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49CETA’s threat to agricultural markets and food quality
CETA’s threat to agricultural 
 markets and food quality
Berit Thomsen, Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft 
(AbL, Working Group for Local Agriculture)
INTRODUCTION
Small-scale farms and other alternatives 
to industrial agriculture will soon be con-
fronted with the consequences of a new 
era of trade policy. The EU is eager to 
open its domestic market for many sen-
sitive agricultural products, such as dairy 
and meat, that have been until now most-
ly protected from imports. Granting mar-
ket access to foreign products through 
new bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs) would put small-scale agricultural 
producers — as well as sustainable agri-
cultural practices in general — under se-
vere pressure in the EU and elsewhere. 
The threat posed by new FTAs to small-
scale farmers is evident in the final CETA 
text, especially in the agreement’s provi-
sions on market access and geographical 
indications.
In Germany, and throughout the EU, the 
market for meat and dairy is character-
ised by excessively low producer prices. 
EU agricultural policies have encouraged 
a production surplus, which drives down 
prices to primary producers, supposedly 
to make European farmers ‘competitive’ 
on the global market. The main benefi-
ciaries of the EU’s low industrial prices 
are European industrial meat processors. 
If deals like CETA go ahead these large 
processors will be able to increase ex-
ports, leading to even greater revenues.
Currently, European domestic meat mar-
kets are protected through import tariffs, 
including on imports from Canada, to ac-
count for a significant price differential. For 
several years, Canadian pork has sold for up 
to 60 per cent less than European pork.1 In 
2014, despite the price crash in the Europe-
an pork sector, the Canadian price was still 
25 per cent lower. In part this is because 
Canadian pork producers are paid 15-35 per 
1 OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2015-2024. Database 
published July 2015. (www.agri-outlook.org).
Photo: Rieke Petter / Albert Schweitzer Stiftung für unsere Mitwelt, 
flickr (Creative Commons license)
50 Making Sense of CETA 
cent less than their European counterparts. 
Should CETA allow for an opening of those 
markets, under current conditions Canadi-
an producers would be able to offer their 
products in the EU at a much cheaper price 
than comparable EU producers.
ANALYSIS OF KEY 
 PROVISIONS
Market access: The cheapest 
provider exports
CETA 2 envisages a complete elimination of 
tariffs on almost all goods over a transi-
tional period starting from the agreement’s 
entry into force.3 Both Parties have, howev-
er, negotiated special provisions for certain 
agricultural products in the form of quotas 
for duty-free imports of particularly sen-
sitive products including, for the EU, beef 
and pork.
2 Consolidated CETA text as published by the European 
Commission in February 2016: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf.
3 For market access, see chapter 2 of the CETA text: 
National Treatment and Market Access for Goods, page 9: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tra-
doc_154329.pdf.
If CETA is implemented, the EU’s quotas 
for Canadian pork and beef imports will 
increase twelve- to fourteen-fold rela-
tive to current levels.4 Whether imports 
actually increase will depend on the Ca-
nadian export industry’s ability to fill the 
new quota volume without the use of hor-
mones or ractopamine (a controversial 
feed additive to accelerate the fattening 
process). Production standards are high-
er in Europe than in Canada and, in many 
cases, are still influenced by small-scale 
farmers. In Europe, the use of growth hor-
mones or performance-increasing antibi-
otics is prohibited. In addition, European 
regulations and standards for livestock 
handling (e. g. space requirements, the 
kind of slatted floors to be used, authori-
sation procedures) are different than Ca-
nadian rules.5
* Statistics by BMEL: http://www.bmel-statistik.de/.
** See footnote 2
4 See CETA Chapter 2 – National Treatment and Market 
Access for Goods, p. 9ff, as well as Annex 2-A, p.231ff: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tra-
doc_154329.pdf.
5 ISN: Vergleich der Rahmenbedingungen in der 
Schweinehaltung in den USA und Deutschland, http://www.
schweine.net/news/ttip-us-handelsbeauftragter-kein-
zwang.html.
Source: BMEL* , CETA text **
† Duty-free quota with transitional period of six years after ratification.
Infographic: Quotas for duty-free imports and exports of meat and dairy in CETA (tonnes) 
Existing tariff 
quotas (tonnes) Actual imports 
Quotas for duty-free 
 Imports † in CETA
Total tariff 
quotas after 
implementation 
of CETA
Canada to EU
Pork (hormone-free) 5,549 63 75,000 80,549
Beef (hormone-free) 4,162 42 45,840 50,002
EU to Canada
Cheese 13,472 14,505 16,000 31,072
Industrial cheese 1,700
51CETA’s threat to agricultural markets and food quality
Canadian slaughterhouses have not yet 
been able to fill the EU’s duty-free quotas 
for pork and beef imports. However, as 
increased quotas would make it more at-
tractive for Canadian producers and pro-
cessors to produce hormone-free meat for 
export, CETA may give them the incentive 
to restructure their production chains and 
slaughtering processes. If that were to 
happen, the resulting increase in imports 
from Canada could put significant down-
ward pressure on European meat prices.
The agreement would allow Canadian im-
ports to encompass about 0.4 per cent of 
European pork consumption and 0.6 per 
cent of its beef consumption.6 There is 
already a surplus of meat and dairy pro-
duction in Europe, which is responsible 
for destructive producer prices. In order 
to ensure the continued existence of lo-
cal agriculture, the meat industry must 
make it a priority to reduce production 
6 Directorate General for External Policies (2014): Nego-
tiations on the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) concluded, Brussels, October 2014
quantities and focus on consumer de-
mands for high-quality, socially conscious 
products.
Transatlantic milk trade
While CETA would have a potentially dest-
abilizing impact on the European meat 
market, proposed increases in dairy quo-
tas in the agreement would also facilitate 
additional European cheese exports to 
Canada, putting comparable pressure on 
the Canadian dairy market.
Currently, Canada employs a supply man-
agement system for its dairy industry. This 
policy provides dairy farmers with fair, sta-
ble incomes by ensuring that the supply of 
dairy products is aligned with domestic 
demand. Producers are allotted a quota 
for production and are fined for every litre 
of milk produced in excess of their quota, 
while imports of dairy products are limit-
ed by tariffs. The price of milk in Canada is 
therefore aligned with the domestic cost 
of production, providing for a fair return 
to primary producers.
Photo: bauernverband, flickr (Creative Commons license)
52 Making Sense of CETA 
ANIMAL WELFARE FOR FARM ANIMALS IN CETA 
Olga Kikou, Compassion in World Farming
There is no language in CETA specific to ‘animal welfare’ except briefly in the chap-
ter on Regulatory Cooperation (Chapter 21). This oversight makes it difficult to as-
sess any positives or shortcomings in CETA’s approach to animal welfare, except of 
course when we compare the text to existing legislation and practices in Canada 
and the EU. The lack of attention given to animal welfare in CETA demonstrates an 
alarming trend among governments to sacrifice significant ethical principles and 
social values in the name of international trade.
In Article 21.4(s), the Parties commit to undertake regulatory cooperation activ-
ities in a wide variety of areas, including by ‘exchanging information, expertise 
and experience in the field of animal welfare in order to promote collaboration 
on animalwelfare between the Parties.’ However, plans for collaboration do not 
necessarily result in higher levels of protection for farm animals or the protection 
of existing standards.
Canada’s standards for farm animal welfare are very weak compared to EU legis-
lation. Indeed, Canadian agricultural policy is characterized by an overall lack of 
consideration for the well-being of farm animals. Codes of practice are outdated, 
often voluntary, and are not backed by strong enforcement provisions. Canada’s 
Criminal Code includes some very limited protections for farm animals, but they 
exclude chicken and fish — i. e. the animals making up the majority of food produc-
tion. The Health of Animals Act regulates the transportation of farm animals while 
the Meat Inspection Act sets down regulations for the slaughter of animals, but 
this federal legislation is generally considered inadequate for protecting animal 
welfare.
The European Union has recognized animals as sentient beings and requires 
Member States to ensure their welfare is respected. A series of regulations and 
directives covering different species at all stages of the farming process guaran-
tee some minimum level of protection. In particular, EU-wide bans are in place to 
safeguard against the worst forms of cruelty. For example, barren battery cages 
for hens, veal crates, and sow stalls (after the first four weeks of pregnancy) are 
all banned in the EU. However, after a period of progress in enacting legislation, 
the EU is currently unwilling to produce new animal welfare legislation. The cur-
rent Commission’s strategy is to focus more on enforcement rather than to pres-
ent new legislative measures.
An increase in the trade of animal products under CETA, without any safeguards 
for animal welfare standards at all phases of the production process, will erode 
current standards and may undermine future efforts to strengthen animal wel-
fare rules in both the EU and Canada.
53CETA’s threat to agricultural markets and food quality
Thanks to this supply management system, 
the price paid to dairy producers in Can-
ada is approximately 50 cents (€0,34) per 
kilogram.7 In contrast, the price of milk in 
Europe dropped drastically in June 2016 to 
just 25.81 cents (€0,17) per kilogram.8 The 
recent decline was the result of the abo-
lition of the EU milk quota regime in April 
2015. The EU’s efforts to re-orient its ag-
ricultural policy toward exports — in order 
to lay the groundwork for trade agree-
ments such as CETA — had the effect of 
slashing the price of milk paid to European 
producers.
The low price of milk in the EU is bound to 
undercut the higher, income-supporting 
Canadian milk price. The EU cheese indus-
try would easily fill the new tariff quota 
space afforded under CETA. It should be 
noted that EU agricultural policy cannot 
claim to be ‘sustainable’ if by exporting 
its surpluses to Canada it interferes with 
a socially oriented market regulation de-
signed to support farmers.
Procedural quality versus 
product quality
In addition to liberalising agricultural 
markets, CETA threatens to weaken food 
safety standards. For example, the sur-
face treatment of meat with chemical and 
organic substances may become more 
common. In Europe, carcases generally 
remain untreated after slaughtering, ex-
cept in cases where they are washed with 
water. In Canada, however, it is common 
practice to clean carcases with chemicals 
such as chlorine. The EU has already re-
laxed standards for the surface treatment 
of beef carcasses with lactic acid 9 (per-
7 Canadian Dairy Commission (2016): http://www.cdc-ccl.
gc.ca/CDC/index-eng.php?id=3810.
8 European Commission. European Milk Market Observa-
tory: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/milk-market-observa-
tory/latest-statistics/prices-margins_en.htm (last visited: 
04.08.2016).
9 Commission Regulation (EU) No 101/2013 of 4 February 
2013 concerning the use of lactic acid to reduce micro-
biological surface contamination on bovine carcases: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O-
J:L:2013:034:0001:0003:EN:PDF.
haps as an early gift to Canadian and U. S. 
trade negotiators). In addition, the EU has 
been discussing for several months now 
whether to permit the surface treatment 
of poultry using acetic acid.
CETA may lock in these changes and en-
courage further deregulation. Weakening 
standards for slaughtering practices will 
not only be profitable for the Canadian 
poultry and meat processing industries, 
but also for their European counterparts, 
as it will allow for the further industrial-
isation of slaughtering processes. The EU 
has signalled its willingness to trade off 
high-quality meat processing and quality 
assurance practices for more chemically 
based treatments.10 From an agricultural 
perspective, the trend is extremely prob-
lematic. Instead of this deregulatory ap-
proach, the EU should prioritise the pro-
tection of small-scale slaughterhouses, 
and promote ethical, safe and sustainable 
processing practices.
10 Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft (2014): 
Freihandelsabkommen stoppen – unübersehbare Aus-
wirkungen auf die bäuerliche Landwirtschaft, Berlin/Hamm, 
April 2014.
Photo: Bad Kleinkirchheim, flickr (Creative Commons license)
54 Making Sense of CETA 
CETA AND GENETIC ENGINEERING 
Karl Bär, Umweltinstitut München
CETA contains an article specifically referring to bilateral cooperation in the field 
of biotechnology (Article 25.2). Through this article, Canada and the EU commit 
to information exchange and further cooperation on a wide variety of critical bi-
otechnology issues, including approval procedures for new products and proce-
dures for dealing with the release of unauthorised genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs). The list of ‘relevant issues’ for bilateral dialogue is non-exhaustive and 
can be expanded at any time. Notably, while trade promotion is a primary objec-
tive of the bilateral dialogue on biotechnology, there is no mention of environ-
mental or consumer protection. It also makes no mention of efforts to limit the 
dominance of a very few corporations on the seed market.
In Canada, GMOs are widely used in agriculture. For example, more than 90 per cent 
of all rapeseed (canola) cultivation in Canada is genetically modified. Genetically 
modified rapeseed from Canada can even be found in food products that are al-
legedly GMO-free.1 For example, Canadian honey often contains pollen from genet-
ically modified rapeseed crops.2 Like the EU, Canada has an approval procedure for 
genetically modified plants 3 and enforces a zero tolerance policy for species that 
are not approved. However, Canada has approved far more species than has the EU.
From the perspective of Canadian exporters, the EU’s strict rules for biotech prod-
ucts are a barrier to trade — products that are not approved in the EU cannot be 
exported to the EU. Furthermore, goods that are contaminated with non-approved 
products must be withdrawn from the market. Canada has already challenged Eu-
ropean rules for the approval of genetically modified plants through the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).4 In 2009, Canada and the EU reached a settlement that 
included the creation of a bilateral forum for the approval of new biotech prod-
ucts. In CETA, this dialogue is expanded to address a wider variety of biotech 
issues.
A dialogue shaped by the interests of the biotech industry
Even though CETA does not create a binding obligation on the EU to change its 
current approval procedure for GMOs, the parties commit to further dialogue and 
cooperation on GMOs and related issues. Problematically, the issues and objec-
tives of the bilateral dialogue, as described in Article 25.2, are clearly designed to 
serve the interests of the biotech industry. For example, paragraph 25.2.1(c) spe-
cifically addresses the impacts of ‘asynchronous’ approval processes for biotech 
products, which is a common complaint of biotech exporters.
1 http://www.oekotest.de/cgi/index.cgi?artnr=104985&bernr=04(in German).
2 Pollen from genetically modified rapeseed crops has been found in Canadian honey on various occa-
sions since the 1990s by Germany authorities (Chemischen und Veterinäruntersuchungsämter (CVUA) in 
Baden-Wuerttemberg) and the magazine Ökotest. See e. g. http://www.ua-bw.de/uploaddoc/cvuafr/JB2008_
Gentechnik_Internet.pdf (in German).
3 The Regulation of Genetically Modified Food in the website of the Canadian Ministry of Health http://
www.hc-sc.gc.ca/sr-sr/pubs/biotech/reg_gen_mod-eng.php
4 World Trade Organization dispute DS292 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds292_e.htm 
55CETA’s threat to agricultural markets and food quality
CETA’s mechanism for ‘regulatory cooperation’ (see chapter on Regulatory Coop-
eration) is particularly important in this context, since the parties are bound by 
that mechanism to try to align their regulations over time. The regulatory cooper-
ation mechanism raises the risk that future legislation in the field of biotechnol-
ogy (e. g. for the regulation of new methods of genetic manipulation) is, from the 
very outset, influenced by the interests of the biotech industry.
Furthermore, it is particularly dangerous that the parties agree in paragraph 
25.2.2(b) ‘to promote efficient science-based approval processes for biotechnology 
products’. In North America and among industry associations, the precautionary 
principle — the policy that precludes the approval of new products if they have not 
first been proven harmless to humans and the environment — is not considered 
‘science-based’. Instead, Canadian regulators and the biotech industry take the 
approach that risk must be unequivocally proven before a product can be banned. 
This demand in CETA might seem harmless at first. Yet, one of the fundamental 
principles of the EU’s regulatory processes is that policy makers decide wheth-
er or not a particular risk should be taken. Unlike a technocratic, ‘science-based’ 
standard, policy makers can be held accountable by their voters in elections.
Canada is also a global leader in the 
development of international stand-
ards for so-called ‘low-level presence’.5 
Through trade policy, Canada and oth-
ers intend to establish an interna-
tionally-accepted tolerance limit for 
GMO contamination, thus solving the 
problem of contamination without ad-
dressing the root cause. This approach 
not only contradicts the current EU ap-
proval process but it also clashes with 
a large segment of public opinion in 
Europe.6
Finally, in addition to Article 25.2 on bi-
otechnology, CETA’s chapter on invest-
ment protection has a potential sig-
nificance for biotechnology regulation. 
Canadian biotech corporations may 
be able to use the agreement’s inves-
tor-state dispute settlement mecha-
nism to sue governments in the EU for 
compensation over stricter or modified 
regulations related to genetic engi-
neering (see chapter on ISDS). ISDS is 
just one more threat to the regulation 
of GMOs under CETA.
5 http://www.agbioforum.org/v16n1/v16n1a04-tranberg.htm
6 One of the very rare EU-wide surveys was the Eurobarometer survey published in February 2010. A key 
finding of this survey was that people in Europe ‘do not see benefits of genetically modified food, consider 
genetically modified foods to be probably unsafe or even harmful and are not in favour of development of 
genetically modified food’. See http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/
download/DocumentKy/55674
Titel titel titel Bildtitel photo: Name 
Fotograf_In, flickr mit cclicense
Photo: BASF - We create chemistry, 
flickr (Creative Commons license)
56 Making Sense of CETA 
Degradation of regional 
 quality
Geographical indications (GIs) are the 
names of specific regions and places that 
designate the origin of certain protected 
food products. GIs make it possible for 
small-scale farmers in specific regions to 
establish higher prices for well-known, 
high-quality food products, and they con-
tribute to regional economic development 
by supporting value-added industries. Ex-
amples of important GIs in Germany alone 
include Frankfurter Grüne Soße (Frank-
furt green sauce), Schwäbische Spätzle 
(Swabian egg noodles), Bayrische Brezen 
(Bavarian pretzels), Münchner Bier (beer 
from Munich) and Schwarzwälder Schink-
en (Black Forest ham). In 2015, 1,308 food 
products, 2,883 wines and 332 spirits were 
protected as GIs in Europe.11
CETA would only protect 173 products with 
geographic indications.12 Although CETA 
contains a space where Canadian GIs can 
be listed, the space is totally empty. There 
is no such system for Canadian products, 
and Canadian producers of imitation food 
products would like to do away with GIs 
completely.13 The list of GIs in CETA is un-
likely to prevent imitations in Canada an-
yway. Under CETA, Canadian producers 
would still be allowed to distribute com-
parable products with English or French 
translations of the original name (e. g. 
‘Black Forest Ham’). The European Commis-
sion claims it was not possible to negotiate 
comprehensive protection for English and 
French translations of GIs, which means 
they are effectively neutered in Canada.14
11 Friends of the Earth Europe (2016): Trading away EU 
Farmers, Brussels, April 2016.
12 In the CETA text, geographic indications are included 
in Chapter 20 – Intellectual Property, p.155ff and Annex 
20-A, p.516ff: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/
february/tradoc_154329.pdf.
13 Agra-Europe (2015): TTIP: Hogan will ‘Schnellstraße 
über den Atlantik’, Agra-Europe 9/15, 23 February 2015.
14 German Bundestag (2015): Auswirkungen von TTIP 
und CETA auf geschützte geografische Herkunftsangaben 
und auf die Kennzeichnung von gentechnisch veränderten 
Lebensmitteln. Drucksache 18/4560, April 2015.
The CETA text allows for the possible ad-
dition of products to the list of protected 
GIs after the conclusion of the agreement. 
However, it also allows for products to be 
erased from the list if they are no longer 
regarded as relevant. Article 20.22.1 states 
‘the CETA Joint Committee, established un-
der Article 26.1, may decide to amend Annex 
20-A by adding geographical indications 
or by removing geographical indications 
which have ceased to be protected or have 
fallen into disuse in their place of origin’.15
Because the CETA Joint Committee is ulti-
mately responsible for this decision, Can-
ada’s consent will always be required if a 
product is to be added or removed from 
the list. Notably, while this committee 
would likely include the corporate sector 
in its decision-making processes for regu-
latory cooperation, it has no obligation to 
involve European national parliaments.16 
The future effectiveness of the GI system 
is called into question by CETA at exactly 
the moment it should be strengthened in 
Europe and internationally.
Closing the door to agrarian 
industrialisation
The ratification of CETA in its current form 
poses a considerable threat to local agri-
culture on both sides of the Atlantic. Rather 
than the promotion of exports and surplus 
production, what is needed are concerted 
efforts to safeguard regulatory standards 
for food quality and local economic devel-
opment. Concretely, this includes efforts to 
foster animal welfare and non-GMO feed-
ing, to strengthen the local production 
of protein feed, to ensure the right to re-
sow seed from protected varieties, to stop 
back-door genetic modifications, and to 
reduce the use of pesticides and chemical 
fertilisers. These crucial initiatives are both 
obstructed and threatened by the pro-cor-
porate trade policy found in CETA.
15 CETA Chapter 20, p.159 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf.
16 Stoll P-T, Holterhus P, Gött H (2015): Die geplante 
Regulierungszusammenarbeit zwischen der Europäischen 
Union und Kanada sowie den USA nach den Entwürfen von 
TTIP und CETA. Vienna, June 2015.