Where do we go: on the development of the Russian Navy

This article arose after reading the article by Roman Skomorokhov "What can we do in modern Russia." It was not written for the sake of discussion, since to argue with the problems that the respected Roman voiced is to contradict common sense. There are problems, and they are, perhaps, even deeper than those voiced by the author.

But there was a need to present a broader view of the problems of the Russian fleet. Try to comprehend: where are we and where can we move? The author of this article does not consider what is stated in it to be the ultimate truth, rather, it is just thinking aloud.

Problems of the Russian fleet

Problem number 1 of the Russian fleet in all eras of its stories - even though the Russian Empire, even the USSR, even the Russian Federation - this is a geographical factor.

The United States has two fleets - in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Japan, China, Great Britain, France, Italy, Turkey, Germany - they have, in fact, one fleet, which they can gather into a single fist at any time.

Russia, on the other hand, has four (!) Fleets and one flotilla, which, in the event of a real war, will be completely isolated from each other. This is our given: it has always been this way, and over time the situation has only worsened, since the speed of hostilities has only increased recently.

In the era of the USSR, this problem was somewhat smoothed out due to the fact that we had allies in the ATS, a powerful economy and industry, which made it possible to maintain a really powerful fleet. At present, the task has become more complicated: it is necessary to very competently dispose of rather limited economic resources.


And here we are faced with problem number 2 - the difficulties of strategic planning.

Simply put, in general, there are doubts about the presence of at least some reasonable planning.

Judge for yourself, dear readers: patrol ships of project 22160 are being built, the real value of which in battle is zero.

Project 23550 ice-class patrol ships are being built: two for the Navy, one for the FSB Border Service. Naturally, the real combat value of these ships is also zero. Of course, there is some kind of weapons on them, they even threaten to place "Caliber", but this is not a combat ship. It is quite normal for the FSB to have such patrol officers, but why would the Navy need them?

But this is a spent budget, berths, regular maintenance.

More examples?

You are welcome!

Corvettes of projects 20385 and the latest versions of 20380 - with problematic radar "Zaslon". More on this in the articles of M. Klimov.

But that's not all - it is necessary to mention the nuclear submarine of projects 09851/09852/09853. These are special-purpose nuclear submarines, which, according to the media, should be carriers of Poseidon nuclear torpedoes. Despite the fact that the Poseidon itself has not yet passed the tests, has never been launched from a standard carrier, nevertheless, three (!) Nuclear submarines are being built for it.

For the sake of fairness, it should be said that special-purpose nuclear submarines still need to be updated. The Navy now has one such submarine - BS-64 "Podmoskovye". Perhaps one of the nuclear submarines under construction will replace it.

And finally, the project 20386 corvette, which is likely to remain in a single copy in the form of an experimental vessel.

The author has no doubt that these problem projects can be the subject of discussion. And corvettes 22160, and ice patrolmen 23550, and nuclear submarines SPN theoretically can be justified. But, perhaps, being good at performing some local tasks, these ships in no way solve the main task - victory in a naval war.


Problem # 3 is maritime aviation.

While some progress has been made with ships and submarines, the renewal of naval aviation is proceeding extremely slowly, and in most areas it is not at all.

Over the past 10 years, naval aviation received 22 Su-30SM, 24 - MiG-29K / KUB and 8 - Il-38N. Not a single aircraft or AWACS helicopter, not a single electronic warfare aircraft, not a single new anti-submarine aircraft or helicopter.

The problem is especially acute with target designation for anti-ship missiles. According to media reports, only the Il-38N is capable of detecting surface targets at a distance of 320 km and issuing target designation for them. However, there was not a single message in the media about the use of the Il-38N for targeting anti-ship missiles during the exercise.

At the same time, the Liana space targeting system is not ready for use, according to some reports, it is planned to bring it to readiness within 10 (!) Years ...

So, in terms of target designation, the Russian fleet has two Ka-31 and 8th Il-38N AWACS helicopters, which theoretically can issue target designation for anti-ship missiles.

Which direction could we go?

The answer to this question can only be given hypothetically. By designating the desired and, if possible, combining it with the realizable.

Obviously, we cannot have an adequate fleet in all 4 directions.

On the Black Sea, given the possibilities of our budget and our industry, we will inevitably yield to Turkey, and there is nothing to say about the Baltic Sea - there is a large fleet of the FRG, in the Far East - Japan and its huge fleet.

Therefore, it is most reasonable to have one powerful naval fist in one of the directions, and to complete the remaining directions on a leftover basis.

According to the author of this article, priority should be given to the Pacific Fleet.

Why?

The answer is simple - there is a problem here that is being solved primarily by the forces of the fleet, namely the Kuril Islands. Moreover, both Kamchatka and Chukotka are a huge region without railways and practically without normal highways. Most of its supply goes by sea. If we want to control this region, then we must dominate the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

Again, even if we do not consider a possible conflict with Japan over the Kuril Islands, even in this case, the forces available in the Far East are categorically insufficient to cover the SSBN.

Will our submarines be able to shoot at the territory of the United States in this case?

It is impossible to predict with certainty, but the likelihood of successful completion of a combat mission can be increased by strengthening the Pacific Fleet.

Of course, strengthening the Pacific Fleet is possible at the expense of other fleets. And in the short term, it can be carried out only through the transfer of NK and submarines from the Black Sea, the Baltic and even partially the Northern Fleet.

But are we really losing so much by weakening our other fleets?

After all, there is zero sense from the Baltic Fleet in the event of a conflict with NATO. It makes no sense to keep large NKs here. They will be destroyed quickly and easily. On the Black Sea, the situation is similar: we have only Ukraine out of our real opponents. Against it will be enough MRK, IPC and a pair of submarines, given the capabilities of the coastal missile systems "Bal" and "Bastion", as well as aviation. The Caspian Flotilla can be attracted to help the Black Sea Fleet, since the transfer of ships from the Caspian to the Black Sea has recently been worked out.

Ideally, we could have about 30 large NC and nuclear submarines and about 15 diesel-electric submarines in the Pacific Ocean. Of course, the Japanese navy is still stronger. However, if in parallel to develop naval aviation, to supply coastal missile systems to the Far East, to solve the problem with target designation, to place in the Far East "Calibers" with special warheads that would keep the most important Japanese airfields at gunpoint.

In this case, the likelihood of a conflict with Japan is significantly reduced. The readiness for war is quite capable of preventing the war itself ...

Of course, for a large fleet to be based in the Far East, many tasks need to be solved: to provide servicemen with decent living conditions, to ensure the supply of fuel and lubricants and ammunition to the fleet, to put in order the ship repair enterprises, and, if necessary, create additional capacities. However, you need to understand that all this is investments in the economy of the Far East, the creation of jobs for thousands of people, and the improvement of logistics. This would be very useful for the development of the region.

Separately, it should be said about aircraft carriers.

Place "Admiral Kuznetsov" - in the Far East.

If we look at how the air cover of the southern Kuriles is organized, it is striking that they are practically out of the coverage area of ​​aviation from most of the local air bases. From Vozdvizhenka, Nikolaevka and Central Corner to the Southern Kuriles, taking into account the bending of the territory of Japan, the distance is about 1 km. Su-200s will not be able to operate at such a range, having a combat radius of about 34 km. For the Su-1 SM and Su-100S, the range of 30 km is close to the limit, their combat radius is about 35 km.

There is no need to talk about Yelizovo in Kamchatka, from there to the Southern Kuriles it is about 1 km. This is the limit for the MiG-370. Relatively effective air cover for the South Kuriles is possible only from the Kamenny Ruchey airbase near the Soviet harbor (here the distance is about 31 km) or from the Yasny airfield on Iturup.

Needless to say, the Japanese Air Force is in much better conditions, just look at the map.

Therefore, the presence of aircraft carriers in the Far East is necessary to cover the fleet and the Southern Kuriles.

Of course, Admiral Kuznetsov alone will be of little use: a small air group, outdated machines. However, the Japanese navy is still not Americans. In the near future, they can only convert several helicopter carriers under the F 35B.

The result?

Of course, the idea of ​​creating a powerful fleet in the Far East can hardly be developed.

The leadership of each of our 4 fleets strives to prove their worth to the Ministry of Defense and actively lobbies their interests. We can only hope that the leadership of our Navy has specific strategic plans in case of war in the Far East.

Nevertheless, even in these conditions, much of what is necessary, first of all, can be done.

1. Modernization and development of infrastructure in the Far East so that the Pacific Fleet is able to receive additional ships, including aircraft carriers.

2. Revival of naval aviation. This is one of the most important tasks.

First of all - the creation of new anti-submarine aircraft or a significant modernization of existing ones. The creation of AWACS marine aircraft is a difficult task (there are no approaches to it yet), but it must be solved.

Reconstruction of naval missile-carrying aviation. Apparently, the Tu-22M3M project is unlikely to be developed - there are too few machines in satisfactory condition. Therefore, now it is possible to rely mainly on the Su-30SM, which seems to be chosen as the main aircraft of naval aviation. It would be reasonable to adapt the Su-30SM for the use of Onyx or Brahmos missiles (there were reports in the media that the Defense Ministry was considering the possibility of purchasing these missiles). If we talk about the number of Su-30SM in naval aviation, now there are about 22, another 21 units have been ordered. Obviously, this is absolutely not enough for naval aviation. Their number must be increased to 150, at least 100 units.

3. Creation of a new anti-submarine corvette or small anti-submarine ship to replace the Soviet IPC projects 1124 and 1331.

4. Solving the problem with torpedoes.

It's no secret that our Navy is armed with obsolete torpedoes (for more details, see the articles of M. Klimov). To date, it is known only about plans to purchase 73 UET-1 torpedoes until 2023. Moreover, UET-1, although undoubtedly better than the old USET-80, is still far from its foreign counterparts in its characteristics. Nevertheless, this is our best 533 mm torpedo and we need to increase its production and purchases.

There have been no messages in the open media for the UGST "Fizik" / "Fizik-2" over the past few years. Considering that it has recently been widely accepted in the media to talk about the arrival of new weapons, it follows that the UGST has not yet entered a wide series, and it is difficult to say when it will.

5. Modernization of carrier-based aircraft.

Here I disagree with Roman Skomorokhov in assessing the prospects for the MiG-29K.

This aircraft, of course, is not the most modern, but due to modernization (it is possible to install a more powerful radar with AFAR or at least PFAR, a REP complex similar to the Khibiny), as an air fighter, it is quite possible to pull it up to the F / A level. 18E / F Super Hornet.

Here you can take an example from the French, who use the Rafale as a carrier-based fighter, which, although it does not have a Stealth airframe, is otherwise a very modern and dangerous machine.

It is important to understand that we cannot get a new carrier-based fighter in a short time, therefore, to the maximum, we should use the platform that is available - the MiG-29K. Due to the aging and lack of modernization of the Su-33, it would be possible to consider replacing them with the MiG-29K.

6. It is necessary to restore the network of military airfields to cover the South Kuriles.

It would be possible to build a new runway at the Korsakov airfield in southern Sakhalin. The restoration of the Burevestnik airfield on Iturup should also be considered.


7. Modernization of mine action forces.

According to media reports, the Navy has only two Project 12660 naval minesweepers (MTShch) capable of dealing with Captor torpedo mines. Most likely, the base minesweepers of Project 12700 "Alexandrite" are capable of fighting them. But only 9 of them have been ordered, of which 6 have been built for four (!) Fleets.

8. Deployment in the Far East of the Kalibr and RIAC cruise missiles, which could hold at gunpoint strategic objects (airfields, fuel and lubricants bases, ammunition depots) in Japan.

9. It is necessary to abandon any dubious projects such as patrolmen 22160, 23550 and focus on the construction of worked out projects: frigates 22350, corvettes 20380, MRK 22800, nuclear submarine 885M Yasen-M, minesweepers 12700 Alexandrite.

Conclusion

The thoughtful reader will note that in the final conclusions of this article, little is said about aircraft carriers.

And this is absolutely correct, since the creation of a modern aircraft carrier will take at least a decade, and most likely more. Moreover, it is necessary to consider not just the creation of an aircraft carrier, but the development of carrier-based aircraft as a whole, with all its components, including AWACS aircraft, electronic warfare, PLO helicopters, the creation of catapults for launching carrier-based aircraft.

There are applications for aircraft carriers in the Far East, but there are more pressing tasks, which are indicated above. And now it is necessary to focus on saturating the fleet with waste industrial submarines and submarines, on the creation of modern torpedoes and anti-mine weapons, on the reconstruction of naval aviation, on the revival of the Far Eastern airfields.

If we set a specific task for the fleet (in this article - the confrontation with Japan in the Far East), then we can easily assess many ship projects that are being built for the fleet now.

Do you need Project 22160 patrolmen in this case?

No, they are not needed. There are no tasks for them in the Far East.

Do you need Project 23550 patrol icebreakers?

Not needed - there are no tasks for them.

Do you need DVDs?

No, they are not needed, there are no tasks for them here.

But we need projects that have been worked out by industry, which can be built in large quantities to achieve at least quantitative parity with the Japanese fleet.

Of course, parity with the Japanese navy is difficult to achieve.

If only for the reason that Japan is an island state. The fleet is the main component of their armed forces. In addition, Japan has access to the most advanced military technology that cooperation with the collective West provides.

Our capabilities are much more modest here. However, the very readiness to repulse the aggressor, the determination to use all available means to defend their territory: the fleet, aviation, long-range cruise missiles, coastal RKs - all this significantly reduces the likelihood of conflict and gives hope for a peaceful future.