Emerging Brazil under Lula: an assessment on International Relations (2003-2010): a special issue of Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional. 1. ed. Brasília: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2010. v. 1. 240p .

Antonio Carlos Lessa

The aim of this article is to analyze Brazil’s foreign policy towards the South American region during President Lula’s administration. As such, the article intends to highlight two specific dimensions: the extent to which foreign policy during this period has differed from previous periods and the relative importance granted by Brazilian diplomacy to recente cooperation and integration efforts, more specifically the Unasur and Mercosur. The article argues that the Lula administration has behaved differently from its predecessors by prioritizing the building up of Brazilian leadership in South America on several diferente fronts, especially by strengthening multilateral institutions in the region.

The Brazilian field of international relations (IRs) has evolved over the course of two centuries. Since Brazilʼs independence in 1822, international topics have deserved attention from local practitioners and scholars. The emergence of Brazilian standpoints about international a airs and of a Brazilian IR scholarship developed a er the consolidation of similar fields in other Western countries. Multiple schools of thought held sway over local understandings, thereby leading to the formation of a di erent field as compared to characteristics of the Anglo-American mainstream. The institutionalization of the area has come about through the creation of scholarly departments and national government agencies. It all led to a unique combination of methods, theories, and issues being currently explored in the Brazilian branch of IR scholarship.

This article highlights Brazil’s increasing visibility in international politics and attributes this to the almost constant maintenance of two long-term goals for the country’s foreign policy: the pursuit of autonomy and greater projection on the international stage. The argument is sustained by a historical analysis of the paradigms of Americanism and globalism and their reformulation in the form of two other paradigms, pragmatic institutionalism and autonomy. These constructs serve as a basis for observing that the continuity of Brazilian foreign policy and the development of specific strategies for attaining its objectives have been consistent even across changing governments and regimes.

Ano 53 • Special • 2010 Emerging Brazil under Lula: an assessment on International Relations (2003-2010) Special issue EDITed by Amado Luiz Cervo & Antônio Carlos Lessa Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (Rio de Janeiro: 1958-1992; Brasília: 1993-) A Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI) é uma publicação semestral do Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI) dedicada a promover a reflexão, a pesquisa e o debate acadêmico sobre relações internacionais e sobre a política exterior do Brasil. © 2010 Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Publicação semestral. Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (Ibri). – Brasília DF, Edição especial, 2010. 240p.; 23 cm (ano 53 special edition). (ISSN 0034-7329 e ISSN on line 1983-3121) 1. Política Internacional. 2. Relações Internacionais. 3. Direito Internacional; 4. Política Comparada; 5. Economia Política Internacional; 6. Política Exterior. I. Título. Correspondência para a Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Caixa Postal 4400 70919-970 Brasília – DF, Brasil Telefone: (55.61) 2192-9460 Fax: (55.61) 3107-0755 e-mail: editoria@ibri-rbpi.org Sumário Editorial 5 An Assessment of the Lula Era Amado Luiz Cervo Antônio Carlos Lessa Artigos 7 Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World A ascensão do Brasil no cenário internacional: o Brasil e o mundo Amado Luiz Cervo 33 Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21 century Setor Externo Brasileiro no início do século XXI Renato Baumann st 54 Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010) O Brasil e o multilateralismo econômico, político e ambiental: o governo Lula (2003-2010) Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini André Luiz Reis da Silva 73 When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula Quando países emergentes reformam a governança global das mudanças climáticas: o Brasil sob Lula Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau 91 Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Questões de segurança no governo Lula: da perspectiva reativa para a afirmativa Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa Manuela Trindade Viana 115 Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) Parcerias estratégicas do Brasil: um balanço da era Lula (2003-2010) Antônio Carlos Lessa 132 A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Um novo diálogo estratégico: as relações Brasil-Estados Unidos na Presidência Lula (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo 151 Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration: caught between South America and Mercosur Política externa brasileira para a América do Sul durante o governo Lula: entre América do Sul e Mercosul Miriam Gomes Saraiva 169 The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy A Nova África e o Brasil na era Lula: o renascimento da política atlântica brasileira José Flávio Sombra Saraiva 183 Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China Parceria Global Emergente: Brasil e China Niu Haibin 193 International Thought in the Lula Era Pensamento Internacional na era Lula Raúl Bernal-Meza 214 Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010): uma visão geral Celso Amorim Editorial An Assessment of the Lula Era Amado Luiz Cervo* Antônio Carlos Lessa** Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) has kept Brazil open to the international economy and promoted internal economic development and social inclusion. He has worked toward the overcoming of the inequalities among nations and the elimination of hunger in the world; and has intensified the harmony between the State and social leaders to whom he has delegated power and responsibilities regarding development. He endured the criticism of the opposition, used for decades to lambasting foreign policy and, in Lula’s case, some concessions made to the Workers Party as mere allegories. As a matter of fact, Lula has achieved significant external results in important sectors for national life and failed in others. South America, his priority project, occupies a middle ground. To make South America into a power pole supported by a solid economic base, political unity, and security autonomy is a Brazilian project that dates back to previous governments but which has been assigned priority by Lula. A series of circumstances turned this project from a high priority into a low priority in the 21th century. The South American countries have promoted institutionalization, with the establishment of UNASUR in 2008. In general, they have preserved the political intent buthave created different national arrangements and became dispersed among different models of participation in the international scene. Major energy and infrastructure projects have not materialized. With the passing of time, Lula has let know that Brazil’s locus is the world, without however allowing this global dimension of external action to result in a distancing from South America. Lula’s diplomacy has met with two failures. At the WTO it failed to achieve the desired global agreement on free trade that would favor our national interests, given Brazil’s higher competitiveness at a systemic level. In addition, the effort to make part of the global power club, especially of the Security Council, was an attempt that earned some rhetoric support but yielded no actual result. It will be up to the next government to rethink these two lines of external action – foreign trade policy and admission to the power club. * Tenured Emeritus Professor of History of International Relations of University of Brasilia – UnB and senior researcher of National Council for Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq (alcervo@unb.br). ** Associate Professor of University of Brasilia – UnB and researcher of National Council for Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq (alessa@unb.br). 5 Editorial On three other fronts – the most relevant for the promotion of national interests – Lula has achieved remarkable success, which makes it advisable for the next government not only to maintain but also to reinforce these lines of external action. First, the internationalization of the Brazilian economy. Of the BRIC countries, Lula’s Brazil has stood out as the most internationalized economy, either as a recipient of foreign enterprises or direct foreign investments or owing to the outward expansion of Brazilian companies and investments. This represents a jump in historic quality toward a mature process of development and of the country’s participation in the international scene. Secondly, with conviction and even with bold initiatives, Lula has promoted the negotiation of international conflicts. This conflict solution strategy is a novelty, given the intensity with which it is conducted by Brazilian and Chinese diplomacy, not to mention UNASUR. It is the opposite of NATO’s strategy of dealing with conflicts through the violence of sanctions or intervention, which has governed international relations since World War II and should be replaced for the sake of peace. Thirdly, Lula has promoted coalitions among emerging countries that have demanded and achieved the shifting of the axis of the international system characterized by the old North-South asymmetry toward a new North-Emerging Countries symmetry. The time is past when the decision-making power in international relations was restricted to the understanding among a few developed powers, which was then proposed to the others as a possible consensus. This special issue we offer our readers examines and looks deeper into these and other aspects of Brazil’s international relations in the 21th century. 6 Artigo Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World A ascensão do Brasil no cenário internacional: o Brasil e o mundo Amado Luiz Cervo* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 7-32 [2010] From the Cardoso to the Lula era: Brazil and the world In the course of their sixteen years in office, Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) were two statesmen who defined the pattern of Brazil’s integration into the international scene at the turn from the 20th into the 21st century. Cardoso’s ideas and decisions drew inspiration from the neoliberal political philosophy, while Lula’s derived from a logistic mission of the State. The two presidents’ modes of thinking are not sufficient to explain their strategies, though. As he essayed the logistic model of foreign policy in his second term, Cardoso, the neoliberal turned skeptical when he formulated the concept of asymmetrical globalization, paved the way for his successor, who adopted the new model to promote Brazil’s interdependent integration into the international scene. From neoliberalism to global interdependence Neoliberalism had both adverse and positive effects on Brazil’s international relations. Adverse effects included unilateral opening of the domestic consumers market, foreign trade deficit, foreign indebtedness, sale of assets of Brazilian companies, submission to consensuses and advice from capitalism’s center, obedience to the rules of global governance established by the rich to their own benefit, and the sacrificing of relations with emerging countries in favor of the first world; in sum, a country’s loss of power on the international scene. In time, though, economic opening resulted in the modernization of industrial plants and made the Brazilian economy more competitive, while * Tenured Emeritus Professor of History of International Relations of University of Brasilia – UnB and senior researcher of National Council for Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq (alcervo@unb.br). 7 Amado Luiz Cervo liberalism led to a smaller role of the State and the attendant rise of society. Lula boarded this train already on the move and advanced farther on the path of real interdependence. He discarded previous mechanisms of dependent integration and placed Brazil among the nations that move on their own feet in search of their destiny, with their governments’ support. Here lies the jump in quality of the Brazilian model of integration into the international scene at the turn of the millennium: the State’s intermediary role and external action on behalf of the social segments, subsuming the national interest, which encompasses the objectives of producers and consumers, entrepreneurs and wage earners alike. To stake out its space in the world, instead of just opening itself to the world as before, Brazil would have to face up the asymmetries caused by the inequality of power and benefits in the international order. To what extent has Lula’s Brazil succeeded in this respect? The international order at the outset of the new millennium is in a state of effervescence involving actors and powers. Neoliberalism has receded to the periphery and placed itself at the service of the European Union and the United States, which reinforced their political, geopolitical, and economic alliance and resisted the regulation of economic activities, the root of the 2008/09 crisis. On the other hand, globalization had altered an order imposed by the liberal doctrine for the order dominated by the States and its military power, and by transnational corporations. Old capitalism’s supremacy and global logistic have had to come face to face with the emerging nations, which have come together to tame globalization’s impetus. To the north, one sees what Bertrand Badie calls the power’s impotence; to the south, we see the counterpower’s play; and according to Gilberto Dupas, both actors recognize the limits of the national States. In the south, counterpower springs from the social and political legitimization on whose bases the rules of the new order are to be defined so as to benefit all; it springs further from democracy, which leads to the formulation of these rules. It springs also from neoliberalism, which motivates individuals and, on the other extreme, from terrorism, which nourishes the root causes. Globalization’s order is entering a new, still more global phase: each actor feels bound to the whole – to the rich and to the poor, to the developed and to the emerging countries, and to those benefited or excluded by capitalism – since all are affected by international trade, peace and war, the environment, human rights, the energy and the financial crises, and the scarcity of food. The entry of new actors on the stage adds other voices to the criticism of global asymmetries, and hampers diplomatic negotiations. This explains the stagnation of multilateralism, which was supposed to draw up the rules for the global order in the 21st century; it also explains the defensive reaction on the part of the developed countries, which reactivated the G-8, as well as the confrontation of two dispute settlement strategies: the Chinese-Brazilian, through the peaceful means of diplomatic negotiations, and the US-NATO, through the violent means of intervention or sanction. 8 Since Cardoso and during Lula’s Administration, international order has undergone significant changes. These changes have allowed Brazilian foreign policy to mitigate the internal effects of the order established by others and, at the same time, to become an active participant in the formulation of the new order. How has this occurred? With globalization of democracy seeming a utopian objective, as shown by the American failure in Iraq and by the continuity of the Chinese political regime, why not democratize globalization? This objective, susceptible of producing real, positive effects, is the mainspring of Brazilian foreign policy. As a first step, Lula’s foreign diplomacy adopted this approach at the World Trade Organization’s Conference in Cancún, in 2003. Since World War II, international economic regulations had been established by capitalism’s center in its own favor. Developing countries, later called emerging countries, were at the most spectators at negotiation tables, and would certainly abide by the rules. All of this was seen as natural. After Cancún, in the view of Brazilian diplomacy, either the emerging countries would participate in the formulation of the rules or the process would stop. To create counterpower, this diplomacy worked then and thereafter to form coalitions in the South, the first of which was the G-20, a group of countries established on the occasion of the Cancún Conference to address trade issues. The determination to democratize globalization added new facets to foreign policy: reinforcement of the role of the State as an international negotiator; sovereign defense of national interests, including big business under the process of being globalized; alliances with emerging countries with identical objectives, beginning with those of South America; open dialogue with, instead of subservience to more developed countries; and a component of morality in the form of fight against poverty and hunger.1 Lula has maintained the tradition of formulating and programming foreign policy as a State policy. It has preserved values, interests, and modes of conduct adopted through historical channels, such as an industrial calling and a harmonious connection between the State and society. It has preserved Brazil’s historical participation in multilateral negotiation organizations and increased by more than thirty percent the number of countries where Brazil maintains diplomatic representations. It has established three external objectives: a) market liberalism ensuring reciprocity of benefits; b) expansion of business abroad through trade and internationalization of Brazilian companies; and c) reinforcement of military power to influence global order and sectoral regimes. This is what makes the logistic strategy of incorporation into the international scene. 1 BADIE, Bertrand. L’Impuissance de la puissance: essai sur les nouvelles relations internationales. Paris: Fayard, 2004. DUPAS, Gilberto. Atores e poderes na nova ordem mundial. São Paulo: Unesp, 2005. PAROLA, Alexandre G. L. A ordem injusta. Brasilia: FUNAG, 2007. 9 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World Amado Luiz Cervo Consolidation of the logistic mode of participation in the international scene At the 2003 World Economic Forum in Davos, Lula, as an initial message of his first Administration, made clear his dissent from the neoliberal model, which he saw as an exaltation of the market-god. In the view of Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, blind faith in open markets and in the State’s stepping back cannot induce development and equality among nations. The new leaders have thus developed an awareness of the role of the State and demanded political action to allow the country to penetrate global processes as an active agent in the system, without submitting itself to the play of traditional forces. A logistic State is one that does not lend itself merely to rendering services, as was the case at the time of developmentalism, or to remaining a passive spectator of market forces and hegemonic power, as was the case at the time of neoliberalism. It is a logistic State because it reassumes development’s strategic planning and the function of supporting and legitimizing the initiatives of other economic and social actors, to which it delegates responsibilities and power. Contrarily to literature’s presumption about globalization, this new mode introduced by Cardoso and consolidated by Lula prevents governments from being incapable of governing owing to international forces. Being Brazil an organized society, with its class associations bringing together industrialists, farmers, bankers, workers, businessmen, and consumers, it is incumbent on the State to support the achievement of the interests of these segments of society, watching over the welfare of all, which is the supreme national interest. As all of this depends on both internal and external factors, the State ensures that the national interest has a weight on foreign policy, and becomes an agent of global governance. This development warrants seeing foreign policy in the Lula era as a decisive step toward maturity. Two factors, among others, contribute to the consolidation of the logistic State in Brazil: the high degree of society’s organization, which facilitates the leader’s coordinating work; and political and economic stability, which prompts the linking of internal governability’s logic to the logic of global governance. The combination of these factors, when placed at the service of development, gives rise to the logistic State, whose conduct differs from that of the neoliberal State, especially as it recovers the decision-making autonomy in the political sphere and turns to the reinforcement of national economy’s hard core in the economic sphere. In light of this conceptual framework, we can now review the different areas of external activity geared to the achievement of the nation’s interests. And thereafter we can assess the results, as it is appropriate to a study of the country’s international relations.2 2 CERVO, Amado Luiz. Inserção internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008. CARDOSO, José Celso (org). Desafios ao desenvolvimento brasileiro. Brasília: Ipea, 2009. BRASIL, Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Política Externa Brasileira I. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. Idem, DEP: Diplomacia, Estratégia e Política. Brasília, MRE, n. 1, 2004. GUIMARÃES, Samuel Pinheiro. Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2005. 10 Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World Brazil is forging ahead in the 21st century to become a globalist country. But its mode of integration into the international scene differs from that of other globalist countries, such as Chile’s. Chile’s international insertion fits the tradeoriented globalism that prolongs society’s infancy by taking as guidelines free trade treaties and an economy based on primary exports, i.e., neoliberal precepts of the 1990s. Brazil adopts the industrialist globalism mode, characterized at this stage of maturity of the development process by two essential features: reciprocal multilateralism and economic internationalization. We advance now to a more thorough study of these features to describe the Brazilian mode of incorporation into the international scene in the 21st century. The concept of reciprocal multilateralism Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century operates through reciprocal multilateralism: “We want free trade, but free trade characterized by reciprocity,” said Lula in Davos on January 26, 2003. Reciprocity does not apply only to international trade. In all areas of the international order – economy, trade, security, environment, health, and human rights – reciprocity is ensured when the rules of multilateral order benefit all nations. Without these rules, international order remains at the mercy of the stronger, as shown since 1945 by the discussions at GATT-WTO and the UN, the two pillars of multilateralism. As a co-founder of these two more relevant multilateral organizations devoted primarily to trade and to security, respectively, Brazil has maintained continuity of ideas and conduct, as it has advocated the peaceful, negotiated solution of disputes and the promotion of the interests of the rich and the poor through the international trade system. However, multilateralism has not been guided by these principles over time. In the 21st century, the Security Council still lacks representativeness, impartiality, and efficacy for maintaining peace, while the WTO lacks balance in the decision-making process to meet the nations’ interests. As of 2003, Brazilian foreign policy has found more power to demand reciprocity in international relations. “We have formed the G-20 in Cancun, when the United States and the European Union were attempting to impose an unfair agreement that left farm subsidies virtually untouched and offered little or no opening to products of interest to developing countries, while demanding from these disproportionate concessions,” wrote Celso Amorim. Brazilian diplomacy applies its concept of reciprocal multilateralism to trade and security, but also extends it to all areas of international relations. The concept involves two presuppositions: the existence of rules to govern the international order, without which the power disparity will prevail in favor of the great powers; and the joint formulation of these rules, so that they will not favor the interests of some to the detriment of the interests of others. 11 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional High priority attached to integration into the global scene Amado Luiz Cervo Reciprocal multilateralism eliminates two theoretical utopias for an understanding of Brazilian foreign policy: hegemonic stability, and a necessary connection between foreign policy and political regime. The hegemonic stability theory lies at the foundation of an international order based on the unilateral conduct of the dominating power – the United States since the end of the Cold War – or on the subservience of the others and the attendant irrelevance of the multilateral organizations. But a hegemonic instability theory would serve just as well as an explanation, according to Badie, as can be seen in contestation, anti-Americanism, terrorism, the outbreak of the financial crisis triggered at the hegemonic center, the random conduct of certain powers, the ease with which the States move. As hegemony does not engender order, much less an acceptable order, only multilateralism can preserve the order from the nations’ selfishness, in the view of Brazil’s foreign policy. In other words, the ideal order is the multilateral order. A political regime does not necessarily show any connection with peace, development, justice, and mankind’s welfare. Liberal and democratic regimes operate toward these ends but may also operate in an opposite direction. In South America, development models have shown similar results, regardless of the democratic or authoritarian nature of the different regimes.3 Reciprocal multilateralism: examples To describe the reciprocal multilateralism that characterizes the Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century, we have chosen examples in five areas, for didactic purposes. (1) reciprocity in the international economy and in the decisions of the great economic powers: the G-8, whose meetings are attended by the Brazilian Head of State; and the financial G-20, whose first summit was held in November 2008 to combat the effects of the crisis and the stagnation of the developed countries; (2) international trade and Brazil’s conduct at WTO’s Doha Round, as well as its determination to establish coalitions among emerging countries; (3) international security, especially the efforts before the Security Council, and the valorization of the strategy of negotiation instead of that of violence in dealing with issues; (4) climate changes and other environmental issues; (5) health and human rights. 1. International economy: G-8 and G-20 The basic characteristic of Brazil’s international economic relations is the pursuit of actual interdependence, i.e., of reciprocity in the achievement of interests through negotiation at different forums, and of economic internationalization. 3 BRASIL, Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Política Externa Brasileira, I. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. AMORIM, Celso. A diplomacia multilateral do Brasil. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. 12 Since 2003, negotiations have incorporated this economic policy and guided diplomacy’s conduct at the WTO, in connection with the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and toward the European Union, as well as in the formation of coalitions with emerging countries. The purpose of this strategy is to strengthen ties to the largest possible number of nations, blocs, and regions, regardless of their geographical situation, but with emphasis on the Southern Hemisphere, where Brazilian interests are more evident. In 2004, for instance, Argentina was the second largest destination of Brazilian exports, after the United States, while China came third, and southern countries were the destination of fifty percent of total exports. In 2010, China ranks as Brazil’s first trade partner. In economic relations with the European Union and the United States, the unrestricted liberalization of business, financial, and products flows does not serve the achievement of the national interest, as the country still lags behind them in productivity. With unrestricted liberalization, Brazil would jeopardize its industrial future. It is under this light that one should understand the rejection of free trade treaties, which perpetuate asymmetries; the search for partnerships and coalitions in the South; the attention to Mercosur; and the construction of South American economic unity – all of which are features of foreign policy’s realism. While the North offers little other than a large market, and requires much in structural terms, relations with the South are more favorable, in addition to offering opportunities that would be insane on the part of good policy to miss. The financial crisis that erupted in September 2007 in the United States and then spread to Europe, following the same pattern of capitalism’s 1929 crisis, reveals the new equilibrium of the international economy, thus showing the appropriateness of Brazil’s international economic policy, which maintains strong ties to the North, but reacts logistically to change. On the one hand, emerging countries appear, with good regulation, high productivity, production, and exports, in addition to holding huge amounts in United States Treasury papers; on the other, one sees bad regulation, high imports level, consumerism, low savings, and public indebtedness at the center of capitalism. Rich countries hold frequent meetings to discuss the direction of international relations and their own interests, especially those that are not addressed by multilateral decisions of global organizations. For some years now, they have invited emerging countries they see as global actors to sit at the table. At the 2007 Germany Summit, for instance, the G-8 (Germany, Italy, France, United Kingdom, United States, Japan, and Russia) invited one of the G-5 (China, India, South Africa, Mexico, and Brazil), and offered President Lula the opportunity to attend the negotiations of the rich. At its 35th Summit, held in Aquila, Italy, in July 2009, the G-8 decided to convert itself into the G-14 (G-8+G-5+Egypt). The invitation addressed at the G-5 was prompted not by mere courtesy but by these emergent countries’ weight, needed for addressing the issues and solving problems on a global scale. 13 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World Amado Luiz Cervo When the developed economies went into recession in 2008, the G-8 was forced to dilute itself into the financial G-20, which shelters the twenty largest economies plus the European Union, a forum then established for adopting measures against speculation and for reigniting growth. But it is the rich countries’ defense instinct that explains the maintenance of the G-8, which in June 2009 had been declared dead by Celso Amorim and; Lula, accordingly, characterized the same forum as inadequate to make decisions about the international economy. At the June 2010 Toronto meeting of the two forums, the G-8 reformulated its modus operandi. As the instinct of defense, coupled with emerging interests and the multiplicity of economic negotiation forums (G-8, G-15, G-20, and Central Banks) fails to conciliate decisions, it entails the irrelevance of these multilateral meetings for conceiving the new economic order, to be ultimately determined by the rich and the emerging countries. The rich countries’ economic stagnation reflects adversely on Brazilian economy in three ways: a reduction of exports, especially of manufactures, of foreign direct investment, and a slackening of the pace of economic growth. Reaction to these effects has been threefold: intensification of investments under the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC); reinforcement of the southern coalitions aimed at reforming the international financial system, the IMF, and the World Bank; and the making of ten billion dollars available to the IMF to reinforce its lending resources. At economic forum meetings, Brazilian government has advocated biofuels as a means of meeting the energy challenge, which is similar to the challenge presented by China, with its massive population and its fast growth pace, to climate change. The investment protection issue, which puts in opposition the interests of two worlds, has been shifted to bilateral agreements. A new form of protectionism has come up into the discussion, introduced by countries such as Canada and the United States, which proclaim the freedom of investment but begin to reconsider and even prohibit businesses that might lead to the acquisition of their strategic corporations by emerging countries through shares transfer. As regards intellectual property, which protects patents and technological innovation, discussion at the G-8 faces a similar situation. Regulations in favor of laboratories and corporations of rich countries are accepted with reservations by India and China, while Brazil has already issued compulsory licensing of medication against AIDS, thus breaking its patent. From the negotiations with the big ones – if one might speak of real negotiation between rich and emerging countries – three conclusions can be drawn. First, the meetings address issues that are vital to Brazilian interests; the country should identify which regulations it would be advisable to accept and make its policy clear at multilateral forums and at the time of negotiating international agreements. Second, it is necessary to learn from this process, as the country now becomes a holder of intellectual property and international investor. Third, the 14 Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World perception imposes itself of how important it is for the national interest to preserve decision-making autonomy in foreign policy, as expressed in President Lula’s unpolished words at the conclusion of the Germany meeting: “The developed world thinks that it can make a speech and that we have to take it as the last word and obey.”4 Globalization stimulates international trade in goods, services, and factors. The volume of foreign trade, exports and imports reflects on the income of producers and consumers, on the employment level, and on the country’s external finances. Hence, attention should be devoted to trade. After the trade deficit of the 1990s owing to the devaluation of the Real in 1999, Brazilian foreign trade showed an upward trend, but it was only as of 2003 that this rising trend confirmed itself, with considerable surpluses, owing to higher consumption and higher prices of export commodities. Finance Ministry data show that exports totaled 48 billion dollars in 1998, 60 billion in 2002, and 197.9 billion in 2008, falling to 152.3 billion in 2009, due to the crisis. Surpluses also arose, from minus one billion dollars in 1999 to 40 billion in 2007. This was the year when the list of exports was further diversified, including agribusiness exports, in which Brazil is a world leader (it ranks first as an exporter of ethanol, sugar, coffee, and orange juice), and sophisticated exports, such as aircraft and software. Manufactures, which accounted for 52.3 percent of the total, exceeded primary exports then. In 2007, the United States and the European Union accounted for less than half of Brazilian exports – 65 billion dollars as compared with 161 billion dollars. As consumption in rich countries fell, China became Brazil’s first trade partner in 2010. Despite globalization, the modernization of the Brazilian productive system, and the logistic strategy for integration into the international scene, Brazil has not been able in the 21st century to substantially modify its list of exports and to reap greater benefits from foreign trade. In 2009 it exported more commodities than manufactures. As regards manufactures, 40 percent went to the major economies (United States, European Union, and China), while another 40 percent went to Latin America, which attests to the attention to the neighbor countries. These data illustrate the Brazilian diplomacy’s activism at the WTO. As an advocate of the liberalization of markets, Brazilian diplomacy seeks to address the imbalance between Brazilian productivity’s higher status within the global system and its low participation in international trade. Two specific objectives drive Brazilian participation at these negotiations: to secure the liberalization of the 4 BATISTA JR. Paulo Nogueira. O Brasil e a economia internacional: recuperação e defesa da autonomia nacional. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2005. 15 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 2. International trade and the WTO Amado Luiz Cervo agricultural market and the end of farm subsidies in Europe and the United States; and refusal to make any concessions on manufacture trade as long as this injustice is not redressed. That is, to establish the reciprocity of trade benefits between the rich and the emerging countries. This Brazilian trade policy practiced also at the WTO governs all negotiations; and as it met with resistance, it caused the collapse of the FTAA and of the Mercosur-European Union Free Trade Agreement. The trade G-20 was formed in Geneva, in August 2003, during preparatory meetings and thus preceded the Cancun Conference. It is made up of emerging countries willing to prevent the acceptance of results predetermined by the Northern powers at multilateral trade negotiations. Its original membership has been expanded from twenty to twenty-three member countries, whose ministerial meetings take place at regular intervals. The WTO has been taken by surprise by the upsurge of the emerging countries, which has caused it to change its modes of negotiation. It no longer accepts prior agreements between rich countries proposed to the Assembly as a possible consensus to be imposed from above. The interests of the South now make part of the negotiations’ dynamics. The two group’s confrontation, particularly on the agricultural issue, dragged on for the entire decade, hampering negotiations, and confirming Celso Amorim’s prediction that the WTO would tend to become irrelevant. On one side, stood the rich countries, which did not yield to the emerging countries’ right to take part in the decision-making power which determines global trade order, demanding from them the liberalization of their industrial markets without giving up their farm policies; on the other side, stood the emerging countries, which since Cancún had gained sufficient power to do away with subservience in international relations and to ensure reciprocity in the achievement of interests. In June 2006, the Doha Round negotiations were suspended and were actually resumed only at the end of the decade. But discouragement took hold of diplomats and specialists. Agricultural negotiations were thus shifted to the United Nations, which convened a major FAO Assembly in 2008, in Rome, to discuss food security, which was placed in jeopardy by the food crisis. The meeting was attended by forty heads of state and 4,800 delegates from 192 UN member countries. As it happened at the WTO, negotiations at FAO also bogged down and yielded insignificant results. In brief, at trade negotiations, countries easily shift responsibilities to one another. For Brazil, multilateralism’s failure at trade negotiations in the 21st century both harms and disturbs political decisions in matters of foreign trade: should one continue to wager on global free trade, move toward the bilateralism of free trade as advised by diplomats of the Cardoso era and some businessmen, or seek an alternative in the South? As long as a change of strategy did not occur, the South alternative began to materialize. Trade with China now ranks first, South American integration has been promoted with this purpose in view, and in 16 Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World December 2009 Brazil signed a trade agreement with 22 developing countries, under which mutual tariffs have been reduced by 20 percent.5 The powers’ security policy shows an internal face, the provision of means, and a strong connection with foreign policy. Despite multilateralism and the formation of blocs, security is grounded on internal reality, from where it draws the means for action and for exercising the decision-making power. In recent years, the Brazilian academia has involved some groups in the study of security issues, which are no longer limited to a concern on the part of the armed forces and of diplomacy. According to Vaz, there is a gap in Brazil between the strategic capability and the perception of the role to be played at the regional and global levels. With its ability to form consensuses, Brazilian diplomacy offsets the armed forces’ scarce means of dissuasion and defense. This is why it extols Brazil’s international role in security matters. It berates the United States’s unilateral preemptive action, the doctrine of European intervention and terrorism; in addition, it to links security to development and to the combat of hunger. It proposes a strategy of favoring negotiation over the resort to violence for the solution of conflicts and the maintenance of peace. It points out the positive effects of its praxis on the construction of peace and calls for the democratization of decisions at the Security Council as another way of achieving reciprocity in the multilateral order. It has recently taken initiatives in this respect, such as the attempted mediation between Iran and the West in regard to that country’s nuclear program; also in the talks between Arabs and Israelis regarding conflicts in the Middle East. But Brazilian diplomacy has not been successful in its attempt to join the exclusive club of political and military power, which remains firmly closed. The 1996 plan to reform national defense led to institutional advances, such as the establishment of the Ministry of Defense and the alternation of civilian ministers at its whelm, which however produced no effect on the country’s strategic capability. Ten years later, the Lula government drafted a second plan conceptually appropriate for reequipping the armed forces but whose results are not yet known: to restart the military industry and technological research aimed at providing the armed forces with internal means. But as long as a cultural change does not occur in the country, foreign policy will remain deprived of operational means. Despite these contradictions, Brazilian foreign policy moves on with the intention of playing a relevant role in the field of security, based on the negotiated conflict solution. In 2004, Brazil joined Southern Cone countries, 5 BRASIL Ministério das Relações Exteriores. O G-20 e a OMC: textos, comunicados e documentos. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. Idem, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n. 83, 2003. See “Informe sobre o Comércio Mundial 2008 – O comércio em um mundo em processo de globalização,” prepared by the WTO. 17 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 3. Security and the Security Council Amado Luiz Cervo Argentina and Chile, secured the cooperation of Uruguay, Peru, and Bolivia, assumed the command of the troops, and acted to bring peace, development, and redemocratization to Haiti – Brazil’s major involvement in UN peace missions since 1946. Let us now look at two objectives of Brazilian external involvement: the UN Security Council and the South American Defense Council. Consistently with its pacifist foreign policy, Brazil has preference for a multilateral approach as a mechanism for solving conflicts. It attaches importance to the UN Security Council, of which it has made part since its founding, and frequently participates in peace missions. But Brazil calls for a reform of the Council in view of its lack of representativeness and of effectiveness in facing 21st century conflicts. In 2005, the Brazilian government submitted to the UN General Assembly a proposal for the Council’s reform, a proposal that had the support of other members of the G-4 (Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan), a group of major powers that wish to be made permanent members of the Council. Despite the G-4 endeavors, global reaction prevented the reform. The five permanent members’ fear of losing power, the regional rivalries among powers, and disagreement as to the nature of the reform have kept the Council just as it was when it was established right after World War II. On the occasion of the signing of the treaty establishing the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) in Brasilia in 2008, the Brazilian government submitted a proposal for the establishment of a South American Defense Council as one of Unasur steering bodies. After some obstacles to its establishment were overcome, the Defense Council was officially established in March 2009. Its purpose is to keep external powers away from security matters in South America, to maintain the region as a zone of peace and negotiation, and to solve any regional conflicts. Threats to security in Brazil’s neighborhood do not come from the reequipment of the nations’ armed forces, ideological differences between governments, of geopolitical rivalries. But the United States’s reactivation of the IV Fleet, which operates in Latin America, Central America, and the Caribbean, inactive since 1950, and the use of seven airbases ceded by Colombia are a regional hegemonic power’s answer to South America’s pretended security autonomy.6 6 VAZ, Alcides Costa. La agenda de seguridad de Brasil: de la afirmación soberana hacia la cooperación. In: Cepik, Marco e Socorro, Ramírez (orgs.). Agenda de Seguridad Andino-Brasileña. Bogotá: Fescol, 2004, p. 145174. PAGLIARI, Graciela De Conti. O Brasil e a segurança na América do Sul. Curitiba: Juruá, 2009. BRASIL, Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Política Externa Brasileira, II. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. Idem, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n. 96, 2005. ALSINA Jr. João Paulo Soares. Política externa e política de defesa no Brasil: síntese imperfeita. Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, 2006. 18 Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World In the view of the Brazilian foreign policy, the environmental issue encompasses three other issues: the planet’s survival; development; and hunger. Multilateral negotiations for establishing appropriate regimes to address these issues have always been carried out under the auspices of the United Nations. Three Conferences were devoted to the matter: Stockholm in 1972; Rio de Janeiro in 1992; and Johannesburg in 2002. Brazilian diplomacy has played a significant role in this area, with the intention of introducing the reciprocity of effects into the discussion. The industrial countries introduced the environmental issue into multilateralism at the Stockholm Conference; thereafter, the developing countries injected their interests into the discussion, and in this Brazil has had a prominent role, as it has always associated the issue with development, and more recently with sustainable development. The discussion has turned into polemics. On one side, the rich countries ascribe poverty and hunger to causes located in the South, such as corruption, government incompetence, and the restricted opening to the economic agents of capitalism’s center. Since Rio-1992 they have been willing to finance projects of their interest. On the other side are developing countries, who point to the industrial countries as the culprits of environmental degradation and of the inequality among nations. Though hampered, the discussion has proceeded, with conceptual gains for the developing countries, but with scant actual effects in general. Climate change has become the most salient issue in the discussion. It surfaced in 1992, was the subject of a convention that entered into force in 1994, made headway after the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, in force since 2005, and has attracted public attention owing to the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, released by the United Nations since 1990. International law sets targets for pollutant gas emissions that cause the planet’s warming; these targets are compulsory for the industrial countries and left to the emerging countries’ sense of responsibility. Alleging that compulsoriness interferes with its sovereignty, the United States has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, thus setting up a serious obstacle to the regime’s success ten years after it was established. Moreover, the Copenhagen Conference failed. Under these circumstances, the United Nations is going ahead with its efforts to save the planet from the climatic scourges that compromise not only the planet’s very survival but also the survival of the poor. In late 2007, the XIII United Nations Climate Change Conference was held in Bali, Indonesia, and was attended by 189 countries. Totally isolated, the United States gave in and finally a protocol of intentions for the post-Kyoto era was signed, to enter into force in 2012. The regime was supposed to make progress as the emerging countries 19 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 4. Climate and other environmental issues Amado Luiz Cervo committed themselves to reduce their emissions with the help of technologies financed by the rich countries, including the United States, which would then make quantified cuts.7 But the truth is there has been no progress. This is the conclusion warranted by the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, the 15th conference of parties on climate change, which was attended by heads of state and fifteen thousand delegates. 5. Health and human rights Military spending and the costs financial systems’ recovery after the recent crisis have required huge sums, particularly in the developed countries. The internal and international impact has been indifference toward hunger, the internal difficulties of many nations, and the heightening of international tension. Mankind’s food situation became more serious in 2007-08. The Brazilian foreign policy regarding human rights, as in the aforementioned cases, is critical of an international order devoid of reciprocity or justice. Human rights have been seen traditionally by the North in light of the ideas inherent to the liberal revolutions of the 18th century, which were incorporated into the United Nations 1948 declaration. Since World War II, this strain of political philosophy has inspired the realism of international relations theory and of political praxis, which vests the States with hegemony for defining the global order on the basis of interests and power, or rather, on the basis of the interests of those that wield power, without taking morals into consideration. This realism, a target of criticism in the North as well, does not match the Brazilian vision, which for decades has associated human rights with development and, in the Lula era, with combating poverty and hunger. At the UN General Assemblies he has attended since 2003 and at meetings of world leaders and of multilateral organizations, President Lula or his diplomats have chastised an order that ignores the scourge of hunger and disease, thereby violating human rights. On the domestic front, action is taken through social programs such as the Family Grant, the driving engine of the Zero Hunger subprogram; on the external front, action is taken through cooperation extended to poorer countries, especially from Africa. Before Lula, the Brazilian government already resorted to international negotiations in this area, and achieved results, such as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights-TRIPS mechanism adopted by the WTO, under pressure from the emerging countries, so as to rein in the right to medical drugs patents and expand the use of these medicines when required by public health. As an example, it may be mentioned that in 2007, the Lula government, frustrated over the lack of results in the negotiations with a 7 LAGO, André Aranha Corrêa do. Estocolmo, Rio, Joanesburgo: o Brasil e as três conferências ambientais das Nações Unidas. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. 20 Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World lab holding the rights to the Efavirenz, a drug for combating AIDS, ordered the competent agency to break its patent.8 For the first time in history, internationalization of Brazilian companies has become part of the country’s external strategy. Lula indicated this conceptual change at the 2005 Davos World Economic Forum when he said: “Something I have repeatedly said to Brazilian businessmen is that they should not be afraid to make their companies into multinationals, to make investments in other countries, as this would be very good for Brazil.” At meetings with businessmen, Celso Amorim, has reaffirmed the objective of turning Brazil into a globalized country, through the expansion of its businesses abroad. “Brazil has exchanged a participation in the international scene through dependence and subordination for a sovereign, cooperative participation…,” said the President that same year before hundreds of businessmen in São Paulo. The dialogue between Lula and the business community will continue. A trend that has deserved much attention in international relations since 1990, globalization manifests itself in two ways: access to markets and expansion of internal businesses abroad and of external businesses into the internal domain. Europe and the United States have benefited from globalization and thereby increased their systemic competitiveness since the end of the Cold War. Brazil’s objective in this regard is to have strong corporations to compete on a global scale, with the State’s logistic support and the financial support of national institutions, such as the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and the Bank of Brazil. If Cardoso privatized [enterprises], Lula conglomerated [them]. The President’s finger is behind the formation of the great national conglomerates. Despite this earlier achievement, Brazil has a long way to go before attaining the density of developed countries, whose multinationals co-opt their own governments, which then form coalitions and use pressure to influence decisions at multilateral organizations, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, and for the signing of bilateral treaties, and ultimately to obtain internal and intergovernmental rules in their own favor. The Brazilian businesses’ rising globalization trend has been recorded by the Brazilian Society of Studies on Transnational Corporations and Economic Globalization, whose data we have used here. The internationalization of the Brazilian economy has picked up speed since 2005, in tandem with the trend in the emerging countries. Brazilian direct investments abroad have increased an average of 14 percent a year, rising from 8 CORREA, Luiz Felipe de Seixas (org.). O Brasil nas Nações Unidas: 1946-2006. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. PAROLA, op. cit. 21 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Internationalization of the Brazilian economy Amado Luiz Cervo 6.4 billion dollars in 2004 to 18 billion dollars in 2006, but falling to 13.9 billion dollars in 2008 and dropping to 4.5 billion dollars in 2009 owing to the global financial crisis. The emerging countries held about 5 percent of direct investments abroad in 1990 but this percentage exceeded 20 percent by 2007. In that year, with 180 billion dollars consolidated, Brazil had become the second foreign investor among the emerging countries and foreign investments in Brazil totaled 34.6 billion dollars, a 100-percent increase over the previous year. In early 2008, international reserves totaled 194 billion dollars, a threefold increase over the previous two years (59.8 billion dollars), and continued to rise, exceeding 250 billion dollars in 2010, after the country received the investment grade from the risk rating agencies. In December 2008, Brazil’s consolidated direct investment abroad totaled 149 billion dollars. Brazilian corporations invest abroad, starting in South America, where they maintain about one thousand companies, showing that the movement involves medium companies as well as large groups. Among the major ones, Vale do Rio Doce and Petrobras lead the way, followed by Gerdau, Embraer, Odebrecht, Itaú, Braskem, Votorantim, Camargo Correia, and WED, and others. They operate in various areas, including mining, prospecting, metallurgy, industry, and technology. Because of the legislation in neighbor countries, investments have been redirected: between 2001 and 2008, investments in Argentina fell from 15 percent to 9 percent; between 2001 and 2010, the share of investments in the United States, which became the main investments destination, rose from 13 percent to 37 percent of Brazil’s total direct investments abroad. The companies’ motivation varies: a valued currency, which prompts the acquisition of shares in multinationals; the establishing of subsidiaries; the association with or the purchase of other companies, which facilitates the raising of financial resources abroad; technological development; and raising productivity to a systemic global level, in addition to stimulus to higher quality exports. Globalization occurs also when a company enters production chains in a worldwide network. By failing to follow this trend, national economy perpetuates its structural dependence. As a remarkable example of this gain in maturity, one often refers to Embraer, whose performance has been studied by Martinez. After its 1994 privatization, anchored on the technological knowledge amassed by two previous centers – the Brazilian Aeronautics Center and the Aeronautics Technological Institute – the Brazilian Aeronautic CorporationEMBR AER turned to global market, adopted new innovation processes, replenished its resources, and embraced specialization for competing. Years later, it ranks as third maker of commuter jets in the world, and its products have topped the list of Brazilian exports. The central countries are showing signs of concern over the pace and the effects of the internationalization of businesses from emerging countries and are starting a dangerous tendency to reverse globalization. Substantial financial stock 22 is being accumulated in the treasury of emerging countries that are exporters of raw materials or manufactures, such as the Arab countries and China. These countries establish sovereign funds, which currently total about three trillion dollars, of which 250 billion in possession of the Brazilian treasury. The reversal of the financial situation now under way still does not displace the hegemony of the capital of developed countries, but is leading these countries to resort to other forms of protectionism, such as raising difficulties to or barring transfer of the control of the assets of their multinationals to emerging countries, arguing that control of their multinationals determine their structural position on the capitalist system’s hierarchy. Before seeking developed markets, Brazilian capital was channeled primarily to South America, especially to Argentina, where today it is part of Quilmes, in the brewery area; of Perez Companc, in the fuel and energy sector; of Loma Negra, the cement concern; of Alpargatas, in textile and footwear; and of Acindar, the steel company; in addition to major export packinghouses.9 Integration and bilateralism: establishment of the global network The formation of blocs is the trend in international relations in the 21st century, although it lacks the dynamics of the 1990s. The European Union has given up on a Constitution, rejected through plebiscites in 2005, and replaced it with the Lisbon Treaty, which has also failed to obtain unanimous approval of the 27 members. In South America, governments endeavor to improve social and economic conditions, which had deteriorated at the time of neoliberalism, and seek domestic solutions, based on national projects, in addition to programming different modes of participation in the international scene. Here also, some governments do not view integration as an efficient strategy for overcoming difficulties. Under these circumstances, the Brazilian foreign policy, of a marked integrationist bent, makes use of integration processes to establish or consolidate the cooperation and power network directed at the South, starting from South America and advancing toward alliances with other regions, so as to achieve the goal of making Brazil into a global-oriented country. Mercosur and Unasur The concept of relations along the same axis has been introduced into the international relations theory on the basis of a study by Patrício, who investigated the role played in the origin and development of integration processes by bilateral relations between key countries in a region, such as France and Germany in the 9 BRASIL, Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Política Externa Brasileira, II. Brasília: FUNAG, 2007. Idem, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n. 96 e 97, 2005. SARFATI, Gilberto. Carta Internacional, USP, out. 2007. MARTINEZ, Maria Regina Estevez. A globalização da indústria. 23 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World Amado Luiz Cervo case of the European Union, and Brazil and Argentina in the case of MERCOSUR and South America. We have presented this concept and reviewed its application to the South American case in my book Inserção Internacional. Brazil-Argentina relations were affected by the 1999 devaluation of the Real, the Brazilian currency, and even more seriously by Argentina’s profound economic and social crisis in 2001-2002. At the outset of the 21st century, the governments of Néstor Kirchner and of Luiz Inácio da Silva faced a trade dispute caused by Brazilian export manufactures that hindered Argentine industrialization. Other factors helped raise further difficulties in the management of bilateral relations and their impact on neighbor countries: scarce provision of energy, the acquisition of Argentine debt bonds by the Venezuelan government, and the approval of Venezuela’s adhesion to MERCOSUR by Uruguay and Argentina and obstruction on the part of the Brazilian and the Paraguayan Congresses for some years. As regards multilateral negotiations, the two countries have been in tune because they have identical interests. The same has occurred in regard to regional security on the occasion of the crisis between Colombia and Ecuador in March 2008, triggered by a preemptive action by Colombia against a guerrilla camp located on Ecuadoran territory. In brief, the axis has survived, the partners walking side by side though not hand in hand. In addition to the exponential growth of Brazilian direct investments in Argentina, bilateral trade has also been favorable to Brazil. Between 1996 and 2003, Argentina recorded yearly surpluses of nearly one billion dollars, equivalent to a little over 10 percent of total bilateral trade. Between 2004 and 2007, as a reflection of the Argentine crisis, it was Brazil’s turn to record surpluses that rose from 1.8 billion to 4.0 billion dollars. Significantly, manufactures account for nearly all Brazilian exports, less than 30 percent of Argentina’s. This difference in the exports list is an indication of unequal development. Succeeding her husband as President of the Republic in 2008, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner expressed willingness to reestablish good understanding with Brazil, as Argentina had shown to be capable of economic recovery. Attention was then given to deepening integration in the areas of energy, science and technology, defense, production, space, and nuclear matters. This past February, the two countries signed seventeen bilateral agreements covering these areas, an indication that both see relations along an axis as being essential. The first South American countries summit meeting, held in Brasilia in 2000, reflected the intent of furthering regional integration, with Mercosur as a starting point. An action plan for the integration of regional infrastructure (IIRSA) was then established. The 2004 summit meeting of the 12 countries in Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais, took steps in this direction, establishing funds to finance economic convergence and the organization of a future community of South American nations. The Mercosur Parliament, with its headquarters in Montevideo, later replaced the Interparliamentary Commission. As a matter of 24 fact, Mercosur decisions mingled with South American decisions, showing the desired intertwining of the two integration processes. Brazilian foreign policy sees Mercosur as a political project that neoliberalism’s crisis and the continued existence of asymmetries have made more flexible. Organized segments of Brazilian society intended to use it in favor of their business transactions, while diplomacy envisages it as an instrument for reinforcing the international bargaining power. All things considered, integration purports to establish a regional hub more appropriate for achieving the objectives of multilateral reciprocity and of globalization of the Brazilian economy. At bottom, just as in all countries and sectors of international relations, the hegemony of national interests comes first, more so in the 21st century than in the 1990s. The building up of South America advanced, consistently with Brazilian political thinking, with the announcement of the Community of South American Nations at the 2004 Cuzco Summit, which was established on the Margarita Island in 2007, but became institutionally enacted under the Union of South American Nations-Unasur constitutive treaty signed on May 24, 2008 at the summit of the twelve South American countries in Brasilia. On the basis of its operational structure and purposes, one could say that Unasur does not play only a mediating role between Brazilian interests and foreign policy’s global objectives. If it becomes operational, the recently created nucleus of power– the entity South America – will fully meet Brazilian interests. The Union is structured into four bodies: The Council of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the South American Defense Council, and the Council of Delegates. Unasur came into being to serve political, geopolitical, and economic objectives. In the political area, when the Member States unanimously approve decisions, their intention is to put the region on the world map, express the unison voice of the countries in a multilateral setting, and enhance its political independence, as it enjoys the status of a legal entity under international law. In the geopolitical area, although it is not a military alliance, it creates a regional nucleus of power and ascribes emphasis to regional security; disputes in this context are settled through diplomatic activity, on the basis of South American international law doctrines, respect of sovereignty, and nonintervention in the internal affairs of the States. This precludes the intervention of external powers and organizations, such as the OAS, the Rio Group, and the old Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at the outset of the Cold War. In the economic area, Unasur seeks to promote production, energy, and infrastructure integration, but without replacing either Mercosur or the Andean Community, both of which remain active. This South American integration process displays two distinctive characteristics: originality as compared with other experiences and the fact that it starts with political and geopolitical rather than economic integration, as was the case of the European Union. 25 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World Amado Luiz Cervo Doubts raised at the time of Unasur’s founding regarding its performance questioned the possibility of excessive bureaucracy, the superimposition of regional bodies, the scarceness of financial resources, and the difficulty – given the cult of sovereignty and political arrogance – of implementing projects aimed at improving infrastructure and at energy integration. One finds in South America a variety of models of international integration, and different worldviews and concepts of regional integration. Nevertheless, favorable conditions warrant this new step forward in the process of integration: economic growth early in the century and greater social inclusion, in addition to the establishment of financial reserves and the availability of energy stocks.10 Casting the net beyond the neighborhood The casting of a global network as a goal of Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century gains impetus with reciprocity multilateralism impelled by diplomacy, which establishes coalitions and takes the leadership in global negotiations, and with economic internationalization, impelled by Lula’s personal interest and by economic and social agents. The net weaves its first threads in South America in these two aspects and, fortified at its base, extends toward the world, as if this were Brazil’s natural locus. We should now look at this long-reach movement and the ties to blocs, regions, and countries beyond South America. 1. Blocs and regions Relations between Europe and Brazil take place in three contexts: relations between the European Union and Mercosur; relations between the European Union and Brazil; and relations between European countries and Brazil. Since 1995 negotiations have been under way for establishing a European Union-Mercosur free trade area; but though fifteen years have elapsed, no conclusion has been reached. The impasse is due to the Brazilian aversion to treaties that do not include reciprocity, as is the case here and with the treaty calling for the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which has never been concluded either. Europeans and Americans do not relinquish their agricultural subsidies and protectionism but demand concessions in the areas of industrial goods, public call to bids, and services, which would place Brazil’s industrial development at risk. However, recognizing Brazil’s role in the international economy and in multilateral negotiations, especially in the conclusion of WTO’s Doha Round and of the Mercosur-EU agreement, the European Union, at a special summit meeting 10 PATRÍCIO, Raquel C. de C., As relações em eixo franco-alemãs e as relações em eixo argentino-brasileiras: génese dos processos de integração. Lisboa, ISCSP, 2007. CERVO, Amado Luiz. Relações internacionais da América Latina: velhos e novos paradigmas. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2007. COUTO, Leandro Freitas. O horizonte regional do Brasil: integração e construção da América do Sul. Curitiba: Juruá, 2009. SARAIVA, Miriam Gomes. As estratégias de cooperação Sul-Sul nos marcos da política externa brasileira de 1993 a 2007. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, n. 50 (2), 42-49, 2007. 26 held in 2007, proposed to confer on Brazil the status of a “strategic partner”, a proposal that was endorsed by the European Parliament. In the European view, Brazil, as a key country in the region, is an indispensable ally in meeting global challenges related to climate change, human rights, intellectual property, industrial policy, and other economic and social issues. The European decision was based on specific data and on expectations: Brazil accounts for approximately 80 percent of Mercosur’s GDP; while the European Union accounts for 22 percent of the Brazilian foreign trade, it directs only 1.8 percent of its foreign trade to Brazil. European investments in Brazil are significant, but business would increase should there be a better regulatory framework and lower customs duties – if adopted, these measures would facilitate European Union’s relations with South America. This concession to Brazil signals a change in the European bloc’s international strategy; since its formation, the bloc had assigned priority to inter-bloc relations, assuming that it would export its model of integration that yielded recognized benefits. Brazil became European Union’s eighth strategic partner, after the United States, Japan, Canada, India, Russia, China, and South Africa. The programming of the joint cooperation plan began promptly and has continued at ministerial meetings and at a series of Brazil-European Union summits held since then. The financial crisis affected the European Union, disclosing some countries’ heavy public indebtedness, triggering recession, and threatening the Euro. Trade with and investments in Brazil were indirectly affected. A further difficulty in recent bilateral relations has been raised by Brazilian diplomacy’s strong reaction to the EU’s collective measures and police action to contain and discipline immigration. This reaction was especially strong in view of the detention and mistreatment of about 2,500 Brazilian tourists at the Madrid airport in 2008 and the mistaken execution of Brazilian Jean Charles at the London subway. All these, as Itamaraty officially pointed out, meant disregard for human rights. Bringing together potentially great economies, Brazil took the initiative of forming a political bloc of emerging countries, which was formally established in 2007, under the acronym BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The bloc purports not only to promote business transactions among its members by also to coordinate their diplomatic activity and adopt common stances in respect of issues of their interest in international negotiations. Its weight on the international scene has rapidly increased owing to the accelerated growth of the four economies and to the recession that has affected the rich countries. As was the Brazilian diplomacy’s desire, from now on multipolarity is a fact, so that the establishment of rules for the global order has now to mean shared responsibility. Since the first BRIC foreign ministers meeting in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in May 2008, there have been other meetings of foreign ministers as well as of other authorities. In 2009 summit meetings of the four great emerging countries have been held on a regular basis, the first of which also in Yekaterinburg and the second in Brasilia in 2010. The bloc is gaining life and now has influence on the 27 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World Amado Luiz Cervo establishment of the rules that govern the global order by the financial G-20, the IMF and World Bank policies, the United Nations reform, the Doha Round and the legal frameworks in important areas of international relations. World power is thus acquiring a new face, with BRIC being on the same footing as the old G-8. IBAS is another political group devoted to cooperation among its members and to the harmonization of positions vis-à-vis the international scene. It came into being in Brasilia in 2003, bringing together three major southern countries inclined to make autonomous decisions – each one being the major democracy on its respective continent: India, Brazil, and South Africa. Other than global interests that occupy the group in their successive summit meetings, such as associating social inclusion and development, South-South cooperation is envisaged under agreements covering areas of specific needs, such as trade, security, information technology, energy, health, food, and interconnection with Mercosur. The emerging countries have given indication of their strength at the joint BRIC-IBAS summit meeting held in Brasilia in April 2010, when international economy was facing the worst crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s and at a time when global governance is at a crossroads, facing the challenge of promoting sustainable development. In May 2008, Lula attended the summit meeting of the member countries of the Central American Integration System (SICA) held in El Salvador, to reinforce economic, political, and cultural relations with one more regional bloc, one that unites eight countries of Central America. The command of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), successfully carried out with concern for economic and social issues, has opened the doors of the Caribbean to Brazil. Not only Haiti but also other countries in the region are receiving attention from the Brazilian government, which provides logistic support for business transactions and investments, especially for oil prospecting and the production of biofuels. The new interest in the region, previously removed from Brazil and close to the United States, was illustrated by the Brazilian diplomacy’s disastrous involvement when the Honduran Judiciary and Executive deposed President Manuel Zelaya in 2009, accused of threatening to subvert the Constitution. The net extends also to Africa and the Arab countries. Lula has visited Africa more than a dozen times, in addition to helping bringing about the African Countries-Latin America summit meeting and being a special guest at the African Union Summit. Positive results from this approximation include programs in the area of health, especially for combating AIDS, credit lines, the presence of Brazilian contractors, activity by Petrobras, integration with Mercosur, increased exports, and a common stance against farm subsidies. Although economic and strategic returns from relations with the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) are scant, cultural gains are substantial. Africa is creating favorable conditions for foreign presence, and in this respect the United States, China, and Brazil stand out. 28 Since 2003, the government intended to change the Brazilian policy toward the Near East and the Arab countries and even to establish an Arab-Latin American bloc so that the two regions could raise their voices at international negotiations and Brazil could expand its trade with the Muslim world. This thought led to the South America-Arab Countries Summit held in Brasilia in May 2005, a new example of Brazilian diplomacy’s activism. The summit was attended by 33 countries – 11 from Latin America and 22 from the Arab world, including the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – and 800 businessmen. The summit elicited no concern on the part of the powers used to intervening in the region – Europe and the United States – given the Brazilian diplomacy’s moderating role worldwide. The same cannot be said of the agreement signed by Brazil. Turkey, and Iran aimed at making possible the Iranian nuclear program. On the occasion, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton voiced the indignation of the United States’s conservative sector against the Brazilian diplomacy’s naïve intervention in an area where western powers have been traditionally involved. 2. Bilateralism Bilateral relations or relations between a given country and a bloc have intensified in the 21st century for three main reasons: first, the crisis of multilateralism, as illustrated by the United Nations inefficiency and its stagnated reform, and the WTO’S incapacity to conclude the Doha Round; secondly, the State’s reinforcement after neoliberalism’s failure, especially in Latin America, and the United States’s unilateralism; thirdly, the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements – the new trade policy carried out outside the WTO. Bilateral free trade agreements have stricken a fatal blow against negotiations of a global agreement at the WTO. Brazilian diplomacy abhors the former as much as it prefers the latter. By 2007, a network of approximately 400 of these bilateral agreements had been signed, encouraged by the United States, eventually joined by the European Union, particularly in Asia and in Latin America. Relations between Brazil and the United States unfold in a dual context: on the one hand, the foundation provided by a historical political and economic alliance between the two countries, whose benefits have always been perceived and appreciated by both parties, regardless of which governments are in office; on the other hand, competition between the two, both as regards geopolitical views and the confrontation of specific economic interests. This substratum conditioned bilateral relations under the two Administrations of George W. Bush and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the first decade of the 21st century. The two leaders talked with each other with frankness and autonomy, whether in agreement or disagreement. Used, just as their predecessors, to consulting with businessmen of their respective countries, Bush, Lula, and Barak Obama have had little to do to help 29 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World Amado Luiz Cervo them move forward on their own and discover business opportunities on the other side, as the way has been opened decades ago. But the presidents of the two countries have established on their own a special partnership under the technological cooperation agreement signed in Camp David in March 2007, on the production and marketing of ethanol and other biofuels. In addition, the two governments have signed a military cooperation agreement in April 2010, without compromising sovereignty. And through negotiations, they have solved bilateral disputes, such as the one caused by WTO’s authorization for Brazil to retaliate against the United States because of cotton subsidies. Relations between Brazil and China, viewed as strategic by both governments view as strategic, are based on the principles of mutual trust, bilateral trade, and coordination of positions in respect of multilateral policies, pursuant the communiqués issued by Hu Jintao and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the two presidents, as they exchanged visits in 2004 and 2010. Relations are closely followed by the Brazil-China Businessmen Council. Studies sponsored by this Council have shown that Brazil has progressed from being an exporter of commodities to being a destination of Chinese investments and that since 2009 China ranks first as Brazil’s trading partner. During Jintao’s last visit, a wide-ranging Joint Action Plan was established. The strong effort to establish a partnership springs from the familiarity cultivated at multilateral forums, such as the conferences on the environment, the financial G-20, and BRIC, and finds bilateral expression in trade and investments. Imports of capital goods, raw materials, and intermediary goods have facilitated the expansion of the Brazilian industry, while the imports of final consumer goods have fallen to approximately 10 percent. The trend of business transactions attenuates the pressure of Brazilian industrialists on the government to contain the entry of Chinese manufactures, such as footwear, plastics, and textiles, as well as Itamaraty’s complaint because of the lack of Chinese investments in Brazil. On the other hand, Brazilian investments in China are scarce and restricted to the area of technological cooperation between Brazil’s National Space Research and the Chinese Space Agency, which in 2007 launched jointly a remote sensing satellite. Brazil and India take common positions at multilateral forums, especially aimed at changing trade rules to their benefit, but their bilateral cooperation is meager and IBAS does not fill this gap. Despite good political and geopolitical understanding, as illustrated by BRIC’s very existence, another country that maintains bilateral relations with Brazil much below the potential is Russia, as regards both trade and technological cooperation. There persists in Brazilian diplomacy a utopian presumption of a possible transfer of military technology by other countries, such as Russia, France, China, and the United States. This presumption became evident in the attempts made by Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, all of which frustrated, as it is natural to expect in this area of international relations. 30 To celebrate the first centennial of Japanese immigration, Japan’s Crown Prince visited Brazil in 2008. On that occasion, an assessment was made of our historical bilateral relations, comparable to those established with the United States, if one considers the participation of Japanese companies in Brazil’s industrialization process in recent decades. Brazilian agribusiness exports to Japan also enhance these relations, recently intensified by cooperation in the area of biofuels production and marketing. The challenges to be met for strengthening these relations further call for the expansion of bilateral trade, still modest, and for higher Japanese investments, which have remained stagnant in recent years and kept Brazil as a seventh destination. As regards Europe, in addition to maintaining traditional relations, the Lula government has renewed the nuclear agreement with Germany and now welcomes France’s renewed interest in our country. Portugal and Spain are the 21st century newcomers, as our bilateral relations shifted from the sentimental to the instrumental plane. As dynamic agents of economic internationalization, the two Iberian countries have turned their attention to Brazil, which they have chosen as their preferential partner in Latin America for both economic and cultural reasons. Around 2000, Brazil became the first destination of Portuguese and Spanish direct investments abroad, which have been channeled in Brazil to both large and medium enterprises. As privatizations have ceased, just as has the establishment of great corporations, particularly in the area of communications, these flows will tend to abate. In South America, despite the formation of blocs, relations privilege the bilateral trend, such as in energy integration projects, for instance. On the occasion of Argentina’s bicentennial celebration, two books edited by Botana and Russel have compiled excellent analyses of the internal and external profile of that country, Brazil’s main partner. They also explain in depth the concepts of declinación and of international extravío, as well as Brazil’s success and difficulty in dealing with Argentina. Countries with a strong introspective bias, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay do not disturb Lula’s good humor, and he maintains spontaneity in his relations with their leaders. From the preceding and on the basis of other cases not mentioned, one concludes that in the world of globalization all attention should be devoted to bilateralism, the crucial path for ensuring the achievement of national interests. This is a tempting stance, as multilateralism and integration are two waning trends, while the unfettered movement of national States seems to be the rising tendency.11 Received July 1st, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 11 LIMA, Maria Regina Soares de & Hirst, Monica (orgs.). Brasil, Índia e África do Sul: desafios e oportunidades para novas parcerias. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2009. OLIVERIA, Henrique Altemani (org.). China e Índia na América Latina. Curitiba: Juruá, 2009. COSTA, Carla Guapo da. A cultura como factor dinamizador da 31 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World Amado Luiz Cervo Abstract Since Cardoso and during Lula’s Administration, the international order has undergone significant changes. These changes have allowed the Brazilian foreign policy to mitigate internal effects of an order established by others and, at the same time, to become an active participant in the formulation of the new order. To democratize globalization became the mainspring of Brazilian foreign policy. In the scope, President Lula has maintained the tradition of formulating and programming foreign policy as a State policy, and also has fostered the logistic strategy of incorporation of Brazil into the international scene. Resumo Do governo Cardoso ao governo Lula, a ordem internacional passou por significativas mudanças. Essas mudanças permitiram a política externa brasileira mitigar os efeitos interno da ordem estabelecida pelos outros ao mesmo tempo em que participa ativamente na formulação de uma nova ordem. Democratizar a globalização tornou-se motivação da política externa brasileira. Nesse escopo, o Presidente Lula manteve a tradição de formular e programar a política externa brasileira como política de Estado, mas também aprofundou a estratégia logística de inserção do Brasil no cenário internacional. Key-words: Brazilian foreign policy; new global order; emerging countries. Palavras-chave: política externa brasileira; nova ordem global; potências emergentes. economia: os investimentos portugueses no Brasil. Lisboa: UTL, 2005. PINO, Bruno Ayllón. As relações BrasilEspanha na perspectiva da política externa brasileira (1945-2005. São Paulo: Emblema, 2006. RUSSELL, Roberto (org.). Argentina 1910-2010: balance del siglo. Buenos Aires: Taurus, 2010. BOTANA, Natalio R. (org.). Argentina 2010: entre la frustración y la esperanza. Buenos Aires: Taurus, 2010. Principais sites utilizados: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Universidade de Brasília (Mundorama, Cena Internacional), Universidade de São Paulo (Carta Internacional, Contato), Instituto de Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro (Observatório Político SulAmericano), Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China, Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos de Empresas Transnacionais e da Globalização Econômica, Instituto Argentino para el Desarrollo Económico, Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales, Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarollo. 32 Artigo Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Setor Externo Brasileiro no início do século XXI Renato Baumann* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 33-53 [2010] Introduction Brazil has traditionally been characterized by a culture of inward-looking policy making. It is a big and diversified geographic space with a large population, surrounded by neighboring countries with particular languages and histories, yet having no significant border conflicts. A century-old history of immigration has led the country to concentrate most of its intellectual effort and policy initiatives in the domestic market. The systematic prospecting of external markets, based on specific policies to foster exports, is only four decades old. This is not to say that the Brazilian economy has been closed to foreigners. The presence of foreign firms in the Brazilian productive sector has always been significant and the share of foreign-owned firms is one of the highest that can be found among developing countries. The intensification of industrialization efforts in the mid-1950s relied heavily on foreign investment. Additional favorable policies to attract investment were adopted in the mid-1960s, and again in the early 1990s. This has hardly changed in the present decade. Multilateral opening to trade was intensified in the first half of the1990s, together with efforts to promote preferential trade on a regional basis. The degree of openness of the economy (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP) increased from an average 13.6% in the 1990s to 21.5% in 2000-2008. The imported component of the domestic consumption basket and the share of imported producer goods in the productive processes have increased quite significantly. No major policy change to reduce imports has taken place since the early 1990s. Foreign direct investment inflow has traditionally been close to US$ 2 billion per year. This changed dramatically in the mid-1990s, partly due to the privatization of public firms. But even then other factors played a major role, as the share of privatization in FDI inflow was lower in Brazil than in most other Latin * Director of United Nations – Economic Commission for Latin America in Brazil and professor at University of Brasília – UnB (rbaumann@cepal.org.br). Opinions herein are my own and might not correspond to the official position of these institutions. 33 Renato Baumann American countries. The typical figure for annual FDI inflow has become since the mid-1990s some eight to ten times higher than what it used to be. Opportunities in the domestic market, coupled to macro stabilization and political/institutional stability have increasingly been taken into consideration by potential investors. A peculiar feature in the present decade is the process of internationalization of Brazilian firms, very much like what is being observed in other Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Chile and Argentina. In Brazil this has become an active policy matter, based on the assumption that it is important to have big players of domestically-owned capital. Policies towards the external sector have maintained their basic characteristics since the beginning of the present decade, although emphasis has been given to some specific aspects. Little doubt remains that the positive outcome – at least until recently – has been clearly a result of the country having profited from very favorable circumstances in the international scenario. That has helped quite significantly to reduce the economy’s vulnerability (in terms of external debt indicators), to increase reserves of foreign currencies and to maintain market-friendly import policies. This set of characteristics, on its turn, has helped to foster the country’s external image and has given support to a more pro-active positioning in the international scenario. It is widely recognized that things have changed in the international markets since the 2008/9 crisis. This has raised some concern about the actual conditions of Brazilian economy to cope with these new circumstances. This article discusses the main features of the external sector of the Brazilian economy, regarding trade flows, foreign investment, the internationalization of Brazilian entrepreneurial groups and the short-term financial requirements in foreign currencies. This is done in four sections, following this Introduction. The next section presents a set of basic indicators, as a background picturing of the external sector conditions and achievements since year 2000. Section III concentrates on merchandise trade. It discusses the basic features and recent changes, as well as the recent debate about the composition of the export bill. Section IV deals with the financial exposure of the Brazilian economy. It will become clear that it has been in this area where the most significant recent achievements have taken place. Section V presents some final remarks and overall appraisal. An overall scenario of basic indicators Brazilian trade relations with the rest of the world in the present decade reversed the trade deficits that characterized the second half of the 1990s. Trade surpluses increased every single year to reach a record US$ 46 billion in 2006 (one third of total exports that year) and have come down to about US$ 25 billion since 2008. At the same time the share of Brazilian products in total world exports increased marginally from an average of 0,95% in the 1990s to 1,06% in 2000-2008. 34 At the same time the balance of services and income remained increasingly negative, having reached a bottom of US$ 57 billion in 2008. This is hardly surprising, given the structural dependence on freight, travelling, remittances, etc., as well as the recent evolution of the exchange rate, as will be discussed further on. The Current Account reached a maximum of US$ 14 billion in 2005, dropping to a deficit of close to US$ 30 billion in 20081, a three-year shift of US$ 44 billion. It is an unprecedented outcome for the economy to have achieved simultaneously an increase of imports together with trade and Current Account surpluses, in a period of GDP growth, such as the one Brazil experienced in 20032007. Only very peculiar conditions allow for such result, which is another aspect to be elaborated in the next Section. Net inflow of foreign currency in the second half of the present decade has been fostered not only by unprecedented trade surpluses, but also by a significant amount of investment – both FDI and portfolio – as well as external loans, allowing for significant Balance of Payment surplus. The following graphs illustrate the major indicators. Source: Central Bank Source: Central Bank 1 The net inflow of unilateral transfers is relatively modest in Brazil: the top recorded value was US$ 4.3 billion in 2006, when it accounted for only about 3% of total merchandise exports. 35 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Renato Baumann Source: Central Bank In 2008 the economy was affected by the international crisis and experienced a decrease of its trade surplus and a sharp reduction of portfolio investment, only partially compensated in 2009. The favorable results achieved in the mid-2000s are by and large the outcome of an extremely positive scenario, more than the result of specific policies. As a matter of fact, an estimate of the potential incentives to export has shown2 that total incentives have had rather small variation: between 1990 and 2003 they varied from a minimum of 24.1% to a maximum of 29.4% and in 2004 they corresponded to 33.0% of total export value. Active administration of the external sector variables has helped as well. Brazilian authorities aimed at improving the profile of the external commitments both by increasing the amount of foreign currency reserves (from US$ 33 billion in 2000 to US$ 207 billion in 2008), as well as reducing the relative weight of the external debt (worth US$ 236 billion in 2000 and US$ 267 billion in 2008, with a sharp reduction of public external debt), and improving its profile, thus fostering confidence in the economy. As a result the ratio of the external debt to total reserves dropped constantly since 2000, as Graph 7 illustrates. These points will be considered in more details in Section IV. It goes without saying that this signaling of an improved capacity to face external commitments3 has indeed contributed quite significantly to the attraction of external investment and to the willingness to lend by foreign creditors, as shown in Graphs 4 and 5. Be that as it may, Brazilian economy achieved in 2008 and 2009 an investment grade classification by three rating agencies, precisely when the international economic scenario was being affected by the crisis. This has further contributed, among other things, to attract resources from investment funds. 2 H.C.Moreira, M.Panariello (2005), Os Incentivos às Exportações Brasileiras: 1990 a 2004, CEPAL, LC/ BRS/R.176, Novembro. 3 Coupled to macroeconomic and political stability. 36 This is not to say that a number of aspects could – and perhaps should – have been dealt with in a different way, raising criticism to the policies towards the external sector. The following section discusses the evidence and some controversial issues related to merchandise trade. Merchandise Trade The present decade has been remarkable, being a period when the Brazilian economy: a) maintained its commitment to opening the economy – the degree of openness (exports + imports as a percentage of GDP) was 18% on average during the 1990s and went up to 26% in 2000-084, and b) took advantage of a period of high global trade growth to improve its export performance. Between 2000 and 2009 exports increased 178% in current US dollars, surpassing the 129% variation of imports. This is a different outcome from the 1990s, when exports increased by less than half the variation of imports (75% and 170%, respectively), leading to systematic trade deficits in the second half of the decade. The figures for the whole period conceal, however, quite different situations in the first and the second halves of the present decade. From 2001 to 2005 the average annual rate of growth of exports was 17%, well above the 7% average growth of imports. Since then the situation has reversed quite sharply, with exports increasing on average at a yearly rate of 8.4% and imports growing at 18.4% in 2006-2009. Trade balance is still positive, but has been falling at a sharp, worrisome pace. A good deal of the positive outcome of exports in the first half of the present decade is clearly explained by exceptionally good conditions in the international market for merchandise trade. As shown in Graph 8, there was a remarkable, 4 Data from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. This compares poorly with the corresponding indicators, for instance, for the other BRIC countries (China, India, Russia), where the degree of openness is well over 40%. 37 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Renato Baumann sustained increase in international demand conditions between 2001 and 2004, and a stable but high rate (15%) of yearly growth until 2008, which benefited most trading economies. Source: Ipeadata These active market conditions have affected international prices. Between January/2003 and October/2008, when the financial crisis started to be felt, Brazilian terms of trade improved no less than 44.6%, as shown in Graph 9. Source: Ipeadata This favorable outcome is, of course, directly linked to the special conditions in the demand for ‘commodities’. From 2000 to 2008 total Brazilian export prices increased 88%, boosted by the prices of intermediate goods (96%) and non-durable goods (88%), whereas capital goods and durable goods experienced an improvement of less than 30%. Table 1 summarizes the main results, for manufactures and non-manufactured goods. 38 Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Table 1 Brazil – Variation of Export Price and Volume by Type of Products 1990-2008 Basic Products Semi-manufactures Manufactures 1990-2000 2000-2008 111,5 131,4 80,0 99,8 48,2 57,8 303,9 150,6 185,6 59,4 267,3 80,4 Volume 1990-2000 2000-2008 Source: FUNCEX According to Table 1 the increase in prices of all export goods was more intense in the present decade than in the previous one, and even more so for basic products and semi-manufactures. Variation in export volumes, however, corresponded to only a third or less of those registered in the 1990s. Furthermore, the ratio of the increase in export volume for basic products to the increase in manufactures was much higher in 2000-2008 (1:1.87) than in 1990-2000 (1:1.13). This has led to a significant change in the composition of the export bill towards a higher component of basic products, a quite controversial subject. Graph 10 illustrates the recent evolution of the structure of Brazilian exports. It is clear that there has been a systematic loss in the relative weight of manufactures and a corresponding gain by basic products, with their respective shares in total exports, changing from a ratio of almost 3:1 in 2000, favoring manufactures, to an almost even situation in 2009. This has led to a fierce debate with regard to a ´re-primarization` of exports. Source: FUNCEX 39 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Prices Renato Baumann Before we go into that discussion, however, two pieces of additional information are needed. First, relative prices have reduced the stimulus to the export activity, via a significant exchange rate appreciation. This period comprises a peak level in the second semester of 2002 that is clearly an outlier, resulting from political and financial uncertainties. To avoid these extreme points we take as reference the average exchange rate in the second semester of 2003. The effective exchange rate5 appreciated between the second semester of 2003 and December/ 2009 no less than 40.3%. But even worse for the exporters of manufactures, this appreciation has taken place in a period of sharp increase in real wages in the industrial sector, as shown in Graph 11: between March/2003 and December 2008 real industrial wages increased 55.5%. Source: IBGE As an outcome, the exchange rate/wage ratio experienced systematic reduction, falling 56.0% between the second semester of 2003 and the first semester of 2009, as shown in Graph 12. This is a clear indication of loss of attractiveness of the export activity for producers in the industrial sector, to the extent that not all domestic producers are able to ‘export’ their cost pressure to consumers abroad (‘pass-through’). 5 Based on wholesale price indexes. Estimates by FUNCEX. 40 Source: Ipeadata The second aspect to emphasize is the uneven geographical distribution of manufactured exports according to destination. Brazilian manufactures seem to be more competitive in some markets. Whatever the reason for this geographical concentration, if one considers the share of manufactures in total bilateral exports, there are clearly three groups of countries, as indicated in the following graphs. Source: SECEX 41 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Renato Baumann Source: SECEX Source: SECEX For Group 1, comprising other Latin American countries, Brazilian exports are mostly manufactured products. Preferential agreements, lower transportation costs, similarity of demand structures are clearly some of the reasons that might explain this outcome. As a matter of fact, this result has led to criticism of regional preferential agreements as a means to force consumers in the region to purchase less efficient or dearer products. This set of countries absorbed on average between 2000 and 2009 some 21% of total Brazilian exports, but with a decreasing importance, their share being reduced from 23% in 2000 to 19.5% in 2009. A second set of markets comprise the US and the African continent, where manufactures account for between 60 and 80% of Brazilian exports. These countries absorbed on average 24% of total Brazilian exports in 2000-2009, but with opposing trends: whereas the share of the US market went down from 24% to 10% between those two years, trade with Africa gained importance, increasing from 2.4% to 5.7%. The clear downward trend in the US market is indicative 42 of a lack of competitiveness of Brazilian production, mainly in comparison to competing Asian suppliers. A third set of markets, and where Brazilian performance is most worrying, comprise Europe, Asia and the Caribbean. These regions absorbed on average half of total Brazilian exports in 2000-2009. Once again, aggregate figures hide different trends: the share of the European Union came down from 27.8% to 22.2%, whereas Asia (China in particular) more than doubled its share, from 11.5% to 25.8%, at the same time that the share of the Caribbean countries increased from 0.5% to 2.1% and Eastern Europe also gained importance, from 0.9% to 2.2%. Typically Brazilian exports to the Group 3 markets are mostly (over half) nonmanufactured products, and in Asia and the Caribbean the share of manufactures is becoming even lower. Asia is the region where trade has been most dynamic in recent years, but clearly the strong effect of high commodity prices has been decisive in stimulating an increasing share of primary products in total Brazilian exports, as suggested in Table 1 above. Taken together, the fall of manufactures in Brazilian exports to the US, plus the low and decreasing share of manufactures in total exports to Europe and Asia make a picturing of low competitiveness precisely in the most rich and dynamic markets. This has led to an intense debate about the ‘re-primarization’ of the Brazilian export bill. This debate is centered on two positions. The most critical appraisals stress: a) the negative impact of the exchange rate over manufactured exports and b) the increase in domestic demand, which absorbed most of the production in the manufacturing sector. For instance, Souza (2009) sustains that between 1998 and 2008 there has been an increase in relative prices favoring commodities and the export volume of manufactures fell in comparison to the exports of primary products (from an index of 100 in 2005 to 84 in 2008). According to Souza, however, there is no point in considering this a result of external demand. Brazilian exports of manufactures have grown much less than world exports in 1994-99, recovered up to 2005 and have been falling again since then. Furthermore, world exports of manufactures have been growing in volume, also in those periods when Brazilian exports have stagnated, which means that on a world scale there has been no tendency to a de-industrialization of exports. Souza puts emphasis in 1994-2008 having been a period of exchange rate appreciation that corresponded to stagnation of manufactured exports. The reduction in the share of manufactures in total exports has also to do with the dynamism of domestic demand; this is confirmed by the simultaneous boom in imports in recent years. An alternative view questions the very argument that there has been a ‘re-primarization’ of the export bill in recent years. 43 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Renato Baumann From a more detailed sector analysis, Puga (2009) argues that in the last 13 years there have been no significant changes in the composition of exports and imports in favor of commodities: in 2008 the products of agribusiness, metals, metallurgy and oil corresponded to 60% of total exports, a figure close to the 58% of 1996 and 55% in 2002. A closer look at commodities shows as a main change the increase – 5 p.p. – in the importance of oil and fuels, both in imports and exports. Hence the improvement of trade balance in 2002-2008 does not seem to be related to the higher growth of commodities. Between 2002 and 2008 the export prices of Brazilian agricultural products had an increase of 85%, well below the increase of 132% of international prices for commodities, and little above the 81% increase for the prices of total Brazilian exports. For non-commodities there has been an increase of export prices (40%) above the corresponding increase in import prices (32%) in 2002-2008. The producers of non-commodities have been able to partially compensate for the overvaluation of the exchange rate, via the mechanism of transferring price pressure (‘pass-through’) to consumers abroad. The extent of this effect is still an open empirical matter6. These two positions suggest that a good deal of additional empirical work is still needed in order to precisely identify the extension and sector concentration of the effects of the overvaluation of the exchange rate on the composition of the export bill. A final aspect related to merchandise trade has to do with the structure of the export sector. An additional outcome of the overvalued exchange rate7 is its impact over the number of exporting and importing firms. The total number of importing firms increased from 25.542 to 34.033 between 2002 and 2009, an increase of 8.5 thousand new importers in seven years8. Between these two years total exports increased 152%, largely surpassed by the 170% increase in total imports. On the export side this increase has not meant more firms. Instead, it reflects more clearly the fact that the same exporters increased their export value: the average annual export value per firm increased from US$ 3.5 billion in 2002 to US$ 7.7 billion in 2009. At the same time the average annual import value per firm increased from US$ 1.8 billion to US$ 3.7 billion. 6 Barroso (2010) analyses quarterly data of Brazilian exports to 53 destinations in 1997-2006 and finds evidence that 58% of exchange rate appreciation would be passed-through to foreign consumer prices, with Brazilian exporters absorbing a 42% loss via reduced mark-ups, with the degree of pass-through being positively related to the technological intensity of the produtive sector. 7 As well as other distortions, such as structural constraints imposed by inadequate infrastructure, tax costs and others. 8 Data from ‘Real valorizado eleva número de importadores e reduz exportadores’, O Estado de São Paulo, 28/02/2010. The number of exporting firms increased from 17407 in 2002 to 19823 in 2009, but figures are not strictly comparable, as the government includes(since 2006) in these statistics about 3 thousand firms that export small values via postal services. 44 Participation of smaller agents in exporting activities has also been affected. The number of micro and small firms involved in the export activity varied from 8854 in 1998 to 14154 in 2004; but accompanying the exchange rate appreciation that number fell to only 10114 in 2008. The evidence presented in this section indicates that the Brazilian economy has been affected to a significant extent by the conditions of the international market – influencing the composition of trade flows and the geographical distribution of its trade; it suggests, additionally, that domestic policies (exchange rate policy in particular, but also the usual list of unresolved obstacles to exporters, such as the fiscal cost, infrastructure constraints and others) have contributed to determine a trade performance that could have been much improved. It also points out that regional integration exercises (such as Mercosur and LAIA) indeed help the exporters in some sectors, like manufacturers, but have not been a source of dynamism for the export sector as a whole. Next section discusses another remarkable recent feature of the external sector, the internationalization of Brazilian firms. The internationalization of Brazilian firms Another peculiar characteristic of the Brazilian external sector in the present decade is the process of internationalization of domestically-owned firms. This movement started to gain momentum as an initiative by a few large firms with significant direct investment abroad, mainly in natural resources-intensive sectors (mining, energy, steel makers). Resource-seeking strategies helped these firms to control their supply of raw materials as well as to place them in a stronger competitive position in the international market. Graph 16 shows the recent intensification of Brazilian FDI, having reached a record US$ 28 billion in 2006. 45 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Renato Baumann During the 1990s Brazilian FDI remained virtually stable at a very low level, with a light increase since 1997. In 1998-2000 Brazilian FDI was recorded at about US$ 2 billion but this has changed, with a much intense dynamism, since 2004: the stock of Brazilian investment abroad increased by 14% per year until 2006, thanks to the improvement in the financial capacity of Brazilian firms in recent years, the exchange rate overvaluation, and the strategy of accumulating assets by domestic firms aiming at consolidating their position as global players (Ambrozio (2009)). Most of the FDI is merging & acquisition of existing firms, with a small number of operations at very high value. Typically Brazilian firms aim at the control of natural resources, such as mining and hydrocarbon. The largest operation took place in the mining sector9. As for greenfield investments, they take place mostly in the oil and gas industry. Table 2 shows some of the most important Brazilian investors abroad, their sectors and the geographical distribution of their investment. As indicated, these six companies – operating in mining, energy and steel industry – are present in Latin American and the Caribbean, but have also invested in other continents. Table 2 Some Brazilian Transnational Companies Company – Number of countries Gerdau Sector Steel 13 countries Countries Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Peru, Venezuela Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico North America: USA, Canada Europe: Spain Asia: India Vale Mining 25 countries Latin America : Argentina, Chile, Colombia North America: USA, Canada Africa: South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Europe: France, Wales, Switzerland, Germany, UK, Norway Asia: India, Oman, Mongolia, China, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan Oceania: Australia, New Zealand Petrobras 26 countries Energy Latin America: Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico North America: USA Africa: Angola, Lybia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania Asia: China, Singapore, India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan Europe: Portugal, UK, Turkey 9 Vale has purchased a zinc producing unit. 46 Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Various Sectors Latin America & the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Bahamas North America: USA, Canada Europe: UK, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland Asia: China, Singapore Oceania: Australia Camargo Correa 13 countries Various Sectors Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico North America: USA Africa: Angola, Morocco Europe: Spain JBS 14 countries Meat Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Votorantim 14 countries Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Mexico North America: USA Europe: UK, Italy, Switzerland Africa: Egypt Asia: China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan Oceania: Australia Fonte: Carvalho/ Sennes (2009) More recently the Brazilian government has adopted an explicit policy to stimulate investment abroad as well as the financing – mostly via BNDES credits – of mergers and acquisition of large companies, as a means to strengthen and consolidate selected domestic firms as major players in specific sectors, able to face international competition. This process of internationalization is also found among Brazilian commercial banks. According to the BIS, Brazilian banks have exposure in third markets worth US$ 51.4 billion10. Here, too, there are geographical differences. Operations in developed economies account to US$ 29 billion, mostly in Europe (US$ 15 billion), mainly in the United Kingdom (US$ 3.6 billion) but also in Germany, Belgium, Portugal and Spain. Credits in developing economies are worth US$ 9.7 billion, almost all of it in South America: US$ 6 billion in Chile, US$ 1.1 billion in Argentina and US$ 1.1 billion in Uruguay. In Asia total credits by Brazilian banks amounts to US$ 609 million, almost all of it in South Korea. Figures presented in this section indicate is that there has been a clear, unprecedented increase in the degree of internationalization of the Brazilian economy in recent years, a tendency intensified in the present decade. They are also indicative that belonging to preferential trade agreements – such as Mercosur – is not a sufficient condition to determine the geographical concentration of direct investment or bank operations. 10 Data from ‘Cresce presença de bancos brasileiros no exterior’, O Estado de São Paulo, 01/03/2010. 47 Renato Baumann Financial Exposure Until as recently as the late 1980s the traditional view about the Brazilian economy with regard to its external equilibrium was that as a latecomer in the industrial world it presented structural characteristics that are typical of a developing economy. Basic features comprised an unstable outcome in its trade balance, by and large influenced by the terms of trade, a systematic deficit in its services and rent account, due to constraints on transportation, payment for technology, remittances, etc., as well as a restricted access to capital markets, hence a constant need for external financing. Over time there is a quite strong correlation between the net inflow of foreign currencies and GDP growth: the economy could only grow when it had no binding external constraint. What has changed since the beginning of the 1990s is that: a) the diversification of exports (at a product level as well as in geographical terms) has allowed for additional degrees of freedom in terms of the export dynamism (notwithstanding the qualifications discussed in section II); b) broader access to international capital market coupled with the attractiveness to foreign investors has facilitated the financing of the requirements in foreign currency; c) monetary authorities have adopted active policies towards external debt, comprising the reduction of public indebtedness in the external market, changes in the currency composition of the debt, increasing the share of commitments in domestic currency, broadening the term structure of the debt, together with parallel actions towards increasing the stock of foreign currency reserves. This has allowed for a significant change in the profile of external commitments, as summarized in Table 3. Debt service fell from over half of the total export revenue by 2005 to less than 30%. Compared to GDP, Brazilian foreign debt has always been smaller than that in other Latin American countries. Yet that share still came down from 19% to 13% between 2005 and 2009. Favorable conditions and active policies allowed the country to build up reserves of foreign currency to an unprecedented level. Foreign currency reserves corresponded to less than a third of total external debt in 2005; four years later it surpassed total debt by almost one-fifth. A low increase in external debt coupled to a sharp increase of reserves, plus the accumulation of assets of Brazilian banks and Brazilian credits abroad led to negative net indebtedness. The ratio of net external debt to exports varied from 0.9 in 2005 to -0.4 in 2009, at the same time that the ratio between reserves and debt service went up from 0.8 to 5.5 in the same period, meaning a much reduced pressure over the foreign currency market. 48 Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Debt service/exports (%) Total debt/GDP (%) Reserves*/total debt (%) Net External Debt/Exports (ratio) Reserves/Debt service (ratio) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 55.8 19.2 41.3 15.8 32.4 14.1 19.0 12.1 28.6 12.9 31.7 0.9 0.8 49.7 0.5 1.5 93.3 -0.1 3.5 104.3 -0.1 5.5 118.2 -0.4 5.5 * liquidity Source: Central Bank As shown in Section II, part of this outcome was made possible by the unprecedented results achieved in trade balance, leading to record levels of Current Account surpluses, plus the historically high level of inflow of foreign direct investment. Graph 17 illustrates the trajectories. Brazil presented five continuous years of Current Account surpluses, between 2003 and 2007, reaching an unparalleled level of US$ 14 billion in 2005 and 2006, corresponding to over 1.5% of GDP. This is all the more surprising when one would have expected that a developing economy is more likely to experience deficits in its Current Account, for the lack of enough domestic savings. Between 2001 and 2009, net inflow of FDI in Brazil varied in the range of 1.7 – 4.0% of GDP. These two movements together have led to novel negative financing requirements in all but one year between 2001 and 2009. Source: Central Bank Furthermore, the fact that net external debt became negative led to several manifestations stressing the fact that the country has become a net creditor in the 49 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Table 3 Indicators of External Debt Renato Baumann international scenario. This was by and large due to the relatively stable value of total debt, from which to deduct an increasing amount of foreign currency reserves. This would indicate an increasingly comfortable position in the country’s external accounts, and even more so when one takes into account the fact that the share of public external debt is quite low. A rather different result comes out when one considers the amount of net external liabilities. There are two basic criteria to measure such indicator. One is to accumulate the Current Account deficits. Since Balance of Payments statistics have been available since 1947, this would correspond to the accumulation of those deficits since then. Graph 18 shows the results. There is a period of improvement between 2003 and 2007, when the amount of liabilities was systematically reduced, as expected on the basis of Graph 17, but a worrying upward trend in the last couple of years: the Current Account balance went down from US$ 14 billion in 2006 to minus US$ 28 billion in 2008, a US$ 42 billion fall in only two years. Source: Central Bank An alternative criterion is divulged by the Central Bank in the ‘International Position of Investments’ that accompanies the Balance of Payment statistics. This measure computes all external assets and all external liabilities (comprising net FDI flows, net position in portfolio investment, external loans, fixed income bonds and commercial credits, minus reserves). It takes into account changes in the value of assets and liabilities, monetization via gold and variations in SDR positions. This concept reflects not only the remuneration to loans, but also the return to risk capital. Hence, when there is a reduction in the external debt coupled to an increase in the inflow of FDI the net debt position of the country reduces, but not so its external liabilities, as this would correspond to lower payment of interest but to higher remittances to non-residents. This is why its values differ from the previous indicator. 50 Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century Table 4 External Liabilities (% of GDP) 2001 2009 A -Foreign Direct Investment B – Portfolio Investment In stocks In fixed income bonds 22.0 27.4 6.7 20.7 25.4 35.6 23.8 11.8 C – Commercial credits & loans Total liabilities D=A+B+C E – Brazilian Direct Investment abroad F – Portfolio Investment G – Other investment H – Reserves I – Total External Assets J – Net External Liabilities 17.8 67.2 9.0 1.2 2.7 6.5 19.3 47.8 7.6 68.6 9.9 1.2 5.2 15.1 31.4 37.2 Source: figures for 2001 – Boletim SOBEET, Ano VII, No. 55, julho/2008; for 2009 – Central Bank According to Table 4 there has been in fact a reduction in net external liabilities in terms of GDP, from 47.8% to 37.2% between 2001 and 2009. It is worth noticing, however, the significant change in the participation of some items: the composition of both assets and liabilities has changed throughout the decade. Among the components of external liabilities there has been a noticeable increase in the importance of FDI inflow, but even more so an increase in the investment in stocks, with a corresponding loss of importance of loans and commercial credits. It is also remarkable that even with one of the highest real interest rates in the planet investment in fixed income was reduced as a proportion of GDP, from 21% to 12% between 2001 and 2009. The higher share of FDI and the increasing importance of investment in stocks imply a higher degree of pro-cyclicality in the inflow of resources. It is also an indication of the interest, by non-resident investors, in the Brazilian stock exchange, what has stimulated the entrance of new firms in that market at an unprecedented pace. Long-term financing of investment projects has changed of lately. Among external assets it is worth noticing the increase of about one percentage point of GDP in Brazilian investment abroad, as previously discussed 51 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional According to this criterion the net external liabilities position of Brazil increased from US$ 230 billion in 2002 to US$ 588.9 billion in 2009, again indicating a worsening of the profile of the country’s external position in absolute values, although not so in terms of total domestic production. Table 4 shows the relevant figures. Renato Baumann (section III). “Other investment” almost doubled its relative importance, but most important than anything else is the impressive increase in the amount of foreign currency reserves, from 6.5% to 15% of GDP (second only to the variation in investment in stocks). The picturing that figures in Tables 3 and 4 suggest is that of an economy with clearly improved indicators relative to external solvency, far more integrated in the international scenario via investment (both inflow and outflow of direct investment, as well as portfolio operations), hence less dependent upon loans and quite active in making profit out of this situation in order to build up its own “self-insurance” via the accumulation of relatively large foreign currency reserves. Yet Graph 18 reminds us of a worrying situation in the worsening of the external equilibrium conditions in recent years. Final Remarks This article aimed at presenting the basic features of the Brazilian external sector in the first decade of the XXIst century. The overall picture that comes out from the basic indicators is one of an economy that knew how to profit out of very favorable international circumstances, by improving its basic financial conditions with regard to indebtedness and the building up of self-insurance via actively increasing its foreign currency reserves. Little doubt remains that the administration of the external sector’s financial side was successful. It has been helped also by the maintenance of a reliable macroeconomic environment (plus political stability), which has helped quite significantly to attract foreign investors, at the same time that it allowed the economy to “flex its muscles” and promote the strengthening of domestic groups to compete in a better position both in the domestic market and abroad. Nevertheless, this picturing gives margin to increasing concern in two directions. In the short-run, in view of the indications of a rapidly worsening condition in the Current Account: at the time or writing (early April) there is an increasing concern with regard to the forecasts for 2010, with most analysts, including the Central Bank, expecting a Current Account deficit insufficiently covered by the inflow of direct investment, a quite different scenario from the one described here for the 2000-2009 period. A good deal of this deficit is related to a sharp reduction in the trade surplus. This leads to concern in the long-term, for the lack of structural policies to sustain the external equilibrium, by assuring competitiveness of exports. Overall it can perhaps be said that most of the focus of the external sector policy has been concentrated on reducing the financial constraints. But it has been less active in promoting initiatives that might help to overcome the remaining difficulties and lack of stimulus to external trade, and this might turn into a high price to be paid in the medium-term, if it translates into less competitive production of exports and import-competing goods. 52 Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century References Carvalho C.E.; Sennes, R. (2009), Integração financeira e internacionalização de empresas brasileiras na América do Sul. Nueva Sociedad. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Buenos Aires: Dezembro, p. 17-32. Ambrozio A.M. (2009) Entendendo o Investimento Brasileiro Direto no Exterior. Visão do Desenvolvimento 2008 BNDES. Rio de Janeiro, p. 135-143. Souza F.E.P.(2009) Da reativação da economia ao crescimento de longo prazo: a questão da competitividade e do câmbio, em Reis Velloso J.P., Albuquerque R.C (org) Na crise, esperança e oportunidade, desenvolvimento como sonho brasileiro. Forum Nacional. Ed. Campus. Rio de Janeiro, p. 71-93. Barroso J.B.R.B. (2010), Pricing-to-market by Brazilian Exporters: a Panel Cointegration Approach, in Essays on International Prices and the Subjacent Market Structure. Doctoral Dissertation submitted to Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia. Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Rio de Janeiro. Received April 1st , 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Abstract Although Brazil has traditionally been characterized by a culture of inward-looking policy making, the presence of foreign firms in the Brazilian productive sector has always been significant. The share of foreign-owned firms is one of the highest that can be found among developing countries. This article discusses the main features of the external sector of the Brazilian economy, regarding trade flows, foreign investment, the internationalization of Brazilian entrepreneurial groups and the short-term financial requirements in foreign currencies. Resumo Apesar de o Brasil ser tradicionalmente caracterizado por ter cultura de fazer políticas voltadas para dentro, a presença de empresas estrangeiras no setor produtivo brasileiros é significativa. A porção de firmas estrangeiras no país é uma das maiores entre os países em desenvolvimento. Este artigo discute as principais características do setor externo da economia brasileira, tendo em perspectiva o fluxo de capital, o investimento externo, a internacionalização de grupos empreendedores e os requerimentos de curto-prazo de moedas estrangeiras. Key-words: Foreign investments; foreign firms; Brazilian productive sector. Palavras-chave: investimento externo direto; empresas estrangeiras; setor produtivo brasileiro. 53 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Puga G.P.(2009) Balança Comercial Brasileira: Muito além das Commodities.Visão do Desenvolvimento 2008. BNDES. Rio de Janeiro, p. 77-87. Artigo Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010) O Brasil e o multilateralismo econômico, político e ambiental: o governo Lula (2003 – 2010) Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini* André Luiz Reis da Silva** Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 54-72 [2010] Introduction1 During the first decade of the 21st century, the multilateral dimension was a challenge to Brazilian foreign policy through two inflections. In the 1990s, it followed the medium powers, changing from resistance to the ongoing regime towards an acceptance of its bases and rules, putting them in harmony with the general principles of the system that emerged, their regimes and procedures. This move implied distancing itself from the third-world discourse and a perception based on the North-South divide. It involved instead the adoption of the international mainstream and the replacement, according to governmental discourse, of the “autonomy through distance” (autonomia pela distância) model to the “autonomy through participation” (autonomia pela participação) one (VIGEVANI, CEPALUNI, 2007). The multilateral space had been defined by Brazilian diplomacy in the 1990s as the best setting for the country’s performance, eagerly willing to participate in the building up of rules for the framing of a new world order. During Cardoso’s administration, the development strategy was based not on a critique of the international system, but on the attempt to influence the construction of its rules with the means of potentializing the country’s international insertion. With the change in government, and the swearing-in of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the multilateral policy would keep its central position, although its contents and strategies were deeply reoriented. The new multilateral conception was based on a perception of the international system as having a multipolar tendency * Professor at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul – UFRGS, Brazil (paulovi@ufrgs.br). ** Professor at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul – UFRGS, Brazil (reisdasilva@hotmail.com). 1 We are thankful to Bruna Kunrath (junior researcher BIC/CNPQ) for the data base research and to FAPERGS for the support given, and to Iara Binta Machado (junior researcher BIC) by the translation. 54 and power diffusion, but still jeopardizing developing countries. As such, Brazil stood strong behind the need for increased representation in discussion forums as a means to democratize and augment the efficiency of organizations such as the UN. On the action front, it has sought to explore new bargaining and negotiation spaces through the intense usage of articulation groups. On the other hand, the multilateral agenda received a new makeover, adding the substantial issues of economic development and trade openness to the necessity of further democratizing the decision-making process (UN). As a result, an institutionalized coordination has been established with other developing countries in forums such as IBSA and the G-20. Thus, the purpose of this article is to analyze Brazilian multilateral diplomacy’s new conception through the study of Brazil’s international insertion in economical, political and environmental global issues. It will precisely attempt to verify how the formation of “variable geometry” groups (IBSA and G-20) is working to add new dynamism in multilateral negotiations and to reinforce Brazil’s development model. Foreign Policy under Lula: Multilateralism and Variable Geometry In his inaugural speech as president, President Lula announced an inflection in foreign policy with the construction of a new international political matrix. Lula stated that foreign policy would also reflect the aspirations for change seen on the streets, guided by a humanistic perspective and as an instrument for national development. The main tools for national development would be the promotion of free trade, the building up of capacities through advanced technology, and the search for productive investments, regional integration, and trade negotiations with other blocs and countries. With regard to trade negotiations, Lula remembered the protectionism practiced by developed countries, so detrimental to Brazilian exports. The President also reaffirmed the willingness to negotiate in every forum and with every region in the world, yet the priority would be South America and Mercosur (SILVA, 2003). In bilateral relations, Brazilian diplomacy stated its disposition to enlarge and strengthen partnerships in all continents. Regarding developed countries, the President made reference to the enhancement of understandings and cooperation, at the same time manifesting the desire to deepen relations with the great developing nations such as China, India, Russia, and South Africa, among others. After stating his willingness to boost relations with the African continent, Lula went on to deal with multilateral relations. He defended the need to democratize international relations, stimulating multipolarity and so avoiding hegemonies. In the context of the Iraq invasion, unauthorized by UN’s Security Council, Lula laid claim to enhance the importance of multilateral organizations and of International Law. He also advocated the UN Security Council reform so that it would represent 55 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010) Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini e André Luiz Reis da Silva contemporary reality through the inclusion, as permanent members, of developed and developing countries from all regions (SILVA, 2003). The appointment of Ambassador Celso Amorim to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) symbolized the great lines of Brazilian foreign policy under Lula’s government. The designation of a career diplomat, a former Chancellor under Itamar Franco’s administration, posed as another sign that the country’s foreign policy would neither undergo an abrupt change nor adopt a “militant and ideological” posture, as some analysts speculated. On the other hand, the guidelines defined by the new Chancellor pointed to a deepening of some initiatives taken under the Cardoso government since the worsening of the international crisis. During the last two years of Cardoso’s government, Brazilian diplomacy developed a significant agenda for South America as a way to overcome the crisis in Mercosur and to keep the integration process flowing even under adverse circumstances. By the same token, very discretely, it sought to regain certain autonomy before the United States since the beginning of the Bush administration. The new diplomacy sought to negotiate and bargain with more impetus the country’s international agenda regarding the great powers. At the same time, neighbors are offered the opportunity of a much needed partnership to resume economic growth, which is an imperative condition for integration to stop being virtual. Furthermore, there is also the need for some strategic action at a global level to revert the growing marginalization the region has been suffering. Regional integration could ensure governability and development across South America. Moreover, a reinforced South-American integration is an essential instrument of negotiation when facing the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). As a result, Brazilian diplomacy sought to guarantee the country’s autonomy, multiple international insertion and a more consistent and less rhetorical action than the one led by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Finally, the government’s internal project has also had a significant international impact as its social proposals met the agenda planned to correct the distortions created by globalization centered only on trade and free investments. The implication was to revise the current development model, a move which gave new bases for regional integration. However, in order to assure that a production economy could replace the neoliberal project – which generated a tendency for stagnation –, it would be necessary to reinforce multilateral organisms and, within them, to reinforce Brazil’s performance in all its strength. That is the meaning implied by the expression “a more active and affirmative diplomacy” (diplomacia mais ativa e afirmativa) which seeks to react to adverse international conditions. In April 2003, in the opening academic session at Instituto Rio Branco, Chancellor Celso Amorim evaluated the first hundred days of government. The session was developed into four parts translating what can be considered the four strategic axes of Brazil’s international insertion: (a) South America; (b) the commitment to multilateralism in the process of peace development; (c) the 56 Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010) affirmative commercial agenda, and (d) diversified partnerships with developed and developing countries (AMORIM, 2003). Starting with Lula’s government, Brazilian foreign policy sought to revalue the strong core of national economy and to promote an international insertion to regain spaces lost during the 1990s. In the context of the transformations in Brazilian foreign policy, the G-20 came into being on August 20th 2003, during the preparatory meetings for the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Cancún (Mexico) between September 10th and 14th 2003. The group, accounting for nearly 60% of the world population and for 70% of all rural population, focuses its actions on agriculture – the central theme in the Doha Development Agenda. In fact, since the last Ministerial Conference (Doha, 2001), WTO member-countries unsuccessfully tried to reach some form of agreement regarding the agenda adopted on Qatar’s capital, whose main axis was precisely development and agriculture. On September 1st 2003, the G-20 sent Uruguayan ambassador Carlos Perez del Castillo a letter demanding his agricultural liberalization proposal to be referred to Cancún. The G-20’s decision was a response to Perez del Castillo’s initiative to send his final declaration draft to Cancún, a document which was considered to be too close to the joint interests of the United States and of the European Union. Overall, he had presented a very limited agricultural liberalization proposal if compared to the one posed by the G-20 (ROSSI, 2003. p. B1). During the first G-20 Ministerial Meeting – held in Brasilia on the 11th and 12th of December 2003 –, the Ministers highlighted that by congregating developing countries from Africa, the Americas and Asia – all with different structures and agricultural orientations –, around a common negotiation platform, the G-20 contributed substantially to make the WTO’s process more inclusive. Furthermore, they showed their desire to extend cooperation with other groups. The Ministers also urged WTO members to consider the concerns expressed by of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The G-20 recognized the difficulties faced by countries dependent on trade preferences and emphasized the Cairo Declaration, adopted by the African countries, acknowledging the existence of many convergence points between the G-20 and the African Group. It has been observed that closer cooperation between the two groups should be pursued, taking into account the economic, social, and political importance of cotton to a large number of African countries. Since Brazil articulated and led the movement, the discussion started to focus on the countries’ capacity, together with Argentina, China, India and South Africa, to face the world’s biggest powers. In other words, would it not be isolated by trying to face the interests of developed countries? The answer can be found in the number of members in the G-20. Starting with five members, the group was 57 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The G-20, the WTO and Economic Multilateralism Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini e André Luiz Reis da Silva able to reach twenty during the meeting in Cancún. Nonetheless, some countries began to back down under direct American pressure through advantageous bilateral agreements, especially in the Americas. Consequently, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Guatemala all declined from the group. The G-20 reached its peak as G-23, but then backed down to G-12. As the number of countries varied, the group came to be named “G-X” or even G-20-plus, by Chancellor Celso Amorim himself, who indirectly recognized the American competence in undermining the group. Even so, the G-20 holds a large geographical representation with 19 members at present: five from Africa (South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe), six from Asia (China, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand), and eight from Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela) (ALENCAR, 2003, p. B6). In that context, Brazilian diplomacy watched the launching of Uruguayan Perez del Castillo’s candidature to director-general at the WTO. As a response, it launched Brazilian diplomat Seixas Correia to the same position. Nevertheless, the country was not able to mobilize the support of the majority of Latin American, G-20, and Cairns Group countries, even when linking the name of the Uruguayan ambassador to the failure of the Cancun round. Ambassador Clodoaldo Hugueney Filho, subsecretary-general for Economic and Technological Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and main negotiator for the country in the WTO, criticized the Uruguayan candidature, stating that the Uruguayan ambassador led the failed WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun in September 2003 (PEIXOTO, 2004. p. B1). On March 19th 2005, during the India Meeting (which was considered to be a very fruitful meeting), Uruguay confirmed its entry to the G-20. The bloc conquered Uruguayan accession and it also managed to create a prosperous environment for the closing of a free trade agreement between India and Mercosur. In April 2005, following the first consultation round regarding the WTO elections, the Brazilian government withdrew its candidature. Due to the lack of concrete results during the Cancun meeting, the G-20 decided to focus on several technical and political consultations as a means to make the negotiation process more dynamic. Ministerial Meetings followed in Brasilia (December 2003), Sao Paulo (June 2004), New Delhi (March 2005), Durban (September 2005), and Geneva (October and November 2005), as well as frequent meetings at the level of Heads of Delegation and High-Level Officials in Geneva. Furthermore, the G-20 promoted technical meetings to discuss specific proposals regarding the WTO negotiations on agriculture and to compose technical documents to support the group’s common opinion. The first Ministerial Meeting held in Brazil took place in Brasilia on the 11th and 12th December 2003, aiming at coordinating positions to continue the struggle on agricultural negotiations and to secure progress on the Doha Round. At the end of the assemblage, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva offered his greetings to the Ministers at the event and delivered a speech on agricultural negotiations 58 and international trade (COMUNICADO, 2003). WTO’s Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi as well as the European Union’s Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy – both present as special guests –, met with G-20 Ministers. On that occasion, the Official Communiqué listed and restated the group’s main goals, namely the elimination of distorted trade and agricultural practices along with food security. The Ministers reiterated the need to preserve the whole of the Doha Development Agenda and emphasized that any reinterpretation or dilution of the group’s mandate would affect the delicate balance among the various negotiation fronts, compromising the focus of the work program. They also affirmed that an effective liberalization and reform of agricultural trade would largely contribute to the development goals in the Doha Agenda. Since the creation of the G-20, there have been some difficulties in bringing the group and the Cairns Group closer together due to differences in positions and interests. The G-20 includes only developing countries, while the other one consists of rich countries such as Canada and Australia and poor countries such as Paraguay and Colombia. Brazil is a member of both groups, and attempted to bring them together during the Cairns Group Meeting held in Costa Rica in February 2004. The United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick was also present on the occasion and confirmed the North-American willingness to be more flexible during negotiations. Nevertheless, he complained about the American position of conditioning concessions to European Union reciprocity. At the same time, Brazil won several battles on the WTO in disputes considered disloyal by the Brazilian government. The country won a battle against Canada over subsidies concerning the selling of Bombardier airplanes (2001). The final decision assured Brazilians the right to apply retaliating measures against Canadian products. In 2004, it reached success against American subsidies given to cotton production and exports. Brazil argued that the United States came to distort the worldwide cotton trade with subsidies, then provoking an international price reduction on the fiber. During the same year, Brazil won – along with Australia and Thailand –, another proceeding, this time against the European Union, regarding subsidies paid by the block governments to sugar producers (AS VITÓRIAS, 2005, p. B9). On March 2005, Brazil was successful at yet another case against the United States on WTO. It was also authorized by the organization to apply sanctions towards the Americans on the cotton case. The G-20 has been able to articulate itself with other groups, as well as to achieve international arrangements with countries which present a lower degree of development. The Ministers and High-Level Officials of the G-20 and coordinators of G-33, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Group of States (ACP), the Least Developed Countries Group (LDCs), the African Group, the Small Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), the Sectoral Initiative in favor of Cotton (C4), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Non-Agricultural Market Acess (NAMA-11) met in Geneva on June 11th 2007 to evaluate the state of agricultural 59 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010) Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini e André Luiz Reis da Silva negotiations in the Doha Round. During that meeting, representatives released a joint statement reaffirming the need to make progress in the Doha Round and reinforced the importance of the agricultural issue and of the principle of balance during negotiations (Declaração de Imprensa, 2007). IBSA, Multipolarity Defense and the Development of the South Concomitantly with the creation of the G-20, the Brazilian government took part in the formation of the G-3, gathering Brazil, India, and South Africa (IBSA). The India-Brazil-South Africa Trilateral Dialogue Forum, launched on June 2003, consists of the three countries’ strategic articulation. They agreed on the following principles: the respect for the rules of International Law, the strengthening of the United Nations and its Security Council, and the importance of prioritizing diplomacy as a means of maintaining international peace and security. They restated the need to fight threats to both international peace and security in accordance to the United Nations Chart and the juridical instruments Brazil, India and South Africa abide by. Another focal point was the United Nations Reform, with emphasis to its Security Council. In this regard, they pointed out the necessity to expand the Security Council, both in its permanent and non-permanent members, to include developing countries. Brazil, India and South Africa also agreed to join efforts to increase the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council’s efficiency. The Chancellors identified trilateral cooperation as a valuable instrument to reach social and economic development. Additionally, they highlighted their intention to give greater impetus to cooperation among the three countries, especially in the fields of technology, computer science and agriculture (Declaração de Brasília, 2003). After a general announcement to the United Nations General Assembly on September 2003, India, Brazil, and South Africa decided to establish a fiduciary fund in the scope of UNDP to contribute to poverty and hunger relief in an improved international cooperation framework, and also aiming at the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. The fiduciary fund is used to implement scalable projects to be disseminated in developing countries which may show interest in it. The projects are seen as instances of positive practice in the fight against poverty and hunger, as well as actions in health, education, sanitary safety, and food security improvement. The IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger, a special fiduciary fund of UNDP, had Guinea-Bissau as its first beneficiary country in the field of agricultural development, followed by a relief project for Haiti concerning solid waste collection. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs from India (Yashwant Sinha), Brazil (Celso Amorim), and South Africa (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) met in New Delhi in March 2004 for the First Meeting of the Trilateral Commission of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. On the occasion, the three countries focused their 60 discussions on two main areas: cooperation for defense, health, and trade along with the increase on Southern countries’ influence on international institutions, particularly the UN and the WTO. The Ministers stated that IBSA should contribute significantly to the design of South-South cooperation as well as to be a positive factor in the promotion of human development, establishing potential synergies among its members. They also advocated the strengthening of the multilateral system, the United Nations reform – especially of its Security Council –, the fight against international terrorism, the defense of the environment, the preservation of biodiversity, the strengthening of the G-20, the pursuit of social development, and the strengthening of cultural ties. The representatives also agreed to intensify cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other forums, aiming at securing the free growth and development of pacific forms of use for atomic energy through the provision of technology, equipment, and material under the appropriate safeguards. Furthermore, the necessity to maintain Iraq’s integrity and unity was stressed by the Ministers, together with the re-establishment of security and stability in the country. Still on this subject, they urged the transfer of full sovereignty to the Iraqi people as soon as possible. The Ministers understood that it would be an important challenge before the international community to maximize the benefits of globalization, and to assure that the latter becomes a positive force for sustainable economic growth in developing countries. They emphasized the strong need for developing countries to have their own agenda to establish their goals in a globalized world. They have to coordinate this agenda with multilateral processes in order to influence negotiations and reach profitable results for the South. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva visited India in January 2004 and there he signed commercial and technological cooperation deals. On the occasion, Lula asserted that the union among poor countries could change the world’s commercial geography of and break the unilateralism imposed by developed nations on commercial relations. During this meeting, Mercosur member-countries (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) and India also signed a Preferential Trade Agreement, the block’s first commercial agreement with an Asian country. The deal was considered to be the first step towards a Free Trade Area between Mercosur and India. Lula also highlighted the similarities between Brazil and India, stressing the possible benefits to be brought by the tightening of relations between the two countries. In March 2005, a commercial agreement between Mercosur and India came into being in New Delhi, envisaging an expansion to South Africa. According to Itamaraty, this idea was launched during the agreement signing ceremony which stipulated preferential trade tariffs with India on 900 products. Chancellor Amorim participated in the ceremony, as well as in the G-20 meeting (ACORDO, 2005). By analyzing the speeches delivered, it is possible to say that the Trilateral Forum advances as central themes: 1) a fairer and more righteous globalization, 2) 61 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010) Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini e André Luiz Reis da Silva the expansion of Southern countries’ representation on the UN Security Council, 3) the defense and maintenance of the G-20, 4) the promotion of a South-South economic integration, and 5) the exchange of social and environmental projects. In September 2006, the First Summit Meeting of the India-BrazilSouth Africa Dialogue Forum was held in Brasilia. During the meeting, the three countries defended a reform in international organisms to increase the representation of developing countries. Moreover, they asked rich countries to make concessions in trade negotiations. In the meeting, the Brazilian President also suggested a G-3 managerial meeting be formed to advance economic and commercial integration among the countries. In October 2007, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and South-African President Thabo Mbeki took part in the Second IBSA Summit Meeting in Pretoria. They requested a unifying voice from their Southern hemisphere economies to influence international agenda. Lula criticized developing countries participatory formula in world decision forums such as the UN and the G-8, advocating a larger influence for these nations in international debates. At the meeting, Lula also affirmed IBSA’s capacity to express its ideas on several topics on the international agenda, reflecting Brazilian credibility and aptitude to contribute to a fairer and further democratic world order. The United Nations reform and the Brazilian political protagonism Among IBSA’s main goals, besides technical cooperation and possibilities for integration and articulation among similar developing countries, it is pertinent to mention political matters related to the reordering of the post-Cold war international system and the United Nations Security Council reform. Since Itamar Franco’s administration, Brazil has started to work systematically on the countries’ candidature as a permanent member to the Security Council. The following President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, also embraced the task during his two terms in office, although adopting a distinct perspective. By subscribing entirely to a new globalized international agenda and complying with the economic openness model, he believed it would be possible to qualify the country for such a position, with the recognition by the five permanent members of Brazil’s legitimacy. It was nevertheless a slight delusional hope since politics is not a game where people voluntarily share what is theirs; it is necessary to conquer one’s share. In order to conquer it, one needs to increase one’s power, not renounce to it as the former president had done. The debate on the UN reform progressed slowly, with several propositions and candidatures competing against each other (Mexico and Argentina were also on the run, trying at the same time to block the Brazilian initiative). The war on Iraq soon followed, bringing with it the Bush administration’s shocking disrespect of the UN’s position on the matter as the war did not have a UN mandate. To a great 62 number of analysts, the organization was becoming demoralized. Nonetheless, numerous countries saw through the situation the urgent need for reform as a means to establish a multilateral and multipolar order, instead of a new hegemony. Under President Lula, Brazilian diplomacy has prioritized autonomy, a moderate and propositional contestation, strategic alliances compatible with the country’s weight – especially with the great developing countries –, SouthAmerican leadership and the region’s integration, and a campaign in favor of the social dimension. Brazilian performance along with the WTO, the G-3 creation, the material and political support to countries in need, and the opposition to the war, had a considerable impact on the international community. As such, Brazil conquered an important political space, posing as “new” in international relations and laying at the center of a political movement to acquire a permanent seat onto the UN Security Council. The positive expressions of other members such as France, China, and even the United Kingdom to the Brazilian candidature underline the importance of the new Brazilian diplomacy. A strong point in the country’s foreign policy under Lula was the tightening of relations with Africa. The President visited the African continent various times. Half of the Brazilian population has African roots; there are similarities between the two cultures, the African continent lays nearby – being a part of the Brazilian geopolitical scenario –, and the economies on both sides complement each other. Despite all these factors, Africa has always been a secondary front for Brazilian diplomacy. During the 1970s, intense collaboration with African countries in economic multilateral forums began, along with an intense common political agenda and a growing trade of goods and services. Nevertheless, the permanent war on Southern Africa only allowed for the achievement of modest results. It was a difficult situation whose solution only came with the end of the white minority regime in South Africa and Nelson Mandela’s election in 1994. From Fernando Collor to Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazilian government prioritized relations with OECD countries and, to a smaller degree, with Mercosur. Little attention was paid to Mandela’s proposal in 1996 to turn his country into a Mercosur associate member. With Lula’s election, strategic partnership between Brasilia and Pretoria started to be built in matters concerning not only regional issues, but also global – such as the G-3, peace, and development. Both countries are strong candidates for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, as well as to being regional leaders in a multipolar system. Lula’s government has been searching for a new partnership with Africa, particularly with South Africa, which has similar interests within the international system such as the defense of multipolarity. On the other hand, Brazil has been able to sustain an effective participation within the UN. The project for a permanent spot on the Security Council, an old dream of the Brazilian diplomacy, has gained new force and activism. Beyond that, the UN Millennium Development Goals, approved in 2000 during the United 63 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010) Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini e André Luiz Reis da Silva Nations Millennium Summit, show a large resemblance with Lula’s internal development project in such topics as the fight against poverty, increasing the country’s protagonism in this forum. During the opening ceremony of the United Nations General Assembly 59th Session, on September 21st 2004, one photograph made a strong statement in the international political scene: Indian and Japanese Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Junichiro Koizumi, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, holding hands, pledged to support each other’s intentions to conquer a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The two economic giants, once defeated during the Second World War, and the two biggest and most important developing countries sealed a formal alliance to defend their candidatures in the context of the UN reform. For Germany, it was about restoring its full sovereignty, lost since 1945, after a reunification accomplished not long ago. At the same time, Brazil and India, as well as other countries, claimed the same right as representatives of their respective regions. However, due to a series of pressures and unique strategy, Japan announced its withdrawal from the G-4 in January 2006, but it later resumed talks with the group in July 2007 during a meeting in New York. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva traveled to New York on September 13th 2005 to participate in the UN Millennium Summit which was a part of the organization’s 60th Session of the General Assembly. During the summit, Lula attacked agricultural subsidies given in developed countries and demanded the promised financial help for Haiti, besides defending the enlargement of the permanent and non-permanent members in the Security Council. The Final Resolution, signed by 170 countries, did not satisfy Brazilian expectations, since it only acknowledges the need for a reform without stipulating timelines for it. With regards to the fight against hunger and poverty, Lula announced that Brazil was seeking to tax international air tickets to finance the fight against the problem in the world. The committee formed by Brazil, Chile, France, Algeria, Spain, and Germany also put forward a series of proposals to finance strategies against hunger and poverty. Lula still took the time to meet with North-American businessmen. President Lula, during the Security Council meeting on the activities for the Millennium Summit in September 2005, brought once more to the table the matter of increasing the number of permanent members in the council. Later on, he advocated the fight against hunger as an essential tool for the accomplishment of the Millennium Goals and to ensure peace and international security. The Millennium Declaration, approved in 2000 during the Millennium Summit in New York, reflects the development goals for 147 chiefs of State and government for 189 countries. The eight objectives are the following: 1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2) to achieve universal primary education, 3) to promote gender equality and empower women, 4) to reduce child mortality, 5) to improve maternal health, 6) to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 7) to 64 Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010) Brazil and Environmental Multilateralism Under Lula, Brazil sought to promote multilateral forums to discuss environmental issues, underlining the importance of a unified political treatment to the environmental agenda. The idea for Rio+20, a new UN Conference on Sustainable Development, fits into this approach. Another issue raised by Brazilian government as to the environment concerns the world’s energy matrix. The country stands for a joint effort by the international community to research and invest on renewable energy sources. To this regard, the Brazilian diplomacy worked on stimulating the debate on this field through an International Conference on Biofuels, setting the basis for worldwide cooperation in the energy sector. In 2009, the Brazilian speech in the UN General Assembly took a more incisive tone as it prompted developed countries to take part in solving problems related to climate change. According to the Brazilian diplomacy’s conception on the matter, developed countries have bigger responsibilities in the environmental issue than developing countries, “solving these and other dead-locked subjects can only happen if the threats related to climate change are faced under the realization that we all have common, yet differentiated responsibilities” (SILVA, 2009). According to Presidential Messages to the National Congress, the government developed a participatory environmental policy in multilateral conventions addressing climate change and international cooperation in the field of renewable forms of energy (considering proposals presented in 2004 during the Rio+ meeting in Johannesburg). The country also endorsed the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, taking into account that “the country’s double condition as megadiverse as well as a great agricultural exporter gives power and specific weight to Brazilian participation in such an important international instrument” (BRASIL, 2005, p. 234). Brazil has also acted in favor of developed countries’ ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The country takes interest in implementing the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as predicted on the protocol, a move which would allow for investment in projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries. To that matter, in 2004 Brazil signed Memorandums of Understanding with Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands. On the 10th Session of the Conference of Parties (COP 10) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change held in Buenos Aires in 2004, Brazil 65 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional ensure environmental sustainability, and 8) to develop a global partnership for development (SILVA, 2005). To augment its presence in the UN, Brazil took on the coordination of troops in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004. In January 2009, the Minustah forces comprised approximately seven thousand soldiers, the biggest contingent coming from Brazil, Uruguay, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Jordan. Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini e André Luiz Reis da Silva presented its first National Communication, which created a large international repercussion. During the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Brazilian delegation sought to defend a country’s sovereignty over its natural resources. In 2007, Brazil hosted the 8th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Third Meeting of the Parties (MOP 3) of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The country also restated its commitment to participate in the Global Environment Facility (GEF), as well as cooperating with the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) to promote the region’s sustainable development. During the UN General Assembly Session in 2007, President Lula launched the proposal for a new Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, twenty years after Rio-92, and offered Brazil to host the event. In 2008, during the 9th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Bonn, Brazil – along with other developing countries – defended the creation of an international agreement to assure the proper distribution of benefits arising from the usage of biodiversity, helping to fight biopiracy. The country also took part in the 13th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Indonesia, an occasion to advocate in favor of renewable sources of energy and positive incentives to countries avoiding deforestation. By the end of the year, the 14th COP was held in Poland, a preparation for the Copenhagen Conference in 2009. Regarding biofuels, which have been targeted by criticism over the last couple of years, Brazil carried out a clarifying policy about the value of this kind of renewable energy form that would promote sustainable development for periphery countries. That was the approach endorsed during the International Conference on Biofuels in São Paulo in December 2008 (BRASIL, 2009, p. 236). Therefore, Brazil has been able to sustain a strong presence in international conventions discussing environmental issues. Such a presence is justified by Brazil’s position as a megadiverse country and by its concern with the effects of atmospheric pollution on the whole world such as global warming and the ozone layer depletion. Brazil also adopts a demanding position to argue in favor of natural resources sovereignty and the fair distribution of benefits earned through biodiversity. Thus, on environmental matters, Brazilian foreign policy seeks to associate the need for development with the usage of natural resources by all nations. On the same line of thought, the country also shows a strong position in two topics: equal and fair distribution of the profits resulting from the extraction of natural resources between countries with advanced research and technology levels and megadiverse ones; the recognition that all countries should contribute to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, acknowledging the existence of common but differentiated responsibilities. Higher costs would bear upon those who have historically been polluting more rather than on developing countries. Therefore, 66 a South-South alignment on issues concerning the environment is also present once Brazil engaged alongside other megadiverse and developing countries such as India, China, South Africa, and Amazonian countries to act on the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The block’s focus was on a nation’s sovereignty over its natural resources and sustainable use of biodiversity (BRASIL, 2005, p. 234). On the subject of renewable energy sources, Brazilian diplomacy supported an investment on biofuels in several international forums. This action was indeed highly criticized by part of the international society which blames ethanol and biodiesel production for the increase in food pricing over the last couple of years. On the contrary, Brazilian foreign policy holds a speech on the double benefits of biofuels, especially for developing countries, with prospects for energetic autonomy, the opening of a new sector for investments and labor opportunities which would prompt growth and lead the way for sustainable development. To this extent, the International Biofuels Forum was launched in 2007 with the presence of South Africa, China, the European Commission, the United States, India, and Brazil. The forum’s main goal was to establish a dialogue and to coordinate positions on the matter. During that same year, a bilateral approach between Brazil and the United States translated itself into the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Brazil to Advance Cooperation on Biofuels during President Bush’s visit to Brazil. The memorandum sought to promote cooperation, develop the sector in third countries, and form a world market for biofuels. Brazil also pursued the establishment of other bilateral memorandums, particularly with Latin American, Caribbean, and African countries. The partnership between Brazil and the United States started to show results already in 2008. They mainly concern cooperation with third countries with the beginning of studies for ethanol production in various countries in Central America and Africa. In matters of environmental policy, Brazilian diplomacy uses both SouthSouth cooperation dynamic and its relations with central powers. Biofuels came as an opportunity for it to reinforce the country’s international insertion. Such a possibility is due to Brazilian technological lead on biofuel production, which facilitated bilateral cooperation with several nations including the United States and the European Union. Hence, the environmental issue is articulated in the government’s foreign policy for the construction of a new world order, one that is sustainable, multilateral, less asymmetric, and built on democratic institutions. The matters of sustainable development, of access to technology to achieve it, of differentiated responsibilities, and of sovereignty on models of development and on a country’s right to its natural resources show Brazil’s strong performance as a developing country which seeks to open space on international decision-making processes. 67 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010) Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini e André Luiz Reis da Silva Conclusion It is important to highlight that some features in the current Brazilian foreign policy have begun during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s terms in office. Nevertheless, he was severely restrained on his intentions due to internal difficulties and the international crisis at the time. Under Lula, Brazil started to work on an intense international agenda, transcending a subordinated approach to globalization and simple personal projection objectives. It tried to regain the country’s capacity to negotiate concomitantly breaking from the North-Atlantic Liberal Consensus. Brazil has started to act with optimism and political will, constantly originating political facts on the international scene. Previously, it had low selfesteem, taking into account that Collor and Cardoso saw the country as delayed concerning the adjustments demanded by the rich countries. On the contrary, Brazil now sees itself as a leader capable of negotiating and the beholder of a project that can even contribute to insert a social agenda into globalization. Such a position makes the country eligible to pursue several initiatives such as its entrance into a reformed UN Security Council as a permanent member. Finally, instead of focusing on cooperation within large and saturated markets or with countries which see Brazil as secondary, Itamaraty has chosen to concentrate itself on unoccupied spaces. By coming closer together with its SouthAmerican neighbors – particularly Andean ones –, Southern Africa, Arab countries, and giants such as India, China, and Russia, Brazilian diplomacy was able to advance considerably and immediately, with astonishing business perspectives. The presence of Argentine guests and businessmen in the Presidential Delegation is an important remark of the new diplomacy’s sensibility. Beyond that, cooperation allowed for the construction of “variable geometry” alliances such as the G-3 and the G-20, which are able to exert a global influence. Rather than practicing an ideologically strong diplomacy, Brazil developed an active and pragmatic posture, seeking allies for each problem, contesting without challenging the big ones (as in trade negotiations and on the disrespect towards the UN), respecting, although not supporting, the position of problematic countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran. The G-3, as announced during its launching, may come to be a G-5, with the virtual inclusion of China and Russia. Evidently, these two countries posses an important weight in the international system, and could form a group capable of exercising great influence in the alliance with Brazil, India and South Africa. As such, the G-3 initiative also seeks to reinforce and articulate less powerful partners from the group of emerging powers, attempting to turn them into acceptable protagonists. Thus, it is an action which brings Brazil to occupy an idle power space at a low cost, as can be apprehended from the rapid advancement of the initiative. 68 On the other hand, the G-20 gave Brazil a large bargaining capacity as the leader of a group of countries with an important agricultural production, and forced a change of focus in multilateral trade negotiations. However, it is necessary to enlarge and incorporate other actors, especially African ones. The G-20 still suffers restrictions from poorer countries, and its action has been facing resistance from the African block of countries in agricultural liberalization negotiations in the WTO. To be able to reach its goals, Brazilian diplomacy will have to broaden its political capacity to articulate the “variable geometries” with North-South contradictions and demands. Brazilian multilateral environmental diplomacy has also put the country forward as a protagonist, not only through the relevance of the Amazon rainforest, but also through initiatives to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and to defend the environment associated with development. Even though environmental policies in Brazil need to advance, the country is on the way of achieving the status of “environmental power” as a respectable interlocutor in main forums and debates. Finally, trough the reinforcement of multilateralism, taking into account a flexible perspective of alliances and the creation of coalition groups, Brazil has developed its unique diplomacy that is adequate to the era of globalization, also having a development project for the country. However, the unique diplomacy can raise a problem because huge expectations may be created upon it, and it will only provide the expected results along with economic development and changes in the international system. In recent years, building a multilateral environment favorable to the defense of national interests has been one of the central elements for the defense of multipolarity, development and democratization of international relations. Received August 25, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Bibliography ACORDO entre Mercosul e Índia deve ser ampliado para a África do Sul. Folha de São Paulo, 20/3/2005. ALENCAR, Kennedy. Presidente pede à Colômbia que siga no G20. Folha de São Paulo. 9 out. 2003, p. b6. ALTEMANI, Henrique e LESSA, Antônio. (orgs) Relações Internacionais do Brasil: Temas e agendas. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2006. AS VITÓRIAS do Brasil na OMC. Folha de São Paulo. P. B9, 4 mar. 2005. ARRAES, Virgílio Caixeta. 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A política externa brasileira e os desafios da cooperação SulSul. Rev. bras. polít. int. [online]. 2005, vol.48, n.1 [cited 2010-11-11], pp. 24-59 . Available from: <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292005000100002&ln g=en&nrm=iso>. ISSN 0034-7329. doi: 10.1590/S0034-73292005000100002. MIYAMOTO, Shiguenoli. O Brasil e as negociações multilaterais. Rev. bras. polít. int.[online]. 2000, vol.43, n.1 [cited 2010-11-11], pp. 119-137 . Available from: <http://www.scielo.br/ scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292000000100006&lng=en&nrm=iso>. ISSN 0034-7329. doi: 10.1590/S0034-73292000000100006. OLIVEIRA, Marcelo Fernandes de. Alianças e coalizões internacionais do governo Lula: o Ibas e o G-20. Rev. bras. polít. int. [online]. 2005, vol.48, n.2 [cited 2010-11-11], pp. 55-69 . Available from: <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S003473292005000200003&lng= en&nrm=iso>. ISSN 0034-7329. doi: 10.1590/S003473292005000200003. 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Available from: <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S003473292003000200005&lng= en&nrm=iso>. ISSN 0034-7329. doi: 10.1590/S003473292003000200005. SARAIVA, Miriam Gomes. As estratégias de cooperação Sul-Sul nos marcos da política externa brasileira de 1993 a 2007. Rev. bras. polít. int. [online]. 2007, vol.50, n.2 [cited 2010-11-11], pp. 42-59 . Available from: <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S003473292007000200004&lng= en&nrm=iso>. ISSN 0034-7329. doi: 10.1590/S003473292007000200004. SENNES, Ricardo. As mudanças da política externa brasileira nos anos 80: uma potência média recém industrializada. Porto Alegre: Ed. da UFRGS, 2003. SILVA, Luiz Inácio Lula. Discurso no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Setembro de 2005. SILVA, Luiz Inácio Lula. Estadao.com.br. Íntegra do Discurso de Lula na Assembleia Geral da ONU. 23 set 2009. Disponível em: <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/ internacional,confira-integra-do-discurso-de-lula-na-assembleia-geral-da-onu,439 777,0. htm>. Acesso em: 10 mar 2010. SOUTO MAIOR, Luiz. A ordem mundial e o Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional. Brasília: Ano 46, n. 2, 2003, p. 26-48. VIGEVANI, Tullo; CEPALUNI, Gabriel. A política externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação. Contexto internacional. 29(2): 273-335, . 2007. VIZENTINI, Paulo. Relações Internacionais do Brasil: de Vargas à Lula. São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2008. 3a ed. revista e ampliada. VIZENTINI, Paulo. WIESEBRON, Marianne (orgs). Neohegemonia americana ou multipolaridade?Pólos de poder e sistema internacional. Porto Alegre: Ed. UFRGS, 2006. Abstract This article discusses Brazil’s multilateral policy under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration, highlighting economic, political and environmental themes. The main argument is that Brazil’s multilateral relations during this government reached a new significance with the reinforcement of international coalitions and the articulation with the country’s new development model. The country has been using multilateral forums as a way to achieve international projection and support for its development project, highlighting bargaining aspects, variable geometry coalitions and the strengthening of South-South cooperation. 71 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional ROSSI, Clovis. Brasil já vê risco de “nova Seattle” no encontro da OMC em Cancún. Folha de São Paulo, p. B1. 2 set. 2003. Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini e André Luiz Reis da Silva Resumo Nesse artigo, discute-se a política multilateral do Brasil no governo de Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, destacando os temas econômicos, políticos e ambientais. O argumento central é que as relações multilaterais do Brasil durante este governo alcançaram um novo significado com o reforço de coalizões internacionais e a articulação com o novo modelo de desenvolvimento econômico do país. O País tem usado fóruns multilaterais como meio de alcançar projeção internacional e apoio para seu desenvolvimento econômico, enfatizando os aspectos de barganha, coalizões de geometria variável e o fortalecimento da cooperação sul-sul. Key-words: Multilateralism; Brazilian diplomacy; Brazil and International Organizations. Palavras-chave: multilateralismo; diplomacia brasileira; organizações internacionais e o Brasil. 72 Artigo When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula Quando países emergentes reformam a governança global das mudanças climáticas: o Brasil sob Lula Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 73-90 [2010] Introduction This paper aims at exploring the role Brazil has been playing in the global environmental governance1 since the end of the 1980’s in order to assess whether it is or not an emerging power. To do so, some international regimes in which Brazil significantly participates were analyzed, with special focus on climate change, although this is not an exclusively environmental issue. Therefore, the first part of the article will discuss international environmental regimes in general, except for the regimes related to water because Brazil is not playing a significant role yet. The second part will discuss IR theory on climate change, to show under what circumstances Brazil may be effectively considered an emerging power. In this sense, Ian Rowlands’ chapter on IR theory is discussed and some of his general assumptions are challenged. Finally, the article is based primarily on the works of Andrew Hurrell, Jochen Prantl, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Ian Rowlands, Eduardo Viola, Mark Lacy, Adil Najam and Mark Duffield. Usually, most observers consider Brazil an emerging country2, along with others like China, Russia and India to mention only a few. And then they discuss how this international status can be transposed to a more specific sector, like nuclear * Professor at Universtity of Brasília – UnB, Brazil, and researcher of National Council for Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq (anabarros@unb.br). 1 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s (2000, p.12) definition of governance is “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restraint the collective activities of a group”. And Mark Duffield (2001, p. 257) claims that governance corresponds to the shift from aid policy towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction. For him, there is an “emerging system of global liberal governance that is no longer capitalist, because underdevelopment has become dangerous. It is rather “non-state and non-territorial liberal governance”. 2 GABAS and LOSCH, “100 New Global Challengers” do Boston Consulting Group (2008); Standard& Poor’s Emerging Markets Database; BNP Paribas (2007); and IMF “Reaping the Benefits of Financial Globalization” (2007). Apud: Atelier de cartographie de Sciences Po de Paris (2008): http://cartographie. sciences-po.fr. 13/02/2010. 73 Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau non-proliferation, global markets, peacekeeping or environmental affairs. However, an emerging country is not automatically an emerging power, since a country has to impose itself in the international negotiations to have credibility, legitimacy and voice. Thus, the dynamics of the environmental regimes are different from the economic and political ones. In this sense, Brazil is an environmental emerging power since the end of the 1980’s, long before its economic success due to the Real Plan under Cardoso presidency. This period corresponds to the diplomatic and domestic preparation for the 1992 Earth Summit, when Brazil proposed to host the meeting in Rio de Janeiro city. It is based on political criteria, more than economic, since Brazil really aimed at having his democratic transition process acknowledged by the international community and at having a legitimate international role to play in the new 1990’s global order; thus, President Lula continued to work for the same purposes. Nevertheless, the Brazilian environmental profile is a strong condition of its status as an emerging power, since Brazil hosts around 12% of the world freshwater and 15% to 20% of the world’s living biodiversity. So, it is a sui generis country and its participation in environmental regimes is directly linked to this condition. Being recognized as an emerging power has contributed to strengthen Brazil as a global environmental player, though it cannot be considered a key player in all the environmental regimes, as it will be discussed in part 1. Furthermore, the global order after 2008 is more open to the participation of emerging countries too, as the financial and economic crisis led the United States and the European Union to serious domestic problems that constrain their capacity of leadership in areas such as the environment. Therefore, emerging countries account for a growing part of the world’s economy, the BRIC3 alone for around 22%, and they represent one third of the world population. Secondly, their domestic markets are the most promising ones, but they still depend starkly on the US and European markets. Nonetheless, the BRICs do not have a meaning in environmental negotiations yet, as Russia is frequently distant from the other three, especially in regard to climate change talks. Finally, emerging powers will probably change the traditional North-South divide as they are among the biggest consumers, industrial powers, the worst polluters and greenhouse gas (GHG) effect emitters. They are also important technology adaptors and innovators4, allowing them to enhance the South to South cooperation efforts. As a consequence, the international community expects them to have more responsibility in the near future, and to help finance the development of 3 Brazil, India, Russia and China. 4 In some cases such as biotechnology, biofuels, energy technologies, transition to low carbon economy, aeronautics and others. Brazil, in particular, is very well represented with EMBRAPA, FIOCRUZ, EMBRAER and PETROBRAS. 74 the other nations. All of these signs are very clear in the climate change regime, to be discussed in the second part. The main shift here is that environmental governance, institutions, international law and rules, were traditionally driven by developed countries. Nowadays, emerging powers, Brazil and India in particular, are struggling to have a prominent role to play in relation to environmental governance, notably considering food and climate security5. Before assessing the role of Brazil in specific regimes, it is important to point a few characteristics of the Brazilian environmental politics. It changed from what Porter and Brown (1996) described as a “veto-state” to a promoting state, since it signed and ratified all the most important multilateral environmental agreements. But Brazil did not manage to create regional environmental governance (Viola, Barros-Platiau and Leis, 2007), as the Mercosur (1991) 6, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO, 2002)7, the Regional Strategy on Biological Diversity8, and other institutions do not play a role as partners. The main environmental groups and alliances are the G77/China, Megadiverse Likeminded, IBSA9 and the BIC. Last but not least, there is a huge dissonance between Brazilian foreign policy and the domestic ones, and this weakens the Brazilian capacity to have a stand in some multilateral negotiations. For instance, Brazil does not have access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing (ABS) law yet, and the policies related to forests were inefficient in the past. Also, its national distribution of wealth, infrastructure and technology is still among the worst in the world. The Main International Environmental Regimes The first important question to be tackled is in what regimes does Brazil matter? Only four environmental regimes were selected and discussed below: forests, biodiversity, biosafety and access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing (ABS). Forests are an interesting issue to start with. Although it is perceived as central to most countries, the governance of this issue is so fragile and fragmented that it may be stated that there is no regime yet. There is only a 1992 non-binding Declaration of Principles on All Types of Forests due to the disagreement of Brazil and others against the developed countries. Brazil wished to have a declaration on 5 BRASIL. “Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milênio. Relatório Nacional de Acompanhamento”. Presidência da República, março 2010. 6 South Cone Common Market. The five members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and Venezuela joined them in July 2006. 7 Former 1978 Amazon Cooperation Treaty (ACT). Members: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guiana, Peru, and Venezuela. 8 Created by the Andean Pact countries and Brazil did not participate. 9 India, Brazil and South Africa. One must take note that their last meeting was attended by the ministries of environment, not foreign affairs. 75 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau all types of forests, not only the rainforest, and to avoid international interference in what was considered a national issue (Lago, 2006). Brazil is to be considered one of the most important countries in this future regime, because of its ecosystems and the impact of its absence in any multilateral talk. But the country does not intend to be absent from any talk or initiative, on the contrary. In December 2009, the Minister of Environment, Carlos Minc, announced the National Plan to reduce 80% of the deforestation rate by 2020 with the participation of the international community, and that would correspond to a cut in GHG emissions from 36.1% to 38.9%. In this sense, the forest talks were to a large extent transferred to climate change talks, since deforestation accounts for 18% of GHG emissions (IPCC, 2007) and forests provide environmental services, that is, they consume and produce GHG. Thus, one of the most difficult negotiations is actually on REDD10. Secondly, the biodiversity regime is a huge regime, considered to have started with the 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). It has 193 Parties and its main goal is to assure sustainable development. In fact, it is a giant regime that was a starting point to additional protocols in the future, so it is called an “umbrella agreement”. So, forests, ABS, biosafety, desertification, sustainable development and trade are somehow linked to this Convention. Brazil was always a key-player, notably because of its perception on the importance of the Earth Summit and its political will to actively participate in the negotiations. However, before 1992 it was considered the emerging power to block, because Brazil had a “veto-state” attitude against Northern countries that intended to make the rules on biodiversity, despite strong points of disagreement with developing countries. The most important one was that the developed countries wanted an environmental agreement whilst the second ones struggled for a social-environmental compromise, that is, poverty eradication and the right to development were their pre-conditions to achieve effective environmental protection. By that time, Brazilian diplomats knew that active participation was the best strategy to protect its national interests and sovereignty (Barros-Platiau and Varella, 2001; Lago, 2006). Nowadays, Brazil is changing its veto strategy as it has become one of the countries to propose innovative policies and funds, according to its national experience on successful initiatives. Therefore, it is considered as a “model exporter” in this article. The most interesting one was the PPG7, the largest international cooperation program for environmental protection ever settled. But also, under Lula’s administration, there have been several interesting policies, like PROBIO I and II, ARPA, PPP, FUNBIO11, to mention only some of them. As a result, from 2003 to 2008, more than 24 million hectares were transformed in conservation 10 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. 11 All the details about these programs can be found in the Ministry of Environment website: www.mma.gov.br. 76 areas. Furthermore, the Fundo Amazônia was created to fight against deforestation with international financing too. There is no other initiative comparable to that elsewhere in the world, so Brazil is to be considered as an example of models that could be transposed to other countries. Therefore, Brazil is not only a very powerful player concerning biodiversity, it is also country that is showing political solutions to the rest and intends to be a kind of “model exporter” to other countries in the South. Two main issues remain for the future: the creation of the UN organization for the environment, to replace the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and the international obligations of the developed countries. For the first case, Brazil was opposed to the German and French project for the creation of a new UN institution, but now it is strong enough to negotiate it in accordance with its main interests. For the obligations of developed countries, Brazil still demands them to honor their compromises of technology transfers and financing for global development. That is, Brazil is not willing to accept international responsibilities before the developed countries do what they promised to in 1992. This can be described as “the race to be second”, as Benito Mueller put it, for climate talks. Thirdly, the biosafety regime started well and had a Protocol to the CBD signed in 2000, named the Cartagena Protocol. It deals with the transboundary transportation and trade of living modified organisms (LMOs). But as time went by, the Protocol had no impact on trade, so it is considered an epiphenomenon (Young, 1989; 1994). Brazil was so hesitant during the multilateral negotiation rounds that it may not be considered an important player, even though it is among the first producers and exporters of several biotechnology commodities, like soya beans. This trouble was due to a lack of national policy and serious disagreement between ministries12, which still persists. In sum, it can be argued that Brazil had no clear strategy for this regime, but now the main question is whether it will support the strengthening of the international liability under the Protocol. Can hesitant players be considered key? As Brazil does not have a clear position yet, it is difficult to assess its power in the present talks, despite its importance as a LMO producer. If it supports the international liability process, than it will be one of the losers, since it is the only big LMOs exporter which is Part to the Protocol. Therefore, if Brazil plays a key role in the future, it will probably be to block the development of the regime. Finally, the ABS future regime is also central to the assessment of Brazil as an emerging power. The matter is rather complex, with a strong cleavage between the biodiverse countries and the bioprospection powers (countries and companies). Thus, the negotiations are split in different institutions: FAO, WIPO, UNEP and TRIPS/WTO. In terms of patents, for instance, Brazil, India and Egypt 12 Roughly, Environement (MMA) and Health (MS) ministries against Science and Technology (MCT) and Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC). 77 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau are negotiating together in the WIPO talks, but this is not the case for the other institutions. It is key to stress that Brazil and others managed to create the Megadiverse Like-Minded Countries Group13, corresponding to 70% of the world’s living biodiversity and around 45% of the world’s population. Brazil is now the President of the Group, and was preceded by India. They are using their biological resources as political stakes in order to try to create a new regime on access to genetic resources since the mid-1990’s. But the weak point of Brazil is that the country has neither a national ABS policy nor a catalog of its living biodiversity, as only 200 thousand species are listed, whereas 1.8 million are supposed to exist, according to Brazilian public authorities. As mentioned above, Brazil is favorable to the creation of an international ABS regime, but the difficult talks so far do not allow us to envisage a Protocol by the 2010 Conference of the Parties in Japan. Hence, Brazil is a weak player in this future regime, and not even an “emerging” power yet. Climate Change and IR Theory This second part of the article has two main goals. One is to show how Brazil turned from a rather insignificant player to a key player, that is, more than just an emerging power. The other is to stress that we are really in the face of humanity’s biggest cooperation challenge and we must find new theoretical tools to work out political, economical and legal solutions for it, assessing the role emerging powers may play. In this sense, the constructivist approach seems to shed more light on the issues emerging countries raise. In relation to global climate change, the Brazilian perception of the regime has not changed much since 1992. It states that the developed countries of the North have been emitting greenhouse gases since the Industrial Revolution and now humanity is threatened with global climate change. As a consequence, the main emitters are historically responsible for this global environmental problem and they have to accept the burden to solve it, whilst Brazil will be waiting for the North to respect its obligations (legal and moral) and only accept voluntary policies about gas mitigation and national adaptation14. If the Brazilian perception about the regime has not changed significantly, the political strategies changed considerably from the beginning of negotiations in the 1990s (Viola, Barros-Platiau and Leis, 2007). During the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, the issue was known only by a few from a technical elite in these 13 Website: http://lmmc.nic.in/. The members are: South Africa, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Phiilippinas, India, Indonesia, Kenia, Madagascar, Malasia, Mexico, Peru, Democratic Republic of Congo and Venezuela. Australia, Papua New Guinea and the United States are also considered megadiverse countries by the UNEP, but they are not part of the political group created in 2002 in Mexico. 14 Adaptation in the sense of preparing the country or at least the most vulnerable areas for climate alterations: drought, heavy rains, floods and so on. It is directly linked to human security. 78 Southern countries, and it was not really part of their political agenda. Since then, and up to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol early negotiations, some countries started to participate more, Brazil and Argentina15 for instance. Nowadays, Brazil continues to play an active role, but only in the international level, not in the regional one, as explained by Viola, Barros-Platiau and Leis (2007). Also, the climate global order has changed dramatically in the past years. This means that in the 1990’s the biggest emitters were developed countries, and that is why they had the obligation of emissions’ cut under the Kyoto Protocol (first compromise period from 2008 to 2012). Nowadays, China is the biggest emitter and Brazil is the sixth16. As a consequence, emerging countries are already emerging powers in the climate regime, because they are part of the problem and obviously, also part of the solution. One fair illustration of that is the fact that China, India and Brazil together represent 72% of all the Clean Development Mechanisms projects17. Concerning Brazil, several reasons lead to the conclusion that it is a key player now. From a political point of view, Brazil is a regime promoter and has been presenting solutions and policies in the international talks. In the 15th Conference of the Parties, in Copenhagen, last December, Brazil announced its National Climate Plan and President Lula stated that Brazil was ready to be part of the solution to the political deadlock in the regime. The country announced voluntary measures of GHG cut, policies to reduce deforestation dramatically and political will to help finance international funds to fight climate change problems. Moreover, Brazil and President Lula took part in all the main talks to try to reach an international agreement in Denmark. In regard to technology, Brazil has been developing biofuels and dual-fuel engines, but also biotechnological crops and clean energy alternatives. In economic terms, as stated before, Brazil is an emerging power and its domestic market seems to be ready for the transition to a lower carbon economy, because there is still a lot to be built in terms of infrastructure, and Brazil can afford to pay and to adapt the best available technologies. So, if Brazil is an emerging power, how can it be analyzed through international relations theory? Starting with a critical analysis of Ian Rowlands’ work on IR theory and the climate change regime, his main conclusions will be applied to the Brazilian case. 15 The 1998 COP 4 took place in Buenos Aires, and Argentina had a short but prominent role in multilateral negotiations. For more details, see Viola, E. and Leis, H. “Governança Global Pós-Utópica, Meio Ambiente e Mudança Climática”. Paper prepared for the conference “De Rio a Johannesburgo – La transición hacia el desarollo sustenable: la perspectiva de América Latina y Caribe”, (PNUMA/INESEMARNAT/ Universidad Autônoma Metropolitana, México, 6-8 May 2002, mimeo, 27 p. 16 China is responsible for 23% of the world total (and growing around 5% a year), India and Russia are fourth and fifth respectively. The BRIC countries are all expected to raise their emissions in the near future close to the Chinese rates. 17 The CDM is one of the main mechanisms to promote GHG mitigation and international cooperation between the North and the South. http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0208/208544.pdf. 13/02/2010. 79 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau Rowlands used the four main research agendas in IR theory to test to what extent they could explain the climate regime formation and its outputs. The first one is realism plus neorealism. According to their premises, States are the main actors and it is possible that the powerful ones, the hegemons, change international structures in order to achieve political coordination, benevolently or malevolently. Among the questions that immediately arise, there is one relating to power that is essential. How to define power concerning environmental issues? Rowlands answers that military and economic power may be conceived as important. Military power because it can be used in case of armed conflict over natural resources. And economic power because of the possibility of economic sanctions, for example, in case of non-compliance with international law. In this sense, the Unites States is a “climate hegemon”, and may be the only one. The realists and neorealists can therefore explain why the regime was formed as it was, under strong influence from the US (Bodansky, 2001). It was the US that insisted on flexibility mechanisms, market instruments and technology to replace regulated emissions cut obligations, the clean development mechanism18, and even the list of six greenhouse gases that would be controlled within the regime (instead of only three proposed by the EU). Also, they could explain that the US defection would lead the regime to serious fragility, playing the role of a “veto coalition” as described by Porter and Brown (1996). In fact, it did happen when President Bush disengaged the US from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. From this viewpoint, it is easy to understand Viola’s proposal of a commitment of the powerful states to bring a quick solution to the global warming problem, as did the former Canadian Premier, Mr. Martin. We are not living in a world democracy and crucial matters are usually solved by a few powerful countries that impose rules on the others, such as nuclear non-proliferation. That happened as the G8 discussed the issue seriously since the 2005 Gleneagles meeting (Amorim, 2005)19. In their last meeting, the issue was still on their agenda, and despite the efforts of some like Angela Merkel to build consensus on mandatory policies, the US achieved to postpone obligations from the richest countries in the world, and the Europeans followed it. Nonetheless, focusing on the hegemon prevents the observer from analyzing the role of groups and informal governance to some extent. Also, these realist approaches do not help to identify emerging powers. Other countries also played important roles at some point, as “lead states”, notably Germany, Denmark, France and the Netherlands. During the negotiations many groups were formed, and serious split happened inside big traditional groups, such as the European Union (Hampson, 1989; Paterson and Grubb, 1992; Young, 1993). The OPEC 18 Starting from the Brazilian proposal of creating an international fund to help developing countries adapt and develop their economies at the same time. 19 In Dodds and Pippard, 2005. Foreword. Brazil, China, India and South Africa took part in the meeting. 80 countries were united, but not the G77/China, sometimes hijacked by OPEC20. The JUSCANZ was important in COP1 in Berlin and the Umbrella Group of JUSCANZ plus Russia and Norway in COP 4. So, the regime shows some points the realists cannot or do not focus on. The role played by smaller States, emerging countries and NGOs is one of them. Another one is related to the US having to accept the deal: 7% emissions’ cut, no mitigation obligations for developing countries, limited market mechanisms, and little attention to technological solutions. Hence, although the US tried to influence the climate change governance as much as possible, it was not able to do so. Thus, countries that were not economically powerful ended up playing roles, such as the AOSIS21 countries and Brazil22 or Argentina 23. However, we can firstly argue that climate change is not only an environmental issue24. In fact, it never really was. Climate change is also an economic, social and mainly security issue. Buzan et al. (1998) explain that there are traditionalists and modernists, and the former are enlarging the concept of security. Among modernists there are influential actors, starting with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Bill Clinton and others. Annan worked hard to explain to the international community that security matters were no longer only from military origin, and they were intertwined with other matters such as transnational crimes, money laundering, poverty, environmental degradation and so on25. There lies another limit of realism and neorealism, that is, the incapacity of analyzing emerging countries’ roles in multilateral negotiations, especially if they are not military powers or big threats to the global order. The second one would be taking climate change as a first order threat (Lacy, 2005)26. The second theory is historical materialism, although many different schools are put together here. Under their analysis, the North is the rich part of the world that dominates and exploits the poor Southern part, and the “dependency theory” is a good example of that. In other terms, in a capitalist world economy, the analysis of powerful actors better explain the patterns of international cooperation, which will favor the North in the first place. Rowlands states that among the top 20 Discussion group in IIASA, Austria, 22 June 2003. With the participation of Farhana Yamin, Adil Najam, Bradnee Chambers, Jessica Green, Ana Barros-Platiau, Danah Fisher, Veit Koster and others. 21 Alliance of Small Islands. 22 Brazil could play a much more important role because it has one of the lowest costs for CO2 mitigation at the moment (Viola, 2007). 23 Argentina played a short but important role when it hosted the Conference of the Parties (COP4). It declared that it was prepared to cut emissions, expecting to convince neighbors and developing countries in Asia and Africa to follow the way. What happened was that Brazil criticized profoundly the Argentinean initiative and the issue was avoided in subsequent meetings. 24 Buzan et al. takes environmental security issues as if they were only environmental. 25 His two reports on that matter are: “In Larger Freedom” and “A More Secure World”. 26 Mark Lacy uses John Mearsheimer’s work to criticize realism and determine its limits related to global warming. 81 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau five world companies there were two carmakers (General Motors and Ford) and two oil groups (Royal Dutch/Shell Group and Exxon) at the period of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations. This may explain the creation of the Global Climate Coalition, aiming at denouncing the economic costs and the scientific uncertainties in order to block the legal commitments (Bodansky, 2001). This priority to economic interests could also explain why there is such a huge dissonance between political discourse and action, that is, why it is so difficult to comply with international obligations in the national level. Also, it may help understand why the regime focused more on the South future profile than in the North present consumption patterns. Those are the main contributions of the historical materialism approach. According to Rowlands, there are also unambiguous limits to the historical materialism approach. Firstly, there are the prospects of new economic opportunities that it does not consider. Royal Dutch/Shell welcomed the Kyoto Protocol and then they left the Global Climate Coalition, along with BP/Amoco and Ford. Also, the groups and coalitions formed cut across the North/South divide, as it was explained above. Thirdly, emerging countries are not developed countries, but they are getting very far from the underdeveloped ones, so they need a new analytical category of their own. Finally, industrial interests are perhaps not well mobilized or their interests are not considered properly in IR theories yet. To complement these conclusions, it can be added that companies may be constrained by the market and consumer choices. Sometimes they have to make concessions in the short-term in order not to loose clients in the long-term. This may be one reason why the French carmakers did not sue California against the clean car act with Americans, Japanese and also Volkswagen industries27. Probably, they wanted to keep their image as the carmakers concerned with global climate change, considering that public opinion would not appreciate the lobbying of carmakers. The third grand theory set is the neoliberal institutionalism and it includes authors from Grotius and Kant to the functionalists and neo-functionalists. It also comprises different theories such as regimes, interdependence, and authors like Ernest Haas, Keohane, Nye, Young, Byers and Krasner. Rowlands uses Young’s “contractarian” and “constitutive” definitions (1997a, 276) to guide his reasoning. Contractarians believe actors have different identities and interests, so they are motivated to cooperate in the international level since they may gain from it, similar to Paterson’s cooperation under anarchy theory. States are seen as utility maximizers and cooperation is better developed if there are mutual interests, the shadow of the future is long and the number of players is low (Rowlands, 1995b, 21-22). He affirms that climate change does not lead to the tragedy of the commons 27 They formed the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers with other carmakers. See Central Valley ChryslerJeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon in the US. 82 (Hardin, 1968) because the impacts, benefits and costs vary in the global scale. Thus, different vulnerabilities to action and inaction lead to different perceptions and strategies. For instance, while the 37 AOSIS countries are struggling for their survival, Russia may benefit from warmer and shorter winters, in the case of global warming. However, this point does not correspond well to the Brazilian case. First of all, the country does not have a precise perception of its situation yet. Even after the last IPCC report in 2007, Brazilians still believe they are victims of an unfair regime. Using Hurrell’s and Woods’ (1999) terms, they say they were “rule-takers” and they are struggling to become “rule-makers” now. One proof of that would be the April 17, 2007 debate on climate change in the UN Security Council discussed below and the G8 summits, especially Gleneagles (2005) and Heiligedam (2007). In this sense, Brazilians are unconscious that they are extremely vulnerable to global warming (IPCC, 2007; Viola, Barros-Platiau and Leis, 2007). The Amazon region will be much drier, with savanna-like vegetation; the Northeast part of the continent will also be hotter and more arid; desertification will worsen, and so cropping lands nearby will be lost. Considering Brazil’s agricultural potentials, the losses in social and economic terms may be enormous. Since the country is not prepared for adaptation urgency measures, natural catastrophes entail serious impacts on the poorest populations. In sum, Brazil does not perceive itself as a potential victim of future global warming consequences, but only as a victim of the regime under construction. Its strategy was very far from AOSIS countries because it did not see the environmental and social risks it will face, insisting on its first assumption that the country is not historically responsible for GHG emissions as it is a young and less industrialized nation that has the right to development, since millions of Brazilians still live under the poverty line. So, contrary to Rowlands’ idea, it is not the right or scientifically-based perception that shapes the strategy of emerging countries. In fact, perceptions may be wrong and prevent cooperation to be developed. In the Brazilian case, it is the rational choice of getting the most from the regime and of assuring its right to development, with the support of other emerging countries. In fact, that is the main reason that keeps the BIC together. Nevertheless, the BIC is just an ephemeral gathering that meet often because they coordinate most of the G77/China 50 or so specific groups, but they do not have a precise strategy concerning climate talks yet, and maybe they will never do. Thus, Brazilian authorities do not even consider it a formal group. When Rowlands mentions the shadow of the future, he means that the longer an issue stays on the international agenda, the more countries will be apt to cooperate. This can also be discussed, because some issues may just be forgotten with time, or countries may feel discouraged to work for something when they feel they were already very unsuccessful. If it is true that some time is needed so that actors understand environmental matters and get more used to them, it can 83 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau also be argued that issues lasting too long may loose attention in the benefit of other freshly new issues on the agenda. This was the case with global climate change. Firstly, it took advantage of the ozone regime to get established, under the leadership of the US and then the European Union. But then it was left aside as the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq wars were treated. Hence, issues come and go to the negotiating table rather than just staying there for a longtime, and there are at least two different and somewhat autonomous tracks for negotiators (political and technical) and two different pathways to be taken (formal and informal). Thus, what does longtime mean? Does it really lead to more prepared diplomatic delegations? It does not seem to be the case in climate change negotiations, as emerging countries still not have modeling and scenarios to better understand what climate change will bring to them. That is the reason why they are negotiating on principles and nonobligations, and to a lesser extent, it contributes to explaining why they were not able to form a consolidated negotiation group. To finish with contractarians, they seem to be “cautiously optimistic” with the regime when stating that interests have played an important role, according to Rowlands. It is useful to explain the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol and the different targets negotiated. But it may be underlined that countries were more worried about their economic and technological interests in the short term than their social, environmental and security ones. This approach could also be used to explain why international cooperation results were so disappointing, since negotiating with almost two hundred countries could be no different from a minimum consensus pattern. Indeed, this approach may be very helpful to explain why Brazil took years to start cooperating seriously. If interests play a key role, and if countries believe their interest is to negotiate as a group, all their initiatives for new institutional arrangements can be understood. But this approach is no longer useful to explain why Brazil talked so much and did so little, especially concerning economic integration and climate change. Coming back to Rowlands’ analysis, from the constitutive perspective, the main idea is that institutions shape identities and interests, and the best example is the European Union, said to have “formative effects” (Laïdi, 2008). Levy, Keohane and Haas (1993) wrote that international institutions can increase government action and agenda setting; enhance a contractual environment and increase national capacities. Consequently, they provide bargaining forums, reduce transactional costs, create an iterated decision-making process, help monitoring, increase national environmental performances as well as national policies and increase national and international accountability. However, this does not seem to be the case for climate change, especially because of the fact that international institutions are fragile, notably the UN, 84 WMO and UNEP28. The second one is considered to be too technical and the third one is politically irrelevant now. Thus, they created the IPCC, which was strongly dominated by governments of the Northern countries (Schleicher, 2006). As it may already be clear, the role of multilateral institutions is very limited in this regime. Therefore, the constructivists do not help much because institutions are often weakened by the concerns related to national interests of all powerful countries, unexceptionally. The same may be stated for emerging countries now. The works of Abbot and Snidal (2000) are very helpful to develop this idea, especially the part on delegation and precision of multilateral norms. They assert that multilateral organizations are stronger if norms are precise and a high level of delegation is accepted, otherwise, there is no way an institution can work independently. Since precision and delegation are low, can we expect the emerging countries to change this picture? The answer tends to be negative. The last school is based on cognitive approaches. Rowlands states that they focus on how actors perceive, process, interpret and adapt to new information. So, they observe those actors that produce or control knowledge and how they act in the decision-making process. Their contribution is valuable since climate change issues are so complex and full of uncertainties. It is true that “scientists raised the profile” of climate change several times already since the 1970s, and that is clear each time after the IPCC publishes one of its reports. But do they really have a voice in this regime? Do emerging countries trust the knowledge produced in the North? Anyway, there are many challenges to this approach. Two of them are their blurred boundaries with historical materialists (Cox, 1977) and that the concept of power links them to realists and neorealists (Patterson, 1996a). As a result, Rowlands concludes that many authors use different research agendas at the same time, so it is difficult to come to conclusions. Nevertheless, the role of knowledge and information can also be overestimated in IR theory. In emerging countries in general, and Brazil in particular, all the recent information on global climate change has not influenced political actors significantly and even less short-term decisions. This is probably due to the fact that political principles are so consolidated and the diplomatic body is so closed that new information is accessible, but not always used immediately. As Brazil decided to stick to the principle that its development comes first, it will be hard for the country to make international concessions under the Kyoto Protocol new commitments period, starting in 2012. Thus, information on climate change is very complex, so opinion-makers need sometime to understand them and translate them to the public. 28 The climate change issues were taken from UNEP and WMO to New York, so these two institutions were weakened. 85 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau Another point, complementing the theoretical discussion above, is that environmental politics is not ruled by hegemonic fixed structures or balanceof-power structures. Different actors have been playing unexpected important roles, from the private sector, like the supermarkets that banned GM food; from carmakers producing more efficient cars; from politicians, scientists, singers, movie stars, religious leaders, indigenous leaders, NGOs and so on. In this sense, Rowlands summarizes the North-South divide in two debates about threats and vulnerabilities that are rather interesting. The first one is described as the “economic-liberal” with the myth of “techno-fix”. That is how some developed countries see environmental issues, but not all of them agree to that. Nordic countries and Germany, for example, are less convinced that technology is the best alternative to bring effective solutions to climate change, since rich countries and rich families from emerging countries cannot carry on their patterns of consumption and production eternally. In the same way, Robert Jackson and Georg Sorenson mention modernists (who believe in technology solutions) and “ecoradicals” (calling for dramatic changes in lifestyle and population control) according to Lacy (2005). The other is the periphery in opposition the center, very close to the materialism discussed above. This is definitely the discourse of some countries or some important diplomats, as the ECLA used to publish in South America. But again, it does not include all the countries from the South, since it no longer fits the emerging countries profiles, especially Brazil. In sum, the borders of the two approaches seem to be more and more blurred, and the UN system, as the main environmental governance system, contributes to that in a large extent. Final Remarks It may be concluded that Brazil is undoubtedly an emerging country in economic terms, but in environmental terms it was considered an emerging power even before President Lula was elected. This is due to three main reasons. The first one is the Brazilian political will to participate in global environmental governance since the end of the 1980’s and beginning of the 1990’s, and to the fact that this was not only President Collor’s decision at that time, but also Presidents Cardoso and Lula. It was totally supported by all successive ministers of Foreign Affairs. In sum, there was a clear institutional continuity that enabled Brazil to actively participate in the global environmental governance for more than two decades now. The second and the third ones are more related to the global order after the 1990’s. On the one hand, we are living in an era of multipolarity with no effective multilateralism, since the US and the EU are not able to assure the leadership of all matters in the agenda. Consequently, Brazil has more space to participate as an emerging country in issues like sustainable development and global climate change. On the other hand, emerging countries are trying to dialogue, although 86 informally, in order to establish common negotiating positions, as far as possible, in the BRIC, BIC, IBSA and so on. Hence, they are becoming more powerful in the G77/China, G20 and the UN pathways. As a consequence, the North-South divide is more and more blurred. Another important remark is that Brazil is not an emerging power in all the environmental regimes analyzed, despite the statements above. In some regimes, it still has to prepare a strategy of participation, such as water regimes, law of the sea, and biosafety. Therefore, Brazil has the environmental and agricultural resources to be a relevant actor, but this is not yet the case. In the forest talks, on the contrary, Brazil has long been a key player, but its participation was rather in the sense of avoiding the creation of an international regime exclusively for rainforests and contrary to its national interests. Nowadays, as the forest talks are also included in the climate change regime, Brazil may be considered as a key player and a “model exporter”, since its proposals are based on ambitious and rather successful national experiences, such as the Fundo Amazônia. In the giant biodiversity regime, Brazil has been an emerging power since the 1980’s preparation for the 1992 Earth Summit, but it has not been strong enough to promote further progress on the other regimes directly related to it, notably the ABS regime. In the latter, despite all their political efforts and their biological resources, Brazil is not a powerful actor, nor is India. A third remark is related to the climate change regime, in which Brazil can be considered more than just an emerging power. It is certainly a key player and a “model exporter”, considering energy, forest, biotechnology and agricultural recent policies, especially during President Lula’s rule. Also, Brazil has a dynamic market that allows the country to have voice in the talks about viable solutions to climate change mitigation and adaptation challenges, especially as it comes to financing and technology transfers. The only thing is that Brazil still needs to update its perception as a key player in this regime and accept more responsibilities in the context of the developed countries’ failure to honor their international obligations. In other words, the country seems to start to understand that only demanding and confronting the developed countries will not get the solutions implemented. A final remark concerns international relations theory. It can be noticed that all of the approaches show serious limits as the question of assessing emerging powers is put. For realists and neorealists, emerging powers are becoming rich countries, but not necessarily powerful yet, and they are extremely dependent on traditional powerful countries, that is, the US and the EU. The same may be argued for historical materialism approaches, since emerging powers have a transitory status and so they blurry most of the analytical categories for research. They do not belong to the North, but they are getting far away from the South too. For the liberal schools, explaining cooperation in environmental governance was always a challenge, and emerging powers make their work even more complicated. Finally, 87 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau the constructivists’ approaches seem to be more adapted to the emerging powers research agenda, because their perceptions and access to knowledge may be the key to assess their role in global environmental governance. Received August 20, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Bibliography ALTEMANI, H.; LESSA A.C., (2007) As Relações Internacionais do Brasil, Belo Horizonte: Saraiva. AMORIM, C.; REZENDE, S.; SILVA, M. (2006)»A Amazônia não está à venda». Folha de São Paulo, 17 de outubro. ABBOTT, K.; SNIDAL, D. (2000) “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance”. 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(2010). “Impasses e perspectivas da negociação climática global e mudanças na posição brasileira”. Cadernos do CINDES. www.cindesbrasil.org VOGLER, John. (2000). The global commons: Environmental and technological governance. 2nd Edition. Chichester: Wiley & Sons. YAMIN, F.; DEPLEDGE, J. (2004). The International Climate Change Regime: A guide to institutions and procedures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. YOUNG, O. (1992) “The effectiveness of international institutions”. In ROSENAU, James N. & CZEMPIEL, Ernst-Otto. Governance without government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 89 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional KEOHANE, R.; NYE, J. (2000). Governance in a Globalizing World, edited by Joseph Nye and John Donahue, Cambridge, Mass, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau Abstract Due to its recent economic success, Brazil is considered an emerging country, but is it an emerging power concerning global environmental governance? This article argues that although Brazil has a sui generis profile, it can only be considered an emerging power in some environmental regimes, such as global climate change. Thus, international relations theory needs more analytical instruments to assess the impact of emerging powers in global environmental governance. Resumo Por causa de seu recente sucesso econômico, o Brasil é considerado um país emergente. Isso vale também para a governança ambiental? Este artigo argumenta que, apesar de o Brasil ter um perfil sui generis, o País pode ser considerado uma potência emergente em alguns regimes ambientais, como o de mudanças climáticas. Portanto, as teorias de relações internacionais precisam de mais instrumentos analíticos para lidar com o impacto de potências emergentes na governança ambiental global. Key-words: Brazil; emerging power; environmental governance. Palavras-chave: Brasil; potências emergentes; governança ambiental. 90 Artigo Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Questões de segurança no governo Lula: da perspectiva reativa para a afirmativa Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa* Manuela Trindade Viana** Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 91-114 [2010] Introduction An analysis of continuities and changes in Brazilian foreign policy during Lula’s administration is only possible through careful observation of the two mandates under his power. This assertion stems from the fact that there was, during these eight years, a gradual process of structuring and consolidating the country’s foreign policy. In this sense, Lula’s foreign policy during 2006-2010 can only be read together with the structural modifications promoted during his first tenure1. This is valid for all the issues in the foreign policy agenda, but especially important for security. The gradual process mentioned above allowed a new and remarkable feature on Brazil’s foreign policy: the movement from a reactive to a more assertive approach towards security issues. Indeed, in Lula’s first mandate there was an emphasis on reacting to proposals related to terrorism presented by United States and also those discussed in the Organization of American States (OAS); in the second one, it is possible to identify a considerably active role as regards security issues, such as the deploy of Brazilian troops to join the stabilization mission in Haiti, the negotiations with Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) for hostage liberation, the mediation on the controversy on nuclear energy involving Iran, among others. It can be argued that, until Lula’s first administration, Brazil didn’t have a security policy at the regional level. Due to this “vacuum” left by * Professor of the Deparment of Political Science and of the Institute for International Relations of the University of São Paulo – USP, Brazil (rafaelvi@usp.br). ** Master’s Degree by the Department of Political Science of the University of São Paulo – USP, Brazil, and Researcher in the Center for International Relations at the same university. 1 This article passes briefly through the main points of inflection between Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s and Lula’s administration. For a more complete analysis regarding this matter, see: Villa; Viana (2008). 91 Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana Brazil, the initiative towards security issues in South America has been traditionally taken by the United States. Furthermore, Lula’s second mandate reveals a “worldlization” of the foreign policy agenda on security – in contrast with the regionalization that has characterized Brazil’s foreign policy in this area. Of course, the country’s involvement in debates, for instance, on Middle East security issues has always existed. Nevertheless, the proactive aspect in Brazil’s foreign policy constitutes the main feature that distinguishes Lula’s second mandate from the past administrations. Having these ideas as its fundamental base, this paper is structured in four sections. First, it deeply analyzes what we consider to be Brazil’s “reactive approach” towards security issues during Lula’s first mandate (2002-2006). The second and third sections focus on the two main elements in relation to which a more assertive approach can be identified: the expansion of the foreign policy agenda in terms of security towards global issues; and the innovative features through which Brazil’s security policy towards South America was exercised during Lula’s second mandate. The last section of this paper analyses the impacts of the elements mentioned above over Brazil’s relations with the United States. The reactive period Lula’s first mandate conserves, in general terms, the major characteristics that have prevailed since Itamar Franco’s administration (1992-1993)2 (Villa; Viana, 2008) a period known as “autonomy through integration”. This doctrine was essentially different from the one called “autonomy through distance”, attributed to Brazilian foreign policy from Ernesto Geisel’s (1974-1979) to José Sarney’s government (1985-1988). “Autonomy through distance” presented as its main pillars: i) the diversification of diplomatic and trade relations; ii) the stabilization of Brazil’s identity as a developing and Third World country, as well as the country’s intensive participation in international regimes related to these categories3 ; iii) the condemnation of international asymmetries in international trade, finance and nuclear regimes; and iv) the claim for dialogue among nations in the North-South axis instead of the East-West axis4. After Itamar Franco, foreign policy is used in a more systematic way in order to achieve development, an effort made through a model that combined autonomy of action before the international scenario with active participation 2 This position is not consensual: some analysts identify structural differences in Lula’s foreign policy, in comparison to the past governments. See, for example, Guilhon Alburquerque (2007) e Weintraub (2007). 3 For instance, Non-Aligned Movement and G-77 (which congregates developing countries). 4 For more information about “autonomy through distance” doctrine features, see: Sennes, 2003; Vizentini, 2003. 92 in international fora and diversification of external relations. This new doctrine was guided by an attempt to build an identity focused on Brazil’s continental proportions, which stressed regional integration as a new form of international insertion. Furthermore, “autonomy through participation” aimed at articulating the aspiration of being a global trader in the medium term with that of being a political global player in the long term. These goals were followed mainly by three means. First, the Third World activism that characterized previous governments was gradually substituted by a more positive approach towards international regimes, which meant an active participation in multilateral organizations such as World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nevertheless, in all of these fora, Brazil’s participation included an active critique about the asymmetries perpetrated by these regimes5. Secondly, Brazil built a more constructive agenda with United States, maintaining at the same time Brazilian foreign policy’s autonomy. This position can be illustrated by trade liberalization, privatizations of several governmental companies and the signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – denounced as unfair by Brazilian diplomacy since the 1960’s. Finally, in South America, Brazil gave priority to Mercosur as a special locus for reaffirming its regional leadership (Campos, 2000; Vigevani et al., 2004). This stage was privileged in Brazil’s strategy not only in regard to trade and political integration: for security matters, this is also valid. The security agenda during Lula’s first mandate gave continuity to the same guidelines performed by Brazilian foreign policy; specifically in terms of security issues, there were no wide ruptures, comparably to the previous administrations, towards some concerns arising within the continent. The security reactive agenda was outlined around three points: i) the position on the new architecture for security in the Americas; ii) the attempt to stabilize conflicts in some of the neighboring countries, especially Venezuela; iii) the denial to engage the war on terror approach in South American territory, stressing the need not to securitize regional problems that in fact had its roots derived from the social inequalities, poverty or domestic violence. The debate about a new security architecture of the inter-American system stemmed from the need to adjust hemispheric institutional design in order to combat threats which have a non-estate nature6. As for this point, Brazil reacted positively to new conceptual bases to think hemispheric security: the country 5 In WTO, for instance, Brazil articulated a coalition with developing countries, with the objective to enjoy a better position in the negotiations. In the UN Security Council, Brazil’s participation presented an emphasis on the need for redistributing seats among the Organization members so that it could include developing and least developed countries in its decision making process. Finally, a more intense participation in the IMF was seen as a good strategy to achieve better terms to the negotiation of the country’s debt. 6 These issues were analyzed in Villa, 1999. 93 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana accepted the concept of multidimensional security7 – as institutionalized by the OAS in 2003 – as well as the new role for regional armed forces. However, Brazil opposed the proposal presented by the US delegation, according to which Armed Forces and national police forces cooperated in the fight against drugs, terrorism and even migration. As regards South America, Brazil’s reaction aimed at avoiding that internal crisis escalating towards political instability in the regional sphere. Defined by Itamaraty’s discourse as “non-intervention without indifference” (Amorim, 2004) the role played by Brazil can be understood through concepts that entail democracy, political stability, regional security and economic integration, searching, at the same time, for a political initiative facing the United States. Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador – countries that went through political instability in 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively – were objects of Lula’s administration special attention. Brazilian diplomacy led the creation of the Friends of Venezuela Group, an initiative considered to be the first moment of audacity in Brazil’s foreign policy (Carvalho, 2003). Gathering the OAS, Chile, United States, Mexico, Portugal and Spain, the Friends of Venezuela Group facilitated the negotiation between diverging actors in May 2003 – more than a year after the coup attempt against Hugo Chávez, in April 2002, which triggered the political crisis in Venezuela. As for the Bolivian crisis, in October 2003, Lula’s Special Adviser on Foreign Policy, Marco Aurélio Garcia, played an important role in the negotiations that led to a political solution that resulted in the renouncement of the President Sanchez de Lozada. As regards the 2005 institutional crisis in Ecuador, Brazil’s participation was determinant in the negotiation of a diplomatic agreement that established the exile, in the Brazilian Embassy, of President Lucio Gutiérrez, who was then transferred to Brasilia by Brazilian Air Force airplanes. In respect to the adoption of the war on terror approach in South America, Brazil neither recognized the presence of terrorist groups in the region, nor accepted the denomination of some guerrillas as terrorist groups – despite US and Colombia’s pressures in this direction8. However, the denial to accept these approaches was 7 The Declaration on Security in the Americas resulting from the Special Conference on Security (OEA/ Ser.K/XXXVIII.CES/DEC.1/03 rev. 1), held in Mexico City in October 2003, recognizes that “states of the Hemisphere face both traditional threats to security and new threats, concerns, and other challenges that, in view of their complex characteristics, have meant that security is multidimensional in nature” (preamble). More specifically, “new threats, concerns, and other challenges are cross-cutting problems that require multifaceted responses by different national organizations and in some cases partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society all acting appropriately in accordance with democratic norms and principles, and constitutional provisions of each state. Many of the new threats, concerns, and other challenges to hemispheric security are transnational in nature and may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation” (4.k). Available at: <http://www.oas.org/en/sms/docs/DECLARATION%20SECURITY%20AMERICAS%20REV%20 1%20-%2028%20OCT%202003%20CE00339.pdf>. Access: 7 Aug. 2010. 8 It is worth mentioning that Barack Obama’s new national security strategy, launched on May 2010, abandoned the global war on terror doctrine. Despite defining Al-Qaeda as the main threat to United States security, the “Obama doctrine” defines American partnerships beyond United States traditional allies and includes countries such as China and India. 94 Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach not followed by an alternative proposition, leading to a vacuum of initiative in the region, which was historically filled by the United States – especially in the Andean countries. By the end of Lula’s first mandate, it was possible to notice that the complete rupture expected when he was elected did not happen. Instead, the president conducted foreign policy according to the same pillars that characterized the “autonomy through participation”. During Lula’s second mandate, the initial efforts to differentiate Brazil’s foreign policy resulted in the expansion of some differences, beyond the institutional and multilateral spheres. In this period, Brazil’s security foreign policy presented a more active approach while Lula’s administration took advantage of the initiatives both in global and regional multilateralism. Particularly, this approach was evident through Brazil’s claim of a UN Security Council permanent membership; in the proposal to create an autonomous regional defense council at Unasur; and in the technological modernization of Brazilian military forces. All of these actions were underlined by the search for political objectives under a regional label. Although the claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council does not constitute a new goal – it has been in Brazil’s foreign policy agenda since Itamar Franco’s government (1992-1993) –, Lula’s second mandate approach to this matter presents discontinuities in comparison to past administrations regarding the intensity and methods applied to accomplish this goal. Since 1992, Brazilian diplomats have emphasized the importance of implementing a reform in United Nations structure so that the organization can reflect the changes observed in power distribution in the international scenario. Assuming the existence of a different international order, Brazilian government has since then put the incorporation of new actors as an indispensable measure to maintain the efficiency and reliability of the United Nations. Put differently, this doctrine associated Brazil’s aspiration with the process of democratization of international relations, suggesting that the incorporation of Brazil as the developing world representative in the permanent group of countries in the Security Council would contribute to minimize the legitimacy deficit in this international organization (Silva, 2004). Despite essentially presenting elements of continuity in comparison to the doctrine established by previous governments, Lula’s foreign policy approach presented important discontinuities. Firstly, the reference on the democratization of international relations is as strong an idea as a political interest. Quoting Lula: “It is not enough to watch world events distantly and subordinately: we want our voice to be heard and respected. We are taking big steps on this direction”. (Silva, 2004) In this sense, the president and the diplomats explicitly communicate the 95 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The “worldlization” of Brazilian foreign policy Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana means applied in order to pursue what this administration considers the country’s political interests to be. A similar conduct was taken towards the announcements of Brazil’s regional and global preferences. Secondly, there is very strong belief that Brazil’s respectability throughout the world undergoes participation in the UN Security Council and that developing countries’ leaders are favorable to the Brazilian claim. This self-perception is reinforced by the presidential figure: “Our partners recognize that Brazil assumed its weight and importance in the community of nations”, affirms Lula (Silva, 2004). It is possible that Brazil’s relative power in the international arena is misrepresented according to developing countries perceptions. However, there is no doubt that these actions aiming at adequate means and ends have led to some novel aspects of Brazil’s foreign policy. First, the action through coalitions was one of the main methods applied by diplomats during Lula’s administration, a trend in which the claim for a seat in the Security Council also fits: Brazil led the articulation of G-4 (constituted by Brazil, Germany, Japan and India), whose members consider themselves potential occupants of a permanent seat in the Council. Even in the case of a negative result – after United States and China blocked the possibility of reform in the Council –, Brazil was supported by a considerable number of South American countries and some important medium powers, such as France, Russia, Spain and China. As the Chinese vice-minister recognized, “Brazil is the greatest developing country in the Western Hemisphere and we attribute a great importance to its role in regional and international issues (…) China is disposed to intensify its collaborations with the Brazilian part as regards the reform on the Security Council” (Trevisan, 2004, A10) Brazil’s efforts to participate on UN peace operations – notably in Haiti – can also be understood as a strategy circumscribed in the country’s aspiration of participating in the Council as a permanent member. It is relevant to underline that Brazil joined UN peace missions in East Timor and Angola during Cardoso’s governments. Nevertheless, the activism in the Haitian case reveals a more explicit way to aspire for a seat in that body9. The consequences of this more active involvement towards regional security issues can be seen as a paradox. On one side, there is the Brazilian perspective of a multipolar world with strengthened regional powers. Brazil’s aspiration of affirming its autonomy and neutralizing United States military goals in the regional sphere can also be understood in this involvement, especially after Plan Colombia, considered by Brazilian government to be the main responsible for the militarization observed in the Andean and Amazon regions. On the other side, sending troops to Haiti can be understood as a message to the United States that 9 As put in an article published in The Economist, “Brazil has long been a gentle and introverted giant, content to be a bystander on the world stage. Now that is changing”. Available at: <www.economist.com>. Access: 30 Oct 2009. 96 Brazil is able to share political and economic costs related to peace missions. This message is positive to the United States, since they are looking for partners with whom to share the costs of regional security. Anyway, Brazilian action is innovative – it can’t be forgotten that it refused to send troops to Haiti in the beginning of the 90s, when this country was facing a crisis. However, this action lacks some necessary legitimacy degree (Soares de Lima, 2006), having all the decision processes been concentrated on the Executive, especially on the Presidency and the Defense Ministry. Therefore, Lula’s multilateral action moves in the normative sphere through the re-affirmation of a discourse that can be summed up as follows: “be attentive to the need of those who are more vulnerable, defending a free, fair and egalitarian international trade, and democratization of deliberative instances. Our compromise with democracy and with popular participation is reflected in the purpose of working together to strengthen multilateralism, stimulating more transparent and legitimate forums, which are representative of international cooperation” (Amorim, 2004b). As regards these principles, it seems to exist no innovation, since diplomacy continues to have its traditional doctrinaire motivations: the pacifist discourse backed by negotiation and international intermediation as a way of resolving conflicts; and the re-affirmation of a juridicism that dates back to the 20th century. By adding to these two characteristics the democratization of the international system, in which prevails the existence of politically autonomous units, not subordinated to any superior, it is possible to understand why Lafer (2001) considers Brazil’s foreign policy to be “Grotian” . To sum up, if the plea for a permanent seat in the Security Council was already present in Cardoso’s administration (Amorim, 1994; Guimarães, 1999), it was manifested with greater intensity during Lula’s government. Moreover, the deployment of Brazilian troops and command forces in Haiti reveals the rising of a new actor in Brazil’s foreign policy on security: the Ministry of Defense. All of the activities in Haiti – from training and sending troops to the coordination of Brazilian military and civil personnel – are in charge of the Ministry of Defense. Recently, a cooperation agreement signed by United States’ Department of Defense and Brazil’s Ministry of Defense also reveals a greater participation of this latter Ministry in foreign policy on security10. This could mean that the conduction of Brazil’s foreign policy agenda on security is not anymore monopolized by Itamaraty. However, the most important income that derived from the emerging role of the Ministry of Defense was that global goals were associated to the goal of strengthening the national defense agencies, especially the Armed Forces and the construction of a collective and regional body on security. This idea can be 10 The content of the agreement is available at: <https://www.defesa.gov.br/mostra_materia.php?ID_ MATERIA=34008>. Access: 15 Aug. 2010. 97 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana accentuated if we singularize two measures taken by Lula’s administration which connected directly defense and security policies: the gradual modernization of national armed forces; and the proposal of creating a South American Defense Council. In September 2007, President Lula announced the creation of a working group which, under the direction of the Ministry of Defense and coordination of Mangabeira Unger, then Secretary of Strategic Affairs, would formulate guidelines for a modernization plan directed to the Armed Forces. The Strategic Plan of National Defense – or Plan to Accelerate Growth (PAC, in Portuguese) in Defense, as it became known in the media – takes into account three broad goals: i) to review defense strategies; ii) to reactivate the domestic arms industry; iii) to assure the autonomy of defense policy. Directly linked to these goals, the PAC in Defense aims at addressing the following concrete concerns: i) what are the best strategies for peacetimes and war; ii) how to organize the Armed Forces, operationally equipped with cutting-edge technologically; iii) how to reactivate the national industry of armaments accordingly to the autonomy in defense; iv) how to identify the Armed Forces with the nation, especially on the defense of borders in the Amazon as a priority, compulsory military service and social tasks; and v) how to establish lines for the Armed Forces in situations of maintenance of order and the rule of law. Additionally, it doesn’t seem plausible that the modernization project of Brazilian armed forces is derived from an analogous modernization ongoing in any neighboring country. Instead, Brazil’s main motivation seems to reside in the projection of its hemispheric and global role, that is, in the search for adequacy with the country’s status of emerging global and multidimensional actor – which include not only economic but also political and security aspects. “Brazil is wellpositioned to initiate a sustained arms buildup increasingly supported by its own domestic industries (…) The choice of the three finalist aircrafts – significantly, two are from NATO member states and one is from a state that might as well be – suggests something of essential importance about the way Brazil views its future. Despite shifting geopolitical realities around the world and its own rise to regional prominence over the next decade, Brazil does not appear to foresee a major conflict or even an adversarial relationship with the West” (Stratfor, 2008)11. The proposal presented by Brazilian Unasur delegation to create a regional body of defense can also be interpreted as a measure aligned with the country’s political goal towards the region. In this sense, the process of “South Americanization” could be understood as “an important leverage” to build up Brazil’s national development project (Monteiro, 2001, p. 2) in which “collective security complements national security,” (Idem, p. 4). As Medeiros points out, “The emerging question is: to what extent is regional integration as proposed by 11 This note refers to an international bidding process referring the purchase of military aircrafts by the Brazilian Air Force 98 Brazil an end in itself (i.e., an aim to promote the interests of the whole region) – or is it a means to achieve the objectives of Brazilian foreign policy? (Medeiros, 2010, p. 175) This reflection becomes more striking when one observes that, especially in Lula’s second mandate, the country adopts a foreign security policy with a more incisive character. Two events can be cited in this direction. Firstly, the South American Defense Council could be seen as an instrument of collective defense. The idea is considered to be strategic for Brazil’s future in the region, according to the Presidency’s Center for Strategic Affairs (Núcleo de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República – NAE, in Portuguese). Secondly, the Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim’s, campaign throughout South America, at the end of 2007, to promote the establishment of a regional collective defense body (Medeiros, ibid., p. 176). More recently, one of the steps forward taken by Brazilian diplomacy on security issues was the recent mediation played by Brazil and Turkey on an agreement with Iran. On May 2010, the three countries signed a document – known as the Tehran Declaration – through which the Iranian government committed itself to send 1,2 ton of Uranium to Turkey, where the material would be enriched and sent back to Tehran in order to be applied to medical research. The agreement represented an effort of Brazilian diplomacy to avoid the renewal of sanctions towards that Persian country in the UN Security Council. However, the initiative can also be interpreted as an attempt to leap further towards international recognition of Brazil’s capability to build dialogues on hard topics on the world security agenda and, in this sense, to advance on its quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Despite the UN Security Council’s refusal to accept the agreement as a confidence building move, it is worth saying that it was the first time that a developing country assumed a proactive position in core negotiations on world security and stability. South America: still on the top, but with a different emphasis South America has always been on the top of Brazil’s foreign policy agenda (Almeida, 2008; Bandeira, 2006; Onuki, 2006). Indeed, the country has always seen the region as an area of its natural influence, given its proportions on territory, population and economy (Bandeira, 2006). Nevertheless, Brazilian government’s main efforts were more often directed to intraregional trade relations. As for the political dialogues, these rarely evoked the multilateral coordination between South American countries in security matters. Moreover, the predominant approach towards security issues was characterized by bilateral geometries and by a reactive position. It can also be argued that United States influence in some of South American countries – notably Colombia and Peru – favored a more militarized treatment 99 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana towards some of the problems faced by these countries. The most evident example can be found in anti-drug policies led by the United States in Andean countries. Indeed, Plan Colombia – considered to be the highlight of American foreign policy to fight drug production – has presented an unequivocal solution to the problem: the military one. The securitization of the drug problem was gradually deepened and culminated with the creation of battalions specialized on assuring the success of fumigation operations in Colombia. Even US involvement with the Colombian armed conflict was read through the narcotized and securitized lenses that characterized American foreign policy towards the region12. In this context, Lula’s administration represents a watershed regarding the promotion of an approach based on pillars different from the bilateral-reactivemilitarized tripod prevailing in the previous period. An emblematic initiative in this sense is the creation of Union of South American Nations (Unasur, in Spanish), in 2008. Stemmed from a Brazilian proposal, the Unasur project resulted from numerous summits13 involving South American chiefs of State and government representatives. The initiative was formalized in the Cuzco Declaration (December 8th, 2004), a document in which the participants affirmed their determination to gradually build a South American identity and citizenship as well as to develop a regional locus of integration in political, economical, social, cultural and environmental issues, besides its emphasis on infrastructure as a channel to reduce asymmetries among the countries of the region. The project was then temporarily called as South American Community of States (CASA, in Spanish), until the Isla Margarita Summit (Venezuela), in 2007, when it was renamed Unasur. Despite the modifications on the initial draft, its main innovative traits remained intact: i) rupture with the bilateralism that has prevailed up to that moment in South American countries intra-regional relations; and ii) rupture with the priority given to trade in previous integration processes developed within the region. These two characteristics are directly related to the approach given to security issues by Lula’s administration, especially after his second mandate (2006-2010). Firstly, Unasur is essentially a multilateral project, an aspect which is reinforced in its constitutive treaty: “[Unasur is seen as a] decisive step towards the strengthening of multilateralism and the force of law in international relations, in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and fair world” (Tratado Constitutivo da Unasul, Preâmbulo). 12 For more information, see: Viana, 2009. 13 The first dialogue that promoted a closer cooperation between South American countries happened in 2000, at the first Summit of South American Presidents, in Brasilia (Brazil). It is worth mentioning that this attempt to approximate South American leaders happened in a context of regional apprehension because of controversies surrounding Plan Colombia. On the third summit, the participants of Cuzco Summit (Ecuador, 2004) decided to create the South American Community of States (CASA). From 2000 to 2008 there were seven summits of South American presidents. 100 It was the first time that an institutional and multilateral initiative was launched in South America. Thus, with its 12 State members14, Unasur represents a rupture with the bilateralism or unilateralism that has since then characterized the relations between the governments of the region. Furthermore, the emerging South American bloc constituted a multilateral project which, for the first time, did not privilege the trade agenda among its members. Among the multiple goals upon which Unasur is structured15, three of them open room for debates related to security issues: i) to strengthen the political dialogue between State members, aiming to assure a coordination space in order to reinforce South American integration and Unasur’s participation in the international scenario; ii) to stimulate the coordination between South American States’ specialized agencies, respecting international norms, with the objective of strengthening the fight against terrorism, corruption, “the world problem of drugs”, human trafficking, weapons traffic, transnational organized crime and other threats, as well as to address disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear and massive destruction weapons and mines removal; and iii) to exchange information and experience in defense matters. Some elements are noteworthy on this excerpt. First of all, it seems plausible to argue that the choice for the terms “the world problem of drugs” reveals a South American historical claim to a broader understanding of the fight against drugs. Indeed, many governments in the region – especially those whose international image has been affected by this problematic – have protested against the supplyside-approach16 underlying developed United States policies to combat the problem of drugs, that is, the idea that the most efficient way to fight it is to eradicate the problem on the source axis, not on the demand one. South American presidents have insisted that the responsibility on the existence of narcotraffic lies also on those countries whose citizens largely consume drugs. Thus, the emphasis on the drug problem as a “world problem” must be read in this context. Another interesting aspect related to the goals highlighted above is the formalization of the cooperation in defense matters between South American States. This is an ongoing practice in some countries of the region, notably Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, initiatives which were also intensified during Lula’s mandate. Brazil’s Federal Police has promoted joint operations with neighboring countries’ police forces to fight organized crime, often relying on the United States support as regards logistics, personnel and finance. In early 14 UNASUR members are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela. 15 Unasur’s Constitutive Treaty presents 21 goals for the integration project, which include economical, political, social and cultural spheres. These are specified in the second and third articles of the above mentioned treaty, available at: <www.integracionsur.com/sudamerica/TratadoUnasurBrasil08.pdf>. Access: August 9th, 2010. 16 To see how this approach was used by United States in its anti-drug policy, visit the Office of National Drug Control Policy website, at: <http://www.ondcp.gov/policy/ndcs.html>. Access: 14 Aug. 2010. 101 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana 2006, there were nine operations17 along the boundaries with other countries nearby the Amazon forest. Additionally, through the establishment of the Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM) in 2001, which includes surveillance and alarm units, the Brazilian government shared data collected by the system18 with Colombia, so that this country could expand its military, police and environmental control over the Amazon region (Uriguen, 2005, p. 182; Guzzi, op. cit). Similar measures were also taken towards Peru and Ecuador with whom Brazil signed military cooperation agreements, which a schedule of annual meetings between the Parties. As regards security, there is another interesting aspect in the process of consolidating Unasur. A careful analysis of the documents on the initial period of South American integration reveals that there was an attempt to associate the emphasis on poverty and social inequality eradication with the de-securitization of some problems faced by the countries in the region. More specifically, the documents often invoked the terms “citizen security” to refer to the need for States to deliver better life conditions and economic development to their citizens. This development is here broadly understood, involving income fair and balanced distribution, access to education, promotion to social inclusion and cohesion, as well as the environmental protection19. After an inter-ministerial meeting in 2005, involving Ministries of Justice, Defense and others in charge of issues related to this concept of security, South American leaders recognized that “social inequality is one of the causes of violence and insecurity in South America, at the same time that the latter hampers better levels of social equality” (Declaration on Citizen Security in South America, 2005, preamble). Regardless of the attempt to formalize regional cooperation on a new approach towards security, the term “citizen security” was gradually removed from the official documents, which may 17 These are COBRA and CRAF operations, on the border with Colombia; PEBRE (Peru); and VEBRA (Venezuela). Besides these, in the regions defined as a second priority, the operations performed were: GUISU (Guyana and Suriname); BRABO (Bolivia); “Ribeirinho”, along all Amazon border; Alliance (Paraguay); and the Southern Cone (Argentina and Uruguay). 18 Seeking to respond to a challenge identified by surveillance systems data – according to which most of the drug entering Brazil was carried by small planes –, the government approved, through the Decree N. 5.144/2004, the Destruction Shot Law (Lei do Tiro de Destruição, in Portuguese, which regulates a 1988 law on aircrafts intercepting in Brazilian aerial space, in case these are suspected to be carrying illegal drugs into the country. The previous law – Law N. 9.614/1998 – determined that “Once legally specified means of coercion are exhausted, the aircraft will be classified as hostile, thus subjected to destruction”. The Decree approved in 2004 specifies concepts such as “means of coercion”, hostile aircraft” and “destruction”. The full content of the Decree N. 5.144 is available at: <https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2004/ Decreto/D5144.htm>. Access: 07 Aug. 2010. 19 See: Declaração de Ayacucho (available at: <http://casa.mre.gov.br/documentos/reuniao-presidencial-decusco/declaracao-de-ayacucho/>; access: 14 Aug. 2010); Declaração Presidencial e Agenda Prioritária (available at: <http://casa.mre.gov.br/documentos/i-reuniao-de-chefes-de-estado/declaracao-presidencial-e-agendaprioritaria>; access: 14 Aug. 2010) and Declaração sobre Segurança Cidadã na América do Sul (available at: <http://casa.mre.gov.br/documentos/i-reuniao-de-chefes-de-estado/declaracao-sobre-seguranca-cidada-naamerica-do-sul>; access: 14 Aug. 2010). 102 illustrate the difficulty to find a common ground on de-securitization matters between South American countries, as well as the lack of priority of this approach in some of the foreign policy agendas. Despite the broad range of themes on Unasur’s scope, it can be argued that the South American integration project dedicated a privileged space for defense and security issues. More specifically, beside the four-body institutional structure20 approved in the final version of the bloc’s constitutive treaty, State members accepted, in 2008, Brazil’s proposal to create the South American Defense Council (CDS, in Spanish). The objective of the new institution is to promote the cooperation between Unasur members in security issues, the coordination on joint defense policies, the exchange of armed forces personnel, the joint participation on United Nations peace operations, among others. Therefore, the CDS does not assume a conventional military alliance between South American countries such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the objective of clarifying the traits that differentiate CDS from past international initiatives on security, Brazil’s Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, visited South American countries before the Brasilia Summit (May 2008). According to the Brazilian government, a forum specifically dedicated to defense and security matters in the region could avoid crises such as the one that involved Colombia and Ecuador in 2008. Moreover, CDS’s institutional deepening could contribute to defend the region from potential external interventions. Nevertheless, South American leaderships did not reach a consensus on that occasion: the Brazilian proposition was only immediately accepted by Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela and – with some reservations – by Uruguay. Beside the disagreement between Andean countries on the decision-making procedures to be incorporated to the Council, Colombia also insisted that OAS constituted the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to regional security. Despite the approval of the CDS by Unasur’s members on December 2008, the possibility that the proposal is interpreted by South American countries as an instrument for Brazil’s projection may become an obstacle for consolidating the CDS. This defense body could certainly improve Brazilian military capability. However, being a mechanism of defense cooperation, it doesn’t seem plausible to hold that the CDS could induce regional suspicion as regards Brazil’s motivations, or that it could trigger an arms race in South America (Amaral, 2004, p. 32). Anyhow, Unasur’s CDS fills a vacuum related to autonomous initiatives towards South America security issues, in which United States usually takes the lead (Hirst, 2003; Villa, 2007). Its most distinguishing trait is the quest for multilateral solutions to conflicts in the region, which downplays unilateral measures as well as the role of OAS in South American security issues, considered 20 The South American bloc is composed by the Chiefs of State and Government Council (UNASUR’s main decision body); the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council; the Delegates Council; and the General Secretariat. 103 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana to “not sufficient for the current challenges and threats presented in the continent” (Cepik, 2009, p. 230). The mediation played at the end of 2008 by Unasur on the Bolivian crisis involved Evo Morales’ administration and indigenous groups on one side, and governors of Eastern provinces on the other. The conflict threatened to trigger a conflict escalation and, then, the destabilization of Bolivia’s political scenario. As put by Emilio Mendez do Valle (2008), Unasur’s mediation meant, firstly, that South American countries could formulate solutions through their own means, that is, without United States mediation; secondly, the strong support to Morales and to the democracy on the country represented a joint South American initiative towards Andean countries. To Brazil, this meant an assertive reaction to the critique that its security policy – as well as the radius of this one – is limited to Mercosur (Pagliari, 2009). Despite the optimism surrounding Unasur, the region still faces the persistence of bilateral problems between some of its members – for instance, those involving Colombia and Ecuador, or Venezuela and Colombia. One of the first challenges faced by the South American bloc consists of the close relations between Colombia and the United States. The history and nature of these relations conflict directly with one of the main motivations underlying the CDS: the autonomous conduction of South American security agenda. The dynamics of the presidential meeting in Bariloche (Argentina), on August 2009, was affected by the announcement made by Colombian government of a cooperation agreement with the United States through which Bogotá authorized American troop presence in seven military bases in the Andean country. The initiative was justified as a continuity of the bilateral efforts to fight narcotraffic and terrorism in the Andean region, as well as a necessary measure face the removal of American troops from Manta military base (Ecuador). Brazil21 and Venezuela critiques considered the measure a threat to regional stability, once it could result in the permanent presence of US troops in the region. Moreover, Brazil accused the agreement of being incompatible with the Colombian government’s declarations that the guerrillas were significantly weakened during Uribe’s administration. During the discussions, South American Presidents pressured Colombia to reveal the content of the agreement – which had not been signed at the time – as well as to accept a proposal related to transparency on cooperation in military matters. However, divergences observed in the Bariloche presidential summit were not reflected in the declaration finally approved by all Unasur members. This was not the first occasion in which Colombia was considerably isolated in multilateral talks with its South American neighbors. Indeed, the military aspect of United States presence in Colombia constitutes a constant topic of concern 21 One of these military bases is about 50km distant from the boundaries with the region known as “Cabeça de Cachorro”, on Amazon Northwest. 104 towards the armed conflict faced by the Andean country. Traditionally, Brazil sustains that political or violent conflict in South America countries should be interpreted as a social-rooted problem. As a conflict stemmed from development gaps and social and political inequality, Brazil holds that its resolution can’t be found in the military sphere22. If the two declarations of the CDS23 suggest some advances on the intraregional cooperation in defense matters – such as data disclosure and transparency on the conduction of military exercises –, the South American Council was put to the test on matters of its members’ relations with extra-regional countries, as it was the case of the agreement signed by the United States and Colombia. Indeed, Unasur’s constitutive treaty and CSN’s statute reveal a gap in respect to how the previous sub-regional integration projects – namely, Community of Andean Nations (CAN, in Spanish) and Mercosur – and the repertoire of bilateral cooperation agreements with non-South American countries will be articulated inside Unasur’s structure. These are challenges with which the South American bloc still has to handle, given the divergences in security agenda among some of its members. For Brazil Unasur is also a bridge for the cooperation with neighboring countries, especially the Bolivian case. Vaz (2002) defends that the current peculiarity of the security relations among South American countries is given by “the fact that potentials threats don’t emanate from state policies”. But if any moment there was possibility what Brazilian interest in matters of security would be threatened by other South American state, that happened in the episode that embraces the (re) nationalization of gas and petroleum by the Evo Morales government on May 1st 2006. That was the most polemic and defensive moment within South America exactly because it involved a problem of energetic security. Brazil is the first client of the Bolivian gas (having imported more than 30 million cubic feet from Bolivia in 2006). On the other side, the Brazilian company, Petrobras– Brazil’s Petroleum – was the main investor in these Bolivian gas and oil sectors and all of the refineries were operated by Petrobras. But the principal impact derived from that fact is that part of the Brazilian industry had changed its technological matrix in order to adequate this to the consumption of natural 22 Regardless of the consideration that the Colombian crisis is a matter of domestic nature, the large boundary that Brazil shares with Colombia has stimulated some concerns about the resulting scenario of offensive military operations led by Uribe’s administration in the Colombian Amazon forest. Particularly, Brazil fears that guerrillas can use the Brazilian territory as a base for operations or temporal refuge to escape from Colombian army’s offensive. Brazil is also concerned with the possibility that drug traffic groups use Brazilian territory in order to expand coca-leaf crops or to install cocaine processing labs. In this regard, the Federal Police of Brazil decided to promote joint operations with neighbor countries’ police forces to fight organized crime. 23 See Santiago Declaration (available at: <http://www.cdsunasur.org/es/consejo-de-defensa-suramericano/ documentos-oficiales/57-espanol/161-declaracion-de-santiago-de-chile-2009>; access: 15 Aug. 2010) and Quito Declaration (available at: <http://www.cdsunasur.org/es/consejo-de-defensa-suramericano/ documentos-oficiales/57-espanol/150-reunion-extraordinaria-de-ministros-de-relaciones-exteriores-y-dedefensa-de-la-unasur>; access: 15 Aug. 2010). 105 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana gas. The episode involving the Bolivian government also arose more problems by the Brazilian government because it meant the participation of other regional actors with political projects that, at first sight, seemed to be competing with Brazil. Especially the Brazilian sectors, inside and out of the government, saw in the episodes that followed the Bolivian nationalization a strong influence of the Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, as well as the Venezuelan oil company PDVSA – Venezuela’s Petroleum. Despite the exaggeration in the affirmation of Chávez’s regional leadership potential, it is true that his administration took the regional leading role from Brazil, contributing to an uncomfortable diplomatic atmosphere between both countries24. However, this crisis involving Bolivia has also revealed that old negative images, as that of Brazilian sub-imperialism, are still strong in the imagery of nationalist sectors in South American countries. However, the Brazilian nationalistic wave erected by the Bolivian nationalization accused Lula’s administration of not being firm in defense of the national interest and Petrobras’ interests in Bolivia; Lula’s government maintained one moderated position and continued to manage the situation inside the boundaries of the diplomatic treatment. The main example of that moderate position was the delay of some military maneuvers that the Brazilian army had scheduled exactly for the weeks when the nationalization happened. The rationale of the Brazilian government seems to have been action in a pragmatic way, so that the process of integration would be preserved and, in the medium range, could have accommodated Brazil’s, the Petrobras’s and the Bolivian government’s interests. That in fact happened when the Petrobras signed an agreement of compensation by the investments that Brazilian companies, all in the infra-structure sector, like refineries, made in Bolivia since 1996. At the same time, negotiations on new Brazilian investments were retaken25. Bolivia, on the other hand, also brought to Unasur’s multilateralism its first diplomatic victory when, in the end of 2008, the new institution avoided escalation and greater instability of Morales’s government. Reinforcing democracy, Unasur avoided a new delay in the process of regional integration26. “As a lesson 24 This major initiative drives of the Venezuelan government was manifested under, at least, two aspects: the purchase of public securities of Argentina’s and Ecuador’s external debts; and the polemical proposal of building a South American pipeline whose extension would be from the South of Venezuela until Patagonia (Argentina). On the other side, addressing the Brazilian Congress, Chancellor Celso Amorim expressed his displeasure with Venezuela’s behavior during the nationalization of the Bolivian gas. 25 On this matter, check: “Brasil deverá anunciar a retomada de investimentos na Bolívia, available at: http:// tv2.rtp.pt/noticias/?article=90184&visual=3&layout=10. Access on 08/15/2010. 26 In Morales’s government the conflict had its starting point in the claim of the Bolivian Eastern provinces of managing of autonomous way the resources that derived the exploration and commerce of the gas and petroleum. As it is well known in the Eastern provinces of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Sucre and Tarija concentrate greater dynamism of the Bolivian economy because these provinces are the producers of gas and petroleum. Thus it is very common amid local elites according to claim to their provinces a huge part of Bolivian welfare and, therefore, the Bolivian East would have more rights from the profits that are derived from the exploration of gas and oil. This idea is rejected both by Morales administration and by poorest 106 from experience, the agility of the South America reaction signaled to others countries that South America would not accept any separatism , as well as any external intervention in the continent” (Cepik, 2009, p. 238). In others words, Unasur gave an autonomous answer within South America’s security complex, addressing a problem whose dynamics is internal to that complex. For countries like Brazil and Argentina the solution through Unasur was an excellent result in political terms and in security terms. In the case, mainly for Brazil, the success of Unasur’s mediation passed the first test, and confirmed its conviction according to which the process of regional integration needs multilateral mechanism to be speedily accessed in particular moments of crisis which threaten the process of integration. In the second case, because Brazil (and Argetina too) depends so much on the supply of the Bolivian gas, national interest was delivered from a collective initiative. It is necessary to remember that the rebel groups in the Bolivian Eastern provinces in a given moment began to attack the gas infra-structure, which affected production and supply. Partnership and dispute involving the United States: impacts of an assertive approach Studies on American security policy towards Latin America agree that this region does not figure as a strategic priority to United States interests (see Vilas, 2005; Bonilla, 2004; Messari, 2004). In general, this assertion is correct but it is important to mention that it neglects one important point: although, since the Cold War, South America is not as relevant in strategic terms as other regions – such as the Middle East, Western Europe and Asia –, the United States has kept a coherent security policy for the region27. This is possible due to a solid consensus among Democrats and Republicans that guarantees the continuity of goals At the same time, differently from the past, now the United States has to deal with threats of a distinct nature in the region: communist states, parties or movements are not anymore perceived as actual threats, but actors and processes such as drug traffickers, migration, political instability, weapons traffic, money laundry, terrorism – all of them of non-estate nature. social groups (and their organizations), which claim that that the resources must be managed and distributed broadly in the Bolivian state, beside the State would have the control over supplies. The top point of this polarization came in September 2008, when the governors of the these provinces, all opposition, stimulated local groups to violent actions against indigenous groups and gas infra-structure that resulted in more of two dozen of deaths, mainly between indigenous and peasant groups. By fearing the escalation of the conflict, Unasur called for an emergency meeting, held in Santiago de Chile, on September 15th. The strong support and pressures from Unasur to the Morales government and the internal democratic process were decisive to stabilize and to pace, at least temporarily, the Bolivian political conflict. 27 Plan Colombia, the allocation of military bases, anti-drug policies and anti-terrorist initiatives are some of the measures that validate this assumption. 107 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana In this sense, September eleven has presented impacts over the security policy towards South America. Indeed, one important change was the emergence of conceptual and political changes in the way American decision-makers perceived the relation between threat and terrorism. Particularly, the United States global strategy after September eleven propelled a conceptual and material overlap between the war against narcotraffic and the war against terrorism – which was strongly supported by Álvaro Uribe’s administration. Therefore, from the conceptual and practical perspective, the Colombian guerrilla, as well as the paramilitaries, became synonymous of terrorism (Villa, 2007). Brazilian government and its diplomacy diverged from the Colombian and American approach towards guerrilla groups and decided not to consider these armed groups as terrorists, fearing this association could block any possibility of demobilization negotiations. Instead, Brazil offered to participate as a mediator of peace talks, if invited by the government of Colombia. However, this call was never made, so Brazil had no active participation in negotiation processes (Hoffmeister 2003). Another aspect that was subjected to disagreement between Brazil and United States particularly regards the “new architecture of inter-American system” in order to combat threats which have a non-estate nature. One of the first steps towards this new system was the institutionalization of the Conference of Ministers of Defense, in 1995. On the first meeting, the US delegation presented as one of its objectives the wish that South American countries’ Armed Forces cooperated with their national police forces to combat coca crops and other perceptions of non-territorial threats, terrorism and even migration. The decision to associate Armed Forces and Police in the fight against drug traffic has not been consensual among most of South American countries. Brazil, for example, accepts the concept of multidimensional security28 – as institutionalized by the OAS in 2003 – as well as the new role for regional armed forces, but it disagrees with the United States on the idea that those should be used primarily to combat threats as drug traffic and terrorism. The Sixth Conference of Ministers of Defense (2004), held in Quito (Ecuador), exposed the tensions between these two perspectives. Especially due to Brazilian pressure, the meeting, which aimed at formulating a type of security 28 The Declaration on Security in the Americas resulting from the Special Conference on Security (OEA/ Ser.K/XXXVIII.CES/DEC.1/03 rev. 1), held in Mexico City in October 2003, recognizes that “states of the Hemisphere face both traditional threats to security and new threats, concerns, and other challenges that, in view of their complex characteristics, have meant that security is multidimensional in nature” (preamble). More specifically, “new threats, concerns, and other challenges are cross-cutting problems that require multifaceted responses by different national organizations and in some cases partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society all acting appropriately in accordance with democratic norms and principles, and constitutional provisions of each state. Many of the new threats, concerns, and other challenges to hemispheric security are transnational in nature and may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation” (4.k). Available at: <http://www.oas.org/en/sms/docs/DECLARATION%20SECURITY%20AMERICAS%20REV%20 1%20-%2028%20OCT%202003%20CE00339.pdf>. Access: 7 Aug. 2010. 108 architecture for the continent, culminated with the rejection, by most of the participant countries, of the proposition that the Armed Forces were turned into a security agency, with police functions (Guzzi, op., cit, 2007, p. 43) It is noteworthy that the United States proposal may have been motivated not only by changes in perception of threats since the end of the Cold War, but also by the anti drug policies implemented in Bolivia and Peru during the 1990s and in Colombia since 1980s (Thoumi, 2003). In these countries, the illegal production of drugs has been fought both by security agencies (police) and defense agencies (mainly the army). Since late 1990s, however, the case of Colombia experienced a more dramatic change in this direction, especially as regards the involvement of military personnel with security issues (Thoumi, 2002; Viana, 2009). This approach was gradually materialized through United States narcotized foreign policy towards Colombia (Crandall, 2002) and culminated with the approval of Plan Colombia, a package of US$ 1,2 billion implemented in 1999. Initially thought by President Pastrana as a Colombian Marshall Plan, the version and budget finally approved by American Congress directed 80% of the resources – until now, approximately US$ 3,8 billions – to intelligence, training, personnel, arms and equipments dedicated to combat drug traffic in Colombia (Isacson, 2006). Brazil’s reservations towards Plan Colombia are related to the emphasis on military strategy to solve the drug problem and the protracted conflict in the Andean country. Expressed since Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration, these objections to Plan Colombia sustained the thesis that the United States policy may have spill over effects on other South American countries, that is, the execution of Plan Colombia could result not only in the displacement of drug crops, but also of the refining activities (Hofmeister, 2003, p. 51). Moreover, “the strength of the positions of the United States implies obstacles to the project of South American integration promoted by Brazil” (Castro, 2003, pp. 69-70). The idea that the strengthening of American presence in Colombia could represent a precedent for United States military engagement in South America was stressed with the installation of seven United States military bases in Colombia, announced in 2009. The cooperation agreement signed between these two countries was seen as an alternative to the withdrawal of bases from Panama (Howard air force base) in 1999, from Puerto Rico (Vieques naval base) in 2003 and from Ecuador (Manta air force base) in 2009. United States removal from these countries demanded that its Department of Defense sought, through the Southern Command, alternatives for American military presence in the region not only to monitor the Caribbean drug transit zone and the production area (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru), but also to support United States war on terror. Moreover, it can be argued that the United States took advantage of the absence, of regional security initiatives from the main states in the region. The Paraguayan Congress approval to the temporary allocation of United States troops can also be interpreted as a result of the security and defense vacuum, 109 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana considering Mercosur main members’ omission in relation to the perception of threats in the region known as Triple Border – a reference to the geographical limits between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (Flores, 2005/2006, p. 37). In this regard, the negotiations aiming at the allocation of troops in Paraguay and Peru were responded by Brazil and Argentina through an outline of some military measures by the end of 2006. However, it is important to mention that there were some security issues towards which Brazilian and American governments agreed. Interestingly, former president Cardoso (1994-2002) shared with the United States the perception that drug trafficking and weapon smuggling “posed a threat to national sovereignty”. This announcement, made in 1996, as aligned with the bilateral Agreement to Combat Drug Trafficking, signed in April 1995, which launched a financial and technical cooperation between United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Brazil’s Federal Police (Martins Filho, 1999). During this period – which we consider to be the “reactive” phase of Brazilian foreign policy of Lula’s administration –, there were other moments of cooperation between the two countries, especially involving the Triple Border. Once identifying threats related to money laundry in this region, the United States – with Argentinean support – has suggested that Brazil established a regime to regulate financial and bank operations in the Triple Border. After 9/11, the suspects towards the possibility of terrorist groups’ activities in the region – added to the perception that they were not being carefully guarded by the police and intelligence agencies of the countries comprehended in the Triple Border – were accentuated. Thus, the United States State Department announced, in March 2006, that the Agency of Immigration and Customs Inspection would join the Argentinean, Brazilian and Paraguayan governments in order to combat the money laundry and other financial crimes in the Triple Border Area. Moreover, the State Department associated this region to radical Muslim groups funding, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, link assumed to date back to July 1994, when there was a terrorist attack against the Mutual Israeli Argentina Association (AMIA, in Spanish). In this context, Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay signed an Antiterrorist Agreement to patrol their common boundaries. Additionally, Brazil created, in November 2005, the Regional Intelligence Center in Foz de Iguaçu, which was thought as a national agency that would gradually evolve towards a pivotal unity for cooperation with its neighbors Argentina and Paraguay. Final Remarks The analysis of Brazil’s foreign policy security agenda during Lula’s administration leads to the observation of a heterogeneous approach through the 110 President’s two mandates. While the first tenure (2002-2006) revealed a more reactive approach towards security issues, the second one (2006-2010) presented an assertive position. Brazil’s security agenda during Lula’s second mandate was significantly changed in terms of its geographical scope and instruments through which it was exercised. Indeed, this article sustained that the foreign policy on this sphere incorporated more systematically global issues, such as the Iran nuclear weapons negotiations and UN peace missions as a channel to accelerate the country’s quest for a permanent seat in the Security Council of this Organization. South America – which has constantly been an object of Brazil’s foreign policy attention – was also approached differently by Lula’s administration. Despite being a geographical space historically privileged in Brazil foreign relations, South America was often regarded as a locus for economic exchange. Thus, the emphasis on security underlying the regional integration project – through Unasur’s CDS – can be read as a thematic fundamental difference in comparison with past administrations. Moreover, the multilateral answer to security problems faced by South American countries also represents a shift in relation to the bilateral approach that has characterized dialogues on security in this region. It also implies that inter-American institutions, like the OAS and its concept of “new architecture of security”, do not offer answers that take into account a regional, more autonomous perspective. The OAS “(…) is not sufficient for the current challenges and threats that are present in the continent. In this sense Unasur draws a different approach from that which has been asserted from the OAS (…)” (Cepik, 2009, p. 230) It is, thus, interesting to stress how the promotion of a security agenda can be read through the lines of the development of integration projects in the South American experience. In other words, threat perception was not perceived through security lenses only: it was interpreted as a challenge to the integration efforts in the region. Once the CDS was structured on the idea that the region should develop a more autonomous agenda on security, United States’ presence in some of South American countries is interpreted by Brazil as a threat to the integration efforts in the region. At the same time, the creation of the South American Council aims at fulfilling a vacuum left by Brazil’s lack of initiative towards South American security topics – a space that has been historically taken by the United States. Thus, it seems plausible to suggest that the consolidation of South American integration project will conflict with the external relations that some of the countries in the region – namely Colombia and Peru – present with the United States. 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Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala. VALLE, Emilio Menendez de. Bolivia: el ejemplo positivo del UNASUR. Avaliable at http:// www.comunidadeandina.org/prensa/articulos/elpais15-10-08.htm Last acess: 30/07/2010. VAZ, Alcides Costa. “Desafios e Questões de Segurança nas relações do Brasil com os Países Andinos”. Center for Hemispheric Defense and Security Studies. REDES 2002. Research 113 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional LAFER, Celso (2001). A identidade internacional do Brasil e a política externa brasileira. Passado, presente e futuro. São Paulo: Pespectiva. Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana and Education in Defense and Security Studies, August 7-10,2002, Brasilia, Brazil. Panel on “Las eguridades Emergentes de la Comunidad Andina y MERCOSUR”. Available at: http:// www.unb.br/irel/ibsa/documentos.htm. Last access: 14/08/2010. VIGEVANI, Tullo et. al. (2003). “A Política exterior Brasileira no Período Cardoso: a Busca de Autonomia pela Integração”, Revista Tempo Social, (15) 31-61. VIILAS, Carlos C. , (2005). “Is there any room for Latin América in US foreign policy”. In: Journal of Developing Societes, 21 (3-4). VILLA, Rafael .Duarte. (2007). Quatro teses sobre a política de segurança dos Estados Unidos par a América do Sul. Tese de livre docência apresentada á Universidade de São Paulo para obter o grau de livre docente. São Paulo. VILLA, Rafael Duarte; VIANA, Manuela Trindade. (2008) b Política Externa Brasileña: nuevos y viejos caminos en los aspectos institucionales, en la práctica del multilateralismo y en la política para el Sur. Revista de Ciencias Políticas, Vol. 28, No. 2. Santiago, pp. 77-106. VIZENTINI, Paulo. (2003). Relações Internacionais do Brasil: de Vargas a Lula. São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo. WEINTRAUB, S. (2007) Impact on the United States of Brazil’s foreign policy under president Lula. Política Externa do Governo Lula: 2003-2005. São Paulo, p. 59-71. Received August 16, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Abstract Brazil’s security agenda during Lula’s administration was not homogeneous through the two mandates: the first tenure (2002-2006) revealed a reactive approach towards security topics, while the second one (2006-2010) was more assertive. More specifically, the shift occurred in terms of both its geographical scope – once it incorporated global issues in a more systematic way –, and instruments through which the security agenda was exercised, given the multilateral initiative of Unasur’s CDS. Resumo A agenda de segurança do governo Lula não foi homogênea durante os dois mandatos: o primeiro período (2002 – 2006) revelou uma postura reativa quanto às questões de segurança, enquanto o Segundo mandato (2006 – 2010) foi postura mais assertiva. Mais especificamente, a mudança ocorreu em termos de escopo geográfico – uma vez incorporadas as questões globais de maneira mais sistemática – e em termos de instrumentos por meio dos quais a agenda de segurança foi exercida – dada a criação do Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano. Key-words: Lula’s security agenda; assertive approach; South American Defense Council (CDS). Palavras-chave: agenda de segurança de Lula; política externa afirmativa; Conselho de Defesa Sul-americano. 114 Artigo Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) Parcerias estratégicas do Brasil: um balanço da era Lula (2003 – 2010) Antônio Carlos Lessa* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 115-131 [2010] Introduction During President Lula da Silva’s two terms in office (2003-2010), Brazilian diplomacy worked to reinforce the country’s relations with its traditional partners, particularly the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, but also assigned priority to establishing new dynamic axes, as illustrated by the pursuit of partnerships with countries such as South Africa, India, and China. These adjustments and fine-tuning of bilateral relations laid the foundation of universalism in Brazilian foreign policy, as well as defining major lineaments for the country’s international performance, namely, consolidation of economic relations (from the standpoint of trade currents and investment flows) and closer political cooperation at the highest level. Starting from an analysis of the idea of “strategic partnerships” and of how it evolved through Brazil’s international experience, this article will assess the development of this concept in recent years. The purpose is to stress the importance of the effort toward diversification and the sophistication of the political and economic ties with a view to the strategy for Brazil’s incorporation into the international scene, as well as seeing how it relates to other movements, such as the pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. A complex incorporation into the international scene The years that separate the end of the Cold War and the attacks of September 2001 constituted a peculiar moment in international life. While free trade and democracy asserted themselves as supreme values for the organization of the Professor at University of Brasília – UnB, Brazil, and researcher of National Council for Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq (alessa@unb.br). * 115 Antônio Carlos Lessa economies and for the political life of the National States, there also occurred the emergence of new political operating modes among nations and of new issues that rapidly became central to International relations. There occurred a drastic oscillation in the behavior of the central actors in international relations, especially of the United States, as well as a tendency to value political and economic multilateralism, including the establishment or sophistication of regionalization projects. At the same time, on the international agenda predominated new issues, such as human rights, the environment and environmental governance, sustainable development, fair trade, energy, food security, new security issues raised by defense challenges, nuclear nonproliferation, democracy, and migration, among others. The way these issues have evolved since, their modes of operation and particularly the way they have influenced each other were fundamental for determining all relevant countries’ strategies of incorporation into the international scene, as well as conditioning their economic development strategies. This was particularly the case of Brazil’s integration into the international scene, which has been complex and not free of hesitations and oscillations. After a decade of experiments in foreign policy, which led first to the reversion of traditional behavior patterns, the shrinking of the diplomatic network, and the depleting of the bilateral contact assets, and especially to the valorization of multilateralism, these experiments gave rise to a new formula as of 2000 but particularly as of 2003. Firm action in multilateral spaces had its counterpart in the reconstruction of geographic universalism, which in turn acquired a new sense of priority. The revaluing of priority bilateral contacts, which in Brazilian traditional diplomatic praxis are known as “strategic partnerships,” forms part of this new pattern. As a result, new dynamism has been injected into the economic expansion process, the trade and investment flows, and a new capacity of political coordination was achieved. Changes in the international scene since the 2000s and the change in the perception of the great emerging markets have greatly influenced the conditions of Brazil’s international visibility. The perpetuation of the country’s firm command on economic stability strategy has also contributed to project the image of a large, stable mass consumption market. On the international scene, Brazil has displayed an assertive profile, as seen for instance in the determination with which diplomacy has aimed at a protagonist role in the unfolding of negotiations in respect of the most diverse issues on the contemporary agenda. The direct and indirect consequences of the events since 9/11 have had a decisive impact on the setting of new priorities on the global security agenda, and have shown the need to reinforce multilateralism and strengthen multipolar international order. In the economic sphere, the pressing need for a new form of trade liberalization led to the launching of another round of trade negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization-WTO. On the environmental 116 agenda, the impact, risks, and costs stemming from climate change, which has become more evident in recent years, have called the attention of the governments of some of the rich countries to the need of giving priority to cooperation in the search for alternative energy sources. The intertwining of these three new agendas has created a unique opportunity for Brazil, whose government has since 2003 enthusiastically sought more room for South-South and North-South political coordination. Though its chances to act as a protagonist in respect of the global security agenda were meager, the same cannot be said in relation to the debate regarding the legitimacy of contemporary international policy and the need of reforming and valorizing multilateral institutions. Still in 2003, at the World Trade Organization Conference in Cancún, Brazil took the leadership of the emerging countries, in opposition to the historical practice whereby the rules of international trade are negotiated and decided by the developed countries. The formation of the Group of 20 (G-20) and then the mandate as negotiator in WTO’s Doha Round were moments when the new group sought to condition the opening of the services and industrial markets of southern countries to the corresponding opening of the northern countries’ agricultural markets. In respect to the climate change agenda, Brazil does not act as an actual protagonist but as a holder of significant assets. The country’s technological development and especially its many competitive advantages regarding biofuels production chain are factors of the innovating profile it displays in international action, with significant repercussions on its agenda of cooperation with both northern and southern countries. In the regional sphere, Brazil’s leadership role has become more prominent, although contested by some neighbors, particularly Venezuela and Argentina. In addition, the Brazilian government has demonstrated concern over regional political developments and has involved itself in stabilization experiences, as illustrated by its participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. In addition, it has sought a new modus operandi on different chessboards of contemporary international policy. The dedication with which Brazilian diplomacy has sought new coalitions, established around new issues and agendas, is an indication of an instigating vision. These coalitions include the IBSA Forum, formed by India, Brazil, and South Africa, and the Group of 4, formed by Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India to fight for the reform of the United Nations institutions. These coalitions were attempts to coordinate two sets of ideas: 1. The worldview of a country that sees itself as a regional power on a peaceful ascent, a major emerging market, a promoter of a genuinely multipolar international order, under which multilateral spaces are an essential condition; and 2. A bold view of international policy and an essentially positive reading according to which current international circumstances favor a review of the 117 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) Antônio Carlos Lessa decision-making mechanisms in different arenas. This is so because of the relative weight that countries such as Brazil bring to bear on the processes of stabilization of their respective power subsystems, as well as the fact that these countries (particularly Brazil) hold diplomatic assets that are highly important for major agendas and negotiations. This is so, for instance, in regard to international trade, as well as to the environment, and more specifically, to climate change. This kind of coordination shows the exact measure of an ambitious strategy of certain costs and doubtful gains. Brazil must prepare itself to have greater influence on international processes and specifically on the formulation of norms (without feeling constrained) that dramatically limit its interests as a regional power as well as its development possibilities. Accordingly, this explains the objective of a significant part of the major turns of Brazilian foreign policy in the Lula da Silva era: the pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This is one of the three main ambitious objectives that explain the marked changes in the Brazilian system of bilateral relations since 2003. The other two ambitious objectives that have contributed to restore the universalist character of the country’s international conduct until the early 1990s are related to economic expansion: (a) Restoration of the traditional trade channels (with Europe, United States, Japan, and South America, for instance) and the valorization of traditionally poorly explored economic relations (with Africa, China, the Arab World, and Asian regions, for instance); and (b) the opening of spaces for the operation of Brazilian business conglomerates, especially in strategic sectors (such as oil and ethanol). These three lines of action required an extraordinary effort to expand bilateral ties in every direction. The first thing was the sophistication of the agenda of cooperation with traditional partners, especially with Europe, and to a lesser degree with China, India, Japan, and South Africa. The second was the extension of the diplomatic network to previously untouched limits, endowing with a priority political sense the establishment of new ties with countries and regions with which Brazil had historically maintained weak relations. Together, these two facets of the country’s incorporation into the international scene with a universalist impetus led to a revaluation of the “strategic partnerships” concept. The strategic partnerships concept in Brazil’s international experience The idea of “strategic partnerships” acquired an unequivocal meaning in Brazil’s international experience in the 1970s and 1980s. It arose as a category of Brazilian diplomatic thinking in the context of the rapid change in relations with the United States under President Geisel (1974-1979). At that time, the idea became operational owing to the decision to speedily valorize relations with Eastern European countries, so as to mitigate the effects of the deterioration of the political and economic relationship with Washington. The movement had major consequences: it confirmed the importance of diversifying foreign links, 118 which came to pass only under a system of bilateral relations of a universal cast (Lessa, 1995; Lima, 1996). The strategic partnership with European countries, in turn, conceived as an escape valve for the tensions from bilateral relations with the United States, did not survive the changed international political and economic situation in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, it allowed interesting experiments from a political standpoint, such as the nuclear agreement with Germany (1975) and the involvement in the discussion about a new international economic order, which did not prosper either. In the economic sphere, when the consequences of the first oil shock (1973) could still be felt, the dynamics of approximation with the European countries allowed the reversion of the United States’s historical preponderance in trade and investment flows into Brazil. As a result of this and of the consolidation of the universalizing opening then adopted (pursuit of new relationships, opening toward Africa, recognition of the People’s Republic of China, etc.), Brazil managed to secure a more balanced incorporation into the international scene – or at least established highly diversified economic ties. This first experiment in “strategic partnerships” with European countries was the first movement that firmed up this concept in Brazilian diplomatic thinking. It can be said that this first generation of “partnerships” established the prototype of relationships called strategic. From this standpoint, strategic partnerships are “priority political and economic relations, reciprocally compensating, established on the basis of an accumulation of bilateral relations of a universal nature. The building of strategic partnerships rests on the harmonization of Brazil’s historical calling for universalism and the need for selective approximations, which ensures the possibility of adaptation to the niches of opportunity and to international constraints arisen from circumstances (Lessa, 1998).” The concept of strategic partnerships thus established itself in Brazilian diplomatic thinking with a definitive meaning. A historical analysis of foreign policy relates it to the search for inputs for the national development strategy (Cervo, 2008). Thus, the expression’s vulgarization led to its inconsequential use in the diplomatic discourse, especially as of the 2000s. Now diplomacy expects to inject a sense of opportunity and urgency into the political discourse and the economic relationship with as many “partners” as seem to be useful in the current aggiornamento of Brazil’s international profile. Be as it may, either from the perspective of historical analysis or in light of a careful examination of experiments under way, the expression “strategic partnerships” today needs further clarification. This is all the more obvious in view of the proliferation of ties that in the Brazilian government’s view (especially since 2004) deserve to be called “strategic.” After all, what kind of relationship deserves to be so called? It can be noticed also that during the Lula era, the strategic partnerships concept has served to the carrying out of a spectacle-inclined diplomacy. This is 119 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) Antônio Carlos Lessa illustrated by the focus on the achievement of complex objectives of quite uncertain results, such as the pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This pursuit is particularly on its own behalf but it is also moved by the desire to project a new international image of a responsible regional power and emerging economy attuned to market values and endowed with attributes that qualify it as an actor ready to participate in the dynamics of stabilization of the international system in its multiple dimensions. Accordingly, the country has sought an international protagonist role, for which the “vulgarization” of the concept of strategic partnerships may have been useful. The epistemological problem raised by this “new generation” of strategic partnerships is precisely the loss of meaning and importance of the concept as it was established by Brazil’s international experience. A strategic partnership thus ceases to be an expression of a bilaterally defined agenda around political convergence and economic projects and becomes a mere label. It may happen that under this label complex projects and potentially valid agendas may be implemented, but it would be expected that essentially normative views of the relationship’s reality in question would predominate. It is thus necessary to establish a new framework for future bilateral relations, possibly determined by political coordination mechanisms (regular summit meetings and joint commissions) and by specific agendas (energy, sustainable development, trade, investments, etc.) This is not the place to make an exhaustive assessment of these ties, but there is a clear, nearly self-evident measure for them. Thus, empirical reality, which would permit testing the strategic partnership concept in Brazil’s international praxis, could be obtained by an examination of the trade and investment flows, the density of political dialogue, the potential of scientific and technological cooperation, the dialogue channels, the convergence of agendas at multilateral forums, and the involvement in joint development projects. Fundamental partnerships: United States and Argentina The most fundamental system of Brazilian bilateral relations, on whose basis the intensity of ties with other countries may be measured, has been historically related to the United States. It may be said that this is a “fundamental partnership”, which gives rise to the need for diversification of external ties and to the very historical process of building strategic partnerships (Lessa, 1998). From this standpoint, relations with the United States should be classified as a “structuring relationship” because its development over the long term gives a measure of the intensity and organization of the entire system of Brazil’s international relations, especially in the period from 1945-1990. Relations between Brazil and the United States have undergone significant changes since the 1990s. These changes can be explained by the difference in the management of a relationship that had been built in the previous thirty years as 120 a basically contentious relationship. As a matter of fact, bilateral relations had deteriorated to such a degree in the late 1980s, involving issues such as market access, science and technology, intellectual property, foreign debt, and development financing that this rapidly contaminated the rather poor political dialogue. The fact is that the two traditional partners were already following different courses in respect of punctual issues since at least the late 1950s. This pattern of disagreement can be explained by many factors, including the loss of economic complementariness, one of the major reasons. Stabilization of relations with the United States, which began under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration (1994-2000), permitted the setting up of a positive agenda that incorporated the management mode traditionally characterized by tension peaks. Thus, the change had to do rather with the improved dialogue conditions and with the adoption of a specific mode of managing these relations, referred to by Hirst and Pinheiro (1995) as the “right to diverge.” It is true that the United States still ranked highest among Brazil’s economic partners, but for some decades relations were no longer characterized by economic dependence on the part of Brazil. This was also due to the stimulus to and prioritizing of political and economic relations with other developed countries (particularly with European countries). As it was to be expected, there were problems in the handling of bilateral relations, connected with processes in which Brazil was involved. Governments tend to differ on trade issues, as illustrated by the episode of the negotiation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas – FTAA as well as of trade liberalization, especially in the World Trade Organization’s context. In such cases, the mere existence of a multilateral framework (as for instance the rounds of negotiations aimed at trade liberalization and the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism) favored the empting of a possibly conflictive potential of bilateral relations regarding some of the burning issues on the contemporary international agenda. There arose then a tendency to compartmentalize the bilateral agenda into two well-defined sectors: in the political negotiations between governments lie the differences regarding regional political processes (in the 1990s, the Colombian issue; in the 2000s, Venezuela’s case; and more recently, the Honduras episode), migrations, international security, etc. On the more general level of views of the international political processes, countries tend to differ about the great issues of international politics, where there is still a large grey area characterized by the differences as to the very importance of political multilateralism, institutions, and the achievement of a multipolar order. What is new in the management of bilateral relations is the fact that these compartments do not communicate with each other as they did before. Thus, the differences over the agenda and its implementation remain isolated and rarely compromise the overall quality of relations. Relations with Argentina could also be easily qualified as strategic. But there are certain specificities that make Brazil’s relations with its major neighbor 121 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) Antônio Carlos Lessa unique, which could also be properly described as “a structuring relationship.” Indeed, relations with Argentina have conditioned the development of Brazilian policy toward South America, and the extraordinary transformation they have undergone since the 1980s has acquired a historic meaning, so that they could be described as a genuine Brazilian strategic partnership. The Brasilia-Buenos Aires axis became a vector of South America’s stabilization, established upon the review and normalizing of bilateral relations since the casting away of reciprocal mistrust and the heralding of a new phase of convergence aimed at economic integration. Equally complex, relations with Argentina spearheaded Brazil’s regional activity, in both the political and the economic areas, and provided a basis for projects developed by Brazil on trade integration, security, and measures of political cooperation with other South American countries. These coordination mechanisms assumed different forms in the last two decades (Mercosur, Free Trade Area of the Americas – FTAA, South American Community of Nations-CASA, Union of South American Nations-Unasur). Under the Lula government it has no longer been possible to separate the development of relations with Argentina from the development of regional integration mechanisms. Mercosur has tended to lose relevance on the overall list of Brazilian international priorities. At the same time, Argentina lost the first trade flow positions to Brazil, while providing room for the expansion of great Brazilian conglomerates, especially in the financial and energy sectors. Mercosur has been assigned no priority in the Brazilian diplomatic discourse under Lula. This economic space has been absorbed by the development of South American regional mechanisms, such as Unasur. Mercosur has thus become a difficult project to manage, to the point that several influential sectors in Brazil now openly call for its reduction to a free trade zone. It is argued that this might be advantageous to Brazil, in so far as the country would recover the capacity to negotiate free trade agreements with more important partners, such as the United States and the European Union. The Argentine government under Néstor Kirchner fiercely resisted Brazil’s attempt at becoming the instrument of leadership in South America as a diplomatic asset. Cristina Kirchner, on the other hand, has been more pragmatic as to the potential “Brazilian ascent” to a global level and has wagered on restoring the quality of the relationship with Lula’s Brazil. In some segments of Argentine public opinion it has been possible to detect greater understanding of the gains that could be derived from Brazil’s protagonist role for their country, Mercosur, and South America. New strategic partnerships In recent years, the Brazilian government has sought to stamp as “strategic” its traditional relations with some countries. A far from exhaustive survey (Brasil, 122 Repertório, 2007) specially valorized this in relations with Asian powers (Japan, India, and China) and with the main European countries, namely, France, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and Italy, in addition to Russia. Brazil also maintains a “strategic partnership “with South Africa, and with it and India it forms the Group of Three (IBSA). But other countries have also been named “strategic partners” – South Korea, Venezuela, Paraguay, Ukraine, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. But it is possible to suppose, in view of the growing number of countries that have been named “strategic partners” in the diplomatic discourse, that the expression has been vulgarized and soon made into a style device by diplomacy and its agents. Used in an imprecise, abusive way, the expression begins to lose its meaning derived from historical experience and no longer signals importance, relevance, and priority in foreign policy’s strategic thinking (Abreu, 2008). Some representative cases will now be looked into: Japan, China, India, South Africa, and the European Union. Japan The establishment of a strategic partnership with Japan, of great potential, was interrupted in the early 1980’s in view of the first signs of the Brazilian economic crisis. The great project of this partnership was cooperation for Brazil’s agricultural development under the Japanese-Brazilian Cooperation Program for the Development of the Cerrados (Prodecer), conceived in 1974. Cooperation was not uninterested, of course, as the Japanese wanted to encourage the entry of a new player in the global grain market and thereby attenuate their nearly total dependence on the United States. Be as it may, both this program and the Japanese economic presence in Brazil are key components of an overall view of Brazilian development in the last three decades. Economic relations with Japan lost their impetus in the 1980s and remained at the same level until 2005. On the other hand, an intense political agenda was kept, owing to a great extent to the question of the dekasseguis, the growing community of Brazilians of Japanese descent who migrated to Japan beginning in the 1980s in search of work opportunities. Trade indicators never grew to a significant degree, and investment flows remained below their potential. The bilateral political and economic agenda gained a new impulse as of 2005. Two factors explain why Japan was included again on the list of Brazil’s strategic priorities. First, there was the perception on the part of the Japanese foreign policy operators that their country had actually lost major economic positions and conditions of dialogue with Brazil. Not less important, was the broaching of some initiatives that helped bring the two countries together again: the formation of the Group of 4, consisting of Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India, all four aspiring to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council; and the choice of 123 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) Antônio Carlos Lessa the digital TV system in Brazil, potentially worth billions of dollars, which was decided in favor of the Japanese. China Brazil’s relations with the People’s Republic of China date back to 1974, when the Ernesto Geisel’s government recognized the Chinese government and for the first time established Brazilian diplomatic relations with China. This meant a break with the position Brazil had maintained since 1949, of systematic support to the international isolation of the great Communist country. Though these relations are mature and long-standing, major joint projects under these relations were lacking. China had intermittently signaled promise under Brazil’s international relations system, or at least until 1993, when the Itamar Franco government decided to make Asia in general into a priority region for Brazil’s international activity, and this was reiterated under both the Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the Lula Administrations. Since 1995, China has acquired a unique status in the strategic thinking of Brazilian foreign policy, given its cooperation potential in the area of Science and Technology and the magnitude of its trade. The development of the remote sensing satellite-CBERS (in two generations launched respectively in 1999 and in 2003) illustrates the nature of this relationship, which indeed holds an immense cooperation potential. One of the major gestures toward the strategic valorization of relations with China was made by President Lula who paid a State visit to China in 2004, taking with him the largest entourage ever of Brazilian businessmen on this kind of mission. Brazil supported China’s admission to the World Trade Organization, in the belief that this would indirectly contribute to the strengthening of the world trade system, because, given China’s immense domestic market, the Chinese might agree to compromises that would benefit the developing countries (Oliveira, 2004). A key element in Brazil-China relations beginning under the Lula government is the potential for political cooperation in different aspects, and this makes this relationship into a true strategic partnership. In addition to being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, thus holding veto power to bar reforms in the organization’s structure, China has systematically sided with Brazil in respect of various issues and negotiation processes under the contemporary international agenda. China has consistently grown as regards Brazilian trade flows in recent years, rapidly gaining top positions in the ranking of Brazil’s major trade partners. As a result of the economic crisis that has harmed Brazil-United States relations, in April 2010 China for the first time ranked first in our trade relations, surpassing the United States. This fact does not really constitute a tendency, as Brazil’s relations with its traditional partners (United States and Europe) are much better balanced, but nevertheless reflects the dynamism of Sino-Brazilian partnership. 124 China is not only one of the greatest exporting countries, but also one of the world’s greatest importers as well. Currently the Chinese import in excess of US$1 trillion, which certainly means open doors to all the sectors of Brazilian economy, principally manufactures and consumer goods, in addition to basic products, such as iron ore and soybean. Brazil’s greatest challenge is precisely the need to balance its trade list, as it exports basically primary products (about 70 percent of Brazilian exports consist of iron ore and soybean, whereas 95 percent of its imports consist of manufactures). India and South Africa Brazil’s bilateral relations with India and South Africa have not been historically important, though long-standing. On both sides, there has been lack of dynamism and priority establishment. For different reasons, the two countries were assigned low priority under Brazilian foreign policy: Asia, where preferential ties were established with Japan; and Africa, a continent where Brazil’s expansion came late and was motivated principally by the needs of trade expansion. India and Brazil have a history of political cooperation since the 1960s; it is highly dynamic at multilateral forums, especially in respect of international trade negotiations. But their economic relations have been decisively marginal in the second half of the 20th century and until the 2000s. India entered the political debate about Brazil’s international choices as of the 1990s, when the country realized the need to reorganize its presence in Asia and particularly its relations with continent-size countries that began to emerge politically and economically. The first systematic approximation with a view to prioritizing bilateral ties beyond potential cooperation at multilateral forums was initiated by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government. This approach had an economic component, which did not develop properly, as well as a political coordination mechanism, which did not go much further either. Relations with South Africa were dynamic until the early 1970s, when the Brazilian government decided to keep its distance from the South African segregationist regime that, as could be noticed then, hindered a consistent policy of approximation to the rest of the African continent. Starting then, Brazil systematically kept its distance from South Africa and joined the international majority that condemned apartheid. This situation lasted until the end of the regime, with Nelson Mandela’s election, and the normalization of South Africa’s international profile in 1995. The effort to reactivate bilateral relations has since included a restoration of the trade flows and the attempt at injecting dynamism into the political dialogue, but the truth is that at that time Brazil still attached low priority the African region and South America was still an unknown region to South Africa (Penna Filho, 2001). Reactivation of Brazil’s relations with South Africa and India gained a new impetus early under the Lula government. In June 2003, the Ministry of Foreign 125 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) Antônio Carlos Lessa Relations announced the launching of the India-Brazil-South Africa – IBSA Dialogue Forum. This initiative was conceived as a coordination mechanism primarily of a political nature among the three countries, which, more than ever, are believed to have a greater potential for cooperating than for competing. They are three intermediary countries, regional powers, multiethnic, multicultural democracies that can derive mutual benefit from coordinated actions in different areas, as well as from exchanging experiences related to economic and social development. The IBSA Forum is grounded on a conceptually interesting argument and rests on converging political positions and on the three countries’ potential for economic cooperation. This is certainly a model of trilateral strategic partnership, based on cooperation mechanisms and on the exchange of experiences with challenges common to all three. Europe The announcement of the establishment of the European Common Market in 1957 caused the greatest concern on the part of the Brazilian government, which was fully convinced that European integration would entail a significant drop in exports of coffee and other traditional products. This would happen due to the redirection of trade to the benefit of our African competitors, which would be favored by measures of trade association that would guarantee them privileged access (under the provisions of Arts. 131-136 of the Treaty of Rome), not only into France and Belgium but also into most partners, including two of Brazil’s major trade partners in the world, namely, Germany and Italy (Lessa, 1998). This less than auspicious beginning defined the character of the history of Brazilian relations with the European integration process in its earlier decades. Whereas Brazil’s bilateral relations with the European States flowed unimpeded, free since then of trade disputes (which had been significant in some cases, such as with France), this heavy agenda, over which the parties seldom agreed, was reinforced precisely by the establishment of the European Common Market (Bueno, 1994). The establishment of the Common Market entailed a major rupture of the European nucleus of Brazilian bilateral relations: it produced an axis of conflict, previously inexistent, which survived practically until the mid-1990s, centered on the handling of trade issues, especially market access and tariff treatment (Lessa, 1998). During this long period, there was no talk of political cooperation, as Latin America in general constituted a blind spot on the list of European community’s international priorities. On the other hand, it was at that moment that Brazil established relations with a significant number of European countries. These relations rapidly evolved into innovative forms of political and economic cooperation, as shown, for 126 instance, by the diversification of foreign links established under the Ernesto Geisel government (1974-1979) (Lessa, 1995). Those were the first steps toward strategic partnerships, as the Brazilian diplomatic thinking would conceive it: a strategic partnership with European countries was as a matter of fact conceived strictly as an escape valve for the tensions caused by the bilateral relationship with the United States, but did not survive the change in the international political and economic circumstances of the late 1970s. Since then Brazil’s interaction with the countries of Europe’s western nucleus (France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, and Belgium) proceeded at two different paces but was gradually normalized, consistently with the peculiarities of the bilateral agendas. Contacts with the Community as a whole, on the other hand, evolved very little and much more slowly: Brazil established diplomatic relations with the Community in 1960 and very little happened thereafter. A somewhat limited cooperation agreement with the Community was signed twenty years later and entered into force in 1982, but was replaced by a Cooperation Framework Agreement in 1995, which was the instrument governing contacts between Brazil and the European Community until 2007. In the early 1990s, when integration experiments in South America had already advanced, the European Union’s priorities envisaged the establishment of an agenda of cooperation with Mercosur. In this regard, the establishment of Mercosur in 1991 was a major factor for the reformulation of the European Community’s relations with Latin America in general. This can be explained by the South American bloc’s emergence as Europe’s major trade partner and destination of European investments in the region. Thus, still in 1992, an inter-institutional Cooperation Agreement was signed, which was followed by an Interregional Cooperation Framework Agreement. The coordination of interests continued in June 1999 with the first Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Chiefs of Government of the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean. On that occasion, a Bi-Regional European UnionMercosur Negotiation Committee was established, for the purpose of liberalizing trade relations, with a view to the future signing of an inter-regional association agreement (Saraiva, 2004). An inter-regional partnership was thus established, encompassing the mechanisms of political contacts between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean (bi-regional summits) and the ministerial meetings of the Rio-European Union Group (Valle, 2005). Brazil’s growing international profile in recent years, coupled with the tiredness of the formula of dialogue used by the European Union with Latin America and the Caribbean (asymmetry of the integration processes, disparity in trade flows, political and economic heterogeneity of the Latin American actors) and the stagnation of negotiations with Mercosur led Brussels to abandon the 127 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) Antônio Carlos Lessa traditional model of cooperation with the region. Thus, in late 2005, the European Union, after reviewing its overall relations with Latin America, decided to privilege Brazil as the region’s key country. Brussels view of Latin America was based on a perception of historic and structural homogeneity which did not match the region’s political and economic circumstances, and this probably impeded the fluidity of the bi-regional dialogue. From the aggiornamento of this view came the decision to individualize the political relationship with the region’s major countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, which would reignite contacts between the two regions, through the definition of clearer political objectives (Europe, European Commission, 2005). The maturing of this view led to the adoption of the model already applied to the European Union’s relations with its main interlocutors – the United States, Canada, Japan, Russia, China, and India – that is, relations in the form of a strategic partnership. As expressed by European diplomacy, these relations are characterized by “the range of bilateral contacts and the intensity of political and commercial ties and are built on a complex network of institutionalized forums and thematic dialogues that incorporate from technical working groups to meetings of Heads of State and Chiefs of Government (Barthelmess, 2008).” It was then recognized that the maintenance of insufficient structures of bilateral political dialogue with Brazil was not consistent with the profile the country was displaying in international policy, and more specifically, with its apparent distancing from Latin American political and economic reality. The announcement of the Brazil-European Union strategic partnership broke the cycle of paralysis of the European policy toward Latin America. The announcement took place in Lisbon, on July 4, 2007, on the occasion of the BrazilEuropean Union Summit Conference, which brought together the European Council’s Troika and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The truth is that this new tie is of major importance for Brazil, which although it was not singled out among the emerging powers (as a matter of fact it was the last one of them to be so distinguished), now has conditions for individualized dialogue as an important actor in contemporary international policy (Brasil, MRE, 2007). The expression “strategic partnership” is rather loosely used in the European Union’s jargon and documents. The countries recognized as European Union’s strategic partners are indeed privileged political interlocutors, of different statures, but acknowledgedly important for the realization of the interests of Europe’s international action. Four of the European Union’s strategic partners (Canada, United States, Japan, and Russia) form part of the group of major industrial countries, the Group of 8; three are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, Russia, and China); three (Japan, India, and Brazil) aspire to a permanent seat on the Security Council, should the latter be reformed; and four (Brazil, China, India, and Russia) are the major emerging economies today, and form the bloc known as BRIC. 128 Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) Moreover, the European Union is the main trade partner of five of these major economies: United States, China, Russia, India, and Brazil. Canada, owing to its preferential ties under the NAFTA, and Japan have the United States as their main trade partner, followed by the European Community. Brazil’s incorporation into the international scene has undergone major adjustments in the Lula era. In addition to new projects, such as southern coalitions, as exemplified by the IBSA Forum, and the ambition to win a seat on the United Nations Security Council, one can observe a line of continuity with the foreign policy of the governments of the 1990s. There has been some change in style, which however has not been sufficient to revolutionize Brazil’s international action. Lula’s Brazil benefited from the consolidation of tendencies of international policy from the preceding decade: the ascension of the great markets, the emergence and centrality of new issues, and the valorization of multilateral spaces, for instance. This has permitted the consolidation of a profile that was being timidly sketched and the assumption of a protagonist role in different environments. The instrumentation of diplomatic assets recently created or reconverted from traditional international praxis has also been highly relevant for the aggiornamento of the management of Brazil’s relations with its traditional partners and for the building of new partnerships. The qualifier “strategic” as a synonym of special, important, and necessary matches a vision of political and economic cooperation projects based on a sense of opportunity but whose effects will last. Thus, Brazil’s strategic partnerships, taken into account in an assessment of the Lula government’s foreign policy, may be more than tools of an involved diplomacy. They may be associated with shared worldviews and sound results for the national development strategy, reinforcing the capacity for autonomous international action. Bibliography BARTHELMESS, Eugênia (2008). Brasil e União Européia: a construção de uma parceria estratégica. Tese apresentada ao LIII Curso de Altos Estudos do Instituto Rio Branco – Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Brasília: Mimeo, 205 pp. BRASIL (2007). Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático. Repertório de Política Externa: Posições do Brasil. Brasília: Mimeo, 160 pp. BUENO, Clodoaldo (1994). A política multilateral brasileira. In: CERVO, Amado Luiz (org.). O desafio internacional: a política exterior do Brasil de 1930 a nossos dias. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, pp. 59-144. CERVO, Amado Luiz (2008). Inserção internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros. 1. Ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 297 p. 129 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Conclusion Antônio Carlos Lessa EUROPA. Comissão Européia (2005). “Uma Parceria Reforçada entre a União Européia e a América Latina”. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=COM:2005:0636:FIN:PT:PDF (accessed on 01/15/2009). HIRST, M. & PINHEIRO, L. (1995). A Política Externa Brasileira em Dois Tempos. Rev. bras. polít. int., Brasília, v. 38, n. 1, pp. 5-23, Junho 1995. LESSA, Antonio Carlos (1995). A estratégia de diversificação de parcerias no contexto do Nacional-desenvolvimentismo (1974-1979). Rev. bras. polít. int., Brasília, v.38, N. 1, pp.24 – 39. LESSA, Antonio Carlos (1996). Da apatia recíproca ao entusiasmo de emergência: as relações Brasil-Europa Ocidental no Governo Geisel (1974-1979). Revista Anos 90, v.5, pp.89 – 106. LESSA, Antônio Carlos (1998). A diplomacia universalista do Brasil: a construção do sistema contemporâneo de relações bilaterais. Rev. bras. polít. int., Brasília, v. 41, n. spe. Available at <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73291998000300003&ln g=en&nrm=iso>. accessed on Sept. 01/2010. doi: 10.1590/S0034-73291998000300003. LIMA, Maria Regina Soares (1996). Brazil’s Response to the “New Regionalism”. In: MACE, Gordon & THÉRIEN, Jean-Philippe. Foreign Policy and Regionalism in the Americas. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 143-144. OLIVEIRA, Henrique Altemani de (2004). Brasil-China: trinta anos de uma parceria estratégica. Rev. bras. polít. int., Brasília, v. 47, n. 1, June. Available at <http://www.scielo. br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292004000100002&lng=en&nrm=iso>. accessed on Sept. 03 /2010. doi: 10.1590/S0034-73292004000100002. PENNA FILHO, Pio (2001). África do Sul e Brasil: diplomacia e comércio (1918-2000). Rev. bras. polít. int., Brasília, v. 44, n. 1, June. Available from <http://www.scielo.br/scielo. php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292001000100006&lng=en&nrm=iso>. Accessed on Sept. 01/2010. doi: 10.1590/S0034-73292001000100006. RODRIGUES, Diego de Freitas (2010). Cooperação horizontal Sul-Sul: arranjos de concertação política entre a Índia, o Brasil e a África do Sul. Rev. bras. polít. int., Brasília, v. 53, n. 1, July. Available at <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S003473292010000100003&lng=en&nrm=iso>. Accessed on Sept 01 /2010. doi: 10.1590/S003473292010000100003. SARAIVA, Miriam Gomes (2004). A União Européia como ator internacional e os países do Mercosul. Rev. bras. polít. int., Brasília, v. 47, n. 1, June. Available at <http://www.scielo. br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292004000100005&lng=en&nrm=iso>. Accessed on Sept. 14/2010. doi: 10.1590/S0034-73292004000100005. VALLE, Valeria Marina (2005). O peso das relações inter-regionais com a União Européia em relação a outras alternativas de política externa do Mercosul. Rev. bras. polít. int. 48, no. 1. doi:10.1590/S0034-73292005000100004. http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_ arttext&pid=S0034-73292005000100004&lng=en&nrm=iso. Received July 1st, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 130 Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010) This article examines the priority bilateral relations of Brazil, named “strategic partnerships”, both because of their tradition and historical relevance and due to the existence of political and economic cooperation projects. An assessment of these relationships, especially under Lula’s administration, is made in this work, bearing in mind the concept of “strategic partnerships” and its development in Brazilian foreign policy. There will be considered partnerships with the US; Argentina; Japan; China; India; South Africa and the European Union. In the article, the meaning of the increase in these relationships is interpreted on the grounds of its significance to the international insertion strategy of Brazil. Resumo No trabalho são examinados os relacionamentos bilaterais prioritários do Brasil, que receberam a denominação de “parcerias estratégicas”, tanto por causa da sua tradição e relevância histórica, quanto por causa da existência de projetos de cooperação política e econômica. A partir da elaboração do conceito de “parcerias estratégicas”, e de como ela se construiu na política externa brasileira, neste trabalho se propõe um balanço desses relacionamentos especialmente durante a administração Lula da Silva (2003-2010). São examinadas as parcerias com os Estados Unidos, Argentina, Japão, China, Índia, África do Sul e União Européia. Propõe-se uma interpretação sobre o significado que o incremento desses vínculos possui para a estratégia de inserção internacional do País. Key-words: strategic partnerships; bilateral partnerships; Brazilian foreign policy. Palavras-chave: parcerias estratégicas; parcerias bilaterais; política externa brasileira. 131 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Abstract Artigo A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Um novo diálogo estratégico: as relações Brasil-Estados Unidos na Presidência Lula (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 132-150 [2010] Introduction Since 2003, until the end of Luis Inácio Lula´s da Silva term as Brazilian President in 2010, one of the most controversial issues of the country´s foreign policy was the status of bilateral relations with the US. For some, they have grown weaker because of Brazil’s “new options”, the reinforcement of the South-South cooperation axis;, for others, the alliance has grown stronger due to the strength of our political, diplomatic and economic profile. The polarization of these evaluations stretched to the whole of Brazil´s external performance and reflects classical traditions of foreign policy, the bilateralhemispheric (1902/1961) and the global multilateral (1961/1989). After the end of the Cold War, these traditions have clashed as a choice between the past and the future and reached their peak at Lula’s two-term Presidency. From 1989 to 1999, the bilateral hemispheric option was dominant and, since 1999, the nation has been experiencing the comeback of the global multilateral view, in particular after 2003. From this period on, Brazil´s progresses in the world are significant, strengthening the South-South and North-South axis of our International Relations. Examining the facts, the easy criticisms of the global multilateral option do not hold still and fail to understand the new role that Brazil is playing. This role cannot be linked almost exclusively to an alignment with the US (either pragmatic or automatic), but as part of an international system that shows traces of multipolarity and significant dynamics of multilateral alliances and institutions. * Professor of International Relations at Federal University of São Paulo – UNIFESP and Associate Researcher at the Center of International Relations and Strategic Studies at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul – NERINT-UFRGS and the University of Brasilia – UnB (crispece@gmail.com). The author would like to thank Ellen Cristina Borges Fernandes, undergraduate student of International Relations at State University of São Paulo – UNESP for the help with the economic and trade data. 132 Facing this scenario, joined by Brazil’s choices in the last few years, the aim of this article is to argue that Brazil-US bilateral relations have grown stronger. It is also going to discuss the idea that growing “stronger” does not mean total convergence of ideas or interests, but a reality of building mutual understanding with shared views on some issues, respecting differences of opinion. In addition, the “Strategic Dialogue” established in 2005 represents US recognition of Brazil’s stature in South America and the world; that situation, as in many other US bilateral relations (such as the ones with similar emerging nations as China and India), means, as well, an attempt to engage and contain these poles. Therefore, it’s necessary to examine these complex patterns, presenting a balance of BrazilUS bilateral relations from 2003-2010. A Brief Background: The 1990s In January 2003, when Lula came into power, Brazil-US bilateral relations were facing a period of relative distancing, characterized by the absence of both crises and progresses. In 1999, still during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s (FHC) administration (1995/2002) and the last couple of years of Bill Clinton’s (1993/2000) Presidency and the beginning of George W. Bush´s term (2001/2008), the Brazilian nation had slowly begin to adjust its agenda of foreign policy. This adjustment was symbolized by “asymmetric globalization” and projects of regional integration in South America. These policies were a break from the pattern of alignment that prevailed in the previous decade and were deeply criticized by some interest groups in the country. Brazil-US bilateral relations during the 1990s, regardless of Itamar Franco´s administration (1992/1994), were characterized by the revival of the “special alliance”, based on some assessments: the idea that Brazilian foreign policy in the 1960s-1970s promoted the nation’s isolation in the world; that this situation caused its economic and political crisis of the 1980s due to a strategy of “autonomy through exclusion”; and that the country was weak. It was necessary to link its future to the US once more, as in the first half of the 20th century, leading to “autonomy through integration”. Last, but not least, this was the “only” choice, since the US was the hegemonic power in the unipolar order created after the end of the Cold War. From the “lost decade”, Brazil entered the “bilateral decade”, translated into the adoption of the economic prescriptions of the neoliberal Washington Consensus and of several regimes in the area of dual technologies (in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty), the environment and human rights. The nation abandoned its national security priorities, depleting its Armed Forces, and its projects of development based on import substitution and the goal of being a middle power. During Fernando Collor de Mello’s brief tenure (1990/1992), alignment was automatic, and, in the first term of FHC (1995/1998) the pragmatic 133 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo stance prevailed. Even though similar in logic (compliance to the main stream US agenda and, therefore, to the First World1), Collor’s and FHC’s tactics were different, since FHC envisioned the country as a regional power and Collor worked from a perception of weakness. FHC’s prospects of recognition were sustained by Brazil’´s regional stature and its “responsible and legitimate” foreign policy, and benefited from “Plano Real”, the stabilization plan that put an end to the economic crisis. Two main objectives were envisioned: the permanent seat at the UN Security Council and fair and open trade in regional and global terms. Brazil´s aim was to be a relevant player at the World Trade Organization (WTO), advancing agricultural talks from 1995 onwards and, in the region, in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) talks. Launched in 1994, the FTAA project recovered US Latin American ideas of former President George H. Bush (1989/1992) proposing the creation of a hemispheric free trade area and good governance in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI). In 1990/1991, the only results of the EAI were related to debt relief (Brady Plan) and the creation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). In neither of these scenarios Brazil gained its objectives and, although its efforts were clearly directed to promote good relations with the US (President Clinton and FHC did share excellent friendship), no benefits resulted from the reborn special alliance. Also, in 1998, in a context of economic crisis due to the failure of the neoliberal agenda, after his reelection, FHC promoted the adjustments mentioned. Which were the contents of these policies, asymmetric globalization and regional integration, that stretched, in some manner, to the next period? The purpose of “asymmetric globalization” was to offer “constructive criticism” of globalization showing the need for adjustments in international governance and aid2. As Vizentini (2008) points out, Cardoso’s move was more of a tactical, trying to recover its space in the First World and towards the US, than of a strategic nature. Although there was not a full recovery of the globalmultilateral tradition, there was a more realistic account of the international system balance of power and Brazil’s priorities. In relation to this balance, the perception of American unipolarity (which remained only in military terms) was replaced by the recognition of a trend towards multipolarity due to US relative economic decline and the consolidation of other poles such as China, EU, Japan, India, Russia and South Africa. Brazil should turn its focus to these areas of opportunities, in particular amongst developing nations and South America, also was being hit hard by the neoliberal crisis. 1 Other concepts that can be linked to this idea are the search for the “normalization” of the State and peripheral realism. (CERVO, 2008) 2 SILVA, 2009 offers an interesting account of FHC´s foreign policy evolution 134 FHC’s promoted the revival of Mercosur3 and the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA), thus recovering the idea of the South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA4). IIRSA invested in projects of infrastructure, focusing on strategic sectors such as energy, transports, communication trying to reignite development. The project was launched in 2000 at the Brasilia Presidential Summit and was also a response to US initiatives that were recovering an interventionist stance at that same year: Plan Colombia, to help Colombia fight drug dealers and eradicate production of cocaine, which allowed the US to maintain troops in this country; and US growing criticism of autonomous actions in South America, including Brazilian foreign policy and the rebirth of the left, represented by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and in many other nations, linked to neo-liberalism crisis. Plan Colombia, and other US policies of this period (1998/1999) such as new pressures on Iraq were related mostly to domestic issues in the US, such as President Clinton’s process of impeachment due to the Monica Lewisnki scandal,the growth of the neoconservative right, and the pending 2000 Presidential elections. No particular attention was directed to Brazil or Latin America, and processes like the FTAA and NAFTA stood still, once the US focused on strategic issues its internal agenda and in Eurasia. Republican George W. Bush’s election in 2000 brought no changes, even though in his campaign he mentioned reviving the FTAA and giving more attention to the hemisphere (symbolized in his “America’s Century” proposal). W. Bush’s goals were directed to Eurasia, holding a unilateral stance that devalued multilateral organizations, cooperation and non-security issues such as trade. Not only Brazil, but all nations were viewed as second rank partners, even traditional allies in Western Europe. These trends were deepened by 9/11/2001, the following Global War on Terror (GWT), the military operations in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Summing up this agenda, the 2002 National Security Strategy became known as the Bush Doctrine, stating that the US could act in a preventive and preemptive manner in the world. For Latin America this meant a focus on security issues: enlargement of Plan Colombia and the fight against “narcoterror” symbolized by Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC); also it meant studies for the installation of Military Bases in the region and the definition of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay common border (“Tríplice Fronteira”) as a place of illicit activities ranging from terrorism to 3 In 1990/1991, the creation of Mercosur by Collor was linked to the neoliberal agenda and US projects. Supported by Menem in Argentina, the acceleration of the process of strengthening political and economic ties in the Southern Cone incorporated Paraguay and Uruguay. After Collor left power in 1992, Mercosur became the first priority of Brazilian foreign policy, and regained an autonomous profile. 4 In 1993, SAFTA was Itamar Franco´s government answer to US initiatives in the region and a means to reinforce Brazil´s compromise within South America and Meercosur. 135 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo organized crime. Brazilian diplomacy refuted all these accusations and refused to define FARC as a terrorist group. Tough US distancing from Brazil was interpreted by some in the country as a result of FHC’s changing tactics. In the last year of FHC’s government, a division that would gain significant ideological weight in the next administration of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva was to begin. This group viewed South American integration, asymmetric globalization and new partnerships in the South as a break in the nation’s commitment towards modernization and the First World (i.e alignment). These circles, in the next government, identified themselves as “Americanists”, defenders of the bilateral hemispheric tradition and the vertical axis of IR. Other options of engagement, such as the global-multilateral, were narrowly defined as “non-americanist”. This polarization was still based on assumptions that were dominant in the 1990s, of Brazil’s weakness and US strength, and also sustained its arguments in other political misconceptions regarding US foreign policy: (a) the direction of its priorities in the world, which since 1945 were very distant from its hemisphere; (b) the idea that the initiatives of the 1990s such as the EAI, NAFTA and the FTAA were designed to break the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (“America for the Americans”) leading to cooperation, ignoring the fact that they were linked to US economic decline and the need to try to secure regional markets, worldwide confronted by Western Europe and Asia (Japan and China), preserving its sphere of influence; (c) the fact that the US was opening its markets and was compromised with trade multilateral talks despite since the 1980s protectionism and subsidies dominated its agenda coordinated by the Legislative, without differences amongst republicans or democrats and, at last, (d) the idea that the bilateral relation was a “one-way street” and that the US would change its views of Brazil due to its alignment. Quite the opposite, since the US tends to respect power, and not subordinate nations that cannot exercise regional roles. There was a deep exaggeration of criticism directed to FHC’s foreign policy that did not hold still. From 1999-2002, there were no great conflicts or advances in bilateral relations since neither one of the partners focused on each other. There were no benefits, but also no conflicts. And, from 1990-1998, no benefits came through either, although Brazil was showing a policy of alignment. Nevertheless, this fact was ignored and the pro-America coalition continued to defend the comeback of alignment. To make matters even worse for this group, the prospects of bilateral relations were worrisome. In 2002, Brazilian Presidential elections were viewed with some concern by the US since the favorite candidate in polls was Luis Inácio Lula da Silva from the Workers Party (PT), who had already been a Presidential candidate in 1989, 1994 and 1998 elections. For the neocons, Lula’s advance was seen as part of a dangerous “turn to the left” that Latin America was experiencing, influenced by the antihegemonic project of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his “socialism for 136 the 21st century”. In the heated environment of US politics and Bush’s preventive doctrine, there were some hypotheses concerning the birth of a “Latin axis of evil”, similar to the “axis of evil” of “rogue states” composed by Iran, Iraq and North Korea, identified as threats to US national security and world’s stability. This “Latin axis”, according to The Washington Times, a small newspaper linked to US radical right was composed of Venezuela, Cuba and Brazil. Although leftist projects in Latin America were linked to the failure of neoliberalism and alignment trying to recover the economic and social agenda of the countries in the region, its tactics were different. Whereas Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, seen as the leader of this emerging bloc by the US had an antihegemonic stance, Lula in Brazil argued in favor of social democratic reforms. High level contacts in 2002 and 2003 among Brazil and the US, including Lula’s team after election eliminated these doubts since the political and economic agenda to be followed showed some important level of continuity. This trend was also accompanied by adjustments in Brazil´s policies framework, ending the alignments of the “bilateral decade”. A Comprehensive Foreign Policy (2003/2010) Not only Brazil, but several other nations in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia went through the 1990s with policies of alignment towards the US, including Russia, the former superpower of the Cold War. In a similar fashion, these nations were hit hard by crisis and the lack of political, economical and strategic benefits from the US, reflecting the preservation of asymmetries in multilateral talks and the absence of reform in international organizations. Faced by these constraints, these nations opted for significant changes in their domestic and foreign policies from the 2000s onwards. A new stance of pride and bargaining in International Relations was strengthened, generating new alliances amongst them and a different autonomous view of the US, which, for its part, is confronted by its own relative decline, altering the world’s balance of power. For Brazil, the beginning of Lula’s administration represented a turning point which impacted the nation’s stature and its role in the international system. In the particular instance of Brazil-US bilateral relations, its evolution can be divided in three phases since 2003 until 2010: 2003-2005refers to the first two years of Brazil´s new presidency and W. Bush’s peak of unilateralism; 2005-2008 are the years of Bush’s crisis and reform in the US and of Brazil’s power consolidation; and 2009 onwards, Barack Obama´s beginning of mandate and Lula’s term to end. 2003/2005: Regaining Brazil’s National Power In this period, Brazil focused on recovering the global-multilateral tradition, adding new strong components to its agenda. This agenda was conducted by Celso 137 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo Amorim at the Ministry of External Relations and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães as Secretary General of External Relations (2003-2009), since the beginning of Lula’s term. From 2009 onwards Guimarães has been ahead of the Secretary of Strategic Affairs and Antonio Patriota, former Brazilian Ambassador to the US (2007/2009), was named Secretary General. Lula also exercised an important role in Presidential Diplomacy, as a representative from the Third World. One of the most significant changes was not only the recovery of the global multilateral agenda, but also as Vizentini´s (2008) points out, the new social dimension that was brought to diplomatic speech (fight against hunger and poverty, debt relief, disease control) and its assertive stature. To this social dimension, political and economical demands such as the reform of International Organizations and equal and fair trade were added. Brazil was no longer trying to “belong” to the First World, but to reaffirm its place as a leader of emerging nations. Instead of giving priority to the North-South vertical axis of foreign policy, the country focused on its traditional South-South horizontal relations with similar nations such as India, China, Russia and South Africa, and less developed countries (LDC). The affirmative projection on South-South relations increased Brazil´s bargain power towards the North, including the US. Since 2003 Brazil invested in a serious of alliances of variable design: IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum, for economic, political and technical cooperation); the G4 (Brazil, India, Germany and Japan for UNSC enlargement for new permanent members)5 ; and both G20s (trade and finance). The “trade” G20 was created in 20036, for the WTO Cancún Ministerial meeting, and the “finance” G20 gained new stance after 2008 due to US crisis (it was created in 1999). At the UN, Brazil is ahead of the United Nations Mission of Stabilization to Haiti (MINUSTAH). Brazil put forward its projects regarding South American integration, following FHC’s agenda, such as IIRSA, but with a strong political component of autonomy. The South American Community of Nations (SACN) was created, later on renamed Union of South American Nations (Unasur), and Mercosur was strengthened with new agreements and talks in progress in the region and with international partners such as the EU, Israel, SACU (South Africa Customs Union) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The South American and Arab Countries Summit (ASPA) and the South American Africa Summit (ASA) were held in Brazil. After 2007, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) begun to be defined as the new pillars of world order as emerging nations, 5 Brazil is supported by Russia (in exchange for Brazil´s support to Russian candidacy to the WTO), China, France and Great Britain. US stance will be discussed ahead. 6 The “trade” G20 was led by Brazil and had as its members other developing and less developed nations such as China, India, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Mexico, and represented a clear coalition of countries from the South. 138 beginning its process of institutionalization with two Summits (Yekaterinburg, 2009, and Brasilia, 2010). Brazil-US bilateral relations in this first phase showed the same pattern of 1999-2002: absence of great conflicts and of significant progress. Although the US remained, until 2009, when it was replaced by China, the most important individual trade partner of Brazil, the paths chosen by the Bush administration set the US apart from its major partners during his initial term, in which unilateralism prevailed. Bilateral relations were included in this framework, in regard to the WTO, the FTAA and multilateralism. WTO and FTAA talks that extended to Lula’s government benefited strongly from this foreign policy of autonomy, portraying a new strategic role for Brazil. This role sustained by demands of trade openness and fairness was not a complete break from FHC´s last couple of years. Nevertheless, Brazil was accused by the US, and by opposition groups in the nation (the “Americanists” which became to be portrayed quite more often in the media, openly criticizing the government), of being responsible for both talks deadlocks in this period. Let´s examine both issues: – WTO – Since the creation of the WTO in 1995 and its First Ministerial Meeting, in Singapore, a clear pattern of talks emerged after the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs Uruguay Round (GATT) represented by developed nations’ lack of compromise in discussing agricultural issues (also supported by the Peace Clause, that imposed restrictions on agricultural panels till 2003), added to new pressures on developing countries to open their services markets. There was relative frustration since many nations such as Brazil, at the height of its alignment agenda, opened their markets for industrial good and were still unable to sell their agricultural products due to tariffary and non-tariffary barriers, subsidies and protectionism from the North. Also “autonomy through integration” showed no results in FHC’s administration. Moreover, in 1999, at the failed Millennium Round in Seattle, developing nations were accused of being competitive because they did not abide to environmental and labor standards. At the “rebirth” of WTO, the Doha Development Round (DDR), Brazil once more resisted these pressures and, in 2003, these divergences reached their peak at the Cancún Ministerial Meeting and after the end of the Peace Clause, Brazil intensified its diplomatic actions in WTO panels against the US and the EU. At Cancún, Brazil’s leadership of the G20 coalition was criticized by US diplomacy in the immediate aftermath. Cancún repeated WTO’s talks dynamics, with developed nations pressing for concessions and developing ones resisting. The US and the EU tried to break G20’s alignment, but the alliance sustained its compromises. Robert Zoellick, head of the USTR at that moment, called Brazil “the country which only said no”, repeating the pattern of “blaming” our diplomacy for the failures of talks, although US focus was solely directed to the GWT at that point of the Bush presidency. He mentioned that G20 would certainly have a short 139 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo spam of life. Zoellick’s critics were repeated in Brazil widely, but fell short. Not only G20 survived until 2010, but had proven capable of sustaining its demands. Different from the FTAA, the process of WTO talks and negotiations is still ongoing. The DDR remains open and nations continue to confront themselves in the panels conducted by the organization. The prospects of the DDR were also affected by the 2008 economic crisis, which favored US and EU protectionist policies. Although arguments related to the WTO tend to focus on Brazil-US bilateral relations, diplomatic clashes are not only directed to the US, but also to the EU. On the other hand, FTAA talks were centered on Brazil and the US, in spite of the rhetoric of hemispheric trade. – FTAA – The same pattern of Brazil’s resistance, and US negatives and pressures, extended to these talks. The first phase of Brazil-US bilateral relations under Lula was characterized by a very important period, when Brazil and the US shared the command of the negotiating process. At that time, 2003/2005, talks were already at crossroads, reflecting the absence of progress that was characterizing the whole project since its launch in 1994. Even then, with Brazil’s alignment in place, FHC government defended stances that, as in the WTO arena, showed that the nation’s compromises in trade were limited by some boundaries that reflected pragmatic economic interests. Brazil and the US shared significant differences regarding the framework of talks and hemispheric arrangements. The US supported the FTAA to encompass all regional arrangements, so organizations such as Mercosur and the Andean Pact would cease to exist. Brazil argued in favor of preserving these ties and that the FTAA should be a composition of them (building blocs). Brazil demanded to link the FTAA agenda to WTO talks. Moreover, there was a clash regarding the pattern of talks and implementation of decisions: Brazil preferred single harvest, that meant that all issues and resolutions should be implemented at the end of all talks, and the US the early harvest, with the gradual provision of rules. US options were intended to put pressure on Brazil in order to reform its economy and open markets, in particular the attempt to separate regional and global talks. Even if Brazil was trying to sustain a special relation with the US, autonomous trends of foreign policy remained, leading to a mixed position by the government, trying to defend the FTAA and Mercosur at the same time. During the whole process, the US clearly stated that it would not negotiate issues regarding its farm subsidies or protectionist practices and refused to address talks regarding products such as orange juice, soy, ethanol, cotton, tobacco, and others. Since the agenda was restricted from the beginning, the process was relatively doomed to fail, extremely constrained by US domestic policies and economic interests. FTAA talks from 1994 to 1999 were held in one Summit (Santiago, 1998) and five Ministerial Meetings (Denver and Cartagena 1996, Belo Horizonte 1997, Costa Rica 1998 and Toronto 1999). Another issue during this period that concerned Brazil was Clinton’s inability to gain the fast track mandate. In the US, trade talks 140 are a responsibility of the Legislative. Unless the White House obtains fast track, all decisions should be submitted to Congress afterwards, which limits credibility. US talks with Brazil were accompanied by appeals to members of Mercosur, such as Argentina, trying to weaken the bloc, and Brazil which was its leader. Argentina held a pendular stance, going back and forth Mercosur and the US. In 2001-2002, when FHC left power, three Ministerial Meetings (Buenos Aires, Quito e Miami) and one Summit were held (Quebec, 2001). Clearly, the US had abandoned the project and Brazil sustained its previous position. It should be stressed that Bush even got fast track for these negotiations (renamed, TPA, Trade Promotion Authority), but trade and other multilateral issues were put at bay. From 2003-2005, the US and Brazil shared the command of talks and there were no consensus until 2005, the proposed date to end negotiations. Two Summits, Monterrey (2004) and Mar del Plata (2005), were held but although there was a Brazilian attempt of proposing a “light FTAA” the process stood still. Bush’s trade record in the region and the world is precarious for these issues were not viewed as priorities. The only US “advances” were bilateral agreements with small Latin American nations and CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement) in which no concessions were needed. Latin America was second rank of US interests, focused on Eurasia, the ongoing Afghan war and the pending Iraqi conflict. The power vacuum in the Americas strengthened Brazil’s South American projects and Venezuelan ones represented by the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). Either in the WTO or the FTAA talks, the crossroads was not Brazil’s “fault” but part of more complex reality of US interests. Brazil clearly was searching for new opportunities, recovering its diplomatic stature and preserving its autonomy. These stances have broken the pattern of reducing bilateral relations, and even Brazil’s International Relations as a whole, to economic and trade issues, a trend that prevailed in the 1990s linked to the concept of “normalization”. Political and strategic matters were recovered, along the social agenda, envisioning a growing role. This period also represented the process of UN talks regarding the Iraq 7 War , that ended with US invasion, supported by the “Coalition of the Willing”, composed by nations such as Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Poland. Brazil stood along with France, Russia and Germany in the defense of the multilateral system, which also represented a rift in this period. Bush’s unilateralism distanced the US from many other partners, including Brazil, with direct consequences for its hegemony. Summing up 2003-2005, Brazil and the US followed separate paths with very different results for both countries and their relations in the second phase, 2005-2008. 7 In 1990, Brazil supported “Operation Desert Storm” against Saddam Hussein as part of a multinational effort supported by the UNSC. Nevertheless, the country did not send troops to the Gulf, as Argentina. 141 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo 2005/2008: A Re-Start Lula´s first term represented the strengthening of Brazil´s external projection and a leap forward in South America and the world, a growth similar to the one led by its BRIC partners. Once more, the nation was to be praised as a relevant power pole in the region, the world and multilateral organizations, recovering its Third World leadership. After 2005 and Bush’s reelection, the US showed opposite signs: isolation, weakness, crisis and overstretch, leading to a change in its relation to the world trying to share the burdens of its choices. US “comeback to multilateralism” was a product of its relative decline, conducted by former head of the National Security Council Condoleezza Rice, who became Secretary of State after Colin Powell´s exit. First it was only a reaction to negative trends. With the worsening of US crisis in 2007/2008, it gained strategic meaning, laying the ground for the next administration of Barack Obama (2009/). What did this mean for Brazil and bilateral relations? From 2005 onwards, the US started a process of rapprochement with is regional allies, Brazil included. Brazil was visited in 2005 by both Rice and Bush (and Lula and Bush shared a very good personal relation such as Clinton and FHC had previously). This year of 2005 represented the official beginning of Brazil-US strategic dialogue, which meant that bilateral relations would embody regional and global issues. To stress the meaning of “Strategic Dialogue”, it should be remembered that the US only shares this kind of dialogue with nations such as China, India and Great Britain. Brazil was invited to Middle East talks and, in South America, it offered an alternative to Chávez. Lula was already seen by America´s diplomacy as a “responsible leader” of the left, accompanied by Michelle Bachelet in Chile. Chávez was still viewed as dangerous, as his influence spread across the Andean region to Equator and Bolivia, with the elections of Presidents Rafael Correa and Evo Morales. Only President Alvaro Uribe’s Colombia was clearly aligned to the US. It was Brazil, the most relevant power pole in South America, the one that could work as a regional balancer and an honest broker. Addressing the Strategic Dialogue, President Lula stated that, When I was elected for Presidency, several people anticipated the deterioration of Brazil-US relations. They were completely wrong. Quite the opposite, our relations are, nowadays, facing one of their best moments. Economic and trade relations were enlarged and our political dialogue gained a high level. We both understand, the US and Brazil, our political and economic importance and the responsibilities that come from this (...) For all these reasons, we are very enthusiastic that the US is willing to include Brazil among the countries with which it maintains a privileged strategic dialogue. At this landmark (...) US-Brazil relations are significant and its improvement is a legacy for the ones who will come forward (SILVA, 2005, s/p) 142 Patriota (2008) mentions that this Dialogue represents the maturing of bilateral relations and the balanced mix of converging and diverging ideas that are common to power relations among great nations. WTO talks and the reform of multilateral organizations showed no progress in this second phase, Brazilian products8 still face barriers on the US markets, such as antidumping and fitossanitary measures, additional import tariffs and subsidies to American producers in several areas. Patriota indicates that this situation offers a significant toll on Brazilian exports and slows the growth of bilateral trade. Brazil has been more active in other markets, mainly amongst South countries. As Lima (2005) points out, one of the most relevant aspects of Lula’s agenda was this diversification of markets. This search of alternatives allowed Brazil to be less vulnerable to the world economic crisis in 2008. In relation to the US, Table 1 below shows the trade patterns of the last decade. Table 1 Brazilian Trade Brazil and United States US$ FOB Export US$ FOB Import US$ FOB Balance Results (A) (B) (A-B) 1999 10.675.124.224 11.741.047.942 -1.065.923.718 2000 13.189.576.929 12.899.226.083 290.350.846 2001 14.208.572.954 12.905.492.013 1.303.080.941 2002 15.377.822.589 10.287.452.316 5.090.370.273 2003 16.728.079.047 9.569.454.702 7.158.624.345 2004 20.099.235.400 11.357.061.637 8.742.173.763 2005 22.539.731.875 12.666.508.176 9.873.223.699 2006 24.524.748.523 14.657.479.678 9.867.268.845 2007 25.065.048.412 18.723.280.625 6.341.767.787 2008 27.423.048.799 25.627.961.850 1.795.086.949 2009 15.601.628.031 20.030.382.627 -4.428.754.596 2010** 8.953.658.378 12.075.872.253 -3.122.213.875 Year Source: SECEX ** Calculado até o mês de junho In the security arena, the US maintained Plan Colombia, the alert in “Tríplice Fronteira” and the 4th Fleet was put to work again with ships patrolling the South Atlantic. The region of the South Atlantic, since the mid 1980s has been a focus 8 See, in this regard, Barreiras a produtos brasileiros no mercado dos EUA. Embaixada do Brasil, Washington DC e FUNCEX. 2007. [http://www.funcex.com.br/material/estudos/Barreiras2007.pdf ]. The products that most suffer barriers are: orange juice, ethanol, sugar, tobacco, chicken, pork and cow meat, fruits and vegetables and iron. 143 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo of differences between Brazil and the US, as the country proposed the creation of ZOPACAs (South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation) and the US presented OTAS (South Atlantic Treaty Organization, similar to NATO). For Brazil, the goal is the defense of a demilitarized region, and for the US to gain new ground in the area. During the 1990s the debate reached a low point, but it came back due to the discovery of new oil and gas reserves by Brazil, “pre-salt” and Angola and the nation’s autonomy9. Environmental (the preservation of the Amazon, global warming, sustainable development), human rights and security issues are also present. Brazil sustained all its projects and the relation came forward. US recognition of Brazilian efforts was not the main goal of Lula’s policy, but was a natural development of the strengthening of our diplomacy. It showed a clear understanding of the international system trends towards multipolarity (power redistribution) and of the US. Any realistic account of US foreign policy indicates that, in history, this country values powerful partners, in particular in moments of crisis. The US, in fact, needs its partners to be stabilizers in each of their regions and tries to balance each one of these allies in different manners, in order to prevent their alliances against the US (“divide and conquer”). The Bush era deepened the process of counterbalance against the US (named soft balance by the American literature) due to its unipolarity: IBSA, trade G20, the Shangai Cooperation Organization are examples of these initiatives. Rice needed to recover these ties in order to prevent the deepening of this process, harmful to US hegemonic interests. In 2007, during President´s Bush visit to Brazil, both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding to Advance Cooperation on Biofuels that was presented as a very important step on bilateral cooperation. The Memorandum focused on joint research regarding biofuels, mainly ethanol, and on studies for the creation of an ethanol commodities market. Although opportunities in this area, including production in third party countries and environmental issues, are still being hailed as very significant, and Brazil has an important competitive advantage in sugar cane ethanol production, US markets still remain closed to our exports10. The ethanol issue is one of the most significant examples on how US markets can be closed to Brazilian products that are highly competitive, suffering two kinds of taxation: a 2,5% tax import and U$ 0,54 added per gallon. This second tariff per gallon will expire in January, 2011 and as Ambassador Vieira points out “the most likely scenarios are three: expiration of the tariff as scheduled; its renewal at the current value; or its renewal at 45 cents a gallon, on a par with the subsidy for blending ethanol with gasoline” (VIEIRA, 2010, p. 10). Although during his 9 Brazil is also working to enlarge its national maritime borders due to this strategic oil reserves. 10 The pressure against Brazilian ethanol in the US come from a variety of sources: corn producers, from which US ethanol production derives, and the energy sector lobby (oil industry). 144 campaign in 2008 and soon afterwards US President Barack Obama regarded the development of biofuels and a new energy paradigm for the country as a priority, the reconversion of the American economy is slow. In spite of trade barriers, strategically Brazil is being viewed by the US in a different light. In 2008, Rice included Brazil as a “stakeholder of international order” alongside China, India, Russia and South Africa. Rice also defined Brazil as a “regional leader and global partner”, stressing the relevance of its social agenda and the progress of the country as a “multiethnic diplomacy”. (RICE, 2005 and RICE, 2008). The support for UNSC enlargement was also present, but still loose. Analysts as Onis (2008), Stuphen and Hachigian (2008) and Zakaria (2008) stressed Brazil´s and other emerging nations11 role in the world´s balance of power, and the need for the US to deepen its relations with these “strategic partners”. The third phase of Brazil-US relations is rooted in these changes started by Bush and Rice, and continued by Democrat President Barack Obama. 2009 Onwards: A Regional Stabilizer and a Growing Global Role Since 2009, and in his campaign during 2008, Obama designed a program of domestic and international change for US leadership, in the midst of its deepest crisis since the Great Depression of 1929. Bush´s policies led to an economic breakdown and political isolation that was deeply affecting American hegemony. Rice’s agenda managed to reverse some of these negative trends and its proposals were adopted by the future Obama presidency in its “smart power concept12”. The growing role of emerging nations, less affected by the crisis, gained relevance, and the finance G20 meetings of 2008-2009 were presented as examples of US new type of cooperation with other nations in dealing with the reform of economic institutions. Expectations extended to other multilateral forums and also in specific bilateral relations including Brazil. Obama’s administration fell short, because once more the President focus had to be elsewhere than Latin America, Brazil or reform. US main demands were domestic and he had to deal with the GWT, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The promised leadership on the environment was not fulfilled, including the prospects on biofuels. Furthermore, he has to deal with constant opposition from Republicans and from his own party, which affect his ability to try to balance the reforms the US need. The fight over building bipartisanship consensus affects US ability and its legitimacy (leading to changing positions and clashes in some matters in international affairs between the State Department, the White House and the 11 Khanna (2008) defines Brazil, China, Russia, India as leaders of the new “Second World”. 12 Smart power is a concept created by US academic Joseph Nye that combines hard and soft power into one, meaning the use of military, ideological, institutional, economical and other resources in a balanced manner. 145 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo Pentagon). In spite of winning the Nobel Prize in 2009, Obama, in the first year of his administration was unable to reach forward to US allies. Obama was only able to launch a new National Security Strategy (NSS-2010), promote the renewal of the Afghan mission and the withdrawal from Iraq in 2010. What has this meant for bilateral relations under Lula’s Presidency? Here, it is necessary to make a separation between long term strategic issues and current affairs. In relation to current affairs, themes like the WTO and the FTAA stood still, as well as the reform of the UNSC, the G8, the IMF, the World Bank, and other institutions. Brazil and other emerging nations sustained a significant leadership in these issues. In bilateral terms, in 2009 one of the most significant disputes with the US was settled at WTO: in the cotton dispute Brazil was authorized by the WTO to retaliate the US in almost U$ 830 million. After a year of bilateral talks, in 2010 Brazil agreed to postpone the retaliation until 2012 when the US promised to review its Farm Bills and illegal practices, and to the create a fund to help Brazilian producers (for a list of WTO’s Brazil’s panels check PECEQUILO, 2009). The US sustained its bilateral policies with Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia from a hegemonic stand, mixing them with promises of engagement and dialogue: for Cuba, there was the temporary suspension of Helms Burton law, which imposed sanctions on companies that traded with this country until February 2010 and fewer restrictions on trading food and medicines and travels, but the embargo remained; in relation to Venezuela, US promises to engage Chávez went no further and in Colombia, the fight against drugs continued, added to the project of installing seven US military installations. In 2010, this project was rejected by Colombian Congress, after the end of Alvaro Uribe’s term and beginning of Alvaro Santos’s tenure. The 4th Fleet revival was maintained and the US showed growing concern over autonomous actions from Unasur, mainly the newly created Council of South American Defense (CDS), and the growing presence of China in Latin America (and also the EU). In Haiti, after the earthquake, the US acted more decisively with MINUSTAH, but after the worst peak of the crisis, Brazil and the UN remained as pillars of engagement. The Honduran crisis represented a mixture of conflict and partnership, in particular due to US changing positions: after the Coup against Zelaya, Brazil and US condemned these actions and pressed for the return of the democratic legitimate order. After Honduran opposition resistance and Zelaya’s refuge in the Brazilian embassy, the US ended up supporting the coup whereas Brazil sustained its position. After the election that led Porfirio Lobo to power, the White House soon recognized the new administration and Brazil refused to. The crisis represented the difficulties of American diplomacy in sustaining a coherent stance and Brazil´s new field of action in Central America, in which it later proposed the Community of Caribbean and Central American 146 States (CELAC), in which the US would not be participating (as in Unasur). In all these issues, OAS participation was minimum. The same pattern repeated in Iran nuclear talks: Brazil and the US started as allies and ended following distinct paths; that ignited a new round of criticism by “Americanists”, since Brazil was “getting out of its league” and harming its bilateral relations. In the beginning of 2010, Brazil, Turkey and Iran closed a trilateral agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program, which was initially supported by the White House in its new engagement policies. However, after closing the deal, Brazil and Turkey were criticized by the same US, which continued to seek UNSC sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and unilateral actions, including threats of a military invasion made by some Pentagon high ranked officials. Brazil and Turkey sustained their stance, and the situation regarding nuclear proliferation in Iran is still ongoing as of the second semester of 2010. Added to this, Brazil is slowly recovering its nuclear program and its Armed Forces potential. Brazil does not wish to become a military power, but is working to recover its defense capabilities and technological assets. Regarding the nuclear issue, the focus is to invest in uranium enrichment, for which the country has comparative advantages in uranium reserves and technology (Resende Plant) and the project of the nuclear submarine. The country has clearly established its compromises with the NPT, the Tlateloloco Treaty and other regimes from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and still abides to defense of the development of sensitive technologies for peaceful use as in the 1960s. These episodes, and US periodical criticisms of Brazil´s agenda, were held as proof of the alleged “failure” of the global multilateral option and the SouthSouth axis. Critics failed to understand the new stature of Brazilian diplomacy in the first decade of the 21st century vis à vis the US, other nations and multilateral institutions that means our steady involvement in a whole set of difficult and different issues. Therefore, we come to the long term strategic issues: in the real world, bilateral relations kept growing strong and, for the long run, Brazil and other emerging nations resilience is well recognized by the US, even in its new NSS, The starting point for that collective action will be our engagement with other countries. The cornerstone of this engagement is the relationship between the United States and our close friends and allies in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East – ties which are rooted in shared interests and shared values, and which serve our mutual security and the broader security and prosperity of the world. We are working to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence – including China, India, and Russia, as well as increasingly influential nations such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia – so that we can cooperate on issues of bilateral and global concern, with the recognition that power, in an interconnected world, is no longer a zero sum game (NSS-2010, p. 11) 147 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo Whereas considering bilateral relations in particular, We welcome Brazil’s leadership and seek to move beyond dated North-South divisions to pursue progress on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues. Brazil’s macroeconomic success, coupled with its steps to narrow socioeconomic gaps, provide important lessons for countries throughout the Americas and Africa. We will encourage Brazilian efforts against illicit transnational networks. As guardian of a unique national environmental patrimony and a leader in renewable fuels, Brazil is an important partner in confronting global climate change and promoting energy security. And in the context of the G-20 and the Doha round, we will work with Brazil to ensure that economic development and prosperity is broadly shared. (NSS-2010, p. 53) Will this come easily? Not so often and it will depend on the circumstances involved and mostly on US domestic policies. For the US, as much as pivotal States need to be engaged, they need to be contained as well. Brazilian political and economic goals will continue to suffer some restrictions, and the country should still pursue them into the framework of its other alliances of variable design. In the case of Brazil, as well as other nations, the hegemonic power looms in the world and it cannot be disregarded in any strategy. However, the US is not the only partner to be reckoned with. The dilemma is well presented by Vieira, Sometimes Brazil and US perceptions will converge and the dialogue will be easier, as on climate change. In other cases, we will have different perceptions, diagnoses, and solutions, as with Iran. What is true in each case, however, is that, to quote US Ambassador to Brazil Thomas Shannon, “The US needs to get used to the idea that, from now on, it will come across Brazil in places where it previously would not expect to find Brazil.” (VIEIRA, 2010, p. 7) Final Thoughts Still rifted by ideological polarizations, in particular in Brazil, bilateral relations with the US have grown stronger in the last decade. As China, India, and Russia, Brazil is viewed as a regional and global power that, in spite of lacking military power, is able to influence the political and strategic scenario. As Obama mentioned the need for the US to exercise its “smart power”, Brazil has been able to enlarge its influence in the world by making use of its soft power: alliances of variable design and a new diplomatic speech for the South. For the future, the core of Brazil-US bilateral relations will continue to go forward as both nations understand and respect each other´s changing roles in the coming multipolar world. 148 A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010) References ALTEMANI, Henrique e LESSA, Antonio Carlos (org). Relações internacionais do Brasiltemas e agendas. Volumes 1 e 2. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2006. GUIMARÃES, Samuel Pinheiro. Desafios Brasileiros na era dos gigantes. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Contraponto. 2006 HACHIGIAN, Nina and STUPHEN, Mona. The next American century. NY: Simon & Schuster. 2008 HIRST, Monica. Brasil-Estados Unidos: desencontros e afinidades. FGV Editora: Rio de Janeiro, 2009 KHANNA, Parag. O Segundo mundo. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Intrínseca, 2008. LAMPREIA, Luiz Felipe. Diplomacia brasileira – palavras, contextos e razões. Rio de Janeiro: Lacerda Editores, 1999. LIMA, Maria Regina Soares de. A política externa brasileira e os desafios da cooperação SulSul. Rev. bras. polít. int. [online]. 2005, vol.48, n.1 [cited 2010-11-11], pp. 24-59 . Available from: <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292005000100002&ln g=en&nrm=iso>. ISSN 0034-7329. doi: 10.1590/S0034-73292005000100002. National Security Strategy, 2010. The White House and the National Security Council. 2010 ONIS, Juan de. “Brazil´s big moment”. Foreign Affairs, 87 (6) November/December 2008, p. 110-123 PATRIOTA, Antonio de Aguiar. “O Brasil e a política externa dos EUA”. Política Externa (17) 1, Junho/Julho/Agosto 2008. p. 97-109 PECEQUILO, Cristina S. A política externa dos EUA: continuidade ou mudança. Porto Alegre: Ed. UFRGS, 2aed, 2005. PECEQUILO, Cristina S. Manual – Política Internacional. Brasília: FUNAG, 2009. RICE, Condoleezza. Remarks at the Memorial Museum of Juscelino Kubitschek. Brasilia, Brazil, April 27, 2005. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/45276.htm. Disponibilidade: 01/02/2008. RICE, Condoleezza. Remarks with Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. Itamaraty. Brasília, Brazil, March 13, 2008. www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/03/102228.htm. Disponibilidade: 14/03/2008. RICE, Condoleezza. “Rethinking the national interest- American realism for a new world”. Foreign Affairs on line, July/August 2008. SILVA, Luis Inacio Lula da, AMORIM, Celso e GUIMARÃES, Samuel Pinheiro. A Política Externa do Brasil. Brasília: IPRI/FUNAG, 2003. SILVA, Luis Inacio Lula da. Declaração à imprensa do Presidente da República Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da visita oficial ao Brasil do Presidente os EUA da América no Brasil. Granja do Torto, 06/11/2005. Disponível em http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/ politica_externa/discursos/discurso_detalhe3;asp? ID-Discurso=2719 149 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional CERVO, Amado Luiz. Inserção Internacional- formação dos conceitos brasileiros. São Paulo: Ed. Saraiva, 2008. Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo SILVA, André Luis Reis da. Do otimismo liberal à globalização assimétrica- A política externa do governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). Curitiba: Juruá. 2009 VIEIRA, Mario Luiz Iecker. Interview in The Brazilian Economy, August 2010, 2 (8). 2010. p. 6-11. VIZENTINI, Paulo F. As Relações Internacionais do Brasil – de Vargas a Lula. São Paulo: Ed. Fundação Perseu Abramo, 3aed, 2008. ZAKARIA, Fareed. The post-american world. NY: W.W Norton & Company, 2008. Received August 25, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Abstract The aim of this article is to examine Brazil and the United States bilateral relations from 2003/2010 and their strategic patterns during the Presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. The goal is to understand the development of this dialogue in the 21st century and its previous background in the Post Cold War world, identifying its evolution and change due to Brazil’s growing regional and global role and US relative position. Resumo O objetivo deste artigo é examinar as relações entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos 2003 e 2010 e os seus padrões estratégicos durante a presidência de Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. Busca-se compreender o desenvolvimento deste diálogo, no século 21 e sua formação anterior no mundo pós-Guerra Fria, identificando a sua evolução e transformação, devida ao crescimento do papel regional e global desempenhado pelo Brasil com relação aos Estados Unidos. Key-words: Brazil Foreign Policy; US Foreign Policy; Brazil-US Bilateral Relations. Palavras-chave: Política Externa Brasileira; Política Externa dos Estados Unidos; Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos. 150 Artigo Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration: caught between South America and Mercosur Política externa brasileira para a América do Sul durante o governo Lula: entre América do Sul e Mercosul Miriam Gomes Saraiva* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 151-168 [2010] Since 1991, Brazil’s foreign policy towards South America has developed along two lines that share some common ground. Brazil’s diplomatic efforts have centred on two movements with regard to its South American neighbours and in the effort to build Brazilian leadership in the region. On the one hand, Brazilian government has developed and consolidated a process of regional integration along the lines of open regionalism: the Common Market of the South, i.e. Mercosur1. Meanwhile, it has also fostered less structured cooperation and integration initiatives in the region.2 The significance of these two movements, the way they have been coordinated and the relative weight given to one or the other have varied from administration to administration as a function of each one’s respective foreign policy strategies, the country’s international standing and the behaviour of its neighbouring States. All these initiatives, especially since Itamar Franco came to power, have been underpinned by a longer-term goal adopted by Brazilian diplomacy to build up regional economic and political leadership that is autonomous from the USA, while strengthening Brazil’s position as a global player on the international scene.3 In * Professor at State University of Rio de Janeiro – UERJ, Brazil, and researcher of National Council for Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq (miriamsaraiva@uerj.br). 1 Open regionalism is the name given by ECLAC to the form of regionalism that gained ground in the 1990s: a combination of the opening up of economies based on liberal standards, the building up of a largerscale economy to boost the standing of the individual countries in the global economy, and the defense of democratic regimes. 2 Here, integration means a voluntary action that involves taking on certain commitments and areas of shared of sovereignty on the basis of a treaty. Cooperation is a joint voluntary action. See Malamud (2010). 3 The idea of giving precedence to universalism as a model of international insertion was frequent in the past, while Brazil’s links with Latin America were not identified as a priority by Brazilian foreign policymakers. Integration with neighboring countries started to be more clearly articulated as a goal in the 1980s. For more on this topic, see VIGEVANI, T. and RAMANZINI JR, H, Haroldo. Regional Integration and Relations 151 Miriam Gomes Saraiva both cases, these movements have gone hand in hand with efforts to use foreign policy to support national development. The aim of this article is to analyze Brazil’s foreign policy towards South American countries under the government of President Lula (2003-2010). As such, it intends to highlight two specific dimensions: the extent to which foreign policy during this period has differed from that of previous periods, and the relative importance granted by Brazilian diplomacy to recent cooperation and integration efforts, more specifically the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) and Mercosur.4 The article argues that the Lula administration has behaved differently from its predecessors by prioritizing the building up of Brazilian leadership in South America on several different fronts, especially by strengthening multilateral institutions in the region. In order to fulfil this aim, the article first investigates continuities and discontinuities in Brazilian foreign policy, laying special attention on the Lula years. Next, it traces Brazil’s historic behaviour towards its South American peers, in this case focusing more on the regional policy developed by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration. The third part analyzes Brazilian foreign policy as practised by the Lula administration in its relations with South America and especially with regard to Mercosur. Throughout the text, the ideas of foreign policymakers – linked with their interests – are considered as important tools for the analysis. Continuity and discontinuity in Lula’s foreign policy Brazil’s relationship with is neighbours and efforts to build up regional leadership have not been consistent over the last twenty years, with different strategies and priorities gaining precedence during this period. For many years, the overriding paradigm inside Itamaraty has been based on beliefs that would seem to indicate an increasing meeting of minds within Brazilian diplomatic circles and some important signs of continuity in the country’s foreign policy.5 According to Vigevani et al (2008), autonomy and universalism are the two mainstays of Brazilian foreign policy. Here, universalism is meant to express the idea of receptiveness towards all countries, regardless of their geographical location, regime or economic policy, and could be equated with the idea of acting as a with Argentina: Bases of the Brazilian Thought. Paper presented in Joint International Meeting. Diversity and inequality in world politics. Rio de Janeiro, ABRI/ISA, 22-24/jul./20092009. 4 For an important discussion of perspectives for change in Brazilian foreign policy, see VIGEVANI, T. and CEPALUNI, G. A política externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação. Contexto Internacional, vol. 29, n. 2, 2007, p.273-335. 5 The definition used here for “belief” is based on the classification by GOLDSTEIN, J.. & KEOHANE, R. Ideas and Foreign Policy: an analytical framework. GOLDSTEIN and KEOHANE (eds.). Ideas & foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political changes. Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 2003. p.3-30. 152 global player. Meanwhile, autonomy can be seen as the amount of manoeuvring space a country has in its dealings with other States and in international politics. Underlying both ideas is the belief – shared by Brazilian foreign policymakers over the years – that Brazil is destined to become a major power, allusions to which have been made since the early 1900s. It therefore follows that Brazil should have a special place on the international scene in political and strategic terms (Silva, 1998). These beliefs are consistent with the presence of a structured diplomatic corps. The highly historically concentrated foreign policymaking process in Brazil with the presence of Itamaraty as a specialized bureaucracy, from a perspective of historical institutionalism6, has contributed to more consistent behaviour founded on longer-term principles. Meanwhile, these beliefs also contribute to initiatives towards the region that are inspired on realistic assumptions. Pinheiro (2000) notes that within the framework of realism, Brazil’s behavior sometimes takes on more of a Hobbesian character, while at other times it gives preference to realism of a Grotian nature in a bid to boost the country’s power in the region and on the international scene.7 Lima (1990: 17) argues that countries like Brazil often adopt multifaceted international behavior, seeking to take advantage of what the international system has to offer, while simultaneously spearheading efforts to remodel it with the aim of benefitting southern hemisphere countries and adopting a stance of leadership in the region. Nonetheless, continuity has to coexist with some discontinuities. The strategies inspired by Hobbes or Grotius, and the quest for greater autonomy in international relations or for leading initiatives representing southern nations are formulated according to: a) the international context; b) the national development strategy; and c) calculations made by foreign policymakers that vary according to their political preferences and perceptions as to what the “national interests” are and other more specific variables. From the 1990s onwards, explains Lima (2000), as the foreign policy agenda started to gain space in the realm of public policies and attract the interest of different spheres of civil society, Itamaraty’s monopoly in policymaking and what could be termed the country’s “national interests” started to wane. The opening up of the economy was one factor behind the politicization of foreign policy as a function of the unequal distribution of its costs and gains, while the consolidation of democracy led to discussions in society and different opinions being voiced about what should be on the international agenda. These two processes made room not just for a consolidation of different schools of thought within Itamaraty (also 6 See HALL, Peter & TAYLOR, Rosemary. Political Science and the three New Institutionalisms. MPIFG Discussion Paper 96/6,1996. 7 The Hobbesian dimension of realism seeks to increase a state’s relative power in relation to others, while the Grotian dimension emphases initiatives with a view to absolute gains that may also mean benefits for other states. For more on Hobbesian and Grotian realism see Pinheiro (2000). 153 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration Miriam Gomes Saraiva identified with different political groups), but also for the inclusion of players from other state agencies in foreign policy making and implementation.8 When Lula came into power, the autonomist school of thought gained ground within Itamaraty, and since then it has become the main foreign policymaking group in Brazil. Above all, the autonomists defend a more self-directed and active projection for the country in the international arena. As part of this, these analysts and policymakers are in favour of a reform of international institutions so as to open up a broader international platform for Brazil. Adopting behaviour defined by Lima as soft revisionism,9 they have political and strategic concerns regarding north-south problems and forge links with other so-called emerging countries with similar traits to Brazil. The main goals are to build up regional leadership and be seen as a global power.10 The autonomists are largely an offshoot from economic developmentalism. They see integration as a way of gaining access to foreign markets, strengthening the country’s bargaining position in international economic negotiations, and projecting Brazilian industry in the region. This group now coexists with a more recently assembled community having its own foreign policy proposals, which has scant historic ties with the diplomatic classes but which, during the Lula administration and in the process of including new players in foreign policymaking, has set up an important dialogue with Itamaraty and has exerted some influence on foreign policy decisions.11 This force comprises scholars and political leaders, mostly from the Workers’ Party (PT). Indeed, when Lula came into office, he broke with the tradition of keeping foreign policymaking within the confines of Itamaraty by inviting Marco Aurélio Garcia, then the PT’s Secretary for International Relations, to be his advisor. By so doing, he effectively opened up new spaces for this group to influence policymaking. This new point of view is also expressed in several government agencies.12 8 Since the 1990s, Brazilian diplomacy has basically been divided into two schools of thought, autonomists and pragmatic institutionalists, which hold different views about the dynamics of the international order, national interests and the best strategy for attaining the overall goals of autonomy and economic growth for the country. These two currents were in tune with the views of political players during the period. For more on this topic, see SARAIVA, M.G. A diplomacia brasileira e a visão sobre a inserção externa do Brasil: institucionalistas pragmáticos X autonomistas. Mural Internacional Ano 1 n.1. Rio de Janeiro, 2010. p.45-52. 9 Expounded by Maria Regina Soares de Lima in “As bases conceituais da Política Externa Brasileira” at Seminário Iniciativa México Brasil, LACC/FIU, Miami, 13th May 2010. 10 Alongside the autonomists from Itamaraty, the Lula administration has also been influenced in its foreign policy for the region by nationalistic thinkers who see Brazil as the most important country south of the equator with a capacity to influence its southern peers thanks to certain of its attributes, such as its population, geography, economics, etc. 11 For more on this subject, see BRICEÑO RUIZ, J. and SARAIVA, M.G.iriam G. Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela. Foro Internacional 199 vol.I num.1, Cidade do México, 2010. p.35-62and SARAIVA, M.G., A diplomacia brasileira e a visão sobre a inserção externa do Brasil: institucionalistas pragmáticos x autonomistas, Op.cit. 12 This group is identified by MALAMUD, A. and CASTRO, P. – Are Regional Blocs leading from nation states to global governance? A skeptical vision from Latin America. Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies vol. n.1, 2007 – as the progressives. 154 Based on the understanding that South America has its own identity, this group has prioritized regional integration which it seeks to develop in the political and social spheres. In this sense, it supports initiatives taken by the region’s anti-liberal governments that are designed to bolster their respective countries’ development strategies and even their political regimes and proposes a kind of tacit solidarity with them. This group also argues that Brazil should be willing to take on a larger share of the costs of regional integration. As far as Mercosur is concerned, they are in favour of strengthening integration in the political, social and cultural spheres. This position has been influential amongst Itamaraty’s autonomists, as it has contributed for Brazil to take a more proactive stance in its cooperation with its neighbours and in accepting the different political positions existing in the region. Nonetheless, when it comes to some topics, Mercosur being a case in point, the influence of one group outweighs the other, leading to results that are often incoherent, such as the weakening of the bloc just when the Mercosur Parliament was created. As Brazil’s cooperation with other countries from the region has grown, certain agencies, such as the Ministries of Health, Science & Technology and Education, have been more involved in formulating the country’s international cooperation policy, while the Brazilian Development Bank, BNDES, has started lending more abroad. Unlike the Cardoso administration’s foreign policy, autonomy-oriented diplomacy efforts under Lula have sought out more direct strategies for boosting the autonomy of Brazilian actions, while strengthening universalism through south-south cooperation initiatives and in multilateral forums, and strengthening Brazil’s proactive role in international politics. With respect to South America, the Lula da Silva administration has demonstrated a political will to increase the level of coordination between the region’s countries, with Brazil at the hub.13 Precedents of Brazil’s behavior in the region Until the 1950s, Brazil channelled most of its dealings with its neighbours through its participation in Panamerican multilateral forums. However, as the 1950s progressed, a new regional identity started to take shape thanks to the developmentalist ideas of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), which also put discussions about regional integration on the agenda. In 1961, Brazil inaugurated its Independent Foreign Policy with more explicit support for the new sub-regional integration initiative, the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), and a bid to forge closer ties with Argentina through 13 LIMA, M.R.S.de – Are Regional Blocs leading from nation states to global governance? A skeptical vision from Latin America. Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies vol. n.1, 2007mentions the political will of the Lula administration to build up regional integration and notes Brazil’s effective leadership in the region, while drawing attention to its limitations. 155 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration Miriam Gomes Saraiva what was called the spirit of Uruguaiana14, even if this was never a top priority in Brazil’s foreign policy. From 1964 until the end of the following decade, Brazil’s approach towards its South American neighbours and regional integration was to give precedence to bilateral agreements and only formal support for joint initiatives. The rise to power of João Figueiredo in 1979 saw a major shift in the country’s foreign policy for the region. The government incorporated into its foreign agenda the idea of a Latin American identity for Brazil by drawing closer ties with the other countries in the continent, and also started to prioritize actions in multilateral forums. The exacerbated conflict between East and West, the weakening of the Third World on the international scene and the foreign debt crisis contrived to bring Brazil closer to its regional peers. The Brazilian government took its first steps towards closer links with Argentina with the following measures: the signing of the Tripartite Agreement on Corpus and Itaipu; the visits by the presidents to their neighbours in 1980; the signing of a nuclear agreement between the two countries; and Brazil’s position of partial neutrality during the Falklands War. But it was in the second half of the 1980s that Brazil made its most notable shift in approach towards the rest of the continent as the countries started emerging with new democratization processes. Within this context, the Brazilian government took the important step of signing the Declaration of Iguaçu and launching the Programme for Integration and Economic Cooperation with Argentina. The same period also saw the creation of the Rio Group with the aim of aligning the region’s international policies. At this time, Brazil’s attitude towards the region was influenced by a combination of domestic factors and positions within the government apparatus, which were instrumental in the move towards integration with Argentina along heterodoxal economic lines. The mechanisms designed to address the economic crisis triggered by the foreign debt problem, the need to update the country’s production sector, and the consolidation of democracy were drivers for this rapprochement. The turn of the 1990s saw major changes in the international scenario and inside Brazil. The foreign policy of forging bonds and integration with its neighbours became a priority for Brazil, and since that period Brazilian government has taken forth a number of initiatives in this area, the most ambitious being Mercosur. The demise of the model of economic development based on import substitution and the financial problems brought about by the foreign debt crisis led the Brazilian government to set about redefining its development project. The fact that two liberal governments were in power concomitantly in Brazil and Argentina took the integration process, launched in 1985, down a more liberal path: the trade dimension of Mercosur gained force and the process took on the features of open regionalism. 14 For more on Brazil’s stance towards Argentina in this period and the spirit of Uruguaiana see SPEKTOR, M. Rupturas e Legado: o colapso da Cordialidade Oficial e a construção da parceria entre o Brasil e a Argentina (1967-1979). Master thesis in International Relations, Brasília: iREL/UnB, 2002 156 From an economic perspective, Mercosur was seen by the government and government agencies as the first step towards a customs union, which was in line with its development strategy as it would help achieve economies of scale, with greater comparative advantages and efficiency in production. The government then started to negotiate the formation of a common external tariff. Meanwhile, Mercosur could also boost foreign trade and operate as a magnet for attracting foreign private investments, being it an integration project that was nonetheless open to foreign trade. Politically speaking, Mercosur could also reinforce Brazil’s bargaining position, adding it weight in the international arena. An intergovernmental institutional model was adopted in order to maintain autonomy in foreign and macroeconomic policy decision making. The arrival in power of Itamar Franco put the brakes on the growth of liberalism in Brazil and opened up new space in Itamaraty for autonomist players. In terms of economic cooperation, his government gave greater priority to creating a future South American Free Trade Area than it gave to Mercosur. With South American integration under Brazilian leadership raised top of the agenda, the autonomists sought to expand the bloc by opening the doors to new countries and pushing for the formation of a free trade area across the whole continent. In the meantime, Mercosur could still serve to give Brazil some regional leverage and could be a helpful element in the formation of such a free trade area. However, this project failed to get off the drawing board, while the Mercosur integration project gained ground. Even so, it was during Franco’s administration that Brazil started to conceive of South America as something different from Latin America in its foreign policy. During the tenures of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazilian diplomacy, which had until then been marked by the ideas of the pragmatic institutionalists, started to perceive the importance of having South American partners if they were to strengthen Brazil’s position as a global player and negotiator in multilateral forums, and as space for expanding Brazilian development. Diplomats started to review traditional attitudes towards the region based on the idea of nonintervention, and strove to establish leadership in the area by striking a balance between integration, regional security, democratic stability and infrastructure development (Villa, 2004). This position also started to take a stance whenever a democratic regime came under threat. Meanwhile, the first steps were taken to build up a community of countries in the region. In 2000, with the weakening of Mercosur as a result of the exchange rate crisis of 1999, the first meeting of South American countries was held in Brasília with a view to forming the South American Community of Nations (SACN). The meeting’s agenda was dominated by discussions about economic integration, infrastructure and the strengthening of democratic regimes. Brazil’s energy system was reoriented towards the region and infrastructure integration projects 157 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration Miriam Gomes Saraiva were designed that signalled the way towards the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA). As regards Mercosur, there was a growing movement within Itamaraty that defended its development based on an incomplete customs union, on limiting political integration and on a low institutional profile, which would bolster Brazil’s international position while avoiding the strict commitments required for a common market or any supranational traits (VIGEVANI et al, 2008). From this time on, trade integration took on a key role within the framework of open regionalism, while institutionalizing the bloc was not deemed relevant. Politically speaking, Mercosur was seen as useful in strengthening Brazil’s negotiating clout, adding it weight in the international arena. Despite some friction inside the bloc about the common external tariff, parallel trade negotiations were held with the EU and for the formation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) under the bloc’s new legal personality, instituted at the end of 1994. The prospect of an alliance with Argentina concerning the regional policies implemented by Itamaraty was halted by a consensus amongst diplomats and other sectors of Brazil’s bureaucratic apparatus: Brazilian foreign policy would be an area of national sovereignty.15 To compound matters, Brazilian diplomacy started to see Argentina as a lesser partner and its frequent changes of foreign policy only went to raise suspicions. It was neither clear what weight each country should have in the alliance nor to what extent Brazil would be an ally of Argentina’s or would act as the bloc’s paymaster. In practice, however, efforts were made in the regional ambit to develop common positions with Argentina on topics concerning South America where they had previously held different positions. In Mercosur, the signing of the Ushuaia Protocol was an important step. In this process, Mercosur took a priority position in Brazil’s foreign policy for the region, and integration with other South American countries was relegated to a complementary level with Mercosur at the hub. In 1999, Mercosur went through a serious crisis when Brazil devalued its currency, which had serious knock-on effects for the Argentine economy. Brazil considered the decision to be one of national sovereignty over economic policy decisions and failed to consult the other members of the bloc in advance. The devaluation had a strong impact on Argentina’s Convertibility Plan, and the Menem administration reacted by imposing customs barriers on Brazilian products. While Menem’s successor, De la Rúa, was in power, Brazil again started to play up its relations with its South American neighbours, while putting Mercosur on the back burner in response to the perceived fragility and unpredictability of the Argentine administration. 15 Argentina’s decision to align itself with the USA during the period also made further articulations in this area impossible. 158 Ultimately, it was the 2001 crisis in Argentina that gave the bloc a new lease of life. Brazil chose to give the country political support, aligning itself as an ally within the Mercosur framework. During the last year of the Cardoso administration, which overlapped with President Duhalde’s term in Argentina, the countries drew closer again in response to the important role played by Brazil during the Argentine crisis. The Brazilian government restated and elucidated its support for its neighbour and for Mercosur trade negotiations which helped bolster Argentina’s position in the eyes of countries from outside the continent. Building up Brazilian leadership during the Lula administration Brazil’s foreign policy for South America underwent some changes during the Lula da Silva administration. The period was marked by the rise of the autonomists inside Itamaraty. But alongside the traditionally central role played by Itamaraty in foreign policymaking, this policy was also influenced by a more politically – and academically – inclined group which, as mentioned earlier, defended stronger political and social integration based on the perception of a certain compatibility between the countries’ values, real mutual advantages to be reaped, and a relatively common identity across the continent. The convergence or in some instances the mere coexistence of these two viewpoints meant that the region was perceived differently from how it had been during the previous administration, and also opened up space for a new attitude by Brazil’s diplomats towards the building up of Brazilian leadership, by pursuing new forms of cooperation and integration with neighbouring countries, and also towards Mercosur (which in this case lost ground). This movement instigated by the Brazilian government incorporated both the Hobbesian and Grotian dimensions of realism. The globalized international scenario, a more multipolar international system with the rise of new players after 9/11 and greater fragmentation as of the 2008 crisis paved the way for the rise of Brazil. New spaces became available for it to take a more proactive stance. In the US, the Bush government gave up once and for all a Panamerican policy for Latin America after 2001, and there has been no specific policy for the region since Obama came to power. In South America, liberalism has lost ground since the early 2000s as new anti-liberal governments have been elected, reinforcing this overall trend. This external scenario has also been propitious for Brazil’s revised approach to the region. Cervo (2008) identified Lula administration’s attitude towards South America during this period as being characteristic of a “logistic State”, which takes on an important role in orienting and supporting the domestic economy and society in its dealings with the rest of the region. This pattern of behaviour in its interaction with its neighbours is propitious for South American integration. 159 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration Miriam Gomes Saraiva The importance of the South American dimension When Lula da Silva came to power, increased coordination between South American countries under Brazilian leadership started to be a political priority. Integration with its neighbours was seen as the surest route for Brazil to gain international standing, while also helping Brazil realize its potential and form a bloc that was strong enough to have more international clout. With this in mind, Brazilian diplomacy set about further developing an approach that had already begun under President Cardoso, while giving new weight to leadership building through a combination of soft power patterns, based on Grotian realism, which took the form of strengthened multilateralism in the region. Brazil reinstated and adjusted the principle of non-intervention in the form of “non-indifference”16, and included in its agenda a regional leadership construction programme by coordinating regional cooperation and integration efforts with an eye to boosting Brazilian development. The strategy to consolidate the SACN was an important ingredient in this project. Once Lula was elected, Brazilian diplomacy focused more directly on its institutionalization, which was formalized in 2004. At the 1st Meeting of Presidents and Heads of Government of SACN countries in 2005, the group’s agenda gave priority to addressing asymmetries, and also included talks on a broad range of topics, including political dialogue, physical integration, the environment, energy integration, South American financial mechanisms, asymmetries, the promotion of social cohesion, social inclusion and social justice, and telecommunications. This demonstrates the outcome of the broadening of the scope of technical and financial cooperation initiatives with countries from the region. In 2008 the SACN was succeeded by Unasur in response to pressure from Venezuela. The approach within Unasur is more one of cooperation than of traditional integration, but it has become increasingly consistent and has been important in responding to situations of crisis in the continent. For the Brazilian government, the organization has become its main channel for multilateral action. For one thing, it is strictly intergovernmental and has a very limited institutional framework, which assures Brazil a good level of autonomy from the other members and in its relations with countries outside the region. It is also an important mechanism that highlights the political dimension of Brazilian policy for the region and through which Brazil’s diplomats have operated in their quest to build up common positions with its neighbours in response to situations of crisis, 16 In the words of Celso Amorim -A política externa do governo Lula: os dois primeiros anos. Rio de Janeiro: Observatório de Política Sul-Americana/Iuperj. (Análise de conjuntura n.4). [http:// obsevatorio.iuperj.br/analises.php] Accessed: 01/03/2010- “Brazil has always taken the stance of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States [...]. But non-intervention cannot mean a lack of interest. In other words, the precept of non-intervention should be seen in the light of another precept, based on solidarity: that of non-indifference.” 160 while striving to hold onto a leading position inside it. Economically speaking, as it has no specific regional integration commitments, it can accommodate different sub-regional initiatives like Mercosur and the Andean Community. In strategic terms, the South American Defence Council was recently formed on the initiative of the Brazilian government. The autonomists, who defend developmentalist thinking, see integration and cooperation with other countries in the region as a tool for gaining access to foreign markets, encouraging transformations in and enhanced efficiency of domestic production systems, and an instrument that can strengthen the country at international economic negotiations. It also has the potential to open up new prospects for Brazil’s industry in that it can take advantage of any gaps in its neighbours’ production systems. The National Defence Strategy presented by the Lula government puts particular weight on the development of Brazil’s defence industry. Under President Lula, Brazil has added a complex cooperation structure with other South American countries to its overall foreign policy agenda. While in its dealings with emerging countries from other parts of the world it has focused on technology exchange and joint actions at multilateral forums, in its dealings with its South American peers it has given priority to technical and financial cooperation, bilateralism, and “non-indifference”. Brazil’s efforts to build up its leadership in South America have been particularly marked by this second form of cooperation. One important indicator of Brazil’s regional position is its level of technical and financial cooperation with its neighbours. In South America, Brazil has funded infrastructure projects, engaged in technical cooperation initiatives, shown a preference for bilateral relations and relativized the concept of non-intervention. On the financial front, BNDES has started lending money for infrastructure projects in other countries in the continent that are being conducted by Brazilian enterprise. During the period the IIRSA has become increasingly important in raising funds for regional infrastructure.17 Technical cooperation in some sectors is starting to be introduced bilaterally via the countries’ respective Ministries of Education, Science & Technology and Health. These initiatives effectively work as foreign policy tools, but rely on the decentralization of their formulators. Nonetheless, Brazil’s foreign policy stance in the region has not been free of tension. With the rise in nationalistic sentiments in some governments as they realign their domestic agendas, some of Brazil’s neighbours have challenged its position and demanded economic concessions. The nationalization of oil and gas by the Bolivian government was a blow to the Brazilian government. The pressure 17 COUTO, Leandro F. Política Externa Brasileira para a América do Sul as diferenças entre Cardoso e Lula. Civitas vol.10 n.1. Porto Alegre, 2010. p.23-44, provides a wealth of information and interesting data on the IIRSA and the Lula government’s foreign policy for the region. 161 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration Miriam Gomes Saraiva exerted by Fernando Lugo’s administration to reform the Itaipu Treaty is starting to bear fruit, even if only to some extent for the moment. There are widespread calls for Brazil to act as regional paymaster. In response, Brazil has taken some major steps internally in order to obtain greater political support for its regional leadership project, which can be seen by the formation of a coalition that is more favourably disposed towards Brazil’s taking on some of the costs of South American integration. The debate is now public and the association between Brazilian leadership and its costs is clear to members of government agencies. The country is slowly but surely becoming the region’s de facto paymaster, despite facing some resistance at home. Thinkers from the group previously identified with academic and political arenas have also had some influence on this overall move, expounding the idea that cooperation is positive, encouraging efforts to build up a South American identity, and bolstering initiatives to bring the country closer to other governments that are also identified as being progressive. Another significant yet little discussed element in the agenda is Venezuela and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). According to Marco Aurélio Garcia, President Chávez “is a sincere man of exceptional will who has grasped the problems of Venezuelan society”; he also defends close ties with the neighbouring country.18 Garcia goes on to argue that “there exists greater solidarity between Brazil and its neighbours. We do not want the country to be an island of prosperity in the midst of a world of paupers. We do have to help them. This is a pragmatic view.” In the eyes of international players outside the region like the EU, Brazil could be seen as the “natural leader of South America” with the means to buffer the moves made by Chávez in Venezuela and bolster stability in the region (Gratius 2008, 116). But Brazil’s autonomous foreign policy stance prevents it from playing such a role. While Venezuela’s regional integration moves (ALBA) may be different from and compete with the integration model championed by Brazil, it is nonetheless important for it to be kept within the regional frameworks. Finally, when it comes to the USA, Brazil has maintained autonomy when it comes to the issues of the South America continent. There is no consensus between the two countries as to how to deal with these topics and no prospect of building up any coordinated action. The negotiations towards the formation of the FTAA were effectively blocked and ended in failure. Brazil’s more autonomous involvement in international politics and its reformist trends have created new points of friction between the two countries, which are addressed with low political profile. 18 Interview by Dieguez with Marco Aurélio Garcia and cited in DIEGUEZ, C. O Formulador Emotivo. Piauí, n.30/mar./2009. p.20-24. 162 Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration As regards Mercosur, the behaviour of the Lula administration is symptomatic of the coexistence of the two broad influences on the country’s foreign policy. For their part, the autonomists aim to achieve South American integration under Brazilian leadership, for which purpose they are pushing for the expansion of Mercosur through the entry of new states or the formation of Unasur. Those that defend this position see Mercosur as capable of leveraging Brazil’s regional standing and opening the way for the formation of a free trade area in the region.19 The signing of agreements with the Andean Community and the process of admitting Venezuela as a full member are indicative of this. Meanwhile, the open regionalism and trade-oriented nature of Mercosur have their critics. In a publication from 2006, the then Secretary-General of Itamaraty Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães comments: “the shortsightedness of Brazil’s strategy in abandoning the model of political cooperation between Brazil and Argentina and exchanging it for the neoliberal model of integration around trade extolled in the Treaty of Asuncion has been notable,” (2006, 357 cited in Vigevani and Ramanzini, 2009, 24).20 In the same work, Guimarães criticizes the waning importance being given to “development” in the bloc’s framework. The current administration has striven to maintain an economic balance within Mercosur, giving precedence to Brazilian infrastructure development and industry projects. Those players who are aligned with the PT are more likely to defend greater political and social integration. Although their influence in government is more limited, their presence is still felt and they have gained ground. To overcome the institutional deficit, the Permanent Review Tribunal came into effect, and the Commission of Permanent Representatives was created, with a more technical bias for the bloc’s Secretary being discussed. Finally, in 2006, the Mercosur Parliament was created, albeit with no legislature. The creation of the Mercosur Fund for Structural Convergence (Focem) was a step towards Brazil’s officially taking on the role as the bloc’s paymaster. However, the Brazilian government is still strongly biased in favour of pursuing bilateral initiatives in the realm of cooperation, and these far outweigh any influence Focem might have when it comes to Brazil’s relations with its neighbours and even with other members of Mercosur, such as Paraguay.21 19 In an article written in 2005 (AMORIM,C. A política externa do governo Lula: os dois primeiros anos, Op.cit.), the Minister of Foreign Affairs reflects on the first two years of the Lula administration’s foreign policy, giving special attention to South America and other international initiatives. The overriding concern he voices about Mercosur is the benefits related to Brazil’s position towards other countries from the continent. 20 The article mentioned is Guimarães, Samuel P. Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes, Contraponto, Rio de Janeiro, 2006. 21 Focem was created in 2005, with an initial fund of US$100 million a year, with Brazil contributing 70% of its monies. Its funds were recently increased slightly. See http://www.mercosur.gov.ar. 163 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The relative weakening of Mercosur Miriam Gomes Saraiva However, the current scenario has not helped much in the way of strengthening this group’s influence on Brazilian strategic making. Though some parts of the government defend an alliance with Argentina, the greater weight the Brazilian government has placed on South America does not make it likely.22 Meanwhile, the Brazil/Argentina axis, which is the political cornerstone of Mercosur, is facing some problems of its own. While one might have expected the election of Lula and Néstor Kirchner to have made way for a more robust political partnership between the two countries, it has actually been somewhat eroded by a combination of other factors. Politically speaking, Brazilian government investments in South American integration and in pursuing its regional leadership agenda have been one priority in its foreign affairs. This has been received badly by the Argentine government, causing some sectors of the country’s diplomacy close to former President Kirchner to turn to Venezuela in a bid to counterbalance this putative leadership. Meanwhile, it has been hard to discern any clear longer-term objectives for the region in the foreign policy developed first by Néstor Kirchner and then by Cristina Kirchner, which leaves little hope for any bolstering of the alliance. When it comes to economic policy, Kirchner’s strategy is neodevelopmentalist, with the aim of establishing a more active policy designed to reorganize the country’s industry, but this has clashed directly with Brazil’s consolidated industrial policy and the expansion prospects for Brazilian businesses in the region. The corollary of this is that Argentina has shifted in its attitude towards Mercosur, breaking some of the terms of the free trade area and the common external tariff. This change of behaviour has eroded the confidence Brazilian government agencies and export agents had in the Argentine market, and trade with the country has diminished in relative terms in the Brazilian trade balance. The trade agreement prospects for Mercosur have also proved limited. Only one agreement was signed recently between Mercosur and Israel. But if the possibility of joint economic negotiations with international partners was originally an important factor, Brazil’s growth has not been matched by its Mercosur partners. According to some private economic players, Brazil’s Mercosur partners do not have much of a say in these negotiations.23 When it comes to the agreement between the EU and Mercosur, the negotiations are still underway but with negligible results thus far. A “strategic partnership” has been signed by Brazil and the EU outside the ambit of Mercosur, which implicitly undermines the interregional effort and consequently the agreement between the EU and Mercosur as the default forum for political dialogue and cooperation. 22 VIGEVANI, T. and RAMANZINI JR, H., Regional Integration and Relations with Argentina: Bases of the Brazilian Thought., Op.cit, note that, Samuel P. Guimarães, defended an alliance with Argentina as the basis for South American integration. 23 This opinion has been mentioned in the Brazilian press. 164 Finally, the strengthening of the Brazilian economy and the country’s growing international presence have opened up new arenas for Brazilian diplomacy – the IBSA Dialogue Forum, the BRIC nations, etc. – while Argentina has been left behind. Brazil has been active in a number of multilateral forums without any kind of recourse to its southern neighbour. The countries’ nuclear cooperation agreement is losing ground as Brazil sets its sights higher. In general terms, it is the autonomists’ view that has set the course for diplomacy in realist terms. The South American perspective combined with the country’s international projection has gained precedence and are being pursued independently of Mercosur. Although without mention by Brazilian diplomacy, the partnership between Brazil and Argentina has in practice ceased to be a priority for Brazil in its foreign policy. Despite the diplomatic limitations, there are important gains that have been reached in terms of integration, partly within Mercosur but primarily between Brazil and Argentina. At the end of the government, anew Mercosur customs code was signed and double taxation came to an end as part of the custom union; these will be introduced during the next government. The Mercosur Fund for Structural Convergence has also seen some progress. Above and beyond the Mercosur Parliament (with all its limitations), the degree of cooperation between different ministries working in the realms of education, culture, energy and labour on both sides of the border has grown during the Lula years. Integration is starting to make sense on a societal level thanks to initiatives taken by different government agents, expressing the incorporation of new players in foreign policymaking in the Lula government. Conclusion In the current scenario, it is a priority to open up and consolidate room for cooperation and integration within South America, and there are some elements that are clearly beneficial for this process. The Brazilian government has clearly set its sights on making Brazil a regional leader. The country’s growing international presence has helped strengthen its regional standing, although growth in one sphere does not necessarily lead to growth in the other. As for Brazil’s foreign policy for the region, the autonomist school of thought has gained precedence inside Itamaraty and other government agencies. The scenario in the continent has proved favourable in the sense that several progressive governments working within different frameworks and alliances have come to power, and certain inter- and intra-state crises have come to a head. The building up of this leadership and the model of cooperation and integration being pursued is in tune with the three pillars of Brazil’s foreign policy: autonomy, universalism and growth for the country on the international sphere. This logistic State, as defined by Cervo (2008), has put its diplomats and government agencies 165 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration Miriam Gomes Saraiva at the service of its drive to draw closer ties with its neighbours both politically and economically and through technical and scientific cooperation. Meanwhile, the scenario within Mercosur is far from propitious. Brazil’s trade relations with Argentina have seen a number of setbacks, causing certain Brazilian sectors to speak out against the bloc and fuelling the position of those that prioritize South American integration in strategy formulation. It has proved harder to make progress inside the bloc than on a broader regional level. Brazil’s belief in autonomy, universalism and its destiny as a global power has received such attention under the Lula administration that Argentina has reacted with some mistrust. Indeed, Brazil’s newfound international standing, while drawing interest to the region, has ultimately eroded the partnership between the two countries. Finally, this analysis of the Lula government’s foreign policy towards South America would generally confirm that Brazil’s attitude towards the rest of the region is underpinned by a strong belief in autonomy, universalism and the country’s destiny as a global power. However, it also highlights a lack of continuity in the international and South American scenarios, in the political options available, in the foreign policy strategies and their outcomes. References AMORIM, Celso. (2005). A política externa do governo Lula: os dois primeiros anos. Rio de Janeiro: Observatório de Política Sul-Americana/Iuperj. (Análise de conjuntura n.4). [http:// obsevatorio.iuperj.br/analises.php] Accessed: 01/03/2010. BRICEÑO RUIZ, José & SARAIVA, Miriam G. Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela. Foro Internacional 199 vol.I num.1, Cidade do México, 2010. p.35-62. CERVO, Amado Luiz. Inserção Internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008. COUTO, Leandro F. Política Externa Brasileira para a América do Sul as diferenças entre Cardoso e Lula. Civitas vol.10 n.1. Política e integração sul-americana. Porto Alegre, 2010. p.23-44. DIEGUEZ, Consuelo. O Formulador Emotivo. Piauí, n.30/mar./2009. p.20-24. GOLDSTEIN, Judith. & KEOHANE, Robert. Ideas and Foreign Policy: an analytical framework. J.GOLDSTEIN and R.KEOHANE (eds.). Ideas & foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political changes. Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 2003. p.3-30. GRATIUS, Susanne. O Brasil como parceiro estratégico da UE: conseqüências bilaterais, regionais e globais, W.HOFFMEISTEr (ed), Anuário Brasil-Europa 2007. Rio de Janeiro, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008. p. 111-120. 166 Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration HALL, Peter & TAYLOR, Rosemary. Political Science and the three New Institutionalisms. MPIFG Discussion Paper 96/6,1996. LIMA, Maria Regina S. de. Instituições Democráticas e Política Exterior. Contexto Internacional vol.22 n.2. Rio de Janeiro, IRI/PUC-Rio, 2000, p.265-303. LIMA, Maria Regina S. de. Identidad y diversidad en América del Sur: Desafíos para la Política Exterior Brasileña. Paper presented in “Amérique Latine: Nouvelles Gauches? Nouvelles Démocraties?”, CÉRIUM, Université de Montreal, Montreal, 29-30/mar./2007. MALAMUD, Andrés & CASTRO, Pablo. Are Regional Blocs leading from nation states to global governance? A skeptical vision from Latin America. Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies vol. n.1, 2007. MALAMUD, A. Conceptos, teorias y debates sobre la integración regional. Paper presented in V Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política/Alacip. Buenos Aires, 28-30/jul./2010. MELLO, Flávia Campos. Diretrizes e redefinição da política externa brasileira na década de 90. Paper presented in XXIV Encontro Anual da Anpocs, Caxambu, 23-27/oct./2000. PINHEIRO, Letícia. Traídos pelo Desejo: um ensaio sobre a teoria e a prática da política externa brasileira contemporânea. Contexto Internacional vol. 22 n.2, Rio de Janeiro: IRI/ PUC-Rio, 2000. p.305-336. SARAIVA, Miriam G. A diplomacia brasileira e a visão sobre a inserção externa do Brasil: institucionalistas pragmáticos X autonomistas. Mural Internacional Ano 1 n.1. Rio de Janeiro, PPGRI/UERJ, 2010. p.45-52. SILVA, Alexandra de Mello e. O retorno do “ destino manifesto”: o Brasil face à reforma do Conselho de Segurança da ONU. Paper presented in XXII Encontro Anual da Anpocs, Caxambu, oct./1998. SPEKTOR, Matias. Rupturas e Legado: o colapso da Cordialidade Oficial e a construção da parceria entre o Brasil e a Argentina (1967-1979). Master thesis in International Relations, Brasília: iREL/UnB, 2002. VIGEVANI, Tullo e CEPALUNI, Gabriel. A política externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação. Contexto Internacional, vol. 29, n. 2. Rio de Janeiro, IRI/ PUC-Rio, 2007. p.273-335. VIGEVANI, Tullo; RAMAZINI JR., Haroldo; FAVARON, Gustavo; CORREIA, Rodrigo A. O papel da integração regional para o Brasil: universalismo, soberania e percepção das elites. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Ano 51 n.1, Brasília, Ibri, 2008, p.5-27. VIGEVANI, Tullo & RAMANZINI JR, Haroldo. Regional Integration and Relations with Argentina: Bases of the Brazilian Thought. Paper presented in Joint International Meeting. Diversity and inequality in world politics. Rio de Janeiro, ABRI/ISA, 22-24/jul./2009. 167 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional LIMA, Maria Regina S. de. A economia política da política externa brasileira: uma proposta de análise. Contexto Internacional Ano 6 n.12, Rio de Janeiro: IRI/PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro,1990, p.7-28. Miriam Gomes Saraiva VILLA, Rafael D. Brasil: política externa e a agenda democrática na América do Sul. Paper presented in 4to. Encontro Nacional da ABCP, Rio de Janeiro, 21-24/jul./2004. Received August 10, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Abstract The aim of this article is to analyze Brazil’s foreign policy towards the South American region during President Lula’s administration. As such, the article intends to highlight two specific dimensions: the extent to which foreign policy during this period has differed from previous periods and the relative importance granted by Brazilian diplomacy to recent cooperation and integration efforts, more specifically the Unasur and Mercosur. The article argues that the Lula administration has behaved differently from its predecessors by prioritizing the building up of Brazilian leadership in South America on several different fronts, especially by strengthening multilateral institutions in the region. Resumo O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a política externa para a região sul-americana durante o governo de Lula. Assim, no artigo, pretende-se destacar duas dimensões específicas: a extensão pela qual a política externa durante esse período diferenciou-se dos períodos anteriores e a importância relativa dada pela diplomacia brasileira à cooperação e à integração regional, mais especificamente a importância dada à Unasul e ao Mercosul. No artigo, argumenta-se que o governo Lula comportou-se diferentemente do seu predecessor, priorizando a construção de liderança na América do Sul em várias frentes, especialmente fortalecendo instituições regionais. Key-words: Brazilian foreign policy; South America; Unasur; Mercosur. Palavras-chave: Política externa brasileira; América do Sul; Unasul; Mercosul. 168 Artigo The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy A Nova África e o Brasil na era Lula: o renascimento da política atlântica brasileira José Flávio Sombra Saraiva* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 169-182 [2010] The main purpose of the present text is to present a relevant regional dimension regarding Brazil’s international insertion during the Lula era. Africa has been one of the major fronts of Brazilian international insertion over the first years of the 21st century. The African continent has a significant historical weight in our constitution as a nation and is also part of the moves adopted by Brazil’s foreign policy. Brazil decided to play in the new political “chessboard” in which the international context of post-Cold War world consists. The government headed by President Lula (2003 – 2010) revived in more permanent bases Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa. This new measure seems to be closer to a State policy and tends to overcome some of the reasons for historical oscillations considering Brazil’s path in the South Atlantic area. Idealism and realism are gathered in an extremely balanced way supporting the foreign policy conducted by our national State in relation to its Atlantic boundaries. In this sense, the present work is divided in two parts: the first part approaches Africa’s international insertion throughoutthe recent years and the second one is oriented to analyze the dimension occupied by African affairs in Brazil during the Lula era. The historical evolution described on the second part is crucial to emphasize what is novelty about the current relationship involving Brazil’s Atlantic borders and its different perspectives. A new Africa coincides with a global Brazil International circumstances experienced during the turn to the present century have been extremely favorable to Africa’s international insertion. Years separating 1999 from today represent almost one decade of struggle and obstacle overcoming. Compared to the previous four decades, marked by low economic continuity, fractures in the formation of national States and very low social * Professor at University of Brasília – UnB, Brazil, and researcher of National Council for Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq (fsaraiva@unb.br). 169 José Flávio Sombra Saraiva standard levels, there is a new Africa represented by the relatively successful results experienced over the first decade of the 21st century. Noticeable economic development in a recent cycle (1999-2008) has brought structural consistency to the modernization of the African continent, which comprises a territory of thirty million square meters. This is truly a novelty in African states’ recent history, born as a result of the first series of independence processes happening by the end of the 1950’s and beginning of the 60’s. All quantitative and qualitative data produced by international agencies, as well as the rulers of the fifty-four African States, have brought about significant empirical evidence concerning initial assertions. Economists, governments, as well as Chinese and American companies, and even balance sheets carried on by Brazilian companies and government entities, have confirmed the historical improvement witnessed over the other side of the South Atlantic in the early 21st century. Nearly 700 million Africans now behold a new hope for normalization, after decades of turmoil, structural crises and historical difficulties in the fields of social asymmetry and economic dependence on their former metropolises. Acknowledged as global capitalism’s last investment frontier, Africa has recently captured the attention of the international community. This has been Africa’s opportunity to, through economic growth, pursuit political normalization as well as to promote the pacification of its internal conflicts such as the ones held among the different National States within the continent. The expectations which made Africa prominent in the international system have been extremely relevant considering a continent dwelled by States counting only half a century of formal autonomy after the colonial cycle. It’s likely that over the first decade of the present century, Africa has been overcoming the historical drama regarding its internal wars and political violence. Despite the gravity properly applied to the case of Darfur, the number of African countries involved in internal armed conflicts decreased from 13 to 5, between 2001 and 2008. These conflicts have been the most important immediate cause of the high poverty levels in the continent. Their drastic reduction suggests that resources, an estimated amount of US$ 300 billion spent in the wars between 1990 and 2005, may now be directed to poverty eradication policies. The new setting in international affairs over the second semester of 2008 and first half of 2009, especially regarding the economic fields, has called the attention of African leaders and made them reflect. The initial concern was that the global economic crisis would reach the periphery of capitalism, especially most African countries, resulting in a “domino effect”, following the pattern of instability originated in North-American capitalism and its European extensions. The crisis, born due to capital toxicity, the most relevant global fact in the second half of 2008 after its migration to productive activities by the end of that year, became more serious and was already geographically widespread. This crisis 170 intensifying in the first months of 2009 was no surprise to the ordinary observers of global affairs. Had the crisis stricken the whole world? The logic in which each new economic index is presented by government authorities in different parts of the planet frustrated the initial hope. Fatalism was intense and had proportionally reached the other villainous logic that prevailed in a relatively recent historical paradigm: the one marked by euphoric triumphalism from the ones who had declared the “End of History” in the early 90’s, followed by the rise of “a liberal paradise”. There was somehow panic in Africa. It was soon noticed that the context was not as atrocious as it was believed to be. Eventually, Africa had not been completely affected by the congenial pessimism previously witnessed. There the context was slightly different from what it is likely to be in capitalism’s traditional areas and in the most prominent part comprising the emerging countries in the South. Macroeconomic normalization rates are rather positive, public management has improved and African economies have not been as much affected as were some central areas of modern capitalism. The continent is still living a cycle of growth. And this development has been considered the most sustainable one since the independence movements in early 1960’s. Moreover, the 2010 Soccer World Cup was an effort in order to improve the negative values attributed to the continent and turn them into a positive perspective. South Africa represented, through the soccer championship, the yearning of a whole continent. Naturally, Africa is not totally immune to global crises. Chinese retraction has caused some impact over the continent. However, the advancement of capitals coming from the Persian Gulf has compensated credit and infrastructural financing of some new projects headed by NEPAD, enabling the African initiative regarding sustainable development and social incorporation of the ones seen as more vulnerable. Despite the effect of a pessimist fever contamination, Africa is one of the very few parts of the planet in which the talk on crisis has not acquired a relevant proportion. Partly, due to the fact that the crisis has been a lasting picture considering African geography. The continent has been a “laboratory” testing the most inadequate models of development, citizenship matters as well as the continent’s autonomy and decision-making power, for several years in a row. Now what they wish to have Africa for the Africans, what has somehow been seen as a kind of Monroe Doctrine on the other side of the South Atlantic. There has been a huge feeling of pride comprised in the talks of continental Africanity held in South-African stadiums during the last the 2010 Soccer World Cup. For the pessimists, it’s only possible to talk about Africa in turmoil times which generated real humanitarian tragedies or in times of corrupt governments. In fact, these matters deserve total attention and care from international public 171 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy José Flávio Sombra Saraiva opinion, but there are certainly other “Africas”. There are “Africas”, acknowledged by North-American Freedom House’s reports, which have reduced conflicts and enabled the advancement of “free” political regimes. Besides the situation in Darfur, Congo, the case of Somali pirates or Zimbabwe’s previous regime, or even despite corruption problems in South Africa, more than 50% of current African governments are considered democratic or witness a process of democratic normalization. President Obama is aware of this fact and is known to have his plan for Africa. Brazil, currently ruled by President Lula, began its adequate inflection towards Africa way before. There are even some important lessons learned from Africa. Angola’s economic growth rate, which has proven to remain among 7%, is a very auspicious fact. Such growth is also noticed in Eastern Africa, Ethiopia and Ghana, located in Guinea’s Atlantic Gulf. The same could be applied to what happened in Northern Africa, to the Algerian case, anchored on oil and on a project of economic and political leadership in the region. Despite the fact that the continent was not stricken by the crisis as announced by many defeatist heralds, Africa is still haunted by ancient challenges which do not evolve on the same path of its integration in the global society. Four main challenges, among others, can be named and developed into relevant themes for reflection for the next few years in Africa. The first are the low rates of alternation in power within the continent. The lack of electoral alternation in not a novel theme, but it presents new outlines over the second decade of the current century. These dubious regimes and governments, going through a very slow institutionalization process, unhurriedly substitute the precedent rulers for other elites, which are more refreshed and modernized. The second challenge is penetration of international narcotraffic within Africa, considering the constitution of new elites and other sectors of urban populations in the continent’s metropolises. This is a relatively new aspect rooted in the ancient resource wars in Africa, or the well-known blood diamond wars, like the ones in Western Africa and in Angola, now presenting new versions. There are growing concerns with respect to the so called “African bridge”, emerging between Latin America and Europe, involving people and drug smuggling. There is strong evidence of international trafficking corridors, which associate coca paste producers in South America to the transportation and preparation of new products in West Africa and its manipulation process in Africa and Europe. There are few available data with regard to this subject. However, they seem to be enough to form an assumption that those interests, a reality in international political economy, are vivid in Africa’s current economic and political affairs. What has been noticed is the rise of parasite states, directly attached to this international threat. 172 The third challenge is placed in the exclusive field of public policies conducted so that they can improve financial gains attained over recent years, emerging from capitalism’s highest rates of development in its history. It is also known that this wave’s balance has been broken and that global economic growth is on its way to be reestablished and tends, modestly, to follow its path for many years. This has great implications towards African public policies aiming sustainable development as well as social inclusion. The new order emerging before the end of what was considered a “golden decade”, presenting a more modest economic growth, will demand important choices coming from African leaders and society members. If back in 2007, before the impact caused by the global international crisis, 37 African countries (almost two thirds of all continental nations), used to grow beyond 4% a year, and 34 were classified by Freedom House as free or partially free, how can this pace be kept within a context marked by less capital available to be invested in Africa over the next decade? Besides the ancient challenges, which remain resilient in Africa’s recent history of international insertion, difficulties associated to the changes in progress in the international order linger. Africa will need an élite showing more commitment concerning decision-making autonomy and a positive integration of the continent to global economic processes, as well as a balance between moral and power, and among interests and international cooperation on the 21st century. African economists and Africanists claim that the economic growth witnessed by Africa along the first golden decade of the 21st century is not likely to follow previous patterns. Although Africa, according to OCDE, has been receiving more resources coming from investments than from international aid, this equation may be inverted if there is not responsibility from the part of its rulers within this important chapter of economic normalization already held in Africa despite serious internal costs. Inflation control and fiscal responsibility have been important moves on macroeconomic normalization headed by African governments in the African continent by the end of the 1990’s and beginning of 2000’s. The throwback in these fields and the re-establishment of the external debt cycle would be fatal considering the partial improvements achieved so far. The fourth and last challenge to be faced by Africans in the coming years in the temptation to, considering possible new difficulties rising from the international front, make use of victimhood excuses. This argument, of great political efficacy for African wicked elites, does not fit the Africans who build their future based on their daily lives. Africa has proven that even humanitarian initiatives, like the aid provided in the 1990’s, have brought very few practical advantages to the target population, and have eventually reinforced power schemes ruled by elites. External aid, attached by extreme ties with predominant elites, who contribute to intensify 173 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy José Flávio Sombra Saraiva social, economic and political differences, is a conspiracy against Africa in the sense that the continent tends to remain infantilized in some sectors due to this kind of false pity. Brazil’s action in Africa during the Lula administration and some historical background During the golden decade of economic growth, which comprises the first ten years of the present century, Brazil increased its participation in investment, commercial presence, creation of new embassies and on its strategic and political weight in the African continent. Brazil has gained ground in its Eastern borders. What happened was the replacement of a silent period in its relationship with Africa for a cycle of cooperation and common altruistic projects for the other side of the South Atlantic. There are ancient ties which attach Brazil and the African continent. In actions and mental constructions, Africa became a participant in institutions, economy, multiple identities and in the culture in Brazil. Slavery and slave traffic over the Atlantic have surely initiated this common history, which attached Brazil and Africa from the 16th century up to the end of the 19th century. There was also a historical construction that affected diplomacy and Brazil’s international relations during the second half of the 20th century. The relations between Brazil and Africa tended to have a minor role in the nationaldevelopmentist foreign policy adopted by President Vargas as well as the following governments. There’s a certain consensus that establishes that the rebirth of Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa started in early 60’s, during the administrations of presidents Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961-1964). This would have been a natural consequence of the independence process of most African Countries between 1957 and 1960. However, the analysis of diplomatic documents available on the economic reports, as well as the parliamentary papers, prove that the initial elements of Brazilian policy towards Africa have their origin between the end of the 40’s and beginning of the 50’s. Among the themes directly referring to Africa considered by Brazilian diplomacy between 1946 and 1961, it is important to highlight: international investment in the development of Latin America and Africa, the competition between Brazilian and African primary products in the international market, the perspective of partnership between Brazil and South-Africa, the special liaisons involving Brazil and Portugal through the Luso Brazilian community, and eventually, the first consequences of African decolonization in the South Atlantic area. Brazil left World War II decided to expand its industrialization and to conquer a certain regional influence. This is the basis of the inclusion of Africa 174 in the country’s international agenda, initially as a minor actor and later, in the 1950’s, as a growing element of interest. Nonetheless, the origins of the most classic model of the Brazilian policy towards Africa must be particularly identified in the 1960’s, considering the Brazilian effort to promote economic development. Brazil’s approach towards Africa has been permeated for ideological representations of the role Brazil would have in the future of Africa. Brazil’s natural vocation regarding that continent was equally an important component of the rising policy, which found adepts and skeptical inquirers. The governments ruled by Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, considering the context of independent foreign policy, have been the basis to the acceleration of a policy based on the support of the numerous independence processes, which started to blossom in Africa. Itamaraty, in particular, sent a great number of missions and established in that continent the first Brazilian embassies. The period that ranges from 1964 to 1969 is, in a general way, a moment of oscillation in the liaisons involving Brazil and Africa, when compared to the improvement noticed in Quadros and Goulart’s Independent Foreign Policy. But the drawback did not mean a complete relinquishment of Africa. In a way it substituted the emphasis in the political and economic cooperation with Africa for the geopolitical approach, a concept in complete synchrony with the new forces ruling Brazil after the 1964 coup d’état. This happened, in special, due to the restoration of the liberal standards associated to the administration of President Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and its emphasis on internal and external defense against the communist threat. The necessity of adjustment with the Western world, in the fashion of interdependence, placed Brazil’s foreign affairs at the service of the traditional alignment with the United States, as previously during President Dutra’s administration. The third military government (1969 – 1974) explicitly promoted the reanimation of the relations with Africa. This flow was reinforced during the fourth and fifth military administrations (1974-1985), and remained influent during the first civilian government and the transition to democracy (1985-1990). The signs of this re-establishment had existed since the “Prosperity Diplomacy” times, but its reassurance had only reappeared more clearly during Médici’s government. The Foreign Minister of Brazil, Gibson Barbosa and his visit to nine countries in Black Africa (1972) was the most evident demonstration of the official efforts to reach Africa and symbolized the reactivation of Brazilian Diplomacy towards it and the goals to readapt the African continent into Brazilian markets. At the same time, the African policy had its own function in the conservative project of modernization of military governments considering national development and the growth of Brazil’s autonomous role in the international system. Brazil’s insertion in international relations during the 70’s led the country to reinforce cooperation with Black Africa, especially with Nigeria; as well as 175 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy José Flávio Sombra Saraiva to develop a cooperation policy with the new socialist countries in Africa; and to review the traditional cooperation with South-Africa; and especially to end the alignment with Portugal and is colonialist interests in Africa. The official recognition of Angola’s independence in 1975 was the climax amid the new standards of international relations between Africans and Brazil. Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa at the given period, used to have four principles that are enough to justify it. Firstly, it was intimately associated with the maintenance of the national developmentist project (expansion and modernization headed by the State) through an aggressive and effective international strategy. Secondly, the core of international affairs between Brazil and Africa used to be economic and commercial pragmatism. At the same time its vulnerability on energy sources led Brazil to include an oil supply policy through Africa. Thirdly, Brazil kept, through African policy, its influence over the South Atlantic area. The South American giant also developed its interests via the stimulation of economic relations in a peaceful fashion, without the militarization of that region, or direct interference of other internationally powerful countries or security pacts with South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO). This represented the end of geopolitical calculations and the rise of a modern strategic conception. At last, Brazil built new ties with countries presenting Portuguese expression, but that were not attached to the traditional Luso-Brazilian Community. The defense of common culture and history started to take place through a direct and independent cooperation system with the above-mentioned in Black African countries. The institution of a pragmatic foreign policy directed the governments of Médici and Geisel to criticize the distribution of power in the international system, which, for them, would harden the possibility of appearance of new power poles such as Brazil. This implied direct criticism towards the United States. At the same time, it relocated Brazilian strategy to search new partners in the international system and the diversification of contacts without taking into account the ideological frontiers which used to be so relevant to Castelo Branco’s administration. The expansion of trade involving Brazil, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America was one of the most important changes happening in the field of foreign economic affairs in the 1970’s and part of the 1980’s. Brazilian exports to third world countries increased from 12% in 1967 to 26% eleven years later. In 1981, for instance, Brazil sold 52% of its manufactured exports to the Third World against 46% sold to Northern industrialized countries. Brazil’s new perspectives were a result of the growing complexity of the international system itself, which ranged from a rigid polarization to a relative decrease in the power of The United States in the Western system, as well as the rise of important rivals such as Japan and Western Europe. The uncertainties of the international scenario demanded a more flexible and pragmatic action on the part of Brazilian diplomacy. 176 Africa turned out to have more functional and supplementary relevance to Brazil’s foreign policy. Politically, the African continent used to be a potential source of support to common demands in the dialogue between North and South, in the UN, as well as in other multilateral entities. Economically, the previous policy could be translated into mutual economic interests serving Brazilian pragmatism. Simultaneously, the country’s energy supply vulnerability went on being a huge concern to the rulers of Brazilian foreign policy in the 70’s and part of the 80’s. Nigeria and Angola were oil suppliers, and, in a certain way, represented to Brazil a spot of diversification away from its own vulnerability. The new objectives designed by Brazil towards Africa turned out to be better defined: a)to project the image of a tropical industrial power and b) to convince African States that the liaisons established between Brazil and Portugal should not inhibit the development of an intense relationship with the now independent Black Africa. The pursuit for new markets, especially for manufactured goods, was also well accepted by the strategist military sectors, which had spoken almost exclusively in terms of Brazil’s military hegemony in the South Atlantic. The importance of the South Atlantic as a vital area was maximized by the necessity of increasing oil imports and exports. More than 90% of Brazilian trade was transported, as it is nowadays, through the sea, especially by Cape Route, surrounding South Africa. President José Sarney (1985-1990) also kept the standards towards Africa previously defined by Geisel and Figueiredo during their administrations. The approach was that there was no reason to change foreign policy during the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Brazil’s African policy had acquired a peculiar consistence and diffusion in many areas of political society in the surroundings of the South Atlantic. Still during Sarney’s administration, Brazil reinforced criticism to apartheid editing Law nº 91.524, in August 9th, 1985. The new canon imposed sanctions against South Africa. It was exactly during Sarney’s administration that Brazil headed, in the United Nations, the movement in favor of the resolution that eventually declared, in 1986, the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation. This act ended up confirming the dimension of Brazil’s policy towards Africa carefully assembled since the end of the 1970’s during the administration of President Figueiredo, in order to avoid South Africa from establishing a regional security, in a way, similar to NATO. There were several obstacles to Brazil’s economic presence in Africa. Firstly, there was a variety of markets and a great number of discrepancies in the capacity to consume among African economies. Brazilian companies had to face cultural diversity, the lack of new interlocutors, and the different government languages. The second obstacle was Africa’s low industrialization levels. The continent used to have a very limited number of manufactured goods able to be introduced in Brazilian markets. There was also a significant limitation of credits for exporting in those countries. 177 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy José Flávio Sombra Saraiva The third barrier was probably the most crucial. Brazilian trade had to face the privileged relationship kept between African economies and their former metropolises. Those markets had been engrossed since colonial times and preferential deals between African producers and the European Economic Community had been signed at the time of Africa’s emancipation. The most serious consequence originated from the traditional alliance between African producers and European markets was that transportation, freight and financing were directed exclusively to Europe. The 1990’s were marked by equidistance between Brazil and the African continent. The president elected in 1990 managed to reinforce the ties with the developed countries. Collor de Mello, promising to lead Brazil, once again, through the paths of development and modern capitalism, decided to push Africa aside and reinforce liaisons preferably with developed Western economies. He tried to recover the original standards of associated liberalism in his declarations and first actions as a ruler, but soon Collor had to surrender to the strength of nationalism and a whole diplomatic tradition of partner-countries diversification, which was the basis of Brazilian foreign policy. This is essential in order to understand Fernando Collor de Mello’s trip to four Southern African countries in September, 1991 reproducing the same speech which had been the basis for the relationship between Brazil and Africa during the previous decade. Anyway, the decreasing trend was evident. The economic crisis in Africa in early 1990’s became more serious than the crisis striking Latin America. African markets tended to be more reduced as well the region’s influence in the transition of a post cold war world. Brazil, on the other hand, was no longer facing energy shortage, a fact that in the past had triggered the country’s policy regarding Africa. This way, the levels of trade established between Brazil and Black Africa had returned to the numbers registered in the 1950’s and 60’s. In the 1990’s, trade between Brazil and Africa would not reach 2% of the first country’s commercial relations amount, after having reached around 10% in early 80’s. The low rates did not necessarily mean the end of the contracts and deals. Brazil maintained its presence in Africa, particularly in the economic field, because some companies had decided to remain in the continent. There was also the rise of a new identity in the field of political agreement, especially since the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. Foreign policy towards Africa would remain in a more selective way, with specific and numbered priorities in the continent. The great extent of the policy towards Africa in the 1970’s and part of the 1980’s had been replaced by a more limited focus which included very few countries, regions and themes. The changes regarding African dimension in the international insertion of Brazil were noticed in the initiatives during President Inácio Lula da Silva’s first trips to a number of countries in Southern, Central, Atlantic and Northern Africa in 2003 and 2004. This way, there was evidence of a new political will 178 which aimed the inversion of the picture of oscillation and inconsistence of the 1990’s. But the initiatives did not bring immediate results so that Brazil’s good will towards Africa was acknowledged once Africans were already used to gestures based on advancements followed by several drawbacks from the part of Brazil. According to Brazilian public opinion, the most important of president Lula’s disembarks were the ones to sub-Saharan Africa. The first visit happened in the end of 2003 when the president visited Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and São Tomé and Príncipe. The second was the journey to São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde and Gabon, in 2004. In both cases the president was accompanied by a huge delegation, including a number of ministries, entrepreneurs and intellectuals. In Brazil, the trip was seen as a symbolic gesture and the rebirth of a new cycle comprising our relationship with South Atlantic countries. Nevertheless, other heralds highlighted the scarce possibilities for a renewed agenda including that continent, once it had been dominated by collective tragedies and economic and social underdevelopment. The fact is that the revival of Brazil’s African policy by the beginning of the 21st century has been held in a new background. Firstly, there is a coordinated strategy based on national interests and its protagonists, including entrepreneurs in charge of the expansion of Brazilian capitalism and diplomatic agents. Undoubtedly, a political fact that can be considered a landmark to the rebirth of this policy was the Brazil-Africa Forum: Politics, Cooperation and Commerce, held in Fortaleza, in may, 2003, which provided a strategic closure to the decision process. There are conceptual, as well as practical, innovations considering the reactivation of Brazil’s Eastern surroundings as one of the preferable regions for contacts, cooperation and trade. One of them is the re-examination of the previous “culturalist” speeches in favor of a more structural and pragmatic approach regarding the cooperation with African elites. Consequently, there is a reconsideration of traditional themes concerning Brazilian “Africanity” and its connection with the idea of an assertive foreign policy towards Africa. Lula, along with the Brazilian diplomacy, has innovated considering the country’s proximity with the African continent. This was, partly, the end of the traditional culturalist speech that had historically permeated the inflections involving Brazil and Africa. This concept was replaced by another talk: the one based on Brazil’s historical debt in relation to Africa. The moral debt, acknowledged not only by the president, but also by a great part of Brazilian society, demands a new form to constitute the country’s foreign policy. The second conceptual dimension is its character, against the merely instrumental function previously noticed in the field of the liaisons between Brazil and Africa already scrutinized along this chapter. The renewed policy towards Africa was made more public and legitimated by a social and political consensus in Brazilian society, through institutions such as the parliament, universities, African-Brazilian groups, companies and public opinion most interested agents. 179 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy José Flávio Sombra Saraiva If Africa is a privileged source for the formation of a Brazilian identity, cultivated and developed as time goes by, a policy for the African continent could not obliterate such particularity. This way, the identification of contemporary African leaderships advocating a new discourse towards Brazil has presented extremely different images compared to the ones previously formulated by Brazil in Africa. In previous decades, Brazilian politicians, military agents and entrepreneurs, made use of what was then known as cultural solidarity, most of the times without the African part’s acquiescence. In many aspects this expression caused a series of illusions. We believed we used to have a natural place or position in Africa, that we were the only way to bridge metropolitan Europe and extremely poor Africans, as reminded by President Jânio Quadros during the initiatives of revival of Brazil’s African policy in early 60’s. These symbols are a novelty concerning Brazilian foreign policy and must be celebrated. There is a clear reversion in the illusions which once considered Brazil a racial democracy, able to function as a role model to Africa, in favor of a more multicultural country, which has numerous similarities with African social realities. However, the words and gestures did not remain in theory. The practical attitudes applied to Africa were the redesign of a way to collaborate with the agenda of sustainable development towards our Atlantic surroundings. Africans do not want to find in Brazil anything related to a possible historical forgiveness. This has been extremely clear through the speech analysis of African intellectuals and diplomatic agents. What they want is to talk about the future and about the possibilities for Brazil to contribute to that continent’s sustainable development. In this sense, the new foreign policy adopted by Brazil towards Africa in the beginning of the 21st century is not a re-edition of the past. It’s bolder in order to inhibit international assistencialism, disguised in the most varied forms of old fashioned technical cooperation, so that it will be part of the reconstruction of a logistic and productive infrastructure in Africa. It also encompasses a dimension related to citizenship and acknowledgement: the cooperation programs aiming to combat AIDS, the experiences involving SEBRAE, EMBRAPA’s expertise, among other several companies from Brazil, which have been active in a number of African countries over the last years. Considering foreign policy matters, Brazil has been working with Africa in favor of a South-South adjustment so that it is possible to build a common platform of interests. The mutual access involving Brazil and Africa and agricultural products in Northern markets has been defining interests on international negotiations. From Doha to Cancún and considering the establishment of G-20, Brazil has become a huge representative of African affairs in the international system. IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) has been prodigious regarding cooperation in aspects of interest in a multilateral world. This forum has served as tripartite power regarding international relations in the South. Defense services, 180 business companies, social communities and intellectuals converge on mutual knowledge and practical experiences of interaction; smaller businesses follow the model established by SEBRAE, among other markedly varied aspects. In the economic field, and besides the crisis experienced by the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, Brazil has collaborated with Africa in the sense of a positive outcome, which is a sign of global economic recovery and of the logistic concept of the domestication of globalization through the reinforcement of the State’s inductive character. This is noticed considering mutual initiatives of multilateral economic entities. Regarding bilateral and interregional perspectives, the association between Brazil and Africa in South-South cooperative projects, involves direct investment from Brazilian companies operating in African countries in a more state-of-theart actuation; this trend does not reinforce what used to be called a third world culture, but on the contrary, is deeply inspiring to Brazilians and Africans. Such association, in a certain way, was noticeable on WTO (World Trade Organization) conference in Doha; it was more widely discussed during the following conference in Cancún, and while most recent negotiations took place, in Geneva, Brazil and India represent the G-20 in the reversion of protectionist agricultural policies in hegemonic countries. These are victories, which should not only be attributed to Brazil or the hugest agricultural countries, but also to the smaller cotton producers in Africa, for instance. This new trend involving Brazil and Africa in which the initiative to act in a collective way prevails, is what Africans crave for. It’s a way that has been demonstrating its effectiveness and that clarifies what can still be done, in such a coordinated action, based on the idea of a sustainable development. The findings resulted from the General Assembly of UNCTAD in Rio de Janeiro (2004), in the same context where Africans and Brazilians celebrated their achievements in new rounds of international trade against hatred subsidies to European and North American producers; this context tends to advocate that a new South is rising, forming anti-hegemonic coalitions in which Brazil and a number of African countries have been taking part of. From the viewpoint of global themes, this practice to work along with Africans allows Brazil to envision to the possibility of designing a common plan for social and economic development of their populations as well as entitling a new ground for Brazil and Africa among the other nations. This way, it is right to conclude that the Lula era helped to structure a policy based on permanence and continuity along its Atlantic border. This has been an extremely positive achievement considering Lula’s eight years ahead of Brazilian government. This virtuous circle is expected, at a certain level, to express the political maturity achieved by a State policy aimed at South Atlantic countries and go beyond a mere passing fad. 181 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy José Flávio Sombra Saraiva Bibliographical references RODRIGUES, José Honório. Brasil e África. Outro horizonte. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1982. SARAIVA, José Flávio Sombra. Formação da África Contemporânea. São Paulo: Editora Atual/Unicamp, 1987. SARAIVA, José Flávio Sombra. O lugar da África. A dimensão atlântica da política externa do Brasil. Brasília: Editora da UnB, 1996. SARAIVA, José Flávio Sombra. Política exterior do governo Lula: o desafio africano. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 45 (2), 2002, pp. 5-25. SARAIVA, José Flávio Sombra (org.) Comunidade dos países de língua portuguesa (CPLP): Solidariedade e ação política. Brasília: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2001. COELHO, Pedro Motta & SARAIVA, José Flávio Sombra (org.) Fórum Brasil-África: Política, cooperação e comércio. Brasília: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2004. Received August 11, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Abstract In the post-Cold War world, Africa has been an important focus of Brazilian foreign policy. Having a significant historical weight in building our nation, African countries are also part of the moves adopted by Brazil’s foreign policy. The main purpose of the present text is to show this relevant regional dimension regarding Brazil’s international insertion during the Lula era. The work is divided in two parts: the first part approaches Africa’s international insertion throughout recent years and the second analyses the dimension occupied by African affairs in Brazil during the Lula era. The main argument is that the new role played by Africa in the international scene coincides with a global Brazil. Resumo No mundo pós-Guerra Fria, a África tem tido um papel de destaque para política externa brasileira. Além de ter significativo peso histórico na formação da nação, os países africanos também são parte do movimento adotado pela política externa brasileira. O propósito central deste texto é mostrar essa dimensão regional relevante da inserção internacional do Brasil na era Lula. O trabalho está dividido em duas partes: a primeira versa sobre a inserção internacional da África em anos recentes e a segunda analisa a dimensão ocupada pelo continente na política externa brasileira. O argumento central é que o novo lugar ocupado pela África no cenário internacional coincide com o Brasil global. Key-words: Brazilian foreign policy; African continent; Brazilian Atlantic Policy. Palavras-chave: política externa brasileira; continente Africano; Política atlântica brasileira. 182 Artigo Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China Parceria Global Emergente: Brasil e China Niu Haibin* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 183-192 [2010] Introduction As emerging global players, Brazil and China have developed a fullfledged bilateral strategic partnership. During President Lula’s two tenures, the partnership has been deepened and broadened with increased global components and implications. The creation of some influential international forums like BRIC summit, G20 summit and BASIC meetings have witnessed the cooperation between Brazil and China. While the global influence of the strategic partnership is a very early phenomenon, it deserves to be investigated since the partnership has been a model for the cooperation between emerging powers. Emerging Major World Powers Both China and Brazil have long thought themselves as natural major world powers while the road to this position was not so straight. Largely based on their geographical size, plentiful natural resources, and singular cultural origin, both nations worked to achieve great power status. Since the establishment of PRC, this is the first time for both countries to enjoy economic booming at the same time. During the rapid development of Brazil in 1960s and 1970s, China was struggling out of its cultural revolution and looking for a new direction. While China began its economy launching in the 1980s, Brazil was tortured by the lost decade. Entering the 21st century, both China and Brazil were perceived together as emerging economies and were listed as the top 10 economies worldwide. A little difference here is that China is a reemerging economy indeed considering its historical status in East Asia and weight in world economy. Such is not the case of Brazil. Both Brazil and China pursued a peaceful rise and focused on the soft powers such as economy and international law. Brazil’s contribution during the Second World War didn’t win it a permanent seat at UN Security Council, * Research Fellow at Shanghai Institute for International Studies, China (haibinniu@gmail.com). 183 Niu Haibin which made Brazil commit to achieving its world power status by focusing on means of international economy and law. Considering its abandon of a nuclear weapon program, its peaceful settlements of disputes with neighbors, and its promotion of regional integration in South America, it’s fair to say Brazil’s rise is peaceful. On the other hand, affected deeply by the Cold War system in Asia, China has conflicts with several neighbors. However the mainstream of China’s foreign policy is to engage peacefully with its neighbors. To promote economic cooperation has been the main purpose of China’s engagement with Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ASEAN, and Asia Summit, among other initiatives. With China late joining WTO, it finally integrated itself to the world economy. It’s wiser to deal with so many neighbors through economic integration and regional institutions. To integrate themselves to the world economy also served well for Chinese competitive sectors, namely raw material and human resources respectively. It took time to transform from emerging economies to emerging powers. President Lula’s multilateral diplomacy contributed a lot to Brazil’s status as an emerging world power. Regionally, his efforts to resist FTAA, build the regional cooperation framework in South America, rebuild Haiti, and handle the Honduran crisis reflect the administration’s independent contribution to regional public goods. Globally, the dialogue with G8, African countries and Middle Eastern counties, the creation of G20, IBSA and BRIC summits, the WTO Doha round negotiation, the role of BASIC in climate change negotiation in Copenhagen and efforts on solving UN security issues like Iran’s nuclear program have been leaded by Brazil. These diplomatic efforts made by Lula administration transformed Brazil from a nation representing 2.86% of world GDP to an influential emerging worldwide power. China, despite its 11.4% of world GDP and Permanent seat in the UN Security Council, is being required to contribute more significantly in global security issues, otherwise it can’t be perceived as a responsible stakeholder in the current international system. As emerging global players, both Brazil and China have a long way to go to transfer their economic power to institutional influence worldwide. Emerging powers are still not established powers or great powers. Even the most prominent emerging powers like China and India have not been recognized as established powers, and to achieve this goal they have at least 15 years to go. The current dominant international institutions are still the Breton-woods system and post-WWII security organizations. China’s discourse in WB and IMF is still very limited and it is still a non-member state of IEA and OECD. Before the first G20 summit in Washington, China was an occasionally invited to the G8’s side forum. Brazil enjoyed a similar international status as China’s. Additionally, Brazil is not a permanent member of UN Security Council, which reduces its international prestige. Brazil’s active role in working out the nuclear agreement with Iran didn’t get support by UN Security Council’s permanent members. 184 Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China Promising Strategic Partnership Since 1993, leaders have begun to talk about the strategic nature of bilateral relationship between China and Brazil. Generational leaders from Franco and Jiang Zemin through Cardoso to Lula and Hu Jintao consistently contributed their political will to establish and consolidate the bilateral strategic relationship. This is the first strategic relationship established by major developing countries in the world. The initial meaning of the strategic relationship is to develop longstanding, stable, and strategic mutual cooperation. Both countries share the identity of major developing states, leading regional players, and big potential roles in world affairs. Based on these common identities and forward-looking thinking, both countries developed a comprehensive cooperative path covering trade, energy and mining, finance, agriculture, quality supervision, inspection and quarantine, industry and information technology, space cooperation, science, technology and innovation, and education, among other areas. Brazil offered China the market economy status. China has been Brazil’s largest trade partner, surpassing the US and the EU in 2009. Cooperation between Brazil and China has been the model of South-South cooperation. The strategic relationship serves both countries’ aspiration to play a larger role in promoting world peace and development. Different from an alliance aiming at balancing or constraining other powers, the relationship is a kind of new partnership in the post-Cold War era. A healthy foreign policy of major powers should be diversified and worldwide. The relationship in nature is nonexclusive and win-win oriented. Both countries have strategic relationships with other important global players. The relationship helped both countries to be a part of the dynamic of each region respectively. China has become the member of OAS (as an observer) and IDB with the support of Latin American countries including Brazil. China’s engagement with Latin America has been gradually institutionalized, which will make it committed to the support of public goods for the region with the cooperation of Brazil. Chinese police peacekeepers in Haiti serve under the command of a Brazilian General under the UN auspices. In global terms, Central Asia is the only region where Brazil lacks engagement, while the SCO with China as an important member could lend Brazil a hand. 185 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional The 2008 international financial crisis, however, has provided an opportunity to shorten the gap between emerging powers and established ones, since the strong recovery of emerging powers and the visible improvements of WB and IMF share reforms. The G20, premier forum for international economic cooperation, is a great achievement in accommodating emerging powers into international economy system. Nevertheless, emerging powers still have no access to leadership roles in political and security arenas. Niu Haibin President Lula enhanced the country’s diplomatic efforts to develop its relationship with major emerging powers. This enhancement is expected to promote Brazil’s international status in main international organizations, and to find new markets and investments for Brazil. His efforts in promoting the BRIC summit have transformed BRIC from an economic conception to a political reality. The BRIC summit could both enhance the internal cooperation among emerging powers and increase the voice of emerging powers in major international financial institutions. China shares the wisdom of enhancing the cooperation among emerging powers despite its unease about the cooperation’s negative effects on its relationship with the developed world and the uncertainty about emerging powers’ future development. In a response to the situation of the 2008 international financial crisis, China has increased its political will to enhance its comprehensive cooperation with other emerging powers in the search for new development opportunities and reform of the international financial system. Both the openness of the current international system and the moderate aspiration of BRIC have released China’s anxiety. China will host the third BRIC summit after Brazil in 2011, which shows the consistent support of both countries to the cooperation among emerging powers. At the beginning of the strategic relationship, both sides realized that the implication of the relationship is beyond bilateral dimension. The great potential role in regional and global affairs was the most important impetus for both sides to establish the referred strategic relationship. These potential roles are becoming true in current stage. The international community is more frequently calling on both sides to enhance their cooperation for the solution of the major global issues in the economic, environmental, political and security issues. Regional, multilateral and global issues are becoming important topics of the Strategic Dialogue between both Chancelleries. In this regard, Presidents Lula and Hu Jintao signed the Joint Action Plan Brazil-China 2010-2014 in Brasilia on April 15th, 2010. The joint action plan is a cornerstone of the strategic relationship. Besides the comprehensive bilateral cooperation agenda, both sides committed to cooperate on the broadest multilateral issues since the establishment of the strategic relationship. According to the joint action plan, amongst the abovementioned multilateral issues are arms control and climate change, coordination in UN, WTO, and G20, support of cooperation mechanisms for major developing countries, need to safeguard the rights and interests of developing countries, and inter-regional cooperation between Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. Challenges for a Global Partnership As emerging global players, both Brazil and China are constrained by their heavy domestic agenda, thus they are inward-looking countries to some extent. The Brazilian public has not even begun to debate the ramifications of Brazil’s 186 new prominence, not to mention examining the potential costs and commitments involved.1 Poverty, inadequate public education, corruption, and public violence remain problems to be solved by further development in Brazil. Under the leadership of President Lula, Brazil has made important achievements in fighting hunger, building infrastructure, and accumulating foreign reserves by continuing market-friendly economic policies and stimulating private investment. By its continued high economic growth, the country has earned more resources to provide external public goods. Brazil has, in that sense, contributed its first US$10 billion to IMF by purchasing its bonds. China, on its side, faces the challenge to enlarge its domestic consumer market and the economic structure transition to a more efficient and sustainable one. The domestic agenda and poor resources restrain the capacity of both countries to play a larger role in world affairs, but they are working hard to integrate their economies to world economy to overcome these shortcomings. In the long run, this strategy will work out finally. To build a global and strategic partnership, both sides need to enhance the understanding of each other in terms of economy, society and culture beyond politics. There are some difficulties such as language, geographic distance, and economy frictions obstructing the mutual understanding. Lack of Brazilian newspapers, magazines or media in English make it difficult for the Chinese to know a great deal about Brazil. There is no influential research institute focusing on China in Brazil. Brazil’s advanced economic structure, higher per-capita GDP, universal usage of bio-fuel, and other characteristics were unknown to many Chinese until the very recently. However, under the emphasis of the leaders to the importance of each other, scholars, entrepreneurs and travelers from both sides are beginning to have increasing interest in their counterparts. Centers of Brazil Studies have been established in China’s influential think-tanks and universities with the development of public diplomacy in China, CCTV-news is trying to introduce China’s voice to the world, and more Brazilians will have chances to know China further. Great events like Olympic Games 2008, World Expo 2010, hosted by China, and World Cup 2014 and Olympic Games 2016, hosted by Brazil, have been and will offer great opportunity to mutual knowledge and understanding. The soft power resources of Brazil, such as soccer, Samba, beautiful cities, and renewable energy, impress Chinese very much. The Chinese now know that they can import not only iron ore and soybean from Brazil but also regional jets and biotechnology. The Cultural Month of China in Brazil is planned for 2010, and a similar event for Brazil will be held in China in 2011. These cultural activities plus educational exchange programs will be helpful to deepen the ties across both societies. 1 DIAZ, Miguel and ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto, (2008). Brazil’s Candidacy for Major Power Status, published at [http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?ID=504]. Available on 11/01/2010. 187 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China Niu Haibin Though Brazil and China have a balanced and sustainable trade relationship, there are still some concerns about the bilateral trade model. Brazilian exports to China rely mainly on raw materials and food products, which lead to the worry of de-industrialization in Brazil. This perspective fails to notice that Brazil also exports manufactured products to China and the raw-material and food sectors only constitute a small part of Brazil’s economy. Trade with China in the recent decade has improved the trade condition of Brazil and contributed a lot to its export promotion in the condition of real appreciation. Bilateral trade showed spectacular growth of 780 percent since the beginning of Lula’s administration in 2003, and reached 36 billion dollars in 2009 in spite of the global economic crisis. Furthermore, the booming trade relationship with China also serves Brazil’s trade strategy to diversify worldwide. China is not only a purchaser and consumer, but also an investor. Sectors of Brazilian mining, IT, infrastructure and the newfound oil field have got vast Chinese investments. Brazil initiated a China Agenda in 2008 to identify the priorities in bilateral trade and investment, which is very helpful to find win-win ways. Brazil highly values the cooperation on the Earth Resources Satellites with China, and looks forward to the cooperation on bio-fuel and bio-energy. The cooperation between financial sectors is also getting impetus in recent years. Actions such as to intensify macroeconomic policy dialogue, strengthen cooperation in multilateral financial forum, expand bilateral financial cooperation and facilitate trade finance by promoting the use of local currencies in bilateral trade have been listed to the 2010-2014 Joint Action Plan. It seems that most Brazilians are beginning to treat China as an opportunity other than a pure competitor or even a threat. Brazilians often complain that since we both countries are strategic partners, why doesn’t China back Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat at UN Security Council? In 2005, China opposed to an increase in the number of permanent members in the Security Council, which Brazil seeks as a member of G4 together with Japan, Germany and India. China explained that its opposition was addressed to Japan and India, rather than Brazil, without expressing obvious support to Brazil. The distress of Brazilian UN representatives remains since China doesn’t offer its formal support to Brazil while, in past times, Brazil recognized China as a market economy. The opposition of the U.S., Mexico, and Argentina on this issue released Brazil’s pressure on China temporally. Unlike the neighbors with territorial disputes and historical differences, Brazil should be the most possible candidate to get China’s support on biding for the permanent membership of UN Security Council, considering its comprehensive power, regional leadership, contribution to UN peace activities, and closer relationship with China. is the possibility of a consensus between US and China, support of regional peers, and the substantial improvement of China’s relationship with Japan and India will have great influence on China’s final decision. The political will and consensus on treating each other as emerging global player are not very strong for both sides. Except for China’s experts’ dealing with 188 Brazil and other emerging powers, the usual focus on great powers still treats traditional powers, rather than emerging powers, as influential global players in. Cooperation with the U.S. will continue to represent the first priority in Chinese foreign policy, which seems to be the consensus within the policy-research circle. The shift to priority on the cooperation among emerging powers is only a very recent topic. Initiative to focus on developing cooperation with South countries under President Lula has also led to debates in Brazil. Most of the emerging powers do see themselves as beneficiaries of the current international system, and try to maintain good relationship with traditional powers especially the U.S.; what dissatisfies emerging powers in this context, though, is their lower status in it. Indeed, the strategic dialogues with the U.S. and Brazil are the most influential ones in China’s cooperation with traditional powers and emerging powers respectively. Because of their different influence to the external world and domestic influence, it takes time for both China and Brazil to treat each other as the same level as strategic partner as the U.S. enjoys. Others’ Perceptions of the Global Partnership As BRIC members, both Brazil and China have attracted increasing individual attention from the international community; nevertheless, some countries still consider their international role through the framework of cooperation among emerging powers. Except for the IBSA, both China and Brazil are members of the forums such as G5 (Brazil, Mexico, India, China and South Africa), BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), and the BRIC summit. Some observers defend the idea that both countries seek a stronger and more influential place in international affairs and both would welcome a more constrained role for the United States. Cardoso’s and Lula’s approach to India, South Africa and China since the 1990s have had twin goals of economic diversification and political balancing of U.S. power.2 China can’t press the dollar status as the world currency only by doing the same with other creditors. “The only Chinese statement that created pressure on the dollar came in June, when BRIC leaders called for a ‘more diversified currency system’ in their communiqué. Again, the effectiveness of financial statecraft improved when a concert of creditors sounded out a common position.”3 These observations show that when both China and Brazil can’t effectively affect the main governance structure of world affairs individually. When they have a common voice, it might work. To balance or constrain the hegemonic behavior or hegemonic power has been a major concern in some U.S. think tanks. The increasing tendency of 2 DOMINGUEZ, Jorge I., (2006). China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, published at [http://www.offnews.info/downloads/china-latam.pdf]. Available on: 10/05/2010. 3 DREZNER, Daniel W., (2009). Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics. International Security, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 40. 189 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China Niu Haibin emerging powers to have a more independent foreign policy has severed such concern. Even though both China and Brazil are trying to rise with the West other than against the West, their enlarging role is difficult to be welcomed by the West. China’s cooperation with other emerging powers including Brazil on diversifying world currencies and unifying as a group at Copenhagen Climate Conference was considered by leading powers as arrogant behavior. President Lula’s involvements in the issues of Honduras crisis and Iran nuclear program have led to some difficulties in Brazil’s relations with the U.S. Even though both Brazil and China don’t like to be perceived as alliance aiming at anti-America, they do have a tendency to play a more independent role in solving global issues based on their national interests and self-experiences. This kind of concerns reflects instabilities in the transition of power. The Obama administration has initiated a strategy of multi-partners to solve the pressing global issues. The strategy is the most adequate way of regarding the nature of global issue and shifting power structure. The challenge here for all is to understand partnership and cooperation on the right basis, which means they have to accommodate different approaches, interests and values. Despite the above difficulties, both Brazil and China are perceived as moderate forces within the BRIC group. The third perception is that the strategic partnership has little global influence since it has done little in world affairs. Because countries such as China, India or Brazil are emerging rapidly, they are willing to raise their international status by taking the lead in new “non-Western” international organizations and to gather media attention through summit diplomacy.4 This perception reflects the fact that cooperation among emerging powers is still in its early stages in terms of their different capacity, political system, international status and economic competition. Some countries even expected Brazil to press China to make economic sacrifices for the sake of the global environment. Despite failing to fulfill the expectation, the first-ever BRIC communiqué created some influence when it called for “urgent action” regarding larger say in the international financial institutions. With an institutionalized dialogue and cooperation, the global dimension of the bilateral strategic China/Brazil partnership will appear gradually. The Way Ahead During the two terms of President Lula’s administration, the global dimension of the strategic partnership between Brazil and China has been emerging. Brazil under the leadership of President Lula aims to transform its power resources into real international influence and status. With this active global engagement policy, Brazil becomes an emerging global player in terms of either geography or area issue. The Lula era has witnessed the cooperation in 4 RENARD, Thomas, (2009). A BRIC in the World: Emerging Powers, Europe, and the Coming Order. Gent: Academia Press, p. 19. 190 Haiti peace-keeping task, Doha round negotiation, Copenhagen negotiation and the reform of international financial institutions, etc. President Lula’s emphasis on cooperation with major developing countries has led to international forums based on the membership of China and Brazil. China has consistently contributed itself to develop the strategic relations with Brazil. The current bilateral strategic relationship is becoming full-fledged with an increasing international agenda. To make the strategic partnership get more sustainable, both sides should deepen their knowledge about each other and commit more energy to cultivate the ties between the two societies. China has been put into the center of world affairs in terms of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue between the United States and China, which attracted the main attention of the strategic studies in China. The 2008 international financial crisis told a lesson to China that it is dangerous to put all eggs in one basket. The geopolitical effects of the financial crisis are putting the emerging powers closer. The mutually beneficial economic cooperation between China and Brazil will continually be the foundation of bilateral relationship. Beyond that, China should pay more attention to the potential big role of Brazil in the fronts of environmental protection, containment of climate change, global energy and food security, international development agenda, and global trade system. Enlightened recognition of Brazil’s big potential will help to keep a dynamic strategic partnership. The regional and global implications of the bilateral strategic partnership won’t come naturally. To deliver real public goods, regionally and globally based on sustainable domestic economic development, is the only way to realize the strategic partner’s global impacts. Both countries could work through the regional financial institutes to support regional infrastructure, finance small businesses and reduce poverty. At the global level, they can continue to promote the reform of major political and economic institutions together with other major emerging powers, and make them more representing of the developing world’s interests. Though both countries share common positions in dealing with global challenges like climate change, they do have some kind of gap in preparing themselves to the challenge. This kind of gap, differences or approaches should be frequently coordinated on high level dialogues. As emerging powers in world stage, Brazil and China live in a new era characterized by inter-dependence and global challenges, an era when great opportunities are offered to achieve their great power dream in transforming the current international system. Principal References ALDEN, Chris and VIEIRA, Marco Antonio, (2005). The New Diplomacy of the South. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 7, p. 1091. DIAZ, Miguel and ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto, (2008). Brazil’s Candidacy for Major Power Status, published at [http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?ID=504]. Available on 11/01/2010. 191 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China Niu Haibin DOMINGUEZ, Jorge I., (2006). China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, published at [http://www.offnews.info/downloads/china-latam.pdf ]. Available on: 10/05/2010. DREZNER, Daniel W., (2009). Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics. International Security, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 40. O’NEIL, Shannon, (2010). Brazil as an Emerging Power: the View from the United States, published at [http://www.cfr.org/publication/21503/brazil_as_an_emerging_power.html], Available on 01/04/2010. ONIS, Juan de, (2008). Brazil’s Big Moment. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6, pp. 10-122. RENARD, Thomas, (2009). A BRIC in the World: Emerging Powers, Europe, and the Coming Order. Gent: Academia Press, p. 19. ROETT, Riordan, (1975). Brazil Ascendant: International Relations and Geopolitics in the Late 20th Century. Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 139. SCHNEIDER, Ronald M., (1976). Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 32-43. WILLIAMSON, John, (2003). Lula’s Brazil. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, p. 110. VAZ, Alcides Costa, ed., (2006). Intermediate States, Regional Leadership and Security: India, Brazil and South Africa. Brasilia: University of Brasilia, pp. 1-310. Received June 30, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Abstract The Lula era has witnessed a changing bilateral strategic partnership between China and Brazil, having the interlocutions between both countries became more substantial, comprehensive and influential. To enlarge the global impacts of the partnership, both countries should inject more regional and global components into their bilateral agenda. In doing so, both sides need to enhance the ties not only in terms of economic cooperation but also of social interaction. Resumo A era Lula testemunhou que a parceria estratégica entre China e Brasil tornou-se substantiva, ampla e influente. Para aumentar o impacto dessa parceria, os dois países devem inserir mais componentes regionais e globais na agenda bilateral. Fazendo isso, os dois lados fortalecem os laços não só em termos de cooperação econômica, mas também em termos de interação social. Key-words: Brazil; China; global partnership. Palavras-chave: Brasil; China; parceria global. 192 Artigo International Thought in the Lula Era Pensamento Internacional na era Lula Raúl Bernal-Meza* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 193-213 [2010] Introduction Similarly to other governmental enterprises, President Lula da Silva’s administration was part of the governmental renewal process, economic model shaping of foreign policy and international integration strategies that characterized the transition of most Latin American countries between the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. Renewed government alliances, and politics were the response of national societies to the crisis caused by the neoliberal model and the implementation of public policies according to ideological and fundamentalist vision of the globalization1, which included the transfer of national assets (public and private) to transnational capital, the unilateral opening of economies, deregulation of markets (financial, trade and labor);in general, a policy of submission was perceived and, in some cases, also “servitude” to the United States and central capitalism. The difference with other countries is that Brazil has the attributes in terms of geography, economics, demographics and cultural challenge to apply to that part of the group formed by central actors in the contemporary international system. During Lula da Silva’s tenures, foreign policy found a clear direction, bound to the stage of reformulation and change that had characterized the 1970s, in which policy was associated with large advancements on trade and business. The international context, over a decade after the end of the Cold War, lived the process of building a new world order under the supremacy of the United States as the only superpower. The conditions that had characterized the international system during the previous twelve years, against which U.S. foreign policy responded with opposing trends between unipolarism and multipolarism2, * Professor at the Universidad Nacional del Centro de la Provincia de Buenos Aires and the Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina (bernalmeza@hotmail.com). 1 For an overview on this interpretation of "globalization", cf. FERRER (1998), Rapoport (1997) and BernalMeza (1996, 2000). 2 For our interpretation in that regard, cf. BERNAL-MEZA (2004, 2005a). 193 Raúl Bernal-Meza strongly reinforced unipolarity after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The United States, under President George Bush Jr. left the vision of neo-Kantian liberal internationalism, which had dominated international politics during Bill Clinton’s administration. In this context, Latin America represented less and less in U.S. foreign policy, whose concern is focused on the war against Islamic terrorism. U.S. foreign policy in its epistemic-theoretical foundations, rose from soft power, proposed by Joseph Nye (2004) and adopted by Clinton as a means of seduction and attraction, to its renewed vision of multilateralism under the hegemonic conditions that the hard power rescued to the Republican right, in the tougher tradition of American Realism. As noted by a great historian, the short twentieth century ended in 1991. In the late 1980s and early of 1990 an era of world history ended to start a new one (HOBSBAWM, 2007), which was closed to the Cold War and open to a new cycle of neoliberal utopia. It was this transition that justified a widespread author’s claim to “the end of history” which differentiated between those states where democracy and the free market were imposed, and those who were left aside in history. Fukuyama (1992) would represent the symbol of the liberal, simplistic and monocausal view of international relations; a worldview that would be confronted by the reality of the facts: a world fragmented by differences. They were warned by other ideologists of international relations, among which Huntington (1993, 1996) can be highlighted, who would base the new interpretations of international conflict and the struggle for power, on the basis of cultural and religious differences. Thus, Fukuyama and Huntington expressed the image of a fragmented and conflicting world, reflecting the existence of multipolarities; a systemic context that the thinkers of the Brazilian foreign policy were able to grasp to support the fundamental backers of the new vision of foreign policy. This would be the scenario in which the theoretical foreign policy of Lula da Silva would be formulated. Changes in the theoretical approach of the hegemony Despite the changing times identified with the end of the bipolar order, changes in the theoretical approach to the interpretation of the world and its processes had begun earlier, in the late 1970s and 80s. US literature dominated discussions between interdependence formulators (KEOHANE and NYE, 1977) and the response of structural neorealism (WALTZ, 1979, and GILPIN, 1981); meanwhile, alternatives appeared such as a critical theory (COX, 1981)) and a renewed vision of the political economy of international relations, both being part of a systemic-structural tradition (WALLERSTEIN, 1974; ARRIGHI, 1994, 1996). Furthermore, reaffirming the influence of Kantian liberalism – already present in the thinking of interdependence – the role of institutions and cooperation in the systemic order (KEOHANE, 1988;1993; KRASNER, 1986; HURRELL, 194 1992), appeared to influence predominantly the foreign policy proposals of what years later would be the period of the Clinton administration. A vision that contributed strongly to fragment the world supposedly joining the “new order” and “globalization” was the clash of civilization paradigm, as proposed by Huntington (1993, 1996). Brazilian diplomacy responded to this cultural cleavage strengthening the idea of a “multicultural and multiracial Brazil”. Finally, an important theoretical element to influence the Brazilian model of an ideal State should serve as the foremost instrument for insertion in the new global context: the trading state (Rosecrance, 1986), which had already been identified as a source of important influence on Chile’s foreign policy (BERNALMEZA, 2004) and Carlos Menem’s in Argentina(1989-1999). Of all the debates that occurred during those years, a central point to understand President Lula’s foreign policy would be discussions between singlepole and multiple-pole and discussions with those who sought to impose certain views on globalization; on this debate also present were a few lines of the Latin American structuralist tradition, as old “dependentists” (Dos Santos), those that addressed cultural perspective (Ortiz), and some “neo-structuralist” (Ferrer, Ianni). Among the latter new contributions from the periphery to the discussions on the contemporary stage of historical capitalism would be found, with authors such as Tomassini, Ferrer, Rapoport, Bernal-Meza, representatives of the Chilean Academy and, predominantly, of the Argentine scholars , most of whom would have a strong positive impact on Brazil. International and regional contexts of the Lula era 1. The Latin American scene: In short, scenarios were very different in the early twenty-first century and during the 1990s. A decade of strong homogeneity on the predominance of the normal or neoliberal model as the ideal type of Estado3 ; in economic policies, adherence to the agenda of universal or hegemonic values internationally recognized4, such as democratic norms throughout the world, characteristic of the American liberal internationalism; this approach, indeed, would justify the new forms of international intervention and reform of the principle of non-intervention in the UN Charter, the promotion of economic liberalism, the protection of the environment and others who contributed to the promotion of liberal views on globalization and interdependence (BERNAL-MEZA, 2000). In Latin America, the times of similar foreign policies and a strong inclination toward the United 3 We follow here the ideal types of state developed by Amado Luiz Cervo to explain and interpret the Brazilian and Latin American foreign policy. Cf. CERVO (2000, 2001, 2008, 2008a). 4 As defined by Vigevani et.al. (1999). 195 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional International Thought in the Lula Era Raúl Bernal-Meza States, as well as a vision of integration sustained in “open regionalism”, were followed by a decade of profound heterogeneity: in the ideal model of State (with presence of developmental, normal and logistic models), in economic policies in the views on the integration and regionalism and linkages with the United States. Topics such as the degree of economic openness, more or less globalization, accession or rejection of the FTAA, proximity or opposition to American foreign policy and regionalism model, among others, became characteristics which deeply distinguished Latin American countries one from another. These changes also involve a thorough review of the respective foreign policies, in particular, the worldview, paradigm or doctrine that supported them, and also a reformulation of the models of regionalism (BERNAL-MEZA, 2009). “Bolivarism and XXI century socialism” (in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua); bilateralism and alignment with the United States (Colombia, Mexico); “multilateralism” and “open regionalism” (Chile), “Nationalism and open economy free-market economic nationalism”(Argentina), “special period in peacetime “(Cuba), “South American realism and regionalism” (Brazil), in time replaced, as foreign policy formulations, pre-theories and doctrines, the thought of a decade in which Kantian neo-idealism had dominated the subordinate globalism, neoliberalism and open regionalism (BERNAL-MEZA, 2009a). Parallel to the abandonment of the “middle power” paradigm (Mexico), most South American countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Paraguay), turned to more nationalistic economic policies, returning to neo-protectionist approaches to the economic integration, which, without being dominant, began to compare with the previous prevailing view of “open regionalism” and that would also be prevalent in the Brazilian political vision, even if this would be tempered by pragmatism. Thus, the semi-protectionist vision of MERCOSUR model would be replaced by more pragmatic and flexible vision of UNASUR. The crisis of the neoliberal model, which spread through many of the countries in the region led, in most of them, to a reformulation of the ideal type of state, associated with a restructuring of integration into the global economic system. In a variety of cases – such as Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador – as well as in other countries where the political structures had not yet reached the height of their nation-building process, such as Bolivia and Paraguay –, the new ruling alliance proceeded to a relaunching in the first case, or foundation, in the second, of the developmentalist model. Thus, at the discretion of recovering or building national capitalism, mainly public (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador), as well as private (Argentina in particular), there was a neo-developmentalist variation, with strong state intervention, which involved the nationalization of large companies (gas, oil, electricity, air and services) and the creation of new state enterprises. This model is characterized by a policy of “open economic nationalism” or “free-market economic nationalism”, as would the Argentine model be, or more radical forms of economic nationalism, neo-Marxist-influenced, such being the case of Venezuela and Bolivia (BERNAL-MEZA, 2009a). 196 Only two countries progressed along the path of the construction of the ideal type of logistical State: Chile and Brazil (CERVO, 2008). In practice and due to having been released that way since the days of Pinochet’s authoritarian neoliberalism, the Chilean model would be a pioneer, taking on major initiatives and public policy measures that would characterize the logistic model: formation of large national economic-financial groups; internationalization of private enterprises; attraction of foreign direct investment; exporting of capital; creation of state agencies to support the internationalization of enterprises and the external projection of their business and operations; development of a strong airports, roads, telecommunications and information technology infrastructure. Associated with this was the international negotiation of a wide network of treaties and trade agreements that had facilitated the access of national production to major world markets (U.S., EU, Japan, China, etc.). a) The review of post-neoliberal strategies: the ideal model of logistical State This post-developmentalist model of governmental organization, formulated in theory by Amado Cervo, aims to overcome the asymmetries between nations, raising the national situation at the level of advanced countries, transferring responsibilities to the societies of the former “developing State”, dealing now with societal instances in the realization of their interests. The logistical State mimics the behavior of the advanced nations, particularly the United States, a country that is considered the prototype of the model. Its component of foreign policy in the field of international economic relations, aims to reduce technological and financial dependence, to promote product innovation and other initiatives that reduce external vulnerability. Internally, it seeks to strengthen the national structural economic hub to boost internationalization (CERVO, 2008a: 82-90). b) E vo Morales, the reformulation of the Bolivian state and its impact on Brazilian politics The remaking of the state carried out by Evo Morales involved decisionmaking on a collective basis and was built under the criterion of “representativeness” that benefits the vast majority of the population of native origin, historically excluded from the structures of power. One instrument for providing resources to the project of the new state was the policy of nationalization (mainly in the area of hydrocarbons and energy), regaining state control over oil fields and refineries and therefore affecting the interests of Brazilian capital (Petrobras). Particularly in the case of Bolivia, the most advanced example, but also at different levels, in the cases of Ecuador and Paraguay, the reformulation of state perception would take forward the new indigenous government would confront openly with the realist conception of Hegelian roots, dominant in Brazil, as well as in other countries in the region. The impact of hydrocarbons nationalization reflected not only on the system of bilateral relations with Brazil but also on the characteristics of regional 197 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional International Thought in the Lula Era Raúl Bernal-Meza integration vis-à-vis global integration. It involved the inclusion of the energy issue as a priority for the South American agenda, which led Lula’s diplomacy to bring the Foreign Ministry to the new realities arising from this scenario. Thus, in April 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Policy created the Department of Energy which took the second rank in the hierarchical structure of Itamaraty. The energy issue has changed regional thematic priorities also impacting on the other countries’ relations, as was the case of gas between Argentina and Chile, mainly because of other external factors such as rising international prices and decreasing commercialization of oil and gas in Argentina, bringing producing countries (Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador) to the center of attention in the diplomacy of integration. c) The new South American energy policy and its impact on Brazil: From 2000 to May 2006 – the moment hydrocarbon nationalization in Bolivia – there were two models of energy integration: the Brazil-led, via IIRSA, in which the main protagonists were the private sectors, and PETROAMERICA, an initiative of Venezuela, urging greater state intervention. It was from Evo Morales’ nationalization that both projects would start to distance, showing differences in the conception of the energy political economy. Lula’s government answered to this situation by strengthening Petrobras and diversifying the search for alternative energy supply sources, domestic and international. But another of the initiatives to deepen the differences on economic energy policy would be the Brazilian strengthening of biofuel development, with the U.S. signing a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in this area. The issue of biofuels would eventually oppose Brazil’s potential or important regional producers, such as Argentina and Venezuela. The paradigmatic universe of Brazilian foreign policy and the Lula government: realism, regionalism and logistical State FH Cardoso’s and Lula da Silva’s views on world politics and globalization were confronted and opposed. The first adhered to neoliberalism, while Lula and his colleagues adhered to neo-realism. Thus, while Cardoso confided in the ideal configuration of a new multipolar order with the progressive development of more just and harmonious international relations, Lula kept a hierarchical view of world power and was skeptical about the idealistic vision of a world overall more peaceful, cooperative and harmonious. The opposition between these two visions of international politics was already reflected in the debate between two trends: the “bilateral hemispheric” and “global-multilateral”(CERVO and BUENO, 2002). The first, which promoted the alliance with the United States, was predominant in the Cardoso government. The second would be dominant in the government of Lula, during which Brazil 198 returned to selective universalism, by reprising its alliances and ties with India, China, South Africa and Russia. Under the “bilateral hemispheric” trend Brazil, like other countries, joined with neoliberal governments in the region, to develop the agenda of universal hegemonic or internationally recognized values; Lula, without rejecting this agenda outright, subordinated it to the traditional topics of economic development and security. However, both lines of thought came in a meeting point: the need to promote international cooperation to advance domestic and international goals of peace, development and justice or equity. This has been important because it stresses the coincidence in in the role played by Brazil – given its resources and capabilities – in the management of world order, as well as the country’s contribution to “global governance” (international governance); nevertheless, profound differences were seen on the perception of the viability of “economic interdependence”. At the end of his government, Cardoso expressed his frustration with the concept of asymmetrical globalization5, and established South American integration as a basis for coping with and encouraging dialogue with the European Union. Meanwhile, Brazilian Royalists watched integration, from MERCOSUR, as a power base to counter U.S. dominance and heighten influence in South America6. Foreign policy formulators for Lula joined Joseph Nye’s vision of a multipolar world, an interpretation useful to make coincide both the liberal thought (Lafer) and the Brazilian nationalist realism (including Moniz Bandeira and Pinheiro Guimarães). In the first case, policy-makers shared a neo-Kantian matrix and in the second, multipolarism was functional to the concept of what they aspired to in world politics. For both, multipolarity of the emerging new order allowed a space of action for an intermediate power like Brazil. Celso Lafer’s vision – a liberal thinker and chancellor of Cardoso – was retaken by the foreign policy-makers for Lula. His theoretical thinking is identifiable in two stages. The first (1996), when accompanied by their ideas F.H. Cardoso, is founded on the vision of the new systemic context, by comparing essences7 between the orders of the Cold War and the subsequent; the second stage, at the end of the Cardoso administration (2002) tried to maintain the continuity of Brazilian foreign policy by appealing to the “identities” that characterized Brazil (BERNAL-MEZA, 2005). Celso Lafer was able to propose the aggiornamiento of traditional principles of foreign policy to support the change, to adapt it to what he saw as the “new 5 See La Nación and Clarín, Buenos Aires, January 5, 1999. 6 See, in this regard, Moniz Bandeira (1996); BERNAL-MEZA (2000). 7 The idea of change of essences or change of ontological identity was not new, though. Raúl Bernal-Meza addressed both ideas in key books of the New World Order (1991) and Latin America in the World Political Economy (1994). 199 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional International Thought in the Lula Era Raúl Bernal-Meza systemic context” which flourished in the 90’s and in which the country should be inserted. The novel turned out to be the appeal to “external credibility and reliability”, in conjunction with the epistemic community that supported Argentina peripheral Realism, like conditions of access to the world in three integrated areas of international life: the strategic, the economic one, and values (LAFER, 1996:72). The fundamental idea was that a country of continental features, such as Brazil, should review and adapt its previous worldview, the one dominant under the developmentalist model, between 1930 and 1990. In his 2001 work, Lafer expressed his vision of the new system context, comparing the essence between the order of the Cold War, characterized by “defined polarities” and the current transition, the “indefinite polarities”; then he pointed out the continuities of Brazilian foreign policy, by appealing to the identities that characterize this country. The essences indicated by him implied that the international system had changed from “a period defined polarities” to one of “undefined polarities”. While the former reflected the existence of a bipolar system, in the second the contradictions were presented in each of the essential components of previous systemic order, giving rise to a multipolar scenario in which there was a space of action for a rising power like Brazil; in this context it was necessary to make sense of economic issues to the parcerias internacionais (“international association”, Lafer, 1992) and to adherence to the “universally accepted values agenda” under the logic of globalization (in its liberal vision) and fragmentation (of identities, the secession of States, of fundamentalism, of social exclusion, etc.), which diluted the logic of the old and classic Westphalian order. It is clear that the vision of a world of “indefinite polarities” was a space for insertion on the rise of Brazil in the global power structure. This vision ingratiated the most liberal ideas which represented the Cardoso government policy. That same view Cardoso expressed as he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the realist tradition of Itamaraty. Holding in the models of historical analysis formulated by Renouvin and Duroselle8, which pointed out the existence of “deep forces” among the factors of persistence of a country’s international insertion, Lafer appealed to the central concept of national identity to explain the continuities and changes of Brazilian foreign policy. National identity is the source of differentiation, also to nationalism. Its components are the historical legacy and significance of international identity in a globalized world. Brazil, as a country of continental scale, is inserted in the context of its neighborhood. Brazil takes part in the asymmetric axis of the international system and the nationalist vision of the pursuit for development. These are elements that justify the need to differentiate to Brazil from other 8 Cfr. Pierre RENOUVIN and Jean-Baptiste DUROSELLE, Introduction à l’histoire des relations internacionales, Paris, Colin, 1991; 4ª ed. 200 countries in South America; they allow to justify the breaks and long-term trends in foreign policy and to dissociate the political regime from the practicing and formulating of foreign policy. The paradox is that the vision of Lula’s foreign policy was close to neoliberalism, when he believed that cooperation through institutions and international agreements (UN, WTO, G-20, etc.) could soften the effects of anarchy and the imposition of imperial power; but Lula was also purely realistic when pursued building alliances to face the challenge that the rise of new powers imposed to hegemony; this can be understood in Brazil’s concern to integrate and promote the BRIC group – or construction of an emerging power- that challenges institutionalized power9. With this type of cooperation there was an attempt to improve the relative position of Brazil in the global power structure, while through the integration of South America Lula sought to preserve the position of superiority over the other South American countries (MONIZ BANDEIRA, 1996; BERNAL-MEZA, 1999; 2000, 2008, SOUTO MAIOR, 2006; SOARES DE LIMA, 2008). The perception of weakness was replaced by a re-evaluation of the role of Brazil as a middle power and emerging nation that required a high-profile diplomacy, suited to the country’s abilities and needs (PECEQUILO, 2008:143); the “presidential and personalist” diplomacy, would be replaced by “diplomacy of the nation” (CERVO, 2002), strengthening the vision of Brazil as a great country. In the words of its Chancellor: “o Brasil não é um país pequeno. Não tem e nem pode ter uma política externa de país pequeno” (AMORIM, 2007: 7)10. A very important element in the evolution of thought supporting foreign policy would be “formation of concepts in international relations”, developed by professor Amado Cervo. Brazilian concepts would replace the macro-theories of (supposed) universal scope, developed by the academic thinking of the “centers”, mainly the United States. From a methodological perspective, which has had a clear application in the foreign policy of Lula, this approach is interpreted as a conceptual development that replaces the theoretical elaboration of others, because it is a systemic period of “indefinite polarities”. The main concept was made about the “logistical State”. This system of ideas provides strategic guidance for the dynamics of Brazil in international arenas and supports its expansion in terms of influence. It also involves a set of concepts shared by the leading sectors of the roles of the state structure. In this regard, the State, “plays the role of supporter and legitimacy bearer of the initiatives of other economic and social actors” (CERVO, 2008, 2008a); the state also takes on a 9 On the application of the concept of "countervailing power", cf. DUPAS (2005) and CERVO (2008). 10 In free translation: “Brazil is not a small country. It does not have and cannot have the foreign policy of a small country. 201 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional International Thought in the Lula Era Raúl Bernal-Meza series of tasks that allow it to become a launch pad – mainly economic but also political – for the public and private activities in the country. It is possible to identify two dimensions to this approach. It can be analyzed as: a) a series of perceptions of recent changes in the international system and the role of Brazil on the world stage and b) a set of policies guiding the strategy of internal development and international relations. Images of the international order are related to the recognition of globalization, global interdependence and regionalism, as the dynamic processes that mark the contemporary world (SOMBRA SARAIVA and CERVO, 2005). Another significant factor is the conviction of the loss of unilateral hegemonic stability by the United States and therefore, the birth of a world order based on multilateralism, which would imply a historic structure different from above. With this new international order responsibilities for countries (and other actors) of the executive aristocracy would emerge and they would participate in a decisionmaking process characteristic of a kind of global governance (MASERA, 2010). The concept of logistical State permits, from the ideational point of view about economic development, to delink Brazil from the theoretical vision of the Dependence on the “center” and “periphery”. Brazil is not periphery. It’s in a middle, transitional, position, able to reach the select group of states that command the patterns of status, wealth and power in the world system11. The elite now leading Brazilian government seeks to improve the relative position of the country by accepting the competence and, at the same time, seeking a policy of matching, as it would be explained in the participation and political positions from the IMF and the G-20. The logistical state tends to accumulate attributes of power to reinforce what Cervo called the “national economic hard core” (CERVO, 2008a: 87). This strategy is found in the search for various foreign policy objectives: consolidation of prestige, leadership in regional conciliation, and key presence in international forums like the G-20, etc. Realism and accumulation of power Brazil became the only Latin American country12 to re-take realism as a paradigm of foreign policy. Under that vision, policy makers, decision-makers and influential epistemic community members who accompany them considered Brazil as the only player that could compete with the United States for the “hegemonic influence” in South America. The idea of hegemony has evolved from the “leadership vacuum”, established since the mid-1990s (BERNAL-MEZA, 2000), to a conviction on the leadership itself, which began to be projected on 11 See in this regard, Arrigui (1998), Aymard (1985). 12 For an overview of the dominant paradigms of foreign policy in Latin America, cf. BERNAL-MEZA (2009th). 202 the concept of due role played by Brazil in the regional scene. It is a fact that in the Lula years Brazil is involved internationally in a much more active and multilateral projection than it had during the late 90’s; this has happened both in international economic relations and in security matters, which showed a new international action, taking on increasingly global dimensions. In terms of neorealism: for more power, Brazil was interested in changing its own position in the international system (SCHIRM, 2007). Two groups of emerging powers came to dominate the preferences as a mechanism for reshaping the global order, through multilateralism: the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa). While latter reaffirmed a return to Africa from a strategic perspective of the southern hemisphere, the first represented the emerging global power group. The presence in both groups is indicative of the reasons why Brazil wants to be present at all negotiating tables of the world, as it is in the WTO and the G20, and wants to become a permanent member in the Security Council, where the rules are decided, many of which may be harmful. For Brazil, the BRICs are very important, because in the new vision of order and global power, this grouping will transfer size (hierarchy) in international politics and agree on their desire to be influential in it, increasing their relative value. Leadership, aspiration for recognition as a global power, accumulation of power resources made evident the overall objectives and interests of the new foreign policy. As one ambassador noted, “simplificadamente, pode-se dizer que a idéia-chave subjacente à nossa atual política regional é a construção de uma base subcontinental tão ampla e sólida quanto possível, de modo a firmar a liderança brasileira na América do Sul, o que deveria facilitar, no âmbito mundial, o exercício de uma política de potência emergente”13 (SOUTO MAIOR, 2006:54). However, the logic of this overall strategy has not been uniform: in the case of South-South cooperation with countries in South America, Brazil takes a strategy close to the pattern of dominance, while in the South-South internationalmultilateral sphere, it assumes the behavior of collective leadership, in partnership with other countries also system-affecting, such as India and China (SARAIVA, 2007). Changes in the concept of regionalism and integration: Lula found a large spread of regionalism models and economic integration strategies on the continent; joining them with a pragmatic and flexible proposal – the South American Community of Nations, Unasur today – Lula sought the inclusion of the five existing tariff schemes South America (ALBA, Mercosur, CARICOM, Chile, the Andean Community of Nations). 13 In free translation: “It can be simply put that the key idea underneath our current regional policy is the construction of a subcontinental base as ample and solid as possible, in order to consolidate Brazilian leadership in South America. This should facilitate, in worldy terms, the exercise of an emerging power’s foreign policy”. 203 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional International Thought in the Lula Era Raúl Bernal-Meza For this strategy, Brazil counted with strong support from the Chilean government of Michelle Bachelet, also devoted to a multilateral approach and flexible strategy; both countries then shared – albeit under different economic policies – the model of “logistical State”. A key element of the new realism of Brazil has been the accession of President Lula to the concept of “spheres of influence”. This approach emphasized a division of Latin America into a Caribbean area, North Central and North-southern (Mexico), all of which under the sphere of North American influence, and another area, the South American, under the influence of an expanding Mercosur, whose dynamic axis of power is Brazil. No further work is required on this reflection; suffice it to say that foreign policy documents by Itamaraty stopped referring to “Latin America” as a region for more than five years. (BERNAL-MEZA, 2008). In this regard, the perception of Argentina, according to which the then President Kirchner rejected the South American Community of Nations, was that “it could limit the Mercosur and is perfect for the Brazilian strategy of creating a Latin America without Mexico”14. Regionalism in Brazil under Lula is in close relationship with the logistical concept of State. It promotes productive integration through infrastructure, energy and Brazilian investments, while, at the global level, it has forged coalitions that strengthen the role of Brazil as a “global” actor. As noted by several authors, the Brazilian foreign policy abandoned the idea of a Latin America as an expression of “regional unity and subsystem” in the middle of 199015. The vision of a Latin America as a non-homogeneous region, thus justifying the differentiation of South America, was heavily championed by Brazilian diplomats and scholars of international relations. The lack of interest in what happened to Mexico in intra-regional relations turned Lula and some of his advisers to the governments of Lagos (Chile) and Néstor and Cristina Kirchner (Argentina); additionally, it could not be ignored that the Aztec country did not belong to any sub-hemispheric strategy always being considered a natural part of a Hispano-Lusitanian America in search of the unit. However, Brazil returned to Latin America and the Caribbean during the second presidency of Lula. This return is exemplified by his visits to Mexico and by the meetings that convened Brazil and the CARIFTA countries, a process that began in 2007 when Lula’s government began deploying its influence in Central America through the biofuel issue. The new view is that failed economic, political and security integration slowed the expansion of Brazilian companies. This process happened despite 14 Morales Solá, Joaquín, Los desafiantes objetivos de Brasil, in La Nación, Buenos Aires, May 5, 2005, p. 1. 15 In the latest edition of the book Relações Internacionais da América Latina: velhos e novos paradigmas. São Paulo: Saraiva (Terceira Edição) in chapter 8 – América do Sul no século XXI: construção e dispersão. Amado Cervo argues about the reasons for this return (original texts given by the author). 204 International Thought in the Lula Era The evolution of the Brazilian model of State: The Logistical State under President Lula While Cardoso sought to replace the “developmentalist State” for the normal (neo-liberal) State, Lula would advance in the implementation of the ideal type of logistical State. With the purpose of promoting this model of international integration to lead to development, the Lula government made up a political and economic strategy, whose central issues would be finding a new role in the international order; this central role would be achieved by: generating confidence among the major world powers on reliability and moderation of its policy of multilateralism; seeking to create agreements with them to strengthen the United Nations system; promoting the idea of political importance of integrating Brazil as a permanent member of the Security Council and its role in mediating and stabilizing on the Third World. And in the context of international political economy, the directions were: trying to save the WTO negotiations, separating from its previous alliances (Argentina, India, China) who held tougher positions on the demands on developed countries, by strengthening the G-20; approaching “global governance” as carried out by major powers (U.S., EU, Japan); strengthening the role of the IMF and separating from the above critical positions, through the payment of its debt with the Fund; helping it to strengthen its role as lender and watchdog, taking away from “neoprotectionist” regionalism as Mercosur and opting for a new one: the “Brazilian regionalism”, more flexible and pragmatic (Unasur). All these processes should be backed by a set of national strategies that sought to improve the international position of the Brazilian economy and its main actors, private and public. In this perspective, a key role is the strategy of internationalization of domestic companies, helping big business groups (industrial and services) and enhancing the development of new ones. Under the guidance of this model, the outward expansion of the Brazilian economy – a necessary condition for achieving real interdependence in the world of globalization, as the logistical ideology – works in two ways: by the aggregation of national enterprises to the international production chains and direct investment abroad, starting with neighboring countries (CERVO, 2008). For this strategy, the Lula government conducted a study, created an ad hoc working group and made a proposal for public policy-making16. Also, the 16 See Governo Federal. Termo de referência: Internacionalização de empresas brasileiras, Brasília (DF), december 2009. 205 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional the agreements reached at the Unasur, because in these areas there are many misunderstandings, which add to the already existing with Venezuela and Argentina, and because of the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay as well as policies of economic nationalism in other countries.. In short, Brazil went back to “Latin America” because the “South America” project failed. Raúl Bernal-Meza government of Lula da Silva induces the formation of mega-corporations, capable of competing on the world market. Through funding from the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and a fund of 58 billion dollars, it promotes the formation of “national giants” through mergers and acquisitions in industries such as food, cellulose, telephony and ethanol17; this vision is, by the way, projected in the proposals of the PT candidate to the next presidential election18. Conclusions At the beginning of the XXI century there was a wide multiplicity of ideas trying to interpret the causes and consequences of the transition of world order, with the end of the Cold War and the doctrines and theories that should inform foreign policies in a rapidly changing world system. For a period Brazilian foreign policy seemed to lose direction. It showed contradictions, drastic changes and open infighting that characterized the 1980-1992 years (HIRST and PINHEIRO, 1995; BERNAL-MEZA, 2000). The consistence of F.H. Cardoso’s foreign policy of did not mean the absence of profound questions for his neo-idealistic vision, that put it away from the more autonomic and Third World traditions. Nevertheless, Lula da Silva would promote the rebirth of an idea: Brazil as a power aligned with the foreign policy guidelines of 1974 -1979: autonomy, pursuit of power, aspiration to compete for a major role in regional hemispheric and systemic hegemony. In Brazil, the arrival of President Lula signaled a drastic change in relation to the Cardoso period: a shift in the conception that policy and decision-makers had on global politics, although not on the objectives of the country’s international integration. The visions, strategies and alliances changed deeply. With Lula, Brazil became the only South American (and Latin American) country to re-take realism as foreign policy paradigm ; the same realism had been abandoned, by Brazil itself, and Argentina and Chile, between the middle and in the late 1980s. Taking this path, the definition of “spheres of influence” would be an absolutely obvious of this realistic aggiornamiento. Lula da Silva’s choices in foreign policy involved a transition from the neoidealism in Cardoso’s utopian multilateralism to the classical realism dominant in international relations (CERVO, 2002; BERNAL-MEZA, 2002). Brazilian foreign policy rediscovered, in the beginning of XXI century, the thought on which Rio Branco sustained his foreign policy a century earlier. Under the recovery of this classical conception of world politics, the new Brazilian foreign policy devised the international system as a power game, a fight 17 Brasil impulsa las megaempresas, in Clarín, Suplemento 1 ECO Economía y Negocios; Buenos Aires, may 17, 2009; p. 21. 18 In definitions of eventual future government, the candidate Dilma Rousseff said: “En Brasil (para nosotros), el Estado es socio de los empresarios”. See: Clarín, Buenos Aires, September 26, 2009, p. 52. 206 among the most powerful actors in the system. In view of the rise of the “low politics” agenda and the methodological and conceptual renovation of the new economic diplomacy (Bayne & Woolcock, 2007), multilateralism was stripped of utopia and became the game of interests, with gains and losses distributed as a result of trade negotiations, for which it was essential to recover the importance of coalitions and alliances between similar countries. However, this is not pure realism but it is combined with the Grotian vision19 of the international system by following the rules and institutions of the multilateral order, although simultaneously promoting their redesign, in all agendas, and seeking their own active participation in the mechanisms of global governance. Returning to the thought of Celso Lafer, the future of global scenarios departs from the vision of a world order where loss of unilateral hegemonic stability is perceived. This allows Brazil to have a space of action for its repositioning as a global actor, based on the recognition of its status as an emerging world power. The key instrument of that position, through the international re-integration would be the application of the ideal of “logistical State”. In this way, Brazil has combined in recent years an active participation in multilateral fora, to promote its national interests from a realistic perspective. The novel element is that – parallel to the pursuit of power measured in terms of accumulation of military capabilities – the country points to a strategy based on a “multilateralism of reciprocity” (CERVO and BUENO, 2008). This view suggests that Brazil has progressively held a prominent place in the various domains of international relations, from regional security to the finance arena. Concerns about the emphasis in South America as a region distinct from the rest of the hemisphere (particularly from Central America and Mexico) came from the vision of Brazilian foreign policy adopted by the middle 1990s and remained dormant until it was designed with strong dynamism in Lula da Silva’s foreign policy (BERNAL-MEZA, 2006, 2008, 2008a). The synthesis of this vision showed that to the south of the Rio Grande there were two welldefined areas of influence: one that includes Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America, perceived as economically and politically dependent on the United States; and another, South American, that regionallyintegrates more independent and autonomous projects – the Mercosur and the CAN. This South America, under the leadership of CAN, would be setting up a project of political cooperation, the Unasur, supported by an infrastructure integration program, which would be the IIRSA 20. Lula has worried constantly to ensure the future of the Unasur, one of the biggest assets of Brasilia in foreign policy21. 19 Gustavo Masera calls this combination of ideas as " expanded neo-Grotianism", cf. MASERA (2010). 20 See MONIZ BANDEIRA (2006) and ONUKI (2006). 21 As he noted in lanacion.com, August 29. 207 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional International Thought in the Lula Era Raúl Bernal-Meza However, negative reactions to both the Brazilian government and its internationalized companies were found in most South American countries due to the implementation of nationalist and reactive policies against free market; this criticism referred also to the unilateral opening of the preceding neoliberal period, which would lead to the conclusion that the South American scene was now very complex for political strategies in Brazil. Against this complexity, the Brazilian diplomacy would begin the return to Central America, Mexico and Caribbean. Lula used international multilateralism as an instrument to curb the power of the only superpower and as a way for global recognition to the new emerging power centers, among which is Brazil. The convergence of interests of Lula’s foreign policy and some areas of developed countries, in particular the European Union and a bunch of its leading members, has enabled them to strengthen multilateralism. It has been argued that both segments of this global world share the same vision of “multipolarity and multilateralism”, which has been the basis for the creation of the G-20 (replacing the old G-7), the strengthening of the UN structure, the rescue of multilateral trade negotiations (Doha) and the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change (2009). The pragmatism of Lula’s realist foreign policy has led to the paradox that developed countries have conferred Lula the title of “global statesman” (World Economic Forum, Davos, January 2010), while, simultaneously, his country is headquarters and takes the leadership of the World Social Forum, which represents just the rebellious example of the global economic order represented by Davos. This is a contradiction that many South American socio-political sectors do not understand. The instrument for the new global destination and insertion of Brazil is now the “logistical State”. This paradigm, in the words of Amado Cervo, “does not go passively to market forces and the hegemonic power”, but involves a comprehensive set of public policies at the scientific-technological, industrial, commercial, educational areas, as well as external ones. It involves coordination of internal development and international action based on a country-strategy and a broad vision of the international scenarios, and Brazil’s role in them. Thus, Brazil is seeking its place in the XXI century world setting, from active participation in the design and management of world order. However, the great overarching objectives of Brazil will present enormous challenges, among them being part of the BRIC’s. In this arrangement, Brazil is aiming to take some of the new international management as the only nonnuclear power of the group. In this respect, there is already some internal debate among those who find it necessary to keep a Brazil free of nuclear weapons and those others, closer to the hard positions of realism, who think that there can be no world power without strategic nuclear development. This position being accepted, Brazil should not only renounce the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but also to the Agreements – “Commitment” of Mendoza, 1991, about banning chemical and 208 bacteriological weapons, signed between Brazil, Argentina and Chile. This step, if taken, would, logically and certainly, give Argentina reasons to retake the path of military-strategic nuclear development, a dispute that would put a definite end, to the projects of South American integration and cooperation, which have as a base the cordial, entente relationship between Brazil and Argentina . Brazil begins to abandon the unified position regarding the Mercosur free trade agreement with the European Union. That old order, signed in Madrid in 1995, is not any longer part of Brazil’s interests because its policymakers believe that now would undermine the national potential of integration into the global economy and regional and multilateral trade agreements (CERVO, 2009a: 85). It will therefore be a matter of time before their South American partners, and particularly Argentina, perceive that the interests of its big neighbor do not coincide with theirs. The final thought has to do with the approach from which we have addressed the text. Obviously, the vision has been State-centric, because that is what decisionmakers, elites and power groups in Brazil have imposed, predominantly to the logic of foreign policy and the perspective with which to view world politics. We incorporate the critics on weaknesses facing, in Brazil, the effort to democratize the formulation of foreign policy. It can be said that in this arena, there is limited participation of other social actors that can express their interests in the policy, precisely because of the realistic vision. We also maintain that social inequalities determine the future prospects and options of the country to become a regional leader and global, despite the enormous economic growth and its progress on the path of becoming a world power with a significant increase of its international relevance and influence. As one expert on this country once said, Although Brazilian economy is large and vibrant, the distribution of income in the country is among the worst in the world. 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Currently the country integrates the small group of countries which evolved from an initial peripheral and subordinate insertion dating back to the nineteenth century, part of the most dynamic segment of the semiperiphery. But this category, intermediate between the “maturity” and “backwardness”, according Modernization theorists, or between the “center” and “periphery”, as theorists of the Dependence defend, has undergone a process of overcoming considerable positive progress in the direction of the group of states that dominate the current world system. In this way, during the years 2003-2010, foreign policy, along with the formulation of a new regionalism as a strategy of global integration and a new ideal model of State, has been a key factor. Resumo Nos últimos 50 anos, o Brasil passou por um processo de rápidas transformações estruturais, seguidas do primeiro estágio de desenvolvimento industrial nos anos 30. Atualmente, o Brasil integra um pequeno número de países que saiu da condição de periferia e subordinação do século XIX para um grupo mais dinâmico de semi-periferia. Porém, essa é uma categoria intermediária entre maturidade e atraso, de acordo com teóricos da modernização; ou uma categoria entre centro e periferia, segundo teóricos da Dependência. Esse é um estágio do processo de superação de progressivas considerações positivas na direção de um grupo de Estados que dominam o sistema mundial atual. Nesse sentido, durante os anos 2003- 2010, a política externa tem se tornado um fator fundamental, junto com sua formulação de um novo regionalismo como estratégia de integração global e um novo modelo de Estado. Key-words: Brasilian Foreign Policy; Lula’s administration; Brazil. Palavras-chave: Política externa brasileira; Governo Lula; Brasil. 213 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Received August 15, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Artigo Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010): uma visão geral Celso Amorim* Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition): 214-240 [2010] Introduction As I prepared myself to revise this text, I noticed an article that appeared in today’s press (more specifically the French paper “Le Monde”) with the following title “Lula’s Brazil: an imaginative diplomacy”. I read the first sentence: “after seven years of Lula’s presidency, Brazil has not much in common with what it was in 2002”1. I now put the article aside and return to my task. Brazil’s international credibility stems, to a large extent, from the principles that guide her foreign policy. We are a peaceful country, one that abides by international law and respects other countries’ sovereign rights. We choose to settle our disputes diplomatically – and we encourage others to act in the same way. We see multilateralism as the primary means of solving conflicts and making decisions internationally. We uphold Brazilian interests with pragmatism, without renouncing our principles and values. These characteristics of our foreign policy have been more or less constant over time. Departures have been rare and short-lived. Different governments, however, attach varied degrees of importance to specific issues, themes, regions and agendas. Political leaders have given more or less prominence to foreign policy amongst other public policies. International tides often shift direction and new circumstances simply come up unannounced. As Brazil went through structural transformations, her international identity had to be shaped accordingly. An ever-changing world requires a foreign policy with capacity of adaptation. In a democracy, foreign policy is one amidst a number of public policies. It ought to be subject to the scrutiny of public opinion and be mindful of the people’s will * Minister of External Relations of Brazil. 1 Interview with Jean-Jacques Kourliandsky: “Le Brésil de Lula: une diplomatie imaginative”, Le Monde, October 4, 2010. 214 Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview as expressed at the ballot box. President Lula seized the mandate for change that his two elections granted him in order to shape a new role for Brazil in the world, while remaining faithful to the basic principles that have guided our foreign relations. The author of the newspaper article was right: we did it imaginatively. The end of the Cold War was followed by a great deal of optimism in the face of a “new world order” some claimed would last forever – or, at least, for a very long period. There were high expectations that the practices of “good governance” – universal patterns to be followed by States in their domestic policies – would in and by themselves guarantee a better life for the unprivileged and the dispossessed. Globalisation was generally seen as a panacea. Soon, it became clear that globalisation had its downsides. There is strong evidence that it has increased inequalities among and within States. The promise of a better and fairer world that would result from the triumph of “Western” political values (whatever one means by that) and of market economy was not fulfilled. Contrary to Francis Fukuyama’s predictions, History did not meet its end. It is true that the post-Cold War era brought the world closer together. Globalisation produced a higher degree of political interdependence among States. Neglect of international rules of coexistence under the pretext of protecting national security can only occur at a price. Unlawful unilateral actions, particularly after the occupation of Iraq in 2003, are less and less likely to muster support or, even, to succeed. There was widespread belief that the demise of the Soviet Union would lead to the rise of a single superpower bound to exercise a “benign” hegemony over the entire world. History proved that such a forecast was hasty. There is plenty of evidence that power is in fact being diluted, as a larger number of countries have become stakeholders of global stability. This may not be true when it comes to sheer military might, but it is certainly the case if power is understood in a wider sense: that of influencing behaviour of other actors and, ultimately, the course of events. The rise of big developing countries – Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt, Turkey, among others – is the most important phenomenon of the post-Cold War period. This trend became more evident after the economic meltdown of 2008. The so-called emerging nations enjoy greater political and economic weight in global affairs. This realignment of forces in the international system is paving the way for a more multipolar order. It has been said that the metaphor that best illustrates how the world is organized today is no longer the “hub-and-spoke”, in which all the units must refer to the centre in order to communicate with one another, but rather the “subway map” with its intertangled lines and network of stations, some of which, of course, remain more important than others. 215 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional A changing world Celso Amorim This tendency to multipolarity has not been followed by the democratisation of multilateral institutions, which suffer from progressive obsolescence. Global governance has been running short of legitimacy, transparency and effectiveness, among other reasons, because developing countries remain underrepresented. The period that followed the end of the Cold War witnessed greater international cooperation, especially at the UN. It also witnessed global crises related to financial markets; food security; energy; climate change; terrorism; transnational crime. The emergence of a number of influential non-State actors and shifting alliances are also phenomena of our times that make the international arena a far more complex environment. The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the East-West conflict and ushered in a new era. The rise of developing countries is a structural transformation that is knocking down another wall: the North-South wall. It is a thick wall, albeit an invisible one. It is falling apart much more slowly than the Berlin Wall, but falling it is. In this more multipolar, more complex world in which developing countries are no longer passive bystanders, Brazil is willing to play a greater role. A new role for Brazil The way Brazil is seen – both abroad and within her borders – has dramatically changed in the last few years. The return to democracy, monetary stability, economic growth, poverty reduction, improvement in social indicators, internationalisation of Brazilian companies, the change of status from debtor to creditor, all add up to redefine Brazil’s image in the world. In this process, President Lula’s magnetic personality, his large experience as a trade union leader, the charisma resulting from an extraordinary life, played a central role. But it is not unreasonable to claim that an audacious and, sometimes, irreverent, foreign policy has contributed to this “leap forward”. In the words of a renowned political commentator: “Twenty years ago, Brazil was struggling to cast off a long legacy of dictatorship, hyperinflation and debt. Today it is a stable democracy with impressive fiscal management, a roaring economy and a wildly popular president. Its foreign policy reflects this confidence and a desire to break free of its older constraints.”2 Foreign policy is an important instrument for promoting development. The robust trade surpluses sustained over the last few years can be, at least in part, attributed to the opening of new markets. Although Brazilian foreign policy objectives cannot be reduced to a mercantilist view of the world, an active diplomacy, not limited by outdated preconceptions, helped to boost Brazilian business all over the world. Indeed, there was a total upheaval in Brazil’s trade patterns: in 2009, non-OECD countries accounted for 57% of the Brazilian exports. Back in 2002, such figures were far below, amounting to only 38.5%. 2 ZAKARIA, Fareed. Step up to the Plate. Newsweek, September 29, 2010. 216 The Brazilian economy felt the impact of the financial crisis of 2008-2009 to a lesser degree than most of the world. Although the expansion of the internal market as well as the countercyclical policies adopted by the Brazilian Government contributed to lessen the impact of the financial crisis, the fact that Brazilian exports no longer hinge primarily on the performance of the rich countries was also a factor in the quick exit from the negative spiral. The diversification of trade partners, with emphasis placed on other developing countries, was part of President Lula’s diplomatic strategy from the outset – long before the financial meltdown. Incidentally, it was also the target of harsh criticism, especially in Brazil herself. Creativity and assertiveness were essential elements in some key foreign-policy decisions that had been taken in the course of the last eight years. From day one, President Lula chose to adopt a clearly independent attitude – fearless, but not reckless – commensurate with Brazil’s size and aspirations. A test case came right after President Lula’s inauguration with the US invasion of Iraq. Brazil firmly opposed that move. She did so for a variety of reasons. First, the occupation was not authorized by the UN Security Council, therefore constituting a breach of international law. Second, because we felt that the costs of an armed attack would by far outweigh its hypothetical benefits. Third, because the grounds presented for justifying military action were shaky and ultimately proved to be false. Having presided over three panels on Iraq at the United Nations in the late 1990s, including the very important one on disarmament (which resulted in the replacement of UNSCOM by its successor – UNMOVIC), I had every reason to doubt the allegations about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction. Although we were well-aware of the limited influence Brazil might have on the course of events, President Lula felt it his responsibility to put some diplomatic weight behind Brazil’s position: he joined then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s and Pope John Paul II’s efforts to avoid the war. The fact that our position was based on principles and conviction – and not on a spirit of confrontation – was clearly understood. When President Lula visited Washington in June 2003, President George W. Bush started the meeting with this commentary: “Brazil and the US have their differences, but let’s work on what we have in common.” In the international economic front, President Lula faced two immediate challenges: the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the conclusion of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). I will refer to the latter in more detail further ahead. As far as the FTAA is concerned, President Lula’s Administration considered that the terms under which it was being negotiated did not correspond to Brazilian interests. I will not get into specifics here. Suffice it to say that, whereas sensitive issues for Brazil, such as services, investment and government procurement, had already seen a great deal of “progress” (not from our point of view, of course), questions like agricultural subsidies and antidumping, which were dear to us, had 217 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim not been properly addressed and were, in fact, blocked. The new Government was also expected to present its offer in market access in 45 days after the inauguration, which we eventually refused to do. At the very least, the Administration needed more time to assess what was on the table in consultation with the relevant sectors of Brazilian society. In spite of the difficulties, the parties almost reached a deal at the Miami Conference of November 2003, on the basis of a proposal by Brazil and the US who jointly exercised the presidency of the negotiations. A number of variables interfered and led to the paralysis of the negotiations. Brazil did not oppose the FTAA as a matter of principle, although, with the benefit of hindsight, one would be justified to conclude that the result (or non-result) was not altogether unfavourable to Brazil – especially for her efforts to promote South American integration. Two aspects of our firm posture vis-à-vis the FTAA negotiations deserve to be retained. First, at the same time as we maintained a constructive negotiating position, we were able to resist the very strong pressure, from within Brazil as well from the outside, to accept an agreement that would run counter our interests. Second, we defended our positions in a pragmatic and mature way. Brazil-US commercial relations thrived and high level dialogue was always excellent. More important: disagreements on the regional front did not prevent intense cooperation in search of a solution for the Doha Round. This was especially evident in the crucial role both Brazil and the US had in the so-called July Framework (2004). Global governance Brazil is a firm believer in multilateralism. A rules-based international order is indispensable for a more just and democratic world. This is true as much for peace and security as it is for climate change or trade. The G-20 of the WTO – a group of emerging countries (Brazil, India, Argentina, South Africa and others), which came to include China and at least one LDC, Tanzania – was formed with a view to ensure that the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) would not be another unfulfilled promise and would effectively bring the development dimension into the trade negotiations. More specifically, these countries rebelled against a proposed agreement that would not address the main issues concerning agriculture reform and its impact on international trade. Agriculture had always been considered as a part of the unfinished business of the Uruguay Round and constituted one of the central aspects of the DDA. At later stages, it came to be recognized not only by Brazil and other developing countries, but also by the US herself, that agriculture was the locomotive (sic) of the Doha Round. Former USTR Robert Portman expressly agreed with me on 218 this point, during an informal ministerial meeting sponsored by the OECD in May 2005. Until that moment, the WTO negotiations followed the same informal procedure that used to be the norm of its predecessor – the GATT. All crucial questions were sorted out by a small group of countries – the Quad, constituted by the US, the European Commission, Japan and Canada. The rebellion of developing countries – by the way, with the support of a number of LDCs and smaller countries – not only prevented a bad result in Cancun, but also led to a new pattern in the decision-making process in the WTO. Since then, Brazil and India have been meeting with the US and the EU (and, on occasion, with other rich countries, such as Japan and Australia, later joined by China) in the so-called G-4, which eventually replaced the Quad. Most of the progress made from Cancun until the July Package of 2008 was produced in G-4 meetings. The ability of the G-20 to articulate its positions with other group of developing countries was fundamental for progress made during the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting of December 2005, which decided that the export subsidies for agriculture must be eliminated by 2013. It was not the first time developing countries tried to articulate a common position, but, unlike what happened on previous occasions, in which they had essentially a defensive – although justifiable – posture, this time, developing nations were able to advance a constructive agenda based on forward-looking proposals. It was, for example, the G-20 negotiations that became – with adjustments, of course – the architecture for agricultural negotiations. In Cancun, Brazil was fighting two parallel battles: one was at the negotiating table, against the perpetuation of asymmetries in trade negotiations. Another battle was for winning the “hearts and minds” in a time when the media was selling (or being sold) a totally distorted version, according to which Brazil and her G-20 partners were blocking a deal out of plain obstructionism. Besides, the participation of developing countries (including the poorer ones) gave the whole process more legitimacy. The change in global governance became all the more evident during the financial crisis. As a response to the turmoil in the markets, which almost brought the world into a depression as severe as that of the thirties, a new G-20 sprung up. It is hard not to relate those two groups which carry the same denomination, even though there is no causal relationship between their respective creations. The fact that the G-20 of the WTO had been successful in enabling developing countries to have a greater say in matters of international trade may have been in the back of the minds of some decision-makers at the time of the consolidation of the Financial G-20 as a high-level forum. The Financial G-20, thus upgraded, became the leading forum for macroeconomic coordination. It replaced the G-8 (in reality, the G-7, since the presence of Russia in the group had more to do with her nuclear status then with 219 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim her economic weight). When I said, in a conference at the Science-Po in Paris in mid-2009, that the G-8 was dead, this was seen by many, especially in Brazil, as a manifestation of hubris. Soon after that, the Pittsburgh Summit confirmed the G-20 as the premier forum for economic and financial matters. Brazil has also been a fundamental player in the negotiations concerning the most critical matter of our time: climate change. Brazil is firmly attached to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, which takes into account the rich countries’ historic share in global warming and recognizes the right of poor countries to develop. Nevertheless, we made an ambitious offer of emission cuts at the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, in December 2009, which actually helped push others, especially among the so-called “emerging nations”, to do the same. With her bold proposal, and unlike other countries, including some of the rich ones, Brazil chose not to hide behind other countries’ reluctance. At the same time, we did not allow anyone to hide behind Brazil. In a situation in which the survival of mankind was at stake we decided to preach by example. Unfortunately, the Copenhagen Summit did not reach a consensus. The feasible alternative was the so-called “Accord”. Although circa thirty countries were included in the discussions, the crucial negotiation of the Accord was to take place between US President Barack Obama, on one side, and the leaders of the “BASIC” group – President Lula of Brazil, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India and Prime Minister Wen Jia-Bao of China – on the other. This again points to the changes in global governance already underway. In the event, all this effort came to naught, partly because the Accord was in itself insufficient (on finance and on reduction commitments by some countries, most notably the US), partly because the method to conduct the meeting left some countries excluded and justifiably resentful. On another theme more directly related to the survival of mankind, i.e., disarmament and non-proliferation, Brazil has renewed her engagement with the struggle for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Brazil chaired the 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and gave a strong push for the positive outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the “thirteen steps to disarmament”, adopted in 2000, but which had fallen into oblivion. These steps were based on the proposals made by the New Agenda Coalition, a group composed by developed and developing countries of different regions, committed to a world free of nuclear weapons. *** The economic crisis of 2008-9 sparked the reformist momentum the world is going through. However, if the redesign of economic architecture is underway, the political institutions remain regrettably obsolete and, thus, unable to properly handle the pressing issues of our times. 220 The United Nations needs to be urgently reformed in order to preserve its legitimacy and effectiveness. When the UN was founded, it reflected the realities that emerged from the World War II. Since then, the Cold War has come and gone and the wave of Afro-Asian decolonisation has long come to a conclusion, to mention just two salient features of the second half of the 20th century. In parallel, UN membership was expanded from some 50 countries to almost 200 without significant changes in the Organization’s only body, at least in theory, with ability to enforce decisions: the Security Council. As David Rothkopf, of the Foreign Policy magazine, noted: “The United Nations is weak by design, conceived for a world in which the U.S. and other major powers preferred to leave the real options for action to themselves. (…) The organisation is long overdue for structural reform, and while revamping the list of who sits on the U.N. Security Council is an important part of it (the organisation has no claim on legitimacy with France and Britain being permanent members and India and Brazil left on the margins), the real changes required involve empowering the organization, and not only to reach binding decisions on transnational issues, but to actually be able to enforce them. (…) Nothing guarantees the organization’s ineffectiveness as surely as burdening it with a structure that captures in amber the post World War II power structure of the world.”3 It is almost a truism to state that the United Nations Security Council membership should reflect the current distribution of world power. The role of developing countries in preserving international peace and security must be recognized with an eye to the future rather than to the past. It is inadmissible that the developing world, which accounts for the bulk of UN membership, is not adequately represented among the permanent members. Brazil, along with India, Germany and Japan, assembled in the G-4, has been campaigning for a reform that includes new permanent and non-permanent members. Reforming the UNSC is not a simple matter, but it is an indispensable task. In spite of the complexities involved in changing the UN Charter (such as the need for a wide majority in the General Assembly and the convergence of the present permanent members in the ratification process), we are convinced that the reformist momentum, which started in the economic sphere, will eventually extend to the area of peace and security. World leaders whose countries would not directly benefit from the reform – French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Portuguese Prime Minister José Socrates and British Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, among many others – have already expressed clearly their support for the expansion of the Security Council. 3 ROTHKOPF, David. UNGA week, either you are in or you are out (probably out). Foreign Policy, September 20, 2010. 221 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim Brazil is fully engaged in the G-4 initiative, which we believe gained momentum at the 65th General Assembly and will benefit from the presence of three out of four of its members in the Security Council in 2011. The fact that South Africa, which does not formally belong to the G-4, but shares most of its ideas, will integrate the Council will reinforce this momentum. Actually, one might even say that, taking into account that another important African country, i.e. Nigeria, as well as Brazil, will continue to be a member, the composition of the 2011 UNSC will resemble very much to what an expanded Council should look like. Contrary to the ill-advised opinion of many critics of Brazilian foreign policy, however, all actions undertaken by Brazilian diplomacy have not been conditioned by the supposedly central aim of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. In fact, Brazil has shown that she will not comply with any course of action, with which she does not agree, just to please this or that influential power in order to secure a permanent seat. Having being elected to the Council for the 20102011 term, Brazil took the responsibility the international community entrusted her with very seriously – as it has been done on the nine previous occasions Brazil served as a non-permanent member4. That responsibility is to contribute primarily to peace and security rather than to serve her own parochial interests. This way of thinking inspired the initiative we took, together with Turkey, to find a solution to the vexing question of the Iranian nuclear programme. As a result of an intense diplomatic negotiation carried out by those two countries with Iran, the Tehran Declaration of May 17, 2010 – a day future History books will register, according to an editorial of “Le Monde” – laid out the terms for a swap of Iranian low enriched uranium for nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). The objective of these negotiations, which picked up from the terms proposed by the Vienna Group (France, Russia and the US, endorsed by the Atomic Agency) in October 2009, but which had been first accepted and then rejected by the Iranian Government, was, above all, to build confidence between Iran and the international community regarding its nuclear programme. Iran had refused the proposal on three grounds: i) the quantity of uranium to be swapped; ii) the venue of the swap; and iii) the timing for delivering low enriched uranium and that for receiving the nuclear fuel, which, according to Iran, had to coincide (the idea of “simultaneity”). This is neither the time nor the place to get into specifics. The press has already given a broad repercussion, often criticising, sometimes praising our efforts. Let me just say that a few weeks prior to the Declaration of Tehran, my interlocutors in Tehran – including my colleague, Minister Manouchehr Mottaki 4 Along with Japan, Brazil is the member State that has been elected to a non-permanent seat at the UNSC the most times. 222 – were still insisting that the quantity of uranium to be given away should be limited to 1,000 kilos (other important personalities, including in the opposition, felt that the equivalent in nuclear fuel to 1,200 kilos would be beyond the needs of the TRR); the exchange should take place on Iranian territory (according to their argument, doing otherwise would alienate Iranian sovereignty); the swap should be simultaneous (the Iranian low enriched uranium should only leave Iran when the fuel arrived). During the course of the negotiations, the three issues were solved: i) Iran agreed to exchange 1,200 kilos of low enriched uranium for 120 kilos of fuel; ii) Iran accepted that the exchange would take place on the territory of a neutral power – in this case, in Turkey, and iii) Iran agreed on transferring her low enriched uranium right away, even if the nuclear fuel would not come before one-year’s time. Additionally, Iran agreed to send a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally committing to the terms of the swap. Why did Brazil and Turkey succeed where the traditional powers had failed? First, because Brazil and Turkey – both developing countries – have good relations with Iran. Brazil is a member of the G-15, a group of developing countries to which the Iranian Government attaches a great deal of importance, having presided over its last conference. Turkey not only is located in the Middle East, but is also an Islamic nation, and, under the present AKP Government, has had a very active and independent foreign policy, which naturally facilitates dialogue. Second, Brazil and Turkey are non-nuclear States, thus enjoying far greater legitimacy before the eyes of the Iranian authorities as far as efforts directed at non-proliferation are concerned. Third, they did not assume upfront that the Iranian nuclear programme had necessarily non-peaceful uses. Both believed, much as the original proponents and the IAEA itself did, that the swap deal would help dispel at least some doubts. Finally, Brazil and Turkey have always recognized Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear programme, including the right to enrich uranium, so long as the IAEA could send its inspectors in and ensure the applicable regulations were being respected. Brazil and Turkey had it always clear that the Tehran Declaration did not solve all questions regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. Important issues such as 20% enrichment and the quantity of uranium in Iran’s possession would certainly be part of future discussions, once confidence was recreated (or simply created). The swap agreement was a gateway for a broader negotiation regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. In the course of negotiations, which extended for 18 hours on May 16 and followed months of intense consultations, Iran made voluntary, but difficult, concessions in order to allow the deal to be accepted by all concerned. Surprisingly, the Western powers rushed to announce that a new round of sanctions would still be pursued, irrespective of the results achieved by President Lula and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Eventually, new sanctions were imposed against Iran by the Security Council on the very day 223 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim the so-called Vienna Group submitted its comments on the Tehran Declaration to the IAEA, allowing no time for Iran to reply. Why did the Western powers show this attitude of disregard toward the Tehran Declaration? First, it seems that they were expecting a negative result from the Brazilian-Turkish efforts, which they thought would prove them right about Iran’s intentions. Second, there was probably a change of heart in some of the Western powers along this process. In spite of President Obama’s letter to President Lula (sent about three weeks before the latter’s visit to Tehran), which reaffirmed the points considered essential for an agreement – all of which would appear in the Declaration of May 17 – the US and her allies opted for a course of action which relied on increased sanctions. Having obtained the endorsement of the two more sceptical countries within the P-5 (China and Russia), the proponents of this “harder line” did not want to miss this “window of opportunity”, lest this somewhat fragile consensus among the P-5 might disappear. Lastly, as some critics have argued, some of the P-5 may not have liked to see two emerging nations like Brazil and Turkey playing a pivotal role in a crucial question concerning peace and security in the Middle East, especially in one where they themselves had failed. Former IAEA Director-General Mohammed El-Baradei put it well: “it seems that they could not take yes for an answer”5. On June 9, Brazil and Turkey voted against the sanctions in the Security Council. This was the first time ever that Brazil voted against a resolution that was approved. Having come with a solution – based on a scheme which was not of our making and which required arduous bona-fide negotiations with Iran – we could not do otherwise. Brazil still believes that diplomacy can prevail. In a recent meeting on the margins of the UNGA, the P-5+1 stated that they are ready to engage with Iran again and that they “welcome a meeting of the Vienna Group on the technical implementation of a revised arrangement for the supply of fuel to the TRR.”6 It is hard to imagine that any new discussions will not take the Tehran Declaration into consideration. The so-called fourth round of sanctions against Iran was authorized in an atmosphere of bargaining and secrecy totally incompatible with the role the Security Council should play, making it clear for the entire world that reform should go beyond the question of composition: the methods of work of the Council need to be made more transparent and accountable to the entire international community. In a way, there is a parallel between the Iranian episode and Cancun: on both occasions, Brazil tried to find constructive and pragmatic solutions for real problems affecting the international community (although in Cancun our own 5 Interview to “Jornal do Brasil” on May 30, 2010. 6 Communiqué of the P-5+1 meeting of September 22, 2010. 224 Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Solidarity The exercise of solidarity with those who are more in need has been one of the tenets of President Lula’s foreign policy. The Brazilian Government has not been indifferent to the necessities of countries stricken by poverty, armed conflict and natural disasters. Such attitude of non-indifference is not contradictory with the defence of our own interests. We are convinced that in the long run an attitude based on a sense of humanity that favours the promotion of development of the poorest and most vulnerable will not only be good to peace and prosperity around the world. It will bring benefits to Brazil herself, in political as well as economic terms. This dialectic relation between national interest and the exercise of solidarity has been a fundamental aspect of President Lula’s foreign policy. In the last eight years, Brazil has substantially increased her humanitarian assistance. In 2010 alone, emergency funds were donated (mostly through International Organizations such as the UNDP, the UNHCR and the WFP) to 36 countries facing hardship. Brazil has also vigorously promoted South-South cooperation, sometimes in association with international bodies like the World Bank and the ILO. Brazil’s Cooperation Agency (ABC) – a branch of the Foreign Ministry – keeps projects in many countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and in Asia. In 2009 alone, 414 technical cooperation projects were carried out. In early 2004, President Lula championed, along with Spanish Prime-Minister José Luis Zapatero, former French President Jacques Chirac and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan the Global Action Against Hunger and Poverty. One of the most visible results of such pioneer initiative was the creation of UNITAID, whose purpose is to facilitate access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, especially in Africa. Since 2004, Brazil has had the responsibility of leading the military component of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), committing herself to the stabilisation of the Caribbean country after a period of turmoil and political instability. At the same time as our military achieved the demobilisation of armed gangs, bringing peace to Port-au-Prince shantytowns, the Brazilian Government has been carrying out a series of civilian activities aimed at tackling problems related to poverty, infrastructure and development. In addition to the 225 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional material interests were at stake). On both occasions, those moves were seen as sheer obstruction or dangerous deviation from the pre-established path. After Cancun, it took five months or so for our position to be fully understood by some of our partners. But it was this understanding that allowed negotiations in the WTO to be resumed, leading eventually to the July Framework. Let us wait and see if our efforts, which resulted in the Tehran Declaration will be properly appreciated. And, if so, how long it will take for this to happen. Celso Amorim activities of our military engineers stationed in Haiti, a great number of projects of technical cooperation were set in motion. Along with the other IBSA Fund partners (India and South Africa), Brazil has financed a solid residues recycling plant in Port-au-Prince, which creates jobs and helps clean the environment. This “cash for work” project was considered a model of South-South cooperation by the United Nations Development Programme, from which it earned two special prizes, including one in the context of the Millennium Development Goals. When a devastating earthquake struck Haiti on January 12 – dragging more than 200,000 lives with it, including 20 of our own countrymen – Brazil responded quickly to the new challenges, with direct help and intense participation in broader international efforts. In total, Brazil committed US$ 350 million, divided roughly in equal parts between actions of humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects. Unlike what happened in the case of other donors, much of our promised aid was already disbursed and a great part of what remains to be given out is waiting for decisions to be made by Haiti or in international fora. Our response also included the doubling of our military personnel, which now surpasses 2,000 troops. Upon taking office in 2003, President Lula played a leading role in the creation of the Group of Friends of Venezuela, which helped avoid that the critical situation in that neighbouring and friendly nation deteriorated into some form of violent civil conflict. The Group – integrated by Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Spain and the US – was instrumental in assuring some measure of dialogue between President Chávez and the opposition. This culminated with the realisation of the so-called “Recall Referendum” in conditions generally considered as free and fair by the international community. A number of other examples relating to our neighbours and other countries beyond our region illustrate how a policy based on non-intervention can also display a high degree of “non-indifference”. Universalism During President Lula’s Government, the network of our bilateral relations expanded considerably. In 2002, Brazil had 150 postings overseas. That number is now at 2307. The new postings included 52 embassies, 6 missions to International Organizations, 22 consulates and one diplomatic office, in Palestine. Among them are 23 in Africa, 15 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 13 in Asia and 6 in the Middle East. This increase in postings abroad was followed by the expansion of the corps of diplomatic personnel. In 2005, Brazil had grossly 1.000 diplomats in the service. Today that number is at 1,400. This expansion – compatible with the universal nature of our foreign policy – is likely to go on, as Brazil’s role in international affairs keeps growing. 7 Number of postings already functioning or in the process of being opened. 226 High-level visits, especially presidential ones, are also an indicator of a country’s willingness and ability to strengthen her contacts abroad. Since his inauguration, President Lula paid as many as 259 visits to 83 foreign countries, including international meetings. As Foreign Minister I travelled overseas 467 times, having been received in 101 countries at least once. Presidents, Prime Ministers, Kings, Queens, Ministers, Vice-Ministers and high officials of 137 nations and several leaders of International Organizations made official trips to Brazil since 2003, amounting to an impressive record of 904 visits8. Brazil pursues dialogue with countries of all regions, creeds, colours and backgrounds. No country can afford to relate only with those with whom she agrees or with whom the affinities are self-evident. Of course, it is natural that closer relations will occur when there are commonalities of views and shared interests, whether dictated by geographical proximity, history or prospects of commerce with mutual advantage. The politics of isolation (self-isolation as well as isolation from others), however, is almost always counterproductive. It does not serve the purposes of peace and stability in the world, since governments that feel themselves mistreated in this way become even more self-righteous and tend to radicalize their positions. Many, either as a pretext or out of genuine fear, tend to treat opponents among their own nationals as tools of foreign powers. South America South American integration is Brazilian foreign policy’s top priority. Brazil recognizes that she is stronger and more influential in global affairs by working closely with her neighbours and by helping promote peace and prosperity in her region. In spite of her continental dimensions and vast natural resources, Brazil made a resolute choice to work for regional (i.e. South American) integration. Closer economic and political relations contribute to growth and stability. It also increases our (Brazil’s and South America’s) clout in global negotiations. Mercosul is the original cell of South American integration. Although its original motivation was fundamentally political (and notably so in the first phase of Brazil-Argentina rapprochement), the bloc formed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay started out as a free trade agreement and a (however imperfect) customs union. In spite of all shortcomings, the numbers are eloquent: under President Lula alone, Brazilian trade with our Mercosul partners rose from US$ 8.8 billion in 2002 to US$ 36.6 billion in 20089. Recently, Mercosul’s share of Brazilian foreign trade overtook that of the United States. Economic and productive chains of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay are far more integrated now than at any other moment in History. Pioneering 8 Until August 25, 2010. 9 In 2009, an atypical year in face of the financial crisis, the number sunk to US$ 29 billion. In 2010 the figures are already soaring: US$ 20.7 billion between January and July. 227 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim experiments are being put together in development financing and monetary matters. Local currencies are being used for some transactions, thus reducing the cost of regional trade for small and medium enterprises. The upcoming accession of Venezuela will strengthen the bloc, increasing its energy resources and allowing the Southern Cone of Latin America to be linked to the Caribbean Sea. Some other important achievements were obtained during the past eight years. Part of the credit has to go to President Lula’s strong determination to push for integration, even in the face of bitter criticism. Very often, the Government had to impose its view over the objection of groups and sectors incapable of seeing the long-term interest – not only of the country as a whole, but their own. This was the case in the treatment of asymmetries within the bloc (involving mainly the smaller partners, Uruguay and Paraguay), but also in our relations with Argentina, whose economy was just emerging from a profound crisis and had undergone a period of drastic de-industrialization. There was often the need to show flexibility and, in some cases, even tolerance. It would be unreasonable and probably unfair to expect such an attitude to come spontaneously from the business class, even if – at the same time – our exports to Argentina were growing and our investments were multiplying. In these situations, government has to take the lead, and that is what we did. The result, as shown in the figures quoted above, were more than positive: not only did Mercosul as a whole become a larger trading partner for Brazil than the US, but Argentina alone absorbed more Brazilian exports than any other country, except China, in the last few months – a tendency very likely to be maintained. Mercosul is not merely a trade association. In 1998, the bloc had acquired a strong political dimension with the Protocol of Ushuaia, which condemns any attempt to overthrow a democratically-elected government. Since 2007, Mercosul’s Parliament has been functioning in Montevideo. As I write this article, ahead of the next December’s Summit, in Foz do Iguaçu, the rules for national representation – which balance some degree of proportionality to demographic weight with the principle of sovereign equality – were just agreed by Mercosul’s Council of Ministers. This will make it possible that, not very far in the future, Mercosul’s congressmen will be elected directly by popular vote, as mandated by the Treaty that instituted the Parliament. Mercosul’s Fund of Structural Convergence (FOCEM), established in 2005, is another example of our firm commitment to a balanced development for the benefit of the peoples of all member States. Inspired by similar experiences in Europe, the FOCEM has been utilised to finance development projects, such as housing for the poor in Paraguay; lines for transmission of electricity in Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina; and a Latin American University library in a town in Brazil that borders both Argentina and Paraguay. A plurinational strategy to combat foot-and-mouth disease (which also includes Bolivia, an associate member) is another example of how the Fund has been used to promote socioeconomic 228 development. Brazil is the main contributor to the fund providing circa 70% of its total resources. The establishment of a free trade agreement between Mercosul and the Andean Community in 2004 virtually erected a South American free trade zone – an idea I tried to advance for the first time when I was President Itamar Franco’s Foreign Minister (1993-1994). President Fernando Henrique Cardoso had the indisputable merit of inviting South American Heads of State and Government for a first summit of this kind in 2000. But it was during President Lula’s term that a concentrated effort was made to achieve that objective. The integration of South America involved not only innumerable rounds of negotiation by Ministers and/or high-level officials, but also the personal participation of the President himself. In a little more than eight months in office, President Lula had received, at least once, every South American Head of State. In two years, he visited all countries of the region. Needless to say: nothing remotely similar had happened before. At the same time as advances were made in the commercial area, a renewed push was given on infrastructure projects. As a result, the big industrial and agricultural centres in the Atlantic Coast and its hinterland will be linked, for the first time, to the Pacific ports (and vice-versa), a feat that North America accomplished in the 19th century. This second level of regional integration has a clear political dimension. All South American nations are now gathered under the same institutional umbrella. The Union of South American Nations (Unasul) was officially founded in Brasilia in 2008 with the signing of a constitutive treaty. But the first important step toward political integration dates back to 2004, when a Presidential Summit in Cuzco, Peru, decided to create the South American Community of Nations (CASA)10 – Unasul’s original name. Several thematic commissions were established under Unasul, among them the Councils of Health, Infrastructure, Drug Control and Defence. Besides the cooperation dimension, Unasul has proven useful to resolve crises the countries of South America had to face collectively. In 2008, as the political situation in Bolivia deteriorated, Unasul offered its good offices, which proved instrumental in the reconciliation process. More recently, rising tensions between Colombia and Venezuela were eased with the assistance, among others, of Unasul SecretaryGeneral, late Argentinean President Nestor Kirchner, who joined in the mediation efforts. When a police rebellion threatened the institutional stability in Ecuador, Unasul acted promptly not only to condemn the attempted coup, but also to avoid its dire consequences. While the usual critics decried that Unasul suffered from congenital antiAmericanism, it is becoming ever more evident that the regional organisation has an important role in resolving – or at least addressing conflicts in the region (the polemics around US bases in Colombia was another example). Unasul has 10 The acronym is the same word for “house” or “home” in both Portuguese and Spanish. 229 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim also given South America a face. It was a motive for pride for anyone who was present to watch the Chilean President Michelle Bachelet address the 2nd South American-Arab Countries’ Summit in Doha, Qatar, in 2009, on behalf of the whole of South America. If any further evidence was needed to show the usefulness of Unasul as an instrument for dialogue, the fact that President Obama asked for a meeting with Unasul during the 5th Summit of the Americas, held in Port of Spain, could be another illustration. The consolidation of South America as a political actor is an important step toward the broader integration of Latin America and the Caribbean. In December 2008, President Lula convened a “multisummit” in Costa do Sauípe, in the state of Bahia. The gathering included a Mercosul Summit, a Unasul Summit, a Rio Group11 Summit, and, finally, a Summit of all 34 Latin American and Caribbean States – the first ever to take place in 200 hundred years of independent life of most countries. Indeed, the “CALC” (the acronym by which it became known) was the first occasion on which the Heads of State and Government of Latin America and Caribbean nations met without the sponsorship or tutelage of Europe or North America. Consolidating the integrationist drive, a second edition of CALC was organized in Cancun in February 2010. The most important decision taken in Mexico was to institute the Latin American and Caribbean Organisation– CELAC, in the Portuguese/Spanish acronym. Another Latin American and Caribbean Summit is already expected to take place in Venezuela, in 2011. At that meeting, CELAC’s institutional architecture is expected to be defined. Last April, Brasilia hosted the first Brazil-CARICOM Summit. Most Caribbean States had remained outside the radar of Brazilian diplomacy for far too long and it was about time to remedy such “benign neglect”. Not only is the Caribbean an intrinsic part of our region, but also Caribbean countries – including the English-speaking ones – and Brazil have a great deal in common, not least the enormous African contribution to demographics and culture. Brazil now has permanent diplomatic representation in every single Latin American and Caribbean country. No process of regional integration can be successful without strong bilateral actions, especially when there is a wide perception about asymmetries among the countries involved. Such is certainly the case in South America and might also be true for the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean. Bearing this in mind, Brazil has proposed and carried out many bilateral initiatives – commercial agreements, cooperation projects, financing of infrastructure – with her neighbours. In all these projects and agreements, we tried to exercise solidarity, by voluntarily applying the principle of “less than full reciprocity” that rich countries should observe (but seldom do) in trade negotiations. 11 The Rio Group was formed in 1986 when the Contadora Group and the Support Group – put together to collaborate with a peaceful solution to the conflicts in Central America – merged into a broader group for political concertation. Today, the mechanism reunites almost all countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 230 A recent issue of “The Economist” brought a cover article named “Nobody’s backyard”. In its American edition, the magazine cover was illustrated with a map of the Western hemisphere turned “upside down” (South on top and North on the bottom), defying conventional geographical wisdom. Curiously, this map reproduces, perhaps unconsciously, the idea of an early 16th century map used as the basis for a tapestry that hangs over the wall of the office of the Brazilian foreign minister in the Itamaraty Palace, in Brasilia. The article rightfully emphasizes the economic changes in Latin America and the Caribbean and how this affected the international status of the region. But the situation depicted by the map also reflects transformations made possible by decisive action in the field of foreign policy. South-South At the crossroads of all the main guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy is the effort to establish closer relations with other developing countries. South-South cooperation is a diplomatic strategy that originates from an authentic desire to exercise solidarity toward poorer countries. At the same time, it helps expand Brazil’s participation in world affairs. Cooperation among equals in matters of trade, investment, science and technology and other fields reinforces our stature and strengthens our position in trade, finance and climate negotiations. Last but not least, building coalitions with developing countries is also a way of engaging in the reform of global governance in order to make international institutions fairer and more democratic. On President Lula’s second day in office, I hosted Minister Nkosazana Zuma of South Africa and she raised the need for new mechanisms of coordination among some major countries of the South. Having gone through, in my previous experience as a diplomat and foreign minister, so many failed attempts of establishing such groups, but still recognizing the validity of my colleague’s (and, later on, also my friend’s) concern, I suggested we should try something relatively simple: a small group – only three countries – one in each continent of the South, all of them vibrant multiethnic, multicultural democracies, with an ever-increasing role in the world: India, South Africa and Brazil. Thus the idea of creating what came to be known as IBSA was born. After consultations conducted by the South African Foreign Minister with our Indian counterpart, the first meeting, at Ministerial level, was convened in Brasilia in June 2003, involving Zuma, Sinha (from India) and myself. The 19th – century three-seat piece of furniture where we sat on together to symbolize the new union still stands as I write this article in the Foreign Minister’s office. By now, IBSA has been the object of four Summits, fifteen Foreign Minister meetings; an ever-larger number of Ministerial meetings of sectorial nature and innumerable events involving civil society. IBSA has also been a pioneering example of South-South cooperation, not only for the benefit of the peoples of India, Brazil and South Africa, but also in 231 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim favour of poorer nations. The IBSA Fund finances development projects in some of the world’s poorest countries: Burundi, Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Palestine, Sierra Leone and, most notably, Haiti. On the margins of the 65th General Assembly, IBSA Ministers held a meeting with Indonesia (on the subject of Palestine) with the presence of the Palestinian Foreign Minister. Curiously, an article written by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice before she left office, make specific reference to those four countries – the members of IBSA and Indonesia – as new stakeholders of global stability: “The importance of strong relations with global players extends to those that are emerging. With those, particularly India and Brazil, the United States has built deeper and broader ties. (…) Today, India and Brazil look outward as never before, secure in their ability to compete and succeed in the global economy. In both countries, national interests are being redefined as Indians and Brazilians realize their direct stake in a democratic, secure, and open international order – and their commensurate responsibilities for strengthening it and defending it against the major transnational challenges of our era. We have a vital interest in the success and prosperity of these and other large multiethnic democracies with global reach, such as Indonesia and South Africa” 12 Another example of how Brazil plays her part in this game of “variable geometry” is our strong support for the institutionalisation of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group13. These four countries – which combined account for roughly one third of the world’s population, 15% of the global economy and more than half of the economic growth in the last decade – have already shown their weight in the discussions of global economic and political matters – most notably at the Financial G-20. Last April, Brasilia hosted, on the same day, twin summits of emerging nations: the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of IBSA and the 2nd BRIC Summit. Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa agreed upon the urgency of reforming global governance. Whereas BRIC can rightfully claim to be the new heavyweight of international relations, the IBSA Forum is perhaps one example of imaginative diplomacy put at the service of building a fairer and more democratic world order. Africa, Middle East and beyond Outside South America, priority has been given to enhancing our relations with Africa. Brazil has the largest African-descendent population outside that 12 RICE, Condoleezza. Rethinking the national interest. Foreign Policy, Volume 84, Number 4, July/August 2008. 13 This new category was first invented by an economist specialized in finance matters, Jim O’Neill of the Goldman Sacks. 232 continent. Beyond incidental political and economic gains, the search for closer relations with Africa is guided by historic, demographic and cultural bonds. African Portuguese-speaking countries are, quite understandably, the ones with whom Brazil has the most enduring, solid and diversified relationships. Back in 1975 Brazil was the very first country to recognize Angola’s independence, at a time when the ruling party in Luanda was ill-judged by most of the international community. Such bold gesture granted Brazil a special relationship with that former Portuguese colony that lives on in our days. Progressively, stronger relations were developed with all five “PALOPs”14. The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (or CPLP) – originally idealized by Ambassador José Aparecido de Oliveira following a Summit held in São Luís do Maranhão, Brazil, in 1989, and formally established in 1996 – brought us even closer to those African nations. Brazil’s movement toward the African continent was not limited to the Portuguese-speaking nations. By the end of his second term in office, President Lula will have visited Africa 12 times, including as many as 23 countries. Few, if any, non-African (or even African) leaders can claim such a record. The fact that President Lula was a guest of honour at the 13th African Union Summit held in Sirte, Libya, in July 2009 – upon invitation by the President of the Commission of the African Union – is a testimony to the fact that his commitment to Africa is recognized. A string of targeted initiatives in technical cooperation with African countries have been set in motion under the coordination of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. In 2008 the Brazilian State-Institution for agricultural research (Embrapa) opened an office in Accra, Ghana, in order to share its technology, which has tremendously improved the productivity of Brazilian cerrados and may be replicated in the African savannahs. Brazil also maintains a cotton-producing model-farm in Mali, one of the members of the Cotton-4 group.15 In Mozambique, our Government financed the construction of a factory of anti-HIV/AIDS medicaments, which will soon start production. There are units of the Brazilian national industrial training service (Senai, in its acronym in Portuguese) in Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé & Principe. Africa is the destination of as much as 60% of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency’s budget. As a follow-up to President Lula’s attendance to the Sirte Summit, the 1st Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security was organized in Brasilia last May, aiming at combating hunger, alleviating poverty and promoting development of the African continent. The first Brazil-ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Summit took place in the Island of Sal, Cape Verde, in July, with a view to establishing a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic 14 Countries using Portuguese as an official language on the African continent. 15 Integrated by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, the group fights against European cotton subsidies, which prevent the output of massive cotton-growers from entering the rich countries’ markets. 233 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim and promoting business and other forms of cooperation between our countries. Previously, in July 2006, in Salvador, Bahia, we hosted the 2nd Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora, the first of its kind to be organized outside the African continent. Since 2007, Brazil coordinates the country-specific Guinea-Bissau “configuration” of the Peace-Building Commission (PBC) of the UN. The PBC is a fairly new organ within the UN System, whose creation Brazil supported enthusiastically. It aims at creating and/or strengthening democratic institutions and improving living conditions in societies affected by war or civil conflict. The concept that a sound political environment – where democracy, the rule of law as well as good social practices prevail – is essential to avoid armed conflict is very dear to Brazil. Strengthening peace and democratic institutions in Guinea-Bissau remains a challenging task, to which Brazil is fully committed. As result of the political priority attributed to the African continent in Brazilian foreign policy, the number of Brazilian resident embassies in Africa has more than doubled, now covering 39 out of the 53 countries.16 In spite of the wellknown financial difficulties of most African nations, thirteen countries of that continent decided to open permanent representation in Brasilia since 2003, putting Brasilia among the top capitals in the world in number of African embassies (29). As a consequence, not only has political dialogue with African countries improved vigorously, but also trade between the two margins of the Atlantic has expanded fivefold ever since – from US$ 5 billion in 2002 to US$ 26 billion in 2008. Taken as a single country Africa would appear as Brazil’s fourth commercial partner, only behind China, the United States and Argentina, ahead of traditional partners such as Germany and Japan. Another diplomatic move initiated by Brazil (in association with Nigeria) was the South American-African Summit. When President Olusegun Obasanjo suggested that Brazil should join Africa in a summit similar to those the continent had with countries such as China and India, we felt that not only Brazil, but the whole of South America should meet Africa on summit level. The first South American-African Countries’ Summit was held in Abuja, Nigeria. A second one followed in Isla Margarita, Venezuela, in September 2009. A third edition is scheduled to take place in Libya at the end of 2011. *** In May 2005 Brazil hosted 34 leaders to the 1st South American-Arab Countries Summit. A second summit was organized in Doha, Qatar, in 2009, and a third one will be held in Lima, Peru, in 2011. The high level contacts between foreign leaders helped to detect business opportunities and find new forms of 16 There are also two Brazilian Consulate-Generals in Africa: one in Lagos, Nigeria, and the other one in Cape Town, South Africa. 234 cooperation – such as the combat against desertification. Common cultural projects also sprung from that original impulse, of which the “Amrik” photographic exhibition about the Arab presence in South America, and the construction of bicultural libraries in Algiers and São Paulo are the most visible examples. Moreover, the bridge established between South Americans and Arabs put the old logic that the countries of the South should be tutored by the North in their international endeavours to test. In a way, both bi-regional mechanisms – ASPA and ASA, as we call them – represented important steps in the long road toward a more pluralistic world order. Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula has made a genuine drive toward the Middle East. Lula was the first Brazilian Head of State ever to visit the region officially. Before him, Emperor Dom Pedro II took a trip to the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century, but his was a cultural and religious expedition for personal enlightenment. President Lula went to Syria, Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, Qatar, Libya and Saudi Arabia. More recently, the Brazilian President was received in Jordan, Israel, Palestine and Iran. He was the first South American leader to attend an Arab League Summit. The interest is reciprocal: the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, has been in Brasilia three times since 2003. Aside from their participation in the first “ASPA” Summit, eight Heads of State and Government of Arab countries visited Brazil in the past eight years. Within a period of less than two weeks, in late 2009, Presidents Shimon Peres of Israel, Mahommoud Abbas of Palestine and Mahmmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran all came to Brasilia. Trade between Brazil and the Arab countries has multiplied threefold since 2003, and reached in 2008 US$ 20 billion, with rather balanced trade flows. At its August 2010 Summit in San Juan, Argentina, Mercosul signed a free trade agreement with Egypt. As a matter of fact, the only other country outside South America with which Mercosul ever signed such an agreement was Israel. This is not just a coincidence. The latter agreement has recently entered into force. Similar deals are currently being negotiated with Morocco, Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council. A process is soon to be launched for FTAs with Syria and Palestine. This push towards the Middle East was also motivated by the fact that Brazil is home to an estimated 10 to 12 million Arab-descendants – roughly 5% of our population. We are also proud of the very dynamic Jewish community. Both communities are fully integrated in our society. In fact, the largest populations of Lebanese and Syrian origin outside those countries are in Brazil. Depending on the way they are counted, there are twice as many Lebanese in Brazil as in Lebanon herself. Foreign policy ought to be in touch with the society it represents. As with Africa, Brazilian diplomacy could not ignore such reality. That Brazil can contribute to the Middle East peace process is not only our view, but also that of countries in the region. As far back as 1993, serving 235 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim as Minister under a previous Government, I had an interview with then Foreign Minister, now President, Shimon Peres, who urged Brazil to be more involved in the Middle East in order to exercise, in his words, a “moderating influence on the Arabs”. Whatever the merits (and biases) of such assertion, it shows the Israeli interest in a bigger presence of Brazil in the region. The following year, Brazil was invited by both the Jordanian and the Israeli governments to be present at the ceremony in the Arava Valley, in which the Peace Treaty between the two countries was signed. Brazil was the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean to receive such an honour. It fell to me to represent my country. Our attitudes in the Security Council, over the last twenty years, in issues like Iraq, Libya and, more recently, Syria, Lebanon and Iran, contribute to make it clear that Brazil acts in accordance with her own judgement, even when under strong diplomatic pressure. More recently, as contacts with countries in the Middle East multiplied (with Arab nations, as we have seen, but also with Israel, Turkey and Iran), Brazil became more involved in the questions relating to peace and security in that troubled region. Brazil is an unyielding defender of an independent Palestine, living in peace with Israel, within the pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Brazil was invited to the Annapolis Conference in 2007, and was one of the few developing countries outside of the region to attend it. In fact, Brazil, India and South Africa were the only extra-regional, non-Islamic, non-traditional donor countries to receive the original invitation. During the Israeli attack on Gaza in January 2009, I personally toured the region in order to convey Brazil’s message of peace. Brazil also made two substantial contributions, amounting to US$ 20 million to Palestine to support development in the West Bank and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Along with our IBSA partners, we funded the construction of a sporting facility in Ramallah. We also made resources available for the reconstruction of a hospital in Gaza, when conditions on the ground permit. In Asia, India and China are already our strategic partners not only in name but in volume of trade and cooperation projects. Brazil and India shoulder each other in the IBSA Forum, in the BRIC and BASIC groups, the twin G-20s, the G-4 (which maintains a close dialogue with South Africa) and in many other multilateral negotiations. Brazil and China too are partners in the BRIC and the twin G-20s. In 2009 China became – for the first time – our main commercial partner, surpassing the United States, who had held that position for almost a century. Relations with Indonesia – a vibrant democracy – have been improving steadfastly. Timor-Leste is a country with which Brazil has an affectionate and cultural relationship, due both to the fact that she is a Portuguese-speaking country and to her struggle for independence, which Brazil strongly supported in the UN. Besides our traditional relations with Japan and the majority of the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), we opened 236 Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview *** Countries like Portugal, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, Sweden – to quote a few – are longstanding partners of Brazil. With these and other Western European countries, we have been strengthening our bonds. With some of them we formally established strategic relationships (Sweden and Spain are two examples). Recently I toured several Central and Eastern European countries, including quite a few where a Brazilian Foreign Minister had never set foot on, such as Estonia, Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Romenia. Brazil is one of the few countries to have established a Strategic Partnership with the European Union. Among other benefits, this may help to pave the way for the establishment of a Mercosur-EU Association Treaty. In addition to the commercial opportunities, the political dialogue between leaders has permitted greater coordination and, some times, even joint initiatives in areas like energy, climate, and the treatment of the financial crisis. With France, not only did Brazil establish a fruitful Strategic Partnership in 2007: we also gave muscle to it by setting in motion a number of bilateral initiatives. The Year of Brazil in France (2005) and the Year of France in Brazil (2009) were successful in bringing the French and the Brazilian peoples closer together. According to French data, Brazil, which has important defence needs, mainly in the Amazon and on her economic zone in the Atlantic (where huge reserves of oil have been found), has become the number one market for the French defence industry. The dialogue with the United States has seldom been so intense. We tend to emphasize our commonalities even when we disagree on specific subjects. This has been instrumental in defusing tensions in situations such as the Venezuela crisis in 2003/2004 or in reconstruction efforts in Haiti. It also helped ensure a smooth course for the resolution that revoked Cuba’s suspension from the Organisation of American States (OAS) in May 2010. Aside from the shared values of two great multiethnic democracies of the Western hemisphere, there is a wide positive agenda set forth by our governments. We recently signed Memoranda of Understanding on Biofuels, on Combating Racial Discrimination, on Promoting of Gender Equality, on Climate Change and on Trilateral Cooperation to the benefit of Central American and Caribbean countries, as well as African ones. Earlier this year, during Secretary Hillary 237 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (or will soon open) embassies in Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea and Sri Lanka; and consulates in Canton, Hamamatsu, Mumbai and Shanghai. In 2007 Brasilia hosted the first Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) meant to improve business and political contacts across the two regions. At that occasion, we launched the seeds of a bi-regional association between Mercosul and the ASEAN. Celso Amorim Clinton’s visit to Brasilia, a Global Partnership Dialogue was established between Itamaraty and the Department of State. Brazil and the US are the two largest economies of the hemisphere. Recent data show Brazil as the country with which the US has the largest trade surplus, a dubious honour from our point of view, but an indicator of the intensity of the bilateral relations. Both our countries were also very active in upgrading the Financial G-20 as the prime forum for macroeconomic coordination. We have been strong partners – even if not always agreeing on every single point – on trade negotiations and climate change discussions. In the hemisphere and beyond, Brazil and the US have a great deal to gain from a strong relationship. Even though the relative weight of the United States among Brazil’s trade partners has been dropping in the last few years, in absolute numbers our commercial relations have actually doubled. The US remains one of our leading business partners, but is now rivalled by China and, more recently, by Argentina in strictly commercial terms (of course investment flows from US to Brazil are not challenged by our Southern neighbour). This shows that Brazil diversified our trade without harm to the old and traditional relations. Human rights Brazil’s commitment to the promotion of human rights is unwavering both within our borders and on a global scale. Brazil sees human rights being profoundly related to democracy, peace and development. The promotion of human rights is at the heart of Brazilian foreign policy, as illustrated by our attitude of solidarity and non-indifference toward many of the most vulnerable peoples on the planet. In multilateral fora, Brazil favours a non-selective and objective treatment of human rights, one that avoids politicisation or bias. Every single country – the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak, either in Africa or in Europe – should be subject to the same methods of scrutiny, without double standards. That is why Brazil was one of the most enthusiastic proponents of the mechanism known as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which gives universal, undifferentiated treatment to every single country. In Brazil’s view, although subject to further improvements, this mechanism has been achieving remarkable results since its establishment in 2008. As I had the chance to state before the 65th UN General Assembly, more often than not, the exercise of human rights is more effectively ensured by dialogue and cooperation than by arrogant attitudes derived from self-declared moral superiority. A harsh condemnation of this or that country in Geneva or New York, based on a self-ascribed position of high moral ground, does little to ameliorate the situation of those perishing in the field. Engaging in real dialogue with the authorities with the actual means to make peoples’ lives less miserable 238 is – as a rule – more productive for improving human rights then a resounding speech in the Human Rights Council. In this field, as in many others, preaching by example achieve far greater results than rhetoric. Brazil wishes to give a real contribution to those suffering from human rights violations. Apart from many other actions of humanitarian nature we have undertaken in the recent past, we have just decided to make an important financial contribution to the High Commissioner of Human Rights specifically directed to a project that seeks to alleviate the plight of women who have been victims of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Conclusion In the last eight years, Brazil’s role in the world has undeniably attained new heights. Our voice is heard with greater attention not because we scream louder, but because we are more respected. That has a lot to do with the growth of our economy, the vibrancy of our democracy and the example of our social policies. But some of the success can also be credited to our foreign policy. From the outset, empowered with the mandate for change received in his election, President Lula decided to follow a foreign policy that was both active and bold. With the benefit of hindsight, it is also possible to say that President Lula’s foreign policy was also creative – or “imaginative”, as the professor interviewed by “Le Monde” said. Foreign policy has also been a motive for the Brazilian people’s renewed sense of self-esteem. As we approach the end of President Lula’s Administration, a great number of articles in the international press have been focusing on what our diplomacy has accomplished over the last eight years. Indeed, having been a career diplomat for most of my life and serving as Foreign Minister for the second time, I can say, with all certainty, that in no previous period of our History, Brazil’s role in the world has been the object of so much interest and, I dare say – at least in some cases – admiration. A recent survey carried out by the Pew Research Institute attested that 78% of Brazilians support the way our foreign policy has been conducted. Even more impressive, Pew Research detected that 77% of Brazilians believe their country already is or will eventually become a “superpower”. Granting that nobody knows very clearly what being a “superpower” means, there is no doubt that a profound transformation in the national collective psychology is underway. This is a far-cry from the self-demeaning mindset that was so common in Brazil. In the late 50s, the famous journalist, playwright and often football commentator Nelson Rodrigues coined the expression “stray dog complex” to describe the defeatist mentality that resulted from the frustration with the Brazilian national team almost among the finalists, but never a champion. The victories in the World Cups of 1958, 1962 and 1970 (and, further on, 1994 and 2002) totally 239 Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview Celso Amorim dissipated that feeling. But it subsisted in other fields of Brazilian life – politics included. Twenty-one years of dictatorship, decades of hyperinflation, the dubious record of being one the countries with the highest degree of social inequality, all contributed to this complex of inferiority, which is finally being overcome. In the 1911 novel “The Sad End of Policarpo Quaresma” – commonly translated in the Anglo-Saxon world as “The Patriot” – the great Brazilian writer Lima Barreto used his leading character’s voice to say that “the great fatherland of the [Southern] Cross”, i.e. Brazil, “required nothing more than time” to become a great power – in his words, “to surpass England”. According to Quaresma, “experiencing every climate, (…) every fruit, every useful animal and mineral, the finest arable land and the bravest, gentlest, most hospitable and most intelligent people in the world – what more could it want? Time and a little originality.” In the last eight years, the world changed and Brazil changed. One of the merits of President Lula’s foreign policy was to foresee and understand such changes – and sometimes even anticipate them. Whatever criticism one may raise (and it is good that it should be this way, since all human activity is subject to criticism), that in itself is no small achievement. Received October 25, 2010 Accepted November 11, 2010 Abstract Foreign Minister of Brazil since 2003, Ambassador Celso Amorim outlines the main guidelines and accomplishments of Brazil’s foreign policy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The article provides a full-fledged, although not exhaustive, narrative of a number of diplomatic initiatives championed by Brazil over the last eight years: from the gathering of the group of developing countries in a World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Cancun to the negotiations that led to the Declaration of Tehran, as well as the challenges the country has been facing as its international weight grows. Resumo Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil desde 2003, o Embaixador Celso Amorim descreve neste artigo as principais orientações e realizações de política externa no governo do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. O artigo apresenta uma narrativa completa, embora não exaustiva, de uma série de iniciativas diplomáticas defendidas pelo Brasil nos últimos oito anos: desde o agrupamento de países em desenvolvimento na conferência da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) em Cancún até as negociações que levaram à Declaração de Teerã, bem como os desafios que o país vem enfrentando na medida em que a sua visibilidade internacional aumenta. Key-words: Brazilian Foreign Policy; Lula’s administration. Palavras-chave: Política Externa Brasileira; Governo Lula. 240

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Emerging Brazil under Lula: an assessment on International Relations (2003-2010): a special issue of Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional. 1. ed. Brasília: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2010. v. 1. 240p .

Emerging Brazil under Lula: an assessment on International Relations (2003-2010): a special issue of Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional. 1. ed. Brasília: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2010. v. 1. 240p .

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