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Military Review

A group of soldiers in dark blue dress uniforms with gold accents and black caps with gold bands are marching in formation. They are carrying rifles and wearing white gloves. The scene is outdoors with a clear sky.

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2017

Reducing the Size of HQDA

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Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

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Building Digital Lethality

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Happy New Year!

It is an exciting time to be part of the Army Press, as we have some big changes in store for 2017. First, this year our new website will become operational, enabling us

to provide more content for our readers, additional opportunities for publication for our contributors, and enhanced search functionality for researchers. Furthermore, this year we are expanding U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO) authentication and archiving to cover our online content. This will ensure articles you publish online with Army Press, like our printed products, will carry the GPO Seal of Authenticity and will be archived on govinfo. (Govinfo is the new GPO site that will replace the Federal Digital System as GPO's central portal for official government documents; access this site at <https://govinfo.gov>). Finally, this year we are adding a new affiliate to our family of publications, the *Journal of Military Learning*. This semiannual, peer-reviewed journal is dedicated to advancing ideas and insights that improve education and training for the U.S. Army and the overall Profession of Arms. Look for the first issue this spring.


With the presidential inauguration in January and Presidents Day in February, *Military Review* dedicates this issue to our commanders in chief. Our cover photo for this issue was taken in 2013 during the last presidential inaugural parade; it reflects the rich tradition of military participation in the event. Also, on the inside of our back cover, we present a montage to

The U.S. Navy Parachute Demonstration Team, The Leap Frogs, jump out of a C-130H aircraft assigned to the 139th Airlift Wing, Missouri Air National Guard, and into Arrowhead Stadium in Kansas City, Missouri, during the Kansas City Chief's Salute to Service football game 11 September 2016. (Photo by Sr. Airman Sheldon Thompson, U.S. Air National Guard)

honor all the past presidents who have served in the military. You might be surprised by how many there are.

This issue of *Military Review* contains articles that will appeal to a wide range of interests. In "Reducing the Size of Headquarters, Department of the Army: An After-Action Review," a team from the Office of Business Transformation led by Lt. Gen. Thomas Spoehr describe how the number of personnel in the Army headquarters was reduced by 25 percent to meet lower manning mandates. Maj. Adam Scher argues for a new brigade-level staff position in "The Need for a Brigade Politics-and-Policy Staff Officer," and Col. Andrew Morgado discusses how the U.S. Army Cadet Command is changing its approach to leader development in "Leadership Innovation in the Reserve Officer Training Corps and the Future of the Force." This issue also contains the second-place winner of the 2016 DePuy writing contest, "Writing: Maximizing Returns on the Army's Investments in Education," by Maj. Hassan Kamara.

Thank you all for supporting the Army Press and its flagship publication, *Military Review*. Find us online at <http://armypress.dodlive.mil/>, like us on Facebook at <https://www.facebook.com/ArmyPress/>, and follow us on Twitter @ArmyPress. ■



2017 General William E. DePuy Special Topics Writing Competition


This year's theme: "What needs to be fixed in the Army?"

Articles will be comparatively judged by a panel of senior Army leaders on how well they have clearly identified issues requiring solutions relevant to the Army in general, or to a significant portion of the Army; how effectively detailed and feasible the solutions to the identified problem are; and the level of writing excellence achieved. Writing must be logically developed and well organized, demonstrate professional-level grammar and usage, provide original insights, and be thoroughly researched as manifest in pertinent sources.

Contest closes 14 July 2017

1st Place	\$1,000 and publication in <i>Military Review</i>
2nd Place	\$750 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i>
3rd Place	\$500 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i>

For information on how to submit an entry, please visit <http://militaryreview.army.mil>.



Staff Sgt. Shelby Johnson, squad leader, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, observes the area around Forward Operating Base Torkham, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, 26 September 2013, while wearing the Capability Set 13 communications suite. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Jerry Saslav, U.S. Army)

Themes and Suggested Topics for Future Editions

Sgt. Adam Weber looks out the door of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter before refilling a bucket firefighting system in Cook Inlet while assisting in the response to the McHugh Creek Fire 20 July 2016 near Anchorage, Alaska. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Balinda O'Neal Dresel, U.S. Army National Guard)

War by Other Means

- Are there nations that consider themselves to be at war with the United States? If so, how are they conducting war, and what are the probabilities of their success?
- Insurgent warfare: case studies of winning by outgoverning
- Clash of cultures: Is winning the struggle for cultural hegemony a prerequisite for final victory?
- Case studies: immigration as a strategic weapon of war
- What must the United States do to defend itself against economic, political, or informational warfare?
- Economic war with the West: China's presence in Latin America and Africa
- The relationship of Russia and Turkey as related to the Syrian conflict
- Syria and beyond: Dealing with a reestablished Russian presence in the Middle East
- Kleptocracies: Why they matter to the United States, and the military's role in dealing with them

Dealing with a Changing World

- Adjusting to changing societal norms: how they impact the Army
- Military role in dealing with revival of global slavery
- Security implications of the new Syrian, Iranian, and Russian triad in the Middle East
- Security implications of growing Chinese hegemony over the South China Sea
- Security implications of the new Islamic Europe
- Preparing for the collapse of Venezuela: coping with the adverse effects of a failed state in the Western Hemisphere
- Filling the ranks: how to deal with the long-term challenge of finding people who want to serve in the military and who are qualified
- Clash of civilizations as the new paradigm for global conflict: Was Samuel Huntington right?
- Analysis of the nation-state: Is it the cause of war? Are open borders the solution to ending global conflict?

Operational Level of War

- How are campaigns planned in the age of global insurgency, international terrorism, highly mobile populations, and social media?
- Is the center of gravity concept still relevant in today's operational environments?
- Converging cavalry columns: Does this frontier American Indian war concept have any relevance today?

"Sacred Cows": What Should Go Away but Won't

- Barnacles: Army institutions, processes, customs, or doctrine that are anachronistic and impede needed change and progress
- Relevance of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: What needs to be updated? Is military justice applied fairly and equitably across all ranks?
- Military policing: Is racism or excessive force an issue of concern for military police? How well trained are military police as compared to civilian counterparts?
- Straining tradition: What legal guidelines should be imposed on the participation of senior retired officers in partisan elections?

Mission Command Revisited

- Has the philosophy of mission command taken hold inside the Army? After many years of trying to change, critics say mission command still looks a lot like command and control
- Case studies on the use of the Army design methodology during specific operations
- Modularity ten years after: an evaluation
- Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and mission command: Are we blurring too much the lines between officer/NCO duties and responsibilities? Are we training soldiers or quasi-commissioned officers? What is the impact of new NCO evaluation reports, schooling, and the Army University on the enlisted force?

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U.S. Army, Retired

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U.S. Army, Retired

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About the Cover: Soldiers with the 3rd Infantry Regiment, The Old Guard, participate in the inaugural parade for President Barack H. Obama 21 January 2013 in Washington, D.C. More than five thousand U.S. service members participated in or supported the inauguration. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Teddy Wade, U.S. Army)

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A unit demonstrates the positive impact adequate sleep has on individual and team performance, health, safety, and readiness during an experiment in "sleep banking."

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Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official: 

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

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A Way to Maximize Returns on the Army's Investments in Education

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REVIEW ESSAY

- 126** **The True Believer**
Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements
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U.S. Army

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Soldiers assigned to Special Operations Detachment-C conduct airborne operations from a UH-60 Black Hawk piloted by a Florida National Guard helicopter crew 23 April 2016 in Brooksville, Florida. (Photo by Ching Oettel, Florida National Guard PAO)

Against Bureaucracy

Richard Adams, PhD



(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

This article argues against bureaucracy, which is choking the military. It explains how red-tape routine corrodes the deep competence and independence that are critical to mission command, and it portrays the devastating rise of the military bureaucracy as a failure of leadership.

The Mission Command Idea

The doctrine of mission command derives from *Auftragstaktik*, a German army methodology that espouses initiative at lower levels of command.¹ Perceived and realized in the Napoleonic Wars, *Auftragstaktik* achieved prominence in the German

armies during the First and Second World Wars, finding forceful and famous expression in the 1933 *Truppenführung*—the German army manual for troop command.² Articulating the mission command idea, the *Truppenführung* underlines the strategic value of individual soldiers amidst the confusion of conflict, arguing, “the emptiness of the battlefield requires soldiers who can think and act independently, who can make calculated decisions and daring use of every situation.”³ In its discussion of *Auftragstaktik*, the *Truppenführung* sets down views that “would still be considered radical in many of the world’s armies today.”⁴

Written largely by Generals Ludwig Beck, Werner von Fritsch, and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, the *Truppenführung* established that individual soldiers would be expected to have a clear understanding of circumstances so they could act on their own initiative in accordance with larger strategic intent. Giving doctrinal weight to ideas known later by U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Charles Krulak’s colloquialism—the “strategic corporal”—the editors of the *Truppenführung* recall Hans von Seeckt, who argued, “The principal thing is to increase the responsibilities of the individual man, particularly his independence of action, and thereby to increase the efficiency of the entire army.”⁵

But, while ideas of initiative and enterprise resonate in military lore, they have become essentially rhetorical since militaries have grown more centralized, less adaptable, more prescriptive, and more bureaucratic. Honeycombed by legalism, avoidance behavior, and inconclusive language, bureaucracy cultivates irresolution, and excuse. Bureaucracy suffocates personal trustworthiness, which should distinguish leaders, and the independent responsibility that hallmarks effective soldiers.

Merit and Responsibility

Richard Gabriel explains why bureaucratic thinking is antithetic to that of the military, arguing it is “nonsense when ... institutions attempt to substitute bureaucratic procedures for ethical judgment and responsibility. [The end result is] a reliance upon bureaucratic rules and mechanisms of control, while undercutting the soldier’s opportunities to exercise ethical judgment.”⁶

Arguing against bureaucratic thinking, Gabriel points to what Michel Foucault called the “subtle,

calculated technology of subjugation ... the separation, coordination and supervision of tasks [that] constitutes an operational schema of power.”⁷ This is bureaucratic panopticism, designed “to ensure the prompt obedience of the people and the most absolute authority of the magistrates,” which Alasdair MacIntyre understood to depend for success upon disguise and concealment.⁸ Valued for calculable data, for seeming impartiality, and for the centralization of its control, bureaucracy commodifies people and dissolves moral autonomy.

The bureaucracy’s oppressive attention to marginal detail is in parallel with the technical evolution of communications networks, which have made it possible and appealing for headquarters to exercise control to a meddlesome degree. Bureaucratic centralization means information from the seat of events is passed upward to headquarters, which issue direction. This dissolves the autonomy of individuals and, as Jim Storr observes, is fundamentally unconstructive since

the amount of information passed between a group of people increases roughly with the square of the number involved (a consequence of many-to-many information strategies), while the ability to deal with it increases only linearly.⁹

Red-Tape Routine

Inherently centralizing and controlling, red tape has the overwhelming effect of inhibiting human initiative and responsibility. There comes to be a Kuhnian cultural *gestalt* or paradigm.¹⁰ Samuel Huntington describes a “professional mind,” which structures distinctive

and persistent habits of thought and action—framing a worldview from within which bureaucratic behavior is rationalized.¹¹

Pervasive and suppressive, bureaucracy induces habits of wooden compliance. Soldiers are duped by a culture of compulsory consensus into thinking character equals rule

Richard Adams holds doctoral, master’s, and first-class honours degrees from the University of Western Australia, a master’s degree from the University of New South Wales, and a bachelor’s degree from the University of Tasmania. Formerly an Australian Fulbright Scholar to Yale University, he is presently researching at the University of New South Wales.

following, but soldiers must think differently; the military system fails them. Soldiers, who ought to think for themselves and act decisively, are disabled by the military proclivity for bureaucratic hesitancy. They are deceived and compromised by the cordial hypocrisy that hallmarks military life. The 2012 Australian Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee's *Procurement Procedures for Defence Capital Projects: Final Report* offers an illustration. The report noted that in the Australian Defence Organisation,

personnel get “bogged down” with too much paper work ... and “miss the important things going on” ... [There are] confused or blurred lines of responsibility ... [and] accountability that is too diffuse to be effective—the organisation is unable or unwilling to hold people to account ... [As well, people have] little understanding or appreciation of the importance of contestability and a mindset simply cannot, or refuses to, comprehend the meaning of “independent advice.”¹²

This report spells out the officialdom, which dissolves individual decision. The report makes clear that, inoculated by bureaucracy, soldiers are immunized against self-reliance; their sense of responsibility is numbed by rituals of fudging and double-talk.

Yet, responsible independence is critical; for soldiers to be effective, it is insufficient that they are obedient, that they follow conventions, and that they abide by rules. Soldiers also must be conscientious and decisive. They must answer the call to individual action, which is constricted in the bureaucratic system. Regarded by Jonathan Shay as “the most fundamental incompetence in the Vietnam War,” the misapplication of bureaucratic-process thinking is an institutional failing and the death knell for autonomous and strategically effectual soldiers.¹³

Dereliction of Duty

Military enlistment confers not an excuse to be obedient at all costs, but an obligation to act deliberately for justice. Underlining this idea, philosopher Jeff McMahan asks rhetorically how establishment by certain people of political or bureaucratic relations among themselves may confer on them a right to behave in ways that are impermissible in the absence of those relations. McMahan asks, “How could it be that merely by acting collectively for political goals, people can shed


the moral constraints that bind them when they act merely as individuals?”¹⁴ He illuminates the moral duty people bear as individuals. These obligations are jeopardized by the modern bureaucracy.

Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster makes the risk plain in his book, *Dereliction of Duty*. Considering the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Lyndon Johnson's presidency, McMaster describes “five silent men.”¹⁵ He describes how the Joint Chiefs, trapped by an alleged military code in routines of bureaucratic deference, were acquiescent and persuadable. These men were silent when they should have spoken, malleable when they ought to have been conscientious and uncompromising.

Analyzing the political calamity of Vietnam, McMaster describes a uniquely human failing. Among the many and reinforcing frailties he identifies, the biggest was the craving by the Joint Chiefs for approval, their need to appear loyal, to fit in, and to do the accepted thing. Playing along with bureaucratic convention, the Joint Chiefs abdicated their responsibility to speak up and to exert constructive influence over the policy they were entrusted to enact. The generals failed to act with the purpose and resolution expected of the soldier. Conforming reflexively to familiar punctilios, the generals perpetuated the dependencies of bureaucratic custom. Their rococo politesse and invertebrate conformance embellished military failure.

History provides examples of the failure by soldiers to measure up. In his text *Criminal Case 40/61, the Trial of Adolf Eichmann*, Harry Mulisch coined the term “psycho-technology,” which describes the bureaucratic engrossment with obedience and the culpable torpor that sustains bureaucratic habit.¹⁶ Mulisch explained how “a dull group of godforsaken civil servants doing their godforsaken duty” turned the bureaucracy into a weapon—and an excuse.¹⁷ The polymath Charles Percy Snow underlines the evil that follows from unthinking conformance:

When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion. If you doubt that, read William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. The German Officer Corps were brought up in the most rigorous code of



(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

The Conundrum of Bureaucracy versus Mission Command

obedience ... in the name of obedience they were party to, and assisted in, the most wicked large-scale actions in the history of the world.¹⁸

Conditioned by bureaucracy to obey, soldiers may commit crimes of obedience: acts “performed in response to orders from authority that [are] considered illegal or immoral by the larger community.”¹⁹ Such crimes reveal the military delusion that the observance of routine equals rightness, while deviation from standard procedure is the opposite. But military people have allowed themselves to be duped against the weight of evidence. There is no failure to understand.

The strategic implication of unthinking compliance at the tactical level is well known. As an illustrative phrase, the strategic corporal derived rhetorical power from appreciation of the large-scale significance of tactical autonomy.

Focused on formalities and official rules, the bureaucracy fails to secure background conditions critical to effective soldiering. Bound by red tape and conditioned to seek the go-ahead before they do anything, soldiers are not conditioned to trust their own judgment, to act responsibly on their initiative. They are made hesitant by the unfair application of justice.

Failure of Leadership

In the modern military bureaucracy, the soldier who loses a rifle suffers more obviously than the general who loses the war. This is because senior elites, who do not police themselves or their friends, are too good at ducking responsibility. Their shortcomings are on record, since their legalistic dodging hallmarks the official reports, which follow the fiascos.

The reports are important since they reveal the habituated phraseology of people unaccustomed to taking a stand. Shy of moral language, scared of ideals, overeager to seek the asylum of formulaic and morally



The Royal Australian Navy's Kaman SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopter 19 March 2005 at the Avalon Airport in Avalon, Victoria, Australia. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

meaningless language, the official reports allow bureaucrats to speak for themselves.

The report of the Australian National Audit Office into the Super Seasprite helicopter project offers a prime example. The significance of this report lies in the official trick language—the slippery, astute, and downright devious words and phrases with which the military bureaucracy is regrettably comfortable.²⁰

Super Seasprite helicopters were acquired to enhance the capability of the Royal Australian Navy's eight ANZAC class ships. The project was approved in February 1996, with a budget of \$746 million, and provisionally accepted aircraft were operated by the Navy between late 2003 and early 2006, when flying was suspended. The project was canceled in 2008. Overall, expenditure exceeded \$1.4 billion.

The Seasprite report reveals a bureaucracy riddled with habits of avoidance. Despite evident waste and obvious failure—since no Seasprite helicopter capability exists, or ever existed—the Australian National Audit Office report manages to avoid moral language and ideas. The word “wrong,” for example, occurs three times in the report. On pages 260 and 319, the word

“wrong” appears in the phrase, “wrong side of the aircraft.” On page 334, we read of a “wrong impression.” Despite the nonevent that was the Seasprite helicopter, no person is seen to have been wrong. No person is seen to have made a mistake.

Yet, recalling Robert Kempner's interrogation of the truculent Wannsee participants after the Second War, there were people who “knew the things you had to know,” and who made the decisions significant people make.²¹ Such people accept large salaries from the public purse to remunerate the heavy burdens of responsibility. Incredibly, no person was considered responsible. No person was wrong. No person was found to bear any blame.

The word “blame” appears once in the report, on page 333, where we read that the Australian National Audit Office Report “summarise(s) the apportionment of blame against the audit objective to identify those

factors that contributed to the ongoing poor performance of the project.” So, factors are responsible, but not people. And, the word “responsible” appears in the report as a descriptive word in reference to legal or bureaucratic responsibility. The word responsible is never used in a normative or moral sense.

Materially unrevealing and inscrutable, this report was accepted by the bureaucracy as an explanation. But the report is not enlightening, not a proper account of reasons why the Seasprite project failed. Gnomish phrasing, such as “the failure of the project to provide the required capability,” skirts around the fact that the project was an unequivocal catastrophe.²² The project is described as “canceled,” not “failed.”²³

Evading moral ideas by euphemism, the Seasprite report, and the others like it, speaks in the voice of a bureaucracy preserving its modus operandi and senior cadre. Lacking any sense of right and wrong, the report reveals a critical insolvency and demonstrates the need for institutional reform. On what basis, then, can soldiers be expected to face grave psychological and physical dangers, when the big fish cannot face the truth?

In the words of Adm. R. C. Moffitt’s *Review of Submarine Workforce Sustainability*, there is a “crisis of leadership” and a feckless “benign acceptance of the status quo [among] more senior rank groups.”²⁴ Describing the “poor leadership,” of people “in positions of power,” Moffitt recalls the tone and accent of Lord Peter Levene’s 2011 review of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence.²⁵ Investigating the senescence of British military bureaucracy, Levene makes official shortcomings explicit. In categorical style, Levene criticizes a “culture of consensual, committee-based decision-making,” and an institutionalized failure to hold people to account.²⁶ Notably, he identifies an overinflated senior cadre, a pervasive “inability to take tough, timely decisions,” and an insidious “conspiracy of optimism.”²⁷

The Western Military Hypocrisy

No military ought to expect soldiers to face danger while bureaucrats sit in pleasant chairs, unwilling to face facts. But, this is precisely the nature of the Western military hypocrisy.

When some people write shrewd reports to disguise real reasons and other people accept those

reports as a knowing gloss-over, which diminishes or disguises the gravity of events, then no people seem to have the self-respect and courage to stand for truth and right. Confronted by an adversary, motivated by the most repellent ideology to commit acts of abhorrent viciousness, such a failure of the Western military bureaucracy is deeply concerning.

Speaking to these ideas, Norman Dixon observed in his seminal work *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* how military officers regularly slough off all sense of moral awareness. Dixon’s concern was that officers, convinced of their own superiority, lose all feeling for the moral basis upon which they exercise command.²⁸ Similarly, on the account of this paper, military leaders, habituated to bureaucratic hokum, lose touch with ideals that will inspire soldiers to act decisively with a mind to translating high ideals into practice.

Conclusion

The military must wean itself from the heroin of bureaucracy. Writing should be judged by clarity and power, not by margins and tabulations. Speaking should be frank and courteous, not phobic and weak-kneed. Action should be purposeful.

Medal of Honor recipient Vice Adm. James Stockdale illustrates this idea powerfully. As president of the U.S. Naval War College, Stockdale argued against the overprominence of legalistic and bureaucratic thinking. Arguing against officers’ ticket punching (focusing on) organizational efficiency at the expense of honor, Stockdale observed,

In the Naval Service we have no place for amoral gnomes lost in narrow orbits; we need to keep our gaze fixed on the high-minded principles standing above the law. ...

Today’s ranks are filled with officers who have been weaned on slogans and fads of the sort preached in the better business schools of the country. That is to say that rational managerial concepts will cure all evils. ... We must regain our bearings. ...

Regardless of the fairness of our judicial system, it must not be allowed to take the place of moral obligation to ourselves, to our Service, to our country. Each man must bring himself to some stage of ethical resolution.²⁹ ■

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Aerial view of the Pentagon on 15 November 2012 in Washington, D.C. (Photo by Carmen Stevenson)

Reducing the Size of Headquarters, Department of the Army An After-Action Review

Lt. Gen. Thomas Spoehr, U.S. Army, Retired

Brig. Gen. David Komar, U.S. Army

Lt. Col. Terrence Alvarez, U.S. Army

Lt. Col. Raymond Shetzline, U.S. Army, Retired

From July 2014 through March 2015, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) completed an organizational redesign aimed at reducing overall personnel authorizations 25 percent and reducing operating costs by fiscal year (FY) 2019. This effort was known as the “HQDA Comprehensive Review.”¹


While some would compare this task to performing liposuction on a whale, the people charged with executing it stepped up to the challenge, ensuring HQDA took appropriate reductions alongside the rest of the Army. This article offers discussion on the challenges, successes, and missed opportunities encountered during the redesign and ensuing approval efforts.

After a brief review of HQDA guidance and reductions, Kotter International’s “8-Step Process for Leading Change” will serve as a comparative framework, helping illustrate the key points.² Finally, this article provides recommendations for organizational redesign within headquarters that support and operate subordinate to higher echelons (e.g., the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget) and in response to congressional oversight.

Background and Guidance

Prior to the HQDA Comprehensive Review, HQDA leaders had already identified personnel authorization reductions as part of a focus-area review process, designed to downsize all headquarters led by a major general or higher to meet the Army’s end-strength requirements. Known as the FARG (Focus Area Review Group) within HQDA, this effort established the original 25 percent

reduction target for thirty-two main Army secretariat and Army staff (ARSTAF) agencies, with twenty-five additional field operating agencies (FOAs) and all two-star-and-above headquarters throughout the Army.³ Leaders



Objectives

- Establish a fact-based shared understanding
- Reach a shared vision and commitment
- Optimize the organization in a way that is fast, fair, and disciplined
- Quantify the opportunity, develop a compelling case for going forward
- Establish design principles, targets, and detailed process and execution plans
- Engage the organization at every level

(Graphic by authors)

Figure 1. Overview of the Phased Approach to De-layer Department of the Army Organizations and Field Operating Agencies

soon realized that the FARG focused purely on numeric reductions and did not look at potential organizational redesign, accounting for the various work schedules and workloads specific to each organization.

On 17 July 2014, the secretary of the Army (SA) directed the under secretary of the Army (USA), in coordination with the vice chief of staff of the Army (VCSA), to conduct a comprehensive review of HQDA to “determine the optimal organization and strength and, subsequently, any adjustment of programmed [personnel authorization] reductions.”⁴ Specifically, the review sought to optimize HQDA’s size, roles, functions, and organizational structure to best support its mission. The new structure would be constrained by the projected budget and the overall Army end strength while addressing senior leader priorities. The review needed to maintain a view of the future strategic environment and provide recommendations for an implementation plan no later than 31 March 2015.

The SA guidance outlined a phased approach, as depicted in figure 1.⁵ The “initial diagnostic” phase established the facts, to include previous HQDA growth

over time, a mission-to-workforce analysis, and benchmark comparisons against other relevant organizations. The second phase, “set up the program,” tasked the USA and VCSA to create a shared vision of the future for HQDA and establish design principles. The USA and VCSA would approve organizational redesigns in a top-to-bottom methodology, moving through the leadership echelons that make up staff organizations. At the end of the final “structure and design the organization” phase, the USA and the VCSA would brief the recommended designs to the SA.

On 23 July 2014, the SA concluded the 2013 Army FARG’s effort to identify the number of authorizations required to achieve a 25 percent aggregate reduction within Army headquarters at the two-star-and-above level.⁶ Armed with the approved reduction numbers and with the assistance of all ARSTAF and Army secretariat agencies, the USA and VCSA established a core working group to execute the ensuing HQDA review. Their first task was to establish the program and design principles utilized during the HQDA design review effort. Once the

principles were agreed upon, the ARSTAF and secretariat empowered the staff to develop their own organizational designs with help from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) as outlined in the last phase.

Scope and Initial Phases

During the nine months allocated for the HQDA Comprehensive Review, the USA and VCSA tasked the Office of Business Transformation (OBT) in coordination with the BCG to review the thirty-two main ARSTAF agencies with twenty-five additional FOAs that compose the HQDA tables of distribution and allowance (TDAs).⁷ BCG had specialized knowledge on business analysis techniques and design experience with other large organizational headquarters. They mapped out the formal and actual organizational structures, identified core missions and functions, conducted in-depth echelon analysis, and provided impartial expertise.

BCG began with a review of a subset of the total HQDA agencies to understand the full scope of the HQDA organization and their roles. In total, they identified that the Army secretariat and ARSTAF agencies with associated FOAs included approximately fourteen thousand personnel authorizations with up to ten echelons, or internal organizational layers, between the first-echelon senior decision

Lt. Gen. Thomas Spoehr,

U.S. Army, retired, led the Army’s Office of Business Transformation from July 2013 to July 2016. Prior assignments include director of program analysis and evaluation, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA); deputy commanding general (support), U.S. Forces–Iraq; and director of force development, HQDA, G-8. He earned a bachelor’s degree from the College of William and Mary and a master’s degree from Webster College. His military education includes the U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Brig. Gen. David Komar,

U.S. Army, has led U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Capability Development Directorate since June 2016. Prior assignments include director, CJ7, NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan; and deputy chief of staff and chief of force design for the Chief of Staff, Army’s Task Force Modularity, HQDA. He earned a bachelor’s degree from Lafayette College, and master’s degrees from the Naval War College, the Air University, and Webster University. His military education includes the Air Command and Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College.

Lt. Col. Terrence “Terry”

Alvarez, U.S. Army, was the executive officer to the director of the Business Operations Directorate, Office of Business Transformation. He was previously assigned to U.S. Army Alaska and the 1st Infantry Division, and he has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. He holds a BA from Gettysburg College, an MA from Webster University, and an MMAS from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Lt. Col. Raymond Shetzline, U.S. Army,

retired, led one of the small groups for the HQDA Comprehensive Review as an analyst for the Office of Business Transformation, Performance and Analysis Division. His previous Pentagon assignments include deputy chief of staff G-8, Director’s Initiative Group, and Program Development Division. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy, and master’s degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School and George Mason University.

makers (e.g., the SA, CSA, USA, and VCSA) and action officers or individual contributors at echelons seven and below (see figure 2).

The larger the number of echelons or layers in an organization, the more diluted reporting chains became, preventing the full employment of top talent.⁸ As indicated in figure 3 (on page 19), BCG’s findings from other large organizations showing the increase of time and degradation of message clarity as the number of echelons or levels increase. BCG also found approximately 50 percent of colonels and GS-15–level civilians reported to someone of the same grade, and many general officers (GOs) and their civilian counterparts, senior executive service (SES) leaders, had little or no supervisory responsibilities. They also found that 23 percent of colonels and GS-15s were buried deeper than echelon five within most organizations. The use of additional echelons created shadow reporting chains through the extensive use of deputies deep within organizations, which further confused and lengthened the decision-making processes. Based on this initial review and the developed redesign principles, the USA and VCSA began the “structure and design the organization” phase to change HQDA and FOAs through a methodical de-layering approach, seeking to “flatten” organizations to gain efficiencies.


Kotter’s 8-Step Process

Kotter International’s “8-Step Process for Leading [Organizational] Change” serves as our comparative model because it provides an authoritative, structured outline with stated goals, and it is a prime example of business redesign best practices. It shares two fundamental goals with the HQDA Comprehensive Review: to decrease operating costs through

personnel-authorization reductions and to create more effective and efficient functional processes.

Kotter’s 8-Step Process follows:

1. *Create a sense of urgency* for change that appeals to the organization, and identifies and communicates the need and what is at stake for success or failure.
2. *Build a guiding coalition* from within that can guide, coordinate, and communicate their activities during the change.
3. *Form a strategic vision and initiatives* that use coordinated activities to make the “to-be” vision a reality.
4. *Enlist a volunteer army* that communicates and works to make the change occur.
5. *Enable action by removing barriers* or obstacles by allowing employees to remove inefficient processes or hierarchies from across boundaries and create an impact.
6. *Generate short-term wins* that track and communicate progress and energize the volunteers to drive change.
7. *Sustain acceleration.* Leaders must adapt quickly, determine what can be done, and build on the change toward the vision.
8. *Institute change* through new behaviors, and define and communicate the connections between the behaviors and the organization’s success.⁹



(Graphic by authors)

Figure 2. Initial Department of the Army Echelons with Rank and Duty Responsibilities (Examples)

Through a comparative analysis of the 8-Step Process, this article will discuss the HQDA Comprehensive Review’s ability to achieve its 25 percent authorization reductions and de-layering while simultaneously maintaining and improving work functions.

ensure all HQDA agencies would participate, and avoid the pitfall of a uniform “salami slice” 25 percent reduction within each agency. The design principles in figure 4 (on page 20) defined how the leaders of each HQDA agency should de-layer, or flatten, the echelons




Figure 3. Increased Communication Time and Degradation of Message Clarity with Increased Echelons

Comparison to the Kotter Model and Insights

The SA accomplished the first step, “create a sense of urgency,” during the FARG effort and continued with his tasking memorandum to the USA that established the need and authority for the HQDA Comprehensive Review. Simply put, the Army needed to reduce personnel levels and associated costs by FY 2019 to meet established force structure goals. There were clear reduction targets and a set timeline for completion. On 28 October 2014, the USA and VCSA, supported by OBT and BCG, held an HQDA de-layering kickoff meeting with the Army secretariat and ARSTAF principals. The intent of the meeting was to outline the requirements, introduce the de-layering design principles,

that make up their agency; the principles were used by the USA and VCSA as approval criteria for every redesign submission.¹⁰ Following the second step of the Kotter process, “build a guiding coalition,” the USA and VCSA attempted to build a guiding coalition from within the HQDA principals during the de-layering kick-off meeting. The review had a small core work-

ing group, led by OBT and supported by BCG, to enable change, report on progress, and provide an alternative point of view for redesign progress. Senior leaders relied heavily on this group to coordinate efforts, track progress, and communicate pertinent activities throughout the effort. While this reliance on OBT and BCG ultimately proved successful, the HQDA agencies often viewed them as outsiders forcing change rather than assisting the agencies’ champions with implementing common plans and design constructs. Because of this friction, the USA and VCSA often had to directly address concerns and provide guidance to HQDA principals rather than manage other lines of effort such as reorganizing work flow to determine if larger inter- or intraorganization agency change was warranted. A successful example of

this guiding coalition was the coordinated effort of the USA, the VCSA, and the director of the Army staff, working as a united front to pull together all thirty-two HQDA principals to achieve the end state on 31 March 2015. However, by limiting the guiding coalition to a small core working group outside of the other agencies, the review did not reach the full potential as envisioned by Kotter.

in terms of work and information flow, as proven in other large civilian business headquarters. In addition to the de-layering efforts within each of the HQDA organizations, the USA wanted to examine ways to reorganize the HQDA work flow across the ARSTAF and secretariat agencies. An OBT-led group of subject-matter experts reviewed several enterprise work flow functions, to include the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and

- Span of control (SoC) target of eight—executive assistants, executive officers do not count in span of control
- Seven echelon maximum
- Deputies will not be used as “span breakers”
- If principal and principal deputy both fill the principal role, then SoC target is ten
 - Principal and principal deputy “two in a box” model is applicable only at principal level
 - Both principal and principal deputy exist at echelon 2
 - Any additional deputies reporting to the principal must meet SoC target of eight
- No deputies for leaders below echelon 3
- No new deputies
- All executive assistants shared for leaders below echelon 2
- No same-grade reporting
- All general officers (GOs) and senior executive service (SES) leaders must have direct reports
- GOs, and SES leaders (level 1) within the top four echelons (secretary of the Army, under secretary of the Army, chief of staff of the Army, vice chief of staff of the Army are layer 1)
- No general schedule (GS)-15s below echelon 5
- All positions—managers and individual contributors—should be considered for re-leveling
- Cost and structure targets must be met before proceeding to the next echelon
- Exceptions held to an absolute minimum and must be aired to the senior team
- If work is pushed somewhere else, the people must move with it and it must be accepted by receiving organization

(Graphic by authors)

Figure 4. Comprehensive Review Design Principles

The USA and VCSA supported the third step of Kotter’s process, “form a strategic vision and initiatives,” by forming a singular strategic vision and set of initiatives that guided redesign activities toward the “future state.” They used the information gleaned from the initial documented review phase to illustrate that HQDA had too many echelons in place for clear and effective communication, leaders had low spans of supervisory control, and numerous deputies or senior employees were too deep within organizations to operate effectively and often reported to each other. The USA and VCSA stated their intent to reduce the number of echelons and redundant management processes, or “de-layer” the headquarters, to reverse these trends. In the long run, de-layering the HQDA could offset some of the impact of the 25 percent personnel authorization reductions, making organizations easier to manage and more efficient

Execution (PPBE) process and the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process.¹¹ While the future strategic vision and initiatives were well supported with quantitative data, they were not well communicated across the HQDA and FOA population, except downward through the existing information channels, which were suboptimal in rapidly passing information throughout the thirty-two agencies. Many participants suggested publishing “frequently asked questions,” a headquarters concept plan, and senior-leader meeting notes to the workforce; however, these approaches were never implemented. The lack of information had a significant impact on the speed of the effort and the ability of the workforce to understand how the redesigns would support future state.

In addition, this lack of information transparency made it extremely difficult to “enlist a volunteer army” as identified in Kotter’s step 4. Without this internal

ground swell of support, the project moved forward more by established deadlines and through force of will than by an open dialogue—which could propose, develop, or explore nonstandard organizational designs. This lack of information transparency also resulted in many HQDA agencies and FOAs greeting the supporting teams with a range of emotion from indifference to open hostility. BCG and small “subject-matter expert” teams had to overcome this agency bias before they could effectively communicate how organizations could make effective changes within the agreed upon de-layering principles in figure 3 (on page 19).

The review was not successful in Kotter’s step 5, “enable action by removing barriers and obstacles,” allowing employees to remove inefficient processes or hierarchies from across boundaries. As mentioned earlier, HQDA had to maintain its daily workload while reducing authorizations and attempting reorganization through de-layering. HQDA core functions and daily processes had their own distinct management hierarchies and timelines embedded in them that still had to be met. The USA and VCSA tasked the organizations’ principals with de-layering, but OBT with small teams of the agencies’ process subject-matter experts handled the day-to-day work, reviewing the core processes and potential staff mergers as a second line of effort. These teams encountered the same support and information obstacles as discussed above because they were outside the organizations and were not process owners. Despite these barriers, and to the credit of the process owners and involved participants, these small teams gathered and reviewed a vast amount of information that led to recommendations for further analysis and concept exploration. However, there were no significant changes to the HQDA core functions or processes. To improve processes in the future, process owners and stakeholders would have to prepare, plan, and execute their own process-improvement efforts, vice an outside organization, in order to ultimately achieve their defined goals and implement change effectively.

In support of Kotter’s sixth step, the USA and VCSA did “generate short-term wins,” tracking and communicating success and progress, by quickly approving many smaller agency redesigns. Picking this “low-hanging fruit” was achieved through a stepped review process, focusing first on echelons two through five, as depicted in the final phase of figure 1 (on page 16). Throughout the overall echelon

reorganization review and approval briefings, the principals informed the USA and VCSA simultaneously on their projected reorganization design and, if necessary, sought exceptions for specific “violations” of the de-layering principles. Requests for exception usually dealt with span-of-control limitations due to the nature of work required by U.S. Code, General Order 2012-01, or public law.¹² At each of these briefings, the USA and VCSA attempted to further energize the principals to drive change. Due in part to the principals’ thoroughness, and with support from the BCG, in terms of documentation and alternative design development, the USA and VCSA quickly reviewed and approved the organizations’ concepts. As the approval process matured, the USA and VCSA showed flexibility as decision makers, acknowledging that not every organization could achieve 25 percent reductions within the constraints of the entire rule set. They understood that, in the long term, work flow mattered more than the de-layering principles (rules) as long as leaders preformed due diligence and did not recommend growth. The one rule that remained firm was the 25 percent reduction, which had to be achieved by each organization.

During the effort to reorganize, the HQDA Comprehensive Review was successful in achieving Kotter’s seventh step, “sustain acceleration.” By completing the echelons in descending order, starting with echelon two and proceeding downward into the more populous echelons, the principals and organizational designers could build on the previous work as well as gain more experience with the application of the concepts and design principles.

The HQDA Comprehensive Review “instituted change” as defined in the eighth step of Kotter’s process through the codification of the de-layered organizations’ concepts in revised TDAs, which clearly identified the removal year for each authorization. The review, however, largely did not create new behaviors across the ARSTAF and the Army secretariat, as most organizations continued to function as before with only changes to the number of echelons, providing supervisors greater span of control and ensuring no deputies existed below echelon three. Ultimately, change decisions remained internal to each agency instead of across agency functions. The USA and VCSA also sped the TDA documentation process by temporarily suspending the requirement for

the preparation of command-implementation plans and concept plans per Army Regulation 71-32, *Force Development and Documentation*.¹³

While the main effort to create new TDAs for FY 2019 did not create any significant new behaviors, the core-process review and staff-merger effort did attempt to identify potential new organizational options. One option considered was combining the Office of the Assistant Secretariat of the Army for Manning and Reserve Affairs and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 so that policy creation and operational planning and execution would be within one organization vice two. In addition to new organizational structures within the headquarters, the core-process review and staff-merger effort looked at potential new processes to streamline the existing workload. Task force subject-matter experts examined the TAA (a process that supports the size and skill distribution of the Total Army) and select steps of the PPBE process. These potential changes in organizations and processes were tasked as areas for further analysis due to external oversight factors, the ongoing reorganization, and existing roles and responsibilities defined in General Order 2012-01, vice tackling as part of the overarching effort.

What Was Achieved

The HQDA Comprehensive Review developed and executed the reduction of the HQDA staff by approximately 2,100 personnel authorizations by FY 2019.¹⁴ These reductions constitute approximately 15 percent of the effort; the headquarters does achieve the 25 percent target when incorporated with the FARG reductions and significantly reduces the number of echelons within the staff by flattening the organization. These reductions also increased manager median span of control to eight from as little as one across much of the headquarters, in addition to reducing the percentage of managers by one-third. The reorganized agencies eliminated 70 percent of same-grade reporting, vastly improving vertical information flow, and senior leaders (those at the GO and SES levels) have increased roles and direct responsibilities over more processes and information. The effort moved 94 percent of the GS-15s to or above echelon five, which better aligns talent to decision making, rather than just informing decisions. Additionally, it reduced the use of deputies below echelon three (two-star GO and SES level) by FY 2019.

Overall, these changes successfully flattened HQDA, increasing effectiveness and efficiency, and placed the headquarters on par with other large corporate headquarters. While implementation and rebalancing of personnel to open positions remains to be accomplished, the Office of the Administrative Assistant supported by the United States Army Force Management Agency (USAFMSA) and the affected organizations completed documenting the de-layered and reorganized changes in TDAs by 1 October 2015 (FY 2016).

To complete implementation, HQDA developed the Intermediate Review Council, allowing a forum to adjudicate issues not addressed or developed during the effort and ensuring the de-layering principles would not be violated or discarded in the future. They managed TDA documentation with USAFMSA and the affected agencies, working to align on-hand personnel and remaining authorizations so the authorization reductions could be reached through natural attrition. The full implementation and realization of the loss of the personnel authorizations identified during the FARG and the HQDA Comprehensive Review will incrementally run until FY 2019.

Conclusion

While the effort will not be fully implemented until 1 October 2018 (FY 2019), the senior leadership must maintain awareness of any external changes or decisions that may affect the HQDA Comprehensive Review implementation. As with any project or reorganization, stable leadership continuously measuring the effort is key to achieving the objectives as defined in their vision. Despite senior leadership (SA, USA, and CSA) moving on to other duties, the new leadership continues to implement the authorization reductions in accordance with the documented changes.

The HQDA Comprehensive Review effort would have benefited from having a continuous communication plan throughout the change review that was targeted to inform all levels of the organization. The lack of information transparency was a critical misstep. Better communication to the lowest level in HQDA could have aided in the speed of change and overall support for the effort. Publishing a headquarters concept plan could have provided a clear end state for the workforce to align to and identify other potential ways to accomplish the various tasks.

Sharing meeting notes with all leaders could create support and enlist the army of volunteers that this effort failed to achieve.

The initial reorganization research and planning greatly benefited from the use of the support contractors. They augmented the staff, provided business practices, and documented their findings. They were crucial to the effort—not only for their expertise in conducting a review, but also for serving to expand the concepts and help move the project forward. This need for contractor support made it apparent that the Army lacks the specialty institutional training to complete the art and science for an organizational redesign of this scale. This could be addressed in professional training. Army training builds deployable units, and task-organizes for operations. However, current training focuses on building instead of creating organizations by merging and sharing or removing existing

force structure. The Army could benefit from a greater understanding of organizational design that focuses on building lateral instead of hierarchical organizations that support the rest of Department of Defense, the joint community, and the Army.

The HQDA Comprehensive Review built a sound design to achieve its reductions by FY 2019, along with the rest of the Army. It enabled leaders at all levels to redesign their organizations to effectively and efficiently meet their mission, while absorbing a mandated 25 percent personnel authorization reduction. This comparative analysis discussed the challenges, successes, and hindrances of this dynamic and complex effort. As the Army moves into more reductions and the need for more innovative organizations becomes the norm, it can benefit from looking back at this and other previous efforts to learn from our mistakes and to build on our successes. ■

Notes

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that are organized to perform specific missions and are made up of military or civilian personnel, or a combination of both.

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Producing Strategic Value through Deliberate War Planning

Lt. Col. Jim Cahill, U.S. Army

The U.S. military invests sizable resources in deliberate war planning to prepare for future operations in defined crisis conditions. However, the actual value of current deliberate war planning to military readiness and future combat performance is questionable. This article starts with a brief assessment of the modern U.S. war planning system, then addresses two factors that would enable the deliberate war planning community to deliver greater strategic value.

The first factor, oriented toward prospective planners, is promoting awareness of tensions in both bureaucratic politics and civil–military relations that pervade the process and influence the outcomes. Failure to understand and respect the power of these two tensions equates to letting them become the dominant forces in deliberate war planning to the detriment of any operational or strategic value planning is supposed to provide.

The second factor is the construction of a theoretical framework to understand the actual and potential value added by deliberate war planning. This theoretical framework consists of seven dimensions of planning utility that are sorely needed to counteract the bureaucratic politics

and civil–military relations tensions that currently pervade the process and curb its effectiveness. The potential advantage of these planning factors is that they can be applied empirically to gauge the value of a given deliberate planning effort.

This is not the first attempt to undertake empirical research on war planning.¹

The new contribution sought here is greater understanding of the utility of the activity. Such an understanding could set conditions for increasing effectiveness in future practice. Based on the presumption that deliberate war planning positively influences the manner in which the United States applies military force, this matter is vital to U.S. national security.

The Modern U.S. War Planning System

The United States is the only country in the world that currently professes to “underwrite international security ... uphold our commitments to allies

Lt. Col. Jim Cahill, U.S. Army, is a military advisor at the U.S. Department of State and a PhD student at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government. He holds a master's degree in international public policy from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a BS from the University of Minnesota. His previous assignments include research fellow at the RAND Arroyo Center; joint plans officer at U.S. European Command's J5 Contingency Planning Division; special assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army; and strategic planner at Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 War Plans Division.

Soldiers from the 329th Regional Support Group, based in Virginia Beach, Virginia, team up with soldiers from the 1030th Transportation Battalion from Gate City, Virginia, 13 November 2010 to rehearse for a staff exercise during their annual training at Camp Dodge, Iowa. The soldiers focused on improving military decision-making processes, improving communication from group to battalion level, and setting conditions for better future operations during the annual two-week training period. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew H. Owen, Virginia National Guard PAO)



and partners, and address threats that are truly global.”² Under these guiding principles, the U.S. military’s role is to “ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States and areas vital to its interest.”³ This is a tall order.

One of the military’s key enabling mechanisms to carrying out its role is deliberate war planning, a function intended to “enable understanding and facilitate the development of options to effectively meet the complex challenges facing joint forces throughout the world.”⁴ This intellectually resource-intensive mechanism seems as though it would naturally contribute strategic value. However, the utility derived from deliberate war planning has been widely debated. Some contend that military doctrine and education are ill suited to deal with unfamiliar problems or to satisfy civilian policy-makers’ needs.⁵ Others criticize the common tendency to focus on point scenarios without considering branches, sequels, or the need for rapid adaptation.⁶ Still others argue that the military services’ cultural preferences of planning for future interstate conventional wars impedes effective planning for the more likely unconventional scenarios that the United States has engaged in much more often, a tendency

reinforced by the need to justify high-end conventional military modernization programs.⁷

Latvian Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma (*standing left*) meets Lt. Gen. Tim Evans, commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (*seated fifth from left*), and other members of the exercise staff during the Latvia Cabinet of Ministers Exercise Kristaps 2015 on 10 November 2015 at Lielvārde Airbase, Lielvārde, Latvia. The exercise combined the majority of ministers, the president, and military leadership in a national-level simulated emergency cabinet session to discuss crisis response plans. (Photo by WO 2 Dan Harmer, GBR Army/NATO)

reinforced by the need to justify high-end conventional military modernization programs.⁷

Beyond the contemporary debate, the utility of deliberate war plans to the past one hundred years of U.S. combat performance is not encouraging. In most of the cases that necessitated U.S. involvement in wars, the deliberate war plans that were available at the time of need were not relevant. For example, following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the U.S. national leadership directed the military to initiate a campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan and other locations. At that point, the military had a sizable inventory of war plans, but none of them dealt with this specific need. This lack of relevant war plans also existed when the United States entered the First World War, the

Korean War, the Vietnam War, the War for Kosovo, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Doctrine and Definitions

U.S. military doctrine provides a detailed treatment of the role of joint operational planning, but does not adequately characterize deliberate war planning as a distinctive subcomponent within that larger planning construct.⁸ The doctrinal definition of deliberate war planning—“a planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation”—fails to capture the essence of the discipline, as we shall see.⁹ The result is a chaotic diversity of practice carried out by a disparate and distributed community of practice exposed to influence by powerful forces that degrade strategic value.

Thus, a more precise definition that would enable objective evaluation, unity of effort, and value-adding practices is *the process undertaken by multiple disparate organizations to conceptualize military options, support future U.S. government efforts and objectives, and generate knowledge and understanding—all oriented on assumptions-based, defined future circumstances*. This definition is superior because it emphasizes three key value-adding concepts: deliberate planning as a mechanism for cross-organizational connective tissue, for subordinating military activities to a broader U.S. government campaign, and for individual and organizational learning. The internal and external tensions that adversely influence these value-adding concepts are addressed next.

Bureaucratic Politics: Military-Internal Participants

The U.S. military deliberate war planning enterprise is vast in terms of depth, breadth, and diversity. As a result, bureaucratic politics have a powerful influence on the inputs, processes, and outcomes of deliberate war planning. The point is not that bureaucratic politics should be eliminated, because it will always be present in any large-scale, multiorganizational effort. The idea is to become aware of the role that bureaucratic politics plays, thereby allowing the deliberate war planning community to mitigate adverse influence where possible, as well as amplify the benefits that come from a cross-dimensional enterprise effort.

The vast scale of the undertaking becomes apparent by considering the aggregate effort: over six hundred

military professionals engage in full-time deliberate war planning, and several thousand more are integral but part-time contributors.¹⁰ The full timers are predominantly field grade officers in the prime of their professional careers. Beyond aggregate scale, practitioners represent a diversity of organizations, including geographic and functional combatant commands, service component commands, subunified commands, and the military services. These organizations’ interests and motivations sometimes align but often conflict.

There are nine combatant commands whose geographic and functional roles are established by the president in the biannually updated unified command plan.¹¹ Six combatant commands are geographically oriented and together cover the entire globe, including the global commons outside the sovereignty of any state. Three functional combatant commands focus on specific military missions that cross geographic boundaries: strategic deterrence, global distribution, and special operations. Combatant commanders are directly responsible to the secretary of defense for deliberate war plans. As a result, the combatant command plans teams form and lead the plan-specific joint planning groups within which the rest of the community is represented and serve as honest brokers to achieve joint interdependence and unity of effort.

The problems that deliberate war plans deal with do not typically conform to geographical or functional boundaries, so combatant commands must collaborate on mutual challenges. The result is an interwoven web of supporting relationships and interactions. Because the geographic boundaries, functional roles, and force assignments established by the unified command plan rarely change, each combatant command has developed a unique philosophy and way of doing business, which corresponds to varying regional security environments, as well as differences in the commanders’ personalities and the staffs’ culture. Combatant commanders with overlapping jurisdiction for a particular future contingency scenario understandably view that scenario from different perspectives. Furthermore, relatively constant resource and planning prioritization establish an informal hierarchy among combatant commands. For example, U.S. Central Command’s stature has recently been accentuated because its area of responsibility encompasses the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of war.

Individual combatant commands are not monolithic organizations. They consist of a range of

sub-organizations, including component command headquarters from each of the four military services and from U.S. Special Operations Command. Component command headquarters serve two masters: their combatant commander and service chief. Thus, the perspectives and motivations within a combatant command enterprise are not identical. The combatant commander and his or her staff focus primarily on war plans that can generate strategic outcomes and do so through joint interdependence. The service chiefs and their staffs have a narrower, single-domain focus, and thus concentrate on the contribution made by land, air, or sea power. This is not to say that the services have malicious intent; they simply have the responsibility to ensure that operations in their domain are effective. When conflicts arise, or when combatant commanders' guidance is vague, the services wield the more powerful influence because they control resourcing.

Another important bureaucratic relationship within combatant commands is between the "J5" strategy and plans directorates and the "J3" operations directorates. The J5 directorate produces and maintains deliberate war plans on a continuous basis. If the scenario that a war plan focuses on actually materializes, then a transition process is triggered. During transition, the J5 directorate transfers the relevant war plan to the J3 directorate to form the framework for necessary military operations. The J3 directorate must deal with the present in concrete terms, so if the plan is not presented well, it will seem irrelevant and be ignored, wasting the time that went into it. The outcome of this transition process, which, as a result of the crisis nature of such situations that generally occur under stress, is the ultimate litmus test of the strategic value of a given war plan.

The military services are also important stakeholders in deliberate war planning. Military services rely on war plans to guide their readiness-generation efforts, such as training. This is also the case with Special Operations Command and the National Guard Bureau. In this way, established deliberate war plans provide a common reference point to cope with future uncertainty. However, at some point, the military services' use of deliberate war plans becomes problematic. For example, when services become involved too early, they tend to introduce nonstrategic and biasing concepts intended to establish requirements and drive resources by reverse osmosis. At the other end of the spectrum, when the military services

shift focus from near-term readiness generation to long-term defense strategy choices, deliberate war plans become much less suitable. The Department of Defense has a separate function called *support for strategic analysis* (SSA), which provides plausible scenarios and alternative futures for these types of uses. In practice, the uses of deliberate war plans and SSA scenarios are often mixed up.¹²

One implication of the size and scale of the planning bureaucracy is the impossibility of adding value through an elite, small group of planners. While a roundtable format comprised of handpicked planners appears on its surface to offer the greatest prospect for free-flowing ideas and flexibility, in practice such an approach excludes the participation of individuals and organizations the view points and expertise of which will be vital if the scenario covered by the war plan comes true. Thus, value-added planning must be explicitly carried out to bridge organizational barriers and establish networks up front that will become essential in a crisis.

Another implication is that organizational reform to enhance the effectiveness of deliberate war planning might be part of the answer, but, in isolation, even reform cannot eliminate the intrinsic reality of bureaucratic politics. Therefore, the operative question is how to understand and accommodate the influence that bureaucratic politics has on the potential strategic value of deliberate war planning.

Bureaucratic Politics: Interagency Stakeholders

Bureaucratic politics between the U.S. military and other U.S. government agencies is an equally influential determinant of any value derived from deliberate war planning. This is the case because the military activities described in war plans are necessary, but usually insufficient, to achieve national strategic objectives. Some would disagree by invoking the classic example from the European Theater during the Second World War, where the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered Gen. Dwight Eisenhower to "enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."¹³ Eisenhower's mission could be (and, indeed, was) carried out with purely military tools. However, ultimate victory relied on the pursuit of sequential objectives that were primarily pursued through nonmilitary tools: the reestablishment



A British officer provides guidance to his tank commanders during a sand table rehearsal prior to a battle for Tobruk, Libya, in 1941. (Photo courtesy of Library of Congress/Official British Army photo No. BO 773 [BM 7241])

of democratic societies structured so that it would be difficult to re-create empires, thereby ensuring that a global, near-unlimited war would not occur again. In Germany, this was accomplished by the occupation, the civil-military government, and, ultimately, the Marshall Plan.

Thus, the military activities envisioned in deliberate war plans must be designed as an initial step to generate a new normal that enables the U.S. government to employ the nonmilitary tools that actually generate the desired conditions. This need to employ nonmilitary tools to achieve national objectives has major implications for the manner in which the military activities are carried out. Recent U.S. military doctrinal changes, such as the addition of legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance as principles of war, lend credence to the need for nonmilitary tools.¹⁴

As we have seen, the nonmilitary U.S. government agencies responsible for nonmilitary tools are important deliberate war planning stakeholders. But a disparity between them and the military in planning capacity prevents commensurate participation: none

of the nonmilitary organizations comes close to matching the military's capacity for deliberate war planning. Additionally, culture clash among the military establishment and nonmilitary agencies frequently occurs due to different approaches to planning.

Military planners are more accustomed to assumptions-based, policy-unconstrained thinking than the intelligence community, the State Department, and other civilian-led agencies. This includes exploration of options that are not feasible under present-day U.S. government policy or resource constraints. Additionally, value-adding deliberate war planning requires an orientation on planning assumptions regarding the employment of nonmilitary agents that shape a future hypothetical political and social reality that may not ever materialize. However, the bureaucratic cultures of many nonmilitary agencies



President Barack Obama meets with combatant commanders and other military leadership 12 November 2013 in the White House Cabinet Room. (Photo by Pete Souza, White House)

do not see value in such hypothetical planning and resist military efforts to prod them in that direction.

Consequently, because of the disparity in capacity and culture between the military and other nonmilitary agencies that would have to be involved to achieve long-term political objectives associated with a potential conflict, the military deliberate war planning community finds itself operating in a vacuum. Thus, when left alone, interagency bureaucratic politics degrade the dimension of value-added deliberate war planning. This is reflected adversely in the emergence of a dysfunctional bias toward the use of military force in planning for situations where other value-added tools might generate better outcomes. Furthermore, the formidable expertise that resides in the intelligence community to guide planning is often left largely untapped.

Individual planners' initiative and major interagency organizational reform might help on the margins to resolve such friction, but attempts to achieve improvement through organizational reform have been mixed or even counterproductive. Therefore, what is important here is to understand and acknowledge the inescapable effect of interagency bureaucratic politics

and use that understanding to design a more effective theoretical framework to mitigate the most adverse political tendencies of the process.

Deliberate war planning is a mechanism that offers great promise to connect individuals across stove-piped organizations into a multifunctional community of practice. The challenge becomes one of promoting a broad understanding of the magnitude of these intangible benefits and utilities among those involved in planning. Positing such a framework to overcome this challenge will be a contribution of this article. With such an understanding, deliberate war planning can be carried out in a manner that increases its value to the national security community.

Civil–Military Relationship Tensions

Civil–military relations are another source of tension that influences the strategic value offered by deliberate war planning. The relational dynamics between the officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and

uniformed planners is a central driver of planning progress, process, and content. These dynamics are complicated by competing perspectives on the utility of deliberate war planning.

For military planners, value-added deliberate planning starts with predetermined national strategic objectives that come from civilian officials. Such established national strategic objectives then become the goalposts toward which all efforts can be directed. As we have seen, the deliberate war planning enterprise is substantial, so clear direction is quite useful in channeling enterprise-wide effort along a relatively effective and efficient path. However, experienced military planners do appreciate that as the strategic and political environment evolves, guidance will evolve with it, requiring flexibility in planning. And, innovative planning practices can effectively cope with a finite range of policy preferences. Nevertheless, from the military's perspective, relatively stable and clear policy guidance enables more value-added deliberate war planning.

Civilian officials view war plans as mechanisms for generating decision space through development of a broad range of courses of actions with various mixes of military as well as value-added options. Such options enable high-level decisions that usually involve trade-offs between equally important priorities. Thus, if the outcome of deliberate war planning is a broad range of options that correspond to a broad range of potential policy choices, then this buys valuable time for arriving at the optimal decision. At the practitioner level, this desire for decision space amplifies because there is the added pressure of not getting ahead of the secretary of defense or key Department of Defense undersecretaries.

Neither civilian nor military perspectives are superior over the other. The most productive way to reconcile them is to have awareness and respect for the role that civil–military relationship tensions have on the process for and content of deliberate war plans. With greater awareness, both sides can achieve a better dialogue, and do so at all levels from principals to practitioners.

In summary, bureaucratic politics and civil–military friction become overbearing in the absence of a guiding theory. Individual planners' personality and talent can provide some mitigation, but to achieve a broader increase in added strategic value, a need exists for the theoretical framework that is the topic of this article. As Carl von Clausewitz advised, "So long as no acceptable

theory ... of the conduct of war exists, routine methods will tend take over even at the highest levels."¹⁵

Conceptualizing the Elements of Deliberate War Planning Utility

This section offers a theoretical framework that will enable the military planning community to cope with the tensions described above, thereby adding increased strategic value to deliberate war planning.

The proposed framework conceptualizes the abstract concept of planning utility into seven dimensions: military validity, strategic validity, organizational learning, organizational networking, resourcing influence, flexibility, and clarity. These dimensions can then serve as propositions to help current and future planning leaders and practitioners to assess the value that their efforts are adding. The dimensions also can aid data collection and analysis for future research oriented on historical case studies.¹⁶

Military validity. The first dimension of utility is *military validity*. Military validity (or invalidity) is observed when a deliberate war plan is implemented in actual war. Deliberate war plans are militarily valid if the actual operations carried out resemble the course of action described in the war plan. Conversely, if a war plan was largely abandoned at the time of need, then that would indicate it was invalid.

Military validity is measured by calculating the extent to which the war plan matched the battlefield outcomes, from three perspectives: whether the planning assumptions upon which the war plan was designed were validated, whether the adversary's anticipated course of action matched what the deliberate plan predicted, and whether the U.S. military forces actually adopted the operational approach the war plan called for.

Strategic validity. The second dimension is *strategic validity*. As with military validity, strategic validity can only be observed when a war plan is implemented in actual war. Deliberate war plans are strategically valid if the military operations they prescribe are strategically successful. To illustrate the difference between military validity and strategic validity, the achievement of military objectives does not automatically lead to strategic victory. A good example was the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, where the achievement of the initial military objective, the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, did not result in strategic victory. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion

of Iraq was militarily valid but strategically invalid, because the assumptions undergirding the policy direction to the war proved false.

Organizational learning. The third dimension is *organizational learning*. The process of designing a deliberate war plan should generate insights and innovation that otherwise would not emerge. President Dwight D. Eisenhower characterized the value of learning through the medium of planning in a quote that is often invoked in the contemporary American prewar planning community: “Plans are useless but planning is indispensable.”¹⁷ Approached from this perspective, deliberate war planning can add value by facilitating individual and organizational understanding of complex problems.¹⁸ Organizational learning as a dimension of war planning utility is measured by observing the number of doctrinal changes and professional journal articles published because of the planners’ insights and innovation.

Organizational networking. The fourth dimension is *organizational networking*. Deliberate war planning should breach organizational stovepipes and connect communities of interest. Organizational networking is measured by observing the formation of networks (at all levels) that would not have otherwise occurred had the planning effort not taken place. Additionally, experience should validate that such networks proved to be invaluable in a crisis.

Unfortunately, in some cases, organizational networking is inhibited when deliberate war planning becomes exclusionary because of formal security compartmentalization, informal information sharing barriers, or even restrictions established by the chain of command. Exclusivity is sometimes necessary because of operational and political sensitivities, though it reduces the effectiveness of organizational networking.

Resourcing influence. The fifth dimension is *resourcing influence*. Effective deliberate war plans should influence the military’s investments in technology, equipment, organizational restructuring, and overseas basing posture. Resourcing influence is measured by observing changes in military resource allocations that resulted from the plans.

Flexibility. The sixth dimension is *flexibility*. War plans should offer a range of options, thereby providing a wide enough range of planning latitude to effectively adapt to unpredicted situations.¹⁹ Flexibility is measured by determining the number of potential

adversary actions that the plan anticipates as well as the number of options it provides for the U.S. military commander to deal with such actions.

Clarity. The seventh dimension is *clarity*. War plans should articulate an operational approach that is clear to multiple different organizations and users, thus increasing the possibility of unity of effort and lowering the probabilities of miscalculation and miscommunication.²⁰ Clarity is measured by observing accurate cognition by operational planners in a crisis and service planners in steady-state readiness generation.

Note that the last two dimensions, clarity and flexibility, are inversely related. How to manage this tradeoff is a pervasive question being grappled with by contemporary practitioners and thus must be accounted for in any useful model. In doing so, Albert Einstein’s advice is instructive: “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.”²¹

Military planning doctrine accounts for aspects of these seven dimensions (see the footnoted references). But their articulation as separate analytic concepts is insufficient. Elaboration of the dimensions into a theoretical framework is the contribution sought here. To be sure, this theoretical framework is not a panacea, but there is plenty of room for incremental improvement, as we have seen.

Further research is needed to validate the theoretical framework, potentially through its application to a series of case studies from U.S. military deliberate planning experience. Case studies would ideally include the definitive U.S. military deliberate war planning efforts: Plan Orange, 1924–1941; the General Defense of Western Europe, 1945–1989; and Plan 1002/1003, 1991–2003.²² Ultimately, this research will equip future practitioners with a framework to overcome the tensions that will otherwise pervade the process and generate greater satisfaction at all levels.

Conclusion

While deliberate war planning has real benefits, the environment in which it is carried out today is riven with competing tensions that at best impair its effectiveness and at worst render it irrelevant. This outcome is, perhaps, inevitable. The way to improve the benefits of deliberate planning is not to tinker with the process. The process brings all the relevant parties together. What is needed is a way to improve the outcomes of the process.

The solution proffered here is a theoretical framework populated by an objective set of criteria that can be used to assess the validity of a plan objectively and, in

so doing, shift the focus from institutional and bureaucratic concerns to the strategic merits of war plans and war planning. ■

Notes

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ARWIS

4th INFANTRY DIVISION

4th INFANTRY DIVISION

SAUDI ARABIA



The Need for a Brigade Politics-and-Policy Staff Officer

Maj. Adam Scher, U.S. Army

By June 2015, morning battlefield-update briefs were routine in the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 82nd Airborne Division's Baghdad command post. On one morning of that month, however, there was a critical difference: it was the first time a member of the staff was asked to provide commentary and analysis about the politics-and-policy decisions of regional governments, coalition partners, and the government of Iraq. Given my position as an assistant professor of American politics, policy, and strategy at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Col. Curtis Buzzard, the 3rd BCT commander, asked me to help explain how the 7 June national elections in Turkey might influence our partnership with the Iraqi Army's Ninewa Operations Command and the operational planning to liberate Mosul.

This was not the first time that a brigade commander asked me to fill this role. In 2008, while serving with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Yusifiyah, Iraq, Col. Dominic Caraccilo asked me to study the Iraqi political process, interact with key State Department (DOS) officials, meet regularly with local political leaders, act as an advocate for the Iraqi population, and advise him on the political landscape within the areas of operations and interest.¹ Seven years later, I volunteered to spend the summer with 3rd BCT because I believed the setup of

brigade staffs did not account for the difference between its evolving operational needs and the structure and responsibilities of its staff. I worked with 3rd BCT in the summer because they, like every other BCT in the Army, had no officer at the brigade level to examine the politics and policy of their assigned region, and no foreign-service officers embedded in their formations.

During discussions in Iraq with others on the brigade staff, subordinate battalions, and our higher headquarters, it became apparent we lacked a clear procedure or person to assist in interpreting the Iraqi government's political decisions, in exploring the domestic politics of regional partners and adversaries, or even in understanding the differences between the Title 10, U.S. Code, authorities and functions of the combined joint task force and the Title 22 functions of the Office of Security Cooperation that has been operating in Iraq since 2011.² This lack of understanding reduced our capacity to partner, advise, and assist when our counterparts asked questions about regional dynamics or global issues with which we were not familiar or for which we lacked an appreciation. The BCT staff structure limited our ability to fully understand our operational environment and best apply combat power.

This gap also highlighted the apparent beginning of what has become a recurring complaint about field grade officers and more senior military leaders—that the “best military advice” they provide is too frequently tactically sound but strategically and politically uninformed. As former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright noted,

We forget the other elements of national power will be integrated into the objective at the highest levels of government. We fail to recall the use of force is a political decision—part of

Spc. Rose Lewis, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division, interprets for Maj. Adam Scher, Iraqi Security Forces development officer and political officer for 3rd BCT, and Col. Mohammed, Ninewa Operations Command action officer for popular mobilization forces integration, as they discuss the effect of Turkey's elections on the planning process for liberating Mosul 27 July 2015 at the Iraqi Ground Forces Command Headquarters compound, Baghdad, Iraq. (Photo by James Polk, U.S. Army)



a larger strategy—and that the end state will not be the political introduction of force; it will be a political settlement. That is, the principal reason for military intervention is to facilitate the political objectives.³

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process*, indicates that commanders and staffs must consider operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time—when conducting analysis and planning, stating, “The operational variables are *fundamental* [emphasis added] to developing a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment.”⁴ Consideration of *just* the political and social operational variables may require staffs to evaluate up to seventeen different subvariables.⁵ Quite simply, most commanders and staffs at the tactical level are too task-saturated to acquire the breadth and depth of knowledge needed to create operationally sound plans in an extraordinarily complex political environment. The creation of a modified-table-of-organization-and-equipment billet for a brigade politics-and-policy staff officer could address this issue by assigning officers who are well versed in the

British Middle East scholar Emma Sky initially served 2003–2004 as political adviser to Col. William Mayville, U.S. commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, Kirkuk, Iraq. She developed such admiration and affection for the soldiers of the brigade that when they rotated home in early 2004, she reportedly “sobbed inconsolably all afternoon.” In 2006, Gen. Raymond Odierno, who had been Mayville’s division commander, invited her to become his political adviser when he was appointed the deputy American commander in Iraq. She served as his political advisor in 2006–2008 and in 2008–2010 when he returned as top commander in Iraq. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Curt Cashour, U.S. Army)

political, social, and economic complexities of their operational environment to BCTs.⁶

Some may argue that the intelligence (S-2), civil affairs (S-9), and foreign area officers already exist within our formations and could or should accomplish this mission. While the S-2 can produce the “road to war” prior to a deployment—which typically includes some analysis of the broader region, its stakeholders, and other key influences—the tactical S-2 is enemy-focused. The daily demands of intelligence production at the BCT level do not leave much time for examining the larger strategic environment, or host-nation (HN) security forces.

Similarly, the S-9 typically focuses on infrastructure development, and the operations officer (S-3) is engrossed in planning operations, evaluating key terrain, and coordinating between the other warfighting functions within the brigade. No functional area officers—whether foreign area officers, strategists, or strategic intelligence officers—are assigned at the brigade level. Given the likely continued emphasis on partnerships between conventional Army units and their HN counterparts, the Army cannot continue to accept this deficiency in the brigade staff. Without a trained and resourced politics-and-policy officer, only in rare instances will a commander obtain critical information by setting aside one of his or her officers or directing a staff element to look at these issues instead of or in addition to their mission-essential tasks.

The politics-and-policy officer need not be its own functional area that forces an officer out of the operations track and command pipeline like the strategist, acquisition, or foreign-area officer specialties. Rather, it could be an additional skill identifier consisting of formal schooling and a utilization tour. Selection must be competitive and nominative, and schooling should consist of formal master's degree programs in international relations, foreign policy, public administration, finance and business, or regional studies, with coursework in economics and public policy. Officers who acquire this additional skill identifier should be managed similarly to those who complete the School of Advanced Military Studies.

With a planned reduction to thirty BCTs by fiscal year 2017, the Army would only need to allocate a minimum of sixty officers to a maximum of ninety officers per year to this program.⁷ One politics-and-policy officer per BCT would require thirty officers, with an additional thirty in a one-year graduate school program ready to replace the existing politics-and-policy officers after a twelve-month utilization tour. If the Army wanted to send each politics-and-policy officer to a two-year graduate program, an additional thirty officers would be required.

The question of how to incorporate these officers back into the appropriate key development and command pipelines remains. The Pentagon is already implementing personnel reforms that are expanding officer opportunities for advanced civilian schooling. Such enhanced education proposals are a key component of Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's effort to overhaul the military personnel system. According to the *Military Times*, "the emerging slate of reforms will include new benchmarks

designed to encourage officers to go to civilian graduate schools and other 'broadening assignments' that involve spending time beyond the insular military community."⁸ The politics-and-policy officer billet could be a necessary component to institutionalize already existing military education reforms and bring enhanced capabilities to the BCT without making new, costly investments outside of existing personnel reforms.

Deployed BCTs could benefit from a politics-and-policy officer immediately. During my time with 3rd BCT, it was clear that the brigade's separate missions of building partner capacity, training and equipping an HN security force, and advising and assisting HN political and military leaders at times had competing strategic ends. In some cases, our efforts to equip and train the Kurds undermined our efforts to advise and assist the government in Baghdad. At an even more granular level, our partnership with units committed to the defense of Baghdad often took training time and space away from our HN partner units that were apportioned to liberate areas north and west of the capital. Given that no existing brigade staff section had a primary responsibility to aid the commander in processing or prioritizing competing tactical and strategic measures of performance and effectiveness, it was incumbent upon the leaders within the brigade to come up with creative solutions.

The brigade task-organized and established an advise-and-assist cell comprised of officers for whom the advise-and-assist mission was neither their primary mission nor their area of expertise. Each day, they had to make decisions on how and where to spend their finite time and resources, a situation that could be at least partially alleviated by the politics-and-policy officer, whose daily responsibility should be to organize

Maj. Adam Scher, U.S. Army, is the executive officer of 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He previously served as an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy. He graduated from West Point in 2004 and from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs in 2013. A veteran of multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, he most recently served as a brigade politics-and-policy officer for 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, during its deployment to Iraq in 2015.

what might otherwise be a somewhat ad hoc effort, and relieve some of the task-saturation problem for other staff officers.

The brigade was also constrained by a number of other factors, particularly restrictions on the number of personnel in theater and an inability to operate outside forward operating bases. The operational environment was also complicated by numerous other U.S. and coalition government agencies as well as many factions within the Iraqi government and security apparatus. The BCT quickly recognized that regional and Iraqi-specific context and information were critical to accomplishing its training and advising mission. Buzzard explains,

Without this context and understanding, multiple units could have easily inadvertently caused a long-term problem while pursuing a seemingly logical short-term solution. Given the complexity of the operational environment, the brigade prioritized a “mission first” perspective over concerns about lines of authority, task organization, or who received credit—3/82’s deployment adopted a “one team” approach.⁹

Despite this “mission first” attitude, some missions conflicted with others, and adjacent units, superior and subordinate command headquarters, and peers on the brigade staff did not have refined processes for evaluating the myriad of stakeholders’ interests. Various parties’ interests, both within and external to the immediate BCT battle space, influenced the area of operations and decision making for applying combat power. This is not an indictment of any individual or command—on the contrary, it is an observation that the task organization of the Army’s unit of employment, the BCT, has not been adapted to meet the changing battlefield environment, and it is less than ideally suited to operate and exercise lethal and nonlethal force among large populations of noncombatants. Operations that require the skills of a politics-and-policy officer include—

- training an HN security force,
- equipping an HN security force,
- advising and assisting HN military and political leaders on employment of their force, and
- conducting lethal and nonlethal fires in support of HN ground maneuver.

BCTs will not be able to effectively balance these tactical missions and their strategic consequences unless we task-organize and manage our talent

appropriately to bridge the gap described above. Therefore, the brigade politics-and-policy officer should be given the following duty description:

An assigned officer on the BCT staff will be responsible for making tactical recommendations to the brigade commander based on an assessment of governmental influences on HN security forces training, equipping, and employment. This recommendation should include the officer’s evaluation of data from multiple sources and, upon the brigade commander’s approval, it can be used to create products that support advise-and-assist teams at the battalion level in their evaluation of partnered forces. Equally important, a focus on this type of HN security forces assessment will help provide the brigade commander with an accurate understanding of the capabilities of training units, enabling better decisions about employment in support of all aspects of urban land operations.

The brigade politics-and-policy officer should be given the following key tasks:

- understand HN political leaders’ party affiliation, legal obligation, and election cycle;
- identify informal or opposition leaders not in government (by definition, a key leader engagement only allows us to interact with the winners of the democratic process even if they do not represent more than 51 percent of any given population); and
- track political and policy outcomes of numerous interested governments and assess the potential impact politics and policy will have on HN security force capacity building.

The purpose of formalizing this staff position is to institutionalize intellectual capital within the BCT in the same way we already focus on building tactical and operational expertise for our company commanders and field grade officers. Interestingly enough, the Army already has a repository of officers that could immediately fill this gap. They have already completed advanced civilian schooling, many have published in the fields of political science and force employment, and all have proven to be successful company grade officers at the tactical level.

Prior to making any changes to the modified table of organization and equipment, a pilot program could allow the Army and BCT commanders to test this concept. Officers teaching in the U.S. Military Academy’s Department of Social Sciences are already spending their summers attached to fielded-force units to provide this support. Col. Cindy Jebb, who heads the



Department of Social Sciences, spent the summer of 2015 working with the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and the department considered ways to send another officer to support the joint force land component commander in Iraq again during the summer of 2016.

Additionally, during the summer of 2015, I functioned as the 3rd BCT’s politics-and-policy officer, providing the brigade commander with regional and political analysis of the major stakeholders for Iraq, as well as analysis of U.S. influences on policy decisions and recommendations. This analysis was informed by participation in key-leader engagements every day and was disseminated by publishing a daily report that gave commanders, staff officers, and soldiers down to the platoon level the ability to understand the politics relevant to their operations and to leverage that understanding in their advise-and-assist mission. Buzzard believes his building-partner-capacity and advise-and-assist missions could be enhanced if he and his team assigned a staff officer to generate a political understanding of 3rd BCT’s HN and coalition partners; despite how critical political understanding is, even at the tactical level, the Army did not provide him with an officer dedicated to this task.¹⁰

A role player portraying an Afghan provincial governor addresses security concerns to Col. Michael Getchell, commander of 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, and other brigade leaders 11 June 2012 during a key-leader engagement exercise at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. Such engagements are greatly enhanced by the presence of trained and experienced political officers. (Photo by Sgt. Christopher M. Gaylord, U.S. Army)

The success of this “proof of concept” has generated interest from multiple brigade commanders who are interested in enhancing their units’ understanding of their operational environments and their ability to accomplish their missions. For the Army to truly benefit from the creation of a politics-and-policy officer billet, there must also be value added to the BCT organization in garrison or during home-station training, not just a deployed mission requirement. The lessons learned from 3rd BCT’s preparation and deployment provide unique insight into how the potential functions of a brigade politics-and-policy officer could enhance predeployment training. Buzzard describes his brigade’s predeployment training focus in the following manner:

Upon receipt of the mission, the BCT had to conduct a rapid mission analysis—there

were few facts and a lot of assumptions about this evolving mission. First, and foremost, the brigade aggressively implemented a leader development program that initially leveraged the Security Force Assistance Advisor Team (SFAAT) Academy, which is based at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Their program of instruction was an excellent primer for advise-and-assist tasks, refreshed the unit's understanding of Iraq's cultural nuances, and provided a great start point to examine the mission.¹¹

Ideally, the politics-and-policy officer could supply this type of "primer" at home station, using the SFAAT Academy program of instruction as a base and adding regionally specific context from a variety of sources, including academia. This type of training at home station would allow the unit's training-center rotation to serve as a certifying exercise.

In addition to existing military training programs, Buzzard expanded his predeployment preparation to other nontraditional resources that focused on leader professional development:

Col. Joel Rayburn, author of *Iraq After America*, presented a session to key leaders on his recent book and research on Operation Iraqi Freedom. His insights into Iraqi political and military institutional change since U.S. forces departed Iraq was hugely beneficial, and his connections to experts that the BCT would later leverage during the deployment were equally important. In addition, the BCT hosted the West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, which shared its most recent products on the Islamic State and offered valuable perspectives on the politics in Baghdad and the retreat of Iraqi forces in 2014. The BCT also invited the Negotiations Project from West Point and executed a seminar on developing negotiation strategies for the BCT's leaders.¹²

A full-time politics-and-policy officer could develop and implement this type of unconventional, "out of the box" training. The officer would work closely with the brigade S-3 to ensure the training was properly balanced with other mandatory and predeployment training.

Finally, the Army does not have to do this alone. A whole-of-government approach that leverages

interagency partners could also help fill this gap. Adapting the State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team program to assign foreign-service officers to Army BCTs could be explored as a pilot program for improving the task organization and enhancing the building-partner-capacity and advise-and-assist effectiveness of Army formations. Another option would allow the Army to send its politics-and-policy officers to a civilian graduate school and follow such study with an assignment to an interagency partner such as the DOS. Doing so would enable these officers to serve in an embassy as a member of an ambassador's country team or at the DOS headquarters in order to understand how the political-military sections integrate their specific country's perspectives into U.S. foreign policy goals. As I wrote in an article for the Task and Purpose website, "The United States already has experience with security sector reform and has published doctrine to define the relationship between the DOS, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Department of Defense. In it, these agencies are tasked to work together to provide reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law in a host country."¹³

Expanding this arrangement to incorporate civilian experts into a BCT's culminating training event as well as its real-world deployments could be another option for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of BCTs deployed to conduct partnership operations. While this would not expand the intellectual capital within the Army, it would leverage the knowledge of career civil servants who arguably have a better understanding of culture and politics.

The risk to the interagency support program is in the civilian's lack of experience with Army tactical operations. The advantage of training a successful company commander with an additional skill rests with this officer's ability to understand and integrate politics and policy into existing warfighting functions like fires and maneuver.

While I expect my next job to be a return to a tactical infantry battalion, what became apparent over my time with 3rd BCT was that for tactical decisions at the battalion and company level to be truly exceptional, they must be informed by a political, strategic, and cultural understanding of the HN, by the interests of other governmental and nongovernmental actors, and

by a greater appreciation for other elements of national power that support the overall U.S. strategy. As former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno said, “We now have ... the opportunity to study and recommend changes to our brigade combat team organization. ... It is critical that this vital war fighting formation remains dominant against the evolving hybrid threats in tomorrow’s operational environments.”¹⁴ One way to accomplish this is to create a position on the BCT staff charged with the responsibility to analyze and understand the politics and policies of partnered governments and interested stakeholders that affect our partnered HN security forces. ■


The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

Notes

1. Adam Scher, “Political Advisors: Harnessing the Soft Power of Brigade Commanders,” *Military Review* 90, no. 1 (January-February 2010), accessed 19 September 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100228_art013.pdf.
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MilitaryReview


WE RECOMMEND



An early opponent of Operation Iraqi Freedom, British Middle East scholar Emma Sky nevertheless volunteered to help rebuild Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Subsequently, her educational background, language skills, and gift for diplomacy as well as her blunt honesty ingratiated her with senior military leaders struggling with the issues of occupation. She initially served as the political adviser to Col. William Mayville, commander of the U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade, Kirkuk, Iraq, and then as political adviser to Gen. Raymond Odierno during his tours in Iraq as deputy commander and later as commander of coalition forces. Sky became among Odierno’s closest confidants during the most painful stages of the war. *The Unraveling* details her observations and critical analysis stemming from more than a decade of experience as a political adviser serving in time of war. It provides invaluable insight into the role and the risks of service as a political adviser at the brigade and major command levels.

taskandpurpose.com/the-problem-with-iraqi-security-forces-isnt-just-an-unwillingness-to-fight/.

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Battle of Churubusco. Fought near the City of Mexico 20th of August 1847 (1847), hand-tinted lithograph, by John Cameron (artist) and Nathaniel Currier (lithographer), digitally restored. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Expeditionary Land Power

Lessons from the Mexican-American War

Maj. Nathan A. Jennings, U.S. Army

Since drawing down its large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns in the Middle East, the U.S. Army has been increasingly adopting, as described by its thirty-eighth chief of staff, “an expeditionary mindset” to “conduct forced entry in denied areas under extremely austere conditions anywhere in the world.”¹ While many are turning to the two world wars and interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq for applicable lessons, the campaigns of the nineteenth century—with the exception of the Civil War—may offer more relevant case studies where relatively small, technologically advanced,

and professionally led forces deployed to distant theaters. From the Indian Wars that raged across expanding American frontiers to the global attacks of the Spanish-American War, the republic’s oldest military service evolved to negotiate rapid and economized expeditionary warfare in both conventional and guerrilla settings.²

In the Mexican-American War, 1846–1848, a series of sparsely resourced but highly effective expeditions exemplified the *U.S. Army Operating Concept’s* imperative for future forces to jointly “present the enemy with multiple dilemmas” by being able to “conduct expeditionary

maneuver through rapid deployment and transition to operations,” and “overwhelm the enemy physically and psychologically.”³ Beginning with border skirmishes along the Rio Grande and ending with the occupation of half of Mexico from San Diego to Veracruz, the Army, in concert with the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the diplomatic corps, employed unprecedented joint unity of effort, robust “total force” cooperation between professionals and volunteers, and relatively sophisticated foreign governance policies to achieve strategic objectives. Although the *casus belli* remains controversial, the efficient implementation of joint force effort across the continent established the United States as the dominant nation in North America.

Future U.S. forces will need to achieve mastery of force projection methods reminiscent of successful operations in the contested cities of Los Angeles in 1846 and Mexico City in 1847, while incorporating twenty-first century technologies to project land power effectively. While the modern U.S. military could potentially replicate massive mobilizations similar to the Second World War or the substantial deployment of the Persian Gulf War in the near future, it is more likely to conduct forced entry and security efforts along accelerated political timelines with limited but tactically effective joint and combined arms teams.

Campaigning in Mexico

The Mexican-American War and its relevance to the Army’s current interests in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and East Asia can be readily assessed according to modern U.S. military doctrine. The operational phases of shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority, as outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, provide a ready conceptual framework to contextualize the nineteenth-century confrontation.⁴ While all historical engagements must be assessed as unique events within distinct panoramas, the sequenced invasions and occupations of north, west, and central Mexico by land and sea followed a campaign pattern similar to phased models that regionally aligned forces may potentially apply during forced-entry operations in the twenty-first century.

The first, and enduring, phase of U.S. military operations abroad centers on shaping the security environment. According to joint doctrine, aligned forces conduct continuous missions, tasks, and actions to dissuade or

deter adversaries and assure friends while “influencing adversaries’ and allies’ behavior.”⁵ These efforts often focus on robust security cooperation by partnered elements to reinforce and enable political objectives. As seen in Europe, the Persian Gulf region, and the Korean Peninsula since the rise of American global leadership, expeditionary operations by combined arms teams remain a primary instrument for influencing foreign affairs in accordance with national interests.

For decades before the Mexican-American War, the Army shaped the North American security environment by operating in dispersed contingents as it secured frontiers and coastlines against both tribal and nation-state competitors. Similar to contemporary deployments by regionally aligned detachments, America’s mid-nineteenth-century ground formations rarely united for large-scale training maneuvers or campaigns. Instead, under constant fiscal constraints, they focused on economized security efforts that, contrary to popular belief, often included partnership with Amerindians and territorial militias.⁶

When shaping operations prove insufficient, joint forces conduct intensified posturing and maneuver to “deter an adversary” through demonstration of “friendly capabilities and the will to use them.”⁷ The current positioning of rotational American and allied brigades in eastern Europe and South Korea, for example, underscores how military deterrence through physical presence remains viable in the twenty-first century. While effective messaging can emanate from a variety of instruments of national power, ground forces often provide the most credible demonstrations of national resolve. As argued by Lt. Gen.

Maj. Nathan Jennings, U.S. Army, is a student in the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His previous assignments include assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, headquarters troop commander and cavalry troop commander in the 1st Cavalry Division, security force platoon leader in the 1st Infantry Division, and cavalry scout in the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) with Operation Iraqi Freedom tours in Baghdad and Kirkuk. Jennings earned an MA in American history from the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of *Riding for the Lone Star: Frontier Cavalry and the Texas Way of War, 1822–1865*.

H. R. McMaster, “forward deterrence involves land forces. ... It is very difficult to achieve political outcomes from standoff range.”⁸

When Mexico threatened war over American annexation of its former territory, Texas, scattered U.S. Army garrisons coalesced to deter potential incursion across the Rio Grande. In January 1846, in response to a Mexican Army build-up along the border, Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor led the newly formed “Army of Observation,” comprising approximately 3,900 infantrymen, artillerymen, and dragoons, to the Gulf Coast.⁹ Similar to the massing of allied forces in West Germany in the 1950s to deter Russian aggression, Taylor aimed to dissuade Mexico from challenging U.S. territorial claims through physical presence. Also similar to today, the ad hoc army benefited from a degree of professionalization that allowed the regiments to join, imperfectly, as a combined arms team.

Because of the regular army’s strength at fewer than 7,500 soldiers at the onset of war, the United States was compelled to adopt a mobilization model similar to what it uses today: heavy reliance on volunteer units to conduct “total force” campaigns of mass and scale.¹⁰ When Taylor established camp at Corpus Christi, he received, integrated, and trained state regiments from Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Texas to create the “Army of Occupation” in the contested territory. Throughout the next two years, thousands of volunteers from nearly every state would rotate to provide the combat power necessary to defeat the far larger Mexican military. Though use of volunteers often came at a heavy price due to their indiscipline, many recruits, such as western frontiersmen who specialized in irregular tactics, added special capabilities to the regulars’ conventional strengths.¹¹


The third phase of joint operations begins when deterrence fails and decisive action is required. When conflict becomes unavoidable, American forces transition

from posturing to seizing operational initiative. According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, this foundational action is designed to “gain a position of advantage that degrades and defeats the enemy throughout the depth of an organization.”¹² As proven in the Inchon Landings of the Korean War and the sweeping envelopments of the Persian Gulf War, unified teams that attack rapidly and forcefully at the onset of hostilities or at advantageous points during major combat operations can dictate the battle and exploit opportunities.

For Taylor and his small army, deterrence soon failed and both sides moved to seize initiative. The American main force quickly won bloody victories at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma along the Rio Grande in May 1846. These victories allowed invasion of northeast Mexico while smaller columns conducted deep attacks into New Mexico and California. Though small in size, each of the expeditions employed technological overmatch to defeat an array of defending Mexican garrisons—except for a

tactical setback near San Diego.¹³ Akin to numerous twentieth-century campaigns where operational initiative compensated for inferior numbers, rapid successes allowed American troops to occupy favorable political terrain and ultimately empowered the U.S. government to demand strategic concessions.

The economized forced entry into Alta California, in particular, reflected a high degree of joint cooperation between Army forces, the Navy’s Pacific Squadron, and rebel militia as they defeated and expelled the Presidio garrisons. When an element of the 1st U.S. Dragoons under Brig. Gen. Stephen Kearny initially suffered defeat at the Battle of San Pasqual in December 1846, a coastal contingent of marines and sailors reinforced the horsemen to win several follow-on engagements, retake Los Angeles, and establish a provisional government. Though the partnership was marred by interservice rivalry, the joint success accelerated American gains. Two thousand




Daguerreotype of Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor, ca. 1843–1845. Taylor was appointed by President James K. Polk to lead U.S. forces sent to deter Mexican aggression along the Texas–Mexico border brought on by the U.S. annexation of Texas. Deterrence failed, and the Mexican-American War broke out in April 1846. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

miles to the east, the Navy's Home Squadron likewise blockaded enemy ports across the Gulf of Mexico while protecting logistical transports in support of Taylor's capture of Monterrey.¹⁴

The dominate phase of an operation, according to joint doctrine, "focuses on breaking the enemy's will to resist" or on "control [of] the operational environment."¹⁵ Usually reflecting the most destructive moments in

thirty thousand defenders and capture Mexico City. Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, renowned for his 1815 victory at the Battle of Waterloo, reportedly called the invasion "unsurpassed in military annals."¹⁶

As with previous successes in northern Mexico, the littoral attack relied upon cooperation by diverse military elements. In the largest wartime collaboration between U.S. ground and naval forces to that point



(Graphic courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 1. Route of Ground Force Led by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott that Culminated in the Surrender of Mexico

expeditionary warfare, Army formations dominate their adversaries through both traditional military means and emerging technological offsets. The phase often culminates a successful campaign—sometimes deceptively so, as seen in the American invasion of Iraq in 2003—by shattering the opposing nation's military and economic capability to resist and allowing advancing forces to control politically important spaces.

In the Mexican-American War, the American culmination occurred when Winfield Scott, commanding general of the U.S. Army, led an audacious amphibious attack into Central Mexico via the Atlantic Coast (figure 1). Similar to when a modestly sized and technologically advanced coalition rapidly attacked in Afghanistan in 2001, the Army relied on operational mobility and combined arms superiority to accomplish the contested entry. Outnumbered and far from support, Scott's eleven thousand soldiers captured the port of Veracruz and marched inland along increasingly vulnerable lines of communication to defeat over

in American history, the Home Squadron transported Scott's entire invasion force to the coastal fortress of Veracruz, blockaded the city, and provided heavy cannon to allow an intensive eighty-eight-hour bombardment. Following the "Gibraltar of Mexico's" timely capitulation, U.S. Marines then marched with the Army brigades "to the halls of Montezuma" while fighting in nearly every battle. Throughout the domination of Central Mexico, just as had occurred under Taylor, thousands of volunteers fought alongside regulars while warships secured maritime lines back to supply depots in New Orleans (figure 2, page 46).¹⁷

The fifth, and sometimes most challenging, phase of expeditionary warfare is stabilizing the theater after the end of major combat operations. Intended to "restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability," American joint forces conducting stabilization have remained in numerous countries, sometimes indefinitely, as exemplified by postwar military partnerships with Germany and Japan, after winning large-scale

confrontations.¹⁸ In other situations, U.S. elements have completely departed with disastrous results—perhaps best illustrated by Vietnam—or retrograded and then returned to stabilize, as is currently occurring in Iraq. Regardless of residual intensity, American incursions

formed to, as proclaimed by one Mexican general, “attack and destroy the Yankee’s invading army in every way imaginable.”¹⁹ Only by implementing stability policies that ordered civilians left unharmed, quartermasters to purchase provisions locally, demonstration of respect for



(Graphic courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 2. The Mexican-American War, 1846–1848

often evolve into partnerships with allied governments in order to create desired strategic conditions.

The Army’s mandate to occupy and govern Latin America’s most populous country proved just as difficult in the nineteenth century as similar efforts would centuries later in places like Indochina and Mesopotamia. Frustrated American garrisons pacified restive urban centers from Sacramento to Veracruz while countering a determined “Guerrilla Corps”

Catholic traditions, and partnership with Hispanic constabularies, did the occupiers prevent a popular uprising. In the end, despite numerous violations by ill-disciplined soldiers, Scott’s relatively sophisticated approach, in addition to rising internal conflict among Mexican factions, allowed him to “conquer a peace.”²⁰

Scott’s occupation of central Mexico, and to a lesser extent, Taylor’s occupation of Monterrey, featured critically needed integration of the specialized skills that both



General Scott's Entrance into Mexico City (1850), hand-painted lithograph, by Carl Nebel. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

regulars and volunteers contributed to the combined force. The commanding general employed a disciplined professional infantry to occupy the urban centers and to train allied Hispanic soldiers. He unleashed federalized Texas Rangers—irregular cavalry who had fought Mexicans and Indians for decades along embattled frontiers—to suppress the implacable guerrillas that preyed on convoys and outposts. Despite their tactical effectiveness, the Rangers' brutality toward Hispanic civilians threatened to undermine the expedition's broader pacification efforts.²¹

The final phase of expeditionary warfare enables a civil authority to "regain its ability to govern and administer to the services and other needs of the population."²² As seen in recent operations in the Middle East, ideal transition conditions can be difficult to achieve. They sometimes require reengagement of forces. Identifying and empowering legitimate indigenous governing institutions can also be complicated by social and ethnic fracturing common in war-torn countries. In the end, expeditionary forces usually attain a manageable political outcome—as opposed to a perfect one—in

order to allow redeployment of combat power from the occupied territory.

Despite its precarious position at the close of the Mexican-American War, the Army's threat to occupy northern Mexico indefinitely, with enduring naval support, enabled diplomatic counterparts to negotiate strategic concessions in exchange for a peaceful withdrawal.

The United States paid \$15 million for 529,000 square miles across parts of what is now New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado, Utah, and California, while solidifying control of Texas.²³ Mexico, under foreign rule and suffering massive peasant revolts in the Yucatan region, bitterly conceded the territory to regain sovereignty. The American garrisons then redeployed to once again secure newly expanded frontiers. Though the settlement reflected aggrandizement that the international community now would consider unacceptable, the phased campaign set precedence for similar force projection cycles—some successful and some not—throughout succeeding centuries.

Given the strategic success of the American expeditions that fought through adversity and uncertainty

in Mexico, the underappreciated conflict holds opportunity for further study as heirs to the legacy of nineteenth-century forces train to “win in a complex world.” While the Civil War and the Second World War typically garner the attention of historians, they reflect mobilization paradigms the United States is unlikely to soon experience. Later interventions in Korea and Vietnam, though less vast, likewise reflected far larger investments than recent campaigns in Mesopotamia and South Asia enjoyed. Though no future is certain, these trends suggest that the Army—now smaller than at any time since 1940—will accomplish future forced entries under substantial resource constraints with increasing reliance on joint cooperation.²⁴

This circumstance imparts new relevance to the Mexican-American War. Beyond decisive victories at storied places like Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, and Chapultepec, the Army’s ability to collaborate with maritime partners, integrate volunteer contingents into a “total force” concept, and apply balanced governance policies in occupied territories led to the efficient attainment of most national objectives. These mutually reinforcing tactical,

operational, and strategic efforts, especially when contrasted against recent suboptimal outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan, reveal a time when commanders successfully planned and directed, as now required by joint doctrine, the “deployment of forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.”²⁵

Looking forward to a new century of campaigns, the implications of the United States’ historic victory in the Mexican-American War are clear: its land power institution must train and equip to win across all the phases of expeditionary warfare as it deploys to seize initiative, dominate the enemy, and stabilize war-torn regions. Accomplishing these tasks, which fulfills the *Operating Concept’s* requirement to “deter adversaries; respond rapidly to crises; and conduct expeditionary maneuver against enemy forces,” will require seamless unity of effort between diverse elements of U.S. national power.²⁶ If the war against Mexico demonstrated the potential for the Army to lead multifaceted teams to decisively win on distant and unfamiliar terrain, future endeavors in far-flung theaters will surely provide the opportunity, and ultimate crucible, to do so once again. ■

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Sgt. Jon Findley (*right*), 311th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) intelligence noncommissioned officer, explains how to brief the enemy situation using the Command Post of the Future computer system to Pfc. Arturo Gonzalez during the 311th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Command Post Exercise–Functional 19 September 2015 at Camp Parks, California. (Photo by Maj. Gregg Moore, U.S. Army)

Cutting Our Feet to Fit the Shoes

An Analysis of Mission Command in the U.S. Army

Maj. Amos C. Fox, U.S. Army

The U.S. Army has sought to integrate mission command over the past decade but has run into resistance in many arenas. Mission command has not taken hold in the Army because it lacks specificity in relation to the Army's conditions and culture. Nor does it align with the contemporary American way of war, which is highlighted by its information and data-obsessed pursuit of efficiency and precision. This article seeks to develop a method of command and control more in line with the praxis of Army methods and principles. It recommends rescinding the doctrinal definition of mission command, while retaining mission command's principles. Army doctrine for command and control should incorporate a continuum that includes both mission command and centralized control, rather than preaching mission command but all too often practicing excess control.

The Army defines mission command as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."¹ The Army assigns the following principles to guide mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander's intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.²

There are two primary theories on mission command, both of which reflect the German concept of *Auftragstaktik*. In mission command, a commander clearly communicates his or her intent in relation to friendly forces, the enemy, and the mission but leaves the decisions on how to complete the mission with the subordinate leaders. The higher echelon commander allows subordinate leaders to develop the "how" based on the situation, the conditions, the terrain, familiarity with their unit, and their equipment.³ This idea, providing latitude in execution, is at the heart of mission command, and its intellectual fountainhead, *Auftragstaktik*. While not explicitly referenced in any doctrinal publication, both concepts serve as the foundational underpinning of the Army's command philosophy of the art of command and the science of control.

The other school of thought treats mission command and command and control as sides of the

same coin. In this line of reasoning, the theory of command and control finds its genesis in the relationship between information flow and decision making. Mission command, or what military theorist Robert Leonhard calls *directive control*, is required when decision making can no longer keep pace with the flow of information.⁴ Command and control, what Leonhard calls *detailed control*, is required when decision making can maintain pace with the flow of information. In this school of thought, both forms of command and control—directive control and detailed control—are acceptable and viable in modern war. The key is to balance information flow with decision-making authority.⁵

However, a more granular examination suggests mission command—Leonhard's directive control—is messy, inefficient, and ambiguous. Mission command is messy because it provides parameters within which one must operate instead of an instructive method of operation. Mission command is inefficient and ambiguous because it relies on imprecise, bottom-up understanding and information instead of perfect, or near-perfect, understanding. Because of this, mission command is slow in relation to higher echelons of command as lower echelons develop the situation, analyze the situation, execute courses of action, and report to higher echelons.

Mission Command in the Army Today

The Army's adoption of mission command has been great for generating discussion about empowering junior leaders and developing mutual trust within formations. In 2016, the Army released several works on mission command, to include *Mission Command in the 21st Century*, *Training for Decisive Action: Stories of Mission Command*, and *16 Cases of Mission Command*.⁶ Additionally, the Army's professional journals and Army-related blogs are continually filled with essays advocating for mission command and the principles it entails.

However, resistance to the ethos of mission command can be found everywhere. For all the success of mission command appears to be having across the Army, there are some critical shortcomings to full application across the force. Today's Army finds itself operating in an environment in which messy,

inefficient, and slow methods of command are unwelcome and counterproductive. Regardless of the method of command and control stated in doctrine, commanders have always and will always evaluate their units and subordinates based on how much they trust them. Then commanders will allocate varying degrees of independent action based upon that trust.

Mission Command in Doctrine

In his seminal work on maneuver warfare theory, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War*, Leonhard states that nothing in military doctrine is everlasting, regardless of how strong it is at a given time. Leonhard continues, “Therefore, doctrine has a life span, and its death is certain.”⁷ In analyzing mission command, perhaps it too is approaching its timely demise.

Army mission command doctrine is, in effect, being applied in a prescriptive manner. The Army dictates the primacy of mission command instead of providing commanders and staffs with options for directing action within their commands. Leaders are forced into a dilemma: do they faithfully follow doctrine—potentially at the expense of what is the smart decision—or do they deviate from doctrine based upon their understanding of their organization and its leaders?

This dynamic highlights the need for the Army to shelve the notion that mission command is a singular, unquestionable approach. Instead, the Army should encourage a more flexible approach that encourages leaders to consider options based on their understanding of their unit and their subordinate leaders in relation to the unit’s operational environment.

The Operating Environment’s Influence on Command and Control

Today’s operational environments often place Army units in situations in which their actions must be deliberate and restrained. In many cases, the U.S. government uses the Army as a tool to shape the strategic environment. Where national interests are at stake but limited objectives do not warrant large-scale combat operations, Army units must operate with finesse, in a manner not necessarily compatible with mission command. Concepts such as the “strategic corporal” highlight the limits of mission command—the

independent actions of a single soldier on the battlefield can have strategic impact.⁸ If soldiers’ actions are not carefully controlled, the consequences could affect national security. However, that notion stands in stark contrast to the principles of mission command, which allow soldiers to choose their actions in accordance with commander’s intent and vision, disciplined initiative, shared understanding, and mutual trust. Command and control methods are influenced not only by strategic mission constraints but also are strongly influenced by technological developments.

The proliferation of communications technology, information collection systems, and precision weaponry led the Army to over-engineer battlefield solutions. The thinking was that near-perfect situational understanding could be achieved, enabled by using precision weapons to kill without closing with the enemy while greatly minimizing collateral damage. Though these ideas are virtuous, they erode the principles of mission command and are largely unachievable.

In many cases, technological advancement has been geared toward providing commanders better situational awareness and improved ability to communicate, as with digital systems such as Blue Force Tracker, Command Post of the Future, and unmanned aircraft systems. In the past, commanders relied on reports from the field to populate friendly positions on maps. Today, Blue Force Tracker and Command Post of the Future allow commanders to see their formations down to the individual vehicle on high-resolution digital maps in near-real time. The employment of unmanned aircraft systems in conjunction with battle-tracking systems allows commanders a relatively high degree of understanding. A high degree of understanding, coupled with ubiquitous communications systems, has led to an environment similar to that of Vietnam, where commanders at multiple echelons were directing the actions of platoons and squads on the ground.⁹


Maj. Amos Fox,
U.S. Army, is a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BS from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis and an MA from Ball State University. He has served with the 4th Infantry Division, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the U.S. Army Armor School.

Successful Innovation and Mission Command

Historian Williamson Murray defined four critical factors of successful military innovation: specificity; a reflective, honest military culture; proper use of history; and cognitive openness.¹⁰ Murray's

about fighting. Based on Murray's factors of successful military innovation, it is time for the Army's approach to mission command to evolve.

Further exacerbating the command and control confusion is that mission command does not provide specificity to the Army in relation to the



(Graphic by author)

Figure 1. Continuum of Command and Control to Mission Command

thoughts on innovation are important to mission command because they suggest that philosophies and operational methods must be derived from the culture they are intended to support. In attempting to shoehorn mission command into Army doctrine, some could argue that the Army is improperly using history and ignoring specificity to justify the incorporation of the concept based solely on theoretical preference, or that the Army is cutting its feet to fit the shoes. Joint doctrine's retention of command and control instead of wholesale adoption of mission command could be seen as an acknowledgement of this idea. The Army's mission command doctrine lacks specificity of the environments in which the U.S. Army finds itself, the nature in which technology has influenced how the Army operates, and how the information age has shaped the Army's thinking

contemporary American way of war. The Germans' *Auftragstaktik* was an evolutionary innovation specific to the tactical, doctrinal, and cultural needs of the German army.¹¹ The conditions that allowed the concept of *Auftragstaktik* to develop organically over time and flourish in the German military are not found in today's U.S. Army operations.


The theoretical underpinnings of *Auftragstaktik* were products of vast battlefields in which large field armies were dispersed across great distances, generally operating against opponents similar in style and organization. However, in twenty-first century Army operations, conditions have changed.

The United States traditionally fought according to what many have called the "Western way of war." Historian Geoffrey Parker suggests that it is characterized by a focus on seeking a quick, decisive victory

through annihilation. Furthermore, according to Parker, it is built on finance, technology, diversity, and overwhelming firepower.¹²

However, the conditions changed as information-age technological advancement occurred and the Soviet Union, with its large military force, disintegrated. These factors, coupled with the effects of globalism, have given rise to a relatively new theory on how the U.S. now fights.

individual soldiers can cause strategic problems is at the heart of hypercontrol. To remove the risk of subordinate leaders making, or accidentally allowing, their subordinates to make strategic mistakes, constraints are emplaced, observation is ubiquitous, and heuristics such as the strategic corporal are developed to mitigate risk. The reduction of collateral damage and killing without closing with the enemy by employing precision munitions and precision forces, controlling



(Graphic by author)

Figure 2. Factors Determining Method of Control

Military theorist Antulio Echevarria suggests that U.S. forces “shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs ... into strategic successes.”¹³ He agrees with Russell Weigley and Max Boot that this lack of clear thinking stems from an emphasis on destroying the opponent, rather than taking into consideration the results of tactical victory.¹⁴ In this construct, “control-mania,” or a method of command and control that seeks to supersede risk and battlefield error through detailed control, appears to be a major byproduct of the information-age-fueled American way of war. The fact that

narratives, and seeking perfect understanding all fly in the face of the less controlled mission command approach that focuses on individual initiative, trust, and accepting prudent risk. Mission command reinforces the American focus on warfare (operational and tactical victory in battle) rather than war (strategic and political victory) due to the concept being derived from a German operational concept for winning quick battles of annihilation.

At this point, it is instructive to harken back to Leonhard’s theory of command and control to understand how information-age technology encourages




Figure 3. Conditions Warranting More Detailed Control


practices at odds with mission command. Leaders and staffs now command an amazing array of tools that allow them to visualize the battlefield and the operational environment, which in turn allows them to feel as though they are using information flow to guide decision making. Leaders, in their minds, are not micromanaging the mission; they are making decisions and directing action consistent with what they are capable of understanding.

Thus, technology's proliferation continues to dramatically influence how U.S. commanders exercise command and control. In World War I, trench warfare led to detailed command and control, but in the twenty-first century, technology has had a similar effect, leading to commanders falling too heavily into the detailed control side of the command and

control spectrum.¹⁵ It has undercut mission command. The byproduct of technology is faith in the ability to obtain perfect, or near-perfect, information before launching precision weapons to destroy a specific target. Seeking perfect information in order to precisely kill a target in a way that minimizes the chances of collateral damage creates an environment of control-mania, the antithesis of mission command. Army commanders do not accept prudent risk but instead tend to minimize risk by setting stringently exacting conditions before servicing a target or committing forces.

Recommendations

The principles of mission command should not be exclusive to mission command but should be



(Graphic by author)

Figure 4. Conditions Warranting More Directive Control

principles adhered to in any modern, democratic army. Mutual trust, shared understanding, thinking subordinate leaders who exercise initiative, accepting prudent risk—these are not sacred rights bestowed upon junior leaders by an enlightened commander; rather, these are principles vital to success on the modern battlefield. The speed of the information age demands these principles be intrinsic qualities for any army that wants to succeed. The principles should serve as the foundation of the operations process, the art of command, and the science of control in all the Army does. However, the manner in which commanders lead their organizations and their subordinates cannot be standardized.

Instead, the Army must acknowledge that successful commanders adjust their approach to command methodology by continually assessing a variety of factors to

determine how much to tighten or loosen their grip on the reins of control. Commanders must determine their approaches based upon understanding derived from individual assessment of each subordinate and organization. The Army should not dictate one approach (i.e., mission command or command and control) over another. Instead, doctrine should define the art of command and the science of control as occurring in proportional amounts along a continuum, with directive control and detailed control as the bookends (see figure 1, page 52).¹⁶ The decision on the method of control should then rest with the commander, based upon his or her understanding of any number of factors (see figure 2, page 53).

Doctrine should list the types of factors that commanders should consider when determining the method of control they will employ. However, doctrine should articulate that these factors are only examples to

stimulate thought, not a definitive list. Commanders should assess factors such as the following when determining their method of control:

- degree of mutual trust between leaders in the unit
- degree of situational understanding
- degree of complexity associated with the mission (i.e., is the problem simple, complicated, complex, or chaotic?)
- degree of protection inherent to the organization¹⁷
- degree of synchronization required for the mission or subordinate missions
- complexity and type of terrain
- self-confidence of the commander
- proficiency of the organization and its subordinate units
- proficiency of subordinate leaders
- proficiency of the staff

Commanders will likely gravitate toward detailed control in areas with low degrees of proficiency or high levels of complexity and complicated problems (see figure 3, page 54). Conversely, commanders will likely slide toward more directive control in areas with moderate to high degrees of proficiency and little complexity or complicated problems (see figure 4, page 55).

Furthermore, commanders must understand that the method of command and control is not static. Commanders must adjust their method of control based upon the continually evolving conditions. Another consideration is that organizations have multiple units. A commander may have a cavalry formation forward developing the situation on the ground, while the maneuver units are conducting a complicated, highly synchronized operation such as a wet-gap crossing. The commander would likely employ directive control with the cavalry formation, while retaining more detailed control for the part of the mission requiring highly synchronized operations. Upon completion of the complicated mission, the commander could revert to directive control.

The primary benefit of this approach is that it formally acknowledges the cognitive process a commander undergoes when thinking about how to command and control operations. Commanders and leaders at all levels conduct inventory of their

subordinates and their organization before deciding how to approach commanding each person and unit. Subordinates and units requiring more oversight get more oversight. Conversely, those that can be trusted to operate more independently are often provided more latitude.

Moreover, while addressing the contemporary American way of war, this approach provides flexibility to the commander by not dictating a specific approach for commanding and controlling operations. If the Army adjusts the manner in which doctrine is written and adopts the idea of the directive and detailed control continuum, it will better address the realities of war, pulling doctrine from the theoretical into the tangible.

Notwithstanding, it is useful to observe that either method of command or combination thereof is largely dependent on the quality of soldiers tasked to perform the missions. Gen. George S. Patton Jr. articulated this requirement over seventy years ago when he wrote, “To be a good soldier a man must have discipline, self-respect, pride in his unit and his country, a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and his superiors, and self-confidence born of demonstrated proficiency.”¹⁸

Conclusion

In summation, mission command needs to be overhauled. The concept fails to provide specificity and therefore is at conflict with the Army’s culture and the new American way of war. The Army must harken back to its own history to define what it wants from each end of the continuum while not forgetting the praxis of the American way of war and the influence of the information age. Doctrine must not dictate one way or one end of the continuum over the other but must describe instead how commanders continually assess themselves, their units, their subordinates, their environment, and the threat or enemy when determining which approach to employ. The approach must be appropriate to each subordinate leader in their organization. By adopting a continuum of control, the Army will develop an approach that is at harmony with the Army’s culture and the manner in which it has long preferred to fight. ■


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18. George S. Patton Jr., *War as I Knew It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), 335.

MilitaryReview


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
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Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in Ukrainian Antiterrorism Operations

Victor R. Morris

The U.S. Army Europe Joint Multinational Readiness Center's Raptor 14 team supported "Battle Staff Attack the Network/Network Engagement and Company Intelligence Support Team" training for Ukrainian armed forces officers conducting antiterrorism operations September 2015 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC) in Yavoriv, Ukraine. The training team determined traditional doctrinal tools for intelligence preparation were inadequate to help Ukrainian intelligence staffs understand their operational environment (OE). Consequently, the team adapted the process in a way

Victor R. Morris is an irregular warfare and counter-IED instructor at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany. He has conducted partnered training in sixteen European nations to include Ukraine, with four NATO centers of excellence, and at the NATO Joint Warfare Center. A civilian contractor and former U.S. Army officer, he has experience in both capacities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

that would account for group dynamics and how they influence the behavior of populations relevant to the OE, consistent with a concept called *complex intelligence preparation of the battlefield*, or complex IPB. This experience serves as a case study on how cross-functional staffs and company command teams can improve problem framing, understand relevant issues at all levels, and inform operational

planning. Complex IPB can support the Army's doctrinal *intelligence preparation of the battlefield* process and the joint process called *joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment* (JIPOE).

From IPB to Complex IPB

According to Army Techniques Publication 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, an Army intelligence staff (1) defines the OE, (2) describes environmental effects on operations, (3) evaluates the threat, and (4) determines the threat.¹ The staff uses this four-step process to analyze certain mission variables in the area of interest for a specific operation.² The mission variables analyzed are the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations.³ The goal of Army IPB is to provide Army commanders and staffs the information necessary to develop courses of action and make decisions.⁴

The IPB doctrine states that all four of the mission variables—including civil considerations—and their interactions must be analyzed if the process is to be effective. Staffs must "determine how the interactions of friendly forces, enemy forces, and indigenous populations affect each other."⁵ However, in practice, the process tends to emphasize the enemy rather than holistically integrate the civil considerations. For instance, staffs might not adequately consider multi-group interconnectedness, micro decision making, and population behavior evaluation (i.e., human-domain-centric analysis). Thus, if an OE and its dynamics



are like a garden, the IPB process described in Army (and Marine Corps) doctrine focuses intelligence analysts on the soil, weeds, and insects, instead of the entire landscape and the interactions that made the plants vulnerable or resilient to harm or imbalance.

Authors Tom Pike and Eddie Brown explain how complex IPB could improve IPB in a March 2016 article in *Small Wars Journal*.⁶ According to Pike and Brown, “Using IPB as the nucleus and integrating concepts from complex adaptive systems theory generates Complex IPB.”⁷ Instead of primarily identifying and evaluating the enemy or the threat, the complex IPB process helps intelligence staffs analyze multiple groups and how they interact and collectively behave. Like the hybrid and dynamic threats it was developed to defeat, complex IPB combines conventional and innovative approaches that emphasize cultural and population factors, perception assessments, and analysis of nonmilitary actors in order to create a more accurate understanding of the OE. Therefore, complex IPB expands the core process to include sociocultural profiling, link and social network analysis, and computational agent-based models. Although

A Ukrainian soldier assigned to 1st Battalion, 80th Airmobile Brigade, looks for simulated enemy activity 14 November 2016 during an urban operations training exercise taught by soldiers assigned to 6th Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, as part of the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv, Ukraine. (Photo by Sgt. Jacob Holmes, U.S. Army)

complex IPB has not been employed widely enough to validate its effectiveness, it can help staffs develop a more comprehensive picture of the OE than can doctrinal IPB alone.

According to Pike and Brown, “complex IPB is the next-generation of IPB ... [that could] dramatically improve foreign population analysis as well as improve U.S. ability to influence foreign populations.”⁸ The six steps of complex IPB are—

1. Define the OE.
2. Describe fitness landscape effects.
3. Evaluate the major groups.
4. Evaluate major groups’ courses of action.
5. Assess the groups’ interaction.
6. Evaluate population behavior.⁹

What Pike and Brown call a “fitness landscape” is “a population socio-cultural-political-ecosystem,” a construct that relates to the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) system and subsystem analysis used in JIPOE.¹⁰ Complex IPB considers individual capabilities that Pike and Brown call “fitness functions,” such as profession, education, ethnic group, family connections, and economic need, that influence individuals’ decisions in relation to the fitness landscape.¹¹ Using these constructs, complex IPB can help staffs understand and take into account how individual decisions interact and affect group dynamics.

A Holistic Way to Frame an Operational Environment

Joint doctrine defines an *operational environment* as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”¹² Understanding the OE and defining all of its dynamics are essential to successful intelligence preparation. The OE construct “encompasses physical areas and factors ..., the information environment (which includes cyberspace),” and interconnected systems that can be represented by PMESII.¹³

According to Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, JIPOE consists of four steps intended to ensure joint intelligence staffs include all relevant aspects of an OE in their analysis: (1) define the OE, (2) describe the impact of the OE, (3) evaluate the adversary and other relevant actors, and (4) determine the course of action for the adversary and other relevant actors.¹⁴ The purpose is to help the joint force commander predict the adversary’s most likely actions using a holistic view of the OE and “integrating a systems perspective and a geospatial perspective along with the force-specific IPB perspectives.”¹⁵


To distinguish IPB from JIPOE, joint doctrine characterizes the IPB as requiring “micro-analysis ... to support component command operations,” adding that “JIPOE and IPB analyses support each other while avoiding a duplication of analytic effort.”¹⁶ JP 2-01.3 illustrates the focus of JIPOE with a circular illustration that places a “holistic view of the operational environment” at the center.¹⁷ However, any OE is multidimensional, whether in Army or joint operations,

and understanding it requires a holistic and tailored approach to intelligence preparation. Complex IPB suggests the need to integrate ways to perform holistic analysis, similar to the focus of JIPOE. Figure 1 (on page 61) shows the circular JIPOE process model, with complex IPB interpreted similarly.

Factors usually regarded as influencing the strategic level also affect operational and tactical planning. For example, the strategic environment is characterized by a mixture of complex geopolitics and demographics such as population growth, mixed migrations, and urbanization. The relationship among these dynamics is particularly complex due to global connectedness and emerging and disruptive technologies. These phenomena have created an ever-evolving ecosystem of converging principal and hybrid threats such as revanchist states, extremist proto-states (e.g., the Islamic State), collective violent extremist organizations, state supporters, and transnational organized crime networks.

Operations such as foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and law enforcement employ a variety of activities and collaborative efforts in the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence relating to the threat groups and their interactions with relevant populations. All of the aforementioned operations can occur in isolation, or they can be combined with conventional-force offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in Army or joint operational areas.

Complex IPB emphasizes civil considerations, which include population groups and the societal conditions that influence them, when analyzing the OE. The threat and threat supporting groups’ ecosystem encompasses interactions affecting the OE; they employ a variety of capabilities, tactics, and weapons. The associated weapons threat can be broken down into three main categories: conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and improvised weapons. Improvised weapons offer the potential to modify and combine conventional and WMD capabilities through nonmilitary means of delivery using readily available and self-manufactured materials and technology, making the use of improvised weapons widespread in irregular warfare. In fact, the use of improvised weapons is widespread in many operational areas, sometimes as modified munitions and weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or improvised chemical or



Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment process

(Graphic from Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 21 May 2014], I-25)



Complex intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(Graphic by Victor R. Morris; steps from Tom Pike and Piotr M. Zagorowski, "Dense Urban Areas: The Case for Complex IPB," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 42, no. 3 [July-September 2016])

biological weapons. The combinations of traditional and irregular capabilities that hybrid threats employ are often facilitated by mutually supporting actors and varying resources. Additional hybrid threat characteristics involve employing proxy forces and conducting high- and low-intensity battle-field operations (ways and means) to reach political objectives (ends).

In a May 2016 article in *Army Magazine*, Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault describe how Russia's involvement in Ukraine illustrates its "new-generation warfare," which "combines both low-end, hidden state involvement with high-end, direct, even braggadocio superpower involvement."¹⁸ According to Karber and Thibeault, Russia's strategy includes political subversion, proxy sanctuary, intervention, coercive deterrence, and negotiated manipulation.¹⁹ To achieve its aims, Russia's military efforts include mixed company and battalion tactical groups with electronic warfare, unmanned aircraft systems, massed fires, armor and heavy-infantry fighting vehicles, and air defense capabilities.²⁰ In this environment, complex group dynamics interact with military operations.

Complex Interactions in Ukraine

Given the varied and dynamic nature of the hybrid threat, the demographics, and the motivating factors present in the Donbass region of Ukraine, it is clear that a holistic OE analysis, using complex IPB, is needed. With regard to Donbass, the fitness landscape and functions are somewhat disconnected from the rest of Ukraine and from Russia. This separation has left these ecosystems in a state of artificial regulation and physical isolation, in which both internal separatists and outside actors manipulate the region's fitness landscape. In addition to manipulating these dynamics, both separatists and outside actors ineffectively attempt to replicate governance and political structures through elections and appointment of chief

Figure 1. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Comparison

executives and parliaments within the region using military and nonmilitary means.

While it is true that the region is isolated, it is only isolated to a certain extent; events in Donbass have ripple effects for the populations in that region and also for Ukraine as a whole, for neighboring countries, and for the rest of Europe and the international community. These are the reasons to employ complex IPB, which emphasizes group behavior. Individuals compose a group, and groups compose populations. Populations are represented by some kind of state, protostate, rogue state, or third party. What IPB and JIPOE tend to neglect are ways to understand how these individuals, populations, and states all interact with one another, as well as how relatively small interactions can have significant ripple effects. Complex IPB accommodates this complexity in how it evaluates groups (step 3) and their courses of action (step 4). However, assessing what drives their interactions (step 5) and how individuals and groups make certain decisions or take certain actions (step 6) requires further analysis of the incentives or motivating factors—the fitness landscape effects.

Incentive structures are the conditions within the fitness landscape, or within the PMESII systems, that on a macro level promote cooperation or competition and on a micro level push individuals and groups to make decisions and perform actions.²¹ Actions or decisions may be influenced by a central authority figure or made independently by individuals. If many individuals arrive at similar decisions, a bottom-up group phenomenon manifests. This is evident during color revolutions, for instance.

In Donbass, some individuals and ethnic groups support the separatist movement instead of the government in Kiev. Some of the reasons (i.e., the incentives) individuals support the separatists include a general sense of mistrust toward the central government in Kiev, according to political science writer Elise Giuliano's 2015 study "The Origins of Separatism: Popular Grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk."²² Giuliano reports that a significant minority feel betrayed by the government, which they claim conducted "discriminatory demographic redistribution within Ukraine."²³ Some believe economic policies such as potential European Union membership will hurt their interests, and some are opposed to certain government policies. Therefore, while some share a sense of political

and economic loyalty to Russia, the incentives leading individuals to support the separatists vary. Each group or individual may have different motives for their microdecision to support separatists' goals, but the macroresult is considerable support for the separatist movement. Furthermore, as individuals, groups, and states interact, microdecisions can change over time and cause the collective result to shift.

Training the Ukrainian Armed Forces

During the 2015 training in Yavoriv, the training team conducted a process with what amounted to the essential elements of complex IPB, while teaching an introduction to JIPOE lesson that included PMESII system mapping. The practical exercise was directly applied to operations in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in eastern Ukraine in order to understand the separatist movement—including the effort that was known as *Projekt Novorossiia*.²⁴ Because the focus of this course was intelligence preparation together with system and hybrid network analysis, and because of the complex nature of groups operating inside and outside of Ukraine, it was both appropriate and effective to utilize complex IPB concepts in this context.

The adapted process was more effective than typical intelligence preparation because it not only identified the threat actors and their behaviors but also went a step further to consider the incentive structures that helped create those behaviors and the likely effects of proposed lethal and nonlethal action to support, influence, disrupt, or neutralize targeted behaviors.

The exercise began by identifying actors through adversary evaluation. The usual process was then expanded by first producing a description of fitness landscape effects, and then a graphical evaluation of the major groups influencing political policy and military operations in Ukraine. Major groups' courses of action and group interactions influencing population behavior were also assessed in detail.

Next, the exercise performed complex network modeling that highlighted the sociocultural factors and elements of national power that drove instability, as well as fitness landscape effects and specific incentive structures present. Complex adaptive system emergence characteristics involving decentralized military operations and decision making were also modeled. In



(Graphic by author)

Figure 2. Ukraine Hybrid Threat Model

fact, network modeling and understanding of the mutually supporting relationships between the perceived threat and threat supporting groups were also developed by the Ukrainian students (see figure 2).

As the intensity of warfare fluctuates, so do the threats and employment of various weapons systems. Therefore, since new technologies are constantly changing and complicating the OE, a more detailed analysis identified specific adversary capabilities, tactics, and courses of action. The analysis went a step further by considering the effects generated from the many possible combinations and permutations of overlapping affiliations that could influence pro-government forces, population behavior, and international assistance efforts.²⁵ For example, enemy diversion and reconnaissance groups appeared at the lower or tactical end of the model and highlighted dispersed interactions. They were associated with modified conventional weapons and IEDs targeting government forces, civilians, and critical infrastructure. As a note, other capabilities

associated with diversion and reconnaissance groups involved artillery correction, marauding, and kidnapping and interrogation. Next, since conventional artillery had accounted for 85 percent of the casualties on both sides of the war in Donbass thus far, it was considered a greater threat than modified weapons and munitions (e.g., mines and grenades) and IEDs during a conflict that has fluctuated from high to low intensity over a prolonged period.²⁶ Furthermore, the conventional fires warfighting function was enhanced through layered, unmanned aircraft system reconnaissance and forward observation. This strategy was then coupled with preplanned and massed multilaunch rocket systems and cross-border artillery strikes.

The exercise and subsequent discussions highlighted shared-understanding requirements. Moreover, they highlighted fundamentals for network engagement and intelligence preparation, including analysis of the OE, and of basic (measures of centrality) and group social networks and behavior. While the threat model in figure 2

illustrates sixteen of the various groups inside and outside of the operational area, it does not account for “friendly, neutral, and unknown” actors and groups whose decisions and behaviors affect operations. These actors should also be included in a holistic analysis for appropriate engagement and effects assessment in order to produce the most comprehensive assessment of the OE.

Nevertheless, the participants did assess that the effects of the threat’s behavior and the population’s behavior would be “a stalemate, with neither the government nor the insurgency gaining ground.”²⁷ More refined analysis, however, would reveal the factors that were influencing the most vulnerable portion of the population who did not fully support the insurgency and felt betrayed and disenfranchised by the legitimate government in Kiev. Thus, on one hand, future assessments would identify additional, interrelated PMESII implications involving military reform, anticorruption, and reconciliation initiatives by the Ukrainian government. On the other hand, continued assessments would identify implications of external defense support and ceasefire special monitoring missions by intergovernmental organizations.

Finally, while understanding how nonmilitary groups influence their OE can help military forces conduct successful operations, complex IPB assessments also reveal that the problems that lead to conflict



A Ukrainian company commander analyzes threat network associations and interactions during company-level intelligence and countering threat networks training 17 September 2015 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv, Ukraine. (Photo by Josh Ryner)

cannot be solved by military force alone. Current hybrid threats and external influences will continue to exploit vulnerabilities and grievances if they are not acknowledged, holistically reconciled, and politically accommodated by the Kiev government. Therefore, the

issue becomes what national and international instruments of power could be enabled apart from military force in order to restore the Donbass region's systems specifically, and Ukraine's identity, ecosystem, and postrevolutionary equilibrium overall.

Conclusion

The complex IPB process expands the doctrinal intelligence preparation processes to include bottom-up intelligence refinement and dynamic human network analysis. Therefore, in operational environments characterized by complex demographics and their various incentive structures, complex IPB provides a much needed comprehensive analysis—not only of these system dynamics but also of their interactions and capabilities on varying levels. Complex IPB, as employed during the Ukrainian forces' 2015

practical exercise, undoubtedly helped the participants achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the OE specifically, and of the antiterrorism operations as a whole.

The Ukraine experience with employment of complex IPB suggests the strong potential for achieving similar results in other operations, such as antiterrorism operations in Africa. Other potential test cases for this process could include operations in the Caucasus and Levant regions in complex urban environments, and in megacities. It is crucial that human and group dynamics fuse with infrastructure and physical environment analysis in order to understand anti-access/area denial hybrid-threat connections and to create the most comprehensive understanding possible of human behaviors that affect operations. *Slava Ukraini, Geroyam Slava* (Glory to Ukraine, Glory to the Heroes) ■

Notes

1. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2014), 1-2. ATP 2-01.3 also is published as Marine Corps Reference Publication 2-3A, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 1-1. A Marine Corps staff analyzes "the threat and the environment in a specific geographic area."
4. Ibid., 1-2.
5. Ibid.
6. Tom Pike and Eddie Brown, "Complex IPB," *Small Wars Journal* website, 24 March 2016, accessed 5 December 2016, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/complex-ipb>. Pike and Brown's model shows similarities to Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, *Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2002), accessed 24 October 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1287.pdf.
7. Pike and Brown, "Complex IPB."
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.; Tom Pike and Piotr M. Zagorowski, "Dense Urban Areas: The Case for Complex IPB," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 42, no. 3 (July-September 2016). Note that in their March 2016 article, Pike and Brown erroneously called the first step of complex IPB "Define the area of operations," but in Pike and Zagorowski's July-September article, they corrected step one to read "Define the operational area." Although published a year after the Raptor 14 team's experience in Ukraine, the concepts in Pike and Brown, and in Pike and Zagorowski, eloquently capture the principles the team used.
10. Pike and Brown, "Complex IPB"; Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 21 May 2014), I-1.
11. Pike and Brown, "Complex IPB."
12. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 11 August 2011), xv-xvi and GL-14.
13. Ibid., xvi.
14. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation*, I-1.
15. Ibid., I-5.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., fig. I-6, p. I-25.
18. Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, "Russia's New-Generation Warfare," *Army Magazine* website, 20 May 2016, accessed 5 December 2016, <https://www.ousa.org/articles/russia%E2%80%99s-new-generation-warfare>.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Michael Armstrong, *Armstrong's Handbook of Reward Management Practice: Improving Performance through Reward*, 5th ed. (London: Kogan, 2015), describes ways that incentives influence individual decision making, cooperation, and competition.
22. Elise Giuliano, "The Origins of Separatism: Popular Grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk," PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 396, October 2015, accessed 24 October 2016, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm396_Giuliano_Oct2015_0.pdf.
23. Ibid., 2.
24. A Ukrainian officer described *Projekt Novorossiya* as consisting of seven territories and involving the notion that Ukraine is not sovereign and historically belongs to Russia. Novorossiya plans came to fruition first with Crimea and then by the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. The overall goal of the project was to unite Kharkiv, Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mikolaiv, and Odessa with Transnistria and isolate Ukraine from the Black Sea. *Projekt Novorossiya* is considered defunct due to lack of popular support.
25. In "Complex IPB," Pike and Brown discuss the potential calculations for the possible effects of different groups.
26. Karber and Thibeault, "Russia's New-Generation Warfare."
27. Pike and Brown, "Complex IPB."



Army long-range surveillance soldiers and an Air Force joint terminal attack controller perform a high-altitude, low-opening jump during the U.S. Air Force Weapons School's Joint Forcible Entry Exercise 14B on 4 December 2014 over the Nevada Test and Training Range at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. (Photo by Sr. Airman Thomas Spangler, U.S. Air Force)

Operational Surveillance and Reconnaissance Battalion

Capt. Brian Fitzgerald, U.S. Army

Corps and joint task force commanders require persistent, long-duration surveillance assets to report priority intelligence requirements from denied areas. Three assets are suited to these operations: special operations forces (SOF), unmanned aircraft

systems (UASs), and long-range surveillance (LRS). Commanders have been less inclined to use organic teams from LRS companies, relying more on nonorganic SOF and UASs to collect high-priority information—largely because of the ineffective and outdated organization of

the Army's LRS companies. Due at least in part to this, the Army announced that all LRS companies will be disbanded—no plan to replace the only operational-level surveillance formation has been announced. However, a no-growth reorganization of the Army's LRS units from separate companies to a consolidated battalion would provide corps commanders more effective, responsive, and predictable organic surveillance assets than nonorganic, ad hoc relationships and technology.

Special Operations Forces

Some conventional commanders may view using SOF teams for surveillance as the easiest and most effective answer to their requirements. The SOF "brand" is trusted, taken at face value, and can deliver impressive results. One of the twelve core activities of SOF is special reconnaissance (SR): "reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces."¹ Using SOF elements for SR absolves the conventional commander from training oversight of high-risk exercises. Operationally, the chance of compromise, injury, and mission failure can lead commanders to prefer using surveillance elements from outside their organization. SOF bring many assets and operational approaches not found in conventional units. These elements should be a part of corps and joint task force commanders' surveillance options.

Ostensibly, all Special Forces (SF) operational detachments-A (SFODs-A) can conduct SR, and most can infiltrate denied areas. Some have standoff airborne insertion capability. Some SFODs-A have waterborne and small-vehicle capability. The ability of every SFOD-A to conduct SR could create the false impression that abundant manned surveillance capability is available to Army forces. In addition to SF, the Ranger Reconnaissance Company (RRC) expanded from a detachment and increased its capabilities far beyond traditional reconnaissance techniques. During a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation in October 2012, an XVIII Airborne Corps deputy corps commander told the author that in the event of a real war, Army commanders likely would use an RRC team to conduct surveillance behind enemy lines rather than an LRS team.² Teams from the RRC are extremely proficient in military free-fall parachute


insertions and numerous information-collection activities. Their proven results in recent conflicts across the range of military operations indicate that they will continue to be employed at a high operational tempo for the near future. RRC availability to provide dedicated support to conventional operational commanders is uncertain, at best.

Contrary to the perception of abundant manned surveillance capacity, SF already have more missions than resources. In a large-scale conflict, the best SOF SR teams would be aligned with missions of national or strategic priority as they arose. Their employment for those priorities would deprive operational commanders of surveillance assets, as happened in the Falklands Campaign, where British Special Air Service (SAS) teams were promised to the joint commander as an operational reconnaissance resource. They were also dual tasked by the national authority with conducting raids to destroy shore-to-ship missiles. During the campaign, the national authority re-tasked the SAS teams and deprived the joint commander of this asset at critical times.³

Each SOF team has many special skills that it must maintain to a high degree of competency. The teams tasked to prioritize SR would likely support SOF missions. It is unlikely they would be available to provide support to conventional forces for long durations, if at all.

While any SF teams can conduct SR, they may operate at a level of expertise far below mission requirements, as deep reconnaissance missions in Operation Desert Storm demonstrated. For example, Charles Lane Toomey writes that Operational Detachment Alpha 555 conducted SR after training in Kuwait before their mission.⁴ The team's lack of proficiency in interpreting satellite imagery and finding a suitable hide site, overall surveillance plan, and

Capt. Brian Fitzgerald, U.S. Army, was the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 509th Infantry Regiment S-3 operations officer from November 2015 to July 2016. His previous assignments include operations officer of Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, XVIII Airborne Corps, company command of XVIII Airborne Corps long-range surveillance, and long-range surveillance detachment leader. He has deployed in support of Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Joint Guardian.



other shortfalls in surveillance-specific field craft were mitigated by their contingency planning and luck when they were discovered by civilians. While the LRS teams inserted during this campaign were not compromised, the SF teams were compromised in nearly every case—most by “soft” compromise when their hide sites were discovered by civilians. The SF teams’ specific training in operational surveillance essentially began when they deployed to Kuwait before the conflict. These teams often do not share common communication architecture with conventional forces, nor are they often equipped with modern surveillance equipment. They may report into proprietary networks that are not compatible with conventional force communications.

Often, SOF elements are not well trained in surveillance; instead, their focus is primarily on direct-action, counterterrorism, or unconventional warfare tasks, among others. For these reasons and others, conventional commanders are likely to have a difficult time determining the level of surveillance expertise in SOF units, potentially leading to employment beyond the teams’ true capabilities. The preference to utilize SOF such as SEAL teams over trained conventional

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Dylan Ferguson, a brigade aviation element officer with the 82nd Airborne Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, launches a Puma unmanned aerial vehicle 25 June 2012 in the Ghazni Province of Afghanistan. Ferguson uses the Puma to conduct aerial reconnaissance for troops on the ground. (Photo by Sgt. Mike MacLeod, U.S. Army)

reconnaissance is described well in the after-action reports and is illustrated by the SEAL element that was chosen by a conventional commander over a Marine reconnaissance platoon to conduct a surveillance mission in Operation Red Wings in June 2005. Several factors contributed to the tragic outcome, known widely through the book about Marcus Luttrell’s survival.⁵ The Marine element would have taken a different approach. It had proposed to walk into the objective area, rather than to fast-rope, and to provide its own reaction force, rather than rely on a helicopter-borne element from further away. The Marine element had brought significantly more communication capability than the small SEAL element.

Nowhere in doctrine are SOF required to provide conventional commanders an SR capability.

Commanders of conventional forces might assume or be misinformed that SR capability exists in theater but discover later that the capability is not available when needed. To structure Army units with such a large gap in reliable operational surveillance units dedicated to this difficult mission seems shortsighted.


Unmanned Aircraft Systems

The proliferation of UASs, the steady improvement in portability of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) feeds, and the increase in sensor capability have been significant during the Global War on Terrorism. Live or near-live full-motion video sets the standard for complete reporting from a surveillance asset. UAVs may interdict targets while providing surveillance, and they present low risk to personnel if compromised. Many UASs also provide increased communication with tactical forces as well. UASs are generally able to communicate with every level of a conventional force, making them extremely responsive and helping create a common operational picture. These attributes make results from UASs more predictable than most other surveillance assets and create the perception of a “plug-and-play” capability. Commanders’ reliance on these assets made intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synonymous with UASs for much of the Global War on Terrorism.

However, aerial assets are often limited by weather and station time. Moreover, their use in the near future at the operational tempo commanders grew to expect in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is not sustainable. Commanders could be faced with a reduction in UAS capacity rather than an increase,

according to a 2015 *Washington Post* article.⁶ While the clarity of a UAV video feed can be superior to the radio transmission or still photos of a reconnaissance team, it sometimes provides a false sense of complete information when not integrated with other information collection methods. Drone signatures can present risks to operations, and they can be easily

targeted by forces with even a moderate level of air defense. A UAV often needs to be queued onto a target by assets on the ground as it has a narrow view of the battlefield and is isolated from the events happening on the ground. UASs should be viewed as a powerful augmentation to ground surveillance units, not a replacement for them. Conventional commanders relying on SOF and UASs need to ensure that weather and higher-priority missions do not constrain their organic information collection capability.



Long-range surveillance (LRS) soldiers from the 18th Airborne Corps LRS company certify on the special patrol infiltration and extraction system at Fort Pickett, Virginia, on 23 September 2012 in preparation for assuming the Global Response Force mission. (Photo by Brian Fitzgerald)

Long-Range Surveillance

LRS companies are organic to corps, are focused solely on surveillance, and should be the corps commander’s most-trusted information-collection asset. The companies share the same communication architecture as the command they support. They are designed to provide standoff insertion capability by land, on water, and in the air. An LRS company has a mission-essential task list, which is limited almost exclusively to information collection through surveillance. The LRS teams should be able to provide written reports and still pictures by high frequency or satellite communication from anywhere in the world. The teams are all-weather and can be in position for seventy-two continuous hours without support or up to seven days with deliberate



planning. They can adapt to unforeseen changes in terrain and enemy situation. Recent exercises have demonstrated the ability to provide full-motion video over the horizon from dismounted LRS teams, a complementary and often more persistent capability than aerial platforms. Advances in LRS capabilities have surpassed the legacy voice and still-picture reporting and will remain relevant for the future.

However, Army LRS is poorly organized, making each unit's success entirely personality dependent. Techniques and capabilities are neither universal between companies nor predictable over time as leaders come and go. This limits senior leaders' understanding of LRS and makes the companies unreliable. Surveillance and communication equipment is outdated, and support units are fragmented between the companies, limiting training in support of specialized skills like military free-fall and waterborne insertion. Facilities are spread throughout the Army, increasing cost and redundancy. The separate companies do not have a unifying headquarters to ensure standardization of tactics techniques and procedures, competency of leaders, or relevancy of equipment and training.

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Eric Zubkus and Australian Defence Force Pvt. James Adams conduct surveillance from behind the mesh net of their hide site 17 July 2011 during Exercise Talisman Sabre at the Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia. (Photo by Spc. J. P. Lawrence, U.S. Army)

Since 1986, former LRS commanders such as Lt. Col. Isaac Rademacher and others have advocated the consolidation of LRS units.⁷ These commanders identified shortfalls that have not been solved by assigning the LRS companies to military intelligence battalions, cavalry squadrons, or corps headquarters battalions. These shortfalls include a lack of expertise in unit-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures at the battalion and brigade level, lack of adequate support from parachute riggers, and inadequate force structure to support sustained operations. Each commander advocated the establishment of a headquarters above the company level to provide standardization and accountability.

Recommendations

LRS companies are the conventional forces' organic, persistent, and most reliable surveillance capability.

Disbanding LRS removes the last dedicated operational surveillance formation available to corps and joint task force commanders. To more effectively train and employ these units, pathfinder and LRS companies should be consolidated into an operational surveillance-and-reconnaissance battalion (OSRB). A no-growth reorganization of the separate LRS companies to provide consistent results across the Army is required. Companies within an OSRB would maintain their habitual relationship with the parent corps headquarters, but they would be able to task-organize for purposes based on the mission, the threat, and the friendly situation. A battalion composed of LRS companies would deploy detachments rather than teams; standardize tactics, techniques, and procedures; increase by 30 percent the overall number of LRS teams by reorganizing the communication and surveillance sections; and improve rigger support.

LRS should be employed at the detachment level—an improvement from independent teams. As demonstrated by Operation Red Wings, where the entire burden of tactical mission command was placed on a leader conducting surveillance, in small-unit operations the need is acute for tactical mission command by company-grade and noncommissioned officers separate from the actions at the objective.⁸ While many organizations, particularly surveillance units, are designed for employment at the squad- or fire-team level, these units require a mission support site in most cases. This task organization would enable teams to focus on their objectives while the mission support site covered contingencies, long-range communication, and tactical decisions between supporting elements.

While an LRS company is marginally sufficient to train and deploy teams, it is insufficient to do the same for platoon-sized detachments. The Army requires battalion commanders to certify that platoons are prepared for operations. LRS detachments require a battalion headquarters to certify their expertise in sophisticated communication, high-risk infiltration, and surveillance techniques. Having established a qualified battalion, employment of LRS elements should be modified to enable the detachment headquarters' role as a mission support site, better mitigating operational risk.

Lack of organic fire support and the reduction of end strength weigh heavily against LRS employment. According to the Force Management System website table of organization, LRS companies were reduced from

a 139-person formation to a 100-person formation (30 percent) as the battlefield surveillance brigades disbanded in 2014 and 2015.⁹ The reorganization also removed LRS fire support and tactical air-control party support. An OSRB would enable the battalion to harvest positions from the pathfinder companies to form a dedicated liaison officer team to each company, a role currently filled by the communications soldiers and leaders pulled from other detachments within the company. With liaison support, the LRS company should assign the communication soldiers to the surveillance teams. This would add three surveillance teams to each company, for a total of twelve, and increase the communications capability within each team. This would also preclude the requirement to form ad hoc liaison support from surveillance teams. Creating an OSRB would increase the number of surveillance teams available from eighteen to thirty-six across the active component and return fires and tactical-aircraft control-party support to the LRS without an increase in end strength.

Organizing the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course under the battalion headquarters would enable LRS and pathfinder personnel to be properly trained, save money, and ensure the battalion's unique capabilities were maintained to the highest standard. This organization would also provide continuity to the battalion, keeping the units at a high level of proficiency rather than relying on specific personalities to ensure success.

Currently, each LRS company has a nine-rigger detachment that provides direct support for static-line, military free-fall, and airborne resupply operations. This is an insufficient number of riggers to pack the two hundred plus parachutes required to certify a detachment for military free-fall operations. Consolidation of the rigger detachments into a single company in an OSRB would enable a surge to cover intense training cycles instead of requiring jumpers to pack their own parachutes. This consolidation would further reduce the cost of maintaining three separate oxygen rooms, shakeout towers, and parachute storage facilities. Oversight of the military free-fall program would be safer and more effective, providing two levels of qualified headquarters above the rigger detachment (a rigger company and an OSRB headquarters). This battalion headquarters would understand the capabilities and limitations of the systems and the personnel. The OSRB would provide continuity in high-risk

airborne operations and other tactics, techniques, and procedures, improving safety and capability.

Currently, three pathfinder companies are assigned to combat aviation brigades in the XVIII Airborne Corps. They are typically tasked with downed aircraft recovery team or protective security detachment missions. Because pathfinder and LRS units are similar, the U.S. Army Infantry School merged the mission-essential tasks during previous efforts to form combined LRS and pathfinder units. While pathfinder elements are not capable of operational surveillance missions because they lack sophisticated communication and training, pathfinder platoons do have an extensive reconnaissance capability. Employed as a platoon-sized force, they are well suited to dismounted reconnaissance missions, rapidly securing downed aircraft sites, assisting in the recovery of LRS teams, and providing security in austere environments as part of stability operations. These capabilities would be better employed by consolidating the companies and aligning a pathfinder platoon each to I Corps, III Corps, and XVIII Corps through habitual relationships.

An OSRB is a no-growth proposal to realize fully the information collection contribution LRS and pathfinder

elements can provide. By combining these separate companies, shifting redundant resources within these formations to better support this mission, and re-aligning the companies to better train on specialized skills, the Army will gain a more capable conventional force dedicated to supporting operational-level leaders. These elements have progressed far beyond the days of voice and still-picture reports, and can leverage technology and techniques to increase situational awareness and understanding. Mobility improvements have greatly reduced risk and increased responsiveness both during and after insertion. Lightweight global communication and full-motion video increase the reliability and quality of product delivered. Unity of effort across the Army is needed to realize more than temporary and personality-dependent application of these improvements. The Army's decision to disband these companies and save six hundred positions in exchange for the only dedicated surveillance formation is not a good trade. An OSRB would use Army systems and lessons learned to ensure that LRS and pathfinder companies provide the capability that joint and corps commanders require. ■

Notes

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Soldiers on the 1st Infantry Division staff conduct the daily battle update brief 7 April 2015 at the Mission Training Complex, Fort Riley, Kansas. The brief provides the commanding general with an update on current operations and the combat strength and effectiveness of subordinate units. It marked the start of each day during for the "Big Red One" during its warfighter exercise. (Photo by Master Sgt. Mike Lavigne, 1st Infantry Division PAO)

From Riley to Baku

How an Opportunistic Unit Broke the Crucible

Lt. Col. Jerem G. Swenddal, U.S. Army

Maj. Stacy L. Moore, U.S. Army

Warfighter exercises (WFXs) are the crucible training events for division headquarters and staffs. With this in mind, the 1st Infantry Division (IID), the “Big Red One,” set out on an eight-month journey culminating in the division successfully executing a near-peer, hybrid-warfare training exercise. The Big Red One would secure the fictional city of Baku and drive the World Class Opposing Force (OPFOR) south of the Kura River back into its territory. Throughout the WFX, the IID staff, subordinate units, and unified action partners demonstrated adaptability, innovation, and initiative on a broad scale. In the complex “Decisive Action Training Environment,” where units are presented with a highly capable “near-peer competitor in a hybrid threat environment,” the IID and its partners were able to blunt enemy strengths, mitigate risks to the force and the mission, and rapidly seize upon tactical and operational opportunities whenever they arose.¹ This article describes how the IID built a cohesive team, met the vaunted World Class OPFOR in battle, and broke the crucible.

Planning: Before the Crucible

The IID is an *opportunistic* unit: It demonstrates the ability to create shared understanding, innovate rapidly, observe and anticipate future enemy actions and events, exercise disciplined initiative, and react quickly to seize upon fleeting opportunities.² An opportunistic unit is not epitomized by a few brilliant leaders sprinkled throughout its ranks. Nor is it characterized by a dictatorial, genius commander bending the unit to his or her will. Rather, it is saturated with trained, informed, and empowered leaders who act with disciplined initiative to drive the organization toward a common goal. Opportunistic units exemplify the principles of mission command in training and in combat. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, describes such a unit:

Commanders provide a clear intent to their forces that guides subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative. Subordinates, by understanding the commander’s intent and the overall common objective, are then able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities.³

The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World describes future operating environments as

complex, defining a complex environment as one “that is not only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing.”⁴ In complex environments, potential enemies will seek to outmatch U.S. military forces asymmetrically and to challenge them across every domain. The *Army Operating Concept* further describes how future operating environments will require “innovative and adaptive leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty.”⁵ Both the *Operating Concept* and Army mission-command doctrine agree that in future conflicts, U.S. military units must demonstrate opportunistic behavior in order to defeat their enemies. Their leaders need to commit the time and energy to cultivate critical relationships based on trust, to focus on training and leader development, and to encourage the exercise of disciplined initiative throughout their formations.

In this context, many military units seem to lack enough trained and experienced personnel, specialized technology, and resources to build an opportunistic organization. However, while obstacles clearly exist, they can be overcome—not through technology, but through leaders who develop a unifying vision and utilize the principles of mission command to create lasting cultural change throughout the organization. As the Big Red One headed toward its crucible training event, the division’s leaders developed a clear idea of where they needed to go. But, success did not happen overnight.

Big Red One’s situation. In August 2015, on the heels of its deployment in support of Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. Central Command’s operation against the Islamic State), the Big Red One faced a unique set of challenges. In addition to the perennial problem of personnel turnover after a deployment, the division headquarters struggled to adapt to the Focus Area Review Group II restructuring initiative: the headquarters would reduce by 25 percent but maintain all mission requirements.⁶ The division had also just lost one of its three brigade combat teams (BCTs) to Army structure changes. Of the two remaining BCTs, the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), had recently returned from Operation Spartan Shield (conducting regional engagements in southwest Asia) and had been replaced in the Middle East by the division’s 2nd ABCT. In addition, the 1st Sustainment Brigade (SB) was not aligned to the division and was deployed in support of U.S. Central Command missions. With the

2nd ABCT deployed, the 1ID was essentially a one ABCT division, with all of the responsibilities and missions of a fully manned division.

The 1ID Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) was in the midst of the Army Restructuring Initiative, while supporting division training requirements and getting ready for a deployment to Afghanistan. The division also stood up the 1ID Division Artillery (DIVARTY), which would have a major role in the WFX and precious little time to train. The division possessed many talented, hardworking people, but they would need to coalesce into a team across the division, and into unit-level teams, to make the commander's vision for the warfighter a reality.

Commander's intent and risk. A simple and clear commander's intent is the key to disciplined initiative, and it is the basis for transforming "thought into action."⁷ A mission statement and commander's intent help integrate and unify tasks during operations. As the 1ID struggled to come to grips with its myriad challenges, division leaders seized upon the upcoming WFX as a venue for focusing effort across the division and post. The WFX is the "culminating event within the Army force generation process" for division headquarters and staffs.⁸ Although scheduled for April 2016, nearly eight months away, the exercise served as the center of gravity for the commander's vision, and it would drive all division activities.

Risk is inherent in all Army operations. It was no different for the 1ID. Division leaders recognized they would need the full attention and focus of the staff and subordinate units. The staff had to commit to the work it would take to prepare the division, including numerous repetitions of deliberate planning, rehearsals, and command-post exercises. Deciding to "go all in" on the WFX meant that the division would accept risk to other priorities.

While complete commitment was required for WFX success, risks would need to be articulated early and often during planning. Commands at all levels accepted the risk inherent in committing to a rigorous planning and preparation schedule, and risk was a constant topic of discussion over the months leading up to the WFX. It is important to note that the command knowingly accepted significant risk to other missions. For instance, at the division level, long-range planning virtually ceased so the planners could lead multiple iterations of WFX planning. Subordinate units such as the 1st ABCT sacrificed

precious tactical training time to man and train response cells for several command-post exercises, and they risked leadership resiliency due to constant training for both the WFX and upcoming deployments. Commanders analyzed these risks, ultimately deeming them prudent.

The increased preparedness for the WFX and the reciprocal benefits of having highly trained staffs and units outweighed the potential for negative consequences. However, the division had to overcome the second- and third-order effects of their risk decisions for many months following the WFX, including the disruption to ongoing division campaign planning efforts, 1st ABCT preparations for deployment to the National Training Center, and division headquarters deployment preparations and planning.

The warfighter team. Upon establishing a vision and priorities, the division's leaders set about building the WFX team. The 1ID's parallel maxims of "Training and leader development are one word in the First Infantry Division," and "Every training event is a venue for leader development," set the stage for team building. The division commander emphasized strict adherence to doctrinal planning processes, and he personally coached the division staff. Over the ensuing months, the planners gained greater understanding of the commander and his intent, while building mastery of planning processes, decisive action, and offensive tasks.

The 1ID established four battle-staff teams

Lt. Col. Jerem G. Swenddal, U.S. Army,

is the chief of current operations for the First Infantry Division and the former chief of the First Infantry Division Commander's Initiative Group at Fort Riley, Kansas. He holds a BS in mechanical engineering from the U.S. Military Academy and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Maj. Stacy L. Moore, U.S. Army,

is a RAND Arroyo Center Army research fellow. Her recent assignments include executive officer to the commanding general of the First Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, and secretary to the joint staff for the Combined Joint Land Component Command-Iraq. She holds a BS in biology from Creighton University, an MS in military logistics from North Dakota State University, and an MS in international security and intelligence studies from Bellevue University.

under the leadership of the plans (G-5) staff section. The battle staff served as dedicated, cross-functional, operational-planning teams that attacked various aspects of WFX planning, provided solutions to complex problems, and expedited planning processes. Each battle-staff team was composed of eight people, including a School of Advanced Military Studies graduate as a planning team lead, a representative from each warfighting function, and a digital master gunner who would operate the Command Post of the Future and other systems.⁹ The cross-functional nature of the teams broke down stovepipes in planning and information flow throughout the division headquarters. Although they were composed of mostly junior officers from each staff section, the battle staff soon became central to the division's WFX preparations.

The division commander owned and drove the operations process.¹⁰ He sought frequent, candid dialogue with the division staff, the battle staff, and subordinate commanders. The planning team received personal coaching from the division's senior leaders, sometimes several times a day, for guidance, and for understanding and visualizing ongoing efforts. The deliberate planning provided a venue for developing junior officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and staff leaders. Regardless of rank, leaders listened to, conversed with, and accepted



The 1st Infantry Division "Big Red One" main command post sits outside the Mission Training Complex 9 April 2016 on Fort Riley, Kansas. Division and brigade staffs use the facility to conduct training events such as warfighter exercises in a simulated decisive action training environment. (Photo by Spc. Anna Pongo, 1st Infantry Division PAO)

frank assessments from battle-staff planners. As a result, junior leaders gained confidence, and the team developed innovative solutions to complex problems.

In addition to creating opportunities for professional growth, the division conducted a robust leader development program. The program included professional readings, doctrinal classes, and professional development sessions with military and civilian leaders, including retired Generals Gordon Sullivan, David Petraeus, and Stanley McChrystal; Lieutenant Generals H. R. McMaster and Gustave Perna; Dr. Emma Sky; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Western Hemisphere Affairs Gonzalvo Gallegos; and others. These sessions provided staff and subordinate units with valuable insights on leadership, mission command, and the current security environment. The final component of the leader development program was a series of warfighting-function clinics, where subject-matter experts presented topics relevant to their areas of expertise. The commanding general, division command sergeant major, deputy commanding generals, division staff primaries, battle staff members, and subordinate brigade and battalion commanders attended these clinics, which included dialogue on doctrine, best practices, and future employment.

The 1ID also built upon the experiences of other units to inform its planning and preparation. Key leaders observed the 1st Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 101st Airborne Division WFXs, and the 1ID received augmentation of experienced intelligence personnel from the 25th Infantry Division. This collaboration with other divisions allowed the 1ID to capitalize on their experiences and begin its training at a high level. The 1ID also ensured that it shared its lessons learned at every step of its WFX preparation. The division commander updated all Active Component and National Guard division commanders after each command-post exercise, providing them the division's after-action reviews (AARs), lessons learned, and best practices. The staff did likewise with their counterparts, effectively creating a large network of experienced leaders throughout the Army to share ideas and increase functional knowledge.

The division carried this information-sharing approach to its interactions with the other units that would be participating in the WFX. The 18th Airborne Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division would serve as the higher command and adjacent units, respectively, in the 1ID's WFX. The 1ID worked closely with these units leading up to the exercise to develop a cohesive plan and rehearse

execution. When it came time to execute the WFX, the 1ID staff had already developed solid relationships with their counterparts in these units, participated in planning sessions, and executed a command-post exercise from various distributed mission-command nodes across the Army.

1st ABCT and its battalions provided response cells that replicated the multiple BCTs that would fall under the 1ID during the exercise. They were also part of the team-building process. Battalion commanders and their staffs were included in every stage of planning and participated in three command-post exercises. From the lowest tactical unit response cell to the corps headquarters, the team had already worked together and overcome the kinds of challenges that often detract from mission accomplishment.

Just as critical as building great teammates within the 1ID was building the broader unified action team, including Total Army and institutional Army partners. The 1ID developed a strong partnership with the 35th Infantry Division from the Kansas National Guard, which provided observer/controllers and external evaluation for the division's command-post exercises. The division further integrated critical staff members into its newly established 1ID Main Command Post Operational Detachment from the Nebraska National Guard. These staff members proved crucial for execution of the WFX, and they prepared for the key roles they would fill during the 1ID's upcoming deployment. Just as directed in the *Army Total Force Policy*, 1ID integrated Army Reserve and National Guard forces at the division level, but it did not stop there.¹¹

The integration of the 300th SB and the 110th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) further demonstrated the division's commitment to building a total force. These Reserve Component partners were "training units" for the exercise, and they were critical to enabling the division's opportunistic behavior. Realizing that the 300th SB and 110th MEB would have as few as eight days to train before the exercise, the 1ID developed comprehensive liaison officer (LNO) and technical support teams for each unit. These LNO teams were led and staffed by personnel from the 1st SB and the 97th Military Police Battalion, and they were responsible for ensuring that the 300th SB and 110th MEB were fully integrated and able to achieve their training objectives. Months before the exercise, the LNOs traveled to the

supporting units during their drill weekends, conducted training, planned WFX operations, and executed staff battle drills. Further training on critical mission-command systems ensured these partner units could talk on the same networks, see the same common operating picture, and use the products and standard operating procedures they needed to be successful. The division's deliberate efforts to build a cohesive team were critical to ensuring opportunistic behavior by all teammates throughout the WFX.

Preparation: Command-Post Exercises

The Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) World Class OPFOR benefits greatly from the principle that repetition leads to mastery. Having conducted countless battles upon the same constructive battlefield, the OPFOR has mastered the Decisive Action Training Environment and its fictional Atroplan area of operations.

Intensive training. Any unit that hopes to achieve some measure of success against this trained and experienced OPFOR should seek to level the playing field through its own intensive training program. The Big Red One team conducted a staff exercise, a robust WFX academic seminar at Fort Leavenworth, and three multiechelon command-post exercises. Using a deliberate planning process, the division increased the complexity of each subsequent exercise. In this way, it refined systems and increased competency, trust, and shared understanding throughout the organization. The division maximized the capabilities of the Fort Riley home-station Mission Training Center, and it leveraged Total Army and institutional Army partnerships to expand the scope and quality of the division's exercises.

During the WFX academic seminar at Fort Leavenworth, the staff attended the program of instruction during the day and conducted the military decision-making process over lunch and in the evening. The staff essentially deployed from Fort Riley to Fort Leavenworth. In fact, the IID took three times more people to the academic seminar than is typical. This minimized distractions and let the unit use the time to its fullest, running key-leader seminars during staff planning that included the BCTs and staff primaries. The seminars allowed the division commander to explain his vision to the staff, and they helped the team to

gel as staff sections learned from one another. This first repetition of the planning process for the WFX set the stage for future iterations.

Most division-level headquarters will conduct one or two command-post exercises in preparation for their WFXs. The IID conducted three. Each of these events included a deliberate planning process that took the entire staff and subordinate units through all steps of the Army design methodology and the military decision-making process. Each concluded with a combined-arms rehearsal, a fires-and-intelligence rehearsal, and a sustainment rehearsal. Additionally, each command-post exercise included a four- to five-day operation against a thinking OPFOR on the Atroplan terrain.

The command-post exercises proved crucial to bringing the final WFX team together and refining systems and processes. The IID experimented with and improved all its systems, including the configuration of command posts, the battle rhythm, rehearsal formats, information processing, targeting, and time-constrained planning. Using three command-post exercises allowed the division to address another atrophied skill: command-post displacement, or "jumping." Between the second and third command-post exercises, the division tactical command post (DTAC) jumped five times, and the division main command post (DMAIN) jumped once. Each jump increased the proficiency of the soldiers staffing the command post while significantly decreasing displacement time. The staff revised its processes for battle handoff of mission-command functions between command posts while ensuring situational awareness was maintained. The IID made significant revisions to its systems and processes between the second and third command-post exercises, and it was not until the third that the team truly came together and began exhibiting opportunistic behavior.

Simulation operators. Planning, mission command, and command-post operations are only a few of the proficiencies a unit must master to maximize opportunistic behavior. While the WFX does a good job of simulating a real-world decisive-action environment, it is bound by the digital constraints of the computer program called WARSIM (Warfighter's Simulation). The IID leadership realized quickly that they needed to train WARSIM operators at every level, and allow them to practice on the system. Officers and NCOs selected as WARSIM operators

were responsible for maneuvering critical assets and units around the simulated battlefield and engaging enemy formations with direct and indirect fires. They had to move quickly, react to changing circumstances, and employ weapon systems to their full capability. Within the WARSIM program, these are not intuitive tasks; they require detailed understanding of the system's functionality.

The 1ID incorporated the WARSIM and other similar digital simulations into the division's command-post exercises, and subordinate units tracked WARSIM operators by name. In addition to being experts at their "weapon systems," these operators participated in planning and rehearsals, and they clearly understood the unit's mission and commander's intent. Their location within their respective command posts provided them shared understanding of the developing fight, and they were empowered to react quickly to changing circumstances. Trained, informed, and empowered WARSIM operators were a critical component in the division's success.

The reason the command was able to empower the WARSIM operators was because the division created and sustained shared understanding. Through a series of deliberate battle-rhythm events, aided by digital products that effectively communicated knowledge and understanding—not just information, leaders and soldiers at all levels understood the mission, the situation, and the commander's intent.

Digital master gunners. In a complex operating environment, units operate over great distances using systems such as Command Post of the Future, Blue Force Tracker, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, and Distributed Common Ground System-Army. These are just a few of the systems that must function together to create an accurate common operating picture that communicates shared understanding across distributed mission-command nodes. However, the highly technical capabilities needed for digital integration are not resident within units. To address this deficiency, the 1ID worked with the Mission Command Center of Excellence to train over

seventy mission-command digital master gunners across the division. The master gunners returned to their units and executed digital gunnery tables that developed a high level of proficiency throughout the division. Trained and certified digital master gunners solved countless system-interoperability issues during the command-post exercises and the WFX. Because of their efforts, the 1ID was able to create shared understanding across distributed mission-command nodes on an unprecedented scale.

Learning organizations.

Repetitions do not spontaneously result in mastery. Units must be learning organizations, in which leaders at all levels are capable of seeing themselves in a critical light and then adapting their perspectives, systems, and processes to improve the organization's performance. AARs and external evaluations were critical to the

1ID's development as an opportunistic unit. In addition to partnering with the 35th Infantry Division for external evaluation, the Big Red One also drew on the strengths of the institutional Army. With Fort Leavenworth just two hours away, the division benefited from a close working relationship with the School of Advanced Military Studies, and it took advantage of the school's vast depth of academic knowledge and real-world experience. Dr. Alice Butler-Smith provided valuable insights for the 1ID's planning. Faculty members from the School of Advanced Military Studies—PhDs and fellows consisting of former Army battalion commanders, future brigade commanders, and equivalent joint and international partners—served as observer/controllers during the division's third command-post exercise. Their feedback paid dividends during WFX execution.

After the third command-post exercise, the 1ID team looked and felt like a different organization than the one that started its journey eight months before. Leaders at all levels worked with a confidence born of trust and mastery. They knew their systems and processes, they knew their teammates, and they grasped the enemy and operating environment that they would face. Most of all, they understood the plan and the commander's intent. They were ready for any challenge. An opportunistic unit had been born.

They knew their systems and processes, they knew their teammates, and they grasped the enemy and operating environment that they would face.

Breaking the Crucible: The Success of an Opportunistic Division in Decisive Action

Throughout its WFX planning and preparation, the IID had innovated and adapted to address emergent challenges. Army Techniques Publication 3-91, *Division Operations*, describes how a division, “shapes the operation for subordinate brigades, resources them for their missions, and coordinates, synchronizes and sequences their operations in time and space.”¹² While simple in principle, the sheer scope of this definition is daunting. With tens of thousands of soldiers spread out over hundreds of kilometers, the synchronization of units, critical assets, operations, intelligence, and fires appears a near impossible task. Over the course of three command-post exercises, the IID adapted its systems to simplify the synchronization process and set conditions for subordinate commanders to exercise disciplined initiative and seize fleeting opportunities.

Many of these adaptations were already considered fundamental operational principles, yet they are often misunderstood or misapplied. Four adaptations in particular stand out for their importance to generating opportunistic behavior. Creating an appropriate task organization and the necessary command-and-support relationship are perhaps the most important adaptations, followed closely by articulating a well-defined operational framework and establishing clear graphic control measures. Combined, these adaptations facilitated the division’s opportunistic behavior.

Task organization and command-and-support relationships. Within an ad-hoc formation of multiple unified action partners, assigned and attached brigades, and countless smaller enabling units and assets, two functions that units must get right are task organization and command-and-support relationships. Opportunistic behavior implies that a unit not only sees an opportunity but also can take advantage of it. If critical assets are not available to the unit, it cannot exercise disciplined initiative. In the IID, Annex A (Task Organization) of all operation and fragmentary orders detailed units down to the separate-company and critical-asset level. This task organization was refined daily based on changing circumstances. Commanders at all levels provided detailed briefings of their task organization during daily updates, and commanders conducted digital “flyovers” of their formations within

the WARSIM program to check that their task organization was correct in the simulated scenario.

Equally important was the emphasis on the doctrinal understanding and implementation of command-and-support relationships. Commanders and staffs conducted significant dialogue to assign units appropriate relationships. This was of substantial importance as the task organization shifted rapidly to meet emerging challenges. To reduce the potential for confusion, planners would often detail the inherent responsibilities associated with each command-and-support relationship as specified tasks in operation and fragmentary orders.

Operational framework. Another adaptation that enabled synchronization throughout the division was the clear and continual articulation of the operational framework’s deep, close, and security areas, and main and supporting efforts. This provided subordinate units temporal orientation and prioritization of efforts at all times.¹³ Commonly referred to as the “division fight,” the headquarters used the operational framework to define how it would enable subordinates for the current fight while setting the conditions for the next fight. The operational framework further assisted the commander by providing a conceptual basis for planners to build branches and sequels to the base plan and anticipate future decision points. While clear articulation of an operational framework is vital to enabling opportunistic behavior, the framework must be continuously reevaluated to ensure its suitability for changing conditions.

Graphic control measures. Well-developed graphic control measures are another key adaptation. They communicate the commander’s intent on a map or common operating picture, providing a basis for shared understanding and flexibility throughout the formation. The IID staff built robust operational graphics, and duplicated them across all analog and digital platforms. Operational graphics by definition support the overall scheme of maneuver, intelligence, sustainment, and fires, but opportunistic units take graphics a step further. They build graphic control measures, including routes, checkpoints, phase lines, and fire-support coordination measures beyond those required for the selected course of action. They build them to be both internal and external to their areas of operation. For the IID, graphics facilitated rapid guidance to subordinate units when unforeseen challenges and opportunities arose.

Critical and creative thinking about employing assets. Not everything that the IID achieved was due to an adaptation of, or refinement to, existing doctrinal principles. The division also applied critical and creative thinking to generate new ideas and learn from past doctrine. Over the course of its training progression for the WFX, the IID and its subordinate units experimented with multiple options for employment of key enablers. What emerged was a tension between centralized control and decentralized execution, between control of key assets and flexibility at the tactical edge. On one hand, the division had a broader view of the fight and could provide the most efficient use of key assets such as unmanned aircraft systems and counterfire radars.

On the other hand, centralized control of assets such as mobile bridges might give the division positive control of their employment but ultimately would prevent subordinate units from rapidly seizing the initiative.

The task organization of key and critical assets should be a deliberate decision based on a larger, iterative discussion and articulation of roles and responsibilities at certain points in the fight between the division and its subordinate units. For the IID to conduct offensive tasks as part of decisive action, centralized control of Q37 weapon-locating radars under the DIVARTY allowed for better coverage and forward positioning. As the sole counterfire headquarters in the division, DIVARTY also monitored and recommended positioning of Q36 radars to fill gaps in Q37 coverage. Similarly, based on poor utilization of unmanned aircraft systems during the first two command-post exercises, the division centralized shadow systems under control of the CAB. With a centralized headquarters, the systems were much more responsive to intelligence collection requirements, while maximizing their utilization and capabilities.

In contrast, the division task-organized critical mobile bridging capabilities down to the lead brigades. While the division often lost visibility of this critical enabler, when the lead brigade saw an opportunity to conduct an unopposed water crossing, it was able to rapidly move the bridges to the proper location and seize the initiative. It is

likely there will always be a tension between maintaining centralized control of critical assets and maintaining tempo and combat capability at the lowest tactical levels.

An advance guard force. One of the greatest challenges facing any division performing offensive tasks as an element of decisive action is its ability to collect information around the clock and in any weather conditions.

It is likely there will always be a tension between maintaining centralized control of critical assets and maintaining tempo and combat capability at the lowest tactical levels.

In the past, armored cavalry regiments and division cavalry squadrons were able to conduct aggressive reconnaissance against an unknown enemy force, make contact, develop the situation, and protect the main body of the maneuver force. With the loss of a dedicated ground reconnaissance capability at the division level, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations have become almost synony-

mous with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aircraft systems. In poor weather conditions or a high-threat environment, the division must place BCTs in the lead, often losing critical capabilities and combat power for the decisive operation.

To address this challenge, the IID developed an advance-guard capability, which allowed the division to make contact with the smallest elements possible, maintain contact with the enemy, protect the division's main body, and provide the division commander flexibility in how he would mass combat forces. For the WFX, the IID took its trail brigade's armored reconnaissance squadron (ARS), attached two additional tank companies along with engineer, air defense artillery, acquisition radar, intelligence, and sustainment assets, and put the ARS under the mission command of the CAB. A direct-support artillery battalion with two rocket batteries in a general support-reinforcing role provided responsive indirect fires as far forward as possible. This allowed the division not only to fight for information and protect the division's main body but also to have a fourth maneuver unit, which provided flexibility in executing the plan. The use of the CAB as a higher headquarters for the advance-guard force provided several additional benefits, including the effective integration of unmanned aircraft systems, the optimization of air-ground operations in the reconnaissance-and-security fight, and the retention

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of combat power in the division's primary echelon for water-crossing operations.

The use of the CAB as a higher headquarters for the advance guard was challenging. Within its organic organization, the CAB staff lacks a robust intelligence-and-fires section, and the CAB does not have organic sustainment systems developed to support a heavily task-organized ARS. Within the 1ID construct, rehearsals were critical to ensuring the ARS and the CAB could work together as an advance guard. Creating a habitual relationship between the ARS and the CAB headquarters early in planning was imperative to mission success.

Multiple command posts. Another innovation developed during planning and preparation was the use of four command posts to control the battlefield. The division employed the doctrinal DMAIN and DTAC, and alternate command posts, including a DIVARTY tactical operations center (TOC). It also pioneered the use of a support-area command post (SACP) to command and control the rear area. The way the division used the

DIVARTY TOC yielded significant benefits. When the DMAIN jumped, the DTAC assumed responsibility for the close and deep fights, and the DIVARTY TOC received additional division staff members from the G-2 (intelligence) all-source collection element, the joint air-ground integration cell, and the current operations section. This not only provided a location from which the commanding general could maintain situational awareness, but it also provided the reciprocal benefit of expediting target acquisition and fires prosecution times. The deep fight belonged to the DTAC during the DMAIN jump; however, it proved vital that a contingent from current operations monitored the battle from the alternate command post. While jumping the DMAIN during the WFX, enemy indirect fires significantly degraded the DTAC. Because current operations staff monitored the fight from the DIVARTY TOC, they rapidly assumed control of the battle.

The SACP was crucial in allowing the DMAIN to focus solely on the deep fight. The deputy commanding general for support led the SACP, with constant input from the 110th MEB commander. The SACP maintained rear-area security and allowed supplies and services to flow through the operational area. The SACP staff conducted movement control and managed the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process, while also preventing the irregular threat from influencing the efforts of the rest of the division. Placing the rear area under the command and control of a deputy commanding general with a dedicated command post allowed the 1ID to integrate rear-area operations into the overall battle. The staff of the SACP had full situational awareness and was able to take preemptive action to ensure forward mission success. While this fourth command post required a significant investment in people and resources, it contributed immeasurably to the division's success in the fight.

WFXs are designed to challenge every aspect of a unit, and the 1ID was tested. Both command posts (DMAIN and DTAC) were brought into play as part of the exercise and subject to enemy activity. To execute mission command over extended distances and protect against OPFOR actions, both command posts jumped several times. Further still, the OPFOR employed persistent chemical weapons against the division, a rarely used tactic. With each successive challenge, the division continued to adapt and thrive. Eventually, with the OPFOR's

strategic objectives thwarted, its tactical reserve defeated, and the remaining combined combat power of two Army divisions prepared to resume the attack, the OPFOR had no option but to withdraw toward its own territory.

Integration, partnership, dialog, and trust. The division's success is less the story of its distinct WFX experiences than the story of building an opportunistic division. In addition to the topics discussed above, several other hard-fought lessons contributed to the IID's opportunistic behavior in the WFX.

During WFX execution, a clear commander's intent was the most critical aspect of enabling and integrating disciplined initiative. Building upon lessons learned during previous command-post exercises, the commanding general continuously articulated and emphasized a simple mission statement, an expanded purpose, and key functions that all soldiers throughout the division had to know by heart: tempo, aggressive reconnaissance, fires forward, protection, and partnerships. With this commander's guidance, subordinate commanders could quickly assess risk to the mission and take disciplined initiative.

Partnerships played an important role throughout the exercise. The IID partnered early and often with Atropian forces within their area of operations. Units at all echelons reached out to the Atropians, often conducting in excess of twenty engagements a day. At the division level, the commander personally met with Atropian leadership at least once a day, and the Atropian brigade commander participated in IID updates and targeting meetings. Through the rigorous partnership activities, the Atropians quickly warmed to the IID and began to share intelligence and participate in combat operations alongside the division's forces. Throughout the fight, Atropian forces protected the northern flank of the division, provided rear-area security, and participated in the final attack to seize critical oil fields. Additionally, the Atropians provided significant long-range artillery and air-defense systems that were on par with those of the OPFOR; these were only available due to early command emphasis on partnership building. The same held true for interagency partners. It was crucial to understand each partner's interests and assets. Including all partners in the military decision-making process, rehearsals, updates, and targeting was a best practice.

Commander-to-commander dialogue was critical for enabling opportunistic behavior throughout the division.

The division ingrained commander-to-commander dialogue into the battle rhythm, with regular communications during update briefings, commander phone calls, and battlefield circulation. During nightly commander updates, subordinate commanders offered candid assessments of their units' fight and addressed potential opportunities and risks in the coming days. These conversations took place over the distributed mission-command network, and all command posts participated in the discussions. Soldiers at the lowest levels were privy to the highest levels of information and shared understanding. These regular engagements built an atmosphere of trust between the division commander, the deputy commanders, and subordinate commanders.

The division's leaders created an environment of shared trust and understanding in which innovation and adaptation could flourish. They put an emphasis on training repetitions, and thus complex operations became less complicated, because the division had done it all before. Prepared units are opportunistic units. The IID dedicated eight precious months of training time, deliberately accepting risk to ensure that the division staff, subordinate units, and all members of the team were ready to fight and win.

Why the Warfighter Exercise Remains the Crucible Training Event for Divisions

It would be easy to fault the IID leadership for focusing so much on winning the WFX. However, that point of view would be shortsighted; the global security environment requires leaders that understand how to fight and win through decisive action. Threats posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran make it clear that the Army can ill afford to allow decisive-action skills to atrophy. Offensive tasks against a near-peer enemy are among the most difficult tasks Army forces perform. The challenging decisive-action scenarios at combat training centers and in WFXs are exactly what the Army needs to ensure it stands ready.

Not only did the WFX hone the division staff's decisive-action skills, but it also built the physical network and teams that are vital for future operations. The WFX enhanced the staff's ability to synchronize and employ intelligence, logistics, fires, and other enablers, and these skills translate to any operation. In addition, the exercise provided the challenge the staff needed to hone their

expertise and to develop the critical and creative thinking skills they will need for any mission. As masters of their craft, they can pass their knowledge on to units in their next assignments and to partner forces.

Opportunistic units are fleeting. The Army personnel assignment process does not reward leaders who take time to build a team capable of sharing understanding and displaying disciplined initiative, adaptability, and innovation. Within thirty days of the conclusion of the IID's WFX, the majority of the field-grade and senior company-grade leaders on the staff moved to the brigades to take key developmental positions or moved to other installations. The IID used the WFX as a venue for leader development and, in the process, it developed junior leaders who would spread the opportunistic mindset throughout the division and the Army for many years to come.

This meant that the division headquarters had to immediately plan for another intensive training cycle to bring new staff members on board after the summer transition period. Including senior NCOs and junior company-grade officers in the battle-staff teams insulated the division from a wholesale loss of knowledge during personnel turnover, but it remains to be seen if the Sustainable Readiness Model will solve this persistent, Army-wide problem.¹⁴ Thus, it is imperative to take personnel turnover into account when assigning key battle-staff positions. The IID spent considerable energy documenting its training for and execution of its WFX. The division staff recorded leadership-development

program sessions and cataloged assessments and AARs for the command-post exercises and WFX. Such a complete record should allow new staff members to come on board with a limited amount of turbulence.

Building an opportunistic division is a hard, continuous process. No single exercise, however successful, signals the end of the quest for an innovative, agile, and adaptive unit. The processes described above worked to get a new staff fully engaged and ready for one of the most difficult exercises they would ever face. It trained a group of leaders on the complexity of the decisive-action fight and applied the concept of an opportunistic unit. The experience had a positive effect not only on the division staff but also on the subordinate brigades and sister divisions, as Big Red One alumni moved on to other assignments.

The Big Red One's experiences during the warfighter exercise were consistent with its history. From the unit's inception as part of the American Expeditionary Forces under then Gen. John J. "Black Jack" Pershing during World War I; to its storied exploits in North Africa, Sicily, and on D-Day in France during World War II; to its service in Vietnam under then Maj. Gen. William E. DePuy, who modeled the modern squad after his experiences as the commanding general of the Big Red One; the IID provided the model for others to follow. The warfighter exercise gave the First Infantry Division the opportunity to evolve and to continue its legacy of leader development and innovation. ■

Notes

1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation (TR) 350-50-3, *Mission Command Training Program* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 23 June 2014), 10.

2. William Adler, "Training Opportunistic Formations: Leading Transitions for the Brigade Combat Team," *NTC Decisive Action Training Environment Newsletter* 12-19 (September 2012), 93–103. The authors of this article credit William Adler for inspiring their "opportunistic" construct; they adapted Adler's term to their own purposes.

3. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office [GPO], 17 May 2012), 1-4.

4. TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040 w/chg.* 1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 31 October 2014), iii.

5. *Ibid.*, 16.

6. Jamie Crawford, "Army Announces Force Reduction of 40,000 Troops," CNN Politics website, 9 July 2015, accessed 7 September 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/09/politics/army-announces-force-reduction-40000-troops/>.

7. ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 2-3.

8. TR 350-50-3, *Mission Command Training Program*, 7.

9. The six Army warfighting functions are mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. A digital master gunner is a subject-matter expert on mission-command information systems including the Command Post of the Future command-and-control system.

10. ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, v; ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), 1-3–1-7.

11. Secretary of the Army, *Army Directive 2012-08: Army Total Force Policy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Army, 4 September 2012).

12. Army Techniques Publication 3-91, *Division Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 17 October 2014), 1-1.

13. ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 16 May 2012), 1-9.

14. "Army Readiness Guidance," U.S. Army Stand-To! website, 19 May 2016, accessed 8 September 2016, <https://www.army.mil/standto/2016-05-19>.



A 1st Infantry Division battle captain uses Command Post of the Future during a division command post exercise 27 January 2016 at Fort Riley, Kansas. (Photo by Master Sgt. Mike Lavigne, 1st Infantry Division PAO)

Building Digital Lethality

Capt. Jonathan Stafford, U.S. Army

The staff's primary means to affect the battlefield is not with an M2 heavy machine gun, M4 carbine, or Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Instead, the staff brings to bear intellectual skills and experience enhanced by a mix of digital systems to aid the commander in the exercise of mission command.

While there are many differences between traditional lethal weapon systems and digital systems, a key distinction is that there has not been a program established for digital systems to take untrained individuals and train them to operate to standard as a crew, section, and unit.

To remedy this gap, the Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, developed a framework of ten digital training tables. The 1st Infantry Division (1ID) took these tables and created a "digital gunnery" program that led to a drastic increase in the unit's ability to support the commander's exercise of mission command. The plan received strong command emphasis and fostered an environment that encouraged continuous and integrated digital systems use in training to prepare for operations. The training significantly enhanced 1ID's proficiency in mission command

		Table	Operators	Training outcomes
Digital crew mission command digital master gunner (MCDMG) led	Level 1	I	Basic system skills	Setup, configure, preventive maintenance checks and services; operate; troubleshoot
	Level 2	II	Integration proficiency	Publish and subscribe to Data Dissemination Service
		III	Common operational picture development	Position location information filtering; staff estimates; brigade system collaboration
		IV	Battle management	Track brigade planned operations; react to developing events; execute brigade battle drills; develop storyboards
	V	Digital planning	Plan, prepare, and disseminate operation order; collaborative use between echelons; briefings	
	VI	Digital crew certification	Executes battle management for current and future operations; validate standard operating procedures (SOPs)	
Commander and battle staff MCDMG coordinated	Level 3	VII	Commander/staff/digital crew (command post) integration	Unify team using collaboration of processes and digital systems
		VIII	Commander/staff/digital crew (command post) battle drills	Assess/reinforce employment of mission command information system (MCIS) suite in operations process and supporting synchronization meetings
		IX	Integrated command post assessment	Team successfully completes training program, evaluation, and certifies digital SOP
	MCVE	X	Command post mission command validation exercise (MCVE)	Sustained operations using authorized modified table of organization and equipment (suite of MCIS) executed through successive shift change iterations.

(Graphic by Col. Patrick Crosby, Mission Command Center of Excellence)

Figure. Ten Digital Training Tables

systems, which led to improved digital lethality and success during Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 16-04.

Each Army commander establishes a mission command system with five elements: personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment.¹ When discussing digital proficiency, most immediately think about mission command information systems (MCISs) such as the Command Post of the Future (CPOF). Though these are a critical component of a commander's mission command system, they are only a small aspect of it. Equally important are the personnel that operate the systems and the networks that transmit the information (social and technical), the standardized processes and procedures that establish the framework for use, and the facilities used for operations. When integrated into a unit's training plan and administered by mission command digital master gunners (MCDMGs), digital gunnery provides the bedrock for certifying a unit in all aspects of mission command systems.

Background

Digital proficiency has a history of emphasis in 1ID. In May 2013, the division published a plan to reorganize its joint operations center and establish Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) CPOF as the primary system used by staff and subordinate units to send reports and conduct briefings. This created an environment in which the unit used CPOF daily.

Over the course of the next year, the 1ID established an entire CPOF network on its NIPRNET.² This system significantly improved the division's digital proficiency in garrison, and that directly carried over during Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. military operations against the Islamic State) in October 2014. However, the increased use of CPOF on a daily basis was not enough. Despite a high base proficiency with CPOF, it was clear that the division was not effectively integrating all of its MCISs. Operators of the other systems were working in discrete groups disconnected from each other, where they created specific data

products for their functions, but they did not validate data integration with other information systems.

This problem was not unique to the IID. The Army designed programs to help units synchronize their mission command systems before exercises conducted at a combat training center or those led by the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) at Fort Leavenworth. Of note, the Mission Command Systems Integration Team from the Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications–Tactical provides training to establish command-post (CP) facilities, networks, and digital products in conjunction with an exercise. This program is helpful, but does not provide the tools or a framework to establish and run a unit training program.

To address this Army-wide issue, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) mandated that units use MCDMGs and signal digital master gunners to designate digital crews and lead them through an integrated, three-level training program that ended with a validation exercise:

- Level I: individual skills
- Level II: integration proficiency
- Level III: mission command systems and staff integration
- Mission command validation exercise.³

Concurrently, the MCCoE refined its take-home training program created for MCDMG graduates. The MCCoE applied the FORSCOM guidance in its ongoing efforts to produce the digital gunnery tables.

The Training Tables

There are ten tables in the digital training program. Each table builds upon the previous table, starting at the operator level and progressing to the crew, the section, and then to the entire staff (see the figure on page 86).⁴ As the tables build upon each other, they gradually incorporate the personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment. The figure illustrates FORSCOM's three levels and mission command validation exercises next to their corresponding tables.

Table I covers the basic system skills required to set up, operate, maintain, and troubleshoot the user's MCIS (i.e., CPOF, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS], Tactical Airspace Integration System [TAIS], and others).

An MCDMG or qualified MCIS operator for other systems may teach a refresher, but the initial training occurs at a local mission training complex or proponent school for each system (such as AFATDS at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, or TAIS at Fort Rucker, Alabama). Prior to integration into a team, this table certifies that personnel can use their information systems at a certain level of proficiency.

Tables II and III are instructor led. During training on these tables, soldiers learn critical skills such as MCIS integration, digital standard operating procedures (SOPs), and common operational picture (COP) development. Here, the personnel begin to work as a crew and learn how to achieve interoperability among systems. For instance, AFATDS operators determine how to validate that their fire support coordination measures transfer correctly from their system to the CPOF. Alternately, the CPOF operator learns how to publish graphics and verify that they are viewable on the other MCISs. Each of the information systems receives similar training.

For these systems to function correctly, the different MCISs require an active network necessitating the MCDMGs to work in close collaboration with their information management or signal officers and their signal digital master gunners. Both tables II and III present opportunities for the unit to teach MCIS operators how to create and share digital products according to their unit's SOPs.

In table IV, battle management, digital crews are responsible for executing, tracking, and managing battle drills, responding to critical events, and synchronizing resources. Next, table V requires digital crews to develop and distribute an operation order on the MCIS.

Tables VI through IX are designed to test, validate, and then certify the unit's SOPs, crews, and CPs with full staff integration. The digital crews provide the necessary relevant

information to staff and commanders to make decisions and give guidance.

Finally, the tables culminate with table X. This is the mission command validation exercise that confirms a unit's ability to configure and organize a CP to support mission

Capt. Jonathan E. Stafford, U.S. Army, is a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officers Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BA from Pepperdine University and an MPA from Webster University.

requirements where the staff can coordinate all phases of operations and accomplish all assigned tasks.

1ID's Digital Gunnery: Results and Best Practices

Fort Riley's 1ID embraced the opportunity to work with the MCCoE to test and operationalize the digital gunnery tables. The division commander's goal was to complete all ten tables before WFX 16-04.

The division's knowledge management (KM) section took the lead in this effort; it established a cadre of MCDMGs across the division, synchronized the digital gunnery tables with the division's training schedule, and started conducting the tables in January 2016.

Before starting the tables, the division set out to train enough MCDMGs to efficiently run and manage the training. Working closely with the school, the division identified the right personnel to attend the course. Effective MCDMGs needed the competence to understand the systems and the confidence to lead their sections as they operated those systems. Additionally, they needed to have stability in the unit and represent all warfighting functions. Finally, the selected personnel had to complete training before the unit conducted table I.

Much time was spent determining the proper number and placement of the division's MCDMGs. It was ultimately decided that each section and warfighting function needed one MCDMG per shift and CP. At division level, this meant training twenty-three personnel. Brigades each needed four, with their battalions having two each. Overall, this created a requirement for eighty-seven qualified MCDMGs in the 1ID. The number may seem high, but this investment is critical for building digital lethality.

In addition to training MCDMGs, the Fort Riley Mission Training Complex helped develop an integration module as part of the basic CPOF course. This module introduced students to publishing information from CPOF and subscribing to data from other MCISs to create a holistic COP. Another week of training is under development that will cover four days of systems integration, the digital gunnery process, and a fifth day teaching the division's KM process. The additional MCDMGs and improved CPOF training continue to raise the division's baseline digital proficiency.

Next, the KM section created digital battle rosters broken down by crew. At the division level, each CP had a day and night crew. This gave the division six digital crews: day and night crews for the division main CP, the division tactical CP, and the support area CP. The crews in the division-level CPs were large because the integration of each information system from all the different warfighting functions was necessary to create a synchronized crew. Much like Bradley Fighting Vehicle commanders must train with a driver and gunner, each accomplishing their respective critical tasks for the system as a whole to work, the digital crew must train on and integrate their AFATDS, TAIS, and other information systems. If one of these systems is missing from the crew, the CP becomes ineffective. At a minimum, each crew must have one MCDMG.

Digital crews were presented at brigade quarterly training briefs to highlight their importance and the need for their increased stabilization. Next, the tables were applied to the training calendar in a way that synchronized them with already planned events. The division was preparing for its WFX and had a series of command-post exercises (CPXs) scheduled. Table I consisted of the core systems training completed at the Fort Riley mission training complex. Table II started in January 2016.

Digital gunnery was creatively integrated into other training events. For example, tables II and III occurred as part of the division's joint operations center, and table IV was carried out during CPX 2 between the joint operations center, the mission training complex, and the division tactical CP. Several make-up and retrain events were also included to ensure maximum participation. Table V, the planning table, occurred during orders production for CPX 3. Table VI took place during the CPX 3 communications exercise where each CP had to run through battle drills, COP updates, and briefings. MCDMGs evaluated tables VII and VIII in each CP during CPX 3. The division completed table IX during Warfighter 16-04's mini-exercise and finished with the mission command validation exercise (table X) during the WFX.

The digital tables provided the perfect opportunity to teach 1ID's SOPs, as the MCIS operators learned how to manage battle drills, use tactical chat, send reports, and practice KM. Additionally, the tables went beyond the information systems and allowed for

integration of the complete mission command system. The digital crews improved significantly at CP setup, which enhanced digital integration and promoted better synchronization across warfighting functions. The main and tactical CPs both saw significant refinement as the training and CPXs progressed. Changes based on these improvements were codified in SOP updates and incorporated into later digital gunnery events and subsequent exercises.

Personnel turnover was a significant issue at the division level, but engaged leadership helped enforce stabilization. For situations where stabilization was not possible, the digital gunnery plan incorporated retraining events after each exercise that provided opportunities to update crews on new SOPs as well as to integrate new members.

Additionally, not all members of the CP that operated an MCIS were able to participate in the training. To combat this shortfall, future iterations of 11D's digital gunnery program will have a stand-alone training event for leaders that use CPOF but are not necessarily a part of a crew. This event will give individuals like the division chief of staff or the G-3 (operations officer) a refresher on CPOF and CP SOPs to ensure they have the necessary skill set to effectively operate and lead in the CP. This training will take no longer than ninety minutes, but it will give leaders the depth of understanding to execute and improve the unit's digital SOPs.

The investment of sending soldiers to the MCDMG course and spending the time to train on the digital tables significantly improved the unit's ability to support mission command. This digital proficiency translated directly to lethality, as the division was able to maintain synchronization with faster coordination and increased collaboration. All echelons benefited from an increased shared understanding facilitated by digital crew proficiency.

Two events during the WFX clearly showed the impact made by MCDMGs and the digital gunnery tables. First, the training enabled the division to jump (relocate) the main CP twenty-four hours earlier than scheduled. Digital crews were able to transfer portions of their tasks to the crews in the tactical CP, sustainment area CP, and division artillery CP. MCIS operators ensured their counterparts had the right information and permissions to continue the fight. Personnel in the main CP were then able to disassemble their systems, conduct a

tactical movement, and reestablish connectivity within fourteen hours. During this time, the fight continued as planned, even with the tactical CP losing 50 percent of their personnel in an attack.

Second, the division's ability to rapidly execute branch plans was facilitated by the cohesion of digital crews. The commander quickly published mission orders with effective graphics and other digital products. CPs were able to more rapidly receive, confirm, and then execute these plans thanks to the rapid coordination and collaboration that came with increased digital lethality.

Conclusion

The proficiency necessary to integrate, operate, and maintain today's Army mission command information systems requires command emphasis, continuous use, and a digital sustainment training plan. The digital gunnery tables developed by the MCCoE and operationalized by the 11D are exactly the type of training program the Army needs. Flexible enough to integrate into the division's already planned schedule, they can be added to a battalion or brigade's training program. The digital gunnery tables—with qualified MCDMGs to lead them—provide the framework for developing digital lethality alongside the physically lethal systems.

CPX 1, completed before the tables, gave the 11D a baseline and started the digital gunnery process with the goal of creating highly proficient CPs that used digital lethality to dominate during a culminating WFX. The progression from CPX 1 through the exercise was remarkable. Operators went from using their systems in independent but disjointed efforts, to creating specific digital products, to working in collaboration with other functions to create a truly integrated COP.

During the midpoint after-action review, MCTP observers highlighted the hard work the division had done to prepare for the exercise. Specifically, they emphasized the use and placement of MCDMGs as something that truly set the conditions for success. The digital gunnery tables created an environment where system operators stopped going to the G-6 (communications and network management) with MCIS questions; instead, they called on their section's MCDMGs, or soldiers who had completed digital gunnery, for assistance. The MCDMGs not only assisted in creating better digital products, but they also freed up the G-6 team to focus on a very robust cyber threat.

Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



Army Press Primer on Urban Operations

Today, just over one-half of the world's population lives in urban areas. That percentage is expected to increase to 66 percent by 2050. In 1990, there were ten "megacities" of more than ten million inhabitants. By 2014, it rose to twenty-eight. And, by 2040, that number is expected to increase to forty-one.

With this ongoing and dramatic urbanization of the world's population, the U.S. Army is highly likely to find itself continuing to operate in cities. It is imperative that we study and understand the dynamics of operating in urban terrain. We must take the time now to analyze and test the lessons learned from different urban operations to ensure our soldiers and leaders are prepared for the future.

As a starting point, Army Press has compiled a selection of articles from *Military Review*, publications from the Combat Studies Institute, monographs from students at the Command and General Staff College, and other publications. This primer on urban operations should not be viewed as the textbook on the subject, but rather as a starting point for renewed study and conversation.



Access the Army Press Primer on Urban Operations by visiting <http://armypress.dodlive.mil/primer-on-urban-operations/>

Additional resources are available on the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center website: <http://usacac.army.mil/taxonomy/term/32>

Of note, this success was achieved with only a small portion of the staff completing the digital gunnery tables. Only sixty soldiers from all warfighting functions were able to complete tables I–X, but their ability to shape the success of the division was remarkable. Future iterations of digital gunnery will be conducted with much greater participation, resulting in an even larger increase in digital proficiency. As MCDMGs and their crews continue to build proficiency, there will be less reliance on field-service representatives for each of the MCISs.

Before the final after-action review, the division commander noted that until then, he had not been a part of a unit that so effectively overcame fighting itself during a WFX but instead focused its efforts on killing the enemy. Well-practiced internal processes, KM, and the efficient use of digital systems enabled this success. From the sustainment cell creating effective movement synchronization boards that streamlined the uncoiling of the division, to the future operations and current operations sections quickly implementing a conditions-based branch plan and mission order to enable the commander to seize the initiative, digital systems operators fully empowered 1ID's leadership.

The digital gunnery tables developed in partnership with the MCCoE and 1ID are extremely useful, especially when integrated into training at all levels. ■

Notes

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2. 1st Infantry Division's Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) Command Post of the Future (CPOF) concept of operation, dated 24 February 2014, with all supporting and background documentation found on the Intelink website, <https://go.intelink.gov/t2Mblqk> (CAC required).
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A fatigued trainee rests during a break at the Buddy Movement Course, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 9 August 2006. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall, U.S. Air Force)

Sleep Banking

Improving Fighter Management

Maj. Amy Thompson, U.S. Army

Capt. Brad Jones, U.S. Army

Capt. Jordan Thornburg, U.S. Army

The 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, was selected in 2015 to participate in the “Performance Triad” pilot program led by the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG).¹ The Performance Triad program focuses on our basic biological health needs—sleep, activity,

and nutrition—all of which are important for survival, health, performance, safety, and readiness.² The goal of the program is to improve the health of the force and optimize human performance. Health is the foundation of readiness, and readiness is the Army’s number one priority.³ The focus of this article is sleep.



In December 2015, the brigade surgeon was invited to attend the Army Sleep Summit at the OTSG headquarters. A diverse working group of military leaders and top researchers in the field of sleep science attended the summit to discuss the impact of sleep on performance, health, safety, and readiness. Many experts made a compelling case throughout the sleep summit that sleep duration, daytime impairment, and fatigue are significant correlates of diminished cognitive performance, poor physical health, depression, suicide ideation, motor vehicle accidents, and occupational injury. Specifically, leaders discussed *sleep banking* throughout the summit as a way to optimize sleep and enhance performance. Significant findings from research show that sleep can be “banked” in advance of periods of sleep restriction to improve alertness and performance, and that it contributes to faster recovery from fatigue-induced impairments.⁴ Sleep banking can be planned, operationalized, and strategically placed before a known period of sleep restriction to create large gains in performance when the stakes are high. Sleep banking before performance could be the difference between winning and losing—or life and death.

Soldiers of Bulldog Troop, 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment recover in a hasty fighting position 4 September 2009 after a night patrol in the mountains near Sar Howza, Paktika Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew Smith, U.S. Army)

The Fatigue of the Force

Sleep benefits the brain. Conversely, sleep loss is characterized by brain deactivation, especially in the brain regions that mediate cognitive performance and alertness. Performance deficits often result from the effects of sleep loss combined with circadian rhythm misalignment.⁵ The short-term consequences of sleep loss are attention deficit, slowed reaction time, reduced alertness, impaired problem solving, and reduced motivation.⁶

A 2015 RAND Corporation study reported that 72 percent of service members get less than seven hours of sleep per night, and 23 percent receive less than six.⁷ Routinely getting five to six hours per night of sleep is like performing with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent.⁸ Less than seven hours of sleep for three or more days correlates to a 20 percent decrease in cognitive performance.⁹ In 2014, fatigue was a contributing factor in

628 Army accidents and 32 deaths.¹⁰ Sleep loss results in deficits that affect performance effectiveness and safety in operational and nonoperational environments.

Sleep is a biological need, and it is critically important for soldier health. The lack of sleep and increasing number of sleep disorders among service members is a major public health concern. In 2014, up to 14 percent of soldiers across the Army were diagnosed with a sleep disorder.¹¹ Those lacking sufficient sleep are more likely to suffer from chronic diseases such as hypertension, diabetes, depression, obesity, and cancer; they tend to have a higher mortality rate, a lower quality of life, and less overall productivity.¹² Sleep—or the lack thereof—amounts to being a health, safety, and readiness issue. With readiness at stake, we can no longer ignore the fatigue of the force or allow cultural barriers to continue to inhibit improvement of this larger public health issue. In Army organizations, losing is not an option; the cost of poor performance is high, so mitigating the risks associated with sleep loss and fatigue is imperative.

Cultural Barriers

Military culture historically does not place a priority on sleep. This is evident in a well-known Army recruiting slogan: “We get more done by nine o’clock than most people do all day.” We know that optimal sleep is critical to mission success. Soldiers and leaders associate poor sleep with impaired reaction time, poor judgment, accidents, and low morale. However, despite mission degradation, a cultural acceptance of suboptimal sleep and a perception that lack of sleep is the “Army way” prevail in the force.¹³

The idea of allowing soldiers to optimize sleep, report to work at 0900, and conduct physical training in the afternoon for a seven- to ten-day period before a training event would be quickly dismissed in many circles in the Army. Yet, high-performing teams are willing to change their cultures if a behavior is no longer productive. Having a supportive command climate in the brigade, one that was open to change, was vital to creating an opportunity for performance enhancement and conducting the sleep banking assessment. Once the command team was briefed on the science behind sleep banking, to include discussion of other

Maj. Amy Thompson,
U.S. Army, is the brigade surgeon for the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division.

studies on sleep and performance such as the Harvard Hospital study, the Stanford men’s basketball team sleep extension study, the high schools delayed-start study, and the Harvard Police study, the brigade commander directed one of his subordinate units to support the trial.¹⁴ Then, after gaining “buy in” from the highest level of leadership, the subordinate commanders pushed the initiative to the company and platoon levels.

Operationalizing Sleep Banking

Knowledge of the Performance Triad, the brigade’s engagement in the Army Sleep Summit, and a brigade command climate that empowered innovation combined to create momentum toward a sleep-banking initiative. Encouraged by the brigade command team, subordinate-unit leadership deliberately focused on fighter-management improvement by operationalizing sleep banking before gunnery in an infantry unit.

As a trial, 2nd Platoon, Company C (Charlie Company), 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, was chosen to conduct sleep banking before a February 2016 field training exercise (FTX), during which the unit would fire Gunnery Table (GT) VI.¹⁵ During this FTX, soldiers would conduct twenty-four-hour operations, sleeping when possible—many times in a Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV)—and typically would average three to five hours of sleep daily for seven days, depending on leadership roles. The trial would compare GT VI scores from an October 2015 FTX to scores from the February 2016 FTX to determine if sleep banking affected gunnery performance. Additionally, evaluators would receive subjective feedback from the soldiers during the sleep-bank week and during the sleep-restricted period to discover further the effects of sleep banking on performance, health, and wellness. The company commander scheduled time for the brigade medical team to educate the platoon on the science behind sleep and the potential benefits of sleep banking before the FTX.

Capt. Brad Jones,
U.S. Army, is the commander of Company C, 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division.

Capt. Jordan Thornburg,
U.S. Army, is the physician assistant for 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division.

In order to allow the platoon to sleep bank effectively, an adjustment to the normal Army duty schedule was required. The platoon normally shows up for work at 0600 before starting 0630 physical training (PT). From 5–14 February 2016, the command agreed to “reverse PT,” where the soldiers would show up at 0900 and conduct PT in the afternoon at 1600. This adjustment fell more in line with the natural circadian

controlled, including personnel changes, soldier experience levels, crew dynamics, weather, range execution, and maintenance issues. Additionally, the unit had four months of increased training before the latter FTX.

In October 2015, two of the four crews in 2nd Platoon qualified on their first attempt, while two required multiple attempts to meet the minimum qualification requirements (700 of 1,000 points and



rhythm of sleep, which is from approximately from 2300 to 0700 (the best hours of sleep are early in the morning when the soldiers are normally getting ready for work).¹⁶ During this sleep-banking time, the soldiers were required to keep a “sleep journal” in which they logged their hours of sleep. Sleep journals showed that for the ten-day period before the FTX, the platoon averaged 8.9 hours of sleep per night, significantly more than the reported average of five to six hours per night before sleep banking.

Gunnery Performance Improvement

The GT VI (crew-level gunnery) scores for 2nd Platoon increased substantially from the October 2015 (no sleep banking) FTX to the February 2016 (sleep banking) FTX. However, many factors were not

7 of 10 passed engagements). Upon completion of the FTX, the overall platoon average score was 756 out of a possible 1,000.

In February 2016, following a weeklong period of sleep banking, all four crews in 2nd Platoon qualified on their first attempt, and the platoon average score increased by 163 points up to 919 out of 1,000 points. In addition to the improved scores, the platoon executed GT VI without safety violations, accidents, or injuries.

Soldier and Leader Feedback and Impact on Health

Upon completion of GT VI, all members of the platoon were questioned on how sleep banking affected their health and performance during gunnery. Subjective feedback from across the platoon was

overwhelmingly positive. For example, feedback from soldiers at all levels up to the battalion commander indicated that 2nd Platoon had noticeably higher levels of morale and motivation than any other unit throughout their week of sleep banking and their week in the field at gunnery.

Soldiers stated they got more sleep overall, which positively affected their mood, morale, and motivation.

down their morning pace, which positively affected their children's stress level as well. Soldiers and leaders described increased efficiency and productivity beginning early in the morning and lasting throughout the workday. According to leaders, the platoon appeared happier and had higher morale overall.

During the week in the field, soldiers and leaders reported going into the mission feeling well and not



They preferred doing PT in the afternoons, reporting more productive workouts with greater gains due to being more awake, being more motivated, having more energy (potentially also related to snacking throughout the day), and sleeping better at night. Soldiers reported that doing PT in the afternoon made their entire day more efficient with less time wasted overall. Conversely, leadership reported having a harder time doing PT in the afternoon because many of their meetings were scheduled later in the day based on traditional battle-rhythm events.

Soldiers and leaders alike reported improved family time in the mornings, less stress, and less irritability, and many reported eating a better breakfast. Soldiers who were single parents also reported less stress, and they were appreciative that they were able to slow

Chief Mass Communication Spc. Keith DeVinney, U.S. Navy, sleeps between exercises during Fleet Combat Camera Pacific's Winter Quick Shot 2013 combined field training exercise, held 17 February 2013 in the Angeles National Forest near Azusa, California. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Blair, U.S. Navy)

fatigued. They felt more receptive to new information and feedback, and they were able to grasp new information more quickly. They noted being more engaged, and they said they were better able to tackle tasks more quickly and efficiently. The leadership reported that higher morale continued throughout gunnery. No accidents or injuries were reported. For 2nd Platoon, sleep banking appears to have resulted in improved health, wellness, performance, and quality of life both at home and at work.

The Way Forward with Fighter Management

Charlie Company continued to demonstrate how sleep banking results in improving fighter management. After completion of GT VI and the stellar performance by 2nd Platoon, the company commander strategically implemented sleep banking 5–13 March 2016 for the entire company, the week prior to executing GT XII. The move proved fruitful; all three platoons in Charlie Company qualified on GT XII with an average score of 79 percent. For reference, the Army considers 50 percent the minimum for advancement to company-level collective training.

Once again, the feedback from soldiers and leaders indicated overwhelmingly positive impacts across all aspects of performance, health, safety, and quality of life. The commander reported that sleep banking contributed to increased morale and improved mental health of all soldiers. He noticed increased motivation during afternoon PT and while performing mundane tasks, and he concluded that sleep banking led to an overall better quality of life for his soldiers.

Conclusion

Sleep banking for seven to ten days prior to a known period of sleep restriction has a positive impact on performance and health. Reverse PT allows soldiers to optimize sleep and gain two or three more hours because it aligns with the natural circadian rhythm. Commanders and leaders are responsible for implementing deliberate sleep-management strategies and ensuring they are included in mission planning when periods of sleep restriction are anticipated. The benefits are already proven by sleep science and research across



Lt. Col. Ingrid Lim, Office of the Surgeon General Performance Triad staff member, gathers feedback on fatigue, sleep, and performance from the commander and first sergeant of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, Capt. Remington Adams and 1st Sgt. Willie Watson, 15 March 2016 during Table XII gunnery at Fort Riley, Kansas. (Photo by Maj. Amy Thompson, U.S. Army)

other organizations and cannot be overlooked. The Performance Triad has taught us that a commander's emphasis on sleep must equal emphasis on physical fitness if we expect optimal performance.¹⁷ The Army should continue to improve fighter management by operationalizing sleep. Sleep banking improves the health and safety of soldiers and enhances unit readiness. ■

Notes

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15. Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) gunnery tables range from table I (crew critical skills) to table XII (platoon qualification). Gunnery table VI is crew qualification, executed by individual BFV crews (in subsequent tables, BFVs operate in teams). Table VI entails engaging moving and stationary targets with all weapon systems (main gun and machine guns) while stationary and moving.

16. Owens, Belon, and Moss, "Impact of Delaying School Start Time."

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Soldiers from Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, led by their commander, Lt. Col. Brad Wambeke, participate in a four-mile installation run 4 June 2012 on Fort Carson, Colorado. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew Porch, U.S. Army)

Sleep Emphasis on Fort Carson

A sleep experiment similar to 1st Infantry Division's drew praise from Army health officials, according to a story in the *Denver Post*.¹ In 2014, Fort Carson's leadership changed the standard duty day to allow soldiers to come into work later and conduct physical fitness training at the end of the day instead of first thing in the morning, as is the norm across the Army.

Col. Deydre Teyhen, the Army's assistant deputy chief of staff for public health, cited the Fort Carson program in an interview with Federal News Radio: "Our best example probably is at Fort Carson, where they started reverse-cycle physical training. They do PT at the end of the day instead of in the morning. Not only do they get more sleep, it allowed soldiers to help get the kids ready for school and spend some time with the family before everybody went out the door. It's been a huge success, not only for the families but for the soldiers, because we know that being sleep deprived by four hours decreases your maximum bench press by twenty pounds. If we want to get the most out of unit PT, doing that at a time when they're not sleep deprived is the way to do it. We're seeing pockets of success and I think it's going to continue to grow."²

Unfortunately, the program was curtailed due to "epic traffic jams" caused by "about twenty thousand soldiers" conducting physical training on Fort Carson's roads during high-traffic periods for civilian employees.³

Notes

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Equipment & Resources Needed

Leadership Innovation in the Reserve Officer Training Corps and the Future of the Force

Col. Andrew Morgado, U.S. Army

Material solutions alone will not provide the decisive edge against the complex array of rapidly adapting threats we face. To answer the challenge of this new paradigm, the Army must invest in its most valuable resource, its people.

—Lt. Gen. Robert B. Brown

The number one priority in the U.S. Army Cadet Command is to produce second lieutenants who contribute to what Lt. Gen. Robert Brown refers to as the Army's "decisive edge" and meet the Army's requirements in an increasingly complex world. The 2014 *U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (AOC) clearly asserts that the operating environment is changing and so must the Army.¹ The Army's Cadet Command produces over 70 percent of the total officer corps through its programs, and it provides fertile ground to grow the Army of tomorrow.² This contribution to the force constitutes a significant portion of the leaders who will drive this change in the force. My brigade, one of eight that lead Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs across the country, is responsible for identifying, training, educating, and inspiring these future officers. Each day, we

Army ROTC cadets of the Blue Devil Eagle Battalion welcome the Cadet Command deputy commanding officer, Col. Brian J. Mennes, to Duke University for classroom instruction in officership 3 October 2014 in Durham, North Carolina. During the school year, cadets receive multidisciplinary instruction on leadership, ethics, behavioral sciences, and tactics. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army ROTC)

are learning and adapting our approach and methods to produce the leaders who are capable of meeting and overcoming the challenges of tomorrow.

As our operating environment changes, the Army must consider how to adapt its approach in educating and developing the leaders that will guide the institution through this change. The pace and type of change the AOC describes indicate that many of the current training and education models are becoming irrelevant. Times are changing, and college and university ROTC programs must change with the times to stay relevant. Though the Cadet Command program has produced officers for an Army that is the envy of the world, the limitations of the current program are growing more apparent. Understanding what the AOC demands of future leaders must form the foundation for further action to help reduce or eliminate those limitations. Therefore, Cadet Command—with a national presence in over 270 host institutions and over a thousand partnered colleges—is shifting its training strategy from one largely based on post-World War II models, which are narrowly focused on one type of conflict, to one designed to meet more varied challenges reflective of the times.³

Army Operating Concept Vision

The AOC suggests future conflict will be characterized by an increased velocity and momentum of human interaction. One of the effects of this new dynamic is that future enemies will seek to leverage these interactions by drawing U.S. forces into more complex urban terrain together with other strategies aimed at generally negating

the advantages of U.S. technological superiority.⁴ Additionally, the nature and type of enemy forces the Army will face is also changing. With greater frequency, the Army will encounter situations where irregular forces, nonstate groups, and criminal organizations will either join conventional forces with similar objectives or act unilaterally to accomplish objectives in this complex terrain.

In order to be successful under these conditions, the AOC asserts that the Army must “develop innovative leaders and optimize human performance.”⁵ Such innovative leaders must be capable of succeeding in both “high-tech” and “low-tech” environments—and everything in between. The Army’s *Human Dimension White Paper* stresses this theme, noting that “the basics” of skills relating to successful conduct of warfare have fundamentally changed. Industrial Age warfare characterized by an emphasis on attaining mass for success is giving way to an emphasis on agility and adaptation.⁶ The traditional notion that military leaders must become technical experts in known fields of military science must give way to a broader concept where military leaders possess the capacity to solve a wide array of complex problems with creative solutions derived in part from sources of knowledge outside traditional military studies.

The officer corps of today gained significant experience from years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan that provides some insight into the future conduct of our wars. Our national experience has revealed that the training completed prior to wartime deployments did not adequately prepare military leaders to conduct these wars. In a 2010 study on precommissioning

Col. Andrew Morgado, U.S. Army, is the commander of 3rd Brigade, U.S. Army Cadet Command. He holds a BA from Lehigh University and an MA from Norwich University. He is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies, completing both the Advanced Military Studies and the Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Programs.

training, Maj. Joseph Albrecht discovered contemporary officers criticized their preparation, arguing it placed too much emphasis on task training.⁷ By focusing on technical and tactical preparation, precommissioning training focused on the knowledge and skills required for immediate use on specific, technically oriented tasks vice


emphasizing skills needed for longer term, more general application.⁸ Over time, the specific skills addressed in precommissioning training lost relevance in the face of real world application and actual experience. Instead of skills training, feedback from deployed junior officers suggests precommissioning should emphasize the metacompetencies of self-awareness and adaptability.⁹ In order to address these competencies, long-used Cadet Command models must change.

Cadet Command and Historical Tensions

Since the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, Cadet Command has followed a relatively stable model in educating a large portion of the officer corps.¹⁰ Through nearly five decades, Cadet Command emphasized the use of tactical training as the principal vehicle to drive leader development. Cadet training and education operated in parallel to attainment of a baccalaureate education at a cadet’s respective college. The passage of the Vitalization Act cemented the distinction between training and education in military science programs on college campuses. The act was a culmination of a struggle that raged between college administrators and military leaders through the 1950s.

The sources of this friction were college administrators and educators who were horrified that Army ROTC training, which emphasized tactical skill training and marching drill led by uniformed officers, was granted the equivalency of a college-level course.¹¹ Consequently, many colleges through the 1950s and early 1960s established programs that substituted courses taught by civilian professors for the usual courses specified in the military science curriculum. Civilian faculty and ROTC cadre created many of these substitution programs as part of local agreements.

However, objecting to the impact this “civilianization” could have on the officer corps, the Department of Defense pushed through the Vitalization Act to end the substitution practice, among other changes. Military practitioners resisted the substitutions, arguing that skill-and-task training was the essential component of junior officer training. Essentially, military professionals asserted that the ROTC program existed primarily to provide the Army with competent platoon leaders upon commissioning. This short-term perspective won out over the competing perspective



that asserted the need for a broader educational emphasis on critical thinking and understanding, self-awareness, and adaptability. Notwithstanding, it drove a permanent wedge between military science programs and educators.¹²

Given the intensive manpower needs of the period together with emerging technological requirements for a possible global war against a conventional Soviet threat, the perspective that emphasized the mass production of junior leaders with practical skills that could be immediately put to use at the platoon level was not without merit. By emphasizing the development of skills within a more technical domain, the Army clearly showed that it valued junior leader professional technical competence over the competing argument for the need to build deep intellectual foundations.

This is a common viewpoint for armies facing an immediate and clearly identified threat.¹³ Specific domain knowledge and application are more highly prized when there is clear benefit for application against immediate threats in known conditions. However, the perceived importance of broader education aside from

Harvard University ROTC bayonet drill, ca. 1917–1918. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

technical military skills proficiency in the face of more uncertain conditions was not entirely lost. The fact that the Army maintained the necessity for attaining a college degree as a prerequisite for earning an officer's commission indicated a view that a broader education was recognized as a valuable component of an officer's long-term preparation and professional development.

ROTC's Evolving Approach

As we enter a new period in the evolution of warfare, it is time to reexamine the issue. In previous debates, the Army recognized that earning a degree displays a requisite level of ambition, determination, and problem-solving skills for a leader.¹⁴ As military theorist Morris Janowicz opined, the U.S. Army has always sought to balance its three perceived roles for officers in American society; namely, those of the heroic leader, military manager, and military technologist.¹⁵



However, employing Janowicz's observation as an instrument of analysis, military science programs appear to have become somewhat dated because they have stayed too narrowly focused on developing the heroic leader by emphasizing above all else mastery of technical and tactical skills. In contrast, Janowicz envisioned a future of war that requires the development of a much more diverse set of skills. This is consonant with the AOC assessment, which supports the view that officer education must address the imbalance highlighted in Janowicz's vision to broaden cadet development in other areas.

A readily available way to measure what Army ROTC values in its officer candidates is through the recent version of the order of merit list (OML) used to designate the basic branch of candidates as they access into the officer corps. Studying the OML is useful as it provides a measure of the desired outcomes for each cadet and how he or she would be placed in the Army's structure. The OML model awards cadets up to a total of one hundred points across three categories—academic, leadership, and fitness. Individual cadet scores across these general

1st Lt. Brendan Duke, Fort Carson, Colorado, briefs cadets in the Cadet Leader Course during Center for the Army Profession and Ethic vignettes training 15 June 2016 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. (Photo by Wenqing Yan)

categories are used to rank order cadets nationally and then distribute them across basic branches in accordance with the needs of the Army, cadet preferences, and quality distribution.

Formerly, in this model, a cadet's grade point average (GPA) determined 40 percent of the individual score, while performance at the Leadership Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) determined an additional 25 percent. On-campus physical fitness tests, cadre evaluations, and extracurricular activities made up the balance of the score. This model measured academic performance through a non-normalized GPA and on evaluation of cadets over a twenty-eight-day period performing tactically and technically specific tasks. To a large degree, this model indirectly encouraged two behaviors; namely, seek "the grade" over learning on campus, and study for "the test" at LDAC. Both of these behaviors stemmed from

an apparent institutional emphasis on valuing short-term gain over longer-term learning.

Though changing the accessions OML model might not necessarily address the underlying issues related to preparing adaptive leaders, it would realign assessments to the desired outcomes. This is the direction that Cadet Command is moving.

emphasizes results over process and procedures.¹⁷ Vandergriff stresses that it is not domain-specific knowledge that wins the day for a leader, but rather a broad experiential base, contextual knowledge, and decisiveness.¹⁸

The work of social scientist Mark Moyer appears to corroborate these attributes through his analysis



New Attributes and New Ways

Aligning the Cadet Command leader development and assessment model to what the AOC demands involves a reorientation of the enterprise. It is a change that would move away from rote learning of the familiar toward development of a challenging course that promotes effective problem orientation, critical thinking, and decision making. Using Bloom's educational objectives taxonomy as a reference, cadet education-and-development programs must move beyond just exercises in remembering, understanding, and applying predetermined drills and school solutions toward analyzing, evaluating, and creating in the face of information gaps and uncertainty characteristic of the new security environment.¹⁶

To achieve this orientation, noted leader-development educator Donald Vandergriff stresses an outcomes-based training-and-education model that

Retired Maj. Gen. Burn Loeffke instructs Army ROTC cadets in advanced Spanish language training and medical translation 7 May 2013 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The training was in preparation for a humanitarian aid mission to Panama in December 2013. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army ROTC)

of effective leaders on modern battlefields. In his research involving leaders from Iraq and Afghanistan, he notes ten attributes are recurring themes among successful small-unit leaders. These attributes are initiative, flexibility, creativeness, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization.¹⁹ The application of these leadership principles used in applying doctrine or domain knowledge made small units effective.

The two sets of mutually supporting theoretical observations by Vandergriff and Moyer come together in the Asymmetric Warfare Group's (AWG's)

“21st Century Soldier Competencies,” and the Cadet Command applies the AWG approach to its current developmental models. The soldier competencies Cadet Command strives to promote include character and accountability, comprehensive fitness, adaptability and initiative, lifelong learner, teamwork and collaboration, communication and engagement, cultural competence, and tactical and technical competence.²⁰ Additionally, these skills are being measured in new ways and are reflected differently in the accessions process.

Cadet Command continues the transformation of its education and leader-development approach by applying the concepts noted. In 2016, Cadet Command reconceptualized the OML as an outcomes metrics list, modifying the measurement tool to better reflect the desired outcomes for cadets. The new OML now more objectively measures educational preparedness and de-emphasizes summer camp performance. Though GPA still accounts for 25 percent of the overall score, there is now a broader evaluation employing objective assessments. Cadets must now take two different standardized college education assessment tests (the Collegiate Level Assessment Test and the Miller Analogy Test) that account for 10 percent of their OML score. The command determines an additional 10 percent of the academic score by awarding additional points to cadets pursuing science, technology, engineering, and medical (STEM) degrees.

These new criteria normalize the GPA input and incentivize students to meet the Army’s demand for more STEM-educated officers to serve in technically specific fields beginning in their seventh year of service. LDAC evaluations are now no longer part of the accessions score, with campus-based leadership assessments providing the basis for leadership assessment. The new accessions model will also consider extracurricular activities and reward participation in cultural and language programs.

These changes do not remove the importance of summer camps. Beginning in the summer of 2016, all cadets must now complete a Cadet Individual Education and Training (CIET) program (now referred to as the Basic Camp) following their freshman or sophomore year and the Cadet Leader Course (CLC, now referred to as the Advanced

Camp) between their junior and senior year. Cadet Command designed these programs to transfer the bulk of domain-specific training to summer periods and focus on more general education goals and leader-development tasks on campus. Certainly, leader education and development continue through CIET and CLC, but they are now within a basic skills and tactical framework and are not measured only on the efficient execution of technical tasks. The sum of these changes signifies a significant shift in emphasis from task-based learning to education-based development and evaluation.

Momentum for Additional Change

Redesign of the accessions model and OML process can only be the beginning. These steps assist with measuring the outputs of the program; inputs, ways, and approaches are equally important. Cadet Command must also more aggressively compete to attract, recruit, and retain young citizens with high levels of demonstrated potential across the academic, athletic, and leadership domains. Also, it must update the way it prepares and resources cadre to educate officer candidates in ways that develop them into the high-quality officers the Army needs.

Cadet Command will take a large step in this direction by formalizing its cadre development program, where it will “educate the educators” from across the active and reserve forces in order to implement these updated approaches. It must also enlist and mobilize its partnered educational institutions to take an active part in producing the desired outcomes for its students; namely, relevant college graduates and journeymen military leaders. The challenges are many, but recognizing and acknowledging the intended ends—a leader capable of understanding and thriving in complexity—and reorienting Cadet Command to achieve these ends are the critical first steps. The command is well on its way.

Challenges

Change is seldom easy and never comfortable. But, if the Army is to meet the demands of the future, its leaders must anticipate and be prepared for change. Cadet Command, as the major contributor to the Army’s officer corps, must adapt and change its practices to remain relevant and meet new

operational realities. As with any process of change, the friction associated with moving in a different direction is also present.

Much of the resistance comes from the perspective that this change presents a major departure from a winning formula. However, the Army cannot afford to let tradition stand in the way of progress. Gen. John W. Vessey, in the forward to the 1997 edition of *Once an Eagle* (the classic allegorical tale of U.S. Army

officership), cautioned that tradition, while important to the Army, cannot be taken to extremes where it stunts growth and development. Vessey warned we cannot “worship the ashes” of tradition when former ways have become irrelevant.²¹ Sam Damon, the hero of the novel, declared, “The essence of leadership was an unerring ability to winnow the essential from the trivial or extraneous.”²² In preparing our Army for the future, we must stay focused on the essential. ■

Notes

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Historian Richard E. Killblane interviews 1st Lt. Matthew Beal during Operation Iraqi Freedom 19 March 2007 at Camp Speicher, Tikrit, Iraq.
(Photo by David S. Hanselman)

Creating a Resource

Helping U.S. Army Central Establish a Historical Document Collection Program

Michael Yarborough

Military history is a form of combat power. Writing and reading military history form the foundations for training, esprit de corps, and decision making. The benefits accrue to the Army at every echelon, from individual soldiers to senior leaders. However, in order for the Army to benefit from studying its own history, the basic sources for what happened during combat operations must be collected.

In the summer of 2014, the United States increased military assistance to the Iraqi government to fight the Islamic State (IS). From the beginning, U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) played the principal role in providing American military assistance to Iraq. In mid-August, USARCENT commanding general Lt. Gen. James L. Terry asked the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) for help establishing a historical document collection program to help preserve the command's experiences. In response, CMH temporarily assigned two of its civilian historians (Erik B. Villard and myself) to establish a collection program that we would hand off to a military history detachment (MHD). To accomplish this mission, we worked at USARCENT's forward headquarters in Kuwait from 28 August to 3 October 2014. We also conducted the first field use of the Army military history doctrine that was updated June 2014, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 1-20, *Military History Operations*.¹

This article summarizes our efforts and discusses some challenges we faced. We hope that our experiences will be helpful to future Army historians, MHDs, and soldiers appointed as unit historians as an additional duty. Given current geopolitical uncertainties and budgetary constraints, it is reasonable to assume that Army historians will again be asked on short notice to help establish a historical collection program for another theater Army providing land component support.

Commanders should also find this article of interest. Document collection programs are needed because during wartime, operational records are considered permanent. Their preservation is a statutory and regulatory command responsibility. A useful resource in this endeavor is the Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 09-22, *Commander's Guide to Operational Records and Data Collection: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.²

Based on our experience, we can attest that ATP 1-20 is clearly written and accessible, and it provides

the framework for building a document collection program. Our rapid deployment (we had less than two weeks' notice) prevented us from attending standard MHD training. Nevertheless, we easily used ATP 1-20 to guide our efforts. We also benefited from support by CMH, the greater Army historical community, and the USARCENT staff. Finally, familiarity with the Army's organization and structure, ability to function on a staff, and proficiency with the Army's information technology systems helped us achieve our objectives and overcome obstacles.

Our CMH leadership sent us to Kuwait with the mission to help USARCENT record its experiences by collecting documents and establishing procedures for a follow-on MHD. Immediately upon arriving in Kuwait, we met with Terry. He directed us to save USARCENT's key operational documents in order to help record lessons learned, write narrative histories, and facilitate soldier care in the future.³ In prior assignments with USARCENT, Terry had seen the command expand to meet the requirements of contingencies (Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom), and thus he knew the importance of initiating the preservation of historical documents during the early stages of operations. Now that the fight against IS has become a full-scale operation (Operation Inherent Resolve), and it shows every indication of being a protracted campaign, his early actions have helped ensure the Army's experiences will be preserved for posterity.

We distilled Terry's guidance into four objectives: (1) establish collection procedures, (2) begin collecting documents, (3) establish coordination procedures with key staff, and (4) prepare a transition plan for the MHD.

Accomplishing these objectives also required resolving a number of issues, mostly related to travel, computer and network access, and security. These challenges were part of the friction of operating in a wartime environment, but they would have led to our failure had they not been resolved.

Michael Yarborough is a historian in the U.S. Army Center of Military History's Force Structure and Unit History Branch at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. He holds an MA in American history from George Mason University and a BA in history from James Madison University.

Background

USARCENT has functioned as the Army service component command for U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) since 1982.⁴ Its main headquarters is at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, but a forward headquarters is also maintained in Kuwait. USARCENT's mission is to provide the USCENTCOM combatant commander with land-power options and strategic depth, and to set conditions for improved regional security and stability. The command's efforts help ensure regional access and develop relationships with nations in the region.⁵

During our assignment, USARCENT was coordinating land operations for America's assistance to Iraq's fight against IS. At the time, the command was operating as a joint force land component commander, and later as a coalition forces land component commander. It later formed the nucleus of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, which is currently responsible for leading the coalition against IS.⁶

Since World War II, Army historians and MHDs have deployed in proximity to wartime commands and operations in order to have the best access to leaders and documents. MHDs are separately numbered modified-table-of-organization-and-equipment units that consist of an officer and one or two additional soldiers. They are typically employed at the theater army, Army service component command, corps, and division levels to “carry out directed collection of historical material during combat and contingency operations for later use in writing the official history. They are trained and equipped to gather historical documents and materials, conduct oral interviews, photograph actions and events, and advise supported units on planning and conducting historical operations.”⁷

One lesson of previous military history operations is that they cannot be conducted remotely. Thus, our mission necessitated traveling to Kuwait. During our trip, most of USARCENT's principal staff were in Kuwait. This made Kuwait the right place to be because it was where decisions were made and key documents were generated (even though many documents were digitally stored at Shaw Air Force Base).

For our mission, we reported to USARCENT's deputy chief of staff, and we were supported by the secretary of the general staff. Our physical and

organizational location, close to the command's senior leadership, was ideal because it helped with gaining access to the staff, resources, and support. Many Army historians know from experience that other arrangements, such as being under the public affairs office, typically reduce the effectiveness of history programs.

Historical Collection versus Records Management

Before continuing, it should be understood that Army historians do not collect official records, but instead copies. Although CMH is responsible for, “collecting, maintaining, and making historical source materials and publications available to the Army,” it is not an official records repository, and the documents it holds are considered copies.⁸ The same applies to the documents gathered by command historians and MHDs. ATP 1-20 clearly states, “Historians are not records managers and do not perform these duties. Historical documents and materials do not constitute command or unit official records, although they may include copies of records.”⁹ These copies are used to write official histories, such as the CMH's *U.S. Army in World War II* series (known as “The Green Books”). Today, the Army's Records Management and Declassification Agency is responsible for records management, as governed by Army Regulation 25-400-2, *Army Records Information Management System*.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the Army's operational records management system is broken. The copies of official records collected by Army historians and MHDs often constitute the only preserved copies of wartime operational records. Soldiers and veterans use these records to write official histories, capture lessons learned, and help substantiate claims for benefits.

The breakdown of the Army's records management program first became apparent in the aftermath of the Gulf War (1990–1991), when researchers investigating unusual illnesses affecting returning soldiers could not locate basic documents listing where units were located on the battlefield. This breakdown stems from the disestablishment of the adjutant general's office in 1986 and the transfer of proponentcy for records management to the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management and Information Systems Command (ACSIM). Traditionally, the adjutant



Above, a box contains historical records of the 1st Cavalry Division's 2006–2007 operations in Iraq, which were collected by the deployed 90th Military History Detachment. (Photo by Maj. Glynn Garcia)

Right, the Communications–Electronics Command (CECOM) Historical Collection is located in the Historical Office at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and consists of documents, still photos, films, recordings (audio and video), and miscellaneous outdated media (e.g., floppy disks, safety films, slides, and microfiche). The collection also has a small military history reference library (approximately two thousand volumes). (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army CECOM)



general was responsible for records management, but by the 1980s, the field of information management “saw little distinction between communications and information.”¹¹ As communication became digital, the Army transferred responsibility for managing the data carried on the networks to those running the networks. Unfortunately, information management and records management doctrine proved difficult to integrate. Additionally, the Army eliminated many trained and deployable records managers as a result of Army-wide force structure changes that rebalanced the Army’s tooth-to-tail ratio. The records managers who remained became isolated from the units they supported as their activities were consolidated at the corps level and above.

In 1986, the ACSIM inherited an effort to replace *The Army Functional Files System General Provisions* (AR 340-18-1, now obsolete), the Army’s paper-based, 1960s-era records management system. The Army Functional Files System had served the

Army reasonably well during Vietnam and itself was an update of the War Department Decimal Filing System, which helped preserve records from World War II and the Korean War. Excellent operational records from all three of these conflicts are available at the National Archives. The successor to AR 340-18-1 was AR 24-400-2, *The Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS)* (now obsolete).¹² Unfortunately, MARKS was poorly conceived and only worked well at the Department of the Army and major Army command levels. It did not serve well the needs of field units during combat operations.

As units rapidly redeployed and in some cases inactivated after the Gulf War, the U.S. Army Information Systems Command issued a series of misunderstood and contradictory instructions that directed field units to ignore the guidance in MARKS and submit records directly to it. This confusion led to many operational records from the Gulf War being misfiled, misplaced, or simply never retired. It required

a massive effort in the 1990s, directed by President Bill Clinton and Congress and led by CMH, to recover the relevant records needed by Gulf War researchers.¹³

The Army's continued transition to digital systems has only compounded and magnified existing records management deficiencies. Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in 2001, many wartime records have been irretrievably lost due to the ease of overwriting electronic documents, units' wiping computer hard drives before returning from deployments, and generally poor records management practices. However, during the Gulf War and operations conducted since 2001, deployed Army historians and MHDs have saved copies of many important records. Today, digital and paper copies of GWOT records are held at CMH. This includes copies of records from Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, Freedom's Sentinel, and Inherent Resolve. The collection is still being accessioned, but the National Archives and Records Administration and the Department of State have already characterized it as a "national treasure." It will eventually be used to help write the Army's official history of the GWOT.¹⁴

Objectives and Accomplishments

Army doctrine for field history operations is discussed in ATP 1-20, chapter 3, "Organization for Field History Operations." This doctrine includes command history offices at all echelons, and other Army field history organizations such as MHDs. Erik Villard and I deployed as individual historians, with our initial objectives and orders determined by CMH. Once in Kuwait, these were refined based on discussions with USARCENT leadership and the guidance found in ATP 1-20.¹⁵ As previously mentioned, our four objectives were to establish collection procedures, begin collecting documents, establish coordination procedures with key staff, and prepare a transition plan for the MHD.

Establish collection procedures. Establishing collection procedures was our most important goal because it guided all our efforts. This involved writing a collection plan and getting a fragmentary order (FRAGO) published by USARCENT. We wrote the collection plan first since "the collection plan is the heart of any field history plan or order."¹⁶ We based it on discussions with USARCENT's leadership, initial observations, guidance

in ATP 1-20, and discussions with CMH. The plan contained a statement of purpose and intent, collection tasks, methods of collection, types of historical documents to be collected, collection priorities, disposition instructions, and the final products owed to USARCENT.

To formally notify the USARCENT staff of our mission, objectives, and requirements (and those of the follow-on MHD), we needed a FRAGO.¹⁷ This could have been done as annex to an operation order, but the USARCENT staff wanted a FRAGO. We drafted the basic order, staffed it for comments, and worked with the command's operations staff officers to get the document formatted and published. Publication took several weeks and required our active participation throughout the staffing process, but it was our single most important achievement because it laid the foundation for our efforts and those of the follow-on MHD.

Immediately upon arriving, we scheduled office calls with USARCENT's leaders, most of whom had deployed to Kuwait. We met not only with Terry but also with the deputy chief of staff and the command's principle staff (e.g., the deputy chief of staff for operations, G-3). The USARCENT deputy chief of staff briefed us on the command's recent activities and provided general guidance for how to go about accomplishing our mission. During the office calls with the other staff, we explained our mission, asked where we could locate the types of records we needed to collect, and outlined our requirements. All members of the USARCENT staff understood the importance of preserving operational records for posterity, and they were supportive. Through these office calls, we rapidly gained situational awareness, refined the collection plan, and made personal connections with individuals who would help open doors for us. The importance of networking and being personable cannot be overstated because otherwise we would have been isolated and ineffective. The office calls were also a productive use of time while waiting for network access. Attending routine meetings and social functions also enabled us to meet the command's staff in more informal setting.¹⁸

Begin collecting documents. Once we had met USARCENT's leaders, written a collection plan, and gained access to the network (which took about a week), document collecting began in earnest. In total, we collected over seventy gigabytes of digital documents (mostly classified SECRET). This established a baseline

upon which the MHD continued to collect. Our collection focused on USARCENT’s operations against IS, the Afghanistan retrograde, and activities throughout the USCENCOM area of responsibility. We collected from the command’s portal (SharePoint), network shared drive, and e-mail distribution lists. We collected briefing slides, orders (e.g., operation orders, FRAGOS, or execution orders), operational updates, messages, requests for forces, reports, key personnel lists, information papers, after-action reports, maps, and photographs.¹⁹

Collecting digital documents is a time-consuming, manual process that requires viewing thousands of

gather a large volume of documents in a short amount of time, the methodology needs to be simple and flexible. Therefore, we followed the convention most MHDs use, which is a hybrid approach of maintaining documents’ original integrity, but also reorganizing relevant documents together. We organized our collection first by the command generating the document, then by type (e.g., all FRAGOs of a command were grouped together) or by the staff section that produced the document.

Establish coordination procedures. Final disposition of our collection required sending copies to CMH and USARCENT.²⁰ Standard procedure calls

Folders	Data fields (with sample data)							
	Main section	Sub-section	Sub-subsection	Value (high, medium, or low)	Baseline date	Frequency (daily, weekly, or monthly)	Date last collected	Notes
1	Ops staff	G-3	G-33, products	High	23 Sept 2018	Daily	30 Sept 2018	
2	Ops staff	G-3	G-33, documents	High	18 Sept 2018	Daily	30 Sept 2018	On e-mail distribution
3	Ops staff	G-3	G-33, orders	High	18 Sept 2018	Daily	30 Sept 2018	

(Graphic by author)

Table. Basic Collection Matrix Example

individual files and deciding whether to add them to the collection. Because we were establishing a baseline collection upon which the follow-on MHDs would continue to build, we spent a lot of time mining USARCENT’s SharePoint portal and shared drives for relevant documents and reconstructing their file structure and metadata. Having access to e-mail distribution lists made collection maintenance easier.

To help build the collection and remember where, when, how regularly, and what types of documents to collect, we created a simple matrix in Microsoft Excel. Because the portal and share drive were sprawling, this enabled us to build the collection methodically and avoid duplication. The collection matrix also helped us identify and prioritize locations to revisit as new documents were generated. The table illustrates the basic metadata fields as column headings and sample data for three folders, or locations, listed on separate rows (the actual number would be much higher).

One methodological issue Army historians and MHDs face is whether to maintain documents’ original organizational structure or to reorganize them into specific collections. Because collection efforts often

for saving documents on external media (e.g., hard disk drives or DVDs) and mailing these via official mail.²¹ Mailing the collection, rather than transferring the data over a network connection, is done for several reasons. First, there is the volume of data. We collected seventy gigabytes in five weeks; the typical MHD collects many times this amount during a nine- or twelve-month deployment. Second, there are technical issues beyond a historian’s control: the bandwidth of Army networks is limited, moving data across Army network domains is difficult, and there are infrastructure limitations at CMH. Nevertheless, mailing the data imposed its own difficulties and required close coordination with the command’s security manager, information assurance office, and official post office to ensure we complied with security and information assurance requirements.

Prepare a transition plan. Finally, we prepared a transition plan for the 161st Military History Detachment (Georgia Army National Guard). We had hoped to conduct a relief in place in early October 2014, but unforeseen complications meant they did not arrive until January 2015. Therefore,



1st Sgt. William Staude, retired, salutes the national colors being carried by soldiers from the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command as they march past him during the Veterans Day parade 11 November 2011 in downtown Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Michel Sauret, 354th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

The Importance of Maintaining Field Records

A ProPublica-Seattle *Times* investigative report indicates that field records from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were lost, destroyed, or never maintained in the first place. Authors Peter Sleeth and Hal Bernton discuss this critical shortcoming and detail its ramifications in “Lost to History: Missing War Records Complicate Benefit Claims by Iraq, Afghanistan Veterans.”

The authors write, “Since the 1990 Gulf War, a failure to create and maintain the types of field records that have documented American conflicts since the Revolutionary War [has plagued the U.S. military].... The recordkeeping breakdown was especially acute in the early years of the Iraq war, when insurgents deployed improvised bombs with devastating effects on U.S. soldiers. The military has also lost or destroyed records from Afghanistan, according to officials and previously undisclosed documents. The loss of field records—after-action write-ups, intelligence reports and other day-to-day accounts from the war zones—has far-reaching implications. It has complicated efforts by soldiers ... to claim benefits. And it makes it harder for military strategists to learn the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, two of the nation’s most protracted wars. Military officers and historians say field records provide the granular details that, when woven together, tell larger stories hidden from participants in the day-to-day confusion of combat. The Army says it has taken steps to improve handling of records—including better training and more emphasis from top commanders. But officials familiar with the problem said the missing material may never be retrieved. ‘I can’t even start to describe the dimensions of the problem,’ said Conrad C. Crane, director of the U.S. Army’s Military History Institute. ‘I fear we’re never really going to know clearly what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan because we don’t have the records.’”

Note

To read the entire article, see Peter Sleeth and Hal Bernton, “Lost to History: Missing War Records Complicate Benefit Claims by Iraq, Afghanistan Veterans,” ProPublica website, 9 November 2012, accessed 28 November 2016, <https://www.propublica.org/article-lost-to-history-missing-war-records-complicate-benefit-claims-by-veterans>.

we prepared a continuity book, mobilized the collection effort, and briefed the USARCENT staff. The continuity book listed basic reference information such as key network folder locations, e-mail addresses, and points of contact. It also contained information on our collection activities and advice on travel, in- and out-processing, automation and network support, and security.

Challenges

We faced some challenges related to travel, technical, and security issues. These were part of the normal friction of operating in a location like Kuwait, but they would have resulted in mission failure had they not been resolved. Official travel is full of unique challenges related to the Defense Travel System and obtaining official orders for travel. We flew through Kuwait City International Airport and made sure to coordinate ahead of time with USARCENT for transportation. Before departing, we contacted the USARCENT G-6 (office of the chief information officer) to initiate network and e-mail access, which sped access to the network upon arrival. Securing external media exemptions from the command’s information assurance shop required patience and persistence. Physical security imposed restrictions on movement and communications that necessitated careful coordination and preplanning. Because of limited office space, we moved three times in five weeks. By remaining flexible and coordinating with the staff ahead of time, we minimized the disruptiveness of these moves. Finally, mailing the hard drives was complicated due to the official post office’s limited hours and procedures.

Conclusion

Since Villard and I returned home, three MHDs have deployed to Kuwait, and the collection effort continues today. As an Army historian, I found helping USARCENT build a historical document collection a rewarding professional development opportunity. We demonstrated that Army civilian historians

can fill the role of a military history detachment for a short period. Historians rarely have a chance to witness firsthand history in the making and the creation of the records they use as the foundation of their research. The chance to observe a theater army in action was unique, and we witnessed the skill and professionalism of U.S. Army soldiers, civilians, and

contractors. I am proud to have had the privilege of working alongside them to help build a historical record of their accomplishments. ■

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the policy or position of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any agency of the U.S. government.

Notes

1. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 1-20, *Military History Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 9 June 2014).
2. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook No. 09-22, *Commander's Guide to Operational Records and Data Collection: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, March 2009).
3. Collecting operational unit records helps facilitate soldier care by preserving records useful for processing benefits claims or conducting research studies.
4. U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) perpetuates the lineage of Third Army, organized in 1918, which saw extensive combat in Northern Europe during World War II. In 2006, Third Army was redesignated as USARCENT. See "Lineage and Honors; Main Command Post and Operational Command Post Headquarters, United States Army Central," U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) website, 5 April 2011, accessed 2 November 2016, <http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/lineages/branches/army/usacentral.htm>.
5. "U.S. Army Central/Third Army History," USARCENT website, accessed 27 October 2016, <http://www.usarcent.army.mil/About-USARCENT/History/>.
6. Joint Publication 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 24 February 2014), x. "The designation of a JFLCC [joint force land component commander] normally occurs when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the JFC [joint force commander] determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces." A CFLCC [coalition forces land component commander] performs the same functions, but within a multinational force.
7. ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, 3-4. Additional information on the organization and employment of military history detachments can be found in ATP 1-20, chap. 4, and Army Regulation (AR) 870-5, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 21 September 2007).
8. ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, 1-2.
9. *Ibid.*, 5-7.
10. AR 25-400-2, *The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS)* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2 October 2007). The U.S. Army in World War II series can be found on the CMH website, last modified 27 May 2011, accessed 2 November 2016, <http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/usaww2.html>.
11. William M. Yarborough, "Undocumented Triumph: Gulf War Operational Records Management," *The Journal of Military History* 76 (October 2013): 1431-32; CALL Handbook No. 09-22 also contains a discussion on the breakdown of Army records management and its manifestation during the Persian Gulf War.
12. AR 25-400-2, *The Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS)* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 15 October 1986, now obsolete). Subsequent editions of AR 25-400-2 were published before it was superseded by ARIMS.
13. For additional information on operational records management during the Gulf War, see Yarborough, "Undocumented Triumph: Gulf War Operational Records Management."
14. U.S. Army Center of Military History, *U.S. Army Center of Military History Strategic Plan, 2015-2019* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 4. CMH has transferred a record copy of the Global War on Terrorism collection to the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency for accessioning to the National Archives and Records Administration.
15. For more information about individual historians and teams, see ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, para. 3-16. Additional guidance relevant to our mission is in ATP 1-20, chaps. 4, 5, and 6.
16. *Ibid.*, 6-5.
17. A fragmentary order is an abbreviated form of an operation order.
18. Raising situational awareness by meeting leaders and attending regular meetings was recommended by ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, and by former Army historians who had been deployed.
19. For a list of the types of documents Army historians collect, see ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, 5-1-5-2.
20. The requirement for military history detachments and field historians to send a copy of their collection to CMH is prescribed in AR 870-5, *Military History*, para. 4-7 c(3), p. 10; see also ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, 4-7.
21. Mailing records classified SECRET by official mail is authorized per AR 380-5, *Department of the Army Information Security Program* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 29 September 2000), para. 8-3.



Capt. Irvin Drummond, U.S. Army, studies at a computer 18 May 2007. (Photo by Chris Sanders, U.S. Army)

Writing

A Way to Maximize Returns on the Army's Investments in Education



Maj. Hassan Kamara, U.S. Army

Have the courage to write, publish, and be heard. Launch your ideas and be an integral part of the conversation. Why? Because it makes our nation and our profession stronger. In the end, no one of us is as smart as all of us thinking together.

—Adm. Jim Stavridis, U.S. Navy, Retired

The dialogue on educating the force tends to focus mostly on making additional investments in education, which is increasingly difficult to do in the contemporary era of budget and workforce reductions. Therefore, this article refocuses the dialogue on a way the U.S. Army can maximize returns on the

investments it has made in education. Soldier education and training rank high among the Army's priorities despite budget and workforce reductions. The 2015 unveiling of the Army University evidences the service's commitment to invest in soldier education. According to its charter, the Army University "represents a greater investment in our soldiers and civilians through improved education that will increase competence, character and commitment."¹ Typically, people and institutions invest to yield maximum returns, which raises the question: How can the Army maximize returns on its investments in soldier education? In other words, how can the Army better tap into the soldier expertise it is cultivating through sustained investments in education?

An increased emphasis on writing can help the Army effectively utilize the soldier expertise it is cultivating through sustained investments in education. Implementing *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* requires growing competent, innovative, and adaptive leaders consistent with some of the concept's operational tenets.² By emphasizing writing, the Army can enhance soldier competence, innovation, and critical thinking—this article highlights how, and it posits ways the Army can get soldiers to write more, and better.

Literature on Writing

There is considerable literature on writing, and a brief examination will help provide context and clarity on ensuing arguments about the utility of writing to the Army. Some works on writing discuss the importance and benefits of writing well, but much of the literature on writing seeks to improve writing skills in some respect.

Clear written communication is important and beneficial. The Army understands the importance of clear written communication and promotes it in manuals. For example, Army Regulation (AR) 25-50, *Preparing and Managing Correspondence*, promotes effective written communication within the ranks. It defines effective Army writing as being "understood by the reader in a single rapid reading and ... free of errors in substance, organization, style, and correctness."³ Other examples of the Army's appreciation of, and commitment to, effective writing are the now-revoked AR 600-70, *The Army Writing Program* (1985), and Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-67, *Effective Writing for Army Leaders* (1986). In

DA Pam 600-67, then Army Chief of Staff Gen. John A. Wickham Jr. referred to the fateful Charge of the Light Brigade—a failure based partly on unclear written orders—at the 1854 Battle of Balaclava. Wickham stated, "one way to assure ... clear and concise communication is by improving the quality of our writing."⁴ This perspective is shared by some in the Army. For example, in his well-written 2011 article in the *Military Review* journal titled "Flight Simulation for the Brain: Why Army Officers Must Write," Maj. Trent Lythgoe echoes the critical importance to the Army, as well as the benefits, of writing well. Lythgoe highlights a link between writing and critical thinking, arguing that "writing, although valuable as a communication medium, is most valuable as a powerful way of thinking."⁵

Among the numerous works that seek to improve writing skills, Henriette Anne Klausner's book *Writing on Both Sides of the Brain* stands out as a key enabler to writers and aspiring writers. Klausner helps writers manage their creative, free-writing tendency vis-à-vis their strong impulse to edit and correct.⁶ William Zinsser's *On Writing Well* counts among the salient works about writing improvement. Zinsser tackles common challenges in writing, such as simplicity, style, and techniques—for tenses, grammar, and mechanics.⁷ James Kilpatrick's *The Writer's Art* also describes writing techniques, insights, and examples for both professional and aspiring writers.⁸ Naveed Saleh's *The Complete Guide to Article Writing: How to Write Successful Articles for Online and Print Markets*, is notable for its emphasis on the importance of research in writing successful articles, and for its insights on excelling at the writing craft in general.⁹

Maj. Hassan Kamara, U.S. Army, is an armor officer and an assistant product manager assigned to Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. He has served on the U.S. Forces Korea Joint Staff (J-3), and, prior to that, commanded a Stryker infantry company at Fort Bliss, Texas, and an armor company in Iraq. He holds a BA in political science from Arizona State University, and an MA in security studies from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Kamara is also an honor graduate of the U.S. Naval War College Command and Staff Course.



Writing as a Means to Improve Soldier Competence

The Army can cultivate and better utilize soldier competence by compelling soldiers to write articles about professional military topics and by including writing on operational matters as part of their daily duties. They should conduct research, think critically, and study. These processes are inherent in professional writing, and are catalysts for developing competent and adaptive soldiers. Naveed Saleh concurs that research is inherent in writing, and he reports, “good writers spend about 80 percent of their time actually writing. Good research helps you determine what’s important with respect to the issue being explored and much more.”¹⁰ Kate L. Turabian describes the knowledge-enhancing value of research, stating that writing a research report increases one’s knowledge on a subject and enhances one’s ability to write.¹¹ So, by compelling soldiers to research and write on aspects of the military profession and also as part of daily operations, the Army can help them build the high level of competence vital to overcoming complex challenges.

Adm. James Stavridis, commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, addresses students from the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Enlisted Academy during a visit to the Naval War College 23 October 2012 in Newport, Rhode Island. In a 2008 article in *Proceedings*, Stavridis advocates writing for publication. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Eric Dietrich, U.S. Navy)

Dwight Eisenhower’s experience under the command and mentorship of Maj. Gen. Fox Conner is a good example of how an emphasis on writing in daily operations can enhance competence. While they were stationed in Panama during the early 1920s, Conner had his young protégé and operations officer write plans and operation orders on a daily basis, which grew Eisenhower’s prowess as an operational planner. In a letter reply to Eisenhower’s request for insights to help him prepare for attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Conner wrote,

You may not know it, but because of your three years’ work in Panama, you are far better trained and ready for Leavenworth than anybody I know. You will recall that during your

entire service [with me] I required that you write a field order for the operation of the post every day for the years you were there. You became so well acquainted with the technics [sic] and routine of preparing plans and orders for operations that included their logistics, that they will be second nature to you.¹²

Reflecting on his experience with the operational planning exercises at Leavenworth, Eisenhower would later write, “Fox Conner had been correct, we had done this type of war-gaming in Panama.”¹³

Writing as a Means to Improve Innovation in the Ranks

In addition to building and utilizing soldier competence and expertise, the Army can promote innovation by emphasizing professional writing. Innovation thrives on discourse, which is greatly enhanced by writing and publishing. In other words, writing promotes the free and rapid exchange of ideas and facts, which helps spawn new and innovative ideas. According to Elizabeth Eisenstein, the “revival of learning” in the Renaissance period in fourteenth-century Italy was spurred by the advent of the printing press and the ability to mass-produce various works of writing.¹⁴

Historically, soldiers have written as a way to promote professional dialogue and drive innovation and change. The institutional impact of some who have written and published their ideas long ago can still be felt today. According to Edward Cox, in 1910 while serving on the General Staff, Conner “began writing articles for publication in professional military journals” and published an article titled “Field Artillery in Cooperation with the Other Arms,” which spawned major changes to field artillery regulations.¹⁵ Similarly, Eisenhower and George S. Patton Jr. challenged the conventional infantry doctrine of their day and inspired professional dialogue by publishing articles in the infantry and cavalry journals on combined arms maneuver and armored warfare.¹⁶

Writing helps disseminate information and ideas, which promotes institutional learning, adaptation, and innovation. For example, during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, units were able to share operational lessons by providing written feedback from their combat tours to centralized forums such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and in many cases directly to the units replacing them. This exchange and ready access

to written lessons spurred innovation and adaptation, especially at the tactical level. In his incisive study of military innovation during the Iraq campaign, James Russell highlights that innovation flowed from the tactical level upward as some units adapted their doctrine, organization, and equipment to campaign-specific conditions.¹⁷ Since units typically rotated to home station after a year, sustained adaptation and innovation during the Iraq campaign was largely made possible by sharing written observations and lessons. The Army’s ongoing transformation also depends on sharing lessons, and on learning. Michael Formica concurs by writing that Army transformation would “require the Army to foster a dialogue throughout the organization about the lessons learned.”¹⁸

Writing as a Means to Improve Critical Thinking and Initiative

Winning in the complex contemporary and future operational environments requires better, and more aggressive, thinkers. Challenging and encouraging soldiers to write will help the Army promote critical thinking and initiative in the ranks. Retired Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes concurs that the Army will need to grow and promote “free-thinking, aggressive, risk-taking” officers to lead the complex wars of the present and future, or the Fourth Generation.¹⁹ In his article on writing, Lythgoe argues, “if the Army wants better thinkers, we should start by educating better writers.”²⁰ Desirae Gieseman concurs by writing that the contemporary Army wants “strategic thinkers,” and “a better approach to Army writing will help the Army develop them.”²¹ Interestingly, critical thinking and initiative are indispensable qualities to mission command—a command philosophy that advocates the practice of empowering subordinates to execute missions within the intent of higher echelons, using disciplined initiative.

To better leverage soldiers’ ability to think critically, Army leaders should strongly consider reducing the Army’s overreliance on PowerPoint, by opting to have subordinates present information to them in written reports and briefs, as in pre-PowerPoint times. Hammes writes that prior to PowerPoint, Army staffs “prepared succinct two- or three-page summaries of key issues,” which involved greater intellectual rigor, and afforded more time for staffers and decision makers to analyze and weigh issues in depth.²² PowerPoint does not help



the Army fully realize its investments in soldier education and expertise because it hinders critical thinking. Hammes writes that PowerPoint is “a tool that is the antithesis of thinking ... it is actively hostile to thoughtful decision-making.”²³ Lythgoe writes, “it is relatively easy to produce a PowerPoint presentation without clearly understanding the subject matter. We can cut, paste, and rearrange bullet statements to produce the illusion of thinking and understanding.”²⁴ By emphasizing written reports where feasible, in lieu of or complementary to PowerPoint briefs, the Army can compel soldiers to think critically and with greater depth on issues.

How Can the Army Get Soldiers to Write More, and Better?

Writing is a great means for the Army to cultivate and exploit soldier competence, innovation, and

A soldier of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 34th “Red Bull” Infantry Division, deployed in support of Operation New Dawn, writes a letter home 9 October 2012 at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army)

critical thinking—but how can the Army get soldiers to write more, and better? Army leaders at all levels can start by requiring their subordinates to craft well-written documents and correspondence as part of their daily unit operations. They can also develop formal requirements and performance-related incentives for soldiers to write professionally. Lythgoe concurs and writes that the Army should “bring good writing back as a visible part of day-to-day Army operations,” with leaders demanding subordinates write well in e-mails and other written forms of communication.²⁵ An increased requirement for well-written documents

and correspondence in daily administration will help soldiers and leaders think more critically about issues, and become more competent.

Getting soldiers to write more and better in daily operations will again require a shift from the Army's current overreliance on PowerPoint as a tool to present information to decision makers. This is because PowerPoint inherently requires users to compress information irrespective of the complexities involved, which fosters a preoccupation with summarizing data at the expense of careful analysis, logic, and coherence. According to Edward Tufte, a study that compared PowerPoint with other methods for presenting information yielded evidence that "PowerPoint, compared to other common presentation tools, reduces the analytical quality of serious presentations of evidence. This is especially the case for the PowerPoint ready-made templates, which corrupt statistical reasoning, and often weaken verbal and spatial thinking."²⁶ Interestingly, in his 2015 visit to U.S. Forces in Kuwait, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter was reported to have barred the use of PowerPoint in an effort to "challenge his commanders' thinking."²⁷

The Army can get more soldiers to write professionally by creating and formalizing requirements and performance-related incentives for them to write for publication, or in some cases doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures development. Conceptually, emulative of the Army Acquisition Corps' annual requirement for its members to accrue forty continuous learning points per year, the Army could mandate that commissioned and senior noncommissioned officers publish at least one research article every year in a professional publication. This increased emphasis on professional writing would also help the Army maximize returns on its investments in great resources like *The Army Press* and *Military Review*, and it would promote professional dialogue.

Additionally, the Army could institute written examinations as part of the entrance criteria for officer and noncommissioned officer developmental courses or schools. Douglas Macgregor concurs by writing that as a way to cultivate a habit of professional study early in officers' careers, the Army should institute a written examination for admission to the Command and General Staff College. Macgregor writes that "by publishing the list of required reading and study material, captains would know precisely what areas would be tested and what skills they would need to perform

well."²⁸ At this juncture, it is relevant to highlight that in 2015 the Army implemented and evaluated an initiative in which noncommissioned officers attending the Warrior Leader Course, Advanced Leader Course, Senior Leader Course, Master Leader Course, and Sergeants Major Course were required to write essays that were evaluated by what is known as the Criterion Writing Assessment Tool. This tool helps the Army identify and remedy the writing and communicative challenges of noncommissioned officers.²⁹

The Army can also get soldiers to write by encouraging leaders at all echelons to give higher performance evaluations to soldiers who—all other things being equal—demonstrate a higher level of professionalism relative to their peers by undertaking to study, research, and write on aspects of the profession of arms. Promotion boards could be made to award extra points for candidates who have demonstrated commitment to professional and intellectual growth by consistently fulfilling their mandatory annual requirement to publish on a topic of relevance to the profession.

Finally, the Army can inspire soldiers to write by emphasizing reading. One could convincingly argue that the Army has a strong reading tradition—citing the professional reading lists of numerous Army leaders as evidence. However, the existence of professional reading lists, while inspiring and motivational to some, fails to encourage the preponderance of soldiers to read and study the profession on their own time. Leader (command) emphasis is required to get the majority of soldiers to read professionally. Leaders, preferably commanders, should make reading and subsequent discourse a part of their units' periodic professional development seminars. Reading and discourse will inspire soldiers to write, which will vigorously spur professional growth in the Army. According to Lythgoe, "writing, when combined with reading, produces powerful thinking."³⁰ Some of the most illustrious officers in the Army's history grew professionally through voracious reading, critical thinking, discourse, and writing. While in Panama, Eisenhower not only wrote but also read extensively. Cox writes that Eisenhower and Conner "would read biographies of Civil War generals and spent [sic] hours discussing their decisions together," frequently conversing well into the night.³¹ Interestingly, according to Cox, it was also during this time that Conner passed on his experiences and lessons

from fighting alongside the Allied powers in World War I, and he urged Eisenhower to learn all he could about fighting wars with alliances.³²

Conclusion

With more soldiers reading, thinking, and writing on its challenges and future, the Army could witness breakthroughs in military thinking and innovation just as the German army (Reichswehr) did a century ago. During the period between World Wars I and II, the German Army was able to reform itself and develop combined arms doctrine in large part because its chief of staff, Hans Von Seeckt, dedicated ten percent of the Officer Corps to studying and writing about World War I. According to Williamson Murray, Hans Von Seeckt tasked over four hundred officers with combat experience (roughly 10 percent of Germany's downsized Officer Corps of four thousand, who were organized into different committees) to study and write about World War I doctrine and tactics, as well as future war; "the result was the

extraordinary Army Regulation 487 'Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms.'"³³ This regulation (published from 1921-1923) changed the focus of German doctrine from defensive to offensive maneuver, and it emphasized decentralization and initiative—key tenets of mission command.³⁴ In his insightful article titled "Read, Think, Write, and Publish," Adm. Jim Stavridis argues that the U.S. military will benefit similarly if more service members study, write, and publish on the myriad of contemporary challenges facing their institutions and the joint force.³⁵

The U.S. Army will continue to prioritize and invest in soldier education and training. As the institution seeks and implements innovative ways to educate soldiers, it should also continue to look for ways it can maximize returns on the investments it has made. Emphasizing that soldiers write more and better in their daily operations, as well as professionally, is a way for the Army to maximize returns—in the form of increased soldier competence, innovation, and critical thinking—on its investments in education. ■

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
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MilitaryReview

WE RECOMMEND



Western officials and analysts can improve their understanding of Russian arms control priorities, peacekeeping agendas, military-to-military goals, and perhaps even intent by understanding how Russian military professionals think and express their ideas in writing. With this in mind, Timothy Thomas offers *Thinking like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on the Nature of War*.

The first part of Thomas's monograph demonstrates that Russian military writing typically begins by assessing trends in the character of war and then predicting how future conflicts are likely to unfold. The prediction is followed by assessing how the forces and the means to conduct war correlate for each side in a conflict. Russian military writers then examine the forms and methods of potential confrontation. They review historical lessons learned, foreign and domestic, and decision making about the initial period of war, which Russian analysts consider critical to success.

The second part of the monograph investigates four sources of Russian military thinking: official voices in the defense ministry, two groups of theorists who have regularly dominated thinking regarding the nature of war in Russian military publications, and individual and group thought. Interesting topics include emerging trends in armed struggles, bioweapons, indirect and asymmetric actions, futurology, new-generation weapons, military art, strategic deterrence (both nuclear and nonnuclear), and understanding the concept of geopolitical conditioning. A special interest is Russia's new focus on new-type warfare, which appears to be different from new-generation warfare and is championed by Russia's General Staff.

To view this monograph, visit: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Thinking%20Like%20A%20Russian%20Officer_monograph_Thomas%20%28final%29.pdf.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Response to Col. Kevin McAninch's "How the Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program Could Become a Catalyst for Leader Development"

(Military Review, September-October 2016)

Dr. Jon Fallesen

In the September-October 2016 issue of *Military Review*, Col. Kevin McAninch's article on multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) claimed that the Army is not getting as much value from the MSAF program as it could if the program were implemented differently.¹ While I agree that MSAF can realize greater value, there are several aspects of the program that should be clarified.

The program grew into a requirement from the idea of providing Army leaders with development that was uniquely individualized. MSAF was implemented through the initiative process of the Army Leader Development Program from recommendations in the Army Training and Leader Development Panel study.²

How the Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program Could Become a Catalyst for Leader Development

Col. Kevin McAninch, U.S. Army

Developing strategic thinkers, planners, and leaders is one of the most important things we do, and is grounded in the best possible training, education, and experience.

—Gen. Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army

The U.S. Army considers it important to develop leaders who can operate in the dynamic, strategic environment of the twenty-first century. A component of the Army's training and leader development, and a tool in the self-development domain, is the Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) program. The MSAF is a 360-degree leader development tool. It provides feedback to leaders who have been rated by subordinates and focuses their self-development.

Implemented in 2010, the MSAF initially allows leaders to complete complex leadership challenges, to enhance leader adaptability and self-awareness, and to identify Army leader strengths and weaknesses. "Self-Speaks their preparation for future leader responsibilities." Many civilian organizations use 360-degree feedback for employee development. In the Army, officers are required to initiate assessments, provide assessments of others, and receive the data of their MSAF results on their self-evaluation report (SER).

Showing positive participation does not equate to developmental effectiveness. Civilian studies on post-assessment feedback from 360-degree programs indicate

widespread employee performance improvement is unlikely.³ Additionally, when the feedback is only in the hands of the individual, accountability in interpreting it is lacking, and an inability to implement behavior changes is likely.⁴ Development fails to occur when rated officers are unaccountable, when they see the feedback as supplemental information, or when they view the assessment as an administrative event instead of part of their developmental process. In other words, the tool can become just a bureaucratic hoop to jump through.

In their groundbreaking work *Emerging Character: Pathways to the Army Profession*, Leonard Pittenger and Steven J. Gertz discuss the Army MSAF.

Requiring all officers to enter on their CERAs that they have initiated a multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) in the last three years probably has the unintended purpose of escalating the force to 360-degree feedback. But, the unintended outcome has been the diminution of the practice of an officer's agreement to rated officers, rates, and dates versus the requirement as an administrative nuisance rather than an ethical choice.⁵

The Army is failing to make effective use of the MSAF. This failure is not because 360-degree assessments are inherently flawed. Instead, it is because the Army's implementation is flawed. With certain changes, the MSAF could be a powerful means for building the



Army Lieutenant Paul D. de Saubiere (center) receives the Medal of Honor from General Gen. G. Milley (right) during a ceremony on 21 May 2014. (Photo by Sgt. Ryan Noyes, U.S. Army)

kind of relationships that would enhance leader development. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to influence the Army to improve how it uses the program. The discussion first shows how and why the MSAF is failing to meet its goals. Then it describes critical weaknesses in Army leader development efforts that a 360-degree assessment tool could address, if implemented effectively. Next, it explores ways the Army could respond to the evidence that Army leaders are scarcely benefiting from the MSAF. Finally, it recommends the Army adopt five initiatives that could make the MSAF an effective catalyst for leader development.

How the Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program Measures Up

Each year, the Center for Army Leadership conducts surveys to assess leadership in the Army. It produces annual reports known as the Center for Army

Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL).⁶

The reports cover a wide range of topics and capture "assessments from the field about leadership and leader development."⁷ The center has been assessing the MSAF since 2010. The 2014 report, published June 2015, describes the goal for the MSAF program: "The optimal impact of the process is a, increasing leader's capability to reflect through the assessed leader's actions that follow feedback receipt, such as requesting additional feedback from others, interacting with a coach, developing an individual leader development plan (ILDP), and self-initiated learning."⁸

These program goals, the 2014 CASAL highlights the disappointing state of the MSAF program. The report shows that most officers using MSAF do not value the program, do not desire efforts to self-develop and improve, and do not understand their feedback. The goals of the MSAF program are not being achieved. Indicators also suggest "a culture of resistance" from

information, they can continue to grow and develop as an Army leader.⁶ He sees that improving readiness depends on improving leadership.

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) agrees with McAninch that the MSAF program is worth investing the effort to increase its impact. The CAL Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) studies show that a majority of officers rate MSAF effective for making them more aware of their strengths and developmental needs.⁷ An even higher percentage of junior and senior NCOs and Army civilian leaders rate it effective.⁸ While ratings of value are mostly favorable, attitudes on some criteria are declining or are level, especially among officers who are required to record compliance on their officer evaluation report (OER).

One reason for the ratings trends is that many officers are not using the program as designed:

- Army leaders are required to complete an assessment on themselves and to contribute to the assessments of other leaders. Many leaders are not getting other leaders to participate in their assessments.⁹ Without 360-degree feedback from multiple personnel, no 360-degree program will have a strong impact.
- Many leaders are not viewing their feedback report, so they are not receiving any value from their assessment other than the possible intrinsic value of reflecting on their leadership while they complete the self-assessment.¹⁰
- Many leaders are not discussing their feedback with anyone.¹¹ They are not making use of MSAF coaches, not seeking coaching from professional military education faculty, and not discussing it with their superior, mentors, or peers. Without coaching, they are not being challenged to treat the feedback as a real indication of their ability nor how to learn to use their strengths to improve themselves.

Implementation cannot be entirely faulted if the program is not used as intended.

McAninch omitted a comparison of MSAF to other Army leader development practices, which would shed additional light on its value. The impact of MSAF on leader development is similar to the impact of other programs like Army-provided distance learning, formal leader development programs within units, and performance counseling.¹² MSAF requires a small amount of time and a fraction of investment compared to these other practices. For every two Army leaders, only one

completed an assessment on another leader in the last year, and on average each assessment took twenty minutes or less to complete.¹³ Costs are low, and many leaders assessed by MSAF rate it favorably for improving their leadership capabilities and improving their unit or organization. Education, seminars, performance counseling, and assessments and feedback are all desired practices for developing leaders in any organization.

Low to moderate impact ratings of leader development practices may be symptoms of a culture that is not fully vested in improving leadership. A defining aspect of a skill is that it can be improved through development or practice. The Army's 2009 CASAL results revealed that one-fifth of Army leaders believed that leadership ability is what a person is born with and training would not change it, although a considerable majority did believe that leadership is a skill and can be improved.¹⁴ Multiple studies demonstrate that leadership can be treated as a skill and that its development can result in improved leadership performance.¹⁵ For any Army leader development to work, Army leaders must believe it is important and possible to improve.

McAninch recommended four ways to improve the MSAF program. Two of the ways involved compulsory actions, which are contradictory to his point about changing the program to be purely voluntary. A successful 360-degree program requires doing it, understanding the feedback, and taking action on the feedback. Forcing someone to self-develop is not a certain path to improvement. If tracking mandatory compliance through the OER had a negative impact on the perceived value of the program, forcing follow-up would have a similar negative impact.

Another recommendation by McAninch actually has been an original and enduring aspect of the MSAF program. Training coaches, especially faculty as coaches, has always been a part of the MSAF program. The original directive required professional military education faculty, cadre, and staff to provide coaching to assist students in interpreting 360-degree results and planning development action plans for improvement.¹⁶ Counseling students on leadership has been a requirement of faculty since at least 2002.¹⁷ MSAF provides a source of feedback that can help

Dr. Jon Fallesen is chief of the Leadership Research, Assessment, and Doctrine Division, Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

faculty to perform this function. CAL furnishes tailored coaching guides for faculty and has conducted professional development programs in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools on MSAF coaching.¹⁸ CAL has increased the number of instructional sessions for TRADOC schools for fiscal year 2017.

McAninch recommended that tools be restructured to support vertical development. This point is at odds with Army doctrine that emphasizes common behaviors across levels and positions. The new OER system does not require different competencies at three different levels of leadership as implied in the article. Instead, the tiered OER presents the same competencies at different levels of detail, which allows higher-ranking raters to use greater discretion in what aspects are emphasized. A central idea of an organization's competency-based framework is to first focus on what is common. This reinforces leaders' identifying with a common purpose and working together to achieve shared understanding and synchronized intent. The vertical aspect of development is achieved with assessors of different ranks assessing leaders of different ranks.

McAninch's article implied that the MSAF questions were modeled after Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) products and the Army did not "grow its own." The Army did develop its own competency model and a unique 360-degree assessment instrument. The Army Research Institute developed and validated the Leadership Requirements Model before it was adopted into Army doctrine.¹⁹ The questions used in the MSAF instruments were developed to tie directly to these Army competencies and were updated when doctrine was updated in 2012. The MSAF questions tie directly to the behaviors described in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*, and Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Leader Development*.²⁰ The Army Leadership Requirements Model uses ten leadership competencies and thirteen attributes, while CCL's Benchmarks has sixteen leadership competencies and five derailment factors.²¹ There are only three competencies with similar titles between the Army Leader Behavior Scale (LBS) 2.0 and CCL's Benchmarks instrument. The LBS 2.0 has fifty-four items, while Benchmarks has 130 items. Only about ten items from Benchmarks have much commonality to the LBS items. CASAL studies continue to show that the Army leadership competencies are valid

predictors of outcomes desired in the Army—leader effectiveness, subordinate productivity, team cohesion, and unit ability to perform missions.²²

A good way to increase the impact of 360-degree assessments lies in the hands of commanders who have the authority to set up and conduct Unit 360 events. Gen. William Wallace, the senior official responsible for leader development at the time of program decision, saw the strength of 360-degree assessments in the context of a crucible training event, where leaders get the full opportunity to exercise leadership and to observe the leadership of others under realistic conditions. The Army's policy writers for MSAF thought that requiring 360-degree assessments in mission rehearsal exercises would be too burdensome for deploying units and instead focused implementation guidance—and eventual compliance reporting for officers—around the individual self-initiated events. Some commanders and other organizational leaders still elect to conduct Unit 360 events.²³ They report great value in the feedback they receive on leadership trends in their units. Compared to self-initiated events, Unit 360-assessed leaders are twice as likely to discuss their feedback with others and to develop an individual development plan, and nine times more likely to get coaching.²⁴

CAL's MSAF team continually works on designing improvements to MSAF. One example is based on input received from the field. The MSAF individual feedback reports will be enhanced to show leaders how they are assessed compared to the average for their rank group. The report will also provide ways to develop based on the leader's individualized results. The development actions are already available in chapter 7 of FM 6-22, and the MSAF feedback report will be modified to include the most relevant actions matching a specific leader's results.²⁵ This will enable leaders to better see what they can do to accelerate their development. The report will also provide more emphasis on how to make immediate use of the feedback, rather than focusing on follow-on actions in an individual leader development plan. For example, if superiors rate the leader more favorably than subordinates, the leader may be too upwardly focused and not attending to what subordinates expect from that leader. This feedback can prompt an immediate change in self-awareness, and it can be acted on without

creating a development plan. These improvements will help increase the effects of MSAF. Whatever the design

features and implementation decisions, the impact of any program ultimately depends on how leaders use it. ■


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The True Believer

Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements

Eric Hoffer, Harper Perennial,
New York, 2010, 192 pages



Lt. Col. Benjamin Buchholz, U.S. Army

Many theories attempt to define and offer solutions for dealing with the brand of radical Islam that fuels Middle Eastern movements such as Daesh.¹ Other attempts have been made to demonstrate that radical Islam is not Islam at all, except in the most superficial or perverted manner. The constant claim in those scenarios is that Islamist ideology not only misrepresents Islam, but it can also be viewed as “a virulent vision all its own, one that its adherents have created by plucking selections from centuries of traditions.”² However, this argument rarely extends far enough to give the “virulent vision” a name other than *radical*, or *fundamental* Islam, let alone suggest remedies.³ Common to both of these approaches is the base assumption that the problem of Daesh and al-Qaida should be defined in Islamic terms. An alternative methodology, one that applies the sociology of mass movements rather than the prejudices of religion, removes ipso facto the contentiousness of religious debate and provides insights into—and new methods for countering—these movements’ appeal.⁴

As such, Eric Hoffer’s study in *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* not only

provides a roadmap for analyzing radical Islam as something other than religious heterodoxy but also offers solutions that suggest new approaches to dealing with the many, apparently intractable issues radical Islam presents.⁵ The work is broken into four main parts, though two apply most practically to the mass movement of radical Islam: a discussion of why mass movements have appeal and an analysis of the traits most likely to produce converts to a mass movement.⁶

The Appeal of Mass Movements

Two points that apply directly to the rise of Daesh as a mass movement appear in the beginning of *The True Believer*. First, Hoffer states,

The contribution of the Western democracies to the awakening of the East has been indirect and certainly unintended. They have kindled an enthusiasm of resentment against the West; and it is this anti-Western fervor which is at present rousing the Orient from its stagnation of centuries.⁷

Second, instead of merely blaming discontent for the rise of mass movements, Hoffer digs deeper. He situates

the rise of mass movements at the intersection of discontent and power, stating,

For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be intensely discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that by the possession of some potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they have access to a source of irresistible power.⁸

Here, the potential effects of the various Arab Spring movements come to mind, albeit stifled or subsumed, with both discontent in a present situation and hope in a doctrine (at that point, democracy) strongly intermixed across the Middle East. Where democracy could not take root, which was nowhere in any of those movements—not in Egypt, not in Yemen, certainly not in Syria or Iraq, nor in the states of the Arabian Gulf—Islamism provided and still provides an alternate source for the inculcation of a sense of “irresistible power.”

The individual’s craving for that power is Hoffer’s next main point. He maintains that, rather than a Western concept of individual self-sufficiency offering a palliative, mass movement “attracts and holds a following not because it can satisfy the desire for self-advancement, but because it can satisfy the passion for self-renunciation.”⁹ Individualism scares most of the masses, more so with those who have come from a communal mindset, for when they succeed within a Western milieu those “who attain fortune and fame often find it difficult to gain entrance into the exclusive circles of the majority. They are thus made conscious of their foreignness.”¹⁰ Those who fail, and have neither individual success nor any longer a sense of communal identity, “see their lives and the present as spoiled beyond remedy and they are ready to waste and wreck both; hence, their recklessness and their will to chaos and anarchy.”¹¹ In the particular case of a deeply tribal and communal society such as those that comprise most of the Middle East, and especially with hope of a transition to democracy waning, Hoffer’s statement that “all the advantages brought by the West are ineffectual substitutes for the sheltering and soothing anonymity of communal existence” rings especially true.¹² Mass movements, like those on which Daesh and al-Qaida fuel their respective brands of radical Islam, provide the anonymity of a bygone commune, a purpose into which individual strivings can be melded and forgotten, and a power the subsumed individual can believe irresistible.

Hoffer makes two additional points in this section that are worth mentioning in the context of Islamic radicalism. First, he states that mass movements are a zero-sum proposition, competitive against one another for the raw material of financing and recruitment.¹³ This bears out in the ongoing conflict not only in Syria between various splinter Islamist groups that coalesced into a dominant Daesh presence in early 2014, but also in the now apparent struggle in various parts of the world between Daesh and al-Qaida.¹⁴ Second, Hoffer begins his analysis by emphasizing that mass movements are interchangeable with one another. He says, in reference to the West, “In the past, religious movements were the conspicuous vehicles of change. The conservatism of a religion—its orthodoxy—is the inert coagulum of a once highly reactive sap.”¹⁵ He continues with other cases, “In modern times, the mass movements involved in the realization of vast and rapid change are revolutionary and nationalist.”¹⁶ He cites numerous examples of this interchangeability, and sums up the entire equation by stating,

Since all mass movements draw their adherents from the same types of humanity and appeal to the same types of mind, it follows:

(a) all mass movements are competitive, and the gain of one in

adherents is the loss of all the others; (b) all mass movements are interchangeable. ... A religious movement may develop into a social revolution or a nationalist movement; a social revolution, into militant nationalism or a religious movement; a nationalist movement into a social revolution or a religious movement.¹⁷

It just so happens that the sap flowing now, not soon to coagulate in the Middle East, takes the form of a religious movement, rather than a social

Lt. Col. Benjamin Buchholz, U.S. Army, is a strategic planner at U.S. Central Command. He served as Army attaché and chief of attaché operations in Sana’a, Yemen, from 2013 through the end of 2014. He received an MA from Princeton’s Near East Studies program. His novel, *One Hundred and One Nights* (New York: Little, Brown, 2011), was cited by *Publisher’s Weekly* as a “top-ten contemporary war novel,” and his article, “The Human Shield in Islamic Jurisprudence,” was featured in the May-June 2013 issue of *Military Review*.

or nationalist movement. Still, to shift emphasis away from the “religious” aspect and toward the idea of this being a “movement,” and to understand that the religious dynamic might just as easily be (or become) social or nationalist, allows a wider range of options for secular engagement with, or against, the phenomenon.

Potential Converts

Hoffer next tackles the definition and categorization of the types of potential converts a mass movement draws upon. The key insight here is that neither the abject poor nor the unified poor present a threat, but that—among others—the newly poor, the creative poor, and a category he calls “misfits” contribute most of the participants to a mass movement’s active phase. Hoffer says it “is usually those whose poverty is relatively recent, the ‘new poor,’ who throb with the ferment of frustration. The memory of better things is as fire in their veins.”¹⁸

It is worth noting here that the driving force behind much of Daesh’s military success has been not a religious fervor but the planning, abilities, and impassioned involvement of a number of Saddam Hussein’s former military officers.¹⁹ These officers were marginalized due to disbandment of the Iraqi Army after the U.S.-led invasion of 2003. They became poor, yet remembered, and still remember, the power and status conferred through their positions in Hussein’s regime. As unreliable and potentially murderous as these individuals might be, at least in terms of participation in a mass movement such as radical Islam, as Hoffer says, they are not a lost cause but rather, “They (the veterans) are receptive to the preaching of a proselytizing movement and yet do not always make staunch converts. For they are not irrevocably estranged from the self; they do not see it as irrevocably spoiled ... the slightest evidence of progress and success reconciles them with the world and their selves.”²⁰

This last aspect likely contributed to the success of the Anbar Awakening, as Sunni leaders, many of whom were former Baathists, united in the hope of working as part of, rather than against, the new Iraqi government.²¹ Even now, leaders of Daesh drawn from among former Iraqi Baathist officials and military personnel do not seem to be irrevocably committed, as one local described Daesh’s current *wali*, or leader, in Anbar itself, “I last saw him in 2009. He complained that he was very poor. He is an old friend, so I gave him some money ... He was fixable. If someone had given him a job and a

salary, he wouldn’t have joined the Islamic State. There are hundreds, thousands like him.”²²

Additionally, in those areas of Syria and Iraq where citizens had been relatively affluent prior to the start of the civil war in 2011, many men turned to Daesh as a means to maintain the livelihood of their families.²³ The need to maintain a livelihood would not be such a motivating impulse if the citizens in these areas had always been abjectly poor, for, as Hoffer says,

The poor on the borderline of starvation live purposeful lives. To be engaged in a desperate struggle for food and shelter is to be wholly free from a sense of futility. The goals are concrete and immediate. ... What need could they have for “an inspiring super-individual goal which would give meaning and dignity to their lives?” They are immune to the appeal of a mass movement.²⁴

Thus, for both the core of former Iraqi government and military veterans participating in radical Islam’s mass movements, and for the percentage of men who permit, or even assist this particular mass movement in order that they themselves and their families not become part of the *new poor*, the provision of financial and social lucre, or even hope, may sway significant and influential partisans toward more desirable pursuits.

Another category of potential manpower from Hoffer’s work relates specifically to Daesh’s recruiting; these are the “bored.” Hoffer says of them: “There is perhaps no more reliable indicator of a society’s ripeness for a mass movement than the prevalence of unrelieved boredom.”²⁵ The attraction of fighting for Daesh proves powerful in this regard, especially “to the bored, secure, and the uninspired in Western liberal democracies” to whom fighting in this mass movement provides “a thrilling cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends.”²⁶ This segment of the population’s needs for excitement and purpose, rather than (or in conjunction with) approaches aimed at interdicting the beginning stages of *religious* radicalization, should be studied.

Finally, one group Hoffer labels as difficult for mass movements to recruit—the unified poor—presents itself as a potential remedy for decreasing Daesh’s appeal. The unified poor tend not to join mass movements because, even though they are not wealthy, they have a strong sense of identity and collective self-worth derived from

that identity.²⁷ Hoffer goes on to actually prescribe this as a remedy for mass movements, saying that “any arrangement which either discourages atomistic individualism or facilitates self-forgetting or offers chances for action and new beginnings tends to counteract the rise and spread of mass movements.”²⁸ As such, rather than encourage the individualism and democratic sense of self so embedded in a liberal Western worldview (which would be counter to the goal of diffusing a mass movement), actions and programs that instead discourage individualism and encourage small-group cohesion along with opportunity, would reduce the allure of Daesh and other organizations built on these religiously styled mass movement principles.²⁹ The exact type of promoted small group might vary from place to place and from time to time, depending on local conditions, perhaps attaining from traditional tribal structures, guilds or clubs, family, school, military affiliation, or other sources of identity and advantage.

Conclusion

Hoffer’s treatment of mass movements, when applied to radical Islam, approaches the sources of the movement’s appeal in a way that does not directly engage with, or condemn, Islam as a religion, therefore falling closer to the sphere of influence that secular Western governments and institutions are structured to effect. Some of Hoffer’s solutions and ideas about how best to engage with and diffuse a mass movement can be applied directly to Daesh and al-Qaida, and may yield new approaches and techniques:

The substitution of one mass movement for another. Hoffer states, “this method of stopping one movement by substituting another ... is not always without danger, and it does not usually come cheap.”³⁰ By way of example, he cites pre-World War II Italy and Germany where “practical businessmen acted in an entirely ‘logical’ manner when they encouraged a Fascist and Nazi movement in order to stop communism. But in doing so, these practical and logical people promoted their own liquidation.”³¹ Likewise, substituting something like democracy in the Middle East (such as nearly happened during the Arab Spring) could unintentionally destabilize regimes that have been useful partners and important pillars of the global economy. Despite such risk, it is worth noting that the zero-sum nature of mass movements, as claimed by Hoffer, will mean that—if true—any other rising movement, ideally less

committed to violence against the Western world, will decrease the resources upon which Daesh and other religiously based movements can draw.

The substitution of tribal or other small group structures for individualism. These alternatives could possibly enhance a locale’s ability to stabilize itself and resist proselytization into religiously based mass movements. However, this essentially means encouraging an older, and likely less liberal, way of life. It is, as Hoffer says, an equation where “equality without freedom creates a more stable social pattern than freedom without equality.”³²

The treatment of specific sectors of people from whom mass movements draw their strength. This applies specifically to veterans, formerly successful persons trying not to become newly poor, and the bored. An approach aimed at these target populations may be the most feasible over the short term. Institutions and programs already exist to tackle similar problems.³³ The suggestion here would be to look at those programs and determine whether priorities, messaging strategies, funding sources, and suitable alternatives for hope and financial stability are in place; or if it could be shifted from other approaches that might be wrongly aimed at religious counter-narratives to instead relieve the conditions that conspire to spoil an individual’s sense of self-satisfaction.

Emigration. Finally, and perhaps most practically, Hoffer says, “emigration offers some of the things the frustrated hope to find when they join a mass movement, namely, change and a chance for a new beginning.”³⁴ Since mass emigration away from the Levant, North Africa, and Yemen already occurs, legally and illegally, perhaps it would be wise to examine the streams of emigration not just for the potential to help individuals, or to ensure that radicalization—or radicals themselves—do not cross borders, but to also look at the overall situation as a possible panacea for the illness upon which the mass movement of radical Islam feeds. This would mean encouraging emigration, and promoting and facilitating it as a way to relieve pressures fueling mass movements—through some sort of controlled and global mechanism—rather than continuing the current system of temporary camps and temporary solutions. Hoffer maintains that mass movements arise when people see their individual lives to be irremediably spoiled and cannot find a worthwhile purpose in self-advancement.³⁵ The dedication, devotion, loyalty, and self-surrender that fuel mass movements

are in essence a desperate clinging to something that might give worth and meaning to futile, spoiled lives.³⁶ This article repurposes four of Hoffer's ideas to uncouple radical Islam from the engine of its own mass movement: offer a substitute movement (dangerous), encourage

small-group cohesion (potentially illiberal), target specific groups of people with financial stability and hope (quick but perhaps not long-lasting), and restructure emigration in a way that offers a release for the masses most at risk (global and long-reaching). ■

Notes

1. Some notable opinions on this can be found in Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 117n3; John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 8; Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 228; Sadik J. al-Azm, "Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered: A Critical Outline of Problems, Ideas and Approaches," *South Asia Bulletin, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 13, no. 1 and 2 (Spring/Fall 1993), 95–97.
2. Lee Keath and Hamza Hendawi, "How Islamic Is Islamic State Group? Not Very, Experts Say," Associated Press, 2 March 2015, accessed 14 May 2016, <https://www.yahoo.com/news/islamic-islamic-state-group-not-very-experts-131121264.html?ref=gs>.
3. Hamza Yusuf, who is at the forefront of scholarly Islamic criticism of the Islamic State ideology, suggests linking well (i.e., noncorrupt) representative governance to less marginalization by liberal elites of normative Islamic practices as a potential remedy. The second portion of this approach could work, because normative Islam bolsters rather than detracts from good governance (opposite of the Christian tradition in many ways). However, normative Islam is not particularly conducive to representative governance. See Sina Toossi and Yasmine Taeb, "Prominent Islamic Scholar Refutes Claims of ISIS's Links to Islam," Think Progress online, 5 March 2015, accessed 14 May 2016, <http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/03/05/3630340/prominent-islamic-scholar-refutes-claims-isis-links-islam/>.
4. As an added bonus, by looking at the problem set from a nonreligious perspective, secular governments and institutions may be able to obviate the impulse toward joining or supporting such movements *without* those same governments and institutions having to engage in a religious debate they are ill equipped to win.
5. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010).
6. *Ibid.*, xi. Suggestions from the other two portions of Hoffer's topical organization have been incorporated and referenced in this article, but for the sake of brevity and relevance, emphasis has been placed only on the first two sections. The next section covers Hoffer's theory for how mass movements inculcate united action and self-sacrifice; and finally, the last section enumerates the types of leaders necessary at the initial, fanatical, and practical phases of a mass movement's existence.
7. *Ibid.*, 6. While it seems Hoffer intended the Far East (China, Japan) rather than the Middle East as his "Orient," the general sentiment applies perhaps more strongly and presciently to the subject of this paper. This statement delves beyond a superficial "clash of cultures" into a more nuanced point, that Middle Eastern societies do not only envy the West's relative riches, but more regret the loss of prestige from the thousand-plus years where the Middle East was, more than Europe, a center of learning and progressiveness.
8. *Ibid.*, 11.
9. *Ibid.*, 12.
10. *Ibid.*, 51.
11. *Ibid.*, 25.
12. *Ibid.*, 38.
13. *Ibid.*, 17.
14. Associated Press, "Timeline: Daesh's Reign of Terror," Gulf News website, 18 June 2015, accessed 24 October 2016, <http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/iraq/timeline-daesh-s-reign-of-terror-1.1537224>.
15. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 4.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, 17.
18. *Ibid.*, 26.
19. Liz Sly, "The Hidden Hand Behind the Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein's," *Washington Post* website, 4 April 2015, accessed 24 April 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html.
20. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 46.
21. Eli Lake, "Meet Iraq's Most Important Man," *New York Sun* website, 3 April 2007, accessed 14 May 2016, <http://www.nysun.com/opinion/meet-iraqs-most-important-man/51693/>.
22. Sly, "The Hidden Hand Behind the Islamic State Militants."
23. Pamela Engel, "One Reason Why Men Join ISIS Is Not Flattering for the 'Caliphate,'" *Business Insider* website, 5 October 2015, accessed 24 April 2016, <http://www.businessinsider.com/a-huge-reason-men-join-isis-is-not-flattering-for-the-caliphate-2015-10>.
24. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 26.
25. *Ibid.*, 51.
26. Omar Sultan Haque et al., "Why Are Young Westerners Drawn to Terrorist Organizations like ISIS?" *Psychiatric Times* website, 10 September 2015, accessed 24 October 2016, <http://www.psychiatristimes.com/trauma-and-violence/why-are-young-westerners-drawn-terrorist-organizations-isis/page/0/2#sthash.u2IOB3bl.dpuf>.
27. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 35.
28. *Ibid.*, 19.
29. *Ibid.*, 63. Here he clarifies further: "The capacity to resist coercion stems partly from the individual's identification with a group."
30. *Ibid.*, 19.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, 33.
33. One such organization is the Sawab Center, accessed 24 October 2016, <http://www.sawabcenter.org>. See also France's "Plan d'action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme," accessed 14 May 2016, <http://www.ville.gouv.fr/?plan-d-action-contre-la>.
34. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 20.
35. *Ibid.*, 12.
36. *Ibid.*, 16.

BOOK REVIEWS

ZERO FOOTPRINT **The True Story of a Private Military Contractor's Covert Assignments in Syria, Libya, and the World's Most Dangerous Places**


Simon Chase and Ralph Pezzullo,
Mulholland Books, New York, 2016, 320 pages

Zero *Footprint* examines the evolution of the secretive private security business into a temporary, scalable, deniable private military force, as told by an insider. The name of the book alludes to the level of support and “signature” these operatives are required to maintain while conducting their assignments. The value of the book is its description of the lives that private military contractors (PMCs) lead, the motives for using them, and the effectiveness and value of their service. A real page-turner, the writing is precise, the detail vivid, and the consequences profound.

Zero Footprint is an autobiographical account of a former special boat service member turned PMC, published under the pen name of Simon Chase. It is his tale that is told, with the assistance of coauthor Ralph Pezzullo, an accomplished screenwriter and journalist. The book recounts Chase’s training with the elite special boat services and his subsequent entry into the world of private security in 1999, as well as the massive expansion of the military contractor enterprise through the turn of the century.

Unlike many books about the “war on terror,” the characters described are often seen less as heroes, and more as mercenaries. In the opening chapters, one discovers the misspent youth of the author, and the series of decisions and circumstances that eventually led him to the U.S. ambassadorial compound in Benghazi. In the telling, the reader begins to understand the sense of purpose and duty that drives many of these men. Brought together on dangerous missions without overt

government support, and no recognition, PMCs can only rely on their teammates to watch their backs. To illuminate this, a chapter describes how two principals vying for control of the country wanted their security detachments to fight each other. However, since the community of operators was so tightly knit, the plan became known and the contractors refused to fight. The



author relates a tale of what can happen to special operators that end their service to their country early due to unforeseen circumstances and yet wish to continue the high-risk vocation in which they excel.

The book is much more than a first-person account of dangerous missions taking place in far-flung locations; it provides insight of the

inner workings and decision-making processes that governments use when employing private military contractors. The work they do at the behest of wealthy people, multinational corporations, and governments requires confidentiality. If publicly revealed, the details of these missions would embarrass or compromise the actions of the principals. As related in the book, an employer who is often an arm of the U.S. government requires a covert asset that cannot be traced back to the employer for a time-sensitive or short-term mission. It becomes clear when reading the book why private military contractors fill that role. Having the same skill sets as our elite operators, they become the go-to-guys when governments who have shrunk their military budgets need available forces. When the threat abates, PMCs can be “let go” with no further financial commitment or political ties, unlike government-run military forces.

The effectiveness of these shadow organizations can be hard to measure. However, the deeds and activities that PMCs conducted in the heady days after 9/11

cannot be in doubt. From meager beginnings as personnel security detachments, PMCs augmented the conventional forces providing security in war zones. Through PMC actions, U.S. and coalition soldiers are free to pursue the enemy instead of being tied up guarding diplomats, international aid operations, or critical infrastructure. PMCs conduct a wide range of missions from personal security detachments to covert reconnaissance, snatch and grabs, and the dark side of the business such as forced relocation of indigenous peoples, all of which are described in an entertaining way. The wide variety of tasks they are called to perform, and the emotional context that peppers the narrative, will leave you intrigued.

Eric McGraw, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE NEW NUCLEAR DISORDER Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy

Stephen J. Cimbala, Ashgate Publishing Company,
New York, 2015, 254 pages

The *New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy* is well written and easy to read, even if you are not familiar with the jargon or esoteric terms of art in the fields Stephen J. Cimbala covers. The book is a compendium of different ways the nuclear weapons policy problem is changing during the beginning of the twenty-first century. Cimbala examines a specific policy issue with each chapter. Many of the issues overlap to some degree between chapters, providing some continuity, but the issues are largely covered independently by chapter.

Although I cannot represent all the chapters in a short book review, I will touch on some of the more interesting ideas Cimbala brings to light. He does a nice job recounting the essential elements needed during a crisis for two opposing sides (the simplest case) to limit escalation and resolve their differences. Cimbala then points out that, essentially, all the elements he lists for a positive crisis resolution are targets for cyber war. In an actual crisis, the use of information war techniques could make information so untrustworthy that opponents would not reasonably understand one another's positions and therefore could not resolve the crisis without escalation or possibly a nuclear exchange.

The book is not based entirely in theoretical scenarios. A significant portion is devoted to historical events that highlight the ease with which a nuclear crisis could develop. Cimbala uses events like the Able Archer "War Scare" in 1983, a Norwegian scientific rocket launch over Russia in 1995, and Vladimir Putin's operations in Ukraine in 2014 to show how fragile global peace may be.

Cimbala covers other major areas of concern for those who must solve contemporary nuclear policy problems. These include how geography affects deterrence, the potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia, how to end an ongoing nuclear conflict, the likelihood of small regional nuclear wars, culturally based misunderstandings, missile defense technology issues, and the effects of proliferation (potentially positive or negative effects).

The underlying theme is that the way deterrence worked during the Cold War is no longer a valid model for contemporary policy, and new solutions must be developed. Cimbala lays out many thought-provoking problems but does not offer solutions.

The sole criticism I have for this book is the lack of clear explanation for the model being used to predict the results of a nuclear exchange. It is important to understand the assumptions used to determine the survivability of nuclear weapons in the various scenarios he proposes. The reader is left to accept Cimbala's estimates without further explanation. It is a departure from an otherwise highly authoritative and well-documented work.

In summary, this is a very provocative and interesting book. If you have an interest in twenty-first century changes that affect nuclear weapons policy, this book will be very interesting for you, and it will illuminate challenges that are very difficult and are yet to be solved by policy makers worldwide.

**Harold A. Laurence, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE ON NAVAL COMMAND

Edited by Thomas J. Cutler, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 194 pages

With the vast number of books on leadership, readers could wonder what subject a new book could cover that others have not

discussed. Thomas Cutler succeeds by looking at a related but entirely different topic—command. Cutler, the director of professional publishing at the U.S. Naval Institute, is the author of numerous articles and books, including several editions of the *Blue Jackets Manual*. In *The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Command*, he tackles the complex but often neglected subject of command through an anthology of articles selected from different periods, each providing a unique perspective on command.

Naval Command is part of the U.S. Naval Institute's series of "wheel books." Wheel books are an old naval tradition of having books that provide "supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to all naval professionals." Cutler's wheel book succeeds admirably in this regard by providing commanders an easy resource of perspectives on the challenges of command. The articles selected in *Naval Command* are from the Naval Institute's vast archives and provide ideas, hard-learned advice, and practical suggestions for any individual whether serving as a commander or as a member of a staff.

Defining leadership as "leading individuals" and command as "leading leaders," the stories and articles contained in *Naval Command* focus on the particular burdens and responsibilities of command at sea. Although Navy culture may be different, the lessons and advice provided are universal in their applicability, and readers from any service will immediately recognize the utility to their own situations.

The articles span many decades and offer insights that will be of interest to a wide audience. Whether shedding light on the balance between authority and responsibility, the different challenges facing wartime and peacetime commanders, or reflecting on the command decisions made during the pivotal battles of the Pacific war, each article's author provides a wealth of advice and lessons learned to military personnel at any level. These lessons are timeless. For example, in Cdr. Robert E. Mumford's article "Get Off My Back, Sir," the author addresses the perceived encroachment of micromanagement in the Navy. Although written in 1977, his concerns and suggestions will resonate and be valuable to commanders today.

The author wanted this book to be useful, and he succeeds in this goal. Although each contributor has a unique writing style, the articles in the book are very readable. Since each chapter is a separate article, readers

will find they can read and reflect on the advice in a short time each day. I highly recommend the book to all leaders, especially those going into command, for its thought-provoking lessons and practical advice.

Robert J. Rielly, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

STORMING THE CITY
U.S. Military Performance in Urban Warfare from World War II to Vietnam
 Alec Wahlman, University of North Texas Press,
 Denton, Texas, 2015, 368 pages

The title of this worthwhile book, *Storming the City*, may be misunderstood to mean it is a catalog of twentieth-century U.S. urban warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. Similar misunderstanding abounded regarding John Nagl's *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Despite the title, that book was not about counterinsurgency lessons learned so much as it was about characteristics of adaptive, learning organizations, using two counterinsurgency case studies as contrasting illustrations. So it is here that Alec Wahlman focuses on the two major reasons for U.S. success as seen in four urban warfare case studies. The first reason for success is what he calls *transferable competence*—aggressive tactical initiative to try new things, coupled with rapid proliferation of lessons learned and doctrine. The second is battlefield adaptation. One can argue these same two characteristics contributed to U.S. tactical military successes overall in these wars. However, the urban operational environment most effectively showcases both in action, given city fighting's unique and formidable difficulties.

Wahlman, a veteran analyst of fourteen years at the Institute for Defense Analyses, examines U.S. military ground force performance in taking Aachen (European Theater of Operations in October 1944), Manila (Pacific Theater of Operations in February 1945), Seoul (mobile phase of the Korean War, September 1950), and Hue (Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War, February 1968). Each battle earns its own chapter that begins with a short historical orientation. The analytical treatment then divides into six categories: (1) command, control, and communications; (2) intelligence and reconnaissance; (3) firepower and survivability; (4) mobility and counter

mobility; (5) logistics; and (6) dealing with the population. Wahlman's comparative matrix at the end of the book suggests that the first case—Aachen—showed the United States at its best across all six categories. There is a relatively declining performance trend in Asia, the worst performance exhibited in the fight for Hue City. The reasons for this are complicated, and the author does good service in disabusing the reader of simplistic notions that U.S. ground forces became less proficient in urban warfare. However, the small sample size of only four cases and mostly qualitative and anecdotal evidence are reasons enough not to infer too much from this matrix.

Not unexpectedly, the comparison ranks the United States consistently high in firepower and survivability as well as in mobility and countermobility capabilities. Also not surprising, the worst relative U.S. performance is in terms of intelligence and reconnaissance. Lastly, the author challenges two common urban conflict misperceptions: (1) an overall numerical 3-to-1 offensive ratio is mandatory, and (2) infantry is the most suitable branch of arms for city fighting.

While not predictive of future U.S. ground force performance, Wahlman's *Storming the City* suggests that intangible characteristics through which units discover, learn, and adapt will matter most, although technological advances in firepower, survivability, mobility, and logistics will certainly matter. If you can only have one urban warfare book in your professional library, make sure this is it.

**Col. Eric M. Walters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia**

TRANSFORMING MILITARY POWER SINCE THE COLD WAR


**Britain, France, and the United States,
1991-2012**

Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning, and Terry Terriff,
Cambridge University Press, New York,
2013, 303 pages

T*ransforming Military Power since the Cold War* is a comparative case study by three notable military historians (two European and one Canadian) who offer an illuminating understanding of the military transformation of Britain, France, and the United States beginning after the Cold War.

The authors relied on extensive archival research and numerous interviews and official document access. Anyone interested in how an army transforms, and how it responds to challenges in an environment of constrained resources, will benefit from this book.

With the Soviet Union's inevitable demise, the end of the Cold War, and the increase of connectivity through networked computing and precision-guided weapons, Western military forces concentrated their efforts to adapt to new and unknown risks and requirements. The central question the authors sought to answer was how the armies of Britain, France, and the United States would change to meet new strategic imperatives and take advantage of new technologies. Both the process and the overall outcomes of Army transformation were investigated in their research. By seeking to answer predetermined questions, the authors looked at ways to develop findings that would have a general relevance for how militaries innovate. The authors focused on investigating



four key elements: interests of the organization, military culture with respect to new ideas, the role of civilian and military leaders, and the feedback generated from operational experience.

The book is divided into five chapters. The first begins with the imperatives and innovations involved with army transformation.

The next chapters, in order, focus on the U. S. Army as it concentrated on the promise of information technology and modularization, the British and French armies as they developed networked expeditionary forces, and the development of effects-based operations. Each military chapter considers interests, ideas, individuals, and operational experience, along with how they were all interrelated with respect to army transformation. The final chapter evaluates the overall findings of the preceding case studies and discusses the many implications for the future of Western land power.

Transforming Military Power since the Cold War adds to current scholarly contributions related to military

innovation by taking into account the unique perspective of the British and French armies. The authors purposefully did not seek to test any type of theory but conveyed an army transformation story highlighting contingencies and complexities, along with politics and personality involvement. They wanted to capture the whole story, and had they added the theory premise, key elements of the story might have been deleted if those elements did not contribute to the consistency of the stated theory.

Joint aspects of innovation are not well balanced in the book although it is well written. The focus weighs more heavily toward the British and French militaries. Topics of interest that stand out include the relative scales of innovation (sustaining and disruptive), the impact of joint institutions on military innovation, and the role of civilian versus military leadership and how they shape military innovation. I highly recommended this work for military professionals and policy makers interested or involved in military innovation and those seeking to understand how armies respond to challenges.

**Lt. Col. Stephen Harvey, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

RECKLESS


The Racehorse Who Became a Marine Corps Hero

Tom Clavin, *New American Library Caliber*,
New York, 2014, 308 pages

Warfare, for all its horrors, forges the strongest bond possible between soldiers. The oft-quoted battle speech from Shakespeare's *Henry V* perhaps puts it best, "We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; For he today that sheds his blood with me, Shall be my brother." Since antiquity, soldiers also developed equally strong ties with the dogs, horses, birds, and even elephants that joined them on the battlefield. Tom Clavin's latest book, *Reckless*, relates the story of an unlikely marine—a former South Korean racehorse—and her pivotal role in a U.S. Marines platoon during the final months of the Korean War.

Born with the Hangul name Ah-Chim-Hai (Flame of the Morning), she began her career as an award-winning racehorse in the interwar years between the fall of the Axis powers and North Korea's surprise invasion of the

south in 1950. Like so many South Korean refugees, Ah-Chim-Hai fled with her owners to the Pusan perimeter, where they eked out a meager living using her as a work-



horse, before eventually returning to Seoul in 1952. The horse's return was short-lived as the exigencies of war forced her family to offer her for sale. At the same time, 2nd Lt. Eric Pedersen, a sharp-thinking marine recoilless rifle platoon leader, recognized the critical need for a dedicated pack animal to haul heavy ammunition loads up the steep

Korean mountainsides in support of infantry offensive operations. Through fate or chance, Pedersen bought An-Chim-Hai, renamed her Reckless, and drafted her into the Marine Corps.

After an abbreviated boot camp (for both horse and handlers), Reckless repeatedly proved her worth on the battlefield until the cease-fire in 1953. Reckless's strength, bravery, and character soon endeared her to the marines she soldiered alongside. During the Battle of Hill 120, for example, Reckless carried some nine thousand pounds of recoilless rifle ammunition about thirty-five miles while also hauling wounded marines to medical care despite being twice wounded herself. The marines loved her and insisted she return in glory to the United States at the end of conflict. By the time of her "retirement," Reckless earned a bevy of awards, including promotion to staff sergeant, two Purple Hearts, the Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, the Korean Service Medal, and two unit citations. Until her passing in 1968, Reckless was a key figure in the official ceremonies at her new home in Camp Pendleton, California. Today, Reckless's service is commemorated by a memorial statue at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia.

Reckless is much more than another story about the Korean War. The book provides three critical lessons for military leaders at all levels. First, it accurately captures and explains the unique bonds exclusively developed

among soldiers in combat. Second, Clavin painstakingly describes the duty to return home and care for our wartime animal companions upon the conclusion of their honorable service. This particular lesson was all but forgotten during the Vietnam conflict. If not for the combined efforts of soldiers and nonprofit groups, animals used in Iraq and Afghanistan might have been left behind. The final, and perhaps most important, lesson to be gleaned is the role critical thinking plays in solving complex problems. Pedersen found a successful, if seemingly unorthodox, means to improve his platoon's ability to accomplish the mission. Pedersen's chain of command, up to the commandant of the Marine Corps, not only avoided the pitfall of micromanagement but also gave their full support to his solution. Given the level of unnecessary oversight to the individual soldier level extant in today's military, this is a lesson worth remembering lest we be forced to relearn it.

**Lt. Col. Chris Heatherly, U.S. Army,
Pullman, Washington**

AMERICANS IN OCCUPIED BELGIUM, 1914-1918

Accounts of the War from Journalists, Tourists, Troops and Medical Staff

Ed Klekowski and Libby Klekowski,
McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 296 pages

This book surprised me. I had little expectation that a volume titled *Americans in Occupied Belgium, 1914-1918: Accounts of the War from Journalists, Tourists, Troops and Medical Staff* could hold the interest of a serious military professional or student of military history. I expected an eclectic travelogue at best, but the authors delivered a different result. Ed Klekowski is a retired professor of biology from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and he writes with his wife, Libby Klekowski. They openly admit that the book grew out of their visits to a daughter and her husband who live in Louvain, Belgium, but they felt compelled to tell this story. They have produced a worthy historical account.

This book capably sets the experiences of Americans who lived or travelled in Belgium during the Great War in chronological context. Most historians of the western


front largely ignore Belgium, except for early German atrocities or the battles of Ypres, and they certainly do not set events in the full context from German invasion until war's end, illuminating the effect of combat on the non-combatants. The Klekowskis do that, and meanwhile they interweave some fascinating tales of personal American experience from a great variety of perspectives. The story of Herbert Hoover's Commission for Relief in Belgium is a principal part of this book. Americans also fought on both sides, Allied and German. Aid workers, ambulance drivers, curious businessmen, nurses, journalists, and adventurers all have a voice in this story.

Ed and Libby Klekowski employ their primary sources in a most adept way, and no pertinent source is wasted. The book is primarily based on the memoirs of those Americans who experienced World War I in Belgium, but it also makes

great use of visual records, such as period postcards and photographs, as well as contemporary sources such as newspapers and journals. The Klekowskis have travelled extensively in the region, and their knowledge of place and setting adds much to the tale and is almost scientific in its thoroughness. The book merges the facts of the story with an amplifying visual record.

Americans in Occupied Belgium illuminates the experience of those Americans who were in Belgium when the Germans invaded. One of the protagonists is the head of the American Legation, Brand Whitlock, who remained in Belgium until just before the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917. He was a critical actor in mediating with the occupying Germans and in diplomatically ensuring the welfare of American citizens trapped in or transiting Belgium during the German occupation, sometimes at personal cost. Brand Whitlock was both a model diplomat and a selfless humanitarian.

The Klekowskis' motivation to write the book originated in their visit to the reconstructed library in Louvain, paid for after the war principally by Americans. The inexcusable burning of an entire library of books, including irreplaceable medieval manuscripts during the



sacking of Louvain, is one of the great human tragedies of the war, and it certainly contributed to Allied propaganda depicting the Germans as beasts and butchers. This volume amply illustrates the pathos of the Louvain and Dinant sacking. Anyone with any doubt as to the atrocities committed by the Germans against the Belgians should read this book for careful illustration, documentation, and increased understanding.

Col. Dean A. Nowowiejski, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE END OF TSARIST RUSSIA

The March to World War I and Revolution

Dominic Lieven, Viking, New York, 2015, 428 pages

Are are the historical works that provide new perspectives on iconic events in world history. *The End of Tsarist Russia* by Dominic Lieven is one of those works. His book details the strategic imperatives, decisions, and personalities that led tsarist Russia to war and its ultimate demise. He does not settle for a dramatic retelling of the heady days of Revolution in Petrograd, or the final years of the First World War. In fact, those events are covered in the shortest and last chapter of the book. Instead, Lieven studies the geopolitical situation in the years preceding the Armageddon that swept through Europe and the world a little over a hundred years ago. In so doing, he illuminates dangerous parallels with today.

The first myth that Lieven debunks is that of tsarist Russia as an exceptional or irrational actor on the world stage before World War I. On the contrary, Lieven argues that the strategic calculus of Russia resembled that of the other empires of the time. Russia's desires to control the straits of Dardanelle were similar to British designs on the Suez Canal or U.S. control over the Panama Canal. Furthermore, he underlines the imperial dilemma faced by all great powers in the early twentieth century: that a state's greatness depended on its size. However, the greater a state's size, the more vulnerable it was to political disunity. This threatened all empires in an age of rising ethnic nationalism.

Lieven then explains the particular security dynamics of tsarist Russia. These included its defeat by Japan in Manchuria, Pan-Slavic aspirations, a rising Germany, and growing Polish and Ukrainian nationalism. Interestingly,


and probably as a result of his access to Russian archives, he spends a large amount of the book describing the various personalities of Russian leaders and bureaucrats who shaped tsarist policy in the years before the war. As a result, the reader is struck by the realization of how important individuals are to the course of history.

One of the book's most ambitious claims is that "as much as anything, World War I turned on the fate of Ukraine." While clearly meant to galvanize the reader and draw parallels with the current security situation in Europe, the book does make a coherent argument on the

primacy of the East in World War I. This is an important point for those knowledgeable about the bloody trench warfare of the western front.

This is an authoritative work, with new perspectives, on Russian government policy in the years before World War I. It is well written and particularly relevant in the increasingly fraught geopolitical situation we face today. Those security specialists who seek a greater understanding of historical Russian geostrategic imperatives will benefit from reading this book. However, its in-depth analysis of individual personalities might overwhelm more general readers. Military officers will not find any tactical or operational insights but will benefit from understanding the political context from which war is made.

Maj. Roland Minez, U.S. Army Reserve, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



GALLIPOLI

The Dardanelles Disaster in Soldiers' Words and Photographs

Richard Van Emden and Stephen Chambers, Bloomsbury USA, New York, 2015, 344 pages

This is a collaborative effort between Richard Van Emden, a well-published British author, historian, and filmmaker whose focus has been the

Great War, and Stephen Chambers, a military historian and author whose focus has been the Gallipoli Campaign. In *Gallipoli*, they use their tremendous knowledge and expertise to bring to light the story of the Gallipoli Campaign as seen through the eyes of the participants of both sides. Source material for this well-researched book includes published and unpublished memoirs, diaries, magazines, museum materials, other Gallipoli books, and a large amount of archived material.

Well written and logical, *Gallipoli* is relatively free of difficult military language and detail, and it does not require a detailed understanding of the campaign or World War I to

understand the events relayed by the authors. This book is for World War I enthusiasts, novice and scholar alike, as well as military professionals interested in the impacts of strategic and operational decisions on the men and women who will execute them.

The book's structure is an intricate weave of first-hand accounts connected by the author's narratives in a chronological event sequence. Along with the first-hand accounts, generally from company-grade officers and enlisted soldiers, is a tremendous number of photographs that lend great support to the reader's understanding of the participants. If a picture paints a thousand words, as used in *Gallipoli* they provide the reader the opportunity to view the great panorama on which this campaign unfolds.


While the introduction and first chapter, "Forcing the Straits," provide an effective strategic and operational setting, the focus of this book is tactical. The title, *Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Disaster in Soldiers' Words and Photographs*, identifies the focus as man at war. There are many published strategic and operational analyses of this campaign. *Gallipoli* puts a human face on the execution of the strategic and operational decisions.

The book's organization tries to provide balance between the Turkish and the Allied views, but I felt, if it

were available, more Turkish input would be needed for telling the whole story. The difficulties of the soldier in war are not limited to one side. It is one thing to study the campaign through plans, orders, and grand sweeping movements on the battlefield. It is quite another to attempt to see that same campaign through the eyes of the participants. From the Turkish view, the campaign ended with their honor intact but at a cost of nearly three times as many deaths as their adversaries.

If you are interested in examining how the tactical execution of strategic guidance could go terribly wrong, then the Gallipoli Campaign is one for your research.

Lt. Col. Terrance M. Portman, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



FORGOTTEN HEROES OF WORLD WAR II

Personal Accounts of Ordinary Soldiers— Land, Sea, and Air

Thomas E. Simmons, Taylor Trade,
New York, 2014, 326 pages

Forgotten Heroes of World War II provides the reader with fourteen graphic, personal, emotional, and compelling accounts of the ordinary American soldier, sailor, airman, and marine as each did his job surviving the unimaginable horrors of World War II. Highlighting significant battles in every theater of the war, the book collectively tells the story of the ordinary American man who volunteered to fight for his country and who was thrust into an environment where he witnessed the devastation of war, up close and personal. As soldiers are reluctant to talk about their service in war, the author does an excellent job gaining the confidence of these everyday military heroes as shown with his skillful narration of their stories. In each personal account, the reader is transformed to that air, land, or sea battlefield. Each experience is graphically described, and readers can almost feel as if they were there.

The book is well written, well organized, and interesting to read. It is recommended for undergraduate or graduate studies in leadership, ethics, and history. Although not exclusively for military readers, it provides many examples of ethical dilemmas in war appropriate for military professional development, at any level. Be

forewarned that it contains graphic detail of the horrors of war, death of close friends, stories of survival at all costs, and extraordinary courage. The book highlights the extraordinary brotherhood of the military at war, where service members are literally fighting for their own survival and that of their brothers on their left and right.

The volume of casualties associated with every battle highlighted in the book is staggering. The number of casualties suffered by the 94th Bomb Group, who took part in the bombing campaign against Germany, was shocking. In all, 163 aircraft and 1,453 airmen were missing, wounded, or killed. During eighty-one days of fighting, Okinawa was secured, but at a cost of 65,000 wounded, dead, or missing; 26 ships sunk and 368 damaged; and 768 aircraft lost. After the infamous Battle of the Bulge, American losses totaled 8,607 dead, 47,139 wounded, and 21,144 missing or captured. Finally, the U.S. Marine 4th Infantry Division suffered 9,098 men dead or wounded in their victory over the Japanese on the island of Iwo Jima. All told, the total amounted to one-half the division's strength.

Simmons does not pull any punches as he dutifully transcribes the vivid memories of these rank-and-file heroes. He graphically describes the intensity, gore, and lethality of war. There is a historical context with every vignette. This allows readers to understand the significance of the battle in relation to the overall success and eventual termination of the war. The human dimension of leadership, personal survival, fear of the unknown, and selfless service is humbling. No doubt, the lingering effects on the individuals are overwhelming.


**Col. Michael R. Martinez, U.S. Army, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**WENDELL FERTIG AND
HIS GUERRILLA FORCES IN
THE PHILIPPINES**
**Fighting the Japanese Occupation,
1942-1945**

Kent Holmes, McFarland,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2015, 244 pages

Kent Holmes, retired Central Intelligence Agency officer and senior intelligence service member, gives an extensively researched

account of an American commander's activities and problems of command in *Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines: Fighting the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945*. Holmes provides a sequential analysis of Fertig's background, the operational environment, guerilla development, the enemy situation, the guerilla situation, logistics, intelligence, and Fertig's leadership and responsibilities. He does so to evaluate Fertig's leadership, ultimately asserting that Fertig's guerillas were the largest and best-organized guerilla group, provided the best intelligence coverage, and were one of two groups whose major operational capabilities contributed to the liberation of the Philippines. Holmes points out that Fertig was later one of the architects of U.S. Army Special Forces. In addition to the special operations commu-



nity, this book should appeal to intelligence professionals, Pacific theater aficionados, and anyone who seeks a better understanding of leadership in the complex environments of irregular, hybrid, or guerilla warfare.

The book's examination spans the gamut from the tactical to the strategic aspects of guerilla warfare. It

contains observations on network dynamics and the challenges of mediating among a complex system of sometimes-rival groups. Interwoven in early chapters are Fertig's principles of guerilla warfare, which Holmes then lists at the book's end. While the book provides examples of the integration of tactics and operational-level psychological operations, the descriptions of tactical engagements are not extensively detailed. However, there are ample illustrations of unconventional logistics and communications and of the priority of intelligence over direct action in support of conventional operations. Regarding the latter, Holmes expertly conveys the strategic implications of guerilla activities concerning the naval battles and the Allied counterattack to retake the Philippines. He notes the contribution that Fertig's guerilla intelligence on Mindanao provided to the first battle of the

Philippine Sea (a.k.a. the “Marianas Turkey Shoot”) and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He likewise considers the missed opportunities that arose because U.S. planners at General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area neglected to include the guerilla movement in Allied intelligence and offensive plans. Although the book addresses both the tactical and strategic levels, it provides the greatest insight at the operational level of guerrilla warfare.

Holmes’ thorough research is a valuable resource for special operations planning, for case studies on special operations—conventional forces interdependence, or as part of a larger study of the differences in the evolution of guerrilla movements on the various islands of the Philippines in World War II. The casual reader might find the density of detail cumbersome at times, but researchers will appreciate the meticulous precision, including specific dates, troop numbers, and even packing lists. Despite an academic treatment that seems clinical at times, the book contains indispensable gems of wisdom that practitioners must consider when planning for unconventional or guerrilla warfare contingencies.


Maj. Thomas R. Nypaver,
Texas Army National Guard,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE JEW WHO DEFEATED HITLER **Henry Morgenthau Jr., FDR, and** **How We Won the War**

Peter Moreira, Prometheus Books, Amherst,
New York, 2014, 296 pages

In *The Jew Who Defeated Hitler: Henry Morgenthau Jr., FDR, and How We Won the War*, Peter Moreira tells of the contributions Henry Morgenthau Jr. and the United States Treasury Department made toward winning the Second World War. The title of the book is a bit exaggerated because no single person defeated Hitler, but what cannot be denied is the crucial role Morgenthau played in the Allies’ winning the war. The defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II was the most expensive human undertaking ever attempted, and Morgenthau, while largely behind the scenes, was the individual who helped finance the war and establish many of the initiatives that helped raise so much money for both the United States and the other allied countries.

Moreira uses a wide selection of primary and secondary sources consisting of previously published books, diary entries, letters, international and domestic financial reports, and Morgenthau’s personal papers while secretary of the treasury. Highlights include his



descriptions about the multiple war-bond campaigns held in the United States, Morgenthau’s involvement in the lend-lease program, the War Refugee Board, and the Bretton Woods Conference. Moreira brings to life Henry Morgenthau Jr. and the important representatives within the Treasury Department in detail and vividly accounts for their efforts in financing

World War II. Moreira is also quick to point out some of Morgenthau’s flaws, particularly his insecurities and routine jealousy of other important leaders within Franklin D. Roosevelt’s cabinet.

The friendship between Morgenthau and Roosevelt is written superbly and makes you appreciate the behind-the-scenes impact that Morgenthau had within American policy and diplomacy during the twelve years he was secretary of the treasury. He showed great leadership and organizational skills and artfully picked the right talent to work in the Treasury Department. Due to the amount of respect and confidence Roosevelt had in Morgenthau, he was often assigned tasks not within his duty description or area of influence, which brought Morgenthau undue stress and criticism among some of his peer competitors wanting the same influence on the president.

The Jew Who Defeated Hitler is tailored toward any reader interested in the economic requirements of defeating the Axis powers in World War II, and it focuses primarily on the strategic level of warfare. This book is recommended to any member of the security community who wants to understand how global finances, economic industries, or coalition partners can greatly hinder or improve successful military operations. Some of the fundamental lessons learned within this book are the

importance of peer-to-peer teamwork, leadership, and organization within large bureaucracies.

**Maj. Matthew Prescott, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


CHURCH OF SPIES

The Pope's Secret War Against Hitler

Mark Riebling, Basic Books, New York,
2015, 384 pages

Mark Riebling has written an extraordinary work of literature in *Church of Spies: The Pope's Secret War Against Hitler*. In this, his second major publication, Riebling does a fantastic job of delivering his thesis that contrary to public opinion, Pope Pius XII was actively engaged in establishing a covert network to work for peace during World War II. An accomplished academic, Riebling worked as a book editor before serving as the editorial director of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research for ten years. Post-9/11, he cofounded and became the director of the Center for Policing Terrorism, which gave him experience in successfully profiling secret groups. Widely considered an expert in intelligence and espionage, his experience allows him to navigate the networks he writes about in *Church of Spies*. Riebling's writing style will capture you quickly. Easy to read, *Church of Spies* primarily follows the actions of Josef Müller, a German Catholic patriot, who acted as the primary liaison between the German regular army intelligence chief and the Vatican.

This book primarily covers the period starting six months before Germany's invasion of Poland and continuing through the end of the war. *Church of Spies* also dives into the history of Bishop Eugenio Pacelli, including how his upbringing as a priest and bishop influenced



his actions once he became Pope Pius XII. My one complaint about this book is how Riebling alternates between names—Pacelli and Pius—during the early chapters. I came to the understanding that he did this to help the reader identify the time he was referencing in the pope's life. Pope Pius XII, as politically motivated as he was spiritually, used his experience while leading the Catholic Church during this tragic time to build networks and influence people to plan a regime change in Germany, through assassination if necessary. Müller carried messages between the regular German army and the Vatican. Acting as an agent for the intelligence chief Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, Müller took extreme risks by flying sport planes between Germany and the Vatican.

I highly recommend this book to people who are interested in World War II history or Catholic Church history. It certainly adds to the understanding of Pope Pius XII's actions and leadership of the Catholic Church during this horrific and tragic period in our world's history. Understanding the political sensitivities and the nature of the Nazi Party allowed Pope Pius XII to act and lead in a manner that prevented Adolf Hitler from using the pope's words and deeds as a reason to begin executing Catholics.

**Lt. Col. Joe Schotzko, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

EISENHOWER'S ARMIES


The American-British Alliance During World War II

Niall Barr, Pegasus Books, New York,
2015, 544 pages

More than seventy years have passed since the alliance of American and British powers saw the eventual downfall of the Axis powers in World War II. In *Eisenhower's Armies*, author Niall Barr traces the Anglo-American relationship that eventually led to the success of the Allied forces in the Second World War. Drawing from a vast array of published and unpublished primary and secondary sources from national archives, museums, letters, lectures, and private collections, Barr is able to provide a unique perspective not only into the plans, operations, and battles but also into the politics

and personalities that shaped the British-American military collaboration of the time.

Barr, a widely published author, history professor, and senior lecturer at King's College London, presents both sides of the alliance in a well-researched, balanced manner. Having written numerous books on the topic of Anglican war, Barr's latest effort, *Eisenhower's Armies*, takes a more detailed look into not only the strategy and tactics of the two nations during World War II, but the political, social, and historical components that led to their eventual success as an alliance.



Eisenhower's Armies takes the reader chronologically through the American-British military relationship from its inception during the formative years of America as a fledgling nation through one of the most destructive wars in history, full circle back to an uneasy cooperation almost as soon as the battles have past. By highlighting military conflict and cooperation between the two during the early French expansion on the North American continent, the Revolutionary War, and World War I, Barr sets the stage for a greater understanding of the tensions, suspicions, and early difficulties of this on-again, off-again cooperation. Dire circumstances and mutual need between the two countries, however, eventually culminated in the most successful military cooperation of all time.

Barr's insightful account of how the tensions, tactical collaborations, and even advances in technology affected the war gives the reader a comprehensive view of the British-American alliance in the latter part of World War II. He provides a strategic level understanding of the how the situation evolved to bring about America's involvement in the war, how planning and operations were organized, and even how those relationships from across the Atlantic manifested between the soldiers on the battlefield. By outlining various battles, decisions, and tactics agreed upon (and sometimes disagreed upon) by both sides, *Eisenhower's Armies* presents a

detailed view of the war and its key players in the context of international politics and policy.

Barr's in-depth understanding of the history, cultures, economics, and military conflict of the time, coupled with his descriptive, engaging writing style, makes the book accessible to a wide audience. Though *Eisenhower's Armies* seldom mentions other allies involved, and Barr narrowly focuses on ground forces rather than providing a comprehensive look at the entire alliance, the account reads as genuine, and the style is engaging throughout. He successfully demonstrates the sometimes-overlooked truth that decisions made and implications realized as a result of the tentative partnership between England and America were often forged in the sitting room rather than the war room.

Barr derives military perceptions from multiple sources concerning the personalities of the military and political leaders of the time. The result is an engaging narrative that gives readers a unique perspective on the inner workings of war. His strategic expertise shines through, and the book presents a social, operational, and even tactical analysis of a successful, albeit controversial, time of cooperation in British-American history.

**Maj. Carla Gleason, U.S. Air Force,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

BUDDIES

Heartwarming Photos of GIs and Their Dogs in World War II

L. Douglas Keeney, Zenith Press, New York,
2015, 176 pages

All service members at any rank want the same thing: unconditional loyalty and emotional support. The book *Buddies: Heartwarming Photos of GIs and Their Dogs in World War II* by L. Douglas Keeney provides the reader with a view of military members and their loyal animal companions in everyday life during World War II.


Keeney has written more than a dozen books on American history. *Buddies*, which is an addition to the 2001 publication, *Buddies: Men, Dogs and World War II*, allows the reader to feel the emotion of service members and their dogs. Men who have seen the horror of war can relax and gain comfort from their dogs. Some

of the photos place dogs in whimsical poses, while others show dogs relaxing with the GIs, and still others show dogs recovering from battle wounds.

If a reader is looking for a World War II book on campaigns and national strategy, this is not it. If the reader is looking for a book on military working dogs, or dogs used for policing or explosive detection, this is not it. If the reader is looking for information on mascot pets or purebred dogs that live a pampered life, this is not it. If the reader is looking for a book about mutts and strays that find a GI to take care of them and provide comfort, this is definitely the book.

The book has seven chapters, with five dedicated to the buddies of the Coast Guard, Army, Army Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The two remaining chapters are dedicated to “War’s End” and “Humor in the Face

of War.” Every photo in the book is an official military photo that was researched at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Each photo has a caption, which the author



edited to eliminate personal information and needlessly offensive language from the 1940s that is no longer used today. Journalists who were drafted or volunteered for the service wrote many of the captions. The intent of the photos was to keep the public feeling good about the war when times were hard and the news from the front was not always good. The photos let the American public see our soldiers and sailors making the best of some very difficult situations.

Some of these dogs have great combat stories, such as a dog named Cherbourg, who was at Normandy on 6 June 1944 when a tank landing ship landed. He decided it was a good time to get off the beach and run onto the ship. In addition, there is Skippy, a member of a B-17 crew serving in Northwest African theater with bombing runs over Tunisia and Sicily.

This book is not relevant to the study of World War II history or to the current security concerns of

the nation. However, it is a very good book for seeing World War II from a different perspective of soldiers and their adopted pets.

Boyd Plessl, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COURAGE, COMPASSION, MARINE

The Unique Story of Jimmie Dyess

Perry Smith, iUniverse, Bloomington, Indiana,
2015, 220 pages

From start to finish, readers sense the pride and passion of the book’s author, Maj. Gen. Perry W. Smith, U.S. Air Force, retired, who took ten years to research and write *Courage, Compassion, Marine: The Unique Story of Jimmie Dyess*. The story resonates with the author because Smith is married to Jimmie Dyess’s daughter and only child. Together over the years, the Smiths have represented this American hero’s extraordinary achievements at multiple and various events around the globe.

The book moves effectively in a chronology beginning with Jimmie Dyess’s prewar years, progressing to the Carnegie Medal, the evolution of U.S. Marine Corps, the war in the Pacific, the 4th Marine Division and its role in *Operation Flintlock*, perspectives on the Medal of Honor and courage, and a litany of Dyess’s honors and events. However, the book needs a more effective ending as Smith spends too much time discussing the anatomy of courage, which detracts from the book’s strengths—Dyess and historical research.

As an Augustan, I reveled in the book’s description of “early Augusta”—the city, its citizens, and the attractions that made it the “before Florida” winter playground for wealthy northerners. Here, readers glimpse a young Jimmie Dyess who willingly risked his life to save two drowning strangers and who later would give his life to save marines on the twin islands of Roi Namur. The firsthand accounts by men who served, trained, and fought alongside Dyess capture the man who embodied the character and presence attributes of the Army Leadership Requirements Model.

Smith’s book is not only a responsible and personal portrait of Dyess, but also a revealing historical account of the Marine Corps. This account examines the strategic contributions made by five men who influenced Marine

Corps doctrine, force structure, and training evolutions in the 1930s, and the technological and tactical innovations employed by the Corps (specifically, the 4th Marine Division) in the Pacific during World War II. Examples include massive, sustained air and naval bombardment to weaken dug-in enemy emplacements, fighter planes with air-to-ground rockets against dug-in positions, and underwater demolition teams to reconnoiter defenses and destroy underwater barriers. Readers discover that “in 63 days of combat, the 4th Marine Division (including its subordinate 1/24th Marine Battalion commanded by LTC Jimmie Dyess) saw more close-combat action than any of the six Marine Divisions fighting in the Pacific Theater in WWII, proving the viability of amphibious attack against defended beaches.”

Only one American citizen has earned Eagle Scout status, received the Carnegie Medal for civilian heroism, and been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor—Aquila James “Jimmie” Dyess. A U.S. Navy destroyer and a Georgia highway bear his name, and an award symposium held annually in his honor salutes Americans who, over a lifetime, have made significant contributions to nation, community, and fellow citizens. *Courage, Compassion, Marine: The Unique Story of Jimmie Dyess* belongs on bookshelves alongside more recognizable biographies. I highly recommend this story of a unique and original American with remarkable achievements.

James D. Sharpe Jr., Fort Gordon, Georgia


THE SPEARHEADERS

A Personal History of Darby's Rangers

James J. Altieri, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Maryland, 2014, 318 pages

The *Spearheaders: A Personal History of Darby's Rangers* by James J. Altieri depicts the exceptional soldiers, tough training, and the attrition of sustained combat operations by Maj. William O. Darby's Rangers, America's first commando unit of World War II. The book is an account from Altieri's personal memoirs and written from an enlisted man's perspective. Altieri would rise through the ranks as an original member with the 1st Ranger Battalion and would eventually become a first sergeant and company commander of Fox Company, 4th Ranger Battalion.

Altieri enlisted on 8 October 1941 and joined the 68th Field Artillery of the First Armored Division. While serving with the First Armored Division in Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland, he volunteered for the 1st Ranger Battalion, which had been activated on 19 June 1942. Altieri was among many soldiers selected from several U.S. units in England who were willing to take the challenge posed by this new unit. He details the rigorous



selection process and the realistic commando training received from their British Commando counterparts. The Rangers' realistic combat training in Ireland and Scotland in 1942 resulted in success and the development of new tactics. Altieri sheds detailed light on the Rangers' training in amphibious operations, weapons

familiarization, and grueling foot marches—all of which honed them into a fighting force that would achieve success on the battlefields in Algeria, Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy.

Throughout the book looms the personality of William Orlando Darby. An artilleryman, Darby was the first commander of the 1st Ranger Battalion and put his stamp on the unit through his personal involvement in all facets of their training. Always at the front of the most grueling movements, Darby pioneered night raid tactics that brought the Rangers their early and dramatic successes. Darby was ferociously loyal to his Rangers. Altieri relates with pride that Darby twice turned down promotions to remain as the 1st Rangers commander.

The Spearheaders highlights Darby's gift and what distinguished him from other combat leaders of this era—his ability to recruit, organize, and train future Ranger battalions. After the North African Campaign, Darby and his officers and noncommissioned officers chose to seek out prospective Rangers rather than rely on other units to provide volunteers. He and his battalion leadership avoided existing combat units, most of which were either at the front or likely to see combat

soon, and instead focused on the replacement depots and rear echelon formations in Algeria and Morocco. By April 1943, planners within the War Department gave approval to expand Darby's new Ranger Force to three battalions (1st, 3rd, and 4th battalions) for the campaigns in Sicily and Italy.

By the end of January 1944, Darby's Ranger Force ceased to exist as a fighting force, after the disaster at the battle of Cisterna. Darby's night infiltration attack neutralized a German staging area for an all-out drive to smash American forces in the Cisterna sector but found the 1st and 3rd battalions surrounded and cut off by tanks and numerically superior forces. Darby, with the 4th Battalion as the Reserve, tried desperately to reach the trapped Rangers. Darby's key failure at Cisterna was the lack of good intelligence. The Rangers unknowingly entered an area that had become heavily reinforced by veteran German units from the eastern front. Lightly equipped Rangers without proper support were no match for battle-hardened mechanized German units.

While elementary in style, Altieri presents personal experiences and insight as an original member of Darby's Rangers. *The Spearheaders* is a necessary read for any student of Ranger operations in World War II, as you can study the early formation, training, and employment of this elite force.

Adam J. Carson, Fort Gordon, Georgia

THE REVOLUTION'S LAST MEN The Soldiers Behind the Photographs

Don N. Hagist, Westholme Publishing,
Yardly, Pennsylvania, 2015, 256 pages

Wrinkles on their faces run like ancient rivers across rugged terrain. Eyes of aged men born in the eighteenth century glare at you from 1864 daguerreotype photographs, conveying a seriousness about their past, present, and future. *The Revolution's Last Men: The Soldiers Behind the Photographs*, by Don Hagist, impels the reader to look at the pictures before reading the biographies of these centenarians who were alive during the American Civil War. After soaking in the historic photographs, the reader must understand that this is a book about a book. Specifically, Hagist's book is a genealogical investigation of the facts, or lack

thereof, of the Rev. Elias Brewster Hillard's original work, *Last Men of the Revolution*.


In early 1864, the outcome of the American Civil War remained undecided. The earth continued to consume the dead on battlefields, as described in detail by pro-Union newspapers and echoed by the cries of grieving parents and widows. An infant nation was crawling into a fourth year of the cauldron of war, resulting in a wave of apathy among many northerners. Hillard, a prominent minister from Connecticut, saw an opportunity to rally war-weary Unionists when Nelson and Roswell Moore published photographs of the living veterans of the American Revolution. In an attempt to rally the Union, Hillard embarked on a quest to interview these aged veterans and publish their stories along with the Moores' photographs. *Last Men of the Revolution* was completed

and published in the same year, receiving accolades and recognition for his patriotic endeavor.

However, Hillard did not have access to pension records, nor did he attempt to validate the veterans' stories. He excluded revolutionary veterans living in southern states as that would be contrary to his motivation to rally

northerners. There was also the fact that these veterans were late in years, some literally on their deathbeds when interviewed. In *The Revolution's Last Men*, Hagist conducts an exhaustive examination of the original interviews and subjects them to contemporary genealogical investigative techniques in order to correct, update, or corroborate the veterans' stories. As a result, Hagist brings a historical moment alive by artfully depicting the timeframes, events, and hardships these veterans faced during the American Revolution.

The book contains a foreword by renowned genealogist Maureen Taylor, who explains the efficacy of Hagist's book in correcting and updating portions of Hillard's interviews. Introductions by Hagist and a reprint of Hillard's original preface provide readers a



roadmap to the importance and relevance of the surviving veterans' biographies. The chapters are dedicated to each of the six surviving veterans and arranged in the following order: Hagist's research and findings, photograph of the veteran, a thought-provoking sketch by Eric H. Schnitzer rendering what the veteran might have looked like as a young soldier, a drawing of the veteran's house at the time of interview, and Hillard's original interview transcript.

Hagist does an excellent job using pension and census records, as well as witness testimonies not available to Hillard, to align the veterans' testimonies with events, actions, locations, and battles they might have experienced. The photographs by themselves are worth the proverbial *thousand words*. His research adequately eliminates elements of exaggeration or failing memories that likely occurred during Hillard's interviews. The reader might find a degree of dynamic equivalency on Hagist's part (i.e., applying the author's sense of what the veteran might have sensed in the American Revolution versus trusting the words or phrases expressed by the veteran) when explaining how revolutionary era soldiers behaved in certain situations. However, Hagist's research does not distract from Hillard's interviews. On the contrary, his research and findings enhance our knowledge of the service these veterans provided during our nation's birth. This book is recommended for anyone that enjoys combining history with genealogical research to validate or enhance research conducted in previous eras.

Brook Allen, Fort Gordon, Georgia


**ALL CANADA IN THE HANDS
OF THE BRITISH**
**General Jeffrey Amherst and the
1760 Campaign to Conquer New France**

Douglas R. Cubbison,
University of Oklahoma Press,
Norman, Oklahoma, 2014, 283 pages

Douglas Cubbison's exploration of Gen. Jeffrey Amherst recognizes an important fact—that most successful British Army officers seamlessly transitioned from leadership on conventional battlefields to leadership of population-centric style

counterinsurgencies. Too often those two activities are posed as antithetical, but *All Canada in the Hands of the British* illustrates campaigns marked by successful command and control and a population-centered strategy. He argues that Amherst's use of three columns placed his force in the best position to defeat the French Army and to control the population.

Much of Cubbison's text focuses on the campaign of Amherst subordinate James Murray. Murray excel-



lently secured the French population: "Murray's progress was slow and deliberate, as he landed strong detachments ashore at every parish (or township), swore the inhabitants to neutrality, and disarmed the Canadian militia, on which the French depended for resistance." Long before great military thinkers and

strategists codified military treatises, Cubbison reveals officers who excelled at nested modes of warfare—traditional combat and nonviolent activities.

What is most impressive, however, is Cubbison's integration of illness and disease into the exploration of a well-led military campaign. While it is not a major theme in the book, Cubbison's attention to illness and fatigue is impressive. Scholars like Jared Diamond and Alfred Crosby have made military commanders look like nonfactors, who luckily gained victory solely because of disease, while Cubbison joins authors such as Elizabeth Fenn and John McNeil, who place a higher emphasis on how commanders managed disease. The merger of meticulous campaign analyses written with a mind for operational language, extensive primary source research, and a substantive argument that should influence Seven Years War historiography places Cubbison in a class by himself and makes his book a must read for military professionals. It portrays eighteenth century leaders whose capability as leaders should still impress today's Army.

Joseph Miller, Orono, Maine

CONQUERORS

How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire

Roger Crowley, Random House, New York, 2015, 400 pages

Crowley has written several books about the wars between Christendom and Islam in the Mediterranean. Here he tells how the Portuguese created their maritime trading empire in the sixteenth century.

Portuguese mariners began exploring the Atlantic and coastal Africa in the 1420s for political, commercial, and religious reasons. Prince Henry, their principal sponsor, harnessed new sailing and shipbuilding techniques to extend Portuguese influence southward. The goal was to chart the African coast and the islands in the Atlantic systematically to search for an ocean route to Asia and break the Muslim-Venetian monopoly of the trade with India, thereby enriching Portugal and destroying Muslim power.

The Portuguese trading empire resembled those formed by the Scythians and Mongols, but their contemporary analogues were the Venetians and the Chinese. By 1510 they were in Goa (India), in 1535 they reached Macau (China), and by 1543, Japan. Their empire encompassed stations in Africa, the Persian Gulf (Aden and Hormuz), Malacca, China, and Japan. They forcibly established trading rights, built trading posts, and depended on local expertise throughout their expansion, using ships and cannon to open trade when negotiations failed. The discovery of open ocean routes to Asia opened the way to the contemporary world beginning with the Portuguese, who were followed by the Spanish, Dutch, English, and French.

Crowley's account shows how commercial goals were accompanied by a crusading impulse. A mixture of religious zeal and commercial opportunism made the Portuguese governor, Alonso de Albuquerque, the protagonist in Crowley's story, realize Portugal could control the silk and spice trade by occupying a few strategic points: Aden, Hormuz, Goa, and Malacca. Goa became the linchpin of the Portuguese trading empire.

The Portuguese followed the Chinese when the Ming engaged in maritime colonialism, controlling the main ports on the major East-West ocean trade

networks through force or threats. The Portuguese would also control the port cities and dominate the commerce along the trade routes between them.


Neither the Ming, the Portuguese, nor their seventeenth- and eighteenth-century successors sought territorial dominion; they wanted political and economic command of commercial lifelines, nodal points, and networks. By holding ports and trade routes, they controlled trade, which was essential for stability and prosperity.

Crowley judiciously uses the voluminous official correspondence of the leaders and the diaries kept by their subordinates to give this account of five hundred-year-old events dramatic immediacy. The Portuguese accomplishment included changing the genetic makeup of the South Indian population as well as European culinary and cultural habits.

Crowley tries to present a nuanced and fair interpretation of these events; he admires Portuguese bravery and curiosity but emphasizes their cruelty and greed while de-emphasizing the duplicitous tactics of the Indian rulers and Muslim merchants. In this, he mirrors our contemporary belief that the use of force in international relations began with fifteenth-century European colonialism. This premise is false, as violence occurred in world history from its beginnings—everywhere. In fact, the actions of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, and English in Asia were relatively benign compared to the punishment they inflicted on each other in Europe. Discovering an ocean route to India made Portugal the center of a global empire instead of a backward fringe of Europe. In the end, Portugal did not retain its dominant position due to internal and external factors, but that is another story.

This good book has great implications for our contemporary globalized world. Crowley's skill as a writer makes this an enjoyable book to read, too.

Lewis Bernstein, PhD, Woodbridge, Virginia



Presidents Who Served in the Armed Forces


In 1879, Congress declared George Washington's birthday a federal holiday. It has since become commonly known as Presidents Day and is celebrated annually on the third Monday in February to honor all U.S. presidents. This year we commemorate those presidents who served in our military.



James A. Garfield
Major General, U.S. Army (Volunteers)
1861–1863




Harry S. Truman
Colonel, Army Officer Reserve Corps
1919–1945




Thomas Jefferson
Colonel, Virginia Militia
1770–1779




Jimmy Carter
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy
1946–1953



Abraham Lincoln
Captain, Illinois Militia
1832



William McKinley
Brevet Major, U.S. Army (Volunteers)
1861–1865




George Bush
Lieutenant (junior grade), U.S. Navy
1942–1945



Ulysses S. Grant
General, U.S. Army
1866–1869



Ronald Reagan
Captain, U.S. Army
1942–1945



Millard Fillmore
Major, Union Continentals (home guard)
1861



James Monroe
Major, Continental Army
1775–1778




Dwight D. Eisenhower
General of the Army, U.S. Army
1915–1948, 1951–1952



James Buchanan
Private, Pennsylvania Militia
1814



John Tyler
Captain, Virginia Militia
1812



Richard M. Nixon
Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve
1942–1966



Chester A. Arthur
Brigadier General, New York Militia
1858–1863



George Washington
General and Commander in Chief
Continental Army
1775–1783




Theodore Roosevelt
Colonel, U.S. Army (Volunteers)
1898




Benjamin Harrison
Brevet Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Volunteers)
1862–1865




John F. Kennedy
Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve
1941–1945




Rutherford B. Hayes
Major General, U.S. Army (Volunteers)
1861–1865




William Henry Harrison
Major General, Kentucky Militia
1812–1814



Andrew Jackson
Major General, U.S. Army
1814–1821



George W. Bush
First Lieutenant, Texas Air National Guard
1968–1973




Gerald R. Ford, Jr
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve
1942–1946




Franklin Pierce
Brigadier General, New Hampshire Militia
1846–1848



Andrew Johnson
Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Volunteers)
1862–1865




James Madison
Colonel, Virginia Militia
1775–1781



Zachary Taylor
Major General, U.S. Army
1805–1815, 1816–1849



Lyndon B. Johnson
Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve
1940–1964



James K. Polk
Colonel, Tennessee Militia
1821