Amtrust Audit Reports - BMS Canada (Lionsgate Underwriting) B0618CB19A145A.pdf
This report is generated from a file or URL submitted to this webservice on November 13th 2019 16:51:48 (UTC)
Guest System: Windows 7 32 bit, Professional, 6.1 (build 7601), Service Pack 1
Report generated by
Falcon Sandbox v8.30 © Hybrid Analysis
Incident Response
MITRE ATT&CK™ Techniques Detection
Indicators
Not all malicious and suspicious indicators are displayed. Get your own cloud service or the full version to view all details.
-
Suspicious Indicators 4
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Exploit/Shellcode
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Contains escaped byte string (often part of obfuscated shellcode)
- details
-
"\x2db\x2d8\x2c7\x2c6\x2d8\x2db\x2d9\x2c7\x2dd\x2db\x2d9\x2c7\x2db\x2da\x2dc !"\x2db\x2c7)\x2c7\x2c7(\x2c6 \x2d8\x2c7\x2c6\x2d9\x2dc !\x2d9\x2d8\x2dd\x2d8\x2d9!"!"\x2d9\x2dc#\x2d9$%\x2d8&'()*+
-+..\x2da\x2da/0
-\x2da/0
1\x2da\x2da/++0
2\x2da\x2da
3(,\x2da4\x2da/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,3&,\x2da4\x2da/\x2da/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(--,\x2da\x2da\x2da,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(11,\x2da54+6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(32,\x2da54+6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(33,\x2da/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(37,\x2da\x2da/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(38,\x2da\x2da/\x2da/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,())
9\x2da/
()(',9\x2da,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,&'((,,,\x2dc\x2da.\x2da+,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,&-(&,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,&299\x2da 4,0'.\x2c6\x2c6\x2c7+12'244,2\x2c6\x2c6\x2c7.\x2c7$444,#\x2c75\x2c746,\x2c7!+6,77819\x2d8\x2c7\x2c77\x2c7\x2db-64,.!279\x2d8:-\x2db-&644,..\x2c7$6444,+$!+", "\x2db\x2d8\x2c7\x2c6\x2d8\x2db\x2d9\x2c7\x2dd\x2db\x2d9\x2c7\x2db\x2da\x2dc !"\x2db\x2c7)\x2c7\x2c7(\x2c6:*+ \x2c7\x2d8: ;\x2d8*#\x2c7\x2c7\x2c72\x2dd9\x2da;\x2c70' +*\x2dc-*-&-" \x2c6\x2d9 -&<\x2c6\x2d9 <.;\x2dd \x2d8\x2dc=\x2db-&>\x2d9\x2c7'\x2c7;\x2c78? 7\x2c6$-\x2dc=\x2db-&>6\x2c7778?\x2d9\x2c7'\x2c7\x2c7+\x2c7'8*#\x2c7\x2c7\x2c72\x2dd\x2da\x2db\x2c7\x2d9\x2c7'\x2c7\x2db\x2d9\x2c7(1'\x2c7'8$\x2c7+\x2c7\x2c6>*?\x2db'\x2c7\x2c6\x2c7+\x2c7@\x2c7\x2c780#2\x2c7$\x2da;\x2c70'6\x2c7\x2db*\x2c6$\x2c7(\x2da;\x2c70'\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2c68*#\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2c77\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2c78\x2c7(\x2da;\x2c70''\x2c77\x2c7$+*#\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7(.\x2d9\x2c7'\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2c77\x2c7\x2db\x2c7'7\x2c7\x2c7\x2c6$7\x2c77\x2c7\x2c7+( *\x2c7;\x2c6!\x2c78AB\x2d9888C7\x2c7\x2c7$\x2c7\x2d9\x2c7'\x2c7(#\x2c7\x2c7D>8\x2c6+;?#\x2c7\x2c7\x2d88\x2da;\x2c70'>?\x2c77+#(;\x2c6(\x2c7<'\x2c7>\x2c7\x2d9\x2c7'\x2c7?!7\x2c7*\x2dd87\x2c7\x2db\x2daE8\x2da;\x2c70'*\x2c7\x2c6(#\x2c7\x2c7D7$8\x2dd\x2c6\x2c7\x2c7\x2c6\x2c7\x2c77(\x2d98\x2c78'+\x2c7\x2db\x2c7\x2c7$'\x2da+C\x2c7$+\x2c7$"F(.7\x2c7@\x2c778\x2c6\x2c7$(", "\x2db\x2d8\x2c7\x2c6\x2d8\x2db\x2d9\x2c7\x2dd\x2db\x2d9\x2c7\x2db\x2da\x2dc !"\x2db\x2c7)\x2c7\x2c7(\x2c6+..\x2da\x2da/0\x2c6\x2d9 \x2c6 #"$$\x2d8= <.!(, \x2d8\x2dd\x2d8\x2d9!+.\x2c67\x2c7&, \x2d8\x2dd\x2d8\x2d9! \x2d9!+\x2c67-, \x2d9\x2d8\x2c6\x2d9 \x2c6"$\x2d9\x2d9 +!+\x2c67\x2c7\x2c7=\x2c67\x2c7' 3\x2c6(1, ;$ \x2d9\x2d8 ; 54\x2d9:"\x2d9: \x2d8\x2d9=6\x2da2, ;$ \x2d9\x2d8 ;54\x2d9: "\x2d9"\x2d9: \x2d8\x2d9=6+3, ;$\x2d9!\x2da7, \x2c6\x2c6 "\x2d9!+\x2c678, \x2c6\x2c6 "\x2d9!\x2d9!+\x2c67)
# \x2d8\x2d9!+ .\x2c67\x2c7( (', $#;\x2c6+.\x2c67\x2c7' 3\x2c6(((, \x2dc< \x2d8$\x2d9 \x2c6"\x2d8\x2d9=+G((&, "\x2d9 $\x2d8 "\x2d9\x2c6 $+G(", "\x2db\x2d8\x2c7\x2c6\x2d8\x2db\x2d9\x2c7\x2dd\x2db\x2d9\x2c7\x2db\x2da\x2dc !"\x2db\x2c7)\x2c7\x2c7(\x2c6"\x2da/0 \x2d8\x2c7\x2c7\x2d8\x2c7\x2c647\x2c7'+\x2c6$\x2c7\x2c7\x2c77\x2c7\x2c78\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7+\x2c67\x2c6\x2c7'$\x2dd\x2c6\x2c7\x2c7\x2c6+\x2c6\x2dbA!4(.'\x2c7\x2c7\x2c67\x2c6!+D\x2dd8\x2c6\x2c7$\x2c778\x2c6\x2c6\x2c7$\x2db$8*'\x2c7\x2c6(\x2da\x2da/++0 \x2d9\x2d8\x2dd\x2db\x2c7\x2d8\x2da\x2c7\x2d8\x2c7\x2dc \x2c7\x2d8\x2c7\x2d8!\x2d9"\x2c7\x2d8\x2c7\x2d8\x2dc\x2c7\x2d8\x2c7\x2d8\x2c7\x2c7\x2d8\x2c7#$\x2dc D'7'*+\x2c6>*?*\x2dc-*-&-"\x2c78'\x2c6\x2c6\x2c6-\x2db-&(D'7'\x2c7+\x2c6*\x2c7'\x2c7\x2c7$(4\x2c7\x2c7'$=%(-\x2c7-(-8*\x2db\x2c7@\x2c78$\x2c7,!\x2c7\x2db#\x2c7/<7\x2c7AB7\x2db\x2c7\x2d8\x2c7\x2d8\x2c7$\x2c6'\x2c67\x2d8-#\x2db'7$H\x2c7\x2db*9AB#\x2c7/7\x2c7AB7\x2c78!\x2c7\x2dd'\x2c67\x2d8-#\x2db\x2c7+7( 4\x2c7\x2c7'-:(-8*$\x2c78\x2c7\x2c787\x2c6\x2c6\x2c77\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2c78'0'\x2db77\x2c7\x2c7G\x2c6$\x2db-(4\x2c7\x2c7'$=&(-&(:8*'\x2db\x2c7@$\x2dd\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2db8C\x2c6\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2db'\x2c7\x2c68''( .\x2c7G=\x2c6\x2c7\x2c7\x2c7\x2db\x2c7'8\x2c6\x2c7$\x2dd\x2c6\x2c7\x2c7\x2c6+\x2c6A!4\x2db8\x2c78\x2dd3\x2db7\x2c7( .\x2c7\x2c68*'\x2c7'7887\x2c7\x2c6'7\x2c7*\x2db\x2c7\x2c7$\x2c7(" - source
- File/Memory
- relevance
- 10/10
- ATT&CK ID
- T1140 (Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix)
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Contains escaped byte string (often part of obfuscated shellcode)
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External Systems
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Found an IP/URL artifact that was identified as malicious by at least one reputation engine
- details
- 1/71 reputation engines marked "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns" as malicious (1% detection rate)
- source
- External System
- relevance
- 10/10
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Found an IP/URL artifact that was identified as malicious by at least one reputation engine
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General
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Found a potential E-Mail address in binary/memory
- details
- Pattern match: "teresa@athertanaudit.com"
- source
- File/Memory
- relevance
- 3/10
- ATT&CK ID
- T1114 (Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix)
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Found a potential E-Mail address in binary/memory
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Ransomware/Banking
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Detected text artifact in screenshot that indicate file could be ransomware
- details
- "payments" (Source: screen_31.png, Indicator: "payment")
- source
- File/Memory
- relevance
- 10/10
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Detected text artifact in screenshot that indicate file could be ransomware
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Informative 11
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Exploit/Shellcode
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Possible heap spraying attempt detected
- details
- "RdrCEF.exe" issued more than 3000 memory allocations
- source
- API Call
- relevance
- 10/10
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Possible heap spraying attempt detected
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External Systems
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Sample was identified as clean by Antivirus engines
- details
- 0/58 Antivirus vendors marked sample as malicious (0% detection rate)
- source
- External System
- relevance
- 10/10
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Sample was identified as clean by Antivirus engines
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General
-
Contains object with compressed stream data
- details
-
Object ID 7 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 44 contains compressed stream data: Unsupported filter: ['/ASCII85Decode'
'/DCTDecode']
Object ID 46 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 51 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 56 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 61 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 66 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 71 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 76 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 81 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 86 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 91 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 96 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 101 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 106 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 111 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 116 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 121 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 126 contains compressed stream data: No filters
Object ID 131 contains compressed stream data: No filters - source
- Static Parser
- relevance
- 10/10
- ATT&CK ID
- T1207 (Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix)
-
Creates mutants
- details
-
"\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\Acrobat Instance Mutex"
"\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\DBWinMutex"
"Local\Acrobat Instance Mutex"
"DBWinMutex"
"com.adobe.acrobat.rna.RdrCefBrowserLock.DC"
"\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\com.adobe.acrobat.rna.RdrCefBrowserLock.DC" - source
- Created Mutant
- relevance
- 3/10
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Scanning for window names
- details
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"AcroRd32.exe" searching for window "_AcroAppTimer"
"AcroRd32.exe" searching for class "AdobeAcrobatSpeedLaunchCmdWnd"
"AcroRd32.exe" searching for class "AdobeReaderSpeedLaunchCmdWnd"
"AcroRd32.exe" searching for class "ACROSEMAPHORE_R18"
"AcroRd32.exe" searching for class "Shell_TrayWnd"
"AcroRd32.exe" searching for class "Acrobat Instance Window Class"
"AcroRd32.exe" searching for class "JFWUI2" - source
- API Call
- relevance
- 10/10
- ATT&CK ID
- T1010 (Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix)
-
Spawns new processes
- details
-
Spawned process "RdrCEF.exe" with commandline "--backgroundcolor=16448250" (Show Process)
Spawned process "RdrCEF.exe" with commandline "--type=renderer --primordial-pipe-token=3FE19CE0D2F19E60F9E66C2A ..." (Show Process)
Spawned process "RdrCEF.exe" with commandline "--type=renderer --primordial-pipe-token=7C356077752CFCEB07FDA141 ..." (Show Process) - source
- Monitored Target
- relevance
- 3/10
-
Contains object with compressed stream data
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Installation/Persistance
-
Creates new processes
- details
-
"AcroRd32.exe" is creating a new process (Name: "%PROGRAMFILES%\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroCEF\RdrCEF.exe", Handle: 788)
"RdrCEF.exe" is creating a new process (Name: "%PROGRAMFILES%\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroCEF\RdrCEF.exe", Handle: 1356)
"RdrCEF.exe" is creating a new process (Name: "%PROGRAMFILES%\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroCEF\RdrCEF.exe", Handle: 1452) - source
- API Call
- relevance
- 8/10
-
Dropped files
- details
-
"A9Rry3bf0_1h9ijmn_1f4.tmp" has type "data"
"data_1" has type "data"
"Visited Links" has type "data"
"0FDED5CEB68C302B1CDB2BDDD9D0000E76539CB0.crl" has type "data"
"CE338828149963DCEA4CD26BB86F0363B4CA0BA5.crl" has type "data" - source
- Binary File
- relevance
- 3/10
-
Found a string that may be used as part of an injection method
- details
- "Shell_TrayWnd" (Taskbar window class may be used to inject into explorer with the SetWindowLong method)
- source
- File/Memory
- relevance
- 4/10
- ATT&CK ID
- T1055 (Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix)
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Touches files in the Windows directory
- details
-
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\System32\oleaccrc.dll"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\System32\spool\drivers\color\sRGB Color Space Profile.icm"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Globalization\Sorting\SortDefault.nls"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\System32\KBDUS.DLL"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\System32\drivers\etc\hosts"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Fonts\arial.ttf"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Fonts\arialbd.ttf"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Fonts\arialbi.ttf"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Fonts\ariali.ttf"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF"
"RdrCEF.exe" touched file "%WINDIR%\Fonts\ariblk.ttf" - source
- API Call
- relevance
- 7/10
-
Creates new processes
-
Network Related
-
Found potential URL in binary/memory
- details
-
Pattern match: "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
Heuristic match: "teresa@athertanaudit.com" - source
- File/Memory
- relevance
- 10/10
-
Found potential URL in binary/memory
File Details
Amtrust Audit Reports - BMS Canada (Lionsgate Underwriting) B0618CB19A145A.pdf
- Filename
- Amtrust Audit Reports - BMS Canada (Lionsgate Underwriting) B0618CB19A145A.pdf
- Size
- 901KiB (922629 bytes)
- Type
- Description
- PDF document, version 1.7
- Document author
- Document creator
- PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2
- Document producer
- Investintech.com Inc. PDF Library 2.0.22
- Document title
- Document
- Document pages
- 29
- Architecture
- WINDOWS
- SHA256
- d47626d123cfcd43eb2f55f546204944ea23117829cfe95ec38a67f760165006
- MD5
- 26f9398cf7334f96827f4c9f93a2b3cc
- SHA1
- 5002e3b222d3752298e2822ab1877b73155e6d92
- ssdeep
- 3072:z2aOfZCPc3xWmdv6emx0TtElhWTpl1ZPq4du9a2fxy388R0Ou:zCZz7Kl81ZiaDi
Classification (TrID)
- 100.0% (.PDF) Adobe Portable Document Format
Screenshots
Loading content, please wait...
Hybrid Analysis
Tip: Click an analysed process below to view more details.
Analysed 4 processes in total.
-
AcroRd32.exe
"C:\AmtrustAuditReports-BMSCanada_LionsgateUnderwriting_B0618CB19A145A.pdf"
(PID: 1840)
-
RdrCEF.exe
--backgroundcolor=16448250
(PID: 2168)
- RdrCEF.exe --type=renderer --primordial-pipe-token=3FE19CE0D2F19E60F9E66C2A52658BDA --lang=en-US --disable-pack-loading --lang=en-US --log-file="%PROGRAMFILES%\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroCEF\debug.log" --log-severity=disable --product-version="ReaderServices/18.11.20036 Chrome/59.0.3071.15" --enable-pinch --device-scale-factor=1 --num-raster-threads=1 --content-image-texture-target=0,0,3553;0,1,3553;0,2,3553;0,3,3553;0,4,3553;0,5,3553;0,6,3553;0,7,3553;0,8,3553;0,9,3553;0,10,3553;0,11,3553;0,12,3553;0,13,3553;0,14,3553;0,15,3553;0,16,3553;1,0,3553;1,1,3553;1,2,3553;1,3,3553;1,4,3553;1,5,3553;1,6,3553;1,7,3553;1,8,3553;1,9,3553;1,10,3553;1,11,3553;1,12,3553;1,13,3553;1,14,3553;1,15,3553;1,16,3553;2,0,3553;2,1,3553;2,2,3553;2,3,3553;2,4,3553;2,5,3553;2,6,3553;2,7,3553;2,8,3553;2,9,3553;2,10,3553;2,11,3553;2,12,3553;2,13,3553;2,14,3553;2,15,3553;2,16,3553;3,0,3553;3,1,3553;3,2,3553;3,3,3553;3,4,3553;3,5,3553;3,6,3553;3,7,3553;3,8,3553;3,9,3553;3,10,3553;3,11,3553;3,12,3553;3,13,3553;3,14,3553;3,15,3553;3,16,3553;4,0,3553;4,1,3553;4,2,3553;4,3,3553;4,4,3553;4,5,3553;4,6,3553;4,7,3553;4,8,3553;4,9,3553;4,10,3553;4,11,3553;4,12,3553;4,13,3553;4,14,3553;4,15,3553;4,16,3553 --disable-accelerated-video-decode --disable-webrtc-hw-vp8-encoding --disable-gpu-compositing --service-request-channel-token=3FE19CE0D2F19E60F9E66C2A52658BDA --renderer-client-id=2 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=1260 --allow-no-sandbox-job /prefetch:1 (PID: 2100)
- RdrCEF.exe --type=renderer --primordial-pipe-token=7C356077752CFCEB07FDA141A4CF75BB --lang=en-US --disable-pack-loading --lang=en-US --log-file="%PROGRAMFILES%\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroCEF\debug.log" --log-severity=disable --product-version="ReaderServices/18.11.20036 Chrome/59.0.3071.15" --enable-pinch --device-scale-factor=1 --num-raster-threads=1 --content-image-texture-target=0,0,3553;0,1,3553;0,2,3553;0,3,3553;0,4,3553;0,5,3553;0,6,3553;0,7,3553;0,8,3553;0,9,3553;0,10,3553;0,11,3553;0,12,3553;0,13,3553;0,14,3553;0,15,3553;0,16,3553;1,0,3553;1,1,3553;1,2,3553;1,3,3553;1,4,3553;1,5,3553;1,6,3553;1,7,3553;1,8,3553;1,9,3553;1,10,3553;1,11,3553;1,12,3553;1,13,3553;1,14,3553;1,15,3553;1,16,3553;2,0,3553;2,1,3553;2,2,3553;2,3,3553;2,4,3553;2,5,3553;2,6,3553;2,7,3553;2,8,3553;2,9,3553;2,10,3553;2,11,3553;2,12,3553;2,13,3553;2,14,3553;2,15,3553;2,16,3553;3,0,3553;3,1,3553;3,2,3553;3,3,3553;3,4,3553;3,5,3553;3,6,3553;3,7,3553;3,8,3553;3,9,3553;3,10,3553;3,11,3553;3,12,3553;3,13,3553;3,14,3553;3,15,3553;3,16,3553;4,0,3553;4,1,3553;4,2,3553;4,3,3553;4,4,3553;4,5,3553;4,6,3553;4,7,3553;4,8,3553;4,9,3553;4,10,3553;4,11,3553;4,12,3553;4,13,3553;4,14,3553;4,15,3553;4,16,3553 --disable-accelerated-video-decode --disable-webrtc-hw-vp8-encoding --disable-gpu-compositing --service-request-channel-token=7C356077752CFCEB07FDA141A4CF75BB --renderer-client-id=3 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=1344 --allow-no-sandbox-job /prefetch:1 (PID: 2460)
-
RdrCEF.exe
--backgroundcolor=16448250
(PID: 2168)
Network Analysis
DNS Requests
No relevant DNS requests were made.
Contacted Hosts
No relevant hosts were contacted.
HTTP Traffic
No relevant HTTP requests were made.
Extracted Strings
Extracted Files
-
Informative 5
-
-
data_1
- Size
- 264KiB (270336 bytes)
- Type
- data
- Runtime Process
- RdrCEF.exe (PID: 2168)
- MD5
- 04cc655912a56ed5ec92d9863e17804a
- SHA1
- 44237f354c9fa59e75673d0e031e779036a8e3dd
- SHA256
- e90309174e5687d7e59782d1a1e9c0e9f4825b64fd415f0b64f60199cde84a66
-
Visited Links
- Size
- 128KiB (131072 bytes)
- Type
- data
- Runtime Process
- RdrCEF.exe (PID: 2168)
- MD5
- e5f299c3100e113c9343e86ed9504a2d
- SHA1
- 7865b3759d1cba84cc165aceb3ceee856f31f6e2
- SHA256
- 9d1c9dc432b2e97f7a54b4da2724e4ff96dc719e60cb89c9f82dbec9226856c3
-
A9Rry3bf0_1h9ijmn_1f4.tmp
- Size
- 2B (2 bytes)
- Type
- data
- Runtime Process
- AcroRd32.exe (PID: 1840)
- MD5
- c4103f122d27677c9db144cae1394a66
- SHA1
- 1489f923c4dca729178b3e3233458550d8dddf29
- SHA256
- 96a296d224f285c67bee93c30f8a309157f0daa35dc5b87e410b78630a09cfc7
-
0FDED5CEB68C302B1CDB2BDDD9D0000E76539CB0.crl
- Size
- 637B (637 bytes)
- Type
- data
- MD5
- 974e8536b8767ac5be204f35d16f73e8
- SHA1
- e847897947a3db26e35cb7d490c688e8c410dfb7
- SHA256
- d1bb4b163fe01acc368a92b385bb0bd3a9fc2340b6d485b77a20553a713166d3
-
CE338828149963DCEA4CD26BB86F0363B4CA0BA5.crl
- Size
- 425B (425 bytes)
- Type
- data
- MD5
- b1783b97d2072e141e12e8911e151704
- SHA1
- e3a9fe0da15be51286f39d6092e9126443669e49
- SHA256
- 9009ab7605c35a2b5121b8b5c966b3c893edba9966925268c45ad05b348671c8
-