



1997-1998

STATE OF

WORLD CONFLICT

REPORT

*A Publication of
the International Negotiation Network*



Conflict Resolution Program
The Carter Center

WAGING PEACE • FIGHTING DISEASE • BUILDING HOPE

CB

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This is the fourth edition of the *State of World Conflict Report* in a series that includes editions published for 1992-93, 1994-95, and 1995-96.

For more information about The Carter Center, please write us at **The Carter Center, One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway, Atlanta, Ga. 30307, U.S.A.**, or visit our Web site at www.cartercenter.org.

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INTRODUCTION

As the curtain draws to a close on the present millennium, we leave behind the most violent century known to humankind. Looking back, the costs and suffering wrought by World Wars I and II and the Cold War are simply staggering. Looking forward, we find ourselves faced with numerous smaller wars, fought mostly within rather than between states, that are no less violent or inhumane.

The 1997-98 *State of World Conflict Report*, now in its fourth edition, attempts to capture the nature and scope of these armed conflicts and the efforts made by members of The Carter Center, its International Negotiation Network (INN), and many others to prevent, manage, and peacefully resolve them. As in past editions, we include feature articles, regional and country conflict summaries, statistics, maps, and a reference section all designed to provide a general understanding of armed conflict and point readers toward more complete information. In this edition, we have attempted to be more comprehensive in our coverage and in our definition of armed conflict.

DEFINING ARMED CONFLICT

At The Carter Center, we frequently receive queries from government officials, scholars, journalists, and the general public about the number of armed conflicts in the world at a given time. There is no easy answer to this question. Casualty figures are difficult to collect and confirm in the best of circumstances. Difficult terrain, poor communication, repressive governments, and media manipulation often make these tabulations all but impossible. In addition, basing analysis exclusively on the number of lives lost misses the larger picture of armed conflict, which sadly includes refugee flows, displaced people, ruined homes, environmental degradation, health problems, and the lasting scars of horror and hatred.

Ultimately, any armed conflict discussion depends on the definition used. Several organizations around the world document armed conflict, and we regularly recommend five of these:

- **Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI):**

The sole source of data for the first three issues of the *State of World Conflict Report*, SIPRI identifies different levels of armed conflict. It defines major armed conflict as “prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more

governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 people during the entire conflict.” Under this definition, SIPRI counted 25 major armed conflicts or wars in 24 locations in 1997 plus a dozen minor armed conflicts (at least 24 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict).

- **The Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM):**

The Dutch-based organization denotes “five levels of conflict: peacefulness, political tension (below 25 political killings), violent political conflict (fewer than 100 fatalities in one year), low-intensity conflict (between 100 and 1,000 fatalities), and high-intensity conflict (more than 1,000 fatalities).” Unlike SIPRI, PIOOM does not restrict its analysis to battle-related deaths. In 1997, PIOOM counted 17 high-intensity conflicts, 70 low-intensity conflicts, 74 violent political conflicts, and more than 100 tension situations.

- **Project Ploughshares:**

Based in Canada, Ploughshares uses a variation of the SIPRI definition, in which at least 1,000 people must have died during the course of a conflict. An armed conflict is deemed to have ended if there has been a formal cease-fire or peace agreement, after which no combat deaths (or at least fewer than 25 per year) have occurred. In the absence of a formal cease-fire, a conflict is deemed to have ended after two years of dormancy (in which fewer than 25 combat deaths per year have occurred). Ploughshares counted 37 armed conflicts being fought in 32 states in 1997.

- **The National Defense Council Foundation (NDCF):**

The U.S.-based organization states that its “criteria for selection is based on the level of disruption of socio-economic, political, and security fabric of each country caused by both internal and external conflict which the country is associated with. Accordingly, standardized criteria by the Swedish—such as 1,000 deaths per country—cannot be applied because of issues such as the demographics of each country and even location.” Using what it calls “instability indicators”—infant mortality rate, income distribution, the role of the military in government—NDCF counted 67 conflicts in 1997.

• **The Working Group on the Causes of War (AKUF):**

Based in Germany, AKUF defines war as any armed conflict that engages regular armed forces of the government (military, police forces, supporting paramilitary forces) on at least one side; a certain degree of organization and organized fighting on both sides, even if this extends to organized defense only; and a certain continuity between armed clashes, however sporadic. Under this definition, AKUF counted 25 wars in 1997 and 20 smaller armed conflicts that threatened to escalate into war.

Rather than select one of these definitions or define armed conflict ourselves, we acknowledge that several different definitions exist and provide an overview of armed conflict in the pages that follow. In selecting which conflicts to highlight, we analyzed the work of these organizations and included a cross-section that reflects the state of world conflict today. Thus, we classify countries where armed conflicts are identified, in varying degrees of intensity, by at least four of the five organizations as "high-level" conflicts. Countries with conflicts identified by at least one but no more than three of the five organizations are classified as "lower-level" conflicts.

Under this system, we list 23 locations where "high-level" conflicts were fought in 1997, each of which is featured in the two-page conflict articles that follow. We also list 30 "lower-level" conflicts, which are noted on the world and regional maps and some of which are highlighted in the section titled "Looking Forward." For a more in-depth analysis of armed conflict, readers should consult the work of the five organizations mentioned here and the books and articles listed as "Additional Sources" at the end of each conflict summary in this report.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the box labeled "The Conflict" that appears with each two-page conflict article, the term "incompatibility" means that these conflicts are contests for control of either government (type of political system, a change of central government, or a change in its composition,) or territory (control of territory, secession, or autonomy). SIPRI provides this information. At times, the numbers for "Total Deaths" vary greatly or cover a wide range. This disparity reflects the difficulties inherent in classifying conflicts and the differing definitions used.

Attempts have been made, where possible, to provide battle-

related figures, as provided by SIPRI, and overall casualty figures, as provided by PIOOM and the other organizations.

Nearly all of the conflicts identified are armed civil or intrastate conflicts, as opposed to those between states. We have tried to supply the most current information possible; "na" is used in those instances where figures are unavailable. Information is provided for the government of the country listed, unless otherwise specified. Most of the conflict data comes from 1997. However, we have included the fighting in Guinea-Bissau, which began in 1998, as a "lower-level" conflict. In some locations, multiple conflicts were fought. For instance, SIPRI identifies four separate intermediate armed conflicts and four minor armed conflicts in India in 1997.

The regions we have identified are somewhat arbitrary: Egypt is included in the Middle East rather than Africa, while Central and South America includes information on countries traditionally labeled "Latin America" or the "Caribbean." There are no regional sections for North America or Europe because no "high-level conflicts" were waged in these regions in 1997. We do note on the world map that Mexico was the site of a "lower-level" conflict and that seven "lower-level" conflicts were fought in Europe, some of which are featured in the "Looking Forward" section.

The *State of World Conflict Report* strives to be neutral and unbiased. In choosing how to list each conflict, we use the name recognized by the United Nations. However, while Myanmar is the official name for the state of Burma, we list both names in recognition of the dispute between the majority of people (who prefer Burma) and the ruling military council (which uses Myanmar). We also list Congo (DCR) to designate the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) to differentiate it from the Republic of Congo, which we list as Congo.

Finally, many of the articles and summaries that appear in this report are written by experts in the field, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect positions held by The Carter Center, its staff, or INN members. We hope you find the *1997-98 State of World Conflict Report* accessible and useful, and we welcome your comments about it.

Kirk Wolcott and Steve Shewfelt
Editors

THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION NETWORK

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter founded the International Negotiation Network (INN) in 1987 as a flexible, informal network of eminent persons, Nobel Peace laureates, and conflict resolution scholars and practitioners dedicated to preventing and resolving armed conflicts through peaceful means. Based in the Conflict Resolution Program (CRP) at The Carter Center, the 26-member INN has provided third-party assistance, expert analysis, and advice to parties in conflict around the globe over the past decade.

Through conferences, speeches, and publications, the INN helps educate the public about the nature and impact of conflict and what steps governments, international and nongovernmental organizations, educational institutions, the media, and individuals can and should take to promote peace.

Toward this end, the Conflict Resolution Program produces regular updates on approximately 20 armed or potential conflicts, disseminated weekly to all INN members and to the public through the Internet. Since 1992, the Conflict Resolution Program also has highlighted the work of the INN and others through the *State of World Conflict Report*.

We are pleased to present in this, the fourth issue of the *State of World Conflict Report*, a firsthand look at President Carter's recent peacekeeping efforts as well as a variety of articles on peace and conflict resolution topics by INN members Eileen Babbitt, Harold Saunders, Desmond Tutu, William Ury, and William Zartman. This issue also features timely articles by experts such as Gen. Lee Butler on the con-

sequences of nuclear proliferation, Amb. Robert Frowick on peace building in Bosnia, Dr. Donald Hopkins on health and conflict, and Karin Ryan on human rights.

The INN convened consultations and international conferences in 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1996 to address conflicts in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, the Caucasus, Cyprus, Ethiopia, the Great Lakes region of Africa, Haiti, Liberia, the Korean Peninsula, and Sudan. In April 1997, the INN held a working meeting at the Rockefeller Brothers Estate in Pocantico Hills, N.Y., to

clarify the purpose, structure, and comparative advantage of the network as it sets its goals for the coming years. To remain most effective, INN members identified a set of guiding principles embodied in President Carter's approach to peacemaking (see inside back cover).

INN members remain active in a variety of peacemaking efforts. In July 1997, for instance, INN members Robert Pastor and Marie-Angélique Savané joined in a 40-

member international observer delegation co-led by President Carter, former U.S. Sen. Paul Simon, and former Benin President Nicephore Soglo to monitor the Special Elections in Liberia, following seven years of civil war there. President Carter, Savané, Lisbet Palme, and Desmond Tutu had made earlier interventions in the conflict on the INN's behalf.

In addition to work on the conflicts in Burundi, Colombia, and Rwanda, which are highlighted later in this publication, INN members have made other significant contributions, including work in the areas listed on the following page.





Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter (front row center), about half of the INN members, and Carter Center staff and interns convene at the Rockefeller Brothers Estate in Pocantico Hills, N.Y., in April 1997.

ALBANIA: Vamik Volkan joined Joyce Neu, senior associate director of the Conflict Resolution Program; Tom Forbord of The Carter Center's Global Development Initiative (GDI); and Norman Itzkowitz of Princeton University on a February 1998 mission to provide input to GDI's national development strategy process in Albania.

THE CARIBBEAN: Shridath Ramphal serves as chief negotiator for the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), where he has been responsible for the external negotiations of Caribbean nations concerning their entrance into the Free Trade Area of the Americas.

CENTRAL ASIA: Barnett Rubin leads a project on the Ferghana Valley region (which cuts across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) to assess the potential for future conflict and recommend ways the region can achieve economic and political stability.

CHINA: Pastor has led election-monitoring missions at the village level and negotiated a long-term agreement that enables The Carter Center to help China develop a nationwide data base for improving the electoral process.

ESTONIA: Since 1994, Saunders and Volkan, in collaboration with the Conflict Resolution Program, have led a series of workshops to provide a channel for dialogue among ethnic groups in Estonia, where tensions over integrating the Russian minority grew after the Soviet Union broke up.

GREECE-TURKEY: Babbitt has traveled to Greece and Turkey as part of the Southeastern Europe Consortium, which proposes a series of informal dialogues to build trust among both societies and help move discussion forward.

GUYANA: Ramphal led a peacemaking mission in the wake of civil unrest following parliamentary elections on Dec. 15, 1997, and helped broker the Herdmanston Accord, which was signed by the two rival Guyanese political factions and led to legitimization of election results.

JAMAICA: Pastor organized four pre-election missions and a 60-person international delegation, co-led by President Carter and U.S. Gen. Colin Powell, to observe the December 1997 Jamaican elections, which were the most peaceful in the last 30 years.

SPAIN: Chris Mitchell continues his long-term involvement in the Basque country, where he has visited three times since summer 1997, when demonstrations of an estimated 6 million people were held over the kidnapping and killing of a young politician.

TURKEY: Ury facilitated a series of meetings between Kurdish and Turkish opinion leaders that led to establishing the Turkish-Kurdish Foundation, which promotes dialogue and democratic reform.

MEMBERS OF THE INN

Jimmy Carter—Former President of the United States; Founder and Chair, The Carter Center

Oscar Arias Sánchez—Nobel Peace Prize laureate; Former President of Costa Rica; Founder, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress

Eileen Babbitt—Director, International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Program, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Tahseen Bashir—Former Egyptian Ambassador; Former Permanent Representative to the League of Arab States

Kevin Clements*—Director, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University; Incoming Secretary-General, International Alert

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar—Former U.N. Secretary-General

Hans Dietrich Genscher—Former Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany

Tommy Koh—Executive Director, Asia-Europe Foundation; Former Singapore Ambassador to the United States

Christopher Mitchell—Professor, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

Olusegun Obasanjo—Former President of Nigeria; Founder and Chair, Africa Leadership Forum

Lisbet Palme—Director, Swedish Committee for UNICEF

Robert Pastor—Former Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center; Goodrich C. White Professor of Political Science, Emory University

Shridath Ramphal—Former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth; Co-Chair, Commission on Global Governance; Chief Negotiator, Caribbean Community and Common Market

Barnett Rubin—Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations

Kumar Rupesinghe—Director, State of the World Forum/Europe; Former Secretary-General, International Alert

Harold Saunders—Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; Director of International Affairs, The Kettering Foundation

Marie-Angélique Savané—Former Director, Africa Division, U.N. Population Fund

Desmond Tutu—Nobel Peace Prize Laureate; Chair, Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Robert W. Woodruff Visiting Professor of Theology, Emory University

Brian Urquhart—Former U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping

William Ury—Director, Project on Preventing War, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School

Cyrus Vance—Former U.S. Secretary of State; Co-Chair, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

Vamik Volkan—Professor of Psychiatry; Director, Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction, University of Virginia

Peter Wallensteen—Dag Hammerskold Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University


Elie Wiesel—Nobel Peace Prize Laureate; Professor, Boston University

Andrew Young—Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; Co-Chair, GoodWorks International.

I. William Zartman—Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations & Conflict Resolution, Director of African Studies and Conflict Management Programs, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

OBASANJO'S RELEASE

On June 15, 1998, INN member Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo was released after more than three years in a Nigerian prison. He and eight other political detainees were set free on the orders of Nigeria's new military ruler, Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, who came to power June 8, upon the death of Obasanjo's jailer, military dictator Gen. Sani Abacha. Obasanjo, the only Nigerian military leader to hand over power to a democratically elected government, was convicted in 1995 in a secret trial and sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in planning an alleged coup. In December 1997, Obasanjo's former top deputy, Gen. Mesa Shehu Yar'Adua, died in prison after being accused, but never tried, for the same alleged crime as Obasanjo. Another prominent Nigerian prisoner, Chief Moshood Abiola, the presumed winner of the annulled 1993 elections, died July 7, 1998, within days of his expected release. The INN gratefully welcomes Obasanjo's return to freedom.



Obasanjo, prior to his 1995 arrest.

* New INN member

Notes from the Field: 1997-98

By Jimmy Carter

The past two years have been eventful ones for me, Rosalynn, and staff members at The Carter Center. Our efforts to prevent and resolve armed conflicts, fight hunger and disease, and promote democracy and human rights continue to take us around the globe. After each of these trips, I usually draft a report, detailing who we met with and what was accomplished. I share these trip reports with Carter Center supporters, the White House, the State Department, the United Nations, and others, and the general public can read some of them by accessing The Carter Center's home page (www.cartercenter.org). Following are excerpts from some of these trip reports, which provide examples of Carter Center work and our personal approach to waging peace.

Jan. 15-26, 1997: Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Jamaica

We made this trip representing The Carter Center, and more particularly, our Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, which includes 31 leaders in the Western Hemisphere, all presidents or prime ministers. A number of specific issues were discussed, including a Free Trade Area for the Americas, drug trafficking, and weapons sales. In Chile, we met with former President Patricio Aylwin Azócar and President Eduardo Frei, who are both proud of the successful resolution of 22 of 24 border disputes with Argentina. We then met with leading human rights advocates in Brazil and discussed serious problems that still exist despite substantial progress. In Jamaica, former Prime Minister Edward Seaga told us that if the political system does not work or is misused by the government, then his party may boycott the next election, now expected by the end of this year. He and most other leaders want The Carter Center to serve as election monitors, but we informed Prime Minister P.J. Patterson that we would not do so without his approval.

April 18-21, 1997: Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia

I made a brief visit to East Africa and had a chance to consult with President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. I also visited Khartoum, where I had extensive meetings with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, distinguished members of his cabinet, and some rebel leaders who had just signed a Peace Agreement with the government. I was not able to meet personally with Dr. John Garang, leader of the main opposition Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), because of military activity near his location at Yei. However, his foreign minister, Deng Alor, assured me that the SPLM/A was willing to join in these negotiations, based on the texts of the Peace Agreement and the earlier negotiated Declaration of Principles. The alternative to peace talks will be a continuation and likely escalation of military activities in south Sudan. [Note: To learn more about The Carter Center's efforts in Sudan, see "Facilitating Peace Through Health" on page 14.]



Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, former First Lady Rosalynn Carter, and Carter Center Diplomatic Advisor Vince Farley (far left) meet in Khartoum in April 1997 with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. The Carter Center team, which included Conflict Resolution Program Director Harry Barnes, also met with Sudanese opposition leaders on this trip.

June 25-30, 1997: Liberia and Nigeria

The purpose of this trip was to complete the long search for peace and democracy in Liberia, an effort in which The Carter Center has been deeply involved for the last six years. Almost total disarmament was completed in February 1997, and elections were scheduled for May 30, then extended to July 19. The groundwork has been laid for an adequate but far from perfect election, probably the only alternative to continuing violence.

With Nigerian leader Gen. Sani Abacha serving as chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and his troops dominant in the regional peacekeeping force ECOMOG, Nigeria is the most powerful presence in Liberia. We went to the Nigerian capital of Abuja to meet with him and other top officials. He stated that Nigeria will continue its leadership and the neutrality of their troops. As expected, I urged the release of former president and INN member Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo; his associate, Gen. Shehu Yar'Adua; and the president-elect, Chief M.K.O. Abiola. Later I met with human rights activists, who expressed their concern about the absence of a comprehensible rule of law and with the total domination of their society by Gen. Abacha and the military ruling council. They were doubtful about the Council's promises to restore democratic civilian rule in October 1998.


[Note: In December 1997, Yar'Adua died in prison, followed by the death of Abacha in June 1998 and of Abiola in July, all reportedly of natural causes. Obasanjo was released one week after Abacha's death by Nigeria's new military ruler, who then promised to restore democratic rule by May 1999.]

July 16-21, 1997: Liberia

About two weeks after my previous visit, I returned to Liberia, accompanied by Rosalynn, to co-lead an international delegation to observe the nation's first democratic election, marking the end of a long chapter of civil war. Of the original population of 2.4 million, about 200,000 people have died, some 600,000 are refugees, and 800,000 displaced persons now live in camps near the capital of Monrovia.

Despite this, we found that 751,000 people had registered to vote. On Election Day, we were out early and witnessed by far the longest lines

and most patient people we have ever seen. Many had slept at the polling sites and lined up as early as 2 a.m. The following day at U.N. headquarters, we learned that their quick count was giving Charles Taylor about 75 percent of the presidential vote. In the afternoon, I had a private meeting with Taylor and received his commitment, among other promises, to bring key opposition leaders into his government, to establish a strong and independent human rights group, and to restrict the size of Liberia's armed forces and police. I told Taylor that The Carter Center is very determined to continue our long-standing involvement with Liberia and welcomed cooperation with its official agencies.



Former U.S. Sen. Paul Simon (far left) helped co-chair a 40-member Carter Center delegation with Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter to monitor July 1997 elections in Liberia. INN members Robert Pastor and Marie-Angélique Savané also served as delegates on the trip.

Gregory Steinn

[Note: The Carter Center has worked to facilitate peaceful resolution of Liberia's civil conflict since 1990. Since the 1997 election, the Center has assisted Liberia's Ministry of Education with development of a 10-year national strategy to integrate human rights education into the school system. As more schools reopen after the war, they will play a critical role in laying a foundation for permanent peace and eventual prosperity.]


July 23-29, 1997: China

After leaving Liberia, we traveled to Beijing, where we met former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn and Mike Oksenberg, who was my national security advisor on China. Among the main purposes of the trip were learning as much as possible about current affairs in China from political leaders, scholars, and villagers; discussing Tibet, religious freedom, and other human rights issues; ascertaining Chinese attitudes toward Korea; and exploring possibilities for an expanded relationship for The Carter Center in Chinese village elections and other affairs.

[Note: In March 1997 and again in March 1998, a Carter Center delegation observed village elections in a select number of provinces in China. Then in June 1998, another delegation began helping the government to establish a data collection system for village elections and for standardizing procedures nationwide. The Center continues to work with Chinese officials on setting up the computerized system and plans to launch a voter education project.]

Dec. 18, 1997: Jamaica

Many groups in Jamaica implored The Carter Center to monitor the parliamentary elections because of fear of increasing violence and intimidation. The national election commission invited us, all three parties welcomed our presence, and we were the only international monitors. On election day, our teams visited 1,111 of the 6,332 voting places. Those of us in the Kingston urban areas witnessed many problems during the day, but observer teams in the suburban and rural areas reported almost unanimously that there were few problems and the elections were fair, free, and safe. Although there were some failures to deliver accurate registration lists and other voting materials on time, all the sites eventually functioned well enough to permit voters to cast their ballots. There were four deaths, although the police later said that at least three were not related to the elections. Despite this deplorable violence, police officials and the news media recognized this as the most harmonious and peaceful election in recent history.



A Jamaican child approaches a soldier on the streets of Kingston during the December 1997 parliamentary elections monitored by The Carter Center.

Yim Mckay

March 31–April 12, 1998: Africa

We arrived in Bamako, Mali, and, after a briefing by U.S. Ambassador David Rawson, we met with Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. He welcomed my meeting with opposition leaders, who are boycotting both municipal elections and government involvement. I met later with the six faction leaders (COPPO) who were participating in the boycott. We finally got everyone to agree that two representatives of COPPO, the parliamentary majority parties, participating opposition, and President Alpha Oumar Konare and one of his ministers would meet with me later that night. The president agreed that I would preside. The meeting was tense and negative at first, but finally a consensus seemed to emerge around a package of suggestions I put forward. This is the best and only chance for reconciliation before final plans have to be made for communal elections. [Note: Unfortunately, the parties in Mali have yet to begin a productive dialogue. However, Mali and The Carter Center have agreed in principle that The Carter Center will help the Malian government to formulate the Mali National Development Coordination Project to ensure consistent social and economic plans and policies and to strengthen the nation's ability to implement economic reforms. The strategy will help Mali take the lead in determining how international assistance will be used in its transition to democracy.]

We departed Bamako Saturday morning, refueled in Gabon, and arrived in Pretoria, South Africa. We were surprised when our grandson, Jason, who is in the Peace Corps in South Africa, joined us. We made an early morning visit to Nelson Mandela's home in Johannesburg, where our entire group enjoyed a discussion about projects of The Carter Center in Africa, some regional developments, and the Peace Corps.

When we arrived in Liberia, we found a lot of commercial activity on the streets but slow progress in rebuilding Monrovia, which was almost totally destroyed in the war. The Carter Center sponsored a recent conference that advocated far-reaching reforms to strengthen Liberia's Human Rights Commission, and I delivered a copy of the commission's recommendations to President Taylor. We flew from Monrovia to Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, and then on to Conakry, Guinea. We were overwhelmed by the enormous reception there, with honor guards, ministers assembled, and thousands of people lining the streets. The Carter Center's agricultural program in Guinea has the full support of the government. After an Easter sunrise service at the residence of Ambassador Tibor Nagy, we departed for home.



Kirk Wodcott

Charles Taylor posted an overwhelming victory in the presidential polls, but the road ahead remained unclear for Liberia in 1998. The sign in this photo shows Taylor as a presidential candidate.

HEALING OUR MEMORIES

BY DESMOND TUTU

An INN member and former Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, South Africa, Desmond Tutu received the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize for his leadership in the anti-apartheid struggle. In 1995, South African President Nelson Mandela appointed Tutu chair of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Commission addresses the actions of those involved in the apartheid regime. Below, Tutu shares some of his thoughts and personal lessons learned on the healing process for a nation.

The best way to destroy a people is to destroy their history. In a very real sense, we are our memories—we are creatures of our own history. We all know the frustration of forgetting something, such as the place where we parked our car, leading us to search fruitlessly with rising impatience. While that is a fairly innocuous lapse of memory, we realize, when we look at it more carefully, just how central memory is to our entire existence.

In Africa we say, "A person is a person through other persons." We cannot repeat what we have forgotten, thus we would be unable to be truly human if we did not have the faculty of memory. This also is true of a nation. We must share certain key events and experiences that we can have in common: a shared memory, a shared history. That is why a naturalized citizen has to learn the history of his adopted country. That is why the best way to destroy a people is to destroy their history.

HEALING MEMORIES, BUILDING FUTURES

During the negotiations that brought our first democratic, nonracial elections in South Africa, all parties acknowledged that we had a dark past. In the more than 30-year struggle over the legally imposed racial separation of apartheid, unspeakable horrors were inflicted on members of both the black liberation movement and those aligned with state policies. Somehow, that dark past had to be addressed.

Many thought a thick veil should be drawn over that past, that we should let bygones be bygones and wipe the slate clean by granting blanket amnesty, as has happened in some Latin American countries. But this would not do. Drawing such a veil would victimize the victims a second time by denying that their rights were grossly violated.

President Nelson Mandela created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995 to enable the healing to begin. The Commission investigates apartheid-era actions of both the white minority regime's security forces and the black-led forces that fought them. Those who come before the Commission and fully confess their crimes may apply for amnesty from prosecution. Imperative to granting amnesty is the full disclosure of politically motivated acts where human rights violations occurred.

The amnesty process has helped to provide information no other process would have produced. The victims/survivors who have appeared during the Truth and Reconciliation hearings have testified to the cathartic effect of telling their story in a public forum of mostly sympathetic listeners. This has helped do what our founding act exhorts us to do: to help rehabilitate the human and civil dignity of those whose rights have been violated.



The Oslobodjenje newspaper office, destroyed during the fighting in Bosnia, stands in Sarajevo as a stark reminder of the costs of war and the obstacles for reconciliation.


We could have gone the route of the criminal justice system, as was done at Nuremberg after World War II. This was excluded for several reasons. The Nuremberg trials happened after one side of the conflict won a military victory. In our case, this did not happen; militarily, we had a stalemate. It is debatable whether our miracle of the April 1994 democratic elections would have happened had the security forces known they might be held accountable for their nefarious deeds. That miracle depended on the negotiated settlement, and a critical element of that was the amnesty provision.

If retributive justice was the last word in dealing with our past, then we would have had it. That is what I said to the Rwandese, who established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to address the 1994 genocide perpetrated by ethnic Hutu against ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutu. "Yes," I said, "impunity must not be tolerated, but if you deal with your past only through the International Tribunal, then you should be prepared for another genocide—this time perpetrated by Tutsi against Hutu." A way had to be found out of that spiral of attack and reprisal, counterattack and counter-reprisal.

FORGIVENESS AND REDEMPTION

Ultimately, the healing process has to do with forgiveness: granting the other person a chance to make a new beginning. We have said to perpetrators: "All you need to do is to say, 'I am sorry, forgive me,' and you will be surprised at the response." At the Commission, we have been amazed by the magnanimity of those who have been wronged. They have shown a remarkable generosity of spirit epitomized so spectacularly by President Mandela.

We must let people tell their stories, let them weep and mourn if appropriate. May those who wronged them be moved to ask for forgiveness, and another miracle will happen in our land. Indeed, it is happening. People's memories will



INN member Archbishop Desmond Tutu was appointed chair of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission by South African President Nelson Mandela in 1995.

Michael Schwarz

begin to heal as they learn the truth. The child of someone who was murdered gruesomely and saw her mother harassed and taunted by the police said at our first hearing in East London:

"We want to forgive, but we want to know whom to forgive." You could have heard a pin drop. We have extraordinary people.

There is a new class of victim coming forward: the families of the perpetrators. Most are learning for the first time just what their husbands and fathers did for a living, and that has been traumatic.

Families are under severe stress, they are crying out for help, they need to deal with this newfound knowledge.

Memories can fuel resentment and anger. Such memories need to be brought to the surface and dealt with there. Perhaps healing will come when people who died are acknowledged as heroes and heroines and not as terrorists and criminals. Symbolic gestures and actions are important, such as naming streets, schools, and clinics after those who fell. It would be wonderful if those who were bitter foes met at a commemoration and spoke words of healing and forgiveness.

There is no future without forgiveness. Wonderfully, nobody is beyond redemption.

*At the Commission,
we have been amazed
by the magnanimity
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THE QUEST TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BY LEE BUTLER

Gen. Lee Butler is the former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces and served as Gen. Colin Powell's strategic war planner before retiring from the U.S. Air Force in 1994.



AP/Wide World Photos

Decisions made now by the governments of India and Pakistan, both of which conducted nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, may hold great weight for the future of global security.


The global quest to accelerate the elimination of nuclear weapons received a powerful boost in February 1998 when former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, joined by more than 100 present and former senior government officials from around the world, proposed a bold but reasoned path toward this objective. In May 1998, a series of nuclear weapon tests conducted by India and Pakistan gave renewed urgency to this imperative.

The concerns voiced by President Carter and his contemporaries were underscored by the rationale espoused by India's new prime minister. Predictably, he rationalized these tests by echoing the long-standing rhetoric of declared nuclear weapon states. Their insistence on nuclear deterrence as essential to national security provided a ready excuse for India's highly regrettable decision and diminished their moral authority in urging restraint

upon nations who might feel compelled to follow suit.

Consequently, the historic opportunity created at the Cold War's end to roll back the most acute nuclear dangers is yet more fragile. Precious time has been lost as misplaced executive and legislative priorities in nuclear weapon states have delayed even modest strategic nuclear arms reduction. Conflicting foreign policy goals among the great powers have rekindled distrust and hostility. Deteriorating communications and warning networks in the former Soviet Union, coupled with strategic forces suffering from inadequate maintenance and modernization, have produced false attack warnings and serious equipment malfunctions. Theft of fissile material and unauthorized sale of weapon and missile components have mushroomed. And now, other nations weigh their response to the egregious conduct of India and Pakistan.

NUCLEAR POWERS OF THE WORLD



A HISTORIC JUNCTURE

Clearly, the community of nation-states has arrived at a historic juncture. These sovereign powers confront a stark choice: to enshrine nuclear weapons as the ultimate arbiter of conflict or to reject the prospect of shearing away entire societies in a nuclear holocaust. To consciously perpetuate and multiply the incomprehensible risks of the nuclear age would be an act of unparalleled folly. It would permanently impair our humanity and cast a deepening shadow over the fate of our planet.

Conversely, the journey toward a world free of the nuclear annihilation threat is readily discernible. It begins with a regime of progressive restraints that immediately reduce the most acute risks of the nuclear age. Such common sense measures as removing nuclear weapon systems from high states of alert, declaring no-first use policies, removing U.S. tactical nuclear warheads from Europe, and promptly ratifying the START II agreement by the Russian Duma (the Lower House of Parliament) would dramatically improve the current environment and create a more conducive climate for rapid progress.

We cannot at once hold sacred the mystery of life and sacrosanct the means to destroy it.

REALITY OF THE NUCLEAR AGE

This agenda is certainly within reach of policy-makers in nuclear weapon states. But it is premised on their understanding that nuclear deterrence is inherently unstable; the potential for using nuclear weapons will intensify every crisis, increasing the odds of miscalculation and the stakes of conflict; the consequences of nuclear war will spill well beyond the boundaries of antagonists; and the scale of destruction invoked by such a war is intolerable.

For decades we ignored the essential reality of the nuclear age: We have acquired the capacity to destroy meaningful life on our planet. Such a prospect transcends legitimate concern for national security; it presents a profound moral choice. We cannot at once hold sacred the mystery of life and sacrosanct the means to destroy it. We cannot aspire to fulfill the ideals of democracy while denying the sanctity of our existence. The choice comes as the family of humankind enters a new millennium. How we choose may well determine the likelihood that it will enter another.

WOMEN AND CONFLICT

BY EILEEN BABBITT

Dr. Eileen Babbitt is an assistant professor of international politics and director of the International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Program at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Boston. She is a member of The Carter Center's INN and the author of several articles on negotiation and peacemaking.

I came late to the study and practice of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Although I marched in the anti-Vietnam demonstrations of the early 1970s, I did not identify myself with peacemaking until much later, when the arms buildup of the early 1980s showed me just how dangerous escalation dynamics could be. I re-entered graduate school in 1983 with the goal of understanding international relations and foreign policy decision-making so that I could contribute to a saner, more nuanced view of dealing with one's perceived enemies.

Did I do this because I am a woman and as such am "naturally" drawn to protecting the human species? The answer is much more complicated than that. Women's roles in times of violent conflict vary. At a recent conference on Women and War, organized by the Women's Group at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (an international affairs graduate program at Tufts University in Boston), women spoke from their experience as warriors, victims, and peacebuilders.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH

Clearly, women choose different ways to approach conflict resolution when such choices are available. Some women are drawn to protect their group and families by enlisting, alongside men, in military service. Women military officers at the conference spoke eloquently of their pride and sense they had contributed something important to their children and their country. A second group of women spoke poignantly of the

victimization of women in conflict, the use of rape as a weapon of war, and the increasing attacks on civilian populations in civil conflicts.

Because of this targeting of civilians, many women choose to become peacemakers. Most of those I have met (in Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans) did not intend to take on this role; they felt it necessary as they saw their countries and communities fall into chaos and war. Their motivation? As women at the conference explained, it is to stem the tide of violence and teach their neighbors and children new ways of dealing with differences and increasing tolerance for those perceived to be the enemy.

I have not done a systematic survey of conflict resolution programs worldwide to know if women are overrepresented. But all locally initiated conflict reso-

lution programs I know of in the former Yugoslavia were started by women. All of these women had other professions in their "former lives": professors, doctors, psychologists, and others. And all felt their most valuable contribution lay in stopping the spread of war by learning and teaching peaceful approaches to conflict resolution.

These women are remarkable people who have tried to create optimism in the face of disaster. In regions where conflicts have been more protracted, women also have entered politics to add their voices to political debates about inclusion and nonviolence. The Middle East and Northern Ireland are two important examples.



As wars increasingly target civilians, women and children have become primary victims of conflict, such as this Rwandan refugee family.

Kathy Doherty/CARE



Kathryn Kolb

Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and former president of Ireland, is among the many women leaders promoting peace around the world. She is joined here by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter during a consultation at The Carter Center in May 1998.

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A KEY SET OF SKILLS

When women do participate in such peacemaking efforts, do their contributions differ from those of men? A preliminary study recently published (in *Political Psychology*, Vol. 19, No.1, 1998, 185-209) by one of my colleagues, T.P. d'Estree, and myself titled "Women and the Art of Peacemaking: Data From Israeli-Palestinian Interactive Problem-Solving Workshops" suggests the skills women bring to their leadership positions enhance their capacity to handle conflicts constructively. This includes the ability to develop empathy, especially by sharing personal experiences; the capacity to nurture connections and create personal networks; the tendency to form coalitions across conflict lines; the willingness to address emotional issues constructively; and persistence in striving to increase mutual understanding.

While these relationship-building skills are not sufficient to stop the destruction wreaked by conflict in our world, they are a necessary prerequisite to doing so. Women are leading the way by teaching these skills and by exemplifying them in their lives and work.

Women and the Art of Peacemaking

In both Israeli and Palestinian societies, women are not at the top of the political decision-making pyramid. Increasingly, however, they are part of the influential elite who advise decision-makers, participate in legislative bodies, and affect public opinion through their writing and speaking. It is significant, therefore, when such women reach out across the conflict divide to try to understand the perspective of their counterparts in the other community. Not only do these encounters change the individuals, they potentially have an impact on all those with whom the individuals work and live. Thus the "contagion" of these encounters can be very influential.

—from "Women and the Art of Peacemaking"
by Tamra Pearson d'Estree and Eileen F. Babbitt,
Political Psychology, Vol. 19, No.1, 1998, 206.

FACILITATING PEACE THROUGH HEALTH

BY DONALD HOPKINS

Donald Hopkins, M.D., M.P.H., is associate executive director of The Carter Center, where he oversees its health programs. Dr. Hopkins previously served as senior consultant to The Carter Center's Global 2000 program. He also has been the deputy director and acting director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and a member of seven U.S. delegations to the World Health Assembly.

Armed conflict certainly affects the health of combatants and civilians alike. Consequently, health offers a unique opportunity for peacemaking.

The direct effects of conflict on health are obvious. No vaccine or natural immunity against bullets and other traditional weapons of war exist. Everyone in a region of armed conflict is at risk, and many suffer intended and unintended injuries as a result. If biological or chemical weapons are used, the total damage can be greater than that caused by conventional weapons, particularly if the agents can spread from person to person indefinitely.

However widespread the direct effects of any weaponry, the indirect effects are often

greater. Disruptive displacement of populations promotes the spread of diseases. Refugees or prisoners may introduce deadly pathogens into new areas. Communicable diseases also infect people in crowded refugee camps. During the Franco-Prussian War, more than 150,000 Prussian civilians died of smallpox after infected French prisoners of war were sent to camps in Prussia.

Displaced populations also suffer catastrophically. For example, people in areas free of malaria may be forced to flee to

regions where the disease is endemic. Other indirect health effects include disruption of medical services; destruction of personnel, clinics, wells, houses, and crops; and depletion of human and financial resources used for fighting people instead of fighting disease.

On occasion, health issues can facilitate peacemaking and help mitigate the horrors of war. During civil conflicts in

Lebanon, El Salvador, and elsewhere, limited "days of tranquillity" or "corridors of tranquillity," negotiated under the auspices of UNICEF and/or the World Health Organization, allowed children to be immunized.

THE GUINEA WORM CEASE-FIRE

The longest medical cease-fire occurred in 1995, when former

U.S. President Jimmy Carter persuaded both sides in Sudan's civil war to agree to a two-month "Guinea Worm Cease-Fire." The agreement enabled Sudanese and international health workers—including Carter Center staff—to expand Sudan's delayed program to eradicate Guinea worm disease, a painful, parasitic infection that affects people in Africa, India, and Yemen. Most of the world's remaining 150,000 cases are found in Sudan, where fighting has hampered eradication efforts. The cease-fire was extended for two months and then contin-



Renée Moog

A pregnant woman in Mali shows an emerging Guinea worm to health workers.



Frank Richards

Following the cease-fire brokered by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, UNICEF and others were able to provide planes and trucks to deliver much-needed health supplies to both sides in Sudan's long-standing civil war.

WAR AGAINST THE WORM

Since 1986, when The Carter Center began orchestrating (the) global campaign to eradicate *dracunculiasis*, the disease caused by Guinea worm, cases have dropped (95) percent, from more than (3.5) million to about 130,000 (as of 1997). The disease, which has afflicted people since pre-Biblical times, should be gone from everywhere but Sudan before the start of the new millennium. In Sudan, Jimmy Carter's "Guinea worm cease-fire," as it came to be known, held for five months—longer than any other truce in human history whose objective was to fight disease. Although the war there drags on and Guinea worms persists, the spirit of Jimmy Carter may be understood in that moment, that brief moment, when men laid down their arms and the better angels in our nature flew.

—from *Stratos* magazine, May/June 1997

ued for almost another two months before hostilities resumed. As of mid-1998, the 15-year civil war had killed more than 1.5 million people.

In addition to providing civilians with a welcome respite from the war, the cease-fire in Sudan permitted health authorities on both sides as well as The Carter Center and


On occasion, health issues can facilitate peacemaking and help mitigate the horrors of war.

other international partners to accelerate the national Guinea Worm (*dracunculiasis*) Eradication Program. It also enabled health workers to jump-start the national program to control river blindness (*onchocerciasis*) by treating more than 100,000 people at risk of that disease and to give vaccines and other needed medicines to tens of thousands of Sudanese children. In 1996, both sides increased control measures

against Guinea worm disease and river blindness without a cease-fire—a result of newfound confidence and accomplishments resulting from the 1995 agreement. The Carter Center continues to assist Sudan through programs to help prevent both diseases.

An important topic shared and understood by all, health offers a neutral, confidence-building basis for discussion by adversaries. Thirty years ago, the Smallpox Eradication Program succeeded despite civil wars in Sudan, Nigeria, and Pakistan/Bangladesh. Sudan achieved success during the 1972-83 peaceful respite between two periods of bloody civil war. The country needs another period of extended peace to eradicate Guinea worm disease. Once that disease is wiped out, Guinea worm will become the second disease after smallpox to be eradicated. Allowing warring sides to focus on a common enemy—namely, disease—provides a face-saving rationale for reducing, interrupting, or even halting hostilities. It also can open the door to lasting peace.

ARMED CONFLICTS



Estimated Number of Deaths in 1997		
Conflict Location	Battle-Related ¹	Total Deaths ²
Afghanistan	2,000+	10,000+
Algeria	3,000+	10,000+
Burma/Myanmar	50-200	1,000+
Burundi	800	1,000+
Cambodia	na	100+
Colombia	500-999	2,000+
Congo	4-7,000	10,000+
Congo (DRC)	-	50,000+
India (Kashmir)	500+	1,500+
Indonesia	50-100	100+
Iran	na	100+
Iraq	na	1,200+*
Israel	175-250	100+
Peru	50-200	100+
Philippines	100-	100+
Rwanda	-	10,000+
Senegal	200-500	100+
Sierra Leone	100+	2,000+*
Sri Lanka	4,000+	4,000+*
Sudan	5,000+	10,000+
Tajikistan	-	1,000+
Turkey	1,000+	4,000+
Uganda	250	100+

+ Greater than
- Less than

* Information covers 1997 and 1998 and comes from PIOOM's World Conflict and Human Rights Map 1998

na Information "not available"


- Does not meet SIPRI's definition for "major armed conflict"

Sources: ¹ SIPRI's Major Armed Conflicts 1997

² PIOOM's World Conflict Map 1997

Countries in red depict the 23 locations where “high-level” armed conflicts occurred in 1997, based on a survey of five organizations around the world that monitor and tabulate conflict statistics. Countries in blue highlight the 30 locations where “lower-level” armed conflicts were fought in 1997. In many cases, multiple armed conflicts are waged within the same internationally recognized bor-


der, pushing the total number of armed conflicts in 1997-98 to as high as 100 or more, depending on which definition is used. Recognizing there are different ways to define armed conflicts (see “Introduction” for analysis), we provide an overview here and in the pages that follow rather than creating our own definition.



AFRICA

Africa continued to be the most turbulent region of the world, with “high-level” armed conflicts fought in nine countries and “lower-level” conflicts fought in another 15 spots in 1997-98. Fighting that erupted in Guinea-Bissau and along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border added to the violence in such long-standing trouble spots as Algeria, Rwanda, and Sudan, all of which contributed to the rampant hunger, disease, and refugee problems that have plagued Africa for decades. The historic six-nation tour in May 1998 by

President Bill Clinton (who joined Jimmy Carter as only the second U.S. president to visit Africa while in office) and the tireless efforts of Ghanaian-born U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan helped bring Africa more fully into the international spotlight. While an end to prolonged fighting in Liberia and democratic reforms in several countries led some to state hopefully that an “African renaissance” had begun, fighting in Congo (DRC) in mid-1998 threatened to pull a wide swath of Africa back into turmoil.



Health and Human Development Indicators

For comparisons of countries with high-level conflicts in 1997-98, HDI measures the distance needed to attain the UNDP's 1997 Human Development Report goals for life expectancy, educational level, and income on a 1,000 scale (the nearer to 1,000, the closer a country is to attaining these goals). Under-5 mortality rates, as measured by UNICEF, represent the probability of a child dying between birth and 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births.

Country	% Population With Access to Safe Water (1990-96)	% Population With Access to Sanitation (1990-96)	% Fully Immunized 1-Year-Old Children (1995-96)				Population Annual Growth Rate % (1980-96)	Adult Literacy Rate (1995)	Human Development Index (HDI) (1997)	Under-5 Mortality Rate (1997)	World Rank (1 = highest mortality)
			TB	DPT	Polio	Measles					
Algeria	78	91	94	75	75	68	2.7	62	0.737	39	92
Burundi	52	51	77	63	63	50	2.6	35	0.247	176	17
Congo	34	69	50	47	47	42	2.9	75	0.500	108	46
Congo (DRC)	42	18	51	36	36	41	3.4	77	0.381	207	12
Rwanda	na	na	93	98	98	76	0.3	61	0.187	170	19
Senegal	63	39	80	62	62	60	2.7	33	0.326	110	43
Sierra Leone	34	11	77	65	65	79	1.8	31	0.176	284	3
Sudan	50	22	96	79	80	75	2.4	46	0.333	116	42
Uganda	46	57	96	68	67	66	2.7	62	0.328	141	30
Sub-Saharan Africa	49	44	70	52	53	56	2.9	57	0.380	170	
Mid. East/North Africa	81	72	91	86	87	86	3.0	59	na	65	
United States	na	na	na	94	84	89	1.0	99*	0.942	8	162
World	71	42	89	80	81	79	1.7	75	0.764	88	

* Data refers to periods other than those specified, to a region rather than an entire country, or differs from the standard definition.

Sources: UNICEF, UNDP

Population Displacement

Internally Displaced People (IDPs) are defined as those people who have been forced to flee their homes and who remain in the territory of their own country. Refugees are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Persons in "refugee-like situations" (RLS) fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries but are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers.

ALGERIA

IDPs:	10,000
Refugees:	185
France:	185

CONGO

Refugees:	149
France:	149

RWANDA

Refugees:	467,105
Congo (DRC):	423,561
Tanzania:	20,020
Uganda:	11,236
Kenya:	5,487
Zambia:	1,858
Other:	4,943

SIERRA LEONE

IDPs:	800,000
Refugees:	374,374
Guinea:	248,827
Liberia:	120,001
Gambia:	4,263
Other:	1,283

SUDAN

IDPs:	4,000,000
Refugees:	463,603
Uganda:	223,720
Congo (DRC):	96,529
Ethiopia:	75,743
Kenya:	33,477
Central African Republic:	30,671
Other:	3,463

BURUNDI

IDPs:	400,000
Refugees:	426,750
Tanzania:	385,452
Congo (DRC):	30,226
Rwanda:	9,611
Belgium:	472
Other:	989
RLSs:	100,000

CONGO (DRC)

IDPs:	400,000
Refugees:	134,072
Tanzania:	55,214
Uganda:	28,611
Rwanda:	15,397
Zambia:	14,180
Angola:	9,341
Other:	11,329

SENEGAL

Refugees:	17,490
Guinea-Bissau:	15,000
Gambia:	2,490

UGANDA

IDPs:	70,000
Refugees:	23,574
Congo (DRC):	17,289
Kenya:	5,425
Other:	860

Sources: UNHRC, U.S. Committee for Refugees

Military Comparisons

Defense Expenditures

Manpower

	Total (Millions \$)		% GNP		% Central Govt. Expenditure		\$ Per Capita		# in Armed Forces x 1,000	
		World Rank		World Rank		World Rank		World Rank		World Rank
Algeria	1,238	57	3.2	49	6.9	100	43	78	120	36
Burundi	46	131	4.4	33	24.8	20	8	139	22	95
Congo	48	130	2.9	61	na	74	19	109	10	121
Congo (DRC)	17	154	0.3	164	3.7	139	0	164	49	75
Rwanda	118	105	5.2	25	na	21	20	108	33	85
Senegal	76	118	1.6	115	na	89	9	134	14	110
Sierra Leone	41	136	6.1	15	28.9	14	9	132	14	109
Sudan	na	79	na	16	na	13	na	122	89	48
Uganda	126	101	2.3	85	13.3	52	6	145	52	171
Africa	11,800		2.5		8.4		18		1,538	
United States	277,800	1	3.8	39	17.4	34	1,056	4	1,620	2
World	864,500		2.8		9.9		152		22,790	

Source: ACDA 19

ALGERIA



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 919,591 sq. mi. (2,381,740 sq. km.)

Population: 29,830,370

Life Expectancy at Birth: 69 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Arabic (official)
French
Berber dialects

Religions: Sunni Muslim 99%
Christian &
Jewish 1%

Ethnic Groups: Arab-Berber 99%
Other 1%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$115.9 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$4,000*

External Debt: U.S. \$32 billion*

*1996 estimated

Source: CIA

“U.N. member states have turned their backs on the Algerian human rights tragedy.”

—Pierre Sané
Amnesty International secretary-general
Nov. 18, 1997

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government

Warring Parties: Government of Algeria vs. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)* vs. Islamic Armed Group (GIA)

Troop Strength: **Government:** 170,000 including the Gendarmerie and the National Security Forces **FIS:** na **GIA:** na

Est. Deaths (1997): More than 3,000 battle-related; more than 10,000 overall

Est. Deaths (total): 40,000-80,000 battle-related; 80,000-100,000 overall

*The Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) is considered to be the armed wing of the FIS. There are also several other armed Islamic groups under the FIS military command.

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

Politics and violence in Algeria's civil war have taken new turns since the mid-1990s. War has raged across Algeria since the January 1992 cancellation of its first multiparty general elections. Violent outbreaks began with the popular revolts of October 1988 and continued during preparations for 1991 elections. Current fatality totals are estimated at 80,000, although figures as high as 100,000 are credible since incidents are not reported regularly.

The Islamic protest movement, which rose to a peak level of popularity in the 1991 local elections, has declined throughout the decade. This movement was driven by popular dissatisfaction with the regime, dominated by a military junta, and an absence of other protest channels when political liberalization had been announced as the government program.

After four years of a bloody confrontation between the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) on one hand, and the government on the other, a new element was injected in November 1995 when Algeria became the first Arab country to hold a presidential election with several candidates. Gen. Liamine Zeroual was elected with about 62 percent of the vote in a turnout of 75 percent of the electorate, the highest ever in Algeria.

Zeroual's election was seen as an expression of popular support for ending the civil war and a blind expression of faith in his ability to do so. The second candidate in the election was Cheikh Nahnah of the then-Hamas Party, who received 25 percent of the vote, comparable to Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) support in the 1991 elections.

The more extreme groups of terrorists, now with little ideological or organizational connection to any Islamic movement, entered into the most vicious series of massacres that Algeria has seen.

Instead of reconsidering the vote as an opening for engaging all parties and shifting from military to party government, coupled with dialogue involving Islamic Movement political leaders, Zeroual saw it as an acclamation requiring only cosmetic measures of cooperation with other political forces. In November 1996, constitutional amendments to establish a second, indirectly elected House of Parliament to control the initiatives of the lower house and to ban all religious parties received overwhelming support.

Subsequent parliamentary elections in June 1997 generally were regarded as credible but less free and fair than the presidential elections. The third round of elections was held in October 1997 for local assemblies; since these bodies elect much of the upper house, the government wished to keep them under its control, and their elections were not regarded as free and fair.

During this same period, the government entered into secret negotiations with some of the militant elements of the Islamic movement. Abassi Madani, leader of the banned FIS, was released from prison but placed under house arrest in September, while parts of the regime negotiated a cease-fire with the AIS. As a result, terrorist activity ended in the

Constantine region in eastern Algeria, and military raids by the army cleaned out other areas of terrorist control.

The more extreme groups of terrorists, now with little ideological or organizational connection to any Islamic movement, entered into the most vicious series of massacres that Algeria has seen. From June 1997 through Ramadan in January 1998, thousands of deaths were recorded, particularly in the Algiers region and then in western Algeria around Oran. In exchange, the government armed Legitimate Defense Groups, some of which used their arms to carry out counter-massacres against supposed or real opponents.

Violence continued in Algeria through mid-1998, with terrorists attacking civilian populations of no strategic importance to settle accounts and seek revenge, land, or massacres. The government appeared unable and unwilling to bring them under control, often because it would involve settling accounts between terrorists and former Islamic supporters. In September 1998, President Zeroual announced that he would step down and call for early elections before March, yet violence continued with a reported 41 people killed during the three days following his announcement.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1954	National Liberation Front (FLN) forms, initiates war of independence against colonizer France
1962	One million die before France grants independence; Ben Bella forms first government
1965	Col. Boumediene deposes Ben Bella, sets up military government
1976	Referendum frames constitution based on socialism and Islamic law
1990	FIS wins first local elections, threatens FLN power-hold
1992	Military regime seizes power, cancels elections, dissolves FIS; mass unrest ensues
1993	GIA launches terror campaign; army reprisals increase; thousands die
1995	Zeroual, appointed president three years earlier, wins multiparty election boycotted by FIS; killings continue
1998	1,100 die in massacres during holy month of Ramadan

Dr. I. William Zartman, an INN member, is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution in the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

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BURUNDI



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 10,745 sq. mi. (27,830 sq. km.)

Population: 6,052,614

Life Expectancy at Birth: 49 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Kirundi (official)
French (official)
Kiswahili

Religions: Christian 67%
Indigenous 32%
Muslim 1%

Ethnic Groups:
Hutu (Bantu) 85%
Tutsi (Hamitic) 14%
Twa 1%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$4 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$600*

External Debt: U.S. \$1.1 billion*

*1995 estimated

Source: CIA

“Britain and the other countries of the European Union are in favor of relaxing sanctions on Burundi as significant progress toward reconciliation has been made.”

—Graeme Loten
Britain's new ambassador to Burundi
The Times, July 31, 1998

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Government
Warring Parties:	Government of Burundi vs. National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) Ethnic Hutu vs. Ethnic Tutsi*
Troop Strength:	Government: 40,000 CNDD: na
Est. Deaths (1997):	800 battle-related; more than 1,000 overall*
Est. Deaths (total):	More than 1,000 battle-related; 150,000-200,000 overall*

* Massacres between ethnic Hutu and Tutsi are not classified as battle-related by SIPRI and thus not included in its study.

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BY FABIENNE HARA

For more than four years, Burundi has been embroiled in a civil war that has claimed some 200,000 lives and led thousands of people to flee to neighboring countries. The war began on Oct. 21, 1993, when officers in the Tutsi-dominated army assassinated Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi's first ethnic Hutu president elected by universal suffrage. The president's assassination gave rise to a terrible outbreak of violence in the country. Hutu killed large numbers of ethnic Tutsi, and the army retaliated in massive and bloody fashion against Hutu peasants and officials.

A power-sharing arrangement negotiated in January 1994 did not stop the insurgency movement against the minority-ruled government. In November 1995, the presidents of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire, together with a Tanzanian presidential envoy, discussed the crises in Burundi and Rwanda at a meeting led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and INN member Archbishop Desmond Tutu and organized by The Carter Center. The

insurgency continued, however, until July 25, 1996, when the Burundian army ousted Hutu President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya. He was replaced by Major Pierre Buyoya, the Tutsi head of state who had handed power to Ndadaye in 1993.

In response to the 1996 coup, the leaders of Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Zaire, and Cameroon decided, under the impetus of internationally appointed mediator and former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, to impose sanctions on Burundi. Their aim was to force the government to return to constitutional order and start immediate negotiations with all the parties to the conflict, including Hutu rebel groups. This response by regional leaders led within weeks to lifting the ban on political parties and the restoration of Burundi's parliament.

As of June 1998, the main objectives of regional policy, however, had yet to be achieved: Buyoya remained in place, violence and inter-ethnic fighting continued, the military still

INN Action: Burundi

INN member Kumar Rupesinghe, former director of International Alert (IA), developed a program in Burundi to encourage dialogue at all levels and to strengthen the nation's capacity for conflict resolution and peaceful change. IA facilitated meetings of the Burundian diaspora and supported the development of *Compagnie des Apotres de la Paix*, a Burundian NGO composed of senior figures from the Hutu and Tutsi communities. Meanwhile, INN member Barnett Rubin established and continues to lead the Great Lakes Policy Forum and convene other meetings to address the conflict in Burundi and neighboring countries (see INN Action for Rwanda on page 29).

dominated politics, and peace talks had yet to start.

Because the embargo created opportunities for extortion rackets, corruption, and a highly profitable black market, it failed to exert significant hardship on the ruling class. Its continuation narrowed Buyoya's political base, marginalized moderates, and radicalized elements of the army and the minority Tutsi, who fear regional pressure might force the government to make concessions that would compromise their military supremacy and security. Nyerere's support for the sanctions compromised his neutrality and stalled the peace process.

In March 1997, thanks to the mediation of the Rome-based Community of Sant'Egidio, the government signed a preliminary agreement with the opposi-

tion National Council for the Defense of Democracy in Rome. The Tutsi community's hostile reaction to the talks made further progress extremely difficult. A year later, President Buyoya announced governmental reforms, including an enlarged National Assembly, a reduced government, and the appointment of two vice presidents. The mandate of the current National Assembly was to expire in June 1998.

In addition to sanctions and to the hostile attitude of the region, Buyoya faced many internal challenges. As of mid-1998, his political base in the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party was fragmented. The opposition also was split, with some dismissing the transitional period toward a government of national reconciliation as Buyoya's pretense to stay in power.

Fabienne Hara is a political analyst and the project coordinator for the International Crisis Group's Burundi Program. Previously, she was a research associate on the Great Lakes at the Council on Foreign Relations and a project coordinator for Doctors of the World's mission in Burundi.

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CONFLICT TIMELINE

1962	Burundi gains independence from Belgium; ethnic Tutsi take control of government
1965	Ethnic Hutu military coup fails; Hutu purged from army and bureaucracy
1972	Abortive coup blamed on Hutu; Tutsi massacre 100,000 Hutu
1976	Lt. Col. Bagaza deposes President Micombero in coup
1987	Maj. Buyoya deposes Bagaza
1988	Conflict erupts between Hutu and Tutsi; large-scale massacres follow
1993	Ndadaye, a Hutu, killed by Tutsi soldiers after winning first free election; thousands die in ethnic violence
1994	Ntaryamira becomes president, dies in plane crash; Ntibantunganya takes power
1996	Buyoya ousts Ntibantunganya; regional sanctions levied against Burundi

CONGO



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 132,046 sq. mi. (342,000 sq. km.)

Population: 2,583,198

Life Expectancy at Birth: 45.7 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: French (official)

Lingala

Kikongo

Other African Languages

Religions: Christian 50%
Animist 48%
Muslim 2%

Ethnic Groups:

Kongo 48%
Sangha 20%
Teke 17%
M'Bochi 12%
Other 3%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$4.9 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$1,960*

External Debt: U.S. \$5.3 billion**

* 1995 estimated
** 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Government
Warring Parties:	Government of Congo vs. United Democratic Forces (FDU)*; Angola**
Troop Strength:	Government: 10,000 FDU: 1,500-3,000 Angola: 3,500
Est. Deaths (1997):	4,000-7,000 battle-related; more than 10,000 overall
Est. Deaths (total):	4,000-7,000 battle-related; more than 12,000 overall

* Armed action was primarily carried out by the Cobras, the private militia of FDU leader Sassou-Nguesso.

** Angolan forces were involved in the conflict between the Government of Congo and the FDU.

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BY MARA POSNER

Since the Republic of the Congo became a multiparty state in 1991, its transition to democracy has been characterized more by violence than by progress. Pascal Lissouba defeated former President Denis Sassou-Nguesso and Bernard Kolelas in the August 1992 presidential election. Unable to maintain a majority coalition, Lissouba dissolved parliament and called for new elections. The first-round was held in May 1993. Opposition charges of first-round fraud escalated tensions to crisis levels. The second round was boycotted, and urban violence erupted.

Faced with a deteriorating situation, Lissouba declared a state of emergency and requested international mediation in July 1993. High-level teams from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Gabon, and France worked with Congolese leaders to formulate a resolution to the crisis. On Jan. 30, 1994, the government and opposition parties signed the Libreville Accords in which they promised to consolidate

democracy, respect the constitution, and dissolve their partisan militias, integrating their most qualified elements into the state military and police forces. Due to insufficient funding, the Accords never were implemented fully, and private militias continued clandestine operations.

UNESCO sponsored a December 1994 national forum to encourage renewed dialogue between political parties, civil society, and the government. The forum resulted in the drafting and signing of the Framework Agreement (Accord Cadre) on May 31, 1996. The Agreement, in anticipation of 1997 presidential elections, provided a framework for conducting administrative census and voter registration. Unfortunately, implementation proceeded at a slow pace, creating an environment of mutual mistrust among parties.

Civil war broke out in June 1997 as the country prepared for presidential elections. The confrontation began June 5 when Lissouba sent government forces to Sassou-Nguesso's Brazzaville

home to search for armed militias, alleged to have caused violence in the northern towns of Owando and Oyo. The incidents occurred just days after five main political party leaders, including Lissouba and Sassou-Nguesso, signed a UNESCO-sponsored solemn pledge, affirming their commitment to disarm party militias and peacefully conduct the July presidential elections.

Sassou-Nguesso considered the presence of government troops and armored tanks in front of his home a provocation and ordered his militia to respond. The resulting conflict shifted the violence from northern Congo to downtown Brazzaville. Then-mayor of Brazzaville, Bernard Kolelas, brokered the first in a series of short-lived cease-fires. President Omar Bongo of Gabon, who negotiated the 1994 Libreville Accords, U.N. and OAU Special Envoy Mohamed Sahnoun, and other prominent regional figures and African state

leaders repeatedly attempted to settle the power struggle. All attempts to foster dialogue failed due to differences over power sharing.

After nearly five months of fighting, Sassou-Nguesso, bolstered by Angolan ground and air support, captured Congo's two main cities, Brazzaville and Pointe Noire, and took control of the government. The Supreme Court,

which he had appointed

before he lost the 1992 presidential election, proclaimed him president a week later, and he named a new government that incorporated several opposition party members. Lissouba and some in his entourage

took refuge in Burkina Faso. Traveling to Washington, D.C., and France, the former president expressed outrage at the international community for its role as silent witness to the overthrow of his elected government. He also decried the apparent implication of the French oil industry in the five-month power struggle.

Civil war broke out in June 1997 as the country prepared for presidential elections... All attempts to foster dialogue failed due to differences over power sharing.

Mara Posner is a program officer in the Africa/Near East Program of the International Foundation for Election Systems.

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
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CONFLICT TIMELINE

1951	Congo gains independence from France; Youlou named first president
1963	National Revolution Movement established as sole political party
1968	Maj. Nguabi takes power in coup; proclaims Marxist regime
1977	Maj. Nguabi assassinated; 11-member military council takes power
1979	Col. Sassou-Nguesso selected president
1991	Multiparty system approved
1992	New constitution approved; Lissouba becomes first democratically elected president
1997	Sassou-Nguesso launches rebel attack, captures main cities, retakes control of government

CONGO (DRC)



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 905,564 sq. mi. (2,345,410 sq. km.)

Population: 47,440,362

Life Expectancy at Birth: 47 years

System of Government: Republic with strong presidential system

Languages: French (official)
Lingala
Kingwana
Kikongo
Tshiluba

Religions: Roman Catholic 50%
Protestant 20%
Kimbanguist 10%
Muslim 10%
Other 10%

Ethnic Groups:*
Bantu
Other

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$16.5 billion**

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$400**

External Debt: U.S. \$13.8 billion**

* Over 200 ethnic groups exist, most of which are Bantu
** 1995 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government

Warring Parties: Government of Zaire* vs. Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa (ADFL); Rwanda**

Troop Strength: **Government:** 28,000 **ADFL:** 20,000-40,000 **Rwanda:** na

Est. Deaths (1997): More than 2,000 battle-related; 30,000 to more than 50,000 overall

Est. Deaths (total): 4,000-9,000 battle-related; 30,000-100,000 overall

* After the ADFL victory of May 1997, the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

** Rwanda supported the ADFL against the government of Zaire.

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BY PETER ROSENBLUM

On May 17, 1997, rebel forces swept into the capital city of Kinshasa, bringing an end to the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko and erasing the name "Zaire" from world maps. The country was then renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The rebel assault by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) took only seven months and involved few significant battles, save for the massacre of fleeing Rwandan Hutu. The corrupt and dispirited Zairian army proved incapable of mounting a defense, no less the "thunderous" counterattack it promised. The population, which initially rallied to Mobutu's side against what they perceived as a foreign invader, progressively turned its allegiance to the ADFL and welcomed the rebels' help in ending Mobutu's 32-year rule.

The ADFL began as a coalition of four obscure groups, formed in South Kivu on Oct. 18, 1996, at the beginning of the conflict. The future president, Laurent Kabila, was declared the

spokesperson but eventually managed to displace the other leaders. One died under suspicious circumstances, another was imprisoned, and the third was politically marginalized. Kabila, who brought few troops into the coalition, had little initial credibility.

The impetus for the war came, internally, from a small group of threatened Zairian Tutsi, known as Banyamulenge. Externally, the Rwandan government used the war to dissolve the threatening camps of more than 1 million Rwandan Hutu along the border. For Uganda, the assault offered an opportunity to suppress a Sudanese-backed rebel movement in northeastern Zaire and create stability for the cross-border economy.

Zairians would not accept a war that was led either by foreign troops or by ethnic Tutsi, who they also viewed as foreigners. Thus Kabila, although a longtime rebel with a checkered past, was an "insider" who suited the purposes of foreign sponsors. Kabila succeeded in diversifying his support and putting a Zairian face on the rebellion.

"The continued civil war in the Congo is a serious threat to the peace and stability of all countries in the region."

—Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa
Sept. 16, 1998

However, the easy military victory did not translate into a successful political transition. The speed and ease of the victory left the ADFL overconfident, unprepared for governance, and uninterested in compromise, particularly with the domestic forces that had struggled for democracy throughout the final years of the Mobutu regime. The attitude of the new government and its ministers—most of whom had returned from long years of exile—was triumphant. They quickly lost goodwill, however, through arbitrary and inconsistent programs, belligerent declarations, and crackdowns on the population that had facilitated their victory.

Meanwhile, Kabila's efforts to consolidate power alienated foreign allies and antagonized domestic ones. He also failed to offer solutions to long-term problems, particularly the ethnic and regional conflicts in the east of the country that played a key role in initiating the war. During Kabila's first year in power, several signs of disarray occurred: four Kabila ministers were

jailed; Rwanda and Uganda, key foreign allies, openly broke ranks; and key domestic allies, including the Banyamulenge, lost hope in the government resolving their grievances.

The problems of the Kabila government were complicated further by the killing of thousands of Hutu who fled from ADFL forces rather than return to Rwanda, as had other refugees. There

was little doubt the massacres were committed by ADFL forces and their allies, perhaps at the command and behest of Rwandan officers. Although Rwanda and the Congo refused to cooperate with U.N. investigations into the killings, the

Kabila government bore the brunt of international criticism. In August 1998, Banyamulenge Tutsi soldiers in eastern Kivu provinces declared a rebellion against the Kabila government. Kabila mounted a defense and sought assistance from Angola and Zimbabwe to help repel the rebels and their Ugandan and Rwandan backers. Three rounds of peace talks failed during the following month, threatening to plunge the entire region into armed conflict.

Peter Rosenblum is the projects director for the Harvard Human Rights Program and a member of the U.N. Secretary-General's Advisory Group on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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
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CONFLICT TIMELINE

1960	Congo gains independence from Belgium; army mutinies; Katanga province secedes, prompting U.N. force deployment
1965	One year after country renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo, Col. Mobutu stages military coup, declares himself president
1970	Mobutu elected president for seven-year term; country renamed Republic of Zaire following year
1977	Shaba rebellion put down with Western assistance
1982	Union for Democracy and Social Progress formed in opposition to government
1990	U.S. ends all military and economic aid amid allegations of severe human rights abuses
1994	1.3 million Hutu refugees from Rwanda settle in camps in eastern Zaire
1996	Mobutu opponent Kabila leads Tutsi revolt in eastern Zaire
1997	Mobutu relinquishes power to Kabila; country renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo; Mobutu dies

RWANDA



THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Government
Warring Parties:	Ethnic Hutu vs. Ethnic Tutsi
Troop Strength:	na
Est. Deaths (1997):	More than 10,000 overall
Est. Deaths (total):	800,000 or more overall*

* SIPRI does note that massacres by Hutu militias and Hutu civilians in 1994 are often estimated as having resulted in 500,000-800,000 deaths. Because these deaths are not classified as battle-related, SIPRI does not include Rwanda in its study.

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BASIC FIGURES

Area: 10,170 sq. mi. (26,340 sq. km.)

Population: 7,737,537

Life Expectancy at Birth: 39 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Kinyarwanda (official)
French (official)
English (official)
Kiswahili

Religions: Roman Catholic 65%
Protestant 9%
Muslim 1%
Other 25%

Ethnic Groups:
Hutu 80%
Tutsi 19%
Twa (Pygmoid) 1%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$3.8 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$400*

External Debt: U.S. \$1 billion*

*1995 estimated

Source: CIA

BY GÉRARD PRUNIER

The conflict in Rwanda started with the murder of the late Rwandese President Juvenal Habyarimana, and the ensuing genocide of April-June 1994. This genocide killed about 750,000 ethnic Tutsi and 50,000 moderate Hutu on orders from the interim extremist Hutu government led by "President" Theodore Sindikubwabo (now dead) and "Premier" Jean Kambanda (presently under custody of the International Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania). During the genocide, the war between the government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) Tutsi insurgents resumed, eventually leading to the final victory of the RPF in August 1994 and the flight to Zaire of thousands of Hutu refugees.

At first, the RPF organized a government of national unity comprising several prominent Hutu politicians who had opposed the extremist Hutu regime of President Habyarimana. But in August 1995, these moderate Hutu were sacked from the government, leading to

an ethnic radicalization of the state structure. In the meantime, Hutu extremists of the former regime stepped up their hit-and-run raids against the new regime from their bases in U.N.-supported refugee camps in former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), which sheltered over 1 million refugees. In Zaire, the Hutu genocide perpetrators harassed and killed the Tutsi living on their side of the border with the complicity of Zairian authorities. In spite of several warnings, the international community did little apart from some unproductive discussions with the late Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko.

In September 1996, using the local Tutsi tribe of the Banyamulenge in Zaire, Rwanda's Minister of Defense and strongman Paul Kagame attacked the refugee camps, eventually forcing about 700,000 refugees to return to Rwanda. In October, the Rwandese government sponsored an alliance of several Zairian rebel groups under the



CARE/Kathy Doherty

Rwandan refugees struggle in Congo (DRC).

INN Action: Rwanda

INN member Barnett Rubin, director of the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations, created and continues to lead the Great Lakes Policy Forum. This monthly gathering of international actors in Washington, D.C., works to prevent further violence in the African region by exchanging information, coordinating strategies, and advocating policies to the U.S. and other governments. CPA initially focused on Burundi but widened its work to include Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Uganda as the crisis engulfed the Great Lakes region. Other activities include meetings of the confidential Security Working Group and of the European Forum on the Great Lakes in Brussels.

leadership of Laurent Kabila and lent them the necessary manpower and equipment for overthrowing President Mobutu. The war lasted from November 1996 to May 1997. Of the 400,000 or so Hutu refugees who had fled westward into Zaire, half died, either killed by the Tutsi in hot pursuit or through starvation and disease. The 700,000 who had come back earlier proved hard to control for the Rwandese government. Many former *genocidaires* were among them, and they soon started operating from within Rwanda with the help of some of the former army that had managed to dodge the 1996 offensive by hiding in the

thick forests at the foot of the Virunga Mountains. By then, Tutsi extremists largely had taken control of the Rwandese state apparatus.

By mid-1997, a new war was in full swing, with Hutu extremists systematically killing Tutsi civilians and Hutu "collaborators." Repression by the mostly Tutsi army was brutal after these attacks. In May 1998, the murder in Nairobi of Seth Sendashonga, a Hutu moderate and former RPF minister of interior who was sacked and exiled in 1995, seemed to destroy the hope for dialogue in a situation increasingly dominated by extremists from both sides.

Dr. Gérard Prunier, who has lived and traveled extensively in East Africa since 1970, holds a Ph.D. in African history from the University of Paris and works as a senior researcher for C.N.R.S. in Paris.

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
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The Rwanda Crisis (1959-1994): History of a Genocide (1995) by Gérard Prunier.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1946	Rwanda becomes U.N. trust territory
1962	Year after monarchy abolished, Rwanda gains independence from Belgium; Kayibanda becomes president
1963	Ethnic Hutu-Tutsi tensions erupt; Hutu massacre 20,000 Tutsi
1973	Habyarimana deposes Kayibanda, establishes military administration
1990	RPF, composed mainly of Tutsi refugees, invades Rwanda from Uganda
1993	Arusha Peace Accords signed by Habyarimana and RPF; UNAMIR deployed for six months to monitor cease-fire
1994	Habyarimana assassinated; genocide kills 800,000 or more people, displaces 1.7 million more; RPF occupies Kigali as government flees
1996	More than 1.3 million refugees repatriated

SENEGAL



THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Territory (Casamance)
Warring Parties:	Government of Senegal vs. Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)
Troop Strength:	Government: 13,000 MFDC: 500-1,000
Est. Deaths (1997):	200-500 battle-related
Est. Deaths (total):	More than 1,000 battle-related; more than 2,500 overall

Sources: SIPRI, AKUF

BY KARL MAGYAR

BASIC FIGURES

Area: 75,955 sq. mi. (196,190 sq. km.)

Population: 9,403,546

Life Expectancy at Birth: 56.9 years

System of Government: Republic under multiparty democratic rule

Languages: French (official)
Wolof
Pulaar
Diola
Mandingo

Religions: Muslim 92%
Indigenous 6%
Christian 2%

Ethnic Groups:
Wolof 36%
Fulani 17%
Serer 17%
Toucouleur 9%
Diola 9%
Mandingo 9%
European and Lebanese 1%
Other 2%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$15.6 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$1,700*

External Debt: U.S. \$4.1 billion**

*1996 estimated
**1995 estimated
Source: CIA

While Senegal has not been engaged in one massive war, it has experienced several armed conflicts for nearly two decades that deserve close scrutiny due to its generally good reputation as a conservative and stable society.

Externally, Senegal has had disputes with neighboring Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, and to a lesser extent, Gambia, where a confederate arrangement called "Senegambia" has lasted seven years.

Internally, since the 1980s, factions in the Casamance province have fought for greater internal autonomy and even secession, resulting in more than 1,000 deaths.

Casamance, lodged between Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, includes the two southern administrative regions of Kolda and Ziguinchor that represent 15 percent of Senegal's territory. The

leading armed faction, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, has waged a guerrilla campaign based on four major grievances: impatience with the government's developmental plans for the province; Casamance's separation from the capital of Dakar, exacerbated by distance and Gambia's nearness; ethnic dimensions that identify Casamance's inhabitants with neighboring Gambia and Guinea-Bissau; and claims of Dakar's arrogance toward Casamance's inhabitants.

Should Casamance attain independence, it likely would continue to experience security challenges due to its small size, questionable developmental prospects, and problematic cross-border ethnic relations in the region. For instance, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau have harbored insurgent forces in each other's territories, with both countries often too weak to forcibly

Rebel Activity Resurges in Senegal's Casamance

DAKAR, Sept. 8 (APS) – A Senegalese man and his four children were killed by suspected members of an armed separatist movement in southern Senegal's troubled Casamance region on Sept. 1, according to sources here.

Casamance has been hit by sporadic separatist violence in recent years. Earlier on Aug. 30, five people were killed in the same

area when their bus hit a mine, hospital sources in the region's capital said. Three Senegalese soldiers had died in a similar explosion a week earlier. And on Aug. 26, a leader of the separatist movement was killed in unclear circumstances, according to informed sources.

—All Africa Press Service, Sept. 8, 1997

expel the opposing troops from the cross-border areas.

In June 1998, Brig. Ansumane Mane failed in his coup attempt to oust Guinea-Bissau President Joao Bernardo Vieira, who had lost favor among military forces and the general population. Senegalese and Guinean forces intervened, helping to prevent rebels from overrunning the government, but this episode heightened tensions in the area and generated many refugees.

While a defense pact justified the legal incursion of some 3,000 Senegalese troops into Guinea-Bissau, Senegal used the occasion to flush out Casamance rebels who had taken refuge in the neighboring state. In addition, Mane was accused of smuggling arms and land mines to Casamance seces-

sionists, who allegedly financed their operations with huge overseas sales of drugs, mostly high-quality marijuana.

Meanwhile, Senegal has been engaged in varying levels of armed conflict with its neighbor to the north, Mauritania. In 1989, the two countries launched attacks against each others' nationals in their respective capitals, and government forces led military operations. Unsubstantiated reports said that several hundred people, mostly civilians, were killed.

As of mid-1998, armed conflict had mostly subsided, and both sides had accepted peace terms. However, political issues and questions over land remained unresolved, posing the potential for renewed political and ethnogeographic conflict in the region.

Dr. Karl Magyar is professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. His teaching and research fields include war and conflicts in the Third World, particularly Africa, where he has worked for six years.

Additional Sources:

"Casamance Quandary" (March/April 1993) by *Africa Report*.

"Climate of Terror in Casamance" (Feb. 17, 1998) by Amnesty International.

"Dozens of Civilians Killed in Casamance in the Last Two Months" (Sept. 23, 1997) by Amnesty International.

1960	Senegal gains independence from France; Senghor becomes president
1963	Senegalese Progressive Union wins elections, absorbs all other parties over next three years
1976	Massive student protests prompt introduction of three-party political system
1980	Senghor retires; Abdou Diouf becomes president, removing many restrictions on political activity
1988	Separatist rebels in southern Senegal launch offensives against government
1989	Border disputes erupt with Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau
1993	Eight candidates contest presidential elections; Diouf is re-elected over Wade
1995	Violence erupts near border with Guinea-Bissau; 20 soldiers reportedly killed
1997	40 MFDC rebels killed in clashes near Guinea-Bissau; some 2,000 refugees flee to The Gambia to escape violence in Casamance

SIERRA LEONE



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 27,699 sq. mi. (71,740 sq. km.)

Population: 4,891,546

Life Expectancy at Birth: 48 years

System of Government:
Constitutional Democracy

Languages: English (official)
Mende
Temne
Krio

Religions: Muslim 60%
Indigenous 30%
Christian 10%

Ethnic Groups:
Temne 30%
Mende 30%
Other native
African groups 40%
Creole, European,
Lebanese, Asian 1%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$4.7 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$980*

External Debt: U.S. \$1.4 billion**

*1996 estimated

**1994 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government*

Warring Parties: Government of Sierra Leone vs. Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Troop Strength: **Government:** 14,000 **RUF:** 3,000-5,000

Est. Deaths (1997): More than 100 battle-related

Est. Deaths (total): More than 3,000 battle-related; more than 20,000 overall

*PIOOM designates fighting in Sierra Leone as a "Low-Intensity Conflict."

Sources: SIPRI, AKUF

BY JOYCE NEU

Sierra Leone, a former British colony with abundant mineral resources (particularly diamonds), was torn apart by a five-year civil war that ended in 1996 with the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord. The war killed an estimated 10,000-15,000 people and forced up to 1.5 million from their homes. An estimated 700,000 of the displaced persons were children, many of whom were unaccompanied, making them targets for enlistment as child soldiers. The war took a heavy toll, with some 800,000 in need of emergency food and assistance.

In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a rebellion to overthrow the government led by Joseph Momoh. Capt. Valentine Strasser unseated Momoh in April 1992, but the RUF continued its struggle against Strasser. He was deposed in 1996 by his deputy, Brig.-Gen. Julius Maada Bio. Government representatives and the RUF began peace talks shortly thereafter. Presidential elections were held in

February 1996, before a peace agreement was reached, and Bio peacefully handed over power to the winner, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who assumed power March 29, 1996.

On Nov. 30, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed by Cpl. Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, and President Kabbah, ending the five-year civil war. Despite the Peace Accord, outbreaks of violence continued. Not trusting the armed forces of Sierra Leone, President Kabbah isolated the army and created his own militia using the traditional "Kamajor" fighters.

On May 25, 1997, Army Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma, with a combined force of army soldiers—known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)—and RUF rebels, ousted the government. They called for the release from house arrest in Nigeria of RUF leader Foday Sankoh. The reaction of the international community was swift and firm in condemning the coup. An economic embargo and sanctions were imposed by the United

Nations; ECOMOG, the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) peacekeeping forces, were deployed to Sierra Leone.

A four-member ECOWAS committee, consisting of the foreign ministers of Ghana, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria, was tasked to negotiate the reinstatement of the government. The Committee of Four, which became the Committee of Five with the addition of Liberia following the July

Liberian elections, met with the AFRC through October

1997 to little avail. The AFRC planned to retain power for four

years, then hold elections. The United Nations and

the Organization of African Unity (OAU) supported ECOWAS in taking "appropriate" actions to restore the Kabbah government. In early fall, the United Nations appointed Francis Okelo as special envoy.

Sierra Leoneans boycotted work to protest the ousting of the government, and fighting between the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG and the AFRC/RUF continued, with Liberian ex-combatants

fighting on the side of the RUF and civilians caught in the middle. In mid-February 1998, ECOMOG launched a major offensive and unseated the AFRC.

Kabbah was reinstated March 10. As of mid-1998, fighting in the northeast continued, with the fleeing AFRC/RUF forces killing and maiming innocent civilians in their path. In a television address May 30, Kabbah, in an attempt to stop atrocities against civilians,

offered amnesty to the AFRC/RUF fighters if they surrendered in the next two weeks.

Kabbah and Liberian

President Charles Taylor met July 1 in Nigeria and agreed to cooperate to

end the fighting in Sierra Leone. Despite this,

AFRC/RUF troops continued to terrorize civilians as of late September. ECOMOG

troops continued their efforts to end the fighting, claiming they controlled 90 percent of the country.

About 500,000 Sierra Leonean refugees remained in Guinea and Liberia and were said to be in desperate condition after fleeing from the rebels in the bush.

Foday Sankoh, repatriated to Sierra Leone from Nigeria in July and held in detention, was accused of treason and was to be tried in Freetown.

An estimated 700,000 of the displaced persons were children, many of whom were unaccompanied, making them targets for enlistment as child soldiers.

Dr. Joyce Neu is senior associate director of the Conflict Resolution Program at The Carter Center and adjunct associate professor of anthropology at Emory University.

Additional Sources:

A Time of Hope and Transformation: Sierra Leone Peace Process Reports (1997) by Ed Garcia, editor.

Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone (1996) by Paul Richards.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1951	New constitution introduced
1961	Britain grants independence
1967	Military assumes control of government, returns power to civilians
1971	Dr. Stevens becomes first president under new republican constitution
1981	Political opposition and corruption scandals result in state of emergency
1991	Government begins fighting RUF, led by Sankoh
1992	Capt. Strasser, military junta stage coup, promise elections but suspend legislature
1995	RUF rejects U.N. and OAU appeals that peace negotiations be initiated in five-year war
1997	Dissident AFRC members, led by Maj. Koroma and supported by RUF, seize power; U.N. Security Council imposes sanctions
1998	Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping forces defeat AFRC, restore Kabbah government

SUDAN



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 967,494 sq. mi. (2,505,810 sq. km.)

Population: 32,594,128

Life Expectancy at Birth: 55.5 years

System of Government: Transitional—
previously ruling military junta

Languages: Arabic (official)
Nubian
Ta Bedawi
Diverse dialects of Nilotic
Nilo-Hamitic
Sudanic Languages
English

Religion: Sunni Muslim 70%
Indigenous 25%
Christian 5%

Ethnic Groups:
Black 52%
Arab 39%
Beja 6%
Foreigners 2%
Others 1%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$26.6 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$860*

External Debt: U.S. \$18.5 billion*

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government

Warring Parties: Government of Sudan vs. National Democratic Alliance (NDA)*

Troop Strength: **Government:** 80,000-100,000 **NDA:** na

Est. Deaths (1997): More than 5,000 battle-related; more than 10,000 overall

Est. Deaths (total): 37,000-40,000 battle-related (military) through 1991;
more than 1.5 million overall

* The NDA is an alliance of several northern and southern opposition groups, of which the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) is the largest with 30,000-50,000 troops. SPLM/A leader John Garang is also the leader of the NDA.

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BY CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN AND RICHARD LOBBAN

Although independent since 1956, Sudan has not built a stable nation state. For all but the 10 years between 1972 and 1983, the country has been mired in civil war between the predominantly Arab-Muslim north and the Christian and animist south. The latest period in the war is the result of attempts by the government in Khartoum to impose an Islamic agenda on all of Sudan. Fighting since 1983 has resulted in the death of approximately 1.5 million people.

In 1998, the Government of Sudan (GOS) continued for its ninth year under the control of Gen. Omar Hassan al-Bashir and the religious and political direction of Dr. Hassan al Turabi of the National Islamic Front. With its attacks in 1997-98 on the southern stronghold of Juba, the GOS continued to pursue a military resolution to the war, while failing to engage in meaningful negotiations with opposition movements.

The primary opposition force, the southern-based Sudan People's

Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), is led by Dr. John Garang, with support from several other groups in the north and east. The opposition has achieved some success in defending a common agenda for a secular state but still suffers from some southern ethnic and political divisions.

Last year, Garang met in Asmara, Eritrea, with several opposition leaders under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). These meetings signified increased cooperation among the opposition forces, but the meetings did not result in a political or military solution to the protracted stalemate with Khartoum. This conflict steadily shows high casualty figures on all sides, causing massive economic hardship, egregious human rights violations, and recurring famine throughout Sudan.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—formerly the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)—which is chaired by Kenya and includes

Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda, began peace talks in 1993. However, their success was limited in part by poor relations between Sudan and its two neighbors, Eritrea and Uganda. In March 1995, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter obtained agreement from the GOS, the SPLM/A, and another opposition group to declare unilateral two-month cease-fires for implementing health initiatives. While all the parties agreed to a second two-month extension, provided good faith talks were held under IGAD, hostilities resumed.

A new round of talks began in Nairobi in November 1997. These talks, conducted on the basis of a Declaration of Principles (DOP) that involved establishing a secular state dissociated from Islamic Sharia law, were suspended after one week with agreement to reconvene in April 1998. Even before delegates departed Nairobi, both sides stepped up their military activities and verbal attacks.

When talks reconvened in May 1998, the GOS and several southern factions presented a draft constitution that, according to IGAD representatives, met the DOP requirements. Opposition groups quickly rejected the proposal as an Islamic constitution, while Islamic

fundamentalists rejected it as "non-Islamic." Delegates agreed to a referendum on self-determination for the south, but the parties remained deadlocked over the exact boundary.

Meanwhile, military operations continued in 1998, further draining Sudan's meager budget and its rich human resources. International organizations accused the GOS of forcibly recruiting students as soldiers and bulldozing squatter settlements and churches in and around Khartoum. In addition, U.S. government sanctions, imposed on Khartoum in November 1997 for its continued human rights violations and alleged involvement in international terrorism, banned all commercial relations with Sudan save for humanitarian activities.

In August 1998, the U.S. government bombed a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum and suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, weeks after U.S. embassies were bombed in Kenya and Tanzania. Washington said the Sudanese factory was linked to Iraqi chemical weapons projects, but the Sudanese government denied the claim and requested a U.N. investigation into the bombing.

Drs. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard Lobban are professors of anthropology at Rhode Island College, where Richard is the former director of African and Afro-American studies and Carolyn is director of general education. They also are founders of the Sudan Studies Association.

Additional Sources:

Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan (1994) by Human Rights Watch/Africa Watch.

Historical Dictionary of the Sudan (1992 and 1999, forthcoming) by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard Lobban, and John Voll.


The Sudan: Contested National Identities (1998) by Ann Mosley Lesch.

War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (1995) by Francis Mading Deng.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1955	North and south begin fighting; Britain grants independence following year
1962	Fighting escalates into full-scale civil war
1972	Government, southern rebels sign Addis Ababa Accord ending war
1983	Addis Accord abrogated, John Garang's SPLM/A resumes war with government
1988	Bashir, backed by Turabi's Islamic party, topples al-Mahdi government
1993	IGADD members attempt peace talks as war casualties top 1 million
1995	President Carter brokers two-month cease-fire between Sudanese government and SPLM/A; fighting later resumes
1997	U.S. imposes sanctions against Sudan; newly named IGAD continues peace talks

UGANDA



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 91,135 sq. mi. (236,040 sq. km.)

Population: 20,604,874

Life Expectancy at Birth: 39.7 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: English (official)
Luganda
Kiswahili
Bantu Languages
Nilotic Languages

Religions: Roman Catholic 33%
Protestant 33%
Indigenous 18%
Muslim 16%

Ethnic Groups:

Baganda	17%	Acholi	4%
Karomojong	12%	Lugbara	4%
Basogo	8%	Bunyoro	3%
Iteso	8%	Batabo	3%
Langi	6%	Non-African	1%
Rwanda	6%	Other	23%
Bagisu	5%		

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$16.8 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$900*

External Debt: U.S. \$3.4 billion*

*1995 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government

Warring Parties: Government of Uganda vs. Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Troop Strength: **Government:** 40,000-50,000 **LRA:** 1,000-4,000

Est. Deaths (1997): 250 battle-related

Est. Deaths (total): More than 1,000 battle-related; more than 2,000 overall

Sources: SIPRI, AKUF

BY DENNIS PAIN

The 12-year war in northern Uganda has deep roots in ethnic discrimination and underdevelopment. For the past two years, the government has fought on three major fronts, most notably with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the north, which has resulted in strong regional tensions with neighboring Sudan. Additional fighting occurred in the northwest with the West Nile Bank Front and in the west with the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), which comprises Islamic fundamentalists and former Ugandan soldiers.

During Britain's colonial rule, the Acholi, an ethnic group of northern Uganda, aligned with the British government. Valued by the British for their military skill, many Acholi joined the army and civil service. Col. Idi Amin's nationalist military regime in the 1970s subsequently persecuted the Acholi for their ties to British colonialism. As a result, the Acholi were willing to help oust Amin's regime. The Acholi, despite being divided in their

allegiance between the predominantly Protestant Uganda People's Congress, which dominated the 1980-85 government of Milton Obote, and the Catholic opposition Democratic Party, were widely represented in the post-Amin era at all levels of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). Disillusionment with Obote's war against future leader Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) led Acholi officers to contact opposition groups and involve themselves in the 1985 coup that ousted Obote.

When Museveni took Kampala in January 1986, Acholi soldiers were forced back to their northern homeland, where they feared a repeat of the killing and destruction of their cultural identity of the Amin years. Museveni was sworn in as president in 1986 and formed the National Resistance Council (NRC). Soon thereafter, Acholi cult leader Alice Lakwena engaged both the NRC and the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) in

combat, but the rebellion was crushed in 1987, leaving thousands of rebels dead. Following a peace agreement in 1988 between the largely Acholi UPDA and the NRM, remnants of Lakwena's movement joined with a handful of former UPDA soldiers led by Joseph Kony, who would later command LRA guerillas against the government.

In 1989, Uganda held its first national election since 1980, which the NRC won. The NRC approved legislation to extend the NRM government's term of office, while a new constitution was established. During the early 1990s, the LRA became increasingly disruptive. When the Ugandan government responded with increased military operations and a "free-fire" policy, the LRA moved to bases in southern Sudan.

Lacking support in the community, the LRA began kidnapping children from northern Uganda and taking them back into Sudan. Following the breakdown of government-rebel talks in 1994, abuses increased. The government of Sudan, while publicly denying the accusation, is widely believed to

arm the LRA in return for assistance in its own fight against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, which is seen to have Ugandan support.

In 1995, the government rejected the idea of multiparty democracy, citing ethnic and religious divisions as too threatening to stability. That same year, the LRA launched an attack on Atiak that led to some 250 civilian deaths. Another 200 people were killed the following year in an LRA raid. Between 1993-97, an estimated 10,000 people died in fighting in the two districts of Acholi, another 140,000 were fed by the World Food Program, and some 230,000 were displaced to government "protected villages."

As of mid-1998, President Museveni continued to stress he would not negotiate with Kony, advocating instead ongoing military operations. For their part, Kony and the LRA were concerned that the government would take advantage of any agreement to eventually "eliminate" them, which they claim was the fate of other Acholis who made agreements with Museveni in 1988.

The government has fought on three major fronts, most notably with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the north, which has resulted in strong regional tensions with neighboring Sudan.

Dr. Dennis Pain, a teacher and development specialist on Uganda, has been a free-lance consultant in social development in Africa, India, and British inner-city areas. In 1997, he worked as an independent consultant to help resolve the war in northern Uganda.

Additional Sources:

The Anguish of Northern Uganda (1997) by Robert Gersony.

The Bending of Spears (1998) by Dennis Pain.

Breaking God's Commands: The Destruction of Childhood by the Lord's Resistance Army (1997) by Amnesty International.


CONFLICT TIMELINE

1962	Uganda gains independence from Britain
1966	Dr. Milton Obote leads coup, becomes head of state, adopts new constitution
1971	Idi Amin overthrows Obote; 100,000 Ugandans killed in ensuing reign of terror
1979	Tanzanian troops, assisted by UNLA, invade Kampala; Amin flees to Saudi Arabia
1981	NRA, led by Yoweri Museveni, launches guerrilla warfare against Obote
1986	Lt. Gen. Basilio Olara-Okello deposes Obote; Museveni's rebels defeat army, take control of Kampala, oust Okello
1988	Museveni's army crushes Holy Spirit rebel movement; Joseph Kony forms LRA, launches rebel attack
1994	Peace talks fail between LRA and Museveni; diplomatic relations severed with Sudan
1996	Guerrilla warfare increases in western Uganda

ASIA

Asia was among the most troubled regions, with “high-level” armed conflicts in eight countries, although the status of combat in these conflicts ranged from extreme violence to relative calm. India grabbed global headlines and international condemnation in May 1998 by testing six nuclear weapons, only to be matched weeks later by its neighbor and decades-old rival, Pakistan. In Cambodia, one of the world’s most notorious dictators, Pol Pot, was overthrown by Khmer Rouge officers and later reported dead of

natural causes. Indonesia’s longtime dictator, Suharto, finally relinquished 32 years of control in May 1998 amid a crumbling economy, student protests, and urban riots that left more than 1,100 dead. A new form of repression took root in Afghanistan, where the Taliban imposed strict Muslim principles on its citizenry. And while Sri Lankans continued to seek a peaceful resolution to the ongoing war in their country, negotiations or cease-fires in Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Tajikistan offered reason for hope in the region.



Health and Human Development Indicators

For comparisons of countries with high-level conflicts in 1997-98, HDI measures the distance needed to attain the UNDP's 1997 Human Development Report goals for life expectancy, educational level, and income on a 1,000 scale (the nearer to 1,000, the closer a country is to attaining these goals). Under-5 mortality rates, as measured by UNICEF, represent the probability of a child dying between birth and 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births.

Country	% Population With Access to Safe Water (1990-96)	% Population With Access to Sanitation (1990-96)	% Fully Immunized 1-Year-Old Children (1995-96)				Population Annual Growth Rate % (1980-96)	Adult Literacy Rate (1995)	Human Development Index (HDI) (1997)	Under-5 Mortality Rate (1997)	World Rank (1 = highest mortality)
			TB	DPT	Polio	Measles					
Afghanistan	12	8	47	31	31	42	1.6	32	na	257	4
Burma/Myanmar	60	43	92	88	87	86	1.9	83	0.457	150	25
Cambodia	36	14	90	75	76	72	2.9	65*	0.348	170	19
India	81	29	96	89	90	81	2.0	52	0.446	111	46
Indonesia	62	51	99	91	90	92	1.8	84	0.668	71	67
Philippines	84	75	82	70	67	72	2.3	95	0.672	38	93
Sri Lanka	57	63	88	90	91	86	1.3	90	0.711	19	136
Tajikistan	60	na	96	93	96	80	2.5	100	0.580	76	61
United States	na	na	na	94	84	89	1.0	99*	0.942	8	162
World	71	42	89	80	81	79	1.7	75	0.764	88	

* Data refers to periods other than those specified, to a region rather than an entire country, or differs from the standard definition.

Sources: UNICEF, UNDP

Population Displacement

Internally Displaced People (IDPs) are defined as those people who have been forced to flee their homes and who remain in the territory of their own country. Refugees are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Persons in "refugee-like situations" (RLS) fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries but are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers.

AFGHANISTAN	CAMBODIA	INDONESIA	SRI LANKA	TAJIKISTAN
IDPs: 1,200,000	IDPs: 32,000	Refugees: 10,175	IDPs: 900,000	IDPs: 50,000
Refugees: 2,673,329	Refugees: 59,640	Papua New Guinea: 10,175	Refugees: 84,228	Refugees: 73,341
Iran: 1,414,659	Vietnam: 34,400		India: 62,226	Russian Federation: 19,966
Pakistan: 1,200,000	France: 24,298		France: 15,793	Afghanistan: 18,769
Russian Federation: 20,425	Belgium: 592		Norway: 5,000	Kyrgyzstan: 16,436
India: 18,607	New Zealand: 350	BURMA/MYANMAR	Sweden: 571	Turkmenistan: 12,170
Kazakhstan: 3,500		IDPs: 500,000 - 1,000,000	Switzerland: 318	Kazakhstan: 6,000
Other: 16,138		Refugees: 135,051	Other: 320	RLSs: 30,000 (Uzbekistan)
RLSs: 8,000 (Uzbekistan)	INDIA	Thailand: 15,000		
	IDPs: 250,000	Bangladesh: 30,578		
		India: 440		
		RLSs (Thailand): 350,000		


Sources: UNHRC, U.S. Committee for Refugees

Military Comparisons

	Defense Expenditures						Manpower			
	Total (millions \$)	World Rank	% GNP	World Rank	% Central Govt. Expenditure	World Rank	\$ Per Capita	World Rank	# in Armed Forces x 1,000	World Rank
Afghanistan	na	75	na	43	na	29	na	104	20	104
Burma/Myanmar	1,833	54	3.9	38	37.5	7	41	83	322	18
Cambodia	90	112	3.1	51	na	17	8	135	90	46
India	7,831	18	2.4	80	12.7	55	8	136	1,265	4
Indonesia	3,398	35	1.8	103	8.9	82	17	115	280	22
Philippines	1,151	59	1.5	123	8.5	86	16	116	110	42
Sri Lanka	585	68	4.6	30	15.7	43	33	92	110	43
Tajikistan	209	92	3.7	42	na	71	36	90	8	136
United States	277,800	1	3.8	39	17.4	34	1,056	4	1,620	2
World	864,500		2.8		9.9		152		22,790	

Source: ACDA

AFGHANISTAN



THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Government
Warring Parties:	Government of Afghanistan vs. Jumbish-i Milli-ye-Islami vs. Jamiat-i-Islami vs. Hezb-i-Wahdat
Troop Strength:	Government: 20,000 Jumbish-i Milli-ye-Islami: na Jamiat-i-Islami: na Hezb-i-Wahdat: na
Est. Deaths (1997):	More than 2,000 battle-related; more than 10,000 overall
Est. Deaths (total):	More than 20,000 battle-related since 1992; more than 1.5 million overall since 1978*

* Figure includes fighting between parties other than those listed here.
Sources: SIPRI, PLOOM, AKUF

BY EDWARD GIRARDET

BASIC FIGURES

Area: 250,000 sq. mi. (647,500 sq. km.)

Population: 23,738,085

Life Expectancy at Birth: 46.3 years

System of Government: Transitional

Languages: Pashtu

Afghan

Persian

Turkic Languages

(primarily Uzbek and Turkmen)

30 minor languages

(primarily Balochi and Pashal)

Religions: Sunni Muslim 84%

Shi'a Muslim 15%

Other 1%

Ethnic Groups:

Pashtun 38%

Tajik 25%

Hazara 19%

Uzbek 6%

Aimaks, Turkmen,

Baloch & other 12%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$18.1 million*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$800*

External Debt: U.S. \$2.3 billion*

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

"The U.S. is prepared to engage intensively in Afghanistan in this search for peace."

—Bill Richardson during his April 1998 visit to Afghanistan, the first high-level American diplomatic trip to the country in 25 years.

Now in its third decade since armed revolt first broke out in 1978 against the Moscow-backed Kabul regime, the war in Afghanistan shows no signs of abating. Fighting continues north of Kabul and in other important frontline areas between the primarily Pakistan-backed Taliban movement and "northern Alliance" opposition forces supported by Iran, Tajikistan, and other neighboring countries. The conflict ensures that Afghanistan remains one of the world's foremost development backwaters.

At the same time, the spread of both legal and illicit commercial interests ranging from arms and opium trafficking (the country's largest source of income) to potential overland routes for oil and natural gas pipelines has attracted new outside players to the scene. Since the Taliban arrived in Kabul in 1996, various regional governments, multinational companies, and international drug cartels have sought to influence Afghan factions and war-

lords by cutting deals and providing various forms of material support.

Despite the often heavy fighting, much of Afghanistan remained at relative peace in 1997 and in the first half of 1998. This has enabled local and international aid agencies to pursue limited forms of assistance, ranging from land-mine clearance to water improvement programs. Nevertheless, Afghanistan's internationally perceived state of insecurity prevents the country from receiving the assistance and recognition it requires.

In Taliban-controlled areas, the situation has proven increasingly untenable for many Afghans. Stringent Taliban edicts, such as banning girls in school, playing music, and flying kites, promote the sort of despair that few civilians could have imagined even during the height of the 1979-89 Soviet-Afghan war. The Taliban have discriminated against women, many of them educated, by forcing them from their jobs and denying them access to health care and

education. Even so-called “home schools,” the only places where girls could learn to read and write following their ban from regular schools, were prohibited in 1998. Many Taliban edicts appear to be based on a misconceived religious ideology that has little to do with traditional Afghan culture, and many Afghans deeply resent them.

In July 1998, the Taliban stepped up pressure on the international aid community, which provides virtually all of the capital’s basic social services. By the end of the month, the international staffs of at least 38 aid agencies, such as Medecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) and CARE International, chose to head for the border rather than bow to Taliban demands. The European Union, the country’s largest donor, also pulled out. By mid-1998, only the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which were exempt from Taliban orders, remained in Kabul to provide basic humanitarian essentials.

The expatriate exodus has provoked a desperate situation for the more than

half-million people in the capital dependent on humanitarian aid for survival. These include tens of thousands of widows with no income other than charity. Virtually all women have been banned from any form of existence outside their homes.

The Taliban argue—with certain justification—they have improved security in the two-thirds of Afghanistan under their control by outlawing guns, executing or punishing criminals according to Shari’ia (Islamic law), and eliminating impromptu road blocks. Lawlessness in many opposition-held areas has made it difficult if not impossible for aid organizations to operate.

Nevertheless, Taliban ordinances have done much to curb basic human freedoms, prevent open economic development, and threaten to turn the “new Afghanistan” into a nation of illiterates with virtually no rights for females, over half the population. Food and other humanitarian shortages as well as unfair treatment of women may prompt reactions the Taliban will prove unable to control.

Virtually all women have been banned from any form of existence outside their homes.

Edward Girardet covered Afghanistan as a foreign correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and the MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour, starting with the Soviet invasion in December 1979. He is now the editor of CROSSLINES Global Report.

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Afghanistan: An Essential Field Guide to Humanitarian and Conflict Zones (1998) by Edward Girardet, editor.

Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (1998) by Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby.

Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban (1998) by William Maley, editor.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1953	Lt.-Gen. Daoud becomes prime minister, initiates modernization plans
1963	Daoud resigns; new PM Yusuf introduces more democratic constitution
1973	Gen. Daoud overthrows King Zahir Shah, sets up new republic
1978	PDDA stages Marxist coup, kills Daoud, establishes single-party state
1979	USSR invades to support PDDA against the Islamic mujahideen
1989	USSR withdraws troops; mujahideen establish government-in-exile
1992	Mujahideen invade Kabul; Soviet-installed regime collapses
1994	Taliban takes control of southern Afghanistan; civil unrest follows
1996	Taliban puts down resistance, seizes power in Kabul, enforces strict Islamic law

BURMA/MYANMAR



THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Territory (Karen)
Warring Parties:	Government of Myanmar vs. Karen National Union (KNU)
Troop Strength:	Government: 300,000-400,000 KNU: 2,000-4,000
Est. Deaths (1997):	50-200 battle-related; more than 1,000 overall
Est. Deaths (total):	8,000 battle-related from 1948-50 and 5,000-8,000 battle-related from 1981-88; 100,000-500,000 overall

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BY ZUNETTA LIDDELL

Much of Burma/Myanmar experienced peace in 1997 for the first time in nearly 40 years of warfare between the state and armed opposition groups. However, peace remained uncertain, even in areas where cease-fires had been in place since 1989. The change in the name of the government in November 1997 from "State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)" to "State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)" reflected the military's determination to retain power and oversee development of the country. It also revealed how far the military had failed to do so after nearly 10 years in power.

The creation of the SPDC also uncovered deep divisions within the military—divisions that have made long-term policy decisions elusive and raised the insecurity of groups trying to create a better future for their people. Meanwhile, existing cease-fires showed no signs of developing into lasting peace talks, and fighting continued in three states.

In Karen state, the SPDC launched a major offensive against Karen National Union (KNU)-held positions in March 1997, raising the number of refugees in Thailand to 110,000. The offensive began soon after the KNU organized a seminar of armed ethnic opposition groups that ended with a joint "Mae Tha Raw Hta" agreement. This agreement called on the government to embark on tripartite talks with ethnic minorities and the democratic opposition, led by the National League for Democracy (and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi), a call that has been repeated for four years in successive U.N. General Assembly resolutions. Since that offensive, in which the KNU lost much territory, there have been no further signs that talks will resume.

In Karenni (Kayah) state, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) returned to war with the government when a March 1995 cease-fire broke down in July 1995. In areas where small groups of KNPP soldiers operated, retal-

BASIC FIGURES

Area: 261,969 sq. mi. (678,500 sq. km.)

Population: 46,821,943

Life Expectancy at Birth: 57 years

System of Government: Military Regime

Languages: Burmese
Other

Religions: Buddhist 89%
Christian 4%
Muslim 4%
Animist Beliefs 1%
Other 2%

Ethnic Groups:
Burman 68%
Shan 9%
Karen 7%
Rakhine 4%
Chinese 3%
Mon 2%
Indian 2%
Other 5%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$51.5 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$1,120*

External Debt: U.S. \$5.5 billion*

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA



Agence France-Presse

Exiled Burmese students hold pictures of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi during protests in front of their country's embassy in Thailand in August 1998.

iation against civilians was swift, and from March 1996 to September 1997, more than 70,000 civilians were forced to move off their land and into garrison towns. In May 1998, it was reported that talks between the KNPP and the SPDC had resumed, though no substantial progress had been made.

Low-level fighting continued over a wide area in the Shan state, where breakaway groups of the Mong Tai Army continued to fight the government after the January 1996 surrender of their leader, drug warlord Khun Sa. The government's military tactics focused on civilian supporters of the breakaway groups, which in March 1998 joined together to form the Shan States Army. In the two years after February 1996, more than 300,000 people were

forcibly relocated to strategic garrison towns or into exile in Thailand. Reports of mass executions surfaced in 1998 in some areas where villagers attempted to return to their homes to find food. In southern Shan state, fighting also occurred between the SSA and the United Wa States Party, a group that had reached a cease-fire agreement with the government.

The SPDC continued to resist all attempts by the United Nations to assist the progress of talks. However, Burma became a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1997, and there were some signs that Burma's ASEAN neighbors would increase pressure to encourage tripartite talks.

Zunetta Liddell is the Burma researcher for the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch and is based in London.

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
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CONFLICT TIMELINE

1947	Britain grants independence; U Nu becomes first prime minister
1962	Gen. Ne Win deposes U Nu, suspends constitution, establishes authoritarian control
1973	National referendum establishes new democratic constitution
1988	SLORC takes power in bloody civil war, suppresses mass democratic uprisings
1990	SLORC ignores results of democratic elections, maintains power
1992	Thailand pressures SLORC to negotiate cease-fire agreements with ethnic groups
1995	Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi released from six years of house arrest
1996	Government arrests 260 National League for Democracy members; Suu Kyi invites followers to draft own constitution

CAMBODIA



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 69,900 sq. mi. (181,040 sq. km.)

Population: 11,163,861

Life Expectancy at Birth: 50.3 years

System of Government: Multipart liberal democracy under a constitutional monarchy

Languages: Khmer (official)
French

Religions: Theravada
Buddhism 95%
Other 5%

Ethnic Groups:
Khmer 90%
Vietnamese 5%
Chinese 1%
Other 4%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$7.7 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$710*

External Debt: U.S. \$1.9 billion**

* 1996 estimated
** 1994 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government

Warring Parties: Government of Cambodia vs. Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) (PDK)

Troop Strength: **Government:** 140,000* **PDK:** 1,000-4,000

Est. Deaths (1997): na

Est. Deaths (total): More than 50,000** battle-related; more than 1 million overall

* Figure includes all militias.

** Figure includes an estimated 25,300 Vietnamese soldiers who died during 1979-89 in Cambodia.

Sources: SIPRI, AKUF

BY JEFFERY T. CROUSE

Throughout its modern history, Cambodia has experienced a series of civil conflicts fueled by internal divisions and external involvement. Internal divisions between the monarchy, rival communist groups, and various republican elements have been sparked by external involvement from Cambodia's rival neighbors, Vietnam and Thailand, in addition to France, China, and the United States.

In the 1960s, Cambodia became embroiled in the war in Vietnam, with North Vietnamese forces and Viet Cong guerrillas using territory in eastern Cambodia to support their efforts against South Vietnam. Accordingly, the United States supported Gen. Lon Nol's anti-communist government against the Khmer Rouge, which was allied with North Vietnam.

On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, captured Phnom Penh and began nearly four years of genocidal rule. By 1978, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia and ousted the Khmer

Rouge, as many as 2 million people had died at the hands of the regime. Throughout the 1980s, a civil war persisted between the Vietnamese-installed government and rebel forces.

All parties to the civil war signed a comprehensive peace agreement in October 1991 in Paris. This agreement created the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to oversee a \$2 billion effort to repatriate refugees, disarm warring factions, and conduct a democratic election.

Two critical events limited UNTAC's success: The Khmer Rouge refused to disarm, and the former ruling Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP), led by Gen. Hun Sen, refused to accept the 1993 election results following the party's unexpected defeat. The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and CPP agreed to a coalition government led by co-prime ministers Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen.

"Look at me. Am I a savage person?

My conscience is clear."

—Pol Pot, during his first interview
in more than 18 years
Far Eastern Economic Review
July 1997

Political violence escalated between 1995 and 1997, highlighted by a March 30, 1997, grenade attack that killed 19 people at a rally led by Sam Rainsy, a leading pro-democracy politician. The contentious governing coalition finally collapsed in July 1997, when Hun Sen led a violent coup d'etat that forced his rival, Prince Ranariddh, into exile. A U.N. human rights investigation collected evidence indicating that at least 91 FUNCINPEC officials had been executed following the coup. Elements of the armed forces loyal to FUNCINPEC fled to the northwestern jungles and fought the Hun Sen government throughout 1997.

A cease-fire was reached in January 1998, and Prince Ranariddh returned to Cambodia in March. Political tensions remained high, and election-related violence escalated prior to the July 1998 election. Hun Sen remained firmly in control of the armed forces, the provincial administration, and the elec-

tion apparatus, thus compromising the legitimacy of the election.

Between 1993 and 1998, the Khmer Rouge steadily disintegrated. A series of defections brought high-ranking Khmer Rouge leaders into the Cambodian government. In June 1997, the remaining Khmer Rouge forces overthrew Pol Pot and attempted to distance themselves from the atrocities of their previous regime. By April 1998, when Pol

By April 1998, when Pol Pot died, the Khmer Rouge had fewer than 1,000 loyal troops.

Pot died, the Khmer Rouge had fewer than 1,000 loyal troops and were under sustained attack by government forces.

Cambodia's return to violence in 1997 shattered a brief period of hope for peace, reconstruction, and growth.

Cambodia's immediate future depends on whether a workable government can emerge from the 1998 election of Hun Sen with enough legitimacy to tackle the massive problems of development, drug trafficking, and corruption and prevent a return to broader civil conflict.

Jeffery T. Crouse is regional program director for Asia and the Middle East at the International Republican Institute (IRI), a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing democracy worldwide. He has managed IRI's democracy-building activities in Cambodia since 1992.

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Brother Enemy: The War After The War (1986) by Nayan Chanda.

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The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945 (1991) by David Chandler.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1953	Cambodia gains independence from France
1969	U.S. bombings help depose Prince Sihanouk, install Gen. Lon Nol in power
1975	Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge take over Cambodia after United States withdraws from Vietnam
1978	Vietnam invades Cambodia, overthrows Pol Pot after his regime kills 2 million
1989	Vietnam withdraws from Cambodia
1992	Following peace treaty, U.N. peacekeepers deployed; Sihanouk returns to throne
1993	U.N.-sponsored elections produce coalition government
1994	Banned Khmer Rouge steps up campaign of terror in countryside
1997	Hun Sen ousts first prime minister; resistance forces and Khmer Rouge fight government
1998	Pol Pot dies

INDIA



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 1,269,340 sq. mi. (3,287,590 sq. km.)

Population: 966,783,171

Life Expectancy at Birth: 62.4 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages:* Hindi
English
Bengali
Telugu
Marathi

Tamil
Urdu
Gujarati
Malayalam
Kannada

Religions: Hindu 80%
Muslim 14%
Christian 2.4%
Sikh 2%
Other 1.6%

Ethnic Groups:
Indo-Aryan 72%
Dravidian 25%
Mongoloid/other 3%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$1,538 trillion**

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$1,600**

External Debt: U.S. \$97.9 billion***

* Hindi is the national language and primary tongue of 30 percent of the people. There are at least 24 languages, 16 of which are official, spoken by 1 million or more persons. There are also numerous other languages and dialects.

** 1996 estimated

*** March 1995

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Territory (Kashmir, Punjab, Assam)
Warring Parties: Government of India vs. Kashmir insurgents*
vs. Bodo Security Force (BdSF)
vs. United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
vs. Government of Pakistan

Troop Strength: Government of India: 1,145,000 Kashmir Insurgents: na
BdSF: na ULFA: na Government of Pakistan: 587,000

Est. Deaths (1997): More than 500 battle-related; more than 3,500 overall**

Est. Deaths (total): More than 20,000 battle-related; more than 38,000 to more than 58,000 overall***

* Several groups are active, including the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the Hizb-e Mujahideen, and the Harkat-ul-Ansar.

** 500-1,500 are the result of the conflicts in Kashmir and with Pakistan.

*** 20,000-50,000 are the result of the conflicts in Kashmir and with Pakistan.

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BY AMITABH MATTOO

Fifty years after India achieved independence in 1947, the country's political stability remains challenged by a number of internal conflicts, including several separatist movements in the province of Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeast region of the country. Externally, India's relations with Pakistan reached a nadir after the two countries conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998. India and Pakistan have gone to war three times since 1947.

Through mid-1998, conflicts based on caste, religion, and ethnicity continued to divide India, an extraordinarily diverse country and the world's largest democracy. The election of a Hindu-nationalist Bharitya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government in March 1998 generated widespread insecurity within India's Muslim minority. The BJP, however, seems to have tempered

its pre-election domestic agenda.

The militant insurgency and separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir are the most serious faced by India in the last 50 years. Nearly 30,000 people, including at least 15,000 civilians, have been killed in the province since 1989. Militant groups, usually supported by Pakistan, have demanded a U.N.-administered plebiscite in the province to decide whether Jammu and Kashmir should remain a part of India, accede to Pakistan, or become independent.

By 1996, Indian security forces had contained the insurgency to only a few rural areas, albeit amid charges of massive human rights violations.

In addition, the October 1996 installation of a democratically elected government, under Chief Minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah, ensured a semblance of normalcy in the province. Although India and Pakistan committed them-



Agence France-Prese

Weapons taken from Muslim separatists in the disputed Kashmir region of India are inspected by an Indian soldier.

selves to resolving the Kashmir problem through a bilateral dialogue, it was unlikely that sustainable peace would return to the valley in the short term. The separatist movement, too, remained deeply divided as of June 1998, and even the umbrella 12-party secessionist organization, The All Party Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference, had lost much of its public support.

The crisis in northeast India was no less serious, if much less-publicized. Assam, an oil-rich province in the region, was one of the worst hit, with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and tribal Bodo militants running parallel governments in the region. The ULFA estranged public

opinion after ULFA militants murdered well-respected human rights activist Sanjoy Ghose in 1997.

Nagaland and Manipur, two other northeastern provinces, also faced strong armed movements demanding separate homelands. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan created widespread fears of a nuclear war in South Asia. By June 1998, however, both India and Pakistan seemed to have accepted the need for a sustained dialogue to ensure that their region did not become the site for a nuclear Armageddon. In addition, both countries declared a moratorium on further tests and committed themselves to negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

Dr. Amitabh Mattoo is associate professor at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and a columnist for The Telegraph in Calcutta. He has been a visiting professor at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

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The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (1996) by Robert J. McMahon.

The Crisis in Kashmir (1997) by Sumit Ganguly, editor.

India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Choices (1996) by David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, editors.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1947	India gains independence from Britain, goes to war with Pakistan
1962	India annexes Goa, Daman, and Diu; brief war with China ensues
1965	India and Pakistan fight second war over Kashmir
1971	Support for Bangladesh leads to new war with Pakistan in Kashmir
1988	Pakistani-supported Muslim militants launch Kashmir insurrection
1990	500,000 Indian troops wage war on dissidents, Pakistani forces
1994	Government rejects own plan to hold elections in Jammu, Kashmir
1995	Former Kashmiri militants organize "Village Defense Forces" opposed to pro-Pakistani and pro-independence factions
1998	India tests nuclear weapons; Pakistan follows suit

INDONESIA



THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Territory (East Timor)
Warring Parties:	Government of Indonesia vs. Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)
Troop Strength:	Government: 310,000 FRETILIN: 100-200
Est. Deaths (1997):	50-100 battle-related; overall figures na
Est. Deaths (total):	15,000-16,000 battle-related (military); overall figures na

Source: SIPRI

BASIC FIGURES

Area: 741,097 sq. mi. (1,919,440 sq. km.)

Population: 209,774,138

Life Expectancy at Birth: 62.1 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Bahasa Indonesia (official)

English

Dutch

Javanese

Religions: Muslim 87%

Protestant 6%

Roman Catholic 3%

Hindi 2%

Buddhist 1%

Other 1%

Ethnic Groups:

Javanese 45%

Sundanese 14%

Madurese 7.5%

Coastal Malays 7.5%

Other 26%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):

U.S. \$779.7 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$3,770*

External Debt: U.S. \$110 billion*

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

BY JEFFREY WINTERS

The collapse of the Suharto regime in May 1998 was heralded by the exiled Timorese leader José Ramos-Horta, co-winner of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize, as "the beginning of a peaceful solution." The conflict he refers to began 23 years earlier when Indonesia brutally invaded and occupied the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. The Timorese Diaspora, long fractured by partisan disagreements and jealousies, anticipated the changes in Jakarta and came together in Portugal a month before Suharto fell to form the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT).


The CNRT elected a slate of individuals who intended to rejoin resistance fighters inside East Timor to govern their homeland. They chose José Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmão, whom the Timorese expected to be released from his Indonesian prison, as president. Horta, who extended an olive branch to Indonesia in his acceptance speech, was elected vice president.

This optimism was a striking contrast to the bitter struggle between the government and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (known by its Portuguese acronym FRETILIN), which has fought a low-level but determined guerrilla campaign since Indonesian forces swept into the country on Dec. 7, 1975. The attack came one day after U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with President Suharto in Jakarta and gave what some have called "the big wink" to using U.S. military equipment supplied strictly for defense purposes in an act of aggression. Despite Indonesian atrocities, every subsequent U.S. administration increased military assistance to Jakarta, with \$1.1 billion in weaponry being sold from 1975-97.

More than 100,000 Timorese perished in 1975 alone. By the end of the 1980s, another 100,000 Timorese died from disease, famine, and continued Indonesian attacks. These included massacres like the one at the Santa

"Even as other nations in Southeast Asia seemed to be working painfully out of the region's financial crisis, Indonesia was sliding inexorably toward economic, social and political chaos."

—Françoise Cayrac-Blanchard,
Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1998



Associated Press

A policeman strikes a looter in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta during the unrest that followed President Suharto's abdication of power in May 1998.

Cruz Cemetery in Dili, the capital of East Timor, where Indonesian special forces opened fire on unarmed civilian protesters, killing more than 250. Although leaders of the FRETILIN resistance, like Xanana, had been captured or killed by the Indonesians, the struggle continued into 1997. In April and May, the Indonesians suffered nearly two dozen casualties in ambush attacks on convoys of security forces. In early 1998, a force of just 200 FRETILIN guerrillas remained dug in

Dr. Jeffrey Winters is a professor of political economy and a specialist on Southeast Asia at Northwestern University and author of *Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State*.

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Action Plan for Preventing Ethnic Violence in Indonesia (1998) by The Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Crisis Group.

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East Timor: Island in Turmoil (World in Conflict) (1998) by Taro McGuinn.

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against an occupying Indonesian army of 10,000.

In the 1990s, a powerful grass-roots movement with a global reach, called the East Timor Action Network (ETAN), emerged in many countries to help draw world attention to the struggle in Timor for national liberation. ETAN played a crucial external supportive role to FRETILIN and the resistance movement inside East Timor. It also focused world attention on Indonesia's violent occupation of Timor, which was genocide on a scale worse, in proportional terms,

than the Killing Fields in Cambodia under Pol Pot.

In May 1998, after 32 years in power, President Suharto relinquished power amid a crumbling economy, student protests, and urban riots that left more than 1,100 dead. The departure of Suharto, who was replaced by his long-time associate B.J. Habibie, prompted several prominent officials in Jakarta to call for a new and more flexible attitude toward negotiating peace in East Timor.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1945	Netherlands, Japan grant independence; Dr. Sukarno becomes first president
1949	West Timor joins Indonesia
1963	Dutch transfer Irian Jaya region to Indonesia
1966	Lt.-Gen. Suharto takes power, forces Sukarno to resign
1975	FRETILIN wins civil war in East Timor; Indonesia invades, annexes East Timor
1989	Indonesia opens East Timor to outsiders but denies independence
1992	Government arrests FRETILIN leader Gusmão; repression continues in East Timor
1996	Sukarno's daughter, Megawati, removed as opposition party leader; foreign journalists barred from East Timor
1998	Suharto steps down amid student-led protests; Habibie assumes power, calls for elections

PHILIPPINES



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 115,830 sq. mi. (300,000 sq. km.)

Population: 76,103,564

Life Expectancy at Birth: 66.1 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Pilipino (official, based on Tagalog)
English (official)

Religions: Roman Catholic 83%
Protestant 9%
Muslim 5%
Buddhist/other 3%

Ethnic Groups:
Christian Malay 91.5%
Muslim Malay 4%
Chinese 1.5%
Other 3%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$194.2 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$2,600*

External Debt: U.S. \$42.7 billion*

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Government
Warring Parties:	Government of the Philippines vs. New People's Army (NPA)
Troop Strength:	Government: 110,000 NPA: na
Est. Deaths (1997):	Fewer than 100 battle-related
Est. Deaths (total):	21,000-25,000 battle-related; more than 50,000 total

Sources: SIPRI, AKUF

BY JOE EVANGELISTA

Since the People Power Revolution ousting Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, Filipinos have struggled to reclaim stability over their economic and political development. With a revamped constitution spearheaded by former President Corazon Aquino and foreign investment strategies by former President Fidel Ramos, it remains to be seen how the Asian economic crisis that began in 1997 will play out with the current Joseph Estrada administration.

Lasting peace in the Philippines remains elusive. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) continues to grapple with the Maoist-born communist movement that took root in 1968. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) has since sought to overthrow the government through its military arm known as the New People's Army (NPA). Since the NPA's founding in 1969, more than 21,000 people have died in fighting involving the government, NPA, and other factions.

Fissures within the NPA's ranks have surfaced within the past two years. Top GRP military officials confirm rifts within NPA operations in Zambales, Pangasinan, Bataan, Pampanga, Tarlac, and the Visayas. In addition, some GRP military officials claim the NPA lacks the capability to launch major offensives against the GRP.

Nevertheless, in 1998, the NPA counted at least 6,000 troops in its ranks. For the past two years, membership and activities in certain pockets of the country—especially in the Southern Tagalog and Bicol regions—have increased slightly. NPA guerrillas have committed abductions, kidnappings, and other violent acts, albeit on a sporadic basis. Because of infighting and its growing numbers, the NPA still remains a threat to national security. GRP troops are bracing for violence on the 30th anniversary of the CPP and NPA in December 1998 and March 1999, respectively.

"Intruders will be shot. Survivors will be shot again."

—Sign nailed to a tree on the road leading to the main camp of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
The Economist, June 27-July 3, 1998

For 12 years, the GRP has engaged in on-and-off again peace talks with the CPP's political faction, the National Democratic Front (NDF). The two sides signed the Breukelen Joint Agreement in March 1997 to accelerate the peace process. One year later, their efforts culminated in the "Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law." Ramos called it the most substantive agreement reached in the 28 years of armed conflict with the NPA and the dozen years of negotiations. Estrada signed it in August 1998, but the peace process then hit a snag.

Talks on implementing the agreement were suspended in September 1998 because the two sides could not agree on the framework to apply the agreement. The GRP argues that the NDF must carry out the agreement pursuant to the tenets of the Philippine constitution. However, the NDF claims that doing so would be tantamount to surrendering.

Other sticking points include the indemnification of victims of human

rights abuses under the Marcos administration. The NDF contends the GRP has reneged on a commitment to repay victims. Moreover, the NDF has called for the release of political prisoners—a request the GRP has rebuffed so far.

The GRP and NDF have a long road ahead of them. On their agenda: coming to terms on social and economic reform as well as constitutional reform to which the CPP remains committed.

Lasting peace in the Philippines remains elusive as the government continues to grapple with the Maoist-born communist movement that took root in 1968.

In addition to the armed conflict with the NPA, the Philippine government has struggled for two decades with a Muslim insurgency in the south called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

In early November 1998, Estrada appeared to be making progress in peace talks with the separatist MILF. However, a deadlock occurred when the MILF demanded recognition of 46 rebel territories that the government wanted converted into "zones of peace." The MILF is a splinter group from the larger Moro National Liberation Front, which in 1996 signed a peace treaty with the government.

Joe Evangelista writes and produces news programming for Cable News Network (CNN) in New York. He is completing a master's degree in international communication from American University in Washington, D.C.

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The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (1996) by Mark R. Thompson.

Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (1998) by Thomas M. McKenna.

Patterns of Power and Politics in the Philippines: Implications for Development (1994) by James F. Eder and Robert Youngblood.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1946	U.S. grants independence; Manuel Roxas becomes first president
1965	Ferdinand Marcos elected president
1969	NPA begins fight for power, land reform
1973	Marcos establishes new constitution, suspends it under martial law
1986	Corazon Aquino becomes president, puts down pro-Marcos coup attempt
1990	NPA declares limited cease-fire, resumes fighting following year
1992	U.S. forces withdraw; President Ramos offers amnesty to NPA, other dissidents
1996	Government, Muslim separatists in south sign peace treaty to end quarter century of hostilities
1998	Former Vice-President Estrada elected president

SRI LANKA



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 25,332 sq. mi. (65,610 sq. km.)

Population: 18,721,178

Life Expectancy at Birth: 72.4 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Sinhala (official)

Tamil

English

Religions: Buddhist 69%

Hindu 15%

Christian 8%

Muslim 8%

Ethnic Groups:

Sinhalese 74%

Tamil 18%

Moor 7%

Burgher, Malay,

Vedda 1%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):

U.S. \$69.7 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$3,760*

External Debt: U.S. \$9.6 billion**

*1996 estimated

**1995 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Territory (Tamil)

Warring Parties: Government of Sri Lanka vs. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Troop Strength: **Government:** 110,000 **LTTE:** 5,000-8,000

Est. Deaths (1997): More than 4,000 battle-related; overall figures na

Est. Deaths (total): More than 40,000 battle-related; 48,000 to more than 70,000 overall

Sources: SIPRI, PICOOM, AKUF

BY JACK A. PATTERSON

Sri Lanka observed the 50th anniversary of its independence from Britain on Feb. 4, 1998.

Even at such an auspicious moment, bombs and threats forced the cancellation and transfer of major celebration ceremonies from Kandy to the capital city of Colombo. All present,

including the world press,

were graphically reminded

of the ongoing war

between the govern-

ment and the

Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Fifty years of independence have seen extended

periods of emergency rule, high

levels of human rights violations, and intense, often vicious, military engage-

ment between ethnic communities and between the government and the rebel

LTTE. From the early days of independence, Sinhalese Buddhist interests

began to dominate the state with many

Tamils feeling marginalized and dis-

criminated against both officially and

informally. As attempts to negotiate a solution failed, Tamil calls for autonomy shifted to calls for secession. In

1983, following the LTTE killing of 13 government troops in the north, retaliatory attacks on Tamils in Colombo and elsewhere in the south led to

between 350 (government estimate)

and 2,000 (Tamil estimate)

people killed, with up to

100,000 fleeing Colombo

for hastily established

refugee camps.

By 1985, the military

engagement had escalated

into a spiral of violence

and repression with the LTTE

controlling the Jaffna peninsula

in the far north. Both sides resorted to

extremely repressive means. The LTTE

has been accused of assassinations, tor-

ture, and attacks on civilians, including

massive bombs in public places, while

the government has been accused of

torture and other abuses, including the

seemingly arbitrary and unpunished

"disappearance" of hundreds of Tamils.

"The 15-year-old civil war in Sri Lanka is Asia's bloodiest conflict since the war in Vietnam."

—World Press Review, April 1998

Amnesty International and other human rights groups cite more than 600 “disappearances” in 1997, the highest since 1990 and, according to the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the highest in the world in 1997.

In 1994, with the election of a moderate president, Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga, and the promise of new peace overtures, a cessation of fighting and formal peace talks gave rising hope that the long conflict might end. In April 1995, the cessation ended, instead, with LTTE suicide attacks against navy ships in port. The government launched Riviresa (Sunray) I and II, the largest campaigns of the war, which resulted in taking Jaffna City and the Jaffna peninsula. Up to 500,000 residents fled on the LTTE's orders.

Since 1995, the conflict has continued unabated. In October 1997, the government placed its long-promised, new draft constitution before Parliament, including proposals for the devolution of power to regional councils. These in turn were opposed by the primary Buddhist clergy on Jan. 31, 1998, and rejected by the

main parliamentary opposition, the United National Party (UNP). For its part, the LTTE remained ambivalent and unclear in its intentions, alternately asserting its demand for nothing less than a separate state of Tamil Eelam and then stating it would settle for less only under strict conditions.

Several governments—including Australia, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Sweden—and nongovernmental organizations offered to assist the parties, if they would agree to negotiate. Bombings in the center of Colombo on Oct. 15, 1997, and again in early 1998, however, have lessened popular pressure on the government to open talks with the LTTE, which it officially banned in January 1998. The government was further emboldened by the October 1997 U.S. State Department designation of the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization. As of mid-1998, there was little indication from either side of impending movement on talks, and military clashes continued to incur high loss of life and large-scale displacement of civilians.

Dr. Jack A. Patterson is director of the American Friends Service Committee's Expatriate Dialogue Program in the New York Metropolitan Regional Office.

Additional Sources:

- Buddhism Betrayed?: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka* (1992) by Stanley Jeyaraja.
- Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity* (1994) by David Little.
- When Memory Dies* (1997) by Ambalavaner Sivanandan.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1948	Britain grants independence; UNP forms first coalition government
1956	Sri Lanka Freedom Party wins elections
1971	Government suppresses People's Liberation Front uprising
1983	LTTE begins fight for separate Tamil state
1987	Indian troops sent to monitor cease-fire between government and LTTE
1990	Indian troops withdraw; clashes resume
1993	President Premadasa assassinated; LTTE-government fighting kills 2,000
1995	Government launches Rivirasa offensive against Tamil separatists; mass flight of refugees begins
1996	LTTE inflicts heaviest defeat of government forces in four years

TAJIKISTAN



THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Government
Warring Parties:	Warlords*
Troop Strength:	na
Est. Deaths (1997):	More than 1,000 overall
Est. Deaths (total):	50,000-100,000 overall

* Belligerents include clan-based, democratic, nationalist, ethnic, and Islamic movements. SIPRI does not include Tajikistan in its 1998 yearbook.

Sources: PLOOM, AKUF

BY HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

BASIC FIGURES

Area: 55,251 sq. mi. (143,100 sq. km.)

Population: 5,945,903

Life Expectancy at Birth: 64.7 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Tajik (official)
Russian

Religions: Sunni Muslim 80%
Shi'a Muslim 5%
Other 15%

Ethnic Groups:
Tajik 64.9%
Uzbek 25%
Russian 3.5%
Other 6.6%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$5.4 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$920*

External Debt: U.S. \$635 billion**

*1996 estimate as extrapolated from World Bank 1994 estimate

**1995 estimated - U.S. \$250 million to Russia

Source: CIA

Tajikistan was unprepared for the independence that befell it in 1991. The end of Soviet control left the people of Tajikistan with little sense of national identity and turned loose a strong clan-based regionalism—the primary focus of identity. The Soviet demise also released democratic, nationalist, Islamic, and ethnic minority movements, with the largest ethnic group being Uzbek. Pakistani, Saudi, and Iranian support for the Islamic movement, Russian concern for its southern “security border,” and Uzbekistan’s fear of an Islamic republic next door complicated the picture.

An uneasy alliance of internal forces challenged the established power unsuccessfully in the November 1991 presidential election, then forced themselves into a coalition government in May 1992 and took over the government in September. When the new government proved unable to reassert law and order or to stem economic deterioration, two key regions—Leninabad and Kulyab—and

some Uzbeks refused to recognize the new government. People in Kulyab formed the only effective fighting units (Popular Front) and, with unofficial help from Uzbekistan and the Russian military, gained control of critical parts of the country. They forced thousands of perceived adversaries out of the country.

In November 1992, the Tajik Supreme Soviet formed a new government under Emomali Rakhmonov from Kulyab. The resultant power shift increased Kulyabi control and relegated the former Leninabad region to second place. Rakhmanov became president under a new constitution after a November 1994 election.

A useful framework for analyzing peace efforts is the “multilevel peace process.” A nonofficial dialogue began in March 1993 among individuals from different factions. They met six times over 13 months before official negotiations began. They had met 22 times through June 1998 and produced 11 joint memoranda on problems facing Tajikistan. This nonofficial

“Tajikistan’s post-Soviet politics have been among the most turbulent of any of the successor states.”

—Muriel Atkin
Current History, October 1997

dialogue has been called the “public peace process.”

The official peace process began in April 1994 with the United Nations mediating between the government and the United Tajik Opposition. Between December 1996 and June 27,

1997, government and

opposition leaders

signed a series of

agreements capped

by a General

Agreement on

Peace and National

Accord. The General

Agreement created a

National Reconciliation

Commission—half

government and half opposi-

tion—to oversee implementation of the

series of agreements. Subjects covered

include refugee return, disarmament of

opposition and integration of the armed

forces, political reform, and constitu-

tional amendment. A major sticking

point has been allocating an agreed

number of government positions to

opposition candidates.

The Peace Accord calls for new elec- tions after a transition period of about 18 months. The Commission has draft-

ed constitutional amendments and

changes in the electoral law. At the

third level of the multilevel peace

process, relatively new non-

governmental organizations

are planning public dis-

cussion of these changes

to enhance citizen

involvement in the

process.

Meanwhile, Tajikistan

faces three additional

challenges: the govern-

ment does not fully control

the country; much of the day-

to-day economy has passed into the

hands of citizens, and the government

seems to have no economic strategy;

and the country still lacks a political

culture for sharing power across region-

al lines. Those who hold power may

refuse to share it, thus provoking

renewed fighting.

The end of Soviet control left the people of Tajikistan with little sense of national identity and turned loose a strong clan-based regionalism—the primary focus of identity.

Dr. Harold H. Saunders, INN member and director of International Affairs at the Kettering Foundation, co-chairs the Inter-Tajik Dialogue. Saunders was a member of the National Security Council staff, flew on the Kissinger shuttles in the Middle East, and was U.S. assistant secretary of state during negotiation of the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

Additional Sources:

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The Central Asian Republics—Fragments of Empire—Magnets of Wealth (1994) by Charles Undeland and Nicholas Platt.

Memoranda and Appeals of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue Within the Framework of the Dartmouth Conference, 1923-1997 (1997) by Gennady I. Chufrin, Ashurboi Imamov, and Harold H. Saunders, editors.

The Tajik Conflict (1997) by Irina Zviagelskaya.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1953	Stalin dies; top party and government posts increasingly given to non-Russians
1964	Khrushchev dismissed; Brezhnev becomes Soviet leader
1970	Russian repression fosters growth of Islamic influence and violence
1978	Anti-Russian riots and violence erupt over Soviet-Afghan intervention
1985	USSR leader Gorbachev initiates anti-corruption reform campaign
1992	Pro-communist Russian-backed troops deploy, halt civil war that kills over 25,000
1994	Cease-fire ends renewed fighting; 16,000 killed despite Russian presence
1997	Government, opposition leaders sign peace accord to end five years of civil war

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

Central and South America featured “high-level” armed conflicts in only two countries, the lowest number recorded for any region of the world aside from Europe or North America. However, areas of serious concern remain. Chief among them: Colombia’s ongoing rebellion and drug-related killings and Peru’s deadly struggle with political insurgents. Additional violence, often stemming from political corruption, plagued several states in the region.

Also troubling was the fact that 10 of 26 journalists killed around the world in 1997 were slain in Central and South America. On a positive note, the second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998 and the U.N. Anti-Drug Summit in New York in June brought together government officials and other experts to address major issues in the region, which claimed a relatively strong economy and one of the lowest under-5 mortality rates in the developing world.



THE COUNCIL OF FREELY ELECTED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government includes 31 current and former leaders from the Western Hemisphere who work to reinforce democracy in the Americas, help resolve conflict in the region, and advance economic cooperation. Established in 1986 at a meeting chaired by former U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, the Council is based within The Carter Center’s Latin American and Caribbean Program. It has been a pioneer in mediating and observing elections and has worked to help consolidate democracy in Guyana, Nicaragua, Panama, and Haiti.

Health and Human Development Indicators

For comparisons of countries with high-level conflicts in 1997-98, HDI measures the distance needed to attain the UNDP's 1997 Human Development Report goals for life expectancy, educational level, and income on a 1,000 scale (the nearer to 1,000, the closer a country is to attaining these goals). Under-5 mortality rates, as measured by UNICEF, represent the probability of a child dying between birth and 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births.

Country	% Population With Access to Safe Water (1990-96)	% Population With Access to Sanitation (1990-96)	% Fully Immunized 1-Year-Old Children (1995-96)				Population Annual Growth Rate % (1980-96)	Adult Literacy Rate (1995)	Human Development Index (HDI) (1997)	Under-5 Mortality Rate (1997)	World Rank (1= highest mortality)
			TB	DPT	Polio	Measles					
Colombia	85	85	98	92	93	95	2.0	91	0.848	31	104
Peru	67	72	93	72	66	71	2.0	89	0.717	58	72
Latin America and the Caribbean	77	71	93	79	79	78	1.9	87	na	43	
United States	na	na	na	94	84	89	1.0	99*	0.942	8	162
World	71	42	89	80	81	79	1.7	75	0.764	88	

* Data refers to periods other than those specified, to a region rather than an entire country, or differs from the standard definition.

Sources: UNICEF, UNDP

Population Displacement

Internally Displaced People (IDPs) are defined as those people who have been forced to flee their homes and who remain in the territory of their own country. Refugees are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Persons in "refugee-like situations" (RLS) fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries but are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers.


COLOMBIA

IDPs:	600,000
Refugees:	1,094
Sweden:	770
France:	324

PERU

IDPs:	420,000
Refugees:	2,681
Sweden:	1,323
Bolivia:	632
France:	506
Chile:	220

Sources: UNHCR, U.S. Committee for Refugees



Billy Howard

Former U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford (standing) are joined at the April 1997 Agenda for the Americas conference in Atlanta by (seated, from left) former Presidents Oscar Arias of Costa Rica and Sánchez de Lozada of Bolivia, Carter Center fellow Robert Pastor, Jamaican Prime Minister P.J. Patterson, and former Presidents Luis Alberto Lacalle of Uruguay and Patricio Aylwin of Chile.

Military Comparisons


Defense Expenditures

Manpower

	Defense Expenditures				Manpower					
	Total (Millions \$)	World Rank	% GNP	World Rank	% Central Govt. Expenditure	World Rank	\$ Per Capita	World Rank	# in Armed Forces x 1,000	World Rank
Colombia	2,000	50	2.6	71	16.2	40	55	70	146	33
Peru	989	61	1.7	107	9.3	78	41	82	115	40
South America	23,000		1.8		6.4		72		915	
United States	277,800	1	3.8	39	17.4	34	1,056	4	1,620	2
World	864,500		2.8		9.9		152		22,790	

Source: ACDA

COLOMBIA



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 439,734 sq. mi. (1,138,910 sq. km.)

Population: 37,418,290

Life Expectancy at Birth: 73 years

System of Government: Republic with strong executive branch

Languages: Spanish

Religions: Roman Catholic 95%
Other 5%

Ethnic Groups:

Mestizo	58%
White	20%
Mulatto	14%
Black	4%
Mixed black-	
Amerindian	1%
Other	3%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$201.4 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$5,400*

External Debt: U.S. \$16.5 billion*

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government

Warring Parties: Government of Colombia vs. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
vs. National Liberation Army (ELN)

Troop Strength: **Government:** 140,000 **FARC:** 7,000 **ELN:** 3,000

Est. Deaths (1997): 500-1,000 battle-related; more than 2,000 overall

Est. Deaths (total): More than 30,000 overall, some estimates as high as 160,000

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BY JOHN DUGAS

Focus on Colombia's role in international drug trafficking has obscured an increasingly violent internal conflict between leftist guerrilla movements, state security forces, and right-wing paramilitary groups. Despite intermittent efforts to initiate peace negotiations, the administration of President Ernesto Samper (1994-98) has proven incapable of resolving the long-standing conflict.

The two principal guerrilla forces, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the People's Liberation Army (EPL), are leftist movements that originated in the 1960s. Structural conditions such as endemic poverty, the absence of state services in peripheral regions, the lack of legitimacy of traditional political parties, and the repressive actions of state security forces have allowed for their survival into the 1990s. The guerrilla movements have grown strong financially through criminal activities ranging from drug trafficking to kidnapping and extortion.

Although President Samper initially sought to begin a "useful dialogue" with the guerrilla movements, their continued militancy quickly generated skepticism about a peace process. As the guerrilla movements expanded their territorial presence, it became increasingly questionable whether they saw peace negotiations to be in their interests. Whereas in 1985 the guerrillas had a presence in 173 municipalities, by 1997 they were present in 622 municipalities (out of a total of 1,071). The movements are now estimated to comprise between 10,000 and 15,000 full-time guerrillas.

In August 1996, guerrillas overran an army base in the Putumayo Department, killing several dozen military personnel, taking 60 soldiers hostage, and capturing all of the base's weaponry. In March 1998, FARC guerrillas decimated a military brigade in the Caqueta Department, killing at least 62 soldiers and capturing 43 others. In addition to military confrontations, National Liberation Army (ELN)

"Drug trafficking is the fuel that keeps this conflict burning."

—Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, former Colombian foreign minister and member of the National Peace Commission, Sept. 16, 1998

INN Action: Colombia

INN member Robert Pastor, former director of The Carter Center's Latin American and Caribbean Program, was invited in June 1997 to witness the transfer of 60 Colombian soldiers and 10 marines captured by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia nine months earlier. The prisoners were delivered to the International Committee of the Red Cross and to representatives of the Colombian National Conciliation Commission.

guerrillas have engaged in an extensive campaign to sabotage the country's major oil pipelines (some 90 pipeline attacks in 1997 alone). The guerrillas also have intervened directly in local politics by assassinating, kidnapping, or threatening local political leaders.

In the face of this continued militancy, President Samper's strategy evolved from an emphasis on dialogue to an effort to strengthen the armed forces, declare special zones of public order under military rule, and establish rural self-defense groups. Critics soon charged these local security cooperatives, known as *Convivir*, with paramilitary violence. Whatever the participation of the *Convivir*, there is no question that right-wing paramilitary violence increased significantly during the Samper administration.

Credible allegations exist that the Colombian armed forces have cooperated directly with paramilitary groups. At

the very least, they appear to have acquiesced in paramilitary activities by failing to take decisive action. The number of paramilitary killings increased significantly, from 751 in all of 1996 to 752 in the first nine months of 1997. Paramilitary groups have engaged in wholesale massacres, including the July 1997 torture and murder of 30 villagers in Mapiripan and the May 1998 murder of 20 villagers in Puerto Alvira.

By mid-1998, the internal conflict in Colombia had become a cruel, dirty war, with the bulk of the populace caught in a growing cross fire between guerrilla movements, the armed forces, and paramilitary groups, none of which gained a military victory. In August 1998, Andrés Pastrana succeeded Samper as the country's 60th president, promising to begin peace talks with Colombia's increasingly aggressive rebels.

Dr. John Dugas is an assistant professor of political science at Kalamazoo College. He was a Fulbright Scholar in Colombia during 1990-92 and is the editor of La Constitución de 1991: ¿Un Pacto Político Viable? (Bogotá: 1993).

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Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy (1996) by Javier Giraldo.

The Making of Modern Colombia (1993) by David Bushnell.

The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia (1997) by John D. Martz.

The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia (1988) by Jonathan Hartlyn.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1949	Period of La Violencia lawlessness claims 280,000 lives over next decade
1953	Gen. Rojas overthrows civilian President Gomez
1957	Five-man military junta deposes Rojas
1970	ANAPO challenges election results; M-19 group launches guerrilla warfare
1979	United States, Colombia sign extradition treaty
1984	National state of emergency called amid political, drug-related violence
1991	FARC, ELN launch guerrilla attacks against government
1994	Samper elected president amid allegations the Cali drug cartel funded his campaign
1997	Violent attacks by guerrilla and paramilitary groups intensify; 40 candidates die preceding elections
1998	Andrés Pastrana elected president

PERU



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 496,224 sq. mi. (1,285,220 sq. km.)

Population: 25,573,924

Life Expectancy at Birth: 70 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Spanish (official)
Quechua (official)
Aymara

Religion: Roman Catholic

Ethnic Groups:

Amerindian	45%
Mestizo	37%
White	15%
Black, Japanese, Chinese, & other	3%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
U.S. \$92 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$3,800*

External Debt: U.S. \$23.4 billion*

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

“Earlier this month, some 5,000 protesters took to the streets and presented a petition with 1.4 million signatures ... demanding a referendum to prevent Fujimori from seeking a third term in office.”

—Agence France-Presse, July 28, 1998

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government

Warring Parties: Government of Peru vs. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso)
vs. Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)

Troop Strength: **Government:** 125,000 **Shining Path:** 500-1,500 **MRTA:** 200

Est. Deaths (1997): 50-200 battle-related

Est. Deaths (total): More than 28,000 battle-related; more than 30,000 overall

Sources: SIPRI, AKUF

BY KIRK WOLCOTT

Seven days before Christmas 1996, Peru captured the international spotlight when 14 heavily armed members of a Marxist rebel group stormed the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima and took more than 500 people hostage. The incident sparked a four-month standoff that ended with the deaths of one hostage, two Peruvian soldiers, and all the hostage-takers, signaling continuation of the violence that has plagued Peru for nearly two decades.

Since Peru gained independence from Spain in 1824, politics have alternated between periods of civilian administration and military dictatorship. From 1945-63, political power fluctuated between the elected government and the armed forces. While the new constitution of 1979 offered an opportunity for political order, internal stability was threatened by the emergence in the early 1980s of two armed rebel forces—the Maoist-based *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) and the Marxist-dominated *Movimiento*

Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA).

From 1980-92, the Shining Path was largely responsible for instigating armed conflict that cost Peru more than 25,000 lives and an excess of \$20 billion. President Alberto Fujimori, a relative unknown when he came to power in 1990, launched an aggressive campaign to suppress the Shining Path. In April 1992, Fujimori implemented a self-coup (or *autogolpe*), in which he suspended the constitution, dissolved the congress, and provided his security forces with a high degree of autonomy to combat “terrorism.” In September 1992, security forces captured Shining Path founder and leader Abimael Guzman and 20 prominent members of the group.

Meanwhile, the lesser known MRTA, which was considered near collapse after the October 1993 arrest of many of its members, re-emerged in the closing days of 1996. In a last-ditch effort to free captive members from government jails, the MRTA raided the Japanese ambassador’s compound during

an evening reception. Among the 72 hostages taken were the Peruvian ministers of foreign affairs and agriculture, at least nine foreign ambassadors, and leading police and security officials.

Fujimori, who was elected to a second presidential term in July 1995, agreed to comply with requests by Japan and the United States to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict yet refused to give in to MRTA demands. On April 22, 1997, after negotiations had failed to secure the release of any additional hostages, Fujimori authorized 140 specially trained government commandos to raid the compound. Within 40 minutes, all the hostages were freed, except for a member of the Peruvian Supreme Court, who died of a heart attack. Fujimori received public praise for the raid but also was criticized for killing some MRTA members who reportedly had agreed to surrender.

Fourteen heavily armed members of a Marxist rebel group stormed the Japanese ambassador's residence in the capital of Lima and took more than 500 people hostage.

While the overall number of armed attacks by the MRTA and Shining Path declined for the sixth straight year in 1997, violent incidents by Shining Path members were higher in the second half of the year than the first. In July 1998, Shining Path rebels blew up three power lines and threatened to kill villagers outside of Lima in an effort to derail municipal elections scheduled for October. In addition to internal conflict, Peru fought wars with neighboring Ecuador in 1941, 1981, and 1995 over 49 miles of disputed border about 560 miles north of Lima. In August 1998, Peru accused Ecuador of sending troops into Peruvian territory, a charge that the Ecuadorian government denied. The alleged infiltration set back talks on an internationally mediated settlement to the long-running border dispute.

Kirk Wolcott, program coordinator in the Conflict Resolution Program at The Carter Center, is the editor of the 1997-98 State of World Conflict Report.

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
CONFLICT TIMELINE

1950	Gen. Odira elected president
1962	Gen. Godoy takes power in military coup
1968	Military government adopts socialist Inca Plan for economic and social development
1980	Maoist guerrilla group Shining Path forms, joins others fighting Belaunde government
1984	Rebel group MRTA begins violent power struggle
1990	Alberto Fujimori elected president on reform platform, cracks down on Shining Path
1992	Shining Path founder Abimael Guzman captured, receives life sentence
1996	MRTA overruns Japanese Embassy, takes hostages; Fujimori's forces retake compound in April 1997

MIDDLE EAST

Middle East warfare remained at a relatively low and constant rate with “high-level” armed conflicts waged in four countries. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein continued to thwart attempts by U.N. inspectors to verify the presence of weapons of mass destruction, while internal disputes involving Iraqi Kurds drew more bloodshed. To the north, the Turkish government launched its largest offensive to date in May 1998 against the Kurdish Worker’s Party, pushing the death toll in that bloody conflict to more than 25,000.

Meanwhile, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process gave signs of moving forward as Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu tempered his hard-line stance on several issues and Palestinian Authority Chair Yasser Arafat moderated some of his own policies. While violence in Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, and Saudi Arabia threatened to further destabilize the region, the election of moderate Iranian President Mohammed Khatami signaled encouraging signs of more open dialogue with the United States.



Health and Human Development Indicators

For comparisons of countries with high-level conflicts in 1997-98, HDI measures the distance needed to attain the UNDP's 1997 Human Development Report goals for life expectancy, educational level, and income on a 1,000 scale (the nearer to 1,000, the closer a country is to attaining these goals). Under-5 mortality rates, as measured by UNICEF, represent the probability of a child dying between birth and 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births.

Country	% Population With Access to Safe Water (1990-96)	% Population With Access to Sanitation (1990-96)	% Fully Immunized 1-Year-Old Children (1995-96)				Population Annual Growth Rate % (1980-96)	Adult Literacy Rate (1995)	Human Development Index (HDI) (1997)	Under-5 Mortality Rate (1997)	World Rank (1 = highest mortality)
			TB	DPT	Polio	Measles					
Iran	90	81	90	96	97	95	3.6	69	0.780	37	96
Iraq	78	70	99	94	95	97	2.9	58	0.531	122	39
Israel	na	na	na	92	93	94	2.4	95*	0.913	9	161
Turkey	49	62	69	84	83	84	2.1	82	0.772	47	82
Middle East and North Africa	81	71	91	86	87	86	3.0	59	na	65	
United States	na	na	na	94	84	89	1.0	99*	0.942	8	162
World	71	42	89	80	81	79	1.7	75	0.764	88	

* Data refers to periods other than those specified, to a region rather than an entire country, or differs from the standard definition.

Sources: UNICEF, UNDP

Population Displacement

Internally Displaced People (IDPs) are defined as those people who have been forced to flee their homes and who remain in the territory of their own country. Refugees are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Persons in "refugee-like situations" (RLS) fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries but are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers.

IRAN

Refugees:	76,872
Iraq:	34,194
Sweden:	26,025
Norway:	7,300
France:	3,297
Belgium:	1,645
Other:	4,411
RLSs:	3,000
(Iraq)	

IRAQ

IDPs:	900,000
Refugees:	672,027
Iran:	579,200
Syria:	26,817
Sweden:	20,538
Kuwait:	16,988
Saudi Arabia:	9,701
Other:	18,783
RLSs:	50,000
(Jordan)	

TURKEY

IDPs:	500,000 - 2,000,000
Refugees:	43,338
Iraq:	14,986
France:	12,577
Belgium:	4,907
Switzerland:	3,870
Sweden:	3,495
Other:	3,503

ISRAEL

Refugees:	105,526
Iraq:	62,635
Kuwait:	33,710
Yemen:	6,000
Libya:	3,281



Israeli police (left) and Palestinian men share a bench in Jerusalem during the 1996 Palestinian elections, which were monitored by The Carter Center and other organizations.

Billy Howard

Sources: UNHRC, U.S. Committee for Refugees

Military Comparisons

Defense Expenditures

Manpower

	Defense Expenditures				Manpower					
	Total (millions \$)	World Rank	% GNP	World Rank	% Central Govt. Expenditure	World Rank	\$ Per Capita	World Rank	# in Armed Forces x 1,000	World Rank
Iran	4,191	27	2.6	69	na	53	65	68	440	12
Iraq	1,965	52	na	8	na	31	na	57	390	16
Israel	8,734	14	9.6	11	21.1	26	1,646	2	185	30
Turkey	6,606	19	4.0	37	17.6	32	107	55	805	6
Middle East	48,600		7.9		23.6		225		2,319	
United States	277,800	1	3.8	39	17.4	34	1,056	4	1,620	2
World	864,500		2.8		9.9		152		22,790	

Source: ACDA

IRAN



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 636,293 sq. mi. (1,648,000 sq. km.)

Population: 67,540,002

Life Expectancy at Birth: 67.8 years

System of Government: Theocratic Republic

Languages: Persian and Persian dialects

Turkic and Turkic dialects

Kurdish

Luri

Balochi

Arabic

Turkish

Religions: Shi'a Muslim 89%

Sunni Muslim 10%

Other 1%

Ethnic Groups:

Persian 51%

Azerbaijani 24%

Gilaki &

Mazandarani 8%

Kurd 7%

Arab 3%

Lur 3%

Baloch 2%

Turkmen 2%

Other 1%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):

U.S. \$343.5 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$5,200*

External Debt: U.S. \$30 billion*

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government

Warring Parties: Government of Iran vs. Mujahedin-e Khalq (MOK)

Troop Strength: **Government:** 500,000 including the Revolutionary Guard
Mujahedin-e Khalq: na

Est. Deaths (1997): na

Est. Deaths (total): na

Sources: SIPRI

BY ERIC HOOGLUND

The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran generally is accepted as legitimate by the Iranian people, and there is no organized, violent opposition to it within the country. Outside Iran, however, various ethnic, religious, and monarchist groups are dedicated to changing the government and/or its policies through means of armed struggle.

The two most important Iranian opposition groups in exile are the ethnic Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the religiously inspired Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MOK). Both groups maintain training bases in eastern Iraq and have used these camps to launch occasional guerrilla raids into areas of western Iran bordering Iraq. The KDPI's objective is political autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish-populated provinces of northwest and central-

west Iran. The MOK seeks the complete overthrow of the regime and the installation of MOK leaders in its place.

The most intense period of clashes between the government and the armed opposition was 1979-88, when fighting, terrorist acts, and summary executions resulted in some 20,000 deaths.

Although violent clashes have declined significantly since 1989, about 800 deaths inside and outside of Iran are attributable to the ongoing conflict between 1989 and 1998.

Although violent clashes have declined significantly since 1989, about 800 deaths inside and outside of Iran are attributable to the ongoing conflict between 1989 and 1998.

The MOK has been based in Baghdad since the mid-1980s. Its collaboration with

Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) is believed to have resulted in the MOK losing whatever support it may have had inside Iran. Nevertheless, its cadres—estimated to be about 20,000 men and women—are strongly loyal to MOK leader Masoud Rajavi and his wife, Maryam, the designated co-leader.

The political arm of the MOK is the

Iran Threatens Regional War

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Sept. 14 (UPI) – Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini has issued a threat of regional war if the Pakistan-backed Taliban militia in Afghanistan is not controlled.

Tensions between Pakistan and Iran, which backs the Shiite Muslim militia in the Afghan

conflict, have escalated in recent weeks over the killing of Iranian diplomats by Taliban soldiers and the subsequent buildup of 70,000 Iranian troops along the Afghan border.

—United Press International, Sept. 14, 1998

National Resistance Council, which raises money in Europe and North America. The MOK fighting force, the National Liberation Army, recruits and trains both men and women. The MOK operates at least three military bases in eastern Iraq, and the Iranian air force, in violation of Iraqi air and ground space, has bombed these camps several times since 1992. Iranian agents also have attacked MOK headquarters in downtown Baghdad.

As a result of these attacks, the MOK's ability to carry out guerrilla raids inside Iran seems to have been crippled, although a few incidents of sabotage in remote border regions occurred in 1996 and 1997.

Periodically, the Iranian government announces an amnesty for any MOK members who renounce the organization and "repent."

The KDPI was expelled from its last bases in the mountains of Iranian

Kurdistan in the early 1980s. Since then, the extent of its support among Kurds in Iran is unknown, although Tehran has made concerted efforts to win the Kurds' loyalty by reconstructing Kurdish towns and villages destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War.

At the same time, the Iranian government has attacked KDPI bases in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq, even though these camps are located within Iraq's "no-fly" zone, which is monitored regularly by British, French, and U.S. aircraft. Its agents also are believed to be responsible for the assassination of several KDPI leaders in Europe from 1989-92.

The number of KDPI cadres also has declined steadily, as hundreds of fighters have given up armed struggle to adopt a peaceful life in Europe or North America or even accepted amnesty and returned to Iran. By the late 1990s, it was estimated that the KDPI had fewer than 3,000 guerrillas in its Iraqi camps.

Eric Hooglund, visiting fellow in Iranian studies at St. Anthony's College, Oxford University, is the author of Land and Revolution in Iran and editor of Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East.

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
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The Iranian Mojahedin (1989) by Abrahamian Ervand.

The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic (1986) by Nikki Keddie and Eric Hoogland, editors.

1953	Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq overthrown in pro-shah coup supported by Britain and United States
1963	Arrest of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini for denouncing Iran's relations with U.S. leads to riots
1971	Guerrilla groups, including MOK, begin armed struggle against regime of shah
1979	Shah flees; Ayatollah Khomeini proclaims Islamic republic, KDPI begins armed struggle for autonomy
1981	MOK launches armed uprising; thousands killed in street clashes; MOK leaders flee Iran
1988	Iran, Iraq sign cease-fire after eight years of war; MOK guerrillas enter Iran from Iraq in unsuccessful attempt to start national uprising
1989	KDPI head assassinated in Vienna; Khomeini dies
1992	New KDPI head and three other party leaders assassinated in Berlin cafe
1997	Moderate Muslim cleric Khatami elected president, defeating conservative hard-liners

IRAQ



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 1,68,754 sq. mi. (437,072 sq. km.)

Population: 22,219,289

Life Expectancy at Birth: 67.4 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Arabic

Kurdish

Assyrian

Armenian

Religions: Shi'ite Muslim 60%-65%

Sunni Muslim 32%-37%

Christian or other 3%

Ethnic Groups:

Arab 75%-80%

Kurdish 15%-20%

Turkoman,

Assyrian or other 5%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):

U.S. \$42 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$2,000*

External Debt: Very heavy relative to GDP
but amount unknown

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Government

Warring Parties: Government of Iraq vs. Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI)
vs. Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
vs. Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

Troop Strength: **Government:** 350,000-400,000 **SAIRI:** 4,000-5,000 lightly armed
KDP: 15,000 plus 10,000-20,000 reservists **PUK:** 15,000

Est. Deaths (1997): More than 1,000 overall

Est. Deaths (total): More than 40,000 to more than 200,000 overall

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BY AMATZIA BARAM

While Iraq has yet to recover from the devastation it suffered during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein continued in 1997 to provoke the international community while trying to crush a simmering internal rebellion and political opposition.

In 1997 and 1998, for the first time since the Gulf War, Iraq (with U.N. authorization) sold oil to pay for food and medicine imports and to buy equipment to increase its oil production. Saddam sought more control over the items Iraq could buy with the proceeds, making sales erratic.

In February 1998, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan mediated a resolution to a dangerous standoff between Iraq and the United Nations. Under the threat of a joint U.S.-British air campaign, Saddam agreed—not for the first time—to comply with U.N. requirements that Iraq destroy all weapons of mass destruction and allow U.N. weapons inspectors unfettered access to weapons sites. In return he was praised

by Annan, and the United Nations Special Commission was placed under the U.N. Security Council's magnifying glass more than ever before.

Saddam's internal troubles continued in 1997. Despite several defections within the Iraqi leadership between 1993 and 1997, he reasserted control over his political power base. The Shi'i uprising (Intifada) in southern Iraq continued, however, albeit on a small scale.

Begun in March 1991, the Intifada spread quickly through southern Shi'ite cities. The Iran-based Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI) and the Islamic Da'wa Party, an older, smaller fundamentalist Shi'i opposition group, supported the rebellion. Saddam quickly suppressed the revolt, killing 30,000-60,000 people.

Today many small groups of Shi'i revolutionaries—some fundamentalists, others secular—fight Saddam's troops from the southern marsh areas, creating serious logistical difficulties for the Iraqi army. The SAIRI and Da'wa still support the rebels from Iran, but Syria,

"The bottom line is that if Iraq tries to break out of its strategic box, our response will be swift and strong. We have not taken any option off the table, including military force."

—U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a Sept. 9, 1998, speech

which had supported them until summer 1997, scaled back support due to a partial Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement.

The Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq began in 1961 with a rebellion by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) under the Mulla Mustafa Al-Barazani. The KDP and the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), with limited support from Iran, opposed Saddam's regime during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88). Saddam crushed the rebellion, killing more than 100,000 Kurds in the first half of 1988. Both factions revolted again in March-April 1990, and Saddam's retribution caused nearly 2 million Kurds to flee to Iran and Turkey.

A protected area, including an internationally enforced no-fly zone established after the Gulf War, allowed a May 1992 democratic election in Iraqi Kurdistan, but in May 1994 relations between the PUK and KDP deteriorated, and fighting between them erupted. KDP leader Mas'ud Barazani turned to Saddam for help, and on Aug. 31, 1996, Iraqi tank divisions and KDP forces captured Irbil, capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Zone, which had been controlled by the PUK. PUK leader

Jalal Talabani retained a small area around Sulaymaniya, and in November 1996 the warring factions agreed to a cease-fire.

Hostilities resumed in October 1997, but with the help of American-British intermediaries, the parties negotiated another cease-fire and entered peace negotiations at the end of the year. Both Kurdish factions continue an ongoing dialogue with Baghdad.

The KDP also cooperated with Turkish troops conducting raids against anti-Turkish Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan. The PUK, on the other hand, tolerated rebel bases in its territory and was involved in a number of military confrontations with Turkish troops in 1997. In late 1997, Turkey stationed some 5,000 troops on the Iraqi side of the Turkish-Iraqi border.

Editor's Note: On Dec. 17, 1998, the United States and Britain launched missile attacks on Iraq after the release of a report from the chief U.N. weapons inspector that charged Iraq with systematic obstruction and noncompliance. The U.S. and U.K. governments sent jet fighters, troops, and anti-aircraft to the Gulf region to join more than 200 aircraft and 22 warships previously stationed there.

Amatzia Baram has researched the Ba'th Party and regime of Iraq since 1979. His writings include two books, over 40 articles in academic journals, and two books about to be published.

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Republic of Fear (1989) by Samir al-Khalil.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1947	Ba'th party forms
1958	Gen. Kassem overthrows British-installed Iraqi monarchy
1961	Kassem claims Kuwait as part of Iraq; Kurds revolt in north
1968	Ba'th party comes to power, establishes Communist-style one-party state
1980	Saddam Hussein begins eight-year war with Iran
1988	U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 outlines Iraq-Iran cease-fire
1991	Gulf War forces drive Iraq from Kuwait; Saddam suppresses Kurd, Shi'ite rebellions
1997	Iraq allowed for first time since 1991 U.N. sanctions to sell oil to pay for food
1998	U.S. government threatens force against Iraq for expelling U.N. weapons inspectors

ISRAEL



BASIC FIGURES

Area: 8,019 sq. mi. (20,770 sq. km.)

Population: 5,534,672*

Life Expectancy at Birth: 78 years

System of Government: Republic

Languages: Hebrew (official)
Arabic

Religions: Jewish 82%
Muslim (mostly Sunni) 14%
Christian 2%
Druze and other 2%

Ethnic Groups: Jewish 82%
Arab and other 18%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): U.S. \$85.7 billion**

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$16,400**

External Debt: U.S. \$25.7 billion**

* Includes 136,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, 15,000 in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, 5,000 in the Gaza Strip, and 156,000 in East Jerusalem (August 1996 estimate)

**1996 estimated

Source: CIA

THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility: Territory (Palestine)

Warring Parties: Government of Israel vs. non-PLO groups*

Troop Strength: **Government:** 170,000-180,000 **Non-PLO groups:** na

Est. Deaths (1997): 175-250 battle-related

Est. Deaths (total): More than 13,000 battle-related; more than 18,000 overall

* Examples of these groups include Hamas, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Islamic Jihad, Hizbollah, and Amal.

Sources: SIPRI

BY KENNETH W. STEIN

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a May 12, 1998, address to the National Press Club, characterized the state of the Arab-Israeli peace process in 1997 as "the most disappointing since the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993." The negotiations, she told *The New York Times* the following day, were "stalled ... at risk," facing a "crisis of confidence," with "optimism replaced by a sense of fatalism and helplessness about the future."

Since Benjamin Netanyahu's election as Israel's ninth prime minister in May 1996, control of the pace and content of the peace process has become his exclusive domain. Netanyahu remained steadfast in pursuit of four interrelated goals: ensuring personal and national security for all Israelis; eliminating physical violence as a policy option for Palestinians; prevent-

ing establishment of a territorially contiguous and fully independent Palestinian state; and creating facts to influence the outcome of Palestinian-Israeli final status talks, scheduled for completion by May 1999.

The year 1997 began with Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) signing the Hebron Agreement in January.

Despite deeply held Israeli-Palestinian disillusionment with one another and harsh Arab attitudes directed toward Israel, there was no apparent alternative to the negotiating process.

It was the first agreement signed between the recently elected Likud government and the PA, and it called for Israel to share a city holy to Jewish tradition. Partial Israeli withdrawal from Hebron completed Israel's 1995 commitment to withdraw from the seven major Arab urban areas of the West Bank. Israel responded to Palestinian terrorism and violence against Israelis with reluctance to turn over more land to PA control and imposition of harsh economic restrictions upon Gaza and West Bank Palestinians.

Arab aggravation with Israel stemmed

from Israel's unwillingness to withdraw from additional West Bank territories as promised since signing the September 1993 Oslo Accords. The PA, led by Yasser Arafat, had agreed that Israel alone was to determine the depth of each withdrawal. When Israel missed deadlines, expanded settlements, and confiscated land, however, Palestinians and other Arabs saw Israeli policies as insincere and unsatisfactory.

During 1997, there was virtually no progress on the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks, though Israelis increasingly debated the benefits and manpower liabilities of keeping a security force in southern Lebanon.

Multilateral talks on issues of water, refugees, economic development, and arms control started after the October 1991 Madrid Middle East peace conference. These talks had been an integral part of the wider negotiating process with states not contiguous to Israel but were essentially moribund in 1997 and much of 1998. In October 1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton convinced Netanyahu and Arafat to implement previously made promises, including a greater Palestinian crack-down on suspected terrorists, revision on the PLO charter, and an Israeli transfer of an

additional 13 percent of land to Palestinian control.

The deadlocked Palestinian-Israeli negotiation track had a decidedly negative ripple effect on Israel's economy and on its relations with other Arab states, Europe, the United States, and the United Nations. The slowdown changed the nature of American involvement from facilitator to mediator-umpire. Individually and collectively, the European Union and its member states tried but failed to play a more active political role in Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy. To no avail, the U.N. General Assembly passed resolutions critical of Israeli settlement policies in April, July, and November.

Despite deeply held Israeli-Palestinian disillusionment with one another and harsh Arab attitudes directed toward Israel, there was no apparent alternative to the negotiating process. Though both the Israeli-Egyptian (1979) and Israeli-Jordanian (1994) peace treaties were severely tested, they remained intact. Moreover, by the beginning of 1998, 59 percent of Israelis and 68 percent of Palestinians supported the peace process and wanted it to continue, according to a joint Israeli-Palestinian public opinion survey.

Dr. Kenneth W. Stein is professor of Middle Eastern history and political science at Emory University and Middle East fellow at The Carter Center. He is the author of The Land in Question, 1917-1939.

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CONFLICT TIMELINE

1948	State of Israel comes into existence, begins war with Arab League
1956	Suez War breaks out; Israel temporarily occupies Gaza, Sinai; United Nations Emergency Force established
1967	Israel wins Six Day War with Syria, Egypt, Jordan; occupies West Bank, Golan, Gaza
1973	Yom Kippur War erupts; Egypt reoccupies Sinai; warring parties sign cease-fire
1979	Israel and Egypt sign Peace Treaty
1987	Palestinian Intifadah uprising begins
1994	Oslo process leads to Israeli-Jordanian Agreement
1995	Right-wing Israeli law student assassinates Prime Minister Rabin
1996	Netanyahu elected prime minister; Oslo peace process stalls
1998	Clinton brokers Wye Plantation peace talks in October

TURKEY



THE CONFLICT

Incompatibility:	Territory (Kurdistan)
Warring Parties:	Government of Turkey vs. Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), also known as Kurdish Workers' Party or Apocus
Troop Strength:	Government: 800,000 including the Gendarmerie/National Guard PKK: 6,000-10,000
Est. Deaths (1997):	More than 1,000 battle-related; more than 4,000 overall
Est. Deaths (total):	More than 30,000 battle-related and overall

Sources: SIPRI, PIOOM, AKUF

BASIC FIGURES

Area: 301,382 sq. mi. (780,580 sq. km.)

Population: 63,528,225

Life Expectancy at Birth: 72.4 years

System of Government:

Republican Parliamentary Democracy

Languages: Turkish (Official)

Kurdish
Arabic

Religions: Muslim (mostly Sunni) 99.8%

Other
(Christian and Jewish) .2%

Ethnic Groups:

Turkish 80%
Kurdish 20%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):

U.S. \$379.1 billion*

GDP Per Capita: U.S. \$6,100*

External Debt: U.S. \$75.8 billion*

* 1996 estimated

Source: CIA

BY ALAN MAKOVSKY

Fighting between the Turkish military and the insurrectionist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) has continued over the past few years, and no peaceful solution is in sight. Turkey's position on the ground has gained steadily since 1993, when its military abandoned its defensive approach and adopted more aggressive tactics, including persistent raids on PKK strongholds in northern Iraq. Accordingly, Turkish control in the Kurdish southeast grew steadily firmer, and Turkey claimed that "terror incidents" in 1997 declined by 29 percent compared to 1996 and by 70 percent compared to 1994.

Yet the PKK, which uses both guerrilla and terrorist tactics, showed no signs of disappearing. In 1997, the PKK expanded its field of operation outside the southeast for the first time, launching attacks in the Black Sea area. In July 1998, a PKK attack on a Turkish patrol resulted in 22 Turkish deaths, the largest reported toll in years.

Regional states, primarily Syria

(where the PKK leadership is based), Iran, and Iraq, have assisted the PKK. The Turkish government has regularly charged the Greek, Armenian, and Russian governments with supporting the PKK, which also enjoys widespread financial backing from Kurds in Europe. According to various estimates, the PKK has about 6,000-7,000 fighters in the field, including 2,100 operating on Turkish territory. For its part, Turkey deploys roughly 300,000 security forces of various types in the southeast, dedicated mainly to combating the PKK.

The PKK traditionally has called for an independent Kurdish state in what is now southeast Turkey. Despite this, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan said recently that he would accept a settlement within the current Turkish borders and that he and the PKK would lay down arms to negotiate with the Turkish government in Ankara. The Turkish government and military, however, thoroughly distrust the PKK and view it as having too much blood on its hands to be a suitable negotiating partner.

"Turkey did not abide by the truce we declared. We have developed new war tactics and will intensify our attacks."

—PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan said Sept. 16, 1998, the day after Turkish troops reportedly killed 53 more of his Kurdish rebels. Ocalan was arrested in Italy in November on warrants from Turkey and Germany.

Most foreign observers view the Kurdish issue not as one of independence but as one of the Kurds' achieving full linguistic, cultural, and political rights within Turkey. The Kurds, whose very existence was denied in Turkey before this decade, have made impressive gains in all these areas in the 1990s, but their rights of self-expression nevertheless remain circumscribed. The fundamental issue at stake is Turkey's self-concept as a "unitary state" in which all Muslims, of disparate origins, are expected to adopt a Turkish identity. This approach has been successful with all Muslim groups except a significant portion of Kurds.

In the short and medium term, the most likely prospect is continued armed conflict. Over the longer term, however, there are reasons to hope the conflict might be resolved peacefully. For one, the word "Kurd" is now fully part of political discourse. There also exist political parties that are primarily devoted to advancing Kurdish rights, and

Kurdish publications and music are available on the open market. This trend will likely continue, facilitated by Turkey's desire to be accepted by the West.

Hope for a peaceful resolution over time is also abetted by two important demographic trends. The Kurdish population, generally estimated at 15 to 20 percent of the total population, is increasing in relation to the non-Kurdish portion. Second, Kurds in growing numbers are forsaking the underdeveloped and violence-torn southeast for the large Turkish cities of western and central Anatolia. Evidence thus far suggests that—contrary to some early projections—life in the Turkish west has had a moderating effect on Kurdish residents. These two demographic trends point to increasing pressure for accommodation for the sake of social peace and the possibly growing willingness of Kurds to accomplish that change without violence.

The PKK, which uses both guerrilla and terrorist tactics, showed no signs of disappearing.

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CONFLICT TIMELINE

1946	President Inonu introduces reforms, multiparty system
1950	Opposition Democratic Party wins first free elections
1960	Gen. Gursel leads military coup, announces new constitution
1974	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) forms; Turkey invades north Cyprus
1984	PKK launches guerrilla campaign to establish independent Kurdistan
1992	Government raids PKK military bases in northern Iraq
1993	Tansu Çiller becomes prime minister; 3,000 killed in Kurdish struggle
1996	Welfare Party takes control of government; pro-Islamic Erbakan elected prime minister
1998	PKK leader Ocalan placed under house arrest in Italy

LOOKING FORWARD



Reuters

An armed Serb guards his village in the Kosovo region of Serbia, one of several "flash points" for widespread conflict.

To provide a more comprehensive view on the impact of armed conflicts and efforts to prevent and resolve them, we have chosen this year to highlight several situations that do not meet the definition of "major armed conflict" or "war" yet still merit serious global attention. As 1998 drew to a close, much of the Caucasus, Somalia, and the Kosovo region of Serbia teetered on the brink of all-out war. Meanwhile, traditional trouble spots such as Nigeria and Northern Ireland appeared to be on the road to peace, albeit steep and rocky roads. In other countries, such as Liberia and the two Koreas, it was too early to tell what course they would take as we begin looking forward to 1999. In the pages that follow, experts examine some of the volatile regions of the world and look in-depth at the fragile peace process in Bosnia, the importance of human rights in conflict prevention, and the question of whether peace is ultimately possible.

FLASH POINTS

The year 1998 opened with analysts warning about the outbreak or escalation of armed conflicts in several regions of the world. Along with governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and universities, several publications such as *The Economist*, *Jane's Defense Weekly*, and *Fielding's The World's Most Dangerous Places* forecast hot spots for deadly conflict, including the following predicted for 1998:

- Albania
- Angola
- Bangladesh
- Basque region of Spain
- Central African Republic
- Caucasus
- China
- Cyprus
- Ecuador/Peru
- Equatorial Guinea
- Greece
- Korean Peninsula
- Kenya
- Kosovo region of Serbia
- Laos
- Morocco
- Nigeria
- Panama
- Somalia
- Taiwan


CONFLICT UPDATES

The Conflict Updates give a weekly synopsis, condensed from wire and newspaper reports, of military and political developments in about 20 countries around the world with existing or potential armed conflicts. Updates are compiled, written, and edited by academic interns in the Conflict Resolution Program (CRP) at The Carter Center, supervised by CRP staff. Conflict Updates are distributed to INN members, Carter Center staff, and the public through The Carter Center's home page on the World Wide Web at www.cartercenter.org (see Updates under "What's New").

CARNEGIE COMMISSION: TAKING PREVENTIVE MEASURES

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict was established in 1994 by the Carnegie Corporation of New York as a deliberate effort to "address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict."

Commission co-chairs David Hamburg, the immediate past president of the Carnegie Corporation (both major supporters of the INN), and Cyrus Vance, an INN member, have led a dedi-



icated and highly qualified group of international leaders, renowned scholars, veteran practitioners, and other experts in this endeavor. The result of this ambitious undertaking has been a series of reports, background papers, books, and the widely disseminated and highly praised final report.

In its literature, the Carnegie Commission states that the final report "analyzes the current state of violent conflict in the world and lays out the Commission's vision of an international system of conflict prevention. Three fundamental observations form the foundation of the report: Deadly conflict is not inevitable; the need to prevent such conflict is increasingly urgent; and successful prevention is possible." In the report, the Commission outlines several practical measures and options for early action to prevent mass violence and concludes by challenging the international community to create a "culture of prevention." Information about the Carnegie Commission, including the full final report, is available on the World Wide Web at www.ccpdc.org.

CAUCASUS

BY JOHN COLARUSSO

With five wars since 1989, the Caucasus is the most unstable region in the former Soviet Union. This instability partly has been the legacy of former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and deeper historical grievances dating back more than 200 years. These local problems now are subject to the stresses of oil politics and the geopolitical anxieties of Russia for its southernmost flank. Furthermore, none of the five wars has been resolved in any lasting way, although their prospects for renewed conflict vary.

The Chechen conflict is perhaps the most dangerous, with deep and intense animosities between the two sides (see "Chechnia"). The multiethnic Republic of Daghestan, however, has the greatest level of tension in the Caucasus. Several territorial disputes exist among various ethnic enclaves, but emerging Muslim movements, most notably the extreme fundamentalist Wahabbis, have created a new dimension of civic unrest that almost erupted into civil war in May 1998. While none of these tensions serves Russia's interests, her ability to stabilize Daghestan or Chechnia seemed extremely limited as of mid-1998.

The Prigorodny conflict between the North Ossetians and the Ingush, which erupted into violence in fall 1992, was unlikely to do so again because of Russian troops' strong presence in the region. Meanwhile, these troops have acted as leverage on Georgia to the south, making continued tension there more likely. Georgia has undergone two secessionist wars: the first in South Ossetia, from January 1991 to May

1992; the second in Abkhazia, from August 1992 to September 1993.


As of mid-1998, the South Ossetian secessionist movement had waned, and a solution to the conflict appeared feasible. By contrast, the Abkhaz conflict, which erupted again in late May, was not likely to be resolved in the near term. To keep the Circassians, who are kin of the Abkhaz, in the Northwest Caucasus quiet, Moscow would need to back their own kin, the Abkhaz. Also, with an open arms race in South Asia,

Moscow needs certain seismic monitoring facilities in Abkhazia. Moscow traditionally has controlled Georgia, like the rest of the South Caucasus, in an effort to outflank the unruly North and to keep in check Georgia's oil ambitions.

The Karabagh Conflict, fought ostensibly from 1989-95, actually is a second Turko-Armenian war acted out in the Caucasus and fueled by deep animosities.

As of July 1998, leaders on both sides seemed incapable of securing lasting peace. Armenia had become Russia's satellite in the South Caucasus, serving as a counterweight to Azerbaijani ambitions. A solution to this conflict hinges on a settlement of oil interests that is acceptable to Moscow.

Most other tensions in the North Caucasus center around lost land or economic privileges, particularly in and around Adygheya, in Karachai-Cherkessia, and in Kabardino-



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Balkaria. However, armed conflicts over these matters remained remote, partly because such small wars would not serve Moscow's interests.

A climate of lawlessness has grown out of these wars and out

CHECHNIA

The Chechen War of December 1994-August 1996 was only the last of a long string of hostilities since 1785 between the Chechen people of the North Caucasus and Russians. This latest war was disastrous for both sides, with heavy loss of life and large-scale destruction. For Russia, it was also a military humiliation of major proportions. While the legacy of hatred and mistrust is the biggest factor militating against a lasting peace between Russia and Chechnia, other factors augur poorly for any future settlement.

The truce of August 1996 (signed by former Russian military commander Aleksandr Lebed) and the accord of May 1997 (signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin) refrained from defining Chechnia's status while alluding to the principles of international law. Russians seemed to be buying time through these documents, while Chechens seized upon international legal terms as implying their sovereign status.

As of mid-1998, the Kremlin remained politically divided between hawks and doves. Doves ran the risk of being accused of destroying Mother Russia if they made any progress toward peace with Chechnia. Chechens also remained divided between those who hoped to restore some normalcy with Russia and those who wished to see Chechnia become a conservative outlier of the Islamic world.

The legal issue of Chechnia's status has been a vexing one. First, Chechnia seceded from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in September 1991, not from the Russian Federation. Second, the Russian constitution expressly precludes any portion of the Federation from seceding. This absence of a legal solution has fueled for those nationalists within the Russian judiciary who threaten legal action against officials who talk with Chechen leaders in Grozny.

of abysmal economic conditions. Unless arms trade is curtailed, real economic growth initiated, and political compromises attained, the Caucasus are likely to remain highly unstable and subject to armed conflicts for some time.

Meanwhile, Chechen officials must travel on Russian passports and frequently must seek permission to cross Russian territory or airspace.

In matters of oil, agreements have been drawn up and signed, but the will or means to implement them seems either lacking or inconstant. Chechnia has sought external economic ties, but every success merely serves to alienate the Russian government in the capital of Moscow. Chechnia may still occupy a crucial position along the northern oil

pipeline, but hopes that this would heal wounds and place Chechnia squarely back in Russia's fold seem unfounded.

As of mid-1998, war reparations remained one of the most politically sensitive issues and, while Russia continues to face a financial crisis, one of the least practical ones. Rampant corruption on both sides has thwarted efforts by other countries to send aid.

Through June 1998, Chechnia remained heavily armed and beset by civic turmoil, including several kidnappings. Efforts to reach security arrangements with Russia were proceeding, but their effectiveness also remained unclear.

Finally, the significance of the Chechen war has yet to be determined. It may be an insignificant anomaly in the Russian march toward normalcy, or it might prove to be the beginning of the end of the Russian Empire. Given passions on both sides, prospects for renewed hostilities must be seen as high and those for peace extremely low.

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"For Russia, it was a military humiliation of major proportions."

KOREAN PENINSULA

BY DON OBERDORFER

The Republic of Korea (ROK), the Western-oriented government in the South, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the communist government in the North, have clashed repeatedly since U.S. and Soviet forces divided the peninsula at the end of World War II. The high point of struggle was the bloody Korean War of 1950-53 in which millions of Koreans and 54,000 American troops lost their lives. Since 1972, the two sides have held on-and-off negotiations, punctuated by terroristic incidents and periods of high tension. Today the misnamed "demilitarized zone" between the two Korean states remains the most heavily fortified and dangerous dividing line of the post-Cold War world.

Attempts to create a durable peace, or at least a greater degree of stability, have centered in the past several years on two sets of negotiations: Four Party Talks, including the United States and China as well as the two Korean states, and bilateral North-South talks without the presence of the outside powers.

U.S. President Bill Clinton and ROK President Kim Young Sam proposed the Four Party Talks in April 1996 "to initiate a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement." After extensive maneuvering, China and the DPRK agreed to participate, and the first full-scale meeting took place in December 1997 in Geneva. A second meeting in Geneva in March 1998 failed to produce agreement on an agenda for substantive negotiations, although all sides agreed to meet again.

Bilateral North-South talks at a senior-official level resumed in Beijing in April 1998 after four years in which the DPRK refused such meetings. The inauguration two months earlier of the new ROK president, Kim Dae Jung, who initiated policies of much greater engagement of the North, was a major factor in bringing about the resumption of talks, as was the North's dire economic situation. The initial round at the vice ministe-

rial level failed to achieve agreement on aid and humanitarian issues, but further talks were planned.

Meanwhile, the DPRK nuclear program, which generated intense confrontation in the early 1990s—and threatened to lead to war in June 1994 until former U.S. President Jimmy Carter intervened—has remained frozen under U.N. inspection. This is the result of the Agreed Framework negotiated by the United States and the DPRK in October 1994. The DPRK

agreed to stop work on its existing nuclear program in return for a U.S. commitment to arrange the supply of two substitute nuclear reactors less prone to nuclear proliferation and to provide heavy fuel oil to compensate for energy given up by the DPRK while the reactors are built.

Looming in the background is the DPRK's increasingly serious food and economic situation, which began after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of extensive subsidies from China. Floods and droughts exacerbated

disastrous agricultural practices and government policies to reduce DPRK food production levels well below subsistence requirements. Despite assistance from China, the U.N. World Food Program, and private agencies, aid workers reported deaths due to starvation ranging from tens of thousands to millions.

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LIBERIA

BY TERRENCE LYONS

On July 19, 1997, Liberians voted in elections that marked a return to constitutional rule and represented the culmination of a difficult process to end seven years of brutal conflict. The elections implemented the Abuja Accords, the latest agreement in the long and often frustrating peace process coordinated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, along with other international and local observers, monitored the voting, which was peaceful and well-managed.

Charles Taylor, the former factional leader who launched the war in 1989, won by a large majority and became president. The process therefore ended with Taylor as the clear winner but left unresolved problems including the distortions of power that initially provoked the conflict in 1989, the sense that losing parties had little stake in sustaining the outcome, and a daunting set of challenges to overcome the destruction and divisions of the war.

The main political parties were those led by former factional leaders, such as Taylor's National Patriotic Party (NPP), and those led by civilians, most notably Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's Unity Party. The campaign period was relatively peaceful. On election day, turnout was high. Taylor won the presidency in a landslide, with more than 75 percent of the vote, followed by Sirleaf with 9.6 percent. The legislature was even more dominated by the NPP, creating a de facto one-party state.

Taylor and the NPP won in part because of superior organizational capacity, access to resources (most notably the only short-wave radio station, which was seized during the war), and their populist message and patronage. In addition, memories of seven years of brutal conflict and the consequent fear clearly shaped how many voters viewed the election and the choices available to them. Many Liberians believed that if Taylor lost the election, the country would return to war.

Consequently, they voted for Taylor to appease the powerful ex-faction leader. In the end, the elections ratified and institutionalized the political topography and imbalance of power created by seven years of war.

While the elections marked the end of one phase of the conflict, it is too early to judge whether they served to usher in a new era of sustainable conflict management. Liberia had a constitutional government, but a series of challenges

remained such as rebuilding basic infrastructure, repatriating hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons, reforming security forces, and institutionalizing rule of law and democratic governance.

In its first several months in office, the new regime's record was mixed. Taylor appointed a few opponents to minor cabinet positions and established commissions on human rights and reconciliation. But other actions, such as harassment of the media and reports that new security forces

were being filled with fighters from his old National Patriotic Front for Liberia, raised concerns. In December 1997, the brutal murder of Sam Dokie, one of Taylor's early supporters who backed the Unity Party in 1997, led many Liberians to fear that the violence of the war years was not over yet. In September 1998, several people were killed in Monrovia in a shoot-out between government troops and loyalists of former faction leader Roosevelt Johnson.

Terrence Lyons, a fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, served as senior program advisor and Monrovia office director for The Carter Center's 1997 Liberia Election Project.

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NIGERIA

BY PETER M. LEWIS

Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, has been embroiled in crisis since 1993, when military leaders canceled a widely anticipated transition to democratic rule. Under the ensuing regime of Gen. Sani Abacha, who ruled until his death in June 1998, the country experienced political turmoil, economic malaise, and international isolation.

Nigeria's dilemma has deep historical roots. Like most African states, Nigeria was an artificial creation of colonialism, including some 250 ethnic and linguistic groups of which three—the northwestern Hausa-Fulani, southwestern Yoruba, and southeastern Igbo—became dominant rivals. The stresses of ethnic and regional competition led to political turbulence and civil war in the late 1960s, and these tensions have influenced the nation's politics ever since. The quest for democratic government has occupied many leaders since 1966, when the military overthrew the first parliamentary government. In the ensuing decades, military leaders have governed for all but four years. Nigeria's economy was transformed in the 1970s when the country emerged as a leading oil exporter. Yet the new bounty did not bring prosperity or development. Instead, it signaled a massive increase in corruption and mismanagement.

These deep-seated challenges have been evident in recent crises. In June 1993, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida's regime conducted presidential elections as the final step in a promised democratic transition. Although the poll yielded an apparent winner—Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a popular Yoruba businessman—Babangida annulled the election. He abdicated his eight-year reign and installed a civilian caretaker government, which Abacha quickly shouldered aside. The new regime harassed and detained journalists, human rights activists, politicians, and other dissidents or rivals. Abiola was arrested along with dozens of critics. In November 1995, the govern-

ment executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight compatriots from the Ogoni community who had agitated for environmental standards and economic rights in the country's oil-producing areas. These acts were condemned by several countries and international organizations, which restricted aid and relations with Nigeria. Economic decline and deepening social strains accompanied the pall of political repression.

The Abacha government sought to burnish its image by announcing political and economic reforms. Despite the promise of a new democratic transition agenda, the government permitted only five screened parties to participate in elections and conducted the program in a repressive political atmosphere. In April 1998, all five parties nominated Abacha as their sole candidate for the presidency.

On June 8, Abacha died, reportedly of a heart attack. Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar replaced him and quickly took steps to reverse some of the most unpopular features of Abacha's rule. Several prominent political prisoners were released, the regime began a dialogue with the domestic opposition,

and the country's diplomatic isolation subsided. Despite these hopeful steps, the country was thrown into turmoil when Abiola died suddenly on July 7 while still in detention. Within two weeks, Abubakar announced a new program for transition to democratic rule, set to conclude in May 1999.

Peter M. Lewis is assistant professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington D.C. He has written extensively on the Nigerian political economy and on broader regional issues in Africa.

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SERBIA (KOSOVO)

BY ANTHONY BORDEN

Open violence erupted in early 1998 in Kosovo, the ethnic Albanian-majority province within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which includes the republics of Serbia and Montenegro—see map on page 82).

The outbreak of armed conflict created a major new security crisis with severe implications for the entire Balkan region.

Nine years after Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic revoked the territory's political autonomy, the emergence of the shadowy Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) as an actual, if vaguely structured, armed force shattered the Kosovar Albanians' uniform commitment to peace. The Yugoslav Army's heavy-handed response in two main attacks in early March 1998 caused more than 100 deaths. These violent episodes compelled the international community to react with emergency meetings of the Contact Group (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, and the United States). Reminiscent of the 1992-95 Bosnian conflict, these meetings resulted in a range of ineffectual diplomatic initiatives. The violence also served to rally Albanians, both within and outside Kosovo, to support the UCK, thus establishing a dangerous dynamic with no clear signs of resolution.

The core of the Kosovo conflict has been the dispute over the political rights of Albanians, who make up nearly 90 percent of the province's 2 million inhabitants. Despite the small size of the Serbian population, the province plays a central role in Serbian nationalism. Milosevic, now Yugoslav federal president, rose to power in 1987 through his deft political manipulation of the Kosovo issue by invoking the Serbs' mythic defeat in Kosovo by the Ottomans in 1389. Whereas the Serbs cannot conceive of Serbia without the province, Albanians hold a numerical dominance—and a higher birthrate—that ensures the identity of the area will remain Albanian, save for the presence of Yugoslav Army troops stationed there. Steps by Milosevic in the 1990s to shut down all Albanian-language institutions and otherwise administer the province through an effective military occupation further polarized the two ethnic populations.

The conflict remained frozen throughout the 1990s, partly

because of a balance of fear on both sides, especially during the war in Bosnia. Kosovo has been commonly viewed as the most dangerous flash point in the region because conflict there could easily destabilize neighboring Macedonia, which has a large Albanian minority. Such a development would threaten to ignite a general Balkan war. Other stabilizing factors jeopardized by the violent turn in Kosovo include the extraordinary "parallel" administration through which Kosovar Albanians, funded from Albanians abroad, organized education, health, and other facilities, as well as the peaceful strategy for independence promoted by Kosovar Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova.

Kosovar Albanian frustration reached a critical point after the failure to obtain concrete improvements from the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war in Bosnia. The social destabilization in the neighboring country of Albania, coupled with the end of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, made a large stock of small arms readily available to the UCK. From its earliest actions against Serb police in spring 1996, the UCK increased its ambitions, ultimately establishing some control over substantial portions of the province.

In early June 1998, the Contact Group held an emergency meeting in London, where it made several demands on both sides in the conflict and tried to open peace talks. As in Bosnia, however, lack of a clear political solution and the absence of any credible threat from the international community opened the way for violent confrontation. While the international community pressed for some form of restored autonomy for Kosovo, Albanians there said this would be meaningless without real democratization in Serbia.

Anthony Borden is co-director of the Institute for Journalism in Transition; editor of its magazine, Transitions; and former editor of War Report.

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SOMALIA

BY KEN MENKHAUS

Seven years after the January 1991 overthrow of Siad Barre, armed conflict and humanitarian crises still plague much of Somalia. Despite numerous diplomatic initiatives, a central state has yet to be re-established, leaving the country in varying degrees of anarchy.

In 1991-92, factional warfare over control of the government, key cities, agricultural zones, and humanitarian relief supplies devastated southern Somalia. That conflict initially pitted the Somalia National Alliance (SNA), led by Gen. Mohammed Farah Aideed, against a loose coalition nominally headed by Ali Mahdi of the United Somali Congress.

Warfare between the two alliances destroyed most of the capital of Mogadishu and triggered a massive famine in the agricultural zones of southern Somalia, where an estimated 300,000 Somalis died.

To end the crisis, 37,000 multinational troops were deployed in the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from December 1992 to May 1993. Its successor, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), was given an expansive mandate to facilitate national reconciliation, reconstruction, and disarmament. Despite a national peace accord signed in March 1993 and dozens of subsequent peace initiatives, the U.N. operation was derailed by fighting with Aideed's militia and withdrew in March 1995. It left behind a country still divided and without a central government.

Since the U.N. withdrawal, both political authority and armed conflict in Somalia have become increasingly fragmented and localized. Political factions have simultaneously grown more numerous and more feeble, exhibiting little capacity to administer communities they claim to represent. Most day-to-day political authority in southern Somalia has devolved to village and neighborhood community leaders. By

contrast, in the northeast, a capable regional authority has been established; in the northwest, the secessionist state of "Somaliland" has declared independence from the rest of the country but has yet to gain recognition.

Armed conflict persists in southern Somalia but is more localized than in 1991-92, involving deadly feuds within rather than between major clans. In Mogadishu, the main seaport and airport remain closed due to sporadic but heavy fighting between militias formerly allied in the now badly splintered SNA. Gen. Aideed was killed in combat in August 1996, and his 33-year-old son, Hussein Aideed,

replaced him. In 1998, fierce interclan fighting struck the southern port city of Kismaayo, and sporadic skirmishes plagued the Baidoa area and the Gedo region.

Neighboring states in the Horn of Africa have led efforts to promote national reconciliation since 1997, but these efforts have worked at cross-purposes because of regional rivalries. The Ethiopian-sponsored Sodere conference in January 1997, the Kenya-brokered tripartite agreement, and the Cairo peace conference in December 1997 all failed

to create a governing body for Somalia, which continues to operate without a central government.

Ken Menkhaus is an associate professor of political science at Davidson College and served in 1993-94 as special political advisor to the U.N. Operation in Somalia.

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UNITED KINGDOM (NORTHERN IRELAND)

BY KIMBERLY COWELL

Eighteen months of talks between political parties in Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments resulted in a comprehensive peace accord known as the Good Friday Agreement on April 10, 1998. The Agreement offers the outline of a constitutional settlement, bridging the competing claims of Irish nationalists, who seek to unify the island of Ireland, and unionists, who want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. Approved by simultaneous referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on May 22, the Agreement will be implemented over the next two years.

Since the 1960s, conflict between the Roman Catholic nationalist minority and Protestant unionists in Northern Ireland has claimed approximately 3,200 lives and injured 30,000 persons. The "Troubles"—a euphemism for political conflict—emerged out of a civil rights campaign that met with violent resistance from militant Protestants. Out of these clashes, both sides developed paramilitary organizations. Following a particularly violent period, the British government dissolved the Northern Ireland Parliament and government in 1972. The British Parliament in Westminster has governed the province ever since.

Changes in the context of the conflict fueled the process that culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. In 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement legitimized the interests of the Irish government in Northern Irish affairs. Cooperation between the two governments continued with the Joint Declaration of 1993 and the Frameworks Document of 1995, which outlined a potential settlement. The Clinton administration's controversial decision to issue a visa to Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams in 1994 encouraged the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to declare a cease-fire in August. This cessation was complemented by an October loyalist cease-fire that remained in effect despite more IRA violence in February 1996.

A new coalition dominated by Fianna Fáil (Ireland's largest party), led by Bertie Ahern, and a new British Labour government, led by Tony Blair, combined to place a high priority on resolving the Northern Ireland crisis. With the encouragement of John Hume's Social Democratic and Labour Party, the mainstream nationalist party in Northern Ireland, the two governments stipulated the conditions for Sinn Fein's participation in multiparty peace talks. The IRA declared a new cease-fire in July 1997, and Sinn Fein entered the substantive phase of the talks process in September alongside seven other parties, including political representatives of loyalist paramili-

taries. The Democratic Unionist Party and the U.K. Unionist Party boycotted this phase. Former U.S. Sen. George Mitchell chaired the talks with assistance from Canadian Gen. John de Chastelain and former Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri.

The Good Friday agreement calls for establishing a new Northern Ireland Assembly elected through proportional representation, north-south institutions to encourage and channel cooperation, and a Council of the British Isles. Neither com-

munity is completely satisfied with all aspects of the Agreement. It remains to be seen how the issues of decommissioning weapons and reintegrating former paramilitaries will be settled, how the questions of marches and parades will be resolved, and how the political parties will perform with the new burdens of self-sovereignty.

Dr. Kimberly Cowell, a specialist on Northern Ireland, teaches in the Government Department at American University and is a research assistant at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C.

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OSCE CHALLENGES IN BOSNIA

BY ROBERT FROWICK

Amb. Robert Frowick was called out of retirement to serve as the U.S. representative on the OSCE Task Force and Washington's candidate to become Head of Mission in Sarajevo. Here, he provides a firsthand account of the challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina after its four-year civil war.

The Contact Group negotiators of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought an end to fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, asked the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to assume responsibilities for conflict resolution that were unprecedented in OSCE history.¹ Tasks included supervising the preparation and conduct of “free and fair and democratic elections” six to nine months after the Peace Agreement signing, stimulating democratization and strengthening respect for human rights, and fostering negotiations on and implementation of military stabilization measures.

CONCEIVING A FRAMEWORK

Anticipating a peace agreement, in fall 1995 Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, as OSCE chairman-in-office, established a Task Force in Vienna at the OSCE Secretariat to plan an appropriate mission in Sarajevo. Our Task Force first visited Sarajevo in November, immediately after initialing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. I was stunned by the destruction in Bosnia and vowed to do everything possible within OSCE to help overcome this catastrophe.

It soon became clear that elections were pivotal for at least two reasons. First, they represented the exit strategy for American troops assigned to an initial 60,000-strong military Implementation Force (IFOR), slated to leave Bosnia before the end of 1996. Second, they were the mechanism for replacing nationalistic wartime leadership with a new political structure determined by the citizenry.

To help prepare for elections, a distinguished international team of experts led by Ron Gould of Elections Canada consulted with the Task Force in December, made field trips to Bosnia, and presented a detailed report with recommendations in late January 1996. OSCE closely followed the

experts' script throughout the voting process. Also helpful was an informal meeting of elections experts in Stockholm in mid-January (attended by a Carter Center representative).

Throughout the electoral process, mission leaders were involved in negotiations in Bosnia and consultations with the Contact Group, the Peace Implementation Council, the North Atlantic Council, U.N. agencies, and many others. The Peace Agreement called for installation of a High Representative in Sarajevo to oversee civil aspects of the peace process. Under the aegis of the High Representative, OSCE would work alongside U.N. agencies and others to monitor and report on human rights issues.

The Agreement singled out OSCE to “assist the Parties”—the central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Muslim and Croat-dominated entity), and the Republika Srpska (the Serbian-dominated entity). It called for establishing freedom of expression, association, and movement as well as providing a politically neutral environment. It was unrealistic to expect democratic political conditions prior to holding elections. Instead, I endeavored early on to create a democratization strategy to reach them.

to reach them.

To meet its military stabilization requirements, OSCE quickly convened a preparatory session and then launched negotiations on Jan. 26 in Vienna that led to an Agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures. Subsequent



¹The OSCE was created in the early 1970s as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). With 55 participating states, the CSCE was an instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe. The Contact Group was formed in 1993 with representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia charged with seeking peace in Bosnia.

negotiations produced agreement on "Sub-Regional Arms Control" by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (made up of Serbia and Montenegro). The latter accord was signed June 14 at a "Mid-Term Assessment Meeting" in Florence, Italy.

BUILDING A MISSION

Although the Mission Task Force visited Sarajevo on Nov. 24, 1995, we could not deploy our advance OSCE team in Bosnia until late December. Trans-atlantic tensions emanating from the tough negotiations at Dayton caused delays in deciding the mission leadership. Finally, after the actual signing of the Peace Agreement at the Paris summit, I was named Head of Mission and arrived in Sarajevo on Dec. 29 to stay for the duration. Within five months we rapidly built up a staff of 400 OSCE, IFOR, and European Community Monitor Mission officers in addition to some 400-500 locally hired personnel.

Operations were not always easy, given the diversity of individuals from the 54 OSCE states. Overall, we shaped an effective operation, with a large head office in Sarajevo, six regional centers, and 24 field offices. We also created the Provisional Election Commission, the Election Appeals Sub-Commission to enforce compliance with voting regulations, the Media Experts Commission, Military Liaison Missions, and other authoritative institutions. Thus, by June 1996, I thought we could meet our electoral responsibilities despite many continuing interethnic struggles.

CONDUCTING ELECTIONS

At Florence, it fell to me to recommend whether to go forward with elections in face of serious human rights violations. I wanted to wait a few more weeks before deciding to give our proactive democratization initiatives more time to take hold. Strategic imperatives led to a high-level consensus that an all-out effort should be made to hold elections within the time frame designated by the Dayton agreement.

It seemed essential that the voting should take place while IFOR was still at full strength. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and others emphasized their strong support for the elections and their desire that deadlines be met. After



Armored vehicles from the initial 60,000-person multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia stand amid the ruins near Brcko in summer 1996. IFOR was replaced by a substantially reduced Stabilization Force (SFOR) later that year and continues to keep peace in Bosnia.

Kirk Wolcott

consulting with key ministers, including U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, I decided to make a positive recommendation. Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti, the 1996 OSCE chairman-in-office, then had to certify OSCE's acceptance of the recommendation.

Cotti and I were especially concerned about the status of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who still held public office despite his indictment for war crimes. This action violated the Peace Agreement. The High Representative, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, took steps to strip Karadzic of his powers.

I thought that Karadzic also should relinquish his post as president of the ruling Serb party, the Serbian Democratic Union (SDS). Some key European colleagues feared my position might lead to an SDS boycott of the elections, depriving them of meaning and undermining the entire peace process.

However, I refused to alter course and argued that the elections could not be justified with a war crimes indictee heading one of the main political parties of the country. I took my views to an OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Stockholm, a Contact Group session in London, and bilateral talks with President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in Moscow.

In my judgment, the question needed to be resolved before the election campaign. At the 11th hour, U.S. Under-Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke met with Serb leaders in Belgrade and



Kirk Wolcott

By summer 1998, nearly three years after fighting ended in Bosnia, this bombed out bridge in Mostar had been repaired but continued to divide the city between its Muslim and Croat inhabitants.

hammered out an agreement that Karadzic would remove himself completely from public life. On July 19, 1996, the election campaign consequently began with a boost to its integrity. This episode reflected a constant struggle to find an acceptable balance between integrity and momentum.

The Dayton Agreement stipulated seven levels of elections, and daily judgments had to be made to ensure integrity and momentum in the process. By late August, we decided that municipal elections would not be feasible, owing to insuperable problems. Postponing them, in fact, greatly cleared the air for all the remaining elections, which took place effectively and without violence on Sept. 14—exactly nine months after the signing of the Peace Agreement.

Timing of municipal balloting then became highly contentious. In general, American officials wanted to hold them as soon as possible, while the European Union preferred to allow maximum time for preparation. Early in the debate, IFOR was succeeded at the end of 1996 by a substantially reduced Stabilization Force (SFOR) of 30,000 troops, with an 18-month mandate. Finally, agreement was reached on holding municipal elections Sept. 13-14, 1997.

The electoral process proved difficult, since the war had centered on several key cities and towns—Sarajevo, Mostar,

Brcko, Bihac, and Srebrenica, to name a few. The political struggle remained intense over these strategically sensitive locations. Careful diplomatic navigating, including calls on Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman of Croatia, at last led to another round of violence-free elections in September.


Most significantly, an internal political crisis arose in summer 1997, before the municipal elections, when new Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic, based in Banja Luka, challenged the autocratic authority of SDS leaders in the war-time Bosnian Serb capital of Pale. Plavsic dissolved the Srpska National Assembly and asked the OSCE to supervise election of a new Assembly. I strongly sympathized with her efforts to fight corruption and to accept the compromises negotiated at Dayton. But I could not commit OSCE to active support for Plavsic. The OSCE Permanent Council, representing all 54 participating States, had to decide on such support.

After several weeks of internal and international debate, elections in the Serb Republic were held Nov. 22-23, 1997. Plavsic shocked the SDS leadership by defeating it and creating a new interethnic coalition committed to working together in the spirit of the Dayton Agreement. Her courageous gambit represented a breakthrough in the peace process. [Note: In September 1998, Plavsic lost the presidency, when she was upset by hard-line nationalist Nikola Poplasen. The West viewed his election as a major setback to the Bosnian peace process.]

LESSONS LEARNED

The extraordinary experiences of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina point to several key lessons learned. First, goals and strategies must be clearly and realistically conceptualized, then resolutely pursued. Second, the international community must establish and maintain civil and military teamwork. Third, a rule of reason must prevail in maintaining an acceptable balance between the integrity and momentum of the peace process. Fourth, and above all, there must be a determined will to enforce agreements and stay the course until goals are achieved.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



AFRICA

Angola-MONUA

1. United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
July 1997-to present
2. Central African Republic-MINURCA
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
April 1998-to present
3. Sierra Leone-UNOMSIL
United Nations Mission of Observers in Sierra Leone
July 1998-to present
4. Western Sahara-MINURSO
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
April 1991-to present

AMERICAS

5. Haiti-MIPONUH
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
December 1997-to present

ASIA

6. India/Pakistan-UNMOGIP
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
January 1949-to present
7. Tajikistan-UNMOT
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
December 1994-to present

EUROPE

8. Bosnia and Herzegovina-UNMIBH
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
December 1995-to present

9. Croatia-UNMOP

United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
January 1996-to present

10. Croatia-UNCPSG

United Nations Civilian Police Support Group
January 1998-to present

11. Cyprus-UNFICYP

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
March 1964-to present

12. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia-UNPREDEP

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
March 1995-to present

13. Georgia-UNOMIG

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
August 1993-to present

MIDDLE EAST

14. Golan Heights-UNDOF

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
June 1974-to present

15. Iraq/Kuwait-UNIKOM

United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
April 1991-to present

16. Lebanon-UNIFIL

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
March 1978-to present

17. Middle East-UNTSO

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
June 1948-to present

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING: A KEY TO CONFLICT PREVENTION

BY KARIN RYAN

Karin Ryan is vice chair of The Carter Center's Human Rights Committee and assistant director of the Conflict Resolution Program. In May 1998, she coordinated The Carter Center's consultation with the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, which addressed the need to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations' human rights investigative mechanisms.

When examining the state of violent conflict throughout the world, it also is important to examine general methods for preventing the escalation of these armed conflicts. Much has been written about the necessity of early warning mechanisms to prevent conflicts from escalating.

Given that many recent armed conflicts have escalated despite adequate early warnings, it is essential to find ways to compel the international community to act before the rising violence occurs. Such action requires political will, which is most successfully generated when public opinion supports strong measures.

Human rights reporting is an effective way to determine where societal tensions may escalate into armed violence, as today's human rights violations often create tomorrow's conflicts. Not only does human rights work serve as a potent early warning tool, it also acts as an important lever to influence public opinion.

Over the last several decades, human rights reporting has become a successful device for generating public outrage over persistent violations. Exposing the human costs of oppressive policies is effective because people can relate to the suffering of other human beings. It was just this kind of reporting that

brought home the brutality of South African apartheid, leading to a massive international campaign to abolish that country's racist policies. Nongovernmental organizations have become a powerful force through their reporting, as governments do not want to be labeled as human rights violators.

Creation of reporting mechanisms within the U.N. human

rights program is another significant development. These "Special Mechanisms" include Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups, which are mandated by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to investigate specific human rights concerns. These investigations are undertaken in a specific country or on a thematic or global basis. Special Mechanisms offer tremendous promise toward developing U.N. capacity to respond quickly to emerging human rights problems.

The case of Rwanda offers a good example of how human rights monitoring and reporting could help prevent armed conflict. In 1993, U.N. Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly N'Diaye of Senegal conducted a fact-finding mission to Rwanda under a mandate of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). In his report to the

UNCHR, N'Diaye stated that genocidal killings were increasing and that some modest actions by the international community could prevent a further escalation of violence.



Little international outrage was generated when a human rights investigator was replaced at the government's request in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire). Here, rebels prepare in August 1998 for fighting that might have been avoided.

Reuters

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The report was ignored, however, because the United Nations had no reliable system of distributing such information, let alone taking action. Nine months later, the events now familiar to the international community unfolded: More than 500,000 Rwandans were massacred, and a cycle of violence was triggered that continues to wrack the entire Great Lakes region of Central Africa. If the U.N. Security Council had reviewed N'Diaye's report and taken specific measures, the recent history of Rwanda and its neighbors might not have been so tragic.

Another clear example comes from Iraq, whose government led the charge in extrajudicial killings and a host of other human rights violations in the years prior to the Gulf War. In 1988, the Iraqi government-sponsored massacre of thousands of its Kurdish minority population became the subject of confidential negotiations at the UNCHR. Instead of a public rebuke, nations opted for a quiet strategy toward Baghdad. It is hardly surprising that a state willing to commit such atrocities would eventually pose a threat to international peace and security, as Iraq did with its invasion of Kuwait.

Human rights and other activities remain seriously underfunded, receiving just 1.7 percent of the U.N. annual budget. Also worrisome are efforts by some governments to weaken

THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Established in 1994 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, the International Human Rights Council (IHRC) is based at The Carter Center and serves as a forum for leaders in the field to develop key initiatives in the human rights movement. These include strengthening U.N. human rights mechanisms, promoting human rights principles in the business community, and addressing human rights in aspects of democratization, development, and peacemaking. In March 1998, the IHRC and INN issued a joint letter offering assistance to U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson in her effort to help restore human rights in violence-plagued Algeria.

investigators' impact by pressing for restrictions on their work. Such actions turn investigators into government tools rather than honest and visible reporters. For instance, little outrage was generated when a human rights investigator in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) was replaced at that government's request.

Those truly concerned with conflict prevention should join in common cause with human rights organizations at the international and local level to ensure that honest human rights reporting is conducted within and outside the U.N. system and is done so without government interference. Perhaps in this way, tomorrow's wars can more effectively be spotted and even prevented before they erupt.

IS CONFLICT INHERENT?

BY WILLIAM URY

William Ury is an INN member and director of the Project on Preventing War for the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. He is co-author with Roger Fisher of Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Houghton Mifflin, 1991) and the author of Getting Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People (Bantam Books, 1991) and several other books and articles on conflict resolution.

Imagine your child, grandchild, or younger sibling asking you: "Is peace possible in my lifetime?" Most people I know would take one look at the television screen and the history books and answer something like: "Peace would be a wonderful thing. It may even be necessary to our long-term survival. Unfortunately, it is just not possible. War is human nature. Peace is a pipe dream."

This pessimism comes from the story people tell themselves and their children about human conflict, a story deeply embedded in the prevailing way of thinking. The story goes that humans have been making war since the beginning of time. Human nature is violent. Our past is brutish. Only recently have we acquired a veneer of civilization, but it is thin and fragile. Scratch the surface and you will find a Bosnia or a Rwanda, or the latest atrocity on the television screen. Humans regress all too easily to their violent, blood-thirsty nature.

This story is repeated over and over in one form or another by parents, teachers, textbooks, and the media. Some of our best thinkers have put forward one version or another. Thomas Hobbes declared that humans living in the state of nature before civilization and the state were involved "in a war of all against all." Sigmund Freud suggested the existence of destructive, aggressive instinct and believed that it lay at the root of war.

One need not turn to theorists for validation, however. History usually is presented as the story of one war after another. Newspapers and television screens are full of the latest acts of human cruelty—massacres, bombings, and terrorist attacks. The story of human violence is confirmed every day.

Views of the past influence actions in the present. The impulse to stop the carnage in Bosnia or Rwanda is deflected by the refrain: "But these people have been fighting for centuries and centuries." The implication is they will go on fighting for centuries and therefore there is nothing we can do.

This pessimism is insidiously self-confirming. As long as we saddle ourselves with a fatalistic story about human conflict, as long as we believe it is impossible to achieve peace, we will never make the effort.

The conventional picture of human beings and violence has validity, but it misses one fundamental point: Humans

spend more of their time engaged in peaceful activities than violent ones. Think of human interactions around the world; the majority are peaceful. People spend most of their time making a living, parenting, eating and talking together, shopping, playing sports, watching television, attending religious services, or pursuing love. The overwhelming majority of relationships among nation-states, groups, and individuals are characterized by peace, not violence.



Members of an elite Cambodian military unit stand at attention during a military parade in the capitol city of Phnom Penh.

Reuters

In the world at any one time, serious conflicts exist along with less serious disputes, situations where groups and nations find themselves at loggerheads—over control of the government, territorial boundaries, economic resources, and other issues. The United States quarrels with Canada over valuable fishing rights. Argentina and Chile dispute their territorial boundary in the Andes. The Lombard League declares northern Italy to be an independent state, free of control from Rome. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia all lay claim to the same islands and the oil that may lie underneath the sea around them. In all these situations, positions become entrenched. Yet the great majority of these conflicts, probably well over 90 percent, are handled without violence or warfare.

It is time to stop thinking of peaceful coexistence as merely a vision. Peace is not a vision. It is a reality. For most human beings, peaceful coexistence is the normal condition. War and violence are the exception.

If human beings are innately warlike, why do people not kill each other more than they do? All the police in the world cannot keep people from doing what comes naturally. If war is the natural state, why do most conflicts not end in violence? How can human societies live peacefully and coexist nonviolently with their neighbors for long periods of time?

Seeing human history as peaceful conflict resolution interrupted by war transforms the challenge from one of ending war to extending peace. The questions become: What conditions make peaceful coexistence easier to create and sustain? What mechanisms are effective in preventing conflict? Who can make peace, keep peace, and keep on keeping peace?

Reframing the story reframes the challenge. Transforming war into peace is not changing one absolute into another but rather a journey along a continuum. The challenge is formidable, of course. But war—broadly defined as organized violence—is no more deep-rooted as a social institution than was slavery. The 18th century philosopher Voltaire expressed the widespread beliefs of his time when he pronounced that “slavery is as ancient as war and war as human nature.” Slavery was believed to be immutable, yet within a century, it was banished from most of the planet. If this can happen to slavery, why can it not happen to war?

IS PEACE NATURAL?

BY FRANS B.M. DE WAAL

In the period after World War II, biologists were obsessed with the origins of aggression. Konrad Lorenz, the Austrian Nobel Prize winner, wrote *On Aggression*, an extremely influential book about the aggressive instinct in animals and humans. His message was amplified by popularizers such as Robert Ardrey, Desmond Morris, and others.

In response, social psychologists designed experiments, such as the infamous “Eichmann experiment,” in which subjects obey instructions to deliver high-voltage shocks to other human beings. The point of these studies was to counter the biological argument and to show there is a social and learning component to aggressive behavior.

Overlooked in those days were the natural checks and balances on aggression and conflict. In my studies of chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates, I observed individuals kiss and embrace after a fight, or groom their opponent, in a process that we now call reconciliation. The more we study this behavior—also in children and in nonprimates, such as dolphins and hyenas—the clearer it becomes that if aggression is an inborn response to particular situations (and I have no doubt that it is), mechanisms to maintain peace and to repair social relationships disturbed by aggression are just as inborn in species that depend on cooperation. *Homo sapiens* clearly is such a species.

Dr. Frans B.M. de Waal is a professor of psychology and director of the Living Links Center at Emory University, part of the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center. His recent books include Good Natured (Harvard University Press, 1996), and Bonobo: The Forgotten Ape (University of California Press, 1997). He also serves as a faculty liaison for the Conflict Resolution Program at The Carter Center.

War, Clausewitz once intoned, is a duel. Once rooted in many cultures as the honorable way for men to resolve personal disputes, dueling is now a relic of the past. From cannibalism to the divine right of kings, from human sacrifice to trial by combat, human history is littered with ways of relating to one another. Each was believed in their time to be fixed in the very order of things, and each is now relegated to the history books. Is it not conceivable that the deadly habit of war could follow the same path?

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Zartman, I. William, and J. Lewis Rasmussen. *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997.

Selected Journals

Crosslines Global Report

Foreign Affairs

Foreign Policy

Foreign Policy Bulletin

Global Governance

International Journal of Conflict Management

International Negotiation

International Peacekeeping

International Political Science Review

International Studies

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Journal of Peace Research

Journal of World Affairs

Medicine, Conflict, and Survival

Negotiation Journal

Peace & Change

Political Psychology

Political Science Review

Security Dialogue

Track Two

ACADEMIC PROGRAMS

Several colleges and universities around the world provide certificate, undergraduate (U), and/or graduate (G) programs in conflict resolution or peace studies. All World Wide Web sites begin with <http://>.

ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND OCEANIA

Australian National University, Research School of Pacific Studies (Canberra, Australia) - G

Phone: (61) 6-259-3098; Web site: coombs.anu.edu.au/RSPAS/

Jawaharlal Nehru University, School of International Studies (New Delhi, India), Center for International Politics, Organization, and Disarmament - G

Phone: (11) 667-676; Web site: www.nyu.edu/jnu/sch3.htm

Macquarie University, Centre for Conflict Resolution (Sydney, Australia) - G

Phone: (61) 2-850-9963

Web site: www.gsm.mq.edu.au/conflict/homepage.htm

The United Nations University (Tokyo, Japan)

Phone: (3) 3499-2811; Web site: www.ias.unu.edu/

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

Universidad de los Andes, Programa ANPAZ (Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombia) - G

Phone: (57) 352-0466; Web site: www.uniandes.edu.co/

Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, International Relations and Peace Research Institute (Guatemala City, Guatemala) - G

Phone: (502) 760-790; Web site: www.usac.edu.gt/

University for Peace (San Jose, Costa Rica) - G

Phone: (506) 2-49-10-72

Web site: www.centralplaza.net/upaz/english.html

EUROPE

European University Center for Peace Studies

(Stadtschlaining, Austria) - G

Phone: (43) 3355 2498

Web site: www.aspr.ac.at/welcome.htm

Goteborg University (Goteborg, Sweden) - U/G

Phone: (31) 773 14 28; Web site: www.padrigu.gu.se/

Irish School of Ecumenics, Center for Peace Studies (Dublin, Ireland) - U/G

Phone: (353) 1260 1144; Web site: www2.tcd.ie/Senior.Lecturer/Courses/sch_ecum/isempeac.html

Lancaster University, Richardson Institute for Peace Research (Lancaster, UK) - U/G

Phone: (44) 0524 594266

Web site: www.lancs.ac.uk/users/richinst/riweb1.htm

London School of Economics, Department of International Relations (London, UK) - U/G

Phone: (44) 171 405 7686

Web site: www.lse.ac.uk/depts/intrel/

University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies (Bradford, UK) - U/G

Phone: (44) 1274 235235; Web site: www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/home.html

University of Kent, Graduate School of Politics and International Relations (Canterbury, UK) - G

Phone: (44) 1227 764000, ext. 7530

University of Limerick, Centre for Peace and Development Studies (Limerick, Ireland) - G

Phone: (353) 61 202633; Web site: www.ul.ie/~ipirc/

Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research (Uppsala, Sweden) - U/G

Phone: (460) 18471 2500; Web site: www.peace.uu.se/

NORTH AMERICA

University of Akron, Center for Peace Studies

(Akron, Ohio) - G

Phone: (330) 972-6513; Web site: www.uakron.edu

The American University, School of International Service, International Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Program (Washington, DC) - U/G

Phone: (202) 885-1622; Web site: www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/peace/

Antioch University, Conflict Resolution Program (Yellow Springs, OH) - U/G

Phone: (513) 767-6321; Web site: www.antioch.edu

Ball State University, Center for Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution (Muncie, IN) - U

Phone: (765) 285-8739

Web site: www.bsu.edu/csh/history/program/id1.htm

California State University, Fresno, Peace and Conflict Studies (Fresno, CA) - U

Phone: (209) 278-3013; Web site: www-catalog.admin.csufresno.edu/current/peace.html

University of California at Berkeley, Peace and Conflict Studies (Berkeley, CA) - U

Phone: (510) 642-4466

Web site: www.ias.berkeley.edu/iastp/pac.htm

University of California at Irvine, Global Peace and Conflict Studies (Irvine, CA) - U

Phone: (714) 824-6410; **Web site:** hypatia.ss.uci.edu/gpacs/

University of California at Santa Barbara, Global Peace and Security Studies (Santa Barbara, CA) - U

Phone: (805) 893-4718; **Web site:** www.gps.ucsb.edu/

Carleton University, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Ottawa, Ontario) - G

Phone: (613) 788-6655; **Web site:** www.carleton.ca/npsia/

Colgate University, Peace Studies Program (Hamilton, NY) - U

Phone: (315) 824-7806; **Web site:** departments.colgate.edu/peacestudies/default.htm

Conrad Grebel College, University of Waterloo Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (Waterloo, Ontario) - U

Phone: (519) 885-0220, ext. 261; **Web site:** watserv1.uwaterloo.ca:80/~ipacs2/

Cornell University, Peace Studies Program (Ithaca, NY) - U/G

Phone: (607) 256-6484; **Web site:** www.einaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/

University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies (Denver, CO) - G

Phone: (303) 871-2989 ext. 2539; **Web site:** www.du.edu/gsis/

Earlham College, Peace and Global Studies Program (Richmond, VA) - U/G

Phone: (317) 983-1305; **Web site:** www.earlham.edu/

Eastern Mennonite University, Institute for Conflict Studies and Peacebuilding (Harrisonburg, VA) - U

Phone: (703) 432-4450

Web site: www.emu.edu/units/ctp/ctp.htm

Fresno Pacific University, Center for Peacemaking and Conflict Studies (Fresno, CA) - G

Phone: (209) 455-5847; **Web site:** www.fresno.edu/pacs

George Mason University, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (Fairfax, VA) - U/G

Phone: (703) 993-1300

Web site: web.gmu.edu/departments/ICAR/

The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs (Washington, DC) - U/G

Phone: (202) 994-7050

Web site: www.gwu.edu/~elliott/grad_pr/index.html

Georgetown University, Justice and Peace Studies (Washington, DC) - U

Phone: (202) 687-4531

Web site: www.georgetown.edu/departments/pjp/

Georgetown University, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Washington, DC) - G

Phone: (202) 687-5696

Web site: sfswww.georgetown.edu/sfs/

Hampshire College, Peace and World Security Studies (Amherst, MA) - U

Phone: (413) 582-5523; **Web site:** hamp.hampshire.edu/~pawss/

University of Hawaii, Program on Conflict Resolution (Honolulu, HI) - U

Phone: (808) 956-8984; **Web site:** www2.hawaii.edu/uhip/

University of Idaho, Martin Institute for Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution (Moscow, ID) - U

Phone: (208) 885-6527; **Web site:** www.martin.uidaho.edu

Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (Baltimore, MD) - G

Phone: (202) 663-5700; **Web site:** www.sais-jhu.edu/

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Program on Modeling for Negotiation Management (Cambridge, MA) - G

Phone: (617) 253-2659

Web site: www.clark.net/pub/diplonet/PMNM.html

University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (South Bend, IN) - U/G

Phone: (219) 239-2970; **Web site:** www.nd.edu:80/~krocinst/

Nova Southeastern University, Department of Dispute Resolution (Fort Lauderdale, FL) - G

Phone: (954) 262-7300; **Web site:** www.nova.edu/cwis/

University of Pennsylvania, Conflict Analysis and Peace Science (Philadelphia, PA) - U

Phone: (215) 898-8412; **Web site:** www.upenn.edu

Tufts University, Peace and Justice Studies Program (Medford, MA) - U

Phone: (617) 627-2261; **Web site:** www.jumbohub.com/pjs/

Wayne State University, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (Detroit, MI) - U

Phone: (313) 577-3453; **Web site:** www.pcs.wayne.edu/

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The following international organizations focus on governance, democratization, development, diplomatic relations, economics, human rights, peace, and security. Member nations of these organizations often are involved in the prevention, management, and resolution of armed conflicts. All World Wide Web addresses begin with <http://>.

African Development Bank (ADB)

Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire; **Phone:** (225) 20-4444

Web site: www.focusintl.com/whos0006.htm

President: Omar Kabbaj

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Jakarta, Indonesia; **Phone:** (6221) 726-2991

Web site: www.aseansec.org

Secretary-General: H.E. Rodolfo Certeza Severino Jr.

The Commonwealth of Nations (CW)

London, UK; **Phone:** (44-171) 839-3411

Web site: www.thecommonwealth.org

Secretary-General: Chief Emeka Anyaoku

Council of Europe

Strasbourg, France; **Phone:** (33 388) 41-2000

Web site: www.coe.fr

Secretary-General: Daniel Tarschys

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Lagos, Nigeria; **Phone:** (234-1) 260-0720

Web site: www.ecowas.com

Executive Secretary: Edouard Benjamin

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

London, UK; **Phone:** (44-171) 338-6000

Web site: www.ebrd.com

President: Charles Frank

European Union (EU)

Luxembourg; **Phone:** (35-2) 4300-22475

Web site: www.eu.int

President: José María Gil-Robles

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Washington, DC, USA; **Phone:** (202) 623-1000

Web site: www.iadb.org

President: Enrique V. Iglesias

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti; **Phone:** (253) 354-050

Web site: www.igad.org

Executive Secretary: H.E. President Daniel Arap Moi

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Vienna, Austria; **Phone:** (43) 1-2060-0

Web site: www.iaea.or.at

Director-General: Dr. Mohamed El Baradei

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Geneva, Switzerland; **Phone:** (41-22)734-60-01

Web site: www.icrc.org

President: Cornelio Sommaruga

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Washington, DC, USA; **Phone:** (202) 623-7000

Web site: www.imf.org

Managing Director: Michel Camdessus

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Geneva, Switzerland; **Phone:** (41-22) 717-9111

Web site: www.iom.org

Director-General: Ambassador Brunson McKinley

League of Arab States

Cairo, Egypt; **Phone:** (20-2) 750-511

Web site: haynese.winthrop.edu/index.html

Secretary-General: Dr. Ahmad Esmat Abdul-Maquid

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Brussels, Belgium; **Phone:** (32-2) 728-4111

Web site: www.nato.int

Secretary-General: Dr. Javier Solana

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Paris, France; **Phone:** (33-01) 4524-8200

Web site: www.oecd.org

Secretary-General: Donald J. Johnston

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Vienna, Austria; **Phone:** (43-1) 514-360

Web site: www.osceprag.cz

Secretary-General: Giancarlo Aragona

OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities

The Hague, The Netherlands; **Phone:** (31-070) 312-5500

Web site: www.osceprag.cz/inst/hcnm/hcnm1.htm

High Commissioner for National Minorities: Max Van der Stoel

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)

Vienna, Austria; **Phone:** (43-1) 514-36190

Web site: www.osceprag.cz/inst/odihr/odihr.htm

Director: Ambassador Gerard Stoudmann

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

The Hague, The Netherlands; **Phone:** (31-70) 416-330

Web site: www.opcw.nl

Director-General: José Maurício Bustani

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; **Phone:** (251-1) 51-7700

Web site: www.imf.org/external/np/sec/decdo/oau.htm

Secretary-General: Salim Ahmed Salim

Organization of American States (OAS)

Washington, DC, USA; **Phone:** (202) 458-3000

Web site: www.oas.org

Secretary-General: César Gaviria

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Vienna, Austria; **Phone:** (43-1) 211-120

Web site: www.opec.org

Secretary-General: H.E. Dr. Rilwanu Lukman

United Nations (U.N.)

New York, USA; **Phone:** (212) 963-1234

Web site: www.un.org

Secretary-General: Kofi Annan

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

New York, USA; **Phone:** (212) 326-7000

Web site: www.unicef.org

Secretary-General: Richard Jolly

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Geneva, Switzerland; **Phone:** (41-22) 798-5850

Web site: www.undp.org

Director-General: Alan Doss

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights

Geneva, Switzerland; **Phone:** (41-22) 917-3456

Web site: www.unhchr.ch

High Commissioner for Human Rights: Mary Robinson

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Geneva, Switzerland; **Phone:** (41-22) 739-8111

Web site: www.unhcr.ch

High Commissioner for Refugees: Sadako Ogata

Western European Union (WEU)

Brussels, Belgium; **Phone:** (32-2) 500-4455

Web site: www.weu.int

Secretary-General: José Cutiliero

World Bank Group

Washington, DC, USA; **Phone:** (202) 623-7000

Web site: www.worldbank.org

President: James D. Wolfensohn

World Health Organization (WHO)

Geneva, Switzerland; **Phone:** (41-22) 791-2111

Web site: www.who.ch

Director-General: Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima

World Trade Organization (WTO)

Geneva, Switzerland; **Phone:** (41-22) 739-5111

Web site: www.wto.org

Director-General: Renato Ruggiero

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The following list includes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the world involved in conflict prevention, management, and/or resolution. We recognize this list is not inclusive. In many cases, other relevant NGOs can be found through "links" on the World Wide Web. All Web addresses begin with <http://>.

African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

c/o University of Durban-Westville, Private Bag x54001, Durban, 4000, South Africa; **Phone:** (27-31) 820-2816
E-mail: info@accord.udw.ac.za; **Web site:** www.accord.org.za

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)

1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102 USA; **Phone:** (215) 241-7141; **E-mail:** afscid@igc.apc.org; **Web site:** www.afsc.org

Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management

Altensteinstrasse 48a, D-14195, Berlin, Germany
Phone: (49-30) 8-31-80-90/99
E-mail: berghof@ipn-b.comlink.apc.org

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

1779 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, DC 20036 USA; **Phone:** (202) 332-7900; **Fax:** (202) 332-1919
E-mail: pdc@carnegie.org; **Web site:** www.ccpdc.org

Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN)

11a, avenue de la Paix, CH-1202, Geneva, Switzerland
Phone: (41-22) 734-89-50
E-mail: freymond@hei.unige.ch

Center of Concern

3700 13th St. N.E., Washington, DC 20017 USA
Phone: (202) 635-2757; **E-mail:** jprender@vita.org

Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS)

Program on Preventive Diplomacy, 1800 K St. N.W., Suite 400, Washington, DC 20066 USA; **Phone:** (202) 775-3277
E-mail: webmaster@csis.org; **Web site:** www.csis.org

Center for War, Peace, and the News Media

New York University, 10 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003 USA; **Phone:** (212) 998-7960; **Fax:** (212) 995-4143
E-mail: marcusj@is2.nyu.edu

Centre for Conflict Resolution (CENCOR)

P.O. Box C385, Cantonments-Accra, Ghana
Phone: (233-21) 774192

Communications/Decisions/Results Associates (CDR)

100 Arapahoe Ave., Suite 12, Boulder, CO 80302 USA
Phone: (1-800) MEDiate, (303) 442-7367

Conciliation Resources (CR)

Lancaster House, 33 Islington St., London N1 9LH, United Kingdom; **Phone:** (44-171) 278-2588
Fax: (44-171) 837-0337; **E-Mail:** conciliation@gn.apc.org;
Web site: www.c-r.org

Conflict Management Group (CMG)

Harvard Negotiation Project, 20 University Road, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA; **Phone:** (617) 354-5444
E-mail: cmg@igc.apc.org; **Web site:** cmgonline.org

Conflict Partnership Center

2400 41st St. N.W., #100, Washington, DC 20007 USA
Phone: (202) 337-7574

Council on Foreign Relations—Center for Preventive Action (CPA)

58 East 68th St., New York, NY 10021 USA
Phone: (212) 734-0400
Web site: www.foreignrelations.org/programs/prevent.html

Global FUTURELINKS

2400 41st St. N.W., #100, Washington, DC 20007 USA
Phone: (202) 337-7574

Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE)

Aberfoyle House, Northland Road, Londonderry, BT4 7JA, United Kingdom; **Phone:** (44-1504) 37-5-00; **E-mail:** incore@incore.ulst.ac.uk; **Web site:** www.incore.ulst.ac.uk

Institute for International Mediation and Conflict Resolution (IIMCR)

2708 Cathedral Ave. N.W., Washington, DC 20008 USA
Phone: (202) 828-0721; **Fax:** (202) 462-6151
Web site: www.delve.com

Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD)

1819 H St. N.W., Suite 1200, Washington, DC 20006 USA
Phone: (202) 466-4605; **E-mail:** imtd@igc.apc.org
Web site: www.igc.apc.org/imtd

Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

Suite 1, Stellenryk Building, 526 16th Road, Halfway House 1685, South Africa; **Phone:** (27-11) 315-7096; **Fax:** (27-11) 315-7099; **E-mail:** iss.co.za; **Web site:** www.iss.co.za

Institute of World Affairs

1321 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E., Washington, DC 20003 USA

Phone: (202) 544-4141; **E-mail:** info@iwa.org

Web site: www.iwa.org

Inter-Africa Group

P.O. Box 1631, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; **Phone:** (251) 1-512-280

Interdisciplinary Research Program on Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM)

Department of Political Sciences, Leiden University,
Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands

Phone: (31-71) 527-3861; **Fax:** (31-71) 527-3788

Web site: www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/w3_liswo/pioom.htm

International Alert (IA)

1 Glyn St., London SE11 5HT, United Kingdom

Phone: (44-171) 793-8383; **E-mail:** intlalert@gn.apc.org

Web site: www.international-alert.org

International Centre for Humanitarian Reporting (ICHR)

11 avenue de Joli-Mont, CH-1209, Geneva, Switzerland

Phone: (41) 22-920-1676; **Fax:** (41) 22-920-1679

E-mail: info.ichr@itu.ch; **Web site:** www.ichr.org/

International Crisis Group (ICG)

26 rue des Minimes, 1er étage, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

Phone: (32)2-502-90-38; **Fax:** (32)2-502-50-38; **E-mail:** intercrisis

@compuserve.com; **Web site:** www.intl-crisis-group.org

International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR)

Spoorstraat 38, 1815 Bk Alkmaar, The Netherlands

Phone: (31-72) 512-3014; **E-mail:** office@ifor.ccmil.com-

puserve.com; **Web site:** www.gn.apc.org/ifor/iforinfo.htm

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Attn.

ISN, ETH Zentrum SEI, CH-8092, Zurich, Switzerland

Phone: (41-1) 1-632-19-42; **E-mail:** isn.sipo.reok.ethz.ch

Web site: www.isn.ethz.ch

International Peace Academy (IPA)

777 United Nations Plaza, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10017

USA; **Phone:** (212) 949-8480

E-mail: ipalan!ipapost!admin@ipaatt.attmail.com

Mennonite Central Committee

P.O. Box 500, Akron, PA 17501-0500 USA

Phone: (707) 859-1151; **Fax:** (717) 859-2171

E-mail: bh@mcc.org; **Web site:** www.mennotecc.ca

Minority Rights Group

379 Brixton Road, London SW9 7DE, United Kingdom

Phone: (44-171) 978-9498; **Web site:** www.minorityrights.org

Nairobi Peace Initiative

P.O. Box 14984, Nairobi, Kenya; **Phone:** (254) 2-441444

Fax: (254) 2-440097; **E-mail:** npi@users.africaonline.co.ke

Web site: www.iwa.org

Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Clingendael Institute)

Clingendael 7, P.O. Box 93080, 2597 VH The Hague, The

Netherlands; **Phone:** (31-70) 32-453-84

E-mail: info@clingendael.nl

Peace Brigades International

2642 College Ave., Berkeley, CA 94704 USA

Phone: (510) 540-0749; **Fax:** (510) 849-1247

E-mail: pbiusa@igc.apc.org; **Web site:** www.igc.apc.org/pbi

Peaceworkers

721 Shrader St., San Francisco, CA 94117 USA

Phone: (415) 751-0302; **E-mail:** peaceworkers@igc.apc.org

Web site: www.webco.com/peace/PEACTREE/
pworkers/homepage.html

Project Ploughshares

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel

College, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G6

Phone: (519) 888-6541; **E-mail:** plough@watserv1.uwaterloo.ca

Web site: watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough

Rotary International

Conflict Resolution, c/o Michael Shaw, 833 Rice St.,

Highland Park, IL 60035 USA; **Phone:** (708) 432-0950

Web site: www.rotary.org

Saferworld

33-34 Alfred Place, London SW1E 7DP, United Kingdom

Phone: (44-171) 580-8886; **E-mail:** Sworld@gn.apc.org

Web site: www.gn.apc.org/sworld

Search for Common Ground (SCG)

1601 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 200, Washington, DC

20009 USA; **Phone:** (202) 265-4300

E-mail: search@sfcg.org; **Web site:** www.sfcg.org

Synergies Africa

5, route des Morillons, B.P. 2100, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland

Phone: (41 22) 788-85-86; **Fax:** (41 22) 788-85-90

E-mail: wspinfo@unrisd.org; **Web site:** unrisd.org

United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

1550 M St. N.W., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20005-1708

USA; **Phone:** (202) 457-1700; **E-mail:** usip_requests@usip.org

Web site: www.usip.org

Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO)

Office of the Secretary-General, Javastraat 40A, 2583 AP

The Hague, The Netherlands; **Phone:** (31-70) 360-3318

ASSOCIATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Listed below are several conflict resolution organizations that provide information, referrals, and literature on mediation, negotiation, and arbitration training and practice. All World Wide Web addresses begin with <http://>.

Academy of Family Mediators

5 Militia Drive, Lexington, MA 02173 USA
Phone: (781) 674-2663; Fax: (781) 674-2690
E-mail: afmoffice@igc.apc.org; Web site: www.igc.org/afm

The American Arbitration Association

1150 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Floor 6, Washington, DC 20036-4104 USA; Phone: (202) 296-8510; Fax: (202) 872-9574; E-mail: usadrSGG@arbcom; Web site: www.adr.org

The American Bar Association—Section of Resolution

740 15th St. N.W., Washington, DC 20005-1000 USA
Phone: (202) 662-1680; Fax: (202) 662-1683
E-mail: dispute@abanet.org; Web site: www.abanet.org

Conflict Resolution Center International Inc.

204 37th St., Pittsburgh, PA 15201-1806 USA
Phone: (412) 687-6210; Fax: (412) 687-6232
E-mail: crcii@conflictnet.org
Web site: www.ConflictRes.org/crcii

The Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development (COPRED)

George Mason University, 4400 University, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA; Phone: (202) 273-4485
E-mail: copred@igc.apc.org; Web site: www.igc.apc.org

Council of Better Business Bureaus

4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 800, Arlington, VA 22203-1804 USA; Phone: (800) 537-4600; Fax: (703) 532-8277
Web site: www.bbb.org

Educators for Social Responsibility

23 Garden St., Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Phone: (617) 492-1764; Fax: (617) 864-5164
Web site: www.benjerry.com

The Foundation for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict (PERC)

75 East 55th St., New York, NY 10022 USA
Phone: (212) 421-0771; Fax: (212) 856-7814
Web site: www2.conflictresolution.org/perc/index/html

Institute for Global Communications: Conflictnet

6741 Eastern Ave., Suite 200, Takoma Park, MD 20912 USA
Phone: (202) 588-5070; Fax: (301) 270-6416
E-mail: igcdc@igc.org; Web site: www.igc.apc.org

International Peace Research Association

1 rue Mollis, Paris, France; Phone: 331-45-68-45-83
Fax: 331-40-65-98-71; Web site: www.civnet.org

International Conflict Management

Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
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Paul Dingman

ABOUT THE CARTER CENTER **WAGING PEACE • FIGHTING DISEASE • BUILDING HOPE**

The Carter Center strives to relieve suffering by advancing peace, health, and human rights worldwide. It is guided by the principle that people, with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources, can improve their own lives and the lives of others.

Founded in 1982 by Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter in partnership with Emory University, the nonprofit Center works to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and improve health. The Center collaborates with other organizations, public or private, in carrying out its mission. In this way, the Center has touched the lives of people in more than 65 countries.

Charitable contributions from individuals, foundations, corporations, and other donors support the Center's activities. Programs are directed by resident experts or fellows, some of whom teach at Emory University. They design and implement activities in cooperation with President and Mrs. Carter, networks of world leaders, and partners in the United States and abroad.

The Center is located in a 35-acre park two miles east of downtown Atlanta. Four circular pavilions house offices for the former president and first lady and most of the Center's program staff. The complex includes the Ivan Allen III Pavilion and the nondenominational Cecil B. Day Chapel, other conference facilities, and administrative offices. Adjoining the Center is The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, a repository for the records of the Carter administration, operated by the National Archives and Records Administration of the federal government and open to the public. The Center and the Library and Museum are known collectively as The Carter Presidential Center.

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INN GUIDING PRINCIPLES

These principles represent the INN's philosophy in conflict interventions:

1. The International Negotiation Network (INN) seeks to safeguard human rights, human security, and human dignity through conflict prevention and resolution.
2. The INN focuses predominantly on armed conflicts inadequately addressed by the international community. It seeks to identify and call attention to little-noticed conflicts still in the early stages to prevent them from escalating.
3. The INN encourages a "multitrack" peace process. This methodology seeks to enhance successful conflict resolution through collaboration among governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, eminent persons, religious groups, the business community, the media, and others.
4. Conflict resolution often requires communication with parties who are neither formally recognized nor viewed as acceptable by official actors. Such communication is necessary to build trust and respect among adversaries to achieve a sustainable agreement.
5. A sustainable peace agreement addresses the essential needs of all parties (save for those who commit atrocities, such as genocide, whereby they are recognized as being "beyond the pale"). It focuses on implementation, provides for monitoring, and encourages continuing engagement by interested third parties. Conflict resolution must be sustained long beyond the signing of an agreement.
6. Promoting peace requires responsibility and courage. Failure is an acceptable risk; indifference and inaction are not. The basis for action is a visionary spirit combined with a sense of political realism.

10 THINGS YOU CAN DO FOR PEACE

1. Write letters to the editor encouraging the press to report on both positive and negative news around the world.
2. Learn about other cultures and cultural values and try to meet people from different backgrounds, religions, languages, and ethnicities.
3. Acknowledge your own prejudices and learn to respect differences in other people.
4. Provide multicultural experiences for children at home and in school by reading stories about other cultures, listening to new music, and tasting different foods.
5. Be trained as a third-party mediator or facilitator and apply mediation skills and techniques in your daily life, including at work.
6. Study or travel abroad or learn about other cultures from movies, television, books, and by reading the international section of the newspaper.
7. Monitor international developments and stay informed about your government's human rights and democratization practices.
8. Lobby political leaders to support conflict prevention and early warning methods as much as military defense.
9. Volunteer and promote volunteerism in your community.
10. Write to us at the Conflict Resolution Program of The Carter Center and give us feedback on the *1997-98 State of World Conflict Report*.

Send your ideas to *State of World Conflict Report IDEAS* c/o International Negotiation Network
The Carter Center, One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway, Atlanta, GA 30307 Fax: (404) 420-3862