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2 Ti ll CART! R CE:~TER ( hatr Jrmnn C lrtl'f \'lu.' t 'l~<ur: R'" 'h nn (.lrfl'l I,, nun~ IJJ!'L'dur J >hn ll.rr,lrn.m CoNn.lt r R l -..t)l UTil)N P ROtiRA~1 STA.Fr: /)11'l'Ll11J; '\ B.lllll'' \, runr r\\\uc'ldl<.' /)rrc ctur ln\ll' 1\.L'u \,,l,t<lllt /Jrrl'dciJ fur 1/um<Jn H1~:/u, K;mn R\'.rn l'ru)(l'(jjji ( uurdmcltlll 1--.rrk \\nlulft (Edrtnr) /{<.',ulr,h \w,rmll ~ll\'l 'hu\lllt (l\1.m.r~.:rnc l:,lu.. rl l'rc )(ltijji \,lrjiijii\lliltl\ ~ \"1 lt!jll N.lllL\ Hrl'L''"'l\ l' Th~ t, ntlkt 1\, "''1111< 11 l'r.lj.!f.llll \\'lllrl,llrk, '" rh.mk ~l.lr!,!.lflll... lknh:r~.: md run \X'.rlll'l1'll'l'l1 <>I 'll'l\1 (th... l<>l kh,>lm lntl'fll,lll<ll1.1ll\.lll' R,,L'.rrd\ lrbllllll<'.it ul'l'' 'l.l Unl\Lfl,t\'...,\\,_ l~n). Ak x s,hnu.l.. t l'lt)(.).\1 (.It thl l.entu l r thl... lll.h,,j '"u.rl Contl.u,.It Llr,l.n Ul\1\L'f'l[\, The!':elhl rl.m.j,). Tl... I' R.ll chi <ll AKL F ('tu'h ( Of<llll' llll th, c.iii'l' Ill\\.11 It H.unl'llf!.! Llnl\l'f'Jt \, (,, tl1llll\),md hnll' RL':,:L'hr Ill l'n>)l'li l'ipu.:h-h.lr<> (.u thl ln,rllur~,,f rl Ll.m,l c. nfhli ~(IlLII<'' It <'<~nr.lll ( lrd,.:l (.'oll<.'l.!<', (' 111,1,1.1) fpf thl'lf J.!l'lll'flJll' ol"l'loll1ll' Ill rr<l\ JJlllL! 1111llfln,1[1< tl < tl oltllll'll UlnfllLI' h1t rill' ('llhiil,jt 1<>11. "l'l'lltlth.tnb.ttl' "''',lue '" \lllf lllll'rtl' ""'' \\nrke,l \Ill rill, rn>j<'ll, L''('L'CI.rlh (.)h,e Ah.rhl\ I,... hlullil' "''Ill I' '-'.rrrh Hurt, \.rl.rfll' C.rrtl't, ( \llllllll ( 'h.rl'lll.m, Bl th l),l(,.,n, J<'"ll.l H.l<k, i<lhn (I,,,,Jman, l\lut H.mky, <.;.rr 1 l<ll1l'' :->unn \'.llhu. Annl' Kl'I11J'I'""ll'n, M, ll" I.rill',,m,l (o,l\lll ~11111h \X c ""' \\'Ptdd l1kl' tn.ll: kn<n\k,ij.!e l';un /\mhmutl'\,l'llhll<.ltll>tl' nl.m.lll<'f.11 Tlw ( '.rrtel (\ nlet,l111 h~:r llllll'.md '"l'l.lllll', M, lt"'' (:Pt111\lf ;m,l Kathkcn l! arfl~:ld PI l'hr, ()n, l\lnllol loll ck'ij.!i1111 till, ruhlllillllll1,.kiil\ld... tj,h.ll l " ' (ol'pigl.r O..,t.ltc Uni\'LT'It\\ ( ';Jrt,~raphl lt,,carlh l..d'<>ra!l>r) l"r,k 'ICtl ;md pr,>du~;llllllnlrhc ''.md 'l'n r.d (.. nil'! ( \ nll'l \ 11lunt<'l'f' Wl.d"' II'<Hild l1kl' Ill 1h.m k l '.lltl't L'ei\IL' I [)rp ipm.ll 111 R~:"d<'IK<' Rllhl'rt Dnwn~:y lnr u>n,ulr.n 1111.md l'xi'<'rt.1d1 ll< ''" -.,, r;tl \ ln<.lll<lllllllril''.md lilt h 1, '""l.lncl' 111, d ll 111g.Hhi dr.jit111.c u>pv f"r the cnnllili 'tllnm;lfll'' <111 "ud.m.llhi l ~ ;~n,l.l We would e~pecia ll y li ke to extend our appreciation to the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation fo r their ge nerou~ ~ u pport of t he International egotiation Network. Th1 '' thl lourth l'<ll!l1111 I th, ~em, of \'C"rU t'on/lr..r 1~</'"TI 111,1 'l'tll'' rhar 111<lu,k, ~:.lrtl111h l'lrbihlw,ll,,r I<N2 -'.n ,,m,l I '19 'i 11(1. l "r m"r' llli<>rmo~t 11>11.d' Hif Th, ( ',m, r C, l1tcr, pk I'<' \\'tlrl' u' 11 The C arter Center, O ne C opcn hill, 453 Freedom Parkway, A tl anta, Ga , U.. A.. 11r,.,,., 'Ill \\'ch ' Ill'.11 WW\\.ca rte rcenter.org.

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS In rrojuctlnn The Inrern.lll<ln.d N, gn110111nn Nl'IW<lrk Notes from ilw F1, ld: H hy j1mmy Carter He.tl in!.! Our l\ 1l'll1<1rll's h [)t',mond Tutu The Que'r r11 EI11nu1.1tl.' Nu,ll.n \X.'l.apun' h, Lt'l' Butkr \XhmH:n.m,I Contla<..t h, Etl,,,n B.tH'itr haciln.ning Pl',lll' ThnHI!.!h I kdth h, L),1naid H,)pkan' ArmeJ Cuntlict'> M.1p Ill 10 ll \FRil '\ Algen.l Burundi Congo Cmgu ( DRC) R \\',md.l sl'nl'g.li 'll'ff,l Ll'OI1l' Sud.m Ug.1nd S Atgh.an1st.m Hurm.1/l\.l \ r ind JI1CS1il P1Hilpp111l'S Sn Lank.! T:qiki-,l.m 46 4 so

4 TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED ( ' EN rral & SOUTH AMFRICA Col om hi a Peru ~1 1 DDLE EAST Iran Iraq Israel Turkey llx )I< II'Jl) FORWARD Ca u casu~ Knr~an Peninsula Liberia Nigena Scrhm (Ko~ o vo), omalta Unttcd Kingdom (Northern Ireland) 0, CE Challenges in Bo~nia by Rohen Fnm tck United Natiom Peacekecpmg Operation~ Mar llumnn Rights Reporting: A Key to Con rl tc l Prevention by Karin Ryan Is ConC1 ict Inherent? by William Ury Reading~ in Conflict Resolution Academic Programs International Organi:atiom Nongovernmental Organizarton~ A~sociatiom and Profes ional Org <mi:anon~ Works Cited About The Carter Center II

5 INTRODUCTION A ' 1 h, curr.nn dr.m' tn.1 closl' on the pn:'l'lll nulk n- 111lllll, we le;n c hehmd the 111\lst \ iolenr century kn.n1 n ru hum.tn~inj. suffering wrought h) Wnrl,l Wars I and II anj the CnlJ W.tr are ni:l d arrnl d gr<llll", and incurnng the hattlc-rel;ned deaths nf L<loktng halk, the cosh ;md.11 lea!'.t 1,000 peopk durin~.: the enttrc Lonfllll." Un,k r this dcftnitton, IPRI C\lUnteJ 25 major armed umfltlh or war' m snnpl} '' ').!J.!l'rlll!.!. l.n,1k111g furwarj, we fmd nursl h,,, l.lll'd 24 ltl<.:,ltllllh m 1997 rlus.1 dll:l n 1111nor.mned umfl1l1s (,II wtth nullll'l'<lll' sm.tlll r w.trs, fnughr m<~stl} wtthm ratlll'r th.m between sl.lll's, th,u.ill' n11 less \'tnlent nr inhumane. Th, /lj97 lj.'i 'lwtl' 11} \X'or/J Conj1rl1 H.cporc, n<ll\ 1n lh f,hirth cjtt1<1n,.lltl'll1jlh tn,,,pturl' the nature,m,l '<.:l>pe 111 1hesl' armed C<lllf l1c.:ts.tnd t h, l'ff,lrts lll<lde hy mcmhers nt Th, C. mer Center, 11, lnt, rn.ltt<m.tl Nl'J.!<lllatlon Netwmk (INN),.ukl man) Hher' 111 pre1 ent, manage,,m,l p, tccfulh n:,<lln them. As In rast,,litllll1,, \\L' tnclu,le feature.trtldes, rcj.!ith1.tl.tnd country umfltct summ.lrll's, st attsrto, maps, and a rekrenl e 'cltlo n nil,k signed to pwv1de a general under.s1and1ng of.mned k ast 24 h.ntle rl'l.lll'd Jc.tths pl'l' ye;tr and kwer than I,000 harrle-relarl d deaths dunng the loursl' ul thl conflict). The lntcrdisciplinarv Research Programme un Cause' of Human Right!» Violation' (PIOOM) Tht.' DutLh-haseJ mgan1:atum denotes "ft\'l' len [,,,f cnnfl1c.:t p, acdulness, J'<lltucal tcnsi<m (h, low 25 p<>l llic,ll kdlings), \'l<llenr pnlttt~.;al umtl1ct (ti. \\L'r rh.m 100 l.tt.dtties in nne \Car), 1(1\\" tntcnslly confl1ct (hrrwcen 100 an,! 1,000 fatalities), anj htgh-1ntt:ns1ty L\mf11ct (more th;m 1,000 fatalities)." Unlike S IPRI, PIOOM dne~ nnt restrict It~ analyst~ tu conflict and pomt reader' ttlwarj more comrlete 1nform:Hilln. harrle-relatej Je;Hh~. In 1997, PIOOM Lounted 17 highinrenstry In thb ednu>n, we hal'e attemrtcd to be m11n: comprl'hen lll'e in our covemge anj in uur definttlon tlf armed cnnfltcl. DEFINING ARMED CON FLI CT cunf11c ts, 70 lnw-1n ten s1t~ contltct~. 74 vtnlent po litical conflicts, ami morc' thnn 100 lenshlll situanom. Project Ploughshares: At The C.trtcr Cl'ntl"r, ll'l' frc qth~ntl} n:cc1ve quertes from!.!ll\ B<hl..'d 111 Can.1da, Plnu~hsh.1res uses.1 v,tn.nion nt the Sl PR! ernment pfttcl.tls,,d1<ll,trs, Jllurnaltsts,.mJ the gc ner;~l puhl1c ahout the number uf,trnwd u1ntl1ch 111 th<.: world at,1 J.!IH"n time. Th, rl' IS n<l l' ''} ollbwer to thl, <..jlll''[lll!). C.I'>U.dt\ II!.!Ure' are,llfflc.:ult l<ll<)lll'cl.111 luml1rm 111 the h~.,t ot Llrlllln,r.mn ' D1ft"icult tl rr.nn. ponr l'<'mmunie<hiun, repr<:,sl\'l' J.!<Wl'rt11lll'llts, anj l11l:d1, J1Ulatum ulten ma~c tht:sl' t.thulations,dl hut dd1ntt1un, 1n wh1ch at least I,000 peuple mu't have died Jur I n~ rhe cnu rse nt a umf11ct. An.mned <.:on il1u Is deemed t<l h.t\ c ended 1f rh, re has hl'l'il,, furm,tl lc.tst llre tlr peale.tt.:rel'ment titer\\ h1l.h lhl C<llnh.n de,nhs (11r.n k.~sr fcwl'r 1h,u; 25 pt:r ye:lr) h,l\'e <lllltrred. In thl.lhsen~..e <>fa formal lease hre,.1 C<lllillll 1s dl'l'llll'd to h:tvl' ended.titer two yc.trs nt dmm,mq (1n wh1d1 fewer th,m 2S L'tll11h<lt ~.k.trhs per ye<~r impossthk. In,t,ldirion, h,hlng,malysls exdu~l\'ely tll1 thl' numher of 11\'l's lnst llllsses th~ ltrger p1t:lur, nl.trmnl,untlill, h.ivl' uccurrl'd). Pluughsh.Jrl'S c.:uunted n.trmed conflicts whtch s.tdly IIH.Iudes rl'fu).!l'l' llmvs, displaced (ll'<lple, ruinl d homes, ctn ll'unment.d dl gradanon, h.:alth prnhlems, <llld the lastinj;! sc.trs nf h<lrwr.1nj h,nred. Ulttll1.1lL'Iy. my.mm d cuntl1ct discussl\111 depends un the ddlnttllln u.,ej. Se\ t:ralorganl:atllln s <lrout1ll the world duluillt:nr hetng fought 111 ~2 '>t,lles 1n I 997. ThL National Dcfenst: Council Foundation (NDCF): Thl' U.S.-haseJ urgani:atl<ll1,t,ne-. th.ll It'> '\:rtll'rt.l fnr selcv 11un 1s b<~scd on the le\ el uf dtsrupt iun uf stlcill t.'c{mom IC. pul1ttcal,.md sl'lurtt)- f,thrtl nf c ach c.:ountry C<lltseJ by huth armed C<lnfl1u,,md \\C regular!~ recommend five nf these: internal anj external confltli wh1ch thl' uhmtry is assocl.lll'd 1\ It h. Accordtn!.!l}. stanj.1rd1:ej eritena h) the SweJtsh '5tol kholm International Peace Rc!»earch lmtitute ( Sl PRI) '>U<.:h as 1,000 death' per cnuntr} -c.mnot hc rplted hcl.!llse <ll 1ssues sulh as the Jem<lJ.!t.tphu.:s uf each L'ountr) ;md t:\ l'n of \X/or/d Conflict UeJ>urt, ~IPR II,knrlfil s dtfferl nt k\e[, nf lul.iiiun." Usmg what 11 l.tlls "tnst,lhdll\ tnllll..lltll'," 1nf.1n1 arnwd Llll1fl1Ll. Ir,lefll1l"' lll.l)lll armed cunni<.:!,is "prn mort,tllt} rare, lllultnc dl,tnbuthll1, thc rol, ol th, mdll.ll"\ 1n lnnt.:l',l,omh.n hlt\\'l'l'n rlw miljt.tr) furlc ~ nt l\\'<lnr tn<hl' ~0\'l"rnment NLX 'r Lllll11ll'" 67 ulllilier- Ill Ill

6 T he Working Group on the Causes of War (AKUF): B.tscd in German y, AKUF defi nes war a~ any armed con flier th<h e ngages regular a rmed force~ of the government (mtlnary, polace force~. supportang paramilitary forces) 110 a t le<~st nne "Je; a certain degree of o rgana:au nn and n rgana:ed fighting on hoth side:., even if rhis extends to org<l na:ed defense o nly; and a certain conrinuaty hetween armed c lash es, however sporadic. Under rhi ~ definition, AKUF counted 25 war:- in 1997 nnd 20 smaller armed confli c ts that threatened to escalate into war. Rather than selec.t one of the'e dcfinitiom or define armed conflact ou r sclvc~, we acknowledge that several dafferent dcfanitinns exist and provide an overview of armed c.onflact in the pages that follow. In selecting which confl acrs rn highlight, we analy:ed the work of these organa:ations and anc.luded a c.ross sectllln rhar rcfleus the state of worlj conflict today. Thw.., we c lassify countries where a rmed confli c ts a rc id entified, in varying degrees of intemny, by at least four of the five organa:ataons as "hagh-lcvcl" conflicts. Countri es wath umflacts identi fied hy at lca:..t Ol1l' hut no more than three of the (ave organa :at io n:.. ;u e cla:..sifaed as "lower-level" confli c ts. Under thas -.y-.tcm, we la st 2 3 locations where "high-level" conflicts were fought an 1997, each of which as featured an the two-page conflact ;macles that follow. We abo last 30 "lowerlevel" conflacts, which arc notcd o n the world and rcgion.ll m.1p~,and some of whach arc highlighted in the section utlcd "Lookang Forward." For a more m-depth ana l ~~~~ of arm~d conll act, reader~ ~ h nuld consult the work of the five orgnni:;ariom me nrioned hl rc and the boob and art iclcs lbtcd a~ "Addiuonal ourccs'' at the cnu of each conflac t :..ummary in this report. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS In the hox l ahel~d "The Conflict" that appears with eac.h rwo-pagc conflact article, the term "incompall hal at y" mean~ that thl!se confl a Lt~.arc comests for controll)f cather gov~rn ment (type of poliucal system, a change of central government, or <1 Lhange an ats composataon,) or territor). (controlot terratll r~. ~cce~,aon, or autonomy). ' IPRI provides thas antorm.hhh1. A t tame~. thl number~ for "Toral Deaths" vary greatly or cm ~r a wide r<ange. Thas disparity retl~ct'> the di(ficultal!~ inherent an classafyang conflict:.. and the differing definition' u'cd. Attempt' h.wc hecn m;h.le, where pos~iblc, w prm adc h;htle- related figure~. a~ provided hy S l PRI,,md overall casualty fig u rc~, as provided by PIOOM and the other organizatiom. Nearl~ all of the conflicts identaficd <lr~ a rmeu caval or anrrasrate conflacb, a~ opposed to those herwcen states. We have t ried to supply the mo~t current anformation pos~ib l c; "na" is uscj in those instances where figure~ are unavailable. Information is provided for the government of the country list ed, unless otherwise spec.aficd. Most of the conflict dma comes from llowevcr, we have included the figh ting in G uinen -Bisst~u, which hegan in 199H, as a "lower-level" con flier. ln some locatiom, multiple cnnflacts were fought. For instance, SIPRl idcntafics four separate antermedaatc armed conflacts and four minnr armed confl acts an India in The regiom we have identified arc somewhat arbitrary: Egypt is included an rhe Maddie East rather than Africa, whale Central and, m ath America mcludcs tnformauon on countries traditionally labeled "Latin Ameraca" or the "Cmihbean." There arc no regional sections for North A meric;a or Europe becau:..e no "high level conflicts" were wagcj an the11e region:.. in We do norc on the world map that Mex a co wn~ the site of a "lowerlevel" conflict ami that hcven "lower-level'' conflic t ~ w~re fought in Europe, ~ome of whac.h arc featured 111 the "Looking Forw:1rd" ~cct aon. The State of \Yiorld Confltct Report stm e~ to be neutral and unh i a~ed. ln choo!'>ing how to li~t each con flact, we U!>C rhe name rccngni:ed hy the United Nataom. llowcver, while Myanmar 1 ~ rhe official name for the st,ate of Burma, we lil>t both names in recognition of the dispute between the majonty of people {who prefer Burma) and the ru ling military council (which u:..e~ Myanmar). We abo li ht Cnngn (DCR) to designate the Democratic Rcpuhlac of the Congn {formerly Zaire) to d ifferent imc it from the Republic of Congo, which we list as Congo. Finally, many of the artades ami ~ummarie~ that.appear in thi~ report arc wrarrcn h~ t xpert~ an the facld, anj the vaews exp rcs~cd herein do nor ncces:-.araly reflect po~itaon:.. held by Thl Carter Center, ats ~raff, or INN mcmhers. We hore you find the / Statl.' of World Conflact Report Llcce~saHe and useful, and we welcome your comment.., about it. Kirk Wolcott and Steve Shcwfelt Editors I V

7 ~ :...'(~~~-" THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION NETWORK Former LJ.S. Prl' tdt:th Jimmy Carter foun~k d the lnn:rn;tttonal NL goriation Network (INN) m 1987,ts,, flcxt hie, mformal net work of l'm im:nt pl't~(ln~. Nnhd Pc,lCl' l a urc. tr c~. and cnntltcr rt:sl)lutinn ~chol.trs.tnd practt unncr' Jedtcatcd to prc\'cthmg anj rc,,>lving.mn d conflicts through peaceful m~.:am. Rased tn rhc Confltct Rt:solution Program (CRP) at The Caner Center, the 26-mcmber INN has provided third-panv.tssistance, expert an.tly,t~, anj advice to parties in conf1tct around the globe o\'er the p.tst decade. Through conference!>, speeches, and publications, the INN help:. educate the public about the nature and impact of conflict and what steps governments, interna tiona! and nongovernmental orga nt:atiom, educ.ttional institutions, the media, and mdividuals can and should take to promote peace. Toward thts end, the Conflict Rc:-oluttun Program produ~.:es regu l.u update~ nn,tpproxtmarely ZO armed or potential confltch, Jis ~emmatej weekly to all INN memhcr:; anj to the publtc rhrough the Internet. Since 1992, the Confltct Rcs,llurion Prngram a lso has highlightl d thl' work of the INN and or hers through the.stme of \'V'orld Conflict Report. We arc plea ed ro pre enr m this, the fourth ~sue of the State of IX'orld Conflict HI.'[Wrt, a firsthand hlok at Prl sident Curer\ recent pean keeping efforts as well as a \'aricry of articles on p~.. acc and conflict resolution topics by IN.' mcm hers Etlcen R.thhitr, H:trold Saunders, Desmond Tutu, \Vtlli.tm Ury, and Willi.un Zarrm.m. This issue.tlso features timdy article by expert such,ls Gen. Lee Butler nn the cnn sequences of nuclear prolifcratwn, Amb. Robert Frowick on peace budding in Bosnia, Dr. [), n.lld llopkim on health and conflict, and Karin Rynn on human rights. The INN convened con ulration nnd mrernatinnal confer cnce~ , 1993, 1994, and 1996 to address cnnfltcts 111 Afghantst;\11, the Balkans, Burma/Myanmar, Camhodta, the Caucasus, Cyprus, Ethiopi.t, the Gre;lt Lakes region of Africa, ll.titi, Liheri t, the Korean Peninsula,,md Sudan. In April 1997, the INN held a working meeting at the Rockefeller Brother!> Estate in Pocantico Hills, NY., to clanf~ the purpose, structure, and comparative advantage of the network as it :.et:. its goals for the commg years. To remain most effective, JNN members idcnttficd a set of gutding princi pies cmhodted m President Carter\ approach ro peacemaking (sec inside h.tck cover). INN memhers remain acrive in a \'artery of peacem,tking efforts. In july 1997, for insrnncl, INN mcmhcr~ Rnoerr Pastor and Marie Angclique Savan~ joined in a 40- membcr mremattonal nhscrver Jclcgatton co-led hy Prestdent Carter, former U.S. Sen. Pmd Sunnn, and former Rcntn President Nicephore Sogll> to mnnttor the Spect.tl Elecllom m Liberia, iollo\\ ing ~even year~ of dvtl \\.tr there. Prc,tdent Carter, S;wane, Ltsbet Palme,.mJ D~.:~monJ Tutu h..tj made earlier mtt:rvention~ in the conflict on the INN\ hdulf. In adjuion to work on the conflicts in Burundi, Culombia,,md Rwanda, which arc highlighted l.n~.:r in this publication, INN member:- have made other significant cnntributions, includmg w11rk in the area:- listed on the f<11lowing page.

8 ,. ',."' F :)., c. ' -.. ' _-,. ~ J~:-. t... Former U.S. PresUlent]immy Carter (front ruw CL'Titer), abo11t half of the INN members, aru:l Carter CenLL>r swff aru:l mrerns convenl! al the Rockefeller Brothers E.~uue in Pocantico HrlL~. N.Y., rn April ALBANIA: Vamtk Volkan joined Joyce Neu, senior associate direcror of the Conflict Resolution Program; To m Forbord of The Carter Cenrer's G lobal Development Initiative (GDl); and Norman Itzkowitz of Princeton University on a February 1998 mis ion to provide input to GDl's national development strategy process in A lbania. Ti le CARIIW.EA"J: Shridath Ramphal serve as chief negotiator for the Carihbean Community and Common Market (CARlCOM), where he has been respon ible for the external negotiatiom of Caribbean natio ns concerning their entrance into the Free Trade Area of the Americas. CFNTRAI A '>IA: Barnett Rubin leads a project o n the Ferghana Va lley region (which cuts across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) to as e s the potential for future conflict and recommend ways the regio n can achieve economic and political stability. 0 II 'A: Pastor has led election-monitoring missions at the village level and negotiated a long-term agreement that enables The Carter Center to help China develop a nationwide data base for improving the elecroral process. E~TO:-JI-\: ince 1994, aunders and Volkan, in coll,1horanon with the Conflict Resolution Program, have led a series of worbhops to provide a channel for dialogue among ethnic groups in Estonta, where temions over integrating the Russmn minority grew after the Soviet Union broke up. GREECE-TURJ-..:EY: Bahbitt has traveled to G reece and Turkey as part of the outheastern Europe Consorttum, whrch propn~es a se rie~ of informal dialogues to build trust among both societi.es aml help move discussion forward. G UYANA: Ramphal led a peacemaking mission in the wake of c ivil unrest fo llowing pari iamen tary e lections o n Dec. 15, 1997, and helped broker the Herdmanston Accord, which was stgnej by the two rival G u yane~e polrucal faction and led to legitimization of election results. ]A~1AICA.: Pastor organrzej four pre-election mi~~ions anj a 60-person international delegation, co-led by President Carter and U.S. Gen. Colin Powell, to o b~c r vc the December l997 Jamaican elections, which were the most peaceful in the last 30 years. SPAIN: C hris Mitchell continues hi~ long-term involvement in the Basque country, where he has visited three times since summer 1997, when demonstratiom of an estimated 6 million people were held over the kidnapping and killing of a young politician. T URKEY: U ry facilitated a ~ene!> of meetings between Kurdish anj Turkish optnion l eade r~ that led ro establishing the Turkish-Kurdish Foundation, which promotes dialogue and democratic reform. 2

9 ...!.~.,T,. -~-- - MEMBERS OF THE INN Jimmy Carter-F,,rllll'l I'r<'''Jent of 1 he L n11cd "tile'; Found, r.md Ch.ur, The C.trtl'l' ( \ ntl'r O~car Aria~ Sanche: Nohl l Peace l'n 1.: l.tur,.tt<, Furmu l'rl''''knr nf C \,,to~ Rtc.t; rotmder, A no~' F<HmJ.tri<ll1 fur [',,ttl'.md llum.m l'rogn.'" Eileen Babbitt Dt rl'llnr, In tnnariun,,l N, cutt.lttnn and ( 'onflt<l Rc,olurllm l'r, ~.:r.un, Th, Fl..:t~.:hcr ~<I"'"'.,f L.n'.m,l DrJ'I<IIll.ll,., Tufts UrliH'r'tl\ Tah~cen Ba,hir hmn< r EJ.:\ J'tl<ln Amha" 'd,,r, Former 1\ rm;lnl nr RcJ'r<''<'ntartn to tlw J.,,tj.!tll',,f Arah St.lll'' Ke' in Clement~ Dtr, u,,r, Institute f11r Contltu Analy,ls.m,l Res<llurtnn, Gcnr~.:c M;~,on Unl\'l' f'll~ ; ln~.:oming Sl creuu-y (~cm:ml. lntl'rn:ttt<ll1<11 Alert Javier Perc: de Cuellat hmn..:r U.N. Sl'\.fl't.tr\ llcth:ral Han:-. Dietrich Gen,cher Fnrmer Vtce Ch;~l1,d1Pr.md t--lmt,ll'r nf Poretgl1 Aft.1ir,, Fl,k ral R, ruhlt< nf ll, rman~ Tommy Ko h Exeuttl\l' Dtrl'lt<'r, :\.. t.t E:urPpl F, ttnd.ltll>l1: F,,rmer '-111_,1pn1c Amh.'" "''Jr to the U1111l,l " tcs Chri,topher Mite hell l'rnk'" 1r, Jn,lltlltl' for ( 'ontlll'l A11.d\''l' ;tnd R, -,plut ton, llc,,rg< t-.!.1"'11 Untn:r,lly Olu,egun Oba~anjo F, rnll'r PrcsJ,k nl,,( NtJ.:<fl.l, f pund, r md Ch.nr, Afric.1 Lea,kr,hlp rprum Lbbct Palme Dlrl'll"' s,,e,j.,h Cummtttl'l' f11r UNIC Ll Robert Pa,tor F.mnl'r Dlrl'Ctor, Larin -\nll fll.ll1,m,l Canhh<.m Pr11gram, T h~.: (.trtl'r C:cnrer: l~<)ndnch C. Whttl' Pnlk'"'r nf!'nlltll.ll Su<?n<.:e, Enll>l'\' l 1 nl\ l r,lf) hrid;tth Ramphal F11rmu "L'Lf<!t.HY l~u1u.d nf thl Cllmlllnl1\\l,lhh. Cn l 'h,nr, Cnmm1"11 n, n Ci 1, h. II C~u\'en1<~11ll', Chtd NL gut t<llnr, ( 'anhhl'an (. \unmunll \.md ( \unmnn ~ l.trkl t Barnett Rubin-Dtrel't<lr, Center h1r Pren:nu, e Auton, ( ounctlon Fmetgn Rd,ttums Kumar Rupcsinghe D1rcltt>r, S tate,,f tlw Wurld hlrttm/lur<lpe; Former 'i~ cretarv.<.j, ner d, lntcrn.tti<h1,tl Ak rr Harold aundcr:-. Fllrmer U " As o~st;mt SeLfl't,lry 11f Srarc; DtrLllllr o f lntl'rn.lt 11m.d Aft.urs, The Kettl'rtnl.! FounJatll HI Marie-An~:cliquc " n ant! ~ormu D1rect<1r, AlnL.I [)1\,,,,,n, L l'11pul.u I 't 11hl Dc~mond Tutu Nohd l'l?<lll' Pr1:l Laureate; Ch.ur, Truth and Rl umcdt,ltlnn ( <>tnlll 1,.,11'11; R"hcrt W/. Woodruff Vts lt 1111.! r nlkssilf of Thcolol.!r l mn r ~ U ni\'er~ IL Y Brian Urquhart Funncr U.N. Undl r Seuerary-Gen< ral f11r Peacekeeptng William U ry Dtre<'l<lr, ProJect on I'rl ventll11.! \Xf.tr, J'r,,cram 1111 '\ej.!ollll l<'ll, I l.tn,trd L1w SdiiHll Cyru~ Vance h rmer U.S. '-,cul't.trv of '-t.lte; (,, l 'h,nr, C,trnl'J.:Il' C'ommis '"'11 <111 l'rl'\l'ihtng P<.ll.li) (\ll\tllct \ amtk Volkan l'mk'",r, f r,, d11.hrv; l1trl'lt<'f, l (lltl'l' t.1r the Sru,h of Mmll.md Human lntl'fill , Unl\ l'l'sll\' of Vircin a Peter \Vallcnstecn Da~.: llanum r,kold Pr,,fessor,,f 1\.tu',,n,ll\,nfllll Rl''l'i1rd1, L'pps.d.. t Unl\ l'rstty Elic Wie~cl Nohel Pc<ll.:e Pn:l' Llllreate; Pnlfl s-.jr, P,,"rnn L'nl\'l rstt\ Andrew YounJ.: h1r111er L.::;. Amha-..,,,f.,r l<l the UntrcJ N.Hh)n'; C"-Cha1r, (" nd\\'prb lntern<trlnl1al. I. William Zartman J.twh RI.HI,tl in rr,ltes,llr of lntl'rn<lli<h1.ll Orj.!ill11 ;:,ltllm' & Contl cr Rl''lllutllll1, Dtrl'Lt<H of Afn,,m Stu,lll''.tn,l (.,,nflict ~lo~n.lf..!t'llll'nt Pn gr.un,, Th< l'.nd H 'Jtt :t ~lh'"'l,,f,>\,h ll1ll'd ltl!t'l'l1<llllll1,d St u,lil''.)<1hns llllpkms llnl\'l'rsl!y OBASANJO' S RELEASE On Jun~: 15, I 998, INN mcmher Gcn l lu cgun Oba njn wa rde tsc I tfter morl! than thrc:c yeoln; tn a N tgcn.m prtson. He and ~aght other pt)lttac,tl d~tamee. were :;t t free on the m~k:rs of Ntgcn.l's 11C\\ milttar) rulc:r, Gen. Abdul.tl,ttnl Abubakar, who came to power june, upon the death uf Oh.ts,mjo\ Jatlc, military Jicrator Gen. Sam Abach.1. Oha~nnjn, the only Ntgen.m mdtt.lr) lender tll h.m.! over pnwcr ro a d~moc ratically elected government, was convictt:!d in 1995 tn n sl.'crct trtnl and scnrenccd ro I S years in prbon f1)r his role in plannmg.111 alleged coup. In Dccemhcr 1997, ( hasanjo's former wp Jepury, Gen. M< a Shehu Y.tr'Adua. diej tn prtson titer bcmg acluscd, but nc\ er trtc:d, for the 'ame alleged crune a~ Oba OJ "l. Another prornmcnt N 1geraan pn. oner, Chacf Mo:.hood Ab1ol,1, thl presumed WUU1l'f of the mnullcd 1993 clcllton, dtcd Juh 7, 199, w1thm da) of ht expeltcd release. The INN grateful!) \H.:lcome OhasanJo's return to freedom.

10 ;t/otm fr-o/ff t!u hell: tJ 8 1 J;/f(/1( 1 erv-ty- The post two years hove been eventful ones for me, Rosolynn, and staff members at The Corter Center. Our efforts to prevent and resolve armed conflicts, fight hunger and disease, and promote democracy and human rights continue to toke us around the globe. After each of these trips, I usually draft a report, detailing who we met with and what was accomplished. I shore these trip reports with Carter Center supporters, the White House, the State Deportment, the United Notions, and others, and the general public con read some of them by accessing The Corter Center's home page ( Following are excerpts from some of these trip reports, which provide examples of Corter Center work and our personal approach to waging peace. ih~ , t~ile, 11""/e~ti~a., B,uil, ~.~t! ih~ra.iea. We mode this trip representing The Corter Center, and more particularly, our Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, which includes 31 leaders in the Western Hemisphere, all presidents or prime ministers. A number of specific issues were discussed, including a Free Trade Area for the Americas, drug trafficking, and weapons sales. In Chile, we met with former President Patricio Aylwin Az6cor and President Eduardo Frei, who ore both proud of the successful resolution of 22 of 24 border disputes with Argentino. We then met with leading human rights advocates in Brazil and discussed serious problems that still exist despite substantial progress. In Jamaica, former Prime Minister Edward Seago told us that if the political system does not work or is misused by the government, then his party may boycott the next election, now expected by the end of this year. He and most other leaders wont The Corter Center to serve as election monitors, but we informed Prime Minister P.J. Patterson that we would not do so without his approval. ~~,,i/18-21, tt,~.~t~o., Ke~p., cr«t~o.~, ~.~tl Et~to/Jia. I made a brief visit to East Africa and had a chance to consult with President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, President Daniel Arop Moi of Kenya, and Prime Minister Meles Zenowi of Ethiopia. I also visited Khartoum, where I hod extensive meetings with Sudanese President Omor ai-bashir, distinguished members of his cabinet, and some rebel leaders who hod just signed a Peace Agreement with the government. I was not able to meet personally with Dr. John Gorong, leader of the main opposition Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/ A), because of military activity near his loca- Fonner U.S. President jimmy Carter, former F1rst Lady Rusalynn Carter, and Carter Center D1plumanc Admor Vmce Farlt.ry (far left) meet m Khartotlm m Apnl /997 with Sudanese PnJ1idem Omar al-bash1r. The Carter Ccnl.l.'l' team, which mchulcd ConfliCt Resoluucm Program Dm!CWr /-lam Barnes, also met w1ch Sudanese oppomwn lecul(.'l's on clus mp. tion at Yei. However, his foreign minister, Deng Alor, assured me that the SPLM/ A was willing to join in these negotiations, based on the texts of the Peace Agreement and the earlier negotiated Declaration of Principles. The alternative to peace talks will be a continuation and likely escalation of military activities in south Sudan. [Note: To learn more about The Corter Center's efforts in Sudan, see "Facilitating Peace Through Health" on page 14.] 4

11 fh.(, 25-J~ 1997: LiJ,,.ia Q(d 1/tp,-.ia The purpose of this trip was to complete the long search for peace and democracy in Liberia, an effort in which The Carter Center has been deeply mvolved for the last six years. Almost total disarmament was completed in February 1997, and elections were scheduled for May 30, then extended to July 19 The groundwork has been la1d far an adequate but far from perfect elect1on, probably the only alternative to continuing violence. With Nigerian leader Gen. Sani Abacha serving as chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and his troops dominant in the regional peacekeeping force ECOMOG, N1gerio is the most powerful presence in liberia. We went to the Nigerian capitol of Abu1o to meet w1th him and other top officials He stated that Nigeria will continue its leadership and the neutrality of their troops. As expected, I urged the release of former president and INN member Gen. Olusegun Obosonjo, his associate, Gen. Shehu Yar'Aduo; and the president-elect, Ch1ef M K.O Abiola Later I met w1th human rights activists, who expressed the1r concern about the absence of o comprehensible rule of law and w1th the total domination of their society by Gen. Abocho and the military ruling council. They were doubtful about the Counctl's promises to restore democratic civilian rule in October [Note: In December 1997, Yor' Aduo died in prison, followed by the death of Abocho in June 1998 and of Abiolo in July, all reportedly of natural causes. Obosonjo was released one week after Abocho's death by Nigeno's new military ruler, who then promised to restore democratic rule by May 1999.] th.(, 16-21, 1997: LiJ,,..ia About two weeks after my prev1ous visit, I returned to Liberia, accompanied by Rosolynn, to co-lead on mternotionol delegation to observe the notion's first democratic election, marking the end of o long chapter of civil war. Of the original population of 2 4 million, about 200,000 people hove died, some 600,000 ore refugees, and 800,000 displaced persons now live in camps near the capital of Monrovia Despite this, we found that 751,000 FtmJl<'T U -~ ~.'11. Paul \rmnn (far l< /1) h<l{lal<u-chwr a 40-memlx r Career C <'nh:r d.?lpeople hod registered to vote. On ~g<~uon ~wh ]mnnv '" I H'"''hnn Cart<'T tonu>~utor ]uh /lni elceu"m 111 I tlx't~<i. /!\':'\' Election Day, we were out early and mo:m/,.,~ Uoh.::rt f>a,rtjr <mj.\fun< Angdl,/11'' Sawm al~o 'eft'(cl,,, dd.g<~r.:' m th<' rnp. witnessed by for the longest lines and most patient people we have ever seen Many hod slept at the polling sites and lined up as early as 2 o.m The following day at U.N. headquarters, we learned that their quick count was giving Charles Taylor about 75 percent of the presidential vote In the afternoon, I hod o private meeting with Taylor and received his commitment, among other promises, to bring key opposition leaders into his government, to establish a strong and independent human rights group, and to restrict the size of Liberia's armed forces and police. I told Taylor that The Carter Center is very determined to con t1nue OUi long standing involvement with L1beria and welcomed cooperation with its official agencies. 5

12 [Note: The Corter Center has worked to faci litate peaceful resolution of Liberia's civil conflict since Since the 1997 election, the Center has assisted Liberia's Ministry of Education with development of a 1 0-yeor notional strategy to integrate human rights education into the school system. As more schools reopen after the war, they will ploy a critical role in laying a foundation for permanent peace and eventual prosperity.] After leaving Liberia, we traveled to Beijing, where we met former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn and Mike Oksenberg, who was my notional security advisor on Chino. Among the main purposes of the trip were learning as much as possible about current affairs in Chino from political leaders, scholars, and villagers; discussing Tibet, religious freedom, and other human rights issues; ascertaining Chinese attitudes toward Korea; and exploring possibilities for on expanded relationship for The Corter Center in Chinese village elections and other affairs. [Note: In March 1997 and again in March 1998, a Corter Center delegation observed village elections in a select number of provinces in China. Then in June 1998, another delegation began helping the government to establish a data collection system for village elections and for standardizing procedures nationwide. The Center continues to work with Chinese officials on setting up the computerized system and plans to launch a voter education project.] Many groups in Jamaica implored The Carter Center to monitor the parliamentary elections because of fear of increasing violence and intimidation. The notional election commission invited us, all three parties welcomed our presence, and we were the only international monitors. On election day, our teams visited 1, 111 of the 6,332 voting places. Those of us in the Kingston urban areas witnessed many problems during the day, but observer teams in the suburban and rural areas reported almost unanimously that there were few problems and the elections were fair, free, and safe. Although there were some failures to deliver accurate registration lists and other voting materials on time, all the sites eventually functioned well enough to permit voters to cost their ba llots. There were four deaths, although the police later said that at least three were not related to the elections. Despite this deplorable violence, police officials and the news media recognized this as the most harmonious and peaceful election in recent history. A }ammcan chrlj aj>frroachc~ a so!j!l't on rlw srrcers of Kingswn durrng rl1e Dccl'mb!'r 1997 J>arlramcnr.an dccurm~ monrwred b)' Tho.' Cartel Ceml.'r. 6

13 We arrived in Bamako, Mali, and, after a briefing by U.S. Ambassador David Rowson, we met with Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubocor Keito. He welcomed my meeting with opposition leaders, who are boycotting both municipal elections and government involvement. I met later with the six faction leaders (COPPO) who were participating in the boycott. We finally got everyone to agree that two representatives of COPPO, the parliamentary majority parties, participating oppos1tion, and President Alpha Oumar Konare and one of his ministers would meet with me later that night. The president agreed that I would preside. The meeting was tense and negative at first, but finally a consensus seemed to emerge around a package of suggestions I put forward. This IS the best and only chance for reconciliation before final plans hove to be made for communal elections. (Note: Unfortunately, the parties in Mali have yet to begin a productive dialogue However, Mali and The Corter Center hove agreed in principle that The Carter Center will help the Malian government to formulate the Mali National Development Coordmation Project to ensure consistent social and economic plans and policies and to strengthen the nation's ability to implement economic reforms. The strategy will help Mali toke the lead in determining how international assistance will be used in 1ts transition to democracy.] We deported Bamako Saturday morning, refueled in Gabon, and arrived in Pretoria, South Africa. We were surprised when our grandson, Joson, who is in the Peace Corps in South Africa, joined us. We mode on early morning visit to Nelson Mondela's home in Johannesburg, where our entire group enjoyed a discussion about projects of The Carter Center in Africa, some regional developments, and the Peace Corps. When we arrived in Liberia, we found a lot of commercial activity on the streets but slow progress in rebuilding Monrovia, which was almost totally destroyed in the war. The Corter Center sponsored a recent conference that advocated for-reaching reforms to strengthen liberia's Human Rights Commission, and I delivered a copy of the commission 's recommendations to President Taylor. We flew from Monrovia to Abidjan, Cote d 'lvoire, and then on to Conakry, Guinea We were overwhelmed by the enormous reception there, with honor guards, ministers assembled, and thousands of people lining the streets The Corter Center's agricultural program in Guinea has the full support of the government After on Easter sunrise service at the residence of Ambassador Tibor Nagy, we deported for home C:lwrb Taylor flo.ltd an ovrrwhdmin)! t 'l<"tnn in tlw frre.,idl'nllal polk hw tl1r mad <lllcaj rrmttinl.'d 11nd<.'ar ji n l.1h.:n (l lJH Thc.\lgll m rim /'horn ~hot< ' '> Ttrvlor 1.\ a f>rt:\ld, nrllll candula tl' 7

14 HEALING OuR MEMORIES BY DESMOND TUTU An INN member and former Anglican Archbishop of Cat)c Town, Scnah Africa, Desmond Tutu received the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize for his leadership in the anti-apartheid.muggle. In /995, South African President Nelson Mandela afj/)()inted Tuw chair of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Commission acldrc~ses the actions of those involved in the afjartheicl regime. Below, Tutu shares some of his thoughts and persona/lessons learned on the healing f>rocess for a nation. The he~t way to de~troy a people is to de~troy their hi~tory. In a, cry real sen::.e, we are o ur memorie~wc arc creatu n:~ o f our own history. We all know the frustration of forgetting something, ~uc h as the place where we parked o ur car, lemling u~ to ~ea rch fruitlessly with rising impatience. While that is a fairly innocuou~ lapse of memory, we rea l i~e. when we look at it more carefull y, jum how central memory is to our entire exbtcnce. In Africa we say, "A person 1~ a per~on through other persons." We cannot repeat what we have forgotten, rhus we would he unable to he truly human if we d1d not have the faculty of memory. This also is true of a nation. We must share certain key events and experiences th<lt we can have in common: a shared memory, a shared history. That is why n naturali:ed citizen has to learn the h1s1ory of hb adopted country. That b why the best way to destroy a people i~ w de~trny their history. President Nebon Mandda created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995 to enable the healing to begin. The Commission investigates apartheid-era actiom of both the white minority reg1me's security forces and the black-led force~ that fough t them. Thn~e who come before the Commission and ful ly confess thetr crimes may apply for amnesty from prosecution. Imperative to granting amnesty ts the full disclmure of politically mnrivared acts where human rights v1olminns occurred. The arnne~ty prncess has helped to provide infonm111nn no other process would have produced. The victims/survivors who have appeared during the Truth and Reconciliation hearings have testtficd to the cmhartic effect of telling their :-.tory in a puhlic forum of mostly sympathetic lbrcner!'!. Thb h as helped do wh<h our founding act exhorts LIS to do: to help rehahililate the hl1man and civil dignity of those whose rights have been viol;~rcd. HEALING MEMORIES, BUILDING FUTURES During the negotiations that brought o ur fi r~t democratic, nonracial elections in South Africa, all parries acknowledged that we had a dark past. In the more than 30-year ~trugg l e O\'er the legall y imposej racial separation of <'~pa rth eij, unspeakable horrors were inflicted tll1 members of hoth the black liberation movement and those aligned with sl<lte pnlicie~. Someh ow, that dark pa~t h ad to he adjres~ed. Many thought a thick veil ::.hou ld he Jn1wn over th<tt pa~t. that we ~ho uld let hygnncs he bygones and wipe the ::,lute clean by granting blanket amncmy, H~ has happened in soml Latin American coumri e::.. But this would ntll Jo. Drawing such a veil would victimize the victims a second time hy denying that their rights were grossly violated. 8 The OslohoclJcnjc ncwst>apcl office, dcsrro)'ed durin~ the hltrin~ in l3omia, stand.~ in Samjct'O l is a ~wrl< reminda of Lile crms of war and t/tc: obswcles /r1r reccmdlimiun.

15 W..: C\luld h,l\'t.: go1w tlw ruutt' ut tho.: crm11n.d son-.. Tht Nuremht rg tn.d., happened afu:r one.,,j..: of tht tonfl ~.:~ wo11,, mdjt.lr). \ KIPry. In""' ~ii'l', thl, d1d nnt h.1pp..:n; mdjt.ml~. \\Thad.1,1,11..: nlilll' II "ckh,ll.lhk wht tht.:r tlllr 11\lr<ll~ lt.: pf 1h..: Aprd 1994 dt'llhll.:f,lll~ cll'~t 11'11' wnuld h,l\ t' h.lp pt n..:d h.1clthc 'l'tllflt\ lnrt'l'' kn<l\\11 tht y might ht hcij.ltullml.lhll',,,r thl'lr nd.1riuu' Jl'l.'tk Th.ll m1r<1dl' depenckd <111 rill' nt'gn!l.llt.:d 'l't de menr. mj.1 t.rlt H:.d elemt nt of rh.ll \\',t, tht /1'\N m.:ml>o:r An:hhrsho[> Desmond Trrw u ct' aflf>umtl'd chatr uf ~ouch Afnca s Tnteh and l~.:nmctlwcrrm Cummts,um In Sowh AfriCan Pr.:srdcn1 r\:.:hun ~1culili:k1 m /995 If rt.:tnhuii\l' Jll'lltt' wa' rht l.ht \\'11rd 111 dt al1ng wnh nur ra't, then we wmdd h'" e h.1d 11. Thar 1' '' h.1t I,;ud w tlw Rwande.,e, wlwt.,r.lhli,lwd 1h1.. lnlc.:rn;ltlllna l Cnmm.d Tnhunal fm Rw.mda ro.1ddre'' the 1994 gt nocltk pl'rpt rratt d hr..:d1n1t. llutu.lg<tllbl elili11c Tut'l.md mntkr.ttt.: llutu ")t,," I,,uJ, "11npunll\' mu'l nnt ht t11krat ht.:gm to heal as tht.:y learn thl' truth. The t.hdd of 'omennc who wa' murdered gruesomely a nj saw her mnther harassed and taunted hy the;: police S<lld at our fl ro,t heanng in East Lnndnn: "Wl' want tn torgl\e, hut we want 111 knnw whom w for- 1.!" e." You t'ould h,n l' hl'ard.1 pin clrop. We hm e l.'d, hut II \ llr dt'.d '' 1th ~nur ra't onh thn,ugh thl' lnll'rn.llllll1.d Tnhu11.d, lht'l1 \llll,hnuld ht prt'j'.ired 1,1r.uwt her gt'i1<'l kit' till,!iiili.' J'L'fi'L' rr,nt,l h, Tuht.tg.ul1't llun1." t\ \\,1\ h,,,lt<1 l't' tuun,i<hit,11 th.n 'Jllr.d,,,,ltl,ltk.1nd rt'j'rl,,d, t h l lmntt\\1 11 Lllll,l L'XtraPrd 111.lr\ penplt. Therl! I'-,1 nt'\\ tf.1" ot \'ldlln ~.:P111tn!! tpn\,\r~l: the f,und1..:',,t rh~.. pt rpt'tratpr'. \1o-.t,tre learnm!! t.>r the l1r'1 tii11l' )ll'l \\h,ll rhe1r flu,h.lnd',md t.uher' Jillf,,r,, II\ lllf.!,,1nd 1h.11 h.1, bet n tr;nm1o1t1c. Ullll1ll'T,lll.ltk,111d lll\1111l'i" fl'j'ti' " ) th u It I lt. forgiveness AND REDEMPTION f.,r hdp, d1e) nt cd llltk ;~l edge. \\llh rl11' m wf.,tmd knllwl gl\t'llt'": gr g th1. utht r pel''<ll1,1 t.h.ll1tl' l<l 111.1ke '\\ h~. gllllllllg. \Vt h,l\e -..11,1 to J'L'fJ1t tratllr': "All \<111 llt'l'<l til du " ~. 'I.!Ill 'llrr), fuwi\'e me,' anj )'llll '' dl ht 'lll rn't'd.ii tht rt.:,p11lbl'." Ar the Comm l.,.,llln, \\'l' han het'll.1m.1:ed hy thl' m.1gn.1111miry uf thusc \\h11 h,i\t ht en \Hung~:d. Tht'\' h.n t -.h,,\\ n.1 r..:m.1rkahlt 1-(L!nl'r,,slly 111 spinl I.'J'lllllniZt'd '<l 'PL'Ct.lcui.Hiy hy Prt.,.Jt nr M,mdel,t. We lliiisi ll't J'l'Oplt tt ll thl'ir stnrks, lei tht m \\t'l'j'.md 11111lll'l1 If <IJ'J1l'<IJ'I'I.lll' M.1y 1 host'\\ h,l \\'nll1gl'd rh~. m ht 11111\'l'd Ill.1-.k fur IIH'f.! l\'t'lll'" and illl1hher lllll'<tdt will h IPJ'l'll Mt mllnt:s c.1n fut l rl''l'illllll'l11.1nd.mgt r. Sud1 meml'l'll'' m ed 111 hl' brought t11 tht surl.t~.:t'.1nd dt.dt wnh there. PL rh,lp' ht almg '' dl u>mt \\hen J'l'Pf'lc who dlt'd :trt.tcknnwledged as ht rpl'' and hcn11nes.md nut as tt rrpnsr'.md cnmmab. S) mholic gcsturl'' and act11>n'.lrt lmp,,rr.mr, 'lilh,,, n.unmg 'trt eh, 'chlll>b, anj cl1n1c'.tftl'r lillhe \rho fell. l1 WPtdd he \\'llnderful 1f thu'e \\ hn wert h11 tt r fut.:' m..:l.it '' u1mmemnra nd spok..: \\'<lrd-. nl h1 ;tlm.l! and lllrf,!i\'l'nt'" Tlwrt' j, 111l lutme \\II hlllll furgl\ l'l1l''' w.,ndcrfull). nnhlld)' 1' ht yund rl'dl'm['t lnn. 111 llllr l.md. lndl'l'd, it i., 11:1ppt ning. 1\:nplt \ lllt'llhll'll'' '' dl 9

16 THE QUEST To ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY LEE BUTLER Gen. Lee Braler is the fm mer commander,in,chief of the U.S. Strategic N ~tclcar Forces and served as Gen. Colin Powell's.\trategic war planner before retiring from the U.S. A ir Force in Decisions made now lry the ~:owmmt.!nts of lndra and Pakiscan, hoc/1 of which conducted nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, ma:> lwld J:r(!at wcif!,htfor rhe fw ure of f!,lohal sccun ry. The global quest to accelerate the elimination of nuclear weapom. received n powerful hoo~ t in February 1998 when former U.S. Presiden t J immy Carter, jl)inej by more than 100 present a nd fo rmer senior governmen t offic ia ls from aro und the world, proposed a ho ld hut reasoned path toward rh i~ o hjecti ve. In May 1998, a series o f n uclear weapo n tests conducted hy I nd in and Pakistan gave renewed urgency to t h i ~ impenu ive. The co nce rn~ voiced by President Carter and hi ~ contempo raries were underscored hy the rational e espousl'd by india's new prime minister. Predic tnhly, h l' rntio na li:l'd these tests by echo ing the ln ng-standing rhetori c of declared nuclear weapon sta tes. Their imistcnce on nuclear deterrence as essentia l to nnti o na l ~ec urit y prnvided a ready excuse for lndia's high ly regrettable decisiun and diminished their mo ral authority in urging r t.:~ tr;~int upon n at i cm~ wh n m igh t feel compelled to fnl low ~ u i r. Co n~e qu e ndy, the historic o pportun ity created at tht.: Cold War's end to roll hack the mom acut e nuc lear dangcrs is yet morl' fragile. Prec i ou~ rime ha, heen lo,r a~ mi ~p laced execut ive and legi-. l:1tivc pnor itie~ in n uclear weapon ~ r a te~ have de layed even modest ~trntegic n uc k nr nrms reductinn. Con n ict ing fore ign pol icy goab among the great p owe r~ h:1ve rekindled dist r u~r and hn~t il ity. Deteriurnting commu nicat inns and warning ncrworks in the forme r Snvict U n ion, coupled with strategic fmces suffering frnm in:klequ :1 te mai n tenance and modl'rni:at inn, h m e produced fab<.' attack wmn ings and ~cr i lllls equipment ma lfunctions. T heft of fi~s il e mntt.: ri a l nnd unn uthm ized sale llf wenpnn and mi~si l e co mpo n ent~ h:i\'c mushmomed. A nd now, other natiuns we igh their response tu the cgregiuus conduct of India and Pakistan. 10

17 NUCLEAR POWERS OF THE WORLD A HISTORIC JUNCTURE REALITY OF THE NUCLEAR AGE Cil:arly, the nhnmunity of nat io n -st;ltes has arrived at a h tstonc JIIIK l tll e. Thew 'n' ereign p<lwers confmnt <I stark chotec: tn enshrme nul it:ar \\'Cil('<llb,Is the ultun,lle arhner uf C<li1(Jlll nr tn l"l' ll'l:t tht prnspell ot shearing,1\\'<ly entlrl' snctelic' nudl'<ir hnhll,iu't. Tn consclou,jy pcrpetu.llc and mul11plv the 111Ulil11'rehensthle nsks of the nuckar.lgl' wnuld he.111.ill,,{ unparalk-lt J fnll). It wnuld perm.lnently tmpan uu1 hum;lntt)',md cast.1 deepening Thts agenda is certain ly w it hin reach nf pnltcy-makers 1n nuclear weapon states. Rut it b p remt'>l'd on t h eir unjer '>tandmg that nuclear deterrcnu: 1s mhen.:nrly un..,t;lhle; the potl'l1ri.tl f,lr u... ing nuclear \\'e,lp<lns wdl intl nstf\' L'\'U\' Crt''' tnl reasing the o<:kb of mi-,c.llud.llion.1nd the... r.,ke' of cnnfltct; the c,,n,equence' ul nuclt.tr \\,lr \\ dl spill well he\'nnd the houndanl's of antagnntsts;.md the 'L.ik- o l dl strulii<lll invoked hy such.1 w<tr ts inrolnahk. sh.id<lw over till' t.llt: nf n111 pl.tnl't. \\..: U11111c,( t1l Fnr deu1des Wl' tgn<lred thl t's'>l'l11 ial r, altt) nt Cnn, ersl I~. tlw l<lllrnq tnward,1 wnrld fn:e nl till' nuck ar annthd.ittnn thrt:ar is readily dtscernthle It he)!llls \\ ilh,i rl'glll1t: <lf prngress(\'l: restr;~int.., th<tt tmmedi.trelr rl duce the most acute ri... ks of tlw nucle.1r a~-:e. Such commnn, ntu It ~~I \lll-rul the m\'~t t l"'' (JJ ltfe cmd \cictpswict the meal!\ W dt.'sll Ll'' ll. the nuck.tr.lge We have oill!llll'l'd the L.lp.luty tu de~truy meaningful ltfl un llllf rl.mct Such,I rro~rect tran~ccnd-. legtttnlatl' cnncern tor nattonal secunty; 1t present~ a prpfound mural chotll'. We cannot at once hnld sacred the mpter~ of life and sacrosanct the me;m~ tn destroy tt. We c.mnot.isptre to fulfdl the tdea[, nf dcmnuacy while dl'nying the 'ancsense measures,is l'l'i1hl\'ing nuclear weap11n 'Yst~:ms!rom htgh,t,lte.., o f alert, deci.hing nn-first use policie..., relllp\'1111-! U.S. tacticnl nuclear \\'<trheads trom Eun1pe,.md prompt!) rattlving the START II.1greement h) the Rus>t.ln Dum.1 (thl Lo\\'er llnuse of P<irlt,llnent) would tltr nf ''ur cxt~tence. The cihlicl~ Cllllll's <Is the family of humankind enter... '' ne\>\ millennium. llll\1 we choose may well dl'tcrmine thl ltkdthoud th<it 11 \\'ill enter :mother. dral11,11 1L<Iih lll1j'i"ll\l' thl' lurrl'l1t l'l1.vii"lll1111l'nt,111d c reoill' a 111<ll't' t.<lnducl\'l' dtm,lll' fur rapid J'~ r ogrc~s. I l

18 WOMEN AND CONFLICT BY EILEEN BABBITT Dr. Eileen Babbitt is an assis tant Jnofes sor of international politics and director of the International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Program at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ac Tttfts University in Boston. She is a member of Th e Carter Center's INN and the attthm of several articles on negotiation and peacemaking. I came late to the :.rudy and practice of conflic t resolution and pcncehuilding. A lthough I marched in the anti Vietnam demonstrations of the early 197 0~. I did no t identify myself with peacemaking until much later, when the 12 anm buildup of the earl y 19 80~ showed me ju::.t how d angera u:, escalatio n dynamics could be. I re-entered graduate school tn 1983 with the goal of understamling international relation::. and forctgn po licy decision-making so that I could contribute to a saner, more nuanced view of d ealing with one's perceived enemie:,. Did I do rh is because 1 am a woman and a~ such am "nalll - rally" drawn to protecting the human ~ pec i es? The answer is much more complicated than that. Women's roles in times of violent conflict vary. At a recent conference on Women and War, organized by the Women '~ Group at The Fletcher School of Law and victimization of women in conflict, the use of rape as a weapon of war, and the increasing auacb on civilian populati ons in civil conflicts. Because of this targeting of civilians, m<tny women choose to become peacemakers. M o~t of those 1 have met (in Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans) did not intend to take on this role; they felt it necessmy as they saw their countries and com ~~------~----~~ As wars increasmg/y target civil.ans, women and chilctren have become primary victims of conflict, such as this Rwandan refttgee family. Diplo macy (an internatio na l affairs graduate program at Tufts University in Boston), wo men spoke from their experience a, warriors, vic tim:., and peacebuilders. A DIFFERENT APPROACH C learl y, women choo e diffe rent ways to approach confl ict resolution when such choices are available. Some women arc drawn to protect their group and fami lies by e n l i ~t in g, alongside men, in military service. Women mi litary officer~ at the conference spoke e loyuently of their pride fm d sense they had contributed someth ing important to their children and th eir country. A second group of women spoke po ignantl y of the munitic::. fall into chaos and wa r. T heir motivation? As women ar the conference explained, i r is w stem the tide of violence :md teach their neighhors and children new ways of dealing with diffe ren ce~ and increasing rolcrance for those perceived to he survey nf conflict resolution pro gram~ worldwide to know if women arc overrepre~ented. But nlllncn ll y initiated conflict resolution programs I know of in rhc fo rmer Yugoslavia were started by women. All of these women had other professions in the ir "former lives": professor~, doctors, psychologists, and others. And all felt their mo ~ t valuahlc contrihution lay in sropping 1 he spread of war by learning and teaching peaceful approaches to cnnfl ict resolution. T he:,c women are remarkable people who ha\'e tried to create optimism in the face nf d isaster. In region5 where conflicts have been more protracted, women abo have entered po litics to add their voice;, 10 political debate::. ahout inc lusion and no n vio lence. The Midd le East and Northern Ireland are two important ex ample ~.

19 \ll { f th '\~.: dt th n ml ~t u nnen] t altwhlc L nmzhtwun Ia'\ m st >/>fml the ~Jn cttd of H n h\ k -Ldm ~ [kacefttl ufl/>11 zd1~.:'.\lay'\ ~~~hnh.,n, ch. l N. 1/tgh C)nnml\st lll<'t {11r Hmndn Ri~:hc.,,md fcmn.:r {'r<\ldl'ntuf /rdtmd, ",mwnl! ch, man'\ tt.,m.:n/nu.las promullnf! /><'<Itt',n.,,ncftlll u-.,r/tl. ~ft. '' Jllllll'd Ita.: h Jonn.:r L'. S Pn:"dt:!ll ]mmt'' ( 't~rt<'l clurm~ c1 tmtsttftatunt at Tit, Cana C.:ntt'r 111.\Ia: I \191'1 w u mfltu n.:.solwwn A KEY SET OF SKILLS When WOil1l'l1 do p;nltcij'<lll' in ~ ulh pt.:;lcem,lking effort~. dn dll'll' Clln l nhulllll1' dilfn from thcl'l' elf 111L'I1!.A_ prt.:llll111),\f\ "tlld\ rt'tl'nlh pcd'll,hl d (in Polrllt'al J>.,;. cholog,, \ol. 19, N11.l, 19tJS, I ss-209) h~ nnl' nf Ill\ Llllk.l~lll'', T.P. d'e,trl't',.md my,~. II 111 kd "\\',lllll'l1.u1<l 1 ht An nf l't.tct m.tkm!!: D.11,1 From I,r,ll'lt l'.dt'ii n1.111 ln1n ll r 1\ (' l'rt~hlt m- ~oh 111!! \Vork,ho('," 'uggt''l' dw 'kill, \\!lll1t'll bnnc l<l rhe1r lcadcr,hq' l'"'lllnn, ~. nh.tlll..t lhl'lr t.:. tp.ttll\ 1o h mdlc umflltl' ton,trutll\ch. Tht, m~.lud~., tlw.t hdtl' 111 d..., c:lnr to mp.hh), l''f't'tl.llh b,,h,tnn).! J't'r'<lll,d t'\f't'rtt'i1ll''; the c.1paut~ tp nurrur~. Ctlllllt'C llllll'.tnd <.rt'.tlt'j't'r"ln,d llt'l\\prk": tlw tendcnl\' 111 furm <..P.di1111n'.tl.l'cl" u1nll1<..1 lllll'': the wdlmgne" tll.tddrc" l'lltn nnn.d l"lll!' Lllll't rtlli I\ l'lv:,1nd J'tT'I'tL'nCL' 111 'trl\ 1ng lcl intn:.hc mutu.tlun~.k r,t.tn.. ltn~-:. Whd~. lhl''l' rt l.ttlllll,hlp-huddll)g,kdl,.tn. npt,ufficient Ill 'tc p thl'.jc,trtktlnn \\rt akt d h u>ntlu.:t 111 c1ur world, thl').trc.1 11l'LI.'''"r~ prt requt'ill' It> JPmg,u. Wt1men are leadm!! the \l".ty h) IL'.ilhm:.: rht:'l' 'kdb tnj h~ exempltf\ mg them 111 the1r I i \'l''.tnt! wnrk. Women and the Art of Peacemaking In hoth br,tcli.md Pale!>l ii1wn ~ocietle~. women,lrl' l11ll,it Lh~: Ill(" of thl poht IL,tl JL Ci~llli\ 11Wk111g p) ramij. ln~.:rc.t,tngl~. howl'\'cr, thq.trl' part of the mllucnual clttc "Ito adv1~c dl'ci ton-m.tker,, parliclpatc 111 Jeg1slat1\ C bodtcs, ctnd affect pul he opinion through their wrltmg,mj pc.tkmg. It 1s igntftcant, dh:rd(lre, \\hen ut.:h \\omen rea~.:h out.ilro~s the c;onflilt dl\ 1de l<j tr) Ill under tanj the l't:r,pcctt\ e of thell' counterp,trt in the nthcr ~.om muntl). Not onl) do thc't' e111.: ount~r ~.hangc the md1\ 1dual, the) potcnrt ll} h,l\ c an tmpctct on all rho e wtth whom the tndjvllu,d work and 11\:e. Thu, the "conragwn" of the e t'ncountcrs can be very mflucnu,d. -from "Women and the Art of Pe.tccmakmg'' hy Tamra P..:.trs<m d'e,rrce.m I Etlccn F. R.thhm. Political P~whology, Vol. I q, Nu.l, 199S,

20 FACILITATING PEACE THROUGH HEALTH BY DONALD HOPKINS Donalcl Hopkm.,, M.D., M. P. ll., is associate execuuve direcwr of The Carter Center, where he oversee~ its health programs. Dr. Hot>kins previously served as 5enior consultant w T he Carter Center's Global 2000 program. He also has heen the depacy direcwr and acting director of che Centers for D isea~e Control and Prevention and a member of seven U.S. delegation:-. to the Worlcl Health Assembly. A' med ennooc< "'"'';nl\',rrem the he,. lth of <Om hatant~ anj crvilian:. alrk e. Conse4uemly, health offer~ a unr4ue oppon unity for peacemakmg. 14 T he d rrect effect~ of conflr ct o n health are obv i o u ~. No vaccine o r natural immu n rty agarnm bullets and nth e r tradit ional weapon ::. of war exbt. Everyone 111 a regio n nf armed conflict i ~ at rb k, anj many ~ u ffe r inte nded and unintended injuri c~ a~ a re~ ul t. If b io logical o r chemical w e apo n~ are used, the to ta l d am<lge can be greater than th<ll ca u ~ej by con ven tion a l weapons, particu larly if the agents can :.preaj from pe rson to perst1n indefinite ly. spread the d rrect effec t ~ of any weaponry, the rn d r rect effect:- " re 11ften llowever wideregions wh ere th e d isenl>e i ~ endemic. Other indirect healrh effect include disruption of medrcal ~e r vice~; de::.truction of personnel, c linics, well:,, hou,e!>, ami crops; and deplcuon of h uman and finan cial re,nurce!> u::.ej for fighung people in read of figh ting di ease. A pregnant wmnan in Mali ~hmt ~ an emt>rging Guinea worm to healch worker~. greater. OrHuptl\ e Jbpl.1cement of populatron ::. pmmotcl> the spread llf drl>eases. Refugee' or pnl>oner~ may Introduce JeaJiy pathogens rnw ne\\,1reas. Communrcahle d"ea:-.es a lso rntect pe(1ple rn LTil\\'d1. d r1. fugee Lamps. Dunng th e Franco-Prus,r<m \'V'a r, more th.rn 150,000 Pnrssran Lrv d ran:- d red of smallpox <lfter rnkued Frl'lllh pnmmers 11f war were sent to Loll111'' in Prussia. Di~pLKed P lpul:l trons :llso,ufrer cal:l!-olruphrl<ll ly. Fm I.'X.un pk, peupk In are;ts rre1.' of m, rlaria may he forced Ill fkl lo On occa ion, health i ssue~ can facrlrtn te peaccmakmg and h elp mitigate the ho rro rs of war. During civ rl con fl icts m Lehnn on, El Salvador, and e lsewh e re, li mited "J ays o f tranq ui l lity" or "corridors of tranq uillity," negotiated under the mrsr ices of UN ICEF ami/or the World llealrh O rgan ization, allowed children to he immunized. THE GUINEA WORM CEASE-fiRE The longest medical cca~e-fire occurred rn 1995, when former U.. Pres idem J nnmy Cnrter persuaded both sijes 111 'udan 's civrl war to agree to a two-month "Gurnea W~.)rm Ce.1se-Frre." The agreement enabled, ud,lnese <md mrcrn.urnn.ll health workers-includtng C.trn:r Center st;llf 1\ll xpand Sudnn\ dcl.1yed program w cradrcatc Gurnl'<l worm dhcal>c, a patnful, paral>itrc infection that affl'll' p1. orle 111 Afnc.t, Indm, and Yemen. Most,,( the world\ rem;uning 150,000 L<l'l's ;ue found in Sudan, where fighting ha, h;rmper~. d L r;rdrcation dfnrts. The cease-fire was extl n~.kd for two lll<lnths ;rnd then conlln-

21 WAR AGAINST THE WORM Stncc 19 6, when The Carter Center began orchcstraung (the) global campatgn to erad1cate dracuncubam, the d1~ease caused by Gumea worm, case~ h.tvc dropped (95) percent, from more than (3.5) m llwn to ahout 130,000 ( ts of 1997). The dlse.tse, which has afflicted rcopll 10 e pre B.ht.cal times, hould be gone from every" here but Sudan before the ~tart of the new mdlenmum. In udan, J unmy C,trter\ "Uumea worm ~:case-fue," as it c<tme to be kno" n, held for f1ve months-longer than any other truce in human h1 tory whose objective "as to fight d1sease. Although the war Foll()wmg the cca.~e-fire brokered by former US Prestclenc)tmmy Carter, UNICEF and others were able to Jrrt.wide planes and crucks co deliver much-needed health.~~pplies w both ~ules in Sudan's Long-sumdm~: Ctt tl u ar. there drags on and Gumea worms pers1sb, the ~pirit of] immy Carter may be understood 1n that moment, that brief moment, when men laid down their arml> and the better angels in our nature flew. -from Stratos magazine, May/June 1997 uej f11r.tlmo~t,mother two month~ he fore h o~n lltt c~ rc~umej. A' nf mtj- 199S, the 15-ycar civd '' ar haj kdlcj mnrc th,m 1.5 rn.jl,,m J'enpk. In.H.ldllllll) Ill prll\' tjin~ Ll\'dt.ll\0, \\'llh ol \\'l'lcllllll' rc~plle I rom d\l' \\,11, 1 he ~:ease-l 1 TL' II\ SuJ.m pl rm llll'd hc.d th <llllhnnllc',,n hnth,,des '' well,,., The C.trlL'r CcntL'T,mJ h Pther uuern.lttnnal partnl't' tn,1ct.:elcrate the nallth\,tl Gutnea w.,rm (dwetmculw.m) Fradtc.ttiun Prngram. It,tlo,o L'n,thicJ hl <t h h \\'lltkero, tll jllll\p start the l\,llh111,11 prngram Ill cnntn1l rl\ l't hltndnl''' (oncht~ecrcill\ls) hy trl',ll ing lll 'rl rh.m I pl npk.11 nsk tlt rh.ll di'l',i'l'.md rn gi\'l', accine'.mj < 11 her 1\L'L'lkd mcd IC tnes 111 t L'lb 11! t hnu,,m..j, 11! '-lud.mc'e chddrl'l\. In 1996, hnrh,ides incre.to,l d Llll\trul mcol,llfl'' a~amsr G uinea worm Jisease anj river hlmjness Without a cc.tsc-flrc-a result of newfound conf1dencc.md.tccompltshml'nts re,ulring from the 1995.tgrccmenl. ThL Caner Center ~:til\ I uwes to '~"''t!:'udan lhfllll~h programs lo lll'lp prl'\"l'nt hnl h dtse;bl'o,. An 11npor1.1nt tllplc sh.trcd.md undcr,tond h\.t il, hc;th h tillers,\ 1\ClllTaJ. lllllftjence buddtng h,to,ls (tit dtsuh,ioi1 hr ad\l rs,trtl'' Thlrt)- ye,trs.1go, the Sm.tllpo' l:r;~dtl.ll 1<1n Prtl.f.!lolllt 'ut.:n:eded dc,plte Ci\ d \Iars 111.Su,l.llt, t:-jit.:l'fl,l,.mll P.tktst.tn/RmglaJc.,h. SuJan.ILhtc\ c~l suu.c" durmg 1 he 1 I.J/ 2-S3 J'L'Ht.:efuJ n:o,pite between two pertods n( hjooj} Ll\ tl w.tr. The counrr~ nccj, another pcnud of l''-il'nlkd pc.ile to eradi c.llc ( luinca worm disease. Once th.n dtsca'e 1s " q"~cj nut, (luinea W<1llll \\Ill become the seumd dtse.tsc.tftcr smallpttx tn he eradtc.hed. Alluwmg w,trnng stlk' 1<1 focus <Ill.1 Col1\ll\lll\ L'l1ei11)--I\.IIUCI~. disl',\sc pro\'tdcs.1 l.l{l' s,l\'lllg Ti\tltl n.tll f11r reductng, intcrrupltng, or L'\L'I\ hallmg h,lsldtttcs It,tlsn can npen the dunr t'1 l:t,llll.f.! pe.lcl'. 15

22 ARMED CONFLICTS Estimated Number of Deaths in 1997 CooAict locohon Bottle-f<etotca iorol Deaths Afghanistan 2, ,000+ Algeria 3, ,000+ Burmo/Myonmor ,000+ Burundi 800 1,000+ ~ ~ Cambodia no Colombia ,000+ Congo 4-7,000 10,000+ Congo (DRC) 50,000+ Indio (Ko$hmir) ,500+ lndone$io Iron no 100+ Iraq no 1,200+ Israel ~~ ~~-- Peru Philippines Rwanda 1 0,000+ Senegal Sierra Leone ,000+ Sri Lanka 4,000+ 4,000+ Sudan 5, ,000+ Tojiki$IOn 1,000+ Turkey 1,000+ 4,000+ Uganda (frl",ih:r rh.111 Lt:'" th.1n lnh)rm.hlnn '-''\'l.'r" J~N;.uhiJtll)'-1 llhilonu..... trllm PJ()(.)~I\ \\',,rl,l t ~,mtlh.:l.md llum.m 1\ cht!rrr. ~l.1p JlhJ' n.1 lnh,rm.llhlll 1 'n,u,1\.nl.ll'll " llnl'' mn:l "IPRI\ ddlnlllt n "'' "m 'l"r.lfihl'd ~.:unlla..,r" ~ourl.t:" ~IPRI\ ~1.q,,r Arnu.:d (,,nllh. l'" JlN7!'It)(.)~ I\ \\',,J.J l ""II" 1 ~ 1.'1' I <l<li 16

23 Counrnc~ 111 red d..:p1n the 23 loc.ltlnns wher~ "high le\ cl".1rm~.:j contl1cb occum.:d 1n 1997, ha~ed on.1 ~urvcy of f1ve organ 1 :.HHln~.mHind the W11rld th.u ffi1ll11t1lr.1nd whulatc confl1ct stau~uc~. Cnunrnc~ in hluc h1ghlu.!h l the 30 loc.u ion~ whcrl' "lower-level" armed confl1crs Wl're fought In many c.b~.:~. mulnplc.mned cunf11cb arc waged wlthtn the s,1m~ mrern.nwnally recogn1:cd hnr dcr, pu~hmg the total numhcr of Mml'd conflil:t~ in to.1s high as 100 or more, depending on which Jefini rwn '' used. Rccogni:ing there.1re diffcrt'nt ways to defmc.trmed confl1ct.~ (see " IntroductiOn" for analysts), we provide an oven 1cw here nnd in the pages th.lt follow rarher th.m creating our own definition. High-level Conflicts lower-level Conflicts l7

24 AFRICA Africa continued to be the most turbulent region of the worlj, with "high-level" armed conf1icu, fought in nine countries and "lower-level" confli cts fought in another LS spots in Fighting that erupted in Guinea-Bissau and a long the Ethiopian-Eritrean border addej to the violence in such long-standing trouble spots as A lgeri:j, Rwanda, and SuJan, a ll of which contributed to the ram pant hunger, disease, and refugee problems that h ave plagued Africa for decades. The historic six-nation tour in May 1998 by Prc~iJcnt Bill Clinton (who jomej Jimmy Carter as only the ~econ J U.. pre~ijent to vi it Africa whi le in offi ce) and the tircl e~~ efforts of G hanaian-born U.N. ~ ec retary-ge ne ra l Kofi Annan helpcj bring Africa more fu ll y into the international ~ po tli ght. While an enj to prolonged fighting in Liberia and democratic reforms in several co untri c~ led some to state hopefully that ::m "African renaissance" had begun, fighting in Congo ( DRC) in mid-1998 threatened to pull a wide swath of Africa back into turmoil. Senegal Central Afri can Republic Congo Congo (DlC) Rwanda High-Level Conflicts Comoros Lower-Level Conflicts Mozambique 18

25 ~ Health and Human Development Indicators Fur '''"'l' 'r""lt' I coomtrl<'> ""h hoj,!h I~H I contloct m )<N7 "~. Ul I mc."ure' th.:,h,tmc< n.:ejcj to.ur.un tlw L~DI'\ 1497 llonnm DcHI< J'IIH"nt Rcport!: ' ') I'' l1fl' exp«t.tn<',,..ju, uum.oije,d, on,ltnullll< on o I 000 cal< (rh~ ne.rr, r to I 000, the clo~cr,, country'' to.orr ll!ll!ll! the-e~ g<.rh,j Un,J, r 'i nwnaln~ r.uc,,. o ~ ""' "''red h l 'Nil Ff, r pr<''ll' rh< pr.,f. of.olu~,,, ~ chold d) onj.! f-< 11< n n hn h.ond ~ '" '"of '~" C'-J'Il'''''d J'<'r 1.0(\.1 It" hrrt hs 01o Population % Population % Fully Immunized Populotoon Adult Human Under 5 World Country Wilh Access to With Access l Yeor.Oid Annual Literacy Development Mortality Rote Rank Safe Water to Sanitation Children Grov.Ah Role % Rote Index (HDI) (1997) (1 hoghest ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1995) (1997) mortclity) TB DPT Polto Measles Algeno Burundi Congo Congo (DRC) Rwanda no no Senegal Sierra Leone Sudan Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa Mtd. East/North Africa no 65 United States no no no * World I Dolo refers to periods other thon those specifoed to o r eg oon rother thon on enhre country, or d>ffers from the stondord defonoloon ~ I I t ''\I< H 1 'Dr Population Displacement l nn rn.~lly l),,placcj People ( IDP,).1re Jcfoned a\ ththc pc< rlc who h;wt: hccn forcl'j to flee rh.:1r h,une'.1nj who rcm.un tn rhc terrtwry uf their 11wn cuuntry. Refugee' M~ persons out>~j< the.:nunrry,,( thcor n<1t1on;oluy "'"" illl' un.1hlc or unwdlm~: tn return Jut! ro,1 wdl fnunjcj fear of hcmg perscc\llcj Person' 10 "rcfu~l'c l1kl.' 'llu.uum," (RLS) fe<~r persecution <>r harm,( rcwrned to their h11me counrrll'' hut.it~ nor rccogn :cd hy governments as rcfu~:ccs or asylum seekers. ALGERIA IDPs. Refugees: France: BURUNDI lops: Refugees Tanzania. Congo (DRC) Rwanda Belgoum Other: RLSs CONGO RWANDA SIERRA LEONE SUDAN 10,000 Refugees: 149 Refugees: 467, 105 IDPs: 800,000 IDPs 4,000, France: 149 Congo (DRC) 423,561 Refugees: 374,374 Refugees 463, Tanzon1o. 20,020 Guinea: 248,827 Uganda 223,720 Uganda 11,236 Liberia: 120,001 Congo (DRC): 96,529 CONGO (DRC) Kenya: 5,487 Gambia 4,263 Ethiopia: 75,743 Zambia: 1,858 Other. 1,283 Kenya 33, ,000 IDPs: 400,000 Other: Central African 426,750 Refugees: 134, ,452 Tanzania UGANDA Rehublic. 30,671 Ot er 3,463 30,226 Uganda: IDPs: 70,000 9,611 Rwanda Refugees 23, Zombie Congo (DRC): 17, Angola: Kenya 5, ,000 Other: Other ,214 28,611 15,397 SENEGAL 14, 180 Refugees 17,490 9,341 Guineo B ssou 15,000 11,329 Gomb o 2,490 Military Comparisons Defense Expenditvres Manpower #on Armlh.l Forces x 1,000 World Ronk Total (M1Ihons $) World Rank % Central Gvt $Per %GNP World Rank Expond turc World Rank Capito World Rank Algeria Burundi Conga Congo (DRC) Rwanda Senegal S1erro Leone Sudan Uganda 1, no no no no no 16 no 13 no Afnco Un1ted Slates World 11, ,800 I 864, , , , ,790

26 ALGERIA Spoon THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Government Morocco! ' "..,. massacres \,Tuntsio.. l ; Warri ng Parties: Troop Strength: Government of Algeria vs. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)" vs. Islamic Armed Group (GIA) Government: 170,000 including the Gendarmerie and the Notional Security Forces FIS: no GIA: no Est. Deaths (1 997): More tha n 3,000 bottle-related; more than 10,000 overall ' Mor. Algeria Tamanrossel Est. Deaths (total) : 40,000-80,000 bottle-related; 80, ,000 overall me blom.e Solvot on Army {AIS} " con11d~red to be the armed wong of the FIS Tnero oro also _,{ othor armed lslomoc groups under the FIS mohtory command Sources SIP111, PIOOM. AKUF BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN BASIC FIGURES Area: sq mi (2,381,740 sq. km) Population: life Expectancy at Birth: 69 years System of Government: Republic Languages: Arobtc (offictol) French Berber dtolects Religions. Sunni Mu~lim 99% Christian & Jewish 1% Ethnic Groups: Arab-Berber 99% Ot~ r 1% Gross Domestic Product (GDP): U.S.S 15 9 billion GDP Per Capito: U.S. $4,000" External Debt: 9' Source. OA US. $32 billion" "U.N. member 1-otatc:. have turned their back!. on the Algerian human rights tragedy." -Pierre Sane Amncst;o lntcmauona! sccretat)'-gcneral Nov. 18, 1997 Polttt c.~ anj Vllllcnce in A lgeria\ civd v. ar h,w e taken new turn::. ::.ince tht.! m i J ~. War has ragej ae ro~~ Algi.! ria ~i ncc tht.! J nnuary 1992 cancellauon of its f ir~ t multirarty general c k cti on:-.. Violent outbreab hegan with the ror ul,lr revo l t ~ of Octohcr 19H8 and cont inued during preparat iom for 1991 e lectiom. C urrent fatalt ty totals arc e~ u - The nwr!! extrl'nt L' grmtf' ' of tarori.,rs, now u idt lirdc ideological (Jl' A fter fo ur ye ar~ of a hlooj y con frontation betwee n the blamtc Salvation Army (AI ) anj the b la mic A rmed Group (G JA ) nn one ha nj, anj the governmt.!n t on the othe r, a new clement wa:-. injccrej in Novcmher 1995 when A lgeria hccame the fir~ r Arah country ro hoij a prc:.iji.!nttal election with ~evt.! ra l ca nj, J ate~. Gt.!n. Lta mtnc Zt.!n lllal wa~ mated at 80,000, organi~at ional connection elec.tej wnh about 62 although f i g ur e~ a~ wan) Islamic nwt emcnl, r crct.!nt of the Vott.! in h igh a ~ I 00,000 arc L'lliL'l'L'd inro rile nw.q a turnout of 75 r crccnt credible since inc idenu. t icrotl'i.\t?ric.s of m ct.\'illl'rl'\ nf the electorate, the arc not rer on ej n:gularly. that A l ~L'l ia /w.s 'i~l' ll. htghc:.t ever in A lgeria. The Isla mic rro t c~t movement, which m ~t.! to a r cak level of rorularity in the 1991 local e lection:., ha:. Jccl incd throughout the decaje. This movt.! mcnt wa~ driven by r orujar J t :.S<lt l~ f<k t i n n With the regime, J ommarcj hy <1 milttmy junta, and an a b~ence of other p ro t e~ t channels whe n p o l iti ca ll thc r ;~ l i :a u o n had heen announccj as the government rrogram. Zeroual's election was seen a~ an cx pres~ i o n of r orulu surrort for enj tng the civil wa r and a hlinj exrrcs:.ion of faith in h is abi li ty to do so. The :-.econj candidate in the election w a ~ C he tkh Nahnah of the tht.!n-h nm,ls Party, who received 25 percen t of the vnre, comrarahlc ro Islamic ~a l va u o n Front (FI ) surrort in the elcctiom. 20

27 111,(L'old llf retoi1\idt'llllg tlw \IIIL'.i' o~n llj'l'i1111g fu r c n gagm g a ll J'.lrt It''.md 'hli lnt.: lrom mdll:ir\,,, part y gnh rn CONFLICT TIMELINE 111l'11l, uliij' Icd \\ 11 h dl.dtlglil' 111\'ufviOf.( f,).llllll ~ ~ ll\'cll1l'i1( J'<lii!IL.d k:ltk r,, f.t f< lll.d \,1\\ II,I\,II),IL'LI.Iln,lthll1 fl'i.]lllf 111g <1111) l.lhll1ctil lllt',l'llfl'',,f CllllJ'ef.l T h~.. lllllre l'x1 rl'll1l' grnup' of tl'rrorist-, Ill>\\ h little Hit-olnglt.d <H nr~<ll11~.t llllll.ii Ulll i1l'c l l!lll Ill.111 \ f,l.tlllic ll1ll\'l' lllt'll1, enterl'd Illlt> tlw must 1 IU<lll' 1954 Notional Liberation Front (FLN) forms, initiates war of independence against colonizer France th n 111th >lher pnl1t 11.:d lurtt'' In N,~~ ~ mhn 191.J6, L<lll,tllllt lun.d,ntwnd nll nh t<l e'ro~hlhh 'L'Ltllhl. Jlltllre~.th t ktll'll fj<lll'l' <1f f'. HII.llllL'Il( Ill L<lllt rol 'L'I'It's ul lll,l".ll rl's 1 h.1 1 Algen,t h.t~ st'l'll. I n11n lunc Jl)l)7 thrt>ugh R,un.td,tll 111 ).lllll.lf\ 199~. dlt>lh.llld' uf dt.hhs \\'L'f<' rt'lprd~.. d, ('.lf1iudo~rl~ 111 till' Al~.:1er' One million die before France grants inderandence~ Ben Be Ia forms rst government han.dl rt ll!.!lllll' J'.lrllc' I'L'LL' I\ c,l ''''l'l" w h... lming 'urrnrl. S uh't'ljiil'ilt p.ir li o~ment.ll'\ c lclt hln ' 111 rt'gli '".md 1 h~.. n 111 \ll''ll'i'il t\ l ~.:cri,i.tnhiild l )r.m. In L'XLh.tn~~... 1 he goi'l' I'Il llll'llt,lfll1l'd Lcgltllll,IIL' lkfcn,e l~rnups, '<lllll' <lf wl11ch u,...f 1h~o. n.trnh tt> 1...trf\ 1965 Col Boumediene deposes Ben Bella, sets up military government J UI)L' II.JI.Ji!.!L'IlL't.l ll ) \\ L'fl' fl'!,!mdt:d,}, ucdjhlt hut k " fn:t,m,l f.11r th.m t ht p rl'' Idt nri a l cll'ltllh1,. ThL t hird ruund of t lcll llln ' w,1, hckl1n \ \:tllht r 1997 Ill n.d "l'r ln~.. n r,. \ li llemc com inucd 111 A lgl"n,t rhruu f.( h lllh.l ~. II'I1h tl rnlrhl'.1t t.1ckm g uvd Referendum frames constitution based on socialism and Islamic law f<lf lnt,d,}\\l'illhllt''; 'lllll' tht''l' h,,,fil'' ck... t nw... h,11 tlw UJ'rt r lhl\1''' th...!.!<11 L'flllllL'IH \\ hht,( Ill kt'l'j' tht m 1111,fc1 It' Lllll( 1"<11. <llhft ht'll' L'IL'L 1 IO!b II L'I'L' 1)(11 rego~r,kd l' lrt'l'.m,ll.llr Dunng 1h1',;Jnw J'Lll l, rlw g,,,... rn '' 11h Mlllll' 111 tlw mdu.mt tlcllll'ths of J'<lJ'ul.Hillll' "' 11", 1r.Ht't..:ll. mr<lr- 1.tnu ll> 'Cttlt-,ll(<llllll' oll1tl 'l'l'k <'l'lllllt'nt 'I'J'L'.II'<'<IIIll.lhlt.Hhlun\1 dl1nj.( 1<1 l'nng tlll'm undt r tnntr<ll.,,f1t n ht'colll'l' I I \1 l1uid Ill\ nh L 'l'll lmg.ll.:ulllllts ho..'1\\n'll tl:lrllfl'" 1nd lnrnwr tht f,f,llllll llhl\cilll'lll. t\h,l"l ~~1,1.1111, f'rl'' I ~k nt Zt'fllli,Ii,lf111<lllllll'd th,ll fll' ft o~, f l'r <If the h,1111)l'<f r(s, 1\,h rt ft,l":'f 1\'llldd 'IL'J' dt~\\11.111d t.d f fiji l'lrf~ t'kot fltllll 1'"""1 hut pl.ltl'<illlhler ht~ii'l.i!tt''t tl"n' ht lort ~l.m.. h. \t'l 1 lolt ntt' l'pihin 111 "''J'Icmhcr. 11luk p.trrs of tlw rq.:inh' 11cd 111th.1 rl'pt>rtcd 41 pt't>pk kdlc,l.lurlll'j.:t>ll ltt d,1 n a,, l ln' wnh tlw A IS. A, Ill!,! the three,1,1\s tolhm 1ng h1,,i fl''ldt, IL'fl!lrl'l,K(I\ II) e lhlt l) lt) tht,11111<llll1tl'illci1! Dr I William Zartman, an INN member, is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution m the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkms University FIS wins first local I elections. threatens FLN power-hold Milrtary regime seizes f>ower cancels elections, dissolves FIS, mass unrest ensues GJA launches terror campaign; army reprisals increase thousands die Zeroua~ appointed presi ent three years earlier, wins multiparty election ba~cotted by FIS, ki ings continue Additional Sources: A/gena After the Election: A Giant Small Step (1996) by I. William Zortman. The Algerian Crises: Policy Options for the West (1996) by Andrew Pierre and William Quandt Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics (1995) by Susan Woltz. Politrcs and Violence in A/gena (1999, forthcoming) by William Quondt 1,100 die in massacres during holy month of Ramadan 21

28 BURUNDI THE CONFLICT Rwanda Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Government Government of Burundi vs. National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) Ethnic Hutu vs. Ethnic Tutsi Burundi Troop Strength: Government: 40,000 CNDD: no Est. Deaths (1997): 800 bottle-related; more than 1,000 overall Est. Deaths (total): More than 1,000 battle-related; 150, ,000 overall 22 \ I ~. Tangq,.ka.- - BASIC FIGURES Tanzanoa ~~!!!<=:f' miles Area: 10,745 sq. mi. (27,830 sq. km.) Population: 6.052,614 Life Expectancy ot Birth: 49 years System of Government: R public Languages: Kirunda (of~ciol) rench (official) Kiswohila Religions: Chnstian 67% Indigenous 32% Muslam 1% Ethnic Groups: H tu (Bantu} 85% Tutsi (Hamitic) 14% wo 1 Gross Domestic Produd (GDP): U S. $4 billaor GDP Per Capito: U S. $600. External Debt: 'I ~- /uno <1 Sovn:e: CIA 0 U.S $1.1 billion 30 kilometers "Britain and the other countries of the European Union are in favor of relaxing sanctions on Burundi as significant progress toward reconciliation has been made." - Graeme Loten Bri tain'~ new ambassador to 8 11rundi The Time!>, july 3 /, 1998 ' Mossocrus betwoen cthmc Hvtu ond Tv1J1 ore no1 closstftecl os banle ruloted by SIPRI ond thvs nol mcfudecl m '" stvcly Sovrces. SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF BY fabi ENNE HARA For more than four years, Burundi insurgency continued, however, until has bt!en embroiled in a civil war July 25, 1996, when the Buruntlian that has cla1mcj some 200,000 army ousted llutu President ylvestre live:, and led Lhou ands of people to flee Nt1banrunganya. He was replaced by to neighhoring countries. The war Major Pierre Buyoya, the Tursi head of began on Ocr. 21, 1993, when officers in state who had handed power to the Tuts -Jomm<lted army assassinated Ndadaye in Melch1or NdaJ aye, Burund1':, fir t ethnic ln respome to the 1996 coup, the llutu pre ident elected by un1versal suf- leaders of Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, frage. The pre itlent' a as matlon gave Rwantla, Ethiopia, Zaire, and Cameroon ri~e to a ternble outbreak of violence in decided, under the impetus of internathe country. Hutu ki llej large numbers tionally appoimed mediator and former of ethnic Tut!>i, and the army retaliated Tanzanian Pre ident )uliu" Nyerere, to in rna ive and bloody fa h1on again t impose sanctions on Burundi. Their Hutu pens:mts nnj officials. a im was to force the government to A power-sharing arrangement negotiated in January 1994 did not stop the immediate negotiations with all the return to constitutional orde r and start insurgency movement aga in t the parties to the conflict, including Hutu minority-ruled government. In rebel groups. This response by regional November 1995, Lhe presidents of leaders led within weeks to lifting the Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire, ban on political parties and the restoration of Burundi's parliament. together with a Tanzanian rresidential envoy, discussed the crises in Burundi As of June 1998, the main objectives and Rwanda at a meeting led by former of regional policy, however, had yet to U.. President Jimmy Carter and INN be achieved: Buyoya remained in member Archbishop Desmond Tutu and place, violence and inter-ethnic organized by The Carter Center. The fighting continued, the military still

29 INN Action: Burundi INN member Kuma1 Rup e~m g he, fo rmer lllrcc tor o f International A lert (IA), developed a program in Burundt ro cn~o ura ge d1aloguc at <1 l1 levels and to strengthen the natio n ':, capac ity fo r conflic t resolution anj peaceful change.!a fac ilit,u ed meetings of the Burund1an ll!.tspora anj supported the development of Comp.1gme des A potres de Ia Pa ix, n Burund1an NGO composed of senior figures from the llutu and Tutst communities. Meanwhile, INN nh: mhcr Barnett Rubin establ ished and con tmucs to lead the G rem Lakes Pol1q Forum.tnJ cnnvene other mecungs to a dd res' the conflic t m Burundi.md n cig h bo rin ~.; countrie' (see INN Act H>n for Rwanda o n page 29). CONFLICT TIMELINE Burundi ga ins indeb ndence From Be gium; ethnic Tuts1 toke control of government Ethnic Hutu military coup foils; Hutu pur~ed from army on bureaucracy donun;ned polm~~. and pcacl' r;lib had tion N,Hional CounLi l fnr rh~ Ddcn~c yet Ill ~t<ltt. of DcmoLnlly 111 Rome. The Tursi Bec,IU'C the embargn crc.ttcd nrr~lrtu- Llli111TIUnlly'~ hostde reaction ro the n1t1cs for exlortion ra~ke r ~. corrupnnn, talb m,tde further progrc~., extremely and a h1ghly prof1tahle hl.1ck market, It failej tn cxcn sign1ficanr ha rd~h r on d1ffilldt. A year later, Prc~ 1d ent Buynya announced governmentol l reforms, t he ruling clas~. Its cnntmuation n ar- mcludmg an enlarged Nnrional rnwej Buyoya's poln ical base, m.~rginal- As... cmhly, a reduced gm ernmcnt, and l:l d modennes,.md r.t~h ca l 1:ed ck- the.tppomuncnr of two\ 1cc prcs1denb. mcnts of the army and the m1nnnry The manj,ne of tht current N.monal Tutsi, wihl tear rcghmal prl'"llrl' might A"l'mhly w,h t11 cxptn: 111 june 199b. forcl' the gnvernmcnt to make conces 'ums rh.u wmdd compromlsl' thc1r md1- In addll111n w.. anuums.md w rhe h,~stdl.!llltlldl uf the regt1111, Buyoya t.lr~ 'uprcm,1q,md seumtv. Nn r,-rl \ l.lll"<l m.m~ ll1tl rn.li ch.liknge,, A, nf 'llf'pnrt fur the,,muiilll' cnmpr,jil11'<'d ml,l - 199~. ht, pnlnu... d ba~c 1n thl '"' neutr.lllt\,m,l,r,tlkd thl l'l'.tn Tut,l-dnmln.ned UPR(.)NA parr~ w,t- In M.m:h 1997, th.mb to the med1a- 'l' lll, w1rh 'ume Jl,ltl~Sslng the rran,i - tll>n nf till' Rnme-h.hed C ommuni!\ of tlnn.d per111d 1\m,lrd a guvcrnmcnt u( S.mt'Eg1d1n, thl J.:ll\l'rllmcnt ''gncj CJ nat10n.1l n, oncd1at1on.h Buy<J~a\ preprd1m1n.1ry.tgrccmcnt w11h the npp<l\1 rencl' rn,t,t} m power. Fabienne Haro is a polittcal analyst and the project coordinator for the International Crisis Group's Burundi Program. Previously, she was a research associate on the Great Lakes at the Council on Foreign Relations and a project coordinator for Doctors of the World's mission in Burundi. Additional Sources: Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (1996) by Rene Lemorchond HBurundi Under Siege" (April 28, 1998) by the lntemollonal Crisis Group. Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action ( 1998) by Barnett Rubin, editor. Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes ( 1997) by Glynne Evans Abortive coup blamed on Hutu; Tutsi ma ssacre 100,000 Hutu Lt. Col. Bagoza deposes President Micombero in coup Ma1 Buyoya deposes Bagaza ConAict erupts between Hutu and Tuts1, large-scale massacres follow Ndadaye, a Hutu, killed oy Tutsi soldiers after winning first Free election; thousands die in ethnic violence Ntoryamira becomes president, dies in plane crash; Ntibontunganya takes power Buyoya ousts NtibOntungonya; rj!ional sanctions evied against Burundi

30 CONGO. Central A con J!epubhc Cameroon ', ~!,,..,. -.. ""!''"... ~..-.._..) ~. 24 Go bon Pointe ( ~ -'1., ,.. ~ _, >' Congo -lk..~~..,! Ma.n ~ : 4'areas a( 1 can(/id Brazzaville~ _,.../ J Ouesso } 0 ~ (<.,~ Congo (DRC) No~re 0 r. "' 1,, 0=~= 100 miles I An9olc:i ldlometers BASIC FIGURES Area: 132,046 sq. mi. (342,000 sq. km.) Population: 2,583,198 Life Expectancy at Birth: 45 7 years System of Government: Republic languages: French (or tal) lt gala Kikongo Other African language~ Religions: Christian 50% Animist 48% Mu 1 m 2% Ethnic Groups: Kongo 48% Sangha 20% Teke 17% M'Bochi 12% Oth r 3,..o Gross Domestic Product (GDP): us.4 b GDP Per Capita: U S S 1, 960" External Debt: U S. $5.3 billion THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Troop Strength: Est. Deaths (1997): Est. Deaths (total): Government Government of Congo vs. United Democratic Forces (FDU)'; Angola Government: 10,000 FDU: 1,500 3,000 Angola: 3,500 4,000 7,000 battle-related; more than 10,000 overa ll 4,000 7,000 battle-related; more than 12,000 overa ll Armed oct on wos pmnorily mmed out by the Cobt-os, the pnvolc mil1t1o of FDU lcoclor Sossou Ngucsso Angolan fo,c~s -r n...,/.ed m tl"' confl1ct between the Government of Congo one/ the FDU Sources S/Pf/1, PIOOM, AKUF BY MARA P OSNER S m ce the Repuhhc of the Co n g~) became a multiparty state in 199 1, its transition to democracy has been Lharacteri:ed more by v iodemocracy, re~pett the constitution, and di~solve the1r p:trtiltan militia ~. inregrn11ng the tr most qualified demenu. inro the sra te mil1tary and police lence th <m hy progre~!t. P a~c::~ l Li~souha force!>. Due to imufficicnt funding, the defeated f~1rm c r Pres1dent Denis Sa~~ou- Accord!> never were im plemented fully, Ngue~MI and Bernard K n l e l a~ in the and pnvatt! mdtlla~ cnntinued clandes- A ugu~t 1992 pre,ldcnual election. tine operation... Unahle to maintain majority coal1- UNE CO 'rnnsored December 1994 uon, Li!>,ouha d1ssolved parltament and called for ne" elecnnm. The firstround wa' held 1n M.1y Oppmnion charges of fir~t-rou nd fraud e!tcalated rens1om to c ri ~b lt!vc b. The second round wa~ boycotted, and urhan vio lence erupted. Faced w1th a detenmating situation, Li'souha declired a state of emergency and reque.. red tnternauonal mcdiatwn in Jul) lligh-le, cl reams from the Organt:atton,,f Aincan Unit) (OAU). ()ahon, and Franco: worked with Cong,1lcse leaders tn formuhne re.. olul l<>n rn the crhl't. On Jan. 30, 1994, the g,n ernmenl.md o p po~ition parties stgned the L1hreville Accord!t 111 which thl'\ prmmsed w consolidate national forum to enc11urage rene,u:d dtaloguc hetwecn pnllt1cal partie,, Cl\ d society, ;md the governmcn(. The forum restdted in the dn1ftmg and!tigning of the Framework Agreemem (Accord Cadre) o n May 31, The Agreement, in anticipation of 1997 pres1dent1al electinns, provided a framework for conducting admint::.trative censu' and voter reg1 st r;hton. Uniortunatd\, implementatl~m proceeded at a ~lo '~ pale, creating an en, 1rnnment ~)( nnllu.ll m t, trust ;1mong par1 1es. Cl\ d w,~r hn1ke 11ut tn June 1997 <b 1 he LOU n try prepared (,n presiden twl eleuion-.. The Lnnfrnnt<ltlon hegan June 5 when Lls!touha ~en t government forle>. to S;l'tsou-Nguc,so\ Bm::avdlc

31 CONFLICT TIMELINE honw tll,c,trdl fnr.mned milill,\,, leajer, repcatnll ).memptcj tll ~errle.t lk ~cd tn h.tvl' l.lll'cd \"llllcncc in the the rnwl'r 'trugglc. A ll.tuemph to fll, n.,rrhan t<hi n', 1f 01\',tnJll.md Ovo. tl r Ji.tl, 'l.!lll' f;11lcd dul' tll ditkrl'ncl'' T lw tnu,k nt- n~..~.:urrcd )ll'f J,,y,.tftl'r o1 er pllwl'r,h,lting. ftll' J' llllt<...tl p.trt) leader,, tndud- -\Iter ne.trlv ftl'l' mnnrh',,f f1ghnnl.!, ''!.!nl,l.1 CNE~t 'l).,j'illb<ln,l "'lemn grnun,l,m,l,ur 'urrnrt, c.tptured pk,lg,.. dttrnltnj.: thl tr u>mmttm..:nt I<> Cum:p\ tllll n ~.:tile,, Br.t::.ll til..:.md,lt-.trm J'.lrl\ mdttt,h,m,l pe.1~..cfulh Pntntl' Notre, tnd t<h>k L<ll1trnlllf the L'Pndtllt thl Jul\' prl''''knrt.tl 1-!0n:rnm..:nt. The S uprcml' l11urr,,.ll'llllln' wh1d1 hl' h;tj ;tpplltntej Congo gains indepencience from France, Youlou named first president Notional Revolution Movement established as sole political party Mat Ngouabi takes power in coup, proclaims Marxist regime gnvcrnrnl nt 1 roop~ and armorl'd tanb tn pr,1voc.11 tllll,,n,l ordnl d Ill... rndnt.t fl> rl''l'' Hhl. Tlw rl,ul t 1 n g umtltll... htftl'd th~ t rt d u Llr lnoh >Ill t uu n rn J>r, f>ar, d /ill /llt:\ldl'jtli(l/ tft..ctjii\ r pn:~ tdent tal cle<..rton, prod<1imcd him prc::.t dent <1 week larcr, <tnd he n;tmcd a new gove rnme nt tl1 ;1t tn u>rpora red 'l'' c ra I nrro~ tt lll!l part\ memhcr... Ll,souha.tn,l ' lllll' 1n 111, l'l1tour.t~.:e Moj. Ngouabi assassinated; 11-member military council tokes power Col. Sassou- Nguesso selected president Multiparty system approved do" ntu\\ n Br.t::.ll tlk. Tlwn-111,1\0r,>f Hr.t::.ll tile, Bun.tr,l 1\:ul, l.t,, hn>k.:rl d whn lll'j.!cltloltl'd t hl' 191.)4 Llhrl'l'tlk t\tcc '>rd,, U.N,m,l t..)alj Spcu.tl Em ll\ \lohctnwd SahlhlUn, <Hhl r prlltnt n..:n1 r''gllllt d flt.:ure'.md Atnc.m 't.llc Tr.ll l'lm:.: Ill \V... hmgton, n.c..,m,l Fr.mc~... tht turllll'r prl''''lenr l'xi'rc,,cd <lltrr,tgt.tr rht mtern,ttll>n,d <..<>mmuntr\ tnr th r<)k '"'~dent "I till''~ rn the <>l'l'r thr. >\\' nt Ill,,j,., It'd g,, L'rtli1WI11.tl... ) tk-lrtl'd tlw.tpp.tr~. nt lit tmpltl..tt 11111,,f rlw Fren... h ntl m~.h1,rrv tn thl'!th' Mara Posner IS a program officer in the Afr1co/ Near East Program of the International Foundation for Election Systems. Additional Sources: "Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate" by John F. Clark in Political Reform in Francophone Africo ( 1997) by David Gardinier and John Clark, editors. "Prevention Gained and Prevention Lost: Collapse, Competition and Coup in Congo" by I. William Zartman and Katharine Vogeli in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post Cold War World ( 1998) by Bruce Jen tleson, editor New conshtuhon approved, lissouba becomes first democratically elected president Sassou-Nguesso launches rebel attack, captures main cities. retakes control of government 25

32 CONGO (DRC) THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Government Warring Parties: Government of Zaire vs. Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa (ADFL); Rwanda Troop Strength: Government: 28,000 ADFl: 20,000-40,000 Rwanda: na Est. Deaths ( 1997): More than 2,000 bottle-related; 30,000 to more than 50,000 overall Est. Deaths (total): 4,000-9,000 battle-related; 30, ,000 overall 0 200Miloo BASIC FIGURES Area: 905,564 sq mi (2,345,41 0 sq. km ) Population: life Expectancy at Birth: 47 years System of Government: Republic with strong presidential system languages: French (official) Lingala Kingwana Kikongo Tshiluba Religions: Ethnic Groups: Bantu Other Roman Catholic Protestant Kimbanguist Muslim Other 50% 20% 10% 10% 10% Gross Domestic Product (GOP) U.S. $16.5 bill1on GOP Per Capito: U S. $400"" External Debt U.S. $13.8 billion groups"" Jl most of wluch orp Bantu maled Sourte CIA "The continued civil war in the Congo is a seriou~ threat to the peace and stability of all coun tri c~ in the region." 26 -Tanzanian President BenJamin Mkapa Set>r. I 6, I 998 After the ADfl wci<ky ol May 1997, the country was renamed the Democrotrc Republrc of the Congo (DRC} ' Rwanda wpporlltel the ADfl ogoonsl the go-emmet>! ol Zou e.sou,.,.,. SIPIII, PIOOM, AKUF BY PETER RoSENBLUM 0 n May 17, 1997, rebel forces spokesperson but eventually managed swept into the capital city of to displace the other l ead e r ~. O ne died Kinshasa, bringing an end ro under suspicious circumstances, another rhe regime of Mobutu Sese Seko and was imprisoned, and the rhird was emsing t he nnme "Za ire" from world maps. The country was then renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo po litical ly marginalized. Kabil a, who brought few troops into the coalition, had li ttle initia l credibilily. (DRC). The rebel assault by the The impetu ~ for the war came, inter- Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberatio n of the Congo (ADFL) took only!>even mo nths and involved few ign ficant battles, ave for the rna acre of fleeing Rwa nc.la n Hutu. The corrupt and dispirited Zai rian arm y proved incapable of mountmg a defense, no nally, from a small gro up of thre:uened Zairi an Tursi, known as Banyamulenge. Externally, the Rwandan government used the war to d bsolve the threatening camps of more than l mdl10n Rwandan H utu alo ng the border. For Uganda, the ass::~ ult offered an o pportunity to less the "thunderous" counterattack it suppress a udanese-hacked rebel movepromised. The population, which ini- tially rall1ed to Mohutu's ~ ide against what they perce1ved as a foreign invad- er, progressively turned its allegiance to the ADFL and welcomed the rebels' help m ending 1\lobutu's 32-year rule. The ADFL hega n as a coalitio n of four oh::.cure grnup,, formed in South Kivu o n Oct. I R, 1996, at the beginning of the conflict. The future president, Lauren1 Knhi la, was declared the ment in northeastern Zaire and c reate stability fo r the crnslo-border economy. Zairiam would not accept a war that was led e ither by foreign troops or by ethnic Tut i, who they also viewed a fore igner. Thw. Kahda, a ltho ugh a longtime rebel with a checkered past, was an "insider" who suited the purposcs of foreign spomors. Kahi la succeeded in di versifying his support and putting n Zairian face on the rebellion.

33 llo wevl r, the e< l ~Y m ilit a ry victory did Jailed; Rwa nda and Uganda, key foreign ntll tmm latt: into a ~ u cces~fu l po litical a lli e~. open ly brnke ranb; and key transition. T he speed and ease o f the domesu c a ll1es, mclud1ng the \ 1ctory left the ADFL O\ erwnfldenr, Banyamul enge, lost hope 1n the go\'ernunprcpmcd fnr governance,.m d unm- tl rc:o.tl'd m compn>m1sc, particularly mcnr resolving their g n ev.mce~. T h L problems of th e K.thd a govern- With tht domestic for~.:es that had strug- mcn t were complicated further hy the gled fnr dlnhllracy throughout the fina l kdlmg of thousands ot Hutu who fled ) L'.lrs nf the Mohutu regime. The.lttl- fwm ADFL forces rather than return to tude of the new gcl\'l'rnmt nr.md Its mm1sters-mosr of whnm had rcwrncj fro m lo ng years nf ex de-was trr - umphanc. They q u1 (.;k ly lmt gonj\\ d l, howe\ cr, t h rough arbttrary and inconsistent p rog ram ~. to cooperate with U.N. investihclli gcrcn t J eclaralio ns, anj ~(1hli<1 \ L}jrms 111 'm~oltdat~ [J Itt er u/~~.;nm(.; crackdm\ns on the population char l f Ttl.!-"11 ull!, s and,ml l,!!fllll;:-. RwanJ,,, as had other refugees. There wns lrttle do uht the m<lssac res were w mmined hy ADFL forces am i their all ies, perhaps at the command and behest of Rwandan officers. Altho ugh Rwanda and the Congo refused gaciom into the kdlings, t he Kahrla government bore the h runt of had fac d Ltated rhe1r \'ILtnry mrcrnational crit1c 1 ~m. In A ugust 1998, Meanwhile, Kahda\ effort~ w cnns.)ll - B;tny,tmulenge Tu tsl sold 1ers m eastern dare pnwer <lllenatej fore1gn a ll1cs and.mragnn1:ed domestil ones. He als~l Krvu pnwmces declared<~ re be llion agamst the Kabda gm ernment. Kabtla tarled t11 nffer ~olutltms t'' lnng-rcrm mtlllmed a defense and s11ughr asstspnlhlems, partlcularh the erhn1c,md rcghln,d Ltmtllcb in the cast 11t the countr} that played,\ key role 1n mitla- nng the W.lr. Dun ng Kablb\ rtr... t )ear tn power, 'cveral stgns ot d1s.trray occurrl.'d: four Kahtl.t mm1stt:r~ were ranee trom Angola.md Z1mbabwe to help repel the rebels,md the1r Ugandan.md Rw.1ndan backers. T hree rounds of peace ca lb buled J u ring the followmg m11nth, rhreatenmg ttl plunge rhe entire rt:gi,m rnro armed C\)nflict. Peter Rosenblum is the projects director lor the Harvard Human Rights Program and a member of the U N Secretory-General's Advisory Group on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Additional Sources: "Endgame in Zaire" by Peter Rosenblum in Current History (May 1997) From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo" by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja in Current Afncan Issues No. 20 ( 1998) "Zaire: Predicament and Prospects" by Jean Claude Willame in Peaceworks No. 11, United States lnstitvte of Peace (January 1997). CONFLICT TIMELINE Congo gains independence from Belgium; army mutinies; Kotanga province secedes, ~rompt i nfc U.N. rce dep oyment One year a fter country renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo, Col. Mobutu sto~rs militory coup, ecla res himself president Mobutu elected president for seven-year term; countr~ renamed Repub ic of Zaire following year Shabo rebellion put down with Western a ssistance Union for Democracy a nd Social P r~ress formed 1n opposition to government U.S. ends all militorr a nd economic a id a mid allegations of severe human rights abuses 1.3 million Hutu refugees from Rwanaa settle 1n camps in eastern loire Mobutu opj':'nent Kobila lea s Tutsi revolt in eastern Za ire 1997, Mobutu re linquishes power to Kobila; country renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo; Mobutu dies ) ~ ~I

34 RWANDA Congo (ORC). ~ Gisenyi, ; Uganda * Kigolf Rwanda,. Burundi t' Tonzon10 0 '.., 30 miles 0 30 kii~etcn THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Troop Strength: Government Ethnic Hutu vs. Ethnic Tutsi no Est. Deaths ( 1997): More than l 0,000 overall Est. Deaths (total): 800,000 or more overall $/PRI does nolo that massacres by Hutv molitios one/ Hutv civilians m 1994 ore ohen esl1moted os ha ~ resulted m 500, ,000 clooths Because rl~ese c/ooths ore not clas.,fred os bottle rclatod, SIPRI does not onducle Rwanc/o 1n 1ts study Sources SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF 28 BASIC FIGURES Area: 10, 1 70 sq. mi. (26,340 sq. km.) Population: 7,737,537 Life Expectancy at Birth: 39 years System of Government: Republic Languages: Ktnyarwondo (official) French (official) English {official) Kiswohili Religions: Roman Catholic Prolestant Muslim Other 65% 9% 1% 25% Ethnic Groups: Hutu 80% Tutsi 19% Twa (Pygmoid) Gross Domestic Product (GDP): U.S $3.8 billton GDP Per Capita: US. $400" External Debt:,. J Source: CIA U.S. $1 billion Rwandan refugees sr:rugglc rn Congo ( DRC). BY G ERAR D P RU NIER The conflict 1n RwanJa '>tartej with the murder of the late Rwande~e Pre:,ident Juvenal Hahyanmana, <lnd the ensuing genocide of April-June Thi:-- genocide kil led ahout 750,000 ethnic Tursi and an ethnic ntd1cal1:al10n of the :.rate structure. In the meantime, Hutu extremists of the forme r reg1me stepped up the1r h1t-and-run raijs again:.r the new regime from their ha:.e:, in U.N.- ~ttpponed refugee c.:a m r~ 111 former Z<me 50,000 moderate Hutu on order~ from (now thl Democ..:ra llc Republic of tl11.' the intenm extrem1~t l lutu g1wernment Congo}, whtch 1ohelt erej over I mdl11m led hy "Pre~tdent" TheoJore indi- refugee~. In Zatre, the Huru genoctde kubwaho (no" dead) and "Premier" Jean K,tmhanda (pn!.,cnrl} unjer cu;, tody of rhe lnternauon<tl Trihunal in Arullha, Tan:annt). During the geno Cide, the war between the government and the R wandese Pat rithic Front (RPF) Tursi imurgents re~umed, even- perpetrawr~ hara~~ej and kdlej the Tlll'>t ltvtng on thctr.,,j~ of the hnr~kr wtrh th~ u1mplu... ll) 111 Zatrt;\11 authontt~.,. tua ll y leading t1' the f111al victnry of the Sc".~ St.:ko. RPF 1n August 1994,md the Oight ro Zaire of thou~.mds of llutu refugees. At first, the RPF nrg<h\i:ed a government of nattonaluntt} c..:t'm)lrt.,tng,e, eral prominent llutu pol1t1c1<1m wh11 j haj oppmed the extremtst Huru regime ~ August 1995, the~e mojerate Huru were In ~rite of '~vera I warning:., the internalton;tl u1mmunity JiJ little <tpan from.,ome unprnjucttve Ji,cu,sinn' wi th the late Zn~r~an Jicl<ltnr Mohutu In, cptl mher 1996, u~mg the local Tut~l mhe of the Banyamulcnge 1n Z<ttre, R\\'and,t\ M1111~ter of Defen~e,md 'tnmgman Paul Kagame auackej the rdugee camp~. e' entually f11rcing abuut 700,000 refugee~ to return to Rwand,1. In Oc..:roher, the Rwande~e governm1. nr spolbored,m all1ance of several Zatri.m rehel group~ under rhe

35 INN Action: Rwanda INN member Barnett Rubin, Jirecwr of the Center for Preventive Action CONFLICT TIMELINE (CPA) at the Counctl on Foreign Rdatiom, created a nd continue~ to lead the Gre.tt Lakes Pnlu.:y Forum. This monthly gathering of imcrnat1on.11 actors 1n Washington, D.C., works to prevent further v1olence in the Afncan reghm hy cxch.mging in.form;lt ion, coordinating st rntegies, and advocating pol1cie' tn rhl' U.S. and other governments. CPA lll ltlall y flh.:used on Burundi hut widened irs work to mcludc Rwanda, the Dcmocr,Jtlc Repuhlu.: of Cnngo, Tan:ama, and Ugand.1 as the c ris1s engulfed the Great Lakes reg1on. Other activities mclude meeting' of the confidential SeclJrity Workmg Group and of the European Forum on the Great Lakes 111 Brus~ds Rwanda becomes U.N. trust territory Year after monarchy abolished, Rwanda gains independence from Bel~ium, Kayibonda ecomes president Ethnic Hutu-Tutsi tensions erupt; Hutu massacre 20,000 Tutsi kadersh1p of Laurent Kahd.1 a nd lent the m the necessary m.mpnwl'r a nd equip111l'nl for nvenhn>wing rrestje nt thil:k fmests at the follt nt the V1runga Mnuntaln.-,. Ry th en, Tul\1 extremist;, largely had taken Clllltrol of the 1973 Habyarimana deposes Kayibanda, establishes military administration Mnhutu. The war la ~ tcd fro m Rw;lmko,e state apparatus. Nnvemher 1996 to M.ly!997. Of the 400,0L~O or Sll Hutu refu~cl's \\ h11 had o,wmg, \\'llh H utu extremists sy,tematit'il d \\l'st\\'arj 1nto Za1re, halt J1ed, either kdled hy 1he Tu1s1 1n hut pur;.ult '\_PIIahlli';Jtoro,." Rcprt s..tun hy the mo,tlll' through sllrvatllll1 and diseasl'. The Ry mld- 1997, a new \\'ar w:1s in full c.dly kdlmg Tursi Cl\'lll'lm.md lhnu ly Tills! ;mny wa., hnn.d a ft er these 700,000 whn h;~d Ll lllll' h<1l k eo~rl il r.utacb. In M<l\ 1991-i, 111l' murlkr in pro\'l'd harcl to conlnll for 1 he ]\;,llrllhl 11f Serh '-,en.. l.lshunt-:a.. 1 llutu R\\'alldl''L' gn\ ernmenl- 1\1.111\ l1lrmer mn~.krate.mel torrnl r RPF 1111n1ster llf g-etwndwrc~ were ;Jmunt-: them, ;i nd they soon st:1rred tlperating fnlln w11hin Rw.md.l wnh the help ut s1jille 11f the lurmer.11'111} that h.1j m.m.1ged tu dndge Jnterllll' whtl \\as SiiLh J.md l'xded in 1995, seemed Ill Lko,troy tlw hupe lur d1.dngue '>ltuallun JncrL'.Islngly dnm m.iil'li h\ extremists frum hurh sldl'' Dr. Gerard Prumer, who has lived and traveled extensrvely m East Afrrca smce 1970, holds a PhD 1n African history from the University of Paris and works as a senior researcher for C.N.R.S in Paris. Additional Sources Death, Despatr Defiance (1994) by African Rights. The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience ( 1996) by Strandberg Grafsik Odensee. The Rwanda Crisis ( ) History of a Genocide ( 1995) by Gerard Prunier RPF, comfosed mainly o Tutsi refugeed invades Rwan a from Uganda Arusha Peace Accords signed by Habyarimana and RPF; UNAMIR deployed for s1x months to monitor cease-fire Habyarimana assassinated, genocide kills 800,000 or more people( displaces 1.7 mi lion more, RPF occupies K~ali as government ees More than 1. 3 million refugees repatriated 29

36 SENEGAL i Mauritania (j I ~...,.,... ~ ,,l; I ' Somt louis * Dokor Senegal Koolock ':-w<,; \ 0 75 miles 0 75 kilometers ' ~- ~.' Mali THE CONFLIG Incompatibility: Territory (Casamance) Warring Parties: Government of Senegal vs. Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) Troop Strength: Government: 13,000 MFDC: 500-1,000 Est. Deaths (1997): battle-related Est. Deaths {total): More than 1,000 battle-related; more than 2,500 overall Sovrces. SIPRI, AKUF BY KARL MAGYAR 30 BASIC FIGURES Area: 75,955 sq. mi. (196, 190 sq. km.) Population: 9,403,546 Life Expectancy at Birth: 56.9 years System of Government: Republic under multiparty democratic rule Languages: French (official) Wolof Pulaar Diola Mandingo Religions: Muslim Indigenous Ch istian Ethnic Groups: Wolof Fulani Serer Toucouleur Diola Mandingo European and Lebanese Other 92% 6% 2% 36% 17% 17% 9% 9% 9% 1% 2% Gross Domestic Product (GOP): US $15.6 billton GOP Per Capita: U.S. $1,7oo External Debt: U.S. $4.1 billion.. 0<,, 1995 eslmloiiki Sovfeo CIA Mauri ran ia, G uinea- Bissau, and to a lesser attain indc:jk'lldl'ncc:, exten t, Gambia, it /d.:ef) U'OILUI L'olHlllllt? tn where a confederate c;~.periencc,\c:l'iint)' a rrangement called clwllcn~c.\ due er J irs :mud/ "Senegambia" has.\1 ;:-c, LfllC.\tionahlc tll't'l'l1 Jfl ~ lasted seven years. mental prmpc:cts. ((lld Internally, since the J)mhlcmatic crm.\ hurdcr 1980s, factions in the L'tlmtc rdmiom in Casamance province have th e: n:gu m. would continue to experience fought for greater internal security challenges due to its While Senegal has not been leading a rmed faction, the Movement engaged in one massive of Democratic Fo r ce~ of Casamance, war, it has experienced has waged a guerrill a campaign based several armed confli cts for nearly two on fo ur major grievances: impatience decades that deserve close scrutiny due with the government's de velo pmental to its generally good reputation as a plans fo r the rrovince ; Casamance's co n ~e r va ri ve and stable society. separatio n from the capi tal of Dakar, Externall y, Senegal has had di putes with neighboring exacerbated by distance and Gambia's nearness; ethnic Sht>ttld Ctl.\(lHltlllCL dimensiom that identify Ca~a m an ce 's inhabitants with neighboring Gambia and G uinea-bissau; and claim s of Dakar's arrogance toward C asamance's inhabitants. S hould Casamance attain independence, it likely autonomy and even secession, small size, questio nable developmental prospects, and problematic cross resulting in more than 1,000 deaths. Casamance, lodged between G ambia border e thnic relations in the region. and Gu in ea - Bi ~sa u, includes the two For instance, enegal and Guineasouthern administrati ve regions of Bissa u have ha rbored insurgent forces Kolda and Ziguinchor that represent 15 in each other's terri tories, with both percent of Senegal's territory. The countries often too weak to forcibly

37 Rebel Activity Resurges in Senegal's Casamance DAKAR, Scp1. 8 (AP5) A Sencgabe man and ht~ lour children were kdled 1'-y ~u~- rec:tcd m~:mhers or an armed 'cranust 'oun:cs 1n the rc).!tnn\ c.1p1tal satd Three Sencgalc~c "'ldtcrs h.td dtcd m a stmil.u movement tn southern Senegal\ rrouhled exploston 11 week earlter. And nn Aug. 26,,, Casamance regum on St pt I,.1ecordmg 10 sourcl'' lwrc. C.ts.tmanct h.ts hecn hn hy spnradtc sera- leader of thl separat 1\t movement was k1lled m unclear ctrcumst<lncl's,.kcnrdmg to tnfmmed soiii"l'l's. ratl't nnlcmc m recent ~ c,trs. E.1rlicr on -All A{rrca Pren Scrm:e, Sept. 8, 1997 Aug. W, li\'l' people wen kdled Jn the s.1mc CONFLICT TIMELINE Senegal gains independence from France; Senghor becomes president Sen~olese Pr~resstve Unton wms elections, absorbs all other parties over next three years t'x('t'l tlw nppnstng tr<hl('' from th..: st<lih,h, \\h,,.dl..:~.::..:lll) ftn,ml'ell thl tr c rnss h<ll'dl r,lrt as. lll'eratipn' wtth hugt O\'l'rse,ts s;ji..:s of In June llj9b, Rng. t\n~u m ;1 n<.: Mane Jrug~. mnstly ht~h qualny manjuana. f,1tled in h t.,l.<lilf'.ltt<.:mpt tnnu'ot Mear111hde, SenL gal has heen..:ngaged Cuinea Brs~.lll f'n:stdent Jnan fkrna rjl, 111 v;lry tng leveb nf <JrmeJ umtltct with Vit'lr;l, who had ln.. t L1vor nmnng rni li- tary fllrcl''o.tnd the gt ner;ll pnpulntinn. Su1t gal<.:.,l'.md l lut nt.tn force' inter- th netgh hor tu the nurrh, Maurit ania. In 19H9, the two countne.,launched at t.ll b a).!amst e<tl. h n tlll'rs' n;htonal., 1 n \ l'l1l'll. helptng to ('fl'\ l'nt rl'hl ls from thetr respt ct 1\'e capitals. ;md ~.::overnm l rnmntn!..! thl go\l'rt1111l'nt, hur thi, l'f'l'<llk h..:tghtt ned ten'''m' 111 thl.tfl' ' ment f11rce' l..:llmdtt.lr\' opt r.hhlns. Un,uh,t,llltlatl d rep<lrt' ' llll rh.n 'L'\er,u,,l gt'l1l' t.jtnlm.nl\ rduj.!l'l''.d hunjrt d l'l'<>pk. 1111"tl' Ll\'tli.m... Whdl,, ddt'lhl' p;t< t Jli't tftl'll rhe wert ktllnl. lt'j!,d llllllr~t"n "' '"lllt' ),000 _.\,,,f mld llj9~..lrlllt'd contl1cr h.1d Sl'nt'J.!,Ik,e tr ",l'' tnt<> Clutnt'.l R,~ '" m 1,th '""''Jed. md h,,th ~~cle, h.hl Sl'nq.:.d ll't'd th..: <>tl..lstlln to tll1.,h out.ill<.:pted l'e.ltl' Ll'rm... Hnwen:r, pnlttl C,J,,II11.111t't r< hel' 11 hn ho~d t.tkt n rl'luge t.d j...,ue... 1nd ljlll''t Hllh m'l'r land m tlw twtd1h<ll'inl! st,ill'. In.1dd1ttnn. l\.!.111l' \\',IS olllll'l'd 11f 'lllllgglmg arms rl'l11,1111l'd unrt,nl\ l ll. 1'"'111).! the ('<'l<.:n 11,11 fur rt nl'\lt'd f'oltticoll.111d <.:thnn.t nd l.md Ill lilt'' to ( ',,,,,m,tnll' s~:cc'- gl'n~.::r;lpht<. cunlltcr in the regt<ll1. Dr Karl Magyar rs professor of notional security offcrrs at the U.S Arr Force Air Command and Stoff College at Maxwell Air Farce Bose in Alabama. His teaching and research fields include war and conflicts in the Third World. particularly Africa, where he has worked for six years. Additional Sources. *Casamance Quandary" (March/ April 1993) by Africa Report. "Climate of Terror in Casamance" (Feb. 17, 1998) by Amnesty International. "Dozens of Civilians Killed in Casamance in the Last Two Months" (Sept 23, 1997) by Amnesty International Massive student protests prompt introduction of three-party political system Senghor retires; Al:iC:lou Diouf becomes president, removing many restrictions on political activity Separatist rebels in southern Senegal launch offensives against government Border disputes erupt with Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau Eight candidates contest presidential elections, Diouf is re-elected over Wade Violence erupts near border wtth Guinea-Bissau; 20 soldiers reportedly killed 40 MFDC rebels killed in dashes near Guinea Btssau, some 2,000 refugees Aee to The Gambia to esc~ vtolence in osamance 31

38 SIERRA LEONE "=reetown Guoneo... -._..; " ~. '! - Maken1 Kobolo Sierra Leone. Bo \. 1.,, - i. ' _.,.t ~....,,. I 1 ~. : "'~ ~,.,. l THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Government Warring Parties: Government of Sierra Leone vs. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Troop Strength: Est. Deaths ( 1997): More than 100 battle-related Est. Deaths (total): More than 3,000 battle-related; more than 20,000 overall PIOOM ckmgnolo> figlltmg m SiiJfro Loone as o ' Low lntonllty Con/lid SourctH SIPRI. AKUF 32 BASIC FIGURES Area: 27,699 sq. mi (71,7 40 sq. km.) Population: 4,891,546 Life Expectancy at Birth: 48 yeors System of Government Con~ tituhonol Democracy Languages: Engli~h (official) Mende Religions: Temne Krio Muslim Indigenous Christian Ethnic Groups: Temne Mende Other native 60% 30% 10% 30% 30% African groups 40% Creole European, L!banese. Asian 1% Gross Domestic Product (GDP). US,.} 7 bill1on GDP Per Capito ~ U.S. $980" External Debt: ' e:u Sourc:e. CIA.S. $1 4 billion libe<oo BY JOYC E N EU S 1erra Lellrle, a former B n u~ h colony \\'lth ahundant mmeral re:-ource~ (rarticularly d iam ond~). wa~ tmn nrart hy a fi ve-year civil war that ended 11 l 996 with the :-ignmg of the Ahidjan Peace Accord. The war kdlc.j an e~umated 10,000-15,000 people and fon.. ed ur to 1.5 md lllll1 from their homt'~. An e~tlmatcd Fehruary 1996, hcforc a rcacc,,greement w.1~ re<khej. and Bio reacefully han ded over power tn the winner, Ahmad Tejan Knbhah, whll a~~umed power March 29, 11:196. On Nov. 30, the Ahidjan Peace Accord W<l~ ~ 1 gned hy Cpl. Foday S.mkoh, leader of the RUF, and Pre~1dent K;~hh<lh, ending the five-year uvd W.lf. ne~pnc the Peace Accord, chdjrcn, man\ nf \\h~lm were un.tccnm- out~reab. of \' lnlence conttnued. nt ran1ed, mak1ng them target~ fnr enh~tmcnt a' ch ild,okhe". The war took a hen y w ll. With some 800,000 in need nf emergency food ;tnd a~~btancc. ln 1991, the Revnlutionary United Fnmt (RUF) launched a re~cll1on to.werthrnw the gmt:rnmcnt led ~y Jo~eph M.mwh. Cart. Valentine Srra,~er un~e<he-.1 t>..lnmoh 1n Aprd 1992, hut the RUF cnnttnucclll' depo,ed h 111~ derut). Bng. Gcn. Jul1u' t>..laada Bl~l. Government repre,entolt 1 \'c'',md the R U F hegan peace t.tl b,h,lrt I) t here<tfter. Prc,identl;ll elel 11111' were hdd 111 tru~tmg the armcj fllrce' of, 1crra Leone, Prc~1dent Ka~ha h,,nlated the army and created hi' own m d ill<l u~1ng tit..: uadit i~1na l "K;~m,tjor" fighter~. O n M:l) 25, 1997, Army Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma, wtth a coml:>mcd h1rcc of.umy ~uldlel'\ kml\\ n ~ the A rmed Fl\l'Lc' Re\'nluuonary C.\luncd (AFRC),md RUF rel:>eb, nu,rcd the ~u\crnment. They called for the rclea'e fnllll huu'e arre't in N1gena nf RLIF lcacler Fnd.n Sanknh. The re<tct1un of the mternat llll1.d communlt) wa' '"!It and fmn in cnndemnmg the cuup. An cconomtc embargo and \<111Cil1111' were 1mpo,ed hy the Un1Lcd

39 N.ttll>tb, EC0~1CX1, tlw Fulllomt<. ( E<. '(.)WA ~) peacekccplllg lurtl'' w~ rl' dq' lo\ L,l t < '-tl rra LcunL. A lour-memhcr ECOW,-\S umunlltt't', remstllemcih of the gll\ L'rtllllt'nt. Tht l'ummll to.:l' of FPur, \\ h11.:h hc~.:.uno.: rho.: l \>mmll tet of ft, e ''It h the,t,ldtttnn u! Ltht n.t h>ll<>\\'lll!! thl Juh LthL rt.tn do.:cth>n~. llll't wnh tht AFRC r nwn tll.: rhr<>ll!!h Oc.t<1her 1997 t u lmlc av.lll. The -\FRC planned tu retain pn\\ L'r for fuur rht Org;tnt:.lltnn nt c/uidrttt. lll(lll\ Jj u h m light Ill!!''" t ht,,de uf tho.: 1\l~r.tnd Ll\'tli.tm Laught tn thl mtddlt In mtd Fo.:hnw~ 19':>8, El'OI\10ll l.nmlho.:d a m.ij<>r <>ltemi\'c anj ltn,e,lted the AFRC. K.thh.th \\,h ro.:m~t.iil'd M.m.h 10. -\, <>f t tntjt,l. "11h the tleetng AFRC/RUF lnrt~ s kdltnt.:.m,lm,ttmtng tni111ll:l1l ''' tlt.tn' 111 tht tr p.11h. In,, tcln ''Jl)Jl ad,ln, :-.1." k\ K.thh.th. 111,m.trtcmrt ntkrnl.un nc't) t 11 tlw A 1- R< /R l F I u..:htl'r' 1 t t hn 'urrcnderul 111 llll'f july I tn Ntgert.l.tnd agrcl'd Ill cnupl'rat c to end the ftt.:httng 111 StL'rra Leune. l)l',pttl' rht,, AFR('/IU'F lfll<lf'' C<liHin-,\frtt.lll lltlll~ (0AU) '"f' trnnp' u>l1tll\llt'd thl'ii l'flllrt' I<' pn11~ d EC<.~\VA~ 111 t.tk111~ " 'f'f'i"pf'll ~ nd tlw!tghttn!,.!, Ll.ttllllllJ.! thn t<'ll.ill'",tliillll' ''' re,tnrt tht K.thh;th ~<1\ tr,>lkd ljo J't'rL<:Ill <ll tlw Lt>lllllr\. t'rllllll'ih. In L',trl\ t.dl, thl l lllll'..i Ahotll )L~~\(\('L~ Stt'rT,J LL'<llh'.lll rl'lugl'l'' N,11ion'.tpf't'lllted Ft.ttKI' Okelu " 'f'l' t~ m.ttlll',itnliulllt'.t.tnd l.thnt.l.md lt.tl L'n\"tl\. \\~'l"l',,lid ttl hl' Ill dl''f'l'r;t!l' u>lldtti<lll '-'t~tr.t Lt'<llll'.llb hnyu>trcd Wllrk t<>.t!lt'l tln lllj.: lrt>lll till' rt bt l, 111 the lu,h. 1 n>tl''t th~ <>U,I111!! ul tht go\l.'rnmcth, I Pd.>y ~.mh>h, rl.'p.ttrt<~ted tn ~tl.'rra.tnd ltghttnt.: het\\cl.'n tht' NtgL rt.m-~lom I ~ lltw!rum!':t!.!crt.t Ill Jul).tnd held 111 Jll,lll'LI ECl)~IOCi,tnd thl.' AFR( /Rl'F dt telhip11, W;h,1\;ClN'd nt trl';h\111,tnd CONF LICT TIMELINE 1951 ~ New constitvtion introduced Britain grants independence Military assumes control of government, rei\jrf'!s.rawer to CIVIIOOS Dr Stevens becomes first president under new republican constitution Political opposition and corruption scandals result in stole of emergency Government b:jins fightins RUF, I by onkoh Co.~l Str?sser, m1 >lory tunto stage coup, promise elections but suspend legislature RUF rejects UN and OAU appeals that peace negolio lions be tn>tioted in five yeor war D>ss>dent AFRC members, led by Maj. Koromo and supported by RUF, setze power; U.N Security Council imposes sanctions Dr Joyce Neu ts sentor associate director of the ConRict Resolution Program at The Carter Center and adjunct associate professor of anthropology at Emory University. Additional Sources: A Time of Hope and Transformation: Sierra Leone Peace Process Reports ( 1997) by Ed Garcia, editor. Fighting for the Rain Forest; War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone ( 1996) by Paul Richards 1998 Nigerion led ECOMOG peace keepin~ forces defeat AF C, restore Kobboh government

40 SUDAN Egypt. ' Port Suda n. Rod s.o THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Government Government of Sudan vs. Notional Democratic Alliance (NDA) AI-Unoyyi~ Khartoum* Sudan Troop Strength: Government: 80, ,000 NDA: no Est. Deaths ( 1997): More tha n 5,000 battle-related; more than 10,000 overall Est. Deaths (total): 37,000-40,000 baltle-re loted (military) through 1991; more than 1.5 million overall The NDA " on o/lionce of _,-a/ nortltem ond ""'them opposjtton groups, ol which the Suclon People "s uberotton,,;army (SPIM/A} IS the lof9c1j wtrh troops SPIM/A leader John Gorong IS olso the leader d the NOA Sourees SIPRI.!'lOOM. AKUF BY CARO LYN fluehr LOBBAN AND RICHARD LOBBAN 34 BASIC FIGURES Area: 967,494 sq m1. (2,505,81 0 sq. km ) Population: 32,594,128 Life Expectancy ot Birth: 55.5 years System of Government: Tronsitionolprev ously ruling military junto Languages: Arabic (official) Nubian To Bedowi Diverse dialects of Nilotic Nilo Homitic Sudonic Longuoges English Religion: Sunni Muslim 70% Indigenous 25% Christian 5% Ethnic Groups: Block 52% Arab 39% Bejo 6% Foreigners 2% Oth rs 1% Gross Domestic Product (GDP): U.S $26.6 billion GDP Per Capito U S $860. External Debt;..,, Soun:e CIA U.S. $18.5 billion A I though injepcnjem smce Lihenwon Movement/Army ( PLM/A), 1956, ujan ha~ not Pui lt a is lej hy Dr. John Garang, with support stahle natio n state. For all from ~eve ra l other groups in the north hut the lo ye:m hetwcen 1972 a nd 1983, tlnd east. The oppositio n h as achieved the country h as heen mired in civil war some success in defending a commo n between the predominantly Arab-Muslim agenda for a secular state but still sufn orrh a nd rhe Chn ~rian and ;m11n bt fers from some southern ethnic anj 'outh. The btcm penod tn the war is pnlirical d1vi!>inns. the result of attem p t~ hy the government La~t year, Garang met in Asmarc1, in Kh,m oum to impn e a n blamic agen- Erirrea, with severa l oppol>itio n leaders tla o n a ll of udan. Ftghting ~ in ce 1983 under t h e umbrella o f the Natio na l hal! resulted in the death of a pproximate- Democratic Alliance (NDA). These ly 1.5 million people. meetings sign ifi ed increased coopera- 1 n 1998, the Government of S udan tinn among the oppositio n force!., bur (COS) coni inucd for its ninth year the meetings did not rel!ult in a po litiunde r the contro l of Gen. O mar Hassan cal or m il it <~ ry l!oiutio n to t h e protract - <~1 -Bnsh ir a nd the re li gious a nd political ej sta le mate with Khartoum. This con- direction nf Dr. l las:,an a l Turahi of the fli e r steadily :,hows high casualty figures Natio nal blamic Frnnl. W1th its o n alll>ij cs, cau ing massive economic a tracks 1 n on the southern stronghold of Juh<l, the GO continued to pursue a milllm)' re,olurion to rhe war, whil e f<lllmg ro engage Ill meaningful negouat1nm w1th oppmition m1wements. The primary opposition force, th e ~outhe rn - hase J Sudan Penple\ ha rdship, egregious human rights violations, and recurnng fa mine t h roughout Sudan. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-formerly the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which 1s ch;1ircd hy Ken ya and includcl.

41 Entrl',t, Ethtllp~<t,.md Ug.mJ.l, hcgan fund.lmcnt.tlt,h rcjcuc,l it as "nnnpe.h:c ralb llo\\l'\"l'r, thctr 1-l.tmtc." Delcg.Hc~ agreed ro a reft:rcn- ~u, cl''' \\ols limltl J in part h) f'llllr rela- Jum 1111 sclf-dclertnln,hion for the tllll1' hcrwe~.:n '-,ujan.m,l it- rwo netgh- ~~~uth, but the parncs rcmamej JeaJh,,r,, Ernrc,\,md L g,m,l.l. In March h.: ked n\'cr thl exact boundary. 1995, forml r U..., Prcs1Jenr J mm7 Meanwhtle, mtltt.lry llperatiom con- C.Jrtcr oht,llncd <l).! rl cmcnt from the tmucj m 1998, further dr<nnmg Sudan's (los, llw SPI M/A. and annthcr orro- llll',i).!cr hudgl't.tnd lh nch human s111on gr,>up to do.:.:lan: untlatl!ral rwo- rcsuun:es. lntcrn.ll lllnalurgani:atwns n1l1nth cl',be hn. s fnr implementing.1n:uso.:j the: GOS,,f h'rcihl) recrutttng hl.tl r h 1 n tt vl ~- 'X'h i 1.: all rhe rarric., ~ru. kn rs,,, soij1crs.mj hu lldo:mg.tgr, cd to.1 scclhlll 1 W<l-tnlliHh ex ten- '4ll lllt:l 't:tllclllt:lll' anj ~.:hurches tn s111n, prm H.:Ic:J g Hld f.urh r.1lb were and.tround Kh.1rtoum. In adj1tilm, held under!gad. hnsttllth.:' resuml'd. U.!:->. gnvcrnment,,mcrwm, imposed on A nl'w round of ralb hcg.m tn Kh.mnum 111 m em her 1997 for Its CONFLICT TIMELINE North and south ~in fighhng; Bntoin grants mdepenaence following year Fi~htin~ escalates mto 11-scole civil war Government, southern rebels sign Addis Ababa Accord ending war Na1rol"-i 111 November These Llmtmued human nght~ \'iolanon~ and talb, conducted on the ha1>1~ of a.tllegt'd mvolvemt:nt 1n International Declaration of Princ1rlcs (DOP) rhat terrori1>m, banned all commerc ial relainvolved cstahlish111g a ~ecular stare d11>- souatcd from Islamic Sh.ma law, were su~rcndcd after nne week wnh agree- 11om with Sudan save for humanitarian.kll\ Illes. In Augw,t 199, the U.S. governmt:nt m c:n t w n:convenc in Aprtl 199. hnmhcli a rharm.icl'utic.d factory 111 EH n hdorc delegates departed Natrobt, Khanoum and su~pl'l'ted terronst tramhnth sldt:s srcrrcj ur their mdtran 111g L.lmp~ In Aigh,ml~t.Jn, weeb atrer.tctivlltl''.md Vl'rhal att,tcb. L 1 ~ tmhas'lt'' WL'rL h.>mhcd 111 Kcnva \X'hL n t.db Tl'u1t1\'cno.:d 111 t\.l.n 199~..m,l Tan:.m1.1. W.tshmgtlm -.md thl the (105 and sc\'l'ral 'nuthcrn tacnnns Sud.ml'st: f,~er.,ry w,1s ltnkcd to lra1.p pn:scnted a Jraft CO!l,llllltion that, chl'll11l..<l l wearon~ rrojec.t~, but the.tccmding to I()A[) rl prcscnt<ltlve~. met Sud,ml'sl' gnvcrnmo.:nr do.:ntt:d rhe cla1m the nor requlrl'illenls Orrnsirtnn and requestl'd au N tn\"cstlgatlon gn,ups I.JUickl\ rejectl d the propo!>al a~ an lsl.ltnic constitution, whtle blamtc. the h.nnhll1g. Drs. Carolyn Fluehr Lobbon and Richard Lobban ore professors of anthropology at Rhode Island College. where Rtchard is the former director of African and Afro-American studies and Carolyn is director of general education They also are founders of the Sudan Studies Association. Additional Sources: Civilian Devastation Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan ) by Human Rights Watch/ Africa Watch. Historical Dictionary of the Sudan ( 1992 and 1999, forthcoming) by Carolyn Fluehr lobbon, Richard Lobban, and John Voll The Sudan: Contested Natianalldentities ( 1998) by Ann Mosley Lesch. War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (1995) by Franc1s Mading Deng Addis Accord abrogated, John Go rang's SPLM/ A resumes war with government Beshir, backed by Turabi's Islamic harty, topples a -Mahdi government IGADD members attempt peace talks as war casuallles lop 1 million President Carter brokers two-month ceose fire between Sudanese ~overn menl and S LM/ A, fighting later resumes U.S. imposes sanctions against Sudan; newly named IGAD continues peace talks 35

42 UGANDA - 36 Coo go (ORC) ~ - Omties Sudon,, Uganda Mbororo BASIC FIGURES /'.. "". Kompolo * / Kenya ---l.. Tonronoo Area: 91,135 sq. mi. (236,040 sq. km.) Population: 20, Life Expectancy at Birth: 39.7 years System of Government. Republic Languages: English (ofhcaal) Lugondo Kiswahili Bantu Languages Nilotic Languages Religions Roman Catholic 33% Protestant 33% Indigenous 18% Muslim 16% Ethnic Groups: Baganda 17% Acholi Karmo1ong 12% Lugbara Basogo 8% Bunyoro lteso 8% Batabo Langi 6% Non-African 4% 4% 3% 3% 1% Rwanda 6% Other 23% Bagisu 5% Gross Domestic Product (GOP) S 6 bil.aon GOP Per Capita: S. $900" External Debt: 'IS I " ~ Source. CIA US $3 4 billion THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Government Warring Parties: Government of Uganda vs. Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) Troop Strength: Government: 40,000-50,000 LRA: 1,000-4,000 Est. Deaths ( 1997): 250 battle-related Est. Deaths (total): More than 1,000 battle-related; more than 2,000 overall Sources SIPRI, AKUF B Y D EN NI S PA IN Th e 12-ycar war in northern a ll eg1ance hctwl'cn the predommamly Uganda h.1 ~ Jeer root in eth - Protestant Uganda People\ Congress, nic di~criminarinn and under- whach dommared the governdevelopment. For the past two years, ment o f Milton Obote, and the the governmen1 has fo ught o n three Catholic opposition Democratic Pa rty, major fronts, mmt notahly with the were w1ddy represented in the post- Lord\ Resismncc Army (LRA) in the Am in e ra a1 all leveb of the Uganda north, which has re~ ult ed in strong Nauonal Liben1t111 n Army (UNLA). regional tensions with neighboring Disillusionment With Ohote's war, udan. AJJiuonal fighung occurred in agaimt future leader Yoweri Museveni the northwest w1th the West Ntle Bank and ht~ N<lltmwl Re..,lstance Mo\'ement Front and in the we... t wtth the A llied Democratic Front (ADF), which com prises b lamic funda mentalists and for- (NRM) led Acholi nffker~ to contact oppo~1t10n group.., anj mvolve themselves in the 1985 coup that ousted mer Ug<~ndan ~o ldi e r s. Obore. During Britain's colnnial rule, the When Mu:.eveni took Kampala in Acho!t, a n e thnic group of northern January 1986, Acholi sokliers were Uganda, <1ligned with the British gov- forced hnck ttl the1r northern ho meernment. Va lued hy the British for land, where they fe:arcd a repeat of the their military sk ill, many Achol1 JOined k illing and destrucuon of their cultured the army and ctvtl serv1ce. Col. ldi A min '~ nationaltst mtl1tary regime tn the 1970s ~ uhsequcnrly persecuted the ad entity of rhe Am 111 years. Muse, eni wa... sworn 1n as president and formed the N<i l lonal Re:.istance ALholi for their tic~ to British colonial- Council (NRC). Soon thereafter, bm. As a re~ult, d1l' Acholi were wi lling 10 help ousr Amin's regime. The Acholt, de pitc hcing dtvided in their Achol i c u 1 t leader A li ce Lakwen a e ngaged hoth the N RC anj the Uganda People's Democr<lt ic. Army (UPDA) in

43 th~ LR/\ m rl'f\irn fnr '~'l'f,llll~ lljs7, k,l\ 1ng 1 hllll,,llhl',,f r~ht ls,k,id. ( pllowii1j.!.1!w,tu'.tgrl't'm~nr 111 lljss hl't WL'~n rlw I.Hgt h AL'Il< d 1 U PDA 1[, <1\\'11 fight oll,!all1'( tht ~ud.ln l\ npk\ l.ihl r;llt ll1 M.w~mL nt/arnl\, which '' 'L'L'I1 Ill h.l\ c U~;anJan 'III'I'Prt. CONFLICT TIMELINE,m,l th.: ~R~I. r~mn.mr' of L.tb\t'na\ In 11.}95, thl t:\1\~rnnllnt rl'jt'ct~d tlw 1110\l'tlll'tlt J<llllccl \\tth.1 h.m,itul ''' tnr- tdt,t of multipart) d.:mn<.:r.tq, U[lng mer lii'[)a 'llldtcr' k,l h lll'l'i'h K,ll1\', ~rhntt :-tnj rdlt:lou' d1\ hhlll' 1, t<h 1962 Uganda gains independence from Britain \\ h" \\lltd,!l.u.:r ulmm.m,ll.ha gul'rd rhr~.llt' t1111j.! to 't.thdlt\. Th.n '<lllll' It,.tg.unst thl J.!UH'rnm~nr. \L'.tr, tlw l.ra l.nmdwd.111,ltt.tlk on In I q~q. Ug.m,I.I lwl.l 11, At1.1k rh.h IL J to 'oml' 210 lit'! lllll<lll,d t l.:ctll n u\ dt.tll clc.llh,. t\nntha 20('1 I h 1t c:rmnuh p.:np k '',_. I'L'!.. d k,l tlw f oil, NRC,,.,.n. Thl' NRC ha\ f ll[!.lu 1111 rhrt'c mupjr.,,.in!.: yt.n 111.m LRA :1ppn''L'..I lq~i,iatlllll til fr 1 mts, mo~t nocahh q~.,tth ro~1d. B~t\\L'~n , L'\tL n,l tht \JRl\1 J.!ll' 1h I n d\ f\...slslullu; Arm>,111 L''[llll,ltL'll ((\,0('0 j)l'\l of fin, \\hill',1 I1L'\\ um,ri tutipn ''"~ L'~t.1h- ([ I~ \) m rile ncn rh, u/udt /ws le5ttltulm \lrong J\'~luntd lell.\lom H 111! llelghhmill-1.! ~wlun. pll' clil'<.iiil fij.:htii1j.! in t h.: rwn,l!,tricr' llf Achnl i, nnot hl r 140,000 \\'l'l"l' fed hy l hl \'{/, rid F(l(ld IYYO,, tht IRA hl'l,itn~ Program, and "'111L' 230,000 tnt rt'<hinl-:1),ii,rupt 1\'l'. \'V'hl'n wcrl' di'l'l.lcl d ro L!<l\'~rnm~nt tlw Ug;~n,l.ln gll\ ernm.:nt rt''l'<ll1ll~ll "pnlll'l't.:d \'lllagl''-" \\lth 111trL'<I'L' I mdlt.ll'\ I'L'I",llllllb.tncl.t A' I mi,i-199~. Prt''ldL nt l\{u,~\'l'i11 "frt'l' flll'.. I'"IIL\, thl IIU\ lllll\'t d tll ull1tiiwl'd w 'tr'-''' hl \\'lltdd n<ll nl'gn haw' 111 "'urhnn ~ud.1n. tl.l!l' w1rh J\:,,11\,,~,h,.,,ttlng lll,il'.id I.lL kmg 'lli'p<lrl 111 the u tnltlltlllt\, t hl I RA ht'!! m krdn tpplllg l hd,ln:n p.ir!, K, ln\.tn.l rlw l RA '',.r, um Dr Milton Obote leads coup, becomes head of stole, adopts new constitution ldi Amm overthrows Obote; 100,000 Ugandans killed in ensu1ng re1gn of Ierro Tanzanton lroo~: assisted by UN, invade Kampala; Ami Aees to Saudi Arabia n NRA, led by Yoweri Museveni launches guerrilla warfare against Obote Lt Gen. Basilio Oloro-Okello deposes Obote; Museveni's rebels defeat army toke control of Kampala, oust Okello frpill ll<lrlhl rn UL:.IIld.t,,n,l taking them ho~tk 1111<1 ~11, f nll<l\\ii)j.! dw hl'.lk- 1 9'1-f,.thu,,, llllrt'.l't'd Tht i-!"' crn Lt'nw,l 1 h.n rlw J.!n\ L'rnim'llt '' oukl t,tkt,hh,1111.1)-!l' O! oln),ij.!rl'l' lllllll!ii l'\ L "" "l' ,1[~" tht tn, \\ h1<.h thl' \ L l.tllll \\,,, the Ill t: ut other At ho lt, \\ ho m.t,k 1988 Museveni's army crushes Holy Spirit rebel movement, Joseph Kony forms LRA, launches rebel attack tlll'llt <11 ~ud.tn, \\ hdt puhllt h dt n) 1111.: tht.1 w lllllll,.., \\ i,kh ht ltt n d tll Dt Dennis Pain, o teacher and development specialist on Uganda, has been o free lance consultant in social development tn Afnco. India, and British inner-city areas. In 1997, he worked as on tnde pendent consultant to help resolve the war in northern Uganda Additional Sources The Anguish of Northern Uganda ( 1997) by Robert Gersony. The Bending of Spears ( by Dennis Pain. Breaking God's Commands: The Destruction of Childhood by the Lords Reststonce Army ( 1 997) by Amnesty International Peace talks foil betw een LRA and Museveni diplomatic relations severed with Sudan Guerrilla warfare increases in western Uganda 37

44 AsiA W<h,1mnng rhe mo~t rrouhled regton~. wnh natural cau~e~. lndnne:-.1.1\ lnngnmc d1ct.hor, Suharw, fin,1lly A.,1,1 "hlgh-lc,cl" armed conflict' in c1ght countrie~. rclmqui~hed 32 year-. of contml1n i\la) 1998 amtj a crumhlmg although the '>t<ltll~ ot cnmhat in the-.c contl1lt' economy, -.tujenr prote-.t-., and urhan riuts that left 111l1re than ranged fmm exrn:me vmlcnce ro rel.ttive calm. lndta grahhed 1,100 dead. A new form of repre,.,:-.hm t1h1k root 111 glohal headltne~ and 1nrernat1onal condemnation 1n May 1998 Afghani~tan, where the Talihan 1mpo~ed ~wet Mu~lim princl hy te~ring ~ix nuckar weapom, only to he matched Wl'cb later pie:- on i t~ ciri:cnry. And whik Sn Lankan, continued w '>l'l.'k hy it' neighbor and decades-old rival, Paki,tan. In C<tmhoJm, a peaceful rc~olution tn the ongoing warm thetr country, one nf the world\ mu"t nownnu' dictators, Pol Pot, wa-. over- negotiatiom or cea~e-fire" 111 B<mglaJe,.,h, the Philippine-., and thrown hy Khmer Rouge officer-. and later reported de<td 11f Tajikbtan offered rea:-.on fnr hnpe 111 the region. Sri Lanka High-Level Conflicts - Lower- Level Conflicts '.,--~ Philippines J ~;t 38

45 Health and Human Development Indicators f nr u mp.ht'"'" >I <Pill II fll' \1 11 h lu~h It" I '""'1" '1<17 <1~. II 111 m~ ''""'' 1 h~ dt,1,111<,. lll't'd~d t< d1< L N Ill'\ I <1<17 llutn.ul p,.,.:l"t'lllllll l{l'porr r.: "l' '"' ftf,.,.,p.. rlll<\,t'<hll ttu>n.tlfcl<l.~n.l tm >nt< un 1 ll\)l1 " 'I' (till "' tr<'r 1' I 000, tht,l "<f ttllllnlry '' t.urauung th.-e g<~al) Lu.f,, S ""'II tftn rll<'' "m~'""' II\ l Nlt'l:f. f<'l''"'''' dtc ('n htbdul,ol 1 duij,hmr.: l>(t\\ccnl'trth md S ""'"f.tj!c ''"r"'"" per 1,000 lth hmh, 0 % Populotton % Populohon o Fully lmmuntzed Populohon Adult Human Under 5 World Country Wtth Access to With Acces~ 1 Yeor.Oid Annual Literacy Development Mortality Rote Rank Safe Water to Sonttotton Chtldren Growth Role % Rote Index (HDI) (1997) (1 highest [ J ( ) ( ) ( } (1995) (1997) mortaltty) TB DPT Polio Measles Afghanistan no Burma/ Myanmar Cambodia * Indio Indonesia Phtlippines Sri Lanka Tojiktslon 60 no United Stoles no no no * World Date refers to pe11ods olher then those spectfted, to a reg ton rather then an entore country, or dtffers from the standard deftnthon Population Displacement lnrcrn.dly [),,pl.t«,l Pt 11ple (fl)l\).tr~,ldtncd,,, th'"''!'<'llt'k who h,ll<' ~,.,." t. r<nlt11 t1n thl'tr h mc,.md wh11 rcm.11n 111 "'" rcrrm>ry,,1 thl'u own u>utllr\'. Rt fu)!l'c'.trl' I'"'"'" <lllt,lllt thl' l'lllltllr\ 11t rlwtr tft1\ who.trc lll\.thlt 111' lllll\ dltnr.: Ill fl'lllrtl dut 111 ' wdl t11uildl'd lt,tr.. t hl'llll( rcn~cllll'd l'l'r'<lll ' Ill "rdu~ ~ ltkt 'IIU.IIh>n," (RI-"l k.tr l'<'f,<'cu!illll llr h.mn II rt turnt d "' thl tr ht~ml' cllunrrtts hut arl' ll<lt rt?<:<>gnt:cj h\!: ~~"<'rlllll<'lll ',,, rduf.!~t'' r,,,,lum 'cckl'r' AFGHANISTAN lops; 1,200,000 Refugees. 2,673,329 Iran : 1,414,659 Pakistan: 1,200,000 Russian Federation 20,425 Indio: 18,607 Kazakhstan: 3,500 Other 16,138 RLSs. 8,000 (Uzbekistan) CAMBODIA INDONESIA IDPs: 32,000 Refugees. 10,175 Refugees: 59,640 Papua New Vietnam 34,400 Gumea. 10,175 France: 24,298 Belgium. 592 BURMA/MYANMAR New Zealand 350 IDPs: 500,000-1,000,000 Refugees 135,051 Thailand 15,000 INDIA Bangladesh 30,578 IDPs 250,000 Indio 440 RLSs 350,000 (That land) SRI LANKA TAJIKISTAN IDPs 900,000 IDPs 50,000 Refugees: 84,228 Refugees 73,341 Indio: 62,226 Russian France: 15,793 Federotton 19,966 Norway 5,000 Afghanistan 18,769 Sweden: 571 Kyrgyzstan : 16,436 Swttzerlond: 318 Turkmenistan 12, 170 Other. 320 Kazakhstan 6,000 RLSs 30,000 (Uzbektston) Military Comparisons,,- Defense Expenditures Manpower Total Central Gvt $Per # tn Armed (mthrons $) World Rank o GNP WorldRanlc Expend1ture World Rank Coptic World Rank Forces x 1,000 World Rank Afghanistan no 75 no 43 no 29 no Burma/ Myanmar 1, Cambodia I 51 no lndto 7, ,265 4 Indonesia 3, l Philippmes 1, Sri Lanka To jiktslon no ' United States 277, , ,620 2 World 864, ,790

46 AFGHANISTAN T ur~mon15ton, ' Horor '!JzbtH<uton '. To1ik,,tan '... ' -.,., t "' -.. -~ I...).-..- ~:, M~or-i-Shoril ' ~... Kobul * Afghanislan,..-~ Qondohor,-.,,,. r..l ~ Pakistan Iron Llometers... _ ~ Indio \. I ;.., THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Troop Strength: Government Government of Afghanistan vs. Jumbish-i Milli-ye-lslomi vs. Jomiot-i-lslami vs. Hezb-i-Wohdat Government: 20,000 Jumbish-i Milli-ye-lslami: no Jamiat-i-lslami: no Hezb-i-Wahdat: no Est. Deaths ( 1 997): More than 2,000 battle-related; more than 1 0,000 overall Est. Deaths (total): More than 20,000 battle-related since 1992; more than 1.5 million overall since 1978 Figure mcludos /,ghrmg between porl1e> orher than tho"' /,ted here Sources SIPRI. PIOOM AKUF BY EDWARD GtRARDET BASIC FIGURES Area. 250,000 sq mi. (647,500 sq. km.) Population: 23,738,085 Life Expectancy at Birth: 46.3 years System of Government: Transitional Languages: Pashtu Afghan Persian Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashal) Religions: Sunni Muslim 84% Shi' a Muslim 15% Other 1% Ethnic Groups: Pashtun 38% Tajik 25% Hazara 19% Uzbek 6% Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch & other 12% Gross Domestic Product (GDP): U.S. $18 1 mrll1on GDP Per Capita: U.S. $800 External Debt U.S. $2.3 billion "The U.. i!> prepared to engage inten~ively in Afghanistan in thi~ search for peace." - Bdl H1dwnlmn clurmj.! /11~ Apnl 199!'l tnt w \f~ltd m1wl1, the ftm ht~lt-let d A.mertt: 111 dt/jinnwuc trrfl w the rounm in 25 WCIT\. N ll\\ m ib thtrd decade ~ince lmd ~ hy cutting Jea l ~ ;mj providing arm~d revnlt fir ~t hrokc n ut \ '<HHlU ~ form~ of tena l ~up pllrt. in 1978 ag:1in~t the Moscow- De~plle the often heavy fi ghting, bac ked Ka hul regi me, the war in Afghnni~tan ~ h ow'> nn signs of ah;lting. Fight ing continue' north nfkahul a nd 1n n ther tmport.mt frnntline area~ henwen the pnm.ml) Pakistan-backed Tali ban lllll\ em~nt and "northern Alliance" opp1l'>itinn fo rces supported hy Iran, Tajlktstan, and other n e tghhor- much of Afghani~t<tn remained at re lat1ve pe;1ce in 1997 :1nd in t he first half of Thi~ h,,, enabled lucal and International aid agenctes to rursue limned lmms of asststanle, ranging from land-mine clear,lnle w water improvement programs. Nevertheless, Afgh.mistan\ mternat to nally percei, cd ing co untn e~. The conflict em.ure'> thar, t.tte of m seluflt)' pre\ ent~ the country Afghantst.tn remams one of the world\ from recetving the asslst;mce and recogforemost de, elupment backwater'>. nt t 1on It requtres. A t the s.11nc ttnh:, the '>preod of huth In Tahhan-cuntrolled a reas, the situalegal and illicit commcrcinl interests tion has proven in c re:~ s in g l y untenahle ranging from arm~ <~nd o pium traffick~ for ma n y Afgham. Stringent Talihan ing (the countr) \ largest source of edicts, suc h a~ h;mnmg gi rls in school, 1ncome) to pot~nt 1a l overland routes pl.1ymg m m1c, and flying kites, promote for ud.mj n.nur;ji ga~ p1pelmes has the -.urr of despatr th;ll fc\\ civilians.nrractcd nc\\' llllt,idl: pl<~yers to thl: could h<l\'c unagml d even during the ~ccne. S tnle 1hc T,,lihan arnn ~l tn height nf the ~9 Sll\'let-Afghan K;1hul , \'<lrhhis regtnnal gllvernment~. mulnn.llhlll;d cumpanies, <1nd inrern:h11111,d drug ldrteb have!'.nugh t to 1nfl u~ n Ll' Afghan fo~ uions and war- war. The Talihan h.t ve d1~c nminated :tg;1111~r women, mo~ny of them educated, h) forung rhem from thetr JObs ami dl'n)ing them <llle"' to he;tlth care and 40

47 ~~ ~---.!:..:. -~~-~ - ~~ ~ -..._ ,dhllll,," rh, nnly l'lalt'' 11 ht:rt gtrb untl,llt'.lrn t<l n,,,j.1n,l \\Tilt: tnll1m tng tt't\'t'd rcltgllltt' tdvnipg\ rhar h,t~ lirtlt t ',In 11 rrh tr,t,lttlltn,ti Al!.!h.m utlrure,.md m.m\ Algh.m, d,, ph re,, nr rlwm In luh I'N~. tlw T.thh,m... r, ppt,lup prt,,urt ''" thl' mtt rn.llton.ll.ud u1111 rnunrl~, 11h1d1 )'lll\'tdt ' \'tl'fll.tlly itll nf tht cap11.ti\ ha,il 'lllt.d 'L'r \'ICt:,, Ry t ht ~:n,l of t h, mllnth, thl' rntcrn.tttnn.d \ ITtHcllh all u nh:n h.til-mrllton rt:llpk 111 tht: clptt;d dert:nd~:nr 1>11 hum: ntt.man ard fur,ur. 1'1\',tl. Tht:'L' tndudl ten' 1>! thnu,and, dl.trtt\ Vtrru.tlh.til wnmc:n h,t\'t: hl t:n h;rnrwd frlltn.my fllrm nl L'"'''L"nn Pllt '"k l ht:it hlll11l'' The T.tithan,trgut: 11 tth cert.lln Jll'tt ftt.ltlll11 tht'\ h,t\t: tlllpru\l'd 'l'ull'll) tn tlw t\\ll thtrd, PI Algh.tnr,t.m under rht:ii'l'pntntl h Putl.11nng l.!llll,, t'xl't:ltl m~.:,,r f'unr,htng trtmtnab <tt:tordtng 111 Sharr't,t (l... lamrl!all'},.tnd, limtn.llllll.! rmpn11npru ru.t,! hlu,b. L.m k"lll''' in tniln\ hat~: bu:n hannd <lf'j'lbttllln-h~:ld.trl'<l' h,,, (rnlll Llll\' (urllt uf m.tde 11 d tfftutlr if nnr CONFLICT TIMELI NE U.-Gen. Daoud becomes prime minister, initiates modern izotion plans Daoud resigns( new PM Yusu introduces more democratic constitution -- Gen. Daoud overthrows King Zohir Shah, sets up new republic PDPA sto~rs Marxist coup, ki s Daoud, establishes single party state ( Dn1..t11r' \1(, tth,,ut Ror.lu... ).tn,l ('ARE lnrern.lltl1n.tl. t trh, r th.tn hnw 111 Talrhan d, m.tn,!... r-ih Furupt:.m Untl111, the Clllll1tr)'\ l.tl').!l''l d ,,tlo.,\) pulk-,1 11\ll cherr h nll ~. 1\1 llltd- 1 \I'Js, on I~ the L'nu, d,lltol1... llld the I ntl'tll tttpn.tl ( 'ommlltl'e ~>I the R{ J l l'l''' wl11t h \H'I'l' L'\l'll1('t tmm T.dtb;m trdn..., rern,tint d in K.1hul to pnt\'ttk b,t,il hum.tntt.trt.ln ''"L'Illt.tb Tlw '''l' lln.til' L'X<>du... h,,, J'I'Oiok, d 1 d,,rer.ttt,ltu.l!hll\ for the morl' th 111 n.h1ll'' h.11,.,lonl' much 111 turh h.t,tc hunt.tn frt'l'dunh, prt'\ l'lll IIJ't'n tlltll lltttl dn l loplllllll,.md thl'l':tlt'll 111 lltrn thl "th'\\ t\h.:h.lllt,r.tn" rnr.',1 ntthm nl tllnlr.lil'' \\ tth nrtu,tll) 1111 n,.:hr, lor lt m de-.., ll\tl' h tit tlw J'Opttl.t tl!lll. F,H ld.tn-1 urlwr hum.ml!.tn.tn \\lt!lll'n nl.t\ pn>lllfll rl'.llii '"' tlw [tid.m 1\tllprnH' un.1hk tn umrrol. Edward Gtrardet covered Afghamstan as a foreign correspondent for The Chnstion Sctence Monitor and the MacNeil Lehrer NewsHour, starting with the Soviet invasion in December 1979 He is now the editor of CROSSUNES Global Report Additional Sources Afghamstan An Essential Field Gutde to Humanitarian and Conflict Zones ( 1998) by Edward Girordet, editor Afghanistan. Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid ( 1998) by Rolph H Magnus and Eden Noby. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghamstan and the Taliban ( 1998) by William Maley, editor USSR invades to support PDPA against the lslomtc mujohideen USSR withdraws troops, murahideen estob ish government in exrle Mujahtdeen invade Kabul, Soviet-mstolled regime collapses Tolibon tokes con trol of southern Afghanistan; civil unrest follows Tolibon puts down resistance, seizes power m Kabul, enforces strict Islamic low 41

48 BURMA/MYANMAR -v. / 8hulon ':" 1 Sirtw~ 8oyol a..gol rnc o 1,, ' -,. Alt10 contrdll!td ~,. -. lhe Koren Ntdiong( ~ t Mondoloy Burma/ Myanmar Rangoon Chona...: r \ ''1 '.. -'. - : I... laos ~, -.. ~ THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Territory (Koren) Warring Parties: Government of Myanmar vs. Karen Notional Union (KNU) Troop Strength: Government: 300, ,000 KNU: 2,000 4,000 Est. Deaths ( 1997): battle-related; more than 1,000 overall Est. Deaths (total): 8,000 battle-related from and 5,000-8,000 bottle-related from ; 100, ,000 overall Source SIPRI. PIOOM. AKUF Poth * Thalland BY ZUNETTA LID D ELL 42 -Sea 150molm kitomolen< BASIC FIGURES ' ' Gull ol Thollond Area: 261,969 $Cj. mi (678,500 sq. km.) Population. if Life Expectancy at Birth: 57 years System of Government: Mrlitary Regime Languages: Burmese Other Religions Buddhist 89% Chrrstian 4% Muslim 4% Animist Beliefs 1% Other 2% Ethnic Groups: Burman 68% Shan 9% Karen 7% Rakhine 4% Chinese 3% Mon 2% Indian 2% Other 5<l' Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US. $51 5 billron GDP Per Capita: U.S $1, 120" External Debt: Source CIA U.S $5.5 billion I. Much of Burma/Myanmar In Karen ~tate, the :PDC launchej a expen enu:j peace in 1997 major offemrve agarn~ t K.tren National for th e frn ume in nearly U nro n (KNU)-held pmrtron~ tn March 40 year:. of warfare herween the state 1997, rai~ing Lhe number of refugees in a nd armed oppo ili on gmups. However, Thailand ,000. The offensive pe;1ce remained uncertn in, even in a reas hegan soon after the KNU organi:ed a wh e re Lea~e-fire' h.td h~en in place '~mi n ar of nrmej ethnrc oppllsition ~ rn ce The ch.mge rn the name of gm up ~ that endcj wnh a Jurnt "Mae the government tn Nov~mber 1997 Tha R,l\v Hta" <lgrcement. Thr-. agreefrom"~ tale Law a nd O rder Re~torat i o n rnenl call ed on the government to Council ( LORC)" to " tate Peace and e rnhark o n tripartite talb wilh ethnic Development CoLrncrl ( ' PDC)" reflect- mrnmitres anj the Jernouatic opposred the mtlnary\ determination to retarn tron, lcj h) the Natrona! League for power and nversee J cveh1prnent of the Democracy (and Nobel Peace Pri:e coumry. It also rcvl!n lcd hnw far the Laurcmc Aung ' ;m, tru Kyi), a call military h ad fniled to Jo sn after nearly 1h :11 hns heen repealed for four yea r ~ in 10 years in power. sulce~~ i ve U.N. General Assembly reso- The crealion of the ~PDC also unco\'- lutilms., rnce that offcnsi\'e, in which ered deep Jrvi,rum \\ rthin the mili- 1 he KNU lost mud1 Lernwry, there tary- d ivrsrons that ha\'e made long- have heen no further ~igns that talb term po licy Jecisiom e lusrve and ra i ed wi ll resume. the imecurrty of groups tr7ing to create a better future (or thcrr people. Meanwhi le, exrstrng ce;he-ftre~ ::.howcj no srgns of dcveloprng inw lasting peace ttt lb, a nd fighting coni inued in three states. In Karenni (Kayah) state, the Ka renni National Progressrve Party (KNPP) returned to war wnh the government when a March 1995 cea~e-fi re bro ke down in Jul y In me;rs where small gruups of KNPP so ldi e r~ operated, rcw l-

49 -... CONFLICT TIMELINE 1947 Britain /eranls indepen ence; U Nu be<:omes first prime minister E-:xd.:J Bunno!'o!,udenr' holt! {JI<IIITo!' of oppo<lll!lnletw<'t Arm~: \mr \uu f.:" tlunn)! />Tfll<lll m [rom of chcrr cnrn11n \ l'llll'<t"' m ThmLnulm Augusr!lJ<H fwm March 1996 Ill St ptt mhn 1997, foruhl y rl Inc.llt',l ro 'I r.ltt'glc garrhon t<l\\11'> or Into ~xde 111 Th.uland Gen NeWin deposes U Nu, suspends constitulton, establishes outhoritonon control Notional referen dum establishes new democratic constitution nwre t h ,000 cn d 1,111, wt re forced rowns. In M;1y I 99H, i r '' <b rcpnned that t.d b ht l ween the KN PP ;lllj the 19tJ8 1 n '< >llll'.lfl.'a' wherl.' \' 1l lagcrs.ntempted to r~ t urn In 1hcir homes tn find foo,l In 'ourhern Shan '>tate, 1988 SLORC tokes rvwer in bloody civi war, su~resses f!10ss emocrottc uprisings S PDC had rt,umcd, though no,uh,rantt.t l rrngre" h.ld been lll.ldl' Ll\\-kn l fi ghring u HHIIHit'd o\ er.1 \\ ldt.lrt.l 111 IIH '->h 111,r,ll t', ''here fl!dhii1j.!,d,n oclurred hl'i\\~l'n the SSA.mJ tht Utlllc.l \Va S t.ltt'' Pan y. a grnur that had reached a tease-lire d!.!rl'tmenl "uh dw gnn rnml'nt SLORC ignores results of democratic elections, maintains power l'rl.'.lk.m,l\ gr'"'f'' nf tlw.\1<1111.! T~11 :\rnn uli11 11Hil'd t<l f1 g l11 dw '-!"' L'rn IIH'IH,illt'r tlw j,ijhiolf\ )l)l)(l 'Urrt ndt t 1992 Tho1lond pressures SLORC to n~otiote cease fire agreements with ethnic groups The J.!P\t'rtlllll'lll \ mdll.tr) I. ICll<.:' -\''<ILI<III< n,,f "" uth (,,1 A'1an fm.:u,e,l on <1\'il~;m ' llf1f1< >lll'r' ''' rhc Narron' (t\sl AN) 111 July 1997, and hrt alm.i\ gr<>ll f'' wlllt h 111 l\1.lrch 199h )<>111\.'<1 tngethn tn form tlw :-;h.111 ~r II\.'' 1 hut: "t'rt '"Ill<' ' 1gn' 1 h.n Burma\ -\ "-EAN nughhor' "nuld llllfl'a'c Arm) In 1 ht rwn \'t:,h'.titer h hru.lf\ pre"urt In, nuhir.lgt rnp.lrt Itt' tal b. 19lJ6, m ore th.lll 300,000 f'l'<>i'ic were luneha Liddell is the Burma researcher for the As10 D1v1sion of Human Rights Watch and is based in London. Additional Sources Burma in Revolt. Opium and Insurgency Since 1948 ( 1995) by Bert llintner. Burma Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity ( 1991) by Marlin Sm th Burmese Polit1cs The Dilemma of National Unity ( 1980) by Josef Silverstein "Entrenchment or Reform? Human Rights Developments and the Need for Conflnued Pressure" ( 1995) by Human Rights Watch Opposilton leader Aung Son Suu Kyi released from six years of house arrest Government arrests 260 Notional League for Democracy members; Suu Kyi invites followers to draft own constitution

50 CAMBODIA Kom Cambodia J Kompong Chom Phnom Penh * nwsoom '-.,(... laos Vtetnom, ' ' THE CONFLIG Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Government Government of Cambodia vs. Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) (PDK) Troop Strength: Government: 140,000" PDK: l,000-4,000 Est. Deaths (1997): na Est. Deaths (total): More than 50,000.. bottle-related; more than l million overall F'fJ<J"',.c/CJ<I,s oil m,/,ho.. F;gure,r>clucJes on Ml1moleci 25,300 Victnomme soldiers wl.o c/,ecj dvr~ng n Comlxxl o Sources SIPRI. AKUF BY J EFFERY T. C RO USE BASIC FIGURES Area: 69,900 sq. mi. (18 1,040 sq. km.) Population: 11, 163,861 Life Expectancy ot Birth: 50.3 years System of Government: Multiparty liberal democracy under o constitutional monarchy Languages: Khmer (official) French Religions: Thcravada Buddhism Other Ethnic Groups: Khmer Vietnamese Chinese Other 95% 5% 90% 5% 1% 4q; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) U.S $7.7 bill.on' GDP Per Capito: U S $71 0' External Debt. US. $1.9 b.llion J I ~4 a,jtkaer[o Source. CIA "Look at me. Am I a savage per.,on? My conscience is clear." -Pol Pm, durmg hrs fine mtert'h'tl' m mure chan /8 )'Can 1-ar E. stern EctliWmrc Re, ie'' Jr~l)' /997 T hnnoghom it> onojem hi>ttny, Rouge, '" '"""' "' 2 million people h"j Camhodia h a~ experienced a died at the h.md~ llf the regime. '>ert('~ of civil cnnflrct~ fueled Throughout the 19 Q.,,,1 c i\ il war perhy inrern <l l dl\ t.,ions and external ~isted hetween the Vie L n,um:~ e - imta ll cd involvement. Internal divbions governmenr and rebel force~. hetween the ll1llll<lrchy, rival communbt All part i e~ to the civil w<1r ~igned a group~. and vannus repuhl1can e lemenb comprehen'>l\'l' peace agreement 1n lul\'e been sparked by cxternal mvolve- Ocrubcr n Pari... Tht~ agrcement mcnt from Cambodia\ rival ne1ghbor.,, created the Unned Natiom Tran:-itinnal Vietnam and Thailand, m add1t1on tn Authority 1n Cambodia {U TAC) ro France, Chtna, and the UntteJ rare,. nversee a $2 bdl10n effort to repatriate In the 1 960~. Cambodia became refugees, disarm warnng f.h.:t iom, and embroiled in thc war in Vietnam, with conduct a democratic e lection. Nonh Vietnamese forces and V1et Cong Two criucal events lim1ted UNTAC\ guerr ill a~ usmg territory in c a ~ t crn Cambodia to ~ up p u rt their efforts ~ucce~s: T he Khmer Rougc refu~ed to d isarm, and the former rulin g again~t outh Vietnam. Accordingly, Cambodian Peoples Pa rty {CPP), led by the United 't,lte., supported Gen. Lon No!\ anti-communist government o~gaimt the Khmer Rouge, wh1ch wa~ Gcn. llun Sen, refu!-ed to accept rhe 1993 e lection rcsu lts following the party'~ unexpectt'd defeat. T he,tll1ed wnh North Vietn,lm. atlnn;ll Unned Front fm.m On Apri l 17, 1975, t he Khmer Rouge, Independent, Neurral, Peaceful. and led hy Po l Pot, captured Phnom Penh C11opcrative C:unhodia {FUNCINPEC) and beg<1n nearl y four year-. of genocidal and CPP agreed to a coalllillll governrule. By 1978, when Vietnam 1nvaded menr led hy LO-pnme mmisters Prince Camhodi:1 :rnj ou ~ ted the Kh mer NoroJom Ranariddh and H un Sen. 44

51 CONFLICT TIMELINE 1Y95.tnd JlN7, h t ~.:hlif.!hll'lj hy ol M.lTLh ~0. [997, g ren.tde <11 1.1d t h a t kdkd 19 ('l'p)'k ell ' r.dl~ kd b~ ~.llll R.lll1,\,,, le,l l111g ('Ill deltlllltoll\ pullllli.io. Thl' le d.1 \'tol<-'111 L<HI(' d'ct.ll t h,ll (,1ru~J ht, Tl\",d,!'nnu R,mand,lh, llllll l':l.tk. A I hat oll k... l) I f.uncin t'xl'l..llll'li fo lio \\ 111g t h e Cllll('. E l..:l1ll'l1h pf t h l' FUN( 'INI'H. fll'd I<\ thl' rh.: f>:lunl'r [\(JHg( h, ul /CttL"l' rh,m (\\ 1 fu,al 1 r 1 1/>\ 111m ol('p.tr;i( U,, thu, l.<llli('tnl111'1!1g the k gnlm,tq,,( till l'k lt tnn. B.. t w<. e n 1 99~.md 199H, the Kh m~_ r RnUI.(l' stl'old th dl~ oll\lcgratl'' l. A sl'til'' uf,ld.. ~: t lllns hrmtj.:ht htgh-rankm g Khmer RnliJ.:l' k,tdn, IIllo 1 hl (.unhujtan gn1 ernnwnt. In Jum 1997, tlw r~. mam l nf.! h htll<-' 1 Rtlllf.!l' tore'-'' ''"-'rthr<.'\1 Pol Put.md 111Llll('tl',l tn di,1,111l<-' rh~. m,l'he, ITlllll rh.. ol!tlll.ltll'',,f rh<.'it ('Tl'\'hlll' Tl'J.: IIn<.'. R, April 1 '-N~. when Pnl 1\n cll._.,l, rh._ Khm.. r R n uge h.h.l f._.w._..- 1 h.lll I,000 In\ al Camho d1.t\ ret u rn r,, \HI tnughr tlw l lun ~l'l1 \.!ll\'<-'tll hnel f'l'th,,l,,, Ill'(''!tiT pe.11..l', mcnt througlh11ll I'-N7. T<-C\li1,1Tlldlllll,.md gl<l\\th. A '-'-' ''l' fttl' \\,h T<-' Khl',ltn l.tlllt;tt\ (.llnbt~, l t,t\ llllllll',lt.tll lutlit<-' d, pend, 199~. ollhll'rtnll' R.tn.Htddh Tl' l llflll'd Ill llll \\hl'tih'r.l \\nrk.thl, ).!ll\l'ti1111l'nt C.unh..,lt,t 111 ll.l.trd1. l'nlliil.d tl n-.run' l'l'lllolllll'd h1gh,.llhlek urnll l't'llt.:~l Lolll<-'111<-'Tgl ln11n rh._ 199~._.l._._rllmul I fun -.:._.11 \\ 11h t'll<liij,.:h l._.g tlllllok\' tn \ ll\ll'l1ll' l'sl,liolll'd rnur Ill fl)l' l11h!oli.:kk lill' 111,1"1\'l' ('l'<lhk111' llf lqw; l'k'l IIl \11. ll un ~l'l1 l'l'lll.t lrwd fi rm- dl ~t lo l' lll<-'111,,(rug tr.lf fllktn:.:, ;m ~l lr 111 Ull11llll"l t he a rm.. d forll'' rhe pro, inu.tl.ldnunt,t r.tt lnn,.tnd t h e c lec- LliTI'IIJ'l lo n.111d ('Tl'\'l'lll a return t tl hrn.ldl'l cl\ d LontlJL! Cambodia gains independence from France U.S bombings helh depose Prince Si anauk, install Gcn Lon Nal in power Pal Pot and Khmer Rouge take over Cambodia after United States wtth draws from Vietnam Vietnam invades Cambodia, overthrows Pol Pot after his regime kills 2 million Vietnam withdraws from Cambodia Following peace treaty, U.N. fc:cekeepers dep oyed, Sihanouk returns to throne U N.-spansored elections produce coalition government Banned Khmer Rouge stcp.s up campaign of terror in countryside Jeffery T. Crouse ts reg1onal program director For Asia and the Middle East at the International Republican Institute (IRI}, a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing democracy worldwide. He has managed IRI's democracy-building activities in Cambodia since Additional Sources: Brother Enemy: The War After The War ( 1986) by Nayan Chanda. Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land ( 1998) by Henry Kamm The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945 (1991) by David Chandler Hun Sen ousts first prime minister; resistance forces and Khmer Rouge fight government Pol Pot dies

52 INDIA,._, CJoimed a,.lnd;o Alghoft- <. "'" ~ miles 1 I Kosfulur', 'i=::=--...; lulometon Chono ~. l ~N> "" ' G~Wrol ;.... ~ Po\uttnn..'. ' f ' ',.. ~., Nt~ pol.,.. _.,,.,.. '".,~, 7, New Delhi ~ ', ) ~ llbu!iui /,,.J *...,.,.... \.'" : '!' e;,,gr..r,';f,! l I :' Calcutta!', l - 1 Indio ' UU'fTnCI 0 Bomboy eo,. ol Bongol Bongo! ore Modras...,.,... THE CONFLICT Incompatibility Warring Part1es Territory (Kashmir, Pun1ob, Assam) Government of Indio vs. Kashmir insurgents vs. Bodo Security Force (BdSF) vs. United liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) vs. Government of Pakistan Troop Strength: Government of India: 1, Kashmir Insurgents: no BdSF: no ULFA: no Government of Pakistan 587,000 Est. Deaths ( 1997): More than 500 bottle-related; more than 3,500 overall Est Deaths (total) More than 20,000 bottle-related; more than 38,000 to more than 58,000 overall'.. ' Severolgroups ore Od1YO, ~nclucl~ng the Jammu one/ Koshm.r t.berot1on Front IJKIF}. the H1zb o Mu,oh1cloon. one/ the Horkol ui Ansor 500 I. 500 oro 1hc resul1 of the conr1cts m Koshm.r one/ w1th Pok1ston ,000 ore the result of lite confl1cts 1n Koshm.r one/ w1th PakiStan Sources SIPRI. PIOOM AKUF 46 St~ lonko BASIC FIGURES Areo: 1.269,340 sq. mi. 13,287,590 sq. km.) Population: 966,783,171 Life Expectancy ot Birth: 62.4 years System of Government: Republic Languages:' H1ndi English Bengali Telugu Marathi Relig1ons; Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Other Tamil Urdu Gujorati Moloyohom Kannada 80% 14% 2.4% 2% 1.6% Ethnic Groups: Indo Aryan 72% Dravidian 25% Mongoloid/ other 3% Gross Domestic Product IGDP): US $1,538 trillion.. GDP Per Capita : U.S. $1,600'' External Debt: U S. $97.9 billion... H nc/1 1> lite nahonollonguoge oncl pnmary longue of 30 perccnl of ""'people There orrt atl«nn 2 4 longuogm 16 of wh1ch orr> offic10i spo1en by I m1ff10tt or morrt persons There Cll1! a/so nume<ous oih«language> oncl cl1ulocts ' 1996 e>/omolecl Match 1995 Source OA B Y A MITABH MATTOO F 1fry ye a r~ after India achieved it:. pre-elecn o n do m e~ u c agenda. 1ndependenLe 1n 1947, th e coun- The m ilitant imurgency and se parati ~ t try\ polili cal stal'lility re mains movement in Jammu and Ka:-.hmir are c h<1 lle nged hy :1 numher of internal cnn- t he most s e r i o u ~ laced hy India in the f11 c h, inc ludmg several sepa ratist move - last SO ye a r ~. N e arly 30,000 people, menr~ 1n the pnl\'l!lce o f Jamm u and ~n c lu d111 g at least 15,000 c 1vil ia m, ha ve K a~ hm ir and 111 the northeast bee n killed in the p rovin ce -,ince Militant groups, LNIregio n of rhe Lountry. Exte rnally, India\ n:ld t1o n s with Pak l'>t,m Pakl... t<m, have de mandre ac h ed a nad1r.lite r the rwo c ountnc :-. con - Juc red a se ri e~ of Tlk mrliranc rnstoj!c:ik)' in./ammu and Kmhmir arc rlw mmc sc:rioll.\ a ll y "upporred hy ed a U.N.-admim stered plebiscite in rhe prov111ce to decide nuclear tests in May faced h:-o India in rh c: whe ther Jammu a nd India <lnj r.. klst<ll1 la~ l 50 )'I!LIT:I. Kash m ir... hould rcma tn a h ave gnnc to war three rimes since T h ro ugh nlld- 1998, conflic ts hascj o n Libte, rc ilg1o n, anj et hni e~ t y conunued ro d1v1de I mila,,tn extraordinanly dl\ e r~e count ry and the world\ largest d e mocracy. T he elc~;.u o n o f a llind u nanonal i"t Rh.1ri t) <1 J a n <~ta P <1 rty ( BJ P)- led cnal1t1lln g11\ crnme n r in Marc h 1998 gene rat ed \\ ' td c~ pread tnst.:curi ty w ith in India\ Mu ~ lim m ino rity. T h ~.: BJP, however, 'L'ems to have te mpered part o( India, accede co Pak isum, o r become independent. By 1996, Indian security force" had con tam ed t he m ~ urge n cy to only a few rura l a rea s, alhe n,umd c h a rge~ nf m a~~ ive h uman n g h t ~ V i o lati o n ~. In addit to n, the O c tobe r 1996 imtalla t1 o n of,\ democraucally e lec ted gove rnment, under C hief M ini:;te r D r. Fa ronq A bdullah, emured a ~c mbla n c e o f nnrma lc y in the province. A lt h o ugh l ndia and P a ki ~ tan commi tted the m -

53 CONFLICT TIMELINE W'r IP.m wkt n from \ft"l1m StP.1Tclll 11 m cru dlspuu:d f<a.,hmtr rcg~rm of lndra at<' lll\f>t:cud lry an /ndran suldj., 'L'h-l'' '" n.''"king d1l K. a,hmir prnhkm llj'ii1t<ll1 alta ULFA mtln.tnt' murjen:d rhnlltgh.1 htl.tter.tl clt.tl ngu<.', 11 \\'.h \\l'll rl''f'l'l:ll'd hum,tn ngjh,.iltivi't unlah h th 11 '"'t.un.thlc peall' \\nuld '-' 111) 0 ~ Cih<"l' i. return tn ti K \,tl lq 111 the 'hun term. 1\..ag;al.md.tncl ~l.tn1pur, twn urher The 'ep.1r.1t l'f nhl\"e mc n t, ruu, rl' ll1:lllw d dl'l'j' h d l\ 1dl d,,, pf June 11<lrt hl t\il'rn prnvinl'c,,,tl,n facej 'tnmg armed llhi\ L'lllent' dl ma nding 199S,.md L' L'l1 tlw umhrdl.1 12-p.lrt) 'L'f'.lf.ltl' hnmd tnd, NuL k ar re't' h~ 'l'll'"hllll't, rg.tni:.hwn, Thl t\11 Parn In!1,1.md Pak1,t,1n lfl":tted \\lde,rn:.ul llurn~. ll (rrc'l'd<lm) l'nnkn:rh.e, h.t,l fl.1r' pf.1 nulil tr \\.tr 111 Suuth :\'' ' l.,,r mulh,,f "' puhl1c 'llf'f'prt. Thl.' Ll'l'l' 111 nnrtlw.t't lnd1.1 ''''no p,, Jww JlJ9'-t, h<l\\l'\l'i, h"t h lndi.1.tlhl l'.lkl,t.m 'L'L'IIlnl "' h.i\l'.icll'f re,l till' le" '~fl'''" 11 much k-,, puhllll:l d. Ol.'l:.l for 1 'll't lii1ld d11l<l).!uc to cn,urc A",1111, 111 <111-rrdl pr<n lllll' 111 tlw lh.tt thl'tr rq~1' n, 11,1 n,,, I'L'Lilltle rhc rcg1un, \\a~ <llh t'f dw \\ttr~r Jut,'' 1th 'IlL' for.1!llllil.ir Arm.1gul.lon. In,t,!d l the UnrtL,I Llhl'f;tll!lll f-r n nt nf A,,,1rn (ULFA).111d trrh.tl P,"d" mrl1t.1nt' run tl<lll, hurh ullllltfil'' tkd.trl d.1 rnor;at< l " " fttrthl-r tl''t'.1 nd ullllllltrrnl lllll!.! p.~r.tllcl g1nernml nts 111 the them chl.'s rn nl gntl.l!lllg.1 F1"1lc rl.'gtoll. llw l LF1\ l''tr.tngl,l pul>lte ~1 11~11 rl ( uroll Tll',ll) (f ~H T). Dr Amtlobh Malloo is assoctale professor al the School of lnlernolionol Studies at Jawahorlal Nehru Universtty m New Delhi and a columnist for The Telegraph m Calcutta He has been a visiting professor at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for lnternolional Peace Studies at the Universtty of Notre Dame Additional Sources. The Cold War on the Periphery: The United Stales, lndta, ond Pakistan ( 1996) by Robert J. McMahan. The Cnsis in Kashmir ( 1997) by Sum it Ganguly, ed1tor Indio gains independence from Brito.';(, ~oe~ to war wa okaston Indio annexes Goa, Damon, and Diu; brief war wath China ensues Indio and Pakistan fight second war over Kashmir Support for Bangladesh leads to new war with Pakistan in Kashmir Pakistani-supported Muslim militants launch Kashmir insurrection 500,000 Indian troops wo~e war on dissi ents, Pakistani forces Government rejects own plan to hold elections in Jammu, Kashmir Former Koshman militants orgonaze 'Village Defense Forces" opposed to pro Pakistani ond pro-independence Factions Indio tests nuclear weapons; Pakistan Follows suit Indio and the Bomb. Publtc Opinion and Nuclear Choices ( 1996) by David Cortright and Amitobh Mottoo, editors 4i

54 INDONESIA THE CONFLICT Pool c Ocwon Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Territory (East Timor) Government of Indonesia vs. Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) Sumatla Troop Strength: Government: 31 0,000 FRETILIN: lnd10n Ocwon kilometer'$ Dili. Timor Auslrol o Est. Deaths (1997):,... Est. Deaths {total): Source SIPRI bottle-related ; overall figures no 15,000-16,000 battle-related (military); overall figures no BASIC FIGURES Areo: sq mi. (1,919,440 sq. km.) Population : ,138 Life Expectancy ot Birth: 62.1 years System of Government: Republic Longuoges. Bahasa lndonesto (official) English Dutch Javanese Religions: Muslim Protestant Roman Catholrc Hindi Buddhist Other Ethnic Groups: Javanese Sun danese Modurcse Coastal Malays Otr r 87% 6% 3% 2% 1% 1% 45% 14% 7 5% 75% ~ Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US ~ 19 7 hillion GDP Per Capito: U S. $3,770 External Debt: U S. $11 0 bill ron YO esn Soumt CIA "Even a!. other nation~ in outheast Asia ~eemcd to be working painfully out of the region'!. financial crbi!>, Indonesia wa!.!.liding inexorably toward economic, ~ocia l and political chao:-.." 48 -Fmnrm It! Cayrac-Blanchard, Lc Mnndc Dtplnm;~uquc, Fcbnwry 1998 BY J EFFREY VVINTER S The colbr~c of the Suharw rcg1111e t n May 1998 was hera lded by the exiled Timore!>e leader Jmc Ramns-l lorta, co-winner of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize, a:. "the beginning of a pcaleful solution." The which has fought a low-level hut deterconflict he refer-. to hegan 23 year~ car- Thts or ttmt ~m was a l>mkmg contrast to the birter Mruggle between the government anj the Revolutionary Front for an lnjerendent East Timor (known by its Portuguese acronym FRETJUN), mined guern ll a campaign 'oince lier when lndone:-.ia hrutally invaded l ndone~ian forces ~wept into rhe counanj occuptcd the former Portugue:.e colony of East Timor. T he Timorc. e try o n Dec. 7, The attack came one Jay after U.. President Gt;:raiJ Dta~pora, long fractured by partisan di - Ford and ecretary of State Henry agreements and Jea lousies, anticipated the changes in Jakarta and came wgether in Portugal a month before Suharto fell to form the Natiunal Counci l of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). The CNRT elected a slate of individual, who inrenjcd to rejoin resistance fighters m~tje East Ttmor to govern their ho meland. They chose Jose Alexandre "Xanana" G usmao, whom the Timnre:.c expected to be released from ht ~ Indo nesian prison, as pre i dcnt. H t1rta, who extended an o li ve branch w Indonesia in hi s accer tance sreech, was dccted vice president. Kiss inger met with President uharto in Jakarta and gave what some have called "the big wink" to u ~ ing U.. military equipment :-.ltppliej strictly for defemc purpmes in an act of aggression. Dcsritc Indonesian atrocities, every subsequent U.. administration increased mil nary assistance to Jakarta, with $1.1 bdlton tn weaponry being sold from More than I 00,000 Timmcse perished tn 1975 alone. By the enj of the 1980:., another 100,000 Timme:.c Jied from disease, famine, and continued Indon esian a ttacks. These included massacres like the o ne at the Santa

55 I njnne,t.tn.trtn\ of I In the ,.1 pownful gr.!"> mot~ mnvcment with,1 glnhal re,kh, l:.llled the E.1-.t Timnr Auton Network (ETAN), enh.'i ged tn m.my counrnc~ ro help lira\\ wnrl,l.it tcnrton tn the -.tnt).!dc tn Tunor for CONFLICT TIMELINE Netherlands, Japan grant indebndence, Dr. Su orno becomes first prestdent West Timor joins Indonesia A f>olicemun ICTikc::s a /omrr m the Jndonesran caf>ttalof }alwrw durin,q tlte llnl'c.lt that followed Prrsidem Suharw's ahdtclllt<m of flower in Mil'/ /9911. Cru: Cemetery tn Ddt, the capttal of E,,,t Timor, whcrl' I ndnm,t,m 'rectal lnrt..e' llf'l'lll'd ftrl' t)n un.lrnh.'d (.1\'dtan pnltl''>tt.. r,, ktll tng morl' rh.m 250 Althoul!h lc.tclcr' nl rlw FRETILIN plavej,\ LrULt,lll'Xll'rl1,\l '>Up portiw r11k to FRETILI Ea-.t Timor It,tbo fot..u~ed anj world,\rtent ton 1111 lndone.,ta\ vmlcnt occupation of T imor, wh ich was genocide on " ~ca l e wo r,c, tn pro port it mal ternb, than tlw Ktllmg Fteld~ tn CamhoJta under Pnl Pot. In 1\.l.l\ tfrer 32 )Car-. in rnwcr, Pre-.tdcnt l...,uh.trto rcltnqut,hcd f'llwcr amtd a crumhlm~-: ct"ontlnl), -.rudenr re-.t,t,lnt..l', lth X.m.tn.t, h.tcl h~.. cn C.lp rrott''[',.mel url'illl rh)[' rh.h ktr ffillrl' tttr~.. d or ktllcd h) tl1l lnclont,t,m,, the th.m l.il)l~ dc.tcl The ~..h:parrure ot,tnll-!1-!h: ~.unttllltt..'d trhn In Apnl Suh,Httl, who \Hl' n pl.tll'cl h} h,, hh1g.tnd M.t), the lndont..,tan..,ufferecl ncar- time "''nl:i,ltc R.J. 1-l:ththtt', prompted I} twn dnzt n ~..,,,u,dttt..'' tn.tmhu-.h se\ cr.ll prumtnent t,fftn.d, tn J.tkarra t11.ttt.tt..b nn u1n\'o)'',,f,c~.urity for~.:e,, In earl} 19l)S,.1 fnrll' of JU't 200 FRETILIN guernll.t, rem.tinej Jug m c.tll tnr.t new.md mon: flcxtble atttrude tll\\arj negtlti.lttnl-! pl',iu.' in E.ht Timtlr. Dr. Jeffrey Winters is a professor of polittcal economy and a specialist on Southeast Asia at Northwestern Universtty and author of Power in Motion. Capitol Mobility and the lndoneston State. Additional Sources: Action Plan for Preventing Ethnic Violence in Indonesia ( 1998) by The Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Crisis Group. "Deteriorating Human Rights in East Timor" (September 1997) by Human Rights Watch. East Timor Island in Turmoil (World in Conflict) ( 1998) by Ta ro McGuinn "Indonesia: Poytng the Price for 'Stability' " (Feb. 25, 1998) by Amnesty Interna tional Dutch transfer Irion JoJo region to In onesio Lt. Gen. Suhorto tokes power, forces Sukorno to resign FRETILIN wins civil war in East Timor; Indonesia invades, annexes East Timor Indonesia opens East Timor to out siders but denies independence Government arrests FRETILIN leader Gusmoo; repression continues m East Timor Sukorno's daughter, Megawati, removed as opposition party leader; foreign journalists barred from East Timor Suharto steps down amid student-led protests, Hobibie assumes ~wer, calls for e ections 49

56 PHILIPPINES THE CONFUa South Chma Sea Monoto* Mindoro Luzon Incompatibility: Government Warring Parties: Government of the Philippines vs. New People's Army (NPA) Troop Strength: Government: 110,000 NPA: no Est. Deaths ( 1997): Fewer than 100 battle-related Est. Deaths (total): 21,000-25,000 battle-related; more than 50,000 total Sources S/1'111. AKUF Molcry.oa S..lu Sea BASIC FIGURES Area: 115,830 sq mi. (300,000 sq. km.) Population: 76,103,564 Life Expectancy a t Birth: 66.1 years System of Government: Republic Languages: Pilrprno (official, based on Tagalog) English (official) Religions: Roman Catholic Protestant Muslim Buddhist/ other Ethnic Groups. Chnstion Maloy Muslim Maloy Chinese Other 83% 9% 5% 3% 91.5% 4% 1.5% 3% Gross Domestic Product (GDP): U.S. $194.2 billion GDP Per Capito. U.S. $2,600 External Debt: U.S. $42.7 billion BY J O E E VANGELISTA S rncc the People Power Revolutr,1n ou~tmg Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, Filipinos have struggled to reclaim stability over their cconom ic and political development. With a revamped constitution spearheaded hy former President Corazon Aquino a nd foreign investment strategies hy former President Fidel Ra mo, it re mains ro he seen how the As1an econo mic crisis that began m 1997 w11l play out With the current Jo eph Estrada adm1nistrt1t1on. Lasting peace in th e Phrlippines rem;ttn~ elu!ooivc. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (CRP) continues to grapple w1th the Maoisthorn commun1~t movement that took mot The Communist Parry of Fi ssur e~ within the N PA'i> ranb have surfaced within the past twn years. Top C RP military o ffi ciab confirm rift~ within NPA o perat ions in Za mbnl e~. Pangasinnn, Bu taan, P:unpanga, T;Hhc, and the Visayas. In adjit:ion, some CRP military omciab c laim the NPA lacb the capabi lity to launch major offcm.ives aga1nst the CRP. Neverrhele:-.s, 1n 1998, the N PA counted a t l ea~ r 6,000 troop~ 1n it' ranks. For the pa-.t two years, membership and act1 v1t1es in certni n pockets of the country especiall y in the Southern Tagnlng nnd Bicol regiom.-havc increased, lightly. N PA gue rri lias h ttve commi tred <lhducu om, kidnapp1ngs, and other \'iolent act!>, albe1t on a sporadic ha~is. Becau::.e I YYO m/1moted Soumr CIA "Intruders will be ~hot. be shot again." urvivors will -Sign narled w a tree on rile mad leadmg w the main camp ()f the Mom / ~Iamie Lihenuion Front The Economist,]une27-]11ly3, 1998 the Philippines (CPP) has smce ought to overth row the government through its of infighung <1 nd 1t~ growing numher~. the NPA sull n:mam!'> a threat to mi l1t,1ry arm known a' the New People's national ~ccunty. GRP troops a re Army (N PA). 1ncc the NPA's founding hracing for vwlence o n the 30th in 1969, mme than 2 1,000 people have anniversary o f the C PP and NPA died in fighting involving the govern- in Dccemhe r 1998 anj Marc h 199<1, mcnt, NPA, :1nd uther factions. respect ively. 50

57 ~ ~ Fnr 12 \'l'.lr,, t h~ ( IRP ha' l'11!.!ilt.:cj 111 (ll\-,lj1j (lff olf..!olll1 pl',llt.' t.db \\'ith th~ tr.1t1nn. Th~. NDF umtcnd' the CIRP CPP\ J'lllHIC.d f.l<..tl!111, thl '\l,l(l()11,ll Demnaatl<.. Frlll1f (l\.df). The two 'll:llllb. Mnrt nver, the Nl)F h,1, callcj,id~.., '1~-:ned the Rreukt h:n Jnmt tnr the rck..,t:,,, r 'lmu1l rnsnnt:r.,-a Acn:~. m~:nt m ~larch 1997 tn.lccderart: rt:qut:.,t th~. CJRP ha... rt hutfej 'll far. the pc,ll't: pn1cess One n ;u l.ner, their Th~. lirj'.m,l NDF h:l\'t',1 lnng road effort' udmm.iil',lll1 th~.. "C,,mrre-.1lw. d nf tlwm. On thetr.1g<.. nd.1: ~;omhen.,i\t A!.!rt:t:ment Pn Re'J'l'CI tnr tng 111 tl rm "'lt.d.md t'c ll1 '11l1C llum.m Rt).dll'.md lntlrn.mon.d rdnrm ',,~.. 11., c.: n.,tttuttnno~l rdnrm CONFLICT TIMELINE U.S grants independence; Manuel Roxas becomes first president Ferdinand Marcos elected president Humanll.m.m L.m." R.unn., c.lllr,lll t > wh1d1 the l TJ' r~.. m.ttn' l.llllltnl[te~.l. n..,jdl\:,( Ill tht: 2~ )Colt' 11!.1rmed C1111t11d wnh tht: NPA and the do:e11 ve;lr' Ulsllll.f! fk: lu; Ill ch PhtlzfJ[>mt:. \ n mams dw tt.: as ch~ Hl!ltd \\lth tht I'A. the Ph 1 II pplnl'!.!"'ern menr h.h '' ntggl~.. d tnr two dec,1de, '1g11ed it 111 Auguo,r g-ot.:rnml'nl cunrimtl!\ l!l'l11.)' tn the ~ >uth Lall~:d 1998, hut the p~:ace W!!,W/>J>i<.. H llh th~ the Mtll'll (..,(,lmtl l"rnu.:.,s then hit :1 snag. \! ctuist~hum L0111llllllll\l l.th<.. r.ttllln Fmnt (MJLF). Ttl b 1111 i mplem~:nt 1 ng lllllt 'l'jnclll thd! wok In t.jrl) NlwL mher J 99~. 1 ht agrl'ement ''ere ~u.,pe11d- rout Ill I ()6,"1. Est r;~d.l appt. rnl to he m<lked 111 "epr1:mher lij9t' hel.ill.,t: tlw t\\'o 'Ide, I.PU!d not.1\,!ret on the tng prpgrl'" 111 J'l'.ILI' ralb '' nh rhe 'l'l' r.l!tst :-.tile 11,1\\'l'\er,.1 d~.. dframe\\'mk t11.lppl) the at..:rel'i11l'l1t. (, 'L k Pl'utrrnl \\ h~.. 11 rh~.. 1\ 1ll.F,km.md- Th~.. l~rl'.lrj.!ul's th.u the NDF must e,l rt'ipgntth nnf 46 rdwl tnrltortl'' <...trn Plll th~...lgrel'l11eih pursu the th.ll thl' j.!ll\l'rt1llh'l1t w,jj11<..'d ~,-,111\ errl d tenet'> of rh~.. Phtl1ppmt: u lbtttuttnn. tl1t ":PilL''"' I'L',Ilt'." Tlw t-.tilf ''.1 Hu\\'e\'1'1', th~.. l\il)f ll.ltllh that dotng "' spltntt:r f.!rlllll' tnllll till' l.jrgn Mnm \\oukl h~.. l<llll.lmnunt t11 surrendenng. N.tllun.d l.dwr.tttlll1 Fn,nt, \~htch 111 O djej ~lll..:klllg potnrs tnclud~.. the 1'196 'll-:11\.'d ol['l'dcl' trt:a(\ With thl tndemnthl.iitlln of vilttms,,f hum.m J-!11\ernm~. nt. Joe Evangelista wntes and produces news programming for Cable News Network (CNN) m New York He is completing a master's degree in international communication from American University m Washmgton, D C. Additional Sources: The Anti Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (1996) by Mark R. Thompson. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines ( 1998) by Thomas M. McKenna. Patterns of Power and Politics in the Philippines: Implications for Development ( 1994) by James F. Eder and Robert Youngblood NPA begins f11ht for J?OWer, and reform Marcos establishes new constitution suspends it under martial law Corazon Aquino becomes president, puts down pro Marcos coup attempt NPA declares limited cease f1re, resumes fighting following year U.S. forces withdraw President Ramos offers amnesty to NPA, other dissident Government, Muslim separatists in south s1gn ~ce treaty to end quarter century of hostilities Former V1ce President Estrada elected president 51

58 SRI LANKA lndoo Jo o THE CON FLICT Boy of Bengal Incompatibility: Territory (Tamil) Warring Parties: Government of Sri Lanka vs. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTIE) Troop Strength: Government: 110,000 Lm: 5,000-8,000 Est. Deaths ( 1997): More than 4,000 battle-related; overall figures no Sri Lanka Est. Deaths (total): Mare than 40,000 battle-related; 48,000 to more than 70,000 overall Sources SIPRI. PIOOM. Al(f.JF it Colombo BY JACK A. PATTERSON BASIC FIGURES Area: sq mi. (65,61 0 sq. km ) Population: 18, Life Expectoncy at Birth: 72.4 yeo~ System of Government. Republic Languages: Smhalo (official) Tamil English Religions: Buddhist 69% Hindu 15% Christian 8% Muslim 8% Ethnic Groups: Smholese 74% Tam1l 18% Moor 7% Burgher, Malay, v~dda 1 0 Gross Domestic Product (GDP): u.s $69 7 b IOn' GDP Per Capita: U.S. $3,760' External Debt: U.S. $9.6 billion'' S n La n ka ohscrved the 50th <111111VcN1ry of its independence from Bmam on Fe h. 4, I 998. Even at ~uc h,m ausptciou~ moment, homh~ and 1 h r ea t ~ forced the cancellatton and rramfcr of major tclehration Len:mon t c~ from K,mdy lo the capita l ci ty ofcolomho. A ll p r e~e n t, tnformall y. As attempts ro negotiate d solution failed, Tamil calls for autonomy shtfted ro calb for sece!>!>ton. In 1983, following the LTTE killing of I) government troop~ in the north, retali,nory attacb on Tamib tn Colomho anj elsewhere in the south I.:J to between 350 (government e~ t ima t e) includ ing the worij pre~:-. Amlll'SC)' and 2,000 (Tamil e'timate) were graphtcally reminded frhl'rnatllmal l1ld people k illej, with up to of the ongoing war uthl'r human ng/h$ 100,000 fleeing Colombn he tween the govern- grnhf>s cite HIOrl' dwn for hasti I y establish ed men t anj the 600 "di.,aj)/>l' mmcl's" refugee camps. Ltheration T igers of thl' J 11 ghl'\c By I 985, the mtlitary Tamil Ee l.un (LTTE).,; 11 cl' J9l)() and,.. thl' e ngagement had c~calared Fifty years of indcpen- hi~hl'.\l in thl' tl'm ld into a spiral o f v io lence Jcnce have '>een extended in JlJ97. and repressio n with the LTTE periods of emergency rule, h tgh leveb of human r ights violatio n:,, and control! mg the Jaffna peninsula in the far north. Both sid es resorted to 1995 e>l rnaled "The 15-year-old civil war in Sri Lanka is Asia's bloodiest conflict ~ incc the war in Vietnam." - World Press Review, Alrril/ inteme, often v1ciom, mtlttary engagement between ethnic communitie~ and hctween the government anj the rehel LTTE. From the early Jay'> of independence, tnh<tlc~c Buddht'>t mterems hegan to domm,lte the '>t<lte wtth many Tamib feeling mn rginal ized anj disc.rim inated <l).(<lln.,t hoth offictally and extremely repressive meam. The LTTE has been accused of assassinations, torture, and attacb on c ivilians, includtng ma,sive homh:-. in public p laces, while the government has been accused of torture anj other abuse:-., mcludmg the :-.eem ingly arbitrary an d unpunbhed "dtsappearance" of hundreds of Tamils.

59 ~ CONFLICT TIMELINE Amnc!'tt y lntern.truma l.tnj \lthcr m,lln parlwmentary oppo~1t 1nn, the hum;l n right ~ g rnup~ Clll' m o re than 600 Un1tcd National Pnrty (UNP). Fm tts "db.1ppc 11.\nc~o. \ 1n! 9"17, the h1 gh~o. st pan, rh~o. LTTE rcma1m J.tmh1\ aknt and s mt~o.!990 and,.1u:orj1ng to the U.N undcar 111 it' intent tons, ;tlternatcly Work1ng ()roup, 111 Enfnru:-J or,,,,crltng Its ~kma nj for nnt hmg lc'' I n \'olunt.try Dl~ rrcar.tnces, the high c~ t t h.m,\ 'era rat c '>tate of Tamtl Ed.tm anj 111 th~ w11dd 111 II.J97 then ' ''" mg It would,cttlc h1r Ic,,.mly In 1994, wtrh thl' e il l.ll<lll <lf 1 mojcr- under 'trier um~llrtn tb. arc prcsld~o. nr, ( ' h,mdnk.t Bandaranalkc- - t'h'ral go\'l..'rl1ll1l'l11'> Including peace overtures,,, ce,,,tl inn <)f fighnng Kmgdnm,.md Sweden and no ngtlvcrnand f,,rmal peilll' t;tlb g<tve n s 1ng hope tlur the long umf1 1ct mtght end. In menralorg;tnl:atlt)tb oftcrcd tn a'sl!'tt the p.trtte,, tf they wnuld.tgree to negn- April 1995, th~o. cessat inn end~o. d, 1 iatl'. Rnmhings in the center of tmtead, With LTTE '>lltllde all.tcb ag.lln'r n,t\ y,hi"' 11"1 P lrt. The govern- Colomhn on Ocr. 15, 1997, and,tgain in l'tlrl\' 199 ' hll\\'l'\'1..'1', have le..sened r orllll'llt I <Htnd 1~o. d Rl\'lfl.."' ' (Sunr.ty) I.md ul,tr prl'"llr~o rlw gnhtnment 111 open II, the l.tn!l''t l.tmp.ugn',,t the \\'.lr, r.tlb \\ 1th th~o. LTTI, whtch tt <llft.:talh whtch rl''tt!red 111 t,tk m g J,t(f11.t Ctty,md hanncd 111 l.muary l l)9h The l.!<ln rn rhl j,tlfn,t l'l'llllbttl.t. Up tn '500,000 re,t,lt nt'!led 11 rlw l.tte\ or,ler,_ S m ce l 1 N5, thl cn11tltd h,t, cn111111ued nll'nt w,t, tun her L'l11h,ll,kl1e,l h, the ('lctnhvr [l)l)( U.S. St.ttl' Department,[e,lgl1.tttun <ll tlw LTTE "',,!.lrl'lgn llll'nt pl.tlej It' IPng prlltnts~o. d. ne\\,lr.lft then w, t, li11k ind tglltnl1 frnm ~o. tthcr C<ll1,tlluttun het.nl' P.trlt.tnH'nt, 1ndud- ' Ilk- of tmp, ndmt-: mnn'l11l'l1t on talk,, 1111.! pt<lpn,,t[, fnr the,ln o lullnn o f f'<lwcr,tnd mtltr.tf\ da'hl''..:nn11nued til llllllr 111 rcgto11ailnllt1l:tk Thc,c 111 turn were htgh lu" nf!ttl'.md large '>cale dt,pbcenppo,ej h~ the pnm.tr~ Buddhi'>t Licrg~ ment nf Ct\ tltam. on J.m. 31, 199H,.tnd rejected hy the D~ Jack A Patterson is director of the American Friends Service Committee's Expatriate Dialogue Program in the New York Metropolitan Regtonal Office. Additional Sources Buddhism Betrayec/2: Religion, Politics, and Violence m Sri Lanka (1992) by Stanley Jeyaraja Britain ~{ants indep.eln ence, UNP forms first coalition government Sn Lanka Freedom Party wins elections Government suppresses People's Liberation Front upnsmg LTIE begins firrht for separate Tami slate Indian troops sent to monitor cease-fire between government and LTIE Indian troops withdraw; clashes resume President Premadasa assossinated, LTIE-~overnment fig ti30jills 2, Government launches Rivirasa offens1ve against Tamil se~aralisls mass i~of refugees ins LITE inaicts heaviest defeat of government forces in four years - Sri Lanka The Invention of Enmtty ( 1994) by Davtd Little. When Memory Dies (1997) by Ambalavaner Sivanandan. 53

60 TAJIKISTAN I ~ Ta jikistan * Dushanbe,.. _.._.r 75 kilometers,.. '.. ' Chino THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Government Warring Parties: Warlords' Troop Strength: no Est. Deoths ( 1997): More than 1,000 overall Est. Deoths (total): 50, ,000 overall Algnono!10n,...' L,~ ~ J....,.,_ Khorog "".,..., ",,....1 ' Polostoo ' IJc//,90'"''" mcludo clan~bosocl. democror c. na11onai1si, ethmc, and IslamiC mavemcnrs SIPRI does notmclude TajikiStan m 1/s 1998 yearbook Sources PIOOM. AJ<UF BY HAR O LD H. S AUN DE RS 54 BASIC FIGURES Areo: sq. mi. (143, 100 sq. km.) Population: 5, 9 45,903 Life Expectancy at Birth: 64.7 yeors System of Government: Republtc Languages: Ta1ik (offlctol) Russian Religions: Ethnic Groups: Sunni Muslim Shi' o Muslim Other iojrk Uzbek Russian Other Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 80% 5% 15% 64.9% 25% 3.5% 6.6% U.S. $5.4 billion GDP Per Capito: U.S. $920' External Debt: U.S. $635 billion'" ' 96 '"'" " ' po/uroc/ lrom v.brld Bunk I 994 "'hmalv '' 1995 ml mofrlcl U 5 $250 m ll on to Russro Soumo CIA "Tajikistan'~ post- oviet politics have been among the mo:,t turbulent of any of the succes~or states." - M11rid Atkm Current lli,wry, Oaoher 1997 T aj tkistan wa' unprepared for the mjcpenjence that befell it in The end of ovie t control left 1 he people of Taj iki:.ran with li tll e scn~e of national identity anj rurncd louse a ~ trong clan-hased regiunalism the primary focus of identity. Thc oviet dctm ~e abu relea ~ed democratic, nattonaltst, Ishtmic, and ethnic minori1y movements, with the largest ethntc group hetng U:bek. Paki ~tant, audt, and Iranian support for the b lamic movement, Russian concern for tts Mluthern '\ecurny border," anj Uzhekbtan\ fct~ r of an b lamic republic nex t dnor complicated 1hc ptcturc. An unea~ y a lliance of intern;1 l forces challengl d the esrahltshej pnwer unsuccessfully in the November 1991 presi Jcnttal clectton, then forced themselves tnto a coalitton government in May 1992 anj rook 11ver the government in epremher. When the new government proved unnhle In rea::.serr lnw and order u r t1 1 s1 cm economic dcteri nration, two key rcgtom-lentnabad anj Ku lyab-and some U:heks refu ~ed to recognt:e the new government. People in Kulyab formed the only effective fighting unirs (Popular Front) and, wnh unofficial help from Uzbekistan nnd rhe Russian mi li - tary, gained contml of cntical parts of the country. They forced thou:-.ands of perceived ad versanes o ut of the country. In Novemher 1992, the Taj tk Supreme... oviel f1wmed a new government under Emomali Rakhmonov from Kulyah. The resultant power :,hift increased Kulyahi control and relegated the former Lcntnahad regton ro seconj place. Rnkhman1w hccame president under a new con:-.titution after a November 1994 clectton. A useful framework (or analyzing pe<tce efforts ts rhc "mululcvcl peace process." A nonofftc ial dtaloguc beg;m tn March 1993 amo ng tndtviju:l ls from dtfferent facuom. They met six t imes over I 3 months hefore o(ficial negoti.tttons began. They had met 22 rimes through june 1998 and produced 11 joint memnrand:t on problems f<tci ng Tajikistan. This nonofficial

61 Jtalogue ha~ hecn called the "puhlic peace pmces~." The Peace AccmJ ca I b fnr new elec- The offtct.tl peace pnke~~ hegan in rion~ after,1 tran~i11on pennd nf ahout April 1994 with the Umred Nations 18 monrh~. The Commis~ton ha~ draftmediating hetwet:n rhe government.md the United Ta)lk Opposition. Retween Deu:mher 1996 and June 27, ed const trutional amendments and c h,mgl'~ 1n the ek umal l.1w. At the third kvcl of the multilevel peace 1997, government and pnkess, relati\ elv new nono pposition leadt:rs hr d Gmeral Agreement nn Pt'acc and Nanon.d Accord. The Gent'ral Agreement creat cd a National Reconciliat ion government and half npposl- IHln-to <l\'l'rsec nnplemcntanon of the Thl'.:7111 o( Sc!lld unhn l ull'ihrry mulcrmwd luml /uttl.\ nf itil'miry. go, ernmental nrgani:ation~.1rc pl.mn1ng public di~llls~hln of rhese changes ro enhance uu:en mvolvement tn the Meanwhile, Tajikistan face~ three mlclitlonal ch<ll le n gcs: rhe government docs nor fu lly control the country; much of the dayw-d.ty enmunn h,b passed inro the senl's nf :1\!n.:c'llll.:nb Suhjt:Lls cu\ ercd hand-. uf un:en-.,.mj rhe government uppusltlun and tntegr;hhlll Ill the..rmcd forle', J1lllltlc.ll rdllrm,.mj Llllhlltu- culture fur,h,mng ptlwl'r.tern" re\!lontiun,tl,11ncndment. A m.ijur ~11cking.md the u1untn -.ttll Llcb.1 pulitic.d.11 l1ne,. Thu,c whu h,1ld f'll\\'l'r tn<ly pumt ha, heen all,lc;lttng,m agreed retu~e tu,hare 11, thu-. pruvukmg numhl r 11f gu\'l'rnment pu:-.1tiuns LU rcncwt:d f1ghting. Dr Harold H Sounders, INN member and d~rector of International Affa1rs at the Kettering Foundation, co choirs the Inter Taiik Dialogue. Saunders was a member of the Not1onol Security Council staff flew on the K1ssmger shuttles in the M1ddle East, and was US. assistant secretary of state dunng negotiat1on of the Camp David Accords and the Egypt1on lsroeli Peace Treaty. Add1tionol Sources: Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Ethnicity and Conflict (1994) by Vitally V Noumkin, editor CONFLICT TIMELINE Stalin dies; top party and government posts increasingly g1ven to non Russians Khruschev dismissed, Brezhnev becomes Soviet leader Russian repression fosters growth of Islamic inauence and violence Anti-Russian riots and violence erupt over Soviet-Afghan intervention USSR leader Gorbochev initiates anti-corruption reform campaign Pro-communist Russian-backed troors deploy, holt civi war that kills over 25,000 Cease-fire ends renewed fighting, 16,000 l<illed despite Russian presence Government opposition leaders sign ~ace accord to end five years of civil war The Central Asian Republics-Fragments of Empire--Magnets of Wealth ( 1994) by Charles Undelond and Nicholas Plott. Memoranda and Appeals of the Inter-Taiik Dialogue Within the Framework of the Dartmouth Conference, ( 1997} by Gennody I Chufrin, Ashurboi lmomov, and Harold H. Sounders, editors. The Toiik Conflict ( 1997) by Irina Zviogelskoyo. 55

62 CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Also troubling was the fact that 10 of 26 journalists killed around the world in 1997 were sla in in Central and South America. O n a positive note, the second S ummit of the Americas in Santiago, C hile, in April L998 and the U.N. Anti-Drug Summit in N ew York in June brought together gov- ernment officials a nd other experts to atldress major issues in the region, which claimed a relatively strong economy and one of the lowest under-5 mortality r ate~ in the developing world. Central and outh America featured "high-level" armed conflicts in only two countries, the lowest number recorded for any region of the world aside from Europe or North America. Howe ver, areas of serious concern remain. C hief among them: Colombia's ongoing rebellion and drug-related killings and Peru's deadly struggle with political insurgen ts. Additional violence, often stemming from political corruption, plagued several states in the region. - Guatemala THE COUNCIL OF FREELY ELECTED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government includes 31 current and former leaders from the Western Hemisphere who work to to reinforce democracy in the Americas, help resolve conflict in the region, and advance economic cooperation. Established in 1986 at a meeting chaired by former U.S Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, the Council is based within The Corter Center's Latin American and Caribbean Program. It has been o pioneer in mediating and observing elections and has worked to help consolidate democracy in Guyana, Nicaragua, Panama, and Haiti. High-Level Conflicts - Lower-Level Conflicts 56

63 Health and Human Development Indicators l 11r u>mp.>nslll\' ol u>ulltlll'' 111th hogh lt d cnnfltus >'17 l)h, IIIli measures rh.: Jost,mu: nct d.:d l<> ;ltl.tll1 th.: UN[)I'\ 1'197 Hum.on Pcvclnpnocm Report!:" "' h>r loft: l'xp<'<t.lll< ~, duc.>ll<>ll.l l len I. ;utd 111<11111<' on.> \l;ol<' (tlw >li.'ml'l 111 I 000, th, clmco "u11111trv ''to att;tmu1g th.:s.: g<~als). Undcr-5 mona In, r,ll<'' " llll'nllnl hv LIN I( Tl. f<'j'il'wilt th, pruhaholll) o>f,,,hold d~m~ h.:twc<'i1 hu th.ond ~ ~l'.lr',,f.>g<' t xprc"t'd pt r 1,000 ll\ c honhs. % Populotoon % Population % Fully Immunized Population Adult Human Under-5 World Country With Access to With Access 1-Yeor-Oid Annual Literacy Development Mortality Rote Rank Safe Water to Sanitation Children Grow1h Rote % Rote Index (HDI) (1997) [1 hoghest ( ( ) ( ) { (1995) (1997) mor1oloty) TB DPT Polio Measles Colombia Peru Latin America and the Caribbean no 43 I I I I I I I United Stoles no no no ' World Dote refers to penods other then those specofoed, too region rather then on entire country, or differs from the stondord defonotion. ' u '"' Population Displacement lntcrnalll' D>splau:d r... oplc (IPPs).m,lcfmcd,,, tltnse people who> h,l\'t' hn n f<lrn J to flel.' t ht or homt s.ond who n:m.un 111 tht l<'rrnnry nf rhctr ow n rnuntry. Refugees,If<: per"m' nur-.jc tht courur~ ot rhctr n.>uon,olll\' who1 M<' liiuhl, N llllwollmg!n return dul.' to,, wdl foundcd fc.1r t>f hc1ng pcrse~;urcd. Persons on "rc fu~cc- hk c slfu;ttll>n'' (RLS) fc<tr pt rst:cu!lnn 1>r h.um 1f rcturnc,l ln tht lf hnmt cnulltll<'' hut Ml' r<'<<lg nr:< d hv ~o\l mm... no-,,, rch1~cl.'' or ")!tun,cd<.~:r' COLOMBIA IDPs: Refugees Sweden: France 600,000 1, PERU IDPs: Refugees. Sweden: Bolivia. France: Chile 420,000 2,681 1, Fonner L' S Pre~idl'nt\ }imm'' Career and Gerald FCJrd (_,carujing) arc Joined at the :\fml I 997 A.J!o.'nda for the Amcnm' conference in Atlanta by (\ear.ed, from lefri frmno.'r PTo.'\ldL'n!S o,car Arras of Cmta Rtca and Sancho.';: de Lo~tula of Boln ra CancT CL ntct jd!tju Rohcn Pmrur. )amwcan Prrme Minrsrer P.J. Palrl'TS!In,,md fcmner Prr.:\ul<:nrs I 1m Alberto L.u.:allc of Uru~td'V and Pcurrcro Avlwrn of Chrlo.'. Military Comparisons Defense Expenditures Manpower Toto I Centro! Gvt $ Per # m Armed (Millions$) World Rank % GNP World Rank Expenditure World Rank Capito World Rank Forces x 1,000 World Rank Colombia 2, Peru / South America 23, United Stoles 277,800 I , ,620 2 World 864, ,790 I 57

64 COLOMBIA THE CONFLICT Borronquil'! Cartagena "Medellin * Bogoto. coti Colombia Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Government Government of Colombia vs. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) vs. National Liberation Army (ELN) Troop Strength: Government: 140,000 FARC: 7,000 ELN: 3,000 Est. Deaths ( 1997): 500-1,000 bahie-related; more than 2,000 overall Est. Deaths (total): More than 30,000 overall, some estimates as high as 160,000 Source> SJPRJ, PIOOM, AKUF BI'OZil BY JOHN DUGA S I ~.1 BASIC FIGURES Area: 439,734 sq. mi. (1,138,910 sq km.) Population: 37,418,290 Focus on Colomhia's role in Although PresiJem amper initially international Jrug trafficking ~ought to begin a "useful dialogue" with has o bscurej an increasingly the guerrilla movements, their continviolent internal conflict between leftist ued militancy 4uickly generated skeptiguerrilla movements, state security c ism about a peace process. As the Life Expectancy at Birth: 73 years System of Government: Republic with strong executive branch Languages: Spanish Religions: Roman Catholic 95% Other 5% Ethnic Groups: Mestizo White MuloHo Block Mixed black Amerindion Other 58% 20% 14% 4% 1% 3% forces, anj right-wing paramilitary guerrilla movements expanded their groups. De pile intermittent effons co territorial presence, it became increa~initiate peace negotiat i on~. the ajmini- ingly 4ue~ t ionable whether they saw l>tration of Pre~ident Erne:.to amper peace negotiation:. to be in their inter- ( ) ha:. proven incapahlc of est:.. Wherea11 in 1985 the guerri lias resolving the long-standing conflict. haj a prel!ence in 173 municipalities, The two principal guerrilla force!>, the Revolutionary ArmeJ Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the People's Liberation Army (EPL), arc lefti~t movements that originated in the hy 1997 they were present in 622 municipali ties (out of a total of 1,071). The movements arc now estimated to comprise bet ween I 0,000 and IS,000 fu ll -rime gucrri ll a!j. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US. $201.4 billion" GDP Per Capito: U.S. $5,400" External Debt: 1996 e>limotecl Source: CIA U.S. $16.5 billion" 1960!J. tructural conditions such as endemic povcrt y, the absence o f :.ta te :-.ervices in peripheral regions, the lack of legitimacy of traditional political parties, <J nd the repre~sive actions uf ln August 1996, guerrillas overran an army base in the Putumayo Dep<trtment, killing several Jozen military per~onne l, taking 60 soldiers hmtage, and capturing all of the base's state security force~ have nllowej fnr weaponry. In March 1998, FARC gue r- "Drug trafficking is the fuel that keeps this conflict burning." their surv ival into the 1990s. The guerrilla movements have grown strong ril lall JecimateJ a mili tary hrigade in 1 he Caqueta Oepanment, killing at 58 -A rr&~.c;w Ramirez Ocampo, former Colombian foreign minister and member of the National Peace Commission, Sept. 16, /998 financially through criminal nctivities least 62 soldiers and capturing 43 nthranging frnm drug trnfficking to kijn;lp- e rs. In addit ion to mil iuuy confro n taping anj extortion. tinns, National Lihcrarion Army (ELN)

65 INN Action: Colombia INN memhcr Rohcrt Pa!'ltor, former director of The Carter Cem er's Latin Amcncnn and Carihhean Program, was invited in June 1997 to Witness the transfer of 60 c~ >lombwn snkh c r~ ~md 10 mar me~ captured hy the Revolutwnary Armed Forces of Cnlomh1a n1ne months earlier. The prisoners were JcbvereJ ro the lnternarionnl C'nmmittce of the Red Cros~ and to representatives of the Colom hi.m N.ltlonal Com.iliatinn Commission. CONFLICT TIMELINE 1949 Period of La Violencio lawless ness claims 280,000 lives over next decode 11\,ljclr ell I ('I p~ ltn~ ~ ( ~11111~' l)(l pipe I me.ltt<h..b m 1997,tlc>nl'). The.: guernlla'.tl~u hav~ tnt er\'l ncd dtr~ ctlv tn lo<..a l pol ttto hy a" " '~ g. kidn.tpping, 1>r threatt:nmg lch.:al pulit u.:.tl kadn... In the f.tc.:~ of tht, umt tnucd mil irancy, Prc ~tde nt S.unper\ ~rrar eg~ cvol\'cd fn11n an emph.hl~ on diidngue t 11 an cftort to ' trength c.. n the.. armed force~. ded ;lrc ~peu. tl :one' c>l puhlt c.: order unc..k r mdll.ll~ ruk,.md e.,t.thlt.,h rural,clt -c..k kn.,c.. gruup.,, Crttlo.. uun ch.1rged thc,e lck.tl 'L'utnt\ c..uupc.. rati\l'' kno\\ll '' l'11l1\'l\ tr, \\lth p.tramdtr.1r) 't~>l~ nc..c... Wh.llc..'\c..'r tlw p.lrttup.l fllln elf the t'pil\1\ll',thl'i'l'l' n<>ljlic' tll>n rh.11 nght-\\ lllg po~r.untltt. n \'I<> kn~ c.. tnc.:rc...,,~ d 'lt..: ntftc..;,iih h dunn\.! t he.. SamrK r. dm 1 n 1 ~t r.1111>n. <.'rc.. dlhlc.dlq.,:.ll ll>ns l'"'l 1 h.11 tlw the vcr~ k;l.,t, they appcilr 10 have.h.:q u1e.,u:d 1 n para nul it :1ry <1<.. t1 v 1t ie' h) f.ulmg to t;lke c..lc.. c1~ ive.1c..t1on. The numha of p.tramdll,try kdlmg' IIKrc.. ; J~c.. d 'l~ndu:anrly, fn>m 751 1n.111 n( 1996 rn 7';2 1n 1h c.. f1r ~ r n1ne month~ nf Paramdnary grour~ have 1ng the Jul) 1997 tnrrurc.. <IOd murder of )0 vdlagcr' 111 Mo~pinp;m ami the May 1998 murdcr ol 20 v dllgc.:r ~ 1n Puerto Alvlr<l. R) m1d 199tl, th~ lntc.. rnal confl1ct 1n C\>lllmh1.1 h.1d h~ comc a uuc.: l. dtrn \\ar. 11i1h 1hc.: bulk nf the.: P 'j1ttl.tc<: ~.tughr tn.t gn>\\111).: en"~ fm: between gttl'frtll.l m.w~ rn~ nr.., tlw.trmc.. ll tnr~c,,.tnd p.u.untllt,ll'\ grottjh, n~>n~,,, ''h11.:h g.tlnc.. d,1 md11.1r) '1\:te>n. In Aut:u'r 19 1 >ti, Andr~ ~ l'.tstt.lll,l ~u<..c~ c.. dc.:c..l ~amj'c..' l.h lit.: c..(llllhr) \ 601h pn:~ J.:nt. prnmlstng t b~gtn pc..".l<..l' l,dks 111th l'nlomh1.1\ tn\.r~.t~lnj.:h.tggrc.. ~si\'c Dr. John Dugas is an assistant professor of polit1cal science at Kalamazoo College. He was a Fulbright Scholar in Colombia during and is the editor of La Constitucion de Un Pacta Polittco Viable~ (Bogota 1993}. Additional Sources: Colombia. The Genocidal Democracy ( 1996) by Javier Giraldo The Making of Modern Colombia ( 1993) by David Bushnell. The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia ( 1997) by John D. Martz. The Politics of Coolition Rule in Colombia ( 1988) by Jonathon Hortlyn Gen. Rojas over throws civilian President Gomez Five-man military junto deposes Rojas ANAPO challenges election results; M-19 group launches guerrilla warfare United States, Colombia sign extradition treaty Notional slate of emergen~ called amia po itical, drug-related violence FARC, ELN launch guerrilla attacks ogomst government Semper elected president om d allegations the Colt dru~ carle! funded h1s compoign Violent attacks by guerrilla and pore military groups intensify, 40 candidates die preceding elections Andres Pastrana elected president )9

66 PERU THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Government Government of Peru vs. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) vs. Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) Troop Strength: Government: 125,000 Shining Path: 500 1,500 MRTA: 200 Est. Deaths (1997): battle-related Est. Deaths (total): More than 28,000 bottle-related; more than 30,000 overall Sources SIPRI, AKUF Arequipa. 0 BASIC FIGURES Area: 496,224 sq. mi. ( 1,285,220 sq. km.) Population: 25,573,924 Life Expectancy ot Birth: 70 years System of Government: Republic Languages: Sponrsh (officrol) Ouechuo (official) Aymoro Religion: Roman Catholic Ethnic Groups: Ame1 indian 45% Mestizo 37% White 15% Block, Japanese, Chinese & other 3.- Gross Domestic Product (GDP): U.S $92 billion GDP Per Capito: U.S. $3,800 Extemol Debt: 199 Soun:e CIA U.S. $23.4 billion "Earlier this month, some 5,000 protesters took to the streets and presented a petition with 1.4 million signatures... demanding a referendum to prevent Fujimori from seeking a third term in office." 60 -Agcncc Francc-Pressc, )r~ ly 28, /998 BY KIRK WOLCOTT S even d ay before C hri::.tmas Revolucionario Tupac A maru (MRTA). 1996, Peru captured the inter- From , the Shining Path was natio nal sporli ght when 14 large ly res po n ~ ibl e for inmigating armed heavily armed member~ of a Marxist confli ct that cost Peru more than rebel group stormed the J apa n e~e 25,000 li ves and an excc~s of $20 bilamhassador' re~ iden cc in Lima and lion. President Alberto Fujimori, a re i- rook more than 500 people hmtage. ative unknown when he came to power T h e Incident ~parke d a four-month tn 1990, launched an aggressive C<l m- standoff that ended with the deaths of paign ro su pp re~s the ' hining Path. In o ne hostage, two Peruvtan soldters, and all the hostage-rakers, signaling contin- uation of the vtolence that ha~ plagued Peru for nearly two decades. tnce Peru gamed tndepenjence from Apnl 1992, FuJimon tmplementej a self-coup {or auwgolpe), 111 which he su pendej the conslltutto n, di~solved the congress, and provided ht~ security force!> with a high degree of autonomy patn in 1824, poltrics have alternated to combat "terron sm." In eptember between periods of c ivi lian administra- tion and military dictatorship. From , polittcal power fluctuated between the elected government and rhe armed forces. While the new constttutton of 1979 offered an opporruntty for poltttcal order, Internal st:lhtltty was threatened by the emergence 111 the early 1 980~ of two armed rehel forces-the Maot~t-based Sendero Luminoso ( hming Path) and the MarxiM-dominmed Mlwimienw 1992, securi ty force~ captured Shining Pat h fo unde r a nd leader Ahimael Guzman and 20 prominent members of the group. Meanwhtle, the lesser known MRTA, whtch was comtjerej near collapse after the October 1993 arrest of many nf tt~ member~, re-emerged tn the clo - mg Jays of In a l a~t-jttc h effon to free captive memhers from government j a tl ~. the MRTA raided the Japanese ambassador's compound Juring

67 an..:vcmng rcccptllm. Am.mg the 72 hnsrag..:s t.tkcn w..:rc the Pcntvtan mints t..:rs of turctgn.ttl;ur'.md,lgn culture,.11 lc:ao,t nmc fmctgn amhassajors,.md lcacltl1g police anj s..:curity offtci;tb. Fujtmnn, who was d..:ctcd to,1 second rn:sidenu.d t..:rm 111 Julv 1995, agreed tn comply wnh requem' hr Japan and the U ntred Stdtes tn find a pc:acefu l rl!~o l uuon to the confliu yet ndused to gtvc m to MRTA dem,mlk On m rltt, /''!,11 1 I mt ' n 1.lttacb hy thl MRTA.md Shmmg Path Lk dtm d fur tlw stxth str:llght yc:.u tn 1997, \'h>lent mctdents h\' ~hmmg Path m..:mhc:rs wcrl' higha m rhc seumd halt ot tht )L.H th.m the!tr'r. In July 199'-1, Shtnml! Path rehcb hlcw ll p t h rl'c: p1 )WI! r I me>,mj thrcarc:ncd to kdl \'dlagcrs uutsidc nf Luna 111 an eftnrt to derail muntcipal elections -,cheduled for Octoher. April 22, 1997, atrl!r nego In,~cklt t t on to Internal nations had f.11kd tu 'ccun: contltct, Peru fought \\ars the rele.tsc: llf,my addttiunal wtth netghhunng Ecuador 111 hn-,tagcs, Fupmon,lllthon:cd S I,.md 191.)5 over 49 mtf..:, 'P<.:Ct,llh tratned ~.:nverntnl'nt c.:omman,(o,,,f Jt,putcd hdrjer.th,1ul 560 md..:s Ot)rth to ratd the compuund. Wnhtn 40 mtn lltl's, all th..: hostages werl' fr..:ej, exccrt for 1 tnl.'tnh:r nf the l'eru\'1,111 Suprcmc Court, who dted ll( a hcarr.ttrack. Fupmon reccl\cd puhlic prai~e fnr the ratd hur also was crittci:cd fnr ki lling some MRTA mcmhcrs who reported!} had hnrdcr dispute. 1greed to 'urrcndl.'r. ''' Lun.1. In August 191Jti, Peru.t.:cusl.'d F.cu.hlor of 'L'I)cltng lwops IntO!'..:rU\ t,tn tcrntor},,1 chilrj!l' that th..: Ecuadllri,m governm..:nt dented. The,dlegcd mftltra- t1n11 'et halk t,tlb nn.tn tntcrn,trtol1.tll} medtatcd scrtll.'mcnt to the lo11g-ru g K1rk Wolcott, program coordinator in the Conflict Resolution Program at The Corter Center, is the editor of the Stole of World ConAict Report Additional Sources Cultures in Conflict. Social Movements ond the State in Peru (1995) by Susan Stokes. Peru's Shining Path (1998) by Cynthia McClintock. The Peryviar, Lobyrmth Polity, Society, Economy ( 1997) by Maxwe ll Cameron and Philip Maucen, editors. Shinmg and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, ( 1998) by Steve Stern, editor. 61

68 MIDDLE EAST M 11.ldk Ea,t ".1rfan: n.:matnl"d,1( a rcl.nin l) lnw,,.,,1 t<.k;mwhde, the lsr;~ell-r'akstml.lt1 ['l"<h.l" prl1ll"'' g;ne s1gns nf t:~lnst,ml r.nc with "hl!,!h-!t:, cl".mncd l:pilflic.. rs lllll\'lng iorw.lr,l as l'rael1 Pn.>sl~.lc..-nt [knj<iititn Neran\ ahu remf'l;'rej his hard-linc,t,mcc.. n11 sc\ er<~l issue' anj Pale,rJnlan \\'<IJ.!Cd 1n f1h1r c..ounrrics. In Iraq, Sa,ldam f lu"c1n cnntmuc,l tn rhw.1rt.htemrr' h) U.N. m'recwr' w, enty thc Authnnty Chair Ya"l;'r Araf,Jt ll11hk rated some nf h1s own prt''\.'11cl' ll( \\L'ilpnns of ITI<IS' c..jt~,tfuctl\111, while. llltcrnal.ji, f'llllcies. While \'Hlki1Le 111 Eg) pt, Lt:hanon, Lihya, and ~ aud1 putl'' 1mnlving lr.ltp Ktmb drew mnre hloodshcd. Tn thc Arah1<1 rhn.:;ltened tu fun her dc..,rahil1zc tht: rcgl\111, tht: ekenon north. th~.: Turk1sh gm crnmcnt launlhed lh largcsl oftcnsl\l tn dale 111 Mo~y 199H ag<lllbl the. Kurdi,h w~,rker\ Party, pu,hi11g the death toll 111 1ha1 hlooj\ cnnflict In more lh;m 25,000. nf mmlcrare Iranian Pres1dcnt Moh<lmmec..l Kharami slg n:dcd encpuraglnj.: signs n( morc opc.. n dialngue wirh the Unncd Statcs. High-Level Conflicts Lower-Level Conflicts 62

69 Health and Human Development Indicators For tllllll' If"' ns It Ulllrl<' \\ uh hrj;h lt h I u nt1rtl' <I I ll> I urea ur rlr<.lr 1 lll<..c needed ro tt 1111 drt l "Jill'\ ill l7 I hun 111 I )c,.,!, pmcnt Rcprort., rl tt>r Irk <>cpnr lilt\, <du, llh>noll, \ll, md muunt ''" 1 I OL"'C sc ole (rh, ncart r 11 I 000, rht c..l, "" 1 ll>untr~ '' 1 Ill unrn~: doc c ~:uals) l n.kr S murnlrt) rdtc, 1 mc:hurcd h1 l!\;ll Ef, rcpr< 'Cnl rhc pwh obrlll\,,f r... hrl.l d\ "' lwno.een hrrth md S vc "' ot rr::c cxpr~,..._ d pt r I,VOO II\' 1-rrrh 0 0 o Populotron o Population % Fully lmmunrzed Population Adult Humon Under-5 World Country With Access to With Access 1-Yeor.Oid Annual literacy Development Mortality Rote Ronk Sole Water to Sonrlotron Chrldren Groo.vth Rote % Rote Index (HDI) (1997) (1 hoghe$t [ ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1995) (1997) mortoloty). TB DPT Polio Measles I Iran I lroq I I - Israel I no no no I Turkey I Mrddle Eosl and North Afnco United States World no 65 no no no * l Dolo refers to perooch other than tho$e $pecofoed, to a regoon rather than on entore country or dolfur$ from the standard dehnotoon ',,, I I ~ I I l I I I 162 '')J' Population Displacement Jm, rn.rlh l'lo,pl.otl'.l 1\, oplt (IIW l.or ddmcj,,, tho><' pc<>t lt "h" lr.rh l t t n ful(cd II> tlct rhc11 lrulllt''.md \\h,o rem.un 111 tht lt'rnlur\ t rhcrr own nountry. Rclu,::t,,,,.I''''""" Plll,rdc rhc.:oumry "' rht tr n.lllllll.ol oty whu.trt' un<~hl.: 111 unwrllmt.: " ' rt rrttn due Ill,, wdl lllun.ll.'.l k.tr ot "''"'t.: pcr-<:lurc.l Per""'' 111 "rchr~.:t c lrl..o: 'Hu,Hrlln," (RI.S) k.or pt rsnu!ton'" h.mn rl rt lllflll'.l '" tht rr luunl' Luuntnc' 1-<ur.ort' re.-.. ~:nr:t d hy J.: IVI.'fllllll.'llb,,, rl'flll!<'t'' nr '') hun ''-'t:l..cr,, IRAN Refugees: lroq: Sweden: Norway France Belgium: Other: RLSs: (lroq) 76,872 34,194 26,025 7,300 3,297 1,645 4,411 3,000 IRAQ IDPs. 900,000 Refugees: 672,027 Iron: 579,200 Syria 26,8 17 Sweden 20,538 Kuwait 16,988 Saudi Arobio 9,701 Other; 18,783 RLSs: 50,000 ~or don) TURKEY IDPs 500,000 2,000,000 Refugees: 43,338 Iraq. 14,986 France 12,577 Belgrum: 4,907 Switzerland 3,870 Sweden: 3,495 Other: 3,503 ISRAEL Refugees lroq Kuwait. Yemen Libya: 105,526 62,635 33,710 6,000 3,281 f,rudt/" ft<c!1.-(rl t11lll Pal.:~tmhlll mctt,jr,rr, tt h n,/t trr kn''"flln,ij r rtll~ rlt, /ljll{r f',d,,rrru,m d,, u"m. l!'lrrdt tt'<'ll tllolti!ph'.i f,.., Tit, ( <11 r, r (, ur, r dlt(jt,r/h'l lllj.!dhiz(h ithi\ Military Comparisons Defense Ex~nditures Manpower Total % Centro! Gvt $ Per # rn Armed (milltons $) World Rank % GNP World Rank Expendrturo World Rank Capito World Rank Forces World Rank Iron.4, no Iraq 1, no 8 no 3 1 no Israel 8, II , Turkey / Middle East 48, ,319 United Stales 277,800 I , , World 86.4,500 ' ,790 i

70 IRAN THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Troop Strength: Government Government of Iron vs. Muja hedin e Khalq (MOK) Government: 500,000 including the Revolutionary Guard Mujahedin-e Khalq: no Est. Deaths (1997): no Est. Deaths (total): no Sources SIPRI UAf, ; OniCin BY ER I C HooGLUND 64 BASIC FIGURES Area sq. mi (1,648,000 sq. km) Population: ,002 Life Expectancy ot Birth years System of Government: Theocrolic Republic Longuoges; Pers1on and Persian dialects Turkic and Turkic dialects Kurdish Luri Bolochi Arabic Turkish Religions: Sh1'o Muslim 89% Sunni Musltm 10% Other 1% Ethnic Groups: Persian 51 % Azerboi1om 24% Giloki & Mozondoroni 8% Kurd 7% Arab 3% Lur 3% Boloch 2% Turkmen 2% Other 1, Gross Domestic Product (GDP); U S b II m GDP Per Capito: lj S. $5,200. External Debt: I e '"""' d Source: CIA U.S. $30 billion The government of the blamic Republic of Iran generally i~ accepted a~ legitimate by the I ran ian people, and there i~ no organ ized, violent oppo!>ition to it within the country. Outside Iran, however, var i ou~ erhnic, re l igiou~. and monarch i ~t gro ups are dedicated t o changing the government and/or it!> po licie!> th rough means of armed struggle. The two most important Iranian opposition group~ in exile are the ethnic Kurdi tan Democnuic Party of Iran (KDP!) nnd the religiously imptrej M ujahedin-e Khalq O rgn nizatio n (MOK). Both groups mai n w in training bases in eastern Iraq and have u!>ej thc~e camp!> to launch occa,umal guerrilla raid tnto area:; of we~tern Iran bordering Iraq. The KDPI's ohjectivc b political autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish-popularcd provi nces of northwest and central- signi[ic(iil!h silll I! I ~h9, abma o:-il 0 ctm_(/,l r ho:w.:.:n I 909 and I <)l) ::-,. we t Iran. The MOK seck the complete overthrow of the regime and the m~wllation of MOK leaders m its place. The most inteme pe n od of clashe~ between the government and the armed opposition wa!-> , when fighting, terrorist acts, anj sum mary executions resulted in some ZO,OOO deaths. Although violent clashes have declined significantly since 1989, about 800 deaths tmide and outside of Iran are attnbutable to the ongoing confl ict bt!twccn 1989 a nd T he MOK has been based in Baghd<ld ince the mid- 1980s. Its collaboration wtth Iraq dunng the!ran-iraq War ( ) is believed to have resulted in t he MOK losi ng whatever!>lippert it may have had imide Iran. Neverthele s, it~ cadre:;-estimatej to ~e about 20,000 men and women-arc strongly loyal to MOK leader Masoud Rajavi and ht:; wife, Maryam, the d e~ i g n a ted co-leader. T he political arm of the MOK is the

71 Iran Threatens Regional War ISLAMABAD, Pal1~tan, Sept. 14 (UP!)- conflact, have ~alated m recent weeks over the Iranian lc,1dcr Ayaroll.1h Alt Khomemt has killmg of!raman d1plomats by Taltban soldters is~ued a threat of regtonal war tf the Pakistan- and the subsequent bui!jup of 70,000 Iranian backed 'ttltban mdatia m Afghanistan is nor rroups along the Afghan lxmlcr. conrmllcd. Ten,tnns between P,1k1st;m anj Iran, wh1ch -Untted Press /nwmauona/, Sepc. 14, 1998 backs the Shute Musltm mtlma m rhe Aighan N artnnal Rc-.t, t,tnce Cnuncil, wh ~<.. h KurJbran 111 the earl y 19ROs. ~ 111Ce CONFLICT TIMELINE Prime Mimster Mohammad Mossodeq overthrown in pro-shah coup supported :r Britain and Unit Stoles Arrest of Ayatollah Ruholloh Khomein1 for denounctn~ Iron's relations w1th U S leads to riots ra t' l'' 111\llll') 111 Eurnpe and North t hl'll, the l'x tcm uf its ' ll):'f' ~' rt,1m ~m g Aml'ric,\. The MO K ftchtmc fn rcc, thl Kurd-. an Iran as unkno v.n,,1lrhough,ntn nal Lihcr.Hton Army, rec nurs and Tehran has m,1de concerted effo rt~ to train' hu rh me n,md \\'()tllen. The MO K wm the Kurds' h1y,1lty by rel'onstructmg o perates at least three mdtta ry bases 111 Kurd1sh t ~1wn s and v1llages destroyed eastern Iraq, and rhe lrnnian air force, dunng the l ran - l r;~q W;lr. in vio lation nf Iraqi air anj gwund At thl' saml.' rum:, tht lrnnian governspacl', ha, homhed the~e c a mp~ se\'ernl tlm l'~ ' inll.' )992 lranta n agents a lso h ave atracki:j MO K h l.'adquartl'rs 111 d,n\' th ~lwn R.1ghd.1d. As.t rl.'sul r,,f rhl se,m,1cb, the MOK\,1h tl lt1 to carry,1ut gul.'rnlla ra1ds tnsldl Ira n ' l'l'll1' rn havl' hcen nt:cu rrl d tn Jl)l)6.md 199i. Pc n o dtl.dlr, thl lr.l!1i,tn g~~~ e rnml' nt ;mn ~ lllll les oll1.amnest y fn r an y MO K mcmhc rs wl\l' rennunle t he 11rga n t:a- The KDPI \l,ls cxpdlej fmm Its last ml'nt has artnckl.'d KDPI bases in the Kurdtsh area of nmt hern Iraq, C\'Cn rh,1ugh rhe..,c Lamps are l ~lcat l'd wtrhin Iraq \ " n ~1- fl y " =~' n e, wh1c h ts nhmtttlred n:gularly hy Rrtttsh, Fre n t: h, and U.S. a tr craft. lr-,,lgt nt ' a b n.1re ht ltc n :d to be.d KIWI k.klers 111 Eurnpl' fr,,m!9~9-92. Thl' numhcr,,f KD I'I t:.ltlres,1bo h,ts dl dmed s t c o~ ddy, ots hundreds o f ftghtns h.l\"l' gin:n up,trml d strugg le ro.ad nr t ;1 f'l'<lll'ful lif, Ill F..llrnJW o r N o rth A me rt Lol n r l'\ti1 ollcl'j'(l'd otmn esry and returned ro lro1n. B) the l.ltl' 1990s, tt \\'ols esttmared rh,lt t h~: KDPI h ad fewer t h an 3,000 gucrrdl.1s 1n tt s lraq1 camrs. Eric Hoaglund visitmg Fellow in Iranian studies at St Anthony's College, Oxford Umversily, is the author of land and Revolution 1n Iron and editor of Crit1que Journal for Cril1col Studies of the Maddie East. Additional Sources: A Modern History of the Kurds (1996) by David McDowall. The Iranian Mojahedin (1989) by Abrohomton Ervond. The /ramon Revolufton and the Islamic Republic ( 1986) by Nikki Keddie and Eric Hoogland, editors Guerrilla groups including MOK, begin armed struggle against regime o shah Shah Aees; Ayatollah Khomeini proclaims Islamic republic, KDPI begins armed struggle for autonomy MOK launches armed uprisinjl, thousands kille in street clashes; MOK leaders Aee Iron Iron, Iraq sign ceasehre after ei~h t years of war; MO guerrollos enter Iron from Iraq in unsuccessful ahempt to start notional uprising KDPI head ossass1 noted in Vienna, Khomeini dies New KDPI head and three other party leaders assassinated 1n Berlin cafe Moderate Muslim cleric Khotami elect ed president, defeat in~ conservative ord-liners 65

72 ~... 'lo. '.. -.,.. o ' - A... : - -. _... _.. ' '....=:...6..~ -' ~-~ ': L~:.. t: I IRAQ Tu.t.y f,.,.,~ '.~ - - Jordon " Soudi Atoboo Sovtf>em No-fly ~ 0 Iraq ' Iron t L. j AI Bosroh. THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Troop Strength: Government Government of Iraq vs. Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) vs. Kurdish Democra tic Party (KDP) vs. Populor Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Government: 350, ,000 SAIRI: 4,000 5,000 lightly armed KDP: 15,000 plus 10,000-20,000 reservists PUK: 15,000 Est. Deaths (1997): More than l,000 overa ll Est. Deaths (total) Sources SIPRI. PIOOM. AKUF More than 40,000 to more than 200,000 overall 66 BASIC FIGURES, ',... - l'wsion --~.. ' Area 168,754 sq. mi. (437,072 sq. km.) Population. 22, Life Expectancy at Birth: 67.4 years System of Government Republic Languages A obt Kurdtsh Assyrian Armenian Religtans Shi'ite Muslim Sunni Muslim Christian or other Ethnic Groups: Arab Kurdtsh Turkamon, 60% 65% 32% 37% 3% 75% 80% 15%-20% A..syrion or other 5% Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US. $.42 billion GDP Per Capita: U.S. $2,0oo External Debt: 1996e.hmoteci Source CIA Very heavy relative to GDP but amount unknown "The bottom line is that if Iraq trie!> to break out of it!.!.trategic box, our rcspon!>e will be ~ wift and!>trong. We have not taken any option off the table, including military force." -l'. '1. Scm!Wl)' of Scate Madcbn<" All-rrr!{ht m a St'fll. 9, /991-l, ~t>ccch BY AMATZtA BARAM Whtlc Iraq ha' yet to rcc\1\- hy Annan, anj the United Nation' er ~-rom the Jcvastauon it Srcc1al Cnmm1,~inn ll'<h rl,11..ej unjer,u(ferej dl1ring the 1991 the U.N. Sccurtty Council\ m;1gnifying Gulf War, lraqr Pre~tJen t SaJdam gl;1'~ rnnre than ever hdorc. l:-lu ~~ein contin ued 1n I 997 ro r ruvokc S:tddam'~ internal t ruuhlc~ <.:nnl inued the International <.:1lmmun1ty while in Dc~p1te 'i.!\l'ral dcfeclt\lns rry1ng tu <.:ru~h.1 sunmering 1ntern;1! 11 11hm the l ra~p le<lder,ihr hen, een rehcllum.mj pulltll.. <llllppnslllon ;tnj 1997, he rea"ertcj contr1ll In 1997 and 199b, for the first umc over h1~ poltu<.:.tl power ha,c. The Sht '1,ince rhe Gulf W,~r, Iraq (wnh U.N. urmmg (lnuf,,j,l) 1n.,nuthcrn Iraq conauthon:ntmn) sold 1HI tll pay for fooj and medtc.1ne unr11rt- anj to huy equ1r- mcnt W llllte.l'e l(s otl rrojuctl\111. SaJdam sought more cnntrol o\'er the irem., lmq uhdd hu) w1rh the proceeds, unuej, hnwe\ er, <t lhen on.1 small 'calc. Begun 111 Man.:h 1991, the lnufada 'orreaj LJUickly thrnugh Slllilhern- ht'lle Cities. The lran-ha,ed Surreme A"cmbly nf the l,lamk Revolution of making snlc~ ermtic. Jrnq (SAJRJ) and the Islamic Da'wa In Fehnt<1ry 1998, U.N. Secretary- Pany, an older, ~maile r fundamen talist General Kof1 Annan mej1ated a resolu- ttnn tn,1 Jangemu~ standuff between Iraq ctnd the Un11eJ Natt1m~. Under the threat of,, JIHnt U.. -Brit1sh air campa1gn, SaJJam agrcej-not for the fin time- to comply w1tl1 U.N. rcquiremenl~ that lrnq Jest roy al l "'earon~ of ma~s desrru<..t 11m anj al low U.N. wearuns tn'peuor~ unfenered accc~s to wearnns sttes. In n:turn he wa~ prat~ed Shi'i orrmiuon grour, supported the rehclltnn. SaJJ.un qurc..kl y ~uppre:,sed the re\'olt, ktllmg 30,000-60,000 penrle. ToJ<I) nmn) 'mall group~ of Sh1'i rc\' nluunn.uies-some fundamentalt~ts, other~ sccldar-fight Saddam\ tronp~ from 1 he MlUI hern ITl<H'h area,, creating serinus l 1lgl~t1cal d1ff1cu lrie' for the Iraqi army. The A IRI :md Dn'wa ~til l ~urrnn the rchcb from Iran, hut Syria,

73 \d l!d l h,t,j 'lif'p<hinl I hli ll IIIli d ' lltn nwr )997. 'l.tk d h.t, k 'li Jl P<~rl,lut' l<ld.ltnun,l ~ul.l\m.mr). t,,lfl,l ln :-..;ll\l'fllh r )':Htl,d lf, l l JI ~\ fi,hl foi)'j'll)l. h, 1111.:.'11[. )l)q(j rill' \\",lfrl!l}.! f,il (IOil' ol).!fl'l.'lj til,t Tlw Km,h,h rt'\lllr 111 t\iht hern lr.1,1 llol'l till ''L'g,tn Ill )l}(j I \\II h ol fl hd It <Ill h, rhc,,,),llllltl' r,,umt.:d Ill ()llllh:r Kur.. lt'h Pt'lllll,rHa, P trt\ (KDP) un,lcr hut \\lilt tht hdp n t t\m, rttlll Rntt'h the l\ l ull.t l\1u,t.d.t \I H.~r.a:.tnl. T lw tllll.'rt1lldt,tfll', thl p.trt ll'' ncg<lll.ttc,l J\: [IJ',tl\d th, f'<l)hti. H lj!ltllll pf 1\:mdl"l,tn (!'UK), \\' lt h lumtt d ' u r r " rr fr<llll lr tn, ''I'J''l'cd ~... ld.un\ regtmc dunng the lr tq lr,ll\ W 11 ( )l)s(l.ss). S,tdd.lm uu,ltcd rlw rch ll 1on, kdlm!! oll \lll hl'l Ll' l'c ftrt,tn,jlllfl ll'd l'l",\lt' neg.,tlttl<lm.11 th t t n,l<d the ve.tr. H. r h 1\:urdtsh lddt<lll' conttnue,ii) Pll!!t lllg dt.d guc '' tt h H.tghd hi. Tlw KDI',tJ, L<'OI'er.lted '' llh lllllll' t h o~n 100,L100 1\:md, Ill the ttr't Turk t-h trnnp' u)thiul III11! rahb.t\!. 1111'1 h.tl l ol 19S:-i. H<ll h l.tdl<lll' re \ olre,l ag,un 111 1\ larlh.a. pnl IIJLJ(\,.tnd.tnl i Tm kt'h "-ur' l' 1n lraqt "-urdlst.m. Tht l'ljk, <lll the,,the r h.tnd, tolerated!:->ajd.nn\ retrthlllt< >ll,,,u,t d near! \' r ~. hl'l hase' , terrt tllry.and w,t, 2 nliii Hm KurJ, I<' fle t' to Iran anj tll\oh-ed 1n,1 numht.: r llf mtl tt.tf\ ull1 Turkt.:\'. trunr.tr ton' \\"t th Turkt'h tro''l'' Ill :\ l'f<ll l'l[,,i.trt'.t, m d u,lml.!.an tntt.:r In l.lf t 1997, Turkl'\,t,n illnl,l 'lllut.: natt llll <l ll \ e nf,,ru:d ll<~ tl \ :<lne L'' t<th- '5,(1l10 tr""l'' <'ll thl lr,tql,i._k o l tht la, h e~. l.aft, r tlw ( ~ ull W,n,.tl ln\\ed <' f urkt, h- lr.hp l,,r,kr. :-..1.1\ Jl)l)2 dcllllll r.t t rt c.. I..-, t tlll1 rn l r.1q r Kurd1,1<1n, hur 111 \!1\ )lj\l.f rcl.ttrc..1n' h<.:t\\ccn the PUK.rnd KDI',ler, rl<1r,nc.. d, tnd tt!,!htiih! ht'i\hc.. n rht.:m erupre,l KPI' 1..-.tdc.. r ~l.(,,,' u d [\tr,az tnt ru rm,l t<' lr:tq l r.tnk d" ''ll'lb,tnd K!)J' (,,ret.:' l..lpturt d lrhrl, ' ll'll,tl PI tht 1\: nr..jt,h \\il lll1<' 1llllll' Zone.., wh td1 h.rd hct.:n Etlrror\ :--;, It! On/)<.?, li /1 Ns, r/11! mrccl \r ru~ and Bmam l.. wnclw l1m~qle Hille.. ks on /r,«l <lfter rhc rclursc.. vf t1 Tl pon (r m rhc dut{l,\ 11 capons lll'flt!c..lor rh,ll 'h,rr~cd lrd</ u JC!t ~'\"sl,'ln<icil oh\lrm tum,t:ot,'nlllh'llts se111 1' 1 fr.t:htas, rroofl' un.l tlllll liitc.. rafr w the Cittlj 1cgwn to )(1111 mor.: than :?tl( curcrt~/1 and 22 umslull\ prrt r ou~h 't<wllnl'd thl r.: Amalzia Baram has researched the Ba'th Party and regime of Iraq since His writings rnclude two books, over 40 articles in academic iournals, and two books about to be published. Additional Sources: Building Toward Crisis: Soddam Hussein 's Strategy for Survival (1998) by Amotzio Borom CARDR/; Soddam 's Iraq (1990) by Zed Books. CONFLICT TIMELINE Bo'th party forms Gen. Kossem overthrows Britishinstalled lroqr monarchy Kassem claims Kuwait as port of Iraq, Kurds revolt in north Bo'th party comes to power, establishes Communis I-style one-party stole Soddom Hussern begins ei~ht-yeor wor wi Iron UN Security Council Resolution 598 outlines lroq Iron ceose fire Gulf War forces dnve Iraq from Kuwait, Soddom suppresses Kurd, Shi ite rebellions Iraq allowed for first time srnce 1991 U.N sanctions to sell oil to pay For food - r 1998 U.S. government threatens force against Iraq for expelling U.N weapons inspectors Culture, History & Ideology rn the Formalton of Bo'thistlraq ( 1993) by Amatzia Borom. Republic of Feor (1989) by Samir oi-khalil. 67

74 ISRAEL THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Territory (Palestine) Government of Israel vs. non-plo groups Troop Strength: Govemment: 170, ,000 Non PLO groups: no Est. Deaths (1 997): battle-related Est. Deaths (total): More tha n 13,000 battle-related; more than 18,000 overall Examples of these gro<jpl include Homos, Popvlor Front for tho Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP GC), IJlomte Jihod, Hizholloh. and Amol Sources 5/PR/ BY K EN NETH W. S TEIN 68 BASIC FIGURES Area: 8,019 sq mr. (20,770 sq. km.) Population Life Expectancy at Birth: 78 years System of Government: 0 epublic Languages: ~,... iol} Arabic Religions: Jewish 82% Muslim (mo~tly Sunni) 14% Christian 2% Druze end other 2% Ethnic Groups: J 'I '1 82% Arab ond o1'-ler 18 Gross Domestic Product (GDP): U.S $85 7 btllron"" GDP Per Capita: U.S. $16,400"" External Debt: U.S. $25 7 billion"" Jef, sdtlers '" the ~ Boni rn """ Go/on Hoig/>ts tn the Gazo Stnp and tn fcnl..lennalt!m /August 1996 t!shmole} ' ' I!(/ Soumt CIA U.S. Secretary of State ing establishment of a territorially contiguous and ful ly independent Madeleine Albright, in a May 12, 1998, address to the Palestinian state; a nd creating facts to National Press C lub, characterized rhe state of the A rab-israe l peace process in influence the outcome of Palestinia n Israeli final status talks, scheduled for 1997 as "the mo t disappointing since completion by May the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993." The year l997 began with Israel anj T he neg o t ia t i o n ~>, she told The New the Palestinian Authority (PA) signing York Times the fo llowing day, the H ebron Agreement in January. were "HalleJ... at risk," I)~ spuc dcc[jl, It wai> the first agreement facing a "crim of confi- held I~racli~Palestlllllln signej between the recently dence," w1th "opti- dl~llluswnment u Hh electej Likud government m i ~m replaced by a one mw1iw1 and hclrsh and the PA, and it callej sense of fatali~m and Aruh cl[tllhdl..'.' d!recccd for Israel to share a city he l p l e~sness nbout the (1u urd /.wad, chcrc holy ro Jewish tradition. future." lull' 1111 {1/>/>Mt.'lll Partial Israeli withdrawal Since Benjamin ailcnl<hit c to che from Hebron completed Netanyahu'~ election as 1 '!flllt1t111~ {JTOli..'.\S. Israel's 1995 commitment to israel's ninth prime minister in May 1996, comrol of the pace and content of the peace process has become his exclusive domain. Netanyahu remained steadfast in pursuit of four interrelated goals: ensuring withdraw from the seven major A rab urban areas of the West Bank. Israel responjed to Palestinian terrorism and vio le nce against Israelis with reluctance to turn over more land to PA control and imposition of harsh personal anj national security for all economi.c restrictions upon G aza and Israelis; eliminating physical violence as West Bank Palestinians. a policy option for Palestinians; prevent- Arab aggravation with Israel stemmed

75 fr,>m br.wl\ un\\ dl1n gnl ~, tn \\lthclr;m.tddltlnn.tl I 3 p~rc~nr,,f l.mcl I<) fn >m.tddlti<>n,tl \X,l''t B.1nk tcrrllllrl~~,r, Pak ~r1nran <.:nntrol. CONFLICT TIMELINE rn>mlsnl ' 111Ll' SIJ.!I1111L: thl!:icprcmher The de.tcllo ~.: ked P;rkstrnt.m-bracli IlJ93 Oslo Alu>rck Tht PA, lej b~ 11l'gotl.Hion tra..:k had,1 decldl JI) nega- Y.a,sn r\r.tl.rr, h.~cl,tgrl'l'j rh.ll brae! rl\'l' rrrpll' l'ffl'll 1111 l,r;ll'l\ l'cil lhlitiy.d,hw 1\,l, In.ktL rmll1l' rlw dcprh,,f.md units rel.lllnns w11h uthl'l Ar;rb l'.tlh \\'lth,lr;lw.d. When br.tl l m1s~l d ' 1.11 es, EurupL', the ljn11 ed St.lll''.m LI dl td lm ~,, ~xp.md,,l 'l'l rl cnwnts,.an,j the Unuc,l N.11 1urb. Thl slnwd,l\\'n t~>n fi,c.lll', JI.md, h u WL'\'l'r, P,tkslln1.111s Lh.tngL d rlw n.llurl' nf Amerr~.:.rn Purrng 1997, rherl \\',1, \'lrtu.dh nu rrngrl'" nn rlw '-'\ rr.tn-i,ro~l'lr.md Lchane,c-1 sr,rl'll r ral ks, thllll!.!h I sradts m c:re.tsll1j.!h,jehatl'cl rlw hcnd11s.lrlcl manpower 11.1hil111es nf kel'l'l11g a selu rr l) force rn '"urhnn LchanPn. Multd.Hcral r.db nn ls'lll'' nf w;ltcr. I 9 J I ~l.~clrr,l ~!r,lclk E.rst J'l'.Kl' u>nt, r l'llll'. TJw,l' r.rlb h.1d l'l'l'l1 111 mrl gr.d f'.llt >I 1 he \ll,kr lll'g' > ng pn >Ll'" \\ 11h st,lil'' ll<>t u>lll lglu>u' I<> (,r,il'i hur \\ ~ r~ l'"~'ll lt.llh llllltlhund 111 lljlj i.lthl l<>r lllllfllrl' ln,llvldh.rlh.md u>lll'cti\'l' h. rill' Eun>f'l".lll U n1un,m,l ''' n1l'mher 't.lll'' trtl,i hur t.nkd In pl.ty 1 tlh>n:.il'ii\ e j'< >littl',rj rnjc Ill J\rk,lllll.lll lsr;r, lt, llpl<llll. t~\ T,, nn ;1\,111. the U.N. ( lcnt r;tl Assemhly p;hsl d resulutlnns UII IL.tl nf I sr;ll' l1 'L'I tlcml'n 1 polt l'il'' in At'rrl, July. ;md Nn\'l'l11hl r. J)l''l'llc',k L t'h hll,l J,r.t~ ll- l';rk stll1 1,111,lr slllu, tnnnwnr \\II h nrw.m,>tlwr.md (,r,td, rlh r, \\ IS ll<l lf1f'.llt'lll,tlll'[tl,l fl\t' rn rlw lll').!<lii.iitng pr >LC" T hnuch 1-ont h rlw I si.i< It F.g\ t" ( 19 79),m,l lsr.tl'il ] rr,l.mr.lll ( 1994) t'<',ill lfl'.tlt~, State of Israel comes into existence, begins war with Arab League Suez War breaks out, Israel tem pororily occupres Gazo, Sinai, United Notions Emergency Force established Israel wins Six Doy War with SY.rio, Egypt, Jordon; occupies West Bonk, Golan, Gozo Yom Kippur War erupts; Eg~p t reoccupies inoi; wornng parties sign cease-fire Israel and Egypt sign Peace Treaty Palestinian lntifodoh uprising begins Nc t.rll\'.dllr >nd Ar.>f.tt tn tmplcml'nt rnt.tll M"rv<>\ <'I', h\ rlw h l'gtnn m ~.: <>f 11)t)~. 'i )!'~ r unt <>f lsrh'irs.md 61'1 PL'r 1994 Oslo process leads to lsroelt Jordon ron Agreement f'il'\'tuu'h lll.hie f l!piill~l'', 1nc ludrng.t g il',iicf l'.til''illlt,lll L f, l~ k-j1l\l'll Pll 'il' l'~'l.il'd IL'Il<111SI', ll'\ ISh>ll <111 thl PLO dltrt~ r,,lthl.111 l sr, t~ lr tr.mskr nf,m u:nt nf!':tll'slllll.tll' 'lil'l'"rll',j rlw pc.tu f'fpll'ss,llld \\.lll[l'd 11 Ill Ulllllllll~',.rcu r,lln!,! It>.r Jllilll lsr.rclt-1' 1k'slll11<tll 1995 Right wing Israeli low stuclent assassinates Prime Minister Robin Dr Kenneth W. Stein is professor of Middle Eastern history and politrcal science at Emory Umversity and Middle East fellow at The Corter Center. He is the author of The Land in Question Additional Sources: A Concise History of the Arab lsraeli ConRrct (19961 by tan Btckcrton and Carlo Klausner. Making Peace Among Arabs and Israelis: Lessons from Fifty Years of Negotiating Experience (1991) by Kenneth W. Stein and Samuel W Lewis. Peacewotch/Policywatch Anthology 1997 ( 1998) by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Netonyohu elecfed prime mimster; Oslo peace process stalls Clinton brokers Wye Plantation peace talks tn October (ll}

76 TURKEY Bl ock Soo Jstanbot : ~n(kara ', 00 ~..'...Turkey THE CONFLICT Incompatibility: Warring Parties: Troop Strength: Territory (Kurdiston) Government of Turkey vs. Portiyo Korkeren Kurdiston (PKK), also known os Kurdish Workers' Party or Apocus Government: 800,000 including the Gendarmerie/Notional Guard PKK: 6, ,000 0 ' 200m los 0 Est. Deaths ( 1997). More than 1,000 bottle related; more than 4,000 overall Est. Deaths (totol): More than 30,000 bottle-related and overall Sources S/Pfll. 1'100\.1, AKUF BY A LAN MAKOVSKY BASIC FIGURES Areo: sq mi (780,580 sq. km) Population: 63, Life Expectancy ot Birth: 72.4 years System of Government: Republ1con Porl1amentory Democracy languages: Turkish (Official) Kurdish Arabic Religions: Muslim (mostly Sunni) 99 8% Other (Christian and Jewish).2% Ethnic Groups: Turkish 80% Kurdi~~ 20% Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US $379 1 b1llion" GDP Per Capito: U S. $6,1 00' External Debt: "' 6 Sovrce: CIA US. $75.8 billion "Turkey did not abide by the truce we declared. We have developed new war 70 tactics and will intensify our attacb." -PI\1\ buler Ahdullnh Ocalan said S<!/H. /6, /998, the da)' after Tttrkish troops reponedl-y kzlld 5 ~ mnn? of lm Kurdz.\h rebels. Ocaltm wei.'> urrc11cd m I wl-:- in Non!mher on wan tmtl from Turke-y and Germany. Fighting herween the Turkt~h mil- ('-'here the PKK leadership i~ hased). itary and the immr ec ti o ni ~ t lran, and lmq, have assisted the PKK. Ku rdi~h Workers' Party (PKK) The Turkish go\'ernmcnt has regularly ha~ continued over the rasr few yea rs, charged the Greek, Armenian, <ll1d ami n n rcaceful,olution i~ in sight. Ruli~ i an govern m e nt~ with ~ u prorting Turkey\ po~ i rion on the ground h a~ the PKK, which also enjoys widesprend gained ~tl ad il y o,ince 1993, when irs milttary ahandoned 1ts defensive approach and adopted more aggressive tactio, 1nc ludmg persistent raid~ on PKK -.uongholds in northern iraq. Accorc.ltngly, Turktsh control in the Kurdi~ h southeast grew steadily firmer, of various types in the southeast, dediand Turkey claimed that "terror inci- dents" in declined hy 29 percent comp<lrl'd to 1996 and hy 70 percent compared to Yet the PKK, which usc-. hoth guerri 1- Ia and terronst t;lcttcs, showed no sign' of d isappcaring. In 1997, the PKK expanded 1t~ field nf oper;hton ounde the southeast for the fir~r time, launch Ing attalb 111 the Black Sea area. In July 199R, a PKK attack on a Turkish patrol resulted tn 22 Turktsh deaths, the lnrgesl repmtl d roll in years. Regio nal stall'' primarily Syria financial hacking from Kurd~ in Europe. According Lo vanow. estimates, the PKK ha., ahout 6,000-7,000 fighters in the field, mcludmg 2, 100 operating on Turkish territory. Fnr its part, Turkey deploy.., roughly 300,000 'ecumy force' cared mainly to comharing the PKK. T he PKK traditiunally has cnllcj for an independent Kurdish state in what i:, now southeast Turkey. De~pite this, PKK leader Ahdullah Ocalan said recently th<tt he would accept a settlement within the current Turkish horders and that he and the PKK would lay down arms to negotiate with the Turkish go\'ernment tn Ankara. The Turkish government and mi litary, however, thoroughly di,trust the PKK and view it as having rno much hlood on it s hands to he a ~uirah l e negouating partner.

77 :-.1"'' f<lrl'ign,,h,t n cr' \" IC:\\ rht KurJi,h i"uc ll<ll',h <ll1l' nf indcpl'n dl'iltc hut,,, <ll1l' n f dw Kurd,'.tch ic\"in :.: Kurdish puhht.tlllln'.m d mu'il arc,t\',u lahlc: n n d1t' n pc:n markl t. T h1 ' trend'' dl like I\' coni inuc, fac dll.ttc:d lull l t n~.:u t., t tc, udt ural. md pnli ttcal h) Turkc:) \ J c.,trc: t<l hl <lll.l prcd h) rq.d1h w11 h111 Turkn Tht Kun b, wh nsl' \'L'I'\' L'\ tstl'i1ll' \\,Is den il'd Ill Turkey hdurl' th ts del..tdc:, h.t\l' made tmp rc:v rhc Wc.,r. l lnpl' f,ll,1 PL' ILl'f u l I'L''>olutton <l\l'r tt nll' '',J(,u,d'L'!tL'd h) t\\n import,tnt '1\ L' 1-!<llth 111.til thl''t'.lrl'il' 111 tlw I 990,, dt'llhlgraph tl tren,l-, Thl' Kurdt-,h popu hut tht tr ttght, "' 'elt t'\prl'.,.,hln 11t'\C:rthde.,., rl'ill.l tn Clrt llnt l"lll'.11,t,lkc '' Tu tkq \ scli-c<likl'('t,,.,.1 "untt.tl'\ -.t.ttc" 111 wh u.. h.til Musllltb, uf, lt ' l' tr,tl l' n n gub,.tre <:\ pc:c t..:d 111.tdo pt a TurkJ.,h 1denttt y. Thi -. <lf' l' l'll,ll. h h ts h..:..:n sucll'ssful wtth dl t>. tu,(t m grnlll'' L'\l. Cf'l.1 The l'f\k. t htch and rene nsr Wcrtc l.ttllllt, 1-:l'llt'r,d l) l''tlnt,ltc:,l.tt IS tll 20 I'L' rlt' nt pf rh<: 1u1.d Kur,(t, h pnrt ~l'lnn,l. Kur,l., 111 ~ l'llw t ng num hl r' art (,,r,, tk tn~ the u n,lndt' \'L' loped.tnd,. in k nct to rn sottti1l'i1sl for thl largl' Turktsh cit ie' of \\'estern.md CL'ntral A n.n o liil. F\ td..:ncl' CONFLICT TIMELINE President lnonu introduces reforms, multiparty system Opposition Democratic Party wms ~rst free elections Gen. Gursel leads mi litary coup. announces new constitution Kurdistan Workers' Partx (PKK) forms, Turke~ invades nort Cyprus PKK launches guerrilla campaign to establish independent Kurdiston In tlw -.hurt.u1l.l llll'<ltu m tt rm, rhl Ill'"' ltkch pr "I'L'I..I '' ull11 111liL'd.lrlllt:LI cnntl l )IL'I' thl I11I1J.!l'l" term, hnwe\ L'.t rh prllil'cfll>n,-ltk 111 rh L Turkt,h \IL''t h,t, h.tcl,t m~>,ler.tttng l'tll'lt 1111 Kur,lt,h rl''t,knt,, Tltl''l' 111o dlm11graph1l trcn,l' 1:1, l hc:fl',lfl' rl'.i'lltl' Ill hll('l' the l.lltl((jl( ('0111( to IIKI'l',t'li1J..! ('fl "lll'l tor.llullll lllij.!hl he rl''<lhed J'l' ILL'I ulh. F, r <ll1e, llll>,l.ttion l(lt tlw s.tkc of "'L t.ti('l',tll' t hl \lllrli "Kur,l" h nul\ f ull~ p.trt ol.m,l thl'i''"''hl} gr1>11111~ \ltlltnl.:lll''' ot pnltt IL.d d t'llllll'.,e. Thl'r <:.tl:-.u L'\l't pultt t<.:.d p.trtt<:' rh.n.t i" L' prtlll;ll'l ly de\'nt ed 111.1,h.tnung Kmd t,h nght,,,tnd Kur,l' "'.lllillllpltsh tlt,tl l h.tngl' \1 trh <llll \'1 >11'1111'. Alan Mokovsky is a senior fellow at The Woshmgton lnslltule for Near East Pol1cy From , he worked in the U S Deportment of Stole and served in 1992 as its liaison oh1cer on Operation Provide Comfort in southern Turkey and northern Iraq. Additional Sources: The Kurds and the Future of Turkey ( 1997) by Michael M. Gunter. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s. Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East ( 1996) by Robert W. Olson, editor. The Kurdish Question and Turkey An Example of o Trans Stale Ethnic Conflict ( 1997) by Kemal Kinsct and Gareth M. Winrow Turkey's Kurdish Question (1998) by Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller Government raids PKK military bases in northern Iraq Tonsu Ciller becomes ~rime minister;,000 ktlled in Kurdish struggle Welfare Party tokes control of government; kcro Islamic Erbo on elected prime minister PKK leader Ocalan placed under house arrest in Italy 71

78 LOOKING FORWARD T 11 An at771cd Se1 b guards h1.1 t ilkrge rn rite! Kosnvo region of St..>rbia, one of sc wral "f1a.~h (loinr~" fctr u:tjespro!ad confl~ec provide a more comprehemivc view on the impact of armed conflict~ and efforts to prevent and resolve them, we have cho~en thi~ year to highlight ~e\'cral!iituations rhar do not meet the definition of "major.~rmed conflict" or "war" yet still merit scriou~ glohal arrenrion. A~ l99s drew to a cl...>se, much of the Caucasu~. Somalta, and the Kosovo region 11i Serht.l teetered on the brink of all-out war. Meanwhile, traditional trouhle :-pot!> such as Nigena and Northern Ireland appeared to be on the road to peace, albeit ~reep and rocky n1ads. In other Cl1Unmes, such as Ltberia and the two Korens, it was roo early to tell what cour!ie they would take a~ we begin looking forward tl In the page~ that foll11w, experts examine soml.! of the volatile regtons of the world and look in-depth at the fragile peac;~ proces~ in Bosnia, the tmportancc of human rights in confltcr preven tilm, anj the qu~:stion of whether peace ts ulttmately ro~stblc. 72

79 ,..-:. --- ~ ~~ : --- ' CARNEGIE (OMM 55 ON: TAK!\!G PREVEN' VE MEASURES The Cameg1e Commi s1on on Preventing Deadly Conflict was established in 1994 hy the C,trneglc Corpc)rauon of New York as a dehl:-erate effort to "addres the loormng threat:. to world peace,,f intergroup violence and to,,,1\,-mce new 1de.ts for tlw prevention and rcsolur1on of dc,,jly conflict." Commtssion co cha1rs Da\ id Hamburt:, the tmmediare past pres1dcnr of the Carnegie Cor pnratton (hoth majnr ~>upporrers CONFLICT UPDATES The Confl1ct Updates give a weeki) synop~is. Cl1n dcnsed from wire an<i nc\\ paper n:p(ltts, of mtlitary and polu acal developments m al out 20 coumne around the world w1th extstmg or potenttal armed ~.:onfltcts. Updates are compalej, wntten, and ed1t ed bv ncadem1c Interns Ill the Conflacr Re~olutton Program (CRP) ar The Carter Center, supcn'l ed hy CRP. taff. Conflict CpJates are (h:.mbuted ro INN member, Carter Center staff, and the public through The Carter Center\ home page on the World Wide 'Xlcb at (see Upd;Jtes under "Wh.u\ New"). nf the INN), and Cyrus Vance, an INN member, hav..: led a dedi cared and h1ghly DEADLY COI\TFLICT qualified group of internatwnal leader, renowned 'chl)lars, veter.m practitioners, and ()thcr expert~ in th1:. endeavclr. The result of rh1s ambltll)u:. undertakmg has been a ~erie:-. of reports, b:tckground papers, book,,md the w1dely di emi natcd anj h1ghly praised fin.ll report. In its liter.tture, the Carnq~ic Comm1s~ion states that the fin,tl report "analy:c~ the current stare l1( vitllent conilict in the world anj lay~ out the Commisswn ~ \'ision of :m mtcr national S)stcm of cnnfltct prevention. Thrcl' fundamental ob ervations form the foundotton of the repon; Deadly con flact as not mev1table; the need to pre\ ent :.uch c,mflict is incrl!asmgly urgent; and succes ful pn:~, entlon b po~ iblc." In the repmt, the Commas llm outlmc ~everal pr.tctical meosures and options for early actaon to prewnt mas vao lence,md concludes by challengmg the mternational com muniry to create a "culture of pre, cnt aon." Information ctbout rhe Carnegie C<1mtm i,m, includmg the full final reporr, i~ available on the World Wide Web,Jt www. ccrdc.org. 73

80 CAUCASUS BY JOHN COLARUSSO 74 With five wars since 1989, rh e Cauca:.u:. is the most unstable regio n in the for me r Soviet U nion. This instability partly h as been the legacy of forme r Soviet leade r joseph talin and deepe r h isto rical grievan ces dating back mo re than 200 years. These local problems n ow are subject to th e stresses of oil po li t ics and the geopo lit ical anxiet ies of Russia for irs sou thernmost flank. Furthe rmore, n one o f the five wars has been resolved in any lasting way, a ltho ugh their prospects fo r rene wed conflict vary. The C hech en con fl ict is R u s s perh aps th e mo:.t dan gero us, with deep and inte nse an i mosities between the two Caucasus, in an effort t o o uts ide~ (see "C hechnia"). T h e multiethnic R epu blic of Dagh estan, howeve r, has the greatest level o f ten sion in the Caucasus. everal territo - rial disp ute~ exist amo ng vario w, ethnic e nc laves, but emerging Muslim movements, ~hoz io. ~ North or. -. Qssefio ~ -,. ~ S Chechnio 1992; the second in Abkha:ia, from A ugust 1992 to Septembe r As of mid-1998, the South Ossetian secessionist movement had wan ed, and a solurio n to the conflict appeared feasible. By contrast, the Abkhaz con flict, which e rupted again in late May, was not likely to be resolved in the ncar term. To keep the C ircass ians, who are k in of the A bkhaz, in the Northwest C aucasus q uiet, Moscow would need to back their own k in, rh e Abkhaz. Also, with an o pe n arms race in ' 0.,.... Soufn ~.... Doghesfon Osseho 1Azerba~ an ".' '\., Armenia.,, _,.. Nogorno '. _. '. Korobogh '"),.. ~.;....., r, ' "" '. l. \ r:'"'. Georgia outh A sia, Moscow needs certain se i ~ mi c monitoring facilities in A bkhazia. Moscow tn1ditiona lly has con trolled G eorgia, like the rest o f the Sou l h r ~ ~ '.:. '.. -: l1ank the unruly North and to Turkey.. -.,..... )..f I r a n - keep in check Georgia 's n il ambitiom. The Karahflgh Confl ict, fo ught O!>temibly from , actuall y is a second Turko-A rme nian wnr acted most notably the extreme fun kilometers 1 o ut in th e Caucasus and ~ _ ~ damcnralist Wahabbis, have fueled by deep animosities. created a new d imension of c ivic unrest that a lmost erupted into civil war in May While non e of these tensions serves Russia's inte rest, he r ability to srabil i;:e Dagh estan or C hechnia eemed extremely limited as o f mid The Prigorodny conflict between the North Ossetians and the l ngush, which erupted into vi o le nce in fall 1992, was unlikely to d o so again because of Russian troops' stro ng p re~ e n ce in the region. M eanwhile, these troops have acted as leve rage o n G eo rgia to the south, making contin ued te nsio n the re mo re I ikely. Georgia h as undergone two secessio n ist wars: the first in o uth Ossetia, fro m January 1991 to May Dr. John Colarusso, a professor of linguistics at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, has served as an informal diplomat and advisor in matters concerning the Caucasus and its peoples. A s of july 1998, lem.le rs o n both sides seemed incapable of securing lasting peace. Armen ia h ad become Russ ia's satellite in the South Cauo 1sus, serving as a counterweight to A ze rba ijani ambiti o ns. A!>olutio n to th is conflict h inge::. o n a settlement of o il inte rests that is acceptable to Moscow. Most other te n sion s in the North C aucasus center aroun d lost land o r econ o m ic priv ileges, particularly in and around Adygheya, in Karachai-Ch e rkessia, and in Kabardino- Additional Sources: The Caucasus and the Caspian ( 1996) by Fiona Hill, editor. Institutions, Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: International Experience and Its Implications For the Caucasus ( 1997) by Marc Gorcelon, Alexandra Wood, and Enna Eskin, editors. Russia and the Caucasus (1996) by Paul B. Henze.

81 .. '"'',... -l '_.,_ \_ R.dk.trt,l. ll<lwc\ l'r,.lrtnl,lumfltcts uvcr these m.utns rl m.hncd rl mnrc. p.1rrh bl'c,lllsl' sulh 'm~1ll war' \\\lul,ltwr ot.th\ sm,tl ec<hllllllll. tond!ltlll\' Unlc~s ctrms tradt ''cur t.11lt J, real ec.:utlll!lltc!!rllwth tnllr.ttcj,.tnj poltuc.1l <.:<llllj'rll nl!scs attatned, the C.tul..t'll' arc ltkelv rn rem.11n highl) unstable and subject 111 armed cnntlicts tor S<llllc ttme. CHECHNIA The C hechl n W;1r of December 1994-August 19Y6 was nnly the last of.t long string llf hll~ttliues smce 1785 bet ween rlw Chl chen penplc.: of the Norr h Cauc.bus and Russians. This laresr war was disastrous for borh sijl s, with heav} los~ ut ltfc anj l,trgvscale destruction. For Russta, tt wns abo a military humdtatlon of m.tjor pn1pomom. Whtle thl:' legacy of h,ttrej,md mistrust ts the b1ggest f.tctor mtlmmng against a l.tsllng peace between Russt<~ and Chechnta, o ther factors augur poorly for any future settlement. The truce of Aug u ~t 1996 (signed hy former R u l>~ta n milttary commander A leksandr Lcbed) and the accord of May 1997 (signed by ''Fur I~ ussia, It H'm a military Meanwhile, Chechcn nffiuals must travel on Russian pass p11rts and fr~::quenrl'r must seck permt"'''m tn c.;ro~s Russ1an ln matters of oil, agreements have been Jrawn up and s1gned, but the will 0r means to tmpk ment thl m Sl'ems etther lacking or inconsmnt Chechnra has s11ught cxrern,tl eco nomtc nes, bur every ~uccess merely serves to.1lienare the Russ1an government in the captml of Moscow Chechnia may srdl occupy a crucial posttion nlong the northern oil pipeline, but hopes that rhis woulj henl wounds anj place Chechnia squarely hack 1n Russta's fol d seem unfo unded. Russian Pres1Jent Borb Yeltsm) refratned hwntlracion of mtl)cjr As of mld-1998, war reparattonli remained one of from Jefirung Chec.hn1a's status whtlc alludmg to the pnnc.tples of internatwnal law. Russiam seemed ro be bu) tng ume through these dllcu menrs, while Chechens sct:ej uplm tntenntton.d legal terms,\s tmpl)'tnf.: their sovereign status. As of tnld- 199b, the Kremltn remamej p11littc.tlly JI\'IJcJ hetwc~:n h::twks.mj Jov~:s. Don:s ran the n~k of be in~-: fjtcj/)ortions. '' nccus~:d of destroying Mother Rus~w rf they made any progress toward peace.; wnh Chechnia. Ched1em abo rem,unej d tvij cd between th11sc who hoped to r~::srore ;-;omc nmmalcy wnh Russia.md 111llst' who wbhcd to sec Chechni<1 bcc.:nmc,t con scn,ttt\'c outlier of the lsl.lmtt world. The legal Issue of Chechn1.1 's statu~ has been.1 vex1ng one. First, Chechnia seceded from the former Unton of Sovtet OC1.1 l1st Rl:'publtcs tn t.ptemher l99l, nm from the Russtan Federation. Second, rhe Rus~i.m comtttutton expressly pre clujes any portton of rhc FederatiOn from sccedmg. Th1s ab~ence of a lc :al solution has fueled for those naunnalrsts within the Russtan JUdiLtary who threaten legal ac.;tlon agni11s1 off1ctal:- who talk wirh Chechen leaders 111 Gm:ny. the most polittcally sem.tttve 1ssues and, whtle Russia conttnues to face a ftnancral cns1s, one of the least practtcallmes. Ramp.tnt corruptwn on hoth s1jes has thwarrej efforts b) 0rher countries ro send.uj. Through June 1998, Chcchnia remained heavily,trmej and he.set hy Ct\'IC turmoil, tnclujmg scn:ral kidnappings. Efforts to reach security arrangements with Russia were proceeding, but thctr effec.ttvenes~ al~o rem.11ned unclear. Finall), the ~ tgnifilance of thl Chechen \\'.tr has yet to he determined. It may he <111 insignificant.mumaly 1n the Russian march to\\.uj normalcy, or It n11ght pmvc tll he the bcgmnmg of the end of the Russt.m Emptre. Gtvc11 passtl1lls nn hoth sidl.!s, prospects for renewed hllstilittcs must be seen,\s hrgh anj those for peale extremely low. Additional Sources: Chechnia, War Without Winners (1995) by John Colarusso. Chechnya, Calam1ty in tho Caucasus ( 1998) by Carlotta Gall ond Thomas de Wool Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power ( 1998) by Anotol Lieven. 75

82 76 KOREAN PENINSULA Bv DoN 0BERDORFER T. he Repuhlic of Korea ( ROK), the Western-oriented government in the outh, and the DemLK ratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the c o mmun i ~ t government in the North, have clashed repeatedly since U.. and ov ier fo rc e~ d ivided the penin:.ula at the end o f W orld War 11. The high point of sn ugg le was the bloody Korean War of in wh ich millio ns of Ko ream ;l!1d 54,000 American t roops lost the ir live. have held on-and -off n egotiatio n!>, punctuated by terronstic inc idents and periods of high ten sion. Today the misn amed "demilitarized zone" between the two Ko rean!>tates remains the most heavily fortifi ed and dangerou div iding line of the post -Cold War wo rld. Attempts to c reate a durab le peace, o r at least a greate r degree of stahd ity, have centered in the past seve ral yea rs on two se t~ of negntiatinns: Fo ur Party Talb, inc luding the United Sta t e~ a nd C hina as we ll as 1 he two Korean states, and ince 1972, the two ~ i des 0 Ch no hil ateral N orth- o uth talks without the presence o f the o utside powers. U.S. Prehident Bi ll C linton and RO K President Kim Yo ung Sam proposed the Fn ur Party Tnl b in April 1996 " tn initi<jtc a process a imed at ach ieving n perman ent peace agreeme n t." A fter cx t e n ~ i ve maneuvering, C hma nnd the DPRK agreed ro participate, and the fir..,t full -scale meeting tnok place in Decembe r 1997 in Gen eva. A :-.econd meeting in Gen eva in March 1998 failed to p m duce agreement nn an agenda 1m suhstantive negotiatio ns, a ltho ugh all sides agreed to mee t agam. Bilateral North-South talb at a senior-nffic ial leve l resumed in BeiJin g in April 1998 after four ye,m in wh1ch the DPRK refu sed such meetings. T he in,wguration two months carl ier nf the new RO K pres ident, Kim Dae Jung, who initiated po licies of much greater e ngageme n t of the Nnrth, was a majm fac tor in h ringing a hout t he resumptio n of talks, as was the North's dire econ o mic situatio n. T h e initial round <lt the vice ministc- I * seoul rial level fa iled to ach ie ve agreeme nt o n a id and human itar ian issue:-., bur further talks were p la nned. I.....;.< I Meanwh ile, the DPRK nuc lt:ar program. which gen erated in ren~e ctmfrontmion in the earl y 1990s-and threatened to lead to war in June 1994 until forme r U.S. Preside nt Jimmy Carter inte rvened- has remained frozen under U.N. impcction. T h is i ~ the result t)f the A greed Fra mework nego tiated hy th e U nited S tates and the D PRK in October The D PRK Japan agreed to ~to p work o n its existin g nuc lear program in return fo r au.. co m m itme n t to arrange the ~ u p pl y of two su b stitute nuclear reactors less prone to n uclear prol ifemtion and to prnddc heavy fuel o il to compensate for en ergy given up hy the D PRK while the reactors arc hu ilt. Loom in g in the hackgrnund is the DPRK's increasing ly M.: ri nu~ fond and ccon o m ic si tuarinn, whic h hcgan aft cr th e colla pse of the Soviet U nio n :md the withdrawal of exte nsive :,ubsidies frnm C hi na. Floods ;m d d roughts exacerbmcd disastrous agr icul tural practices nnd government pnl1c1es 1o reduce DPRK food productio n levels well hclnw suhsistcncc requirements. Despite ass i ~t an cc from C hina. th e U.N. World Fnod Program, and private agencies, a1d wmkers reported deaths due tt1 starvatin n n m ging from te ns of thousands to millium. Don Oberdorfer is ;ournalist in-residence at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University's Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. He was a ;ournalist for 38 years, including 25 years with The Washington Post. Additional Sources: Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea (1998) by leon V. Sigal. Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (1997) by Bruce Cumings. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History ( 1997) by Don Oberdorfer.

83 ;. :, LIBERIA Onjul) 19,!997, Lil,~ na n ~ \'lltcj m dclttnm th.u m.trh J.1 rl'l ttrn to l'll.n-.r itu.tipn.tl ru le.md repre'l.'lll e,l t h~. culmttuttnn nt.1 difficult pr<lce" l<l enj ~e1 en ye.tr',,f hrll(al u>nf1ilt. T h~.. elccti<ll1' impletnl'i1ll'd tht: Ahuj.l :\lu,.-d,, the l.tl1.'~l,tgrl'l'llll'l1l 111 the IPnl,!.md n ltl'll truv tr.tt t n~.: J'L',Iu' prul''" L"ordtn.tl~ J h) the E~.on<ll1ltL (. 'nmnhtntt) ot \X.',,t \tn~.,m ~t.lll'' (El l)\x'a~) CL'<hL' Firc i\ l nn t tnrm~.: <.~roup (El\ )~ll)( 1). hm1wr U.S. Pre,ldcnt J tmlll) ( ',trtcr, al,,ng 1111h tlwr tn tnn.lttlln,tl,md J,,.,;.tl BY TERRENCE lyons c,m":4ul'illh. thev l'<lll'll tnr T:l';l,lr ro.tppc.n: t he powerful ex f.lltl<lll lcaclcr. In rl1l l' thl. the ~.. l elliun... r. ll ilt~ ~.l.md tn'tt tullnn,lii:ej the l'<'lutc.d tup<lgr.lph).m,l tmh.d;hh.e o f J1<lWL'I' lrl',lll'd h~ 'even ve.u' ' I 11.tr. Whde the L lecttntb 11\.lrh,l till' ~. nd o f otw ph.t'l',,f thl l<llllltd, 11 '' lll<' e,trh 111 tudge whtthn the\,~.. rn d tnu-.hl r tn,, new era nt 'll't.hn.thle Llllllltll m.tn,lt,:l'llll'th. l.thl.'rt.l h.t,l,, Llltbt n utton.tl g<n'l'!'nm~. nt, hut,1 'el'll'' uf ~..h.dk ngl'' nh,t:f\ 1.'1''. lll<lllllllte,l tlw \llltnl,!, 1\ h tlh \\',h J'l',tedul.m,l wdl-ln.tn.tgl'd. ( 'h lrll'' T.11lnr. thl t.mnn l.llttnnal J ~. n t. Thl p nti..l'" tlw rl'l<ll'l' e nded wtt h T.tylor,,, thl c lc,tr 11 tnn ~.. r h ut left unre.,n h-e,l pn>hle m-. 111lludtn).( the dt, tn rttu n ' nl )1<1\\'l'l' th,tt tn ttt;tl l) pnnnked t h l' u>n tl tll 111 I')Sl), tlw 'l'll'l' 1 h.ll lo,mg part tl'' lud ltlllc ~1.1~,. 111 '"'t.11111ng tlw,,utu'llll',.: Gbarnga Libe ria * Monrov1o Buchanan.. -. ~.... I..... '..., Ci>te d'l o re '... ~.. --,,'.. I Harper ~ ;, ( 11 1.: go\ l'lllilll(l'..tppointed" 1<.:11 nppnn, nt' to m ithlr L.1htl1l't J'<"il lllll',llhll''t.tl'lt,lll'd Llllllllll"illll' on h l nghts,,n,l l'l'(lltktlt.llllll1. Rut.md,1 d.111nttng 'l'l ot l..h.d l eng~.., to,,, ~ r U>Illl' till',le,iiulll<ll1 ollld dt\l~llll1' l>f tiw \\,11. Thl m.11n poltttt tlp.1tttt ~ 11\:tl' th '\: k d h1 ll>rtlll'r to~llhll1,tl k a,las, '"'It 1s T.tli H's :-.Jo~ttun.d P.ttrt< lll P.ll'l\ (~1'1'), 111,1 rh,>sl' lnl h tlt.ll)s, Ill"'' ll~>t.1hh Uk n l~>hn,lln-st r k.tt \ Unll\ l'.lrt\ llw l..lllij'.tl!.!ll l'l'l'llld 11'<1' n.: l,tllll'l\' J'l'lll'lltl. On elntton d.tl, 1111'11<>111 ''"' h t,gh. T.l\ l~>r tlw prc,t.knt\ tn.1 Llll,l-,lt,l,, ll'lth ttll>r, th.lll 71 J'l'ru nt <~f th~. l<llt', toll,nlvd h) "trlc tl 11 tt h <> () I'' rcl'ilt. Th, l,.t.:i'i.hur~. 11,I,,., ~ n mort Jumtn.ttc,l h) the i\:i'p, <.tt'attn~.1 d~ t.tltlltlnvp.trt\ st.hl' T.t~ lor tnd tlw l'\1'1' parr hec.ill'l',,f 'ill'nll>r Jrg.tnt :.ltlllllal,,ijl.ic.ll\,.llli.-' I<) l'l''<>l trle' (llhhl I11ll.lhly thl 11111\ sih> t t \1,1\'l' r.tdt" 't.hh>l1, wh1d1 \\'.1',, t:c,l,lllrtng tlw 11,11 ),,,n,l tlll'tr l'"l'hlt-t nil'" ':.!''.m,ll';llr<>lld!.!l'. In,~, l dttll>ll, llll'lll n n e' of 'l'\'1.'11 \l'.ll'i of hnu.tlu>ntltll,1thl till' Ulllst'l(IIUll lc.tr ~lco~ rl ~ 'h 'l'''d h"w m.lll\ \ 11l1.'r' 1 ll'lll'd th~ cl1.'1. tlllll,m,l tlw ~hlll<.l''.1\',ttl.tl k '" tlll'll1 ~1.111\ Lthnt.m.' hl'ltl'i t,lth.tt tl 11er~. bl'll1!.! ttlll'd 11 tth lt,ght~. r, fl >lll l11s,,1.1 1'\.lllllll,d l'.llrtortc t=r"m l~>r ltbert.l, r.thl'd c ll~.t'lll' In I ), t~. mhl r J<l9/, thl' hnu.d mllr,kr nl "iam 1\,kte, "Ill' ol T tli \,,uh 'lij'i'"nn, 11h11 h.l<.~l'll tl11. l'ntt~ l':trt\ , l, d m.tn\ Ltbl n.tn' ''' k.tr th,1t tit, l'll>k'nl~ 1>! till' ll.tt \'l' "' 11,, nut t>itr \1.'1. In "''J'Il.'llll ~ ~ II.J9b, 'L'', r.d pt'<>pk 1\l:r< ktllc,ltn ~IPntm ~hn<>l llltlk'll\l'l'llj.!<l\l'rl1ml'th 1111<>1'' 111.! l,,,,tj,,t,pi tn1mt:r I.ILIIotl k,,,ler R<l<hl'\ elt l"hn,on. Terrence Lyons o fellow tn the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, served as semor program advisor and Monrovto office director for The Corter Center's 1997 Liberia Election ProJect Addittonal Sources: Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping ( 1997) by Herbert Howe. Liberia: A Nation Displaced ( 1998) by Colin ScoH Voting for Peace: Post-Conflict Elections in Liberia ( 1998) by Terrence Lyons. 77

84 NIGERIA N igcn;t, Afnca\ mnsr populous countr), ha~ hl cn emhroilcd in crbi~ since 1993, when mdttary leaders C;tnceled a widely anticipated tran--itiun to democrartc rule. Under the ensuing regime of Cien. Sani Ahacha, \\hn ru led untd hts death in June 1998, the country expenenccd polittcal rurmoil, l conomic malat~e.,md intcrn,tnonal i ~o l,u i u n. Niger i a'~ Jdemm<l ha~ deep hbtorical root~. Like mo~t Afnc;m state~, Ntgeria was an arnficml creation of colontali-.m, mcluding some 250 ethnic and lmguistic gro up~ of whilh rhre(. -the northwestern Hausa-Fulani, southwe~lern Yoruba, BY PETER M. LEWIS ment executed Ken Sam-Wl\va and e1ght compatrjl)ts fwm the Oglml community who had agttated fllr em ironmental ~ trtndmd ~ and economic right~ 111 the country\ od-pwducmg area:,. These acts were condemned hy several countries and intern;hional organi:minn:-., which res tri c t~:j aid nnd r e lhtinn~ with Nigeria. Economic decline and deepening social srraim accompanicd the pa II llf pol i 1 ical repression. The Ahacha government sougln to hurnish its image by announcmg political and ellmomic reform-.. De-,pite the promise of a new democratic transjllon agenda, the goyernmenr permitted only five screened parties to participate 111 and 'ourhea~tern lghn-hecame Jomin<lnt nvab. The Mresses (lf ethnic nnd regumal competitwn led rn pol ncal turbulence and civd war in the late 1960:., and these tensin n:-. have inn uenced the natio n 's poliu c:. ever -,inu!. T h e quest for democratic gnvcrnmcnt has occupied many leader' ~ince 1966, when the milnary overthrew the fir~t parliamentary government. In the ensuing JecaJel>, milit<h} leaders h,1ve governed for all but four year~. N1gcna\ economy was tran~formed in the 1970., when the country Mali..-.',I lbadon Lagos Niger : '.'Chod elecnom and conducted the program 111. a repr e~~ive political atmosphere. In '-. l. ' April 1998, all five parties nominated Abacha as their sole candidate for the pre~idency. e Kaduno,. O n June 8, Abacha died, reportedly of Nigeria J,... on~~sho Port H~ rcourt, emerged as a le;1ding n il exporter. Yet the n ew bounty d id nnt hring prosperity or development. Instead, ir signfl led <1 m<b sive increa~e in corruptio n and mismanagement. T he-,e dcep--,eated challenges have been evident in rec~:nt cmes. In June 1993, Gen. Ibrahim Babang1da\ reg11nc con JucteJ pre.,jdenual elect1nns <1~ the final step in a promisej democratic transition. Although the poll y1elded,m apparent wmner-ch1ef M.K.O. Abwla, a popular Yoruba bu:-.me:,sman-bahangida annulled the election. He abdicated lw, eight-year reign and installed a c ivilian caretaker government, which Ahacha quickly shoulde red ns ide. The new regime hnras~ed and detained journalbts, human righ h activist:-., polnj cj<ms, and nrher dis~idents nr ri\ nb. Abinla was arrested along wnh do:cm of crincs. In November 1995, the govcrn- 7H '. ~ '.J, Cametaon ' a heart attack. Gen. AbJulsalam1 Abuhakar replaced h1m and quickly tnok -.teps to reverse some of rhe mo~t unpopular features of Abacha's ru le. everal prominent political pnsoners were released, the regime hegan a dialogue with the dome~llc opposition, and the country\ diplomatic isolation suhs1j ed. Despite these hopeful s t ep~. the co mtry w.1s thrown into turmoil when Ahiola died suddenly o n Ju ly 7 while ~ t ill in detention. Within two weeks, Ahuhakar announced a new program for tran::.ition to democratic rule, set to conclude in May Peter M. Lewis is assistant professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington D.C. He has written extensively on the Nigerian political economy and on brooder regional issues in Africa. Additional Sources: Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria ( 1987) by Richard Joseph. Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria (1995) by Tom Forrest. Stabilizing Nigeria: Pressures, Incentives, and Support for Civil Society (1998) by Peter Lewis, Pearl Robinson, and Barnett Rubin.

85 ., r ) ""~ '.JJ- _... - SERBIA (KOSOVO) BY ANTHONY BORDEN Open \'i<lll'll(l' l'fllj'tt d Ill e.lrl) J\}l)S 111 l(,lsll\11, thl' t rhnlc Alhanl.lll lll<ll<lflt) pr''''ll1te wnhm tlw F..:dt ral Rt puhlit ul Yu:.:usl.l\'1,1 (11h1th rnduj..:, th..: r..:puhlu:' ul '-'trhi;l.1nd l\1pn!t:nl'glo-,el' m.q' un pagt S2). Till' 'utl 1 rt',l~,,f.mnt d t~>n!lltt Lle.ltt J )<11 11L'II WLllflt\..:n'1' 11 11h 't'\l'i'l' 1lllpl1t.lllnlh fpr tht t:lltlr..: P..dkan ll'l.!lllll. Nuw \L'.tl' 1fter '>erh1.1n lt o~dt r ::-;lllh.,li.m ~1d<"L'\ It ll'\okcd tht rernll>r) \ l'<>luac.d.hlloill>lll\, thl' emt rgentl' <>I the ~h td ""' 1(,",,,,, Lahl'r.uaon Arnn (UCK) ".111.l<.. tu.d, al '.t:.:ut h form t<>lll111lll1ll' I1t!ll J'l'.lLL'. T h L ) ug<hl,ll Army\ hl',i\'\ hamkd IL''I'"Ibt' an rwu m.1111.tlt.ld,, 111 t:arl, 1\ l.n-th 199::; C<lllst d nwre th.m 1 0L~ dt'.ll hs. Tht se 1 l<llt nt l'l'l'llde, L'lllllpelled tht antern llaon.d Llllll ll1tll1ll\ til re.tc r ll'llh t'llll'rgl'ik\ m..:l'trngs.,, rh..: Cunr;~u <.l roup (FranLL', (rl'rm;mv, <.lrt'<ll Rrata an, Ita ly, Russ ra, and tlw UnirL d Stalt's). RL' Ill llli,l'l'llt 11f rht 1992-lJS Hnsnt.ln L<lll flatt, t hl''l' lllt't:tlng' rl stdrl d 111.t r.i!1\.!l' <II andkuu.llclrt'l<>lll;i!il lll lll.ltl\ e,. Tlw 1 rukntt'.d'" st nc,l Ill r.dh Alh<llll.llls, h,,rh 111than.md <lllt,ldl "''''''" t<> hl't'olu'c halmle,,f k.1r on huth,ide,, espl uallv during th... war 111 Rusni,L k.u,o\o h.t, het n u>tnnhmh \'lt'wcd.1' thl ll11h( d.tnj..!l'f<\lis fl.tsh J'0111( 111 rill' fl'j!ll lll ht'(illi'l' (<ll1t11ct t11l re <..oul,l c.:.hth dcstnhd1zc nt'lghhnnllg M,tt L'd<llll.l, ll'h1ch h,1s.1 l.trge Alh;ml.lll llllll<hiiv. SU<:h.1 dn dclj'iilt'lll Wtlldd tlht'illt'l1 Ill IJ.!I11tL'.l gem ral Balk.m \\',If. Orlwr sr.thdi:ln!,! t,,,. "'~'' JC<>J'.trchzed h thl' 1 Jolt'JH rurn tn K1h<lll lilt ludt illl t'xtr.tprclll\.tr) "p,tralll'l".hlmlnhtratl lll thrc>ugh wihth Kusol.tr t\lhm1.tns, lunck-,1 lrnm Alhan1ans.thr,,td, rgam:ed n lut.ll11111, hl alih, and <lllll'l l.tulttil'>, "well,,, tht J'l'il<..t.:ful 'll'illt:l.!\ (pr llk icj'cildt llll' J'I'Pmntl'J h K'""'',lr Alh:tnl.tn ll',tdl'r lhr,1h11n Ru:.: I',L "-''''"ar Alhan1,tn lrustr<lllllll n.:;t~hl d,llfltl<..illp<hill.lfrer rhl' t.u lurl' ro \lhtam l'oik Jt'tl' unpn ll'jllt nts lr\lm dw llj95 Da}lllll PL',ILl' ALLord' th.lt ended the w.tr 111 H<"nw Thl' sn~1; d dt sr.th d :atlon 111 th <.. ne1ghhonn:.: t'lllllllrt cll t\lh.m1.1, c..nupll',l \\llh rhc l'nd ut llghrm:.: dse\\'hl'rt: 111 till lc nnl'r Yug<>sl.tl 1.1, m.tdl',1 l.ti'!.!l' 'IPLk nt sm.dl,11"111' rl'.tcld),1\':lll.lble 111 tlw L.:CK. Fr11m "' l'olrllt''l, Ill H>ns l!.!ollll'l ~t rh J1<lllte Ill Tht uhl',,1 rht K"'"'" LllnlltLI ""' he, n tlw,t.,ptht',,,n tht l' llatll... d nghr, 111 \lh.mao~r~s, 11 ho m.tkt IIJ' IW.lll) 1 ll~ J't'r (l'l11 I rhv pn III1LL'\ 2 mdla< n anh.ahlt.lllh. Pc,pH<' rh.:-,m,dl 'i:t' "' tlw '-'nbrm l'"l'lll.llhlll, tht pnl\ 1nu pia'' 1,, mr.d rill.:' Ill St rhi.m n.lll<>ll,dt,lll. l\1d"'l'i IL, 11(1\1 Yugn,l,11 fto,k-r.d prl',ldllll, ru,t 1upn11ca ~7 1hrPugh lu',ll'll l' lallt.tl m.llllj'ui.lllllll 111 tlw Kn'<1\'l> l"lll' h, m,,,kmg rlw Sed,,' 111~ thl~ deft'. II 1n Ko'<ll'll h thl <. )rrum.tn' Ill I )SlJ. \XIIIL're.tthc Scrh, lolnll< t cnn~t'l\ t',,t ~t'rlll,l \\ Hh<llll tht pro1 llllt', Alham,u~s hul,l.1 numt'rlt.d d<>lllln.mcl' and.1 h 1ght'l hlrthratt'-1 h.u cnsurl'' t ht: ltk n llt v tll thl'.l rt'<l wi ll n:ma111 Alha 11all, -.:1\'L' for thl pre'<'l1tl' uf Yugo.. lal Arm\ tr<lllj'' st.l ll<lllt'd thl'ft 'sttps h, ~1dost'\ I~ 11 th.:-!9l)l)._ rn 'hut Jn\\11 dw prn1 lllll' dnuugh,ill l'lk~111 l' mdllarv <ILLIIJ'illl<lll turrhn pol;tl'l:<.. d the two L'lhllll J'IIJ'III:Hic>ns. lhl ~nnlliu rcm.unl d lrn:en rhrpugh<hii the 19l)l)s, p.jrtly 'ilk"' 111 dw u>nfi1lt and rn, J t<> "('en J'L',l~~ 1 dk~.,a,, an Ho,l\l.t, lw\\l'\t'r, lttk <~I.1 \.lt.ta l'"llltl.tl ~nlull n.tn,l thl'.1h'l'iilt' pf,ill~ ll'l'dd,jt tliil'ii lllllll lht: lllll'llllllllll,d Lllllllllll 1111) "l't'iil'd rlw \1.1)' l< r 1 tolt nt L<~llll'<lllt.lll<lll \X/hd, rht anrnn.lll< n.d communlt~ prt'"t d f11r s< lllc!prill l>l c~l<>rl'~i.llltoil<)lll\ lor 1(,,,,)\11, \lh:llll.ln' rht rl',,lid tht~ \\Puld b, Anthony Borden ts co-director of the Institute for Journal1sm in Transitton, editor of 1ls magazine Transitions and former editor of War Report. Additional Sources: Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (1998) by Mirando Vickers. Kosovo A Short History ( 1998) by Noel Malcolm Kosovo Avoiding Another Balkan War ( 1998) by Thanos Veremis and Evangelos Kofos. editors.

86 -~ -~<<i<,<j ' )r-"j.. " SOMALIA BY KEN MENKHAUS en~n year~ after the January 1991 O\'erthro" o f Ba rre, armed confltct and humanirarinn c n ~e~ still iad plague much of 'omalia. Despite numerous diplomat ic initltltives, a central stare has yet to be re-established, leaving the country in varying degrees of anarchy. In , fac tional warfare over control of the governmelll, key c itie ~. agricultural zo n e~. and humanitarian relid supp l ie~ devastated ~o uth ern omalia. That conoict initially pirted the omalta National Alliance ( A}, led by Gen. Mohammed Farah Atdeed, against a loose coalitton nominally headed by Ali Mahdt of the United W<trfare hetween the two alliances de::.rroyed mom o f the capital o f MogaJbhu and tnggered a massive o mali Congress. famine tn t h e agriculrurnl zo n e~ of south- "" :Horgeyso ~. e rn omalia, where a n e~timat~d Eth op a 300,000 Som ali~ died., ~ Goolkocyo To end t h~.: cmis, 37,000 multinational troop~ were d eployed in the U.. -led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from December 1992 to May Its succesor, t he Untt ej Nations Operation in oma lta (UNOSOM), was given an expansive mandate to fac ilitate national '. _,.. Somalia.....r-- " ".. Kismooyo reconctliation, recomtruction, a nd disarmamen t. Despite a n ;uional peace accord sign ed in March 1993 and Jozens of contrast, in th e northea~r. a capable regional authority has been establb hed; in the n orthwest, the secessionist state o f " oma liland" h as declared tndcpendc nce from the rest of the country bur has yet to gn tn recognition. Armed conflic t pe rsists in SOLtthern Snmnlia bur is more localized than in , involving deadly feuds within rather than between major c lf'lns. In Mngf'ldi hu, rhe main seaport Hnd airport rematn closed due to sporadic but h eavy fighting between militias formerly allied in the now badly splin tered NA. Gen. Aideed was ktlled in combat in August 1996, and hts 33-year-old son, Hu sein Aideed, re placed him. In 1998, fierce interclan fighting struc k the southern port city of Kismayo, and sporadic s kirmi s h ~.:s plagued the Baidoa area and the Gedo regio n. Neighboring scares in the Horn of Africa hnve led efforts to promote national reconciliation since 1997, but these efforts have worked a t cross-purposes because of regional rivalries. The Ethioptan-spomorcd odere conference in January 1997, the Kcnya-brokered tn parttre agreement, and the Cairo peace conference tn December 1997 all failed to create a governing body for Soma lia, which continues to nperate without a central government. s u b~~qucnt reace initiatives, the U.N. operntinn was d~.:railcj by fightirtg with Aideed's militia and withdrew in March L995. It left behind a country still divided and without a central government. ' ince the U.N. withdrawal, both political authority and armed confl ic t 111 omalia have become increastngly frag mented and localtzed. Political factions have ~imu l mnenu~ly grm\n more numerous and more feeble, exhtbittng ltrrk capacity to admintster communities t h e} cl.tim w re pre~cnt. Mmt day to-dny politic<tl authority in southern Somali a hns devolved to vi llage a nd n eighborhood community leader\. By Ken Menkhaus is on associate professor of political science of Davidson College and served in os specie/ political advisor fo the U.N. Operation in Somalia. Additional Sources: Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention ( 1997) by Wolter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, editors. HSomolio: Political Order in o Stateless Society# by Ken Menkhous in Current History (May 1998) Somalia: Stale Collapse, Mvltilarerallnfervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction ( 199 5) by Terrence Lyons and Ahmed So motor. 80

87 UNITED KINGDOM (NORTHERN IRELAND) BY KIMBERLY COWELL tghteen monrh., of ralks hc:twecn polntcal partit:s in Northern lrl Ltnd.md the Rml',h and In~h gnvt:rn ments resulted 111 a c.:nmprehcn~tvl' peace an:urd A ne'' coalitllm Jomm.ned hv Ftanna Eid (Ireland\ huge~t parry), led hy Bente Ahern,.mJ a new Rmi... h Lahour government, lej hy Tony Blatr, comhmej to pi.ke.t htgh rriority nn known a., tht ()nod Fndav Agreement nn Apnl I 0, The resolving the Northern Ireland en~'' Agrt'l'tnl'llt nlh:r' the n11tltne of a con,rnuttonal sl ttlemt nt, Wtth rhe encpuragement of John Huml \ SPct.d Demncrauc and Lahnur P;~rrv, the hridgml,! tht ullllpt"tlng cl:um~ 11f lnsh 11,Htnn,tlt,t~. who w~k maimtream n.mnn.dtsl party tn Nnrthcrn Ireland, the rwo to untty the t~l.tnd of lrt lan~l..md unhmt~ts, who \\;tnt loo,jprrhern lrel.md tp rcm.ttn part of rhe l ntted Kmgclllm. gu\'ernmcnts.,tlpultted the Cllndttwns h1r Stnn Fem\ parttctpauon 111 mulnran~ peace talb. The IRA declared,1 new Appro\'t,l h~ ~tmnlt.menu' referendum' tn N<lrthc:rn lrd.tnj l:t:'il'>e-hre 111 Jul.,. 1YIJ7,.mJ ~11111 Fetn enten:cl the ~ubst.tnti, e anj tht: Repuhltc ot lrd.tnd 1111 M.t\ 22. the: Agreemt nt wtll he imrlemented,n cr the ne.xt two yt=a r ~. phase 11f the ralb pn1<.:t=ss 111 Septc mher <tlongstde seven other ~111Le the: 1960~. tonfltcl het\\cen thl: parties, tncludtng rolittcal represt:11ltlll\'es llf luy;titst paramtlttilrtes. Tht: Demonat tc Untol1i~t Party and Roman C.nholtc 11<\ltonall' l mmonty and Pmrc~tant untont~h m Northern Ireland has c lmmcd <lpproximatl ly 3,200 live~ and injured 30,000 pcrsnm. The "Trouhles"-a l'urhctntslll f11r polilll<t l umflill -ell\erged out o f.t Ll'vtl nght~ c.unpatgn t h.tt met '' ICh \ tdent rest.,t<llke fmm miltt,uh Pnltl".. t.tnh. Out,,f these cl.hhe,, hnth tondonderry 1 United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) Belfost the U.K. Untont'l Party hoycotted rhi~ pha-.e. Former U.S. Sen. C.'Jcorge Mttc.hell chaired t h e: tnlb with a~~ i srancc from Canadi;m (len. John de Ch;htdain and former Finntsh Pnmc Mtnt~tcr l l.mi llolkt:n. The CiooJ Fnday.tgreemt:nt c for e.. rahlishing.1 nc"' llrthern lrt:l.mj,a..,.,emhl) electecl rhmugh propprrton,tl rep- 'tcle' Je, elllpt d 1'.11'.1111 tltt.lr\ orj,.!iln t:atl!ll1,, Full<lWtnt.:.t p.trttt.ul.trh 'tllk nt pt'rtlld, tht Bnttsh gn\crnmcnt,ltssnhl'll rht Nurrht rn lrel.md Parlt.unent and government tn prov tnce L'\'t't smt e. Changt ~ in rhe context 11! the e<1nf1tcl fueled the pr<llc" rh.tt utlmlll,tll:d tn tht (l11od Fnda\ Agreement In J9S5, the Anglll lrt'h Agrt emt nt kgltimi:ed the tntere't' of the lri'h go\'ernmc th in Nmtht rn lri... h.tftair... Cooper.ttion l:>etwcen the t\\'(1 go, crnmcnts continued wtrh the j11int Dt:claratl\10 nt 1993,md the Framewnrb Dl1Cument of 1995, whtch lhttltned a pthentt.tl... ettlement. The Cltnwn admmtstr;ttton'... conrrn \'er... ial Jeustlln to i'sue a "'' ' to Stnn Fem leader Gcrr) Adam~ tn 1994 cnwuraged the lmh Rcpuhltcan Army (IRA) to,lccl.trc,\ t.e.tse-ftrt. tn August. Tht~ t.cssatton was c:omplemenre..l hy an Ounher luyalt~l t.t asc-ftre th.tr rem,11ned 111 effect dc~pt te more IRA vtulenct tn Fehruary L'l'lC<IUrage.md ch,tnncl CllOper;num,,md,t Councd 11! the Hntt,h bk~. l\.enher Clllll mun11y '' cumpletclv ~.Ht,ftcd wtth all. t~rc cr' nf the Agreement. It rcmatn~ 10 hl ~een htnl thl ''sues nf decllll1ts stoning weap1111s and rl'tntt grat tng fnrmcr paramtl ttartc' "ill he scttlcd, hllw the questions nf marc:lw-. and parad~:-. 11 ill ht rl"sllkej, anj hlm the pnlittc,tl partte., wdl pert.mn \\lth th~: new burdens llf ~df-sovc:reignt) Dr Kimberly Cowell, a specialist on Northern Ireland, teaches in the Government Department at American University and is a research assistant at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D. C. Additional Sources: The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict, and Emancipation (1996) by Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, contributors Opposite Religions Still?: Interpreting Northern Ireland After the Conflict (1996) by B.K lambkin. Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Conflict and Conflict Resolution ( 1997) by Alan O'Day, editor bl

88 OSCE CHALLENGES IN BOSNIA BY ROBERT FROW I CK Amb. Robert Frmdck tm.s called out of retiremenc co sen e m che U.S. r~prc.lf.>nllhit'e em tht! OSCE Task Force and Washmgwn's candrdace co become I lead of Mis~ron rn SaraJevo. Here, he prcwrdes a frrstlwrul accounc of the challenges facrng Bosma and Her~egot'rna after rrs four-year cwilwar. experts' script throughour the v11ting process. Also helpful wn' an informal meeting of electiom experts in Stockholm in mid-january (ntrended hy a Caner Center representative). Throughout the electoral pmces,, mission leaders were involved rn negorrarrons in Amnia and cnnsulratiom with the Contact Group, 1 he Peace lmplementauon Council, the 82 The Contact Group negotiator:. of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought an end to fighting in Bmnr.1 and llerzt:govina, a~ked thl Organization for Secunty <1 nd Cooperation in Europe (0 CE) to a~~ume n.:~p~m~ ihd rtic~ for conflict re~o luti on Lhat were unprecedented in 0 CE history.' Tn:.b rncluded :.upervr:.rng rhe prepnrathm and cnnducr of "free and fair and demncrarrc e le ctro n ~" ~rx ro nrnc month' nfter the Peace Agreement ~ r gnrng, :-.rrmulaung dem1kratiz.1tinn nnd ~trengthenrng re:.pcct fnr human rights, and fostenng negmi,hiom on and implementation of mrlirary 'rahrllzation measure!>. CONCE I V I NG A f RAMEWOR K Antrcipati ng <1 peace agreement, rn fall 1995 I lungarian Foreign Mini ~ r e r Laszlo Knv::rcs, <b OSCE charrman-in-office, North Atlantic CoLrncrl, U.N. agencres, anj many other~. The Peace Agreemcnr called fur rmrallatron of a High Representatrve rn SaraJevo ro oversee caval a'pcct:-. of the peace proces~. Under the aegt' of the High Rcprc~entatrve, 0 CE wou ld work alongsrde U.N. age n c ic~ and others to monrtor and reporr o n human riglus rs,ues. The Agrecm<:nt singlt.:d out OSCE to I _, ~, Hungary, T.. ~ "assist the Parti<:s"-t hc central aulhurities Crootlo ~ e~rahl r :. h e d a Task Force rn Vienna at the ~.' Republiko.l.,.,... ~.. ~- OSCE ~ l'lret a rial to plan an approprwre nw.. sillll rn ~ arnj<:vo. Our Task Force frr't vr,itej,.~raj evo m Nnvemner, rmmcdr.nely after initiali ng of the Oa) ron Peac<: Agreement. I was stunned b) the Jestruct11m in Bosnia and \'owed to do cvcrythrng pnssrhle wrthin 0 CE to help overcome thr~ catastrophe. It soon hcc;rme c lear that elections ( I... " miles _, ktlameters were prvotal for at kast two reasom. First, they rcprc,enrcd the exit ~trategy for Am<.:rican troops assigned to an rnttial 60,000-~t rong milrtary Implementation Force (IFOR), slared tn leave Bosnia before the end nf ecnnd, rhey were the mcchani'm for replacmg nationalistic wartime le ade r~h r p with a new political structure determined hy the ci tizenry. Tn help prepare for election~. a Jistingui~hcJ Srpsko I ' (Serb) e 8on>O lu>o ~\)'('P TLttiO.,..- Bosnia ~ 't_(ll and international tenm of <.:xperts led hy Ron Gould of Elections Can,1Jn <..:on ~ ulted wnh the Ta~k Force in December, made fie ld trip' to Bosnia, and presented n detailed report with recommenjo~tions rn late January OSCE closely followed the ~ ~ ; ~, I.:'-, 1 ' of Bosn i,r,and II er:egov ina, the Federal ion of Bosnia.tnd Her:cgovin.r (the Muslrm and Croat-domrn.ned cnm y ), and the Repuhlrka Srpska (the S<.:rhian-Jomrnared Herzegovina ' Serbia Federation enuty). It c,llled for c,tahlishrng fre<.:dom (Croat and Sora"';tr... MusJ m) of cxpressrnn,,,,~llli<ltton, and mo\'emenr f''.: -,~,..,., as well as provrdrng,, polrtrl,dly neutral I environment. It was unrealrstrc t11 cxpelt. \. '~ t' democratic polruc.1l cond i trom prior to Monocnegro..,. ' ".,. I ~ Alban"' gy to reach them. holding elections. l nste<ki, I endeavored earl y (111 to c reate e1 democrnti:ation stratc- To meet it~ military 'tahili:ation requrrem<.:nts, OSCE quickly convened.1 preparatory ~es'ton.tnd then launched negotiations on Jan. 26 in Vienn.t th<ll led ll) an Agreement on Confidence and Securrty Budding Mc,ti>ures. ubsequent The OSCE ww; cn:ati'j 111 rhe early 197L 1, as chi' Conference on.sccurrty and Coopcrawm 111 Eurof>c (CS( E). \Vuh 55 parucrparrnl! 1tatt:.1. rhe CSC uoa.1 w1 rmrrumcnr for earh 1A:arnin)!, conflrct pret enrron. cri.1is mana,(!ement, and f>rm-conflrcr rdwhilrwtron rn Eurof>e. Tit~ Con wet Grcmf> wa.1 formed ~ wrth T<'flTCit:rtt rtrt es from thl! Unrted States, the Uniced K1111!dom, Franc<', (l.:rmttn)', and Russra drat/zl'd wuh \et!krnl! peace rn /3o.mra.

89 ... ~. )':~,.. '._... Arms Con11nl" hy B, "111:1,tnd IIL-r:l gnv1n.r, CrPill i.1,.md ll1l' rump Federal Rl puhih.,,f Yu~.:nsl,11 1,1 (m.1dl up,,f '-,uh1,1,m,l ~l,,ntcm gn,). The I.Htl'r.ICC:Prd 11n' s1cncd Jum 14.11,1 ~11,I-Tcrm A"c"nK nt Mccrrng" Ill Flnrcn~.c, h.d). BUILDING A MISSION AlthPlll!h thl Mi~s1un To~sk h'rce 1 lstrcd '-'.n.ijl'\ NP\ 24, 199'i, \H' ujukl l1<lt dcplu ~ our.llh,n1lc OS< 'f: tl',llll 111 l\"lll.1 unrd l.itl' l11:ll'l1lhl r. Trans-,nl.mtll L\1\ llln l..hisl'd,!clays m,k-l ldmg rlw mrs.sllh1 lc.1llcrsh1p. Fin,dly,.lfrer thl altu,ll s1gn111g ul rh~. Pcau: AgrL'L'Illl'l1t at the 1\m, summrr, I was lliii11l'd Hc.1d 11! M1ss1Pn.111d Amwn:J 'chrde> from thl' inrual 60,000 /><'Tmn mulonauonallmf!lc:mcnuwon Ferre, (I FOR) rn Bo~nra ~rand amrd ch, rttms nc:ar Brckv rn swnmc:r I 1Jl)6 IF< )R \Ws rc:f>i<il<'j h> a \tth\tanrra/1;; rcjucc:d 'iwhili~chion Fonc (SFOHJ lcun r/1tt1 : celt and wnrmm'.\ w l<cc:flf>cacc rn Bmnill arnvcd Ill ~.1r<1JCI'nlln Dec:. 29 ru st.ly fnr rh~. duratllll1. Wnhm ll\'e mnnrhs we rilpidly hudt up a stall nf 400 o..:;ce.!for,.111j Eumpea11 Commu11rry Mo111tor M1"11l11,,ff,c~. rs in addition to snm~.:" 400-SOO lnc:1 ll y hir~.:"d pero.tmn~.:"l. Op~. rarruns w~. re llllt alw.1y' 1:asy, gl\ en thl dih'rslt y nf mdl \ 1lluals from rhc 54 OS( 'E s[;ltl's. 0\l. rall, \\'(' sh,1pl d o11l L'ffeL'ti\L' lll'l'r,ltlllll, wuh.1 L1rgL' head,,ft1c:e 111 '-,;1ri1JL'\'ll, six rl'g1ll11.11lel1tcrs, a11,1 24 f1dj,,fflccs. \'\('.lis~ll'rl',1ll'd the Prn\Jsl<l11,ll Elcdllll1 Cnmmlsslllll, rh~. Ekctllll1 Appl als Suh (\,mmlssllll1 Ill L'11lllrlL' L<1111plt;ll1ll' With \'l\11111.! rl gui,jii<ll1s, tlw Ml'dl,l Expl'rls ( 'un11lllss1pil, t>.ldlt.lf\ Ll.lls<lll t--1jssllllb,. md Ptlwr auth<lrlt;hi\l' lnstllllllllns. Thus, h j1111l' 199(1, I th n ghr \l'l' u1ukl 111l'L't ou1 ~. kctor,d n:sp<m'd'dllu:os,lesplll' 111;111\' C:lll1flnuing infl'i'l'thnil slruggks. CONDUCTING ELECTIONS o\t I lnflt1l.l', 11 tdl tll rnt Ill rlul!llitil'n,l whl thl r tn gn fllr \\',1rd \\ nh cll'l'llllos 111!,tel' llf ~l'rl<>ll~ hum.tn rtghrs \lnl.nwns. I w,mr~. d ''' 11".\lt,1 fe11 lllllrl' 1\L'L'ks hdllrl' d~:"c:ldmg Ill 1,!1\'l' our.;,m,ulttng \\ irh key ministers, mcludin)! L'.S...:;L'Lrl't.1f\',,f Stare Warren Chnst11phu, I dcuded tl' m.1ke,1 pnsttl\'l' rl'c \Hllmendanon. Sw1~s Fore1gn Mtnr,rer FL1111l C,Hll, the 1996 OSCE Lha1rman-1n-nff1ce, rhen had to Ll.:'rl1fy OSCE\.ICLCJ' I<HKI.:' nt rhe rl'cnmmcndarum. Cllltl.md l werl' e~peu.dlv concerned,th<hii tht star us ot Bosn1.111 ~crb lea,ler R.11.lovan K.uad:1c, \\ h,, sttll hd,l puhlic LHL'd 1 hl PcaLl' Agrel'llll'IH. Tlw High R~.:"prl''l'l1f,Ht I'L', tnrmt r S1H'd1sh Pntnl' M1111~lL'r (,,rl Bildt, tllllk -,rtps Ill 'rnp K.trad:Jc nl hi-. P<JWers. I thought th.tt Kar,l:tL dso sh,,ukl Tl'ltnqtush l11s ]''"',ts pn: Jdl'tll ul thl' ndtn~ ::-,l rh p.trt~, the ::-.erh1.1n ()l'tlhl<..l.rttt Llnllll1 (SDS). ~Hltlle kq E:.ump~..m cnlkagucs k.1rl d my pns~ m1ght le:1d to,111 '-,[)S hpyc<hlufthl l'kllllll1s, <.kpnl'ln).! thl m ul tnl'.mtng.md undl rmll1111)! rhl.:' l'tlltrc J'l',lll' pnlcess. Hni\L'\Cr, I rd"used tn o~lrer ulllrsc.md.lr).!ul',ith,ll thl' L'lcctlons cnuld nut be ju'tlftl'd wtrh,\ 1\.U Cflntl's tndjl'icl' he.1jmg pn>i!cll\e d~.:"mm:rau:aunn 1111fliltl\'es more ttme rn r.1kc hnkl. llnl' of thl' main rnlitil tl par[le~ of the counrr}. I took 111\ Srratcgi<. 1111J1l'r<lli\'Cs IL d to a htgh-lcvcl conscn~us that,tn.1ll <llll l'llnrr shlluld he madl' tn h,,jj dectj<lo' wnhin thl' I'll'\\'' ro an OSCE Parl1amentar}.Asllentbly llll't:llng in.;;llllkhnlm, a c,mr ICl Crnup st:sstul1 in London,.md bilateral tlllll' tr,lrnl' dcsl~.:narc,l h\ the D.tytnn.tgrCL'I11l'nt. r.1lb With President :::.lnbnd,m t--ltlose\'ic 111 Bcll.!raJc.md II 'l'l'ml',ll'"l'nttal th.ll the \'<Hing shnuld t.lkl' pl.tcc 11hde Ru~sl.ln Fnrl'q~n M lnlstl'r Yl'\ gcl1) Pnm.lkLI\ 111 Mn~u m.!for w,1, sttll.u iull str~. ngth NATO Scuer.1r) Cieneral In mv JUdgml nt, rhc qul''fll\11 11l'eJed til he rl',nhcd hctnre thl j,l\'ll'r Snl.tn.l.tnd nrhers l'tnph.hl-cd 1 he1r "' rnng suppnrt f,,r L'kl'lllll1 camp;11gn. At rhl lith h.,ur, U.S. Undl' r ::-,L crl'tar~ nl rhl ell ction~,tnd rh~. 1r,k,lrL' th.h deadline:- he mu. After St<lll' R1~.hard H,,lhnlLlkc ll1l'l ll'lth S~.:"rh lcadl rs tn HL Iwade and

90 Brcko, Bihac, and ' rehrentca, to name a fl'w. The political struggle re mained intensl' over the,e strategically -,en..,ttive locations. Careful diplom<hic n ;wigating, including calb o n Pre~ident~ Milosevic and Tudjman of Croatia, at la ~ t led to amnher round of v iolence -frl'e elec tio ns in ~ep temher. Most significantly, an Interna l pnlitic<1l c ri i1> a rose in umme r 1997, before the mun1c ipal dections, when n ew Republika Srpska Prc~ident R1lj,1na Plavsic, hased in Banjtl Luka, challenged the aurocrattc aurhortty of SO leaders in the war-time Bmnian 'erh capi tal of Pale. Plavs1c dtssolved the rpska mion a l Assl'tnhly nnd asked the OSCE t o supcrvtse e lection of <1 n ew A"cmhly. I strongly ~ympnt hi:ed wtth By summer 1998, nearly rltree years afcer figltr.mg eruled in Bo1ma, dm bombed cmt bridge in Mosutr ltad been reparrecl but wnumred w drl'tde the crcy between res Muslim and Croac rnhabrcams. hammered o ut an agreement that Karadzic would remove himself completely from public life. On July 19, 1996, the e lection campaign comequenrly hegan w1rh a hoost to its integrity. ThiS cpt,odc reflected,1 constant struggle ro find an ac.cl'pta~le halam.e hctween m tegnty and mo mentum. The Oa~ to n Agrl'cment stipulated seven levels o f dec.twns, and d,11 ly JUdgmem' had ro be made to e n sure mtegnty and momentum 1n the process. By late August, we dcc1dcd that mun1c1pal clecllons would no t he feas1bk, owing to Insuperable rrohle ms. Postponm g them, in fact, greatly cleared the ly and without violence on Sept. 14-exactly nine months her efforts to ftgh t corruption and rn accept the compromises nego ll<tted a t Dayton. But [ could n ot commit OSCE to acrtve support for Plavsic. The OSCE Permanent Cmmctl, representing < partic tpattng S t.hes, h;~d to deuje on such support. After several wel'b of Internal and in1 e rnat1nnal dehate, l'lectiom in the Serh Rl'puhl1c we n. hdd Nm , Plavsic l>hocked the, OS leade rship hy lkfcat ing it and crl'ating a new interl'thnic Loalit ion Clllllmttted to work1n~ rngethcr in the spint of thl' Dayton Agreemen t. H er courageoul> gamhit represented a hreakthrough in the peact:: pn1cess. [Note: In, l'ptl' mhl'r 1998, Pl.wsiL lost the pre..,ldency, \\hen she was upset hy hard-lme n.ltlnnaltst N tko la Poplascn. Thl' We~ l viewl'd hts ek ct1on.1s,t 111<1J~lr seth;1ck to 1 h e Bosn i<1 n peace process. I afte r the stgnmg of the Pe<ICl' Agreement. Timmg of muntclpal balloting then hecaml' h1ghl~ LESSONS LEARNED The extraordinary t::xpt:: rie n ces of the OSCE Miss ion lll a 1r fllr a ll the remaining e lections, which took place cffectivl' contcnnow. In general, Amencan officiab wanted to hold thl'm Bl1sn1a and Her:ego\ tn,t pn1nt 1 ~1 se\eral k e~ lc:-.slll1' learn..:d. '",non as poss1hle, whtle the European U num rreferrl'j 111 a llow max1mum ttme fnr pre paratton. Early m the debate, I FOR was sucll'l'ded at the end of 1996 hy a suhsranu.tl lv reduced Stahtlt:arum Foret.' (SFOR) of 10,000 tmup,, wi th an 18-mnnrh manj,ne. Fmally, agreement was re.1ched on hold Ing mun1c1palelectlon' Sl'pt , The clectm;tl process proved difficult, smce rhe war had centered on several key Cities and towns-sarajevo, Mostar, Ftrst, goal and swltegll's must he de.1rly.mj reali sticall ) conceptuali:ed, then resulutely pur,ued. SeLPnJ, thl' intern,lttonal community must est.lhltsh.md ma1nta1n uvil and military teamwork. ThtrJ,.t ntlt:: nf reason must prl'vail in maintaming an accept.1ble halanll' het\\'cl'n the integrity and momentum of the peace prncess. Fourth, and ahuvc all, t here must hl' a determined will to enforce ag reeme nt~ <lnd ~ t.ty the cour~e unttl goab Me.Khic\ l'd. 84

91 CURRENT UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS AFR I CA Angolo-MONUA 1. United Notions Observer Mission in Angelo July 1997-to present 2 Central African Republ1c MINURCA United Notions Mission 1n the Central Afncon Republ1c April 1998-to present 3 Sierra Leone-UNOMSIL United Notions Mission of Observers in Sierra Leone July to present 4 Western Sohoro MINURSO United Notions Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara April to present AMERICAS 5 Hoiti MIPONUH Un1ted Nollom Civilian Police MISSIOn m Ho1h December to present 6. lnd1o/pok1ston UNMOGIP United Notions Military Observer Group in Indio and Pakistan January 1949 to present 7 Tajikistan UNMOT United Notions M1SS1on of Observers in Tajikistan December to present PE; 8 Bosn1a and Herzegovina UNMIBH Un1ted Notions M1ss1on 1n Bosnia and Herzegovmo December to present 9 Crootio-UNMOP United Notions M1ssion of Observers 1n Prevloko January 1996-to present 1 0 Crootio-UNCPSG United Notions Civdion Pol1ce Support Group January 1998 to present 11 Cyprus UNFICYP United Notions Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus March to present 12 Former Yugoslav Republ1c of Macedonia UNPREDEP United Notions Preventive Deployment Force March 1995 to present 13 Georgio UNOMIG United Notions Observer Mission in Georgia August to present T 14 Golan Heights UNDOF United Notions Disengagement Observer Force June to present 15. lroq/kuwoit-unikom United Notions Iraq Kuwait Observation MISSIOn April 1991-to present 16. Lebanon UNIFIL Un1ted Notions Interim Force in Lebanon March to present 17. Middle Eost-UNTSO United Notions Truce Superv1sion Organization June 1948-to present

92 . ~ ~"i;,:; ~: ~... ~~ HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING: A KEY TO CONFLICT PREVENTION BY KARIN RYAN Karin Ryan '' ~ ce chwr of The Carter Center\ Human Hil(ltL~ Commwcl! and asmwnc d1rcccor of che Conflict Rl'soluuon Pmwam. In May 1998, $he coordmaced The Carwr Center's consulration u ith rhc U.N. II1J(h Comm1ssiont>r far Humm1 Right.', wh1ch addressed the ned to strengthen the capac it'! of the Unitcd Nauons' hwnan righcs investi~ative meclw111sms. When e>hmm;ng he """of, ;olcnt m nfl;«thrnughnut the world, it ~ll ~o i ~ imporwnr to exnmm~.: g~.:ne ral method~ for prevent tng the e:.calatinn of th e~e a rmed confl ich. Much h <l!> hecn written about the nece-.~lty nf early warning mechani~m~ to prevent c.onf!lch from e~ca l a tin g. Gl\ ~.:n that many recent armed <.:Lmfl1ct~ ha\'1.! ~.:sca lat L d de~p tt c adequate early ~arnings, it i ~ e~~ent ial 1\l Cind ways I ll compel the int ~.: rn.l tl ona l community to act he fore 1 h e ri:-.mg violence occu r ~. Such ac1 ion r equ ire ~ pnlitlc tl wdl, wh1 ch is mom succcss/ull y gl ne rated when puhlic npin ,uppnrt~ strong measure~. llum;m rights repmung 1s a n d fell1 ve 11 ay to determine wh erl! inw armed \'Hllence, a~ tol.hiy\ humnn rights VH>Ia t iom oftt>n creal c to morrow's conflicts. Not onlv doc-. human nghts wmk serve as a potent early warning tool. it also acts as a n important hrought h ome the brutality nfsmnh African apartheid, leading to a m as~ i ve internarionnl campaign to aboli~h that cnun try's racbt polic 1es. Non guvernmental org,mi:atinm h a\'c become a powerful force t hrnugh their repllrt mg, as government~ do not want to he lahekd a~ human right!> v i olato r ~. C reation of reporting m ~.:c.hant~m~ w1th111 the U.. human nghh prugram ~ another -,ign ficant development. The~e "Spec1al Mechani~ m" 1nclude p~.:cial Rapporteur~,md Wmking Group:-., wh1ch arc m,mdated by tht' U.N. Co mmi s~io n nn l l uman Right~ lo in ve~t i ga t c!>pecific humnn righ1:-. unde rtaken in a specific countr\ nr n n a t h ematic or global ha!>i~. Spec1,d Mechanisms offer rrem~.:n Jou' promt'c rowarj devdortng U.N. capacll~ to respond quicklv to e me rging human rights prohlc ms. The cas\! of R wanja offl!rs a good example of h ow human rights monitoring and repo rting could help prevent armed cnnflict. In 1993, U.N. pec~<t l Rapporteur Bacre Waly l~.:ver m mfluence public op1111on. Q, er the la-.t -.ever.tl J~.:cades, hum,m n~ht s reportmg has become,1 successful dev1ce for gcn~.:rallng puhl1c l1ut rage 0\'Cr p~.:r,i-,rent Lmlt! mtt>nlatumal otltraj!e u as gt:nt..'tatd wh.:n u human nghrs mt'l'stlgawr tl' 15 ref>ltlt.:ed II the gm l>rnmenr 's request m the Democraru: R.:(JUhlrc of thl Congo (fcmnl'ti-y Zarre). H.:r.:, uhds prepar<? m Augt/.\1 1q9s fm jip,/um.~ that m1ght haw h<ien amijcd. VlllLHIIm.,. Exposing the human Clhh of oppre.,.,i\'c pnlicie., i~ effell ive hecau:-.e reople can relate tu the.,uftcrmg of n t her hum;m h~.:1ngs. It was JU~t this kmd of reptlrt 1ng th at 'Diaye nf Senegal conducted.1 fac t -find in ~ mtss1on to Rwanda unde r,1 mandate ot the U.. (UNCIIR). In lm rt>f'llrt to the UNCllR, ' Diay~.: stated th;h gem>cij.tl killings were increasing anj tb::n some modest acu ons hy the tnternatl tmal communlt'r <.:oukl prevent a fu rther e ~ cala t 1nn of vlllll!nce. 86

93 "':'.... ~ THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL htcm, n ht\ 1 / lnn ' I ''/II 1 11 l f n n r ll E~tahl i>hed J4 b~ fur mer U.S. President Jtmtn} Caner, the lntern.ttton.tl Hum.m Right, Council (JIIRC) Ls based at The C.1rtcr Center,mJ serves,1,.1 h1rum h1r le,\jl:r~ in the ficij to Jcl'cltlp kq tnttt.tti\'c' tn the human nght~ mnn: j\ mcnr. The... c mdujt strengthc:ntn:.: C.N. hum.tn j ' tit /umtlin I c 111 \ Thl: l'l'f'<lrl " '' tgnorl:d, hol\l'l'l'l', hl:l.tmt the Untted Nat ton' h.td no rt lt.thk 'Y-'tl'l11 <If dtqnhut mg 'll<.h tnform.t 11un, let.dnne t.tktng.lutun, Ntnt ll1tl1hh' l.ttl'r, rhe t'l'l'lll' n,,,, Llltlllt.tr ''' tht 111IL'f11,11hln,d llllllllllii1111 unfold~. d Murt th.111 5L 1 (1,~1~1L1 Rll.tthl.llb llt'l'l' lll.l" 'ul:d,.m,l.t Lnk llf ''"' rights mcch.mt,ms, promoting hum.m nghts rnno.:tples tn the hustnc" commumty,.mj.1jdrcss111g human rights in,lspects,,f democrati:att<)j1, del'clnpment,.mj J1t<tecm,lktng. In M.1rch 1998, the IH RC and INN ts~ucd a joint letter nffcnng.1sststance to U.N. Hrgh Commtssttmer fnr f Iuman Rtghts Mary Rnhtnsnn Ill h~r cffnrt Ill help rcslllrl' human nghrs Ill vi,,lt-nct -pl.lglll'd A lgcn,l. kntt' '"" tnt:~ne,lrh 11 '-''nlmlll'' "' 11r.kk rlw L'nttrt llrt.tr L.tkL'' lt'j.:ioll ot l 'entr tl.\lrtl.t. It rlw U.N. St'lllrtl\ l <liii1l d h td re1 IL'IIld N'Pta\t'\ rl'j'<lrt,m,lt.tktn 'I'L'LtltL nw ''''~'L'' rlw n:<.l:lll l't'hll\,,, R11.md.a.tnd th nttt:hh,,r, mtghr not h 1\ l ht'l'il 'll 11 IJ.:Il An,,tht t t k.at L''\.tiiiJ'I' LIIIIIL's ln'lll lr.t.j. 11 ho,, J.!''' ~. rnntl'ih k,ltht Lh:ur' 111L'\II.I ftldtu.tl ktlllllg>.and.t h,,_, llf,,thl r hum.tn ttght- 1 '"l.lll<llh 111 tht \'l' "-, l'llpr til rh~ ( lulf W:ar. Ill ILJ~'i. tht lt.t l' J.:lliL'IItlllL'Ilt 'J'llll'<li-L'd m."' Krt of thpii s.tnd, '''lis l<ttldtsh llllllllrll~ f'oi'iii.iiton het,tllll' tlw 'llhtl'li,,f umft,k nrt.d n~gnrt.ttt"n'.n lhl: ljn( ' I!R. ln,tl:.td,,f.t puhltt. rd,uh, n t11pil' ''l'tt,l fill.t qutl:t stratct:\ tpi\,trd B.aghd.td It '' h.tr,ll) '"~'f'l'l'tng th.n.1 't.ltc wdllll\.! tll u>tllllltt sud1.atrn<.iiil'' ll<lld,lt lt'lltu.tll~ po'l'.1 thrc.tt tn tntt'nl.ltl<lll.d f'l',lll'.tnd 'L'lllllt\,,~, lr.tq,ltd 111th th 111\,tsH>n of 1\:ull',ll t. I Iuman nght,.ill,! t~rlwr.itt 1111 IL'' tl:tn,lln 'CI'IIIII'h undl:r ftmded. I'L'l'l'l\ ttl).!'"'' 1.7 J'L'I'LL'llt,,f thl: U.N.. tnnu,d hudgl't. Abu 1\'lllll'<llltl:.II'L l'ffnrr' h~ '''llll' gn\'l:1'111l1l'i1h '" 1\'l:.tkvn lllil''t'g"l"r'' IlllJ'.t~t h\ prlsstng f,n rl',illlit llh on rh~1r "''rk. ~11o.:h.1o.:rtn11' turn 1111 L''llg ll<lrs lllt<l ).!<>lc rnmcnt tnol, r.atlll'r th 111 h11nc't.tnd 1 tsthk I'L'J11ll'll rs. h t ""' lll~l, lllrk llllfl',lgl' 1\',\S gl'nl'r.ttl'" II hl'i1,i lllllll,ll1 ttgltt s lll\esttg,tl<h 111 thl J)l'llh cr.trtc Rel'llhitL of tltt ( \lllgu (f<hilll'rh Z.mc) 11,1' flti.ill'd.it l h.h ),!<1\'ll"llllll:llt \ reqlil'si. Thn'l.' truh C<li1Lt'ITICd \11th LOI1fltll J'l'e\ L'lll 11111,h,nJid Jlllll 111 <.:<lllllllt111 C.lus~ ll'tth hum.1n nght' org,mt:.lllllll'.11 rhe tntern.trl<l!1.tl,111,1 lnl.tl k 1 t l ttl t'lhlltl' th.tt hlli1l''i hum.tn nghts rl'j'prt tnt:'' Cllll,ltiLtl:,l \1 1tl11n.111d <>llt,idl' tlw L'.l'\,,,. tt m.llld '',J,>nt "' 111thout!.: ''LI'Illlltlll mrnkr<.'llll'. Pt:th.q'' 111 tht' \1',1\, l<llll<ltr<lll \ ll,tr' L.tll lll<li"l' l'lfl'lii\l'i) hl' 'J'<llte,J,lll<ll'\'l'll f'l"l'\'l'll!l'd "L'f<ll'l' thl'\ l'i'iij'i.

94 .... \' ' IJ. \ ~.-A.. ~ ' IS CONFLICT INHERENT? BY WILLIAM URY \XIilliam Ury ts an INN member and director of the ProJeCt on Pret cnung War f()r the Program on Negotiation at Harmrd Law School. He is coauthor u!ith Rog<?r Ft~her of Getting to Ye~: Negottatmg Agrcemem W1thnut Givmg In (Houghton Mifflin, 199 I) and the author of Getting Pa~t Nll: Negottatmg With Difficult People ( Banwm Boob, 1991) and sewral ocher boo~ and arucb on conflict resolution. I magine ynli r child, grandchild, o r younger ~ iblin g a~kmg you: "ls peace po~s ibl e in my lifetime?" Mo~r people I know would rake one look at the televisio n screen and the history books ::md a nswer ~omet hin g like: " Peace would 88 be a wonderful thing. It may even be n ece~~ary to l)ur longterm survival. Unfortunately, it b ju:.r not po:.sible. War i ~ human nature. Peace is a pipe dream." This pesstmbm comes from the Mory people tell themselve~ and their childre n about human conflict, a story deeply emhedded 1n the prevailing way of thinking. The sto ry goe:. that human s have been making war since the beginning of time. Human nature is v iolent. Our past is brutish. Only recently have we acquired a veneer of c ivilization, but ir i~ rhin and fragile. Scratch the surface and you wi ll find n Bo~nia or a Rw:mdn, or the lntem atrocity o n rhe teil:v i sion screen. I lumam regres~ all too easi ly to their violent, hloodthirsty nnture. One need no t turn to t h eor i ~t~ for validation, however. History usually is presented a:-. the story of one war after anoth er. Newspapers and television screem are full of the latest acts of human c ru elty-massac re~. bombing!>, and terrorist attacb. The story of human violence i~ l..unfirmcj every day. Views of the past influence actions m the present. The tmpul e to top th e carnage in Bosnia or Rwanda i deflecred hy the refrain: "But the!>e people have been fighting for centuries and centuries." The 1mpltcauon 1s they will go on fighttng for centuries and the refore there is nothing we can do. Members of an dne Cambod1an mil11ary unit ~wnd at atwncwn dunng a military f>aradc m rhe capitol my of Phnom Penh. Thi~ st11ry i~ repeated m er and over in one form or anotherh) parents, te<\chers, text hooks, and the media. Some of our be,t thinkers have put forward one version or another. Thomas l I obhe~ decl<t red that humans li ving in the ~tate of n<hure hefore civi li:ation and the state were involved "inn war of all against nil." Sigmund Freud sugge~te d the ex 1 ~tence of Jesrructive, aggressive instinct and believed that it l:ty <ll the roor of war. This pessimism is in!> idiously self-elmfirming. As long al> we saddle o urselve:-. with a fatali stic story ahour human confl ict, as long as we beli eve It i impol!:.l ble to achie\ e peace, "e wdl never make the effort. T h e conventional pictme of human heings and dolcnct: has validity, but it misses o n e fund amen- ral pomt: Humans spend more of their time engaged in peaceful <\Cti\'ltie than v io lent ones. Think of human interactions arnund the world; the majority are peaceful. People spend mmt of their nme making a l1ving, parenting, eaung and talking together, sh oppmg, plnymg sports, watching television, attending religious ~en i ccs, or pursuing love. The overwhelmmg majority of relatiomhip~ among narion -stares, groups, and individuab nrc characten zed hy peace, no t violence.

95 In rhe \\'Llrld at.my PnL' t 1me, serious cnntl1cts cx~st, don~ wtth le:-.' serious,llsputcs, 'tru,trtons where groups,mj nanons find tht:mseln:s.tt lnggt:rhl' Ids-over control of the gm L'rn ment, tcrriwno~l hlllmjant:s, econom1c resource!>,,mj 11ther issues. The UnitL J '-.tares quarrels w1rh C.m.JJ<~ over,.,1lu.thle fishing righh. Argcntma.mJ Chtll' d1spure thetr tt:rrtton,tl houndary in the Andt:s. The Lnmhard LeagLIL' JedarL'' north ern [t;th tp h1 an tnjependent stare, trel' of umtrnl from Ruml'. ( 'htn;t, VIL'tnam, the Phtltppmcs, lndom" l.t,.tnd M.tl.ty,t,l.tlll.t) d tu the same 1slanJs.md the otl th,h m.t) ln. undcmc.uh the 'ea.mnmd them. In.1 11 rhese stru.t rhc'e conlltlts, prnhahh wt:ll m t:r 1)0 percent,,m: ht~tllllcj '' 1thnut 'll)k nc~ (lr warfar1. It I'- titnl' to stop thtnktng nf peau~ful cnex1stence,1, merdy a v1s1nn. Pe;ICL' ts not.t \'lsllll1. It 1s a realny. For most human ht:mgs, pealeiul l..llcxtstl'nce is the normal condltllln. War.m d v1nlrr11..e.1re the exlept ron. If human hl'ings ;Ire lnnatd) \\:Jrllke, why do reuplc not kill each oth1 r mon. than the),ill! All the poltce tn the \\'Llrld cannnt h er (1l'ork- frnm dllli1j.! ''hat come' n ltur.dl). II w.1r I' thl n.ttural stall', wlw do must u1nfl1lts l'llll L'n,lln VLO kncl! How L'.ln human souetu:s lt\'l' pe,tcdullv,\ll,( CLlexist non\'lolentl\' \rtth their netghhnrs f~lf [,lllj.! pl'rh'j' ot t11ne?...,el' In!.! hum.tn h1 st1lf),ts (1L',ICclul confl1lt res<llutlun 11\lel ruptl d h) \\,tr tr,m,f,,rms th1 Lh,tllcnge trpm ont:,,, ndmg w,tr to L'Xll'lhltn~.: (11',\L'L'. ThL questiolb hl'lllll1l': Wh.lt l<lllllt li lln~ tn,lkl' peoill'fu( Cl\L'XI,fL'ntc l',\sier tll Lre,lll',llkl ~Uo,l,lln 1 tan lll.th pc<iu', kt'l'j' I'L'aCL',.tnd kl, p nn kl'l'j'tng I'L'.tll': Rctr.tm1ng tlw stun rl'frame~ rhl ch.tllengc. Tran.,fPrntmg IS PEACE ATURAL? By fran 8 M DE WAA In the penoj after World War II, btolog~o,ts \\ere' b'tssed wtrh the nngtns of aggre,ston. Konrad Lorenz, the Au tnan Nobel Pn:e,~ mner, "rot.: On Agg;...,sicm, an extremely tntlucnttal book bout the aggre '" e tn ttnct tn cll111nals and h11m m... Ht:; message \\a amphfted by pnpul.m:cr-. uth us Robert Ardrey, Desmond Mom, nnd other. In rc:-.pnnse, soct.11 psydwlogists designed experiments, sudt,b the mt.mlljus "Etchm.mn expcnmcnt," tn whtlh uhjects ohey mstructlon to tk hver htgh-volrage.. hocb to other human be mg... The pomt,,f these studtcs was to counter tbe btolog1cal argument <In I to show there b a social and learning c''mponcnt co aggrc'-stve bchm tor. Overlonked in those days were the natur<d checks ami balances on aggression and conlltct. In my srud1e~ 11f chim panzees and other nonhuman pnmate:-., I ohservej injividu.tls k 1 s~ and embrace after a fight, or ~rroom their opponent, in a process that we now call reconciliation. The more we study rhb behavior-also in children anj in nonprimates, such as J,llphms ami hyl'nas-the clearer tt hecomes thnt if aggrc.,.,ion is an inbnrn respnn~e to p.trtu.:ul.tr situation~ (and I ha\'e no J,mht that it t.. ), mech.mt'm~ tn m.tmt,lin peace and to repa1r ~octal rclationslup' dt~turl ed h} aggre~liion arc just.1~ inborn in pccie:; thnt depend on coopcra tton. Homo sapiens clc.trly i such a pecte. Dr. Frans B.M de Waa/ is a professor of psychology and director of the Living Lmks Center of Emory University, port of the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center His recent books include Good Natured (Harvard University Press, 1996), and Bonobo The Forgotten Ape (University of Col fornia Press, 1997). He also serves as a faculty lia1son for the Conflict Reso/ut1on Program of The Carter Center: \\.lr tntn pcal..l' 1s not ch.mg1ng lli1l' ahsolutl' intll.mothl r hut r.nhet,1 )''urnc).thlllg.1 ~..ontmuum. The chalk ngl' i' tprml d.thk. l)( C1>ursl'. Rut \\'M-bn,adl) defined,,., ''rgan1:cj \'Ill.,(,,, en. The ISth ~.:e ntur\' ph1hn1pher Vnlt.1ire L'Xprcs,ed rhe wt,ie,pread hcl1.:f,,,( lw, ttml' when hl pwnllui1ll'd th u '\lav er) i',ts <mltent,,, \1 ar anj war <h human n.ttllrl' "...,,,\\ L'r\' " ''' hl IIl'\'l'd Ill h.: lllltnut.tbk. yet \\lth1n,1 CL'ntury. 11 w:t' hani,lw,l fn11n 111'''' llf thl pl.1net. If th1~ L:m h,q,pt n to,1,1\' t. ry, why c.tn it nnt h.tppl'l'l tll war? War, Clausewtt: oncl' lntnned, 1s a duel. Oncl' nlllted tn m.m) cultures as the hom,rabll \\'ol)' tor men tn resoln: per s(ln,tl d1spure:-., Juelm:.: 1s 1111W,1 relit,,f the p.1,r. From can nih;t(l.,m to the Jl\ 1ne n:.:ht o t kmgs, fnlln human sacnt1ce t11 tnal h~ u11nhat, hunun h1st11f\ ts lttterc..i wtth w.l\ s nt relat 1ng tll t~ne nnothl r. E.tch ''as hcllt'vcj 1n th.:1r t11ne tn be fixl d in the vcr) llrder nf things, and cad1 1~ no\\ rdecared t11 tht h1~tury books. b 11 11lll umcei\ ahk that the deadly hahn ''' \\.tr LoulJ fnlllm the same p;trh!

96 READINGS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION General Conflict Resolution Burwn, John, nnd Frank Du ke~. ej1o. Conflict: Readmg~ in Management and Re~olution. New Ynrk: Sr. Marrin\ Pre~~ Fi~her, Roger, Elt:aheth Knpclman, and Andrea Kapfer Schne1dcr. Beyond Machtawlli: Tools for Copmg With ConfliCt. C11nhndge, Ma~~.: Hnrvard University Press, Fbher, Roger, and W illiam U ry. Getting to Ye~: Negotiating Aweemcnt Without G1vmg /n. Bnston: Houghtnn-M 1ftl111, Kold, Dehorah M. When Talk Worb: Profiles of Meduuon. ~ an Franusco: Jo~sey-Ba's PuH1shers, Rah1e, Mohamed. Conflict Re.~olation and ErhniClt)' Nl w York: Pr<Jeger Publishing, Ury, W illiam. Getting Past No: Neguciating With Oiffiwlc People. New Y\)rk: Bantam Boob, Ury, W ilh.tm, Jeanne M. Brett, anj rephcn B. Goldherg. Gewng 01~Ptttcs Resolt-cd: Designing S) stems To Cut the Costs of Conflict. ~a n FrancP.co: Joi>sey-Bnss Puhl1~hers, Weeb, Dudley. The Eight Es.~cntlal Steps co Conflict Re.~oluwm. Lns Angeb: Jeremy P. T. u cher Inc., International Conflict Resolution Ben1te:, Jorge, and Qucnne l leynnem.mn. Ethmc Confoct '\cmrccbook. Institute for Fore1gn Policy Analys1,, Brown, Michael E. Conflict and International Security. Princeton, N.J.: Pnncemn Univenmy Pres~ Brown, ~ heryl J., and Kimher M. Scrauh. Rcsolt mg Third \\i'orld Conflict Challenges for a New Era. Wa~hington, D.C.: UnneJ, t;hes ln,ututc of Peace Pre~~ Burton, Jnhn W. ConfLct: Rc.,oluwm and Prcvcntum. New Yurk:, t. t-..brrm \ Press, Cdc, C harles P. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Ctmem Conmm:rsies). Green haven Press, Dav1,, Lynn E. Peacekcej)inf!: and Peaccmakinf!: After the Cold \\'lur. ~ ;mta Momca, Cal1f.: Rand Corp., Dcng, Fr,mcis, and I. WLlil<lm 7<1rtman, ed,. Conflict Re.solucwn m Afnca. Wa~hmgron, D.C.: Rrookmgs lnswut1o n Gurr, Ted. Minorities at Ri~k. Washingrnn, D.C.: United, rates Institute of Peace Pre,s, Holsu, Kalcv1 J. Peace and Wlar: Armed Conflicts m1d lntemancmal Ordc:r Camhndge: Camhndge Unl\ er,.,lt) Pres,.,, Kremen~ uk, Vicwr, ed. lmerruwonal Negmiacion. San Franciscn: J o~sey-bas::. Puhlishers, LiLklidcr, Roy. Stofl/)ing the Killin[!: H ow Civil Wlars End. New York: New York U niversity Pre ~s, M ltchell, Chmwphe r, R. The Structure of lmernawmal Conj11ct. London: MacMillan Pre.,,, Mnnt\ d lc, jo,erh. Conflict and Pcacemakmg in \A ulti-ethnic Societies. Lexington, Mass: Lex111gton B<lllks, Princen, Thomas. Intermediaries in International Conflict. Pnncelon, N.J.: Pnm.:eton University Press, Rnrhman, Ja~. From Confrcmwuon to CooJ>t!rawm: l~csolt-ing Etltnic and Regional Conflict. ewhur) Park, Calif.: Sage Publishing, Saunders, Harold. The Other WalL~: The Arab-lsmelr Peace Proces., 111 a Glohul PersJ)ectiw. Princeron, N.J.: Pnncewn Un1vers~ty Pre~s Smock, Da, ld R. Making Wlar and \'(/aging Pcllce. w,,~hmgtnn, D.C.: United St,\tes lnsrrtu[e o( Pence Press, Volkan, Vamik, Demel nos Juliu ~, <tml Joseph Montnlle. The Psychodynamics of lmcmatwnal RclauomluJ>~. Lexrngton, Ma~s.: Lexington Bnoks, Cultural Factors in Conflict Resolution Avnllh, Kevm, Peter W. Black,.md Jo~eph A. Sume~,a. ed,. Conjl1c1 Resoluwm: Cross-Culwral Perspecuw~. Wcstpllrt, C<111n: U rl'cll\\"ood, Faure, Guy 0., and Jeffrey Z. Ruhm. Culture and Negotiation. Newhury Park, Calif. : Sage Puhlicatiom, 19t) ). Kor:cnny, Feli pe, and S tella Ting-Toomey. Communicating for P!!ace: 0LJ>Iorruu:)' and Newmation. Newhury Park, Cal1f.. l'ubik.ttiom, Ro~s. Marc Howard. The Cultttre of Conflict. New llan:n, C1nn.: Ya le Uni vcr~ ny Pre ~s Weaver, Gary, ed. C11lture, Cmmmmicawm and Conflrn: l~eadrng.~ rn lmcrculwral Relauom. Needham l lelglw., Ma~~.: <.~mn Pre'' Recent Publication!> ( age Aire~. M., ed. The f~ ol.? of lntemacicmal CooJ>ercuion in Conflict Prevention in Africa. Helsinki: KATU, A lker, 1!., T.R. Curr, ;md K. Rupcsmghe, eds. ComemJmrar;, Conflicts: The AnuClpawm, Avoidance, lind Tcrmrnawm of lntcr (;rouj> \'iol.?nce. CEW of the ISSC Attah-Pnku, Agycmang. African Echnicit)': 1/Lswn, Ccmflrct Management, Rcsoltttr(m, and Prevention. Lanham, Md.: Universlly Pres~ of America,

97 R.trlnn, I II.,,.d. f.nwrj \m:nf!tltcnmg /ntcnu.llwllal :\lcduwnn anj \rh11rawm for flr, t, ncmg I h tull-y t 'unjlccc L.mh.un. t--id. RP\\ m.m & Lll tll'ltdd. 19%. Rmwn. M.E.,.md R.N R"'l'\.r,mu.:, l.'d,. Th, Cu.\1 Ejfclllt'<lll'\S oj Ccmj1tct Pret cntwrl. l..mh.un, Md.: Rnwm.m & Lmk hdd, 199S. Rurgt'" H, tdt,,.,j. F.nc\ clupeducuj Conj1ccc Hc"J/uwm S.tnt,t Rarh.tr.t, t'.dlf. t\hc-cl.ll\ C.111.1h.m. 1). ( nu nllwhlc \\?ar,. Amcrrcan Pntt'l'r ml<l F..thm, Cmjltd lldl.m,l \X'.mg. 20th (\ ntury Fun,! f'>tl,>k, 199S. C.nh>nntt r, t I t 'unjllt'r. Pu.\Ctwr Rehwklmg anj ch, tcununn" A Crrcual RL'tldt oj ch, fli,'ttllur, <. ~L n~ \',t: Ul\IRhD, W.tr T<>ltl '-o.,u, t tl.'' PrPJI.'ll, (.)J'W2, 199S. Cktnl.'n' Jr.. W.C. IJ~m,mH'-' uf /m, mchumal Rdm1o11.\. l'onjlld and 'vhwwl t iam in em ~ra uf t ilol>al Interdependence. Lmham, i\ 1d.: Ruwm,m & Ltttldtt kl. 19% CoiK n, Ra) nwnd. NcgmiatinP Acros\ Cultun:s. Wa,hmgtnn, D.C.: l.jnitl.'d St.lll.'' ltnttutc uf Pl.'acc, Davll'!->, J.L.. and T.R. Uurr, l.'d,. Pn:t entit L' Mw~llrl'.\. Bwlding H1sk As.~e.1.111lt't1t and ('nm /:(11'1'1 \XIarnin,q.\\\'stem~. Lanham, Md.: Row man & I tt tid tdd, 19t.>K. l),,hkp\i',kt, \I1Lh.1d N,.1n,l btdnr \XIalltm,tnn. Th, C'ommg At:, of '\rarnt'l. Pr~ n ntm \1,t' ' DL"atll,md l ~L'IW<ide 111 th.: Ttt'l!nt"i FiN ( cnttn"\'. SvrauN', 1\..).. S\'r,l\'tN' Unl\ l.'r,it} Prt'" 19YS. E.llk. D., t,l. Fwm ( ".mjl!cl 10 PcatL in a Chan~ni( \\' >rfj Oxh r.l (h;f,,r,l Unl\,.r,tt) l'rl''' I 99S. F.unb~rJ.!, A.,,m,l A ::-oh,l\\.,\onlcrhal Tcdmolol!llS wd rh~ Pr. L'dlLIOH of I ), uj/.., t 'cm}llt 1 \\',t,htn).!ton. D.l '.: ( trnq~tl' C.. >mmt"h>n on l'r,'\l'tlt tng l)t.lllh C\mfltLl, 1 1 )<)~. ft,hl.'r, R,>n,tl.. l J. frh,ttlllll,. Conjl1ct H,,,olunon. s,r.ll..u,,, N ).. SHaul'L' Unl\l'l'tr\ l'rt " 19'17. Jt thii.'-.>11, R., l'd. Of>/lortlllllllL'~ \11~'.:<1. Oppmunlllll'\ St>l~t d. Pr<?tLilCitt /Jc{llomac'\' m rill' l'o,c (old \\'ar W'mlcl. l..mh.un, i\.hl: R,,,m,m & Lmktrdd, 199s Kanl.'t, Rugt't E., ~,1. Un1n r'tl\ "' llltnul' Pr''" 199t>. R.. ~olt 111,1.! 1\t!~ona/ Conj11cC.\ Crhan. t, Ill.: Ltkl', n... m,l [), Rnrh~htld. l.'lk The lml!maclonal \pr.. w./ of Echlllc Conjlltt. l'nn\.l.'llll1, N.J.: Prmtt't<>n Untn. r,lt\ Prt''' 199t>. LtValll.', Dc.tnno~, L'd. ftht'nlcicioiw/ Conj1icc R.. solcwmt A li111d.: I J Or,l!lllll~d(IOll\ and Pwc!l!lnnt'T\. w.l,htnj.![ (ll)' D.C Lt der;kh. J<1hn l'.llll B111ulmg Pt! 1CL' Stottc' ln,lltlltl'l>f 1\,Kt', 19Y7. Wa,hinl.!t ln, [).(.: l ntr, d Luka~' '1\ hud.1. /srt~t-1..jonlt~n, tml rhl Pcac<.' Prot'''~ ~) r;ll.ll,l.', NY '-ovraun ljniwnt\ Prt'" 19Y7. ~1t.tll, H., 0. R.un,hnrh.tm,.ulll T \X'nodhtlll'l'. Cmt/11,'1 R.:,olwion in Contt>mpunn: ( onj11t'l. Lnndon: BI.Kkwcll, 199S. l)ecd. Ccmjltcc. Pew:.:, and DL'tdoflllll'lH Coof>crawm on the Tltrt!.,/wiJ of cht 21sc Ccn[t(n. P.trb: C)ECD/DAC Peace, Senmt\', and Ccmnu:r Pn t enuon '1/PR/ l NF'\C 0 lfandhouk :-,JPRI,Oxt(lrd UniWNt) l'rc" Ill% R(lt hd1dd, [\maid. Mmragm.~ Eclm1c ( :onn1cc 111 A[nn1. l're\\ttre' and lnrcncrl'l!.\ for Coo/Jl'nltlmr. W.t~hlll~tun, I).(..: Rrnc1km~' ln,rirunlln, ,,,k, Timothy D.. md An,lr,'\\ RL'\ lh>ld,, L''"- E.lecwm.1 anj ( onj71cr Man"gcmt nc m A/rtc(l W.l'.hmgtcll1, D.C. l 'ntre..l Stare' fn,riture nt PLaLL', 199.'-i WL''" T.U. Be:wnd l.n \~thcontntccm.l!: Tmk \harm.~ \\:'ich Rcgwnal \t!mm)' Arran(!t'llll.'tlll (ltlu \en 1Ct'-Jlro1'1dm~: 1\(J( h. Ra'll1JNoke: 1\ lal M d bn, 199R wl',t, llarrv CJ. Conj11C( and /r, Rc:\olll!llltl 111 Ccmc, m[llll'(ll\ AjiKa. L.mh;~m, Md.: Univl.'r'tt~ Prl'" e~f AmL'rtL.t, 19l)7. Z.lt'lman, I. Wtlltam. Got'L'nlllllCt' m Conjl1tt,\(ana,l!cmcnr. Polmo and \'ioll'nre in W!!\t Afnca Wa,hinctnn, D.l'.: Rn>c1king' ln,tltutton, Lutman. I Wtlli.un.,m,l J. LL'I\ '' R,t,mli"L'tl. J>e"cemakmg in /nt, mati m d C.vnjl1cl..\lcchuc.l, wttl1~dnuc.jtll'' \X.'."hmt!t Jt1, LH :.: l ntr, d.;;r trl'' ln,mur, of Pt',l<.:t', 'eil ctcd Journals l,n"'lmc' l]lohal R.:[>orc l mergn Ajfatn Forctglt Pollc't For, lgn Pnl1c'l B!lllrcm t ilohctl (iot cnt<likl' /ntt'tiltlcional }ollnwl of ( 'un}ht t \1wtagenwnt I t11<'1'11 1!1CJIWI,\/cguricllloll I tttcrnac wnctl T'.:at ckt e fling /ntenwcional Policical St'lclltl' Hctletl lmcrnawmal 'iw,l1c' /omnal uj Con/1rll Re,o/caw11 Journal of Peace Research lcmrnal of \Vorld Affwn Md1c:inL', Ccmj11cl, and ~un m!l,\;e~oluhwn journal f>l'ace & Chan~e PoliCical Ps\ cholof.!) Pul111cal ~lil'llcl' f~l!tlt'u ' 'il'ciml\ Dwlogltl' Trmk Tu u 9 1

98 ACADEMIC PROGRAMS Several colleges and universities around the world provide certificate, undergraduate IU), and/or graduate IG) programs in conflict resolution or peace studies. All World Wide Web sites begin with ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND OCEANIA Australian National University, Re~ea rc h chool of Pac1fic tudh!s (Canherra, A ustralia ) - G Phone: (6 1) ; Web site: coombs.anu.edu.<w/r PA / Jawaharlal Nehru University, School of International rudies (New Delhi, India), C enter for Inrernation::d Po litic,, O rganizati on, and Disarmament - G Phone: ( ll) ; Web site: w ww. n yu.ed u /jnu /~c h 3.h tm Macquarie University, Centre for Conflict Resolurum (Sydney, Au rralia) - G Phone: ( 6 1) Web!lite: The United Nations University (Tokyo, japan ) Phone: (3 ) ll; Web site: unu.ed u/ CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Univcrsidad de los Andes, Programa A N PAZ (Santa Fe de Bogm:-~, Colomhia} - G Phone: (57) ; Web site: UniversiJad de San Carlos de G uatemala, lnternatiumll Rd a11on:- and Peace Research lm titure (Guatcm,da C 1ty, Ci u a tcm al :-~) - ( j Phone: (502) ; Web site: ww w.u ~ac.edu.g t / University for P eace (San Jose, Costa Rica) - G Phone: (506) 2-49-L0-72 Web site: rm I EUROPE European University Center for Peace Studies (S tadtschl :nning, A u ~ tri a ) - G Phone: (43) Web site: hrm Goteborg University (Gotchorg, wcden) - U/Ci Phone: (3 1) ; Web site: rigu.gu.se/ Irish School o f Ecumenics, Center for Peace tud1cs (Dublin, Ircl.md) - U/G Phone: (353) ; Web site: www2.tcd.le/sl'nlor Leuurcr/Courscs/sc.h_ccum/isempeac.htm I Lancaster University, R1ch.Hdstm lmt1tute fnr Peace R e~ea rc h (Lm cal>ter, U K)- U/G Phone: (44) \ Veb site: www. l a n c~.ac.u k / u ser~/ n c bin s t/ n wehl. h un London School of Economics, Department of International Rela tion:. (London, UK) - U/G Phone: ( 44) Web site: W\\'w. be.ac. uk/depl!>/intrel/ University of Bradford, Dl'partmcnr of Peace tudies (Bradford, UK) - U/G Phone: (44) ; Web site: www. hraj.ac.uk/ ac<ld/peace/home. htm I University of Kent, G raduate chool of Po lni c~ anj International Relatiom (Canrerhur), UK)- G Phone: (44) , ext University of Limerick, Centre fnr Peace and Developmenr tu Jie~ (Limerick, Ireland)- G Phone: (353 ) ; Web site: ie/-ipirc/ Uppsala University, Dcparum:nt of Peace and Confli ct Research (Uppsala, Sweden) - U/G Phone: (460) ; Web site: ce.uu.sc/ NORTH AMERICA University of Akron, Center for PeaLe Studies (Akron, O h1o) - G Phone: (330) ; Web site: wwv. uakron.edu The American Univer!>ity, chon! of International en ce, Internationa l Peace tuji e~ and Confl1 ct Rc,olunon Program (Wa ~hm gto n, DC ) - U/G Phone: ( 202) ; Web site: me n can.edu/ acadcmic.depts/si "/pe;jce/ Antioch University, Conflict Resolution Program (Ye llow S prin g~. O H) - U/G Phone: (513) ; Web site: Ball State University, Centcr for Pt acc S t u d tc~ and Conflict R e~o lut io n (Muncie, IN) - U Phone: (765) Web site: www. bsu.edu/csh/h.,wry/pr\lgram/ij l.ht m California State University, Fresno, Peace <JnJ Conflict ~ tud1es (Fresno, CA) - U Phone: (209) ; Web site: \\\\\\ L<Halog.adm1n. c~ufres n o. ed u/c u rrl'n t/peale. h t m I University of California at Berkeley, Peace and Conflict Srud1es (Berkeley, CA)- U Phone: (5 10 ) Web site: 92

99 Univer~it\ of California at lninc. (iluh.tl 1\:,JLe.md C1ntltd "tudt~, (lnll1l', Co\)- U Phone: (714) S ; Web ~>ite: lwp.llt.l.,~.uci.~ du/gp.t~,f Univer~it) of California at Santa Barbara, (ihlh,tl Pc.tl~',m,l ')eutrlt\...,,u,ltt' (" B.trh.tr.t, CA) L Phone.!: (SL~)} s9>-471ti; Web ~ite: \\'\\\\.gp,,ll~'" ~ du/ Carleton Univcr..,it\. Nnrm,m l'.ttl'f'pn -..~..hnul of lntt rn.lll<>n,tl J\fLttr' (l)tto~w 1, Onr.trin) G Phone: ((1 11) 7S~ 66'5'5; Web ~ite: w,,.,,..,,trlc!<ln.e.t/nt'''" Colgate L ni\ er..,it,. Pc.tlC ~rueiil' rr.,gr,un ( H.multllll, ~Y) u Phone: ('I"> l \ 1 4 /SC'11; \\'eb... ire: tkp.trlllll'llb.ul k,tt~.t du/ p~.:.lle't u,lt~,f,kt.lltlt.h 1m Conrad Grebe! College, L'nt\ cr,tl\ nf W.uerltlu ln,tllllll' u( Peale.md Ctll111td Studll'' (Waterlun, Ont.mu) U Phone: ('519) Hi-1'5 0220, ~ xt. 261; Web ~itc: \\',ll,cn I. UW<ll erlno.~...t:h(\/ tpac.,2/ Cornell U ni vcr~> it y, Pt'<KC...;tuelit, Pn1gram (lth.ili, NY) L /(~ Phone: (607) S4; Web... ire: ".,,.,,.t in.llldt c.,rncll. cdu/l'l.ll c l'n wr,t m/ Unh.er... ity of Den\.cr, ( lr.t,lu.ht ~dlllul,,f lntern.llh>n.tl ::.--.tu,ltc' ( n, n\l r. l \ )) Ci Phone: ( JlH) s7t-29slj ext 2'i)9; Web..,ite: "'''' du e,lu/g,,,f Earlham Colkge, 1\,ttt' tnd ( ilohal ::-.rudtc' l'n>gr,un (Rtdun 1 I \ \) l /('i Phone: ( '17) 9S '; I ;(l'); \\'eh... itt : "\\ \\,e' nlh.tm.cdu E<t...tl'rn M~nnnnitc l ' nin r..,itv, ln,ttrtllt' f11r ( ".>ntlt~l.uhl!'c le~hud,ltng (ll.trrb"nhmg, \A) U Phone: (701) 4~2-44'50 \Veb.., i tt : II\\\\.l'lllll.l'.Ju/11 11 II ~/e TJ'/l li' h lilt Fre~no Pacific Unh.cr..,it\, l\ nte r l<>r l\,t~l'lll.t~111g m,l c, >nfl 1~ t ~tud ~~, ( ITt''n' ' t 'A) l; Phone: (209) 4'5 ).) S4 7; Wch -.itt : \\\\'\\ tn,nu.l'du/p.lc' ~tudt,~ George ~1.a-.on Univcr..,ity, ln,ttllltt' ll'f Cnnllt<..t An.d'''' mel Rc,,l[Utl<'ll (~,mf.t:>., Vt\) l '/tj Phone: (/0)) t.jl)';.l k~o Web 'ire: \H'h.l.!nllt t,luf,ler.trtnwnt,ficar/ The GeorgL' Wa..,hington Uni\.cr... it\ Ellt<llt ~dl<hll n l lnll'rn.ttt >n,d All ttr' (W t,hm~hln, DC) U/(1 Phom : (20 1 ) 'J94-7L1';('\ Web... itt : \\\\\\!'\I'll edu/-clli<llt/gr,l,l_,,r/m,lcx.html GeorgetO\\ n U niyer~itv. ]u,ttlt'.1nel 1\ ttc ~ru,ltc, (Whhtngton. DC) lj Phone: (202) 6~7-45)1 Web 11i tc: W\1'\\'.gc< lfgl'l nwn.t du/,lej'.irt me n t-/1'11'/ (;corgctown Univ~:r~itv. Edmund A. W,tbh ~d1thd ut Furt tgn ::.--.~ n Ill: (W.~>hmgt<>tl, I)( '} t i Phone: (2L)2) 11~->7 16lJ6 Web 'ire: 't'" "'"CL'Prgt'l'''' n.t,lu/,h/ Hamp... hire College. r,,tel'.tn.l 'X'nrl-1 ~n llrlt~ ~tu,lte'' (Amht.r-t, i\.ta) U Phone: (41 )} 5~2-512 ' \\eb 'ite: h.tmp.h.tllij''htrt.c,lu/-t' l\\''1 Uni\ en.it) of Hawaii,!'r,>gr.tm nn Ct>n!lttl R,,uluttun (l l <~th>lulu. HI) - l Phone: (t-.08) 9'56-ti9~4; Web site: WI\ \\'2.h."""' t du/u htp/ Un i ve r~ it v of Idaho, 1\l.m tn ln,tltute ltlr l'e.tlc ~w,ltc,.mel Cnnfliu Re,nluunn (1\.l<hl'll\\, IL)) Pho n e: (208) ; Web :.ite: 1\'\\\\'.lll,lrttn.uid.thP.edu John:. Hopkins University, Nn:t ~thn,,l nf Adv:mtt d lntt rn.llttm.tl ~lllelte' (B.llt tmnrc, MD) (i Phone: (2L12) 66)-'5700, Web site: 1\'\\\\.,;lt, Jhu.nltt/ Ma.....,achu~>ett:-. ln!>titute of Technology, ~ln.u "th,,,,[ ot ~1m H!llllll\l, l'r 'l.!r.un t>n ~h,,l~ltnc 1<11 ~L'!.!<lll.llt.Hl t t.!uiil"nl (C.llnhn,ll.!~. ~tt\) ti Phone: (6171 2'i )-265ll \\\ b 'ite: """ ellrk.ntt/pub/dq'l llll't/l'~tn.\1 lund ni\ er... it) of Notre Dame, Kn>t ln,tllllte 1<>1 1\,,"' :-.111,1t,, (:-,,,uth Hend, IN) U/t i U lntnn.ttt >n,d Phone: (219) 2 ~9-2970, Weh ~itt : \\ \\\\.n.i.l,i~t:i'>l1/ b,,,,n,t/ Nov<t Southea~tcrn UniYer~itv. Rt "dutu>n ( FPrt I llldt r,[.tl,. H.) (; Phone: (9'i+) )00; Web ~itc: lk pattmvnt,,f l '''!'lite \\'1\\\,lh>\,, dull"''/ ni\er..,it\ of Pcnn..,,hani.t, l \mtltl t An.~l~''".uhl p,.,,,l. Scten~..c (f'ht!addt htt, PA) L.: Phone: (21 ')) S')S.s4 I 2; \\'eb... ite: "" \\.lij'l'iltl.e,lu Tuft~ Unher~ity. Pt.~~:~.tnd lu,ttlt' :Studte' Pr.,~r.ml (1\bltnrd, 1\.IA) U Phone: (617) Web..,ite: \\'\\'\\.]lltnhphuh.c,h11{j'j'/ \V;nnc tate Univcr..,ity, ( lntt r tor i'l'.tec.mll (\mllt<..t '->rujtt' (Dltnltt, \II). U Phone: ( 31 ~) '577 H'> 3; Web 'ire: "W\\.J't' \\ '~ nc.l,iu/

100 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The following international organizations focus on governance, democrotizatton, development, d iplomatic relations, economics, human rights, peace, and security. Member nations of these organizations often are involved in the prevention, management, and resolution of armed conflicts. All World Wide Web addresses begin w ith African Development Bank (ADB) A bidjan, Cfne d'lvoire; Phone: (225) Web site: President: Omar Kabhaj Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Jakarta, Indonesia; Phone: (6221) Web site: ecretary-general: H. E. Rodolfo Certe:a Severino Jr. T he Commonwealth of Nations (CW) London, UK; Phone: (44-171) Web site: Secretnry-Gcncrnl: Chief Emeka Anyanku Council of Europe Stra:.bourg, France; Phone: (33 388) Web site: ~ ecremry-general: Daniel Tarschy~ Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS) Lagos, N igeria; Phone: (234-1) Web site: Executive Secretary: Edouard Benjamin European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) London, UK; Phone: ( ) Web site: President: C harles Frank European Union (EU) Luxembourg; Phone: (35-2) Web site: President: Jose Mnrf<l Gil-Robles Inter-American Development Bank ([DB) Washmgton, DC, USA; Phone: (202) Web site: '''ww.iadh.org Pre~idenl: Enrique V. Iglesia~ Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Djibouti, Republic of Djihouti; Phone: (253) Web site: www. i~ad.nrg Executive Sccrewry: H.E. President Daniel Arap M01 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Vienna, Aumia; Phone: (43) l Web site: www. inea.or.at Director-General: Dr. Mohamed El Baradei International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Geneva, Switzerland; Phone: ( 41-22) Web site: Pre~idcnt: Cornelio Sommarug<J International Monetary Fund (IMF) Wa:.hi ngron, DC, USA; Phone: (202) 62' Web site: Managing Director: Michel Camde:.sw. International Organization for Migration ( 10M) Geneva,, witzer land; Phon e: ( 41-22) 7 I Web site: Director-General: Amha~~adm Brunson McKin ley League of Arab States Cairo, Egypt; Phone: (20-2) Web site: hayne~e.winthrop.edu/index.html Secretary-General: Dr. Ahmad Esmat Abdui-Maquid North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Brussels, Belgium; Phone: (32-2) Web site: Secretary-General: Dr. ]<H" ier olana Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Paris, France; Phone: (33-01) Web site: St.:cn.:tary-Gcneral: Donald J. Johmtnn 94

101 Organi:atinn for c..:urit) and Cooperation in Europe (lbl E) \1u1n,1, Au,tn.l, Phone: (4~ I) '514 16() Weh ~ite: W\\ 1\'.<hL<..'pr.t:.:.<..: :.eli'<..'lii"\ l~<..'ll<..'l',d: U1.111Lolrlu Ar;IJ.!lll1ol OSCE Hi).!h Commil'<~ioncr for National Minoritie~ Th~.. ll.1glll', Tlw Nl illnl.lllds, Phone: ( ~1-07l') ~12 1'50L1 \Vch o,itc: 'h<..l'i'' tg.c/m,t,'i1l nm/huwtl ht m ll1~h l'onlllll"ll>lh:l flll t'\.l!lon.ll ~1tn<>l'lll<..'s; \.m,!.:r ~tod :-.Ln. 0 CE Office for Demnaatic lmtitutions.md Human Right:- (OPIIIR) \'1cnn.1, :\u,ll'l.t; Phonc: (-n-1) 114-~6190 Web :-.ite: \\'\\'\\'. h(<..'pr n.c/i 11,1 f, >d 1hr/t 1d 1hr.hrm Dlrc<..(<ll'. Amh;''' '''"'" l ~cro~rd 5tnudm.mn Organi:ation for the P ro hibition of Chemical Weapon., {ClP( 'W) Th~.. ll.t:.!ll<.., Tlw N<.. t lll'rlo~n,l-, Phone: ( ~ 1-7Q) 416- ~ k' \Neb 'ite: 1\\l'll.nJ'<..II.nl Dlr<..'<..l<>l t ~l'l1<..'1',d: I M.~ ~l.lllrlll<> Hu,t.ll11 Organi:ation of Atriran Unit) (OAU) A!.11 s A h.tl 1, l:t h 1<11' 1,1; Phone: ( 21 I - I ) ) I -77t1(' Weh 'ite: \IIIII tml."r~.:/~\t<..'llt,tl/nr/'ll/<lt ul,,/o.lu htm Sn rtl "~'\ l ~l ner d '-.tl11u \hmt J s.d1m Organi:.ttion of AnH rit-an St.lt<..':-o (l) \S) W l'hlngt<>ll, [)t,usa, Phone: (2L12) 45" \Ol'~t'l Weh o,itl': 11'11'1\ oo1s, >I!! s~...,,...,.".i l ~llll"l d: l \ ' " t ~.1\'lr 1o1 Organi:ation of Petrokum Exporting Countri<.. -. (l )['[ l ') \ l<..'llll,t, Au'l r1 1, Phone: ( 4 ~-1) ~'eh 'ite: \\\1\\,diW<...l)l'g ~c<..tet.ll'\ l~em r,d. United 1\.;ttwm (U.N.) I I.E. Dt. Rtlw.tnu Lukm.m Ne" ),,rk, L ~t\; Phone: (212) 963-!2H Web :.itc: 11 Wll.un.<>rg ::><.. uet.lry ll<.. ner,d: 1\:"tt i\nn,m United Natiom Children\ Fund (UNit EF) l\.e11 ),,rk, L '-.A., Phone: (212) ~26-7L1l1('1 Web ~ite: 1\\\\\.unu.:d.<>rg '-.eu<.."lii'\ - C~.. ncr.d : R1<..h.11,l l.. lly United Natiom Development Programme (UN!W) lrcm 1 1,...,\lll:crl,m,l: Ph\llle: (41-22) {llo.; 'is'i0 \Veh!oite: \1'\\'ll.un,lp.<>rg D r<..'<..t<>raieneral: Al.m nnss U.N. High Commi.,.,ioner for Human Righb c l<.. l 1, '-11 lt:<..rl.m,l; Phone: (41-22) 917 )41() \\eb site: 1111 w.unh~ hr.d1 ll1\!h l n!llllll-'lll!1l'r tnr llum.1n Rtght': ~l.1r1 Rnh1n">n U.N. High Commi...:-.ion er for Refugee.. (l N l ll R) l~<..'l1l'l.t, Sll'it erl.md; Phone: (of I 22) 7 ~9-~ d II Weh :-.ite: WII'II".Uilh<..'f.Lh ll t:.:h C<>mmi-..,.uner f,,r Refuge<.'': Sa,l.lkn l ):.:;n.l W~..,tern Europl.'an Union (WHJ) Bru"e(,, l'kh.1um, Phone: ( ~2-2) 'il)l \\'cb 'itc: eu.1n1 ~Clf<..'l.ll'\ l~encr.d: ''"L' ( 'uttltuu \\'11riJ Bank Gwup \\',.,hmgtun, PC. l '-:\,Phone: (2021 l,2)-7cl10 \\'<.. b,j(l': \\\\\\.\\,,fl,lh,l!lk III'J.! l'rl''i<icill flllll'' [). \X 1 l'lll'iis<lhll \\'nrij Health Organi:ati\m (WI Ill) l ~L'I1L'\ a, Swtt:<.. rl.ln,l, Phone: ( 41 22) 79 I 211 I \.\' l h 'ill': \\ \\' \\.\\ h". <.. h [)tfl'l ror l i<.. twr.d Dr. [ llnhhl :-\ lk.ijiill.t World Trade Organi:ation (WTl)) lien~. ' ' Slltt:~.. rl.m,l Phone: (41-22) in 'ill! \\'eb -.ite: \\'\\'\\ 11 to.l>rg 1)1 n.. ~.. t< r l L ncr.1l: Ren,tr< Rugg1er ' 95

102 NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS The following list includes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the world involved in conflict prevention, management, and/ or resolution. We recognize this list is not inclusive. In many cases, other relevant NGOs con be found through "links" on the World Wide Web. All Web addresses begin with African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) c/o University of Durban-Westville, Private B<:lg x54001, Durban, 4000, South Africa; Phone: (27-31) udw.ac.za; Web site: American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Cherry Sr., Philadelphia, PA USA; Phone: (2 15) ; afscid@igc.apc.org; Web site: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management Altensteinstrasse 48a, D-14195, Berlin, Germany Phone: (49-30) /99 herghof@i pn-b.com lin k.::tpc.org Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 1779 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, DC U A; Phone: (202) ; Fax: (202) E-mai l: pdc@cmnegie.org; Web site: Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN) I I a, avenue de Ia Paix, C H -1202, Geneva, witzerland Phone: (41-22) freymonj@hei.unige.ch Center of Concern th St. N.E., Was hinglon, DC U A Phone: (202) ; jprender@vita.org Center for Strategic Inte rnational Studies (C IS) Program on Preventive Diplomacy, 1800 K t. N.W., Suite 400, Wash ington, DC USA; Phone: (202) wcbmaster@csis.org; Web site: Center for War, Peace, and the News Media New York U ni versity, 10 Washingron Place, New York, NY USA; Phone: (212) ; Fax: (2 12) mmcusj@ is2. nyu.eju Centre for Conflict Resolution (CENCOR) P.O. Box C385, Cantonments-Accra, Ghana Phone: (233-21) Communications[Oecisions/Results Associates (CDR) I 00 Arapahoe Ave., Su itc 12, Boulder, CO USA Phone: ( l -800) MEDIATE, (303) Conciliation R esources (CR) Lancaster House, 33 Islington St., Lonc.lon N 1 9LH, UnireJ Kingdom; Phone : (44-171) Fax: (44-171) ; conciliation@ gn.apc.org; Web site: Conflict Management Group (CMG) Harvard Negotiation Project, 20 Uni versity Road, Cambridge, MA USA; Phone: (617) cmg@igc.apc.org; Web site: cmgonline.org Conflict Partnership Center h L St. N.W., # 100, Washington, DC USA Phone: (202) Council on Foreign R elations-center for Preventive Action (CPA) 58 East 68th St., New York, NY USA Phone: (2 12) Web site: Global FUTURELINKS st Sr. N.W., #100, Washingwn, DC USA Phone: (202) Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE) Aberfoyle House, Northland Road, Lonc.londerry, BT4 7JA, Uni ted KingJom; Phone: ( ) ; incore@in core.ulst.ac.uk; Web site: Institute for International Mediation and C onflict Resolution (IIMCR) 2708 Cathedral Ave. N.W., Washington, DC USA Phone: (202) ; Fax: (202) Web site: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) 1819 H St. N.W., uitc 1200, Wa~hingro n, DC USA Phone: (202) ; imrd@igc.apc.org Web site: Institute for Security Studies (I S) SuiLe 1, SLelle nryk BuiiJing, th Road, Halfway House 1685, oulh Africa; Phone: (27-11) ; Fax: (27-11 ) ; iss.co.za; Web site:

103 ln~titut c of World Affair~ I 32 I Pu1ns\ (,.111 1,1 Avl' S r. W;lshm!.!tnn, I)( 20QO ~ Phone: (202) mt,li'ima., r!.! Web site: \\\\ \\',1\\',Lurg Inter-Africa Group USA P.O. Bnx 16 >I. Add" Ahaha, Ethiorn; Phone: (251) l-512-2tl0 lnterdi..,ciplinary R c~earch Program on Ca us e~ of Human Right~ Violations (PIOOM) Dcrarrment 11( Polltllal ~cte n u~s. Lctden Untvers ty, W<lssl n:wrsl' \\'l'~ 52, 2))) AK Leiden, The Nl thcrl.tnds Phone: 0171)527-H~6 l, Fax: (> l 7l)527 Ht'8 Web 1\ite:,, ww.fsw, k H.lenunl\.nl/\\ >_ltswo/rtnnm.htm International Alert (la) I C!lvn '-,t, Lnn,lnn '-;Ell 51 IT, UnitL J KtngJ111n Phone: (44-171) 793-~0b), lnrlalcrt'h~n.. lpl.nrg Web site: WW\\,tntern,ltilln.tl-alerr.org International Centre for Humanitarian R eporting (ICI IR) II avenue de Jolt-Mnnr, C H -1209, ()cne\.1, s,,tt:l rl,mj Phone: ( 41) ; Fax: ( 41 ) tnhltlh ratlll.ch ; Web site: International Crisi~ Group (ICG) 26 rue JL'S Minimes, ler eta~e. B Brusseb, Belg lll ll1 Phone: (32) ; Fax: (32) ; Web site: WW\\.111tl -crt sts gmup.org Internatio nal Fellowship of Reco nciliation ( IFOR) Sponrstraat > " 1"1 5 Bk :\lkm.tar, The etherl anj, Phone: 01 72) ; nfficc<utfllr.ccm,ul.cumrusl'r\c.ullll, \Veb site: \\\\\\.gn.arc.org/tfor/tfort nf,l.hlm International lno,titute for trategic Studie!. (fl'-,'-.) Ccntu l11r "clttrll\ '-,ru,lt L'.mJ CPntltct Rc,l.trdl, Attn ISN, f Til /.u11rum ~El, ( II "092, Zund1,...,,~ tt:erl.tn,( Phone: (41-1) llj-42, l,n.s pn.rcuk.l th:.lh Web site: 1\'\\\l.t,n.eth:.dl Internatio nal Peace A cadcmy (IPA) 777 UnttL d N,llhll1' Pl,t:a, 4th FhHlr, NL w Ynrk, NY IL1017 U~A; Phone: (212) 949-H4HO tp; tl.tn! trapo't!o~dm tn\fl, tpaat r..nt mad.l 1l1ll Menno nite Central Committee PO Bm; 500, -\krnn, PA LJ~A Phone: (707) ti ; Fax: (717) b hh t.i}mu.:.(1rg; Web 'ite: Minority R i~-:htl> Group 379 Bnxton Rn,,J, L,mJnn ':::.W9 7DE, UnttL d J..:mgdom Phone: (44-171) \l78-949h, Web site: W\\'W.m mnmvnj.d1t' org Netherlands ln!.titute nf International Relatiom (ThL l ' lll1;!l'thl.tcl (n,rtt lltl) l'ltngcjhl.tel 7. P.O. Rux 910HO, 2'597 VII The H.tguc, Thl Netherlanck Phone: (11-70) n-453-s4 in(o<ildmgend.tel.nl Peace Brigade!. International 2642 Collcgc A\ e., BcrkelL y, CA U':::.A Phone: (510) ; Fax: (510)!: pbtuml<!'!itgl.apl.mg; Web site: www. tgc.,lpc.nrg/pbt Peaceworkerl> 721 Shrader..:;t, ~an FraJ1l:I.,L<l,l A Y4117 l ~t\ Phone: (415) , pe<kl'wnrknstfltgl.. If'L.urg Web site: WW\\,wchUl.cnm/pL'<IlL'/PfAC 'TREE/ pwtlrker.,/hlnm: pagl.h t m I Project Ploughs hare:.!jbtllllle of PeaLe.md Con!ltcl ':::.rudtcs, ( 'nnrad ClrehL l Collcgc, Waterl\lo, O nr;~ru l, lan.1da N2L )(~6 Pho ne: (519) ; p(,1ugh 'a\,,thcn l.uwatcrlno.ca Web site: W ell sen l.ll\\ chcrl no.ca/ pl.lllgh Rotary International Confl tc t Rcs\ll u tion, c/o Mtchael Shaw, 833 Rtcc S t., ll ighl<tnd Park, IL USA; Phone : (708) Web site: Saferworld AlfreJ Place, Londlln SW 1 E 7DI'. Untt ed Ktngdom Phone: ( ) 580 -~Rt\6; '-'worij(cj)gn. lpl.org Web '>itc: \\W\\.gn.apl.nrg/,world earch for Common G ro und ("('()) 1601 C.ll111eCIILllt A.\L N W., "ulle 20l\ \X 1.lshtngllll1. nc LIS A.; Phone: (202) 265-4>0l1, ynergie:s Africa 5, J'lllltl' des Mort! Inn,, B. P. 2100, 121 I ( ~Cnl'\ 1, -.;,, tt:nl.m,l Phone: (41 22) 7% 85-ri6; Fax: (41 22) 7RS-b wsrtnhllu unrt sd. lrg, Web l>itc: 1111riS<( nrg United State~ institute of Peace (U~II') 1550 M '-'t N W. ~tllll' 700, Wbhtngtnn,DC L'"A. Phone: (202) ; ustp_rcquesh"u,tp.on: Web site: '' W\\.u,ip.org Unrepre!>ented Nations and P eople' Organi:ation (U. PO) OtticL nf the Secretarv General, J l\ ls r,tlt 40A, 25 3 AP The I bgue. The Netherl.mJs; Phone: ( ~ (. 70) '> Nairobi Peace Initiative P.O R,,x 14%4, Natruh1, Kenya; Phnnc: (254) Fax: (254) ; E -mail: nptciyu,cr,.,,(nl<hlnltm.ul.kl' Web site: \\WW ''' a.1lrl.! 97

104 ASSOCIATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Listed below are several conaict resolution organizations that provide information, referrals, and literature on mediation, negotia tion and arbitration training and practice. All World Wide Web addresses begin with Academy of Family Mediators 5 Milatia Drive, Lexangton, MA USA Phon~:: (78 1) ; Fax: (781) afmnf(ice@igc.apc.org; Web site: www. igc.org/afm The American Arbitration Association 1150 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Floor 6, Wa,hington, DC U A; Phone: (202) ; Fax: (202) ; u,ajr, GG@arhcom; Web site: www. 1Jr.org The American Bar A::.sociation- cction of Rei>olution Sth r. N.W., Wa~hangton, DC U 'A Phone: (202) ; Fax: (202) ) Jbpurc@abancr.org; Web site: Conflict Resolution Center International Inc th Sl., Pimhurgh, PA U A Phone: (4 12) ; Fax: (4 12) Lrtt tl!!konflaunet.mg Web 1>ite: \\Ww.Cn nfli ure~.org/crcit The Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development (COPRED) George M.bnn Unaver,ity, 4400 Uni, er,ir y, Fairfax, VA U~A; Phone: (202) CllpreJ@tgc..apc.org; Web site: W\\W.tgc.apc.mg Council of Better Business Bureaus 4200 Wtl,on Rlvd., -.u itc 800, Arlington, VA USA; Phone: (800) ; Fax: (703) Web site: Educators for Social Responsibility 23 Garden ' t., Camhridge, MA U 'A Phone: (6 17) ; Fax: (6 17) Web site: W\\ w.henjcrry com The Foundation fo r the Prevention and Re,olution of Conflict (PERC) 75 Ea,t 55th l., New York, NY USA Phone: (212) ; Fax: (212) Web site: www2.c.un tlture,olutmn.org/pcrc/!ndex/ht ml Institute for Global C ommunication:-: Conflictnet Ea~tcrn Ave., Sunc 200, Takum,t Park, MD USA Phone: (202) ; Fax: ()01) igcjc@igc.org; Web ~ite: International Peace Research As,ociation I rue Moll", Pam, France; Phone: B Fax: B l ; Web site: WW\\.Lt \ ner.urg International Conflict Management Department of Polttical Sctence, Untvcrstty of Canterhury, Christchurch, New Zealand POL 039@c~c.cantcrhur).ac.n: Web site: The Mediation Center 440 E. BroaJway, uite 340, Eugene, OR USA Phone: ( 54 1) ; Fax: ( 541) tn<lgree@ro-agrec.tnm; Web ~ite : \\'WW.tn-agrce.cum National Association for Community Mediation 1726 M t. N.W., :ultc SOO, W<hhtngtnn, DC U A; Phone: (202) ; Web ~ite: \\ \\\\'.tgc.org National Institute for Di!>pute Re!-olution (NIDR ) 1726 M t. N.W., Suttc 500, Wa-.hangmn, DC USA; Phone: (202) ; Fax: (202) Web site: Peace St udi e~ Association Earlham College, Drawer I OS, Rtchmund, IN USA; Phone: (3 17) < ; Fax: ()17) psa@earlham.cdu; Web i-itc: c~.f.c.nlnrado.cdu/ pcacc/rsa/psa.html Program for Community Problem Solving I) 19 F 't..w., Sune 204, Washtngron, DC U, A Phone: (202) ; ULJ'LP''tlaol.com Web site: Society of Profes1> ionab in Dispute Re~ olut i o n (SPIDR) 1621 Cnnnecttcut A\ c. N.W., utte 400, Wa::.htngton DC U A; Phone: ( 202) ; Fax: ( 202) spid r@spidr.org; Web site: r 98

105 Publications WORKS Ctrnq~u.: Commt,~i(m (ll1 Prt. n:nting Deadlr Conflict. Pn:t curing ljccully Conflrct. Final Reporl. Wa:-hmgton, D.C.. C.trm g1e Comml,!\1(\11 on Pre\enring Deadly (\mflict, Ct. nrral Intelllgcnct. Ag\.'ncv (CIA). /997 W/orld Facchook. <hi tp:/ / 1 g11\ /t. i 1/puhl1e<1l it~m/f;:ilt hook/mdex. html > in CIA Humc < html>. At.L\.'"t. d J unt. 11, I Q9t'. N;num.d 1\.:kml' Cnuncil Fnundat11111 (NDCF) W/orul Crmf7icr Lt\t I 99/.<hup://www n,lcf.nrg/97lt-.r.html > At.cc,:-t. d Au~. I, lll98 PJOOM. "Wnrld Cunfl1u Map 1997." PIUOM Nt:1dwe1 and l'rogrc\.\ Rcf>mt. Wmrn Leidl'n: PlOOM, ProJl'LI l'lnuglbhart.,. Armed Conflict Rcpurr /998 Waralllll, On1 a no: I n'mutc nf Pe<tt.e and Cnnfl tl t ~rud it. ~. 199t-i. Stockhnlm lnternattlll1<11 Peac<: Re,l'arch lmtitutl' (SLPRL) Arm~ Tran~(l'r' D<tt<lh<tsl', l99h. IPRl. SIPRI )'earbool< 199H: Armamt:nts, /)t\armmnem., and / ntemcuwnal Sentnt'/. Oxfurd: Oxford Univcrstly P res~ U.S. Arnb Cnntml and Dt~armament Agency (ACDA). \'V'orld Military Exf>enJiwre.~ & Arm.~ Transfers (\VMEAT) CITED <hrrr:// gov/wme.ll95/wmt'ild.,r.htm> in ACDA I lome <htt p:// gt "'/> Acu:,,ed June I I, 199~. LJ.S. Cummirte\.' ltlr Rctugce~. \'V'orld Refttgee 1\un ey, /997 Wa.,htngton, D.C.: Imm1gra11on.1nd Refugee Servtte' of Atnt.'rt<..,l, Untted Nation' Children\ Fun'"! (UNICEF). State of the 'X'orld\ ChiUlrcrl /99fi. <hur:// 111 l NICEF Home < At.cesscJ June II, I99H Untlt. d N.mnn~ Dl H Inrmcnt Prngrrtmmc (L DP). f111mun Detdofnnent Index I 997. < hdro/hdt.htm> in Human Dewlopmem Report O[frte I lome <hnr://wwv..undp.llrg/undp/hdw/tndt. x.hnn>. Acll'"cd lune L I. 199H. United N.lttom I ltgh Commtsstoner fnr Rctugces (U 1-ICR). Refu~ees and Othen of Concern w UNHCR: /996 Swuwcal Oven rt'tt'. <hrrr:/ / h/rebrar/ 1996/ 96mrro.hrm> rn UN/ ICR I~EF\'V'ORLD-neje1 cnce lnfonnaucm < h t1 p:/ /www. un hcr.ch/rcfworld/refworij/rcfru h/rdpub. ht m >. At.ccs,ed Junc l6, 199R. Wtlrktng Group 1l1l the C<c~usc' uf War (Arhelt,gemetn~ch.tft Krieg~ u rsachenft,r:-.chung, A KUF). 1\riegshilan:: I 997. Hamhurg: Un1ve r.,1ty nf l lnmhurg, Map~ Centr;tl Intelligence Agenn (CIA). \-lcrjm Ethnrc GroHfll Ill Tajiki:;ran,./anc /992. Wa,htngtnn, D.C.. CIA, Economist. Mar nf ::-,ttdan. M.w.:h 28, I 99H. 4 ~ EnC\ clopaejw Bnrwmrnt. "Areas of Kurdt.sh ~t. ulement 111 St,uth'' e,1 A,,,~," <h trp.//1\,, 11.l h.t.111n: 1 oo/q.!,lhm/g?l )nt.f=<..ap/gkurdooooo hrml> 111 Bmannrca ( )nltne <hrtp://w\1\l.eh.ulln lbo/ ~ At.t.c.,~ed June II, 199'1. Enc'iclot>aeJw Bnwnnrca. "Rcltgt\llts ( \mtltct' 111 Soul h A~t.t." <htt p://w\l'w.cb.u 1111: I SO/arr/1,h(bo.lslX1 I m4.gtl > rn Bncannrca Online <httr://ww\l.eh.t.nm: I t-10/>. Acces,<:d Jum II. 19%. Far EtL\tl'l'n Econonw Rl't'll'tt M.1p 1,[ lndlli1c.,t.l. Feb. 26, 199t-i, 16. The Nnt York Trmes. Mar of Afgh.tnt,t;\11. Apnl 6, 199H, Lttc Edttlon, I. RclrctWeh. "Map of the Battleground tn Zatre, April I, 1997." <h ttp://1\ \\'\\.rellciwch.tnr/mapc/.tfr_cnt/c nt/:;lt rcm:1p.hrm I> 1 n ReliefW'eb Map Centre' < reltdweh.mr/marc/>. Acce~'ed June II, Rcltl'IWcl~. "Map of the Rarrlegmund tn Z;me, Apnl n, 1997." < hnp:/ /w11 1\. re ltefwt h.tn r/mai'c/afr cnr/c nt/:;11 rl m2. h 1m I> 111 RclrcjW/l h,'vlaf> (cnrr, <hrtp://w\1\\.reltefwt h.mt/m;tpc/>. Atet.'.,st. d June II, 199t-;. Rt. l il'fweh "Z.ure: ADFL-Ikkl T,:rrllnry, 1\.l.t) " < ht tp://ww\\. re I icfw eb. tn r /map<../afr _gl/cn r/:re/reb:ai re.luml> tn Relie[W/eh Maf> Centre <hup://11'1\'ll'.rel ldwch.tnt/mapc/>. At.t.es,cd June l 0, R~.. ltefwl h. "Map ol ( leorgta, J um 2 7, 1996 ",... ht tr:/ /1\ \\'\\'. rdtefweh. i nr/mapc/cis/cn t /geo/geo.h rm I> in nc:irl'/w'l'h \t!afl Ccnrrc < h ttp://w\\ \\. re ltehl eh.t n l/111.1 rc/>. Ace l'"ccl J lll1l' I I, 199h. Rt ltc!wch. "M<tJ' tlf ICRC in ( rt..'l'rgi,,, Dec IS, 1997 " < h 1 tp:/ /www. rdtl'fwch. in r /mapc/t. ts/'- n 1 /gl u/gellll rt.. h tm I> 1 n HeltejW 1 ch l\.!afl Cenm.' < Acl',.,,eJ J lll1t' I I, 199S. Time Maga;:me "Tracktng Nut.lt.'<H W\.'<lpnns." l\.!.1) 2';, 199S, ~~. Unttl'cl Nattnm. "Wmldmap of All Peact. kt'l'i'iilg Mt,stnn~. J.mttan 1998." < ww.un org:l'io/deprs/dpko/drkomal~ hrml > 111 l 1 nhcd Natwm Peacehecfml~ Operariom (UNP}(()) <ht tr:// pts/dpkp/> Act.Cs\l'd J unl' I I, 199~. UNHCR. "SL'<..urtty Sttu,Hton tn Rwanda m O~..wh'-'r 1997." <http./ / n.h<..r.l h/rdworld/m<lps/afrit.n/rw _com_scc_:nne 20_10_97.gtf> 1n UNf/CR REF\VORL/J. < unhcr <..h/refwurld/> Accessed June 11, I 998 UNHCR. "Rurundt Se~..umit. ' Area M.tp, Ocr. 23, 1997." <. h II r:/ /\\ \\ \\.ll nh<..r.l h/ref worij/m.t P'/afrtl a/f-.urund I 2 3 \It l_ 97.gtf> 1n l'niicr REF\l;.'OHL/J <htrp://1\ \\w.unhu ch/ refworld/>. Acce"l'J Junt: LO

106 ABOUT THE CARTER CENTER WAGING PEACE fighting DISEASE BUILDING HOPE The Can er Center stnve~ to relieve ~uflering hy advanc1ng peace, health, and hum;m nght, worljwije. It i~ guijej hy the pnnciple that people, wtth the nccc~'ary!>kill-., knnwlcjge, anj <1cces:-. tu re:-.ource:-., c.:nn 1mpmve the1r nwn l1ve:-. and the I I\~.:~ nf other:-.. FounJeJ hy Jimmy anj Rosalynn Carter in partnep.hlp wnh Emmy Uni,~.:r,ny, the nonprnfn Cemer worb to pr~.:, ent and resolve contl1cts, enhance freedom and JemoLraq, anj 1mpnwe he,tlth. The Center Loll.lh(lr<Jtc' with other nrg.m1:arwns, puhlil m pri\ ate, 111 carryin~ llut ib m1sston. In thl, wav, the Cemer has fllltlhej th~.: lt ves uf people tn more than 65 Lountncs. Charira[lle contributions from tndivtdu:tb, foundat tons, c.:mpmaunns, ctnd other donors support the Center\ acttvitte~. Pn1gr~111b arc dtrl'cted hy resident experts nr felll)ws, Mltne nf whom teach,it Emory University. They Je,tgn and imp l ~.: menr activities in cooperation with President and Mrs. Carter, nl.!twmb of world leader:-.,,1nd partners 111 the Untted State:-. t~nd ;1hmaJ. The Center is lnc:hed tn a 35-acre park two mi le:-. east of do\\'nt0\1'11 Atlanta. Fnur c.:irlular paviltons house nffices for the former pre:-.tdent and first lajy anj mnst of the Center\ program st,tft. The complex includes the Ivan A llen III Paviltnn anj the nondcnom1narinn.tl CeLt! R. Day Ch,tpd, other conference fac.:il1ttes, ;tnd admtntstr;lll\ c (lfftce,. Adjoining the Center'' The j1mmy Carter Lihrary and ~lu,eum, <l repo,itory for the records of the Caner adm1ntstra t 1nn, operated hy the Nattnnal Arch tves.md Re<:ord, Admm1straunn of the federal gm ernment and open tn the publtc. The Center anj the Lthrary and Mu~eum are knnwn wlk-cuvcly as The Carter Pre~1Jcnttal Ccnrcr. Mnre tnformatton ahnut The Carter Center., :l\";nlahle on the WnrlJ Wide Weh at:,,.,, ''.Lartcrccnter.mg. 100