5. FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT PS752

One of the factors that played a major role in the downing of Flight PS752 was that Tehran’s airspace was kept open, allowing the aircraft to take off despite the tensions on that fateful morning. As described previously, these extraordinary tensions arose as a result of a series of missile attacks launched by the IRGC at US military bases in Iraq on January 8, 2020, at around 2 a.m. Iraq time. Speeches and interviews by Iranian officials indicate that on January 8, 2020, despite edging toward a state of war, the Iranian government deliberately kept its airspace open, which ultimately led to the downing of Flight PS752. The Iranian authorities were well aware of these tensions. An indication of this is the fact that the ADU that shot down Flight PS752 at 6:14AM local time was positioned close to IKA a few hours before Iran launched its missile attack on US military bases in Iraq. Moreover, on January 11, 2020, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Commander of Aerospace Force of the IRGC, explained during a press conference that the country was in a war situation after attacking the US military bases [78]. Hajizadeh stated that “our requests for the closure of the Iranian airspace were rejected by friends [relevant authorities] due to some considerations”.

Similarly, Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, during his speech at the Iranian parliament on January 12, 2020, noted that the tensions were very high between Iran and the US [79]. He added that the IRGC was expecting the US to attack 52 spots in Iran, as was warned by Donald Trump, the then-President of the US, on January 5, 2020 [80]. On April 23, 2020, Hajizadeh appeared on Iran’s national TV and stated that one of those 52 spots was thought to be the residence of the leader of the government of Iran in Tehran [81]. Further, he asserted that if the US had responded to Iran's attacks on January 8, 2020, Iran had planned to strike 400 of the US targets. On January 24, 2020, the Foreign Minister of Iran, Javad Zarif, explained in his interview with Spiegel, that the decision to keep the airspace open on the night of the attack on the US military bases was both a technical and a political decision [82].

On January 12, 2020, Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council which is said to be in charge of making decisions over closure of the country’s airspace, claimed in an interview that “it took hours until it was determined from where the incident had happened” [83]. Despite this, domestic and international flights continued to fly within and over Iran's airspace shortly after PS752 was shot down, without any apparent change in flight patterns. Having this information, as well as the fact that Iran's Air Traffic Control was aware of an “unknown” missile launch report [55], is in contrast with AAIB’s claim that “the air defence sector would not allow [aircraft's] engine startup if an air attack was launched. In the absence of an air strike report, the start of flights to low risk areas would be unimpeded once [they are] identified in the defence network [84].” According to this clause of the AAIB's report, it can be concluded that since the military officials were in the belief that missiles are launched towards the country, the airspace should have been closed. However, not only was the sky open before the downing of PS752, but it also remained open even after an actual attack on PS752 was carried out (allegedly for unknown reasons).

These claims by top Iranian officials demonstrate that the Iranian authorities refused to close the country’s airspace while knowing the risks and likelihood of a full-scale war breaking out, and

thus ignored the safety and the well-being of civilians in a critical period of military conflict. In comparison, during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) Iranian authorities took active measures to cancel flights over the active conflict zones and even change flight paths to avoid high-risk fly zones. The status of Iranian airspace in the Iran-Iraq war is described in the next section. This demonstrates that the Iranian authorities are aware of the protocols to protect civilian air travel safety but chose to ignore these protocols on January 8, 2020.

According to Article 10 of Iran’s national air traffic regulations, closing the airspace at times of conflict is the duty of CAO.IRI after approval of the government cabinet. On March 5, 2020, Hassan Rezaeifar, Head of Iran’s AAIB, said during a phone call with Javad Soleimani, the husband of one of Flight PS752 victims, that Iran’s Supreme National Security Council was the entity responsible for the decision not to close the airspace on January 8, 2020, after the missile attacks on the US bases in Iraq [16]. This assertion is supported by Canadian Forensic Team’s report, which stated that top-level Iranian officials were involved in making the decision to keep the airspace open. Ultimately, it is now clear that the refusal to suspend commercial flights was an intentional act by top Iranian authorities, which was a major factor in the downing of Flight PS752.

After the downing of Flight PS752 and in a televised interview on state media, Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi, the Deputy Coordinator of Military Joint Chief of Staff responded to the following question: "Why didn't you cancel commercial flights during the war on January 8, 2020?" with "We did not even cancel civilian flights during the war with Iraq [85].” Closing Iran’s airspace on that day and those hours was the most basic decision that had to be made when military conflict started by the Iranian attacks on US bases. In terms of comparison, it would be more accurate to compare January 8th with the first days of the Iran-Iraq war and not with the whole eight-year period of the war as Abdollahi compares. As stated in the Homa/Iran Air performance booklet, which was used by the airline’s experts from September 22, 1980, to June 22, 1981: “Despite numerous Iraqi air raids during the first two months of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iran Air headquarters was never evacuated and continued its operations from underground shelters. However, flight operations were highly affected, and (Iran Air) international and domestic flights did not resume until the 1st and 9th of November 1980, respectively. When resumed, flights were conducted during limited daytime hours only, and under close coordination with the Artesh’s Joint Staff. Maintenance and flight line operations were also restricted to daytime hours. Iran Air was directed to forward a list of its flights to the Iranian Air Force forty-eight hours in advance and inform the air force of every schedule change immediately. Flights in and out of Tehran had to be conducted at certain hours and in full coordination with the military authorities.

Immediately after the start of the hostilities [with Iraq], Iran Air implemented a dispersion plan consisting of 50 flights, evacuating its aircraft to safe airports east of the country (Mashad mostly). So, when flights did resume, aircraft had to fly from their eastern refuge to Tehran to take in passengers and returned to Mashad at the end of their flight.

In September 1980, Iran Air had 26 operational airliners, of which 23 were airworthy. Between 23 Sep 23 and 23 Oct (Mehr), Iran Air flew only 159 times, but increased the rate to 285 the next month, and 1,041 within six months.”

In an interview, Mr. Amir Kasravi, the former Chairman of the Executive Board of the Association of Pilots and Flight Engineers in Iran, says, “all planes were sent to the eastern airports of the country, including Mashhad and Zahedan, immediately after the war began. For at least a week, all European flights were canceled. Being aware of the difficult and chaotic situation of Iranian travelers at European airports, I suggested we fly from Europe to the Azerbaijan SSR. This way we would fly over the sky of Iran passing through Gilan Province for a short period of time, so the risk to the civilian airplanes would be minimal. Of course, this had to be done by escorting military aircraft, which is what happened."

Newspaper clippings from that time period do not have much information about European flights, but flights to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj were all canceled. For security reasons, even traveling by car and train was restricted (Figure 5-1 to Figure 5-3). Yet on the morning of January 8, 2020, government, military, and aviation officials calmly allowed civilian aircraft to fly in an active time of potential conflict. On three separate occasions [86], all flights including PS752, requested clearance from the air defence system prior to departure. However, flight PS752 was still targeted by a battery unit of Iran’s air defence system.

Figure 5-1. Haj pilgrimage flights were canceled at the beginning of the war with Iraq and between September 23 and October 23, 1980.

Figure 5-2. The ground travel for the Hajj was also canceled when the war with Iraq began on October 5th, 1980.

Figure 5-3. On September 27, 1980, at the beginning of the war with Iraq, they asked the revolutionaries not to shoot at military jets leaving Tehran's airport.

According to the AAIB's Final Report, measures were taken to control the airspace over western Iran after the missile attacks on US bases in Iraq on January 8th ([84] Page 232). This section will explore the available evidence and shed light on the conditions of the air traffic over Iran, illustrating that the airspace in the west of the country and all the country was still open before the downing of Flight PS752. It must be noted that even if the claim were true, closing the airspace only in western Iran would have not been sufficient given the threat of a US strike on 52 spots, including several in Tehran, when the entire country was in a war situation. Furthermore, in fear of retaliation by the US, Iran deployed its mobile ADUs near the sensitive military sites in the vicinity of Tehran, which are also near the two major airports of the country’s capital and under

established international air corridors. Iran must have closed its airspace to civilian aircraft in light of this increased military presence. This closure should have been in effect before, during, and especially after the planned ballistic missile strike on the US bases in Iraq.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, in its Final Report, provided a screenshot from FlightRadar24 website (see Figure 5-4) to support the claim of the closure of the airspace over the west of the country. This screenshot was used as an indication that there was no air traffic in the “four parallel routes in the west of the country.” However, this Figure is only a snapshot of the situation, showing the air traffic at 6:15AM Tehran local time following the Iranian ballistic missile strike on the US bases in Iraq. To obtain a more complete picture of the situation in the west of the country, it is necessary to consider the time period between the attacks on the US bases and the downing of Flight PS752.

Figure 5-4. The figure shows a snapshot provided in the AAIB’s Final Report showing a closure of the airspace in western Iran ([84] Figure 50, Page 240).

Based on the totality of the evidence available, however, the image shown in Figure 5-4 and the associated statements in Iran’s report are misleading. Upon closer investigation, it appears that Iran did not clear the four parallel corridors over the west of the country as claimed in its Final Report. Moreover, there is no evidence that Iran issued any NOTAM restricting civilian air traffic over the mentioned sectors either before or after the attacks on US bases—including prior to the downing of Flight PS752. The following snapshots from FlightRadar24 website show the flights over the region at various times between the attack on the US bases and the downing of Flight PS752.

Figure 5-5 shows the airspace over the west of Iran about half an hour before the ballistic missile strike on the US bases in Iraq [13].7 At this time, the commercial air traffic shows regular activity over the country. Moreover, Figure 5-5 shows that, despite Iran's claimed risk analysis suggesting a "stop on Iran-Iraq traffic exchange" due to high tensions, at least two Iranian passenger airliners crossed the Iran-Iraq border at this time.

Figure 5-5. Flights at 22:00 UTC, January 7 (01:30AM local time, January 8)

Figure 5-6 shows that the airspace in the west of Iran at the time of attack on the US bases in Iraq was partially, but not fully, cleared. For instance, at the time of the attack, Flight QR8246 from Brussels was on its original route and Flight F2753 was en route to Istanbul.

7 According to Iran’s state media the time of attack on US bases was at 02:00AM local on January 8 (22:30 UTC- January 7). According to the CBS News’ ‘60 Minutes’ program, the first missile impact was recorded as 01:34AM Iraq local time (02:04AM Iran time = 22:34 UTC). Considering a 4-minute travel time for the missiles, it corresponds with the Iranian sources (time of attack on US bases was 02:00AM local time = 22:30 UTC).

Figure 5-6. Flights at 22:30 UTC, January 7 (02:00AM local time, January 8)

Figure 5-7 shows the airspace approximately one and a half hours after the ballistic missiles were fired at the US bases in Iraq. Despite the heightened risk of military response, the airspace was wide open and there were still a significant number of flights over western Iran at that time.

Figure 5-7. Flights at 23:59 UTC, January 7 (03:29AM local time, January 8)

As seen in Figure 5-8 through Figure 5-10, the airspace in the west of Iran remained completely open and in operation for commercial traffic for two to three hours following the ballistic missile attack at the US military bases, or one to two hours before Flight PS752 was shot down.

Figure 5-8. Flights at 00:30 UTC, January 8 (04:00AM local time, January 8)

Figure 5-9. Flights at 01:00 UTC, January 8 (04:30AM local time, January 8)

Figure 5-10. Flights at 01:30 UTC, January 8 (05:00AM local time, January 8)

Finally, Figure 5-11 shows the condition of the airspace in the west of Iran about 45 minutes before the downing of Flight PS752. Given the flights over the Iranian territory, the airspace was evidently still open, though with seemingly limited traffic along the four main corridors. This analysis is consistent with the following findings of the Canadian Forensic team:

Figure 5-11. Flights at 02:00 UTC, January 8 (05:30AM local time, January 8)

“The Forensic Team examined air traffic within the four airways close to the Iran-Iraq border the morning of January 8, 2020 (UT430, UM317/L319, UL223, and UT301). This analysis determined that ATC stopped using the four airways beginning at approximately 05:15TT. ATC managed the traffic in these corridors without issuing a NOTAM to notify airlines of the risk, contrary to international guidance ([27] page 35).”

This analysis illustrates that Iran’s claim about closing the airspace in the west of the country after attacking the US bases in Iraq is false and misleading. As discussed previously, the top officials of Iran knowingly risked the safety of civilian flights to/from Iran’s airports as well as international overflights. These circumstances also point to the strong likelihood that Iran used these flights as human shields immediately after missile attacks on the US bases and until after shooting down Flight PS752.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has claimed that as a measure of safety, traffic exchange between the Iran and Iraq borders was restricted. It must be clarified, however, that this claimed restrictions together with the claimed restrictions explained in previous section were not imposed until one and a half hours after the downing of PS752.8 Refer to Figure 5-5 which shows traffic exchange between Iran-Iraq border. To support this claim, the government of Iran has provided a screenshot9 from FlightRadar24 website depicted in Figure 5-12 of this report showing Flight BAW124 had a slight change of course while in Iraqi airspace and claimed “At 04:11[AM] Iraq ACC requested their counterpart in Iran to accept the entry of British Airways flight BAW124 into the Iranian airspace. This was, however, denied due to the restriction imposed on the traffic exchange between the two countries -Iran and Iraq. Such a negative response was in line with the planned preventive measures ([84] page 102)''. This claim, however, is not accurate.

Figure 5-12. According to the AAIB’s Final Report, Flight BAW124 entry into the Iranian airspace was denied due to the suspension of traffic exchange between Tehran and Baghdad FIR

8 Figure 51 and 52 in AAIB's Final Report show time of issuance for these restrictions were around 8:00TT 9 Figure 53 of AAIB’s Final Report

Figure 5-13 shows British Airways' BAW124 flight paths from Bahrain to London within a month prior to January 8, 2020 (in blue) as well as its flight paths after that date (in red). As shown in Figure 5-13, Flight BAW124 has never used Iranian airspace for this flight. Hence Iran’s claim about a request from Iraq ACC for entry into Iranian airspace and subsequent “denial of entry into the Iranian airspace” is questionable as it is not clear why such request should have been made. This figure also shows flight paths of BAW124 (in red) after the January 8th has changed to avoid Iraqi airspace, most likely, due to the existence of tensions in the region and the downing of PS752.

Figure 5-13. Flight BAW124 Paths before and after January 8, 2020

IRGC aerospace commander, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, stated that the country’s “integrated air defence system detected incoming cruise missiles several times and warned all units [emphasis added] to be vigilant ([27] page 29, [87]).” He also mentioned in the same press conference that “these reports were reaffirmed at one or two stages” and continued “this information was given to [all] ADUs including the one [emphasis added] that shot down PS752.” He also said, “the soldier [in charge of the ADU] mistook the aircraft for a cruise missile.”

There is no evidence that these warnings were in fact given to all air defence units as suggested by Hajizadeh. Likewise, it is unclear what happened to the alleged cruise missiles and what was the source of this allegation, as it has now been confirmed that the US military never launched cruise missiles. Additionally, neither the government of Iran nor the IRGC have provided any explanation as to when exactly these alleged false warnings were given to air defence units—or any evidence to show whether any warning was issued at all.

Earlier on January 11, and after three days of denial, the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GSAF) of Islamic Republic of Iran published a statement on the matter. In this statement GSAF

confirmed that following the attacks on US bases, the Iranian armed forces were on “high alert to respond to potential threats” due to an “unprecedented increase in air movements”, but it does not provide any comment on why the airspace was kept open in this situation. The statement then adds, “in the hours after the missile operation [on the US bases], the combat flights of the American terrorist forces around the country increased, and some news from the observation of aerial targets to strategic centers in the country reached the defence units and several targets were seen on some radar screens causing more sensitivity in the air defence systems [88].”

GSAF also indicates that “in such a critical situation, Flight PS752 of the Ukraine International Airlines departs from IKA, and when it rotates, it is completely approaching a sensitive military center of the IRGC and is at the height and shape of a hostile target [88].”

Hajizadeh later clarified that what GSAF meant by the “hostile targets” in their statement were cruise missiles [87; 89]. The statement does not provide any information on who the source of “some news” about the cruise missiles was, how this news “reached the defence units”, or which “radar screens” saw these "targets” and what section in the army they belong to.

There is much inconsistent and inaccurate information in the above statement.

1. The shape of a 5.5-meter-long cruise missile is substantially different from a 40-meter-long

Boeing 737-800. 2. In addition, the GSAF stated that the PS752's height, at the time of detection, was similar to a hostile target which means, with Hajizadeh clarification, a cruise missile. This claim is also incorrect. AAIB's Final Report states that “at about 06:14[TT] [02:43:56 UTC], the air defence system operator detected a target ([84] page 75).” According to the flight data recorder (FDR), at this moment, the altitude of Flight PS752 was at 5,655 ft above sea level. Accounting for the IKA elevation of 3232 ft per FDR, it can be concluded that the aircraft was about 2,400 ft (appx. 730 meters) from the existing ground level below.

Moreover, the aircraft was quickly ascending at that time, as the altitude of the aircraft was at 7,410 ft from sea level, in less than a minute and at the time of first missile launch at approximately 06:14:40TT per Iran’s claim.10 This translates to about 4,178 feet (appx. 1,273 meters) from the existing ground level below (see Figure 5-14). This is in sharp contrast with altitudes at which cruise missiles typically fly. According to military experts, cruise missiles typically fly less than 150 meters above ground level. Therefore, despite

GSAF’s claim, Flight PS752 altitude was not anywhere close to the altitude of a cruise missile at the time of claimed detection or missile launch—and even minutes before or after that time.

10 Iran claims the first missile was launched at 06:14:41TT in the “Factual Report” which later changed to 06:14:39TT in the Final Report. 06:14:40 is used as an average of the two.

Figure 5-14. Flight Profile at the time of claimed detection and first launch times - Final Report Appendix A – BEA Technical Report ([90] Document BEA2020-0015_tec03 - Appendix A)

3. Despite GSAF’s official statement, Flight PS752 was not changing its course, or “rotating” as mentioned in the statement, towards the military bases at the time of detection. As mentioned above, AAIB's Final Report has claimed that the ADU initially detected PS752 as a “hostile target” at about 06:14TT [02:43:56 UTC in “Factual Report”]. At that moment, the aircraft was moving on its straight path without any deviation (see Figure 5-15, the blue circle), hence not rotating towards the military base. It appears that the AAIB, which drafted the Final Report under supervision of CAO.IRI, intentionally depicted a wrong location (see

Figure 5-15, the red circle) to resolve the mismatch with the GSAF’s incorrect statement and show a fabricated turn towards a “sensitive military center of IRGC.”

Figure 5-15. Location of PS752 at the claimed time of detection

It is worth noting that despite the differences between a cruise missile and Flight PS752—some of which were noted above—on January 12, 2020, General Salami appeared in front of the Iranian parliament and delivered a speech in response to the downing of Flight PS752 [91]. During his remarks, he stated, “Cruise missiles, in terms of speed [and size], are basically a large pilotless plane”, and “when the planes move at low altitudes, [they are similar to] cruise missiles [which] move in low altitudes as well.” He then adds, “when the operator electronically sees in his radar that the target is ascending, he thinks it is a cruise missile.” The statements made by Salami are utterly inaccurate.

Also on January 12, the then-spokesperson for the Iranian Parliament’s National Security Commission, Seyyed Hossein Naghavi Hosseini, found the “human error” scenario “unbelievable”. He explains that “the incident has happened in the IKA’s airspace, and this space is completely on the civilian and military radars.” He questions the possibility of a cruise missile suddenly appearing in the IKA airspace and states that “I highly doubt that a simple human error has caused this tragedy. There must definitely be some behind-the-scenes stories [92].” The next day, when questioned about his statements, Mr. Naghavi Hosseini asserted that his statements were meant to support the IRGC and put the burden on “sabotage and enemy’s infiltration [93].” He is no longer a member of the Iranian parliament.

On January 14, 2020, General Ali Abdollahi, a retired pilot, and the former Deputy Commander of the IRGC’s Aerospace Forces who is now Deputy coordinator of Military joint chiefs of staff of the GSAF, had a televised interview about “the different aspects of the Ukrainian airlines incident”. In his interview, he stated that “cruise missiles normally move in low altitudes. They adjust themselves with [topography of] the ground.” Importantly, he then adds that cruise missiles move in the altitude of “100 to 200 meters, and a maximum of 500 meters to maneuver within mountains and valleys ([94] at 17:50 minutes).” This claim is not supported by any sources, including the military experts who assert that the maximum altitudes of cruise missiles are generally under 150 meters. For instance, an American Tomahawk Cruise missile flies at altitudes of 30 to 90 meters to avoid getting detected [95]. Tomahawk cruise missiles are designed to fly at extremely low altitudes [96].

On January 19, 2020, Khabaronline news agency referenced Mojtaba Zonnour, Chief of the National Security Commission of the Iranian parliament, on information regarding cruise missiles on January 8th. In his comments, Zonnour claimed that “there were reports about incoming cruise missiles, but they were not fact-checked and accounted for as reliable intelligence. Therefore, those reports were not transferred to all air defence units [emphasis added], to specify to which direction or target the cruise missiles were headed, or what system was in charge of defence.” This is, again, in contrast to what Hajizadeh stated about all units being warned. Zonnour continued to add “Also, communication disruption between the operator and the [air defence] unit with fire control network [integrated air defence network] is not proven yet [97].”

Javad Karimi Ghodoosi, who is a member of the National Security Commission of the Iranian parliament and a former military commander with previous connections to the IRGC [98], released a video of himself commenting on “the untold aspects of the downing of the Ukrainian airplane [99]”. In this video, he mentions that “General Hajizadeh, General Salami, and the military experts associated with the Iranian general staff of the armed forces [GASF] insisted that a warning about ballistic and missile cruises was sent to this ADU [emphasis added].” He further explains that the

warning may have been electronic warfare and tries to put the burden on the US. He then continues to say, “based on what we heard from the general staff of the armed forces [GSAF], the warning was sent from Khatam-al-Anbiya integrated defence system base and all the voice recordings and documentations are available.” In another video available from him talking about the Flight PS752, he explains “a voice from the national defence system [IADS] exists in which the central defence command center communicates with this [emphasis added] air defence unit to say what is coming towards you is a cruise missile and you only have ten seconds [to shoot] [100].”

Considering these statements, one may conclude that the ADU in question may have been the sole recipient of these so-called warnings, in contrary to Hajizadeh's assertions. What is of utmost importance, and yet still unexplained, is the time at which this warning(s) may have been given to the operator. These warnings, if true, must have been given after Iranian attacks on the US bases in Iraq (after 02:00TT). Iran has claimed that the ADU was moved at 04:54TT by 100 meters for “tactical reasons.” Iran also claimed the ADU stayed there on standby mode until 06:07TT. By these assertions, it can be concluded that the warnings were likely issued after 04:54TT when the ADU was moved, because the ADU allegedly “remained on the standby mode” from this time until 06:07TT.

The Canadian Forensic Team rejects Iran’s claim about the ADU staying on “standby” mode given the “high threat levels” but simply concludes “Iran tracked multiple targets but could not differentiate” between passenger airlines and the threats after the 100-meter movement (analysis of this conclusion is discussed in Section 5.10.6 of this report). One other possibility, however, is that the operator had indeed switched to the "operational mode" at 06:07TT after receiving warnings through communication from his commander shortly before this time. If true, it is consistent with Ghodoosi’s assertions on the order given to the operator to shoot down the incoming cruise missile; the operator switched to operational mode at 06:07TT and executed the order at 06:14TT, as soon as it appeared on his display, relying on his commander’s radar connected to IADS. The Islamic Republic of Iran has not disclosed any evidence on whether the operator indeed acted on his own decision or relied on his commander’s radar and orders from IADS as Ghodoosi pointed out.

Another related issue is the Islamic Republic of Iran’s claim about communication disruption between the operator and his commander. Iran has claimed that at 06:14:19TT, “the operator notified the specifications of the detected target [perceived cruise missile] to the relevant Coordination Center via the communications network. The message was not relayed to the Center.” This implies, considering the 100-meter movement and the time of switching into “operational mode”, the operator had received the communication/warnings about the cruise missiles shortly before 06:07TT (the time operator switched to “operational mode”), but he was, allegedly, not able to communicate with his commander 7 minutes later for unspecified reasons. The issue of communication disruption is further discussed in Section 5.5 of this report.

In Iran’s third report, the “Factual Report”, AAIB of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that one of the key factors contributing to the claimed “human error” was the misalignment of the ADU that shot down PS752. This report noted the following:

“After the relocation of one of the air defence units [ADUs] of Tehran, clearly causing a change in its heading, a failure occurred due to a human error in following the procedure of system north alignment. As a result, a 107-degree error was induced in the system. As such, while the PS752 aircraft was flying, the direction of objects and targets detected by this system was being observed with an increase of 107 degrees by the operator ([101] B-7 on page 4 and 5).”

AAIB's Final Report reiterated this claim as well, albeit with one variation, as the 107-degree misalignment was changed to 105 degrees. Iran, in the Final Report, has claimed that the crew have failed in “conducting north realignment properly”, which introduced a 105-degree misalignment to the system, and therefore “targeted flight PS752 mistakenly.”

This section reviews the Tor-M1’s technical capabilities using open-source data to examine whether such an “error” in alignment of the unit is actually possible, as outlined in the AAIB's Final Report. In light of one of the capabilities of these units which is discussed in Section 4.3.5 of this report (Tor-M1 missile launch capabilities), such a gross misalignment is very unlikely.

As explained in Section 4.3.5, a Tor-M1, while on the move, only requires a short-stop of a few seconds to launch a missile and after the launch it can continue to move, detect, and launch if necessary. In fact, Tor-M1 (9K331) needs a maximum of 9.7 seconds full stop to launch a missile. Therefore, finding true north in the Tor-M1 does not require the ADU operator to perform any major manual operations after each movement. In other words, the system is designed to eliminate the need for manual calibration in war situations. It is in fact designed to be agile enough for relocation. In case its location is detected by an enemy, Tor-M1can reorient itself quickly (within seconds) and no one needs to get off the vehicle to perform periscope recalibration under fire. As such, AAIB’s scenario about an error by the operators in manual calibration seems to be implausible, or at a minimum, calibration was only needed when the ADU was first stationed and not after each movement, as Islamic Republic of Iran claims. The following statements presented in AAIB's Final Report makes this claim even more dubious.

“At 04:54[AM], on January 08, 2020, one of the air defence units [ADUs] of Tehran was locally relocated for the last time in order of 100 meters according to tactics of mobile ADUs. This relocation clearly caused a change in the ADU's heading and therefore the ADU suffered an error of 105 degrees due to operators' failure in conducting north realignment properly ([84] page 75).”

As mentioned earlier, the true north calibration for a Tor-M1—as a unit capable of detecting targets on the move and launching missiles with a short stop—is automatic or at least semiautomatic. Iran’s claim seriously contradicts the basic capabilities of a Tor-M1. Therefore, Iran must release more information to prove this questionable claim. Because of the above issues, and since no supporting data has been provided by Iran, the claim of "conducting north alignment" cannot be accepted as it is highly unlikely.

Another important factor to consider is the shared memory of Tor-M1 which shares the coordinates of the target received by the Target Acquisition Radar (TAR) with the Target Tracking and Missile Guidance Radar (TTR) for missile guidance initialization. If the TAR is sharing the false coordinates of a target (due to 107- or 105-degree of misalignment) with the TTR, the target coordination error brings the high possibility of the missile missing the target. This is in contrast

with the fact that target (PS752) was shot down and this makes misalignment error claim more questionable.

As mentioned earlier in this report about Tor-M1 specifications, and as indicated in the AAIB's Final Report, the missile engagement range of the ADU is 12 km [27].11

Iran's AAIB has not elaborated in its Final Report on the precise location of the ADU on January 8th. However, the AAIB’s Final Report as well as “Factual Report” show what appears to be the southernmost end of Al-Ghadir base (Figure 5-16), which corresponds with a location estimated by Christiaan Triebert of New York Times [102].12

Figure 5-16. ADU location shown in AAIB's “Factual” and Final Reports

If we take this location as the actual location of ADU on January 8, 2020, based on the known location of PS752 at each point of time and the reported time of the first missile launch at 06:14:39TT (02:44:39 UTC) ([84] page 76) the operator must have launched the first missile when the plane was 13.5 kilometers away from the ADU. This is beyond the specified 12 kilometers range for Tor-M1.

According to Dr. Karlo Copp, a defence analyst and co-founder of the think tank Air Power Australia, who has written dozens of studies on Russian air defence systems and radars:

11 The Canadian Forensic Team has referred to Tor-M1 as “SA-15 missile system” in page 44 of the report. SA-15 “Gauntlet” is the NATO name for the Tor-M1. 12 Other possible locations of Tor-M1 unit will be discussed in Section 5.4 of this report.

“Even assuming actual performance [of ADU] is better [than the design], the distance and the geometry of targeting a hostile aircraft on the flight path the airliner was on made launching missiles at that point a “hail Mary shot,” says Kopp, and one that training manuals for Sovietpedigree systems using the same guidance system discourage taking [103].”

The first missile exploded next to the plane, approximately 18 seconds later, at 06:14:57TT (02:44:57 UTC) when the plane was only 11.2 kilometers away from ADU. In fact, according to experts if PS752 was perceived as a hostile target, the operator should have waited and launched the missile when the plane was well within its 12 kilometers range at the time of impact to ensure it destroys the (hostile) target, but he did not.

This section dissects other factors relating to the misalignment and credibility of this claim. Iran’s third report, namely the ”Factual Report”, provides:

“At 02:43:56 [UTC- this time rounded to 02:44 UTC in Final Report], the air defence unit operator detected a target at his 250-degree azimuth, flying on a 52-degree course. At the same time, after takeoff, PS752 had been flying towards the defence system from a 143-degree azimuth. The aircraft was passing a 309-degree course ([101] page 5).”

The above numbers in the “Factual Report” were modified in the Final Report, with no obvious reasoning, so that the 107 degrees changed to 105 degrees, and the 52-degree course changed to 56 degrees ([84] page 75).

The flight path and the plane’s altitude are available via Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS-B) technology at each point of time. ADS-B transmits GPS-derived aircraft position information along with several other data fields including aircraft type, speed, flight number, and whether the aircraft is turning, climbing, or descending. This information is broadcast to ATC as well as other aircraft [104].

Iran claims the ADU operator detected a target at 02:43:56 UTC and at that time the plane was “taking a 309-degree course”. 13 However, this is not accurate. Latitude and longitude from ADSB Granular data (Figure 5-17) as well as Captain’s Display Heading14 information from FDR data (Figure 5-18) reveal the true location of the aircraft at that moment. The ADS-B and FDR data also shows that at this point of time, the plane was at approximately 5,450 feet altitude, and its track/true course was at 289 degrees azimuth.15

The difference between 289 and 309 degrees is too large to be caused by a cross wind factor, considering the IKA Meteorological Aerodrome Reports (METAR) data provided in AAIB's Final Report as well as the FlightRadar24 website (6 knots, good visibility, and a temperature of -1℃)

13 This time changed to “about 6:14” (local) or 02:44 UTC in the Final Report page 75. 14 Captain’s (Pilot’s) Display Heading is also known as Captain’s Primary Flight Display (PFD) 15 FDR graph in Figure 5-18 shows 284-degrees Captain Display Heading (magnetic) which equals to 289-degrees (true). This is discussed further in this report.

[105].16 In fact, the weather conditions at that time (between 2:00 and 3:00 UTC) were stable and according to aviation experts, reported wind speeds were not high enough to cause this much of a difference between course and track angles. Thus, this difference is a major contradiction between Iran’s “Factual” as well as Final Reports with the ADS-B and FDR data.

Figure 5-17. Granular Data based on ADS-B

16 Based on meteorological information provided by IKA METAR data, at 02:30, the wind speed was around 6 knots @ 280 degrees Azimuth. This means at that time there could not be a significant difference between true course and track. This matches FDR data that was extracted by BEA and released in AAIB's Final Report as an appendix.

Figure 5-18. Plane's Heading info from FDR (blue) at 02:43:56 UTC (claimed detection time) – Final Report Appendix A – BEA Technical Report [90]

In order to ensure ADS-B data from FlightRadar24 website is reliable, ADS-B data was compared against flight PS752 FDR readout data that was released in AAIB's Final Report as an Appendix. A point of time that was available in both ADS-B and FDR was selected for analysis.

ADS-B data shows True Track degree of 312 at 2:44:56 UTC (6:14:56TT). FDR data, shows Captain’s Display (Magnetic) Heading/Course of “306.86-degrees'' at the same time (refer to table 6 in AAIB's Final Report). Track data from ADS-B are True degrees (not magnetic) and FDR’s heading/course data, instead, are magnetic. In order to compare these two, data needs to be converted. Knowing that the magnetic declination in Tehran is equal to +4.54 [106], the true degrees can be simply converted to Magnetic degrees. As such, True ADS-B Track Degrees conversion to Captain’s Display Heading Magnetic Degrees is as follows: Magnetic Track (Capt.’s Display Heading) = True Track – Magnetic Declination Magnetic Track (Capt.’s Display Heading) = 312 – 4.56 = 307.44 (deg.)

The difference between 306.86 degrees from FDR and 307.44 degrees from ADS-B is only 0.58 degrees.

This minimal difference is most likely due to the slight cross wind impact at the time and/or negligible instrument error. This confirms that the ADS-B data are accurate to a very acceptable level and closely match FDR.

In short:

Track numbers (from ADS-B) – Magnetic Declination (4.56 for IKA) = Capt. Display Heading (FDR)

Trying this for the point of detection, claimed by Iran as (2:43:56 UTC), Track (from ADS-B) is 289 degrees (see Figure 5-17). Similar to above, Capt. Display Heading is (289-4.56=284.44). Taking approximate crosswind impact into account, we would have a number close to 284 degrees. This number is closely matching the FDR Captain’s Display Heading shown in Figure 5-18. 17 Additionally, Appendix 2 of the BEA Technical Document “history of the flight” table can be cross checked to verify the Heading of 284 degrees.

The key point is that at this point of time (02:43:56 UTC or appx. 06:14TT) that is claimed to be the initial time of detection, the plane’s course was not at 309 degrees, as claimed by Iran in both its “Factual” and Final Reports. FDR and ADS-B data confirm this fact but unfortunately none of the countries who reviewed the Final Report commented on this discrepancy. Figure 5-19 and Figure 5-20 provide a visual comparison between what AAIB's Final Report incorrectly shows against reality.

17 Unfortunately, the FDR Graphs provided in AAIB's Final Report as Appendix are low in quality which makes it quite difficult for investigators to analyze/post-process data with ease. Upon contacting BEA, a high-quality version of the report was provided to the Association which is used in this report.

Figure 5-19. Location of key events per AAIB's Final Report scenario

Figure 5-20 Location of plane at claimed detection time (blue)

The question arises as to why Iran is showing/indicating a wrong location for the time it claims the plane was first detected? It is the Iranian government's responsibility to clarify these

discrepancies. What can be done, with the available information, is to investigate some possibilities based on the described facts and some rational assumptions.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has claimed at the time of detection, the plane was on a 309degrees course and with a 143-degrees Azimuth from the ADU location. It has also indicated that due to a 105- or 107-degrees error, the ADU operator was seeing the plane on a 56-degrees course (309+107=416  416-360=56) and at his 250-degrees Azimuth. Figure 5-21 shows the “wrong” location of detection per the Final Report in red. The path of the plane is known and fixed, therefore if we are to rely on the 143-degrees Azimuth and the “wrong” location of detection per Iran’s scenario, it means the location of the ADU should be along a line that connects plane’s location at the claimed (wrong) point of detection (in red) to a point that creates the mentioned 143 Azimuth. With this, based on Iran’s scenario, the ADU must have been located somewhere along the mentioned line. This line is shown in Figure 5-21 in blue. Interestingly this line crosses two military bases one of which is the Al-Ghadir site also shown in AAIB's Final Report without mentioning it directly (see Figure 5-19). It appears that all the numbers in AAIB's Final Report add up but are based on a “wrong” location that Iran has shown as location of detection which

Figure 5-21. The line of the 143-degrees Azimuth

Now, Iran’s claim is being investigated without knowing the exact location of the ADU. As shown in Figure 5-22, the 143- and 250- degrees Azimuths shown in red are from the ADU’s point of view as Iran’s report indicated. The red circles represent true and false “location(s) of target at the time of detection” based on Figure 41 in AAIB's Final Report. As previously mentioned, these locations don’t correspond to the time that Iran has determined as the “time of Detection” at 02:43:56 UTC [06:14TT]. In fact, this time corresponds with the locations shown in blue on Figure 5-22 as the True and False “location(s) of target at the time of detection”. So, as it is shown in Figure 5-22, the 135- and 242- degrees are the numbers corresponding with Iran’s claimed time of detection. Again, this is a factual comment that none of the involved countries appear to have commented on while reviewing Iran’s Draft Final Report.

Figure 5-22. Analysis of Iran's misalignment scenario. Inconsistency between true location of plane (blue) at claimed time of detection and the wrong location shown in the Final Report (red).

One may ask why Iran has used 143- and 250- Azimuth degrees to show incorrect locations (red) for the time of detection they claimed while they could have shown the correct locations (blue) of the plane at that time and use the associated 135- and 242- Azimuth degrees.

A few possibilities that Iran may have considered are:

1. Baghdad is exactly at 250-degrees azimuth from the location of the ADU (as is indicated above). So, the government of Iran prefers 250-degrees over the 242-degrees to justify its claim of mistaking the PS752 for a cruise missile coming from US bases in Iraq. (See

Figure 5-23). 2. As mentioned in the Section 4.3.5 of this report, the need for calibration of the ADU after each movement is refuted, based on the unit's specification. Therefore, it appears that claims about misalignment, initially presented in Iran’s “Factual Report”, are engineered solely to support the "human error" scenario, and to create the above-mentioned 250degree Azimuth. Changing the misalignment from 107-degrees to 105-degree, is just to mislead the investigation.

Figure 5-23. Baghdad's Position in relation to ADU location

3. The significance of the difference between the correct location of the aircraft when it was allegedly detected at 02:43:56 UTC [~06:14TT] and the incorrect location that Iran shows in its report (difference between blue and red points in Figure 5-22) is related to the heading of the plane in relation to the ADU location. The incorrect location (red circle) suggests that the plane was flying/turning more towards the ADU and therefore justifies the operator’s “mistake”. However, if the Islamic Republic of Iran had shown the correct location (blue circle), it would have resulted in a flight direction away from the ADU (see Figure 5-24). The letter/report of the former UN Special Rapporteur, Dr. Agnes Callamard, has explained this with a slightly different language and it appears to be based on assuming a different location for the ADU (probably not along the blue line in Figure 5-21) which has resulted in a slight rotation. Nonetheless, the results are the same, meaning that the plane was not flying towards the ADU, but away from it, even with the alleged

misalignment. In Figure 5-24, the mentioned directions/paths are illustrated as well as Dr. Callamard’s diagram (Figure 5-25) for reference and comparison. 4. The fourth and probably the most important reason for the incorrect locations presented by Iran is that the timing would have not matched up with Iran’s scenario if AAIB had indicated the correct time and location. As shown in Figure 5-19, the time that corresponds with Iran’s claimed ‘location’ of the 309-degrees course, as detection point, is 02:44:39 UTC (and not 02:43:56 UTC). In the “Factual'' report it also indicates the time of the missile launch was at “02:44:41 UTC” (06:14:41TT) which later got changed to “06:14:39 local time” (02:44:39 UTC) in the Final Report. This would have meant that immediately after detecting the target (PS752), first missile was launched, which obviously would not make any sense with Iran's scenario of the Tor-M1 crew attempting to communicate with command center first. The Iranian AAIB instead appears to have chosen to indicate an earlier time of detection (02:43:56 UTC) so that it aligns with GSAF’s scenario in terms of the operator attempting to contact the command center, communication getting disconnected, and missiles being launched "inevitably and mistakenly".

In other words, it is likely that the operator launched the first missile at 06:14:39TT (per AAIB's Final Report) as soon as PS752 appeared on its radar and without proper verification. Tor-M1 line of sight investigations taking the topography of the region into account, could confirm this theory but it needs the actual location of the Tor-M1 for this investigation.

Shooting down a target as soon as it appears on radar and without verifying its identity, could possibly only be justified if an order was given to the Tor-M1 crew by a commander whom the operators perceived had access to the country's integrated radar system and could rely upon.

Figure 5-24. different Plane's path of travel at time of detection – similarities with UN special Rapporteur sketch

Figure 5-25. UN Special Rapporteur (Dr. Callamard) report [107]

The travel path of PS752 and its altitude based on ADS-B data, which is proven quite accurate, as well as the topography of the region are modeled using Civil 3D v2021 software. Although the detection range of Tor-M1 unit is 25 km per its specifications, due to the hilly terrain in proximity of the ADU location, PS752 couldn’t have been detected in the ADU's radar until it was approximately 13 kilometers away from it. On the other hand, the radar system of the country at the higher-level command and control centers, such as ADOC and SOCs, must have had the plane on their radars as soon as it took off from IKA.

Location of the ADU that launched missiles at PS752 is never officially specified by Iran. Only Hajizadeh, in his press conference, stated that the ADU was stationed "in the vicinity of Bidkaneh”. There are at least three military sites in the vicinity of Bidkaneh and it is not clear in which site (if it was located in a military site) and where exactly the ADU was located on January 8, 2020. The location of the ADU is of utmost importance and crucial to verifying many of the claims made by Iran’s AAIB without any supporting evidence.

After several footage from surveillance CCTVs as well as public were published in the media, multiple investigators and experts made attempts to 'estimate' the location where missiles were fired from. This was done through geolocating the cameras that filmed the scene and considering the time that missile detonation sound traveled to reach the camera as well as velocity of sound.

General specifications of missile and the aircraft was also considered for these estimates. Figure 5-26 shows military bases in the vicinity of Bidkaneh and different 'estimates' by investigators.

Figure 5-26. Different military sites estimated as missile launch location in the vicinity of Bidkaneh estimated by different sources

As discussed in Section 5.3.3 of this report, analysis of Iran’s AAIB scenario shows the missile launch could have been any of the Al-Ghadir or Sajjad bases (see Figure 5-21 and Figure 5-26) but since Iran has not provided any credible information about the ADU’s location, it only remains a theory and not a fact. As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, the ADU location that AAIB shows in its Final Report is at Al-Ghadir military base (Figure 5-16). Christiaan Triebert of New York Times had estimated, in a tweet, two days after the downing of PS752 which is shown in Figure 5-26 [102]. In fact, one year later, AAIB showed the same location that Christiaan Triebert had 'estimated' two days after the downing.

On the other hand, Islamic Republic of Iran’s state-sponsored TV channel (Khabar Channel) streamed a 15-minutes show around the anniversary of the downing (December 2020- January 2021) which was surrounding the downing of PS752. In this video some information was given that could translate to the possible location of the ADU.

The reporter in this TV-show claims: “The aircraft was initially detected by Tor-M1 at 06:13[AM] [02:43 UTC] when it was at 4,875 feet altitude and at a distance of 19,548 meters from the [TorM1] machine ([108] at 7:44 minutes).”

With the given altitude in the TV-show, the location of the aircraft is known as shown in Figure 5-27 (yellow circle) and 19,548 meters radius from this location crosses the southeast corner of the Sajjad base shown in Figure 5-27. It means, according to the TV-show information, this was the location of the ADU on January 8, 2020. This location matches what Mike Mihajlovic has assumed for the ADU location in his book [71] but is different than what AAIB has shown (Figure 5-16).

It should be noted that the numbers provided in the TV-show appear to be precise numbers as if they are output of a data recorder which implies, they are not approximate numbers. Of course, there is also a chance that these numbers are totally made up to mislead. Nonetheless, they don’t match numbers provided in AAIB’s Final Report which appear to be engineered as discussed in the previous section. In fact, they translate to a different location for the Tor-M1 (Figure 5-27).

Figure 5-27. Data from state-sponsored TV show translates to an ADU location other than what is shown in AAIB’s Final Report

The operator who shot down Flight PS752 was one of the 3 or 4 crew members of the ADU on the early morning of January 8, 2020. The government of Iran, after 19 months and by pressure from the families of the victims as well as the international community, released the names of the ADU crew members together with other individuals whose indictment terms are unknown at the time of writing this report. Prior to releasing identities of the operator(s), multiple Iranian officials at Tehran’s military court had claimed the operator has more than 8 years of experience with this type of short-range air defence system (or similar to it) including his service in Syria, where the IRGC has military presence. Later, Gholam Abbas Torki, who was the prosecutor of the case at Tehran's military court at the time, talked about the operator’s experience in an interview with IRNA news agency asserting that he “should have used his experience [109].” The claim of 105-

degree misalignment, as discussed in Section 5.3 of this report, and especially the decision to launch the first missile as discussed in Section 5.3.2 is even more questionable considering eight years of expertise and experience.

Furthermore, AAIB's Final Report never explained how or why the operator, who is said to be an instructor of Tor-M1 units as well, could not distinguish between the speed, altitude and RCS of a cruise missile and a passenger airliner.18

AAIB's Final Report indicated that the operator detected a target at 6:13:56TT, and 23 seconds later announced its specifications to the Coordination/Command Center at 06:14:19TT. Iran claims that, for unknown reasons, the message was not delivered to the Coordination/Command Center. According to Torki the claimed communication disruption "was only a few seconds" and the time between the two missile launches "was 26 seconds"[109]. That means the operator could have tried re-establishing contact with the command center for verification even after launching the first missile when the claimed "few seconds" communication disruption was resolved but he did not. This is despite the fact that the operator would have had enough time to let the “threat” come closer into its engagement range (Section 5.3.2 of this Report) and retry to communicate with his commander during this time. It also appears that he did not try other means of communication when the primary source of communication was allegedly disrupted.

Hajizadeh’s statements provide that the claimed communication outage may be due to jamming or an overloaded communication ([87] at 06:20 minutes). Yet, the government of Iran never provided any proof for this critical claim, and the Canadian Forensic Team also indicated that they “found no evidence that any possible [communication] disruption was caused by jamming.” There is some evidence that shows there have been GPS issues in the vicinity of IKA airport most likely due to jamming activities by the IRGC to possibly avoid precise targeting of its critical points by the US. This has been discussed in Section 5.10.5 of this report.

Iran claims that the ATC issued the clearance for take-off to PS752 at 06:10TT.19 AAIB’s “Factual Report” explains:

“At approximately 00:30 UTC [04:00TT]., given the change made in the alertness level of Iran's air defense, the military sector informed the civil sector of the country's Airspace Control that only

be permitted to start up [emphasis added]. Until then, it was, in fact, the civil sector that had been issuing such flight clearances, taking the operational considerations of Air Traffic Management into account, and providing the flight information to the military sector for CivilMilitary Coordination. Making such a procedural change and emphasizing the receiving of the go-ahead from the defense sector prior to initiating the flight [ditto] was implemented with

18 At 6:13:56TT (Iran’s claimed time of initial detection) altitude and speed of PS752 was at 5,655 feet and 296 mph respectively. 19 Iran’s “Factual Report” - Page 4 “At 02:40:20 UTC [06:10:20TT], Ukraine International Flight PS 752 received the takeoff clearance from IKA ATC tower”. This time was deleted in the Final Report without any explanation.

the aim of more ensuring the correct identification of civil flights by the defense network and avoiding targeting them by mistake ([101] page 2).”

Per above claims, ATC, most likely, had received the “go-ahead” shortly before 06:10TT after “providing the flight information to the military sector for Civil-Military coordination”. This brings into question the likelihood of the alleged communication disruption, if true, taken place shortly after the ATC cleared PS752 for take-off, likely with the same means of communication.

Based on the totality of Iran’s reports and Iranian authorities' assertions, as well as what was discussed in previous sections of this report one may conclude that the operator may have not even attempted to initiate contact with his commander, especially since no evidence has been provided to support this claim. On the contrary and based on the assertions from Karimi Ghodoosi (member of parliament), as discussed Section 5.2 of this report, it could have been the command center that communicated with the operator(s) notifying him (them) “what is coming towards you is a cruise missile and you only have ten seconds to shoot”.

As noted in AAIB's Final Report, “On January 08, 2020, at 4:54 am, one of the air defence units of Tehran was locally relocated at the last minute in order of 100 meters according to tactics of mobile ADUs.” The ADU in question was initially stationed at its location near Bidkaneh, at the west end of Tehran’s defence ring, in proximity to IKA around midnight on January 8 according to Iran’s report. Elaborating on the status of the defence ring on January 8, Hajizadeh said in a public announcement, “a number of air defence systems were added to the air defence ring in the vicinity of Tehran. The first unit was stationed in the west of Tehran, around Bidkaneh; the same unit that caused this incident ([87] at 03:05 minutes).” According to Hajizadeh, although there were multiple units that were deployed around Tehran, the specific ADU that fired at PS752 was the only one stationed near Bidkaneh. IRNA news agency published a report after the incident that schematically shows the defence ring around Tehran (Figure 5-28). Although the exact locations of the units may not be reliable, it still provides a useful picture of how the units could have been stationed around Tehran.

Figure 5-28. Tehran Defence Ring [110]

Iran claims that after the 100-meter movement, “the ADU remained on standby mode until 06:07TT and after this time, the ADU was set in operation mode ([84] page 75).” The Canadian Forensic Team’s report provides that the “standby” and “operational” modes “reflect different battle readiness conditions, which typically involve SAM units [ADUs] powering radar systems and target detection capabilities ‘on’ (operational) or ‘off’ (standby).” The government of Iran has not explained why the ADU should have been on standby mode (with its radar off) for more than an hour during a “war situation and at the highest level of battle readiness ([87] at 02:45 minutes).” Also, it should be mentioned that the AAIB's Final Report of Iran never described if the Standby Mode is connected to only the “radar off” condition in the Tor-M1 system or to the whole onboard electronics systems. If such a mode only deals with “radar off” conditions, then Tor-M1’s own Gyroscopes and accelerometers as well as the Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) should still be keeping the system calibrated based on the magnetic north. This is an important question that must be clarified by Islamic Republic of Iran and specifically the IRGC.

Iran implied, in its Final Report, that the ADU was initially aligned correctly when it was stationed around midnight. Iran also implies that after each movement of the ADU it must be recalibrated for true north and that the last 100-meter movement and negligence in recalibration “caused a change in ADU’s heading”, introducing a 105-degree misalignment to the system. According to different military sources including Iran’s own state-sponsored Mashregh news agency [111] 20, as well as the showcasing of Tor-M1 units in national military parades, all the 29 Tor-M1 units purchased by Iran in 2007 were fully mobile self-propelled vehicles. Therefore, if

20 “Tor-M1 is a short range, low-altitude, fully mobile air defence system”

such a movement in fact happened, it must have been done under the Tor-M1’s own power. Moreover, moving the ADU with another vehicle requires a system shutdown which would not be logical under the “war situation” and with the claimed reports of incoming cruise missiles. Movement of the ADU on its own power would have required that the system was not turned off, and therefore a recalibration would not be needed based on the ADU’s basic specifications and capabilities (Section 4.3.5 of this report). Therefore, if there indeed existed a 105-degree misalignment in the system, it must have been introduced around midnight and not at 04:54 am as Iran claims. 21 This contradiction is one of the issues that renders the claim of the 105-degree miscalibration highly unlikely.

The command chain for the ADU and its movements would have been performed in coordination with civilian sector to identify civilian flights as AAIB's Final Report states:

“The civil-military operational coordination center (CMOCC) is located in the Tehran ACC. This center communicates all civilian flight information to the military sector, and this information exchange is used to identify civilian flights in the military network ([84] page 85).”

According to AAIB's Final Report, CMOCC clearance was issued around 05:54TT ([84] page 19). Therefore, the ADU operator should have expected flight PS752 passing through his engagement envelope. In turn, the ADU was switched to operational mode (radar on) at 06:07TT, only 3 minutes prior to PS752 receiving take-off clearance from ATC at 06:10TT [101] 22 Two minutes later PS752 departed IKA at 06:12TT. The ADU operator launched the first missile 2 minutes after that at 06:14TT.

It is worth noting that according to AAIB's Final Report, PS752 received “startup” and “push back” (pushback is when an airliner is pushed back from its parking spot near airport loading deck) clearance at 05:55TT which occurs when all doors are closed. Considering the fact that there was no ground or air traffic at that time and weather conditions were stable, according to field information from IKA, it normally shouldn’t take more than a maximum of 6-8 minutes to take-off after push-back starts. Per the Final Report, all the coordination with the military sector had taken place and CMOCC had issued clearance at 05:54TT. Islamic Republic of Iran has not provided any reasoning as to why ATC had not given take-off clearance until more than 15 minutes later, at 06:10:20TT. This wait time, however, is likely associated to receiving the final “go-ahead” from Military as discussed in Section 5.5 of this report. Figure 5-29 shows Islamic Republic of Iran’s claim in this regard.

21 Analysis of the 105-degree misalignment claim has been discussed in Section 5.3.3 of this report. 22 Iran’s “Factual Report” - Page 4 “At 02:40:20 UTC [06:10:20TT], Ukraine International Flight PS752 received the takeoff clearance from IKA ATC tower”. This time was deleted in the Final Report without any explanation.

(a)

IKA ATC Mehrabad Approach Center CMOCC Military Coordination

CMOCC Confirmation IKA Takeoff Clearnace

IKA ATC

(b)

Mehrabad Approach Center

IKA takeoff Clearance CMOCC Military Coordination

Mehrabad Approach Center CMOCC

CMOCC Confirmation

Wait for “go ahead” from military

Military Approval for Takeoff

Figure 5-29. Civil- Military Coordination (a) before and (b) after 04:00TT (00:30 UTC) per Iran’s claim in “Factual Report”

Based on FDR recorded data in appendix 'A' of Iran’s AAIB Final Report, the fuel quantity recording of Left, Right and Center tanks were stopped about one minute before the FDR failure time (first missile impact) at around 2:44. This issue was not explained in the Final Report nor was it included in the list of comments from any of the countries who reviewed the Final Report’s draft.

Since other fuel parameters such as the Low fuel Warning, Fuel configuration Warning, Imbalance Fuel Warning etc. were recorded until the end of FDR recording (~ 2:45), it can be assumed that the Aeronautical Radio Inc. (ARINC) data bus connecting the Fuel Control Unit (FCU) to FDR was not disconnected since most of the fuel parameters are transmitted on the same ARINC data bus.

Also, a close look at fuel quantity parameters and legends, the following observations/issues may need some clarifications: ● The center tank fuel quantity of center tank (green) was increased from about 4400 Kg to 5000 Kg during take-off and initial climb and back to about 4500 Kg before the fuel quantity recordings were stopped. This may be explained as “fuel slosh” occurrence during high pitch attitude (i.e., Take-off) imposed by gravity although fuel sensors and computers are

calibrated for different aircraft attitudes. However, the left and right tanks were not subjected to fuel slosh. A clarification could help better understand such a phenomenon. ● The legend color of the right tank does not completely match with the parameter. Having the source data instead of screenshots from plots could help with better legend colors and more precise value determination on all graphs. ● In the circled area of the graph, as shown in Figure 5-30 the “Fuel Qty Aux Kg [kg]” also is shown which looks to belong to the auxiliary tank. Based on the collected information from various online sources (available AFM, FCOM, AMM etc.), this type of aircraft (Boeing 737-800) is not equipped with an auxiliary fuel tank. The presence of fuel quantity for the auxiliary fuel tank could be better explained.

Figure 5-30 Abnormal recording termination of fuel quantity sensors on FDR

The Angle of attack (AoA) is an aviation term for the angle between the aircraft's wing and the wind direction facing the wing. Based on the FDR data graphs in Figure 5-31, there is up to 9 degrees of AoA sensor disagreement on the ground for a considerable amount of time (about 50 seconds) and prior to take off which can have flight deck effect by triggering multiple Crew Alerting System (CAS) messages in the cockpit. Although such a phenomenon is not directly linked to the downing of PS752 by IRGC, it shows the imprecise data reviewed by CAO.IRI. This sensor disagreement could have been brought to Boeing's attention as safety precautions or recommendation even if it matches with Boeing Air Data System requirements. Similar to Fuel Quantity Sensor issues, this item was not included in the list of comments from any of the countries who reviewed the Final Report’s draft.

Figure 5-31. Angle of Attack (AoA) sensor disagreement prior to take-off

Based on Appendix A of Iran’s AAIB Final Report, the claimed flight path of PS752 after the second missile strike raises an important question that is not answered in AAIB’s Final Report. When an emergency situation occurs during a phase of flight, the crew have to follow certain instructions that are defined in the checklist that is written by the aircraft manufacturer for that specific phase of flight based on the aircraft’s Aircraft Flight Manuals (AFM). Considering that PS752 was in steady climb while being targeted by Tor-M1 missiles and its flight deck effects in the cockpit, the expected maneuver after being hit by the missiles is the steepest possible turn to the airport while following the emergency landing checklist (fuel dump, flap deployment etc.) to choose the closest path to the airport. However, as it was presented in Figure 6 of the AAIB’s Final Report as well as section 3.5 of its Appendix “A”, the aircraft seem to follow an unnecessary longer path which is not aligned with the emergency landing expected path. Figure 5-32 and Figure 5-33 show the path published in AAIB’s Final Report and the one that was expected to be followed in such an emergency situation.

Figure 5-32. The path published by Iran based on Radar information

Figure 5-33. The expected path (in green) to be followed in such an emergency case.

As it can be seen in Figure 5-33, even at some phase of the emergency procedure the aircraft was continuing the straight flight path (circled green) which is not in line with the expected emergency situation. Another question raised by such a figure is the distance between the claimed first “wreckage impact” position (marked by red pin in the figure) with the rest of the track (in orange color) near Nasirshahr city which does not explain the track. Regarding the CVR, also it can be seen that there is no conversation among the crew for emergency landing procedures which adds more questions about AAIB's Final Report. Such a “wide” return to airport could be caused by smoke/significant workload in the cockpit, injured cockpit crew, malfunctions in flight control systems etc.

According to FDR data as well as the flight history table published as Appendix ‘A’ to AAIB's Final Report, the LNAV functionality of Flight Guidance (FG) system was engaged shortly (14 seconds) after aircraft take off rotation (first vertical marker line in Figure 5-34) at 60 feet. However, based on the CVR transcript published as part of AAIB's Final Report, the LNAV engagement and its availability and engagement were announced about two minutes later after flap retraction (see Figure 5-35).

Figure 5-34. LNAV engaged about 14 seconds after rotation (first vertical line highlighted in red) at 60 feet AGL

Figure 5-3535. LNAV availability discussion after LNAV being engaged about two minutes earlier

This discrepancy could be due to miscommunication of crew or discrepancy between the “published” CVR by CAO.IRI and the FDR/Flight History. The association of families of PS752 has contacted the BEA directly to get a copy of the full CVR conversation to investigate this discrepancy. However, at the time of preparation of this report, no response was provided by BEA.

Also, it is important to mention that since pilots were relying on the LNAV navigation method during take off and climb-out phases (which is heavily based on GPS sensor), the GPS invalidity likely caused additional workload to the crew and negative impact cockpit situational awareness. This may also have contributed to the emergency “return-to-airport” maneuver that is described in Section 5.7.3. This increase in crew’s workload caused by GPS invalidity and its direct effect on LNAV can be seen from Figure 5-35 that Instructor Pilot expresses by saying: “Now will flight [fly] like…” at 6:14:51TT.

There are credible reports that the airport staff were screening for anyone holding an American passport from boarding Flight PS752. The Association has independently confirmed that at least three passengers on board PS752 were questioned about having an American passport prior to boarding. This information was relayed to the Association by the victims’ families. The IKA airport has numerous security checkpoints. The last checkpoint that the passengers go through prior to boarding is controlled and staffed by the IRGC, also known as the “IRGC’s gate.” Families have stated that it was at this security checkpoint where their loved ones were questioned about having American passports. Asking this question from passengers living in Canada is not at all routine.

Remarkably, one specific family member reported that their loved one was escorted off the plane by IRGC officers and taken to the IRGC security checkpoint where the passenger was heavily questioned about whether they had an American passport or not.

It is important that the international community places pressure on Iran for access to security footage from the airport on January 8, 2020, in order to corroborate this claim. It is not clear what the intention was regarding this line of questioning. However, what is clear is that there was an active conflict between Iran and the United States on January 8, 2020, and it appears as though the Iranian authorities attempted to ensure that there were no passengers onboard Ukraine International Airlines flight 752 with American citizenship. This raises questions as to the differences between the attitude of Canada and the US. in facing international threats and aggressions.

Flight PS752 took off at 06:12TT, 57 minutes behind the original schedule. Iran’s official explanation is that the delay was caused by the removal of four pieces of luggage from the flight. According to aviation experts, however, debarking four pieces of luggage is not a plausible explanation for a 57-minute delay.

Irrespective of whether unloading of luggage was the true reason for the delay, the families of the victims have confirmed that a few passengers or their luggage were taken off the flight. One of the victims of the airliner PS752 indicated to his parents that the airplane’s door is opening, and a few passengers are getting offloaded. Another victim told his grandmother that the delay was due to the offloading of the baggage of passengers that had not boarded the plane. These statements have been reported directly by the victims’ families. Two other victims of the airliner PS752 provided similar information to their families. To protect the identity of their families, we cannot provide more details.

On the other hand, the reason for the delay was noted differently on January 8, 2020 at the airport. According to reliable sources at the IKA airport, before the flight took off, when the aircraft doors were closed and the plane was preparing for pushback, “mechanical issues” were cited as the reason for the delay. To the airport staff, there was no mention of the delay being due to overloading of the aircraft.

The Association has attempted to get access to the passengers list and any potential changes that were made to it up until takeoff. Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet been successful, and the Ukraine International Airlines has not responded to our requests for disclosure of this information. The Canadian government has indicated that they have no access to this information either. SITA, which is an organization based in Amsterdam with access to the flight manifests for commercial flights, has not responded to our inquiries either.23 A company in Iran, Fanavari Samanehaye Hoshmande Roham, that had contact with SITA, appeared to have had access to these flight manifests as well, but has been closed down since January 8, 2020.

In addition to checking the flight manifest and likely changes to the list of passengers, all CCTV cameras filmed the IRGC’s gate inside the airport and Flight PS752 at the airport parking. This footage can be helpful to understand what the real reason was behind the unexpected 57-minute delay and verify whether any passenger was taken off the flight during this delay.

Possible reasons behind the last 15 minutes of this 57-minute delay which appears to be connected to the military sector has been discussed in Section 5.2 and 5.6 of this report.

Shortly after the downing different sources started to analyze available data. For example, on January 10th, the New York Times evaluated the pattern of flights in the past three Wednesdays prior to January 8th, 2020 (which was a Wednesday) and concluded departure flights from IKA had the same pattern after the Iranian missile strike on US bases (see Figure 5-36). “Despite the crash and the attacks, flight activity at Imam Khomeini International Airport that day was startlingly similar to activity in recent weeks, according to data from FlightAware, an industry tracking firm [112].”

23 A flight manifest is a list of passengers and crew of an aircraft.

Figure 5-3636. Comparing prior consecutive Wednesday morning Flights departing from IKA

FlightRadar24.com which is a flight tracking website and uses Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data to track flights all around the world released the list of flights that departed IKA on the early morning of January 8th and prior to the flight PS752 (see Figure 5-37) [105]. This website only relies on ADS-B data which is fed by aircraft GPS-receivers broadcasting the aircraft's general flight information such as location, airspeed, altitude, destination, type etc. This means if an aircraft is not equipped with a functional GPS receiver transponder the flight data will not be displayed in the FlightRadar24 website.

Figure 5-37. IKA Departures on January 8th, 2020, per FlightRadar24 website

One year later, AAIB of the Islamic Republic of Iran provided a list of departure flights that appears to match with the same list provided by FlightRadar24 website but added a list of canceled flights as well (see Figure 5).

Figure 5-38. IKA Departures on January 8, 2020, per AAIB's Final Report ([84] page 103)

The Canadian Forensics team’s report shows the departure/arrival flights on January 8, 2020, per Figure 5-39 and closely matches the FlightRadar24 departure list. It also shows the first departure flight approximately one hour after the downing of flight PS752 which was an Iran Air flight en route to Frankfurt. Also, “The Forensic Team confirmed that Turkish Airlines Flight 899 to Istanbul, Turkey, and two flights destined for Najaf, Iraq – Mahan Airlines Flights 5042 and 5062 – were scheduled to depart before Flight PS752 but were canceled ([27] page 20)”. This explanation, however, is not accurate. Data from FlightRadar24, as well as other flight tracking websites and sources show these three flights were in fact scheduled to depart after Flight PS752. Instead, two other flights canceled before PS752 were not included in the Canadian Forensic Team’s report. This will be discussed further in this section. All the given times are in Tehran local Time (UTC+03:30).

Figure 5-39. Departure Flights from IKA on January 8th, 2020 (Tehran time)

After reviewing records of flights and their historical departure times from FlightRadar2424, it is concluded that following flights were scheduled for departure before PS752, but were canceled: ● Turkish Pegasus Airlines Flight PC-513, having daily flights from IKA to Istanbul Sabiha airport (SAW), was scheduled to depart IKA at 4:20TT (Tehran Time). This flight was canceled on January 8th due an earlier closure of SAW. In fact, Flight PC-512 (SAW to IKA) never departed SAW airport and as a result PC-513 (IKA to SAW) got canceled. ● Iranian Mahan Airline Flight W5-1138, having regular Saturday and Wednesday flights from IKA to Denizli Cardak airport in Turkey, was scheduled to depart IKA at 2:30TT. This flight was canceled for unknown reasons.

It appears AAIB's Final Report is accurate about the cancellation of above-mentioned flights before the downing of flight PS752, but it partially lacks accuracy for the flights scheduled after the downing of flight PS752. AAIB of the Islamic Republic of Iran has claimed three Iranian flights en route to Najaf, Iraq and one Turkish flight en route to Istanbul, Turkey were canceled after the downing. After reviewing records of the flights and their historical data below findings are presented for the flights shown in AAIB's Final Report as scheduled for departure after

● Iranian ATA Airlines Flight I3-6650 to Najaf. This flight was indeed on the list of January 8th scheduled flights as shown in Figure 5-40 (left screenshot). A thorough investigation for this flight’s historical data as well as explanations from FlightRadar24 (see Figure 5-40-

24 FlightRadar24 Business tier account allows access to historical data of the last three years.

right screenshot) and phone confirmation with the airlines headquarter in Iran, shows that this flight was not actually scheduled to fly on January 8th at 06:00 but is incorrectly shown on the list of scheduled flights in AAIB's Final Report. In fact, FlightRadar24 data shows this flight stopped operating the route back in November 2019most probably due to an outdated database in FlightRadar24 website. This flight number has two flights in the afternoon and evening to Najaf but definitely not at 6:00AM as was confirmed with the airline sales representatives.

Figure 5-40. (Left) Screenshot of scheduled flights on January 8 taken on January 8th,2020 and (right) screenshot of FlightRadar24 explanation on ATA Airlines Flight I36650 taken in September 2021 (1.5 years later).

● Turkish Airlines Flight TK-899 having daily flights from IKA to Istanbul Sabiha airport (SAW) was scheduled to depart IKA at 6:20TT. This flight was canceled on January 8th due an earlier closure of SAW. In fact, Flight TK-898 (SAW to IKA) never departed SAW airport and as a result TK-899 (IKA to SAW) got canceled. This is correctly mentioned in

AAIB's Final Report. ● Iranian Mahan Airline Flight W5-5042 is shown as being scheduled for 06:30TT departure for Najaf, Iraq in the Final Report. Historical data of this flight route confirms this flight most likely was canceled on January 8th, 2020. Reports from some of the passengers of this flight indicate they were boarded into the plane and then after an hour were asked to leave the aircraft as there will be a delay until 11:00TT after which the flight was canceled.

This flight was not shown as a scheduled flight in FlightRadar24 as can be seen in Figure 5-40.

● Iranian Mahan Airline Flight W5-5062 is shown as being scheduled for 06:30TT departure for Najaf, Iraq in the Final Report, however this is incorrect. Historical data for

this flight number shows all the flights, except two instances, were scheduled for 12:30TT afternoon. Also, Actual Time of Departures (ATD), which are accurately based on satellites, are after that time. (See Figure 5-41). This flight was not shown as a scheduled flight in FlightRadar24 as can be seen in Figure 5-40.

Figure 5-41. Historical data for Mahan Flight W5-5062 IKA to NJF - afternoon flights

It appears, AAIB of the Islamic Republic of Iran is showing three Flights to Najaf were canceled, most likely, to justify its “preventive measure” claim in risk management for “stopping traffic exchange between Iran and Iraq” after the missile attacks on American military bases in Iraq. However, as is evident, two of them were not actually scheduled for departure at the time claimed by AAIB and one was not canceled until the last minutes and even passengers were initially boarded the plane but then were asked to leave the plane. This shows lack of a timely plan for what is claimed as a “preventive measure” for stopping flights between Iran and Iraq.

It should be mentioned that the two Iranian Mahan Airlines flights, W5-1150 and W5110 en route to Yerevan and Milan, respectively, (shown in Figure 5-40), scheduled flights to depart IKA at 07:00TT are also shown in error due to the same reasons. According to FlightRadar24 website, both of these flights stopped operating in this route back in July and December 2019. Therefore, it can be concluded that similar to ATA airlines flight I3-6650, these flights, most likely, showed up on FlightRadar24 and other flight tracking websites erroneously and most likely due to lack of upto-date flight schedule data provided to flight tracking websites like FlightRadar24.

In addition to the above-mentioned flights noted in AAIB's Final Report, there is one other flight that was actually canceled shortly after the downing but was not included in AAIB's Final Report: ● Iranian Mahan Airlines Flight W5112 having daily flights from IKA to SAW was, most likely, scheduled to depart IKA on January 8th at 06:50TT but was canceled. This flight still has the same schedule. Cancellation of this flight was likely not due to SAW closure as was the case for TK-899 and PC-513 flight because the SAW airport was back in operation at 05:00 Istanbul local time (05:30TT)25. It is unclear when exactly and why this flight was canceled by Mahan Airlines. It would be a questionable cancellation if the airline canceled the flight before the downing of PS752 at 06:12TT because none of the international airlines (except the ones bound for SAW) canceled their flights in the early morning of January 8th. We encourage passengers of this flight to reach out to our Association and share their information on when they were notified of this flight cancellation. It is worth noting that the aircraft associated with this canceled flight on January 8th was an Airbus-340-300 aircraft. According to the FlightRadar24 historical data, three aircraft with registration numbers EP-MMA, EP-MMC, and EP-MMD were operating this flight. Among these three aircraft, it must have been EP-MMC that was back from Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) on January 7th and landed at IKA at 04:15 TT. Flight W5112 for 06:50TT got canceled for no obvious reasons and later it departed Tehran for Shenzhen (China) in the evening of January 8th at 20:07TT (Flight W587) as planned on other days.

By investigating and tracking many flights schedules and paths in FlightRadar24 it is evident that in the case of many Iranian flights, there are incomplete, inaccurate, outdated data tables on FlightRadar24 website which appears to be due to lack of data management and/or proper and orderly data transfers by Iranian airlines or other providers to global flight tracking websites such as FlightRadar24. Although this is not an obligation for airlines to share this data with flight tracking websites, it is becoming a common practice in the industry, but it appears Iranian airlines are not following that properly. In many cases travel paths of the Iranian passenger airliners are partially shown on this website26 and in some other cases even with no origin and destination information

25 SAW got closed due to an incident that happened at 09:10AM on January 7th. According to FlightRadar24.com Playback feature, this closure continued until approximately 05:00AM (Istanbul local time) on January 8th when PC7192 from Cologne, Germany landed at SAW meaning that SAW was back into operation at this time and most likely some time before that. 26 This could relate to the old ages of the Iranian airlines’ fleet and outdated or non-existent of transponders on them.

which makes it difficult to track them and it could have been a source of abuse by Iranian authorities. (Refer to 2018 reports of weapon smuggling with civilian airliners).27

It can be concluded, on the early morning of January 8, 2020, there may have been other departure flights, most likely belonging to Iranian airlines, in addition to the 10 flights recorded on FlightRadar24 website that could have departed IKA or been cancelled. This is consistent with what some informants have reported to the Association about flight cancellations in the early morning of January 8th.

After the downing of PS752 by IRGC missiles, there were a total of 34 recorded flights departed IKA on January 8, 2020, starting with flight IR713 and no major delays or changes in their flight schedules. Iranian airlines owned 28 out of the 34 recorded flights, namely Mahan Airline, Iran Air Tour, Qeshm Airline, and Taban Airlines. No major flight cancellation was observed.

As mentioned before, PS752 was originally scheduled for departure 05:15TT but it was delayed for 57 minutes to become the last international airliner in a row of 10 departure flights starting from 01:36TT flight J2-9006 to Baku (See Figure 5). The Playback feature of FlightRadar24 website was used to track air traffic after 05:15TT and following screenshots show the traffic situation on and after that time until PS572 departed at 06:12TT. Presence of International flights are highlighted for reference together with their direction of flight. At the time of departure, no international flight had a view of the scene or could observe the shoot down as air traffic near IKA was minimal and limited at that time. Yet, several domestic flights like Aseman Airlines flight IRC3768 which witnessed the scene were in flight. Figure 5-42 to Figure 5-47 are the screenshots from FlightRadar24 that show the air traffic status of Tehran FIR between 05:15TT (01:45 UTC) until 06:10TT (02:40 UTC) when the ATC cleared PS752 for takeoff.

27 In 2018 news agencies reported on the use of civilian airliners for weapon smuggling to Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. https://www.foxnews.com/world/irans-secret-weapons-smuggling-air-routes-to-lebanonrevealed-by-intel-sources. Iran's former Foreign Minister also explained, in a vastly leaked voice interview, how the military forces abused civilian Iran Air flights for military purposes.

Figure 5-42. Air Traffic at 05:15TT (01:45 UTC) Original scheduled time of PS752 Departure

Figure 5-43. Air Traffic at 05:30TT (02:00 UTC)

Figure 5-44. Air Traffic at 05:45TT (02:15 UTC)

Figure 5-45. Air Traffic at 05:55TT (02:25 UTC)

Figure 5-46. Air Traffic at 06:10TT (02:40 UTC) when ATC cleared PS752 to take-off

Figure 5-47. Air Traffic at 06:18TT (02:48 UTC) the downing of PS752

Aseman Airline Shiraz-Tehran Flight IRC3768 en route Mehrabad Airport witnessed the flight PS752 shoot down by missiles while at approximately 25,000 feet altitude (Figure 5-48) and reported the scene to ATC.28 In February 2020, a Ukrainian Week TV (TSN.Tyzhden [113]) leaked what it referred to as an “intercepted communication” received from “intelligence services [55].”

28 ATC of the IKA is under Transportation ministry of the government and directly reports to it.

Later, “Hassan Rezaeifar [then head of AAIB at the time of PS752 downing] acknowledged the recording was legitimate and said it was handed over to Ukrainian officials [by Iran] [114]”. He also commented “We will no longer provide any documents to the Ukrainians [115]”. The audio shows Iranian civil aviation authorities knew about the plane shot down by missiles shortly after the downing but for days insisted mechanical issue was the cause, even after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and US officials began saying they believed it had been shot down [114]. Additionally, In the audio file and before reporting the shoot down by Aseman airlines pilot to ATC, the controller of ATC asks the pilot, without any previous enquiry, “You have GPS failure?”, the pilot responds “no Sir. ([84] page 30)” The question to be answered by CAO.IRI is if any GPS failures or issues were reported to the ATC (by other airlines or other governmental agencies) prior to the communication with Aseman airlines that made the ATC controller ask such a question.

FlightRadar24 playback feature shows while PS752 was in the air, there were two other flights which could have witnessed the downing of flight PS752 and may have had a similar conversation with ATC. These flights have been pictured in Figure 5-48 and are as follows: ● Mahan Airlines Isfahan-Tehran Flight W54530 was landing at Mehrabad airport, and it was at approximately 4,000 feet altitude and much closer than the Aseman Airlines flight. We encourage witnesses (passengers or crew) to contact the Association to share details of the shoot down as witnessed.

● Karun Airlines Ahvaz-Tehran Flight NV2615 was landing at Mehrabad airport and from approximately 6,200 feet altitude, much closer than the Aseman Airlines flight and at an altitude close to PS752 at the time of the shoot down. We encourage witnesses (Passengers or crew) to contact the Association to share details of the shoot down as witnessed.

Figure 5-48. Tehran FIR present flights at the time PS752 was shot shown

The flight KK1185 of Atlas Global took off from IKA at 05:17TT and was two flights prior to PS752. Available data and other clues regarding this flight are described in this section. KK1185

and PS752 were both originally scheduled for departure at 05:15TT. Despite PS752 delay, Atlas global flight took off from IKA on time. Initially, its unrealistic zigzag path of travel, as shown in Figure 5-49 (in red), drew attention from the investigators as well as the public.

Similar to all other flights, historical data for this flight is available on FlightRadar24 website. This data shows that this flight had regular, early morning, daily flights from Tehran to Istanbul from September 2018 until February 2020 when Atlas Global filed for bankruptcy. Since November 2019, its flights from Tehran to Istanbul were scheduled to depart IKA at 05:15TT with no major delays until the airline went out of business in February 2020. Figure 5-49 shows all of KK1185 Tehran-Istanbul flights from November 2019 through January 8, 2020, in blue which were routed through PAROT checkpoint with exception of only three flights shown in other colors: January 8th, 2020, flight shown in red, November 16, 2020, flight shown in Magenta, and December 24, 2019, flight shown in white.

Figure 5-49. KK1185 Flights comparison from November 1, 2019, through January 8, 2020

A few weeks after the downing of Flight PS752, head of Iran’s AAIB, Mr. Rezaeifar, had a phone conversation with one of the victims’ families asking him to remove his Instagram posts as he was criticizing the Iranian government [16]. Conversation continued with exchange of text messages, via Instagram, and he was asked about the irregular path of KK1185. Rezaeifar's response was: “This is included in my report and is getting translated, as mentioned, and we will publish it. Everyone thinks Atlas Global was hacked and hence was not routed in a direct path. [However], per both the Turkish [Atlas Global] pilot's report as well as [ATC?] radar, it was due to airport’s inbound traffic and [Atlas Global] was vectored to change route and get enough clearance from incoming flight. This traffic control technique is called vectoring and is the proper course of action for managing traffic." (Figure 5-50)

Figure 5-50. Text message exchange with Hassan Rezaeifar and his explanations on Atlas Global path

Despite Mr. Rezaeifar’s false assertions about irregular zig zag path being due to vectoring, according to aviation experts, no passenger airliner can make such sharp zigzag moves as shown on FlightRadar24 and other flight tracking websites. In fact, the passenger airliner’s actual path should have been similar to what is shown in green (in Figure 5-51). Additionally, vectoring in aviation is normally due to bad weather, failed Navigational Aid (NAVAID) components or air traffic conflicts. Weather on January 8th was in fair conditions according to METAR data and FlightRadar24 playback feature shows the only incoming flight at the time of KK1185 departure was TK878, being approximately 72 kilometers away from KK1185 (Figure 5-52) at an altitude of 20,000 feet. Had the flight KK1185 routed through the PAROT checkpoint as normal, it would have still kept appropriate Horizontal clearance of approximately 9.6 kilometers from TK878 when they would have passed each other as shown in Figure 5-53 with a vertical clearance of approximately 1,700 feet. Therefore, in the contrary of what Mr. Rezaeifar has declared, vectoring of this flight couldn’t be due to incoming traffic. Vectoring, however, could have happened due to failed navigation as mentioned above and will be discussed in the next section.

It is worth mentioning, according to FAA regulations, which may slightly differ with other jurisdictions, horizontal separation between 3 to 5NM (approximately. 5.5 to 9 kilometers) [116] is recommended and per ICAO, “vertical separation minimum between IFR traffic shall be a nominal 1000 ft below an altitude of 29000 feet” [117].

Figure 5-51. KK1185 recorded versus estimated actual path

Figure 5-52. Traffic at the time of KK1185 departure on January 8th - Distance from KK1185 and TH878

Figure 5-53. KK1185 and TK878 positions near the airport.

According to the CVR transcript that was partially released in AAIB's Final Report, flight PS752 Captain notices GPS failures on both sides approximately 15 seconds prior to the recorded detonation sound at 06:15:56TT (see Figure 5). Based on the times provided by AAIB, approximately 1.5 minutes later, radar communicates with Aseman Airline flight IR3768 Captain and without any inquiry from the captain asks: “You have GPS Failure[too]?” (See Figure 5-55).

Figure 5-54. CVR conversation about GPS failure per AAIB's Final Report ([84]- page 70)

Figure 5-55. CVR conversation about GPS failure per AAIB's Final Report

The above-mentioned Conversations about GPS would indicate there has been GPS issues in the area that was felt not only by PS752 crew but most likely by other flying aircraft. Otherwise, why would radar ask Aseman Airlines about GPS failures without any enquiry from Aseman Captain unless there has been reports of GPS failure by other aircraft and likely by PS752. It appears CVR transcript released by AAIB's Final Report is incomplete and could have valuable information on what crew members experienced.

The GPS failures were most likely due to jamming activities in the region. It is worth noting that GPS was originally developed by the US military to determine “precise” locations in the battlefield and GPS jamming is an activity to neutralize that effort [118]. Therefore, it was most likely performed by IRGC to avoid precise targeting of critical Iranian assets by the US. In these conditions flights were still permitted to depart IKA airport.

In addition to the primary evidence mentioned above, while tracking Flight TK873 on January 8, 2020, in FlightRadar24 playback feature, it is observed the plane disappears approximately near where PS752 track disappeared and then a couple of seconds later reappears in FlightRadar24. Although this could be due to a glitch on FlightRadar24 website, it could also be an additional sign of GPS issues.

As briefly discussed in the previous section, in addition to weather conditions and traffic reasons which do not appear to have been the case at the time of KK1185 departure, other reasons may cause vectoring. It is possible that Flight TK873 informed ATC of GPS issues and therefore ATC has vectored the next flight which was KK1185 of Atlas Global. With this consideration, the question of ATC from Aseman Airline flight IR3768 regarding “GPS failure” makes some sense.

This can be due to GPS jamming at the time this flight was departing IKA. Similarly, but on a larger scale, the zigzag flight path of KK1185 could also be due to GPS issues, likely caused by GPS jamming activities at the time. Existence of GPS issues is consistent with the ATC and Aseman airlines flight IRC3768 conversation about GPS failure that was mentioned earlier. It is also consistent with the fact that, PS752 crew faced GPS failure issues in the final moments prior to the first missile impact according to CVR conversation that was released with AAIB's Final Report. It should be noted that the GPS interruptions don't seem to have any direct impact on the

downing of PS752 but could have potentially and indirectly influenced the cockpit situational awareness and responsiveness of the crew and their workload in handling the situation which could have put the flight safety in serious danger especially since, according to FDR, the PS752 crew were relying on GPS for Lateral Navigation (LNAV) as discussed in Section 5.7.4.

Considering the totality of above-mentioned analysis and especially based on the conversation between ATC, PS752 and IR3768 it is quite possible that Islamic Republic of Iran was performing GPS Jamming activities, likely, in consideration of possible US retaliation using GPS-aided missiles. Having airspace open in this situation and performing GPS jamming activities near an international airport where it will considerably increase flight crew’s workload, as the flight crew were relying on GPS for take-off, is seriously concerning.

Also, the fact of GPS invalidity in PS752, most likely due to GPS jamming, is in contradiction with AAIB’s Final Report claim on the healthy conditions of the aircraft at the time of missile impact. Also, the Ukrainian investigation team had raised the same question about GPS invalidity issue which was not replied appropriately by CAO.IRI and AAIB.

Based on the report given by the AAIB, after the last relocation of the ADU at 4:58TT, due to a human error, a 105 degrees misalignment occurred in heading calibration of the radar system in finding true north. According to the Canadian Forensic Team’s report, the four flights which departed immediately after IRGC allegedly relocated the Tor-M1 unit, were potentially at risk of being misidentified. In this report it is further stated that “This [risk of misidentification] should gravely concern every country whose airlines and citizens travelled through IKA that morning. Because of Iran’s actions – and failure to act – any of those other flights could have met the same fate as Flight PS752”. Considering this piece of information given by the Forensic Team’s report, the possibility of a misalignment/misidentification is scrutinized. Figure 5-56 through Figure 5-61 illustrate the flight path of these four airliners. In these Figures, the position where the first missile hits Flight PS752, and the geolocated position of the second missile impact, are shown with a large hollow circle close to the 12 km range of Tor-M1, and a star sign respectively.

Had misalignment occurred, per Islamic Republic of Iran's unproven scenario, the operator would have mistakenly seen the IKA in the southwest direction on his radar screen. The first flight that leaves IKA after the repositioning of the ADU at 4:58TT, is Flight QR491 of Qatar Airways, at 5:00TT. According to the information provided by the Canadian Forensic Team, this flight has been detected by the radar and “could have met the same fate as Flight PS752”. If the ADU could observe QR491 as soon as it entered the 25 km detection range of Tor-M1 (depending on topography of the area), the operator, knowing that IKA should be on the southeast direction, observes an object that appears on his radar screen from southwest, makes a turn, and then disappears going out of the detection range of the radar. This is shown in Figure 5-56. It is important to highlight that the operator is aware of his location relative to IKA, whether by knowing the area or by observing the flights that had left IKA earlier on that morning (before the alleged misalignment occurred). Therefore, the entrance and exit of an object from the radar screen from a location in southwest direction, where supposedly no airport is located, should have warned the operator, specifically during high tensions when the defence unit is on high alert. It is worthwhile adding that according to the “Factual Report” released by the AAIB, “given the change made in the alertness level of Iran's air defence, the military sector informed the civil sector of the country's

Airspace Control that “only the flights already detected and cleared for flight operations by the defense network could be permitted to start up ([101] page 2)”. Hence, the operator has seen the unexpected appearance and disappearance of an object on his screen a few minutes after the permission is given for take-off. Yet, this flight does not get to the nominal 12 km range of the TorM1 unit and could not have been shot down.

Figure 5-56. Departure of Flight QR491 at 5:00TT. The flight path is shown for the correct north alignment, and with the assumption of a 107 degrees misalignment of the north direction of the ADU.

Only a few minutes after QR491, the operator is supposedly informed about another flight which will take off. This is the TK873 of Turkish Airlines, heading Istanbul shown with a red line in Figure 5-57. Again, even if the operator was not informed about this outgoing flight, he observes that from the southwest direction, an object enters his radar screen and goes towards Tehran. The flight route of PS752 is also depicted for reference, in black, to emphasize the proximity of the travel path of both flights. The flight TK873 climbs, captures cruising altitude, and continues its route.

Figure 5-57. Departure of Flight TK873 at 5:07TT. The flight path is shown for the correct north alignment, and with the assumption of a 107 degrees misalignment of the north direction of the ADU.

Figure 5 shows the vertical path of the flights that left IKA on the morning of January 8th. It is evident that in terms of altitude, all flights have a very similar path. Therefore, it is very questionable why the operator did not see the TK873 as a hostile target as was the case for PS752.

Figure 5-58. Vertical path of departures from IKA on the morning of 8 January [105]

After 10 minutes, KK1185 of Atlas Global departs for Istanbul as well. This is shown in Figure 5-59. The same questions for TK873 above, holds for the case of this flight as well. If the operator was informed about an outgoing flight from IKA, he should have wondered why a few minutes after given permission for flight KK1185 an object appears on his screen from a location which is not in fact the IKA. If the operator had no idea about the incoming and outgoing flights, then KK1185 was a flying object, passing close to the ADU. It is very important to mention that all these flights, when appearing on the ADU's radar screen, are in steady increase of airspeed and altitude in their flight profile. For instance, the moment the first missile detonated near PS752, the plane was flying with an airspeed of 509 km/h, while the cruising airspeed of a Boeing 737-800 is around 860 km/h. The same holds true for the other flights as well. When they first appear on the radar screen, their velocity is a fraction of their cruising speed which should be easy to recognize for an experienced operator. Therefore, the operator should have known that the objects he observed on radar screen have just recently taken off. And he certainly was aware that there is no air base close by in his southwest direction. If any misalignment had occurred, this should have allowed him to learn about it.

Figure 5-59. Departure of Flight KK1185 at 5:17TT. The flight path is shown for the correct north alignment, and with the assumption of a 107 degrees misalignment of the north direction of the ADU.

Shortly after 5:39TT, Flight QR8408 that leaves for Hong Kong, is on the operator's radar screen, depicted in Figure 5-60. An object enters the radar screen from southwest, makes a complete turn and goes back towards southwest. The operator sees an object that initially approaches the ADU, changes direction almost 180 degrees, turns back and goes away. If there was a misalignment in the north direction of the radar and the operator was not aware of it, after observing such a maneuver on his radar he should have certainly realized that there is some problem with the calibration of the radar. Nevertheless, this flight did not reach the nominal operational range of the ADU and was not at the risk of being shot down.

Figure 5-60. Departure of Flight QR8408 at 5:39TT. The flight path is shown for the correct north alignment, and with the assumption of a 107 degrees misalignment of the north direction of the ADU.

Finally, at 6:12TT, and after 57 minutes of delay, PS752 takes off. The flight path for PS752 is very similar to the flights that left for Istanbul (which are also shown on Figure 5-61), and the altitude is almost identical to the other flights that left IKA after midnight of January 8th. The operator has observed nine previous flights (presumably, the identification of the last four of them was affected by misalignment) on his radar after being dispatched to Bidkaneh on the midnight of January 8th, that looked very similar to PS752 in terms of flight specifications. According to the

“Factual Report”, from 4:00TT, “only the flights already detected and cleared for flight operations by the defence network could be permitted to start up ([101] page 2)”. Yet, this time, allegedly, the operator believes that PS752 is a missile. These explanations do not add up. Considering the analysis outlined in this section, there is no reasonable explanation to believe that a misalignment of 107 degrees occurred that was overlooked by the operator.

Figure 5-61. Departure of Flight PS752 at 6:12TT. The flight path is shown for the correct north alignment, and with the assumption of a 107 degrees misalignment of the north direction of the ADU.

According to AAIB's Final Report, traces of explosive trinitrotoluene (TNT) was detected on the outer layers of the fuselage of the downed Flight PS752. Additionally, the report provides that a small amount of DNT was also observed on the remains of the aircraft. The presence of these substances at the crash site is significant as it gives rise to multiple possibilities. As a result, it is important to understand the source of these materials.

Iran’s report asserts that the TNT trace was similar to the aliphatic compounds used in the TorM1 missile launched at the aircraft, and that the DNT could have been a by-product of the thermal degradation of the aircraft's conventional substances like fuel and epoxy. According to the leaked audio file of a top Iranian official, which is discussed in Appendix A, Iran’s investigation team was in charge of analyzing the types of explosive materials (whether from a missile or a bomb) on the remains of the aircraft. The recovered parts of the aircraft were sent to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran as well as a few other laboratories to test for explosive materials. This process usually takes some time to complete, but in the middle of February, the results arrived indicating that there were no other explosive materials on the plane. The only explosive material that was reported was from the missiles themselves.

According to explosive experts, TNT is known to contain DNT as it is an intermediate product of the manufacturing process. Consequently, there are always DNT impurities in most TNT explosive-based charges or commercial TNT products. When explosive charges detonate, they leave unburned trace residues of each with varying concentrations. Thus, finding both TNT and DNT on the surfaces of the aircraft could be a sign of the blast from a warhead containing TNT explosive and DNT impurities. Considering that TNT was detected, the most probable source of

DNT found on surfaces and windows of the aircraft are from the unburned residues from the blast from the missile warhead.

Moreover, AAIB's Final Report explains that TNT was also found in the interior part of the aircraft cabin window. The presence of TNT on the interior side of the aircraft cabin window may be suggestive of the presence of explosive materials other than what was present in the missiles fired at Flight PS752. According to explosive experts, the AAIB’s claim that the source of DNT produced by the burning process of something other than the warhead is not very probable, and almost impossible. TNT is only used as an explosive ingredient. As such, TNT generation by some other substance or source is not possible.

In conclusion, there are two reasonable explanations for the presence of TNT inside the aircraft. The first one is that the missile blast spread trace residues of TNT and DNT inside of the aircraft on windows, which Iran did not mention in its Final Report. The second explanation is that an external factor such as bombs carried inside the aircraft cabin can be the source of the TNT detected in the interior side of the aircraft cabin window, which needs to be investigated further. Possibility of an explosion could be linked to the fuel sensor issue that is discussed in Section 5.7.1 of this report.

Based on the leaked audio file of a top Iranian official, which is discussed in Appendix A, there are no remains of many seats of the aircraft. He stated that because the material was made out of “composite”, it had burned and was destroyed. This claim is not consistent with the fact that the passports and many of the passengers’ belongings survived the fire caused by the downing and were in good or even intact conditions. Some may suggest that the fire was not spread evenly in the cabin and that’s why many passengers’ seats were fully burned and vanished whereas some passengers’ belongings remained almost intact from any damage. Yet, another important question is why many corpses were not with the seats when the PS752 hit the ground in Shahed-Shahr.

According to Alexander Ruvin, the Head of the Ukrainian forensic team from the Kyiv Research Institute of Forensics, passengers were in a state of “panic” before the plane was hit by IRGC missiles [119]. Ruvin said the plane had not risen to a high enough altitude to permit passengers to take off their seatbelts. If the passenger seat belts were fastened, as they should have been, they would have fallen to the ground with their seats, he said. “We saw the corpses of the dead lying on the ground, without seats,” Ruvin stated. “There is reason to believe that the aircraft was burning from the inside and through the holes, black smoke came out,” he added.

It is unclear what could have caused the state of panic on the plane 'before' the first missile struck, as referred to by Ruvin, that caused the passengers to get out of their seats. Based on the available information, there could be three main explanations for the panic on the plane. First, there are some unverified claims that Iran may have fired not two, but more missiles at the plane. That first missile is believed by multiple witnesses to have missed the plane and instead just caused panic among the passengers in the cabin. The second possibility is that an explosion by an external factor like bombing may have happened before the IRGC missiles hit the plane, and that was the reason why some passengers took off their seatbelts to move to parts of the plane less affected by the explosion. Tension in the cabin could be linked with the cause of the fuel sensor issue that was discussed in Section 5.7.1 of this report. Tor-M1 is designed to take down

a fighter plane, cruise missile or helicopter just might not be enough to instantly destroy a big jetliner. The third possibility is that a lot of travelers look out their windows during take-off and landing, many of them might have seen the missile in the last few seconds before it detonated.

Through independent investigations led by the Association, it was revealed that the electronic devices of the passengers of Flight PS752 were subjected to human manipulations to destroy key components inside the electronic devices. The examined devices were given to the Association by the families of victims, and included an iPhone, a Samsung smartphone, a laptop, and an apple watch. The results of this investigation indicate that all of the devices that were examined had damages that were inconsistent with damages caused by a sudden and hard impact. In particular, the memory and data components of the devices were crushed or removed in all of these instances.

This investigation was conducted by Mr. Mark Mendelson, a professional investigator experienced in the analysis of smart phones, laptops and other electronic devices. In his report, which is reproduced in Appendix J, he indicates: All of the items I viewed had extensive outer damage, including cracked screens and the casings either bent or crushed, yet they were devoid of any evidence of fire, water or the odor of jet fuel. Although broken screens and bent casings are common in any type of severe impact, having all of the screens separated from the body and having internal memory components crushed or removed is of great concern. Indeed, this fact leads me to believe that these items were manipulated post-crash.

Mr. Mendelson further remarks that the fact that the screws were removed and covers pried open “strongly suggests that concerted efforts were made to extract [the memory/data] components, rendering a review of data impossible.

A deliberate and systematic tampering with the electronic devices is significant as it suggests that there could have been critical information recorded on board the flight which would have implicated the perpetrators of the downing in a serious way. It is not clear what the nature of the information recorded on the electronic devices of the passengers were to persuade the Iranian authorities to destroy the devices. Nonetheless, what is certain is that a “series of errors”, as claimed by the Iranian officials, would not have justified such a human manipulation with the electronic devices of the passengers.

176 innocent passengers and an unborn child perished on January 8, 2020, when the Ukrainian International Flight PS752 was shot down by two surface-to-air missiles from the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over Tehran's Imam Khomeini International Airport. Islamic Republic of Iran's authorities have been systematically covering up the downing since the early hours after the event; from denying the missile attack for three days to bulldozing and looting the crash site and failing to return the victims’ belongings and valuables to their families. Iranian authorities interfered with burial rites, hijacked funerals, and disrespected and mishandled the bodies.

According to Human Rights Watch who spoke to 31 family members of victims, Iranian authorities have engaged in a campaign of harassment, abuse, arbitrary detention, summoning, interrogation, torture, and otherwise mistreating victims’ family members [120]. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard killed 176 people without a shred of accountability, and now Iran’s brutal security agencies are abusing victims’ family members to squash any hope for justice,” said Michael Page [121].

After the IRGC admitted they shot down Flight PS752, a series of protests broke out in several cities in Iran. Several people were arrested and detained. According to the Human Rights Watch report that was released in May 2021, “Over the past year, courts have sentenced at least 20 people in connection with their participation in protests. [122].” Three more participants have received their sentences just shortly before publication of this report.

In spite of admitting the downing, the IRGC has not accepted responsibility. As per the Chicago convention, Annex 13, Iran as the state of occurrence is responsible to investigate the incident. Over the past several months Iranian courts, and particularly revolutionary courts, have failed to conduct an independent investigation and failed to prosecute the responsible authorities in an impartial fair trial. “On April 6, 2021, Iranian authorities announced that they had indicted 10 people for their role in the incident but have not provided any public information about their identities, ranks, or the charges against them.” Human Rights Watch reported, published on May 27, 2021. In September 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s military tribunal in Tehran issued a notice to the families who have filed a lawsuit. According to this notice, the Iranian courts have prohibited the criminal prosecution of the principal culprits of the PS752 downing. This notice instead provides the names of the few low-ranking subordinates of the IRGC who have been charged only with participating in the manslaughter of 177 people, negligence, recklessness, and failing to observe official duties

In this chapter we attempt to draw the international community’s attention to the series of human rights violations committed by Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to the aftermath of downing Flight PS752, which have (and continue) to cause immeasurable psychological damage to the families of the victims.

Initially, the Islamic Republic of Iran officials closed off the crash site for a hurried and selective clean up. Within hours of the aircraft's downing, the crash site, body parts, and other belongings

of the victims were left unsecured for the public to access. Iranian officials used bulldozers to clear the crime scene before international investigators were granted access [123]. Evidence was destroyed, tampered with, and confiscated. Photographs, taken from the crash site in the early morning hours after the downing, show hundreds of people including members of the Iranian Red Crescent Society, security forces, and individuals without identification or uniform. According to local residents and other witnesses, numerous individuals, including law enforcement officers, looted intact suitcases, cash, jewelry, identification documents, electronic devices and other valuables belonging to the passengers. Several family members expressed that, based on the news media's pictures of the crash site, it was evident that some of their loved ones' belongings were intact and in good condition. However, they have not been returned. Agnes Callamard, the then Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions expressed the seriousness of these violations in her report [107]:

“The reported treatment of the crash-site, in effect a mass grave, raises serious concerns… Governments should ensure that mass graves are preserved and protected and take all measures necessary to immediately protect mass gravesites from erosion, destruction, manipulation and looting.

“The Minnesota Protocol requires the crime scene, defined as any physical space where evidence may be collected, such as the crash site, be “secured at the earliest possible opportunity and unauthorized personnel shall not be permitted entry.” All material collected, including all “personal effects of the deceased, either worn by or in the possession of the deceased,” should be recorded and properly stored. The personnel effects must be returned to the families when there is no further need for them in the investigation. There is no excuse for the State allowing personal items to be stolen or looted or failing to return these items to the families.”

“The authorities allegedly denied the families access to the crash sites and failed to return the entirety of passengers’ belongings, with the result that many families are left without even the smallest mementos of those who lost their lives on PS752.”

According to the local residents, officers returned to the crash site several times and set fire to the remaining belongings of passengers, for months after the downing. Figure 6-1 shows law enforcement officers searching bags and removing some of their contents at the crash site. There is also this video [124].

In the early weeks, the Iranian authorities contacted the families of the victims and asked them to collect their loved ones' belongings. Families, however, were denied access to loved ones' electronic devices even after recognizing their devices. They were told that the authorities were reviewing the contents of the devices. While some electronics were returned, their memory cards were removed by the Iranian authorities. According to the Ukrainian forensics head, Alexander Ruvin, “Several mobile phones and tablets which belonged to the 176 deceased were taken from the Ukrainian team by the Iranians [125]” Figure 6-2 is a picture of some of the electronics that were collected by the Iranian authorities from the site before they were returned to the victims’ families. The bent electronics have raised questions and concerns among several families. One likely explanation is that these electronics may have been bulldozed over in an attempt to destroy any potential evidence that victims recorded in the last minutes of their lives. However, as mentioned in Section 5.13, the Association’s independent investigation revealed that the devices were deliberately tampered with to destroy their memory components. According to the Human

Rights Watch report, “Those devices had sentimental value for families, since they stored many photos and videos from the victims, including some of the last shots they took, several family members said [120].”

There were at least 82 suitcases at Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran that weren't loaded onto the aircraft. These were the only suitcases that were returned to the families. Yet not every item from those suitcases was returned, especially those valuables that belonged to their loved ones. A number of these suitcases were found to have been unlawfully searched before being handed over.

Figure 6-1. Law enforcement officers looting victims’ belongings

Figure 6-2. Victims’ collected electronics from the site.

The Indonesian Lion Air flight JT 610 crash in October 2018 off Indonesia was used as a case study to compare the way the victims' belongings and the crash site must be handled by the state of occurrence. Figure 6-3 shows an example of the victims’ belongings collected from the bottom of water and laid in for identification with great care [126].

By failing to protect the passengers' belongings, Islamic Republic of Iran has exacerbated the emotional impact on the grieving families, as they were deprived of items of sentimental value. The items, if returned properly, could have helped grieving families better understand their loved ones' final moments; anything from the deceased's possessions could help their grieving families cope with their losses.

Figure 6-3 Personal items recovered from Lion Air flight JT610

A number of families sought to repatriate their loved ones to other countries, but a number of reports from the families indicate that the Iranian authorities attempted to obstruct these requests in one way or the other. In some cases, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran required the families to sign a form without which the repatriation cannot be allowed. However, in some cases, families who requested to repatriate their loved ones were not asked to sign this form. According to the UN report, the form required signatures from family members declaring that the victim only had Iranian nationality [107]. This has raised several questions regarding the logic behind this controversial requirement.

In another instance, the authorities intervened in the process of repatriation to block an ambulance carrying the remains of one of the victims to the airport. The ambulance was called back to the coroner’s office without stating the reason, despite having received prior permission to transport the victim’s remains to the airport. Once there, the authorities informed the family of the victim that the body cannot leave the country. It was only after multiple urgent requests to other offices that the coroner’s office issued the permission for the coffin to go to the airport again.

At least for three of the repatriated bodies, DNA tests conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran were inaccurate, according to reports received by the association. During DNA testing by destination countries, the families were informed that the DNA tests conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran were incorrect, and that some body parts did not belong to their loved ones. Families are now concerned whether the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted DNA testing properly or even if they did it at all. The burials of two other victims in the United Kingdom were also delayed for over forty days due to Islamic Republic of Iran's unwillingness to cooperate in transferring DNA results.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, “Families also said that authorities did not allow them to see the bodies of their loved ones. Five family members were particularly disturbed that though they had made repeated requests, the authorities who handled the bodies refused to allow them to see the body of their loved one in a casket. “To this date, I do not know if I actually buried my own son,” a mother of one victim said. Another family member said that when they received the casket, they asked for more documentation that would prove it contained their loved one’s body. But the authorities responsible for returning the bodies refused to provide such documentation or said that they did not have any [documentations] [120].”

The crime scene was cleared by Iranian officials using bulldozers in the early hours after the downing, prior to the arrival of international investigators. While the remains of victims were still at the crime scene, Iranian authorities bulldozed them over utterly disrespecting their bodies and families. Families were denied the basics of human dignity, which is to have the bodies of their loved ones treated respectfully.

For intimidation and propaganda purposes, representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) repeatedly contacted and forcefully visited the families of the victims at their homes and at funerals. The majority of these visits were against the families' wishes. A report to the association indicates that Islamic Republic of Iran's then Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, was at a meeting with the Supreme National Security Council on Friday, the day before the IRGC publicly

admitted to downing Flight PS752 with their missiles. According to information received by the Association, during this meeting, the IRGC members and the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans members were summoned and assigned to contact and visit the grieving families. A vast majority of the families of the victims believe their loved ones were murdered by a targeted and deliberate attack. Families did not want visitors from those they considered murderers. In addition, the officials who forcefully visited victims’ families brought a reporter crew to the families' houses without their knowledge or consent, interviewing grieving families and their relatives.

Later, Islamic Republic of Iran's state-run media heavily edited these interviews to serve its propaganda purposes. The authorities threatened families that publicly condemned the IRGC for this crime; these families were asked to report to the Iranian Intelligence Agency and explain their behaviour. “There are reports that, in the context of public protests about the downing of PS752, Iranian officials sought to coerce families into publicly declaring their support for the Government or risk the non-return of their loved ones’ remains.” Agnes Callamard, the then special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions at the United Nations reported in December 2020 [107].

The Islamic Republic of Iran hijacked funerals for propaganda purposes. IRGC officials showed up uninvited to the funeral, acted as hosts, greeted visitors, and took photos without the family's permission for state media. In some cases, even the families of the victims were prevented from attending the funeral of their loved ones [127]. In fact, every funeral and memorial gathering was closely monitored and controlled by the Iranian authorities (Figure 6-4 through Figure 6-6).

In addition, families were pressured to accept “martyrdom” status for their loved ones. An individual is referred to as a "martyr" if he gives his life in order to defend Islam, the Islamic revolution, and its achievements. This caused immeasurable pain to the victims’ families as they do not believe their loved ones lost their lives for the same cause. Many families reported that, despite refusing to accept martyrdom status, they were issued "martyrdom death certificates" without their consent and knowledge. Some families were even forced to bury their loved ones in the designated sections of cemeteries for martyrs. There have been instances in which victims have been buried in martyr's sections of cemeteries without the families' permission or presence. In several cases, the authorities carried the victims' caskets and wrote “congratulations on your martyrdom'' on the caskets without the families’ consent. According to the Human Rights Watch report, “Families said they believed that the authorities’ attaching “martyrdom” status to Flight 752 victims was a way for the state to assert control over the process of memorializing victims and to distract people from calls for accountability [120].”

The Islamic Republic of Iran's harassment and interference with memorials and vigils has continued since the downing of PS752 and intensified around the first anniversary according to the victims’ families.

Figure 6-4. Victims’ funerals hijacked by the Islamic Republic of Iran. “Martyr” is written on the casket without the family's permission.

Figure 6-5. Victim’s funeral hijacked by the Islamic Republic of Iran. “Martyr” is written on the news title without the family's permission.

Figure 6-6. Victim’s funeral hijacked by the Islamic Republic of Iran and authorities standing near the victim’s casket.

According to Human Rights Watch, who spoke to 31 family members of victims, Iranian authorities have engaged in a campaign of harassment, abuse, arbitrary detention, summoning, interrogation, torture, and otherwise mistreating victims’ family members to silence accountability efforts. “At least 16 people said that security agencies threatened them not to participate in interviews with foreign media or had followed or summoned their relatives or friends who attended memorials and filmed those attending these events”. Human Rights Watch reported [120].

The IRGC and Iranian officials attempted to intimidate families through continuous phone calls and uninvited home visits. A number of the victims’ family members were physically assaulted.

Two officers sexually assaulted the aunt of one of the victims while she was summoned to the Intelligence and Security Office. One of the victims' fathers was detained for over eight hours after he protested and cried against the crime.

As Human Rights Watch further reported, “In at least one case, the authorities tortured a person in custody. In another case, plainclothes officers asked to meet a family member who had spoken against authorities’ conduct at a public place and threatened that person with prosecution. In at least three cases, the authorities threatened family members with “consequences” unless they removed social media posts critical of the government’s lack of accountability.” In at least four cases, family members of victims residing in Canada received several death threats and received numerous threats on-line [128].

In her report, Agnes Callamard, the then special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions at the United Nations has stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran apparently made an initial offer to financially compensate the victims’ families with a condition that no legal action be taken against them [107].

Several of the victims’ families were skeptical of the impartiality of the justice system and were reluctant to file domestic charges. The mistrust grew deeper especially after the senior officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the chief justice, praised the commanders of the IRGC for their January 8th mission on Ain Al-Assad while refusing to hold them accountable for the downing of flight PS752 that same night.

A few weeks after the downing, an organization called the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) which is affiliated with the judiciary system, began to contact the families. IHRC Representatives called families repeatedly, urging them to file complaints with the Iranian judicial system. These phone calls continued unabated for four months. Through these calls, Yadollah Asgari, a "trusted" attorney of the government, was introduced to the families by the judiciary. Some families received a “Notice of Imposed Attorney” from the Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces informing them that an attorney was appointed for the family; despite the fact that they did not request this (Figure 6-7). By appointing their own trusted attorneys to this case, it appears that the Iranian judiciary organization was attempting to control and influence the investigation.

Figure 6-7. A “Notice of Imposed Attorney” was received from the Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Hassan Rouhani's cabinet announced one year after the incident and before any transparent investigation had taken place that it had allocated US$150,000 to compensate the families of each passenger [129]. In spite of this decision, the families of victims repeatedly insisted that an independent and transparent investigation be conducted before compensation is discussed. According to the United Nation report “On April 15, Iran made an offer of financial compensation to Ukraine and the families and promised publication of the black box data, apparently on the condition that no legal action be pursued against Iran [107].” As such, Islamic Republic of Iran offered its compensation in false trade in order to gain impunity.

In May 2021, the families who filed domestic cases reported that they were not able to get any information neither about the investigation nor about the judicial progress on their filed complaints. According to The Human Rights Watch report, published on May 27, 2021, Iranian authorities have not released any details regarding the investigation of domestic criminal investigations, nor have they disclosed the names or ranks of those detained or interrogated [120]. Tehran's military prosecutor, Gholam Abbas Torki, told reporters on January 7, 2021, that the investigation determined that the missile operator’s human error caused the downing. One person who was not identified by name or rank remained in custody, he said [130].

The families of the victims met with the military prosecutor over a year after the incident on February 13, 2021. Families asked whether investigators had summoned Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC's Aerospace Force, against whom they filed a complaint in connection with the downing of the plane. During this meeting, not only were no explanations provided to the grieving families, but the deputy prosecutor, Ebrahim Hatami, told a bereaved father: “We did well to kill them [131].”

After a few days, on February 20th, Shokrollah Bahrami, the head of the armed forces judicial body, told the Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA) that the investigation was complete and judicial authorities were preparing the indictments [120].

On March 17, 2021, Islamic Republic of Iran’s AAIB published its Final Report on the incident [84]. The report blames the cause of the incident on the missile operator who misidentified the civilian airplane as the military threat. According to the report, the operator launched missiles before hearing back from his commanders. In a statement issued the same day, the Canadian minister of foreign affairs and transportation said, “The report makes no attempt to answer critical questions about what truly happened. It appears incomplete and has no hard facts or evidence [132].”

Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine's foreign minister, also called the Iranian investigation "biased," the evidence presented "selective," and the conclusions "deceptive [133]."

On April 6, 2021, Torki, Tehran military prosecutor, announced that ten military officials who were involved in the downing of the airplane had been charged, but he did not disclose their identities or ranks [134]. The families received a legal notice on May 5th stating that 10 people had been indicted for the downing and would face prosecution. Again, neither their names nor their ranks were disclosed. However, the notice states that the prosecutor does not have the jurisdiction to investigate the complaint against The State's Forensic Pathologist, who is being sued by the families for failing to perform proper identification tests on the bodies of the victims and for not returning the belongings of each victim to their families. In addition, the prosecutor has dropped charges against all others who were facing a complaint [135].

According to The Human Rights Watch report “On May 16, several family members filed a new complaint against Hossein Salami, the commander in chief of IRGC, Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, the chief of Islamic Republic of Iran’s Central Command of the Armed Forces, at the Branch 2 of Tehran First Branch of Criminal Military Court.”

In September 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s military tribunal in Tehran issued a notice to the families who have filed a lawsuit. According to this notice, the Iranian courts have prohibited the criminal prosecution of: the Government of the Islamic Republic; the Supreme National Security Council; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); the Unified Air Defence Forces; the Defence Forces; the IRGC Aerospace Force; Iran’s Civil Aviation Organization (CAO); Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC; Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Commander of Aerospace Force of the IRGC; and Ali Abedzadeh, former Head of Iran’s CAO.

This notice instead provides the names of the following low-ranking subordinates of the IRGC who have been charged only with participating in the manslaughter of 176 passengers and crew and an unborn child, negligence, recklessness, and failing to observe official duties: IRGC Captain

Mehdi Khosravi (TOR M-1 commander); IRGC First Lieutenant Meysam Kheirollahi (Operator); IRGC Third Lieutenant Seyed Ahmad Miri (Operator); IRGC First Lieutenant Mohammad Majid Eslam Doost; IRGC Captain Sajjad Mohammadi; IRGC Major Hamed Mabhout; Islamic Republic Army Colonel Mostafa Farati; IRGC Second Brigadier General Ibrahim Safaei Kia; and IRGC Brigadier General Ali Akbar Seydoun.

The families’ access to details of the domestic investigation, the progress of their filed complaints, and the issued indictments are still extremely limited and/or blocked at the time of publication of this report.

After the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps admitted to downing Flight PS752 with their missiles, vigils and widespread protests erupted in several cities in Iran including Tehran, Amol, Shiraz, and Mashhad [136]. Security forces responded with excessive use of force, including physical attacks and the use of tear gas, pepper spray, batons, rubber bullets and pointed pellets. They arrested and injured protesters [137]. “Hundreds of individuals were arrested and subjected to physical and psychological torture and ill-treatment have been used for the purpose of extracting confessions with families denied information about the individual’s fate and whereabouts in some cases” according to the United Nation report. Gholam Hossein Esmaeili, the judiciary spokesperson, told reporters on January 14, 2020, that the authorities had arrested about 30 people during the protests [138]. Human Rights Watch reported in May 2021 that over the first year the courts have sentenced at least 20 people in connection with their participation in protests [139]. At least three more participants, among whom are Ziauddin Nabavi, Amir Hossein Ali Bakhshi, and Ali Haghighat Javan, have received their sentences just shortly before publication of this report [122; 140].

According to the information gathered by the Association through several resources [Refer Appendix F], it appears that at least 72 people were either summoned or arrested and imprisoned. Many of those arrested were sentenced to several years in prison for “Propaganda against the state - Art. 500 IPC29”, “Assembling and colluding to act against national security - Art. 610 IPC” and “Disrupting public order - Art. 618 IPC”. To name a few, Iran Human Rights Monitor reported in September 2020 that Mostafa Hashemizadeh, a civil engineering student at the University of Tehran, is sentenced to five years in prison on a charge of “assembly and collusion to disrupt national security.” This young man is also sentenced to three months of public service at a mental hospital, 74 lashes, and is barred from entering the university dormitory for two years due to “disrupting public order [141].” According to Iran Human Rights Monitor (HRM), “Mostafa Hashemizadeh was pressured to make false confessions during the interrogation. The interrogator threatened to kill him by air injection and abandon his body in a remote location if he did not collaborate with them. Another time, the interrogator threatened to kill him the next morning if he did not confess to what they wanted.”

29 Islamic Penal Code (IPC)

In another instance, Roghayeh Bigdeli from Karaj, attended the protests, and was sentenced to 'exile' due to “Propaganda against the state - Art. 500 IPC” and “Membership in organizations that aim to disrupt national security - Art. 499 IPC” [142; 143]. Masoud Hokm Abadi, a producer and artist from Mashhad, was arrested for refusing to attend the Fajr Festival in protest of Flight PS752’s downing by the IRGC, and was sentenced to two years in prison due to “Propaganda against the state - Art. 500 IPC and Insulting the Leader or the Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran - Art. 514 IPC [144; 145].”

According to Hossein Sherkat Massoum, who published his initial court ruling on his Twitter account, Ahmad Zargar, the judge and executive of the Tehran Revolutionary Court (Branch 36), lifted Massoum’s supplementary punishment for his collaboration during trial, yet this trial was held without Massoum’s presence (Figure 6-8) [146]. This supplementary punishment included: 1) Providing service to Islamic Basij Organizations for 6 months, 4 hours per day; 2) Studying and researching on Flight IR655 that was shot down by the USS Vincennes in 1988, to be handwritten in 120 pages and his handwriting to be verified; the judge is required to compile seven questions and evaluate his knowledge over the content by conducting a test; the accused to be re-evaluated in six month if he failed the test; 3) Gathering information about the United States’ cruelty against his own nation and the world, posting these contents daily with visuals; and 4) Barred from membership in any religious, political or social groups for two years. From these outrageous rulings, it is evident that these protesters have been treated as traitors of the Islamic Republic of Iran only for participating in the peaceful demonstrations or for holding candle vigils in memory of Flight PS752 victims.

Figure 6-8. Hossein Sherkat Massoum’s court ruling from his twitter account.

Appendix F of the report contains details on several of the arrested and imprisoned cases compiled by the Association of Families of Flight PS752 Victims.

In parallel with the aftermath of downing flight PS752, the Islamic Republic of Iran has waged a systematic media and psychological war. This has been a propaganda campaign that distorted the truth for the families of the victims and misled public opinion in favor of the Islamic Republic of Iran's political agenda. During the three days following the downing of Flight PS752 on January 8th, Iranian officials lied furiously to deny any missile attack had occurred. There were several rushed interviews in the domestic media ranging from the highest civil aviation organization authorities to governmenttrusted aviation experts expressing their deceitful theories about the incident. Starting immediately after the downing and during the three days of constant denial, the authorities were bulldozing the crash site and were looting passengers' belongings and valuables.

On the morning of January 11th, after three days of denial, Islamic Republic of Iran's General Staff of the Armed Forces admitted they were responsible for downing flight PS752 with their missiles. In a lame statement, the IRGC offered an insincere apology and blamed one operator's human error for the deaths of 176 passengers, an unborn child, and the crew. On January 9th Ayatollah Khamenei, the Leader of Islamic Republic of Iran, and on a later occasion January 14, the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans both called the victims “martyrs”, a status given to those who sacrifice their lives in defending the goals of Islam and Islamic revolution and its achievements [147-149].

Martyrdom status is considered holy in Iran's public belief and culture. The families of martyrs are treated with respect, their loved ones are buried in designated martyrdom sections of cemeteries and the families receive government financial support. By giving a holy status of martyrdom to the victims, the Islamic Republic of Iran attempted to mislead and deceive the public opinion and families of the victims of Flight PS752. In addition, by controlling and interfering with funerals and memorial gatherings, and forcing financial compensation in false trade for impunity, the Islamic Republic of Iran deliberately diverted attention from calls for accountability.

The IRGC's admission that they downed the aircraft with their missiles sparked an intense reaction from the Iranian public, resulting in protests across the country. People demanded accountability and asked why the Islamic Republic of Iran covered up the truth and denied responsibility. The Iranian authorities arrested and imprisoned several protesters and heavily controlled peaceful candle vigils and memorial gatherings. During the year following the downing, some of those who were imprisoned made their court rulings public. Court rulings revealed that arrested protesters were treated as traitors to the Islamic Republic of Iran for participating in peaceful protests or holding candle vigils in memory of flight PS752 victims. Several protesters were sentenced to prison terms of several years.

In the days following the tragedy, families were called in groups to receive the bodies of their loved ones. Funerals and memorials were heavily controlled and, in some cases, completely taken over by the Iranian authorities. Some families who repatriated their loved ones’ remains were interfered with higher authorities or suffered lengthy delays due to Islamic Republic of Iran’s unwillingness to cooperate in transferring DNA test results. During this time and afterwards, the

Islamic Republic of Iran waged a campaign of harassment and abuse against families in order to suppress accountability efforts.

During the initial weeks after the downing the families of victims were called to collect the belongings and valuables of their loved ones, which were reportedly looted. The families also complained that the authorities mistreated them during the collection of their loved ones’ belongings and made hurtful comments to downplay the atrocity of downing flight PS752. Javad Soleimani who lost his wife, Elnaz Nabiyi, in the downing of flight PS752, in the documentary of “Dear Elnaz” describes the day he went to collect his wife's belongings; “I saw Judge Mohammad Shahriari, the head of the criminal court of Tehran, and the Kahrizak autopsy authorities sitting at a table laughing and eating cucumbers! Is this how to greet the grieving families?”. In another similar instance, the family members who went to collect their loved one's belongings were told by the authorities “why are you crying so much? What is the big deal?”

Iranian authorities delayed sending the black boxes to be analyzed for over six months, even though, according to ICAO Annex 13, the country of occurrence is required to immediately send the black boxes to be analyzed. The black boxes were discovered in the initial days after the downing. Images and video footage from the first days shows that the black boxes were intact and in good condition [150]. On February 19, 2020, Amir Hatami, Islamic Republic of Iran’s defence minister, claimed that the black boxes were heavily damaged despite the evidence to the contrary[151]. During an interview with NBC News on February 14, 2020, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javad Zarif, claimed that while Iran does not possess the technology to analyze and retract black boxes data, his country has not yet turned them over. Rather, Zarif blames the United States for failing to assist the Islamic Republic of Iran on what he claimed was a humanitarian issue and for not handing over the tools and technologies needed to analyze the black boxes [152].

The Islamic Republic of Iran also used the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse for delaying the delivery of flight recorders to France despite having months before the pandemic to do so [153; 154]. In spite of the pandemic, there were still flights bound for France, and black boxes could have been sent regardless. On May 9, 2020, ISNA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran has had several meetings with the European airlines to convince them that Iran’s skies are safe and to have them start flying over Iran and using its air corridors [155]. In the meantime, the black boxes had not yet been handed over for analysis. By refusing and delaying the delivery of the flight recorders, the Islamic Republic of Iran further exacerbated the psychological impact on the families of victims. It is extremely distressing for the families to wait so long for any information to emerge about the content of the flight recorders.

In several instances, the Islamic Republic of Iran showed a lack of willingness to conduct a transparent investigation. They pressured the families to file lawsuits in domestic courts and hire government-trusted attorneys. The Islamic Republic of Iran mistreated the families during their meetings with the judiciary authorities. They offered financial compensation in false trades for impunity. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran refused to provide any information about the domestic investigation, dragging its feet in releasing the incident technical reports. Even when the reports were published, they were inaccurate and unreliable. It was reported to the Association of Families of Victims that a few days before the Islamic Republic of Iran’s final incident technical report was made public, Arash Khodaei, the head investigator of PS752 and the successor to

Hassan Rezaeifar, gathered the domestic media reporters trusted by the government at the Foreign Ministry. Khodaei explained to the reporters what to question or not during the upcoming news press on PS752 final incident report.

During this time, Ebrahim Raisi was appointed as the Islamic Republic of Iran's Chief Justice, overseeing the judicial system. Raisi was a key member of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the entity which decided on January 8, 2020, to keep Iran's airspace open. In this capacity, he has systematically blocked all paths to truth and justice for those who were affected by the downing of Flight PS752. He has exonerated top military and government officials, but arrested and jailed protesters who spoke out against the perpetrators of this crime. Currently, he is the appointed president following a non-competitive election with less than 50% participation. The Islamic Republic of Iran's unwillingness to conduct a transparent investigation, their continual attempts to avoid accountability, and their obstruction of justice have caused families of victims’ unimaginable pain.

Families of victims came together from all over the world on April 1st, 2020 and founded the Association of Families of Flight PS752 Victims. Since then, they collectively and repeatedly participated in activities to seek justice and truth for their loved ones. The Islamic Republic of Iran has used a variety of tactics to divide the families. For instance, around the first anniversary of Flight 752, Saeed Ohadi, the head of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans, told reporters that with families’ consent, 127 victims had been declared martyrs [156]. Historically, families that are registered with the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans are provided with “financial benefits and better housing, employment, and educational opportunities [157]”. The Iranian government may seem to be offering support to the families by registering the victims as martyrs. However, this depends upon acceptance the families endorse and accept the false narrative that their loved ones died in vain to defend the Islamic Republic of Iran and Islam!

In the Association, the family members disagree tremendously that their loved ones who were simply leaving Iran aboard a civilian plane lost their lives to support the grand goals of Islam and the Islamic revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran's calculated step could impact the families' unity and jeopardize their collective cry for justice, as a few may have accepted the status of martyr due to their strong religious beliefs, or financial hardship. On the other hand, the Cabinet of the Islamic Republic of Iran also announced that they have allocated $150,000 to compensate the families of victims [129]. This was while almost a year passed from the incident and yet no transparent and independent investigation was conducted. The families repeatedly demanded justice before any talks about compensation. The “compensation” term was deceitfully used in the media in an attempt to create division not only among the families of victims but also to separate the families of victims from their public supporters who were mostly struggling with extreme economic hardship. Not only did the Islamic Republic of Iran attempt to divide family members, but they also made several attempts to divide countries involved in the incident. The Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, made a secret offer to Ukraine on April 16, 2020, pertaining to flight PS752. “In an interview with Radio Farda, sources familiar with the details of Iran's proposal, confirmed that Iran seeks to reach an agreement with Ukraine in which Ukraine would cease pursuing legal and criminal actions against Iran. According to sources, the proposed agreement has been drafted to shield Iran from accountability [158].”

In November 2020, the Iranian government-linked media falsely reported that the third round of negotiations would take place in December [159]. Ukraine however, on behalf of the countries involved, said that further negotiations depend directly on what information the Iranian side will transmit, and that the exact date of the talks had not yet been agreed upon [160]. It was yet another attempt to mislead the families of victims by claiming that compensation negotiations are taking place successfully. Despite this, families of the victims have repeatedly insisted that the Islamic Republic of Iran be held accountable, that an independent investigation be conducted, that perpetrators be punished, and that discussions about compensation be put on hold until they find truth and justice for their loved ones.

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s domestic media has also actively downplayed the atrocity of the attack on Flight PS752. Iranian TV reported on July 22, 2020 that the number of deaths from COVID-19 in July was equivalent to the downing of 30 airplanes with 170 passengers [161]. The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, made the same comparison of the number of deaths from COVID-19 in a speech he made on September 22nd [162]. To this date, and as the death toll for Covid continues to rise in Iran, many Twitter users with connections to the Islamic Republic of Iran continue to make such comparisons [163]. Since the downing of flight PS752 adversely impacted public perception of the Islamic Republic of Iran, making such a comparison was an attempt by the Islamic Republic of Iran to mislead the public by saying that 176 victims and an unborn child were similar to or fewer than those dying from COVID-19 every month and therefore not as important.

Another example of how the Islamic Republic of Iran's domestic media engaged in downplaying the attack was in portraying Hajizadeh, the IRGC commander in chief, as a heroic figure, instead of questioning him as one of the highest authorities who was in charge on January 8, 2020. Around the first anniversary of flight PS752 Hajizadeh had an interview with “Bedoone Taroof”, which is a domestic TV program notorious for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s orchestrated propaganda and interviews with political prisoners to confess under pressure. In an hour-long interview, he was repeatedly asked about the IRGC missile strike on US bases in Iraq, Ain Al-Assad, and how heroic and successful the mission was. Meanwhile, no questions were asked about the attack on flight PS752 and why the skies were kept open amid high military tensions, and as retaliation was expected from the United States.

A few months after the incident, the city of Tehran offered to build a memorial for flight PS752 victims [164]. Having the Islamic Republic of Iran mishandle the PS752 aftermath, the families of victims have deep mistrust in the system, and this gesture appeared to be a pretentious move to mislead. As the first anniversary of the downing of flight PS752 approached, a memorial service was held at Behesht Zahra Cemetery without the families' knowledge or participation, and solely for domestic media propaganda. During this event, trees were planted in memory of flight PS752 victims, and a memorial stone was unveiled, which had “Memorial to The Martyrs of The Flight 752'' carved on it. Later, a civilian spray-painted this memorial stone as a protest against what they viewed as a petty gesture of compassion toward the families of victims (Figure 6-9).

Figure 6-9. [Left] The memorial stone with “Memorial to The Martyrs of The Flight 752” carved on. [Right] Same memorial stone which was later sprayed over by unknown civilians as a sign of objection.

On the first anniversary of the incident, families of the victims gathered at the crash site for a memorial service. However, their event was intervened by the authorities. To prevent the families from accessing the site, Iranian officials blocked roads to it. When the families refused to leave, the authorities were forced to allow access although later they heavily controlled the event. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s complete disregard and disrespect for the families of victims have continued to the extent that they are even denied the right to memorialize the crash site. Figure 6-10 shows the wall at the crash site that was covered in blood the day of the incident. This wall was painted over only seventy days after the incident with no acknowledgement of remembering the horrific loss (Figure 6-11). Today, this area has been completely demolished and repurposed for private housing and public parks.

Figure 6-10. The wall located at PS752 crash site is covered in blood. Photo was taken the day of the incident.

Figure 6-11. The same wall as in Figure 6-10 is painted over. Photo was taken seventy days after the incident.

Iran has a history of sacrificing innocent lives for ideological and strategical ends, which we cannot rule out in the case of flight PS752. In the collective memory of Iranians, the crime of downing the Flight PS752 has similarities to another crime committed four decades ago. ProIslamic revolutionaries of 1978 and the supporters of Ruhollah Khomeini played a key role in this crime. The revolutionaries were a group of radical Islamists that operated within religious institutions and Mosques, under the guidance of Ruhollah Khomeini.

In the summer of 1978, it became common to set fire to liquor stores, bars, and movie theatres portraying Western films, media, and way of life. The pro-revolutionaries who were influenced by Ruhollah Khomeini and functioned in scattered groups in small and large cities of Iran, considered these places as non-Islamic places and believed that setting them on fire would pave the path for their Islamic revolution.

As one of the four defendants involved in this crime confessed in a court held two years later (after the Revolution), four residents of Abadan, under the influence of cleric and religious activists, decided to do something that would shake the city of Abadan.

Abadan was one of the major oil centers of Iran. Perhaps, it was the most strategic city in the south of Iran in the 1950s, in a decade when the issue of oil was significantly sensitive and always in news headlines. This city, however, had not followed other cities in the midst of an escalating revolution. The fire of the revolution, which had started in Qom since January 1977, was advancing from city to city but wouldn’t reach Abadan. Based on their own confession in court, the revolutionaries led by clerics in Tehran and Isfahan had this belief that Abadan and perhaps the whole country needed an event to start the wheel of revolution.

In the evening of August 19, 1978, four men entered a movie theatre called Cinema Rex, as a general audience, a theatre full of people watching one of the most popular films of the day, The Deer (Gavaznha). They set the corridors on fire with Molotov cocktails hidden under their clothes, and then joined the audience.

When the fire reached the inside of the theatre, the exit doors were blocked due to the crowd attempting to escape, so many died burning in the fire. The revolutionaries blamed SAVAK, the government intelligence services, for the crime, and some people believed the rumor. Ruhollah Khomeini would remember this as the Shah's masterpiece. It was claimed that SAVAK had chained the doors of the theatre from the outside so that no one would survive; a claim that was never proved.

A great disaster happened. The number of victims varies from 377 to 600. Almost everyone was burned, but the number of dead and injured was never announced separately as some of the victims died in hospitals long after this crime.

The crime of Cinema Rex intensified people’s dissatisfaction with the government and became the driving force for the revolutionaries to achieve their goals. The Pahlavi government was overthrown seven months later. Three of the perpetrators were themselves caught in the fire and burned. The fourth person was arrested just before the Revolution, but with its outbreak he escaped from prison without a trial and joined the revolutionary groups.

Not all political parties involved in the Revolution were interested in finding the truth. Cinema Rex was a tool that was used in a timely manner, and many of them, including the interim government, did not see the need to reveal the role of individuals in this crime. But the families of victims never gave up. They arrested the only remaining defendant themselves and with public gatherings and rallies they demanded a trial. The officials finally agreed. It was revealed in court that the city’s influential people, who were religious extremists, had ordered the cinema to be set on fire, but their role was never investigated. The local commanders came to power after the revolution. Two of them became members of parliament for consecutive terms, and the other remained as the representative of Ruhollah Khomeini in the city. The high-ranking clerics in the cities of Isfahan, Qom and Tehran never admitted responsibility and there was no accusation against them anywhere. After the trial, the accused along with cinema officials, some security and police officers of Pahlavi-era were executed. Neither truth nor justice were served.

In the 1970s, innocent lives were sacrificed to spark outrage and the revolution against the Pahlavi monarchy and in 2020, innocent lives were sacrificed for reasons that have yet to be transparently investigated [165-167].

Iran Air Flight 655 is another clear example of the Iranian governments modus operandi. In the spring of 1988, the war between Iran and Iraq, and the confrontation between Iran and the United States in the Persian Gulf had reached their peak intensity.

On July 3rd, three US Navy cruisers, including the USS Vincennes, were escorting oil tankers in the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. After one of the Vincennes’ helicopters got involved in skirmishes with IRGC gunboats (known as Boghammers), the Vincennes entered Iranian waters, in pursuit of the Iranian gunboats.

Amidst the climax in this incident, came Iran Air Flight IR655, a scheduled commercial flight from Tehran to Dubai, with a layover in Bandar Abbas airport. During the war time, Bandar Abbas Airport was used for military and civilian aviation. Years later in an interview, pilot Maj Gen Shahram Rostami, a high-level air force deputy commander at the time, revealed in an interview that an Iranian F-14 fighter jet was being prepared on the Bandar Abbas runway for a mission, but the take-off was aborted for technical reasons. Instead, Iran Air flight IR655, an Airbus 300, was cleared for take-off by the civilian aviation authorities, a process which undoubtedly had been approved by the military authorities [168].

Just as the Vincennes crew was exchanging fire with IRGC speedboats reportedly just inside Iranian territorial waters, the Airbus took off from Bandar Abbas and set a course which took it almost directly over the active conflict zone. Vincennes’ advanced radar detected the approaching plane but due to what portrayed by Americans as a combination of technical errors and human misjudgments, the warship thought the aircraft was an Iranian F-14 fighter jet squawking military IFF codes, and it was descending instead of ascending. Based on newly distributed intelligence reports that Iranian F-14s had been adapted for air-to-ground operations the Vincennes commanding officer decided to engage the perceived threat with surface-to-air missiles. No less than 290 passengers and crew were killed as a result, many of them were children. Despite many warnings sent to the aircraft, experts believe they were not received by the Iran Air flight due to the frequency discrepancy between military guard channels and what the Iranian crew were

listening to. To this day, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not explained why civilian flights were not canceled, delayed, or rerouted over the Persian Gulf despite the state of active conflict underneath, despite the fact that Bandar Abbas air base and civilian airport share many facilities including runways. Iran also never disclosed the contents of the Flight IR655 black boxes.

On the other side, no US. military or political officials neither apologized, nor were they tried or prosecuted. Due to legal complications, Iran's lawsuit against the United-States at the International Court of Justice remained unresolved. Eight years later, the two countries finally agreed on compensation out of court and the matter was settled.

In both cases of PS752 and IR655, it appear that the Islamic Republic of Iran deliberately kept the airspace open to civilian aircraft. If the Islamic Republic of Iran had an experience subsiding the flame of war with downing a passenger airplane, while no punishment awaited them, given the fact that any involvement of Iranian fighter jets was never investigated by any court. Similarly, the relocation of the Tor-M1 system(s) to the proximity of Iran's Tehran International Airport has not been investigated to date, and the reason for this action remains unclear [169-171].

The aforementioned consistencies in Iran’s narrative elaborate how a mere human error was not the cause of the shooting down of Flight PS752. Instead, there is increasing evidence suggesting that the downing was likely intentional, and perhaps premeditated. This raises the critical question regarding possible motivations for the Iranian government to shoot down this civilian aircraft. To answer this question, it is necessary to analyse the circumstances leading up to the downing of Flight PS752 as an aspect of asymmetric warfare.

Asymmetric warfare is a term used to describe unconventional strategies used by a force in conflict when their powers and capabilities are unequal to the opposition. Unlike conventional warfare, which is widely and well understood and guided by long-standing custom and international law, asymmetric war is based on what is referred to as Small Independent Action Units. Here the goal is to strategically upset the balance in favour of the weaker force against the stronger one at a lower cost and with a high achievement. The constant emphasis or focus on the strategic aspect is an indicator of asymmetric war that ultimately leads to the withdrawal of the superior force from the battle, or to its strategic defeat.

Asymmetric war or threat involves unconventional strategies and tactics that could trigger immediate reactions that are not in accordance with a set of principles, rules, and rational estimates. The characteristics of asymmetric war include unrepeatability, short-term, shock, unpredictability, vast and uncertain battlefields, disproportionate impact with disproportionate achievement (achieving strategic goals based on limited resources), having small executive and combat units (a kind of fire at will of tactical units), and finally accurate delivery.

Iran’s reliance on asymmetric warfare is not unprecedented. Mohammad Ali Jafari, also known as “Aziz Jafari”, is a former Major General of the IRGC and one of the renowned actors of asymmetric warfare in Iran. A Washington Post article published on May 5, 2019, explains that the Islamic Republic of Iran is an expert of asymmetric warfare, and that American military pursuit of Iran can evoke this dangerous strategy [172]. Morad Vaysi, Defence Analyst, explains that in the mid 2000s, the IRGC roadmap was based on asymmetric warfare and since then, it has become the strategy of the entire Iranian armed forces. In 2015, Hossein Salami, the current

Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, expressly explained that the IRGC’s strategy for combating the United States is asymmetric warfare [173].

Turning to the circumstances surrounding the PS752 incident, it is important to first remember that deliberate downings of passenger aircraft is not a new phenomenon. The bombing of the Pan American flight over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988 and the downing of a Malaysian MH-17 over Ukraine in 2014 are two recent examples of this.

The downing of Flight PS752, however, is widely suspected of being an intentional action to curtail the threat of a full-scale American assault. In her report published on February 22, 2021, Dr. Agnes Callamard, the then United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary killings, highlights the possibility that the downing of Flight PS752 was carried out with the intention of preventing an escalation of conflict between Iran and the United States. Similarly, on April 16, 2021, the Head of Ukraine’s National defence Council, Oleksy Danilov, asserted that the downing of Flight PS752 was intentional and was done in an attempt to prevent war with the United States [174].

Nonetheless, the precise intentions being a possible premeditation for shooting down the Ukrainian plane can only be uncovered upon criminal prosecution of senior military commanders. It is important, however, to consider different angles of this possibility.

After the ballistic missile attack of the IRGC against the US bases in Iraq, a few hours before the downing of the Ukrainian plane, the entire world was anticipating a retaliation by the US and perhaps the start of a full-scale war. As Amir Ali Hajizadeh claimed at a press conference on January 11, 2020, Iran was in the state of war. The IRGC's top commanders are well aware of their military incapability in a large-scale conflict against the United States. They also know that the Iranian government lacks the capacity to be in a long-term conventional war with the US due to its weakened economic position and a public distrust among a large portion of its population. As a result, turning to the asymmetric war that manifested itself in the downing of the Ukrainian plane must be seriously considered as one of the motives of the Iranian government for the downing.

On January 12, 2020, Hossein Salami, the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, revealed a set of key details surrounding the IRGC’s attack against the US bases in Iraq as well as the downing of Flight PS752. Salami points to two key factors in the decision-making process of the IRGC. The first is the pressure from the public to take revenge from the US for the killing of Qassem Soleimani. Secondly, there was the anticipation of a heavy retaliation of the Americans for Iran’s revengeseeking attacks.

Salami elaborates that the goal of the IRGC was to seek revenge for the death of Qassem Soleimani within a timely fashion, while considering America’s commitment to strike 52 locations within Iran, should Iran launch an assault on the US bases. Salami states that the IRGC was supposed to strike the enemy in an unexpected way such that the expansion of conflict is avoided. These words spoken by Salami are direct references to the asymmetrical warfare strategies.

What Salami failed to explain was the precise method through which the IRGC prevented the expansion of conflict with the US. Irrespective of the gaps in the explanations of the Iranian officials, there is no doubt that following the downing of Flight PS752, which was approximately just four hours after the attack on the US bases in Iraq, the public attention was shifted from war to the

massive and shocking loss of life of the passengers of flight PS752. Ultimately, the US did not take any retaliatory action.

The use of civilians as human shields is rooted in the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The following two statements by Ruhollah Khomeini, the first leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, helps to better understand this theory:

“If infidels [non-Muslims], or corrupted Iraqis, took a group of innocent Muslims as human shields…. it is obligatory for us to kill both Muslims and non-Muslims. The [innocent] Muslims are martyrs and go to heaven, and the non-Muslims are infidels and go to hell.” (Ruhollah Khomeini, August 18, 1981, Tehran) [175].”

He also said, “The protection of the government is more important than the protection of one person, even if he is Imam Mahdi [176].”

During the Iran-Iraq war, human shields were used repeatedly to protect sensitive areas or to engage public sentiment and opinion. One example is choosing not to evacuate oil rigs of oil workers during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq Tanker War/Operation Earnest Will.

As part of an ongoing military and political tensions in the Persian Gulf region in relation to the escalating Iran-Iraq War, on the evening of April 14, 1988, a U.S. Navy frigate hit an Iranian sea mine about 60 miles east of Bahrain and was badly damaged. The U.S. government decided to retaliate swiftly but proportionally. As a result, American political and military leaders chose to attack and destroy two Iranian offshore oil platforms called Salman (Sassan) and Nasr (Siri-D) in the central Persian Gulf, which believed by the Americans to have been used as military staging posts, as well as an Iranian warship in an operation named ‘Praying Mantis’ on the morning of April 18. To prevent unnecessary civilian deaths, the Americans had reportedly informed Iran of their intention the previous evening via the Swiss embassy in Tehran. The warning had immediately reached all levels of the chain of command and reportedly even offshore oil company officials at Lavan Island (the island which serviced and managed the two platforms) got wind of it.

At the daybreak of April 18, a flotilla of USN warships took attack positions around the platforms with warplanes orbiting overhead. According to a well-informed eyewitness (whose identity is protected), the platform personnel (about 50 in total) realized they had been surrounded by the US. strike force only around 6:00AM when they received the final evacuation order by the US. warships on the guard channel, despite the fact that the officials at Lavan had received reports of the US. intention from Tehran. However, and despite the looming threat, workers who had called Lavan island for urgent directions were instructed to stay put and wait. The desperate oil rig workers then contacted the Americans and asked for extension of the evacuation deadline a few times, and later paused their bombardment of the platform so they could return and pick up crews still stranded or floating on the water nearby. They were granted those pauses and the appreciative oil workers thanked Americans on the radio.

Apparently, the evacuation was initiated by the platform workers themselves and no such order had ever arrived from either Lavan or Iranian military authorities.

According to several oil rig workers, this was a clear case of disregard for their safety by the Iranian offshore oil company officials, in addition to their superiors at the petroleum ministry’s war

room and higher at the national command levels, when they knew the platforms were going to be attacked well in advance but chose not to warn and evacuate the workers safely apparently in the hope that the ensuing American bombardment would cause human casualties among Iranian oil workers which could be later used as fuel for their anti-American propaganda machine. That “fuel” was later found in the form of shooting down of the Iran Air Flight 655 by an American warship a few months later on July 3, 1988.

The government of Iran used such unethical techniques on numerous occasions. A clear example that has been reported in the news is the formation of a human chain around the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, which has been done at least twice. All of these demonstrate blatant disregard for the lives of human beings on the path to achieving the belligerent goals of the government [177].

This past behaviour and way of thought puts the crime of the downing of flight PS752 into perspective. Firstly, on the night of January 8th, 2020, domestic and international flights were purposefully not canceled. Iran’s high-level officials chose to keep Iran’s airspace open. Doing so in a time of active conflict with clear risk to civilian lives was the decision by the government of Iran using innocent civilians as human shields.

The government of Iran knew that an attack on the Ain Al-Assad airbase would trigger a response by US forces as there are not many examples in American political and military history where the United States has not retaliated against an attack of such proportions on its forces or bases. The case of the American drone shoot-down in the summer of 2019 is one of the exceptions, given that US president Donald Trump reportedly decided at the last minute not to retaliate kinetically. On the night of January 8, the decision-makers of the government of Iran in the Supreme National Security Council were well aware of likely American retaliation and knowingly decided to keep the Iranian airspace open to civilian aircraft. "Keeping the sky open was a political and technical decision," said Javad Zarif in an interview with DER SPIEGEL on January 24, sixteen days after the plane crash [82]. The technical decision may go back to the Civil Aviation Authority (in which Zarif himself must be held accountable), but what was the political purpose? The question is how and why the Iranian government's political apparatus prioritized their strategic and ideological objectives over protecting innocent civilian lives?

According to Adil Ahmad Haque in Human Shielding (by Omission) in Iran [178]. “Paradigmatically, the use of civilians as human shields involves intentionally moving civilians near specific military targets (‘active’ shielding) or intentionally moving specific military targets near civilians (‘passive’ shielding). In the case of the Bidkaneh missile research and development complex, as well as many other military industrial complexes in and near urban areas, the IRGC chose to retain the extremely sensitive, and continually expanding, facility near the capital’s only international airport, as well as urban areas, despite obvious risks to civilians and civilian activities. The Hakimiyeh neighborhood in northeastern Tehran is a good example, where the MoD and IRGC maintain significant missile industrial facilities, including highly dangerous fuel fabrication plants in proximity to the expanding urban areas.

Typically, this involves taking specific action to change the status quo. The Iranian case seems different. It seems that Iran failed to take specific action (suspending flights) to change the status

quo (flights operating more or less as usual).” He also states, “In general terms, if a State (i) fails to take passive precautions to protect civilians under its control (ii) with the intent to use their presence or movements to shield military targets from attack, then that State unlawfully uses those civilians as human shields by omission. This approach reflects a general principle of law: an omission to perform a legal duty is legally equivalent to an action.”

Protocol I, an amendment to the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of international conflicts, prohibits the use of human shields. According to Protocol I, “The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.” This amendment also states, “The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible: a) endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives; b) avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas; c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.” It is evident that the government of Iran has not acted on any of these cases, although it was aware of them.

We must also point to the day following the downing. Immediately after attacks on Ain Al-Assad and after the downing of flight PS752, Ali Khamenei, the government of Iran’s Leader attended meetings with civilians, an act that may be another example of utilizing civilians as human shields [179]. On April 23, 2020, Amir Ali Hajizadeh mentioned their worry of an American attack on the Leader of the government of Iran. Inviting civilians to Khamenei’s office during a period of great concern of an incoming attack cannot mean anything other than utilizing the lives of those innocent people as human shields, as a means of protection of the government of Iran’s leader [180].

As mentioned earlier, the Islamic Republic of Iran adheres to its ideology to achieve its goals and does not respect human rights, nor do they follow international norms and agreements. The PS752 crime is just one example of the use of human shields and widespread violations of international law.