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'Meeting culture' slows down the Bank

Informed outsiders discuss some frank views with Cristina Mejia and Kevin Rafferty



©AFOTO

Robert Rubin, US treasury secretary

The United States has been working to improve the targeting of its assistance and will continue to press the international financial institutions to improve their targeting as well. Cuts in spending have been a necessary part of our effort to reduce our budget deficit. The progress we have achieved in cutting the deficit, in turn, has helped reduce global interest rates and kept the US economy — the largest market for developing country exports — vibrant.

The single most effective way the Bank and other donor organizations could raise acceptance of aid would be to increase its effectiveness at reducing poverty over the long term. When the public can see clear results of aid flows — in terms of reduced infant mortality, higher life expectancy and faster economic growth — and sees countries graduate from assistance because they can attract private capital flows, they will be much more willing to see taxpayer dollars spent on it.

The Bank's — and the Fund's — campaign against corruption could play an especially important role. Corruption reduces public confidence in aid programs, and rightly so, because no corrupt government will be able to foster the public trust and adherence to the rule of law which market-led development requires.

The [strategic] compact showed a very good understanding of the changes the Bank is going to have to make to adjust itself to the new global economy. The challenge will be to implement the cost-cutting measures and institutional restructuring necessary to meet these objectives.

— Interview with KR

Early in his secondment to the World Bank's water and sanitation division from the French water utility Lyonnaise des Eaux, Gilles Fabre-Rousseau counted no fewer than 25 different places in the Bank where water policy is made — just the kind of overlap that begged for streamlining. Fabre-Rousseau and his colleagues in the Bank's staff exchange program — whereby staff from the Bank and the private sector spend two years working in each other's environmentals — cite numerous other inefficiencies at the Bank, from conflicting organizational charts to elliptical performance reviews, that they say would never be tolerated in the private sector.

Not that the Bank must recreate itself entirely in the image of the private sector. Fabre-Rousseau concedes that the Bank's development objectives exert pressures of a different kind — and it is crucial for the Bank's partners that it meet its own objectives. Unless the Bank convinces governments to establish legal and regulatory frameworks in developing countries, for instance, the private sector won't go anywhere near them.

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Gilles Fabre-Rousseau

"It's important to strike a balance," Fabre-Rousseau says. "The private sector, to put it bluntly, is interested only in the so-called bottom-line: the profit margin. By contrast, the Bank has to satisfy a number of other interests — including political ones. The Bank's board functions more like a parliament than a board of directors in the private sector, who will look out only for the company's interest."

The diversity of the Bank's objectives can render it impervious to business values, however. Fabre-Rousseau says the Bank thrives on a "culture of consensus" or "the meeting culture" that tends to favor solutions that are not necessarily the best but simply the most acceptable to all concerned. Precious time is lost sitting in meetings and listening to everyone's input concerning every aspect of a project. In the private sector, such open-endedness is unthinkable, and the emphasis falls on implementation and management instead. Tasks are clearly identified, and timetables strictly adhered to; accountability is likewise clearly assigned.

"These are basic project management skills," says Volker Ziegler, who is spending his two years away from Siemens Germany in the Bank's telecommunications and informatics division. While he and Fabre-Rousseau are quick to point out that the Bank's fondness for copious analysis reflects the rigorous academic training of most Bank staff and sustains the Bank's reputation as an honest broker, they emphasize the need to balance such commitments against the sense of urgency that should surround every project.

—CM

©AFOTO

Tasuku Takagaki

President of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi

President Wolfensohn is putting more emphasis on the broader harmonization of relations with developing countries. He is taking very much care of the environment, population, education. That's a good thing. It does not exclude the role that the World Bank should be playing in remodelling emerging countries into sound shape economies. On this it is important that the World Bank should have an important voice in a combined effort. I read James Wolfensohn's speeches from time to time and I like what he is saying.

Global community must put people first

Says ***Roger Cardinal Etchegaray*** *in an interview with* ***Kevin Rafferty*** *for the annual meetings*

Q: Everybody has become excited about the importance of free markets. What does the experience of the Catholic Church in many countries, rich and poor, tell you about putting so much faith in markets?

A: As a religious leader, my primary concern is not with the market, but with people. But perhaps there is less of a contradiction than might at first appear. The real force of any economic growth is the initiative, the creativity and the labor of people. The market is only a means. It can be, indeed, an effective means of releasing the potential of human creativity.

Sometimes it is said that the Catholic Church is, if not anti-market, at least reticent about the market. This is not true. Pope John Paul II says "it would appear that, on the level of individual nations and of international relations, the free market is the most efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effectively responding to needs." But he immediately notes that "there are many human needs which find no place in the market."

This is precisely where new challenges are emerging today. While we have to permit markets to do what they can do best, at the same time, we must realize that there are, indeed, many human needs which cannot be met by the market, which do not even belong in the marketplace.

'Many human needs cannot be met by the market'

In the past, it was principally the responsibility of the individual state to ensure that these other needs were guaranteed. But who is responsible for such needs in today's globalized world? Who identifies and assures respect for the global common good? Not the market on its own: not the individual state alone! This is clear, for example, regarding environmental protection. But there are other aspects of the global common good which we also need to address. If we affirm that human initiative, creativity and work are the principal resources for economic growth, then investment in human potential and respect for labor standards must become part of our global concerns. We must develop the concept of a global community in which diversified but precise responsibilities are identified and the concerns of people are placed first.

John Paul II with Etchegaray

Q: There have been huge surges in private capital flows to select developing countries. What do you regard as the main opportunities and the main challenges of such flows?

A: The main problem is, of course, the imbalance in these flows, which go principally to a handful of countries viewed as attractive. Other countries start out already in a position of disadvantage and, in many cases, run the risk of long-term exclusion. A second problem is that, in many countries which do manage to attract investment, the benefits are not always equitably distributed. Foreign investment may bring advantage to large portions of the population, but great inequalities remain between the richest and the poorest sectors. In some cases, these inequalities are increasing. We must always remember that any economic model which leaves large sectors of the population on the margins of development is not sustainable in the long term.

We have to ask where responsibilities lie. The Pope recently spoke about the moral and social responsibilities of the private sector, since it is the sector which has most to gain from the current process of globalization.

Morality has always stressed that accumulating wealth brings with it certain social responsibilities. Is it enough today to say that the private sector generates wealth and that its responsibility stops there? Traditionally, within the economy of individual nations, the private sector not only generated wealth, but through taxation and through local philanthropy, was a dynamic part of social progress. The danger, in a globalized economy, is that the investor is often geographically so far removed from the society where he produces that social responsibility is not even seen as a concern. And further, in the name of competitiveness and comparative advantage, the investor can be lured by short-term tax incentives and thus de facto evade those minimum responsibilities for wealth distribution which taxation implied. The Pope stresses that even where juridical norms to foster solidarity do not exist in a globalized economy, "moral responsibility still remains."

Q: Private capital flows now dwarf official aid by five to one. Are you worried about these trends?

A: In many places, unfortunately, aid has gotten itself a bad name, through bad spending, corruption and bad management on the side of both donor and recipient countries. The policies of many donor countries during the Cold War will have long-lasting negative effects on developing countries. The poorest countries, if they are to attract investment, have an urgent need to remedy their disadvantage. Above all, they need to improve their basic infrastructures — human, social and physical. They cannot do this on their own. They need help from official aid sources.

What worries me most are the attitudes, the mentality and the philosophy which seem to underlie many policies which inspire cutbacks in official aid. It is more than just donor fatigue. We are looking, in many cases, at a weakening in solidarity and a growth in isolationism. If globalization is to be truly human it requires the construction of a global community, in which there is a sense of common responsibility for all, especially for the weakest.

The question of solidarity is a question about the nature of humanity. It is linked with that primordial question of the very first pages of the Bible, in its reflections about good and evil: "Am I my brother's keeper?" If our answer is "no", then we distort the harmony of relationships which the Creator wished to establish among persons, and between persons and the rest of creation. The disenchantment with aid is a challenge to the conscience of humanity. For my part, I would hope to see the Great Jubilee Year of 2000 as a special moment in reawakening solidarity in the spirit of the biblical jubilee tradition. But we must also re-establish a political consensus around the importance of development assistance and its best use.

The question of development assistance is also linked to the question of international debt. For the poorest countries, debt relief is needed to make assistance a realistic diving force for further economic and social development. Mr Wolfensohn for the World Bank and Mr Camdessus for the IMF have taken personal leadership in launching new initiatives for the debt burdens of the poorest countries. But progress is still very slow, and it is the poorest people in the poorest countries that suffer the effects of delays in implementation.

Through meetings between leaders of the Church and of the World Bank and the IMF, there is also emerging a new commitment to fight the plague of corruption, which siphons off funds for development and has given official development assistance such a bad reputation.

Q: What advice do you have for annual meetings delegates?

A: One of the most significant changes on the international scene in recent years is the fact that the World Bank and the IMF today place poverty as a central theme of their work. The fight against poverty is a moral imperative which economic theory must address.

Placing poverty as a central theme of the work of the Bank is not simply a question of a policy change from above. For those working in these institutions, it is much more significant than changing a logo or a letterhead, or a re-alignment of policies. It involves a real change of attitude. There is a sense in which no one can talk effectively about poverty, without somehow feeling in his or her own flesh the bite of poverty, without being disturbed in the comfort and security of our own lifestyle. It is in this process of really understanding the harshness of poverty that solidarity is born.

'The plague of corruption siphons off funds for development'

Cardinal Etchegaray is president of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace.

STAFF ASSOCIATION ... STAFF ASSOCIATION ... STAFF ASSOCIATION ... STAFF ASSOCIATION

BANK GROUP SHOULD DEVELOP POLICIES THAT UNIFY, NOT DIVIDE, ITS STAFF

Early this year, the Staff Association offered a strategic partnership to the president to commit to building a better and more effective Bank Group. Key to our offering of that partnership was our understanding that the effectiveness of the Bank Group as a whole is more important than any single issue faced by any one group of staff.

We have been consulting regularly on the ongoing review of the Bank Group's employment policies. In the spirit of our offer of partnership, we believe that it will be critical for the Bank to develop policies and strengthen practices that unify staff rather than divide them. Our theme of "one staff" is not an abstract assertion that all distinctions must be eliminated, since some differences are clearly legitimate. It is instead a pragmatic expression of our belief that we can be most effective if we all work together as a team with each team member contributing his or her part and being recognized in a way that reinforces team unity. If we are to effectively work in client-focused teams, we must not be distracted by unjustifiable internal inequities that divide staff into interest groups.

Thus, when we look at policy proposals, we want to know concretely how they will affect staff. If there are proposals for new categories of staff, we want to know why, who and how many. We want to know if the divisions between the new categories will be easier or harder to cross than the current ones. If there must be winners and losers, we want to know again why, who and how many.

A historical and quantitative analysis is also critical: if we don't now have the "right" categories, policies or practices, we have to know how we got the "wrong" ones and how to avoid making the same mistakes all over again. To this end, we welcome the emphasis on monitoring and evaluation in the HR Reform Guidelines. There must also be the kind of daily accountability and monitoring of behaviors and results that HR policies in themselves can never provide. No performance management system, for example, can compensate for managers who refuse to be candid in their evaluations of their staff or who refuse to invest in staff training.

Morale is as low around the Bank as we've ever seen it. Whatever changes we ultimately arrive at, for the sake of credibility and morale, we must be able to show our clients and our staff how the changes will enhance the Bank Group's ability to deliver its products effectively.

The reform of human resource policies is a technically and politically difficult task for all of us. It is fraught with risks, not the least of which is the danger of further alienating an increasingly anxious and skeptical workforce. To mitigate these risks, we must all work together to analyze current problems, develop potential solutions, analyze their consequences for both existing staff and our clients, discuss them collaboratively and then make the difficult decisions. Be assured that your Staff Association will continue, as always, to participate in a constructive and forward-looking manner to defend the long-term interests of the Bank Group as well as the present and future generations of staff, which are its primary capital asset.

Bulletin of the Alliance of
Religions and Conservation

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newsfromARC



PRESERVING CHINA'S SACRED MOUNTAINS

IS THE WORLD BANK GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT RELIGION?

SAVING THE PILGRIMAGE FORESTS OF KRISHNA

SUCCESSOR TO THE NEW ROAD AND THE WWF NETWORK ON CONSERVATION AND RELIGION

ARC
ALLIANCE OF RELIGIONS AND CONSERVATION

AIMS:

1. To assist and encourage the evolution of practical, educational, projects which further the involvement of religions in caring for the natural environment.

2. To assist and encourage the development of religious and ethical programmes within conservation bodies.

3. To assist and encourage events which bring together religion and conservation groups to further ties and develop practical conservation projects.

4. To raise and grant funds for the above aims.

5. To publish and promote materials which explore the links between religions and conservation and further the aims of ARC.

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newsfromARC

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on the cover: *decorated with the colours of Holi, pilgrims descend the sacred mountain of Varsana in Vrindavan*

ARC: blending faith with action

Welcome to the first NEWS*from*ARC. The Alliance of Religions and Conservation (ARC) was launched by HRH The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, at the Summit on Religions and Conservation in 1995. It takes over the work of the former Network on Conservation and Religion, established by the World Wide Fund for Nature in 1986.

ARC is designed to help religious communities and environmental organisations work together on faith-based conservation projects which respect and build upon the teachings of the world religions, faith by faith.

ARC currently has projects in India, China, Europe, Africa, Thailand, Canada and the Middle East. A full list is on the back cover. We are always interested to hear from those who work to combine faith and ecology in practical ways. If you have a project you feel ARC could assist, or that you would like others to know about, let us know. NEWS*from*ARC is designed to be a vehicle for exchange of ideas. We invite you to help us make it so.

Martin Palmer *Secretary-General of ARC*

Holy Island brings faiths and ecology together



Buddhist monks make a start on the retreat centre on Holy Island

Holy Island, a rugged little island off West Scotland which was once the hermitage of the sixth century Christian saint Molaise, has once more become a place of pilgrimage and retreat.

It has been purchased by the Samye Ling Tibetan Buddhist Centre in Scotland with a commitment to respect its ancient heritage and restore its environment around an interfaith retreat centre. The community's first act was to plant 30,000 native trees on the island. The project was inaugurated with an inter-faith service at Saint Molaise's cave attended by senior figures in the Christian Churches and representatives of other faiths, with several Members of Parliament.

Work is underway on the retreat centre, which is claimed to be Britain's first large residential building designed entirely around long-term sustainable living. Andrew Wright's award-winning design uses passive solar gain and high levels of insulation with turf roofs to reduce energy consumption. Among the innovative features are composting toilets, waste water treatment, wind generators and permaculture.

People of all faiths are invited to participate in the Holy Island Project. If you would like to find out more please contact The Holy Island Project, Samye Ling, Eskdalemuir, Langholm, Dumfriesshire DG13 0QL, Scotland (tel 01387 373 232).

Preserving China's sacred mountains

For over two thousand years mountains in China have been considered sacred, especially the five traditional Taoist pilgrimage mountains and the four principle Buddhist mountains. These mountains belonged to great Taoist or Buddhist monasteries and were places of retreat from the world. This century, through upheavals of revolution and communism, their ancient balance is under threat. Nevertheless, despite the ravages of change, they still have an aura and command local respect. As Xiao Xiaomin, ARC's adviser in China, puts it, 'The gods still offer protection to the mountains, and local people respect these gods.'

Pilgrims on Wutai Shan

A survey to establish the state of the environment on seven of the sacred mountains has recently begun, preparing the way for a major partnership between the China Taoist Association and the Chinese government to protect and restore their ecology. Detailed surveys have so far been completed on Hua Shan in Shaanxi Province and Qingcheng , known as 'Green City Mountain' for its steep densely vegetated sides which resemble city walls, in Sichuan Province.

Taoism is the oldest religion in China and, despite religious upheavals, still has great influence on the mountains. Tao, or The Way, is concerned with the relationship between human society and nature, and seeks to regulate human interference with the natural order. In the mountains, Taoism has taught the importance of preserving a rich diversity of species. They are home to scores of ethnic communities, whose traditions have remained intact in the remoteness of the mountains. The cultural survival of many of these minorities depends on the preservation of the mountains.

Despite restrictions on the practice of religion, the moral influence of the religious authorities and the sanctity of the sites still act as major controlling factors in protecting the mountains. Ironically though, in recent years the main threat to the sacred mountains has come from religious tourism.

A full report on the results of the survey, and how this major ARC project has developed, will feature in the next issue.



Shrine on Mount Hua Shan

World Bank asks faiths for guidance

For the first time in its history, the World Bank is to ask world religious leaders for advice. They have asked ARC to organise a series of meetings bringing together World Bank directors with senior religious leaders of nine world faiths. Their purpose will be to examine and question the ethics of the World Bank and to help it understand the values and concerns of local communities. Discussions will include frank exchange of views, work towards a common set of principles for communication and understanding between the World Bank and religious communities, and practical proposals for World Bank projects with religions. The first meeting will be hosted by the World Bank in Washington in May 1997, followed by one in London the following year hosted by the Archbishop of Canterbury. We'll keep you informed on the outcome.

A sacred space in Canada

A new forum in Canada which brings together religious communities, scientists and ethical thinkers has organised fifty-five projects in its first five years, ranging from developing educational materials to environmental auditing of places of worship. The Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion, CCEER, was founded in 1991 to develop with WWF Canada the work begun at Assisi in 1986.

continued p7

SAVING KRISHNA'S FORESTS

Special feature by Ranchor Prime



The pilgrimage town of Vrindavan is the focus for a unique experiment in conservation, in which environmentalists and religious leaders are working side by side to reverse the dramatic decline of its forests, wildlife and river. In so doing, writes Ranchor Prime, they are sending out a distress signal and a call to action that is reverberating round the Hindu world.

MAIN PICTURE: A ferryman tends his boat opposite the seventeenth-century tower of the Venu Gopal temple on Vrindavan's riverfront.

ABOVE: An ancient grove of Kadam and Tamal trees spread their boughs where Krishna used to dance with the cowherd girls beside the sacred hill of Govardhan.

Dawn breaks over a skyline of ancient temples and trees. Boatloads of pilgrims step ashore on the river bank and perform their morning ablutions. Peacock cries and the sound of temple bells fill the air. Morning mists disperse as the temperature climbs to reveal a bustling town in which modern India comes face-to-face with a living past. Another day begins in Vrindavan, "town of five thousand temples", eighty miles south of Delhi.

Despite its dilapidated state, Vrindavan is at the heart-beat of Hinduism, because of its close association with Krishna, the most environmental of all Hindu visions of God. Here Krishna was born and lived in the forest herding cows and dancing with the cowherd girls, providing inspiration for generations of Hindu poets, artists and philosophers.

Our story begins in the 1980s when Sevak Sharan, a local retired engineer, was made suddenly aware of the environmental danger threatening his community. One day his peace was broken by the sound of three men cutting down the only large tree left in the area, home to several peacocks. He tried to stop them, but to no avail. He went to persuade their guru to stop them, but he refused to get involved. Finally he reported the incident to the police who also did nothing. By the next day the tree was gone. Sevak resolved to do something.

"What was the use of my chanting and worship in the temples and bathing daily in the Yamuna," he recalls, "If I couldn't protect these trees and animals which were part of my devotion?" Sevak began a campaign which took him to the state capital Lucknow and the national capital Delhi in search of support. Meetings were organised and promises made, ideas and concerns were set down on paper. But after several years Sevak remained a lone voice and was beginning to lose heart. Around this time I heard about him.

I had been visiting Vrindavan since the mid-seventies and had watched its environmental problems develop. Rural India has faced transformations in the last twenty years that took two hundred years to evolve in Europe. The latest western technology now exists alongside rural life patterns that have hardly changed in a thousand years. The resulting disparities have created huge pressures on an unstable social infrastructure and a

ABOVE: Vrindavan is embraced on three sides by the River Yamuna, 80 miles downstream from Delhi.

RIGHT: Two million pilgrims visit every year to walk around the 7-mile pilgrims path and see the groves where Krishna lived

fragile environment. In such circumstances, religion can have a powerful role to play in setting an example and bringing people together, and Vrindavan was an ideal place to encounter and work with its possibilities.

Together we gathered support in the community for an approach to WWF for practical help. Through the contacts which Sevak had already built up in the capitals, and my international links, we were able to make a convincing case and in November 1991 the Vrindavan Forest Revival Project was launched, boldly funded in its first year with £25,000 from WWF in Geneva.

Our main proposal to WWF was to organise tree-planting along the parikrama, the seven-mile pilgrim path which encircles Vrindavan. Every Hindu holy place has a parikrama around which pilgrims walk to honour the sacred place and to symbolise the centering of their lives about God. In focusing on this path WWF would involve the hundreds of thousands of pilgrims who walk the path as well as the people in the ashrams and temples lining its route.

From the beginning the project caused a stir. At the opening ceremony community leaders were

quick to speak out in support and many made the trip from Delhi. Even the State Minister for Energy unexpectedly turned up to show his approval. But it quickly became clear that we would have to be patient.

For example, it is estimated that for every ten trees planted in the open by India's Forest Department only one survives. This is because of brousing animals, careless drivers of tractors and bullock-carts, theft of tree-guards, drought and heat, and in Vrindavan the biggest menace of all, monkeys, who make short work of newly-planted trees due to their love of new shoots, seeds and fruits.

The only way to overcome the tree failure-rate short of mounting armed guards was to have the community looking after the trees as if they were their own and feeling that they had a vested interest in their survival. This, coupled with a sound maintenance plan, gave a survival rate well above fifty per cent.

With this in mind WWF made education a priority from the start, particularly with the young. They commissioned an environmental curriculum in Hindi from the Centre for Environmental Education in Ahmedabad, based on the religious and cultural traditions of Vrindavan, and by the second year had appointed part-time 'Environment Teachers' in each of Vrindavan's thirty-five schools and were running regular training workshops for them.

Two early experiences showed the value of working in the schools. One was when the teenage

THE VRINDAVAN DECLARATION

'Nature enjoys being enjoyed, but reacts furiously to exploitation. Today's situation is caused by our separation from Krishna and his message of commitment. Let us act on his message to play, not to exploit.'

At WWF India's 25th Anniversary Congress in 1994, a declaration written by a senior religious figure of Vrindavan, Shrivatsa Goswami, was presented to the President of India along with a sacred Kadam tree from Vrindavan. The declaration explained how Lord Krishna had acted to restore the ecological balance of Vrindavan, and underlined the community's commitment to conserving their environment.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE VRINDAVAN CONSERVATION PROJECT IN THE YEAR 1995/96

GREENING
3,000 trees planted in community areas
3 new nurseries started in ashrams
30,000 sacred plants distributed
Plant Clinic set up with 7 visitors daily
5 sacred groves adopted

CLEANING
2 sewage hotspots cleared
Sulabh International brought to Vrindavan

EDUCATION
500 children enrolled in 34 Nature Clubs
50 teachers trained
3 school nurseries raised 9,400 saplings
Programmes in 6 Senior, 16 Junior and 12 Primary schools
4th annual Environmental Quiz
Children staged 3 plays and an exhibition
2-day nature camp for 100 children and their teachers

daughter of the head priest at Vrindavan's most orthodox temple won a nature painting competition and declared publicly at her award ceremony that she wanted to spend her life working to restore the environment of Vrindavan. In so doing she set an important and influential precedent among her peers and future community leaders.

The second cause for hope came when the community was asked to turn out in protest at the bull-dozing of hundreds of established trees to make way for a new road. To everyone's surprise and joy, hundreds of school-children joined with their teachers in a peaceful but powerful procession through the town centre. What was unique about this demonstration is that it followed the time-honoured Vrindavan tradition of religious street processions, with singing and musical instruments, but directed this at a specific environmental issue. This potent combination of religion and environment immediately brought to a halt the tree-destruction.

After seeing the progress of the project in its first two years WWF India's incoming director, Samar Singh, raised its priority. He felt that the combination of education, practical work and religious depth gave it a special relevance to the Indian scene. He extended its programme under the headings Greening, Cleaning and Education, re-named it the Vrindavan Conservation Project to reflect its broadened remit, and formed a community advisory committee to guide the project forward.

Around this time an international dimension to the Vrindavan project got underway in Leicester, a British city with a roughly one-third Hindu population from East Africa. Here I helped to launch a group called Friends of Vrindavan, partly to gather much-needed funds but also to forge practical, spiritual and cultural links between the two communities. Over the last four years we have taken Hindu conservation to the Asian community of Leicester and involved them in developing a 'Vrindavan Gardens' in the main city park, and in organising a cycle expedition to India to raise funds for Vrindavan.

The first Yamuna Cycle Expedition in October 1996 took forty riders to India to cycle from the Himalayan source of the Yamuna River over five hundred miles to Vrindavan. Apart from its tremendous value in raising awareness and understanding among the participants and over a thousand sponsors, it raised over £20,000 for work in Vrindavan. Friends of Vrindavan are pledged to continue organising this event annually each October.

As the Vrindavan Conservation Project continues to flourish, funded by WWF and more recently by ARC and Friends of Vrindavan, others are getting involved. Sulabh International, India's largest development organisation, have been given funding by the Government of India, as part of the national Yamuna Action Plan to clean up the Yamuna River, to make Vrindavan one of four settlements to target for sanitary rehabilitation and education, including tackling the town's major problems of sewerage and waste disposal.

Another participant is the government of the state of Uttar Pradesh. As a result of growing concern about the plight of Vrindavan they have recently announced a grant of 40 crores of rupees (£8m) for restoring the cultural and environmental heritage of the region around Vrindavan.

Vrindavan children prepare to plant trees

Finally, WWF India, so impressed by what Vrindavan has done in making conservation something a whole community is involved in, and the power of religion to mobilise such forces, has decided to make the partnership with religion its main focus nationally. In particular, they intend to concentrate on sacred groves, which are to be found across India. Accordingly, starting with five states, WWF India in partnership with ARC, will systematically study all sacred groves in these states, through the participation of universities in the states. They will then identify the most religiously and environmentally significant and develop these into exemplar models for that state – encouraging communities nearby to do the same.

Thus a small scale experiment has burgeoned into a major model, has grown far beyond its original brief, has raised funds of its own through creating a supporters group, has helped release £8 million from central state funds and launched a nation-wide emulation of its religio-environmental principles and practice.

For information on Friends of Vrindavan and the Yamuna Cycle Expedition, write to: Friends of Vrindavan, 10 Grafton Mews, London W1P 5LF, UK

*The Vrindavan Conservation Project is described in depth in **Hinduism and Ecology** by Ranchor Prime (see back page)*

Uncovering Britain's sacred past

Throughout Britain are thousands of shrines, wells, pilgrimage routes and other features of the landscape which have for centuries been regarded as special or sacred. Some of these are still a focus of pilgrimage or festival and attract many visitors, but the history or significance of many has been lost or forgotten. The Sacred Land project aims to re-establish the spiritual and environmental significance of these sites and to keep alive the tradition of sacred space in today's society in both rural and urban settings.

Pilgrimage routes are being rediscovered and re-opened in environmentally sensitive ways. New pilgrimage routes, such as a multi-faith pilgrimage across Britain, are being created. The ancient sacred designs of many medieval cities and towns, such as Bristol, are being rediscovered and used to revive the beauty of the urban landscape. Sacred spaces, old and new, such as the eighth-century shrine of St Melangell in North Wales or a Path of Life sacred garden on a housing estate in Manchester will be restored or created and managed as places of natural beauty, peace and healing. Ancient woodlands belonging to historical monuments, abbeys and churches will be managed and where necessary re-planted. Herbal gardens will be created or re-established in cathedrals and churchyards.

Sacred Land will be the largest religious campaign on ecology ever undertaken in the UK and has already attracted overseas interest. Similar projects are now being proposed in Brazil, Denmark, France and Germany.

For details of Sacred Land books see back page. For further information please write to Sacred Land, 9A Didsbury Park, Manchester M20 5LH, UK, enclosing a stamped addressed envelope.



St Oswald's, Cumbria: a churchyard such as this is an important wildlife refuge

Youth training in the Orthodox Church

Syndesmos, the World Fellowship of Orthodox Youth, the world's largest youth organisation, has made environmental action its priority. Since 1994 it has been organising summer camps, funded by ARC, on the sacred peninsula of Mount Athos. Youth leaders from all over Eastern Europe come there to work on ecological projects with the monks and to discuss Orthodox teachings on ecology.

Work includes opening up old cobble paths to pilgrims as an alternative to cars, restoring sacred caves and wayside shrines, planting shrubs and trees in neglected cemeteries and working in the orchards and vegetable gardens. As well as being valuable experience and education for the volunteers, this work greatly helps the monasteries in fulfilling their own environmental commitments.

A handbook for youth leaders, combining practical ideas and teaching aids with resources from the liturgy and art of the Orthodox tradition, is available from Syndesmos (see back page)

An Orthodox monk walks among wild flowers in the protected woodlands of Mount Athos

Canada sacred space

(continued from p3)

The Canadian government asked CCEER to contribute to public hearings on the proposed disposal of high level nuclear fuel waste in Canada. The result was a two volume report which is now recognised as one of the world's most authoritative critiques of the social, ethical and scientific issues involved.

ARC is supporting CCEER to prepare a sixth volume in the Cassells/WWF Religion and Ecology Series, 'First Nation's Spirituality and Ecology', aimed at strengthening awareness of Native American ecology, and to publish its acclaimed quarterly journal 'Sacred Spaces', the only vehicle for interfaith environmental awareness in Canada.

For further information please write to CCEER, Lot 75, No, 1021 Jackson Street, Dauphin, MB, R7N 2N5, Canada

Projects supported by ARC

The Ohito Declaration on Religion, Land and Conservation

Canadian Coalition for Ecology, Ethics and Religion *(see p3)*

Sacred Land *(see p7)*

Syndesmos: Orthodox youth training *(see p7)*

Tel'Ada Monastery, Syria

Zambia: educational development

Himalayan pilgrims

Vrindavan Conservation Project *(see p4)*

Sacred Mountains of China *(see p3)*

Muslim educational slide pack

Jagannath Forest Project, Orissa

Tree of Life: Buddhist education

Palitana Jain greening project

ARC also works in association with the State of the World Forum Charter of Human Responsibilities, and the World Bank *(see p3)*

Books & resources

Sacred Land

books to accompany the Sacred Land project (see p7) out Spring '97



'Sacred Britain: a Guide to the Sacred Sites and Pilgrim Routes of England, Scotland and Wales' by Martin Palmer and Nigel Palmer. Official Guide to the Sacred Land Project. This beautifully illustrated book offers a whole new way of seeing and understanding Britain. *Piatkus 1997 £25 from WWF (special schools price £20)*

'Sacred Journeys: Paths for the New Pilgrim' by Jennifer Westwood. This lavishly illustrated book celebrates how people around the world treasure the sacred in their landscape. *Gaia Books £14.99 from WWF*

'Earth Ascending: an Anthology of Living Poetry' edited by Jay Ramsay. A collection of modern British poetry reflecting on sacred landscape and its destruction. Recommended for school assemblies. *Stride Publications £9.50 from WWF*

'Worlds of Difference' by Martin Palmer and Esther Bissett. This beautifully illustrated book for all ages tells the story of creation through the eyes of ten different faiths and world-views, each with their own unique vision of nature. *WWF in association with Thomas Nelson and Sons £7.25 (accompanying Teacher's Handbook £2.95) from WWF*

World Religion and Ecology series: 'Buddhism and Ecology' edited by Martine Batchelor, 'Christianity and Ecology' edited by Elizabeth Breuilly and Martin Pamer, 'Hinduism and Ecology: Seeds of Truth' by Ranchor Prime. *WWF in association with Cassell £6.99 each from WWF*

'Genesis or Nemesis: Belief, Meaning and Ecology' by Martin Palmer. Shows how basic themes from religion – celebration, repentance, hope – relate to the practical work of caring for nature. *Dryad 1988 £3 inc p+p (UK) from ICOREC*

'Travels Through Sacred China' by Martin Palmer. A guide to the vast religious and spiritual heritage of the many faiths which have emerged or interacted within China. *HarperCollins 1996 £10.50 inc p+p (UK) from ICOREC*

'Orthodoxy and the Ecological Crisis' – a youth training handbook. *Syndesmos 1996 £10 inc p+p (UK) from Syndesmos*

'So That God's Creation Might Live' – proceedings of the Inter-Orthodox Conference on Environmental Protection. *Ecumenical Patriarchate 1991 £6 inc p+p (UK) from Syndesmos*

People & the Planet: balanced issue-based reporting of the world of conservation and society published quarterly by Planet 21, supported by WWF, IPPF, IUCN, SIDA, UNFPA. *Annual subscription US$25/£15, or £12 (UK only) to:* Planet 21, 1 Woburn Walk, London WC1H 0JJ, UK

From Assisi to Windsor:
a complete handbook of faith and ecology

'Holy Ground: the Guide to Faith and Ecology' edited by Jo Edwards and Martin Palmer with illustrations by Xavier Pick and poems by Jay Ramsay. The essential book on religion and ecology, including the Assisi Declarations and Windsor Statements from nine world faiths. *Pilkington Press £10.50 from WWF*

ORDERING INFORMATION

to order from WWF: orders by credit card or in writing with payment to: WWF UK Education Distribution, PO Box 963, Slough SL2 3RS, UK. tel +44 (0)1753 643104. Post and packing: orders up to £20 add 15%, over £20 add 10%

to order from ICOREC: orders with payment to: ICOREC, Manchester Metropolitan University, 799 Wilmslow Road, Manchester M20 2RR, UK

to order from Syndesmos: orders with payment to: Dimitri Oikonomou, 5 Moreton Road, Oxford, OX2 7AX, UK

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CURRENT ARC FUNDED PROJECTS

DAOIST SACRED MOUNTAINS PROJECT

For at least two thousand years, certain major mountain ranges in China have been viewed as sacred. Traditionally these have become known as the five Daoist sacred mountains and the four Buddhist. In fact, there are probably over fifty such places across China. The nine traditional sacred mountains are substantial ranges of immense importance as natural habitats, forests and watersheds.

Daoism is the oldest religion in China with its roots back in shamanism. In its sacred writings, the notion of the 'Dao' is explored. The Dao is the Way, the Way of nature. Daoism's core teaching concerns regulating human life and behaviour to literally flow with the Way of nature. This is seen in the way that Daoist temples and monasteries are built in relationship to the flow of the natural landscape.

Despite the ravages of this century the sacred mountains still command a respect that has ensured their survival as places of both spiritual and natural significance. They are important islands of passive conservation in the midst of the turmoil and environmental damage of the present day. This project arises from the desire of the China Daoist Association to develop a coherent policy for the seven selected sacred mountains, which would offer the State an overall programme designed to combine respect for nature, for the 'sacredness' of each site and for the increased needs of visitors.

ARC is funding a detailed survey of the mountains and the development of a policy for the future of these mountains, in collaboration with the Daoists, the Tourist Authorities and relevant sections of the Government. The seven Daoist sacred mountains in the project are:

a. Hua shan (Shaanxi), is part of an extensive range and consists of several peaks, of which the highest reaches 2200 m..

b. Song shan (Henan), The mountain, which is part of a range and under 2,000 m., is located near Luoyang .

c. Heng shan (Hunan), located 200 km. south-west of Beijing.

d. Heng shan (Shanxi) situated 150 km. south of Changsha.

e. Tai shan (Shandong) is the most famous and possibly the most visited of the mountains. The range extends some 20 km. to the west of the peak itself.

f. Qingcheng shan (Sichuan) , not one of the great Five, but a major range near the Tibet border.

g. Wudang shan, not one of the five traditionally sacred mountains, stretches 400 km. across north-western Hubei.

Sacred Land Project

Learning for life

WWF







THE SACRED LAND
· PROJECT ·

"The Sacred Land Project is an imaginative idea and a most appropriate initiative for the millennium."

HRH The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh

WWF-UK
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Weyside Park
Godalming
Surrey GU7 1XR
Tel 01483 426444
Fax 01483 426409
Web http://www.wwf-uk.org

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Sacred Land background:

The Sacred Land Project is a 5 year millennium celebration project running from 1997–2002. Sponsored by WWF-UK, it involves major religions and conservation groups in the UK and is working with hundreds of projects across the country.

Sacred Land aims to achieve:

- Recovery of ancient and often lost sacred sites and with it a sense of the 'sacred' throughout Britain;
- Environmentally enhance sacred sites still in use;
- The creation of new sacred places, particularly in urban areas.

How Sacred Land works:

- Creates partnerships with religious communities and conservation organisations;
- Undertakes specific projects (eg opens historic pilgrimage routes, develops sacred gardens);
- Develops education programmes to encourage awareness and action on sacred environments;
- Provides support and expertise to local groups undertaking sacred land projects;
- Serves as a national network linking individual sacred land projects.

For more information on the Sacred Land Project write with a SAE to:
The Sacred Land Project, ARC, 9a Didsbury Park, Manchester M20 0LH



Sacred Britain
The official guide to the Sacred Land Project
Martin Palmer and Nigel Palmer

This beautifully illustrated book offers a whole new way of seeing and understanding Britain. From a retelling of the history of humanity in Britain, through a major section showing how to see the ancient sacred landscapes which lie around us, to modern day pilgrimage routes drawing upon sites sacred to Christianity and other faiths in the UK, this opens the doors to a true appreciation of the sacred environment of our land.

Published in association with Judy Piatkus (Publishers) Ltd

£25.00	0 7499 1706 7

SACRED LAND

Sacred Journeys
Paths for the new pilgrim
Jennifer Westwood

Sacred Land is not just Britain. It is the whole world and this book shows how people around the world treasure the sacred in their landscape and experience it through pilgrimage. A lavishly illustrated book, it contains sixty pilgrim routes to sacred land sites from the UK to South America, Russia to Africa. It also explores the whole notion of pilgrimage to sacred land sites in a thought provoking meditation throughout the book on pilgrimage.

Published in association with Gaia Books

£14.99	1 85675 004 3





Holy Ground
The guide to faith and ecology
Edited by Jo Edwards and Martin Palmer

The essential text book on religious statements and action on ecology. Drawing upon the Assisi Statements and the Windsor Declarations, the book contains nine authoritative statements on ecology from the Bahá'is, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and Taoists.

Published in association with Pilkington Press

£14.95	1 899044 12 4

Making Sacred Gardens
A guide
David Manning

This booklet offers simple practical ideas for creating a sacred garden.

Published by Arthur Rank Centre

£1.00

"The Sacred Land Project is designed to make the familiar excitingly unfamiliar; to make us aware that everywhere is potentially sacred and therefore to encourage us to walk gently for we tread on sacred ground."

Martin Palmer, Religious Advisor to WWF



Earth Ascending
An anthology of living poetry
Edited by Jay Ramsay

A collection of poems by modern British poets, such as Ted Hughes, reflecting upon Britain as a sacred environment. A wonderful reflective resource, especially for assemblies.

Published in association with Stride Publications

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E09E

SACRED LAND - National Launches

Scotland: Friday, April 18; Whithorn and Wigtown

The Scottish Launch will highlight projects that embody both an ancient and modern understanding of sacred land." Events will take place in Whithorn, site of Britain's first monastic community and in Wigtown, where Sacred Land is helping to re-design the town centre.

England: Wednesday, April 23rd (St. George's Day), London

The English launch takes place at St. Mary's Parish Church in Willesden, whose history as a sacred site dates back to pre-Christian times. The water of the church's holy well has not only been known for its healing powers, but for its rare black Madonna which made St. Mary's a major pilgrimage site until the Reformation. After the official launch of the national Sacred Land Project and related publications, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. George Carey, will lead a multi-faith gathering of religious leaders and guests in a blessing of St. Mary's new sacred land project (a churchyard fountain and garden, supplied by water from the ancient spring on the site).

Wales: Monday, April 28, Pennant Melangell and Corwen

The Welsh launch will celebrate the place where the Sacred Land Project was first conceived. Guests including the Archbishop of Wales, will walk part of the traditional pilgrimage route to St. Melangell's Church in Pennant Melangell. Legend has it, a landowner prince chased a rabbit into the forest while hunting in this area. The fleeing rabbit took refuge in the skirts of St. Melangell, who lived a monastic life among the animals here. The Prince, overwhelmed by this sight, not only converted to Christianity on the spot, but decreed the area a nature reserve vowing no living creature should ever be hunted in this forest again.

THE SACRED LAND
· PROJECT ·

supporting community environmental action
on the thousands of sacred sites throughout Britain

celebrating Britain's multi-faith society

promoting sustainability amongst the millions
who hold religious values and beliefs

demonstrating practical ways to improve quality of life
through care for the natural environment

drawing on Britain's ancient traditions
to create a better future

ARC

PILKINGTON FOUNDATION

MOA International

WWF

The Sacred Land Project ICOREC 9A Didsbury Park Manchester M20 5LH UK
tel 0161 434 0828 tel/fax 0161 434 8374 e-mail 'icorec@icorec.nwnet.co.uk'

THE SACRED LAND
• PROJECT •

The Sacred Land Project is an imaginative idea and most appropriate initiative for the millennium. HRH The Prince Philip

The Sacred Land Project is a five year, millennium project, which has launched the largest programme of religiously based, environmentally guided practical and educational projects ever undertaken in the UK. It has the support of all the major Churches, Christian denominations and other religious communities. It is guided environmentally by the World Wide Fund for Nature, UK (WWF) and the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (ARC). Environmental groups from the National Trust to Friends of the Earth are assisting the Project.

But we need your support as well.

When we began planning for the Sacred Land Project, we hoped for about 2,000 associated projects, nationwide, by the end of our five year plan - 2002. It now looks as if we shall reach this figure by late 1998. The demand is so much greater than we had expected. This is why we need your support.

The Sacred Land Project has clear aims. They are:

* Recovery and environmental improvement of ancient and often lost sacred sites and with it a sense of the 'sacred' throughout Britain;
* Environmental enhancement of sacred sites still in use;
* Creation of new sacred/special places, particularly in urban areas.

How Sacred Land works:

* Creates partnerships with religious communities and conservation organisations;
* Undertakes specific projects (e.g. opens historic pilgrimage routes, develops sacred gardens);
* Develops education programmes to encourage awareness and action on sacred environments;
* Provides support and expertise to local groups undertaking sacred land projects;
* Serves as a national network linking individual sacred land projects.

By becoming a Pilgrim Supporter you can travel with us, sometimes quite literally, as we restore, recover and create a better and more sacred environment. For £25 per annum, you will receive the regular newsletter, *Sacred Land,* invitations to special guided visits to key Sacred Land sites; reductions on all Sacred Land books (see enclosed leaflet) and invitations to the annual Sacred Land Lecture. In return we get your help to fund practical projects, educational materials and our specialist team who visit, assess and advise on sites.
We therefore invite you to become a Pilgrim Supporter of the Sacred Land Project. Cheques should be made out to Sacred Land and sent to the address below.

Name ..... Address .....

.....Tel .....

I/we wish to become Pilgrim Supporters of the Sacred Land Project. I/we enclose a cheque for £25 for one year's subscription .I/we have also added £ as a donation.

Signed ..... Date .....

ICOREC

The Sacred Land Project ICOREC 9A Didsbury Park Manchester M20 5LH UK
tel 0161 434 0828 tel/fax 0161 434 8374 e-mail 'icorec@icorec.nwnet.co.uk'

WWF

press information

Background to WWF's Sacred Land Project

WWF PLEDGES TO RE-HALLOW BRITAIN'S ENVIRONMENT

Everyone in Britain lives within ten miles of a sacred site. Our landscape is surprisingly rich in cultural and spiritual history. The Sacred Land Project, sponsored by WWF-UK, is the first of its type - involving religious and secular organisations in environmental restoration and recreation across the country.

WWF has been working globally with major religious groups since 1986. The Sacred Land Project not only celebrates Britain's multi-faith society but also demonstrates practical ways to improve quality of life through care of the natural environment.

Over the next five years, the Sacred Land programme will work with local communities, religious and conservation groups to re-open ancient pilgrimage routes, create new pilgrimage paths, assist in restoring old shrines and sacred sites and develop sacred gardens where humanity and nature can create an environment of spiritual significance.

HRH Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, President Emeritus of WWF says: "Thousands of sacred sites across Britain have been neglected or forgotten. Such places, shrines and monuments have inspired communities for centuries. This is a sacred Britain that reaches back across the centuries. The Sacred Land Project aims to re-establish the cultural religious and environmental significance of these sites....(and)...seeks to keep alive the tradition of a sacred space in a modern context...."

THE SACRED LAND
· PROJECT ·

WWF – the global force for nature conservation

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Out of hours 01483 412222
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press information

The scheme also has the support of the Archbishop of Canterbury and other major Church leaders, along with the support of the Jewish, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and Buddhist communities.

Examples of current projects include:

West Withington, Manchester: The creation of a "Path of Life" to what will be the only public open space on this neglected 1930's working-class estate.

The Hermitage ofSaintsAnthonyandCuthbert,Shrewsbury: Britain's only Greek Orthodox hermitage. A centre for iconography and spiritual retreat where three new woods are being planted as well as a monastic herb garden.

St. Mary's Church, Willesden, London: Originally, the location of a Celtic community ruled by Druids, the church dates back to 938AD. The Sacred Land project is working to excavate the site of an ancient holy well beneath the church, which was once a thriving pilgrimage site.

Notes to Editors: The Sacred Land Project will be officially launched on Wednesday 23 April at St. Mary's Church, Willesden.

For further information about the launch or other sites contact the WWF Press Office: Cherry Farrow 01483 412385, Sarah Gerrard 01483 412386 or John Fulcher 01483 412383.

THE SACRED LAND
· PROJECT ·

WWF-UK is part of the largest independent conservation organisation in the world.

WWF works with other conservation organisations, governments, industry, local communities and the public to protect the natural environment, stem the decline in animal and plant species and reduce pollution.

WWF-UK has a network of more than 400 volunteer groups.

The following are a sample of the more than 30 Sacred Land projects currently in development in the UK:

St. Christopher's West Withington Path of Life

Manchester

In partnership with the local council, church, hospital and area schools, Sacred Land is creating a "Path of Life" leading to what will be the only public open space on this neglected 1930s working-class housing estate.

Two enormous rocks will feature along this path, one listing the names of the three generations of Mancunians who have been baptised at St. Christopher's and another with the names of all those who have been married at the church originally located on this site. Planners hope that both young people and adults will find this space a safe alternative to the streets for meeting and relaxing.

The Hermitage of Saints Anthony and Cuthbert

Shrewsbury

A centre for iconography and spiritual retreat, this site is Britain's only Greek Orthodox hermitage. Set in a beautiful 20 acre site, it is also an example of environmentally sensitive design and practice. The buildings - an old cottage, barn and pigstys, have been rebuilt or adapted using local materials and scrap wood to create the hermitage and church. Three new woods, named after Celtic and Anglo-Saxon saints, are currently being planted, with chapels and prayer huts amongst them. Brother Aidan, the resident hermit, is also creating a wildflower meadow and designing a monastic herbal garden.

Sacred Land is supporting tree planting activities and aiding in the development of a new reed bed sewage system at the hermitage.

St. Mary's of Willesden

London

Originally thought to be the location of a Celtic community ruled by Druids and then a Saxon church, the existing church of St. Mary's dates back to 938AD. Underneath the church is an ancient holy well or spring which once was a thriving pilgrimage centre. In fact, the name Willesden itself means "the spring or well at the foot of the hill". A shrine grew up at site dedicated to the Black Virgin of Willesden who was believed to possess miraculous healing powers. The shrine's Black Virgin was later destroyed during the Reformation and was replaced three years ago.

Sacred Land is working in partnership with the church to restore the well to its original place of importance in religious life of Willesden. and will create a fountain and sacred garden in the churchyard fed by the ancient sacred spring. Sacred Land will also advise on the environmental management of the churchyard - an oasis of green in urban London.

Sacred Space for Wigtown Town Centre

Scotland

Wigtown is a Scottish town that shows the scars of economic collapse: unemployment is high, shops are boarded up; the town centre is empty. The local council is undertaking ambitious plans to reinvigorate Wigtown, positioning it to become the publishing centre of Scotland. The Sacred Land Project has join this revitalising effort inviting local people to imagine the possibilities for a sacred space at the heart of the community.

The final design will include a sacred garden reflecting the influence of Celtic Saints long associated with this area as well the a re-designed town square encouraging people back to the heart of Wigtown for work, shopping, meeting, relaxing and socialising.

Walsingham Pilgrim's Way

Norfolk

Walsingham's famous Anglican and Catholic shrines and Slipper Chapel make it one of Britain's major pilgrimage site visited by more than a quarter of a million pilgrims each year. Sacred Land will create a new section of pilgrimage route along a mile stretching between the Slipper Chapel (where pilgrims historically have left their shoes) and the village, passing en route the Orthodox Chapel in the old Railway station. Currently pilgrims must walk along a busy road competing with cars, trucks and other traffic.

The alternative route makes use of a deserted railway line running parallel to the existing road and would be accessible to the disabled. It will be landscaped appropriately and improved in other environmentally sensitive ways in consultation with churches and the local council.

Holy Island Interfaith Centre and Gardens

Scotland

This island which is the site of the cave of the 6th century hermit St. Molaise and of a 13th century Christian monastery is now owned by the Samye Ling Tibetan Buddhist Centre. The Buddhist community is creating a Tibetan retreat centre on the island based on Christian and Buddhist monastic design, and incorporating sacred garden traditions from both Christianity and Buddhism. The centre will be run on sustainable development principles. Already underway is an ambitious tree-planting programme in which Sacred Land is a key partner. Over 27,000 indigenous trees have been planted to date. An interfaith conference centre is also being planned.

The Whithorn Way and Monastic Garden

Scotland

Whithorn is the home of the oldest monastery in the UK. Pilgrims have been making their way to this holy place for 1600 years drawn by the prayers, poems and insights of the great Celtic saints who lived and worshipped here. Perhaps the most famous of these saints was St Ninian whose cave for meditation is found along the ancient Whithorn Way Pilgrimage route.

With the help of the Sacred Land project, this 93 mile route has undergone a major restoration and improvement taking into account environmental, spiritual and historic elements along the path. At the very heart of the monastery at Whithorn itself, Sacred Land is helping to create a traditional garden based on Celtic monastic principles.

As we have found the first Conference on Religions, Land and Conservation mutually beneficial, we recommend that this gathering be reconvened every five years. This meeting will serve as a review and auditing process to chart the progress of the faith communities and their religious leaders.

We commit ourselves individually and jointly to take the principles agreed upon at this gathering to our various situations and work towards implementing them.

We would encourage and welcome any projects and programmes which embody these principles and recommend courses of action.

Signed on 6 April 1995 by:

Fazlun Khalid	*Conference Chairman*
Shoji Mizuno	*Assistant Chairman*
Jo Edwards	*Conference Secretary*
Paul Hanley	*Baha'i*
Jimmy Seow	*Baha'i*
Venerable Lobsang Gawa	*Buddhist*
Stephanie Kaza	*Buddhist*
Lucian Gavrila	*Christian*
Eddie Idle	*Christian*
Pat Lupo OSB	*Christian*
Shri Shiba Sankar Chakraborty	*Hindu*
Swami Akhandanand Sarasvati	*Hindu*
Shri Sanjay Rattan	*Hindu*
Shri Sewak Sharan	*Hindu*
Meir Lipshatz	*Jew*
Abdur Razzaq Lubis	*Muslim*
Fuad Nadi	*Muslim*
Mohammad Sharif Weideman	*Muslim*
Shigenobu Kanayama	*MOA*
Teruo Taniguchi	*MOA*

The Conference on Religions, Land and Conservation is sponsored by MOA International, Pilkington Foundation and World Wide Fund for Nature

For further information contact:
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9A Didsbury Park, Manchester M20 5LH
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THE OHITO DECLARATION ON RELIGIONS, LAND AND CONSERVATION

Statement from the Conference on Religions, Land and Conservation held at Ohito, Japan, 27th March to 6th April, 1995, later adopted at the Summit on Religions and Conservation held at Windsor Castle 29th April to 3rd May, 1995

The world community of faiths have been voiceless in the environmental debate and marginalised in the decision-making processes concerning the future of their home, planet earth. Yet, collectively, people of faith represent the most powerful voice in the world. The Conference on Religion, Land and Conservation held in March 1995 brought together leading activists of the major world faiths in Ohito, Japan, under the auspices of MOA International, supported by WWF, World Wide Fund for Nature and ICOREC, the International Consultancy for Religion, Education and Culture. After nine days of discussion and reflection they produced a declaration which was subsequently adopted by the Summit on Religions and Conservation held in Windsor Castle, England, in May 1995. It draws attention to the global environmental crisis and the role which the faith communities need to play in motivating people to respect the land and preserve it for future generations.

EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN

The health of the planet is being undermined by systemic breakdowns on several levels:
- faith communities are not taking effective action to affirm the bond between humankind and nature, and lack accountability in this regard;
- human systems continue to deteriorate, as evidenced by militarism, warfare, terrorism, refugee movement, violations of human rights, poverty, debt and continued domination by vested financial, economic and political interests;
- biological systems and resources are being eroded, as evidenced by the ongoing depletion, fragmentation and pollution of the natural systems.

Recognising the important parallels between cultural and biological diversity, we feel a special urgency with regard to the ongoing erosion of cultures and faith communities and their environmental traditions, including the knowledge of people living close to the land.

SPIRITUAL PRINCIPLES

As people of faith, we are called to respond to these concerns. We recognize that humanity as a whole must face these concerns together. Therefore we recommend these principles as a basis for appropriate environmental policy, legislation and programmes, understanding that they may be expressed differently in each faith community.

1 Religious beliefs and traditions call us to care for the earth.

2 For people of faith maintaining and sustaining environmental life systems is a religious responsibility.

3 Nature should be treated with respect and compassion, thus forming a basis for our sense of responsibility for conserving plants, animals, land, water, air and energy.

4 Environmental understanding is enhanced when people learn from the example of prophets and of nature itself.

5 Markets and trade arrangements should reflect the spiritual needs of people and their communities to ensure health, justice and harmony. Justice and equity principles of faith traditions should be used for maintaining and sustaining environmental life systems.

6 People of faith should give more emphasis to a higher quality of life in preference to a higher standard of living, recognising that greed and avarice are root causes of environmental degradation and human debasement.

7 All faiths should fully recognise and promote the role of women in environmental sustainability.

8 People of faith should be involved in the conservation and development process. Development of the environment must take better account of its effects on the community and its religious beliefs.

9 Faith communities should endorse multilateral consultation in a form that recognizes the value of local/indigenous wisdom and current scientific information.

10 In the context of faith perspective, emphasis should be given not only to the globalisation of human endeavours, but also to participatory community action.

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

1 We call upon religious leaders to emphasise environmental issues within religious teaching: faith should be taught and practised as if nature mattered.

2 We call upon religious communities to commit themselves to sustainable practices and encourage community use of their land.

3 We call upon religious leaders to recognise the need for ongoing environmental education and training for themselves and all those engaged in religious instruction.

4 We call upon people of faith to promote environmental education within their community especially among their youth and children.

5 We call upon people of faith to implement individual, community and institutional action plans at local, national, and global levels that flow from their spiritual practices and where possible to work with other faith communities.

6 We call upon religious leaders and faith communities to pursue peacemaking as an essential component of conservation action.

7 We call upon religious leaders and communities to be actively involved in caring for the environment to sponsor sustainable food production and consumption.

8 We call upon people of faith to take up the challenge of instituting fair trading practices devoid of financial, economic and political exploitation.

9 We call upon the world's religious leaders and world institutions to establish and maintain a networking system that will encourage sustainable agriculture and environmental life systems.

10 We call upon faith communities to act immediately, to undertake self-review and auditing processes on conservation issues on a regular basis.

ICOREC is an interfaith, intercultural consultancy actively engaged in promoting greater understanding and appreciation of the variety of faiths and cultures in our world.

Our working principle is that each faith should speak for itself in a way which is accessible to others and bears in mind the audience which it is addressing.

ICOREC is based on the belief that religion plays a key role in shaping and giving meaning to daily life and the ways in which people perceive and value the world.

We intend that faith should speak to faith, and also that faiths should speak to the educational and the secular world.

ICOREC works internationally with faith leaders, faith communities, educationalists, environmentalists, academics, publishers and broadcasters.

Consultants are drawn from the major faiths of the world and represent a wide cross-section within each faith.

ICOREC is grateful to the Manchester Metropolitan University for providing rooms and facilities at its Faculty of Community Studies in support for ICOREC's educational work.

ICOREC co-operates with the Religious Studies department of the University in research and teaching.

ICOREC

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ICOREC

international consultancy on religion, education & culture

The International Consultancy on Religion, Education and Culture was founded in 1983 by Martin Palmer and grew out of work on multi-faith education in inner-city Manchester, UK.

Since then ICOREC has worked with many different organisations around the world to help the major world faiths offer their insights on a range of issues.

We have acted as consultants to the World Council of Churches, the World Wide Fund for Nature, the Council of Europe, the New Economics Foundation, Greenpeace, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church, and many other religious and secular organisations. In 1995 we were appointed consultants for the Alliance of Religions and Conservation.

ICOREC works with religion at the day to day level as well as at the philosophical and conceptual level, seeking always to acknowledge the diversity of ways in which religion and belief affect us.

ICOREC combines a core team of writers and researchers based at its Manchester offices with an international network of independent specialists.

The core team in Manchester provide the basic skills of editing, co-ordinating and organising, as well as writing which is the basis of ICOREC's work. Other consultants provide specific expertise and information in terms of faiths, languages and academic disciplines.

Among ICOREC's many activities:

- Acting as religious advisers to the World Wide Fund for Nature for the establishment and expansion of the Network on Conservation and Religion.
- Directing the World Council of Churches Intercultural Education programmes established in five countries.
- Assisting a number of world religions in producing their own educational material, especially in the area of environmental education.
- Regular research and consultancy work for BBC Radio religious broadcasting, and collaboration on a number of TV programmes with Channel Four, Granada, Central and independent TV production companies.
- Collaboration with the Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environmental Sciences, and with the Friends of Vrindavan educational and environmental project based around the sacred forests of Krishna in India.
- Maintaining and operating Circa photo library which holds transparencies on a wide variety of faiths world-wide.
- Assisting in setting up the International Sacred Literature Trust and the Sacred Earth Drama Trust.
- Council of Europe project on the role of Religion in secular education.
- Assisting in the organisation of major events such as the WWF 25th birthday celebrations in Assisi, summer seminars for the Ecumenical Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church, and the Summit of Religions and Conservation in Japan and the UK, 1995.

Publications include:

- *The State of Religion Atlas* for Simon and Schuster
- *Religion and Ecology* series for WWF UK with Cassell
- *Essential Teachings in World Spirituality* series for Century Hutchinson
- A wide range of Chinese classics in modern English translation, including the I Ching, Tao Te Ching, Chinese Almanac, and collections of Chinese stories, folk-lore and astrological texts.
- *Worlds of Difference* and *Worlds of Choice*: standard classroom books on religion and the environment which have been translated into six languages, produced for WWF UK.
- Material for primary and secondary school religious education with several publishers, including *Religion, Education and Life* with Collins Educational.
- *Sainsbury's Religions of the World* with HarperCollins
- Several liturgies and meditations on religion and the environment.
- A number of books by Martin Palmer which explore and challenge the ways in which we view the world around us.

A full booklist is available on request.

SACRED GARDENS

A living growing memory

by
David Manning

THE SACRED
LAND PROJECT

Sacred Land Project

This project aims to re-establish the cultural, religious and environmental significance of sacred sites throughout Britain. It also seeks to keep alive the tradition of sacred space in a modern context by creating new spaces for reflection and renewal within towns and cities and in the countryside.

Church and Conservation Project

In the late 1980's when it was realised that church land and burial grounds in particular were a valuable conservation resource, having been carved many years earlier out of the natural countryside, English Nature, together with the Arthur Rank Centre established the Church and Conservation Project. Its role was to make the public aware of, and develop this natural resource. David Manning is the project leader.



Sacred Gardens

Section 1

Introduction.

This booklet is an introduction to the aims of the Sacred Land Project, to the concept behind and to the history of sacred gardens. Over recent years the Alliance of Religions and Conservation, the World Wide Fund for Nature and the International Consultancy on Religion, Education and Culture have been working towards adding a spiritual dimension to the current need to help and repair our environment. This has culminated in Britain with the Sacred Land project, a five-year initiative aimed at re-hallowing our land both spiritually and environmentally.

Britain has a rich history of sacred sites and places. By this we mean sites where worship has taken place for centuries, trees that are thousands of years old and which were sacred to pre-Christian religions, cities and towns which were designed around a Christian or biblical template and sacred gardens such as monastic gardens and churchyards. All of these are an important part of Britain's heritage and many sites are being forgotten or neglected today.

The Sacred Land Project intends to revive these forgotten sites and restore their importance both nationally and, more importantly, to their communities.

However, the Sacred Land project is more than simply an opportunity to look back nostalgically at our spiritual and religious past. We aim to take these historical sites and look at them as a way forward to our religious present and future. As with all good conservation projects we are not aiming to "pickle" Britain's religious heritage but to develop and improve upon it where possible. An example of this can be seen in our work with the Shrines of Walsingham where Sacred Land has taken the existing pilgrimage route and added a new mile long section which takes the pilgrim from the Slipper Chapel into the Village itself along a disused railway track.

A further illustration is the work that we are doing with sites such as Knaresborough, Chester Cathedral and Holy Trinity Church, Beckenham on creating sacred gardens.

In this booklet we hope to show some of these sacred garden types, a few of the plants that grow in them and where further information can be found to help build one.

Section 2.

Monastic Gardens.

Before the dissolution of the monasteries in the mid 1530's gardens formed the centre of all the larger abbeys, cathedrals and monastic centres throughout Britain. The gardens were not only central to the monastic way of life but also to the local community to which they provided sanctuary and medicine. When one sees the Brother Cadfael herb garden at Shrewsbury Abbey it is possible to imagine the monks tending the beds and picking the plants that would be used to heal the sick and wounded of the area. Although Shrewsbury is the garden that instantly stands out, other herbal gardens have also been created at Gloucester and Peterborough Cathedrals.

With help from the Sacred Land project Chester is to be the next to recreate one of these important sites. Chester claim to hold the most complete collection of monastic buildings in the country and their educational officer regularly has local school children dressing up as monks and sampling the monastic lifestyle. They believe that the garden will be an important addition to their education department.

The Sacred Land project will help the cathedral to develop this idea by providing plant lists of those plants that would have been present in monastic gardens, designers who are

experts in this area of landscape and garden design, contributions towards the cost of developing this idea and the publicity needed to get a plan of this scale off the ground.

The following is a list of some of the plants that would be found in a monastic garden:

Achillea millefolium	*Yarrow*
Ajuga reptans	*Bugle*
Alchemilla vulgaris	*Lady's mantle*
Anemone pulsatilla	*Pasque flower*
Anethum graveolens	*Dill*
Aster amellus	*Michaelmas daisy*
Foeniculum vulgare	*Fennel*
Hypericum perferatum	*St John's wort*
Hyssopus officinalis	*Hyssop*
Origanum majorana	*Marjoram*
Primula vulgaris	*Primrose*
Salvia officinalis	*Sage*
Tanacetum parthenium	*Feverfew*
Thymus vulgaris	*Common thyme*
Valeriana officinalis	*Valerian*

All of the plants mentioned above had a medicinal use to the monastery and the surrounding community. If you would like further information on design of these gardens or where a full plant list can be obtained then please see section 5 of this booklet.

Section 3

Churchyards and Sacristan's Gardens.

For the past few decades there has been an increasing trend in society to suburbanise and "neaten" our churchyards and cemeteries which has left our rural and urban areas with thousands of "bowling greens" that have headstones in them. This is a recent development in the management of burial grounds and is also a complete break from tradition. Originally these areas would have been used as hay meadows and would have been grazed on rotation by sheep and goats, therefore giving a beautiful floral display during those months when the areas were rested from the livestock.

This is an area of work that has been developed over the past eight years the Living Churchyard & Cemetery Project, which, with support from English Nature, has been promoting the principles, and practices of nature conservation in burial grounds throughout the country. Whilst this project is running independently from the Sacred Land project, it is still closely connected via the Church & Conservation Project which is housed at the Arthur Rank Centre in Warwickshire. With over three thousand sites around the country involved with the Living Churchyard & Cemetery Project, the Sacred Land project feels that this is an important element of its support work

On a similar line, however, are the Sacristan's gardens that the Sacred Land project is developing with help from the Living Churchyard & Cemetery Project. These gardens would have been part of the surrounds of abbeys and the more important churches and would have been created and tended by the sacristan, hence the name.

Unlike the monastic gardens (see section 2) they would have not have been developed primarily for medicinal usage. Their purpose was to grow plants that would have been used to decorate the adjoining church or abbey on special occasions such as weddings and religious festivals. Like the monastic gardens these sacred gardens disappeared at the time of the dissolution and it is, therefore, likely that a majority of the plant species grown would have been indigenous.

The following is a list of some of the plants that may have grown in a sacristan's garden:

Rosa gallica officinalis	*The Apothecary's Rose*
Rosa gallica versicolor	*Rosa mundi*
Digitalis purpurea	*Foxglove*
Dryopteris filix-mas	*Male fern*
Fragaria vesca	*Wild strawberry*
Helleborus niger	*Christmas rose*
Papaver rhodeas	*Field poppy*
Papaver somniferum	*Opium poppy*
Primula veris	*Cowslip*

For further information about these plants see section 5 of this booklet.

Section 4.

Garden Design Points

When creating a sacred garden it is important to build into the plan and then cater for the section of the public with special needs. Incorporating a sensory aspect to any garden will benefit not just the disabled visitor but will contribute to general enjoyment of the garden by all visitors. The following is a list of hints that should be considered when creating sacred gardens.

Paths and ramps:

- Widths of paths and ramps should be a minimum of three foot, but four foot wide would enable a wheelchair to be turned round anywhere on the path.
- Material should be non-slip, such as ribbed concrete, and special care should be taken about shady areas where the build up of algae can be slippery.
- Gradients of ramped areas should be no steeper than one in fifteen.
- Ramped areas should have a handrail, preferably both sides, for people who are arthritic or visually impaired. The ideal height is 33 inches.
- It is essential to have a defined path edge – a raised kerb at exposed edges to prevent wheelchairs going over the

edge e.g. into the soft soil; and this should be a different colour for the visually handicapped person.

- Consider using some very bright coloured ceramic tiles set in cement every so often, to add interest and change.
- Be careful that branches of trees are not too low, or that trailing plants don't stray too far onto the path.
- If you have any steps on the path itself, they should be a maximum height of 2 inches and 1 foot deep. This is OK for anyone pushing a wheelchair, but will be impossible for all but the most athletic self-propelling wheelchair users.
- If you have an interesting feature in the ramped area, it is essential to create a level "parking space" so a wheelchair user can stop safely to see or smell or listen or feel.

Raised Beds.

- Ideal height is 2 feet to 2 feet 6 inches for wheelchair users to see and touch plants, especially if they are going to be involved themselves in tending the beds.
- Space for wheelchair access needs to be three foot all round.
- If standing, an ideal height for a bed is 3 to 4 feet, for those who are involved in gardening but cannot bend.
- You need to remember that raised beds tend both to dry out very quickly and also get very cold in the winter. They need good moisture compost, drainage and also sealing, especially if you use brick.
- Drainage holes can be covered with nylon mesh to prevent them becoming blocked.

A few "sensory" ideas.

- **Hearing**

Running water, a fountain – the sounds change as one moves round.

Pool of water for reflection and ripples, induces a feeling of calm.

Wind chimes hanging from branches of trees.

Birdsong – bird tables, nesting boxes.

Bees, or plants which attract them e.g. cotoniastas

Noisy foliage plants - bamboos and grasses which russle in the breeze.

- **Smell**

Flowers and shrubs – keep different strong scents a little separate from each other so each might be appreciated. Some examples are wallflower, lily of the valley, sweet william, broom, jasmine, magnolia, honeysuckle, stock, nicotiana, mock orange. Seasonal smells should also be considered e.g. chrysanthemums in autumn, firs in winter.

Camomile lawn – releases fragrance when walked or wheeled upon. Also mint lawn.

Fruit – e.g. strawberries.

Herbs such as rosemary, sage, lavender, lemon balm, thyme.

- **Touch**

Different textures – bark of trees.

Plants with feathery plumes (astilbes), cineraria leaves feel woolly, hazel catkins, thornless roses, hydrangeas, dahlias – big flower heads to hold, different shapes and sizes of leaves.

Plants with contrasting leaves - smooth waxy eucalyps to the spiky conifers, the small leaved box to the large sycamores, the long straight thin grasses to the complicated ornamental junipers.

Water – pools and water trickleing over stones.

Stones – rough, smooth different shapes used to texture the path and edges.

- **Taste**

The wide range of culinary herbs offer a very wide range many also with interesting scents - from the many varieties of the mint family, through to the onion tribe. The hardwood thymes to the vigorous sweet cicely and lovage. All these offer a safe adventure of taste.

Include the less common herbs - the bitter rue to the aromatic lavender family.

Think of fruit trees, bushes, and vegetables.

Take care not to include harmful plants.

- **Sight**

Remember safety aspects, beware sharp edges of anything, seats should be set back, warnings about any hazards, edges of paths distinct.

Blocks of colour is better than intermingled, it makes a greater visual impact.

Encourage wildlife, butterflies etc.

Brightly coloured stone set into concrete paths (see above).

Take care to balance and compliment colours and hues. Different varieties of plants show different shapes and can intrigue and fascinate.

Hearing, touch, smell and taste are important for visually disabled people, so all the above apply.

Other related considerations

- Provision of disabled toilets with recommended access and support features.

- Provision for disabled parking.

- If a feature is that it is to be accessible to the disabled there may be grant aid, tax concessions and specialist advice available.

Section 5

Further information and contacts.

Full lists of plants found in
monastic gardens, and
sacristan's gardens
are available from.

The Church & Conservation Project, The Arthur Rank Centre, National Agricultural Centre, Stoneleigh Park, Warwickshire CV8 2LZ
Tel. 01203 696969 Fax. 01203 414808

The Living Churchyard & Cemetery Project has a range of information including leaflet packs, DIY information packs, posters, videos, slide/tape packs and audio-cassettes. These are available from:

The Living Churchyard & Cemetery Project, The Arthur Rank Centre, National Agricultural Centre, Stoneleigh Park, Warwickshire CV8 2LZ
Tel. 01203 696969 Fax. 01203 414808

The Sacred Land Project is run from the International Consultancy on Religion Education and Culture at ICOREC, 9A Didsbury Park, Manchester M20 5LH
Tel. 0161 434 0828 Fax. 0161 434 8374

Other organisations:

The Wildlife Trusts, The Green, Witham Park, Waterside South, Lincoln LN5 7JR
Tel. 01522 544400

English Nature, Northminster House, Peterborough PE1 1UA
Tel. 01733 455000 Fax: 01733 68834

English Heritage, Keysign House, 429 Oxford Street, London W1R 2HD
Tel. 0171 973 3000

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£1.00

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With support from

ICOREC

PYRAMIDS OF SACRIFICE

POLITICAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

PETER L. BERGER

Basic Books, Inc., Publishers

NEW YORK

Chapter V

POLICY AND THE CALCULUS OF PAIN

THE HISTORY OF MANKIND is a history of pain. The pain inflicted by nature usually appears in the historical records only in its most spectacular manifestations, as in the most terrible famines, epidemics, or earthquakes. But the pain inflicted by men on each other is the indispensable raw material of the historian's reconstructions. Looking backward from the vantage point of the present, history appears as an endless series of massacres. The farther back these massacres lie in the past, the easier it is to overlook the human anguish they represent, especially if they are connected with what now appear to have been great turning points in history. Historians are very good at burying the trivia of individual suffering in the alleged magnalia (to borrow Cotton Mather's term) of the course of events. Philosophers of history have raised this trick of inattention to the level of an essential tool of their trade. When overlooking the pain becomes difficult, they provide its legitimations. The usual formula for the latter goes something like this: "Event X brought great suffering to many who had to live through it, but it was a good thing after all, because it led to event Y"—which event Y then usually turns out to be something from which the philosopher and his contemporaries now benefit. As Jacob Burckhardt pointed out (in his *Reflections on History*), this kind of philosophy of history

has about the same logic as the farmer who sees proof of providence in the fact that a hailstorm destroyed his neighbor's field but not his own.

All men are vultures in that they live off the agonies of the past. At the foundations of every historical society there are vast piles of corpses, victims of the murderous acts that, directly or indirectly, led to the establishment of that society. There is no getting away from this fact, and there is nothing to be done about it. It is an inevitable burden of the human condition. But some men are vultures in a more active sense. They produce additional piles of corpses by their own actions. And they themselves, or more likely others in their service, produce the legitimations of the massacres even as the latter are taking place, and in some instances beforehand. It is this kind of thinking that is of interest here; it constitutes the ideological nexus between policy and pain.

Analysis of alternative policy options in terms of costs and benefits, of input and output, has become commonplace. Such analysis is typically very technical, and generally borrows its concepts and techniques from economics, even where noneconomic phenomena are involved. To say that such analysis is technical is ipso facto to say that it is value-free. As was pointed out earlier, it is not the intention here to question the validity of this kind of analysis, or, in principle, its utility. It is of great importance, however, to see its limitations. There should be no objection, on methodological grounds, to the technical and value-free analysis of policy problems. But it must be clear at the same time that policy invariably *also* implies problems of values. Sooner or later, avowedly or covertly, all policy considerations involve choices between values, and all policy decisions are value-charged. What is proposed here, therefore, is a *non*-value-free expansion of costs/benefits analysis.

More specifically, what is proposed is an input/output calculus of human suffering, aspects of which can be clarified in a technical way, without immediate value judgments. For example, it is possible to calculate quite objectively the relationship between a particular wage policy and the degree of deprivation it will entail for various groups. Or one may objectively describe the contribution of a compaign of terror to the attainment of particular political goals. But even if there is no moral intent in such analyses, any *application* of their results to policy making immediately and irrevocably takes place within a moral frame of reference. This is so even if, and perhaps especially if, the policy makers claim that

their actions should be understood in purely technical terms. Therefore, it is proper that the value presuppositions of the following argument be made explicit. They are very simple: *It is presupposed that policy should seek to avoid the infliction of pain. It is further presupposed that, in those cases where policy does involve either the active infliction or the passive acceptance of pain, this fact requires a justification in terms of moral rather than technical necessity.*

Every mode of analysis "slices up" reality in a particular way. Thus a map of the world drawn by someone interested in the distribution of rainfall will look different from a map designed to show the spread of American investments. The calculus proposed here suggests a different way of "slicing up" the sociopolitical realities of the contemporary world, a different way of "mapping" them. In the dichotomy of capitalist and socialist models of development, Brazil and China regularly appear as polar opposites. This allocation, of course, is highly defensible in certain respects: Brazil is today the largest and most dynamic case of capitalist development in the Third World, as China is the most important case of the socialist alternative. What is more, each model has been deemed a success *in its own terms*. The analysis proposed here, though, is precisely geared to question these terms. It suggests that, whatever the dissimilarities, the two cases belong in the *same* category in one crucially important aspect: *Both the Brazilian and the Chinese models assume the sacrifice of at least a generation for the achievement of their respective goals.* A comparison of these two cases will therefore be very useful in elaborating what is meant by the proposed moral amplification of policy analysis.

When the military seized power in Brazil in 1964, it proclaimed the beginning of what it called (and still calls) the Brazilian Revolution.[1] The immediate aims of the takeover were to prevent what the military perceived as the communist direction of the Goulart government then in office, to establish political order in the country, and to arrest the galloping rate of inflation. The long-range goal was the transformation of Brazil from a poor and backward into a rich and modern country. In 1971, as the military regime proclaimed its First National Development Plan, it stated as its first objective "to place Brazil, in a period of one generation, in the category of developed nations."[2] To attain this objec-

tive, the regime has formulated in considerable detail what is now widely called (by advocates as well as critics) the "Brazilian model of development."

What are the key features of the model, as defined by those in charge of it?

The model is explicitly and unabashedly capitalist. It presupposes that development is best achieved by a capitalist market economy, and both its economic and political policies are geared to providing a favorable environment for this type of development. Conversely, the model is not only explicitly antisocialist but is opposed to all forms of welfare policy deemed to hinder capitalist development. The model is defined as avoiding both "statism" and "denationalization." By "statism" is meant the control of central economic processes by the government; in the ideology of the regime, "statism" is identified with socialism, and is considered as equivalent to economic stagnation. By "denationalization" is meant the control of central economic processes by foreign interests. The ideology of the regime is emphatically nationalist, and in this respect if not in others it is fully in accord (at least on the level of rhetoric) with the current polemic against "dependency" in other Latin American countries. The capitalist development of Brazil is to be, in the long run, under the auspices of what is called "national enterprise"—that is, it is to be a Brazilian capitalism, controlled by Brazilians for Brazilian purposes. The opposition to "statism," however, by no means implies a laissez-faire role played by government. The Brazilian government intervenes very powerfully in all areas of economic activity. Its interventions, however, are understood to be for the protection and furtherance of a market economy. In addition, the opposition to "denationalization" does not imply a hostility to foreign capital. On the contrary, the regime has created unusually favorable conditions for foreign investments, which since 1964 have flowed into Brazil in what may accurately be described as an avalanche. But this foreign capital is understood by the regime as an indispensable aid to the furtherance of "national enterprise." Dependency on foreign economic interests is either denied by advocates of the model or presented as a temporary phase in the development process.

The key emphasis is on economic growth, as measured in terms of Gross National Product and per capita productivity. Indeed, the ideology of the Brazilian model is a textbook instance of what its critics call "developmentalism" or "growthmanship." For all practical purposes, in

the rhetoric of the regime economic growth *is* development. Both economic and social policies are geared to "modernization," understood as the transformation of society in such a way as to facilitate rapid and enduring economic growth. For example, there is a massive government program of manpower training, PIPMO, which is viewed as the mobilization of "human resources" for economic growth. Even the educational programs of the government, such as MOBRAL, the vast literacy program, are defined in the same manner. The rationale of almost all government actions is explicitly economic, and the justifications are often stated in terms of technical economics. The "modernization" of the country is to be rapid and is to include the country as a whole. The latter goal is stated in terms of "national integration," meaning the overcoming of regional isolation and the economic rationalization of the continent-size expanse of Brazil. A potent symbol of "national integration" is the construction of the Transamazonic Highway, which, when completed, will link the impoverished Northeast with the pioneering areas of the Amazon Basin, and will link both with the more advanced regions of the south.

Conversely, there is a deemphasis of what may broadly be called the "distributionist" aspects of development. A less polite formulation would be that the model is "antiwelfare." One of the most-quoted dicta among advocates of the model is to the effect that "wealth must be created before it can be distributed." It is acknowledged that the short-term effects of the policies of the regime are increasing polarization of the population in terms of income distribution, and postponement in alleviation of the miseries of the most deprived groups. These effects are understood as being both necessary and temporary. In the long run, according to the ideology, all groups will benefit from the economic growth. An important aspect of this is the anti-inflation program of the government. Its economists concluded early that a rigorous policy of wage controls was essential to combat inflation, and this policy has been adhered to forcefully. The economic technicalities of the policy are complex (a key category is that of "monetary correction," which serves as a guideline to all government interventions in this area), but the practical consequences are quite simple: Severe limitations have been imposed on the economic advancement of large sectors of the population.

It is also acknowledged with considerable candor that such policies are difficult to pursue under conditions of representative democracy in the common Western sense. Brazil since 1964 has been a military dicta-

torship, only superficially adorned with some of the trappings of representative democracy. Apart from the actual practice of the government, even the new constitution formally gives near-dictatorial powers to the executive in all strategic areas of government. Apologists for the regime routinely deny its terroristic dimensions, but they generally admit its less than democratic character. The justification is the maintenance of political stability, which in turn is deemed essential for economic development. Democracy, like a more equitable distribution of economic benefits, will supposedly come later in the process of development.

The regime claims that it has gone a considerable way toward achievement of the goals set by the model. It has certainly succeeded in reversing the direction in which Brazil was moving under the Goulart administration (however one may wish to designate the same). It has also succeeded in imposing a condition that, in value-free terms, could be described as political stability. All organized opposition to the regime (with the possible exception of segments of the Catholic church) has either been suppressed or domesticated. All politically relevant media of communication are tightly controlled. Unlike the situation in some neighboring countries, there is virtually no guerrilla activity, rural or urban, in Brazil, and it is unlikely that any will develop. The country, in other words, continues to be firmly in the hands of the military government.

This political stability has indeed been utilized to provide a secure environment for the economic policies of the regime. The government claims that it has succeeded in bringing inflation down to a manageable rate. This claim is disputed by its critics (and, incidentally, it is only with regard to inflation that the critics charge that the government's statistics are fraudulent). Nobody disputes that in recent years Brazil has achieved remarkable economic growth. This achievement is what some enthusiastic commentators have called "the Brazilian miracle." In 1965, the year after the military took power, the GNP growth rate was 3.9 percent. The rate increased in an accelerated fashion from year to year. In 1972 it reached 11.3 percent. Between 1964 and 1970 (the year before the First National Development Plan was promulgated) the GNP increased by 52 percent; in the same period industrial production increased by 69 percent. To date there is no indication of a reversal in these trends. *In its own terms*, therefore, the model may be said to have

succeeded in at least some of its short-run objectives, and to be well on the way to the long-run ones.

The terms of this assessment are put in question by asking about the costs of the model.[3] Even before such a critique gets to the matter of costs in human suffering, there are serious questions to be asked about the economic "distortions" of the model. The very first question will be: *What* is growing under the present policies? The answer is not clear in all details, but the general trend is clear enough: There has been a heavy expansion of capital-intensive (as against labor-intensive) industry, much of it producing durable consumer goods and much of it financed and/or controlled by foreign interests. The consumer goods produced (automobiles, television sets, refrigerators, and so on) remain unattainable luxuries for the bulk of Brazil's population. In other words, the priorities of production are geared to the consumption of a privileged minority. The role of foreign capital in this economic expansion has created a formidable national debt and has certainly promoted "dependency," at least in the economic sense. But the most important "distortions" have been brought about by the capital-intensive character of this type of industrialization.

If economic growth of such dimensions is tantamount to development, one may expect that its effects will be clearly noticeable in a decrease in unemployment. The opposite has been the case in Brazil. Unemployment has been growing, not decreasing. Thus between the censuses of 1960 and 1970 the percentage of the labor force in employment declined from 32.3 percent to 31.7 percent—not a dramatic decline, to be sure, but rather different from what one would expect during the unfolding of an economic "miracle." Even more ominously, the proportion of the labor force engaged in *industrial* employment also declined somewhat between the two census years. The import of these statistics may be captured by an image—that of, say, a Japanese-owned factory making sophisticated electronic equipment in the Northeast. Many such factories have been drawn there by a government policy of tax incentives to favor the poorer regions of the country. These incentives are unrelated to employment practices. Such a factory may even be fully automated—and it may import from Japan the few technicians needed to operate the automated plant. Quite apart from the question of whether Brazil really needs more sophisticated electronic equipment, and whether Japanese-owned factories should produce it, the impact of such a factory on its

immediate social environment may be exactly zero. The image is that of a gleaming modern plant, with a few foreign technicians watching over an automated production process, turning out goods for which nobody in the area has the slightest use—and all this, very likely, in a community in which there is massive unemployment and unrelieved human misery.

The polarization of the population also appears quite clearly in the government's own statistics. Thus between the 1960 and 1970 censuses there has been a decrease in the share of the lowest strata of the population in total national income. Again, the decrease has not been dramatic; but, again, the notion of a development "miracle" would make one expect a change for the better rather than for the worse. In 1970 one-third of the total national income was in the hands of 5 percent of the population; in the same year, the poorest 40 percent received 10 percent of the income. But this is not yet the worst of the tale told by these statistics. The economic condition of the poor has not only declined relative to that of the more privileged strata (declined, that is, in "distributionist" terms), but it has declined *absolutely*. This result is attributable to a combination of inflation and the wage policy designed to combat inflation. Thus, between 1960 and 1970 the real minimum salary is estimated to have *declined* by about 30 percent. These are national figures; in some regions the decline may have been even greater. To understand the significance of a 30 percent decline in wage income, one must be aware of what these wages actually are. Thus, in 1968, 50 percent of the population had an annual per capita income of one hundred and twenty dollars—or thirty-five cents a day! Put simply: In populations living very close to the subsistence margin, even a slight decline in income may spell disaster; a decline of 30 percent, although drawn out over a ten-year period, may spell the difference between survival and starvation. And even if one allows every argument put forth by advocates of the model in justification of these facts (such as the argument that more recent statistics are more reliable and therefore not strictly comparable with earlier ones, so that the deterioration may be less than it seems, or the argument that wage income figures have little significance in certain rural settings), a clear conclusion emerges: For a large portion of the Brazilian people the alleged economic "miracle" has meant not less but more misery.

The overall picture that emerges is that of two nations, one relatively affluent, the other in various degrees of misery. Such a state of affairs,

of course, exists in many countries of the Third World. The sheer size of Brazil, however, with its enormous territory and its population of about one hundred million, makes for a particular situation. Using reasonable criteria of differentiation, one may divide this population into about fifteen million in the sector of affluence and eighty-five million in the sector of misery. To see the economic import of these figures, one must focus on the fact that fifteen million is a very large number of people—indeed, it is the population of quite a few important countries with advanced industrial economies. As one commentator put it, Brazil is a Sweden superimposed upon an Indonesia. This "Sweden," though, can generate an intensive economic dynamic of its own, by and for itself—without having any great effect on the "Indonesia." More specifically, the "Sweden" constitutes a sizable domestic market for consumer goods such as automobiles, television sets, or even air-conditioning units, thus permitting economically profitable production of these commodities. This is a feature of the Brazilian situation that is absent in most Third World countries, where the domestic market is simply too small for this type of industrialization to be profitable. In this way, the very size of Brazil contributes an additional dimension to the process of polarization. It also contributes a seeming plausibility to the rhetoric of the regime: With a little luck, a visitor may travel all over the country and see nothing but "Sweden," with some bits of "Indonesia" either being absorbed into the former or serving as a colorful backdrop for it.

This is the dry stuff of economics. Behind it lies a world of human pain. For a very large segment of the population, life continues to be a grim daily struggle for physical survival. There are, of course, regional differences, with conditions in the Northeast being the worst in the country.[1] Millions of people in Brazil are severely undernourished, and some are literally starving to death. Millions of people in Brazil are afflicted with diseases directly related to malnutrition and lack of elementary public hygiene, and are abandoned to these diseases with little or no medical care. As always, it is the children among whom these conditions take their greatest toll. There are areas in the Northeast where about a third of all children die before they reach the age of three and in which life expectancy at birth is in the thirties (it is now in the seventies in Western industrial countries). It is on *these* realities that one must focus in relation to the economic data on unemployment, income distribution, and so on. The crucial fact is: *These are realities*

that kill human beings. The word "kill" here does not have the metaphorical sense it may have when people speak of underprivilege in the advanced societies—the sense of anomie, of wasted lives, of killing the spirit—but rather the most literal sense of *physical dying* and *physical death.* Needless to say, there is always the additional dimension of psychic suffering.

If only for reasons of comparison, it is tempting to try and arrive at a "body count" of all these victims. With some arithmetic on the demographic and economic data, it would be possible to arrive at a reasonable estimate. This is not the place for such an exercise. Suffice it to say that over, for example, a twenty-year period (as between the 1950 and 1970 Brazilian censuses) there would be a toll of several million human beings who, by the humane criteria of Western civilization, could be said to have died "prematurely" and "unnecessarily"—the first adverb referring to a comparison with even the poorest in an advanced industrial society, the second to a consideration of who could have been saved by various policies of public welfare. Put simply: Millions of human beings have died because Brazilian society is what it is. It is also useful to recall that a large percentage of these victims are children; the human costs of this situation are literally a "massacre of the innocent."

One point should be clarified in this connection: Opponents of the Brazilian model often couch their criticisms in terms of a comparison between the present situation and an ideal of egalitarian distribution. In other words, they criticize the status quo because of the large gap between the incomes of the higher and the lower strata. The question of just what is to be considered equity in income distribution is interesting, but it is *not* the burden of the present critique. It is not an abstract "lack of equality" that is at issue here, but the particular inequality between affluence and hunger. Put differently: The present critique of the Brazilian model is not that it is insufficiently egalitarian, but that it condones the starvation of children as an acceptable price for economic growth. The critique further assumes that a rejection of this price, through social policies that attack misery, is not necessarily tantamount to a program of radically egalitarian income redistribution.

When the Brazilian regime is discussed abroad, conversation usually centers on its terroristic character. There can be no question about the latter.[5] Since 1964, with varying periods of intensity, the Brazilian government has suppressed its opponents by terroristic means. The protection

of civil rights and liberties has been inoperative in cases involving "national security," which has become an area of arbitrary force by the police apparatus of the regime. The independence and jurisdiction of the courts has been systematically undermined in this area. Large numbers of people have been illegally arrested and imprisoned for political offenses (real or suspected). There have been assassinations of political opponents of the regime by its security organs and by vigilante groups tolerated if not directly organized by the same organs (such as the "commandos to hunt communists"). Most loathsome of all, there has been systematic use of torture throughout the country, both as a means to extract information and as an instrument of intimidation. The direct application of terror has been linked to a nation-wide network of domestic espionage and censorship of all media of communication. In all of this, a vast police apparatus has been built up, centralized in the security division of the military police. Most of this terror has been directed against middle-class opponents of the regime. On a different level of society, and mostly under the auspices of local rather than national police organs, there has been brutal violence against various elements of the "marginal population" (that is, real or suspected criminal elements in the lower classes). The so-called "death squads" are the most notorious example of this.

There is a connection between the terror and the economic policies of the regime. Execution of the latter, with its aforementioned price of suffering, has certainly been facilitated by the silencing of criticism and the intimidation of all potential rebels. Nor should there by any question about the repulsiveness of these realities. The facts about torture alone (a torture that has been continuous and "systemic," and which cannot therefore be excused as an occasional aberration) would suffice for a moral condemnation of the regime. Nevertheless, in the preceding critique of the Brazilian model the emphasis has been placed elsewhere—namely, on the human costs of the economic policies of the model rather than on its political "support structure." The reason for this is simple: Victims of the former have been vastly more numerous than victims of the latter. It is estimated that between 1964 and 1972 (when Amnesty International published its report on the matter) about two thousand individuals were tortured. During the same period the number of assassinations by police organs and vigilante groups was probably in the hundreds. In 1973 it was estimated that there were about twenty thousand political prisoners in

Brazil. These numbers in no way offer a moral justification of the terror, nor do they mitigate in the least the horror of any single instance. Nevertheless, in any assessment of the human costs of the Brazilian model it is the other realities of massive misery, involving millions of victims, that must take precedence.

How does the regime legitimate the human costs of its economic program? Needless to say, no advocate of the program would state its costs in the manner utilized here. However, unlike its position on the political terror (a position of simple denial), the regime's handling of the aforementioned economic realities has been remarkably candid. For a dictatorship, it has produced unusually honest economic statistics. Even the regime's critics have admitted this and indeed used official government statistics in their own arguments. Perhaps some of this can be explained by lack of efficiency in the censorship apparatus; the First National Development Plan proclaimed that its objectives were to be achieved "in accordance with the Brazilian natural character," and this at least potentially humanizing quality may have had certain influences even on the organs of oppression. All the same, the candor with which leading spokesmen and apologists of the regime have spoken about the inequities of the present situation is sometimes startling. Even the president, Emilio Médici, has been quoted as saying on one occasion that "the economy is doing very well; the people, not."

More than Latin insouciance or inefficiency lies behind this candor. There is a well-articulated legitimation, which essentially boils down to a single proposition: *The present inequities are a necessary and temporary stage in the process of development.* Both the necessity and the temporary character of the inequities are formulated in terms of economic theory. A term often heard in Brazil is that of "Gini's Coefficient," which refers to a measurement of income distribution produced decades ago by an Italian economist. Hardly heard outside technical discussions by economists in other countries, the term falls frequently from the lips of Brazilian bureaucrats and businessmen, who, one suspects, would not know a coefficient if they saw one. Whatever may have been Gini's own views, the way they are used in the ideology of the Brazilian regime is as follows: Economic growth inevitably produces sharp inequality in income distribution in the early stages. If this entails misery in the lower income groups, that too is inevitable. In the later stages of the process the misery will be alleviated and the distribution of economic benefits will also

become more equitable. The important point is that all of this is understood to be the result of strictly economic mechanisms, functioning autonomously, without political interference. Indeed, any such interference with the strictly economic dynamic can only have deleterious results, inhibiting economic growth and thus postponing if not preventing the eventual alleviation of misery. The function of government in all of this is to facilitate economic growth, not to hinder it by misguided humanitarian interventions. European and North American economic history is supposed to illustrate the correctness of this view, but the stages of economic growth are assumed to be the same everywhere.

Delfim Neto, the economics professor who became minister of finance under the military regime and, for a while at least, virtual tsar of its economic policies, has taken this position frequently and forcefully. Assuming belief in this economic theory, a moral justification can be formulated quite readily: True, many people in Brazil today are suffering. True, the government is doing less than it could to alleviate this suffering. But the government policies are designed to elevate Brazil to the status of a fully developed society by the end of this century. When this goal has been achieved, there will be a sharp and general alleviation of misery. In other words, the suffering of this generation will contribute directly to the happiness of the next. In elementary human terms, parents are made to sacrifice themselves for the future of their children.

The Brazilian regime has had a bad press in the Western world. Thus there are few intellectuals who accept this line of reasoning, except perhaps some hard-nosed economics professors whose opinions were unscathed by the turmoil of the 1960s. But the regime has its "fellow-travelers" in other groups, notably in business and government circles in the United States. Both in Brazil and outside it one may meet Americans from these groups who reiterate the preceding legitimations with unrestrained enthusiasm. Some of them will react with irritation and aggressiveness to any expression of doubt about the intellectual presuppositions of this point of view. "Everyone in Brazil is very happy with the regime, except for a handful of leftist agitators and terrorists," said a State Department official in Washington (who also denied that there was any "repression" by the Brazilian government—except against people who, he opined, fully deserved it). "The Brazilians have nothing to apologize for," replied a colleague of his in Brasilia when asked about the legitimations of the model (he misunderstood the term "legitimations,"

but his own feelings about the matter were clear enough). Indeed, among some American businessmen there has emerged what could be called a Brazilian "zionism": Brazil is now the Promised Land of capitalist development and perhaps even the last best hope of the Free World. As to the "marginals" who are not immediately sharing in the bonanza of the "Brazilian miracle"—well, those people have never had it any better, they are not like us, and in any case their children will be grateful for what is happening now. Who knows—perhaps it feels different to be hungry in Recife than it would in New York. As another American admirer of Brazil put it: "One must remember that these people have a different attitude to suffering than we do. They have been used to it all their lives."

China, like Brazil, is a country of continental vastness. China, like Brazil, is going through a process of national transformation that has been held up as a model for other countries. Unlike Brazil, what is taking place in China comes after a decades-long convulsion of bloody war with outside forces and internal civil war. Unlike Brazil (which is ruled by a dictatorship but which cannot be called totalitarian), the present Chinese regime has established what is probably the most pervasive totalitarianism of the twentieth century and perhaps of human history. While the Brazilian regime has engaged in terror against selected opponents, the Chinese regime has imposed upon its subject population a terroristic system of apocalyptic dimensions.

Since 1949, when the Communists achieved victory in the civil war on the mainland, this terror has swept across China in a series of cataclysms. Periodically, one wave of terror was followed by a period of relative relaxation, which in turn would be followed by a new terroristic campaign. This flood and ebb can be explained in part by the changing exigencies faced by the regime, and in part by Mao Tse-tung's belief in the necessity of "protracted struggle," a consciously anti-Confucian view of historical progress through conflict and disharmony. While the intensity of terror varied greatly at different times since the "liberation" of 1949, its availability and constant threat has remained a permanent feature of the regime. As the terror went through its periods of high and low tide, the numbers of its victims went through similar variations. In terms of physical destruction of human lives, the worst period came shortly after the establishment of the regime, from about 1950 to 1955.[6]

At least partly out of accordance with Maoist ideology, major new policy steps of the regime have been introduced in campaigns given the appearance of "movements." Some of these campaigns sought to mobilize the population for positive policy goals, others to destroy opposition and instill terror. Usually the two aims have been conjoined.

The first of these great campaigns was the Land Reform Movement, 1950–1952. It was inaugurated to redistribute land ownership to the poorer peasants and to liquidate the "landlord" class. Teams of party agitators appeared in virtually every village throughout China, "classifying" the population and then whipping up those groups classified as properly proletarian against those designated as "landlords" and "rich peasants." The culmination of most of these visitations were so-called "struggle meetings," at which selected members of the enemy class were accused of various crimes before large assemblies, condemned by "the masses," and executed either on the spot or soon thereafter. Reliable estimates give the total of two million executions during this two-year campaign. It seems plausible that this first phase of the terror had widespread support among the bulk of the peasantry, who had strong interests in the land redistribution provided by the reform law. There is every reason to believe that the peasants thought this redistribution to be the culmination of the revolution; the Communists, of course, only saw it as the first step in the revolutionary process of collectivization. Following the example of the Soviet Union, the Chinese regime expropriated the new owners in the second step of the process, transferring the redistributed land from private ownership to collectivist "cooperatives." The main difference from the Soviet model was the speed with which the regime passed from step one to step two. The first redistribution was completed in 1952; "cooperativization" took place in 1955. At this second point the regime encountered much broader peasant opposition, as it did again in 1958, when it tried to force the new cooperatives into gigantic communes during the Great Leap Forward.

Different campaigns had different target groups and policy implications. The Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries Movement, 1951, was directed against all possible sources of political opposition, including old supporters of the Kuomintang and other "bourgeois elements." The standard operating procedure of "struggle teams" and "struggle meetings" was again followed here, as indeed it was in most subsequent campaigns. Compared with the Land Reform Movement there were fewer executions

(probably about five hundred thousand throughout China), but there was a vast wave of arrests. In this campaign was inaugurated the "Reform through Labor" program, which has remained a constant feature of the regime ever since and which (again in an adaptation of the Soviet precedent via the Maoist ideological tenet of "learning from the masses" by physical labor) has provided the regime with a large manpower pool of forced labor. It is estimated that between three and four million people were sent to "Reform through Labor" camps by the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries Movement, some of them remaining in these camps for many years. There are few data on mortality rates in these camps.

The Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement of 1951, launched after China's entry into the Korean war, was directed against all vestiges of Western cultural influence, especially against Western missionaries and Chinese Christians. The Thought Reform Movement, 1951–1952, was directed against intellectuals. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti Movements, 1952, were directed, respectively, against insufficiently zealous or corrupt cadres in government and party, and against businessmen. They resulted in virtually total destruction of remaining private businesses. The Judicial Reform Movement, 1952, dealt with the legal system and, among other things, abolished lawyers. The Fulfillment of the Marriage Law Movement, 1953, was directed against "reactionary" patterns of family life. It featured bitter "struggle meetings" at which wives and daughters were encouraged to denounce their husbands and fathers, and was marked by a wave of suicides both of men thus denounced and of women who either refused to play their assigned part or regretted it afterward. The Anti-Hu Feng Movement, 1955, began with an official attack on a literary figure by that name, who as far back as 1941 (!) had allowed himself some criticisms of a speech by Mao on literature and the arts. Again, it was directed against intellectuals guilty of inadequate "thought reform." The Elimination of Counter-Revolutionaries Movement, 1955, was once more a broad campaign against all possible opposition elements, opened by a directive by Mao himself ordering that 5 percent of every organization should be purged. The purge was mainly by imprisonment rather than by physical liquidation, though there was still a large number of executions.

The year 1955 marked a certain watershed in the history of the regime's terror campaigns. The largest physical massacres took place

before that date. Subsequent campaigns were characterized by at least relatively milder forms of terror—psychological pressures, public humiliations, beatings and occasional torture, and, most important, imprisonment, forced labor, and forced migration. This does not mean that there was no more physical liquidation, but it became less important as an instrument of coercion. The sheer magnitude of the massacres that had already taken place, and the "prophylactic" memory of these in the population at large, were undoubtedly major factors in this shift of emphasis. The Anti-Rightists Movement, 1957–1958, was directed against intellectuals who had been imprudent enough to make use of the brief period of relatively free expression permitted in 1956 after Mao's injunction of "letting a hundred flowers bloom." It was followed by a broader All-Nation Rectification Movement. The Great Leap Forward of 1958 was accompanied by relatively little terror, mainly because resistance to it was general and massive.[7] The dismal collapse of this effort, which resulted in a sharp decline in Mao's own power and the irrational policies of the most zealous Maoists within the regime, led to several years of relaxation.

This was interrupted by the cataclysm of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966–1968, which was unleashed by Mao to break the power of those who "followed the capitalist line" (that is, advocates of pragmatic, rational policies) and to revitalize the revolutionary spirit.[8] Unlike all the previous campaigns, this was a *genuine* struggle during which Mao's Red Guards encountered vigorous and finally successful resistance—first by the entrenched government and party bureaucrats, then by a growing mass of industrial workers, finally and decisively by the regional commands of the People's Liberation Army. As a result, while there was terror by the Red Guards, it involved relatively little physical liquidation of opponents. Most of the victims of the Cultural Revolution (probably somewhat over one hundred thousand) resulted from skirmishes between different factions of Red Guards and their antagonists. In 1969, after the reestablishment of government authority with a very strong military component, there was a measure of terror against "extreme leftists" among the Red Guards themselves, including executions. The demise of the Cultural Revolution, however, was accompanied by a gigantic Transfer to the Countryside Movement, in which millions (one estimate goes as high as twenty million!) of people were deported from the cities to "learn from the peasants," many of them former Red Guards and other "troublemakers." The effects of this

continue to this day, as does the system of "May 7 Schools" for the "reeducation" of intellectuals and cadres. The peasant majority of the population was relatively untouched by these convulsions, and in the long run it probably benefited from them.

Western visitors reporting on China in the last few years have repeatedly commented on the differences in everyday social interactions as between today and the pre-1949 period. Whereas before the Communist takeover there was a tumultuous street life, with people pushing, fighting, and laughing, the scene today seems to be one of smooth, quiet cooperation. There is no dirt and there is no noise. Even Seymour Topping, one of the first American correspondents to enter China after the beginning of the current thaw, whose early reports were positively vibrating with awed admiration of everything he saw, remarked that street crowds in Canton seemed "strangely silent and ordered."[9] No wonder! After having lived through the holocausts outlined in the preceding paragraphs, any people would be inclined to cooperate quietly.

Anyone who looks at the record of the Communist regime since 1949 with even a modest intention of objectivity will be impressed by the enormous quantity of human pain directly traceable to the actions of the regime. It is a record of death, anguish, and fear, deliberately inflicted upon the most numerous people on earth. What is the actual number of victims? How many human beings were actually killed? There have been efforts to answer this question with numerical estimates.[10] This is a difficult undertaking, for both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons. It is intrinsically difficult because, in the nature of the case, only indirect evidence is available: The regime, obviously, does not publish yearly statistics on the number of people it killed. Estimates have to be put together by compiling information from the mainland press and from refugees' reports. The analyst of the Chinese terror is thus in the position of someone who tried to estimate the extent of Stalin's atrocities prior to the twentieth party congress or of the Nazis' persecution of the Jews prior to the end of World War II (in both instances, even the most anti-Stalinist and most anti-Nazi observers grossly underestimated the numbers of victims). The difficulty is compounded by the extrinsic fact of the pro-Chinese climate of opinion which, since President Nixon's visit to Peking, now stretches from Washington government circles, through the business community and the liberal news media, to the left-leaning intelligentsia. It appears that even a substantial number of China

scholars have become very careful about making pejorative statements about the regime while they are waiting for their visas to the mainland. To ask about the number of Mao's victims in this atmosphere of Sinophile euphoria appears vulgar and inappropriate.

Morally significant questions have appeared vulgar since the days of the Hebrew prophets, and there is good moral reason for disturbing the current American mood about China (which, by the way, need not imply political opposition to the Nixon policy of detente between the two governments). All the same, as in the discussion of the human costs of the Brazilian model, this is not the place to attempt a "body count" of the Communist experiment in China. There can be no doubt, however, that the number of victims, even in the strictest sense of victims of physical liquidation, runs in the millions of human beings. One prominent American expert on China was asked recently to give his estimate of the number of outright executions during the worst period of terror, the years up to 1955. Assured that he would not be quoted by name, he replied: "No more than ten million, no less than five million." (It should be added that this individual is by no means identified as an enemy of the Communist regime and that, at any rate, his recent writing about China has been far from polemical.) Since 1955, there has been much less physical liquidation. But even leaving aside the monumental burden of psychic suffering—millionfold fear, anguish, and sorrow—there is the physical pain inflicted upon those who were hounded by the organized mobs of "enraged masses" in the various mobilization campaigns, and those who were imprisoned, sent to forced-labor camps and "May 7 Schools," or forcibly deported to the countryside. Millions of human beings were affected by these policies. There is no way of telling how many of them died in direct consequence. In this connection one should at least mention the policy of deliberate genocide carried out by the Chinese government in Tibet, after the suppression of the Tibetan revolt of 1959.[11]

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, it appears that there has been a period of relaxation in China. There have been no mass campaigns of terror and executions. Western observers disagree on who is responsible for the moderations of the regime, even on who is presently in control, and what elements are likely to come to the fore in the future.[12] Yet there is no indication that the regime, despite its recent moderations, has dismantled its system of totalitarian controls (though it has given them

new names and, to a degree, new organizational forms). Terror still lurks behind every corner of the road, in vivid memory and as an effective threat, and no one can predict the political vicissitudes that might once more unleash it with full force. Perhaps the weight of human pain to be accounted to Chinese Communism can be summarized as follows: *This regime has succeeded in making one of the liveliest peoples in the world walk the streets without noise and without laughter.*

If these have been the costs, what have been the achievements of the regime? Among Marxists there has been endless discussion as to whether China does or does not represent the purest form of socialism to date. This discussion has little meaning for non-Marxists. Among the latter, the discussion of achievements has centered on economic matters, and there is now a widespread consensus that the economic condition of most Chinese has greatly improved as against the pre-1949 period.

Evaluation of the economic achievements of the regime is also beset with considerable difficulties.[13] Unlike the Brazilian government, the Chinese authorities issue only sparse economic statistics, and issued almost none at all between 1959 and 1969. Much economic information is still regarded as a state secret and anyone who divulges it is severely punished. Outside observers have to compile a picture through the limited data released by Peking (often this involves "reading between the lines"), data on trade with China released by other governments, and the necessarily selective reports of tourists and refugees. There is one generally accepted proposition: The regime has succeeded in eliminating starvation (the last widespread famine was probably in 1959, following the economic fiasco of the Great Leap Forward). All recent reports on China agree that food appears to be plentiful and cheap. To what extent this is due to the socialist policies of the regime is another question: A crucial factor is that the Communists were the first in many decades to establish a strong central government with authority over the entire country, permitting them to take measures against famine that had been impossible for a long time (beginning with such simple things as the operation of a nation-wide transportation system). Also, it is clear that a number of socialist policies, inspired by Maoist ideology, had severely detrimental economic effects, especially in the area of agricultural production. It could be logically argued that the economic gains were achieved by the

immense diligence and productivity of the Chinese people *despite* the often surrealistic irrationalities of Maoist economic programs. Be this as it may, it is probably correct that most Chinese are better off today, in terms of nutrition and other basic necessities (housing and health are relevant categories), than they were before the Communist takeover. In aggregate amounts, these economic gains are modest. Once more, though, it is important to recall that in a population living close to the subsistence margin (this is so for a larger proportion of Chinese than of Brazilians) even small economic gains or losses can be of decisive importance.

It is virtually certain that the *distribution* of economic benefits is today much more egalitarian than it was before 1949. Except perhaps for the top political leadership secluded in the splendor of the Imperial City, there are few economically privileged groups, and the income gap between occupational categories is probably among the smallest in the world. Put differently, wage scales are highly egalitarian, despite the fact that the extreme egalitarian policies of the hard-line Maoists appear to have been quietly abandoned. Thus "material incentives," which were violently denounced during the Cultural Revolution, seem to have been restored in both industry and agriculture. Private plots, abolished in the communes in 1958, now seem to be generally tolerated and, according to some reports, account for an increasing proportion of agricultural production (in this way, quite possibly, reiterating the Soviet experience).

China is still a very poor country—as, indeed, its leaders keep saying in their desire to legitimate themselves as the vanguard of the Third World. By all conventional criteria China is still an underdeveloped society. Thus the *top* factory wage in 1971 was one hundred eight yuan (forty-two dollars) a month. While food and rents are very cheap, the limitations on consumption imposed by these wage levels become clear when one looks at some prices—for instance, of a wrist watch at one hundred twenty yuan, the cheapest transistor radio at thirty-one yuan, or a pair of leather shoes at seventeen yuan.[14] In view of this, the question of the likely future course of the Chinese economy is important. Again, there is widespread agreement that the future prospects are favorable if nondramatic. Economic growth rates since the early years of the regime have been very modest (since 1952, about 4 percent), but there seems to have been an acceleration since the end of the Cultural Revolution (1968–1971, 8.8 percent). The likelihood is that the Chinese economy will continue on a course of steady advance and that its benefits will be

spread around fairly equitably, though no dramatic improvements are in prospect. In view of the fact that China is still overwhelmingly a country of peasants, it is especially important to look at the progress in agricultural production. This has been very modest indeed. It is thought-provoking that, in the period 1952–1967, the agricultural growth rate of China has been *precisely the same* as that of India, at 2.5 percent.[15] Need one recall that, during these years, there was no terror in India, no collectivization, and no "mobilization of the masses" in government-run campaigns? In 1973, at any rate, both China and India had to turn to foreign imports in order to feed their populations.

Whatever may have been the detrimental consequences of some Maoist economic policies, it seems plausible that (by contrast with the case of Brazil) the major human costs of this model must be accounted to the political rather than the economic policies of the Chinese regime, with the terror being the necessary focus of the accounting. How are these costs legitimated by advocates of the Maoist model? The most common response is a denial of the facts. Such denial is routine both with official representatives of the regime (in the now unlikely event that anyone raises the question with them) and with enthusiasts for Maoism (or what they perceive as such) outside China. The denial is commonly linked with a denunciation of all sources that affirm the facts being denied. This does not mean that all acts of official violence are denied, but the *dimensions* of the terror are enormously depreciated and contrary reports are invalidated as being the products of "imperialist propaganda." Whatever portion of the terror is admitted is then legitimated within the overall ideological frame of reference. Most basically: *The human costs exacted by the terror are interpreted as necessary and temporary aspects of the revolutionary process.*

The alleged necessity was continually reiterated during the Cultural Revolution in the following passage from the *Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, which Red Guards were in the habit of chanting in unison during acts of harassment or violence against "revisionists": "A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained or magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another." In other words: To make an omelette, one must break eggs.

The alleged temporary character of these "not so refined" actions

is legitimated by way of Marxist doctrine. The revolutionary process passes from establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" through the "transition to socialism" to the millennial event of the "transition to communism." At the last the state will "wither away" and its coercive apparatus be dismantled. Different schools of Marxists disagree as to just where China is to be located on the road to the millennium. Except perhaps for the heady moment in 1958, when the Great Leap Forward was to be the beginning of the last "transition" (a claim, by the way, that impressed the Kremlin in about the same way as the Roman Curia would be impressed by the assertion that Jesus had just returned and was on his way to take over from the pope), even ardent Maoists have conceded that they were still operating this side of the coming of the kingdom. In this premillennial age, then, the coercive power of the state must continue to be used against counterrevolutionaries. The most prudent answer Maoists (as, indeed, other Marxists) can give, when asked when all this ugly business will come to an end, is the same answer given by the Revelation of St. John regarding the return of Jesus: "The Lord cometh *soon*!" So as not to confuse the moral issue, it should be pointed out that the earlier expectation legitimated martyrs while the more recent one legitimates the martyr makers. But in both cases an "adventist" propensity to fix precise dates in the near future has led to confusion and disappointments in the ranks of the faithful.

Unlike Brazil, China has had a very good press abroad, especially in recent years. As David Caute has shown, Western intellectuals have increasingly turned to China as they have become disillusioned with the Soviet Union.[16] These foreign sympathizers relate to the official legitimations of the regime in different ways. Some are self-consciously Maoist, imitating as best as they can, under unfavorable circumstances, the way of life enjoined by "the Great Helmsman" (Jean-Luc Godard has created a monument to this group in his film *La chinoise*). These people, of course, replicate the official legitimations *in toto*, as their will to believe is total. There are other Western Marxists who do not identify themselves as Maoists but who look to China as an important socialist alternative to what they consider to be the failure of the Soviet exemplar (the Italian group known by the name of its publication, *Il Manifesto*, is a good example). Their legitimations are more complicated than those of the outright Maoists; indeed, it sometimes sounds as if they feel they know better what is *really* going on in China than do the Chinese them-

selves. Both the first and second groups of sympathizers move within the universe of discourse of Marxist ideology, and thus their interpretations of Chinese events often have a doctrinaire character that has little significance to outsiders (the question of whether China is already poised to make the "transition to communism," or is still laboring over the "trausition to socialism," is a case in point). In both groups the legitimation of the human costs of the Chinese experiment ranges between denial of the fact of these costs and assurance that the costs are "necessary and temporary."

The most interesting legitimations come from people who are neither Maoists nor Marxists, but liberals (and, of late, even a few conservatives) who profess appreciation of the regime's alleged accomplishments while disavowing credence in its ideology. Among them are individuals renowned for their political independence and intellectual nonconformity. The recurring phenomenon of the sudden collapse of all critical faculties into a veritable orgy of gullibility, typically on the occasion of a very brief and thoroughly regimented visit to China, merits detailed analysis that cannot be undertaken here. Comments made by James Reston to Eric Sevareid after a trip to China in 1971 may serve as an example. One should read these words very slowly, while keeping in mind the record of blood and tears that was outlined earlier: "I'm a Scotch Calvinist. I believe in redemption of the human spirit and the improvement of man. Maybe it's because I believe that or I want to believe it that I was struck by the tremendous effort to bring out what is best in men, what makes them good, what makes them cooperate with one another and be considerate and not beastly to one another. They are trying that."[17]

Once more, the degree of simple denial of the facts of the Chinese Communist holocaust varies in this third group. Recent American writing on the regime has displayed a deafening silence on the earlier, most bloodthirsty period. Where the "repressive" features of the regime are mentioned, they are typically legitimated in terms of the economic achievements: All this ugly business is, of course, deplorable, and not in accordance with our own values. But the Chinese people have been freed from the threat of starvation, they are increasingly better off, and it seems that most of them are reasonably happy with the situation. Or, in the word used by Kenneth Galbraith in writing about a visit to China, the present system "works."

Serious questions must be raised about this type of legitimation. As pointed out above, any assessment of the economic achievements of the regime is faced with formidable difficulties. Information is sparse and unreliable. It seems premature, to say the least, to maintain that the system "works," even in strictly economic terms. More weighty is the question of whether the extent to which it "works" can be attributed to the policies and ideology of the regime, or whether it is a case of the stupendous abilities of the Chinese people producing results as soon as they are given half a chance—as in the last few years, when the more grotesque follies of Maoism have been restrained in the economy. As to whether most Chinese are happy with the situation, there is no conceivable way of finding out, least of all by short-term visitors taken through selected places on guided tours. In terms of a *moral* assessment of the Chinese model, however, all the above considerations are off the mark: In order to provide even a rudimentary moral justification of the terror, it would be necessary to show that there is a direct causal relation between it and at least some of the alleged economic achievements. Put simply: Assuming that the Chinese people have more to eat today than they had before 1949, is this fact *in any way* due to the other fact that millions of their number were killed by the regime? Nowhere in the apologetic literature is the question posed in this way. The reason, no doubt, is because the answer is all too clear.

One more observation should be made on that aspect of the legitimation that emphasizes the difference between Western and Chinese values. Admittedly, this point is valid with regard to certain matters. For example, it is safe to say that the overwhelming majority of Chinese peasants have never had an interest in freedom of the press and that therefore they hardly feel deprived by its absence today. It is all the more important to understand the oppressiveness of the regime in terms of *their* values rather than those of Western intellectuals. In the center of the world of Chinese peasants were three values—the family as a social reality, the family as a religious reality (especially in connection with the ancestor cult), and the ownership (actual or aspired-to) of land. The Communists have, as far as they have been able, tried to smash the social reality of the traditional family; the most brutal aspects of this effort have been the alienation of children from their parents, deliberately fostered by agents of the regime, and the forcible separation of families in the policies of forced labor and "reeducation." The Communists have

done their best to destroy visible manifestations of the religious life, not only in the Buddhist and other formal organizations, but on the level most important to the peasant, that of the ancestor cult; one of the most cruel measures in this respect has been the destruction of tombs, traditionally placed in the midst of cultivated fields. The treachery of the Communists' policy on land ownership has already been mentioned. From the peasants' point of view, they were first lured into support of the revolution by the promise of land, which was then given to them and taken away again within a span of five years. If, therefore, one has some doubts about the happiness of Chinese peasants in the semimilitarized communes in which they now live, these doubts have nothing to do with Western prejudices or "bourgeois liberties."

The most contemptible aspect of the legitimation that "the Chinese are different from us" pertains to the taking of life. Supposedly, "the Chinese put a different value on human life." The thesis is debatable in terms of historical generalization. The Confucian ethic was preeminently pacific, and the history of Western civilization is not exactly easy to interpret as a record of the respect for human life. The thesis is not debatable at all on the level of individual pain. It hurts as much to die, or to see one's loved ones die, in China as it does in America. Indeed, it hurts as much to be hungry in both of these places as well as in Brazil. Perhaps one should expand the critique of this type of legitimation by pointing out its inconsistency—if human life really means so little in China, why should one *praise* the regime for eliminating hunger? Is it only death by execution, but not death by starvation, that the Chinese "feel differently" about? Perhaps, though, it is enough to express contempt for those who justify the suffering of others by their own allegedly superior sensitivity.

The purpose of this chapter has not been to engage in a detailed discussion of the recent histories of Brazil and China. Rather it has been to highlight the moral calculus that ought to be employed in the assessment of the human costs of different models of social change. Nor has it been the intention to equate the cases of the two countries. In terms of direct "repression" by organs of the state, Brazil compares to China as Switzerland to the empire of Genghis Khan. In terms of the equitable spread of economic gains, on the other hand, China is to Brazil as a

kibbutz utopia is to medieval Europe in the heyday of feudalism. If China today can still be understood under the Maoist slogan "Politics takes command," then Brazil should get the slogan "Economics takes command." The difference between the two phrases points to the difference between the two models as well as between the kinds of human costs they exact.

It is all the more interesting to perceive the similarity between official legitimations of these costs. In both cases, what is crucially involved is an alleged certainty about the future course of events, and thus about the consequences of one's own policies. What the alleged course of "Gini's Coefficient" performs in one legitimation, the concept of the "transition to communism" performs in the other. It is true that there are harsh realities to the process under way, the legitimators declare, but these are necessary stages as the process moves toward its goal and will disappear when the goal has been reached: No more misery and no more crass polarization when Brazil will have become a "fully developed society"—no more coercive use of state power when China will have "attained communism." But what if these articles of faith are put in question? For articles of faith they are; there is no way of arriving at them by way of the available empirical evidence. What if they are wrong? Or even, what if one cannot be certain about them? It is at this point that the postulate of ignorance, as elaborated in the preceding chapter, becomes relevant morally. As the postulate is seen as pertinent to both cases, their respective legitimations collapse. What remains is a mass of human pain, willfully inflicted without any justification.

The value presupposition of this chapter has been the avoidance of human pain in the making of development policy. The calculus of pain must be applied to every model of development, as indeed to every model of deliberate social change. Neither the Brazilian nor the Chinese model can stand up under this application. As one looks at the available information in terms of the calculus of pain, *neither* model is morally acceptable. Conversely, *neither* case can be cited either in defense of or as a final argument against, respectively, capitalism or socialism. Brazil does not exhaust the possibilities of capitalism, and there are socialist possibilities beyond Maoist China. It is the quest of such other possibilities that should preoccupy anyone concerned with the mitigation of human suffering in the course of social change.

NOTES

1. For an account of these events by an opponent, see Miguel Arraes, *Brazil—The People and the Power* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972). For the events leading up to the military takeover, see Joseph Page, *The Revolution that Never Was* (New York: Grossman, 1972). For a more personal report of one who lived through the takeover, see Marcio Moreira Alves, *A Grain of Mustard Seed* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1973).

2. *First National Development Plan, 1972/74*, published in English by the Brazilian government (Brasilia: 1971). The economic data on Brazil are taken from a variety of mostly periodical sources and are all based on Brazilian government statistics. It was not possible to refer to an overview in book form in English.

3. The most trenchant economic critique of the model is by the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado. His major book on this is not available to date in English; it was published in Spanish as *Análisis del modelo brasileño* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1972). Furtado, while not a Marxist, is politically on the left. This type of critique, however, has now spread to some surprising quarters. Even Robert McNamara, in an official address as president of the World Bank, has recently associated himself with important aspects of the critique (notably the criticism of the anti-"distributionist" orientation of the Brazilian model).

4. For a graphic account, see Paul Gallet, *Freedom to Starve* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972).

5. See Report on *Allegations of Torture in Brazil* (London: Amnesty International, 1972).

6. See Chow Ching-Wen, *Ten Years of Storm* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); Doak Barnett, *Communist China—The Early Years* (New York: Praeger, 1964). For a detailed account of these years in one area, see Ezra Vogel, *Canton under Communism* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), cc. 2–4.

7. For a brief but excellent report, see Stanley Karnow, *Mao and China* (New York: Viking, 1972), c. 5.

8. See Robert Elegant, *Mao's Great Revolution* (New York: World, 1971); Edward Rice, *Mao's Way* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

9. Tillman Durdin, James Reston, and Seymour Topping, *The New York Times Report from Red China* (New York: Quadrangle, 1971), p. 141.

10. The most comprehensive attempt is to be found in a report prepared by Richard Walker for a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *The Human Cost of Communism in China* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). The report is unimpressive in its use of sources and seems motivated by the bias to set the number of victims as high as possible. For an eyewitness account of conditions in Chinese prison camps ("Reform through Labor" camps, in which people are permanently confined, as against "Education through Labor" camps, in which confinement is for

limited periods of time), see Bao Ruo-Wang and Rudolph Chelminski, *Prisoner of Mao* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973). The authors estimate a figure of sixteen million as reasonable for the inmates of these camps.

11. The term "genocide" is used deliberately. The charge of genocide was made in a careful report on the events in Tibet by the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva 1960. For a moving account of the same events, see the Dalai Lama's book, *My Land and My People* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962). The Tibetan record is particularly relevant to Peking's claim to lead the "anti-imperialist" forces of the Third World (as is China's more recent policy with regard to Bangladesh). Pro-Peking advocates have observed that Tibet was, after all, an integral part of China when these events took place. The statement is open to question juridically (in another report, Geneva 1959, the International Commission of Jurists concluded that Tibet was in fact and in law a sovereign state). More importantly, the moral persuasiveness of the observation is about that of, say, an assertion that the Nazis were justified in killing those Jews who were German citizens.

12. See, for example, Ching Ping and Dennis Bloodworth, *Heirs Apparent* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973).

13. See the compendium prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, *People's Republic of China—An Economic Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

14. Data from Durdin et al., *The New York Times Report*.

15. Kuan-I Chen and J. S. Uppal, eds., *Comparative Development of India and China* (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 46.

16. David Caute, *The Fellow-Travellers* (New York: Macmillan, 1973). For a comparison of earlier accounts of the Soviet Union with recent ones by visitors to China, see Paul Hollander, "The Ideological Pilgrim," *Encounter*, November 1973.

17. Durdin et al., *The New York Times Report*, pp. 354 f.

Chapter VI

POLICY AND THE CALCULUS OF MEANING

ONCE AGAIN it is appropriate that the considerations of this chapter be prefaced by a statement of the underlying value presupposition. Once again it is a simple one: *Human beings have the right to live in a meaningful world. Respect for this right is a moral imperative for policy.*

The need for meaning is almost certainly grounded in the constitution of man.[1] Man is the animal that projects meaning into the universe. Man names things, attaches values to them, and constructs vast orders of significance (languages, symbol systems, institutions) that serve as the indispensable guideposts for his existence. This human propensity for giving meaning, although it is represented by every individual and may sometimes be exercised in solitude, is fundamentally a collective activity. That is, human beings together, in groups of varying magnitude, engage in the enterprise of ascribing meaning to reality. Indeed, every human group, from the family to a national society, is at its center a meaning-giving enterprise. Meaning, in other words, is not something added to social life, that one may or may not want to look into, depending on one's particular interests. Rather, meaning is *the* central phenomenon of social life, and no aspect of the latter can be understood without looking into the question of what it means to those who participate in it.

The need for meaning has both cognitive and normative dimensions. Put differently, human beings must know both what *is* and what *ought to be*. Every society thus provides for its members both a "cognitive map"

of reality and an applicable morality. The former tells people "where they are," the latter gives them directions on what to do in that particular "location." No morality makes sense without the accompanying "cognitive map." For example, a particular society may prohibit marriage to second cousins but allow it to third cousins. Before the individual can obey this moral injunction (or, for that matter, disobey it), he must be able to distinguish between these two types of relatives. It is a safe guess that most contemporary Americans would be incapable of passing this test, so this particular bit of morality would be meaningless for them cognitively as well as normatively. If one contends, therefore, that people have a right to their own meanings, it is not enough to understand this in terms of moral norms or values—that is, to see it as everyone's right to act "in accordance with his conscience." Every "conscience" presupposes a particular cognitive world view, a particular understanding of reality. The right to meaning thus necessarily extends to "philosophy" as well as morality—people have a right to live in a world "as they see it to be." Respect for the "conscience" of others necessarily implies respect for their "definitions of reality."

Neither collective nor individual life is possible without a framework of meaning (in both the cognitive and normative sense). A society cannot hold together without a comprehensive set of meanings shared by its members. An individual cannot make sense of his own life without such a set of meanings (be it in comformity with or deviating from the societal one). Ever since Emile Durkheim sociologists have had a term for the condition in which groups or individuals are deprived of such a framework of meaning: Such groups or individuals are said to be in a state of anomie. It is an almost intolerable condition, and it is indicative that Durkheim first studied it, and gave it its name, in an inquiry into the causes of suicide. To deny an individual, or a group, the meanings by which life is organized is to deny, often literally, the very possibility of living. Thus the aforementioned right to meaning can be aptly reformulated as a right to be protected against anomie. It is based on the recognition, discussed earlier in this book, that "men do not live by bread alone." The same recognition is implied by contemporary widespread protests against "materialism," both in the Third World and in the advanced industrial societies. In the end, it is widely seen today, all material advances are pointless unless they preserve the meanings by which men live, or provide satisfactory substitutes for the old meanings.

The human need for meaning is a historical and cross-cultural universal; it may safely be assumed to have existed throughout history and in all societies. It is important to understand, though, that to speak of a right in this area has quite different implications in modern as against premodern societies, because of a fundamental difference between these two societal types. In premodern societies most meanings are *given* to the individual by tradition, which is rarely if ever questioned by him. In modern societies an increasing sector of the spectrum of meanings is *chosen* by the individual. Put differently: In premodern societies most meanings are presented to the individual as taken-for-granted, typically sacred facts about which he has as little choice as about facts of nature—the values that govern family life, for example, are *there* in very much the same way as a rock, a tree, and the color of one's hair are *there*. By contrast, in modern societies a growing number of important meanings are offered to the individual in a sort of meaning-market in which he moves around as a consumer with a wide variety of options—as, for example, between different family values, life styles, or even sexual preferences. Consequently, a "right to meaning" has almost opposite implications within the two societal types: *In a modern society it implies the right of the individual to choose his own meanings. In premodern societies it implies his right to abide by tradition.*

Much of the discussion of "human rights," when applied to the Third World, is plagued by an incomprehension of this difference. The dominant assumptions and categories in this matter are of Western provenance. They always refer to this or that right of an individual freely to choose his own meaningful world without outside interference (notably on the part of the state). Such free choice, however, is neither desired nor even real to large numbers of people who continue to live within traditional frameworks of meaning. The Marxist denigration of the Western ideology of rights as "bourgeois liberties" only obfuscates the matter even further. The previous discussion of contemporary China may be recalled here: The Chinese peasant has little use for such "bourgeois liberties" (read more accurately: *modern* rights) as freedom to vote for the political party of his choice and to read its (uncensored) newspaper, freedom to select a religious preference from many available ones, or freedom to opt for a particular style of private consumption. But he is very much concerned with his right to maintain the uninterrupted worship of his ancestors, to live his own life in the protective proximity of their

tombs, and to raise his children in accordance with traditional precepts. The Communist regime in China, therefore, is not to be reproached primarily for violating the "bourgeois liberties"; within the meaningful world of most Chinese people, it is the regime's assault on "peasant liberties" that is the primary issue (the Communists' physical terror is, of course, a different question).

The matter is further complicated by the fact that, in most of the world today, traditional frameworks of meaning are under severe stress and are in the process of changing their fundamental character. In other words, the matter is complicated by the global fact of *modernization*. There are many facets to this process, but a crucial facet may be expressed precisely as follows: *Modernization is a shift from givenness to choice on the level of meaning.* Tradition is undermined to exactly the degree in which what previously was taken for granted as a "fact of life" becomes something for which an individual may or may not opt. Consequently, in any situation undergoing modernization, it is often unclear which of the two versions of the "right to meaning" should pertain—the right to choose freely or the right to be left alone in the old givenness. This unclarity is not just in the mind of an outside observer; it marks the minds of those who are in the modernizing situation. It has often been remarked that individuals in the throes of modernization are torn, divided within themselves. A decisive aspect of this division is the ambivalence between givenness and choice. It is not difficult to see that anomie is a powerful threat under such conditions.

The nature of the shift may be illustrated by an episode. A visitor was talking with an elder of an Ujamaa village (collective agricultural settlement) in Tanzania. This particular village was inhabited by members of different tribes. The visitor asked whether traditional tribal ceremonies and dances were still being performed in the village. Yes, replied the elder. Once or twice a year there was a special occasion when members of the village got together and the different tribal groups performed their traditional dances. He added that this was a very good thing, since it helped the people in the village to understand each other better. The episode contains all the important ingredients of the shift: While tribal dances were previously performed at times designated by tradition, they were now staged for occasions chosen by the village council. Previously the performance was given as inevitable, now it was decided upon in an act of choice—and, by definition, the choice could be *not* to hold the

event on a particular date. Furthermore, the dances were now performed for an audience of outsiders, while probably the most accurate description of the previous situation would be to say that the dances were held to be seen by the gods. Finally, a rationale was now attached to the enterprise: Previously the people danced because it was necessary to do so—they probably reflected about it as little as they did about eating or breathing. Now they danced because, supposedly, this was a good thing for the morale of the village. In sum, even if the motions of the dances remained unaltered in every detail, they would now no longer be the same dances; dancing then and dancing now are two drastically different activities.

Barring catastrophic events that would make people literally forget what has happened, the modernizing shift from givenness to choice appears irreversible. Once an individual is conscious of a choice, it is difficult for him to pretend that his options are a matter of necessity. This becomes quite clear in all movements to preserve or revive traditional ways to which the prefix "neo" may be attached. Thus a "nativistic" movement may violently reaffirm the superiority of the old ways, but the very violence of the affirmation reveals its inherent precariousness. The precariousness is rooted in the knowledge that the old ways are no longer inevitable, that there are people who have chosen to abandon them, and indeed that one could, in principle, make the same choice oneself. The traditionalist untouched by modernization will reject the new in an attitude of self-assured superiority. The "neo"-traditionalist will perform the act of rejection in a very different attitude of anger and defensiveness —because the new is, for him, a *temptation*. And there is, it seems, no way back to the old assurance.[2]

Is this shift for the better? The answer will obviously depend on the value one attaches to the freedom and autonomy of the individual. Anyone who identifies with Western cultural history will give a positive answer. To do so is not necessarily an expression of "ethnocentrism": It is possible to have a strong allegiance to certain values while, at the same time, understanding and respecting the values of others. But the way in which the right to a meaningful world was started here deliberately seeks to bracket the question of the superiority, or lack of same, of modern libertarianism and individualism. Such bracketing becomes possible if one reapplies the previously stated principle of "cognitive participation": It is not for the outsider (be he scientific observer or policy maker) to

impose his own conception of rights and value priorities. His first task is to listen, as carefully as he can, to the manner in which these matters are defined by the insiders. The fact that this is not always easy, especially because of the ambiguities brought into play by modernization, provides no alibi for ad hoc impositions. Minimally, what is urgently required in the area of development policy is respect for the varieties and the inner genius of traditional ways of looking at reality.

It is valid and useful to understand modernization as an institutional process. However, one must also understand it as a process on the levels of meanings and consciousness. At its very heart, modernization is a transformation of the meanings by which men live, a revolution of the structures of consciousness.[3]

Since modernity is generally taken to be a good thing in the commonsense view in Western societies, while "backward" and "old-fashioned" are pejorative terms, it may be useful to look at it for a moment from the opposite point of view. From the viewpoint of a traditional consciousness, modernity is a sort of disease, a deeply abnormal and destructive deviation from the way men are intended (by nature, by the gods) to live. The etiology of the disease can be traced. There is no question about the original source of infection: It is Western civilization. Modernity, for whatever historical reasons, originated in one place, in Europe, and spread outward from there. Although today the disease has been diffused throughout the world and is now transmitted further by many non-Westerners who have been successfully infected, modernization and Westernization were historically concomitant processes. Modernity is a complex of institutions and structures of meaning that originated in the West under historically unique circumstances, and it was the world-wide expansion of Western influence that diffused modernity to other cultures. It is doubtful whether any sizable territory today is immune to this influence. Modernity, however, is not an either/or matter. There is no totally modernized society. But modern institutions and structures of consciousness are unequally distributed in different societies as well as societal sectors, which may then be described as *more* or *less* modernized. If modernity is perceived as a pathological condition, then some societies are still healthier than others—to wit, those taken to be the most "backward" in the Western common-sense view.

It is not the purpose here to advocate such an epidemiological perspective on modernization. It is only suggested as a corrective to the unexamined prejudice that modernization is necessarily a progress from lower to higher forms of social life. But whether one views modernity as a disease or as a desideratum, or whether (more wisely) one takes a differentiated attitude toward it, the mechanisms of its transmission are empirically available. It is possible to analyze in detail the "carriers" of modernity. These are economic, political, and cultural processes, many of them in complex interrelations with each other. Primary causes of modernity in the West were the technological transformation of the economy and the rise of the bureaucratic state. Consequently, primary carriers of modernization have been all the extensions into other parts of the world of the Western technologized economy and Western bureaucracy. Economic and political "imperialism" has been a major, but by no means the only, mechanism of transmission. The immense power of Western culture over the last few centuries has radiated outward through a variety of cultural influences that cannot all be subsumed under the heading of "imperialism." Thus there are various processes that may be designated as secondary carriers of modernization—notably the processes of urbanization, social mobility, mass education, and mass communications. Very often these secondary processes have been closely related to the penetration of non-Western societies by Western economic and political power, but they are also capable of acting independently. Thus, the glittering imagery of modernity has been diffused to areas in which there has been only minimal impact by modern economic or political forces.

Modern consciousness has many facets, and this cannot be the place for a detailed description. Only two key facets can be indicated here: *Functional rationality* and *plurality*. It has long been a truism that modernity is the "age of reason," but the quality of this "reason" must be specified. It is not necessarily the "reason" of philosophers and scientists; that antedated the modern period and is today, at best, the property of a small minority. The rationality of a modern society is "functional" rather than theoretical; that is, it is a way of describing the everyday operation of numerous processes in ordinary social life. The original locations of this rationality are in technology, in the economy as it has been transformed by capitalism and by the industrial revolution, and in

the institutions of bureaucracy (originally these were mainly agencies of the state). Rationality here implies not great sweeps of theoretical reflection, but a certain attitude of calculation, classification, and manipulation of reality. Such rationality is not "carried" by philosophers or scientists, but by engineers, businessmen, and bureaucrats. And it is this type of rationality that has invaded ever-wider areas of life in the course of modernization. One of its most important characteristics is what might be called "makeability": Reality is to be approached in a problem-solving mood, and once any given problem is correctly understood, then reality, at least in principle, can be "made over." While this is essentially an engineering mentality, it has now spilled over into areas of life that have no direct relation to technology.

Functional rationality is easily traceable to the primary carriers of modernization. Plurality is due more to what have been called the secondary carriers. Urbanization, social mobility, and the "knowledge explosion" have critically eroded all self-enclosed and thus self-assured worlds of meaning. The individual living in a modern city, oriented toward mobility and subjected to the onslaught of modern communications, must come to terms with a wide variety of people who have drastically different values and definitions of reality from himself—and with whom, nevertheless, he must coexist. This plurality has undermined the taken-for-granted adherence to traditional world views, and has been a major cause of the aforementioned shift from givenness to choice. The same plurality has especially tended to relativize and weaken religious and moral certainties; it lies at the root of the modern crisis in these two areas. In other words, the pluralization of the worlds of meaning by modern society has made certainty hard to come by—not only religiously and morally, but finally even with regard to the individual's own identity. Put simply: Modern men must continuously ask what they can believe, what they ought to do—and, finally, who they are.

Both functional rationality and plurality are difficult to live with. There are human needs and aspirations that cannot be satisfied by an engineering attitude. And there is a deeply grounded need for certainty. Modern society has generated a sort of solution to this problem in the emergence of the private sphere. The large public institutions—notably the economy, the state, and other large bureaucratized complexes—have fallen under the sway of functional rationality. Public life, especially under

urban conditions, has become highly pluralized. To compensate for this, as it were, there has developed what is now called private life—a social sector in which the individual can pursue his "irrational" needs and in which he is given considerable leeway to construct "little worlds" for the cultivation of a modicum of certainty. The dichotomization of the individual's social existence between the public and private spheres is one of the most important institutional manifestations of modernity. It has equally important consequences on the levels of meaning and consciousness. Thus an individual may be "alienated" at work, but find deep personal satisfactions in his family life. The larger society may provide the individual few certainties "to live by," but he is left free to seek out such certainties in religious groups, therapeutic programs, or other voluntary social relationships. While this has shown itself to be a viable solution for large numbers of people, it is inherently tenuous—precisely, once again, because the private sphere is based on choice rather than on givenness. Nevertheless, private life is for most modern individuals the principal focus of their striving, although of course any particular "life project" always takes place within the coordinates set by public institutions: The individual may want to construct a certain style of family life, but he must be able to afford it, which will depend on his occupational career and ultimately on the course of the economy.[4]

While modern consciousness has features that are the same all over the world, there are many different worlds of tradition. Thus the collision between modernity and tradition takes different forms. Some traditional worlds are more open to modernization than others. Nevertheless, almost everywhere the onset of modernization is experienced as a severe trauma, a collapse of the old certainties, and, for better or worse, the beginning of a journey into new worlds of meaning. The experience is eloquently expressed in the following passage, in the words of a man interviewed in the former Belgian Congo:

> "I learned to feel close to the ancestors, and to know that we were one with them, although I still did not know where they lived or how. But when I put on the skin of the leopard and painted my body and became as a leopard, the ancestors talked to me, and I felt them all around me, I was never frightened at such times, but felt good. This is what we have lost, what we had taken away from us. Now it is forbidden for us to talk to our ancestors . . . so we can no longer learn

> their will or call on them for help. We no longer have any reason for living, because we have been forced away from the ways of our ancestors, and *we lead other men's lives, not the lives of our fathers.*"[5]

Yet it is important to understand that modernity does not appear on the traditionalist's horizon *only* as a threat. It *also* appears as a great promise—of a longer and better life, of a plenitude of material goods (the "cargo"), but also of individual liberation and fulfillment. The reaction to modernization is frequently quite ambivalent, a psychologically complex mixture of revulsion and attraction. Occasionally there is direct and violent rejection, the attempt to stave off the threatening new world through determined resistance. On other occasions there is an enthusiastic embrace, with the "carriers" of modernization hailed as harbingers of redemption. More commonly (and more interestingly) the reaction is between these poles. Tradition and modernity then relate to each other through a variety of compromises and mutual adjustments, with the outcome varying greatly from one place to another. The compromises are institutional, but inevitably they also involve adjustments on the level of meaning (a process that may be called "cognitive bargaining"). Thus there are regimes whose purpose is to modernize their countries, making use of highly traditional institutions to promote this purpose—as the regime of Léopold Senghor in Senegal has done with the traditional Muslim leadership.[6] Apart from politics, traditional institutions have taken on very new functions and, in the process, have been forced to modify their self-conception—as in the case of caste associations in India, despite their foundation in the most traditional structures of Hinduism, operating to assist the social mobility of their members in the rational world of modern bureaucracy.[7] Traditional customs can actually be converted to become vehicles of modernity—as in Indonesia, where the traditional folk theater has been used to dramatize the conflicts of modernization and to indoctrinate the audience in modern attitudes.[8] Examples could be multiplied at will from the relevant literature.

Because modernization everywhere entails a rupture in the order of meanings, it calls forth resistance. Any meaningful world provides for its "inhabitants" a shelter against anomie, a place of security—a sort of home in reality. Conversely, modernization poses the potent threat of *homelessness*, and often the threat is realized in the experience of numerous individuals similar to the African quoted above. The loss of opportunity

to live "the lives of our fathers," with its profound religious and social implications, brings forth frustrations and anger of potentially violent intensity. Thus, from the beginning, modernization and countermodernizing reactions go hand in hand. This was so in Europe, the original center of the "epidemic." Reactionary rebellions, such as the Fronde in France, were a recurring phenomenon during the centuries of initial modernization. Similarly violent reactions, coupled with hatred of the foreigners involved, can be observed again and again in the non-Western countries subjected to the onslaught of modernity. The extermination of Christianity and almost all Western influence in seventeenth-century Japan is probably the most successful case on record of such resistance (it retarded the modernization of Japan by two full centuries—a remarkable success, in historical terms). But there are many others, such as the Boxer Rebellion in China, the Indian Mutiny, the rebellion of the Mahdi in the Sudan, and the Ghost Dance in America.

As modernization succeeds in transforming the institutions and meanings of a society, the more direct and violent expressions of countermodernization become rarer. This does not imply that the discontents have disappeared. In the Third World today there continue to be strong movements and ideologies (usually in the form of nationalism) that seek to control some of the less desirable features of modernity and to preserve at least some aspects of premodern tradition. The continuing influence of Mahatma Gandhi in the political thought of India, pan-Islamism (as in the ideology of the Qaddafi regime in Lybia), and the various versions of *négritude* (from the thought of Senghor, who gave the term political currency, to the "African socialism" of Julius Nyerere) may be cited as examples. In each instance there is a strong antimodern and anti-Western animus, and a desire to preserve some inner kernel of indigenous culture. At the same time most of these movements and ideologies do not reject modernity out of hand. They still desire the "cargo" of good things that modernity promises, from better agricultural techniques to a longer life. But the goal is to have these good things *without* the anomic features, the homelessness, of Western societies.

It is noteworthy that similar aspirations can be found in the advanced industrial societies. Recently they have been expressed powerfully by youth culture and counterculture movements. Here too there is deep discontent with the functional rationality ("dehumanization") and plu-

rality ("alienation") of modern society. The more radical wing of these movements reject modernity outright and attempt to return to simpler, presumably healthier ways of life (as in some rural communes). More importantly, though, there is the desire to control rather than abolish modern institutions, to modify them in such a way that the benefits of modernity will be preserved but freed from their "dehumanizing" and "alienating" side effects. It is also noteworthy that in such countercultural milieus, in Europe and North America, there exists today a strong identification with the Third World. It may be argued that this identification is more than romantic sentimentality, that it is based on a sound instinct. What is sound is, quite simply, the recognition that intact traditional cultures provide meanings for their members that are lacking in fully modernized societies. This sense of lack may often be expressed in absurd ways, but it is nonetheless very real.

To say that modernity produces discontents is not in itself a value judgment. Thus it is quite possible to maintain that the achievements of modernity are well worth these discontents, indeed that "alienation" is the necessary price of individual freedom.[9] In that case, the desire to have *both* individual freedom *and* the security of "being at home" in society (not to mention the cosmos) is doomed to disappointment. Be this as it may, whatever one's values, it is important to understand the costs of modernity. "There are no free lunches," and modernization, even if one welcomes its basic thrust, is not free either. To what extent can the costs be reduced?

The answer to this question hinges on how one understands some key features of modernization. There is one view that conceives of modernity as a single, inextricable, inevitable entity—a kind of seamless robe, a whole that cannot be taken apart. In such a view, the idea of keeping some elements of modernity (such as technological innovations in the economy, or a well-functioning state apparatus), while abandoning others (such as the domination of much of life by an engineering mentality, or the isolation of people in a modern city), is a Quixotic fantasy. If one wants better nutrition, say, or a government that can effectively control floods or famine, then one will have to settle for the demise of poetry in social life and just get used to anomie. The opposite view holds that the several elements of modernity can be assembled or disassembled freely. Nothing is inextricably linked together, everything can be re-

arranged. Thus one might combine modern agricultural techniques with traditional rain dances, chattel slavery with a modern communications system, and polygamy with electric stoves.

The available evidence suggests that neither of these opposite views can be maintained. Modernization is not the irresistible juggernaut pictured in the first view—there are too many modifications, compromises, and even reversals of the process to make this view tenable. But on the other hand, neither is modernization a completely haphazard game, with rules and combinations to be changed at will—if nothing else, there is too much evidence of the powerful and highly consistent effects of the primary carriers, so much alike in their impact in different parts of the world. The matter is both more complicated and more interesting: It is not a question of having to submit to modernity as an inexorable fate, nor of being able to play with its components as if they were the infinitely variable pieces of an erector set. The question is this: *Which* components of modernity may be tinkered with, and *which* must be taken (or left) as a "package deal"? In other words, the question is one of *limits*. What are the limits of modernization? And what are the limits of all efforts to modify or control modernity?

If one sees the institutions and meaning structures of modernity being diffused by the primary carriers, and from the areas of social life most directly affected by the latter, one can attempt to measure the degree of such diffusion. For example, an engineering mentality is presumably unavoidable in the course of engineering activities. The "package" of this activity and that mentality is, therefore, *not* one that could be much tinkered with. But even the most devoted engineers are engaged in activities other than engineering, and carry their engineering mentality with them as they engage in these other activities. Indeed, many critics of contemporary culture have pointed out the sway of this mentality over such activities as sexuality, marriage, child rearing, or even religion. Is this unavoidable, too? If not, by what cognitive and social mechanisms can these other areas of life be shielded from the influence of the engineer's mind? Is it perhaps even possible to be an engineer on the job and a poet in the bedroom?

Put differently: Technology (especially in its application to economics) and bureaucracy have engendered inextricably "packaged" combinations of meanings and social patterns. Without these "packages" neither could exist—and, therefore, modern society and its "cargo" of

benefits could not exist without them. This intrinsic and inevitable linkage pertains only to these areas of social life, yet the meanings and social patterns originally appropriate to technology and bureaucracy have been carried over into other areas, sometimes with great force. The question of possible modifications of modernity may, then, be formulated as follows: What are the processes of *carryover* between those areas in which modernity is indeed a seamless robe and other areas in which this only seems to be the case? Conversely, what are the possibilities of *stoppage* of this diffusion?

In terms of what may be called the classical solution to the discontents of modernity, the question of stoppage pertains to the dichotomy of public and private spheres. This is mostly a question of the *protection* of private life against the logic and the mental habits of the large public institutions. How can the individual, for instance, be calculating, controlled, and emotionally detached at work, and then come home and be generous, spontaneous, and warmly human? How can a good bureaucrat have a satisfactory sex life? Can an upwardly mobile executive be a good father? Can a successful professional continue to exhibit the classical virtues of femininity? There is also the question of whether there can be stoppage of the technological and bureaucratic mentalities as between different institutions of the public sphere itself. What elements of technological production can be "humanized" in the sense of nontechnological values? What are the respective limits of efficiency and civility in a bureaucratic organization? Can mass education be anything but a vast machine of "alienated" bureaucracy? How can the home-like warmth of homogeneous urban neighborhoods be reconciled with the technical demands of efficient city government? Very generally: How can there be reconcilation among various "particularistic" solidarities and the "universalistic" ethos of mass organizations? This second set of questions is more interesting than the question of the protection of private life because it involves possibilities of *institutional innovation*. And, despite the enormous differences between the two types of societies, it is possible that in this search for innovative options some of the experiments in Third World countries could turn out to be, at the least, very suggestive for the advanced industrial societies as well.

On the basis of a sociological understanding of modernization, a hypothesis may be ventured: The possibilities of stoppage with regard to modern consciousness will increase with distance from the primary areas

of technology, the technologized economy, and the bureaucratic state.[10] Thus, in all likelihood, it is futile to try to apply non-Western cognitive or normative principles to technological production, to try to run a factory as if it were a *Gemeinschaft*, or to try to apply "participatory democracy" to the bureaucratic structures of the national state. By the same token, however, it may be possible to create innovative institutional arrangements by which non-Western cultural patterns are preserved in sectors of education or in local government, or by which family life or religious activities are deliberately governed by countermodern values. In other words, the clearer a notion one has of the limits of countermodernization, the greater (and, one may add, more exciting) will be the possibilities of innovative experiments within these limits.

A term is widely used, especially in the ambience of the United Nations, that illustrates the policy problem very aptly: "Resistances to development." This refers to all the negative reactions that people have toward the development programs designed for their benefit. The term is usually employed in a pejorative sense. "Resistances to development" are, almost by definition, the actions of ignorant or superstitious people, who do not properly understand their own interests. Sometimes anthropologists and other experts in irrationality are hired to study the motives behind the "resistances." The solution to the problem (if coercion is eschewed) will finally be education: As the "resisters" are educated to understand the superior wisdom of the development program at issue, they will naturally start to cooperate.

The basic purpose of this chapter is to subvert the thinking that lies behind the term "resistances to development." An awareness of the costs of modernity, and therefore of the validity of the countermodernizing impulse, is an intellectual presupposition for such subversion. An episode may make the policy implications clearer.

In a number of African countries it is government policy (out of necessity rather than principle, in all probability) to enlist local participation in the construction of new schools. This is so in the country in which the episode took place. The national education ministry sends out so-called "persuasion teams" into villages for which new schools have been targeted. There is a meeting of the village community. If, as expected, the villagers agree with the project, they themselves construct

the building for the school and another building to house the teacher. The ministry then supplies the teacher and the necessary equipment, including books. Since the desirability of schools is now widely believed in even in the remote hinterlands, the "persuasion" is usually a fairly easy affair. In this particular instance it was not. There was strong and unanticipated opposition to the new school. The main opponent was an old man, a village elder. His argument went something like this:

> "We don't want your school. What good will it do our children? If they stay in the village, they will learn nothing useful. All they will learn is to despise the ways of their fathers and to have desires that cannot be fulfilled. But if, to satisfy these new desires, they leave the village, where will they go? Like so many before them, they will go away to the city. We know what the city is like. Many from the village have been there and have told us about it. The city is a bad place. People there are unhappy and violent. There is not enough work for everyone. We don't want our children to go to the city. And we don't want them to be dissatisfied here. Therefore, we don't want your school."

African meetings tend to be wordy affairs, so the discussion went on all night. The young men from the education ministry did their best to convince the villagers, but in the end the decision went against them. After many hours, in the first dawn, they climbed into their landrover and drove off, defeated. As they left the village, the old man, who had become greatly exercised by the long discussion, followed them out and stood in the road, shaking his fist at them.

An American who had gone along on this expedition took some photographs, including one of the old man shaking his fist. He showed these pictures in a seminar in this country. The members of the seminar divided into two groups quite neatly—those who identified with the old man, and those on the side of the earnest young men from the education ministry. This division has both emotional and ideological undertones (for example, in terms of sympathy or lack of sympathy for the counterculture). But there is also the matter of insight involved—namely, the capacity to appreciate the *logic*, indeed, the *rationality*, of the old man's argument.

Quite apart from emotional or ideological identifications, the policy position recommended here is that so-called "resistances to development" should be taken with the utmost seriousness; they should *not* be hastily explained as ignorance or superstition. There are important intellectual considerations behind this position; they were explicated previously in terms of the postulate that all worlds of consciousness are, in principle, equal, and that therefore no one is capable of "raising" anyone else's consciousness. This is a theoretical as well as a moral position. But there are also pragmatic reasons for this position: *Policies that ignore the indigenous definitions of a situation are prone to fail.*

This is hardly a novel insight. To a surprising degree, for example, it influenced British colonial policy in the past. It is furthermore an attitude that has long been popular among ethnologists and anthropologists, who have frequently warned that institutions and meanings cannot be easily transplanted from one culture to another. Yet in the discussion of development since World War II there has only recently been a spreading awareness of all this. In the original heyday of "developmentalism," into the mid-1960s, the alleged experts were far too sure of themselves to be susceptible to such lines of thinking. The recent change is probably due to two principal factors—first, the sharpening of Third World nationalisms, and second, the practical failures of many development programs (nothing opens the mind more than a good fiasco). Thus the recent literature and public discussion of development policy increasingly emphasizes the importance of indigenous perceptions and values, and the desirability of looking for alternatives to the mechanical transplantation of Western institutional models.[11]

All "resistances to development" entail *counter-* definitions of the situation. These may be normative or cognitive, or both. If they are normative, what is involved is the defense of traditional values against the values of the modernizers. If they are cognitive, it is traditional views of reality that are being defended against the *Weltanschauung* of modernity.

With regard to the normative aspect, the policy implications are relatively straightforward. The problem is essentially *political*: To what extent will those who are in charge politically allow any countervalues to stand in the way of government programs? Sometimes this question can be put in terms of democratic controls or participation. In the end it is likely to resolve itself into a question of force: How much coercion is

deemed possible, necessary, or acceptable by those who are politically in charge? In other words, it may not be feasible to ride roughshod over indigenous objections. Or it may be judged unnecessary (in the sense, perhaps, of uneconomical) to do so. Finally, it may even go against the moral scruples of the political elite. The case of Vietnam provides a grisly illustration, especially for Americans, of what may happen when policy in a Third World country systematically ignores the indigenous norms in the definition of the situation.[12] But the cognitive aspect of the matter is probably the more interesting. What it involves is, finally, the necessity of "learning from the peasants" (though hopefully in a sense diametrically opposed to the Maoist one). While this is less obvious than respect for indigenous norms and values, it is probably more important for development policy in the long run.

Agricultural development is a good area for illustrations of the necessity for policy makers to adjust to local knowledge, and conversely of the price of ignoring indigenous definitions of the situation.[13] Thus policy makers have misperceived the economics of particular areas because they looked at measurements of yield in terms of land rather than labor, mistakenly considering the latter rather than the former as the scarce resource. They have failed to understand that the peasant's time budget must give priority to his food rather than his cash crops. They have failed to take seriously the peasant's view on what is good or bad for the soil. After enumerating these and other policy failures, two British agricultural experts recently insisted on the urgent need to create procedures for *listening* to the peasants:

> "This may not seem at all remarkable, indeed obvious and commonsensical as an approach. But the hard and sad fact is that government servants and some researchers are not inclined to spend many hours listening and learning: *they think they know already*. Moreover, they often rush out and back from their offices or homes or headquarters always in a hurry and never with time to spend a day listening. The cost is great in the potential benefits foregone."[14]

Mutatis mutandis, the same observation may be made with regard to any other area of development policy.

The transplantation of institutions and processes from one culture to another is often highly "dysfunctional." This is nothing new. For

example, in the eighteenth century all things Chinese had high prestige in Europe. In 1750 a Swedish diplomat in the Ottoman Empire paid for a Bulgarian farmer to travel to Sweden for the purpose of demonstrating the use of threshing equipment derived from China. This equipment had come to be widely adopted in Mediterranean countries. Since it involved threshing on an open platform, it was very usable in warm climates, but very impractical in Northern Europe. Nevertheless, through government pressure, it was widely adopted in Sweden.[15]

When the German colonial government in Tanganyika sought to bring the blessings of European civilization to the natives, they introduced the modern plow there and urged the African farmers to us it. Parts of Tanganyika had long observed the practice of preventing soil erosion by the construction of terraces around the fields. The German plows destroyed these terraces. This was promptly understood by the African farmers, who pointed it out to the German experts. The latter, in the calm assurance of their superior knowledge, dismissed the farmers' protests as typical native ignorance and superstitious fear of all innovations. (It may be added that the German colonial officials did not even have the excuse of not understanding the Africans' language—all government officials in German East Africa had to learn Swahili. But the purpose of this, no doubt, was not to facilitate listening to the Africans, but rather to give them orders.) The government continued to push the plow—with the result that large areas of agricultural land were severely damaged. The story does not end there. When the British took over from the Germans after World War I they repeated exactly the same mistake, with exactly the same results. After World War II American plows were exported in large numbers to Greece and India, again with the same results. And in Burma it was the Soviets who repeated the performance. A few years ago visitors reported that large quantities of Soviet tractors were rusting in a lot near the Rangoon airport, where they had been discarded after it was discovered that their effect on the land was devastating.[16]

It might seem that agricultural technology would be one area in which such mistakes could not be made. After all, the practical consequences are immediate and obvious. If in fact such mistakes are made there, it is easy to see how they would be made in other areas, where the practical penalties for ignoring local knowledge are less immediate

or obvious. Again, it should be stressed that the "dysfunctional" transference of practices and institutions from one culture to another is nothing new in history. What is new in recent years is that such irrationalities can now be massively imposed through the powerful agencies of modern government.

One of the most instructive examples from recent development literature concerns a birth control program in India.[17] It is worth elaborating in some detail. During 1956–1960 the Harvard School of Public Health, with funds of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Indian government, carried out a birth control experiment in a group of villages in the Punjab. There was then a follow-up study in 1969. The experiment consisted of the propagation of contraceptive foam tablets in some of the villages, while another group of villages was left alone, in order to serve as a control group. The whole operation was accompanied by an impressive research apparatus. The results of the experiment were very depressing. Between the inception of the program and the follow-up study there was indeed a decline of the birth rate, apparently due to a rise in the age of marriage rather than to use of the contraceptive tablets, and (more important) the decline was the *same* in both the experimental and the control populations. It may be added that the total cost of the experiment was around one million dollars. What had gone wrong?

The answer is quite simple: Almost all those connected with the experiment (Indians *no less* than Americans) refused to listen to the initial objections of the villagers. The presupposition of the experiment was the conventional Western wisdom on birth control: The more children a family had, the less was its chance for economic betterment. Therefore, birth control was in the rational self-interest of the villagers. The villagers denied this. They claimed that, on the contrary, they were better off economically precisely the more children they had. This assertion was classified by the experimenters as a typical case of irrational "resistance to development." Indeed, an anthropologist was hired to study the perceptions of the villagers, grounded as they undoubtedly were in traditional religious values and superstitions. And efforts were made to "Indianize" the staff as much as possible.

What happened subsequently is very funny. When the villagers saw that the experimenters would not listen, they told them what they wanted to hear—and they threw the contraceptive tablets away. Thus an early

report stated that 90 percent of the villagers were in favor of contraception; the report assumed (falsely, it turned out) that a similar percentage was using the tablets. Here is how one villager explained his "acceptance" of the tablets (needless to say, he never used them): "But they [the staff] were so nice, you know. And they even came from distant lands to be with us. Couldn't we even do this much for them? Just take a few tablets? Ah! even the gods would have been angry with us. They wanted no money for the tablets. All they wanted was that we accept the tablets. I lost nothing and probably received their prayers. And they, they must have gotten some promotion."[18]

The villagers' assertion was a perfectly rational one based on the agricultural labor market. For each family the cost of an additional child is negligible, but the potential increase in income is quite large. Children permit increased productivity on the family's land, as well as saving on hired labor. Also, family income increases as a result of wages earned by its members. As there are more brothers, some work to finance the schooling of others, whose higher income after graduation then pays for the education of the brothers who saw them through school. In simple fact: For the villagers, children are a highly rational economic investment. Here is what one villager told a member of the experimental staff: "You were trying to convince me in 1960 that I shouldn't have any more sons. Now, you see, I have six sons and two daughters and I sit at home in leisure. They are grown up and they bring me money. One even works outside the village as a laborer. You told me I was a poor man and couldn't support a large family. You see, because of my large family, I am a rich man."[19]

This rationale will hold as long as agricultural production is based on very simple technology, so that the size of the working family will determine income. If the staff of the project had listened to the villagers, instead of having an anthropologist study their alleged superstitions, they would have had no difficulty understanding this. They would incidentally have saved a million dollars. The moral of the story is simple, too.[20]

The plea in the preceding chapter was for a *humane* approach to development policy. The plea in this chapter could be described as for a *humanistic* approach, not in the sense of humanitarianism but of the

humanities in the classical Western sense. Humanism, from the Renaissance on, has meant a respect for the place of values and meanings in the affairs of men. The humanities have been the disciplines that have studied human events from within, as it were—from within the subjective perceptions of reality that animate actors on the historical scene and that make their actions intelligible to an outside observer. Humanism in this sense has been widely dismissed as unscientific in the ambience of the social sciences, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries. The discussion of this chapter indicates that this dismissal may have unfortunate consequences. A humanistic approach to development policy (and just as much to the other areas of politically controlled social change) will be based on the insight that no social process can succeed unless it is illuminated with meaning from within.

NOTES

1. For a detailed discussion of the implications of this for an understanding of society, see Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966).

2. Attempts to deny the shift from givenness to choice may still be found in the most modernized societies, typically in subcultures committed to premodern traditions. Traditional Judaism in America is an interesting example. One may come across spokesmen for Orthodoxy telling American Jewish students that their Jewishness is ontologically given and that this imposes inevitable obligations upon them—while the students' own experience tells them that their "Jewish identity" is *a project* for which they may or may not opt. Paradoxically the Orthodox spokesman's activity itself presupposes the empirical fact that Jewishness is far from being ontologically given: It makes no sense to exhort someone *to be* something, unless that being is in some way a matter of decision rather than destiny. By contrast, Jews in a traditional *shtetl* might require exhortation to meet their religious and moral duties—but their "identity" was given, for better or for worse, and no one would have thought of making it a topic for exhortation.

3. For a detailed analysis of this, see Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind—Modernization and Consciousness* (New York: Random House, 1973). For the religious component, see Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 11.

4. On the level of individual experience, a crucial characteristic of modern consciousness is "life planning." See Berger, Berger, and Kellner, *The Homeless Mind*, pp. 72 ff. This, in turn, is related to the specifically modern experience of time. One of the grossly neglected aspects of modernization has been its transformation of human temporality. A recent effort to fill this gap is Rudolf Rezohazy, *Temps social et développement* (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1970).

5. Colin Turnbull, *The Lonely African* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1963), p. 178. Emphasis added.

6. Lucy Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

7. R. S. Khare, *The Changing Brahmans* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

8. James Peacock, *Rites of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

9. The connection between freedom and "alienation" has been pointed out by the contemporary German sociologist Arnold Gehlen, in his essay "On the Birth of Freedom from Alienation," in *Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie* (Neuwied/Rhein: Luchterhand, 1963), pp. 232 ff. Gehlen, however, is a conservative thinker with severe doubts about the worth of this bargain.

10. The thinking behind this hypothesis is explicated in detail in Berger, Berger, and Kellner, *The Homeless Mind*.

11. Not surprisingly, in view of the historical antecedents, this viewpoint has been strongly represented in Britain. See, for instance, Guy Hunter, *Modernizing Peasant Societies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). Perhaps the demise of the highly "ethnocentric" French colonial empire has facilitated the reception of similar ideas in France—as in Jacques Austruy, *Le scandale du développement* (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1968). In this country, the influence of Karl Polanyi has stimulated similar lines of thinking, particularly among anthropologists and economists. See George Dalton, *Economic Anthropology and Development* (New York: Basic Books, 1971). The influence of Ivan Illich has more recently been in the same direction. See his latest work, *Tools for Conviviality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).

12. See Frances FitzGerald, *Fire in the Lake* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

13. For an overview, see Raanan Weitz, ed., *Rural Development in a Changing World* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971).

14. Robert Chambers and Deryke Belshaw, "Managing Rural Development," mimeographed (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 1973), p. 5.27. Emphasis added.

15. See article by Paul Leser in Anthony Wallace, ed., *Selected Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Anthropology and Ethnological Sciences* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), pp. 294 f.

16. I am indebted to Paul Leser for these examples.

17. See Mahmood Mamdani, *The Myth of Population Control* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

18. Ibid., p. 23.

19. Ibid., p. 109.

20. The moral is *not* that uncontrolled population growth is a good thing for India. It clearly is *not* a good thing. But the error was to confuse the national interest with the individual self-interest of the villagers. It may be doubted whether appeals to the national interest can induce people to have fewer children. There is no doubt that this result cannot be achieved by telling people that they are being harmed by the very thing they know to be of benefit to themselves.