The Libyan Projects Market 2012

A comprehensive overview of project opportunities in the new Libya A MEED Insight report

CONTENTS
Contents Preface Executive summary Introduction The Libyan projects market Oil & Gas Introduction and background Major oil elds and transport networks Export, rening and petrochemicals facilities Industry structure and future prospects The status of existing production facilities The future for Libyas EPSA holders Power Renewables Desalination The Great Man-made River project Wastewater Industry Housing and real estate Social infrastructure Transport Airports Ports Roads Rail 2 4 5 7 11 17 17 22 28 35 40 47 50 58 63 67 76 81 86 91 97 97 102 104 107 TABLES/CHARTS/MAPS Introduction
Table: Selected members of NTC provisional cabinet as of 22 November 2011 Table: Key economic indicators 9 10 Table: Export terminals Table: Reneries Table: Petrochemicals The status of existing production facilities Table: Output and status of major oil and gas facilities The future for Libyas EPSA holders 11 12 13 Table: International rms that have signed EPSAs Table: EPSA contract holders 32 32 32 40 45 47 47 48 50 50 51 51 52 52 53 54 54 55 56 56 58 58 60 60 61 62

The Libyan projects market

Table: Contract awards, 2002-10 Chart: Contract awards by sector, 2002-10 Table: Selected major projects awarded, 2002-10 Chart: Top 10 international contractors in Libya by value of work awarded Chart: Nationalities of the top 10 contractors in Libya by value of work awarded 14 14

Power
Chart: Peak power demand growth Table: Residential power tariffs Table: Non-residential power tariffs Chart: Breakdown of power demand by sector Chart: Installed generating capacity by technology Table: Major power plants Chart: Breakdown of power plant feedstock by type Chart: Gecols projected fuel mix Table: Selected power projects under way as of early 2011 Chart: Power demand outlook Table: Power plant projects planned by Gecol

Chart: Top clients in Libya based on awarded contracts, 2002-10 15 Chart: Budget value of planned projects prior to the conict 16 17 17 18 18 18 19

Oil & Gas

Introduction and background Table: Top 20 oil reserves by country Table: Top 20 oil-producing countries by output Table: Oil production of Opec countries Map: Major oil producing basins Map: Production facilities, pipelines, export facilities, reneries and petrochemicals plants Major oil elds and transport networks Map: Western Libyan gas project facilities and pipelines Table: Oil elds, locations, producers and capacities Export, rening and petrochemicals facilities

Renewables
20 22 23 27 28 Table: Reaols renewable energy targets Table: Average wind speeds at ve coastal locations Map: Libyan wind map Table: Planned wind farm projects Map: Solar thermal electricity generating potentials

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CONTENTS
Desalination
Table: Actual operating desalination capacity Map: Major desalination plants in operation Table: New desalination plants under phase 1 Table: New desalination plants under phase 2 Table: New desalination plants under phase 3 63 64 65 65 65 65 67 67 68 69 69 70 72 73 74

Industry
Table: Existing cement plants Chart: Cement producers by design capacity Table: Local cement producers Table: Licences granted for new cement capacity Table: Libyan Iron & Steel Company facilities Table: Existing steel and cement plants Map: Existing steel and cement plants

81 81 82 82 83 84 85 85 86 87

Transport Airports
Map: Main airports Table: Main airports Table: Contract awards on Libyan airport expansion programme

97 97 97 98 99 102 102 102 104 104 104 105 107 107 108 108 108 109 109 110

Ports
Map: Ports Table: Major ports

The Great Man-made River project

Chart: Water supply by source Map: The Great Man-made River project Table: The Great Man-made River wellelds Table: Planned reservoirs on the Great Man-made River Map: The Great Man-made River phase 1 network Map: The Great Man-made River phase 2 network Map: The Great Man-made River phase 3 network Map: The Great Man-made River phase 4 network Table: Major construction contracts awarded on the Great Man-made River project Table: Planned water usage for the rst three phases of the GMR project

Housing and real estate

Table: The 2001-15 housing plan Table: Key elements of the Housing & Infrastructure Board programme Table: Selected major housing contracts under construction Table: Selected major real-estate and tourism projects Map: Tourist sites

Roads
Map: Road network Table: Vehicles in Libya

87 88 89 90 91 91

Table: Selected major road projects

Rail
Map: Planned Tripoli metro Table: Metro line characteristics Table: Metro station locations Table: Metro technical aspects Table: Rail projects Map: Planned rail networks Table: Major contract awards by Railway Executive Board

Social infrastructure
75 Table: Mena university investment Table: Selected projects on Odacs university 75 76 77 78 79 and campus building programme Table: Hospitals and health centres Chart: Health investment Table: Projects under construction

92 94 95 96

Wastewater
Table: Wastewater treatment plants Map: Major wastewater plants Table: Selected Housing & Infrastructure Board contract awards

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Preface
W
ith the highest gross domestic product per capita on the African continent and the eighth largest oil reserves in the world, Libya has long had excellent projects potential. However, until recently, its projects market was largely moribund, held back by an overbloated bureaucracy and a lack of central decision-making. As a result, it fell well below its promise. The fall of the Gadda regime and the transition to a new, democratic Libya have transformed attitudes towards the local market. After decades of mismanagement, there is hope that the projects market can start living up to its potential. For the time being, efforts are being focused on the reconstruction of facilities and infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the conict. Initial ndings suggest that damage to key infrastructure is not as bad as rst believed. With oil and gas output returning close to pre-conict levels, thoughts are already turning to the future and meeting Libyas widespread infrastructure needs. In this latest MEED Insight report, Libyas projects potential is assessed across all main sectors. The challenges and opportunities are analysed, along with the history, policy, targets, projects and key clients. In addition, an assessment is provided on the damage made to certain facilities. This report is the product of three months research and thanks go to everyone who made it possible. It is the latest produced in 2011 by MEED Insight, the bespoke research and analysis arm of MEED. December 2011

Thoughts are already turning to the future and meeting Libyas widespread infrastructure needs

For any questions regarding the contents of this report, please contact Edward James (edward.james@meed-dubai.com). For more details on MEED Insight publications and its bespoke research services, please phone +971 (0)4 367 1302 or email insight@meed.com
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Executive summary
T
he capture and killing of former Libyan leader Muammar Gadda on 20 October 2011 made headlines the world over. And rightly so; after dominating Libya since he took power in a military coup in 1969, the death of the mercurial statesman was an event of signicant local, regional and global importance. But his passing has also brought with it considerable uncertainty over Libyas future. The capture in late November 2011 of Saif al-Islam, Gaddas most inuential son, and security chief Abdullah Senussi has drawn a line under the last vestiges of the previous regime, but the National Transitional Council (NTC) has its work cut out as it attempts to bring some semblance of normality back to the country. There are signs that this is already happening, however. Oil production in many areas is being brought back up to capacity
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surprisingly quickly, while export facilities have been reopened to enable Libyan crude to access the international market. The speed with which this is happening is testament not only to engineering ingenuity, but also to the fact that Libyas hydrocarbons infrastructure much of it in remote areas has emerged remarkably unscathed from the ghting. It is a similar story in most other sectors. Surveys carried out as part of this report have found that most facilities and projects have experienced relatively little damage as a result of the conict and that in many existing plants, production is already resuming. Work on projects that were under construction is a separate matter. International contractors have yet to return to the country while they wait for the security situation to improve. However, there is plenty of incentive for them to go back

Oil production in many areas is being brought back up to capacity surprisingly quickly

as most still have performance bonds in many cases up to 10 per cent of their contract values with the clients and much of their equipment is also still in the country. Contractors, spoken to as part of this report, state that advanced parties are reentering Libya to assess the situation and to gauge the right moment to return. If the situation on the ground rapidly improves, then most of them will be in a position to return by mid-2012. The interim government has already stated that it will honour legitimate contracts signed under the previous regime, although much depends on the NTCs denition of legitimate. Certainly, there are concerns among Chinese and Russian companies in particular, due to their governments initial unwillingness to support the rebels cause and it remains to be seen whether there will
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be any lingering animosity towards these rms that could result in them being unable to return. Whatever happens, the hope amongst contractors is that Libya will become a major projects hub. It is fair to say that under the Gadda regime, the Libyan projects market was anaemic at best. Despite oil production of more than 1.5 million barrels a day (b/d) and the African continents highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the projects market has consistently underperformed. Over the past decade, total annual contract awards have never exceeded $8bn and have averaged less than $4bn. The fault lay primarily with a bloated and inefcient bureaucracy, which had neither the decision-making authority nor the funding approval to proceed with the governments project plans. This is despite Libya having no shortage of funds and the pressing need for capital investment in almost every sector as the countrys aging infrastructure became increasingly unable to serve the fast-growing population. It was not uncommon for tendering activities and contract award procedures to take years to complete. Projects were frequently cancelled or remained permanently in limbo. Often, contracts were awarded only for the successful contractor to discover that funding had not been approved for the project. Despite four oil
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projects investment and the nance is available to fund this need. From housing and hospitals to roads and railways, there is considerable underdevelopment of existing infrastructure, which will require substantial investment in the medium to long term. In the short run, the emphasis will be on completing existing schemes and ensuring that the nations hydrocarbons and utilities infrastructure is operating at a sufcient rate. The private sector, both local and foreign, will have a key role to play in this projects evolution. The Libyan economy has hitherto been dominated by the public sector. Any new government will be keen to liberalise the economy and attract urgentlyneeded foreign investment into the country. As an investment destination, Libya is fertile territory. For example, its proximity to Europe, cheap power and competitive feedstocks make it a prime industrial investment target, while its thousands of kilometres of unspoilt beaches, ancient ruins and good weather should prove attractive to tourism developers. The emergence of a new Libya offers the prospect of a major new projects market in North Africa. For suppliers, vendors, investors, contractors and subcontractors, it provides a potentially lucrative new market that can offset the increasingly competitive environment in the Gulf. The risks may, for the time being, be relatively high, but so will the potential returns.
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and gas licensing rounds, there was little discernible increase in hydrocarbons activity. The downstream sector remained moribund, while international oil rms have been reluctant to invest in upstream production increases. With the demise of the Gadda regime, the hope is that the new government will be more efcient in its capital spending programme. It certainly has the cash to do so. Libya had foreign exchange reserves of close to $170bn as of late 2010, according to the International Monetary Fund, while its foreign assets totalled $152bn. Both

gures compare very favourably with the countrys $96bn GDP. It will take time, however, for spending to accelerate. By denition transitional, the NTC is unlikely to embark on any major capital spending programme. Until an elected government takes over, concrete developments are not expected to take place and may not occur until 2013 at the earliest. But the potential is clear. The Libyan projects market is in the optimum position where there is a pressing need for

Introduction
History
Libya is a predominantly Arab state that has a long and proud history, although it has only had a truly independent identity of its own since 1951. References to the area that is present Libya date back as far as 2,700BC, when ancient Egyptian inscriptions refer to troublesome Berber tribes. The Ancient Greeks, followed by the Romans, settled in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and there are still many remnants of the Roman empire in Libya, such as the famous city ruins of Leptis Magna. The Arab conquest, along with Islam, swept across North Africa in 647AD and for the next several hundred years, Libya was a nominal part of the various Arab caliphates, although due to its remote location from the Arab heartland in the Gulf and Levant, direct rule from the caliphate capitals at Damascus and then Baghdad was limited to coastal areas only. From the 17th century onwards, the
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Ottomans began to assert greater control over North Africa and this remained the case until 1911, when Italy, seeking an overseas empire, invaded Libya and took control. The Italians remained in the country until the end of the second world war, when temporary control was passed to the British under UN mandate. The UN voted to give the country independence and Libya declared its independence on 24 December 1951. For the rst time, the nation was in control of its own destiny. Initially, Libya was a monarchy ruled by King Idris al-Senussi. But Idris was a weak and ineffective ruler and civil discontent became rife. On 1 September 1969, a group of army ofcers led by Muammar Gadda took control, following a military coup and Libya was declared a republic. Gadda would rule Libya until the civil war in 2011. Under Gadda, Libya was a democracy
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with direct rule by the people through General Peoples Committees. However, Gadda was the sole decision-making authority in reality and democracy was merely an illusion. His erratic and mercurial personality resulted in Libya adopting several contentious and often bizarre policies both at home and abroad, which resulted in the country facing UN and US sanctions throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 2003, Gaddas government renounced terrorism and sought a rapprochement with the West. In the following two years, sanctions were lifted and there was a renewed hope that Libya would become a prime projects market and investment destination. However, in both cases this was not the case as a lack of a strong government institutional framework, an absence of any private sector activity and a weak civil society meant that even after opening up to the world, the economy was simply unable to move forward. The civil war and the demise of Gadda have once again raised hopes that Libya can start to live up to its potential. The National Transitional Council (NTC) has temporary control, with the expectation that elections for a permanent government will be held in 2012. Having thrown off the shackles and constraints of the Gadda era, optimism about the countrys prospects has never been higher.

Climate and society

Libya is primarily a desert state, with most of its geographical area falling in the Sahara desert where human habitation is impossible outside of scattered oases. It is the fourth largest country in Africa and the 17th largest in the world. There are two main climates in Libya: a Mediterranean climate along the coast,

Its large size and small population make Libya one of the most thinly populated countries

where temperatures cool considerably in the winter and seasonal rain is not uncommon; and a desert climate in the interior, where temperatures soar in the summer and rain is extremely rare all year round. Only 2 per cent of Libya receives enough rain to make human habitation possible. As a result, the vast majority of the countrys 6.5 million people live in coastal cities. However, the fact that Libyas two major cities, Tripoli and Benghazi, are almost 1,000 kilometres apart has only served to accentuate regional and political differences between the Cyrenaica and Tripolitania regions. This aspect was no better demonstrated than by the fact that the 2011 uprising quickly spread in the east of the country and took some time to have an impact in the west. Libyas large size and small population make it one of the most thinly populated countries on earth, with a population density of just 50 people a square km. More than 95 per cent of the Libyan population speaks Arabic. In the south and west, Berber languages predominate. Tribes play an important role in Libyan society, with more than 20 existing major tribal groups. Because of the geographical vastness of Libya and the prevalence of tribes being associated with specic areas or towns, political or social differences are often drawn along tribal lines.
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The system of government

By denition, the NTC is a temporary government with a self-imposed mandate to oversee Libya until a permanent government can be elected. As of November 2011, it remains unclear just what the NTC plans to implement during its period in control, but it is likely that the council is going to leave the most important decisions to the elected government once it comes in. This will likely include decisions on foreign investment, major project funding and oil sector strategy. The new NTC cabinet, announced in late November 2011, is broadly secularist and technocratic, with a nod to the more prominent military commanders who played a key role in the civil war. Its composition has already been welcomed by the major Western powers. There are a number of interesting aspects about the new government. All three of the top ofcials are academics and have clearly been selected for their neutrality. Interestingly, both Prime Minister Abduraheem el-Keib and Deputy Prime Minister Mustafa AbuShagur worked together at the University of Alabama in the US and, at the start of the conict, were both working in Dubai. Both are also believed to hold US citizenship. The other deputy prime minister, Omar Abdulkarim, speaks Japanese and is understood to have strong ties to Japan.
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Libyas economy suffers from inequity in the distribution of growth and high unemployment rates
The presence of two former senior executives from Italian rm Eni on the cabinet will reassure Italy, which relies on Libyan oil and gas for much of its energy needs. It is hoped that the technocratic nature of the cabinet in general will ensure steady leadership until elections.

Selected members of NTC provisional cabinet as of 22 November 2011

Name Abduraheem el-Keib Position
Prime Minister

Remarks
Technocrat. Professor of electrical engineering who has been living in exile from Libya since 1976, primarily in the US and the UAE. Holds dual US/ Libyan citizenship. Family is from Sabrata Technocrat. Professor of electrical and computer engineering who has been living in exile from Libya since the 1970s, primarily in the US and the UAE. Is thought to hold dual US/Libyan citizenship. Born in Tripoli Technocrat. Former chairman of Eni Oil in Libya and worked for Agoco before that. Has a doctorate degree in petroleum engineering from Waseda University in Japan. From Benghazi Veteran diplomat and long-term dissident of Gadda regime, he left the Foreign Service in 1984 in protest over the Libyan embassy hostage crisis in London. Has been an active member of the opposition ever since. Until returning to Libya, he was a resident in Canada. Originally from Derna Leader of the Misurata militia, which successfully withstood a month-long siege and much of the worst ghting during the conict Technocrat. Former chairman of Eni operations in Libya. Also previously worked for NOC Head of Zintan militia during conict, responsible for capturing Gaddas son, Saif al-Islam. Former teacher and army ofcer

Mustafa AbuShagur

Deputy Prime Minister

Omar Abdullah Abdulkarim Ashour Ben Khayil

Deputy Prime Minister

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Structure of the economy

While Libya enjoys the highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Africa, thanks to its low population and large oil and gas reserves, it suffers from several structural issues that have impeded growth over the years. Primary among these is the centralised planning aspect of the economy and the previous distrust of private sector activity. As such, the economy is state-dominated with only little private enterprise. There is also inequity in the distribution of growth and unemployment, especially among the young, is high. Libya also suffers from poor social infrastructure, particularly in affordable housing, healthcare

Fawzi Abdulali

Minister of Interior Minister of Oil & Gas Minister of Defence Minister of Finance Minister of Electricity

Abdulrahman bin Yazza Osama Juwaili

Hassan Zaqlam Awad Barasi

NTC=National Transitional Council; Agoco=Arabian Gulf Oil Company; NOC=National Oil Corporation. Sources: NTC, MEED Insight

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Much needs to be done to disconnect the Libyan economy from its reliance on crude exports
and education, although the previous government had targeted these sectors for investment over the last decade. Like many other regional oil producers, Libyas economy is highly dependent on crude, with oil exports comprising 97 per cent of total export revenues. Unsurprisingly, real and nominal GDP rises and falls with the oil price, so while real GDP fell by more than 2 per cent in 2009 as the oil price slipped below $100 a barrel, it rose by 4.2 per cent in 2010 as the oil price picked up. With the oil price remaining steady, the Libyan economy should enjoy stable growth once oil output reaches pre-conict levels. Nonetheless, it is clear that much needs to be done to disconnect the economy from this reliance on crude exports. Whatever happens, the NTC and the government that succeeds it, will have their work cut out in transforming it into a market economy.

Key economic indicators (LDbn unless stated)

2006 GDP, constant prices GDP, constant prices (% change) GDP, current prices GDP, current prices ($bn) GDP per capita, constant prices (LD) GDP per capita, current prices (LD) GDP per capita, current prices ($) Total investment (% of GDP) Gross national savings (% of GDP) Ination, average consumer prices Ination, average consumer prices (% change) Volume of imports of goods and services (% change) Volume of imports of goods (% change) Volume of exports of goods and services (% change) Volume of exports of goods (% change) Value of oil exports ($bn) General government revenue General government revenue (% of GDP) General government total expenditure General government total expenditure (% of GDP) General government net debt General government net debt (% of GDP) General government gross debt General government gross debt (% of GDP) Current account balance ($bn) Current account balance (% GDP)
Exchange rate: $1=LD1.2488; GDP=Gross domestic product. Source: IMF 41.7 6.7 72.3 55.1 6,897.3 11,967.2 9,112.4 22.6 73.6 94.5 1.4 -2.6 1.1 7.9 9.2 41.7 47.5 65.6 23.2 32.1 -58.6 -81.0 0.6 0.9 28.1 51.0

2007
44.8 7.5 86.9 69.0 7,264.5 14,090.4 11,188.7 26.6 69.8 100.3 6.2 17.4 26.6 3.4 3.4 47.8 59.3 68.2 33.5 38.5 -72.4 -83.3 0.0 0.0 29.8 43.2

2008
45.9 2.3 116.5 95.3 7,284.4 18,505.0 15,140.1 27.2 66.1 110.7 10.4 37.6 9.4 -6.5 -6.5 60.7 76.4 65.6 46.2 39.6 -82.4 -70.7 0.0 0.0 37.1 38.9

2009
44.8 -2.3 73.7 58.8 6,971.8 11,461.4 9,149.4 34.8 50.8 113.9 2.8 5.0 17.7 -6.8 -7.5 35.7 44.7 60.7 40.8 55.3 -81.6 -110.8 0.0 0.0 9.4 15.9

2010
46.7 4.2 90.3 71.3 7,115.0 13,768.1 10,872.8 35.8 50.2 116.7 2.5 2.2 11.3 -7.2 -7.2 42.3 56.0 62.0 48.2 53.4 -91.3 -101.1 0.0 0.0 10.3 14.4

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The Libyan projects market

P
rior to the recent conict, Libya was well-known as a projects market with plenty of potential, but with little to show for it. Tripolis rapprochement with the US and the UK in late 2003 was greeted with enthusiasm by many companies, especially oil rms, which viewed the country as an exceptional opportunity, given its general infrastructure requirements and the fact that it had the money to fund them. Throughout 2004 and 2005, Libya was a prime target for business development among rms, with many establishing ofces in the country in the hope of winning work. But over time, it became apparent that the countrys entrenched bureaucracy, budgetary issues and inherently slow decision-making had not changed with the opening up of the economy. At the same time, the exploration and production sharing agreement (EPSA IV) licensing rounds did not create
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Libya was wellknown as a projects market with lots of potential, but with little to show for it
the expected massive upstream investment, while downstream investment deals with the likes of the UKs Shell and BP failed to materialise into physical activity. Indeed, project spending fell considerably in the immediate aftermath of the lifting of sanctions, with the total value of contracts awarded between 2003 and 2005 barely exceeding those awarded in 2002 alone. However, there was a marked increase in spending from 2006 onwards, although 2010 levels dropped substantially.

Contract awards, 2002-10

($m)

8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

10 20

Source: MEED Projects

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The decrease in activity in 2009-10 was primarily due to upheaval and restructuring in the government, brought about by several erratic decrees by Gadda. The resulting bureaucratic inertia meant that many planned projects did not proceed. Surprisingly, given its huge oil and gas potential, there has been very little capital investment in Libyas hydrocarbons sector over the past nine years. What spending there has been has focused on upstream production and processing projects, but with less than $6bn spent in total over this period, the sector has been slow moving. This largely reects the relative failure of the EPSA IV licensing rounds, where international oil companies (IOCs) have been reluctant to implement eld developments either because oil and gas were not found in sufcient quantities or because it was not commercially viable to proceed. Even at producing elds, there has been little in the way of upgrading facilities. In some cases, this is due to lack of agreement with the IOCs state-owned joint venture partner on how to proceed. In others, Opec quotas have meant that there was little point in increasing capacity if there was no export outlet. Downstream has been even more disappointing, with almost no investment at all over the last decade despite an obvious need for the upgrading and rehabilitation of existing facilities. The high-prole deals
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There has been little investment in Libyas hydrocarbons sector over the past nine years
for a new petrochemicals complex with the US Dow Chemical Company and the revamp of liqueed natural gas (LNG) facilities with Shell failed to materialise despite bilateral government support. The most successful sectors have been infrastructure, power and construction. Infrastructure has been the largest sector since 2002, due to large contracts to upgrade the existing airports and build a new railway network. Power has been another key sector. Rising electricity demand, due to economic and demographic growth, has meant investment in new generating schemes, although progress on individual projects has frequently been slow and erratic. Construction, primarily in the form of social housing projects, has been the other mainstay of the Libyan projects market. Demographic growth has again been a factor, with the previous regime attempting to address a considerable housing shortage.

Contract awards by sector, 2002-10

Industrial, 0.7 Pipeline, 2.3 Gas processing, 4.5 Oil/Gas production Infrastructure Metal, 0.6 Rening, 0.5

($m)
11,361 10,223 9,329

8.2 11.1
Water and waste

%
21.8

26.5

4,741 3,526 1,930 985 310 260 200

23.8
Power

Construction

Source: MEED Projects

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Selected major projects awarded, 2002-10

Project Railway Executive Board Sirte-Misurata-Khoms railway line HUPEA Tajoura, Benghazi and Tripoli housing project Gecol Al-Khaleej steam power plant CAA - Tripoli airport terminal, package II Gecol Tripoli West power plant expansion HIB Tripoli and Benghazi infrastructure network GMRA Great Man-made River, phase III WOC Farig eld development, phase II Eni Wafa gas development Gecol 400kV overhead transmission lines GMRA Great Man-made River, phase IV Libya Investment & Development Company Tobruk housing development Gecol Transmission lines and substations ESDF Tripoli Complex towers Railway Executive Board Hicha-Municipalities railway line Railway Executive Board Misurata to Sebha railway Railway Executive Board Coastal railway Gecol Power transmission line Edkhar Bank Tripoli housing units Gecol Sebha power station Sector
Infrastructure Construction Power Infrastructure Power Infrastructure Water and Waste Oil/Gas production Gas processing Power Water and Waste Construction Power Construction Infrastructure Infrastructure Infrastructure Power Construction Power

Contract value ($m)

1,850 1,600 1,463 1,350 1,267 1,250 1,246 1,246 1,200 1,200 1,000 996 990 880 840 824 805 800 800 750

Award date
2008 2009 2007 2007 2007 2008 2005 2006 2002 2007 2004 2009 2010 2008 2008 2008 2009 2008 2006 2007

EPC contractors
China Railway Construction Corporation Amona Ranhill Consortium Sdn Bhd Gama Energy, Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction, Hyundai Engineering & Construction Consolidated Contractors Company, TAV Construction, Strabag Odebrecht, Vinci Archirodon Group, Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction, Hyundai Engineering & Construction Tennessee Overseas Construction Company Tekfen, Frankenthal, KSB Group, TML Construction Company, SNC Lavalin Group Joannou & Paraskevaides Tecnimont, Sofregaz, JGC Corporation KEC International, Saadiyat Free Trade Authority, Cobra Instalaciones y Servicios, Kahromika Al-Nahr Company Sungwon Corporation Technologies, Investments, Services, Energy Consolidated Contractors Company China Railway Construction Corporation China Railway Construction Corporation, Metis China Railway Construction Corporation, Russian Railways Laptechno Power Saraya Construction Company Global Electrical Services Company, Enka Teknik

HUPEA=Housing & Utilities Project Execution Authority; Gecol=General Electricity Company of Libya; CAA=Civil Aviation Authority; HIB=Housing & Infrastructure Board; GMRA=Great Man-made River Authority; WOC=Waha Oil Company; LAP=Libya Africa Investment Portfolio. Source: MEED Projects

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Top 10 international contractors in Libya by value of work awarded

Nationalities of the top 10 contractors in Libya by value of work awarded* ($m)

5,580 Singapore

($m)

5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0

5,000

Italy

4,000

8
Libya

Korea

3,048 2,579 1,600

3,000

8 10

2,000

Malaysia

1,000

%
16 18

34

1,400 1,300 1,000

l g g on hil rin rin cti n an m ee ion ee ion tru tio a R or tiu gin truct gin truct ns pora n n n o o s E s C r iE s Am Con ay Co oo on da on ilw ew C un & C Ra Da & Hy a in Ch

& ou s nn ide Joa keva ras Pa

CC

C ya ara

n tio uc ny str mpa n Co Co

Hy

ux S

e aip

m on gw Co rp

ti ora

on
China

Greece

Su

*2002-10. Source: MEED Projects

Source: MEED Projects

The main contractors

In terms of contracting, there have been few successful Western rms in Libya over the past decade. The market has tended to be dominated by Chinese, Russian, Korean and Turkish contractors, while local rms have had very limited success with the exception of Saraya Construction Company The most successful contractor in Libya over the past 10 years, in terms of value of contracts awarded, is China Railway Con MEED Insight

struction Corporation. This is due mainly to its large railway contracts with the Railway Executive Board, although it has completed some oil sector work too. Versatile Korean contractor Hyundai Engineering & Contracting is in second position, due to work won in the construction, power and hydrocarbons sectors, while its compatriot Daewoo Engineering & Construction has been the dominant utilities contractor in the country.

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The leading clients

With one exception, the major clients in Libya over the past nine years have all been government entities. By far, the most active client has been the General Electricity Company of Libya (Gecol), which awarded more than $10bn worth of work between 2002 and 2010. Gecols ranking reects the pressing need for power in the country, although its performance has been mixed; in many cases its projects have taken years to get off the drawing board, while contractors have complained

that it awarded contracts without necessarily having the required government nancial approval. A more effective client has been the Civil Aviation Authority, which awarded a raft of contracts in 2007 and 2008 to upgrade the Benghazi, Tripoli and Sebha airports. Italys Eni is the only private sector and non-Libyan client on the list due to its signicant investment in the Western Desert Gas project. The Railway Executive

Top clients in Libya based on awarded contracts, 2002-10

($m)

12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

Ge

co

e Ex

ay ilw d Ra oar eB tiv cu

il Civ

ia Av

tio

uth nA

ori

ty

En

Gecol=General Electricity Company of Libya. Source: MEED Projects MEED Insight

Inf

ras

& ing d us ar Ho re Bo ctu tru

Gr

ea

tM

er Riv ty de thori a -m Au an

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Board is the client behind major projects won by Chinese and Russian rms to build a coastal railway linking Tripoli with Benghazi. The Housing & Infrastructure Board (HIB) is responsible for infrastructure, housing and wastewater development in the major cities. It had a signicant investment plan that was curtailed by the conict. It remains to be seen whether the plan will continue under the new government.

Budget value of planned projects prior to the conict

($m)

Future projects
Prior to the conict, Libya had more than $120bn worth of planned projects. The majority were in the construction sector, consisting primarily of the two Energy City projects at Ras Lanuf and Marsa al-Brega, as well as the Madinat al-Hana development planned by the UAE-based Tatweer. Metals was the second largest sector as a result of two aluminium smelters that had been planned by Russias Rusal and Switzerlands Klesch & Company, while power and oil and gas production the two traditionally largest sectors in the country each had more than $5bn worth of investment planned. Due to the upheaval, it is unlikely that all of the projects planned before the conict will proceed under the new administration. Even before the conict, there was considerable doubt about the viability of
MEED Insight

90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0

90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0

Libyas projects market is expected to accelerate once the new government has settled in
many of them. New ministers and personnel at clients will almost certainly want to revisit each project to determine its viability. In parallel, foreign investors may well have second thoughts about their project investment plans in Libya.

Co

tr ns

uc

tio

n Fe

r til

ise

r Ga s c pro

es

sin

g Ind

us

tria

l Inf tr ras

uc

tur

LN

Me

tal /G as d pro

uc

tio

n tr Pe o e ch

mi

ca

ls

r we Po

Re

nin

g r d an

s wa

te

Oil

te Wa

LNG=Liqueed natural gas. Source: MEED Projects

Whatever happens, the contracting community can be relatively sanguine about the Libyan projects market going forward, due to the twin combination of the countrys signicant infrastructure requirements and its nancial ability to pay for projects. The projects market is expected to accelerate once the new government is settled in, with the hope that it can comfortably exceed the $5-8bn annual average witnessed over the past decade.

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Oil & Gas Introduction and background

L
ibya has long been seen as a country with huge, if unfullled, potential as a major producer and exporter of oil and gas, rened fuel products and petrochemicals. This is with good reason. According to the UKs BP, the country had the eighth largest oil reserves in the world in 2010, with 46.4 billion barrels and the largest in continental Africa. However, BP data shows that Libya only produced 1.66 million barrels a day (b/d) of oil on average in 2010, making it the worlds 18th largest producer of oil behind relative minnows Kazakhstan, Algeria, Angola and Norway. Among the 12 Opec member states, Libya produced the ninth largest amount of oil in 2010, despite having the seventh largest reserves overall. It should be noted that when compared to BPs estimates, Opec
MEED Insight

According to the UKs BP, Libya had the eighth largest oil reserves in the world in 2010
cites a lower 2010 production gure for Libya of 1.49 million b/d and slightly larger reserves of 47.1 billion barrels of oil.

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Top 20 oil reserves by country

Country Saudi Arabia Venezuela Iran Iraq Kuwait UAE Russian Federation Libya Kazakhstan Nigeria Canada US Qatar China Brazil Angola Algeria Mexico India
Source: BP

Proven reserves (billion barrels), 2010

264.5 211.2 137.0 115.0 101.5 97.8 77.4 46.4 39.8 37.2 32.1 30.9 25.9 14.8 14.2 13.5 12.2 11.4 9.0

Top 20 oil-producing countries by output

Country 2010 production (kb/d)
10,270 10,007 7,513 4,245 4,071 3,336 2,958 2,849 2,508 2,471 2,460 2,402 2,137 2,137 1,851 1,809 1,757 1,659 1,569 1,339

Oil production of Opec countries

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Saudi Arabia Iran Venezuela Iraq Kuwait UAE Nigeria Angola Libya Algeria Qatar Ecuador

Production (million b/d)

8.17 3.54 2.85 2.35 2.32 2.23 2.05 1.69 1.49 1.19 0.733 0.476

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Russian Federation Saudi Arabia US Iran China Canada Mexico UAE Kuwait Venezuela Iraq Nigeria Brazil Norway Angola Algeria Kazakhstan Libya Qatar* UK

The National Oil Corporation started nationalising Libyas oil assets almost from its inception
Oil output peaked at 3.34 million b/d in 1970, which made Libya a bigger producer than Saudi Arabia at the time. This was a year after former Libyan leader Muammar Gadda seized control of the country in a military coup and the same year that state oil rm National Oil Corporation (NOC) was formed in place of the Libyan General Petroleum Company (Lipetco), created in 1968 to work on a strategic plan for the state-led development of the petroleum industry. NOC started the process of nationalising the countrys oil assets almost from its inception, a process that coincided with a steady decline in output. Production reached a historical low of 1.02 million b/d in 1984. From 1984 onwards, production rose steadily despite UN and US trade embargoes against Libya, with sanctions imposed by the latter lasting from 1986 to 2004. In 2008-09, average daily production topped 1.8 million barrels,
www.meedinsight.com

b/d=Barrels a day. Source: Opec

*=Includes condensates; kb/d=Thousand barrels a day. Source: BP

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18

although it fell again in 2010 as Tripoli abided by its Opec production quota of 1.47 million b/d. The increase in production during the sanctions era was largely attributed to the return of international oil companies (IOCs) to the country and the lifting of embargoes on crucial equipment to the country. In 2010, Oil Minister and NOC chairman Shokri Ghanem announced that oil production would hit 2.3 million b/d in 2013-14 and 3 million b/d by 2017. Earlier estimates from NOC had pegged output at 2.5 million b/d by 2011-12 and 3 million b/d by 2015. MEED Insight research that was conducted for this report shows that overall production capacity at the end of 2010 was as high as 1.9 million b/d and much higher than the ofcial Opec quota.

Major onshore oil producing basins Pelagian basin

TUNISIA Tripoli

Gulf of Sirte Cyrenaica platform Ghadames basin

EGYPT

Exploration and development work was ongoing off the countrys coast in the Gulf of Sirte
The Ghadames basin, which borders both Algeria and Tunisia, is the site of 23 concessions and most notably contains the Wafa gas eld, operated by Mellitah Oil & Gas, a joint venture of Italys Eni and NOC. The Murzuq basin in the southwest borders Niger and holds 29 concessions, which include both Enis major Elephant eld, also known as the El-Feel eld, and Spain-based Repsols Sharara eld. Sirte, which stretches along the Libyan coast from Tripoli to Benghazi and south to the border with Chad, is both the largest basin and the countrys most prolic source of oil. It holds more than 50 concessions and includes some of the states most important elds, such as Mabruk, Sarir, Al-Sarah Amal, Aguila/Nafoora and Bu Attifel. It contains the vast majority of the countrys oil and gas reserves 42-43bn barrels of oil equivalent (boe) of oil and gas.
SUDAN

Sirte basin

Oil and gas basins

The oil and gas industry has six major geographic areas where the vast majority of exploration and production occurs: the Pelagian, Ghadames, Murzuq, Sirte, Kufra and Cyrenaica basins. Prior to 2011, exploration and development work was also ongoing off the countrys coast in the wider Gulf of Sirte, although offshore production has played only a limited role in the countrys hydrocarbons sector to date. The offshore Pelagian basin sits to the northwest of Tripoli and contains seven oil and gas concessions. Its most notable acreage is the Bouri and Al-Jurf elds.
MEED Insight

Murzuq basin

LIBYA

Kufra basin
NIGER CHAD

Source: NOC

The Cyrenaica basin to the east contains a further 15 concessions, none of which
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Production facilities, pipelines, export facilities, reneries and petrochemicals plants

Bouri G1 D1

Zuara

TUNISIA
Oued Chebbi Tigi Kabir

Azzawiya

E1

Tripoli
Khoms Misurata Benghazi Derna

Libyas rening capacity is situated at Ras Lanuf, Sarir, Azzawiya, Tobruk and Marsa al-Brega
Tobruk
have been commercialised to date, while the Kufra basin is home to a further nine concessions that are also in the prospecting phase.

Bir Tiacsin

Sirte

Zueitina El-Sider Ras Lanuf

Gozeil Hamada/Al-Hamra Emgayet Almas Mabruk Bahi Farad/Hofra Dahra

Marsa al-Brega
Hateiba Graguba Lehib Dor Marada Ain Jerbi/Meghil/Sorra El-Meheiriga Raleh Amal/Al-Sarah Aguila/Nafoora Intisar Bu Attifel Gialo Bel Hedan Al-Waha Majed/Messla Sarir N. Katib/ Rimal

EGYPT

Ed Dib Oued Tahara Bualwan Zella Aswad Sabah Wafa Balat/Samah Khalifa Atshan Kotla/Ora Nasser Zaggut Jebel

Production facilities in all basins are connected by a 7,000km network of pipelines to export facilities at Marsa al-Brega, Tobruk, Ras Lanuf, Azzawiya and Zueitina. The countrys rening capacity is situated at Ras Lanuf, Azzawiya, Tobruk, Marsa al-Brega and Sarir, while small petrochemicals plants are located at Ras Lanuf, Marsa al-Brega and Abu Kammash.

Sharara

LIBYA

Sarir Defa

Oil pipeline Gas pipeline Oil pipeline Tanker terminal Oil elds Major gas processing plant LNG export plant Gas or gas/condensate elds Oil renery
Elephant

LNG=Liqueed natural gas. Source: NOC

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History of production and exploration and production sharing agreements (EPSAs)

Oil was rst discovered in Libya in 1959. The government at the time was led by King Idris and was relatively weak with only nominal control outside the main cities. As a result, when Libyas rst oil and gas law for the sector was passed in 1955, it effectively handed control of all aspects of the industry from shouldering development costs to setting prices to international oil companies (IOCs) that had won exploration and production rights through direct negotiations with the Petroleum Ministry. The new law allowed IOCs to produce and export as much oil as they liked while setting prices as they saw t, with the Petroleum Ministry acting as a tax-gathering authority, but having no strategic oversight of the development of the sector. As a result, until the late 1960s, Libyan oil was among the cheapest in the world despite being an attractive, light, sweet crude. In the second half of the 1960s, the government began to take more of an interest in growing the role of the state in the production and export of hydrocarbons and started planning a new petroleum law, which was implemented in 1966, giving Tripoli more of a say in the way the industry was run. In 1968, Libya became one of the rst Arab countries to negotiate a joint venture agreement with Frances

ERAP-Aquitaine and established the rst state-run oil company, the Libyan General Petroleum Company (Lipetco). In 1969, a 27-year-old ofcer named Muammar Gadda oversaw a military coup that resulted in the toppling of the monarchy. Under him, Lipetco was replaced with National Oil Corporation (NOC), while the government began to make moves to part-nationalise the oil industry. A new subsidiary, Arab Gulf Oil Company (Agoco), was set up to act as NOCs main operating rm and between 1969-73, it was awarded 24 concessions the majority of those made available during this period. In 1972, Enis subsidiary Agip agreed to Agoco taking a 50 per cent interest in the Bu Attifel eld and from this period onwards the new government asked for a 51 per cent interest in all existing concessions and new licences. This led to disputes, and a decline in exploration activity. In 1974, Tripoli offered an ofcial EPSA for the rst time on all new concessions, with the rst such award being made in February of that year. NOC took a majority stake of 85 per cent in the concessions offered, while the US Occidental Petroleum committed to explore the available areas and repay any development costs to

NOC if oil was commercialised. Later agreements under EPSA I saw the government take a stake of 80 per cent plus. In 1980, the existing EPSA was updated to increase the states revenue from oil and gas concessions, with the new agreements described as EPSA II. A lack of success saw the licences changed again in 1988 to allow foreign rms a bigger share of concessions. The new terms were named EPSA III. Exploration and production activity slowed between the late 1980s and early 2000s, largely because of international sanctions and trade restrictions placed on Libya by the US in particular. From 2001, relations between Tripoli and the West slowly thawed and in 2004, the US lifted the last of its embargoes on Libyan trade. With the lifting of sanctions came new opportunities for the development of the oil and gas sector and NOC went to work on preparing new terms for future and existing exploration and production concessions, known as EPSA IV, which were introduced in 2004. Under EPSA IV, NOC asked for a minimum 50 per cent share in all new concessions unless consortiums were involved, when it would consider a share of about one-

third of equity while IOCs took on the cost of exploration and evaluation activities. Development costs for new commercial prospects were to be shared equally between NOC and its foreign partners, while the cost of running production facilities was to be split along the lines of equity shares. Where production was found to be commercially viable, the EPSA agreements ran for 25 years from the initial production. Winning bidders committed to two payouts to NOC a signing-on bonus and a rst-production bonus and operating companies working in the country paid a tax on their net prots after accounting for royalty payments to NOC. Four rounds of contracts were awarded under EPSA IV, from 2004-07. The nal auction focused on associated gas assets and was one of the most nancially lucrative for NOC. Separately, in 2007, BP directly negotiated an EPSA agreement with NOC, which covered a vast swathe of the Western Ghadames basin. The UK company committed to spend about $900m on the project, which marked its return to work in the country for the rst time in 30 years.

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Major oil elds and transport networks

Introduction
Libya has dozens of active oil and gas elds across its main basins. Most production is located far inland and one of the chief challenges over the years has been for National Oil Corporation (NOC) and the international oil companies (IOCs) to nd a means of transporting crude and gas to the coast for export. In many cases, different elds and concessions share the same pipeline export infrastructure. But it has also meant that it is difcult to make small and isolated elds commercially viable, given the added cost of building an export pipeline.

Oil and gas production from the Pelagian basin is dominated by Italian rm Enis Bouri eld
maximum production capacity was about 45,000 b/d. The two oil production platforms at the eld are connected to a oating storage and ofoading (FSO) terminal, which directly transfers oil produced at the eld to oil tankers for export. Italys Saipem, was the lead engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractor during the development of the eld. It has completed additional work since 2004 as Eni has made inroads towards halting the slide in output. The NC-41 concession includes the Bahr Essalam gas eld, which is connected by a 110-kilometre pipeline to gas processing and export facilities at Melliwww.meedinsight.com

The Pelagian basin

The Bouri eld
Oil and gas production from the offshore Pelagian basin is dominated by the Bouri eld, which sits within the NC-41 concession. It is jointly operated by Italys Eni and NOC, through the Mellitah Oil & Gas venture. The eld was discovered in 1976 and two production platforms were commissioned in 1988. Initial production was as high as 600,000 barrels a day (b/d), but by 1995, output had dropped to about 150,000 b/d and by 2004, had fallen again to about 60,000 b/d. In 2010,
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22

tah. This is part of the Western Libya Gas Pipeline development. To the southwest of the Bouri eld lies the Al-Jawf eld, part of the NC-137 concession owned and operated by Frances Total (37.5 per cent), Germanys Wintershall (12.5 per cent) and NOC (50 per cent). Like the Bouri eld, oil produced from this eld is transported to an FSO terminal. In 2010, maximum output at the eld was estimated at 45,000 b/d.

The Ghadames basin is the site of one of Libyas most signicant gas developments
bons to export and processing facilities at Mellitah on the northwest coast. From Mellitah, the gas processed at Wafa is transported via a subsea pipeline, known as Greenstream, to Gela in southern Italy, along with gas produced at the offshore Eni-operated Bahr Essalam eld. Saipem was the main contractor for most of the work on the Western Libyan Gas Project and Greenstream pipeline.

Western Libyan gas project facilities and pipelines

Gela

The Ghadames basin

The Ghadames basin is the site of one of the most important gas developments in Libya and also produces signicant volumes of oil.

TUNISIA
Bahr Essalam
110 km Gas pipeline 36 Oil and condensates 10 Greenstream 520km Gas pipeline 32

The Western Libyan gas project/Greenstream

Discovered in 1991, the most signicant hydrocarbons site in western Libya is the Wafa eld, which was developed by a 50:50 joint venture of Eni and NOC. Oil and gas production on the scheme started in September 2004. Some 15 oil wells and 22 gas wells were drilled at the eld with the stated aim of producing about 600 million cubic feet a day (cf/d) of gas and 60,000 b/d of oil, with production understood to have been at around these levels in 2010. Production and processing facilities at the eld are connected to two pipelines, one for oil and another for gas, which transport hydrocar MEED Insight

The Al-Hamra elds

The remainder of the major oil and gas assets located in the Ghadames basin is largely made up of elds operated by Arabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco), a subsidiary of NOC. These elds, about 13 in total, all lie within the block 66 concession held by the company and have been collectively named the Al-Hamra, or Hamada, system. Oil from these elds is collected at a central facility and transported to processing and export installations via a 241km pipeline, which has been upgraded in recent years to incorporate supplies from the Mellitah

530km Gas pipeline 32 Oil and condensates 16

LIBYA
Wafa
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23

Murzuq system in the south of the country. In total, the system produced about 12,500 b/d of oil in 2010.

The Murzuq basin

The Sharara eld
Spains Repsol is the operator of Sharara, part of the NC-115 concession, along with Austrias OMV and Frances Total. Sharara is one of the biggest producers of oil in the country, with a maximum output of 360,000 b/d; in 2010, it produced about 290,000 b/d. It is linked to the Hamada/Al-Hamra system processing and distribution facilities in the Ghadames basin by a 520km pipeline.

The El-FeelSharara pipeline is still functional and can be utilised if necessary

When it was rst commissioned, El-Feel was linked to Repsols Sharara facilties by a 75km pipeline, with its oil transported by the Repsol-operated pipeline to the Hamada/Al-Hamra system. In 2004, Eni contracted Egypts Petrojet to construct a $180m purpose-built pipeline, which connects the eld directly with Mellitah, following the path of the existing Sharara pipeline, rst to Hamada and then north. The El-Feel-Sharara pipeline is still functional and can be utilised if necessary. In September 2011, Eni conrmed that it was still in talks to sell half of its stake in the eld to Russias Gazprom.

The Elephant (El-Feel) eld

The Elephant, or El-Feel, eld, was one of the most signicant oil discoveries to be made in recent years in Libya, when a UK-Italian-Korean consortium rst found oil in 1997. Following an Eni takeover of the UK partner, Lasmo, the eld was developed by Eni, NOC and South Koreas Korean National Oil Company, with Eni acting as operator. On commissioning in 2004, the eld produced about 10,000 b/d and this was ramped up to 125,000 b/d in 2006. Estimates on peak production capacity vary from 130,000-140,000 b/d, but the eld produced 127,000 b/d on average in 2010.
MEED Insight

NC-186
NC-186 is another Repsol-operated concession. Its partners in the eld are OMV, Total, Norways Statoil and NOC. Oil was rst discovered in 2006 and as of 2010, it was producing about 80,000 b/d of oil, with hydrocarbons transported to Sharara via a 31km pipeline. In 2009, Repsol announced another major discovery
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within the bounds of the concession, but as of 2010, was yet to announce a major addition to the overall output of NC-186.

The Sirte basin

The Sirte basin is the most productive area of Libya and is also the most heavily exploited. It is one of the worlds biggest petroleum provinces and has 16 giant oil elds, with reserves of 500 million barrels or more. Among its most prolic assets are the Nasser, Amal, Al-Waha, Nafoora, Intisar, Gialo and Bu Attifel oil elds and the Graguba gas eld. The elds are connected by pipelines to oil and gas processing and distribution facilities at the Bahi, Fahra, Al-Waha, Amal and Bu Attifel elds. These facilities are in turn linked with coastal processing and export facilities at El-Sider, Marsa al-Brega, Zueitina, Benghazi and the Marsa al-Hariga terminal at Tobruk.

The Dahra eld, meanwhile, is owned and operated by WOC, a joint venture of NOC (59.2 per cent) and a group of US companies known as the Oasis Consortium, whose shareholders are ConocoPhillips (16.3 per cent), Marathon Oil (16.3 per cent) and Hess (8.2 per cent).

The Gialo-Samah-El-Sider system

WOC also produces oil at the Al-Waha, Samah and Gialo elds and operates the 550km pipeline that links them with the El-Sider export terminal. In total, WOC can produce about 170,000 b/d from the Al-Waha eld and a further 190,000 b/d from the smaller reservoirs. The Gialo-Samah pipeline system also carries oil produced by Harouge Oil Operations (HOC), a joint venture of Canadas PetroCanada (50 per cent) and NOC (50 per cent). HOC operates the El-Naga, Ghani and Amal elds, which have a combined average output of approximately 60,000 b/d.

The Sirte basin is one of the worlds biggest petroleum provinces and has 16 giant oil elds

The Graguba eld is further connected to a 171km oil pipeline linking the SOCoperated Jebel and Nasser elds with Marsa al-Brega. In total, SOC can produce about 100,000 b/d of oil from the elds it operates, with Nasser contributing about 30,000 b/d at most. Tibitsi has a maximum output of about 20,000 b/d.

The Rimal-Intisar-Zueitina system

To the east of the Sirte basin lie the Rimal and Bu Attifel oil elds, which are operated by Mellitah Oil & Gas. Oil from the elds is transported to Zueitina in eastern Libya via a 347km pipeline. The pipeline also connects the Intisar oil eld to the coastal town. Intisar is operated by Zueitina Oil, a joint venture of NOC (83 per cent), the US Occidental (12.25 per cent) and OMV (4.75 per cent). Gas from Bu Attifel and Intisar is transported to Zueitina by a separate 360km pipeline. Rimal produced a maximum of about 30,000 b/d before 2011, while Bu Attifels output was about 73,000 b/d. Zueitina Oil claims that Intisar had a maximum output capacity of 60,000 b/d, although non-company sources say that 2010 production was closer to 40,000 b/d.

The Bahi-El-Sider system

The Bahi facilities connect the Mabruk, Bahi and Dahra elds to the countrys oil and gas network via a 46km pipeline, run by Waha Oil Company (WOC), to El-Sider. The Mabruk eld is a part of the C-17 concession operated by Mabruk Oil Operations. Its shareholders are Total with 37.5 per cent, Statoil with 12.5 per cent and NOC holding the remainder. It produced about 23,000 b/d of oil in 2010.

The Defa-Marsa al-Brega, JebelMarsa al-Brega systems

Two further major pipelines pass through the WOC facilities. A 299km gas pipeline travels north from the southern Defa eld to Marsa al-Brega and connects to the giant Nasser and smaller Hateiba elds. A second oil pipeline travels north to El-Sider through the Zaggut and Graguba eld facilities, which are operated by the state-run Sirte Oil Company (SOC), and the Tibitsi eld operated by Harouge.

The Sarir-Marsa al-Hariga system

The Sarir eld, to the southeast of the Sirte basin, produced a maximum
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25

of 200,000 b/d in 2010 and is one of the countrys most signicant elds. It is operated by Agoco and is connected directly to the Marsa al-Hariga export terminal, located next to the northeastern town of Tobruk, by a 509km pipeline. This pipeline also passes through the Rimal eld.

The Sarir-Messla, Messla-AmalAguila/Nafoora, Amal-Ras Lanuf system

Sarir is further connected to the Gialo eld to the west by a short trunkline and to the Messla eld to the north. Messla is part of an Agoco-run network, which links the Amal/Al-Sarah and Aguila/ Nafoora elds via a 420km pipeline. Oil is then passed through a second 420km pipeline to the Ras Lanuf export and rening terminal. Agoco produced about 140,000 b/d of oil from the Nafoora/Aguila elds in 2010 and 55,000 b/d from the Messla eld. The Al-Sarah/Amal elds, in which PetroCanada and Wintershall hold stakes, produced a total of about 120,000 b/d.

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Oil elds, locations, producers and capacities

Production capacity, 2010 (kb/d)
45

Oil elds, locations, producers and capacities (Continued)

Production capacity, 2010 (kb/d)
20 20 na na na na na na na 100 73.4 30 40

Field Al-Jawf

Basin
Pelagian

Operator
Murzuq

Shareholders (%)
NOC (50), Total (37.5), Wintershall (12.5) NOC (50), Eni (50) NOC (100) NOC, Repsol, OMV, Total NOC (33.33), KNOC (33.33), Eni (33.33) NOC, Repsol, Total, OMV, Statoil NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) NOC (59.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) NOC (50), Total (37.5), Statoil (12.5) NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) NOC (50), PetroCanada (50)

Field Tibisti El-Naga

Basin
Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte

Operator
Harouge Oil Operations Harouge Oil Operations SOC SOC SOC SOC SOC SOC SOC SOC MOG MOG Zueitina Oil

Shareholders (%)
NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (50), Eni (50) NOC (50), Eni (50) NOC (83), Occidental (12.25), OMV (4.75) NOC NOC NOC NOC (50), WIntershall (25), Gazprom (25) NOC (50), PetroCanada (50)

Bouri Hamada/ Al-Hamra system Sharara Elephant (El-Feel) NC-186 Al-Waha

Pelagian Ghadames Murzuq Murzuq Murzuq Sirte

MOG Agoco AOO MOG AOO WOC

44.5

Graguba
12.5 290 127 80 170

Nasser Lehib Dor Marada Jabal Ralah Arshad Ain Jerbi Wafa Bu Attifel Rimal

Samah

Sirte

WOC

25

Dahra

Sirte

WOC

25

Intisar

Gialo

Sirte

WOC

140

Sarir Nafoora Messla Al-Sarah

Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte

Agoco Agoco Agoco Wintershall Harouge Oil Operations

200 140 55 90 30

Mabruk (C-17)

Sirte

Total

20

Ghani Al-Jufra

Sirte Sirte

Harouge Oil Operations Harouge Oil Operations

20

Amal
20

kb/d=Thousand barrels a day; MOG=Mellitah Oil & Gas; AOO=Akakus Oil Operations; Agoco=Arabian Gulf Oil Company; WOC=Waha Oil Company; NOC=National Oil Corporation; KNOC=Korean National Oil Corporation; SOC=Sirte Oil Company; na=Not available; The table above breaks down the major Libyan oil elds by location, detailing maximium output capacity as of 2010. On the basis of this data, maximum output in the country could have been as high as 1.81 million barrels a day by the end of the year, with output likely constrained by a combination of infrastructure and Opec quotas. Source: MEED Insight

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Export, rening and petrochemicals facilities

Introduction
Libyas major oil and gas export terminals and its rening and petrochemicals facilities are nearly all located along the countrys coastline. They stretch from Abu Kammash, Mellitah, Azzawiya in the west to El-Sider, Ras Lanuf, Marsa al-Brega and Zueitina in the centre and Marsa al-Hariga, which is located next to the eastern town of Tobruk. In total, Libya was exporting on average 1.5 million barrels a day (b/d) of oil products in December 2010 and January 2011, with exports completely ceasing at the height of the civil war. The countrys reneries have a total nameplate capacity of 380,000 b/d, although total output of rened products was closer to 410,000 b/d in 2009 and 2010. Domestic consumption of rened fuel products hit about 270,000 b/d in 2010, with the remainder exported largely to European markets. Despite its huge natural wealth, Libyas downstream and petrochemicals industries is underdeveloped. The countrys rst major projects were commissioned in the late 1970s and early 1980s, shortly before US and UN sanctions made fur MEED Insight

The countrys total petrochemicals production capacity is 2.9 million tonnes a year
ther development of rening or petrochemicals capacity difcult. The countrys total nameplate petrochemicals production capacity is 2.9 million tonnes a year (t/y), although actual output has recently averaged at about 2 million t/y, according to sources in the country.

Abu Kammash
The Abu Kammash petrochemicals complex sits in the far west of Libya and is operated by state-owned General Company for Chemical Industries. Its facilities, commissioned in 1980, include a 140,000-t/y ethylene dichloride plant, a 60,000-t/y vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) plant and a 60,000-t/y polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plant. Other chemicals produced at the complex include caustic soda, table salt,
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chlorine, hydrochloric acid and sodium hydrochloride, all of which are sold into the local market. The main feedstocks are salt, which is produced at the nearby Sebkha salt mine and is used to produce chlorine and caustic soda; and ethylene, which is transported to the complex by tanker from a loading jetty. The ethylene is mixed with chlorine gas to produce VCM. The VCM is then used as the main feedstock for the hydrochloric acid and PVC units. In 2010, the Libyan Investment & Privatisation Board planned to list General Company for Chemical Industries on the Tripoli bourse, but did not manage to accomplish this before the uprising took place.

The Mellitah complex contains a sulphur recovery plant for treatment of sour gas
and one oil/condensate train, which have a total capacity of 695 million cubic feet a day (cf/d) and 31,000 b/d respectively. The complex also contains a sulphur recovery plant for the treatment of the sour gas from Bahr Essalam, which has a capacity of 450 tonnes a day. Gas from the Mellitah complex is transported to the Greenstream gas compression facilities, based at the same site, which have a total capacity of 10 billion cubic metres a day. The main Mellitah facilities were built by a consortium of Switzerlands ABB, South Koreas Hyundai Engineering & Construction and Italys Saipem.

Mellitah
The Mellitah facilities are operated by Mellitah Oil & Gas, a 50:50 joint venture of Italys Eni and NOC, and are dedicated to processing and exporting oil and gas from the onshore Wafa and offshore Bahr Essalam elds. The complex is made up of two plants: the Wafa Coastal plant, which treats the oil and condensates produced at Wafa, and the Mellitah plant, which processes the gas and condensates produced at Bahr Essalam. The Wafa Coastal plant has two treatment trains, which have a total capacity of 76,300 b/d of oil and liquids. The Mellitah plant has three gas processing trains
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Azzawiya
Further down the coast to the east lies the Azzawiya terminal, whose site also includes one of the countrys main reneries. The 120,000-b/d facility is owned and run by NOC subsidiary Azzawiya Rening Company (ARC). NOC had planned to revamp the renery, commissioned in
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1974 and expanded to its current capacity in 1977, in order to improve the volume and quality of its output. However, after years of delay, NOC announced in 2010 that it was looking for a foreign partner to take a 50 per cent stake in ARC and participate in the expansion. ARC also operates the Azzawiya oil terminal, which consists of three offshore berths that can handle tankers with capacities of 140,000 tonnes, 100,0000 tonnes and 20,000 tonnes. According to the UKs Lloyds Maritime Intelligence, 311,000 b/d of oil and petroleum products were exported via the Azzawiya terminal in December 2010.

The El-Sider terminal has storage facilities that can hold 6 million barrels of oil
Ras Lanuf
The Ras Lanuf terminal is the site of Libyas biggest renery and the majority of the countrys petrochemicals facilities. The Ras Lanuf Oil & Gas Processing Company (Rasco), an NOC unit, operates the 220,000-b/d Ras Lanuf renery, along with the associated petrochemicals facilities: a 1.2 million-t/y naphtha cracker, which produces 330,000 t/y of ethylene, 170,000 t/y of propylene, 130,000 t/y of C4s and 335,000 t/y of gasoline. In 2007, NOC announced plans to upgrade the facilities, and that April, signed a heads of agreement with the US Dow Chemical Company for a $2bn expansion of the complex. In 2009, the state-run Economic & Social Development Fund announced a $54bn development plan to turn Ras Lanuf and Marsa al-Brega into giant energy cities, which would include the proposed Dow deal. The Ras Lanuf terminal includes four offshore berths, which can

El-Sider
El-Sider is the location of the single biggest export terminal in Libya, with 447,000 b/d of crude passing through the central coastal facilities in January 2011. The terminal is owned and operated by Waha Oil Company, a joint venture of NOC and the US ConocoPhillips, Marathon Oil and Hess. The terminal has four offshore crude loading berths, two that can load 40,000 barrels an hour (b/hr), while the third and fourth transport oil at 35,000 b/hr and 50,000 b/hr. The terminal also comprises storage facilities capable of holding up to 6 million barrels of oil.

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accommodate ships with capacities of 130,000-300,000 tonnes.

Marsa al-Brega
The rening and export facilities at Marsa al-Brega are smaller than elsewhere in the country and are among the oldest. The port is run by Sirte Oil Company (SOC), which is headquartered there and also operates the renery, which has a nameplate capacity of 10,000 b/d.
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The port also contains ammonia and urea production facilities with nameplate capacities of 700,000 t/y and 900,000 t/y respectively, operated by the Libyan Norwegian Fertiliser Company (Lifeco), a joint venture of Norways Yara International (50 per cent), NOC (25 per cent) and the Libyan Investment Authority (25 per cent). Lifeco is one of the few recent foreign investment success stories in Libya.

The rening and export facilities at Marsa al-Brega are smaller than in the rest of Libya

On average, about 90,000 b/d of oil was exported from the Marsa al-Brega terminal in December 2010, a gure which fell to 51,000 b/d in January 2011. The port has three offshore oil transfer berths, all of which can accept tankers of up to 300,000 tonnes, and two additional berths for liqueed natural gas (LNG) and liqueed petroleum gas (LPG).
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The LNG facilities were among the rst of their kind in the world when they were commissioned in 1970, but have long since fallen into disrepair. In 2008, the UK/Dutch Shell Group signed an agreement to jointly redevelop the LNG facilities with SOC and NOC. Under the plan, the ports LNG production capacity would have risen to 3.2 million tonnes a year (t/y) from about 700,000 t/y.

Export terminals
Terminal El-Sider Marsa al-Brega Tobruk (Marsa al-Hariga) Ras Lanuf Azzawiya Zueitina Oil capacity
3 X tankers of 250,000 dwt 3 X tankers of 300,000 dwt 3 X tankers of 120,000 dwt 3 X tankers of 250,000 dwt 5 X tankers 175,000 dwt 5 X tankers 270,000 dwt

Petrochemicals
Speed (t/hr)
6,600 na 8,000 7,000 6,500 6,500

Gas capacity
na 2 X berths (LPG, LNG) na na na 4 X LNG loading stations

Location/plant RAS LANUF Ethylene Propylene Mixed C4s Pyrolysis gasoline LLDPE HDPE

Capacity (t/y)

330,000 170,000 130,000 325,000 80,000 80,000

Zueitina
The Zueitina export terminal can accommodate as many as ve tankers of up to 270,000 tonnes each and has a maximum oil transfer capacity of 6,500 tonnes an hour (t/hr). The terminal also has four loading berths for LPG exports. In December 2010, it handled 311,000 b/d of the countrys exports, although this fell to 199,000 b/d in January 2011. The terminal can store 6.5 million barrels of crude oil, 988,000 barrels of naphtha, 240,000 barrels of butane and 270,000 barrels of propane. It is operated by Zueitina Oil, a joint venture of NOC, the US Occidental and Austrias OMV.

Reneries
Renery Ras Lanuf Azzawiya Tobruk Marsa al-Brega Sarir Operator
Ras Lanuf Oil & Gas Processing Company Azzawiya Oil Rening Company NOC NOC NOC

Nameplate capacity (b/d)

220,000 120,000 20,000 10,000 10,000

2010 output (b/d)

220,000 120,000 20,000 10,000 10,000

October 2011 status

Under repair; end 2011 recommissioning As above

MARSA AL-BREGA Ammonia Urea ABU KAMMASH

700,000 900,000

Operational Under repair; end 2011 recommissioning Operational

Ethylene dichloride Vinyl chloride monomer Polyvinyl chloride

104,000 60,000 60,000

t/hr=Tonnes an hour; dwt=Dead weight tonnes; na=Not available; LPG=Liqueed petroleum gas; LNG=Liqueed natural gas; t/y=Tonnes a year; LLDPE=Linear lowdensity polyethylene; HDPE=High-density polyethylene; b/d=Barrels a day; NOC=National Oil Corporation. Source: MEED Insight

Tobruk/Marsa al-Hariga
The Marsa al-Hariga terminal is run by Agoco and has three offshore loading berths capable of handling tankers of up to 120,000 tonnes and transferring oil and fuel products at up to 8,000 t/hr. It has about 116,500 cubic metres of storage facilities. The terminal is linked by a
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pipeline to the 20,000-b/d Tobruk renery, which is also operated by Agoco. The terminal and renery are both fed by oil from the Sarir eld. The terminal exported 51,000 b/d of oil on average in both December 2010 and January 2011.

Sarir
The only major downstream facility in Libya not to be located along the countrys coastline is the 10,000-b/d Sarir renery, which sits alongside Agocos main production facilities at the Sarir oil eld.

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Pre-2011 downstream deals and plans

Following the lifting of international sanctions in 2004, the government made moves to attract international investors to the country to help kick-start downstream projects and bring in key technologies, which had been, in many cases, unavailable for decades. However, only four major development deals were signed with Dow Chemical, Yara International, Dubais Al-Ghurair Group and Shell. As of 2010, talks were also ongoing to turn Ras Lanuf and Marsa al-Brega into energy cities giant industrial hubs at a total cost of $54bn. The Dow Chemical deal was rst mooted in April 2007, when Dow and NOC issued a joint statement announcing their plans to form a joint venture company to operate and expand the Ras Lanuf petrochemicals complex. The plan called for the upgrade of the existing cracker and the addition of new butadiene, butene, methyl teritiary butyl ether (MTBE) and teryl-amyl methyl ether (TAME) units at a projected cost of $2.5-3bn. However, Dow is understood to have pulled out of the deal during the 2008-09 global nancial crisis, when it was suffering from severe nancial strain due to its $15.3bn takeover of another
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In 2004, the Libyan government moved to attract [foreign] investors to the country
chemicals company, the US Rohm & Haas. The Yara International deal was formally completed in February 2009, having been in the works since 2007. Under the terms of the deal, Yara set up a new company, Lifeco, along with NOC and the Libyan Investment Authority to operate, renovate and upgrade the Marsa al-Brega fertiliser complex. The upgrade programme called for a 25 per cent output increase at the Lifeco facilities, which have a nameplate capacity of 700,000 t/y of ammonia and 900,000 t/y of urea. The budget for the scheme, which was at the planning stage at the end of 2010, was about $2bn. The existing Lifeco facilities were shut down in February 2011, with Yara pulling its international staff from the country at the same time. Workers were returning to the facilities in September, with production start-up scheduled for the end of the year.
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The Shell deal with NOC was one of the rst to be made in Libya after the country started to open up in 2004, with an initial heads of agreement signed in March of that year and further endorsed in April 2005. The agreement called for Shell to cooperate with NOC and SOC in rejuvenating and upgrading NOCs LNG facilities at Marsa al-Brega. The plan aimed to boost production capacity from 0.7 million t/y to 3.2 million t/y at a cost of up to $450m. It included an exploration and production sharing agreement for ve new blocks, which Shell hoped to discover gas in. A clause in the deal called for the construction of a new LNG plant at Marsa al-Brega, should a major new gas nd be made; in December 2010, Shell said that it was appraising a gas nd in the Sirte basin. However, progress on even the LNG plant upgrade was slow. The partners tendered the engineering procurement and construction deal for the upgrade in 2009, but only the UKs Petrofac submitted a nal bid for the project. In 2010, contractors were told that SOC and Shell planned to retender the deal, with a new tender eventually being launched in 2011. Final bids for the deal were due to be submitted in the rst quarter of 2012, but the project was on hold as of the end of 2011. In March 2009, NOC signed an agreement with Al-Ghurair Group for a $2bn devel MEED Insight

Energy cities at Marsa al-Brega and Ras Lanuf

In July 2007, the Economic & Social Development Fund (ESDF) commissioned US engineering major Fluor Corporation to develop a masterplan for the creation of two giant energy cities at Marsa al-Brega and Ras Lanuf. Unveiled in October 2009 by the ESDF and the countrys Economic Development Board, the Fluor plan set out a 15-year timetable for a total overhaul of all of the existing oil, gas and petrochemicals facilities at the two cities, along with plans for the development of new power, rening, petrochemicals and LNG export facilities, and a huge tourist resort. At Ras Lanuf, Fluor outlined plans for a 50 per cent increase in cracking capacity, a 25 per cent boost to the existing polyethylene plant, new LNG facilities, an aluminium plant and a new power plant. At Marsa al-Brega, the plans called for a 25 per cent increase in fertiliser production, a tripling of LNG capacity, a new PVC pipe plant, new port facilities and a new power station, along with a ve-star hotel resort. The plans, put on hold in early 2011, had attracted the interest of major international oil and petrochemicals rms including BP and Dow Chemical.

opment of the Ras Lanuf renery through a new joint venture company, Libyan Emirati Rening Company. As of early 2011, little progress had been made on the upgrade project, although the joint venture deal had been concluded. The renery was closed in February 2011 as the civil war broke out. In 2008, a Canadian engineering company, Wineld Energy, announced that the Libyan government had approved its application to build, own and operate a new 300,000-b/d renery at Ras Lanuf. The company said in May 2010 that the agreement still stood, although no work

had been done on the project as of early 2011. It is thought that the scheme is unlikely to progress. Other renery upgrade projects were planned by NOC at Tobruk and Azzawiya, with the state oil rm in talks with potential partners in late 2010. NOC also planned to build a new 220,000-b/d renery at Sebha, in the southwest of the country, to help ease domestic supply issues in more remote parts of Libya.

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Industry structure and future prospects

Since its formation in November 1970, state energy rm National Oil Corporation (NOC) has dominated all aspects of Libyas hydrocarbons sector, controlling strategic long-term planning, a percentage of all exploration and production concessions and almost all of the countrys downstream assets. NOC has also been the countrys main marketer of oil since its inception and has its own oil eld drilling and service companies, which are widely used across the country. Frustrated by its apparent lack of progress, the government went as far as to shut down the Energy Ministry in 2000 and hand over all of its responsibilities to NOC, although this decision was reversed in 2004. In 2006, then-Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem was appointed to the post of NOC chairman and was given responsibility for all aspects of the energy industry, along with the Energy Ministry that now came under the purview of NOC. In September 2009, Ghanem resigned as energy chief because of tensions within the leadership and was replaced by his deputy, while a new supreme energy council was set up. However, Ghanem returned to the post a month later.
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By 2006, the Energy Ministry had been handed over to the National Oil Corporation
At the beginning of 2011, the industry was effectively centred around NOC, its subsidiaries and a series of joint venture companies. Owned by NOC and international oil companies (IOCs), the ventures operated concessions under the terms of exploration and production sharing agreement (EPSA) licences. As of late 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC) had kept this structure more or less intact and had in fact retained many existing employees of state rms, with the exception of a few top executives replaced. Ghanem, who is now based in Dubai, was replaced by Nouri Berouin, a former top Arabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco) executive, whom the NTC appointed in late August 2011. Until that point, a rm set up by the NTC, Libwww.meedinsight.com

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yan Oil Company, had been co-ordinating oil and gas operations and marketing from assets under NTC control. In May 2011, the NTC appointed a new Oil & Gas Minister, Ali Abdussallam Tarhouni, the former US-based economist. He was replaced in November 2011 by Abdulrahman bin Yazza, a former chairman of Enis local operations. Exactly what shape the industry will take in the future remains to be seen, with the countrys main cash cow a source of erce debate between NTC members, NOC company executives and the wider Libyan population. NOC was seen as more business friendly under Ghanem than in the past and less subject to the capricious whims of the Gadda regime, with international oil executives welcoming the chairmans plans to turn the rm into a more effective institution modelled on quasi-independent companies like Saudi Aramco. However, many NTC members are not keen to see NOC enjoy the kind of autonomy it enjoyed in the past. They foresee a more central planning role for the Oil & Gas Ministry or its successors, with state rms like Agoco and Sirte Oil Company (SOC) acting independently from NOC. In the near term, it is unlikely that any radical changes will be made to the industry structure, with the NTC focused on ramping up oil production, generating
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healthy revenues and stabilising the country in the run-up to national elections in 2012. Executives with ties to NTC members say that ministers are unlikely to want to make any big decisions before elections are held, lest they be accused of acting without oversight. However, it is likely that the Oil & Gas Ministry will begin investigating the terms and tendering process for major EPSAs and other contracts awarded under the Gadda regime. Ofcials have been at pains to make clear that contracts awarded within the bounds of existing laws will be honoured, but are likely to be keen to make an example of any company proved to have acted improperly. Given the already relatively harsh terms of EPSA IV and the need to attract further investment in the hydrocarbons sector, it is not thought likely that any new administration will seek to introduce even stricter terms. Indeed, it may well be the case that EPSA IV is revised to make it more friendly for new concession agreements.

It is unlikely that any radical changes will be made to the oil and gas industry structure

Agoco acts as both an exploration and production company. It is largely focused on elds in the Sirte basin, the most important of which are Sarir, Messla, Nafoora, Beda and Hamada. The company also operates the Tobruk renery and export facilities and the Sarir renery. The company is Benghazi-based and was the rst oil rm to fall into the hands of the NTC. It started producing oil for export in late August and early September 2011. Key contact: Ahmed Majbri, Chairman Telephone: (00218) (61) 222 90064 Website: www.agoco.com.ly

Azzawiya Oil Rening Company

Azzawiya Oil Rening Company (ARC) was founded in 1976 to operate the NOC-owned Azzawiya renery. The company also manages the Azzawiya oil export terminal. In 2009 and 2010, NOC started the search for a partner to participate in the kind of deal it had pioneered at its Ras Lanuf rening facilities: taking an equity stake in the complex in exchange for a promise to fund an upgrade and improve management. The renery was briey shut as the civil war broke out in February 2011, but was restarted the next month. In August 2011, the renery became a focal point for ghting between the NTC and the Gadda regime, and was once again shut when the
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State-run companies
Arabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco)
Agoco is the successor to Arabian Gulf Exploration Company (Ageco), set up in 1971 to take over part of UK-based BPs stake in Libyas oil and gas industry. In 1979, Agoco assumed assets previously held by BP and the US-based rms of Nelson Bunker Hunt, Chevron and Texaco.

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NTC took control. It was restarted in early September 2011 and has been running more or less continuously since then, largely working from existing stores of oil. Key contact: Nouri Berriuen, NOC Chairman Telephone: (00218) (23) 764 3500 Website: www.noclibya.ly

Rasco
Ras Lanuf Oil & Gas Processing Company (Rasco) is the main operator of the Ras Lanuf renery, petrochemicals complex and export terminal. The company was founded in 1983, in preparation for the commissioning of the Ras Lanuf renery, and subsequently took on the task of running the adjacent petrochemicals facilities, which were built in the 1990s by mainly Yugoslavian contractors. In 2008, management of the Ras Lanuf renery was handed over to Libyan Emirates Renery Company (Lerco), a joint venture of NOC and Dubais Al-Ghurair Group, with Rasco continuing to act as de facto operator of the facility. NOC also planned to set up a new joint venture company to run the Ras Lanuf petrochemicals facility, but these plans fell through, when the deal to develop the complex with the US Dow Chemical was cancelled. Key contact: Mohamed Eltrshani Telephone: (00218) (54) 384 3450 Website: www.lercorenery.com

Sirte Oil Company (SOC)

Marsa al-Brega-based SOC was set up in 1981 to take over Esso Standard Libya, a subsidiary of the US ExxonMobil Corporation, which quit the country rather than agree to new licensing terms on its concessions. In 1986, it assumed the assets of another US rm, Grace Petroleum, after it was forced to relinquish its assets in the country under new US sanctions. Until 2005, SOC was in charge of the fertiliser complex now operated by Libyan Norwegian Fertiliser Company. It continues to operate the Sirte oil renery, the Marsa al-Brega export terminal and the Marsa al-Brega liqueed natural gas (LNG) plant, along with a number of oil and gas elds. These include the Nasser, Graguba, Jabal, Wadi, Ralah, Arshad, Ain Jerbi and Al-Wafa oil elds and the Hateiba, Sahil, Assamoud, Meghil, Sorrah and Attahaddy gas elds. Key contact: Nouri Berriuen, NOC Chairman Telephone: (00218) (21) 361 0376 Website: www.soclibya.com

Joint ventures
Zueitina Oil Company
Zueitina Oil Company was founded in 1986 to take over the assets of the US Occidental Petroleum, which had been working in Libya since 1966, but had to abandon its concessions due to US sanctions.
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In 2008, a deal was struck under the terms of the EPSA IV licence for Occidental to return to the country as a partner in Zueitina, with a 12.25 per cent share, while Austrias OMV took a 4.75 per cent stake, and NOC holding on to the remaining 83 per cent. The company runs the Zueitina oil terminal and operates the Intisar oil eld, along with some smaller elds, including Zella, Sabah and Fida. Total output in 2010 was about 40,000 b/d. The company is headquartered in Tripoli. Telephone: (00218) (21) 338 01114 Website: www.zueitina.com.ly

main Mellitah compression facilities and the Greenstream pipeline, which transports the gas produced by Mellitah Oil & Gas to Sicily.

Waha Oil Company

Waha Oil Company (WOC) was set up in 1986 to take over the assets relinquished by the Oasis consortium, which was made up of three US companies under the sanctions of that year ConocoPhillips, Marathon and Amerada Hess. In January 2006, the three former partners negotiated shares in the company. It is now jointly owned by NOC (59.2 per cent), ConocoPhillips (16.3 per cent), Marathon Oil (16.3 per cent) and Hess (8.2 per cent). WOC operates the Al-Waha, Samah, Dahra, and Gialo elds and associated facilities, along with the El-Sider export terminal. The company also runs the pipeline network that links the elds with El-Sider and carries crude from elds operated by Germanys Wintershall and Frances Total. Key contact: Bashir Elshahab, Chairman Telephone: (00218) (21) 333 1116 Website: www.wahaoil.net

Mellitah Oil & Gas is a 50:50 joint venture of Italys Eni and National Oil Corporation

and gas concessions, which it had operated with Germanys Gelsenberg, later renamed Veba Oil Libya, since the 1950s. Following Mobils departure, Veba Oil Operations was formed as a joint venture between NOC and Veba. In 2002, PetroCanada took over Veba Oils share of the company and in 2008, it signed six new EPSA agreements with Veba Operations, now renamed Harouge Oil Operations, acting as developer on the agreed areas. Harouge operates the Amal, Farig, Ghani, Tibisti and El-Naga elds, along with the Ras Lanuf export terminal and associated facilities. Key contact: Abdulwahab Elnaami, Chairman Telephone: (00218) (21) 333 0081 Website: www.vebalibya.com

Mellitah Oil & Gas

Mellitah Oil & Gas, a 50:50 joint venture of Italys Eni and NOC, was set up in 2008 to take on responsibility for all of the pairs joint venture activities, which include the NC-118 oil eld and the Wafa gas eld in the Ghadames basin, the Elephant eld in the Murzuq basin, and the Rimal, Khatib and Bu Attifel elds in the Sirte basin. The company also operates the offshore Bouri and Bahr Essalam oil and gas elds, and the main processing and distribution facilities at Mellitah. Key contact: Najmi Krayem, Chairman Telephone: (00218) (21) 335 0890 Website: www.mellitahog.ly

Akakus Petroleum Operations

Akakus Petroleum Operations is a 50:50 joint venture of Spains Repsol and NOC, which, until 2007, was known as Repsol Oil Operations. The companys primary role is operating Repsol-led concessions, including the Sharara oil eld in the Murzuq basin, the N-186 concession in the Ghadames basin and the nearby NC-190 concession. Akakus also oversees Repsols exploration activities in the country and operates the Sharara-Hamada pipeline.
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Harouge Oil Operations

Harouge Oil Operations, formerly Veba Oil Operations, is a 50:50 joint venture of Canadas PetroCanada and NOC. The company was formed in 1987 to take over the US Mobil Oils share of a series of oil

Greenstream BV
Greenstream is another 50:50 Eni/NOC joint venture. It owns and operates the
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Repsol Oil Operations Company was set up when it won its rst EPSA deals in Libya in 1994. It changed its name to Akakus Oil Operations in 2007, as part of negotiations around new concession licences and a reworking of existing concession terms under the EPSA IV licensing terms. Contact: Abdulmajid Shah, Chairman Telephone: (00218) (21) 480 263039 Website: http://www.akakusoil.com

Mabruk Oil Operations

Until 2007, Mabruk Oil Operations, a 50:50 joint venture operating company owned by NOC and Total, was known as Total Oil Operations. The companys name was changed during negotiations over new licences and updated terms for existing concessions. Its main activities are centred around the Mabruk oil eld in the C17 concession of the Sirte basin, in which NOC holds a 50 per cent stake and Total and Norways Statoil hold respective shares of 37.5 and 12.5 per cent. It also operates the offshore Al-Jawf eld in western Libya, in which NOC holds a 50 per cent stake, Total 37.5 per cent and Germanys Wintershall a 12.5 per cent stake. Key contact: Ahmed Abulsayen Telephone: (00218) (21) 335 0401 Website: http://www.cptlibya.com

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The status of existing production facilities

By and large, most of the civil war damage to Libyas oil and gas infrastructure was fairly supercial, with most rms working in the country complaining more about the looting and destruction of accommodation and ofces, rather than signicant damage to major production facilities. However, oil executives in the country were concerned about two key issues: the speed with which many oil elds had been shut down and the danger of mines left by pro-Gadda forces. The rst issue is one that executives say will take months, if not years, to fully gauge, with Libyas older elds already in need of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques before the civil war. The second is most likely to be a problem for major international oil and engineering rms sending workers into the country. National Transitional Council (NTC) ministers remain concerned that both groups might hold back because of safety concerns. Nevertheless, oil output was recovering rapidly in the nal quarter of 2011. Production had reached about 570,000 barrels a day (b/d) in the rst week of November;
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Libyas older oil elds were in need of enhanced recovery methods even before the civil war began
a month later, local ofcials said it was up to 840,000 b/d. What follows is a detailed breakdown of the status of the countrys key oil and gas infrastructure.

West Libya:

Bouri, Bahr Essalam, Abu Kammash, Mellitah, Azzawiya, Ghadames and Murzuq basins

Bouri/Bahr Essalam elds

The offshore Bouri and Bahr Essalam elds, operated by Mellitah Oil & Gas (MOG), were shut down in February 2011, with Italian shareholder Eni concerned about them sustaining damage. According to Eni, the facilities sustained no damage whatsoever. MOG started working towards restoring production at the Bahr Essalam eld in early November,
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targeting output of 380 million cubic feet a day (cf/d) of gas by the end of the month, with production from the Bouri eld set to begin at the same time. Production at the Mabruk-operated Al-Jawf eld was restarted in late September and by early November had reached about 45,000 b/d.

Wafa eld
The Wafa eld, which supplies the bulk of the gas to the Greenstream pipeline, also suffered relatively little damage during ghting and the main pipeline linking the complex with Mellitah just required basic maintenance. Production started at Wafa in mid-October. Eni said in early November that it could technically return to full pre-war production levels at the eld, but that it was only pumping enough gas to meet domestic fuel and electricity needs about 50,000 barrels of oil equivalent a day (boe/d).

The Greenstream pipeline required light repairs, but was operational by late October

Mellitah complex
The Mellitah complex was the scene of some ghting during the civil war and is understood to have sustained some damage, most of it supercial. The Greenstream pipeline required light repairs, but was operational by late October and ofcials at Eni remained upbeat about the facilities capability to cope with increasing production over the coming months.

Spains Repsol restarted production at the eld on 25 October and targeted production of about 10,000 b/d by the end of the month. In early November, former oil & gas minister Ali Abdussallam Tarhouni claimed that output from the eld had reached 90,000 b/d, although local executives disputed this, saying that the gure was closer to 60,000-70,000 b/d. Full 2010 output of 260,000 b/d was not expected until the rst half of 2012.

Elephant eld
The Elephant eld facilities, operated by MOG, were among the most severely affected by the civil war, with Eni initially reporting major damage to the infrastructure. The pipeline linking the eld with Mellitah also came under heavy attack. However, production resumed in midNovember and was running at 40,000 b/d by early December, well down on the late 2010 average of 127,000 b/d.

Hamada/Al-Hamra system
The Hamada/Al-Hamra system, operated by Arabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco) also escaped major damage, although the state-run rm conrmed in late October that it was yet to restart production at its Ghadames facilities because of issues related to the speed and manner in which they were shut down. Pre-war output was about 12,500 b/d.

Azzawiya facilities
The Azzawiya renery and export complex, run by Azzawiya oil Rening Company (ARC), was the scene of heavy ghting between NTC troops and Gadda loyalists in August 2011. The Azzawiya facilities were shut down after the NTC took control of the area and were not reopened until September, when the National Oil Corporation (NOC) reported that the renery was operating at about half of its 120,000-b/d capacity. By early November, the plant was processing about 90,000 b/d and was operating at full capacity a month later. All its output was going to the local market.
MEED Insight

Sharara eld
The Sharara eld, operated by Akakus Oil Operations, was initially thought to have sustained considerable damage during the civil war, with sustained ghting occurring in the vicinity of the main production, processing and distribution facilities. However, damage was limited to living quarters and ofces, with only light repairs required to key equipment and the pipeline linking the eld with Hamada.

NC-186
Production from elds at the Akakusoperated NC-186 concession restarted in November. Despite some damage to pipeline infrastructure, output ramped up swiftly and had reached 200,000 b/d by early December.

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Central Libya:

The Sirte basin, El-Sider, Ras Lanuf, Marsa al-Brega and Zueitina

is back online and domestic gasoline needs have been met.

Reneries and export terminals El-Sider terminal

A major roadblock to boosting Libyan oil exports after the war was the sustained damage caused to the key El-Sider oil terminal, which saw almost all facilities in need of repair. Repairs started in October, with local oil service rms taking on the majority of the work. Exports from the terminal began in December, although it was expected to be a year before the facility was fully repaired.

Marsa al-Brega facilities

The Marsa al-Brega terminal suffered considerable damage during the war and as of early November was still under repair, with the facilities not expected to be in use until December. Full repair of the facilities is likely to run well into 2012, according to industry sources. Key repairs were also delayed by striking workers at Waha Oil Company (WOC), the terminals operator, who demanded that the companys chairman be sacked for co-operation with the Gadda regime. The Libyan Norwegian Fertiliser Company complex at Marsa al-Brega did not suffer severe damages and Norways Yara International began to assess repair needs at the end of October, while targeting a restart for the plant by year end.

Ras Lanuf facilities

The Ras Lanuf renery was the site of several pitched battles between Gadda loyalists and NTC troops. However, the plant was closed in March, with Ras Lanuf Oil & Gas Processing Company (Rasco) employees trying to minimise the potential for damage and returning to the site to undertake repairs whenever necessary. Production was expected to resume in December. However, full commissioning of the 220,000-b/d renery is not likely to take place before the rst half of 2012. The Rasco-operated petrochemicals facilities were not as badly affected by the ghting as the renery itself, but will not return to full production until the renery
MEED Insight

Zueitina terminal
The Zueitina terminal suffered the least damage of all the Gulf of Sirte oil export terminals, having been taken over by the NTC in March, at the start of the war, with enough repairs being made for oil to be loaded at the facilities by mid-June.

Waha Oil Company facilities

WOC operates the Al-Waha, Samah, Dahra and Gialo oil elds, which are connected to its El-Sider export terminal by a 550-kilometre pipeline that it operwww.meedinsight.com

42

ates. The pipeline required some repairs after the war, but is understood to be in good condition. The Dahra and Samah elds were the rst to restart and were jointly producing 16,000 b/d by early December. Production was also about to start at the Gialo eld, which had mainly suffered damage to its accommodation and administrative buildings. In contrast, the Al-Waha eld required extensive demining, according to WOC ofcials. The strike by company employees demanding that the chairman be sacked for
MEED Insight

collaboration with the Gadda regime was nally resolved in mid-November. This allowed production to resume at the rst two elds.

Mabruk Oil Operations facilities

The C-17 (Mabruk) concession, which is run by Mabruk Oil Operations, was unable to start producing until the WOC dispute was resolved, as exports pass through WOC pipelines. However, by early December, Mabruk production had risen to 45,000 b/d. Its facilities were largely unaffected by the war, allowing production to resume quickly.

The Zueitina terminal suffered the least damage of all the Gulf of Sirte oil export terminals

Harouge Oil Operations facilities

The Harouge oil elds are connected to two pipeline systems, with output from the El-Naga, Ghani and Al-Jufra elds linked to the WOC line to El-Sider, while the Tibisti eld is connected by a separate line, run by Sirte Oil Company (SOC), to El-Sider. Harouge started repairs to the elds in early October and loaded the rst tanker of oil for export in late October. The elds had suffered varying degrees of damage, largely to administrative and accommodation buildings, which Harouge estimated
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would cost about $30m to repair. Production was about 30,000 b/d in early November and Harouge was condent it could bring output up to the 2010 levels of 80,000 b/d-plus by the end of the year.

Sirte Oil Company facilities

The SOC pipeline to El-Sider carries oil from its Zaggut and Graguba elds. The Graguba eld is linked in to another pipeline system, which also transfers oil from the Nasser and Jabal elds to Marsa al-Brega. In total, elds operated by SOC produced 100,000 b/d in 2010. SOCs ofces and administrative headquarters in Marsa al-Brega were among the most affected by the ghting. The company has had the most difculty in restarting oil production due to a lack of accommodation or buildings at its elds, heavy mining around some facilities and a lack of capacity. Total output from the companys elds was estimated in early November at about 20,000 b/d.

The Sarir and Tobruk reneries were both largely unscathed by the civil war
tion in October. As of early November, the company was pumping as much as 30,000 b/d from the Intisar eld and undisclosed volumes of gas.

both the Sarir and Tobruk reneries, which have a combined capacity of 30,000 b/d and were both largely unscathed by the war. Meanwhile, the Marsa al-Hariga terminal was operating at full capacity in early November. The Messla and Aguila/Nafoora elds were more affected by the ghting, but came on stream in early October, adding some 80,000-90,000 b/d of production. As of early December, Agocos total output was about 280,000 b/d. Two more elds are connected to the Agoco-Ras Lanuf network: Amal and Al-Sarah, operated by Harouge and Germanys Wintershall. Wintershall reported in mid-October that it was producing about 20,000 b/d from Al-Sarah, while Harouge was producing a similar volume.

Arabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco) facilities

Agoco is the biggest producer in Libya and was the rst to be run by the NTC. It operates the giant Sarir eld, which produced 200,000 b/d in 2010. Sarir is directly connected to the Marsa al-Hariga terminal by a dedicated pipeline. Its other main elds are Messla, Aguila and Nafoora, which are part of the network of linked facilities that are connected to the Ras Lanuf export terminal. The Sarir eld was the scene of some ghting early in the war, but by September, Agoco had made signicant repairs to both the eld and the pipeline connecting it with Tobruk, claiming that production was about 160,000 b/d. The output from Sarir was being used as a feedstock for

Rimal-Intisar-Zueitina system
MOG was back at work at the Rimal and Bu Attifel elds in October and had reportedly boosted production at the elds 103,000 b/d in total before the war to about 70,000 b/d by late August, after nding little damage at either eld. Zueitina Oil, which uses the same pipeline as MOG to transport oil to its Zueitina oil terminal, also returned to produc MEED Insight

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Output and status of major oil and gas facilities, November 2011
Basin Al-Jawf Bouri Hamada/Al-Hamra system Sharara Elephant (El-Feel) NC-186 Al-Waha Samah Dahra Gialo Mabruk (C-17) Ghani Al-Jufra Tibisti El-Naga Graguba Nasser Lehib Dor Marada Jabal
Pelagian Pelagian Ghadames Murzuq Murzuq Murzuq Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte

Operator
Murzuq MOG Agoco AOO MOG AOO WOC WOC WOC WOC Total Harouge Oil Operations Harouge Oil Operations Harouge Oil Operations Harouge Oil Operations SOC SOC SOC SOC

Shareholders (%)
NOC (50), Total (37.5), Wintershall (12.5) NOC (50), Eni (50) NOC (100) NOC, Repsol, OMV, Total NOC (33.33), KNOC (33.33), Eni (33.33) NOC, Repsol, Total, OMV, Statoil NOC (59.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) NOC (50), Total (37.5), Statoil (12.5) NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100)

Production, 2010 (kb/d)

45 44.5 12.5 290 127 80 170 25 25 140 20 20 20 20 20 na na na na

Production halted (2011)

March February March February March February March February February February February March March March March March March March March

Production restarted (2011)

September Mid-November (target) na October na (November/December) na (November/December) na na na na na October October October October Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown

Estimated output, October 2011 [kb/d)/Damage status

40 0/MOG working towards midNovember start-up 0/Start-up issues causing delays 90 0/Severe damage to infrastructure, pipelines na 0/Damage to accommodation, worries over mines 0/Strike action 0/Strike action 0/Strike action (accommodation disruption) 0/Cannot be started until WOC facilities are recommissioned 10 10 0/Damage to accommodation, worries over mines 10 General concerns over SOC capacity remained na na na

MEED Insight

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Output and status of major oil and gas facilities, November 2011 (Continued)
Basin Ralah Arshad Ain Jerbi Wafa Bu Attifel Rimal Intisar Sarir Nafoora Messla Al-Sarah Amal
Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte Sirte

Operator
SOC SOC SOC SOC MOG MOG Zueitina Oil Agoco Agoco Agoco Wintershall Harouge Oil Operations

Shareholders (%)
NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (100) NOC (50), Eni (50) NOC (50), Eni (50) NOC (83), Occidental (12.25), OMV (4.75) NOC NOC NOC NOC (50), Wintershall (25), Gazprom (25) NOC (50), PetroCanada (50)

Production, 2010 (kb/d)

na na na 100 73.4 30 40 200 140 55 90 30

Production halted (2011)

March March March March February February February February February February February February

Production restarted (2011)

Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown October October October August August August October October

Estimated output, October 2011 (kb/d)/Damage status

na na na 20 50 20 30 160 50 30 30 20

kb/d=Thousand barrels a day; MOG=Mellitah Oil & Gas; AOO=Akakus Oil Operations; NOC=National Oil Corporation; Agoco=Arabian Gulf Oil Company; KNOC=Korean National Oil Corporation; WOC=Waha Oil Company; SOC=Sirte Oil Company; na=Not available. Source: MEED Insight

MEED Insight

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The future for Libyas EPSA holders

The opening up of the Libyan economy in 2004 revived hopes for a huge boost in production in a country that has consistently underachieved as a producer of oil and gas. Initially, the signs were promising. Between 2004 and 2008, National Oil Corporation (NOC) closed a total of 57 exploration and production sharing agreements (EPSAs) under the terms of its EPSA IV contracts, bringing the total number of oil and gas concessions in the country, including those held solely by NOC and its afliates, to 228. But despite the sheer number of contracts signed after 2004, all of which required the winning IOCs to commit to a large minimum spend on exploration activities and to pay signicant signing on bonuses running into hundreds of millions of dollars, oil output was not increased at the pace that many observers and industry insiders had expected. IOC executives blamed this on a combination of poor exploration results, stiing bureaucracy and tensions between the government of the late Muammar Gadda, NOC and the IOCs.
MEED Insight

Between 2004 and 2008, National Oil Corporation closed 57 production sharing agreements

International rms that have signed EPSAs*

Company PetroCanada Occidental (Oxy) Eni Woodside Petroleum Royal Dutch Shell Repsol RWE Total Wintershall (BASF) Tatneft Nimir Petroleum Inpex Holdings StatoilHydro ExxonMobil BP Turkiye Petroleum ONGC

International rms that have signed EPSAs* (Continued)

Company Sonatrach Oil India BG Pertamina Nippon Oil Corporation PGNIG Chinese Petroleum Company (CPC) China National Petroleum Corporation Verenex Chevron Petrobras Hess Boco OMV Algerian-Libyan E&P Joint Operating Company

*=Includes oil rms no longer active in Libya; EPSA=Exploration and production sharing agreement; E&P=Exploration and production. Source: MEED Insight

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EPSA contract holders

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Production (kb/d)
1,475 1,427 1,375 1,485 1,623 1,745 1,815 1,820 1,820 1,652 1,659

Gazprom and Tatneft and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), winning development contracts. When the fourth, gas-focused round was held in December 2007, only 13 companies out of the 54 qualied bid and only six out of the 12 contracts were awarded. At the same time, NOC, headed by former oil & gas minister Shokri Ghanem, attempted to renegotiate all existing production sharing agreements under the terms of EPSA IV. In 2009, Frances Total and its partners in Libya Germanys Wintershall and Norways Statoil agreed to the new terms, which reduced their share of production at existing concessions from 50 per cent of oil output to 27 per cent. Under the new deals, the companies also agreed to take 40 per cent of gas output from their concessions, falling to 30 per cent within ve years, rather than the initially agreed 50 per cent. The deal followed a similar renegotiation between Italys Eni and NOC in 2007, which brought all of the rms contracts in line with EPSA IV. This was followed by a reworking of Spanish rm Repsols concession agreements in Libya. Coupled with higher signing-on fees and a commitment to take on all development costs, rather than sharing them with NOC, the new deals were becoming less attractive to IOCs. This largely explains why

Firms whose governments had abstained from working with the NTC might suffer

companies willing to earn lower margins, or with strategic interests in capturing a share of production at a national level, were more successful in later bid rounds. With a new administration in Tripoli, there has again been considerable speculation over new opportunities for IOCs, rewards for rms which lent early support to the National Transitional Council (NTC) and penalties for those whose governments were not as supportive of Gaddas ouster. The speculation was fuelled by several reports out of Libya. In an August 2011 interview with Reuters, an Arabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco) ofcial said that the rm had no issue with Western rms whose governments had recognised the NTC and which had agreed early on to work with the rebel government, but that those rms whose governments had abstained, namely Russian, Chinese and Brazilian rms, might suffer. This was followed in late October by NOC releasing details of deals signed and proposed with IOCs for oil supplies and help in restarting oil and gas production. Switzerlands Vitol was a major supplier of fuel to the NTC, while Repsol offered help in restarting production. Tripoli has had to adopt a pragmatic approach, with the need for a speedy resumption of production and, with it, an inow of revenues overriding politiwww.meedinsight.com

EPSA=Exploration and production sharing agreement; kb/d=Thousand barrels a day. Source: BP Statistical Review

Interest in the four post-sanctions bid rounds also waned. In the rst round, which ran from October 2004 to January 2005, 15 exploration and production areas were offered. About 163 companies applied to bid for the contracts, 63 were approved and all of the concessions nine onshore and six offshore were awarded. In the second bid round, held in October 2005, 26 areas were bid by 48 companies, many of which were smaller independent and Asian rms. However, during the third bid round, 14 areas were offered and 47 rms were prequalied to bid, but only 10 deals were completed, with more nonWestern companies, including Russias
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cal concerns. The NTC has said that it is committed to upholding all contracts that were signed in line with existing Libyan laws, although it will investigate existing EPSA deals for any improprieties in the way they were awarded. This, executives say, includes all contracts signed with Russian, Brazilian and Chinese rms, although the council does not want to alienate potential economic partners or future oil consumers. The chances of contract renegotiations or new bid rounds before late 2013 are extremely low. The NTC is by nature a transitional council and has been cautious not to make major decisions that could come under scrutiny after a permanent government has been elected through a national vote in 2012. As a result, new deals are unlikely to be struck until a democratically elected oil minister has been put in place and has had time to work on a long-term strategy, new petroleum laws or concession terms. NOCs core focus is restoring oil output the countrys chief source of revenue by working with existing partners. The state oil company hopes to reach pre-conict production of 1.6m b/d by the end of 2012. IOCs are unlikely to resume signicant exploration operations until they can assess the security situation, following the 2012 elections. They will also need time to build new relationships with the
MEED Insight

National Oil Corporations focus is restoring oil output by working with existing partners
future oil & gas ministry, which may well reduce the role of NOC. A less idiosyncratic government can only be a good thing for IOCs and if the NTC acts on its promise to improve transparency and economic freedoms, the business environment could be signicantly improved. However, a clear picture of the structure of the industry and an opportunity for new oil and gas deals is unlikely to emerge until 2014-15.

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Power
P
ower supplies were seriously disrupted during the civil war, with lengthy blackouts being experienced in the major cities of Tripoli, Misurata, Sirte and Benghazi. In most cases, disruptions were caused not by damage to power plants, but by a lack of oil and gas feedstock or network issues. Feedstock availability will be crucial in determining how quickly power capacity and supplies can be restored to pre-2011 levels.

In the decade up to 2010, power demand growth averaged 8-10 per cent a year

Peak power demand growth, 2000-10

(MW)

6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000

6,000

5,000

4,000

Demand
Prior to 2011, Libyas power sector experienced strong growth both in terms of peak power demand and installed capacity. In the decade up to 2010, power demand growth averaged 8-10 per cent a year and reached 5,759MW, an increase of 9 per cent over the 2009 gure. The high growth was driven by a population that rose on average by 2.2 per cent a year and an economy that expanded by an
MEED Insight

3,000

2,000

1,000

20

00

20

03

20

06

20

08

20

09

10 20

Sources: Gecol, AUPTDE

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Between 2000 and 2007, per capita consumption climbed by 56 per cent to 4,158 kilowatt hours
average of 7 per cent a year over the period. It was also due to a sharp rise in per capita electricity consumption. Between 2000 and 2007, per capita consumption climbed by 56 per cent to 4,158 kilowatt hours (kWh), which while being relatively low compared to the Gulf states, was high in relation to elsewhere in North Africa. The increase in per capita consumption reected: a jump in installed generating capacity the near completion of a long-running programme to connect the entire population to the network rising living standards brought about by higher oil prices Libyas reintegration into the international community, which paved the way for increased foreign investment, new infrastructure projects and the rise of a middle class An additional factor for the relatively high per capita consumption was low tar MEED Insight

Residential power tariffs

Monthly consumption (kWh)
1-1,000 1,001-1,400 1,400 and above

Tariff (LD/kWh)
0.02 0.03 0.05

Meter charge (LD)

0.05 na na

kWh=Kilowatt hours; $1=LD1.3; na=Not applicable. Source: Gecol

Non-residential power tariffs

Tariff (LD/kWh) Commercial Agricultural (large) Agricultural (small) Heavy industry Light industry Light industry
kWh=Kilowatt hours; $1=LD1.3. Source: Gecol 0.068 0.032 0.02 0.042 0.031 0.031

Meter charge (LD)

0.55 0.2 0.2 0.5 1 1

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Breakdown of power demand by sector, 2008

Installed generating capacity by technology

Agriculture 33 Residential 33 21 13 Steam turbine Gas turbine 4,247 2,355 1,747

Industrial

%
Combined-cycle Commercial

MW
Source: AUPTDE

Source: Gecol

iffs. As in much of the Gulf, tariffs are set well below the cost of power production and transmission and, as a result, are heavily subsidised. This means there has been little incentive for consumers to conserve energy. The existing tariff system is broken down by sector and for residences by band, based on usage. The residential tariff ranges from LD0.02 ($0.016) a kWh up to LD0.05 a kWh, excluding a LD0.05 meter charge. Non-residential tariffs are higher,
MEED Insight

with commercial establishments paying a at rate of LD0.068 a kWh. Prior to 2011, however, revenue collection was poor, resulting in many residential consumers effectively paying nothing for their electricity. Compared to some Gulf states, the sources of power demand in Libya are relatively balanced. According to the latest gures from the General Electricity Company of Libya (Gecol), the residential and commercial sectors each accounted for 33 per

Serious power shortages in 2004 prompted Libya to invest heavily in new generating capacity

cent of demand in 2008. Industrial users made up 21 per cent, with most of the demand coming from the oil and gas sector and the Misurata steel complex, while agriculture accounted for the remaining 13 per cent.

Capacity
Serious power shortages in 2004 prompted the government to invest heavily in new generating capacity, which has provided an increasingly wide cushion over supplies. In 2010, capacity reached 8,349MW,
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Technically, the state had a power reserve margin of over 40 per cent in 2010
a signicant increase on the 2008 total of 6,196MW. Of the total installed, half was gas turbine technology, almost 30 per cent was combined-cycle technology, with the remainder covered by steam technology. Technically, the state had a reserve margin of over 40 per cent in 2010. However, the actual reserve margin may well have been much lower, given that it is unclear how much of the installed capacity was available. In both the desalination and wastewater sectors, a considerable amount of installed capacity was not operating in 2010 as a result of age, a lack of investment, poor operations and maintenance. There is little to suggest that it was any different in the power sector, especially as some 3,000MW of installed capacity was built prior to 1995.

Major power plants, 2010

Power station Tripoli West Benghazi North steam Tripoli West Khoms steam Abu Kammash gas Kufra gas Derna steam Tobruk steam Misurata steel Sarir gas Tripoli South gas Zueitina gas Khoms gas Western Mountain Benghazi North combined-cycle Azzawiya combined-cycle Benghazi combined-cycle Sarir Zueitina gas
Source: MEED Insight

Capacity (MW)
325 160 240 480 45 50 130 130 507 45 500 200 600 624 810 1,350 750 750 550

Contractor
Alstom Deutsche Babcock Bharat Heavy Electrical Deutsche Babcock Westinghouse Fiat Avio BBC (ABB) BBC (ABB) Hyundai Engineering & Construction Westinghouse ABB ABB ABB BHEL Daewoo Engineering & Construction Alstom, Hyundai Engineering & Construction Daewoo Engineering & Construction Hyundai Engineering & Construction Enka

Operation date
1976 1979 1980 1982 1982 1982 1985 1985 1990 1990 1994 1994 1995 2005-06 2007 2005-07 2009 2010 2010

Fuel
Heavy fuel oil Heavy fuel oil Heavy fuel oil; light fuel oil Heavy fuel oil; light fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil Light fuel oil Heavy fuel oil Heavy fuel oil Heavy fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil Light fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil; natural gas Light fuel oil; natural gas

MEED Insight

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A feature of the local power sector is its dependence on liquid fuels. Gecols latest data shows that in 2008, liquids made up the majority of feedstock, with heavy fuel oil accounting for 21 per cent of the total and light fuel oil 32 per cent. Despite Libyas large reserves, natural gas had a relatively low share, making up 47 per cent. Gecols long-term goal is to substantially reduce the consumption of liquids. In 2009, it announced plans to increase the share of gas in its total feedstock mix to 94 per cent by 2012 and to 99 per cent by 2016. Delays

A feature of the local power sector is its dependence on liquid fuels for the majority of feedstock
in project implementation mean that these targets are likely to be missed, although they should be reached by 2020. Gecols projected fuel mix, 2008-16

Breakdown of power plant feedstock by type, 2008

47 Heavy fuel oil Gas 32 21

%
Light fuel oil

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

(%)
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

20

08

20

09

10 20

11 20

12 20

13 20

14 20
Natural gas

15 20
HFO

16 20
LFO

Source: Gecol MEED Insight

Gecol=General Electricity Company of Libya; HFO=Heavy fuel oil; LFO=Light fuel oil. Sources: Gecol, AUPTDE www.meedinsight.com

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Several projects awarded by General Electricity Company of Libya failed to proceed altogether
As of early 2011, over 6,000MW of new capacity was at varying stages of completion. The list of projects included contracts dating back to 2007, such as Gulf (Al-Khaleej) steam, as well as more recent schemes, including the 750MW Zueitina 2 combined-cycle project, which was awarded to South Koreas Daewoo Engineering & Construction in October 2010. Even before the civil war started, delays were frequently encountered on Gecols capacity building programme. A lack of clear direction, payment difculties, budgetary issues and bureaucracy were all blamed. In the worst cases, several projects awarded by Gecol failed to proceed altogether either as a result of a change of heart by the client or a lack of funds. In recent years, the Libyan power market has been dominated by Asian contractors, in particular Daewoo and its South Korean counterpart Hyundai Engineering & Construction. Their main competitors
MEED Insight

Selected power projects under way as of early 2011

Plant Gulf (Al-Khaleej) Sebha Western Mountain extension Benghazi North Misurata Tripoli West extension Zueitina
Source: MEED Insight

Type
Steam Gas turbine Gas turbine Combined-cycle Combined-cycle Steam Combined-cycle

Capacity (MW)
1,400 750 312 750 750 1,400 750

Lead contractor
Hyundai Engineering & Construction Enka Bharat Heavy Electricals Daewoo Engineering & Construction Daewoo Engineering & Construction Hyundai Engineering & Construction Daewoo Engineering & Construction

have been Indias Bharat Heavy Electricals and Turkeys Enka, which has carried out a number of projects in partnership with Global Electricity Services Company (Gesco), a joint venture of Gecol and South Africas Eskom Enterprises. On the consultancy side, the leading player has been ACESCo, a joint venture of Gecol and the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (EEHC). The outbreak of the civil war in early 2011 brought all project activity in the power sector to a halt. Following the end to hostilities in October 2011, all the leading international contractors in the market were preparing to visit Tripoli to assess the state of their project sites and to hold talks with the National Transitional Council (NTC) over how to resume construction activities.

Demand outlook
The high volume of power plant contracts awarded in the period 2007-10 underlined the pressing need for new capacity in the local power sector. Tripoli was, in effect, making up for the lost decade up to 2005 when no new power plants were commissioned in the North African state. Gecols capacity building programme was the outcome of a masterplan announced in 2008, which called for installed capacity to rise to about 13,000MW in 2012 and to 19,000-20,000MW by 2020, from 6,196MW. The capacity forecast was
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Power demand outlook, 2010-25

Power plant projects planned by Gecol, 2011-25

Power plant Sebha Zueitina phase 2 Tripoli West Gulf of Bomba Misurata phase 2 Tripoli East Benghazi West West Derna Mellitah Khoms expansion Mellitah Ras Lanuf Type
Gas Gas Steam Steam Combined-cycle Steam Steam Steam Combined-cycle Steam Combined-cycle Steam Combined-cycle Combined-cycle

(MW)

Capacity (MW)
855 820 1,400 1,050 750 1,400 1,400 1,400 750 1,400 750 1,400 750 750

Proposed commissioning date

2011 2011 2013 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2017 2018 2019 2021 2022 2024

20000 15000 10000 5000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

20

08

10 20

15 20

20

20

20

25

Abu Taraba phase 1 Abu Taraba phase 2

Source: Gecol

Source: Gecol, 2008

based on accelerated peak power demand growth of 10-12 per cent a year in the period 2009-25. Under this scenario, power demand was projected to reach 12,621MW in 2015 and 15,078MW in 2020, up from just 4,756MW in 2008. To meet the demand growth and capacity targets, Gecol drew up a list of new projects to be executed in the period 2011-25. This called for the addition of 14,875MW of new capacity and included the Sebha, Tripoli West and Zueitina 2
MEED Insight

projects, for which contracts have already been awarded, and the proposed 1,500MW Mellitah station, all of whose output is destined for export. For the rst time, the government proposed that some of the new capacity should be developed by private companies, as opposed to being conventionally procured from the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracting market. In 2009-10, Tripoli held discussions with a number of developers over a

No agreements were reached on the IPP programme before the civil war broke out

planned independent power project (IPP) programme, which was to begin with the Tripoli West plant. However, no agreements were signed before the civil war broke out. Even before the civil war, there was growing pressure on Gecol to revise its demand and capacity forecasts, as well as its project timetable. The utility had envisaged a spike in power demand in 2010 as a result of a series of large-scale real-estate and infrastructure projects
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being completed. In the end, however, project delays and cancellations meant that demand reached 5,759MW, well short of the 8,582MW projected in Gecols 2008 forecast. The civil war has only served to make the future requirements of the power sector even more uncertain. In 2011, peak demand is reckoned to have fallen by 30-50 per cent and a return to pre-conict demand growth rates will largely depend on how quickly the political situation can be stabilised and investment can resume. Even in the best case scenario, Gecols 2008 demand forecast for the year 2020 appears to be 3,000-5,000MW too high.

Steps have been taken to connect Libyas domestic power grid with the regional network
tian grids have been connected by a 220kV line since May 1998 and there were plans prior to the civil war to upgrade the voltage of the interconnection to 400/500kV by 2012. Libya and Tunisia are linked by a 380kmlong double circuit line between Medenine and Abu Kammash, and a second 298km single line between Tataouine and El-Ruwis. The interconnections were completed in 2003, but technical issues held up their synchronisation. A 400kV link between Libya and Algeria has also been proposed, along with a subsea cable to Italy to export 1,000MW of power from the planned Mellitah power plant.

Transmission and distribution

Libyas transmission network extends for 2,000 kilometres between the Tunisian and Egyptian borders and for up to 900km south into the Sahara desert. Gecol completed the internal interconnection of the national grid at the 220kV level in 1993 and a decade later began upgrading the network to 400kV. As of 2009, there were 442km of 400kV lines, with a further 3,200km under construction and 2,000km more planned. It also had 14,000km of 220kV lines, 22,000km of 66kV and 33kV lines and 45,000km of 11kV distribution lines. In recent years, steps have been taken to connect the domestic grid with the regional network. The Libyan and Egyp MEED Insight

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Renewables
A
s a result of its energy riches, renewable energy has traditionally been overlooked in Libya. This is despite the state having good solar and wind potential. Solar radiation levels are as high as 7.5 kilowatt hours (kWh) a square a metre a day, while wind speeds reach up to 7.5 metres a second. However, in 2010, renewables made up well under 1 per cent of the total energy mix and were conned to small scale photovoltaic (PV) projects serving rural communities. The 2008 publication of an extremely ambitious roadmap by the Renewable Energy Authority of Libya (Reaol) moved renewable energy further up the agenda. Under the 20-year plan, Reaol called for 1,000MW of renewable energy to be installed by 2015, with wind accounting for 750MW of the total, concentrated solar power (CSP) 100MW, PV 50MW and solar water heaters 100MW.
MEED Insight

Renewables made up well under 1 per cent of the total energy mix in 2010
By 2020, Reaol aimed for renewables to reach 2,750MW, which it said would make up 10 per cent of the total energy mix, implying a total capacity of 27,500MW. However, this was well above General Electricity Company of Libyas (Gecols) own 2008 estimate of 20,000MW by 2020. In the following decade, the renewables share was set to reach 25 per cent in 2025 and 30 per cent by 2030.

Reaols renewable energy targets, 2015-25

Wind (MW) 2015 2020 2025
750 1,500 2,000

CSP (MW)
100 800 1,200

PV (MW)
50 150 500

SWH (MW)
100 300 600

Planned share of total energy mix (%)

6 10 25

Reaol=Renewable Energy Authority of Libya; CSP=Concentrated solar power; PV=Photovoltaic; SWH=Solar water heating. Source: Reaol

Even before war broke out, international consultants were sceptical about Libyas ability to meet its targets, concluding that these were more aspirational than deliverable. The scepticism was partly due to the states lack of experience in the sector and its poor record for delivering power projects. In a study on renewable energy in Libya published in April 2010, Cairo-based Regional Centre for Renewable Energy & Energy Efciency concluded that a lack of government coordination was a major stumbling block in the path of renewables.

These targets and strategy for renewable energy in Libya do not seem to be fully shared among all participants, despite the cabinets approval of the target, said the report. One reason seems to be that the targets and strategy have not been developed from any comprehensive analytical work. This lack of consensus means that the programmes and targets of Reaol may not in fact be realised in the time-scale envisaged. The targets have looked even more unrealistic since the war broke out in early 2011.
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Historical context
Renewable energy in Libya dates back to the 1940s, when the rst wind-powered schemes were implemented and to the mid-1970s for the rst solar projects. In 1976, the states inaugural PV pilot plant was commissioned and was followed in 1993 by the establishment of a 10MW pilot wind farm. Up until 2007, renewable energy largely fell under the responsibility of Gecol. However, in a major government reshufe that took place in March of that year, the General Peoples Committee for Electricity, Water & Gas was established to oversee the work of Gecol and four new entities, including Reaol. Two years later, the General Peoples Committee for Electricity, Water & Gas was abolished and replaced by the new General Peoples Committee for Utilities. In August 2009, the government set up a new Higher Council for Energy Affairs to formulate policy in the elds of oil and gas, nuclear energy, renewable energy and electricity. Following the move, Reaol reported directly to the cabinet. Despite all the changes, the decision to establish a dedicated renewable energy authority was warmly welcomed and seen as the start of a new era for renewables. Reaol was given a budget of $480m for the period 2008-12 to undertake research, planning and implementation of alternative energy projects, although beyond the
MEED Insight

The new council aimed to address the lack of co-ordination between stakeholders in the energy sector
Derna wind farm scheme, there were few details about which schemes would proceed. In December 2010, just two months before the civil war started, the states rst major renewable energy contract was awarded, with Spains Amtors winning phase one of the Derna wind farm project. To date, there have been no serious efforts made to reduce energy use, although this was part of the responsibility of the new energy council that was set up in September 2009. Members of every energy-related organisation are on the board, from the Industry & Economic Development Ministry to the National Oil Corporation (NOC), Gecol and Reaol. The council aimed to address the lack of co-ordination between stakeholders in the energy sector and promote renewables. Its objectives were to prepare energy policy, develop the structure of the sector, establish procedures for foreign investment, set out a pricing strategy and evaluate renewable energy resources, especially solar power.
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Policy
Libya has lagged well behind its neighbours on the renewable energy front, having no energy efciency or enabling legislation in place for renewables and no nancial support, such as feed-in tariffs. There is also no law allowing private sector participation in the electricity sector. It was hoped that some of these legislative gaps would be lled by a new electricity law, which was under preparation in 2010. The draft law, expected to have been similar to Egypts, was a key component in a wider restructuring of the electricity sector, which would have allowed private generators for the rst time. Explicit provisions were originally to be made for both renewable energy and energy efciency in the draft. However, subsequent reports suggested these would be removed and included in separate laws. At the same time, Reaol was expected to be split into two, with one entity looking after physical assets and the other to undertake regulation and planning. As of mid-2011, the electricity law had still to be passed and there seems little prospect of it materialising any time soon. Without it, progress on renewables will be limited.

There is no law allowing private sector participation in the countrys electricity sector
Wind power
Libya has a good wind prole. According to a 2004 wind measurement programme, average wind speeds are 6-7.5 metres a second across the country. With 1,770 kilometres of coastline, offshore wind generation is also a possibility, although to date this has not been pursued. Wind power was rst used in Libya in the 1940s for water pumping. However, it was not until the 2004 study that it was considered for large-scale applications. In the study, ve coastal sites were identied as Average wind speeds at ve coastal locations
Location Derna Misurata Sirte Al-Maqrun Tolmeita
Source: Planbleu

Libyan wind map

TUNISIA

Tripoli

ALGERIA (m/s)
10.5 10 9.5 9 8.5 8 7.5 7 6.5 6 5.5 5 4.5 Draft result: 20.02.2001 Mean wind speed: 50m (Grid size 5km, 1986-2006)

Speed (metres a second)

7.5 6.6 6.3 7.1 5.9

NIGER CHAD SUDAN

www.meedinsight.com

m/s=Metres a second. Source: Reaol

MEED Insight

60

offering the best prospects for wind generation. These ranged from Misurata in central Libya to Derna in the east, which had recorded the highest wind speeds at 7.5 metres a second. Based on the wind speed measurements, in 2008, Reaol drew up a wind energy programme aimed at delivering 750MW of capacity by 2015, 1,500MW by 2020 and 2,000MW by 2030. Two coastal sites, Derna and Al-Maqrun on the Gulf of Sirte, were selected for the rst wind farms and were to be followed by: Mellitah, Tarhouna and Asabab in the western region with capacity of 250MW Gallo, Almasarra and Tazerbo in the south eastern region with capacity of 120MW Aliofra, Sebha, Ghat and Ashwairif in the south western region with capacity of 120MW In December 2010, the rst commercial wind farm project was awarded for the Derna 1 scheme. Spains Amtor beat off competition from the US GE and Germanys Siemens to win the $142m contract, which called for 60MW of wind turbine capacity to be installed by late 2012. Turkish subcontractor Biltek managed to complete some of the projects preparatory work before the civil war broke out. Despite the site being well away from areas of conict, the scheme was eventually put on hold, although there were
MEED Insight

Planned wind farm projects

Wind farm Derna 1 Derna 2 Al-Maqrun 1 Al-Maqrun 2 Western region Southeastern region Southwestern region
Source: Reaol

Capacity (MW)
60 60 120 120 250 250 250

Status
Contract awarded in Dec 2010 Planned Planned Planned Planned Planned Planned

reports in November 2011 that work had resumed. Derna 1 was always seen as the trailblazer for Libyan wind projects. However, the conict dealt a serious blow to it and other planned wind farm prospects. Delivery of wind energy infrastructure is totally reliant on international companies and technologies, so no further progress is likely to be made until Libya stabilises and international companies return.
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Solar
Libya has considerable solar potential. The countrys daily radiation levels are as high as 7.5kWh a square metre, it enjoys 3,000-3,500 hours a year of sunshine and most of its terrain is both at and uninhabited. The highest concentration of solar radiation is in the south. To date, the only successful applications of solar have been small scale. Since the mid-1970s, PV panels have been used to power cathodic protection systems on oil pipelines in the desert and telecommunications equipment and water pumping stations in remote areas. In 2003, PV technology was incorporated into a rural electrication programme, which is still ongoing. As of 2010, there were more than 440 completed PV projects providing power to over 2,000 rural inhabitants. Libya plans to have more than 2MW of PV capacity by 2012 and 10MW by 2020. Success at a local level has not been translated into large-scale PV generation, however. In its 2008-12 programme, Reaol planned three 5-10MW PV plants to be connected to the grid at Al-Jufra, Green Mountain and Sebha, and the installation of 500 PV rooftop systems. It also proposed the construction of the states rst 100MW CSP plant using parabolic troughs. Finally, it called for the establishment of joint ventures to manufacture and assemble PV panels and solar water heaters. The government had even talked
MEED Insight

Even without war breaking out, meeting the 2012 targets seemed highly unlikely
about exporting solar power to Europe through initiatives, such as Desertec. In late 2010, Abu Dhabis Al-Maskari Holding announced plans for a $3bn solar energy hub near Tripoli, which included a subsea cable to feed electricity under the Mediterranean. But even without war breaking out, meeting the 2012 targets and delivering on the planned export projects seemed highly unlikely. Progress on all the large-scale schemes had been painfully slow and, unlike on the wind front where at least the Derna contract had been awarded, there appeared to be very little progress on the states solar plans.

Solar thermal electricity generating potentials

TUNISIA

Tripoli

DNI (kWh/m2/y)
<1,800 1,875 1,950 2,025 2,100 2,175 2,250 2,325 2,400 2,475 2,550 2,625 2,700 2,775 2,850 2,925 3,000

NIGER CHAD SUDAN

DNI=Direct normal irradiance; kWh/m2/y=Kilowatt hours a square metre a year. Source: MED-CSP

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Desalination
Desalination has traditionally played a minor role in Libyas water sector, largely as a result of Tripolis focus on developing the Great Man-made River (GMR) project to meet its water requirements. In 2009, it made up only 11 per cent of total water supplies, well below the GMRs share of 61 per cent. However, prior to the civil war, Tripoli was proposing a signicant ramp-up in desalination capacity to meet rising potable water demand in urban areas and, for the rst time, was targeting private investors. Libya was an early adopter of desalination, building plants to process brackish water in rural locations for domestic and industrial use in the 1960s. Most of the 200,000 cubic metres a day (cm/d) of capacity was based on reverse osmosis (RO) and electrodialysis technology. In the period 1975-85, an intensive investment programme was undertaken, which resulted in about 300,000 cm/d of new
MEED Insight

Desalination made up only 11 per cent of the countrys total water supplies in 2009

plant capacity being built, with the focus on multi-stage ash (MSF) technology. A further 440,000 cm/d of new capacity, largely based on multi-effect distillation (MED) technology, was installed between 1985 and 2010. However, as in other infrastructure sectors, a signicant amount of desalination capacity was not in operation before the civil war due to bureaucracy, absence of distribution networks, poor maintenance and the age of existing assets. In March 2010, the General Desalination Company of Libya (GDCol) estimated that total operating desalination capacity was about 290,000 cm/d. This gure was well below the 850,000 cm/d of capacity that had been installed in the state since the mid-1960s. GDCol and its predecessor, the General Electricity Company of Libya (Gecol), were unusually open about the problems affecting the desalination sector. Ever
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since the rst plant was commissioned in the 1960s, the sector has suffered from a lack of skilled workers with desalination experience. As recently as 2007, Gecol blamed the lack of experienced operators for 150,000 cm/d of capacity being out of action. Environmental issues have also handicapped production, particularly the issue of seaweed playing havoc on ltration systems. Corrosion, poor design and years of economic sanctions have also been blamed for the sectors poor performance, which was underlined in 2007 when Gecol estimated that some 800,000 cm/d of capacity was either shut down or under-utilised. In an attempt to improve efciency, the sector underwent several restructurings in the period 2007-10. The result was that as of early 2011, existing and new standalone desalination infrastructure came under the responsibility of GDCol. The company, previously known as General Desalination Company (GDC), was a subsidiary of Gecol until 2007, when it was handed over to the newly formed Utilities Ministry. With the exception of the Bomba MSF plant operated by Gecol, all desalination capacity is run by GDCol. By regional standards, Libyas desalination plants are small with capacities ranging between 20,000 cm/d and 50,000 cm/d. In con MEED Insight

Actual operating desalination capacity, 2010*

Plant Bomba Zliten Tobruk II Abu Taraba Derna Sousa Azzawiya Zuara Operator
Gecol GDCol GDCol GDCol GDCol GDCol GDCol GDCol

Capacity (cm/d)
30,000 30,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 50,000 20,000 40,000

First operational
1988 1992 2002 2007 2009 2009 2010 2010

Technology
MSF MED MED MED MED MED MED MED

trast, most of Saudi Arabias new plants have capacities of over 500,000 cm/d. Moreover, all GDCols capacity is based on MED technology and has been built by Frances Sidem, which until 2009, dominated the local desalination sector.

*=Does not include small units serving industry and the military; cm/d=Cubic metres a day; Gecol=General Electricity Company of Libya; MSF=Multi-stage ash; GDCol=General Desalination Company of Libya; MED=Multi-effect distillation. Source: GDCol www.meedinsight.com

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Major desalination plants in operation

TUNISIA Zuara
Zuara
Sousa 50,000 cm/d Derna 40,000 cm/d

40,000 cm/d

Tripoli
Zliten Sousa Derna Bomba Tobruk

Azzawiya

Azzawiya 20,000 cm/d

Zliten 30,000 cm/d

Abu Taraba
Abu Taraba 40,000 cm/d

Tobruk 40,000 cm/d

The planned plants were to be far larger than anything Tripoli had ever considered before
Sidems stranglehold in the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) market was nally broken in November 2010, when GDCol awarded an estimated $100m contract to Singapores Hyux to build a 40,000 cm/d plant at Tobruk. The award was notable for being the rst for a large-scale RO plant in over 20 years. The Tobruk project marked a reversal in policy by GDCol. In 2008, the government unveiled an ambitious programme to build 2.5 million cm/d of new capacity through 11 projects up to 2020. The programme represented a radical departure from past desalination procurement in Libya. For a start, the planned plants were to be far larger than anything Tripoli had ever considered before, with capacities of up to 500,000 cm/d. Moreover, GDCol proposed that all new plants would use RO technology and not MED. Finally and most critically, rather than tendering the work as EPC contracts as had been the norm in the past, the government body opted to develop them as

independent water projects (IWPs). Under the proposed model, foreign partners with technology, construction and operations experience were to be brought into new project companies, which would build, own and operate the plants. The IWP programme was divided into three phases. Under phase 1, running from 2010-14, an estimated 1.55 million cm/d of new capacity was planned at four separate sites in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misurata and Tobruk. The second phase, covering the period 2014-16, called for four more plants to be built with a combined capacity of 600,000 cm/d. The third phase planned to add 300,000 cm/d of new capacity in the period 2017-20. New desalination plants under phase 2, 2014-16
Location Derna Sousa Sirte Capacity (cm/d)
100,000 100,000 100,000

Bomba 30,000 cm/d

EGYPT

LIBYA

Status
Planned Planned Planned

cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: GDCol

300,000 Planned Jifarah coast cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: GDCol

New desalination plants under phase 1, 2010-14

Location Benghazi Tripoli Tobruk Misurata Capacity (cm/d)
400,000 500,000 150,000 500,000

NIGER

CHAD

Status*
Under discussion Under discussion Under discussion Under discussion

Prospective developer
Hyux Hyux Befesa Befesa

New desalination plants under phase 3, 2017-20

Location Azzawiya Zuara Bomba Capacity (cm/d)
100,000 100,000 100,000

Status
Planned Planned Planned

SUDAN

*=As of 2010; cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Sources: MEED Projects, GDCol MEED Insight

cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: GDCol www.meedinsight.com

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In 2009, GDCol signed up two prospective partners for the phase 1 programme. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was reached with Hyux to build the 500,000 cm/d plant at Tripoli and a 400,000 cm/d facility at Benghazi. This was followed by Spains Befesa signing an MoU to build three new plants with total capacity of 800,000 cm/d at Misurata, Tobruk and Tripoli West, even though the Tripoli site was not originally included in GDCols list of planned projects. Little progress was made on any of the IWPs before the civil war, which may explain why GDCol decided to award Hyux a separate EPC contract for the Tobruk plant in late 2010. Even when the privatisation scheme was launched, there was scepticism about whether it could ever succeed. Libya lacks robust legal and nancial frameworks to support buildown-operate contract models and has no experience of commercially nancing major infrastructure projects. There were also considerable doubts about the governments commitment to increasing the role of the private sector, given the past state domination. Finally, the reputation of GDCol, and its predecessor Gecol, was poor for project delivery, even when tendering much simpler EPC contracts. This was demonstrated with a planned 40,000 cm/d plant at Sirte. It rst attracted bids in early 2007 from Austrias Wabag, Frances Sidem and
MEED Insight

South Koreas Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction. The following July, Gecol scrapped the tender on account of high costs. The project was subsequently integrated into the planned Al-Khaleej steam power project, which itself was later abandoned. The scheme was then resurrected in 2008, with capacity increased to 50,000 cm/d, but was never awarded. The lack of water was a major problem for several cities during the civil war, with power disruptions and network problems being the main issues, rather than damage to desalination plants. Going forward, the National Transitional Council (NTC) faces major decisions on the desalination, and wider water, front. A key decision will have to be taken on the future of Gaddas agship infrastructure project, the GMR, and the role it should play. NTC will also have to decide whether the pre-revolution body GDCol and its procurement strategy should remain in place. In September 2011, its UK representative, Guma el-Gamaty said that the NTC was open to private investment in the desalination sector, but conceded that it was still very early days for the reconstruction programme.

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The Great Man-made River project

L
ike its neighbours, Libya depends on groundwater for the majority of its water supplies. However, most comes in the form of fossilised water from aquifers deep in the desert, through the Great Man-made River (GMR) project. The GMR has provided an increasing share of Libyas water in recent years, accounting for 61 per cent of the total in 2009. The 4,000-kilometre network of pipelines, linking massive underground aquifers at Kufra, Murzuq and Sarir with Libyas urban centres on the Mediterranean coast, has also received the lions share of investment in the water sector. In the 25 years up to 2010, the government spent more than $20bn on the project, which contributed over 1.6 million cubic metres a day (cm/d) to the countrys water supply. Prior to the conict, plans called for the GMR to supply about 6 million cm/d by 2030, according to the General
MEED Insight

The major water deposits under the Sahara desert were rst discovered in the 1950s
Water Authority (GWA), a largely autonomous arm of the Agriculture Ministry. The major water deposits under the Sahara desert were rst discovered in the 1950s during oil exploration. The newfound aquifers were partially developed in the 1970s, with production reaching about 500,000 cm/d and supplying mainly agriculture. In the late 1970s, the government undertook studies to assess the optimum use for the fossilised water. It concluded that it would not be cost-

Water supply by source Water supply

Desalination 61 GMR 28 11

Groundwater

%
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GMR=Great Man-made River. Source: General Desalination Company of Libya

67

effective to grow crops in the south of the country and proposed instead that a network of pipelines should be built to transport the water to the more fertile and already developed coastal plains. Plans for the GMR project were rst formulated in the 1980s by the UKs Brown & Root, now part of the US KBR, and Price Brothers, a pre-stressed concrete pipeline specialist. Initially, both rms worked for the government and then for the Great Man-made River Authority (GMRA), which was set up in 1983. The plans drawn up by the consultants and the government called for a massive water pipeline network to be built in phases. In total, it envisaged the drilling of some 1,350 production wells spread across the four basins, which would be connected to the coast by 600,000 sections of pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipes (PCCP). In total, more than 4,000km of pipeline were to be laid, delivering over 6 million cm/d of water. The rst wellelds to be developed were planned at Tazerbo and Sarir, in the east and southeast of the country, to tap the Sirte basin. A total of 284 wells were to be drilled at the two locations, which would ultimately pump 2 million cm/d of water. This was to be followed by the development of three wellelds on the Hassouna basin, which aimed to produce 2.5 million cm/d of water from 586 wells at the
MEED Insight

The Great Man-made River project

TUNISIA

Tripoli

Benghazi Sirte Ajdabiya Tobruk

Plans for the Great Man-made River project were rst formulated in the 1980s
northeast, east and west Jabal Hassouna elds. The rst two phases planned were considered priorities, producing the majority of the water supply projected under the GMR programme and accounting for most of the capital outlay. The development of a single welleld at Kufra was then planned, which would add 1.68 million cm/d of supply. This was to be followed by new wellelds at Ghadames and Jaghboub, which would further tap the Hassouna and Sirte basins. The Ghadames project called for the construction of 144 wells to produce 90 million cubic metres a year (cm/y), while the Jaghboub scheme was planned to produce 50 million cm/y from 40 wells. Each welleld was to be linked to storage reservoirs and distribution networks for domestic and agricultural purposes through four-metre-diameter pipelines. In the east, the Sarir, Tazerbo and Kufra wellelds were to be connected to the network, which would transport water to
www.meedinsight.com

EGYPT
Ghadames Brega PCCP plant

Northeast Jabal Hassouna welleld

Jaghboub

LIBYA
Sarir welleld East Jabal Hassouna welleld

Sarir PCCP plant

Tazerbo

ALGERIA
Kufra

Phase IV Phase III Phase I Phase II Reservoir Pipe production plant

NIGER CHAD SUDAN

PCCP=Pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe. Sources: GMRA, MEED

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The Great Man-made River wellelds

Number of wells Ghadames system Northeast Jabal Hassouna system East Jabal Hassouna system West Jabal Hassouna system Brega pipe manufacturing plant, water system Sarir pipe manufacturing plant, water system Sarir welleld system Tazerbo welleld Kufra system Jaghboub
106 60 479 47 7 3 126 108 285 40

Projected production (kcm/d)

250 600 1,400 500 14 14 1,000 1,000 1,680 137

The Hassouna project was designed to transport water directly to Tripoli and Tarhouna
a holding reservoir at Ajdabiya and then on to two larger reservoirs, called Al-Gardabiya and Omar Mukhtar. The separate Jaghboub system, close to the Egyptian border, was designed to service Tobruk and its surrounding area. In the west, the Hassouna project was to transport water directly to the capital, Tripoli, as well as Tarhouna, while the Ghadames scheme would serve the coastal towns of Zuara and Azzawiya. Eventually, the Kufra-Sarir-Tazerbo-SirteBenghazi system would be linked via pipeline to the Hassouna-Tripoli network, creating a nationwide system. In total, the GMR project called for the construction of ve major storage reservoirs with total capacity of 55 million cubic metres. By far, the largest, with a proposed capacity of 24 million cubic metres, was the Grand Omar Mukhtar reservoir. A key part of the project was the construction of two PCCP manufacturing plants at Sarir and Brega. Each plant was

to be provided with water from specially drilled wellelds. Seven wells were to be drilled to supply the Brega plant with 14,000 cm/d of water, while three wells were planned to deliver 11,000 cm/d of water for the Sirte facility. A 90MW power plant was to provide energy at the Sarir plant and the nearby drilling operations. Construction was originally planned to be carried out in three phases: Phase 1 would cover the Kufra-TazerboSarir-Ajdabiya-Sirte-Benghazi systems Phase 2 would take in the HassounaTripoli-Tarhouna network Phase 3 would involve the JaghboubTobruk and Ghadames-Azzawiya-Zuara system, along with the Sirte-Tripoli link However, the plan was subsequently revised, with another phase added. This covered the development of the Kufra eld, the Kufra-Sarir pipeline and the Sirte-Tripoli pipeline, which was removed from the rst and third part of the project. The GMRA had also considered undertaking a fth phase, which would link the welleld at Sarir Qattusah in the west of the country to the Hassouna-Jifarah portion of the project. This phase would add 500,000 cm/d of production capacity to the GMR, boosting overall output to a peak of 7 million cm/d. Under the 1983 masterplan prepared by the GMRA and Brown & Root, it was
www.meedinsight.com

kcm/d=Thousand cubic metres a day. Sources: GMRA, MEED Insight

Planned reservoirs on the Great Man-made River project

Location Ajdabiya holding reservoir Al-Gardabiya reservoir Omar Mukhtar reservoir Grand Al-Gardabiya reservoir Grand Omar Mukhtar reservoir
cm=Cubic metres. Sources: GMRA, MEED Insight

Planned capacity (million cm)

4 6.8 4.7 15.4 24

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intended that South Koreas Dong Ah Construction would be the main contractor for each phase, with the US engineering rm overseeing its work. However, nancial difculties and concerns over its performance meant that Dong Ah only worked on the rst two phases of the scheme.

The Great Man-made River phase 1 network

where there are two more 170,000-cubicmetre tanks and the separate Sarir collection system joins the main pipeline. From here, two four-metre-diameter pipelines extend a further 380km north to the Ajdabiya reservoir. The two pipelines then travel east and west to Benghazi and Sirte, where they meet end reservoirs as well as the Grand Omar Mukhtar and Grand Al-Gardabiya reservoirs, built to stockpile water in case of drought. Dong Ah designed and built the PCCP plants at Sirte and Brega and was also contracted to operate both factories for the duration of the rst phase. The Sarir plant has the capacity to produce up to 120 pipeline sections a day and the Benghazi plant can construct 80 pipeline sections a day. As part of phase 1, the contractor also built 1,500km of road to transport equipment along, as well as ofces, workshops, accommodation and support facilities. These facilities have since been consolidated into operations and maintenance stations at Tazerbo, Sarir, Brega, Sirte and Benghazi. In addition, Dong Ah and Japans Itochu Corporation built the 90MW Sarir power plant. GMR phase 1 was inaugurated in 1993, although overall completion was not achieved until 1996/97.

TUNISIA

Tripoli

Benghazi Sirte Ajdabiya Tobruk

Phase 1
The GMRs rst phase covered the construction of the Tazerbo-Sarir-SirteBenghazi system, which is often referred to as the SS/TB project. Dong Ah was awarded the $3.8bn main construction contract in 1983, which was largely completed a decade later. While it carried out the majority of the contract itself, the Korean contractor also subcontracted out several packages, including the construction of the Grand Omar Mukhtar reservoir at Benghazi and the Grand Al-Gardabiya reservoir at Sirte, which was won by the local Al-Nahr Construction. A number of elements of the rst phase project were not included in Dong Ahs scope, including the well drilling contract, which was awarded to Brazils Braspetro. The rst phase programme breaks down into several distinct parts. The Tazerbo welleld is connected to a 170,000-cubicmetre collection tank, which is then linked to the rst major 256km pipeline network. This transports water to Sarir,
MEED Insight Ghadames

EGYPT
Brega PCCP plant

Jaghboub

LIBYA
Sarir welleld

Sarir PCCP plant

Tazerbo

ALGERIA
Kufra

NIGER
Pipeline Reservoir Pipe production plant

CHAD SUDAN

PCCP=Pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe. Sources: GMRA, MEED Insight

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Phase 2
Dong Ah started work on the second phase of the project in 1986, although it was not until 1990 that it was ofcially awarded the $6.1bn construction contract. During this phase, which cost $7.4bn in total, 2,115km of pipeline was installed to carry 2.5 million cm/d of water from the east, west and northeast Jabal Hassouna wellelds to Tarhouna on the Jifarah Plain and then on to Tripoli. In addition, associated pumping stations and regulating
MEED Insight

Dong Ah started work on the second phase of the Great Man-made River project in 1986

tanks were built, along with 2,155km of road. Tripoli decided to review the project in 1991, when some 25 per cent of the scheme had already been completed, following issues related to collapsing wells on phase one. With coastal aquifers becoming depleted faster than expected and urban water demand increasing, however, Tripoli decided to expand Dong Ahs phase 2 contract scope, adding a 380km

line to link the Hassouna eld with Tarhouna and Tripoli at an estimated extra cost of $760m. The initial scope of the second-phase project had only covered the construction of a central 1,715km pipeline linking the welleld with Tripoli. The eastern line, which included a station at Assdada, allowed the system to be integrated into phase one via a second pipeline linking it with facilities at Sirte. The central pipewww.meedinsight.com

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line has a capacity of 880,000 cm/d, while the eastern branch can carry 1.2 million cm/d. In 1996, the South Korean rm was awarded an additional $350m contract to drill about 260 new wells at Hassouna to boost production at the eld. This extension came to be known as Hassouna West. In the same year, Dong Ah was informed that it would be awarded the $6bn contract to build the third phase of the project, which then covered the JaghboubTobruk and Ghadames-Azzawiya-Zuara systems, along with the Sirte-Tripoli link. However, in 1997, Tripoli decided to competitively tender the phase and split the work up into seven individual packages. In December of that year, Frances Dumez submitted the lowest price for the rst of these contracts, covering the SirteTripoli link and associated pumping stations, with a price of about $1bn. However, a drop in oil prices and increasing political instability in the country saw the project put on hold and no further deals were tendered. More worrying for Dong Ah was the onset of the 1997 Asian crisis. Unable to cope with debts of about $3bn, it slowed the pace of work on the second phase of GMR and in August 2000, applied for an 18-month extension to the phase 2 works. This led to disputes between Tripoli and the South Korean contractor, which was
MEED Insight

In 1997, Libya decided to split phase two of the Great Man-made River project
eventually liquidated by the South Korean government in 2001. To ensure the second phase of the project was completed, an agreement was reached between Seoul and Tripoli whereby Dong Ahs Libyan operations were taken over by its former partner on the project, South Koreas Korea Express. The Libyan operation set up a consortium with its former subcontractor Al-Nahr, taking a 50 per cent stake in a new venture. This was later reduced to 25 per cent and today, Al-Nahr is wholly owned by the GMRA. Several other international contractors worked on phase 2. These included Frances Vinci Construction, which won a $410m contract to build pumping stations at Al-Gardabiya, Wadi Wishkah and Assdada in 1999.

The Great Man-made River phase 2 network

TUNISIA

Tripoli

Benghazi Sirte Ajdabiya Tobruk

EGYPT

Northeast Jabal Hassouna welleld

LIBYA
East Jabal Hassouna welleld

ALGERIA

NIGER
Phase II Reservoir Tripoli-Sirte pipeline

CHAD SUDAN

Sources: GMRA, MEED Insight

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Phase 3
In 2001, a consortium of Japans Nippon Koei and the UKs Halcrow was awarded the $15.5m contract to design the third phase of the project, with a reduced scope. This covered the construction of pumping stations at the Kufra welleld, a 380km pipeline linking the eld with the Sarir/Tazerbo network, along with a 140,000-cubic-metre regulating tank, ow control stations and roads. The contract ran until 2009 and required new studies of the eld to be carried out. In 2005, Turkeys Tekfen was awarded the $500m contract to build the pipeline linking Kufra with Sarir, while in October 2010, Canadas SNC Lavalin won a $450m contract to design and build the Kufra welleld system by 2015.

The Great Man-made River phase 3 network

TUNISIA

Tripoli

Benghazi Sirte Ajdabiya Tobruk

Brega PCCP plant Jaghboub

EGYPT

GMR 1

LIBYA
Sarir welleld

Sarir PCCP plant

Tazerbo

ALGERIA
GMR 3 Kufra

NIGER
Phase III Phase I Reservoir Pipe production plant

CHAD SUDAN

PCCP=Pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe; GMR=Great Man-made River. Sources: GMRA, MEED

MEED Insight

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Phase 4
In 2004, Al-Nahr was awarded a $960m contract for the fourth phase of the project, covering drilling, construction of production facilities and installation of pipeline systems for the GhadamesAzzawiya-Zuara and Jaghboub-Tobruk systems at a cost of $960m. The following year, the company awarded a design and project management subcontract to Brown & Root. The Ghadames-Zuara-Azzawiya section was due to be completed by the end of 2011 although this was delayed by the civil war.

The Great Man-made River phase 4 network

Azzawiya Zuara

TUNISIA

Tripoli

Benghazi Sirte Ajdabiya Tobruk

EGYPT
Ghadames

Jaghboub

LIBYA

ALGERIA

NIGER CHAD SUDAN

Phase IV Eastern Section Phase IV Western Section

Sources: GMRA, MEED

MEED Insight

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Since 1983, the GMRA has awarded more than $15bn worth of contracts, with the majority going to Dong Ah. Its sister agency, the GMR Water Utilisation Authority (GMRWUA), also became a signicant client, placing over $2bn worth of contracts for reservoirs, water distribution networks and infrastructure for new tracts of agricultural land. Agriculture was always earmarked as the main beneciary of the GMR project. From its inception, Tripoli set a target for at least 80 per cent of GMR water to be used for agricultural production, by irrigating up to 160,000 hectares of land. However, because of a rapid decline in water production from Libyas coastal aquifer system, as well as the slow pace of development of the countrys desalination network, the target was lowered to 66-70 per cent prior to the civil war. GMR infrastructure sustained damage during the civil war, most notably the Brega PCCP plant, which was hit by Nato airstrikes in July 2011. At the time, Nato said that the plant had been targeted as it was under the control of Gadda loyalists and was home to multiple rocket launchers. In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, it was unclear how much priority the new government in Tripoli would attach to completing existing contracts on the GMR, or to awarding outstanding work. The GMR always was a highly political project for Gadda, who described it as
MEED Insight

The GMR project is unlikely to be abandoned, given its growing contribution to water supply
the eighth wonder of the world. It is unlikely to be abandoned completely, given the vast sums already invested in it and its growing contribution to water supply. Moreover, if future investment is not forthcoming, then an alternative water production strategy will need to be developed and quickly, or Libya will face growing water shortages.

Major construction contracts awarded on the Great Man-made River project

Description Phase 1
Sarir-Sirte/TazerboBenghazi system Reservoirs Tazerbo/Sarir wellelds

Contract type
Main construction contract Construction subcontract Drilling Main construction contract Main construction contract Drilling Main construction contract Main construction contract Main construction contract Main construction contract Revamp and operation Design, construction, operation of GhadamesZuara-Azzawiya system; Jaghboub-Tobruk system

Value ($m)
3,800 na na 6,100 760 360 410 na 450 500 1,100 960

Contractor
Dong Ah Al-Nahr Construction Braspetro Dong Ah Dong Ah Dong Ah Vinci Al-Nahr/Vinci SNC Lavalin Tekfen SNC Lavalin Al-Nahr Construction

Phase 2

Hassouna-Tripoli-Tarhouna/ Assdada system Hassouna-Tarhouna system Hassouna welleld

Phase 3

Al-Gardabiya/Assdada pumping stations Al-Gardabiya-Assdada pipeline Kufra welleld system Kufra-Tazerbo/Sarir pipeline system Sarir pipe production plant

Phase 4

Ghadames/Zuara/Azzawiya system

na=Not available. Source: MEED Insight

Planned water usage for the rst three phases of the GMR project (cm/d)
Municipal Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
410,170 1316090 253,000

Agricultural
1,506,030 1,175,660 1,427,000

Industrial
83,800 8,250 0

Total
2,000,000 2,500,000 1,680,000

GMR=Great Man-made River; cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: GMRA www.meedinsight.com

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Wastewater
E
ven before the civil war broke out, Libyas wastewater sector was in desperate need of attention, investment and additional capacity. Its aging infrastructure was struggling to meet the growing demands of an expanding population. The result was that increasing amounts of sewage were being dumped either at sea or in the desert. Six months of hostilities, during which electricity was frequently cut to sewage treatment plants, only served to exacerbate the problem. For many years, the wastewater sector was a secondary priority for the Gadda regime, coming well down the political agenda and well below the Great Manmade River (GMR) project. As of 2010, there were about 40 large-scale plants with total design capacity of just under 500,000 cubic metres a day (cm/d). But actual capacity was considerably less at about 240,000 cm/d, with only a handful of plants operating near to their potential.
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Wastewater treatment plants

Plant Ajdabiya Benghazi A Benghazi B Al-Marj A Al-Marj B Al-Beida Tobruk A Tobruk B Derna Derna Sirte Abu Hadi Marsa al-Brega Zuara Sabrata Sorman Azzawiya Zenzour Commissioning year
1988 1965 1977 1964 1972 1973 1963 1982 1965 1982 1995 1981 1988 1980 1976 1991 1976 1977

Wastewater treatment plants (continued)

Design capacity (cm/d)
15,600 27,300 54,000 1,800 1,800 9,000 1,350 33,000 4,550 8,300 26,400 1,000 3,500 41,550 6,000 20,800 6,800 6,000

Treatment type
Activated sludge Trickling lters Trickling lters Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Trickling lters Activated sludge Trickling lters Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge

Plant Tripoli A Tripoli B Tripoli C Tajoura Tarhouna Gharyan Yafran Meslata Khoms Zliten Misurata A Misurata B East Garyat West Garyat Topga Shourif Sebha A Sebha B

Commissioning year
1966 1977 1981 1984 1985 1975 1980 1980 1990 1976 1967 1982 1978 1978 1978 1978 1964 1980

Design capacity (cm/d)

27,000 110,000 110,000 1,500 3,200 3,000 1,725 3,400 8,000 6,000 1,350 24,000 500 150 300 500 1,360 47,000

Treatment type
Trickling lters Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Trickling lters Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Activated sludge Trickling lters Activated sludge

cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Sources: Government of Libya, Wheida Edawi, Wastewater Treatment & its Applications as a Water Supply in Libya

The main problem facing the sector has been the age of existing treatment capacity. Virtually all of the capacity was built between 1965 and 1995, meaning that much of it has now exceeded its sell-by date. The sector has also suffered from a lack of management, engineering and planning expertise, with some plants never having been used at all as a result of
MEED Insight

Much of the states wastewater capacity has now exceeded its sellby date

planned waste collection and distribution pipeline networks never having been built. A further feature of the wastewater sector is the uneven spread of treatment capacity across Libya. In rural areas, sewage treatment plants are practically nonexistent, with the overwhelming majority concentrated along the Mediterranean. Even in

urban centres, such as Benghazi and Tripoli, there has been a lack of capacity and network.

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The lack of working treatment capacity has meant that a signicant amount of raw sewage is dumped in rural areas or piped directly into the Mediterranean, with up to 700,000 cm/d of untreated efuent and wastewater being disposed of at sea. Such widespread dumping has had a serious environmental impact. In rural areas, aquifers and surface water supplies have been heavily polluted, with saline content at up to 5,000 parts per million. Polluted seawater is also an issue for the local desalination industry, which has had to contend with serious fouling. Privately, government ofcials have warned against bathing in the sea near populated areas due to the risk of water-bound diseases. Lack of investment in new capacity has made things worse. In the two years up to 2010, the sector saw relatively little project activity, despite the need to build new capacity to serve the growing population. The General Water & Wastewater Company (GWWC), which is also known as the General Company for Water & Sanitation (GCWS), awarded only one major contract, which covered a E110m ($150m) water treatment plant at Tripoli. This was despite its announcement, in 2008, that it would tender about 140 projects between 2009 and 2015 under a $5bn upgrade programme. In August 2010, GWWC held a forum with prospective contractors to discuss the projects, in a sign that the programme might be about to proceed. However, as of
MEED Insight

Major wastewater plants

Zuara 41,500 cm/d

TUNISIA

Zuara Sorman

Tripoli
Misurata Benghazi Tobruk

Misurata 24,000 cm/d

Sirte

Benghazi 54,000 cm/d

Tobruk 33,000 cm/d

A signicant amount of untreated sewage is dumped in rural areas or into the sea
late 2010, it had still not awarded the main consultancy contracts or any of the construction deals. Other government agencies had similar problems in turning their plans into actual projects. In 2005, the National Infrastructure Development Plan (NIDP), drawn up by the Housing & Infrastructure Board (HIB), was launched to upgrade infrastructure nationwide. The UKs Biwater was one of the rst beneciaries. In 2005, it won three contracts worth an estimated $70m to build 14 small-scale wastewater treatment plants in the Jabal Akhdar region. It followed this up in 2007, with the e110m contract to build a new wastewater treatment plant in Tripoli, along with associated pumping stations and 14 kilometres of pipelines.

Tripoli B 110,000 cm/d Tripoli C 110,000 cm/d

Sirte 26,400 cm/d

Sebha

LIBYA

Sebha 47,000 cm/d

NIGER CHAD SUDAN

cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: Government of Libya

Contractors had expected a steady ow of contracts to follow under the NIDP plan, but in late 2007, the plan was halted as
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part of a government restructuring. However, HIB did proceed with some of the planned projects. In 2009, Biwater had been expected to win two larger contracts to manage the water infrastructure in both Tripoli and Benghazi, under a deal that would also have involved providing engineering and construction services to the GWWC. However, the contracts were not awarded, due mainly to bureaucracy and internal wrangling. The biggest wastewater client in recent years has been HIB, which awarded some $5bn worth of housing and infrastructure contracts up to late 2010. In addition to the infrastructure contracts, most of which contained a wastewater element, HIB made a handful of dedicated sewage treatment plant awards to the likes of Austrias Wabag, South Koreas Kolon Engineering & Construction and Singapores Salcon Engineering, a subsidiary of Singapores Boustead. The HIB projects also faced difculties. In some cases, deals took up to 18 months to be awarded. Even then, contractors reported that they were unable to mobilise on certain projects as the sites were not handed over to them. This affected Kolon Engineering & Construction on both the Ain-Zara and the Tripoli sewage projects, Indias Simplex Projects on the Al-Marj township scheme, and Indias Punj Lloyd on its contract to install sewerage and stormwater drainage at Souk
MEED Insight

Selected Housing & Infrastructure Board contract awards, 2007-10

Value ($m)
1,250

Contract Tripoli and Benghazi infrastructure network Tajoura infrastructure modernisation Al-Beida infrastructure Tripoli and Misurata infrastructure General infrastructure Benghazi infrastructure Infrastructure works at Zuara, Ragdaleen and Al-Jamail Souk al-Juma utilities New township in Al-Marj municipality Arada township infrastructure Ain-Zara sewage treatment plant Tarhouna township water supply and wastewater infrastructure upgrade Al-Guarchia sewage plant renovation, Benghazi Al-Azharat development infrastructure works Tripoli sewage treatment plant Zenzour pumping stations

Scope
Laying pipes for water supply, construction of sewage system and roads, lighting, aquifer development, associated facilities 200km of infrastructure, including sewage pipes for new wastewater system Public service networks over 2,200 hectares, such as telephone, gas, drinking water, wastewater and power lines Electricity, sewer, telephone and water networks 600km of sewage lines, 450km of water lines, 600,000 square metres of sidewalk lighting and 400km of roads Public service networks over 2,200 hectares including telephone, gas, drinking water, power and wastewater lines Roads, water lines, wastewater networks, electricity grids, telephone lines and associated works

Awarded
Q1 2008

Contractor
Tennessee Overseas Construction Company Strabag Sacyr Impregilo Nemzetkozi Vegyepszer Sacyr Punj Lloyd

Scheduled completion (original)

Q3 2010

Q1 2008 Q4 2009 Q3 2009 Q1 2010 Q4 2009 Q3 2009

640 545 490 413 400 392

Unknown Q1 2013 Q2 2011 Q1 2013 Q1 2013 Q4 2011

Water, sewage and stormwater drainage networks and electricity lines 1,164 single-storey, semi-detached houses with municipal water supply, sewage networks and utilities Construction and upgrade of general infrastructure 50,000-cm/d pumping station and sewage treatment plant Upgrade of water and wastewater service networks and construction of new water and wastewater service networks, pumping stations and additional water treatment plants Renovation of existing sewage treatment plant to 150,000 cm/d Roads, wastewater, water and telephone lines Construction of a 60,000-cm/d treatment plant Construction of 16 pumping stations and renovation of main sewer

Q1 2009 Q3 2007 Q3 2007 Q2 2009 Q2 2008

276 230 180 135 130

Punj Lloyd Simplex Projects Punj Lloyd Kolon Engineering & Construction Company (South Korea) Salcon Engineering

Q2 2012 Q1 2010 Q1 2010 Q3 2012 Q2 2010

Q1 2008 Q2 2009 Q4 2008 Q1 2008

122 93 86 41

Wabag Lotte Engineering & Construction (South Korea) Kolon Engineering & Construction Wabag

Q3 2010 Q1 2013 Q1 2011 Q1 2010

cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Sources: MEED Insight, MEED Projects www.meedinsight.com

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al-Juma, near Tripoli. Others fared even worse. Salcon was forced to cancel one of its contracts in 2009, involving the upgrade of the Tarhouna water supply and wastewater system, following a failed attempt at price renegotiations made by its parent company on a separate construction project. Over the years, payment has proved to be a real issue for contractors operating in the local wastewater sector. In September 2010, several rms reported that the central government had halted payments to local clients on a number of large-scale projects as part of a spending review of
MEED Insight

the past ve years. Indeed, one of the largest European players in the market warned that it would signicantly reduce its local presence unless the situation was resolved swiftly and projects were reactivated. Planning, or rather the lack of it, seriously handicapped the development of the wastewater sector. To address the issue, the Swedish ofce of the UKs WSP was contracted to draw up a masterplan for the countrys water supply and sewage systems. Working alongside the local National Consulting Bureau, the project involved a complete review of existing water and wastewater supplies and infra-

Payment has proved to be a real issue for contractors working in the local wastewater sector

structure, along with recommendations for meeting water and wastewater demand up to 2025. It was nally completed in early 2010, although no details on the ndings were released. Following the end of hostilities in October 2011, the initial indications were that there had been only limited damage to wastewater infrastructure. However, this was of little consolation to a sector that was already in a poor state of repair before the civil war and that desperately needed an integrated and comprehensive approach to its rehabilitation.

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Industry
C
ompared to its neighbours, Libyas non-oil industrial base is limited and focused on cement and metals. This in part reects the small size of the Libyan market, but also highlights the lack of foreign investment in the non-oil economy and the painfully slow decision-making process during the Gadda era.

Cement
Prior to February 2011, Libyas cement sector was preparing for a huge expansion, with some 18 million tonnes a year (t/y) of new capacity planned. The new plants were to be built by European, Middle East, African and local investors and formed part of the strategy by the General Peoples Committee for Industry, Economy & Commerce and the National Mining Corporation to signicantly expand sector activity. However, none of the new plants had entered construction before the outbreak of civil war, which also forced all existing cement factories to halt production.
MEED Insight

Prior to February 2011, Libyas cement sector was preparing for a huge expansion [of capacity]
Years of sanctions and poor maintenance have meant that installed cement capacity, estimated at 10.4 million t/y, has operated well below design. Actual production was understood to be no more than 4-5 million t/y in 2010, due to the age of many plants. For example, the local Arab Cement Company, which owns four plants in the country, says that its Al-Marqab factory, which began production in 1969, produced in 2010 about 240,000 t/y, some 100,000 t/y below design

Existing cement plants

Owner JLCC JLCC JLCC Arab Cement Company Arab Cement Company Arab Cement Company Arab Cement Company Arab Union Contracting Company Arab Union Contracting Company Al-Nisr Cement Company Total design capacity Plant
Benghazi Al-Hawri El-Fatayah Zliten Al-Marqab (Khoms) Souk al-Khamis Libda Burj 1 Burj 2 Tripoli

Design capacity (t/y)

800,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 330,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,400,000 1,400,000 1,400,000 10,330,000

Year commissioned
1972 1978 1984 1984 1969 1977 1981 2005 2009 na

na=Not available; JLCC=Joint Libyan Cement Company. Sources: Arab Cement Union, MEED Insight

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Historically, the sector has been dominated by two state-run organisations, Libyan Cement Company in the east and Arab Cement Company in the west. The two commissioned seven plants in the 1970s and 1980s, with a signicant amount of their capacity directed to meet the requirements of the Great Man-made River (GMR) project. However, since 2000, two new players have entered the market. The rst was state-owned Arab Union Contracting Company (AUCC), a leading local contractor, which decided to capitalise on the cement shortage in the country. It commissioned its rst cement plant, the 1.4 million t/y Burj line, in 2005 and added a second line of the same capacity in 2009. AUCC was joined by Tripolibased Al-Nisr Cement Company, which opened a 1.3 million t/y plant. Cement has been one of the few manufacturing sectors to have experienced some privatisation. In 2007, Austrian materials manufacturer Asamer, in joint venture with the Economic & Social Development Fund (ESDF), acquired 90 per cent of the shares in Libyan Cement Company, with the remaining 10 per cent being granted to the employees. Following the acquisition, the companys name was changed to the Joint Libyan Cement Company (JLCC). The main goal of the privatisation was to modernise three plants in Benghazi,
MEED Insight

The sector has been dominated by Libyan Cement Company and Arab Cement Company
Al-Hawri and El-Fatayah and increase their output. Prior to the civil unrest, JLCC had installed bag lter systems at all three plants, which prevented serious dust pollution that had affected the surrounding areas for years. It had also planned, but not completed, to: implement and start production of limestone blended cement install and dispatch cement in large bags open cement retail shops, to be known as Sales Express, in order to supply bagged cement directly to end users install and open a silo terminal for bulk cement in eastern Libya gain the Conformite Europeene mark for exporting commence the Al-Hawri cement plant line upgrade

Cement producers by design capacity (Million t/y)

Al-Nisr Cement Company 3.3 2.8 2.8 1.4

%
Arab Union Contracting Company JLCC

Arab Cement Company

t/y=Tonnes a year; JLCC=Joint Libyan Cement Company. Source: MEED Insight

Local cement producers

Company Arab Cement Company Type
State-owned, formerly known as Al-Ahlia Cement Company Joint venture of ESDF and Asamer State-owned contractor na

Plants
Benghazi, Al-Hawri, El-Fatayah Zliten, Al-Marqab, Souk al-Khamis, Libda Burj lines 1 and 2 Tripoli

Capacity (million t/y)

3.3

JLCC Arab Union Contracting Company Al-Nisr Cement Company

2.8 2.8 1.4

t/y=Tonnes a year; na=Not available; ESDF=Economic & Social Development Fund; JLCC=Joint Libyan Cement Company. Source: MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com

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Following the outbreak of the civil war, in February 2011, Asamer evacuated its expatriate staff and all of JLCCs plants were shut down to prevent any damage being caused through the disruption of power supplies. Local staff subsequently reported major damage and conrmed that gas supplies had been interrupted during the conict. However, production was expected to resume by the end of 2011, provided power supplies could be restored. Asamer estimated local cement demand at 3.5-4 million tonnes in 2010 and was forecasting a similar level in 2011, before hostilities began. This represented a fall from the 2007 peak of about 6 million tonnes, when the re-opening of the country after years of sanctions led to a surge in cement demand. As highlighted by Asamer, the local cement industry has attracted growing interest in recent years, with investors looking to take advantage of low energy and production costs to meet local and overseas demand. As of late 2010, licences had been granted for up to 18 million t/y of new capacity. The largest project planned was a 4 million-t/y plant at Tobruk. Costing an estimated $750m, the plant was under development by Italian cement giant Italcementi in conjunction with ESDF. Feasibility studies were concluded in
MEED Insight

Licences granted for new cement capacity

Plant Tobruk Wadi Shati Nalout and Al-Jufra Ajdabiya Misurata Wadi Zaza Al-Marj (Zliten) Misurata Karsah Main investor
Italcementi Cement African Company Alhadena National Company for the Building Materials Industry Cemena Libya Cemena Libya Aska al-Ramada Construction Emaar Libya Africa Investment Portfolio Libya Africa Investment Portfolio

Capacity (million t/y)

4 1 2 2 2 1.5 1.5 2 2

Over the long term, demand is set to increase, given the infrastructure needs of the country
2010 and construction was scheduled to start in 2013. Licences had also been granted to the ESDF-owned Alhadena National Company for the Building Materials Industry to construct plants at Nalout and Al-Jufra, to local contractor Aska al-Ramada Construction for a cement line at Wadi Zaza and to Dubaibased real-estate developer Emaar for a new cement facility at Zliten. However, all the projects were put on hold at the start of 2011 and it remains unclear how quickly they will be reactivated. This is especially the case with the host of plants planned by Libyan Investment Authority subsidiary ESDF, which was one of the most politicised organisations under the Gadda regime. Over the long term, demand is set to increase given the infrastructure needs of the country. International expertise will also be vital in rehabilitating the states older cement plants.

t/y=Tonnes a year. Sources: USGS, MEED Projects

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Steel and aluminium

Libyas metals industry is concentrated in the Mediterranean port city of Misurata, The city plays host to one of North Africas largest integrated steel complexes. Owned by the national Libyan Iron & Steel Company (Lisco), the Misurata steel plant was supposed to symbolise Libyas economic progress, but it became a key battleground in the recent civil war. Although its foundation stone was laid in 1979, it was not until 1990 that molten steel was rst produced at Misurata. A second phase expansion was completed in 1997. Lisco has molten steel capacity of 1.34 million t/y and produces a wide range of products through its mills and melt shops. Nearly all of its rebar production is consumed locally, while most of its at products are exported to southern Europe. The company has also exported some of its hot briquetted iron (HBI) production in recent years. Lisco imports all of its iron pellets from abroad, mainly from Sweden and Brazil. The company benets from low-cost gas feedstock, which has helped offset the rising prices of raw material imports. The gas is supplied to the steel complexs captive power plant, which has capacity of 510MW. Two international companies have played key roles in the construction and develop MEED Insight

ment of the Misurata complex. Indias MN Dastur & Company has undertaken numerous engineering assignments at the site and had to evacuate 66 members of its staff in March 2011, following the outbreak of hostilities. Liscos main contractor has been Austrias VAI, which is now part of the Siemens group. Liscos production rates have varied in recent years. Total production of direct reduced iron (DRI) was estimated at 1.6 million t/y in 2008, but this fell to 1.1 million t/y in 2009, which Lisco attributed to the drop in demand caused by the global nancial crisis. Figures collected by Arab Steel for the rst half of 2010 show that DRI output increased by 79 per cent to 753,000 tonnes, bringing production close to 2008 levels. Despite uctuating demand, a series of upgrades have been carried out by Lisco over the past decade. It commissioned an expansion of the strip pickling line in 2005, followed by new drawing, galvanising and colour coating lines in 2007. Under plans approved in August 2007, molten steel production was set to increase to 4.2 million t/y by 2015. The plan included a new 1.8 million t/y cold direct reduced iron (CDRI) facility at the existing direct reduction plant. Other facilities were to be expanded, with HBI production set to increase from 630,000 million t/y to 850,000 million t/y and melt shop capacity to more than dou-

Libyan Iron & Steel Company facilities

Facility Direct reduction plant Steel melt shop 1 Steel melt shop 2 Bar and rod mills (2) Light and medium section mill Hot strip mill Cold rolling mill Products
HBI DRI Billets and blooms Slabs Rebar Light and medium sections Hot rolled coils and sheets Cold rolled coils and sheets Galvanised coils Colour coating line

Volume (t/y)
650,000 1,100,000 630,000 611,000 800,000 120,000 580,400 140,000 80,000 40,000

HBI=Hot briquetted iron; DRI=Direct reduced iron; t/y=Tonnes a year. Source: Lisco

Nearly all of Libyan Iron & Steel Companys rebar production is consumed locally

ble, with the plant ultimately being able to produce 2.1 million t/y of rods and bars and a similar quantity of billets, blooms and slabs. In a major shift, Lisco turned to private investors to assist in funding the estimated $2bn upgrade programme. In the autumn of 2010, the rm hosted a private investment workshop to outline its plans, which was attended by both local and international rms. However, the expansion plans were placed on hold and the plant shut in February 2011, when Misurata became a major battle site in the civil war. Many of Liscos estimated 6,000-strong workforce were involved in the civil unrest, while the plant itself suffered some damage.
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Following the end of the war in October 2011, Lisco said that its biggest challenges in resuming production were securing staff and ensuring adequate electricity supplies. Ofcials also maintained that the search for private investors would restart once the political situation had stabilised. Given the high volumes of electricity required to produce steel, it will be some time before Lisco can again operate at full capacity, although it should be able to restart some of its rolling mill operations sooner. Until then, the country will rely on imports from Turkey, Italy, China and other markets. Existing steel and cement plants
Location Misurata Benghazi Al-Hawri El-Fatayah Zliten Al-Marqab Souk al-Khamis Libda Burj Tripoli Type of plant
Steel Cement Cement Cement Cement Cement Cement Cement Cement Cement

Aluminium
Tripoli has long had ambitions to develop an aluminium industry to take advantage of its low-cost gas feedstock and further develop its metal production base. However, despite a burst of activity in 2008, the country still has no smelting capacity. In January 2008, the UKs Klesch & Company signed an estimated $8bn joint venture agreement with the Libyan African Investment Portfolio for the construction of a 725,000 t/y smelter to be completed by 2011. This was followed nine months later by the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the ESDF and Existing steel and cement plants

Libyan Iron & Steel Company should be able to restart rolling mill operations soon
Russian aluminium giant Rusal for a 600,000 t/y smelter joint venture. While the Kletsch initiative was always considered speculative, the Rusal project was taken far more seriously, particularly after

the Libyan Investment Authority became an investor in the Russian conglomerate, following the oatation of 10.6 per cent of the rms shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in January 2010. A third aluminium project was also under discussion in 2008. Canadas Rio Tinto Alcan conrmed that it was in talks with the government to build a $2.5bn, 360,000 t/y smelter. However, like the two other projects, no contracts were signed prior to the civil war and Rio Tinto declined to comment in October 2011 about its future intentions in Libya.

Producer name
Lisco JLCC JLCC JLCC ACC ACC ACC ACC AUCC Al-Nisr

Design capacity
1.3 million t/y 800,000 t/y 1 million t/y 1 million t/y 1 million t/y 330,000 t/y 1 million t/y 1 million t/y 2.8 million t/y 1.4 million t/y Source: MEED Insight

Cement plant

TUNISIA

Tripoli
Souk al-Khamis

Al-Marqab Libda Zliten Misurata Burj

Steel plant

El-Fatayah Al-Hawri Benghazi

EGYPT

t/y=Tonnes a year; Lisco=Libyan Iron & Steel Company; JLCC=Joint Libyan Cement Company. Source: MEED Insight MEED Insight

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Housing and real estate

I
n January 2011, hundreds of protesters stormed buildings under construction in the cities of Beni Walid and Benghazi. The protests were fuelled by growing popular resentment at the lack of public housing, lengthening waiting lists and seemingly rampant corruption within the system. Despite promises and huge sums being pledged, the local housing sector has never kept up with demand in Libya. The provision of housing was declared a right for all by Muammar Gadda, shortly after he seized power in 1969 and was subsequently enshrined in the Green Book. However, translating words into action proved much more difcult, particularly when the oil price crashed in the 1980s. During the 1980s, some houses were built by the government under its Priority Housing Programme (PHP), but a large proportion of Libyans opted to build their own properties on land allocated to them by the
MEED Insight

Despite huge sums being pledged, the local housing sector has never kept up with demand
government using low-cost loans. This route became much more difcult to follow from the mid-1980s onwards, when loans dried up and building materials became much more expensive. Financial austerity forced the government to change its policy. No longer would the state provide housing for all, but it would assist private developers by encouraging banks to lend to individuals wishing to buy or build their own property. But again there were major problems. The Secretariat for
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Housing was scrapped, creating a void in both policy and planning. Shortages of bank nance, construction materials and contractors further exacerbated the housing shortage. By the early 1990s, the housing situation was becoming acute. In response, the General Peoples Committee for Housing & Utilities (GPCHU) was formed in 1993 and the General Housing Corporation (GHC) was set up to plan and deliver new housing. After being disbanded in the early 1980s, housing cooperatives were also re-established, which helped their members to secure land, nance and materials for housing projects. One of GPCHUs rst tasks was to look at housing requirements over the short, medium and long term and set targets and budgets for investment. The forecasts were based on estimated population growth of 3 per cent a year and a housing decit of 73,387 units in 2000. To meet demand, GPCHU concluded that Libya needed 465,988 new housing units in the period 2001-15. Data on how many of these units were actually constructed is difcult to obtain, but it is clear that the new housing stock and nancial allocations failed to satisfy demand. In 2005, the General Committee for Planning & Finance sharply increased the new housing requirement gure, stating that 420,000 new homes were needed by 2010. More recently, independent studies
MEED Insight

Before the war, an estimated $11bn worth of housing projects were under construction
have put the estimated shortfall at about 500,000 units by 2020. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Libya, there had been an increase in the volume of major housing contracts by the two main government agencies, the Housing & Infrastructure Board (HIB) and the Organisation for the Development of Administrative Centres (Odac). HIB was given the task of delivering 200,000 new homes, with supporting infrastructure, by 2020 and had appointed the US Aecom to oversee the programme in 2007. Before the war, an estimated $11bn worth of housing projects were under construction, involving more than 60,000 units. The largest by far was the 25,000-unit Benghazi new town project, which was being built by China State Construction Engineering Corporation at an estimated cost of $6bn. In addition, there was a signicant volume of housing-related infrastructure contracts under execution. Historically, Turkish contractors have car-

The 2001-15 housing plan

Long-term plan 2001-05 2006-10 2011-15 TOTAL Targeted number of new houses
214,200 117,190 134,598 465,988

Number of units to be built a year

42,840 23,438 26,920 31,066

Cost (LDm)
6,242 3,768 4,345 16,368

Cost ($m)
5,205 3,053 3,520 13,263

Sources: Meeting Housing Needs in Libya, 2007; Abdulsalam Ahmed Abdalla, Newcastle University UK, Report on Housing Programmes, GHC, 2000

Key elements of the Housing & Infrastructure Board programme

Large-scale housing projects Small-scale local housing projects Infrastructure projects to support housing Main elements of infrastructure projects
26, consisting of 115,000 units 85,000 units, mainly in southern communities 146 10 million square metres of roads, 1,200 kilometres of sewage pipes, 1,300km of water mains, 2,000km of stormwater drainage, 1,000km of electrical conduit, 1,000km of telecoms cabling, 714 pumping stations and 173 sewage treatment plants

Source: Aecom

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ried out the majority of housing projects in Libya with the likes of TML Construction, Mesa Mesken, STFA and Enka building thousands of units across the country. Their main competitors have traditionally been Korean rms. However, in recent years, Chinese, Malaysian and Indian contractors have entered the housing and related infrastructure market, with China State Construction, Indias Punj Lloyd and Simplex Infrastructure, and Malaysias Ranhill all winning major awards. The housing programme was put on hold in early 2011 and it is unclear when it will be restarted. Questions remain about whether some projects, including the new Benghazi project that was being carried out by the Chinese, will even be reactivated at least in their original form. Ofcially, the National Transitional Council (NTC) has told contractors and consultants that it plans to honour existing contracts and that housing is a priority. However, as of November 2011, rms were still waiting to hear what payments would be made available before they return to work and what compensation would be offered for the millions of dollars worth of equipment, vehicles and materials looted during the conict. Aecom was hard-hit by the civil war. It announced in mid-2011 that it had lost an estimated $10m from costs involved in leaving Libya at the start of the conict.
MEED Insight

Historically, Turkish contractors have carried out the majority of housing projects in Libya

Selected major housing contracts under construction, late 2010

Project Tripoli housing Value ($m)
800

Contractor
Saraya Construction

Scope
400 housing units in 19 towers 2,000 housing units 10,000 apartments 20,000 apartments 25,000 housing units 10,000 apartments 5,000 housing units 100 housing units 4,000 new housing units 2,000 new housing units 7,000 new housing units 2,000 new housing units

Client
Edkar Bank

Ghira housing Tajoura housing Benghazi housing New Benghazi housing Tripoli housing Tobruk housing Sirte city housing Sebha housing Souk al-Ahad housing Suluk and Al-Mijineen housing Qubah City

415 413 774 6,000 413 996 50 300 256 476 420

Simplex Infrastructures Amona Ranhill Consortium Amona Ranhill Consortium China State Construction Engineering Corporation Amona Ranhill Consortium Sungwon NACO Construction & Trading Company CKG Engineering STFA SMI Hyundai AMCO

HIB HIB HIB HIB HIB Lidco Odac Odac Odac Odac Odac

HIB=Housing & Infrastructure Board; Lidco=Libyan Investment & Development Company; Odac=Organisation for the Development of Administrative Centres. Source: MEED Insight

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Real estate and tourism

Commercial real estate is a relatively new proposition for Libya. A range of tourismrelated schemes were planned in the period 2006-08, many of them by Gulf developers, but none had made much progress before being reined in, rstly by the 2009 economic downturn and Gulf property slump and then by the civil war. Even schemes funded by local investors had been slow to progress. Tripoli Greens, a $4bn governmental complex with the involvement of numerous international architects, was halted in 2008/09 with little explanation. Similarly, the $3bn Green Mountain tourism and development had made little progress, despite being personally launched in September 2007 by Gaddas son Saif al-Islam and employing the UKs Fosters & Partners as masterplanners. Some smaller real-estate projects seemed to have fared much better than the vast developments planned by the likes of Dubai-based Emaar, Bahrains Gulf Finance House and Qatars Barwa Real Estate. For example, Athens-based Consolidated Contractors International Company (CCC) had been contracted to build two tower blocks on the Tripoli shoreline near the Corinthia Hotel by the Economic & Social Development Fund (ESDF). Both had been progressing well prior to the war.
MEED Insight

Selected major real-estate and tourism projects

Project Energy City The Waterfront Barwa mixed-use development Sports and service complex Berjaya Golf Complex Corinthia Hotel, Benghazi Zuara Economic City Tripoli Towers Al-Waha Tripoli Greens Value ($m)
5,000 250 2,000 204 227 136 15,000 800 750 4,135

Pre-war status
Planned Planned Planned Planned Under construction by Daewoo Planned Planned Under construction by CCC Planned On hold

Scope
Business district for energy industry Luxury residential development with ve-star hotel 3,000-square-metre mixed-use development Hotel and leisure complex Golf course, villas and Mariott hotel Five-star hotel in Benghazi Tourism development over 40 kilometres of coastline Two towers, one 48-storey, one 30-storey 11 residential towers and one commercial tower New government congress complex

Client
Gulf Finance House with ESDF Al-Libya al-Qataria Barwa Barwa/Lidco Berjaya Oyia Development with ESDF International Hotel Investments with Libya Arab Foreign Investment Company (Laco) Emaar ESDF Lidco/Al-Maabar Real Estate Company Odac

ESDF=Economic & Social Development Fund; Lidco=Libyan Investment & Development Company; CCC=Consolidated Contractors Company; Odac=Organisation for the Development of Administrative Centres. Source: MEED Projects

Despite the lack of progress and the civil war, real estate has considerable potential in view of Libyas largely undeveloped Mediterranean coastline and worldclass tourism sites. Developing tourism infrastructure at its ancient Greek and Roman sites, most notably Leptis Magna and Sabrata, would assist in economic diversication and create much-needed jobs. However, the government estimated in 2010 that there were only 14,000 hotel rooms in Libya. As part of a plan to boost tourism revenues from $7.9bn in 2009 to $22bn by 2019, Tripoli was plan-

The government estimated in 2010 that there were only 14,000 hotel rooms in Libya

ning to raise the number of hotel rooms to 50,000. It is a similar situation in the commercial sector. Prior to the war, demand was rising from an increasing number of joint venture companies servicing the oil and gas, construction and nancial sectors. Topquality ofce space was only available in three buildings in Tripoli: Five Towers, Al-Fateh Tower and the Corinthia Business Centre, which was built alongside the Corinthia Hotel. All three, however, were operating at 100 per cent occupancy.
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Tourist sites
Farwa Sabrata Nalout

TUNISIA

Zuara

Tripoli
Leptis Magna Cyrene Apollonia

Ghadames

EGYPT

Adiri

Garama The Awbari lakes Tadrart Acacus

LIBYA

Waw an-Namous

NIGER CHAD
Sources: Lonely Planet, www.tomehu.com

SUDAN
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Social infrastructure
Education
During Muammar Gaddas rule, all Libyans were eligible for free education, which was provided by the state. Between the ages of six and 15, it was compulsory for children to attend school, where the curriculum was overwhelmingly focused on Gaddas political philosophy, Arabic and Islamic studies. In the latter years, it also included compulsory military training and during the 1980s, the teaching of Russian instead of English. An educational reform programme, launched in 2005, was accompanied by a 19-year ban on the teaching of English being lifted and signicant new investment going into higher education. In 2006, the government drew up a ve-year plan to upgrade and expand education facilities. Its centrepiece was the construction of about 30 new university campuses, in a programme overseen by the Organisation for the Development of
MEED Insight

Administrative Centres (Odac). The university programme was one of the largest in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabias in terms of value. Compared with many other infrastructure projects in Libya, the university building programme progressed relatively smoothly and rapidly. In July 2009, US consultant Hill International was awarded the project management contract for what became known as the 25 university programme, as well as for the $2.5bn Al-Fateh University Mena university investment
Country Saudi Arabia Libya Kuwait Qatar UAE Investment value ($bn)
19.4 7.5 5.87 7.04 1.95

Mena=Middle East and North Africa. Source: MEED Projects www.meedinsight.com

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expansion, which was already under way. At least four more located at Sirte, Azzawiya, Ghadames and Ras Lanuf were under way, but fell outside of Hills responsibilities. The Al-Fateh University project was by far the largest. It involved the expansion and redevelopment of the existing university in Tripoli, through the construction of about 65 new buildings. As of early 2011, it was about 60 per cent complete, with numerous contractors, including Turkish rms Guris and Mesa Mesken, working on the development. On the 25 university programme, all buildings were either under design or in the construction phase as of early 2011. For the designs, the client split the programme into four packages. The Argus Alliance, made up of UK rms Arup, Davis Langdon and Keppie Design, had the contract to design 12 universities. Contractors had been appointed for six of these: Mesa Mesken for Omar al-Mukhtar University at Derna, the local/Italian joint venture of Libyan Investment & Development Company (Lidco) and Impregilo for Misurata Universitys Zliten and Tarhouna campuses, China Building Technique Group for Omar al-Mukhtar University at Tobruk, a contractor identied as Way-2B for the Misurata Universitys campus at Khoms, and Turkeys Arsel for Garyounis University campus at Al-Marj.
MEED Insight

Ten university campuses in the west of the country have been designed by the UKs BDP
A further 10 campuses in the west of the country have been designed by the UKs BDP. All had main contractors on board. These included Chinas Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation, Kuwaits Gulf Group Construction Company, Turkeys Akdeniz, Spains Bruesa Construccion, South Koreas Cosmo and Turkeys BTK. Spains Idom designed the Misurata University campus at the coastal city for which construction was under way by the Lidco/Impregilo partnership. The fourth design package was being carried out by the UKs RMJM and covered the Zliten campus of Al-Asmariya University and the Misurata University campus at Beni Walid. Following the end of the civil war in October 2011, Hill was preparing to conduct a damage assessment of each site and draw up an inventory for materials and equipment lost. Odac had also indicated its desire to restart the programme and

Selected projects on Odacs university and campus building programme

Location Ajdabiya Awbari Beni Walid Birak Derna Garyounis Gharyan Houn Al-Tahadi Misurata Murzuq Nalout Nasser Sebha Sabrata Sorman Tarhouna Tobruk Zintan Zliten Zliten Zuara Al-Beida Jifarah Khoms Al-Marj University
Garyounis Sebha Misurata Sebha Omar al-Mukhtar Garyounis Al-Jabal al-Gharbi Sirte Sirte Misurata Sebha Al-Jabal al-Gharbi Nasser Sebha Al-Jabal al-Gharbi Al-Jabal al-Gharbi Misurata Omar al-Mukhtar Al-Jabal al-Gharbi Al-Asmariya Misurata Al-Jabal al-Gharbi Omar al-Mukhtar Al-Fateh Misurata Garyounis

Designer
Argus BDP RMJM BDP Argus Argus BDP Argus Argus Idom BDP BDP Argus BDP BDP BDP Argus Argus BDP RMJM Argus BDP Argus Argus Argus Argus

Contractor
tba Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation tba Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation Mesa Mesken tba Akdeniz Unknown Dogus Impregilo/Lidco Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation Cosmo tba Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation Gulf Group Construction Company Bruesa Construccion Impregilo/Lidco China Building Technique Group BTK tba Impregilo/Lidco Bruesa Construccion tba Maltauro Way-2B Benaa & Tasheed/Arsel JV

Odac=Organisation for the Development of Administrative Buildings; tba=To be announced; Lidco=Libyan Investment & Development Company; JV=Joint venture. Source: MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com

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make payments as soon as it had the authority to do so. The damage to schools in some areas was extensive, since many were used by military forces as bases, which in turn became targets of the bombing campaign. Those hardest hit were located in villages between Ajdabiya and Benghazi, in Zliten and Sebha, and in parts of Tripoli. A clearer idea of the damage to schools is expected once Unicef and Paris-based charity ACTED complete an assessment. Education is a priority for the National Transitional Council (NTC). Its focus will not just be on rebuilding damaged infrastructure and relaunching pre-conict projects. It will also look to overhaul the curricula and stafng, which became highly politicised during the Gadda era. It was no coincidence that one of the NTCs rst moves on the education front was to appoint Faisal Kreshki as the new dean at Al-Fateh University, which had been renamed the University of Tripoli.

The hardest hit schools were located in Zliten and Sebha, and in parts of Tripoli
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Healthcare
Libyas health sector has been the area most severely affected by the civil war. From the destruction of primary health centres to overwhelmed hospitals and an exodus of medical professionals, the already strained system was close to breaking point when the end of hostilities was announced in October 2011. The local healthcare system is almost entirely state-dominated, with just a few small private clinics. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the country had some 23,000 hospital beds, 96 hospitals and 1,424 primary health centres prior to the conict and employed more than 113,000 healthcare professionals. The public healthcare system is four-tiered. It starts with the primary health centres, which typically serve a catchment area of 5,000-10,000 people. Under the structure, patients are then either referred to the 45 specialist clinics spread across the country or district hospitals. If necessary, they are transferred to advanced or teaching hospitals for further treatment. Most residents tend to go directly to the hospitals, thus bypassing the primary health clinics. Those that can afford to generally seek treatment overseas, so as to avoid the staff shortages, overcrowding and inefciency that have become a fea MEED Insight

ture of the public healthcare system. Residents in need of specialist care drive mainly to Tunis, or Cairo, or y to Malta, Germany or the UK. The healthcare system has suffered from a lack of investment and 15 years of international sanctions. A major issue has also been the fact that the system has been run at the regional or Shabiat level without sufcient clear policy guidance from the central government. Frequently, ministries have appeared to give out conicting Hospitals and health centres
Type of facility Specialised hospitals Central hospitals General hospitals Rural hospitals Total number of public hospitals Total beds in public hospitals Total beds in welfare clinics Total beds in private clinics Total beds in all hospitals Beds per 10,000 population Primary healthcare facilities Polyclinics Quarantine units Number
25 18 21 32 96 20,289 1,060 1,433 22,782 37 1,424 37 17

Source: WHO Country Co-operation Strategy Libya, 2010-15 www.meedinsight.com

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policy advice. For example, in the 2009 budget, the Finance Ministry said it wanted to build a series of major public hospitals, while the Health Ministry said that the policy focus should be on primary healthcare, rather than large physical infrastructure. To stem medical tourism and improve local healthcare expertise, former prime minister Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi announced a $500m investment programme in 2006, aimed at attracting international consultants and universities to Libya. This led to a raft of partnership agreements being signed. In May 2008, the Libyan Secretary of State for Education & Scientic Research and the UK government signed a memorandum of understanding on medical training. This provided for local medical staff to be given a years training in the UKs National Health system, in areas including endoscopy, while the UKs Royal Colleges trained Libyan surgeons in specialist areas, such as obstetrics. In December 2009, the UKs Liverpool John Moores University secured a contract with Tripolis Al-Fateh Medical University to run degree programmes in nursing, although it was yet to begin as of early 2011. Training was a particular area of focus for the government. In 2009, the General Peoples Committee for Health & Environment was established to bring the fragmented system together. One of its rst initiatives
MEED Insight

Health investment

($m)

3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

3,000

2,500

2,000

management outsourcing and the establishment of non-government facilities. In January 2008, the UKs Healthshare International was awarded an LD250m ($197m) contract to manage and modernise the Al-Khadra hospital in Tripoli. Along with providing on-site training, Healthshare was to renovate infrastructure, install a new information technology system, and modernise the management training system. International expertise was also tapped for the Al-Marg hospital in the northeast of the country. The UKs International Hospitals Group (IHG) was contracted to commission the new hospital building and brought in 20 senior staff to manage it. IHG was forced to evacuate its expatriate staff in early 2011, although following the end of hostilities in October 2011, it was looking to send them back. Benghazi Medical Centre was expected to be the next institution to follow the outsourcing route. In 2010, it announced a LD150m ($120m) tender for management and refurbishment. Small-scale private hospitals were also becoming more common prior to the war, with about 80 in operation. One of the newest was the Libyan European hospital in Benghazi, run by Germanys Epos Group. Its owners, the Mercantile Group, were planning a second 200-bed hospital in Tripoli prior to the revolution.
www.meedinsight.com

1,500

1,000

500

9 19

94 19

9 19

9 19

97 19

9 19

9 19

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

10 20

Source: General Peoples Committee for Health & Environment

was to launch a centralised training programme and in 2010, it sent 1,170 medical professionals overseas to Jordan, Egypt, Germany, the UK, Malaysia, Singapore, Italy and France for training. It also began to document and report on health indicators and statistics for every hospital, recording information such as the fact that the average Libyan visited a primary health centre three times in 2010. Recent years have also seen private rms take on a role in the sector, both through

Recent years have seen private companies take on a role in Libyas healthcare sector

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Projects under construction

District Albetnan Sirte Misurata Derna Jifarah Al-Marqab Jabal Akhdar Morzig Tripoli Al-Marj Sebha Benghazi Wadi Alhiat Azzawiya Al-Waha Wadi Shati Nalout Kufra Ghat Al-Nequt al-Ghamis Ajdabiya Al-Jabal al-Gharbi Other TOTAL Number of projects
9 9 64 14 7 37 13 11 33 13 7 56 7 34 7 18 8 9 3 24 6 36 6 463

scale schemes. Among them was a 200-bed hospital contract awarded to South Koreas Daewoo Engineering & Construction at a cost of $205m. The healthcare sector was hit hard during the six-month civil war. Primary health centres were forced to close as staff, funding and supplies failed to arrive. This led to an overwhelming number of people seeking treatment in the hospitals. The most stressed hospitals were in Misurata, along the Ajdabiya to Brega road, Azzawiya in the Nafusa Mountains and in and around Tripoli. Following the end of hostilities, hospitals and health centres desperately needed to replenish their medical supplies and source equipment. Many also faced acute staff shortages, with more than 20,000 healthcare workers, most of whom were nurses, having left the country. The NTC has stated that healthcare will be a key priority moving forward and, with needs in almost every area, from medical supplies and equipment to training and upgrading of facilities, the sector is likely to become the focus of major investment. There is also widespread acknowledgement that after years of international isolation, foreign expertise is needed to transform the sector, which makes it all the more likely that management contracts and private investment will be a key part of future strategy.
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Most of Libyas existing healthcare infrastructure was built in the 1980s and 1990s, and much of it was constructed by eastern European and Korean contractors. One of the biggest players in this period was Bulgarias Technoexportstroy, which carried out more than 25 health-related contracts. These included a 500-bed trauma centre in Tripoli, 16 polyclinics and three 201-bed hospitals in Sabrata, Al-Zahra and Sirte. Project activity slumped in the period 1990-2005, as a result of tight government budgets. However, funding has risen in

recent years with budgeted health spending reaching an all-time high of $2.6bn in 2010, double the 2007 allocation. The higher spending was reected in increased project activity. According to the General Peoples Committee for Health & Environment, there were 463 new healthcare facilities under construction as of December 2010. These were spread throughout the country, with the biggest concentration located in the Misurata and Benghazi areas. Although many of the projects were small scale and clinics, there were also a handful of large-

Source: General Peoples Committee for Health & Environment MEED Insight

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Transport Airports
Libya has 15 civil airports, although only two Tripoli and Benghazi have signicant international trafc. The majority of its airports are small, serving outlying communities and handling domestic and charter ights. In addition to the commercial airports, there are also a number of private landing strips, generally serving remote oil installations and military bases. Much of Libyas airport infrastructure is old, having been built in the 1970s and 1980s. Little investment was made in the 15 years up to 2003, when international sanctions had a major impact on the local aviation sector. However, the industry began to recover after 2004, with growing international investment and tourism activity leading to Libyan Arab Airlines and its sister airline, Afriqiyah Airways, undertaking eet and route expansion programmes.

Main airports
Airport

TUNISIA

Tripoli Mitiga Tripoli Tripoli International Misurata Benghazi Sirte

Aireld Airstrip

Ghadames

EGYPT

Sebha

LIBYA

Ghat

Kufra

NIGER

Source: World Food Programme

MEED Insight

CHAD

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Main airports
Location Ajdabiya Amal V12 Beda M3 Benghazi Birak Bu Attifel Dahra Eddib V7 Al-Beida El-Sider Fox 3 Ghadames Ghat Gialo Hamada Hamada Hateiba Houn Kufra Majed Marsa al-Brega S-21 Messla Misurata Nafoora M4 Oxy 103 A Ras Lanuf V 40
MRA HLNR HLZG HLNF HLMB LMQ HLML HLON HLKF HUQ AKF HLTD HLGT HLGL Nc-5 Nc-8 HLHM HLNM LTD GHT

ICAO location indicator

HLAG HLAM HLBD HLLB BCQ A100 HLRA HLDB HLLQ HLSD

IATA location indicator

Usage
Private Private Private

Customs
No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes No No No

Runway
Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved Unpaved Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved Unpaved Paved Paved Unpaved Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved

IFR runway
No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No

Length (feet)
3,200 5,900 7,400 11,800 11,100 7,000 5,100 5,900 11,800 6,800 6,500 11,800 11,800 6,500 7,700 6, 4,100 5,900 12,000 7,200 7,200 7,200 10,300 7,200 5,600 5,900

BEN

Civil Civil

HLFL

Private Private Private

In 2006, a $2.5bn upgrade of Libyas busiest airports was announced to expand capacity
In 2006, a $2.5bn upgrade of the states busiest airports was announced by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) aimed at expanding capacity to about 28 million passengers a year from an estimated 5 million. Under the plan, Tripoli and Sebha were to be expanded simultaneously, with Benghazi following close behind. Other airports earmarked for improvement included Ghat, Ghadames and Tobruk, all of which serve tourism sites. The civil war in early 2011 brought the local aviation sector to a standstill. This was conrmed on 19 March 2011 when a UN Security Council resolution in 1973 effectively banned all Tripolibased carriers from ying. Commercial activity recommenced on 2 November 2011, when, following Natos announcement that it was halting military operations on Libya, Alitalia ew 100 passengers from Rome to Tripoli. The carrier was quickly followed by a host of other airlines including Turkish Airlines and Egyptair, as well as Qatar
www.meedinsight.com

LAQ

Civil Private Private Civil Civil Private Private Private Private Civil Civil Private Private Private Civil Private Private Private

MEED Insight

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Main airports (Continued)

Location Sabah 74 Sebha Sahil Samah Sarir C-4 Sirte Tagrift V10 Tobruk Tripoli International Tripoli Mitiga Ubari Zuara
HLGN HLLT HLLM QUB HLZW WAX TOB TIP MJI HLSA HLGD SRX HLLS HLSH SEB

ICAO location indicator

IATA location indicator

Usage
Private Civil Private Private Private Civil Private Civil Civil Civil Civil Civil

Customs
No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No

Runway
Unpaved Paved Paved Unpaved Paved Paved Unpaved Paved Paved Paved Paved Paved

IFR runway
No Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes No No

Length (feet)
5,200 11,800 4,500 4,200 7,200 12,000 6,500 9,700 11,800 11,076 8,000 5,900

Airways, which started ights to Benghazi for the rst time. Prior to the civil war, the local aviation sector was preparing for a period of expansion with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) forecasting growth in Libyan passenger air trafc of 6.9 per cent a year between 2010 and 2013. Whether this can be achieved will depend largely on how quickly the reconstruction programme can begin and whether political stability can be restored.

ICAO=International Civil Aviation Organisation; IATA=International Air Transport Association; IFR=Instrument Flight Rules. Source: World Food Programme logistics cluster

Contract awards on Libyan airport expansion programme

Project Tripoli International airport expansion Benghazi International airport expansion Sebha Package
New terminals Air trafc control tower Air trafc control tower New terminal New terminal Air trafc control tower

Contractor
Odebrecht, TAV, CCC Vinci Indra SNC Lavalin CCC, TAV Indra

Value ($m)
1,400 76 na 542 300 58

Date of award
Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q3 2007 Q3 2007 Q3 2007 Q3 2007

Design consultant
ADPI ADPI ADPI ADPI ADPI ADPI

CCC=Consolidated Contractors Company; na=Not available. Source: MEED Insight

MEED Insight

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Tripoli airport
Existing capacity: 3 million passengers a year Planned capacity: 20 million passengers a year Total project cost: $2.1bn Expansion of Tripolis international airport was identied as a key priority in 2006, when the then prime minister Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi announced a $450m project to build a new terminal and appointed Frances Aeroports de Paris (ADP) as designer, supervisor and project manager. By the time the main construction contract was awarded to a joint venture of Brazils Odebrecht, Athens-based Consolidated Contractors International Company (CCC) and Turkeys TAV in September 2007, the scope of works had doubled to become a twin terminal project with capacity of 20 million passengers a year. A year later, French construction giant Vinci was awarded in joint venture with Libyan Investment & Development Company (Lidco) a $76m contract to construct the air trafc control tower. The expansion was originally due to be completed by September 2009, but it encountered serious delays. By August 2009, it was already running two years late as a result of changes to the projects scope and rising costs. The cost-plus contract model employed was also a factor: although it minimised contractor risk, it led to intense negotiations over the nal
MEED Insight

During the civil war, damage to the Tripoli airport and construction site was limited
cost. After the negotiations, it was agreed that the interior t-out package for the western terminal would be removed from the Odebrecht/CCC/TAV ventures scope. Even so, its contract value was still about $1.4bn. By the time the civil war broke out, only about 30 per cent of the expansion had been completed. During the conict, damage to the airport and construction site was limited, although all vehicles, equipment and materials were looted. Construction work is not expected to resume until mid-2012 at the earliest.

Sebha airport
Planned capacity: 3 million passengers a year Total project cost: $500m Lying 600 kilometres inland from Tripoli, the Sebha airport is undergoing a $500m upgrade, which includes a new terminal building. The project was awarded in two packages in 2007. The rst, worth $58m, went to Spains Indra for the air trafc control system and communications netwww.meedinsight.com 100

work. The second, covering the new $300m terminal building, was won by the CCC/TAV venture, with a construction period of 30 months. As with Tripoli, the Sebha project was suffering extensive delays before the civil war. The main issue was that the CAA decided to change the structure and scope of the project from a build-operatetransfer (BOT) to an engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) deal in early 2010.

Benina International airport (Benghazi)

Planned capacity: 5 million passengers a year Total project cost: $600m Located 19km east of Benghazi, Benina International is Libyas second largest airport. Like Tripoli and Sebha, it has been undergoing a major expansion. Designed by ADP, it centres on the construction of a new terminal building with capacity of up to 5 million passengers a year. In 2008, Canadas SNC Lavalin was awarded a $542m contract to build the terminal, while Indra won the air trafc control package. SNC had been due to complete the project in 2010. However, when ghting broke out in the coastal city in early 2011, the contractor was still pouring concrete for the main structure. Rumours that the airports runway was destroyed in February
MEED Insight

2011 proved unfounded. According to the UKs Capita Symonds, which was working as a project manager on the expansion, damage to infrastructure was limited, with looting having been the main issue. As on Tripoli, construction work is not expected to resume until 2012.
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Ports
With more than 1,770 kilometres of coastline and its strategic location at the boundary between Europe, Africa and the Middle East, Libya should occupy a prominent position in the Mediterranean ports sector. However, a lack of investment, bureaucracy and inefciencies have combined to make it a peripheral player in the regional shipping industry. Libya has more than a dozen ports, of which six are commercial, with the remainder serving industrial users, such as Sirte Oil Company at Marsa al-Brega and Libyan Iron & Steel Company (Lisco) at Misurata. By international standards, the commercial ports are relatively small and have drafts of less than 12 metres. The one exception is the states main seaport at Tripoli, which has an offshore berth with depth alongside of 16 metres. The Maritime & Ports Administration, part of the Secretariat for Transport & Communi MEED Insight Source: World Food Programme

Ports
TUNISIA
Abu Kammash Zuara Tripoli Azzawiya Khoms Misurata Benghazi Sirte El-Sider Ras Lanuf Zueitina Marsa al-Brega Derna Tobruk

cations, is in charge of port infrastructure, with work overseen by the Board for the Execution of Transport Projects (BETP). However, in 2010, plans were approved for the formation of a higher ports authority. Much of Libyas port infrastructure was built in the 1970s and 1980s by contractors from the former Yugoslavia and is now in urgent need of upgrading, on account of age. Although there has been some investment in recent years, it has focused on refurbishing existing infrastructure. The main exception was a plan to build a new commercial port to the west of Sirte, with a capacity of 8 million tonnes a year (t/y). The US Bechtel signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to construct the port in 2008, for which the Netherlands Royal Haskoning is the design consultant. However, the $1bn contract never came into force. Before the war, Tripoli had drawn up plans to invest $1.3bn in its commercial
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EGYPT

LIBYA

ports sector. The programme included the development of Benghazi into a modern container terminal and the expansion of Derna port. As in the aviation sector, the war halted all port projects and disrupted the local shipping sector. Although naval ships became a key target for the Nato bombing campaign, with the ports of Tripoli, Sirte and Khoms affected, the damage to port infrastructure was minimal. The bigger problem was the looting and theft of equipment.

age, electrical works and fencing, and was scheduled to take 33 months. However, it was still to be completed as of early 2011. Azzawiya harbour Plans to build a new harbour at the Azzawiya oil renery, west of Tripoli, have been under consideration for several years. The aim of the estimated $280m project is to replace three offshore single buoy moorings with ve sheltered berths to serve liqueed petroleum gas (LPG) tankers of up to 5,000 dead weight tonnes (dwt), product tankers of up to 70,000 dwt and crude tankers of up to 150,000 dwt. The Azzawiya Oil Rening Company project was out to tender as the civil war broke out, with three bids having been submitted, but not opened. Project sources said in November 2011 that the client was keen to proceed with the scheme and was planning to approach the original bidders. Sirte East Port development Construction was reportedly under way on the Sirte East commercial harbour by an unidentied contractor in 2010. Royal Haskoning, along with the local Maward Consulting Engineers, was providing technical assistance.

Port projects
Tripoli Port breakwater reconstruction Geneva-registered Archirodon Construction (Overseas) won the $222m construction contract to rebuild the Tripoli Port breakwaters in the third quarter of 2007. Placed by the Maritime & Ports Authority, it covered construction of a 4,700-metre rubble mound extended berm in front of the two existing 2,000-metre-long breakwaters. The main consultant on the project was Royal Haskoning. The project was about 40 per cent complete at the start of the civil war in early 2011 and it sustained no damage during the conict. Benghazi Port phase 2 A Turkish joint venture of STFA and EREN was awarded the $104m contract by the Maritime & Ports Authority in August 2007. It called for the construction of 37 new buildings, earthworks, drain MEED Insight

Major ports
Tripoli Area (km) Capacity (t/y) Quay length (m) Max berth draft (m) Covered storage (m) Open storage (m) Vessels a year
3 na 4,029 12* 34,546 377,220 600

Misurata
3 6 3,550 11 67,000 600,000 na

Marsa al-Brega
1.15 0.36 1,120 13 1,500 64,500,000 na

Benghazi
4.4 4 4,490 10.53 7,500 44,500 na

Derna
na na 453 9 0 15,000 170

Tobruk
1 0.6 1,702 9 3,600 15,000 120

km=Square kilometres; t/y=Tonnes a year; na=Not available; m=Square metres; *16m at offshore berth. Source: World Food Programme, Logistics Assessment, Libya, March 2011 www.meedinsight.com 103

Road network
Zuara

TUNISIA

Sabrata Azzawiya

Tripoli
Tarhouna Zintan Gharyan Khoms Misurata Benghazi Sirte Al-Beida Derna Tobruk

Nalout

Roads
Over the past 40 years, Libya has invested heavily in developing a national road network. As of 2010, it had an estimated 83,000 kilometres of road, of which 47,000km was paved. This represented a signicant expansion on the 8,800km of paved highway in 1978. Vehicle usage has risen strongly in recent years and reached 1.8 million in 2008, with cars accounting for 76 per cent of the total. Libyas most important road is the coastal highway, which stretches along the entire coastline from the Tunisian border in the west to Egypt in the east. On the way, it links the major cities of Tripoli and Benghazi, and passes through Khoms, Misurata and Sirte, before reaching Derna and Tobruk. The 1,822km highway was built in the 1930s when Libya was under Italian colonial rule. The governor general, Italo
MEED Insight

Beni Waled Ben Jawad El-Sider Ras Lanuf

Ghadames

Ajdabiya

Marsa al-Brega Houn

EGYPT

Vehicles in Libya
Type Cars Minibuses and vans Buses Trucks Motorbikes and three-wheelers TOTAL NUMBER
Source: World Health Organisation

LIBYA
Number (million)
1.388 0.219 0.091 0.091 0.036 1.826

% of total
76 12 5 5 2

Sebha

LIBYA

ALGERIA
100

NIGER CHAD SUDAN

Source: www.ezilon.com

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Balbo, was credited with building the road, which opened in 1937. Thirty years later, it was repaved. Due to its size, Libya has several other major arterial roads. A 787km highway runs from Tripoli down to the southern city of Sebha and on to Ghat, a further 552km. Heading southwest from the capital is the 602km road to Ghadames. In the east, the main southerly highway is the 871km road linking Ajdabiya to Kufra, while the former is also connected to Tobruk via a 410km link. Most of the major road networks have been built by Korean, Turkish and Chinese contractors. In recent years, Germanys Strabag has made a strong push into the Libyan roads sector. In 2008, it was awarded, in joint venture with Lidco, the 221km AjdabiyaBenghazi-Al-Marj section of the coastal highway by the General Peoples Committee for Communication & Transport, Roads & Bridges. It followed this up with a 210km road maintenance contract covering the highway between Misurata and Sirte. In 2009, the contractor won a $66m contract to upgrade 22km of the highway serving Tripoli International airport and a year later, it was awarded a $143m contract to dualise the Ras Ajdir-Garabouli road in the west. Given its exposure and substantial order book, Strabag was hit hard by the civil war, writing off 50m ($69m) in losses
MEED Insight

Most of Libyas major road networks have been built by Korean, Turkish and Chinese contractors
and a further 350m ($483m) in forward orders. The company sent a reconnaissance team into Libya in October 2011 and it reported that machinery had been stolen and camps destroyed. The contractor is planning to send expatriate staff back to Libya, although this is unlikely to take place before 2012 and only once security is guaranteed. Turkeys MNG Group, through contractor MAPA Contracting & Trading, was also working on several road contracts. These included the 200km rehabilitation and dualisation of the Al-Marin-Al-BeidaDerna section of the coastal highway in the east. The $150m contract started in late 2006 and was set to run into late 2011. Another 103km dualisation contract for the section between Sabrata and Ras Ajdir was also under way. MAPA declined to comment in October 2011 on the status of its projects, but one of its subcontractors conrmed that work had stopped and there were no immediate plans to return. Prior to the civil war, the largest upcom-

Selected major road projects

Route Ras Ajdir to Imsaad Ras Ajdir to Garabouli Al-Beida to Derna Sabrata to Ras Ajdir
km=Kilometres. Source: MEED Projects

Length (km)
1,700 200 200 103

Cost ($m)
3,000 146 150 80

Status
Design Awarded to Strabag Awarded to MAPA Awarded to MAPA

Scope
New road Upgrade Rehabilitation Rehabilitation

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ing road project was the planned 1,700km Ras Ajdir to Imsaad highway, which was part of the friendship treaty signed between Muammar Gadda and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in 2008. The treaty called for Rome to invest $5bn in Libyan projects over the next 20 years as part of a compensation package for the Italian colonial period. An Italian consultant was understood to be carrying out preliminary design work for the estimated $3bn highway and a number of Italian contractors had expressed interest in building it in 2010.
MEED Insight

These included two major consortiums of: Bonatti, Ghella, Grandi Lavori Fincosit, Toto Costruzioni Generali, Astaldi Impregilo, CMC di Revenna One other major new road was also under discussion. The 787km link between Tripoli and Sebha formed part of the UN Economic Committee for the Africa TransHighway 3 project, a planned 10,800km road running from Tripoli in the north to Cape Town in the south. Despite being backed by the UN, African Development Bank and the African Union, Tripoli had been reluctant to complete a second sec-

In the longer term, contractors expect more road dualisation contracts to be awarded

tion of the highway, running southwards into Chad, for fear of causing instability. Dualisation of Libyas main highways was a key focus for Tripoli prior to the outbreak of the civil war. However, post war repairs of potholes and bomb damage will be a greater priority going forward, especially on routes such as the BenghaziSirte highway. Such projects are likely to be carried out by local contractors. In the longer term, however, contractors expect more road dualisation and maintenance contracts to be awarded.

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Rail
Although Libya does not have any rail infrastructure in operation, it had a narrow gauge network serving Tripoli and Benghazi. Built by the Italians in the rst half of the 20th century, the 950-millimetre gauge lines connected the cities with outlying areas. Tripoli had three lines, one of which headed west 100km to Zuara and a second east to Tajoura. The third and nal line ran 100km south from the capital to Gharyan. Benghazi had two lines, both stretching inland in a V shape from the city. One was 110km long and went to Al-Marj, while the other linked Suluk, a distance of 56km. During the second world war, a further 350km line was completed in 1942 as part of the allied defence of North Africa. However, this was closed in 1946. By the mid-1960s, the last section of the narrow gauge network was also shut, but following the Gadda coup in 1969, Tripoli began planning a major rail pro MEED Insight

Planned Tripoli metro

B-10 C-1 C-2 C-3 A-02 A-01 A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5 A-6 A-7 A-8 A-9 A-10 C-4 A-11 B-9 C-18 C-17 A-19 C-19 C-20

B-11
A-12

B-8 A-13 A-14 A-15 A-16 B-7 B-6 B-5 B-4 A-17

A-18

Janzur A-Central

B-12 B-13

C-16 C-15 C-14 C-12 B-3

A-20

A-21

C-5

B-14

C-6

B-16

Railway Terminal
B-25 B-26

B-17 B-18 B-19 B-20 B-21 B-22 B-23 B-24a

C-7

C-8

C-9

C-10

C-11 B-2

Tajoura
B-1 B-01 B-02 B-03 B-04

University

B-24c B-24b

Airport

Source: Uvaterv Engineering Consultants

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gramme. Taking in a national rail network and a metro for the capital, it took until 2008 for the rst major construction contracts to be awarded.

Metro line characteristics

Line A, green B, red C, blue Deep (km)
14.56 19.15 20.95

Subsurface (km)
15.04 13.72 1.38

Surface (km)
0.0 14.53 0.0

Elevated
0.0 4.88 0.0

Tripoli Metro
Plans for a light rail system linking the capital to the airport were rst unveiled in the 1980s, when Hungarys Uvaterv Engineering Consultants completed the rst study on the Tripoli metro. This was followed up in 2007 by the same rm being commissioned to produce a revised study. The revised study proposed three metro lines; A (green line), B (red line) and C (blue line) with a total length of 104km and served by 72 stations. The longest of the three was the 52km red line, which would link Tripoli airport to the city before running eastwards to the university and on to Tajoura. The second was the 30km green line running directly across the city from Janzur to the east and the third blue line would run 22km from the western coast, then take a southern run forming a U shape, before emerging on the eastern side of the city.

km=Kilometres. Source: Uvaterv Engineering Consultants

Most of the metro network was to be subsurface, with only 19 kilometres of line above ground
Most of the network was planned to be subsurface, with only 19km of line and eight stations above ground. The client for the revised study scheme was the Railroads Project Execution & Management Board, which was given responsibility by the General Peoples Committee in May 2006. Although Uvaterv completed its revised study in 2009, the project has not progressed since. Internal competition among ministries and committees was blamed for the lack of progress. As of early 2011, the Railway Executive Board, in charge of the national rail system, and the Railroads Project Execution & Management Board operated independently and competed for funding with each other and different organisations within the General Secretariat for Transport & Communications. Nevertheless, the rationale for going ahead with the project remains strong, given the need to connect the Tripoli University project and the Tripoli airport expansion to the city centre.
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Metro station locations

Stations A, green B, red C, blue Deep (km)
11 17 17

Subsurface (km)
11 6 2

Surface (km)
0.0 3 0.0

Elevated
0.0 5 0.0

km=Kilometres. Source: Uvaterv Engineering Consultants

Metro technical aspects

Operational length Stations Trafc system Electronic system Power supply Telecoms Signalling system
104.21km 72 Automatic train control Scada 750V DC using third rail with 3x400/230V AD for auxiliary consumer supply CCTV, exchange phone system, dispatcher phone system, radio phone system, emergency call system, passenger text info service Electronic in cooperation with train control system (ATO/ATP) system

km=Kilometres; ATO=Automatic train operation; ATP=Automatic train protection. Source: Uvaterv Engineering Consultants

MEED Insight

National rail network

Uvaterv also carried out studies in the 1980s on a national railway. Unlike the Tripoli metro however, several major packages were under execution by Chinese and Russian contractors prior to the civil war. But the outbreak of hostilities brought construction activity to a halt and led to the death of Said Mohammed Rashid, the chairman of the Railway Executive Board. Rashid was credited for the signicant progress made in the rail sector since 2008. The rst contract on the 2,000km coastal line was awarded to China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) in February 2008. It covered a 352km section between Khoms, Misurata and Sirte and included the construction of 26 stations, 55 bridges and 370 footbridges. Estimated to be worth $1.85bn, it was originally scheduled for completion by 2013. Rail projects
Line Coastal high speed line Minerals railway Value ($m)
6,500

The rst contract on Libyas coastal line was originally set to be completed by 2013
CRCC won a further two packages on the coastal railway. In August 2008, it was contracted to extend the line from Khoms to Tripoli, also by 2013. Six months later, it picked up the 172km section between Tripoli and Ras Ajdir on the border with Tunisia. The Chinese contractor was working on one other rail project in the local market, the $824m minerals railway project. Involving the construction of a 800km line between Wadi Shati near

Planned rail networks

Zuara Azzawiya

TUNISIA

Tripoli
Al-Beida Benghazi Sirte Derna Tobruk

Sabrata Khoms Tarhouna Misurata Zintan Gharyan Nalout Beni Walid

Ghadames

Ben Jawad El-Sider

Ajdabiya Marsa al-Brega

Ras Lanuf Houn

LIBYA
Sebha

ALGERIA

Scope
2,000km coastal line from Ras Ajdir in the west to the Egyptian border 800km inland railway from Wadi Shati to Misurata 52km of track, plus stations

Status
Contracts awarded in 2008/09 to CRCC and Russian Railways Contract awarded in 2008 to CRCC Preliminary design complete, project on hold

Client
Railway Executive Board

800

Railway Executive Board Railroads Project Execution & Management Board

Designed

NIGER
Design currently being updated Not designed

Tripoli metro, red line

500

CHAD SUDAN

km=Kilometres; CRCC=China Railway Construction Corporation. Sources: MEED Projects, MEED Insight

Source: MEED Insight

MEED Insight

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Sebha and Misurata, the contract also covered ve train depots, 40 bridges and 940 footbridges. CRCC has not been the only beneciary of the Libyan rail expansion boom. In April 2008, Russian Railways was awarded a $3.1bn contract to build the 550km section of the coastal railway linking Sirte to Benghazi, which will have about 30 stations. Construction began in December 2008 and was scheduled for completion at the end of 2012. Major subcontracts were placed by both Russian Railways and CRCC, with the main beneciaries being Italys Ansaldo and Selex Communications for signalling and communications work and Germanbased Vossloh Cogifer for fasteners and switches. To support the rail programme, a welding plant, with capacity for 500km of track a year, was built by Russias Pskovelectrosvar in June 2010. Some 800km of the coastal line has still to be awarded, with the focus on eastern Libya and the link between Benghazi and Imsaad on the Egyptian border. The Imsaad to Tobruk section was in the design stage in early 2011, while the $2bn Benghazi to Tobruk link, covering a distance of about 450km, was under study by Germanys Dorsche Gruppe. The outbreak of hostilities in early 2011 led to the suspension of the entire rail pro MEED Insight

gramme, with employees from both the Russian and Chinese contractors having to be evacuated. Despite the end of the civil war being ofcially declared in October 2011, it is likely to be some time before construction resumes. As of November 2011, calls to both the Railway Executive Board and the Railroads Project Execution & Management Board went unanswered, suggesting that restafng and the resumption of operations had still to take place.

Major contract awards by Railway Executive Board

Line Khoms-Sirte Sirte-Benghazi Khoms-Tripoli Ras Ajdir-Tripoli Wadi Shati-Misurata Length (km)
352 550 120* 172 800

Value ($m)
1,850 3,100 na 805 824

Contractor
CRCC Russian Railways CRCC CRCC CRCC

km=Kilometres; CRCC=China Railway Construction Corporation; *=Estimate; na=Not available. Sources: MEED Projects, MEED Insight

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