force, the ANSF lacks the joint capabilities envisioned by most Western armies. As a landlocked country, Afghanistan maintains no appreciable naval forces. The ANAAF serves as part of the ANA. As such, the ANAAF provides transportation and limited close air support to the ANA.

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

Due to the influence of the US, NATO, and other Western militaries, the ANA continues to evolve away from a Soviet influenced military to one based on Western principles to include C2 of their military forces. The ANA maintains a headquarters in Kabul that directs military operations of the corps that operate in each of the districts. While difficult due to previous experience, the ANA shows some movement to a C2 structure of centralized planning and decentralize execution. The Afghan National Command Center communicates with their corps headquarters through wireless microwave links. Units use CODAN (HF) Radio for long-range communication and handheld Motorola 960 radios for short-range communication.¹²⁶ The ANSF needs to become more independent and wean itself off ISAF C2 support.

MANEUVER

The ANA consists primarily of light infantry structured to fight a COIN war. The ANA possesses only one armored battalion and one mechanized infantry battalion. Due to equipment maintenance issues, most serve in a light infantry role like the rest of the ANA.¹²⁷ Afghan kandaks, especially the commando ones, continue to show vast improvement in their completion of operational missions against insurgents.¹²⁸ Many of the Afghan units, however, still need support from the ISAF as the MOD still does not consider most of them fully mission capable.¹²⁹ Some ANP elements appear more suited to military maneuvers than police work but ANP elements lack the organic fire support, and possess only light wheeled transport found in the ANP.

INFORMATION WARFARE (INFOWAR)

Both the ANA and ANP contain few dedicated INFOWAR assets. ANA and ANP actions will, however, produce tangible and positive information operations benefits. The more professional and proficient the ANA and ANP become, the more the Afghan people will accept their roles in society. If the Afghan MOI implements the strategy outlined in March 2010, the Afghan people will begin to see the ANP not as their enemy, but as a key part of the government.¹³⁰ In a recent survey, 1% of the Afghan people blamed the lack of security in their country on the ANSF (ANA/ANP) while 52% blamed the insurgents.¹³¹ While not overwhelming, the numbers indicate that the majority of the Afghan people seem supportive of the ANSF and the government. The results may reflect the secondary and tertiary effects of ANA/ANP operations and not any dedicated Afghan INFOWAR plan.

On the other hand, many of the insurgent groups use INFOWAR as they attempt to attack perceived GIRoA weaknesses—the Karzai government’s lack of legitimacy to many Afghan tribes and the GIRoA’s inability to protect the civilian population. This includes attempts by the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN), and the Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) to influence the general population through IO type activities that usually include face-to-face engagements that often focus on the intimidation of the civilians to support the insurgents.¹³²

RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION (RISTA)

The ANSF possesses limited RISTA capabilities. Each ANA corps support battalion contains an intelligence unit and each infantry brigade contains a reconnaissance company with armored vehicles.¹³³ The ANAAF contains no dedicated RISTA aircraft.¹³⁴ The MOI contains several units scattered throughout their organization with intelligence gathering capabilities or missions. These units include the AUP who gather intelligence to support COIN operations, the ANCOP who provide intelligence in the “shape” and “clear” phases of COIN operations, and the AACP’s dedicated Police Intelligence unit that coordinates all police intelligence collection activities.¹³⁵

FIRE SUPPORT

The ANA operates an assortment of field artillery, primarily from the former Soviet Union or their client states. Exact quantities of weapons remain unknown, but the ANA appears to possess between 50 and 86 Soviet D-30 122mm howitzers and 24 155mm howitzers. The ANA received 24 D-30s from Slovakia in 2006 and Turkey provided the others. Most of the howitzers suffer from poor maintenance and a lack of spare parts.¹³⁶ The ANA expects that they will need 283 D-30 howitzers for a force of 134,000, but will need additional artillery for further expansion.¹³⁷ (*See Annex A for more details.*) The ANAAF currently fields nine Mi-24/35 Hind attack helicopters for aerial fight support.¹³⁸ The ANAAF will eventually replace the Hinds with Mi-17 Hip dual-purpose helicopters that can carry cargo, people, or be used as an aerial attack helicopter.¹³⁹ With few CAS/CAA airframes, the ANA must rely on artillery and a limited number of rotary wing platforms for fire support.

PROTECTION

The ANSF continue to improve their protection capabilities as they purchase equipment or countries donate equipment to Afghanistan. The ANA currently possesses about 1/3 of their required 6,500 armored HMWWVs. By the end of 2010, the ANA should possess a total of 4,100 armored HMWWVs.¹⁴⁰ Additional HMMWVs will continue to arrive as the ANA continues to expand. Donations from other nations to increase the protection capabilities of the ANSF range from the Netherlands that provided cold weather boots, field jackets, and sleep systems; to Korea that provided motorcycle helmets; to China that donated mine detection systems, fire fighter uniforms, and protective gas masks.¹⁴¹ As the ANA continues to grow to its October 2011 numbers and beyond, the individual soldier protection requirements will also increase. The most likely source for this equipment remains donor nations.

LOGISTICS

The MOD rates their national logistics capability as CM3, meaning that foreign personnel perform the work for the Afghans. None of the four subordinate areas—Senior Logistics Coordination; Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Logistics Command; and Acquisition Agency—rate any higher than CM3.¹⁴² At least 107 advisors and mentors support the MOD, General Staff, and the ANA national logistics system as it converts to an automated system. Areas that need improvement include manpower authorization and organizational structure review, doctrine/policy, procurement, training, materiel management, maintenance, distribution, and automation. A US or ISAF logistics advisor mentors each ANA unit as they attempt to make the ANA logistically self-sufficient.¹⁴³

At the lower levels of the ANA, the primary problem with the logistics system stems from the lack of literacy of the Afghan soldiers. Without the necessary skills to complete a supply form properly, the requests often just come in the form of a written note. Without stock numbers, the logistics chain must guess what the unit actually needs or reject it.¹⁴⁴ The former often means that the unit receives the wrong item, but the latter means that the unit must operate without necessary equipment. The lack of accountability means that equipment and supplies appear unaccounted for and may end up on the black market.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Currently, most ANSF cannot work without US or other outside support or advice. While the ANA demonstrated considerable progress over the last year in the number of units no longer rated CM-4, most units still need much work to reach CM1, fully mission capable. For the ANP, the security situation makes it difficult for the foreign advisors to perform their job completely. Each Focus District Development (FDD) requires a squad of soldiers to assist two civilian police advisors and

their two interpreters. The military must provide an FDD team chief, operations NCO, personnel NCO, and a logistics NCO in addition to a six soldier security element.¹⁴⁵

Operationally, the MOD or MOI transfer prisoners are taken, by the ANA or ANP respectively, to the Afghan Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The transfer of prisoners between different Afghan ministries makes it difficult to control and account for detainees. Corruption within the Afghan MOJ causes the release of many detainees and can significantly impact deployed military forces.

Military personnel must always consider the ethnic makeup of ANSF forces, both nationally and locally. The ANA remains a force with its roots in the Northern Alliance, with significant Tajik and Uzbek composition. The more locally recruited ANP generally reflects the ethnic makeup of the local operational area. In areas like RC-South, where the ANP and ANA may come from different ethnic groups, this could present problems, or even preclude combined operations. Deploying military forces must understand these ethnic sensitivities and operate accordingly. For example, Pashtun ANP officers probably will not remand captured insurgents over to Tajik or Uzbek ANA forces.


NON-STATE PARAMILITARY FORCES

Most of the insurgents that fight in Afghanistan against the GIROA led by President Karzai come from Pakistan, but Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan direct their activities. Most of the insurgents attempt to fight a war based on fear, intimidation, and persuasion.¹⁴⁶ Insurgents target education through attacks and threats aimed at schools, teachers, and students—especially females. Other prevalent insurgent targets include construction crews, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) members, Afghan journalists, government workers, UN workers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and those that receive NGO assistance. In early August 2010, the Taliban captured and executed a group of 10 foreign humanitarian aid workers. The Taliban charged the group with both spying and attempting to spread Christianity.¹⁴⁷ Normally the Taliban allow unarmed aid workers to travel unharmed, but this incident may suggest that no foreigners should feel safe in Afghanistan's backcountry even when they travel on humanitarian missions.

Numerous threat groups that may threaten US forces operate in Afghanistan and include insurgents, criminals, warlords, and even foreign military forces. The five most important insurgent groups include the QST, the HQN, the HiG, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the Qaeda al-Jihad (al-Qaeda) of the Lands in the East and West (AQAM). (*See Annex F for a short summary of the threat actors in Afghanistan.*) Other Afghan threat actors include the Tehreek-e-Nifaaz-e-Shariat-Mohammadi (TNSM), the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), the Hizb-e Islami Khalis (HIK), the Lashkar-e-Janghvi (LJ), various criminal elements, warlords, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).¹⁴⁸ (*See Threat Actors: Afghanistan, Handbook 9, published by TRISA-Threats in June 2010 for additional details for the major and minor threat actors in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.*) While these groups may loosely coordinate their activities, they do not share a common plan. Each group develops its own strategy and tactics, and executes them on its own terms.¹⁴⁹ Recently, the Taliban focused many of their attacks on pro-GIROA militia groups formed to oppose them.¹⁵⁰ The Taliban may consider the militias a softer target than the better trained ANSF. While the insurgency continues to suffer heavy combat casualty losses, to include senior leaders, the insurgent groups still find an almost endless number of civilians that will join their cause.¹⁵¹ The death or capture of over 900 Taliban leaders in the ten month period from April 2010 to March 2011, however, created a shortage of experts such as IED facilitators, gun runners, and bomb trainers. The ANSF and Coalition operations against insurgent leaders created such turnover that some insurgents refused to assume higher leadership positions. Recent indications show that many of the insurgents groups show no urgency to fight battles and often refuse orders from their leaders located in Pakistan.¹⁵²

QUETTA SHURA TALIBAN (QST)

The QST operates throughout Afghanistan. While sources vary, analysts estimate that the QST may number approximately 25,000 fighters. Ameer-ul-Mumineen Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahid (Mullah Omar) leads the QST leadership council that directs four military *shuras* based upon their geographical locations. The Quetta shura directs operations in southern and western Afghanistan, the Miramshah shura directs operations in southeastern Afghanistan, the Peshawar shura directs operations in eastern and northeastern Afghanistan, and the Gerdi Jangal shura directs operations in Afghanistan's Helmand and Nimruz Provinces. The QST usually conducts hit and run attacks and will not stand their ground unless they can cause massive casualties with minimal losses.¹⁵³




An October 2010 report indicates that the QST now operates more like a criminal organization than an insurgent group that wants to take over Afghanistan to institute a government based on Sharia law.¹⁵⁴ The QST no longer emphasizes the extortion of Afghan farmers with a “poppy tax,” but focuses their efforts on the more profitable processing and exporting of drugs to fund their military operations.¹⁵⁵ The QST no longer allows their subordinate commanders to keep the majority of their profits from their illegal activities, but send them back to the QST leadership for redistribution.¹⁵⁶ This decision caused a rift in some of the dispersed QST groups as the subordinate QST leaders now choose to take their taxes from Afghans in the form of useful products (food or drugs) to avoid sending cash back to the QST leadership in Pakistan.¹⁵⁷

In response to a 2010 BBC/ARD German TV poll and previous knowledge that the common Afghan civilian no longer supported the insurgents, the QST issued a “Taliban Rules and Regulations Booklet” written in Pashto and Arabic. The poll indicated that 90% of Afghans preferred the GIRoA over the Taliban, 30% possessed a favorable opinion of the Taliban, and 69% believed that the insurgents posed Afghanistan’s greatest threat. These figures all move substantially against the Taliban from polls in 2008 when 67% of all Afghans viewed the Taliban favorably.¹⁵⁸ The Taliban rules of engagement that attempt to reduce Afghan civilian casualties appear to be a ploy to win back the hearts and minds of the Afghan people to the insurgents’ cause.¹⁵⁹ The QST will continue its quest to establish an Islamic government in Afghanistan and will also most likely continue to defend the heroin trade in the southern Afghan provinces as the drug trade provides the group with much of its economic support.¹⁶⁰


HAQQANI NETWORK (HQN)

The HQN, the second most important insurgent group, operates primarily in the Eastern section of Afghanistan and close to the Pakistani border. The HQN comes under the TTP umbrella, but it plans and executes its own operations. The exact number of TTP fighters remains unknown as double counting may occur with the TTP that may contain up to 35,000 fighters altogether in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan War, founded the HQN. Haqqani led the forces that captured Khost in the Soviet-Afghan War, and many consider it one of the biggest Afghan victories against the Soviet invaders. Some reports, however, indicate that Jalaluddin Haqqani's son, Sirajuddin, now runs the HQN. The HQN's primary tactics include improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, suicide bombings, and long distant attacks that use mortars or rockets. The HQN also may conduct assassinations, kidnapping, and limited Internet cyber attacks. As part of the TTP umbrella organization, the HQN desires to establish an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan hostile to non-Islamic countries such as the US and will required the overthrow of President Karzai and the GIRoA. The HQN will most likely continue to collaborate with other threat groups as it attempts to create safe havens for its forces on the Afghan side of the border while conducting activities against the GIRoA in Afghanistan.¹⁶¹



HIZB-E ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HiG)

The third most important insurgent group, the HiG, operates primarily in Eastern Afghanistan, east and north of Kabul. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar founded this radical Islamic group in 1977 as a means for native Afghans to combat the Soviet invaders. It received its financial support from American, Pakistani, and Saudi Arabian sources. In 1996, Hekmatyar moved to Iran and lead the HiG from that location.¹⁶² In 2002, Iran kicked



Hekmatyar out of their country and he now operates from an unknown location. The numbers of fighters that belong to the HiG remain unknown. The HiG's primary tactics include ambushes and attacks by rockets and mortars. While Hekmatyar sent a letter to Karzai in spring 2008 that indicated possible rapprochement with the GIROA, HiG attempted to assassinate Afghanistan President Karzai on 27 April 2008.¹⁶³ It remains likely that the HiG will continue to become more aggressive as it perceives the US pullout from the Korengal Valley as a victory for its forces.¹⁶⁴



TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)

While the TTP operates primarily in Pakistan, the group has conducted missions in southeastern Pakistan in support of their goals. The TTP wants to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish an Islamic Emirate of Pakistan, a Taliban-like regime, based on Sharia law. With a similar ideology to the HQN, the TTP sometimes assists the HQN

in its fight against the GIROA. Pakistani Pashtuns and Sunni-Deobandi Islamists compose the majority of the TTP. The TTP allies itself with other groups that possess goals similar to them such as AQ and IMU. While estimates of the TTP vary by the source and possible double-counting, the TTP most likely contains about 35,000 fighters. The TTP conducts IED attacks, suicide attacks, bombings, mortar and rocket attacks, assassinations, extortion, kidnappings, assaults, raids, and kidnappings for ransom.¹⁶⁵

Hakimullah Mehsud leads the TTP and currently the US Department of State offers a \$5 million reward for the capture of Mehsud due to his role in the murder of seven American citizens on 30 December 2009 at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan. In addition, Mehsud and the TTP claim

responsibility for the 2008 Marriott Hotel bombing in Islamabad, Pakistan and the failed Times Square bomb attack in New York City on 1 May 2010.¹⁶⁶



QAEDA AL-JIHAD (AL-QAEDA) OF THE LANDS IN THE EAST AND WEST (AQAM)

While AQAM operates in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, AQAM recruits its members from radical Sunni Islamist Arabs from South/Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. AQAM conducts spectacular suicide attacks and joins other groups with similar ideology to conduct complex attacks, IED attacks, raids, and ambushes. The AQAM does not hesitate to fight alongside the QST or TTP in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The exact strength of AQAM remains a mystery, primarily because the group spreads out its training camps so no more than ten fighters operate from any one camp. AQAM's leadership finds itself in flux because of the death of its leader, Mustafa Yazid, in late May 2010.¹⁶⁷

INSURGENT GROUPS' MILITARY FUNCTIONS

A military function is a group of related tasks, activities, capabilities, operations, processes, and organizations that fulfill the specific military purpose for which they all exist. When integrated with other such functions, they contribute to the accomplishment of larger missions.

JOINT CAPABILITIES

Due primarily to their weapons' limitations, Afghanistan's insurgent groups do not possess joint capabilities as defined by Western doctrine. The insurgent groups fight as light infantry due to a lack of armor and infantry personnel carriers; no need for a navy in a landlocked country; and no aviation assets—airplanes, helicopters, and UAVs. The insurgent groups may possess some handheld surface-to-air (SAM) missiles left over from previous wars in Afghanistan. Except for the possibility of very limited handheld SAMs, the insurgents do not possess the equipment or structure to work as a joint force.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The insurgent groups operate chiefly through decentralized operations, but with central control. Sometimes the insurgent groups operate together, but may become rivals at other times. To avoid Afghan or Coalition intelligence operations, some groups operate at the squad size to avoid detection.¹⁶⁸ Insurgent groups primarily use cell phones to communicate with each other despite reports that the Afghan/Coalition forces use the insurgent cell phones to track their movement.¹⁶⁹ Even without the use of modern communication equipment, the insurgent groups find ways to distribute information to each other.¹⁷⁰ The remote distance from the insurgent groups' primary leaders and their subordinates does cause some problems and even the refusal of subordinate leaders to follow orders.¹⁷¹ While the insurgent groups do not operate with the same type of C2 as their enemies, the insurgents find solutions in order to conduct centralized planning with decentralized execution.

MANEUVER

The insurgent groups fight as light infantry and normally conduct low intensity conflict operations. The insurgents set ambushes, conduct raids, and detonate IEDs to harass the ANSF and Coalition forces. Rarely will any insurgent group stand and fight against the ANA or the Coalition forces because their opposition possesses superior firepower. The insurgents group's primary strategy remains to outlast the ANSF and Coalition forces. The insurgents believe that the Coalition forces will eventually leave Afghanistan and the ANSF will not possess the ability to win the war. The insurgents believe that while they may lose most of the battles against the ANSF and the Coalition forces, the insurgents will eventually win the war.

INFOWAR

Many of the insurgent groups conduct INFOWAR, but the insurgents direct their Internet activities at target audiences outside Afghanistan. Due to the limited number of Afghans that possess Internet access, the insurgents target foreign audiences to raise funds for their goals and to recruit potential fighters. Inside Afghanistan, insurgent groups do conduct INFOWAR activities through non-electronic means. These activities include demonstration killings or night letters to intimidate others to not support the GIRoA, the ANSF, or Coalition forces. In 2009, the Taliban issued rules of engagement for its forces to reduce civilian casualties in an effort to win back the hearts and minds of the Afghan people to their cause.¹⁷² Whenever ANSF or Coalition forces cause civilian casualties, the insurgents attempt to capitalize on the incident to gather more support, active or passive, to their side. While the insurgent groups operate very limited electronic INFOWAR assets inside Afghanistan, most insurgents possess the uncanny knack to take advantage of any piece of information that reflects poorly on the GIRoA, the ANSF, or Coalition forces.

RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION (RISTA)

The insurgent groups possess limited electronic RISTA capabilities, but possess a vast network of human intelligence (HUMINT) operatives. Because the insurgents speak the local language or Arabic, the insurgent groups can relate better to the Afghan people than the Coalition forces from Western countries. The insurgent groups use their vast HUMINT network to obtain information from Afghans that work for the GIRoA, serve as contractors for the Coalition forces, and common Afghans that interact with ANSF forces that pass through their area. In the last fifteen months, the insurgent groups may find that they now receive less HUMINT than before because of the polls that show a large drop in support of the Taliban.¹⁷³ The insurgent forces use their HUMINT to plan their ambushes, raids, and IED attacks.

FIRE SUPPORT

The insurgent forces possess limited fire support, usually in the form of mortars and rockets. Insurgents sometimes use forward observers equipped with cellular phones to observe indirect fire and adjust future rounds. While insurgent groups may sometimes use several mortars at the same time, the insurgents primarily use single mortar tubes in their attacks. Often, the insurgents set up their mortars in crowded areas where many civilians congregate so the ANSF or Coalition forces may feel reluctant to conduct counter-battery fire for fear of collateral civilian casualties. While the insurgents may conduct mortar and rocket attacks, these attacks possibly cause more problems strategically than tactically as it indicates a lack of security to both Afghan civilians and foreign audiences around the world.

PROTECTION

The usual small signature of the insurgents serves as their major source of protection. If too many insurgents gather in one place for too long, the ANSF and Coalition intelligence assets may discover them. In fact, many of the insurgent groups do not allow more than a squad to gather to avoid detection and elimination.¹⁷⁴ Due to limited assets and the fact that the insurgents must carry their supplies on their back, most insurgent groups do not possess the means to protect themselves from the ANSF or Coalition weapons.

LOGISTICS

The insurgent groups limit logistics as much as possible to conduct their missions due to the type of weapons used, limited access to supplies, and Afghanistan's rough terrain. Since the insurgents use primarily light infantry weapons, the insurgent groups do not need the large amounts of supplies

that heavy weapons require. Due to the control of the roads by ANSF or Coalition forces, the insurgents must supply most of their forces by porters that cross the heavy Afghan mountain ranges. Due to Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, the insurgents must limit their supplies to the minimum requirements. Often, the insurgents take supplies from local farmers and call it a tax.¹⁷⁵ Despite any attempts by the ANSF or Coalition forces to interdict the insurgents' logistical chain, the insurgents will just husband what they do receive until they possess enough to conduct an attack. The insurgent groups find a way to operate despite any logistical difficulties they find.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

While the insurgent groups possess different goals and leaders, each possesses a similar aim to eliminate foreign influence in Afghanistan. The groups may sometimes cooperate in a venture that support both of their goals, but the insurgents may fight between each other over territory or criminal enterprises similar to organized crime in the US.¹⁷⁶ Ultimately, each insurgent group wants to eliminate the current Afghan government, but replace it with a government led by their group, not others.

NON-MILITARY ARMED COMBATANTS


Many other warlords continue to exist throughout Afghanistan and they may or may not support the current GIRoA. Many of these warlords use their paramilitary forces as means to support themselves economically. The warlords use force or the threat of force for economic gain. Many of the eight companies involved in the Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract that transport 70% of the goods and materials for American military units pay protection money for the warlords to leave them alone. A typical convoy of 300 supply trucks that travels from Kabul to Kandahar usually contains 400 to 500 guards, most provided by a warlord. If a trucking company fails to pay the "special security" payments to the warlords, the convoy often finds itself under attack. The convoy attacks often turn into firefights that last several hours.¹⁷⁷

Foreign and Afghan contractors exist throughout Afghanistan that provides security, logistics, and training to GIRoA forces and ISAF. In August 2010, President Karzai declared that all private military contractors (security forces) must cease operation or become part of the ANA or ANP.¹⁷⁸ Karzai likely sees the armed contractors as an armed force independent of GIRoA control and a threat to his power. Second, President Karzai may see that contractors often take the best ANSF personnel and that reduces the ANSF's capabilities. Third, Karzai surely does not want a repeat of 1989 when the Soviets left the country when multiple armed groups, loyal to different masters, were torn Afghanistan apart by civil war. Unless the ANP can provide protection from those elements that attack road convoys, Afghanistan intra-state commerce will suffer. Due to problems in the implementation of the ban on security forces and at the insistence of foreign governments, especially the US, the ban on private military contractors never took place. Instead, the GIRoA attempted to provide more oversight to the private security firms that operated in Afghanistan. In February 2011, over 30,000 registered private security contractors (PSC) worked in Afghanistan for 52 different companies. While most companies cannot operate with more than 500 personnel, many of the companies that operated before Karzai's ban received an exception to the size limitations.¹⁷⁹ (*See Annex E for historical data on contractors employed by the US*). In March 2011, the GIRoA closed down seven PSCs and gave all of the rest of the PSCs only 12 months to end their operations. The APPF will assume the duties currently provided by the PSCs, but the additional time will give the APPF more time to reach minimum standards.¹⁸⁰

ATTACK TRENDS

As of March 2010, DOD attack data for the past six years still continues to demonstrate a seasonal pattern for enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan. The insurgent attacks normally peak from June through September each year and then decline in the winter months. (*See chart below.*) Even though

the attacks fluctuate seasonally, the annual attack “peak” (high point) and “trough” (low point) for each year since September 2005 continued to surpass the peak and trough of the previous year. Similarly, while attack levels fell since their August 2009 acme, they remain higher than the numbers from prior years. The total attacks against ISAF, ANSF, and civilians between September 2009 and March 2010 increased by about 83% in comparison to the same period the previous year, while attacks against civilians rose by about 72% for the same time. Total attacks against the ANSF increased by about 17% over the same period from the previous year.¹⁸¹ The most recent reports indicate that insurgents killed 75% more Afghan civilians in the first eight months of 2010 compared to the same period in 2009. So far in 2010, IEDs killed 1,859 Afghan civilians compared to 1,057 for the same period in 2009. The biggest increase took place in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban’s stronghold.¹⁸² As September 2010 comes to a close, the seasonal attack figures may indicate the success of the ISAF and ANSF’s COIN operations over the last year.



NATO/ISAF FORCES

As of 31 March 2010, the ISAF consisted of approximately 87,000 US forces and 46,500 international forces.¹⁸³ (See Annex C for troop contributions as of 1 February 2010.) The United States increased its force level by August 2010 to 98,000 soldiers while other countries intend to increase their support by at least 9,000 additional soldiers.¹⁸⁴ While this appears as a surge, similar to what occurred in Iraq; the force must succeed quickly as US President Obama promised to start reducing US soldiers in Afghanistan by July 2011.

The ISAF strategy will continue the plan as envisioned by General McChrystal before he left command: improve the effectiveness of the ISAF through greater partnering with the ANSF, prioritize responsive and accountable governance, regain the initiative against the insurgents, and focus resources on the most vulnerable population.¹⁸⁵ The new ISAF Commander, General David H. Petraeus, issued his guidance in August 2010 that echoed McChrystal’s position.¹⁸⁶ The ISAF will use US COIN doctrine, which will enhance effective partnering with the ANSF in order to build ANSF

capability and eventually transition the lead for the security mission to the Afghans, a goal shared by the Afghan government. The ISAF will continue a strategy of shape, clear, hold, build, and transition as they continue to rid area after area of the insurgents.¹⁸⁷ Eventually, the ANA will need to take over the safe areas created by the ISAF and then lead more of the COIN operations as the ISAF begins to reduce its combat role as the July 2011 deadline approaches.

Summary

The various insurgent groups find themselves on the defensive due to recent actions within the last year that took out over 900 Taliban leaders. The attacks generated such a fear within the Taliban fighters that many refused to assume leadership positions. The insurgents have a shortage of technical experts to include IED facilitators, gun runners, and bomb trainers. The average Afghan civilian now supports the GIRoA more than the insurgents and this caused the Taliban to issue rules of engagement to their fighters to reduce civilian casualties in an attempt to win back the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Many of the insurgents that joined the anti-GIRoA movement for ideological reasons became disenchanted with the insurgents' focus on criminal activities and left the group. The insurgent groups may possess fewer fighters, but the fanatical ones will continue to fight for their cause.

While the United States continues to push the ANSF to lead the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, the ANA and ANP cannot usually do it without outside assistance. While the number of ANSF units with improved CM ratings continues to show progress, they do not show the growth rate necessary for the ANSF to gain self-sufficiency by July 2011. The ANA and ANP will probably reach their goals for personnel as scheduled, but it will only reflect the overall numbers, and not necessarily effective formations. While the ANSF can train a sufficient number of recruits and even junior officers by July 2011, the ANSF mid-grade officers and NCOs will likely remain undeveloped. While the sergeants and officers may possess the title for the position they hold, they will remain unlikely to demonstrate the technical and tactical competence expected in a Western-style military. Considering the time even an established military like the US Army spends in professional NCO development, the challenges faced by the ANA become readily apparent. In both World War I and World War II, even the US Army found it difficult to quickly train competent NCOs to operate at the squad and platoon level. The ANSF can only develop a competent and professional NCO corps if given the time to do so.

The ANSF find themselves in a transition from former Soviet weapons, vehicles, and equipment to those supplied by NATO forces. The conglomeration of Soviet and NATO weapons creates a logistical nightmare as the weapons require a variety of ammunition and the vehicles remain non-standardized. As the ANSF convert from Soviet small arms to NATO small arms, the soldiers and police will need to understand that Western-style weapons and equipment require more comprehensive maintenance than their former Soviet equipment. Without proper maintenance, the newer equipment will not function as intended.

The ANSF do not yet meet Western standards, but they demonstrate signs of progress to a competent army and police force. The ANSF will need to continue to require outside assistance and support to avoid being overwhelmed by the insurgency and gain the requisite time to properly train the ANSF's NCO and officer corps to a proficient level.

Annex A

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL ARMY EQUIPMENT

Nomenclature	Manufacturer	Type Equipment	On Hand	Goal
T-55	KhPZ, UVZ	Tank	Unk	Unk
T-62	UVZ	Tank	~ 30	Unk
BRDM-1/2	GAZ	Recon	50	Unk
BMP-1/2	GAZ	IFV	~ 30	Unk
BTR-60/70/80	GAZ	APC	Unk	Unk
M113A2	BAE	APC	173	Unk
M577	BAE	APC (CP)	16	Unk
T-155 Firtina (155 mm)	Samsung Tech	Howitzer	24	Unk
D-30 (122 mm) (2A18)	Motovilikha	Howitzer	86	283
D-1 (152 mm) (M1943)	Uralmash	Howitzer	Unk	Unk
M-46 (130 mm) (M1954)	Motovilikha	Field Gun	Unk	Unk
BM-21 (122 mm)	Splav	MLRS	Unk	Unk
M37 (82 mm)	USSR State Factory	Mortar	Unk	Unk
M1938 (120 mm)	USSR State Factory	Mortar	Unk	Unk
M1943 (160 mm)	USSR State Factory	Mortar	Unk	Unk
SPG-9 (73 mm)	KBP IDB	ATGM	Unk	Unk
B-10 (82 mm)	KBM	Recoilless Rifle	Unk	Unk
9M14 (Sagger)	KBM	Recoilless Rifle	Unk	Unk
RPG-7 V	Bazalt	RL	Unk	Unk
RPG-16	Unknown	LAW	Unk	Unk
9K32/9K32M Strela-2/2M (Grail)	KBM (SA-7A/B)	MANPADS	Unk	Unk
9K310 Igla-1/1E (Gimlet)	KBM (SA-16)	MANPADS	Unk	Unk
9K34 Strela-3 (Gremlin)	KBM (SA-14)	MANPADS	Unk	Unk
HN-5A	Norinco (Chinese)	MANPADS	Unk	Unk
9K35 Strela-10	SZM (SA-13, Gopher)	SAM	16	Unk
FIM-92A Stinger	Raytheon	MANPADS	Unk	Unk
ZSU 23-4 (23 mm)	MMZ	SP AA	Unk	Unk
M53 (12.7 mm)	Praga (Czech)	SP AA	Unk	Unk
ZU 23-2 (23 mm)	USSR State Factory	AA	Unk	Unk
ZPU-1/2/4 (14.5 mm)	Various	Towed AA	Unk	Unk
S-60 AZP (57 mm)	GPO AK	Towed AA	Unk	Unk
KS-19 (100 mm)	Soviet State Factory	Towed AA	Unk	Unk
KS-12 (85 mm)	Soviet State Factory	Towed AA	Unk	Unk
Makarov (9 mm)	Various	Pistol	Unk	Unk
TT-33 (7.62 mm)	Various	Pistol	Unk	Unk
M4/M16A2 (5.56 mm)	Colt	Rifle	32768	104000
M24 (7.62 mm)	Remington	Sniper Rifle	Unk	1544
CZ vz-61 (7.65 mm)	CZUB	Sub MG	Unk	Unk
AK-74 (5.45 mm)	IMW	Assault Rifle	Unk	Unk

AKS 74U (5.45 mm)	IMW	Rifle	Unk	Unk
AMD (7.62 mm)	FRG (Hungary)	Rifle	Unk	Unk
Vz 58 (7.62 mm)	CZUB (Czech)	Rifle	Unk	Unk
SKS (7.62)	Various	Rifle	Unk	Unk
AK-47/AKM (7.62 mm)	IMW	Lt MG	40000+	Unk
M249 (5.56 mm)	FNdH	Lt MG	2199	2600
M240B (7.62 mm)	FNdH	Lt MG	1138	1700
M2 (.50 caliber)	Browning	Hvy MG	100	576
RPD (7.62 mm)	Various	Lt MG	Unk	Unk
RPK (7.62 mm)	Various	MG	Unk	Unk
PK/PKM (7.62 mm)	Unknown	MG	Unk	Unk
DShk (12.7 mm)	Unknown	Hvy MG	Unk	Unk
KPV (14.5 mm)	Unknown	Hvy MG	Unk	Unk
M203	Colt	GL	1760	2250
AGS-17 (30 mm)	KBP IDB	GL	Unk	Unk
M-24/35 (Hind)	Mil	Atk Helicopter	9	Unk
Mi-17 (Hip)	Mil	Assault/Trans Helicopter	25	56
Mi-8MTV-1 (Hip)	Mil	Assault/Trans Helicopter	2	Unk
G-222 (C-27A)	Alenia	Trans Plane	5	20
AN-26 (Curl)	Antonov	Trans Plane	1	Unk
AN-32 (Cline)	Antonov	Trans Plane	5	Unk
L-39C Alabartos	Aero	Trainer	2	Unk
Armored HMMWVs	AM General	Various	2914	6500
F350 SORV	Ford	Pickup	5000	23000
M-35 Series	Various	2 ½ ton Trucks	2781	5200
M-939 Series	Navistar	5 ton Trucks	Unk	4000
Heavy Trucks	Unknown	NA	Unk	1200

ANSF Equipment, DOD; Jane's Information Group; and The Long War Journal, 2010¹⁸⁸



T-54/55 Main Battle Tank
Nellis AFB, NV, 2005
(Taken by US Gvt Employee,
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T-62 Tank Main Battle Tank
Fort Irwin, CA, 1988
(Taken by US Gvt Employee,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



BRDM-1 Reconnaissance Vehicle,
Janusz Maguski, 1975
(Scanned under Polish copyright
laws, Wikimedia Commons,
August 2010)



BRDM-2 Reconnaissance Vehicle
Fort Benning, Georgia, 2005
(Taken by US Gvt Employee,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicle,
Fort Benning, Georgia, 2005
(Taken by US Gvt Employee,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle
APG, Maryland, 2007
(Taken by Mark Pelligrini,
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BTR-60 Armored Personnel Carrier
Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan,
2005, (Taken by DOD GSGT Keith A.
Milks, Wikimedia Commons,
August 2010)



BTR-70 Armored Personnel Carrier
Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, 2008
(Taken by Torin, Use under
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BTR-80 Armored Personnel Carrier
 Al Kut, Iraq, 2003
 (Taken by DOD LCPL Andrew
 Williams, Wikimedia Commons,
 August 2010)



M113A2 Armored Personnel Carrier
 Fort Irwin, California, 1997
 (Taken by US Gvt Employee,
 Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



M577 Command Post Vehicle
 Tikrit, Iraq, 2006
 (Taken by US Gvt Employee,
 Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



**T-155 Firtina 155mm Self-propelled
 Howitzer, Turkey, 2007,**
 (Taken by Kizilsunger, Use under
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D-30 (2A18) 122mm Towed Howitzer
 ANA, Afghanistan, 2005
 (Taken by DOD CPT Cenethea
 Harroway,
 Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



**D-1 (M1943) 152mm Towed
 Howitzer, Sevastpol, Ukraine, 2007**
 (Taken by Cmapm, Use under
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**M-46 (M1954) 130mm Field Gun,
Tel Aviv, Israel, 2005
(Taken by Bukvoed, Use under
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**BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launch
System, Poland, 2010
(Taken by Kapitel, Use under
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**M1938 120mm Mortar, 2008,
(Taken by Torin, Use under
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**M1937 82mm Mortar,
Petaluma CA, 2003
(Taken by BrokenSphere, Use under
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**M1943 160mm Mortar, 2008,
(Taken by Torin, 2008, Use under
GNU Free Document License,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**SPG-7 *Kopye* (Spear) Recoilless Rifle,
TRISA Worldwide Equipment
Guide Volume 1, 2009**



**9M14P1B1 "Sagger"
Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM),
TRISA Worldwide Equipment
Guide Volume 1, 2009**



**9K32/9K32M Strela-2/2M,
MANPADS (SA-7, "Grail")
TRISA Worldwide Equipment
Guide, Volume 2, 2009**



**9K34 Strela-3,
MANPADS (SA-14, "Gremlin")
TRISA Worldwide Equipment
Guide, Volume 2, 2009**



**B-10 Recoilless Rifle,
Tel Aviv, Israel, 2006
(Taken by Bukvoed, Use under
Free Documen License,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG)
Launcher, Beshud, Afghanistan, 2008
(Photo by DOD SPC Justin French,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**9K35 Strela-10,
Surface-to-Air Missile (SA-13,
"Gopher")
TRISA Worldwide Equipment
Guide, Volume 2, 2009**



**9K310 Iгла-1/1E,
MANPADS (SA-16, "Gimlet")
TRISA Worldwide Equipment
Guide, Volume 2, 2009**



**FIM-92A
MANPADS, "Stinger"
TRISA Worldwide Equipment
Guide, Volume 2, 2009**



**ZSU 23-4
Self-Propelled 23mm Anti-Aircraft
Gun
TRISA Worldwide Equipment
Guide, Volume 2, 2009**



**M53 Praga, 2007
SP 12.7 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun
(Taken by Marko M, Use under
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**ZU 23-2,
Towed 23mm Anti-Aircraft Gun,
Tel Aviv, Israel, 2006
(Taken by Bukvoed, Use under
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**ZPU-1,
Towed 14.5mm Anti-Aircraft Gun,
Tel Aviv, Israel, 2005
(Taken by Bukvoed, Use under
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**ZPU-2,
Towed 14.5mm Anti-Aircraft Gun,
Togliatti, Russia, 2010
(Taken by ShinePhantom, Use under
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**ZPU-4,
Towed 14.5mm Anti-Aircraft Gun,
Kuwait, 1991
(Taken by DOD LCPL Dunham,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**S-60 AZP (Chinese variant),
Towed 57mm Anti-Aircraft Gun,
Shenzhen, China, 2008
(Taken by Brokensphere, Use under
GNU Free Document License,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**KS-19,
Towed 10mm Anti-Aircraft Gun
Camp LeJeune NC, 1989
(Taken by DOD SGT J.L. Roberts,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**Makarov 9mm Pistol, 2006
(Taken by Asams10, Use under
English Wikipedia Project,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**TT-33 7.62mm Pistol,
Ft Lewis WA, 2009
(Taken by Joe Mabel, modified by
Altirador (talk), 2009, Use under
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Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**M4/M16 5.56mm Variants, 2007
(Taken by Offspring 18 87, Use under
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**M24 7.62mm Sniper Rifle
Mosul, Iraq, 2007
(Taken by US Gvt Employee,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**Czech vz-61 7.65mm "Skorpion"
Machine Gun/Pistol, 2009
(Taken by Pibwl, Use under
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**AKS-74U, 5.45mm Assault Rifle, 2003
(Taken by Roman Stepanov, Use
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**AK-74, 5.45mm, Assault Rifle, 2006
(Taken by Nowa Technika
Wojskowa, Use under GNU Free
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Commons, August 2010)**



**AMD, 7.62mm Assault Rifle
Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan, 2008
(Taken by DOD LCPL Gene
A.Ainsworth III, Wikimedia
Commons, August 2010)**



**Czech Sa vz 58 7.62mm
Assault Rifle, 2007
(Taken by John Hrdonka, Use under
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**SKS, 7.62mm Assault Rifle, 2006
(Taken by Jmajonis, Use under
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**AK-47 and AKM 7.62mm
Assault Rifles, 2008
(Taken by Koalorka, Use under
English Wikipedia Project,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**M249 5.56mm Light Machine Gun
Squad Automatic Rifle (SAW)
(Taken by US Gvt, Wikimedia
Commons, August 2010)**



**M240B 7.62mm Light Machine Gun
(Taken by US Gvt employee,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**M2 .50 caliber Heavy Machine Gun
(Taken by US Gvt employee,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**RPD 7.62mm Light Machine Gun,
2008
(Taken by Altirador, Use under
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RPK 7.62mm Machine Gun, 2008
 (Taken by Koalorka, Use under
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PKM 7.62 Machine Gun
 (Taken by US Government employee,
 Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



KPV 14.5mm Heavy Machine Gun,
 Buckley AFB CO, 2008
 (Taken by Koalorka, Use under
 English Wikipedia Project,
 Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



DShk 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun,
 Bosnia, 1998
 (Taken by DOD SSG Kim Price,
 Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



M203 40mm Grenade Launcher
 Baghdad, Iraq, 2005
 (Taken by DOD PFC Mike Pryor,
 Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



**AGS-17 30mm Grenade Launcher
2001**
(Taken by the Finish Defense Forces,
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**Mi-24 "Hind" Helicopter
Riga, Latvia, 2008**
(Taken by Riyaah, Use under
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**Mi-17 "Hip" Helicopter
Croatia, 2007**
(Taken by Dtom, Use under
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**Mi-8MTV-1 "Hip" Helicopter
2009**
(Taken by Doomuch, Use under
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**G-222 (C-27A) "Spartan" Transport
Plane**
ANAAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2010
(Taken by DOD SSG Markus Maier,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)



**AN-26 "Curl" Transport Plane
Farnborough Air Show, England,
2008**
(Taken by Milborne One, Use under
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**AN-32 "Cline" Transport Plane
2009
(Taken by DOD MSG Herbert
Cintron, Wikimedia Commons,
August 2010)**



**L-39C "Albatross"
Transport Plane, 2006
(Posted from Airliners.net, Use
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**ANA HMMWV, Afghanistan, 2010
(Taken by Todd Huffman, flickr.com,
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August 2010)**



**ANA Pickup Truck,
Herat, Afghanistan, 2005
(Taken by Koldo Hormazza,
flickr.com, Use under GNU Free
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Commons, August 2010)**



**M35 2/12 Ton Truck, 2006
(Taken by US Gvt employee,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**M939A2 5 Ton Truck, 2006
(Taken by US Gvt employee,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**



**M911 Heavy Tractor Truck, 2005
(Taken by US Gvt employee,
Wikimedia Commons, August 2010)**

 Annex B

AFGHANISTAN'S 2008 MOI ANP OFFICER REFORM MEASURES

Rank	Before	% Before	After	% After	Change
General	319	2	159	2	0
Colonel	2712	17	310	3	-14
Lieutenant Colonel	2140	14	403	5	-9
Major	2598	16	626	7	-9
Captain	3779	24	1507	17	-7
Lieutenant (1st, 2nd, 3rd)	4263	27	6013	67	40
Other (Unknown)	1985	11	NA	NA	NA

 Afghanistan's MOI ANP Reform Measures, DOD, 2010¹⁸⁹

Annex C

ISAF TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS (AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 2010)

Country	1FEB10	Future Pledge
Albania	255	125
Armenia	0	40
Australia	1550	120
Austria	2	0
Azerbaijan	90	0
Belgium	575	0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	10	0
Bulgaria	540	0
Canada	2830	0
Colombia	0	TBD
Croatia	295	40
Czech Republic	440	100
Denmark	750	0
Estonia	150	0
Finland	150	25
France	3750	0
Georgia	175	923
Germany	4415	500
Greece	15	0
Hungary	315	0
Iceland	3	0
Ireland	8	0
Italy	3150	1040
Jordan	0	0
Kazakhstan	0	TBD
Latvia	175	0
Lithuania	165	20
Luxembourg	9	0
Netherlands	1940	0
New Zealand	220	0
Norway	500	0
Poland	1955	680
Portugal	105	120
Romania	945	700
Singapore	40	0
Slovakia	240	240
Spain	1070	500
Sweden	410	125
Macedonia	165	80
Mongolia	0	TBD
Montenegro	0	TBD
South Korea	0	TBD
Turkey	1755	0

Ukraine	8	22
United Arab Emirates	25	0
United Kingdom	9500	1200
United States	47085	0
Total	85795	6509

Foreign Military in Afghanistan, Congressional Research Service, 1 February 2010¹⁹⁰

Annex D

AFGHANISTAN ORDER OF BATTLE (AS OF FEBRUARY 2011)¹⁹¹

ISAF/USF-A, Kabul

CF SOC (Forward)-Afghanistan, Kabul

Combined Joint SO TF-Afghanistan, Bagram Airfield

Regional Special Operations Task Forces

1-16 Infantry, Village Stability Operations

ISAF SO Forces/SO Command & Control Element (UK/Australia), Cp Phoenix, Kabul

Regional Special Operations Task Groups

NATO Training Mission-A/Combined Security Transition Command-A, Cp Phoenix

3-4 Infantry, Kabul Military Training Center & other locations countrywide

1-134 Cavalry, Cp Phoenix, Kabul

International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, Kabul International Airport

Regional Command (Capital) (BG Sasmaz, Turkey), Cp Warehouse, Kabul

Turkish Battle Group, Kabul

Regional Command (West) (Italian “Julia” Alpine Bde), Cp Aerna, Herat

TF North (Italy), Bala Murghab (2-9 Regt Alpine); operations in Badghis

TF Center (Italy), Shindand (3-9 Regt Alpine); operations in southern Herat

TF South (Italy), Farah (9-9 Regt Alpine); operations in Farah

3rd “Principe” Lt Infantry Regt (Spain), Qala-e-Naw; operations in Badghis

7-10 Cavalry (US), Cp Stone, Herat; operations in Herat & Badghis

Regional Command (East) (US), Herat; operations in Herat & Badghis

TF Bastogne (US), Jalalabad Airfield (1/101 AA)

1-32 Cavalry (US), Naray; operations in Nuristand & northern Kunar

1-61 Cavalry (US), Khogyani, operations in western Nangarhar

1-327 Infantry (US), Pech, operations in western Kunar

2-327 Infantry (US), Chawkay, operations in eastern Kunar

TF Currahee (US), FOB Sharana, Paktika Province (4/101 AA)

1-506 Infantry (US), FOB Sharana; operations in western Paktika

2-506 Infantry (US), FOB Orgun, operations in eastern Paktika

TF Duke (US), Khowst (3/1 ID)

1-33 Cavalry (US), Cp Clark; operations in eastern Khowst

1-168 Infantry (US), FOB Lightning; operations in Paktya

1-187 Infantry (US), FOB ?, operations in western Khowst

TF La Fayette (French), Kapisa (9th Marine Lt Armored Bde)

2nd Marine Infantry Regt (France), FOB Tora; operations in Surobi

7th Mtn Infantry Bn (France), FOB Kutschbach; operations in Kapisa

TF Patriot (US), Logar (4/10 Mountain Division)

2-4 Infantry, FOB ?; operations in Wardak

2-30 Infantry, FOB Shank; operations in Logar

3-89 Cavalry, FOB Airborne; operations in Wardak

TF 222 (Jordan), FOB Shank; operations in Logar

TF Red Bulls (US), Bagram Airfield (2/34 Infantry Division)

1-113 Cavalry, Bagram Airfield; operations in Parwan

1-133 Infantry, FOB Mehtar Lam; operations in Laghman

TF White Eagle (Poland) (10th Armored Cavalry Bde), FOB Ghazni

Battle Group A (Poland), FOB Ghazni; operations in eastern Ghazni

Battle Group B (Poland), FOB Warrior; operations in western Ghazni
 3-187 Infantry (US), FOB Andar; operations in southeastern Ghazni
 Regional Command (North) (Germany), Mazar-e-Sharif
 Tng & Protection Bn 1 (Germany), FOB Kunduz; operations in eastern RC N
 Tng & Protection Bn 2 (Germany), Cp Marmal; operations in western RC N
 TF Warrior (US), Mazar-e-Sharif (1/10th Mountain Division)
 1-87 Infantry, FOB Kunduz; operations in Kunduz & Baghlan
 Regional Command (South) (US), Kandahar Airfield, 10th Mountain Division
 Combined Tm Uruzgan (US), Tarin Kowt; operations in Uruzgan province
 1-2 Stryker (US), Tarin Kowt; operations in Uruzgan province
 5 Royal Australian Regt (Australia), Tarin Kowt
 Combined Tm Zabul/2nd Stryker Regt (US), Qalat; operations in Zabul
 2-2 Stryker (US), Qalat; operations in Zabul province
 26th Infantry Bn, Qalat; operations along Hwy 1 in Zabul
 U/I Infantry Bn, Qalat; operations along Hwy 1 in Zabul
 TF Kandahar (Canada), Kandahar Airfield
 1-22 Royal Regt (Canada), Kandahar Airfield; operations in Panjwayi
 1-71 Cavalry (US), FOB ?, operations in Dand & Daman
 TF Lightning/525 BSB (US), FOB Spin Boldak (SB)
 4-2 Stryker (US), FOB SB; operations in southeastern Kandahar
 1-38 Cavalry (US), FOB ?; operations near Pakistani border
 TF Raider (US), Kandahar City (1-4 Infantry Division)
 1-22 Infantry (US), FOB ?; operations in Kandahar City
 1-66 Armor (US), FOB ?; operations in southern Arghandab district
 TF Strike (US), FOB Wilson (2-101 AA Division)
 3-2 Stryker (US), FOB Aziullah; operations in Maywand
 1-75 Cavalry (US), FOB Wilson; operations in south-central Zhari
 1-502 Infantry (US), FOB Wilson; operations in eastern Zhari
 2-502 Infantry (US), FOB Howz-e-Madad; operations in w Zhari
 Regional Command (Southwest), (US) Cp Leatherneck (1 MEF)
 2nd Recon Bn, Cp Leatherneck, operations near Sangin & Marja
 3rd LAR Bn, Khan Neshin; operations in Reg district
 3-25 Marines, Cp Leatherneck; base security mission
 RCT 1 (US), Garmsir; operations in southern Helmand province
 2-1 Marines (US), FOB Delhi; operations in Garmsir
 2-3 Marines (US), COP Geronimo; operations in Nawa
 2-8 Marines (US), FOB Sher Wali; operations in northern Marja
 3-9 Marines (US), FOB Marja; operations in southern Marja
 RCT 2 (US), Cp Delaram II; N Helmand, SE Farah & NE Nimruz
 3-5 Marines (US), FOB Jackson; operations in Sangin
 1-8 Marines (US), FOB Musa Qala; operations in Musa Qala
 3-8 Marines (US), FOB ?; operations in northern Sangin
 32 Infantry Bn (Georgia), Cp Delaram II; operations in Delaram area
 TF Helmand (UK), Cp Lashkar Gah (16 AA Bde);
 1 Irish Guards (UK), Cp Tombstone; army advisors
 2 Para Regt (UK), Babaji; operations in southern Nahr-e-Saraj
 3 Para Regt (UK), FOB Shahzad; operations in northern Nad-e-Ali
 1 Royal Irish Regt, FOB Shawqat; operations in southern Nad-e-Ali
 2 Ryl Life Gds (UK), Gereshk; operations in N Nahr-e-Saraj
 2 Ryl Regt of Scotland (UK), Lashkar Gah; operations in Lashar Gah
 5 Royal Regt of Scotland (UK), Lashkar Gah, police advisors

Annex E

US HIRED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR HISTORY

Quarter Ending	Total PSC Contractors	US Citizens	3 rd Country Nationals	Local Nationals
September 2007	3152	6	4	3142
December 2007	2998	19	30	2949
March 2008	2986	32	72	2882
June 2008	3537	5	15	3517
September 2008	3847	9	32	3806
December 2008	3689	15	23	3651
March 2009	4373	17	29	4327
June 2009	5198	19	264	4915
September 2009	11423	76	1017	10330
December 2009	14439	114	409	13916
March 2010	16733	140	0980	15613
June 2010	17983	152	4915	16687
September 2010	18869	197	858	17814
December 2010	18919	250	731	17938

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL DATA ¹⁹²

AFGHANISTAN THREAT ACTORS

Group	Abbreviation	Est Strength	Primary Area of Operations	Leader
Quetta Shura Taliban	QST	25000	Afghanistan	Ameer-ul-Mumineen Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahid
Haqqani Network	HQN	Unknown	SE Afghanistan	Jalaluddin Haqqani
Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin	HiG	Unknown	Eastern Afghanistan	Hekmatyar Gulbuddin
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan	TTP	20000-35000	Pakistan & inside Afghan borders	Hakimullah Mehsud
Qaeda al-Jihad of the Lands in the East and West	AQAM	Unknown	Eastern Afghanistan & Pakistan borders	Mustafa Yazid (KIA)
Tehreek-e-Nifaaaz-e-Shariat-Mohammadi	TNSM	Unknown	Pakistan	Maulana Fazlullah
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba	LeT	Unknown	Pakistan/India	Hafiz Muhammad Saeed
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	IMU	~500	Northern Afghanistan	Tahir Yuldashev (KIA)
Lashkar-e-Islam	LeI	150-2000	Eastern Afghanistan	Mangal Bagh
Hizb-e-Islami Khalis	HIK	Unknown	Southeastern Afghanistan	Anwar ul-Haq Mujahid (Detained)
Lashkar-e-Janghv	LJ	<100	Southeastern Afghanistan	Mufti Abuzar Khanjari

Threat Actors in Afghanistan¹⁹³

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ECONOMIC

“Afghanistan is at a crucial stage in its struggle to rise out of poverty and conflict. The intensifying insurgency adds to the critical need for the international community to do more to help Afghans build effective institutions and promote equitable economic growth.”

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework, 2010-2013

Economic

The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources. Specific factors may include the influence of industrial organizations, international trade, foreign aid, finance, institutional capabilities, and the rule of law. Other factors include black market or underground economies, which are alternative structures indicating weaknesses in the mainstream economy. Such factors influence an actor's decision to alter or support the existing order.

KEY FACTS:

- Afghanistan relies heavily on foreign aid and investments.
- Afghanistan imports far more than it currently exports.
- Afghanistan continues to carry a heavy burden of external debt.
- The Afghan economy is fragmented, largely undocumented (unofficial), and virtually unregulated.
- Afghanistan leads the world in opium and heroin cultivation, production, and trafficking.
- Thirty-six percent of citizens are extremely poor and live on less than \$1 per day.
- Afghanistan's high unemployment rate leads many to farm opium or hire themselves out to insurgents in order to provide for their families.
- Afghanistan contains considerable wealth in unexploited natural resources that include petroleum products and minerals.
- The Afghan government recently restructured the tax code and improved tax collection procedures, with notable positive results.
- Afghanistan has established a national banking system that offers modern services, but most money is still moved by the traditional method of *hawala*.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE ECONOMIC VARIABLE IN THE OE:

- Reliance on *hawala* as the primary method of money exchange makes it difficult to track funds moving through the country, encouraging corruption and illegal activities.
- Afghanistan will rely on foreign aid and assistance for some time yet before revenue reaches a level sufficient to support the government.
- Successful exploitation of Afghanistan's abundant natural resources can provide the country with economic growth and stability, but requires security and a significant reduction in corruption.
- Security and a successful economy go hand in hand; Afghanistan cannot obtain one without the other.
- Most economic activity in Afghanistan is small-scale. Microfinance and similar strategies could effectively spur economic growth and decrease unemployment simultaneously.
- The Afghan government has no domestic military production capabilities and must rely on foreign imports to equip its forces.
- Afghanistan has the capacity to produce considerable amounts of food, but many fields are currently used for illegal poppy production instead.
- Illegal economic activities such as poppy production, if allowed to persist unabated, will continue funding insurgent activities in the country.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

Afghanistan's weak economy remains a primary source of its internal conflict. The near absence of economic development in Afghanistan, especially in the south, drives the insurgency and concurrently creates the conditions for the Afghan central government's weakness. The legal Afghan economy practically operates at a subsistence level and provides, at best, the most basic of necessities to the population. Most Afghans rely on international aid, crime, or most perniciously, the opium trade. In addition, the negative effects of international aid are played out in the country's economy. Despite this grim assessment, the Afghan economy demonstrates many positive trends, especially its search for a legal replacement for the drug trade. Afghanistan is at a crossroads, where the outcome of the battle between economic development and the hydra of drugs, corruption, and insurgency remains in doubt.

TABLE OF ECONOMIC DATA¹

Economic Measure	Data	Remarks
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (purchasing power parity)	\$23.35 billion (2010 figures price in 2009 dollars)	Afghanistan's GDP is roughly equivalent to Jamaica and Estonia
GDP (per capita)	\$800	Roughly equivalent to Mozambique and Central African Republic
Unemployment Rate	35%	
Population below the Poverty Line	36%	
Commercial Bank Prime Lending Rate	14.92%	
Exports	\$5.3 billion (2009)	
Exchange Rate	45 Afghanis to one USD	This number fluctuates daily but trades in a range of 40-50 over the past decade

TIMELINE OF KEY ECONOMIC EVENTS

100s, BCE: The area now known as Afghanistan serves as a crossroads along the Silk Road and becomes a source of mineral wealth for traders.

1839-1919: During the various Anglo-Afghan Wars, foreign aid, often in the form of weaponry, proves decisive in the defeat of outside invaders and internal enemies.

1946-1973: Due to its neutrality in the Cold War, Afghanistan receives economic aid and development from both the US and USSR.

1978-2001: Under the Communist (1978-1992) and Taliban (1992-2001) governments, Afghanistan suffers from a centrally planned economy.

1991: The cessation of Soviet aid upon the USSR's dissolution dooms the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's viability.

1994: Afghanistan becomes the source nation for the majority of the world's heroin. Afghanistan retains this distinction for every year thereafter, except for 2001.

2010: Geologic reports suggest that Afghanistan contains as much as \$1 trillion in untapped mineral resources.

PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Afghanistan functions as a small participant in the global financial system, as the country spent much of the last three decades either isolated entirely from global finance due to economic sanctions, or with an economy shattered by the effects of almost constant war. Since 2001, the economy began to expand and slowly diversify from the opium dependency that characterized Afghanistan's economy under the Taliban regime. Afghanistan's participation in the global economy initially confined itself to the flow of capital into the country, as massive amounts of international aid, loans, and remittances entered the Afghan economy.

Ironically, Afghanistan's illegal activities probably helped the global economy in the recent worldwide financial recession. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime estimated that global banks effectively laundered over \$350 billion between 2004 and 2009. Since Afghanistan serves as one of the one of the world's largest illegal drug producers, it remains probable that a large portion of these illegal transactions involved Afghan money from Afghan sourced heroin.²

The Afghan government and probably other countries as well find it difficult to determine precisely how much legal and illegal money flows through Afghanistan and from where it comes. This lack of hard data makes economic forecasts for insurgents difficult, and creates an increased momentum for government corruption that does not usually occur in more developed economies that possess powerful currency controls.

IMF/WORLD BANK

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently noted significant economic improvements in Afghanistan, and brokered a 96% reduction of Afghanistan's debt held by the nations of the international community.³ Since 2006, the IMF disbursed \$81 million in development aid and funds for the Afghan government's operation.⁴ It remains unlikely that any international organization, such as the World Bank or IMF, can sustain their Afghan monetary commitments indefinitely. The lack of future outside financial support will require the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to become more efficient and to rely on expected government revenues, not foreign aid.

DIRECT INTERNATIONAL AID

International aid serves as the primary instrument for the international counterinsurgency effort and represents a massive international investment in Afghanistan's future. The most recent ISAF commander, General David Petraeus, reiterated this when he wrote, "Money is a weapon" while providing the newest rules of engagement to the soldiers.⁵ The UN, along with the US and many partners in the international community, aggressively use direct international aid as a tool to build up the necessary elements of a sustainable Afghanistan. The UN's economic development agenda includes agriculture development and diversification, natural disaster management, work opportunities, and resources management.⁶

US government international aid also remains similarly focused, with emphasis on infrastructure, especially roads, water, and electrification; revenue collection; and education.⁷ Additionally, the US development effort in Afghanistan concentrates on job training, land titling, and financial reform, to provide the macro-level requirements of a sustainable economy. Significant issues remain with corruption fueled by the flood of international aid.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

The US Department of State believes that Foreign Direct Investment numbers to Afghanistan remain unreliable. The UN estimated in 2008, however, that investment inflow in Afghanistan amounted to roughly \$300 million with FDI stocks of \$1.365 billion, or over 10% of the Afghan gross domestic product (GDP).⁸ One of Afghanistan's major objectives involves increased foreign direct investment. Afghanistan ranks as the 23rd easiest place in the world to start a business by IMF standards.⁹ In the future, Afghanistan's location, low wages, and natural resources could make Afghanistan an attractive investment proposition, but it also depends upon an improved security situation, more advanced banking and legal systems, and lower government corruption.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Afghanistan's main economic activities center around two main income sources—the opium poppy and international aid—resulting in a weak legal economy with a large illegal component. Improved security and billions of dollars in developmental aid continue to gradually improve the Afghan economy. Significant structural obstacles, however, still remain before substantial improvement can occur at all levels of the Afghan economy. These improvements include a reduction in the illegal drug economy, reduction of corruption throughout the entire country, lower unemployment levels, and an increase in institutions upon which economic activity flourishes. Thus, a “Catch 22” occurs wherein the insurgency thrives because of an overall lack of economic development, while economic development cannot thrive in areas that lack proper security.

ECONOMIC ACTORS

At the village level, Afghanistan's economic life revolves around the bazaar, where small merchants buy, sell, and trade products. Alongside major roads, small stores or roadside trading posts are common. Within the cities, a variety of actors provide goods and services, though these are usually sole proprietor businesses, rather than large corporations like those found in the West.

Brokers will buy and sell products and trade raw materials, usually to foreign countries like Pakistan, for production into finished goods. ISAF continues to document the lack of high value-added production capability in Afghanistan as a significant problem to economic development.

TRADE

Afghanistan's primary external trading partners include India (23.5%), Pakistan (17.7%), US (16.5%), Tajikistan (12.8%), and the Netherlands (6.9%).¹⁰ These five nations comprise over 75% of Afghanistan's legal external trade. Afghanistan's legal exports consist primarily of agricultural goods, marble, carpets, and gems. Within Afghanistan, many Afghans consume agricultural products locally, as internal transport remains slow and relatively expensive in relation to the goods' cost.

The Afghan government continues to explore public-private partnerships as a means to improve the global competitiveness of key Afghan exports such as dry/fresh fruits, marble, and carpets. The Afghan government also wants to use public-private partnerships to build up two key trade support elements—transportation and telecommunications.¹¹ Development in these industries will serve as a basic enabler of growth in other sectors of the Afghan economy.

MILITARY EXPORTS/IMPORTS

Afghanistan depends upon foreign aid instead of their own government's resources to build and equip its military forces. This reliance on foreign aid acts as a long term strategic disability for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) because the GIROA may not possess the ability to sustain the ANSF once foreign countries end their aid. Insurgents, however, provide for their forces through

sustainable illegal activities that will likely remain once foreign aid to the ANSF ceases. The lack of any domestic military industrial capacity precludes any Afghan military exports.

ECONOMIC DIVERSITY

Unfortunately for Afghanistan, any discussion of “economic diversity” begins with a three-way dialogue about subsistence-level economic activities, international aid, and illegal drug production. Afghanistan’s dependency upon international aid as its primary economic source since early in the 20th century has stunted its development of internal economic activity for decades. However, the latest intensive international aid focused on development, especially from the US and Europe, indicates that such aid may begin to pay economic dividends. Recently identified mineral deposits, known petroleum reserves, and Afghanistan’s strategic geographic location—vital for pipelines and trade routes between Asia and Europe—could become the basis for a sustainable and relatively robust economy. Afghanistan finds itself primed for a departure from its history as a “rentier state,” where state authority originated from a combination of military power and the distribution of foreign aid.¹² This change, however, will require a sustained economic, political, and military effort by both the international community and the GIRoA.

ENERGY SECTOR

Afghanistan does not currently exploit any significant quantities of oil or natural gas, but may serve as a transit corridor for a proposed Central Asian oil and gas pipeline from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Indian Ocean port facilities. Such pipelines would diversify the current pipeline routes, avoid potential chokepoints, and place the hydrocarbon products closer to consumers, especially in India. Any such project, however, currently exists only at the preliminary stage, as the security situation precludes any pipeline construction. Like the pipeline situation, Afghanistan’s exploitable oil and gas reserves, primarily in the country’s northern areas, require a higher level of overall security and considerable investment before they will become a significant factor in the Afghan economy.

The lack of refineries and limited domestic hydrocarbon production means that Afghanistan will remain dependent on imported fuel for the immediate future. External military and internal ANSF that require fuel will need to rely on long supply lines from the Afghanistan border that are vulnerable to pilferage and insurgent interdiction. To maintain their ability to maneuver and operate, international military forces and internal ANSF will depend on favorable conditions outside their own area of operations.

Oil

In 2006, Afghan and American government estimates suggested that Afghanistan possesses 1.6 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil.¹³ Due to infrastructure damage and the current security issues, Afghanistan does not exploit these oil resources at this time.¹⁴ Afghanistan will likely remain an oil importer for the foreseeable future.

Natural Gas

The Afghan and American governments estimate that northern Afghanistan maintains 15,687 billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 562 million barrels of natural gas liquids. Like oil, Afghanistan does not exploit its natural gas resources in any meaningful way due to problems with the infrastructure and problems with local security in some locations.¹⁵

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture in Afghanistan, exclusive of the poppy precursors of opium, generally operates at the subsistence level, with few products intended for export. Agriculture remains a central pillar of the Afghan economy as it produces 31% of the GDP in a country with a dearth of arable land.¹⁶ Currently, the USDA estimates that 12% of Afghanistan's land is arable, but the Afghans use only half of that for agriculture.¹⁷ Food imports remain vital, as the World Food Program reports that the majority of Afghans are food insecure, or lacking consistent reliable access to necessary food.¹⁸ Food product distribution throughout the country presents a major challenge for Afghanistan that will only increase as the country grows in population.


Afghan farmers usually produce their agricultural products based on small pastoral herds or tenant farming. The most common animal products include meat products, pelts, wool, and skins. Major farm products include barley, wheat, rice, fruit, and opium. The Afghanistan government identified the development of a sustainable export sector as a priority and both dry and fresh fruits as potential export cash crops.

The US Civil-Military Strategy in Afghanistan identified the severance of the link between illegal agriculture activities (poppies for opium) and the insurgents, along with an impetus to return farmers to legal agricultural pursuits, as one of their key high-level objectives.¹⁹ The need to move Afghan farmers into legal activities remains especially critical to not only starve the insurgents of their opium revenue, but also create the food stocks needed for export and to feed Afghanistan's expected population growth.

MINING

While mining served as a minor component of the Afghan economic landscape for years, recent developments opened the door for mining to become a central component of Afghanistan's economy. For well over two centuries, Afghan gems and mining composed a small segment of the Afghan economy. Recently released geological reports estimate that Afghanistan possesses nearly \$1 trillion in exploitable raw minerals.²⁰ Much of the material wealth comes from Afghanistan's non-Pashtun areas and that could create wealth distribution issues similar to what occurred in Iraq.

Currently, mining serves as the main extractive industry of Afghanistan. The GIRoA identified marble mining as a key export industry. Marble mining remains a long-term pillar of the Afghan mining sector, with most marble exported to Pakistan for manufacture into finished products. The recent US Geological Survey (USGS) report suggests that Afghanistan might become the "Saudi Arabia" of lithium and other key minerals. Exploitation of Afghan mineral resources could potentially transform the Afghan economy, but will require significant positive developments in services, transportation, finance, and security arenas to come to fruition.



MANUFACTURING

Afghan industry comprises roughly 26% of the country's GDP, but contains very little large scale industrial manufacturing capacity. Instead, it primarily consists of small cottage industries, independent repair shops, and a few stand-alone factories.²¹ The most common products include shoes, cement, furniture, textiles, and soap. Afghanistan also produces fertilizer that supporters often divert to insurgents for use in improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Defense Industries/Dual Use

Due to a lack of industrial capacity, the ANSF largely depends on international donors for major military equipment requirements. Afghanistan cannot support the ANSF beyond the most basic requirements of food and clothing. Due to other civilian economic requirements and lack of need, as other countries sent large amounts of munitions to Afghanistan over the last 30 years, the Afghans' ability to build any significant munitions and armaments industry remains negligible. The international community will likely need to continue to supply the Afghan military with arms and ammunition even after the international forces' withdrawal.

The Afghan insurgents largely procure funds through a combination of drug sales, other criminal activities, and donations from both foreign and domestic donors. The insurgents purchase their war

materiel, especially explosive precursors like ammonium nitrate, through international and domestic markets.²² At the local level, insurgent group leaders must equip their own military forces. Generally, insurgents do not require much military equipment, but military weapons requirements often limit the size of Taliban units.

SERVICES


Telecommunications transport, and retail services make up the bulk of the remainder of the legal Afghan economy. The telecommunications industry demonstrates much growth as Afghans increasingly consider cell phones a necessity. Security services still represent a significant potential growth opportunity for Afghan business. President Karzai announced in August 2010 that all private security forces would be outlawed.²³ He later recanted and allowed several dozen of these companies to continue operations, but plans to replace them with Afghan government forces around March 2012. Embassies will still retain the right to utilize private security.²⁴ The security situation in the country will remain significantly unchanged, as most nongovernment organizations (NGO) or non-military foreign government operations require significant security that ANSF cannot provide in the foreseeable future. The probable workaround will be that foreign private security forces will be able to operate only within their compounds, and all other private security firms will be required to be Afghan owned and operated businesses.

EXPATRIATE LABOR

While a prime export of Afghanistan is labor for other markets, most expatriate Afghans lack the skills or education to serve in roles outside physical or other unskilled labor positions. Those Afghans that work abroad and send money back to their home country, however, now serve as an important piece of Afghanistan's domestic economy. In 2008, the UN estimated that Afghans in Iran, a popular destination point for expatriate labor, sent \$500 million back to Afghanistan.²⁵ The GIRoA identified the encouragement of expatriate labor as a potential strategy to ensure employment for the anticipated future Afghan youth bulge.

BANKING AND FINANCE

The Afghanistan banking system consists of a hybrid of ancient mechanisms, like hawala, and the most modern banking practices, like Internet banking. Prior to the fall of the Afghan Taliban government, Afghanistan found no need for complex transactional banking capabilities due to a lack of economic activity. The demands of modern international aid and anti-corruption efforts, however, now require the introduction of



modern banking services, like mobile phone enabled banking. To assist in this development, USAID spent over \$5 million to introduce cell phone banking to Afghanistan.²⁶ Modern banking services remain somewhat limited, but the future fusion of hawala with modern technology represents great potential.

Western-style commercial banking enjoys a rebirth from its nadir in late 2001 when the cumulative effect of Afghan Taliban governance almost put the entire banking sector out of business. Since the reestablishment of Western-style banking after the arrival of the international forces, the commercial banking sector grew from less than \$300 million in assets in 2004 to over \$1.7 billion just four years later.²⁷

PRIVATE BANKING


While Afghanistan begins to use modern banking methods, the hawala system remains the dominant method to transfer money throughout the country. Afghans now use modern commercial banking methods such as letters of credit, loans, and direct deposit. After telecommunications, finance operates as Afghanistan's most important service industry.²⁸

Banking System

Hawala remains the core of the Afghan banking system. Hawala operates as a trust system, where an individual gives money to a *hawaladar*, who contacts a fellow hawaladar, who then provides cash to the recipient. The hawaladars, usually related to each other, will settle their accounts with each other. Nearly untraceable, hawaladars serve as a highly efficient and often cheap way to move a significant amount of cash. The Afghan Central Bank requires the hawaladars to obtain a license, but enforcement remains difficult. The Afghan Central Bank also requires any person who conducts large money transfers to report the transaction to the Financial Transaction Report Analysis Center of Afghanistan (FINTRAC) element, but compliance remains uneven.

The GIRoA built its modern banking system around the Da Afghanistan Central Bank that functions in a similar manner to the US Federal Reserve Bank. The Pashnany Bank controls the Afghan Central Bank, the national airlines, and insurance concerns. Currently, the Afghan Central Bank performs limited commercial operations in rural areas and conducts noncommercial operations in Kabul.²⁹

Currently, 14 commercial banks conduct business in Afghanistan. While primarily focused on international markets and foreign banking, these banks can and do provide financial services to local residents for short periods (12 to 36 months.) Many individual Afghans maintain their individual savings in jewelry and/or cash, or reinvest profits back into their businesses versus keeping large sums in banks.³⁰



The Afghanistan lending interest rate currently stands at 15.2%, a positive trend downward from approximately 18% in 2006-2007.³¹ This demonstrates the positive effects of the macro-economic policy of the GIROA. In the future, an analysis of bond and lending rates in Afghanistan can give a quick view of the financial markets' perception of economic and political risk.

Stock/Capital

The Afghan Ministry of Finance drafted plans for a Kabul International Stock Exchange, but operations will not begin until 2013.³² Most financing for large projects comes from overseas capital markets or is funded through public-private partnerships. In recent years, domestic credit rose sharply and began to provide much of the capital for business activity.³³

Microfinance and Informal Finance

Informal finance remains common throughout Afghanistan, especially among the poor. Without access to any sort of Western-style banks and often without significant collateral, many Afghans must rely on local lenders. Because of Islamic prohibitions on interest, loans are structured in such a way that the borrower often ends up permanently indebted to the lender in a sharecropper-type relationship. The borrower must continue to mortgage his future in order to survive today.

Recently, microfinance became a development strategy in Afghanistan where international aid agencies provide a large number of small loans to poor individuals to increase their economic potential. A circle of co-borrowers, usually linked to the original borrower through close physical proximity or family ties, secures the loan. As the original borrower pays off his loan, the money becomes available for new loans. Microfinancing provides the initial financial resources necessary for common Afghans to improve their economic earning power. Since 2003, the Afghan Ministry of Finance provided 450,000 small loans from \$100 to \$3,000 through its Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) program.³⁴ In the future, microfinance solutions could provide working capital to large numbers of Afghans who cannot obtain credit themselves, but have relatives who would help secure the loan.

PUBLIC FINANCE

Since 2001 Afghanistan's public finance has depended on foreign aid, and quickly became rife with official corruption. In addition to the structural issues in Afghanistan's public finance, many foreign countries reneged on their pledge to provide aid to Afghanistan. Due to the lack of accountability and high levels of corruption, the introduction of even larger amounts of foreign aid has become problematic. The situation developed into a classic conundrum in Afghan development where corruption deters foreign developmental aid and the lack of developmental aid encourages corruption among the governmental officials. The macro level trends of Afghan public finance demonstrate mainly positive signs with responsible financial policy, increased diversification of governmental income, manageable inflation, and the retirement of Afghanistan's crippling debt.

Currency/Inflation

Afghanistan's currency is the Afghani and the exchange rate stands at an average of 43 Afghanis to the dollar. Like many countries, Afghans prefer the US dollar in large value denominations. Dependent on the proximity to a border, Iranian or Pakistani currency often finds its way into circulation in Afghanistan.

In the last 12 months, due to a combination of the global economic downturn and prudent fiscal policy, Afghanistan experienced a significant drop in inflation. Inflation, always a significant threat to wealth accumulation, now will enable the Afghans to increase their prosperity.³⁵

Afghan Inflation Rates 2003-2010	Inflation, in Average Consumer Prices	Percentage Change
2003	24.1%	
2004	13.2%	-44.97%
2005	12.3%	-6.96%
2006	5.1%	-58.57%
2007	13.0%	155.29%
2008	26.8%	105.27%
2009	-9.3%	-134.93%
2010 (Oct)	-12.2%	-31.18%

Afghan Inflation Rates, Data from IMF, 2010

Currency Reserves

The IMF estimates that Afghanistan holds about \$3.7 billion in foreign currency reserves.³⁶ Many international financial observers that include the IMF consider the GIRoA's current financial position as adequate. They also concur that Afghanistan's finances show signs of improvement despite the current flow of capital and level of foreign trade.³⁷

Financial Policy

The GIRoA uses a variety of public policy mechanisms to diversify Afghanistan's financial policy and reduce its current dependence upon international aid and loans. The current plan stresses traditional business and personal taxation, bond sales, a reduction of internationally held public debt through forgiveness and restructuring, and the development of internal industries. For the FY09/10 period, the Afghan national government collected roughly \$1 billion in revenues while expenditures reached \$3.3 billion.³⁸

Taxation

Historically, Afghanistan's central government's ineffectiveness limited the country's ability to collect taxes, especially in rural areas. Despite the tradition of government income dependent upon foreign aid, the GIRoA recently shifted to internal taxation to fund governmental activities in a sustainable manner. Recent changes in the tax code and improvement in the tax collection institutions yielded an increase in revenues of 60% from 2004 to 2008.³⁹

The Afghanistan tax code primarily includes a tax on businesses and individuals.⁴⁰ Afghanistan sets the official personal tax rate at 10% of the amount of personal income for those individuals that make between 150,000 and 1.2 million Afghanis; and 105,000 Afghanis plus 20% of income for those individuals that make over 1.2 million Afghanis.⁴¹

Despite gains in Afghanistan's public tax revenues, the country still faces issues inherent to constructing an equitable tax system. This is due to the fact that much economic activity either comes from illegal activities or operates on a subsistence level. The incentive by individual Afghans to avoid tax payments, under-report income, or bribe government tax officials to reduce their taxes remains high.

Public Liabilities/Debt

As of 2009, Afghanistan's public debt stood at roughly \$2.1 billion, a level twice its FY09/10 revenue. Foreign countries consider Afghanistan a "Heavily Indebted Poor Country," or HIPC, and recently negotiated debt write-offs of more than \$1 billion with the Paris Club of wealthy creditor nations.⁴² The IMF reports that current debt restructuring efforts will eventually reduce Afghanistan's debt to

96% of its 2006 level of \$12 billion.⁴³ As debt levels fall, the ability of the GIRoA to put resources into security and development will continue to rise.

Holders/Type/Interest Rate

The Afghan Central Bank offers bonds for sale and currently possesses about \$231 billion in outstanding bonds. The GIRoA intends for bond sales and increased taxation to replace the over \$32 billion in foreign aid that funded the Afghan government's operations from 2002 until today.⁴⁴ Afghan national bonds usually consist of short-term instruments that mature within six months. Future scrutiny of Afghan bond premiums (the amount over internationally recognized averages) will provide excellent insight into the international perception of the GIRoA's stability.

Foreign Investment

Recently, the instability of the security situation in some parts of the country stifled foreign investment in Afghanistan. For most of the decade since the Taliban's removal from power, international aid and developmental funds provided most of the investment in Afghanistan. Recently, the GIRoA recognized the non-sustainability of its dependence on foreign aid and began to aggressively court commercial foreign investment.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Unemployment and underemployment remain significant issues in Afghanistan's economy. The security situation stunted job creation within Afghanistan since the onset of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In a no-win situation, the lack of jobs for young Afghan males created a recruitable force for the Taliban that has further deteriorated the country's security.

LABOR MARKET: EMPLOYMENT /UNEMPLOYMENT

The overall labor market in Afghanistan will remain a continuous source of instability. Unemployment is epidemic within Afghanistan and helps to fuel the insurgency. Due to the lack of jobs, Afghans may choose to fight the GIRoA in order to earn money that will help support their families.⁴⁵ Current estimates suggest an unemployment rate of nearly 35% in Afghanistan.⁴⁶

ECONOMIC IMMIGRATION/EMIGRATION

The Soviet-Afghan War created large numbers of refugees and massive emigration, both legal and illegal, to Afghanistan's neighboring countries. Since the Afghan Taliban government's fall, many expatriates returned to Afghanistan and represent an important element to the country's reconstruction and development, as they bring back resources and the education they received. Many of the Afghan emigrants, however, remained behind, generally in both Iran and Pakistan, where they work in the black or grey economies as laborers or other unskilled workers.

Government officials find it difficult to determine the exact number of Afghan expatriate workers as many work on fraudulent documentation or became Afghans by birth, but never lived in Afghanistan. Some analysts estimate that about two million economic migrants live in Iran and Pakistan.⁴⁷ In the future, Afghanistan may follow a policy of labor export like that of the Philippines or Pakistan, where migrant labor remittances generate a sizable portion of the country's national economy, in addition to any internal economic development.

ILLEGAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Illegal activity occurs rampantly in Afghanistan, with many analysts describing Afghanistan as a “narco-state” where a large portion of the country’s economic activities connect directly to the illegal drug trade. Of Afghanistan’s many intractable problems, the most difficult remains the control of illegal economic activity. This activity, most notably the production and export of opium and heroin, finances the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST). Additionally, the QST controls smuggling routes, and their “taxes” on the transshipment of items on consumer goods and gasoline through the areas they control fund their combat operations. Such income allows the Taliban to maintain their troops in the field and, more perniciously, bribe Afghan government officials.


The drug trade most likely interconnects with legal activities, as laundered drug proceeds often go back to QST coffers in the form of remittances and “charitable”

donations. To further complicate matters, the lack of legal economic development in the primary conflict areas (such as RC-South) means that an aggressive counter-narcotics strategy might drive the local population to fight for the QST simply for economic survival. Analysts determined that the symbiosis between heroin traffickers and the QST continues to increase. Even more troublesome for Afghanistan are the links between known heroin producers and the GIRoA. While the full scale of corruption within the GIRoA remains unknown, arrests and accusations of corruption continue at a rampant pace within the government.

Afghan poppy cultivation centers around Helmand Province in southwestern Afghanistan. From the poppy cultivation in Helmand, heroin flows into Iran and Pakistan for eventual consumption along the distribution pipeline and by the Western nations. Drug money returns to Afghanistan—either directly smuggled or laundered through a variety of means. The drug traffickers launder money through charitable donations, as overhead on legal transactions, or combined with legal hawala transfers, to fund the insurgency against the GIRoA.

BLACK MARKET

Some economists might consider almost all Afghanistan’s financial transactions as grey or black market activities, as much of the country’s economic activity involves the barter system. Few Afghans think of such activity as “illegal” since the exchange of goods and avoidance of taxes exists as a standard practice. A more troubling “black market” activity concerns the export of large sums of cash, most likely the proceeds from government corruption. Since 2003, US authorities estimate that at least \$3 billion in physical cash left Afghanistan.⁴⁸ Recently, the US Department of Defense estimated the total cost of black market and illegal trade at \$12 billion dollars. The same report estimated that government officials received \$2.5 billion in bribes, the GIRoA lost \$1 billion in revenue, and many billions were wasted to pilferage and project mismanagement.⁴⁹



Afghanistan's graft, endemic to the country's economic environment, creates significant barriers to any economic development. Since most foreign developmental aid bypasses the GIRoA because of perceptions of government corruption, accountability remains difficult as the money goes directly from international donor to the local project. Due to the lack of oversight in the donation process, however, corruption at the local level goes relatively unnoticed.⁵⁰ The GIRoA and ISAF recently developed better monitoring and reporting mechanisms to reduce corruption, but they will not reach maturity for some time. Afghanistan will need to continue to combat persistent corruption and deployed units will need to contend with corruption with the limited means at their disposal.

Taliban tax collection operates as another illegal activity that affects large parts of Afghanistan. Often disguised as *zakat*, the Islamic charitable obligation, the Taliban often will extort taxes in the form of cash or crops.⁵¹ More common in areas without significant GIRoA or ISAF presence, the ability for the Taliban to collect these illegal taxes sends a clear message of the GIRoA's powerlessness and ISAF's indifference.

TRAFFICKING (DRUGS/PERSONS/WEAPONS/OTHER)


The trafficking in all types of illegal goods occurs throughout Afghanistan at epidemic levels. Loose border controls and the insurgents' continuous demands for weapons and ammunition to feed their cause generate an outbound flow of opium (and gems) and the illegal import of money and weapons.

Most of the Afghan heroin trade occurs in RC-South, where the Afghans grow the majority of their poppies and refine them

into heroin. The traffickers export the heroin, primarily through Iran and Pakistan, to international markets. The GIRoA, with ISAF support, now focuses military operations to control the poppy trade through direct targeting of traffickers, control of refining precursors, border enforcement, and economic incentives to farmers. Afghan heroin production operates on a massive scale and it will likely take decades of sustained effort by both the GIRoA and the international community to get it under control. The Taliban will likely push back against this effort as the heroin trade provides a significant amount of the financial support for the insurgents. The UNODC estimates that between 2005 and 2008, the Taliban made between \$250 million to \$600 million.⁵² When not involved in physical heroin production, the Taliban makes money through taxation upon poppy and heroin production, and fees on the transport, security, and storage of heroin.

KIDNAPPING


Kidnapping remains a significant threat in Afghanistan for foreigners. While kidnapping can exist as a function of insurgent military activity and remains the most serious concern, many kidnapers act simply for a get-rich-quick scheme. Kidnappers often receive a ransom significantly larger than



they could earn in a legal job because an NGO or foreign government will pay the ransom. Kidnappers may be common criminals or insurgents, but the line between the two often becomes blurred.⁵³ Most kidnappings will likely occur in insurgent-contested areas like RC-South or RC-East, due to the lack of persistent law enforcement presence.

EFFECTS UPON INSURGENCY/TERRORISM

Illegal heroin production supports the Taliban in its insurgency against the GIRoA. The continual symbiosis between narcotics production and sales and the ability of the Taliban to generate combat power for their insurgency fuel each other. Funds from the illegal narcotics trade provide the Taliban the funds necessary to bribe GIRoA officials, purchase arms and ammunition, hire unemployed Afghans, and limit the effectiveness of economic aid and development projects. Simply put, Afghanistan poppy production provides the economic engine to drive the Taliban insurgency.



Afghanistan's underground economy fuels the insurgency against the GIRoA. While Afghanistan's opium cultivation recently dropped, Afghanistan remains one of the primary global opium sources. Annual opium cultivation numbers can skew the GIRoA's success in the fight against illegal drugs as cultivators often store opium as a hedge for poor poppy harvests or to artificially create heroin shortages to drive up the market price.

Most Afghan poppy growers come from the desperately poor farmers forced into poppy cultivation by Taliban threats or possible starvation of their families and themselves. Simple destruction of all poppy fields might drive the farmers to become Taliban fighters for economic survival and not ideological or tribal reasons. To prevent an increase in the Taliban's insurgent forces, the GIRoA and ISAF continue to opt for a targeted approach that focuses kinetic efforts on mid- to high-level drug traffickers, while they concurrently attempt to provide economic alternatives, primarily through developmental aid.

The Afghan opium trade continues to impact the entire world immensely. Analysts can directly link Afghan heroin from its origin in Helmand Province to places as diverse as Esfahan, Iran and East St. Louis, Missouri with their social costs of addiction and the associated crime for the drug users to support their habits. The UNODC estimates deaths due to Afghan heroin in NATO countries outweigh actual NATO nation combat deaths. Corruption greases the illegal drug machinery along

its path from a Helmand Province field to an addict's arm while it creates significant, but hard to quantify social costs. Heroin production's lucrative nature and ability to grow in semi-arid regions continues to edge out more vital economic activity, such as food production.

Summary

Since 2001, the Afghan economy has displayed significant improvement, but the vast majority of Afghans still survive at a subsistence level. Narcotics production and trade and its effects on developmental aid, governmental corruption, and poor security reflect the situation's gravity. These negative assessments should be balanced by solid gains in Afghanistan's standard of living, government finances, and key industry development over the last several years. Historically, Afghanistan serves as an economic crossroads between Asia and Europe, but now the country faces a similar crossroads of economic development, where a failure of security could derail economic development or economic development could drive gains in political stability and security.

Afghanistan, in the near term, will need to base its economic growth on development of key industries such as marble, agriculture, carpets, financial services, and transportation as the GIRoA attempts to leverage these to create economic growth in other sectors and create a path to internally sustainable development. Success reinforces itself and if these key industries grow as expected, they will spur other businesses and industries to meet the internal Afghan demand.

Afghanistan's greatest potential assets include its central location between Asia and Europe and its untapped mineral wealth. The exploitation of natural wealth and economic gains leveraged by its geographic position will take decades, and will require a substantial improvement in the security situation. Moreover, as in Iraq, any economic development contains the seeds of its own destruction, as economic spoils become the *casus belli* for future conflict.

Afghanistan's economic problems help sustain the insurgency against the GIRoA. Many of Afghanistan's problems that impart momentum to the insurgency result from a lethal combination of illegal drugs, government corruption, and economic underdevelopment. Without continued economic improvement in Afghanistan, the Taliban will probably never lose the insurgency. As the insurgents attempt to return Afghanistan back into the narco-state under the Taliban regime, Afghanistan will face many major hurdles that could take decades to overcome.

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SOCIAL

“Much has been said, and written, about Afghanistan as a leading producer of drugs, causing health havoc in the world. It is time to recognize that the same tragedy is taking place in Afghanistan that has now become a leading consumer of its own opium.”

Antonio Maria Costa, UNODC Executive Director, 21 June 2010

Social

The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members.

KEY FACTS:

- Afghanistan's historic tribal and religious culture contradicts the imposed national government and any semblance of Western democratic ideas.
- Most Afghans practice Islam and observe many Muslim customs, yet the degree to which they do so varies dramatically among tribes and the subsections of each tribe.
- The Global Peace Index for 2010 ranked Afghanistan 147 out of 149 countries, making it the third least peaceful country of those included in the study. (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010)
- Afghanistan ranks among the least developed countries in the world, making living conditions for the majority of the country very poor, with little access to education, housing, jobs, and healthcare.
- Hundreds of thousands of refugees, displaced due to war or inadequate resources under the Taliban, chose to return to Afghanistan over the past few years.
- Many Afghans resort to the easily accessible and inexpensive opium to deal with the stresses of their lives and to reduce pain from injury and illness; adults even give it to ill children, which creates a cycle of dependency.
- Women's rights exist in word and policy, but the Afghan government rarely ensures compliance.
- Despite the Taliban's "fall" in 2001 and the ratification of the Afghan constitution in 2004, violence continues to escalate.¹

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE SOCIAL VARIABLE IN THE OE:

- Increased poverty will force many children to leave school (or prevent them from ever attending) and into exploitive labor situations to help provide for their family; this is particularly true in families with an absent or deceased father.
- If the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) does not implement effective methods to counter Afghanistan's drug culture, the drug problem will not go away because the insurgents and corrupt government officials find it too profitable.
- If schools do not receive better security, education will remain unattainable to the vast majority of rural Afghans because teachers fear Taliban retribution if they go to work and families fear for their children's safety at school.
- If GIROA does not develop authority beyond the capital and northern/eastern major cities, the Taliban will continue to thrive in the predominately Pashtun south.
- If President Hamid Karzai strikes a deal with the Taliban, Afghan women fear their recent gains in rights will fade away.
- If the GIROA does not acknowledge, respect, and integrate the tribal structures, it is unlikely to ever gain the level of support it needs to endure.

SOCIAL OVERVIEW:

Most of Afghanistan faces dire social conditions, particularly women and children who are exploited by the religious and traditional systems without consequence. Rampant poverty; lack of a sustainable, effective government; corruption; and insurgent activity all contribute to a society that perpetually fails to provide the basic necessities to many of its inhabitants. Alternately, historians and analysts will acknowledge that the tribal system, rampant drug culture, and other endemic cultural practices favor some groups, particularly warlords, drug lords, and others who are now identified as insurgents. Since the Taliban's fall in 2001, Afghanistan continues to show improvement, with outside help, in many areas such as governance and infrastructure. An upswing in insurgent activity in the past few years, however, contributed to larger opium production and a higher collateral civilian death rate. While Afghanistan shows substantial construction since 2001, the country still falls short of enough schools or hospitals, and most current ones remain inaccessible to Afghanistan's rural inhabitants. Much of Afghanistan's population lacks access to potable water, electricity, or a modern sewage system. The return of five million refugees to Afghanistan over the last 10 years continues to strain Afghanistan's already sparse resources and services.

Afghanistan took steps in the right direction to improve its social system when the citizens ratified the constitution in 2004 and granted equal rights to men and women. The Afghan constitution implemented the rule of law for the country and the GIROA even outlawed poppy cultivation. Implementation of many laws that could improve the Afghans' social situation remains incomplete, however, because they contradict Afghanistan's cultural history.

SOCIAL STATISTICS FOR AFGHANISTAN (CIA 2010 ESTIMATES):

Population	29,121,286
Age distribution	0-14 years: 42.9% (6,407,865 male; 6,096,971 female) 15-64 years: 54.6% (8,160,844 male; 7,749,565 female) 65 years and over: 2.4% (338,695 male; 367,346 female)
Median age	Total: 18 years Male: 17.9 years Female: 18 years
Population growth rate	2.471%
Birth rate	38.11 births/1,000 population
Death rate	17.65 deaths/1,000 population
Net migration rate	4.24 migrants/1,000 population
Urbanization	Urban population: 24% of total population (2008) Rate of urbanization: 5.4% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
Infant mortality rate	151.1 deaths/1,000 live births
Life expectancy (at birth)	Total: 44.65 years Male: 44.45 years Female: 44.87 years
Fertility rate	5.5 children born per woman
Major diseases	Food or Waterborne: bacterial and protozoan diarrhea, hepatitis A, typhoid Vector borne: malaria Animal contact: rabies
Ethnic groups	42% Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, 13% Turkmen, Baloch, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Parsis, Nuristanis,

	and others
Religions	80% Sunni Muslim, 19% Shia Muslim, 1% other
Languages	50% Afghan Persian/Dari (official), 35% Pashto (official), 11% Turkic languages (such as Uzbek and Turkmen), 4% 30 different minor languages
Literacy rate	Total: 28.1% over age 15 who can read and write Male: 43.1% Female: 12.6%

POPULATION MOVEMENT

The violence over the last 30 years put Afghan residents through a series of displacement and repatriation cycles as the inhabitants fled active combat areas and returned home when they believed they could do so safely. Since about 2004, insurgent violence forced Afghans to leave their homes again and created significant numbers of “conflict induced” internally displaced persons (IDPs). The US State Department defines a refugee as “a person who has been forced from his or her home and crossed an international border for safety. He or she must have a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her native country, on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”¹ Afghanistan’s refugees primarily moved to Pakistan, but many did not make it that far and became IDPs in their own country because of the lack of safe havens in nearby countries.²

MIGRATION

Due to a lack of data, the migration rate for Afghanistan generates a challenge to determine factual figures. In 2010, the CIA estimated Afghanistan increased its population through migration as 5.22 migrants per 1,000 residents entered the country.³ The CIA, however, does not distinguish between types of population movement between countries. Often it becomes difficult to arrive at true figures as Afghan IDPs move internally around the country depending upon the ebb and flow of services from humanitarian aid organizations. Many Afghans fled and some continue to flee to neighboring Pakistan, although millions of Afghan refugees returned home to Afghanistan since the Taliban’s ouster in 2001.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Afghanistan contains three main types of IDPs: conflict induced, environment (natural disaster) induced, and protracted caseload. Due to fluctuations and internal movement, actual IDP numbers become difficult to track. Without accurate numbers, humanitarian aid organizations find it hard to deliver the resources that the IDPs need. In 2009, however, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported 235,833 IDPs in Afghanistan.⁴

Over 30 years of war and many natural disasters have generated countless IDPs; the GIRoA does not possess the resources to take care of Afghan IDPs’ basic needs. Currently the US and other foreign nations, through government programs or nongovernment organizations (NGOs), attempt to provide the IDPs scattered throughout the country with the basics to survive. Even with all the foreign help, the NGOs do not possess enough personnel or resources to properly care for the homeless. Since 2002 with the Taliban’s expulsion, greater than five million Afghans decided to return to their country, most assisted by the UNHCR and Afghanistan’s Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR).⁵

Table 1: Overview of Protracted Caseload IDPs in All Sites

Kandahar-city	Spin Boldak	Zhari Dasht
Direct Flight Badghis – 95 families Ghor – 25 Families Secondary displaced returning refugees Badghis – 30 families	Direct Flight Ghor, Balkh – 120 families Badghis, Sari Pul – 40 families Secondary displaced returning refugees Badghis, Faryab – 340 families Kunduz, Farah, Sari Pul – 750 families Sari Pul, Badghis – 200 families	Direct Flight Badghis – 130 families Kunduz, Badghis – 130 families Badghis, Farah – 120 families Badghis, Sari Pul, Kunduz – 100 families Faryab – 60 families Secondary displaced returning refugees IDPs: Faryab, Badghis – 180 families Returnees: Faryab, Badghis, Sari Pul – 170 families
Total: 150 families	Total: 1,450 families	Total: 890 families

Table 2: Overview of Conflict-Induced IDPs in All Sites

Kandahar-city	Spin Boldak	Zhari Dasht
Post 2004/5 Uruzgan – 1,800 families Helmand – 550 families Zabul – 1,700 families Kandahar – 300 families Paktika – 50 families Total: 4,400 families	Post 2004/5 Kandahar – 9,000 families Helmand – 4, 000 families Uruzgan – 3,000 families Zabul – 100 families Total: 16,100 families	Post 2004/5 Zabul – 130 families Total: 130 families
Post 2001 Paktika – 60 families Helmand – 20 families Total: 80 families	Post 2001 Paktika – 750 families Total: 750 families	Post 2001 Ghazni – 380 families Helmand – 180 families Kandahar – 80 families Wardak – 30 families Zabul – 60 families Total: 730 families
Secondary displaced returning refugees since 2004	Secondary displaced returning Refugees	Secondary displaced returning refugees
Uruzgan Nangarhar Zabul Total: 100 families	Since 2004 Kandahar – 2,000 families Since 2001 Kandahar, Uruzgan – 12,000 families Nangarhar – 20 families Total: 14,020 families	Zabul – 80 families Total: 80 families

Table 3: Overview of Environment (Natural Disaster)-Induced IDPs (including Kuchi)

Kandahar-city	Spin Boldak	Zhari Dasht
Paktika: 40-families of Suliman Khail (overlap with conflict-induced) Garamsir, Badghis and Kuchi who used to migrate between Kandahar and Ghazni: 60 families (Nurzai, Barakzai former and Taraki Kuchi)	Kandahar – 1,000 families Ghor – 170 families Kuchi (Helmand-Ghanzi) – 60 families Kuchi (Kandahar – Ghazni) – 500 families Nangarhar (Kuchi) – 40 families Long-term: Other – 1,800 families, mostly Kuchi	Zabul, Badghis: 250 families (also conflict) Badghis, Ghazni, Zabul, Wardak: 130 families (collapse of Taliban also mentioned) Zabul: 20 families Faryab, Badghis: 180 families
Total: 100 families	Total: 2,770 families	Total: 580 families
Tables 1-3 from Appendix II : Overview of IDP Populations Studied – Three site comparison of Beyond the Blanket: Towards More Effective Protection for Internally Displaced Persons in Southern Afghanistan, May 2010		

REFUGEES

Afghanistan's perpetual state of war prevents foreign refugees from entering the country; it is not a place where people would seek asylum. Afghans, however, represent 25% of the world's refugees (2.8 million), and currently seek asylum in 69 different countries.⁶ As of 2008, the Iranian and Pakistani governments continued to "warehouse" 2,790,900 Afghans in their countries; some for nearly 30 years. "Warehouse" consists of "populations of 10,000 or more restricted to camps or segregated settlements or otherwise deprived of rights to freedom of movement or livelihoods in situations lasting five years or more."⁷ In 2008, Afghanistan ranked fourth in the countries with the most refugees who sought asylum in other countries.⁸

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

The CIA estimates that approximately 76% of Afghanistan's population resides in rural areas, but the country faces an annual urbanization rate of 5.4%.⁹ The predominately rural population means most Afghans engage in agricultural pursuits. Kabul, in the northeastern section of the country, serves as Afghanistan's capital city. Other major cities include Mazar-e Sharif in the north, Jalalabad in the east, Herat in the west, and Kandahar in the south. Major cities naturally possess a higher population density than rural areas.

DEMOGRAPHIC MIX

Males nearly equal females in Afghanistan, but the ratio changes slightly based on age. Males outnumber females at a ratio of 1.05:1 until the age of 65, when the ratio drops to 0.92:1. Afghan girls travel a completely different life path than Afghan boys. Insurgent groups attempt to recruit Afghan boys at an early age to indoctrinate them at a malleable and pliant stage in their lives. If the boys can avoid the insurgents, some will attend school and others will work with their families, often as farmers. In some areas of Afghanistan, girls may also attend school. (*See the education section of this variable for more information.*) Whether they go to school or not, females usually marry young and immediately begin to produce children, a consequence of cultural expectations and the taboo of birth control. The average Afghan woman gives birth to at least five children over the course of her lifetime. This high birth rate coupled with often nonexistent medical care could account for slightly

fewer females in the population at young ages. In later years, the females begin to outnumber the males, probably due to the consequences of war.

Afghanistan faces a “youth bulge” with a median age of only 18 years, making it one of the youngest populations in the world. With a life expectancy of only 44 years, this makes Afghanistan’s overall population quite youthful. With a death rate of 17.65 per 1,000 individuals and a birth rate of 38.11 per 1,000 people, Afghanistan’s growth rate comes out to a positive 2.471%.¹⁰

SOCIAL VOLATILITY

Afghanistan faces a socially unstable and often quite volatile environment due to several factors. First, the Afghan people find themselves under pressure caused by the conflict generated by their society’s power brokers for their support; namely the insurgent groups, the GIRoA, and the traditional system of tribal leaders and religious leaders. Second, the Islamic Sunni and Shia factions still quarrel over the schism that occurred more than 1,300 years ago. Third, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) demonstrate recent improvement in their military effectiveness, but must still prove that they can protect Afghanistan’s citizens from the insurgents. Many Afghans fear that the Afghan National Police (ANP), a part of the ANSF, will only protect their own ethnic group because ANP members often come from the predominant local tribe instead of the entire society like the Afghan National Army (ANA). Finally, some Afghan tribes still continue historical feuds against other local tribes.

Illegal drugs contribute to Afghanistan’s social volatility. An estimated one million Afghans age 15-64, or about 8% of the entire country’s population, find themselves addicted to drugs. A treacherous combination of easily grown poppy crops, easy access to drugs, and lack of healthcare services (little access to prescription drugs) cause Afghans to turn to illegal drugs. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) states that many Afghans form their illegal drug addictions as refugees in Iran or other countries, but can more easily support their addictions after they return to their home country due to its cheaper cost.¹¹

The insurgents’ recent effectiveness to harm and scare Afghan citizens without consequence caused President Karzai to reach an agreement with Taliban leaders. Karzai recently talked with Pakistan about the legitimization of some Taliban operatives’ power and this caused serious concern among some Afghans, particularly the non-Pashtun minorities. Another issue that affects Afghans concerns Karzai’s recent reassignment of Bismullah Khan, a Tajik, from the ANA Chief of Staff position to Interior Minister. Another Tajik, Armullah Saleh, resigned his position as head of the Afghan intelligence service after Karzai reportedly said he “no longer had faith he [Armullah Saleh] could do the job.”¹² These actions caused increased ethnic tension and energized former presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah to hold meetings and give the appearance that he may organize a political campaign. Abdullah, of both Pashtun and Tajik ethnicity, does not want the GIRoA to share any power with the Taliban and said, “We bring them [Taliban] into the government – we give them one or two provinces . . . If that is what they think, it is not going to happen that way. Anybody thinking in that direction, they are lost. Absolutely lost.”¹³ Karzai’s fear that the ANSF may not possess the strength to defend the GIRoA from the Taliban may have driven him into this position. Regardless of Karzai’s motives, any decision that might allow the Taliban into the GIRoA could become quite negative for Afghan minorities.

EDUCATION

Afghanistan suffers from illiteracy that makes it difficult for its people to advance in a modern society. Only approximately 28% of Afghanistan’s people over the age of 15 can read and write in any of the regional languages. About 43% of Afghan males possess basic literacy skills, but only 12% of females are literate. Male children attend school for 11 years according to the CIA *World Factbook*, but females only receive four years of formal education.¹⁴


Education in Afghanistan remains a privilege and not a right as compared to most Western cultures. Since the Taliban's fall, children, particularly girls, often risk their lives if they choose to attend school. Many parents decide to keep their children home from school because the insurgents threatened to harm or kill the children, teachers, or parents. UNICEF reported that school-related attacks in Afghanistan increased dramatically since 2005. In 2006, attacks more than doubled from the previous year from 98 to 220. In 2009, the attacks nearly doubled again from 2008 when they increased from 348 attacks to 610.¹⁵

HEALTHCARE

Many Afghans suffer from poor health attributable to a lack of hospitals, poor drinking water, high risk of infectious disease, and drug use. While poor healthcare services affect men, women, and children, the effects devastate women and children the most. Approximately 109 babies are born for every 1,000 15-19 year old adolescent females each year in Afghanistan.¹⁶ Twenty percent of children die before the age of five. Most women do not receive any healthcare during pregnancy or childbirth, contributing significantly to the high number of maternal deaths in childbirth. Further complications occur because most women are young, malnourished, or have small bodies to start.¹⁷ Approximately 97% of women in Afghanistan do not use birth control because the men do not allow it. Even if the Afghan women wanted to practice family planning, they would need access to a clinic to obtain birth control.¹⁸

ETHNIC DIVERSITY

Afghanistan contains a diverse ethnic population. The Pashtuns comprise close to half of Afghanistan's population and inhabit the southern part of the country. Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks comprise the next three largest ethnic groups, and along with several smaller groups inhabit




primarily Afghanistan's northern section. Experts commonly refer to Afghanistan as a "patchwork quilt" because small ethnic groups appear all over the map, making it difficult to exactly determine each group's ancestral home or current location. Historically, Afghans first identify themselves as part of their ethnic group (typically from the bottom up: family, clan, tribe, for example) before they consider themselves an Afghan. In the last five years, some Afghans began to foster a sense of national identity as they gained an understanding of GIRoA through either direct interaction with GIRoA officials and ANSF, or through information passed from provincial reconstruction team (PRT) members or Coalition Soldiers, but due to the country's rural nature, this phenomenon continues to spread quite slowly.

PASHTUN

Five major tribal confederations comprise the Pashtuns: *Durrani* (Kandahar and Helmand Provinces); *Ghilzai* (Oruzgan, Ghazni, Zabol, and Dai Kundi Provinces); *Ghurghusht* (found alongside Baluchis in Baluchistan); *Karlanri*, known as the "Hill Tribes" (Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area [FATA] and Paktia, Khost, and Paktika Provinces), and the *Sarabani* (Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – formerly known as Northwest Frontier Province [NWFP], southeastern Afghanistan, and Pakistan).¹⁹ These five are further broken down into an estimated 350 separate tribes comprising over nine million Afghans.²⁰ The Pashtun divisions confuse even anthropologists, and one source claims that Pashtuns number in the range of 30 million.²¹

Pashtuns do not possess a traditional hierarchical tribal structure and do not enjoy any sense of Afghan nationalism. A statement made by an Afghan in 1809 rings true to this day for some segments of the population: "We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood . . . we will never be content with a master."²² Such a statement indicates that the Pashtuns may never accept any outside governance, whether it comes from the GIRoA, the Taliban, or the US. Most of the Taliban, however, come from Pashtun tribes. Ironically, many Pashtuns participate politically in Afghanistan's government as governors,



ministers, and members of parliament. The level of trust the average Afghan Pashtun possesses, though, likely still reflects the statement spoken over 200 years ago.

Each Pashtun subtribe possesses unique characteristics. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), belongs to the Ghilzai Pashtun tribal group. Ghilzais, in general, possess a reputation as strong warriors. By contrast, the Durrani tribes demonstrate a more peaceful disposition and consequently show little interest in ANA service. President Karzai comes from a Durrani tribe. Most of the Ghurghusht live in Pakistan just south of the Durand line. Anthropologists noted a change in the Ghurghusht from a relatively peaceful group to a more “radical” group over the last 10 years.²³ The Kakar subtribe of the Ghurghusht boastfully claims that several Taliban leaders come from their tribe. The Karlanri comprise factions of the Haqqani Network (Jallaludin Haqqani). The Sarbani represent another Pashtun group known for their adept fighting skills.²⁴

Ethnic Group	Branch of Islam
Pashtun	Hanafi Sunni, except the Turi who are Shia
Tajik	Hanafi Sunni; some are Ismaili Shia
Farsiwan	Imami Shia
Qizilbash	Imami Shia
Hazara	Imami or Ismaili Shia; some Sunni
Aimaq	Hanafi Sunni
Moghul	Hanafi Sunni
Uzbek	Hanafi Sunni
Turkmen	Hanafi Sunni
Kirghiz	Hanafi Sunni
Other Muslim groups	Hanafi Sunni

Ethnic Group and Religions, [Afghans – Their History and Culture](#), 2010

TAJIK

Tajiks compose the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan at about 27% of the population. The Tajiks speak Dari and primarily practice the Sunni Muslim faith. This group lives mostly in Herat Province and in or near the Panjshiri Valley in Panjshir Province. Two days before 9/11, al-Qaeda assassinated Tajik Ahmed Shah Massoud, a hero to many Afghans for fighting both the Soviets and later the Taliban. The ANA’s ethnic diversity under represents the Tajik’s population numbers in Afghanistan.²⁵

HAZARA

The Hazara ethnic group speaks a Dari dialect called Hazari and practices the Shia Muslim faith. Hazaras typically belong to Afghanistan’s poorest economic group. The Hazaras’ physical appearance suggests Mongolian descent and their tribal lore traces their origins to Genghis Khan. Because of their low socio-economic position, other Afghan tribes routinely displayed extreme prejudice against the Hazaras for hundreds of years. When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, the Hazaras found themselves susceptible to extreme violence. Hazaras are poorly represented in the ANA and rarely serve as officers.²⁶

UZBEK

The Uzbeks practice the Sunni Muslim faith and speak Turkic. Because of their small numbers in Afghanistan, they often ally themselves with the Tajiks, who share similar values. Uzbek representation in the Afghan National Army approximately equals their percentage of the population.²⁷

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Two primary sects comprise the Islam religion: Sunni (or Sunnites) and Shia (also called Shiites). The groups formed in 765 after the death of the fourth caliph and Mohammed's legitimate successor, Ali. Ali, the prophet's cousin, also became Mohammed's son-in-law. The Shias believe only a descendant of Mohammed is qualified to lead the Islamic faith while the Sunnis do not. The Sunnis believe the people should elect the *caliph*, or leader, of their faith. This schism divided the Muslims and continues to cause tension between the two sects to the present day. Approximately 80% of Afghans practice the Sunni version of the Islamic faith. About 19% practice the Shia Muslim faith while less than 1% practices other religions, such as Christianity.

All Muslims practice the same five pillars of their faith.

- Recite the *shahadah*: Each Muslim, or anyone that wants to convert to the Islamic faith, must state, "I testify that there is none worthy of worship except God and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of God."
- Conduct *saleh*: Muslims must conduct ritual prayer five times a day. These include *Fajr* (pre-dawn), *Dhuhr* (noon), *Asr* (afternoon), *Maghrib* (sunset), and *Isha* (evening). While mandatory, the religion allows flexibility in certain circumstances. Muslims conduct all prayers in the Arabic language.
- *Sawn*: In the month of Ramadan, or the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, Muslims must fast from dawn to dusk. This includes both food and drink. Certain groups, such as soldiers, may break their fast if it creates undue hardship on them. Those that break Sawn, however, should make up the fast at a later time.
- *Zakat*: All Muslims that are financially able should give a fixed portion of their accumulated wealth as alms to the poor. Muslims consider these donations as a religious obligation and not as voluntary charity. Those Muslims that can afford it should give even more to the poor.
- The *Hadj*: The Islamic faith requires every able-bodied Muslim who can afford it to make a pilgrimage to Mecca in Dhu al-Hijjah, or the 12th month of the Islamic calendar. The Hadj includes many rituals that symbolize important events in the Islamic faith.

SUNNI MUSLIMS

Worldwide, the Sunnis constitute about 90% of all Muslims and Sunnis dominate the Islamic faith in most countries. This is true in Afghanistan as 80% practice the Sunni version of Islam. The Sunnis place great emphasis on Mohammed's deeds and words. Four Sunni legal schools—the Maliki, Shafi, Hanafi, and Hanbali—interpret the Koran and the *hadith*, the words of the prophet Mohammed. These judges rule on issues and questions about the Islamic faith. Most Afghans belong to the Hanafi School, who interpret the *hadith* more liberally. The Hanafi School began in the 8th century in Baghdad and now serves as the world's largest Islamic legal school.

SHIA MUSLIMS

While Sunnis dominate the Islamic religion worldwide, two countries contain a Shia majority: Iran and Iraq. As a neighbor of Iran, Afghanistan contains areas of Shia that suffer discrimination and persecution by the Sunni majority. About 19% of Afghan Muslims practice the Shia version of Islam. Over the centuries, several other groups splintered off the Shia branch due to disputes over a number of issues to include the interpretation, importance, and validity of the *hadith*.²⁸

COMMON LANGUAGES

Many Afghans speak at least two languages in a country with dozens of identifiable languages. Dari and Pashto serve as Afghanistan's two official languages. The Pashtuns in the south speak primarily

Pashto while northern Afghans speak primarily Dari. Both Dari and Pashto come from the Indo-Iranian language family. Dari, a derivation of Persian, is sometimes referred to as Afghan Persian. Both Dari and Pashto possess numerous local dialects. Various smaller ethnic groups in the north primarily speak Turkic.

The chart below contains some common phrases translated into both Dari and Pashto.

English	Dari	Pashto
Hello	Sa-laam	Salaam-alay-kum
Goodbye	Baa-maa-ne khu-daa	Khu-die-pa-amaan
Thank you	Ta-shak-kur	Mo-te-shak-ker-am
Yes/No/Ok	Ba-ley/ney/Du-rust	Ba-le/nah/sa-hee
Please	Lut-fan	Meh-ra-baa-ne
Excuse me/I'm sorry	Bu-bakh-sheyn	Wo-bakha
My name is	Na-me ma... as	Z-maa noom
What is your name?	Naa-met chees?	Staa num tsa de?
How are you?	Che-tor has-tee?	Tsenga-ye?
I am fine, thanks, and you?	Khoob has-tum, ta-shak-kur, too che-tor has-tee?	Za-xa-yum, ma-na-na, te-tsenga-ye?
Do you speak English?	Eng-lee-see yaad-daa-ree?	Ta lng-li-si sha-ba-ri ka-wo-lie she?
Good/bad	Khoob/bad	Xa/bad
Left/right	Chap/du-rust or raast	Chap/raast-ta
North/South/East/West	Sha-maal/ju-noob/sharq/gharb	Sha-maal/ju-nub/sharq/gharb
Help me	Ku-ma-kem ko	
Help!		Ma-ras-ta
Do you need help?	Too ba ku-mak za-roo-rat daa-ree?	Maa sara marasta wuka
We are Americans	Maa am-ree-kaa-yee has-teym	Mung-Amrikaa-yan-yu
Stop/come here	Es-taad sho/een-ja be-yaa	Wo-d'a-ri-ga/del-ta raa-sha
Stay where you are	Da jaa-yet baash	Pa dzai de wo-da-ri-ga
Put your weapon down	Sa-laa-he-ta ba za-meen baan	Topak de-par-mi-dzaka ki-xiz-de
Lie on your stomach	Roo-ye she-kam da-raaz be-kash	Par makh pre-wo-za
Do not move	Sor na-kho	Har-kat ma-ka-wa

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Handbook 10-10, [Agribusiness Development Teams \(ADT\) in Afghanistan Handbook](#), November 2002 (accessed 5 August 2010).

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Insurgent activity creates most of the criminal activity throughout Afghanistan. Insurgent groups, especially the Taliban, harass, assault or even kill Afghan parents who send their children to school (other than traditional madrassas), those who do not adhere to Islamic law, or women who do not follow tradition or who commit so-called moral crimes.

Insurgent groups recruit young boys, train them in explosives, and then direct them to plant roadside IEDs that kill or injure both Coalition Forces and innocent citizens. To protect themselves from ISAF firepower, many insurgents now adopt an effective practice in which they use innocent civilians as shields when they come under attack. The insurgents either place women and children in their compounds with them, or hold a baby in their arms to prevent the ISAF from firing.

HUMAN RIGHTS

When Afghanistan adopted its new constitution in 2005, the constitution declared that the law considered all women and men equal. This principle encountered two problems. First, gender equality would change the historical social balance practiced for centuries in the Afghan culture. Although women's rights in Afghanistan fluctuated over the years, Islam created a restrictive environment for females. Most people, Afghan or not, will not change their values simply because of a constitutional declaration. Second, the GIRoA cannot or will not enforce the legal rights of its

female citizens. The nascent GIRoA struggles to perform the basic governmental functions, including attempts to keep its citizens safe, so women's rights issues do not receive a high priority.

WOMEN

Afghan women face many obstacles if they decide to seek work outside the home. Only 7% of Afghan women hold jobs compared to 81% of Afghan men. Nearly 60% of employed women earn less than \$100 monthly, barely enough to support themselves.²⁹ Even if an Afghan single mother with children could find an outside job, she probably could not make enough to support her family. Societal support for women with jobs varies by gender and location. About 73% of urban Afghan women "strongly" support women's employment, but only 29% of rural men do the same. Encouragingly, 50% of urban men "strongly" support a woman's right to work outside the home.³⁰

The Muslim tradition for women to wear the burqa creates controversy in Afghanistan as its citizens view the burqa as both protective and repressive. In a 2009 survey, 58% of Afghan men thought that women should not decide for themselves whether they should wear the burqa, but 55% of Afghan women believed they should make their own decision. (Three percent did not answer the question.)³¹

The treatment of women in a traditional manner may result from the fear of backlash if women attempt to assert all their constitutional rights. Because of centuries of tradition, Afghan men will most likely not change their treatment of women in their society quickly. Often, women who attempt to assert their new rights receive punishments and beatings as they dishonor their families according to the Islamic faith. The perpetrators who attack women do so without fear of repercussions from the GIRoA.³²

Recent political events cause Afghan women to fear that they may lose their new-found constitutional rights. President Karzai's latest plan to potentially share power with Taliban leaders scares women, who believe that Afghanistan will return to the Taliban's repressive era.³³ Women still remember their lives under the Taliban 10 years ago, and realize they live better lives today in Afghanistan, even if only marginally. The Afghan women think that if the Taliban return to power, even with just a small role in the GIRoA, Afghan women will lose the gains made in education, jobs, and healthcare since the Taliban's ouster.

CHILDREN AND CHILD WARRIORS

According to IRIN, the GIRoA does not protect children's rights any better than women's rights. Children find themselves more susceptible to negative influences and often possess no recourse to change their situation. The Afghanistan Rights Monitor (ARM), a human rights group in Kabul, reported that more child fatalities occurred in Afghanistan in 2009 than in any year since 2001. "About 1,050 children died in suicide attacks, roadside blasts, air strikes and in the cross-fire between Taliban insurgents and pro-government Afghan and foreign forces from January to December 2009," ARM reported in January.³⁴ This means that three or more children died every day in war-related events in 2009.³⁵ A representative of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) stated, "Both male and female children have been the increasing victims of war and criminality in Afghanistan but the government has not done enough to alleviate their hardship and to reduce their deprivation."³⁶

Children not only fall victim to violence, but many boys become the perpetrators of violence. The insurgents recruit boys to commit crimes and sacrifice their own lives as they plant IEDs, serve as suicide bombers, and conduct other dangerous military related activities. The ARM reported over 2,000 rights violations against children in Afghanistan in 2009 alone. These reported violations included child recruitment for war activities, neglect of basic food and healthcare needs, rape, and forced labor. Many children also could not attend school because of attacks on their parents, schools, teachers, and themselves.³⁷ A report by the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict

in February 2010 alleged that the ANSF, which includes the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), still employ children below their self-imposed minimum age of 18 because of “insufficient age determination procedures.”³⁸

CENTERS OF SOCIAL POWER

Both traditional and nontraditional groups possess various degrees of power and influence in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai, district leaders (governors, sub-governors), and National Assembly members represent the government’s power along with the ANSF, while mullahs and tribal leaders represent the traditional power structure present for centuries. Insurgent groups and warlords also wield power in Afghanistan that is just as significant as the power of the traditional leaders and governmental leaders. The insurgents maintain a loose power network, but often use fear and intimidation to gain the “support” of locals, making their power as significant as that of legitimate sources.

POLITICAL

President Hamid Karzai won his second term as president in August 2009, although widespread allegations of fraud clouded the election. Even now, Karzai continues to struggle to earn support from the parliament, who rejected 17 of Karzai’s 24 nominations for ministerial positions.³⁹

Complications plagued the 2009 elections due to the logistics required to set up polls. The general lack of infrastructure and security became evident in the election process. Voters/candidates filed thousands of claims of voter fraud that questioned the election’s legitimacy. The GIRoA set up thousands of polls throughout the country with separate areas for all males and females. The GIRoA set up most of the southern polls, however, in dangerous areas that prevented election monitors from safely presiding over the sites. The lack of monitors enabled the alleged voter fraud and increased the number of complaints.⁴⁰

Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai’s main opponent and a primary complainer of the process, alleged that voter ballot boxes were “stuffed.”⁴¹ Although Karzai, a Pashtun, was always favored to win, he fell just short of the required 50%, and Abdullah garnered approximately 31% of the votes. The two candidates were to face off in a run-off election but Abdullah opted to pull out, citing the fraudulent process. Despite Karzai’s shortfall at 49.67%, the Independent Election Committee awarded him the win when he no longer had an opponent.⁴²

The GIRoA still finds itself with a fairly limited reach within its own borders. The farther from Kabul, the less control the central government can maintain over the Afghan people. Any area outside ANA or ANP reach becomes a place that the insurgents can attempt to infiltrate and set up a shadow government. President Karzai early on, however, established successful relationships with the US and other countries to bring Afghanistan to where it finds itself today.

SOCIAL

Afghanistan does not possess one clearly established social hierarchical network. Various hierarchies exist throughout Afghanistan and compete simultaneously for the Afghan people, especially since ISAF began to assist the GIRoA’s development. The GIRoA exists as a powerful entity in the capital area, but weakens every mile farther away from Kabul. In the rural areas and cities away from Kabul, the power to effect social change revolves around the male heads of their families, the various tribes and their leaders, and religious leaders.

Religious

Religious leaders play a major role in Afghanistan’s social life. Islam not only serves as a religion, but as a way of life for Muslims. What the mullahs and imams say in the Mosque about social issues

echoes throughout Afghan society. This remains especially true in the more traditional and rural population. If military personnel cannot obtain the support of the mullahs and imams, they will most likely not gain the support of local civilians.

Tribal

Historically, Afghanistan contained a number of tribes whose leaders affected the social order, and this remains true to this day. Recently, ISAF approached the Shunwari tribal leaders from a large Pashtun tribe located in the south and asked them to join forces to fight local insurgents. The Shunwari elders did not feel they could rely on the Afghan government and agreed that they might serve as an effective weapon against the insurgents. As one elder stated: “We are doing this for ourselves, and ourselves only. We have absolutely no faith in the Afghan government to do anything for us. We don't trust them at all.”⁴³

Unfortunately, this local security plan against the insurgents backfired for two reasons. First, the plan did not unify the Shunwari with the GIRoA despite the fact that they both faced the same enemy. Second, it did not take long before infighting between the Shunwari began as “two subclans erupted into a firefight that has left 13 people dead and another 35 injured.”⁴⁴ These incidents discourage the foreign countries that want to help Afghanistan as it changes to a democratic style government that remains unlikely to function efficiently for some time.

Family

Afghanistan's most important social system remains the family. Families may temporarily ally themselves with other families, their clan, their tribe, and even their nation, but those relationships can change based on the situation. Ironically, family loyalty does not apply to a family member who breaks the code of honor; the family will kill the offender. In Afghanistan, the husband/father serves as the undisputed head of the family. Other family members usually acquiesce to the male head of household's decisions even when they go against the other family members' interests.

Gender

In Afghanistan, males dominate the social system due to a historically patriarchal culture and the Muslim religion. When Afghanistan ratified its constitution in 2005, women abstemiously received equal rights. While evidence of progress for Afghan females exists throughout the country, especially the 25% of women in the National Assembly as mandated by law, many gender inequalities overshadow progress. In rural areas, many women still do not know that the approved constitution granted all Afghan females equal rights. Tribes, local governments, and insurgents regularly persecute women for moral crimes and women possess no recourse against their accusers and prosecutors.

Age

In Afghanistan, age serves as an important piece of the social system. Traditional Afghans respect their elders and typically defer to their wisdom, gained through years of experience. Tribal elders usually meet at *jirgas* to discuss and decide community issues. In many business deals, the senior male will make the decisions.⁴⁵

ECONOMIC

In Afghanistan, the poor economy permeates all areas of the social system. Despite relatively impressive economic gains over the last 10 years, Afghanistan's economy remains one of the worst in the world. The high poverty rate generates poor health and limits educational access for most citizens. Although the GIRoA outlawed poppy cultivation, many farmers still grow poppies as it serves as the only means they can obtain enough money to support their families. Since corrupt

government officials, police, or insurgents profit from illegal activities, law enforcement remains lax in many areas of Afghanistan, especially in the south. The GIROA does show some improvement as they reduce poppy cultivation in northern and eastern Afghanistan.

Economic Class

As with many other issues, the southern rural areas experience a higher poverty rate than the rest of Afghanistan. Normally, those areas closer to Kabul enjoy a lower poverty rate than those farther away. As of 2010, 53% of Afghans lived below the poverty line.⁴⁶ Many Afghans suffer malnutrition from lack of a balanced diet and medical care. Health issues create other social problems. If a family loses their mother, then the father must rear the children and that may compromise the father's ability to maintain a job. Likewise, widows find it difficult to find outside work to support their family and possess few other resources to support them.


The poverty endemic to the whole country renders most Afghan citizens economically powerless. Corrupt elements of the government and insurgents capitalize on the little profit made by some Afghans as they implement "tariffs" by threats on poppy farmers in exchange for looking the other way, or to provide "protection." Those farmers who attempt to survive legitimately find it difficult because legal crops simply do not bring in enough money for them to support their families.

Occupation

Afghanistan primarily operates as an agrarian society as almost 79% of the people work in agriculture-related pursuits.⁴⁷ Rural Afghan men farm and sometimes will take on other labor-type jobs when they can find the work. Rural women usually do not work outside the home, but share in the responsibilities to maintain the farm and the home. Widows struggle to survive because of their inability to find outside work to earn enough money to support their large families that often contain about five children.

BASIC CULTURAL NORMS AND VALUES

Many experts often compare Afghanistan to a patchwork quilt, and rightly so. Each patch on the Afghan quilt represents a different tribe or sub-tribe and ultimately becomes sewn together by Islam and the Pashtunwali code as practiced by Pashtuns and some other Afghans who also adopted the principles.⁴⁸ Due to the differences between the various groups, their codes of honor, and the concept of revenge that permeates almost all Afghan society and causes a great deal of strife, the threads on the Afghan quilt become quite fragile and can unravel easily. An inability for the various tribes to unify under a central government largely explains Afghanistan's lack of development while it exacerbates the tribes' differences.



Taliban Propaganda Poster, Marine Corps Combat Development, 2010 Command, 2009

HONOR AND REVENGE

Honor is an essential feature of Afghan tribal society and unifies the family members. If someone kills a family member, the honor code implies that another family member should seek revenge and retribution against the person, clan, or tribe that caused the family member's death. If an Afghan dishonors his own family, however, the honor code may require that his family kill the malefactor for the sake of the family's name. For example, the Taliban distributed a powerful leaflet that showed an ISAF male soldier as he searched an Afghan woman (see above). Because only male family members can touch their female relatives, this search invaded not only the woman's privacy, it also dishonored her family. If the family found out about the search, they might kill the woman because, from the Afghan perspective, the violation of her person brought shame to the entire family.⁴⁹

HOSPITALITY


While Afghans do not trust outsiders, the culture displays a dichotomy because they practice good hospitality for their guests. As in many non-Western societies, hospitality and personal interactions follow a very rigid set of rules. Specific examples are described under the Customs and Practices section below.

APPROACH TO WARFIGHTING

The Afghans fought guerilla style warfare even before the French coined the term in the late 18th century and they probably used similar tactics when they fought Alexander the Great in 330 BCE. Most military experts respect the ability of the Afghans to conduct guerilla warfare, especially the British, who lost several wars against Afghan guerillas in the 19th century, and most recently the Soviets, whose invasion and subsequent occupation in the 1980s failed. Afghanistan's terrain with its treacherous mountain ranges and harsh weather makes it perfectly suited for unconventional warfare. Afghanistan's tribal history, ethnic groups, and warlords make it an ideal fit for decentralized unconventional operations.

Afghans respect physical fitness, courage, and glory in combat and are recognized by outsiders as warriors and fierce fighters. In this effort to achieve glory in combat, they will often disregard the opportunity to seize and retain land over the chance to attack an enemy. Afghans see war as an endurance contest or a test of wills over who will fight and last the longest. They do not view war in terms of battles or campaigns. Historically, Afghans lack the military training and discipline of Western militaries. Afghans teach their children at early age, however, how to handle weapons and most rural males carry weapons, even in peacetime. The Afghans do not attach any shame if they cease combat for a certain time period, negotiate with the enemy, or even change sides in combat if it will help them achieve their ultimate goals.

Afghans support the Islamic concept of *jihad*, or holy struggle. Jihad refers to the Islamic fight against sin and suppression of Islam, but can also mean an armed struggle to defend Islam. In



Afghanistan, jihad now means an armed struggle against outside infidels (non-Muslims) and an armed struggle to defend their homeland. Along with the Afghan warrior's hopes for glory, an Afghan soldier, like all Muslims, believes that if he dies in a jihad, Allah will forgive all and he will die a martyr for Islam. If Afghans fight and survive in a jihad, the soldiers become heroes.

Many Afghans considered themselves *mujahideen* (loosely translated from Arabic as "those who struggle") in the Soviet-Afghan War, while other Afghans simply regarded themselves as defenders of their own land. The Afghan resistance of the 1980s fought the Soviet invasion and occupation as a decentralized mujahideen force with many different leaders and commanders. Most *mujahideen* groups consisted of ethnically related men from nearby or related villages or towns.

The all-volunteer mujahideen allowed many soldiers to fight part-time so they could tend their crops or herds until recalled for the next battle. This aspect of Afghan tribal warfare generates an almost seasonal combat tempo, since the war's ebb and flow may stem more from the agricultural cycle than strategy. This decentralized, part-time force reduced the mujahideen forces' requirements to maintain large logistics trains to support its force. The mujahideen also wore out the Soviets, who could not isolate the dispersed force and then concentrate its firepower to destroy it. The mujahideen successfully exploited the Soviets' weaknesses as they remained bound to the Ring Road.

Traditionally, the Afghan warrior culture did not support suicide attacks, as the Afghans did not see any glory or honor in such tactics. Most suicide bombers originally came from outside Afghanistan and analysts consider such attacks as a strong indicator of al-Qaeda or foreign fighter involvement. Over the past few years, al-Qaeda successfully influenced the Taliban to implement and increase its suicide missions in Afghanistan. Now, both al-Qaeda and the Taliban contain suicide brigades in their group's personnel structure.⁵⁰ Currently, the typical suicide bomber is a male in his teens to early twenties.

CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES

Personal relationships serve as a vital component throughout Afghan society. The development or disintegration of the relationships depends on whether or not individuals follow many societal customs such as those listed below. While Afghans admire bravery in combat and a certain degree of stoicism, the country also respects poetry. Afghans, like many non-Western countries, do not like direct language and will view the speaker as ignorant. Instead, Afghans enjoy, appreciate, and will listen to speakers who use metaphorical language. Outside military personnel can gain more respect from the Afghans through their personal behavior than their military rank, threats, or displays of power. According to anthropologist Nancy Dupree, "Individuals gain respect, maintain status, and enhance their social standing in the community through polite behavior . . . Much of etiquette therefore is designed to preserve *zat* [honor]. As a consequence, Afghan society places much emphasis on correct behavior."⁵¹ Common Afghan customs and behaviors are explained below.

CULTURAL "DOS AND DON'TS"

- Do not inquire about men's wives as Afghans consider these questions rude. Do not offer information about your wife or show pictures of her to the Afghans. Many Afghan men, particularly those in rural areas, do not see the faces of any women except for their own wives, sisters, and mothers.
- Be polite and show hospitality to guests.
- Do not maintain constant eye contact with Afghan men. If possible, do not look Afghan elders directly in the eye. Do not make eye contact with any Afghan women.

- Although some sources state that Afghans do not always expect foreigners to know all their cultural traditions, military personnel should avoid showing the bottoms of their feet to any Afghan.
 - You will often sit on the floor for meetings, so sit cross-legged with your feet tucked under your legs.
 - Showing the bottoms of the feet is a sign of deliberate insult.⁵²

MEETING AND GREETING

- Take time to make proper introductions and greet others.
- Greet everyone you pass on the street. Afghans consider it rude to walk past someone without greeting them.
 - Greet passers-by with “Salaam Aleikum”; if the person greets you first, reply with “Wali Aleikum Asalaam.”
 - If the Afghan is your elder, place your right hand over your heart and nod your head while speaking the greeting. This is a sign of respect.
 - Shake the hands of other men when meeting and greeting them. Ensure your handshake is firm. Place your free hand over the other person’s hand to indicate a warmer, friendlier greeting.
- Many Afghans will greet with hugs, especially family members.⁵³

VISITING/HOSPITALITY/GIFTS

Whenever possible, remove your shoes when you enter someone’s home. Afghans consider this a sign of respect and comfort. Afghans place a great deal of emphasis on manners and hospitality. Afghans honor their guests with tea and sometimes a simple snack such as nuts, crackers, or something sweet to accompany it. This level of hospitality helps build the interpersonal relationship in the Afghan culture. It is also a sign of respect and gratitude to bring a gift when visiting someone.

TABOOS

Military personnel of both genders should not show too much skin. Afghan men commonly keep their arms and legs covered. Women do the same with the addition of covering their hair and, for some, their face.

PERSONAL SPACE

Afghan males greet other males with warm handshakes, hugs, and even kiss each other on the cheek. Only shake a woman’s hand in a business/professional situation. Otherwise, do not touch or make direct eye contact with Afghan females.

DISPLAYS OF AFFECTION

Except for greeting an individual as describe previously, Afghans do not deem other public displays of affection appropriate for their society. This includes affectionate display common to the US such as hand-holding between members of the opposite sex or kissing, even when conducted by a married couple. The Afghans place much value on modesty.

MARRIAGE RITUALS

A typical Afghan wedding ceremony will last three days and the groom will not see his bride until the third day. The Afghans spare no expense on the wedding celebration. The groom is expected to pay for the wedding, which often costs much more than his annual salary. Wedding debts often are paid over several months to several years. The groom also offers a payment to the bride's family, a "reverse dowry" of sorts.⁵⁴ Men and women do not date in Afghanistan as families arrange the marriages. Afghan girls normally marry at a young age, around age 16, sometimes even younger in rural areas, but sometimes not until their early twenties. Extravagant weddings are part of the Afghan cultural tradition.

WORK WEEK/WORK HOURS

Afghans manage their time much more loosely than Western societies. Meetings will start, like anything else, on a personal level. Afghans spend much time to cultivate interpersonal relationships and continue this practice into business meetings. Meetings often last a long time, but with little accomplished. A male Afghan elder will set the meeting's pace and the other participants must respect it.⁵⁵

The Muslim month of Ramadan drastically affects work in Afghanistan. During Ramadan, do not schedule meetings after 1500 hours. Strict Muslims will only perform what they perceive as essential work during Ramadan, and daily schedules are typically shortened.⁵⁶

CONCEPT OF TIME

In business meetings with Afghans, the participants will rarely cover the entire agenda. Military personnel will need to allow more time over a series of meetings to cover all the issues.⁵⁷ Do not show impatience, look at your watch, or try to rush the meeting to a conclusion. Afghans must build a relationship and sense of trust with business partners before they can get to actual issues that need resolution. The Afghans' penchant for metaphorical oration slows the pace of business as well.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Conflict resolution varies from rural to urban environments. Rural Afghans resolve conflicts before a council of elders at a jirga. The jirga allows each person to speak his opinion in a respectful manner. The jirga then reaches a consensus solution agreeable to all present. In the cities with new governmental systems in place, Afghanistan operates more formal systems. This includes the use of local police and judges to resolve issues that the jirga decides in the rural areas. This is a challenge as many rules of law are as yet underdeveloped.

DEATH/BIRTH RITUALS

Both births and deaths require visitations and celebrations or rituals of sharing food. The birth of a firstborn child creates a massive family celebration in Afghanistan. On the sixth day of the child's life, the new parents expect friends to visit and bring gifts. Due to the patriarchal aspects of the society, Afghans celebrate more elaborately the birth of firstborn male children than female children. Afghans hold less extravagant birth celebrations for later children. Deaths entail many large meals that take place intermittently for up to a year after the death to honor the lost loved one. Family and other community members take part in these remembrance dinners.⁵⁸

Summary

Afghanistan's culture comprises a dichotomy on many diverse levels. The strength and position of any one layer may change over time. The people generate much of Afghanistan's social complexity. The most basic social division in Afghanistan comes from the religious divide between the Sunni and Shia sects. The Afghans, however, demonstrate other marked social differences: urban and rural; men and women; ardent insurgent supporters and passive supporters. Most Afghans are poor, particularly by US standards. Many men will cultivate poppies, participate in the drug trade, or join an insurgent group if that is what it takes to support their families. Afghanistan's culture operates through trust based on interpersonal relationships. Outsiders do not earn the Afghans' trust easily, and this is made even more difficult with decades of deceit from other countries.

Afghans often support the system with the most power or the one they will think will help them achieve their local goals. If the local security forces are present, visible, and have demonstrated ability to protect the people, then the people are swayed to believe that their government will protect them. If, however, the security forces fail to protect the locals for any reason and the insurgents dominate the area, the Afghans will switch their support to the insurgents to ensure their own survival. The ISAF goal for a functional Afghan government, while altruistic, may not be realistic. Recent headlines indicate that President Karzai is in talks with the Taliban and may reflect the philosophy "if you can't beat them, join them." It could also be that Karzai is afraid of what might happen when ISAF leaves and if the ANSF cannot protect the GIRoA from the insurgents. Thus, to ensure his own survival, Karzai perhaps will attempt to co-opt the Taliban to become part of his government. This would exemplify an inherent cultural norm in Afghanistan that is present even in the nation's top leader.

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INFORMATION

“The mirror fell, and broke into pieces. Everybody took a piece of it, and they looked at it and thought they had the entire truth In Afghanistan, this is the problem, because everybody holds a piece of that mirror, and they all look at it and claim that they hold the entire truth.”

Mohsen Makhmalbaf, Iranian filmmaker

Information

The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, manipulate, disseminate, or act on information.

KEY FACTS:

- Afghanistan possesses a diverse information environment.
- Afghanistan mass media continues to mature rapidly.
- Military personnel can consider the Afghan information environment as key terrain in the battlespace.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFORMATION VARIABLE IN THE OE:

- Foreign military personnel will experience severe disadvantages in the information warfare (INFOWAR) fight for many reasons such as language, xenophobia, and enemy INFOWAR actions.
- In Afghanistan, the Internet does not serve as an important internal information medium, but acts as a critical asset to the overall Taliban effort to provide their side of the story to the rest of the world.
- Due to Afghanistan's high illiteracy rate, radio and TV serve as the most important mass media outlets.
- For military personnel, word of mouth communications serve as the most vital method of day-to-day communications operations. For the best effects on the target population, military personnel must understand their audience, their history, and their motivations.

INFORMATION OVERVIEW:

Afghanistan possesses a dynamic and diverse information environment that may frustrate, confuse, and mislead outsiders who do not understand the culture. While the Afghan population suffers from low literacy rates and a lack of formal education, they exhibit a ravenous appetite for information. The growing communications industry wants to fill that void, but the security situation and other factors, such as financing, create challenges to information dissemination through modern technology. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) considers INFOWAR as a critical element of the overall Coalition strategy for Afghanistan's security. While Afghanistan possesses the physical conditions (Internet, radio, TV, and other mass media) to project their messages, ISAF finds it difficult to transmit the information effectively because of the perceptions and attitudes of the target audience.

Perception management forms the heart of INFOWAR for all combatants in Afghanistan as the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and the insurgents attempt to create the impression of their respective successes. While limited, other INFOWAR elements do exist in Afghanistan. For example, the insurgents use deception measures or command line improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to defeat ISAF jamming.

Neither the GIRoA nor the insurgents maintain a highly technical intelligence capability. As in most counterinsurgencies, human intelligence (HUMINT) serves as the primary intelligence gathering mechanism. In the future, the GIRoA will likely increasingly leverage its foreign partners' technical capabilities, such as biometrics. Conversely, the insurgents will probably turn to the international market to increase its INFOWAR and intelligence capabilities.

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

After the US intervention in 2001, public communications media began to flourish as TV, radio, and Internet use exploded by all levels of Afghan society. When the Taliban government ruled Afghanistan from the mid-1990s to 2001, the Muslim fundamentalists practically eliminated all public media. The Afghans, especially the younger people, made public communications popular under the GIRoA, which limits censorship but maintains the legal right to suppress anti-Islamic views. The GIRoA, however, generally refrains from doing so. Afghanistan's multicultural society typically means that radio stations and TV broadcast their programs in either Dari or Pashto, and less commonly in Persian, Urdu, or English. In March 2010, the GIRoA announced that the government would begin to filter and block anti-Islamic web content that included web-based email, social networking sites, and sites related to sex, alcohol, and gambling.¹

The Afghan public media enjoys considerable confidence among the Afghan people, especially compared to the GIRoA. Surveys indicate that 70% of Afghans possess confidence in the media outlets, but only 50% possess confidence in their municipal, provincial, or national governments.² Future US strategic communications plans created in theater want to leverage the public communications media to create a meaningful inter-Afghan dialogue about Afghanistan's future, the government's structure, and the Afghan nation's strategy against the insurgents.

Unsurprisingly, Afghan urban dwellers receive more exposure to public communications media than those in rural areas as those in the cities possess greater access to a radio, a TV, or the Internet. Afghans can obtain their information from a number of sources such as the GIRoA, private news stations, and international outlets. Radio is the primary media source of information for most Afghans.



Afghan Border Police Officer and Afghan civilian try out an ISAF distributed radio, National Guard Bureau, February 2010

In the future, Afghan media will probably experience decentralized growth that leads district capitals and other major cities to develop their own media infrastructure.³ Like the US, Afghanistan will likely develop a two-tier public media, where local stations affiliate themselves with a national network. Afghanistan's mountainous terrain will limit the distance of broadcasts, so national media will need to partner with local stations to reach their intended audiences with over-the-air broadcasts.

INTERNET

The Internet continues to expand within Afghanistan, but currently only the urban, literate elite use it regularly. Prior to 2001, the Afghan Taliban government banned Internet use due to its non-Islamic content. Since 2001, Afghan Internet use continuously increased, but even by regional standards remains quite low at 3.4% of the population or about a million users in 2010.⁴

The insurgents, to include the ousted Afghan Taliban, now leverage the Internet to disseminate propaganda internationally to raise funds and for political purposes. While the Internet provides a crucial weapon for the insurgents' INFOWAR effort, their targets reside outside of Afghanistan. Conversely, various international elements in support of the GIRoA also use the Internet effectively.

Internet use depends upon available infrastructure and the literacy of the potential users. In the past 24 months, Afghanistan demonstrated a slow but steady improvement in both Internet infrastructure and the number of users. In 2006, the International Telecommunications Union estimated Afghanistan contained roughly 300,000 Internet users. By 2008, Afghan Internet users almost doubled to 580,000, and in June 2010 Afghanistan passed the million user mark.⁵

Internet use in Afghanistan continues to expand. In February 2009, Afghanistan possessed over 5,000 Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.⁶ Three thousand of these addresses belonged to the Internet Service Provider Neda, while the rest belonged to foreign governments, small regional ISPs, or the Afghan government. This number, however, does not count Afghan-focused sites hosted overseas. The overall Afghan-focused web presence is larger than the numbers would otherwise suggest.

Many Internet consumers in Afghanistan use satellite-based Internet services like those provided by Bentley-Walker, LinkStar, and others because of infrastructure limitations. Like mobile telephones, the portability provided by satellite-based service greatly outweighs any of its limitations. Due to the lack of a nationwide electric power grid, most future Internet users outside the major cities will use satellite-based/mobile phone-based infrastructure.

Two major problems will hinder the growth of Internet usage in Afghanistan. First, a shortage of landlines will constrain bandwidth, especially for trunk lines. Second, Afghanistan's high illiteracy rate will limit the number of Afghans that can use the Internet. The former will require additional infrastructure construction while the latter will only improve with education. The solutions to both problems will require time and money.

TELEVISION

Television's popularity continues to grow in Afghanistan with a wide variety of international and domestic broadcasters that provide international, national, and local content. Despite TV's growth in popularity, a television set remains cost-prohibitive to many of the lower segments of Afghan society, who still listen to the radio in great numbers. Currently, one official broadcaster and 15 private registered broadcasters operate in Afghanistan.⁷ Due to the lack of infrastructure for terrestrial TV broadcasts, many Afghans receive their TV programs via satellite. Most Afghan TV broadcasters reach their urban audiences through a terrestrial TV infrastructure, but use a satellite to reach the rest of the nation.



Major Afghan TV network logos, 2010

Afghan television content varies, with news and entertainment, both internally produced and imported from around the world. Afghan entertainment programs often involve sports or Indian-produced programs. Afghan news programs contain a blend of both international and domestic content. The GIRoA does censor TV broadcasts when it determines the program might offend the Muslim viewers' sensitivities. The GIRoA will allow the broadcasters, however, to air stories that might damage the government's image, such as the June 2010 attack on the Peace Jirga that President Karzai attended.

To completely understand the Afghan media landscape, military personnel need awareness of one major Afghan media mogul, Saad Mohseni. Mohseni owns and operates the Moby Group, a media conglomerate composed of radio, TV, and film enterprises. Mohseni reigns as the single most powerful man in the Afghan media landscape.⁸ His ability to both create and distribute content on a variety of media outlets gives him unique power in Afghanistan, and his political connections mean his ability to preserve his dominant position is high. He received much of his initial startup capital from USAID and then used his connections with the Northern Alliance to receive radio and TV licenses from the GIRoA. Mohseni also produces entertainment programs such as the Afghan Star, the local equivalent of American Idol, and Afghan soap operas. The Afghan Taliban government banned this type of entertainment and Mohseni rose to fill the void in the Afghan entertainment industry when the Taliban fell from power.

Broadcaster	Broadcast Methods	Ownership	Language
Radio Television Afghanistan	Terrestrial and Satellite	State	Dari, Pashto
Tolo TV	Terrestrial and Satellite	Private-Moby Group	Dari, Pashto
Lemar	Terrestrial and Satellite	Private	Dari, Pashto
Aina TV	Satellite	Private-Abdul Rashid Dostum	Dari, Uzbek, Turkmen, Pashto
Ariana TV	Satellite	Private-Eshen Bayat	Dari, Pashto

Selected TV Broadcasters in Afghanistan, BBC, 2010

RADIO

For most Afghans, radio serves as their most important electronic communications medium. About 80% of Afghan households can access a radio.⁹ Radio possesses advantages over other forms of communication due to its portability, no literacy requirement, and relatively cheap cost for both the broadcaster and recipient. While FM, AM, and shortwave stations operate in Afghanistan, FM dominates the airwaves. In addition to local and national broadcasters, major foreign broadcasters like Voice of America (VOA), Deutsche Welle, and the BBC also operate robust broadcast operations in Afghanistan. Most foreign broadcasters, however, use shortwave broadcasts.

As of 2008, the CIA concluded that 48 radio stations operate in Afghanistan.¹⁰ By 2009, over 150 radio and 23 TV stations were broadcasting.¹¹ In Kabul alone, 18 FM and one AM radio station are broadcasting. Four shortwave broadcasters, all foreign and who also broadcast in Dari and Pashto, aim their programs at Afghanistan's population.¹²

The insurgents also use the radio for their own purposes. They often broadcast over both AM and FM frequencies by the use of homemade transmitters. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the insurgents

use their radio broadcasts to intimidate citizens and government officials, announce targeted killings and intended victims, and present an image of insurgent control and the GIROA's impotency.


PRINT MEDIA

Afghanistan's low literacy level and low newspaper print runs limit the effectiveness of any print media in the country. Despite these handicaps, the print media sector contains active publishers who will report major stories, even those that might embarrass the GIROA. The GIROA sponsors two major dailies, the *Hewad* and the *Anis*, while the United National Council publishes the *Payam-e Mojahed* ("Voice of Mojahed") on a weekly basis.¹³ The government also operates the Bakhtar News Agency, while other private local agencies also maintain either representatives or operate in Afghanistan. The Afghan print media will discuss sensitive topics as their generally educated and urban readers usually favor the GIROA.

TELEPHONE

Afghans primarily use mobile telephone services. Like other undeveloped countries, the relatively lower initial infrastructure investment for mobile phone services; their inherent flexibility and portability; and ability to provide voice, data, and Internet services make them the clear choice for development. Afghanistan possesses very few landline telephones with only 460,000 in the entire country. With over 8.45 million mobile subscribers and continued expected growth in the near future, Afghanistan's telephone future will undoubtedly remain mobile.¹⁴

Four major companies provide telephone services in Afghanistan. These include Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC), Etisalat Afghanistan, MTN Afghanistan, and Telecom Development Company Afghanistan Ltd. (ROSHAN).¹⁵ All providers generally use GSM 900/1800 standard and all provide voice, data, and Internet capability.



Very Small Aperture Satellite provides the primary means to link Afghanistan's far-flung cities with each other and to the outside world. The GIROA will need to continue to ensure that the protection of the mobile phone infrastructure remains one of its key security requirements. The government will have to ensure these communications infrastructure elements provide Afghans with information, and remain secure from insurgent attack. Such control will demonstrate the GIROA's resolve and capability.

POSTAL/COURIER

While the Afghan Post operates what little postal system that exists in Afghanistan, the US government described it as "largely defunct."¹⁶ Courier services move most goods within Afghanistan. International couriers, like TNT and DHL, maintain Afghan offices, while local couriers provide services on different scales. Afghan domestic couriers like OQab, Actco, KTS, and Astran provide services that range from small parcels to container-size shipments. The security

situation can negatively affect the transport of goods, but deliveries in northern Afghanistan and Kabul remain relatively dependable.

The GIRoA took steps to modernize the Afghan postal system to provide a variety of services, especially communications and financial ones, to rural areas. These services included email and e-post services, along with money transfers, and are connected to a nationwide information and financial backbone through satellite connections.¹⁷ Such a transformation would likely not only have positive political, military, and social consequences, the relatively light sustainment requirements for satellite and cellular infrastructure makes maintenance of the network sustainable for a resource-limited government like the GIRoA.

WORD OF MOUTH

Within Afghanistan, perhaps the most trusted information dissemination medium remains the earliest known—word of mouth. In a relationship-driven society like Afghanistan, the exchange of information between individuals is the critical means of communication. Many groups possess highly complex and effective means to exchange and disseminate information, by means concealed from, and unknown to, outsiders.¹⁸ The Kuchi, a largely pastoral group whose highly effective internal communications mechanisms can span hundreds of miles unaided by modern technology, are still not understood by outsiders.¹⁹

For most military personnel, word of mouth will serve as their primary communications medium with the Afghan people. Military personnel must respect the Islam religion and understand the basic tribal customs if they wish to succeed in their missions. All guides written about personal conduct in Afghanistan agree that military personnel must invest time and involve themselves in discussions in a manner understood by the Afghan people as the only method to influence either an Afghan village or the GIRoA. Within any Pashtun village, military personnel will likely meet two important leaders—one religious and one tribal.

Most Afghan villages will contain a *mullah*, or religious leader, that military people must interact with if they want to succeed in that village. Mullahs possess a wide variety of education and experience. Among the more highly educated or literate villagers, the mullah provides them their religious guidance. Because Islam serves not just as a religion but as a way of life, religious sanction remains essential for many activities. While the mullah lacks the combat power of the tribal authorities or warlords, or the political powerful of clan or *qawm* (tribal, or collection of families) leaders; the mullah can craft public opinion and shift the social winds within his area of operations by his sermons and rulings.²⁰


Very often, an Afghan's pedigree or *gravitas* as determined by his familial history determines who becomes a village elder and leader at the khel (clan) or qawm level. This demonstrates why the considerations of "respect" or "honor" among the Pashtuns and outsiders become utterly critical to successful interaction with the Afghan people. Pashtun tribal politics exhibit a high degree of democracy as few recognized leaders and few recognizable leadership positions exist. Rather, some individuals, due to a combination of recognized intelligence, pedigree, or economic or family connections, can speak with greater authority than the average person. These individuals can craft public opinion through their advocacy in jirgas or other meetings.

INFORMATION CONTROL

Information in Afghanistan represents a significant part of the battlespace as information flows from all actors in their attempts to persuade and influence others. Distrust permeates the information arena because it becomes difficult to determine fact from fiction, even for people physically present at the scene or event under discussion. ISAF forces often find themselves faced with the need to react to insurgent disinformation quickly, often while at the scene of the event, but cannot do so because of

bureaucratic restraints. Meanwhile, the insurgents' knowledge of the battlespace actors, common language with local civilians and news media, their desire to directly or indirectly profit from the event, and freedom from their chain of command to issue propaganda that supports their claims immediately gives them the advantage.

Most Afghan people do not trust the information put out by the GIRoA located in Kabul because of the historical prejudice against a far distant central government.²¹ With a reputation for corruption and ineffectiveness, many Afghan citizens simply do not believe any GIRoA pronouncements. Afghans do not just distrust the GIRoA, but will maintain an information distance, where Afghans will attempt to gather on but not reveal information to anyone outside their clan/tribe, even people that might very well live in close proximity to them. Afghans view the veracity of information in light of the depth of the relationship



Meeting between Afghan Citizens and US and ANA soldiers, Kunar Province, July 2009, US Army

between the speaker and the listener. While recent polling suggests that 90% of Afghans prefer the GIRoA to the Taliban, this preference does not immediately translate into belief in the government's veracity or a lack of appreciation of the challenges of Afghanistan by the population.²²

At the tactical levels, the requirement to possess a personal relationship in order for the Afghan listener to believe the speaker manifests itself by the extreme delicacy and time investment required to develop and maintain personal relationships with most Afghan leaders. The possibility exists that such an investment in time and resources serves as the Afghan process to vet the outsider while they determine his authenticity and trustworthiness.

Many Afghan leaders are functional propaganda experts and can adeptly use both offensive and defensive disinformation due to decades, if not centuries, of engagement with outsiders in INFOWAR. Afghan leaders commonly use conversational tactics to hedge an answer or avoid a definitive answer, or delaying tactics that might commit the speaker to any definitive answer or course of action. Meanwhile, the military person immersed in this information environment must stick to the known facts, avoid the tendency to accept rumors at face value, or attempt to speed up the process. Military personnel need to continue to ask for the facts and avoid the offered opinions.

INFOWAR

The ISAF J2 asserts that the insurgents use INFOWAR operations as one of their main efforts.²³ The insurgent INFOWAR campaign is the prime element to winning over the human terrain in the heart of the insurgency. The INFOWAR campaign gives the insurgency political legitimacy and support from the population. The insurgents generally rely on perception management operations, deception, and physical destruction. When ISAF units conduct combat operations, insurgents use the ancient strategy to hide their weapons, pick up agricultural implements, and put on the pretense of innocent farmers. The insurgents use the destruction caused by combat operations, especially collateral damage, to paint the perception of an uncaring and cruel ISAF and a distant and

disinterested GIRoA. The insurgents want to drive a wedge between the Afghan people and the GIRoA and its ISAF allies.


The insurgents also carry out an INFOWAR campaign based on the IED and its related kill chain. Successful insurgent IED attacks generate overseas financial support. With the external financial support, the insurgents can then make more effective IEDs to use against ISAF and its “apostate” forces—Afghanistan and Pakistan. Insurgents film many of their IED attacks and use the footage to raise funds, recruit new insurgents, and for general propaganda purposes. The process continues to reinforce itself in an almost never-ending cycle.

After a slow start in the INFOWAR, US military leaders now see the importance of the information operations (IO) campaign and the need to win the INFOWAR battle. The Taliban and other insurgents continue to demonstrate their knowledge of INFOWAR and to this point in the war probably applied their concepts more completely, quickly, and inexpensively to their target audience than ISAF. The US wants to conduct a more aggressive INFOWAR campaign as it plans to elevate the public debate in Afghanistan among the Afghans themselves in an attempt to provide a credible local alternative to Taliban propaganda.²⁴

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The GIRoA possess very limited electronic warfare (EW) capabilities that generally consist of tactical EW equipment such as protective jammers. As the ISAF IO campaign becomes a primary line of operation, the GIRoA will most likely place more emphasis on electronic communications, broadcast detection, location, jamming, spoofing, and other EW capabilities. Eventually, these capabilities will become organic to the GIRoA, but this will take many years to complete. The low level of training and education among much of the ANA will also impede the effort to integrate these capabilities into the ANSF.

The insurgents responded to the significant EW overmatch with ISAF with a retreat to primitive, but effective, tactics. The rise of the command wire detonated IED in Afghanistan demonstrates the insurgents’ attempt to use primitive means to defeat advanced ISAF IED initiation countermeasures. With a lack of EW equipment, usually due to cost, the insurgents will continue to accept the EW overmatch but will persist in searching for low-tech/no-tech solutions to ISAF advanced capabilities.



Command wire IED initiator, DOD, 2010

COMPUTER ATTACK

The GIRoA does not possess any significant computer attack capabilities except the most basic computer forensics capabilities. While al-Qaeda and the Taliban issued computer attack threats in the past, it remains unlikely they possess the capabilities of a state actor or even a state surrogate, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, to carry out the threats. Ironically, the insurgents will most likely not engage in computer attacks because of their extensive Internet use to raise funds, recruit, and train their forces.

INFORMATION ATTACK

At best, both the GIRoA and the insurgents possess rudimentary capabilities for information attack, or the ability to disrupt or corrupt the content of the opponent's information. Both sides suffer from a lack of suitable and trained personnel to conduct such attacks.

DECEPTION

Tactical deception remains a hallmark of insurgent operations, especially for the Taliban. The insurgents understand and respect ISAF intelligence capabilities. To avoid the ISAF and ANSF target acquisition capabilities, the insurgents use deception continuously. The Taliban knows the ISAF/ANSF positive identification requirements and will use tactical deception to “close the gap” between the two sides to negate ISAF/ANSF firepower advantages.

Many reports suggest that the Taliban knows the difference between thermal and night vision sensors, and possesses a working knowledge of ISAF sensors.²⁵ Acquisition of sensors similar to ones used by ANA and ISAF can improve insurgent denial and deception operations, and thus help to neutralize a key ISAF capability. ISAF should be aware that its sensor overmatch is high, but a potential failure point against a threat increasingly targeting that capability.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

Considering the insurgents' reliance on primitive means of communication, ISAF and ANSF face limitations on the number of insurgents' INFOWAR assets they can target. Most insurgents use very basic, but reliable, man-portable commercial-off-the-shelf civilian origin radio equipment. Possible targetable insurgent assets for the ISAF/ANSF include mountaintop repeater stations that extend hand-to-hand radio ranges in mountainous terrain or pirated radio stations.

Due to the power and effectiveness of ISAF and ANSF radio and mobile phones, the insurgents often target infrastructure such as antennas. At the tactical level, the insurgents understand ISAF and ANSF communications strengths and limitations. This often means that the insurgents will make radios and target acquisition equipment a priority target in an attack.

PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

Due to the limited nature of the insurgent's information systems, they operate limited protection and security measures. Like most insurgencies, the Afghan insurgents most likely depend on a variety of languages, slang, or jargon to protect their information as they often broadcast over open channels. The insurgents probably use a trusted courier when they want to transmit operational and strategic communications that they do not want compromised.

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

In Afghanistan, the insurgents place great emphasis on perception management operations. In the absence of battlefield victories, the insurgents identified



A Taliban “Night Letter,” NATO, 2010

perception management as the center of gravity of GIRoA and ISAF operations. The current COMISAF's guidance that he wants his force to be "first with the truth" is an implicit admission that ISAF past attempts inadequately dealt with insurgent perception management operations.²⁶ Every Taliban attack, however unsuccessful, sends the message to the foreign governments and their citizens that their forces' participation in ISAF represents an unsustainable cost and unachievable objectives. Though the location population may blame the insurgents for the Afghan security situation and sense an economic improvement, the impact of the insurgents' propaganda in foreign countries creates the miasma of an inescapable quagmire.

The insurgents primarily use radio to claim victories, present the illusion of insurgent control, and terrorize local officials.²⁷ Additionally, the insurgents use "night letters" to intimidate and terrorize government officials and those unsympathetic to the insurgency. The insurgents place these letters on the recipient's doorstep at night and threaten them with death unless they stop their anti-insurgent actions. The very delivery of the night letters sends the message of the insurgents' reach, capabilities, and GIRoA's powerlessness.

It is likely that the Taliban media will face many more direct challenges, as the central role it plays in sustaining the insurgency is fully appreciated.²⁸ Taliban messages have focused on the lack of GIRoA capability, rather than presenting a competing vision for Afghan governance. Considering the lack of desire among most Afghans for a return to Taliban-style rule, the direct competition in the public arena of ideas of governance between the insurgents and the government actually favors the government.

INTELLIGENCE

The National Directorate of Security (NDS) serves as the primary national-level intelligence organization for the GIRoA. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of the Interior (MOI) also provide national-level intelligence support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), respectively. The 2008 United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) described the three main Afghan security organizations as plagued with a lack of collaboration and coordination, and hampered by incoherent international support and legacy Soviet models.²⁹ The NDS possesses a myriad of mission requirements that multiple agencies like the CIA, FBI, and Secret Service handle in the US. The NDS reports directly to the Afghan president. In contrast, any intelligence generated by the MOD, the ANA, the MOI, or the ANP must go through its MOI or MOD minister before it reaches the president.

Currently the Afghan intelligence leadership finds itself in a state of flux. The NDS head, Amrullah Saleh, resigned in June 2010 ostensibly over the failure to prevent the attacks on a Kabul Peace Jirga.³⁰ President Karzai temporarily replaced Mr. Saleh with Ibrahim Spinzada, his brother-in-law.³¹ "Engineer" Spinzada, as he is known, previously served as a deputy to Mr. Saleh at NDS. The ramifications of Mr. Saleh's ouster, as one of the most visible high-level ethnic Tajiks and former Northern Alliance members within the Karzai government, are difficult to ascertain.³²

Karzai then selected Rahmatullah Nabeel, formerly the head of the Presidential Bodyguard and a Spinzada protégé, to head the NDS.³³ Nabeel speaks Pashto, Dari, Urdu, and English, and analysts consider him intelligent, capable, and loyal to Karzai. His appointment could very well represent the continued enlargement of the role of Karzai-affiliated Pashtuns in the GIRoA ministries.

Insurgent intelligence is generally tactical in nature, gathered by and in direct support of local commanders.³⁴ The strong suites of the insurgent intelligence network remain nearly omnipresent HUMINT – evidenced by the demonstrated ability to infiltrate government security organizations – and maintaining tactical observation of GIRoA and ISAF forces.³⁵ Insurgents lack any significant centralized means to combine or analyze intelligence collected beyond the tactical level, and face significant overmatch by Western forces' cryptology and other protection efforts.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

The various Afghan intelligence services primarily focus their operations on HUMINT operations. The combination of inherent HUMINT demands of counterinsurgency, legacy Soviet focus on HUMINT collection, and resource constraints of the Afghan government make HUMINT the most important element to the GIRoA collection process. The GIRoA most likely focuses on local Taliban and their enablers in surrounding countries such as Pakistan. The expansion of the Afghan mobile phone network aids the HUMINT collection efforts as Afghan citizens can provide leads anonymously.

Like the GIRoA, the insurgents rely almost exclusively on HUMINT that includes a web of informers, GIRoA turncoats, sympathizers, and co-opts. Insurgent commanders often possess an excellent situational awareness in their local area, but probably know little beyond it because of the limited nature of their own organic intelligence network. Insurgent fighters that travel between areas may provide some intelligence sharing between the groups, but the new fighters will find themselves handicapped by a lack of local knowledge for their new area of operations.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

The GIRoA likely uses open source intelligence (OSINT) collection as its primary method to collect strategic political intelligence as it monitors trends within insurgent groups through video exploitation. The GIRoA probably also uses OSINT to monitor opposition parties and nongovernmental organizations as a part of situational awareness and to vet the organizations.

The insurgents will also most likely find OSINT collection important, as it represents the insurgents' only means to collect intelligence at any level above tactical. The insurgents then must disseminate any operational and strategic level intelligence by word of mouth, as it remains unlikely that they possess any other systematic dissemination methods.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Afghan signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities likely remain the least developed of the GIRoA intelligence disciplines due to a lack of dedicated collection assets, low-grade GIRoA and insurgent communications equipment, and the insurgents' lack of EW equipment. Most insurgent forces operate commercial radio equipment and will often communicate in the clear between each other and even with the ANSF. Both the GIRoA and the insurgents focus their primary SIGINT collection activities on communications intelligence (COMINT) by monitoring the other's conversations, and usually at only the tactical level.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

While the Afghan National Army Air Force (ANAAF) possesses fixed and rotary wing aircraft capable of imagery collection, the ANAAF operates no dedicated imagery intelligence (IMINT) collection platforms. As in other resource-intensive collection disciplines, the GIRoA will likely continue to depend on ISAF capabilities to collect and process IMINT.

ANAAF platforms capable of IMINT include Mi-24, Mi-17, and Mi-35 helicopters and An-32 and C-27A fixed-winged aircraft. With the eventual withdrawal of ISAF, the ANAAF will most likely obtain dedicated airborne IMINT assets, likely unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE

The expansion of measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) capabilities probably represents the most significant area of future GIRoA growth capabilities of the intelligence disciplines. The GIRoA will likely use MASINT capabilities for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes as they begin to use population monitoring capabilities such as biometrics and acoustics against the insurgents.

The ANSF demonstrated the utility of biometrics to establish the identity of ANA and ANP recruits and to monitor population movements that establish civilians' identities and domiciles. By establishing clear proof of identity, biometrics may also help decrease corruption and other illegal practices.

Acoustics enjoy a long history in counterinsurgency operations that date back to the Vietnam War. With technological improvements, the GIRoA may use acoustic listening devices that could play a vital role as they monitor and protect installations or villages.



Summary

INFOWAR operations, both complex and simple, will play a major role in any military operation in Afghanistan. As modern electronic media establishes itself in Afghanistan, the penetration of mobile phones and the overall importance of the mobile phone infrastructure will only increase. The future success of the current decentralized ISAF strategic communications strategy, with the intent of fully engaging Afghans in a discussion of their future, and a concurrent discrediting of the insurgent INFOWAR message, is far from certain. It is likely that any development of the mass communications landscape will empower the Afghan people to hold both the GIRoA and insurgents accountable for their actions. The insurgents, without “anti-GIRoA government corruption” as their major theme, could eventually lose the Afghanistan INFOWAR.

To win the INFOWAR battle, the GIRoA may need to take the perception management fight away from ISAF and engage the insurgents directly. For that to occur, the GIRoA needs to eliminate the governmental corruption and become more credible to the Afghan people. Issues of tribal and familial allegiance, criminality, and incompetence will plague ISAF's efforts to make the GIRoA appear legitimate, truthful, and capable.

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INFRASTRUCTURE

“Afghanistan is determined to share its favorable location, as a regional land-bridge, to help unlock the tremendous economic potentials and opportunities that exist in our region. Over the past eight years, we have rebuilt our network of roads and highways. We plan not only to expand and improve this network, but also to construct rail links that will connect us to our neighbors and beyond.”

Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan President, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 28 April 2010

Infrastructure

Infrastructure is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.

KEY FACTS:

- Only 24% of the Afghan people live in cities; Kabul, with over 3 million people, is the only city with a population of over 470,000.
- At 5.4%, Afghanistan has one of the world's highest urbanization rates.
- Fewer than 20% of urban and 11% of rural Afghans can access electrical power, potable water, or modern sewage treatment methods.
- Afghanistan consumes all internally-produced natural gas and coal.
- Afghanistan primarily uses roads for transportation; the Afghan "Ring Road" cost over \$400 million to build and is almost complete.
- Afghanistan is building its first railroad in over 100 years from Hairatan on the Uzbekistan border in the north to Mazar-e Sharif.
- Due to Afghanistan's rough terrain and its location as a land-locked country, aviation continues to play a key transportation role.
- A natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan remains in the planning stages.
- Most Afghan people use cell phones and not landlines for telephonic communication.
- Most Afghan farmers own their own small lots of land, but only 25% of the farmland receives irrigated water; lack of water sometimes forces farmers to cultivate poppy to support their families.
- Afghanistan lacks industrialization, but possesses some natural resources that the country could exploit.
- Most water and land pollution comes from groundwater contamination due to open sewage, not factories.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE VARIABLE IN THE OE:

- Any military operating in Afghanistan will need to provide its own utilities—electricity, potable water, sewage treatment, and communication.
- Military organizations must test all locally procured food and water before use.
- The lack of railroads will require the military to support their forces via air or ground convoys from a neighboring country.
- Road security remains vital for Afghanistan's economic growth.
- Any pipeline through Afghanistan will require protection from anti-government forces.
- Cell phones will remain the primary communication method in the country. The mountainous terrain, however, may affect coverage areas.
- Modern farming methods that include better irrigation will reduce Afghan farmers' dependence on the poppy for economic survival.
- The ability of Afghanistan to sustain itself will depend on its ability to exploit natural resources and to serve as part of the pipeline network to transfer hydrocarbons to other countries.

INFRASTRUCTURE OVERVIEW:

Despite the massive amount of aid that the United States and other countries donated or loaned to Afghanistan since 2002 to improve its infrastructure, Afghanistan remains one of the least modern countries in the world. While less than a quarter of the Afghan people live in urban areas, most urban dwellers still cannot access basic utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems. Afghan urban infrastructure, however, seems “modern” when compared to the infrastructure rural Afghans can access in most parts of the country.


Since 2002, primarily due to the influx of outside aid, some areas of Afghan infrastructure demonstrate significant improvement compared to what the country possessed with the Taliban in charge. With the Taliban’s ouster, the Western world once again began to provide funds for hydroelectric plants, road construction, improved bus service, and even the first railroad built in Afghanistan in over 100 years.

Afghan infrastructure faces two major tests that will determine whether the country can capitalize on the success of the projects undertaken since the Taliban’s upheaval. First, can Afghanistan sustain the projects built by the various outside organizations and countries? In the past, outside agencies built unsustainable projects such as hydroelectric power plants without replacement parts or a training program for the Afghans to maintain the project themselves. Without regular maintenance, the projects deteriorated and eventually stopped functioning. Thus, the Afghan people found themselves where they started before the project began. Second, Afghanistan and its government must find a way to protect the new infrastructure from attacks by those that wish to see the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) fail. Without proper security, the projects could turn into a waste of time and money by the outside agencies that built them. The Afghans need to take “ownership” of the projects so that they will protect what they built and enjoy the progress that the new infrastructure will bring to them, their families, and their country.



CONSTRUCTION PATTERN

Afghanistan remains primarily a rural country with only a few scattered cities, a timeless pattern seen for well over 2,000 years in an area invaded too many times to count. Afghanistan is the 43rd most populous country in the world, with a population of over 28 million people. Only 24%, however, live in urban areas. Additionally, Afghanistan demonstrates a fairly high urbanization rate of over the last five years of 5.4%.¹ This urbanization rate and rising expectations of the Afghan people will cause a strain on the GIROA to provide the urban dwellers with basic utilities—clean water, electricity, and modern disposal methods.



Most large Afghan cities demonstrate the same construction pattern. Dense, random construction made from local materials (dried mud) or cheap concrete compose each city’s center core. Since some cities date back over 5,000 years, the current urban center grew up around the initial city site.²

Outside the dense center city, construction remains random but less dense. While some of the Afghan cities may show the closed orderly block construction of Western cities, this resulted by accident more than by urban planning.

Due to the violence in Afghanistan over the centuries, many homeowners in both cities and villages turned their houses into mini-fortresses by the construction of a mud wall that encloses their courtyard. Each complex may contain one main building and several smaller buildings built within the courtyard. The Afghans frequently fit the walls with loopholes (firing pots or “murder holes” and the walls themselves can often stop 7.62mm NATO or 7.62x54 Soviet medium machine gun rounds.

URBAN ZONES

Many urban Afghans live similarly to their rural countrymen except that they live in a denser population environment. Almost all large Afghan cities possess a city core with little open space and tightly packed buildings. Unlike Western cities, however, Afghan urban buildings are not the high multi-story buildings typical of Western city centers. While a few multi-story buildings may exist, most do not exceed two stories. Very few high-rise residential areas, such as apartments, exist in Afghan cities. While some commercial areas are present, the Afghans dedicate very few areas to factories or industry. Many Afghans live in a single extended family compound where the various branches of the family live in two- or three-room, one-story houses. Each urban compound can become a mini-fortress if used as a defensive position by insurgents.

URBANIZATION BUILDING DENSITY

While Afghanistan exhibits an average population density of 113 persons per square mile, the population density varies widely from province to province and city to city. While Kabul Province contains a density of 2,072 persons per square mile, the city of Kabul reaches a density of 28,254 people per square mile. Figures for Afghanistan’s other largest cities do not exist due to the lack of knowledge about each city’s actual geographical size, but the provinces’ density can be determined. The actual density of each of the cities is significantly greater than that of the entire province:³

Kandahar City (Kandahar Province): 47.4
 Mazar-e Sharif (Balkh Province): 168.9
 Herat (Herat Province): 83.4
 Kunduz (Kunduz Province): 264.2
 Jalalabad (Nangarhar Province): 448.1
 Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province): 63.7

MAJOR CITIES

Afghanistan contains only one city with over a million people and six more cities that possess more than 200,000 residents. Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital city, contains over three million residents. In order of size, the next six largest cities are Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz, Jalalabad, and Lashkar Gah.



[Kabul's Babur Gardens](#) (Taken by Jim Kelly, Use under GNU Free Document License Wikimedia Commons, June 2010)



[Kabul Province](#), USAID, 2010

KABUL

Kabul (also known as Kābol or Caubul), located in the northeastern mountains of the country in the province with the same name, represents the country's largest city with a population of over 2,850,000 residents and over 3,450,000 in the metropolitan area.⁴ The Kabul metropolitan area grew from around 500,000 residents in 2001 to over three million in 2006, a 500% increase in fewer than five years.⁵ Kabul represents one of the oldest cities in the world, being inhabited for over 5,000 years.⁶ It is one of the few Afghan cities with large high-rise buildings located in the downtown area. Many of Kabul's buildings suffer from a lack of maintenance and war damage. Scores of residents live in dilapidated buildings and some estimate that up to 50% of Kabul's residents live in shantytowns, or hastily built construction.⁷ Kabul possesses one of the few operational public transit systems in an Afghan city with a bus fleet of over 100 vehicles. This number, however, cannot meet its requirements.⁸ Three different hydroelectric power plants provide intermittent power: Istalif, Mahipar, and Naglu. Due to low water levels at certain times of the year, some of these power plants cannot provide power year round to Kabul.⁹ Kabul continues to grow and each new occupant makes it more difficult for the city and the GIROA to provide basic utilities for its residents. In November 2008, Kabul opened a new \$35 million international airport funded by Japan.¹⁰



Kabul (Taken by Aulfat Rizai, Use under GNU Free Document License, Wikimedia Commons, March 2004)

KANDAHAR CITY

Since 2002, Kandahar City (or Qandahār), located in the southeastern corner of the country in Kandahar Province, has grown to become Afghanistan's second largest city with a population of 468,200 people in the city and 1,058,000 in the metropolitan area.¹¹ Kandahar became the capital of Afghanistan in the 18th century, but now only reigns as the provincial capital. Kandahar serves as the major city for an agriculturally dominated province that focuses on fruit and, lately, poppy.¹² Kandahar is similar to Kabul in that it contains an old city center core. Unlike Kabul, it possesses few high-rise buildings and the construction is more random. Due to the relatively low density of the province and the slower rate of urbanization than in the Kabul region, Kandahar possesses more open space for military maneuvers. Since Kandahar serves as one of the primary tribal areas of the Pashtun Tribe, much military activity has occurred in the area over the last 30 years.¹³ Thus, many of the civilians continue the centuries old practice to build their residences into the mini-forts with mud walls that encompass their courtyard. The Kandahar International Airport is open for civilian commercial airplanes and the city operates an irregular microbus system.¹⁴ Two turbines from the Kajaki hydroelectric plant provide electrical power to Kandahar with a third turbine under construction with support from China.¹⁵ Many of the insurgents find sympathetic supporters in Kandahar Province and



[Kandahar Province](#), USAID, 2010



Kandahar, NASA, 2011

Kandahar City's size makes it difficult to determine the insurgents, supporters, and non-supporters.

HERAT

Herat (or Hirat) serves as the capital of the extreme western province with the same name. With 349,000 people, Herat ranks as Afghanistan's third largest city.¹⁶ Herat lies on the Hari River and rose to prominence because of the surrounding rich agricultural areas that produce crops such as cumin, grain, peas, sesame, and watermelon. Businesses include a Super Cola company (Coca Cola spinoff) and the fur industry.¹⁷ The Herat people are mainly Pashtun and Tajik and enjoy a profitable trade relationship with Iran. Herat became a city over 2,700 years ago and in the Middle Ages became known as "The Pearl of Khorasan."¹⁸ Because of its proximity to Iran, Herat finds itself at the center of much of the Afghan smuggling trade.¹⁹ Due to its smaller size and rectangular layout, Herat is not as densely populated as Kabul, but does possess the same central core as the other Afghan cities.²⁰ Most Herat buildings do not comprise more than a few floors of construction. While significantly smaller than Kabul, Herat enjoys a very urban atmosphere compared to most of Afghanistan.

MAZAR-E SHARIF

Mazar-e Sharif (or Mazār-I-Sharīf), located in north central Afghanistan, contains 300,600 people or over 25% of Balkh Province's population.²¹ Mazar-e Sharif is famous for the *Blue Shrine* (or Blue Mosque), also known as the Shrine of Hazrat Ali. Some Muslims believe that Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, is entombed in the mosque; others believe Ali is entombed in Najaf, Iraq. For Afghanistan, Mazar-e Sharif and the entire Balkh Province is relatively wealthy compared to the rest of Afghanistan because of the tube-well irrigation system that makes agriculture more productive and profitable.²² Mazar-e Sharif's major business pursuits include Karakul (Karakuli), a silky fur made from the skins of newborn lambs; Turkmen carpets; and tourism. The city receives some electricity from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but possesses limited potable water or modern sewage systems.²³ The city did not possess any type of railroad service until the Asian Development Bank (ADB) funded 97% of a \$170 million project to connect Mazar-e Sharif with Hairatan, located on the Uzbekistan border. The railroad became operational in December 2010, six months ahead of the target date.²⁴ The new railroad should increase Mazar-e Sharif's economic potential and should subsequently increase its population base.



[Herat Province](#), USAID, 2010



Herat (Taken by Aven Dirks, Use under GNU Free Document License, Wikimedia Commons, March 2004)




[Balkh Province](#), USAID, 2010



Blue Mosque (Taken by US Gvt employee, ISAF, September 2009)

KUNDUZ


Kunduz (also spelled Kundûz, Qonduz, Qondûz, Konduz, Kondûz, Kondoz, or Khunduz) is located in northeastern Afghanistan and is the capital of Kunduz Province. Recently, Kunduz surpassed Jalalabad to become the country's fifth largest city with a population of 264,100.²⁵ Before the Taliban, Kunduz Province was one of Afghanistan's wealthiest due to its rich agriculture with abundant grain and cotton harvests. Kunduz possesses enough water to avoid the droughts that affect many other areas of Afghanistan. Kunduz contains the typical city center with high population density that becomes less dense farther from the city's core. Like most other Afghan cities, the outskirts consist primarily of shantytowns with houses made from any material possible.²⁶



[Kunduz Province](#), USAID, 2010

RURAL AREAS


Despite the 5.4% urbanization rate over the last five years, 76% of the Afghan people continue to live in rural areas. Overall, 78.6% of the Afghan people depend on agriculture or agriculture-related businesses for their livelihood.²⁷ These people live in small villages and tend to their fields or flocks for survival. Most survive without basic utilities such as potable water, electricity, or modern sewage facilities. Some villages operate small or mini-hydropower stations to provide themselves with a minimum amount of electricity.²⁸ Some villages also produce enough electrical power from their micro-hydropower plant to not only supply their own needs, but to sell their excess power to neighboring villages.²⁹ For the most part, however, many rural Afghan people live very similarly to the way their ancestors did centuries ago. The rural Afghan people gather in small villages and use mud to construct their houses as they eke out an existence on a family farm or graze their small herds of goats and sheep.



Kunduz (Taken by Bastian Kuhl, Use under GNU Free Document License, Wikimedia Commons, October 2006)

UTILITY LEVEL

Afghanistan's utilities, when compared to Western standards, are almost nonexistent in both the rural and urban areas. Less than 25% of all rural Afghans can access the standard utilities such as electricity, potable water, modern sanitation, and telephone services. The same holds true for the urban areas, but some data now indicates that up to one-third of urban Afghans may possess the means to access modern sanitation facilities on a regular basis.³⁰ Military units will need to provide their own means to produce electricity, obtain potable water, dispose of human waste, and communicate. Some military logistical units may find it necessary to support not only themselves, but also their allies. At times, military units may find it necessary to assist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with their humanitarian efforts.




Afghan Rural Village (Taken by DOD SSG Justin Holley, Wikimedia Commons, March 2007)

UTILITIES PRESENT

Afghanistan suffers from a dearth of infrastructure. While some Afghan residents experienced limited improvement in their access to basic utilities since the end of the Taliban, most Afghans still cannot access potable water, electricity, or modern sewage systems. Even though the GIRoA increased utilities infrastructure since 2002, with massive support from outside agencies, there remains a substantial gap between utilities availability and requirements.³¹

POWER


Most of the people in Afghanistan cannot obtain electricity produced by any source. As of September 2009, the GIRoA estimated that only 15% of urban homes and only 6% of rural homes could access electrical power.³² The public power grid only supplies 234,000 customers, with over one-third (76,000) located in the Kabul metropolitan area.³³ In the entire country, Afghanistan only operates seven major hydroelectric power plants (*see Annex A for a list and photographs*), one of the cheapest ways to produce electricity.³⁴ Many of Afghanistan's small rural villages operate micro-hydropower plants to produce very small quantities of electricity, but often the power does not meet the villagers' basic electrical needs.³⁵ Instead of lower cost options such as hydroelectric, natural gas, solar, wind, or even imported power, many in Afghanistan rely on costly diesel generators.³⁶ The intention remains to reduce the Afghans' reliance on expensive diesel generated power and only use diesel when other cheaper alternatives are not available.³⁷ Cheaper sources include the purchase of power from neighboring countries such as 300 megawatts (MW) that require the conversion of the power at substations such as the one at Andkhoy in northern Afghanistan.³⁸



**Tarakhil Power Plant
USAID, 2009**

Afghan Power Goals


In 2006, the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) stated four goals for the country's energy development. First, Afghanistan wants to develop enough electrical capacity and infrastructure to reach 65% of all homes in major urban areas. Second, it wants to reach 90% of all non-residential businesses in major urban areas. Third, Afghanistan wants to reach 25% of all homes in rural areas. Lastly, it wants to cover at least 75% of total operational costs through user fees by December 2010, but the results remain unknown.³⁹ These represent very ambitious goals because some experts believe that due to Afghanistan's terrain, the extension of the public power grid to villages and rural areas remains virtually impossible with today's technology.⁴⁰ Instead, some believe that Afghanistan should concentrate on micro-hydroelectric power plants and renewable energy sources such as solar and wind that the Afghan people can operate within a decentralized model of energy distribution. The US intends to help Afghanistan reach these goals by an increase in electrical generation and transmission capacity from 389MW in April 2009 to 1,500MW by 2013 through hydropower, gas power plants, and renewable energy sources.⁴¹ Even with all the emphasis on increased electricity production for the country, most Afghans will remain off the national power grid for the foreseeable future.



**Solar Panels in Rural Village
AIRP, 2009**


Alternative Energy Sources

In the last 35 years, some forward thinkers began to examine the use of alternative methods to provide electricity to Afghanistan. In 1975, before the Taliban took political control of the country, US consultants examined the use of 11 different solar heating methods to provide electricity and energy to Afghan rural buildings.⁴² Any collaboration between the US and Afghanistan on solar energy became impossible when the Taliban excluded most of the Western world from interaction with Afghanistan. With the end of the Taliban control, some rural villagers now use solar panels to produce electricity for their homes. In May 2007, USAID initiated an assessment of the possible use of wind power to produce electricity in Afghanistan. In general, most of Afghanistan is ill-suited for wind power except for the extreme western sections where the USAID report usually rates the possibility of wind power as excellent to superb.⁴³ The GIRoA will need to pursue all possible avenues if they wish to increase their citizens' access to electrical power.



Electricity


Since the US Department of Energy (DOE) began to track Afghanistan's electrical usage in 2004, Afghanistan always used more electricity than it internally produced. For the four years (2005-2008) currently on record with the DOE, Afghanistan maintained the same installed capacity for electrical capacity, but increased its generation and consumption each year from 2005 until a downturn in 2007.⁴⁴ Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan increased its energy capacity from 430 MW to 1029 MW through the rehabilitation of various hydroelectric plants and the construction of other types of power plants.⁴⁵ Seven major hydroelectric power plants provide the bulk of the electricity for Afghanistan, but do not operate at maximum capacity due a lack of turbines or poor maintenance. Over the past eight years, Afghanistan, with assistance from several



overhauled, or completed the installation of power plants at Istalif, Mahipar, and Naghlu, all located in Kabul Province; and Kajaki in Helmand Province in the southwest. Future plans include the completion of projects or the installation of additional turbines at Mahipar and Gerishk in Helmand Province.⁴⁶ Even with the completion of the projects to refurbish the current Afghan power plants, the country still faces an electrical power shortage.


USAID estimated that Afghanistan would require three times more power from the Northern Transmission System in 2010 than the five previous years. USAID estimated that the demand on the Southern Transmission System in 2010 would demonstrate a similar increase, but final figures remain unpublished. In 2005, Afghanistan lost 44% of the power it produced due to inefficiencies in the transmission and distribution network with not much improvement since.⁴⁷ From 2006 to 2009, Afghanistan increased its dependence on imported electricity from 33.5% of overall consumption to 56% of consumption.⁴⁸ As Afghanistan modernizes its infrastructure, electricity demand will only increase and put additional strain upon the government to provide it from internal sources and import it from external sources.

Oil, Natural Gas, and Coal



Afghanistan possesses some hydrocarbon resources, but the country does not adequately exploit what their limited natural energy resources. Since 1970, the DOE does not list Afghanistan with the production or distillation of any crude oil.⁴⁹ Since 1959, Afghanistan detected 29 small oil fields in its borders with outdated Soviet methods that contained more than 150 million barrels of oil, but without much exploitation of these hydrocarbon resources.⁵⁰ Since 1991, due to poor maintenance and war, Afghanistan’s natural gas production dropped significantly. Afghanistan used to export natural gas, but now Afghanistan consumes every cubic foot of natural gas produced internally. Like their natural gas resources, Afghanistan consumes their entire annual coal production.⁵¹ Most of Afghanistan’s coal remains untapped as it remains inaccessible due to the terrain, depth, the lack of a sufficient transportation network, or the absence of infrastructure to use the coal.⁵² Much of the


coal in the northern areas of Afghanistan grades out very high while the southern coal usually demonstrates lesser quality. The primary bottleneck for coal distribution remains transportation, as the trucks find it hard to move over Afghanistan’s difficult roads, especially in the winter months.⁵³ Lack of a nationwide rail system similarly hinders coal distribution.



Since 2002, the United States and other foreign countries continue to invest heavily in Afghanistan’s infrastructure that produces power. Since 2008, the ADB and their associates provided almost \$1 billion for various energy projects in Afghanistan.⁵⁴ The United States, through USAID alone, invested \$300 million to overhaul the Kabul (Tarakhil) Power Plant, a dual fuel plant capable of operation on both diesel and heavy fuel oil when power from the hydroelectric plants become unavailable due to low water levels in the rivers.⁵⁵ In December 2009, the Afghans began the operation of the Tarakhil Power Plant’s third and final power block so the facility can now run at maximum capacity and provide electricity to 500,000 Kabul residents.⁵⁶ Each block can provide 35 MW of power and increases electrical capacity in the Kabul area by 24%.⁵⁷ Some analysts believe that the dual fuel power plant will become too costly for the Afghans to operate and will require external subsidization.⁵⁸

Security Concerns at Infrastructure Project Sites

Afghanistan’s power infrastructure rehabilitation in certain areas faces difficulties for security reasons. In June 2009, the United States terminated the contract for the rehabilitation of the Sheberghan gas fields for subcontractor non-performance after it spent \$7.1 million on the project, but the actual



Kajaki Hydroelectric Power Plant Convoy, AIRP, 2008

reason involved security problems.⁵⁹ In October 2009, the United States ended the contract to rehabilitate the Kajaki Hydroelectric Power Plant in Helmand Province in southwest Afghanistan after they spent \$47.9 million and replaced only two of the three turbines due to security reasons. Even the limited success of the Kajaki rehabilitation required the additional expenditure of funds in August 2008 as a 100-vehicle convoy and 4,000 British, Afghan, and other NATO troops took five days to deliver one of the turbines safely to the Kajaki site.⁶⁰ After this time, the contractors spent an additional \$1 million for airlift to move parts for the power plant to avoid using the unsecured roads. Security costs for the project later increased to almost 30% of the value of the contract.⁶¹ In October 2009, the second turbine became operational and the Kajaki plant, the largest in Afghanistan, can now produce 51 MW of power that will further reduce the country's reliance on more expensive diesel fuel.⁶² Without proper protection, any Afghan dam and power plant remains susceptible to an insurgent attack.

WATER

Most people in Afghanistan cannot obtain potable water for drinking or cooking. In 2002, only 19% of urban dwellers and 11% of rural Afghans could access clean water.⁶³ By November 2009, the access of safe drinking water to rural Afghan people only increased 1%.⁶⁴ Most Afghan people still obtain their drinking water from wells and open streams, but more than 90% of the water contains some contaminant. Human and animal waste often runs back into the waterways and flows downstream where the next village draws their drinking water.⁶⁵ Due to inefficiency and waste, Afghanistan annually fails to use over two-thirds of its potential 75,000 million cubic meters of water resources. Droughts over the last four years in various parts of Afghanistan only exacerbated the water shortage problem.⁶⁶ As late as 1997, Afghanistan still used 99% of the water taken from their rivers and streams for agricultural purposes.⁶⁷ For the conceivable future, most Afghans will continue to use contaminated water.



**Rural Afghan water well,
USAID, 2009**

Post Taliban control, other countries and NGOs began to focus on Afghanistan's water problems. In 2002, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), through financial support from USAID and the Danish government, provided minimum water and sanitation facilities to 500 villages and 300,000 Afghan people. As the droughts in Afghanistan lengthened, UNICEF increased their effort and added 600 additional villages.⁶⁸ In 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources, and Environment developed a three-year plan to cope with its most difficult water problems, and other countries pledged \$55 million for the first year of the plan.⁶⁹ The World Bank allocated \$200 million for four years that began in 2009 to ensure a coordinated approach to Afghanistan's water problems, rehabilitate irrigation systems, restore damaged dams and reservoirs, and install and operate 174 hydro-meteorological stations. As of May 2008, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United States rehabilitated 1,223,910 acres of agricultural land, completed 493 of 700 targeted projects, and increased the average yield by 24-104% per acre dependent upon the location and its crops.⁷⁰ Even with all the successes to improve Afghanistan's water infrastructure, Afghan farmers still irrigate less than half of the farmland they irrigated prior to the Soviet's 1979 invasion.⁷¹ As more of the irrigation system becomes operational, the Afghan farmers will cultivate more land. More local crops will reduce food costs and possibly reduce costs due to increased supply.

While the UN and the NGOs concentrated their efforts at the grassroots level, USAID focused their effort of work at the governmental level. In March 2009, USAID launched Year Two of its "Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer Program" (AWATT). The AWATT listed 11 goals for the year: integrated water resource management, technology demonstrations, water and agricultural best practices, capacity building at universities, teaching laboratories at universities,

forage improvement demonstrations, water allocation assessment, decision making training, natural resource management, gender equity, and renewable energy.⁷² The Afghan people must understand how the water system works so it can become a sustainable and renewable resource.

Some of the biggest problems with the Afghan water situation involve the water system's sustainment costs. If the Afghans do not learn the proper methods, foreign governments or NGOs will need to continue to subsidize the Afghans so they can continue to access clean water. The Western countries and agencies, however, must work around Afghan cultural norms. In 2009, USAID began to train brother and sister teams to serve as water meter readers in four provincial water supply departments. This allowed the female meter reader to enter the resident's home during the day to read the meter if the male head of the house worked outside the home. In their first trial month in one water department, the dual meter readers increased the collection of water usage payments over 75% from the previous month, identified five illegal water connections, and collected several payments for past service.⁷³ In Mazar-e Sharif, the Mazar Water Supply Department (MWSD) increased revenue by three times the previous month as they computerized their customer accounts, accelerated collections activity, and improved customer service.⁷⁴ Since October 2009 when the MWSD formed a customer care department with a hotline, the MWSD typically completes 77% of their repairs within one day of the customer's call with an average response time of only 1.6 days.⁷⁵ As the water utility companies become more professional, the average Afghan may come to expect better customer service and spread this idea to other areas of the economy.



**Coed Meter Reader Team,
USAID, 2010**

SEWAGE

While the number of Afghans that can access clean water is exceedingly low, it pales in comparison to the number of people that can access improved sanitation facilities. In 2010, about one-third of all urban Afghans used modern sewage methods compared to only 5% of rural and 16% of urban Afghan people in 2002.⁷⁶ Most rural Afghans use primitive facilities (latrines) that can allow human waste to contaminate ground water sources or return to the river where it flows downstream to the next village.⁷⁷ Without running water in their homes, rural people use the local stream to bathe, wash clothes, and water their animals.⁷⁸ Educational programs about sanitation would reduce water contamination and, in turn, reduce the amount of waterborne disease in the country.

Since 2002, the number of urban Afghans that used modern waste disposal systems more than doubled from 16% to 33%.⁷⁹ The vast majority of urban Afghan houses use "dry vault" toilets that collect solid and liquid waste separately. Many Afghan people use the "night soil" as fertilizer for urban agriculture. The lack of water and power make a Western-style urban sewer system cost prohibitive to build and operate for most Afghan cities. As of August 2007, 36 public toilets existed in Kabul for a city population that exceeded three million people. Due to the shortage of facilities, city residents often defecate or urinate in public places and in the local rivers. Septic tanks do not adequately solve the problem and they often further contaminate the ground water. Unhygienic toilet facilities cause 70% of hospital visits due to diarrhea. Each day in Kabul alone, 100-150 children visit the hospital because of diarrhea.⁸⁰ In March 2010, an American company won a bid to build a sewage treatment plant in Kabul, but it will only service 6,000 of the three million residents.⁸¹ Until more houses can access running water and modern sewage systems become available in the cities, urban residents will continue to use traditional methods to dispose of human waste.

Recently, the United States began to use some of the latest scientific water treatment processes to help Afghanistan convert wastewater into a discharge that meets the requirements by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for municipal wastewater. The traditional waste treatment process takes up to 30 days and leaves 40-50% sludge. Scientists at Sam Houston State University in Texas developed a portable system that completes the process in 24 hours and with less than 10% sludge. The United States Army recently deployed two test systems to Afghanistan to test the process in a rugged and austere environment.⁸² The Army also began to test another self-contained water disposal system for military units or small towns developed by the Missouri University of Science and Technology that eliminates the tremendous cost to haul away waste water.⁸³ If successful and cost-effective, these revolutionary systems may help bring Afghanistan's waste disposal processes into the 21st century and reduce the sickness and economic loss caused by water contamination.



**Wastewater Plant "In a Box"
(Used with permission of the
Missouri University of Science &
Technology, 2009)**

SERVICES AND TRANSPORTATION

Before 2002, almost the entire transportation infrastructure of Afghanistan demonstrated signs of neglect, abuse, and underdevelopment. Afghanistan possessed an unimproved road system more suited for travel by animal than vehicle, no railroad network, and limited air transportation infrastructure. Kabul operates a sub-standard bus system and the city enjoys a large taxi fleet. Except for Kabul, few Afghan cities operate a public transportation system for their residents. Since the end of the Taliban, foreign countries have used enormous amounts of money to improve the Afghan national road system, install the first railroad tracks in the country in over 100 years, and modernize several of the airports.

TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE

Most Afghan people still travel the way they did before the advent of modern transportation, such as on foot, by animal, or in a wagon. In cities, residents usually travel by foot, bicycle, or bus.⁸⁴ Slowly, modern transportation means have begun to replace ancient transportation methods. The road construction projects generate local employment and provide a better method for farmers to get their products to market. The completion of the first railroad line in Afghanistan in over 100 years should help drive the price of imported goods down. The modernization of the airports in Afghanistan's major cities will also help improve intra- and inter-state commerce. Any type of transportation improvements should cause an increase in the economic status of the Afghan people.




**Afghan Road from Ghazni to
Gardez,
AIRP, 2009**

ROAD

With the high cost of air transportation and no railroads, the Afghan people travel primarily by road. In 2009, the CIA estimated that Afghanistan contained 7,674 miles of paved roads and 18,517 miles of unpaved roads.⁸⁵ Since 1992, the GIRoA demonstrated signs that Afghanistan wanted to update the primitive road network. The primary means for this is the completion of the Ring Road that will circle about 1,925 miles around the country.⁸⁶ Additional roads branch off the Ring Road similar to spokes on a bicycle wheel. The initial concept for the Ring Road occurred in the 1960s, but the invasion of the country by the Soviets and the Taliban government put a halt to foreign funding.⁸⁷

Once the Taliban lost power, however, the Ring Road development again became a priority. In October 2007, the Asian Development Bank provided a new \$176 million grant to supplement \$4 million provided by the GIROA to complete the Ring Road network. As of August 2009, Afghanistan, with foreign funds, completed a hard surface on the Ring Road, except for 89 miles in the very mountainous northern region of the country from Bala Murghab to Leman. In total, the international community provided over \$2 billion to complete the Ring Road network, regional and national highways, provincial roads, and some city streets.⁸⁸ The latest estimates indicate that the final three pieces of the Ring Road will open not later than July 2013.⁸⁹ India, Iran, and Pakistan funded construction of roads off the Ring Road that will connect Afghanistan with their own road systems.⁹⁰ (See Annex B for detailed breakdown of the road cost by section.) To ensure sustainability, the GIROA set aside in their national budget \$8 million for routine maintenance, \$34 million for periodic maintenance, and an additional \$3 million for emergency repairs.⁹¹ Without protection from insurgent attacks and regular maintenance, the roads could deteriorate and affect the Afghan economy.



**Road Bridge Builders,
AIRP, 2009**



Afghanistan Ring Road, Asian Development Bank, 2009

The Ring Road project produced not only positive economic results, but positive social gains as well. First, the massive construction project generated at least 771,000 full-time jobs for the Afghan people.⁹² Over 1,500 Afghan workers perform routine and emergency maintenance on the 946 miles of the Ring Road already completed.⁹³ Second, the Ring Road reduced average travel time by over 50%, increased freight traffic throughput in most areas, and reduced travel costs. Third, Afghan

residents that live within the zone of influence (ZOI), within approximately nine miles of the Ring Road, cultivated more irrigated land, increased their income, and produced more gross income in their village shops than those outside the Ring Road corridor. Fourth, Afghan residents in the ZOI operate more motor vehicles, own more generators, and possess a personal well within their home compound at a higher rate than those that live outside the ZOI. Last, Afghan ZOI residents also attend school at a higher rate and visit a hospital or medical clinic more often than non-ZOI residents.⁹⁴ The Ring Road serves as a catalyst for Afghan development.



**Afghan Road Maintenance Crew,
AIRP, 2009**

The most strategic point on the entire Ring Road remains the Salang Tunnel. The Salang Tunnel, located northwest of Kabul, connects the Afghan capital city with its northern provinces. The tunnel cuts 186 miles off a journey from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif and Kunduz, the capitals of Balkh and Kunduz Provinces. The Salang Tunnel passes 1.6 miles through the Hindu Kush mountain range and currently operates as one of the highest road tunnels in the world. Completed in 1964, a fire damaged the tunnel in 1982 and the mujahideen further damaged it in the late 1990s. Since the Salang Tunnel's reopening in 2002, 1,000 vehicles pass through the tunnel per day on average. This number will only increase as Afghanistan improves its economy.



**Salang Tunnel Entrance (Taken
by Michael Vogt, Use under
GNU Free Document License,
Wikimedia Commons, June 2009)**

The Ring Road construction projects did not come without a cost. In the construction of the 618 miles from Kabul to Herat via Kandahar, 162 Ring Road workers lost their lives and another 202 received wounds from insurgent attacks between 2003 and March 2008. In addition, the increased freight traffic along the better roads created a lucrative business for hijackers. Truck drivers can attempt to bribe the hijackers to not take their loads, or lose their loads to the hijackers, or even pay with their lives if they attempt to stand up to them. Some corrupt Afghan policemen even stop truckers and make them pay “rent” to continue to their destination.⁹⁵ The businesses must pass these costs on to the consumer in the form of higher prices as these informal payments inflate transportation costs by 50%.⁹⁶ Overall, the positive economic and social impacts of the improvement of Afghanistan's highways outweigh the costs. India funded the 135 mile highway from the Afghan border town of Zaranj to the Ring Road town of Delaram that reduced travel time from about 14 hours to two hours while it increased freight traffic ten-fold.⁹⁷ For Afghanistan to become a participant in the world's economy, the country must provide the roads for its citizens to take their goods to market.

Afghanistan primarily imports used vehicles from Japan and Europe with very few new vehicles in the country. In 2007, the GIRoA registered over 300,000 cars, 100,000 trucks, 100,000 motorcycles, 40,000 buses, and 5,000 motorized rickshaws. In the three-year period between 2004 and 2007, the number of registrations increased 23% for cars, 15% for trucks, and 48% for motorcycles. Registered motorized rickshaws increased only 2% in the same time period.⁹⁸ A rise in vehicle registrations should continue as better roads and better economic conditions occur throughout Afghanistan.

BUS

Two different bus systems operate in Afghanistan—the official and the unofficial. In 2005, Afghan buses completed 45 million passenger trips.⁹⁹ After the Taliban government fell in 2001, approximately 108 public buses operated in Kabul for a city with a population of over three million

in the metropolitan area.¹⁰⁰ Donor nations provided funds to add 1,061 buses to the GIROA national Millie Bus system, but 57% operate only in Kabul.¹⁰¹ Even the Afghanistan Embassy in Washington, DC advertises that buses are only available in the Kabul metropolitan area.¹⁰² As of September 2009, 235 private bus companies operated in Afghanistan with over half (135) based in Kabul. A total of 38,568 buses provide intra-transportation service, but the only cross-border bus service occurs between Jalalabad and Peshawar, Pakistan.¹⁰³ Due to the better roads in Afghanistan and new buses, Afghanistan now operates limited commercial bus services between its large cities. A trip from Kabul to Fayzabad in Afghanistan's northernmost province, Badakhshan, used to take two days and older residents remember when the trip took two months. Now the trip only takes 12 hours while the price of the bus ticket dropped from \$40 to \$14.¹⁰⁴ As the GIROA builds other roads, bus trips to other distant parts of Afghanistan will become cheaper and quicker.



Entrepreneurial Afghans operate an unofficial bus and minibus system out of motor parks called *falang*, a corruption of “flying coach,” on the edge of towns. The Afghans use many minibus models, but favor Toyota HiAces. The cost of the fare varies dependent on the popularity of the destination, and the minibus departs when the vehicle becomes full. To leave earlier or to obtain a little more legroom, as four passengers normally sit in each bench seat, a rider can purchase more than one seat. Drivers will rearrange passengers so Western passengers do not sit next to an Afghan woman. Drivers stop at *chaikhanas* (Central Asian teahouses) every four hours or so for food and prayers. On long trips, the driver might stop at a chaikhana for the night.¹⁰⁵ For many Afghans without access to their own vehicle, the *falang* might serve as their only method to make long trips.

TAXI

Two types of taxis also operate in Afghanistan—the ordinary taxi and the shared taxi. Over 46,557 registered taxis operate in Afghanistan. In Kabul alone, 53 registered taxi companies operate 16,309 vehicles. In the provinces, another 108 registered companies operate an additional 30,248 vehicles. These numbers do not include vehicles used as taxis, but unregistered with the GIROA.¹⁰⁶ An ordinary taxi resembles a Western-style taxi where the rider determines where the taxi will go. Usually, the taxi does not contain a meter and the rider needs to negotiate the price of the fare before departure. Afghans expect to haggle over the price and riders need to ensure that they understand the terms of the “oral contract” with the driver before they depart. A shared taxi is similar to the unofficial minibus system, but the driver operates a yellow taxi or private car instead of a minibus. Many drivers operate Toyota Corollas and take two passengers in the front seat and three in the back seat. To avoid the middle seat upfront, a rider can purchase both front seats for an additional fee. Shared taxis cost more than the minibuses, but usually arrive at their destination sooner.¹⁰⁷ Taxi fares can range from one to five cents per mile for paved roads and 5 to 24 cents per mile for unpaved roads.¹⁰⁸ As more Afghans flee the rural areas for the cities, registered and unregistered taxis should continue to increase.

RAIL

Afghanistan lacks any major railroad system and that forces the Afghans to transload imports onto trucks on their borders before distribution within their country. A major problem for Afghanistan remains that all their neighboring countries operate on different railroad gauges than Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹ Currently, Afghanistan possesses only two separate railroad tracks that cover 16 miles to transshipment yards in Torghandi and Hairatan, cities in Balkh Province in northern Afghanistan. The former Soviet Union laid both these tracks to ship supplies into Afghanistan after their 1979 invasion. After the break-up of the Soviet Union and the transfer of the railroads to the

successor states, Torghandi and Hairatan receive goods from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, respectively.¹¹⁰ Each day, Afghan workers transfer goods from 250 wagons (railroad cars) at Hairatan and 50 wagons at Torghandi to Afghan trucks for further distribution throughout the country, representing about 50% of Afghanistan's imports. The primary goods include petroleum products, humanitarian aid, wheat, flour, fertilizer, construction materials, and scrap metal that the Afghans transship by truck to Pakistan. Except for some seasonal fruit, Afghanistan exports very little through the railroads at either Torghandi or Hairatan.¹¹¹ In the future, Afghanistan might increase its rail exports.

In late 2009, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a plan to build the first commercial railroad system in Afghanistan in over 100 years as the two spur routes built by the Soviet Union were originally built to support their military. On 25 May 2010, the ADB held a ribbon cutting ceremony with many dignitaries to include the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, to highlight the \$170 million railroad project that will connect the Hairatan transload site with Mazar-e Sharif, approximately 47 miles away. The construction on the railroad actually began on 22 January 2010 with an expected completion date of June 2011.¹¹² The Afghan government, however, expects the railroad to reach full operation by the end of 2010.¹¹³ The actual route will only contain one track, but the plan calls for a passing loop every 12 miles large enough to handle 100 wagons. The tracks will accommodate trains that travel 50 miles per hour with an expected usage of two trains per day.¹¹⁴ The ADB provided a grant of \$165 million while the GIROA provided the other \$5 million.¹¹⁵ The new railroad could save Afghan shippers up to \$113 per 1,000 ton-mile with an estimated trade increase with Uzbekistan from \$170 million in 2008 to \$300 million annually by 2015. The total estimated economic impact on Afghanistan is an increase to \$5 billion per year by 2015 from the \$3.5 billion baseline in 2008.¹¹⁶

The new railroad line from Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif will produce other benefits for Afghanistan. First, Afghanistan will not need to procure any locomotives or rolling stock as the Uzbekistan Temir Yullari (UTY or Uzbekistan Railways Company) will extend the Uzbekistan railroad gauge system to Mazar-e Sharif and operate the railway line.¹¹⁷ Second, Afghanistan can now export its cotton through Uzbekistan instead its current round-about method through Turkmenistan and Iran to the port at Bandar Abbas.¹¹⁸ Third, the railway will offer more security from Taliban forces than the use of the road network, and will reduce hijackings and bribes necessary for goods to pass through certain areas of the country.¹¹⁹ All this will reduce the cost of the products to the end user. Fourth, the railroad will create secondary and tertiary jobs for local companies, shippers, and freight forwarders to include administrative jobs for Afghan women.¹²⁰ Fifth, the railroad should reduce HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (STD) in Afghanistan as long-haul truckers serve as a primary carrier of HIV/AIDS and STDs.¹²¹ Sixth, the railroad will reduce traffic accidents, pollution, and road maintenance costs as trucks will travel fewer road miles. Freight trains produce less than 10% of the carbon monoxide generated by road traffic to carry the same amount of goods the same distance.¹²² Last, by 2012 the 47-mile railroad will reduce traffic on the Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif road 35-50% from its 2008 usage rate with a 50% reduction on travel time for freight between the same two locations.¹²³ If a 47-mile railroad could affect Afghanistan's economy so much, new railroads between other large cities could do something very similar.



**New Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif
Railroad Line from the Air (Taken by
DOD PO1C Mark O'Donald, 2010)**

Developers also plan other possible Afghan railroad projects, but they will probably not reach fruition for at least a decade. In February 2007, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced construction of a railroad line to link Herat with Sangan, Iran with construction to begin by March 2008 by Iranian contractors.¹²⁴ In April 2010, the planned railroad hit a snag as Iran wanted Afghanistan to

build and pay for the final 36 miles of track from Herat to the Iranian border. It appears that unless some developer steps forward with the funds, this project will not become a reality for at least another 10 years.¹²⁵ A recent breakthrough in negotiations, however, may jumpstart the construction of the railroad from Islam Qala, the Afghan border city with Iran, to Herat. Recently, China pledged to build a railroad as a part of their Aynak copper mine project from Afghanistan's northern border to Jalalabad.¹²⁶ The other possible railroads for Afghanistan include routes from Chaman, Pakistan to Kandahar; Mazar-e Sharif to Herat; Mazar-e Sharif to Tajikistan; and Jalalabad to Torkham in Nangarhar Province.¹²⁷ The quicker the railroads become available, the cheaper the price of imported goods should become for the Afghan consumer.

AIR

Afghanistan's aviation infrastructure comprises an important piece of its transportation network due to the country's rugged physical terrain, poor road system, and limited railroad lines. Afghanistan contains at least 119 airports and airfields, but only 12 operate concrete or asphalt runways. All the others consist of dirt, gravel, or sand runways. Many of the airfields consist of little more than a path cleared of debris. Some of the primitive runways can only service helicopters or C-130 type airplanes due to the short or poorly maintained runways. Airfields with asphalt or concrete runways include Bagram, Camp Bastion, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul International, Kandahar International, Kunduz, Mazar-e Sharif, Sharana, Sheberghan, Shindand, and Tapa.¹²⁸ Two international and 22 domestic airports meet International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Class 4 categorization standards.¹²⁹ (See Annex C for the entire list of airfields and photos of most airports/airfields.) Due to Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, the ability for a plane to land near any Afghan city becomes important. Even if the unimproved runway can only take helicopters or limited cargo planes, the runway could become important in times of natural disaster.

In 2008, the GIRoA announced a plan to build 12 new airports over the next five years at a cost of \$500 million, and it remains on schedule. The plan would improve air service to the Afghan provinces of Badakhshan (northeast), Bamyan (central), Farah (west), Ghowr (central), Maydan (central), Nimroz (southwest), and Wardak (central).¹³⁰ The plan would provide asphalt or concrete runways built to ICAO standards, and provide other amenities such as terminals, parking, and security fencing.¹³¹ In May 2009, ISAF took possession of the recently completed Kabul International Airport (KAIA) North, a \$77 million construction project. This allowed ISAF to turn over KAIA South to the GIRoA for civilian purposes and economic activities.¹³² Due to the upgrades, the Kabul International Airport increased its use from 20 airplanes per day in 2001 to over 300 per day by February 2010, as it can now operate 24 hours per day. In late 2010, NATO opened up a new \$30 million 3,000 meter runway at the Mazar-e Sharif Airport.¹³³ Plans call to convert Mazar-e Sharif to an international airport by early 2012.¹³⁴ Since Afghanistan is a landlocked country, businesses require modern airport facilities to increase commercial activities.

One government-run and one civilian-owned commercial airline operate out of Afghanistan. Ariana Afghan Airlines (AAA) began operation in 1955 and currently operates nine aircraft, seven that



Kabul International Airport (Taken by Carl Montgomery, Use under GNU Free Document License, Wikimedia Commons, October 2008)



Kandahar International Airport (Taken by DOD Photographer's Mate 3rd Class Ted Banks, Wikimedia Commons, February 2002)

carry passengers.¹³⁵ The US Embassy recommends that Americans should not use Ariana because the airline sports a poor safety record and does not meet all current civil aviation requirements.¹³⁶ Ariana currently operates two Airbus A310-300s, one Airbus A300/B4, and four Boeing 727-200 Advanced Series jet airplanes. Ariana operates one Boeing 727 freighter and one Antonov-24 for cargo flights. Currently, Ariana flies internationally to the following locations:¹³⁷

China—Urumqi International Airport, Xinjiang Province
 Germany—Frankfurt Main Airport, Terminal 2
 Kuwait—Kuwait International Airport
 Iran—Tehran International Airport
 Russia—Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport
 Saudi Arabia—Jeddah International Airport
 Turkey—Ankara International Airport
 Turkey—Istanbul Attaturk International Airport
 United Arab Emirates—Dubai International Airport



Ariana Airlines, (Taken by Courtney Walker, Use under GNU Free Document License, Wikimedia Commons, June 2005)

A civilian airline, Kam Air, began operations in Afghanistan in 2003 and travels both domestically and internationally as it carries both passengers and cargo. Kam Air operates a fleet of airplanes that include the DC-8, the B-747-200F, the IL-76-TD, the AN-26B, and MI-8 helicopters. Based out of Kabul, Kam Air makes regular international flights to Almaty, Kazakhstan; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; Mashad, Iran; New Delhi, India; Peshawar, Pakistan; and Urumqi, China. Kam Air also makes regularly scheduled domestic flights within Afghanistan to Mazar-e Sharif and Tarin Kowt in Oruzgan Province.¹³⁸ As Afghanistan's economy improves, other civilian airlines should spring up to reap the benefits of an increased market.




Kam Air Airlines (Taken by Srikrishna1, use under GNU Free Document License, Wikimedia Commons, September 2007)

PORTS/SEA/RIVERS

As a landlocked country, Afghanistan operates no seaports and conducts very few maritime operations. The Amu Darya, the country's primary navigable river, serves as Afghanistan's northern boundary with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and part of Turkmenistan until it turns north. For the 746 miles that the Amu Darya contacts Afghanistan, it can accommodate ships that weigh up to 500 deadweight tons.¹³⁹ Some of the Amu Darya's tributaries can support smaller vessels. A civilian-operated ferry on the Amu Darya operates three to four times a day, dependent on the number of customers, in the vicinity of Hairatan, to transfer passengers and trucks between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.¹⁴⁰ Afghanistan will never build up its maritime infrastructure because of its lack of access to the oceans.

PIPELINES



No major oil or natural gas pipelines currently cross Afghanistan, but projects and proposals are afoot to use Afghanistan's geographic position to export oil and gas, especially from Central Asia. Since the 1990s, hydrocarbon companies and various governments have discussed the feasibility of the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline that would cross the four countries to deliver Turkmenistan gas for use by India.¹⁴¹ When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, discussions about the construction of the TAPI pipeline came to a halt due to the instability of the government and security issues in a war zone. As early as December 2002, after the ouster of the Afghan Taliban government, TAPI pipeline discussions resumed.¹⁴² Instead of delivering gas to India, however, the new plan signed by the leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan would move the location of the pipeline farther west and deliver the gas to a Pakistani port for export to the rest of the world. The ADB completed a feasibility study on the TAPI pipeline in 2005 and updated it again in 2008. The latest version of the TAPI pipeline plan, however, returns to the original concept to build a 994-mile pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to deliver it to Fazilka, India.¹⁴³ If completed, the pipeline would provide India with 60% of its annual natural gas requirements and also provide Pakistan with some of its natural gas needs. The TAPI would also provide 12,000 construction jobs for Afghans and \$400 million in annual transit fees that would greatly benefit Afghanistan.¹⁴⁴

Once built, the TAPI pipeline will become a main concern for Afghan security personnel and any Coalition forces that remain in Afghanistan. The TAPI pipeline will become Afghanistan's most expensive project and anti-government forces will seek its destruction to undermine the government and discredit the Western countries that helped build it.

Afghanistan does possess some minor pipelines for internal Afghan consumption, but these pipelines suffer from poor maintenance and security stability issues. Pipelines move natural gas from the Sherberghan area gas fields located at Djarquduk, Howaja Gogerak, and Yatimtaq in Jowzjan

Province to refineries. Another pipeline transfers small quantities of natural gas from these same fields to Mazar-e Sharif to supply a 48 MW power plant and partially operate a fertilizer plant. Small diameter pipelines from the Djarquduk and Khowaja Gogerdak fields provide natural gas to Sherberghan and a few nearby villages.¹⁴⁵ At one time, the Angot Oilfield near Sherberghan produced a small amount of crude oil, but the amount became so minute that it does not register with the United States Department of Energy's Energy Information Agency.¹⁴⁶

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE

Since the fall of the Taliban in 2002, Afghans now fully embrace the cellular telephone while they eschew landlines. Afghanistan's difficult terrain and lack of landline telephone architecture makes the cellular phone the people's first choice when it comes to personal communication. As of 2008, Afghanistan possessed only 460,000 hard telephones in the country, ranking 100th in the world. At the same time, the Afghan people operated 8.45 million cellular telephones to rank 69th in the world.¹⁴⁷ By May 2010, over eight million mobile phones operated in Afghanistan versus 80,000 only seven years before.¹⁴⁸ Currently, four companies provide cellular telephone service in Afghanistan: Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC), Etisalat Afghanistan, MTN Afghanistan, and the Telecom Development Company Afghanistan Ltd. (ROSHAN).¹⁴⁹ While future landline growth is unlikely, Afghanistan remains a substantial market for additional cellular telephones.


Since their fall from power, the Taliban and other insurgent groups revealed a love/hate relationship with the cellular telephone. In 2006, the insurgents considered the cell telephone towers off limits for their attacks because of the dramatic increase in cell phone use by the Afghan people.¹⁵⁰ By 2008, however, insurgents focused their attacks on cell phone towers after reports that ISAF could track the insurgents from their cell phone usage.¹⁵¹ After the insurgents attacked at least ten cell phone towers and caused almost \$2 million in damage in 2008, the insurgents stopped most of these attacks.¹⁵² Without the cell towers, the Afghan people could not use their cell phones and that made them very angry with the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Also, the insurgents figured out that without the towers they could not communicate with each other because they communicated primarily by cell phone.¹⁵³ In September 2009, for the first time in over six months, the insurgents destroyed a cell phone tower in Afghanistan located in the northeast province of Kapisa, about 80 miles from Kabul.¹⁵⁴ Taliban attacks against cell phone towers occurred intermittently throughout 2010.¹⁵⁵ The Taliban remain conflicted about the cell phone towers as the insurgents need them to communicate with each other, but it also reportedly continues to provide a means for ISAF to track them.

While Internet users showed an astronomical growth rate over the last decade, the average Afghan does not use the Internet. In 2000, only an estimated 1,000 Afghans could access the Internet under the Taliban.¹⁵⁶ By 2010, that number rose to 1 million Afghans. With that exponential growth rate, still less than 3% of the Afghan people can still access the Internet.¹⁵⁷ Most major hotels in the large cities provide Internet access to their customers. Major cities possess numerous Internet cafes that usually charge between \$1 and \$3 per hour for access.¹⁵⁸ Due to the remote nature of most of Afghanistan, it remains likely that only urban Afghans will find a way to access the Internet for the foreseeable future.

As of 2009, 150 radio stations and 23 television stations operated in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁹ Stations broadcast in a variety of languages to include Pashto, Dari, Urdu, and English. Outside countries, such as the Voice of America and the BBC, broadcast within Afghanistan.¹⁶⁰ USAID continues to provide radios to local residents for them to hear the broadcasts.¹⁶¹ Despite major strides in the development of radio infrastructure, many remote areas of Afghanistan still remain isolated from modern media methods. (*See Information variable for additional information on telephone use, cell phones, internet, television, and radios.*)

AGRICULTURE

Despite one of the highest urbanization rates in the world, Afghanistan remains largely an agriculture-based society. In 2009, 78.6% of Afghan people worked on farms or in jobs related to the agricultural industry.¹⁶² Due to Afghanistan's climate and a water shortage in many parts of the country, farmers only cultivate between 10-12% of Afghanistan's total land.¹⁶³ This, however, represents an increase from the 6% farmed in 1997.¹⁶⁴ Due to damage to ancient irrigation systems because of the years of war, Afghan farmers only irrigate about 25% of their farmland.¹⁶⁵ Farmers either use a dry farming technique called *lalmi* that relies on rainfall, or an ancient system of tunnels and canals known as *karez* or *qanat*. The karez system can carry water for many miles from the mountains that receive more rainfall, but require much maintenance due to the damage caused by spring rains that carry debris through them.¹⁶⁶ As the GIRoA rehabilitates destroyed irrigation systems, Afghan farmers will increase the amount of farm land they cultivate. More land could produce more products and help drive down costs and increase farmers' profit margins.



Most Afghan farmers use outdated methods that date back centuries and fail to replenish the soil. Wheat continues to reign as Afghanistan's most important legal crop. Afghan farmers, who normally own their small plot of land, also produce barley, beans, beets, corn, cotton, grapes, fruits, madder root, melons, nuts, olives, potatoes, rice, sugar, tobacco, and many varieties of vegetables. In 2009, Afghan winter wheat farmers produced record yields from their fields. While this drove down prices slightly from the previous year, wheat prices remain higher than in 2007.¹⁶⁷ Many farmers also use their sheep to produce mutton and wool.¹⁶⁸ Between 1979 and 1997, Afghan farmers' crop production dropped 50% due to the damage caused by war, especially to the irrigation systems.¹⁶⁹ Since 2002, outside agencies attempted to provide Afghan farmers with better techniques to produce larger crop yields while they reinvigorated many of Afghanistan's fruit and nut tree orchards.¹⁷⁰ The more Afghan farmers can rely on legal crops to produce a profit, the less likely the farmers will grow illegal crops.

Due to the damage caused to their farmlands over the long years of war, many Afghan farmers turned to poppy production for financial reasons. The poppy requires much less water than other crops and farmers therefore need not repair their *karez* system to produce it.¹⁷¹ The farmers also make more profit from the poppy as the drug traders pay more for heroin's basic ingredient than the farmer can make from other crops. To wean Afghan farmers off poppy production, one GIRoA plan pays the farmer the value of their next poppy crop if the farmer burns the poppies in the field and grows a legal crop with seeds provided by the government. This prevents the resentment by the farmers generated when soldiers burn poppies to prevent their eventual transformation into heroin.¹⁷² In the fight against poppy production, foreign governments and NGOs also provided irrigation pumps to the areas with the highest poppy production. The pumps provide the additional water that legal crops such as carrots, onions, radishes, spinach, turnips, and sunflower seeds will need to flourish.¹⁷³ To continue to increase legal Afghan agricultural production and wean the Afghan farmers off the poppy, the US provided 89 agricultural experts; supplied vouchers to farmers to obtain saplings, grapevines, and trellises; and continued to rehabilitate degraded watersheds to improve irrigation.¹⁷⁴ Besides the possibility of an increase in Afghan food prices caused by a drought, water shortages may force some farmers to return to poppy production in order to produce a crop for the year. *(For more details on farming, see the economic and physical environment variables.)*

INDUSTRY

Afghanistan lacks a significant industrial output for its country's size, population, and natural resources because of almost constant war since the Soviet Union invasion in 1979 and even before as well. Afghanistan once exported large quantities of natural gas and internally processed or produced tons of sugar, textiles, and chemical fertilizers, but that is no longer the case.¹⁷⁵ Due to the war's destruction, most of the 5.7% of the population that work in industry operate in small factories that produce textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, cement, hand-woven carpets, and other facets of the textile trade.¹⁷⁶ Heavy industry likely remains several years in the future, but entrepreneurial Afghans can take advantage of the market economy to start small businesses on their own that will provide jobs for other Afghans.


Afghanistan possesses a variety of mineral reserves, but the country has failed to exploit their natural resources due to a lack of access, technology, and financial capital. Recent discoveries indicate that Afghanistan may hold nearly \$1 trillion in untapped mineral resources.¹⁷⁷ These reserves include aluminum, barite, beryl, chrome, coal, copper, gold, halite, lapis lazuli, lithium, iron, gold, lead, mica, niobium, salt, silver, sulfur, talc, tin, uranium, zinc, and other rare metal pegmatite.¹⁷⁸ China recently announced that the Aynak copper mine in Logar Province in southeastern Afghanistan will not open until at least 2013 and maybe as late as 2014.¹⁷⁹ Afghanistan also possesses some quantities of gemstones such as rubies, sapphires, and emeralds that also need exploitation.¹⁸⁰ The lapis lazuli trade in Afghanistan goes back over 6,500 years and still produces the best of those gemstones in the entire world. Many of the most historic jewelry collections in the world that include many countries' crown jewels possess semi-precious stones mined in Afghanistan.¹⁸¹ *(For more information on industry, see the economic variable.)*

POLLUTION

Afghanistan suffers from high level of pollution, but not for the same reasons that Westerners think of when it comes to the environment. Due to its lack of extensive industrialization, Afghanistan does not suffer from extensive factory-related air contamination. Some limited local factory pollution originates in the Balkh Province fertilizer, textile, and coal plants; a Baghlan Province iron smelting plant; and a Pul-e-Charkhi cement plant. Instead, the majority of Afghanistan's air pollution comes from generators, burning animal manure, burning coal, and baking bricks. Due to the lack of vehicles in the country, most automobile pollution remains limited to Kabul and the few other major urban centers in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan suffers most from water pollution, primarily due to groundwater contamination. The lack of modern sewage systems allow human and animal waste products to seep into the groundwater or run into the local streams and rivers. In Kabul, drainage canals carry raw sewage directly into the Kabul River without treatment. Districts outside of Kabul contaminate their groundwater through the use of septic tanks and double pit latrines. Since most Afghan people obtain their water from open wells, they become contaminated from the human and animal waste untreated by modern methods.

Recently, the GIRoA demonstrated tangible proof of its desire to take care of the environment with the passage of several environmental laws and the establishment of Afghanistan's first national park. In early 2010, the GIRoA designated the six Band-e-Amir lakes in Bamyan Province in central Afghanistan as a protected area. Currently, the Afghan government is training park rangers, educating the provincial and local government officials on park operations, and developing laws and policies to protect the animals and natural beauty of the area.¹⁸²



As Afghanistan develops its industry, the level of air pollution will increase unless the government takes the necessary steps to mitigate the factories' pollution output. Only by the development of modern plumbing will Afghanistan find ways to reduce its water pollution. Pollution reduction in Afghanistan can only improve the lives and life expectancy rates for the Afghan people.

Summary

Afghanistan is primarily a rural country as only about a quarter of the people live in urban areas. Less than 25% of urban Afghan residents possess electricity, potable running water, and a connection to a modern sewage system. Less than 6% of rural Afghan citizens can access the same amenities.

Afghanistan possesses limited transportation infrastructure. While the road network in many places is new, it suffers from a lack of maintenance and attacks from anti-government forces. Afghanistan is in the midst of building its first railroad in over 100 years, but it will only reach Mazar-e Sharif from Uzbekistan. Some parts of the aviation industry are also new, but many of the rural airfields exist only as clear gravel paths viable for C-130 type planes or helicopters.

Due to the heavy influx of outside aid, all areas of Afghan infrastructure show signs of modernization and improvement. The Afghan Taliban government neglected the infrastructure during its reign and it will take decades and much economic assistance to transform Afghanistan into a country with modern infrastructure.

Afghanistan does possess some natural resources and the government must take advantage of what it does possess with the outside assistance to develop a sustainment program for the infrastructure based on preventive maintenance. Without sustainability, the Afghans will only allow the newly built infrastructure to lapse into a state of neglect. If that occurs, outside agencies will need to continue to provide financial support to the Afghans or allow them to return to a state similar to what they faced when the Taliban controlled the country.

Annex A

MAJOR HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Name	Location	Operator	Power Supply	Built	Remarks
Asadabad	Kunar	Ministry of Energy & Water (ME&W)	2 X 350 kW	1983	German built. 1 set in operation
Gerishk	Helmand	MEW & W	2 X 1.2 MW	1945	Only 2/3 turbines installed
Istalif	Kabul	MEW & W	200 kW	2006	Micro-hydro project
Kajaki	Helmand	MEW & W	2 X 16.5 MW	1975	Only 2/3 turbines installed
Mahipar	Kabul	MEW & W	3 X 22 MW	1967	2/3 turbines repaired in 2003 & are back on line
Naghlu	Kabul	MEW & W	4 X 25 MW	1967	\$30 million refurbishment
Pol-E Khomri-1	Baghlan	MEW & W	3 X 1.6 MW	1960	German built



[Asadabad Dam,](#)
Power Plants around the World, 2010



[Gerishk Dam,](#)
Power Plants around the World, 2010



[Istalif Power Plant,](#)
Power Plants around the World, 2010



[Kajaki Power Plant,](#)
Power Plants around the World, 2010



[Mahipar Dam,](#)
Power Plants around the World, 2010



[Pol-e Khomri-1 Power Plant,](#)
Power Plants around the World, 2010

Major Afghan Dams, Power Plants Around the World, 2010¹⁸³

Annex B

RING ROAD DETAILS



Highway Type	Location	Donor/ Implementer	Cost US\$ (Millions)	Length (Miles)	Status (April 2009)
Regional	Kabul to Kandahar (Sections B to F)	USAID(LBG)	311	242	Complete
Regional	Kabul to Kandahar (Section G)	Japan	29	31	Complete
Regional	Kandahar to Herat (Section 1)	Japan	100	71	Ongoing
Regional	Kandahar to Herat (Section 2)	Saudi Arabia/ USAID	52/ 13	72	Complete
Regional	Delaram to Zaranj	India	84	134	Ongoing
Regional	Kandahar to Herat (Sections 3 to 5)	USAID (LBG)	181	203	Ongoing

Highway Type	Location	Donor/ Implementer	Cost US\$ (Millions)	Length (Miles)	Status (April 2009)
Regional	Herat to Islam Qala	Iran	45	75	Complete
Regional	Herat to Armalik	Iran	25	37	Complete
Regional	Herat to Torghondi	Afghanistan	30	74	Pending
Regional	Armalik to Leman	IDB	10	31	Pending
Regional	Leman to Bala Murghab	ADB	176	89	Pending
Regional	Bala Murghab to Qaysar	ADB	55	56	Ongoing
Regional	Qaysar to Andkhoy	ADB	75	130	Ongoing
Regional	Andkhoy to Mazar-e Sharif	ADB	36	113	Complete
Regional	Mazar-e Sharif to Pole-e Khomri-Hairatan	ADB	34	165	Ongoing
Regional	Andkhoy to Aquina	IDB	20	23	Ongoing
Regional	Pol-e Khomri-Kunduz to Sher Khan Bandar & Kunduz-Taloqan	World Bank	30	144	Complete
Regional	Pol-e Khomri to Kabul	World Bank	68	126	Complete
Regional	Pol-e Khomri to Doshi	IDB	Unk	Unk	Pending
Regional	Kabul to Jalalabad	EC	66	88	Complete
Regional	Jalalabad to Torkham	Pakistan	50	46	Complete
Regional	Kandahar to Spin Boldak	ADB	25	38	Complete
Regional	Kandahar to Spin Boldak	Afghanistan	13	26	Pending
Regional Subtotal			1528	2013	
National	Kabul to Gardez	USAID (LBG & UNOPS)	47	75	Complete
National	Gardez to Khost	USAID (LBG & B&V)	69	61	Ongoing
National	Lashkar Gah to Ring Road	USAID (UNOPS)	13	30	Complete
National	Ghazni to Sharan	USAID (UNOPS)	20	39	Complete
National	Pol-e Alam to Ring Road	USAID (UNOPS)	7	22	Complete
National	Farah to Ring Road	USAID (UNOPS)	18	42	Complete
National	Panjshir Valley Road	USAID (UNOPS)	21	42	Complete
National	Ghazni to Gardez	USAID (LBG & B&V)	63	63	Ongoing
National	Sheberghan to Sar-e Pol	USAID (UNOPS)	15	34	Complete
National	Keshim to Feyzabad	USAID (LBG & B&V)	118	64	Ongoing
National	Kandahar to Tarin Kowt	USAID (UNOPS)	25	93	Complete
National	Jalalabad to Asmar	USAID (UNOPS)	38	75	Complete
National	Mazar-e Sharif to Dara I Suf	ADB	69	94	Pending
National	Yakawlang to Bamyan	Unknown	59	62	Pending

National	Maidanshahar to Bamyam (Segment 1)	Italy	31	34	Ongoing
National	Maidanshahr to Ounai Pass (Segment 2)	Unknown	72	51	Ongoing
Highway Type	Location	Donor/ Implementer	Cost US\$ (Millions)	Length (Miles)	Status (April 2009)
National	Taloqan to Keshim	World Bank	22	42	Ongoing
National	Kajaki Dam to Ring Road	USAID (LBG & B&V)	5	0	Terminated
National	Charikar to Bamyam	World Bank	5	99	Pending
National Subtotal			716	1022	
Provincial	Kandahar to Bikah	USAID (UNOPS)	24	58	Ongoing
Provincial	Spin Boldak to Bikah	USAID (USACE)	20	42	Ongoing
Provincial	Bikah to Shinkay	USAID	13	44	Terminated
Provincial	District Center Roads	USAID (UNOPS)	8	48	Complete
Provincial	District Roads	USAID (UNOPS)	21	65	Complete
Provincial	Urban Roads	USAID (LBG & UNOPS)	5	3	Complete
Provincial Subtotal			91	261	
GRAND TOTAL			2326	3265	

Ring Road Status, Government Accounting Office, 2009¹⁸⁴

Annex C

AFGHANISTAN AIRPORTS [185](#)

Airport Name	ICAO Code	IATA Code	Longitude (North)	Latitude (East)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Surface	Location
Amdar	OAAD	None	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unknown
Ajrestan North Runway 1	None	None	33° 30' 49.87"	67° 09' 32.46"	1904	98	Gravel	120 miles SW of Kabul
Ajrestan South Runway 2	None	None	33° 29' 7.03"	67° 08' 38.77"	2565	30	Gravel	120 miles SW of Kabul
Andkhoy	OAAK	None	36° 56' 35.96"	65° 12' 25.08"	2480	60	Gravel	133 miles W of Mazar-e Sharif
Asadaba Fire Base	OA1Z	OA1Z	34° 51' 10.72"	71° 08' 01.74"	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Asmar	OAAS	None	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	159 miles ENE of Kabul
Baghlan	OABG	None	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	107 miles NW of Kabul
Bagram	OAIX	None	34° 56' 46.55"	69° 15' 54.11"	11819 (9852)	150 (180)	Concrete	65 miles NW of Jalalabad
Bamar	OABR	None	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Bamyan (Bamiyan)	OABN	BIN	34° 48' 31.04"	67° 49' 05.64"	8515 (4700)	75	Gravel	73 miles NNW of Kabul
Band-E-Sardeh Dam	None	None	33° 19' 14.54"	68° 38' 11.62"	6902	190	Gravel	77 miles SW of Kabul
Camp Bastion (Bastion Airfield)	OAZI	None	31° 51' 18"	64° 12' 44"	7054	92	Concrete	102 miles W of Kandahar
Bandkamalkhan	OABK	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Behsood	OABD	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Bost (Lashkar Gah)	OABT	BST	31° 33' 32.46"	64° 21' 5.076"	6233 (6500)	150	Gravel	86 miles W of Kandahar
Chakhcharan	OACC	CCN	34° 31' 36.01"	65° 16' 18.00"	6635 (5900)	90	Gravel	153 miles E of Herat
Charburjak	OACS	None	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	300 miles S of Herat

Airport Name	ICAO Code	IATA Code	Longitude (North)	Latitude (East)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Surface	Location
Charikar	None	None	35° 08' 33.10"	69° 18' 11.58"	3270	100	Gravel	40 miles N of Kabul
Darra-I-Soof	OADZ	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Darwaz	OADZ	DAZ	38° 27' 42.13"	70° 52' 54.42"	2145 (2200)	105	Gravel	145 miles NE of Kunduz
Dawlatabad	OADD	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	36 miles NW of Mazar-e Sharif
Dehdadi	None	None	36° 38' 45.80"	67° 01' 56.20"	8472	456	Gravel	7 miles W of Mazar-e Sharif
Deshoo	OAOO	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	175 ESE of Herat
Devar	OADV	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Delaram	OARM	Unk	32° 07' 41.21"	63° 25' 54.87"	5112	96	Unk	148 miles WNW of Kandahar
Dostmohammadkhan Kalay Runway 1	None	None	31° 02' 38.73"	64° 09' 15.61"	740	40	Gravel	112 miles SW of Kandahar
Dostmohammadkhan Kalay Runway 2	None	None	31° 02' 38.73"	64° 09' 15.61"	715	95	Gravel	112 miles SW of Kandahar
Dwyer	OADY	Unk	31° 05' 23.08"	64° 03' 58.60"	6096	95	AM2 Matting	109 Miles SW of Kandahar
Eshkashem	OAEM	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	239 miles NE of Kabul
Faiazabad (Feyzabad)	OAFZ	FBD	37° 07' 18.85"	70° 31' 06.76"	6077 (6500)	120	Unpaved (PSP)	83 miles NE of Kunduz
Farah	OAFR	FAH	32° 21' 56.19"	62° 09' 54.51"	6365 (6500)	72	Gravel	162 miles S of Herat
Gader	OAGD	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Gardez	OAGZ	GRG	33° 37' 53.98"	69° 14' 21.02"	5460	175	Gravel	55 miles S of Kabul
Gardez South	01AY	0A1Y	33° 34' 14.82"	69° 15' 02.43"	Unk	Unk	Unk	55 miles S of Kabul
Gasar	OAGS	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Ghaziabad	OAGA	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk

Airport Name	ICAO Code	IATA Code	Longitude (North)	Latitude (East)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Surface	Location
Ghazni	OAGN	GZI	33° 31' 52.42"	68° 24' 46.37"	1000	Unk	Unk	88 miles SW of Kabul
Gulistan	OAGL	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Helmand Runway 1	None	None	20° 19' 48.13"	61° 53' 49.76"	6045	30	Gravel	142 miles SW of Kandahar
Helmand Runway 2	None	None	20° 19' 48.13"	61° 53' 49.76"	5900	30	Gravel	142 miles SW of Kandahar
Herat	OAGR	HEA	34° 12' 36.06"	62° 13' 41.88"	8202 (8200) (8218)	150	Asphalt	7 miles SSE of Herat
Islam Qala	OAEQ	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	75 miles WNW of Herat
Jabul Saraj	OAJJ	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	50 miles N of Kabul
Jalalabad	OAJL	JAA	34° 24' 00.91"	70° 29' 55.87"	6460 (6000) (7262)	90 (148)	Asphalt	3 miles SE of Jalalabad
Jawand	OAJW	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	154 miles NE of Herat
Kabul International Airport	OAKB	KBL	34° 33' 57.03"	69° 12' 44.71"	11483 (11400)	164	Concrete	½ mile NE of Kabul
Kajaki	OAKJ	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	150 miles NW of Kandahar
Kalat	OAKT	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	82 miles NE of Kandahar
Kaldar	OAKR	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	53 miles NE of Mazar-e Sharif
Kamar	OAKM	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Kamdes	OAKD	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	201 miles NE of Kabul
Kandahar International Airport	OAKN	KDH	31° 30' 49.10"	65° 51' 39.80"	10500 (10400) (10532)	180 (148)	Asphalt	10 miles SE of Kandahar
Karez-I-Mir	OAKZ	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	12 miles NW of Kabul

Airport Name	ICAO Code	IATA Code	Longitude (North)	Latitude (East)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Surface	Location
Keshm	OAEK	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	86 miles E of Kunduz
Khgagar (Khojaghar)	OAKG	None	37° 03' 55.0"	69° 29' 79.2"	5400	105	Gravel	50 miles ENE of Kunduz
Khost (Chapman)	OAKS	KHT	33° 20' 01.10"	69° 57' 8.51"	6100	90	Dirt	132 miles SE of Kabul
Khost-O-Fering	OAFG	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Khvej Ghar North	None	None	37° 04' 15.78"	69° 29' 42.24"	4384	74	Gravel	50 miles ENE of Kunduz
Khvej Ghar South	OAKG	None	37° 03' 40.20"	69° 29' 17.61"	8020	128	Gravel	50 miles ENE of Kunduz
Khwahan	OAHN	KWH	37° 53' 05"	70° 12' 02"	3255	170	Gravel	190 miles NE of Kunduz
Koban	OAKA	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Konjak-I-Logar	OAKL	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Kotal	OATK	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	184 miles SE of Herat
Kotubkhel	None	None	34° 11' 34.54"	69° 08' 08.25"	8450	115	Gravel	40 miles S of Kabul
Kunduz (Konduz) (Kondo)	OAUZ	UND	36° 39' 54.40"	68° 54' 39.00"	6466 (6500) (6558)	113 (148) (54)	Asphalt	5 miles SE of Kunduz
Kron Monjan	O AQM	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Kuran-O-Munjan	None	KUR	71° 7' 0"	38° 24' 0"	Unk	Unk	Unk	270 miles NE of Kunduz
Laghman	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	81 miles E of Kabul
Lal (Sarjangan)	OALL	None	34° 30' 21.37"	66° 17' 58.53"	2303	97	Gravel	140 miles W of Kabul
Logar	OALG	None	33° 59' xx"	69° 01' 26.40"	600	180	Metal Ribbed	94 miles S of Kabul

Airport Name	ICAO Code	IATA Code	Longitude (North)	Latitude (East)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Surface	Location
Maimanah	OAMN	MMZ	35° 55' 79"	64° 45' 69"	5040	60	Gravel	212 miles SW of Mazar-e Sharif
Marnah Ghar	OA1A	None	32° 20' 13.27"	68° 56' 25.75"	4652	115	Gravel	134 miles S of Kabul
Mazar-e Sharif	OAMS	MZR	36° 42' 24.89"	67° 12' 34.84"	10437 (10400) (10361)	147 (150)	Asphalt	5 miles E of Omar-I-Sharif
Mollayan	OAMY	Unk	31° 57' 12.84"	67° 02' 34.82"	200	265	AM2 Matting	80 miles E of Kandahar
Mukur	OAMK	None	32° 52' 46.68"	67° 50' 55.09"	6020	80	Gravel	120 miles SW of Kabul
Munta	OAMT	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Nawor	OANR	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Nayak	None	None	34° 41' 30.67"	66° 52' 55.53"	5360	50	Gravel	109 miles NW of Kandahar
Nili	OANL	None	33° 44.2' xx"	66° 09.4' xx"	2400	65	Gravel	188 miles N of Kandahar
Nimroz	None	IMZ	61° 56' 0"	31° 06' 00'	3281	Unk	Unk	303 miles SW of Kandahar
Obeh	OAOB	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	63 miles E of Herat
Oruzgan	None	None	32° 54' 11.04"	66° 37' 50.51"	4670	155	Gravel	90 miles NE of Kandahar
Paghman	OAPG	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	12 miles NW of Kabul
Pan Jao	OAPJ	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Panyab	OASN	None	34° 23' 52.50"	67° 01' 19.00"	1200	75	Gravel	144 miles W of Kabul
Qades	QAQD	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	113 miles ENE of Herat
Qaisar	QAQR	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	220 miles NE of Herat
Qala-I-Naw	OAQN	LQN	34° 59' 15"	63° 07' 06"	6560 (6800)	82	Concrete (Unpaved)	65 miles NE of Herat
Qala-I-Yazkhan	OAQK	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk

Airport Name	ICAO Code	IATA Code	Longitude (North)	Latitude (East)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Surface	Location
Qalet (Qalat)	OQAQ	None	32° 08' 03.00"	66° 53' 93.00"	4829	60	Sand/Clay	82 miles NE of Kandahar
Qara Tapa	None	None	37° 25' 23.83"	69° 25' 48.53"	447	287	Gravel	93 miles NW of Mazar-e Sharif
Qarqin	OAAQ	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	92 miles NW of Mazar-e Sharif
Razer	OARZ	None	36° 01' 21.51"	70° 46' 11.04"	2858	133	Gravel	119 miles NE of Kabul
Rimpa	OARP	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Rustag	OART	None	37° 06' xx"	69° 51' xx"	5400	60	Unk	113 miles NE of Kunduz
Sabar	OASR	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Salang-I-Junubi	OASS	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Salang-I-Shamali	OANS	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Salerno	OASL	None	33° 21' 49.48"	69° 57' 19.30"	4000	90	Gravel	132 miles SE of Kabul
Samangan	OASM	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	148 miles SW of Kunduz
Sarday	OABS	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Sar-e Pul	OASP	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	114 miles E of Herat
Sarhawdza	OASW	None	33° 09' 21.81"	68° 49' 10.31"	8494	156	Gravel	83 miles S of Kabul
Sarobi	OASB	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Serka	OASK	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Shank	OASH	Unk	33° 55' 58.13"	69° 04' 22.00"	6827	90	Concrete	70 miles S of Kabul
Sharana (Sharona Airstrip)	OASA	None	33° ?' 07.33"	68° ?' 50.19"	4265	82	Asphalt	125 miles S of Kabul
Sheberghan Runway 1	OASG	None	36° 44' 59.06"	65° 54' 45.17"	8600	80 (70)	Asphalt	89 miles W of Mazar-e Sharif

Airport Name	ICAO Code	IATA Code	Longitude (North)	Latitude (East)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Surface	Location
Sheberghan Runway 2	OASG	None	36° 44' 59.06"	65° 54' 45.17"	6939 (6800) (4582)	100	Gravel	89 miles W of Mazar-e Sharif
Sheber Too (Sherber) Too	None	None	34° 46' 44.41"	67° 29' 12.11"	110000	113	Gravel	83 miles NW of Kabul
Sheghnan	OASN	SGA	37° 29' 55.51"	71° 30' 25.25"	2635	100	Gravel	213 miles N of Kabul
Shindand	OASD	None	33° 23' 28.79"	62° 15' 39.51"	9190 (9140)	160	Concrete	58 miles S of Herat
Taluqan (Taloqan)	OATQ	None	36° 46' 30.96"	69° 31' 57.61"	5165	114	Gravel	45 miles E of Kunduz
Tapa	None	None	32° 44' 53.15"	62° 35' 58.85"	1169	108	Asphalt	92 miles S of Herat
Taskhurghan	OATG	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	69 miles W of Kunduz
Teh Wareh	OATW	None	33° 32.4' xx"	64° 25.5' xx"	1950	100	Gravel	200 miles W of Herat
Tereen (Tarin Kowt)	OATN	TII	32° 36' 18.60"	65° 51' 50.70"	6002 (5000)	114	Gravel	60 miles N of Kandahar
Tesak	OATZ	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
Tewara	OATW	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	116 miles E of Kandahar
Toorghodi	OATQ	None	35° 13' 20.01"	62° 17' 26.67"	815	265	Gravel	55 miles NE of Herat
Urgun (Urgoon)	OAGG	None	32° 55' 54.63"	69° 09' 22.81"	2104	165	Sand	132 miles S of Kabul
Oruzgan	OARG	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	136 miles N of Kandahar
FOB Wasi Khwa	OAWK	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	198 miles S of Kabul
Wazakhwa	OADW	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	198 miles S of Kabul
Wazirabad	OAWZ	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	123 miles W of Kunduz
Wurtach	OAWU	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk

Airport Name	ICAO Code	IATA Code	Longitude (North)	Latitude (East)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Surface	Location
Yakawlang (Yakolang)	OAYL	None	34° 30' 47.70"	66° 18' 11.00"	4200	100	Gravel	172 miles W of Kabul
Yakawlang (Yakolang)	OAYL	None	34° 30' 47.70"	66° 18' 11.00"	4200	100	Gravel	172 miles W of Kabul
Yawan	OAYW	None	37° 33.7' xx"	70° 26.5' xx"	1820	65	Gravel	188 miles NE of Kunduz
Zaranj	OAZJ	ZAJ	30° 58' 9.00"	61° 52' 01.30"	7610	155	Gravel	262 miles S of Herat
Zeback	OAZB	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	207 miles E of Kunduz



**Ajrestan Airport, Ghazni Province,
Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil
Aviation, 2010**



**Andkhoy Airport, Faryab Province,
Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil
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**Bagram Airport, Parwan Province,
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**Bamyan Airport, Bamyan Province,
Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil
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**Band-e Sardeh Dam Airport, Ghazni Province,
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**Camp Bastion Airport, Helmand Province,
Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil
Aviation, 2010**



**Chakhcharan Airport, Ghor Province,
Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil
Aviation, 2010**



**Charikar Airport, Parwan, Province,
Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil
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
**Darwaz Airport, Badakhshan Province,
Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil
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**Dehdadi Airport, Balkh Province,
Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil
Aviation, 2010**



Dostmohammadkhan Kaly Airport, Helmand Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



Faizabad Airport, Badakhshan Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



Farah Airport, Farah Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



Gardez Airport, Paktia Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



Ghazni Airport, Ghazni Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



Helmand Airport, Nimroz Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



**Herat Airport, Herat Province,
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**Jalalabad Airport, Nangarhar Province,
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Khvej Ghar North and South Airports, Takhar Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



Khwahan Airport, Badakhshan Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010




Kunduz Airport, Kunduz Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010




Kotubkhel Airport, Logar Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



Lal (Sarjangal) Airport, Ghor Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



Lashkar Gah (Bost) Airport, Helmand Province, Afghan Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation, 2010



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
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**Rustag, Takhar Province,
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**Sheberghan Airport, Jowzjan Province,
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
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

“We must have gone five months without rain. Some days the dust and haze were so thick that you couldn’t see the mountains only a few clicks away. Everything was dry and brown and dead. There were two-foot deep ditches beside all the roads on base. Newcomers must have wondered what on earth for – until the first good rain.”

Laura Deatrick, LT/USN, March 4, 2011

Physical Environment

The physical environment variable includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations. This variable defines the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, and sea.



KEY FACTS:

- Afghanistan is located in the center of Central Asia on the Iranian Plateau.
- Afghanistan is slightly smaller than Texas.
- Afghanistan borders six countries: China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
- The Hindu Kush mountain range that runs northeast to southwest separates Afghanistan's northern part from the rest of the country.
- Afghanistan is landlocked and depends upon its neighboring countries for trade access to the rest of the world.
- Afghanistan possesses limited water resources and its few rivers are vital to the population and to agricultural production.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE IN THE OE:


- Soldiers not acclimated to Afghanistan's hot and dry climate will find themselves at a distinct disadvantage to the enemy, who is already acclimated to the weather. The extreme high temperatures, especially during the summer months, can cause heat stroke and heat exhaustion.
- Natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes occur often in Afghanistan, and will impact the movement of personnel and equipment.
- An abundance of landmines in southeastern and eastern Afghanistan make agricultural pursuits and travel dangerous.
- Rugged mountains cover more than half of Afghanistan and make it an ideal terrain for ambushes. The mountainous areas also provide numerous caves for insurgents to live in and use as an operations base.
- Afghanistan possesses many rivers, but only a limited supply of fresh water. Due to environmental pollution, military personnel will need to sanitize drinking water from unknown sources or rely on internal logistics to access potable water.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW:

Mountainous terrain covers two-thirds of Afghanistan and creates the dominant land characteristic of the country. The Hindu Kush mountain range separates the country into three distinct regions, hinders mobility, and affects personnel not acclimated to the high altitudes and wide fluctuations in temperature. The mountains' high elevation provides an excellent field of observation for all sides. Afghanistan lacks sufficient natural water sources, which limits agricultural production. The most probable danger from the terrain comes not in the form of natural disasters, but from landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) left over from 30 years of war.

BOUNDARIES

Afghanistan possesses an external border of 3,436 miles and abuts six different countries. Afghanistan shares its longest international border of 1,510 miles with Pakistan to the east and south. The other international borders include Tajikistan in the north, 749 miles; Uzbekistan in the north, 85 miles; Iran in the west, 582 miles; Turkmenistan in the northwest, 462 miles; and China in the east, 47 miles.¹



TERRAIN

Afghanistan encompasses a total land area of 251,827 square miles.² Mountains generally run in a northeast to southwest direction cover the country's central region. Over 49% of Afghanistan's total land area lies above 6,560 feet.³ The Hindu Kush mountain range stretches approximately 149 miles from north to south and 600 miles from east to west, and divides the country into three geographical regions: the northern plains, the central highlands, and the southern plateau.

Northern Plains

Afghanistan's northern plains encompass 40,000 square miles that consist of mountainous plateaus and hills that average 2,000 feet above sea level in elevation. The region contains very fertile foothills and plains, especially near the Amu Darya River. The northern plains run north of the central highlands and extend eastward from the Iranian border to the foothills of the Pamirs, near the Tajikistan border. The Afghan people intensely cultivate the northern plains and provide most of the country's agricultural production. The northern plains also possess significant mineral and natural gas deposits.⁴

Central Highlands

The central highlands cover 160,000 square miles or almost two-thirds of Afghanistan. As part of the Hindu Kush, the mountains extend from the northeast to the southwest. The central highlands contain deep, narrow valleys and high mountains—historically important to Afghanistan's defense against outside invaders. Some of the northeastern peaks reach more than 22,950 feet in elevation. This includes the Khyber Pass, one of the most important access routes into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The central highlands experience extreme cold in the winter, but summer temperatures average 81°F.⁵ For personnel not acclimated, the high elevations could lead to altitude sickness such as headache, dizziness, nausea, and shortness of breath.

Southern Plateau

The southern plateau, located south and west of the central highlands, consists of high plateaus, sandy deserts, and semi-desert terrain. The southern plateau covers 50,000 square miles and averages 3,000 feet in elevation. Except for the areas along the Helmand and Arghandab rivers, infertile soil dominates the region. Sandstorms commonly occur in the region, especially in the deserts and arid plains.⁶

BODIES OF WATER

While landlocked Afghanistan possesses many rivers, the country does not effectively exploit this natural resource. Mountain streams feed most of the rivers. Some of those rivers become dry in the summer, but snow melt generates great amounts of water in the spring. Afghanistan's four major river systems include the Amu Darya, the Harirud, the Helmand, and the Kabul Rivers.


Each of the four rivers in Afghanistan possesses unique features. At 1,491 miles, the Amu Darya River reigns as Central Asia's longest river and forms Afghanistan's northern border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and part of Turkmenistan. As Afghanistan's only navigable river, the Amu Darya can carry boats with a capacity up to 500 deadweight tons. Oil products, insecticides, and chemical fertilizers heavily contaminate the Amu Darya.

The Harirud River originates in the Hindu Kush mountain range in central Afghanistan and flows west 404 miles. It provides water to the fertile Herat valley in western Afghanistan and forms part of the border with both Iran and Turkmenistan. The river eventually disappears into the desert in Turkmenistan.

At 808 miles long, the Helmand River forms Afghanistan's longest river. The river originates in the Hindu Kush mountain range, flows to the southwest, and forms part of the Iranian border. Afghan farmers use the Helmand River extensively for irrigation.⁷

The Kabul River serves as eastern Afghanistan's main river. It also originates in the Hindu Kush mountain range, but flows east and passes through Afghanistan's capital, Kabul. The Kabul River eventually joins the Indus River in Pakistan before reaching the Indian Ocean. In the summer, the low flow months, the river can become completely dry since the Afghans use much of its water for irrigation in farmlands near Kabul.⁸

Afghanistan possesses few lakes and those present usually do not reach any significant size. The most prominent lakes include Lake Zarkol along the Tajikistan border, Lake Shiveh in Badakshan Province in northern Afghanistan, and the saline lake Istadeh-ye Moqor in the eastern province of Ghazni. These lakes' water levels fluctuate with the seasons—high in the spring and low during the summer.⁹



SURFACE WATER RESOURCES

Afghanistan contains three surface water hydrological basins: the Amu Darya Basin, the Darya-ye Helmand Basin, and the Indus Basin. All Afghan streams that flow north belong to the Amu Darya Basin. These streams either join the Amu Darya River or disappear in the northern deserts. Streams that flow south or west from the Hindu Kush belong to the Darya-ye Helmand Basin. The Indus Basin streams flow east and south from the Hindu Kush into Pakistan and eventually join the Indus River.¹⁰

The Afghan people face cyclical surface water shortages due to seasonal precipitation and snowfall melt in the Hindu Kush mountain range, which feeds many of the country's streams. Streams that contain large amounts of fresh water in high flow periods may become dry during low flow periods.¹¹ (Refer to Map 1 in the Annex for more information on surface water resources.)


GROUND WATER RESOURCES

Most Afghan people cannot access fresh water, as the country possesses limited ground water sources and surface water is usually contaminated. The Afghans find the best locations for ground water at the bottom of hills or mountains, in valleys located between mountains, or near some major streams. Ground water is absent or sparse in most of Afghanistan's desert regions and areas of hills formed by volcanic activity. Afghanistan does contain abundant ground water in the southeast and southwest basin plains and the eastern part of the northern plains between the Amu Darya River and the Hindu Kush.¹² (Refer to Map 2 in the Annex for more information on ground water resources.)

MOBILITY CLASSIFICATION

Most urban areas exhibit signs of over-population that will slow down troop movement. In cities such as Kabul and Kandahar, the Afghans built their houses close together with narrow passageways that offer easy movement and hideouts for insurgents. These dense construction patterns allow the enemy easy access from building to building. (See *Infrastructure for additional information on Afghan city construction patterns.*)

The mountainous terrain will provide sanctuary areas for the enemy, especially for those who use motorized transportation. Ground transportation faces many challenges with Afghanistan's mountainous terrain as the terrain hinders vehicular movement and does not facilitate armored or mechanized operations. In some areas, people must rely on high mountain passes to reach their destinations. Since the locals know the mountains, the insurgents hold the upper hand as the difficult terrain provides them both hideouts and perfect ambush sites. Afghanistan's rough terrain and poor road networks throughout the entire country will limit mobile military operations. Winter snowstorms and blizzards and summer high winds will affect aerial reconnaissance and air operations. (Refer to *Maps 3 and 4 in the Annex for the engineer route study and the cross country layout in Afghanistan.*)



Hajikal Pass, MCIA, 2007

SEVERELY RESTRICTED TERRAIN

In the central highlands, the mountainous terrain severely restricts both mounted and dismounted movement. Vehicles must stay on the roads and the difficult terrain slows dismounted movement. Some valleys remain accessible only through a small number of highly restricted routes. In clear weather, the mountains provide long range observation opportunities that make it difficult for military personnel to move stealthily. The mountainous terrain also provides few landing zones for airmobile operations close to insurgent bases. Troops will most likely need to move dismounted to seize key terrain on high ground and provide overwatches and lookouts against the enemy.

Large rocks or fine dust covers much of the southern plateau. Sandstorms often occur and trap vehicles in the deep dust. The dust hinders helicopter operations and permeates almost anything that requires mechanical maintenance such as weapons, aircraft, and vehicles. Some areas become flooded or muddy in the spring runoff season and may force planners to find alternate and usually longer routes between positions.

MOUNTAIN PASSES

Historically, Afghan mountain passes formed significant barriers against outside invaders and the mountains continue to possess strategic importance. The Khyber Pass, located in central Afghanistan and the country's most important mountain pass, links Kabul, Afghanistan to Peshawar, Pakistan. The Khyber Pass creates a strategic chokepoint as it stretches for 33 miles with high mountains on both sides and few places for entry or exit by a large military force. The Khyber Pass reaches its highest elevation at the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. In some places along the Khyber Pass, the road narrows to only 10 feet wide.¹³ In addition to the inherent danger of the terrain the road receives little maintenance, negatively affecting transport time and passenger safety. Afghanistan uses the Khyber Pass to import goods from Pakistan while others use it to smuggle refugees, fighters, goods, and weapons.

Other important passes include the Unai, the Kotal-e Salang (aka Salang), and the Bolan. Afghanistan contains more than 200 mountain passes, and some passes remain unknown except to the local tribesmen. Many of those passes cross nearly impassible terrain and offer ample places to hide. Such passes do not accommodate large military vehicles and force soldiers to patrol only on foot. Many mountain passes remain littered with landmines from over 30 years of almost continuous combat, and become a hazard for foot patrol and military vehicles.¹⁴

Known Afghanistan Mountain Passes		
Strategic Pass	Distance (Miles)	Description
Afsik	2.3	Leads into Chitral, Pakistan (NWFP)
Agram An	3.1	Leads into Chitral, Pakistan (NWFP)
Anjuman	2.4	Runs through Panjshir Valley in north-central Afghanistan
Bamiyan	1.7	Leads into western Afghanistan
Baroghil	2.4	Leads into Chitral, Pakistan (NWFP)
Bazarak	1.7	Leads into western Pakistan
Bolan	60	NW-SE pass in Baluchistan Province, Pakistan
Dorah	2.8	Leads into Chitral, Pakistan (NWFP)
Gomal	13.5	Links eastern foothills with Indus plains
Haji Gak	1.7	Leads into eastern Hazarjat and Bamiyan valleys in central Afghanistan
Kachin	3.5	Joins Afghanistan to Pakistan in the NE through the Wakhan Corridor
Khwak	2.2	Runs through Panjshir valley in north-central Afghanistan
Khyber	30	Links Afghanistan (Kabul) to Pakistan (Peshawar)
Kilik	2.9	Leads into Chitral, Pakistan (NWFP), through the Wakhan Corridor
Kotal-e Salang	2.4	Links Kabul to regions in the north and south of Afghanistan
Mullah Khak	2.2	Leads into western Afghanistan
Sabzak	0.4	Connects Herat and Badghis provinces in northwest Afghanistan
Sad Eshtrag	3.3	Leads into Chitral, Pakistan (NWFP)
Shibar	1.9	Links Kabul to Bamiyan province in central Afghanistan
Shotogarden	2.3	Links Logar and Paktia provinces in east Afghanistan
Tartara	N/A	Links Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to Peshawar, Pakistan
Unai	2.0	Leads into Jazaraja and Bamiyan valleys in central Afghanistan
Wakjir	3.0	Leads from Wakhan Corridor into Pakistan (NWFP) and China (Xinjianf)

Known Mountain Passes in Afghanistan, Information Derived from Intellipedia, Global Security (Chart Created by TRISA, 2010)

NATURAL DISASTERS

Afghanistan suffers from a high risk for natural disasters that include droughts, avalanches, earthquakes, and floods. Earthquakes happen frequently and occur more often in Afghanistan's northern and northeastern regions. Snow melts and heavy spring rains trigger annual floods in many parts of the country. From 1980-2010, an average of 634 Afghans died and an additional 220,026 were affected by natural disasters each year.¹⁵


AVALANCHES

Avalanches usually occur in mountainous regions in the winter season from November to February/March due to strong winds. When avalanches occur, they shut down mountain passes at high altitudes for many days. The Kotal-e Salang pass, at 12,700 feet, remains prone to avalanches and links Kabul to Afghanistan's north region. In March 1997, an avalanche in the northern part of the country buried 100 people in the snow as they attempted to board a bus.¹⁶ In January 2009, avalanches on the southern part of the Salang Pass killed at least 10 people.¹⁷ In February 2010, at least 169 people died and 130 suffered injuries due to a series of avalanches in the same general area.¹⁸

EARTHQUAKES


Geographically, Afghanistan exists in a zone of high seismic activity that makes earthquakes an almost routine occurrence. Experts find it hard to accurately report how many earthquakes occur annually in Afghanistan. Sometimes earthquakes in remote parts of Afghanistan go unreported, even when they cause loss of life and substantial property damage. The most dangerous earthquake areas are in northern Afghanistan, especially around the northern Hindu Kush Range.

Many earthquakes occurred in Afghanistan over the past 15 years with the most devastating two in February and May 1998. On 4 February, an earthquake with a 5.9 magnitude on the Richter scale rocked Takhar province in the northern part of the country, with people feeling it as far away as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The earthquake left at least 2,323 people dead and 818 injured, and destroyed 8,094 houses.¹⁹ On 30 May, the provinces of Takhar and Badakshan experienced an earthquake that registered 6.6 on the Richter scale and left at least 4,000 dead.²⁰ At least 1,000 more suffered injuries and 60,000 were left homeless in the 60 affected villages.²¹ In March 2002, two earthquakes in the Hindu Kush occurred three weeks apart. The first earthquake, on 3 March 2002, registered 7.4 and killed at least 166 people with several injured and 700 houses destroyed, many by subsequent landslides. People felt the earthquake in China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.²² The earthquake on 25 March 2002 registered 6.1 and left at least 1,000 dead. This disaster damaged or destroyed around 2,000 houses and people felt it as far away as Pakistan and Tajikistan.²³ At this writing, the most recent major earthquake in Afghanistan occurred on 17 September 2010 with a magnitude of 6.3 in the Hindu Kush region. This earthquake, which people in Kabul felt, caused no reported deaths, injuries, or damage.²⁴



FLOODS

The numerous conflicts over the last 30 years destroyed much of the reservoir and irrigation systems that controlled flood waters.²⁵ In the spring, heavy precipitation and snow melts generate floods throughout Afghanistan. Every year, floods cause many fatalities and destroy thousands of homes. Most of those homes, especially in the rural areas, consist of mud huts that the heavy rains quickly wash away. In early May 2010, Afghanistan experienced heavy rains for a couple of weeks that left 80 dead, 240 injured, and damaged more than 5,000 houses throughout the country.²⁶



MANMADE HAZARDS

Afghanistan suffers from several environmental issues, including pollution and landmines. In 2008, Afghanistan's National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) reported that they could trace 70% of the diseases in Kabul to unclean water, solid waste pollution, and air pollution.²⁷ Landmines and ERW both create serious problems throughout Afghanistan.

POLLUTION


Afghan water pollution occurs most often due to the overuse of chemicals, such as fertilizers and pesticides, and untreated municipal and industrial waste. The contamination of water supplies remains a significant issue and poses considerable health threats to deployed personnel and native people. Some urban areas possess pit latrines and septic tanks, but in other regions, many surface water sources demonstrate signs of animal and human waste. In major urban areas, houses dump raw sewage directly into rivers and local streams. Only 48% of all Afghan households can currently access improved drinking water sources, and only 37% have improved sanitation facilities.²⁸ In the main urban areas, contamination of water with fecal pathogens commonly occurs. Military personnel will need to sanitize any local water source prior to use or they will need to obtain potable water through their logistical support. Some areas possess limited water distribution systems, but most of Afghanistan's population obtains their water from wells that often become contaminated with bacteria. Due to the lack of water sanitation, water-borne diseases commonly exist throughout the country.²⁹

Most Afghan air pollution occurs in the main urban areas. The Afghan Ministry of Public Health claims that approximately 3,060 residents may die each year from causes related to air pollution.³⁰ The NEPA stated that Kabul remains the most air polluted capital in the region. Kabul's population expansion, increased urbanization, and a proliferation in cars all contributed directly to the increased air pollution in the greater Kabul area. Most Afghans do not possess electricity or natural gas so they use other materials as fuel for food preparation, heat, and other uses. Afghans burn wood, rags, plastics, and various other materials for all these purposes. Those actions lead to more air pollution, especially in Kabul.³¹ The pollution occurs most often and more densely in the summer with the presence of smog on any given day due to a mixture of dust, factory smoke, and automotive fumes.

LANDMINES

The high presence of landmines and ERW in Afghanistan make it one of the countries most affected by landmines. From 1999-2008, Afghanistan suffered more landmine victims than any other country in the world.³² Afghanistan's ERW contamination stems mainly from the 1992-1996 internal conflict, the Soviet invasion of 1979, and the US intervention in 2001. Afghanistan still demonstrates signs of increased ERW contamination because of the continued insurgency against the Afghan government.³³ The Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan recorded at least 481 casualties from mines and ERW in 2009, with the total number from 1999-2008 being 12,069.³⁴

As of July 2009, it was estimated that Afghanistan contained 258 square miles of landmine/ERW-contaminated land that affected 32 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. The number of casualties and affected areas fluctuates due to poor reporting procedures; difficult terrain, coupled with ongoing lack of security, prevents reporting of some incidents altogether. ERW primarily affects Afghanistan's southeastern (Kandahar and Helmand Provinces) and eastern (Kabul) regions.³⁵ The Afghan people, especially children, face the risk of ERW as they go through their everyday tasks of collecting food, wood, and water; travelling; and tending animals. Most Afghan people possess no knowledge of the landmines' locations and people suffer with each accidental explosion.



VEGETATION

Afghanistan exhibits vegetation as varied as its terrain, ranging from short grasses in the desert areas to forests and alpine tundra in the mountain areas. The country contains only a small percentage of arable land, and outdated farming practices hinder agricultural development. Poppies continue to serve as a major crop for Afghan farmers, especially in the southern regions, and Afghanistan leads the world in poppy production.


LAND COVER

In Afghanistan today, forests occupy a smaller area than in even the recent past. In 1990, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that forests occupied 3.2 million acres of Afghanistan. In 2005, the FAO estimated that number decreased to 2.1 million acres from drought, overgrazing, and wood cutting, with forest area comprising only 1.3% of Afghanistan's total land area.³⁶ Alpine tundra exists at Afghanistan's higher elevations, below the permanent ice and snow line. Mountain forests that include pine, fir, and spruce trees grow below the alpine tundra in warmer climate regions. In the northern plains, grasses, annual plants, and shrubs are common. The dry climate and terrain in the southern part the country do not allow much vegetation, with only scattered short grasses growing. Irrigated croplands occur in the major river valleys and fruit trees are grown close to rivers.³⁷

AGRICULTURE


Agriculture remains the Afghans' main source of income. Even though experts consider only 12% of the total land arable, agriculture accounts for 31% of the country's total GDP and generates jobs for 78.6% of the country's labor force.³⁸ Afghanistan's major crops include wheat, tobacco, cotton, sugar

beets, and castor beans. Other less important crops include corn, rice, barley, vegetables, nuts, and fruits. Afghans cultivate wheat, their most important grain crop, throughout the country.³⁹ Fruits grow mainly in the Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul Provinces. Afghanistan primarily produces cotton in the northern regions from Takhar to Badghis, and in Herat and Helmand Provinces. The western provinces of Patkia and Nangarhar grow corn extensively while the northern provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, and Laghman grow vast quantities of rice.⁴⁰ Agricultural production remains limited due to farmers that practice outdated cultivation methods, a shortage of modern farm machinery, and the destruction of irrigation channels.



POPPY CULTIVATION

Even though the Afghanistan central government passed laws to make opium production illegal, many farmers still grow it for the drug trade. Afghanistan produces the most opium of any country in the world, reaching record levels in 2007 and accounting for 93% of global production. In 2008, however, Afghan poppy cultivation declined 19% due to low opium prices, poor weather conditions, improved security for legitimate farmers, and increased enforcement of the anti-opium laws in the major opium production provinces.⁴¹ Despite the recent decline in opium production, Afghanistan remains the largest opium grower in the world. The provinces that produce the most opium include Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Zabul, Farah, and Badghis.⁴² These provinces contain a strong Taliban presence, possess weaker governmental control, and are more violent than other parts of the country. Extensive poverty and poor agricultural conditions force many farmers to turn to poppy production to support their families. The poppy requires less water than other crops and grows relatively easily in southern Afghanistan's harsh terrain and climate.⁴³ (Refer to Map 5 in the Annex for opium cultivation at the provincial level.)



CLIMATE

Afghanistan's climate ranges from arid to semi-arid. Much of Afghanistan faces a harsh climate with severe winters and hot, dry summers. Areas located in the northeastern mountains experience sub-arctic conditions that include dry, cold winters. Throughout the entire country, Afghanistan experiences hot summers except in the high altitude areas of the southern plateau region.

SEASONS


Afghanistan experiences four very distinct seasons. Winter begins at the end of November and ends in February with January as the coldest month. Afghanistan experiences very cold winters, except in the far southern areas of the country. Heavy snow falls across much of Afghanistan and makes winter travel difficult. Some parts of Afghanistan find winter travel nearly impossible and some remote regions become totally cut off from the rest of the country. Spring normally lasts from March to May. When temperatures rise, snow melts bring frequent floods that sometimes wash out poorly constructed dirt roads. Summer usually occurs from June to August with very high temperatures, especially in July. Sandstorms often occur in the summer and can affect both fixed wing and rotary aviation travel.⁴⁴ Fall typically occurs from September to November with frequent spells of dry weather in the early part of the season.

WEATHER


Afghanistan temperatures vary from region to region based on the climate and altitude. Afghanistan experiences extreme fluctuations between day and night temperatures. The arid southern region experiences the highest temperatures and lowest precipitation. Afghanistan's high elevation results in significant daily and seasonal temperature changes.

PRECIPITATION

Rainfall varies throughout Afghanistan and the rainy season generally lasts from December to April. Annual rainfall averages about 16 inches in the southeastern areas, and decreases as one moves west.⁴⁵ Snow falls quite often in the winter months, and the highest mountain peaks boast permanent snow caps. Flash floods occur regularly, as UNICEF reported 28 such floods that affected over 10,000 families in the first half of 2007 alone.⁴⁶




TEMPERATURE-HEAT INDEX



Afghanistan experiences severe summer temperatures with July and August as the hottest months of the year. Temperatures vary dependent on region and altitude, and can reach as high as 120°F.⁴⁷ For example, Kandahar's average summer temperature ranges from 99-102°F, with a record high of 111°F, while Kabul averages a more moderate 87-92°F.⁴⁸

TEMPERATURE-WIND CHILL INDEX

Afghanistan experiences very harsh winters, especially in high altitude areas, with its lowest temperatures in January. The snow can stay on the ground for two to three months. The snowpack becomes so thick that people in high rural areas may rarely leave their homes and frequently must sleep near their stoves. High temperatures often only reach between 12°F and 17°F in the winter and sometimes do not even reach 5°F in higher mountain areas. In mountainous areas near northern Pakistan, the snowpack often reaches seven feet deep and generates numerous valley snow traps. In the Ghazni area, temperatures sometimes drop to between -10°F and -15°F and the snowpack remains on the ground until almost summer.⁴⁹



Month	Average Sunlight (hours)	Temperature, °F				Discomfort from heat/humidity	Relative humidity		Average Precip (mm)	Wet Days (+0.25 mm)
		Average		Record			am	pm		
		Min	Max	Min	Max					
Jan	6	18	36	-6	58	N/A	80	70	31	2
Feb	6	22	40	-5	74	N/A	79	62	36	3
March	6	34	53	6	77	N/A	76	44	94	7
April	7	43	66	27	83	N/A	69	35	102	6
May	10	51	78	34	95	Moderate	61	32	20	2
June	12	56	87	42	99	Medium	52	24	5	1
July	11	61	92	51	101	Medium	51	22	3	0
Aug	11	59	91	47	104	Medium	54	23	3	0
Sept	10	51	85	36	97	Moderate	58	18	0	0
Oct	9	42	73	27	89	N/A	59	22	15	1
Nov	8	33	62	5	77	N/A	67	31	20	2
Dec	6	27	47	5	67	N/A	76	53	10	1

Average Conditions in Kabul (East Afghanistan), BBC Weather, 2011

Month	Average Sunlight (hours)	Temperature, °F				Discomfort from heat/humidity	Relative humidity		Average Precip (mm)	Wet Days (+0.25 mm)
		Average		Record			am	pm		
		Min	Max	Min	Max					
Jan	7	31	56	14	70	N/A	83	51	79	5
Feb	7	36	62	21	80	N/A	75	38	43	4
March	8	42	72	21	88	N/A	74	31	20	2
April	9	50	83	33	97	Moderate	64	28	8	1
May	10	57	92	39	107	Medium	57	28	5	0
June	13	62	99	49	111	High	52	23	0	0
July	12	66	102	53	108	High	57	27	3	0
Aug	11	63	99	52	109	High	53	23	0	0
Sept	11	51	93	39	100	Medium	56	21	0	0
Oct	10	44	85	30	100	Moderate	65	23	0	0
Nov	9	36	73	16	89	N/A	76	29	0	0
Dec	7	31	59	15	77	N/A	81	43	20	2

Average Conditions in Kandahar (South Afghanistan), BBC Weather, 2011

WIND

Airborne, aviation, and air assault operations will normally find operations more difficult in southern Afghanistan, the country's windiest area. From December to February, the Sistan basin in southwestern Afghanistan experiences severe blizzards. Locals call the most common winds in Afghanistan the "winds of 120 days." The winds usually blow between the mountains of eastern Iran and the central mountains of Afghanistan from June through September and generate sandstorms, drought, and intense heat. The winds can reach speeds up to 115 miles per hour and hinder any movement while they damage crops.⁵⁰

ADDITIONAL TERRAIN/ WEATHER INFORMATION

The Weather Underground Service (<http://www.wunderground.com>) and its full-screen weather maps service functions as a great tool for military mission planners. The service offers screen-size weather maps where viewers can locate current local temperatures and conditions. Users can access weather alerts and receive wind and humidity information for any city in Afghanistan through satellite, terrain, regular map, and hybrid options. Users can also view local cloud cover and precipitation via satellite and radar. Through the satellite and hybrid options, Soldiers can see actual maps, distinguish obstacles, and select key terrain features to determine mobility. The service functions as a useful tool for exercise design guides and pre-deployment training.

NATURAL RESOURCES

While Afghanistan possesses great quantities of natural resources, they still need development. In many cases, mineral exploitation faces challenges due to security concerns, poorly developed infrastructure, and the rugged terrain. Minerals present in the country include coal, copper, chromate, sulfur, lead, zinc, iron, ore, salt, and precious and semi-precious stones. Illegal mining and smuggling of gemstones, often to Pakistan, is common and can involve either local authorities or insurgents.⁵¹

Afghanistan contains large coal, oil, and natural gas reserves in the northern regions. Experts estimate coal reserves at around 400 million tons, oil at 0.4-3.6 billion barrels, and natural gas at 100 million-1 trillion cubic feet.⁵² In June 2010, American officials announced that studies conducted since 2004 in Afghanistan resulted in the discovery of untapped mineral deposits worth nearly \$1 trillion.⁵³ The deposits include large quantity of iron, copper, gold, and lithium. Extraction of these resources will take some time due to lack of infrastructure and Afghanistan's current security situation.


Summary

The Hindu Kush Mountains that stretch from the northeast to the southwest dominate Afghanistan and create few arable regions within the country. Military forces that operate in most parts of Afghanistan will need to deal with high altitudes, extreme temperatures in both summer and winter, and few local natural resources such as water. The rugged mountainous terrain and poorly developed roads will hinder both mounted and dismounted military operations. Military planners will need to consider Afghanistan's climate and seasons before any operations. In winter, many mountain passes and roads become impassible and will force the planner to find alternate routes for ground mounted operations.

The climate, the terrain's harshness, and lack of irrigation force many farmers to grow poppy crops. Natural disasters, such as floods and earthquakes, will continue to affect the Afghan people. Poor infrastructure, especially in remote areas, will add to the destruction caused by the disasters. Pollution and other environmental issues will likely worsen as the country continues to develop. Those deployed in Afghanistan will need to consider the increased air pollution as it can lead to long-term health risks. Afghanistan's rough physical environment will take a toll on personnel and equipment and military personnel will need to find ways to mitigate the terrain's effects to achieve the mission.


Annex

Map1: Surface Water Resources




TEC, <https://tsunami.tec.army.mil/Products/WaterResources/productlibrary.cfm#Afghanistan>, 2002

Map 2: Ground Water Resources



Map 3: Engineering Route Study




TEC, <https://tsunami.tec.army.mil/countries/Afghanistan.cfm>, 2009

Map 4: Cross Country



Map 5: Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009



Afghanistan and Narcotics: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends, 2001-2009, UNODC, 2009

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- ²² USGC, "[Magnitude 7.4 Hindu Kush Region, Afghanistan: 2002 March 03 12:18:19 UTC](#)," 13 November 2003 (accessed 10 March 2011).

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TIME

“NATO has the watches, we have the time.”

Attributed to a Taliban fighter, Afghanistan, unknown date

James Shinn, Wall Street Journal, 29 October, 2009

Time

The time variable describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the OE.

KEY FACTS:

- Afghans are not time sensitive when compared to most Westerners.
- Afghans often use the term “*inshallah*” (God willing) when they make an appointment or agree to a meeting.
- The Afghan work week begins on Sunday and ends on Thursday; Friday is the Muslim holy day.
- The expansion of information technology in Afghanistan has influenced the Afghan cultural perception of time, creating more of a sense of urgency, though the people are still much less concerned with time than are Westerners.

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE TIME VARIABLE IN THE OE:

- The perception of time for most Afghans could greatly affect military operations in Afghanistan. Due to the relatively unimportant concept of punctuality, Afghans may miss deadlines or arrive late for scheduled operations.
- Due to Islam’s influence throughout Afghanistan, military personnel will need to know the local prayer times. Whenever possible, military planners should avoid meetings and training during prayer times.
- Close personal contacts remain a key component to business success and mission accomplishment in Afghanistan. This personal relationship can take much time, from the Western perspective, to develop. Afghans usually do not discuss business until the individuals establish a close interpersonal relationship.
- Military personnel many need to make several visits to the same individual or village over a period of time before the Afghans feel comfortable enough to work with the outsiders.

TIME OVERVIEW:

Many nations, kingdoms, and empires influenced Afghanistan throughout its history and made significant contributions to its development and culture. Over Afghanistan's long history, Islam and imperialism perhaps exerted the greatest influence on the country's culture. To understand Afghanistan today, one must understand the country's long and complex past. Military advisors and planners will make more informed and effective decisions if they become familiar with Afghanistan's history and Afghans' perception of time.

TIME PERIODS AND EVENTS

Afghanistan's known history dates back to approximately 2000 BC. The country's geographic location routinely placed Afghans between very powerful civilizations that developed in more fertile areas, and the people who live in what is now Afghanistan often fell prey to these powerful outside forces.¹ Over the centuries, many different peoples and nations ruled over parts or all of what is now Afghanistan. The Persians, Macedonians, Kushans, White Huns, Yaftalee, Arabs, Mongols, British, and Soviets represent just some of those who conquered or controlled Afghanistan over the past four millennia. In 637 AD, Arab Muslims introduced Islam to the Afghan people as they conquered the various local tribes.² The Afghans' conversion to Islam, perhaps the only significant lasting change to tribal culture brought about by foreign influence, continues to the present day. Different empires continued to control Afghanistan until 1747 when the last great independent Afghan empire rose under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durrani. In the 19th century, European imperialism came to Central Asia as Great Britain and Russia became the primary rivals for control of Afghanistan. The British and Russian rivalry for influence in Afghanistan led to the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars that occurred from 1839-42 and 1878-80, respectively.

In 1893, an agreement between the government of colonial British India and Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan established an official border known as the "Durand Line" between Afghanistan and what then constituted British India (modern day Pakistan). The border divided the Pashtun tribes, as the Durand Line bisected the Pashtuns' traditional lands. While nominally self-governed, the British exercised considerable influence on Afghan domestic affairs via subsidies to Afghan rulers and control of Afghan foreign relations. This artificial boundary sowed the seeds for the Third Anglo-Afghan War. On 19 August 1919, the Treaty of Rawalpindi ended the brief Third Anglo-Afghan War and the British relinquished control over Afghanistan's foreign affairs.³ Amanullah Habibullah, who ruled from 1919 to 1929, introduced the first Afghan constitution in 1923. The last king of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zahir Shah, ruled the country for 40 years after he took power in 1933. When Pakistan became a country in 1947, the division of the Pashtun tribes continued to cause tensions throughout the region, as the Durand Line continued to be the established international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In 1973, Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan overthrew the Afghan king and established the Republic of Afghanistan. Political and economic conditions began to worsen in Afghanistan and lead Daoud to lose most of his political support. In 1978, the Khalqi faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) killed Daoud in a military coup. The PDPA renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and instituted radical Marxist policies contrary to Afghan traditions. The Marxist Afghan government alienated much of the population and spawned the *mujahideen* (loosely translated from Arabic as "those who struggle") who fought the communists. The next year, Soviet troops invaded the country in an effort to suppress a tribal and religious insurgency by the mujahideen against the communist Afghan government. The Soviet invasion failed as the Soviets grew weary of the expensive conflict and withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.⁴

The communist government of Afghanistan could not maintain control without the assistance and support of the Soviet Union. By 1992, the communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan fell and the mujahideen created the Islamic State of Afghanistan government. This government, plagued by infighting, proved ineffective and Afghanistan descended into a state of near-anarchy as various groups battled each other for control. Amidst this chaos, the Taliban (meaning “students” in Farsi and Pashto) appeared and pledged to restore order through the application of strict Islamic law. The war-weary Afghan people initially welcomed the Taliban, who made steady territorial gains throughout Afghanistan and captured Kabul in 1996. Various ethnic, religious, and political groups eventually joined together to form the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (known in the Western world as the Northern Alliance) to fight the predominately ethnic Pashtun and devoutly Sunni Taliban.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States led to military intervention and the current state of affairs in Afghanistan. The historical timeline annex to the Time Variable provides greater detail of the history of Afghanistan. An examination of the timeline reveals some valuable information to those who operate in Afghanistan.

While throughout some 4,000 years of history, historic Afghan leaders such as Bahlul Lodi and Ahmad Shah Durrani ruled areas that extended beyond Afghanistan’s current borders, the Afghan tribes usually found themselves subjected to the rule or influence of foreign powers. Achaemenids, Macedonians, Seleucids, Bactrians, Kushans, Sassanids, White Huns, Arabs, Mongols, Mughals, Safavids, British, and Soviets attempted to subjugate the Afghans, but the tribes still remained fiercely independent.

Even while ruled by other Afghans, the tribes always maintained their own leadership structures and frequently rebelled against those who ruled over them. The Afghan tribes frequently overthrew, forced into exile, or assassinated the central Afghan ruler. Most Afghan people know their history. The tribal structures remain the one constant throughout Afghanistan’s tumultuous history. The conversion to Islam is perhaps the only significant change to tribal culture brought about by foreign influence that has endured over time.

Al-Qaeda attempts to capitalize on the Afghan people’s pride in their history. In November 1841, Mohammad Akbar Khan (son of Dost Mohammad Khan) besieged British Major-General William Elphinstone's force in Kabul. Elphinstone accepted an offer from Akbar Khan of safe-conduct for the British force of 4,500 soldiers and about 12,000 civilians (laborers, women, and children) to India. The Afghans subsequently massacred the British over a seven-day period. Of the 16,500 people, only one man, Dr. William Brydon, escaped. Al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, referred to the massacre in September 2006, stating “Dr Brydon will not be returning to India this time, because his corpse will be thrown to the dogs in Afghanistan.”⁵

KEY DATES, TIME PERIODS, OR EVENTS

Afghanistan uses three calendars, which can confuse foreigners. Holidays, the wedding season, and harvest cycles are the most significant periods.

CALENDARS

Although Afghanistan uses three different calendars, the 1957 Afghan constitution established the *Hejrah-e Shamsi*, or solar Islamic calendar, as the country’s official calendar. The *Hejrah-e Qamari*, or lunar Islamic calendar, chronicles Afghanistan’s Islamic religious holidays and events. The Afghans also use the Gregorian calendar (Western or Christian solar calendar), for international relations.⁶

TRADITIONAL WEDDING SEASON

In Afghanistan, boys and girls typically do not meet and do not talk to the opposite gender except for close relatives. Afghan parents arrange marriages for their children once they find a suitable match and the two families reach an agreement.⁷ Afghans marry at a young age and believe a woman reaches marriageable age by 16. Wedding celebrations in Afghanistan (known as *walima*) last longer than they do in Western culture. The celebrations take place for three days at the homes of the bride and groom's families.⁸ The holy month of Ramadan ends with the three-day Eid al-Fitr celebration. In Afghanistan, the period between this holiday and the Eid al-Adha festival two months later is viewed as an inauspicious one for marriage. Therefore, most marriages in Afghanistan take place before Ramadan. Shooting firearms into the air is a common celebratory act at weddings.

NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS

Holiday	Date	Description
Eid-ul-Adha	Fluctuates by Lunar calendar	"Feast of the Sacrifice" celebrates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son to God; a lamb is sacrificed and a third of the meat is given to the poor
Ashura	Fluctuates by Lunar calendar	Celebration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the Prophet's grandson and his followers at the battle of Karbala; events of that day are re-enacted by Shia communities (10th day of Muharram month in Islamic calendar)
Navruz	21 March	Persian New Year
Roze-Maulud	April	Celebrates the birth of Prophet Mohammad (occurs on the 12th day of the month of Rabi al Awal of the Islamic calendar)
Revolution Day	28 April	Celebrates the "victory of the Muslim nation"
Labor Day	01 May	Also known as "Day of the Worker"; it is a celebration of worker solidarity
National Day	19 August	Celebrates Afghanistan's independence (gained in 1919)
Eid ul-Fitr	Fluctuates by Lunar calendar	Also known as the "Feast of Breaking the Fast"; celebrates the end of Ramadan (the month of fasting)

Important Holidays, Information Derived from the MCIA, Afghanistan Country Study 2007, Library of Congress Afghanistan Country Profile 2008, and Visiting Arts Cultural Profiles Projects (Chart Created by TRISA, 2010)

Afghans determine their Muslim holidays based on local sightings of the moon's phases. During Ramadan, Muslims do not drink or eat anything from dawn to sunset, but families enjoy a large meal each night. Since the lunar year lasts 11 to 12 fewer days than the solar year, Islamic lunar calendar dates will correspond with different dates on the Western calendar each year.

HARVEST CYCLES

The Afghan harvest cycle normally lasts from May to September, but depends on the crop. The poppy harvest, unlike the other legal crops, takes place in the spring. The harvest begins in the eastern

part of the country followed by the southwestern region. The Afghans harvest the crops from the central and northeastern regions located in higher altitudes last.⁹

ELECTIONS

In Afghanistan, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) manages the country's elections. In accordance with their constitution, the Afghans elect the president to serve a five-year term; the next presidential elections will take place in 2014. In the August 2009 presidential election, Afghanistan experienced numerous fraud allegations. The situation brought into doubt the current electoral system's legitimacy, which began in 2003.

In addition to fraud, a tremendous amount of violent protests against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and the electoral system occurred before, during, and after the presidential election. In the days just before the August 2009 national elections, the Taliban unleashed a series of suicide attacks in Kabul and surrounding areas. The attacks focused on polling stations, various candidates, and candidate supporters.¹⁰ In any period before an election, military personnel should avoid Afghan polling locations or take appropriate countermeasures to ensure their own safety.

NATURAL OR ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS

Afghanistan suffers from natural disasters that include avalanches, earthquakes, and floods. Earthquakes occur most often in northern and northeastern sections of the country. Avalanches occur in the winter, usually between November and March. Floods throughout Afghanistan will likely occur in the spring because of snow melt in the mountains and heavy rains. (*Refer to the Physical Environment Variable for more information.*)

CULTURAL PERCEPTION OF TIME

In general, Afghans do not consider punctuality and accountability as important as people in the Western world. Afghans will often arrive at meetings late, but they expect foreigners to arrive on time at meetings set by them. Afghans use the religious saying "*inshallah*" before they agree to a future meeting or project deadline as a hedge against possible tardiness or missed suspense dates.

Most Afghans practice the Muslim faith and must set aside time for five daily prayers. Muslim prayers include *Fajr* (pre-dawn), *Dhuhr* (noon), *Asr* (afternoon), *Maghrib* (sunset), and *Isha* (evening). Prayer times may vary as they are not based on a clock time. *Dhuhr* occurs after noon and *Asr* takes place in the late afternoon. *Fajr* takes place before sunrise and *Maghrib* occurs just after sundown. Just before a Muslim retires for the night, they conduct their *Isha* prayers. Daily prayers might interrupt meetings or operations, so military leaders must plan around those times in order to accomplish their mission requirements.¹¹

TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF TIME

Afghans are content to wait to achieve their goals. The tribal structure is eternal and it is only a matter of time before foreign forces withdraw from Afghanistan, just as all other foreign powers have done in the past.

ENEMY PERCEPTION OF TIME

Afghanistan's history contains numerous examples where foreign powers came and went while Afghan tribes remained. Afghan insurgents will use time for their strategic advantage. The insurgents know the US will not stay indefinitely in Afghanistan and they need only wait long enough for the US to leave. With a withdrawal date for American troops already set, the insurgents

may believe that if they hold out long enough, US forces will leave Afghanistan.¹² Once the US forces depart, the insurgents believe they possess the military strength necessary to defeat the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The insurgents hope the American citizen's short attention span will determine the insurgency's outcome, similar to what occurred in Vietnam.¹³

Summary

For thousands of years, foreign powers attempted to rule or influence the people who live in present-day Afghanistan. These foreigners include the Persians, Macedonians, the Kushans, the Mongols, the Mughals, the British, and the Soviets. Eventually, each invader withdrew while the tribes remained. To the Afghan people, their tribe remains the only constant in their lives.

Afghans perceive time differently than Westerners, with a decided lack of punctuality throughout the culture. Military planners must understand the Afghans do not possess the same degree of urgency as citizens of most Western countries. Afghans will take as much time as they believe they need to build a personal relationship before they will trust and conduct business with an outsider. Insurgents believe the foreign soldiers will inevitably leave Afghanistan, and if they only continue the insurgency, then the insurgents will eventually win.

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Annex

HISTORICAL TIMELINE OF AFGHANISTAN:

2000 BC-1500 BC

- The city of Kabul is thought to have been established during this time.

600 BC (approximation)

- Zoroastrianism introduced in Bactria (Balkh).

522 BC

- According to early Hinayana biographies of the Buddha, Tapassu and Bhallika, two merchant brothers from Bactria, became the first disciples to receive layman's vows, establishing Buddhism in the area.

522 BC-486 BC

- Darius the Great expands the Achaemenid (Persian) Empire, conquers most of Afghanistan, including Aria (Herat), Bactriana (Balkh and present-day Mazar-i-Shariff), Margiana (Merv), Gandhara (Kabul, Jalalabad, and Peshawar), Sattagydia (Ghazni to the Indus river), Arachosia (Kandahar, and Quetta), and Drangiana (Sistan).
- The Persian empire was plagued by constant tribal revolts from Afghans living in Arachosia (present-day Kandahar and Quetta)

329-326 BC

- Alexander the Great conquers Afghanistan, but fails to truly subdue its people. Constant revolts plague Alexander.

323 BC

- Greeks rule Bactria (located between the range of the Hindu Kush and the Amu Darya).

312-260 BC

- Seleucid rule (the Seleucid Empire was created by Seleucus I, one of Alexander the Great's generals, out of the eastern conquests of the former Macedonian Empire).

170-160 BC

- Bactrian-Parthian era.

50 AD

- Kushan Empire's rule begins.

225 AD

- Kushan Empire splits into Western and Eastern halves, Western Kushans (in Afghanistan) are soon subjugated by the Persian Sassanid Empire and lose Bactria and other territories.

248 AD

- Persians depose the Western Kushan dynasty and replace them with Persian vassals known as the Kushanshas (or Indo-Sassanids).

300-400 AD

- Bamiyan Buddha statues constructed.

400 AD

- Invasion of the White Huns.

425-550

- Independent Yaftalee rule.

550 AD

- Persians reestablish control over what is now Afghanistan.
- Revolts by various tribes.

652 AD

- Arabs introduce Islam to the region.

962-1030

- Ghaznavid Dynasty establishes its capital in Ghazni.
- Ghaznavid rule establishes the domination of Sunni Islam in what is now Afghanistan and western Pakistan.

1030

- The most prominent Ghaznavid ruler, Mahmud Ghazni, dies.

1140

- Ghorid chief Ala-ud-Din Husayn burns the city of Ghazni.

1219-1221

- Genghis Khan invades, destroying cities such as Herat, Ghazni, and Balkh.
- The Mongols' destruction of irrigation systems turned fertile soil into permanent deserts.

1273

- Marco Polo crosses Northern Afghanistan traveling from Italy to China.

1332-1370

- Descendants of earlier Ghorid rulers reassert control over Afghanistan.

1370-1404

- The rule of Timur (Timour-i-Lang or Tamerlane).

1451

- An Afghan named Bahlul Khan Lodi ascends to the throne of Delhi and founds the Lodi Dynasty, which rules until 1526.

1504-1519

- Zahir ud-din Muhammad Babur, founder of the Mughal dynasty, takes control of Kabul

1520-1585

- Bayazid Khan, known as Pir Roshan or Pir Rokhan, a Pashtun warrior, poet and intellectual of the Barak/Urmar (known today as Burki) tribe, revolts against the Mughals. Roshan was killed in battle but his followers continued fighting.

1613-1689

- Khushhal Khan Khattak (a Pashtun poet, warrior, and chief of the Khattak tribe) writes more than 45,000 poems during his life. He is an advocate of Pashtun nationalism and unification.
- 1672 - Pashtuns revolt against the Mughals who maintain control of trade routes but fail to completely suppress the rebellion.

1708

- Mirwais Khan Hotaki (an influential chief of the Ghilzai Pashtuns) leads a revolt that makes Kandahar independent of the Shia Safavid Persia, which had ruled it since 1622. He is the first ruler of the Hotaki Dynasty.

1722

- Mirwais' son, Mir Mahmud Hotaki, defeats a vastly superior force at the Battle of Gulnabad and besieges the Safavid capital, Isfahan. Soltan Hossein abdicates and acknowledges Mir Mahmud Hotaki as the Shah of Persia. At the same time, the Abdalis - later known as the Durrani (a Pashtun tribal group from which the kings of Afghanistan are later descended) - revolt, and end the Persian occupation of Herat.

1725

- Mir Mahmud Hotaki dies mysteriously after suffering from insanity and physical deterioration.
- Ashraf Khan Hotaki (Mir Mahmud's cousin) assumes the throne.

1729

- A Turkic Afsharid Persian, Nader Shah, rebels against Afghan rule and defeats Ashraf's Ghilzai forces at the Battle of Damghan in October 1729. Ashraf Khan Hotaki dies during the retreat.
- Ashraf Khan's death is the end of Hotaki rule in Persia, but Hussain Hotaki continues to rule the region of Afghanistan from Kandahar.

1736

- After seizing control of Persia, Nader Shah occupies southwest Afghanistan.

1738

- Nader Shah takes Kandahar, ending the Hotaki Dynasty.

1747

- Nader Shah is assassinated; Afghans, under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Abdali (later known as Durrani) retake Kandahar and establish modern Afghanistan.

1747-1773

- Rule of Ahmad Shah Durrani (a Pashtun also known as Ahmad Shah Abdali), regarded by many as the founder of the modern nation of Afghanistan.
- Ahmad Shah consolidates and enlarges Afghanistan. He defeats the Mughals to the west of the Indus, and he takes Herat from the Persians. Ahmad Shah Durrani's empire extends from Central Asia to Delhi, from Kashmir to the Arabian Sea. It includes all of modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- 1750 - Khorasan renamed Afghanistan.

1773-1793

- Rule of Timur Shah Durrani.
- 1776 - Capital of Afghanistan transferred from Kandahar to Kabul because of Pashtun opposition.
- Constant internal revolts.

1793-1801

- Rule of Zaman Shah Durrani.
- Constant internal revolts.
- 1795 - Persians invade Khorasan (province).

1801-1803

- October 1801 - Shuja Shah Durrani proclaims himself king of Afghanistan.

1809

- Shuja Shah Durrani overthrown by Mahmud Shah Durrani and goes into exile in India.

1818

- Mahmud Shah Durrani deposed.

1819-1826

- Sons of Timur Shah Durrani vie for the throne, leading to civil war and anarchy.
- Afghans lose Sind permanently.

1826

- Dost Mohammad Khan (a Pashtun) establishes control of Kabul and begins the Barakzai dynasty.

1832-1833

- Persian forces advance into Khorasan (province), and threaten Herat. Afghans successfully defend Herat.

1834

- Afghans lose Peshawar to the Sikhs; later, under the leadership of Akbar Khan, they defeat the Sikhs near Jamrud. However, they fail to retake Peshawar.

1836-1838

- Dost Mohammad Khan is proclaimed as Amir al-mu' minin (commander of the faithful). He attempts to form an alliance with Great Britain but when the governor-general of India, Lord Auckland, fails to respond to his advances, Dost Mohammad renews relations with Russia, and, in 1838, Lord Auckland issues the Simla Manifesto, which leads to the first Anglo-Afghan War.

1839-1842

- **First Anglo-Afghan War**
- August 1839 - Shuja Shah Durrani is restored as King of Afghanistan by the British (1839-1842).
- Dost Mohammad Khan surrenders to the British.
- November 1841 - Mohammad Akbar Khan (son of Dost Mohammad Khan) besieges Major-General William Elphinstone's force in Kabul. Elphinstone accepts an offer from Akbar Khan of safe-conduct for the British force of 4,500 soldiers and about 12,000 civilians (including laborers, women, and children) to India. The British force is massacred over a seven day

period. Of the 16,500 people, only one man, Dr. William Brydon, reaches safety at the British garrison in Jalalabad.

- April 1842 - Shuja Shah Durrani is killed by Shuja ud-Daula (a Shia).
- Autumn 1842 - British "Army of Retribution" destroys Kabul; British release Dost Mohammad Khan.

1843

- Dost Mohammed Khan reestablishes his authority, renewing his policy of hostility to the British.

1845

- Akbar Khan dies, possibly after being poisoned by his father.

1846

- Dost Mohammed Khan, forms an alliance with the Sikhs.

1849

- Dost Mohammed Khan returns to Afghanistan after the British defeat his Sikh allies at Gujrat on February 21, 1849.

1850

- Dost Mohammed Khan conquers Balkh.

1854

- Dost Mohammed Khan captures Kandahar and assumes control over southern Afghan tribes.

1855

- Dost Mohammad Khan signs a peace treaty with India.

1859

- British take Baluchistan, and Afghanistan becomes completely landlocked.

1863-1866

- Sher Ali Khan, Dost Mohammad Khan's son, succeeds to the throne, founding the Pashtun Barakzai Dynasty.
- 1865 - Russia takes Bukhara, Tashkent, and Samarkand.

1866-1867

- 1866 - Mohammad Afzal Khan, brother of Sher Ali Khan and oldest son of Dost Mohammad Khan, occupies Kabul and proclaims himself Amir.
- October, 1867 - Mohammad Afzal Khan dies.

1867-1868

- Mohammad Azam Khan declares himself Amir.
- 1868 - Mohammad Azam Khan flees to Persia.
- Sher Ali Khan reasserts control (1868-1879).

1873

- Russia establishes a fixed boundary between Afghanistan and its new territories.

1878-1880

- **Second Anglo-Afghan War**
- 1878 - After Russia sends an uninvited diplomatic mission to Kabul, the British send a diplomatic mission as well. The British mission is turned back at the Khyber Pass and the Second Anglo-Afghan War begins.
- February, 1879 - Sher Ali Khan dies in Mazar-i-Shariff, and is succeeded by Amir Muhammad Yaqub Khan.
- Amir Muhammad Yaqub Khan signs the Treaty of Gandamak, surrendering control of Afghanistan's foreign relations to the British and giving up Kurram, Khyber, Michni, Pishin, and Sibi territories to the British.
- September, 1879 - Angered by the Treaty of Gandamak, a regiment of the Afghan army from Herat massacres the British Mission in Kabul.
- July, 1880 - In response to the massacre, Britain expels Muhammad Yaqub Khan to India and appoints his cousin, Abdur Rahman Khan, as Amir, and he agrees to the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak.
- July 1880 - Muhammad Yaqub Khan's brother, Ayub Khan, who had been serving as governor of Herat, revolts, defeats a British detachment at the Battle of Maiwand, and besieges Kandahar.
- September 1880 - British decisively defeat Ayub Khan at the Battle of Kandahar, ending his rebellion.

1885

- The Panjdeh Incident: Russian forces seize the Panjdeh Oasis, a piece of Afghan territory north of the Oxus River. The Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission, without any Afghan involvement, delineates the northern boundary of Afghanistan, effectively making Afghanistan a buffer state between British India and the Russian Empire.

1892

- Abdur Rahman Khan becomes the first ruler to bring the country under a centralized Afghan government after finally subduing the last of the rebellious Hazara people (Persian-speaking Shia of Iranian descent). Many Hazara have their property confiscated or are sold into slavery.
- While utilizing modern armaments, Abdur Rahman Khan opposes technologies which might give Europeans a foothold in Afghanistan, such as railroads and telegraphs.

1893

- The Durand Line establishes the borders of Afghanistan with British India (present day Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, and Baluchistan Province), splitting Afghan tribal areas, leaving half of these Afghans in what is now Pakistan. The Kalasha-Ala (or Red Kalasha people) in Nuristan, on the Afghan side, are converted to Islam by Abdur Rahman Khan.

1895

- Russia and Afghanistan agree on Afghanistan's northern border.

1901

- Abdur Rahman Khan dies and is succeeded by his son Habibullah Khan.

1907

- Russia and Great Britain sign the Convention of St. Petersburg (also known as the Anglo-Russian entente), in which Afghanistan is declared a British protectorate outside Russia's sphere of influence.

1914 - 1918

- 1914 -1918 Afghanistan remains neutral during World War I.
- 1918 - Mahmud Beg Tarzi introduces modern journalism into Afghanistan with the creation of several newspapers.

1919-1928

- February 1919 - Habibullah Khan is assassinated. His brother, Nasrullah Khan, succeeds him for a week before being imprisoned and replaced by Amanullah Khan, Habibullah's third son.
- **Third Anglo-Afghan War** (06 May 1919 – 08 August 1919)
- The Treaty of Rawalpindi results in Afghan independence with full sovereignty in foreign affairs while the British gain a reaffirmation of the Durand Line.
- Amanullah Khan modernizes the country, creating new schools for both boys and girls and overturning traditions such as dress codes for women. He increases trade with Europe and Asia and, with the guidance of his father-in-law and Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarzi, promotes a constitution incorporating equal rights and individual freedoms. His wife, Queen Soraya Tarzi, greatly influenced his policy towards women. He also met with many Bahá'ís

in India and Europe and brought back books which are still in the Kabul Library. This association later served as one of the justifications for his overthrow.

- 1924 - Amanullah Khan's rapid modernization spawns an uprising known as the Khost rebellion, which is suppressed.
- 1926 - Amanullah Khan changes his title to Amanullah Shah.
- November, 1928 - Tribal and religious leaders revolt against Amanullah Shah's reforms.

1929

- Amanullah Shah abdicates and goes into temporary exile in British India. Mahmud Tarzi seeks asylum in Turkey.
- Amanullah Shah's brother Inayatullah rules Afghanistan for three days until Habibullah Kalakani assumes power (for about nine months) with the help of various Ghilzai tribes.
- Mohammed Nadir Shah (a great grandson of Dost Mohammed Khan's brother, a general in the Third Anglo-Afghan War, a Minister of War, and Afghan ambassador to France), who had been exiled by Amanullah Shah with British support returns to Afghanistan and sacks Kabul.
- Mohammed Nadir Shah invites Habibullah Kalakani to truce talks and executes him when he arrives.

1930-1933

- Mohammed Nadir Shah abolishes many of Amanullah Shah's reforms but modernizes Afghanistan's roads and communications, opens the nation's first university, initiates a banking system and establishes commercial ties with foreign countries.
- Mohammed Nadir Shah sets ethnic groups against each other (mainly Pashtuns versus Tajiks) to suppress opposition to his rule.
- Nadir Shah is assassinated by a high school student, and his son, Zahir, inherits the throne. He rules until 1973. (Zahir Shah's uncles serve as prime ministers and advisors until 1953.)

1934

- The United States of America formally recognizes Afghanistan.

1938

- Da Afghanistan Bank (State Bank of Afghanistan) is incorporated.

1940

- Zahir Shah proclaims Afghanistan neutral during World War II.

1947

- Britain withdraws from India. Pakistan is created from former Indian and Afghan lands.

1949

- After a Pakistan Air Force aircraft bombs a village on the Afghan side of the Durand Line, Afghanistan's parliament denounces the Durand Treaty and refuses to recognize the Durand Line as the legal boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Pashtun nationalists proclaim an independent Pashtunistan, but their proclamation goes unacknowledged by the world community.

1953

- Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan (Pashtun) becomes Prime Minister.

1954

- The US rejects Afghanistan's request to buy military equipment to modernize the army.

1955

- Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan turns to the Soviet Union for military aid.
- The Pashtunistan issue flares up.

1956

- The Soviet Union agrees to assist Afghanistan.

1959

- The Purdah (physical segregation of the sexes, and the requirement for women to cover their bodies) is made optional and women enroll in the university, enter the workforce, and begin to become part of the government.

1961

- As a result of Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan's Pashtun-nationalist policies (he advocated a reunification of Pashtun peoples from Afghanistan and Pakistan) and support to militias along the Durand Line, Pakistan closes its borders with Afghanistan, causing an economic crisis and greater dependence on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union becomes Afghanistan's principal trading partner.

1963-1964

- Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan is forced to resign due to the crisis caused by his Pashtun nationalism. Dr. Mohammad Yusuf Khan becomes prime minister.

1965

- The Afghan Communist Party is formed in January. Babrak Karmal is appointed as secretary.
- In September, first nationwide elections under the new constitution.
- Babrak Karmal is elected to the parliament.

1969

- Second nationwide elections.
- Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin are elected.

1972

- Mohammad Moussa becomes prime minister.

1973

- 17 July - While Zahir Shah is undergoing medical treatment in Italy his government is overthrown in a military coup led by Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan and the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Zahir Shah is the last ruler of the Barakzai dynasty.
- Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan abolishes the monarchy, establishes the Republic of Afghanistan, and declares himself president.

1974

- President Daoud replaces Zahir Shah's democratic constitution with a mostly nominated Loya Jirga (Grand Council or Assembly in Pashtun).

1975-1977

- President Daoud presents a new constitution.
- President Daoud seeks to increase relations with other Muslim countries and makes a tentative agreement with Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on a solution to the Pashtunistan problem while distancing himself from the Afghan communists.
- President Daoud uses the army and police to suppress a growing Islamic fundamentalist movement. Jamiat-e Islami ("Islamic society") start a rebellion in the Panjshir valley and other areas. Afghan government forces easily defeat the insurgency and many Jamiat-e Islami members flee to Pakistan where they are supported by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
- In 1977 President Daoud distances his government from the Soviet Union and tries to bring Afghanistan closer to the West and to oil rich Middle-Eastern nations. Afghanistan signs a cooperative military treaty with Egypt, and the Afghan military and police force receive training from Egyptian Armed forces.

1978

- Mir Akbar Khyber, leader of the Parcham faction of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), is assassinated outside his home on 17 April 1978. The government blames Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami for Kyber's death, but Nur Mohammad Taraki of the PDPA alleges the government itself is responsible.
- Thousands of PDPA sympathizers protest during Khyber's funeral on 19 April and President Daoud orders the arrests of PDPA leadership, which in turn prompts the Khalqi faction of the PDPA to launch a military coup (the Saur Revolution) during which Daoud is killed, and the PDPA takes power.

- Nur Mohammad Taraki (Khalqi faction of PDPA) becomes Prime Minister, Babrak Karmal (Parchami faction) becomes senior Deputy Prime Minister, and Hafizullah Amin (Khalqi faction) is foreign minister.
- State atheism is promoted, along with a declaration of women's rights. The initiation of radical Marxist policies contrary to Afghan tradition, in particular issues of land ownership, arranged marriages, Sharia law, and tribal leadership, alienates much of the population.
- The communist government imprisons or murders thousands of members of the traditional Afghan elite, the religious establishment, and the intelligentsia.
- The country is renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
- December - Nur Mohammad Taraki signs a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.
- Afghan mujahideen guerrilla movement is born.

1979

- February - The US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, is kidnapped and dies in an exchange of gunfire between his kidnappers and Afghan security forces.
- March - The 17th infantry division in Herat under Captain Ismail Khan (later a Northern Alliance commander) mutinies after government troops fire on protestors.
- March - Nur Mohammad Taraki meets with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow and formally requests the assistance of Soviet ground troops in the fight against the mujahideen. Over the spring and summer, requests for support continue and the number and types of Soviet forces in Afghanistan steadily expand.
- July - US President Jimmy Carter signs an executive order authorizing the CIA to conduct covert propaganda operations against the communist Afghan government. President Carter also signs a presidential finding authorizing funding for anti-communist guerrillas in Afghanistan as a part of the CIA's Operation Cyclone, which would later include providing weapons to the mujahideen.
- September- Hafizullah Amin becomes president after Nur Mohammad Taraki dies (he is alleged to have been suffocated by order of Hafizullah Amin).
- 27 December - Within three months of assuming power, Amin is assassinated by a Soviet KGB and Spetsnaz team (Operation Storm-333), and Babrak Karmal is installed as president; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan begins.

1980

- Dr. Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai is appointed the head of KHAD (Government Intelligence Service), the secret police controlled by the Soviet KGB.

1981

- The PDPA creates the National Fatherland Front (NFF) in an attempt to gain support for the communist government.

1982

- The United Nations initiates negotiations to facilitate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

1984

- UN sends investigators to Afghanistan to examine reported human rights violations.

- Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam establish Maktab al-Khadamat to raise funds and recruit foreign mujahideen for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

1985

- Mikhail Gorbachev becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
- As part of their exit strategy, Soviet forces begin training Afghan military to operate without Soviet support.

1986

- May 1986 - Under pressure from the Soviet Union, Babrak Karmal resigns as secretary general of the PDPA and is replaced by Dr. Najibullah.
- November 1986, Najibullah is elected president and a new constitution adopted.

1987

- Najibullah's proposals for reconciliation with the mujahideen are rejected.
- December - Mikhail Gorbachev announces Soviet forces will withdraw from Afghanistan.

1988-1989

- April 1988 - Peace accords signed in Geneva.
- May - August 1988 - Approximately half of the Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan.
- November - February 1989 - The remainder of Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan.
- Mujahideen continue to fight against Najibullah's regime.
- May - Afghan guerrillas elect Sibghatullah Mojaddedi as head of their government-in-exile.

1991

- September - The Soviet Union agrees with the United States on a mutual cessation of military aid to both sides in the Afghan civil war, to begin 01 January 1992.

1992

- April - The mujahideen take Kabul and President Najibullah seeks refuge in a United Nations compound.
- The Peshawar Accords - The mujahideen form the government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. In an agreement excluding the Shia factions, various parties form a council and announce Sibghatullah Mojaddedi will be president for two months, followed by Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Jamiat-e Islami. Ahmad Shah Massoud is minister of defense. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is named prime minister but within two weeks, Hekmatyar and his Hizb-e Islami party are excluded from the government. Hekmatyar launches indiscriminate rocket attacks on Kabul intermittently for three years until he is forced out of the Kabul area in February 1995.
- June - Mojaddedi surrenders power to the leadership council, which elects Burhannudin Rabbani president.

1994

- The term “Taliban” begins to appear in media reports. Initially the primarily Pashtun Taliban, led by Mullah Omar, are viewed favorably by many Afghans, as they are seen to bring order to the chaotic situation in the country.
- Ahmad Shah Massoud invites the various rival factions, including the Taliban, to join a political process with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections. The Taliban decline to participate.
- November - Taliban forces capture Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, and Helmand.

1995

- March - Taliban advance into southern Kabul.
- September - Taliban seize Shindand and Herat.
- November - Taliban launch offensive against Kabul; government forces led by Ahmad Shah Massoud successfully defend the capital.

1996

- June - Gulbuddin Hekmatyar signs a peace agreement with President Rabbani and returns to Kabul to serve as prime minister.
- September - Taliban capture Jalalabad, Sarobi, Asadabad, and Kabul. They execute former President Najibullah and his brother, Shahpur Ahmadzai.
- The Taliban brutally impose their strict interpretation of Islam on the areas under their control.
- United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (known in the Western world as the Northern Alliance) brings various factions together in opposition to the Taliban.

1997

- February - Taliban delegation visits United States.
- May - Pakistan recognizes Taliban as government of Afghanistan.

1998

- February - Earthquake strikes the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border region, killing over 4,000 people, destroying villages and leaving thousands of people homeless.
- Abdul Malik Pahlawan, one of Abdul Rashid Dostum's subordinates, allows Taliban forces into Mazar-e Sharif after arranging a deal wherein the Taliban will recognize his authority. The Taliban almost immediately renege on the agreement. Dostum goes into exile in Turkey.
- August - US President Clinton orders cruise missile strikes in retaliation for the bombings of American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. A suspected terrorist training camp in Khost is one of the targets.
- September - Tensions rise between Iran and the Taliban over the killing of their diplomats and a journalist by the Taliban during the capture of Mazar-e Sharif.

1999

- February - Earthquake hits eastern Afghanistan.
- June - The US places Osama bin Laden first on the “most wanted” list.
- July - US imposes economic sanctions on the Taliban.

- September - Deposed King of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zahir Shah, calls for a Loya Jirga (grand assembly) to discuss bringing peace to the country. The United Front welcomes the idea, but the Taliban reject it.
- October - UN Security Council Resolution 1267 is adopted; sanctions against the Taliban.

2000

- May - A magnitude 5.6 earthquake near the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
- June - The UN calls for around \$67 million in international aid for severe droughts across Afghanistan.
- December - UN Security Council Resolution 1333 is adopted; additional sanctions against the Taliban for their continuing support of terrorism, cultivation of opium, etc.

2001

- March - Despite international pleas and requests the Taliban destroy ancient historical statues in the Kabul Museum, historical sites in Ghazni, and blow up the giant Bamiyan Buddhas from the 5th century, saying they are idols forbidden by Islam.
- April - Ahmad Shah Massoud addresses the European Parliament.
- 09 September - Ahmad Shah Massoud is killed in a suicide bombing by two Arabs posing as journalists at Khwaja Bahauddin, in Takhar Province.
- 11 September - Terrorist attacks strike the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
- 07 October - The United States and United Kingdom, working with the forces of the United Front (Northern Alliance) launch air strikes against the Taliban.
- November - Taliban lose control of Mazar-e Sharif.
- 05 December - Bonn Agreement. Afghan political groups meet in Bonn, Germany and form an interim government. Hamid Karzai is chosen as Chairman of the Transitional Administration.
- 20 December - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 establishes the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
- 22 December - Initial deployment of ISAF.

2002

- 16 February - The first attack on ISAF soldiers occurs when British soldiers of the 2nd Parachute Battalion are fired upon in Kabul.
- April - Former King Mohammad Zahir Shah returns to Afghanistan but does not claim throne.
- June - Loya Jirga elects Hamid Karzai as president of a transitional government until elections are held in October 2004.

2003

- March - The first two brigades of the Afghan National Army complete 10 weeks of training.
- April - NATO unanimously agrees to take command (in August) of the ISAF in Afghanistan.
- August - President Karzai decrees officials may no longer hold both military and civil posts.

2004

- January - Afghanistan adopts a new constitution creating a republic with executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.
- October - Presidential elections are held after being delayed twice. Hamid Karzai is declared the winner, with 55.4% of the votes.

2005

- September - First parliamentary and provincial elections in more than 30 years.
- December - New parliament holds its inaugural session.

2006

- July - NATO troops take over the leadership of military operations in the south.
- October - NATO assumes responsibility for security across all of Afghanistan, taking command in the east from a US-led coalition force.

2007

- May - Taliban's most senior military commander, Mullah Dadullah, is killed during fighting with US and Afghan forces.
- Afghan and Pakistani troops clash on the border in the worst border violence in decades.
- July - Former King Mohammad Zahir Shah dies.
- August - Opium production soars to a record high, the UN reports.

2008

- British Defense Secretary Des Browne announces British troop numbers in Afghanistan to increase by 230 to a new high of more than 8,000 by spring 2009.
- President Karzai warns Afghanistan will send troops into Pakistan to fight militants if Islamabad fails to take action against them.
- September - President Bush sends an extra 4,500 US troops to Afghanistan.
- October - Germany extends Afghanistan mission to 2009 and boosts troop numbers in Afghanistan by 1,000 to 4,500.
- November - Taliban militants reject an offer of peace talks from President Karzai, saying there can be no negotiations until foreign troops leave Afghanistan.
- December - President Karzai and new Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari agree to form joint strategy to fight militants operating in their border regions.

2009

- October - Hamid Karzai is declared winner of the August presidential election, after second-placed opponent Abdullah Abdullah quits before the second round.
- November - Hamid Karzai is sworn in for a second term as president.

2010

- Parliamentary elections for the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) are marred by alleged fraud and improprieties.

2011

- January - President Karzai makes first official state visit to Russia by an Afghan leader since the end of the Soviet invasion in 1989.
- Afghanistan's parliament elects Abdul Rahoof Ibrahimi (an Uzbek former warlord from Kunduz who fought with Hezb-e Islami in the 1980s against the Soviet occupation) as its speaker.

SECTION 2: TRENDS

POLITICAL <u>Key Themes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghans will continue to be loyal to local elements like family, clan, or tribe over the central government. The majority of the Pashtun population remains uncommitted politically. Corruption will continue to be the key element hobbling Afghan political development. 		<u>Key Dates or Events:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> May to August-Harvest cycle 1 AUG-30 AUG 2011-Ramadan 2011-2015-Transition of security leadership from ISAF to GIRoA 2014-Presidential Elections 			
3 months		6 months		12 months	
MILITARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The GIRoA will continue to integrate local forces into the security framework. GIRoA will aggressively target opium production in certain areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GIRoA will proceed with reconciliation/reintegration of insurgents in predominantly Pashtun areas. IEDs will continue to be the main casualty producing mechanism. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Certain ANSF units will start to have significant former insurgent participation. Ethnic communities like the Tajiks will attempt to circumvent the GIRoA and work directly with foreign governments. 		
ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Attacks on opium production will alienate certain farming communities. Increased commodities prices will create wealth that will shore up support for GIRoA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demands for more feeder roads into the Ring Road. Local ANSF will combine with leaders to lobby for more funding for infrastructure and other development projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Corruption of the awarding of contracts will be major element of local economy. Attempts to wean farmers away from opium production will have some success as global food prices rise. 		
SOCIAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GIRoA will lack significant popular support, especially in south and east Afghanistan. GIRoA support will remain strongest among the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek populations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development programs will continue to have mixed results, especially as foreign NGOs turn over operations to Afghans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social development programs will slowly become the main target of insurgent violence. 		
INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GIRoA will continue outreach to fight opium production and official corruption, to little effect. Lower ISAF-origin civilian casualties will be viewed positively. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Private media providers will grow in viewers/readers/listeners and will correspondingly grow in political clout. Insurgent intelligence capabilities will grow. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Domestic media production will supplant foreign media. Media producers will increasingly create multilingual content. Insurgents will obtain better ISR capability. 		
INFRASTRUCTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Infrastructure projects will be used as incentives in places with less support for the government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The satellite and cellular phone network will face insurgent attack. Securing the Ring Road will be a 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Internet will surpass print media as the third most important medium. TV and Radio will retain the first and 		

		major political question.	second place, indefinitely.
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The geographic reality of Afghanistan will continue to favor the local over the national. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ANSF forces will create significant goodwill for the government during natural disaster remediation efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First attempts at securing mining revenue rights for groups without significant mineral wealth will commence.
TIME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The GIRoA will make a demonstration of anti-corruption efforts in order to create the appearance of success. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The GIRoA will continue to attempt to assert more local control over ISAF combat operations and NGO efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The insurgents will likely increase their attacks on the ANSF after the reduction in outside forces. As ISAF forces retrograde, they will become paradoxically more popular as the reality of their stabilizing influence becomes apparent.

MILITARY <u>Key Themes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANSF faces a serious illiteracy problem throughout its enlisted soldiers and policemen. • The ANSF needs the time to generate a competent non-commissioned officer corps and junior officers. • The ANSF finds the change from Soviet equipment to Western equipment difficult because of the increased maintenance requirements. • The ANSF should reach their strength goals by October 2011 as currently planned. • AWOL rates continue to decrease as the ANSF increase their self-identification as ANA or ANP instead of their tribe. 		<u>Key Dates or Events:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • April 2011: Poppy harvest. • July 2011: Scheduled exit date for US combat troops. • 1-30 August 2011: Ramadan • October 2011: Date to reach 171,600 ANA soldiers and 134,000 ANP policemen. • November 2011: Scheduled end for all foreign and domestic security contractors to operate in Afghanistan. • 2013: Scheduled completion of 12 new airports. • 2014: GIRoA expects the ANP to contain at least 5,000 additional female police officers. 			
3 months		6 months		12 months	
POLITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The GIRoA must decide whether to ask the US/Coalition combat forces to remain beyond the July 2011 to continue their assistance in providing security. • If the GIRoA actually means to eliminate poppy cultivation, the ANSF will need to emphasize the destruction of the spring poppy harvest. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANP will need to continue to improve their professional conduct so the Afghan civilians can accept their legitimacy to enforce Afghanistan's laws. • If the US/Coalition combat forces leave Afghanistan, the ANSF will need to ensure the continuation of the current government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANSF will need to take the lead in the war against the insurgents. • The ANSF will need to become a professional force that enforces laws without regard to the perpetrator's ethnic group if they wish all Afghans to accept the GIRoA's legitimacy. • Eventually, the GIRoA will need to decide what size ANSF Afghanistan can afford without outside financial assistance. 		
ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANSF will need to protect the new Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif railroad line so Afghans can take advantage of the cheaper cost of imports. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANSF will need to do a better job to protect the Ring Road from insurgent attackers so Afghans can take advantage of the roads' economic benefits. • The ANSF will need to protect the Ring Road so the farmers can get their crops to the market at a lower cost and before spoilage begins. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANP must eliminate the internal corruption, especially those policemen that form roadblocks to extract money from the truckers to pass through to their destination, if Afghanistan actually wants to reduce transportation costs. • Eventually, the GIRoA must find some way to exploit the limited natural resources in Afghanistan, especially those centered on mineral extraction. 		

SOCIAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Pashtuns will most likely continue to shun ANA service. • Afghan tribes will continue to distrust ANSF from ethnic groups different than their own. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many Afghan tribes will most likely continue to join the local Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) to provide security in the local tribal area. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANA will continue the policy to maintain ethnic diversity among the enlisted personnel. • Most Afghan tribes, especially the Pashtuns, will continue to fight any central control from the GIRoA in Kabul. • The ANSF will need to continue to improve school security if they want Afghans, especially females, to receive an education.
INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANSF will continue as the GIRoA's face and will provide the majority of their communication with the government, especially those in the rural areas without access to other communication means. • The ANSF war on poppy cultivation will indicate whether the GIRoA actually wants to eradicate drugs or will only provide lip service to placate the Western countries and Russia. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANSF actions, good or bad, will serve as the primary means of rural Afghans' contact with the GIRoA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The number of Afghans with access to modern communication means will only continue to increase. • The ANSF actions, good or bad, will still serve as the primary means of rural Afghans' contact with the GIRoA.
INFRASTRUCTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANSF will need to continue to protect the Ring Road and other transportation networks from the insurgents to avoid costly repairs and replacement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The improved road network should help the ANSF travel more quickly and provide more rapid movement for rural Afghans. • The increase in the ANSF by October 2011 will generate additional requirements for barracks and training facilities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANSF will need to continue to improve their protection of new construction projects to avoid costly replacement. • As more airports reach completion, the ANSF will most likely use the new aviation infrastructure for training and missions.
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As the ANSF grows and conducts more training, they may harm their surroundings unless they take precautions to prevent environmental damage. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANSF, with the right equipment, should provide additional support to help with earthquakes, floods, or other natural disasters. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased construction to support a larger ANSF will cause some damage to the physical environment unless the GIRoA spends the resources to mitigate the damage. • As the ANSF grows, they will need

			more training areas to conduct exercises.
TIME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The ANSF continues to reach their personnel goals early, but the high attrition rate means that many ANSF personnel remain in training at all times. The ANSF will need to take over the GIRoA's protection by July 2011 when the US starts to pull out their combat troops. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The ANSF will need to continue to conduct operations against the insurgents in spite of the seasons or Ramadan. The ANSF must find methods to reduce the high attrition rates for the army and police or the ANSF will most likely never become a professional force. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The insurgents will likely increase their attacks on the ANSF after the US begins their military drawdown. The ANSF should reach their October 2011 personnel strength goals as planned. While the number of IED attacks may fluctuate up or down compared to previous years, seasonal trends are apt to continue.

ECONOMIC			
<u>Key Themes:</u>		<u>Key Dates or Events:</u>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption in Afghan life remains persistent. • The GIRoA continues to rely on international partners' resources, finances, and expertise. • The insurgency and opium cultivation play major roles in Afghanistan's economy. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • April 2011: Poppy harvest • June 2011: Original Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif railroad line completion date • July 2011: Scheduled exit date for US combat troops • 1-30 August 2011: Ramadan • October 2011: Date to reach 171,600 ANA soldiers and 134,000 ANP policemen • July 2013: Ring Road scheduled completion • 2013: Scheduled completion of 12 new airports 	
3 months		6 months	12 months
POLITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The GIRoA will continue to play up positive economic news to encourage its legitimacy. • The GIRoA will attempt to keep the Afghani exchange rate within historical ranges. • Bank failures due to rumor will create a crisis in Afghan banking. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuing global food shortages will boost food commodity prices, causing unrest in the cities. • Bank failures will cause calls for Afghan banks, especially the Central Bank, to separate themselves fully from the government. • Sales taxes, especially on imported goods, will be introduced. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The GIRoA will continue to pressure international donors to deliver upon pledged aid. • International banks will be called upon to partner with Afghan banks. • Large tribes will attempt to be included in government offices dealing with development aid at the local and provincial levels.
MILITARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The GIRoA will continue to expand its forces. • Insurgent attacks on economic targets will create a level of animosity between the population and insurgency. • Outside governments will actively assist the Taliban. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAF/GIRoA operations will make the costs of opium refinement rise. • Rent-a-Taliban will continue to be a primary element of the insurgency. • Calls for increased police and military wages will strain GIRoA budgets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insurgent dependence on opium-based financing will continue. • The GIRoA will start to finance its own security operations. • The GIRoA will shift back to cheaper Chinese- and Russian-sourced equipment.

SOCIAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption will remain a central fact of Afghan political life. • Increasing calls for effective social services like job training and food subsidies will replace security issues as the prime complaint of many Afghans. • The GIRoA will attempt to oppose opium production through religious and social appeals. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strains on social services will be seen as expat worker salaries fall, especially those working in the Persian Gulf. • Use and abuse of opium will continue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Microfinance will be a key element of rural finance in Afghanistan, replacing traditional loan and sharecropping activities. • International trade in Afghanistan will slowly cleave along ethnic lines, with Pashtuns trading with Pakistanis, and Tajiks and Uzbeks trading with Central Asian countries. • Increasing numbers of Hazara will be employed as expat labor in Iran.
INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satellite TV choices will expand. • The GIRoA will start to censor certain content to burnish its Islamic credentials. • Media outlets will expand content and availability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insurgents will make a dedicated campaign against cell phone and radio repeaters. • Shifts to mobile phone banking will continue. • Calls for increased government transparency to fight corruption will be resisted by government officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell phone coverage will expand. • Afghan radio and TV stations will start to aggressively push content onto mobile devices. • Internet connectivity will increase markedly for most Afghans.
INFRASTRUCTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The GIRoA will continue to use infrastructure spending to generate political support. • Insurgents will attempt a major attack on the National Highway/Ring Road to demonstrate reach and capability after recent GIRoA offensives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing electrification will improve economic conditions, especially in cities. • Calls for increased all-weather roads will rise, especially those roads connected to the National Highway/Ring Road. • Hardening of road infrastructure will create political stability, as insurgents move to softer targets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasingly capable ground transport links with Iran and Pakistan will drive trade in RC-South and RC-West. • Rail links with the north will drive trade with Central Asian states. • As international forces recede, aviation will be less important.

<p>PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cities will continue to benefit economically from better connectivity versus rural areas. • Illegal logging will continue to plague areas of Afghanistan, creating water issues for farmers. • Road and bridge washout will be an issue, especially in RC-East. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drought in RC-South areas will spurn creation or rebuilding of irrigation systems. • Low reservoir water levels could limit electrical production. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of jobs and government services will spur population movement into cities. • Opium production will continue, especially in water poor areas. • Pakistan floods will decrease - though not eliminate - economic activities with Pakistan, for both legal actors and insurgents.
<p>TIME</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall economic development will weigh against the insurgency, as jobs and economic development drive up the costs of recruiting and equipping Taliban. • International actors, especially China and Iran, will attempt to fill the economic voids in Afghanistan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insurgents will increasingly resort to extortion and illegal taxation to fund operations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly uneven economic growth will create tension between the cities and rural areas across Afghanistan. • The insurgency will be increasingly dependent upon the drug trade as the international role in providing security in Afghanistan diminishes.

SOCIAL <u>Key Themes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pashtun values dominate the Afghan way of life. • Access to education and healthcare has improved but remains unreachable to many, especially those in rural areas. • Poverty pervades Afghan culture and affects quality of life for most Afghans. • Refugees who have returned to Afghanistan are further straining available resources. • Afghans do not have a strong sense of national identity. 		<u>Key Dates or Events:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 01-30 August: Ramadan • Post-Ramadan: Eid al-fitr, an Afghan holiday, occurs to commemorate the end of the fasting for Ramadan by celebrating with friends and exchanging gifts. • 18 September 2010: Parliamentary elections 			
3 months		6 months		12 months	
POLITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust of elected Afghan officials will remain elusive. • Insurgents will continue to sway rural Afghans with accusations against the GIRoA and reminders of the tenets of radical Islam. • Support for Karzai may wane if he continues talks and potential negotiations with Taliban leaders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghans will continue to distrust ANA soldiers and ANP police who are from different tribal/ethnic groups. • Insurgents will utilize fear and intimidation to reduce rural Afghans' support of the GIRoA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most Afghan tribes will passively resist the central authority of the GIRoA. • Insurgents will utilize fear and intimidation to reduce rural Afghans' support of the GIRoA. 		
MILITARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghans, particularly in rural areas, will remain wary of the ANA and ANP until they prove no prejudice in their activities and increase security measures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most Pashtuns will shun ANA service. • Afghan tribes will continue to distrust ANSF from ethnic groups different than their own. • Many Afghan tribes will utilize the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) to provide security in their local areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ANA will strive for ethnic diversity among enlisted personnel. • Inadequate security and fear of the Taliban will prevent many children and most females from receiving an education. 		
ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural Afghans will remain poor and reliant on illegal poppy crops to sustain their families. • Corruption will remain a central fact of Afghan political life. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural Afghans will harvest their poppy crops and perpetuate the drug culture that affects Afghanistan and many other parts of the world. • Strains on social services will be 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghans will remain poor. Many rural Afghans will continue to cultivate poppies due to the higher profit in comparison to other crops. • Microfinance will be a key element of rural finance in Afghanistan, 		

		seen as expat worker salaries fall.	replacing traditional loan and sharecropping activities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> International trade in Afghanistan will slowly cleave along ethnic lines, with Pashtuns trading with Pakistanis, and Tajiks and Uzbeks trading with central Asian countries.
INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghans rely on word-of-mouth as their primary means of communication and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The ANSF will continue as the GIRoA's face and will provide the Afghan populace with the majority of their communication with the government, especially those in the rural areas without access to other communication means. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghans rely on word-of-mouth as their primary means of communication and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The ANSF actions, good or bad, will serve as the primary means of rural Afghans' contact with the GIRoA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghans rely on word-of-mouth as their primary means of communication and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The ANSF actions, good or bad, will serve as the primary means of rural Afghans' contact with the GIRoA.
INFRASTRUCTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The need for more schools and clinics closer to the rural communities will remain. Potable water, sewer facilities, and electricity will remain elusive to many, even those in more urban areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghans will be able to travel as road networks and railroads become more accessible. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved travel routes and communication devices (cell phone, Internet, TV) may begin to show more use by more Afghans, resulting in expanded information available to individual Afghans. Improved transportation networks will make goods and services more readily available.

<p>PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insufficient available water for both crops and people (to drink, cook, and bathe) will remain an issue. • Spring floods may result in casualties and damage or destroy homes and farmland. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natural disasters may create humanitarian crises; difficult terrain hinders emergency response and relief efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natural disasters may create humanitarian crises; difficult terrain hinders emergency response and relief efforts.
<p>TIME</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tribal structures and Islam will continue to drive decision-making for most Afghans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tribal structures and Islam will continue to drive decision-making for most Afghans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tribal structures and Islam will continue to drive decision-making for most Afghans.

INFORMATION				
<u>Key Themes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan will remain a highly dynamic information environment. • The information operations campaign of the insurgency will remain its primary focus of operations. • The Afghan mass media continues to mature rapidly. 		<u>Key Dates or Events:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Next Presidential elections-2014 • 1-30 August 2011: Ramadan • Ramadan 2012 begins on 20 July 2012 • Tentative handover of security operations-2011 to 2014 		
		3 months	6 months	12 months
POLITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The GIRoA will attempt a media campaign to demonize the use and growing of poppies. • The GIRoA will aggressively condemn any Pakistani failure to combat Islamism. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The GIRoA will embark on an information campaign to “reintegrate” Taliban fighters. • The consistent insurgent message will remain the institution of authentic <i>Sharia</i> to solve the problems of Afghanistan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The GIRoA will maintain a slowly divergent information campaign from its Western supports to demonstrate its independence. • The insurgents will likely continue to aggressively and competently portray the GIRoA as unconcerned toward the population of Afghanistan, corrupt, and a puppet of Western Interests. 	
MILITARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Insurgents will start attacking radio and TV stations that broadcast unfriendly messages regarding the insurgency. • Insurgents will continue to look for low-tech work-around solutions to ISAF information overmatch. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insurgents will increase “pirate radio” broadcasts. • Insurgents will attempt to directly target teachers, government workers, NGOs and other non-security elements of ISAF and the GIRoA to both dissuade them from action and demonstrate insurgent reach and capability. • Insurgent deception operations will increase in skill and scope. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GIRoA organic technical intelligence capability will slowly improve. • President Karzai will continue to staff the intelligence services with loyalists to ensure their adherence to Karzai’s goals. • Insurgents will attempt to create an INFOWAR capability to attack Information Attack. • Insurgents will increasingly use night vision, thermal, or other advanced sighting tools. 	
ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information providers will become an increasingly important element to the overall economy. • Increases in information technology will allow critical sectors like transport and banking to develop. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advertising revenue will expand Afghan TV and Radio broadcasters’ reach throughout the economy. • Foreign content providers will start providing Afghan sourced content. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Afghan Information economy will start to condense around three or four major ownership groups. • Despite the media mergers, there will be an increase in available content. 	

<p>SOCIAL</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confidence in mass media will grow as the media reports on items adverse to the GIRoA. • The insurgents will use intimidation tactics against any elements wishing to change the existing way of life. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Educational opportunities via the proliferation of information technologies like the Internet and satellite radio will start to be available to rural Afghans. • Media exposure of urban life will entice more Afghans to relocate to urban areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural areas will receive increased broadcasts and mass media directed and marketed at rural dwellers. • The Afghan mass media will fragment to serve distinct urban and rural populations
<p>INFRASTRUCTURE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Postal and courier systems will expand their services and reliability. • Cellular phone coverage will increase in area and data speed supported. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internet penetration will increase in rural areas. • Biometrics will become increasing important in GIRoA population monitoring efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satellite radio will start being available to rural Afghans. • The GIRoA will introduce plans to issue every Afghan an identity card with biometric features.
<p>PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geography will continue to be the prime impediment for information infrastructure development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell phones will almost entirely replace landlines. • The internet and other point-to-point communications will likely migrate to satellite providers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The national highway will continue to be key terrain for physical transport for mail and courier operations.
<p>TIME</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Even large changes in the information infrastructure will not undermine local authorities' ability to manage or control information flow. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The insurgency will continue to play up messages of its persistence and eventual victory. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The information environment will be the prime battle environment until the withdrawal of ISAF places the insurgency and the GIRoA on more equal combat power terms.

INFRASTRUCTURE				
<u>Key Themes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foreign countries will continue to provide financial support to build Afghanistan's roads and railroads. The majority of infrastructure improvements will go to where the people live, primarily the large cities such as Kabul and Kandahar. The urbanization of the Afghan population will continue to place a strain on the cities' ability to provide electricity, running water, and modern sewage disposal methods. The rural Afghan population will never receive the same quality of services as the urban dwellers. 		<u>Key Dates or Events:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> June 2011: Original Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif railroad line completion date July 2011: Scheduled exit date for US combat troops 1-30 August 2011: Ramadan July 2013: Ring Road scheduled completion 2013: Scheduled completion of 12 new airports 		
		3 months	6 months	12 months
POLITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For the Afghan people, the initial successful of the Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif railroad may provide more legitimacy to the GIRoA. GIRoA's credibility should increase if the Afghan security situation improves. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The ANSF's inability to protect the Ring Road from insurgent attacks will continue to undermine the GIRoA's credibility. Continued attacks on the Ring Road harms the insurgents' credibility as it hurts the Afghans ability to travel and work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The GIRoA should gain more credibility with the Afghan people if the government can successfully capitalize on the increased road, railroad, and aviation infrastructure. 	
MILITARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif railroad continues to provide an alternate route for the ISAF to support their forces other than ground convoys through the Khyber Pass. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved roads may allow the ANSF to continue the offensive against the insurgents throughout the year. Improved roads should reduce maintenance costs for both ANSF and ISAF vehicles. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved airport access should allow better aerial movement of the ANSF through Afghan National Army Air Force (ANAAF) support. Improved infrastructure should continue improve both ANSF and ISAF logistics capabilities. 	
ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Damage from insurgent attacks will continue to generate jobs as the GIRoA continues to repair the Ring Road. Constant attacks by the Taliban on the Ring Road will continue to retard 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved roads should allow Afghans to travel farther and more often to increase economic trade throughout the summer months when the weather affects movement less. Improved infrastructure should assist Afghan farmers to get their agricultural products to get to the market sooner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The costs of imported goods should continue to decrease as the new railroad line to Mazar-e Sharif from Tajikistan reduces transport costs. The continual improvement of the Ring Road should help decrease transportation costs and should reduce a product's cost to the 	

	Afghanistan's economic growth.	and increase profit margins.	consumer.
SOCIAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased traffic on the Ring Road and the other highways will allow Afghans greater ability to visit relatives at a reduced cost. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved transportation networks will allow Afghans to travel more year round. More people movement will expose more Afghans to other ethnic groups than before. Afghans can learn firsthand about other ethnic groups rather than a reliance on other's prejudicial views. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Better roads should make rural Afghans less home-bound than in previous winters. More people movement will expose more Afghans to other ethnic groups than before. Afghans can learn firsthand about other ethnic groups rather than a reliance on other's prejudicial views.
INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Even though the number of cell phone, Internet, radio, and TV users continues to climb, word-of-mouth will continue as the primary communications means for most Afghans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cell phone and Internet user increases will only continue to break down the communication barriers originally formed by Afghanistan's mountainous terrain. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As more Afghans become educated, they will rely more on their own analysis and less on the elders to make decisions.
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most Afghan people will continue their traditional ways of life without change in their effects on the environment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Infrastructure development should improve the Afghans' quality of life, but unless closely monitored it could also increase pollution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continued improvements in the transportation networks will allow more freedom of movement in the winter months than before. If the Afghans continue their high rate of urbanization, it will put a strain on the cities' ability to provide basic utilities and untreated sewage disposal methods could continue to contaminate the environment.
TIME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most rural Afghan people will still not possess any means to access potable water, electricity, or modern sewage disposal methods. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The GIROA will continue to improve their infrastructure where most people live—Kabul and other large cities—while they expend minimal resources on the rural areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most rural Afghan people will continue to heat their homes in the winter in their traditional methods. Afghanistan's high urbanization rate will continue to put pressure on the GIROA to provide basic utilities—potable water, electricity, and sewers—to the cities' residents.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT				
<u>Key Themes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Neighboring countries will continue to leverage Afghanistan's position as a landlocked country to influence politics within the country. • Difficult terrain and a harsh winter climate affect all variables and increase the hurdles faced by both ISAF and the Afghan people. • Natural disasters such as drought and earthquakes continue to hamper quality of life. 		<u>Key Dates or Events:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Winter is the wettest period of the year. Mountain regions will have significant snowfall; rivers will experience flash floods during spring thaw. • Summer temperatures average around 90-100°F. Highs can reach 120°F. • Insurgent OPTEMPO follows a seasonal cycle, with spring and summer being the peak months. 		
		3 months	6 months	12 months
POLITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Iran and Pakistan, use their proximity and Afghanistan's landlocked position to influence Afghan political policies and positions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Iran and Pakistan, use their proximity and Afghanistan's landlocked position to influence Afghan political policies and positions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Iran and Pakistan, use their proximity and Afghanistan's landlocked position to influence Afghan political policies and positions. 	
MILITARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrain and spring flooding impede ISAF units' freedom of movement, giving a distinct advantage to the insurgents. • Fighting increases as spring progresses, with a noticeable lull during the poppy harvest. • Flooding and a dearth of available routes due to terrain hinder ISAF logistical operations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrain impedes ISAF units' freedom of movement, giving a distinct advantage to the insurgents. • Fighting continues to increase, with a noticeable lull during fall harvest. • A dearth of available routes due to terrain hinders ISAF logistical operations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrain and harsh winter climate impede ISAF units' freedom of movement, giving a distinct advantage to the insurgents. • Fighting continues on an annual cycle due to harsh winter conditions throughout the country. • Harsh winters and a dearth of available routes due to terrain hinder ISAF logistical operations. 	
ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan continues to rely on neighbors for trade and access to world markets. • Demining efforts gradually increase the amount of land available for farming. • Despite international efforts, poor land quality and lack of water resources continue to make opium poppy a favored crop in the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan continues to rely on neighbors for trade and access to world markets. • Demining efforts gradually increase the amount of land available for farming. • Drought causes crops to fail in areas of the country. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan continues to rely on neighbors for trade and access to world markets. • Despite international efforts, poor land quality and lack of water resources continue to make opium poppy a favored crop in the southern areas. 	

	southern areas.		
SOCIAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spring floods result in several casualties and damage or destroy both homes and farmland. • Avalanches kill and injure dozens during winter and spring. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natural disasters create humanitarian crises; difficult terrain hinders emergency response and relief efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natural disasters create humanitarian crises; difficult terrain hinders emergency response and relief efforts. • Avalanches kill and injure dozens during winter and spring.
INFRASTRUCTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan's mountainous terrain and spring floods hinder efforts to build and improve transportation and utilities infrastructure. • Lack of clean, reliable water sources continues to plague the average Afghan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan's mountainous terrain hinders efforts to build and improve transportation and utilities infrastructure. • Lack of clean, reliable water sources continues to plague the average Afghan; drought exacerbates the problem. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan's mountainous terrain and harsh winter climate hinder efforts to build and improve transportation and utilities infrastructure. • Lack of clean, reliable water sources continues to plague the average Afghan.
INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghans continue to favor cell phones over landlines due to minimal infrastructure requirements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghans continue to favor cell phones over landlines due to minimal infrastructure requirements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghans continue to favor cell phones over landlines due to minimal infrastructure requirements.
TIME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projects fail due to unrealistic timelines that ignore or minimize difficulties created by climate and terrain, and discourage both ISAF nations and the Afghan people. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projects fail due to unrealistic timelines that ignore or minimize difficulties created by climate and terrain, and discourage both ISAF nations and the Afghan people. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projects fail due to unrealistic timelines that ignore or minimize difficulties created by climate and terrain, and discourage both ISAF nations and the Afghan people.

SECTION 3: EVENTS

Event	Severe Floods	
1. Related Activity	➤ Floods caused by heavy rains wash away homes and refugees' shelters.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Military ○ Physical Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Afghans left homeless. ➤ Military helps evacuate those stranded in remote areas. ➤ Rising water causes extensive crop damage and destroy farmlands.
2. Related Activity	➤ Potential disease outbreak.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Poor sanitary conditions may lead to disease outbreak that cause more death and spread fear. ➤ Sick Afghans cannot work and the sick that do work may actually help spread disease.
3. Related Activity	➤ Afghan survivors exhibit increased frustration with the GIRoA's response.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political/Infrastructure ○ Political/Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Afghans become frustrated because of the government's slow response to the disaster and the government's inability to quickly restore services. ➤ Taliban will exploit the government's poor response with messages about the GIRoA's inability to take care of its citizens.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 	
	Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 	
	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 	
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Nation Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Support Civil Administration (SCA) (ART 5.4.6) 	

Event	Earthquake	
1. Related Activity	➤ Strong earthquake hits Afghanistan and causes massive destruction and loss of life.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ GIRoA will need to respond to the situation and decide whether to request foreign aid. ➤ Afghans will want the GIRoA to take care of their immediate needs and rebuild their homes. ➤ Infrastructure will need replacement.
2. Related Activity	➤ The Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), coalition military, and/or NGOs will need to respond with assistance.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Earthquake victims will require minimum standards of food, water, and shelter. ➤ The ANA, ANP, NGOs, or coalition forces will need to provide rescue teams, medical assistance, temporary shelter, and food/water to earthquake victims.
3. Related Activity	➤ Afghan economy will suffer due to the earthquake's effects.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economy ○ Information/ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The economy will not return to a semblance of normalcy until the Afghan people can obtain permanent housing and businesses reopen. ➤ As most rural areas rely upon cell phones for communication, people will lose contact outside the location area.
4. Related Activity	➤ Earthquake may overextend the GIRoA's limited financial resources.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The GIRoA may use the earthquake as a means to obtain additional financial support. ➤ The GIRoA's response may determine its legitimacy among the Afghan people.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) 	
	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Disaster Relief (ART 7.4.1.1) ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 	
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Nation Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) 	

Event	IED Destroys Bridge	
1. Related Activity	➤ Taliban blows up Ring Road Bridge.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The bombing demonstrates the GIRoA's inability to protect its infrastructure. ➤ ANA soldiers may need to secure vital infrastructure instead of conducting offensive operations against the Taliban. ➤ Infrastructure will need replacement ASAP.
2. Related Activity	➤ Ring Road destruction slows down the ability for Afghan farmers to take their goods to market.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Economic/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Farmers may lose profits because of additional spoilage due to longer transportation time. ➤ Afghan farmers may continue to pay bribes to the Taliban so they can take their crops to the market.
3. Related Activity	➤ Ring Road maintenance costs will continue to escalate.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political/Economic ○ Political/Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Foreign countries that built parts of the Ring Road may determine that the continual reconstruction no longer makes economic sense. ➤ The GIRoA may discover a lack of funds to rebuild the Ring Road and may need to decide what sections remain most important.
4. Related Activity	➤ The Taliban will exploit their successful bombings to aid recruitment.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The Taliban will promulgate messages that the GIRoA cannot protect its citizens. ➤ The Taliban will use the lack of security for the infrastructure to undermine the GIRoA's legitimacy.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 	
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 7.2.2) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 	
	Conduct Mobility Operations (ART 1.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct General Engineering Support to Assure Mobility (ART 1.6.2) 	

Event	Suicide Bomber Attacks Building	
1. Related Activity	➤ Suicide bomber attacks a GIRoA or other building.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Attack reduces the GIRoA's credibility and legitimacy because of its inability to provide a secure environment. ➤ Attacks for the ANA and ANP to focus more on infrastructure security instead of offensive operations against the Taliban.
2. Related Activity	➤ Taliban attempts to exploit its successes for recruitment and its own legitimacy.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Taliban will issue statements that if they control Afghanistan, these bombings would not occur. ➤ People like to be on the winning side and some Afghans may become anti-GIRoA due to the Taliban's perceived strength based on the bomb attacks.
3. Related Activity	➤ Depending on the building's purpose, the attack may cause some problems for the Afghan economy.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ If the Afghan people fear a future bomb attack, they may not take their goods to the market.
4. Related Activity	➤ Any bombing will cost additional funds to rebuild.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The destroyed building will need eventual replacement or repair. ➤ The GIRoA will need to determine the cost/benefit ratio for additional security forces to improve security.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Support in Response to Disaster of Terrorist Attack (7.4.1) ➤ Provide Support to Civil Law Enforcement (ART 7.4.2) ➤ Supporter DOJ Counterterrorism Activities (ART 7.4.2.1) 	
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 7.2.2) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 	
	Provide EOD Protection Support (ART 6.12) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct UXO and Explosive Remnants of War Operations (ART 6.12.1) ➤ Conduct Counter IED Operations (ART 6.12.3) 	
	Provide Area Security (ART 6.5) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2) ➤ Conduct Survivability Operations (ART 6.7) 	

Event	Farmers Refuse to Abandon Poppy Crop Cultivation	
1. Related Activity	➤ Farmers continue to grow poppies instead of subsistent crops.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical Environment ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Due to the lack of moisture in southern Afghanistan and poppies' need for less water, farmers continue to grow poppies. ➤ Despite GIRoA or foreign subsidies, poppy production still generates more money than other farm crops.
2. Related Activity	➤ Soldiers destroy poppy crops.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Military/Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The destruction of any poppies only drives up the value of the other Afghan farmers' poppy crop. ➤ Farmers dislike the ANA/ANP since they destroy their crops despite any reimbursement. ➤ Many Afghan government officials receive bribes to ignore the poppies.
3. Related Activity	➤ Taliban continues to use the drug trade to finance their activities.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic/Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The Taliban continues to pay the farmers more money than they receive from other legitimate crops. ➤ The Taliban continues to exploit drug use, a normal part of Afghan society.
4. Related Activity	➤ Legitimate crops will need a market and/or subsidies to wean the Afghan farmers off poppy production.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	○ Infrastructure	➤ Afghan farmers will need improved canals and irrigation ditches to provide the water that legitimate crops require.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations (ART 2.3)	
	➤ Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations (ART 2.3.2)	
	Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)	
	➤ Conduct Air Assault Operations (ART 1.2.1.1.2)	
Conduct Air Movement Operations (ART 4.1.2.3.2)		
➤ Conduct Air Movement Operations (ART 4.1.2.3.2)		
Conduct Consequence Management (ART 6.9.5)		
➤ Provide Support to Law Enforcement (ART 7.4.2)		
➤ Conduct Post Incident Response Operations (ART 1.6.1)		

Event	Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier or Afghan National Police (ANP) officer shoots US/coalition soldier.	
1. Related Activity	➤ ANA or ANP member shoots US or coalition soldier(s).	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Individual US or coalition soldiers may lose trust in ANA/ANP members. ➤ Afghan people may lose trust in the ANA or ANP as an organization.
2. Related Activity	➤ Taliban uses the shooting for propaganda purposes.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Information/ Political ○ Information/ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Taliban attempts to lure other ANA/ANP members to their side or influence them to conduct similar attacks. ➤ Taliban may attempt to exploit the incident in messages directed at the US public so they may pressure their government to end the mission. ➤ Taliban may provide financial incentives for other ANA/ANP members to conduct similar attacks.
3. Related Activity	➤ US military helps conduct the investigation into the shooting.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US must weigh the costs and benefits to conducting their own investigation or letting the ANA/ANP lead the investigation with US assistance.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3)	
	➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3)	
	Manage Protection Services (ART 7.5.4)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Personal Security Vulnerability Assessments (ART 6.5.4) ➤ Provide High-risk personnel Protection (6.5.4) 	
	Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) ➤ Disseminate Police Information & Intelligence Products (ART 2.2.5.3) ➤ Provide Forensics Support (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 		
Conduct Law & Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct Host Nation Police Training & Support (ART 7.3.2.3) 		
Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.1)		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Reconnaissance & Surveillance (ART 2.3) ➤ Conduct Area & Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) ➤ Secure Routes & Convoys (ART 6.5.6) 		

Event	Afghan National Army (ANA) unit defects to the Taliban.	
1. Related Activity	➤ ANA unit chooses to switch sides and join the Taliban against the GIRoA.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The Taliban will attempt to exploit the switch as it delivers a message to the Afghan people that the Taliban is winning the war. ➤ The GIRoA must decide what to do with any PWs they capture that defected to the Taliban.
2. Related Activity	➤ The ANA unit will take their weapons, ammunition, and equipment when they defect to the Taliban.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military/ Political ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The ANA officers that defect will provide the Taliban with the ANA's latest TTP. ➤ The GIRoA must decide whether to reconstitute the unit that defected. ➤ The GIRoA will need to spend additional funds to replace the weapons while the Taliban receives supplies at no cost to them.
3. Related Activity	➤ The GIRoA may change their units' ethnic makeup to eliminate future defections to the Taliban.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ethnic groups may become upset if the GIRoA changes the ANA ethnic percents. ➤ Ethnic groups may boycott ANA service to protest changes to the system.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	
	Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) (ART 2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform ISR Synchronization (ART 2.3.1) ➤ Perform ISR Integration (ART 2.3.2) ➤ Conduct Surveillance (ART 2.3.4) 	
	Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) ➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3) 	
	Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) ➤ Disseminate Police Information & Intelligence Products (ART 2.2.5.3) 	

Event	Afghan National Army (ANA) unit refuses to engage the Taliban.	
1. Related Activity	➤ ANA unit mutinies and refuses to engage the Taliban in combat.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The Taliban will attempt to exploit the switch as it delivers a message to the Afghan people that the Taliban is winning the war. ➤ The GIRoA must decide what to do with the unit.
2. Related Activity	➤ The ANA arrests the mutiny's leaders.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political ○ Social/ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The ANA must decide if they will conduct a court-martial or enact other punishments against those that refused to fight. ➤ If the ANA comes down too harshly, the GIRoA may lose support from one or more tribes. ➤ If those prosecuted all come from the same tribe, the tribe may feel that the ANA leadership holds a grudge against them.
3. Related Activity	➤ Some coalition forces may withdraw as they determine that the situation is unwinnable.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Time/ Political/ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Every coalition member that leaves Afghanistan before it should reduces the likelihood of military success against the Taliban. ➤ The longer the situation in Afghanistan lasts, the more likely that coalition members will withdraw for political or economic reasons.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3)	
	➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3)	
	Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5)	
➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2)		
➤ Disseminate Police Information & Intelligence Products (ART 2.2.5.3)		
Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3)		
➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1)		
➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3)		

Event	Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National Police (ANP) commander takes bribes.	
1. Related Activity	➤ ANA/ANP commander takes bribes.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political ○ Social/Time ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ If the commander is taking money that should go to the soldiers, the ANA/ANP personnel may lose confidence in not only their leader, but the entire ANA/ANP officer corps. ➤ The GIRoA must decide how strongly they will enforce anti-corruption laws. ➤ Bribery is normal way of doing business in Afghanistan. It will take a long time to eliminate. ➤ Bribes supplement commanders' wages, but recent raises may reduce the officers' need to take bribes.
2. Related Activity	➤ ANA/ANP commander may defect to the Taliban rather than face corruption charges.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political ○ Social/Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The commander may provide the Taliban with the ANA/ANP's latest TTP. ➤ If the commanders all come from the same ethnic group, the group may feel persecuted by the GIRoA. ➤ If those prosecuted all come from the same tribe, the tribe may feel that the ANA leadership holds a grudge against them.
3. Related Activity	➤ The lost of experienced commanders may affect the quality of the ANA or ANP forces.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	○ Military/Time	➤ The military will improve over time, but the loss of experienced commander may retard the ANA/ANP's growth.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage General, Drug, & Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 	
	Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) ➤ Disseminate Police Information & Intelligence Products (ART 2.2.5.3) 	
	Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) ➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3) 	

Event	Taliban Fighters Defect or Surrender to Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National Police (ANP)	
1. Related Activity	➤ Taliban fighters choose to give up the insurgency and surrender to GIROA forces.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The GIROA must decide what to do with the former Taliban fighters. ➤ The ANA may allow some of the Taliban fighters to join the ANA.
2. Related Activity	➤ The GIROA must decide how to handle the Taliban leaders and common soldiers that give up the insurgency.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ If the GIROA does not maintain an even-handed policy, some ethnic tribes may feel persecuted. ➤ The GIROA must decide the costs and benefits of keeping former Taliban leaders/fighters in prison.
3. Related Activity	➤ The GIROA, US, and coalition forces will all use massive defections from the Taliban in messages to the Afghan people and back in their home countries.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Information operations campaigns will use the defections to show the other Taliban fighters that they should defect also. ➤ The US and Coalition forces will use the defections in command information reports back to their home countries to show success in Afghanistan.
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) <p>Conduct Internment & Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Detainee Operations Compliance (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Integrate HN Corrections Training & Support (ART 7.3.2.3) ➤ Conduct US Military Prisoner Corrections (ART 5.5.1.2.4) ➤ Conduct Police Intelligence (ART 2.2.5) <p>Counter the Threat (ART 6.11.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) ➤ Perform Counterintelligence (ART 6.11.3.3) 	

Event	IED Severely Damages Road in Khyber Pass	
1. Related Activity	➤ Insurgents blow up road in a narrow area of the Khyber Pass.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The bombing demonstrates the GIRoA's inability to protect its infrastructure. ➤ ANSF may need to secure vital infrastructure instead of conducting offensive operations against insurgents. ➤ Infrastructure will need replacement ASAP.
2. Related Activity	➤ Khyber Pass destruction limits Afghan imports and exports.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US loses main logistical route for importing supplies. ➤ Exports to Pakistan are nearly halted, causing financial distress for Afghan businesses. ➤ Imports from Pakistan are nearly halted, causing shortages on goods and foodstuffs.
3. Related Activity	➤ Insurgents will exploit their successful bombings to aid recruitment.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgents will promulgate messages that the GIRoA cannot protect its citizens. ➤ Insurgents will use the lack of security for the infrastructure to undermine the GIRoA's legitimacy.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Support in Response to Disaster or Terrorist Attack (ART 7.4.1) ➤ Provide Support to Civil Law Enforcement (ART 7.4.2) 	
	Conduct Civil-Military Operations Center Operations (ART 5.4.7)* * = ART pending addition to FM7-15	
	Conduct Logistics Security (LOGSEC) Operations (ART 6.11.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform LOGSEC Assessments (ART 6.11.2) 	
	Support and Sustain the Warfighter (ART 4.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Rear Detachment Activities (ART 1.1.4) ➤ Conduct a Tactical Convoy (ART 1.3.3) ➤ Provide Logistics Support (ART 4.1) 	

Event	Mild Winter with Minimal Snowfall	
1. Related Activity	➤ Winter is mild, with above-average temperatures and minimal snowfall.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Populace survives the winter with fewer illnesses or deaths. ➤ Flocks and herds increase as fewer animals die of starvation or exposure. ➤ Ease of transport keeps availability of goods high and prices low.
2. Related Activity	➤ Insurgents continue attacks during the winter months.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgents extend fighting season, keep increased OPTEMPO. ➤ Insurgents regroup and resupply at an above-average pace.
3. Related Activity	➤ Drought occurs throughout the country.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Decreased water supply; wells and surface water sources run dry. Disease spreads. ➤ Crops and herds fail; poppy cultivation skyrockets. ➤ Insurgent membership surges as men seek ways to support their families.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct a Movement to Contact (ART 7.1.1) ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct a Pursuit (ART 7.1.4) 	
	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) ➤ Provide Support to Civil Law Enforcement (ART 7.4.2) 	
	Provide Potable Water in the JOA (ART 4.1.3.11) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Water Hoseline and Storage Operations (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Manage Water Quality Surveillance Program (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Distribute Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Produce Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11.1) 	

Event	Insurgents Perform Illegal Checkpoints	
1. Related Activity	➤ Insurgents create illegal checkpoint on Ring Road.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The GIRoA is criticized for lack of security on main highway. ➤ ANSF fails to respond, citing lack of resources.
2. Related Activity	➤ Vehicles required to pay in order to pass checkpoint.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Freight trucks looted, prices rise on remaining goods. ➤ Local populace further impoverished.
3. Related Activity	➤ Drivers and passengers beaten for not being in compliance with <i>sharia</i> law.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Populace less tolerant of insurgents, but also more afraid of them. ➤ Local populace seeks alternate routes despite increased time/difficulty, further deteriorating secondary road structures.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Coordinate & Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3) 	
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.1) ➤ Establish Local Security (ART 6.5.3) 	
	Conduct Logistics Security (LOGSEC) Operations (ART 6.11.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform LOGSEC Assessments (ART 6.11.2) 	
	Conduct Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) Operations (ART 5.4.7)* * = ART pending addition to FM7-15	

Event	Oil Prices Rise	
1. Related Activity	➤ Oil prices rise to \$200 per barrel.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military ○ Economic/ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The GIRoA reduces funding to social programs and limits amount ANSF may spend on fuel. ➤ ANSF curtails activities due to fuel rationing. Some ISAF nations limit activities or pull out altogether, citing costs. ➤ Food and goods prices skyrocket as transportation costs increase. Availability of electricity decreases, as populace can no longer afford fuel for gasoline generators
2. Related Activity	➤ Exploitation of known gas/oil reserves is initiated.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Outside investors fund exploitation due to increased value of possible returns. ➤ ANSF reallocated to provide increased security to oil and gas infrastructure.
3. Related Activity	➤ Insurgents utilize changes to military and economic climate.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgent membership surges as men seek ways to support their families. ➤ Insurgents see increased success due to activity changes of security forces.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 	
	Develop Theater Petroleum and Water Infrastructure (ART 4.1.7.2.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coordinate Contracting Support (ART 4.1.5) ➤ Coordinate Construction and Engineer Support (ART 4.1.7.3) ➤ Coordinate Host Nation Support (ART 5.4.3) 	
	Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct a Movement to Contact (ART 7.1.1) ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct a Pursuit (ART 7.1.4) 	

Event	Insurgents Poison Girls' School	
1. Related Activity	➤ Insurgents attack girls' school by poisoning school well.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Female school enrollment plummets as parents subsequently keep their daughters at home. ➤ The GIRoA is viewed as unable to provide safety to local citizens.
2. Related Activity	➤ Daughter of popular provincial governor dies from attack.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Governor and local populace take hard line against insurgents. ➤ Increased operations conducted against insurgent group(s) suspected of involvement. ➤ Local citizens form <i>arbaki</i> (defense force) to combat insurgents.
3. Related Activity	➤ NGO drills new deep-water well for school.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ NGO praised for efforts, but also criticized for not locating well where entire community could use it. ➤ Local populace increases interactions with NGO, asks for well, assistance with building project.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 	
	Develop Theater Petroleum and Water Infrastructure (ART 4.1.7.2.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coordinate Contracting Support (ART 4.1.5) ➤ Coordinate Construction and Engineer Support (ART 4.1.7.3) ➤ Coordinate Host Nation Support (ART 5.4.3) 	
	Conduct Police Intelligence Operations (ART 2.2.5) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Collect Police Information (ART 2.2.5.1) ➤ Analyze Police Information (ART 2.2.5.2) ➤ Provide Forensics Support (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 	

Event	Groundwater Well Dug in Village	
1. Related Activity	➤ NGO digs well in rural village suggested by provincial government.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Clean water source leads to fewer illnesses in community. ➤ Village populace becomes more supportive of NGO and provincial government.
2. Related Activity	➤ Neighboring village of different ethnicity complains; claims other village was chosen based on ethnicity and not need.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Relations between the two villages degrade as people take sides. ➤ Government seen as biased and selective regarding who receives assistance.
3. Related Activity	➤ Wells in three neighboring villages subsequently run dry.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ New well is located lower in the water table, draining other local wells and rendering them useless. ➤ Disease increases in affected villages as populace turns to other, less healthy, sources of water. ➤ Relations between affected villages and initial village degrade, as the latter is viewed as having "stolen" their water.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Coordinate & Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3) 	
	Develop Theater Petroleum and Water Infrastructure (ART 4.1.7.2.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coordinate Contracting Support (ART 4.1.5) ➤ Coordinate Construction and Engineer Support (ART 4.1.7.3) ➤ Coordinate Host Nation Support (ART 5.4.3) 	
	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) 	

Event	Large Emerald Mine Discovered Near Major City	
1. Related Activity	➤ Large emerald mine with high-quality stones discovered within easy reach of a major city and provincial capital.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provincial governor takes immediate possession of mine, starts mining operations. ➤ Local employment increases as mining operations proceed.
2. Related Activity	➤ Insurgents attempt to take over mine, threaten employees.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Governor orders ANP to guard mine, attack insurgents. Local <i>arbaki</i> (defense force) formed by mine employees. ➤ Insurgents lose popularity, local population backs governor and mine employees.
3. Related Activity	➤ Average income in city increases due to increased commerce.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Demand increases as more people become able to afford vehicles and utilities. ➤ Standard of living increases for local population.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) ➤ Integrate Information Engagement Capabilities (ART 5.3.1) 	
	Conduct Civil-Military Operations Center Operations (ART 5.4.7)* * = ART pending addition to FM7-15	
	Coordinate & Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3) 	

Event	Pakistan Takes Serious Action Against Insurgents in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP)	
1. Related Activity	➤ Pakistan sends significant forces into KP and FATA, kills multiple insurgent leaders.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgent structure in area is seriously crippled. ➤ Karzai praises Pakistan for firm stance against militants.
2. Related Activity	➤ The ANSF and ISAF attack insurgent structure in eastern Afghanistan.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ ANSF and ISAF conduct subsequent operations to attack related insurgent structure on Afghan side of border. ➤ Perception of ANSF and the GIRoA increases, especially in eastern Afghanistan.
3. Related Activity	➤ Resources for Afghan insurgents decrease significantly.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Military ○ Economic/ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Leadership, funding, and supplies to Afghan insurgents from NW Pakistan are reduced to a fraction of previous levels. ➤ Faced with lack of outside leadership and funding, many insurgent groups curtail activities or consider reconciliation with the GIRoA. ➤ Remaining affected insurgent groups increase illegal taxation and kidnappings in an attempt to replace lost funding/supply sources.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	
	Coordinate & Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3) 	
	Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct a Movement to Contact (ART 7.1.1) ➤ Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) ➤ Conduct a Pursuit (ART 7.1.4) 	

Event	Swedes Killed in Northern Afghanistan	
1. Related Activity	➤ Two Swedish NGO workers and a Swedish soldier are killed in northern Afghanistan.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Political/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Populace demonstrates in Sweden, demands withdrawal of troops. ➤ Other NGOs in area temporarily curtail activities.
2. Related Activity	➤ NGO pulls out of Afghanistan.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Projects in progress are abandoned, angering affected locals who blame ISAF and the GIRoA. ➤ Insurgents use event as IO win, claiming credit for NGO pullout and asserting that ISAF and the GIRoA are untrustworthy.
3. Related Activity	➤ Swedish government decides to pull out forces, to be complete within four months.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Remaining nations receive increased pressure from populace to do likewise. ➤ ISAF and US faced with decision to have US take over Swedish PRT in RC-N with only four-month lead time, or leave nearly half of RC-N (4 of 9 provinces) without ISAF presence and only unpartnered ANSF for security.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Provide Base Camp Sustainment (ART 4.1.4.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Contracting Support (ART 4.1.5) ➤ Provide Human Resources Support (ART 4.2.1) ➤ Conduct Actions to Control Pollution and Hazardous Materials (ART 6.7.4) 	
	Support to Force Generation (ART 2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Establish Intelligence Architecture (ART 2.1.2) ➤ Tailor the Intelligence Force (ART 2.1.5) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	
	Manage Theater Opening and Reception, Staging and Onward Movement of Forces (ART 1.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Onward Movement of Forces (ART 1.1.2.2) ➤ Manage Establishment of Sustainment Bases (ART 4.1.4.3) ➤ Manage Deployment/Redeployment Operations (ART 4.1.6) ➤ Coordinate Host Nation Support (ART 5.4.3) 	

Event	Foreign Radio Station Broadcasts Anti-Islamic Program	
1. Related Activity	➤ Foreign radio station broadcasts negative program on Islam.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political/ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Majority of populace interprets program as being anti-Islamic. ➤ Major political leaders condemn broadcast, call for restrictions on foreign broadcasts.
2. Related Activity	➤ Demonstrations occur throughout country.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Demonstrations occur in cities; calls for removal of “occupying forces” and “anti-Islamic influences.” ➤ ANSF called out to monitor demonstrations, ensure that they don’t turn violent. ➤ Fringe groups and insurgents attack radio towers associated with program broadcaster, damaging several.
3. Related Activity	➤ Additional restrictions imposed on foreign activities in country.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ License of program broadcaster revoked, additional restrictions on foreign broadcasters and content (domestic and foreign) imposed. ➤ Presence and activities of NGOs monitored more closely; some NGOs banned from the country.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Manage Protective Services (ART 6.5.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Personal Security Vulnerability Assessments (ART 6.5.4) ➤ Provide High-risk Personnel Protection (ART 6.5.4) 	
	Provide Engineer Support to Protection (ART 6.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Plan & Conduct General Engineering Support to Enhance Protection (ART 6.7) ➤ Plan & Conduct Combat Engineering Support to Enhance Protection (ART 6.7.1) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	

Event	Suicide Bomber Assassinates Pro-GIRoA Tribal Leader	
1. Related Activity	➤ Suicide bomber assassinates pro-GIRoA tribal leader.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Attack reduces the GIRoA's credibility and legitimacy because of its inability to provide a secure environment. ➤ Attack influences the ANA and ANP to focus more on offensive operations against the Taliban in the province where the attack occurred.
2. Related Activity	➤ Taliban attempts to exploit its successes for recruitment and its own legitimacy.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Taliban will issue statements that if they control Afghanistan, these bombings would not occur. ➤ People like to be on the winning side and some Afghans may become anti-GIRoA due to the Taliban's perceived strength based on the bomb attacks.
3. Related Activity	➤ Tribal leaders, fearing for their safety, are more reluctant to support GIRoA.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ People are unwilling to support ANA, ANP, and ISAF operations due to fear of Taliban retaliation.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Civil Support Operations (ART 7.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Support in Response to Disaster of Terrorist Attack (7.4.1) ➤ Provide Support to Civil Law Enforcement (ART 7.4.2) ➤ Supporter DOJ Counterterrorism Activities (ART 7.4.2.1) 	
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Security Operations (ART 7.2.2) ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.3) 	
	Provide EOD Protection Support (ART 6.12) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct UXO and Explosive Remnants of War Operations (ART 6.12.1) ➤ Conduct Counter IED Operations (ART 6.12.3) 	
	Provide Area Security (ART 6.5) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2) ➤ Conduct Survivability Operations (ART 6.7) 	

Event	Afghans Abused	
1. Related Activity	➤ Media publishes photos/video of ISAF abusing Afghans.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political/ Information ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Majority of populace enraged by photos/video. ➤ Major political leaders call for an investigation into possible criminal activity by ISAF troops. ➤ President Karzai calls for soldiers to be tried in GIROA courts.
2. Related Activity	➤ Demonstrations occur throughout country.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Demonstrations occur in cities; calls for removal of “occupying forces.” ➤ ANSF called out to monitor demonstrations, ensure that they don’t turn violent.
3. Related Activity	➤ Additional restrictions imposed on ISAF operations.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Information operations conducted to counter negative perception of ISAF. ➤ Activities of ISAF scrutinized; some nations call for reduction or withdrawal of their forces.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	

Event	Western NGO Assisting Insurgents	
1. Related Activity	➤ Western NGO is supplying insurgents with cash and nonlethal aid.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Receives significant international media and GIRoA and US national-level political attention when discovered. ➤ Cash allows for significant expansion of insurgent operations in scale and quality.
2. Related Activity	➤ Evidence of NGO bribing GIRoA officials found.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local officials named in the collusion attempt to hide involvement and allow NGO to leave. ➤ Evidence surfaces that local officials are tipping insurgent forces to ISAF operations.
3. Related Activity	➤ Evidence of NGO helping to stage ISAF perpetrated war crimes surfaces.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgent INFOWAR capability increases with access to persons familiar with Western media. ➤ Other NGOs threaten to suspend operations elsewhere in Afghanistan due to “undue ISAF influence.”
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	

Event	Western Origin Foreign Fighters Captured	
1.Related Activity	➤ Western origin foreign fighters detained by ANP.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local ANP commander puts Westerners on public display. ➤ Western-origin foreign fighters improve local insurgent combat capabilities.
2.Related Activity	➤ There is evidence of advanced training given by foreign fighters to local insurgents.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local officials deny foreknowledge of foreign fighters operating in the area. ➤ Insurgents mount more capable attacks against ISAF.
3.Related Activity	➤ Capture is recorded by civilians and posted on YouTube.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ ANSF/ISAF forced to respond. ➤ Local politicians blame ISAF for allowing foreign fighters to operate.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Conduct IED Defeat Operations (ART 6.7.1.7) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Prepare for IED Defeat Using Tenets of IED Defeat (ART 6.7.1.2) ➤ Prepare for a Suspected IED Attack Against Static Positions (ART 6.7.1.3) ➤ Plan for Possible IED Threats (ART 6.7.1.7.1) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	

Event	Provincial Governor Unexpectedly Replaced	
1. Related Activity	➤ Relations with local clan, tribal, and religious leaders jeopardized.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military/Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Joint programs cancelled or delayed. ➤ Locals stop providing tips to ANSF or ISAF.
2. Related Activity	➤ Replacement governor highly unpopular.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local officials angered at change. ➤ Local ANSF won't patrol until trust is established.
3. Related Activity	➤ Local ANSF are reluctant to share intelligence with political leaders.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Intelligence sharing breaks down. ➤ Impression of insurgent power grows.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	

Event	Pakistan Forces “Hot Pursuits” into Afghan Territory	
1. Related Activity	➤ Pakistani force kills or injures ANSF.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political/Information ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local ANP commander holds press conference. ➤ Confusing RoE makes engagement difficult.
2. Related Activity	➤ Evidence demonstrates that Pakistani forces planned the incursion.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military/Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ GIRoA denounces incursion and masses Afghan troops on AF-PAK border. ➤ US commander called to remediate INFOWAR damage.
3. Related Activity	➤ Evidence of Pakistani intelligence penetration of ISAF FOB/COP.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Failure of counterintelligence to identify likely suspects. ➤ Anti-Pakistani demonstrations occur.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ART 2.30) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations (ART 2.3.2) ➤ Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Integration (ART 2.3.2) ➤ Conduct Surveillance (ART 2.3.4) 	

Event	Clear Evidence of Iranian Support to Insurgents Discovered	
1. Related Activity	➤ Iranian intelligence officers detained by ANP.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local ANP commander puts Iranians on public display. ➤ Custody and Exploitation of detainees is fought between ISAF and GIRoA.
2. Related Activity	➤ Evidence of Iranian bribes to Afghan officials found.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local officials named to be involved. ➤ Evidence that local officials are tipping Iranian and insurgent forces to ISAF operations emerges.
3. Related Activity	➤ Evidence of Iranian intelligence penetration of ISAF FOB/COP.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Social/Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Failure of counterintelligence to identify likely suspects and Iranian sources. ➤ Reduced on-post economic opportunities threaten local livelihoods.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	

Event	Supply Line Cut by IED	
1. Related Activity	➤ ISAF and ANSF face supply shortages.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Shortages limit military operations. ➤ NGO and Afghan government operations stop due to lack of security.
2. Related Activity	➤ Security patrols curtailed due to lack of fuel supplies.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local officials negotiate with insurgents to limit attacks. ➤ Insurgents operate with greater freedom; stockpile weapons, explosives, and cash.
3. Related Activity	➤ Supply line road or bridge requires remediation.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Economic/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Line requires engineering support to rebuild. ➤ Increased spending employs locals.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Provide Engineer Support to Sustainment (ART 4.0) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Plan General Engineering Support to Sustainment (ART 4.1.7) ➤ Conduct General Engineering Support to Sustainment (ART 4.1.7) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	

Event	Outbreak of Cholera	
1. Related Activity	➤ Cholera outbreak stops local civilians and NGO civilians from aiding government.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Outbreak garners significant political attention from GIRoA when discovered. GIRoA demands significant ISAF resources. ➤ Local ANP/ANA unable to patrol in order to care for families.
2. Related Activity	➤ Local military aid station overwhelmed.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political/ Information ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Inability of GIRoA to handle medical requirements and dependence on ISAF creates political backlash among local population. ➤ ISAF forces medical capabilities strained by response to crisis.
3. Related Activity	➤ Significant economic operations curtailed.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Political/ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local factory unable to operate due to lack of well workers. Workers unable to work receive no income. ➤ Local authorities request economic assistance from ISAF to support families unable to work.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Provide Health Service Support (ART 4.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Combat Casualty Care (ART 4.3.1) ➤ Provide Medical Evacuation (Air and Ground) (ART 4.3.2) ➤ Provide Medical Regulating Support (ART 4.3.3) ➤ Provide Medical Logistics (ART 4.3.4) 	
	Conduct Civil Affairs Operations (ART 5.4.6) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Nation Assistance (NA) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Support Civil Administration (SCA) (ART 5.4.6) ➤ Conduct Populace and Resource Control (PRC) (ART 7.3.3.4) ➤ Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) (ART 7.6.2.5) 	

Event	Taliban Broadcasts Evidence of ISAF War Crimes	
1. Related Activity	➤ Taliban receives evidence of ISAF war crime from NGO.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Significant GIRoA political attention to ISAF ground operations when discovered. ➤ Insurgent recruitment increases significantly.
2. Related Activity	➤ Massive protests by Afghans target local NGOs as the “soft target.”	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Anger at Westerners is channeled onto NGO workers who are unable to defend themselves. ➤ ISAF forces are required to defend NGO facilities and train for riot control duties.
3. Related Activity	➤ Operational constraints are imposed on the local ISAF commander by GIRoA.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Evidence of “war crimes” puts ISAF on defensive; NGO accuses ISAF of fabricating evidence against it to discredit accusation of support to insurgency. ➤ NGOs threaten to suspend operations.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	

Event	Civilian Aircraft Shot Down by Insurgents	
1. Related Activity	➤ NGO support aircraft is successfully engaged.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The downing is widely publicized in Western media. ➤ Insurgents demonstrate a tactical breakthrough in effectively targeting aircraft.
2. Related Activity	➤ ISAF aircraft are put at risk of more effective ground fire.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local officials named in the collusion; Officials wish the NGO to leave to reinforce their own position. ➤ Downing reinforces Insurgent INFOWAR messages of insurgent eventual victory and tactical reach.
3. Related Activity	➤ NGO refuses to operate in area.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political/ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Social services vanish; ISAF blamed by local population. ➤ Local government demands ISAF provide services.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1)	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4)	
	Develop Theater Petroleum and Water Infrastructure (ART 4.1.7.2.6)	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2)	

Event	
1. Related Activity	➤ ANP Executes Insurgent POW ➤ Executed POW is member of local tribe.
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Significant local anger at execution. ➤ Insurgents increase operations to capture ANSF/ISAF member for retribution.
2. Related Activity	➤ Local and international media discover execution.
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Significant national level involvement by GIRoA as a high-profile investigation by GIRoA is conducted. ➤ Local ISAF leaders accused of cover-up by media.
3. Related Activity	➤ Evidence emerges of ANP executing other POWs.
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Military <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Existing low level of public trust in ANP evaporates; US mentors are implicated in the executions. ➤ ANP refuses to patrol due to lack of effective prisoner handling by Ministry of Justice.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Coordinate & Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3)
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2)
	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3)
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4)

Event	Prison Break at Large Provincial Prison	
1. Related Activity	➤ Local insurgent commanders and intelligence officers escape from prison.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Breakout is highly embarrassing to GIRoA. ➤ Escapees plus up local insurgent forces.
2. Related Activity	➤ Evidence of insider involvement emerges.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local officials attempt to shift blame onto ISAF. ➤ Significant complicity of Ministry of Justice and ANP personnel suspected.
3. Related Activity	➤ Insurgent activity spikes as insurgents return to fight.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurgents returning to the fight provide massive boost to insurgent perception management operations focusing on GIRoA powerlessness and the inevitability of insurgent victory. ➤ NGOs and GIRoA civilians threaten to suspend operations as insurgent combat activities increase.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Conduct Internment and Resettlement (I/R) Operations (ART 4.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Police Intelligence (ART 2.2.5) ➤ Conduct Detainee Internment (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Conduct Detainee Operations Compliance (ART 4.4.1) ➤ Integrate HN Corrections Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3) 	
	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 	

Event	Pashtuns Occupy Ethnic Minority Lands	
1. Related Activity	➤ Armed tribesmen occupy land belonging to a minority ethnic group and refuse to leave.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The GIRoA is criticized for lack of security and control. ➤ ANSF fails to respond, saying issue is unclear.
2. Related Activity	➤ Rioting by ethnic minorities.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ethnic minority groups steal goods and damage shops. ➤ Ethnic minority groups' distrust of GIRoA increases.
3. Related Activity	➤ Internally displaced persons (IDPs) surface.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	○ Infrastructure	➤ GIROA must provide displaced populace with shelter, food, water, and other basic amenities.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Coordinate & Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3) 	
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.1) ➤ Establish Local Security (ART 6.5.3) 	
	Provide Potable Water in the JOA (ART 4.1.3.11) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Produce Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) ➤ Distribute Potable Water (ART 4.1.3.11) 	
	Conduct Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) Operations (ART 5.4.7)* * = ART pending addition to FM7-15	

Event	Police Unit Extorts Money in Exchange for Protection	
1. Related Activity	➤ An Afghan police unit demands payments from locals in their AOR in exchange for police protection.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Social ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Faith and trust in the GIRoA is reduced. ➤ Victims of extortion see police as little better than the Taliban. ➤ Distrustful locals are unwilling to share info with police or ISAF.
2. Related Activity	➤ Frequency and level of extortion increases over time.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Locals experience economic stress due to police extortion. ➤ Some victims of the extortion look to the Taliban for assistance.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Coordinate & Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Perform Law Enforcement (ART 5.5.1.2.2) ➤ Conduct HN Police Training and Support (ART 7.3.2.3) 	
	Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area Security Operations (ART 6.5.1) ➤ Establish Local Security (ART 6.5.3) 	

Event	Insurgents Kidnap a Local Government Official and a Religious Leader While They Are Waiting to Meet ISAF	
1. Related Activity	➤ Local government and religious leaders show fear and distrust toward ISAF.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political/Social ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cooperation between local leaders and ISAF is severely reduced. ➤ Locals afraid to pass information to ISAF.
2. Related Activity	➤ ISAF attempt to rescue the kidnap victims ends in disaster when both victims are killed during the operation.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local officials angrily blame ISAF for deaths and refuse to cooperate with ISAF. ➤ Local ANSF refuse to work with ISAF.
3. Related Activity	➤ Local leaders demand ISAF provides them with personal protection before they will cooperate.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Political/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ ISAF must provide protective services. ➤ Local leaders see ISAF efforts to protect them as evidence of sincerity.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
Manage Protective Services (ART 6.5.4)		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Personal Security Vulnerability Assessments (ART 6.5.4) ➤ Provide High-risk Personnel Protection (ART 6.5.4) 		
Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2)		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 		

Event	ISAF Apprehends Provincial Governor Trafficking Opium	
1. Related Activity	➤ Relations with government and local clan, tribal leaders jeopardized.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economic ○ Military/Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Seizure of opium and cash negatively impacts residents who benefitted from the opium trafficking. ➤ Locals stop providing tips to ANSF or ISAF.
2. Related Activity	➤ The provincial governor is replaced by an unpopular politician.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Locals do not support new governor, creating more antagonism toward GIRoA. ➤ Local ANSF become uncooperative with ISAF, fearing they may be removed from their jobs as was the governor.
3. Related Activity	➤ Local ANSF are reluctant to share intelligence with political leaders.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/Social/Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Having profited from the previous governor's activities, resentful local ANSF are reluctant to share information. ➤ Distrust of ISAF increases, as locals see ISAF involvement in the governor's removal.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting and Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Intelligence Support to Army Info Ops (ART 2.4.2) 	
	Conduct Criminal Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manage General, Drug, and Economic Crimes Investigations (ART 5.5.1.2.3) ➤ Manage Special Investigative Support Functions (ART 5.5.1.2.3) 	
	Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 	

Event		US Military Chaplain Preaches against Islam	
1. Related Activity	➤ Media publishes video of a uniformed US military chaplain preaching against Islam.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Majority of populace enraged by video. ➤ President Karzai demands chaplain to be tried for blasphemy. 	
2. Related Activity	➤ Demonstrations occur throughout country.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Social ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Muslim cleric issues a fatwa calling for the death of the chaplain. ➤ Demonstrations occur in cities; calls for death of “infidel” chaplain. ➤ ISAF and ANSF must respond to widespread rioting. 	
3. Related Activity	➤ Additional restrictions imposed on ISAF operations.		
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information ○ Political/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Information operations conducted to counter negative perception of ISAF. ➤ Activities of ISAF scrutinized; some nations call for reduction or withdrawal of their forces. 	
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct Support Area Operations (ART 6.5.1)		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) ➤ Conduct Area and Critical Asset Security (ART 6.5.2) 		
	Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (ART 7.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) ➤ Establish Civil Security (ART 7.3.1) ➤ Establish Civil Control (ART 7.3.2) 		
Coordinate & Conduct Law and Order Operations (ART 5.5.1.2.1)			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Integrate Civil Control (ART 7.3.2) ➤ Restore Order (ART 7.3.2.1) 			
Support to Situational Understanding (ART 2.2)			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ➤ Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch (ART 2.2.4) 			

Event	Insurgents Employ Chemical Weapons against Pro-GIRoA/ISAF Populace	
1. Related Activity	➤ Local leaders refuse to cooperate with GIRoA or ISAF.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political/Social ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cooperation between local leaders and ISAF is severely reduced. ➤ Locals afraid to pass information to ISAF.
2. Related Activity	➤ Local leaders blame ISAF for insurgents' use of chemical weapons.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Local officials angrily blame ISAF for deaths and refuse to cooperate with ISAF. ➤ Local ANSF refuse to work with ISAF.
3. Related Activity	➤ Local leaders demand ISAF provide their people with chemical protection or eliminate threat before they will cooperate.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Political/Social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ ISAF must provide CBRN protection measures and/or eliminate insurgents' chemical stockpile. ➤ Local leaders see ISAF efforts to protect them as evidence of sincerity.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Conduct CBRN Operations (ART 6.9) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support CBRN Active Defense (ART 6.9.3) ➤ Provide CBRN Passive Defense (ART 6.9.4) ➤ Conduct CBRN Consequence Management (ART 6.9.5) 	
	Conduct Consequence Management (ART 6.9.5) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Post Incident Response Operations (ART 1.6.1) ➤ Respond to CBRNE Incident (ART 6.9.5.5) 	
	Counter CBRNE Weapons and Threats in the Operational Area (OP7) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct CBRN Operations (ART 6.9) ➤ Provide High-risk Personnel Protection (ART 6.5.4) 	
	Provide Support to Targeting & Info Superiority (ART 2.4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Technical Intelligence on UXO, IED, CBRNE (ART 6.12.6.5) 	

Event	US President Orders an Additional “Surge” to Increase Number of Troops in Afghanistan	
1. Related Activity	➤ Additional forces begin arriving immediately.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Existing ISAF infrastructure is insufficient. ➤ US forces face a shortage of space, supplies, food, water, etc.
2. Related Activity	➤ US forces must build additional facilities for incoming surge.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social ○ Economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Some of the populace resents the increased presence of US forces, while others welcome the Soldiers. ➤ The surge presents an opportunity for additional income to locals who are hired to build infrastructure.
3. Related Activity	➤ The GIRoA, US, and coalition forces emphasize coalition commitment to Afghanistan.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Information operations portray the surge as evidence of US commitment to GIRoA; urge Taliban fighters to surrender.
Possible Related METL Tasks	Manage Theater Opening and Reception, Staging and Onward Movement of Forces (ART 1.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Support Onward Movement of Forces (ART 1.1.2.2) ➤ Manage Establishment of Sustainment Bases and Reception Facilities (ART 4.1.4.3) ➤ Manage Deployment/Redeployment Operations (ART 4.1.6) ➤ Coordinate Host Nation Support (ART 5.4.3) 	
	Execute Theater Opening and Reception, Staging and Onward Movement of Forces (ART 1.1.2.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Onward Movement Support Operations (ART 1.1.2.2) ➤ Provide Supply and Maintenance Support (ART 4.1.1) ➤ Conduct Terminal Operations (ART 4.1.2.2) ➤ Establish Sustainment Bases and Reception Facilities (ART 4.1.4.3) ➤ Provide Life Support Services (ART 4.2.1.1.4) 	
	Provide Base Camp Sustainment (ART 4.1.4.3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Contracting Support (ART 4.1.5) ➤ Provide Human Resources Support (ART 4.2.1) ➤ Conduct Actions to Control Pollution and Hazardous Materials (ART 6.7.4) 	



**TRADOC G2
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Operational Environment Assessment (OEA) Team
Ft. Leavenworth, KS**

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