Military learns much from battle with Erwin Rommel

If even half those supplies and reinforcements had been provided to Field Marshal Rommel in July 1942, when he requested them, the tide would have turned, and Axis forces under his command would have taken the Suez Canal. Now the Axis forces were being squeezed from both sides, and those supplies and reinforcements would be squandered.

The Deutsch-Italienishe Panzermarmee, located in the south of Tunisia, occupied the Mareth Line, on Feb. 15, 1943. It had been constructed by the French in the 1930s as a precaution to any Italian invasion of their Tunisian colony and was located 80 miles inside the Tunisian border.

The Panzermarmee consisted of the Deutsches Afrikakorps and the Italian XX Motorized, and XXI Infantry, Corps. The glory days of the Deutsches Afrikakorps were long gone. With most of its veterans buried, its leaders captured or dead, and most of its equipment destroyed at El Alamein, and the 21st Panzerdivision stripped from it, it was a mere shadow of its former self.

The army also included the remnants of the elite Ramcke Parachute Brigade. Recognizing the Italian contribution, the army was renamed First Italian Army on Feb. 23 and placed under the command of Giovanni Messe, generally acknowledged as the best Italian field general.

In the north of Tunisia, the new troops that were arriving were organized into the Fifth Panzerarmee under the command of Hans-Jürgen von Arnim. Gen. von Arnim’s Fifth Panzerarmee was combined with Gen. Messe’s First Italian Army to form Armeegruppe Afrika, briefly commanded by Field Marshal Rommel.

Tunisia is dominated by a mountain range — the Eastern Dorsal — which runs north to south, parallel to, and about 70 miles from, the coast. There were several passes that led through the mountains to the coast. One was Faid Pass. The Allies had occupied it in November 1942. The Axis recognized that Allied troops coming through the pass could separate the two Axis armies and cut off Gen. Messe’s First Italian Army from supplies now coming into the ports of Tunis and Bizerte.

On Feb. 1, 1943, the 21st Panzer Division, commanded by Hans-George Hildebrandt, seized the pass from the French XIX Corps, commanded by Gen. Alphonse Juin.

Ever the gambler, Field Marshal Rommel decided on a bold strategy to address the Axis’ deteriorating situation in North Africa. Since the Allied Eighth Army, under Gen. Bernard Montgomery, was not expected to, and did not, move very quickly, Field Marshal Rommel decided to hold the Mareth Line in front of General Montgomery’s Eighth Army with infantry units, while his mobile troops struck the predominately American forces near Kasserine Pass.

Field Marshal Rommel’s plan envisioned that both Axis armies would be involved, and with a pincer movement, would capture the huge Allied supply depot at Tébessa, Algeria, surround the Allies and annihilate them. Tébessa is located 15 miles west of the Algerian-Tunisian border and today has a population of 650,000.

However, Gen. von Arnim was more conservative than the “Desert Fox.” Although, Field Marshal Rommel had ultimately convinced his formerly recalcitrant Italian allies to follow his lead, he had only been able to do so by demonstrating the success which his audacity had brought, and by recognizing the limitations of those allies, primarily in equipment and transportation.

By the end of his two years in North Africa, even though the Panzermarmee Afrika had been virtually destroyed at El Alamein, most of the Italian soldiers would willingly follow and obey Germany’s youngest Field Marshal — “der Wüstenfuchs.”

In von Arnim, however, he found a different attitude. Gen. von Arnim was of Prussian nobility, older than Field Marshal Rommel, fresh from the Eastern Front, not impressed by the desert exploits of the young Swabian upstart in this backwater theater and probably jealous of his field marshal’s baton.

Consequently, cooperation between the two was very difficult. Although Kasserine Pass is considered an Axis victory, because of the lack of cooperation from von Arnim, it was not what it could have been. Even then, it would probably have only served to prolong the demise of the Axis position in North Africa by a few months, even if it had been completely successful, given the numerical and materiel superiority of the Allies, which would have overwhelmed the Axis, as it did at El Alamein.

The force facing the Axis on the western side of Tunisia was Lt. Gen. Kenneth Anderson’s British First Army, consisting of two corps of Commonwealth troops and one each of French and American.

On the morning of Feb. 14, the Panzers of Baron Friedrich von Broich’s 10th and Gen. Hildebrandt’s 21st Panzerdivisiones, delivered their St. Valentine’s Day greetings to the green Americans at Zidi Bou Zid, an American communications hub and supply depot.

The American corps commander, Gen. Lloyd Fredendall had dug himself in 80 miles from the front. He made his troop displacements from his headquarters with little to no regard for terrain, or the advice of the commanders on the scene.

The Americans, who had just beaten the French in Morocco and Algeria rather easily, were overconfident and undertrained for what they were about to receive. Lt. Col. John Waters, son-in-law of Maj. Gen. George S. Patton Jr., had told his men, “We did very well against the scrub team. Next week we hit the Germans. When we make a showing against them, you may congratulate yourselves.”

There would be no congratulations. In fact, Col. Waters was captured, and spent the rest of the war as a prisoner of the Reich. In addition to Col. Waters, the two Panzer divisions killed, wounded or captured 1,000 American soldiers and destroyed 100 tanks.

Field Marshal Rommel then sent Baron von Leibenstein’s DAK into action, and on Feb. 17, it captured Thelepte Airfield and 50 tons of much needed fuel and lubricants. By this point Gen. Fredendall’s II Corps had lost 2,546 men, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, three antitank guns and an anti-aircraft battery.

Baron von Leibenstein’s DAK, and the two additional Panzer divisions, jointly assaulted Kasserine Pass on Feb. 19, 1943. Unlike Gen. Fredendall, Field Marshal Rommel led from the front, as was his custom. And as usual, the presence of “der Wüstenfuchs” inspired his soldiers.

As the Axis units passed through Kasserine Pass, they could see the burning hulks of 22 American tanks and 30 half-tracks. But more and more Allied units were joining the fight and the Axis fuel and ammunition was getting lower and lower. Finally, on Feb. 23, after pushing the Americans back 50 miles, and giving them a thrashing, “der Wüstenfuchs” called it off. It was his last victory.

The Americans had suffered 6,000 casualties and the loss of 183 tanks. This was more than 20 percent of their force — an unacceptable number. Axis losses were 2,000 and 34 tanks.

In his report to Army Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall, Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower said, “Our soldiers are learning rapidly. I assure that the troops that come out of this campaign are going to be battle wise and tactfully efficient. They are now mad and ready to fight. All our people, from the very highest to the very lowest, have learned that this is not a child’s game and are ready and eager to get down to business.”

As for Gen. Fredenall, British Gen. Sir Harold Alexander remarked to Ike, “I’m sure you must have better men than that.” Gen. Ernest N. Harmon described him as a, “... physical and moral coward.” On March 6, Gen. Fredenall was replaced by Maj. Gen. George S. Patton Jr. Gen. Patton would not dig in 80 miles from the front!

This was the first battle which Ernie Pyle covered.

Next month: The Third Battle of Kharkov

Mr. Wimbrow writes from Ocean City, Maryland, where he practices law representing those persons accused of criminal and traffic offenses, and those persons who have suffered a personal injury through no fault of their own. He can be contacted at wimbbrowlaw@gmail.com.