288 Current Law Journal [2012] 2 CLJ

DATO’ RAJA IDERIS RAJA AHMAD & ORS A

v.

TENG CHANG KHIM & ORS

COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA B

LOW HOP BING JCA
ABDUL MALIK ISHAK JCA
CLEMENT SKINNER JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: B-01(IM)-255-2011]
16 DECEMBER 2011 C

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Originating summons - Striking out - Appeal

against - Whether reasonable cause of action disclosed - Rules of the High
Court 1980, O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) - Whether court has duty to consider
prayers sought - Factors to consider - Whether suitable for summary D
disposal - Whether weak case was ground for striking out - Bandar
Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Declaration - Discretion of court to grant

declaration - Originating summons - Prayers for declaratory judgment -
E
Whether proper to strike out if no reasonable cause of action disclosed -
Whether court has power to grant declaration even if cause of action did
not exist at time of filing application - Specific Relief Act 1950, s. 41 -
Rules of the High Court 1980, O. 15 r. 16

The appellants (‘plaintiffs’) filed this appeal herein after being F

dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court which allowed the
respondents’ (‘defendants’) application to strike out the plaintiffs’
originating summons (‘OS’) under O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of the
High Court 1980 (‘RHC’). The plaintiffs were members of the
State Legislative Assembly of Selangor (‘SLA’). They filed an OS G
against the defendants in the High Court seeking the following
declarations, inter alia, (i) that the composition of the Select
Committee on Competence, Accountability and Transparency
(‘SELCAT’) did not reflect the balance between the parties within
the SLA as required by Standing Orders (‘SO’) 72(1) and (ii) that H
the proceedings and functions of SELCAT had impeded upon
matters reserved for the Public Accounts Committee of the SLA
under the SO and/or the Selangor State Constitution, and
SELCAT had thereby acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Subsequently, the defendants filed an application to strike out the I
plaintiffs’ OS wherein the said application was allowed by the
 Dato’ Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v.
[2012] 2 CLJ Teng Chang Khim & Ors 289

A High Court since it disclosed no sustainable cause of action under

O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) RHC. Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs. It was
the plaintiffs’ submission that they had a reasonable cause of
action and the court must have heard and determined the OS on
its merits. The defendants on the other hand contended that the
B OS should be struck out since the matters complained of did not
provide the plaintiffs with a sustainable cause of action which was
recognised by the courts. Further, it was the defendants’
submission that they could still invoke the striking out procedure
although the plaintiffs were merely seeking a declaratory judgment
C by way of declarations under O. 15 r. 16 RHC. On the contrary,
the plaintiffs subscribed to the view that where the OS was
seeking declarations under s. 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950
(‘the Act’) and O. 15 r. 16 RHC, there was no requirement to
have a cause of action at all. The issues that arose for
D consideration herein was: (i) did the OS disclose a reasonable
cause of action for it to be considered by the court on merits and
(ii) upon a true construction of s. 41 of the Act and O. 15 r. 16
RHC, where the OS prayed for a declaratory judgment in the form
of declarations, was it proper to strike out the OS on the ground
E that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

Held (allowing the appeal; setting aside order of High Court

and reinstating the OS)
Per Low Hop Bing JCA delivering the judgment of the court:
F
(1) In dealing with an application under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) RHC,
the duty of the court is to consider the pleadings in a writ
action, or, in the OS herein, the prayers sought by the
plaintiffs, and to determine whether the OS was “obviously
unsustainable” (Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United
G
Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd; refd). (para 14)

(2) A proper perusal of the OS would bring into focus the

plaintiffs’ allegations of the defendants’ breaches of the SO,
the fundamental rules of natural justice and the Selangor State
H Constitution. These alleged breaches clearly disclosed a
reasonable cause of action which required further ventilation
by the parties on merits, pertaining to substantive issues or
questions of law of constitutional importance. Hence, the
determination on such alleged breaches were eminently
I unsuitable for summary disposal under the striking out
procedure. (para 21)
290 Current Law Journal [2012] 2 CLJ

(3) So long as the OS raised some questions which was fit to be A

decided by a judge, the mere fact that the case was weak and
not likely to succeed was no ground for striking out. A court
should not strike out a claim or an OS concerning an area of
law which is in the process of development or evolution. As
such, the plaintiffs should not be summarily deprived of an B
opportunity to argue their case. (para 21)

(4) A declaratory judgment states the rights or legal position of

the parties as they stand without altering them in any way. By
virtue of s. 41 of the Act and O. 15 r. 16 RHC, the court’s C
jurisdiction to make a declaratory order is unlimited, subject
only to its own discretion. The court has power to grant a
declaration irrespective of whether an application has a cause
of action or not and even if a cause of action did not exist at
the time of filing the application. (para 28) D

[The originating summons was reinstated and remitted to the High Court
to be heard and disposed of on merits before another judge].

Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

E
Perayu-perayu (‘plaintif-plaintif’) telah memfailkan rayuan ini setelah
tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang telah
membenarkan permohonan responden-responden (‘defendan-
defendan’) untuk membatalkan saman pemula (‘SP’) plaintif-plaintif
di bawah A. 18 k. 19(1)(a) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi F
1980 (‘KMT’). Plaintif-plaintif merupakan ahli Dewan Undangan
Negeri Selangor (‘DUN’). Mereka telah memfailkan SP terhadap
defendan-defendan di Mahkamah Tinggi dengan memohon
deklarasi-deklarasi berikut, antara lain, (i) bahawa komposisi
Jawatankuasa Pilihan Khas Mengenai Keupayaan, G
Kebertanggungjawaban dan Ketelusan (‘SELCAT’) tidak
mencerminkan keseimbangan di antara pihak-pihak dalam DUN
seperti yang dikehendaki oleh Peraturan-Peraturan Tetap (‘PT’)
72(1) dan (ii) bahawa prosiding-prosiding dan fungsi-fungsi
SELCAT telah menghalang perkara-perkara yang disediakan untuk H
Jawatankuasa Akaun-Akaun Awam bagi DUN di bawah PT dan/
atau Perlembagaan Negeri Selangor, dan SELCAT telah bertindak
melebihi bidangkuasanya. Defendan-defendan pula telah memfailkan
permohonan untuk membatalkan SP plaintif-plaintif di mana
permohonan tersebut telah dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi I
memandangkan ianya tidak mendedahkan kausa tindakan yang
kukuh di bawah A. 18 k. 19(1)(a) KMT. Oleh itu rayuan ini oleh
 Dato’ Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v.
[2012] 2 CLJ Teng Chang Khim & Ors 291

A plaintif-plaintif. Adalah hujahan plaintif-plaintif bahawa mereka

mempunyai kausa tindakan yang munasabah dan mahkamah mesti
mendengar dan memutuskan SP berdasarkan meritnya. Defendan-
defendan pula berhujah bahawa SP sepatutnya dibatalkan
memandangkan perkara-perkara yang diadu tidak membekalkan
B plaintif-plaintif dengan suatu kausa tindakan kukuh yang diiktiraf
oleh mahkamah. Tambahan, adalah hujahan defendan-defendan
bahawa mereka masih boleh membangkitkan prosedur pembatalan
walaupun plaintif-plaintif hanya memohon suatu penghakiman
pengisytiharan melalui deklarasi-deklarasi di bawah A. 15 k. 16
C KMT. Sebaliknya, plaintif-plaintif pula berpandangan bahawa di
mana SP memohon deklarasi-deklarasi di bawah s. 41 Akta Relif
Spesifik 1950 (‘Akta’) dan A. 15 k. 16 KMT, tiada keperluan
untuk adanya suatu kausa tindakan. Isu-isu yang dibangkitkan
untuk pertimbangan di sini adalah: (i) adakah SP mendedahkan
D suatu kausa tindakan yang munasabah bagi ianya dipertimbangkan
oleh mahkamah berdasarkan merit dan (ii) atas pentafsiran sebenar
s. 41 Akta dan A. 15 k. 16 KMT, di mana SP telah memohon
untuk penghakiman pengisytiharan dalam bentuk deklarasi-deklarasi,
adakah ianya berpatutan untuk membatalkan SP atas alasan
E bahawa ianya tidak mendedahkan kausa tindakan yang munasabah.

Diputuskan (membenarkan rayuan, mengenepikan perintah

Mahkamah Tinggi dan menghidupkan semula SP)
Oleh Low Hop Bing HMR menyampaikan penghakiman
F mahkamah:

(1) Dalam mengurus suatu permohonan di bawah A. 18 k. 19(1)(a)

KMT, adalah tugas mahkamah untuk mempertimbangkan
pliding-pliding dalam tindakan writ, atau, dalam SP di sini,
permohonan-permohonan yang dituntut oleh plaintif-plaintif,
G
dan menentukan sama ada SP “sememangnya tidak boleh
dibenarkan” (Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan
Banking Corporation Bhd; dirujuk).

(2) Suatu penelitian wajar SP akan membawa kepada fokus

H alegasi-alegasi plaintif-plaintif berkenaan kemungkiran defendan-
defendan terhadap PT, kaedah-kaedah keadilan asasi dan
Perlembagaan Negeri Selangor. Kemungkiran yang dialegasikan
itu jelas mendedahkan suatu kausa tindakan yang menghendaki
hujahan lanjut oleh pihak-pihak atas merit, berkenaan isu-isu
I substantif atau pun persoalan undang-undang yang penting.
292 Current Law Journal [2012] 2 CLJ

Oleh itu, penentuan terhadap alegasi kemungkiran sebegitu A

adalah tidak sesuai untuk diputuskan secara ringkas di bawah
prosedur pembatalan.

(3) Selagi SP membangkitkan beberapa persoalan yang sesuai

untuk diputuskan oleh seorang hakim, fakta bahawa kes B
tersebut adalah lemah dan tidak kemungkinan akan berjaya
bukanlah alasan untuk dibatalkan. Mahkamah tidak boleh
membatalkan suatu tuntutan atau SP berkenaan kawasan
undang-undang yang masih dalam proses perkembangan. Oleh
itu, plaintif-plaintif tidak sepatutnya terus dihalang suatu C
peluang untuk menghujahkan kes mereka.

(4) Satu penghakiman pengisytiharan menyatakan hak atau

kedudukan undang-undang pihak-pihak seperti ada tanpa
mengubah mereka dalam apa jua cara. Melalui s. 41 Akta dan
D
A. 15 k. 16 KMT, bidangkuasa mahkamah untuk membuat
perintah pengisytiharan adalah tidak terhad, tertakluk hanya
kepada budi bicaranya. Mahkamah mempunyai kuasa untuk
memberi deklarasi tanpa mengira sama ada suatu permohonan
mempunyai kausa tindakan atau tidak dan walau pun suatu
E
kausa tindakan tidak wujud pada masa pemfailan permohonan
itu.

[Saman pemula dihidupkan semula dan dikembalikan ke Mahkamah

Tinggi untuk didengar dan diselesaikan berdasarkan merit di hadapan
hakim lain.] F

Case(s) referred to:

Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation
Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7 SC (refd)
Brett Andrew Macnamara v. Kam Lee Kuan [2008] 7 CLJ 625 HC (refd)
G
BSN Commercial Bank (M) Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Mersing
[1997] 3 CLJ (Supp) 1 HC (refd)
Cekal Berjasa Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2006] 8 CLJ 69 HC
(refd)
Dewan Singh v. M Thynappa Ltd & Yeo Teck Chiang [1939] 1 LNS 20
HC (refd) H
Gan Hwa Kian & Anor v. Shencourt Sdn Bhd [2007] 3 CLJ 538 HC (refd)
Gobind Singh Deo v. Yang DiPertua, Dewan Rakyat & Ors [2010] 9 CLJ
449 HC (refd)
Guaranty Trust Co of New York v. Hannay [1915] 2 KB 536 (refd)
Hj Hussin Hj Ali & Ors v. Datuk Hj Mohamed Yaacob & Ors & Other Cases
I
[1983] 2 CLJ 68; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 165 FC (refd)
 Dato’ Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v.
[2012] 2 CLJ Teng Chang Khim & Ors 293

A Hj Salleh Jafaruddin v. Datuk Celestine Ujang & Ors [1986] 2 CLJ 209;
[1986] CLJ (Rep) 142 SC (refd)
Indah Desa Saujana Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors v. James Foong Cheng Yuen
& Anor [2008] 1 CLJ 651 CA (refd)
Karpal Singh v. Sultan of Selangor [1987] 2 CLJ 342; [1987] CLJ (Rep)
686 HC (refd)
B
Lim Cho Hock v. Speaker, Perak State Legislative Assembly [1979] 1 LNS
45 HC (refd)
Tan Beng Sooi v. Penolong Kanan Pendaftar (United Merchant Finance
Bhd, Intervener) [1995] 2 CLJ 846 HC (refd)
Tengku Mariam Tengku Sri Wa Raja & Anor v. Commissioner for Religious
C Affairs, Trengganu & Ors [1968] 3 LNS 1 HC (refd)
Tropical Profile Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia, Jabatan Kerja Raya
Malaysia & Ors [2008] 1 CLJ 513 HC (refd)
YAB Dato’ Dr Zambry Abd Kadir & Ors v. YB Sivakumar Varatharaju
Naidu; Attorney General Malaysia (Intervener) [2009] 4 CLJ 253 FC
(refd)
D
Legislation referred to:
Federal Constitution, arts. 63, 72
Rules of the High Court 1980, O. 15 r. 16, O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), (2), (3)
Specific Relief Act 1950, s. 41
E
Other source(s) referred to:
Malaysian Court Practice 2008, Vol 1 pp 1553, 1555 and 1556

For the appellants - Kamarul Hisham Kamaruddin (M M Athimulan, Lim

Kon Keen & Siti Maspuah Maulan with him); M/s Athimulan & Co
F For the respondents - Tommy Thomas (Nur Ashikin Abdul Rahim with him);
M/s Tommy Thomas

[Appeal from High Court, Shah Alam; Originating Summons No: 21-380-
2009]

G Reported by Kumitha Abdul Majid

JUDGMENT

H Low Hop Bing JCA:

Appeal

[1] On 21 March 2011, the Shah Alam High Court allowed the
respondents’ (defendants’) summons in chambers and struck out
I the appellants’ (plaintiffs’) Originating Summons (the OS) under
O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. Being
dissatisfied, the plaintiffs filed this appeal.
294 Current Law Journal [2012] 2 CLJ

(A reference hereinafter to an order and a rule is a reference to A

that order and rule in the Rules of the High Court 1980).

Factual Background

[2] The plaintiffs are members of the State Legislative Assembly

B
of Selangor (“SLA”).

[3] Defendants 1 and 8 refer to one and the same person ie,
Dato’ Teng Chang Khim (Dato’ Teng) who is the Chairman of
the SLA Select Committee on Competence, Accountability and
Transparency (“SELCAT”), the Chairman of the SLA Committee C
of Rights and Privileges (“CRP”) and the Speaker of the SLA.
Both SELCAT and CRP are Committees constituted under the
Standing Orders of SLA (“SO”).

[4] Defendants 2 to 7 are committee members of SELCAT. D

[5] Defendant 9 is the clerk of the SLA.

[6] Defendant 10 is the State Government of Selangor.

[7] The plaintiffs’ OS sought the following declarations: E

(a) That the composition of SELCAT does not reflect the balance
between the parties within the SLA as required by SO 72(1);

(b) That in conducting its hearings publicly and in allowing the

publication and dissemination of reports concerning its F
proceedings prior to the presentation of its formal Report to
the SLA, SELCAT has acted in breach of SO 75 and the
Constitution of the State of Selangor 1959 (“the Selangor
State Constitution”);
G
(c) Dato’ Teng as Speaker of the SLA and Chairman of CRP is
in a position of conflict when he sits as the Chairman of
SELCAT, and therefore all proceedings conducted by
SELCAT are null and void, being contrary to the rules of
natural justice; H

(d) That the proceedings and functions of SELCAT have impeded

upon matters reserved for the Public Accounts Committee of
the SLA under the SO and/or the Selangor State
Constitution, and SELCAT has thereby acted in excess of its I
jurisdiction;
 Dato’ Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v.
[2012] 2 CLJ Teng Chang Khim & Ors 295

A (e) That the matters deliberated upon by SELCAT are beyond

the scope of the matters expressly referred to SELCAT by the
SLA and therefore the said proceedings are null and void,
being contrary to SO 73(4); and

B (f) That the formation of SELCAT and/or the proceedings thereof

are null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

Reasonable Cause Of Action Under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a)

[8] At the hearing of the instant Appeal, learned counsel from

C both sides of the Bar table submitted at great length and covered
such issues as the privileges of the SLA, and the position in the
United Kingdom and Malaysia. They also relied on the Privileges
of Legislative Assembly and Privileges of Parliament respectively
under arts. 72 and 63 of the Federal Constitution.
D
[9] More specifically, Mr Tommy Thomas (Ms Nur Ashikin
Abdul Rahim with him), of counsel for the defendants, took the
position that the OS should be struck out under O. 18 r. 19(1),
as plainly, clearly and obviously the matters complained of do not
E provide the plaintiffs with a sustainable cause of action recognised
by the courts. For this proposition, they cited the following
authorities:

(a) Lim Cho Hock v. Speaker, Perak State Legislative Assembly [1979]
1 LNS 45 HC;
F
(b) Hj Salleh Jafaruddin v. Datuk Celestine Ujang & Ors [1986]
2 CLJ 209; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 142 SC;

(c) YAB Dato’ Dr Zambry Abd Kadir & Ors v. YB Sivakumar

G Varatharaju Naidu; Attorney General Malaysia (Intervener) [2009]
4 CLJ 253 FC; and

(d) Gobind Singh Deo v. Yang DiPertua, Dewan Rakyat & Ors
[2010] 9 CLJ 449 HC.
H [10] Mr Kamarul Hisham Kamaruddin (Mr M M Athimulan, Mr
Lim Kon Keen and Ms Siti Maspuah Maulan with him) submitted
that the plaintiffs have a reasonable cause of action; and the court
must hear and determine the OS on its merits.

I
296 Current Law Journal [2012] 2 CLJ

[11] In essence, the learned High Court judge has struck out the A
OS on the basis of O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), on the ground that the OS
discloses “no sustainable cause of action” and so it was a “plain
and obvious case for the court to allow the striking out order”.
The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:
B
3. As this is an application for a striking out order under
O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, it is my
duty to see whether the defendants have shown that the
plaintiffs indeed have no sustainable cause of action against
them. After reading all the cause papers and scrutinizing the
parties written submissions as well as listening to their oral C
submissions, I am satisfied that this is a plain and obvious
case for the court to allow the striking out Order.

[12] The above submissions and the High Court judgment under
this head revolve around the resolution of the following question: D

Does the OS disclose a reasonable cause of action for it to be

considered by the Court on merits?

[13] The governing procedure is to be found in O. 18 r. 19(1)(a),

pursuant to which the court may at any stage of the proceedings E
order to be struck out, inter alia, any pleading or the indorsement
of any writ in the action, on the ground that it discloses no
reasonable cause of action. O. 18 r. 19 shall apply to an OS as if
it were a pleading: O. 18 r. 19(3).
F
[14] Order 18 r. 19(2) provides that no evidence shall be
admissible on an application under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a): See eg,
Tropical Profile Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia. Jabatan Kerja Raya
Malaysia & Ors [2008] 1 CLJ 513 HC; and [2007] 8 MLJ 419
HC; and Indah Desa Saujana Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors v. James
G
Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor [2008] 1 CLJ 651 CA. In dealing with
an application under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), the duty of the court is to
consider the pleadings in a writ action; or, in the OS herein, the
prayers sought by the plaintiffs, and to determine whether the OS
is “obviously unsustainable”: see eg, Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd &
H
Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7
SC.

[15] Now, it is appropriate for us to embark on an analysis of the

authorities cited for the defendants.
I
 Dato’ Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v.
[2012] 2 CLJ Teng Chang Khim & Ors 297

A [16] First, the High Court judgment delivered by Abdoolcader J

(later SCJ) in Lim Cho Hock, supra, considered two issues viz
procedure and jurisdiction. On the issue of procedure, which is
relevant to the Appeal before us, it was held that a declaration
can only be made by OS under the provisions of the (then)
B O. 54A r. 1A of the (then) Rules of the High Court 1957 ie, “Any
person claiming any legal or equitable right in a case where the
determination of the question whether he is entitled to the right
depends upon a question of construction of any written law, may
apply by originating summons for the determination of such
C question of construction, and for a declaration as to the right
claimed.” There, the proceedings by OS were incompetent as they
did not come within the requirements of O. 54A r. 1A. In the
result, the OS, being misconceived, failed in limine. That being the
case, we are unable to see how the defendants could enlist any
D assistance from the above High Court judgment.

[17] Next, the subject matter in Haji Salleh Jafaruddin, supra, was
an application for judicial review under O. 53, seeking an order for
prohibition. There was no trace of O. 18 r. 19(1) being invoked
E to strike out the notice of motion which was indeed heard on
merits.

[18] The third case is YAB Dato’ Dr Zambry, supra, where an OS

sought, inter alia, a declaration under s. 41 of the Specific Relief
Act 1950 (s. 41) and O. 15 r. 16 that the respondent’s decision,
F
in suspending the applicants from attending the Perak State
Legislative Assembly, was against the laws of the Constitution of
Perak and therefore null and void. Again, the OS was not
disposed of under O. 18 r. 19(1). Instead, it was heard on merits.
G [19] Defendants’ fourth and final authority was Gobind Singh Deo,
supra, in which the plaintiff sought declaration to the effect that
the plaintiff’s suspension as Member of Parliament for 12 months
was null and void and that he was entitled to his remuneration
and allowances. Again, there was no application to strike out the
H plaintiff’s OS under O. 18 r. 19(1). It was also heard on merits.

[20] Our analysis leads us to the view that the aforesaid four
authorities, relied on by the defendants herein, are of no assistance
to them. On the contrary, these authorities clearly militate against
I them, especially the second to the fourth authorities which had
been heard and disposed of on merits, and not under O. 18
r. 19(1)(a).
298 Current Law Journal [2012] 2 CLJ

[21] A proper perusal of the OS would immediately bring into A

focus the plaintiffs’ allegations of the defendants’ breaches of the
SO, the fundamental rules of natural justice and the Selangor State
Constitution. These alleged breaches clearly disclose a reasonable
cause of action requiring further ventilation by the parties on
merits, pertaining to substantive issues or questions of law of B
constitutional importance which are in a developing or revolving
state. These questions are not unarguable. The determination on
such alleged breaches are eminently unsuitable for summary
disposal under the striking out procedure. So long as the OS
raises some questions fit to be decided by a judge, the mere fact C
that the case is weak, and not likely to succeed, is no ground for
striking out. A court should not strike out a claim or an OS
concerning an area of law which is in the process of development
or evolution, as in the instant Appeal. In these circumstances, the
plaintiffs should not be summarily deprived of his opportunity to D
argue their case: See Malaysian Court Practice 2008, Vol 1 pp 1553,
1555 and 1556. Our answer to the above question posed in para
[12] is in the affirmative.

Declaratory Judgment E

[22] In the alternative, for the sake of completeness, in response

to questions posed by us pertaining to O. 15 r. 16, the
defendants contended that they could still invoke the striking out
procedure although the plaintiffs were merely seeking a declaratory
F
judgment by way of declarations under O. 15 r. 16.

[23] The plaintiffs subscribed to the view that where the OS

seeks declarations under s. 41 and O. 15 r. 16, there is no
requirement to have a cause of action at all.
G
[24] Learned counsel for the respective parties herein had not
addressed the learned judge on the legal effect of s. 41 and
O. 15 r. 16. That being the case, the learned judge cannot be
blamed for not expressing any opinion thereon.
H
[25] The question raised in the aforesaid submissions may be
formulated as follows:
Upon a true construction of s. 41 and O. 15 r. 16, where the
OS prays for a declaratory judgment in the form of declarations,
is it proper to strike out the OS on the ground that it discloses I
no reasonable cause of action?
 Dato’ Raja Ideris Raja Ahmad & Ors v.
[2012] 2 CLJ Teng Chang Khim & Ors 299

A [26] The substantive law that confers jurisdiction on our court to

grant a declaratory judgment may be found in s. 41 which merits
reproduction as follows:
Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right
B 41. Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right
as to any property, may institute a suit against any person
denying, or interested to deny, his title to the character or
right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a
declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not
C in that suit ask for any further relief:

Provided that no court shall make any such declaration

where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than
a mere declaration or title, omits to do so.

D [27] The above substantive law is supplemented by the

procedural law contained in O. 15 r. 16 which regulates
“declaratory judgment” in the following words:
16 Declaratory judgment (O. 15 r. 16)
E No action or other proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought
thereby, and the Court may make binding declarations of right
whether or not consequential relief is or could be claimed.

[28] A declaratory judgment merely states the rights or legal

F
position of the parties as they stand without altering them in any
way: see Gan Hwa Kian & Anor v Shencourt Sdn Bhd [2007] 3 CLJ
538. ‘A declaration can be used to ascertain and determine the
legal rights of parties or to determine a point of law’: Brett Andrew
Macnamara v. Kam Lee Kuan [2008] 7 CLJ 625; [2008] 2 MLJ
G
450 at 459 per Balia Yusof J (now JCA). By virtue of s. 41 and
O. 15 r. 16, the court’s jurisdiction to make a declaratory order is
unlimited, subject only to its own discretion. The court has power
to grant a declaration irrespective of whether an application has a
cause of action or not and even if a cause of action does not
H
exist at the time of the filing of an application: see eg, Tan Beng
Sooi v. Penolong Kanan Pendaftar (United Merchant Finance Bhd,
Intervener) [1995] 2 CLJ 846; BSN Commercial Bank (M) Bhd v.
Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Mersing [1997] 3 CLJ (Supp) 1; and Cekal
Berjasa Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2006] 8 CLJ 69; [2006]
I
4 MLJ 284 at 294, per Abdul Malik Ishak J (now JCA).
300 Current Law Journal [2012] 2 CLJ

[29] The jurisdiction to make a declaration under the rule is not A

confined to cases in which the plaintiff has a complete and
subsisting cause of action: Guaranty Trust Co of New York v.
Hannay [1915] 2 KB 536, CA (Eng); Dewan Singh v. M Thynappa
Ltd & Yeo Teck Chiang [1939] 1 LNS 20; Hj Hussin Hj Ali & Ors
v. Datuk Haji Mohamed Yaacob & Other Cases [1983] 2 CLJ 68; B
[1983] CLJ (Rep) 165, FC; Karpal Singh v. Sultan of Selangor
[1987] 2 CLJ 342; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 686; and Tengku Mariam
Tengku Sri Wa Raja & Anor v. Commissioner for Religious Affairs,
Trengganu & Ors [1968] 3 LNS 1. Our answer to the question set
out in para [25] is in the negative. C

Conclusion

[30] Based on the foregoing grounds, we allow this appeal, set

aside the striking out order of the High Court and substitute it
D
with an order that the OS be reinstated and remitted to the High
Court and, with the utmost respect, to be heard and disposed of
on merits before another judge. Parties have agreed that there
shall be no order as to costs. Deposit to be refunded to the
plaintiffs (appellants).
E