E.2-..s..., 3 ". ~ CONTKUl NO. I..)~

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1 INFO: AWI--:- /. OCM_' SA _ PO... L..._ EooL...- PI!,-'~_ USI'l.S'~_ CONS_ 011". ADM---:'" GSO, 8E~ PER RSO MSG~ TSO. SCRQ CRtI_ CEO,...'--- DA."C. Q MAAG_ AG~;-- DEA~_ IRS TCTR -, J. ~'MMA.'YI DURING J977, ~FGHA!nST"N S SEClIRlTY ANt) IN!)EPENO!!of~E R :'l2air. D l'ndvlinit;1!~, THUS SATISFYI~G OUP. rorelitost folrcy ~(UL HERt. PRESt~E"T DAOL~ ~ls~ M'DE SIG~lFIC~~ CONTRT~~IO~~ TO THE IflIPP.OV!~F.NT O~ REGIO'AL ST A~It tty -- TM n.'3y HELPING TO FULFILLS ARotlP'..P. PRINCiPAL u~~. I)~JECTIVE. ~VOIDIAG THE TEflI;-TATJOff TO TAK" JEKAC"!AGE OF PAXIS'TI,': S J'll)ft,ESTIC POLITIC~l TURMOIL, n~ouo CON TINU~ TO NU?TlmE THE P'6PPP.OCH~~F.~T HE AN9 FOP.~ P. PAKIST~Nt PRIME!'JI"IsrE~ BHurTO H~n L4fJrlCHE:> u 191.' 'ie \fas IILSO ABLE TO REACH A ~l~ually S~TISF~crOP.Y SETTLE~ENT ~rrh l~an OF THE IInF- Q..D Kaf'lA!fD.)IATERS DI~P~E.....:. 2. THE, lusp.lights OF U.~."AFGHAN!ILATF.RAL P. LATIOf:S ~~~E I (A) t~ablish~emt ~F A JOINT CO~~ISS!~8 TO ~~qat "ARCTICS' (~, AFGHAR SUPPORT 1-1 THE un O~ THE: au"", fa'!!) PUF.:RTO RIr.tl ISSt'!:S; AMn ~C) A~!NVITATION FROM PRESIDENT CARTEP. TO OAOl~ TO pay A STATE VISIT TO THE u.s. END SUMMARY. SHIRrl-+-'_ TABfl..ISFA i 1~ FAA TU...,... CRUow/L...-_ AmEn'\b~ssy '-EH:l.G.N R ~e3~!6t J~N' 7~... n ~.":!~~~SSY ~:~'.:!Ul...~":'"-,'.~ ;'... TO T't':j!C/~~C~ATt't-@~t";~.! r~ IN~O PQ~r~~1A~~~~ASSY ISLA~A9A~ ~~,~ Rl'!'lT CI :.~t.f':1~i.s!:y LO~~~OU I ta~ P. ~1I~01 A~ I!I~ASSY!l70!!-COlJ 874 RU~~~E/A~!~ASSY ~E~ DELHI '154 RUMJPG/USLO prki~g t68 RUO~HR/A~!~BA~SY P.!HRAM 5S9m RUH~HGA/CI!'ICPAC BY CO~FID NTIAL CI"CP~C FOR POLA' E.2-..s..., 3 ". ~ CONTKUl NO. I..)~. KA~UL 8!'20 E. 'J. 1tEi521 (IDS TAG~I PEPR, AF SL~Jf.CTI AFGHANISTAN tg AN EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT," -.. ". A _.,... - 'l"'t' ~ J : :.~... :. \:.. ~~....,,; 47 J~N ~ 1 'i:la 3. P.~L~TIOHS ~ITH!HE us: U.S.-~FGHA~ FFLATIONS nu~i~g 1~77 ~F~E Er.CE:~LF.:JT. TH::; GOVEP.N~~I~T OF AFe:-:A:-lISTMJ (~I.:'A) F1.lL~tLLED ~~ oeli~ati~ato'us TO ESTA?L!SH A JOI~r COM~I~SION TO CO~'~OL ~~P.COTICS PRODUCTI~N ANu TP.AFFICKi'G. VHlIrE 1376, ~~~H THE GO~ \'E'lT P.4~K ON A CO;r"'lIT!'1r.:~ ~OT TO OJJPOSE US O~ THF ~u~'! I~~IfF., «THE GOA GAVE us HtLP IS THE 1977 U1Ji;,. ON ~OTH GU~K A~m ~t,!:':'tt) p.rco r::su!s. l)~'.)ud ACCEPTED Afl!~VITAT1t)m'TO fllal([ A STATE,'!~IT TO T~r. U.s. I~ TH~ SU~~ R OF IS78. FUUOI~( FOR THE U.~. ~illt~ny TRAl~I~r: PROGRAM F~~ AFGHA~ OFFIC~PS.WAS nou~led I~ 6p' r.rfort TO OFFSET _.. ALSEIT T:> A 'lfod'!st nee~e -- TilE IllASSruF. SOvIET PREO~MI~A~CF. I~ THE AREA uf FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR THE APGHAN AR~1!!J Ft'RCES. ~. AS U~AID/AF~~~NJSTA~ ~~neavc~~~ TO SHA~~ ITS ~~~rn~~s TO ~~~ CO"~RrSSIO~~L A~~ ~I~ ~~IDELI~~S, b~~h~~ DI~~UlrTU~~ ~hs Ev P?r.s~!) QV!R 'that ~?PF:~PE,) TIj TH:::~~ TO r:~ ~ ~!::C(1)Irl~ ~""r,:"!ct! Ct)!'!~!T~ENT IN rhe!)f.'j~lop'e JT ~~SU'"i A~Ct: /lrh. nr: H'GI{~~ U'''A;1f''-~ SHI? FRE~UENTLY ne"i!i' ms:::l LOCAL t,~!l) VI51Tl'H~ ~"'ERlrAN OFnCI!.l~ T~~: ~Fr.H.CHH~!AN W.~TS A MOF.~ vr5i~l~ 6"'!:RIC:\~j ArD PP.ESH~C"" TO /JFl:":, SOM C01!~I!~P. SALiVJCF TO TH~ Pl'::I1~:'~I:~AtlT s::j'.i!rr r nfsf.nc~ TN. T~r5 COUNTRY.

2 ca ~1'FID~N I' r;'t /~. T ~".,J,,;JJ,..1 _ r...l..i 5. AFGHAN OFFICIALS Hill) T'lO t'tr:j-le"!'."l C~::TAr.Tf- ll'ii"; i'':-;:. '.:C: t._~",,":"!,,_ SHIP IN WH~N A~A!::ft~~:1 A''')UL \-!Al!Il' K"PPl P::tE~f"IT~!\ uic7 CP.EDE"lTIAl.S AT T~E WHITS: Ht t::~ Ot~ JUt. Y 2S-, ppr'!t"e'~t CAf"!'rp TOln HI"I -THE UNITED STATE.S "'AS FOLLO'ltl) wtrh I'~T~PF.ST TIotF r~~:"iitic't~ OF" YOUR 'NEV CONSTITUTION AND WE ARE PARTICULAr-LV AlI.'ARE 'F'!TS "'~:"I!!~ RIGHTS PROVISIONS WE ARE ALSO MUCH '~AP.E OF Pr.ESIDENT D~O~~'S EfrORTS TO IPIPROVE THE tconofllic WELL-BEING OF TII ~F(;\(f\t~ Pt:.. ~!.F.. WE 'ARE READY TO HELP 1ft THIS EFFORT.- THE PRESID[~T ALSO CO~- PI.. iplented THE GOVDNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (SOA) OfJ THE EST"~LIS"' MENT TWO DAYS EARLIER ~F THE NEW JOINT CC~~ISSI_N O~ ~FG~A~ NARCOTICS MATTERS AND EXPRESSED HIS STRONG PERSONAL I~TEF~~ IN NARCOTICS CONTROL. 6. SUBSEQUEtJn Y, ON OCTO~ER 1, S~:ORn.V 9EFORE THE UNt=A SF.~;'TOtJ, FOREIGN MINISTER WAH ED A2DULLAH /'let WITH S CRETAPY V'N~f. ~'ID ASsiSTANT SECRETARY AH!~r.TOM. ABDULLA}' WAS i..t.d ihat it~ l'~e REGARf)S THt OPllf.ll-PR.DUCTION PROP1. ri IN AFGftANISTAN AS "A HIC:J4 PRIORlrY ISSUE.- (THIS VIEW WAS ECHOED BY SENATOR WlttlA~ t. SCOTT OF VIRGINIA DURING ~IS NOVEMPER VISIT TO KA~l~, 'wpr~ H~ ELUNTLY TOLD DAOUD THAT FUTUflE A~EP.ICAH AID WAS CO~DITI~~~ O~ AFGHAN PERFOR~ANCE IN THE NARCOTICS-CO~TR~L APEA.' THE AMEpIC~q. SIDE WAS ASSURED BY ABOULLAH THAT PRESIDENT' DAOUD ST~!fDS P!P SONALLYBEHIND THE EFFORTS OF TIO GOA IN THE OPItJlll-CONTPOt FIELD.'. 7. ~T Ar~AfI1E MEETING,. AB'utLA~ EXPLAINED THAT Tf(E P.OA '-'ANT!n ACLOSER. SHIP WITH THE NEW AMERICA~ An~InISTRATI0N AND A "VERY VISIm.~ 'If. ESE~CE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SECP.ET,P,Y PE- PLIED THAT THE ~~ $ THE INOEPENnEHCE AND TERRITO~I~L INTEGRITY OF AFGHANI.. O~LL CONTHJUE ITS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. SECRETARV VANC~. 7OP~N~ THAT OUR TWO PR~SlDF~T~ SHOULD GET TO KNOW EACH OTH_,.-ur-ntlS CONHECTIO~, H~ EXTENDED A PRESIDE~TIAL ItlVITATIO~ t~'f{l,...!'jjj(! fa. STATE VISIT TO THE US DURI~G THE ~U~~ER OF THE-AYG"A~ PRESIDENT SUBSEQUENn.y ACCEPTED THE IlI'JITATION. 8. RELATIONS WITH THt USSR: AFGHftNISTAN'S MOST IMPORT~Nr BI LATERAL RELATIOHSHIP CONTINU~D TO BE THE SENSITIVE. BUT LVC~ATI r LINK WITH ITS HUGH NORTHER~I tjeiih{130r. THE SOVIETS AVOIDED, A~Y APPEARANCE OF MEDDLING IN AFaHAN INTERNAL ArF~IP.S -- AND MAIN TAINED THEIR POSITION AS THE lliajor AID DONORTYO AFGHtarHST,.tl (:,\Ot)F THAN ONE BILLION DOLLARS OVER THE PAST QUARTER CEfrrURY, CO~P~REO TO LESS THAN ONE-HALF 9ILLION FROM THE U.S.). ALTHOUGH NO SIG NIFICANT ADDITIONAL AID WAS COMMITTED BY THE SOVIETS IN 1977, THE TWO SIDES DID HOLD DISCUSSIONS IN APRIL ABOL~ USES FOR THE OUTSTANDING $780 MILLION OF SOVIET CREDITS ALREADY CO~MITTED ~o AFGHANISTAN. SOVIET MILITARY DElIVERIES TO AFGHANISTAN IN 1977 INCLUDED A FEW SIGNIFICANT NEW WEAPONS, SUCH AS SA-3 AND SA-7 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. \ 9. FRO!'! APRIL 12 TO 15, D,'lOUD PAID 't!hil.t BOTH st!)es STYLED AS A "'ROUTINE" VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION n1hicp., 1!ICmENTALLY, WAS AMONG THE pnincipal REASO~S ~HY DAOUD ~AS SO EAGER TO GET AN I"VVOATIO~ FRO~ US -- IN ORDER TO MAINTAI~ ~HAT THE GOA PERCfIVES COI\fB1iDiiJi'T'IiIA.L 48 \ \.'\

3 COI'JFIDEI'JTIAL AS A OPTICAl. BALANCE ~ET"'~FN T"'. TWO GRFATt'S'! PO~!EPS).!\:J!'!Pr, rye MOSCO~ SOJOl~~, DAOl~ ~ PARTY SI~~F.D A ~E~ T~EtV -~~R AGDF.~~EMT TO DEVELOP AFGHAN-SOVIET ECONO~IC AHD T~ADE RELATIO~~. UJ., RELATIONS YITH CHIN~: 111 ORDER TO PROVIDE ANOTP.E'~ TYP~ {\t" OPT~CAL ealiihce TO DAOltD S TP.IP TO T"~ lissp. TH~ ~F(?"~l!S D:'CFI' l:"~ ml APRIL 9 A DEL GATION FROM T~E PEOPLES PF.Pt~LIC {\r r.ui~f. HEADED ~Y CH~I SHU FAN, VICE MINI~TF.R rop. FOP. I(?» Tr~~~. THI~ VISIT PRODUCED LITTLE OF ~U9STANCE, HO~~VEP., 11. ALTH~UGH IN A LOYA JIPGAH SPEECH.~~RLi~~ IN T"~ YF.AP ~AO~~ HA~ EXPHES~ HIS HOPE FOR EVER-EXPAN~ING ~~ATIOMS ~JTH CHJ~A. NOT~ING DISCERNIBLE ALOMP. T~SE LI~F.S ~AS ACCOMPLIS~ ~U~I~G THE CHUESE BRIDGEHCAD HERE ('-!HICH I~CLl'D~S SO!l!F M!NO" AID,PROJECTS) RE~AINS QUITE MQDEST -- el~ IS SUFFICIENT TO SYM80LIZ~ AFGHAN N~UTRALITY BETWEEN r.osco~ ~ND PEKI~G. 12. RELATIONS 'IIT..H,,). ~~ISTANI THE RE~ARK~~LE P.APPROCHF.~F~T I~ ITIATtD THE. PREVIOUS ~AR BY O~OUD AND FO~M~P. P~KIST'~I P~J~~ MINIST~ EHUTTO CONTINl~O.THROUGHOUT PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL UPHEAVAL OF t3hutto RECEIVED A CORRECT, edt pel AT I VELY RESTP.AtNED A!fD COOL WELCOME DURING A BRIEF Jl'NF. "lsi! TO -A~t'1. (SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DOVUF~LL), A, WHICH TI~E THE GOA SUGGt~E~ THAT FURTHER DETAILED T~LKS ON THE PUSHTUNISTAN IS~UE (DE~('!'I~rn BY THE GOA AS THE SOLE DIFFERE!~Cr.- I!ET\t'EEN THE T'!.O STATES) B~ DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE THEN-F.XPECT~ PAKISTA~I F.L~CTIONg. SIMIL)r. understa~di~gs WERE REACHE9 L~TF.P vith ee" ~~L 7.t~-l~ HAQ. PAKISTAN S CHIEF ~P.RTIAL LAW AD~INISTR~TOR, DUPINe HIS. OCTOC3ER VISIT TO KABUL. HAQ ASSURED THE ~FPH6~lS -- AP?I'?ttrrtY TO THEIR SATISFACTION -- THAT ALL ElE~ENTS OF PAKIST~~l SOCI~Y NOW SUBSCRI9E TO THE DETENTE YITH AFGHA~ISTAN. FOP. TH~l~ a~nt, THE AFGHANS HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED AMY SE~BLANCE O~ InTr~ FERENCE IN THE t~ternal. AFFAIRS OF PAKIST A~, ALTHOU~H n'~y t:'y PRESSF.D GR~AT SATISFACTION YHEN ~AL! KH~~ ~AS RF.CEnTLY?~L ~~E~ FROM PRISON AND ALLO~ED T~ REJOIN THE POLITICAL LISTS. 13. THE SOVIETS HAVE REfI'Wf~ED OL'n'M?DL Y N:SSIVE ARCIJT THE {lf~u6"' PAKISTA~I RAPPROCH!II~~T THUS FAR. m! THE OT~E:P. PANO, us OFn" ULS IN 90TH COUNTRIES HAV! M~DE CLEAR ~AgHINGTO~'S GREAT S~T~~~{lr.TION OVER THIS DEVELOP~E~T WHICH SATISFIF.S O~F OF OUR MOST IMpOnT~~T RE~IO~AL OBJECTIVES. 14. RELATIor~S liith IRA~: T)AOUD ALSO rr-jught AROUT PF.rTE? pel~i10~~ WITH AFGHANISTAN'S CULTunAL COUSIN. InAN. PC SETTl!~G -- ~l LFA~7 FOR THE PRESENT -- A LONG-5!AM~ING ISSUE ~ErYEr~ TY~ T~O ITAT~~: THE DIVISlor~ OF THE ~'ATERS OF TH~ ~:~!1Jl"lD PIVER. ~f"1"~.~ ~!-'''',)I''::: HIS PP.OTHER AND SPECIJlL E~VOY, :"!O~~~r.~D ~~llj~. TO P~\If)~'! TO all"!:" THE ~AY. THE GOA EXCHJl~GED WITH TH~ GOV~~~~~~' OF 1~~~ 6K~GOI) I~STRU":~t1T~ CF p.atl~!ret!o'1 FOR T~~!~73 }!t:lmp;!l9 \ :I\TE?S TR~~TY, WHICH H.~D BEEN LEF1' Hf.~.~H~'~ U LInr flfter THe ROYAL r:o"~~nv,e:jt OF AFGH~NISTAN, ~HICH H~~ NEGOTI~TED IT, HAD BEEN DEPOSED P,Y THE

4 -CONFIDENTIAL '4 -/ S'~ ~E'" REPU9LICAtJ p7.r;!lli~. NAIIlI ALSO ~S\:u1i!:."D IT.A'fIAN urmfp.~t_'mlt.lg TO VHAT U~TIL TH~~ HAn9~~N A.CO~TPOVEr.SIAL FLOOD-CONTPOL _NO m~lg~tioh PP.O...'F.r:T TH! A~H"t:S ~tm~'red TO l~u"'ch I~ TH LO~;:P HElMANn (THIS P~QJ~CT IS ~C~ I~ TH~ CESIGN"STAG~). 15. ON THZ 9E~lT 51'!, HO~~JER, T~E AFGHA~S CO~TINt~' TO ~~~~~~ NG..,HAT THEY -- WITH SO'E JUSTIFIC~TIQNvfG...\eJ> p.s \QP!I)~I~~..Gi ON PAST AI~ PRO~IS~S. AS THE YEAR [~DEn, ~~REOVER, ~~TP.~~O~!~~ ~NTS ~EP.E INTENSELY, P.IIT DISCP.EETLY TP.YI~G T~ p.rsol~ ~'~QUA~~Lt t.'/c"r A S'llALL l'ispu!et' ~:::~~=NT OF 130pn~ NEt.J~ I~~'" ~ALA '(IN THF fiie~h!!)-ir.:~at ROA!). I~RITAT!) p'! REPEATED FXpr~SSI' J~.~F~"CO!ICC"r.~ B'f THE SHAHIJOV P. SOVET UlFlUENCE ttl "rohatiist~n A!f~ '.~ LAC~ OF AN ASSUP.EQ PLA~ OF S~CC~SSIO~ FOR DAOUD, T~F AFGMA~ ~!~~FP~HI~ COU~TERFO' AT EVERY APPP.OPRIATE OPPOPTUNITY BY\C~~J~~'~HEIR OVM YORRIFS ov~e l'hf. SUCCESSION QUESTI~N IN IP.A!J..' '111J'~' 16. R!L~TI"NS \'rith OTHER ~~TESI,)U:H~G TH! F~t"'. «=~ ~OA 0[ CEIV D A RAPID SUCCESSION OF FQBEIGrJ DIr:NITARH:S,' \4HOst tfi~itc' PROOL~~ LJTTLE OF REAL SU35T~1 CU~AN DEp,UTY FOPr.IP.~ ~INI~F.a PELEGRJN TO~RAS CSErTE~9~R 19-2~), HUNG~RI.N pp.[sin~~t PAL LOSOUCZI (OCTO~~n 1~-le), InAQI VIC~ PRESln!~ TAH~ ~UHI-AL- DIN MA r.uf (OCT~9ER 22-25), ~~O "ONGOLIAN ~OPEI~N MINISTEp "ANGAlYN DUGERSUREN (OCTOBER 26-3~)~ UPON HIS P.ETt~N FP.O~ ~~ UNr-~ SESSION t~~d A TOUR OF CAlIFOR~IA>, A~GHAN' FOP.EI~N ~tnicotep W~HE~D ABDULlA~ VISITEO IRAQ, IRA~, A~~ VAPIOUS PERSIft~ ~ULF ~~TES (WHERE HE TRIEO TO ATT~ACT FINANCIAL" ASSISTANCE FP'or. T~E LATTEp GROUP OF WEALTHY CORF.LIGIONISTS>. 'OST OF T~I~ FL~RY nr DIPLO~ATIC VISITING WAS DESIGNED TO BlmNISH AFG~A~ISTA~ S CREDF.NTIAlS AS ~M ACTIVE NOH-ALIGNED STATE, AS KAqUl A~9ITIOUSLY PP.F.PAP.!O TO HOST THE MAY ~EF.TI~G OF THE COORDI~ATI~G r.o~~ittee OF THE NO~-AlIG'ltD GROUP or STATES. THE' GOA HAS eef..l U,..~rAS1NG ITS ACT rvity n~ SUPPORT OF THE ~ON-Al I<.:tl~O 1lI0VE~ENT I 'l SE\~RAL AREAS, SUCH AS THF laysof-the SEA CONYERENCES AUD RO~TH-SOUTH ECONO~IC ISSUES. KABUL IS PARTICULAP.LY FAr-ER TO I~PPOVf THF. STATUS OF LANO-LOCKE~ OEVElOPIHG COUNTRIES AN') HAS T~~OU~~Otrr 1977 UTILIZEO :'V~RY O?P3~T~NITY 10 PROMOTE THIS CAUSE. 17. ALTHO~~H THe: GO\}~nrl. 'plt-c:)t:t~olleo AFGHAN PRESS REPORTED T~E PEACE-TALK~~ACTIVrTY I~ T~E ~ID~LE EAST 1M A-THOROUGH, ~ND BALA"C~ FASHIOfl, THc."GI)~ WARILY CJNTINUED ITS long-starlolng POLICY OF AVOIDING ANY I~vnLVF~~~T -- ~ND HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY' CARC"FUL IN THIS AREA SINCE SADAT'S erf.ak WITH SEVERAL ARAB sr4tes: ~ AFGHANS SEE TH~~SELVF.$ AS NON-~EMITIC ~USLI~S, WITH NOTHING 1f..2..~~ BY TAKItIG A'~Y ~ll\f!d OTHER THAN PROVIDING GEr~ERf\L LIP ~~c TO THE APA~ C~~~F CO:"l~E~T: U.s. I!~H::::-:: fs HI int: PP...MOTIOtJ AND PRESFPVATION OF REGIO~IAL STABILITY ~~r.,:: \:'ELL S RVEO OU?H!G THE YEAR BY D#lOl""S RESPonSI!3L! I~PRO':~r!k.~IT o~ A!=,!?H,HI PElATIO~!E WITH PAKI~T~N 61f0 1P.A~I.!iIS }'A:~JLI:~G OF n:: DIFFICULT II::') CO:1PLEX ~ElfiTIO~Sll!P WITH T:-tF USSP ALSO CC!-.'T!'IUED TO 9 OEF'T Arm flble. II~ ~E~"'AL WHC;, A~GHANISrA~I'S GE:':..UTIC~L fitliati.. N ROUGHLY RF:SFIIl9lF:S THAT OF FDLI\ND -- M:D DAOlJ1) "'H~/lGl:.:S THIS CHALLEN<:E AT L~AST AS ".I~L AS, IF' flot Br.TI ER. THAN lrei<!<onh1. CONFIDEN711 _.l-1...lj ~ T 19. If~ ORl)~R TO ~UPPQF'T fr.r;:}i"'1i~ta~i S FFFORTS TO PR::~~RVE T~~ LAn~~~;- POc;SF.L ~ D~(ml=.:lr 0r.' H1DI?I'~!JDENCF F"?Ofi! SOVIET :lp.essu"~!; W~~!Cr. IS T!-'~ lji~gcipal UC' ~Ol H~v r-oal '~E?'::, wt;" CO~~T~':!.lt io!:'~"cr~- ~P_4TJ=: :"l:..;r. F~ln'~l.Y r,',; T~'~GPLE 1t:TE~:::~T T~P~Ur.:! I> \I!~I1:L~ A'W-H;A!~ P?;:~:!=:NCE!~ TI-'IS COm1Try. nr. STATE VIS!;- I]'.: IlAVE ~LftE:ADY p~a\!~~n DA8UD IS TH~ KFY ITEM O~ TH IS7S U~-AFGHAU ~GE"~A. ~ nim,

5 P.. I A... i,.j1 ~...,..,,..'~.-L-.,.., J ~'.J t _. ;""... -_._._- ",1 '.: ---- ~r.u~_,.. ~..,."--"-- lea 1:0;'s I _ ol1 l._ r? n~~755! ~AY ~~ ~~ A~r~nA5SY K~PUL TO RU~HC/':.'O::CSTAr~ ~ :,3:-!:JC f1 :::~!'li.n!:: 7166 rl,;:'l~jcs/~r.l'ef!!,,:, ~r.!!'.t;=: i'l;y :rr r'{'/!h:'!~~" F"T :. :.:.~~~ ~f) P...EDIATE r'!l.!')~:"."/:::] "('pi r. r';':~'!'.'t~ i':~'q ;'.I.~~; "!)/ : :-': ::':::'.' i2!... ': /lp!.l1) PPIOP.ITY r: us:) ~ ~:/ ::" ::. ''3/,.:-:~Y :.:.. :' " ~-'. :.1{ j'. ~! C:; ITY 5 ~S5 rhi~:':;':~u ~!., ::;'~.'\S:'Y r~;.~ t.j; F'1!O!: ITY S~P5 31 SECRET CINCPAC FO~ ;.r.~,~ 3.u. 11 5~: POLfon. Z 6..2-~ / ""l.1 r CONTRQLUO. {! /'_' 705!.l1 MAY 4 :':(;(1<7-1 TAGS: A~EC. PI~~. ~F 8i= SllLl,JECT: BI O::R :W~I C r: 'IT A O~J "FG Ht\t~ ClIS I t~er ;J[f1 ~itj. _ REf: KABUL 3423 RSO 1. FOI.LLO::P:G IS ~!O[:P.APHIC!)/ITA ~!b\ ' AVA ILABLE TO THE P r..'1~'":y 011 THf:o: ~'E~!~i:':P.S OF' T:!:: AFGHflli C:'IBH1ET M'!1(lUNC:'D r':ay: iso_ rjijr MOHAr.i~f!D Tf.Rf.J(J--PRH'F. fl'i!~jstj::r Ml:l CHAIR!'1Ar ~ OF Ti-!E :;Cfi'"J REVOLIITHH!"nY COtJ~~C!L. (RIO REPORTED Kf,~lIL 3372). r.r 4f.. _~.;jlli ---BI\3RAK l{a~~'l\l--vic" CHU:qi'~Ml (i:- Tift R&:'JC1_IJTIO~lI\PY CCU!ICIL!~.~~ '---'.' VICE PnIt-F : rh!ji5t:::':p. Kj\m!.~,- (f'rr.quj::litt Y IO!('l~~ ~H:~LY AS :'Ml1l~M{) ~\Ir' ". w~s DORN Ai::r.UT 19~~!':::A~ Y.l~r:l!I.. HS IS TV::; SO!! OF' A (;r.:~:ep.~'.!.i1i.n J A~ POS~InL"{ A DISH,';! p.~lanvf. OF Df!mm. I:!:: ~!f!c; "!="!U!1!::! 'T '''/I.~ f\gitno~ '.n:iu: ATn:~I!lH1G K!tBUL liljivef:«;:i1"'f Min ~P!::"~T FIVE YSM~S I... - J".lflIL (1~:5?-5~).,.FTZR HIS ~r::l.eaf::: II::: CC'IlIPLErr:n HI: t/\~ I.,!;~: ":<~:-."!=: 1\'''' ~ :c'\~::: A~("oCIAT='D ~;1TH MI~ t::nt.p. 1~!t4!::"'!i\, T'i~ i.; r.. CO; l; ;U;ZIET LJ:t.D~ 'j~!o~ i~u:u>:::r ~?!HL 17 'J4S TJ-{E F1F~~ Cl;;-I,P'..... ~n~:1 OF T~!\I.:1U:: TO CO:' (}(6THJL 3142). t,?afoxm~tei.y...:.. l!~(jr': '!F n:::c~:~s f>. CLOe;:;: FRIEOI!l (LOVER> OF A~IMHTA P'f,TEBZI\!)A'I, TI.:-:-l._. ~.'C:.J!'1r::!~1"':~ OF' ~OCIJ\L I\FFAIf:C:, A~D 1:1 }f'65 H~ 'las 'SLCTE!) TO CEO~ PtRL!A~~17. I~ 1965 H~ ~Ag CHOS~~ AS A ~!~3F~ OF THF CF~TRAL.._-- CO:!"H17F.:r:.: OF TP. eo~~;:i..i\1.l::t P~P.TY AT IT F'OU!-:DI W.i emigres!=:. C~OP, IN 1967 :i:.icit'f:o "'!"i'l i\haip.f1f\ IN OPPO~!TJO:~ TO n'~ TI\PAl<! CI:I:...,.._ G?nl'f' (~ 1~1.t:\> TO F~'~" P:'\RCH~!':. H:: 'An~ ~~rrr!::!) A~ A STRO~G SUPPORTSR CF THF. PtIC:lrrl':II~.'t:!~~m: tlith CLOSE C"' 'HCTS "'ITH WALl KH.I\!!.... (.~'!'l TH~ ;~"TH'!.L eo':,::! PA~TY pi P.tll{Jc;;~~:. I~~ 1973 H~ LSD.lfL.L-.._. ";1;;:- i..f\:~g:~t n:::;'r-';~t~: "ITIO!' I".~Fr-~r.r! HIC:;TORY" TO PROTEST THE l:\~r;..._ Coo. ur.,~"'1\ ~!') ~~ I~T -I>".~~:,r-!--;: ~IT ~'IT:: I!': ~". BPR I\y. 'JAS ONE OF' T HF. ma S::V':~~ CO:~'~l! :J~T L ':r "-...!=' A:\:~;; '~T::-n DY 'THE DAOUD GOVER:-n1E~JT O'J AFRIl ~5 <:~r 3~L 32",/). ;-. 'A _ LJ,".filt ~~"F'IZIlLLf:;' :";'1--'.' t" fili""' :"!"IST~l1 f.'!f) ~P:ISH:~ OF' FOr.n~:!. - /,..-; -,.rf'lif::'.,a.: T"...:...! n: j-h(.:.' ":': r!~ 1<:::<'. ~S =.'.:;LY Af I~'ir: I!!: ~:."~ I."'.. '.. ii~..i :.,: r,r::.,','!" HAS;' ~!A51:i'!:: DEGREE I:: ~.:~~~r>,.:i: "; :;:,~:r:!'it1,)" r?ol,j COU''''~ Ift (I~'j~) t!'!!:>?::tt.''',':' 56

6 '(; (!,. :-- C'.4=-~~-'- 'of':"' 6 ;, ~ :1 c '!'~~rll CJ963-6~).r,-. i :.j :. lj ;IC'r'l\I. Y-::tH'I~ OF' FY\l'Cft.Tl":'N. ~!;,:. n.lil!j~~;:~-; 1./=1::" ~:i'~' ~ '.. " I'-~'~ C~,.'::7~. Ai~I:';.WA~ r."c'{)ct.'\t'=::> ::ii:: 7:'!':l::j III TH: ;::;"1-... ;-!:.~-: '.) '~J HI~ KITTER FI\CTIO!!ALI~~I r:::r'r:-: :tl l<iii\lp A"!') P~;:i:; '.' i~' j~(" ',.:: S I\CCU~rfl BY P"RCHAMI!rr~ ~F... 1'" I. C!.~!".::-:--:T to.. -. f.~r... :~'=: L(\'!::~~ ~OU~E C'F P/:!~!. I"-: :NT,!Ii"J:~ '!,;5 O::!,;:.:-lO:,l(;,LLi. O\.lrsl;;;QJ;J.;,:~ AGAIHST U~ AG. :".. t;f ~ l.:~ ""l:"ir.~n ~T~I. ~!"HJ "'1\'3 4\1"O:~G T~OSE COMr.V' 'ISTS i~":-:'r~'~ :":' T:!r'!)':Ol'T') r-o'.':'i, le'!! C'I A~~IL 25. C:'\PT~.~" ::~!'{.~~.t.n ""I,!':,1--lijC'=" :, Ir:~!"!I~~I!=:r~~ M~l) ~I1:I~rF.P. OF CQf::'i. 1 ; :I ('!;1 IC:IS. (::::-::: 'I.':. ;'L ~35~) COLC":;:!.. f\~,p~i!. "',,::"::1--:-;r :'1.~,;:~ 0::- j)i:':f'r;,~~. ('S'EE STATE l1e3", AI;D l!~;)!;o Y,t?"t. r.1t- -"'A~-r' "i3r--1r.!!~...,:,~,.., f:" C"'l~) C!>," ::.!. A. J) --~i1 ~H :-:T"':-:: Or- I ::T':'P01. A~~:--.~1) O~ h~ (.; Pt."J:.'! ~.' 'i:::-: ~:'\;i OF 4!J~f.l_TIlY Lt;.. ~l.::'~n I'~ TH:~ K~~DAH.'\~ I\P:" i".1 ~ T-'::LYf':;:':!' Te ~r ~ I"IIV~:'C:!TY :';~t-.r!l!!~t;:, ~p:::!:rcs r.~::.u~ 'I,.. ~,,) ":r' " "J':'.' flfnc::r'.!.. P! T!'!~ "'f\ijst?y OF' Fom:lG:i r.f:f.].i~ ;-.~ic~ ':'~ HJS ~t-::r.ti':.'~: TO :'!':::UA',' ::7 I~~ 1!'l65. 'HI 1:16~ H': \'r:~ ~-:::!'C~I! T?!) "IT!~ '. ~~~:~:< K~n~'Al. r..:m TH;: P/,~CHf\:'~ PARTY. r:~?,.,hlit'i~:::!'i H:- T001{ " ~!'l"~ CC::i':r!C'1 U:';', rtit oun PolO Ol'T/\ srf':t!.:~ =,~:!~""!TlC":LU') Tlif,; I(~ ( 1f1.Y 9E ~or.[ T~ACT:\2Lr. A!:n CPEI~nI/::l'Z:) T}';:J onr::~ CO:~;':l':'lfrs. SI!LT!::J "li 1!;':~~Hn f,lj--~ J '!srf.r ('II:' PI.IHJ:-'I~C:. Y.F.:5HTf 1,v.l HA~ Bmw C"!. J ~"::5. 1 ~j J%S W: I,'for ~::~lt"~1) Tn HA\I~ ~E;:;?l C!~ n-:=- cr::;~rr.lt1. r.o-':"itt';': OF' TW: PEtlPtr. C;!':"'nC~ATIC PltRTY em: EAr.LIJ~R HH~ \'< :."TIO;; OF i:;'!/~l~). P 1flG5 H:: PAl. FO;,? A LO'.~!:R HC'IJS:: EAT II-! PI\!:LI!~\~:'t!T ~!:T ',(1ST p;-:-: r.l::::;nor ;. IN 1967 HF H~Lt) TH~ rositjo" OF [lie~crcr: Gr', '!'t T~ TI:::: [CCr;n::ICf. FCTIO!' Or-- rh~ :'ir:'~~th'f 07 n:~::s C:r:! I::VIIS'f:-'ES. HJ~. C:ISrF.:-!~ J-lr,V:: R.~l:::~ t~/!aly <:,:!!-,' n~'f:::?~ CF' Jj~. M!Al:U'i RAT ~~ADAHf THi:: PR':SHIT MI:i!~'i::r! OF!:OCI fit,!'f'f!\!'~s.. J)n. r. 'tf!i r'o!'!\',;;,:,," 7~~"" -- ~~t':f'ir.-l? OF' /H~!'lIClJLT!!~:'::. I"R. It;:,:y:!.=lS :0. (~!;:~,Dllt;T:~ j:l Tf~~: I~' ',:" ~'~!I'J::;:C'ITY M::-nt:::ll1. FACULTY!.:tl:"i:~~ ~.~.~ \..;i~r:.,. T:~!: T :? (,;.." I:!: :"::.- ~':.~ All. "- ~~'~~H Y~'&ll~~. W: '..'lis 4 Cfl. :~ID'IT:: F(I~: r.:?lp~j:- 't r. :W:~ j;r: ll)a;.c,,~ II'! nn: 1959 ':1.;~~ iic::s. J:~- :'.~~ Ai'j'/,-:'; :;LV t: ~ '''''i<::r'l f:0'':'j'p'::: f"j!:r:;::; THE C~ : : 'l[:!i.!'"j T"q TTi:::- W~ ;!f.. 'l ;1?:~C'RTEn TO 9lZ,~ l'i!::/'j:; a Of' TH: "C.' Ti'~L CO:::;J.Tr~~-~.~::,;, GlIOUP. ': f: ~",CfP~:) r::';-c.-:t!.. ~,!CC:') T~'lT D~). 71.\ liay sr:"r.ti~s /IT T"!:: E~E) nf I')~"l T:::'il~:-':':'" "I::: }':!::~"T!("~ ~:->o:; TIE ;:Ht:.l~ r,');'ty at' (~!::.. I '.i~ nut Til:: Pl.;;7':'!'!\:"I ~lot i'.;r7:~t;::; 1 Tt.l T~I:' G('\\.':~'~r~E:flT V:'j"<"; ru- r;~\'~~':t. j": (IT Til/;-j T,'~':: ~1Jr. :i"'~rn T'~~j ll,!:f"izi;u.:'\l t.;'! <:~~.,.: "(:''\!. ': (..~..!.! jl,l C:J "'IT77:~ ;"CI ~ :" 1:.l) ~',(l,,,_'\ Hf\;n: I"':!~ ',':":~i' 'w '{::'. 'i',' :;Y 10 :>::"qg!! ~':'':'~?r;:l1r"'~l'1' I"?;~('ITl=.:C,T AGr.I':::r :/1'': <r r;. L' :...!... r ~ : ~-;.,!!:,; ;::~j:~lt,t1(l:: ~ :7?Or;Tr.TI'-y \r.ij::i\!~?:'r::') i,.~.-,. _.- ~t'v ~.'.' t u=: ~r..,~" ",... f.!\.:.'~. :~-:: I ~ :~~'# T. :::VC~ ~J17~: ::~lj!:~:tl y T:: :;".~ '~-'..;' ~;, l:l7 :'~.' r: jv ;.' -n:..g:j ~ ::.?..".":':'f 1',:?r.(I"'~F;-:-.','., ("-,":'" ':'".);~. r. r ':l("~ 0. ~l;i.t:h!ll. fl... ) rrn::icl..,.. : ~.~: :. 57 o ;-,.. ~..-:..,-:. r/~,_ '..J.... :.~:"".

7 -. DR. ~~lfth WALl (IILF:f:I1: ~1.I--:-'!~ IC;T -!' (1- P1I8!..IC HEALTH. TH~ L.~~T Nfl:l: I:.LE:~OZA I :::ST I\:~. I...- ~ P.!;.: i\::!i rur.;:.jtu:! from TH::: Y.A,/DAHl\::> Al;ZA. IJ~.LI G~!,DU!'.T:-:~.: C : 7H':' r j;: )J CAL SCHOO'. OF KAPUt IItHVr;?SITY Am ':las A!J A~r-ISTlHlT Fi'r'--~50R (IT Ttf:. r"::::'ic'!'t SCHOOL I~J JALI\LA3A:'. H;: I1AY HA\J!: r.zc:::ived ~O!';E TRAI:!!::G IN CZECHOZL(:VAKI!l. Ilr THE TIHE 0;: THE coup I!:::' 'l!ts D~Pll!Y :)IPF.Cra? Of iu\bul ur.'ivt"!'5ity ~'om :; S HO!';PI1 AL. '/Jll.I UAS O~J::: Of TH~ SEV;:,:r ' CO~1~U'1I SI~ A;mEsr,,:) BY THE DAOU~ GOVERN!IENT ON APRIL ~5. GHULA~'l Of,~TI~I;: PA~JSHI;-{ I--fU;:IST;:::l OF EDUCATIOtJ. paf-:jsml':i UAS F'ORr~ERLY l)!r.~cto~ or CFrJSOR.sHI~, RADIO AFnHANi~TA~ ( ) AND DIRECTO~ Of LIT~R~RY 'PRI!~S, MI~ISTRY OF p J fom1atiof! lwd CtltTUR':.: (1!)6~). HJ::~t'\S Ir.Pr.ISONSD D"r.IN~ THE P~RLIA~ 1r!~TARY ;::L:::CTIONS FOR I~S!~TING THZ KI~G AHD WA~ P.~l~A$ED I~ f~7~. a~rone HIS ARRESa HE ~~S ASSOCIATED wrth KHAIaA~ ~~D BA~RAK KA~M~L, BUT EVIjE~~lY ~Hrl~ I~ PRISON HE u:::sig~~r, F'nOM THE PP~CHAM PARTY IN ~;IJC!I H':': ~IAS A ~::~lber Of 'ih~ Cr::JT?tL CCi1i1ITT?:'i:. IN 197t!, PM:JSHIRI M!D II COllSUI ron~rm Ii ~?!.IHr:-:~ GR(!lIP CALL'":!:! DEI'!OCR4TIC KHAL ) l\arcm~i AFGHA~'I~":1. HE '!f,s ONE OF' TH~ GRell? OF SEVEN ARRE~:'D O~J APRIL 25. ~iohf..=:ji;t.d H"SSM! 3AR=:K 5H~rII (SH~F'I E) -- ~1H:IST!::R or IIJF'OR;.iA7IO:: l1nl> 4'ULTmn:. A "LE':DP!G ~F'GHAN PO-::T, SH,~~! ;;: IIf,S TH!:: EDITClR OF TH THE~ rj:::tl PlI:UCHII)!! ooiol.l'!l:)" r~ 19(;G, A~!!) ~1f11? nl~~c10~ OF PHCrTOGRAr:r~ITnY I tj THE CA~TCGUIP:rrc H!STIl'':;T~ O~ p;;: r~i!!s7p.y OF!"H'r.:S M'I) Ui)i.;T~I!::S fro:1 195A Tn 1~67.,~ 1\1.50 EDHF.!) "PA~HTU!!..IAGH"' ILIl.r.~.ZI~IE,,'m '~f1s DI:>ECTCR FO:? "PAYAm: E'tlA7' I!'I I:~ 196r HI:.: ~F.~T TO ~!ORK AT TH~ r'ii:!i STUY 0:: n!!='o::~latl OU 1\1:1) CiJl.TUiH': H! AN U~SPECIFIEI) POSITIO!:. PUP T~::; TIfE.SAtiE YEAR H~ 9ECAt"!E A S:::CRETAP.Y OF TH=: PA::1CHAM c~r:r::f:l co: ~r:rtte:e, HAVI~:G STAYED \-lith PARCHA:1 A!="TEP. THE Hp.:'.!~r SPLIT. :>urhng A 1966 CONVF.~S4TION l!lit!i TAP.~XI AND SHAFE" I, ErmflSSY OFFICERS REPORTED THAT T"~AKI ~AS VE~Y ~OLICITOUS OF ~H.4Fe: l, A'JD THAT HE CO"!SUl.TE1" :.with HHI P~IOP. TO MJS'J~RnJG ()I:~TCIJLT fllle::;tions. ALTHOtiuH ~K~;:-;'" I"S LAi~GU~r;:ES ARE SUPPO::;E~LY U:'U;:D TO FARSI AN:> P'J5HTO, n~::::s OF'ftCF.RS BELIEVEO HE COULD Fe', 1."11 rost OF' THHR ~!,!r,lish Co"~:;-:p~"TIn~'. ~..:.:: "~HiMJ LAEf)--!~I:lIsr!':R OF' ~A':'r(l A'm TnEVl~IOr-J. SE~ KA~UJ. :!o.:. ~~':: 58.

8 PROFESSQ,1 HAHMOOD SU~/\H--MmlSlER OF HI!1HER tdh~!itrcm. SU!.]f\Jt IS A PROFESSOR IN TI::: FACULTY O~ scn:;~cr..!c JS ETn:rn A SY~1PATHIZER o.=:t MEf.i!l!:~ OF THl: KHALQ PAnTY.. m: 1:t.l:.. t'!~ii :S CO!~N,CT WITH KNOWN PARTY ME~ ;aer So DR. ANAHITA RATEBZADAH -lljini~er OF ~ar:!i\l flrf!;!~;' acmn ABOtn' 1929 IN KAIH.'i., SH! ATn::nm!,:~~,.:~$ Sc.!iO~!. :r!~ c;ric;',:e" , ArID MEDIC.'.!. SCHOOL fl.'!' l~fl~u_ u : Y::;:':S7:":'. ~"::.: ';?:r... :~ '1"1-":: LOVER OF B!,JRAK K~.!~I~r;L ABOtJr 19GD I\lm, ~.';:!:':N E:~:."-:"":.iJ TO rt.:.!~lf.nl::~it IN 1967, t.uts ASSOrV,'fl::D UITI! I:A::tI"f.L (~U!:m r.!: "'; Cl~:":'1)!I!i. ONE OF'Tm:.. COMMu:n:.:i' 1R IU:1VL:;"fZ In F.'.:,,;'. ~.~::::":." l':! 1!"72i 5!!E ~AS REPO~Tr.o TO BE OIl THE P/iRC;!;\N F';~:~"fY C::::.i:!?, cc:::~ni:ei:.. f,odul QADUS GHcnSAl-IDI--MItlIsr:::R OF cn:~:::~\cr::.. P: t)'t!1 G!:'.:.'~r;r1:ml wr.s A 11E! II.1r.:R OF THE Pt.:?CH!\'l C=:'.i:'il,.t r.cl:~ui"e~ r.:::'> f\ CLOSE FRIEND OF B:.r3RAK KhRHAt. VE kave NOTlli:R Il;}:();;:1.~!"IC~l AT THIS TIM. ' NIZAr1UDDTN Tf.HZIB--M!!!IST R r F TRIBAL :Y~;t"J-::'S. T~ EEl Ie:; f.i10!1 l'ui'muz, BO!HJ "l,prnlr.~:~;f.tely!5.'':;~. IN n;;;: t... 7tLY Ir:~~:.j' S TI\I:::11:. T'Aliimr AT lir,3inia CC'i.L~GE :':.::'l r,!:') AT 1 :-.: IS!J ~:":: Lyr'~ ::.l HE IS A G~A.DUATE 07 THE IS1..Ar;Ic F"A'CUl.lY C;:- \(:'.~~L 1.1:~IIJ:~?srTY. L/I"f R HE ~]O~n~~D FC;,/ Kt BU. Rt.D Io Am r~;::tj ro~l: f'.. "F~ '.1 UP. Tm: MIln~:7';\Y or E::>UC,iTION le:l'r:;1i: ~ LlC:::~:D W T;,': C:':~'..~T:;;:::T OJ ENCYCLC:':!)IAS IIlm t/as A C:::!.L rle~ri::r 0F SO:~: :: :.;,:~CH OF 'i:f:~ CC::;mNI:;!' :'t';1ty. r;.; 1%6!2 ~:r.:; REFC:;T::':iJ TO t;:::::;-; m:gul,"~' \:IEi:Kl.Y :~::":T:i:3S AT T!;: };il ';. 07 Nl~~ i:8l" ':1Nl 'i' :,',::i. lit '(L7 'fi~:::: HE 1:'.::; f{ FORT;))l~Y ImC'~\':-") IN PC':"'" 1:«~I::.i.. m 19';~ F"-: \.'~S j":> :i: :r.l Tn :.':~ D ".r" r':' '!"-:: 7::','.:~S' 1"..;~~ :.. ').'.:... ": 'fl' ;:,:::; 11 (;. -', rrlll'....' i:' ioo.:,. ': sr.;.!", :., ~."D~~I~ l<;,{~!1al 1.1::' SlJl_f\~:.':~; L;~t:c::,.. :...: ::.~~ ~.~ " _ Pt, :T:" ::0:-:rIO:-;.. 59 E:.ICT

9 .,. &0..._.. _.. _ MEMORANDUM GeM" IDEN I IlItt- INFORJ.'fATION NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 2826 May 11, 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI PAUL B. HENZE l~\ SUBJECT: The Asian "Soft Underbelly" and your Visit to Peking I would expect the Chinese to be much more upset about the recent turn of events in Afghanistan than about anything that has happened in tho Horn in the past year. The Chinese will be concerned not so much because of Afghanistan itself, though it is important to'them, but because of the implications of a pro-soviet government there for Pakistan, which the Chinese have always (perhaps somewhat unrealistically) seen as a counterweight to India. The problem goes deeper, ho~ever, and it will be interesting to see whether our views and the Chinese view are very far apart. Hugh Seton-Watson in his splendid new book, Nations and States, characterizes the area from India/Pakistan through Iraq as one of the most inherently instable parts of today's world. He points out that all the states of this region are potentially brittle and none fully meets his definition of nation. Pakistan's future is problematical, perhaps deeply affected by what happens in India itself. Afghanistan's major peoples all overlap with those of its neighbors. Iran, for all its wealth and ambition, is loosely consolidated as a nation-state with large minorities who must still be expected to have centrifugal tendencies if central control weakens. Iraq has never solved its Kurdish problem. The Russians have been keenly interested in this area since the 19th century and now, with its oil wealth and the absence of a major outside counterforce, it offers them almost irresistable temptations, possibly as a diversion from the growing nationalism of their mushrooming Central Asian Muslim populations. The more successfully Iran modernizes, the more vulnerable it becomes to Soviet subversion. No one who is not deliberately myopic could see expansion of Soviet influence in Afghanistan, whether it has resulted from design or accident, as anything other than a large potential gain for th~ Soviets. There is a real case in this part of the world--especially as between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan - for some political restructuring. But to expect this to occur peacefully and without external major power involvement may be as unrealistic as in the Horn of Africa. Short of this, there is a natural case for Iran and Pakistan to draw closer together in face of a Soviet-supported leftist government in Kabul and to look to us for help. The Chinese will be very interested in knowing how we view all this and what we plan to do to bolster Iranian and Pakistani confidence. We have an instrument at hand: CENTO. It doesn't amount to much. It has not been popular or fashionable recently; we eenpirjen I rat'

10 .....' Q8ffPf DEN' TI1cb have come close to letting it go the way of SEATO. It may be handier than we think as a device for putting some tone into the soft underbelly of Asia. But in the end it will depend upon unilateral and consistent U.S. initiative to get anything meaningful started. The Chinese would be impressed by evidence of resolution on our part in this area. cc: Huntington Quandt/Sick Thornton Cgw:fH)~rT1AL ~~ ~~

11 ,: '. -. $: '....~ ~~----_.,~---_."...,I :.\......, o ọ.. Coo;. o "0:.~..., 0:.:.c,'" ~ ~, ọ.. - :> V> C 0 H rid t H T 1 A L S CTIOH I O~ 2 KABUL ;,'80J ~ CINCEUR AND CIHCPAC ALSO ~OR POLAOS I. LO. J 1652: lids' l!. ~\. TAGS: PEPR, PwOY, PINS, PINT. AF, JR. Pit, US". SUBJCCT:' SIX IICC~' AFTER AFgHAltIITAI(" RnOLU,/Dltl A IUIUIIIIg UP,. THE rolloiiih; JS A SU""ARy 0' "V-AULYSIS','" THE'. SITUATION IN AFgHAHISTA~ AND Its J"PLJCATIO.':ioR U.S. POLICY 611 WEEItS AFTER THE REYOLUTJOMOF tpril ~7 2' AND ON THE EVE O~ "' FJ~AL DEP~RTUAE,'RO" ItAaU ~.,; 2. THE HEll QOYERnEJCT OF THE DE"OCRATlC RE~U8fIC~O' '.,u'lihahistan (ORA) IS OY RVHE'L"U;U'.DEPENDENT.' II ",TH '. CONFIDENTIAL COH~IDEHTrAL. t PAGE 02 KABUL O~801 OJ OF 02: 13202'Z.:.. -- SOVIET UNION. IT CANNOT STAY IN POWER WJTHOUT ':.... '.:.. l~. CO'"OElUAL: :J.:' :.. ~ l, -.:.: : : ;r.~~ ~; ~: :...~.,... ir,.. ~.", f.'.. r','i j. ". Lo f"'.:. ~7J. '. 1,'lIo :.. ' : N.. '.... C',... ~~'t.,. J;,. J. '}.;,.~l';. -. ~ ~ ;, '... '. ~. \, '.. ::: V> :: ọ.,... os: '" I- lo) ;.. IJ c:: -( >- l- e: ::> u lo) V>...l -<:... 0 I- -<:.. :r...c E 0 ~ r

12 : : : : : ~~.. -I., f I '..1~ \II. r!. I : :j. : r.'j.! "~ ej.....r...". ~,. :-. : : ~.:: : :.. :.~ ~..... C't7IP'JOElTfA 'J _of: HELP. IT RELIES ON HUNDRED PERCENT ON THE"O 'ET. ; ~. UNION ror "'LITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIP"~T. AMD IN-. : CREA51HDLY ON THE sorret UNION FOA ECOIO"IC!ISIITANCE,; BOTH TE~lfIfICAL AND' FINANCIAL. AND 'OR;'IAO _. : ~. THE LEADERS OF THE OU" HAn aen l t Ol.OQrtALLV. : IH INSPIAED BY THE 10YIET UNION.~THEIR;AOHrIENCI TO!. "ARlJ8"-LE"INJ8~ J8 R YULED IN THEIl IHrTOIJC, I". : THEIR STATED INTENTION TO FOLLO~ the' 'OY'ET DEYELO'"ENT "ODEL BY E"PHASIZIN~ HEAYY INDUITA'lAM~ACOl.l.ICTIYIlATION. or A;AICULTURE IN THE MAY rn'~hrch:th y. HAY ORGANrZED ' THEI; PAATY ANO GOYEAN~ENT, AND IN THE~'CLJE'A'FINITr. TO THE BOVIET SATELLITE'S. ~.',.' \:r: ~......, o o"" (;) Q.., "o "~.. ~ ~. THE HEW LEADERS 0; THE OAA ARE ELATEC 8 THE S»CCESS ~~A~H~~: ~~:~~~Il~~y ~~ l~~,~:"~gl~:iti~=~~:s.~~:ri~fhl.. INT ERNAL AHD EXTERNAL FOACES ;! AND SECURITY AlRAMGE"ENts,\8E HI GHL Y YJS I8L E' AHD ST8 let.. : A NATI OlilHOE ~U~HTT U, ~ CURFEW IS STILL Ite rffe CT. -.~:,.;:: 5. I A" HOT AWARE THAT ANY OPP081110N!TD.THE:OAA IS~' BE IN' ORgAHI ZE () 801~JiY fojttluji!!o!e.njlfit. U 11 HO"~. EYER, CLEAA THAT~t ORA REPR lotl!jcliljloruy Or THE-.,. AFGHAN POPULATI ON AleC THAT THEAE III COIISIDEU8LE.:,.: APPREHENSIOM AND OUTRIGHT OPPOIJTION Tm:THEjIEQ'PlE,r INSIDE AFGHANISTAN 1M THE "IOOLE ClA. ~THE!CLEA;Y,. AHD THE TRIBES. AT THE "O"ENT!~IfHJI!0't.fs!nl.,~",n!..\~. FRAG"ENTED AND LEAO(RlEI8 ANO,' HE1IC...'OI l :110' I""EDJATE THREAT TO THE REGI"E. WHETHER IT CAN COALESCE AROU~D A. LEADER IN THE "OHTHS AHEAD AE""IN5 TOalE'IEEMa,BUT, ~~ CDMF JDEMr IAl < I"!.;" COM; JDEfeT IAl 1':./ { ::;. PAGE 03 KABUL 01480J o"j.~ or 02;' 'J20U'Z'. ;i~. ~~~:J~~AI~~~ ~~~ita~~ ;g~i& ~~~~H~O~:~~t~i~~~Hi~ TH:~' "llifary REIOURCES OF THE USSR' tn'ordcr:to~qyerthrov: IT. A POSSIBLY="ORE LIKELY "CE'ARIO"J.'OUEIAIIAISJN~: TIONS. TEARORIIT ACTS t AHD QUERRILLA'VARVAR,IN THE~!. "OUNTAIHOUS TRIBAL AAfAS ADJOININg PA(1ITAN~OTHER ~ POSSnILtTI B liihic}l ARE HARDT:TO EYALUAT r.ati{jhe fto" JCfi" ~~;i~~~n 6:~~T=t~H~~~ ~~~D~~;J,tJAN ~ ~i~~~ ~~ ~R ~ ~~~4~~~ :",. }H, ft'. L'AD,aSHIp IS INEXP,a IE"CE~;I ~ g,~ye~""e"1 : :~J(F~ ~tja.t... : :~7: \.,~,.-:.:. ',~.,~. ::.::.::..~.: -. :.:~,,: :.:.:::, ~ i~1 : 0 : : ::,'t"t ~.' \ '~"? eo..." f ~ r;-:,~~.. i.t,; "... Ė 0; ọ. ~ r- c.i > 6 c:: < > r- ;:> 2 U r.l CI)..:I < Z oi=.< :z....:

13 ......\....,".....-\'." ~... ) : :..~ :~o.,,r, T;~:: ::: ::- : ~.~..'W1\'Z J"' ,. ~. I, i,,, ;::: ':~'Tl'L."UL,.e" 02 or n 1;'~'~It"... ; tl ACTJDH NEA'-)' '... " ; INFO OtT-OJ EUR-J2 EA-,O,1'0-00 ~CJAE-OO DODE-OO H-OI JNR-,O l-u HUE-OO' N.C-OI 1'A-0" 'P-02. : SI-JS ICA-" 0"8-01 TI'E-OO IO-I'! 8-01 AID-O' AGRE-GO HA-05' "CT-O' CT" -OO IHT~"" DOE-U IOE~02 HRC- 06 " If 7 W; :' 'f. ; :t',: o~~o'2 I1212'Z I'~ ~. Ii, JlIltlZ JUN 71...,." A"CII'A"Y KAIIIL TO 'EC,TATe /lainoc IIIJ INFO AIICIIIA." ANKARA A"E"Un, DACCA A"E"BAllr IILA"ABAD A~E"BAIIY LONDO~ A"E"BAIIY "OlCO., A"E"8AIS' ~E" USLO PEKlHG A"E"BAI8Y TEHRAN CJNCEUR CJHCPAC r di' H roe JC DELHJ T I :' i. \.: { #. A ~ Stc;ON 2 :-o'f~~~~l" ~IO' ~IHC UR AHD CI~CPAC ALSO FOIPOLAOI ~,... _. 1. IN FOREigN polley, THE ORA WILL:UMQUEITIONABLY NOT WANT TO ENgAgE IN ANY ACTION' MH1CH'MOULD DISTURB THE PEACE IN THII AEGION -- AT'LEAIT UNTIL JT:HAI CLEARLY SOLIDIFIED ft. POSITION WITHIN AF'QHAlJ.TAII;" THERE ArTER t ITS FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULAltY'TOMARD PAKISTAN :1gH~;A~~ l~eli~~~ltt3h'~n~f~i~ytl~g~:fil~t'~.t~~", "' 0 THAT,T YIETI A. ruture" USE, AND THAT-THE OAA WI L:8E THEIR' " --. I. I \.f.~~ CONF IOENTJ AL~ ~"j' t", f ~':. COHF'IO NTJAL! ;.~. :~.. t l :.,~. PAGE 02!UBUL Olt80' ::f'02 OF~:0!jlJ320~8Z ~ 8. ONt QUESTION THAT CO"EI~TO "INDIf, MH[THER TH ~DaA WILL WANT TO OR 8E ABLE ro;ftaintain NY'DEGaEE OF ~:.;:--. '''':.. 1 cohndr.tud" :.~~i +\t. it..' ~-:' i'.".....,. '..~,~. :: :: :::~ : :..~:. ~:::.>';1: ~... ~... ' -~ : ~ ~?;' PII-05 - :1 ':". ' :' ',t'!::' ';;j;~: :', ~1~1.. ':'.... CO> o ọ.. o Q c :Ṣ.. c ~ co ~'.. CI.:: en -o CO>....i=

14 CONFIDENTIAL ""e' f1 I ~ ~.: i -~ : :?: : :-." e..... ~..:oij" - t. _ :.. :... i'",.;!btlrm :: ~: :.. :... AND ADMINISTRATION AND WILL HAY' A DI"ICULT TI" WITHOUT EXTENSIVE EXTERNAL TECHNICAL ASSISTAMCE IN CO"IN; TO grips VITHIA'GHANIITAM'1 ECOIO"IC AND\.OCIAL PROBLEMS. THE [CONO"""A' "OYE'AHEAO 01 ITI OMI ITfA" FOR A WHILE, AIDED 8Y A FAYOR.alE AGRleULTURAl SITUATION THIS YEAR, BUT DIFFJCULTIE~ COULD IEtO"E E'IDENT MITHIN SJX "ONTHS to A YEAR. THE PRIYATE 'ECTOR, 'OR EIA"'LE, IS SLOWJNg DOWN RAPIDLY, AHO THE PRINCIPAL 'OA" OF GOYEAH"ENT REVENUE. tuito"s RECEIPTS, HAYE 'A~LfN SHARPLY. ~: "....., g... o co ~ c ~ '" El:, ~ J,. I V i...!ii ~ :t \'..~. i: ;t f...i t ~. - ọ.,... ~: ~ i I:., Ị j COHF.lDEkT,U1....., :... I. ~ '.' :; : : e.: :.~.....:: : :.:..::: '!, ~.l.' " j E e Co.

15 e..,. ' : : ::. :.: e. :.: ::- ::-..c "... :'.. 1'-, I co~"or.t'al ~ r. - IND!PEMDE.CE EROn THt'IOwl Er U"O~ TH~'LEAD~IIHJP SAYS IT WANTI TO. IT RE"AI~I TO IE IEf. WHfTHER IT:" ABLE TO. "O,T 'IQ/t, '0 FA': IIiDICATtFHAT TN. 10r/tr..tll"ACl fb PRETTY TIGHT..~. :'j ~f~ 9. ANOTHE'R QUUrro. JI WHY T,. t, LF WANTS TO DO"JHATE A'OHANI AN. UII"; the DAOUD. _NO, ~ IHE ROYAL -- Arg/"E'. fht IOYJ[T'~QOT MHAT'THEY WANTED OUT OF AFGHAN"TA" 'TAATrgJtALL~ AND rco.o"ically. WHY DO THEY WANT TO.'IU"E A IP.O~IJBJLJTY 'OI'THI. rractiou' COUHTRYL ANa WHY GOltHEr WA.'~TO A"U"[ AN EYEN GREATER SHAR~ O"THE Ca'T~Y ECOIOIJC auiof. or AFgHANI,TAN'S FUTUA~ OE'ElO'ft JT7'ft".fLJ F "; rhat SOYIET lotology PERSUAOES THE~~HAT HIITORT 1.;0. THE SIDE OF'"ARIIS"-lENJ"I'" AND 11' ftl.'ft~ltaiic' ARE,"VOlYED. HISTORY IHOUlD 8 'uoara _LOla. PAATICULARLY IF' IT INYOLyn THE EITABLJlH"!1IT'O' A"IOn T~DO"JJ'ATE'O RE~J"E. IN THE CAIE 0' THE.A'~'A YUUTIO.~IT~OUlO ' APPEAR FOR THE "O"ENT THAT THfi.OYI!T, HAYt OOTTt. AWAY WlfH IT WITHOUT ANJ'IlDNIFICAlniDA"AOTO THfJA:A LATIONS WITH us OR WITH THE INDIANS AIO,lHAT~fH Y HAYt ACHIEYED 50"E HEV PSYCHOOOgICAl'AOYA'TAlr,. TNfII R tatjo~'hips WITH IRAh AND PAKISTAN. O",~:~IiO.OftJCtIIDr.~TH Y ARE GI'J~G A~AT,HOTHJHQ-fI,H ItHlIIJrH r '(L~.SPE"D IN A~;HANISTA" WILL IE REPAIO"I'TH A'aHAN ftllrral RESOURCES, E8PECIAllT'PETAOLEUft. aas'~' 0 ~OP" A. BUT POSSIBLY ALSO ilion AND URA"JU~~I.~; ~: '0. IN THJS SITUATION. "HAT SHOULD T \UNnro "etates BE DOIHg7 WlTH RESP.E'CT TO A,gHPISTAIt. 1 8ELUYE lie SHOULD DO OUR BElT TO ~AJ"TAIN A IU"JtIENT'~EI.[NCE CONF' I DENTJ AL :.::t- «f.: CONF' I DENT I AL : :.' f. '~/1, PAGE 03, KABUL ' : 02 OF.. 02 :;..\,U03~~,:: jhere RESPECT TO THE REgION f. I HAYE 'ola " Lt.tAIDJCO.TJ"UE SO THAT WE CAN OFFER AN ~ 'TEaN.T,li TO THt EITE.T that THE AFgHANS ARE'WILLING 10 A8L :~O U'E~O.E. WITH. TO FCCL, THAT 'THt,cclI.trr DF.. lam AMDf711E 'I',IAII IV!.' REGION,. OF 'ITAl,",oArANeE 0 THE U'J, Jfa:'TAT li AND ALSO THE SECURITY OF:PAKIITAN JMIOFAR~~.IT A" CTI OUR INTERESTS I" IRA.IANO JI'~HE gulf. J THEIE'OI BELIEVE IT JS IMCU"BEMT UPOM'UI TO DOl 'Ea'TH1M; WE CAN~ TO SHO'E UP IRAII A/tDt'Atl'TAJUAgAIII'T'.rllE 1t1,~rH'IAT TO THEIR SECURITY POSED~8T THE~IOYIEr.8At' I ;I"E IN,i..... c....1 AF'l;HAHrS].A'i,...E. 8ttOULV. L~~YJ "2.PO~8T..z!!f[;'UNDI OF' ;' '. ~..~ ::.::.:: ~rn~ltttvrjal',:.".::,~j.. ;:, T -r":" J..~ ';r' :'"l':;' ~. :. ~!. '...., ~ ~: J r ~ ~. :.... M oọ.. o ọ.. o M : E o ~

16 .. ~.. CONr( O(HT JAI..' J. "~l'" r V!,I - L. ;. T.,)... fr.,.~. i ~, I i... ".~.J, : :-~.,. CO"'I~r.TUL; j; 1.," TH SOY lets THAT WE R GARD:OUR INTERESTS J.:JaAN A.D~ PAK ISTAH All YJUL. "! :J.:~ ELIOT f ~.~ " ~~~ :~:~i~:~?fr.:.'~..,.'... g... c.i c c,~... c ~ " at I'.< -o CO>..... ~ ,.., CONFIDENTIAL E e '"..';. '. ~....,:'.,.~'.' ~~:i::~: 0~~::~..;;::

17 CORFIDENTI~/NOFORN MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PAllTICIPAHrS: Cuermady ICAzaak1n. S,v,ee Embassy, Tehraa JaM D. Stempel. AlDedcaD mba..y, Tehran DATE & PLACE: July 18, Chinese Restaurant, Pablavi. Ave. SUBJECT HlIIYft R18hts. Afshaniatan and Intemal Iraaian PoUeics DISTRIBUTION: CHARGE. POL. Olt. USIS.IoIIO. REA/lIN. inrjua INRlOn/B. A11EHBASSY ICA!UL The tenor of the lunch vas sec when Stempel invited ICazankin to bring Shcbaransky alang a. an extra guest. ICazankin a.ked who Shcharansky was and Stempel aaid he would be dehshted to tell him over lunch. The follciwing poines of lnterese callie out durins the meeting. Human Rights - Stempel 1mmediately launched into a liioderately reatralne~ attack on Soviet policy with respect to dissidents. Why was the Soviet Union being so deliberately abrasive1 Did Kazankin reau.ze" how s.illy and counterproductive the recent Soviet trials bad been? lcazankin attempted to brunt the thrust with a fairly hard-line response that this was the Soviet way and very quickly shifted co AmbAssador Young's statement of polid.cal pr1soner. in the U.S. After a considerable amount of back and forth discussion. talk about human rights liiore or le.s dlssolved. Kazankin showed himself extremely adroit at bringing.young's comments to bear a,ainst American criticism of Soviet di..ident activity. Afghanistan - Kazank1~who had served in Afghanisean In the late 60. sald the Soviets were adoptlng a wait-and-see attitucicl toward the new regillle. When Stelllpe.l dryly asked whether placing various Soviet advisors in the ministries cia., to tbe priwy cleaner lewl was a.wa1.t-llld-see at:titude. lcazankift satd ~hese were all technical specialists and were not advisors. Stempel cballenged him on this and asked for his comment on the nearly two dozen economic agreements the Soviets had slgned with the nsv Afghanistan government. Kazankin said tbe Soviets were giv1ng help to Afghaniscan because they felt the govcmment VolS doing IIIDre for 'che people tb.an previous govemlqt>nts. He /laid Soviec relaei"ns vil:h the two previous AEgban regimes had also been excellent to good. Stempel noced that there remained a good deal of suspicion in liiany quarters of Soviet actlvities in Afghanistan. Ka:ankin pressed for Iran's views of the problem. Stempel merely noted that the Iranians vcre suspicious. Kazank1n described the new Afgnanist:.n's governmenc's program as u a good democracic bourgeoisie" prt... am and reslstt=d wich only mnor uneasiness Scempel'.5 j:lbs " COllllllUl\1st influence in AfghanLstaft. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN 7S '....

18 C09FIDENTlAL/NOFO~l 2. Internal Iranian Politics - Kazank1n p~essed at aeveral points for Stempel's views on the Iranian Incernal Political acene. S:empel, pleadiag a ~ecent return from vacation. merely said be had heard the political system was opening up. lcazankin poo pooed th1a and said" "If the Shah. 15 atill around Dex:: year. everything will be rigged by the government." Stempel picked up on the "if" and asked if 1C&zaokia had any :levs that would suggest differently. Yere the. Soviets planning something in Iran'l ICllzankin cl~ared bta throat and treat1lcl 5tempel..te the rumor that the Shab was reportedly sick from cancdr or some other blood disease. (This rumor has abounded in many quarters and may be of Soviet inspiration.) Kazankin a180 said he had heard the U_5. wa. trying to make Dr. Ali Amini prime minister again. Stempel denied this with a derisive anort and said the U.S. waa delightsito see the political system opening up but th~u.s. bad.no preferred candidates. Visitors - In what has become a ritual, Stempel and Kazankin discussed perspective visitors from their countries to Iran. lcazankin noted that the hea~ of the Soviet chamber of coll2lllerce bad been in Iran 1n mid-juri and Iran and the USSR bad agreed to open a Soviet-Iran joint chamber. ICazankln did not seem very interested in Under Secretary Newsom'. visit and Dr. Eugene Rostow'~ short stay here. (Comment: Perhaps the Soviet intelligence list has not caught up with recent events. On the other band, maybe they feel they know all they need to know about the visit. Kazankin's lack of interest in these ewo visits ~as unusual.) Rio floce - K.:1ZIUh in w1l1 be leavinf for ~sia for vacation August:I. He invited the Stempel amily for a Tnursday afternoon s-.n.m lunch an July 27. (Collllllent: OR' notes :his 15 an unusual step; few official Acericans are ever invited to Zarcandeb. tbe Soviet summer compound.) Kazankin also expressed interest in seeing journal 'Irticles from American publications such as Foreign Policy, '/hieh dealt with Iran and the Mideast. Stempel promised to provide a few. cm:fidenttaliuofopjf 76

19 ~_.. _. - c-o~~ ~_. c :3 ~~~~vv 0')?U;j"'~R isb003bka452 ~~ ~~~HC R4166/ not :;SSS~ ::ZH r Jl r; '!' o ~1??~~~ AuG 7a ;~ c~cs:~!~ WASHDC TO RUfS~A/USH:SSION USNATJ l~~?~:~~e ~~92 IN~O &US3LK/AHF."'9~tiSY KA,uI IMM~~.AI~ 512~ PU~~fn;AM~~~A5SY i~hja~ I~~EDIA~~ S'l~C?US?;,j:'/M1~MUSSY ISUf-'AHn H'ME: i.cf i~2e FUSPA~/~MS~BASSY ~K~ bilri.imme~iai~ 221~ RUQrRAiAM~MSASSY JI~PA IMH~rIAT~ ~2~4 1)'1 SEC R r. T StCTION 1 OF 2 :'T4T~ 1~4166/1 ~("rion' por.3 It.lFO AP.f9 OCM ECm12 PM OR lca SRlRAZ CRU2 R8...J. :l165~: X-GrJ~ TA~S: PEPR, SA. IN, JR, AF, PS SU!:ECT: UNDlR SECRiTAdY NE~50M'S!R!P TO 50UT~iRN ASIA -1' MAY D~A~ ORALLY ON FOI.LJWIN~ OSSERVATIONS CONCERNt'~G :J'!DtR SECRlTARY NE"wSOH'S Jl!~T 8-1~!~I~ TO SOUTRo:RN A~IA I~ PvLADS AdGUST 2: I.A. tfgbinistan: ArGnAN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE : F~I~ND1J RELA!IO~S.ITH TH~ ~NITED STAT~S ANn ~MPRASIZ E. '~I~ r~~ict OF NO~-A1IGNME~:. TRE! SAID irat T~!Y ~~RE ~';ll~i~g-various ISSUES SUCS ~s TB FRONTIeRS ~ITa PA~i5~A~ AND THE ~ATER AGRE!MENT WITH I~AN AND HAD NO: ~~T DET~RMINiu TH IR POLICIES. TR~T STATED THAT ~RATEVF.R.. ~. ~!'~CI510NS THEY rior~d ~o USOUE ISSUES VI!H THEIR ~=OhS THhOUGH ~6GOTIArIONS. ~. ~. I~TtRNAL MATT1RS, THiT SAID THE! WOULD BE DRA~ING UP A,IYS YEAR PLAN AND THAT THEIR FIRST FRIORIT! WOULD Bl LA~~ R~FOR~. THE! SAID TnET FAVORED COOP~RATIV~S OVRR 'f) i L ~:'I-! v\:~ c IlIi. ; ~:':;iti:: IS GEI~LRA1 I:-IPS-ESSION.-ROUND westirn t"'~as:: 1 :. I ' :\P.UI. Til,u TRE NUM :!'~R OF SOV I t.t AD'lIsnS IS 1:.:.', :...;. qs "'A~ NOT r1e"'10ned 3T AFGHAN OFrIC:ALS, "L'::;;..... ~r:i\.i!'oi'\ti.d :HJT Tn.n H::'iAIf{STHi HAD HAD COOr. ~~L'1:J. :1~ i~~ ~OVlrT UNION ~~~ SIXTY YEARS AND LOO' :. h;", h.. 1\.1.:iU:,~l'At..1AL H::L? i:\j:1 n!r ~\)vie!' UNION. -...': -up:.u TO GU" Su3~!A~lTHt ".'..1' ~'QO", O'!'liHS AS 'HLL

20

21 " ", ",.,/.. \ D'P",.ltII,,.1 of Sial' TElEGRAM ~'DDT'A PMI " AerrGII ""-0' IMI'O OCT-oa '10-00 IA-N!tIII o.... oa CIAr-OO MM " M-M fiie-o' L-OI '.-01 losa ti '... a",.'1 '11 a"1ti1 lip,. I'If"'._, 1IIIWI I...,MIIU.,..mrA"...I....yDACCA...y,..MMAD..., JIDDA MlMMSY ~.,.-coti MIMMS., fth D!Ut, 1&0 PtIC,. I CO" " lor " T, A I. T NUIt LUCUS..-.. _.'~"_..-'_..." E.O. I usaa QOI. ' TACiSa!A'O. PEPA. ~ IA. US StIIIJI IRNf/Nf MSI:8SIeIr 0' AFfiHNf DErEZ.OPIf 1IrS AIftJ lj.8. AFIHM RELArltJlfS RE'a STATE '.'~",~ / '.....:....-'. ~.'...,.,-v...,. /!... '. I '.' /!J. :;;,</ I/. ~. " I -. I. AOOR SSEES All ' NT IIfNf ftas YIATUALI. Y FAOf' TfoIE "AST HEr.o PAIYAT, VlEtI_ ft!ti AFGfWt QOY AIV lh AS FaA ALI. '''T NTS AND PURPOSES A SEAyAftT op THE SOYI TS. foi HAS OISGU'SED THIS VI II B JtIN) Nt opp1cial. POlIC., OF -"AIT-AND-SEE- QIYlftG THE fteti QOA YERY 8 ~EFIT OF rfole DOUIT. POARAL REI.ATIONS HAYE CONT'~UED AS 8EFORE. IftCL~'... COftT'NUI..Q DIS8lJASEME~TS ~ EJ'STI..G ECO~O"rc C~I~TI (TEHRAN '1.1 AftO ~~OU" TO DEPT AND (AB~L ~ AUcaul', aa) BUT Al.IIAYS "ARllY. COftF' IO!ftT'AL CDlCP lde"rrat. TEHRAN 09a19 2'09JJ2.. " \i /0 2. SHAH fw)e IT CLEAR TO THE MBASSAOQA. AT TfoIE Tl"E. CWlDE"nAl

22 ~Ar.F THPF~ 5 C R F T 1111A 3. SAuDI ARahI~/YiMENS: SAUDI CFFICIALS CON,;'YED ~F.EP CJNCEiN O~~A!BE iecr~t COUP tn ADEN.3ICH THEY pgrcr.!v~ AS IURTBiR ~1IDENCE Of A SOiI~T ifrort TO ENC!RCLE THtIR OIL-HlC~ ~r.ninsula _ITa REGI~r.S HOSTIL~ TO MOD~R~Tl GOVERH~~NrS. TBiY EIPR.SSED PARfICULAi CONCERN OVER ~RA~ TH1Y A~LI~~~ Tv B~ AN INFLUX or FOREIGN TROOPS JNT~ TH6 r OP~E'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF!f~EN FOLLOWING 't'sl G:!l!P. WE COMPLIMENUD THE SAUDI GOV;;atof1&NT FJR ITS ROL! IN JULY 2 ARAB LK\GU! MrETI~~ WHICH RtSJLT!D IN A COHD~~NATIO~ BT A HAJJRIT! or L~AGUi ~E~Bg~S or PDRT'S &OLi IN 1Ft ASSASSINATION or NORTa!EME~ PRiSID~NT GP.ASBMI A~D FURTB!R POLITICIAL AND iconomic ISOLATION or ~Hl ADtNI ~EGIME. V~ ARE ALSO WORKING WITH THE SAG!IT 1f~166 PAGE FOtTR SEC RET ,' - 1~uc13 \~., U.a. 'NNNV' S»004BRA RUQMHil ~t RUiBC t4166/ ZNT SSSSS US o 0122"bZ AuG 78 rh SiCSTATE VASgDC TO RUFHNA/USMlSSlON USNATO IMMEDIATE 9393 INfO AUSBLK/AMEMBASSl labul IMMEDIATE 5130 RUQMBP./AMtMBASSI T H~AN IMMEDIATE 57~7 RUSBQD/AHtMB15SY ISLAMABAD IHH!DIATE 0821 RUUH/AM1MIsASSY NtW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2211 RUQMRA/AM~MBASST JIDDA IMMf.DIATE T SEC RET iinal S~CTION or 2 STATE 1941~6/2 LIMtIS TO ACCELiRATl DELIVlRY or ALREADY APPRO'ID us ~!LITARr EQUIPMENT TO NORTa lemen AND to NOT INTEND TO RESPOND A1 THIS rim~ TO ANY PDRY INTER~ST IN IMPROVSD R~LATIONS WITH US. VANe;: -. 8T "4:106

23 NNNRVV SA370BRA29~' RR iluqpihr DE RUEHC 4356/ ZNY SSSSS ZZK" ~ g1zs12z DEC 78 f" SECSIATi WASHDC TO RUS3LK/AM (1SASSY KABUL 6410 INFO r.usjqu/a~rmassyisla~aad 2545 RUQiolilRlAI'Z('1JASSY TEilRA N 3391 RUSDAUAi:.znaASSY NiW DELHI 4725 RU1'lJDK/A('1EteASSY CACCA 7116 RU HfiO/A(~HaASSY MOSCOW 3754 RUMJPG/uSLO PEKING 3985 RUQ~GU/AM,KBASSY ANKARA 6935 RUHQHQAI CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII 1843 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE BT SEC RET SECTION ~I OF 82 STATE /91 EI~l~ E.O tags: GOS PEPR, EAID, AF. US -\.\~.. t.c,.j" SUBJECT: ASSESSl1ENTOFAFGHAN D VELOPJ~ENTS A.ND U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS REFS: CA) STATE ; KABUL W~ AGREE WITH THE B~OAD OUTLIllZS OF YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TnEGi~ER~ DIRECTION 07 DEVELOPMENTS IN AFuHAHISTAN AND THE UNCE~TAIN PROSPECTS FOR A RETURN TO CLOSE U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS. NEVERTXELESS, ~E STILL FIND OURSELVE~ U~SURE A30UT THZ SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE P?ESEIU REGIHE MAlflIAINS ITS HOLD ON POWi::R, Aim WE BELIEVE ~, SrtOULD WORK FROM T~E P?Z~ISE THAT A CONST~UCTIV~ U.S. AFGHAN UORAING RELATIONSHIP COULD srill EMeRGE. WE WOW~iR, IF AND ~HC:N THE SIT~HriON G2LS A BIT ~CR~, ~H~TH:~ TH~ DnA ~ILL a~co~c A D~CIL~ CAI~-fOLLOW R DC~INAr,D 3Y irle USSR,oa A ~ADICAL-LifTI~T ~SGI~, ON THE FRINGE ~F TH UON-ALIGN~D ~OVLr~~T Bur ~IIA P~CULIAR AFGHAN CHARACTERISTICS AND A C~ Gn~E OF I "D~E~JDEiJCE. TjiE: l ij5t ADYC::P,S;:: i)ivelopi ;..:lh I H UR:1S OF OUR IiUERES LI. D :-.. ~ r;' ON OF SOV ':" ',' T T WAlCH WOULD SinIOUSLY uisturb TaE tojiia' R(:GION. 2. we SZi, AS YOU DO, OUR RZ~10UAL INT~REsrs AS PARAMOU~T I~ OUR CO~SID2RATIOw OF A PROPlP. APP~CACX TO THE ORA AND ~OULD VIE~ AN Ia~IJE~rIST AFGAANISTAN, ESP~C!ALLY ONE gacked ay rae SOVI~iS, AS A S,RIOUS Tij~EAT TO PEACe:: AND STA3ILlTY IN THE A2l::A. \11 3iU'::VE Td15 IS A RE:AL FEAR ESPENIALLY IN PAKI~TAN AND ALSO IN IRAN. ~ 3. THE ASSE3SMENTS OF ArGH~~ISTAN'S N IGH30BS ARE SIMILAR TO OU~:> t,ltrlough p~l:isra~j Ai,;'; 12AN COiJIl::t-lD THAT AFG:iAtHSTAN IS AL~Z~OY I~~~VOCA~LY -LOSr- TO THE S~VI T UNION PA;(ISTA:~ S:::r:: :s TO,:!,\:'l US n :;riartc: T!Elrt ASSC:SS :,.:n OF" THZ r:';;:;:::at, P;:;::':;;Ui ia.:ily T:; CJTAli'; A Gi,;;:t,T:.: t;.~. C~J:."lTi,ji::tn TO ~~~rsias's S~CU~ITY. nr NO TIM~ HAV: I~ Pft~I5TA"IS ~ IJ: :STI O~;:D.ill 2 P ~t! (.Y OF i ;,\ L ~:, r ::r ;~G T;::: U.S. f":':'s':: r :c:::: F ACTIOO c POL) c!l INFO... A 1'IB 0 c ~.. ~ ~ 0... tilt ~ PX:2 ':; PM am ~ "4 Z :; 0 ::c 0..,-... t e J:J :5 c. Ė 0; 0....c: Eor;,j > B c:: < > Eo- 2 ~ 0 (oj 0...J < Z 0 f:: ẓ <. ::; E 0 ~

24 NNNNW ;::SA.371a~A~~S- il;i RU~ i1iir DE RUiac ~35&/~2 ' ZNY SSSS!i ZZi( R,U&12Z DEC 78 ::, ':O'lL FH S CSTAT WASHDC TO RUS31.1~1 Ai1E:'1aASSY KAdUl INFO RUSJ~D/A~E~~ASSY ISlA~A3AD 2546 RUQI1HR/Ai-l!:i'L3ASSY re:hran 03)2 RUSBAE/Ai-l::l1dASSY I~C:~ DEl.HI 4726 RUMJDKIAI1t:~~ASSY DACCA 7117 RUEHMO/A~~I~ASSY MOSCOW 37~5 RUI~PG/USl.O PE~lNG 3936 RUQ"GU/Ai~~ASSY A"KARA 6936 RUHQHQAI CIUCPAC HOUOLULU HAWAII 1344 RUSNAAA/USCIHCEUR VAIHIHGEN GE at ~ E C RET FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE /92 LIraDIS, CONCERN A30UT TaE NEW REGIME"S QU~~TIONA3LE HUMAN RIGHTS p~rfonmanc. T~E AFGHANS SHOULD BE KEPT FULLY AWARE OF THESE CONCERNS IN OISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEADE~SHIP. 7. WE REGARD THE SITUATION IN AF~HANISTA~ AS AN EVOLVING C~E WHICH ~UlnES OUR CONIINUING ATTENTION AS ~ELl AS A ~~NTINUING DIALOGUE WITH OTHER STAT~ IN THE R'GION. ~E ENCOURAGe: E~=ASSIES T~i~AN, ISLA~~JAD, A~t new DELHI IN PARTICULAR TO CON!1NUE,XCriANGING VI~wS WITH HOST GOVERN MENTS ON THE NHANGING AFGHA~ SCEN~, K~EPi"G IN MIND THAI OUR INrLUENCE IN KA3UL.IS SEVZRELY LI~IT~D AND THAT WE LOOK T~ AFGHANISTAN"S NkIGH30RS TO TAK~ THE LEAD IN D~VC:LCP I:~G A NETIJOrtA OF COO?:::nATIVE FrZLATIOI:S l-liuch \:II LL CONTRlaur~ TO PEAC2 AND S!A5ILITY IN THE R~GIOU. VANCE at 4356 ::: o M ~ ~.. ~....Ė o ~ tii ;> (.) c:: < > e-- 2 ::l (.) C=J en...:l < Z o E= < z E oc:

25 DEPARTMENT OF STATE MORANDUM OF CONVERSATION CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT: Afghanistan and U.S.~Afghan Relations PARTICIPANTS: vasiliy K. Embassy Gorovoi, First Secretary, USSR Ronald D. Lorton, Country Officer for Afghanistan DATE: April 11, 1979 DISTRIBUTION: Gorovoi said he had not been able to understand developments in U.S.-Afghan relations since he had last met with Lorton, commenting that on his last visit (February 8) relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan had appeared to be "calm" but that since the terrible event which resulted in the death of the American Ambassador in Kabul there had been an abrupt change in those relations. He cited as evidence, the U.S. decision to reduce economic aid to Afqhanistan and calls in Congress for other actions such as withdrawal of the Peace Corps. Gorovoi explained these developments as incom?rehensihle because the u.s. has always sought to preserve its position around the world. NEA/PAB, EU~/SOV, S/MS, SY, IUR/R~A/SOA, INR/OIL/~. NEA-Mr. Miklos, Embassy Kabul, Embassy scow, Embassy Islamabad, Embassy ehran, Embassy New Delhi, NSC Mr. Thornton Lorton agreed there have been difficulties in the U.S.-~fghan relationship, explaining that although relations before February 14 had been normal, we nonetheless had a number of questions on our minds including CO~~FIDENTIAL GDS 04/11/85 84

26 CONFIDENTIAL our inability to Agree with the Afghans on various matters of International concern and the apparent lack of interest in the part of the ORA in many of the programs we were continuing to offer. What disturbed us about the handling of the kidnapping of Ambassador Dubs was the ORA's complete lack. or cooperation or even consultation with us in their handling of the incident. All of these factors were part of our decision to reduce our assistance level. Lorton concluded. Gorovoi questioned what he called the u.s. view that the Soviets were in a position to control the behavior of the Afghans at that time. He said Afghanistan was a sovereign country and denied that the USSR is in any position to order the Afghans to do something. Lorton demurred and said it was not a question of issuing orders, but our view that the Soviets who were advising the Afghans should have been in a position to urge restraint on them. In reality, the Soviets even played an operational role in some aspects of the anti-terrorist operation, according to eyewitness reports. Nonetheless, Lorton noted we have expressed our view to interested Members of Congress and others that it is the Afghan Government which must bear the responsibility for the outcome of their action.. Gorovoi opined it is difficult to see how U.S.-Afghan relations can make progress in the light of the sharp u.s. decisions. Lorton said the U.S. had no desire to see a deterioration in our relationship with Afghanistan but observ~d that one of the major difficulties in having a cooperative relationship in the future is the continuing charges emanating from Moscow regarding outside interference in Afghanistan's affairs. Lorton noted the two recent public statements made by the u.s. in this regard, reaffirming that the u.s. has not interfered and has no intention of interfering in Afghanistan's affairs. Improvements in U.S.-Afghan relations would be difficult, Lorton concluded, as long as these kinds of charges and the atmosphere they create continue. Lorton asked Gorovoi for his assessment of developments in Afghanistan and the major problems faced by the Taraki Government. Gorovoi thought that the ORA was facing problems common to all revolutions as the old and new classes vie for control. Gorovoi observed that there is a;strong religious tradition in..p CONFIDENTIAL 85

27 CONFIDENTIAL Afghanistan and indicated this was a source of opposition to a regime which sought to separate church and state and remove religion from politics. He also noted the autonomous traditions of certain tribal groups and observed that a number of dissidents have crossed the border into Pak~stan to carry out anti-ora activities. However, Gorovoi continued, the ORA enjoys a lot of support for its reform programs (such as land reform) which benefit the masses of the Afghan population. He viewed the military as key to the progress of a revolution in developing countries. Lorton questioned whether the regime indeed had "mass support, observing that large $egments of the general population appear to have expressed their opposition to the regime in. the revolt in Herat and by leaving Afghanistan for Pakistan. Lorton suggested that these were indications of less than mass popular support for the regime and a reaction to the harsh measures the regime is taking against its opponents. Gorovoi responded that every action provokes counteraction and quoted Lenin on the need of a revolution to defend itself. He recalled that large numbers of Russian peasants had opposed the Russian Revolution because they were uneducated and illiterate and did not know where their real interests lay. He saw the task of the Afghan Government's leadership as being the education of the masses regarding their true interests and described this process as difficult. yorton concluded by saying that he thought it would indeed be a difficult time ahead for the Afghan people since the ORA appears to prefer destruction of old institutions in~avor of new structures rather than attempting to work with or through those institutions. Drafted by: NEA/PAB:RDLYr~on:lcb X29552; 04/1'"2/79 Cleared by: NEA/P~:~QOon CONFIDENTIAL 86

28

29 , I!I NNNNVU ESA824MJA543 PP RUQIIHR DE RUSBLK 'J557/ ZNY CCCCC lzh P R 88834~Z PlAY 79 m APlE"BASSY KABUL 7" Z0.. TO RUEHC/SECSTAtE VASHDC PRIOFilaTli71~ J' INfO RUQftGU/AMEPIBASSY ANKARA 3688 Rlk'IJPG/NlDlBASSY BEIJING 512 RUSBQDI APlEMBASSY UiLAflABAD 871! RUQKRA/AflEPIBASSY JIDDA 278 RUDTClAJllDIBASSY LONDON 1"'\ RUEHMO/NlEPIBASSY "OSCOV 1~92 RUSBAE/AMEPIBASSY NEV DELHI 6779 RUFNPS/AflIEPIBASSY PARIS '\817 RUWilHR/MIEflIBASSY TEHRAN 152-" RUHQHQA/CINCPAC BT CON F IDE N T I A L SECTION 1 Of 2 KABUL 3557 CINCPAC, ALSO FOR POLAD E.O GDS 5-7,,85 <TAYLOR, JAPJES E.) DRooP TAGSa PEPR, PINR, PGOV,"PINT, SHUPI, AF, PK, UR, IR SUBJEcr. THE -BIG LIE- BECOMES STANDARD KHALQI TOOL REf. (A) KABUL (B) KABUL (C.. ENt IRE TEXT.) 2. SlI'IflIARYI SEVERAL NEV POLIT ICAL WiiINKLES WERE PART OF A DE LUGE OF ANNIVERSARY SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES GIVEN OVER THE LAST DAYS BY PRESIDENT NOOR PJOHAflPlAD TARAKI AND PRIPIE PlINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. INCLUDING ANOTHER HINT THAT SOPIE FRICtION BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS PlAY 6E A REALITY. FLAt DENIALS that ANY ARPlY MUTINY HAD OCCURRED IN JALALABAD. OR that THE REGIPIE TOfiTURES ITS POLItICAL PRISONERS, INDICATE THAT THE -61G LIE- PlAY HAVE BECOME THE REGIPlE'S PREFERRED PUBLIC TACTIC FOR DEAL- ING WITH THORNY ISSUES. ALLEGED INTERFERENCE BY IRAN, PAKIStAN, AND -IPIPERIALISM- REMAINED the GOVERNPlENt S PAIPIARY EXCUSE FOR CONTINUED DOMESTIC OPPOSITION, WHILE thinly-veiled BARBS WERE LAUNCHED AT -BROTHERLY- COUNTRIES (SPECIFICALLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA) WHO PlAY CONSIDER PROVIDING REfUGE TO THE EXILED PARCHAIIIIST LEADERS, END OF' S\J'IMARY... 87

30 3. TARAKI-~~IN RELATIONS: DESPITE A~IN'S necent EFFUSIVE DESCRIPT ION OF TAnAKI AS -THE MOST GLORIOUS PEflSONALITY IN AFGHAN HISTORY" (WnICH ELIMINATES &UCH NOTA6LES AS DARIUS, AlEXANOER TKE BKEAT, GENGHIS KHAN, TAMERLANE, AHMAD SHAH DURKANI, LAVY SALES, AND flash~an), HINTS CONTINUE TO SURFACE THAT DIFFERENCES Ok floiicllon between 'IHi: TWO LEADERS MAY XIST. IN ONE NEWS CONF Ri:NC hespo~se REGAkuING AMIN'S RE-..;EHT CONDE~NAIION OF ANY CULT OF PEr~SONALITY SURROUNDING TAnAKI (REF A), TH~ Gn~AT LEADER HIMSELF MODESTLY REPLIED THAT THE AFGHAN P=.OPLE -LOV AND RESPECT l'ie".so!''luch THAT THEY INSIST ON PliTT ING UP PHuTOGkAPHS EVEGVl.iHERE, HE ADDED THAT THE GOV RN~eNr HAS ISSUED IN~TRUCTIONS TO CEA~E THIS PRACTICE, out THE ~EGI~t.ILL NOT USE FORC~ TO PREVENT THE PEOPLE FROM EXHI5ITING THEIn AFFECTIOI~. (Corr,rIlENT: A LARGE NUflIBER OF TARAKI PHOTOGRAPHS HAVE DISAPPEARED riecently.) AT THE SAME CONFERENCE, TAnAKI CATEGORICALLY DENIED ThAT AMIN HAD EVER SAID, OR EVEN INTIMATED, THAT CEnTAIN UNKNOWN ENEMIES ARE ATTEMPTING TO'wiNFlUENCE" IHE AFGHAN PnESIDENT (f.ef B). TARAKI PETULANTLY B1SISTED THAT Ai'lIN HAD ::>AID "NOTHING OF THE SORT, W AND THAT HE KNEW THIS WAS T~UE D~CAUSE HE HAD "fiead ALL OF AMIN'S INTER VIEWS aveii THE PAST YEAn." 4. HU~AN nlght~: ~DLIQUELY COUNTERING WIDESPnEAD REPORTS, CONFIRMED OY EYE~I1NE~SE& AND VICtIMS, THAT THIS REGIME PHY SICALLY P1ISTI\EATS MNY OF THE NUflIEROUS PIHSOHERS IN ITS. CUSTODY (UQ.UDING LARGE-SCALE NIGHTTIME EXECUTIONS OF POLI TI~AL PIUSONE:RS, SANS TidAL, AHD THE APPlICATION OF ELECTRICAl SHOCKS TO CERTAIN PARTS OF THE BODY), A11H1 CLAIMED THAT WE HAVE Nor UNDER~INED HUMAN DIGNITY. even WHEN ilealing WITH THOSE HATCHING INTRIGUES AGAINST OUR PE.OPLE AND THE COUNTRY, AND AIiDED THAt "WE HAVE NOT ACTED 4GAIN5T ANYONE USING MEANS" CON TRARY TO RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY". TARAKI INSISTED THAT ONLY "oetween 1,000- AND 100 POLITICAL PRI~ONERS ARE INTERNED.. (COl'lI'iEHT: W:: THINK THAT THE FIGURE 15 ACTUALLY WELL OVER TEN THOU&AND.) '. DOMESTIC SECURItYI alame.for INTERNAL ~ECURITY PROBLEflIS CONT INUED to 8E LAID At THE DOORSTEP OF F"OREIGN I NrILTRATORS,.'. ESPECIALLY.. ~OLD IERSoU.AFGHAN DRESS FROM PAXIST AN AND IRAN. taraki INDI~ECTLY ADMItTED THAT FIGHTING IS UNDERWAY IN NORTH WEST AFGHANISTAN.WHeN HE INSISTED THAT VIOLENCE AROUND MAIMANA (A TURKrtAN REGION NEAR THE ~OVIET border) 1~ THE WORK OF "IRANIAN INFILTRATORS" WHO ESCAPEu FOLLOWING THE UPHEAVAl IN HErtAT. TAHAKI ALSO ASSERTED THAT "l~tereference ay IRAN AND PAKISTAN HAS COMPELLED THt: REGIME TO itetain THE OVERNIGHT CURFEW IN KAEll. MOnE THAN ONE YEAn AFTER THE FcEVOLUTION. TARAKI BENT THE FAC!~ 5UkROUNDING A COUPLE OF POINt;; WHEN HE CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT "ANYTHING," ~UCH LESS ANY ARMY MUTINY, HAS HAPPENED I~ JALALABAD RECENTLY, AND INSISTED T~AT NO ONE (SPECIFICALLY SHl'l~S) HAS SEEN AkRESTED b~caust: 01' TH~Ifi RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. El t3557 8&

31 NNNNVV ESA825MJC9~5 PP RUCIrIHR. DE RUSBLK 13551/ ZNY CCCCC ZZH P R f1j803<6'z PlAY 79 flii AMEl'IBASSY KABLL 8MlT 19 U7 Z9 : TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY 3715 INfO RU~GU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3601 RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 513 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 87l~ RUQMRA/AroEMBASSY JIDDA 279 RUDTC/AME~BASSY LONDON 15S~ huehmo/amembassy MOSCOW 1593 RUSBAE/AroEMBASSY NEW DELHI 678~ RUFNPS/A~El'IBASSY PARIS 3018 RUQMHR/NIEMBASSY TEHRAN 153 RUHQHQA/CI NC~AC BT CON FLO E N T 1 A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KAbUL 3557 CINCPAC ALSO'FOR POlAD 6. GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION:!ARAKI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BUILDING OF' A SOCIALIST SOCIETY IS A LONG-TERM TASK, LUT HE CLAIMED THAT the "FOUNDATION" OF A SOCIALIST SOCIETY WILL BE LAID IN "SIX TO TE~ YEARS." AS FOR THE NATUitE OF THE REGIME, JARAKI REMARKED that "DEMOCRACY MEANS THAT MlASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN for THE BENEfIT Of THE MAJORITY," ANu AD~ED THAT "WE CAN CALL THE DRA A DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP because IT IS IN favor OF' 98 PERCENT OF THE PEOPlE." 7. RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN: "~EGIONAL REACTIONARY POWERS" (READ' IRAN AND PAKI st AN) WITH THE SUPPORT OF "11'1 PERIALISM- (READ US AND UK> CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT "ARMED AGGRESS ION" AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, ACCOnDING 10 THE AFGHAN LEADERS, AND HAVE "MARTYRED. A LARGE HUMBEfi OF PEOPLE" INCLUDING WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY. JARAKI CLlAr'iED THAT ~INCE APRIL 8, 1979, "PAKISTANI SOLDIERS HAVE COMMITTED ELEVEN INFRINGEMENTS ONTO AFGHAN TERRllORY"'. TARAKI INSl~TED THAT ALL FURTHER EN CROACHEMENTS WOULD BE REPULSED DY THE AkMED FORCES OF AFGHAN ISTAN, wsupported BY AFGHANISIAN ~ INTikNATIONAL FnIENDS." TARAKI ADDED THAT WE.DO NOT CON5IDER ZIA-UL-HAQ AS OUk ENEMY, BUY MAYBE SOONER OR LATEh Ht: IlIILL STOP SENDING INF'ILTRATORS INTO THIS COUNTRY." 09

32 8. RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: TARAKI INSISTED THAT THERE ARE ONLY BET~EEN 1.0e0 AND l.lae SOVIET ADVISERS HERE. AND, OF THESE. ADOUT ~~z ARE SERVING WITH THE AFGHAN ~ILITARY. (COMMENTI WE BELIEVE THAT THEnE ARE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 SOVIET MILlTARYA::lVISER:i HfRE -- AND AROUND 2,50" CIVILIAN ADVISERS.) HE SUGGESTEiI. THAT FufiElGN COnnESPONDENTS COMPARE THAT FlGUftE 'liith THE ~ltuatlons IN IRAN, PAKISTAN. AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE "SIXTY TO SEVc.NTY THOUSAND AMEi(ICAN- AND OTHER ADVISERS ARE PkESENT. fiegarding MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THE USSR, TAnAKI CLAIMED THAT ".HATEVE~ WE NEED AND CAN MANAGE. WE GET." ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, TARAKS IN~ISTED THAT "BRO THERLY RELATIONS between AFGHANISTAN AND CIECHOSLOVAKIA INDI CATE THAt CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOUlD "NEVER GIVE SHELTER" TO FORfliER ~BASSADOR BABRAK KAR~AL. HIS EXILED PARCHAMIST COLLEAGUES, OR OTH R ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUf 10M. 9. PARTY HELATI0NS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT: ACCORDING TO TARAKI, THE PEOPLE S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANI~TAH (PDPA) HAS HAD -HISTORICAL SOLIDARITY WITH THREE MAIN ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENTS." THE "GLOBAL FRONT FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS;" THE -INTERNATIONAL ~ORKIHG CLASS ~OVEMENT;" AND, THE "NATIONAL AND SOCIAL LIBERATION MOVE~~NTS ALL OVER THE WORLD." Ie. CONCLUSIONS' AbIDE FROM THESE NEW FOn~ULATIONS, THE GREAT DELUGE OF HIGH-LEVEL VERBIAGE SURROUNDING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION COVERED OLD GROUND. PUDLIC DENIALS BY THE LEADERSHIP THAT EVENTS KNOWN TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE <E.G., THE JALALABAD MUTINY, TORTURE OF PRISONERS, ETC.) HAVE EVER OCCURRED APPEAR TO HAVE BECOME THE ACCEPTED -&IG LIE" TACTIC, THEREBY FURTHER UNDERCUTTING WHATEVER DOMESTIC CREDIBILITY THE REGI~E MAY HAVE POSSESSED. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS CONNEctluN IS TARAKl S DISINGENUOUS DENIAL THAT AMIN ~VER MENTIONED THAT -PEOPLE" WERE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE GREAT" LEADER. A REFERENCE BY THE ~IME MINISTER WHICH IS PART OF THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD IN THE GOVERNIlIENT-CONTROlLED PRESS. TARAKI S BARBS DIRECTED AT ~AGUE COULD ALSO HVE BEEN AIMED AT OTHER -BROTHERLY- COUNTRIES (E.G., YUGOSLAVIA, OR EVEN THE USSR) WHO MAY NOW OR AT SOME POINT PROVIDE A SAFE HAVEN FOR THE EXILED PARCHAMIsr LEADERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SEEMS THAT THE LONGER THE KHALQI REGIME REMAINS UNA6LE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS OWN DOMESTIC SECURITY, THE MOHE CONCERNED THE KHALQI LEADER SHIP MAY BECOME THAT ITS "INTERNATIONAL FRIENDS" MAY BEGIN CASTING ABOUT FOR ALTERNATE LEnIST LEADERSHIP TO SUPPORT. AMSTUTZ BT

33 NNNNKGfllJ VV ESA94~BRA412 RR RUQIllHR DE RUEHPJO ' ZNY CCCCC ZZ H R.8172~Z "AY 19 1M AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHOC 5932 INFO RUMJPGlANEMBASSY BEIJING 196e RUSBQD/AMEflIBASSY ISLAMABAD 1955 RUSBLKlAPI IllBASSY KABUL e~98 RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 57~4 RUSBA /AfIll lllbassy NEW D 1.HI 1433 RU'I'lHRI AfII IllBASSY TEHRAN 1137,-- at COli F 1 DEN T 1 A L "OSCOW NOFORII E.O RDS-l 5/8199 (TOON, "ALCOLM) OR-M TAGSI PX, AF. PEPR. MOPS, PBaR. UR SUBJEct I (C) PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT DISCUSSES SOVIET-PAK RELATIONS, AFGHANISTAN I. (C-EItIRE TEXT) 2. A PAKIstAN Dlfl.OMAT (PROTECT) HAD THE FOLLOWlllG TO SAY ABOUT SOVIET-PAK RELAT IONS AND THE SITUATION IN AfGKAllSTAIl DURING PlAY 7 CONVERSATION WITH EfllBOFF. 3. ON SOVIET-PAK RELATIONS, HE COMMENTED THATI -- AMBASSADOR KHAN RECENTLY DELIVERED A LETTER FROM GENERAL ZIA TO PREMIER KOSYGIN. FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF THE MESSAGE. KHAN USED THE I'IEETING TO STRESS THAT ISLAMABAD WANtS TO HAVE UNION AND AFGHANISlAN. GOOD RELATIONS WUH THE SOVIET IT DOES NOT WANt THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN AND DID NOT INVITE THEM. PAKISTAN WOlA.D; BE.PLEASED IF THE REFUGEES RETURNi::D HOME. TKE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANlcTAN CAN DO WHAT THEY WANT INSIDE AFGHANISTAN TO KEEP THE :FUGEES FROI'l ENTERING PAKISTAN, TO THE EXTENt OF SULLO!... A WALL IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER, TKE IITERNAL SITUATION l~ AFGHANISTAN AND NOT PAKISTAN SHOlLD BE BLAl-jED FOR THE EXODUS. PAKISTAN HAS THE HlJIlANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT FOOD AND OTHER ESSE Nt IAtS GET TO THE REFUGEES. - KOSYGIN'S RESPONSE WAS -MODERATE-. HE HOTED THAT THE AFGHAN VERSION DIFFERED FROM AMBASSADOR KHAN.- PRESENTA- TION. IT WOULD ae GOOD IF THE REASONS FOR rh~se AFGHAN APPREHENSIONS WERE REMOVED. HE SAID

34 ,.,; I! ' -- IKE sovm AftBASSADOR II ISLAJtABAD WAS "ORE DlREcr. Iii RESPONSE TO PAKIstANI DlSAVQllfQ.S Qf 410lP.8 -ACI-DU Act IVlt IES DlANAt ING FROIt THE REFUGEE CAflPS.-.c""STAtm ELUIltLY that THE 'AKIST All GOVERIIM lit IS PROVIIUIG... to the RE~S.JR TIRED PAIISTAIII MILITARY ' RSO.IEL All traillia ~rogeesfor MILItARY ACTIVity AGAIiIt till DRA, AND OFFJCIAL- PAIISTAIII PROPAGAIIDA IS CRItIC4 or, WHILE RE1,JJct Alt TO DRAW AllY DEFllnIVE CQlQ.USlOU if "t_ OJ 'AXISfAIIl-.UJ&ASSY III MOSCOW BELIEVES that ItOSCOW IS- ILL".0, INtEJt STED IN PURSUING GOOD RELATIOIIS WITH' ISLAMABAD AID fiiay EVEI BE RESTRAIIIlla KABII.,FROfi floviiig ~lvely to STIR up. BORDER PROBLE"S WlfH PAKlstAI. AT the SAfIE t IIIE. the MBASSY IS APPREHENSIVE THAt this APPAREIr SOVIET POS11101 COlLD CHANGE, D 'EIIDIIiG 011 the SlTUAtlON II AFGHAIlSlAI. -- OTHERWISE, 81LATEBAL RELATIOIIS ARE DEVELOPI.G VELL. EGDI IAT lolls ARE UIIDER.IAY FOR SHIPPIIiG AID COISlI.AR AGREEMENt 5." COOPER AT 1011 all the SOVIET-ASSISTED STEEL MILl. IS PROCEEDING WELL. All EDUCATIOIT AGREEltEIIt Wl1.L BE SIG.ED At THE 'END OF THE MAY OR THE BEGINlllHG OF JUliE AFGHAIiISTAI, PAXISTAITI SOURCE STATED that. -- PAXISIAII1 lli'elligence HAS OBTAINED IIIFOR",TIOIL FROfI LOWER LEVEL AFGHAN BUR, UCRATS that SEIIlOR ORA OFFICIALS HAVE struck "ORE OF A,..~FIDEtn' ATTItUDE FQLLOVlJlG THE VISIT TO KABUL BY GENeRAL YEPISHEV. DETAILS OF THE VISIt. HOWEVER, ARE HARD TO COME BY~ YEPISt(EV filet OILY WITH TWO OR THREE TOP OFFICIALS IN TKE GOVERlLftENT. TKE RESULts OF THESE "E TIIiGS ARE BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD. - IT IS.U..lKELY that THE HELICOPTERS US~:O TO HE1.P SUPPRESS THE JALAKABAD MUT lny WERE n.owi by AF'GKAITS. SliCE they HAD OILY RECENTLY ARRIVED IN KABU1.. THEY VERI PROBABLY P!LorEn c BY SOVIETS. BY '1~5~ TOOl - \,":",'. ~...\.I t.. I In', "; ~ \" "': "r ':":-' ' " 'l".!;:' I ~- '. n,:" f' -:-, "':..:" It':.".... ~ :':;?-: r B~'~\" T'.',;;', i:, ~('. l: 'r'-;". :': : I,: () ': I ~ -, ) r ~. it." "., '"... ',1.''-,..,'\ ",~':.: c"~:r"'::':j-'~~( \\ \; y

35 VV ESA90~JC24e RR RUQf!lHR DE RUSBQD ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 14l1J231Z I'IAY 79 F1'I AI'IEM6ASSY I SLAMAtlAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WAS)G)C 2951 INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE RUNJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 496 RUQ1"IRA/AI'IEMBASSY JIDDA 728 RUSB1.KlAMDtBASSY KABUL 9201 RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 7943 ZENIAMCONSUL LAHORE POUCH Rtm'C/AMEMBASSY london 3966 RUEtoI01AI'IEMBASSY MOSCOW RUSBAE/AMDtBASSY NEW DELHI 787 "ZENIAMCONSUL PESHAWAR RUQMHR/AMEBASSY TEHRAN 52e7 RUFHRO/Al'lEMBASSY ROME 609 sr S [ C R [ T ISLAI'IABAD E. O s 60S 12/5/85 (SHERMAN, RICJO OR- P TAGSs PEPR, PBOR, PK, AF SWEcr: (C) GAIlANI REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS PROGRESS IN UNIFYING AFGHAN DISSIDENT GROUPS REFs ISLAMABAD 47S0 1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT 2. SlJ1lIMARY: HUMAYUN lisen. AFGHAN ATTORNEY FROM PARIS WHO ACCOMPANIED SYED AHMED GAILANI TO [MBASSY ON APRIL 23 (REITEL) t CALLED ON E!"lBOFF MAY 13 WITH UP-DATE ON PROGRESS IN FORGING UN.ITY AMONG PESHAWAR-BASED GROUPS. ASEFl ALSO ADVISED OF SUCCESSES IN FIGHTING BETWEEN DISSIDENT FORCES AND DRA TROOPS. HE LEIT WITH US PARTS HE ALLEGED WERE TAKEN FROM M16-21 AIRCRAFT DOWNED ElY DISSIDENT FORCES IN,LATE APRIL. EN[)/SUMMARY.... g... ọ.. -o ~... r:: A.. :3 c. Ė "Ci ọ. or. f-' c.i > o c=: < > f-' 2 ::> u COl <II...J < % o i= <z.. -= I

36 r I 3. ASEFl, WHO HAS BEEN TRAVELING i"hroughout PAKISTAN SINCE ftlevious VISIT TO EMBASSY IN ATTn TO ESTABLISH UNITY or DISSIDENT tiovemehi', SAYS -MEANINGFUL ASSOCIATION"' or THREE GROUPS (ANLF, GAI1.ANI GROUP, AND "IAN GlL JAN GROUP) IS NOV 98 PERCEHI' ASSURED AND SHOULD 'BE ANNOUNCED BY NAY 18. THE AGR IIENT WILL BE SIGNED 5Y LEADERS or THREE ORGANIZATIONS IN PESHAWAR AND WILL BE ANNOUNCED TO PRESS -THROUGHOUT THE WORLD-, ASEFl SAYS. THE ASSOCIATION VIU INa-WE COMANO COORDINATION IN FlELD_ OPERAT-IONS AND COOPERATION AT TOP LEVELS IN PESHAWAR. 4. AS FI HAS ALSO ARRANGED FOR EXPATRIATE AFGHAN BUSINESS MEN TO SPONSOR A RADIO STATION WHICH WILL BE PURCHASED IN EUROPE AND SET UP IN talihisfan UNDER DIREcnON or UNIFIED tmoups COMMITTEE. ASEFI REPORTEDLY TOLD HIS COUSIN GO~ FONSEC SHAHMAVAZ, OF HIS INTENTIONS AND ASKED PERMISSION TO IRJIORT RADIO EQulfltENT. ASEFI DID NOT REPORT FONSEC APPROVAL. RATHER, SHAHNAVAZ -DID NOT TELL ME TO srop THE ftlocess, ASIFI SAID. 5. ASEFI SAYS IlAJCII TRIBAL GROUPS OF AFGHANisr AN HAVE RECENrt. Y BECOMI IlORE ACTIVE IN SUPPORTING REBEL ACTIVITIES. VAZIRS HAVE ACTIVELY JOING FIGHI' AS OF flay 11 AND IlENGALS, TAJUS, UZBEXS, AND AFRIDIS HAVE ALL AGREED IN PIUNCIPLE TO Do SO BUT LACK ORGANIZATION TO COORDINATE THEIR PEOPLE S EFFORTS. ANOTHER FACTOR CAUSING SOlIE HESITATION ON PART OF. THOSE ETHNICITRIBAL GROUPS IS LACK or ANY LEADER OF -NATIONAL- stature VITH VHOM THEY CAN IDENTI". ASEFI HAS LETTER ALLEGEDLY SIGNED BY N.1. THESE GROUPS ADDRES&m TO KING ZAKER SIfAH APPEALI fig FOR HIS RETURN, OR THAT OF ABDUL VALl, TO REPR SENT BALL YING POINI' FOR DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES. LETTER IlAKES a.ear TO KING, ACCORDING TO ASIFI, THAT RE-ESTABLlSHIlENT OF "ONARCHY NOT, RPI' NOT, INTENT OF THE GRQUPS. ROYAL PERSONAGE VOULD BE FIGUREHEAD R.!!!!!R THAN RULING MONARCH......, o ọ.. ọ.. ~ 0; en.. ::: cii ::: ọ.,...!. ọ.. Ė 0;..c E-< r.i > t3 c:: < > E-< 2 ;:l u c.j en...:l < Z o i= < ẓ..z E 2 w.

37 ~. ASEFI SAID HE HAS ASKED FONSEC SHAKNAWAZ ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF UlCER SIfAH S OR ABDUL VALI S BEING PERIIITTED TO ESTABLISH A BASE III PAKl5tAN. SHAHNAVAZ RESPON WAS - f'erkaps A LmLE LATER, BUI' Nor NOW.- SHAHNWAZ ALLEGEDLY TOLD ASEFI THAT SOVIETS IfAVE MADE DDlARCH AT IIFA OPPOSING 8OP S PERIIITTING AFGHAN ROYAL FAfllLY TO TAICE UP RESIDENCE HERE. 1. ASEFI SAYS GROUPS 111 PESHAWAR TEfl) TO DOUBT SOVIETS ValLO. IN AMY CIRCUIlSTANCES, OCCUPY AFGHANISTAN to SAVE IHALQI 80VERNIlENJ'. 1 SAYS FIRST KOVE AnD! UNInlMG 1lAJ0R GROUPS VXU BE TO CONtAct' SOVIETS ON SOlIE NETIRAL -TUR"" AND ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP BASED ON REALITIES OF THE SITUATION I.I. that NO RIGI THE SOVIET UNION. THESE lni'en1'ions CANNOT A T1fIE, ASEFI COMrINDS, OR THE SUPER-RELIGIOUS WOULD IIISUNDERSTAND AND UNITY WOULD BE. IflPOSSIBLE..s..PLRPORTEDLY REFLECUIIG VIEVS or SYED AHKED GAILANI AND OTHER LEADERS IN PESHAWAR AREA, ASEFI VARNED E"BOrr THAT Melt ZIA NASSERY IS IROB~Y A DOUBLE AGENT.- ASEFI a.aiu XU HA$my 1ft VIIlLHUI' In, ab: MIii:-AT UN LASt YEAR SHORTLY THEREAftER VISITED KABtn.. HE THEN- APPEARED IN PESHAWAR AND ALLIED HIKSELF WITH GAILANI AFTER BEING REPULSED ANl.F LEADER, IIOJEDEDI. GAILANI NOV REGRETS BEFRIENDING ZIA NASSERY AND WANI'S IT UNDER srood THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEENHIM AND THE A1'IERICAN, ACCORDING TO ASEn. 9. ASEFI REPORTED THAT DISSIDENT FORCES HAVE: NOT SHOT DOWN THREE DRA lug AIRCRAFT. THE FIRST AT VOlA IN THE ZADRAN AREA or PAKflA ON APR I XL 25; THE SECOND NEAR PACHAl OGAN (SIC) VILLAGE PAKfIAI AND THE LATEST, ON PlAY 9 NEAR XHOWSf IN PAKfIA. HE DID NOT SPECIFY HOW AIR CiA" HAD BEEN SriOl DOWN Bur LEFT 'lith EI'lBOFF--ON LOAN-- SEVERAL REMNANTS OF' THE AIRCRAFT, INQ.UDING FIVE IIARKINGS PLATES TORN orr THE FIRST "IG, AS WELL AS PHOTOS OF THE AIRCRAFT. COPIES BEING POUCHED TO LONG TEIG C/o IHR/RNA/SOA FOR INTERESTED WASHINGTON CONSUNERS. CONSTAB1..E m 5531 o to- to M o ~ o Q c Ṣ. c :c.. c:: ~..: ~.; Ul.. ; Ul ::c o M...

38

39 !tef"t IJV i~," ~7~B~ AtTl ~? FU(:",~ ~ ~l':hli:o ':Hlle~/:'l1 1441~P zn ~~~~s 1l!l, P. 2" 12~,Z fl'u '79 ~ A~E~BA5~Y r.nscov T('I fil'eiic/~c5tate v_shde?fliorlty 66G 1';'0 9 '!!"'IQU/AI'lt:!'f:)ASSY ANKAR" ~7" VU[JI"n/~INT B_~HDAD ')~~5 Rur.Jr'"'AJfEP'lBASSY leij I N'; IS7. R','F'-'r;!./AfC["B"~!;" eonn " I Ii f\l':'ij~i'!/a"'e"'eas~y COLO~EO """'9 it ','Il!JD l(/a~ei"!a~sy DAcrA "'3'? I ~1' ~M/A!','tMP.P;Sr,y DAr-',sces 1216 RUH:WA/rncrt.c ~~:tmlulu HI '"?1!:~9OD' Al':Er:R_ S~'i I :-t~!'!aead "~l 1I!.!...!"'RA/AIll! M6A ::Y JJ&DA.""3! PU::s\. KI AIt' U'l : AS!='Y J(Hl~ """ R~JHTIA MIASSY!tATHI"ANDlI PUrHLr./A:v.CC)'!'iSl'l. Ll:'nNGR~ '619, P!DTC/AI"E.~'aASr.;y LtHDOff!.U4 P.USBAE/A(lIE"BASSY NF.~ DElHI.44'! ~U'NPS/A"'EP!aA$SYrAP J$.. 74~1. IrU~uo!'![~eASSY PO"'!': S"4P RUOti\!R 1t."'lC"'!ASSY TE~ ~ N "U!:':KO/A~tJl:aAr.!y TOKYO ~'77 Rt1,HJA/U::i';!!'SION t!'6~li~' 471" RurH"AI~I"iJSSI0N US::UO 69t1i6"..~tibT/~I!'Ir:!S~IOfl rs:'j'; H~'" YORK 7e33 ~..,...,'.'. ~ -: t.. r R :; T, 5ECTI~J. I 'I Of :"5!r.oscn\l I.H~S~.... '., POL.~. ROUTl VT ~ J5 AS () \1 ]1. VIS..,- cp1 /'"'V' 117 I ' :" I MM. NC. SEC. ' r.o. 1~:'!~I.,RDS-3 "~l/9~' (TOON; Ji!~lCOll"" OR-"I. TAG~ I. Af... III,' ""r,ps. ~,FP... PINT '.' ' ~uejr.crj ecl ~FOHANISTjNI ~~C1S F~P ~6VI[T!1TntvE'rr Ie:, N (A) KA~~t..:,61.6, e8>... OSCUlo t=~~4 I I. (Cl SU I'; AP. Y. ~'[ D('I i::ll TH I ~!I( nut Ttl~ SOVI n c l:i O~: I :;tmef! PPlist:lT ri~ CIIl":~l ANC:~ v F~'~ IT~ ('PTJOJiS I '. ~f3ha:~is- TA': las O?n-r~DFD. ItO C'l~ OPFI:l~, ~r~~lo~i!; "'!!H TME., CP.!U'VIF.l HlV A~ I ON OF ClF(""0:-1. \"V.Q '!I r AR f. raul TY. V:. THI"~ TM.!"OVT~S WILL C(I~T!W~ TO I'ICR:Ia~t: THU!t ADVISORY AID LC" FTJrAL ~ILIHRY ~ltppr.rt fop. T~:" pqo-soviet ICAaUL "rr.yo't;. 5OJlI SOVIET PEPSl"H/:1....,'\'1' F.::ro""r I N!':OLVED IN IRA --:!l'lapy OPfRATlONfl. tl'it!.'r rr'ii~~;-':arle l""i~cl.t:"l~tances, ""'C\J R, l":oscow WIll PFr.UI:l~ l'\~nd" fi-ir.ulc!=:ring A S~8STU ~ SjR.: OJ.;3I!1.. Nt.;.-.Jd t~~liu' CQ.~A'" ~~ Iti..'M ~ru...! ~H ". -trc {SL't'f:tl!AR Y. -

40 nopl T:HF.' I'lOSCCW FEPEFLCT IV, t A~:> rspfri ~LL Y ItJ TNt UP.ltG' lico!fti'!s. A ~(jvift I~-nqt~ "F' H'r;H:,:~ISTAN "'CULD.!ABt Y PEDCU Ii) TO.1 H~ j) IS"[",rII"! I'c, f. OF ':" :18111 STRAT[G J e "R:STS. IT 'ig!t.d Or-tot I ~~..,,~r.::- J:l r._ If' D":TI=;HTE with,,:[st AT A nr:r VHS:N.1':(\,="[:. I~ I!I!I'1I~.r.r.!~alY pp.f-oecupjld V!H. GYi 1IiI!;C CtfINE~C: B~,-I\T I:' T!f!:': D~T. SUCH A P10V!.t:r. Alr,t'ST C~UINl.Y D('I{ ~, (,/.I.T. IT 'Jl'UlD PROVIDE EXeEltIT (A!C). ~s U TKE CJlSZ Of ('Z?r\lr:~CV'-Klf\t LONr,-YC:RPI, I~ f'ofi CWAR~ S!Y THE O'I~I~::~ t~:{j OTlFI)~ (If snviet ('X- N~ I' 'IT$!, "iegf.!":ohlst c.::;jhli'jo::~ p' T"';" ~mfld. IT.'Ol'LD ;l'p e a III IO:lS,-':Tl" THE I:"'f-(,RTf-~n "'~'~l J:o' ~&'!nd. r) I:~ 1~;6~ 1HE covitto:: CAlCt'LAT:'D C,'RIECT!..Y 1;;rT THF %:,: :~~ \Yr'1.-!) ~~nt nl]~t. T HI S W(JIIlD ~f't,. Ar p ot. I', THE ell SE ~, ti='t;;';a'j!staf4. F'URT~ER. THF. SOVrl:J (lejr,rtiv: n CZFCHOa.,C"A'U lias EASILY Hcr n'lisrled ~Y f.('r~ P'lT:r Jl\'O P~CJF'YI" T'(E :"c;3an CENTERS. f"o!'cow S H~--: '''Ot!.D ;-:- ':o~r DHFlCl'LT TN Hr-H.'~!YSTAN WHERE THe: GRrAY PrL!( Of ih": POP.tlHION--AND Tlo{r R(3ISTUCE--ARE LOCf;!~ 1:; R!~IIl '~~A::-. IT IS EV~'f ft'\' :iiblf THAT T!'t( JNS~!Rr:r.NCY JIJ lofcha:;r!"tj'; \,.:~i:'1..d R~CI::IVr.: AnDFD Il'iPETUS BY 117

41 " \,IV FS.'1"7~~~~ f.1~ 1 J.r~- ~l= P 1I : '...~.,... I!H: ;; 'JEH"''' ~~c::v:~! 14~ 1~?7 Z 11'1 ~C'f:~S "UM p 1.,4 12' ~z :r AY 7' ~ A E70R~~S"Y ~'nfr()'"" 10 F.l'EMC/~H f.!.ate :,'~~!-I':.:!:,': rty S62? UfO ~IH'I~~t:/Arotf:"'PA:SY '.. ':":' "~'75 Rl!E'fP.)/!!Sr:'! I?A:':HD.r '. "hi - rn"jpr./~!"e"'ea!'sy 1:F.!JJj;~!~..." RUF'.;nt./~~E:"l:~SSY 150U 1 1f 17 -P~'!"!J~IVAr:Er.aASSY COLC'rec. 1'6~ Rt""JD ~/A~E~!ASSY DACCA '5~: RUE~D~nfll r.8~~sy D"~I'!'C~'c;' J.'71 RUtt'H,:,.vCt~!CPAC HOlMlltl.' "I -"tj~cld/a"fjf'~ /tsf!y %rl.al'!a::,\li ft~~ra/_~!~~assy JIDDA I~~S ;,',!. ~fh~sbl J(/A~E"'~II~~Y 'XADl'l "'7 :di,wj"'t Ir.~ "'S~!;SYKIlTM!"ANDI! l:~l~ ::auf'l.git.:"cmlslil U:MN~,R~ ~F"C -JUJ)TCI...r.!:I'l!81l.SSY LC III OY..a.'=, RDS8.~/A~EY~~5SY :f.~ D!l~r 1~41 i'rt:f:.ft'/il!"p~i!assy far I!;,..1UB. RUf'lRllJAr:E. iil\t:~y Ir~~! 90"9 ~Ruar~/AM~~f.SYTEHRAN C~~,. 'RUt~n/A~~~~~UXTO~~7P,~,RUF'!JA/u.c;"nSIf'N.USBERLJN "'71~ P.t1.'H:tA",vcr.I~~10N.tOSHATO tsf-:1, ~UEJC)T IUSP!lC'~I{\~ CSt: Iii NEW YUR If. 'tt~..!t,. ".'. ~ 't.~::i,~r.:cnoil."? 0'1, "!)~P!~OV l.'?~~.tmf DIP.!LCT C~lnTIlIFNf ~F ~ovm 1(O;;'P't-. to' 0 JUtV!V~~n,i'Y:OF' TNt:!':'j<~l!'l-A!'iI'! R:r.~ -,":i!l~ 1, :SJNB!.Y DEktl)[ffT ~~ Tl;f r~.t!nijli ': ~'''';'."!" p; \~, SU~H TRfl(,~. - T'j ;- j '~irn r: l<. C'C;";o to T

42

43 . " ((") IT J':\"" COURSE toiot POSSI91.r.~~ \Or.UlD"f.F. FP,"t.ISr 'f'll US yr. R!JL I I)UT COr:ftnflY THE POSSIF.ttJTY OF A ~. Vt::: tivi. ~!I)" OF H't;L;nJlSH ~ tn RESPOll5=i:!O ~l ttpp:- ~l. 'C'Rnr. i' -El.E"GUrRED ~_LOI 1tE~IMt. "'''ItF.' 'It ErLUVi T~H YHe:" D!S!NC;:NTI\1::,~ IN T8IP!! OF f.osco,* ::o r~lcutanotl nj\ ITS nest "l8te!'e5ts "T THI!!; 1'Iro ~PFE~~ tl:::avil Y TO OUTwt:'IGH THE: UCr"ftTIVES t the ract~r~ ~DVANCE'!) ily I(ASUL U1 PARA II Rl:~F' t- ARE ~ILL COG hl'. IF THY POLlT IrAl-!'!ILlTAPY SlTl'A! 10r; PI "~HUI~"U ~:.;rituft'f.~ TO :>rte1!iorate, THF ~ovtet 1.r:.:.l"CP '';HI~!f.AY V RV WElL '~E T~ PT D TC COH~lD'"~ T"'~ POS~l ltlty. OF 50"[ U:!.:~ER F'''F!''' Of DIR;::CT I~:T~Vrt:TI:':J Tr ~p.ntf.rt IT:: Q\J~Ai.l INViSTr~r~T' H: rrr:hani TAN. FOR T~IS RC:AS('IN it r.til oun riltere~ TO fo"tj~t''e TO :::IV: nr.ca~i( NAL R :-:UDF.i, ' Tn THE ::QVY ET S Of THE: ~EF.ICUS VI E''': ~!: t,rf.ll'ld TAKE or A~y ~uem AtrI08~. RE~l~~~S ~o~ W:~TfP.N A~D THIRD-wORLD (i~)i Tu~t'''TS CO"!=TITUTF u THc-I':::-E1.VES Dl~;BC:-"TIVtST('l 'D JRECT PTERVF.'~7 IO'!. ".,. (r) S"-ORT OF DIR Eel. LAP'Of-SCALE SOVIFY "'ILITtRY I fjtn:i V~"l'IMJ"\'HAT JS THe LIJm.Y Nr,!!'R? nd SCOP~ I)F' sovin ~ 1L tt ~Jl Y 'ASS I 51 ~ NCE TO AFGH~!;ISTI. Nl THEAF'~KA" ~IL IT ARY' S, t.b~or~tive CAPAeIT y ~A'" '.let!.. P.E' TH:; Ot.'!. Y li:w:it ~~t\h~ AT thi! TIl'!' O~ HO" FA't THE ~Cl'JItT:; ~E witlt'jr. TO roo....:; F.!:.!.!t:'JE T ~E Nlfl'f,af.R or ~1)VI::T ~DV IS~': COt... ~ FRC':jR,~!'IV L Y }lo![,.$[,.a~ ~(l!"f' r:1l'ld BrCi)~'" UVCLVE'D I'; i"'ilit_ry OPERAU9HS. SOl'll:: ~nvjet FIR i' SlIPPORT COULD 'BE FnOVID: :O. for FXA~;J:l.E. Jt~ TlfE,01'" OF ih1.icop1er Gt'~I~HIP!'i? T ~rtjc~:'!. All :;!!PfOPT fo~ r.rotl~.' ~FE~ ~T I~~~~, OP THE ~r-ipl(\y!"'ei:t f!f!it-viet P~$O~'~~ Tv OP;-.P..ftT~ : ~OflHISTIc:~n:D :"I!.JJt.R'\ ::'t:cif-...1enl. T"J~ ~C''lt ~ll ~f IN Tllr' rq~jot=r.r, HO'iE'Vnl, (,F,lI;~!':Jlt\. A'I) ~t)t!=~\1!t.t TP '~F~ ~lli~!.rt.d>:? Jim THE COr-fAT ~~'RD~H If: ~. SITUATJMJ "'J!ERF. TN=- Dr",,, (O!.;.: rjlpt- :ILlTIFS TO SURV:V;: /If';C '~ra'd US r.n''t~'l' --~~ 'CT ~':-,r;r:g':!': DIp' ::t"t INTtJ~'Ji.t:!li; -- '. ttyll at TH::: CHI FF J:trlr~ p:r. ;"i~ rlf TH?" DfSTJ ~y OF nc H'(:I;r:'. "!!T. 'S"f!~ :, 120 /.,I

44 ḅ ~ r. ':P". ~"';':-I'A~P6.~P :. i!:.w ~ OF fi~h''::; ~a3/03 l~,tl! ~.~ lny S~S!:~ 'ZZP. ' p p.~ H!S"n ~'!, 'f 19 F:or. Af':El'9BASSY ~O~COW TI\ truehc/sf.estate WAS DC PRIORITY (i6~ n'!i:for1'('!"'3:jlal'lt"l~ass\'."i(iia,~7~.w l.-.t\\:.ti:,1 \).;~ 1f!J "~D/USIIiT?_":KDAD ~!,51 ~L~J?'/A~ ~B~ $Y BEIJl~~ Ji76 P Uf';f'lLO~' :JllBIoS SY eoniii 7q ~ R~'!"IJ~~n "C::":IiA~$t COLO:otBO!21e IiU:,\J1) K/A~El'IaA!SY DACCA 8.!~~ t R l,;.:::t)~/_ljiepibassy DAf'ASCUS' una RUH"'P~A/CUlcPAC HOIIOLlLU HI ~t:ss~/"~!:~8assy' IstAJl:ABAD S5 ~ P.U1;"P.AlAr.EI!B,SSY JIDD~ lui ~UStL I(/A ~E"'3A&SY KABUl ~,e! RU~J"lT IAI'![fw;8ASSY KATHIIAPC) I' a? I ~ Rf,fFHL9/AfllCONSt'- l NIN:RAD 'PLI 1' ':"TClAME1:B~S'SY LOND(\I N" RU~PA /A~E~!A~!Y HEV DtLHl 1~~2 RUFffP~/A"'Er,;,~!)y PARIS 74f'9 ~UF~$OIA'fl'lE:-.AASSYp.n~E 985. It U"M$/AM ~BAS~" TEHR AN 014', -p,:;rlfy-o/a!"!eksassy TOKYO 3"9 Rt.'FHJA/USf'!JSSIO. USBERLU 41.6 JtUF'H"A/U!f" ISS rr.~ USI.TO: ~,!. RU.t~T/USl':!SSIOIl USUH IlEw YORK 7!J5. ~T '., 'S E C R E'T SEeTIOIL 83 Of"~.s., '. "'R E'J OL l,,'y 10 N- f:oscnr l:'af.~.. I'..',.(e) F'I NAU.~' Y' at ;_R A II REF A W.f. DO.OY C-ONSIDER THAT, CONCER IQ ~OUf, T IIUSl:1P1 PtlPULAUON OF. THE savitt CEIITR'.t A'SIAI RtPUl!t11 " Ifm'P' WOl1LD BP: 'AN "IMPORIA:'IT UCEHT!VE YOfl 'T1lE sovl" ~ERJHl',TO An0PT AI JRTERVENTIONIST 'COtJtSE III A~KAlIstAIf. _LL ;.TltE JlfFORf'lATION 'IF. HAVE PZEN A~E to, GU~ ABOUT, THIS REGlOr.l I NOICATES.THAT- fl!o$ctjw ;.las.tift:,!t1'uauqlf1l 1.L DM)tJ!t cnlftrol. F'Ri~O tit VISITS Py,.r"'Assy O'''ltOS To SOVIET CEItRAL ASIA II RECER:t' "Off~}l.!{.VE..'~fi~"Dm Fl:WSIGflS OF DISCOITE!;T. THE CENTRAL ASIAN P.EPtnl.lCS HAV[!f,ADE SIOIlIFlCAIT ~OCJ At. AND tcottql'lic PROGR::~S UIm!R SOVIET RIA.E ANO [_JOY A SICUFJCAfln y,higher ST/lND/lRO OF l!vtttc THAI III IEIG'mCRIN" AR[A~ OF AF'etlA'IISTAN A~D. DU~. AND. $M(lt.lD OaCO.TENT NOflETHELESS ~URFACE IN,-"'r: ~lw.; MO~"THS. Tift SOVIETS C'~" BE COt'NTED :'\' TO ",ovr :'tlie~y,,~~ EFFEr.TIVJrlY TO CRUSH n. TonN :'1.'. '~'31s!! i.n

45 W fsa837"",,c"58 Z~.19 RR RUCllJHR DE RUSSell ne75/el 175 U15 IIY CCCCC lzh R t 41519% JUN "9 '" AIt ltbassy ISLAf1A&AD TO RUEKClSECSTATE WASHDC.1'.16 '"INFO RUSlAUAftEI'IBASSY NEU DELHI ". RUsa.UAMEH8ASSY KABlL '351 nuciihr/amembassy TEHRAN 5284 RUGNRAIAMEM8ASSY JIDDA 119 Bt CO. F 1 DE. T I A L SECfION I OF 2 ISLAltABAD 1"'" FOL TEL DATED 21 JUN 79 SENT ACTION ISLAMABAD REPEAlED FOR YOUR INFO QUOTE. ~L, 1533zC#? jj.c..t.j./ (Cf- CIJ(lo,v UFO LAHORE PESHAWAR CO. F IDE II T I A L SECf ION 1 OF 2 KARACHI h RD (BRIMS, JS) OR-P TAGSI SREF PI( AF PINT subj. (C) LAW AND ORDER IN BALUCHISTAN - TEISIO. OVER AFGHANIsrAN GROWING CONCERN AND REF. ISLAMABAD A-113, ISLAMABAD 4288 J. (C) - ENt IRE nxr 2. SlnMARY. THE RECENT TIDE or AFGHAN REFUGEES SWEEPING INtO BALUCHISTAN HAS KEIGtaENt:» CONC,RN THERE OVER THE CONFLICT ACROSS THE EORDER. DC:SATi OVER \lha! THE MARTIAL LAW ADMlnSfRATIOH IS [ioing Arm SHOULD DO VIS-A-VIS AFGHANISf AN REFLEers AND EXACERBATES DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PROVINCE AND BEtWEEN THE PROVINCE AND THi: FEDERAl. GOVERNPIENT. IN THIS DEBATE, THE.REFUGEE~ T'':.t1SELVE:S AnE BECOPIING AN ISSUE. ODDS THAT TENSIC-I'': O' AFGHANISTAN WILL SPARK VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN :';.~~':" len klhen THE LEcnON CAt'lPAIGtl BEGINS. PlUCH COULD D~r~ND ON MOV THE us COMMITMENT TO PAKISTAN IS PERCEIVED. A MILT IR.IER EFFEer 3. FIVE MONTHS BEFORE NATIONAl. ELECIIONS, ('IIR TALKS UITH RESIDENTS OF SALUCHISrAN SHOW THE'".10..; PREOCCUPIED ay THE spalover FROI'I ArGHANISTAN THAN S: the PROSPECT OF GOING TO THE POLLS. THE EVENTS ACROSS THE BORDER ARE REAL AND IPJ[ 1EDIATE 1I!H?:REAS THE ELECTIONS tlove"ber 17 ARE A PlUCH-DOUBTED PROI1IS. BEHIND ~OPl.E S CONCERN IS,THE SELIEF THAT 'PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANIStAN CAN HAVE A MULTIPLIER EFnCT ON BALUCHISTAN BECAUSE ~F THE PROVINCE S INTERHAL INSTABILITY. T~ TIDE OF REFUGEES 4. UNI'IL THIS SPRING, THE TIDE OF REFUGEES FROM NORTH AND WEsr OF THE DWlAND LINE F1.0W D INTO THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE. THEN, IN APRIL OR MAY, THE EFFLUX FROM AFGHANISTAN BEGAN A SECOND CHANNEL TO THE SOUTH, PERHAPS REFLECfING A GEOGRAPHIC SHIrt Itl THE FIGHTING IN THE BORDER AREA. ON ONE DAY A ~AV Of AS MANY AS 12,000 PERSONS REPORTEDLY CAME: ACROSS INTO 3AlUCHISTAN. THE CHIEF SECRETARY or THE PROVINe:::: ASSERTS THAT BALUCHISTAN AND THE FRONTIER NO~: SHAR;:: ABOIJ( EQUALLY A TOTAL OF loe,""" REFUGEES. OTHERS ESTIMATt: A low ~ SUT STIll SU9SI'A..aIAL FIGURE FOR BALUCHISTAN

46 5. THE UPSURGE OF AFGHAN REFUGEES HAS COINCIDED WITH INCREASING a.eavages OVER THE GOVERtmENTO S ROLE IN DEAl.UIG,,; ITH 'THE INSURGENCY. PERCEPTIONS DIFFER OF ""HAT I~AMABAD IS DOING AND WHAT IT SHOULD DO. THE DEBATE BOTH REFLECTS AND EXACERBATES DIVISIONS WITHIN THE pnovince AND BETWEEN THE PROVINCE AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. DIFFERENCE OF OP~HtONS 6. THE DIFFERENCE OF OPINIONS APPEARS TO FOLLOW A LEFT RIGHI' PATTERN. ~EfileERS OF THE PAKIsrAN PEON.E S PARTY AND THE PAKISI' At~ NAT IONAL PARTY, ON THE PROGRESSIVE- END OF THE POL IT ICAl SPECTRUI1, BELIEVE THAT THE MARTIAL law ADfilINISI'RATION IS AIDING THE ~IUJAHIDS IN THEIR FIGHI' TO OVERTHRO~ THE REGIME IN KABUL. AN URBANE FORMER PROVINCIAL NINISI'ER FOR THE PPP SAID THAT, IF THE MlA IS SERIOUS IN IT S DENIALS OF SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENTS,- IT SHOUlD SEAL THE BORDER. HE ARGUED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD MOVE THE REFUGEE CAMPS INLAND AS FAR AS PUNJAB OR SIND TO PREVENT THEIR CONI'INUING TO BE A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF PROVOCATION TO KA3Ul. THE OPPOSITE POINT OF VIEW, THAT THE rla IS HElPING THE MUJAHIDS BUT SHOULD DO MORE, G:::r~ERALLY COft:ES FROitJ MiNBERS OF THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE AND OTHER CONSERVATIVE PARTIES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PERSONAL ASSISI'ANT TO TEHRIK-E-ISTHLAL PRESIDENT ASGHAR KHAN ASKED US WHY THE US CIA HAS NOT ENGINEERED A CO.UP D TAT AGAINST TARAKI. DIVISIONS--HIsrORICf.l. 7. SOME OF THE DIVI:IC REFLECTED AND EXACERBATED BY AFGHANISI'AN ARE H1;:;TO. : AL. ALTHOUGH \ :E HAVE YET TO MEET AN ADVOCATE OF G:t:::ATER BALUCHISTAN WHO "-'ILL CONFESS HIS VIEWS TO US DIRECTLY, FOfi('1ER GOVERNOR OF BALUCHISI'AN AK2AR KHAN BUGTI AND OTHERS TOLD US THAT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF BALUCHIS STILL HAP.BOR Ar-1BITIONS TO UNITE THE 8ALUCHI PROVINCES OF IRAN, AFGHAUISTAN AN[' P".KIsrAN BTO A SINGlE NATION, POSSIBLE INCLUDING ~ II BUGTI SAID T HAT THESE PEOPLE BELIEVE THE AFGHAN REvel UT ION HAS srr:::ngthened THEIR C.4US'::, THAT THEY LOOK TO THE TARAKI REGIME AND TH~ ~OVIETS FOR SUPPORT, OVERT OR COVERT, AND THAT THEY f'llgh! TAKE ADVANTAGE OF POLITICAL. DISI'URBANCES ~IITHIN PAKISI'AN TO BEGIN AN OPEN STRUGGLE AI1AINST THE f1la. OTHER BALUCHIS, WHO SEEK GREATER AUTONOP1Y FOR BALUCHISTAN IJITHIN PAKISTAN BY CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, HAVE TOLD US THAT PAKISTAN MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRA TION SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS MAY ALREADY HAVE SFI?RED RETALIATORY SOVIET DABBLING IN BALUCHISTAN. NOT A FEW GO SO FAR AS TO envision THE PROVINCE BECOMING A BATTLEGROUND FOR TH~ SUPER POWERS. SINCE ILLOGIC AND EGOCENTRISM At;E STRONG, THESE PEP-SONS SHOW LITTLE INCLINATION TO QUESTION THEIR DOOHSDAY' VISIONS OF SOVIET TANKS AND INFANTRY DIVISIONS BEARING DOWN ON QUETTA IN A RACE TO THE.. HOT ~,'AT ~R PORTS. BT , f..". I.. (~ I 1"...., '. " \ oj ( I I I. I \ I I

47 NNNNVV ESA08iMJC69 I RR RUQIIHR. DE RUSBCilD n87s/e ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 2'''89% JUN U7 ZZ FM AJilEI'IBASSY ISLAr:Ap.A" l TO RUEHC/SECSfATE WASh.J': 3537 INFO RUSBAE/AMEPJBASSY NEW DElHI '6I RUSBL KlAPlEPIBASSY KABtL 9352 R~HR/APlE"BASSY TEHRU '285 RU~RA/AME"BASSYJIDDA 788 BT CO.. F IDE N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 Is'.Al.l8AD 787' SOCIOLOGICAL 8. OTHER DIVISIONS ARE SOCIOLOGICAL. BALUCHISTAN REI'IAINS LAREGEL Y A TRIBAL SOCIETY BUf ONE THAT IS BEING THREATENED BY CHAfiGE. ON THE ONE HAND WE TALICED TO TRIBAL LEADERS WHO SAID THAT THE FIGHtING IN AFGHANISTAN IS A CRUSADE TO PRESERVE ISLAM AND A WAY OF LIFE, ON THE orfer TO PERSONS WHO REBELLED AGINST THE UNJUST RILE OF TJUBAL LEADERS AND PRAISED THE TARAKI GOVERIIIENf S EFFORTS TO DO AWAY WITH THE WORST FEATURES OF THE TRIBAl SYSTEfol IN AFGHANI SfAN. Q.EARLY. PEOPLE OF BALUCHISfAN APPEAR TO BE LlNING UP FOR OR AGAINST TAJIAKI PARTLY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ATtITUDES TOWARD THE SOCIAL SfRUcrURE OF BALUCHISUN AND ETHNIC.. 9. ALTHOUGH OUR EVIDENCE IS SKETCKY, WE BELIEVE frol'i TALKS IN KARACHI AND QU TTA THAT DESPITE CROSS CURRENTS THE AFGHAN REVOLurIO~, ADDITIONALLY, MAY BE DIVIDING. THE ETHNIC B.~LUCHIS AND PAT HANS. THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THESE TWO LARaEST GFiOUPS OF THE PROVINCE: SURFACED CONSfAHfLY IN CONVEIi~ATIO~S. UE DISCERNED A GREATER DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR TARAKI AMONG THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ROUGH!. Y '0 P:::P.C Nl BALUCH POP1A.ATION THAN AMONG T HOSE OF THE APPROXIllIATELY 40 PERCENT PATHAN. INTERESTINGLY, THE HEAVIEST CONCiNTRATION OF REFUGEES IS IN THE NORTHERN DISfnICTS, \.'HERE THE PATHANS ARE IN THL:i'lAJORITY. TO CROSS DIRECTLY INTO THE AREAS WHERE BALUCHIS PREDO:"lINATE THE REFUGEES W01A.D HAVE TO TRAVERSE A VIRTUAllY IMPASSABLE DESERT. GOVERNMENT CAUTION 12l. THE GOVERNMENT APPfARS TO BE AWARE THAT IT MUST \.'ALK A tighrrope IN DEALING PUBLICLY lhth THE INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN. IN n<:) NE TINGS WITH US, FORMER FEDERAL MINIsrER FOR LOCAL [ODI~5 KHAN MOHAMMED ZAMAN KHAN ACHAKZAI PRAISED THl:. COnJ\ECT WAY IN ~HICH THE MLA HAS ACTED. HE ENPHA:'IZ'::[l THAT HUilIANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REF'UG!S IN THE: LHIIT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INVOLVEMENT. l'lany OFf>ONElnS OF THE lljl.a, HOWEVER, TOLD US THEY ARE NOT SO ":I~,':. THEY BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ, THE 501. Of A MAULVI, IS IDEOLOGICALLY MOT IVATED TO FAVOR TII::' I Sl..f.llIC REBELS, AI~O THAT THE PAKISI'AN ARMY CANNOT SIT ON ITS HANDS WHILE AN OPPORTUNITY EXISI'S TO ELIMINATE A HOSTILE NEIGHBORING REGIME. THE REFUGEES AS AN ISSUE II. -THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES ARE steaming AN ISSUE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S RELA~T"lNS ~ITH THE PEOPLE OF BALUCHISTAN. ALTHOUGH CM1PS E~:T"'T' THEM, MANY AFGHANS LIVE OUTSIDE THEIR CONFINES. A::I r :iave TO HAVE SPACE TO GRAZE, AND TH~ REFUGZE:i HAV:,:OUGHI' WITH THEM ALMOST THE NUI-IBER Of CAt'lELS, SHEEP, GOATS AND DONKEYS A~ THER ARE Of' THEMSELVES. THE DISPERSION OUTSIDE CAMPS MAKES 11 DIFFICLLT FOR THE GOVERNM NT TO EXERCISE CONTROL AND CREATES SUSPICIONS THAT THL GOVERNMEtlT DO~S NOT WISH TO DO SO. IT IS ALSO CR::::ATli~G TENSION aep. J THE AFGHANS AND PAKISTANIS OVfR GRAZING PIGHT;. iven WITH

48 ITS NORMAL POPu..ATIu~, THE LAtID IS ~AJ\t:LY CAPABLE OF' SUESISfENCE. SO F'AR THE HOSPITALITY OF' THE NATIVES HAS OVERCOME THE IRRITATIONS. BUT IF THE NUMBER OF' REFUGEES CONI'INUES TO SlJELL AHI) THEIR STAY LOOKS TO BECOflIE PERMANENt, THE GOVERNI'I Nl WILL HAVE TO DEVISE POLICIES TO SETTLE THEM OVER A WIDER AREA. ELEer 101 VIOLENCE. 12. THE ODDS THAT AFGHANlSrAN WILL BE THE SPARK 'OP VIC1. Nt TROUBLES U BALUCHlSrAN "AY SHORTEN VITH TItZ B GIIINING OF THE ELEClION CMPAIGN. III A DISl:USSIOI ~ITH US, THE PROVUCIAL USPEClOR GENERAL OF POLICE IUDE NO SECHEr 0' HIS BELIEF THAT LAW AND ORpER WOlLO BE 8 ftp PRESEHVED VEIE THE ELEeI'IONS TO B[ POUPaND. RECEIII' ifatf ~EITS BY THE BALUCHI IAtlONALIsr LEADER OF THE PAIClSf. 'I NAtiONAL PARTY, fllr GHOUS BUX 81ZENJO, SUGGEST T E TYPE OF RHErORIC THAt COlLD Un-AItE PASSIONS. AT THE PHP' S COWElrION U KARACHI JURE I, 8IZENJO REPORTEDLY SAn that THE PROGRESSIVES AID DDiOCRATS OF' PAKISfAI VILL RISE TO DEFEND THE REVCl.UnON OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE l' THE" COUNrERREVOLUTIOIiARIES VILL lor DESISI' FRCII THEIR aei' IVlT IES. ICHAIR BUX flbri THE LEADER or THE lpiportur flori TRIBE, VHO Is SAID TO CONSIDER HlfiSEL' THE CHE GUEVARA OF BALUCHISTAN, IS A POTEITIAL LEADER OF A GUERRILLA-SnLE lnsurgeicy. ECONOfIIC DISSATlSFACT ION IN THE PROVUCE COlLD CREAst CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO DIstURBAIllCES. TO DATE, HOWEVER, THE PROVIICE IS QUIET. THE us,13. WHEIHER BALUCHISTAN Runs COll.D DEPEND all THE TliOUBLEt1AKERS' PERCEPTION OF THE STRE~GI'H OF THE U': COillilInlENT TO PUIsrAN. THE BELIEF THAT THE US HAS A3ANDONED PAKIstAN EMBOLDENS SOME, POSSIBLY INCLUDING / EIZ::NJO, WHO THINK THEIR BEST INTEREst' LIE IN flaking AN ACCOMMODATION NOW VITH THE SOVIEt UNION. UNFORTUNATELY, fli0sf OF THOSE kle TALK TO FROPI BALUCHISTAN EXPRESS nu: OPINION THAT THE US HAS DESERTED HER FRIENDS. THE REASONS ADVANCED INCLlJDE THE STANDARD REFERENCES TO LACK OF US SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN IN 1965 AND 1971, AI -~~n US FAILtmE TO SI'AND UP TO THE SOVIETS IN ANGOL... '-uiopia AND AF(;HANISTAN, US -apposition- TO THE fliuslii'i world un T US cur-off OF' AID TO PAKISTAN. 14. DESPITE THE CF:ITI.;..;~,!'lUCH GOOD WILL TOWARD THE US REMAINS. II1PORTArlf SEGMENTS OF BALUCHIsr AN SOCIETY PREFER TO RETAIN GOOO RELATIONS WITH THE US. THESE INQ.mE GOVERN='IENT OFFICIALS (ADt'.ITTEDLY MOSTLY PUNJABI>, BUSINESS P~OPLE AND MANY TRIBAL LEADERS. ALTHOUGH HIGtl.y CRITICAL OF' RECENT AMERIC.HI '1CTIONS, THEY CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT THE US I:ILL COI'IE TO P. <ISTAN'S ASSIstANCE IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET-INSPIRn SUBVERSION OR ATTACK. THE DIFFICULT TASK WE FACE IS TO PuaL ICIZE TO THESE ~R SONS AS WELL AS TO POTENTIAL "UISLINGS THAT THE tis REMAINS COMMITTED TO PAKISTAN S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND STABILITY WITHOUT IDENTIFYING OURSELVES WITH THE UNPOPULAR I'ILA. THIS task IS BOTH CO: IPLICATED AND HELPED BY THE ZIA GOVERNMENT' S EFFORTS TO SHOW THE PUBLIC ITS ARMS- LEI~GTH SfANCE TOWAnD TH US WHILE IT NEGOTIATES ENTRY INTO THE NON-ALIGNE~ MOVEtIENT; COMPLICATED BECAUSE WE OFTEN FIND OU~ GESTURES OF SUPPORT REJECTED BY THE f'ila, ArlO HELPED BECAUSE ZIA' S TROUBLED RELATIO~S WITH THE US ARE 'SEIZED ON AS EVIDENCE THAT THE US FAVORS AN ALTERNATIVE REGIME. MOST DAflIAGING IN THE LONG RUN 1rI0lLD BE OUR FAILURE TO CONE TO THE AID OF PAKISTAN IN A ~ITUATION WHICH n. HAVE INDICATED ~OULD ENGAGE OUR PLEDGE UNDER TH, 1959 BILATERAL PACT. SUCH US INACTION COlLD ElESlLT WERE PAKISTAN NOT TO HAVE Cl. AN HANDS. UNQUOTE KING ET.7 75

49 tnua:vv ::fai "'5 ::JC;;'S~?P r.up.1hf. DE RUC3~ y. i~:. ~ (' 176: 9..3 r, 7NY cccec ZZH p R 25 C?'-S42Z JU:: n FM A~!~gAS~Y Y.A5UL TO RUEHC/SZCSUT:: ':A~~C ~ID::ITY 4449 INFO RUS3Qi)/M~!:aA~~Y ISl~i';A1~: -.,~ I Rl K~O/A~:Ei;BASSY ;IOSCO~' 16~J RUSBA /Ar~ NEA~5Y :.~"!'!-lhi S:)":" ~ RUGl'iH!:VA!'i:::~SASSY r:a:::r.:! 251) BI'. C C NFl D. ~ T I f. l 1:~21..n. ~ lib ~.!). 12e65: GDS 6/25/ :5 (Ar.r.r I '1'Z, J. ~;:tr~;) or.i;;_ TAGS: PItJI'.!T:!, AF, PU~ SUBJECI': (C) :JEErING \O;ITH SCVIF1 ih?lor-'.a.t: P~_~T I CF III OBSERVATIONS ON THE U:TERNAl AFGHAN POLITICAL SCENE I. (C - ENT IRL TExt) j! L:I, ~Ḻ 2. S~~AP.Y: HICK SVOIET ~:'~~SSY OFFICIAL ~I~Cl~~:S ~~V!:r~ HAVE B!EN 1IF.5ING DRA TO ESTA~LISH A ~/(no~al FT;~::r.!: :::,:a~:-n BASE OF THE GOvr - ::ur so ra~ t!thot!t SUCCE:SS. Tf!: :' l!=l ~:~AT D SCRIS~ THi: I NSU!1 GENCY AS COf!:I]S!!!G. ~rj I SI[~;'A::Y.... M o ọ.. o c c: o c: "" :.c.. c 3:..: ọ.. 3: z....~ CIl = o... C'? ~.....Q :i c.ė c; o < z o E < Z E o c::

50 5. THE NARROIII POLITICAL 3~S:: ~:: TJ-:~ :-:'.~. \ P~~ I =':'~'T~t):':'" THAI tr Ht WERE Fi,PORTS CI:"clllATl:~G Hi:\! 1P':: r:?a L:'~~:~.:~lP WAS TAlKIflG ~nh FORCiER P?I::~ 'arhs!'::::: Z!;:!:A:iI M!J y:,,,s,z: ABOUl JOINING TH~ sovr SO AS ;0 :P.OA~::'I~!T~ ~(!L;r!cn,K:Z, AND THAT THE SOVIETS \-"ER~ PLAYIt'G SO:~::: F.CI.::' IN THIS, SAFRONCHUK SHOOK HIS HEAD. "\o:hat IS T~~':,- M;' CO:~F'ID~~, "IS THAT WE HAVE BE!N Ur.GINS THi vxa l~d.=:fship To $?lj~c:r; D'S BASE BY BRINGING IN NEll! P:'OPl.! I:~TO THi: SOVT, 3'..'T "-"HAT IS Nor TRUE IS THAT WE HAVE ~~~ HCl.DU~ DISCt!SSIO!'!S "'!!Y YOUSEF OR ET liladi.- COt.'TINUIHG, ~ s:.!~, "::::sr A;!.ISHING A NAT IONAl FRONT, LI!'L OTHEf. COllt:TF.Ii:.~ H~~ DOII~, f~c!'ld ~.;: SENSIBlE FOR THE!'.." SAFRONCHUr. cor:pl.ai:~:'='horev~ THAT: -THEY (ORA) "Ill NEITHER ALLm' A~Y OP?CSITlor~, O~ lie T~~Y \-'ISH T: SHARE POWER. TKEl~ "IDEA ASOUT ;p.caj!'~n~g TI P'JLITIC.4L BASE IS SOLELY TO drganiz:; STUDE~'T, YOUTP., ~:O~1 N AN~ FOr.Y.E~S ORGANIZATlUWS, BUT THOSE ARC ALL PA~T O~ TM: SAr~ POLITICAL PARTY. THIS IS NOT 2ROADENING TJoU: POLITICAl ;;AS:." HE RDIARKED, "THEY edlia) ASE ''FRY S:;:NsITnv.:: AF..OUT A!lY SU~1~~IOr! OF SHARING POWER. THEY ARE STU3eor.~! P~~PlE , o ọ.. u o c: ọ..... s:: ~.. ~ \ GUo. 6. REFLECfING ON TH! PRO~LE!~S FACIN~ THZ DnA, H:; SAID!):1E: NarABLE WEAKNESS (UD Nt: Y.::PT Rn~~Il\G TO THIS PO!tl!) ~':'; THE -VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF INT ll::'ct:jals U' TN, GOvr.- HE sm: YOU SEE THIS A9SENCF U ::M~Y ~ ~'!s. IH:::: NEWSPAPERS ARE TERRIBLE, M~~ TM2 ClJLT!tr:AL LIFZ!E BAF.REN. IT WAS Il'IPORTANI' FOR THE G:lvr, ';AFRO!:CP'I'~ SAI~', TO ATTRACT TO ITsar -r:ors: INTELl':CTUAlS.- 7. T~ ~~URGE~- SAF1\ONC~IJr. SAID'HIS zr':~assy FINDS THE i 0 NCY ~ Y Cot~FUSIN$". TJor.:Y CANf,~OT I!)::fTIFY A~Y SINGlE REBa LEADER WJ!O DO:'lH:ATES n:=: OPPJS!TIOtJ ~!.rch AS JO{()llIEINI OR HO CHI ~IN 1"10 IN r... 1:': C!)flf'T:-::IES. HIS E;i2ASSY DOES aaieve THAT THE IP.ANIA~! A~' P'\~ISTA~ ':lvfs AFE ABErT ING THE REBELS, T. AX ~ Y?ll:-LIC :ru ~::::r'''ts A~m RADIO BROADCASTS, AND THE PAKISTANIS ~Y CL.~!\J::ST!:f:::LY StJPPLYHl, larms AND MATERIAL SUPPORT. H::: S! MFr. fl.f_l1j!1~: {-ISU.~t IT IS A ERRIBlE R Groer'" E ~ N :,i08" I F'J;T5:'! ;- :..;":'1\ F')F: TI-!C" INSURGENCY. THE POPU.ACE, It:: SAID, ;':5.:-'1f:::: -:~: "':I'ISTS Ar~ M;o.t:,q IS-AM," Atm THIS HE 09SE?v;::n I~t.l~~ TM::" ZjF.A" ~ Tf\~:': V~.F.Y ::lifflt;l'lt. ~ = ọ.., f.. ~ ;! Co. Ė U o

51 \ 8. WHEN, AT ONE POINT, 'r TOLD HIM THE us GOvr WAS NOT AIDING THE INSURGENTS. THAT \1E HAVE SEVe-RAL TIMES TOlD THE DRA THIS. AND THAT I WAS CONsn'UENTLY UPSET BY THE REPEATED PIer tfie CAPT IONS IN THE DRA PJtr:SS nus PAST 11: 1<, IMPLYING THAT THE SHOWN "CAPTURED-\o.'EAPONS Op.IGH~ArED \!ITH THE USA (AND CHINA), HE HAD THIS TO SAY... N I'IY I'IANY CONVER- SATIONS ~ITH TOP LEVEL ORA M!NIST!:RS AND D s." A D T US AC S S ING THE INSIIRGENCr-. WHEN I POINTED our THAT MOST OF' T~ FOP.EIG~ I'JILITAI\Y \leapons IN PAKISTAN ~:EP.E OF' us OR CHINESE ORIGIN, AND TKUS IT "'AS UNDERSTANDABLE FOR THE INSURGENTS ALON<= THE PAK FRONT ler TO HAVE SUCH ':EAPONS, HE SAID THAT THE DRA' LEAD~SHIP -KNOWS THI5"'. RETURNINt:: TO AFGHAN-US RaATIONS, SAFRONCHUI< SAID THAT. -THE I AItn' ABOur THE USA IS NOT ABOUT YOUR GIVING ARMS BUI ABOUT YOUR VERY CRI _ 9. THE TIME TO EVACUATE WOf'IEN AND CHILDREN 'HAS NOT COME. I TOlD SAFRONCHUK THAT ONE OF' ~Y G~ING CONCERNS WAS \!ifen Atm IF TO EVACUATE A~ERICAN OEP NDE91S. ItICID NTS U1<E THE J.UNt 23 OurBliEAK IN MaUL, I SAID, COI'IPELLED OUR EMBASSY TO AJ)IMtS~THE QUESTION. SAFRONCHUK RESPONDED THAT, WHILE HE HIM SELF DID t~ot HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT- THIS KIND OF QU STION ("'THIS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AMBASSADOR AND THE OTHER ftlnlsrer-counselor-), HE SAID HE COllJ) UtJDERST AND MY r.ojiry. -VHO 1<NO S," HE SAID, -\~H.4T NEXT WEEK OR NEXT MONTH \'Ill BRING? AS FOR ~HAT HIStMBASSY HAD DONE, HE SAID IT HAD EVACUATED 10 THE USSR -All WOI'I!N AND CHILDREN OF SOVIETS WORKING OUTSIDE KABUL." tt FOR THOSE IN KABUL, HE SAID. ALL THE DEPENDENTS W)(JE STILL HERE. "WHEN THERE IS TROUBLE. LIKE YESTERDAY," HE SAID, -WE BRING THEM INSIDZ THE Er:BASSY COMPOUND F'OR SAFETY." ke THOUGHT THE ORA WAS IN C~Nl'ROL OF' KAEUL AND DIDNeT THINK THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CITY RE~I!IRED AN EVACUATION. Ie. 310 ijata. FOR A SOVIET ::>IPLor~Ar. SAF'RONCHUK IS ExtRA ORDINARILY OPEN. HE IS ~IILLING TO ANSWEr. OUEST!ONS, AND HZ STROCK ME AS 50TH INTELLIGENT ANn A ~AN YOU CAN ~EASON WITH. ~ITHIN THf HIERACHY OF THE SOVIET E~1~ASSY, HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF' AS "~F'ESSIOtJALL y- HAVI NG THE RAfJ!< OF'..AMBASSADOR, - BUT PROTOCOL 1r:ISE WAS HERE RANKED 0Ni. Y AS NO.3. THIS 'J}AS S::CAUSE THE OTH::R MINISTER-COUNSElOR, YIJRlY K. AL:'XC:::V, HAD PRECED~ HIM TO KAaUl, AND SINCE HE ARRIVED~ST,? :#,6:-~)6,9.2 AFTER AMEASSAD~~ PUZANOV. AS F'OR HIS OW~ P.tSPON~I2ILIrIES, SAFRONCHUX SAID HE WA NCERN WI H -E L 0U OIlS"' \.: I.:..lAS. SIElL::: FOR" INTERNAL QUESTIONS." \-'HAT HE!';~ANT BY THIS \ IAS NOT CLEAR, \ sur LATER HE REFERREDfO ALEXEEV'S FIELD AS - AMINISsrRATION.". ).. ~ APJST urz..y 9T ~;; '-4888 S"6. ~. "\..\~ tft},,/. ọ.. ~ ':; en. ~ z

52

53 ~:Nl~tJVV C:SAleSr1JC8S9 pp F.U(.'l:~HF D:: P.l'S~L!< #4~S9 176~945 Z ~;y CCCCC ZZ H P R 25 '7542Z JUN 79 F".~ AI1Zf'13ASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY 4450 I~FO FUSBQO/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8942 RUE~10/AMEMBASSY MOSCOw 1694 RIJSBA2/A:1EMSASSY NEw DElHI 6967 RU91HP./AI1C:M3ASSY TEHRAN e267 at CON F IDE N T I A L KABLL 4 sa9 25Jutt 79 i Z I Iz....., o ọ.. F.O. 12~65: GDS 6/25/85 CAMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE> OR-M TAGS: PINT, UF, AF', PINR SUBJ: ec) MF~TING WITH SOVIET DIPL~1AT: PART II OF III - SOVIc:T-AFG~AN RELATIONS )(AELL 488S 1. ec - ENTIRE TEXT), 1... Slf'If'iAP.Y. THE: MOST INTERESTING COMf'ENTS SAFRONC){UK MADE Our-INO OUR MEETING RElATED TO SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS, SPECI FICALL Y HIS DENIAL THAT THE SOVIETS "-'OUlD CONSIDER BRINGING IN SOVIET TROOPS TO SAVE THE ORA. SAFRONCHUK QUOTED LENIN AS SAYING, "EVERY REVOLUTION MUST DEFEND ITSElF.- END SUMMARY. 3. DURING OUR DISCUSSION OF THE INSURGENCY, I TOLD HIM THAT TH2RE 1r:.4S SPEC1l.ATION IR THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS THAT HIS GOvr ;Cll.D, IF NECESSARY, BRING IN TROOPS TO SUPPORT THE DRA. SA~OtJCHUK DENIED ANY SUCH INTENTION. HE REFERRED TO FD.,EZH:.J::"V S JUNE 11 SPEECH IN MOSCOW, IN WHICH THE LATTER SAID,..\" SHALL NOT ABANDON IN TROUBLE OUR FRIENDS - THE AFGHAN PEOPLZ, - eur.explained THAT IN SAYING THAT, -BREZHNEV D!D NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THIS INCLUDED MILITARY INTERVENTION.- SAFRONCHUK WENT ON TO REPEAT SEVERAL TIMES THAT LENIN HAD.-JJ SAID, -EVERY REVOLUTION MUST DEFEND ITSELF." 4. PURSUING HIS THEME, HE SAID THAT ~'ERE THE SOVIETS TO FRING IN TROOPS, THIS WOUlD HAVE BAD REPERCUSSIONS INTER- ~;!~TJONALLY. HE EXPLAINED. -IT WOUlD HARM SALT AND THE POSITION CF THE SOVIET UNION IN THS ~ORLD," - HE THEN ADDED, "QUITE ASIDE rnol'l rrlfernational CONSIDERAT IONS, IT WOULD BE '3AD ~LICY I N TERMS OF INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS." I OBSERVED THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOUlD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME IN THIS RUGGED, ~10UNT.uNOUS COUNTRY. HE NODDED_HIS HEAD VIGOROUSLY. ọ...,.: eṉ - ọ.,... ~.. co or.leo E c; o < z oe::: < z '".r:.-

54 5. ENlARGING ON SOVIET POLICY, HE SAID, -LIKE YOUR COUNTRY. OlJ\ MAIN OBJECTIVE HE'RE IS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY- (HE MUST HAVE STUDIED SOME OF OUR POLICY STATEMENTS). -WHAT WE ~ISH TO SEE, HE SAID, -IS A PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFUL AFGHANISTAN 6. WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDS MORE THAN ANYTHING ElSE. HE CON TINUED, WAS TO ElIMINATE ILLITERACY. IF EVERYBODY COULD BE LITERATE AND ACHIEVE A BASIC EDUCATION. THAT WOULD BE THE BEST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN. THEN HE COMPLAINED, -INSTEAD, THE AFGHANS KEEP ASKING US FOR MORE AND MORE ARMS - NOT FOR MORE HELP IN EDUCATION.- 7. IN RESPONSE, I CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD BEEN LONG-STANDING AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANtSTAN TO PROMOTE SIABILITY IN THE REGION. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AFGHANISTAN AT PEACE WITH ALl. ITS NEIGHBORS, NOT ONLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT ALSO WITH IRAN, PAKISTAN AND CHINA. FOR DECADES TOO, WE HAVE HAD A, HlJIIANIT ARIAN I NTEREST HERE, INVEST ING ROUGHLY $20 MILLION PER ANNUM IN THE COUNTRY S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPfllENT. TO THE EXTENT THE AFGHANS COULD UPLIFE THEMSELVES SOCIALLY AND ECONOM I CALL Y, ~E BELIEVED THIS WOULD PROMOTE STABILITY. SAFRONCHUK AGREED. 8. I ALSO TOLD SAFRONCHUK THAT AS A COROLLARY TO OUR POLICY OF WORKING FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, WE HOPED THAT AFGHANISTAN WOlL» NOT BECOME AN AREA OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR.TWO COUNTRIES. TO THIS SAFRONCHUK RESPONDED, - I AGREE WITH YOU COMfLETEL Y. - GOING ON, I WARNED HIM, THAT WERE THE SOVIETS TO BRING IN TROOPS INTO A~GHANISTAN, THIS WOULD VERY MUCH COMfLICATE AND HARM SOVIET-AMERICAN RElATIONS. HE NODDED HIS HEAD.... M o ọ.....: ọ.. ~ '; til..ci ::: <I> ::: ọ.,... t'.. ~.... o 9. COMMENT: I CONSIDER SAFRONCHUK' S REMARKS SIGNIFICANT. I APPRECIATE THAT ONE COULD ARGUE THAT HIS DENIAL OF ANY SOVIET INTENT ION TO INTERVENE PHYSICALLY WAS THE ONLY ANSWER A SOVIEr DIPLOMAT COtR.D HAVE BEEN AlffHORIZED TO GIVE TO MY QUEST ION, AND FURTHER THAT THE QUOTATION F'ROM LENIN WAS HYPOCRITICAL IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE. YET, REFLECTING ON OUR CONVERSATION, I THINK HE GENUINELY BELIEVED \.JHAT HE WAS TELLING ME, NAMELY THAT SOVIET PHySICAL h"terv Nt'ION WOULD BE MORE HARMFUL THAN HELPF'UL FOR SOVIET INTERESTS, AND THEREFORE IT \,,'OULD NOT OCCUR. AMSTUTZ at '46~9 E ọ. tr.

55 VV ESA501MJC987 RR RUQIIHR DE RUSaK ZNY CCCCC ZZ H R Z' JlI. 19 F\"I AJllEI'IBA SSY KABtL TO RI HC/SECSTATE WASHOe 4655 INFO RUMJPG/A/'IEMBASSY BEIJING 611 RUDJ<RB/AMEMBASSY BaGRADE 187 RUFHEB/AflIEPlBASSY BERLIN 24 RUFHOL/AI'IEJlJBASSY BONN 6'52 RUEHEG/AI'IEMBASSY CAIRO 376 RlJlIJGMIA/'IE 1'1BA SSY COL OIllBO 4' 9 RUSB WIAIIIEMBASSY I SLAIIIABAD 8995 RUQIlIRA/AM liibassy JIDDA 333 RUDTC/A/'IEflIBASSY LONDON 1672 RUEH/'IO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1731 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3140 RUDKRP/AMEl'IBASSY PRAGUE 68 RUQIlIHR/AflIEMBASSY TEHRAN.H 1 RUHQHQA/CI NCPAC RUSNAAA/CINCEUR RUFHNA/USNAT 0 13 RUEHOT JUSUN 917 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 62 BT CON F I D N T I A L SECT ION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5246 CINCPAC ALSO FOR PCl.AD CINc m ALSO FOR POLAD I 2JUl L.0. 12"~. RDS-l 719/99 <fl.at IN, BRUCE A.) OR/flI TAGS. PEPR, EAID, PINT, PORG <NAME), AF, GE, UR, PK SUBJEcr ICC) PUZZLEflIENTOF THE EAST GERllIAN AflIBASSADOR OVER CONTRADIrIONS"" OF THE KHALQI REGIME REF. KABtL 5146 <NOTAL) 1. CC - EN!' IRE TEXT) 2. AS ANTICIPATED IN THE REFiEL, DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU, THE AflIBASSADOR OF THE GERflIAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AT KABlI., CALLED ON ME JtLY 9 TO CHAT ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN AFGHANIsrAN. AS IS HIS USUAL PRACTICE, SCHWIESAU ENDEAVORED TO APPEAR FRIENDLY AND FRANK. ( IIVlf -.: ~ L L: /~(1{'/l 16:l

56 3. SCHIiIESAU EXPRESSED PlIZZLEPlEN1' OVER HOW THE AFGHANS! EPI TO I'IISflIANAGE THEIR RELATIONS WITH OT HER COUNTRIES, P1ISSING OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITIES TO DISPLAY' A SMOOTHER DJPLOflIATIC IPiAGE. USING KABIL S BILATERAL RaAT IONSHIP WITH ISLAMABAD AS AN EXAPlftE, HE WONDERED WHY AFGHANISTAN HAD APPARENTLY CHANGED ITS SIGNALS AT THE LAST /lilnute AND HAD OPPOSED PAKISI'ANI I'IDIBERSHIP IN THE NONAlIGNED I'IOVEMENT AT THE RECEN HAl'! CONFERENCE AT COLOMBO. SCHWIESAU RECALLED THAT THE AFGHANS HAD APPEARED TO HAVE a.early PROMISED PAKISTAN BEFORE THAT CONFERENCE THAT THEY WOULD SUPPORT PAKISTAN S BID FOR MEI'IBERSHIP IN THE NAM. SCHWIESAU REVEAlED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD EVEN URGED THIS COURSE OF ACTION. s:ituesau SAID THAT ) AND OTHER OBSERVERS WERE SURPRISED WHEII THE AFGHANS TOOK A STRON ANt' 1-PAKIST AN Sf AND AT Ca..QllIBO $ '5 297)$,..,.'5?U, z).'5verer FOR THE AFGHANS TO HAVE INSl'EAD STATED THAT, -ALTHOUGH AFGHANISTAN HAS MANY BD.ATERA!. PROBLEMS WITH PAJ<ISTAN, THOSE CAN BE RES(l.VED IN OTHER WAYS, THEREFORE. AFGHANISTAN IS NOT a.ocking PAKISTAN S ENTRY INTO THE NA/ll. - HE FOUND THE AFGHAN POSIt ION ESPECIALLY- STUPID- BECAUSE T HEY COULD NOT GET ENOUGH VOTES TO BLOCK PAKISl' ANI MEMBERSHIP ANYWAY. 163 I

57 4. SCHWI SAU ALSO WAS StfiPRISED THAT THE AFGHAN POLICE AtI'HORITIES WOu..D BE SEIZING A PAKISTANI EPIBASSY STArrr fl:eplber AT THE SAPIE TIPIE THE THE AFGHAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS PREPARING FOR DEPUTY FOREIGN PlINISTER DOST S FRIENDLY VISIT TO ISLAMABAD. SCHWIESAU LEFT NO DOUBT THAT HE B LIVED THAT THE PAKISTANI HAD BEEN FORCIBLY ~IZED BY THE AFGHAN S SEC~ITY PO"dCE, AND HAD NOT DEFECTED VOLUNT ARIL Y TO T HE AFGHAN SIDE AS THE KHALQIS a.a IJlI. WHILE ON THE TOPIC OF THE DOST VISIT, SCHWIESAU WONDERED WHY THE KHALQIS HAD FELT COI'IPELLED TO REFl1J'E THE SUBSE QlEN!' PAKISTANI STATEMENT THAT AGHA SHAHI WOUlD BE PAYING A RETmN VISIT ON PRIPIE MINISTER HAFIZI1.LAH APlIN. ASIDE FRO' THE PROTOCOL SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED, SCHWIESAU THOUGHt' AMIN SHOI1.D BE ABLE TO RECEIVE AGHA SHAHI GRACEFULLY - AND TRANSFER HIM OVER TO A LOWER OFFICIAL, SUCH AS EDUCATION MINISI'ER JALILI, FOR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. 5. WHEN I ASKED SCHWIESAU WHY HE THOUGHT THE KHALQI REGIME SO FREQUENTLY SEEMED TO BE OPERATING AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH ITSELF, SCKWIESAU REPLIED THAT IS A MYSTERY TO HIM. HE OBSERVED THAT, ALTHOUGH ONE MINISTRY MIGHT PROCEED ALONG A DIFFERENT COURSE FROM ANOTHER MINISTRY,. THERE HAD TO BE SOME OVERALL DIRECTION FROM THE rope FOR EXAMPLE, SCHW IESA U NOTED THE AFGHAN DELEGATE S ANT I-PAKISTAN SPEECH AT COLOMBO HAD TO HAVE BEEN APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY NO ONE LESS THAN PRIME MINISTER AMIN. 6. TURNING TO THE INSURGENCY SITUATION, SCHWIESAU REGARDED 'J[ AS SERIOUS. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPENDENTS OF ONE OF HIS OFFICERS REMAIN BEHIND IN BERLIN WHEN THAT OFFICER RET URNS TO KABUL FROM HOME LEAVE, BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THE SECtRITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS -DANGEROUS. SCHWIESAU REVEALED THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAKS ARE SENDING SOME TECHNICAL ADVISERS BACK TO THE HERAT REaION, BUT WIT HOUI' THEIR WIVES AND CHD.DREN. 8T

58 3.VV ESA495MJC981 RR RUQI'lHR DE RUSBL K 15246/2 192 ~ 05 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R Z JtL 79 Fl'l A!'lEI'lBA SSY KA BUL HO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHOC 4656 INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 612 RlDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 188 RUF'HE8/AMEMBASSY BERLING 25 RUFHOL/ AMEMBA SSY BONN 6'53 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 377 RlJ'1JllI/AMEI'lBASSY COLOMBO 460 RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISlAMABAD 8996 RUQMRAIAMEMBASSY JIDDA 334 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1673 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1732 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3141 Rl1lJ(RP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 69 8Qf'IHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 312 RUHQHQA/CI NCPA C RUSNAAA/CINCEUR RUF'HNA/USNATO 14 RUEHDT/USUN 918 JiEHU8/USINT HAVANA 63 BI' CON F IDE N T I A L SEer ION 2 OF' 2 KABUL 5246 CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD C1 NCE LR AL SO FOR POL AD E.O : RDS-I 7/9/99 (FLATIN. BRUCE A.> OR/M I 2JUl 75 i j 00 &: 7. SCHWIESAU SAID THAT HE FINDS ESPECIALLY FRUSTRATING THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE MESS IN THIS COUNTRY. } HAS OFTEN TOLD T HE AFGHANS THAT r HEY ARE FOOLS NOT TO ENCOURAGE T HE BROADEST POSSIBLE PART ICIPAT ION BY ALL NAT IONS. EAST AND WEST. IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS CONNECT ION, SCHWIESAU SI'ATED THAT te WAS TOLD KHALQI POLITICAL EXTREMISTS THAT THEY ARE our OF STEP WITH THE MODERN SOCIALIST MOVE- MENT WHEN r HEY ATTEMPT TO SQUEEZE" IMPERIAL! sr" REPRESENTATION OUT OF KABtL. HE SAID THAT HE TOLD THEM HOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR ALL NAT IONS TO WORK TOGEr HER FOR PEACE AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

59 8 AS FOR EAST GERMAN PROGRAMS FOR AFGHANISTAN, SCHWIESAU WAS VERY BEARISH. HAVING LONG BEEN VERY SXEPT ICAL ABOUT THE ABSOR PI' IVE CA PACIT Y OF AFGHA NI ST AN FOR FORE IGN AID, &:HWIESAU SAID THAT, AT HIS RECOMMENDATION, THE GJR HAS OFFERED THE KHALQI REGIME A MODEST INITIAL AMOUNT OF AID CREDIT TO TEST THE POSSIBLE SUCCESS OF EAST GERMAN PROGRAM MING IN THIS AREA. SCHWIESAU WAS DISCOURAGED, HOWEVER, BY IS FIRSl TECHNICAL CONVERSATIONS WITTH AFGHAN AID OFF'ICIALS. THEY WANTED EASl GERMANY TO BUILD A TURNKEY-TYPE INDUsrRIAL INSTALLATION IN AFGHANISI'AN,REQ\JESTING THAT EA sr GERMA NY UNDERT AXE T HE COMPLETE PROJECT. SCHIESAU SAID THAT HE TOOK THE AFGHANS TO AWORLD MAP, POINTED OUT }«)W DISI'ANT EAST GERMANY WAS FROM AFGHANISI'AN, AND ASKED 'THE AFGHANS WHETHER THEY WERE SERIOUSLY PROPOSING THAT HE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE EAST GERMAN BRICKS TRANSPORTED ACROSS POLA NO AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUCH A PROJECT. HE CON C1.UDED THAT HE HAS THUS FAR GOTTEN NOWHERE n GETTING THE AFGHANS TO BE PRACTICAL ABOlIT SUCH PROPOSITIONS. 8. COMMENT: T HE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SCHWIESAU ON JULY 9 WERE CONSISlENT WITH THE GENERALLY CRITICAL ATTITUDE HE HAS DISPlAYED TOWARD THE KHALQI REGIME IN PROVATE CONVERSA TIONS WITH OTHER DIPLOMATS SINCE HIS ARRIVAL HERE ELEVEN MONTHS AGO. SCHWIESAU DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT OF RECENT SOVIET-SPONSORED "NEGOTIATIONS" TO FORM A "NATIONAl FRONT REPlACEMENT FOR THE KHAL QI REGIME (REFTEl>. FLAT IN BT

60

61 ,... J: f ",.J. ( N. ESA.l71MJC5 1 6 RR RUQMHR DE RUSBLK 152~ ,J Ih:. ZHY CCCCC R 11fJ429Z JUL 79 Fl'I USDAO KABlL (' \ u TO RUEKJCSlDIA washoeiidb-2cii l'h, INFO RUseW/USDAO I9.AI'IABAD RUQlll~/USDAO TEHRAN RUHQHQA/COIUPAC CP H.M. SMITH HIIIIPAC IH/I251I5JI/ I I JUl 7g I" D,, RUHQHQA/CIHCPAC, HONOLULU, HI//J2.l.l/J2JI/ Sf CON F IDE H T I A L/NOFORN SUBJECI'I THIS IS IR 6 B0B "~6 79, CLD COUNTRYI AFGHANISTAN CAF)/PAKIsr AN CPK> 2. CU) REPORT NUPIBERI 6 Bee J. CO) TITLEI SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN ". UD PROJECI'NUflfBER I MIA 5. CO) DATE OF INFORJlIATION CO) DATE OF REPORT I (tj) DArE AND PLACE OF ACQI 1907B9. KABUl B. cm REFERENCEI INITIAT IVE 9. (tj) ASSESSI'IENT I A. F-6, B. F (tj) ORIGINATORI USDAO KABlL. 11. CO) RUtEST EVAL I CO) PREPARING OFFICERI ROSERT c. DISNEY, LTC, USA, ADATT 14. CO) SOURCE I A. SCI 6 see 066, B. ONE TIJlIE SOURCE 15. (to DIRCI NO 16. CONFIDENTIAL/1I0FORN SUPlJlIARYI ACCORDING TO TWO THIRD-COUNTRY DlfLOJllAT S, THE SOVIET UNIO. ALLEGEDLY HAS THREE OBJECT IVES IN AFGHA NI SfAN. THESE ARE SAFEGUARDING THE INVESfJllENfS THEY HAVE JlIADE TO SUPPORT THE REVOLUTION, JlIAINl'AINING A SOCIALISf REGI"E IN AF, AND EXTENDING THEIR AREA or INFt. DENCE. IF IT APPEARS TO THE SOVIET S T HAT THE CURRENT CITARAKI» REGIME IS NOT GOING TO BE SUCCESSFtL IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY WILL NOT HESnATE TO REPLACE THE REGII'IE WITH ONE THAT WOlLD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE BULK OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, IN ORDER TO SAVE FACE AND TO ATTAIN THESE OBJECTIVES. THIS NEW REGIME WOlLD PROBABLY BE OUTWARDLY \liore NATIONALISTIC AND WOULD PROBABlY BE DRAWN FROM THE ARflIED FORCES. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT t SITATE TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS INTO AF TO INSURE THE SlJ:CESS OF' THE REVOLUTION, A DEVELOP\lIENT WHICH WOULD, IN SOURCES' VIEW, NOT PROMI'T A SER IOUS USG REACT,ION.

62 22. CONFIDENrIAL/NOFORN DETAILS' SOURCE A. ON HIS OWN INIT IATIVE PAID AN OFFICE CALL ON REPORTING OFFICER (RO). DURING THE RATHER LENGTHY (2 AND A HALF HOURS) VISIT SOURCE AND RO HAD A CONVERSATION WHICH COVERED SEVERAL SUBJECTS. THE PRIMARY TOPIC OF' CONVERSATION WAS SOURCE S VIEWS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AF. IN RESPONSE TO RO S QUESTION SOURCE STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE SOVIET UNION HAD THREE OBJECT IVES IN AF". THE F'IRST OF THESE WERE THE SAFEGUARDING OF' THE I'IASSIVE INVESTMENTS OF WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT AND MONEY WHICH THEY HAD PROVIDED THE TARAKI REGI!'lE TO SUCCESS F'lLL Y CONCLUDE THE REVOLUrION. THE SECOND WAS TO ENSURE THAT A SOCIALIST REGIME SlJlVIVED IN AF, AND LASTLY, TO ENSURE THAT THEIR AF' VENr URE, All) EXTENSION OF T HEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE, VAS NOT REDUCED Bur FURTHER EXTENDED. SOURCE CONTINUED BY sr ATING THAT IN HIS VIEW THE CURRENT REGIME WOULD NOT LAST -TOO!'lUCH LONGER BECAUSE OF'THEIR INCREASING PROBLEMS WITH THE MUSLIM INSmGENTS"' WHO WERE DIAMETRICAlLY OPPOSED TO A SOCIALIsr GOVERNMENT AND BECAUSE OFITS UNPOPULARITY WITH THE FERVENTLY RELIGIOUS lliuslim POPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN. ALLEGEDLY THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO RELAIZE THIS AND, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLU TION AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES, THEY WOUlD NOT HESItATE TO REA-ACE THE PRESEIIr GOVERNl'IENT WITH ONE WHICH WOtLD BE 1II0RE ACCEPTABLE TO THE IS-AIIIIC P1AJORITY, BlIT WHICH WOlLD ALSO BE PRO-MOSCOW, BUT IN A LESS Cl.ARING SENSE. RO ELIECITED SOURCE S VIEWS 01 WHO WOlLD FORM THE NEV REGIME. SOURCE SI'ATED THAT If VOULD "AINLY COMPOSED or NATIONALISTIC f'in.itary OFFICERS WHO WERE SYMPATHEt IC TO THE SOYIET CAUSE. HE CaNT INUED BY STATING THAT HE KNEW SEVERAL AF OF-FICERS WHO WalLO FIt THIS "OLD, Bur DID 110 ELABORATE FURTHER. CONTINUING, somce SI'ATED THAT THE sovn:rs WOUlD NOT GIVE UP THEIR ULTIMATE GOAL OF OBTAINING AIt ACCESS TO PK WARP! WATER PORTS ON THE ARABIAN SEA. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A BASE FROM WHICH THEY COULD PROJECT THEIR laval POWER TO CONrRO THE SEA LINES 0' COMUNICATIONS opal WHICH 1lI0VE THE BLLK OF' THE FREE WORLD S FlEL REQUIRDlENrS. ACCORDIIIG jo SOURCE THIS ACCESUOlLD BE OBTAIIIED THROUJlR...I.HE A..SSISI'ANC[ 160

63 OF FRIENDLY "ELEMENT S III THE BAlUCHI sr AN PROVINCE OF' PK. -EVEN TODAY THERE ARE BOTH COIlERT AND OVERT ElEMENTS IN BALUCHISTAN, IN THE PAY OF' THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE ADVOCATING THE INCREASED AurONOMY OF' THE PROVINCE. IN TIME, AND WITH THE REQUISITE POLITICAL a.imaje, BALUCHISTAN COULD BECOME A SEPERATE POLITICAL ENTITY AND THEN THE SOVIETS VOlLD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE JHEIR L9NG-SOUGHT GOAL - ACCESS TO T HE ARABIAN SEA-. IN SOURCE S VIEW IT IS IMPERAT IV[ THAT THE USG PROVIDE THE HECESSAR\' ECONOMIC AID TO ASSIsr PK IN THE RAPID DEVElOPMENT OF BAJ.,UCHISTAN IN AN EFFORT TO BLUNT SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE REGION. ADDITIONALLY SOURCE MADE A STRONG REQUEST FOR USG MILITARY ASSIStANCE IN ORDER TO J PROVIDE PK \lith -CREDIBLE DEFENSE FORCES"'. 1M RESPONSE TO RO $ J QLEsrIOM AS TO HOV THIS MILITARY AID, IF PROVIDED. /'light BE VIEWDD BY INDIA, SOURCE STATED THAT IT WAS -LlJDICRQUS- FOR ANY NATION, INa.WINO IIIDIA, TO BELIEVE THAT PK HAD ANY HOSTILE INI'EHI'IONS TOWARDS INDU. 'K IS A SMALL COUNTRY WlTH VERY LIMITED RESP;RCES All> IT itas 10 IffTEffTION OF UXlIIlI ANY HOSTILE sreps AGAIN A MAJOR POWER SUCH AS IIDIA. PK WOUlD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE GUARAIfI'EES NECESSARY THAT ITs "ILITARY CAPABILITY WOlLD HEVER BE USED AGAINST INDIA, EXCEPT IN DEFENSE OF ITS OlIN SOVEREIGNTr. TO ENSlF.E THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOL or ION Iff AF' AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES IN THIS REliION, SHOURCE SAID THAT -I Aft CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WOUlD NOT HESITATE TO INrRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS, INTO Ar- IF THIS PROVIED NECESSARY. IN RESPONSE TO RO S Q\!ESTlOIi AS TO HOW THIS DEVELOP\'lENI' HIGHI' BE VIEWED BY THE NATIONS OF the WORLD, AND ESPECIALLY BY THE USG IN LIGHT 0 THE RECENT SALT II AGREE"ERT, SOURCE COUNrERED BY SI'ATING THAT IT WOlLD HOT CAUSE -TOO "UCH CONCER~ ESPECIALLY AS IT APPEARED TO PX AHD "ANY OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONS THAT THE USB HAD -WRITTEN OF'F' PK AND THIS REGION AS BEING UNESSENl tal TO YOUR SfRETEGIC AND NATIONAL INTERESTS-. DURING AN ATTACHE FUNCTION WHICH RO ATTENDED LATER THAT DAY, SOURCE B, IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QI. SfION REGARDING SOURCE"S VIEW OF' SOVIET INTENTIONS, GAVE ESSENTIALLY TKE SAME VIEWS AS STATED BY SOURCE A. ONE POINT WHICH BOTH SOURCES STRESSED WAS THE APPARANT LACK OF' INTERST BEING DISPLAYED BY THE USG IN THE!FOLDING DEVELOP/lIENrS IH THIS REGION. BOTH SOURCES UNDERLINED THIS POINT BY STATING THAT THE usa MUST TAKE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO HALT THE SOVIET EXPANSION IN THIS REGION. ORIGINATORS COMMENTSI (CONFIDENTIALINOFORN) BASED ON THE ABOVE II' APPEARED TO RO THAT BOTH SOURCES 'WERE ENUNCIATING THE PARTY LINE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. IN AS MUCH AS THIS IS THE rirst TIME RO HAS OBTAINED ANY INF"ORl'lATION FROM EITHER OF' TKE SOURCES AN ;-5 RATING HAS BEEN ASSIGNED. DE a.. 10 JUL 85. BT 152A19

64

65 > N ' ESA815MJC497 RI..e UQIlIHR DE RUSBLK NY CCCCC lzh R16848ll JUL 7! '" Af4[MBA 95Y KABtL TO RUEHC/SECSrAT WASHOe 4718 INFO RlJQlIIGU/At1EMBASSY ANKARA 3661 R... JPGlAlI\Ef'IIBASSY BEIJING 619 RUSSQD/A1I\EHBASSY ISLAMABAD 9011 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA JJ6 RUDTC/AI'lEMSASSY LONDON 1688 Rl fflo/ame!'ibassy (lljoscow 1740 RUSBAE/AHEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7064 ftufnps/amembassy PARIS JI48 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN RUHQHQA/CINCPAC sr CON F IDE N T I A L KABtL 'J~e I... I CINCPACz ALSO FOR POLAD E.O GOS ~-I'-S5 CTAY1.0R, JAMES E.> OR-P TAGSa PEPR, PINS, PINf, AF SlSJECf I (lou> AFGHAN UNDERGROUND PROPAGANDA CALLS FOR THE OUSTER OF PH IME..INI srer AM IN I. (C - ENT IRETEXf.) 2. SlJ1l'IARYa A RECENT SPATE OF.. UNDERGROUND" LETTERS CALLING FOR THE OUsrER OF PRIME MINIsrER AII\IN AND HIS COLLEAGUES csur NOT PRESIDEHI' TARAKI>, AND THE FORMATION OF' A UNITED FROHI' OF ALL -TRUE REVOLUfIONARIES,- COULD BE PART OF A RlI'IORED EFFORT TO MODIFY THE COMPOSITION OF' THIS REGIME'S LEADERSHIP IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THE GROWING DOMESTIC INSURGENCY, THE LETTERS' THEMES, HOWEVER, ARE THOS[ OF THE RIVAL PARCHA/'I WING OF THE PARTY, AND THEREBY, WITH THEIR EXTREII\E LEFTIST ANDINHERENI' ANI'I-\'ESTERN BASES, OFFER LITtLE COf'lIFORT TO THOSE WHO MIGHrHOPE FOR A GENUINE MODIF'ICATION OF' THE KHALQI GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES. END OF' SUMMARY, J.7

66 3. UNDERGROUND -HIGHT-LETTERS- (SHAaNAHMASOO) STARTED eir ClLATING THROUGHOUT KA8tL SEVERAL DAYS AGO. DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN SURREPTITIOUS, BUT STILL FAIRLY OPEN (I.E., COPIES HAVE BEEN FOUND LYING ON THE STREETS, AND ONE FLUTTERED OVER A DIPlOMAI S WALL IN BROAD DAYLIGHT) THEREBY SUGGESTING THAT SOME SEGPlENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE TURNING THE OTHER WAY. THE SUBSTANTIVETHRUsr OJ:'' THESE LETTERS IS SIMILAR, AND INClUDES THE FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS: -- PRIME PlINIsrER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. ANi) HIS FASCIST BAND OF' GANGSTERS, REPRESENTS T HE PRINCIPAL URGEr. IoIHILE NO eft IT IC I 9lI OF' PRES ment TARA XI HAS YET BEE N SEEN. -- OTHER TARGEI'S ARE: UNITED Sf ATES IMPERIALISPI (WHOSE NEFARIOUS HAND, BY CLEAR IMPLICATION IS BEHIND ALL EVENTS IN THE R&GION); THE \'IU&. 1M BROTHERHOOD (-IKHWAN-I-MUSLII'IIN ); THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFPAKISfAN; THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, AND -REACTIONARY FORCES. -- GOALS OF' -TRUE REVOLUT IONARIESOO SHOULD BE rh OSEPRO- Cl..A IMED BY MIR AKBAR KHAIBAR <THE FORMER PARCHAMIST INTEl. LECTURAL WHOSE MURDER ON APRIL 17, 15)18.,SET OFF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE KHALQI REVOLUTION), AND THE WORKERS IDEOLOGY, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIsr COUNTRIES, SHOlLD SERVE AS A GUIDING LIGHT. -- THE REGIME OF THE CHIEF OF THE PROFIESSIONAL CRIMINALS CA1'1 IN) IS TYPIFIED BY INDISCRII'IINATE ARREST AND TORTURE OF FEMAlES, THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERESTS OF U. So If'IPERIAL~ I~, ANIMAL TORTURES- OF nwe REVOLUTIONARIES, AND THE PILLAGING OF INNOCENT PEOPLES HOMES, ALL OF WHICH WERE FEATURES OF' ADOLPH HITLER S RULE. -- PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION. AND DEFENSE OF THE TERRI TORIAl INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE HOMELAND, IS IM POSSIBlE WITHOI1l' THE IMMEDIATE ELIllIINATIOH- OF AMIN AND HIS ASSOCIATES.

67 ,r-. -DEATH TO AI'lIN Aft) HIS FASCIST PARTISANS, TO THE CIA, TO IKJNANIS, TO MAOISTS, AfI> FORWARD WITH ALLIANCE AND UNITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND NATIONALIST F'~CES. j CO!'IMEHT: THE TRACT CLEARLY REfLECTS A PARCHAMIST AUTHOR SHIP, AS MOST OF THE VITRIOL IS DIRECTED AT THE KHALQI leadership, ALBEIT MINUS TARAKI. THIS PARTICULAR FEATURE COlLD BE PART OF T HE RUMORED EFFORT UNDERWAY TO REMOVE SOME MEMBERS OF THE CURRENT leadership IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THE DOMESTIC INSURGENCY, SINCE A GENERAL PARCHAMIST BROADSIDE AT THE: KHAlQIS WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE RESERVED SOME BRICKBATS FOR TARAKI. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE APPEAL TO FOLLOW THE PREACHINGS OF KHAIBAR -- WHO BEFORE HIS DEATH WAS REPORTEDlY A PROPONENT OF THE 1977 KHALQ/PARCHAM WEDDING -- AND THE ASSERTION THAT THERE REMAI -TRUE -REVOl..ur IONARIES WITHIN THE KHAlQ PARTY, COlLD REPRESENT AN APPEAL TO All LEFTISTS CPARCHAMISTS AND DISENCHANTED KHALQIS) TO FORM A -UNITED FRONT- FOR THE OUSTER OF AMIN AND HIS COllEAGUES. VE HASTEN TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE MYRAID ANTI-WESTERN DIA TRIBES UNDERSCOR THE CONCLUSION THAT A leftist AFGHAN RE GIME S BASIC POLICIES, EVEN WITHOUT AMIN, WOUlD PROBABLY NOT MODIFY TO ANY GREAT EXTEHT. 5. FINAllY, THE MERE APPEARItNCE OF THESE letters IN SUCH VOl..II'IE (VIRTUALLY EVERY DIPlOMATIV MISSION HAS GAINED POS! SSION OF ONE OR MORE COPIES) ANI> THE MANNER OF THEIR DIS TRISur ION SUGGEST THAT, FOR rome REASON, THE POLICE AND SECtlUTY AUTHOR IT IES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SQUELCH THE SPREAD OF PROPAGAPmA CALLING FOR THE REMOVAl COR WOR3) OF THE COUNTRY S STRONG-MAN. HOW LONG T HIS SITUATION WD.l PERSIST REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT AMIN, IN OUR JUDCJlIENT, IS NOT THE KIND OF POlITICIAN TO MEEJQ..Y FOLD HIS TENT AND PERMIT OTHERS TO TAKE OVER -HIS- REVOLUTION. 6. OTHER ANTI-AllIIN PROPAGANDA HEARD HERE RECENTLY PORTRAYS THE PRIME MINISTER AS A SECRET CIA AGENT WHOSE MISSION HAS BEEN TO DESTROY THE CREDIBILITY OF THE USSR IN AFGHANISTAN. AMST UTZ BT 1536"

68

69 NNNNRXXVV ESA 1421l'lJC649 RR R UQIII )II DE R U~Bl. K 15433/1 19ge68' ZHY CCCCC ZZH R If!05~Z JI1. '79 ~ A~E~BASSY KABUl TO RUEHC/SECST ATE WASHOC INFO R U"'OU/AIlIEM!ASSY ARXAR A 3663 RlJIIIJPG/AJI!EI'lBASSY BEIJING 621 RUSBQ:>/APIEMBASSY ISLAPlABAD 9021 RU~A/AMEMBASSYJIDDA 339 RtDTC/Al'IEltBASSY LOrmON 1683 RUEHPlO/AIlIEP!BASSY P10SCOW 1743 R USBAE/Al'IEJIlBASSY NEw DELHI 7075 RUFIPSIA1tEJllBASSY PAR IS.3152 RUQItIIfl/APlEPlBASSY TElfiAN ~24 RUFHRAlU~ISSION USMATO 15 RUHQH9A/CINCPAC R U~RAAA/CINCEIIi BY CON F IDE N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUl 5433 CUCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAn CINCEIIi: ALSO FOR POLAI) fbjulh E.O : GOS (TA'tlOR, JAPIES E.) OR-P TAGS: PEPR. PINS, PINT. AF, iii. SUBJEct I <LOU> SOVIET EFFtRT TO URGE DR A TO FUD A POLITICAL RE~m.UI'ION Of DOIIIESTIC CONFLICT PlAY BE UNDERWAY ;) D:1, REF. (A) KABUL 5892, (B) KABUL '8881 (C) KABUL 5146, CD,} KABUL (E> KAB11L 5368, (F) KABUL 4695 (ALL NOTAL) 1. (C - ENt IRE TEXT.) 2. SU'lIllARY: A NUMBER OF RECENT DEVELOPl'1ENTS IN AFGHANISTAN SUGGEST THAT A SOVIET CAI'IPAIGN MAY BE UNDERWAY IN KABUl, AJIlIED AT -HELPING- THE EMBATTLED DRA LEADERSHIP FIND A POlI TICAL, RATHER THAN STRICTLY lllililary, l'ieans TO COUNTER THE GROWTH OF DOIIJESTIC At{) FOREIGN 'OPPOSITION. STEPS TAKEN SO FAR, WHILE PERHAPS BUYING THE REGIPIE AND MOSCOW ~I)IIIE BREATHING SPACE, ARE PROBABLY INSUFfICIENT IN THEMSElVES TO GUARANTEE THE FUTllRE OF THE REVOlUTION, AND CONSIDERABLY!"'ORE SuESTANTJVE CHANGES WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY. OPTIONS ALtlNG THESE LINES ARE FEW, HOWEVER, AND THE -VOlUNTAR - DE- PARTlfiE OF ONE OR!'lOR E MEMBER S OF TH OP SHI P I'! Y BE M ~ 010 FACING A ORA SOS F. M ITARY INTERVENT ION IN ORDER H KHAl.Q!S ~AY-AFLOAT. W AIN THAT SOVIET -ADVICE- WILL BE kel!j)w BY TKE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP, AND MUCH I'IAY. DEPEND ON THE PER SOHAL D IPLOfIIACY OF VASIL Y SAFRONCHUK, THE RECENIL Y t>.rr IVED -TROUBLESHOOTER- AND SENIOR DIPlOMAT WHO COULD WElL HAVE BEEN CHARED WITH SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIND INC;,. VIABLE EXIT FROIII THE CtRRENT I'IAZE. PITFALLS AND tjlll(nowns REMAIN NUM EROUS, BlIT CONT INUED SOVIET ASSlfi ANCES TO THE :t'.f(;ht>.n -PEO PLE,- At{) RECENT IHO ICATIONS OF I NCREASED SOVIET INVOLVE MEN! IN THE MILITARY FIELD HERE, SUGGEST 'that A SOVIET -GUARANTEE- OF THE REVOLUT ION MAY BE THE INDUCEMENT OFFERED THE KHAl.GIS IN RETURN FCfl THE SACRIF'ICE~ WHICH!'lAY BE NECESSARY TO REVERSE THE T IDE OF CURRENT EVENTS. END OF Sl'M!'1AR Y. to- M 8... U Q c: 0 ~ c: ~ ~ '" 0... ~.; en ~ Z-.. f: en = 0..,-... ~.. Ji :i. c::.. Ė ".. J:.!-o c.i > U c:: < >-!-o ~ ii: ::> ~~ u r.j en...j < Z vj-~ V1 2!-o vy:'/ < ẓ. J.-. ~ -= E 0.. ""

70 /'.~'t\ 4. II""r l'" ;'/-J(V. \J"~~" (t' ~ y~~'.. ~ 3. A ~AR em FOR A POL ITJ CAL R SDLU110ff!IF' DOIll ST I C PROSl EMS PlAY BE lif1)erway. OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THERE HAVE BEE~ A IIl1tBER OF DEVElOPl'lENTS WHICH SUGGEST THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERN BABL Y AT SOVIET tl'ging, "AY BE SEEKING A" PO THAN ' TIC OPPOS. "E HAS BOlDLY, AI.. PERHAPS DISIN- GENUOtlSL Y, DEa.ARED ITS LAND REF~f'1 frogr~1'i successrlilly COfllfLETm CREF A), THEREBY AT LEAST AVOIDING the CREATION or FLRTHER OPPOSITION ALONe THE L IHES THAT PARTICULAR RE- FORI'! fteaslr APPARENTLY HAS frdrlpted SINCE ITS INCEPTIOH. LIKEWISE, ACCORDING TO RECEm HINTS BY PRII'JE "INISTER AIUN, THE DRA'S LITERACY CAI'IPAIGN, WHICH HAS PROVOKED HOSTILITY 1.N THI~ EXTREPJEL Y CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY BECAUSE "OST AFGHANS DO NOl WISH TO SEE THEIR FE"ALES EDUCATED EVEII TO RUDIPJERTARY LEVas, OR -EXPosm- TO fliale TEACHERS, "AY SOON BE DECLARED A -SUCCESS.- A DRA ANNOUNCE"ENT ON Jtl. Y 11 PROMULGATING SEVERAL "CONCESSIONS- TO THE PR IVATE SECTOR OF THE EtONOPlY REPRESENTED, INTER ALIA, ANOTHER ATTE"PT TO "OLLIFY ANY oppo SJTIOft STE1'll''IING FROPJ FEAR OF THIS REGI"E'S FutURE ECONOPlIC POLICIE~. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT APPARENTLY HAS BEGUN TO DIS TANCE ITSELF frojil A NuPlBER OF ITS MORE APIBITIOUS UD GRATING REFORJIlS, NOT NECESSAR ItY BECAUSE THEY WERE ILL-COfiCEIVED, OR UNNECESSARY, BUT PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY WERE OVERZEALOUSl Y INITIATED -- AND AP01!SED SERIOUS RE'5ISTANCE. 4. REPORTS OF tlegotiatiotis- A"ONG THE REGIME, THE SOVIETS, AND SEVERAL LEADERS OF FDRIIIER GO" R'lENT S WOtlJ) ALSO POI NT TO AN EFFORT TO ESTAELISH SOME SOP. OF -NATIONAL FRONT- (REf B), COPlI'IENTS BY USUAlL Y WEl..L-INfORfilED EASTERN ElItOPEAN AND SOVItT DIPLOI'IATS HERE LEND A CERTAIN ~EDENCE TO THIS PARTICt1.AR THESIS (REF C). U1 THIS CONNECT ION, THE REPORTED RElEASE FROl'\ PRISON OF PARCHAJIlISTS (REF D), AM> THAT GROUP'S SUBSEQL'ENT PRINTING API) WmESPREAD DISTRIBUTION or UNDER GROUND- LETTERS CREF E) ATTACKING, INTER ALIA, Al"IIN AND OTHER ELEI"!ENTS OF THE REGIME, REINFORCE THE CONTENTION THAT CER TAIN forces ARE WORKING TO PROVJDE SOME FORM OF LEADERSHIP AND PARTY MORE BROADLY BASED THAN THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN Cf'[)PA). 5. ON THE FOREI~ POLICY FRONt. AS WELL SOME SIGNS HAVE SEEN DtTt"CIED THAT SUGGEtt A DEVELOPING PROGRAM TO AVOID OR DRAW BACK SELECTIVElY FROPI CONFRONTATION. THE EARLY JULY VISIT TO IS LAMABAD ElY DEPUTY F<liEIGN P1INISTER DOST HAS BEEN THE!'lOST IMPOR TANT DEVaOPl'lENT ALONG THESE LINES, ~SPECIALLY SINCE THERE HAS BEEN RECENTLY A SLIGHT /'IODERATION IN THIS GOVERNMENT S ANTI- ST , o ọ. ọ.. ~ :> en.,-... = ọ ~ c CI E ;:; o " -= Eo ~

71 y.3vv [SA 15 0l'IJ C664 RR RUQClJIfi DE RUSBLK 15433/2 1"'718 ZNY CCCCCZZH R 1P!5~'Z JtL 19 '" AMEJlIBASSY IABll. TO RUEHClSECSUTE WASJlDC.4154 lifo RUWlGU/AftEMASSY AllAR A.36'" RUNJPG/A"~BASSYBEIJING 622 RUSBCDI'A1'l P1BASSY llafliabad 9022 Rt:JllIRAI'APlEPlBASSY JIDDA "34. RlJ)TClAMEPlBASSY LOmOR 1684 RUEHJIIIOI'M IlIBASSY PlOSCOW 1744 RUSBA I'APlEPlBASSY NEW DELHI 7876 RUFIPSlAPl MBASSY PARIS 31'.3 RUQIlIlfi/APlDlBASSY TEIlRAI 325 RUFHNA/USMISSIOR USNATO 16 RUHQKQA/CltlCPAC RU!i=NAAA/CI NCEUR BT COR Fl D NT I A L SECT loti 2 OF 3 KABUl 5433 CIICPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD CIICElR: ALSO FOR POl.AD E.O : GOS ' (TA\'lOR. JAPlES E.) OR-P. PAKIstAN PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. I'J(REOVER t WE HAVE BEE. TOSED A FEW I'JINOR OL IVE-TWIGS LATE1. Y -- RELATIVD. Y HIGH-LEVEL ATTENDANCE AT OlR JlLY.. RECEPT IOII. A FIRST -EVER " TUG t AT AF'GHU INITIATIVE, BETWEEN APIU AND A VISITING USICA LEamER -- WHICK COllLDUDICATE THAT THE DBA "~ :: ~~terested IN 1 IEIJlG OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSI!!f-fiNCuE NADIR IT HAS REACHED IN RECENT MOUTKS. -. I BJrn. 79 i ~ IDz....., g... o cc os DO ~ "~ ọ.. :; cii - ọ.,..... :: E o c::

72 6. HIGH-LEVEl. SOVIET DJPLO!'AT COULD BE T~~PUTg1BEHI" THESE DEVELOf'lllERtSa AU OF THESE SIGIIS KA ERG SliCE THE EARLY JUNE ARRIVAL IN XABUL OF SOVIEt DIFLOMAT VASIL Y SAJiRoH~Ok, FtJ(JlIER AMBASSADOR TO GHANA, FelnlER DEPUTY PER JlIANENT REPR ESEIf1' AnVE AT THE UlflTED RATIONS, AND A CAREER DlflOJllAT vith APPRENTLY SOLID POLITICAL CONllEcrIONS, VHO IS OBVIOUs.. Y OVER-QUalIFIED TO SERVE AS THE THIRD-ftAIXUG "AN IN THE SOVIET D1BASSY IN -KABUl (HIS PROTOCOl. RANK VHICH NO ONE HERE 8 LIEVES). PRICII TO HIS ARRIVAL, STIBIES CIR CtLATm IN KABUl AND IN JlIOSCOV THAT SAFROIICHUK VOILD SERVE AS SOI'lE SORT or -ADVISOR- TO THE HIGHEST LEVElS OF THE AFGHAN GOVERRPlENT, sranes WHICH PlAY HAVE BEEI BORIIE OUl' BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. GIVEI SAFRORCHUIr S EXPERIENCE, WE BEtIEVE IT SAFE TO CONO-WE THAT HE IIAY HAVE COIlE TO AFGHANIsru with ORDERS TO TRY All) Fum A P01.ITICAL, RATHER THAN P~E1.Y IlJILITARY, RESOLUTION OF THIS COUNTRY'S DOfIESTIC STRIFE, FROBAaL Y "ost I"PORTANTLY 11 ORDER TO PBECLQPE A DRA APPEAL E.CR DIRJCt soviet PlIUTAR Y HELP IN Sf AYING AFt.OAT. II tris CONNCE lor, "osr OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT SAFRONCHUX HAS NO ROR"Al FUNcnOI IN THE SOVIET DlBASSY. ALTHOUBH SOPIE OF THE suunses ABOUl' SAFRONCHUX S IUSSION ARE SPECUlATIOH, VE BElIEVE THAT THE SUDDE'MESS OF'. AND THE PECUlIAR ClRCUPl ~ANCES SffiROUflHNG, HIS APPOINT"ERT, HIS STATUS SINCE HIS ARRIVAL, AM> THE POLICYDEVElOPfllENTS 10TED ABOVE, CLEARLY ltoicate: THAT "OSCOV IS trging, IF NOT PRESSURING, the DRA TO TAKE sreps TO REVERSE THE TIDE OF EVENTS, All) TO PRE SERVE THE INTEGR IT Y OF THE REVOLUT I'p ~ {) Q - ọ.,:. - " co E u ọ...r::!- Czl > t3 c: < >!- 2 ::l {) Czl Ul..:l < Z o i=<z u :5

73 7. IONS WHICK ON THE DR A TO F1 TICAl. SOLUT ION I THE AFGHAII REGINE S APflRENT INABILITY -- OR UHWILLIIGNESS -- TO utmertaice, ON ITS OWN S1'EPS WHICH wollo STABSLIZE THE DETER IORATING SECURITY AND' POLITICAl. SITUATION U THE COUNTRYSIDE, OR BROADEN THE GOVER fililent S BASE OF SUPPORT, would flrobabl. Y CONST ITUlE THE GREATESI' IfllPETUS Fal ANY SOVIET DECISION TO URGE, CAJOLE, OR PRESS!.fiE THE AFGHAIl LEADERSHIP TO SEEK POLITICAl. SOLUTIONS- TO ITS PROBLEfIIS. LUnJISE, P10SCOW l'jay WELL HAVE WAITED to DEFtECI' THE DRA' S WILLINGNESS TO BUILD T NSIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS (ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN), A TREND WHPCH COULD HAVE LED TONUN AFGHAN APPEAL FOR SOVIET HELP TO COUlTER FalEIGN -AGGRESSION" (REF F>. l'jal OVER. THE CHILL III AFGHAII-U.S. RElATIONS, AfI) THE DRASI'IC REDUCTION OF OUR ECOIOPlIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAfll (ESPECIALLY SINCE THE JUL Y 13 VOTE BY A SENATE-HOUSE CON FERENCE COI'JPlITTEE TO cur AID). COULD ALSO HAVE BEER VIEWED BY.THE IGID1LIN AS COUNTER TO SOVIET LARGER INTf:RESTS, SINCE l'joscov al ITS SlRROGATES WILL PROBABlY HAVE TO TAKE UP THE ASSISTANCE 9.ACK IF OTHER FREE-lIalLD DONORS DEPART FROft THE AID FIELD HERE, AND BECAUSE AN) EVEt.! GREATER PERCEIVED DEPENDENCE BY THE DRA ON THE SOV lets WOlJ1.D PROBABLY EXAIERBATE THE DOftEST IC UNREST, RATHER THAN APIEl.I~ATE IT. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, A CONCERN THAT AN ArTHAN SOS VAS BECOJI/ING PlOOE AND PlORE LIxtly. AS WELL AS-JUSI'IFIED- INTERPIS OF THE 1978 BILATERIAL TREATY, AT A TIPIE WHEN fii0scow HAD larger INTERSTS WHICH IT PROBABLY Dm NOT WANT TO THREATEN BY PlRSUING A DECISION TO INTERVENE, MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE BOTTOJI/-LINE CONSIDERATION IN DIS PATCHING SAFRONcHUK ON HIS PlJSSION TO KABUL s. A POLITICAL RESOlUTION WIll PROBABt Y REQUIRE PlORE -CON CESSIONS- THAN HAVE SlfiFACED HERETOFORE: BASED ON OUR READ ING OF WHAT MAKES THE INSlRGENTS FIGHT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ORA leadership WILL HAVE TO SWEATEN THE POT CONSIDERABLY liiore BEFORE THE TIDE CAN BE TmNED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE VARIOUS REFORM PROGRAfIIS DID INDEED CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL TO THE GROWT.H Or DOMESTIC HOSTILITY TOWARD THIS REGIJl/E, BUT, NEVERTHELES~. THE ovmwheuii NG MOTIVATION EM 1II0 ST AFGHAN HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS HAS BEEN THEIR PERCEPT ON THAT THE KHAL IS ARE PUPPETS. o D THESE DEEA. Y-HElD BElIErS WIll ClEARLY R U GREAT SKILL AM) SUBSTANT IVE CONCESSIONS WELL EXCEEDING WHAT THE REGIME HAS DONE SO rar. WHETHER THE SOVIETS AND THE DRA LEADERSHIP CAN CQlIIE UP WITH AGREED AND NECESSARY NEXT STEPS REfIIAINS TO BE SEEN, But THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEIR TASK Ie: FOR[IlIDABLE. S. AVA TlABLE OPTIONS ARE NOT PlENT IFLn..; IF, IN ract, THE GROWTH OF THE OPPOSITION HAS NOT BEEN COfllPLETEl Y STUNTED BY THE GOVER N[IlENT " S REPRESSIVE MOVES SO rar, THERE STIll ARE NOT [IlANY MORE STEPS AVAILAELE TO CREATE AN ALTER NATE REGIME WHICH WOULD CARRY An GENUINE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING THE TIDE, YET STOP SHOR OF' THREATENING THE INTEGRITY OF THE REVOL UT ION. BT # to M 8... o to- O'-en = oco>...

74 I NNNNVV ise041kjce73 RR RUQMEli DE R~SJt, «5433/3 IPSZ725 ZNY CCCCC ZZIi! 18l525Z JOL 79 FI'I A~EI'1B.1.SSY,:U:'L fo!d!~c/sics!at! ~AS:DC 4755 ~ INFO P.UQtlGlI/At1EI'1BASSI ANUli.A ~ 5 5 a RUt1JPG/AHEMBASSJ BtIJI~G 523 ~ R05B~D/AM~IAS5! I~1!~~!AD ~~?~! ROQMRA/AM!~fA55J JIDDA 341 i IUDfC/AMEHBASST LONDOK 1595 o aoibho/ahehbassy MOSCO~ 1745 I RnSJAE/AM!HBASSt Nr.~ DELEI 7177 aulnps/akekbassy PARIS 3154 I aoqmbi/.lhe"basst UHRiN 3:ae ROBQ!QA/CINCPAC IUFBNA/OSHISSIOH OSMATO 17 _ ROSHlAA/CINCEOR :n CON lid E N f I A L SECTION 3 OF 3!ABct 5433 CINCPAC: ALSO lor POtAD CINCIUll: ALSO lor POLAD : GDS (TA!LOR, JAMES!.) OR-P le. THE 1'10ST pao!able s AND PERHAPS T~I MOST rcessaii!:woold BE A ~AN~! Ii fhe DB 5 Tnp ttifiersbip. ECNOHpASSI~G!BJ f DllARTURE OF A"I~ OR TJRA~I -- oa BOTE. BASED ON SOME IN DICATIONS (fig RICIN! spite OF UNDtRGROUND TRA~S. MOS! or VlICH RAVE BITtERLY A'l'UCKED AMI"), AND ON j,--c:eneaal -FEEL" AMONG VIRfUALLY ALL OUR AFGHAN CONTACTS, ~ARAII I1GL1 VIEVED AS A FIGUREHEAD W!O SEOULD N ~ '!'BE R NSIDERED RESPONSIELE lor,., PPROESSIVE POLICIES OF ARRES'!', TORTURE, AND iiecufion, AS WELL AS THE DRIVING FORCE!E~IND THE :RAT ING DOt1ESfIC RElORM PROGRAMS, AND AFGEANISTAN'S ARDENT EM BRACE or 'l'be USSR. 'l'ber1fort, ANI SINCERE ATTEMPT TO RECON- CILI 'fbe YORelS LOOSE IN ArG~ANIS'l'AN TEROUGE A LEADEiSEIP CHANGI WOULD P10!ABLY HAVE TO INCLUDE T~E DEPA3TURE, oa -- ]) II'!''!!R YET - TB~El'1'8 or 'Ml.~ (IN THIS LAND OF TEE ilood FEUD, SOME ~RALQl LErmfi HAS TO PAY THE TRADITIONAL PRICE FOR T50USANDS OF DEA'l'?S). WE COULD rores3~ A SC~NARIO IN WRICH TARA!I WOULD RE- MAIN AS THE POLITICALLY IMPOTZNT "GR:!1T LtAD'ER. - IN TEIS REGARD, TEE~ONSTANTLI!UILDIN; TARA~I "PERSONALITY CUL'l'ft (SY~BOLIZ1D MOS RECENTLY!! THE tavise CELEB3ATIONS SURROUNDING HIS 62ND JIB DAY ON ~ULY-l4l SUG~ES'l'S TBA'!' 'l'a~lki's DEPA~TURE WOULD BE A VIE HIN~ ONl:JOR~E REVOLUTION, AND ~OULD EE UNDERTAKEN ONLY AS... M o ọ.. o c c: c ~.: ~ " ~ = ọ., c; ~... c:. Ė ọ...c: I- c.i ~ C3 c: -< > l- e: :J (,) Col...l '" < :z: o f= -< :z:....c: E o ~

75 A'D~~prqA'E LAST RESORT. INCIDENTALLY. TARAKI IS STILL RESPECTED BY ELEMENTS IN NON-~BALQI S~MENTS or AFGBAN SOCIETY. PARTICULARLY IN r?1 RANIS 01 T!E EDnCATED H! SALItNT QUESTION, OF COURSE, IS WfETBER THE SOVIETS CARRY S~!FICI ~' ~tigbt TPAT TstIR -ADVICE- COULD COHVINCt TliA~I ANt/OR AMIN TO SACRIFICE BIM~ ~ SELF FOR THE SAKE OF fee levoluti0n. EVERYTHING VOOLD DEPEND ~ ON!OY SUCH ADVICE ~AS COUCHED. PROBAEGY THI MOST TIA-! ILE APPROACP ALONG TBES!. LINES WOULD EX TBE T6E515 TEIT TBi ; STA'~ O~ AFFAIRS ror TBIS GOVIRNH!N! BAS RIACHED TBr POINT P IFA! T!E SPIER EIISTEKCE or THE REVOLUTION MAND1TES TBE 5 BONO!ABLE AND VOLUHTARY- RETIREMENT OF ~ERT1IN MEHBERS OF J TBE DiA L1ADE1SBIP. AT TBE SAMZ TI~E, MOSCOW VOULD leer!-! AFfEP. -GUAiANtEE- THE FUTU'-E OF TE~ REVOLUTION '!ROUGB PLEDGiS OF INCREASED MILI~A!Y AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. RECENT STATE JMENTS JY TEE SOVIET ELITE PROMISING SUPPORT FOR TB! AFGFAN! PEOPLE, AND TiE 4B1 IVALo I~ AFJ EAN1&TAN or DOZENS or SOiIET _ HELICOPTER PItOt~. INDICAfEf T:!T HOSCO~ IS PROBABLY 1! :1rSSURING tbe DR! LEADEiS!!P OF CONTINUED SOVIET!AC~IN~, DESPITE TBE SIMULTANEOUS CAHPAI~N TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLU!ION. li. SOVIET ~ISCALCutATIO~ OE FEAVT-PANDEDNESS. OR A TAR1~1 AMIN DECISIoN TH1T they TRULY RATF. NO OPTION, aut 10 FOR;E!BEAD ALONG CURRENT PATES, COULD VERY POSSIBLY SCOTCE ANY SlAKe! FOR A NON-HILITA3T APPROAC! TO THE INS~RGENCY. VI DOUBtT fbat THE SOTIETS ARE.ILLING OR ABLE TO FORCE THE RE-' HOVAL O! ANT OF THt D!A LEAD~XSfIP. ALTROU~E MOSCOW MAY EVENTUALLY DECIDE TO LEND s~ppoat ro ANT ELEMENts ~HICE DISPLAY A~ INCLINATION TO SETTLE TaE CONYLICTSSORT or AN APPEAL roa DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY HELP. THIS COULD INct~D! A COUP D'ETAT BY THE AFGEAN MILITARY. 13. INTRANSIGENCE C~ fef PARr or TARAll AND AMIN, OR AN ABORTED SOVIET CA~PAIGN WFICE MAY NOW BE UNDERWAY. WOULD PROB ABLY SIGNAL "MORE OF rae SAMr" FROM THE DR1. A STANCE wbicb WOULD LiADE TO rurt ER CONTLIC1. BLOODSHED, AND INSTABILITY. THIS LOW ERED TBRiSEOLD or VIOLENCE -OULn. O! COURSE, CARRY SERIOUS ECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR FORIIGN!~S STATIONED IN TBIS COUNTRY. 14. CO~CLUSIONS:.E MAY BE IN TEt MIDST OF A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO NUDG! OR PuSB AFGHAN POLICIES IN DIRECTIONS ~EICB _OULD REVE~S~ THE GROWTB or DOMESTIC OPPOSITIO~, lnt D~rcs! DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN HOSTILITY TO T~I~REGIME' SO TEAT. IN THE LAST Ah!LYSIS. MOSCOW ~ILL NOT EAV : TO FACE ln AFGHAN APPEAL FOR DIRECT MILITARY HELP. AT!HE AM1 TI~E; STATEMENTS!Y TEE SOVIET ELITF. AND INDI- CAT NS OF INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT SUGGEST A o Q c S ~ c =

76 E o ~ PA~AL1EL POLICY AIMED AT INSU?IN: TEE FUTURE or TEZ i~f01~ TION. A~TEOUGB PERHAPS iit~cut TB! P!ESFNT ~OMPOSITIO~ Of TBE AFGHAN LEADtRSr.IP. 1~. ~AFRONCH~~ COULD ~L T=t ~OC1L EE~IaD-TBI-SCENES ~Ii!CTC~ OJ TaIS?ARTICU1Ai DRAMA. EUT T3F P?O'Li~E AND PITFALLS CON FRONTING 'ElM l~d TEF DR! LIAD:RS IP lrl tor~ida»l!. AND f~i UNK~OWNS REMAINING I~ T3r. t~ta~ion A~~ STILL NUMERO~S. ~~SfU!Z IT ~54~3 =

77 VV ESAI49/1lJC Ill! QPIIfi DE RUS8\. K 15459/1 1991~e0. ZNY ~SSSS ZZM C R 1!1240l JU- 79 Fl': AME~BASSY KABtl. TO RUEHC/SECST ATE WASHOC IPlI'lED late 4767 INFO R UrY.E:B/AI'l I'lBASSY BERLIN ""26 RUSBli:D/AI':EI':BASSY IS1.AJlIABAD 9~f RUE~O/AJlIEJlIBA~~Y MOSCOW RUSBkE/AJWiEJlIBASSY NEW DELIU 70l'S RUQ"I1fi IAPlE!W'BASSY TEHR AN 0331 RlJ!W!JPG/A"'E~BASSY BEIJING ~627 BT c: E 1 ~ECT ION 1 OF 2 KABUl TAGe::: SUaJ: I BJut7S EiS: RDS 7/18199 (AI'lSTuTZ. J. BRUCE).CR-J11 PINT. PINR. AFt lis (S) GDR AMBASSADM REPORTS THAT SOVIETS HOPE TO REPlACE PH Ir.E MINISTER AlliIN WITH A BROADER BASED GOVT. REF: KABlA (S - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. Slr.I'IARY. I HAVE JUST HAD AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING with 6ERPIAN DEIlIOOlATIC REPUBLIC AMBASSADOR DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU. IT AA~ EXTRAORDINARY ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE -DISCLOSED- WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET INTENTIONS HERE INa.VOING THE UKaIHQOD OF A C:QVTET-BACKED MOVE TO OUSI PRID'!' liiintsie1ljiaf'iz!a.lah AMIN. OVER THE LAST 3 WEEKS WE HAVE HAD HINTS OF A POSSIBLE "SOVIET-ASSISTED INTERN~.L COUP. BOTH FRQrlI GDR AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAU (KABUl ) AND EARLIER FROf'I SOVIET I'lINISTER COUNSElOR VASII..IY STEPANOVICH SAFRONCHUK (KABUl ). THIS!IME. THE GDR AMBASSADOR WENT IlIUCH FURTHER IN SPELLING OtlT ~OVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ORA, TKE ~OVIET DILEllIl'IA ABOUT WHH TO DO, AND THE?OS~IBILITY OF AN INTERNAL PARTY COU~ 10 EI..!P!INATE AlliIN. HE HINTED THAT THIS (\light OCCUR IN AUGUST. END SUMMARY. i 3 ~n, PoL C'vt9 t!(..l1'" (Lf (..\if'1....., o ọ.... -= Eo c::

78 4. SOVIET DISSATISFActION WITH THE ORA: YESTERDAY WE SU'T A REPORT CREnEL) ANAlYZING THE PRESSURE~ SEEr.INGL y. BUILDING UP FOR AN INTERNAL CHARGE IN THE DRA LEADERSHIP.' WHAT. SCHlIIESAU TOLD "E AT Olft fleeting CONFIRMED ALL THIS, INCLUDING THE DeI!'J'ENCE OF BEHIND-THE-SCE""[S NEGOTJATI'ONS BY SOVIET ffirisi'er-cou8selor SAFRONCHUK WITH PDPA PARTY LEADERS AND others TO ElR IHG ABOUT AN INTER NAL CHANGE. SCHWIESAU REPEATEDLY C:t;'~ T!!AT ~HE ~OVIET~ 'a'ff'f. DEcrPLY O1~R!E!) nvfr TP.E wnru:f.nu:; SlTUATIUN IN AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID, -THEY KNOW THE REGlPlI:: HAS LITTLE PUBLIC SUPPORT AND IS LOSING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY. WHILE TELLING PIE THIS, HE ALSO SAID, -WE ARE DETERPIINED TO SAVE. THE REVOLunON.- 5, SCJIIJESAU a.early LAID THE BLAflIE FOR THE DRA'S TROUBLES ON FlUIlIE 'UNISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER HAFIZUlLAH A"IN. HE DESaUBED AII1IN AS -TIlE STRONG (lian- IN AFGHANISTAN. -HE!'ERSONAlLY RUNS THE ERIIRE GOVT,- HE SAID, -CONTROLLING THE ARffY, THE INTERIOR I'IIRIstRY, AM) HE P1AKE~ AlL II'IPORTANT DECISIONS,- A/''HN HAS BLUfI)ERED BADLY, HE SAID, IN THE WAY!fE HAS IMPLEPlENTED THE GOVT'S ECONOI'IIC AND REFORM PROGRAI'IS, AND PARTICtLARLY IN THE WAY HE HAS -HARSH!.. Y"' ACTED AGAINST PERSONS HE SllsPEcrm I'IIGHT OPPOSE HIM., <.. ċ -".r. ~ C..... en ~ Z., f CIl V> == ~~ nv~ ~. I I I ~ :3 <:. Ė -.; 0...<: f- c.i > 0 c:: < >- f- 2 :> 0 k) en ~ I < % 0i=<%.. :: E 0 ~

79 I \ I 6. C:CHWJESAt' DJSl'lISSED TML'KJ ls JNEUEcrJVE. HE: DESCRIBED HIIll A~ AN-OLb, KINDLVTEACHER, PKll0S~AND WRITER- WHO J!' WEU ]NTENTIONED, AND LOVES THE ADUlATION P.EA~ ON HIM It. TP.E PRESS ( ESPECIALLY THE PICTI'RES""). WE SUSPECT,- C:CHWIESAU caid, -THAT HE DOEC' NOT KNOlll P1UCH OF' WHH IS GOING O~ IN TliF COUNTRY." 7. SOVIET l'!ai:el'vers: ~CHWIESAt; COHFIRfllEO THAT SOVIET ~IHISTER-COCNSE1.0R SAFRONCH'.'K HAS BEEN GIVEN THE TASK, BY r.oscow, TO B!H NG ABOll1' ~ -R AD I CAL CHA NGt" IN THE GOV!. SAFRONCHUK WAS GIVEN THIS' TA51(, SCHWIESAU SAID, BECAUSE,.. TT J~ NOT r,o{;d FOR THE l;ov let Ar.BA~SADOR HII'ISElF TO BE SEEN HOLD ING THE~E DEl.rCATE NEuOTIATIONS. HE CONTINUED, -IF n!e~e tjegotlatiot~s FAIL, AND/OR SAFRONCHUK \oi RE EXPElLED AS PERSONA ~ON SfATA, THAT k'otld ATTRACT LESS ATTENTl<JN AND BE LES~ OF A DIF'LCI':AlIC EI'!BARRASSMENT FIM THE SOVIET UNION THAN IF Ar.9~SSADOP. PUZANOV WERE EXPELLED.- 9. AS To WHAT IS LIKtLY TO HAPPEN, SCHWIEc.-AlI Cl,_ ~ND CAT ED Tli T ACl NTH I Nt; AI':IN AND PERHAPS OTHFRc, IS AHAT THE SOVIET~ INTEND. S'CH\tIES~U ~A!D HER!:' ARE NOil DEEP DJVISION~ IN IRE PDPA PARTY,'f1AHY /'IF :..:HocE LEAD!NG P1EPlBERS ARE VERY DJSSATISFIED '.'ITH THE?RESEtJT CO~S~ OF EVENt'S ~ND Al'IIN S LE4DER~HIP. HE SAID ih~t WHAT!~ NEEDD> IS A NEW fir IME MINISTER WHO IS A -STRONG PlAN AND -NOT IDE~'TIFIED- \lith "PRE~ENT POLICIES. ::. WHEN I MENTIONED DEFENSE MINISTER WATAN.JAR AS A POSSIBILl~Y, SCHWI~SAll ACTED A~ IF I HAD CAUt;HT HII'I IN A c:'ecret. AFTr:R" ~MJ~, ~ ~AID WATANJ~ IS - NOT A POlIl ICIAN, Sl!T OF COURSE T:;:- I':IL nary l~ KEY TO I\NY CHANGE." THEN HE W::NT Pt; TO OB!=:EF.VE T!oIIIT, SINCE THE REVOLUT ION, WAHNJ~R HAS NEVER!'lADE A..,.?F.::C~ THAT 1tA~ F'RINTlffi IN TH~ PRE~l= I'rID THAT HIS EX~cr ~OL!T! rr,l v IE,, S /IRE NOT CLE~R Ti) THE PUBLI C.!PH'\.. yitig BY T:f] S TH~T Il:ATANJAR ~/l.s.. Q.F.AN. - cchi.'iesal' WF:NT ON, HOl,:~VER, T0 'it NT T I.:AT IrJ HIL E WAT ANJ /lr MIG HT PL II Y f. ROLF. t N A COllNTER CIJt:p. n: ~j:,s NOT L!KEL Y TO BE?R I~E nnistep. ~ItoCF. "HE ':!6~ N0T ::~F!? I:: ~r:ed.- M too ọ. ọ.. ~ '" ọ., ;:; I I I E o c::

80 NtdJNVV ESA 15 laojch9 10!:!! t:'n~ 0:: r.~'sblk 1'15459/ '" Z NY C'C'~c;::; ZZH ') R I ~12421Z Jta.. n FY. ArEM3A c SY K~P~~ Tt) Rl'E'lC/~CSTATE WASHOC IPI~'::DJ~n: 476; urn p.uf!ofea/afi!e:w:b"~~y oertin -~27 RUS21)/A~E~BA~~Y ISLA~ABAD 9~29 ~\,I[~O/A~ Tojc~.5~Yp!oscow ABEl P.USBAf'/A Eff:2ASSY NEw DELHI RU::3ll1HR/AI'l!i"IBA~!;Y TEHRAN "'3.32 R 1II'lJFGIA:"Er-'BASSY BEIJING'62 CJ 1:\T.. E C RET SECTION 2 OF 2 KAStl Ii. SEVER Al T II'lES SCHW IESAU SAID, -WE ARE NOW seei NG THE ClOSI Nt' C!'lAFt ~ OF TH! S GOVT." HE I'lUST HAVE USED THE TERI'l, ".Q..0~U1G CHAPTER-, AT LE~ST TlltEE TIJIlES TO PIE. AS TO WHEN THE CHANGE WAS LIXEl Y TO OCCUR, C;CHWIESAU HINTED THAT IT COlLD HAPPEN ANY TIME BlIT WalLO PlOST LIKELY TAKE PlACE IN CAUGllS'G) HE SAm HE WAS SEHDTNG HIS wift TO AST BERLIN SOON FOR -TlftEE OR FO~ WEEKS REST.- AfI) LATER HE TOLD IIIE HE HII'!SELF COlLD Nor POSSIBlE LEaVE KABUl THIS SUPlPlER SINCE -AUGUST J~ t;oint TO BE HOT. AND I DON-T MEAN THE weather_ EARLIER IN OIR CONVERSATION, HE SAID THAT THE SITUATION WITHIN THE GOVY WAS HIGR.Y UNstABLE AM) THAT SECURITY IN KABUL COULD DETERIORATE ANY TIME, so FAST IN FACT THAT IT WOUlD BE - IJ'llPOSSIBlE TO EVACUATE DEPENDENTS." 11. ~OVI'EJ INTERESI~: SCHVIESAU SAID THAT NO INTER NAL PARTY -R~.D I cal CHANGE" COULD oecm HERE WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT t AND THAT SOVIET INTERESTS WOlt.D HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNl BY ANY NEW AFGHAN GOVT. "AFTER ALL, - HE SAID, "AFGHANISTAN BORDERS THE ~OVIET UNION AND JUST AS YOU HAVE A SPECIAL INTEREST IN ANYI'HING HAPPENING IN CANADA AND /'IEXICO, THE SOVIET UNION HAS A!=PECIAl INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN.- lhus, HE SAID, A POLITICAL SOLUTION HAS TO TAKE: INTO ACCOUNT T~8f FACTQRS r ;'SAV!NG THE FACE OF THE SOVIETS, SAVING THE FACE THE AFG.l'AN L.!A.~TY (PDP-A', AND SAVING THE FA~ /'IUSlIMS.-.., U Q c Ṣ. c ~.. :0;..: 0... ~ ::l en :0; Z c; ~ iii =0 -..,... >:... c.ė a...l: f-o c.i > U a: < >- f-o 2 ::> c.> ~ en...:l < Z 0 e::: < ẓ. -:: E 0 ~

81 12. IN CONNECTION WITH SAVING SOVIET FACE, SCHWIESAU SAID T~AT T'iE SOVIETS MAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THEIR RELATIONSHIP AND REPUT ArION WITH OTHER PARTIES AROUND THE wmlo. IF THE SOVIETS WERE SEEN TO ABANDON THE PARTY HERE IN AFGHANISTAN, HE SAID,!T WOlLO HAVE A -VERY UPSETTING EFFECT ON PARTIES El.SEWHERE WHICH WERE F1UENDLY with MOSCOW. THIS COPIMENT TRACKS with HIS COMMENT "ENTIONED ABOVE (PARA -') THAT, "'WE "'US! SAVE TKE REVOLUtION QUEc:TION OF SOVIET lllilitary INTERVENtION IN AFGHANISTAN. TOWARD THE Eft) OF Otfi CONVERSATION, SCHWIESio' VOLUNTARILY RAISED THIS C:UESTION. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE THERE WAS SPECULATION IN THE DIPLOPIATIC COJIIJllUNITY AS TO whether THE SOVIETS WOULD, IN THE LAST ANAlYSIS, INTERVENE 1111LITARILY IN AFGHANlSTAN. -WERE THEY TO DO SO, HE SAID, - IT WOlLD SOLVE ONE PROBLEM BUT ~EATE ANOTHER.- SOVIET INTERVI'NTION COULD ELlflIINATE THE PRESENT GOYT THEREBY SOLVING ONE PROBLEM. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, OlEATE A~OTH R PROBLEPJI NAMELY, THAT THE -ENTIRE AFGHAN NATION VOILD T lfi N AGAl NST THE SOVIETS, JUs\" AS THE AFGHANS TUR NED AGAlIiST THE -mutish INVADERS- IN THE 19TH CENTDRE. HENCE, HE SUD, IT "ADE NO SENSE FOR THE SOVIETS TO INTERVENE III IL IUft IL Y. 1~. "ihe PARCHA~ISIS: SCH"'IESAU, IN DISCUSSING THE PARCHAIUSTS, COPlPlENTED THAT TARAKI HIMSELF HAD BEEN ACCEPTABLE 10 THE PARCHA!'!IST WING. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE with HAFIZUl.LAH APlIN. EX ILED PARCHAJlJIST LEADER t BABRAK KARflIAl, AND APlIN wme -'RIVALS. SCHWIESAU OBSERVED THAT IT WOtl.D BE IPlPOSSIBLE FOR APlIN AND BABRAK KARPIAL 10 BE IN THE SAJIIE GOVT. REFLECTING ON THE TWO WINGS OF THE PARTY AT THE TIPIE OF THE REVOLUTION, SCHWIESAU CONFJRI'lED Olfi IfffRESSION THAT THE PARCHAJlJISTS HAD A WIDER FOLLOWING THAN THE KHAlQIS WITHIN TH! PARTY AND APIONG l!.ab.u S't'l'lPATHIZERS, Bur THAT THE KKAlQIS WERE STRONGER IN THE I'lIL1.l.@Y. THE LATT R ~ STRENGTH IN THE MILITARY PROVED DECISIVE, SCHltlIESAU OBSERVED, IN PlilGING THE PARCHAPIISTS. I ASKED HI'" WHETHER HE HAD INFORI'IATION AS WE DID, THAT MANY PARCHAPIISTS HAD eeen RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PUL-E-CHARKI PRISON. HE SHOOK HIS HEAD. HE SAID THOUGH THAT, AT THIS PRESENT JUNCTURE I N THE ~ ISES FACING THE ORA, IT WAS NOl ENOUGH TO BR IHG BACK PARCHAMISTS INTO THE GOVT. rr IS NECESSARY TO BR CADER THE BASE OF THE GDVT rar BEVON) THE PARCHAJIlISTS.- n:o OTHER THINGS NEED TO BE DONE TOO, HE SAID. ONE WAS TO RELEASE MANY POlITICAL PH ISONER~ (-EVEN PARTY MEMBERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED-', AND THE OTHER WAS FOR A NEW GOVT TO BE -FIREND!=: WITH THE PlOSlEPI COUHTR IES.-... M o ọ.. ọ.. '" ": en - ọ.,... E o ~

82 15. sns ANI> PIECES: SCHWIESAU OBSERVED THAt THE DRA HAS -LOS]' CONTROL OF MANY PROVINCES. - WHEN I ASKED HIIlI FOR EXAf'lA. S, HE 5AlD KEP.AT (THOUGH WE KNOW HERAT CITY REMAINS IN DRA HANDS) AND THE PROVINCES IN THE CENTRAL PART OF THE COUNTRY (THE HAZARA..!AT REGION). 16. EE IU~W,*I~~lAr ~:FjUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS MORE ANGEROU~ IW H HAT Of PAKISTAN. WHEN I ASKED HII'! WHY.!it: SA!D IT WAS BECAUSE OF I S INFL ENCE W~ TME SHIlA POPLl.ATION WHICH RELIGIOUS ELEPI Nl PREDOPlIHATEED IN THE PROVISCES BORDERING IRAN AND IN TKE PROVINCED ""KING UP THE I'!OU~"TAINOUS CENTRAl P1A55IF. 17. THEN. SOI'IEWHAT IN CONTRADICTION TO THE ABOVE R l'lark.!ie SAID T~t.T THE PUS TUNS WERE POL IT ICAU Y THE "OST IPlPORTA../lT ETHNIC EL r:eni IN TlI CO(iNIRY. RENCE, SUCE SO flany OF THE pll~!'lfl'nswep.e. OPPOSING THE REGUJE P1ILITAR ILY,. THIS WAS ANOTHER ~ 10US POL IT ICAL PROBLEPI. l!l. COPlI'lENT: AS A REStLT OF THIS CONVERSATION. togemer WITH EAR1.IER ONES MENTIONED. WE a LIEVE THE EVIDENCE. JS NOW Q.EAR THAT THE SOVIERT ARE D ISSATISFI D WITH HArIttlLlAR Al'\IN "; ::: i~yi~ 10 ENGINEER A wbapicalo CHANG;. we ARE ALSO T lpieve THAT THE SOVIETS, BY fleans OF SAfRONCHUX S CONVERSATION WITH I'IE ON JUNE 24, AND SCHWIESAU'S two CONVER SATIONS WIT U~ ON JILY 9 AND 17, HAVE TRIED TO SEND US A SIGNAL. /THAT SIGNAL SEEMS TO BE THAt t THEY ARE UNHAPPY with THE APlIN L REGIPJ ' THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE A CHANGE, AND 81 Al'I SPEClLATING HERE) ARE HOPING THIS WILL NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE II'JPACT ON US. ONE COtll.D AL.SO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT, WITH THE OBVIOUS SLIPPING GRIP THE ORA HAS OVER THE COUNTRY, THE SOVIETS HOFE THAT BY BRINGING ABOut A CHANGE AND BROADENING THE BASE OF' THE ::CVT. Afi> BY POSSIBLY MAKING AMIN A SCI.PEGOAT, THEY CAN AVOID LOSING THEIR INVESTMENT IN THIS JIIARXIST PARTY At«) GOVT. AID AVOII> A MAJOR BLOW TO SOVIET INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE. BT 1'5459 A"'!'1'!rt'Z....., o ọ.. ọ.. ".:;." = ọ.,...?3....j c:. Ė o

83 "NNN~J ESA233l'1JCa62 00 J:!.JQllIHR DE RUsaLI( _e: ZIIY S5SSS ZZH o R 191B3R JlL 79 F'PI Al'IEl'IBASSY KABtL TO RUEKC/S[CSfATE WASHOC INFO RlJlIJPG/AME!ltBASSY BEIJING 63. RUFK B/AI'IEMBASSY BERLIN 28 RUSBQD/Al'IEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9e3J RlJt)fllJOI A~E"BASSY PIOSCOW 1753 RUSBAE/AI'IEMBASSY NEV DELHI 789. RUGnHR/AllIEPlBASSY TEHRAN JJ5 Sf S t ~E T MBlL 508 n'mediate U81 / [XDIS ~651 RDS-l 7/19/99 CFlATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-" tags: PINT, PINS, PINR, AF, GE, US SUBJECT: (5) FURTHER COI'IPlENt5 BY EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR ABOur SOVI l EFFORTS TO ALTER AFGHAN REGIKE REF: KABIL '45' 1. (5 - [NT IRE TEXT) 2. SIJlIIIIARY: [ASf GERMAN AMBASSADOR SCHVIESAU HAS IDENTIFIED CERTAIN IOH-PU5HTUN CABINET MINISTERS AS BEING IN SUPPORT OF CURRENT SOVIET fllackinations TO ALTER THE AFaNAN REGIME..:;:cHWIESAII THINKS II "IGJa 8E TOO LATE TO ACHIEVE A pm ITlCAJ,. 91.mION TO IHE PRESENT MESS 1M AFGKANIsrAN. END OF SUI'IMARY. Pol 0 M oc... v c c: c (1 /-17).,.}Jr j Cffi,...,1.. ' ~ ọ... CIl = ọ.,... ị....d ;:j C.Ė Oi o 3. DURING A CONVERSATION WIlH THE A~ AT A SOCIAl EVENT ON JtL Y 18, DR. h.::.rmann SCKWl'tSAU, AMBASSADOR OF TKE GERMAN DEPIOCRATIC REPUBLIC, EXPANDED SOMEWHAT ON THE PRESENTATION HE MADE TO CHARGE AMsrUTZ ON JULY 17 CONCERNING CURRENT SOVIET EFrORTS TO REsrRUcTURE THE AFGHAN REGUIE CREFTEl). SCHWIESAU EXE:RCIS D CARE TO \ CONVEY HIS VIEWS OM... Y TO THE APIERICAN OFFICER, CHANGING THE TOPIC OF CONVERSATION WHEN THE BRITISK AND JAPANESE \ AMBASSADOR S JOINED TKE GROUP

84 4. WHEI ASKED WHEtHER HE THOUGH PRINE IIIUSTER HA'IZULLAH ANII, THE PRIIIARY TARGET OF THE SOVIET NACHIIATIOIS, IS AWARE OF WHAT IS HAPPEIIIG, SCHVIESAU AFFIRNED THAT A"III IS VERY ALERT TO DEVELOPflENrS, But- PROBABLY 1M "'ARE Of ~RTHfIIG THAT HAS OCCURRED DURII~ ~~ P:~ WI, V~" qwu:t EFFORT HAS MOVED INTOJiEI PHASE: WHEN ASKED WHET HER Mill WOILD ACCEPT HIS FATE QUIETLY OR nena, SCHWIESAU REPLIED THAT IlE Dm.or XIIOV.,. AS fie"bers OF' THE ANrI-MlIIi ALI I.IIEIIY, SCHVIESAU IDEIII'InD THE FOLLOWING NIIISTERS, NOTUG THE SIIIIIFlCAILCE OF THE FACJ' THAT ALL ARE NOI-PUSHrUIU FUAIICE IIUISTER ABDIL KARl" 'USAQ, A HAZARAI JUSTICE "IIIISTER ABDIft. MXIPS SHARAI! JAUZJAlI, AN IJZBEXI PUBLIC WORKS "III5Th DASUSIR PANJSHIRI, A TAJIXI AND "liisrer OF I'FORNATION AIID CLTURE BARE;'SHAFEYE, A TAJIX. <HE DID Nor REITIO. (JI'HER IOI-POSHtUIS, LIKE MIIISTER OF CONIIDCE ABDUL QlDUS 8KORBAIDI, A TAJIX, OR fliiister OF "IllES AID INDUSTRIES "OIWUlAND ISftAn. DARESH, A XtllLBASH.> SCHVIESAU I"PLIED that AR I"PORTAIT PARt OF the CURREIft POLITICAL FRoa.Eft IS tile EXCESSIVE PUSKTURIZATION TEIDERCIES OF the CIJUtENI' IHALQI LEADERSHIP. C. WH II the A1DCfI OBSERVED THAT It low SEEMED A LITtLE LATE II THE nile FOR AR ATTEllPI' TO ACHIEVE A PCLITICAL SlLurIO. TO the JOIALQI IlESS, SCHVIESAU GRAVELY NODDED HIS AGREDlEIf. SCINIESAU FURTHER AGREED THAT A UIIIEL Y EXPANDED POLITICAL BASE WOU NOW APPEAR DIFrlClLT TO CONSTRUCT SliCE the IKALQIS SEU TO HAVE allelated AL"OST EVERY ELEMENT OF.,WKAI SOCIEty. ~~,../... M C;; u c oṣ. ". c: c: ~ r. 3: Vl :t: :z..~ en = 0..,... ~ c "E -.; t:l...c l- ui :> U ~ < :>- l- 2 ::> u C:J en,...l < :z 0 i= < :ẓ. = E2 "'"

85 , \. I 7. SCJNIESAU vile OR TO COPIPLAIN BITTERLY ABUT THE RASH INCOftPETENCE OF THE KHALQ! L ADERSHIP THAT UEVITABLY LED TO THE CtMR Nl SnUATlOIi. AS AM EXAPIPLE, t CITED THE COraROVERSIAL LAND REFOR.. PROGRA..; WHICH HAS BEEII RESPONSIBLE FOR P1UCH OF THE OPPOSITION 1M THIS COUIITRY. SCHVIESAU RECALLED THAt HE HAD VARIIED THE KHALQIS LAST YEAR TO GO!LOW WITH A COMPLICATED PROGRAPI OF THIS TYPE. ADVISING THEPI THAT THE GERPiAN DEPIOCRATIC REPUBLIC, -THE MOST ADVANCED SOCIETY IN THE SOCIALlsr CAPlP, -HAD' CAREFULLY PHAstD IT 5 LAtI>-REF'ORft PROGRA" OVER A fifteen-year PER 100. SCHVIESAU ADDED GlUPll Y THAT THE OVERLY ERrHUSIASTIC KHALQIS REJECTED HIS ADVICE -- AND srated THEIR COIVICTIOI THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOlLD SUPPORT THEIR ACCELERATED PROGRAM. AFTER SIX MONTHS, SCHVIESAU OBSERVED, IT VAS Q.EAR THAT LAflD REFORfII VAS A DISASTEIl. t RECALLED HOW MAllY LANDLESS All) -LAII)-POOR- PEASANTS HAD WANTED TO REFUst TO ACCEPT LAtI) BECAUSE OF RD-IGlOOS SCRUPLES OR FEAR OF F'UI'lJRE RETRIBut ION BY THE DEPRIVED LANDLORDS. THE KHALQIS FORCED THEM TO ACCEPT THE LAII), THREATENING THEPI WITH IPlPRISO...ENt IF' THEY REFUSED. ACCORDING TO SCHVIESAU, SEVERAL OF T H SE PEASANTS LATER COI'IMJTTED SUICIDE. S. COI'tPlEHT: THROUGH SCHVPQSAU, THE SOVIETS WOULD SEE" TO 8E trying TO PlAICE CERTAIN THAT WE ARE BEING KEPT - INZRPlED- 15,,- 1$5 S3,3398.3,5 -- FOGIWHATEVER PURPOSE THEY HAVE IN PlIND. (AN INTERESUNG NOTE, INCmENTALLY, IS THAT SCKWIESAU HAD A LARGE BOUQ( T OF TOWERS DELIVERED CHARGE AMsrurZ A"ER TH lr JULY 11 HE tgng.' 9. THIS EMBASSY RE"AINS SICEPTICAl THAT THE SOVIETS VIl.l. BE ABLE TO BROADEN! THE POLITICAL BASE OF THE AFGHAN REGIME SUFFICIENrlY TO srill THE WIDESPREAD INSURRECTION IN AFGHANISTAN. VE FREQUENTLY HEAR RUPIORS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE sr al TRYING TO BUILD A NEW REGIME AROUND FORNER ROYAlISI' PRIME PlINISTER YUsur, W}fO WOULD PROBABLY SERVE AS A FIGUREHEAD PERSONAGE. THE LARGE NUPIBERS OF AFGHANS ~HO HAVE NOW BEEN INCITED TO BLOOO-FElD ACTION ARE UNLIKElY TO BE F'OOLED BY Q.D WINE IN NEW BOTTLES. ANY SOLUTION INVOLVING THE REPlACEMENT OF KHALQIS BY PARCHAPIIsrS WOLLO ALSO BE A LOSER. THE LATTER' ARE ALSO REGARDED BY AFGHANS AS PRO-fl!OSCQIi ATHEISTS. Af'lST urz BT CO> 8... u o ọ.. = ọ oj: f- c.:i > 6 a:: < > f-o ;; :J Uc.J '"...J < Z o ~ < z E o c::

86

87 N~~NVV FSP'Z4~JC1?? 00 'll!'ci'4;:~ DJ X~~~l.~ t~f~~ 2~911fP ZNY CCCCC 1Z!I o a 2~11237 J[L 99 F~ A~r~~~Ss! r.ab~l Tr q~rr.c/stc~!a~i ~ASBDC IM~iDIATr 4915 I~FO RP~MCG/A~[K~ASSY A~:AR# ~576 Rr.~~~D/~~I~~'SS? ISLA~~EAD ~~7e RUDTC/A~rMBASS~ LONDON 1706 RcrF~o/AME~BASSY MOSCOW 1777 RU~2AE/A~ M!ASS! NEW DELHI?13~ ~~FNPS/AMEMPA~SY PARI RUOMrR/AME~BASSY TEERAN 349 RUP.C~OA/CINCPAC ~r;~jpg/amembasst BEIJING 641 n C 0 ~ F I D! N T I A L KABUL 56e3 CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD Zq.lol7: E.O : GDS (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-F TAGS: PGOl, PINS, 1F SrBJECT: (LOU) AMIN GIVEN MORE DIRECT ROLE IN PROSECUTIN~ COUNTERINSURGENCY 1. (c) SUMMARY: P~lME MINISTER AMIN HAS BEEN GIVEN A MORE DIRECT ROLE IN CARRYING OUT THI REGIME'S TRUGGLE AGAINST TFt DOMESTIC INSURGENCY, AS WELL AS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECTLY CONTROLLING AFFAIRS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. T~IS ENHANCED POS1TION SUGGESTS HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE scrne IS NOT fet IMMINEN!, ALTHOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR ~EERt TFIS PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT FITS IN THE STILL UNFOLDI~G POLITICAL DRA~A BIRE. END OF SUMMARY. 2. (LOU) RADIO AFGHANISTAN, IN ITS FVENING NEWS BROAD CAST ON JULY 27, CARRIED A "DECREE" FROM PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI WHICH APP~ARS TO ENHANCE THE ROLE OF PRIME MINISTF~ BAFIZULLAB AMIN IN COM~ATTING THE DOM1STIC IN SURGENCY. ACCORDING TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT, "THE CONTINUED AGG~ESSION" '~AI~~T AFGHANISTAN BY PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN MILITIAMEN" BAS REQUIRED TARA~I TO ASSU~~ PERSONAL LEADER SHIP or THE C~UNTRY'~ DErE~SE A~D COMMAND OF TBE ARMED FORCES. TARAKI, ~OWEVEP., ~AS ENTRUSTED" AMIN, IN ADDI TIO~ TO P.IS OTHER DUTIES, WITP TEE EXECUTION OF TARA~I'S ORD~B5, AND HA~ IN~TRqCTED THZ PRIME MINISTER TO REPO~T REGULARLY R~GA?rI~~ F~OG?~S~ I~ TH! COUNTEP.-INSVRGENCY EFFO~T. MOREOV!o. A~I~ H~S!IEN INsrSUCTID TO "TAKE OVE~ TEE AFFAIRS OF TR~ MINIST~Y af D~rENSE nnder TAR~V.I'S 213 ({L ( ~1 EC.o,) pre POL

88 OVERALL COMMA~D AND GOIDA~CE. ~. (C) COMMENT: WHERE TfI~ PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT FITS IN TBE CUR~!NTLY UNFOLDING POLITICAL DRAMA HERE IS STILL UNCLEAR. VHAT SEEMS FAIRLY CERTAIN, EOVE'ER, IS TBAT THE AU!HORIT~ AND, PERHAPS, POLITCIAL PRESTIGIE 01 DEFENSE MINISTER ~OHAM~AD ASLAM WATANJAR HAS BEEN DIMINISHED. MANY OBSERVERS BELIEtt THAT WATANJAR COULD PLAY A PROMINENT PART IN A~T EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A MORE!ROADtT BASED RE GIME -- BECAUSE HE IS CO~SIDIRED MORE NATIONALIST THAN THE TARAtI/AMIN TEAM -- AND HIS FAT! MAT PROVIDE HINTS REGARDING DIRlCTIONS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS MAY TAKE. 4. (e) AT 1 MINIMUM, THE ANNOUNCEMENT POINTS TO A LARGER AND ~OR! DIRECT ROLE FOR AMIN IN TEE DRA'S ANTI-INSURGENCY BATTLE, A POSITION VHICH SUGGESTS THAT 1MIN'S DEPARTURE - TO PAVE T6E ~AT FOR SOME SORT OF NATIO~AL FRONT REGIME -- IS NOT YET IMMINENT. UNCERTAI~TlrS CO~CERNING THE LOTALTY AND MORAt! or TBE ARMED FORCES COULD HAVE PROMPTED TPoIS Movr, SINCE THE DRA LEADERSHIP MAY BATE FELT THAT AMIN, RATPER THAN PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER WATANJAR, WILL BE ~ORE CAPA!LE OF INSTILLING PROPER REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL WITHIN THE WEARY AND F.ARD-PRESSED.AFGPA~ MILITARY FORCES. AT THE!IME OF TBE 1978 REVOLUTION, AMIN HAD MANY DIRECT PERSONAL TIES TO ~ILITARY orficers, MOST or WfOM HE HAD PERSONALLY ~rcruittd INTO THE PARTY. ~Hr. CURRENT STATE OF THOSE TIES AFTER MOR! TRAK ONE TrAR OF PURGES, INSURGENCY, AND INSTABILITY IS.UN~NOWN. A~STUTZ 'T #

89 THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION INAFGHANIST~~ v\\ tr~:" 1-- f,o;.~,.~/ 1. The localized tribal fighting that erupted in the eastern provinces...hen thepro-50viet coup group seized po...er In late April 1918 has since grown into a countr}~ide insurgency. (5),- A. Faced with the hostility of the great majority B. of the traditionally independent population, the regime of President Taraki and prime Minister Amin has Do ~tte~~t~a~-an even chan1t to complete its second year in power. (5) Taraki 'lnd Amin will survive only as long as the loyalty of the military, the security service and the ruling party remainsintact.~~~~ts~:h~~vy ~~~~~~':~i~9"i);~~9'htt~b-;;;~\;yh~a~~~ ~f;~c~s~. ~(~) 1. The most likely successor regime would be led by, or at least have the backing of leftist military officers. (5) ",:.. ;' 'r'.:l ":1:. ~ii.j: 1::..:.. -. "- "i.. ~." f-. \ :j. J'. ~. "'.. I - ~.., L' \\\":,,, l~.'.::::.~_r ~~]::'~"1"~."t'\... ;"\.. t:~ se1.ze f'owerwould in any case retain s~rong i 'f' 14.~...~'",.... ' I.:C ;,:-:-,:..t;" 2. Coup plotters might seek MOSCOW's tacit approvcal 1\..:1.J~a..J."_ ~;.,t-.t. ties with the50viet Union. (5) ~.~-J1''- ~:J~i.~"~.):.~~~: The Soviets favor the ).nstallation of; a more - - : _ r\. \v... '/: '...(.. (( '.> (,.'. -;~.!...r... ~",kr..: ~ \..,\..,~..-.. :.\. '1; '. "_.'._- ~ '~... \'.f',.1,. ~,',. ~'. A'.,o.,r... '.:.. l - ';." broadly based 90vernment as a means of defusing the tribal insurgency. I (s),., t '\.j \' G

90 JI. Taraki and Amin have been the key fignres in the regime since the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan seizea power in April l~78. (S) A. However. Taraki, 62, is not in good health and.there are signs he is playing a less active role than during the early days of the revolution. (S) B. Amin is de facto key decision-maker in the day-to day affairs of the gove~ent. (S)."7.'~- '".) _ l. ', 1. His status a8 the regime's IIlOveE 'nd shaker was confirmed 31 March when he was ~romoted from deputy prime minister to prlme minister, a c. post Taraki had held since the revolution. The regime's key policymaking body is the ruling (S) party's seven-man Political Bureau. (S).. D 1. Taraki. AlDin and Deputy Prime Minister Shah Wali IIl4ke up the Political Bureau's Secretariat. (S) The top party leade~hip seems fairly well united as it faces the country's multiple domestic problems. (S) 1. There are some frictions but the key figures I c ~I :1II, 1 \ :1 recognize they must submerge their differences at a time when their survival is threatened by a countrywide insurgency. (S) The beleaguered Taraki regime's survival has come to. depend increasingly, as the insurgency has spread, on Soviet political, military, economic and technical support. (There are between 1,5000 and 2,000 soviet advisers presently in Afghanistan.) (S)

91 A. Afghanistan's nearly total dependence on Moscow has given the Soviets far more say in the ~~ghan C~vernment's day-to-day decisionmaking process than they have ever had., (5) 1. Still, Taraki and AJdn appear to be setting the main 1ines of policy. (5) B. The regime does not yet face a security situation that might prompt a request to Moscow for the direct intervention of Soviet forces. (S).. ~... - c. \ 1. \. However, an appeal for Soviet combat ~it. is conceivable within the next 12 months. (5) The Soviets wi1l go to some lengths to protect theij:: interests in Afghanistan but probably not to,the '),.If / extent of ~ntervenin9 militarily. C S ()J-flU'1'oA,. /. -~ The Soviets would be deterred' by the prospects that their forces would be bogged down indefinitely trying to shore up a discredited ( 11l~~~J.Ut.,~~ ~1N'J..Jtr1'~~.P.. f., t~. '" regime. CS)..~ ;;~~- hat""" "lu ~ 'o~t:"j~'" ~fk. oj.~i.~~ CA~'1t I Soviet leaders -also 'tiiv d-weign-the reqiod 1-- particularly wiht respect to Iran, Pakistan and India--and international political costs of -direct intervention. (5) 3. However, if serious f~c;jhtin9 broke out in areas near the Soviet border, Moscow li\iqht provide, J('{' '214') increased numbers of tactical aircraft, ~ellcopters,, tnj pilots and advisers to assist Kabul. (5) ~T -~'~J -(,( ~\I(I':21,p.,'~ - 3 SECRET 54 v-j.o':>

92 tribal insurgency, which continues to spread and erode military capabilities. (5) A. If morale in the military continues to decline it will affect the government's ability to hold Kabul and other key cities. (5) B. Casualties and defect.ions to the rebels have left the regime short of men in major commands throughout the country. (5) C. In spite of continuing Soviet support, the Afghans face pr~blems units in the field. (5) in maintaining equipment and supplying v. The tribal insurgents operate with impunity in oyer half of the country. They have overrun a few government ~sitions i~ the eas~ and interdicted main roads for a few hours but they have been unable to seize an important town. (5) A. They lack centralized leadership and strategic 1~' ),. "; T. '... -.' ".f' ~oorqination needed to unify them int.o a cohesive i.. - I i.", I fprce....:.. (5) '.' "'~;' I"".: \:1.1.:J..~, B. Still, they ' '..,.. i 1:,.!.,J.,. _I ;.':. - f a.gainst the.,j f.. ~.~ ~t._~..1,... ~ ~~ should"be able to maintain pressure regime for some time. (5) 1. They have a long t~adition of guerrilla warfare and can draw on large manpower reserves. (S) 2. Simple logistic requirements enable them to live off the land and to equip themselves with arms captured from government forces. - 4 ':SECRET r.. I 55 ',... (S)

93 )l /'1 j ;.' I( 1'I ~ <I I. The Soviets have suffered setbacks in relation. with the US and the PRe and have made little progress 1~ mending rifts inside the C~unistallianceand movement, but they have clearly registered gains in the third world, particularly in Africa, the Middle East, XI. South and Southeast Asia. A B. Some ot these galna have been marginal but--if cleverly exploited--could lead to larger triumpha. The extent of Soviet involvement in Africa haa increased significantly in recent years. The number of Soviet advisers--both military and civilian--in 29 African states now-totals nearly 8,000. Cubans total almost 50,000. The Soviet Union has signed friendship treaties with Angola, Ethiopia, and Hozambique--but had one abrogated by Somalia in cj! C. The USSR is the princi~ foreign backer of the Angol~ 3nd Ethiopian governments, and is deeply involved with the Rhodesian patriotic front guerrilla movement. III. Moscow's greatest success ir Africa has, ot course, been in Ethiopia. SECRET NOFORN J- ~. (. ~..i-.."1'.. ( «v... <.-, a,:t.. "." 1:lf(...''''\.0;'..,,- ~..(~, c t"'. ~ I' '.. /. J... eo. ~ ,... ~ II '!..,;.. /... "",,:-. ~c.:, Of... "... a-... _--,. r; ~,:..(,- c.. #0I r , / I:::" t J.f, f,,,:,...' """... ( ;J'll 1',.:. ~f."

94 ~) r (.,t t~. N()FO~'1 A. Mengistu could not have pulled off his military success in the Ogaden and his more limited achievement in Eritrea without Soviet guidance, assistance, and logistic support. The Ogaden campaign in particular was conceived and led by a Soviet general officer--an unprecedented involvement for the Soviets in the third world.and i. lived 1~,jOO-15,OOO Cuban troops, equipped by Soviets. 1. The Soviets have nearly 2,000 military and civilian advisers in Ethiopia and the conclusion of the Soviet-Ethiopian friendship treaty in November indicates that Moscow is di99~n9 tor the long haul. 2. Possible base rights to replace those lost in Somalia. A. Dahlak Island with floating pier and floating barge. B. But Ethiopia still independent and ethnocentric. Some differences in relations and ultimately Soviets may go out as did in Egypt, etc. -2- SECRET NOFORN 102

95 1. ~c.onomic agreements su~gest Soviets may make. II It_I" tw, c)i{n a special effort to meet some of Ethiopia's more important needs and thus assure Moscow'. long-term presence. IV. Relations between Moscow and Angola are also good with no indications of serious policy differences. A. The Soviet-Angolan friendship treaty provided for the strengthening of ~litary cooperation on the Mbasis of corresponding agreements which are being concluded, an unusual formulation in'a soviet friendship treaty. (1,000 Soviet military advisers, 19-26,000 Cuban military). 1. So far Soviet military assets in Angola include a shore-based communitations link \ \ between naval headquarters in.moscow and Luanda. The Soviets reportedly run the Luanda naval base where their naval, merchant and fishing ships enter and depart at will. An AMUR-class repair ship has been stationed at the base and has serviced soviet naval ships, including hull maintenance for the diesel submarine on patrol in the area. Since 1977, Soviet TU-95 long-range aircraft have deployed to Luanda -3- SECRET NOFORN IO~

96 ..."...,'r airfields periodically for reconnaissance operations over the South Atlantic and around the Cape of Good Hope. 2. The aircraft-carrier Minsk rec~ntly called in Angola and Mozambique. B. Military assistance is the foundation of Soviet influence in Angola, but the Soviets have also moved to make their influence felt in key financial and commercial ministries. C. There have been reports of friction between the Angolans and Soviets and Cubans at the working level, but so far these do not appear to have led to serio~s differences between the two gover..nts. The Soviets also want to carve out a larger, more influential role for themselves in Rhodesia, believing that any majority government t'lat achieves power as the result of military struggle will be more dependent on the USSR and less receptive to Western influence. A. To achieve this objective, the Soviets have: 1. _U~ged an expansion of military operations by the PF against Rhodesia. -4- SECRET NOFORN Ifl..1

97 2. Otf~red Lo in~rease deliveries of militdry. I J l~lj~"ljjd; cquipr.lent to the PF and to increase the number 01 :oviet and Cuban advisers working in Zambia and Mozambique. 3. Encouraged the major factions of the Patriotic Front to unify their organizations and form a government-in-exile. 4. Have increased military deliveries to Zambia and J.1ozamblque. B. But, both FLS and PF suspicious of Soviet ~otives. C. Military assitance has clearly been the key to ~ Soviet successes in Africa thus far, but poor economic performance could ultimately undermine this success and diminish Soviet prospects in such areas as Nigeria and Guinea where military assistance is accorded a lower priority. Toure has seriously reduced Soviet presence. 1. nigeria is particularly disenchanted with Soviet economic performance. VI. President Sadat's willingness to pursue a separate treaty with Israel could provide the Soviets with an opportunity to reverse their recent dismal performance in the Middle East. ~ -5- SECRET NOFORN

98 :-) r. ".l:'; ~Or'O~N A. In recent years, the Soviets have witnessed: 1. The complete deterioration of their relations with Eqypt--the former linchpin to the Soviet position in the Arab world. 2. A worsening of relations with Syria because of Syrian intervention in Lebanon against another soviet client, the PLO. And, 3. Increased Iraqi flexibility which has been marked by economic and military purchases in the West as well as the execution of prominent Iraqi communists. ~. There also are trends in the region that are favorable to the Soviets. 1. The us and West Europe are already faced with higher oil prices, which is in Moscow's interest~ 2. Soviet clients in the area--particularly the radical Libyans, the Marxist South Yemenis and the stateless Palestinians--serve as middlemen or at least spokesmen for the USSR. 3. TI luthority of established governments in the region is becoming more fragile and, a~ power bases become smaller, the opportunity for Soviet exploitatio~ becomes greater. -6- SECRET NOFORN

99 4 'J In.: d<:li\ibc of Ct:NTO. C. The Soviets will have to move cautiously to exploit these ncw opportunities, since key AIab statcs already are alert to an expansion of Soviet influence in the area. Saudi and Iraqi in~ecurity, for cxample, has already bcen heightened by: 1. 'l'he toppling of the nonaligned Afgban.government in April 1978 by a Soviet-trained army ~u ed by a small number of local communists. 2. The assassination of the North Yemeni president by a South Yemeni, and the coup in South Yemen in June 1978 that broug' t to power a leadership more receptive to the Soviet leadership. And, 3. Soviet logistical support for the South Yerneni's in the recent PDRY attack against North Yemen. D. The Soviets will also try to exploit Arab resistance to the separate treaty between Egypt and Israel, particularly among the Syrians, the Iraqis, and the Libyans. 1. Even Saudi Arabia has been flirting with the idea of diplomatic contacts with the Soviets because of its recognition of expanded Soviet influence in the region. - '7- SECRET NOFORN

100 VII. :':OSl:OW'S jlllcres.t in South Asi is less intense than its interest in the Middle Last, but the region is close to the USSR and the Soviets do not want it to be used for actions inimical to the USSR. A. The Afghan government has always needed Soviet political, military and economic support, but the increasingly close relationship with Moscow threatens Afghan independence and President Taraki s own freedom of action and risks increasing popular discontent. The number of Soviet a~visers may have doubled since Taraki's coup--to about 3,500 including with the military. 1. Taraki's Soviet-backed regime is already facing serious threats from Mosl~m insurgencies, which have already forced Moscow to become directly involved in keeping the government afloat. 2. Soviet military advisers have been helping government forces combat the insurgencies in eastern Afghanistan, where Soviet pilots reportedly have flown MI-24 helicopter gunship operations along the Afghan border with Pakistan. -8- SECRET NOFORN 108

101 . '- : J.,_ I, l....i",.",.::;.~lo.1y ho.1vc.,d~o t..skcn pull in It!lInlJing rebel-held posit.lons in Herat recently, and Soviet militdry and civilian advisers have been killed by various dnti-gover~ent forces. 4. Soviet efforts to protcct their e~uily in Afyhanist.m could complicate Soviet relations with both India dnd Pakistan and could even jeopardize chances for Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty. VIII. The Soviets are also acting to bolster their strategic bclieve that a stronger mi litary position in t:.he area will in the long term compel the North Asian nations to take Soviet interests in~o account. A. The most dramatic Sovie~ moves have been in the Pacific. 1. The Soviets now have t.he aircraft cacrier Minsk under the Pacific con~and_ 2. Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border are being upgraded and, earlier t.his year. posit i on in 1\sia in the wdke of the Sino-Japilnese rapprochcment, the normalization of Sino-American relations. and Bp.ijing's dbrogdtion of the Sino- Sovi I t f; ndship treaty. The Soviets appear to -9- SLCRET NOFORN

102 llur'orn -. the Soviets held the most extensive military exercise ever staged along the border. 3. General petrov reportedly has become the ~ander-in-chief of a newly formed Far East command and also participated in the exercise. B. The continuous enhancement of Soviet forces in 1\s1a will not contribut(~ I..> the success of Moscow' & intensified diplomatic activity in the area. 1. The Soviet presence in Vietnam will irritate other Southeast Asia countries and complicate soviet bilaterals with them. 2. Soviet activity in the Northern Territories will not go down well with the Japanese, who have used it to justify higher military budgets and closer defense cooperation with the us. 3. An antagonistic soviet posture on the border with China certainly does not augur well for talks that are tentatively slated to begin in Moscow in ~id-september. A. It is possible for example in view of China's previous precondition for Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia, that Soviet -10- SECRET NOFORN I I ()

103 deploymejlls along the Sino-Sovie~-Mon<Jolia border will become an intractable proble~ in the early stages of negotiations. b. The recent border incident alonq tbe 51no Sov1et border could also delay the talks. c. Soviet activity could, therefore, accelerate trends toward greater Sino-US-Japanese cooperation that Moscow would like to forestall SECRET NOFORN

104

105 6Auc7~ ZlSVVV ESA923MJC RUbt1HP. DE RUSBLK 15967/ ZNY SSSSS ZZH o P Z AUG 79 ~ AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASK>C IMr:EDIATE 5085 INFO RU~JPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY (i58 RUSBQO/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9125 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1124 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1192 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1799 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 315 RUSBKR/A:"ICONSU. KARACHI PRIORITY 4388 RUHQHQA/CINCPAC PRIORITY RUSNAAA/CINCEUR PRIORITY RUFHNA/US"lISSION USNATO PRIORITY 21 BT SEC R E r SECTION 1 OF' 2 KABUL 5967 NOFORN DEPr. Ai. SO FOR: A/SY/CC KARACHI: FOR RSS i' POL CHG ECON CHRON RF E.O. 12QJ~: GDS (FlATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-P TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AF, PK, IR SUEJECT: <LOU) AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF' THE BALA HISSAR MUTINY REF': KABUL 5942 I. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.> 2. SUMMARY: KABUL WAS AGAIN CALM ON AUGUST 6, FOLLOWING SEVERE FIGHI'ING THE PREVIOUS DAY BETWEEN MUTINOUS AFGHAN TROOPS AND FORCES LOYAL TO THE KHALQI REGIME. AFTER RE SI'ORING ORDER, THE LATTER CLAIMED THAT THE TROUBLE HAD BEE N CA USED BY "THE AGENT S OF PAKI ST ANI AND IRANIAN RE ACT ION." THIS WAS AMONG THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGES THE KHAt QI REGIME HAS YET FACED. -- AND IT SHOWED ITSELF" CAPABLE OF HANDLING IT. HOWEVER, THE EIISODE FORESHADOWED GROWING PR091EfIlS FOR THE KHALQI REGIME AND ITS SOVIET MENTORS. END OF SlJ'IMARY 228

106 , J. AS DAWN ROSE OVER KABUL ON AUGU6, THE CITY WAS SlLLENLY QUIET, AND UNDER THE F'IRM CONTROL OF'THE KHALQI REGIME. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF' THE CONTINUED CLOSURE OF' A FEW STRATEGIC STREETS, TRAF'F'IC WAS ALLOWED TO Fl.Ow FREELY -- OVER PAVEMENt'S TORN BY SPEEDING TANK TREADS THE PRE VIOUS AFTER NOON. 04. MOST OF' THE AUGUST 5 F'IGHTING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CEN TERED AT AND NEAR KABUL S ANCIENT BALA HI SSAR F'ORTRESS, SCENE OF' BATTLES OVER SEVERAL CENTURES. ESSENT I ALL Y, THE MAJOR CONFl.ICT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BETWEEN MUT I NOUS TROOPS IN THAT AREA AND ARMORED UNITS, WHO REMAINED LOAYL TO THE KHALQI REGIME. EXACTLY WHAT INITIATED THE F'IGHTING IS sr ILL UNCLEAR. SOME KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS THINK THAT A BALA HISSAR UNIT LAUNCHED THE MUTINY, BUT THAT THE BACKUP F'ORCES T HE MUTINEERS HAD DEPENDED UPON SUBSEQUENTLY CHICJ<ENED OUT. ALTHOUGH MUTINOUS TROOPS \IERE F'IGHTING INSIDE THE BALA HISSAR, THE RED KHALQI FLAG WAVED OVER THE F'ORTRESS DURI NG THE ENT IRE BATTLE. THIS INDICATES T HAT THEY PROBABLY NEVER GA INED F'LLL CONTROL OVER THAT ENT IRE MIllTARY COMPLEX. THE AOOUsr 5 MUTINY, LIKE THE HAZARA SHI A UPRISING OF' JUNE 23, F'A n.ed TO IGNITE ANY SIGNIF'ICANT SUPPPRTING ACTION ELSE WHERE IN THE CITY, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ISOLATED F'IRING IN CIDENT S THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AROU@...KASUl.

107 s. ALTHOUGH n IS DIFrIClLT TO EVALUATE THE CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE AT T HI S TIME BECAUSE SOME OF THE PRIMARY AFFECTED AREAS ARE STILL CORDONED OFF BY GOVERNMENT FORCES, EXTENSIVE TANK FIRE AND HELICOPTER GUNSHIP FIRE WAS PUMPED INTO THE BALA HISSAR NEIGHBORHOOD FOR OVER TWO HOURS IN A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF KHALQI OVERKILL TACTICS. ONE AFGHAN SOURCE, WHO LATER WAS AaLE TO GET NEAR TO THE BATTLE SITE, REPORTS THAT LARGENUMBERS OF MUT INOUS TROOPS WERE SLAUGH TERED. AlTHOUGH ~E HAVE NO WAY OF' VERIFYING CASUALTY FlGURES, WE DID NOTE DtfflING THE BATTLE WHAT APPEARED TO BE GOVERM"J~NT FIRING AT TROOPS FLEEING OVER THE SHERDARWAZAH MOUNTAINSIDE THAT OVERLOOKS THE BALA HISSAR. WE ALSO NOTED HElICOPTER GUNSHIPS F'IRING IN THE VICINITY OF THE KABUL- LOGAR ROAD. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT FLEEING ML1T INEERS. 6. THE MODO IN KABUL TODAY IS SULLEN AND RESENTFUL. IT IS TYPIFIED BY AN AFGHAN WHO MUTTERED TO AN EMBASSY OFFICERz -,IF OM.. Y THEY DID NOT HAVE THOSE PLANES, \lo'e MUSLIMS WOUlD 'TAKE CARE OF THE~ THIS COMMENT, INCIDENTALLY, ILLUSTRATES THE EFFICACY OF THE KHALQIS' HARDHITTING RETALIATORY TACTICS. THEY DO PRODUCE A S03ERING, INTIMIDATING EFFECT ON ANYONE WHO IS CONTEMPLATING ENTERING INTO THE FRAY. er ~, 230

108 NNNNVV ESA925~JC RUQIlHR DE RUSBLK 15967/2 21P.le57 ZNY SSSSS ZZ H o P Z AUG 79 r F1'I ArlEMBASSY KABl1. u AUG i:. -1, TO RUEHC/SECSTATE It:ASHDC IMMEDIATE 5086 INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY ElEIJING PRIORITY 659 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISlAMA3AD PRIOF:ITY 912~ RUDTC/Al'IEMBASSY LONDON PRIOR IlY 1725 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEll' DElHI PRIORITY 7193 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 180~ RUQlIHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 376 RUSBKJUAMCONSLL KARACHI PRIORITY 4309 RUHQHQA/lINCPAC PRIORITY RUSNAAA/CINCEUR PR lor IT Y RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 22 BT. 5 E C RET SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5967 NOFORN DEPT. AlSO FOR: A/SY/CC KARACHI: FOR RSS E.O : GDS (FLATIN, BRUC:: ft.> OR-? 7. COMMENT: THE BALA HIS~A?!:>ATTLE OF AUGUsr 5 ALSO ILLUSTRATED ONE OF THE MAIN WEAKENSSES OF THE KHALQI REGIME: TH~!4 E- TERIORATING RELIABILITY OF ITS REGULAR TROOPS. IT ALSO D.LUSTRATEO AT THE SAME TIME AN IMPORTAf\'! COMPO~!ENT OF THE CO NT I NUl NG STRENGT H OF' T HE TOUGH, TENACIOUS KHALQI LEADERSHIP: THE FIRM SUPPPORT OF' THE COUNTRY'S Kr:Y FORC:::S, SUCH AS COMMANDO UNITS, ARMORED BRIGADES, AND THE AIR FORCE. AS IN THE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28, 1978, THE TANl< AGAIN PROVED ITSElF TO BE A KEY YJEAPON IN SECURING THE CONTROL OF KABUL. TO A LESSER DEGREE, THIS ~"AS ALSO TRUE OF THE HElICOPI'ER GUNSHIPS. AS ""AS THE CASE DURING T HE JUNE 23 UPRISING, THE KHALQIS AGAIN MADE QUICK USE Or THEIR PROPAGANDA ASSETS: DROPPING LEAF"LET~ FROM HELl COPTERS, MAKING ANNOUNCEMENTS F"Ror1 SOUND TRUCKS, AND ISSUING BUSINESSLIKE RADIO AND TELEVTSION BULLETINS. 2.31

109 Be THE AUGUsr 5 BATTLE WAS A MUCH MORE SERIOUS CHALLENGJ:: TO THE KHAtQI REGIME THAN THE HAZARA SHI A UPRISING OF JUNE 23 HAD BEEH. IN T HIS LATTER CASE, T HE GROWING PROaEM OF DISAFFECTION WITHIN MILITARY RANKS DISPLAYED IT SELF IN THE CAPITAL -- IN F:1.A.L VIEW OF THE AFGHAN ELITE AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS. StNCE THE MILITARY AND POLICE DE FECt'IONS OF THE HERAT UPRISING IN MARCH AND THE MUTINY AT THE JAl~ABAD ARMY BASE IN APRIL, THERE HAVE BEEN RE PEATED REPORTS OF DESERTIONS AND DFECTIONS OF AFGHAN UNITS ENJ OED AGAINST REBEL FORCES ALL OVER AFGHANISTAN. SOME OF THE UNITS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN LARGE, PERHAPS UP TO BATTALION AND REGIMENTAL SIZE. ALTHOUGH THE KEY UNITS AROUND KABlL REMAIN LOYAL AND EFFECTIVE -- AS THEY PROVED THEM SELVES AGAIN ON AUGUST 5, THIS HEMORRHAGING OF MANPOWER IS LIKELY TO CONFROHI' THE KHALQIS AND THEIR SOVIET MEHI'ORS WITH SOME TOUGH CHOICES. UNTIL NOW, THE USSR HAS BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THE TARAKI-AMIN OPERATION AFl.;OAT THROUGH GENEROUS INJECTIONS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT, MILITARY MATERI~L, 'AND MILITARY ADVISORS. THE LATTER HAVE BECOME STEADILY fliore NlJlIEROUS -- PERHAPS NOW TOTALLING SOME 2,000 ~- AND THEY HAVE BEEN ENTERING INTO DIREIQ COMMAND ROLES IN SOME UNITS. THEREFORE, THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT APPEARS TO BE EVOLVING THROUGH STAGES NOT TOO UNLIKE THOSE THE USG WENT THROUGH IN VIETNAM (E."G., THE GRADUAL SOVIET ASSlJlIPI'ION OF CONTROL OVER BAGRAM AIR BASE>. '9'. fjl-.»ffll.:::or.the,worsening MANPOWER SITUATION, --f~ts COlLD EVENTUALLY ASK THE SOVIETS ~-ijp;rheir ANTE HERE gy CONTRIBUTING SOME COMBWOSUNI'I'S. "'ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO THE SOVIETS MAY CONSIDER IS THE ASSIGNMENT OF SPECIAL COMBAT, ReES TO KABUL, JALALABAD, AND (36 LOCATIONS -TO 'PROTECT SOVIET CIVILIANS" THERE. (MOTEa KAtllL S fiiiijmoyan fcushfgj)fstrict FOR SOVIETS HAD.-J AVY4II1t.1TAR)' PROfECTIOtVOlJR1'NG THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING.> ~..AF'COMf'tENr. " Je.. SECURITY NOTEa NO AMERICANS WERE AFFECTED BY THE AUGUST, FIGHTING. THE U.S. MISSION IS CONDUCTING NORfllAL OPERA TIONS. AMSTUTZ BI' '~, 232." '

110

111 en 358 NNNNVV ESB324BR!75~ PP!lUQM!!ll DE ROrBN! #5515/~ ZNT SSSSS ZZE P Z AUG 79 r~ OSHISSION OSNAro TO RUERC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRI~RI!Y 1542 INFO ROFHH/ALL NATO CAPITALS RUSBLt/AMEHBASST KABUL ~~18 RUEB~O/AHEMBASS! MOSCOW 6423 ROEBBAC/AME~BASS! CANBERRA 0109 ROQMBR/AHEM~AZST!IRRAN ~e11 RUSBQD/AHEMBASS! ISLAMABAD 0~71 BT SEC RET SECTION ~1 OF 0 OSNATO?~615 E : RDS-l 08/09/89 (GLITMAN. HAY~ARD) OR-P 1AGS: PINS. Ar. NATO SUBJECT: POLADS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN (5) REF: (1.) STATE (NOTAL). (B) STATE (S - ENTIRE TEXT) POL CHG ECON RF CRRON 2. AT AUGUST 7 POLITICAL CO~HITTEE HE~TIN~, o.~. FRG, CANADA AND TUR~IT SUBMITTED written CONTRIBUTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN SITUATION. TEXTS ARE TRANS~IrrrD PARA 6. U.I. REP WH~ HAD SU~GESTED EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN ~x PRESSED APPRECIAtION FOR CONTRIPUTIONS AND RECO~M~NDED fba! POLAD~. I~ VIEW OF THE DEVELOPING SITUATION, DISCUSS SUBJECT AT NEXT MEETING AS WELL. THIS ~AS AGREED. 3. U.s. RtP UNDERLI~ED PER REF A VASHIN~TON INTERESt IN ALLIED ASS!SS~ENT OF SOVITT INTENTIONS IN AfGFANISTAN (WRITTEN CONTRIBO'IONS ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT IN PART), AND SAID T!~Rt SHOULD BE A CONTIN~ING rxchangf. ON THIS ~ITRIN fhe COMMITTEE. CANADIAN REP, IN RFSPONSE TO U.S. DESCRIP TION OF SUCCESSFUL EVACUATIO~ OF U.S. D!P~NDENTS A~D ~~~ ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM KA~OL, SAID TBAf CANADIANS TOO WERE "INTERESTED" IN r.vacuation ISSUE. HE WENT ON TO NOT~ OTTOWA'S VIlY TiAT REBEL MOVEMENT WO"LD REMAIN rra~ MENTED AND INEFFECTIVE O~TIL A SINGLE ANTI-TARA~I LEAD~F. EMERGED WRICS BAS NOT be~n TSE CASE TO DArE. CANADIAN REP AS~ED FOR ANY VIEWS OR l~for~atl~n OTHERS ~IGF.T HPV~ ON ]S ASPi:Cr. 4. I ALlAN REQUESTED THAT AUGUST 5 COD? RF THE SUBJECT OF THEa DISCUSSION AT ~Er.7 POLADS ~ErTI~G. FR~ RF.P. SAID HIS AUTHORITIES JERr NO! S~RE.r.E~R~~ R~CENT GJVERN-

112 ~!NT RESHUfFLE WAS DUE TO DESIRF TO IMPPOVE EFFICIE~CT CR WAS DIRECTED AGAI~ST! POSS~BLE USSR IN~ERNAL -PLOT-. 5. ACTION REQUESTID: NEX! POLADS MEETI~G VILL BE AUGOS! 21. VE VOOLD APPRECIATE ~LT OOB AU3UST 21 ANY WASnIN~TON COMMENTS ON THE ALLIED PAPERS AND fbe VARIOUS POINTS RUSED ORALLY. f. EEGIN!EXTS or ALLIED PAPERS: E~GIN TEXT OF CANADIAN DELl~ATION P!PbB: INTERNAL OPPOSITION SITUATION IN AFG~!NISfAN 1. THE TRIBAL OPPOSITION MOVEMEN~ IS SLO~LI BUT STEADILY INCREASING IN AfGHANISTAN. ALTHOUGH rhe ~OVERNMINT CON TINUES TO RETAIN CONTROL OF THE MAJOR URBAN CENTRES AND THE MAIN ROAD NETWORK. IT HAS SURRENDERED ITS AUf DORITY IN T~E COUNTRYSIDE. 2. ALTHOUGH ARMED OPPOSITION IS INCREASING. IT CONTI~UES,TO BE FRAGMENTED VITH LITTLE READILY APPARENT PROSPECT or MERGING INTO A COHESIVE FORCE. IT HAS NOT YfT DrVELOPED THE ClPACITY ror SUSTAINED CO-ORDINATED HILITARY QUESTIONS SUIFICIENT TO [NOel OUT THE TARA~I ~EGIHE. DESPITE AN ELEHENT 01 DISLOYALTY IN THE ARMED forces AND PROBLEMS OF ARMS AND ~~UIPM1NT SBORTA~ES, THE ~OVERNMENr SEE~S ABLE ~o MAINTAIN ITSELf IN TSE URBAN CENTRES VHICH ARE 'ITAL TO ITS EIISTENCE. PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS ---, PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO RECEIVE AND TO HELP SUSTAIN ArGgAHISTAN RErUGEES VHILE AT THE SA~f TIME DOING ITS.BEST TO LIMl~ THE REfOGEES' POLITICAL/MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE PAIISTAN ATTEMPTS IN THIS AREA MIGFT BE BEARING SOHE FRUIT IN THAT THE USSR REPRESENTATIVES AND TASS aave IN THE PAST TWO VIlIS BEEN DROPPING VERBAL BOUQUETS ABOUT,PAIISTAN AND P1IISTAN/USSR RE1ATIONS. WE SlY MIGHT BE CAUSE SUCH ACTIVITIES COULD'BE' INSPIRED BY SOMETHING OTHER THA~ EVENTS IN AfGHANISTAN TO HA[E INROADS IN CHINA'S COMPARATIVELY favoured POSITION IN PA~ISTAN. :~. iie RECENT REDUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET Ar.CU S1T S Of PA[ISTAH'S CONNIVANCE VITB THE REBEL FORCES TER H THI ACTIVE SUPPORT or RlfUGEE AGITATORS MAT ~E EASING ONE ASPECT or BORDER TENSIONS. NEVERTHELESS. AN ISTI~ATED 125,000 RErUGEIS IN CAMPS AS ~ELt AS TBoaSANDS n "5615 "

113 to."'''',....~" f\at~',,... HIJ(~~HR DE:!WFlltM!!~ (~I~n-r: :;~c Il;01 l tjy ~~S$SS Zll~. P 3~17J7: Q!Ju 79 zt: l Fi1 U5:'iI55W:: USN '\Te Tr RUEHC/s::rSTATE "A~t-~C pnio~i7y 15~.3 11;,.0 RUF";n:iUf.:"'L NAjO C:IPITALS RU3BLK/Ai'lE:1BAS::;Y I<Ai)\JL r,019 RUEI~O/AMEMRASSY ~os:~~ G424 RU~HBAC/A~EM3ASSY C~~~EHRA 011~ R1frw~"HR/A!'IEr1iJA~;SY!EHnAN ~"1~ r.usb~l>/amemej:~$y IS'.. M :4BAD cen B1 5 E ere T SECT Ior~ C2 OF' 06 ur.rll\to (lis 615 OF OTHER AFGHANISTAN R[F'UGEES P.Ef.I::lIHG!,.'ITil BORD;::;; llpea KINSFOLK, IS A DRAI:; ON PAXIS7!,N'S PATIEIJCC: Arm?ESO!!PCES. l'akist AN'S OBSESSION \HTH 1 HE SOVIET prl1:s?-tice A':['l INFLU ENCE WITHIN AFGHArHSifdl IS llpl?:?eoicta9le Ai id A FAC'i(j!~ CON THIBUfUlG 1"0 n{e POTEr-.'TIAL FOR ItlSTA9ILITY IN THE,o?'t:'A. THE IRRATION4L ELE~:'NTS IN HI!: ra!(isra~r F'OREIG~1 "'-illcy. INCLUDING ITS OOISLA!l1C" DP1EtlSIO~ ALSO PLAY A PMn. SOVIET ROLE' IT WOULD APPEAR THAT AS FAR AS THE SOVIET POSITION IS COHCER~ED LITTLE HAS CHANGED IN THE L,\ST TWO!!O:lTHS. Go WKILE THERE HAV:: BEEN PERSI :;TENT RUMOU:iS THAT THE SOVIETS WOlJ'.. D BE PRE"A!~ED TO Dnop THE TA:?:'Il(J LfllT'fRSHIP I1~ FAVOUR OF A GRO:J D WHO "lich! BE MORE ~CCEP; A3LE TOT HE AFGHANI5rAN MASSES. THERE HAS BEEN tlo H~.~W EVJDJ::/;Ci: TO SUPPORT THIS ASSERl IO:~. UDF.ED, T tie ro?:::10st :;0\'1 c:t OB- J~CTIVE r.usr BE TO I(EEP AFGH(.~JJ:rrAN CLO~:::LY UNOF.f{ THE SOVIET THIMB AS Mol'( t:::hange I N f'o~.'er IJIHIHI T HE ClJm~TRY SHOULD ~IOT BE ALLO'i~D TO INTF.RF RE WIT H THE "NEW LEVEL 00 0;'- f,ovietlaf~hiinista:j RELATIOns. AT THi ~O:1ENT. TPEf?EFORE, IT VOllLD 1.I'P:::,\R H!,,\T THE SOVIETS HAVl. DF.fI~lITELY DECIDED TO conrrn~i::': TO SU?paRT THE PRE:::::NT REGli';;:: lip TO A POINT S;~1)~1T OF VIflseT IrIEP.vElviIOrJ \1I11LE AT THE SAME TIMt:, THEY' /-11. Y' BE C,,\5i! ~G A90;jT FOq HE\o! U:ADERSHI P \o.'heresy r HEY CAN rr.jtitain TP~IR A::iFZ P::ESE::CE I.'HILE OF"F~RING A r.o?e P/ILATA8LE (,uvern:-:e~;r TO THE AfGHAN PEOPLE. CtJNCL USIO!~ 7. THE Ci,L!. OF A';~"!'.N Mln.lAHS FOR A -,JIHAn- AGIIP'3'7 THE TARnKl/n~IN n~gime H~S Not LED TO THE EMERGE~CE OF ONE LEADER FRO~ ~IT~I~ THE GU~RRILLA RANY~. WE HAVE ~1 EVI I :::NCE T!':.T ~):ie lulu A?Pf.AR. klj~ SO LC.f;G f,s THE ClP::-OSITIC,') il~~.~ltls [IISO~GANIED Tl-lE srouc:cle APr:'AF.~ BOllflD Tu oe PrtOT RACT ED. Etlu iext

114 Si='~I\I<ING I:OrES SUBJf:C!: AFGHflrJlGTAN; COI'J:,ENTS O~l THE SOVIET ENGAGE.r~a!T I. Ar(jii;,(HsrA~;'S WIERf::.!. 5 C~rry 5I1UATIar~ IS RAPIDLY WOR~E~r~G. THE PRO-MOS~G~ TARAKI R~GIME IS APPARENTLY FACI/I;,; IJlrF'IC~_T lese Iii SPIrt: CF ~lf\ssive r1ilitary SUPPORT BY T H:: SOVIETS IN THE Form O~ LARG::-SCALE DELIVERIES Or W::APor~s Arm THE U:iE OF I3F.TI'!F:EN 3,0$1~ AND 3,5~13 MILITARY ADVI~::'~S - 50''1:: 0':- TH~M 1:: L;:A~I'i(l POSlrIO;IS - THE AFGHAN CENTRAL GOVERti;1f. I IT HAS :>0 FAR BEEN UNABLE TO BREAK THE PREDO~'II tlantly f{~ligiousl Y-:~uT1VAT D RESIST MICE OF LARGE PARTS OF' THE P,')t"LU,TION. ON THE COtlTRARY, THE RESISTA:~CE GROLIPS JI:~E ACHIi:~'JNG GRo\.:H:G SUCCESSES. WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT, THE RF..GJilIE W(O~1.D F?09A9LY HAVE FALLEN A LOflG TIME AGO. 2. AS FAR AS ihe SOVIET LE~DEP.SHIP IS CONCERNED, THIS MEANS THAT Ii \lill SOOtl BE OBLIGED TO TAKE A DECISION CONCERNING ITS FUTURE ErJG~GEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. j. If CA.' PROBA!lI. Y BE RULED OUT THAT /'Ioseo\;' WILL DROP THE PPESENT REGI= je SINCE THIS /'light MEAN THE loss OF AN If'IPORTAIll' lotle OF' INTEltEST FOR rhe SOVIETS, BECAUSE - :3Y WINNING AFGHANISfAN - T~E DISTANCE SEPARATInG THEM FROM THEIR GEOSTRATF.G!C AIM, TJfE INDIAN OCEAN. HAS SHRUNK TO 50B 1C1S. IF' AFGHANI Sf AN WERE TO RETURN TO A MonE OR LESS ISlAMIC srate, l"loscow WOULD IN ALL PROBABIUT Y ll~ve AN ANI'I-SOVIE:T NEIGHBOUR. APART rro!1 SUCH A POLITICAL SET- BACK. IMPlICATIOnS ON OTP.ER SOVIET ZONES OF INFLUENCE AND TilE MUS-I:"! aemeni's IN THE SOVIET POPULATION COULD NOT BF. EXCl UDED. ~. Tft:: POSSIBLE REPLACEMENi OF THE PRESENT RULERS IN KASLL BY A GI)VEnt:~lENT WHICH APPEARS IN A LESS PRO-MOSCOW UGHI' TO THE OlITSIDE WORLD - THIS IS WHAT TilE SOVIETS ARE APp~p.n7LY TRYING TO DO AT THE PRESENT TIME - WOULD HA~DLY HAVE A~4 HIFtUEtICC: ON ThE RESIST/WCE MOVEMENT. THEY Ant: FIGHT Itlii NOT SU MilCH AGAI NST THE ME~8ERS OF THE ;'l\eseut REGIi':E IHIT AGAINST THE eom:'iuth sr IDEOLOGY \-IHICM, FOR THEM, IS PR!ioiARILY REPiH':SENTED BY THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE COUtIT~Y. BT

115 I r ' NNNNV' F.S!02~BRA775 PP RUQHHR DE P.U~BNA '5615/ ~e ZNY SSSSS ZZf P AUG 79 F~ USHISSION OSH1TO TO ROEBe/SIeSTATE WASHDC PIIORITY 1~~4 INro ROrB((/ALL NATO CAPIT1LS ROSBL(/AHI~BASSY (ABUL 1023 RUEBMO/A~!MBASSY MOSCOW 5~25 RUZ!BAC/AMEHBASST C1NB~RRl 0111 ROQMHR/lMEMBASSY TEBRAN 0013 ROSBOD/A~EMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9973 Bf S E CRt T SECTION 03 or 96 OSN1TO 15615,. :5. TBERElORE, IF MOSCOW WANTS fa MAINTAIN ITS PRISENT 'POSITION, Ir ~OS! REINrORCI ITS COMMITKENT E'EN 'URTIII TBI SO'IET PRESS BAS RECENTLY INDICATED TBAT TBE ACTI'1 OSE 0' SO'IET TROOPS IN SUPPORT 0' TIE T1RAlI RIGIME MIGBT BI CONSIDERED. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE or TBI rriend SBIP T!EATY BETWEEN T51 SO'IET UNION AND ArGHANISTAN, THI SOYIET ONION ~OULD BE ENTITLED - ArTIR MOTUAL CONSOLTA TIONS - fa TA[! ACTION TO MAINTAIN TBE SECURITY, INDIPENDtNCE AND TERRITORIAL INTIGRITT or A'GHANISTAN. THIS COULD!I PREPARlD POLITICALLT AND PSYCIOLOGICALLT IY POI ~ICATIONS IN rhe SOVIET AND ArGRAN PRESS ON TBI SOPPORT or REBELS AND TBE AGGRESSION BT PAIISTAN. lor TBI rirst TIME, AFGHANISTAN IS DESC~lIED IN TIl SO'Ilt PRESS IS 1 MEM!ER 01 THE SOCIALIS' COKMUNItT, WIICH WOOLD Mlr.E lei SUBJECT TO rat BREZINEV DOCTRINE. S. 10WEVER, IT APPEARS DOUBTrUL ~ETHIR the SO'IIT ONION. WILL STtP OP BER IN~AGEMINt fa TBI LEVEL or MILITAa! INTERVENTION SINCE this WOULD LEAD TO SIRIOUS IIS!S. FIBST or ALL, SOCH A STEP WOOLD II BOOND TO PRO'O[E NEGA TIVE REACTIONS, ESPECIALLY ON TBE PART 0' THI ARAB AND ISLAMIC VORLD. EUT ~OSCOV MIGBT StILL BE PREPARID TO ION THAT IISI. ~. ~OB! SERIOOS, BOVEYII, VOOLD EI tie RESISTANCI TO II EXPECTED FROM THE AFGHAN POPULATION AND THI RESULTING CONSEQ~ENCES FOR TBE SOVIETS. THI A1GBAN POPOLATION 11 GIRQNOTHING AS MORI IMPORTANT TBAN ITS rriidom; UP TO NOW IT BAS BEEN lblt TO DlrEND ITSELF AGAINST ALL roriign CLA. 07 SUPR~MACY AND HAS NEVIR BEEN rorcid UNDli ANT ror 7 COLONIAL ~ULE. IN CASE or A SOVIET INTERVENTION, TEE OPULATION IS LI11L1 TO IGNORE ALL THE EXISTING TRIBAL I 9

116 QOARR~LS AND ~O ~ISE AS ONE ~AN AGAINST THE SOVIET IN VADERS. 8. IT APPEARS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLI TO OVIRCOHI THIS RESISTANCE. THE INACCESSIBILITY 07 THE TIRRAIN - 8e OF Ar~!lNISTAN ARE COVERED BY MOUNTAIN icountry VITHOUT ROADS AND lre FAVOURABLE ror GUIRILLAS :T!E MENTALITY OF TBE WARLI[~ MOUNTAIN TRIBES AND THEIR :lorh or VARFARE ~A[I THIS UNLI!ELY. IT MUST BE ASSUMED TBAT ln INTIRVENTION WOULD L!~D TO A PROTRACTED GOIRILLA :VAR WBOSE OUTCOME WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN AND VHICH WOULD TIE DOWN SOVIEr ro~ces FOR A LONG TI~l. ~ '9.THERI CAN BE NO DOUBT TRAT THE SOVIET UNION VILL CON~ ~TINUE TO TA!E ACTION IN SOPPORT OF THE RE~IHE IN [ADUL. )ADDITIONAL ARMS WILL Bg SENT. AND TBE NUMBER OF SOilIT ADVISIRS WILL INCREASE. IT IS ALSO CONcrIVABLETBAT ;HOSCOW HAT USE SOVIET TROOPS TRO~ UZBElISTA"'AND TADCHIKI STAN WHO, WHEN PUT INfO AFGHAN UNIFORMS, ~OULD~REHAI~ UN :CONSPICIOUS froh A PHYSICAL AND A LINGUISTIC POINT or :VIEV. BOVEJER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS AT PRES1NT ~RE 'TBER MOSCO~ IS REALty PREPARED TO ACCEPT TBE RISK 01 A MILITARY INTtRVENTIO~. END TEXT. BEGIS TEIT OF TUR!ISH PAPER:!rG~ANIS'UN U! G!NEUL I"InESSION AlTER 'fbi ceup IN APRIL '1978 WAS Tilt THE Hi" REQ-II1E VOULD UV.E A DU'lICt'LT TI~' TAKING ROOT AND THAT TBr. CONSIRVATIY! AND IND~PI~DENT CBARJC!ER. or TBE AFGBAN PIOPLE VOULD.N~T!l!E EASILY TO fbi SOVIET~ INCLINID AND COMHUNI~T NATURE OF THE RE~IME. THIS lopeeast ~AS rurned.out to B! TRUI: rirst THE. NOMADIC TRID!S ALONG THE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL BORDERS REfUSED T~'CO~E U~DE~ ree RULF 01 T!E R&GIMEl rhf-ir RESIS TANCE SPR!At J~AD~ALLY UNTIL THE FI~HTI~~ BRO!! OUT IN Sr.RAT IN MA?C AND'TH~N IN KABUL ON 23 JU~! A~D OY!R TEt Ll~T VEr~!ND. DrSPIT! GOYER"HENT EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN AWAT r~!s UNREST AS IOREIGN-INSfIGAtED. TaE MAIN reace BEHIND IT SEE~S TO~!E 1St DISCORD~NCE HENtIOHED ABOVE.!iIT IS PLAIN 'rha'! IRA," AN1) PUISU~ DO NOT.VIEii THE j!g REGI~!.ITB A Y'R~ H~ART. AND ~~~lrd IT AS A CO~ 'RA TIO~ OF ~REIv ow~ ISLAM-INSPIRIt RF.GIHES. NOTiITH STI..!ol~. NEIT!!!:? C0~Nl'Rf IS IN A POSITION TO rar.~ ACTION. PA~ISTAN: r~oh~hic CONDITIONS '~D BFR ISOLATIO~ IN n 1) 1'5615

117 NNNNVV ESBS26BRA778 PP ROQMBR DE RUfSNA '5615/ INT SSSSS lib P eb1131z AUG 19 fm OSMISSION OSHATO TC RUEBC/SICStATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1545 INFO ROrBrK/1LL NATO CAPITALS RUSBL~/AHEHBASST KABUL 0021 ROEH~O/AMEMBASST MOSCOW 6426 RUrHBAC/AME~B1SST CANBERRA 0112 ROQHHR/AHEHBASST TEHRAN 0014 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY. ISLAMABAD 0~74 BT S r C RET SECTlON 04 OF 06 USHATO ~5~15 THI REGION CO~STITUTE DETERMINING FACTORS IN HIR AtTITU~E. If IS TaUE rhat!er.nomad POPULATION ALONG THI lf~han BORDER UNDERTAKE ACTION DIRECTED AT AFGHANISTAN; WIrs OR :WITHOUT AfGHANISTAN, THIS IS A MAJOR PROiLEM lor PA1ISTAN FOR, TO BRIN~ ORD!R AND GOVERNMENT RULI TO TBAT REGION, SBE HAS TO lesort TO AN:EITENSIVE MILITARY OPIRATION ALONG THE LO~G AND RUGGED BORDER REGIO~. I IRAN: VARIOUS STATEMENTSBY IiAHIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS CONDEMNING THE PRiSS~RE BEING EIERCISED ON THIIR COUNTER PARTS IN AfGHANISTAN NOTWITHSTANDING, IT IS DIFfICULT TO ENTISAGE HORE SUBSTANTIAL IR1NIAN HOVIS IN HIR PRESINT DAY CONDITIONS.. ALONGSIDE DOMESTIC OPPOSITIO~ to THE AFGHAN REGIME, 'AIIOOS GRODPS HAYE EEEN 70RH!D ABROAD, WHO R"E DIMON STRATED IN SOMEIOROPEAN COUNTRIES AND IN INDI1. TBE M1IN lttribote OF OPPOSItION GIOOPS AT HOMi OR ABROAD, ARMID 01 NOT, IS THIIi INDEPINDENT MATURE FROM EACH OTHIR, LACl or CO-oRDINATION 'AMON~ TKIM AND TBEIR LACt or LIADER SFIP. THISE SHORTCOMINGS'MIlI SOCCESS tlss LIKELY. the SOVIET lttitude IN THE faci or STRONGER DOMESTIC OPPOSITION IN AFGHANISTAN WILL BI or SIGNlfIC1NT WEIGHT. 'THI03GBOUT JUNB THIS reai,~rumoois CONCERNING A POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVINTION-HAVE CIRCULAtED IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES IN tabut. AN ARAB lmeassador TOLD HIS!ORrISH COUNTERPART THAT TARAII 11NT TO ~OSCOW ON STH JUNITO ASt ror SOVIET itroops, AND TH1T.THE SOYlErS TURNED THIS REQUEST DO~N,.0NLiEASSURIHG fhl AfGHAN LllDIR THAT ECONOHIC AID WILL CON I UE. THE.CLAUSE IN THE fwo COUNTRIES' lriendship TRi PROVIDING.10R THE EXPEDItION_Ol SOVIIT TROOPS VAS INS ED AS A RESUtT OF AN AfGHAN RIQUIST. IT IS OBVIOUS.TBAT T~E. SOVIET LEADERS SEE TRIS AS A LAST RESORT, AND. 11

118 EVEN THEN ~OULD HAVE TO Y~I~B!?[ SITUATION VERY CARiFUL1f. BIIIINC 1M MIND THE rollowin~ CONSIDERATI~NS: - SUC! A STIP ceuld LEAD CHIN1-~AKISTAN-IRAN AND 'THE ~S1 TO CLO~E RAN~S. ~ - TB! SOVIETS COULD T~OS!ND UP PL1Yl~: INTO CSIN- ~ IS! BANDS. I: S - THE SOVIETS COULD BE DIRECTLY CONFRONTED WIT~ THE ja'gean PEOPLE, IN A VIETNAM-T~pr ADVENTURE. - i. IN TRr CASt OF A FoqTHER DETr.RIORATION IN TARA~I'S IPOSITION, THE SOVIET'S C~ULD BOWEVER PROCEED TO A RESHUffLE 01 'HI AFGHAN MARrISTS, TRas TRYINr. TO RETIIN A SYMPATHETIC APP!lRANCF. THIS SEEMS TO!S A STRON~Ea POSSIBILITY. THEY 1lHAT l 'OR INSTANCE, THIN! ABOOT INSTALLIN: SOMEBODY ELSE ;BELoNGING TJ TAiA(I'S PEOPL?,'S PA~TT (KS!LQ PARTT), OR ;EyrN ABOUT SUBSTI!UTING TFi ERC~H PARTY, PREVIOUSLY OUSTED BT ~gatq PARTY. ~BETfiSR ~3 NOT THESi COCLD BE lchieved. ~ITfOUT BLOODSHED IS DIFFICULT TO foresei. ALSO IF A PO~ER STRUGGLE AMON~ TBE ~ARXISTS V~RE TO TAKE PLACE THIS COULD OFFER THE OPPONENTS JF TPE RE~IM! ~OOD PROSPECTS.. INDICATIONS T~lT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES IRE NOT ALL TBAT ~APPY VITH TARA[I BAVE ALRElDY STARTED TO SURFACE. IN THIS CO~TEIT, TBE 'OLLOVING RIM1RIS HADI TO TBE TURKISH A~!ASSADOR BT THE CDR AND TBI NBWLY-1RRIVED VIETNAMESE #~B1SSADORS, ART. ILLUMINATIN:: (G~R) -TSt REASONS FOR THE REGIME'S DIFFICULTIES LIE IN THE STRING or MISTAIIS HADI. IN TEE 'ACE OF THE COUNTRY-WIDE RESISTANCE A~lINST TBE"REGIME, 'THERE IS NO MORE ROOH FOR NEW HISTA(ES. TBt LEADERS B1VE TO BE VERT ~ARY FROM NO. ON. thi lirst WRONG STEP ~ILL, JUST 15 IN CHESS, COST THEM THE GlME. T~OSE ~HO RESIST ARE PUT UNDER lrre:t _ITBoor ANT DISCRI~INATION FOB CEILDREN AND WOMEN. EVERYBODY ~~O~S THAT T IS CANNOT woar.- ALL TBE SAME, SOVIET suppoat SErMS fo CONTIN~r.. PERRlPS IN A SHORT ~~IL~, INTERNALLT AND IN PARTICOLAR lroh THI PARTY ITSELF, SO~1 ALT~~NATIVES COULD APPElR.-.. (T~! VIETNAMESE) -DESPItE MY RECENT ARRIVAL, IT IS NCT ~IF?!~UtT TO )BSIaVl TBI INTERNAL CRISIS. THIS STF.~S 'RO~ r~e DISTANCE SEPARATING TPI LEADERS AND TEE' POPI~IO~. TSE TCry~! LIME ADOPT!D YIS-1-VIS TaE REBELS AND.IHALLT ~EFOR~S BEING MADE WITPOUT TEE NECESSARY PRI INAPIES. TFESt MiY AL~O BE THE P.EASON BEHIND TBE ~AT ~OVERNMENT REsSUrrtE. AfGHANISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH Tnt WESTERN COONTRIES C1~NOT BE SAID TO BE GOOD. lltbo'gh UNTIL ASBORT WHILE JT '5e15 l:.!,!

119 ~'. NHHN" ESB02BJRA78~ PP BOQI1BR DE BUFBNA '5615/ g25 ZNY SSSSS UB P % AOG M OSI1ISSlON OSNA'l'O :fo IUiHe/SiCS1ATI VASBDC PRIORITY 1546 ~INro RurB~l/ALL NATO CAPITALS ~ ROSBU/AMEMBASST KnOt 3322 proeb'10/amem1lasst MOSCOW ~RDIRBAC/AMEM!~SST CAHBtRRA 3113 RDQMBI/AMJ:!'lBASSr TERRAH9015 IRUSJQD/AMEI1!ISSY ISLAMABAD 9075 E C! E f SECTION Z USHATO IB! s. AGO. fhi LEADERS EMPHASIZED TBAT fret VANTED TO BAVI GOOD ;RILA'IONS VITH fbi USA, SINCE fbe MURDEI or fbe AMIIICAN -AMBASSADOR AND TBE following COOLING 01 RI~ATIONS, fbey HAVE, IN TBEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, TENDED " N6ME lranci fhi 01 AND THE OSA FIRST AMONG fbe COUNTRIES AGAINSf fa~ 1IGI:011-. afghan-iranian RELATIONSHIP ~ONTINUES fo BE fensi. ON lvlly OCCASION, 'EE~A1GBAN SIDE CALLS THE IRANIAN REL IGIOUS ~EADERS AS fhe RE1C'ION1RT 1ND FA~lTICll LIADEns or IIAH AND BEHIND EViRT UPIISING LOOK FOR A SHIITE ON IRANIAN fin~er.. _ TEE JOLY ISLAMABAD VISIt BY DOST, THE AFGHAN DEPUTY roriign MINISltl, CONSTIfOTED IN OPENER FOR A D!A~O~U! VITB PAr.ISTAN. PllISTANI AUTHORITIES STRESSED TO the TORtISH EMBASSY TBtI! IMP~!SSION THAT ~OST DID NOT HAVE MUCB AUTBORI!Y AND TFAT BE DIn NOt r~mmit HIMSELF TO ANY!BIN~ DORIN~ TBE VISIT. NEVIPTHELESS, IT WAS ONLY AFTER THIS 'lsi! TBAT TEE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT ~y TEE PA':IST1N roreign POLlcr ADVISFR, ~R. AGBA SBAHl, IN PREP1R1TIO~ FOR A SUMMIT 9F.TWF.iH TAP.A~1 AND ~ENERAL ZIl. APPEARED. END feu. BEGIN TEIT OF or. P1PERa AFGHANISTAN 1. RECENT REPoRTS nemonstrate THAT THE Tl~A7I rte~im!'3 UIiT To ~E!P COf\'TROL IS INCREASIN~LT DtPENDENT ON savin MIL RT SUPPORT. TSE MAINTENA~CE or A FRIE~DLT AND CO OPE IVf. ~OVERNM~~T I~ AFGRAHISTAN IS Moes MORE IMPORT~NT TO SOVIET rnio~ TRPN TP.E ~AINTENANeE OF TARAf-I AND AMIN. BUT WE SnOULD NOT ONUER STIMArE ffe SOVIET e~~mit- 13

120 MENT TO THE -AFGHAN REVOLUTION- AS SUCH. 2. THE RUSSIANS HAVE INVESTED MOCH IN rbi PROPOSITION ~~AT TIFRE BAS BEEN A RE'OLOTION IN AfGHANISTAN, THAT IT REPRISENTS A MAJOR ~AIN ror Til Af~HAN PEOPLE AND THAT IT CO~FERS 1 -QUALITATIVELY NEW CHARACTER- ON SOVIET/AFGHAN ~RELATIONS. IF A SUCCESS~R ~EGIME ~ERE TO DISAVOV THE ~REVOLUTION, THE RUSSIANS ~OULD SEE THIS 1S A SET-BACK, ~WHETBrR OR NOT AFGHANISTAN REMAINED IN PRACTICE.LAR~EL!. ; DEPENDENT ON TEt SOVIET UNION. THEY VOOLDBE THE MORE pconcerned IF rael BAD REASON TO FEAR AN ANTI-SOVIET BACIaLASH.. i IF THERt IS NO ALrE~~ATliE TO lara[i A~D.AMIN walch - IS LIIlLY TO PR~VE VIABLE AND TO PAY AT LEAST LIP SERV1CE ito REVOLUTIONARY CONTINUITY, THE RUSSIANS WILL GO TO CON ~SIDERABLE LENGTHS TO PRESERVE TBE PRESENT REGIME. THE S DISADVANtAGES OF DIRECT "'nitart IN~ERVENrzON, IN TRt SINSE ;or LARGE NU~BERS or SOVIET TROOP.S OPERATING D~RECTLY AH~ VISIBLY ONDER SOiIET CO!1:1AND, ARE MANY AND. TIU:.,RUSSIANS, ARE UNLIIELY TO CONSIDER IT EXCEPT AS A LAST ~ESORT. THE ~ PROBnLE SOUET PREFERENCE, AND THE ONE ror VHICH.'.rURE. ~ IS INCREASING EVIDENC~ IS TO FURTHER SUENGTHIN THE SOVIET tc) MILlrAFT PRrSENC~ IN AFGR1NISTAN, MORE ESPECIALLY IN SO C'. FAR AS A DErEiIORATING INTERNAL SITUATION CAN BI BLAMED ON to EXTERNAL INTERVE~TIO~ AND IT CAN BE ARGUED TU! THIll IS 1 TIRIAT TO THZ SICORITY, INDEPENDENCE AND '.rerii'.roiial - INTJ::JRIU- OF U'GHANI.STAN VITKIN 'fhetei/'1s. or-alncle.~ or '1'81 SOVUT!AFGiJANTRIATY.... I... THE RUSSIANS BA'~ REkCRID OUT IN. AFGHANIS!AH ror MORE THAN THEY REALLY NEED, BUT ARE NOW IN A POSITI~N VHERI T!IY CANNOT EASILY RETRIA'.r WITHOOT CONSIDERABLE LOSS or lace AND THE POSSIBILITY 01 ~ORE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO TEEIR. INTERESTS. 5. SUBJICT TO TBE ABOVI, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE RDSSIANS WOULD LItl TO SWITCH BORSES, IF AN ALTERNATIVE.TO TARAn AND AMIN ~IRI lvlij:,ajle'. THE PROBLEM IS THAT ANT ALTERNATIVE SET or LEADERS VOULD rind IT DIFrICULT TO ESTABLISH' A POPULAR BASE UNLESS THEY COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT TIEY wire SUBSTANTIALLY MORE INDEPENDENT or THE RUS SIANS THAN riraii AND AMIN. EVEN WERE THE RUSSIANS PRE PARED TO CONTEMPLATE lllo~in~ A SUCCESSOR RIGIME A LOOSER RII!"THIRE IS NO POLITICAL GROUPING AVAILABLE TO TAIE. ON ROLl. A MILITART REGIME HIGH! BE AN ALTERNATIVE. THE HY HIGHT BI SIEN BT fhb POPULATION At LARGE AS BEING sur IENTLY DISTINGUISHABLE from fhe KBALQ HOT TO BE. TAR VItR TRE SAME BRUSH. FOR THlIR PAR~ THI RUSSIANS 14

121 'HIGHT BE SAfISlIED THA!!HE LARGE NUMBER or orlicirs VI'E,RAIHING IN Tar SOVIET UNION WOULD INSUIE TEl CONTIMUATION or THEIR IN1LUENCE. BGVEiIR. AL'HOUGH IT MICa! BI RELA TIVELY EASY FOR fbi RUSSIANS TO INGtNllR 1 COUP,!RIII IS COOD REASUN!O DOUBT ~BtTnER THE Cl~IBI! AND RELIA BILITY or!he ARMY ARE SUFFICIENT TO BlAB THt ADDIT!ONAL ~ Jl'1. ~'~615 - NNt:NVV ESIl027 jrj.t79 :pp ll.uqi".hr :DE lurena ~5615/a I ZNY SSSSS ZZH p 0e17372 A~G 79. "'M OSHISSI0N USt~U'o ~T~ ROEHC/SEeSTA'! VASHrc PRIORITY 1547 ~lnfo RUY6r.K/lLL NATO CAPITALS ~PDS!1(/AHEMDASSY KAJUL 0023 prdehmo!amehbassr HOSCO 6~2B 5~uEHEAC/AHEMBA~ST CANBERRA 0114 ~ROQHfR/1HEMBASST TEHRAN 0016 :" ~ROSJQD/AHEHBAssr ISLAMABAD B'1'. is E ere T SECTION 36 OF 06 USNATO lil5615 I INCREASE IN RESPONSIBILITY. ; END TP.XT. GLI'fI'lAN.:B'f #

122

123 - \IV 1_: :'~"~"~J~-J~7 f'p f;~(':~:r: r.c ~US~_~ #~!~1/1 r~[r7~5 zt:y t'cccr ZZ II P P. I S:"=7r'''~ A'.'~ 7~ Fro A~E~~~SSY YABl~ TO I.tF-HC/~iCST ~Tt \.'J,!;!::,\C ~IOi(I1Y ~?6~ R!JQ:'iGlJ/l-JlI;[fIi&'ASSf AtlY.ARJ\.5!9J "USC-C;:IA!,I~~q~SSY ls.. '~~~AD ~ 1T": Rt~~F~'A~~~=ASSY c!ijj'g (,~1 atj~~t.i~~~e~jbas!:y JIDUA.5~ H~rCl~!':r!1BASSY londo:.j 1751 nuev,io/amei'i AS5Y l'iosco'"t~t RU~AJ:IIIl'fEP:SA~S't NEil: DtLHI 724C RlIY.~PSlAl'ID'!BASSY'~,F.IS.3217!iUQ"lHIVA~!l!uA:SY rehp.a~~ 4('1 ~~rt:'=if"!vc7n~f'~c r.ur!:"all!s!'ii~sim: ~,::;t\atc ~3 s: C 0 ~ f. :r, r t' T I " t ~t:ct'ic~;, cr /. n~:1l. :51 CltlCP.l:CI 111.~C. rjf P{I!.AP t:.o. l:fl~ t G!)!. ~"l~-~ cra't'... t'~. J~:.!S t.)' O?.. r- r/ '!:..r ~rcr'il. fl~~, n:r.. Ar. ~I~JJ f1.. ~U) "ATU":!"F THE "rghat: OPPOrITIOi: 1. <c - Ef\7rF. TFi:T.) POI. CHG,CHRON ECOll H.:..!:tr~AT Y, ~ot!ir:j OF-POSnIO~ TO THr i"'ale: F:I:':l~E Ci ~i::::lr:eflr NOCr. MOI:/t"'::"."!' 1ARAU AtC rnr;t; r:rris-ef: ~AF!Z!.:t.LAH.~vt~; I S POSED ry "ANYiiISP/.i\AH. EL:r.:.!:rs "'J.:!:l A~t. r.cti\late,) "iii" ijlrfniic GRIEVANCES. FE/.,P.S rceg~~~n:: 1Ht F.:'::~F.EF!J'W or 1:l.~~ II": p.es r:1"1[n'j or w~ai THi:Y pe':::cnv: AS A S!::"'L"O!JT 11: ~)~r.o\:= 0; "rgha';isr4a: ~ PATIC~"L S'L'l f.r;e T H Fjd~A?Y 1:;~"'~ [IIE!'fl'5 F!JaI!f~ T!:~ v:.r'iouscjof:)s!tio ; Gr'OlJr~ n!lug~~i"~ Fn~ A 2$1.r.':SC ty.a:'gl' U THIS ~~VOL:JT'IOHAF.Y P.LCI~E. SYolJRTOr r.:::!:r:k~ 50K: :H::r..\:::,~ r~i~ ':1J:rr S:f:~ " ~/r"!:tie CHf;r:G:, THE ':'~~~KI A~I'; U::D:t!... :~ J:I,5 t.unf ~IA..rt"nin;u.; 1\0':/;: AI::> FE:..' Oi"l!O~S \:;{I::1 '10:'.. r r-c:e!:z' VH. tli, CHAI.crs OF' p.h'n:su:r, TN:: CUr.Fl:lil TJ:[;."j.tC!~~.,';:., C';U!o,"; r.:;x ~s IF.::i'CY O;'!:!'I;'! ::m!:, T ~E?r:ro:. E, ftr. F-1!~~/I~.Y ':~: TN!: ~C! IZO~l, c: /iq,rc\.'ith ;. Li.~.:':-? r.~:!lff :.r~ ",~:;! ;~Sf.V:' r:.:.: ~j:"~. l;.r.: i(: il ~~'~I(';; I!~;:Lr. IF ~!Jl TI::~ r, :!:ih::t..:c:: t.a='i-:n::~.h. lj:z?rrt.: IT:: :I:rc:~:::; r/,"; Ft.FI, ;U:' :~r~~;r:j" :-.~~'~P:: Fr:"~;i:'I.Ti.:; h::':' :SSi.IlTHLL'I ~'=TI~~IL'T L!.,'!:.r.r- ~:~I;~. c---: 24 '

124 ~. F'~~~CA2l;:: ~"1ST~~~.~ :-:'~:;;.)"T T~~~ ':.S~~::.:;!~ T~~'~ ::;n-=-n ro Ci/liU HO'.' ~ n::-r::~':! ;t:l,~'.;r 'l.~ 3~,, ~'j l,,' ~LL -p.;~~:::; ~(a:le. AtiD TH;:,)F'~.J'Hrl::: :: :;::1:';":; ;f:'v.u ; :':!If1~L:'Y C::~;;TI CiJ..,\T!D. ~'tu ~r~g'~e". :~X::;:'"ii~~l':' ::;, ~,- :!:r::'1 : ~"''Y ;i!: 'J~?':'':"IT:(,~~ <.;;:'=)4 %~ DY ~C ::. ~S A:'::!.~:Ql C~ "!.r..'".:.~~': :tt:=(j-: -t~~c:":::'::-: F"':R :rr!i;-:o ';.T ~:-::5.--:~~.~ ~lit,~:"=! ~,.... : "":::L:: r: s~~ ''-....~ ~~.IT '!::fl. UlrC:1:E'SJ' Uf 7"'!S ::(,:_;:;r~'{ A:;~'.. =:~!:::. ;'.~: ;:-~Ll. :: A :YIT~.'L. t:i.n; 1;1' ~'io' ';':J.V.J.i:7... ';CK;-e-.o~~:i4:. i'....tl : -, _ -... rr ~- -~ ~~~"Ct;S31Jt:S FO~;13 T}ln':'-~cr.o r: T'.'::' 1'-:>:' :':~;L~ :;Y ij~"ii:::''\h:.: I~' t!l~t Clw. A:::';E~:;A~~E5 VI:'''; :, :\:~ 'i':':,'litl':- :::.~,,;:: i~ 'IIsrC~Y:<; ::,: r : Ce:5~.'\nl'f A':r.!j-:\j~. Lr?:;'oi!:!:,';-. :;::;P1':'~ r:-r: i'a~:ty 0)-" :"r:~!::-1~!"...r:""a1'! -: :,.,;"",:cop:l'.:r;:" :-Lr:~ ~!":l : '~tt:}-l.ell ::~.. :~:,.;:! ;::: '''':::A::L~ -l" :~::. ;~1~.::,J/.i!'.:. r.:!:'~nc! VI Hi:: J:V:l..'::'~i.:'1'.~Vfr:"..~ n r"4:5 '::;_'~:T~ :'. :".'''.:::-:::.'!.{, A ~::-U~,( ~\:::~ E:<;'~~Tl,'.LL'f :.; 1'1.:':: "!;...:.:. C::Tfll.i'::- T:::r;':'T:; ':c :~~H ~ ~..,.~ ~~~ ~::L ( t:.,::; ~:.~! :l! ':.::r ~'~~fl:i:~y G\:!:"~I~l 1t:1:: tco:f~" I r; ;::r':? 1 <~.~.. r;:i. -:';' ;: =-.:::r I)-.-; F' ~ :.[ - I ~L.,\:I!Ie. pl\?fr Of AF~!~4'~:".:'A:: ::.\Li."" ;:';:11 : ~:: P:;':!!!~'I ;;:- ;:J?~.Hr. IH S~J!r::H)~':;r <'~Z" T: : L!7E ':. :~Il =~: :).,\;10 T...: ~C;;Ail.y H~nTI\3LZ ii:~~sr:-::,.~j ~:;l..:r:;~.\!:'=.:::- :..: K:J.*:l~%~ :.tio~u HI\'Ji ;;"-c~r:::'je: u.~:"..uj r:~;:r~ l:!".~ ~~;I:~:\. ::': ;l~r:,:::: iolc'.. JU~ In!))!H:r~J.?lifIcX A:iAl...=r s:~ : :::-.".l.'li ;;:f~ci~t.~!"i3!oit.~":!,'\r T~ ~t.. ~~.:?,'\LA~:CZ, ~'-="":::\t? C.:~ LM!C~ ~ ;jr:;:stj. :;!'.':N ij'e ~:1A''i ~;'7~-~. :~y,...;~:: i.t.:.: TO :'10Z~!:\. ~ ~t.'tl)?~'j ~ l:l'( r'~ ~?Ii:::l ;'Y T}l~ 1':'~I. ": '':f ;;, r :\:!Al(I _~t!.' lj:li:j r.:r-i~:::. :- '~~ ~F ~U"'::.4? Y. --- ~ ~. trli'rcd!.jc!i,)s: ::1:'::::: r::. :::::-T"-!.~ -.~":::r I)F' rl3~!l:~:~(,"aric ~~rjet:c 'J~ A;::C' 1,:1::- ~'l C 1~) :,:--:: :~:'::':.~fj :rw;.~,j.j. 11-1;; LtAtZ;.!;:!P ~rii> RAf;i( M; ::-Zt!-: '7 rio: f"~:.~:"._:.- ~~:";1"::P:!I';?~7'!TY t}; ~:-:::IiH:;r.'l~' (f!)?.~ -- i: :'_': ;'''UTZ::,L ::1.::--:':: t-~ ih: (,-:l::~f':"''(. \;:.l'js[ Pitt tlj;p~1. :t ~OT.; :.E':' 0 ~-'!...L ";.'~1Ii'!~~ ':' ~.:.. ::.. rr."';y. fl, ::31Z':T :F!~" r If ':~.. t,: ":::;r 3I~., :.p1j t;::. ~,".:1,~,.r:, ~:~ :i ~::H ~?~I~tj TO klr::? ::-:,,"r;t"'",l::ot '\rr.. :!. 1::.~~7 : ~!~:...!!1:.L-.; '.!TIC,",:' ~.. : =:~!'~ -: ".I.:'lt~~!~I~!; ". :~.---:: t.~":'j: :.t~~ _.,,,4; -"".".~,:;)?"~ ""Aj.:; ':~S.THlS IlEVlJLI1TI~tlli~, A GIME"S GO.,.5 "'OVla~ frabavt-y. ItJ Tt4EMmViS, ~)E::::!t'J:: GEftVU1[ S'UPPD~r "Of( ""&1'.. r:.. : t,- _...~.'7:~.:.!~ :r7:::. t"'" ~.;...: t..:t '.; 7: ":",t.: "':"'.-.;.~ ~.:,;.'-:~. ~ ~ L ~..L ",: ::r ;.~..-.:;,.' ~. I r;'.7. '!.,.:- t: f!......!... : i'.-:,\:;,0',: ~~. -::.o'!".,':..-{ 7"'- t..., I ',...., :" 1 25

125 O GROUPS vu E~Afil~rJ:4~~ pp Rl1r/.'IHM. DE P.C~B:' to..g251/2 2Z~E74~ llfy CCC:C ZZn p R 16~7p.r:- AU~ 79 F1't AP1El':8ASSY KA9lL TO RutHc/SECSTATE WASKlC PRIORITY ~261 RU~GU/A"E~ttSSY A~~AHA J~4 RUSSQD/Ar1 116ASSY!:;LAfllASAD 9178 ~UMJPG/AMtM&ASSY6,IJIR06B2 RU"'RA/A!ItEl1BAS~YJIDDA J'G RUDTC/AI1E/'IBASSY LOlWON 1752 RUEHPlO/APIi1'fBASSY t1dscow J82'. o. RUSI~E/~DASSY ~w DELHX'1247 stllmslako'ibassy PARIS J21!. 'RUQ'lHRlA1'! PIBASSY TEHRAtI AC2 RUHQHQA/ClI:CPAC...JnJP14HAlUSMISSION US'lATO 34 pt. e 0 II 'r J D [ N T I A L SECT! Of! 2 or ~ r.ttglll 525 I. 'CIICPACI ALSO for.... ~, '.. - PCLAD 'OPJ'OSITIOff MOVEl'JtHI' WHO~ It!SlmG~:;CY C~!RATIO:IS HAVE:.NIBBLED.AVAY AT THE GCVf.Rt:MENf S CAPJlCITY. Tt :or:tp.ol Th' COUtlTRY ourside'l'iajop. POPULATIC" CEF.tER~..- ALTHOUC~ THE!1t3IPSE cit.":.' 51' JLL"R SPOfO QUIC~Y /did FORCEFLLLY CAS pe:r.m~srrar D IN KABUL. OR '"musf.') fo DIRECI CHAl.LEf:GES ~!EI:~ T ~ cout:try S POL ITleAL.t ART. 'Of!!THE1.ESS, THtO?FOSITION, AL!!EIT SI ILL.F'f:AGfI',ENTED. '. aid GEIlERALLY LEADEP.U:SS. '1 S \: ID SPRtAD Am> APPARE:f';'TL~' FUELED. 8Y J)EtA.Y-HElJ) GRIEVANCES THAT' HAVE CAUS D THOUSANDS or.:...~ '. 0'..; ~', 0". ".; '<:; :>o...~ I JISII'atIl'S TO RIS1C'AU. IN AN ATTEMPT TO.13VERfmow A REGIME' VKICH :.PROP'ESSES THAT tr HAS ate..om: WElfARE. or THEAFGHAlI.,~SSEBo At.HEART. '.:.PRlIIC1PAL ELEI1ENTS OF' THE OFPOSIrIOH E~1I~.TI0N: T)(.E AJ'PO- : mioi,1'o~tju: DRA IS HOT A r.oijolithic AND CCORil1:1ATED nls[jr ElICY. SlICE A' ItI'1BEr. OF' 'DISPARATE tl!'ief:rs ME SiP.UGGtING F'OI...vARIOUS REASONS FOR A DRASTIC CHANb lfl T}lIS REGIME. TKI":RlBEL AcrUAlLY ENGAGED IN COr.BA! AGA!';ST THE ~.rg!iar ARf'fY APP &~to DRAtoI I Hr.IR ~jani'o'iep. FRO:' V!L!..AGt:S Ar..'D TUDES, WHICH COP.~UTurE :A~JHt:RE FJ:~ c:--~~ r-zr.c:n:r OF AF'GK"':ISIArl S POP\LATl~'T~ GE~nhLtY lll1t!:r.att: S~J'j:::trrs or AF'(!HA:t lidcn:l'v T~tTIONAt.' FOES \Ii AS'{ c ""Tr:AL GOVEiWi1 l\'t AT "rell~kquw',:many AAE APOLITICAL IF. LUT ~0r:E:...h'O"tV~R._.~E V%LLAGtR~ -- FO~ vanious REASO~S <E.G ECONO~IC) - #UlCDOUBTOLY SUPPOii,..!"' DiU, SINCE "'the r.ur'.l?opulatior: ALSO. SERVE!. AS nee: QOVER1r.lEN'T S /'I~"POIiUl POOl. fop. rrs tlilitary ~ ~lsred RANKS. rhus~ RESISTANCE, HOWEVER WIDESPREAD. HAS :~ 'YO CO~jP\.ETELY -sry:'4je:dthe REGII'IE S ABILITY 10 fiieet _ IrS tl td!;.-tor ur~skn.lto TRooPS,. ALr.HOUGHftODlE~.f. HAVE. -1KDEt'D 8tt~ [HCOU~'TE:RED. 26:

126 " ".~..".L ;..., _ :-"j-. &: :..a... _"...: "'_.'_ "'"'''''.\., '-:-: 'p..~ J~'':':''::!7IO'':'~ l;f;"j.t~. ;,:LA:IV!:S Of ~'\O:i= ':n.,j tl.w 5!'ft: :-:"!'!I:~T;r, til' nn,,!~l'=~ P;:,::SECliTD!''l' T'!!!" }-~:.~,~~ U~ ~.-:':': ;,L: ':",~L ':::::-:;:n!(.:~,,::.,.. H r~e T~I.~:TI( :: I.: T:i15 J. ~...,..:--- :...!:< "':-.C!~Y. T;'- l.;:,t~;' r'{l~ t~/,:'[p'~up t''..-;:-_,t':.. ~:~-.: T\ ~~.Sl!:!~:' p;~ r-.:.~icr::~, TEF: If.H~!:t\ n:1s?a~ttc:!laji ~:::'~:P ~!11. ':' ::0:;:;:. ~Ir-~!:U;;7U:i) rxl J~OU.T:::D lrf71sts,c"'cnly r,"~{:;::':ji~::,~;r M"SC ~~:! nisarfzcted l(~al::is) as" ~EJ(,. CI AL:.!JOT l.easf C/F ALL stc~use TH Y BD.IEVE THE.TAftAkl- '.:.. "IYoU,TEAM Mil!: ~crrayij) THi: CEt:UW SPIRIT or THtRF.VOUrrION. 'Atf!I t:as E:~U!,!I~:r.Et; THE IIJITlI.!. GClOll-WIU.,lI:HICJ: GRcrTED THE : 'i.fjv Nl or l '~E!'r~:-:Isr9(1vrfl~~'Zf~'t S!Y.TEEI4 t:o~-rhs AGO. DIS- ;." ]:U:USI0~a, l.!t hts or 'f~ fit. 'v. "HO fltay,see KO '[tft',t.o ~.1H Flma~KG ANDKILLUiG.,RE.T A l'ol IfIUllY CRITICAL' ~ti~,,'t'::-\j' THE' OT'P:)S1IIOti [SP CIA1.1.Y If DEStRTlO~S ANi) DE. ',Fl~ %ONS.lJICF.E:ASE.: OR IF f URtHEJl. XPLpsrc»cs UKE:.AUGUST 5 GROUPE; JlEADWMTERED IN PESI'.AWA~ occtr'..!'jl.e O~J"OSITI0rf 'P.EPREiDr,'Dlssrrr. FROl'I THE FORPIER"-,ESfA2LISK'lEHT." ltho ~N-. EP.ALLY 'LOOK ~ItH!)lSOAIN UPON THE KYoALCUS, "qsr OF'lINer! DO 'I NOr fftac THEIR UWl!ME'TO THE EL;lT ~ASSES.',IIl TMEr,SE1.VES.:, HO\'EVEft, these PARTIClLAR -LIBERATION :~f'rdrr~ l'j\'obadly»o::iiot POSE A SERIOlJ5' CHAl.U:RGE TO 1H :DRIt. "AND,:FI)R"~i( AFGHf&"~ :',' " f~atioi:al LIEERArlOR frota.(a(non, n- A1.~"'tO J'lAY AN INPDR1':Ala' FUTURE TroJ.! THEY \TILL Pr.OBABl. Y HI.V TO SETTLE THEIR OVN' '. f lrar,ar.l~a!. DIFFEr.!NCES,' Ar~3,EST ADLISH SO"'E COIfVINCING ", 'EONA.1%f.ES roll Cr.'::IRYING our llisuhcn't OPERATIC':S NEARER " THE:,P""':'IT!Cl\!. I AAY OF n,:r COUl~rp.y. GROUPS \'11M L SS'THAR,',on BOtJ..S AAF:. ALS~ HAHASS%tlC THE GO~RNI1EtlT. AS REGUlAR., PAIfi,l,lTS Aim OTKiFt CilIJIII~AL n.t!':tt!ts STEP UP THEIR OP RATIOtJS.:LeN6 StVER~.L' 0; 'TK COUr:TRY'S PF:ltlCIPAL HIGM1.:AYS, THEREBY :OI:'If:lBUIHC IN teo S!'/t.LL ::EASl'!\E TO THt OVJ:nALL Br.EA"J):>~ t1 If~ LA\' Il~ ORDEn n~ THE CoUtlT1;YSIIJE la..foil OP?OStTIOK ~OUP5 opr~t.ting' WITHffl AfGHAf~ISrAt.l1, Mt..JDfi. AR~AS,'or SUCCESSfUl. OPPOS!!IOI: OPERATI:>US HAVE BEFNI..,. ff{ EASI'ERN'flnOVlNC OF NURISI'l\tl ('.;.IHERE Th'E Nl"RISTANIS FOR.. 'lotlfhs A'PEARED tnt' 1fESftD om. '{ U DENYING THr R Gn~E ACCESS' '. :TO'TH Dr RUGGED HOMILAfm, BUf \"HO /'lay NOlo' ALSO SE,ASSOCIATED'., \:Ii'H the f!ghurg It: THE PANJSHIR.VALLEY,I'1UCH IJEARER Kl.e!Jl.l, :.' PAr.IU 'ROVIHC[ sourk ~st OF THE CAPITAL (WHOSE OPPOSITIOf( ". PSOWMEta'S MAY BE ~osr 'Q.OSEl.Y RELATED TO 1'HE REFl.(G S'ltt:,,. PAI:ISI'AK. AS lieu 'AS TO THE VARIOUS -FORMAl- GROOPS (ESPECIALLY " 10,,~'HAT,'OF G,t.lLBmQU HEKI'IAIYAJ\ AND SEYED -AJND GAlLAnt", HEAD- '. ~' EfttC' IN P'SHAWAR. AND ~HEP.E EF'FDRrS l'1ay.have REACKLD', ~JnES Of GARDEZ Am> GHAn~I> J THE'LUNAR-I:%J( cenrral ' '.,.. Or'THE COUNTRY (WHOSE HAZAnA/SH1~.A 'POPlLAT1Ot~. Tm,.. II' Ru..NG :OS TKE, t.f6p.a~ ECONO~IC ANt> SOCIAL. LADDER,,1 S.' S sr-~; ~~ ". "..:'6'2~.)' 27 :..--: ' ~,.,',,.,.'

127 vv ESA~I7r:...C511 pp P.U~Hf: " RUS!: K 1&'2' 1/3 228C!:7~' DE,%11 CCCCC UH.' r R 1&-:7"a AUO' '79 ' m A"tr.SASSr KA8UL to RUEHC/SECSlATE tlashdc PRIORITY 526'2, RUQJllGUlAYoEnBASSY -ANKARA J05 RUSS ~I Al':tI'!BASSY IS.AJlJABAD, J7J RlJ'IJPGl~BASSYBEIJIIO'S8.S. RU~RAlA(lIilteASSY, 'JIDDA. J6"7 : RUDrClA!ltEI'JBASSY,~OIlDON.:t"J5.3 " RllEHllIO/AMEftSASSY :"OSCOW ~1s,,0.., RUIiBAE/MJEMBASSY 1 II DElHI 7248 'RUFNP!:IAPlEMBASSY PARIS.5219 ;.,RUQlIJr./A,y,E"BASSY TEHRAIl 403 RUH:»{QA/CINCPAC..':.. ' RUFHNA/USPIISSIOIl i1snato J' 8T.:-: _,:.,. : CON'.%, DEI T 'I A 1. stenon 3 'OF'~., KA Btn. 625 i.. '..". CINCPACz. ALSO FOR' POL AD ":,... ":.. '.,.. PRoeA!lY~FIGHrIWG'l"~ORDER TO A~NGE PAST,nEPRtssIONS SUFFtRED' AT THE,HANDS OF pusmun-dominate:). -ctntrat 'GOVERt~ I'E"'T~l THE AREA :AROUffD HERAT, CITY eitf\ep.e. Y.l RE ~HAV BEE~, ~E lwlcatlon~ THAT.IRANIAII -IRf1.UENCE'! OR. ~EXPEa~ENC~, MY 8E AIDlHG THE :larsi"'an AKD PUSHrU 'INSLRGEHTS) :'~:AN!), '..' THE TURKO:".!:! ANt 'OZ8rk ABl1ICU.TURAL "REiuOZfS BORTH OF"tffE " KIII»U KUSH..(AlTHOUGH TH S REOIO/fS ARE le~s..1ieavil-y-matihtd.. BY. THE AyaM" ARI1Y', the FIBHUHG- HAS ttor"reac~':the,<pro-'" :,:..fiorriojis OF.. THAt :ALOHG THE PAKlSI'AN-AFGHANISJ'Ali Bmu>ER)~ 4 ;.EV.JDEIIC.O':COORDINAfION OF r~se FFORTS;.HDWMR.RDfAiRS; :aijsjjlei";aji), :50 :rar.at L~Asr. rhese-;'suecessf'ui;' OPElAT:I()fI~. 'tcavf}f'riiic!pally.. BUll" ur~ertakeff YLO::A!.". tflhasnaifts"': :',FlOHr.l'a' Tv.~f;nIID TH!IR OWM TURF., IF' THE IfiSURGEffTS 8 -, GIll "OUNrII"n'AJor.~ OP.ERAT%ONS..oursIDE, these INDIVIDUAL :.',"': REGIONS (AS'PJAY.. 8E:fHE CA~,.:oW TITH'THE'JlURISTAHls>, THE. JI Olrn:~S:'PROBLE"S MY Brcor :' MAtUF' stly MORE DIFnClJLT.! ',... ' ".. S. 'FOfiDAPlENUL OPPOsnIOll GRIEVARCES' APPE'A~' SUFFIC'IF:IOT' to susralif LOlflJ TE)U' ngki'ingr TWO FUI'IDAI"1E:fTIJ.:: PERCEPTIONS TRAIfSC 1ID ~THESE COl'2PL'dltts- f1otivatjno IP!)JVIDUAL OPPO SITION.El.Er1 NTS, AI!) FUEL T~ OVZ:tIJ.L lnsureetfctes TOA FAR GR~TER. ExrENI'. THAll 'AlY' OT~R CONSIDERATION. rm:se ARE the VIRtUAlLY URIVDlSAl."'..p RCEPTIORS.tHAT.THE,ORA LEADERSHIP. IS KIJ)E 'O":OF :,"GDD!. SS CO!"ll'JutlI srs. '1U:D THAT, THE TARAKl... AIUR.TEAPI ems SOLD AF'GHAHlSTAU S 'Nt-UOHAL SOlll. AND FURTURE ' TO i'loscow..~n:ars.of'rj«e lltwaye REPRESSION OF'THEIR " RD. IGlOOS JUGta S A"LA:. SOVIEtCEl:I'RAJ: "ASIA' en SHOULD"BE '. tllel'i M8ER D'tHAT<I'IANY."U~1!'tS'f1.ED THOSE AREAS TO AYOHANISr"MJ tin TH1S<\CENf-uR,r.' II.,ORDE!t TO PRtSERV~. TJr:;lR ~E1.1GIOUS ".INTE- ~~ t;~!?a~:attl~;~f!i~~.j{~~_~!:l>_~l~!!:.~~l!\~~~ -".,,,,-,, ,..."... 'ROTY '~A~Y!:TUrf ~'KF" rt-:~r \-.!;...:.:::-" "'::.:-::,~:: &.:;~ f.. :IU r~ IU:\1E1;nE. T~Y AIF :"'~:I':H:C; m':.j'7ly ~o T ~~I!l:1~H.tr ~:t~,.~::r. r,r:~. Ljf\-rVI:;:. "~ :T~:::~':~ l~ ~ -f;'-:c"-:'.l -;:) ~~!":~... t";'" '.'to' r:,' ~i.. 28

128 ,Ie., COr:rRAST, THE RJ;c;t:i:~ S i'(. IrJ~r ~'/!. r.croil'?,logp.lt:":r. rnr'jucii?z It::;TTf::i/,CY,... A::~ l:ft'cifi:i.!.l:::rl't.nc,:l Of 'TH[ TRt.nT IOIl~.. Sf.I:lE:?RICE," Min B.ot\~~i:G or UStE \' f'ilactic~s)., PROVOr.ED S~ SCATT~ED OPPlJSnIOf;, [d':' Tlit O~GOIt-;c: 'IHSURw:w.:y IS flor -J'i!!MAr.~'(.St:ST r.1 ~L ~'! 1:~H Il ~T 'l" TO rh!sefrotir~'st 110 1'!IJTi:F. HO~ UNPCPtn.Ar: T~Y r:ay HA'Ti: Sc: I:. CHAT!EE"" Q.EAR IS THAT DEEf'l. y-mt :~clio~~ I.F.E NECESSARY to CAUSE EVE,. AFGHANS TO ':',.". UP AR!"1S AGAIN~ r ;r.dern "f APb:l~ ~IE1.DIJ) BY A f)i:1'~!'iir.rd fi:~d nun~e~s GOV f-:hi~ut, At:D ~~HAT St H EMotIONS DO, II( FACT,.F.itVAIl Ol~ THE ClffiR~HT ~F'GJfAll 'PCLtI' ICftL..SeE NE.. Ie.-~E.V P01.tCY OPrIONS ARE' AVUlASlE TO Tm: R eit1eto RE ~_ thepr SENT tr::hdt THE DRA LEADERSHIP APPEARS to HAVE ~Y:.~~'PoL=lTICAL:,OPfIONS AT ITS DISPOSAl' ~}{1CH, '~F ADOptED,,,'tOlLD "HAvt~IAB1.E:.cHA2ICES.OF. REVEF.SING THE: CURHENI' TIDE.'. ":t HE aovejur'letjr.:.:nas -DECl.ARED A' HtmB R or 'ITS PROGRAMS (PlOS!' fi01'ably.lard~ruor") :~SUCCEssrl1.tY CO:'lPlETIJ>," BU! THIS "ACUON "HAS..HAD LUTLE NOTICEA91E IP'lPACT 0:: THE LEVEL OF. '''IGRtING," A D VELOPME~ wliich WOUL~ $UFPO?T THE Cor.TEt:rIQr~ IJCAI TlCE JlEGlfllE-S REFORMS: DID 1i0T R~Piir:s::r:r P.OOT CAUSES.T:U~ 'GROllTH OF TIE OPPOSITION...;),. 11. J'"O ADDRESS THE RalGIOUS I ssur, 'AHt LEADERSHIP HAS!'iOI.!l!I'ED AN INl'EtlSE PUBLIC R tatioi:s Cf.lllPAIGU, l:~ctwing REP ATE[\ ASSUU':CES BY TARAKI ANt A~It! Ir~ THEIR PUBLIC SF..ECHES THAT THE DRA IS ADSCLL'IELY :~.OT Of'~SED TO ISLA.). -r.of:eovtr, ~ EARLY AUGUST COtCLAVL IN r.ae~u1. Or OVER ONE Murm;:: I) -'l5lal'jic SCHOLARS" I SSUEDA STAT 'MENT SUPPORT!NG.' THE -D~OUIUESS- OF THE: REGI(II '~Nn CLAltUr.G THAT rue.dra:- I.CI' UA!.1.Y IS TH! -PROTECTOR- OF ISLAM. NONI:1'HElESS,.THIS.' FAR! IClLAR EFFOP.T MAY val...ave COME 100 LATE TO convuce. lhe MASSES" THAT.TJtE Y,flALQI Rt:GU1E DOES NOT HAVE THEREDUCTIOR' OF' ISoAfl1,U"AF'GHANISfAN 1.5 ONE of" ITS PAIf1AAYGOAlS.. ~..'. J2 KODIFlCATIOUS.:tR. the DRA S RELAT.lOiISHIP \'nh THE ~OVIET UNION:PJIGJ«:{!'OSSmLY "OLLIFf T HE OPPOSITION TO SO!'lE EXI'ENI'.J3ur : U'''ls t)2:mcil"t ; TO.ID~HT IFY. MEAnINGFUL ll:asy TJf' KHALQIS,GOlLJ).DotKlS:.VItflOur RISKING T~lP. OWN SElf-nC::STftUCTION,." SINCE :TlIt <sovi!.tft:ornecuon,is..the CRUCIAl. SUPPORT FOR t HE :CtJlRENT l.eadership.~:thus, T~ I'ARAI{1-AtlIN TE4M FACES THE." er.almarl.tkat 1H :DRA PROBAalY COU1.!) NOT.SURVIVE WItHOUT.,... l:xtensive SOVIET :SUPPORT; ~HllE" AT THE "SAJliE t Ifl1E, THAT '\'ERY: SUPPORT 'SERVES TO',FAIl.THE F1.AMES -CF THE nationalist1c " OPPISUIOH. ','. at '~'l I

129 .... :,. - ~ 11'. --l 01 '...,., r~'. ~, '.: /, :.: ~.,. :.. -, :. J.~.':.. :~.: '! ::'.. ~: ~~' ,..... l.' ~, po... _I:",:;'..;;"~.;... i ~:.J!;, :- - ::"la",::.:~~:~s~..!!~ ~ t' :;C~..~; If. :.:':::' ::~y :,~,.:,:,,~ 1-" ;:::=- ~..." f.~:: ;~f.!,:r-:~ ::~ ~::,. ;~. 1r.::. ~ ;,:'.~:: ~l/.;.r:~c~~::~ l~: i:~}- ~ 7: "':' ~!:;:' ~~~. r;./ :...f: :ufa!=s'( r.".~ 1 ~ ~Z:: ~ f!.l".~'~'.1 :"::::-::'10:::':' i!:tr." :.~ 4 'A F ;: ~: ". _/~;!:~PA= ;.: L!;~';:.Ii: -: '1 5~loN us;;t:r 0,)6 f J Y r I ~ E N 1 I A L ::ECTIuN 4 OF',,'. KABUL 6251.;~:-:- CI\:P/\Ca ALSO ror, POLAD u.~ ~ElmIHi: (:HANGE' Iff THE COMPOsntOH 'OF THE DP.A l ADER~... S"IP (!:ar JtiEP.a Y A COSm:t Ie P.ESHUFFLIIlG OF PORTFOLI.Os) - "I&Ht.:?(lS::IB!..Y t!c.p PRESERV:: 1m: P.EVOLurIOl~, BUT'A MEV DRA T AM tr::01.~ ~LSO f'!!'m~l r Jlft\IE TO cm:vitlcr fhf. AF'GHMlPOP!.IlACE: Hi"!' :,;r." AF~OACnES- r 0!:Ol)f I aa~ AND :~osco~ \'OUL:> Bt U::'-:::-:;T"r.::f~. It: THIS CiJ:1N:'CTIO!:, HO'''~V~, TIC F'? SEHt LEADER-' S~!P IS UILIY.n. Y TO apr VO!.UIfT.r.JUl Y FOR ITS 0\It\ DESTRUCr.IOt~,. f.i.cap.!'less C;" T H: Al'.OUtrr or!ol!?ce OF our SIDE f':' SSUP.. AS A C:;;:~~~ GZI:C:-- I~m If' THe: AI:5ENCE OF lnihvldual. ASSASS- 1l1~T 1"'.:, ~ ~CS3Ii!!LITY UHICH CAlmar &E JWl.ED our' -THE.. r.:!.!.\:l le,ai2ers 1.'ILL Fi\09ftEL'! FORGE AHEAD WITH THtJR CURRE,rr E?To:;rz 70 Si' ~!'IP ~UT the: OPPOSITICrl BY FQP.CE, A POLICY ~RICH ~n.l PI'C~f.!:L Y R! :llt IN 1:fCr, AstlJ FIGHUNC IN TKE COUNTRYSIDE,'. Hl~H!:k LEvn.sor SOVIET SUPFORT, A'in,. EV!NTUALLY, POSSIaLt.. DI~Lcr!:\!I!::T Itrr P.VE~!I'I!lN TO S:'Vl: fjie REVClUTlotJ THE O?POSITION IS ltot TEN F1:U :raj..~:r 'D Sp Ir TKt PRo;.!!.Z1I:5 II' HAS CHEATED FO~ the KKAli:U REGlI't ~ T~ OPPOSITIDlJ FACES IrS own OBST Aa. S, AND THi::.1) 1':15 or the DRA 'IS 'BY NO r.et.n~ IfEVUA LE. FOR XAr:PLE. the: INSURBEll!'s (PE:RHAPS BY. DESIGJO HAVE m TO CAPTOR&: AND HOLD ANYTHING la.qgtp. THAN ",.1: T(J. N CALn :OUGH large AREAS Of THE COCHTHYSID AfiE NOV, OFF";' l.i":jrs- FOR GOV P.IfI1 M& FOF.CZS!. ESPC:CIALLY AFTEr. t:ighi'fall), ~.-...,_ r HE!'!: APPEARS TO BE NO 1%) :'7 UICJ) OPP-JSIT l~h LEADER 'WHO CAN COM-. M~ t:atjcn~'j!)! ALL!GUU~, ton!), r.r:n"p.ecyl'll' EFFORTS 'REfl:AIN" UNCO~;.uU:Arc:n Ar~ IOITnJU! ANt APPAREf,"T cvtrall pta~. TO.. O~![. T:I opposnim HAS?tEf: PRIII:P.F.Il Y ~?'!:lp.ed BY THE r.eglr';i S O'lt: MY ~ MZS A~'D ~A'JY-".A!o~r;t.$';, ~,'\C'TO?S WHICH AP.~ Es~r:rIALl.Y r:::gativi: r.r.nv:'tiol!s. nm.'l.:: n::: Y.J{ALQIS AVCI~ F'J'TH:::':!'l~..'Or, C':IS\:,".l.Clt.r.nONS on i,:';:':-l ~:}!;: CLEVER Pt'LITJCAL PLOYS :::, rrlli- C~'::, A~:~ SHOt'!..!' r;:~ :~:~'!;:G!:rrrs Co: lwal!lr TO (\f'ca~~lz':: 7\.;:... ::~'J:::: UND~? I. l'!iife<: l:::adef.sp.ip, IT IS U:.'C RTAU ho..' L ~l': ~;~f~ati VE INCE::rIlfiS CAN roust AI:! THE HARDSHI-P AND SU~'rL:,!;;C!iC:C:SSAl\Y 10 OVE;::!Hl\OIi A DEn:F.:-:HED AND \ El.L-AP.~iLt' r.r::r.ii'ie. SI'R SS, ATTHI7ION, AN:). T;::~!:>~: At:! PRESJ.r1A51.Y tlcr LI!':IT[[j ct.'ly TO nc "nal~is, AffJ, U I~:!: r:r::s.h1. rr;vlnot!:-:~ni, VICrCp.y"" PlAY...ELL GO. TO..~~~:SIVE THAl' CAt.: S!"lPl..Y AVOID LOSxr:C.JOi

130 1"'. A;: ~r:;'osit!c:~ "\j!::;c'~'~- ~':'::L!' Ht:~E!'ilr.n~ &L~~:;nlGS st:-:j' ~._... ~~... c... cuft.,... t H ~---:-!"=.".:~...~.':!._~=... -=-:... : _. ',.... ',1_...'... ~.-:,... -.,..- '. :'"T;'"I.:-~~... " _. I. _.. _ ~/,1, io-\". i :L.:..' ',~_:, :~ " ~.,;.., 1 "::"':.~I:': V': - \'... :.'.. ": ;'::'" :.: r. I.,-!,..,:!'.,.,.y :. '../1~,,~t.;~ c:~'e;: : :LC~~.1I... " ': 1': : ~-'~.)'!~ ~::V:LC':"'-' :.:;: :-:., :.,.. : "r: ::J:. C:: T!:L. ~F;;:C!:=-IC,;:,_, I' ; ;:: :.. ::'1: OF THE ~:.'''::-:-;:!'::. ~-;'_-!' :~:..'. :~!-:-;. :':<:.. ~\'~" ~'~!'~:"::.,y. ::'~;t.,~~-:~!:, ~~" ~~ :;:'r (~~ -: :71 ;':,,;, ;"!"!J.:,l ~.~ ;~i",-!~~f.~::' :if:-. ~I:::'::;'~~: ~7!'.r~"'~~:~~ :" -, i.:'.:-?\";~i..l:l\i :el' ::-.::-:.:.. Tfi~ C01: V0C;:!:".,: r,,;: fl "l.::y;,... ~:~,.~):- (TH::' r;:"l'17i';:"~1. I\T'(~At:!:UPI'En: C~~~ :-'!l.. r:.~llr:r. ::- : ~ ~'::.'''~ " ~JC":"; n:.:.:~-.~:.~'~ Afri:'=~!t~G!~:: (;,.';t;r::' ), iw:!fi:..:c!"i.:;'::'! F~" t;ttl ~..~:~:;,: :" r-~.ocr::: 'E!: :'::.i.1.!: ~i r.ep.vc, ~~,::;~.nirg ~T':~ " r.ett:",.. r:j~!l;~ H1Di::!:O!\'tR : :::. 1-'..!\C~..~ ~.... 1::. :::;:'~:!:.~S"::L'r.!H:' 1.'.':.1:":';:LE "Ml.r.!F!.~::>;.' i55l;:0 BY SOME: ~ ;' ~':11 l':1r: tii~(jll"~' Cf.!..t j'e.::. It SOCIAL AIr,) ::,c01\nr:lc SYSTEM :':'~'_.;~ ':It: TN:' "~!:;:J~~'L;!7:!L1SI tenets af ls1.an.. ~?~. T}!~t:... F~ :::. ;.t: OPPOSITl(;I~"~~!J r.;eglfl:e ";t:~!l[' P:!~OSt.LY NOT HAVE '.., ~:.: cttj. g~ ECO:!O:'~IC fi F"OF.lI';S (CO ~::C :SSh?,{ F~ THIS BACJCVARl1 :;::'U:':!'~'{) U.ltnIOt- l!~ p~!~lin\' \..IST.!P.:mSA~S OF PtP.~ONAl \I?:~;:F.iTA'?'.'OtlLn P~:-~t\i:t.';" zr c~r.p.lt!l ~m- l;c~li:sr,swiviving f:-lt;:.c: ~FFICIAl!'t!; :'i.:d' ~\l:;a9ly. U:ifiIZHIIJG II POS!-DJiA.!.;:~H~ S :il.r,"'~ R::~r. ;.::C;- ;:;, ;';0 :'!AnEp. H:~:.JU!lTIr.I D Rt.. TF.;:{j,IOI\ A':.t.U~:': $)"';: c;:nch1.e ~;}Clfi Af.-r~:.~ f:l 9i. AR -, l! :IT:l:~~l.Y sr~r1:t l:j~t.-~. 11:-': l'~s;.(~~7 I::L\il:;,!: te, ~UT C'E~!~I!:"Y!~0RLP:1Cf.'\:!.E '::IVU; T!-:~ FC:i.~::!: :;~r:v:.li!;~ rhe CURfiEN! OrF'=,sr:~!:, cn~_:; ~:~'J: l;f;'i1,:::l::l~:' RE:::t.T r:i:. rm:: l:::egic J 4, Es'::ri ~LY G:VL"N!.:.:~ tl:;:::-:;,!t":-::.-s P'~f.',.';Il.B;: 11: I\!="GHAfUsrt.tI S!~Ir.E:::v~I~C CJ:a:F~t:;. lp:':;!.v~:;:-:';i;li:y,!:;c:~'t~;til.l.ly. COULD f.!~ E~!~OSC:,~ ~ IlS::l:.::S~:::t;T ef '~J~' t.'-,~ -:~ :'~.~. \':: ~~ rh!~ r){al.ol 17. Jf~ I.1!-..LAt:~::t ti:l\-::vi:~, CUR 1 ;.i-;g::'::: I~:rE2!::sr!;., C:S~~CIA\..LY,:Hvr.f~ TiG: DilA :: XTl\!f::.L'l' CU)~,r. Til! 'r:l ::i)sc;;'':, HilS R GIMr s t.l1';o~r OP;'I-I HO:Tl1.1TY TO lis, AND Jr.::.UMOSPHEf:t OF rear.n,,_ HA~ CP.F.ATlD HmOUGHJIJT ThIS COUNTRY, vc:r_g PHOf,A5L-Y, ar... : SF.'RVETJ BY rnt I) ~!I~ OF th"z r JinAK1 AN!),',;':rN R[GIM, PtSPITE ~ \,HATEVER scrbac~s HilS ~IGHT ~::'AN ~'OR rlit uih: ~OCIA1. AND ',.., ECOIij):'HC' flerort~s \'UHlt: AFGi1AIHffi i.;;.. ';~Srurz El7 1~

131 ;s. _ J:U::W t~:'~j2efl;'zej co RU01HR DE, RU[;;dI~I~.v~1 ~~2:?,H4 v:y SSSSS tt ~ o? 2~lf45Z ~UG 79 P.l SECsr ATE 0; ~Sh!'lC TO RUf~Nt.lUSr:I 5SIO:1 L:;;!;~TO n:~ D! f.t i "7.:;4 INFO AlL NATO CA?!TALS "'P.l:':'!lT':' RU ~B~C/A~EME~JSY C~~a~~p.~ ~~82 RUSELKlt4MEMEAS~Y y','\5ijl 961S RUSBQD/A!'lE:19ASSY I~t.!I:-:'=f.!'l, 77') F.U~[-JHR/A:'1Er.BASSY rem A?f ~ 1;) I RUE~O/AMEMSAS5Y ~C~CO~ 53iG 8T S [ C? T SECTIC'I ~l OF rz ST.1fE 21F.1(4/~1 en 3:56 POL CHG CHRON EDOM "F TAGS:.?IN~. PEPR, AF. UR, ~~:~ i1::~: ijsn,\to ($ - PITI":: r!x!) 2. ;:-OLLOIJIHG ~ie o:.;~ C~i::':E::T~ c.; ~'Ji:;: (.:'!J,::::?OI~IT::i ~~I~!) O?I\lLY M;~!~;. :'LLIi: ~ ~,1r:::;'S ;"L?I:':: r.r.:g:;s 7 POL~:S L:I3CUSS!0~ ::;::-.;::,;':,~.'I5i';':J:. ~E AC?EZ nr~; r~~,r:!a',~~?: ::~nl.'.no l~ T~f.: :.F~;';...r'? 2!l. 1'!OV ~:::t't I~ r;; ~...l..:;:~.;;:ij '-1,:;:<= :.: tl:if.::::;)-l!~g)j L!:ADE.q. T!1::::':: :,;:::A;~~:7.::~~:. ':l..'::.\; ',;:n c:;t... :::l'!:'i'~~::t";:;y LOuISTICAl. ':l;??c::t :~.~ L!:Cv.F ;~s... ( ~~J\::ijt:RY. ~ f.\!::: PReV:~rrE~!~:::: I:i:i:~i'.i:: :ey ;:';;0:: :EI',G ~?!.:: Te. COCR:lI':ATE ArTACKS as r!':,.:~::!'::: C'~ :,.;:U) ~;tjc:r :':' ::;: C? I:I::;T~LL/l ;IO:iS F:R t..~'( L'::I:3TJi 1);<" r I:::. :i::. :::T~~L::Z, l:~:-:i~::ge::cy c;,~:rlq!!!e c:.ll:n "IX:;r~crr :2." IT i{"': ~::.ITTL:':~ ;w.~y ;.T til{l CCtlTP.:lt OVE.~ :he :~ljn&7!y~id~ "~ld :;C\l: TH? A;:N':: 'he ~"Flt OF' C~A?O~Ei\--I.::., 7k::.':ILI7AR'(, ne!':aj'jr?oad.5. A~~ L~~AN ~q~as. T~r. ORA STTLL ('~TAI~= ~ILITAnY ZUFEnICp. IT'! AS LOtlG AS TJiE AR:" v F':nC~S CES?::CVl.LY K~Y A.,:,/OT:EC A:D ~:f\ FORCE li::ir~!~ I{A~t'L) n~. :AHJ '4'IlLI!1G TO FI~HT fer 1:-.:::: REGI~E AGAnlST I:~SL7!G::~:i5 AND r-:iliv,;;y.ui~~idttrr~. --.fiz FrG REP'S DT:::i\EST FJ JULY r:~:=i1;::; i\esh'~;:7l.e, (lur ne'n RC:MAli~S ':~Ar IT :ns??i:';c!f~l.ly :-E~:'j.;Z::: TO r.l'-c' Ai; AI(I All:> A:11:1 '~:lr!: r!:'i:,:::.1 U:::,':'; 3~ :':.: ::;~Ct/i IT Y ;':,;7 ~-Ei\ 5 A'r: ~DEC1' "'~:.~IJ!;.L c.:.~r:.;::.. :.~::: ::". "r:.:r:,::,,:. F~r::, :":!~~;J.:: A'JO ;.:::r:.~'(t:; crr.d:::7:::'7!c ;~,.~:- ~.:. -.Ti~ I::. ~~~Lr; -~ ~..,;'''fic!e~.t '::~ ::lj; t}'"'i :-=-::,~. _t- "',..,.~..~. ~:.: t ~1 :.t-=:l:' :.;:~JE ':O~;:L~/~-:L i;..;;;.:' :'.. i~i:~:-~:.. T:' ~.~~;(.. ~ i ~.::.r:~:l:': G::- '.:::..-.-:~ c : ~,! IJ=: ~.~::: :: ~AT ::.:~ i ~.~T c: ~ ",,:, :...;;, '". ~.'. ~ :".J... : ; ~ ~ -. J' : L rt... ~::T

132 -- HiRr.ISH PAPER': ~i:: Ail:': I~,;~:t:';.;,T~!1 r'~ n-::: ::r~tc:!'i:'!, THE DEr!~SE CuNSl~T~~!GN CL~~~E ~~ r~~ 5CVIE;-~F~kA~ THAT FiUE:l:>SHIP TltE:.6TY '.:AS Ij4~~::!r::l) AT!H!: ~::r.<:';::st Or THE ArGHAP~5. ':Ol,i1.D ':'HE ruri<! SH F.F:; ~LAoOi1t.T:::' or; TkIS ASSERT IOfn 3. ADDITICNAl. CC~r,iNTSr YOU rlay ~Rn FnO!'i, XAdUl 6251, \HUCH IS US ANALYSIS OF TUE OP?OSITIOS 10 TilE TAlf'\":I F.EGH:r: AS \oit:l.1. AS it DISCUSS ton Cr POSSIQU DEi:ELO?;::::O: S IN p!"ghani:rr AN. 'tou 5)( :101 ii?t ~or ~AS:; ml J{.,\2:..1. S CO;'CUjS!O~S ABet:! :H:: E:FFtc:S ~N!:. s.!; rr!itests OR!:~:::!: S1;'/l::il.I1Y Cit r:il: t2!:!5e Ol" ThE TAR~.KUA~I~; ;;E:il;,::. -- k~ ~E~tI:l c:)::c::::::;~;::) A::l::lJT ~cv::~ : :':1r:'/;,"rCll IN A!G~A:I!srf,'; A'I;} :::::: r::':)l=c~r::'3 :;;- :U'iE7 t:i~;~l_\i ~:~:;T r~e~~ ::.:'~ r~: f?et:i j.;.?ece::7 : ;'-':CAT:i;::: ;.;;~ ':"\i~t 7io'S SC\;!:t~:: ~!:1.L C~~:!Ii:L~ Te F~~,:!(,:: ')L E.:7!.~I.,L SUPPCf;! TO T~:: C.:--:;:~;7 ~~~li::e:. r-',: ~ :w~:..~ r:;,;'l i'ie ~~~:.~ 0: :-;:l:.e c::~:!..; ":::~CtVEi~:':';-:- ~~!,\ ~:"=.;,!)~;:.!:::; 3AS!::. - TM~ ;Zf;HE::!$ (if -::~ ht:gr:3t :: :=IG~.71~;G!:: :<j!~rl AS :"E:i..L.\5 Tk,\; ''':;HCH o;:::;::?~!' i:::rf.: '':1 ;::!':~5T 15 ~E:~AI"S. ~~~::I..E.,R. 17,~?r::A.':~ 7~Ar ~!J":::.:ILl7j1~\, :::L i-: fits ~ll3 :-~!iai's C!~.'~l.IA:: I':::..:~r;::.::i'i';'; '..;::F:E H'I.'~LtlED W TH:: :::.LA ~ti.3sa? FI-::H!rlc, ~ MUGU~ J) : 1.7 DE:!:.n..!i ARE TOO MAG:':~::TARY!O ;;of. r~::cise. ~:(~r IS ClU? IS THAT THE r~~ CAr. :iil1. t'ouur 0:; ITS K::Y u~:rr3 (;'F.i ~(jited Arm AIR) TO C~;~E: TO ITS uefz:.!e 'l:hzn :-:E:~.ED. ' v.. i i~!..:l'::',:, 0_ 3":' r -....' r: -,.f..... _ ~o I \ \ \

133 ." I I!\~I~'4VV E::r 1!41"JC' 'C::._ [,J It '.' ~~ I-P. DE P. ~'~!\L I( ; 6"4?4~ 114~ INY 5S ~~ ZZ!4 r. F ~ 1 F"~ c c.,- F'1'" AM Ef'I\E-P~ ~ Y -f ' "~ TO P.Uf.!JC/!;rC<:T~H "'~:~C I~r.EDI/lTE 5462'!~r'l R~r-:JFGO: ~ '':~Y ~'EIJI-':C PRIORITY 0713 R'J B"'/lI:":::.'Br."~~ '':"I.~M4:AD 9?~9 ~l'eif'on:"f' :Ile~y -,-"e-co:" 1 7" RUSBAE/A;E'r.t.~:Y ~J::',!:I EU!I 7328 RUf"l':~/"~Er,r'A<;ey TE~ Ml "442 V PUEKJC~/DIA I,IIlSlilUI::.,S 8T 5 E (' P.. T ltae!11l ~XD~ NOFeR N 00l:l74 E X 0 I S en 1374 CHRG' ~RN E.O. 12~65: GD~ 8/13185 (FLATl':, 9R'.'CE t.) OR-M TAGS: PEPR, PINR, MASS, J>J~, H, ~ SUBJ: (S) PAVLOVSKIY MI S~ION TO KMWL REF: STATE (NOTAL> 1. (S - ENT IRE TEXT> 2. GENERAL PAVLOVSKIY, COMMANDER ~F <:,OVIEI GJWUND FORCES, AND TWELVE OTHER SOVIET GENU: AL~ :-itve EEEN at KABUL SINCE At'GlJc:'f 17 UNDER VERYTI';Kl Ernfr'Y ~~!iefovy SECURITY PRO TECTJON. TRUSTED AFGHAN OFF'lCULS SAV~ BE'::N TOLD THAT THE ~OVIET MISSION IS HERE FOR -F/lCT-F'IJIDur;- ~URPOSES. FRIME P'UETER AtO ACT ING DEFENSE ~INISTEP. He.,FIZ~'llAH A/'IIN HAS o!rected THAT LOIIIER -RANKI NO OFn CT ALS OF THE DEFENSE P1INlnRY AnE E~:POlj.'EJ(rn TO ~IGN ROUTINE ~GREElW!ENTS "'ITH THE VISITING SOV let TE~r:. 3. CO':;':!:.:'!!: THf E:--:BASSY ll'ould PREFER TO A~.'6JT FURTHEH ltftelu~e':r': C'1LLErTION AND EVALlIHEHJ BHOR!: c;peculhlng TOO :,.. ~I.! t'!:!o~'1 T~E F'ti I'-'~!,Y MISSION OF THE ':OVIET T tl'l. HOIl1EVER, l i ':': S~E':'IAL e:m C:~'!ICF. MILITARY RE~P'J~:SI?rUTY OF ITS LEADEP., 1''' ~LR:::.D~ Ln;'TLJ~ D!~fTF1N OF T1.iE VISIT, ~ND THF.: F~CT THAT!TJP:.L ~trr ~-t ')0 -eol T c:- -1 YrE,~r;rl r.: :-:ENT S AF. ~ fo~f'{!.~ EfliTL Y 3EI NG -SEt;ClTPTD,- :~'~re~ THfoT CI:E PO"'-:'SLE REtC:ON FOft ::1I'.'U'll!='V " S "'P~C:::NC::!JEP.E re"le BE T~~T THE,-,SSR I~ LP.YING T 4[ 0 ET A'LO rn '.;T I N:E '~CY ~:! Ot'~CWOR!< F')!1 THE ;:!.tt~ E B"! '.:RVE NT Ie r: r!= C:OVTET FOFr:.-c:- IX ~FS!-:A!nnt~, ~P.!.l~'lD ~:O!'CO"" EVHTUALLY O:C!DE TIII'.T leu ~EP!~ NrCE=-j1~Y. ON THE OT~~C! HAND, IT. -,~\. r~'\i;.'..~ TL'~: PflVLOV~'1!Y IS :iere PRINC!Pe.LLY TO PRGVILlE EY ~~o7. T,I ~ -U:v E~ r-:! IO ~ NrE 0 ': CO:' NT Er -! W"l'R (it ~)CY (,;:ry;t 10 NS Tl j:':-: ~r~l'6" i'""<to:p-;y :'F OEFEN'=E. 1I,."coTU!Z 51

134

135 Copy ':'" -.._~.. 14 September 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Security Council SUBJECT Alert Memorandum on. USSR-Afghanistan (U). The Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the Taraki regime and protect their sizable stake in Afghanistan. small Soviet combat units may already have arrived 1n the country. I am concerned that the Soviets may be underestimating the difficulties of shoring up the regime and may find themselves under growing pressures to escalate the scope of their intervention in the next few months. Moreover, the Soviets may now be more inclined to gamble on a substantial intervention in Afghanistan because of their perception of a downturn in relations with the US and the uncertain prospects for Seqate approval of the SALT treaty.~flnc/oc) Atta ". -'" ", - rs,a SECREI"- NOFORH/HoCOrfnRA~CON S.'\i!1T1Z~:' "01--'- " "rio:..:._,_:,..._...."._.j FER~~ ~,~- F:~_._tJU=-l(C4" E'V _ N..,... ;)''',.:~

136

137 MEMORANDUM - SJJ8 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL September 17, q!qp 5Ee!t!l'!'/CODEWORD INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SUBJECT: What Are the Soviets Doing In Afghanistan? (S) Simply, we don't know. Speculation is, however, intriquing. (S) There appears to be three possibilities: FROM: THOMAS THORNTQ.K\!.,. c The entire sequence over the weekend (dismissal of the Ddlitary in the cabinet: retirement of Taraki: Amin' s announcement of the end of one-man leadership) was stage-managed by the Soviets as a way of getting a more acceptable government installed in Kabul. This doesn t t seem likely. The Soviets made quite a fuss over Taraki last week in Moscow: Taraki would have been a much better figurehead for a national front government in"afqhanistan; and the Soviets would not seem to have any reason to do in the military faction. This ~uld seem to be the least likel~ explanation. (S) 2. Amin is doing the whole thing in defiance of the Soviets, facing them with a fait accompli. This would be a highstakes game for him, but he is capable of it. It is not clear, however, why Amin would now be calling for broadened leadership unless that is solely window-dressing or nothing more than a gratuitous slap at Taraki. (S) 3. Amin started out on his own, but after the dropping of Taraki, the Soviets stepped in, called his bluff, and are now forcing him to accept a collective leadership -- something the Soviets have probably been looking for for quite a while. (S) WOP We have no evidence that proves or disproves any of these. before the SECRB':lI/CODEWORD OIlIGIIAL CLIt o z!yzi78nstt DECL Kl REVI' ox: e t 99 S,I'1JIIT1ZH' ~1 ~--'" ~-~36 t..w~ J. "",...lj. PER P.E ~~S:-, I _

138 ~p 6ECRE'P!COOEWORD 2 ouster of the military men may denote foreknowledge, but not necessarily complicity. As between the second and third explanations, I like the second one since I think that Amin would have held out longer in his bluff against the Soviets, and will doubt his vague professions of future collegiality until he starts implementing them. That, however, is only a guess. (TS/Codeword) It is hard to see how the Soviets can come out winners no matter which is the case. They tried before to put a national front together and failed, probably because nobody else would play. Why would anybody be more willing to sign on now - unless the Soviets could give credible guarantees that there would be a genuine sharing of power? That doesn't seem too likely. And, given the growing weakness of the regime, why would anybody want to share power now when they might get the whole thing shortly? (There may be in fact reasons that would ~pel people to do so, arising perhaps from inter-tribal considerations. But I donft understand these and know nobody who does.) (S) Most likely, the Soviets have just been pushed a big step nearer to their moment of truth in Afghanistan. In this game of "Ten Little Afghans," there is now only one left. (S) Whatever the Soviet role in this, they should be made to look as if they had a hand in the operation. Taraki was something of a Lenin figure and had a degree of foreign respect. Amin is the Stalin of the drama and the Soviets should have him hung prominently around their necks. (S) Brement concurs..,top SECRf:T/COOEWORD

139 LJ"DU POL (HG CHaON uu LI~lS I~~O. C':l~ U Il!IS5 CAr-STUTZ.J. tr.ljce) -OH-I'l 'Uc~, rills PI::! AP. lsi _,~-.-..., '1:0:"1" ~ F1.EC110Ioii OIl THr AFOHArl1st/.I. POLITICAl. ell S ;:...~..,L \1.1 ~._.. I. CC - ErlTlii[ nxn.. I THINK lr ~usr BE mllt EVI~E'::T TO T~tE DEPT ~.:m AOOR SSE POSTS THAT ~c f~e ~ITUE~SI~e ~ V~~Y S!~~lFICA~T Fm.1TICAL cnx::is I~ AfGItMIISTA:J. I!I ntis HEGt..'?D, I \1CULi> LIME TO' HtGr:LICHT' S(l~:.c: ASP;:C!~ A»D SHM1[ ~om:?ej\sohit THOUGHTSI. -- the CRISIS IS :lor o...!:.~..'1 THIS r;;n:t!:~ T!I'l[ THE LOYALTY OF'THE DriA i":ilitap.y ljrhts!i~ L:~H "F:E:A:; A~ GHA:J%I, KA'UU.H/II\ ~~:o l(tm: t.!: IS ~wr ClFJR. A~:O Th 'RE t.p.e ~ID:: SPREAD "tports 0::;) SOd: {"'!IrrlOcr-:, 7P.AT!H::: ThRr:: DEPQS::D ~ILITARY figunes I~ T~( c~ei~et (~ATA~J~~, GULA37.0I, A~~ ~AZCOORY~H' have nahag!d TO ESCAFE 1r~ CITY A~D ARE AT l~~ea Ir'IS ~~ItE POSSIBL~ TJiAT CIli n: :J AR ~1Clti(j :'I,'JCR DR A till IT A., 't UlaTS 'COULO EtaSUS, LED 9Y PRO-TARAl<! OR CilHEi:IiIZE: 1t~IT!-:;~n' tle~: NTS4J99... Hi JIi XA!Ult, ii:,'!~t Vl::RY l'iljch A;JARE THIlT THE POLllICAL, SrrUATlON Rr::I'!AHIS T NSZ. r.ajoii $TRZ TS Al'JACEHT TO 'll'fpctftalft, 1'!1!tISTU S PoE."!AI:f 'clocm;d OFF Tl) negular TRAfFIC, ~tld HERE AT THI'.CHANCERY. Nt-lINF.1) savitt-btjilt TA::XSAilc: STATIOl'l!I).ASTRIDE. THE Tl'ilr::E ST~n:TS i:orderihci n:: [!'.oassy Pf;Q?Er:1Y. '*'E' CflN-Y ENTER Ol\!XIT BY THE FilO!!r GATE: E:CAUS:':: THE ST?t::::T IS CLO:;ED, so ile AnE USING cu. tmerc::::cy BACK GI.7E. WT CO Sf) t;nctr 'I'M! BARREL OF A lo\?'l'".e 1-2!A~Jj<. IT I~.:tlL A :';IT I.!H~Ei;VI ;G,,~ SOi':ETHIt:G CEfiTKII~LY TO!":~ITE iio::e :0 :"cn::::fi,:.r;c,ut. -- f:n IS M~NrHS ~ov ~E h~v: ~ATC~E~ 7hI5 ~ARXIS! FARTY (?CPA) DLVOll1l ITsar. A~: r\f~ii"h o~;rci~l l.ast ~!c;rr r.;l;l~tly, [,[SC!U~~D THE: L!ACEJiSHIP TO A~!~!:AS:; t CFPICZft Il~ A -cn:ch O~ :icc:tp:jhs ailing Eketl orne;. TO DE:I':'H."?Y '<lay OF' ILl.U TRATIOlt. THFRf HAVi EEIN 2~ CABln~T CkA~GZS ~ISC~ i~! OP.I~I~Al LIST WAS ~f.~. ~ULGATED I:~ ~P;tIL I!H3. ne ;C\;: ;a:.::~ 0; ' :;PUT 'f ~HUSTER CKaNCfS ;-'AS aee~ ~v;:::;!':qiu: s :S-4. PLH ~c: I.fTc;;, fl::; '.!l HAS OCCtiitE:;. AI'lJ O~.E: CAlIar I1:'LF lio::ijer )o!':-j Ti1!: RE.GI:-1:: r':a!:al.:r~ TO SURVIVE.' PART J7 TH~ ~S~'ZR IS, OF,tOURS,_ sautal SUPPk ~5ION ~F _. P!RC!l'Jr: "'f'positio~l. ' T~E ~U!'iaEl\ OF"?I'1.ITICAt PRISONERS ICILUJ) ~AY HAV~ fleac~eo 6,0~e. AND PaO~~EtY jore!hat. roun TI~[S THAT toilj':ber HAVE u::~!1 IN MID 01.:1 01" PJl.ITICAL JAILS. -- TH n:stihcn:cy DI,;"JI,IG T'HIS CRI~IS felflod HAS ~~U u:rpl A:I:) ~:.JrES'cr~rr. IT }!!':) ;~CT TM:;:;l,\t... A:tT~CE CF' ThE r-ol.liicj.1. calsi~ TO P~~H ITS ~V:'NTAaE. -- I gonar KIWJ ilh.\t TH::: l"'!.;rt:~~ ~ ILl. ~IHG. A~IH HAS Af'l~ INaY :iurv IV i:' PLOT.~::T::::!'!. vt ';:JAI:bT Hm. ~U1UJ.:( THE: LAW OF' AVERAGES %OLl!j r.:.tch UP \;ITH HI~ ;;C~.![,H. :~1 1'\!":';.:i:'A1.I!l,DH:O I:~ i:e". F:::.;';:~jnLY,!....:JL!) GIV=: 1\1,1 0 Enn;; ;):)05 THMI,~ PER r.:-~ir T:I ~:.:rrj!.';: III cor,',r:;:" THIS C"UHDAR '(:,lr. I GIVE HIS Cli!br:"S Or I""f i~;...~ Li ::~;) ':;;;' C~D ~r:: f.;:' :IIL. 1 ;:::.r T:,Cl.:13H, lay ;;t:~,::? c:n~,..'!.!i-~ ";.-::ry!t'::::j.; C~Pi).ILL ;Ur.VIV~ 1;4 cc~ll'i?!:l IN ;.::::-:: ;-';::~".!. :; IS :,N I'tT~::~~~rI~!S T!~~': r ~ "h''':. :'~CI)"( (~::.&: r;~:1!.,." l S ;' 76!'~ ",.. ',.. l._e, ~ ::r ~:

140

141 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECUR.ITY COUNCIL September 24, X CHRONFILB ~.,SEC~'1',.!SENSITlVE INFORMATION MEl40RANDUM FOR: FROM: THOMAS ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI THOlU~TO~~ SUBJECT: Regional Cooperation re Afghanistan (5) Bob Gates said that you wanted a paper on this; one is attached. I have discussed it with Gary Sick and it generally reflects his views. (C) The paper sets forth two strategies -- A is low-key and would be my preference between the two. B is much higher profile. They could also be characterized as Indian and Iranian strategies. (And that choice tells you something about the problem:) (C) Beyond this, you are aware of my various efforts to stimulate greater discussion of regional security problems. This is, of course, very long range. In addition, Mike Oksenberg and I are working on ideas to bring the Chinese to a greater degree of cooperation. (S) ~EeREIJSENSITIVE Original Classif. by Thooas Thornton Review on September 24, 1985 DECLASSIFIED ±t;~ U~~ C~.6 :~ ~.o::~k1~;:

142 "". secaa~/sensitlve 5507-X Preliminary Observations First, what are our objectives? Assumedly they involve: Preventing a Soviet psychological victory and forcing the Soviets back at least to the status quo ante as regards Afghanistan. Second, bringing about a change in government in Afghanistan that will be no less favorable to us than was the Daoud regi~e. Third, developing a self-sustaining security system in Southwest Asia that is compatible with US interests. (S) The third of these needs further examination since it is not only an objective in itself but can also be the means of attaining the first two objectives. (S) I~eally, we seek a regional approach which comprises an Indian leadership role in South Asia; broad acceptance of this role by strong and independent regional states (especially Pakistan); a substantial improvement in Chinese-Indian relations to the point that each accepts the bona fides of the other; the reestablishment of a strong Iran that has sympathetic relations with us and the other countries involved. The US would have no significant security involvement beyond limited arms sales to Iran, India and Pakistan, and a modest, offshore presence that was accepted as benign by all others. The USSR would play no greater role than we do except that it might be very heavily installed in Afghanistan. We are a long way from this situation and it may be unobtainable. It should, however, be our goal and we should try to avoid actions in conflict with it. (S) Short-Term Approaches The following suggestions fall into two groups. The first (Group A) constitutes steps that are consistent with the long term goals; the second (Group B), in varying degrees, less consistent and should be pursued only if it meets the criteria of urgency and probable effectiveness. (5) 9ECRET/SENSITIVE Original Classif. by Thomas Thornton Review on September 24, 1985 SANmZED E.O.1295B. Sec.3.6 P~RE r--\.ll-:fl-:s? rrv-*-nars.d.a~~

143 _ ,.. -~ SS07-X ~SENSITrvE GROUP A 2 1. We seek to develop increasing awareness of the situation through a program of diplomatic and intelligence briefings. The main aim, from our point of view, is heightening the awareness of the regional states that Soviet involvement in Afghanistan presents a novel security problem for them. Most of them do recognize this; India, which is key to our strategy, is however reluctant to accept the idea. (5) 2. Through these discussions we are seeking to stimulate discussion of the problem among the regional states. We shoulc do more -- e.g. urging Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, etc. to put pressure on the Indians to take account of their re ional concerns. 3. The China factor must be turned into a positive rather than a negative element -- i.e. Peking should take added initiatives to improve relations with India and reduce the Indian perception of a Sino-Pakistani (and perhaps US) alliance. (5) 4. Something has to be done about Iran. First, it seems incapable of purposeful action; second, our relations with it are poor; and third, its strident Islamic tone frightens the Indians. The third point might be amenable to improvement if we could convince the Iranians to initiate some discussion with the Indians about their concerns with the Soviet role in Afghanistan. (Similarly, we might encourage the Iranians to start thinking of the Chinese as a potentially useful connection in that regard.) The first and second might be amenable to some improvement if we and the Iranians could find ground for collaboration in approaching the Afghan problem. This subject has been broached discussions could be intensified. (5) 5. The Pakistani element is substantially frozen by the nuclear impasse, although there seems to be increasing Pakistani interest in assistance to the insurgents. The problem with that is ensuring that it not justify a Soviet intervention or otherwise evoke a more direct Soviet threat to Pakistan. We have consultations coming up with the Pakistanis next month and can sound them out better then. Before then, we should concentrate on intelligence exchan e~~"""""""""1i1i1i1i1i1i1 -(5 ) S~C~~/SENSITIVE

144 ~c& sserb'f/sens ITIVE X 6. India is very difficult to deal with because of the absence of a functioning government. This problem will at the earliest be resolved early next year. In the interim, we should play an unobtrusive role, concentrating perhaps on briefings through intelligence liaison channels. We should not take the initiative in urging the Indians to consult with others. (S) In sum -- We would be relying essentially on the regional states to take initiatives among themselves to heighten mutual awareness and perhaps lay the groundwork for cooperative action. Our role would be limited to behind the scenes efforts and the risks would be small. But the chances of an effective result are also not great unless there is a massive and unambiguous Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that so alarms the regional states that they can put lesser problems behind them. (S) ~e~t/sensitlve

145 5S07-X -Si RE!fSENSITlVE GROUP B This set of actions would escalate Group A significantly in terms of us involvement. The strategy would focus on closer regional coordination, with the US playing as unobtrusive a role as possible, but nonetheless one that would be much higher profile than in the Group A scenario. (5) 4 1. In this strategy, the emphasis shifts from India to Iran. We would pick up on their offer to discuss the Afghan insurgency problem. If they show further interest, we would have to be prepared to offer Iran help in supporting the insurgency. We could provide arms, money and training; we would consult closely with Tehran and provide intensive intelligence briefints. It is by no means certain that the Iranians (especially Qom) want to play this role but it is one of our few shared interests and a major benefit of this strategy is that it gives us something to talk about with Iran. 4. The Chinese would be urged to add something to the pot for the insurgents, working through both Iran and Pakistan. (5) 5. The overall coordination much more structured have to be a focal parties concerned of this kind of effort would be the Group A case. There would coordination of effort amona the ~ECRE~/SENSITIVE

146 SECPE'P{SEN5ITIVE 5 SS07-X 6. Iraq is not likely to join in. We and other concerned nations should, however, urge Iraq to take a benevolently neutral stance, pointing out that the issue of the day is thwarting Soviet hegemonism, rather than exploiting old regional an~agonisms. (5) 8. A heightened as military presence would be appropriate, demonstrating support for Pakistan and in the Gulf area. (S) aecne~/sensitive _._ _.

147 5S07-X SECBET/SENSITIVE GROUP C (?) 6 Theoretically, there is a Group C -- actions that would provide a much more dramatic us profile. This would call for a public and leading US role in the coordination of Southwest Asian security, involving a reborn CENTO or, at least, open US membership in the coordinating body dealing with Afghanistan. (S) The costs of such action -- polarization, raising of unrealis~ic expectations, damage to other US policies -- are too high to warrant consideration, given the meager increase in benefits to be ex?ected. (5) Crit::rue -~ Ther~ are several serious problems involved in the Group B acticns (and a fortiori in Group C) that must be kept in mind: 1. Cutside involvement in the Afghan situation will serve as a tr:gger -- and for many a justification -- for Soviet intervent:'on. 2. Aside from the political costs with India, etc., this will make it highly unlikely that whatever we and others may do will save the insurgents from defeat. We will in all likelihood have our bluff called and emerge from the confrontation weakened. Even the regional countries who welcomed our support will have to reconsider their options vis-a-vis the Soviets. 3. The strategy relies heavily on Iran which is one of the more uncertain trumpets around. We could reduce this danger somewhat by focussing mainly on Pakistan and China, but this would simply be the replay of If we drive India definitively into the Soviet camp the political cost would far outweigh whatever gains we have any reasonable expectation of making elsewhere. Hope for any stable regional security system would be destroyed. (S) The B Strategy thus shows little promise of meeting the objectives set at the beginning of this paper. In addition, it does SECReT/SENSITIVE

148 -..~ ~.---_.I!II...~;J-...,.. -t"-'" ~eje~/sensitlve X not meet the test of urgency since nobody really expects us to do anything in Afghanistan. (5) At the same time, it might be worth pursuing for domestic political reasons; as a means of showing our determination to become involved in Gulf security; or as a global signal to the Soviets. Certainly a successful thwarting of Soviet designs in this important region would be of immense benefit on all fronts. Also, this strategy could be of importance in building a new relationship with Iran and the greater the degree of foreign involvement, the greater the chances for coordination and effective action by the Afghan rebels. (S) The cost-benefit equation will be more favorable if we can move rapidly, decisively and effectively, and if our role is appreciated. The chances of bringing this off depend partly on skill, but also heavily on ou= ability to manage the public information side effectively. That has not been our strong point recently. (S) 'f J.o 2!3 Jf ~/1. 19:rct &/(fi70;..( f'/~, 1/),u,;.r{o-v-. I JCL ECRE~/SENSITIVE

149 '..4-':.~--1111!.-.-!.-'~!Dincr~or~.'" ~,t.. (... ~~ Ceacn.l... :+ ~ (atetn.eace '~-' ''1;. ioviet 'eptieos iri>af~hanistari , : o'....- ",.-..:-:'=...-'-'. '"., ~.. '}-- :.. :. I....-:.. (;.- ~~' ",. '..:.. ~...:. -..:.' "_.-... '. ~"'.. "..:.~.'.... :.-~..,:...'......' I.... ~ :~";' '.~ '''... ~.. '-': "... Iater.aCeDCY late;diceac:e Memor2ndum : ' " '9',...- "... :.;. -.. ". ~ ~..:~;~:~.,.':'~:...~-'. ' ~...;.:",.~.,;.:: '0'...,- '....'... '......".'...,'. '.. ~ ""...,..,-' -.~-:.:.. ;......,',.. "."...--;.. '-." ' ".:. "~:""'~';:''''' ::.: : -. : ~ ~'.: -,'.'.-... _.... wi.. '~." \. "'~ ':..'_.::-.... ~::". -' ~. '...,....;....~ fop '..-;':; r.... ; ", :::'.-. -'. ':'~~,\"'~~ "...-. ~-::....,'.":-.. '.'.~~<~<~? :';',... f;ti~tl~x ~'.. " ~. ':.. ~."l.'..,.. "... ~.:.c.~ ~.J F:::R.. ~ -f~ EV r:.:~,:...7j7:!o:

150 .t ". ~ '...~ -4!op secret HO~-oRCOH e savin OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN KEY JUDGMENTS Moscow probably views the situation in Afghanistan as e'tlen more unstable after the fall of Taraki. While the Soviets may have previously decided to implement new military measures to support Taraki against the rebels, the uncertain tenure of Prime Minister Amin' s regime makes it likely that Moscow is deferring major new initiatives to expand the counterinsurgency effort pending a dec~sion as to whether Amin can consolidate his position. ~-..-. may fear.s coup might fragment the Afghan y and lead to a breakdown of control in Kabul. In this event, they would be likely to deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisions to the Kabul vicinity to protect Soviet citizens already e'" there as well as to ensure continuance of some pro-soviet regime in the capital. Although we might not receive prior warning, we believe it likely that we would promptly detect a deployment of Soviet forces on this scale once it began. We do not believe that Moscow would intend such a deployment for use in fighting against the Muslim insurgency, although, once in Afghanistan, such Soviet airborne forces could eventually be drawn into such fighting. We have not seen indications that the soviets are at the moment preparing ground forces for large-scale military intervention in Afghanistan.,~. This memorandum was prepared under the ausp~ces of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe, National Foreign Assessment Center. It was coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency; with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; with the Defense Intelligence Agency; with the National Security Agency; and with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Info~ation available through 27 September 1979 was used in the preparation of this memorandum. TCS :.ta~ J$eei'et....."...,J'

151 "t In the months before the coup, as the insurgency in Afghanistan intensified and spread, the soviets increased the numbers and expanded the counterinsurgency role there of what now are at least 2,500 of their military personnel, who are heavily involved in quiding combat operations. Moscow may also have permitted direct participation of Soviet helicopter pilots, and possibly some tank personnel, in combat alongside the Afghans. In addition, we believe that one lightly equipped Soviet airborne battalion has been quietly deployed in Afghanistan since early July to provide security at Bagram Air Force Base.* Meanwhile, also during the summer of 1979, the Soviets have apparently tried and failed to induce the regime to admit other political elements to the government to broaden its base. All these measures have proved inadequate to halt the deteriora ~on of the regime's position. ~~ Amin's seizure of sole power within the Khalqist regime in mid-september has further complicated these soviet problems in dealinq with both the reqime and the insurgency. We believe that the Soviets probably did not instigate or foresee this move by Amin. Moreover, they probably also evaluated it as rendering the counterinsurgency task more difficult, at least in the short term, because it further narrowed the regime's base of support, and, in fact, threatened to divide the ~linq party itself. ~_ If Moscow, within the next few weeks, concludes that Amin has consolidated his position and that no effective challenge from within the regime and the Army is likely, we believe the Soviets will probably increase their counterinsurgency role over the next few months, albeit incrementally rather than dramatically. In this case, Moscow may further increase the number of Soviet advisers and. expand their combat activities, and may gradually bring in additional special battalions or regiments to provide security in key cities. In addition, Moscow could bolster the counterinsurgency effort by providing Soviet-manned combat support and combat service support units, such as attack helicopter, logistic, and maintenance units, to enhance Afghan combat reach and effectiveness. ~TS1llll * The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency believes that there is insufficient evidence to determine the role or function of the Soviet unit deployed at Baqram Air Force Base. There is no evidence that this unit is equipped with crew-served weapons. 5f9" TCS "... ' SecLet:

152 I...~... We believe the introduction into AfC1hanistan of additional Soviet battalion- or reqiment-s1ze units for security purposes, like the forces already at Baqram, could be accomplished without immediate detection if this were done gradually, alonq with the onqoinq airlift of materiel. Our ability to detect promptly the incremental introduction 9f Soviet combat support and combat service support units ~s.s~milarly limited, although time would increase the pro~ab~f our learning that such units had entered Afghan~stan. ~TS_. The Soviets are probably well aware of the open-ended nulitary and political difficulties that could flow if such limited intervention were allowed to grow into a larger and more visible commitment. They are also aware of the ~dverse pol~tical consequences this would entail for th~m ~n South As~a and the Middle East. On the other hand, ~t is clear that the Soviets' sense of their interests in Afghanistan is now more ambitious than it was before the advent of the Marxist regime in They see the maintenance of a Marxist state in Afghanistan as important to their strategic and political interests in the region. This perception has increasingly supplanted the Soviets' earlier and less ambitious goal of simply maintaining a friendly buffer state on their southern border. If they do decide to provide some additional military support to Amin, they are likely to do so' in the hope of bolstering the anti-insurgent struggle SUfficiently to avoid fac~g a decision as to w.ethr to use Soviet combat units on a large scale. J,JJ:.9 In the event that Amin does not consolidate his position but that an acceptable and viable Marxist alternative emerges, the Soviets are likely to shift their political and military support accordingly. If no such viable leftist alternative appears, and the Khalqi regime fragments, the Soviets would promote installation of a more moderate regime willing to deal with them, rather than accept the political costs and risks of a massive Soviet invasion to f~ght tj:1e insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foresee cont~ngenc~es under which the chances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention would become substantially greater: Prolonged political chaos. The prospect of advent of an anti-soviet regime. Foreign military intervention. ~'rs_ TCS , ~crat.

153 DISCUSSION 1. The threat raised by the Muslim insurgency to the survival of the Marxist government in Afghanistan appears more serious now than at any time since the government assumed power in April During the past 17 months, the government has become increasingly dependent on Soviet political, military, economic, and technical help. The Soviets have been generous but the Afghans remain unsatisfied. Meanwhile, the declining fortunes of the Khalqist* regime probably have caused Moscow to reassess what level of assistance would be needed to keep the Khalqis in power and at what point the risks and burdens associated with such assistance would outweigh the benefits of preserving the Taraki-Amin regime--and now the Amin regime. j,i1if 2 Although a fairly important garrison recently surrendered to the rebels, the various insurgent groups do not yet pose an immediate military threat to government control of the major cities, and can only intermittently interdict 'key communications routes. But the Afghan armed forces are increasingly stretched thin in their efforts to deal with the insurgents, and their willingness to support the government has been continuously eroding. ~ soviet Interests in Afghanistan 3 Until last year's Marxist coup, Moscow's interest in Afghanistan seemed to be focused on ensuring the continued primacy of Soviet influence in a state on the southern border of the USSR. Before last year, Soviet interests in AfC1hanistan were guaranteed by two treaties (a 1921 Friendship Treaty and a 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression which prohibited Afghan territory from being used for actions inimical to the USSR) and by the USSR's role as chief economic and military aid donor. To be sure, Afghanistan's foreign policy was nonaligned and Moscow's ability to influence Afghan internal affairs was limited, but the Soviets seemed satisfied with their level of influence there, and regularly cited Afghanistan as a model 0 f how two states with differing social systems could peacefully coexist. J!!t * Ine dominant faction of the People I s Democratic Party (PDPA). Jcr 4

154 .~* NOFO.. OCON'lBAC'l-oRCON 4. We have no convincing evidence to confirm reports that the Soviets were behind the coup which brought the Marxists to power. The USSR undoubtedly had been the chief inspirational force and financial source of support for the Afghan Communist movement since its establishment in the earlr 1950s. But the Soviets were always worried about the ~act which support for the Afghan Communists would have on their relations with the Afghan Government and were extremely circumspect in their direct dealings with them. Indeed, Moscow has never officially acknowledged the existence of an Afghan Communist party, or permitted any Afghan Communists to attend international party meetings, even inc0gnito. ;tc).. 5. 'the successful seizure of power by the Afghan Communists, however, dramatically changed their status in M~SCOW. B~th the USSR.' s envoy in Kabul, Ambassador puzanov! who. 3.S reporte~ to be an ideologue with important conn~ct1.0j?-s.l.n the SOV3.et party Central committee, and the SOV3.et II1l.l1.tary, who are likely to have seen an opportunity to enhance the Soviet strategic position, probably urged soviet leaders to take advantage of the political windfall and to crea~e yet another Communist regime on Soviet borders. In addition, the Soviet leadership probably thought that the consolidation of Marxist rule could take place gradually and be managed in a way that would not jeopardize more important Soviet foreign policy interests. (~C=OC) 6. It is clear that the Soviets' sense of their interests in Afghanistan is now more ambitious than it was before the advent of the Marxist regime in They see the maintenance of a Marxist state in Afghanistan as being important to their strategic and political interests in the reqion. This perception has increasingly supplanted the Soviets' earlier and less ambitious goal of simply maintaining a friendly buffer state on their southern border. ~., Evolution of Soviet Involvement Mindful of the narrowness of the new req1.me IS TCS

155 base of support, and anxious to help it consolidate its position, the USSR also began increasing its military advisory presence, which at the time of the coup numbered an estimated 350 persons. In 3uly 1978, Moscow concluded a $250 million military aid aqreement with the new regime. ~JoC). 8. As opposition to the government increased last fall and winter, the soviets continued to augment their military advisory presence. By early this year, their presence had grown to at least five Soviet generals and an estimated 750 to 1,000 military advisers. These soviets were initially stationed in the Kabul area, assisting newly promoted officers in running the Ministry of Defense and training Afghan recruits. JiJS_ As conditions in the countryside deteriorated, an increasing number of Soviet advisers were sent to the provinces to assist in the governmentis antiinsurgent effort. 9. The uprising in Herat last March and the subsequent visit to Kabul by the Soviet military's top political officer, General Yepishev, in early April led to a further augmentation of the Soviet military presence. In June 1979, Moscow deployed eight AN-12s to Afghanistan to assist the government in transporting men and materiel to the various battlefronts. We now estimate that there are at least_ 2,500 Soviet milit.a.ry personnel in Afghanistan. * ~ 10. there are Soviet advisers attached to every major Afghan Armr command, as well as to at least some reqiment- and battall.on-level units. They appear to be heavily involved in quidincj Afghan combat operations as well as in Af an Arm 10 stics and administration. ~ * This figure does not include up to 3,600 additional troops which, according to unconfirmed reports, have recently been moved into Kabul to safeguard facilities there. See paragraph 39. ' TCS

156 11. In addition, there are some reports which are not confirmed, but which we regard as fairly credible, alleging that Soviets have piloted helicopters together with Afghan pilots in strikes against insurgent positions, and have on occasion furnished tank personnel for combat operations..~ 12. If these latter reports are accurate, the soviets, in addition to guiding Afghan combat operations, are themselves already participating in combat on a small scale and in certain limited ways. In general, however, t."ley are not organized in cohesive combat units intended to conduct unilateral operations. ~~ 13. Soviet personnel also appear to be stationed in considerable numbers at Bagram Air Force Base north of Kabul, wh~re they apparently service the airlift from the Soviet Umon. In addition to the aircraft service and support contingent at Bagram, an airborne battalion--some 400 personnel--has apparently been at the airbase since early July. The unit is lightly equipped and probably has been deployed to Baqram to provide security. We have no evidence that it has been used in combat operations against the Afghan insurgents.*p_ ~ The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency believes that there is insufficient evidence to determine the role or function of the Soviet unit deployed at Bagram Air Force Base. There is no evidence that this unit is equipped with crew-served weapons. 7 TCS _~.<..TSW

157 14. soviet civilian involvement in Afghanistan has also grown appreciably since the coup. By the end of 1978, we estimated that the number of civilian advisers had nearly doubled to some 2,000, as the Soviets assumed top managerial and planning jobs in the government's economic ministries and became involved in changing the government's educational system. The Soviets, however, have not promised the Afghans any significant new economic assistance beyond additional debt relief (the USSR is by far Afghanistan's largest creditor) and 100,000 tons of wheat. This is because the Afghan capability to absorb substantial increases in foreign economic assistance is limited and because there is still some $300 million in unallocated credits from the $1.3 billion extended to previous reqimes. The 60 economic aid agreements that were signed last year allocated only $200 million of the $500 million in credits outstanding at the time of the April 1978 coup. Nonetheless, the Afghans are said to be dissatisfied over the level of Soviet economic assistance actually being provided, and annoyed over their unsuccessful attempts to join the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in hopes of loosening Soviet purse strings. (S NF.::;J.C. ec).jfi4!j' 15. Moscow's political commitment to the new reqime was symbolized by its willingness in December 1978 to conclude another friendship treaty with the Afghan Government. The treaty is similar to others signed with Third World countries; in that it said nothing about the Marxist Leninist character of the new regime, paid lipservice to Afghanistan's professed foreign policy of nonalignment, and contained no explicit mutual defense commitment. Article Four of the Treaty, however, presumably could be invoked to justify soviet combat intervention on behalf of the regime. It calls for the two sides to "consult with each other and take by mutual agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity" of the two states. #)~ 16. As the prospects of the Khalqist group for consolidating its rule have declined, Moscow has become increasingly concerned that Afghanistan's neighbors, P~ an mi ht be te ted to aid Ai han insurgents. ~ To deter such support, the Soviets have kept up heavy dip omatic and propaganda pressure on Pakistan and somewhat lesser pressure on Iran. They have also repeatedly accused the United States, China, and Egypt of training Afghan insurgents. Tes ~'fs~ '"

158 Recent Soviet Behavior 17. In addition to increasing their military involvement in the government's anti-insurgent effort, the Soviets. have urged Taraki and Amin to seek political means for easing ~e situation. They convinced the government to abandon. 1ts land reform program. But they were not able to reverse some of the other social and economic reforms introduced by Taraki and Amin that have alienated deeply religious Afghan tribes who refuse to be wrenched from their nearfeudal way of life. ~) 18. Similarlf, the Soviets have apparently had little s~ccess in persuading the Afghan regime to modify its host1le posture toward Pakistan in the interest of inducing Pakistan to minimize support for the Af han insur ents. 19. The apparent lack of harmony between the Soviet and_afghan leaderships lent support to the numerous indications that Moscow-throughout the summer of 1979 was seeking alternatives to.the Taraki-Amin regime. We have received reports that the Soviets encouraged leaders of the ri!al ~archam faction of the People's Democratic Party, ;n ex1le 1n-Europe, to believe "that the USSR would back the1r return to power and, alternatively, that the Soviets were plan"; ng a military coup. Jailed members of the Parcham faction in Kabul, who were released at Soviet urging in early July, were rearrested in August after they began circulating anti-amin and anti-tarakidocuments. (~JOC) 20. MOscow's desire to enlarge the Afghan ruling circle apparently was discussed directly with Taraki and Amin. Ambassador Safronchuk, the Soviets' special envoy to Kabul, told the US Charge on 24 June that Moscow had ~ot yet been able to persuade the regime to bring new people ;nto government. By mid-july the East German Ambassador 1n Kabul was claiming that the Soviets were going to replace Taraki and Amin by force if necessary _ In late July, the public comments of Taraki and Amin made it clear that they were aware of the Soviet machinations and that they would TCS

159 resist. Amin pointedly reminded Moscow that the prerequ~site for continued close ties was Soviet "respect for our natj.onal sovereignty and independence. II In the same period, there was evidence suggesting that'amin had taken steps to circumscribe the power of the Minister of Defense Watanjar, a key fiqure in any putative Soviet effort to induce the Afghan military to depose Amin and Taraki. On 28 July, Amin assumed effective control of the Defense Ministry and appointed Watanjar as Interior Minister. (~NC ec) 21. Events during the latter half of August suggest that despite the difficulties in its dealings with the regime, Moscow was n~~repared to halt the growth of its commitment to the qis. On 19 Auqust Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosyqin sent an unusually warm message to the Afghan le~ders in connection with Afghan independence, day. A few days before, a large high-ranking Soviet military delegation led by the Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, General pavlovskiy had arrived in Kabul secretly to conduct a lengthy assessment of Afghan military needs.,~.jic."oc) 'rcs 22. In mid-september, Amin's seizure of sole power,~ir removing both Watanjar and Taraki from the government, rate further complicated the Soviet problems in dealing with both the regime and the insurgency. The Soviets probably saw the Amin coup as 'rendering the counterinsurgency task more difficult, at least in the short tem, because it further narrowed the regime I s base of support and in fact threatened to divide the Khalqi party itself. J..'r~ Military Options 23. On the eve of the Amin coup, in the apparent absence of viable political alternatives, the Soviets seem to have decided by late August to renew their commitment to the Afghan leadership as it was then constituted, and to focus on the scope and character of military support needed to support that commitment. The size and rank of the Pavlovskiy delegation, plus the long duration of its visit, strongly suggest that it was tasked to make that assessment of military needs. If Moscow chose to provide additional military support, its options could be divided into four categories, as discussed below.,js1-~ 24. Equipment and Advisers. The most obvious option is to supply more equj.pment and to increase the number of Soviet advisers. Because of a shortage of trained Afghan ,- :=-,...

160 ~.:..,~~-... manpower, such an increase might necessitate allowing Soviet advisers a more extensive role in combat and air support activities and in ferrying men and materiel within Afghanistan. The Soviets, for example, could assign more personnel to fly and maintain tactical ground support aircraft and helicopter gunships for operations against the insurgents. ps~ 2S. Introduction of Combat Support and Combat Service Support Unl.ts. Another optj.on, at a higher level of l.nvolvement, would be to provide the Afghan Army with Soviet-manned combat support and combat service support units--such as attack helicopter and additional logistic and maintenance units--to enhance the Afghan combat reach and effectiveness. Combat support and combat service support units could be moved to areas of the USSR adjacent to Afghanistan and incrementally introduced over a period of weeks without straining the Soviet transport system. Our ability to detect such Soviet movements and intrusions promptly is limited, although time would increase the probability of our learning that such units had entered Afghanistan. jjts~ 26. Lindted Intervention With soviet Combat Units. The Soviets might cons1.der dep10p.ng a 1111l1.ted nuiiieer of their own units to provide security or operate in combat as separate entities. The Soviets would have to weigh whether their increased combat presence would alienate rather than bolster the Afghan forces that are now loyal to the regime. Because of this uncertainty the introduction of Soviet combat units probably would be accomplished incrementally. It might begin, for example, with a few battalions up to and including an airbol:i1e division or two to help stiffen Afghan AImy resolve or provide security for key cities or critical points. As noted earlier, we believe one such battalion has already been introduced to provide security for Bagram airfield since early July.~ 27. The most likely airborne division to be called in is the one nearest Afghanistan, located at Fergana in the Turkestan Military District (MO). It could be brought up to its operational strength of some 7,900 men in a few hours. ~) 28. The airlift of an airborne division into Afghanistan could be accomplished within a day or so if ':he transport and airborne forces were previously alerted and prepared. The Fergana division is situated about 380 nautical miles from Kabul, and the flight time between the two locations '.rcs ~~- St!!#"

161 Tes is onlf about one and a half hours. With the short distance :Lnvolved, the Soviets would probably elect to establish an air shuttle and delivel:' the division in several reqiment-size increments, each requirinq about 100 aircraft sorties. Some 200 additiona! sorties would be required for the division I s support equipment. An airlift of this nature would be well within the capabilities of the Soviet military transport fleet. /ips 29. ~he Soviets could also airlift to Afghanistan infantry elements up to regimental size from divisions in the Turkestan MO. Without their heavy equipment, these units would not have the. firepower or mobility of airborne units but could be used for point defense or, with.the commitment of substantial helicopter lift and support units, to protect communication lines or conduct anti-insurgent operati:ons. V) 30. All of these limited deployments could be suppor'te by fighter aircraft from the three tactical air force bases in the Turkestan MO. Only 45 of the approximately 120 tacti cal fiqhters at these bases have a primary role of qround attack, but other aircraft could readily be deployed to border airfields if necessary. The closest combat assault helicopter unit is in the Transcaucasus MD, 1,100 miles from the Afqhan border, and other units are farther away in the carpathian and Transbaikal. MOs. Soviet transport helicopter units are located 'throughout the western and southwestern military districts. The Soviets probably would not consider that airstrikes by themselves would reverse a deteriorating military situation, but they miqht use' such strikes to support Soviet combat units if they were introduced.,f-'" 31. Massive Soviet Mi.lit~ Intervention. Anything beyond securu1q Kabul or some other key Cl.ty and a few criti cal points would require the commitment of large numbers of regular ground forces in a potentially open-ended'operation. An overland move to Kabul--particularly with the possibility of Afghan Army and insurgent opposition--would be a multidivisional operation exhausting the resources of the Turkestan MD. An operation of this magnitude would therefore require the redeployment of forces--and their supportinq elements--from western and central military distri~, in addition to.those near the Soviet-Afghan border. ~)

162 If I!!:) 'O~ KOF;. OlttBAcr-oacoN 32. Soviet ground forces closest to Afghanistan are located in the Turkestan MD--some 45,000 men in four cadrelevel motorized rifle divisions, an artillery brigade, and various Me-level support units. All of these forces are manned considerably below their intended wartime strengths. In about a week some 50,000 reservists could be mobilized to fill out the Turkestan units and an additional division could be moved in from the Central Asian MD. ~) 33. Six other Central Asian Military District divisions would also be available for operations but would require a few weeks or longer to mobilize reservists and move to the Afghan border. The Soviets probablr would be reluctant to move any substantial portion of thel.r Central Asian forces into Afghanistan, however, for fear of weakening their position opposite China. ~) 34. The Soviets have 12 other divisions located well over 1,000 miles from Afghanistan in the Volga, Ural, and North Caucasus MOs from which they could draw intervention forces. These units are also manned at low levels in peacetime and would require a few weeks to fill out and move to. the Afghan border. ~) 35. The terrain and lack of a modern transportation network in Afghanistan are hampering the Afghan Government's milita.ry effort agaibst the insurgents and would seriously complicate large-scale Soviet military operations. Most of the country is hilly or mountainous--terrain that would limit the use of transport and logistic vehicles. In addition to controlling the mountainous areas, the insurgents could disrupt Soviet movement by cutting the roadways that lead from the border area to several key cities as well as those roads between major urban areas., Prospects 36. The prospect of a successful Communist government in Afghanistan is important to Moscow for ideological reasons: such a government would provide substance to determinist claims that world "socialism ll will eventually emerge victorious. The Soviets feel obligated to support such revolutions and embarrassed when they fail. The outcome assumes an added importance when the revolution occurs in a country on the USSR's border. In addition, it is conceivable that some Soviet planners have welcomed the advent of such a revolution in Afghanistan on strategic grounds, arguing that if orcs

163 this revolutionary regime could be consolidated in power at acceptable cost, it could open the way for the eventual expansion of Soviet influence southward. 37. For these reasons Moscow has been determined to make the Khalqi seizure of power blossom into a workable government, and has been frustrate~ by the steady decline of the regime I s fortunes. We have seen that as the insurgency has worsened and the regime I s needs have grown, the Soviets have steadily expanded the flow of military supplies to the reqime to the limts of its ability to absorb them. Similarly, they have gradually increased the number and expanded the counterinsurgency role of Soviet advisers in the country. They have. placed a battalion at Baqram airfield to provide security for the airlift. As these measures have proved inadequate to halt the deterioration of the regime's position, the Soviets have explored the option of seeking a broader based Afghan leadership but, even before the Amin coup, had clearly failed in their efforts to create a coalition that might a.ttract greater popular support while guaranteeing the government's continued pro-soviet orientation. lu~. 38. Under these circumstances, the Soviets are likely to have begun more serious consideration of the spectrum of possibilities for direct combat intervention. The likelihood that the Soviets had been weighing the military options discussed earlier was enhanced by the arrival in mid- August of General Pavlovskiy. The delegation led by the Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces was specifically reported to be preparing, among other things, a detailed report on the Afghan insurgency and the Afghan military. (5 HF~~) We cannot rule out the possibility that Pavlovskiy's visit followed a decision already made by Moscow to intervene at one of the levels discussed earlier, and that Pavlovskiy's task involved working out the modalities. One clandestine source in early September alleged that the Soviets had already moved some 3,600 Soviet combat troops into Kabul, with the pw:pose of protecting Soviet citizens and facilities. The Soviets might have considered such a move into Kabul prudent in view of the uprisings that have occurred in Kabul this year and the continuing possibility of violence in the capital. Sizable numbers of such troops without heavy equipment could have been brought into the city 'rcs t..c.,.

164 .. from the USSR undetected by US intelligence if this had been done gradually and incrementally as part of the ongoing airlift of materiel for Afghanistan. We have been unable to ~;s report, however, by other intelligence means. 40. It appears reasonable to conclude that the soviet leadership has wished to avoid allowing the situation to deteriorate to a point where only large-scale intervention by Soviet troops could save the Afghan regime. Moscow would then have to calculate whether Khalqi survival was worth commitment to the qrave and open-ended military task of holding down an Afghan insurgency in rugged terrain. The Soviets would also have to consider the likely prospect that they would be contending with an increasingly hostile and anti-soviet population. The USSR would then have to consider the likelihood of an adverse reaction in the West, as well as further complications with Iran, India, and Pakistan. Moscow would also have to weigh the neqative effects elsewhere in the Muslim world of a massive Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Soviet-Iraqi relations, for example, have already soured because of Baghdad's suspicion about Soviet intentions in the Middle East follo"fing the upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan. A conspicuous use of Soviet nlitary force against an Asian population would ~vide the Chinese considerable political capital. 41. On the other hand, if worse came to worst, and the Soviets chose to abandon the Khalqis rather than accept the political costs and risks of a Soviet invasion, the effects would again be damaging to the USSR. But whatever criticism the Soviets might suffer for not defending a budding revolutionary movement to the end could be deflected by reminding detractors that the USSR had provided Kabul with large amounts of assistance and had warned Taraki and Amin that they were mismanaging the revolution. Moscow's unwillingness to acknowledge the Afghan regime publicly as a Communist government has suggested that the Soviets have wished to leave open a ~ropaganda retreat in case the Khalqis collapse. 42. To avoid being confronted with an all-or-nothing decision, however, the Soviets seemed prepared before the Allin coup in mid-september to provide the reqime with additional military assistance that could include some combat help but would, for the time being, probably be well short TCS ls q'~tt

165 .' of a major intervention (which we have defined as a multidivision ground force operation.) In short, the Soviets seemed likely to act initially on the smallest and least conspicuous scale co~!~ith Pavlovskiy's estimate of the regime's needs. ~ 43. As noted earlier, Amin's seizure of sole power has further complicated the soviet problems in dealing with both the regime and the insurgency. We believe that the Soviets probably did not instigate or foresee this move by Amin, which in fact may conceivably have been a preemptive step to forestall a Soviet plot to have Taraki remove him. (~ 44. We believe it likely that Moscow views the situation in Kabul as extremely unstable since Taraki' s fall, and th~t the soviets see the uncertain tenure of Amin' s regime as requiring at least a brief deferral of new soviet military initiatives against the insurgency pending a decision as to whether Amin can consolidate his po~ition. ~s.) 45. At the same time, the soviets have seemed ready decisively to preserve security in Kabul if the ation there should ra idl deteriorate e Sov1etS lday ear at Amin' s coup might provoke fighting within the Afghan Army and a breakdown of control in Kabul. In this event, the Soviets are probably prepared to deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisions to the Kabul vicinity to protect soviets already there as well as to ensure. continuance of a pro-soviet regime in the capital. We believe it likely that we would promptly detect a deployment of Soviet forces on this scale. We do not believe that the Soviets would intend such a deployment for use in fightinq against the Muslim insurgency, althouqh it is not impossible that, once in Afqhanistan, such Soviet airborne forces could eventually be drawn into fiqhting.!1~ 46. If, on the other hand, the Soviets within the next few weeks conclude that AlDin has consolidated his position and that no effective challenge from within the regime and the Army is likely, we believe the Soviets will probably increase their counterinsurgency role in the next few months, albeit incrementally rather than dramatically. Tes ,

166 " ~~;y?-- HOFO~~ Any moderate increase in the Soviet role--involvinq expansion of the combat activities of advisers, providinq some combat support and combat service support elements, and perhaps in!tially airliftinq in additional airborne or liqhtly equipped battalions or regiments to provide security in key cities~-would be primarily intended to buy time. Perhaps the biggest immediate threat to the prospects for a Uholding action" of this type is the loyalty of the Afghan Army. Small-scale defections occur almost daily and, with four major mutinies in the past seven months, its continued allegiance is highly suspect. ~ 47. 'Unless the Army completely unravels, therefore, additional Soviet advisers and a limited sprinkling of Soviet combat units would improve, but not guarantee, the staying power of the Khalqis. In expanding incrementally the level of their own involvement, however, there is a danger that the Soviets will increase their own stake in the ultimate outcome, making it increasingly likely that they will raise the level of their participation still another notch if the situation continues to deteriorate. p- 48. In the event Amin does not consolidate his posi- tion but an acceptable and viable Marxist alternative emerges, the Soviets are likely to shift their political and military support accordingly. If no such viable leftist alternative appears, and the Khalqi reqime fragments, the Soviets would promote installation of a more moderate regime willing to deal with them, rather than accept the political costs and risks of 'a massive Soviet invasion to fight the insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foresee contingencies under which the chances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention. would become substantially greater: Prolonged political chaos. The prospect of advent of an anti-soviet regime. Foreign military intervention. ps~ 'res ~t

167 Warning Considerations TCS 1. It is difficult to assess warning time for imprecisely defined military options such as we can postulate for Afghanistan. In Europe, for example, we know the parameters of the "threat" forces and there is an extensive body of good evidence indicating how they intend, in general, to employ these forces against NATO. In Afghanistan, however, we have no evidence on Soviet military objectives or on the forces that the Soviets would consider necessary to accomplish them. Moreover, in estimating warning time in Europe we have evidence of what the Soviets would consider to be a minimum force necessary to launch a deliberate attack and have predicated our minimum warning time on the time necessary for the Warsaw Pact to prepare, and for NATO to detect, such an attack. In an intervention into Afghanistan, however, the Soviets do not face well-organized forces on their frontier to be overcome in an initial as-. sault. Therefore, even the largest intervention, which would take weeks to fully prepare if undertaken as a coordinated assault, could be undertaken piecemeal, beginning with airborne or ground forces near the border. Such an operation could be initiated in a day or so, with little or no warning, as follow-on forces were being mobilized. ~f 2. The options available at the lower end of the scale provide the least. warning but also would likely have the least military impact. Soviet airborne troops or small "ground forces Units probably could be readied for an intervention in a day and it would take about that long to marshal the air transport to move them into Afghanistan ina single lift. We could not be confident that we would detect the increase in troop readiness early on, but the concurrent marshaling of transport aircraft for a major airlift probably would become apparent in a day. In addition, Soviet airborne and airlifted troops could be introduc~~~wu'ning at all if they were moved in piecemeal. ~ 3. The larger intervention options offer more warning time, depending on the level of the soviet commitment. M~ltidivisional operations to secure a few lines of communication into Afghanistan, for example, could be initiated, probably in about a week using the four divisions in the Turkestan Military District; it would take us a few days to *7~et:

168 detect the mobilization and movement of these forces. Operations in the face of Afqhan Army resistance or efforts to pacify substantial areas of the country probably would require forces from areas beyond the Turkestan Military District and would take up to a few weeks to prepare. We probabl would be able to detect the mobilization and moveme~~~ divisions in these areas in a few days to a week. ~~. TCS '!';>Jr<t

169 DE R:JQMER DE RUEHC.6809/ ZIIY CCCCC ZZH o.p Z SEP 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ROSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0012 INFO RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY RUEBMOIAMEM8ASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7116 RUSSAK/AMEMBASSY MEW DELHI PRIORITY 1376 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 4791 CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 0101" 02 STATE /01 E.O : G 0 5-9/28/85 ( PECX, ROB~RT) TAGS: PEPR, SNAR, AF, UR, US, PK SUBJECT: NEWSOM MEETING WITH AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER 1. CONFIDENTIAL- ENTIRE TEXT. 2. ~UHMARY: DURING LENG~HY, BUSINESSLIKE SESSION IN NEW YORK, UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM AND AFGHAN FONMIN SHAH WALl TRADED MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT AGREED ON LITTLF. ELSE. DISCUSSION TCUCHED ON THE DUBS ASSASS INATION AND THE ')'ta APPROACH 'f0 ACCEPTASCE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. SHAH WALI AFGHAN-FUGITIVES- WERE BEING TRAINED THERE. HE MIN IMIZED THE SOVIET PRESENC~ IN AFGHANISTAN AND DEFENDED HIS GOVER NMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMEN~. WE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE DRA'S.INTEREST IN ~ONTROLLING NARCOTICS. END. SUMMERY. 3. AT US INITIATIVE, UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM CALLED ON AFGHAN FONNIN SHAH WALl FOR A GENERAL HOOR-~ONG EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SEPT 27 IN NEW YORK. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS AND NEA/PAB DEREC TOR PECK SAT IN. SHAB WALl HAD ONLY A NOTETAKER WITH HIM. 4. NEWSOM OPENED BY NOTING THAT WH~ HE WAS LAST IN AFGHANISTAN HE MET WITH THEN-PRESIDENT TARAKI AND FON. MINISTE~ AKIN. HE WANTED TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE FONKIN'S WISIT TO EXTEND HIS EEST WISHES TO AMIN AND TO SHAH WALl AS THEY ASSQMED ~HEIR KEW RESPONSIBILITIES. NEWSOM SAID CHARGE AMSTUTZ HAD REPORTED TBAT HE BAD A CORDIAL CORVERSATION EARLIER THE SAME DAY WITH PRESIDENT AMIN. S. I~ RESPONCE SHAH WALl SAID THE ORA HAD FROM THE BEGINNING WANTED TO HAVE ~OOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES WITHOUT EXCEP TION. AFGHANISTAN HAD TRADITIONAL~Y FRIENDLY R~LATIONS WITH THE US AND THE ORA HAD BEEN DESIROUS OF MAINTAINING THESE ~IES. REFERRING TO THE DUBS ASSASSINATION, SHAH WALl SAID CERTAIN EVENTS R HAD ACCURRED WHICH THE ORA DID NOTWhNT. THE ORA HAD DONE ITS BEST TO PROVE THAT THESE EVENTS HAD BEEN OUTSIDE ITS CONTROL. 94 "

170 6. NEWSOM NOTED THAT THE REACTION IN THE US TO THE DUBS ASSASS INATION HAD BEEN VERY STRONG AND LED TO THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WHICH REDUCED SOMEWHAT OUR COOPERATION. WE HAVE ~RIED TO EXTEND OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AS LONG AS WE COULD ~NDER THE LAW, AND ARE PHASING OUT OUR PROGRAMS IN AN ORDERLY FAnHION. THE US WAS ALWAYS READY TO DISCUSS STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN TO PUT OUR RELATIONS BACK ON h MonE NORMAL BASIS. WE WELCOMED WORD THAT PRESIDENT AMIN WANTED ~ETTER RELATIONS. WHEN THE TIME CAME WHEY' BETTER RELATIUNS COULD BE DISCUSSED, WE WERE WILLING TO EXPLORE HOW THE CONDITIONS LAID DCWN BY CONGRESS HIGHT BE MET. 7. IN keply TO SHAH WALI'S SUGG~STION THAT- FALSE PROPA~ANDA- ON THIS ISSUE RhO UNDULY INFLU NCED US POLITICAL LEADERS, NEWSOM SArD IT WAS THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE A~SASSINAT~ON THAT WERE ~~SPO~S!BL. NOT NEWSPAPER REPORT5. WE ALSO FELT THAT W~ HAO NOT GOTTEN AS MUCH COOPERATION IN THE INVESTICATION AS WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED. IN DEFENSE, SHAH WALl POINTEC TO THE SERIOUS DOUBTS STILL REMAINING ABOUT THE KENNEDY ASSAS~INATION AND REITERATED THAT THF DRA BELIZVED IT HAD DONE ITS BEST. P.. REMINDED OF PREVIOUS USG ASSISTANCE T~ AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT PROJEC~S SUCH AS THE HELMA~D VA~LEY. SHAH WAL: SAI~ THAT IT WAS ~ECAOSE OF THE PKEVIOUS~RI~~~LY RELATlONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNT Rl~3 THAT THE DRA CONSIUERED Tn~ PRESENT SITUATION TO BE -ABMOR ~AL. HE SAW NO HINDRANCE OR PROBLE~ WHICH COULD NOT BE SOLVED. HE DENIED THAT THE ORA WAS TURNING AWAY FROM THE PRIOR AFGHAN PRACTICE OF DRAWING ON MULTIPLE AIU SOURCES AND ADVISERS IN PUTT- ING TOGETHER COOPERATIVE PROJECTS. SHAH WALl POINTED TO THE. CONTINUATION OF WORLD BANK, GERMAN AND OTHER PROJECTS, AND ARGUED THAT AF~HANlSTAN S ACTIONS_IN SOME SPECIFIC CASES - ( READ U.S.) HAD ARISEN from A FEELING THAT INDIVIDUALS DID 50T have PROPER OUALIFICATIONS. HE ADDED THAT AFGHANIS~AN HAD ASKED FOR MORE PERSONNEL IN CERTAIN CASES, CITING THEIR REQUEST TO CARZ MEDICO ( WHICH HAD A LARGE US PERSONNEL COMPONENT ) FOR MORE ME DICAL SF~CIALISTS. HE ADDED WITH APPARENT REGRET ~HAT CARE-MEDICO HAD BEEN UNABLE TO COMPLY, AND THAT HE RAD LEAkNED SnORTLY BEFORE DEPARTING KABUL OF CARE-MEDICO'S DECISION TO WITH~RAW ALL OF ITS PERSONNEL FROM THE COUNTRY. 9. SHAH WALl REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE WH~N ASKED IF HE EXPECTED CHANGES IN BASIC ORA POLICIES rollowing RECENT LEADERSHIP CHANGES. HE EXPECTED CONTINUITY SINCE THE POLICIES WERE LAID DOWN BY THE PARTY, AND TUE FARTY STILL EXISTED. NEWSOM SAID WE HAD NOTICED PkESIDENT AKIN'S BT n~nnvv ESB004DRA 546 nn RUOMHR DE RUEHC *6809/ ZUY cceee ZZH o P Z SEP 79 PH SECSTATE WASHOC TO RUSBLK!AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 00J3 95

171 INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMAbAD PRIORITY 738} RUEHNO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7JJ7 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY ]377 au9.mhr/ahem~assy TEHRAN PRIORITY 4792 BT CONFIOEH~IAL FINAL SECTION OF 02STATE /02 STATED DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S ~ IGHBO~SPAKISTA" AND IRAN, SHAH WALl SAID THIS REFLECTED ~HE/SINCERE O~SI~ESOF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THE PARTY. HE SAID DEFUTY FONMIN DOST'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN IiAD RESULTED 1111 HAVANA Al~D FORMER PRE SIDENT ~ARAKI HAD ALSO TALKED WITH PAKISTANI PRES IDENT' 211. ThERE. H~ WAS CAREFUL TO POI~T OUT THAT THE LATTER MEETING " REFL~CTED THE DESiRE OF OUR GOVERNM NT" ~ H~ INDICA'J;ElJ THAT lio'ta AGHA SHAHI AND ZIA HAD BEEN INVITED '1'0 KABUL, BUT THAT IT WAS UND RSTOO~ ZIA WOULD COME ONLY AFTER AN A~HA SHAHI VISIT HAD TAKEN PLACE~ 10. AT ANOTHEk POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, SHAH TOOK A MILD SWIPE.0\'':. PAKISTAN WHEN DISCU~SING THE UNDER LAYIN ~AOS~S OF THE INSURGENCY. HE SAID THS R~3LES WERE MOST~r ~HOSE ~HO HAD LOST THEIR FO~~~R FEUDAL. PRIVILEGES, 3UT ADDED T3AT PART OFtTHS PROBLEM WAS CREATED BY AFG3ANISTAN'S N2IGHBORS. HE ~OINTED ~O ':'HEC1'.l"'.PS IN PAXIS'l'AN WHERE AFGHAN " FUGITIVES" t'lere Jf.kAOZlfEO., HE ADDED THAT PAltISTAN ALSO SENT SOME "MILITIA" INTO AFGHANISTAN. ASKED ABOUT THE REFUGEB SITUATlaN, SHAH WALl ARGUED TBA~ AFGHANISTAN'S BORDERS WERE VERY POROUS AND THAT 2.5 MILLION NOMADS CROSSED THE FRONT IERS EVERY YEAR.'1'11 EXPLA~ATION, HE CONCLUDED, WAS THAT- THEY HAVE DETAINEUOUR NOMADS. 11. ON THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS WITH TH~ SOVIET UNION SHAH WALl SAID AFGHANISTAN'S TRADITIONAL GOOD RELA TIONS WITH ITS NORTHERN N~I~HBOR HAD CHANGED LITTLE WITH THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENTS OVER THE YEARS. ASKED If HE SAW ANY CONTRADICTION BETWEEN A!'GHANISTAN' S PROFESSIONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THECOCNTRY, SHAH WALl SAID THE NUMBERS OF SOVIET ADVISORS HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED. A MOUNTAIN HAD BEEN MADE OUT OF MOL~HILL. HE POINTED OUT THAT AFGHANIS~AN HAD HAD SOVIET ADVISERS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, AND SAID THE NUBER HADUOT CHANGED MUCH. HE DECLINED TO B~ PINNED DOWN AS '1'0 EXACT NUMBER THERE NOW, AND SAID THERE WERE ADVISORS FROM OTHER NATIONS SUCH AS. INDIA. IN APPARENT CONTRADICT ION OF HIS EARLIER STATEMENT. HE CONCLUDED THERE HAD BEEN NO QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION, JUST A QUANTITATIVE ONE. 96

172 12. SH~H WALl ALSO DECLINED TO BE PINNED DOWN'AS TO WHETHER THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHA NISTAN( PDPA) WAS A MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY. HE', SAID WE COULD JUDGE OURSELVES FROM THE PROGRAM OF THE PARTY. THE PDPA, HE ADDED, REFLECTED THE SO CIALIST STRUCTURE OP'THE COUNTRY. NENSOM RBCALLED H!S"EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH THEN FOREIGN.MINISTER A~IR ron THE NATURE OF THE PDPA!N LIGHT QF.US..LEG ISLATION BEARING ON RELATIONS WITH NATIONS DOMINA TED OR CONTROLLED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST. MOVEMENT. DID SHAH WALl CONSIDER THE PDRA'A PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OR A~,A PURELY AFGHAN ENTITY? SHAH WALl SAID THE PDPA WANTED RELATIONS WITO ALL PARTIES, NOT JUST THOSE IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE ASSURE~ NEWSOM THAT HIS WAS A SOVEREIGN GOVERNEMENT NOT UN~Ek THE INFLUENCE OF ANOTHER GOVERNHENT ~R.PARTY. AFGAN ISTAN WAS FAITHFUL TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND WANTED.TO HAV~ A.POLICY OF ITS OWN~ NEWSOM COMMEN TED THAT THE US RESPECTED RTRUE NON~ALIGNMENTR, BUT THAT WE HAD PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERrNCED WITH SOME CONTRIES' DEFINITION OF NCN-ALIGNMENT--SPECTIFICA LLY THAT OF CUBA. 13. SAUNDERS SAID WE APPRECIATED THE ORA'S INTERE ST IN CONTROLLING THE clow,of NARCOTICS. D~SCRIB ING NARCOTICS AS A MAJOR NATiONAL PROBLEM I~ THE US, SAUNDERS SAID WE WERE'PREP~RED TO'WORK WITH AFGHAN AUTHORITIES,AND.WOULD APPRECIATED ANY cooreration THE ORA MIGHT GIVIL SHAH WAJ..I 'BRI'GHTENED 'v,isiiily IN~THANKING US FOR.MENTIONING.THIS MATTER. 'HE SAID THE ORA HAD BURNED A CACHE OF' HASH ls,i I,AST YEAR WORTH DOLS 25 MILLION, BUT.THE 'WEs'IiERN PRESS nad PAID THIS NO' HEED..NEWSQM "RECRETTE'D ~,THE 'LACK OF!>U3LICITY BU~' SAID WE. IU ' THE' esg IIAD. NOTICED,. WE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIESCOUNT~IES F~CED IN IN TERFERING WITH TRADITIONAL NARCOTICE CU~TURE AND TRAFFICKING, PhRTICULARLY SIUCE NARCOTICS COULD BE AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INCOME.tbRPOOR FARMERS. IT WAS AU ACT OF.COURAGE FOR,A GOVERNMEN~ IN A COUN'l'RY SUCH AS Jl.FCHANItTAN TO TAKE A STRONG STAND. AND WE JlPPRECJ;ATED _,THIS. HE ADDED TH'IS WAS A POSI TIVE ELEMENT IN OUR.RELATIONS. 14. IN CLOSING, NEWSOM" S~IO HE WANTED ~O KEEP THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES OPEN. HE HAD ASKED A LOT OF OUESTION. BUT THIS HAD P 'EN IN THE INTEREST OF FINDING A BASIS ON WHICH ~E 'LD IMPROVE OUR R~LATIONS. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGE THE RECEPTION PRESIDENT AMIN HAD GIVEN TO OUR,.riGE EARLIER IN THE DAY AND HOPED THIS WOULD SIG NAL CONTINnED IMPROVEM~NT IN OUR RELAT!ONS. VANCE BT <:'7. ' - ~.,

173 NNNNVV ESP'~~P~JC12~ 00 ROOfo1'!I~ DE RUS)L~ ?5~333 ZNT SSSSS US o R Z OCT 79 1M AMEM!ASST ~A!rL TO RUEBC/SiCSTATF W~SF.DC IMM~DIAT~ INFO RUMJPG/A~r.~BASSY BEIJIN~ 7f4 RUSBCD/AM!.~!~~SI ISLA~A~.r. 935~ ROQMRA/A~EMPAS3! JIDDA 4~4 RUDTC/AHEMB~SSY LO~DON lc~7 RUEB~O/~Hf.~~ASSY ~OSCO RUSIAE/AHEM~~SSYTCF~ ~!LEI 7475 ROFP.NA/OSMISSION ~SN.TO 72 / ROQMHR-AHEHBJSSY TEH!AN 53~ RODKRJ/AH~H!'~SY ErL~RAD~ 197 RU20F.QA.!C INC PA C ~ RUSNAAA/CINCED~ ạ.!'1' ~ f EXDIS ị. ~ NOFORN SEC' Jl E l' 7{A'BUL ne2 E l( DIS CHARGE' CHRN.,, : CINCPAC AND CINCEUR ALSO ror POLAr, t : RDS-1 1~-1~99 (flttin, Eaccr A.) O~-~ TAGS: PEPR. PI NS, MILl, :"lops. 'U', ttr. SOIJ: (5) REPO~TS OF SOVI!T CO~!AT TROOPS IN AFG3ANISTA~ REr: (ABUL 5772 (NOTAL) 1. (S-rNTIRE IE!r) 2. TO SUPPLrME~T TH! EMIAssr'S RtPORTIN~ IN INTELLI~ENCE CHANNELS ABOUT TEE PRESENCE or SOVIET CO~PAT FORC!S I~ ArGH!NISTA~. THE rollowi~g OBSERVATION~ ~r roxeign DIPLO~ HATS AT!ABDL AR~ ADDED. 3. ON sr.ptr~brr 30, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR DOGDAN ~AL~A~I:!PLIASE PROTECT) ASKED TP~ A/DC~ VHF-TRER RECEN! J.S. NEWS RiPOP.TS" or TROOP ACTIVITY IN SOVIlT CENTRAL ASIA INVOLVED AI~PO~NE UNITS. ~ALBASIC, A rormer AR~l ;~~~~AL. WHIT ON TO STATE THAT P.E BA~ BEARD TPAT THE SOVIETS f.av~ ALREADY PREPOS ITIONED surn CIi:NT ARMAMENt AND!~UI?~mir lor ONE AIPBORNE DIVISION AT BAGRAH AIR BASE, NORTH ~r rabul. HE SrJMF.D TO BE C~O!AIN OF ~HIS INFORMATION. U 102

174 ,. T!f. YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR TEOUG!T TB4T THI SOVIET UNION VOULD INTRODUCE COMBAT 70RCr.S HERE ONt! A~ A LAST RESORT. WI O!SERVE~ TBAT OTP.ER OPTIONS SHORT O! 5UCH A DRASTIC STEP VERE srill OPEN: r..~ PHOADENING THE POLITICAL BASE AND POPULAR APPEAL OF 1ST {HALOI FF~IM1 -- AND A QUIC, MILITARY COOP WHICH WO~LD R~PLACE TaE!BALQI LEADERSHIP VI!B FRESH, INITIALLY APOLITICAL P RSONALITIES. 5. ALSO ON SEPTE~BER 30, J. DA~tAT SINGH, rhe I~DIAN DC~ (PLIAS! PROTECT), TOLD THF. }!DC~ TEAT ONE or HIS SOURCES BAD RECENTLY DISCUSSlD TH~ PrtESfNCE or SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS VITH A FORMER AFGEAN ARMY OFFICER. NOW A PRISONIR AT POL-I-CHARKI, WHO BAD A BErCHF HIS ARRrST, SERVIL AT THE ~BOOSE OF TPE P~OPLE PEADOUART~RS or TEE {HALQI LEADE? SHIP. THE AlGRlN OFFICE~ RrpOp.~EDLY SAID THAT 4REN BE LAST VAS IN A POSITION TO P.AY! ACCr.SS TO SF.~SITIVE INFOrt~A!ION, TBlRE wi~e 9.~00 SOYIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISiAN. T~E INDIAN DC~ DID NOT!MOW rb~ EXACT DATE OF HIS INiO?MATION. BUT ~AS OF fhe ~ OPINION TPAT IT WAS FAIRLY RECENT. SINGE HIMSELF TFIN~S TEE cua ~ RENT FIGURE IS EETWEEN 1Z.~0a AND 29,09~ (HE LEANS TOVARD TBE ~ UPPlR END or THAT RANGE) -- A~D SAID THAT HE HA! AL~lADY RIPORTED : TFI~ SPRr.AD TO NE~ DELHI. ~ f 6. ON SSPTEMPER 3e, A west GERMAN E~!ASSY OFFICER TOLD T:E ~ A/DC~ THAT ~ERMAN TRUC~ DRIVERS rysin~ THE REBEL!ARMY-DESERTEP/ : BANDIT-INFESTED Hr~AT-To-r.ANDAF.AR ROAD?ECENTLY REPOR!I~ srtin~ VRAT WERE CLEARLY ETHNIC RnSSllN SOLDIERS MAN T~E L~AD ARMORED 'EF-IeLI IN THEIR ROAD CONVOY. HE CLAIMED T IT TnEt ~OC~ PHOTO GRAPHS AS PROOF. THt GER~A~ OFFICER THOUGHt 50~I WEsrERN ~ rs PUBLICATION WOULr. PAT MUCS FOR T1.051 PHOTOGRAP~S.,. COMMINT: rhe ABOV! 'IE~S ARE!iIN: REPORTED WITH SOMI RESERVATIONS. T1.E YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATIO~ AB~UT PREPOSITIONED ARMAMENTS AND E~UIPMENr AT BAGRAM RIFLECTS TFE SITUATION ~OTED AT OT~ER LOCATIONS AROUND AFGEANIS1AN (E.G., TBF PUL-I-CFla~I TANK BAS~) WSERE LARGE N~M!ERS OF AIRCRAFT, TA~~Sl AND OT6E~ ~ILITARY ITE~S AR~ NOW EEIN~ P!~~ED -- AN AS~EM~tY OF AR~AMFNT ~RICB WOULD APPE!R 10 DE FAB ~ORE TEAS THE AF~~AN A~MI ITSELF COULD ~AN IS rhe I~MELIATf ruture. vr S~VF NO INF~R~ATION ~c CONFIRM TPE YUCOSLAr'S REPoaT OF PR!POSITIONED EOUIPMtNT ror A~ AI~BORNl DIVIEIOS. 9. AS ror TFE OBS~RVATION O~ SINC~. A SOUND DIPLO~AT ~EO 15 N!VERTPELESS GIvFN OCCASIONALLY TO UNCRITICA1 ACCEPTANCE O! TPF INFoP.MA!ION DRIFTIN~ ABOUT IN TPt &ABCL RU~OR MILL, IT WOOLD BE SIGNIFICAN~ If O SAS I~DLED FROVIDED 1SE le,az3 TO-2~,000 FIGUP.F. ~o TRE D~CISION-MA~ERS AT NE_ DtLf.I. ~E ~NOVa! NO CNF.FR SOUDCE H~R~ CITIS~ A FI~nR~ T?oAT [IG? AND 103

175 WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) BELIEVE IT OORSELVf,S. 9. ALTBOUGB AMERICAN OfFICERS BAyr OCCASIONALLY SEEN savitt SOLDIERS AROUND KABOL, WEARIN~ AFGEAN ~NlrORTA (A CUSTO~ARY PRACtICE FROM TBE ROYAL AND DiOODIST ERAS), NO us orrlcrr BERI RAS TEf SPECIrICALLY SPOTTED WHAT C~~LD BE IDENrIfI!D AS A SOVIET COMBAT UNIT.- ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE EVIDENCE. BOWEVER, WELL-BIDDEN SOVIET COMBAT rorcrs A~E UNDO~BTEDtY ALREADY INSIDE TBE COUNTRY. CURRENT ESTI~ATE~v SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN 9iN A, CLUDING Taos OA~DI~ BAGIAH AIR BAS~, IS PER PS 4. ~e WITP. N ADDITION L ~,ee0 fary ADVISORS. - : le. AS lor TBE GERMAN STORY,. BADLY ILLUstRATES EO~ i SOVltT HILITAR! ADVISORS ASSIGNED TO RE~ULA~ AfGBAN AR~Y UNITS CAN BE IMPLorED IN DIR~CT OPI!ATIONAL ROLES AT TI~tS. ; J"S!U!~ IT ~.'252 o I. ~ :~ z ~ z = g 2 ~

176

177 RR RUOMHR DE RUQMGU ' ZNY CCCCC ZZP. a OU420Z OCT 79 am AME~EASSY ANXARA TO RUEHC!SECSTATE WASHoe 8S07 INFO RUMJGM/AMEMB~SSY COLOMBO 132 au!~jdx/amf.hbassy DACCA 20.8 RtlSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3821 RUXOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 132 RUSBLY/AMEMBASSY XABUL ~840 RUEHMO!AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1468 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1609 RUQMIlR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6160 RUEHDT/USMiSSION USUN NYJ878 BT CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA 7248 E.O : CDS 10/1/85 ( XUX. DENNIS), OR-P TACE: HOPS, PP,PR, TU, AP, UR, PX SUBJ: (C) TURKISH VIEWS ON OSSR-AFGRANISTANsFOLLOW-UP REF: CA) STATE ,rS) STATE ,(C) ANKARA (C) - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE ( SEE PARA 7). 3. SUMMARY: POLOFF FOLLOWED UP ~r(c) DEMARCHE WITH WORKING-LEVEL MFA OFPICER WHO RXD SERVED IN AFGHANISTAN nuring THE TARAXI REVOLUTION. TilE OFFICIAL STATED THERE WAS SUPPORT WITHIN THE MFA FOR A TURKISH DEMARCHE TO:THE RUSSIANS,ON AFCBA_JS~AN. BOT'THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF A PUBLIC S~ATEMENT. ~RE TURKS WERE VERY INTERESTED IN.OTHER COUNTRIES' VIEWS ON AND RESPONSES TO THE SITUATION. THE MFA OFFICIAL SPEC ULATED ON POSSIBLE RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ETEM~ADI, RORMER AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN AND THE USSR, AS A REPLACEMENT FOR AMIN. END SUMMARY. 4. GOT-USSR DEMARCHE: MFA MIDDLE EAST SECTION CHIEF ALP KARAOSMANOGLU INFORMED EHBOFF (RICCIAR DONE) SEP'1'EUBER 28 THAT THERE WAS STRONG SUPPORT WITHIN THE MFA FOR AN UNPUBLICIZED DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, SINCE THE FONMIN WAS NOW IN Nr,W YORK, IT WOULD TAKE TIME BEFORE A FINAL DECISION WOULD BE TAXEN. IT WAS VERY UN ~~~~Y_HTA'1' THE GOT WOULD MAXE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. THE GOT WAS VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES' REPRESENTATIONS ( IF ANY)TO THE SOVIETS ON THE SUBJECT OF AFGHANrSTAN. KARAOSMANOGLU REACTED VERY POSITIVELY TO THE DEPARTMENT'S SEPTEMBER 19 PRESS STATEMENT AS A SIGN OF US INTEREST IN THE AFGHAN SITUATION. 105

178 (COMMENTI THROU~HTOUT THE CONVERSATIONKARAOSMAnOGLU HADE IT CLEAR THE GOT WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON INCREASED US INTEREST AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE rormer CENTO REGION ( SEE ANKARA 720] (NOTAL)L 5. USSR INTERVENTION: ~RAOSMANOGLU REITERATED THE GOT'S BELIEF TH'T THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT SEND MILITARY FC'CES INTO AFGRAN:STAN UNLESS A CRISIS DEVELOPED IN WHICH RUSSIAN LIVES BECAME THREATENED. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING ror ANOTBBR_RORSE~TO BACK IN VIEW OF AKIN'S NARROW ~ASE OF SUPPORT. THE TURKS BELIBVED THAT ETEM1XDr, FOR14ER AFGflAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW AWD LATER '1'0 ISLAMABAD, WOULD BE A LIKELY CANDICATE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE AT THE MOMENT TRYING TO GET IN ToaCH WITB HIM-. KARAOSMANOGLU SAID ETEHAADI HAD RETURNE~ TO ~ABOL FROM PAKISTAN THE DAY BEFORE THE TAKAKI COOP, AND HKS BEEN IN JAIL SINCE SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HE ADDED THAT ETEMAADI!lAD HAD EXCEL1.ENT RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND MIGHT HAVE HAD COJinc"Ts AMONG-ExT'iiMy-n" PARCHA"IST GROUPS IN EXILE IN MOS~O~.~RA ' OSMANOGLU ASKED FOR OOR VIEWS ON THESOBJECT OF ETEMAADI AS A SUCCESSOR TO AMIN. 6. MILITARY INSUBORDINATION INCIDENTI THE TURKS HAD BEARD THAT SOME 20 AFGHAN PILOTS HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN ASSIGNED THE MISSIon TO BOMB HERAT DURING THE TROUBLE THERE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. THE PILOTS DELIBERATELY DROPPED THEIR BOMBS OFFTARGET, RETURNED TO BASE, AND WERE REPLACED BY RUSSIAN PILOTS WHO BOMBED THE ASSIGNED TARGETS IN DOWNTOWN HERAT. THE AFGHAN PILOTS WE~E SUMMARILY EXECUTED FOR THEIR INSUBORDINATION. 7. ACTION REQUESTED: PER PARA 5 EMBASSY WOOLD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S EMBASSY EABUL'S COMMENT ON TURKISH VIEW THAT SOU lets MAY BE CORSIDERING ETEMAADI AS POSSIBLE REPLACEME»T FOR AMIN. SPIERS BT '7248 IOE

179 _...~~. MEMORANDUM CHRON FILE 5709 r\r-(,- -CONF IPENT IAL NATIONAL SECURI,ty COUNCIL October 2, 1979 INFORMATION ME."IORANDOM FROM: SUBJECT: FOR: DAVID AARON THOMAS THO~ Soviet-Afghan Contingency Planning (C 1 A week ago you asked where the contingency plan was for responding to a possible Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. You asked for something by last Tuesday. (Cl State has dragged its feet considerably on this and the best that they could come up with by end of last week was the attached outline. They tell me that they will have a fully fleshed out paper by the middle or end of this week. (U) This has not been a sterling perforjance. The pressure seems not quite so great, however, and I am inclined to let them have until the end of the week. In all fairness, the office that has to produce this has been under very great pressure on a variety of fronts -- including my demand that they get to work on a contingency plan for a Pak nuclear explosion. (C)..cOWi'IPENTIAL Original Classif. by Thomas Thornton Declassify on Oct. 2, 19B3 \ DEClASSIFIED I E.O Sec.3.6 Nu--li'\-U. ~l\il lw RE BV NARS. OATE~

180 ~" _.:c-.-,......_ ~_...'......:-.:-: =~ _. -..._.... r.. ~_~~~. : OUtiine for USG. ~~;.)~.-,. " :- "'...: ". I.7":' Incremental Expansion of Sovj.et mili.tar)" Role -. ~_~-_. _ ~ Equipment and Advisers :=:.._.=:.. -==-...:: ~ ' _..- --'" ~:~. Diplomatic Responses -_: _:.: _..._ COnsultations ~--_. ",,' ~.;.",... ~... ~.'.:.::.. ~. ~---_._- t-.:=;:.....~- ;.::.. r =.:::t~-:=::-='.~..::.-i:=..:.:...~c. f..- - _...~--- B. t Response Paeer to Soviet Options a. with Regional Countries b. with Allies c. Stimulate consultations among others (1) South Asians (2) Iran - India (3) Other Moslem and Third World countries 2. Further Reductions in Kabul Staff Publicity 1. VOA 2. Press Backgrounders Military - None Encourage others to discuss human rights UNHCR Refugee program ---- ~ ~:::::::::: ~~.... :c. ~D Extensive diplomatic consultations - seek expressions of concern publicly and to Soviets COnsider break in diplomatic relations Publicity _ _-- ~, ,...---_._-. ~: -_ ~, _ DECLASSIFIED E.Q.12S53. ~ ~.\MlE ll'-l-:t-<52-- :~~S.OATE~ I'

181 ~..~..-.. ~_ ~,- :.-. '_-. b P. International Fora - Encourage reqional st.ates ~-.=:.~ to raise in Security Council/URGA context G. Talks with Paks under 1959 bilateral with attendant publicity 111. Massive Combat Role A. Diplomatic Consultations - seek' condemnations. Test Indian willingness to reassure Pakistan militarily ' -- B. Breaking of Dip Relations with Kabul - - C. Publicity ~. o. Military - fleet movements, tacair deployment to Pakistan E. International Fora - Secu~ity Councilor UNGA to address i. -_.._-_.- II

182 I

183 NNNWV E.SA68TPUC62f'1 pp RUliI'ltft DE RUSBL K II I" Z NY CCCCC ZZ H P R Z ocr 79 Fl'! AIIi[I'IBASSY KABtL r I, U TC RUEKClSECSrAT WASK)C PRICIlITY 586" ojj... INfO RU'lJPG/APlEPIBASSY BEIJING 785 R US3W IArt,EJl\BASSY ISlAPlA8AD 9~91 R tj) MRB/AI'IEI'IBASSY BEL~ PDt 199 RUt)"IR AIAPlEI'lBASSY J IDD A.UJ5 R ldt C/AI'IEI'IBASSY LOmON 1839 R UEHr:O/APlEMBASSY 1II0SCOW 1958 R USBAilAPlEI'IBASSY NEW DElHI 7478 R UfN PSI AMEI'IBASSY PARIS 3305 R U~Ifl/AI'IEl'IBASSY TE~AN R Cl{ ~HQA/ CI NCPAC ST C Q NFl DEN T I A L SEerION 1 OF' 2 KABUl (EX ) CINCPAC AlSO ror POLAD E X DIS CHARGE CHRN 11:: : RDS-I lel-2-99 eflat IN, BRUCE A.) OR-/'i TAGS: PEPR PGOV PINS AF' UR YP PUR:;! SlIBJ: ce) AF'GHANIsrAN S APlIN ROUP: LOC YUGOSLAV AND SaVIn VIEWS I. ce-entire TEX'i') 2. SlJIIIlIARY: ACCORDING TO 1M : YUGOSlAV AMBASSADOR AT KABUl., THE SOVIETS WERE AWARE OF' A DEVELOPING TENSION BECHIE~ AF'GHANIsrAN S F~l'IER PRESIDENT NOOR P10HAMMAD TARAKI AND FlHjWjE IHHISTER HAFIZUllAH Al'IIN FOR "SEVERAl 1II0NTHS" BEF(JfE THE P1ID-SEPt' PIBER ausis THAT LED TO Al'IIN S VIOLENT TAKE OVER OF fill POWER. THE SOVIETS DISQ.AII'I ANY f"ooekhow LEDGE OF THE COUP ITSElF', HOWEVER. P10SCOW APPEARS TO BE IiIILLING to WORK WITH AMIN, NO~ THAT H~ HAS PRESEtoiTED THE SOVIETS WITH A FAIT ACCOl':PLI. EM> OF SUMMARY. 2. REQUESTING ABSOLUTE PROTECTION AS A SOURCE, YUGOSLAV Al"BA SSADOR BOGDAN 1'1ALBASIC BR IEF'ED THE AIDCI'! ON SEPTEMBER ~~ ABOur A RE'CENT CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH SOVIET Al'lB ASSADOR ALEX A ti) ER M. PUZANOV CONCER HI Ne; HAfIZ ULLAH AMI N S film-september COUP D"ET AT. CMALBASIC EX P'1" AI NED THAT HE OCCASIONALl Y HAS LONG CHATS WITH PUZANOV, AM) HAS FOUND HIM RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING IN SUCH SESSIONS. PUZANOV PRO FESSES A CONTINUING FRIENDLY INTEREST IN YUGOSLAVIA, ~"HERE HE ~ERVED FOR SEVER AL YEAR 5.) 1::)'1

184 4. ACCORDING TO MAlBASIC, PUZANOV PROVIDED THE Fa-LOWING BACKGROUND TO THE DR AM AT IC PO\'ER SIR UGGl.E WITHIN THE l(halqi HIERARCHYO THE SOVIET AflIBASSAOOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD BE~N INVOLVED TO A CERTAIN EXTENT -- BUT WAS -SCILL NOT CER TA Itt- ABOUT AlL THE EVENtS HTAT HAD ATTEhOED Al'IlN' STAKE. OVER. HE D ISQ.AIMED ANY FOO EKNOWLEDGE OF THE VIOLENT SEPTEflIBER 14 CON~ONTATION, AND OBSERVED THAT THIS SURPRISE.DEVELOPl'lENT CAUGHT THE LOCAl SOVIET COMMUNITY WITHOUT ADE QUATE SECllHTY PRECAUTIONS. (NOTEt AMERICAN OFFICERS SCOUTING AROUN) KABUL THAT DAY WHO HAD NOTED INCREASIIIG NUI'IBERS OF AFGP.AN SOLDIERS Ati> POLICE IN THE STREETS, DID OB~EHVE THAT RUSSIAN DEPEN>ENTS WERE flioving ABOUT NOR" AlLY, AND THAT SOVIET HOUSING AHEAS DlD NOT HAVE Ar~Y OBVIOUS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.) 5. PUZANOV TOLD I'IALBASIC THAT THE STRAHl BETWEEN FORMER PRESIDENT TARAXI AN) AI'IIN HAD BEEN INCREASING OVER THE 'PAS~ SEVERAl. MONTHS. PUZANOV WAS auneal OF TARAKZOS CULT OF29",3-HD IVIDUAL - PUFFER Y -- Atll CITED TARAKI'S' UNWILLI NG NESS TO PASS THE FULL RANGE OF PRII'IE I'IINISTERIAl. POWERS OVER TO AMIN WHEN THE LATTER WAS QESIGNATED AS -FIRST MIN ISTER.- PUZANOV tloted, FOR INSIA'NCE, THAT TARAKI CONTIN- UED TO CHAIR SESSIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF' fliinisters -- AND THIS GREATLY ANNOYED AI'IIt~.. 6. PIIlANOV RECALLED THAT THE CLRRENT al!sis SfART ED AFTER l'arak1's RETURN FHOI'! HAVANA AND fli0scow ON SEPTErlBER 11. AT A SEPTEI'lBER 12 CABINET SESSION, APlIN -INDICATED 'THE' NEED FOR CABINET CHANGES -- I.E., THAT 11IINIsrER 01: IN- TER lor P10HAl'lI'lAD ASLAM WATANJAR.. MINIstER OF FRONTIER AFFAIRS StiER JAN flialpooryar, AN) fliinizleveof COPIMUNICATIOIl1S SAYED' MOHAI'lMAD GlLABZOI.BE RE;,PLACED II'IMED IATELY. TARAKI OBJECTED, TAKING ISSUE WITH AI'! I NOPErt.Y. 7. ACCORDING TO PUZANOV'S ACCOUNT, -THE' QUARREL CONTINIJED ON SEPl" EI'lBER 1.3,- AN) CAI'lE TO A HEAD ON SEPTEMBER 14, WHEN AMIN WEfo.7 AHEAD WI1H AN ANNOtlNCEMENT ABOUT' THE CABItiET CHANGES. TARAKI '"CALLED AJIIIN OVER'" TO DISCUSS THAT ACT- AW THE GUNfIGHT ENSUED PUZANOV SAID.THAT HE HAD HAD -TWO MEETINGS \HTH THE: KHAl..(H LEADERSHIP DURING THESE CRITICAL DAYS. PoE DID..NO! GIVE ANY DETAILS ABOUI' THE FIRST. THE SECOND WAS THE JIIORNING SESSION HE HAD WITH ifllin ON SEPTE:MBER 15, THE DAY BEFORE THE LATTER WAS DESIGNATED AS TARAKIoS SUCCESSOR. CNOTE: T HIS!'lEET! NG WAS R[PORTED BY THE PRESS). BT "72~ 1 Ie"., I

185 ~HNNaKa"v ESA7I1lZPlJC674 pp RU~tfl DE R USBL K 17281/ ~~ ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZOCliS i 1 j I, P R B21059Z Oflll 79 fir. AMEP\8ASSY KABlL TO RUEIiC/SEcsrATE WASHOe PRHJUTY ~861 INFO RU'lJPGAXAI"IEPlSASSY BEIJING 8786 R USBQ)I AI'IEMBASSY lsi. AI'lABAD 9392 RW IftB/ArlEMBASSY BELGRADE 0200 R UQi'lRA/APlEl'IBASSY JIDDA f\4s6 R LDTC/AMErlBASSY LON>ON ([{HI RUEHrlO/ArlUIBASSY PlOSCOW 1959 RUSBAE/Al'IEI'IBASSY NEW DELHI RUF'NPSI AI'lENBASSY PAR IS 3:S 06 R U,"~ IAMEMBASSY TEtflAIiI Q!) 32 R UH~HQA/CINCPAC BT CON F" IDE iii T I A L SECT ION 2 Of 2 KABUL 7281 :XD IS t. MALBAS1C li,;d rhe IMPRESSION F'RQtlI HIS TALI< lliith PUZANO\i THAT THE SOVIETS F'OUfIl THEPlSELVES COMPELLED TO ACCOI'lI'lOOATE THEIR AFGHAN POLlCY TO AI'IIN'S FAIT ACCOfllPLI. AlTHOUGH THEY DID NOT I til ICATE GREAT ENTHUSIASM. WHEN HE C()II)f!iENTED TO Pl!:ANOV ABOUT MIN'S WEAK POINTS, SUCH AS HIS BAD PUBLIC JI'lAGE. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR JlEf\.IED. -AfI1IN IS STRONG AND WELL-ORGANIZED. OF CO~ SE, HE HAS SOPlE FAULTS. BUT WHAT LEAD EH DOESN"n- 9. INTEREST INGlY ENOUGH. PUZANOV WENT ON TO COPIPLIf'lENT THE FIRED WATAtWAR AS -A GUeD "AN.- (NOTE's - FREQUENTLY HEPRD POST-COUP RU'I~S PORTRAYED VATANJAR AS HAVING SOUGHT AS'tlUl'l IN THE SOVIET EflIBASSY -- AND THE INDIAN EPlBASSY BELIEVES THAT PUZANOV HAD TR led TO INTEltCEDE IN BEHAlF OF WATANJAR AN> THE OTHER FIRED P1ILITARY PlUISTERS ON SEPTEPIBER 14.) 10. MAlSASIC GOT THE STRONG II'IPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD EXTRACTED CERTAIN CONCESSIONS FR(JlI AlliIN IN EXCHANGE FOR THEIR POST-COUP SUPPORT. ttl THOUGHT. fat EXAI'IPLE, THAT THE SOVIETS HAD INSISTED THAT TARAKI BE KEPI' ALIVE. MAlBASIC OBSERVED THAT AMI N IS NOW COl'1PLETa Y DEPEtI>ENT UPON THE SOY lets -- AM) -MUST PAY THE fir ICE fi1alba-sic OPINED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOli Ef{)E~,VOR TO MA KE AJWi I N -MORE PAL AT ABL E- AS A LEAD ER. FAILI NG T HI S THEY MIGKI' CONSIDER THE ALTEHNATIVES SHOOT OF DIRECT MILITARY H.7ERVH7ION, SUCH AS A QUICK COUP D"ETAT BY THE: -AFGHAN" ARl-iED FORCES" HE DID NOT RlLE OUT AN EVENTUAL RESORT TO THE USE OF SOVIET COMBAT Foo CES. HOWEVER -- BUT THOUGHT IT RATHER UNL IKEL Y THAT THAT EXTREME STEP ""OUlD BECOME NECESSARY

186 12. COMMENT: PJM.9ASIC'S ACCOUNT SQUARES IN GENERAL WITH THE KEY ELEMENTS Of VERSIONS HEARD fr()iii OTHER REASONABLY RELIABLE SOLR CES. AS CAN BE EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THE KABUl RU"~ RILL HAS ~ 00 uee» A GR EAT VAR let Y Of ACCOUNTS. I'IOST STOR IES BEGIN WITH TARAKI'S SEPTD18ER 9-10 TALKS WITH BREZHNEV IN MOSCOW. SOI'lE SAY HE WAS THEN rold 8Y THE SOVIET LEADERS THAT HE WAS FIll SliED -- BUT THAT SOMBER NEWS WOULD BE DIFfICULT TO LINK WITH APlIN'S BUOYANT DEMEANCIf WHEN HE RETlRRED TO KABUL ON SEPrEI'IBER 11. OTHERS SAY THAT BREZHNEV TOLD HIP! TO GET R m OF APlIN -- AM) THAT HE MUfFED THE JOB. THIS EltBASSY IS INa. I NED TO FAVCR THE VIEW THAT THE COPIING LEADERSHIP CfUNCH WAS NOT DISCUSSED AT ALL IN MOSCOW -- Al() THAT TARAKI FIRST CONFRONI'ED IT UPON HIS REltH N. <INCIDENTALLY, WATANJAR WAS THE SECON>-RAN1<ING MAN IN HIS AIRPORT WaCOPIING PARTY--SI'ANDING NgXT TO AMIN.> 13. AS FOR PUlA NOV' S O~N ROLE, THE INDIAN EI'IBASSY VERSION, TO WKICH REFERENCE WAS MADE IN A FmEGOING PARA~APH N EVEN HAS AN ARMED PUZANOV PARTICIPATING IN THE SEPTEPIBER 14 SHOOTour AT THE HOUSE CF' THE PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT THIS. WE. DO THINK IT ~OBASLE: THAT PUZANOV AT SOI'lE POINT PlIGHT HAVE TR led TO INTERVENE IN BEHALF' OF' THE ~ATANJAR GROUP -- AS HIS POST-COUP CQP:MENT TO MALBASIC INDICATES. 14. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A FEW LOCAL OBSERVERS WHO THINK THAT THE SOVIETS OPr FOR TTA -IRON F'IST- (1N THIS CASE, APlIN) SOLUTION WHENEVER THERE IS A TOUGH PROeLEM TO BE LICKED (E.G., THE emrent AFGHAN INS~RECT ION>. WE ARE INCl.I NED BELIEVE Tt\AT THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY NOT COMPLETELY IN TO THE PTCTtRE AS THEIR VIOLENT. DIFFICULT-TO-CONTROL HALQI Q.IENI'S SI'AGED THEIR UTERNAL CONrnONTATION. LIKE SCORPIONS IN A JAR. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF' RUSSIAN WOPIEN AND CHILDREN IN PUBLIC A..ACES AT KABUL DURING THE DSVE:.LOPIHG SEPTEMBER 14 ausis, AS WELL AS THE CONTINUING SOVIET MEDIA PLAY OF' TARAKI'S floscov VISIT AFTER AlIlIN'S SEPTEflIBER 16 TAKEOVER, WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED BY EPIBASSY 1lI0SCOV AND FBIS, IM>ICATE T}tAT T}tE SOVIETS VERE PERT QS U()EED SURPRISED.3D 15. PUZANOV APPEAREsro HAVE FAILED I N AN ATTEIlIPT TO KEEP STABLE THE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT HERE. BECAUSE PUZANOV WAS On'EN REPORTED TO HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN AT SERIOUS ODDS WITH AlliIN 0 lr ING THE PAST YEAR, THE LOCAL DIPLOMATIC COlllPlllfUTY IS ROSSIPING ABOUT HIS CONTINUED TENURE HERE. AN AFCYA'N SOlRCE. WHO HAS BEEN USUALLY RELIABLE IN THE PAST, TOLD THE A/DQlJ ON SEPI'EflIBER 27 THAT MOSCOW HAZ REQUESTED AGREI'IENT FOR Pl!ZANOV'S SUCCESSOR. THE SOlfiCE DID NOT HAVE THE NAPIE. END COMI'IENT. APIsr UTZ 9T n

187 \ NHNNf' ESB056MJC416 RR RUQMBR DE ROSELl '731~ ZNT CCCCC ZZH R Z OCT 79 1M AMEMBASSY (ABUt TO SECSTATE WASEDC 5878 INfO RUSBQD/AMEI'1BASST ISLAMABAD 939B RUEBI'10/AMEI'1BAS T r.o~cow 1961 RUS!AE/AMEMBAS~T NE~ ~ELRI 7463 RUQHHR/AMII'1BASSY TEHRAN 534 1lT C 0 ~ rid E N T I A L K~B"L 731~ ~ c~~, E.O.12065: 'G~S Ul/3/95 (AMSTUTZ, J. BhUCE) or-:,,\ TAGS: PINT H UR SUf:SOVIET OFFICIAL COMMEN~S ON STATUS OF TAPA!I A~D T5L ~ PURGED I'1ILIfARY O ficlr CABINET MlhISTERS ~ 1. '(C-ENTIRE ~FX!) CH" ~'11 HON Rf 2. SUMMARY. A SOVIET E~~ASSY OFFICIAL DESCRIBES TARA:'I AS BIIMG HELD! PRISONER ALONE IN THE PEOPLF'S PALACr. COMPL T.. AND THAT TARAKi ALONG ~ITE THE TBkE R~CEN~Ll PURGED MINIST1RS (_ATANJAR, entaizo! ANC MAZDOOkrAR) EAVE BEE~ EIPELL~D FROM THE PARTY. END Sr~MAAY. 3. AT 1dE AIRPORT TOLAY, I RAN INTO SOVIET COUNSELOi VILIJ~ ~. OSADCRIT, whn VAS IN rhe VIF LOUNGE (A RARE PRIVI~EGE) AWALTlkG IMBARCAT!O~ O~ AN AEROF101 FLIGBT TO MOSCO~. (Tii I~PORTANCl OF C5ADCHIY, A~D THAT OF rhi SOVIEt E~BASS~. 'AS OND~RtINED IY SIS BEING ALLOWED TO CSt THJ VIP LOON.E ror A 'ACAfION TRIP TO TEE USSR, WHICR PR VILEGE IS S'~"'ITHIHG DINUD TO MOST AMBASSADORS lice T WHEN THEY FIRST ARRIVE OR LEAiE PERMANENTLY.),. OSlDeBIY tias ALWAYS BEEA ONE or THE FRIEND:IEST kwl HOS! OPXN OF SOVIET OFFICIALS BERE, AND I SEIZED TgE OPPORTUNITY TO ASi HIM SJME QUtSTIO~S. HIS ANSwEhS VERI, I TBINK. WORTH RECORDING: TA~AKI IS BrING HELD A PR1SO~ER "ALONE" IN Tr. PtCrl~'S PALACE COMPLEX (WEERF. PRESIDF.NJ HAFIZOLLAH AMIN ALSO LI~:S); THE IMPLICATION BEINr, THAT HIS FAMI~T IS NOT with him. R~ 13 DtrI~ITILT A~IiE AND WAS ~CT ~OUN~ID BY ANI WEAPON. ~~EN I ASIED OSlDCHIY A~OUT A RuMOR TRAT TARAKi MIGHT SE ~OIN~ :J MOSCO~ fop MEDICA~!REAT~ENT, OSADCHI! REPLIED, "POSSIhLY LA~EP BUT NOT RIGHT ~~~ HE IG~ORED MY INQUIRY ABOUT TH~ F.IAC~ sra1e OF 'fara"'s BEALTH. _ ;:X-H1NISTERS WATAlJJAR, GULBZuI AtiD HUDOORYAR ARE AT LARGE, BUT OS4DCHIY ~RorIS~~D NOT TO KNC~ TH1IR ixa~t WBER~ABOUTS. HE SAID THERE 'AS A ROMOR fbat THEY H~L ESCAFL~,.0 A Ni:IGB1;Qif.INt} ':ODNTR!. lieitn I Isni' IF II'; MEANT TU; ~JnE,] UNIO~, HE CHUCKLED AND SAID: POSIfIVELT ~OT. If THE! ~A:, VE world NOT KEEP THAT A SECRET. AFTEEk ALL, ;~ ARE NO. DENYING THAT BABRAK ~AMAL I~ LI_ING IN PRAGU~." WHEI~ I OBSER'El' ThJiT '.1. FAIl JuST lieaii.d TEAT TAli!?l ;.s~ THE THREE EX-MINIS~f~S JAD tie~ EXPELLED rfo~ T3B?A~TY. OSADCPIY REF~IED. -THAT I~ CO?RECT. R 5. OSADCEJT SAID T!H:' lie ";AS :'OING ':'1) MO$COili FeR C0.. SU:. TATIONS ANr THEN F~~ A ~~~1a's HU:IJ!Y!~ T~r C~lMi~. ~E SAID F.~' ia~ W(JFN OUT APH ';3AT '!'l:f LOCAL :-':LITl ;g S~TC"TION EAr; ~AnL [I r li~li': DIFtICnT. P.;' WE SF:'..,,:I.L. EE SAiD SOF~Lr, ~E ~IVE~ ~~ow ~~A! :OMO~iO~ ~It: B~i~~ Brr.r. #."1STUTZ Dr r'7~hr; ~jj

188

189 e,. ~~Nt:VV F.f;I'~Il]IIIl" RunMNR ~E RC~HNA 16q27 ~U317~8 ZHY SSSSS ZZ & OC'T 79 FM USM:SSION USN~TO TO RDEHC/SEC:;TATF. WASIfDC rt1hf.oia'l'ej79s INFO ~OEH8'C/AMEHnASSY CANBE~RA 012] ~USBQD/hMF.MB~5SY ISLAM~8AD OOR4 RUSBLK/AMF.M~A~S\ KA~UL OO~l RU~H~O/A~E~BASSY MOSCOW 6~O' RDS8AE/AMEM8A!oSY t.;s.w DELHI,",(\,4 R~EHOT/AMEH&ASEY OTTAWA 3247 ~U"~HR/AM~MBASSY ~EKRA RUEHKO/AMEHBA SY TO~YO 0540 ROEHWL/AME~BASr.y WELLI!'lr.1'C'N 1)("8 lit ~SECRET USNATe 0(,927 LI~DIS E.C : RDS-: lo/l~/o~, rlitman, HAVK'~D) op-p 'rags: NATO. PEPT., PINS. "'.~'. UR, lis. S08.7C::'1': (5) SOVIET INTENTTI)N1' IN 1<F,;)-IANlS711tl REFS: (A) STl,'l'E (lli::-;nlito t>78':- I:H',,;\L), (Cl USNATO 55P2 (NOTAL) 1. ( - ENTIRE TEXT). 2. CURING OCTOBER 9 POLl'tIU 1, COMMITTEE MEETING, 'CANADIAN REP ~ADE POINTS CON711INgD PA~A ~ or REF B ( BEING REPEATED TO 07TAWA) RFGAROING CURqENT CANADIAN INCLINATION ':"0 F(lCtJ~ V.OqI: ON IM1>I.ICIITIONS OF ArGHA~ INSTABILITY FOR FhKISTAN THAN ON LIKEI,IH 000 THAT THAT IHSTADILITY COULD PROVOKE DIRECT SOVI~T INTERVENTION IN APGH~NIST~N. WE HAD PRF.VIOU SI,y PROVI:lED CANADIAN REP 10>1 TH C'OMMF.Wl'S T~"NSMI TTED RE!" A AND RF.PEATE~ THI:M INRF.:;uO~lS.F. '1'(' CA~;,'D!i\IJ INTERVENTION IN POLi\DS. or.; BOTH OCC1\SIOllS. r;1\nad1.an REP REGISTERED OTTAWA'S I~TEREST IN RECEIVl~G FCR7HEr IN~(\R~1\'!'ION, ESrEC!ALLY CCNCERNIS... SOVII:-r MILITARY ACT!VITIES ~0RTH OF TilE ~jviet-.l\l"ghailbi)rl'e;:;. WHle,l MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN f.ea!'sessing Tilt CANr.DIll" ATTtTUDE TOt4ARDS A POSSIBLE APP" '",A': I: TO ':'11 SOVI TSASD WE NOTED THAT WE HAD MADE A STAUDING REnUE~T THAT WASH INGTON KF.EF U~uu-~O-D1\TF. IN THIS ~EGARD ( qer ':). 3. NETHERLANDS ~EP l'ep0?teo TO THE CC~~ITTEE OW A R~CENT CONVERSATION BETWEeN TilE DUTCH AMBASSAOOP IN ISLAMABAD AND THE LOCAL 7~S~ REPRESE~TAT!VE IN WHI~H THI: LATTER COMPLAINEI.l "'Hr.". lis ~H';'II TA~AY.I LE~(\~" HI!".. AMIN WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ADVICE AND HAS ~RESSTN~ RE~';)RMS IN A CRUDE ANf' HAl'TY WI\'iWIfICH EXA:': ;F.BA~I:;O nivisions WITHIN THE TRIBAL AFGHAN ~0CrFTY. THE A~~ASSAOOR, NETHERL~NDS REP ADDeD. INTERPRETED THESE REMARKS ~S POSSIBLY INDICATIVE O SHRINKING ~aviet BACKINr. FOR A~IN. GLITMAN. 8'1'. jl~927 1',;.

190

191 ~\~~-~ FS~~5lP~A~54?~ :- ~ O"'-t' ~~! ~S~~~ Z~V ~r~~:3 ~; ~-rfc.~~4;/?t 2~?~~5~!~y ~S~~S?Z~ l' ~:)2Q.~!" CC" 7'P ~w ~I~~~A1r ias1r~ r, ~r'~is/a~e~~asst al:i!~~ ~RIO~Ir! 1~~7 ih;~' ::: /A'1F"l~.'~ST,.j.: (P. ~ PHOllITY 1211?U~:~B/A~I~P~S~Y E~L;~A~~ g~!~r!ty ~'~7?J~',q/A~!~~J~SY B~CF~q~~T P!lO~I~Y '?3~ ~~r~~!c/)~r~~ts~t ~'\P~~~~ F~I~~ITY 3?l C ~ Rr"'J~~/A~t~aASS9 rolo~~o?d!~~itr 117~ ~ ~r'. '::' I.H~;:~1!A5H t.'~::a?':)!orj'!'y :~"flo l ::~~~~/A~r~BASSY J!~A~~A PRl;~!wy 53~5 ~ p.rqy:~/~yf.r.~as~! J!t~~ r1io~ity 173e ~ ':)~~~~r/a~!m~a!sv NIV '?t~i P~IORI:! 1E4~ e l'r~fc?/a~!"~a~sy T~:=~Af: P:tIOr.I'!'Y 5~~7' ~~!NJ/AYF~'~~5Y!~~'O?~I0~I~T 9~54 i ~g~;~~~~~i~i~~~;f;'~;l;~~~~~t~r~g;;ty 1332 ~ ~~~JP~/!MEYb!SSY ~:'IJI~G PPJ~~I~! a2e5 i ~cs~r~/h~e~~as5y I5LAM~B~D P~jC~!T! 7571 I!~MJ1 /!W~~?A5S! :.A!p~ArDO P3IDRI7Y?772 ~~F~~A/~SMIS~!O~ ~S~ATr ~3IC~IT! ~259 ; I"!fO ~US;L: /A~E: I~;.::n ~:;~~L illuoiuty ~i:'~.~ n~~~~c/a~f~pasz! ~C~:r.~ F~!C~:T! 73 c 4 RrE?!!:~S~12~IO~ '5C~ ~!~ YO~( 61P0 F.~~~~~/ CIN::FA:?~xJLnLU ~~~AII 43~Z!IT S I ~ ~ ~ ~ S~C:IO~ "1 O~?? ST~Tr /Z~ en: 3057 ~ CHARGE ECtoN CH~OM ~~.,,"C'... -;.." 1~/17/95 (COO~, JaN! A.), ~EA 1. (s - ~NTI~~ 7~!r) L. IN~ ~AS F?EPA~r~ 'OL~O~I~~ TI1~I~: FOI~T! ~N S~Vr!! AF~~3~ l~lat:o~~ AN~ ~01tiT TrVOLt~u~~T IN \;~7~~I!A~ ~Rr.'" of~!cr. ACnO!' ;.DDR~SSE::S ~AY H TPfIf\ ~iscli:.':'ro!; i>r.!4' IN COS-IN~IS: ~tsc1s~ion~ $ITE :051 ;OVE?~~~~:S ~~ SO~~~ INT!N~IO~~ IN A:G~A~lS~A~. T.r.ESE POINTS UPPLr"'ENT IN ~"'A~ION PROVID!~ p~ivior2:t IN cia-r?37,~. D!Tt~ AP 1 1., '27 >. 119

192 3. IURr~G TFE SI1 ~ONTFS PRrC~nI~~ Trr ~~FrM~Frr 1 -:~ A~I~ ~~'rovr~, ~~S=O, lmploy~d, S~FiE~ ~f P~LI:IC'L TACTICS TO DEAL ~IT~ ~ DETEhl0R~TING SI~~'TION IN IF;~'~ IS1A'I: u.) IT n~st TP.rr.:> TO Jl7ii~UAllE T~r 'rbai'!-,mii. l;g!'".; 'l':l ~ROAD~~!Tf BAS~ Or S"PP~R~ AN~ T~ ~~~;~A!; JT~ :0Ll:!;S. TFIS AnVICE ~fkt LAR~E~Y ~N~EIDEV. (p) ~O~ A tritr T~FRrArTr.~. ~OSCO. ~IS~A~C~D!T~f.LF sc~. WSAT r~o~ A~IN A~D TA~'KI AS INfIVlrUAL5. ~~II~ co~r:~~ju~ P~!LICLY TO rrp ORT T~F ArG~.N!~V~L~TI0~. ~ (C) r.o.(!ve!l. "OSC:)'" "Vi~'TUA~LY S~~'~S 'l'; ~..n :o~::;;:-::; ~ (l~o~t Ar~U5~)!~A~ ~qfni was ~o VIA5t~ A~Tr.~~ATIV~ :; ~ T~E ra~ayi/~min ~igl~t (~LT~~~G~ rq~~i FA~ Fli~ - SPEC~L'TION!~A7 ~O~CO~ INT~~DID TO B.. C.. ~;f ~~if ~:~=A!= ~ TAiLFI AGu~,:r A~4H;). S ~ ~ % I ~!~ ~~y ~'T1. i~~~ TARA:I?A~S~D TPROrrGR ~~SC). ~~?:::: EOM! F~O~ S~ ~AvaNA NA~ sn~~t; IN ~A~L! S~P~E~~~3. 'I~ MFETING ~ITr 3B~Z~~EV {l~ ~lv~h FFrD~IV! F~~LJCIT! 1 A F!~~!-TO-?A~T! C~~~~~~ r~a~ CA~? CLCS:: ~~A~ ~V~1 urrorf T0 e~=o~~izi~~ ~p~ PFCPL~'~ ~~~OCc;~~C ~L~-~ ~~ AiGB~~ISTA~ (?[PA) AS A C~M'I~1IS! P~;~T. : 4. DD~J~~ rqr SA~E ~I~-yr~7~ P?2IJ:. S~~I!~ F~I:71(:: =:F:Q!'T~ ~'-:ih ~-lphf"~r'~::' ll'r uti.i:'p! ':';.-,:: 'r!'"f!\!:~;h:\ O~ : j"drr ':1 ~.1TAtlY ~:~5':' ~.:!. I';C~L_3E- Te HOD': ~.~T~ '.J' ':"~'. I~:::'l~r~~ A).-r~:.~S,a'Jr.'.'1I!.I':'r 7 ~~Pt::~T p::r..'~" '::L. ~')rl~: ~!... :'... F' A'!J4C~ :~ ~J'i~ 7: :EI cai~ali~~ L~'!L I~ rf~ 'F}~~~ ~IL!:;~!. INC~!A~I~~L~. ~:r!~~ ~~ris!~5 ~'u~ ~A~Y~ JVSF F::-5 ~~;~ ~~C~ED ~I~I':~1v A)VI5C~~ O~~~. ~.~. 1\ ~C'1~~N~ ~r~~:i~~~ 4~: -?PG~m[D:Y!~ SOME CJ~BA~ r~~ctio~~ A5 ~'FLL. ','r? -:A"r. -O "EE"'. ~"(l ~f!.ia"l: r OIC4':'IO' '!J.a.~ 5 ' :n!!'t -;O"?C:-S : t\'t "~"TICIP~."'~i' It\ C~:'j'9t'l ;~o.i"~t l~~~!~?~t~ ~~ ~~ITS. ~OVI!~ ~~ A5IN~~5 ~3~~T Trr A~~~l~ SE~J~ITY SI~~~~IO\ 1~!r~ FA:~ JF :~ lssrr;~~:! A~D A~~! r:i~ie~ LED!?: 5~VtlTS ~O TJ. ~ :N SJV? PI"~CT SiCrRI~!?~SPorSI!ILI:I!S. I.~. ~T ~A~~A~ AI~!l5! ~'-r~! TF~o~ IS A FORCE OF 47: S~1,IET~ ":'ll~~i"';: ~~~7"lJ:Ett 111-1"'- (." FU":l-:- c: p~.';:-~ '.:ly ALL H'lY'P"'TO'''~ JccrT;l~l''':','I"'~'1r,T 'rl'j,t,c-:- 'H"~:;:: T:) "OSC:" PU~ DETAILS OF ~PAT H!ppr~!D RE~AIN ~~CL;AR. SOVIET '~!AS~ADOR PU7A~OV APPA~~N~L!!t?T I~!~"C3 :ITr EV~~7S AS!n~Y UNFOLDED. : ~:: f..t ~.' A ='= Iif 1::- r. I C' lj 0 F :W Cr., ':' P. :.: ~ I I:: ~'::::.!.~. ~.,=,,1. ~:;'~'F':' "'''D!&. CrTP:;~n I:> P"l.U:!7? :~,?6"I'~!:!.:,~~q? ATO':'i.-: ~,. qd r"~:j.l)'! 1;<-[1. 0V!l.:-?:-.C' :...!,,),,:~.:':: I \' I II AL "=:,.: ~:;:- J:- C:>,~ " ~ A ~ :' ~ ~ J: I 0 t~ S : J.a, '"! '\ I ~ ":l1:'rti~~:" 'f~ ":;'::;A I'~ P~~'fS lh.~ ~O:~-CC' vi';... U. :,;'":' SI: ::;:O '~';-y :=:,'n-'".::-;;p ";': P:i.:I:'7~t ~':FF:::::: ;'). :..: r... 'J -:- ~ I :v l' IT 1'3 LI':i:':' ~:T~ <")\lii:;.. D\IC:'dS ~::r..::cf'- 1', ;.. L':: I 17T,~ SFF:?V~~5 17 ~cf;~ :~~ I~ ~~~~ T ' 120

193 .e_ '. I MNNNVV ;: ~SA8"BRA~ 'PP Ruon,,' I DE RUEHC '''lh1/erl'8il~~ ZIlY CCCCC ZZ H P R 2.23'3Z.. ocr. n fit. SECSTATE' WASHOC TO RUSSQD/MEMflASSY ISL.HI".OlbAD PHIUIlITY 71tH OOJ~~B INFO RUMJPGlAMEMSASSY b~ijing 0J88 RUFHQL/~Y bonn 3~99 RUSBlIl/A)lEMBASSY KABUL 0270 ~ RUDl<IAKEMBASSY LONDON 0032 RUEHMOIAMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8189,RUSSA /AMEMBASSY NEW OElHI 1994 RUFNPSlAl'lEMBASSY PARI,S 1386 CHARGE RUQMHllIAI'IE.,BASSY TEHRAN' lj5. ECON BT'~'. RF COli F IDE N T I A 1: SECTION 01 OF 1:.4 STATE /01 CHRON. E. O. 1200, RDS-I,3 10/22199 (PECK, ROBERT A.)... TAGS." PEPR, AF, US, PK, IR, IN, UR, eh : I SUBJEcr, :US-PAK TALKS' REGIONAl. ISSUES....., R FERENCES, CA) STATE (B) STATE 2749)", I. CONfIDEUUAL - ENTIRE TEXT SUI'lMARY, OVER HALF OF THE FOkMAl. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PAI<ISTANI AND US DELEGATIONS OCT08EH IN WASHING- TON WAS DEVOTED TO REGIONAl. ISSUES. OUR ASSESSMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN'WERE QUITE S1l'ULAR, THOUGH THE PAKISTANIS I VIEWED THE'THREAT IN SOI'.EWHAT MOkE IMI1t:DIATE TERMS THAN DO WE. Tilt PAKISTANIS WERE FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT THE STATE OF THE CURRENT'RELATIONS WITH INDIA, but STILL CONSIDER INDIA TO BE PAKISTAN'S PRINCIPAL LONG-RANGI:: SECURITY THREAT, ON IRAN,SHAHI E"PHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTA&lISHING A ' FeRSONAL"'EiUATION WITH KHOl'lElNI AND INDICATED THAT. PAKISTAN JiAS TRYlIIB'lO" SAVE 'THE RCD IN THE FACE OF IRANIAN.. i J)PPOSlfIOIlJ.~TJlE~U' STRON~P REAHIRl'IED 'lls SUPPORT,FOR,. "PAKbUNI-SEC""ITYi1,BUT 4 WE INDICATf.D 'THAT' OUR ABILITY. TOt L EXPRESSltHlslSUPPORT~IN"PRACTlCAL TERMS WOULD REjlJAIN"CON~,I.,SI'RAINEDtASt'tOHqYAS OUR tdifferences OVER~ THE HUCl.,EAR 1 ISSUE.d WERE' UNRESOLVED. THE'US ALSO REAFF'IRl'I D'THAT IN/THE EVENT, PF AFGHAN AGGRESSION AGAINST PAKISTAN WE WOULD' CONSIDER THE'. I'" BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO BE RELEVANl,., (SEPTEL). i DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, CHINA ~THE INDIAN OCEAN!'LSO ~OVERED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAMS, END. SUMMARY.!.!".,,. 3. :THE FIRST DAY OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND. PAKISTANI DELEGATIONS AT THE DEPARTI'lENT (OCTOBER 16) WAS DEVOTED LARGELY TO REGIONAL ISSUES. ON THE PAKISTANI ' SIDE, THE DISCUSSION WAS LED BY FOR~IGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR AGHA SHAHI AND FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAHNAWAZ, WITH SOI'lE CONI'RIBUTIONS DY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, GU, GHLLAM JILANI KHAN. ON THE US SIDE THE SECRETARY LED ljff WITH AN OPENING STATEMENT CREnEL A) AND PARTICIPATED IN NUCH!IF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF US INTERESTS IN THE REGION. ~ 120 ~3218 f r.'4. AFGHANI STAN. THE TWO DELEGATIONS TRADED ASSESSI'IENTS OF THE INI'ERNAL AFGHAN SITUATION AND THE TTRE4T AFGHANISTAN POSED TO PAKISTANI SECURITY. SHAHI SAID THAT THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION HAD AFFECTED PAKISTAN PROFOUNDLY. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF AFGHANISTAN AS A BUFFER STATE HAl) DISAPPEARED, AND PAKISTAN FOUND ITSELF ILL-PREPARED AND ILL-ElilUIPPED TO PlEET THE MILITARY THREAT. PAKISTAN DID NOT LXPECT AN IMMEDIAT~ INVASION, BUT WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE LONG-TERM POTENTIAL FOR CROSS-BORDER SUBVERSION. 5. INI'ERNAL SITUATION. SHAHI SAID THAT THE MARXIST REGIME IN KABUL REMAINED OFF &ALANCE IN THE face OF THE CONI'INUING INSLHGENCY AND INTERNAL PARTY AND MILITARY DISSIDENCE. THE POLITICAl BASE OF THE REGII'IE WAS EVEN NARRWER FOLLOWING AMIN'S INTERNAL COUP. AT THE SAI'lE TIME, THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL HOLD Of THE SOVIET UNION ON AfGHANISTAN WAS STRONGER THAN EVER AND APPEARED TO BE GRWING. THE SOVIETS FOCUSED ON CONSOLIDATION Of THE REVOLUTION AND P,RSONALITIES DID NOT MATTER. SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV HAD RECENTLY WARNED DEPARTING PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR PlkACHA THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD NOW THINK SERIOUs..y ABOUT CHANGING ITS POLICIES TOWARD AFGHANISTAN SINe, THE USSR WAS DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE REVOLUTION. PUZANOV SAID THAT BY SPRING THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE CREATED A "NEW AFGHAN ARMY- THAT WOULD THEN BE IN A GOOD POSITION TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE INSURGENTS " SHAHI ARGUt;D THAt ONCE THE REGIME HAD CONSOLIDATED ITS POSITION, IT WOULD TURN ITS NEWLY ACQUIRED MILITARY CAP ABILITY AGAINST PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN VIEWED THE THREAT AS BEING ONE TO TWO YEAIiS OFF, DEPENDING ON THE PACE OF INTERNAL.CONSOLIDATION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TIME TO DO SOI'IETH~NG WAS NOW. " 1. THE PAKISTANIS INDICATED TI Y WERE EVEN MORE UNCOMFORT- ABl.E WITH AMIN'S ONE-liIAN.ILE THAN THEY HAD BEEN WITH THE., PREVIOUS REGIME., IJHILIi:;....;N HAD,MIIQE,$Pl'lE,.P~LICjSTATE-,I'IEHI' s, ; APPAREiaLY, AT,!,~OV 11:01' \IRQI.HG" REGA80ltHl\AdIESIRE.; FOR BETTER: RELATlONS, 1 : HAD;,u.SO\!Gl,YEN!CONTRARY. SIGNALS THE PAKISTANU 'HAD; BEEN. P{lRTICULARLY. CONCERHE~ BY.;THE: I PRESENCE OF., EXILED PUSHTUN: NATIONAl-1ST LU~ElhAJ"AL hi.;..,khattak AT A RECENT PUBLIC l'ieetlng IN:KABUL,ATWHICH KHATTAK WAS GIVEN EQUAL STATU!> WITH DIPLOMATIC ~EPRESENTA TIVES ASSEMBLED TO HEAR OF PLANS FOR A NEW CON:iTITUTION. SHAHNAWAZ CHARACTiRIZED THr: REGIl'IE AS A MIXTURE OF PUSHTUN CHAUVINISM AND IDEOLOGICAL MISSIONARY ZEAL, A COMBINATION ~ICH POSED A DOUBLE THREAT TO PAKISTANI INTERESTS BT 1790' 121

194 NNHNIJV E~A897bRA65~ PP RU(J'lHR" :. DE' RUEHC 11981/~ i1l ZNY CCCCC ZZH, P R f::4zj5.5z, ocr 19.1'\ St:CST ATE, WA~HCJC TO RUSUQD/AI'lEI'IBASSY I:,LII~lltiiAD PhiOkITY 7782 INFO RUMJPGI'~JE"BASSY 5~IJING 0389 RUFHOLIAMEMBASSY aonn J300 RUSBl IV AI'IEI'IBASSY KAIWl 1Il271 RUOTC/A~I'IBASSY london il0.505 RUEHI'lO/AMEMBASSY NOSCOW 8190 ',RUSBA l.aflei1bassy NEW Ot:lHI 1995 RUFNPSlAflEI18ASSY PARIS JlUQ\!~/AMEJ'lB~SSY TEHRAN 51,05 6 ;,, J 1'; ".. I'" t...,.-;,. ; ~ ;,.'r~:,~~~~i:~ :,E>N T I, A L ~CT ION 02 vf ki4 ST,AH'~?.?9~111~2 : :' I "',,,.. ::...,It.... 8~ THE~PAKISI'ANIS DID NOT PLACE MUCH HuP;:: INTHEJR DIf\.OI'lATIC DIALOGUE WITH AFGHANISTAN, BUT INlilCATED'THI::Y WOULD KEEP TRVlNe. :>HAHI SAID HE DID NOT KNOW 'WHETHEW T~ INVITAT{ON Tv HII'I TO VISIT KA"Ul WOULD be RENE~D. Itj'AtjYCAS ; THE DIALOGUE SEEM D NCIRE IN THE' AfGHAN','" "'INrERESI' THAN 'IN PAKIS7AN'S INTERI::~l. TH~ AFGHANS WANTEll TO!GJ:;T:PAKISI'AN TO FOflCE THil' ni::fugi::l::s flack ACROSS THE' fl, :BORDiR'(SHAHNAWAZ PRIVATt:lY SAID WHAT THE'AFGHAN~..IREAlLY \oianteii WAS THE XPl1.SIOI~ OF 1tc.t.EL li::ailt:rs,. AND IoIErlE,',NOT PREPARED TQ TALK ~iriously A~(JUT ANY OTHt:H ISSUES. THEIR "I PURPOSE WAS TWO-f OLD.' FIRST, THl::Y WOULIl bt': letter AalE -TO COPE WITH TH ' 1NSUkGC:NCY If THl:: PAKISTANI HEFUGE' WAS ~UNAVAIlA~L&::;AND,!;ECONDly,;THI:;Y'WANTlD TO CRt':ATE A; '.,,' SITUATION 'IN 'WHICHTHty COULD AGAItl POSE, AS THE'; CHAMPIONS OF',PUSHlUN NATIOtJALISI'I. 'IF THEY COULD FORCE PAUSTAN:TO ABANDON THe: kefugees, PAKI!iTAN WOULD ill:: DIl:iChI::DlTED AND THE DRA WOULD HAVE A b&:.ttl::h LONG-HANGE CHANCE TO RAllY THE TRIBES TO THEIn SIDE, 'l"",i~;..,,~~;,,',.,j' I. 3i19~'ITTHr:~SECREtAhY"ASKED 'IF 'PAKISI'AN SAW THI:: DANGt':R FROM -AFGHAN'ISlAN AS'oili.or,lONG-RUN SUUVI::RSION OR1DIRECT:, "" 'MlLITAHY'\AGGRI SSION JSHAin Rli:PlIEDI THAl" flothi WERE' AI :ii...;; CONC~R N~~BUT""'ENT"O~T('01 SCUSS PHl11ARIl Y THf:ISUflVERSIVE THREAT '1$ THEnArGHANs~il,Hl:: SAID, Wk:HE, GI VING' UP, ON' THE"I -:, Q..DER;GENERATION or~pusht ln NATIONALISTS ANIl'.WERE' CorPI' ' :C HTRATING ON A YOUNGli:k' GENERATION OF PUsHTUN~~ AND. f1aluchis IIHO WERE SHOIIING tlarxisi' TENDENCIES'- THE INTEllECTUAL,'SUBIIERSION, OF THI:. PAKISTANI' PEOPLE WAS ALREADY SHOWING ; 1 SOI'IE SIGNS OF SUCCESS, AND NANY PAKI~TANIS WERE SHIFTING 'THEIR, ATTITUDES Tl)JARD AFGHANISTAN. WHEN THE AFGHAN COUP FIRST OCCURRED, THERt:',\;AS BHOAD!;;UPPuHT IN PAKISTAN' FOR l'ieasuhes TO Ht:LP THE Rc:rUG&::t':s AND ASSIST THE INSURGENTS. I'IANY PAKISI'ANIS WEllE NOW COMING AROUNll TO THE VIEW THAT,~, ~ ;"; f i l I I I AFGHANISI'AN -- Arm TH;:;!;;OVIHS THROUGH AFGHANISTAN - NEEDED TO be ACCOMMO~AT&::D- SiNCE PAKISTAN HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ACQUIRI:': ADEQUATt: (lutside suppor,t. SOI'lE PAKISTANI TRIflESl1iN AkGUiD THAT IT WAS PAKISTAN'S DUTY TO FIGHT THE ANTI-I9.AIHC AND NARXIST Rt:GINE IN KABUL aut, IF THE GOP WAS TOCI AflfAID OF THE RUS~lIlNS TO 00 SO, THEN PAKISTAN SHOUll) ('IAKE lt~ PEACE WITH TIlE SOVIET UNION. PAKISI'ANI leadi:.kti IIOIlRIED THAT, If AFGHANISTAN PUT PR~SsIJRE ON PAKISI'AN IN THI:': PRESENT SITUATION (E.G.,!iY' A POLICY OF HOT PUHSUIT ACROSS THE BORDERS, DISI'HIBUTION OF ARMS IN BALUCHISTAN OR PROVllKING AN I NSURGl::NCY>, PAKISTAN WOULD BE IN A VERY DHFICUl.T POSITION. " " ~ ":....,. 10.' ASKED IF PAKISTAN ANTICIPATED THE DIRECT :PARTICIPATION OF SOVIt:T TROOPS IN PUTTING DOWN THE INSURGt:NCY, SHAHNAWAZ SAID HE COULD NOT GIVt:: A CATC:GORICl\l ANSWER. THE: 'SOYIETS a.e:arly WOULD GIVt': WHATI:,Vt:k ASSI~iANCt:: \oias NECESSARY TO A5'GHANISI'AN, INCLUDING MILITARY AID~ " 1 THOUGHT THEY.. ~g~~~o~~y A1g ~~~~1aiH~or:~~IC ~~~~O~FO~~i~~{~~ ~~go:~lq, ' EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF SOVIET Ct:NTltAl ASIAN TROOPS MINGLED IN WITH AFGHANS, SHAHNAWAZ,oaSC:RVED THAT THE' SOVIETS HAD THIS CAPAlliLITY. Ii. THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIt':T UNI(,N WOULD USE CUclANS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THEY HAD THEIR OWN CI::NTRAL ASIAN ThOOPS TO [);(AW ON IIHO WERE CULTURALl Y MORI:: ASSIMIl AflLl. ' :!' II. ASKED If THt: PAKISIANIS SAW CHINA AS PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE,IN CONTAINING GROWING SOVIET INFlUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, SHAHI SAID THi::Y,DID NvT. THEY'HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TALKED WITH THE CHINESE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, flut THE CHINESE Fill BACK ON AN IDEtllOGICAL ANALYSIS FROM WHICH THEY CONCLUDED THAT THt': AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD l1.timately BE VICTORIOUS. THE CHINC:SE HAD ADOPTl::D A HANDS-OFF POLICY. THt':RI:: WERE ALLEGATIONS THAT THL:: INSURGENTS WERE!fECEIVING ARPIS FRllM THI:: CHINESE, &UT PAKISTAN HAD NO EVIDENCE OF THIS. '. ' 12. INDIAI ThE t:xcilange ON INDIA CONTAINED NO ~UIlPRHjE.:;. THE PAKISTANIS VOICED FAMILIAR CONCERNS ABOUT LONG-IIANGE INDIAN INTENTIONS AND INDICATED'THAT 'TH~Y' CONTINUE TO CONSIDER: INDIA'THt':P,UNCIPAl 'TMEAT Tll 'PAKISTANI SECURITY, DESPITE THE INNEDIACY OF THEIR PROBLEMS WITH' AFGHANISTAN 'SHAHf' NOTED THAT PAKI~\AN'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA\lEkE /'lore -TENSION-f'HEE- THAN'AT'ANY'TlML::' IN THE'PA::;T. "THt.Y " GAVE CONSIDERABLE CRt:DJf TO FORMER PR 1111:: I'll NI STEil' Dt':SAI, AND \oiere PARTlCl1.ARLY t",eciative OF DESAI HAVING STOOD UP TO BREZHNEV AND i<oln'..,j IN MOSCOW BY REFUSING TO PUT PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN OVER AFGHANISTAN. HilS \oias, SHAHI SAID, A "HEALTHY DEVi::lOPMt:NT-. HIE PAKISTANIS NONETHELESS EXPRESSED CON;IDEHABlE ANXIETY Rt:OAhDING THE POLICIES WHICH ~I1GHT BE PURSUEll BY WHAIEVEIf INDIAN COV!'RNPlt:NT Wt"lJLO EMER GE FH OM THI:: N~XT ELECT I ON. I t 14. SHAHNAWAZ l:iaid THAT PAKISTAN HAD TRIED PAhllCULAhlY HAIIO IN flecent 110NrH:i TO KE P RELATIONS WITH INDIA Ali SAT Ii[' l7~itj 1 -. e--- _ lzz 123

195 NNIIIIIISKAW ~. ;.I;J. { "I ; I'. ~,,,- DB ESAS'5BRA'4S PI' RUQIIHR.. D RUEHC I1!HU/~ Z NY, CCCCC zz: H USIil163 ', P R, UU'U' ocr n. f)'i secstate WASHOC TO RUsaQll/Al'l I'I8ASSY 19 AI'IABAD PRIORITY INFO RUltJPGlAI'IEI'IG/lSSY :IJING 63!1lil RUFHOL/AKEMBASSY aon~.~el RUSBLKlAMEi1IiASSY KABUL 0272 RUDTClAtlEMBASSY LONDON 083" RUEH~O/AME~BASSY MOSCOW 81'1 RUSBAE/AftEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1!Il9' RUFNPSlAM MBASSY PARIS 1388 RUQtHR/AtlEMBASSY TEHRAN' 1,)7, ~O N F~I"D E'N T i AL SECTION 83 OF 04 STATE 21uei/ THE PAKlSfANIS DEVELOPED THE THEME THAT THEY HAD HAD Fl1.L' AND. fratik DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN OFfICIALS ON TilE NUCLEAR QUESTION ANti THAT INDIA ACCEPT~D PAKISTANI A~SlJRANCES OF PEACLFUL 1HTENT AT FACE VALUE. SHAHI R~COUNTED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN FOREIGN ~INISTER PlISHRA IN BOTH HAVANA AND NEW YORK IN WHICH SHAHI OFFEkED TO GIVE WHATI:.VER ASSUHANCES INDIA MIGHT ~EQUIRE IF INDIA HAD DOUBTS REGAIiDING THE NATURE OF PAKISTAN'S PROGRAM. SHAHI SAID HE ALSO I::XPRESSED CONCERN OVt:R CHARAN SINGH S I\ED FORT SJ AUMENT. I'll SHRA REPCJRTEDL Y REPLIED THAT THIS HAD ElEEN MADE; IN THt: HYPOTHETICAL CONTI::XT OF' A PAKUiTAHl NUCLEAR W AP(,NS PIl011RAM, SHAHI INDICATED THAT l'iishra WAS SATISFIEo BY PAKISCANI AS!iURANCE~. 124.' ~..~ ~... ISFACI'oR'Y AS POSSUI1..E IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHAN ISfAN.' HE NOTLD THAT, DURIIIIG HIS VISIT TO NEW DEL.HI IN MAY, HE HAD CONDUCTED PAKISTAN'S FIRST WIDE-RANGING.. EXCHANGE OF VJEWS WITH INDIAN OFFICIALS. ON AFGHANISTAN, " HE HAD FOUND THE INDIANS EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN EXPRESSING," THEMSELVES, POSSIBLY OUT OF FEAR THAT THEIR VIEWS WOUL.D GET BACK TO THt: SOVIETS, SHAHNAWAZ SPECULATED THAT THE INDIANS ARE PRO&ABl.Y CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGt:R WHICH I " SOVIET ADVANCES IN AFGHANISTAN POSES FOR INDIA ITSELF AND. CANNOT BE PlEASED THAT AFGHANISTAN IS NO LONGER A BUFFER SJATE. THESE CONCUlNS, HOWEVER, HAD NOT REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE INDIANS WOULD ADI'IIT THEM OPENLY. NONETHELESS, ' PA~'S EXCHANGE OF VIEwS WITH INDIA ON THIS ISSUE MAY HA~D SONE IflPAcr, ASKED IF THE INDIANS HAD AT ANY TIME EXPRESSED THEIR CONCEIINS TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT AFqHANISIAN, SHAHNAWAZ SAID HE THOUGHT THEY HAD NOT, BUT THAT,THEY,HAD, Dt:MONSTRATED THIS CONCERN BY RESISTING SOVIET REQUESTS FOR' Pk~SSURE 011 PAKI SfAN...,., JI.,..,.~ '.. #I'"." 16. SHAHNAWAZ CHll'u::D IN TO 1'0INt' "UT THAT THE R D FORT sratel'l~nt CAI'IE ONi. Y A n::11 DAYS AFTEh SENATON PEkCY'S REl1Aft KS 1N CIIL curt A "t:gaii DI hg THt: PilTI::NT!AL THREAT TO INDIA'S ClTII::S OF A PAKISTANI bol1tj. (WHILE ~ DID NOT DftAW THE CONClUSION SHARPLY, ~HAHNAIIAZ SEEr,D'TO'&E IMPL.YING THAT THe: US gort: SClI'lt: IiE!iPClNSIBjLI.Y FOIi CHAAN SI NGH S OUTbUh!iT ) 17. SHAHNAWAZ ALSU D SCkIflED 1111 :iome DETAIL HIS DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH INDIAN LEADUlS,' INCLUDING FORNER PhII'l MINISTt::R DESAI, IN DELHI LAST MAY,, ~ SAID DESAI MADE A COI'iPUTELY UHA.lflIGUOUS STATEMENt-. -, THAT HE WAS SATlSFJEll IIITH PAKISTANI ASSUR.ANCES. SHAHNAWAZ AlSO WENT OVEH FAMILlAH GROUND ON THE OESAI-ZJA CORhESPONDENCE IN WHICH ZIA IiEPORTEDLY SUGGESTED A JOINT SJATEMENf RI::NOUNCING NUCLEAR Wt:APONS AND CiESAI 1,0lJNT RED ' IUH A PROPOSAL FOR UNILATERAL STAII:.MENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE THf EfFECT OF A JOINT STATEMENT. SHAHNAIIAZ CONCLUDED TIlAT, SINCE BOTH CESAl AND ZlA HAD STATllI THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE INDlANS WERE APPARENTLY SATISFIED. lis. IRAN. Nli:WSOM ljescri&ep US EFFOhTS TO keassure THE tii!."w GOVERNjoJ~NT THAT WE ACCEPT THE REVuLUTION. we HAD NOT 'tet APPROACH&::D KHOI1l::INI liirt:ctly. lilan's REFUSAL TO ACCEPT OUR AMBASSADOR MADE COMMUNICATIONS MOR&:: DIFFICULT AND THE CO NT INUING EXECUTIONS GAVI:: US A PUbLIC RELATIONS f'roblem. HEW~OM ~ESCRI8~D SOVIET-IHANIAN R~LATI0NS AS "TENSE l~. IN REPLY, SHAHI STRESS D THE IMPOkTANCE OF HAVING A PERSONAL EQUATION WITH KHOMEINI AND THE AYATOLLAH'S " TOUCHINESS ABOUT CONTINUING ANY PROGRAM OR POLICY' begun 11'1 THE SHAH. tit: f't':lt THAT SENDING A ~.t:legation TO KHOMEIhl WOlLD BE IHE ONLY WAY TO IMPROVE. USRt.LATlONS WITH THE PGOI, BUT RECOGNIZlD THAT THIS COULD BE DIFfiCULT fijr US IN TERMS OF US PUbLIC OPINION. 21.:. SHAHI l'.entloned THAT PGOI SUSPICIONS OF ANYTHING ESfAbLISHED ElY THE SHAH LED IT TO WANT TO ABOLISH THE kcd. ~ SAID THAT PAKISTAN WAS TRYING TO SAVE IHE OIJGANIZATION. PAKIST AN WAS "e:valuati NG" THE ROLE OF' RCD,, AND' HOP D' THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY WOULD PERSUADE THE IRANIANS THAT THE RCD HAD UTILITY IN FURTHERING REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPER AT ION. 21. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SHAHI NOTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE t:asy TO SET UP A NEW REGIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTION. THE PERSIAN GULF SIiAIKHODl'lS, WHICH WOULD LOGICALLY BE INCLUDED IN A NEW ORGANIZATION, WERE UNEASY AbOUT THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN AND WOULD THt:klFCJRE PROBABLY BE NERVOUS ABOUT AN ORGANIZATION WHICH LINKED THEI~ IIITH IRAN AND WHICH HAD IRAN IN SOME SORT OF LEADERSHIP POSITION, 22. PAKISTANI OPEl,' G THE ljiscussion ON PAKISTAN'S SECURITY REQUll1i..,l:.tfi NEWSOM SAW HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOoI HOW THE GOP THOUGHT ~ COULD ASSI ST PAKIsi AN IF WE ARE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE PRO&LEMS THAT CONFRONT US". NEWSOM INDICATED THAT at THE US VIEWED PAKISTAN'S SECURITY REQUIRE '7901, US ~

196 wnnnvv rsab~8brag61 PP RO",,~:J,. DE RUEHC"'~"I/b4 2~80104 ZNY CCCCC ZZH ' P R U2353Z' OCT 19" Fl'I SECST ATE WASHDC TO RUS8QD/Al'IEI'IBASSY IS-AMABAD PRIORITY 1184 INfO RUMJPGlAMEl'IBASSY beijing 0391 RUFHCl.IAl'IEl'IBASSY BONN pb2. RUS8l.KlA1'IEI'IBASSY KA&UL- "213.. RUD-WA1'IEl'IBASSY' LUHDON 0035, RUEHMO/A1'IEl'ISASSY MOSCOW 8192.: I RUSBAE/A1'IEI'lBASSY. NiW DELHI 1991 RUF'HPSlA1'IEI'IBASSY; PARIS IU9:' RU~Ifl/Al'IEI'IBAS5Y'Tl:':HRAN '1~8 ", : sr.. ~J~.. ", I ;,,;.'.,:~. :. ;,. I ~ I. w,.. '. ~" ~rl '.: r t",',.. "... -,~,. " I ~ d.:i'~. '. I ;,: ' 1.\. J. ".1.,..:' l... I. ",I' I hi: ; ~ 'I. i.j I' I 'J\.: L. i " :\1 '1~,r;lr. '..,,"1,I.. j' ':': CO' N ~~ ~; D. ~"N' T ~,A L FINAL SECTION ~f 04' STAlE, 2}~?I~.rt."~'.: MENU AS FALLING INTO T~EE G~NEIlAL CATEGORIESI.', 1. I -If; ~... (A) 'THE DEVELOPMENT Of A HiALTHY fjody POLITIC AND THE, SEARCH FOR IJALANcED ECONOMIC' DEVELOPMENT WERE fundamental.: TO ANy'COUNTR;Y'5 ~Cl/flITY. OBVIOUsly THESE"ARE ISSUES"';'. ON WHICH ONly"PAKISTANIS THEM:) ~VES CAN MAKE DECISJONS. ;.- :." BUT OTHER 'COUNTRJES CAN f'rovide' ECONOMIC AND TEC~NICAL... ' I LP TOo/ARC REACHING THESE GOALS. '. " "I'.~ ;: I... '.. " "1 - ;'...;.,. '... '\,. t~ I.. ;. ~ <S) AN ADEQUAH r.jln;' 0' Dt:FENS :. OUR P~RCEPTIONS OF I./HAT' IS ADEQUATE MAY DliFc:t: OMt::WHAT, but Wi DO AGREE THAT f ON SIDERABLE 1'I0~ERNILATl.. AND UPGRADJNG ur EQUJPI'iENTJS " fladl.y NEEDED.' TH :S~ HI::QUJkt::M :NTS, HOW VE:R, HAD TO'lIE",,WE ~~~p.,aga~ NSJ')Ht: NEED for. l;iouno ~CONOM~C!,DEVEl.OP~ENT.: '(C) IN THE ;DJ~OMATlC AKEllA, A COUNTRY WITH l.imhed.,., RESOURCES'SUCK'AS'PAKJ,STAN'AUDS TO'ITS SI:':CUllTY VERY SIGNInCANTl. Y BY SUSTAlNJNG A Nt:TW("IlK Of EXTER ial"tles WHICH ' tnp TO IlAl,.~NCt: THOSE f'orcc:s PAKISTAN FltiJS JNJMICAL TO ITS JNTEIiEST S. ',' OVER. THE YEARS PAKI ST AN HAU rout/d,: IT lhecessary '(, '. TO P~Sl :AI'1UlURE,OF PRACTICAL DJPLOl1ACY DESIGNED TO",, l.il1lt"con,flj.ontatiohs WITH lts NEIGHIlORS AND' EF.'FORT~TO I!:- -:.GA.l!!.R~P~R~~1.j9; s.~rfq~t..~,m~~_~ E~~S!.DE.:~~E~~;;~ 'i'.',] ~!;l:~ ~~il ~;;;.;.~\' ".~~ht.'~:i 4;.... ~.I.. ~'!:.;' ~1... ~ \. ~TJ.n.;, l;f,ii 0:'1' iii')'.. ' l," : :fl\ ;;J, WHlLt. r/lt:ile ARt: :;OMk: Mi AS IN IIHICH PkKJSTAN OF NC:CESSlTY 1o/0ULII HAVE: TO IJt:Pt::NIJ PhINCIPAl.l. Y ON ITS OWN 11E!;iOUHCES, THE US HAD IN THE PAST TkIt:U TO III:: RI::SPONSIVE IN ALL THREt: GENERAL j;r<:as. TO THt: I::Xtt:NT OUR OVERAl.l.. HELATIONS PERMIT IT" WOULD LIKE TO CONTlHUE.OURSUPPORT IN EACH OF TltiS':: All;:';.. 24, PICKING UP Tltl:: Tk:::11E OF A -11lX- Or NlLJTAHY AND I' DlfLOMATIC Mi:A~UllES, SItAItI ASKED WHAT,-THE: U~ WAS PREPARED'. I TO DO TO ENHANCE PAKISTAN':; DifENSE CAPABJLJTY. NEWSOM.. ' ~SCRIBI:':D THE UGIS-ATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON ",UI A:O' PROGRAM 0 AND NOTED PRObl.EMS WITH MAJOR MILITARY ~AI.E. ~t:quiring CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCI::NCE. THE PAKJSTANiS NAD Cl.EAR THAT INDIA REMAINED THE PRINCJPAL THHEAT AGAINST WHICH PAKISTAN MUST PLAN IT~ ~EfEN~E, AND SUGGi!;iTLD THAT THE:ADSENCE;OF A', GOOD FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS r-16:), WAS THEJk KEY WEAKNESS. IN A DISCUSSION Of THI:: OIPLOl1ATlC ELEMENTS 0;' PAKISTANI SECUHITY, THE US ~IDI:: ~THES~ED ITS' INTENTION TO' CONTINUE TO TAKE' INTO ACCOUNT PAKIS1AN'!: IHn:RESTS IN THE l'ianagei'lent OF ITS RELATIONS WITH TH~ MAJOR CONTINENTAl. POWERS Of ASJA. WE ALSC SAID WE WOULD' CilNTlNUE TO USE auk JNFtUEHC~ IN N :W DC:LHI TO E:NCOUHAGt: IN~IAN "EsTRAINT ANp COOPERATION. WITH PAKISlAN. ON Af?HA~~~qA~. "I : ~~ID.~r :.,: 'WOULD USI:: Io/HAT~V~R Lc.VERAGE WE 'HAO: IN KABUL TO ENCOUHAG I AFGHAN RESTRAINT RELATIVE TO PAKI:)]'AN, AN\) THAT WE WOULD' CONTINUE TO IMPRESS UPON THI:: ~OVI'::TS'THAT lit: lxpc:ct THEI'l TO RESPECT AfGHAN JI~DEPENDENCE AND'TO RiFllAIN' FIlOI'! INTERfERRING IN AFGHAN INTl::IlNAL AffAIflS, THE US SJDE'. SPECJFlCALl Y AfrIHMi.D THAT THt: 15l5g liil.atiral. AGRE MENT WITH PAKISTAN 1o/0ULD ut: RELEVANT IN THE E:VENT OF AGGRESSJON mon AFGHANISTAN. (fljl.l.er DISCUSSION Or THIS ~UBJECT IN ~PTEL.), VANCE BT :J'; ";'.' : i.: \...,. I. "', i! 0,.,\,;.1:1-,-,!... t, T, , I 127

197 ~NNN'V RR ESB249CO'19f RUQMER DE RUQ~CU ~795~/~1?~~143~ ZflT ceccc ZZE R 251~271. ocr?9 F~ A~r.MBASSJ AN~I~A u"""...- _" ~~ '...J _ T~ EnEPc/~ECSTATE ~A~EDC 997~ RUS!LK/A~EMB~SSY VA~~L let5 INFO RUSBOD/A~F~BJSSY ISL'Mk~'D ~~31 RUl~MO/A~fM~ASSY ~OSCow 14~S ROQ~P.R/A~EMBAS~! :is~a~ ~'f~ B'r CON rid E N T I A L ~~C~ION Zl ~F 2, AN~AaA 07GS5 I.O : GDS le/?5/e~ (~CX. r~~n!~) OR-P TAGS: l"\(ips. PINF. repr, A". :'U. OR SUEJICT: (C) rnr~ish I~FOqM,rON ON AF;EA~ISTAN SITUA:IC~ POL CHARGE ECON,,~ CHPClN REFS: (.I.) ~~AT! ; (3) H" A!H 724B; (C) :.;nul 73~2j (D)S(ATY. 2=0.S4.6; (E) U~FL f~3e 1. (C) - ENTIRE TF~T. 2. T~IS IS AN ACTI0N ME~SAG!; S~! PARA SUMMARY: DURING DISCUSSION or ~VENTS I~ AFGBAN:srA~. A~ MFA OFFICER TOLD US ~~AT THE TUF.~S CONC~RRED ~IT~ TEI U.s. ASSESSI":E~T or THE STRAUS EETliEEN A.,'iIN AND THE SOVIETZ. THE TURKS BELIEVF.D THAT TRF T~~F! MINISTrRS _EO FLED 'ROM AMIN MIGHT H! IN HIDIN~ IN rhe SOVIEr EMBASSY;!~JT SOVIET A~BASS1DOR POZANO' WAS PRESFNT AT THE AnG PALACl: AT A'1IN'S!NVIrATION ':'iif,n THE l!ult::t~ FLEW; AN: THAT ro!~er PRIMIN ETEMAtI YAS DEAD. THE TURKS WE HE V~R! INTFRESTrD IN ~r.ports TREY 3AD RECEIVED TBAT A~IN HAD H!~ SURTACE-TO-AIR MISSILES INSTALLED AT ~AG~AM Ar~BASE. TEET RAD ALSC BEAP.t :HAT lar'~i's FORM~R ~ItE r~ CA~P, CRIE! OF GERNERAL STAFf YAY-Uf, ~IGF.T BE READED FOR A POR~[. AND frat ~INPUBLIC ~OR~5 PANJSBI~1 BAD LEiT FOR MOSCOW -FOR HEALTH ~raso~s-. END St~MART. 4. AMIN/USSR STRAI~5: ~M?OF'S :ALLED ON MFA MIDDL~ FAST! NORTE AFRICA S~CTION CHIFF ALF,AP.AOS~ANjGLU OCT~BER 24 FOR A DISCUSSION EASED ON RtF (A). ACCOrtDI~~ TO KARAOSMANO~LU. THE T3R~S SHARED Tft u.s. ASSESS~ENT THAT THERE WE~r S~RAINS ~ET.ErN A~I~ AND THE SCVltTS. XARAOSMANOGLU P~I~TEV TO A~IN'S OCTOBE~ 1~ S?EECH BEFOR~ A M~TING or 'l'=! NIW CO,.STI70,:,IC:-O COM"iI'I'rlE. I~ '1131eB iii" USEP~TRE M~RXIsr BUZZ~~Hrs -~ICTATonSHIP OF TEE"PROLErh~IAT ANDUSTATE O~~E~SBIF Of THE ~ta~~ OF PFODUr.TION AS ~~.s s 121

198 CLEAREST PUBLIC D!CLARATION TO ~'Tr. OF TH~ ~HALQI PAR~Y'5 COMH~NIS! AFFILIATIO~. ~ARAO~MA~C~L" SJRMISrn TBAT SO:F. STA~EHENTS A! THIS TIMF ~[ST IRRITATE TSE SOVIETS. ~H~ WOULD PROBABLY PRFFEa A~I~ TO APPEAR AS MO~tR1TE AS POSSIBLt IN ORDER TO BROA~EN HIS RA~! OF SryPPORT. fh! TURXS INTERPRETED ANO~HER INCIDfNT ts A~ INDICATION OF USSR-AMIN STRAINS: sovr~r A~~ASS~DOR PUZANOi. -PEP.BAP~ PLATING THE ROMAU CONSUL PAD SE~T nis DCM IN HIS PtAtl TO ATTEND roreign ~INI5TER $HA~r.LI'~ ~!CFNr PRI~FIN= FC1 SOCIALIST J.LOC AroBASSADORS. ; ;NNO~~~i~H~HA~!Ai~:A;A~~F~~:'~~I~;D ~;~~A~~T:~~~~Ti~~!!f.E O~HFR two HINI~TERS PU~GrD ~FPTEMBER 13 E~TEiING 1Sl ~ SOVI!T EMPASST T!! SAME tat. KARACSMANO~LU BELIEVE~ TEAT : THE THREE KINISTtRS MIGPT W~LI STILL BE INSIDE TnE seviet : E~BASS!; IN A~T CASE. HE WAS SURF TrEY ~[FE NOT DEAD. ~ CITING AS suppoat A~IN'S RtCENf STATEMENT TO FOREIGN ~ JOUR~ALISTS ~RA~ ~E KNr~ ~rere WATANJAR, ET AL, WERE. PUT i TRAT THEY conld ~or IE REAC~ED PT TELEPHONE., ; 6. PUZANOV: ~EE TUP.r.S "KNO." ~~AT SJVIET AMBASSADOR POZANOV WAS ~RESENT AT T5~ ARG?~LA~E WHf.N THE SHOOTING STARTED. TEEf RE~UNST~OCTtD EV~NTS THUS: TARA~I HAD SUMMONED AMIN TO T~E PALAC~. A~I~. ~I~DFUL or A SI~ILAR INVITATION TP.E PREVIOUS Y1A~ ~J A RECALCITRANT HINISTER WRO ~)~ txecored UPON ArPFA~rNG AT THE ~ALACE, ASKED PUZANoV :0 BE PR~~ENT. EOPING rfat HE ~orll CONSTITUTE A SORT GF LIFE rn~ur~nce. TqE TURK~ DID NOT ~NOW ~BO STARTED THE SHCO:INC. AND. GIVE~ PUZANOV'S INV1TED PRESENCE, THEY BELIEVED IT POSS~BLE THAT AMIN MIGHT NOT HAVE PLlNNED TO STRIKE AT TARAKI. AT LEAST NOT IT THAT MOMENT. 7.~ETEM1DI: THE TURKS NOW EELIEVED FORMEP. PRIMIN NUR AHMAD ETlMADI ~REFS B. c. D) BAD BEEN EIEcnTED. AFGHAN ~RIEr or INT~LL!r.ENCE ASADULLlE AHIN BAD P.EPORTEDLY TOLD SOMr. or HIS FRIENDS" THAT ETEMADI HAD BEEN tx!cu~ed O~ T1R1[I'S ORDERS. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TEND~D TO CCNrIB~ TBIS. IN THE TUR'ISF. VIEW: SISCE ETEMADI'S rhprison~tn! TH~ DAY AFTER TEE TARA(.I REVOLUTION. RIS FAHILY HAD BEEN rrrmitted. WITHOUT S;EIN~ HIM. TO BRING FRESH FOOD AND CLOTHES TO 7FE PRISON AND TO EICB\NGE LETTERS WITH HIM. ABOUT TWO ~O~THS AGO ~ErSE PRIVILEGES VERE CUT BACK. A~D TS~ DAIS AGO. EVEN THE LETT?R EXC~AN~[ WAS STOPFED. 8. jpams: THE TUKtS HAD RECiIVED RrpnRTS rhat AMIN RAD _B~~JUR'tCr-~p-!IR MISSILES INSTA!.LE~ AT PAGR~~ AI~BA~!. THEY SAW THIS A~ A 7ERY SIG~IrlCANT DEVFLOPMENT :r TRUE;. fhe ONLY FORESEEABLE TARGETS OF suer ~EAro~s COULD ~E BT.7?~ 1~2

199 NNNNf' tsb048gua193 TtP. JlUQI'lER DE IUQ"GU.7966/ t0 ~Nt CCCCC ZZB i 25]4272 OCT 79," A~EH!ASSJ ANlARA '1'0 RUtBC/SECSUTE WASJlD(, 8880 RDSiLK/IHE~!ASSY Y.ABUL 1846 INfOIUSBQDIJHEMBASSY ISLAMAB1D3832 ROEBMO/Al'lEM~ASSY MOSCOW 14~9 JlOQHf.R/AMEl'lBASSY TEHRAN.Sl?0,. IT CON r I., E N T I AL SECTIO~ 0~ OF 02 ANU!!! ~7955, ~ U'CP.ANISTAN'S OWN AIRCRAFT. 11 AHIN BAD IN nct INS1'1LL D, WEAPONSAGAl'NSl' THr UENTUALI'1'Y OF 1 STRUE :BY US OWN ~ All fohce, THIS WASNE~ EiIDENC~ or further REAL OR PER." CEIVED EROSIOH 07 AMIN'S CRUCIAL HltlTART SUPPORT. UUOSHANOGLUAS!ED ljs TO CREC&: TBE.Rr.PORTS or THE SAr. I' INSTALLATIONS A'l' RAGllH. 9. PURGES: rret~a~s HAD EEARD THAT AjGgA~ CalEf 'OF S'1'11FAND FORMER TARA'! AIDE DE CAMP GE~ERALYA~UP WOULD II PURGED. THEY ALSO KNEW THAT MINISTER 01 PUBLIC VOPIS PANJSHiRI (REF E, PARA 5), ONE OF T9E last 01 fall PACBEMIrES"!N. THE thin GOVERNI1t;~'r, HAD DICA"'PIL FOR MOSCOW FOR HEAL!B RI1SONS" ONLY FIVEUAYS AFTEB ASSUMING BIS FORUOLI". 13. ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD l~preciat! ANY CONFIRMAtION I)R CO"I1ENTS D};Pt.RTHEl~tJR t:a.dlll CAN ~1i.E! ON THE 'fortis! RI-PORTS. PARTICULARLY ON TEE IN10RMlTIOK OF TF.E JAGRAM SAH INSTALLATION. lor USE IN OUR CONTIN~ING DIS CUSSIONS Wll~ YEE 'furks. SPIERS IT.'1966 l~j

200

201 NNNNVV t:~a 127hJCb 713 PP HU(..~}iJ\ lje RU~I..K ~ ~S Z I~Y CCCCC ZZ H f' R Z 0(,'1 79 F!": ll/e";8assy KHBUl. TCI RUEHC/SECsrATE WASHOC PR lorit Y 6093 INFO RUMJPC/~1EKtASSY BEl~ING "e16 RUSbQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMHcAD 9466 RUF~B/AM~MBASSY 6ERLIN 0043 Rl.jI:TC/AMEMoASSY LOlmON IB6"{ RU hfiloi AMil'ifIAS:;Y MOSCOirI 2011 RUS6AEI Al1EMtlAS5Y NEW Dt::lltl 7577 RUF~PSlAMEMB~SSY PARIS ~336 JiU~MtiP./At-IEI1HASSYTEHHAN 0571 RUHI./iiQA/CINCPAC sr J CON F IDE NT! A L KABUL 770G CINCf'A(; ALSO FOR POLAD ~.o. 12etSS: GDS lel25/85 (TAn-OR, JAMES E.) OR-P TAG;'; PEPH, ~HR, PINT, AF, UR, GE SUBJ: <LOU) NEW EAST GERMAN AM~ASSADOR TO REPLACE CENTRAl FIGURE IN LAST SUMMER S REPORTED ATTEMPT TO BROADEN REGIME'S POLITICAL BASE ite~: KAEUL 6309 (l~01al) POL CHRG CON RF CHRN 1. ecl SUMMARY: A NEW EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN NA~ED TO KASLI!. TO fteplace HERMANN SCHV:IESAU, A CENT~IU. FIGURE HERE IN LAST SUMMER'S PURPORTED SOVIET ntempr TO riave the J(h;.LQI REGIME "BROADEN ITS l'a..itical BASE."' WHETHER THERE WAS AA/'( nre i:ehind THAT POLITICAL SMOKE. REflIAINS UNCLEAR, BUT THEkE IS 1.lTTLE [JOUBT that THEN PlUJll MIt:ISI'ER HAFIZULLAH AMI~t THE REPORTED TARGET FOR THIS "'CAMPAldN"' FOR WHIC!'{ SCH'.rIIESAU lias A MAJOR MOUTHPIECE, KNEW ABOUt The; AFFAIR. SCHWIESAU ABRUPTLY DEPART~D KABUL ABOUT THE TlflIE IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT AflIIN'~ POWERES WERE HOT BEING CURTAILED, BUT FIRM EVIDENCE REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES &URROUNDING HIS DEPARTURE AND REPlACEMENT HAS HOT YET COPIE TO LIGHT. AT AN I RAtE, FOR T~ SHORT TERM AT LEAST, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO KltVE LITTLE CHOICE But 10 BA~K AMIN'5 EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE TKE REVOLUTION. END Of SUMMAR Y. 2. (LOU) ON THE EVENING OF OCIOBER 24, THZ ORA ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD GIVf.N AGRE.M NT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF KRAFT BUMBU (AFGHAN FOREIGN!'lItUSTRY SOURCES INSIST THAT IS THE COkRECT SPELL I NG) ~s THE NEIt.! AMBASSADOR OF r HE G.1MA N DEMO CRAT IC REPUElLlC TO KABUl. NO FURTHER DETAILS ARE INCLUDED Hi T HE BRIEF RC:PORT.3, CC) COl"iMENT: auf~ael REPLACES FORMER GDR Al'I.r,ASSADOR H'.:R MANN SCHWIESAU "H~ WAS A CENTRAL FIGURE IN LASl SUMl'!ER S REf-UTEC SOVIET "CAMPAIGN" TO PERSUADe::" THE DRA L ADERSHIP Ttl -BfdJADE!'l Ib POLITICAL case OF" SUPPORT." ALONG W!!'i SOVIET MINl.:;TER-COUt~SS:LOR VASILl Y SAFkOHCHUK, SCh.. lesau A"! THAT TIME IrJA5 EXTREMElY OUTSPOKEN... ITH HIS DIPLONA1IC COLLEAGLlE;5 RECARDING THE DOI"IISTIC DIFFICULTIES ~F THE KHALGIS, AND ES PECiALLY AdOUT THE DRA"S NEED to SkOADEN IT~ SUFF-ORT IwTTHIN THE CCVtlTR Y. SOME UNCONFIRMED REPORTS WERE HLAHD T HAT A~ H1TEGitAL PART OF THIS ALLEGED SOVIET EFFORT WAS THE THElfl::: THAT THEN PRINE I'lINISTER HAFIZULLAH AM1N" ; POWEtiS HAD TO BE CL.~TAlLED, SINCE HE WI'S THE PfRCEI VED VILLAI N BEHIND THE ORA'S REPRl::~SlVE AND RADICAL POL!CIES..124

202 Ij. CCi AS TIME PASSl::D, AMI N' ~ REAL POLITICAl. POtiER APPEARED TO INCREASE, DESPITE THi. OSTENSIBLE SOVIET EfFORT TO CLIP HIS Irt'l!:GS, AIm AMI N DROPPED SEVEIiAL PUBLIC HINTS THAT HE ""A~ A~'Ak OF" THl SOVIET -MAttl:.UIlERING~ WHICH SAF'RONCHUK AND SC~.iIESAU WERE PUSLICIZII.G ALL OVEP. TCltII.. NOT LONG AFTER IT BECAMe: Q.EAR THAT AlliIN'S flowers WERE ~OT DECLINING, SC!l ~IESAU ABRUPTLY DEPARrED KABUL, HEPuRTEDLY BECAUSE HE HAD ;iuhered A ~ROKEN LEG WHICH WOUI.D ftequire SIX MONTHS IN GERl"/M~Y TO HEAL, O'.JH GOR COLLEAGUES HERE GAVE NO INDICATIOH THEN Of: IN THE INTEP.Hi T!-IAT SCHWIESAU WOUl.D NOT RETURN TO KA1HL TO TAKE UP HIS AMoASSADCJRIAL ASSIGNMENT, 5. CC) AS WITH MuST ELt::MENTS OF TlilS '-lurk" STORY, THE REA- SONS BEHIND BU"I~EL 's APPuI N'f!'iENT ARC: NOT CLEAR, AND SCINl[SAU'S ~ERMA~NT DEPAkT~RE COULD HAVE ~EV~RAL EXPLAhATIONS. THE MOST OBVIOUS IS ThAT HIS MEDICAL PHCJi:.LEMS HAVE REQUIRED THE GDR TO FD..L ThE VACANCY HERf;, RAT HER THAN TO WAIT FOR SCHWIESAU'S FlU. F.ECOVERY. AHCTHER EXPLANATIu;, 1~ THAT SCHWIESAU HAD ~RVED HIS PL:RPOSE IN ANY -:i:-:ui.iie"iit;g ThE base- CAf'ER, AND TtfliT H15 SERVICES AS A SuVIET - SPC':;.':i,AN- ~EJtE NO LOtJGER ttedld in KABUl... IT COUl.D ALSO 0-1, iivl.':'v":k, THAT AMIN, THE S:Jf'POSE~ P'iUNCIPAL TARGeT ~? ANY _n~"t Te, ijt:!='~se THE DOP'.ESTIC OPPOSlT ION TKliOUGH POLlTIC':'L r';::'.,i\~, u"di::i:t:i; SCHI.:IESAU'S ABRUPT DEfARTUhE POSSIBLY AS 1\!.,i.'.(JN~Ti.:.Li,;,. It;,:.! Ai'llN WAS, IN FACT, A LEADER OF THE AFGHAN Lc.liuLUTII..i:. '.!io HAD Nt. It\TEIJ110N Of VU.. WJTMULY RfLINQUISHING 1,IS I'LJi.'.:.:, :::VL:~: It" ~:I~ C~OSE FRIE:mS THE SOVIETS TP.~MSi::LV:S ~!i-:~.;;: ':'lj,.'::s:":',. l.;;id{hg o!::hind THE S~ENE,) TO SRII.G ABOUT ~l!ci! A 1;::'Vj;;~.(J?r'j:,jff. ui. ~Ai..i',:\CE, THEREFORE, 'NE BELIEvE H:AT ~CH~:ESAU S A nupt I:E.PAiiTURi::: At\iJ r,eplacejllent COUL.Ii.ELL havi:: ~c:::::.: g SOrli 'oj:'y f-olitic:'.lly A~D NCT NEDI CALLY 1';",TIIIAlt:D. ~'HA1'o:.lIii': THt. CASE!'!AY EE, AS {, RESllLT Of THE STILI. iji.~lia;\ ~I::PTEMJt:R 14 SHOulOUT IN KABUL, THE SOVIETS APrC:A~ TO HAVE LITTLE Sl{CRT-TERI') CHvICE but TO SUPFGi1T hi'in; lfj HIS ATTEMPT TO,"UELL ':'HE DGMISTIC INSURGENCY ;.tlti CONSOLIDATe: THe: SECUttITY OF THE Ri::VOLUTICN. BLOGD LT '77L6 ]25'

203 N~~JNVV ESA'?'43~jJC9S4?P r. U(\f'~ HR 003~O 7 DE RUSfJ. K 17764/1.3N 11Z~ Z NY CCCCC ZZ H,.. Po.3 0~94 9Z OCT 79 Po, A~ M6ASSY KAcUL I 10 R:..:~rlGL/AMEMet.SZY ANKAkA Pf\IC,RITY 37~3 H:FO 'wr';,jp!i1 AI.EMi:lAS SY be:ij Hili ~t. 1~ rl~5t~d/~~em~kssy ISLAr.AcA~ 94~0 F.Ui;;i JhAI AI~I::MijilSS"{ oji DDA Oil~ I k~el1r"ci Al",::I'IB~::iSY MOSCOW Z ~,15 Hl!SL:.AE/AI'iEMcASSY Ni:W DELHI 7588 RUQI'lHR/ AMEr'1&ASSY 'H:hRAN e~ 76.,.'?UZP.C/SC::C~jArE washoe 6137 RUH<.:H'A/C I r~cpac il!ifht\a/usi'1! SSION USNAT 0 0~l:l3 COt: f' I 1) E ~l T I A l SECT ION 1 (;F 2 X{'~l.L 71<'4 POL CriR:: ECON Rf CHRH -- E.C;. 1~065: GD5 10/29/85 (fl.~tin. ~HLJC~ A. '; lji;-:'~ TAGS: MOPS. P~Pfi. PI~R, AF, UR. ru SUB..': (C) TURKISH INFORMATION ON THE SI1vATI(JI~ H: i\fglr.: ~~ji,: HEF: I.NJ<ARA 7956 (N(;TAU 1. (C - Ef'lTIRE TEXT> 2. PLflSUANT TO Elr.BASSY ANKARA' 5 REQUiSi It. PA,;AG. ~.P!: 1: -0; THE REFTEL. TIllS EMBASSY HAS THE follljt'iing "l.-~:lvt.ti":i:s 7( 11AKE A!JOUI TH: POINTS DISCUf.SED BY KARAO.A:,t.~:l':;Le: CA) AlllN-SOVIE:! STRAINS: ALlP'juuH THEI1:: ;,;WS L-=:':I~ ii;r~- CAT IONS IN THE f':st THAT!Ht: ~(jvic:ts 1':1GIo!T :".~IJ": P'.1::'-::J,;._:-.s~;: OfHEi1 POLITICAL ~OLUTIOr\ TO lhe Ui{~TAEl...i A;:C,:'f,:: :...nuril~~. -:;:1-.. T H.C: CONT I NUi::D leadep.~hli-'!if T H.E RUT HLESS ANL!.l.'Pu?UL k. HAFIZlLLAH AlllN, I'JOSCvi:! IS NOW Cl.J::AkLY 5T:':Ci'. lin/; H!l:.?7 Li:':AST FOR THE SHOnT RllN. \:E AGREe: ~ITH r:a:.,h... i,;th:v"ll 7',,1 "'l,:' $OVIl:."TS ARE N(1I.~ UNDOUbTEDLY GliIDII-;G AI11N j C rlllo' t; r1ci[':. (\:::. COiiRSE 1 iii ORDZil TO Bf. OADEN. IF AT ALL PlJ:= S:;;.L.. d..; :J\'~:..,;s L ~,::- SUPPOtU. we.'\1.s0 FOUND THi: ABSENCE 'CF AI'loAS;,ADO!-' ;'!Z!\N(;V Fr,()' FOREIGN MIIHSTER 5HAfl ~jali's UNUSuAL OC!OEc:r f. L... ;~il'.g ;,?C'SSI&LE P;DICATIONS TIiA! THl:: :"OVET liuli:: :'i. SEPT:.:.1:~i;, 14 COULD HAVE peei\ RE-GARDED A::; AtITI-AMl1l. :icil:::v'::r.. ::! ;. :...:CI:. CONVERSATION IHTH A SOUTH ASlf,N IiIPLOI'iA1, ;"C''v'lET \'~inb'te:- COU~SELOR SAFRONCHUK TRIED TG D()\;.'NPLt.Y PlIZilt>C'}"~: :-;.:.PE~' -.::;:: 14 Rq..C. DESO:<IBING I!I AS All iffunt Ie. PRi:.St:pVE PL",.Ci E.:::,:::C:~' IHE WARR!Nt; FACTIO~~ Or THe: Ai'"GHA/o; P:.RTY. or; GCTur..ik 2S. PUZAf'OV PRAISED I.:-':IN EIGHL Y Tu c?itish At':flll'::.>ALv/,_r,C:SlSI\l.:':: H1LLIER-F:;Y. (WE SH",ULD ADD THAT 1 HEilE l;re S(l~lc ;"FFIc.::r.5 1 i, nus Ef1E:ASSY WHO Bi::Ll VE THAT 1-',;51 Tl;LK 0F STi\AINS L::j\~:::::" AMIN AND THl SO'.'IETS HAVE uei::n A "SHr:LL GAI'i::" -- AI~lJ HU T THE 'lllutih" SIt,ONGM,"J HAS 8iEN r:o::;cow s!'ian bi~ci.. TH::: ~":JINr:It.G (,1 Tn.. KliAL In ERA.) 126

204 -- - AMI"'S "FiEFERENCE TO "ljictatorship orrm: Ph CLE:TAR I AT"' 1:. HIS OC!C,hEr. H.. SPiI::CH ISIIIOT N'~. ;u: AND F(,j-.::':'/\ PI:ESUiEI\; TARAKI HAVE OCCASIONALLY USED THH 1l..kr : H ihe. PAST. /iis SIATEMENT THAT... ALL THE I!'iPukTAtn AREAS ijf P;';OliUCTIC,...ILL BE CONSIDERED PUblIC PROPERTY" WAS I-jADE IN THE C(,NTEXT OF ASSlJUNG THE CONTINUED SECURITY OF PRIVATE Pf.OPi:RTY <A Pt:O MISE FTcE.QUENTL Y MADE ZY THE KHALQI LEADEkSHIP TO AFGHANIS': AN'Z -NATIONAL CAPITALISTS"), WHILE THR~ATENING TO r;eprive POSSESSORS (if "~OCIAL PRODUCTs- FRO: ; -THE Pl.wEH TO SUDJECT THE lai..cir OF OTHEf<S THROUGH PRIVATE ",.'NERSHIP THElcEOF." THIS FORNlLA!ION AL~O REPEATS A THEP1E we HAVE HEARD Hr:r.E DEFOn:::. <B) A~nUi'1: VI:: DO NOT THINK THE THl\Ei ::XPELLEli i :ILITt.F.Y MINISlERS A;~i ~TILL WITHIN THE SOVIET El':bA5SY, IF, INDEED, THEY HAD C;NC::: SOUGHT PROTECTION THERE. THE ";OS1 COt1MONLY I LD LOCi,L VIEf.I IS THAT WATANJAR, PERHAPS ACCOrr,pt.iHc:r.l 2.Y GUlABZCI, IS IN HIS HOI :E :f.0vuice OF PAKTIA. ~AFIIDNCHi.:K RECEtlfLY TULD A SCiUTH ASIAN DIPLOI'1AT THAT THAT PAIR IS "~T1LL AT LARGE." THEY AXE believed BY SEVEFiAL LOCAL OaSERVERS TO BE TRYING Te ESTABLISH THEl'll:JELVES WIlH DISAFFECTED rlllitary FORCES Hi SOUTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN)Q IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THllt'T WATANJAR AND EiUlAEZOI!"AY ~E zr.; THt US5ft SO THAT THE SoVIE':'S COUlD KEEP THEIR ACTIVITIJ::S UNDER CONTROL, ALTHOUGH A HIGH SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER DENIED T HIS TO CHARGE AMSTUTZ ON OCTQcEn 3 ekabul 7318). MANY BELIEVE MAZDOORYAR 'AO BE DEAD, BUT A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT STATES THAT Hi WAS RECENTLY TOLD EY SAflIONCHUK THAT f'lazdooryar IS BEING KEPT UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN HIS QUARTERS AT THE PUL-I-CHAnKI TANK BASE. IF THIS IS TRUE. HE WOULD PROEABLY Ei:: UNDER ~UVIET PROTECrrON Fr.Oi : A:~lN <T HE: SOVIETS PROBAblY NOW CONTROL THAT bas=:). WHO k'ould UNDOU3TEDLY HAVE HIff, KILLED Ii'iNEDIATELY IF HE COULD ~E crought UNDEfi KHALQI CONTROL. THE: SOVIET MOTIVE IN ~UCH A SITUTATION COUlD BE TO I'IAINTAIN LEVERAGE AGAINST AiollN, WHC P:UST EE PAIN FU.LY AWARE OF THE E;{ILED AfGHAN lc:adeiiship THE ~GVIETS ARZ KEEPING ON THE SH[lF e'::.g., THE. PARCHAi 1I5TS). :T 1718" 127

205 .- II I, I... "..:' ;... _,",w:" f.: :.f ":,,:::.:,. ~... ~-: i : roo :... ".l 1",. I,., ".. I I... ', 1"'_... I' toil ""~;...'.'..../..1. '..:'1:... _'. j... f f.~' r.~i.:!j:.l 1" n '(,j7.la. \'..:. 1 7::. '7i,/... t \ ; : /1._.. "" 77 I 1 i ; r _ '- t... l:;},,:,:..v:.;";;.::.l~.~ ;.~,~.. _!'f.l: ':ALI'~ :': LL-;\i::POii'i'ED i : L,.. -: ~ : ;._.;.,:.~ '~'_:..: ':'~:I..r :;.~: :'1?Ll;i :ATS Ct. lictul.c.n 6, ~E.:.U... _.!..Z"::._ -; :i: P':;...;. to. F..._t._LY AT ih, PALACE AT ~ ;.._:!... _~: ~':' i-;.:_; :.. TI._ ~1-..."'i'I..UT -- If' I\(,T THROUGHOUT 'l';~ _:.:_. _.,'.L.. v ';::1:.:" 1:'?Lri~~IL.L~ TriA! taf.kki f':ight :;'i,'.: _.:" '_ ".,...;',... l.i "".. ~...::l!y?t.:r:atunely raj. APlIN AT T~;.~ :-: -- ;,:l '[~.>"" '. ;._ Lt.L. :..:r;,j"it N\iT HAVr: OftGINALLY ~~;.t.:: _!..... 'J ". "",.'::;: _.. ':"...:.: IS.:. ;URI~G THIS PARTICULAR j'':..;' _I';" :\,.1\,,:., ~: 1 _7 ;':'1.1<.:. l,; AXY ":tecalcitr.ant ; :.. l_~.~:." :::,.. :... _.:.,;.' ;..C:.;!_L ':'1 'inc. PALACt. IN IHt: PREVIOUS Y_.:":.. 1L :.EC:, J./'':' J~,;,,;.;.:;..i.,'\:.I.~Ll: hcfiniu~g7 CFuRlIlEn DEFENSE :1":1::-. ~.:..._:..:":" (of.'..;:...,.~:,~ "I.~ Ii.ICK.:..D INTC COMING TO THE 2.AC_..;- :",_.7.~ ;.::., : ;... ;':.::':;.;.'1'.:.1, I~ i.~lic:ved TO ~TILL QE f.l H'~ h~' r.l - r-..;: :.:... j{j t'i: I :';..1 ) (UET:,::,;L.I:.'f":' _:.. 1::.GhINC :.~VC:f.I.L id:.liai..l:: heports, lo'e ;';;CI l-:av:,,~t.:":"y Cl:;CL:';L.~ ilia! Ful :( ;.;;itprh:c :'iinistt:r NUn AH[~AO ::'1 i:.i:~l: 1 ;,;';: 1:.:,::':'.1.0 _:'_:..::;:t:cut ":L. ALTHCliGr THt. Ai';! N REGIME r... ~I.:pt:l:r... ~LY I I.:",. HI :ihift THe:....LAC,t. F("R THAT ACT ON TARAKI AtoI! H.. ;~;:~.. n~_;' C:I1':"F A:'A['~U,H, Tnc. C:XECl.rrlv~ Pf\(j6AbLY CiCCURRED I:.FT.h?r.:::'~ _...?i._;:_::l 14 Tfd\::.i.iVc.f\. THe: C()NSIANT REPORTS t.i::"ljt ~u'v'l.:.. PL':'::~ Tv l;t:;:ll:~ c.til,adl FO;:; A?CLITlCAL ALTai I~r 11/.;. Tt.! A.. I:. t.?f'at;;::!<tly :... AL;::C THZ:: vlc r';ai,,'s FATE. C.:.i ;.,';i:':' ;.:r...'lit,t.i :: i..l,:i:.ai, All\~A:::.;:. I~ U:.;;:,r:I,.!::vVIET CONTROL, A:,O M:Ih I~, j'~.li.c.fl,:\.:., ;~lji A~LC Ii" HA\t;:. M:Y ~PECIAL l'e:lpgns I NST ALLt.;' T ;'...1._ I,.'li' He:;: ;,{J\t 1"::T CCi:'Cl;.. FlZ:'C'::: f\!~~ ~t;pp(;i\ -; HE ;'j:gna',,~ ;ti~v,"!':h: ~.A,:~ bii;ci;. THE. ~A(,jULI5i i..'a, FL.:.:iUi:A..:LY TO CG,:r::N!; PAh1'l:ALL Y \.'ITH T~ F. LATlVE i,iupc.r.l"'i'.1ty c,f" TI-!:': f'al:isralil Alh runc"::. THS:ii::: IS Nv INDICkTh.:', :~':CIDn'TALLY, THAT Tii;;' t.f~:-:ai\ ALi "'Ul~C':'f l"h.ich IS, Il' ZF"F.:.CT, ~OVIET COl\T"uLL.';, lll..pnisi::r~.h;y 1I'Il'.l:,UIAT': n.ii..:.t TC Ar1g A lcr;g ;..5 Ti-:~ _0.1~ ;~T:> L'::~lRt. Tv ~c.;:; 1:1:': ni.::l!ag g ru\o1c.h. <F") :~(J;. _5: CHlt.F... F ~'iaff" YA~OU:" :.;".::~ r,~! APPEAr. TJ... :::. l:~ Ai;,( PI-LIT I CAL T.. v~::'li AI THe I Ni lc.::' I AT.:. TII lt.. IN FACT, ~.h~ ;.i:ce~:i'ly r.mig!.: TO Hi~Ci:::;TJ.AL cor ;r:lttc..:. uf THi: :t~lh:g PA:;lY. P~;"LIC wvi-.ks r'ii~;i5ti;: PArwJ HI/tI, I.'HO IS '::'d.iivio 7li al,c:,: ii/wi:: HAD PARCHA;H sr LEAr\lNGS, HDEEt DID LZAVC: r'un rj(j~cil:~ FO;; "";i:cical ThEAnl:c:.NT" AF"TI::R M~IN'S COUP, ;..~~~ HA~ :,l:! ~c.a. h.:.ritiljnt.!.; ::'lnc::: IN T1-:1::!.'DIA. HE COULD 'JELL r:r: CO:',::: ;.. IiI CT h. 01 r HI:. 1\::i\T io lju Nl.i uf' pun Gc.s. IN 5UCH A CASE, :t:;. ~;:'VL:'.i ~ ::CULD Pl:,~;r;"'Li f.-lsv (.'rf't:r: Hll~ iiefugi: O~: nci;l II ~.i. Si~1v~ : Hit F. " oj,?lt.,;::;.:. COi.ViY Tv KAhAu~;;Ar\uGLU THe: GRii:..TI~GS ClF' HIS "i ;-:.lcai; il ;~;;.!::SY CCLL.:.A(jUl:.~ :!hlj R~r': i ;.:.E:R HHi FOt:CLY FROft] ~ir~ ~_ r~.. ~I~H CH~~G.:. AT KA~UL. ~L00~

206

207 ':- Near East and South Asia Review 13 N~cmbcr 1979 A!IG 1997 :... ~.....

208 NEAR EAST AND SOUTE ASIA REVIEW 23 November 1979 CONTENTS.~s~~:. Outlook for the Insurgency During Winter The course of the insurgency ~ill be shaped primarily by factors that have been central to the conflic~ ~ince it began in soviet support, loyal~of the military, and rebel disunity. _ ~...:.:-:).,!'.-:.. ~ o '0....,.

209 -'." 0"...,... :.~ Afghanistan: OUtlook for the Insurgency During Winter -The e'ff~t of winter--which arrived this month in northern and eastern Afghanistan--on the scale and te.itpo of the insurgency 'Will depend.' on the severity of the weatller. Last 'Winter insurgent tribesmen took adval.~age of unusually mild weather to expand their areas of operation in the eastern provinces, currently the scene of the heaviest fighting.'.... The courfie of the insurgency during the winter months ending in April.will.be shaped primarily by factors.that have been central -to the conflict,since it began.in the spring of 1978-~Soviet support; loyalty of. the military, and disunity. of rebel forces. Neither the government nor the rebels ~ppear capable of gaining a decisive.edge in the months ahead. Both sides ~ay concen-. tra~e.~n.~s~~~ening thei:r;: respective pos~t:iojls... ~' ':'~:t':~~:~ :"". -.' ~...:.; ".. _.. ~ ".' :'... ::0... '>.... ',:, The ;.Chances this winter are good for' further mutioies in the~~aimy, and this 'could bring about the'~collapse of President Amin' s regime. Unless the "Army turns against the.regime:and r~~ches an understanding with the tribes, however,.the r~~ellion probably viii dragon inconclu-.sively into the spring. JIll.... "..:"...-.::~..~'.'....!~~~;~ I,': ~~~.,.,...~.. "w..: ~ -"". - -,,;... ~:..:..''':W.,

210 Pages: rj.. ±----=:::3L-...,..._

211 Key Factors Other factors vill tran~cend weather in determining the cocrse of the insurgency durir.g the coming months. The" rebel effort vill continue to be impeded by the ;... "failure of the various independent insurgent groups 'to coordinate operations.' Additionally, unless the 'rebels receive more meauingful military suppo::-t than it has thus far--particularlj- anti~ craft veapons--and more financial backing from 'Saudi:. Arabia,.their effort to bring the Soviet-equi~ to tl:~ point of c011apse may lose :n~m~tum." ~ =-..." \', w". :1. ", '.

212

213 SECRET (l/f-:rlbarry:i'ir 1,2 115/79 X 2 112L SIMS: ~'SHULl1J"!'i IMT1EDIATE MOSCOL./ V :.._. -. ( \ :-';~'_'i::;lj;:.sive ir.fc ( ) CL.-..sslFY :-:5.,. ()Dl)\VNGl~ETStO()Sor()C,O/'UJI' E.O, 11652: RDC, 12/15/9~ SUBJECT: SOVIeT ;'l:::ll TAI\Y ~~r~oyli[r-.;t MS 1/ RLEG.: ss 1 {S - ENTIRE TEXT.] 2. SHULMAN CALLED IN Sr,vILT CHAf~G[ vasev DECEMBER 15 AND MADE POINTS IN REf 7EL VAS[V \~R[ED TO TRANSMIT REQUEST FOR INFORMAl ION TO MOSCOW. HOWEVER, HE SAID. SPEA KIN G r ERSON ALL Y, HE f3 L L I [ '.' Ell f1 \) S C0 U W0 Ul. D 8 E DISTURBED ey OUR REQUFST. l!ihjlt~ f1[ :1/-1) NO INFORMATION ON SOVIET DEPLOVI1[NT 1'1;!.F{,HMJISTidJ-. ANY SUCH ACTIONS W0 UL D B[ IN THE corh [ XT 0!: SCV ~.. ET- AF C HMi REL ATION S AND WOULD CONSTITUTE NO THREAT TO THl US. MOSCOW MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT US FOCUS ON AFGHANIS1AN WAS DESIGNED AS A DIVERSION TO DETRACl II i'tent 1 orj ;-ROM PLANNED US ACTION AGAINST IRAN 3 SHULMAN ASSURED VASE\.' i"!;j,t iw.t~e WAS NO FOUNDATION for ANY SUCH SUPPOSITION AND 7HA! OU~ CONCERNS REGARDING AFGHANISTAN l"epr ~[~,u[') ' r.l' TO -H[ ~IT:";ATIO:~ W: :AW DEVELOPING ThERE. L ~/ 1)ID'1

214

215 U~SSIFtED SPEcrAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING December 17, 1979 I II ) t--.. -":. '1~./ Time and Place: 8:45-9:45 a.m., ~~ite House Situation Room Subject: Iran participants: The Vice President State Warren Christopher Harold Saunders Richard Cooper** Defense Secretary Harold Brown W. Graham Claytor JCS GeI1.eral David Jones General John Pustay CIA Admiral Stansfield Turner Frank Carlucci Robert Dean*** Energy Secretary Charles Duncan** Treasury Secretary William Miller** Anthony Solomon** Robert Mundheim** White House Hamilton Jordan** Jody Powell** Stuart Eizenstat** Lloyd Cutler** Zbigniew Brzezinski David Aaron NSC Colonel William Odom Gary Sick Thomas Thornton*** **Domestic Issues Only ***Afghanistan Only Justice Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti** John Shenefield** / Domestic Issues: S C4assiofiee dnd EnteAQlild Reassl'!. use l.13(f), kc..(ci~:t./,,, ~ ~Abl< SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 1. Economic Steps. A message was sent out on Saturday clarifying our understanding of the various steps which the allies will implement on a voluntary basis. We should have reactions from the various capitals today. Once those reactions are in, a joint message from Secretaries Vance and Miller will be sent requesting immediate implementation. That message will be prepared for President review today, in anticipation of its being sent tomorrow. State has prepared a matrix showing our present understanding of what the allies are repared to do. A copy is attached. UM I PA~.tLJ,) DaclassihedlReleased on ~J I'8 under provisions of ~:12958 by R. Soubers. NlltlO~/Il se.cijp"1co~cjl '-..-? J

216 U~SSIF1ED State also prepared a paper on the steps available to us in invoking Chapter VII sanctions through the UN. A copy is attached. The SCC was briefed on the President's interest in taking the necessary preparations to move on Chapter VII if and when a decision is made and the President's preference for seeking maximum sanctions. The SCC did not believe that seeking Chapter VII sanctions would provide a~ excuse for delay of action by the all!~s si~=e :~~~ already see~ prepared to proceed with limited voluntary steps bu~ will be reluctant to go beyond those measures in any event without Chapter VI authorization. We will wish to consult in advance with the Soviets since a veto could have serious implications for SALT, as well as preventing sanctions. We should seek Sovjet abstention, if support is not possible. Mr. Cutler suggested that we move immediately to get a finding by the SC on Article 39 that the Iranian situation constitutes a threat to the peace, since the Soviets may be willing to support that. State pointed out that a call for a finding under.') I)(.'-/~"' Article 39 is, in effect, a call for sanction and should not be c:'! I. 1 undertaken until we are prepared to follow through with the entire ~~ ", ~-./.,. program. <J1) _J~. f f,to,1.. - ',~~, ;,...1'., The SCC agreed that it would be useful to wait for several q~ys /. )'c before invoking Chapter VII in order to see the outcome of allied decisions on voluntary steps, effects of the ICJ ruling, reaction to the Shah's departure, and the results of consultations between the new Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Mansour Farhang, with the Secretary General. In order to sustain momentum, it would probably be useful ~~. ~l. to be prepared to proceed with Chapter VII on about Thursday or Friday. Once the decision is made, the sec recommended seeking steps land 2 of the State paper (denial of military sales and credits, interruption of normal air, rail, post and telecommunications links, and a selective embargo except for humanitarian items), but stopping short of a total trade embargo which woutd ~nvolve extended debate and possible failure in the UNSC. (Z) APPROVE ---- DISAPPROVE In order to maintain the public appearance of momentum, it will be )'~ f~c~: necessary to publicize in some form the types of actions which our ~ f_' allies have agreed to undertake. Some will not object: others will j; ~\ ~~. wish to keep their advice entirely private. The SCC recommended ~~~ ~~ that State contact the countries involved and determine what they would be willing to announce publicly. Depending on their reaction, we will probably want to do a careful backgrounder to get out the whole story. This can be linked to intelligence information on the decline of shipping into the Persian Gulf, to increase the appearance of effective disruption of trade. We would expect to do the backgrounder by Wednesday. (;M APPROVE v DISAPPROVE 2. Presidential Views. Dr. Brzezinski briefed the sec on the President's comments on the notes of Friday's meeting. The President approved the proposed strategy on the White Paper (that the informati mwlassified

217 UWGLASS,F\EO 3 be collected and papers prepared, but not to publish a formal document) but asked that the internal documentation be complete for selective use. Approval was granted for leaking information about certain banks' circumvention of restrictions on Iranian assets. At this point, however, there appeared to be no flagrant cases to be exploited. ~ 3. Trials. The President noted that it is important chat we do nothing which would lend legitimacy to any trials of the hostages by Iran. The question of the lawyers preparing legal support for the hostages will be raised at the meeting tomorrow. ~) 4. French. The Iranian case against u.s. branch banks in France has been refiled. The sec agreed that Giscard should be reminded of his assurance to Vance that this case would be tied up in the courts and not be subject to an early court decision. (~) Political-Military Issues: 1. Afghanistan. Admiral Turner briefed the latest developments. Soviet forces had remained stable from July until recently, but now there is evidence of movement. Two new command posts have been created just north of the Afghan border, there is a buildup of air assets, and two divisions may be on the move. There are about 5,300 Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan and approximately 2,000 civilians, some with families. CIA does not see this as a crash buildup but rather as, a 'steady, planned buildup, perhaps related to Soviet perceptions of a deterioration of the Afghan military forces and the need to beef them up at some point. Most of the countryside is now in rebel hands, but no major cities are expected to fall unless there are significant defections from the Army. We believe the Soviets have made a political decision to keep a pro Soviet regime in power and to use military force to that end if necessary. They either give this a higher priority than successful completion of SALT, or they may believe it is irrelevant to SALT. They may be ready to dump Amin, but they have not found a suitable replacement. ts') The sec, after some discussion, recommended a three part strategy. First, for the record, we will continue our diplomatic demarches to the Soviets on a private basis. There is no benefit in going public at this time. Second, we will explore with the Pakistanis and British the possibility of improving the financing, arming and communications of the rebel forces to make it as expensive as possib: for the Soviets to continue their efforts. Third, we will attempt to increase propaganda pressure on the Soviets worldwide. We will recommend to our European allies that they encourage their press to pay more attention to the subject. We will also step up our efforts to cast the Soviets as opposing Moslem religious and nationalist expressions. ~) APPROVE UMmSSIFIED DISAPPROVE

218 'U~SSIF'ED We are hamstrun9 by the divisions w~t in t e tribes, and an effort to organize them would be a mammoth undertaking. However, we can put in enough to keep them active and perhaps prevent the Soviets from wearino them down. One additional option would be to circulate a letter at the Security Council drawing attention to the Soviet role in Afghanistan. The see felt that it would be better to wait until the hostage problem was resolved before such a move since we want to maintain maximum Soviet cooperation at that issue. (%) 4 o UN8MSSIFiED

219 I JAl.nl J\.c..c.1I;J.J=O ~l.. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. O.C December 26, Oecemoer-"2 6, i.979 SPECIA: CODRDINATI~~ CO~~!IT~EE MEETI~G 7359-X (2 IF FIll ~ j(z Z~1A TIME AND PLACE: 9:30-10:30 a.m.; White House Situat~on Room SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meeting on Soviet Moves in Afghanistan (S) PARTICIPANTS: STATE Secretary Cyrus Vance Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Harold Saunders, Ass't. Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs DEFENSE W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy secretary Robert W. Komer, Under Secretary for Policy Affairs JCS General David Jones Lt. General John Pustay CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director Arnold Horelick, Nro for Soviet Union Military,-(,J Analyst WHITE HOUSE Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski David Aaron NSC Thomas Thornton Col. William ~om ehlended by E. 8ralila~R.ki ~E!aeeAI lise 1. i:5 {b) _ [kcfo~ilf f)/i : 014/)/< Partial~~:lasSjfjedlReleaSel1 on b/81 C;J' b R pro\'lsjons of E.O. 129~ V Soubers. Nationel Security Council --"'

220 7359-X 2 The CIA briefed the SCC on Soviet military actions in Afghanistan over the past two days. As many as 215 transports, including AN-22s, AN-12s, and IL-76s, arrived in Afghanistan from the Soviet Union durino December 25th. Kabul airport a?pears to be a major rece?~ion ~oin~. Ac~~~vity at Bagram airport ~s not known. This size airlift, it is speculated, could raise the Soviet combat force level in Afghanistan to somewhere between two-thirds and one and one-half divisions. No ground forces at Termez or Kushka have yet crossed the border into Afgpanistan. Thus we have an unusually large air movement but no ground re-inforcement. There is direct politburo supervision ot par~s of operation. (2) I, - The greatest risk that we face is a quick, effective Soviet operation to pacify Afghanistan. This would be extremely costly to our image in the region and to your position here at home. Our objective, then, should be to make the operation as costly as possible for the Soviets. The covert actions that you authorized have been very slow in getting off the ground. CIA will submit a full status report tomorrow. (.8) There will be a PRC tomorrow to discuss the broad regional impact of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. By that time we should have a more definitive picture of the scope of Soviet activity. At the PRC we will develop options for dealing with the issue, including possible recourse to the UN. In terms of immediate actions, we decided this morning: 1. We will permit information of the newest Soviet actions to reach the media on its own and maintain our current public posture.' 2. The new developments will be briefed promptly to concerned countries in the region as well as other interested parties. 3. State will brief the Congressional leadership today in connection with planned briefings on Iran. 4. You should not become personally involved in a further demarche to the Soviets at this time. We will have Tom Watson reiterate our concerns and press for an explanation of recent troop movements: the Soviets have probably passed the point of no return. l~ S ~ut:ended ey g. B!'eei!lift~ -Rea lion' USC 1.13 (e)._ D.ed4.tS"~t>.-! oil 1>1<..

221 .... L MEMORANDUM December 26, MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT J"\ <C-... FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ~~. SUBJECT: Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan I will be sending you separately a proposed agenda for the NSC meeting on Friday, and it will focus on both Afghanistan and Iran. In the meantime, you are receiving today's SCC minutes on both subjects. This memorandum is meant merely to provide some stimulus to your thinking on this subject. As ~ mentioned to you a week or so ago! we are now facing~' j re 10nal crisis. Both Iran and Afghan1stan are in turmoil;, anapakistan Is both unstable internally and extremely appre- ~ hensive externally. If the Soviets succeed in AfghanistaAi ana if Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled Historically, the British provided the barrier to that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer state. We assumed that role in 1945, but the Iranian crisis has led to the collapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and oman Gulfs. Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in ~ghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. While it could become a soviet Vietnam, the initial effects of the intervention are likely' to be adverse for us for the following dome~~~~ and ~ternational reasons:,:.'. -...~~~~-~ Domesi:i"t,:.. ';'1'-.-::-.' ) --::'J:.J,.~~ A. Ther\... ~"~.bention is likely to ati.mulate calls for more -. : tj.~? ~litary action in Iran. Soviet -decisiveness- vil~"'.codmstedwith our restraint, which will no longer be labeled".. prudent but increasingly as timid: B. At the same time, regional instability' may make a resolution of the Iranian problem more difficult for us, and it could bring us into a h~ to head confrontation with the Soviets, ~ Declassihed/ReJeased on.,/l'7/; ~ under provisions of f.e.2958 by R. Soobers. National St":'"c"'1'; C::-unril f~ j ~ 7b

222 lwasslflfu -2- C. SALT is likely to be damaged, perhaps irreparably, because Soviet military aggressiveness will have been so naked:.. D. More ~enerally, our handling of Soviet affairs will be attacked by both the Right and the Left. International A. Pakistan, unless we somehow manage to project both confidence and power into the region, is likely to be intimidated, and it could eventually even acquiesce to some form of external Soviet domination. B. With Iran destabilized, there will be no firm bulwark in Southwest Asia against the Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean: C. The Chinese will certainly note that Soviet assertiveness in Afghanistan and in Cambodia is not effectively restrained by the United States. Compensating Factors There will be, to be sure, some compensating factors: A. World public opinion may be outraged at the Soviet intervention. Certainly, Moslem countries will be concerned, and we might be in a position to exploit this. B. There are already 300,000 refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan, and we will be in a position to indict the Soviets for causing massive human suffering. That figure will certainly grow, and Soviet-sponsored actions in Cambodia have already taken their toll as well. c. There will be greater awareness among our allies for the need to do more for their own defense... A Soviet Vietnaa? ~...,.:ci However'_0 sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Sov!e ~. A. badly organized and poorly led: --. ':4 t~.,," 4".'!(.:.. "l. ('-'- B. They have iio. ctuary, no organized army, and no central government -- all ~f which North Vietnam had: C. They have limited foreign support, in con~rast to the enormous amount of arme that flowed to the Vietnamese from both the Soviet Union and China, ~MSlfltll

223 tlifti:assintu -3- D. The Soviets are likely to act decisively, unlike the U.S., which pursued in Vietnam a pol~cy of -inoculating- the enemy...;.~..,.. As a consequence, the Soviets might be able to assert themselves effectively, and in world politics nothing succeeds like success, whatever the moral aspects. What is to be Done? What follows are some preliminary thoughts, which need to be discussed more fully: A. It is essential that Afghanistani resistance continues. This means more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice; B. To make the above possible we must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan. cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy; C. We D. We should concert with Islamic countries both in a propaganda campaign and in a covert action campaign to help the rebels; F. P.in istan t '1 should encourage the Chinese to help the rebels als01 E. We should inform the Soviets that their actions are placing SALT in jeopardy and that will also influence the substance of the Brown visit to China, since the Chinese are doubtless going to be most concerned about implications for themselves of such Soviet assertiveness so close to their border. Unless we tell the Soviets directly and very clearly that our relations will suffer, I fear the Soviets will not take our -expressions of concern W very seriously, with the effect that our relations will suffer, without the Soviets ever having been confronted with~ need to ask the que_tion whether such looa1 adventurism is worth the lon9-.~ d...9.~ to the U.S.-Soviet relationship;,..,. ~'~:~'''i':;~ ~ i1ioti14 consider taking Soviet actions in Afghan...:._.threat to peace..-.. ~... :...~ ". ~~"':-.'''''.:.-'''.;'..". ~,..;...-;"..:c.;z..~ I:~ ",'1tW ~~. f..., ES1HHi

224

225 7 I; I (ill >ltdd eli UNClASSIFJED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. Zll506 PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING December 27, 19-9 TIME AND PLACE: 4:30-6;00 p.m.; White House Situation Room SUBJECT: Southwest Asia PARTICIPANTS: STATE Secretary Cyrus Vance ~:arren Christopher, Deputy Secretary David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political A :airs Harold Saunders, Ass't. Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs DEFENSE Secretary Harold Brown W. Graham Claytor, Jr. Deputy Secretary JCS Admiral Thomas Hayward Lt. Gen. John Pustay Central Intelligence Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director WHITE HOUSE Dr. Brzezinski David Aaron NSC Thomas P. Thornton Marshall Brement Turner: One unknown at this point is the extent of Soviet activity and their full intentions. They have brought in perhaps an additional 4-5,000 troops. We know that Babrak is a Parchamist who has been in Prague as Ambassador. After his dismissal he remained in Eastern Europe. His father was a ~ullah and this is being used to his advantage. Resistance in Kabul has died out for the night. SE ejl68rq99 S~T i!bigniew BI zezil1ski ileasoll- NSC' J 3 (b 8) ~ '. bi~is~ Declassihed/Releaseo un under provisions ot E.O by R. Soubers. National Secunty Council.'

226 7484 lex Add 011 ~'ED 2 Brown: Was the Soviet movement designed primarily to force a change in government? Newsom: Or do they think perhaps that the insurgents can be be~t~r dealt wit~ b~ Babrak? Brown: The insurgents are not going to buy that. Turner: They probably felt that they had to replace ~in; we don't know whether they have made a broader commitment. The forces in the Turkestan milita=y district may just be to support this move. Brzezinski: Who is in charge of the Afghan Army? Watanjar was purged and Amin kept the defense port Turner: folio. Brzezinski: The Soviets have ~een directly engaged. Turner: Yes. In Kabul they a=e engaging in combat. We do not know what is going on in t~e countryside. There are reports of Soviet flights in Herat and Kandahar. Brzezinski: casting? Turner: What is Radio Afghanistan outside of Kabul broad- :ve don't know. Vice President: now? What is the number of Soviet military there Turner: We do not,know exactly -- perhaps 10,000 men. Vice President: countries? What are the reactions of other Islamic Saunders: We have not got them yet. Newsom: We sent a Message last night to the Islamic posts. Vance: Let's go to the State paper now. Are there any substantial problems with the "objectives?" ~IED

227 PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW COMMIftEE December 27, _ ,- TIl-IE AND PLACE: SUBJECT: 4:30-6:00 p.m., White House Sit~ation Room Southwest Asia PARTICIPANTS: STATE Secretary Cyrus Vance Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs OSD secretary Harold Brown Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr. JCS Admiral Thomas Hayward Lt. General John Pustay OCI Admiral Stansfield Turner Deputy Director Frank Carlucci WHITE HOUSE Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs NSC Mr. Thomas Thornton, Staff Member Mr. Marshall Brernent, Staff Member SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS :,,20y Ue=J2Ss.1Ied/ReJeilsed OIl / ~/J I,'! under prtlvlsloils of f.o : i D. Van Tassel, National Secunl'/ Cc~' Ff'1-1'/4 / l The PRC met to discuss the situation in Southern Asia, especially in light of recent events in Afghanistan. Admiral Turner briefed on the fast-moving situation in Kabul, noting that the Soviet

228 liiil1tary presence a- the '"COuntry Vas as hiqh as perhaps 10;"000. ~ (v..:) e SECRET

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232 f, Deparl,,!ent oj State OUTGOING TELEGRAM 'T'Tt. CO"'10t-TIA, ~"1'1 10'I T T~OO".at NO- 'TATIOM~D IN If' IN'&.I&CTJa~. AT a'i~~ a-e l~ ~MD~l a, ~a~, 'O'&R~"INt IUI~DI_".- s. QUI INITIA'- '1~~1~&' INOICATI 'ftat T"1 'ZI'T ' OU.'I RlNTI 0' TNt COUP 'P"'R TO "AV~ CORC"'.QR TI'.'"ITTI.' I. TM! IOwltT uhla~ ITIIL', AhQ "~T 'WaR.'010 "'"'Nlll'~ 1_ a,'ul. 'fttl~ A.~OU-C1R&NT&.tMI C~lA.~T 'II.IICOIOIO and -Iii 11'IATtD CO.TI~UOU'~T 0.. I&'~.'~ '~&au'nc1&',yl. 'OITI-S TO.1 IAGIO a""'.l.'a~. ACCOIOI.. TO 'MIll...-ou-eIR&.'" IAAI.""E~ "AO IUCC&IOEO AMIN A..D." -'AlO '.&'101.' O~ TMi RI,OLUTIONa_' tou.ci~. I'.IAI CeMICM MI JI u.ua~lt C'LLtD).al 'OR ~A_' "AI' A-I"L O~ 'OIAlR,al'JOtNT TAMAAI 'OM ~tadi~i"l' 0' a,ima.iitan" ~al't "O"RINt. A'TEt T"' a'mil,.,. co~' IAIRAI.AI -,RIO ICPyTf PI1"1 RS_IITEa BuT _ITMI" A fl. "O.TMI MI.A' -IIILIO. AI 'RIA"AOa. TO 'RAiut,, 'O.T M MILU 'OM '~T III.cae. atfowc IIING OROt.lO lack TO a'.ul~ li.ail.,d MoT IIT~ft T~ K'.VL, IVT.C ItLl 'l "t.1~a1nid I-. AlTII. IUlDPt ~TIL ~JI J.'TAL~ATlgN., TKi IOwIET. A' T~ MI. "IRA~ '1IIIOlM,. ME I'.NOM. TO 1, D OICATCO WAIII,T.~ KAI 'II~ CLOIE TO T"I"auvllt.,~a 't'r'; ANO MI.IL~ "OI'ILT It '"OROU'MLY 'RtILI TO 10YItT ojlte110-. II'i- T~ Cl.C~AlTA.Ctl 0' "1' I.'T'LLATIO-, 'AI~&. IlL' CL1AaLY 51 OIPINOlNT OM Roleo. 'OM "1' IURVI'AL. " I. -I ""I.IP~tl,aOR A"U~ '"a' 'ME la_ii' AIML1" I' CONTINU1-S. t,allla I- O Cl"~lR, AT LtalT TN taul,.'t.t 0', CORa'T _ &1R.' ' 1,10 at.a&.ar AIR folel aaal tort RILII MO.'" ~ TM~ CA'ITAL. a "a, IUI.,TlaL.~ILD~ Of '0'11',a.CII 1""t.Dl'T ~'.ali'" D' 'ttl A"MAII 10IlD&' 1.'OL'l.' T~ ILI"IN" Of AT LIt '1'1 01,1110N" IU'leIT. 'KAT '"I 10,1'TI "a,1 ADDITIONAL "1'll'.T OIJICTlvl1 -.. ec'o-u T~ e~.~ Of &OVI.~IMT IN 'A.U~. TNI' lujldu'. - - CO"lDlNl1A~., _... _... -_ _ _ _-~..--- MOT'0IIUPCOOUat' "'HOUT THI AUTHOIiZAnON Of thlixku11viikaitaa,

233 .Depart",t!" Df Slate... OUTGOING TELEGRAM 1"'1. ca"'lotnt!a'- lilli' ~'I&&.U".~., ~, COR"! 'l.c.a~t 'led "1~1CU'!I~'. T~ ~I. _tiir' "A' ALREAO' RADl lar& CO.Cl~JAToa, UI~I' 6_.OU.CI"~.Ta 1.,. t"ont TO "'_I IT "Ok' 'ALAT ILl TO T"& 'fi"'. 'u.l1c AND Mal 0"'.1.0 TO NIIOTIATI.. -- IT" VA_IOU. I.'U«G~"T i.au'i. "o_ev..., w& I.'ICT 'MAT 'T 0' T~ lle.ukie.'. -ILL 'IOIAILt.'ua. 'N&ll '''IOACMeI l.el 'MiT AAI '1~IL' TO IliAMD IA..,i.1 "IN ROII-' - 1,'UlC or TNI.aYliT UNION TN'N "I' '~IQ&CI"OR. I".'J ILL DOW"LI" live LI' ' 1.1' TO NO_-AL1I."I.' IUT.J~ 'ACT I' ~v".ul_' ".a-'oyi~t 'OLle, AND If.vE"JI.' o '"I.0vltT. I- DO"&lllt "'AIRI. T~t NI_ ItalRI "A' "AVE A Ol'Fl'ULT TIAl CO-O"llee IRlIe" Of T"I 'OIRC. ao. ~.. " ~T; T"f A""'_ 'RRY N"ICM ALI~'O' IAIL' Dl"OI'LlltD.1L~.1 'U.TKlI '"'II, MIl ROIT ~tci_l CO~' 'NO '" 11 MA' M1LL al "oal Tftt 't'ftan uey!~dprlnt 'I05N'".a. 'LaIADf IN' "A.ILI' DUI To'T"1 -IDI,,1140,,g'U~A. 1.'U'IINer THJO~ T TM COU~T"'191. '"1 'OYIETlL~ 'ACt A 01'flC~T- 61e 18.lauILD1~& '"l "I"AM AMR' 'NO IrCO~ITIUCTlil TMC Co.,",.. MOtTO.liftoouao ~HOUTTHI AUTHOliZAnOM Of IHI EXKUtlYI HcalTAIY

234

235 ~ ~, M\:I I' MEMORANDUM FOR FROM: SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI DAVID AARON MARSHALL BREMENT ~ OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM December 28, 1979 Response to the Soviets Regarding Afghanistan: A Menu of Possible Actions To emphasize the outrageous and unprecedented nature of the. Soviet coup in Afghanistan would be to belabor the obvious. Any failure to respond adequately on our part would be perceived as glaring weakness by our Allies, by the non-aligned, and especially in the Persian Gulf. The domestic near-consensus on Iran could evaporate over Afghanistan. It is therefore imperative that we not only act to counter what the Soviets have done in Afghanistan, but that we are perceived as having done so. The speciousness and bald-faced arrogance of the Soviet action can hardly be exaggerated. There was no need, for example, to announce Amin's immediate execution, which gives the lie to the Soviet assertion that they were invited in by the Amin government. Furthermore, the use of the recently-signed Friendship Treaty with Afghanistan as the juridical basis for their actions creates a logical implication that the Soviets could equally undertake the overthrow of any of the ten governments with whom they now have such treaties, e.g. India. Equally to the point, would Sadat and Siad have thrown out the Soviets so cavalierly if they had felt that one serious Soviet option was to fly in an army and set up their rivals in power? I. The Public Posture We have no real option of downplayinq the significance of the Soviet action. We need a clear, sharp and unequivocal response, which should be given full play by all our communications media. The themes we should stress are as follows: a. The fact that Amin was assassinated within two days of the Soviet invasion makes a mockery of Moscow's claims that it was invited in by the Amin Government. That Amin' s family was killed along with him shows the kind of people we are dealing with.... I ~ I q ~\ \ Deciassified'Released on.,1.1 ~ I,~ under provisions 01 E.O by R. Soubers. National SecUrity Council fh-b1 b

236 -2- b. The fact that the Soviets cite their Friendship Treaty with Afghanistan as the basis for interference in the Afghans' internal affairs implies that the Soviets have a similar right in all other countries with whom they have friendship treaties. c. This is the first use by the Soviets of their armed forces in a combat situation outside the Soviet Bloc since the Second World War and is therefore an extremely ominous precedent. Do the Soviets claim such universal rights in all other areas? How can this be squared with the UN Charter? d. Afghanistan had been the classic buffer state for the past 150 years. The Soviets had no legitimate national interest in taking such actions. The fact of the matter was that the Amin Government was, by any reasonable standard, pro-soviet, as was the Taraki Government which preceded it. Furthermore, the Afghan Government which existed before the April 1978 coup was not anti-soviet in nature and maintained cordial state-to-state relations with Moscow. All the military needs of that regime, for example, were supplied by the Soviets. e. Does the Brezhnev doctrine apply to the entire Third World? What are the limits to the Brezhnev doctrine? As Soviet force projection capabilities increase over the cominq decades, they will have the capability to mount such an action anywhere in the world. Is this a tolerable situation for the international community? f. We are extremely concerned at the human toll which the Soviet-supported combat is taking. There are 350,000 refugees now in Pakistan, and we would not be surprised to see that number rise to half a million in the near future. Thus, as in Cambodia and in so many other countries since World War II, the Soviets are creating another enormous refugee problem, this time in South Asia and among an overwhelmingly Muslim population. The United States is prepared to do its utmost to assist the Afghan refugees with humanitarian aid. g. The Soviet Union is atheistic by doctrine and has published enormous amounts of anti-religious and anti-muslim literature. The US, on the other hand, firmly believes in religious freedom and enshrines it in our Constitution. Three million Muslims practice their religion freely in the US. In the USSR, Muslims have been persecuted, mosques have been closed, and religion has been discouraged. In Soviet Azerbaijan, for example, there are only 24 officially recognized mosques now operating, whereas before the Revolution of 1917 there were several thousand in operation. h. In sum, replacement of one government by another through the use of armed force, as done by the Soviets in Afghanistan, is an egregious violation of normal international standards of behavior, sets a very dangerous precedent, and is regarded by the US reckless adventurism. We calion all nations, and particularly nations with significant Muslim populations, to appeal to the Soviet Onion to allow the Afghan people to settle its own problems in line with the principle of no interference in the internal affairs of other nations. ~ UnlJlAuul\ -il.ij as

237 II. Other Possible Actions 1. Dispatch a high-level mission to give the Pakistanis the kind of assurance they need to bolster their confidence and to assist us in our support of the Afghan insurgents. 2. Dispatch a mission to investigate conditions in the refugee camps in Pakistan, which would presumably result in additional US and international assistance to support the refugees. 3. Explore with all pertinent governments the stepping up of covert assistance to the insurgents and in the process commit ourselves to maximizing such assistance. 4. Form a special committee in NATO to examine threats to the peace outside the Treaty area. III. 5. Liberalize our arms sale policy to the sub-continent. Other Possible Actions in the OS-Soviet Context The above actions might be enough domestically and in world opinion if the Soviets are basically unsuccessful in tamping down the insurgency and thus become mired in a Vietnam-type situation. But if they are successful, these actions will not be sufficient and we will look weak and ineffectual. In any case, the Soviet action in Afghanistan almost demands that we take specific bilateral steps to indicate our abhorrence. Among those steps which the President might consider (and it is too early to make definite decisions on this score) are the following: 1. Withdrawal of SALT. If, after consultation with Byrd and others, it is determined,that SALT no longer has a chance of early passage, the Administration could consider withdrawing it unilaterally, while waiting for a better climate, although still committed to the fact that the Treaty is in our basic interest and still favoring ratification by the Senate. 2. Grain Sales. The Administration could suspend the US Soviet Grain Agreement or simply suspend all sales of grain to the USSR for ~e indeterminate future. This would require Congressional authorization to purchase and store the excess grain. 3. TeChnOl~ Transfer and Licensing. We could announce a much tougher pol~ regarding technology transfer to the USSR and a closer look at licenses for petroleum-related exports. 4. MFN. We could announce that we do not intend to introduce legislation giving MFN to the Soviet Onion during the current session of Congress -3-

238 lwl1.j~l~~ _ ~ s. Postponement of US-Soviet Trade Council. We could announce the postponement of the next session of the US-Soviet Trade Council, scheduled to meet in Washington April Tighten Up COCOM Procedures. We could announce that we are undertaking with our Allies a review of current COCOM procedures with a view to tightening them. 7. E~ulsion of a Lar e Group of Soviet Agents. We could identify an arrest 50 to 130 Soviet KGB agents in the US, making clear to the Soviets that any retaliatory action on their part would mean further expulsions by us at a rate of two Soviets for one American, i.e. the current ratio of Soviet Embassy personnel in the US to Americans in the USSR, leaving out the 550 Soviets at the UN (which makes one-for-one expulsion entirely unsatisfactory and un~ reciprocal to us). 8. Withdrawal of Ambassador. We could (and probably should) recall Watson for consultations. (Dobrynin's absence is obviously not entirely medical in nature.) 9. Broaden Securitf Relationships. The US could undertake new security relationships w1th Oman, Somalia, and Turkey, i.e. three Muslim countries. 10. Broadcasting. The US could announce increased broadcasts to Western Asia and to the Muslim portions of the USSR. 11. China. In conjunction with the Brown visit, the US could let it be known that we have agreed not only to the sale of certain high technology items to China, but to the sale of over-the-horizon radar and anti-tank missiles -- clearly defensive weapons -- as well. We could explain that this was done explicitly in light of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Future arms sale to China, we could add, would be on a case-by-case basis. 12. Removal of Inhibitions on Covert Actions. The US could ask for revision of all of the legislative inhibitions on our ability to conduct covert actions anywhere in the world. In sum, Soviet negative reaction to various protests and expostulation: including ours, is completely predictable. These were taken into consideration by the Soviets before they made their move. This is an event of such importance that a strong and vivid US response must be made to it, and not just in terms of Soviet action in Afghanistan itself, but in terms of overall US-Soviet relations. The Soviets must be made to understand that this was a very expensive invasion and that it should not set a precedent for future action. The American people and the Congress should be sympathetic to tough responses by the President, especially if the Soviet actions in Afghanistan are cast in the proper light, i.e. the Soviets have kicked us while we were down, and we do not intend to stand for it. URuLRuuU 'lou -4-

239 INFORMATION J 7406 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL I December 28, 1979 MEMORANDUM FROM: SUBJECT: FOR IJ ZBIGNt:RZEZINSKI DAVID ON ~1ARSHA BREMENT v5 Where Soviet Actions in Afahanistan Violate the Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War The following specific provisions of the basic principles of relations of May 29, 1972, are either violated or called into question by the Soviet actions in Afghanistan: "The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the OtEer, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the parties based on the princi le of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of orce." "The USA and the USSR have a special responsiblity to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.. " From the agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of June 22, 1973: "The parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the develo ment of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacer at10n 0 t e1r relations... " "The parties agree. to proceed from the premise that each party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the party, against the allies of the other party, and against other countries in circumstances which may endanger internat10nal peace and security.. "

240

241 - - RANDUM ftnfibeii'fial INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FROM: SUBJECT: FOR: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL / // fr Decem~28' 1979 ZBIGNIEW ~RiEZINSKI MICHEL O~BERG ~ Afghanistan (U) I consider the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a major watershed event. It has profound implications for Soviet willingness to use military might to advance their interests. In strategic importance, it outweighs the hostage problem in Iran. (C) We must make this a costly effort for the Soviets by insuring that the insurgents have adequate arms and by increasing our aid to Pakistan. The President's nuclear non-proliferation and arms restraint policies must take second place to a concerted effort to teach Moscow that aggression does not pay. Here are the measures -- some admittedly extreme -- which I think we should now consider: Significant increases in arms sales to Pakistan. (C) Covert arms supply to Afghan insurgents. (C) U.N. Encourage third countries to take the invasion to the (C) Toughen export controls to USSR. (C) Immediately approve sale of telephone switching equipment to the PRC. (C) Encourage France to sell military equipment to the PRC. (C) Quietly encourage dock workers to disrupt the loading of grain on ships going to Russia. (C) Copy to: Marshall Brement CQUPIDEN'I'IAL Review on December 28, 1985

242

243 ... i " December 28, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI DAVID AARON ROBERT BLACKWILL ~ The President's"December 28 Telephone Calls to European Leaders (C) I wili do a full record tomorrow of the President's calls to Thatcher, Schmidt, Cossiga and Giscard d'estaing, but I wanted you to have a quick summary now. (C) T~e President used the talking points at Tab A almost verbatim e~cept for #4, the one on SALT. He put that issue in the -" :>llowing way: "We are going ahead with SALT independently : what happens in Afghanistan, but we are not going to allow ;r concern about SALT to interfere with our strong condemnation : Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.".(Schmidt's response :> this line was "I think that is appropriate.") The President.150 told each of the leaders that he was going to send a very ;~rong message to Brezhnev on Afghanistan, and he invited "1rs. Thatcher, but none of the others, to do the same. (C) AS you know, Thatcher, Schmidt and Cossiga all immediately ~greed to a meeting of deputy foreign ministers this weekend..mder NATO auspices, but Giscard said "no." He did not favor the NATO structure for this meeting because Afghanistan was not in the NATO Treaty area. Thus, t was not proper to use the NATO instrument in this case. A meeting in London of the NATO members, but not under NATO sponsorship, was the compromise. (C) Incidentally, Giscard made ~he impo~tant point that we must take the Soviet intervent~o.. i~ A:ghanistan seriously because of its impact on Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf States. The latter, said Giscard, would certainly feel threatened if there were no Western reaction to the situation in Afghanistan. (Cl The President urged both ~rs. Thatcher and Giscard not to offer substantial amendments to our UNSC resolution on Iran. He told Thatcher that we could accommcdate in the resolutior. the British concern about the 10 ships that British oil companies jointly own with Iran, but not the other British suggested amendments --.emlfiqenti.1l,l. Review 12/28/2009 Extended bv z. Brzpzin~~i

244 .,..,...,.., &ONFIl)iNWbM., es~bially the one concerning extraterritoriality. After'indieating that the British concerns were purely technical, Mrs. Thatcher seemed to hint that HMG might eventually agree to o~ formulation. In response to the President's question on this subject, Giscard said that the only thing about our draft ~esoulation which he could not accept was its prohibition on airline flights in and out of Iran. That would endanger French and other foreigners there who might want to'get out in a hurry. The President said that he did not even know this was in Our language. (Gary Sick tells me it isn't.) I briefed.bill Maynes on this part of the two conversations and he is getting in touch with the British and French to try to reach an agreed text. Finally, Cossiga told the President tha t he will be seeing the Soviet Ambassador' tomorrow who has asked to come in. Cossiga will say that the Governrr,~nt of Italy is gravely worried about the Soviet intervention in Afgtinistan which is contrary to the policies of detente and which 'c~ars the risk of creating a far worse situation in the region ~nd beyond. (Cl 1, sum, none of these leaders showed the slightest hesitation in a;reeing with the President's analysis of the strategic importance c: Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. We have yet to see what ",hey will be willing to do about it. (el

245 . ~ ~..', Talking points for Discussions on Afghanistan with Allied Leaders 1. We regard the soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an extremely grave de~elopment. 2. It has profound strategic consequences for the stabili~y of the entire region. 3. We believe that it is essential that we make this action as politically costly as possible to the Soviet Union anc to that end will be a?proaching a number of governments; particularly the non-aligned and the Muslim countries to speak out.4. We are. not going to be deterred from making an issue of this because of SAL~. The Soviets have clearly rr4de a decision that this intervention is more important than SALT 5. ~e also are prepared to carry it all the way to 'the United Nations; ho\.;ever, because of our own efforts in the UN with regard to the hostages, we would appreciate it if others could take the initiative there We also believe the North Atlantic Council should meet immediately at a high political level to assess the matter and to coordinate allied strategy. (For France: I hope that France can work within the North Atlantic Council and show solidarity on this issue.) DECLASSIFIED O12958 Sec I ~&) PER:Jd.~~~NAL.JRS~.DATE~ BY_~~- -BEeRS'!!

246

247 e ;-~....: '-.!ESBh UI ' 7S"S' I'i'l's'l!e... UUCUSS1HEO. _. _0.,;.." - THE WHITE HOliSE WASHINGTON O~ ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT It... ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ~:> Our Response to Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (U)..,... o ọ.. u Co c c... c One of our basic problems with the Soviets, as has been the case with all our recent predecessors in office, is maintaining our credibility in Moscow. We have frequently protested Soviet actions (bases in Vietnam, Cubans abroad, etc.). Since we have not always follow~ these verbal protests up with tangible responses, the Soviets may be getting into the habit of"disregarding our concern. (C) Warren Christopher will be meeting with our major Allies in London on Monday. They will be looking to us for leadership, for specific evidence that we are unwilling to let the Soviets get away with this invasion with impunity. With this in mind, you may wish to instruct Christopher to inform these governments that we are taking tangible steps in our bilateral relationship with Moscow to manifest our displeasure. (S) Since in your conversations yesterday with European leaders you drew a parallel between the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the one in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it may be useful for you to know what actions Johnson and Rusk took after the August 20, 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. (You may be sure the Soviets have the list at hand and will draw comparative conclusions about the international environment in which they operate. The same- will be true of most countries of the world, especially those"anywhere near Afghanistan.) Within three days of the invasion: (1) The President made a strong public statement. (2) Secretary of State made a public statement. (3) We initiated a Security Council meeting. (4) We suspended bilateral talks with the Soviets on peaceful uses of the atom (5) Embassy Moscow was instructed to restrict all official and social contacts with Soviet officials. ọ..... CIl '" = ọ., oj:. f-o (oj :> U c:: -< >-!: c:: ::> u III en...j < Z o f-o -< Z... -= Eo t:=

248 ~FCPFT/Slilll.i'i'JiUoE.._... _ ~_._-~. '." " _-- UNClASSIfiED _._- ---_._--- (6) We sent the same instructions to all US diplomatic missions worldwide. (7) Rusk told Dobrynin on August 23 that there would be no movement on other issues until the situation in Czechoslovakia was clarified. (8) The State Department actively discouraged us business ties with the Soviet Union. (9) We stopped, turned down or delayed requests for export licenses to the Soviet Union: (10) We stopped participation in trade fairs in the Soviet Union. (11) We cancelled pending cultural exchanges with "the Soviets. (C) As you will recall, the invasion of Czechoslovakia also resulted in the cancellation of the scheduled first round of SALT talks between Washington and Moscow. While I would oppose any freeze on our efforts to achieve SALT ratification, I think it would be a mistake to confine our response to this Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to words. In this connection, I enclose a memorandum from Marshall Brement of the NSC Staff which lists a menu of actions we could take to evidence our displeasure with Moscow. I would welcome your guidance on what you feel might be done. I do think something definite in our bilateral relationship with Moscow should follow this extraordinary act of Soviet arrogance and brutality and that Warren Christopher should inform the Allies on Monday what specific steps we intend to take. In my judgment, such resolve on our part would have significant benefits for us, both domestically and internationally. (S)... M o ọ.. u c c ọ. c ~.. ~ ọ.. :: '" = oco>... c. Ė.. ọ..&.!-' tai > u c:: < >- t: c:: => uu:l en..:l < :z oi= < :z E e "- UNCUSSIFIED

249 -ME.MORANDUM c:eetfpieeu'fi.ltl ACTION ~~ 7405 Add-on NATIOl'iAL SECURITY COUNCI~01- ~~ December 29, 1979 FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI r ", ROBERT BLACKWILL >/ SUBJECT: Summaries of President's Telephone Conversations with European Leaders (C).~ I attach for your approval memoranda of the President's telephone conversations yesterday with Thatcher, Schmidt, Cossiga and Giscard d 'Estaing. (C) / Approve --- Disapprove CO~FICENmI.AL Review 12/29/85

250 TH E: WH ITE: HOUSE WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM OF CONVERATION SUBJECT: Surumary of President's telephone conversation with Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga of Italy, December 28, 1979, 12:26-12:33 p.:n. (C) The President told t~e Prime Minister that he had callee Cossiga to discuss the Soviet intervention in A~ghanistan. We regarded this as an extremely grave development, equivalent to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moscow had changed a buffer state into a puppet state, and this had profound strategic consequences for the stability of the entire region. Cossiga agreed, and said the consequences would not only be felt in the region. The President said absolutely,that this event would have reverberations throughout the Moslem world, the Non-Aligned world, and even would affect the North Atlantic nations. The President said that we were going ahead with SALT independent of the -situation in Afghanistan, but ~e would not let our concerns about SALT prevent us from strongly condemning the Soviet intervention. The President said we were prepared to carry this issue all the way to the United Nations but, because of our own efforts in New York concerning the hostages, we were not the ones to take the initiative now at the UN on Afghanistan. The President said that he would like to send Warren Christopher, our Deputy Secretary of State, to a North Atlantic Council meeting this weekend in order to exchange views on the Afghanistan situation. Did the Prime Minister think this was advisable? ec) Cossiga said that he supported the President's proposal and the two leaders agr~ed that either Vance or Christopher would be in touch with the Italian Foreign Minister to work out the details. The President said that Cossiga's position was very good news for him. We did not want a major confrontation with the Soviets, but we would not let them do this in Afghanistan without some political cost and some expression to the world about our concern. (C) Cossiga then passed the phone to his diplomatic adviser, Berlinguer, who translated Cossiga's response into English as follows: -'=6Ni IDEN'rIAL Review Classified & extended by Z.Brzezinski Reason for extension :--bu~iab

251 Cossiga was in complete agreement with all the President had said. He was going to see the Soviet Ambassador next morning, who had asked to come in, most likely on this issue. Cossiga would stress Italy's grave concern about Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, which was contrary to the policies of detente and which bore the risk of creating a worse situation in the region and beyond. Cossiga was at the President's disposal for any further communication with him as the President wished, and completely agreed to a North Atlant~c Council meeting this weekend. (C; After ~~e President said that the State Department would be in tou=h in a few hours, he stressed how deeply he appreciated Cossig~ls attitude. The President looked forward to meeting the Pr_~e Minister personally and we were already planning our t=ip t~ Italy in the late spring. Stressing that Cossiga s:oulc call him directly at any time, the President conveyed r~s bs3t wishes to the Prime Minister, politically and c:nerw:.se. (C)

252 ~. THE WHITE: HOUSE: -G9NRBEN+W:- COW rpell'i'ial e: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJEC':': Summary of the President's Telephone Ccnve=sa~icn Mrs. Margaret Tha~che=, Prime Minister c: Great Britain, Deca~be= 28, 1979, 1::40 t= 11:50 a.m. (C) After an exchange of holiday greetings, the President told Mrs. Thatcher that he wanted to speak to her about A g~anistar.. He said that we regarded the Soviet in~ervention in A!ghanistan as an extremely grave develofment, similar in scope anc?e~anent Dmpact to what the Soviets did in Czechoslovakia. In effect, Moscow had changed a buffer naticn into a puppet nation under Soviet direction. This would have profound stragegic consequences for the stability of the entire region. (C) The President continued that it was essential that we make this action as politically costly as possible to the Soviet Union.. Although we could not force the Soviets out of Afghanistan, ~~ey would have a serious problem with the Nonaligned countries and particularly with the Moslem countries. This was true not only of Pakistan, Iran, India and others of a similar nature in the region, but also of the entire Nonaligned Movement. The President said he intended to call on these countries to speak out against the Soviet intervention. (C) The President then noted that we were going ahead with SAL~ independently of what happened in Afghanistan, but we would not let our concern about SALT interfere with a strong US condemnation of the Soviet intervention. The President said that he did not ~~ink that we could afford to let the Soviets get away with this intervention wi~~ impunity. (C) Noting that we were prepared to carry the Afghanistan issue all the way to the United Nations in the next number cf days, the President said because of our own efforts in the UN concerning the hostages, it was probably not advisable for us to take the initiative on Afghanistan in New York. There were others who could do this -- Britain, China or some of the Nonaligned countries. (C) ='t:qufiomi':fl\l Review 12/28/2009 Extended by Z. Brzezinski Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a) SANlTlZED ~ d.. J.~~,~ 2~.5B. Sec..3.6 ~RE ~-t."-ci.~ BY~NARS OI\"'C~~/4r,..

253 The President said that the last?oint he wanted to make was that we should dramatize our concern about Afghanistan. We would like to have a meeting of the North Atlantic Council solely on the Afghanistan problem. The President would send a high-level person to attend the Council this weekend. It was critical for the Allies to decide as a body how we should address the problem in Afghanistan. (C) Mrs. Thatcher replied that she and Peter Carrington wo~ld be about ~~is weekend a~d a VS representative would be very welcome in London. The President asked if the Prime ~inis~er agreec that we should get t~e North Atlantic Council together. Mrs. Thatcher said yes, and observed that when something like this occurred, it was important to act right at the beginning. (C) The President agreed and observed that the Soviets had probably gotten away with this intervention for too many hours already. We had raised our concern about this for two or ~~ree weeks, but prl~arily at the Secretary of State level. The President said that he was probably going to make a personal public statement this afternoon to stress his concern about the Soviet intervention. (C). Continuing, the President noted that the Germans were very concerned as had been reflected in a conversation bet...,eei70 Cy Vance and Genscher that morning. The FRG was worried about the future ~pact of this event on countries not only like Pakistan, but also Romania and Yugoslavia as well as the precedent it established with relations between the Warsaw Pact countries and the European Allies. (C) In response to Mrs. Thatcher's repeated willingness to welcome a us representative over the weekend, the President said he would probably send Warren Christopher, our top man second only to Cy Vance. The President suggested that Cy Vance would call Lord Carrington in the next few hours to discuss the details and the Prime Minister replied that she would let Carrington know. Mrs. Thatcher said again that it was important to act quickly. (Cl Turninc to Iran, the Presiden~ said that Cv Vance would be delivering our Iranian message to the Security Co~~cil personally tomorrow or the next day. We were especially concerned about the extensive amendments that the UK had o:fered on our Security Council Resolution, and the President told Mrs. he hoped that the UK wculd not be adamant about these suggested changes. (C) That~her CONFTDpl'"I A:,

254 J=9lG-lB!:ll'lAL -3- Mrs. Thatcher responded that the British amendments were technical in nature, having tc do with their own legislation. The President replied ~~at we had a long-standing debate about extraterritorialitv, a debate we certainlv could not resolve in the next few days. The OS could, ho~ever, be responsive to the u~ concern over jointly-owned Iranian flag ships. But the other British ocints would be verv difficult for us. (el The President then said that we could accommodate the British need on the ten ships owned jointly by OK oil companies and Iran and this could be worked out between Cy and Lord Carrington. ( Noting that he would be calling Schmidt, Giscard d'estaing, and cossiga, the President said he wanted to talk to Mrs. Thatcher first. She ~~anked h~ and said that they should stay in close touch. She hoped that the US had the requisite number of votes in the Security Co~~cil to pass the Iranian resolution. ~he President said he ~~ought so if we gave the Secretary General a brief period of tl~e to try to work something out pending L~position of the sanctions. This would be a two-step approach with the first step taking five or six days. The President noted that we had just finished a National Security Council meeting and this was what he had decided although he would not announce it publicly. This two-step approach should bring aboard more than enough votes. (Cl Mrs. Thatcher agreed, and said it would give the Iranians an opport~~ity to react. ~he President observed that they could save face in ~~is way i: they wa~ted to. However, it was his judgment that Khcmei~i had ~c such desire although he was probably getting pressure fr~m ether ma~ers 0: the Revolutionary Council. (C) In concluding the conversation, ~~e President said he would be sending a strong personal message to Brezhnev and that i: rtrs. Thatcher would consider doing something similar, it would be helpful. (C 1

255 THE WHITE: HOUSE WASHINGTON MEMO~~DUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT: Summary of President's telephone conversation with Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the FRG, December 28, 1979, 12:01-12:09 p.m. (Cl After an exchange of holiday greetings, the President to~d the Chancellor that he hoped Sc~~idt was look~ng forward to a great year, political and otherwise. Thanking the President, Schmidt said that he knew the President was still greatly concerned about our people in Tehran. The President noted that Secretary Vance would be taking our resolut~cn to the Security Council tomorrow. (Cl Indicating that the principal purpose of this call was to discuss Afghanistan, the President said we regarded the Soviet intervention there as an extremely grave development, second only to what the Soviets had done in Czechoslovakia. They had changed a buffer state into a puppet or satellite state under Soviet control. This would have profound strategi9 consequences for the stability of the entire region. (Cl I The President said we had received a message from Schmidt's people earlier in the day and Vance and Genscher had also spoken together. We knew how concerned the FRG was over this matter. The President said he was going to send a strong personal message to Brezhnev, a message in the strongest possible terms. We thought it was important that the Soviets not complete this action in Afghanistan with impunity. Although we could not dislodge them from Afghanistan, we could encourage the Non-Aligned and Moslem countries to speak out and condemn Soviet action in Afghanistan. (Cl The President continued that we would not let the Soviet action interfere w~th SALT, but, equally, we would net let our concerns about SALT dissuade us from strons condemnation of the Soviets. Schmidt replied that he thought that approach was appropriate. (Cl The President noted that we were prepared to carry this all the way to the United Nations, but given our own efforts in New York concerning the hostages, we were not the proper ones cc ~lp I f)emy IAJ:r. Review Classified & extended by Z.Brzezinski Reason for extension~ OECLi:.SSIFIED E.G.i 295(3. Sec.3.G!$ ~fh«e ~-~~~ :~ ~': NAAS.OA~5i C

256 ~. l~. n to take the initiative in the UN on Afghanistan. Concerning Iran, we hoped to get a Security Council vote on our resolution before the end of the year when the composition of the Council changed. (Cl The President then said he thought we ought to have a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council on Afghanistan. He was prepared to send Warren Christopher, our Deputy Secretary of State, to Europe this weekend to discuss common statements or action we might want to carry out in response to the Soviet intervention. Schmidt replied that he thought this was quite appropriate. Noting that he had talked to Mrs. That~he= after first trying to reach the Chancellor, the President said she agreed completely about the seriousness 0: the Soviet matter and the need for a North Atlantic Council meeting. (Cl Schmidt then said he would like to make a formal suggestion regarding the Council. Since Afghanistan was outside the North Atlantic Treaty area, it might be necessary to give the Council meeting a headline that would not lead others to shy away from participation. Given the events in Belgi~~, Holland and Denmark a few weeks ago, it might be worthwhile to give the session a little different headline. The President asked what sort of headline, and Schmidt stressed that for him, calling a meeting explicitly on Afghanistan was okay; he said that other capitals in Europe might prefer something like "discussion of the global situation." Schmidt then repeated that the idea of this meeting was fine with him, and he would so inform Genscher. The President said Vance would be calling Genscher in a few hours to work out the details, and he would be getting in touch with Giscard d'estaing next. The President said that he thought it was necessary to move expeditiously on Afghanistan outside the UN since the Security Council was so involved with Iran. Thus, the idea of a Nort~ Atlantic Council meeting. (Cl The President closed the conversation by saying how sorry he was to interrupt Schmidt's vacation on Majorca, and the Chancellor stressed that he had welcomed the call. (Cl

257 THE: WHITE: HOUSE: WAS"IN(;':'ON MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Teleohone Conversaticn with V~lery Giscard d'estaing, President c: France, December 28, 1979, 1:54 to 2:0~ F.ill. (Cl After a brief exchange of greetings, the President told Giscarc ~~at r.~ wanted to talk to him about Afghanistan. We regarded the Sc :iet intervention in Afghanistan as an extremely grave d~'lelc~ment. The Soviets had changed a buffer state into a f:?pe:' state and this had profound strategic consequences for t e e~~ire region. Giscard agreed. (Cl.e P=:sident continued that we believed it was essential that ~ maj:= this action politically costly to the Soviet Union. ~ wo~:ld be approaching a number of governments, particularly he NC:laligned and the Moslem countries, to speak out. Al- :houg~ ~~e plight of our hostages made it impossible for us :0 ta: :.= Afghanistan to t..'1e UN now, eventually this would. have :0 be,d-one by the US or someone else. The President said that e co:-.sidered this Soviet intervention to be a violation of ;reements the Soviets have had with us since Nixon concerning.:ene::-a}. principles of detente. (C) ~he?resident noted that the Moslem countries, and especially ~1ose directly adjacent to Afghanistan, would be deeply concerned. He had just talked with President Zia, who said the Soviet inter-,-ention was tragic and destabilizing. Zia believed that the direct overthrow of the Afghanistan government was orchestrated by ~~e Soviet Union. The President said that there was no doubt abc~t that. Indicating that we had all that we could handle in the Security Council right now with our hostages and Iran, the President stated that Cy Vance would be presenting our case in New York the next day. (Cl The President said that he felt deeply that we needed to have a consultation about events in Afghanistan, perhaps as soon as this weekend before too much time went by. He was therefore planning to send Warren Christopher, our Deputy Secret.ary of State, to Europe to talk to seme of our North Atlantic Council partners. (C) ESeNrIDSSl'tIA:C- Review 12/28/2009 Extended by Z. Brzezinski Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

258 ~NPIf)E!i'fIAL -2- Giscard replied that ~~e Soviet i~terver.tion in Afghanistan was an important development and we must take it seriously. This was because of its impact on the countries in the region, not only Pakistan and Iran, but also the Gulf States. The latter would certainly feel threatened if there were no Western reaction. Giscard said that he knew we must present our case to the Security Council and that France would support us. The two delegations were discussing details in New York a~d, as we knew, the French had spoken to an African count::-y on tl1e Security Council. Giscard thought things were mc~ins in tje prope::- direction. (C) Gisca=d had seen the comments on the Soviet intervention made by the FRG and UK and the French statement was about to be issued. It was important, Giscard continued, to have consultations on Afghanistan. However, he did not favor doing this through the NATO structure. Afghanistan was not in the NATO area. It was there=ore not proper to use this instr~~ent. On the other hand, Giscard said, if the US sent an en'loy to consult in capitals, the French would be willing to have this consultation. (C) In response to the President I s observation that it would be difficult to call in at all the capitals in a short time, Giscard said that was not his problem. In any event, o~ly a few NATO countries had an important interest in the issue. The President asked if Giscard would be willing to have a consultation this weekend in London, Bonn, Paris or Rome. We would send Warren Christopher to the meeting. (C) Giscard replied "whatever you like." France could match Christopher wi~~ a French representative. Bonn was not the best place for such a matter because of its proximity to the Soviets. Giscard said London was the place and it was better to have an umbrella created by the participation of ~~e countries concerned. Any European country could join, but not under NATO auspices. (C) The President said he had never quite understood France's relationship to ~ATO. He had talked to Schmidt, Thatcher and Cossiga earlier. ~~ey all believed that we should get tocether, althouah Schmidt had some of the same =oncerns as Giscard. The President asked again if Giscard agreed that there should be a meeting this weekend at the Warren Christopher level and Giscard said all right. (C) Noting that Vance would follow up with Fran~ois-Poncet, the President said ~~at he would have to check with the other leaders, but he was sure that a meeti~g in London wou:d be OK with them. Giscard then noted that France would continue to g{)upibe~l

259 ,,~ '" -3- support the US concerning Iran and the hostages. In response to the President's expressed hope that France would not sugges~ substantial amendments to our Security Council Resolution, Giscard said that he would not get into details. However, he did not think it was a good idea to prevent airlines from flying to and from Iran. That could be dangerous to our citizens inside the country who might need to get o~t in a hurry. ~~e President responded that he did not know that this was?a~~ c: our resolution, and he understood Giscard's concern. ~~e President then asked if anything else in our reso:ut:~o~ wcrriec Giscard, and Giscard said the detail he had men:icned was the only thing. (C) ~~ip IDEN'fIAL

260

261 '- SECRET SUBJE:T. ArsesF~ent ~~ ~nviet Actions 4nJ In~eI~ions ill Af9hani..tdn -.---; i soviet military intervention in Afghanistan represents a major watershed in Soviet policy. It....Y... ~,.:. is the first time since World War II that the Soviet Union' has intervened militarily outside the Warsaw Pact area to overthrow an existing regime and impose another of its choice ~. I... ~i:!. ~ i:-~~ The calculated Soviet intervention in Afghanistan J' I ".:~ takes on a special dimension because of the implications ~; I ~ 0 ::1, j.; sl for the troubled, volatile region of the Middle East. l" ~ The Soviet intervention was primarily designed to.h 9 shore up what the Soviets perceived as a deteriorating M ~ >.. ~ Q~ --: ~ it~~ situation in Afghanistan, Le. an increasingly alienated ~~ r~,.r.:j leadership challenged by widespread insurgency. However, the USSR surely undertook this major step after weighing its consequences in terms of wider regional considerations, including the effects of the.,'.) ~'~ ~ ::q i'~ (is '; '.' ~--- c..1 :;1 :-; \ \.'), I.~ US-Iranian crisis. One cannot exclude from this assessment the probability that the Soviets acted in Afghanistan on the assumption that the "correlation '.\ of forces" in the region and elsewhere made the timing propitious for such a major new stage in Soviet '\ '.. mil~tary assertiveness. SE2RET

262 SECRET :>irlom, tj:; :md '\.n~el.l.; gerlce repvrtd J..tril.g past months provided conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union was striving to broaden the Afghan regime's 2 base of power and popularity. Although former President Taraki was not a popular figure, much of the opposition in Afghanistan appears to have focused on Arnin himself. Following Taraki's visit to Moscow in September 1979, our intelligence indicates that.1'" he was given the necessary Soviet backing to seek Arnin's removal, i.e. demise, after Taraki's return to Kabul. This plan backfired and resulted instead in Taraki's death with Arnin becoming president. Not unexpectedly, insurgent opposition to Arnin intensified during the three months of his rule. The Soviet choice of Babrak Karrnel as the new leader of Afghanistan may not be consistent with the earlier Soviet desire to broaden the regime's support and popularity. This is because Babrak, a leader of the Parcham (Banner) wing of the Afghan People's Democratic Party, appears to be even less acceptable to Afghan opposition elements in light of his long pro-soviet stance. If Babrak now proceeds to purge leading figures of the Khalq (Masses) wing of the party, the Soviets can hardly expect that the SFCRET

263 SECRET 3 ParchariFt factio,) wi~l a~hie~e mu=h mor~ rroa~ly based support than did ~ne ~hal~ leq~ershi~. ~ ~LLt,tive conclusion from this is that Babrak's loyalty to Moscow was considered more important than his likely political acceptability among opposition elements in Afghanistan. Pre-Soviet intervention assessments of the likelihood of the Soviets taking this step tended to stress the inhibitions posed by the reactions that would be caused in the third world--above all in the Islamic countries--and in the West, principally as US-Soviet relations were affected. In light of the scale and consequences of the Soviet intervention, our assessment of Soviet motivations and assumptions includes the following factors: -- The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan required firm, decisive actions; -- The turmoil in Iran, particularly the US-Iranian crisis over the hostages and the Shah, offered a unique smokescreen for the intervention with less risk of weakening the Soviet position elsewhere in the region: -- The US position in such key regional states as Pakistan was seen as sufficiently troubled so as to deny any US attempt to counter the Soviet intervention effectively: ~FCRFT

264 SECRET 4..- US- o"\i t rela-:ion;, ircjuc;ing,,:h~ prc,sfjects for SALT II ratification, were assessed as sufficiently poor to conclude that there was more to be gained in Afghanistan and the region than to be lost in the benefits of the existing US-Soviet relationship. US-Soviet Relations/East-West Detente The Soviet leadership's decision to intervene massively in Afghanistan clearly bespeaks, as noted,.s".". a judgment that the us-soviet and East-We,st consequences would be acceptable in terms of the probable areas of forfeit in these relationships. If one assumes that the Soviets calculated that their intervention would further undermine the prospects for SALT II ratification, this need not mean that the USSR has abandoned its interest in arms control. The Soviet leadership may well believe that the gains in Afghanistan will be ~. consolidated in due course and, after this intervening period, the SALT process can be resumed on its own '- merits. Correspondingly, there would not appear to be any basis for concluding that the USSR will forego TNF negotiations (other things being equal), withdraw from MBFR, etc. On the contrary, the Soviets have long maintained a clear distinction between their foreign policy and military ventures and most of the arms SLCRE~

265 cont.rvl S~CRE7' 5 d.cea.3. As for the future of detente, the boviet action can only be taken as representing a qualitatively new, dangerous stage of Soviet assertiveness. In the past, the Soviet leadership has moved cautiously and deliberately.~.~ in undertaking moves of such consequence. It is clear that the West should now reassess Soviet policy in terms of how likely it is that the 1980's will see greater Soviet willingness to achieve its foreign policy aims through the overt intervention of its military forces, particularly in the Third World. In this regard, it is extremely probable that the USSR will weigh the success of its intervention in Afghanistan against the ultimate consequences and, if the balance sheet is favorable, the Soviets may well conclude that the discrete use of their military power is a tool which should be more frequently employed. The most dangerous consequences of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan would derive from a Soviet decision to broaden and extend the "Brezhnev doctrine" to those non~aligned countries where, as in Afghanistan, the opportunity arises to deal with an initially pro-soviet, anti-us regime with which SECRET

266 SECRET 6 the t1bsl< then.no.res...0 conc.lude a t.:eat:- cf frie~dship and cooperation, assists militarily, etc. There now arises the legitimate concern that the USSR would be as willing in another country to "safeguard" the revolution by again intervening to crush opposition forces which began to threaten the regime and its pro-soviet stance. Recent years have seen the expansion of the number of friendship and cooperation treaties which the Soviet.~ Union is concluding with Third World countries in key world regions. The fact that the Soviets invoked the relevant provisions of the treaty with Afghanistan is an ominous development and only time will tell whether this instrument will become the license for selected Soviet interventions in countries where the~~ position is subsequently weakened. This use of such treaties ~. is much more significant than the accompanying Soviet reliance on Article 51 of the UN Charter in "justifying" '.~ its actions in Afghanistan. (A separate INR paper will '- analyze the Soviet invocation of Article 51 over the years.) Finally, in this regard, the West must seriously consider whether a more assertive and interventionist Soviet Union will, in effect, begin pursuing a dangerous course which is based on the belief that "what's once mine remains mine." EURlsav'G7Matth~ws:12/~91Iq SECRET

267 ... P4EMORANDUM. _ secre'f NATIONAL SECURITY COU CIL 7426 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FROM: SUBJECT: FOR: ZBIGNIEW ~ZE~SKI.,...- STEPHEN LARRABEE 1t- Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (U) The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is an event of major political and strategic significance. -- It is the first time since WW II that the Soviets have used their own combat troops outside Eastern Europe to establish a puppet regime. -- To defeat the guerrillas, or at least to neutralize them, will probably require significantly more troops than the Soviets presently have in Afghanistan. -- If the Soviets are successful, Pakistani security and the balance of power in Northeast Asia will be seriously affected. -- The invocation of the Treaty of Friendship as justification for Soviet actions sets an ominous precedent and suggests that the Soviets may extend the application of the Brezhnev doctrine to any country with whom they have a Treaty of Friendship. (S) The Soviet intervention requires a firm, measured and forceful response on the part of the Administration, particularly the President. The President must take the initiative and show leadership in coordinating a response with our allies and the non-aligned. If he does, he can help himself considerably, both domestically and internationally. If he doesn't, the u.s. will be perceived as sitting idly by as the Soviets marched into a neighboring country, just as Hitler marched into Austria in Our prestige -- and that of the President -- will erode further, particularly in the eyes of those countries most directly affected by Soviet actions, who will draw the conclusion that they have no choice but to accommodate themselves to Soviet power. (S) -&EeUI Review 12/29/85

268 ... -e -2- The Soviet action is so blatant a violation of international law that we should be able to count on tactical allies in many differrent quarters, particularly among the Moslem countries. We should exploit this tactical advantage to the hilt. Recommended actions: Soviets Consider withdrawal of SALT. Soviet action in Afghanistan has probably doomed whatever small chance SALT had of being ratified in If this analysis is correct (and the President should consult Byrd and others to be sure it is) then the President would be better off seizing the initiative and withdrawing SALT, stating that while he still believes SALT is in the national interest, Soviet actions have made a rational debate impossible (which is true). (He could point to Johnson's decision to delay initiation of the SALT talks after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an example of a precedent.) This would make clear to the Soviets that there are costs, would undercut domestic criticism from the right, and gain the President some points for steady, cool leadership. (S) -- Simultaneously make clear that MFN for the Soviet Union in the near future is out of the question. -- Cancel upcoming (late January) USDA joint commission meeting in Moscow. -- Publically make clear that Soviet actions in Afghanistan will inevitably have an effect on bilateral relations. The Soviets cannot have detente and military intervention in foreign lands at the same time. (S) Regional -- increase cooperation and coordination of policy with Pakistan increase arms sales to Pakistan review arms sales policy to Northeast Asia as a whole consider supplying arms to the insurgents. (This makes cooperation with Pakistan and review of arms transfer policy all the more necessary and urgent.) -- expose Soviet subversion activities in Baluchistan. This would have negative impact on Soviet relations with Iran as well as Pakistan. (S) Non-Regional -- encourage Chinese to aid rebels and consider sale of some defensive arms -- anti-tank weapons for instance -- to China.

269 ..'... -SECRET -- encourage NAM to condemn invasion; stress that Soviet actions strike at the heart of the non-aligned movement. Yugoslavia can be helpful here. -- work through UN to get public condemnation of Soviet action and withdrawal of Soviet troops. While we may not be successful on the latter point, pressure will serve to embarrass the Soviets. (S) Moslem World -- Step up broadcasting to Moslem world, including Soviet Central Asia. The foundations for this have been set by the decisions taken at December 11 SCC on broadcasting. However, we must keep up the pressure to ensure that the SCC's decisions are implemented, especially by OMB, which is reluctant to appropriate the necessary funds. -e Publicize Soviet intervention, stressing anti-islamic element, particularly among countries of Middle East. We should portray regime as a Soviet puppet and Soviet action as anti-afghan and anti-moselm. Aim should be to isolate Soviets within Moslem world. Continue to stress our own common interests with Islamic world, contrasting our approach to internal change with Soviet approach. Consult the Saudis with aim of getting them to bankroll arms to Pakistan and insurgents. Strengthen our military presence in the Middle East. We must do this in a gradual, measured way, however, closely coordinating our efforts with the countries in the area as well as our West European allies and Congress. (S) Allies Initiate consultations with our NATO allies, not only on Afghanistan, but on the problem of non-european threats to the Alliance. The latter is one of the major problems that we are likely to confront in the coming years, but the European allies have yet to face up to it. A permanent working group on the subject should be established within NATO. We should also encourage leading foreign policy organizations here and abroad to hold conferences on the subject in order to raise elite and mass consciousness on the subject. (S) -SECRET _

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271 e MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CitRO ~ t:/t..c ""...' -eouf!otntial INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: ZBIGNIEW B~Z i,,/ STEPHEN ~. SUBJECT: Soviet Policy in Afghanistan (U) There is an increasing tendency in the news media and around town generally to make an analogy between Afghanistan and Vietna~. In my view, this is simplistic and dangerous. While the situations do share some similar characteristics - the danger of a protracted involvement, for instance -- there are important differences: e -- logistics and transport: The US had to transport t=oops and materiel over 5000 miles; the Soviets can move t~oops and materiel quickly over short distances and across ':pen borders. -- organization: The North Vietnamese had been fighting ~~e war for 25 years before the US became heavily involved. 7~ey had a well organized, well disciplines army and underground; ~e Afghan tribes have a history of insurgency, but they are not well organized and many of their actions are uncoordinated -- or at least have been until now. -- leadership: The North Vietnamese were led by a leader wtlo was generally regarded as a national hero, even in the South; at present no such national leader has emerged in Afghanistan who can rally the disparate tribes and provide cohesive, inspirational leadership. -- weapons and supplies: The North Vietnamese could count on outside aid and weapons in large quantities; this is not (yet) the case in Afghanistan. e- -- political constraints: US was constrained by (1) disunity over its goals; (2) its unwillingness to commit the forces needed to "win" the war militarily; (3) a desire to accommodate its South Vietnamese ally. The Soviet Union is under no such" constraints. Having overthrown Amin and installed their own DECLASSIFIED - enrioe.<l!!1tl.. Review 12/31/85 ~2~~ ; ~NAAS"OATE~

272 . ĊONFIDENTP,L- -2- puppet, who is completely beholden to them, the Soviets are likely to commit the resources needed to neutralize, if not defeat the insurgents, rapidly and in large number. -- role of the media: Vietnam was a "media event" and this had a major impact on US domestic and international opinion, turning much of it against the war and US ~~volvement. This will not be the case in Afghanistan. The Soviets will restrict access to the war by the press, and there will be few film clips of Soviet soldiers setting fire to Afghan huts or mopping up Moslem villages being flashed across TV screens into Soviet living rooms -- or :or that matter across TV screens anywhere. This will minimize Soviet domestic and international criticism, after the initial furor dies down. (C) Nonetheless, the Soviets will not have an easy time in Afghanistan. While Moscow will probably attempt to broaden the support for the new government, Karmal is not likely to prove to be any more popular than Amin was: indeed in the eyes of many Afghans he may be regarded as worse, since he is clearly a creature of the Soviets. Moreover, the Soviets -- will face a hostile climate and terrain, which will make wiping out the insurgents difficult: -- have difficulty transporting supplies once inside the country: this too will hamper their efforts: lack experience in guerrilla warfare: will probably need to "Sovietize" the war because the regular Afghan army is in no shape to defeat the guerrillas. (C) The basic point is that, while the Soviets confront significant problems in Afghanistan and the prospect of deepening involvement, they are not likely to face many of the constraints that the US faced in Vietnam. They can be expected to move rapidly and in force to carry out their goals, with little of the vacillation characterized by US efforts in Southeast Asia. This will be a critical advantage. Whether it will be enough remains to be seen and will depend to a large extent on -- the ability of ~~e Afghan insurgents to coordinate their activities; -- our ability to work effectively with Pakistan and other countries to aid the insurgents; -- our ability to keep up public awareness of Soviet actions and to mobilize pressure against them within the Nonaligned and Moslem world. (C) ~e!f! lde.:<l'lla"hcc: Brement: Thornton; Odorn, Ermarthi Griffith: Henze

273 DEPARTMENT OF STATE W...'neton. 0 C 2OS December 31, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: U.S. Soviet Relations and Afghanistan In accordance with the NSC request, I attach the Department's papers on U.S. Soviet relations and Afghanistan for Wednesday's NSC meeting 1.' / ~ V,--' () re to..-..r' ~ Peter Tarnoff ~ Executive Secretary Attachments: Tab 1 - Afghanistan: Steps in the Framework of U.S. Soviet Relations. Tab 2 - Possible U.S. Actions. Tab 3 - Possible Soviet Reactions. SECRET GDS, 12/31/85 I" -. "I"'l;_.- ". FeiflJi: Ik- N~ -qf""-71. D".: ~,~

274 .. - Afghanistan: Steps in the Framework of OS-Soviet Relations There are three kinds of impact we hope to achieve vis-a-vis the Soviets in our responses to the Soviet moves in Afghanistan. The first is punitive: we want them to pay a price for infringing fundamental principles of international behavior. The second is coercive: we want them to withdraw their troops and allow Afghanistan to return to a semblance M ~ of sovereignty and neutrality. The third is deterrent: we #'~: want to prevent the Soviets from crossing further thresholds, such as hot pursuit of rebels across international frontiers or escalation of the fighting with the rebels to a massive '.. scale. -: ~ We are also interested in the impact of our responses :~~ on other international actors, including European Allies, ~.. nervous Eastern Europeans, nonaligned Third World countries, ::: ~.- and Islamic governments. Thus, even actions that may make I:: I~ ": H' little impression on the Soviets can be of value for other audiences: some US actions could cause concern to our Allies. ~ \ Many of the steps we might take cut across other highpriority national objectives, including maintaining the strategic nuclear balance. We have already faced this kind of dilemma in considering whether to give priority in the Security Council to achieving our objectives in the Iran hostage situation or to mobilizing international action on Afghanistan. There may also be opportunities as well as problems for us in this crisis to the extent we are able to gain new collaborators or settle old problems, as in our efforts to gain base access on the Indian Ocean periphery. To achieve these objectives, there are political, economic and military actions we can take in each of two broad categories -- bilateral and multilateral. Soviet reactions may also take the form of countermoves across a broad spectrum. In choosing one course of action over another, the irrevocability of an action will be one important factor to consider. To cite only one example, failure to implement the SALT fractionation limits can lead to testing of a high number of RV's on a single missile, permanently precluding verifiable lower warhead l~its and severely affecting MX vulnerability. With regard to the possible impact on the Soviets of various steps, Moscow will not be much swayed by deterioration in the climate of US-Soviet relations. This deterioration almost certainly was anticipated, and has therefore been discounted in advance. Certain steps affecting OS-Soviet relations may have the desired effect on other countries, but the most effective steps in getting our po~n~ across to Moscow are likely ~n ~n ~~ L~_L -~----~,