World Atlas of Illicit Flows

World Atlas of Illicit Flows

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - A former Seleka soldier looks at a woman washing extracted soil and small rocks as she pans for gold near an open-pit at the Ndassima gold mine near Djoubissi, north of Bambari May 9, 2014. © REUTERS / Siegfried Modola

Contents 01 Notes & references Nellemann, C.; Henriksen, R., Pravettoni, R., Stewart, D., Kotsovou, M., Schlingemann, M.A.J, Shaw, M. and Reitano, T. (Eds). 2018. World atlas of illicit flows. A RHIPTO-INTERPOL-GI Assessment. RHIPTO -Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, INTERPOL and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized crime. www.rhipto.org www.interpol.int ISBN 978-82-690434-2-6 Printed by RHIPTO Layout by Daniel, C., ZoĂŻ Environment Network Disclaimer The contents of this report do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of RHIPTO, INTERPOL, or the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. The designations employed and the presentations do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the institutions or contributory organizations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, company or area or its authority, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The issues related to terrorism are addressed only by RHIPTO and INTERPOL under their respective mandates.

6

07

76

Introduction: Environmental crime has become largest financial driver of conflict

The Trans-Sahara: Migrants, drugs and arms

02

08

12

90

Environmental crime: The largest conflict finance sector

Migrant smuggling and human trafficking

03

09

18

102

Illegal trade and exploitation of fuel: Oil and charcoal

Foreign fighters: Travelling along smuggling networks

04

10

42

108

Illegal mining in contexts of conflict

Drugs and threat finance

05

11

54

132

Illegal logging: The largest, least risky and most profitable illicit environmental industry

Terrorist and rebel finance: Taxation, drugs, counterfeits, natural resources and migrants

06

12

60

Wildlife crime and waste

140

Conclusion: The cost of war – environmental crime surges as threat finance for war profiteers

Acronyms & abbreviations AQIM

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

bpd

barrels per day

CAR

Central African Republic

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

coltan

columbite–tantalites

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

FARC

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army

GDP

gross domestic product

HTS

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

INTERPOL

International Criminal Police Organization

IUU

illegal, unreported and unregulated

JNIM

Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin

KDF

Kenya Defence Forces

4

Preface Peace, development and security are the most crucial concerns for any country. Yet national and international efforts are increasingly undermined by criminal networks. Indeed, transnational organized crime is infiltrating every corner of society, and continues to diversify its scope of operations. Of particular concern has been the growth and convergence of criminal networks exploiting governance weaknesses during local conflicts and sustaining non-state armed groups and terrorists. This atlas identifies more than 1,000 routes used for smuggling drugs and natural resources as well as human trafficking. The report provides the first consolidated global overview of these illicit flows and their significance in conflicts worldwide. It also forms a foundation for further development of actionable intelligence.

JĂźrgen Stock INTERPOL Secretary General

The findings reveal that the incomes of non-state armed groups and terrorist groups are diversifying and becomingly increasingly based on organized crime activities, sustaining conflicts worldwide. Illegal exploitation and taxation of gold, oil and other natural resources are overtaking traditional threat finance sectors such as kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking. At the same time these non-state armed groups only take a fraction, around 4 per cent, of all illicit finance flows by organized crime in or near conflicts. The implication is that combating organized crime must be considered a significant factor in conflict prevention and resolution. This report provides a new impetus for our continued efforts to stem these illicit flows and combat the threat posed by transnational organized crime in terms of peace, development and security.

Christian Nellemann RHIPTO Norwegian Center for Global Analysis

Mark Shaw Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime

5

KENYA, Nairobi - Volunteers carry elephant tusks to a burning site on April 22, 2016 for a historic destruction of illegal ivory and rhino-horn confiscated mostly from poachers in Nairobi’s national park. Kenya on April 30, 2016 burnt approximately 105 tonnes of confiscated ivory, almost all of the country’s total stockpile. Several African heads of state, conservation experts, high-profile philanthropists and celebrities are slated were present at the event which sent a strong anti-poaching message. © AFP PHOTO / Tony Karumba

01 Introduction

Environmental crime has become largest financial driver of conflict

Introduction: Environmental crime has become largest financial driver of conflict This atlas of illicit flows presents over a thousand smuggling routes worldwide of goods and services associated with environmental crimes, drugs and people. Conflict and terrorism are today funded on an unprecedented scale by transnational organized crime and by illicit revenue from natural resources. While it is not possible to establish with certainty the exact value of revenues flowing to criminalized groups and non-state armed groups, it is possible to generate a rough snapshot based on the major non-state armed groups. The proceeds of environmental crime – which encompasses not just wildlife crime, but also fuel smuggling and illicit mining of gold, diamonds and other minerals and resources – have become the largest source of income for non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations. Combined, environmental crimes, including those that involve the sale or taxation of natural resources, account for 38% of the financing of conflicts and of non-state armed groups, including terrorist groups; followed by drugs (at 28%); other forms of illegal taxation, extortion, confiscation and looting (26%); external donations (3%); and money extorted through kidnapping (3%).1 This evidence-based report aims to quantify how these illicit flows finance the major non-state armed groups. Broadly speaking, environmental crimes generate the single-largest overall threat finance to conflicts today. The lack of criminal investigation, enforcement efforts or attention from the international community has enabled environmental crime to provide a ‘free ticket’ to armed criminalized groups and war profiteers, and it is gaining increasing interest as a source of financing among insurgents, terrorist groups and criminal cartels, in addition to

their traditional financing sources from drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. The interest in natural resources is rising, especially gold and other minerals, and timber, among many armed and criminal groups, and this can be currently seen in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Colombia, Peru and Central America, and South East Asia. The biggest source of revenue – that is, from one single illicit product category – for non-state armed groups in conflict is drugs, which, as mentioned, account for 28% of their funding. Most of this revenue comes from taxation of drugs by groups such as FARC and the Taliban. Illegally procured oil, gas, gasoline and diesel provides 20% of their income (this was the predominant source of financing for Islamic State in 2014 and 2015). Illegal income from oil is also crucial for organizations outside of the seven main global insurgent and terrorist groups discussed in detail here, including funding organized crime in conflict zones. Gasoline and diesel smuggling is a key source of criminal networks’ financing particularly in parts of Latin America, Libya and Nigeria. After drugs and oil, taxation and extortion, and illegal mining, follow, with both representing 17% of revenue. Then, kidnapping for ransom, and external funding and donations each represent 3%. Charcoal and antiquities constitute 1% each, but these categories feature more predominantly as financial sources in particular regions, especially charcoal. Combined, these illicit flows directly fund an estimated 96 900 full-time fighters, and an unknown number of part-timers, associated with the seven most notable non-state insurgent and terrorist groups, plus the multitude of non-state armed groups active in north-eastern DRC.

8

Recent surveys by INTERPOL of member countries showed over 84% reported convergence of environmental crime with other forms of serious crime. Similarly, EUROPOL reported in 2017 that 45% of criminal groups in Europe were involved in several crime types – a sharp increase against the 2013 figure.2 Some 40 000 members of the Taliban totalled an estimated annual income of US$75–95 million from taxation – particularly of drugs, land and agricultural produce – and from donations from abroad. In mid2017, Islamic State made an estimated US$10 million a month.3 Today, with dramatic losses of territory, Islamic State probably has at their disposal no more than a quarter of this. This comes largely from confiscations and illegal taxation. In all likelihood, they also have considerable reserves, of an unknown size. This figure is 98% down from their high of US$549–1 693 million in 2014.4 The merged al-Qaeda groups Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel make an estimated US$18–35 million and US$5–35 million, respectively, from illegal taxation, donations, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes, drugs and illegal taxation. Al-Shabaab receives an estimated US$20 million, half from the illicit charcoal trade and the rest from other forms of taxation,5 while Boko Haram made an estimated US$5–10 million mainly from taxation, bank robberies, donations from other terrorist groups and kidnapping for ransom. Over 8 000 rebels6 inside the DRC make at least US$13 million7 a year from the exploitation and taxation of natural resources – and this sum is but a small portion of the total estimated value attributed to illegally exploited resources in the eastern DRC, which has been put at over US$770 million a year.

The smuggling and facilitation of migrants along the trans-Saharan routes have evolved into a highly lucrative industry for armed groups, with an estimated annual revenue of US$450–765 million (of which US$89–236 million is accounted for within Libya alone).8 Organized criminals use smuggling networks that also increasingly enable foreign fighters to move across borders to safe havens, and to stockpile or ship resources by means of formal and informal networks of financial flows. Over 2 600 unaccounted-for (predominantly Islamic State) foreign fighters have left Syria and Iraq, an unknown number of them via Libya, using these illicit smuggling networks, and they use them to get access to forged papers, as well as routes to safe havens. Collectively, for the seven main extremist groups of insurgents and terrorists (referred to above) – alShabaab, Boko Haram, FARC, HTS, JNIM, Islamic State and the Taliban, plus the DRC fighters, the combined funding totals about US$1–1.39 billion a year. Taxation of natural resources and drugs is the most significant, readily available and accessible source of income, ranging from taxation of vehicles at checkpoints, agricultural produce, protection money targeting commercial activity to religious taxes. The 96 900 fighters who make up the seven extremist groups (and the DRC combatants) earn an average of US$12 342 a year each. Although this is well above a typical combatant’s ‘salary’, which can be as low as US$100 a month, this amount also includes the funding for their campaigns, the cost of weapons, logistics, bribes and operations, and expenses for governance provision. In some cases, such as the Taliban and FARC, and most likely Islamic State too, a large amount is saved for future governance efforts.

Besides groups that are designated as terrorist organizations, and including regular organized-crime groups in and around conflict, the scale of criminal economies is in the US$24–39 billion range (with profits far lower). This indicates that threat finance revenue to terrorism and major insurgencies represents about 4% of the total illicit finance to organized crime in or near conflict.9

elite, are therefore directly stimulated by continued or renewed conflict in many of the world’s most deadly contexts. Conflicts, and the resultant severe impact of lost development on the lives of a rising number of people, are likely to continue to increase until the role of the profiteers of organized crime in conflicts is addressed as a primary threat to peace, development and stability.

This means that transnational organized-criminal groups targeting primarily natural resources and environmental crimes, in or near conflicts, get by far the largest slice of their revenue in conflict zones, often associated with corruption, and powerful political and military elites.

Environmental crimes have grown to the point where they account for 64% of illicit and organized-crime finance, or between US$22.8 billion and US$34 billion of the criminalized economy in fragile states in or near conflict areas. This threat must be addressed in peacekeeping and in enforcement and prevention, otherwise it will continue to grow and undermine development and security in decades to come.

The costs to the natural and human environment, and to peace, sustainable development and security are severe, including development prospects for nearly two billion people, 535 million of whom are children,10 and causing forcible displacement of 65 million people,11 and with an estimated 127 000 people killed in conflicts (the figure is from 2017).12 Fragility, conflict and violence are critical development challenges that threaten efforts to end extreme poverty. The proportion of the extreme poor living in conflict-affected countries has been projected to rise to more than 60% by 2030.13 By comparison, the percentage of people living on only US$1.9 a day globally has dropped from 44% in 1980 to 9.6% in 2015.14 Conflicts also drive 80% of all humanitarian needs, while they reduce gross domestic product (GDP) growth by two percentage points per year, on average, according to the World Bank.15 Environmental crimes, and associated transnational organized crime, which are often deeply embedded in state and non-state armed forces and the political

9

Powerful elites engaged in organized crime gain from sustaining conflicts and fund non-state armed groups, which undermines the rule of law and good governance. This, in turn, enables criminal elites to benefit from instability, violence and lack of enforcement and, hence, their subsequent exploitation of illicit flows during conflict. Strengthening information and analysis is essential to be able to prevent, disrupt and defeat both violent armed groups and the organized-criminal actors that provide these armed groups (and themselves) with an environment of impunity and instability. In order to ensure early prevention and intervention in conflict, it is therefore imperative to forcefully address the role of organized crime and illicit flows in benefiting non-state armed groups and the powerful elites engaged in criminal activity.

The rising transnational environmental crime smuggling networks

North and Central Americas United States

Mexico

$ $

$

$

$

Western and Central Europe

$

Central America

$

$ $

$

$ $

$

Caribbean

$

$ $

Colombia $

$

$

$

$

Italy

$ $ $

South America

International organized crime network

Bolivia

Ivory and rhino horns Wood and wood products Heroin and cocaine Migrant trafficking Human traffiking

Brazil

Western Africa Nigeria

Main players Region Regional origin or destination Country of origin Transit country Country of destination/market $

DRC

Tax haven Internationally active criminal organization

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sources: UNODC annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database, and The Afghan Opiate Trade and Africa, 2016; CITES; The Global Initiative Against Transnational crimes, The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime Nexus, 2016, and Organized Crime: a Cross-cutting Threat to Sustainable Development, 2015; INTERPOL, Vessel Tracking for Analysis of Timber and Fisheries Crime, 2015; RHIPTO investigation, 2015 and 2016. RHIPTO 2016

10

$

$

Japan

$

$ $

East Asia $

China

Hong Kong $

$ $

Russia

South East Asia Thailand

Malaysia

Oceania Indonesia

Middle East

South Asia

$

Kenya Tanzania

$

Mozambique

South Africa

11

PERU - Aerial view of an illegal gold mining area in La Pampa, Madre de Dios, southern Peruvian jungle on July 14, 2015. In an unprecedented operation in mid-July, Peru managed to eliminate 55 camps for illegal gold mining in the area of La Pampa, in the region of Madre de Dios, where 60,000 hectares of forest have been destroyed by this activity. Š AFP PHOTO / Ernesto Benavides

02 Environmental crime

The largest conflict finance sector

BURKINA FASO, Poura - January 3, 2008: To the goldmine of Poura the gold diggers come from everywhere in the hope of finding a little gold. Women, children and men of of all ages are here in a universe of dust under a blazing sun. In Burkina Faso, illicit gold mining is for some the only activity that keeps them out of desperate poverty. Š iStock / Gilles Paire

14

Environmental crime The largest conflict finance sector The term ‘environmental crime’ is often understood to collectively describe illegal activities harming the environment and aimed at benefiting certain individuals, groups or companies through the exploitation and theft of, or trade in natural resources. The term encompasses serious crimes and transnational organized crime, often linked to other forms of crime, tax fraud, corruption and threat finance. In all these manifestations, environmental crime comes with massive costs to countries worldwide.16

38%

Major environmental crimes, drives and impacts

• Environmental crime is now estimated to be equivalent to US$110–281 billion annually (2018 figures), an approximately 14% (9%–20%) increase from the previous official estimate in 2016 and 44% higher (32%–57%) than the first estimate in 2014, disregarding inflation. This is mainly a result of improved estimates and criminal intelligence, alongside the addition of illicit oil (which contributes about 9% of the total value).

152

• Environmental crime now slightly more lucrative than human trafficking, and is the third largest criminal sector worldwide, moving up from the 4th largest, after drugs, counterfeit goods and trafficking.

Illegal logging and trade

• Illegal fisheries: estimated US$11–24 billion. • Illegal mining: estimated at US$12–48 billion.

Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated fishing At stake: 23 11 Fish stocks depletion

Climate change emissions from deforestation and forest degradation

Loss of revenues for local fishers and States Targeted species: tuna, toothfish, sharks

Illegal exploitation and theft of oil At stake: 23 19 Pollution and ecosystem depletion

Corruption National Local

Corporate crime

Loss of revenues for national economies

International National

Lack of legislation National

Mafias Lack of law International enforcement National National

Conflict National Regional

At stake:

23

International

International Domestic

7 Wildlife poaching and trafficking

At stake:

48

Species extinction

Increasing demand

Annual revenue losses Minimum and maximun estimates, Billion dollars

Resource depletion Gold, diamond, rare earth... Livelihoods (local communities)

• The illegal wildlife trade: estimated at US$7– 23 billion. • Forestry crimes, including corporate crimes and illegal logging, account for an estimated US$51–152 billion.

At stake: Livelihoods Species extintion Endangered forests National economies: Illegal logging between 15 and 30 % of the global legal trade

50.7

• The cost impact of environmental crime is rising by 5% to 7% annually, or two to three times the rate of the global economy. • Forestry crimes including illegal logging, valued at US$51–152 billion annually.

of incomes that finance the largest armed groups derive from environmental crimes

10

Loss of raw material for local industry

12

At stake: Ecosystem depletion Human health

12 Trade and dumping of hazardous waste

Illegal extraction and trade in minerals

15

RHIPTO 2018

SUDAN - Men working in gold mine, north Sudan, 1 December 2007. Š iStock / Maciek67

• Illegal trafficking and dumping of toxic and electronic waste: US$10–12 billion. • Illegal exploitation and theft of oil – previously unaccounted for due to lack of information – adds an additional minimum US$19–23 billion to the total (or 9% of the total environmental crime figure). • Loss of government revenue through lost tax income due to criminal exploitation is equivalent to at least US$11–28 billion annually. • Environmental crime is increasingly converging with other forms of organized crime, such as drugs, cybercrimes, corruption, tax fraud and money laundering. The wide range in the values given above reflects the lack of statistics in this field, but these figures are based on best sources and criminal intelligence from INTERPOL and other sources. The cost impact makes environmental crime the third largest crime category in the world after drug trafficking (US$344 billion), counterfeit crimes (US$288 billion), with human trafficking (US$157 billion) – fourth by some estimates. Unlike any other known form of crime, environmental crime is aggravated by its impact on the environment and therefore its cost to future generations. Deforestation, dumping of chemicals and illegal fisheries (and others) damage the environment, causing loss of clean air and water, exacerbating extreme weather conditions, reducing food security and thereby threatening overall health and societal wellbeing. These crimes also deprive governments of much-needed revenue and undermine legal businesses.

TURKEY - Turkish drivers with hundreds of tanker trucks lining up on their way to get oil from Iraq at Turkey’s Habur border point in this Aug. 16, 2002 file photo. Although U.N sanctions limit Iraq’s oil exports, more than 80,000 barrels of Iraqi crude are smuggled into Turkey each day. © AP Photo / Burhan Ozbilici

18

03 Illegal trade &

exploitation of fuel

Oil and charcoal

19

IRAQ – October 2015: Smoke rises as Iraqi security forces and allied Popular Mobilization Forces shell Islamic State group positions at an oil field outside Beiji, some 250 kilometers (155 miles) north of Baghdad, Iraq. Ramadi and the city of Beiji, home to Iraqs largest oil refinery. Š AP Photo

20

Illegal trade and exploitation of fuel: Oil and charcoal Illegally procured oil, gas, gasoline and diesel sales account for 20% of the income of non-state armed groups in conflict, and this segment was the predominant source of income for Islamic State in 2014 and 2015. Oil also features as a source of income for rebel groups and organized crime – derived from gasoline and diesel smuggling in parts of Latin America, Libya and Nigeria. Al-Shabaab makes an estimated US$20 million, where half is from the illicit charcoal trade and the rest on other taxation.

Niger Delta

UNODC estimated in 2009 that 55 million barrels of oil (145 000 barrels per day) are smuggled (or ‘bunkered’) out of the Niger Delta each year. At an estimated price of US$20 per barrel, this comes to about US$1.1 billion.17 In a more recent Chatham House report, government loss from illicit trade in hydrocarbons in Nigeria amounted to between US$3 billion and 8 billion. That study estimates a loss of 100 000 bpd in the first quarter of 2013.18 Nigeria’s 7 000 kilometres of oil pipeline (at least) are difficult to secure. Sabotage was responsible on average for 44% of losses that occurred between 2004 and 2011.19 When it comes to oil theft, the typical methods are hot tapping (creating a branch connection, for example under water) and cold tapping (where bombing a pipeline is used to install a spur pipeline). Barges then transport the stolen oil downriver to tankers in the Gulf of Guinea;20 some of it is transported by trucks in barrels. Another way in which oil is stolen is through corruption. Meanwhile, non-state armed groups, like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, and the Niger Delta Avengers, benefit from the proceeds of oil thefts.21

Mexico

Some 23 500 bpd of crude and refined oil are stolen through tapping of the state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) pipelines. The cost has been put by the Mexican government at US$1.17 billion (March 2016 figure). Much of this is caused by criminal col-

21

20%

of incomes to the largest armed groups are derived from oil and gas

lusion conducted by Pemex personnel, for example identifying tapping valves, and helping to install sophisticated equipment for tapping. In addition, there is theft, through coercion or stealth and ‘kidnappings’ trucks where the oil is ransomed.22 Among the perpetrators, the Zetas cartel (which has captured 38.9% or US$372 million of the illegal market) is the dominant player, followed by the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (21.4% market share, or US$212 million)23 and the Gulf Cartel, with 16.3%, or US$158 million.

Ghana experiences a wide variety of illicit hydro-

carbon activities. These include transshipments via the offshore Saltpond Oil Field (which sells 100 000 barrels per year, but 470 000 barrels were shipped in 2014); oil tanker hijackings; tapping and siphoning of pipelines; and fuel smuggling caused by a 50% subsidy on oil price at a rate of US$13 million per year, according to official numbers.24

In Morocco illicit hydrocarbon activity is centred on illegal supply chains and smuggling. Stolen crude oil from Nigeria is laundered through Ghana’s Saltpond Field, and sold on to the SAMIR field in Morocco, which exports it. Oil price subsidies in Algeria also cause smuggling overland – according to one report by official sources, smuggling accounted for 1.5 billion litres (9.4 million barrels) in 2013, with losses of US$2 billion per year.25 The estimated amount equates to an oil price of over US$200 per barrel, which is halved here to reach an estimated total value of US$1 billion.

8 000 000 000

1 100 000 000

Mexico

1 170 000 000

1 170 000 000

13 000 000

13 000 000

1 000 000 000

1 000 000 000

830 000 000

1 730 000 000

4 800 000 000

14 500 000 000

750 000 000

1 000 000 000

2 500 000 000

2 500 000 000

19 063 000 000

23 013 000 000

Ghana Morocco Iran/Pakistan Angola Libya Turkey

Total

Estimated overview of IS finances

US$ millions 500

Oil income

Oil and Gas income

Oil income

200

16.5

10.5

Max

Min

Other income

100

Other income

Hydrocarbon crime is also widespread in a number of other countries, although reliable estimates of its scale are missing from the data. These include Uganda (principally the result of smuggling, by former DRC rebels called the Opec Boys); Mozambique (corruption); Thailand (smuggling from Malaysia caused by subsidized prices there); Azerbaijan (smuggling from neighbouring countries).35

300

Other income

Because of its strategic location, Turkey is a major node in many illicit trafficking flows, not least oil. Smuggling is the major issue in Turkey, much it the result of price disparities. At their height, Islamic State earned up to US$1.4 billion a year from sales of oil and gas – a large proportion of it to Turkey. While oil smuggling across the border from Syria has existed for some time, it increased by 300% when the Syrian civil war started.33 According to official numbers from the energy ministry, smuggling accounts for up to 2.7 million tonnes a year, at a tax loss of US$2.5 billion a year.34

400

Oil income

About US$750 million to US$1 billion worth of Libyan oil is smuggled to Malta each year, according to the Daphne Project and the Libyan National Oil Corporation.31 The oil is transferred from ship to ship about 12 miles off the Malta coast.32

Net income

a production rate of about 1.63 million bpd in 2018, making Angola as the second largest producer of crude oil in Africa. The company’s official net profit in 2017 was US$224 million,27 and yet its profit margin was just 0.7%.28 Human Rights Watch and The International Monetary Fund have said this is because tens of billions of dollars are missing from official accounting figures.29 A conservative estimate of 5% to 15% of total production is lost to corruption, which equates to between US$4.8 billion and US$14.5 billion a year.30

Oil low (US$)

Nigeria / Niger Delta

2014

2015

2016

22

117

2017

Expenses

Angola’s state-owned oil company, Sonangol, has

Oil high (US$)

Other income

In the border area between Iran and Pakistan, diesel smuggling has taken over from drug smuggling for some locals. The low Iranian oil price (approximately 15 US cents per litre, compared with US$1.06 in America) leads to smuggling volumes of 100 to 130 tankers a day, each carrying 25 000 to 40 000 litres. Smuggling activity has a revenue potential of between US$0.83 billion and 1.73 billion a year.26

0

IRAQ – A Sunni gunman stands at a checkpoint on the road near Biji city, northern Iraq, June 2014. © EAP / STR

23

Taxation and extortion Islamic State made most of their income at the group’s peak in 2013 and 2014 from oil, but were forced into using more coercive fundraising methods when they came under pressure two years later. They are one of the terrorist groups with the largest financial reserves, likely to be well over a hundred million US dollars. And the group has the ability and intent to recruit low-level individual terrorists while exercising increasing ability to undertake highly dangerous and more sophisticated attacks, like the one in November 2017in Egypt that killed 305, including in Western countries. The group’s finances have plummeted since a high in 2014: September 2014 US$1.1 billion with US$436 million in expenses February 2015 US$670 million with US$435 million in expenses February 2016 US$285 million with US$222 million in expenses June 2017 US$130 million with US$117 million in expenses January 2018 US$6–24 million in expenses, half locally raised, half from reserves In 2017 and 2018, Islamic State incurred very heavy financial and military losses, with a 95% drop in income. However, they are likely to retain in excess of US$100 to US$200 million in reserves and are still independent of expat finance. The group have become so weakened that they are not in a position to conduct their earlier robust and systematic funding campaign. However, a lot of their wealth is likely laundered, for example through investment in real estate. And their ‘brand name’ is still strong, not least because of their credible threats of resurgence as well as their reputation for use of extreme violence, so these investments remain relatively secure. In the meantime, they will resort to local taxation and extortion, as well as confiscation, as forms of income, which is what most insurgent groups

17%

of incomes funding the largest armed groups derive from illicit taxation and extortion, excluding taxation of drugs.

turn to when under pressure, and which Islamic State has already shown a strong tendency for.

Smuggling of diesel and gasoline to mafia-run militant groups

At the time of writing, Islamic State’s capacity is unlikely to be more than 5 000 fighters in Iraq and Syria. The big unknown, however, is how many are on the run but who may still maintain strong loyalty to the organization. That figure is likely to be in the region of 5 000 at least, giving a total capacity of about 10 000. In addition, there are returned foreign fighters, about 20% of whom had left the group’s territories at various stages. There are an estimated 5 600 foreign fighters affiliated with IS, who have returned to their home countries.36

Various criminalized militia groups export diesel out of Libya. In October 2017, Italian police disrupted a group smuggling diesel through an Italian mafia network. The mafia were engaged in a Libyan fuel-smuggling ring in which at least €30 million (US$35 million) of diesel was sold in gas stations in Italy and Europe. A Libyan group used small boats to steal fuel from Libya’s National Oil Corporation refinery in Zawiya, a port city west of Tripoli. The fuel was then transferred to a larger ship off the coast of Malta and shipped to Italy.

In terms of funding, at a fairly basic subsistence minimum and with some transportation and bribe costs of US$100–200 a month for 5 000 fighters, and additional costs of maintaining the organization, hiding high-value targets, and sustaining intelligence and counter-intelligence costs of another US$200 per fighter, Islamic State would have estimated current expenses of between US$6 million and US$24 million. They are likely to be able to raise half of this, funding the balance from their reserves. In their current situation, therefore, the organization is likely to think less in terms of salaries, and more in terms of emergency burden sharing and long-term survival as a group.

There is a huge amount of fuel-smuggling activity between Colombia and Venezuela; Tunisia and Libya; Iran and Afghanistan; and Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. Very often, militant groups engage in the smuggling of fuel themselves, or tax impoverished people engaged in it. The smuggling occurs at all levels, from highly organized rings using road tankers, to buried funnels cross border between Syria and Turkey, to small refineries. In some cases, small quantities are smuggled in canisters by road to individual low-level dealers or sellers.

24

Islamic State: Estimated incomes (in US$ millions), in Syria/Iraq, 2014–2017 2014

2015

2016

2017

Oil and gas

150-450 / 400-1,400

435-550 / 84-244

200-250 / 48-95

Lacking / 10-17

Taxes and fees

300-400 / 26-170

400-800 / 77-258

200-400 / 70

Lacking / 107

Kidnap/ransom

20-40 /87

Lacking / 20

10-30 / 20

Lacking / 10

Antiquities

Lacking / 36

Lacking / 22-55

Lacking

Lacking

Foreign donations

Unknown

Insignificant/ 40

Insignificant

Insignificant

Looting / confiscations

500-1,000 / Included above

200-350 / 240

110-190 / 138-216

Lacking / Included above

Sum income all sources

970-1,890 / 549-1,693

1,035-1,650 / 523-815

520-870 / 262-309

Lacking / 127-134

Expenses (salaries, arms,

285-586

285-586

221

117

259-1,107

229-238

40-87

10-17

transport, social services)

Net income

Sources: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King’s College, 2017 and RHIPTO Norwegian Center for Global Analysis 2014-2017 (in bold) 38, 39, 40, 41. The numbers are generally roughly compatible with estimates from captured Islamic State accounts from Deir-ez-Zor Governorate from January 2015.42, 43

SYRIA – Islamic State in Palmyra, Syria. © Unknown photographer.

25

Syria smuggling routes from and into Turkey, 2016

Tunceli Bingöl Elâzığ

Muş Tatvan Bitlis

Malatya Niğde Diyarbakır

Siirt

Batman

Adıyaman Kahramanmaraş

TURKEY Mardin

Şanlıurfa Tarsus Icel

Zakho

Nusaybin Al Qamishli

Gaziantep

Adana

Dahuk

Kilis İskenderun

Izaz

Al Hasakah

Manbij

Tall Afar

Antioch Aleppo

Samandagi

Madinat ath Thawrah

Idlib

Ar Raqqah

Al Ladhiqiyah

IRAQ

Dayr az Zawr Hamah

SYRIA

Tartus Homs

Tadmur Tarābulus

Abu Kamal

LEBANON Ad Nabk

Beirut B'abda

Hezbollah YPG (Kurds)

Smuggling Ar Rutbah

Oil

IS fighters

Antiquities

Turkmen fighters

Main oil export route

Haifa Nazareth

Palestinian Territories

Ramla

Regime forces

Jabhat al-Nusra

Oil/gas field Mobile refinery

Damascus

Al Qunaytirah

Tel Aviv

ISIS

Oil facilities

Douma

Saida

ISRAEL

(As of February 2016)

Rebels

Zahlé

Nabatiye et Tahta

Control of the territory

Nablus Ramallah Jerusalem

Dar'a

As Suwayda

Border crossing point Port

Irbid

Concentration of oil tanker trucks

Al Mafraq As Salt Amman

Az Zarqa

JORDAN 26

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Financial Times; Norwegian Center for Global Analysis; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation RHIPTO - 2016

Mosul

Syrian and Iraqi smuggling routes from and into Turkey

Diyarbakir

TURKEY

Kahramanmaras Adana

Tarsus

Dortyol Iskenderun

Icel

Kilis

Izaz Sarmada

Hatay

Besaslan

Hacipasa Kharbet al-Jawz

Mediterranean Sea

Hakkari

Mardin

Zakho

IRAN

Al Qamishli

Jarablus

Dahuk

Sari Kani

Tell Abiad

Al Hasakah

Manbij Aleppo

Al-Ya'rubiyah Madinat ath Thawrah

Idlib

Al Ladhiqiyah

Siirt

Sanliurfa

Gaziantep

Ceyan

Batman

SYRIA

Ar Raqqah

Tall Afar

Mosul

Ash Shaddadi

Irbil

Kirkuk

Dayr az Zawr

Hamah

As Sulaymaniyah

IRAQ

Tartus Homs Abu Kamal

Palmyra

Trablous

Qasr-e Shirin

LEBANON Beirut

Ad Nabk

Zahle

Dar'a

Palestinian Territories

Baqubah

Ar Ramadi

Damascus

Mandali

Al Fallujah Baghdad Al Musayyib

As Suwayda

Karbala Al Hillah

JORDAN

An Najaf

Amman

Al Kut

Ad Diwaniyah

Ash Shatrah

ISRAEL

SAUDI ARABIA

ISIS territory control (As of April 2017)

Actually controlled Gained in 2017 Lost in 2017 Lost in 2016 Lost in 2015

Old smuggling scheme Route active in 2016 and now reduced or closed Border crossing point active in 2016 and now closed

Actual smuggling routes IS fighters Antiquities Oil Border crossing point active in 2017

Oil facilities Oil/gas field Mobile refinery Concentration of oil tanker trucks

27

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Financial Times; Norwegian Center for Global Analysis; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation RHIPTO - 2017

SOMALIA – New recruits belonging to Somalia’s al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab rebel group march during a passing out parade at a military training base in Afgoye, west of the capital, Mogadishu February 17, 2011. © REUTERS / Feisal Omar

28

29

HAITI – Charcoal sellers wait for customers at the Titanyen Market outside of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on March 20, 2018. This market is filled with sellers and buyers on Tuesday and Friday. Š AFP PHOTO / Hector Retamal

30

31

1%

of the income of the largest armed groups is derived from charcoal

Charcoal – Africa’s black gold In Africa, 90% of wood consumed is used for fuel and in the form of charcoal (the regional range is 49–96%). The charcoal production was 32.4 million tonnes in 2016, with a market value of approximately US$9.7–25.9 billion. Illicit taxing of charcoal, commonly up to 30% of the product’s value, is carried out on a regular basis by organized-criminal groups, militias and terrorist groups across Africa. Given an official tax rate of 5% to 10%, the annual revenue lost to the fiscus from not taxing the charcoal trade is between US$0.5 and US$2.6 billion to African countries.

Al-Shabaab: The rise and fall and rise of charcoal income As of 2018, al-Shabaab had a fighting force of approximately 5 000. By comparison, there are about 200 Islamic State fighters in Somalia.48 AlShabaab have been linked to over 4 500 fatalities in 2017.49 Their largest attack to date happened in October 2017, when more than 300 were killed by a truck bomb in Mogadishu.50 Their support zones, as well as striking ranges, are spread throughout the southern and central part of the country, in both inland and coastal areas.51

Militias in the DRC are estimated to make between US$14 million and US$50 million annually on illicit taxes.44 Al-Shabaab’s primary income is from informal taxation at roadblock checkpoints and ports. In one case, in Somalia’s Badhaadhe District, from 2012, they were able to make up to US$50 000 a day from one particularly lucrative checkpoint by taxing trucks transporting charcoal.45 Trading in charcoal and taxing ports generated at their highest point an estimated annual total of US$38–56 million for al-Shabaab in 2012/13. The overall value of the illicit charcoal export trade from Somalia has been estimated at US$360–384 million a year in 2012, dropping to US$120 million by 2017.46

Al-Shabaab’s primary income is from charcoal. In 2011 and 2012, the group were taxing the charcoal trade out of six ports, the biggest being Kismayo and Barawe. They took money from all those involved in the trade: producers, workers, transporters, buyers, operators of small boats and port workers. These were all taxed at 2.5%, which is equivalent to the religious tax zakat. In addition, dhows were charged docking fees and exporters an export tax.52 By November 2012, the illegal charcoal export trade was generating for al-Shabaab an income from illicit taxes of between US$38 million and US$56 million53, from 9 to 10 million sacks of exported charcoal weighing 25 to 30 kg. The charcoal was shipped to the United Arab Emirates at a rate of 500 000 to 600 000 sacks a month, and 200 000 to 300 000 sacks a month to Saudi Arabia.

Increasingly, transnational criminal networks are taking control of the Somali charcoal trade. The supply side in Kismayo, Somalia, and the receiving side in Dubai are connected through the socalled All Star Group of companies, comprising suppliers, traffickers and investors in both locations. According to an informant to the Group of Experts (who subsequently received death threats from al-Shabaab’s Amniyat unit), the All Star Group is alleged to cooperate with both the president of Somalia’s Jubba interim administration and al-Shabaab over profit sharing in the charcoal trade and export terms.47

Although they were the major player in this illicit market, not all of the income from the trade benefited al-Shabaab. Later they were squeezed out in large measure by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF). Al-Shabaab were also making money from a series of other taxation activities, including taxing sugar imports into Kismayo, although this generated only a modest US$400 000 to us$800 000 a year.54 At that time, one exceptionally profitable checkpoint, at Buulo Xaaji, generated the group a daily income of US$35 000 (US$12.8 million a year) from taxing 90 to 100 trucks a day at a rate of US$250 to US$500 per vehicle, depending on its size.55 32

By 2014, the charcoal price had increased, and alShabaab had honed their taxation systems, generating about US$7.5–15 million from checkpoints alone. In addition, it took a 30% to 40% share of all charcoal exports out of Kismayo, where the export tax had risen to US$3.75 per bag – with at least 6.57 million bags exported from Kismayo and Barawe, al-Shabaab generated at least US$8.2 million to US$9.8 million – this from illicit export taxes alone.56 Meanwhile, that year, it also accrued income from numerous other inland forms of taxation – taxes on production, work, transport, buying and loading. With vehicle checkpoints and export tax from charcoal generating US$20 million, alShabaab was probably earning in 2014 close to the same as during its financially most rewarding year, 2012. But that would soon change. From late 2015, al-Shabaab shifted almost entirely away from the charcoal trade, even to the point of enforcing their own ban, and attacking those involved in the trade within their own territory. This happened in conjunction with their losing control over Kismayo Port in September 2012 (although they retained a share of the trade for another couple of years) and Barawe Port in October 2014; a breakdown in revenue sharing with Interim Jubba Administration President Ahmed Mohamed Islam; and the KDF increasing their share of the trade by charging export tax of US$2 per bag at Kismayo and establishing an AMISOM base at the Buur Gaabo charcoal stockpile. At the same time, the international enforcement of the export ban has become more effective.57 Following their losses in charcoal revenue, alShabaab have diversified their income streams by doubling down on taxation across all aspects of private and commercial life in an effort to compensate. They tax everything: drinking water at wells, intensified zakat collection, extortion of businesses in person or by text messages, agriculture and

The illegal charcoal trade controlled by al-Shabaab

UZBEKISTAN

AZERBAIJAN TURKMENISTAN

TURKEY

SYRIA Beirut

LEBANON

Damascus

Baghdad

Amman Jerusalem

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

IRAQ

Cairo

KUWAIT

Kuwait

PAKISTAN LIBYA

EGYPT

Khasab

Manama

QATAR

Riyadh

Doha Dubai Abu Dhabi

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

SAUDI ARABIA

Creek of Sharjah Muscat

OMAN

Jizan CHAD

YEMEN

Khartoum

Sanaa

Asmara

Al Ahmadi

SUDAN

Aden DJIBOUTI Djibouti SOMALILAND Hargeysa

Addis Ababa

CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.

ETHIOPIA

SOUTH SUDAN

SOMALIA

Charcoal illegal trade Country of origin

Juba

Mogadishu

UGANDA CONGO

KENYA

Kampala

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Nairobi

RWANDA

Kigali

Main importer Other importer Area controlled by the al-Shabaab militia

Baraawe Buulo Xaaji checkpoint Anole

Main shipping lane Secondary shipping lane Main shipping port

Kismaayo

Koday

Other important shipping port

Buur Gaabo

Al Shabaab “taxing” checkpoint

Bujumbura

BURUNDI

Sources: UN Security Council, Somalia report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance with resolution 2060, 2012

TANZANIA

33

SOMALIA – Kenya Defence Forces and Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) soldiers take part in a joint patrol at a charcoal depository formerly under the control of al-Shabaab militants in Burgabo, south of Kismayu in Somalia in this in December 2011. Kenyan forces fighting militants in Somalia are taking cuts from charcoal and sugar smuggling, earning themselves about $50 million a year and boosting an illegal trade that helps fund the Islamists, a rights group said on November 12, 2015. Š REUTERS / Noor Khamisl

34

livestock taxation, and they train young cadres as tax collectors, identifiable by their uniforms.58 The group has also intensified the taxation of distribution of development aid as well as commerce, using checkpoints, which has driven up local prices.59 In late 2016 to early 2017, however, al-Shabaab resurrected their taxation of the charcoal trade, using checkpoints on the road to Buur Gaabo and Kismayo, as well as still controlling the main production areas in Lower and Middle Juba.60 The charcoal trade in general, and therefore alShabaab’s tax revenue, is smaller however,61 as is reflected in the lower tax of US$2.5 per bag, down from US$3 in 2016.62 The group’s estimated revenue from charcoal is currently about US$10 million a year.63 The shift back to illicit charcoal taxation was possibly due to their having found that alternative income sources proved both more resource intensive to collect and less fruitful. In addition to their charcoal income, the group probably makes another US$10 million from other forms of taxation. For example, from a single checkpoint at Leego (which generates US$1.8 million), livestock markets at Safarnooley and Wajid (US$1.6 million and US$0.9 million, respectively), and protection money from three companies, alShabaab make US$4.3 million.64 This would seem to correlate well with about 4 500 fighters earning about US$100 a month, and perhaps 500 Amniyat and senior leaders earning US$500 a month,65 giving a total of US$8.4 million in salary expenses, and about US$11.6 million in other costs, including transportation, ammunition, food, training camps, religious education and bribes. Widely cited rumours that al-Shabaab had major sources of income from ivory have been refuted.66 Similar rumours about their involvement in the East African heroin route trade have not been refuted,

35

but the Group of Experts had, as of 2015, not found any evidence for it.67 Al-Shabaab remain a threat to stability, albeit mainly in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya, including their retaliatory responses to temporary territorial losses and disputes over their share of the charcoal trade, which impede their political influence over clan leaders in Somalia. For African countries experiencing ongoing conflicts, including Mali, Central African Republic, DRC, Sudan and Somalia, a conservative estimate is that, in total, the militia and terrorist groups in those countries may gain US$111–289 million annually, depending upon prices, from their involvement in, and taxing of, the illegal or unregulated charcoal trade.68 With current trends in urbanization and a projected population increase of another 1.1 billion people in sub-Saharan Africa by 2050, the demand for charcoal is expected to at least triple over the next three decades. This will have severe impacts, including large-scale deforestation, pollution and subsequent health problems in slum areas, especially for women. The increased demand for charcoal will also rapidly accelerate emissions from both forest loss and emissions of short-lived climate pollutants in the form of black carbon. It is estimated that there are over 1 900 charcoal dealers in Africa alone, at least 300 of which export minimum orders of 10 to 20 tonnes of charcoal per shipment.69 Their minimum daily orders exceed the official total annual exports for some countries. For East, Central and West Africa, the net profits, combined, from trading and taxing unregulated, illicit or illegal charcoal are estimated at between US$2.9 and US$7.8 billion.70 When one compares this figure with the street value heroin and cocaine in the region, which is US$2.65 billion, the scale of the illicit charcoal market becomes starkly apparent.

SOMALIA – The Somali National Army patrol the area for extremist group Al-Shabaab on 22 March 2014 © United Nations Photo / Flickr

36

al-Shabaab and ISIS presence in Somalia, 2017

DJIBOUTI

Caluula

a sh

Djibouti

Aw

Berbera Boorama Burco

Hargeysa

Addis Ababa

Hurdiyo

Ceerigaabo

Qardho

Bandarbeyla

SOMALIA Laascaanood

Garoowe Eyl

ETHIOPIA

Galkayo

SOMALIA

Shebe le

a Gen

Dhuusa Mareeb

le

Ferfer Beledweyne Dolo Bay

Mandera

Luuq

Mereeg

Garbahaarey

Mogadishu

KENYA

Marka

Terrorist groups' presence al-Shabaab

Bu'aale

ISIS

Attacks and casualties, 2017

Jamaame

Attacks involving al-Shabaab Fatalities reported

Kismaayo

Nairobi

Buur Gaabo

73

TANZANIA

50

10

5

Sources: Norwegian Cnter for Global Analyses; ACLED Database

37

The impacts of unsustainable charcoal production

Estimated annual deforestation rates caused by charcoal production

Africa

Square kilometres, 2009

Asia Central America 390

29 760

2 400

5 100 South America

Charcoal production

Africa

Million tonnes, 2009

Asia Central America 1 061

26 116

5 006

7 621 South America

Grenhouse gas emissions caused by charcoal production

Africa

Million tonnes, 2009

Asia Central America

67.3

2.8 19.7

Methane*

13.0 *

Carbon dioxide (CO2)

CO2 equivalent

South America

Source: Chidumayo, E., N., Gumbo, D., J., The environmental impacts of charcoal production in tropical ecosystems of the World, 2012

38

Bags of charcoal line a road in Africa. Š SHUTTERSTOCK / Peter Wollinga RHIPTO 2016

Wood charcoal production in Africa

MOROCCO TUNISIA LIBYA

ALGERIA

EGYPT

Western Sahara

MAURITANIA

MALI NIGER

GAMBIA GUINEABISSAU

SUDAN

CHAD

SENEGAL BURKINA FASO GUINEA CÔTE D’IVOIRE

SIERRA LEONE

TOGO

ERITREA DJIBOUTI

BENIN NIGERIA

GHANA

Charcoal officially produced by country

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

LIBERIA EQ. GUINEA

Tonnes, 2012 4 000 000

ETHIOPIA

SOUTH SUDAN

CAMEROON

GABON

SOMALIA

UGANDA CONGO

KENYA

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

RWANDA

1 000 000

BURUNDI

500 000 100 000

TANZANIA

MALAWI

4 000

Total charcoal production trend in Africa

ANGOLA ZAMBIA

Million tonnes 30

MOZAMBIQUE ZIMBABWE

25

NAMIBIA

BOTSWANA

MADAGASCAR

20 15

SWAZILAND LESOTHO

10

SOUTH AFRICA 5 Source: FAOSTAT, accessed May 2014

0

39 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010 2012

The charcoal supply chain

Price of a bag of charcoal at retail market Percentage of the total selling price, Malawi

Forestry department

Production site Producer Armed groups roadblocks

Police or other official authority

Roadside vendor

33

6

Middlemen

Packing

Police or other official authority

12 Private taxes and bribes Armed groups roadblocks 25 Transport Wholesale market 3 Market fee Retail market

21 Point of control, roadblock with informal taxation and bribery

Retailer

International market, shipping

Household

40

International market via Internet

Sources: Kambewa, P., et al., Charcoal: the reality, 2007

SOMALIA – Naasa Hablood mountain in Somaliland. © iStock / Muendo

41

SOMALIA – Boys pan for gold at a riverside at Iga Barriere, 25 km (15 miles) from Bunia, in the resource-rich Ituri region of eastern Congo February 16, 2009. © Reuters / Finbarr O’Reilly

42

04 Illegal mining in

contexts of conflict

43

Illegal mining in contexts of conflict

17%

of the income financing the largest armed groups is derived from illegal mining

The Great Lakes: Gold and minerals in the world’s most violent organizedcrime conflict The illicit exploitation of natural resources in eastern DRC is valued at over US$1.25 billion a year; this falls to between US$722 and US$862 million if diamonds are excluded from the picture (which may also be sourced outside eastern DRC). Of this figure, an estimated 10% to 30% (i.e. US$72 million–426 million per annum) goes into the coffers of transnational organized-criminal groups.

Around 98% of the net profits from illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly gold, charcoal and timber, go to transnational organized-criminal networks operating in and outside of the DRC. The significance of charcoal as a conflict resource is likely to increase given increasing demand and a growing regional energy deficit (see Chapter 3 for more on charcoal).71

The annual net profits to organized crime in the eastern DRC – and these are conservative estimates – derive from:

Armed groups in eastern DRC retain around 2% (equivalent to US$13.2 million per annum) of the net profits from illegal smuggling. This income represents the basic subsistence cost for maintaining at least 8 000 armed fighters a year, and enables defeated or disarmed groups to continually resurface and destabilize the region. Revenue from illegal natural resources exploitation finances a high number of well over 25 armed groups (up to 49, according to some estimates) continuing to destabilize eastern DRC. While the armed groups have their own proven survival strategies, transnational organized-crime networks might try to ‘divide and rule’ armed groups in eastern DRC to prevent any single armed group from achieving a dominant role and potentially interfering with illegal exploitation rackets run by transnational criminal networks.72

i) Gold (US$40–120 million) ii) Timber (US$16–48 million) iii) Charcoal (US$12–35 million) iv) 3T minerals (US$7.5–22.6 million) v) Diamonds sourced mainly from outside the conflict zone (US$16–48 million) vi) Other, including wildlife (ivory and fisheries), local taxation schemes, cannabis and other resources (US$14.3–28 million). DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – Karawa, August 24, 2013. An upaved road in rural Congo, a lot of people are walking on the road which connects two villages in the province of Equateur. © iStock / Guenter Guni

44

Natural resources and armed groups in the Kivu provinces, DR Congo CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SOUTH SUDAN ETHIOPIA Juba

Onaba

Nimule Arua

Watsa

Isiro

UGANDA NORTH KIVU

Lake Albert

KENYA

Bunia

Bafwasende

Tororo

Beni Kisangani

Butembo

Kampala

Lake Edward

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Lake Victoria

Nairobi

RWANDA

Lake Kivu

Kigali To Mombasa

Bukavu Kindu

Mwenga Kampene

SOUTH KIVU

Uvira

BURUNDI Bujumbura

Fizi Banaka

Mining Gold Cassiterite Diamond Wolframite Coltan Copper

Kigoma

Lake Tanganyika

45

Wood and charcoal TANZANIA Degraded forest and charcoal production Smuggling routes Charcoal Wood Border crossing point

Armed groups Local airport Main road

Source: Norwegian Center For Global Analysis, 2015; MONUSCO; International Peace Information Service (IPIS) 2014.

Mai Mai Mongol

Kivu armed groups’ areas of influence

Beni [Various Local Defence]

Allied Democratic Forces

UGANDA

FPC/UPCP

Mai Mai FDLR Raia Mutomboki

Butembo

TSHOPO

Armed groups

Others Various local defence groups

FARDC presence Sector

Lake Edward

Regiment

NORD-KIVU

Battalion RUD (FDLR) Mai Mai FDLR Soki/Kasongo

FDLR FOCA

NDC Sheka

Selected armed groups count

(Higher estimates)

APCLS

Walikale

FDC/ Guides/ MAC

Raia Mutomboki

MANIEMA

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Nyatura Sud

CNDP M27

Mai Mai Kifuafua

Mai Mai Kirikicho

Raia Mutomboki Kalehe

Goma Lake Kivu

RWANDA

Raia Mutomboki Walungu/Kabare

Shabunda

Mai-Mai Mongol Kabare Bukavu

Walungu

NDC MCC Bede

Mwenga

Mai Mai Nyakiliba

FDLR FOCA

[Various Local Defence]

Mai-Mai Kifuafua

BURUNDI

Mai Mai Fujo-Nerere Mai Mai Mayele

FPLC

500

FRPI Mai-Mai Yakutumba

Minembwe Mai Mai Mulumba Chochi

Mai Mai Sikatenda

1 000

PARECO

FNL

Mai Mai Musombe/ Ilunga

Mai Mai Kapopo/Eradi

SUD-KIVU

ACPLS ADF/NALU

[Various Local Defence]

Raia Mutomboki Shabunda

MANIEMA

4 000

FDLR

[Various Local FDDH Defence]

Masisi

Mai-Mai Simba

200

Mai-Mai Kirikitcho

Mai Mai UCCB/Brown Lake Tanganyika

FRF

TANZANIA Yakutumba

FPJC

North Kivu DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

FNL (Burundian)

South Kivu

Mai-Mai Populaire

46

40

Source: Norwegian Center For Global Analysis, 2015; UNODC, 2011; based on a map from Christoph Vogel, 2014.

Juba

Resource smuggling and armed g roup control in eastern DRC

SOUTH SUDAN

Aketi Moroto Bumba

Wamba

Mongbwalu

ITURI

Masindi

Bunia Basoko

Mbale

Bafwasende Yangambi

Kisangani

Mubende

Beni

UGANDA

Butembo

Jinja

Kampala

Katwe

NORD-KIVU Lubutu

TSHOPO

Buluko

Ikela

Goma

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

RWANDA Kigali

Bukavu Mwanza Kindu

SUD-KIVU

Mwenga

Uvira

Lodja

BURUNDI

Kampene

SANKURU

Bujumbura

Kasongo

Lusambo

Armed group control

Kigoma

K ABINDA

Kananga

Kabinda

Mbuji-Mayi

Gandajika

TANZANIA

Kongolo

Lubao

Demba

Mwene-Ditu

Gold Diamonds Cassiterite Coltan Others

Kasulu

MANIEMA

Dibaya

Artisanal mines

T ANGANIK A Kabalo

Congolese Army (FARDC) Rebel groups

Smuggling Nyunzu

Charcoal, wood and minerals Gold smuggling hub Main border crossing point

Kalemie

Sources: Norwegian Center For Global Analysis, 2015; International Peace Information Service (IPIS) 2017.

47 Karema

DRC – Chai, North Kivu, March 29, 2014: FDLR rebel soldiers reloading ammo before patrols start in Chai, North Kivu, DR Congo. Š iStock / Jon Brown

48

49

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC – Prospectors work at an openpit at the Ndassima gold mine, near Djoubissi north of Bambari May 9, 2014. © Reuters / Siegfried Modola

50

Armed groups, border-corridor movement and clashes in CAR October 2017

SUDAN

Niyala

CHAD

U Birao Gordil U

U

Akoursoubak

Ouanda-Djallé

U Ndele

U

Ouadda

U U

Kabo U Azene

U U

Kaga Bandoro Bossangoa Dekoa

Bouar

Yakossi

Obo

Bossembele Zemio

U Boali

Bangassou

U

U

Bangui

Berberati

U

Carnot

U

Yaloké

Bambari

Sibut

Bossemptele

Bria

U

Bozoum

SOUTH SUDAN

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Paoua

Mobaye

Mbaiki Nola

Libenge

Transhumance U

CAMEROON

Livestock movement Entry point Conflict, 2016

Density of livestock High Medium Low

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

MINUSCA army presence Republic of Congo Cameroon Morocco Bangladesh Pakistan Mauritania Zambia Burundi

REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Sources: Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, 2017; IPIS, 2017

51

DRC – U.N. peacekeepers drive their tank as they patrol past the deserted Kibati village near Goma in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, August 7, 2013. Š Reuters / Thomas Mukoya

52

Illegal mining of gold and coltan in Latin America by FARC and drug cartels Illegal mining, especially of gold but also other minerals, is gaining increasing interest in Latin America among non-state armed groups, as well as traditional drug cartels, which are finding safer, alternative income streams through taxation or illegal logging and mining in the Peruvian, Brazilian and Colombian parts of the Amazon, and in the mountainous areas of Colombia. Similar trends are observed in parts of Central America. Like in Africa, natural resources, such as gold and timber, are easy to launder and sell in Latin America, with virtually no interventions from law-enforcement agencies, except for in Brazil. Hence, the risk, compared to that of the drug trade, is minimal. Most of the world’s tantalum comes from Brazil and Australia (it is also mined in China, the DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Russia and Rwanda). Tantalum is also produced in Thailand and Malaysia as a by-product of tin mining and smelting. Tantalum raw materials occur in many other countries, such as Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. The level of production in these countries varies from exploration deposits to active artisanal mining and inactive major mines. Tantalum is a notable and well-documented threat finance source to rebel groups and organized crime networks.

Coltan, a contraction used for columbo-tantalites, is refined to produce tantalum. Members of FARC, who have been observed in the Colombian Amazon, are involved in taxing coltan ore being transported through the area. This illicit tax has been valued at about US$7 per kilogram of coltan ore. Paramilitaries, it has been alleged, were running the business in collusion with the army and police. Sometimes taxes have paid with crack cocaine, which is possible given the area’s proximity to drug-producing areas. Coltan ore has been priced at an average of US$180 to US$200 per kilogram (in the period 2011–2015). Its commercial value is calculated on the tantalum oxide content: a concentrate may contain between 10% and 30% tantalum oxide. This corresponds with a front-line ore price of US$27 to US$60 per kilogram (possibly much lower) depending on purity and distance from the mine, suggesting a vehicle checkpoint or river tax of between 11% and 27%. Illegal coltan mining, alongside gold mining, has been allegedly tied to some cartels, possibly drug cartels such as the Sinaloa cartel and the Cifuentes Villa family, but this anecdotal information has not been verified. Much of the coltan is transported through Brazil and exported, and can be bought online, such as on the internet platform Ali Baba.

53

DRC – The forest in the Itombwe Reserve, South Kivu. © Riccardo Pravettoni

54

05 Illegal logging

The largest, least risky and most profitable illicit environmental industry

55

MADAGASCAR – Toamasina, April 12, 2014: Loading of rosewood on trucks at the port of Toamasina (Tamatave). © iStock / Pierre-Yves Babelon

56

Illegal logging: The largest, least risky and most profitable illicit environmental industry

1%

Less than 1% of the income of the largest armed groups comes from timber

The UN Environment Programme and INTERPOL estimate that 62% of all suspected illegal tropical wood entering the US and 86% entering the EU arrives in the form of paper, pulp or wood chips, and not as roundwood, sawnwood or furniture products, which have tended to receive the most attention in the past.73 The more than 30% lower market prices fetched by illegal tropical wood in recent years – of which INTERPOL has estimated that 50% to 90% of the wood felled in tropical countries is traded illegally – has probably contributed to the downfall of many European forestry and paper industries, and the loss of over 270 000 jobs in the industry from 2000 to 2010.74 Overall, the European forestry sector (which employed over 3.3 million people in 2016) has shed about 560 000 jobs since 2000, equivalent to 17% of the workforce. Across the EU-28, manufacturing employment levels fell by 16.8% during the 2000–2015 period, while the largest losses were recorded in furniture manufacturing (which saw 29% lower employment). Pulp, paper and paper products lost 22.2%, while employment in the manufacturing of wood products dropped by 26.5%. Asian paper and pulp companies now account for nearly half of the global market share.75

57

BRAZIL – Forest on Awá land is being illegally cleared by settlers. © Survival / Fiona Watson

58

Illegal logging and log laundering

Getting "cross border permits" through bribes

Cutting Illegal cutting

Country A

Country B

Re-importing

Smuggling Transport

Protected area

Milling

Hacking to obtain false road transport or logging permits

Concession

Mixing illegal timber with legal local timber

Exporting Cutting wider along road corridors

Getting "permits" through bribes Cutting down in and around palm oil plantations

Cutting beyond concessions

Cutting down in and around palm oil plantations

Underreporting actual capacity and production in mills with a modest legal production

Fake documents attesting production from plantations

Exporting Processing roundwood into chips or paper before exporting, making traceability very difficult or impossible

Plantation Illegal operation

Laundering operation

Legal operation 59

Rhinos grazing. Š iStock / 2630ben

60

06 Wildlife crime & waste

61

Buluko

Primary ivory trafficking routes in Tanzania Lake Victoria

Bukoba

Machakos

Musoma Konza

Kigali

RWANDA Cyangugu Cyangugu

Ngara

Biharamulo

Mwanza

BURUNDI Bujumbura

Ngorongoro

Kakonko Shinyanga

Kahama

Makamba

Lamu

Witu

Moshi

Voi

Kilifi

Mbulu

Mombasa

Same

Nzega

Kanyato

Malindi

Arusha

Oldeani

Ruyigi Bururi

KENYA Tsavo

Geita

Cankuzo

Mwenga

Namanga

Nyahanga

Babati

Kasulu Singida

Kigoma

Tanga

Tabora

Uvinza

Korogwe

Mkokotoni

Manyoni

Nyunzu

Zanzibar

Mpanda

Dodoma

Karema

Manono

Chake Chake

Itigi

Sikonge

Lake Tanganyika

Wete

Bagamoyo

Mpwapwa Kilosa

TANZANIA

Morogoro Kibaha

Dar es Salaam

Mikumi

Kipili

Indian Ocean

Kibiti Iringa

Sumbawanga

Luanza

Mbeya

Mbala Tunduma

Nchelenge Kawambwa

ZAMBIA Protected areas

Njombe

Tukuyu Chitipa

Lindi

Karonga

Kasama

Mtwara

Chinsali

Songea

National park

Masasi Tunduru

Other protected area

Trafficking routes

Mbamba Bay

Mzuzu Nkhata Bay

Main route Other route

Kilindoni

Ifakara

Mpika

Mocimboa

Lake Malawi

Mzimba Lundazi

MOZAMBIQUE Sources: Norwegian Center for Global Analisys, 2015, UNEP, WCMC, Protected Planet

Pemba

Nkhotakota

62 Chipata

MALAWI

Lichinga

Marrupa

Montepuez

Wildlife crime and waste Insignificant as conflict finance except for marginalized groups Elephants and rhinos The number of elephants killed in Africa is in the range of 20 000 to 25 000 a year (2016 numbers) out of a population of 415 428 (+/− 20 111) plus a possible additional 117 000 to 135 000 elephants. The latter number is based on less certain estimates. In total, this gives a broad range of 395 000 to 570 000 elephants.76 For the forest elephant, the population is estimated to have declined by about 62% between 2002 and 2011.77 Poached African ivory may fetch an end-user street value in Asia of an estimated US$165–188 million of raw ivory per year, and this figure does not include ivory from Asian sources.78 In the case of rhinos, about 94% of the animals are poached in Zimbabwe and South Africa, which have the largest remaining rhino populations. In those countries, poaching has increased dramatically – from 13 (the number recorded in 2007) to 1 215 in 2014, declining slightly to 1 028 by 2017.79 Poaching of rhino horn involves organized syndicates. Rhinos have disappeared entirely from several Asian and African countries in recent years. The value of rhino horn poached in 2013 was valued in downstream markets at between US$63.8 million and US$192 million, but the value is much less at the supply end of the chain.80 Wildlife and forest crime play a relatively small role in threat finance to organized crime and non-state armed groups, including terrorist groups. It is estimated that less than 1% of the overall income to nonstate armed groups comes from ivory. Ivory provides a portion of the income raised by militia groups in the DRC and CAR, and is most likely a primary source of income for the Lord’s Resistance Army, which currently operates in the border triangle of South Sudan, CAR and DRC. Ivory also provides a source of income to the Sudanese Janjaweed and other horseback gangs operating across Sudan, Chad and Niger.

Given the estimated elephant populations and the number of projected elephants that are killed within the striking range of these militia groups, the annual income from ivory to militias in the whole sub-Saharan region is likely to be in the range of US$4.0 million–12.2 million.81 Poaching is also a threat to Asian rhinos. Over 70% of Indian Greater One-horned rhinos were in Kaziranga National Park by 2008, with an estimated population of 2 401 in 2015. Poaching is currently a threat in Kaziranga, with 123 rhinos killed between 2006 and 2015. The poaching trend has increased dramatically: 58% of these rhinos were killed between just 2013 and 2015. In Nepal, rhino populations diminished by 88%, to 100 animals in 1960 in just one decade as a result of poaching. A Rhinoceros Action Plan for Nepal was developed in 2017. Earlier, an intense protection scheme, including deployment of the army, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation, and the translocation of 87 rhinoceros took place between 1986 and 2003 (at an average cost of US$4 000 each). When the war broke out in Nepal in 1996, tourism dropped by 41% in two years and rhino numbers decreased by a third in five years to a population of just 408 by 2005, as they were poached by armed groups for cash. Dedicated rangers and anti-poaching units in the Bardia and Chitwan national parks fought hard to rescue remaining rhinos at the height of the conflict. After the war, the campaign continued, this time against organized-criminal networks smuggling rhino horn to China via Pokhara and Kathmandu. As populations reached their lowest, protecting the remaining rhinos became vital. Due to intense efforts, the year 2015 passed without the loss of a single rhino to poaching in Nepal (likewise 2011 and 2013). 63

ZAMBIA – Lower Zambezi national Park, 2011. © Unknown photographer.

African rhino smuggling Main trafficking hubs Main routes Main country of origin Main transit country Secondary transit country Main destination Secondary destination

Number of rhino horn seizures by country 53 1

CHINA The Netherlands Germany Ireland UK Belgium

Tibet

Hong Kong Hanoi

VIETNAM

MALAYSIA THAILAND Assam Bangkok (INDIA) Singapore MYANMAR

Czech Republic

NEPAL

Slovakia

OMAN YEMEN

KENYA TANZANIA ZAMBIA MOZAMBIQUE

Black rhinoceros, a dramatic loss

BOTSWANA

Number of black rhinos in Africa, thousands 100

NAMIBIA

80

1 200 1 000

60

SOUTH AFRICA

40

South Africa

Other countries (2014-15 only)

800 600 400

20 0 1960

Southern African rhino poaching

Rhinos reported illegally killed 1 400

200 1970

1980

1990

2000

0

2010

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Source: TRAFFIC, The South Africa – Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus, 2012; TRAFFIC data, 2015

64

MAURITANIA

MALI

CHAD

GUINEA

SIERRA LEONE

DJIBOUTI

BENIN TOGO

LIBERIA

ERITREA

BURKINA FASO

GAMBIA GUINEABISSAU

SUDAN

NIGER

SENEGAL

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

ETHIOPIA

NIGERIA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

GHANA

SOUTH SUDAN

CAMEROON DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

EQ. GUINEA GABON

KENYA

Somaliland

SOMALIA

UGANDA

CONGO

RWANDA BURUNDI TANZANIA

Elephants and rhinos threatened by conflict

MALAWI ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

Conflicts and security incidents

MOZAMBIQUE

Major battle (more than 50 fatalities) Battle and other security incident with more than 1 casualty Riot or protest Violence against civilians

Protected areas and animal range

MADAGASCAR

ZIMBABWE BOTSWANA NAMIBIA

Protected area

SWAZILAND

Elephant known range

LESOTHO

Rhino known range

SOUTH AFRICA Note: A battle is defined as a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location. A riot is defined as a violent disturbance of the public peace by three or more persons assembled for a common purpose. A protest is defined as a spontaneous, non-violent gathering of civilians for a political purpose

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED); African Elephant Database (AED)/IUCN/SSC African Elephant Specialist Group (AfESG)

RHIPTO 2016

65

Greater one-horned rhino smuggling in Nepal

Dandeldhura Moradabad Rampur

TIBET (CHINA)

Jumla

Xigaze Gyangze

Dhangarhi Pilibhit

Bardia

Bareilly Budaun

Salyan

N E PA L Baglung

Nepalganj

Pokhara

Shahjahanpur Bhairawa

Bahraich

Sitapur

Chitwan Parsa

Main smuggling route

B H U TA N

Kathmandu Bhimphedi Hetauda

Ramechhap

Gangtok

Birganj Lucknow

Other smuggling route Protected area in Nepal Habitat of the great one-horned rhinocero

Ilam

Gorakhpur

Faizabad

Rajbiraj

INDIA

Thimphu

Biratnagar

Siliguri Alipur Duar

Muzaffarpur

Corridor for the movement of the rhinos Bottleneck

Purnia

Forested area

Patna

Urban area

Bhagalpur

Annual mortality of the greater one-horned rhinoceros in Nepal 40

BANGLADESH Natural death

35

Poaching

30

Dhaka

25 20 15 10 5 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

66

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Sources: RHIPTO 2018; Thapa, K., et al., Past, present and future conservation of the greater one-horned rhinoceros Rhinoceros unicornis in Nepal, 2011; Nepal Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation, 2017

NEPAL – A relocated rhino charges a Nepalese forestry and technical team after being released as part of a relocation project in Shuklaphanta National Park, some 510 km from Kathmandu on April 4, 2017. Conservationists on April 3 captured a rare onehorned rhinoceros in Nepal as part of an attempt to increase the number of the vulnerable animals, which are prized by wildlife poachers. Š AFP PHOTO / Prakash Mathema

67

Pangolin, the world’s most trafficked mammal

CHINA

INDIA LAO

MYANMAR

VIETNAM PHILIPPINES

Pangolin trafficking

THAILAND

Myanmar, a new hub for pangolin trafficking to China INDIA (Assam)

Main smuggling routes

CHINA

MALAYSIA

Main country of origin Transit country Main destination

INDONESIA

MYANMAR LAOS

Pangolin seizures, 2010-2015 Individuals or kilograms of scales 4 200 THAILAND 1 000

100

Road Sea or river Air Not specified

Confiscation site Main roads used for trafficking

68

Sources: Environmental investigation Agency, 2015; Nijman, V., et al., Pangolin trade in the Mong La wildlife market and the role of Myanmar in the smuggling of pangolins into China, 2016

Pangolins Every year, between 400 000 and 2.7 million pangolins are hunted in the forests of central Africa. Hunting pangolins has increased by over 150% since 2000,82 making the pangolin one of the world’s most trafficked animals in the illegal wildlife trade. It is estimated that at least a million pangolins were traded in Asia in 10 years.83 In 2015, Vietnamese customs officers trained by the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme seized around 4 000 kg of pangolin scales (along with 1 023 kg of ivory).84 In January 2017, Tanzanian authorities seized 6 000 kg of scales destined for Asian markets.85

Pangolin Š iStock / Daniel Haesslich

69

Tiger © iStock / THEPALMER

70

85% of the global trade in tigers takes place within the EU

BHUTAN Thimphu

United States

CHINA

INDIA BANGLADESH Dhaka

MYANMAR Hanoi Naypyidaw

Rangoon

LAOS

VIETNAM

Vientiane

THAILAND Illegal trafficking in big cats

Tiger habitat Resident Possibly extinct

UK

France

Belgium

Spain

Netherlands Germany

Czech Republic Switzerland Poland Austria Monaco Belarus Hungary Croatia Italy Romania Ukraine

Russia Japan

Malta Europe Turkey China

Vietnam United Arab Emirates Tiger habitat Resident Possibly extinct

Thailand

India

Indonesia

Import and export of tigers Top 20 importers of live tigers, 1975-2017 Top 20 exporters of tigers Quantity 911 500 50 Main destination of tigers exported from Europe Source : CITES database 2018, UNODC and RHIPTO 2018

71

Malaysia

Bangkok

CAMBODIA Phnom Penh

INDONESIA – Navy ship blowing up a foreign fishing vessel caught fishing illegally in the waters near Bitung, North Sulawesi, 20 May 2015. According to media reports, Indonesia has sunk 41 foreign boats across the country, as part of an ongoing push to stop illegal fishing in its waters. Š EPA

72

Trafficking in waste: The rise of global dumping grounds Some 41.8 million metric tonnes of electronic waste (e-waste) were generated in 2014, and this number is set to increase to 50 million metric tonnes by 2018.86 According to various estimates, the amount of e-waste properly recycled and disposed of is between just 10% and 40% of the total. The presence of the informal economy makes precise estimates of the value of this sector difficult to ascertain. However, using an estimate formulated by INTERPOL that attributes an average value of US$500 to each tonne of e-waste, the volume of e-waste handled informally, or which is unregistered, including illegally, amounts to US$12.5–18.8 billion annually.87 It is unknown how much of this e-waste falls within the illegal trade or is simply dumped. Its role in threat finance to conflicts is peripheral or insignificant. However, organized-criminal groups, including the Italian mafia, have been engaged in it for decades.

Fisheries crime: Fraud and impunity on the world’s seas Close to 10% of the world’s catches are dumped at sea if they fail to meet the regulatory standards required.88 Great concern has been expressed over illegal fishing off the coast of West Africa and its impact on the livelihoods of local fishermen. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing off West Africa, which makes up between one third and half the total catch, is worth US$2.3 billion in 2015.89 In Somalia, illegal fishing has been posited as a cause of the rise in piracy through lost livelihoods. Losses incurred by foreign illegal vessels off Somalia have been estimated to be in the region of US$100– 300 million.90 IUU fishing off Senegal, with a catch of about 261 000 tonnes a year, incurred a loss of about US$300 million in 2012, or 2% of GDP.91 Many vessels offload illegal catches to other ships at sea.

73

The role of IUU fishing for threat finance is peripheral, although some fisheries are used to pay illegal taxes. The role of fishing vessels and recreational vessels in transporting drugs – whether from Colombia, or along the west and east African coasts – is significant, however. Furthermore, fishing vessels are key to transporting foreign fighters, including across the Caspian Sea, the Mediterranean, and off the Horn of Africa and Yemen.

Swirl of fish © iStock / Tammy616

74

Illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing ILLEGAL FISHING

LEGAL FISHING

Fish catch is registered and checked by authorities

Fishing that violates national laws or international obligations.

Fishing within a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone without permission

UNREPORTED FISHING

Documents are forged to provide legal ground to illegally caught fish

Fish gets to the market or to the processing factory

? Fishing that has not been reported, or has been misreported, to the relevant national authority

UNREGULATED FISHING ?

A

Fishing by vessels under the flag of a country they are not part of, or not part of a fishery organisation

Fishing outside of regulated zones, breaking international law to conserve living marine resources

Global losses from IUU fishing are estimated to be between US$10 billion and US$23.5 billion annually, between 10 and 22% of total fishery production

Sources: NOAA; IEEP, an independent review of the eu illegal, unreported and unregulated regulations, 2011.

75

CHAD – This photo was taken in the Chadian desert. A group of migrants were travelling in a truck that broke down Mondou, Chad, December 8, 2012. Š iStock / yoh4nn

76

07 The Trans-Sahara

Migrants, drugs and arms

77

Trans-Saharan trafficking and threat finance October 2017

TURKEY TUNIS

ALGIER

Islamic State TRIPOLI

Ouargla

MOROCCO

GNA/ GNC Islamic State Misrata Militia Sabha

AQIM Deb Deb ALGERIA Western Sahara

AQIM

MAURITANIA NOUAKCHOTT

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin

MALI

MUJAO

DAKAR

Sirte

AQIM

Haftar/LNA LIBYA

Tibesti Mountains

Tamanrasset Madama

Arlit

Aïr Mountains

Kidal Agadez

Gao Menaka NIAMEY

Zinder

BANJUL GAMBIA

Dongola

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Nile River

SUDAN

CHAD Lake Chad

EGYPT

Kufra district

Zouar

NIGER

Ansar Bayt / Islamic State Al Maqdis in the Sinai

Cairo

Ghat

Tessalit

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin

LEBANON

Benghazi

KHARTOUM Janjaweed/ RSF South Darfur Kordofan

ERITREA ASMARA

Kassala

BURKINA SENEGAL FASO Ouagadougou BISSAU BAMAKO Sokoto Boko Niyala GUINEA BISSAU Maiduguri Haram Kadugli GUINEA BENIN CONAKRY Malakal JEM Kano SIERRA Abuja FREETOWN TOGO LEONE NIGERIA CENTRAL Ex-Seleka AFRICAN LIBERIA CÔTE Lome Anti MONROVIA SOUTH GHANA REPUBLIC Balaka D'IVOIRE LAGOS SUDAN TEMA ABIDJAN JUBA DOUALA CAMEROON BANGUI

DJIBOUTI ADDIS ABABA Gambela

SAO TOME Main transit point Small-arms supply routes Small-arms supply routes by air Goods, counterfeit, human trafficking and drugs route Human trafficking Charcoal and other natural resources

GABON

Bottleneck on trafficking routes of strategic importance AQIM Militia groups fighting over the control of bottlenecks Main regional conflicts and areas of reported operations by militia groups Area* with severe resource gap for livestock feed for the period 2011-2030. Cattle need to move south in the fattening period *Information available for Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad only

Source: RHIPTO - Norwegian Centre for Global Analyses, 2016

78

KAMPALA DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

al-Shabaab

ISIS

SOMALIA

Nairobi

RWANDA BURUNDI

DJIBOUTI CITY

ETHIOPIA

KENYA

Major trafficking and trade axis taxed by militants or run by organized crime

AQAP

Massawa

UGANDA

LIBREVILLE

YEMEN

Mombasa

Al Shabab

MOGADISHU

The Trans-Sahara: Migrants, drugs and arms Armed groups in the Trans-Sahara engage in numerous forms of trafficking, including smuggling cigarettes, drugs and arms. However, their main source of income is from extorting taxes, and through their involvement in supplying the human-trafficking industry, including supply of 4x4 vehicles.92 Taxes are extorted of between 10% and 30% of the price depending on the commodity and its place in the supply chain. In addition, armed groups invest incomes from cigarette and arms trafficking, ransom and ex-pat finance in improving the logistical base of smugglers, and subsequently tax them 30–50% of their incomes from traditional trafficking. Drugs are trafficked by ship and air from Brazil and Venezuela, landing in West Africa, especially Guinea-Bissau. Drugs transported in mother ships are consolidated into smaller units in fast boats or sailing vessels at sea, which head north to Cape Verde or the Canary Islands and then onwards to mainland Europe. Those that arrive on the African mainland are trafficked onwards using all manner of transport, but commonly 4x4s that driven by highly organized groups. Much of these flows pass through Morocco and Algeria, as well as Libya. Cocaine also arrives in containers in West Africa, and in East Africa by air via Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as well as its splinter groups Al-Mourabitoun (now reformed after a two-year split) and Ansar Dine,

are now increasingly changing how they finance themselves, shifting their attention away from kidnapping for ransom and cigarette smuggling to protection-taxing the trafficking of drugs, predominantly cocaine originating in Latin America, an activity that pays much higher dividends. For AQIM, these illicit protection taxes are charged at a rate of between 10% and 30%. The group has been significantly bolstered by having had access to a steady supply of arms from Libya since 2011, which has strengthened their position to offer ‘protection’. AQIM has also invested cigarette smuggling profits in traffickers’ infrastructure since the mid-2000s, in return for a cut of trafficking profits. This affords a discreet and hands-off approach to how they make money, earning a possible rate of 5% of the value of drugs trafficked through key hotspots. The estimated trafficked volume of cocaine in the region is around 18 tonnes per year, and its price rises from US$1 600–2 500/kg in Colombia to around US$20 000–30 000/kg as it passes through checkpoints. If, hypothetically, AQIM and Al-Mourabitoun could tax only one in three route segments and only two out of the four major drug routes in the region, one could put an estimate of their likely annual income from these flows at around US$7.5 million to US$22.5 million a year, or US$2.5 million to US$7.5 million. Armed groups are also involved in the smuggling and trafficking of migrants. For example, Islam-

79

ic State in the Sirte region of Libya allegedly operated a vehicle checkpoint near Al Nuwfayah, where receipts were issued for migrants to pass through. With an estimated 150 000 to 170 000 migrants and fees for transit and onward travel at around US$3 000 to US$4 500 per migrant, the overall migrant business in the Trans-Sahara, including Libya, is now estimated to be worth between US$450 million and US$765 million. If armed groups tax criminal entrepreneurs or take the commonly used illegal tax rate of 10% to 30%, and less than 5% goes to terrorist organizations, armed groups in the region may make as much as US$45 million to US$229 million a year.93 Meanwhile, terrorist groups, like JNIM, Ansar al-Sharia and, for a time, Islamic State, are likely to make around US$22 million to US$38 million.94 It is believed that smuggling of drugs and cigarettes continues to be a relatively important income mainstay for regional terrorist groups, but it is also evident that migrant trafficking and investing in entrepreneurs and traffickers – irrespective of what they transport – are becoming safer and more common sources of income for terrorist organizations, such as JNIM. This may also explain the aggressive attacks made by JNIM during 2017 on UN forces north and east of Bamako in Mali – seen as an attempt to enable them to exert taxes on the routes from the west to the Gao– Kidal–Menaka–Tessalit ‘smuggling highway’ to Algeria and Libya.95

LIBYA – Tuareg in Acacus Mountains. © iStock / Cinoby

80

81

LIBYA – In this March 5, 2011 photo, an anti-government rebel sits with an anti-aircraft weapon in front an oil refinery in Ras Lanouf, eastern Libya. The fight for the Ras Lanuf refinery and nearby Sidr depot threatens to spiral into open conflict between rival factions vying for power from east and west. © AP Photo / Hussein Malla

82

Migrant routes to Libya

ITALY

TUNIS

ALGERIA

Sousse Sfax Gabes

LAMPEDUSA MALTA TRIPOLI Gharyan

MOROCCO

Al Bayda

Tarhuna Bani Walid

Benghazi Ajdabiya

Sirte

Ghadamis Debdeb

Shweref

Tassili Mountains

Ubari

CAIRO

Hun

LIBYA

EGYPT

Tazerbo

Al Qatrun Tummo

Madama

Aïr Mountains

Arlit

MALI

Agadez

Dirkou

Tibesti Mountains

NIGER

ERITREA

SUDAN

Kassala

KHARTOUM

Lake Chad NDJAMENA

ASMARA

Gonder

Metema Niyala

DJIBOUTI

Bahir Dar

BENIN TOGO

Humera

Gedaref

Zinder

NIAMEY

Faya Largeau

CHAD

Tahoua OUAGADOUGOU

Area of strategic importance for traffic movements 1. Salvador Triangle Ethnic group presence Toubou Touareg 1

Kufra

1

Tessalit

Transit point Main hub Main hub disputed by different forces

Sabha

Ghat Tamanrasset

Main smuglging routes Arms Migrants and refugees Main route, as of end 2017 No more in use

Darnah Tobruq

Bole Mikhel ADDIS ABEBA

NIGERIA SOUTH SUDAN

GHANA

Las Aanod Garaway

Beledweyne

RHIPTO - JANUARY 2018

Source: IOM, 2014; UNHCR, Mixed Migration Trends In Libya, 2017; United States Institute for Peace, 2014; Norwegian Center For Global Analysis, 2017

Mogadishu

Refugees, migrants and territorial control in Sabha

H AY A BDELKAFI

Migrant detention zones and departing points in Libya

Magarha HQ

Zone of departure Mediterranean Sea Migrant hotspots A L M AHDIYAH

Nigerian Consulate Security Directorate

A L T HANWIYAH

City Hall

Tripoli

Gathering area Living area Working area H IJARAH

Territory controlled by Tebu Gaddifa Magarha Awlad Suleyman

Hospital

A L M ANSHIYAH

Jigjiga

ETHIOPIA

CAMEROON

A L -J ADID

Somaliland

Wachale Hargeise

IOM Office

A L Q URDAH

Warshefana Gharyan

Zintan

RHIPTO - JANUARY 2018

Sabha Airport

Source: UNHCR, Mixed Migration Trends In Libya, 2017

Detention areas Area where migrants are gathered by smugglers before the departure

Misrata Tarhuna

(Smugglers tend to avoid this area)

83

Main area Secondary area Former main departure area, no longer in use

Bani Walid

Control ot the territory Portion of the route used by smugglers controlled by the clan indicated Area controlled by the clan indicated

RHIPTO - JANUARY 2018

Source: UNHCR, Mixed Migration Trends In Libya, 2017

GREECE

Libya territory control and conflict January 2018

Sabratha

TUNISIA

Tripoli

Zuwarah

Al Khums

Az Zawiyah

Derna

Al Aziziah

Misrata Gharyan

Benghazi

Tobruk

Nalut Shinawin

Surt Ajdabiya Al Qaryah ash Shargiyah

Dirj

Marsa al Brega

Al Jaghbud

Ghadamis Hun

Waddan

Awjilan Maradah

ALGERIA

Jaid

Zillah Al Fuqaha Birak Adiri

LIBYA Sabha

EGYPT

Awbari

Tmessa Umm el Araneb

Tazirbu Zighan

Waw al Kabir

Ghat

Al Qatrun Madrusah Al Wigh

Tahrami

Al Kufrah

Rabyanah

Al Jawf

Control of territory GNA (Government of National Accord) LNA (Libyan National Army) Amazigh Touareg Tebu Criminal gangs Safe haven for smugglers LNA expanded control between July 2017 and January 2018

Militias presence ISIS Misratan militias

Toummo

Armed conflicts and violence, 2017 Actor involved ISIS Misrata militias Other actor Fatalities

Ma¯tan as Sarra

141

Al ¯Uwaynat

SUDAN

CHAD

50 25 5

Sources: United Nations; ACLED database, accessed in October 2017 RHIPTO - 2018

84

Attacks in Mali linked to violent-extremist groups

ALGERIA

Attacks from extremist groups 2017 2016 2015 2014 Include rebels, political militias and ethnic militias

Attack against UN Division or International Army Force 2017 2014-2016 Tessalit

Fatalities 55

MALI

10 1 Source: ACLED, 2017

MAURITANIA Gao

SENEGAL

Menaka

NIGER Djenné Ségou

Bamako

BURKINA FASO

NIGERIA Attacks against local defense and security forces in Mali

GUINEA

80

BENIN

60 40

GHANA

SIERRA LEONE

20 0

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

2015 2016 2017 RHIPTO 2017

LIBERIA

85

MALI – Malian soldiers patrol the roads during the visit of the Malian Prime Minister in Menaka Mali on May 9 2018. Š AFP PHOTO / Sebastien Rieussec

86

87

SAHARA – Young Tuareg with camel on Western Sahara Desert in Africa. © iStock / Hadynyah

88

Jab al b in

Migrant routes and political threats in Niger

Gh una ym ah

Fezzan area. Risk of spillover of Libya’s instability into the south

Salvador Pass (triborder point) Ahagar Mountains

(triborder point)

gar

Ta

ag Ah -n-

Madama

ua

io ssil

ALGERIA

LIBYA

Tibesti Mountains

Djado Plateau Djado Deo Timmi Séguédine Adrar Bous

Assamakka Arlit

Ténéré Erg Dirku

Iferouâne

Bilma

Aïr Mountains

NIGER

MALI Political threat. Marginalized tribes and local issues spilling over the border

Agadez

Tasker TchinTabaradele

Route to avoid moving within Chad territory

Tanout

Tahoua Ayorou Tillaberi

Border patrol issues

Birni Nkonni

Niamey

Nguigmi

Madaoua

Goure

Zinder Maradi

Diffa

Dosso Ouagadougou

Lake Chad

Fada Ngourma

NIGERIA Gaya

BURKINA FASO Kandi

TOGO GHANA

CHAD

CAMEROON Sahara Desert

BENIN

Boko Haram incursions in Niger

Sahel Erg and other desert Presence of Touareg Presence of Toubou

Migrant routes Using ATW to avoid official roads Stopover point Border police post French military base or facility American military base

Political threat from bordering country Terrorist attacks, Jan 2017 - Jan 2018 Islamic State’s Adnane Abou Walid al-Sahrahoui, killing UN and France soldiers amongst others Attacks from Boko-Haram in and nearby Niger

0

200 Sources: RHIPTO; Reuters press review 2018 RHIPTO - February 2018

89

400 Km

GREECE – Refugee migrants, arrived on Lesvos in inflatable dinghy boats, they stay in refugee camps waiting for the ferry to mainland Greece. October 12, 2015, 2015. © Shutterstock / Anjo Kan

90

08 Migrant smuggling & human trafficking

91

Migrant smuggling and human trafficking Human smuggling and trafficking are now probably, economically speaking, the fourth largest global crime sector – estimated at an annual market value of at least US$157 billion.96 Globalization and increasing access to transport from any corner of the planet have made it possible for criminal networks to organize the movement of enslaved victims, and of refugees and migrants at unprecedented levels, even for mass movements. EUROPOL and INTERPOL estimated the value of migrant traffic from outside Europe to Europe in 2015 to be in the order of US$5 billion to 6 billion each year.97 According to various other estimates, human smugglers made revenues of about US$4.2 billion smuggling people into Europe; US$672 million from the onward journey inside Europe; total revenues in 2015 of US$4.9 billion. The profit margins for human smugglers (in the range of 10% to 50%) are US$42 million to US$2.1 billion for entry into Europe; US$67 to US$301 million for the onward journey; total profits in 2015: US$489 million to US$2.3 billion.98

Nepal: Trafficking networks grew during the civil war and continued post-war During the civil war in Nepal, many trafficking networks expanded, as is often the case during conflicts. However, unlike with the poaching of rhino horn, the incidence of which was reduced or even stopped as a result of targeted efforts after the war, trafficking of women and children for forced labour and prostitution in Nepal continued, and these activities now fuel organized crime.

Libya: Migrant trafficking in conflict Based on numbers of migrants arriving in Italy in 2016, combined with detailed price levels for the different legs of the journey, it is possible to calculate revenues and profits to armed groups on the various legs. Along the eastern route, there were about 43 000, whereas on the western route the number was between 143 000 and 300 000, with the two flows merging in Sabha. The average prices charged within Libya to the north-west coast is US$300 to US$500, with an additional US$200 to US$250 for the departure by boat. The traffickers and smugglers may gain a profit of 15% to 30% of the income. With an estimated 186 000 to 343 000 passing through Libya in 2016, and with no indication of a significant decrease in flow, the annual revenue to all armed groups combined is US$93 million to US$244 million, with a net profit of US$13 million to US$71 million.101

92

Mali and Niger: Migrants, cigarettes and conflict JNIM conducted an eastward offensive in 2017, including attacks on forces of the UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA. JNIM also operates from the south-east corner of Mauritania. From there, they advance out, using caches of arms, as far as south of Bamako. Formerly parts of AQIM’s Sahara branch, Ansar Dine, Katibat Macina and Al-Mourabitoun merged with JNIM in early 2017. The group is based in the Sahel, its core area being northern Mali. They have been responsible for a large number of attacks on UN peacekeeping forces in Mali, operating out of Mauritania and Mali, and in south-west Libya and Algeria. It is likely that they will increasingly move into Niger to gain control of smuggling networks as income opportunities. Their precise sources of finance are unknown, but it is derived mainly from ransom money, cigarette and drug smuggling, illicit taxation, protection money and return from investments in migrant smugglers (e.g. trucks and finance). JNIM’s income is probably in the range of US$7 million to US$20 million for drugs and ransom, and US$11 million to US$15 million from return of investments in the migrant trafficking trade, which is largely outside JNIM-controlled areas, apart from some traffic from the south-west. JNIM is the big potential future winner among the Salafist/jihadist groups. Some expat finance is believed to be involved. The group probably has about 3 500 to 4 500 fighters.

Migrant trafficking into and within European Union and approximate costs in 2015

EU and Schengen country EU non-Schengen country Non-EU and Schengen country Main origin country Border with reinforced surveillance or fence Temporary and local reintroduction of border controls

ICELAND

Migration routes Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan route Apulia and Calabria route Central Mediterranean route Western Mediterranean route Western Africa route

FINLAND NORWAY

ESTONIA

SWEDEN

Main route Secondary route

LATVIA IRELAND

Number of trafficked migrants

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

LITHUANIA

UNITED KINGDOM

790

KAZAKHSTAN

POLAND

250

CZECH REPUBLIC SLOVAKIA HUNGARY AUSTRIA SWITZERLAND SLOVENIA GERMANY

15 2 or less

250

Cost of the voyage

FRANCE

CROATIA

1 000 Approximate price paid to organized crime groups

PORTUGAL

ITALY

SPAIN

ROMANIA

SERBIA

AFGHANISTAN

BULGARIA MACEDONIA

TURKEY

ALBANIA GREECE

1 000

1 000 SYRIA

2 000

MOROCCO

1 500

ALGERIA

600

1 500

EGYPT

LIBYA

1 500 MALI

1 500 SUDAN

NIGER

ERITREA

Sources: Frontex; International Organization For Migration (IOM); International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD); Norwegian Center for Global Analisys (RHIPTO)

93

RHIPTO 2016

NIGER – West African refugees travelling north to Libya across the Sahara and then on to Europe. Niger, 2005. Š Nature Picture Library / Steve O. Taylor

94

95

Migrant routes, costs and criminal groups' profit into and within European Union

FINLAND

NORWAY EU and Schengen country EU non-Schengen country Non-EU and Schengen country

SWEDEN

ESTONIA

Border with reinforced surveillance or fence Temporary and local reintroduction of border controls

LATVIA

Main routes and price Euros, 2015 Within Europe 250

LITHUANIA

Into Europe 1 000 1 500 2 500

POLAND

Organized crime annual profit Million Euros, 2015 100 Into Europe 10 Within Europe

GERMANY

1.6

CZECH REPUBLIC

AUSTRIA SWITZERLAND

SLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

SERBIA

47

ITALY

PORTUGAL

ROMANIA

49

SLOVENIA

CROATIA

Eastern Borders route

69

BULGARIA

71

Western Balkan route

915

TURKEY

4

MACEDONIA

48

ALBANIA GREECE

SPAIN

772

7.5

Western Mediterranean route

Central Mediterranean route

Eastern Mediterranean route

118 Sources: Frontex 2016; Norwegian Center for Global Analisys (RHIPTO)

96

RHIPTO 2016

Migrants in the EU: main countries of origin and destination

First-time asylum applicant, 2015

Sweden

Thousands

Finland

430 100 50 10

United Kingdom Germany

Pakistan

Netherlands

Country of origin

Belgium

Country of destination

Main destinations

Hungary

CH

Primary destination Second and third destination by number of asylum seeker

Note: only the first 10 countries by origin and destination, and only the first three destinations by country are represented

Unknown

Ukraine Afghanistan

Austria

France Iran Italy

Spain

Kosovo Iraq

Albania Syria

Eritrea

Somalia

Nigeria Source: Eurostat 2016

97

RHIPTO 2016

Human trafficking in Nepal - Patterns DESTINATIONS PUSH FACTORS

Gulf Countries

Conflicts

Impoverishment Open border

Family disruption

China

Natural hazards

Impunity

Domestic violence Patriarchy

Illiteracy

ord ss b Cro

Ov

ers

er t

eas

raffi

tra

cki

ffic

ng

kin

g

India

Nepal

RECRUITMENT AND TRANSPORTATION

Forced labour

Fraudulent marriage Deception: offering jobs and education

Sex industry

Provoking unconsciousness with drugs

Brothels

ce

REASON FOR TRAFFICKING

98

tion duc Ab

Coe r VULNERABILITY

atic

HIGH

tem

LOW

Sys

LOW

cio n

HIGH

vio

len

SOCIAL STATUS

ENSLAVEMENT PROCESS

Sources: Maiti Nepal; Interpol; Hodge, D., and Lietz, C., The International Sexual Trafficking of Women and Children: A Review of the Literature, 2009.

Trafficking of women and girls in Nepal CHINA SETI MAHAKALI

KARNALI

Chainpur BHERI

Delhi

Silghadi

DHAWALAGIRI RAPTI

GANDAKI BAGMATI

Kathmandu

Jumlikhalanga

INDIA

LUMBINI Baglung Syangja

NARAYANI

SAGARMATHA

Sandhikharka

Mumbai

JANAKPUR

MECHI

KOSHI

Inaruwa

Pune

To other indian cities

High trafficking risk districts

LEBANON ISRAEL

Documented trafficking border crossing point

IRAQ Main destinations

JORDAN

Kolkata

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

BAHRAIN QATAR UAE OMAN

Estimates of trafficked girls and women for brothel based prostitution Thousands 12 8 1.5 0.3

Estimates not available

Sources: Maiti Nepal; NHRC, Trafficking in Person Especially on Women and 99 Children in Nepal, 2008, Interpol; Press Review.

To SouthEast Asia

Migrants to the US bypass the Mexican border using multiple entry points In the Americas, the UNODC estimated that in 2010 there are 3 million illegal entries to the US each year, with 60% to 75% entering secretly, and over 90% paying a smuggler. Of these, between 14 500 and 17 500 are victims of human trafficking.99 Facilitating smuggling across the Mexico–US border has been estimated to generate an income of US$6.6 billion a year,100 and links to drug trafficking cartels are often insinuated. Meanwhile, US efforts to counter this threat have resulted in the creation of a border patrol of paramilitary proportions, with over 60 000 border-patrol officers. However, smuggling hubs that move migrants into the US are far from confined to the Mexican border alone. Addressing the smuggling networks requires more sophisticated approaches.

USA – A Border Patrol agent looks out from his small river patrol boat momentarily resting against the Texas bank while monitoring the Rio Grande River for illegal aliens crossing into the U.S. Such encounters are a daily experience in the Rio Grande Valley sector of Border Patrol operations. Š iStock / Vic Hinterlang

100

Trafficker gang arrests and Latin-American migrant smuggling hubs in the US

Gang member arrests, by gang Latin Kings

18thStreet

Ernesto Ramos Mexican Antonini PHP Mafia

Linda Vista Crips

MS-13 Bloods

Chirizos

Surenos 13

Barrio Azteca

Gangster Disciples

Raza Unida

M18

Trinitarios Crips

Tiny Radical Latin Counts

Tango Santiago Blast Iglesia PHP Norteno

Texas Syndicate

CANADA

Boston

Minneapolis Detroit

Chicago

New York Philadelphia

San Francisco San Jose

UNITED STATES Los Angeles Atlanta

Main commercial hubs

Houston

Anti-immigration filters Militarized barrier “Frontera olvidada”: jointly controlled by USA and Mexico

Miami

Gang member arrests, 2013 MEXICO

150

100

50

25

5

Immigration as workforce Percentage of irregular migrants integrated in the workforce 0

2

4

6

8

BELIZE GUATEMALA

10

Fonti: The Washington Post, Who’s crossing the Mexico border? A new survey tries to find out, 2013; Brooking Institute, Metro North America: Metros as Hubs of Advanced Industries and Integrated Goods Trade, 2013; Buzzfeed, The Deported: Life On The Wrong Side Of The Border For Repatriated Mexicans, 2013; Center for immigration studies., 2013

EL SALVADOR

101

HONDURAS NICARAGUA COSTA RICA PANAMA

SYRIA – An explosion after an apparent US-led coalition airstrike on Kobane, Syria, as seen from the Turkish side of the border, near Suruc district, 24 October 2014, Sanliurfa, Turkey. © Shutterstock / Orlok

102

09 Foreign fighters

Travelling along smuggling networks

103

Foreign fighters: Travelling along smuggling networks There are at least 5 600 foreign fighters associated with Islamic State.102 These combatants move along several routes: from Libya to Egypt, Mali and Mauritania onwards to Senegal and out of the African continent; from Turkey to the Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan, then across the Caspian Sea and via Iran or Turkmenistan to central Asia (Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); via Turkey to the Balkans, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many have also returned to Western Europe, and to Tunisia and Morocco. Claims of large numbers of Islamic State foreign fighters from Africa’s Great Lakes region are false.

RUSSIA – Cheznya. © Unknown photographer.

Some 14 900 foreign fighters leaving conflict zones have at least in part used these routes for travel back to their home countries; of these, some 5 395 are imprisoned; 6 837 have returned home but without having been apprehended by the criminal-justice system. This leaves over 2 600 unaccounted for, in addition to some 7 000 killed, mainly in Syria and Iraq.103 Organized-crime groups use smuggling networks that increasingly enable foreign fighters to move across borders to safe havens, as well as build up or migrate resources through formal and informal networks of financial flows. The over 2 600 unaccounted-for foreign fighters have left Syria and Iraq, and an unknown number travelled via Libya, using these illicit smuggling networks for access to resources such as forged papers, as well as routes to safe havens.

RUSSIA – Cheznya. © Unknown photographer.

104

Flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq

Finland

Norway

Denmark UK Ireland

Russia 2 400

Sweden

Netherlands Germany

Belgium France 1 700

Austria Switzerland Bosnia Italy

Portugal

Romania Serbia Kosovo

Albania

Tunisia 6 000

Algeria

Uzbekistan

Georgia

Macedonia

Azerbaijan

Turkey 2 200

Spain

Morocco

Kazakhstan

Moldova

Lebanon Israel

Libya Egypt

Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan Tajikistan China

Syria Iraq Jordan 2 000

Kuwait Saudi Arabia 2 500

Qatar

Pakistan

UAE India

Sudan Maldives

Number of foreign fighters flown into Syria and Iraq

Cambodia

Somalia

6 000

Foreign fighters joining the fights in both Syria, Iraq and Libya originate from a wide range of countries - of which Tunisia and Saudi Arabia are the most significant in terms of absolute numbers, but also including former soviet republics, Jordan and France as the top five countries of origin, reaching as far as Central and Southeast Asia and covering over a hundred countries.

2 000 500 10 or less Country of origin Country of destination Source: The Soufan Group, December 2015

Indonesia

Foreign fighters often return to their countries following periods of fighting in Syria/Iraq. Terrorist suspects subsequently cannot be identified through means of race, nationality or religion. Strengthening information, analysis and investigative capacity, along with accelerated sharing mechanisms of intelligence, are vital for prevention and early intervention. Nonetheless, the mass migrations and refugee streams to Europe, including expansions of networks of traffickers, smugglers and forged document suppliers along these streams, also facilitate movements of individual criminals - including terrorist suspects. RHIPTO 2017

105

Foreign fighters to Syria, Iraq and Libya And their routes out of the fight

CANADA UNITED STATES

1-NETHERANDS 2-BELGIUM 3-GERMANY

DENMARK UK FRANCE

SPAIN MOROCCO

FINLAND

NORWAY

RUSSIA

SWEDEN

1

2

3 KAZAKHSTAN AUSTRIA ITALY BOSNIA KOSOVO MACEDONIA ALBANIA

UZBEKISTAN TURKEY

SYRIA LIBYA 4 000 6 000 EGYPT

TAJIKISTAN

AZERBAIJAN

TO EUROPE

ALGERIA TUNISIA

CHINA

IRAQ

27 000 31 000

MAURITANIA GUINEA-BISSAU BRAZIL

MALAYSIA MALI

SAUDI ARABIA INDONESIA SUDAN NIGERIA

CHAD

SOUTH SUDAN

ETHIOPIA SOMALIA

Concentration of foreign fighters (estimate, 2015/2016) Country of origin Country where they fight Transit for return Main country of return

Routes and fluxes 6 000 2 400 750 150 Fighters moving out from the battleground Unknown numbers

106

Sources: RHIPTO, Norwegian Centre for Global Analyses; The Soufan Group, FOREIGN FIGHTERS - An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, 2015; CNN and The Independent press review; Global Security.org RHIPTO 2017

Foreign fighters going back home from Syria and Iraq

CANADA UNITED STATES FINLAND 1-NETHERANDS 2-BELGIUM

NORWAY SWEDEN

DENMARK

UK 2

1 GERMANY

FRANCE

AUSTRIA SWITZERLAND BOSNIA

SPAIN

ITALY MOROCCO

WESTERN BALKANS

UZBEKISTAN

GUINEABISSAU

TAJIKISTAN

GEORGIA

KOSOVO

TURKEY

TUNISIA ISRAEL

ALGERIA

AZERBAIJAN

EGYPT

INDIA SAUDI ARABIA

MALI CHAD

AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN

IRAQ

JORDAN LIBYA

CHINA

KYRGYZSTAN

SYRIA

MAURITANIA

CENTRAL ASIA

KAZAKHSTAN

RUSSIA

MALAYSIA INDONESIA

SUDAN

NIGERIA SOUTH SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

AUSTRALIA

Country of origin Country where they fight Transit for return Main country of return

Return routes and fluxes Major route Other important route

Estimated fighters returned from Iraq or Syria 900 (Turkey) 250 50 10

Sources: RHIPTO, Norwegian Centre for Global Analyses; The Soufan Group, BEYOND THE CALIPHATE: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees, October 2017

107

RHIPTO 2017

COLOMBIA – A counter-narcotics police officer takes cover as a helicopter lands on a coca field in Tumaco, southern Colombia, Wednesday, April 18, 2018. Š AP Photo / Fernando Vergara

108

10 Drugs & threat finance

109

AFGHANISTAN – May 27, 2016: members of a breakaway faction of the Taliban fighters during a gathering, in Shindand district of Herat province, Afghanistan. Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi said Sunday. Š AP Photo / Allauddin Khan

110

Drugs and threat finance

28%

of the income of the largest armed groups is derived from production, trafficking and taxation of drugs

The Taliban – opium and heroin According to the US military and the Afghan government, in late 2017 insurgents were in ‘control’ of 2.2% of the population and ‘influenced’ another 9.2%, which, combined, means some 3.7 million Afghans. A further 24.9%, or 8.1 million people, live in contested areas. As of August 2017, 13% of Afghanistan’s municipal districts were either controlled or influenced by insurgents, the highest rate in at least two years. In late 2017, the Taliban claimed to control 34 out of 400 districts, and to contest a further 167 districts (claiming a 40–97% presence in the latter). In practice, the Taliban contest half the country. The group claims to control most of the provinces of Helmand, Nimruz, Urozgan, Ghazni and Zabul, and half of Kandahar. The Taliban’s size has been estimated to be more than 200 000, with a fighting strength of 150 000, of whom about 60 000 constitute a full-time force. Accounting for rotation for leave, and other reasons for absence, the fighting force present in Afghanistan would not exceed, at any one time, 40 000.104 The full-timers are highly mobile and rely on safe havens, particularly in Pakistan, but also in Iran, when they are not operating in Afghanistan (accounting for a third of the time spent outside the country on rest and recreation). This compares to about 11 000 US troops in present in the country, and well over 300 000 Afghan government security forces (numbers recently classified).105 There has been recent fighting between the Taliban and Islamic State in the north-western provinces of Jawzjan and Faryab, and at least one case of 111

collaboration between the two in the attacks and killing of over 50 Shias in the Sayyad District of Sare-Pol Province in August 2017, probably attributable to family or tribal affiliation rather than strategic cooperation. The Taliban carried out eight large attacks in 2017, killing Afghan security forces and civilians, with between 15 and 150 fatalities per attack. Both the magnitude of such attacks and the increase in insurgent control over the population undermine the credibility of the Afghan security forces and the government. Opium production in 2017 in Afghanistan was 9 000 metric tonnes (up by 87% from 2016) from an area of 328 000 hectares (up 63% from 2016) – equivalent to a total farm-gate value of US$1.4 billion, according to UNODC. The largest increase was in Helmand Province, followed by Kandahar, Badghis and Faryab. UNODC estimates that non-state armed groups in Afghanistan raised about US$150 million in 2016 from taxing opium production. The UN Security Council Committee in 2011/12 cited an Afghan government estimate that reckoned that a quarter of the Taliban’s income was derived from opium-related activity, in other words US$100 million out of a total income of US$400 million. In 2010 the CIA estimated that the group was predominantly funded by non-drug-related taxation, and donations from Pakistan and Persian Gulf countries. As these examples show, agencies with different perspectives and priorities have debated this issue throughout the Afghanistan war.106

The entire 2017 poppy crop was 9 000 metric tonnes. The price varies between regions, and has been cited as between US$52107 and US$155108 per kilogram for fresh opium, and US$182 for cooked opium.109 The fresh farm-gate price then gives a price range for the crop value of about US$468 million to US$1.4 billion. If the Taliban tax three-quarters of the area they control – and there is some evidence they are effectively taxing the rural parts of districts that are supposedly in government control, so about a quarter of those – then this balances out the equivalent of 100% taxation of 60% of the land. Prices vary by season, year and even by district, not to mention by region. Empirical data is not available to cover these variations (and will probably never be available). In the meantime, by extrapolating from their Helmand tax rate of 1.125 kg per hectare,110 with a 60% tax coverage, the Taliban earn an estimated 221.4 tonnes of opium from the entire crop, worth a total of US$11.5 million to US$34.3 million.111 In addition to this there is taxation of transportation at checkpoints, but this is very hard to quantify without specific intelligence, since the transported goods do not pass through just a few ports, as is the case in Somalia with charcoal, for example (see Chapter 3). In the two districts Nad-e-Ali and Marjah, closely studied by David Mansfield in 2016, 66% of the Taliban’s income came from tax on opium (US$2.46 million); 8.2% (US$305 000) was land tax, and 25% (US$935 000) was wheat tax.112 In the case of the Bakwa District, in Farah Province, also in 2016, taxation was based on an altogether different method: the number of tube wells, and totalled US$287 000–US$766 000.113 In the two districts in Helmand cited above, twothirds of the Taliban’s funding came from opium, whereas in the district cited above in Farah, none of it did. Their funding from Pakistan is also very well documented, although precise figures are difficult to come by.114 Given the expenses incurred by maintaining a permanent force of 40 000, with another 20 000 out of the country, and ambitions to make savings towards future governance expenditure, it is likely that the group’s annual funding would need to be in the US$50 million to US$100 million range (and probably closer to US$100 million), where onethird comes from opium, giving an annual funding of US$75–95 million from all sources.

Opium poppy field © Shutterstock / Zoran Orcik

112

Turkistan

Drug routes, Taliban and ISIS presence in Afghanistan Urgentch

Qaratau Arys

K AZAKHSTAN

UZBEKISTAN

Iskandar

Tashkent

Angren

Guliston Kattaqorgon

Jizzax

Samarqand

Kogon

Turkmenabat

Shahrisabz

Dushanbe

Guzar

Kulob Khorugh

Termiz Andkhvoy Sheberghan

Mashhad Neyshabur

Meymaneh

Karokh

Taloqan

Kunduz Mazar-e Sharif Aybak Baghlan

Balkh

Bamian Chaghcharan

Herat

Feyzabad

Pol-e Khomri

Qal eh-ye

Torbat-e Jam

Mahmud-E Eraqi Charikar Mehtar Asadabad Mayda Kabul Lam Shahr Jalalabad

Gardiz

Ghazni

Yazdan

Birjand

Taliban and ISIS presence Taliban control zone Taliban support zone ISIS control zone ISIS support zone

Smuggling routes

Qalat

Zaranj

Sargodha

Dera Ismail Khan

Lahore

Lashkar Gah Zabol

Islamabad

Peshawar

Kohat

Kundian

Farah Kandahar

Parachinar

Bannu

Zareh Sharan

Tarin Kowt

Saidu Mardan

Baraki Barak

AFGHANISTAN

Capital District capital Other city or town Main road Secondary road

Osh Fargona

TA JIKISTAN

Kuybyshevskiy

Tejen

Quchan

Kashmar

Denow

Atamyrat

Mary Bojnurd

Derbent

Qoqon Konibodom

Kok Yangak

Andijon

Leninobod

Qarshi

Kaka

Olmaliq Khujand

Tash Komur

Namangan

Uroteppa

Urgut

Ashgabat

Zhob

Jhang

Faisalabad

Chaman

IRAN

Multan

Quetta

Dera Ghazi Khan

Zahedan

PAKISTAN

Bam Dalbandin

Taliban drug routes

Rahimyar Khan Sadiqabad

Source: Norwegian Center for Global Analyses; Long War Journal; Institute for the Study of War;

Larkana

Sukkur

INDIA Nawabshah Turbat Mirput Khas RHIPTO 2017

Chabahar Gwadar

Kara Balta

Talas Toktogul

Zarafshon

Bukhara

Qulan Oytal

Shymkent

Navoi

TURKMENISTAN

Taraz

Pasni

Hyderabad

Karachi 113

AFGHANISTAN – farmers harvest raw opium at a poppy field in the Zhari district of Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Š AP Photo / Allauddin Khan

114

115

AFGHANISTAN – Helicopters in Afghanistan. © iStock / Mie Ahmt

116

117

AFGHANISTAN – Special Forces vehicles on mission. © iStock / Analisa Hegyesi

118

Drug routes and threat finance to Eastern European organized crime

Sweden

Norway

Germany

UK Western and Northern Europe

Russian Federation

Ukraine

France

Austria

Kazakhstan

Romania 1

Caucasus

Spain

Italy

Balkans

Bulgaria Turkey

Organized crime

Syria

Organized crime hub

Afghanistan Iraq

Main criminal organization 1. Chechen mafia 2. Dagestan criminal groups

Heroin

2

Iran

Taliban

Libya

Trafficking route Country of origin Main flow

Weapons Trafficking route Country of origin

Sudan Eritrea

Source: UNODC, 2010; Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, 2015

119

Country or region of destination

Ethiopia

COLOMBIA – Military forces of Colombia supervise territories where guerrillas of FARC still act.Soldiers patrol the mountain river in November 6, 2012 in La Macarenia,Colombia. Š Shutterstock

120

121

COLOMBIA – Soldiers keep guard over workers uprooting coca plantations as part of a government counter-narcotics program in San Francisco Antioquia province May 11, 2009. Š Reuters / Fredy Amariles

122

FARC – cocaine and illicit mining The Colombian revolutionary insurgent movement, FARC, who had been at war with the Colombian government since 1964, disarmed itself and transitioned into a political party in June 2017. In the 1980s, FARC were funded by primary commodities, like cattle and other agricultural products, and by oil and gold. They also engaged in smuggling in border areas.115 Until 1981 they had considered cocaine and marijuana counter-revolutionary, but for fear of alienating local farmers, and seeing obvious financial advantages, FARC changed their policy on drugs. Initially their taxation came from gramaje, which is a farm tax. Later this was upscaled to both systematic taxation of coca cultivation, as well as any infrastructure or transportation routes associated with the logistics of moving the product. The Colombian government assessed in 1998 that illegal paramilitaries, including guerrilla movements like FARC, made US$551 million a year in drug trafficking, US$311 million from extortion and US$236 million from kidnapping for ransom.116 During the last few years of their insurgency, FARC guerrillas moved out of the mountainous areas and established a number of camps in the Colombian Amazon, including areas north of the Brazilian border to the far east of the country, outside drug-producing areas. In recent years, they gained about 20% of their income from illegal mining of gold. The organization’s 34th Front allegedly made over US$1 million a month from extorting miners.117 When the peace process took place, FARC declared their wealth in an inventory as US$332 million, including assets such as US$147 million worth of property, US$10.5 million in cattle, US$70 million in weaponry and US$10.7 million in gold. However, InSight Crime calculated in 2015/2016 that FARC at that time had assets worth US$580 million, mostly income from drugs and illegal mining.118 The peace process was honoured by about 10 000 FARC members, but several thousand rejected it

123

or did not participate in it, led by the dissident 1st Front. About 2 500 of these dissidents are thought to have formed an ex-FARC mafia, some of whom call themselves the Eastern Bloc, who have become big players in the cocaine trade. They operate a relatively flat business-oriented structure, and have taken control of key choke points bordering Venezuela and Brazil.119 A significant degree of corruption in the chain of command, as well as thousands of FARC members or their part-time support cadre leaving or ignoring the peace process, or simply going rogue and joining criminal groups, could explain some of the discrepancy. In addition, assets kept abroad are not included in the inventory.120 FARC controlled about 60% to 70% of the coca-producing areas, and were the biggest single player. Their income largely came from taxing – varying between US$35 and US$150 per kilogram of coca base.121 They were also to some extent involved in production, and widely taxing of labs and transportation.122 In 2016 the coca crop – over 188 000 hectares, with an average production 7 kg of cocaine per hectare – could have produced a max crop of 1 200 tonnes, according to InSight Crime. The actual cocaine production for 2015 was about 646 000 kg, according to UNODC.123 The price of coca base was US$621 per kilogram in 2016, and US$1 633 for cocaine.124 The total cocaine value for the entire crop would be US$1.05 billion, given UNODC production numbers. InSight Crime has calculated FARC’s earnings from the cocaine trade alone to be in the region of US$267 million, where US$67.9 million was from cocaine base taxation, US$169.5 million from cocaine production and US$30 million from other taxes. Other earnings came from heroin (US$5 million), marijuana (US$30 million), cattle taxation (US$4.5 million), extortion of businesses (US$76.8 million a year) and illegal mining (US$200 million), giving a total of US$580 million in 2015, of which about US$200 million was taken by corrupt commanders.125

COLOMBIA – Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas listen during a “class” on the peace process between the Colombian government and their force, at a camp in the Colombian mountains on February 18, 2016. © AP Photo / Luis Acosta

124

125

Drug trafficking routes from colombia

CANADA Vancouver

Europe

LIBYA

Ottawa Chicago UNITED STATES

Los Angeles Tijuana

Mexicali Nogales El Paso MEXICO Laredo Culiacán McAllen Mazatlán

Puerto Vallarta Mexico City Acapulco

Boston New York Washington, D.C.

MOROCCO ALGERIA NIGER

MALI Miami

Tampico Mérida Veracruz

SENEGAL

Cancún

NIGERIA

GUINEA

The Caribbean

SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA

Barranquilla Cartagena Cali

Southern Africa

Medellín Bogota COLOMBIA

BRAZIL FARC presence Coca crops

PERU BOLIVIA

VENEZUELA

COLOMBIA Main drug trafficking route for Colombian drugs ECUADOR

Colombia, main drug producing country Other drug producing country Main transit country Main drug market

BRAZIL

PERU Sources: STRATFOR, UNODC, European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drugs Addiction; Colombia Reports

126

COLOMBIA – A soldier stands next to packages containing marijuana at an army base in Cali, Colombia, Friday, Aug. 22, 2008. According to the Colombian army, 6.7 tons of marijuana were seized from rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, near Cali. Š AP Photo / Christian Escobar Mora

127

LIBYA – Libyan rebels travel to a battle line where they will fight Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s army. Ajdabiya, Libya, April 7, 2011. © Shutterstock / Rosen Ivanov Iliev

128

The new ‘jihadist drugs’ Since 2015 there has been an increasing number of intelligence reports regarding extensive smuggling and use by jihadist fighters, especially Islamic State, of tramadol, an opioid pain reliever, as well as Captagon, a psychostimulant for increased alertness. Both often called ‘jihadist pills’ or ‘courage pills’. Captagon is a brand name for the drug fenethylline, a combination of amphetamine and theophylline, which increases alertness. Tramadol provides pain relief and can also allegedly reduce fear and stress during battle by in some cases releasing serotonins, creating a feeling of wellbeing or happiness. Captagon stimulates alertness and reduces exhaustion, and the need for sleep. This kind of drug use is predominantly seen in the Middle East, is very prevalent in Syria and Iraq, including by Chechen fighters, but is also becoming increasingly common in the Trans-Sahara, including Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Libya. Islamic State has been directly involved in the smuggling and sale of jihadist drugs, and not only to their own fighters. Pills are entering the region from Greece and Tobruk, Libya, as well as via Lomé (Togo), Cotonou (Benin) and Nigeria. Most originates from India. The rising use of this drug by jihadist fighters in the Trans-Sahara, Libya and Nigeria most likely points to increased smuggling activity by Islamic State and related jihadist groups.

129

LIBYA – Libyan rebels in Tripoli, 21 Aug 2011. © Lightroom Photos / Fyson Lathbury

130

Tramadol smuggling into jihadist combat areas Country of origin Country of transit Country of destination Smuggling route Main smuggling port

Arctic Ocean

UK 2

Atlantic Ocean

1

GREECE

Piraeus SYRIA Tobruk

IRAQ

JORDAN

INDIA

LIBYA Nhava Sheva MALI NIGER

TOGO

NIGERIA

Piraeus

Lome

Indian Ocean

Sources: RHIPTO, Norwegian Centre for Global Analyses; 2018 RHIPTO 2018

131

DRC – New recruits in the FDLR rebel group begin training in the mountainous region of DR Congo, North Kivu Province. Chai, North Kivu, DRC- March 29, 2014. © iStock / Jon Brown

132

11 Terrorist & rebel finance Taxation, drugs, counterfeits, natural resources and migrants

133

DRC – Artesanal gold mine in a river in Mwenga, in South Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Š Riccardo Pravettoni

134

Terrorist and rebel finance: Taxation, drugs, counterfeits, natural resources and migrants Incomes to seven armed groups + groups in DRC US$ millions

%

Drugs

330

28

Charcoal

15

1

Antiquities

15

1

Kidnapping for ransom

36

3

External funding and donations

36

3

Confiscations and looting

99

9

Taxation and extortion (not drugs)

197

17

Illegal mining

203

17

Oil and gas

230

20

Total

1 160

100

For the seven main terrorist/rebel groups that comprise a mix of insurgents and terrorists – alShabaab, Boko Haram, FARC, HTS, JNIM, Islamic State and the Taliban – as well as a number of groups operating in the eastern DRC, the combined funding is about US$1 billion–US$1.39 billion a year. Taxation of natural resources and drugs is the most important, commonly available and accessible source of income. This ranges from taxation of transport at vehicle checkpoints, to agricultural produce, protection money targeting commercial activity and religious taxes. The numbers given here represent updates on a body of work accumulated over the last few years featuring best estimates based on official reports, academic assessments and criminal intelligence.126 Insurgent groups primarily finance their activities by illegal taxation of the populace, illicit commercial activity, whether in drugs, minerals, gold, charcoal, timber, or through taxation of migrants. If they do not exert territorial control, 135

which is typical for terrorist groups, incomes more typically involve mobility, such as kidnapping for ransom, or smuggling of high-value goods, like drugs. The seven major non-state armed groups here all feature elements of insurgency and terrorism. None is either a pure terrorist or pure insurgent group, but the motivational characteristics of terrorism or insurgency can be plotted on a continuum between the two. They are insurgents,127 in that they seek political change over a ruling regime, and hold or aspire to hold territory. These dimensions apply particularly to FARC and the Taliban, but also in considerable measure to alShabaab and Islamic State as well. They are all terrorists128 too, in that they use fear generating violence and coercion without legal or moral restraint against civilians, for its effect on various audiences. This applies particularly to JNIM, HTS, Boko Haram and Islamic State, but also to the Taliban and, to some extent, FARC.

Islamic State remains the most serious threat be-

cause of the organization’s international reach and suspected financial reserves. As of May 2017, the group was making up to US$10 million a month in revenues. In mid-2018, its funding in Iraq and Syria is likely to be a tenth of that – a total of US$6 million to US$24 million a year. A large, unknown amount, but possibly over US$100 million, has been funnelled out of Iraq and Syria, and some of this has been laundered in investments in Iraq, Syria and neighbouring countries. The group’s estimated strength is currently around 15 600 including 5 600 returned foreign fighters, with a remaining force in Syria and Iraq of 5 000 active fighters – and probably at least a similar amount laying low.

HTS is a merger of what used to be al-Qaeda

groups, which for a time took the name ‘Jabhat al-Nusra’ in Syria. Their relationship with the al-Qaeda central command is currently under much debate, but should not be underestimated. They are about 10 000 strong, funded by taxation, donations and kidnap for ransom, but are underfunded at about US$8 million a year. With expenses of US$19 million, they are dependent on expat finance from organizations to the tune of about US$11 million.

JNIM is the al-Qaeda central merger in the Sahel of the former AQIM Sahara branch, Katibat Macina, and Ansar Dine and Al-Mourabitoun. They have been very active recently, attacking UN forces in Mali from neighbouring countries. JNIM are funded by revenue from cigarette smuggling, drugs and other taxation forms, extortion, possibly migrant taxation and kidnapping for ransom. Their income range is likely to be in the range of US$18 million to US$35 million. Kidnapping for ransom provides the major chunk of their funding, at US$8 million in 2017 alone. Their strength is estimated to be at about 3 500 to 4 500 fighters.

SUDAN – Men working in gold mine north Sudan, 1,December 2007. © iStock / Maciej Jawornicki

136

The Taliban’s roughly 40 000 full-time members control or influence at least 13% of districts in Afghanistan (see Chapter 10). Their funding sources are highly disputed but are believed to include taxation of the biggest cash crop in the country, opium. The 2017 poppy crop was 9 000 metric tonnes. The Taliban are able to tax 60% of this crop at rate of 1.125 kg per hectare and US$52–US$155 per kilogram for an estimated 221.4 tonnes of opium from the entire crop, worth a total of between US$11.5 million and US$34.3 million. In addition, they are funded by taxation of transportation at checkpoints, but this is very hard to quantify without specific intelligence. Their funding from Pakistan is also very well documented, although precise figures are difficult to come by.129 Given the expenses incurred by maintaining a permanent force of 40 000, with another 20 000 out of the country, and ambitions to make savings towards governance in future, it is likely that the group’s annual funding would need to be in the US$50 million to US$100 million range (and probably closer to US$100 million), where one-third comes from opium, amounting to a total annual funding of US$75–95 million.

Boko Haram has suffered serious setbacks following Nigerian military offensives supported by a joint task force from neighbouring countries. Their fighting strength has dwindled to about 4 000, which is further weakened by their split into two factions in 2016, one led by Abubakar Shekau and the other by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Shekau is on the run and is striking back against civilian targets using suicide bombers, increasingly children. Barnawi is based around Lake Chad and is slowly building up military capacity and attacking military targets. Barnawi remains loyal to Boko Haram’s allegiance to Islamic State. The group’s income is reckoned to be no more than US$5–10 million a year, mainly from extortion, donations made by individuals, charities and groups like AQIM, kidnapping for ransom and bank robberies, as well as taxing migrants and human traffickers.

Al Shabaab remain a significant threat in Somalia,

with their most violent attack to date happening in Mogadishu in October 2017, which killed over 300. They were responsible for killing over 4 500 people in 2017. Their current strength (as of 2018) is about 5 000 fighters, compared with about 250 Islamic State combatants in Somalia. Their estimated revenue from charcoal is currently about US$10 million per year, but this is down dramatically from 2012 when they were making US$38–56 million.130 Al-Shabaab for various reasons imposed their own ban on the trade in charcoal in their own area, but after about a year they returned to charcoal as a revenue source. The shift back was possibly due to their having found that alternative income sources proved both resource-intensive to collect and less fruitful. In addition to their charcoal income, al-Shabaab probably make another US$10 million from other forms of illicit taxation. Just over 40% of their income is spent on salaries, and the rest for other costs, including transportation, ammunition, food, training camps, religious education and bribes.

FARC, now officially disbanded, numbered about 8 000 at the time they disarmed and became a political movement, but also had a very large number of part-time supporters in various functions. Today, about 10 000 of them have accepted the peace process, whereas about 2 500 did not or went rogue and joined various criminal activities, including an exFARC mafia network running drugs. Their income, calculated in 2015, but likely to be similar in 2017 at the time of the disbandment, was made up as follows: about US$267 million a year from the cocaine trade, heroin (US$5 million), marijuana (US$30 million), cattle taxation (US$4.5 million), extortion of businesses (US$76.8 million a year) and illegal mining (US$200 million), giving a total of US$580 million in 2015, of which about US$200 million was taken by corrupt commanders. At the time of their disbandment, the group had declared assets of US$332 million, believed by some to be as high as US$580 million if one includes drugs and illegal mining. This figure excludes the group’s overseas assets.

137

SOMALIA – Amisom troops prepare for battle. © United Nations / Flickr

138

Finances

Organized crime and insurgent groups' finances

Averaged full time members, 2015-2018

Million dollars 0

580

5

10

15

20

8 000

FARC

Total Income to organized crime in and around conflict areas Million USD

31 539 290

1 160

17 900

ISIS

620

Part of the income that 4% goes to insurgent and terrorist groups

75 40 000 Taxation and extortion (excluding drugs)

95

Drugs

197

External funding and donations

330 Oil and gas

Illegal mining

18

36 35

203 Antiquities

Confiscations and looting

230 99

15 15

K

Charcoal

d a

i n p

36

Kidnapping for ransom

TALIBAN

4 000

NUSRAT AL-ISLAM / JAMA'A NUSRAT UL-ISLAM WA AL-MUSLIMIN' (JNIM)

5 000 20

AL-SHABAAB

Origin of the incomes for selected insurgent and terrorist groups Million USD

13,4

MILITIAS IN DRC

10 000

6 10

RHIPTO 2018

8 000

HAI’YAT TAHRIR AL-SHAM (HTS)

5

4 000

10

139 BOKO HARAM

Maximum estimate Minimum estimate

JORDAN – A syrian refugee child in front of his tent in Zaatari refugee camp. © Shutterstock / Melih Cevdet Teksen

140

12 Conclusion The cost of war

environmental crime surges as threat finance for war profiteers

141

GHANA – Fevered by hopes of striking it rich, illegal miners claw sacks of “money stone”—gold ore—from the Pra River in Ghana. Their toil feeds the world’s hunger for gold, and leaves a ruined landscape in its wake. © National Geographic / Randy Olson

142

Conclusion: The cost of war – environmental crime surges as threat finance for war profiteers If one looks beyond groups designated as terrorist organizations to include regular organized crime that occurs in and around conflict, the scale of criminal economies is in the range of US$24 billion to US$39 billion by turnover, although profits are far lower. Threat finance revenue to terrorism and major insurgencies represents only about 4% of the total illicit finance in or near areas of conflict.131 Despite their high profile, such armed groups operate within an environment where exponentially higher incomes go to transnational organized crime. The armed groups take part in these activities, and feed off the income streams, but they are not the dominant financial players. Powerful elites engaged in organized crime gain from sustaining conflicts and fund non-state armed groups, which undermines the rule of law and good governance. This, in turn, enables criminal elites to benefit from instability, violence and lack of enforcement and, hence, subsequent exploitation of illicit flows during conflict. Strengthening information and analysis is essential to be able to prevent, disrupt and defeat, before it is too late, both violent armed groups and the organized-criminal actors that provide these armed groups (and themselves) with an environment of impunity and instability. In order to ensure early prevention and intervention in conflict, it is therefore imperative to forcefully address the role of organized crime and illicit flows in benefiting non-state armed groups and the powerful elites engaged in criminal activity.

143

BRAZIL – A boy plays with a kite in front of logs cut illegally from the Amazon rainforest at a sawmill in the city of Morais Almeida, Para state, June 27, 2013. Š Reuters / Nacho Doce

144

Children living in conflict

Russia Germany

Belgium

Ukraine

France

Turkey Lebanon Israel

Algeria

Libya

Iraq

Mali

Niger

Sudan

Burkina Faso Colombia

Cote d’Ivoire

Yemen

Ethiopia

Cameroon Uganda D.R. Congo

Myanmar

Philippines

Thailand

Tanzania

Congo Peru

Bangladesh

Somalia

S. Sudan Nigeria

Pakistan

India

S. Arabia

Chad

Honduras

Iran

Jordan Egypt

Mexico

Afghanistan

Syria

Burundi

Angola Mozambique

South Africa

Number of children living in conflict zones Thousands, by country, 2016

Conflict and disasters impact 535 million children and a total of over 2 billion people

50 000 10 000 3 000 1 000 500

One in four children in the world live in countries affected by conflict or disaster, often without access to medical care, quality education, proper nutrition and protection

Sources : PRIO, The War on Children: Time to End Grave Violations against Children in Conflict, 2018, UNICEF, World Bank, 2018

RHIPTO 2018

145

Footnotes Taxation of migration is not included here because the empirical basis is too thin to be able to accurately calculate what portion it forms of the seven big groups’ funding. Other armed groups, particularly in Libya, are making very large incomes from this, but that is largely outside the realm of the seven.

1

EUROPOL/SOCTA, ‘European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2017’ (2017). Available at: https:// www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/ european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment-2017 accessed 25 June 2018.

2

3

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Update on Islamic State financial situation in Syria-Iraq’ (27 May 2017).

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Islamic State funding and implications’ (18 September 2014).

4

UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2017/924 Report on Somalia’ (2 November 2017), para 200.

UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG, ‘Experts’ background report on illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources benefitting organized criminal groups and recommendations on MONUSCO’s role in fostering stability and peace in eastern DR Congo’, 15 April 2015, p 4. Available at https:// postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_DRCongo_MONUSCO_OSESG_final_report.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

5

6

World Bank, ‘Fragility, Conflict & Violence’.

15

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Rise of Environmental Crime – A Growing Threat to Natural Resources Peace, Development And Security. A UNEP-INTERPOL Rapid Response Assessment.’ (2016). Available at http://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/7662 accessed 25 June 2018.

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Strategic value, routes and incomes to armed groups in Libya from 143,000 – 343,000 migrants’ (18 January 2018).

8

Percentage average of US$993 million–1 372 million compared with US$38–51 billion.

9

10

UNICEF, ‘Press release: Nearly a quarter of the world’s children live in conflict or disaster-stricken countries: UNICEF.’ (9 December 2016). Available at https://www.unicef.org/ media/media_93863.html accessed 25 June 2018.

UNHCR UK, ‘Figures at a glance’, (19 June 2018). Available at http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html accessed 25 June 2018.

11

RHIPTO estimate based on multiple source reporting, including ACLED, media reports, official estimates and others from Afghanistan, Iraq, Mexico, Syria, Myanmar, Philippines, Ethiopia, DRC, Somalia, Nigeria, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Niger, Tunisia, Sudan, Cameroon, Chad, Yemen, Egypt, South Sudan, Mozambique and CAR.

(1.63m bpd × US$54.25 per barrel average in 2017 × 365 days × 0,05 or × 0.15).

31

Bloomberg, ‘Libya Oil Chief says fuel smuggling costing $750 Million a Year’, (18 April 2018). Available at https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-18/libya-oilchief-says-fuel-smuggling-costing-750-million-a-year accessed 25 June 2018.

32

The Guardian, ‘Malta ‘fuelling Libya instability’ by failing to tackle oil smuggling.’ (9 May 2018) Available at https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/09/malta-fuel-oilsmuggling-libya-daphne-project accessed 25 June 2018.

33

Ian M. Ralby, ‘Downstream Oil Theft,’ p 67.

34

The National, ‘As economy booms, demand for black market fuel soars in Turkey’ (23 September 2011). Available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/as-economy-booms-demand-for-black-market-fuel-soars-in-turkey-1.439347 accessed 25 June 2018. Cited in Ian M. Ralby, ‘Downstream Oil Theft’ p 66.

35

Ian M. Ralby, ‘Downstream Oil Theft’.

36

See separate section on Islamic State.

37

The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and political violence, ‘Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes.’ (2017). Available at http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

38

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Islamic State funding and implications’ (18 September 2014).

39

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘IS funding update’ (30 January 2015).

40

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Islamic State in Iraq-Syria financial situation’ (27 February 2016).

41

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Update on Islamic State financial situation in Syria-Iraq’ (07 June 2017).

42

Jihadology.net, ‘The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zor Province’ (5 October 2015). Available at: http://jihadology.net/2015/10/05/the-archivist-unseen-islamic-state-financial-accounts-for-deir-azzor-province/ accessed 25 June 2018.

43

Since 2008, listed terrorists, including al Qaeda, Islamic State and affiliates and allies of both groups, have generated well over US$220 million in ransoms, equivalent to around US$22 million distributed on the three groups. UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, ‘Report on ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities S/2017/573.’ (30 June 2017), para 85. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/573 accessed 25 June 2018.

16

UNODC, ‘Transnational Trafficking and the rule of law in West Africa: a threat assessment’, (July 2009), pp 1926. Available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/West_Africa_Report_2009.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

17

Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil’, Chatham House (September 2013), p 18. Available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/ Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

18

Ian M. Ralby, ‘Downstream Oil Theft: Global modalities, Trends, and Remedies.’ Atlantic Council: Global Energy Center. (January 2017), p 15. Available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Downstream_Oil_Theft_ web_0327.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

19

20

Ibid.

7

30

Economist: Baobab, ‘Oil theft in Nigeria: A murky business’ (3 October 2013). Available at https://www.economist. com/baobab/2013/10/03/a-murky-business accessed 25 June 2018.

Terry Hallmark, ‘The Murky Underworld of Oil Theft and Diversion’, (26 May 2017). Available at https://www.forbes. com/sites/uhenergy/2017/05/26/the-murky-underworld-of-oil-theft-and-diversion/#d774fa06886e accessed 25 June 2018.

21

Ian M. Ralby, ‘Downstream Oil Theft’, p 7.

22

Ibid. p 9–10.

23

Ibid. p 30.

24

Ibid. p 38.

25

0.91 USD/litre × (100 or 130 tankers) × (25 000 litres or 40 000 litres) × 365 days.

26

12

World Bank, ‘Fragility, Conflict & Violence’ (2 April 2018). Available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview accessed 25 June 2018.

13

Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Global Extreme Poverty, (2013, revised 27 March 2017). Available at https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty accessed 25 June 2018.

14

Reuters, ‘Update 2 – Angola oil production seen steady in 2018 – Sonangol’ (28 February 2018) Available at https:// www.reuters.com/article/angola-sonangol/update-2-angola-oil-production-seen-steady-in-2018-sonangol-idUSL8N1QI2W7 accessed 25 June 2018.

27

Given Brent crude average price from 2017 of US$54.25 per barrel.

28

CNN, ‘The billion-dollar question: Where is Angola’s oil money?’ (29 November 2012), Available at http://edition.cnn. com/2012/11/28/business/angola-oil-revenues/index. html accessed 25 June 2018.

29

146

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis – Threats to sustainable development from illegal exploitation and trade in wildlife and forest resources. A UNEP-INTERPOL Rapid Response Assessment.’ (2014), p 8. Available at https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/9120 accessed 25 June 2018.

44

UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2013/413. Report on the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia.’ (12 July 2013), Annex 9.1. Available at http://www.un.org/ ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413 accessed 25 June 2018.

56

45

UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2017/924. Report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea,’ para 206. Available at https:// www.securitycouncilrepor t.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/s_2017_924.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

57

46

Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2016/919 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2244 (2015)’ (7 October 2016), pp 40-43. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/919 accessed 25 June 2018.

58

S/2016/919 pp 70, 132.

59

S/2016/919 p 131.

S/2017/924 para 209.

60

S/2017/924 p 46.

Reuters, ‘Islamic State’s footprint spreading in northern Somalia: U.N.’ (8 November 2017). Available at https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-islamic-state/islamic-states-footprint-spreading-in-northern-somalia-u-nidUSKBN1D828Z accessed 25 June 2018.

61

In 2014 the Monitoring Group of Experts assessed the trade to be worth US$250m, and in 2017 only US$150m. See S/2014/726 and S/2017/924 p 47.

62

S/2016/919 p 42.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘Africa’s Active Militant Islamists Groups.’ Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/Africas-Active-Militant-Islamist-Groups-Jan-2018.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

63

S/2017/924, p 46.

64

S/2017/924 pp 62, 63.

65

S/2017/924 p 64.

66

Tom Maguire and Cathy Haenlein, ‘An Illusion of Complicity: Terrorism and Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa,’ RUSI (September 2015). Available at https://rusi.org/sites/default/ files/201509_an_illusion_of_complicity_0.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

47

48

49

50

51

Seventeen out of 19 merchant vessels exported out of Kismayo, the other two from Barawe. Al-Shabaab had reduced activity from Barawe, but most activity out of Kismayo. See Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2014/726 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2111 (2013),’ (10 October 2014), para 139. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726 accessed 25 June 2018.

RHIPTO Threat network assessment, ‘Major Terrorist finance and risk assessment’ (30 November 2017).

Jordan Indermuehle, ‘Al Shabaab Area of Operations in Somalia: October 2017.’ Criticalthreats.org. Available at https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaab-areaof-operations-october-2017 accessed 25 June 2018. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2011/433 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010),’ (18 July 2011), para 63. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 accessed 25 June 2018.

67

52

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis’ p 8.

68

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis’ p 8.

69

Ibid.

70

At 30% profit.

71

UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG, ‘Experts’ background report on illegal exploitation and trade,’ p 3-4.

72

Ibid.

73

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis’ p 8.

53

Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2012/544 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)’ (27 June 2012), pp 147-154. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544 accessed 25 June 2018.

54

S/2013/413 Annex 9.1.

Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2015/801 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014),’ (9 October 2014), p 203. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/801 accessed 25 June 2018.

55

147

74

Peter Blombäck, Peter Poschen, Mattias Lövgren, ‘Employment Trends and Prospects in the European Forest Sector.’ (2003) UN FAO. Available at https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/timber/docs/efsos/03-sept/dp-29.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

75

(£) Statista, ‘Distribution of paper production worldwide in 2016 by region.’ (2016) Available at https://www.statista. com/statistics/595787/paper-production-worldwide-distribution-by-region/ accessed 25 June 2018.

76

C.R. Thouless, et al., ‘African Elephant Status Report 2016’ (2016) IUCN African Elephant Database Accessible at https://www.iucn.org/ssc-groups/mammals/african-elephant-specialist-group/african-elephant-database accessed 25 June 2018.

77

Fiona Maisels et al., ‘Devastating Decline of Forest Elephants in Central Africa.’ Plos One 8, no. 3 (04 March 2013). Available at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0059469 accessed 25 June 2018.

78

UN Environment, ‘Press release: World Marches to Demand an End to Illegal Trade in Wildlife.’ (4 October 2014). Available at https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/ press-release/world-marches-demand-end-illegal-tradewildlife accessed 25 June 2018.

79

National Geographic, ‘More than 1,000 Rhinos Killed by Poachers in South Africa Last Year, (25 January 2018). Available at https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/01/ wildlife-watch-rhino-poaching-crisis-continues-south-africa/ accessed 25 June 2018.

80

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis’ p 8.

81

Ibid.

82

Daniel Ingram et al. ‘Assessing Africa-Wide Pangolin Exploitation by Scaling Local Data’, Conservation Letters (March/ April 2018). Available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/epdf/10.1111/conl.12389 accessed 25 June 2018.

83

Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘Illegal trade seizures: Pangolins mapping the crimes’ (no date). Available at https://eia-international.org/illegal-trade-seizures-pangolins accessed 25 June 2018.

84

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Rise of Environmental Crime’.

85

Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘Illegal trade seizures: Pangolins mapping the crimes’.

86

Baldé, C.P., Wang, F., Kuehr, R., Huisman, J., ‘The global e-waste monitor – 2014’, (2015) United Nations University, IAS – SCYCLE. Available at https://i.unu.edu/media/unu. edu/news/52624/UNU-1stGlobal-E-Waste-Monitor-2014small.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

UNEP, ‘Waste Crime – Waste Risks: Gaps in meeting the global waste challenge: A Rapid Response Assessment.’ (2015), p 7. Available at http://web.unep.org/ourplanet/ september-2015/unep-publications/waste-crime-wasterisks-gaps-meeting-global-waste-challenge-rapid accessed 25 June 2018.

87

Dirk Zeller, et. al., ‘Global marine fisheries discards: A synthesis of reconstructed data’ (26 June 2017). Available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/faf.12233 accessed 25 June 2018.

100

UNODC, ‘The Globalization of Crime’, p 66.

113

Ibid., p 40.

101

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Strategic value, routes and incomes’.

114

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan (2012), p. 63. London: Bloomsbury.

102

BBC News, ‘IS foreign fighters: 5,600 fighters have returned home – report’ (24 October 2017) Available at https://www. bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41734069 accessed 25 June 2018.

115

103

UNSC Counter-terrorism committee executive directorate, ‘The challenge of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters: research perspectives,’ (March 2018), p 10. Available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/ uploads/2018/04/CTED-Trends-Report-March-2018.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, “Colombian Labyrinth: The synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability,” RAND, pp 25-26. Available at https:// www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1339.html accessed 26 June 2018.

116

Ibid. p 40.

117

Global Initiative against Organized Crime, ‘Organized Crime and Illegally Mined Gold in Latin America’ (April 2016). Available at http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2016/03/Organized-Crime-and-Illegally-MinedGold-in-Latin-America.pdf accessed 26 June 2018 accessed 26 June 2018.

118

Mimi Yagoub, ‘The FARC’s Riches: List of Assets Fails to Reveal Guerrillas’ Total Wealth’ (29 August 2017), InSight Crime. Available at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/ analysis/the-farc-riches-list-assets-fails-reveal-totalwealth/ accessed 26 June 2018.

119

InSight Crime, ‘Ex-FARC Mafia: The New Player in Colombian Organized Crime’ (9 March 2018). Available at https:// www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/ ex-farc-mafia-new-player-colombian-organized-crime/ accessed 26 June 2018.

120

Mimi Yagoub, ‘The FARC’s Riches’.

121

Jeremy McDermott, ‘The FARC’s Riches: Up to $580 Million in Annual Income’ (6 September 2017). Available at https:// www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/farc-riches-yearly-income-up-to-580-million/ accessed 26 June 2018.

122

Mimi Yagoub, ‘The FARC’s Riches: Millions Apparently Lost to Dissidents’ (4 September 2017) Available at https:// www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-farc-riches-millions-apparently-lost-dissidents/ accessed 26 June 2018.

123

UNODC, ‘Colombia: Monitoreo de territories afectados por cultivos ilicitos 2015’ (July 2016). Available at https://www. unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Colombia/Monitoreo_Cultivos_ilicitos_2015.pdf accessed 26 June 2018.

124

Jeremy McDermott, ‘Record Cocaine Production in Colombia Fuels new Criminal Generation’ (17 July 2017), InSight Crime. Available at https://www.insightcrime. org/news/analysis/record-cocaine-production-colombia-fuels-new-criminal-generation/ accessed 26 June 2018.

125

Jeremy McDermott, ‘The FARC’s Riches.’

126

UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG, ‘Experts’ background report on illegal exploitation and trade’; RHIPTO Threat network assessment, ‘Major Terrorist finance and risk assessment’ (30 November 2017).

88

Doumbouya A et. al. ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal Fishing: The Case of West Africa’. (2017) Front. Mar. Sci. 4:50. Available at h t t p s : / / w w w. f r o n t i e r s i n . o r g / a r t i c l e s / 1 0 . 3 3 8 9 / fmars.2017.00050/full accessed 25 June 2018. 89

90

University of Rhodes Island and Transafrica Consultancy Services/Adeso, ‘Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Territorial Waters of Somalia’ (April 2015), p 10. Available at http://www.crc.uri.edu/download/SOM14_finalreport.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

104

Antonio Giustozzi for Landinfo, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure’ (23 August 2017), p 12. Available at https://landinfo.no/asset/3589/1/3589_1.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

105

RHIPTO Threat network assessment, ‘Major Terrorist finance and risk assessment’ (30 November 2017).

Alfonso Daniels et al., ‘Western Africa’s missing fish: The impacts of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and under-reporting catches by foreign fleets.’ (June 2016), p 11. Available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/ resource-documents/10665.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

106

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (June 2018), pp 34-35. Available at https:// www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-52-LL.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

RHIPTO Threat network assessment, ‘Rising smuggling of Tramadol and Captagon smuggling for use for fighters as a stimulant in the Trans-Sahara and Nigeria.’ (06 March 2018).

107

91

92

10-30% of 450-765m number above.

93

5% of the same numbers.

94

108

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Strategic value, routes and incomes to armed groups in Libya from 143,000 – 343,000 migrants’ (18 January 2018).

95

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Rise of Environmental Crime’.

96

Europol-INTERPOL, ‘Migrant Smuggling Networks: Executive Summary’ (May 2016). Available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-and-interpol-issue-comprehensive-review-of-migrant-smuggling-networks accessed 25 June 2018.

97

UNODC/ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, ‘Afghan Opium Survey 2017: Cultivation and Production’ (November 2017), p 45. Available at https:// www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_opium_survey_2017_cult_prod_web.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

109

Average of David Mansfield’s price range for cooked opium of US$164–200 in David Mansfield, ‘Bombing Heroin Labs’ 50n p 19.

110

David Mansfield, ‘Understanding Control and Influence: What opium poppy and tax reveal about the writ of the Afghan state’ (August 2017), AREU, p 37, available at https://areu. org.af/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/1724E-Understanding-Control-and-Influence1.pdf accessed 26 June 2018.

RHIPTO Briefing note, ‘Migrant trafficking patterns and incomes to organized crime’ (22 January 2016).

98

UNODC, ‘The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment’, (2010). Available at http://www.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/the-globalization-of-crime-a-transnational-organized-crime-threat-assessment_html/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

Average of David Mansfield’s price range for fresh opium of US$40–65. See David Mansfield, ‘Bombing Heroin Labs in Afghanistan: The Latest Act in the Theatre of Counternarcotics, (January 2018) LSE International Drug Policy Unit, 49n p 19. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/united-states/ Assets/Documents/Heroin-Labs-in-Afghanistan-Mansfield. pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

99

This equals a tax rate of about 4%, somewhat higher than the 2.5% cited by David Mansfield, which is also the zakat tax rate.

111

David Mansfield, ‘Understanding Control and Influence’, p 38.

112

148

Bibliography NATO defines insurgency as including at least the following three elements: (1) actions or activities by an organized group, (2) a goal of some form of political change over a ruling regime; and (3) the use of violence or subversive activity. See NATO, ‘Counterinsurgency: A generic reference curriculum’ (no date), p 8. Available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ pdf_2017_09/20170904_1709-counterinsurgency-rc.pdf accessed 26 June 2018.

127

CIA specifies further that what distinguishes insurgency from terrorism is the ‘objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources.’ US Government, ‘Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency’ (2012), p 1. Available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713599 accessed 26 June 2018. Alex Scmid defines terrorism as, on the one hand a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form of tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraint, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. Cited in Sergei Boeke, ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, insurgency, or organized crime?’ (2016) Small Wars & Insurgencies 27:5, pp 914-936, p 917, original emphasis.

-

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Africa’s Active Militant Islamists Groups.” Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/Africas-Active-Militant-Islamist-Groups-Jan-2018.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

-

Economist: Baobab, “Oil theft in Nigeria: A murky business” (3 October 2013). Available at https://www.economist. com/baobab/2013/10/03/a-murky-business accessed 25 June 2018

-

Juliano Assunção, Clarissa Gandour, Romero Rocha, “DETERing Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Environmental Monitoring and Law Enforcement” (May 2013), Climate Policy Initiative. Available at https://climatepolicyinitiative. org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/DETERring-Deforestation-in-the-Brazilian-Amazon-Environmental-Monitoring-and-Law-Enforcement-Technical-Paper.pdf accessed 26 June 2018.

-

Environmental Investigation Agency, “Illegal trade seizures: Pangolins mapping the crimes” (no date). Available at https://eia-international.org/illegal-trade-seizures-pangolins accessed 25 June 2018.

-

Environmental Investigation Agency, “Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania’s Elephants” (November 2014). Available at https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-Vanishing-Point-lo-res. pdf accessed 26 June 2018.

-

Europol-INTERPOL, “Migrant Smuggling Networks: Executive Summary” (May 2016). Available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-and-interpol-issue-comprehensive-review-of-migrant-smuggling-networks accessed 25 June 2018.

-

EUROPOL/SOCTA, “European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2017” (2017). Available at: https:// www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/ european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment-2017 accessed 25 June 2018

-

Antonio Giustozzi for Landinfo, “Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure” (23 August 2017), p 12. Available at https://landinfo.no/asset/3589/1/3589_1.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

-

Global Initiative against Organized Crime, “Organized Crime and Illegally Mined Gold in Latin America” (April 2016). Available at http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2016/03/Organized-Crime-and-Illegally-MinedGold-in-Latin-America.pdf accessed 26 June 2018 accessed 26 June 2018. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2017.00050/full accessed 25 June 2018.

-

128

-

-

Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 63.

129

130

S/2017/924 p 46; UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis’ p 8.

US$1.16 billion total income to 7 + 1 armed groups constitutes 3.7% (rounded to 4) of the total income to organized crime in or near conflict areas, which is US$31.54 billion.

-

131

Baldé, C.P., Wang, F., Kuehr, R., Huisman, J., “The global e-waste monitor – 2014”, (2015) United Nations University, IAS – SCYCLE. Available at https://i.unu.edu/media/unu. edu/news/52624/UNU-1stGlobal-E-Waste-Monitor-2014small.pdf accessed 25 June 2018. BBC News, “IS foreign fighters: 5,600 fighters have returned home – report” (24 October 2017) Available at https://www. bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41734069 accessed 25 June 2018. Peter Blombäck, Peter Poschen, Mattias Lövgren, “Employment Trends and Prospects in the European Forest Sector.” (2003) UN FAO. Available at https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/timber/docs/efsos/03-sept/dp-29.pdf accessed 25 June 2018. Bloomberg, “Libya Oil Chief says fuel smuggling costing $750 Million a Year”, (18 April 2018). Available at https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-18/libya-oilchief-says-fuel-smuggling-costing-750-million-a-year accessed 25 June 2018.

-

Sergei Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, insurgency, or organized crime?” (2016) Small Wars & Insurgencies 27:5, pp 914-936

-

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan (2012), p. 63. London: Bloomsbury.

-

- CNN, “The billion-dollar question: Where is Angola’s oil money?”, (29 November 2012), Available at http://edition. cnn.com/2012/11/28/business/angola-oil-revenues/index. html accessed 25 June 2018.

The Guardian, “Malta ‘fuelling Libya instability’ by failing to tackle oil smuggling.” (9 May 2018) Available at https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/09/malta-fuel-oilsmuggling-libya-daphne-project accessed 25 June 2018.

-

Terry Hallmark, “The Murky Underworld of Oil Theft and Diversion”, (26 May 2017). Available at https://www.forbes. com/sites/uhenergy/2017/05/26/the-murky-underworld-of-oil-theft-and-diversion/#d774fa06886e accessed 25 June 2018.

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Daniel Ingram et al. “Assessing Africa-Wide Pangolin Exploitation by Scaling Local Data”, Conservation Letters (March/ April 2018). Available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/epdf/10.1111/conl.12389 accessed 25 June 2018.

-

-

Alfonso Daniels et al., “Western Africa’s missing fish: The impacts of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and under-reporting catches by foreign fleets.” (June 2016), p 11. Available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/ resource-documents/10665.pdf accessed 25 June 2018. Doumbouya A et. al. “Assessing the Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal Fishing: The Case of West Africa”. (2017) Front. Mar. Sci. 4:50. Available at

149

-

-

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The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and political violence, “Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes.” (2017). Available at http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf accessed 25 June 2018. InSight Crime, “Ex-FARC Mafia: The New Player in Colombian Organized Crime” (9 March 2018). Available at https:// www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/ ex-farc-mafia-new-player-colombian-organized-crime/ accessed 26 June 2018. Jihadology.net, “The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zor Province” (5 October 2015). Available at: http://jihadology.net/2015/10/05/the-archivist-unseen-islamic-state-financial-accounts-for-deir-azzor-province/ accessed 25 June 2018.

- Jordan Indermuehle, “Al Shabaab Area of Operations in Somalia: October 2017.” Criticalthreats.org. Available at https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaab-areaof-operations-october-2017 accessed 25 June 2018. -

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-

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Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, “Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil”, Chatham House (September 2013), p 18. Available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/ Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil.pdf accessed 25 June 2018. Tom Maguire and Cathy Haenlein, “An Illusion of Complicity: Terrorism and Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa,” RUSI (September 2015). Available at https://rusi.org/sites/default/ files/201509_an_illusion_of_complicity_0.pdf accessed 25 June 2018. Fiona Maisels et al., “Devastating Decline of Forest Elephants in Central Africa.” Plos One 8, no. 3 (04 March 2013). Available at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0059469 accessed 25 June 2018. David Mansfield, “Bombing Heroin Labs in Afghanistan: The Latest Act in the Theatre of Counternarcotics, (January 2018) LSE International Drug Policy Unit, 49n p 19. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/united-states/Assets/ Documents/Heroin-Labs-in-Afghanistan-Mansfield.pdf accessed 25 June 2018. David Mansfield, “Understanding Control and Influence: What opium poppy and tax reveal about the writ of the Afghan state” (August 2017), AREU, p 37, available at https://areu. org.af/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/1724E-Understanding-Control-and-Influence1.pdf accessed 26 June 2018

- Jeremy McDermott, “Record Cocaine Production in Colombia Fuels new Criminal Generation” (17 July 2017), InSight Crime. Available at https://www.insightcrime. org/news/analysis/record-cocaine-production-colombia-fuels-new-criminal-generation/ accessed 26 June 2018.

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Jeremy McDermott, “The FARC’s Riches: Up to $580 Million in Annual Income” (6 September 2017). Available at https:// www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/farc-riches-yearly-income-up-to-580-million/ accessed 26 June 2018.

-

Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “S/2011/433 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010),” (18 July 2011), para 63. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 accessed 25 June 2018.

-

Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “S/2012/544 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)” (27 June 2012), pp 147-154. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544 accessed 25 June 2018.

-

-

-

-

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Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “S/2013/413. Report on the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia.” (12 July 2013), Annex 9.1. Available at http://www.un.org/ ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413 accessed 25 June 2018. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “S/2014/726 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2111 (2013),” (10 October 2014), para 139. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726 accessed 25 June 2018. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “S/2015/801 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014),” (9 October 2014), p 203. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/801 accessed 25 June 2018. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “S/2016/919 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2244 (2015)” (7 October 2016), pp 40-43. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/919 accessed 25 June 2018.

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National Geographic, “More than 1,000 Rhinos Killed by Poachers in South Africa Last Year, (25 January 2018). Available at https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/01/ wildlife-watch-rhino-poaching-crisis-continues-south-africa/ accessed 25 June 2018.

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NATO, “Counterinsurgency: A generic reference curriculum” (no date), p 8. Available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_09/20170904_1709-counterinsurgency-rc.pdf accessed 26 June 2018.

- Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, “Colombian Labyrinth: The synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability,” RAND, pp 25-26. Available at https:// www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1339.html accessed 26 June 2018. -

Ian M. Ralby, “Downstream Oil Theft: Global modalities, Trends, and Remedies.” Atlantic Council: Global Energy Center. (January 2017), p 15. Available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Downstream_Oil_Theft_ web_0327.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

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Reuters, “Islamic State’s footprint spreading in northern Somalia: U.N.” (8 November 2017). Available at https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-islamic-state/islamic-states-footprint-spreading-in-northern-somalia-u-nidUSKBN1D828Z accessed 25 June 2018.

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Reuters, “Update 2 – Angola oil production seen steady in 2018 – Sonangol” (28 February 2018) Available at https:// www.reuters.com/article/angola-sonangol/update-2-angola-oil-production-seen-steady-in-2018-sonangol-idUSL8N1QI2W7 accessed 25 June 2018.

-

RHIPTO Briefing note, “Migrant trafficking patterns and incomes to organized crime” (22 January 2016)

-

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, “IS funding update” (30 January 2015).

-

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, “Islamic State funding and implications” (18 September 2014)

-

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, “Islamic State funding and implications” (18 September 2014).

Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “S/2017/924. Report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea”. Available at https://www.securitycouncilreport. org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/s_2017_924.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

- RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, “Islamic State in Iraq-Syria financial situation” (27 February 2016).

- The National, “As economy booms, demand for black market fuel soars in Turkey” (23 September 2011). Available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/as-economy-booms-demand-for-black-market-fuel-soars-in-turkey-1.439347 accessed 25 June 2018.

- RHIPTO Threat network assessment, “Rising smuggling of Tramadol and Captagon smuggling for use for fighters as a stimulant in the Trans-Sahara and Nigeria.” (06 March 2018)

150

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RHIPTO Threat network assessment, “Major Terrorist finance and risk assessment” (30 November 2017).

- RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, “Strategic value, routes and incomes to armed groups in Libya from 143,000 – 343,000 migrants” (18 January 2018)

-

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, “Update on Islamic State financial situation in Syria-Iraq” (27 May 2017)

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RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, “Update on Islamic State financial situation in Syria-Iraq” (07 June 2017).

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Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Global Extreme Poverty, (2013, revised 27 March 2017). Available at https:// ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty accessed 25 June 2018.

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