



**MALI: Information bulletin**  
1 Civil Military Interaction Command  
APELDOORN December 2013  
Cut-off date: December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2013

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**Introduction**

1 CMI Command (1 CMI CO) has done research to acquire a clearer view on the non-kinetic situation in GAO, MALI. Doing so, 1 CMI CO used its particular characteristics by employing all open sources available to it, especially French ones, as the francophonie of its personnel is one of the particular strong points of 1 CMI CO within the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces. Additionally, 1 CMI CO employed its other assets, such as its traditionally good personal relations with the NGO community and its own expertise present within its networks of Functional Specialists.

As a result, this report, as practically all products of 1 CMI CO, has been issued with the lowest possible security classification. Rather than as disqualifier, this classification can and perhaps even should be regarded as a sign of distinction when evaluating this report.

The information acquired was assembled in and disseminated from 3 D ARTS, the special database software tool designed by 1 CMI CO.

**How to read this document**

This report covers six topics, and each chapter discusses one of those six topics. Please note that the current order of chapters implies no indication regarding relevance. Inevitably, overlaps occurred while covering the six topics but these have been synchronized and dovetailed to the chapter at hand.

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## Summary

### 1) Political structure and people

Since Mali's independence in the 1960's, the country has seen several switches from a centralized to decentralized government, and vice versa. In 1992, the latest move to a decentralized government began, which is still in progress today. It aims to give local governments more responsibilities to achieve better management of the country's resources, to create an enabling environment for local land and natural resource tenure systems, and to strengthen legal recognition of customary land use rights. In Mali, decentralization was a rejection of the colonial style of centralized government, which had created local governments, but vested little authority in them. A total of 161 political parties participated in the actual election rounds in Mali. A part of the results of the last election rounds in the Gao region and several other regions are discussed in this document. Due to lack of information on the internet, actual key players on regional and 'commune' level, and the exact locations of local government institutions are only limitedly discussed, though most of the key players on the national level have been identified and also some on the regional level. The parties ADEMA-PASJ and ASMA-CFP dominate in Gao.

### 2) Informal power structure

No indications were found of a shadow government in Gao. One interviewee in Bamako explicitly said there currently exists no shadow government in Gao. The formal government in the North of Mali, as well as the police and justice chain, is practically non-existent and non-functioning. It lacks substantial checks and balances and is, to a great extent, corrupt. The formal government in the North of Mali lost its legitimacy among the population to a great extent. Many governmental officials had to flee the city of Gao due to the disgruntled population. Malinese people see decentralization as the most appropriate form of democracy. However, the 1999 national plan of decentralization was hampered significantly by Touré 'consensus model', which eliminated pluralism and any opposition. The national government produced weak local governments with limited capacity and showed a lack of concern for improving local governments. So, the last decentralization measurements resulted in more influence of Bamako, rather than less. During the MNLA rule, a shadow government of Azawad was formed. It was opposed by the Malian state and ECOWAS. There are no recent indications that this shadow government has any actual power.

### 3) IOs and NGOs

Many IOs and NGOs have paused or stopped their development programs in the Northern regions of Mali, due to the insecure situation and unsafe environments for their employees. Some of them do have an emergency program for IDPs and others who have suffered from the recent violence in Mali. This document focuses primarily on the UN OCHA Country Team. This Country Team coordinates the most important and most active organisations in Mali. A total of about 50 organisations are active in Mali at this moment.

### 4) Social and cultural structures

Between 90% and 95% of the Malian population is moderate Muslim (Sunnites). During the violent unrest in late 2012, these moderate Muslims, together with religious minority groups such as Christians, suffered, as extremist Muslim groups tried to install Sharia law in Northern Mali. Sharia law is generally considered incompatible with the tolerant Malian version of Islam. During the French military intervention, most extremists left the Gao region. Nonetheless, ethnic tensions and conflicts between the different groups, and related militias, like the Peul, Bambara, Tuaregs, Arabs, Bella and Songhai are currently still ongoing. Many Tuaregs have fled the region, as they fear reprisal attacks.

**5) Locations and state of socio-economic important structures**

The infrastructure for the basic needs of the Malian people is very poor. The network of water supply systems cannot cover the needs of the people. Thereby, the quality of water that is available is very poor. IRC assists the Malian authorities with supplying new water systems, pumps and purifying tablets. Electricity is provided by EDM, but the network is not reliable. Other resources, like gas, coal or oil, are not sufficient. The shortage of these resources blocks economic development.

In Mali, people mostly communicate over cell phones. There are two providers in Mali: Orange and Malitel, of which the latter is part of the state owned company Sotelma. There is hardly any communication over land line connections. Mali has one government owned TV-station and one radio station. In 1994, the Malian government made it possible for people to start private owned radio stations. Internet usage is very low and only 2,9% of the people is connected to the Internet.

In Gao, there are about nine public places where the local people gather, such as a hospital, pharmacy, a marketplace and mosques. The occupation of the city of Gao by the Islamic militants for more than six months has considerably degraded the economy in general and trade in particular. Local banks, hotels and shops have been pillaged or damaged, which severely hit economic and commercial activity, both at the local and regional level. These shops are mainly managed by members of the Arab, Yoruba and Tuareg ethnics. Malian people generally are in great need of food and agricultural products.

The public transport system is dependent on mostly bus companies and several boat companies, who use the Niger River for transport. The railroad infrastructure is in a very poor condition, has a narrow gauge system and is in need of refurbishment. Public air transport is in fact only possible via the airport of Bamako. Twelve airlines fly at this moment to and from Bamako. Gao airport is not used for public transport.


**6) State structure. Reach and locations of media outlets**

Mali, a country seen as an example for the rest of the region for its democracy, rule of law and relatively liberal media environment, now hangs in the balance. The crisis resulting from the March 2012 military coup, led to serious deterioration of the freedom of press. During the crisis, radio stations and many newspapers were forced to shut down or suffered brutal attacks from the rebel groups, and especially media within Mali's three Northern regions were affected. This deprived the people of the only source of information available. Prior to the conflict, radio coverage reached 80% of the population. Mali remains a country of oral tradition, due to its low adult literacy rate, and therefore radio plays an important role. While media in the South still have a functioning infrastructure and relatively easy access to information sources, media in the North have seen a destruction of the mass communication infrastructure and a substantial loss of newspapers, periodicals, radio bulletins, etc., which has left the population in an information void. Also the poor energy situation, with more than 97% of Mali's rural population living without access to electricity, hinders distribution of free media information. Only a very small number of households use car batteries to cover their electric requirements, i.e. for lighting, cooling (fan), TV and radio. Journalists are de facto operating under threat of retaliation from Islamist groups, who try to control the information flow in and out of the country's Northern region. The murder of Radio France Internationale journalists Ghislaine Dupont and Claude Verlon on the outskirts of Kidal, a town in the Ifoghas massif, on 2 November 2013 has highlighted the extent of the threats to freedom of information and press in this part of Northern Mali.




1 Political structure and people

Overview: regions, circles and communes



Administratively, Mali is divided into eight regions and the capital district of Bamako:

- Gao
- Kayes
- Kidal
- Koulikoro
- Mopti
- Ségou
- Sikasso
- Tombouctou



Gao region marked red

Besides the regions, there is the capital district of Bamako. Each region is under the authority of an elected governor. Each region consists of five to nine districts (or Circles ), administered by Prefects. The region of Gao consistst of:

- Gao circle;
- Almoustrat circle;
- Ansango circle;
- Bourem circle.

Circles are divided into communes, which, in turn, are divided into villages or quarters. A decentralisation and democratisation process began in the 1990s with the establishment of 702 elected municipal councils, headed by elected mayors, and previously appointed officials have been replaced with elected officials, which culminates in a National council of local officials. Other changes included greater local control over finances, and the reduction of administrative control by the central government.

**Sources:**

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Mali](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Mali)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gao\\_Region](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gao_Region)

### 1.1 Responsibilities of the government on the 'région'-level in Gao

- The responsibilities of the government on 'region'- level in Gao are: secondary, technical, and professional schools, and special education;
- Regional hospitals, support of "vulnerable" populations;
- Roads, communication, and energy;
- Organization of rural production;
- Artisan and tourism activities.

**Source:**

[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACA905.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACA905.pdf)

### 1.2 Main offices/departments on the 'région'-level in Gao

- Regional Directorate of Agriculture
- Regional Directorate of Water and Forests
- Regional Directorate for Rural Engineering

**Source:**

[https://mali.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/system/files/documents/files/Rapport\\_mission\\_intercluster\\_Gao\\_2013.pdf](https://mali.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/system/files/documents/files/Rapport_mission_intercluster_Gao_2013.pdf)

### 1.3 Actual people employed/elected in Gao

Function	Name
Governor of the Gao region	Brigadier General Mamadou Adama Diallo
Chairman of the Regional counsel	Mohamed Ould Mohamed Idris
Regional Directorate of Agriculture	Seydou Timbely
Regional Directorate of Water and Forests	Sadio Diallo Harouna,
Regional Directorate for Rural Engineering	Ibrahim Toure



Governor of the Gao Region: Brigadier General Mamadou Adama Diallo

**Sources:**

<http://www.malikounda.com/Communiqués-du-Conseil-des-Ministres/index/Page-11.html>

<http://maliactu.net/forum-regional-de-Gao-les-jalons-dune-unite-retrouvee/>

<http://www.maliweb.net/news/politique/2013/07/09/article,157490.html>

<http://www.nu.nl/buitenland/3637126/etnisch-geweld-overschaduwet-verkiezingen-mali.html>

<http://www.bamanet.net/index.php/actualite/autres-presses/13641-quinze-personnes-ont-ete-interpellees-apres-lassaut-donne-par-des-miliciens-sur-le-camp-militaire-de-ouatagouna-au-mali.html>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21432724>

#### 1.4 Responsibilities of the government on the ‘cercle’-level in the Gao-cercles

The circle (cercle) is a territorial group of several municipalities, with legal entity and financial autonomy granted. There are 49 circles in Mali. The council is composed of members elected by councilors for a term of five years.

Responsibilities of the circles:

- Secondary schools
- Health facilities
- Roads and communications
- Rural waterworks

This includes:

- Budgets and accounts of the circle ;
- Protection of the environment;
- Management area of the circle and the acquisition of heritage;
- Creation and management policy of collective interest regarding circle equipment, especially in the following areas : the second cycle of basic education, health, roads and some rural water supply;
- Organizing activities of rural and agropastoralist production forestry;
- Organization of crafts and tourism activities;
- Creation and management mode services and agencies of the circle and the circle intervention in the economic field;
- Works and supply contracts, leases and other agreements;
- Imposition of countervailing taxes on benefits, specific services of the circle and the fixing of rates and taxes in accordance with the principles and the maximum by law;

- Loans for intervention expenditure, loans or guarantees, and granting of the circle grant guarantees or grants;
- Twinning projects and cooperation activities with the Malian and foreign governments;
- Modalities for the implementation of the articles of association of personal services and agencies circle;
- Acceptance or refusal of donations, grants and bequests.

The council can advise on all matters relating to the circle and must be consulted on projects for the development of the state or region .

**Source:**

[http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collectivité\\_territoriale\\_au\\_Mali](http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collectivité_territoriale_au_Mali)

### 1.5 Main offices/departments on the 'cercle'-level in the Gao-cercles

- Planning
- Statistics
- Informatics
- Spatial planning
- Population

**Source:**

<http://www.maliweb.net/news/politique/decentralisation/2013/10/29/article,176557.html>

### 1.6 Actual people employed/elected in the Gao-cercles

Function	Name
Prefect Gao Cercle	Idrissa Sidi Maiga
Prefect Ansango Cercle	Unknown, no information found
Prefect Bourem Cercle	Issa Koné
Prefect Almoustrat Cercle	Aldjouma Traoré
Mayor of Gao	Sadio Diallo Harouna

**Sources:**

<http://www.maliweb.net/news/politique/2013/04/11/article,138922.html>

[https://mali.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/system/files/documents/files/Rapport\\_mission\\_intercluster\\_Gao\\_2013.pdf](https://mali.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/system/files/documents/files/Rapport_mission_intercluster_Gao_2013.pdf)

<http://www.nord-mali.com/component/content/article/4375-bourem--ladministration-se-reinstalle->

<http://bamada.net/le-prefet-de-menaka-affirme-le-redeploiement-de-ladministration-dans-le-cercle>

[http://www.malijet.com/mobile/actualite\\_dans\\_les\\_regions\\_du\\_mali/rebellion\\_au\\_nord\\_du\\_mali/78174-le-pr%C3%A9fet-de-m%C3%A9naka-affirme-le-retour-de-l%E2%80%99%C3%A9tat-dans-le-cercle.html](http://www.malijet.com/mobile/actualite_dans_les_regions_du_mali/rebellion_au_nord_du_mali/78174-le-pr%C3%A9fet-de-m%C3%A9naka-affirme-le-retour-de-l%E2%80%99%C3%A9tat-dans-le-cercle.html)

[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=340504252736125&story\\_fbid=369331883186695](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=340504252736125&story_fbid=369331883186695)

<http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/detail/3550579/2013/11/24/Etnisch-geweld-overschaduwet-verkiezingen-Mali.dhtml>

### 1.7 Responsibilities of the government on the 'commune' level

Mali is subdivided into eight administrative regions and a capital district: Gao, Kayes, Kidal, Koulikorom, Mopti, Ségou, Sikasso, Tombouctou and the capital district of Bamako. These regions are headed by appointed high commissioners. Each region is subdivided into five to nine districts

(cercles) headed by préfets, which are in turn divided into communes or municipalities and then into villages or quarters.

Communes are governed by elected mayors and elected local councils. The result of a decentralization programme in 1999-2001 has been less administrative control by the central government and greater local control over finances and issues such as health, education and water supply.

Overview of the responsibilities:

Communes	Cercles	Regions
1. Preschool, primary school, and literacy teachers	1. Secondary schools	1. Secondary, technical and professional schools, and special education
2. Health workers and facilities	2. Health facilities	2. Regional hospitals, support of "vulnerable" populations
3. Transportation, roads, and communication	3. Roads and communications	3. Roads, communication, and energy
4. Urban and rural waterworks	4. Rural waterworks	4. Organization of rural production
5. Local markets, sports, and cultural events		5. Artisan and tourism activities

Local governments receive central governmental grants but also have the power to collect local taxes. However communes do not clearly know what their roles and responsibilities are and what limits of supervision they have. For example, a commune is sometimes investor, sometimes the contractor and often the procurement agency or a commune even combine these functions. This situation may lead to the abuse by community teams in the allocation of farm and residential lots. The administrations of the lowest level, quarters and villages, are not democratically organized in a grass roots way and there is a lot of corruption at these levels. Commune councils consist of 11-45 members, elected by universal suffrage and proportional representation. Each council chooses a mayor and commune executive form its ranks.

**Sources:**

<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Mali.pdf>  
[www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/fiche-coulibaly-eng.pdf](http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/fiche-coulibaly-eng.pdf)  
<http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/Docs/dec/monograph/PopularPartic-MLI.htm>  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communes\\_of\\_Mali](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communes_of_Mali)  
<http://www.matcl.gov.ml/pdf/ComRegGao.pdf>

### 1.8 Main offices/departments on the 'commune' level

Communes are headed by a mayor, who is assisted by a commune executive and deputies. The commune council takes important decisions affecting the life of the commune. The mayor has broad powers to manage the commune's development activities. For example, the mayor may act as municipal police officer, registrar and head of the administrative staff of the commune. He has to

organise and chair all the full commune council meetings. The management of local development is in hands of the councillors who are supported by the local village/quarter organisations. The general commune departments and functions are budget management, infrastructure, public services, natural resource management and local security.

**Sources:**

<http://www.snvworld.org/sites/www.snvworld.org/files/publications/mali-gov-kit-decentralisation-2004en.pdf>

### 1.9 Actual people employed/elected

As from September 7<sup>th</sup>, 2013 the Malian government consists of the following ministers:

- President: Mr. Ibrahim Boubacar Kéita
- Mr. Oumar Tatam Ly, Prime Minister
- Mr. Mohamed Ali BATHILY, Minister of Justice
- Mr. Soumeylou Boubèye MAIGA, Minister of Defence and Veterans Affairs
- Cheick Oumar Diarra, Minister of National Reconciliation and Development Northern Regions
- Mr. Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
- Ms. BOUARE Fily Sissoko, Minister of Economy and Finance
- Colonel Sada SAMAKE, Minister of Security
- Dr Bokary Tereta, Minister of Rural Development
- General Moussa Coulibaly Sinko, Minister of Administration
- Mr. Cheikna Seydi Ahamadi DIAWARA, Minister of Planning and Forecasting
- Mr. Tieman Hubert Coulibaly, Minister of State Properties and Land Affairs
- Mr. Abdel Karim Konate, Minister of Commerce
- Mr. Moussa Bocar Diarra, Minister of Public Service
- Ousmane Ag Rhissa, Minister of Environment and Sanitation
- Colonel Abdoulaye KOUMARE, Minister of Equipment and Transport
- Hamadoun KONATE, Minister of Labour and Social and Humanitarian Affairs
- Mohamed Diarra, Minister of Housing
- Moussa MARA, Minister of Urbanism and Urban Policy
- Ms. Oumou SANGARE BA, Minister of Promotion of Women , Family and Children
- Ms. Jacqueline TOGOLA Nana, Minister of National Education
- Mr. Moustapha Dicko, Minister of Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research
- Ousmane KONE, Minister of Health and Public Hygiene
- Mamadou Keita Frankaly, Minister of Energy and Hydraulics
- Bruno MAIGA, Minister of Culture
- Mahamane BABY, Minister of Employment and Vocational Training
- Ms. Berthe Aissata BENGALY, Minister of Crafts and Tourism
- Dr Boubou Cisse, Minister of Industry and Mines
- Dr. Sylla Abdramane, Minister of Malians abroad
- Jean Marie SANGARE, Minister of Communication and New Technologies and Information
- Mamadou Diarra Gaoussou, Minister of Youth and Sports
- Mr. Malick Alhousseini, Delegated Minister to the Minister of Territory, in charge of Decentralization
- Mr. Nango DEMBELE, Delegated Minister to the Minister of Rural Development, in charge of Livestock, Fisheries and Food Security

- M. Tierno Amadou Diallo Omar Hass, Delegated Minister to the Minister of Territorial Administration in charge of Religious Affairs and Worship
- Mr. Madani Toure, Delegated Minister to the Minister of Economy and Finance, in charge of the budget
- Mr. Moustapha Ben BARKA, Delegated Minister to the Minister of Economy and Finance, responsible for Investment Promotion and Private Initiative Policy

**Results of the elections in November 2013 in the following regions :**

**Niafunké:**

The URD list is headed by the party's candidate in the presidential election: Soumaïla Cissé . He and his running mate, Dédéou Traoré carton won 62.18 % of the votes. Their closest rival is the list of RPM with 19.86%. In third place comes the list ADEMA with 15.50%.

**Diré circle:**

URD won with 42.28% of the votes, followed by ADEMA with 35.62%.

In **Gao** the list ADEMA-ASMA holds the upper hand with 42.96% of the votes, followed with 30.89% for RPM. Key leader of ADEMA: Assarid Ag Imbacaouane.

**Ansongo:**

The list UMRDA ADEMA leads with 25.55% of the votes, followed by URD and PDES with 23.75% and RPM with 20.35% and the alliance ASMA-MPR (19.33 %).

**Bourem circle:**

The alliance RPM-UMRDA won with 67.84 % of the vote leaving no chance to his rival of Adema ( 20.73 %) and URD ( 10.75% ).

**Tessalit in Kidal Region:**

RPM won with 65.47 %. URD 34.53 %

**Mopti:**

RPM/APR/ADEMA-PASJ list head with 36.55% of the votes. The URD coalition CODEM/MPR is positioned in second place with 23.57 % of the votes, closely followed by the group UDD ASMA/PSC-PDES with 23,33 %.

**Douentza:**

URD -PDES won 48.01 % of the votes. The coalition PSP-UMRDA Faso Jigui follows with 27.44 %.

**Mopti region, Koro:**

Alliance ADEMA-CODEM-RPM won with 40.86 % of the vote. PDES-URD-UMRDA was second with 35.93%.

**Djenne:**

URD won with 51.26 %. The ADEMA PASJ-RP follows with 43.59 %.

**Segou:**

The alliance ADP- RDPM won 38.27% of the votes, followed by the group RPM-UMRDA-Sadi with 37.66%.

**Sikasso:**

ADEMA-CODEMs-MIRIA won 29.93 % of the votes. The alliance RPM-MPR-ANKA FARE Wuli came second with 19.48 %.

**Sikasso region, Kolondiéba circle:**

The list of SADI obtained 23.87 % of the votes and the URD 22.16 %. Note: SADI Oumar Mariko who was a candidate in the presidential election in the URD.

**Kadiolo circle:**

PARENA won 29% of the votes, followed by the Kadiolo Nieta list with 19.93% and the RPM-ADEMA alliance with 18.64%.

**Bougouni:**

The CDS/URD group/FARE ANKAWULI won 34.50% of the votes, followed by the alliance RPM-ADEMA with 29.69 %.

**Yorosso:**

38.78% gave their votes to the list ADEMA-RPM, followed by the group URD-UDD who had the support of 20.80 % of the votes.

**Koulikoro Region:**

The RPM won 17.31% of the votes, followed by the list MPR-PARENA with 16.83% and the URD with list 15.13%.

**Koulikoro region, Dioïla:** The group RPM-URD-Adema-FARE ANKA Wuli won 53.18 % of the votes, followed by MODEC with 42.54% of the votes. Note: Konimba Sidibé of MODEC is another former candidate in the presidential election.

**Kati:**

The RPM-ADEMA list won 46.50%, followed by the group URD-ASMACSP-CODEMs-MPR with 29.52 % of the votes.

**Kita:**

The list ADEMA-PARENA and the RPM won 28.43% and 28.30% of the votes.

**Kayes region:**

The group Adema/URD/PRVM/PDES/PARENA won 49.32% of the votes, followed by RPM and FARE ANKA Wuli with 21.11%.

**Bafoulabé:**

ADEMA won 31.33%, followed by RPM with 27.39%.

**Sources:**

<http://www.primature.gov.ml/>



### 1.10 Physical locations of government institutions in Gao (city)

For administrative purposes, the Gao Region is divided into four cercles: Ansongo, Bourem, Gao , Ménaka.

The **Ansongo Cercle** is an administrative subdivision of the Gao Region of Mali. The administrative center (chef-lieu) is the town of Ansongo. The Niger River passes through the cercle and plays an important role in transportation and the economy in the region. The cercle is divided into seven communes: Ansongo, Bara, Bourra, Ouattagouna, Talataye, Tessit, Tin-Hama.

The **Bourem Cercle** is an administrative subdivision of the Gao Region of North-eastern Mali. The administrative center (chef-lieu) is the town of Bourem. The cercle is divided into five communes: Bamba, Bourem, Taboye, Tarkint, Temera.

The **Gao Cercle** is an administrative subdivision of the Gao Region of North-eastern Mali. The administrative center (chef-lieu) is the town of Gao. During the Northern Mali conflict in 2012, the main Tuareg rebel group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNL) lost the region to the Islamist groups Ansar Dine, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In 2013, the Islamists then lost most of the region to French and Malian soldiers. The cercle is divided into seven communes: Anchawadi, Gabero, Gao (an urban commune), Gounzoureye, N'Tillit, Sony Aliber, Tilemsi.

The **Ménaka Cercle** is an administrative subdivision of the Gao Region of Mali. Its administrative center is the town of Ménaka. The area is a traditional center of the Kel Dinnik Tuareg confederation, with the town of Andéramboukane, near the Nigerien border. The cercle is divided into five communes: Alata, Andéramboukane, Inékar, Ménaka, Tidermène.

The **city of Gao** is one of the first municipalities in the region of Gao. It consists of 9 districts (Gadeye, Farandjiré, Aljanabanbia, Djoulabougou, Sanèye, Sosso koira, Boulgoundjé Castle and Djidara). It has a municipal council of 29 members elected in the municipal elections of May 30<sup>th</sup> 2004.

The administrative center of the municipality is Gao. The main political parties in the municipality are: Adema, URD, MPR, RPM, The CNID. The mayor of Gao is mr. Sadou Diallo.

Note: Exact locations of governmental institutions in and around Gao have not been found yet.

**Sources:**

[http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/mali\\_fd\\_strtgy/plans/Gao/Gao/P\\_S\\_A\\_Commune\\_Gao\\_vf.pdf](http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/mali_fd_strtgy/plans/Gao/Gao/P_S_A_Commune_Gao_vf.pdf)

<http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/culture-loisirs/international/article/sadou-diallo-maire-de-Gao-au-mali-le-gouvernement-francais-sait-qui-soutient-les-terroristes-il-y-a-le-qatar-7750348568>

[http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gao\\_Region](http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gao_Region)

### 1.11 Political parties which were active in the elections of November 2013

Mali counts totally 161 political parties. See attachment 'Repertoire des partis politiques'.

**Sources:**

<http://www.matcl.gov.ml/>

[http://www.matcl.gov.ml/PDF/ListePP\\_28\\_06\\_2013.pdf](http://www.matcl.gov.ml/PDF/ListePP_28_06_2013.pdf)

## 1.12 Local representatives/leaders of these parties

Results of the elections November 24<sup>th</sup> 2013 in the Gao region:

<b>ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES</b>		
<b>1ER TOUR DU 24 NOVEMBRE 2013</b>		
<b>RESULTATS PROVISOIRES COMPLETS</b>		
<b>Circonscription</b>	<b>GAO</b>	
<b>Inscrits</b>	<b>106 334</b>	
<b>Nombre de BV</b>	<b>285</b>	
<b>Votants</b>	<b>55 207</b>	
<b>Bulletins nuls</b>	<b>2 254</b>	
<b>Suffrages exprimés</b>	<b>52 953</b>	
<b>Taux de participation</b>	<b>51,92%</b>	
<b>NB sièges</b>	<b>3</b>	
<b>NB listes</b>	<b>7</b>	
<b>VOIX OBTENUES PAR LISTE ET POURCENTAGES</b>		
<b>LISTES</b>	<b>VOIX</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>ADEMA-PASJ/ASMA-CFP</b>	<b>22 750</b>	<b>42,96%</b>
<b>RPM</b>	<b>16 359</b>	<b>30,89%</b>
<b>CNID-FYT/UDD</b>	<b>1 322</b>	<b>2,50%</b>
<b>INDEPENDANT ALLIANCE 2013</b>	<b>1 803</b>	<b>3,40%</b>
<b>URD/SADI</b>	<b>7 215</b>	<b>13,63%</b>
<b>INDEPENDANT IR NAATA</b>	<b>1 652</b>	<b>3,12%</b>
<b>FARE ANKA-WULI/UMRDA FASO-JIGI</b>	<b>1 852</b>	<b>3,50%</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>52 953</b>	<b>100,00%</b>
<b>Ecart entre total des voix et Suffrages exprimés</b>	<b>0</b>	

The main political parties in the municipality are: Adema, URD, MPR, RPM, The CNID. The representatives of the participating parties on national and Gao region level are:

- **ADEMA-PASJ:**  
Dioncounda Traore, teacher, Bamako-coura, Rue Fankélé DIARRA Porte 145 BP 1791 Tél. 20 23-03-68. Gao: Assarid Ag Imbarcaouane, Abouzeïdi Ousmane Maïga.
- **ASMA-CFP:**  
Soumeilou Boubeye Maiga, reporter, Bamako, Tomikorobougou, Rue : 662, Porte : 537. Gao: Arbonkana Boubèye Maïga.
- **RPM Gao:**  
Ibrahim Ahmadou, Aguisa Seydou Tour, Alhousna Malick Touré, Moussa Ario Maïga.
- **CNID-FYT:**  
Mme Mountaga Tall, lawyer, Rue 202 X159 Hamdallaye. Gao: mrs Mariam Diarra.
- **UDD:**  
Mme Hassane Barry, lawyer, Bkp Sogoniko, tel : 20 20-46-94, Avenue OUA Porte 3626 BP 3275
- **INDEPENDANT ALLIANCE 2013:**  
Unknown.

- URD:  
Younoussi Toure, economist, Bamako, Badalabougou, Rue 105, Porte 483, Tel 20 20 86 40, 20 20 86 42. Gao: Hassimi Maïga et Mrs Kadidia Traoré.
- SADI:  
Cheick Oumar Sissoko, filmmaker, Bamako, Djélibougou R.246 P.559, Tél. 20 24-87-82 B.P. 3140.  
Gao : Agaly Ag Akeratane.
- INDEPENDANT IR NAATA Gao:  
Harouna Abdoul Maïga.
- FARE-ANKE WULI:  
Soumana Mory Coulibaly, customs inspecteur in Bamako, ex Imacy, avenue Cheick Zayed, Dravela. Gao: Modibo Sidibé (former Prime Minister), Zaouder Talfi Maïga.
- UMRDA FASO-JIGI:  
Unknown

**Sources:**

[http://www.matcl.gov.ml/PDF/ListePP\\_28\\_06\\_2013.pdf](http://www.matcl.gov.ml/PDF/ListePP_28_06_2013.pdf)

<http://www.primature.gov.ml/>

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## 2 Informal power structures

### 2.1 Shadow governments

No indications were found of a shadow government in Gao. One interviewee in Bamako explicitly said there is no shadow government in Gao currently active. Also, the formal government in the North of Mali is hardly existent and is not functioning.

After the French had ousted the Islamists from Gao, a governance vacuum developed. By April 2013, Gao residents were calling for the rapid return of officials to re-start basic services and help run their town, which they said was in a state of “complete chaos”. The federal government made a direct appeal to administrators to return to their posts and in May 2013, UNICEF reported that it had provided support to enable authorities to resume their functions, while working together with security forces (notably the police). Despite these efforts, government authority is still not fully restored, and the operational capacity of national authorities has been severely compromised due to the lack of functional infrastructure and logistical resources available on the ground.

Only skeletal teams of administrators have returned to their posts. At the beginning of April 2013, Gao’s governor and prefects returned, as did the director of the academy that oversees the region’s schools. Officials responsible for health, energy, education, planning and other programmers have yet to return, though sources report that education authorities continue to return to the region of Gao. Since many officials remain absent in the region, government services are only limitedly available. Almost all the regional services in Gao are in disarray, according to one of the few teachers in Gao: *“Health, agriculture, taxes, social development, police, civil protection, the treasury, the banks... all are in disarray.”* UNICEF, for instance, reports the problems with civil registration of births.

The crisis in Mali is in its essence not a security problem but a political problem: the absence of a legitimate and effective government is a central cause of the crisis in the North of Mali. In short, the government is unable to effectively control the area, provide security, and guarantee the rule of law. It lacks resources, means, personnel, substantial checks and balances and is, to a great extent, corrupt. Due to this corruption and non-functioning the formal government has lost to a great extent its legitimacy and many officials had to flee the city of Gao. For example, the population was disgruntled with the governor of Gao Mamadou Abdoulaye Diallo and asked him to leave the 11th of October 2013. The mayor also had to leave town.

The police and justice chain in the region of Gao are also practically non-functioning and non-existent, lacking resources, training and personnel. In addition, Malians have little faith in the judicial system, which they see as the most corrupt government institution, and therefore they rather go to traditional or religious leaders to resolve disputes. There is one judge for every 25,000 Malians, while the international standard is closer to one for every 8,000. Courts are chronically underfunded. The few judges of Gao have left town. The rule of law before the crisis was already problematic and weak, and the crisis effectively dismantled the entire justice chain. Exemplary for this is the fact that the Court of Bamako has been made competent to rule about crimes committed during the crisis in the North, and not the court of Gao. The police system has the same problem of lack of resources, means and of corruption. There are also cases that the people wrongly believe that the police is corrupt. Due to lack of resources the police won’t follow up the prosecution of e.g. a crime or will accuse and prosecute the suspect of a lesser crime that is easier to prove. Nevertheless, people will think the police have let the suspect go and will think the police is corrupt.

Malinese people see decentralization as as a particularly Malian approach to democracy. Decentralization and dialogue were the key points of democracy under then President Alpha Oumar Konaré (stepped down in 2002) but fell short in recent years. Dialogue and opposition were undermined by the consensus politics of former President Amadou Toumani Touré. Touré was not aligned with any political party and invited all other political parties to join his coalition. This coalition soon undermined the political opposition that had been robust under President Alpha Oumar Konaré.

Also, the decentralization project failed. During decentralization, the weak Malian national government produced weak local governments with limited capacity. In 1999 the national government started a national decentralization project with the intention to give local governments more autonomy on important issues like health care, education and water. The decentralization project failed by lack of resources; questionable commitment of elites with no real accountability to the people; a too legalistic approach; and in general, a total lack of commitment of the national government to improve local governance and accountability.

A good example of this lack of concern for improving local governance is the failure of the government to follow through on peace agreements in the North, and the implementation of the Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali. In 2010, the European Union contributed 16.34 million euros to support this program, which aimed to reduce insecurity and terrorism in Northern Mali. It was a top down program whereby Bamako did not include local populations and, instead of focusing on development, it emphasized security. By focusing on security, the national government rather gave less than more autonomy to the North and strengthened its grip on the North. Therefore, tensions heightened between the North and the government in the South. It was, in fact, a major government miscalculation that contributed to instability in the region by reinforcing the awareness that the government was increasingly ignoring the concerns of those living in the North.

During the MNLA rule a shadow government of Azawad was formed. It was called the 'Conseil de la Transition de l'Etat de l'Azawad' (Transitional Council of the State of Azawad or CTEA) and it denounced the Malinese government. It had the intention to rule over the regions of Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao, and part of Mopti region, in which it had the desire to 'establish a secular government, and freeing the region from corrupt and ineffective Malian rule'. Gao was the temporary capital of Azawad, as eventually Timbuktu was to become the official capital, once MNLA-rule had been solidly established. Neither the Transitional Council nor the independent State of Azawad is recognized by any international body or country, besides the EOAS (Organization of Emerging African States). The Malinese state and the ECOWAS even actively opposed the Council. No recent indications of actual power of this shadow government of Azawad were found.

## **2.2 Local power brokers operating outside the state apparatus**

- In the Gao region there are four 'cercles' and in total 24 communities ('communes') spread over more 170.000 km<sup>2</sup>.
- There are practically no reliable inter-community local power brokers operating outside the state apparatus.
- Before the crisis, inter-community meetings where local leaders of different communities gathered, often took place during e.g. cultural activities. Since 2006/2007 these informal structures/cultural activities do not exist/take place anymore.

- Any power of local power brokers is reduced to community level. Therefore there are no reliable representatives exceeding the community level, so there are no reliable representatives of e.g. the Songhai, or the Tuaregs
- Local power brokers operating outside the state are historically important as conflict resolution actors/peace makers. Mali has a long successful history of dialogue between state, and non-state, traditional leaders. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (e.g Marabouts) are most often informal.
- Any dialogue or reconciliation talks should start – giving the absence of inter-community leaders – at the community level.
- Without traditional leaders there will be no peace. The inverse, however, is not as simple. Many traditional leaders are engaged in opportunistic political alliances and/or illegal businesses, so they are often both cause and solution of the conflict.

In the Gao region there are four ‘cercles’ and in total 24 communities (‘communes’) spread over more 170.000 km<sup>2</sup>. Currently, there are practically no reliable inter-community local power brokers operating outside the state apparatus. Before the crisis, inter-community meetings where local leaders of different communities gathered, often took place during e.g. cultural activities. An interviewee said that due to the security situation, since 2006/2007 these informal structures/cultural activities do practically not exist/take place anymore in the Gao region. According to him any power of local power brokers is reduced to community level. According to an interviewee, there are therefore no reliable representatives exceeding the community level, so there are no reliable representatives of e.g. the Songhai, or the Tuaregs.

The engagement of local communities in Northern Mali is essential to respond to its security issues and pressure of local communities is best in containing crime. In the past some inter-community meetings have been organized that brought together various stakeholders (formal, informal, state, non-state, civil society etc) in the security domain to educate communities about the various threats, and to raise people’s awareness and to attempt to bring back peace and stability. This ‘alternative security’ is embraced by Malian actors but its implementation is not effective yet.

An intercommunity meeting on peace and security in Northern Mali was organised in Kidal on 29 October 2009, bringing together 1,432 participants from the three Northern regions and Bamako. Every community present in the North of Mali was represented. The President of the 2006 Alger agreement Monitoring Committee was also present, as were the Directors of the Northern Development Agency and the National Investment Agency for Local Authorities, as well as Libyan and Algerian diplomats. The forum led to the establishment of the Northern Mali Network for Peace and Security, supported by the European Union. It involves locally elected representatives, *fraction* chiefs, community leaders, dignitaries and senior executives. Its objective is to foster social cohesion, promote non-violent approaches to resolving disputes, and prevent conflict. It is said that The Network is now the main point of contact for the Malian authorities and international partners but its effectiveness is uncertain. It acts as an interface between the government, local authorities, international partners and local communities. Since its inception, more than 360 *fractions* and villages have joined the Network and a provisional secretariat has been set up, made up of 45 members, one President (Alhabass Ag Intala) and two Vice-presidents (Abouzéidi Maiga and Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh).

Mali has a long successful history of dialogue with a variety of state and non-state Stakeholders. For example, the 1991 National Conference, was a ‘foundational moment for democracy in Mali’; citizens often refer to it as the ultimate example of successful dialogue in the country. The

conference was in fact a series of annual forums to debate topics such as insecurity, education, health, family law and brought together over 800 individuals with different backgrounds who could directly participate in building democracy.

Currently, dialogue is felt to be essential and according to an interviewee living in Bamako, the word dialogue is often used nowadays. Respondents of a series of interviews among more than seventy-five interviews with local leaders from central and Northern Mali carried out in October 2013 also emphasized the importance of dialogue at both the national level and the local level and that dialogue was key to peace and reconciliation. So, (inter)communal and inclusive dialogue must be at the heart of conflict resolution in Mali.

Given the absence of inter-community leaders any dialogue or reconciliation talks should start at the community level. In this respect it is important to avoid working with one side, group or fraction and to take care that all parties are involved. It is said that without traditional leaders there will be no peace. The inverse, however, is not as simple. Many traditional leaders are engaged in opportunistic political alliances and/or illegal businesses, so they are often both cause and solution of the conflict.

### 2.3 Incorporation of traditional power brokers within formal power structures

- In rural areas traditional power brokers are most often outside formal power structures. In the city there exists a mix of traditional informal power brokers and formal power brokers.
- Mayors/'chefferies' are often also chosen traditional leaders. And if not, the mayor's 'chef du quartier' or 'chef du fraction' are chosen traditional leaders. Therefore, mayors often function as interface between the formal government and informal local traditional leaders.
- Religious leaders are formally outside the State apparatus (due to Mali's laïcité = separation of state and religion). The power of religious leaders is slightly increasing. Jihadist are not necessarily seen as bad. They brought electricity and doctors as well.
- The system of informal traditional leaders remains, to outsiders, a blurred and undefinable system; a system hard to get a grip on.

In rural areas traditional power brokers operate most often outside formal power structures. In the city there exist a mix of traditional informal power brokers and formal power brokers. For example, most conflict that causes tensions between communities are about land and cattle. The land regulation and distribution in rural Mali relies on customary law, whereas in urban areas, land distribution is governed primarily by the Land Registry Law.

Traditional leaders, such as Marabouts, play an important part in traditional conflict resolution; they are sometimes involved in hostage negotiations and also have a tremendous influence over voters. However, the system of informal traditional leaders remains, to outsiders, a blurred and undefinable system; a system hard to get a grip on.

The traditional conflict resolution is called *Sanakouya* ('*alliance à plaisanterie*' in French) and is a solidarity system widespread in West Africa. Different clans and ethnic groups exchange jokes as a way of greeting each other, diffusing tensions and creating trust, all of which are indispensable for good communication. Malian communities in the North use similar methods to prevent and manage intercommunity conflicts.

Mayors/'chefferies' often function as interface between the formal government and informal local traditional leaders because mayors are often also chosen traditional leaders. And if not, the mayor's 'chef du quartier' or 'chef du fraction' are chosen traditional leaders.



Religion has been gaining importance and greater presence since the 1990s. The implementation of the Sharia and militant Salafist groups grew rapidly in Northern Mali. The population was not persé anti-militants/anti-Sharia because they brought some security, electricity and doctors. Mali is a laic state and thus religion and government are officially separated. But, the state works with Muslim and Christian organizations. The High Council of Islam, created in 2002 , is a liaison between government and local Muslim associations and has officially advised the state on matters related to Islam. The role of religious leaders still grows. An example of their growing power is the new family code. This law, that was debated over for two decades, and eventually was passed before The National Assembly was to improve women´s rights. However, the HCIM argued that the law did not recognize traditional and religious marriages and organized wide spread protest. Finally, the president gave in and modified the law. This shows the strength and political success of Muslim leaders. Also, the HCIM organized a meeting to which more than 50.000 attended in Bamako on August 12, 2012. The Muslim leadership presented itself as unified to tackle the crisis. The attendance of the then prime minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, underlined the government´s back up and support to the religious leaders. More information about religion can be found under point 4.

#### **2.4 The most powerful informal power brokers**

Based on the interviewees the following can be said:

- In short, there are hardly any informal power brokers exceeding the community level in Gao.
- Possibly, there are still some strong mayors in the Circle of Menaka. In the other circles, including Gao there are no strong mayors. The mayor of Gao, as well as the governor of Gao had to flee the city because the population were angry and dissatisfied with them
- Due to the crisis, corruption, malfunctioning state, governmental leaders have totally lost their legitimacy. This is true for traditional leaders as well, though to a slightly lesser extent.
- Mostly the Songhai, the black Tuaregs and their former slaves are now present and ruling in Gao. There are still some white Touregs at the river, but most of them are fled or do not stick out. However, the security situation is that uncertain and perilious that at any time the power can be shifted to e.g. the MNLA or other armed groups.
- An interviewee mentioned that the Songhrai family Maiga is an important family in Gao. Most village chefs are Maiga, including some religious leaders
- All interviewees mentioned that due to the situation most leaders cannot be trusted. Any contact should be checked and double-checked. They will say what you want to hear. The French (and thereby the Dutch and all Western people) are – apart from their popularity during operation Serval – not popular and mistrusted and seen as friends of the Tuaregs. People cooperating with them can be seen as collaborators. On the other hand, they can also be seen as bringers of stability and security.

**Sources:**

- 2.4 is predominantly based on different interviews and checked with information from other sources.
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- Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms, August 2012, Kalilou Sidibé, Institute of Development Studies, Research Report Vol 2012 No 77  
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RR77.pdf>
- Interviewer: TInt. S.Oudejans, Interviewee: M. Lankhorst, senior researcher at the Hague Institute for Global Justice. 21-11-2003, the Hague
- Interviewer: TInt. S.Oudejans, Interviewee: J.Nelen, Adviser Agriculture West-Africa, SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, 04-12-2013 Bamako, Mali
- Interviewer: TInt. S.Oudejans, Interviewee: A. van der Heide, ontwikkelingswerker in Noord Mali, 27-11-2013, Apeldoorn, 04-12-2013, Bamako, Mali
- Interviewer: E. Dortant, TInt. S.Oudejans, Interviewee: M. Stravens, ICCO, 14-11-2013, Amsterdam

### 3 IOs / NGOs

The three following topics are covered in this overview:

- 3.1 Locations of the current activities of IOs/NGOs in Gao region
- 3.2 Current spokespersons / LNOs for said IOs/NGOs
- 3.3 Assessment of the capability and the intent of currently active IOs/NGOs

The table exists out of three columns, first with the name of the NGO/ IO, continued with information and in the third column contact persons. Within each theme, the organizations are listed alphabetically.

List of active NGO's, organized in 9 themes by UN OCHA: coordination, shelter and non-food items, education emergency telecom, nutrition, protection, health care, food security, WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene).

<b>Organisation active in Gao</b>	<b>Information / intent</b>	<b>contact</b>
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#### Coordination

OCHA	OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.	Chief of OCHA office, Fernando Arroyo arroyof@un.org
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#### Shelter and non-food items

CR-Mali		
NRC	<a href="http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9683821.pdf">http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9683821.pdf</a>	T.b.a.

#### Education

IRC	<a href="http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali">http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali</a>	Abdoulaye Alassane head of IRCs education programs in Northern Mali's Gao region.
World Food Program/ Programme Alimentaire Mondial	WFP is part of the United Nations system and is voluntarily funded. WFP pursues a vision of the world in which every man, woman and child has access at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. We work towards that vision with our sister UN agencies in Rome -- the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development	Bureau de pays du PAM, Mali. - Nancy Walters, Representative nancy.walters@wfp.org.  - Ely Salem Ould El Hadj, Directeur Adjoint elysalem.ouldelhadj.@wfp.

	(IFAD) -- as well as other government, UN and NGO partners.	org
Save the Children	Save the Children is the leading independent organization creating lasting change in the lives of children in need in the United States and around the world. Recognized for our commitment to accountability, innovation and collaboration, our work takes us into the heart of communities, where we help children and families help themselves. We work with other organizations, governments, non-profits and a variety of local partners while maintaining our own independence without political agenda or religious orientation.	
UNICEF	UNICEF is mandated by the United Nations General Assembly to advocate for the protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential.	<p>Françoise Ackermans, UNICEF Representative in Mali.</p> <p>Hector Calderon Head of Communications UNICEF Mali Tel +223 7599 4089 <a href="mailto:hcalderon@unicef.org">hcalderon@unicef.org</a></p> <p>Anouk Desgroseilliers Humanitarian Affairs Officer - Reports Specialist OCHA Mali   Tel+ 223 7599 5761 <a href="mailto:desgroseilliers@un.org">desgroseilliers@un.org</a>.</p>

**Emergency telecom**

PAM	WFP is part of the United Nations system and is voluntarily funded. WFP pursues a vision of the world in which every man, woman and child has access at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. We work towards that vision with our sister UN agencies in Rome -- the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) -- as well as other government, UN and NGO partners.	<p>Bureau de pays du PAM, Mali. - Nancy Walters, Representative <a href="mailto:nancy.walters@wfp.org">nancy.walters@wfp.org</a>.</p> <p>- Ely Salem Ould El Hadj, Directeur Adjoint <a href="mailto:elysalem.ouldelhadj.@wfp.org">elysalem.ouldelhadj.@wfp.org</a></p>
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**Nutrition**

AAG-GAO	<a href="http://www.aide-Gao.org/">http://www.aide-Gao.org/</a>	
ACF-Espagne  Action contre la faim	<a href="http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/fr/content/mali">http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/fr/content/mali</a> ACF International) is an international humanitarian organization with a focus on ending world hunger. Action Against Hunger specializes in responding to emergency situations of war, conflict, and natural disaster. Their program areas include nutrition and health, water and sanitation, and food security.	
AVSF	<a href="http://www.avsf.org/">http://www.avsf.org/</a>  Agronomes et Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (AVSF) or Agronomists and Veterinarians Without Borders is an international humanitarian organization recognized as a public utility, which supports peasant agriculture since 1977.	
CR-France		
IRC international rescue committee	<a href="http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali">http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali</a>	
MDM Belgique- medecins du monde	<a href="http://www.medecinsdumonde.be/">http://www.medecinsdumonde.be/</a>	
Save the Cildren	Save the Children is the leading independent organization creating lasting change in the lives of children in need in the United States and around the world. Recognized for our commitment to accountability, innovation and collaboration, our work takes us into the heart of communities, where we help children and families help themselves. We work with other organizations, governments, non-profits and a variety of local partners while maintaining our own independence without political agenda or religious orientation.  When disaster strikes around the world, Save the Children is there to save lives with food, medical care and education and remains to help communities rebuild through long-term recovery programs. As quickly and as effectively as Save the Children responds to tsunamis and civil conflict, it works to resolve the ongoing struggles children face every day - poverty, hunger, illiteracy and disease - and replaces them with hope for the future.	
FAO- Food and	Achieving food security for all is at the heart of	Ms Fatouma Seid,

agriculture organisation	<p>FAO's efforts - to make sure people have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives.</p> <p>Our mandate is to improve nutrition, increase agricultural productivity, raise the standard of living in rural populations and contribute to global economic growth.</p>	fatouma.seid@fao.org
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**Protection**

GREFFA	<a href="http://www.rplmali.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=79&amp;Itemid=15">http://www.rplmali.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=79&amp;Itemid=15</a>	
IEDA RELIEF	<p>IEDA began operating in the country in February 2013. IEDA is part of the project 'Monitoring and Protection profiling areas of return; in partnership with the UNHCR. IEDA Relief has its main office in Bamako and 3 field offices in Segou, Timbuktu and Gao. International Emergency and Development Aid is US based organization with its head quarter in the Houston, Texas (USA)</p>	
IRC International rescue comittee	<a href="http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali">http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali</a>	
ICCO/ International Act Alliance/ Norwegian Church Aid/	<p>ACT Alliance is on the frontlines: addressing systemic poverty; supporting survivors of disasters, wars and conflicts; training rural communities in sustainable agricultural techniques; helping people adapt to environmental change; and influencing governments and other key decision makers to safeguard citizens human rights</p> <p>'providing for 50 000 people in Northern regions of Mali'</p>	<p>ICCO: Leo Spaans- baas Bamako ICCO <a href="mailto:Leo.spaans@icco-cooperation.org">Leo.spaans@icco-cooperation.org</a></p> <p>Sékou Kané- ICCO emergency aid program Northern Mali <a href="mailto:Sékou.kané@icco-cooperation.org">Sékou.kané@icco-cooperation.org</a></p>
OIM/ International organisation for Migration	<a href="http://www.iom.int">www.iom.int</a>	
OXFAM GB	<p>Working with thousands of local partner organizations, we work with people living in poverty striving to exercise their human rights, assert their dignity as full citizens and take control of their lives. Oxfam is running several programmes in the North of Mali, supporting 77,000 people affected by the consequences of the conflict. We are currently distributing food, providing cash grants to support livelihoods, providing fodder and vaccinations for livestock, and promoting health and hygiene to</p>	

	prevent the spread of disease.  <a href="http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/mali-crisis">http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/mali-crisis</a>	
UNHCR	The agency is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country. It also has a mandate to help stateless people.	

**Health**

ACF-Espagne  Action contre la faim	<a href="http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/fr/content/mali">http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/fr/content/mali</a> ACF International) is an international humanitarian organization with a focus on ending world hunger. Action Against Hunger specializes in responding to emergency situations of war, conflict, and natural disaster. Their program areas include nutrition and health, water and sanitation, and food security.	
CR-France/ Red Cross		
CR-Mali/ Red Cross		
FIDA/ IFAD:	The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), a specialized agency of the United Nations, was established as an international financial institution in 1977 as one of the major outcomes of the 1974 World Food Conference.	Bakary Coulibaly  Country Programme Officer  UNDP , BP 120  Bamako, Mali  b.coulibaly@ifad.org
GREFFA	<a href="http://www.rplmali.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=79&amp;Itemid=15">http://www.rplmali.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=79&amp;Itemid=15</a>	Fatimata Touré, head of Gao-based NGO GREFFA
IMC	<i>International Medical Corps is providing emergency health care, critical nutrition interventions, child immunizations, and protection services to Malians affected by the conflict</i>	Emergency Team Leader Pacifique Kigongwe PKigongwe@InternationalMedicalCorps.org
IRC international	<a href="http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali">http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali</a>	

rescue committee		
Medecines du monde Belgique	<a href="http://www.medecinsdumonde.be/monde/mali">http://www.medecinsdumonde.be/monde/mali</a> Budget Mali 2012: € 2912833,- (in 2012)	
MSF Medicines sans frontieres	Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is an international medical humanitarian organization created by doctors and journalists in France in 1971.	
WHO/ OMS- Organisations Moniale de Santé	<a href="http://www.afro.who.int/en/mali/who-country-office-mali.html">http://www.afro.who.int/en/mali/who-country-office-mali.html</a>	Monsieur le Représentant de l'OMS Fall, Dr Ibrahima-Socé Boîte postale 99 Bamako, Mali  Telephone: +223 202 23714 afwcoml@who.int
PU-AMI	Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale, <a href="http://www.pu-ami.org">http://www.pu-ami.org</a>	
Santé Diabete	<a href="http://www.santediabete.org/fr/">http://www.santediabete.org/fr/</a>	

**Food security**

ACF-Espagne Action contre la faim	<a href="http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/fr/content/mali">http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/fr/content/mali</a> ACF International) is an international humanitarian organization with a focus on ending world hunger. Action Against Hunger specializes in responding to emergency situations of war, conflict, and natural disaster. Their program areas include nutrition and health, water and sanitation, and food security.	
Adesah	<a href="http://www.societecivilemali.org/?ONG-ADESAH-recherche-UN-COMPTABLE">http://www.societecivilemali.org/?ONG-ADESAH-recherche-UN-COMPTABLE</a>	
AVSF	<a href="http://www.avsf.org/">http://www.avsf.org/</a> Agronomes et Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (AVSF) or Agronomists and Veterinarians Without Borders is an international humanitarian organization recognized as a public utility, which supports peasant agriculture since 1977.	
ICRC International committee of the red cross	<a href="http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/africa/mali/index.jsp">http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/africa/mali/index.jsp</a>	
GREFFA	<a href="http://www.rplmali.org/index.php?option=com_cont">http://www.rplmali.org/index.php?option=com_cont</a>	Contact : Mme TOURE Fatimata - Secrétaire



	<p><a href="#">nt&amp;view=article&amp;id=79&amp;Itemid=15</a></p> <p>women, health</p>	<p>Exécutive</p> <p>Adresse : BP : 68</p> <p>Ville : Gao (Mali)</p> <p>Tel : 282.04.19</p>
IRC international rescue committee	<p><a href="http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali">http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali</a></p> <p><a href="http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/fact-figures/10-04-mali-facts-figures.htm">http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/fact-figures/10-04-mali-facts-figures.htm</a></p> <p>Media contact person: Mr MBAOH NANA Valery Gervais</p> <p>Mobile: (+227) 97 45 43 82</p> <p>Languages spoken: French/English</p>	<p>ICRC mission</p> <p>Quartier Hamdallaye</p> <p>ACI 2000</p> <p>Rue 207</p> <p>BP 58</p> <p>BAMAOKO</p> <p>Phone: (+223) 2029 72 14</p> <p>Fax: (+223) 2029 72 16</p>
MERCY CORPS	<p>Empower Malian communities to cope with and recover from resource scarcity, particularly in fragile conflict-affected areas.</p> <p>Mercy Corps is focusing first on pregnant women and the mothers of young children. To date, we have provided 2,315 vulnerable families in Gao with vouchers redeemable at local markets for food, hygiene products and other essential supplies. This project benefits 18,000 people.</p>	<p>Program Officer Sarah Wardwell</p>
ONUFEMME/ UNWOMEN	<p>In July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly created UN Women, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. In doing so, UN Member States took an historic step in accelerating the Organization goals on gender equality and the empowerment of women. The creation of UN Women came about as part of the UN reform agenda, bringing together resources and mandates for greater impact. It merges and builds on the important work of four previously distinct parts of the UN system, which focused exclusively on gender equality and women empowerment</p>	<p>Mali Country Office</p> <p>3ème étage Immeuble</p> <p>Alou Diarra Hamdallaye</p> <p>ACI 2000 Bamako, MALI</p> <p>Tel: +223 76 40 83 98</p>
OXFAM GB	<p>Working with thousands of local partner organizations, we work with people living in poverty striving to exercise their human rights, assert their dignity as full citizens and take control of their lives. Oxfam is running several programmes in the North of Mali, supporting 77,000 people affected by the consequences of the conflict. We are currently distributing food, providing cash grants to support livelihoods, providing fodder and vaccinations for livestock, and promoting health and hygiene to</p>	

	<p>prevent the spread of disease.</p> <p><a href="http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/mali-crisis">http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/mali-crisis</a></p>	
WFP/ PAM	<p>WFP is part of the United Nations system and is voluntarily funded. WFP pursues a vision of the world in which every man, woman and child has access at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. We work towards that vision with our sister UN agencies in Rome -- the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) -- as well as other government, UN and NGO partners.</p>	<p>Office WFP, Mali. - Nancy Walters, Representative <a href="mailto:nancy.walters@wfp.org">nancy.walters@wfp.org</a></p> <p>- Ely Salem Ould El Hadj, Directeur Adjoint <a href="mailto:elysalem.ouldelhadj.@wfp.org">elysalem.ouldelhadj.@wfp.org</a></p>
SAHEL CONSULT	<p><a href="http://sahelconsulting.com/">http://sahelconsulting.com/</a></p> <p><a href="http://sahelconsult-mali.net/">http://sahelconsult-mali.net/</a></p> <p>E mail : <a href="mailto:dnoumou3ben@yahoo.com">dnoumou3ben@yahoo.com</a> et <a href="mailto:noumoudiakite3@gmail.com">noumoudiakite3@gmail.com</a> )</p> <p>Ousmane KONIPO (00223 66712040 Email : <a href="mailto:ouskonipo@yahoo.fr">ouskonipo@yahoo.fr</a>)</p>	<p>Dr Noumou DIAKITE</p> <p>0022366763799</p> <p>0022373475191</p>
TASSAGHT	<p>The NGO Tassaght is mainly targeting the poorest segments of the population , its goal is to reduce poverty and vulnerability in its area of intervention . To achieve this goal, Tassaght is based mainly on supporting initiatives developed by the rural communities. Through outreach and training as well as investments to facilitate production ( fences, wells, small equipment, ... ) Tassaght allows beneficiaries to improve their living conditions by developing a profitable gardening business.</p>	<p>St. Route SMB, Gao</p> <p>Tel 223 21 82 02 92</p>

**WASH**

ACF-Espagne Action contre la faim	<p><a href="http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/fr/content/mali">http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/fr/content/mali</a></p> <p>ACF International) is an international humanitarian organization with a focus on ending world hunger. Action Against Hunger specializes in responding to emergency situations of war, conflict, and natural disaster. Their program areas include nutrition and health, water and sanitation, and food security.</p>	
AVSF	<p><a href="http://www.avsf.org/">http://www.avsf.org/</a></p> <p>Agronomes et Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (AVSF) or Agronomists and Veterinarians Without Borders is an international humanitarian organization recognized</p>	

	as a public utility, which supports peasant agriculture since 1977.	
IRC- International Rescue committee	<a href="http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali">http://www.rescue.org/irc-mali</a>	IRCs Dicko Hamadou is directing water and sanitation projects in the Northern Gao region.
OXFAM GB	Working with thousands of local partner organizations, we work with people living in poverty striving to exercise their human rights, assert their dignity as full citizens and take control of their lives. Oxfam is running several programmes in the North of Mali, supporting 77,000 people affected by the consequences of the conflict. We are currently distributing food, providing cash grants to support livelihoods, providing fodder and vaccinations for livestock, and promoting health and hygiene to prevent the spread of disease. <a href="http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/mali-crisis">http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-response/mali-crisis</a>	
Solidarité Internationale	<a href="http://www.solidarites.org/en/nos-missions/mali">http://www.solidarites.org/en/nos-missions/mali</a> Working together with SEAD, local partner in this project, in May and June 2013 to assist 2,166 households in the Gao region where cholera cases was detected. In the absence of an emergency, it is 168,331 people who receive awareness training and diagnostics in villages. In parallel, IF identify 40 local associations that will be issued units of local production of chlorine.	
UNICEF	UNICEF is mandated by the United Nations General Assembly to advocate for the protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential.	<b>Françoise Ackermans,</b> <b>UNICEF Representative in Mali.</b>  Hector Calderon Head of Communications UNICEF Mali Tel +223 7599 4089 <a href="mailto:hcalderon@unicef.org">hcalderon@unicef.org</a>  Anouk Desgroseilliers Humanitarian Affairs Officer - Reports Specialist OCHA Mali   Tel+ 223 7599 5761 <a href="mailto:desgroseilliers@un.org">desgroseilliers@un.org</a> .

source:

<http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/emergency-support-conflict-affected-population-mali-%E2%80%93-mli131>

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#### 4. Social-cultural structures

##### 4.1 The role of religion in the daily life for the average Gaoan

###### Conclusion

Approximately 90 to 95 per cent of the Malian population is Muslim. An estimated 3 per cent of Malians adhere to indigenous or traditional animist beliefs. However, a clear line between the different religions can hardly be drawn, since there exist many different mixtures of Islam and animism. Another 3 per cent is Christian. Atheism and agnosticism are very rare in the Malian society. Islam as traditionally practiced in Mali is characterized as moderate, tolerant, and adapted to local conditions. Relations between Muslims and practitioners of minority religious faiths were generally amicable. While under influence of the Jihadi rebels between April 2012 and January 2013 in Gao, Christians were under big threat of persecution.

###### History

The dominant ancient pre-Islamic religion in Mali was animist. Believers prayed to the Spirit of the Land asking them to increase the growth and harvest of the crops.


Islam was introduced by Arab traders who brought not only trade goods through caravan trails across the Sahara, but also their religion the Islam in the 13th century. Gradually Islamization filtered down to the common people as they accepted the new faith, although they never entirely gave up their traditional animist faith. Slowly and gradually, Islam became the dominant religion in Mali.

###### Islam

Approximately 90 to 95 per cent of the Malian population is Muslim, mostly Sunnites, with a strong tradition in Sufism. Sufism as Islamic religious movement is characterized by the exchange and influences of religious and spiritual aspects. Sufism, or *Tasawwuf* as it is known in the Muslim world, is Islamic mysticism. Because of the exchange of religious and spiritual aspects, one definition of Sufism cannot be given. Sufism says that true religion is inner truth, not outer practice; liberalizing strict rules of Islam.

Sufism traditions or way of thinking is combined with Sunni Islam. Within Sunni Islam, there are four schools of *Fiqh*; four branches with different interpretations of religious law based on the ideas of four imams. In Mali, Maliki is the most common school, as it is in large shares of Northern Africa (see map).

Most Islamic militants from the main armed Islamist groups in the North—AQIM, Ansar al Dine and MUJAO follow a more stricter school of Islam, which is dominant in Saudi-Arabia; the Hanbali school. Hanbali jurisprudence is considered very strict and conservative, especially regarding questions of theology.



Islam as traditionally practiced in Mali was characterized as moderate, tolerant, and adapted to local conditions. It was often combined with animistic and local traditions. This mixing of Islam with the more traditional African religions can be explained by the gradual process by which Islam was spread through the Sahel. This has caused Islam in Mali to be less strict compared to its counterparts in, for instance, Northern Africa and Asia. Women do not have to be veiled, and alcohol consumption is widely accepted. Women were allowed to participate in social, economic and political activities, although this share is low. The Tuareg and Arab groups within Mali are the exception though, as these groups generally cling to stricter forms of Islam.

Central to the Malinese concept of Islam are the 'Marabouts', elsewhere known as a Murshid ("Guide"). These are important religious men that are considered to be the link between Allah and the people. These Marabouts perform for instance ritual healings and the telling of fortune. They are also consulted when family or financial problems occur. Marabouts rely mostly on donations to live. Often there is a traditional bond to support a specific marabout that has accumulated over generations within a family.

Relations between Muslims and practitioners of minority religious faiths were generally amicable, and foreign missionary groups (both Muslim and non-Muslim) were tolerated. However, since the 2012 imposition of the Sharia in the Northern areas of Mali under the Islamist militants, tolerance towards non-Muslims was extremely reduced. Since then Mali was listed high (no. 7) in the Christian persecution index published by the NGO Open Doors, even above Iran (no. 8). Open Doors monitors persecution of Christians globally and serves those in need. The organization described the persecution in the North as 'extreme'.

Implementation of Sharia included banning of music, with groups showing up randomly in villages, armed with weaponry, to burn musical instruments and musical items. Other rules such as cutting off hands or feet of thieves, stoning of adulterers and public whipping of smokers, alcohol drinkers and women who are not properly dressed were also implemented, also repressing moderate and liberal Muslims in the area. After the intervention of the French Army, the armed extremists have left the city of Gao. Since then, social and community activities which were banned under the Islamist militants, such as sports for schoolgirls, have re-emerged.

A historic centerpiece in Gao is the Askia Tomb, built in 1495. It is the largest and best known mosque in the area, popular with locals and is also open for visitors of the area (except Friday during mid-day prayers). Since 2004 it is an UNESCO World Heritage Site.

### **Indigenous religious beliefs**

Approximately 3 to 5 per cent of the population adheres primarily to indigenous religious beliefs; Animism. In the pre-Islamic era, Animism was the dominant religion throughout Mali. Communities adhering these beliefs pray to the Spirit of the Land. Animist believers can be found throughout Mali, but mostly in rural areas and often belonging to the ethnic groups of the Bambara, Malinké, Bobo, Songhai, Sénufo or the Dogon.

### **Christianity**

In Mali approximately 3 per cent is Christian, both Catholics and Protestants. Christians can mainly be found within the Dogon and Bobo ethnic groups. Nonetheless, there is a Catholic and Protestant representation in most cities and larger villages, including churches which have both economic and social functions.

In Gao there is a little Christian community, although shape and numbers are very unclear: many fled the region in 2012 because of the threatening security situation, especially for religious minorities. The church of Gao was destroyed in March 2012. Specifications are unclear. Unconfirmed news showed that approximately 200 to 300 Catholics stayed in Gao while the Sharia was imposed, it is unclear if, and if so how many Catholics have already returned to Gao.

### **Sources:**

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<http://www.blackpast.org/gah/city-Gao>  
<http://histclo.com/country/afr/mali/act/ma-rel.html>  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle\\_of\\_Gao](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gao)  
<http://www.france24.com/en/20121206-africa-mali-islamism-sharia-eritrea-uganda-football-refugees-kenya-music-industry-piracy>  
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<http://www.modernghana.com/news/449952/1/basketball-girls-back-on-sharia-square-in-malis-ga.html>  
<http://www.news.va/en/news/africamali-in-Gao-the-church-and-the-caritas-local>  
<http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/agim.html>  
<http://www.opendoors.nl/vervolgdechristenen/ranglijst-christenvervolgning/landenoverzicht/mali/>  
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/#wrapper>  
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/02/mali-jihadis-sharia-black-africans>  
<http://www.worldshare.org.uk/where-we-work/africa/mali/tahanint-nmassinag-e-tinbuktu/ministry-rebirth-in-islamic-west-africa/>  
[http://www.worldwatchlist.us/?utm\\_source=opendoorsusa.org&utm\\_medium=referral&utm\\_campaign=wwl&utm\\_content=homepage-banner](http://www.worldwatchlist.us/?utm_source=opendoorsusa.org&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=wwl&utm_content=homepage-banner)

#### 4.2 The role of ethnicity in daily life/common social interaction in the Gao society

Traditionally, ethnic groups in Gao lived peacefully together, and were intertwined in social, economic and cultural areas. During the conflict, however, ethnic tensions rose, with on the one side the light-skinned Tuaregs and Arabs, and on the other the darker skinned ethnic groups, such as the Songhai, the Peul, the Bella and the Bambara. During the Islamist occupation of Gao, residents claim that dark-skinned inhabitants were mainly targeted for sharia punishment, while after the Islamist occupation, there have been reports of violent acts of retribution aimed at the light-skinned Gao inhabitants.

Part of the explanation of the ethnic tensions lays in the active and strategic use of ethnicity by (political) leaders in order to mobilize people, or to pursue a 'divide and rule' strategy. Oxfam argues that ethnicity has become an important dimension of Gao's daily life, as ethnic tensions are still present. Inter-group trading, for instance, is still not back on the level where it once was. On the other hand, Oxfam sees potential in ethnic reconciliation, considering the many years of peaceful co-existence between the different groups in Gao.

##### 4.2.1 Peaceful ethnic relations before the conflict

The Gao-region is dominated by the Songhai, which is a dark-skinned ethnic group. However, the city of Gao is Northern Mali's largest and most diverse urban environment, where ethnic groups such as the Songhai, Peul, Fulani, Tuareg, Arabs, Bella and Bambara lived peacefully side by side. The different groups were interdependent, and formed social, economic and cultural networks. For instance, the Songhai traditionally sold cereals, and the Tuaregs would trade their cattle with members from different ethnic groups (*Oxfam, 2013*). Thereby, most of these groups all adhere to Islam.

In the broader context of Mali, relations between darker-skinned ethnical groups are generally well and interwoven. Stereotypes exist, but humour and jokes about these stereotypes is used to end conflicts. Tuareg and Arabs however are largely excluded from this. Views of the darker-skinned ethnic groups towards these groups have always been slightly negative, and vice versa.

##### 4.2.2. Growing ethnic tensions during the conflict

During the conflict, ethnic cleavages between the different ethnic groups in Gao (re-)emerged. Human Rights Watch reported already in December 2012 that the deepest ethnic cleavages in Northern Mali were between the Songhai and Peul on the one hand, and the Tuaregs who supported the MNLA on the other. This is mainly due to the fact that the rebellion was initiated by the MNLA, which remains a Tuareg movement, despite its attempts to involve more different groups. Therefore, many of the Songhai in Gao viewed the MNLA as an effort by the Tuareg to impose their will on the city and particularly over Songhai populations. It should be mentioned, however, that ethnicity is often used in a strategic way by (political) leaders, either to mobilize people, or to pursue a 'divide and rule' strategy. For instance, the MUJAO and its allies have used ethnicity in a strategic manner, in order to connect to the different ethnic groups in Gao. They tried to appeal to Gao's Songhai population, by producing videos full of Songhai ethnic references and symbols. It is not clear to what extent they actually succeeded in involving the Songhai by appealing to their ethnicity. The Islamists were welcomed by the general population when they ousted the MNLA, but the general understanding is that this was the case, because under MNLA-rule, the city experienced chaos and anarchy. The Islamists, on the contrary, at least offered stability.



**Skin colour**

The role of skin colour should not be underestimated, as for many actors in the conflict the colour of the skin is directly related to ethnicity. The conflict has even been referred to by Malians as a 'war of colours', 'war on white skins' or as 'racism against black populations'. This is mainly due to the difference in skin colour between the Tuaregs and Arabs, who are considered white, and the other ethnic groups, who are considered black. Gao residents claim that during the Islamist occupation, mainly the black skinned inhabitants of Gao were targeted for sharia punishments, belonging to ethnic groups such as the Songhai, the Bella and the Bambara. Mali is now in a situation in which both groups complain about racial discrimination on the part of the other group.

**Ethnic militias**

That ethnicity is a factor of importance is also shown through the formation or re-emerging of ethnic militias during the conflict. One of these militias is the Ganda Koy, or 'Masters of the Earth'. It is a Songhai self-protection militia, and has its roots in the 1990s, during the first Tuareg-led rebellion. It has fought with the Malian army against Tuareg rebels, and they have allegedly committed massacres against Tuareg civilians during previous rebellions. The head of the Ganda Koy told a reporter in January 2013 that they "*consider all Tuaregs MNLA*". Another militia is the Ganda Izo, a Fulani ethnic militia, which was formed in 2008 and performs a similar function to Ganda Koy, namely providing self-protection and countering the Tuareg rebellion. Supposedly, the Ganda Izo has now expanded to include more ethnic groups than just the Fulani. Human Rights Watch issued a warning in January 2013 that the ethnic militias, such as the Ganda Koy and the Ganda Izo, were compiling lists of members of the MNLA, Ansar al-Dine, and other groups and their collaborators. The ethnic militias have used bloody violence before, during the previous rebellions in the 1990s and the 2000s.

**The army**

Also the army seems to be contributing to the ethnic tensions. Since the unrest in the North started, the army allegedly was involved in violent actions against (white skin) civilians. Human Right Watch reports that a number of Tuareg and Arab civilians have been subjected to serious abuses, including murder, by the security forces. It remains unclear whether the army has used such violence against Tuaregs and Arabs specifically in Gao.

**4.2.3 After the French intervention in Gao; ethnic tensions remain**

The Security Council report of October 2013 states that the relationship among and between communities in some parts of the Northern regions remain tense, particularly among and between the Arab, Tuareg, Peul and Songhai communities. Civilians' experiences include widespread violence, severe human rights violations, and a mass exodus. This has weakened social ties more generally, restricted interactions and provoked feelings of fear and mistrust.

However, since the French intervention, it seems that especially the Tuaregs and Arabs in Gao are threatened. The securing of the Northern towns in January 2013 was followed by the looting of homes and shops owned by Arabs or Tuaregs by both civilians and Malian soldiers who accused them of having supported the rebels. Other sources report the public lynching of Tuaregs and Arabs, as they were believed to be jihadi fighters. These jihadi fighters were teared limb by limb by the crowd. By May 2013, a vigilante group 'the Patrollers of Gao' was combing the town for members of the MUJAO, and it has been reported that seized men were publically beaten in the marketplace. Malian soldiers have intervened, though supposedly also these soldiers consider most Tuareg traitors. Very few Arabs or Tuaregs remain in Gao, as they fled the town fearing violent acts of retribution, or arrest

and beatings by Malian forces. Some of those have already begun to return, but there is still a risk of tension and conflict between those who come back and those who remained.

#### **4.3 Changed ethnic composition since the recent shifts in population in Northern Mali**

It is still early to tell how the recent shifts in population have changed the ethnic composition of Gao. However, a survey executed by Oxfam in Gao and Timbuktu shows that the mass displacement of populations (mostly of Tuareg and Arabs), has brought about new demographic realities. In many Northern Mali villages the traditional composition and ethnic diversity has changed. Some multi-ethnic villages have been transformed into mono-ethnic villages. In Gao, few Tuaregs and Arabs remain, also because of the threat of retaliation. Most of the Arab and Tuareg refugees and IDPs state they want to return to their home in Gao, though it is no telling when they will actually do so.

Like many other Northern cities and towns, the share of Arab and Tuareg populations in Gao used to be larger than in Southern parts of Mali. However, the vast majority in Gao is not Tuareg or Arab, but Songhai. Traditionally the Tuareg are nomadic pastoralists, though the past decade many of them have adopted a more a settled lifestyle, due to drought in the entire Sahel region. Since early 2012, over 380.000 people in Mali were forced to flee their homes, mainly Arabs and Tuaregs. Most of them have found refuge in the country (334.000). Others, some 20.000, have fled the country, to amongst others Mauritania and Niger. About 17.400 are registered as refugee at UNHCR. Many of the displaced ethnic Tuareg and Arabs face harsh conditions since their displacements: often, they are treated as separatists or islamists. Therefore, most of them are afraid to return home, as they fear retaliation.

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## 5 Locations and state of important socio-economic structures

### 5.1 Locations of the following: mosques, public gathering-places (stages, parks, social hang-out spots etc) / Markets, petrol stations/ Public transport terminuses/Public transport companies / Medical services (doctors /hospitals)

#### Public gathering places in Gao

- **Stade Kasse Keita (stadium)**  
Kruising: Avenue de Dia en Rue 201
- **Grand Mosquee**  
Avenue de Askia
- **Grand Marché**  
Rue 206, Western end, opposite Hotel Atlantide
- **Ferry Port run by CoMaNav**  
Located at Niger river Quai near Grand Market
- **Commisariat de Police et de Immigration**  
Adress : Avenue de Askia  
50 meters South east of Grand Mosque
- **Hôpital de Gao**  
Address: between Avenue de l'Aéroport and Avenue Aldouseini o Touré
- **Pharmacie Populaire de Gao**  
Address: Avenue de Askia  
100 meters South east of Grand Mosque
- **Radio Gao**  
RN 8, South entrance of Gao town South of at Vegetable Gardens
- **Lebazy Internetcafe**  
Rue 206

### 5.2 The state of: Potable water systems (pumps/taps) / electricity / Communications systems (radio installations/telephony) / Public transport

#### 5.2.1 Potable water systems (pumps/taps)

##### Gao

- Gao, population 86,633 inhabitants (2009) today 70,000 inhabitants.
- Gao's water system is managed by *Société Malienne de Gestion de l'eau Potable* (SOMAGEP).

- Before the crisis the SOMAGEP system output was 6,500 m<sup>3</sup>/day for 4,800 distribution points, private households or some 72 public water fountains managed by several private water resale committees, «comités de revente d'eau privés».
- According to the SOMAGEP network map, the water grid could not feed the entire population, its 6,500 m<sup>3</sup>/day optimal output won't cover the estimated 8,307 m<sup>3</sup>/day peak need.
- The other serious concern is the low quality of the distributed water, its high manganese and iron content even if lowered, is not fixed by the existing treatment system: The distributed tap water is NOT potable.
- Since several months the water distribution system cannot cover the basic population's need, several sectors not being covered anymore, the inhabitants have asked the local administration and the locally represented international NGO's regarding these points

The output has been reduced to 4000m<sup>3</sup>/day because of :

- Failures having occurred on 4 of the 11 collection wells
- Time limited electricity feed to the pumps
- Illegal connections to the grid creating a 40 to 60 % loss and a reduction of the output disrupting or cutting the distribution in some city sections

What has been done in 2013 :

- RCIC has provided fuel for the power generators to respond to the emergency water need until last September.
- SOMAGEP has sent a technical team in May 2013 opening two additional wells.
- French «SERVAL» force has renewed the pumps.
- What seems to be much needed is the improvement of the water quality in order to reach a constant potability. It could be helped by renovating the pumping stations and pipes, the treatment units, creating a quality control lab and reinforcing the power supply.

## **Mali General**

### **Infrastructure: Potable water**

Mali possess large potential of natural resources amongst others water however this situation varies regionally due to the variation in the rainfall in the regions. One of Africa's largest river the Niger crosses through Mali. Irrigation of agriculture is on a large scale depend on the availability of sufficient water supply and the infrastructure of the water supply. Nevertheless the abundance of water, there is a scarcity of water regionally and in some period of time. The river Niger runs through 9 countries hence that many institutions in different countries are responsible for good integrated water management. Food supply and integral water management is one of the top priorities of overseas development department (OS) of the Dutch embassy in Mali.

### **Gao Region**

Due to degradation and neglected maintenance more than half of the existing water supply infrastructure is no longer functioning and serious scarcity of water occurs in Menaka. The International Rescue Committee is since April 2012 with an Emergency team operational in Mali and in cooperation with local partner organizations repairing 7 existing water pumps/ installations. Around 1.000 Non-Food-item (NFI) kits with a.o. water purifying tablets were supplied to 1.000 families who were for their water supply dependent on contaminated water. From this project approximately 48.000 inhabitants will benefit including 7.000 displaced persons from other regions.

**Sources:**

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(source FLA-PVO / 04.12.2013)

<http://www.nwp.nl/activiteiten/internationale-activiteiten/mali.php>

## 5.2.2 Electricity

### Gao

- National electricity company E.D.M (*Électricité du Mali*) fixed 3 of the 7 generator units it operates in Gao.
- At best, power is provided from 18.00 to 05.00 but not constantly in all the city sections.

### Mali

- In Mali no natural resources as coal, gas or oil are available.
- The energetic consumption of Mali is at 80% biomass.
- Coal or wood are used at 99% as a source of energy by households which represent themselves ¾ of the energy use of the country.
- The over-harvesting of wood is a major ecologic threat to Mali's natural areas.
- The lack of cheap and reliable energy sources is a major holdback to economic development.

### General

Energy is a cross-cutting issue, which explains the presence of many players in the sector. It is currently managed by the Prime Minister's Office, which supervises the Commission de la Régulation de l'Énergie et de l'Eau du Mali (CREE), five ministries, four national technical directorates and three specialized services overseen by the Ministry of Energy and Water. The National Directorate of

Energy is responsible for defining the PEN and for coordinating and supervising technical services in charge of policy implementation at the regional and sub-regional levels.

### Energy:

In 2008, the energy balance reported that biomass (firewood and charcoal) accounted for about 80% of national energy consumption, fossil fuel 16%, electricity 3%, and renewable energy (other than hydropower) 1%.

### The energy sector comprises four main sub-sectors:

- a) Fossil fuel: The oil and gas sub-sector is characterized by total dependence on petroleum imports.
- b) Traditional energy: Fuel wood is the primary traditional energy source for households. Mali's forestry potential is estimated at roughly 33,000,000 hectares (ha), including a standing volume of about 520,000,000 m<sup>3</sup>.
- c) Renewable energy: The national renewable energy inventory reveals substantial potential depending on energy source. Although these sources have never been factored into the energy mix, they may be about 3% of conventional electricity generation or 12 megawatts (MW). One of the objectives of the Politique Énergétique Nationale (PEN) is for renewable energies to reach 6% penetration in the country's energy mix by 2010 and 10% by 2015.
- d) Electricity: The national electricity access rate was 27.1% in 2010. The demand for electricity is growing by 10% annually. The electricity access rate is around 55% in urban areas, but only 14% in rural areas. The PEN projects a rise in the electrification rate from 1% in 2005 to 12% in 2010 and 55% in 2015. So far, results are consistent with goals. The average electricity generation costs

are estimated at USD 0.24/kWh for the electricity supplier Énergie du Mali SA (EDM SA), while off-grid generation costs for private energy service companies (SSD Koray Kurumba and SSD Yeleen Kura) are estimated at about USD 0.47/kWh.

Energy Resources					
Resource	Value	Units	Rank	Period	Source
Wind Potential	0	Area(km <sup>2</sup> ) Class 3-7 Wind at 50m	143	1990	NREL
Solar Potential	4,312,187,335	MWh/year	21	2008	NREL
Coal Reserves	Unavailable	Million Short Tons	N/A	2008	EIA
Natural Gas Reserves	0	Cubic Meters (cu m)	114	2010	CIA World Factbook
Oil Reserves	0	Barrels (bbl)	139	2010	CIA World Factbook

**The energy problem should be tackled at 2 different levels**

The energetic consumption of Mali is at 80% biomass. Coal or wood are used at 99% as a source of energy by households which represent themselves ¾ of the energy use of the country. Only 10% of the population has access to electricity principally in urban areas. Hydroelectricity represents 70% of the electricity produced in the country. The over-harvesting of wood is a major ecologic threat to Mali's natural areas. The lack of cheap and reliable energy sources is also a major holdback to economic development. The energy problem should be tackled at 2 different levels:

**Consumption of Energy**

Mali, as many other developing countries has the advantage of having a low consumption of energy compared to developed countries. Nevertheless, this consumption is uncontrolled and already has had dramatic consequences on the environment. The economic development of the country and rise in standards of living of the Malians will lead to an increase in that consumption. It is then necessary to implement development policies in favour of sustainable solutions and energy conservation. The problem has to be faced differently for households and industries. Policies must favour technologies consuming less energy and material goods with longer life span. The energy consumption of households must be minimized. For industries, symbiotic system similar to the ones observed in nature should be mimicked. The excess production of energy of one industry feeds the other and the waste of the first are the primary resource of the second. It is a circular system reusing waste and maximizing production as the industrial symbiosis of Kalunborg in Denmark. The last problem is transportation. Mali has the chance to still have very few car compare to the population. It is important to develop an efficient public transportation system combining water ways, railroad, eco-friendly vehicles (lower carbon emission, using biofuel, bicycles...) to control carbon emission and segmentation of ecosystems but ensuring the freedom of move for the inhabitants.

**Energy Stations**

Hydroelectric station	Community	Coordinates	Type	Capacity	Year completed	Name of reservoir	River
Manantali Power Station			Reservoir	200 MW	2002	Manantali Reservoir	Bafing River



**Sources :**

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<https://sites.google.com/a/tcd.ie/mali-mdp/events>

<http://en.openei.org/wiki/Mali> (*Open Energy Information*)

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### 5.2.3 Communications systems (radio installations/telephony)

- Islamists militants have destroyed the existing network in Gao to prevent intelligence feed to the Malian and French forces.
- Land lines seem to be operational again at least in the city
- GSM\3G is provided again by two operators : Orange and Malitel but the region coverage is far from being completed
- Telephony/internet through land lines is almost not available.
- In the last 2 years mobile telephony has grown strongly in Mali.
- In Mali, mobile telephony is a very important "infra factor" (the same applies, for example, in countries like Somalia).
- There are two major mobile telephone operators, **ORANGE** (originally: Ikatel, a subsidiary of Sonatel, of Senegal) and **Malitel** (a subsidiary of SOTELMA, the state owned telecommunications company).
- There will be licensed a third operator within Mali (**Alpha Telecom Mali**) within the upcoming year(s).
- Internet Country Code (Top level domain): ML

#### General

##### Telecommunications in Mali

The infrastructure of Communications in Mali, while underdeveloped, is crucial to the nation. *Orange* and *Malitel* (Sotelma) are the current mobile providers with over 99% of subscribers on pre-paid.

##### Providers / providers Mobile telecom

1. ORANGE
2. Malitel

There are two major mobile telephone operators, **ORANGE** (originally: Ikatel, a subsidiary of Sonatel, of Senegal) and **Malitel** (a subsidiary of SOTELMA, the state owned telecommunications company). There will be licensed a third operator within Mali (**Alpha Telecom Mali**) within the upcoming year(s).

##### Ad 1. Orange Mali

Orange Mali, originally Ikatel, is a Malian telecommunications company, mobile operator. Ikatel, subsidiary of the Société nationale des Télécommunications (Sonatel) Senegal, belonging to the France Telecom Group, was renamed Orange Mali on 30 November 2006<sup>1</sup>. Orange is the second mobile phone operator in Mali since February 2003, its network covers Bamako, the eight regional capitals (Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal), Kati, Koutiala and Sévaré cities as Bamako-Koulikoro and Kayes-Yélimané roads.

Orange has the dominant but eroding market share of over 60%. The government is planning to

license a third mobile operator. The introduction of ADSL, WiMAX and mobile data services has started to accelerate growth in the internet and broadband market, but Mali's landlocked location makes it dependent on neighboring countries for international fiber bandwidth, which has kept prices high. Improvements in this sector can be expected from the arrival of new competitive international submarine fiber systems to the region in 2011 and 2012. Both ORANGE AND MALITEL currently offer fixed line and mobile voice services, in addition to broadband via either ADSL and wireless in the local loop (SOTELMA) or WiMAX (Orange). Minutes of use per subscriber were last reported at 48 by orange in December 2010. Business Monitor international forecasts a penetration of 90.3% | 2015 – significantly less than the INFORMA/WCIS forecast in the graph below. BMI believes rapid network expansion to underserved areas and increasing downward pressure on mobile tariffs are among the main growth drivers in Mali's mobile market

Orange's market share continues to be eroded by second operator Sotelma. At the end of June 2011, orange had a market share of 63.4%, down from 68.6% at the end of December 2010 and 73.6% a year earlier

## Ad 2. SOTELMA

SOTELMA is a private telecommunications company in Mali. The company is based in Bamako. Sotelma provides local telephony, international telephony, internet service and mobile telephone service, etc. Its mobile service subsidiary is **Malitel**. It is also the official registry of the .ml country code domain. The full name of the company in the French language is "Société des télécommunications au Mali".

In 2008, it was announced the government of Mali would privatize Sotelma to an as yet unnamed private party. The company was divided with 51% going to a single private investor, 20% retained by the government, 10% going to employees, and 19% sold by public offer. Privatization was finalized in 2010. As of 2002, Sotelma had a total worth of 43,817 billion CFA francs, over 1300 staff, operated 1100 km of fibre optic transmission line, 9 DOMSAT relay stations, 19 VSAT stations, 110000 telephone subscriber lines and 5241 public phones.

SOTELMA provides X.25 and dial-up telephone services. Many operators offer dial-up internet service, and wireless internet services. Most ISPs are small Bamako based providers with a VSAT connection, a cyber cafe and use wireless systems (Alvion, 802.11a,b, g, Motorola) to share their service with their clients. Bamako has at least 21 wireless providers, ranging from small VSAT operators, to sophisticated, multi-access point, full services providers.

	Orange	Malitel / Sotelma
Mobile Subscribers*	6,610,000	4,236,000
Market Share*	61%	39%
Market Position	1/2	2/2
ARPU	7.14 US\$	6.25 US\$
License*	GSM 900 & WCDMA 2100	GSM 900
Mobile Money	Yes, Mobile Money	N.a.

Geographical Coverage	N.a.	N.a.
Population Coverage	40% (Apr 2004)	N.a.
Main Network Supplier*	BTS and MSC: Alcatel & Huawei (MMSC = Ericsson)	Alcatel & NSN
Cell Sites	N.a..	N.a.

BMI 2011; \* WCIS Data Nov 2011 (Dec ember 2011 estimated)

### History

Prior to the 19th century, the area which became Mali was crisscrossed by trade and communication links, the most important being the Niger River, and important Southern terminals of the Trans-Saharan trade routes. Only the most basic infrastructure (notably the Dakar-Niger Railway) was constructed during the period of French Colonialism. During the first two decades of independence, Mali received major technical and financial support from the former Soviet Union, China, and their allies, especially in the area of radio and television broadcasting. Since the 1980s, the government has instituted major infrastructural drives, primarily funded by European government partners, to improve and expand communications. Cellular phone usage, due to the vast and sparsely populated distances in the North and west, has grown tremendously since the 1990s. Internet connectivity, very low by developed world standards, has been the focus of decentralized commune based development projects since the year 2000, while the government participates in the UN's Global Alliance for ICT and Development and the Connect Africa projects to further computer and internet availability in the country.

### Telephone service

There are some 75,000 (2005) landlines in Mali, far outstripped by 869,600 (2005) cellular lines. There are two major mobile telephone operators, Ikatel (a subsidiary of Sonatel, of Senegal) and Malitel (a subsidiary of SOTELMA, the state owned telecommunications company). In June 2003, legislation passed allowing other private telecommunications operators to enter the market.

- Telephone system: domestic system unreliable but improving; provides only minimal service
- Domestic: network consists of microwave radio relay, open wire, and radiotelephone communications stations; expansion of microwave radio relay in progress
- International: satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean)

### Radio and television

- Radio broadcast stations: Government funded: AM 1, shortwave 1.
- Radios: 570,000 (1997)
- Television broadcast stations: 1 (plus repeaters) (2001)
- Televisions: 45,000 (1997)

Since 1994 Malian law allowed privately owned (as in non-state) radiostations to operate. Foreign funding, and some commercial funding (mostly in the capital) have helped to established 160 FM stations in Mali, though many of those are small community "suitcase radio stations". Private radio-owners are required to be member of URTEL, the radio union <http://urtel.radio.org.ml>.

The state operated radio, is ORTM (office de Radiodiffusion au Television de Mali), which operates two FM stations and one television station, with repeaters throughout the country.

*note: The shortwave station in Bamako has seven frequencies and five transmitters and relays broadcasts for China Radio International (2001)*

### Internet

Internet usage is low by international standards, ranked 123 of 125 by the UN in 2002.

- Internet Service Providers (ISPs): 13 (2001) . There are an estimated 24 private internet service providers. Recently an association has been formed called AFIM (Association de Fournisseurs de l'Internet au Mali), which is intended to represent these providers.
  - In 2011, Mali's total Internet penetration rate was 2.9% of the population.
  - Internet users: 414,985 (2011)

### Authority

*“AMRTP / Autorité Malienne de Régulations des Télécommunications/TIC et des Postes”*

ACI 2000 Hamdallaye

Rue 390 Porte 1849

Tel : (+223) 20 23 14 90 /44 90 10 87

Fax : (+223) 20 23 14 94

Email: [amrtp@amrtp.ml](mailto:amrtp@amrtp.ml)

### Branding - Logo's



Other backgrounds:

### **“ MALI'S SOTELMA SIGNS SECOND WIRELESS DEAL WITH HUAWEI**

Mali's incumbent telecoms operator Société des Télécommunications du Mali, Sotelma has signed a partnership agreement with China's Huawei Technologies as part of a concerted effort to strengthen political and economic ties between their respective countries. Huawei will work with Sotelma to develop a wireless network, by providing and deploying equipment, and helping the telco to secure financing for the project, some of which could come via concessional loans from the Chinese government. The agreement was signed over the weekend whilst Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited the African country to boost ties. A couple of weeks ago it was reported that the Sotelma will implement a CDMA 2000 network that it hopes will replace much of its existing infrastructure, particularly at the local loop level. This new infrastructure deployment is the result of a partnership between the Sotelma and the Chinese telecoms equipment company ZTE.”

### Sources:

FLA-PVO / 04.12.2013

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sotelma>  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telecommunications\\_in\\_Mali](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telecommunications_in_Mali)  
(source: [http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange\\_Mali](http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_Mali))

## 5.2.4 Public transport

### 5.2.4.1 Roads

#### Conclusion / Connections at GAO:

- Gao is connected to the capital, Bamako at the western end of Mali, by 1200 km of paved road.
- The town of Gao is strategically placed with road links (unpaved) to the desert Kidal Region to the North and to Niamey, the capital of Niger, to the South.
- The road to the South runs along the left bank of the river.
- The town of Ansongo is 103 km from Gao.
- The border with Niger is just South of the village of Labbezanga, a distance of 204 km.
- Bus : Several companies are operating everyday across the country , Bamako-Gao.  
Costs 17000 FCFA (17000 XOF= 25 euros)
- In 2006 the Wabaria bridge was inaugurated to replace the ferry service across the Niger. The bridge was constructed by the *China State Construction Engineering Corporation* and financed by the Islamic Development Bank and the Malian government.

#### General

Mali's transportation infrastructure is regarded as poor, even by regional standards. Nevertheless, improvements have been noted in the early 2000s. A number of road and airport projects were initiated prior to Mali's hosting of the African Nations Cup football tournament in 2002.

#### Facts & figures: roadways Mali

total: 18,912 km

paved: 3,597 km

unpaved: 15,315 km (2004)

country comparison to the world: 114

#### Highways

Mali had a road network totaling about 18,563 kilometers in 2000, including about 4,450 kilometers of paved roads. Mali's main economic link to the coast is a paved road between Bamako and Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire. The European Development Fund is financing the construction of a road linking Bamako and Dakar, Senegal. The African Development Bank is funding the construction of a road linking Bamako and Kankan in Guinea. There are also plans for a trans-Saharan road linking Mali with Algeria. In general, road conditions outside of urban areas are hazardous, especially at night. Because of isolation, poor road conditions, and the prevalence of banditry, overland travel to the North of Mali is regarded as especially dangerous; flying or traveling by boat is reported to be preferable where possible. Many of Mali's major thoroughfares in the North are little more than desert tracks with long isolated stretches.

#### Urban transport

Because rate of automobile ownership is low and formal government run public transit is sparse, informal buses and taxis are abundant in Malian urban centers. Bamako in particular is known for its green and yellow taxi fleet. Other vehicles, including trucks, buses, motorcycles and mini-vans, function as taxis. In recent years small motorcycles, imported from China and most lacking licenses,

have come to dominate much of Bamako's traffic. Inexpensive motorbikes are often the only affordable transport in Mali, with Chinese made bikes selling for \$700 USD.

While the government formally requires licensing for both motorcycles and their operators, these rules are largely ignored. Some 500,000 motorcycles were estimated to be operating in Mali in 2009, with two thirds of them inexpensive Chinese made cycles, known locally as "*Jakartas*", which boast better fuel economy but fewer safety features than more expensive Japanese or Western brands. In the 1990s, Bamako banned horse carts, which caused an increase in hand carts on the streets. Recent road construction has included separated lanes for two wheeled (carts, bicycles, motorcycles), four wheeled, and pedestrian traffic.

#### **Road fatalities**

Motor vehicle accidents are relatively common on Mali's roads. The Malian Equipment and Transport Ministry reported that the first half of 2008 saw 254 deaths and 1,924 injuries on Mali's roads, following on 579 deaths in 2007 and 642 in 2006. The government has pledged 15 billion CFAF in 2009 to fund road safety, and has pledged to create a national road security agency to control highway traffic.

#### **Barriers to transport**

While police control barriers are a common sight on African highways, and while illicit demands for bribes at such stops are common in many countries, the main Malian highway heading South from Bamako to the Burkina Faso border was singled out in late 2008 as the worst in West Africa. A survey by the Observatory of Abnormal Practices (OPA) of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) found the Malian section of this road to have the highest number of police roadblocks with the highest average amount paid in bribes per trip in West Africa. An average of twenty-nine roadblocks, almost 4 for every 100 km, were reported from June to September 2008.

The amount paid in bribes in the Mali section (per trip) was CFA F 31,509. While in other nations the customs officials were responsible for most stops, in Mali, gendarmerie (National paramilitary police) and the police force were found creating the majority of bribe extorting roadblocks. The number of roadblocks on the Bamako-Burkina highway also increased by 12 per cent during the third quarter of 2008, going from 67 to 75.

#### **By bus / Bus Companies / coaches**

- Bani (tel. 220 6081)
- Binke (tel. 220 5683)
- Bittar (tel. 220 1205)
- Somatra (tel. 220 9932)

The better private bus companies are Bani (220 6081), Binke (220 5683), Bittar (220 1205) and Somatra (220 9932), all of which run regular services between the main towns South of the Niger River. North of the Niger River the roads can be terrible, and 4WDs, fortified truck-buses and standard trucks are used for public transport.

#### **Sources:**

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html>

#### 5.2.4.2 Rail

##### Conclusion

- Gao is not connected to the MALI Rail infrastructure.

##### Facts & figures: railway in Mali

total: 593 km

country comparison to the world: 109

narrow gauge (NL: smalspoor) : 593 km 1.000-m gauge (2008)

Gauge: 1,000 mm (3 ft 3 3/8 inch)

Brakes: The railway uses vacuum brakes.

Couplers: Buffers and chain, European. - see loco CC2286.

Couplers: Norwegian for some vehicles from India.

Axleload: 15 tonnes

##### Rail general

Mali has only one railway, the Dakar-Niger Railway, which includes 729 kilometers in Mali and runs from the port of Koulikoro via Bamako to the border with Senegal and continues on to Dakar. The track gauge is 1,000 mm (3 ft 3 3/8 inch). The Bamako-Dakar line, which has been described as dilapidated, is owned by a joint company established by Mali and Senegal in 1995, with the eventual goal of privatization. In 2003 the two countries sold a 25-year concession to run the rail line to a Canadian company, which has pledged to upgrade equipment and infrastructure. The Malian portion of the railroad carried an estimated 536,000 tons of freight and 778,000 passengers in 1999, but the track is in poor condition and the line is closed frequently during the rainy season.

The line is potentially significant because it links landlocked Mali to the port of Dakar, increasingly of interest for Malian exports in the face of the disruption of access to Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, as a result of civil conflict in that country beginning in late 2002. In the early 2000s, there also were plans to construct a new rail line between Bamako and Kouroussa and Kankan in Guinea.

##### Rail Dakar - Bamako

The Dakar-Bamako train is definitely NOT RUNNING at the moment, and all passenger service has now stopped completely, except for Kayes-Bamako, and shows no sign whatsoever of resuming anytime soon. A thrice-weekly Kayes-Bamako train is currently running. For the record, way back in 2003 trains stopped running because of the condition of the track. Much of it is still the original rails laid in 1904 to 1912. Operation of the railway was handed to a Canadian company which started working to improve things. In 2005, a weekly express was reinstated from Dakar to Bamako and back, which in 2007 was reduced to running every 8-9 days rather than weekly due to yet more engineering work on the line, and to not set schedule. This continued until summer 2009. At this stage, the train was starting from the Gare de Hann, 3km out of Dakar, and not from Dakar station itself. In summer 2009, all train service from Dakar stopped running again, and that is the current status in 2012. One report suggests the operator is bankrupt. It was reported that second hand carriages from India and some new engines were due to be delivered in late 2006, and that the Indian government had approved a loan to buy 1 engine and 12 new coaches for the Dakar-Bamako train, due to enter service in 2007. Some of these second hand Indian coaches did arrive and are running between Kayes and Bamako.

##### Sources:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport\\_in\\_Mali](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_in_Mali)

### 5.2.4.3 Air

#### Conclusions / Facts & figures Air Transport in Gao / Mali

- Gao airport is not yet operational for public transportation.
- In 2007 Mali had 29 airports, 8 of which had paved runways.
- The main airport is Senou International Airport in Bamako, which offers flights to neighboring countries and to Europe. As part of infrastructure improvements in 2002, the runway at Bamako was extended, and new airstrips were built in previously isolated areas of the west-Kayes, Mopti, and Sikasso.
- Air Mali was liquidated in April 2003, but intercontinental services from Bamako are provided by Air France and a Belgian airline, among others.

#### Flying to Mali

Numerous airlines fly into Bamako and those with offices there include the following:

1. Afriqiyah (8U;223 1497; [www.afriqiyah.aero](http://www.afriqiyah.aero) ; Ave de la Marne)
2. Air Burkina (2J;221 0178; [www.air-burkina.com](http://www.air-burkina.com) ; Ave de la Marne)
3. Air France (AF;222 2212; [www.airfrance.com](http://www.airfrance.com) ; Sq Lumumba)
4. Air Mauritanie (MR; 223 8740; [www.airmauritanie.mr](http://www.airmauritanie.mr) ; Sq Lumumba)
5. Air Sénégal (V7;in Bamako 223 9811; [www.air-senegal-international.com](http://www.air-senegal-international.com) ; Ave Modibo Keita)
6. Cameroon Airlines (UY;222 9400; [www.cameroon-airlines.com](http://www.cameroon-airlines.com) ; cnr Ave Kassa Keita & Ave de l'Indépendance)
7. Ethiopian Airlines (ET;222 2208; [www.flyethiopian.com/et/](http://www.flyethiopian.com/et/) ; Sq Lumumba)
8. Ghana Airways (GH;221 9210; [www.ghana-airways.com](http://www.ghana-airways.com) ; Sq Lumumba)
9. Interair (D6; 221 9210; [www.interair.co.za](http://www.interair.co.za) ; cnr Ave Kassa Keita & Ave de l'Indépendance)
10. Point-Afrique (223 5470; [www.point-afrique.com](http://www.point-afrique.com) ; Ave de la Marne)
11. Royal Air Maroc (AT;221 6105; [www.royalairmaroc.com](http://www.royalairmaroc.com) ; Ave de la Marne)
12. Point-Afrique flies from Paris to Marseilles to Mopti, Gao and Bamako, usually for much less than longer-established airlines.

Air France flies daily non-stop from Paris-Charles de Gaulle to Bamako (and return). Royal Air Maroc is a little cheaper than Air France and has daily flights from Europe and New York via Casablanca in Morocco. There are also smaller companies, such as Point Afrique, who fly cheaply to & from Mali in the busy tourist season. Both Air France and RAM unfortunately arrive and depart in the middle of the night - so even if you are planning a budget trip it may be worth splurging for a nice hotel the first night where you can make real reservations and maybe even get picked up at the airport.

Many African and pan-African airlines fly into Mali, for example: Air Mauritania, Tunisair, Air Afriqiyah and numerous others. Some of these airlines also have feature connections to Mopti.

The airport is about twenty minutes' drive from the centre of Bamako. There are fixed rates for taxis to different parts of town: to find them, cross the roadway in front of the airport and go the right-hand end of the block of kiosks. You will see a group of taxi drivers and a board with prices. As at August 2007, the price was 7500 CFA (around US\$15).

However, if you know the local language enough, you might be able to bargain the official price down to 4000 or even 3000 CFA, especially if you arrive during the day. Make sure you board an



official taxi though (see the Stay Safe section below). There is even well-hidden restaurant: follow the exit road past the barrier, and it is on the right, surrounded by trees, about 50 m from the terminal building. They're very friendly and serve basic but filling and tasty snacks. For getting back to the airport from Bamako, try to negotiate hard and you may get a rate significantly cheaper than the set rates for the airport to Bamako. If you fly Royal Air Maroc, beware that Casablanca Airport is notorious for opening checked-in bags and removing valuables. Also luggage can arrive late. As is common with many other airports, there will be people trying to push you into unauthorized taxis and to change money some are even allowed into the airport terminal itself, avoid them. Mali's main international airport is Sénou International Airport (220 4626), although Point-Afrique also flies into Mopti and Gao.

**sources:**

<http://wikitravel.org/en/Mali>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport\\_in\\_Mali](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_in_Mali)

**Authority / Mali's Directorate of Civil Aviation ANAC**

P.O. Box 227, Bamako, Mali

Tel. +223-22-225524; Fax +223-22-226177

E-mail: [infos@anac-mali.org](mailto:infos@anac-mali.org)

Directeur Général: Hady NIANG

**Airports**

#	Location	ICAO	IATA		Runway 1 / ft	Runway 1 / mtr
1	Bamako [Sénou Intl], ML	GABS	BKO	Senou International Airport	8879	2913
2	Tombouctou (Timbuktu), ML	GATB	TOM	Timbuktu Airport	6923	2271
3	Gao [Intl], ML	GAGO	GAQ	Gao International Airport	8202	2691
4	Mopti Ambodedjo [Sevare AB]	GAMB	MZI	Mopti Airport	8340	2736
5	Nara [Keibane], ML	GANK	NRM	Keibane Airport		
6	Nioro du Sahel, ML	GANR	NIX	Nioro Airport		
7	Kayes [Dag Dag], ML	GAKY	KYS	Kayes Airport		
8	Sikasso, ML	GASK	KSS	Sikasso Airport		
9	Segou, ML	GASG	SZU	Segou Airport		
10	Koutiala, ML	GAKO	KTX	Koutiala Airport		
11	Goundam, ML	GAGM	GUD	Goundam Airport		
12	Kéniéba, ML	GAKA	KNZ	Kenieba Airport		
13	Yélimané, ML	GAYE	EYL	Yélimané Airport		
14	Ke-Macina, ML	GAKM				
15	Kidal, ML	GAKL				
16	Kita, ML	GAKT				
17	Sikasso [Dignangan], ML	GASO				
18	Tessalit, ML	GATS				
19	Bourem, ML	GABR				
20	Menaka, ML	GAMK				
21	Kolokani, ML	GAKN				
22	Bougouni, ML	GABG				

23	Niafunke, ML	GANF				
24	Dioila, ML	GADA				
25	Ansongo, ML	GAAO				
26	Bafoulabe, ML	GABF				
27	Markala, ML	GAMA				
28	Hombori, ML	GAHB				
29	Faladie, ML	GAFD				
30	Douentza, ML	GADZ				
31	Bandiagara, ML	GABD				
32	San, ML	GASN				
33	Aguelhoc, ML	GAGL				
34	Gourma-Rharous, ML	GAGR				
35	Taoudenni, ML	GATN				

### Airlines

AIRLINE	IATA	ICAO	CALLSIGN
Air Mali	15	CMM	CAMALI
Mali Air Express	-	MAE	AVION EXPRESS
Mali Air Transport	-	-	-
SAM Intercontinental	-	MMT	-

### Domestic carriers

There are now two domestic carriers:

- Compagnie Aérienne du Mali**  
 CAM  
 229 9100  
 o.nubukpo@cam-mali.com  
 Immeuble Tomota / Ave Cheick Zayed  
 Hamdallaye  
 Bamako
- Mali Air Express**  
 MAE  
 223 1465  
 sae@cefib.com  
 Ave de la Nation, Bamako

Both airlines fly from Bamako to Mopti, Timbuktu and Kayes. CAM also operates a weekly flight to/from Gao that goes via Mopti and Timbuktu. Return fares are only a fraction under double one-way prices.

#### sources:

<http://www.lonelyplanet.com/mali/transport/getting-around>  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_airlines\\_of\\_Mali](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airlines_of_Mali)

**Handling****Air Freight Forwarders****Cogimar-ab**

Cargo Agents/Freight Forwarders, Mali

Bamako Airport  
BP E1044  
Cité du Niger  
Bamako  
Mali

Tel: +223 (0)76.43.36.85  
Email: ops@cogimar-ab.com  
Website: www.cogimar-ab.com

Commercial Manager: Igre Cheick

**Express Handling Services**

Cargo Agents/Freight Forwarders, Mali

Bamako  
BP 932  
Hamdallaye Ac 120000  
Bamako

Tel: +223 (0)+33 1 70.03.84.07/8  
Fax: +33 1 70.03.84.09  
Email: operations1@ehs.fr  
Email: operations2@ehs.fr  
Website: www.ehs.fr

Administration Manager: Emmanuel Odaris

**Flying Eagle Shipping Ltd**

Cargo Agents/Freight Forwarders, Mali

Bamako  
Quater Du Fleuve  
450 Rue 310  
Bamako

Tel: +223 (0)21 56-36-59  
Fax: +223 (0)21 56-36-50  
Email: control@flyingeagleshipping.com  
Email: johnson@flyingeagleshipping.com  
Website: www.flyingeagleshipping.com

Manager: Baruwa Johnson

**Ivoire Packing Shipping Services**

Cargo Agents/Freight Forwarders, Mali

Bamako  
Rue Nkrumah, Lot 125 Ave 13  
BP 210 Bamako  
Bamako

Tel: +223 (0)21.26.58.95  
Mobile: +223 (0)4565 4200  
Fax: +223 (0)21.26.31.98  
Email: info@ivoirpackingshipping.com  
Website: www.ivoirpackingshipping.com

Shipping Manager: Akwasi Boateng

**Matrans Mali Sarl**

Cargo Agents/Freight Forwarders, Mali

Bamako  
BP 1306  
Quartier du Fleuve rue 311  
Porte 105  
Bamako

Tel: +223 (0)20.23.62.08  
Fax: +223 (0)20.23.76.57  
Email: malilogistics@lcalogisticsgroup.com  
Website: www.lcalogisticsgroup.com

Manager: Diarra Yacouba

**Platinum Shipping & Logistics Limited**

Cargo Agents/Freight Forwarders, Mali

Bamako  
BP 2710  
Bozula - Rue 127 Porte 97  
Bamako

Tel: +223 (0)+233 303 206752\_  
Mobile: +233 24 957 1653  
Fax: +233 303 204127  
Email: solutions@pslghana.com  
Email: info@pslghana.com  
Website: www.pslghana.com

Managing Director/Operations: Akwasi Boateng  
West Africa Projects Coordinator: George Atakro

**Superior Cargo**

Cargo Agents/Freight Forwarders, Mali

Bamako  
BP 683  
Rue 319 Porte 238  
Opp EX-USAID Office  
Bamako - Coura

Tel: +223 (0)20.22.76.76  
Tel: +223 (0)65.70.76.76  
Mobile: +223 (0)7070 0010  
Fax: +223 (0)20.22.76.76  
Email: info@superiorcargo.net  
Website: www.superiorcargo.net

Managing Director: Okorie Mbah

**Source :**

[http://www.azfreight.com/search\\_results\\_directory.htm?comp\\_name=Company+Name&facility=5&type\\_iata=0&products=0&geographic\\_location=1&country=Mali&location=-1&state=-1&criteria=Keywords&which\\_order=country&x=91&y=11](http://www.azfreight.com/search_results_directory.htm?comp_name=Company+Name&facility=5&type_iata=0&products=0&geographic_location=1&country=Mali&location=-1&state=-1&criteria=Keywords&which_order=country&x=91&y=11)

**Other Freight Forwarders****Afrique Logistics**

Rue 400, Porte 123, Bamako, Bamako, +223, Mali  
Telephone: +223 (0)2022 8888

**Marine Assistance**

Rue de la présidence, Bamako, Mali, 12283, Mali  
Telephone: +22  
Fax: +228 235 15 77

Source : <http://www.freightnet.com/directory/p1/cML/s30.htm>

**Geodis Mali**

Immeuble Sonavie - ACI 2000,  
Hamdallaye, BPE 2091,  
Bamako, Mali  
Phone No.: +223 (0)229 46 49

**Goshmelo Shipping & Trading Ltd**


Quater Du Fleuve, 450  
Rue 310,  
Bamako, Mali

Phone No.: +223 (0)244 53 70 30  
 www.gosmeloghana.com

Source:  
[http://www.cargoyellowpages.com/mali\\_freight\\_forwarders\\_cargo\\_agents.html](http://www.cargoyellowpages.com/mali_freight_forwarders_cargo_agents.html)

**Aviation Beacons**

Name	ID	Type
BAMAKO/SENOU	BKO	VOR-DME
BAMAKO/SENOU	BM	NDB
GAO	GAO	VOR
GAO	TZI	NDB
GOUNDAM	GM	NDB
KAYES	KAY	VOR-DME
KAYES	TZJ	NDB
MANANTALI	MNT	NDB
MOPTI/AMBODEDJO	MO	NDB
MOPTI/AMBODEDJO	MTI	VOR
NIORO	NO	NDB
SIKASSO	SKO	VOR-DME
TESSALIT	TZE	NDB
TOMBOUCTOU	TB	NDB
TOMBOUCTOU	TBT	VOR-DME



#### 5.2.4.4 Waterways

##### Conclusions / Facts & figures: waterways

- River Niger is 1,800 km  
Downstream of Koulikoro; low water levels on the River Niger cause problems in dry years  
In the months before the rainy season the river is not navigable by commercial vessels) (2011)
- Country comparison to the world: 44
- Ports: Koulikoro
- Boat : On the Niger river, COMANAV boats (Compagnie Malienne de Navigation) transports goods and passengers on «Pinasses» (narrow boats with several decks) between :
- Gao-Koulikoro (South) in july-august
- Gao-Mopti, july to december
- The boats stop in the harbors of : Ségou, Mopti, Diré, Kabara (Timbuktu) and the main villages along the the river.
- Smaller companies are offering transportation between villages in short range on «pirogues» (smaller boats).
- The fluvial transport system is quite risky and an accident occurred in last October 2013 with 40 souls lost.

##### source:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html>

##### Boat

Most boat journeys on the Niger River are only possible from August to December when water levels are high. Three large passenger boats, operated by the Compagnie Malienne de Navigation (Comanav), ply the Niger River between Koulikoro (50km west of Bamako) and Gao, from August to November/December. In theory, one boat heads downstream from Koulikoro at 10pm Tuesday, arrives in Mopti at 3pm Thursday, in Timbuktu at 7am Saturday, and Gao at midnight Sunday. Another boat heads upstream from Gao at 8pm every Monday, reaching Timbuktu at 6pm on Wednesday, Mopti at 4pm Friday, and Koulikoro at midnight Sunday. In practice, the journey can take twice as long.

##### Source:

<http://www.lonelyplanet.com/mali/transport/getting-around>

##### Seasonal ferry services GAO

There are also **seasonal ferry services** on the Niger River. A service between Gao and Koulikoro, a distance of 1.380 km, is managed by the *Compagnie Malienne de Navigation* (COMANAV). It usually operates from the **end of July**, after the annual rains when there is sufficient water in the river, **until mid-November**. Smaller boats are able to operate for a longer season between Bourem and Ansongo.

##### Annual flood of the Niger River

Almost all the local agriculture depends on river water for irrigation. The annual flood of the Niger River is a result of the heavy rainfall in the headwaters of the Niger and Bani rivers in Guinea and the Northern Ivory Coast. The rainfall in the headwater areas peaks in August but the flood water takes time to pass down the river system, through the Inner Niger Delta region and arrives at Gao. At Koulikoro the flood peaks in September, while in Gao the flood lasts longer and reaches a maximum in December. There is a large year to year variation in the extent of the flooding. The existing and

proposed dams upstream of Gao reduce the overall flow of the river and could potentially have a large effect on the local agriculture. When in flood the river is 4 km wide at Gao but during the dry season a number of islands appear in the river. There is very little flow, only 5% of the maximum, in June and July.

### 5.3 Main loci for economic activities (shopping districts, gasstations, etc.)

#### Conclusions Gao

- The occupation of the city of Gao by the Islamic militants for more than six months has considerably degraded the economy in general and trade in particular. Local banks, hotels and shops have been pillaged or damaged, which has severely hit economic and commercial local and regional activity.
- These shops are mainly managed by members of the Arab, Yoruba and Tuareg ethnics.
- Today the Arab's shops are closed in fear of retaliation because of suspected collaboration with MUJAO (*Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest*) when it was ruling the city.
- The exodus of the Arab shop owners from Gao to the neighbouring countries and the closing of the Algerian border - a huge commercial hub - have considerably disrupted the trade and exchanges.
- The majority of the Arab and Tuareg big traders from Gao have displaced their merchandise into the surrounding villages by precaution.
- The main market place, burnt down during a MUJAO commando assault in last February, has been fixed with the help of the French forces. It's currently quite active but the goods available are not in the quantity and variety observable before MUJAO has been ruling the city.
- Gas Stations: end of November 2013, two official gas stations were supplying gas in Gao city.
- 

#### 5.3.1 Shopping districts

There is minimal information available about existence of supermarkets or Shopping centres. In the yellow papers online only 5 registered supermarkets were found in Bamako. Mali is a poor country and we did find a lot of references of outdoor central market places where food and non-food articles are traded. Because of this fact the lack of references of supermarkets/ shopping centres in the main town of Mali, it is assumed that supermarkets and/ shopping districts are not yet popular places for the local community to buy their commodities and clothes.

#### Source:

<http://www.lespagesjaunesafrique.com/societes/mali/supermarches/>



### 5.3.2 Gas - Fuel Stations

**Conclusion:**

- Organisations active: There are over 250 gas stations disseminated all over the country.
- Fuel supply in Mali is not an issue.
- However, there are only 2 gas stations in Gao:
  1. Station Service (no name)  
Address: Avenue de l'Aéroport ( N16) 100 meter eastern side of crossing with RN 8 at Place de l'indépendance / Gao
  2. Station Service (no name)  
Address: Avenue de Askia  
At crossing with Avenue Aldouseini o Touré

**General**

Regardless of the importers, petroleum products mainly come from two major refineries;

- a. the Societe Ivoirienne de Raffinage in Abidjan
- b. the Societe Africaine de Raffinage in Dakar

Currently, Mali has about fifty registered petroleum importers, four of which are multinational corporations, namely Total, Shell, Tamoil and Star Oil. The rest consists of private companies, created by Malian traders. The supply is regular and there are no reported shortages.

**L' Office National des produits pétroliers (ONAP)**

*Office National des Produits Pétroliers - ONAP*

Address: Rue 315 - Porte 157 - Quartier du Fleuve Bamako

Tel: +223 20 22 28 27 Tel2: +223 20 22 49 59

Fax: +223 20 22 44 83

Email: [onapmali@afribone.net.ml](mailto:onapmali@afribone.net.ml)

Website: <http://www.onapmali.com>

The Office National des Produits Pétroliers is attached to the Finance Ministry. Among other tasks the OANP:

- ensures the continued availability of petroleum products;
- contributes to the definition of the political consumer prices;
- takes part in the definition and the constitution of the national security stock;
- participates in defining standards and quality controls;
- and intervenes in the fight against fraud.

**Major Suppliers AND Distributors:**

- **Total Mali**

Address: Avenue Kasse Keita BP 13 Bamako

Tel: + 223 20 22 29 76

Fax: + 223 20 23 36 08

Website:

*Note: Total has the best spread station network and propose a voucher payment, notably used by some UNICEF*

- **Shell Mali**  
Address: Hippodrome, Route de Kkoro Boite Postale 199 Bamako  
Tel: +223 20 21 24 52  
Fax: +223 20 21 76 15  
Website:
- **Tamoil Mali**  
Address: Quartier du Fleuve 3eme etage immeuble UATT BP E 5190 Bamako  
Tel: +223 20 23 79 79  
Fax: +223 20 23 78 77  
Website:
- **Staroil Mali**  
Address: TSF B.P. 145 Bamako  
Tel: N/A  
Fax: N/A  
Website:
- **Mali Oil Development SARL**
- **Ben Et Co (Mali)**  
Tel: +223 223-6554  
Fax: +223 223-0111  
Office Location: Badalabougou - Avenue De L'oua Porte 487
- **Elf Oil Mali**
- **Ets Darhat**
- **Exxon Mobil Mali**
- **Mobil Oil (Mali)**  
Office Location: Niarela - Depot T.S.F  
Tel: +223 221-0276  
Fax: +223 221-1833
- **Shell Mali / VIVO Energy Mali / Permanent employees: 27 / Retail outlets: 13 / Storage (cubic metres) 3,200**
- **Société du Groupe Air Liquid**
- **Société Naman Sarl (Mali)**  
Tel: +223 237-2355  
Office Location: Lafiabougou – Segou
- **Société Soleil Service (Mali)**  
Tel: +223 223-9404  
Fax: +223 223-8750  
Office Location: Bamako Coura - Place Omvs
- **Station N'diaye Et Freres (Mali)**  
Tel: +223 223-3636  
Office Location: Badalabougou - Avenue L'oua
- **Tamoil Mali**
- **Total Texaco Mali**

## Backgrounds

### 'ORYX ENERGIES'

*Oryx Energies has been active in Mali since 2009 and the stated they are becoming a key player in Mali's energy market.*

Quote:

*" We source and supply Liquefied hydrocarbons to wholesale and retail outlets and offer product and services through a growing network of service stations. We provide high quality lubricants to commercial and domestic customers and entered the bitumen market to support the nation's future infrastructure developments. We also take part in the supply of an important power plant (60 MW) with fuel oil and lubricants, demonstrating our ability to act as a major operator for the Independent Power Projects (IPP) segment by delivering solutions adapted to the growing electricity needs in the region.*

**Retail network:** *Oryx Energies has seven service stations in Mali, providing gasoil, gasoline and lubricants to the local retail market.*

**Lubricants:** *We are rapidly developing our share of Mali's lubricants market, serving the needs of clients in the mining, industrial, transport and construction sectors. We also provide lubricants to licensed distributors and partner garages for retail sales in the country. The acceleration of our development in the lubricants market has been made possible by the opening in 2011 of an ultra-modern blending plant by Oryx Energies in Lomé.*

**Fuel distribution:** *Oryx Energies supplies wholesale fuel to industrial and commercial customers, as well as to the retail market. It became a wholesale distributor of gasoil in Mali in 2010, expanding its capacity to respond to the growing energy needs in the country. Oryx Energies is in a unique position to supply the Malian market, thanks to its integrated model, with its own coastal terminals in Benin and Senegal ensuring a dependable supply.*

**Bitumen:** *Oryx Energies entered the bitumen market in Mali in 2011 to help respond to the need for new infrastructure. By the end of 2012, we had developed a market share of almost 20% and a reputation as a reliable and credible supplier. Oryx Energies is gradually becoming a major player in Mali's energy market. Our reputation as a professional and reliable supplier, with an integrated offering of fuel, lubricants and/or bitumen, is increasingly making us a partner of choice in the industrial and construction space, as well as consumer facing outlets.*

**Fuel sourcing:** *Oryx Energies trading arm sources and supplies refined oil products that serve the needs of our downstream activities and third parties in Mali, as part of our integrated product and service model in Africa. With the advantage of Oryx Energies terminals in Senegal and Benin, our trading arm comfortably supplies over 40% of the country's needs."...*

#### **SHELL**

***" In December 2011, Vitol, Helios and Shell completed the first phase of the deal announced in February 2011"***

*"Vitol and Helios have acquired the majority of Shell's shareholding in its downstream businesses in Cape Verde, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia- launching the joint-venture Vivo Energy in these countries. As a result, local companies have changed names to Vivo Energy Maroc, Vivo Energy Tunisie; Vivo Energy Senegal, Vivo Energy Madagascar, Vivo Energy Mauritius, Vivo Energy Mali, Vivo Energy Cabo Verde.*

*Vitol and Helios each own 40% of Vivo Energy, with Shell holding the remaining 20%. For further information on Vivo Energy please go to [www.vivoenergy.com](http://www.vivoenergy.com). Shell, Vitol and Helios will now focus on resolving the remaining regulatory and legal issues for the completion of this transaction in all the remaining countries during 2012."...*

#### **Sources**

<http://www.oryxenergies.com/en/country-presence/mali.php>

<http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/contact-us/contact/contact-mali.html>

<http://www.mbendi.com/indy/oil/sstn/af/ml/index.htm>

## **5.4 Goods on sale and origin of those goods (place of production, trade networks, etc.)**

### **Conclusions**

- The numerous market places of Gao offer hand made products such as bags, pillows, leather boxes, knives and swords made of iron, ebony or bronze.
- The majority of the goods such as sugar, rice, noodles, vegetal oil, flour or canned food is coming from Nigeria, Niger and Algeria.
- Under MUJAO domination, the importation of goods has become extremely complicated for the traders because of the insecurity on the routes and the economical local network has been extremely weakened by the massive exodus of the population to the South.
- The Gao region is today very isolated both because of the disruption of the main commercial route Mopti-Gao during the fighting and the closing of the Mali-Algeria border.

- The freight flow including many alimentary products destined to the North Mali and Gao is still now considerably limited.

(source FLA-PVO / 04.12.2013)

### Import 2010 Mali (import countries)

#### General

Since 2008, an agricultural business named *Produits du Sud*, has trained unemployed youth to conserve and tap the gum Arabic and gum Karaya trees for their high-value resins, rather than clear them for cattle land, which exacerbates the region's harsh conditions. These natural gums are harvested from trees that grow wild across the African Sahel, and exported to Europe to meet rising demand for their use in products from pharmaceuticals to cosmetics to baked goods. Exports to Europe 10-fold while payments to farmers have jumped from \$17,000 in 2008 to more than \$1 million in 2012. Behind *Produits du Sud* are two local entrepreneurs, Amidou Sissako and Charles Ndoye.

#### Source:

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/willyfoote/2013/03/14/mali-entrepreneurs-offer-path-to-peace/>

### Import 2010 Mali (import countries)

**Total amount \$3,401,185,414**

Division:

Year	Abbreviations	Name	Share	Value in \$
2010	SEN	Senegal	15.63%	531,577,383.53
2010	BEN	Benin	13.07%	444,455,291.35
2010	CHN	China	12.65%	430,195,743.61
2010	FRA	France	9.46%	321,685,575.78
2010	USA	United States	8.93%	303,640,847.09
2010	CIV	Cote d'Ivoire	8.90%	302,600,898.57
2010	TGO	Togo	2.66%	90,412,312.49
2010	JPN	Japan	2.57%	87,399,259.32
2010	GHA	Ghana	2.37%	80,454,675.79
2010	DEU	Germany	2.29%	77,957,957.67
2010	MAR	Morocco	1.97%	66,976,884.30
2010	NLD	Netherlands	1.39%	47,151,840.10
2010	AUS	Australia	1.36%	46,195,287.78
2010	ARE	United Arab Emirates	1.27%	43,095,263.37
2010	ESP	Spain	1.24%	42,047,949.79
2010	GBR	United Kingdom	1.20%	40,845,003.88
2010	AUT	Austria	1.14%	38,874,289.15
2010	CZE	Czech Republic	1.10%	37,466,969.50
2010	HKG	Hong Kong	1.00%	34,097,102.23
2010	EGY	Egypt	0.74%	25,073,287.24

Section	2005	2006	2007	2008	2010
Live Animals; Animal Products	\$21,939,722	\$35,082,804	\$33,540,840	\$41,281,069	\$51,710,276
Vegetable Products	\$108,391,227	\$129,627,768	\$112,533,487	\$144,375,863	\$189,380,064
Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils and Their Cleavage Products; Prepared Edible Fats; Animal or Vegetable Waxes	\$14,900,884	\$26,368,401	\$39,725,195	\$55,230,361	\$57,312,154
Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar; Tobacco and Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes	\$101,135,202	\$117,122,027	\$130,080,093	\$165,505,522	\$235,018,781
Mineral Products	\$96,651,898	\$99,033,761	\$141,934,927	\$215,052,446	\$227,236,783
Products of the Chemical or Allied Industries	\$228,029,753	\$223,516,983	\$300,226,531	\$428,904,040	\$619,019,699
Plastics and Articles Thereof; Rubber and Articles Thereof	\$55,301,598	\$58,039,091	\$76,438,012	\$121,061,726	\$182,201,242
Raw Hides and Skins, Leather, Fur skins and Articles Thereof; Saddlery and Harness; Travel Goods, Handbags and Similar Containers; Articles of Animal Gut (Other Than Silk-Worm Gut)	\$1,376,735	\$1,781,928	\$2,222,367	\$6,342,253	\$7,770,349
Wood and Articles of Wood; Wood Charcoal; Cork and Articles of Cork; Manufactures of Straw, of Esparto or of Other Plaiting Materials; Basket ware and Wickerwork	\$3,800,892	\$4,103,622	\$5,360,383	\$11,146,981	\$15,087,818
Pulp of Wood or of Other Fibrous Cellulosic Material; Recovered (Waste and Scrap) Paper or Paperboard; Paper and Paperboard and Articles Thereof	\$14,559,387	\$16,831,580	\$16,317,130	\$27,864,833	\$40,604,520
Textiles and Textile Articles	\$36,979,386	\$39,486,289	\$66,279,172	\$86,035,369	\$89,660,210
Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, Sun Umbrellas, Walking-Sticks, Seat-Sticks, Whips, Riding-Crops and Parts Thereof; Prepared Feathers and Articles Made Therewith; Artificial Flowers; Articles of Human Hair	\$8,444,617	\$8,876,984	\$9,418,072	\$18,284,561	\$22,949,612
Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica or Similar Materials; Ceramic Products; Glass and Glassware	\$11,957,826	\$14,557,340	\$17,757,608	\$35,793,687	\$47,482,744
Natural or Cultured Pearls, Precious or Semi-Precious Stones, Precious Metals, Metals Clad With Precious Metal and Articles Thereof; Imitation Jewelry; Coin	\$65,295	\$101,040	\$97,336	\$369,116	\$1,560,096
Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal	\$86,924,173	\$101,653,094	\$104,322,261	\$206,162,313	\$283,797,451
Machinery and Mechanical Appliances; Electrical Equipment; Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders and Reproducers, Television Image and Sound Recorders and Reproducers, and Parts and Accessories of Such Articles	\$174,412,870	\$224,975,343	\$322,621,739	\$560,524,936	\$726,710,911
Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated Transport Equipment	\$105,260,024	\$147,786,431	\$168,009,337	\$227,954,857	\$331,254,928
Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic, Measuring, Checking, Precision, Medical or Surgical Instruments and Apparatus; Clocks and Watches; Musical Instruments; Parts and Accessories Thereof	\$9,268,122	\$12,653,591	\$17,634,363	\$62,217,106	\$47,002,915
Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories Thereof	\$20,397	\$281,173	\$1,115,856	\$1,307,034	\$1,243,183
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles	\$10,682,014	\$15,374,214	\$13,753,394	\$31,385,284	\$49,400,711
Works of Art, Collectors' Pieces and Antiques	\$25,647	\$96,166	\$50,776	\$1,293,232	\$568,030
Other	\$3,244,751	\$9,204,759	\$3,568,018	\$4,000,696	\$2,423,320
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,093,372,420</b>	<b>\$1,286,554,389</b>	<b>\$1,583,006,897</b>	<b>\$2,452,093,285</b>	<b>\$3,229,395,797</b>

**Source:**

<http://www.indexmundi.com/trade/imports/?country=ml>

**5.5 Geographic mobility of the inhabitants of the region  
(i.e. any région/inter regional/international traffic worth mentioning)**

- The international population movements are frequent since the end of the MUJAO domination towards Niger, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ghana.
- The city of Gao is a usual departure point for :
  - inter-regional trips like Gao-Kidal
  - international trips via the Gao-Niger way to the Niamey Airport

**5.6 Current scarcities (such as food/petrol/luxury goods etc.)**

- Despite the current alimentary help supplied to one third of the population, the needs remain only partially covered because an increasing number of families suffering of the food crisis. These families are requiring a better support.
- The humanitarian crisis remains in the region. The hunger rate is higher than in 2012 and the malnutrition is reaching an alarming level in the city of Gao.
- According to an evaluation of the alimentary security conducted in July 2013 by the Malian government, the WFP, the FAO, three household out of four are food wise depending on support in Gao.
- Gao region is usually in deficit for agriculture production. Because of the crisis, agricultures have seeded less and haven't been given the usual technical assistance, and therefore their production has dramatically decreased.

## 6 State, Structure, Reach, and Locations of Media Outlets

### Overview

Mali, a country which had been held as an example in the region for its democracy, rule of law and a media environment considered one of the most liberal in the region, now hangs in the balance. The crisis resulting from the March 2012 military coup, led to serious deterioration of press freedom conditions in the country. During the crisis, radio stations and many newspapers were forced to shut down or suffered brutal attacks from the rebel groups with Mali's three Northern regions most affected. And by doing so depriving people of the only source of information available.

Prior to the conflict, radio coverage reached 80% of the population. Mali remains a country of oral tradition and radio plays an important role due to Mali's adult literacy rate. While media in the South still has a functioning infrastructure and relatively easy access to information sources, media in the North has seen a destruction of the mass communication infrastructure and a substantial loss of media, which has left the population in an information void. Also the poor energy situation, with more than 97% of Mali's rural population living without access to electricity hinders the free press distribution. Only a very small number of households use car batteries to cover their electric requirements, i.e. for lighting, cooling (fan), TV and radio.

Journalists are de facto operating under threat of retaliation from Islamist groups trying to control the information flow in and out of the country's Northern region. The murder of Radio France Internationale journalists Ghislaine Dupont and Claude Verlon on the outskirts of Kidal, a town in the Ifoghas massif, on 2 November 2013 has highlighted the extent of the threats to freedom of information in this part of Northern Mali.

### 6.1 Main written media-outlets in Gao (city/region) (e.g. newspapers, magazines, circulaires) and numbers of publication

The impact of print media in Mali is limited due to the low literacy rate. Mali remains a country of oral tradition.

All newspaper distribution is geographically limited to newsstands in the city of Bamako. Even before the crisis, 90% of the newspapers were circulated only in Bamako. Circulation numbers are low with 300 to 1,500 copies printed a day. From June 2013 there is steady progress in the general press freedom and safety of journalists' conditions in Mali. For instance, in the Gao region, five (5) newspapers have re-appeared on the newsstands.

#### Mali Newspapers

<a href="#">Echos, Les</a>	(Bamako)	French
<a href="#">Essor, L'</a>	(Bamako)	French
<a href="#">Info Matin</a>	(Bamako)	French
<a href="#">Malikoundou.com</a>		French
<a href="#">Républicain, Le</a>		French
<a href="#">Ségovien, Le</a>	(Ségou)	French

The only national newspaper, l'essor, is state-owned.

**Sources:**

<http://www.kidon.com/media-link/ml.php>

<http://www.abyznewslinks.com/mali.htm>

<http://www.sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/mali/malinews.html> >

<http://www.kidon.com/media-link/ml.php>

<http://cima.ned.org/tools-and-resources/country-profiles/africa/mali>

Monitoring report: 'Media Sector in Mali Witnesses Steady Recovery After Devastation by Conflict':

<http://www.ifex.org/mali/2013/06/30/media%20sector%20in%20mali%20witnesses%20steady%20recovery%20after%20devastation%20by%20conflict.pdf>

Media Assessment report: 'Media in Mali divided by conflict':

<http://www.mediafound.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Media-in-Mali-divided-by-conflict.pdf>

## **6.2 Main oral media-outlets in Gao (city/region) (e.g. local transmitters/transmissions of national broadcasting, local ('community') radio-stations) and transmissions**

Radio is the most prominent media in Mali as the main newspapers and publications are only distributed in Bamako and other large cities. Before the conflict there were 369 different private radios operating in the country conforming to the regulatory framework.

During the crisis, about 57 radio stations and many newspapers were forced to shut down or suffered brutal attacks from the rebel groups with Mali's three Northern regions most affected. In the Gao region about 21 radio stations were affected by the crisis. Islamist groups controlled the information flow in and out of the country's Northern region, leaving the population in the South unable to access information about the North and vice versa. Radios under the control of the Islamist groups are used for propaganda purposes reinforcing the imposed sharia law in the three Northern regions of Mali. Apparently some local journalists in Gao have even been offered up to \$700 per month (equaling almost one year's salary) to work for the Islamist groups.

From June 2013 there is steady progress in the general press freedom and safety of journalists' conditions in Mali. About 25 out of 57 radio stations and newspapers that suffered closure have resumed broadcasting and publication. For instance, in the Gao region, about 13 out of 21 radio stations that were affected by the crisis, have resumed broadcasting. Some radio stations still remain closed because they have not secured any assistance after they were vandalized by armed groups. Others remain closed due to huge technical damages resulting from the crisis. Radio stations that manage to broadcast are able to do so because they have received solar panels from the Servile Forces.

### **Directory of FM radio stations in the region Gao**

MHz	Station	transmitting from * = exact site
91.70	Radio Naata	Gao
91.90	Aadar FM	Menaka
94.90	Radio Hanna	Gao
96.20	ORTM Radio Mali	Ansongo
97.20	ORTM Radio Mali	Bourem
98.90	ORTM Radio Mali	Gao
99.90	ORTM Radio Mali	Menaka
101.00	La Voix de l'Azawak	Menaka
105.30	Radio Annya	Gao
107.80	Aadar FM	Ansongo

### **Radio stations Gao Province**

105.9	Radio Tidarfit	Menaka (Gao)
(FM)	Radio Tizdass	Kidal (Gao)



**Gao Province (Southwest areas)**

94.6	Radio Lafia	Tombouctou (Gao)
97.9	Radio Alfarouk	Tombouctou (Gao)
(FM)	Radio Bouctou	Tombouctou (Gao)

**Sources:**

<http://www.radio-africa.org/fm/fm.php?itu=Mali&region=Gao>
<http://www.radio-africa.org/fm/fm.php?itu=Mali&region=Gao>  
<http://www.radio-africa.org/fm/fm.php?itu=Mali&region=Gao>
<http://radiostationworld.com/locations/mali/radio.asp>  
<http://cpi.org/2012/09/at-least-five-radio-stations-attacked-in-mali.php>  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media\\_of\\_Mali](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_of_Mali)  
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<http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/dim-prospects-media-freedom-Northern-mali-after-french-journalists-murder#sthash.uoTX4SOH.dpuf>  
[media sector in mali witnesses steady recovery after devastation by conflict.pdf](http://media.sector.in.mali.witnesses.steady.recovery.after.devastation.by.conflict.pdf)  
<http://uk.omg.yahoo.com/video/Gao-radio-helping-mali-reconciliation-171654598.html>  
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**6.3 Dissemination of radios and TV-sets among the population**

Radio is the most prominent medium, providing coverage to approximately 80% of the population. But electricity supply especially in Northern Mali is poor. For instance, the city of Gao receives power from 1800 to 2300 hours with untimely power outages. Some areas in the Gao region have been in total blackout for two months. TV reception in the North is non-existent, leaving shortwave radio as the only potential channel of news from outside of the Northern region.

Found numbers for TV sets among the population are inconclusive and are somewhere between 132.000 and 150.000.

**Sources:**

[http://www.nordicom.gu.se/common/publ\\_pdf/NMT12.pdf](http://www.nordicom.gu.se/common/publ_pdf/NMT12.pdf)  
[http://www.discop.com/ci/pages/show/about\\_sub\\_saharan\\_africa](http://www.discop.com/ci/pages/show/about_sub_saharan_africa)  
[http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/med\\_tel-media-televisions](http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/med_tel-media-televisions)  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media\\_of\\_Mali](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_of_Mali)

**6.4 Possibilities of Internet-access, Internet usage and locations for Internet-access (e.g. Web shops, Internet cafés)**

In the Northern part of Mali where internet connection has been limited and where the Islamist groups have closed cybercafés, there is still a possibility of access through phone networks.

To be taken in consideration is the fact that mobile subscription growth rate in Africa is easily outstripping mature mobile markets elsewhere in the world. This is a strong indicator that communications and media are developing in Africa. But most mobiles are no smart phones (yet) and internet bandwidth is (very) low and expressed in Bit/s (in comparison to Kb/s or even Mb/s). The number of mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) in Mali was 68 as of 2011. In Mali there are appr. 3.500 000 (depending on source used) mobiles (population: 14,613,000).

	Previous	Last
Mobile cellular subscriptions in Mali	2530891.0	3438568.0
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) in Mali	18.1	23.8
Personal computers in Mali	100.000.0	
Personal computers (per 100 people) in Mali	0.8	
International Internet bandwidth (bits per person) in Mali	17.2	51.5

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Some mobile internet coverage is available from phone companies, allowing for low-speed connections through for instance usb-modems. But the internet penetration rate is low in Mali: Estimations vary between 2,2- 2,7% of the population (appr. 400.000 internet users country wide). The majority of them is to be expected to be located in the Southern region and especially in Bamako.

#### Sources:

ITU report: Measuring the information society, 2013, [http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/publications/mis2013/MIS2013\\_without\\_Annex\\_4.pdf](http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/publications/mis2013/MIS2013_without_Annex_4.pdf)  
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm>

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<http://www.oafrica.com/city-profile/malis-internet-access-manages-gains-but-needs-stability-to-achieve-full-potential/>  
[http://www.discop.com/ci/pages/show/about\\_sub\\_saharan\\_africa](http://www.discop.com/ci/pages/show/about_sub_saharan_africa)  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media\\_of\\_Mali](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_of_Mali)  
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2>  
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<http://therealtime.com/2012/10/15/social-networking-penetration-among-internet-users-is-highest-in-middle-east-africa/>  
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/mali/households-with-television-percent-wb-data.html>