The football chameleon: 4–2–2–2 in Brazil
Speaking about football in Brazil, at least in common sense, is to go back and think about that old traditional formation that exists in common speech: a team is built by 2 wingbacks, 2 central defenders, a “first volante” (defensive midfielder), a “Segundo Volante” — a more technically gifted defensive midfielder — , the third midfielder, the fourth midfielder/number 10, center forward and a second striker. But where did the Brazilian 4–2–2–2 came from, and how it altered it shape during time?
— The Diagonal System
Firstly, it is important to notice that the first tactical movement really important in Brazil is the concept of the “diagonals”, applied by Flavio Costa. It consisted of an adaptation of the W-M — the 3–2–2–3/3–2–5. In this context, Flavio Costa’s idea was pretty simple: pushing back a little one of the center halves, so it could work defending the area and, to compensate this drawback, one of the inside forwards would also be pushed back, so the team could maintain some equilibrium in the midfield.
In this image, referring to Flamengo’s 1941 side, you can notice that the right center-half, Carlos Volante — from whom derives the name of the “defensive midfielder” role in Brazil — , was drawn back to act almost in between the right fullback Baguá and the centerback Domingos da Guia, acquiring more defensive stability. But, as it was needed to compensate numbers in the midfield, since it lost a centerhalf in more advanced areas, Costa asked for Zizinho to perform a more receded and midfield-minded role. Ultimately, this kind of tactical formation, with influences of hungarian football coaches like Béla Guttmann and Gyula Mandi, would lead to the creation of the 4–2–4 formation, which was popular in Brazil especially during the 1950’s decade.
However, the diagonals that Flávio Costa thought of didn’t necessarily needed to be made by the right side, but instead was a football formation which could be adapted and leaving more levels of footballistic freedom to some players. In the 1941 Flamengo side depicted, the main task was to guarantee some freedom of attack to Perácio, Pirilo and also the winger Vevé. Zizinho’s task was to organize and dictate the tempo in the midfield, while Carlos Volante would maintain defensive solidity. Fluminense, that same year, would use a left-sided version of the diagonal, where Spinelli would do the role of Carlos Volante — but on the left center-half — , the left inside forward, Tim, was brought back to the midfield so the formation could guarantee Romeu, Adilson and Russo the liberty to attack indiscriminately.
This trend continued even after the “volante” had become, effectively, a second centerback. An example of this moment is the Brazilian national team formation in the 1958 World Cup, where one of the center-halves — Zico — acted more defensive and closer to the defensive line than the other center-half — Didi, a.k.a. Mr. Football — so he could make the defensive cover of Nilton Santos, which was a more attacking minded left-back. This moment on, another tactical movement begins to set, which is one of the attackers becoming a proper midfield.
Zito, the “Primeiro Volante” of that national team, main task was to protect the defensive line, but the movement which is interesting to us is the one made by Zagallo, the left winger, who would drift back from its original position in the attack to the midfield zone. This meant that he could bring stability to the midfield and would liberate the right-winger Garrincha — an extremely avid dribbler who could terrorize the opponents — , so he would not have necessity to do the defensive work, focusing only in attacking. This trend would lead to the 4–3–3 that would appear in the same Brazil side in the 1962 World Cup.
Curiously, this 1962 brazilian 4–3–3 appears less as a symmetric formation and more as a formation which has a really wide winger — Garrincha — and a centralized third forward, the “ponta-de-lança” — spearhead — . In this system, Pelé (and posteriorly Amarildo, since Pelé got injured during the 1962 Cup), the width by the left side was guaranteed either by Zagallo moving forward and wider, either by the attacking movement of Nilton Santos. While that happened outside, Amarildo would be a forward and a midfielder at the same time, constructing play while also scoring goals. He exceled at that tournment in the Pelé-role and was crowned champion with the Seleção.
The birth of the Brazilian 4–4–2.
A few years later, somewhere between the years of 1968 and 1969, in the city of Belo Horizonte, would appear what was, by many, the first prototype of the Brazilian 4–2–2–2: The Cruzeiro which had Tostão and Dirceu Lopes
This Cruzeiro side, had two extremely gifted midfielders: Dirceu Lopes, was free-to-roam and fast; and Tostão, a sort of cerebral player who exceled in finishing, were liberated by two “volantes” who would protect the defensive line — Piazza and Zé Carlos — while they had two very incisive and attacking minded wingers who could attack the space and the area — Natal and Hilton Oliveira. This team greatest characteristic was its really fast tempo in passing, besides the speed they could get into the opponent area and create havoc to them. The magnum opus of this first 4–2–2–2 was an astounding 6–2 against Pelé’s Santos, with Dirceu Lopes scoring 3 goals and Tostão scoring one. Surely a team which started to create the popular imagination in Brazil that the 4–2–2–2 is the most perfect formation.
If the 1968–69 Cruzeiro set the landmark of the midfield as a pairing of two volantes and two midfielders, it was the 1982 Seleção that consolidated the 4–2–2–2 as the most perfect formation that would possibilitate the “real Brazilian Football”
As much as Telê was ridiculed by the media and the football fans for its rejection of using wingers in its team( as in the famous comedic sketch of Zé da Galera, played by the famous comedian Jô Soares, in which he begs, talking with Telê from a public telephone ‘BOTA PONTA, TELÊ!’/PUT WINGERS, TELÊ!), it ended becoming famous in football history for being a side that played a “beautiful” brand of football. Even though the team had a winger — Éder — , on the other side of the pitch who would guarantee the width was Leandro, Flamengo’s right back. In the midfield area, Sócrates would play a bit more to the center and Zico would play at the center-right midfield.
This 1982 formation differ itself from 1969 Cruzeiro, especially by using a proper center forward: Serginho Chulapa. Chulapa was not reputed for being a really skilled forward, but for its ability to make lots of goals. Whilst Cruzeiro’s side based its game on collective construction and players making late runs to finish, the 1982 Seleção looked forward to make use of all of its flair and creativity to create scoring chances so Chulapa could score the goals the team needed.The “segundo atacante”, Éder, acted as a proper left winger, attacking the area but primarily looking for crosses so Serginho could head.
Modernity or traditionalism? Adaptation.
The Tragédia of Sarrià proved traumatic and has thrown Brazil unto an spiral of doubts about how to better act against european sides and agains Argentina (who won the 1978 and 1986 World Cup titles). At the 1986 World Cup, Telê Santana was cornered by criticism due to losing the last World Cup, and played in a more conservative manner, with a team that positioned itself in a 4–3–1–2. In the 1990 World Cup, Sebastião Lazaroni tried to organize the Seleção in a 3–4–1–2, using Valdo as a number ‘10’, but it also didn’t work out well. Brazil would only return to its glories in 1994, with Carlos Alberto Parreira and yet another adaption of the brazilian 4–2–2–2.
The 1994 Seleção that was crowned World Champions, yet it was criticised, would go by the idea that there are two primary phases in the game: the offensive and the defensive phases. In the offensive phase, Parreira in the beggining tried to use Raí and Zinho as midfielders, while Dunga and Mauro Silva had the task of protecting the defensive line. In the defensive phase, Raí and Zinho would position themselves as side midfielders, so the team would defend in a 4–4–1–1 or a 4–4–2, as so to protect the attacking minded fullbacks.
However, Raí didn’t adapted to the Seleção style of play and ended up being sacked of the eleven, with Mazinho playing instead. Mazinho was less able technically speaking, but had more marking skills. During the attacking phase, a 4–2–2–2 really well drawn could be seen, with the fullbacks providing width, volantes playing really deep and covering the spaces the fullbacks, two midfielders playing in central areas, trying to create chances for the forwards Bebeto and Romário.
Even as the 1994 side hadn’t brought back the enchantment that the 1982 side had, it set the bases to a football model that was widely used during almost the whole decade of 1990 in Brazilian Football. During the 1998 World Cup, Zagallo tried to maintain the 4–2–2–2 Parreira fashioned in 1994, but a controversial-yet-uncontested 3–0 defeat at the Cup Final against France, aswell as Zinedine Zidane magic display, made that the already contested football model and system in Parreira’s days would fall deeply in disuse. At the same time, the advent (and popularization in Brazil) of 3 centreback systems led to a new change.
At the 2002 World Cup, Felipão tried to solidify its base in a determinated team (the “Scolari Family”) and its players having roles well defined. The team would position itself sometimes with three centrebacks, sometimes with a back-4. This happened because Edmílson could act in both functions properly in the team. Against weaker teams, Edmilson would position itself in front of the defensive line, and the team would line up in a 4–2–2–2/4–3–2–1 that asserted its dominance in the midfield.
In this system, the team would position themselves with Edmilson and Gilberto Silva as volantes, Kleberson as a third midfielder and Ronaldinho Gaúcho as the number 10. Rivaldo acted like a “9 and a half”, in the role of a “segundo atacante/second striker”. He created chances for its teammates but would also appear to finish and score goals.
Being crowned champions in the 2002 World Cup made that, by quite some time in the 00' decade, this sort of alignment was popular and used by managers like Joel Santana, Muricy Ramalho (especially by winning consecutive Brazilian Championship in 2006–07–08 with São Paulo) and Abel Braga.
By the end of the 00’s the hybrid three-at-the-back formations went into ostracism, as happened the advent of the 4–2–3–1 formation. In the Seleção, Dunga was chosen as manager and reshaped the team in a 4–2–2–2 which looked like an assymetrical 4–2–3–1. In “Dungaball’s” era, out goes the back three line and the back four is brought back, fostered by two combative volantes.
The 4–2–3–1 of Dunga became well known in Brazil for a style of playing sometimes conservative, with focus on defensive solidity which is the bases of the “Escola Gaúcha/Rio Grande do Sul Style”, and a positioning which is undecipherable in numbers. It was conventional to call it an assymetrical 4–2–3–1, even if it was no more than one of the shades of colours the brazilian chameleon system 4–2–2–2. Maicon and Michel Bastos would provide width, Gilberto Silva and Felipe Melo covering them while also starting the play from the back.
Until now, everything usual. Then strangeness happen: the player — Elano, Ramires or Daniel Alves — on the right side, would play at almost the same height of the field as Felipe Melo, the segundo volante, but less central, in the right halfspace. Kaká, the number 10, would stay closer to Luis Fabiano. This space on the right of the pitch was always a great question. Dunga played Elano, then Ramires and ended up with Daniel Alves, a right back, playing there. Robinho, the left-winger/segundo atacante, would attack diagonally to the inside of the pitch and rarely participated in defensive phase.
This formation, which gained some fans in Europe (like Michael Cox, from Zonal Marking ) never really got it going with the brazilian fans, harnessing sort of an horror to the Dunga Era. The mistakes of goalkeeper Julio Cesar and the lack of emotional control of Felipe Melo in the game against the Netherlands in 2010 finished the job in destroying the “dunguista” project and its interpretation of the 4–2–2–2.
Ever since, the 4–2–2–2 seems to be hibernated, awaiting for its new skin shedding and ressurge. Which will be, in the future, the new skin of the 4–2–2–2? This is a question only time can tell.
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