Ada 465098

Night Vision and
Electronic Sensors Directorate

AMSRD-CER-NV-TR-220A
Breaching the "Devil's Garden"

Operation Lightfoot
The Second Battle of El Alamein
23 October 1942
(APPENDICES)
February 2006
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5806
20070411204
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE A N.074018
Iliaz PitrvSjira12;N. its~iW. 21-2*11)-3ILJ2asdk3

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4. TITLE AND SUBTIT LE S. FUNDINGO
NUMABERS
Breaching the Devil's Garden - The 6th New Zealand Brigade in Operation
Lightifoot. The Second Battle of Alamiein, 23 October 1942 (Appendicies)
6.AUITIIOFIS)
William Schneck
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMEIS: AND ADDRESS(ESI B. PERFDRMING ORGANIZATION

Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate REPORT NUMBER
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13. ABSTRACT ~tiWx;riymju

200 wardsl
This stutdy is one in.a series that will examine combat breaching operations. Otlier studies have covered Operation Citadel
and Operation DeseLrt Storm. In this report, the breaches created in the zone of the 6th New Zealand Brigade are'studied in
detail. This repo~rt has been structured such that the situations of boith sidils are discusscd, rollowcd by a detailed narrative of
the operation. Of particular inlterest to students of military engineering, is the effect of the lack ofl'antipcrs{)rnnel mines on the
effectiveness of the "Devil's Garden." lthough this was forced on GeneralfeldinarshallRommtel And his mnen by logistic
constraints, it should be. of current interest as our soldiers are strippjed of conventional mines by 2010.
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OFPAGES

283
16. PRICE COIDE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OFTHIS 119, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20, LIMITATION OFABSTRACT
OFREPORT PAGE OFABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIF:IED 'UNCLASSIFIED None
NSIJ 7540-1-280-5500 2fl8 Rev. 2.e91
Slar.crd Fnsm
byA.NSI
FPLrirrbiirrl Sill. 734.~
1HV73 w10
APPENDICES
Appendix A Deutch-ItalienischenPanzerarmeeDefense Plan

Annex 1. GeneralfeldmarshallRommel's Defensive Plan, Dated 20 September 1942
Annex 2. GeneralDer Kavallerie Stumme's Instructions, Dated 22 October 1942
Appendix B Operations Order "Lightfoot"
Appendix C Operations Order "Supercharge"
Appendix D German Assessment Of Italian Infantry
Appendix E Axis Obstacle Plan
Annex 1. "Sperrplan ElAlamein," As Of 24 September 1942
Annex 2. Detailed Obstacle Plan For The 2 "dNew Zealand Division Zone Of Attack
Annex 3. Explanation Of World War II German Military Symbology
Appendix F German Mine Warfare Doctrine
Annex 1. Translated Extract From Ausbildungsvorschrift Ffir Die Pioniere, Teil 4b,
Minen Und Ziinder, H.
Dv. 220/4b, 1 October 1939.
Annex 2. Special Orders For Mine And Obstacle Employment From Oberst Hecker And
His Staff
a) New Method Of Arranging Minefields ("Mine Boxes")
b) Special Order For Mine Employment Nr. 8
c) Special Order For Obstacle Employment Nr. 3
d) Experiences In Mine Employment In The Last Month (Hauptmann Andres,
Commander 2 0 0th Pioneer Battalion)
Annex 3. Chapter IV. "Tactics," Section VII. "Minefields," Extracted From Handbook
On German
Military Forces, TM-E 30-451, War Department, Washington, D. C., 15 March 1945.
Appendix G Mines And Fuzes Used By The Axis At El Alamein
Annex 1. German
a) Antitank Mines
b) Antipersonnel Mines
c) Fuzes
Annex 2. Italian
a) Antitank Mines
Annex 3. British
a) Antitank Mines
c) Fuzes
Annex 4. French (HUNGARIAN?)
a) Antitank Mines
b) Fuzes
Appendix H Terrain Analysis
Appendix I Axis Order Of Battle
Deutsch-ItalienischenPanzerarmee
Deutschen Afrika Korps
XX Italian Motorized Corps
X Italian Corps
XXI Italian Corps
PanzerarmeeTroops
Luftfiotte 2
5 th Squadra,Regia Aeronautica
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

Appendix J Allied Order Of Battle
X Corps
XIII Corps
XXX Corps
8 th Army Troops
Desert Air Force (And Related Elements)
Appendix K Chronology Of Events, 6 th New Zealand Brigade Zone
Appendix L Other Breaches Conducted As Part Of The Overall Operation
Annex 1. "Breaching Operations, XIII Corps, Operation Lightfoot"
Annex 2. "9 th Australian Division Breaching Operations During Operation Lightfoot"
Annex 3. "New Zealand Engineer Breaching Operations During Operation Supercharge"
Appendix M Open Questions
Appendix N Author's Biography
Bibliography
Glossary
Distribution
ii BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

APPENDIX A
PANZERARMEE AFRIKA'S DEFENSE PLANS
ANNEX 1. GENERALFELDMARSHALL ROMMEL'S DEFENSIVE PLAN, DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1942

ANNEX 2. GENERAL DER KA VALLERIE STUMME'S INSTRUCTIONS, DATED 22 OCTOBER 1942
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot A-1

APPENDIX A, ANNEX 1
GENERALFELDMARSHALL ROMMEL'S DEFENSIVE PLAN,
DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 19421
SECRET COMMAND ISSUE
Headquarters, Panzerarmee Army Command Post, 20.9.42

Afrika 9 Copies
Abt.la/Pi Nr.2090/42 secret command issue. 9 th Copy
The daily casualties of static warfare requires a shortening of the front in order to gain depth based on the
following new organization plan:
1.) The foremost mine obstacles (the former Main Line of Resistance) are to be observed day and night by combat
outposts. The night garrison must be as strong as the day garrison. Watchdogs will be supplied to assist the
troop detachments with overwatch.
The combat outpost line will consist only of squad strong points. Therefore, extra positions will be used as
alternate positions. All new positions will be placed in the minefields. A part of each combat outpost, in the
old positions will guard the lanes through the minefields.
The former battleground in the forward portion of the obstacle area remains the maneuver area of the
combat outposts and the engagement area for local counterattacks.
2.) An area about 1 to 2 km deep will be left unoccupied between the combat outpost line and the main battle area.
3.) The M.L.R. (Main Line of Resistance) is to shift to the back half of the obstacle areas (Devil's Gardens).
Therefore, the forward edge of the main engagement area lies mostly in the Devil's Garden, about 2 km behind
the zone of the combat outposts. These troops positioned in the main battle area are to be organized to a depth
of about 2 km.
4.) For the present, continue to work toward the new employment given in Attachment 1. Afterwards, establish a
battalion sector with a width of about 1 ½/2kmn and a depth of about 5 kin. One company of the battalion
(without heavy anti-tank weapons) is to be employed in the combat outposts, while the bulk of the battalion is
deployed in the main battle area.
In the X Corps sector, the newly won minefields in correspondence with those of the XX Corps are to be
used to deepen the obstacle areas.
5.) The tasks in Merkblattes f'ir Stellungsbau (Instructional Pamphlet on Fortified Position Construction), as
modified by the current instructional Pamphlet (Pz.A.O.K. la/Pi Nr.1334/42geh. 111. Ang. V. 1.9.42), are to be
applied.
6.) On 25 September 42, present to the Army Headquarters:

a.) A proposal for a new organization with appropriate directions on a 1:25,000 map.
b.) A proposal for the development of new obstacle zones.
The execution time for the new organization will be given by special order
I Attachment The Commander-In-Chief
Distribution Generalfeldmarshall
General Plan
General/eldmarshallRommel's memo to subordinate units dated 20 September 1942, US National Archives, Captured German
Records
Division, Series T-3 13, Roll 431, frame 8723662.
A-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

0berko~ando der Panzetarmee 1 A-GelaStafld~, den 20-942
tbI i I.r.2-:090/42 g.Kdos. 9 Ausfe~ggn-,
4. iisf ertign
Die tdglchen Verluste in Steflun~g skri eg erfor emern u

ufl1ockerunjg der Front nach der Tiefe. Hiierzu i-st folgende Neug1io-
derung vorzusohentI
1.) Die vordersten Minensperron (blshcrigo F-X.i~L) ai.nd du~rch Go-

cochtBvorj~caontq Ug uný, Neoht zu bowachon. Die NEaohtbcsctzung
mu!3 ettirkor als ei T0%gcsb ,cctzunE sin. Zur Er3.oichtoru~ng dcr
tiberwtachung vw;rdcn den~ Truppcntcilon W-achhundc zugcftihrt wcrd~cn.
- Dic Stc11unrZ dcr G.f tchtsvorpostcn hat ntir- eus Grrp~cn-
at1"i puntýn Lu bcstchcn. rDc-nnch tibcrflhssig wcrdcndcZ.nlagcn
aind van~ichat ale 77cchsclatcl~ungui zzu b(cnutzcn. Bci sllen Nfeu-.
sa1sacn sind dic Gcfcchtsvoropostc-n 4- dic~ Mincrnf~dcr zu 1c.gon.'
Boi a-ton 1ilnegorn habon Tcilc dca- G; fcchtsvorpostcn iLn don Yincd.
fuldurn dic, Bwa-hu.-g durch,&J'dl-'rn.
- ~~Dor bishoriý:,; lKampframr iL, vorcicrcn Tci3.. dor Spcrrgol~iet~
bloibt Dow ogungerc.um der Gc~fc~cht:zorpoatcn und Koxnpfrcum fUr Oii
licho GcGenouatboo.
, 1.Ti%,fo dor Gofccohtsvorponitc-i in nrch 60oLa.nco 0twa 500
1.000 Mlotor~. , 1'
2.) Zwischon 'don rof'cchtnvorpocetn und9 d= ln

1uptkampf fold iat cin
4. A
* - twti 1 - 2 kmn tic~fcr Raum iunbcactzt zu lhaoon.
3.) I~io R-K-L- i-at i i'rtickwarti9( TT'1ft.nder Sporrgobioto (

fc3~girc vcrlcgon. Domr.c.ch liugt dor vordor ~cd
-az Rend
IEnuptk~ipffoldoa dor Gr~ssc dr'Tz~ufolag9rt~f cn teprochet-

..2 km hinter der Zone cor Gc f,;ch:-cporvcl fi~~~p~ q
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'IS GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot A-3

2'r 0 '---
fold aingosatztcn Truppcn eind btwc. 2 km tiof ztx gicdern'..
4..) Einon t~nhý-It fUr don domnv~ch durchzufUh-rondn noUon Ein~antZ

;,ibt Ltgo1. fl,'.ne.ch botr~.gt dic Broito dci- ]tl.-,& bachnitto
otvza 1-j kma, die Ticfo otwa 5 kmn- Elmo Kompcanic doe Met
(olme schwcro Pz~jbwchiwclffc~n) Jet r-Is Gcf~btsvorposten,
dic 1Mv.sco dcs Btl. 'in dc= H'c.uptkrmpffold oinzunotzcn.
Im 9Lbachni-tt doe X.L..1. sind dia nou gowonnoncn Yinon-
feldc.- onteprc-chcnd dcncr, dca X2.A;.1X. zu Sporrgcbicton zu
vcsrt'.of on.
P.is zux- 1.usgcabu aincO r.bctohdortcr. Ytcrkblctttoo ftir Sto2Thun~a-

n~uabr.u Jet das blchý*rigo 1Y~rkblp~-tt (P..0KI F7Iir-1334/
42e.. II.sgv~..2 irz c=dssonzuwcrndci.n
T1' 6) Zzi2..2aind don j..C.X. vorzulcgcn:'

KVorsch.1c.g ftar Ncuglicdcrung crntoprcchc.nd vorstchondcn
flichtlirnion mit Krc-rtc 1 f 25 000,
b) Vor~schlrhg fur ncuor. Vcrlcwuf dcr Spcrrgcbictuinrc'.ndungcn,,
DiZcitpunk~t dcr BrchfUhrung dcr n~cuc~n Glicdcrung
Yvird besorndors befohion wcrdcn.
I3.n£n-1r0. Dor Obc'rbeiohleho.bor:
Generalfoldmcrarcballe I'
Vertoilcr
gcmU13 hitwvxf.

ve.e
-Ar
le-
A-.7
* '-
.*~ ue.
~ A6 ~,r*+
BRAHIGTH
DEIS ADE"OprtinLihfiblA-
APPENDIX A, ANNEX 2
GENERAL DER KA VALLERIE STUMME'S INSTRUCTIONS,
DATED 22 OCTOBER 1942
Headquarters, Panzerarmee Army Command Post, 22.10.42
Afrika
The Commander-in-Chief
Abt.la/Pi Nr.9532/42 secret
subject: Instructions
During times of positional warfare it is most possible to exploit training opportunities. This applies in the
front lines to troops not deployed in the fortified position. But also offers an opportunity to the units deployed
directly behind the front to train in a limited scope. I give a few guidelines on the training orders of the divisions-on
the execution of training-to establish the basis.
1. General
1.) The attack is and remains the best defense. Therefore, place this form of combat in the forefront of training.
2.) A pure defense can never bring success, to wrestle down an attacking opponent. Rather, every defense must
change into an attack where the opportunity presents itself The decision based on local combat conditions must
be made lightning quick. The counterthrust is therefore the duty of the local leaders. They must be trained in
this. This leader training must be obeyed. The counterattack is the duty of the senior leaders. Each quicker and
better prepared to break loose; so greater is the success.
3.) The unconditional holding of the position without regard for threats to the flanks, breakthroughs to the sides, or
within the position and so on alone guarantees the defensive success. Therefore wiring and mining, as well as
all around defense of the battle groups in the line of combat outposts and the M.L.R. are ordered.
The combat outposts and forward strongpoints as well as the M.L.R. are to be held. No leader of the combat
outposts is authorized to decide on his own to give up the line of combat outposts. Also a breakdown in
communications to the rear does not justify such a decision.
II. In Particular.
1.) No driving of unarmored vehicles into organized defenses of the enemy without protection (panzers, armored
cars) in advance. No concentrations of vehicles or soldiers.
2.) Present no targets and locations. Against it: camouflage, adapt to the country and with each halt go to ground.
3.) Reconnaissance troops: train reconnaissance and assault troops with the object of reconnaissance, as possible
bring in many prisoners and through fire, destroy the enemy.
4.) Rapidly breach enemy minefields and belts as well as wire obstacles under enemy defensive fire. The enemy
minefield must not be allowed to be a grave to an attack's spirit and drive. In addition training exercises are
necessary. Mine detection and removal is only the first step. Protective fire, close engagement of the enemy,
smoke, lanes created through all arms and so on.
5.) Advance the Infantry through thoroughly planned fire from all infantry support weapons. Ensuring this is the
main task of the battalion and regimental commanders in an attack.
6.) Exploit the success of the panzers or of the fires of all support weapons including artillery through closely
placed infantry, often these will be mounted possibly.
A-6 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

7.) Fire discipline! Aimed fire of all weapons including rifles. In addition maneuver the fires of all support
weapons for fully effective firing ranges.
8.) Application of close combat means. Hand grenades, bayonets, shovels, pistols!
9.) Trainin and schooling of the junior leader up to company commander. For this under different planning
games in the smallest scope.
10.) Weapons training on as many weapons as possible including captured weapons.
11.) Vehicle driver training.
12.) Drill exercises only to fortify the discipline of the men, never over half an hour.
The Commander-in-Chief:
Acting
General der Panzertruppen
Distribution:
To the divisions.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot A-7

S;Dr Ob~erbefebehabe
7'Ab t'JI Ulri 9 3/42_ge ei
- 7
-Die %Zeit de'd a-te11uxý,kriegem ist'iweitmoeglichet 'u~rl

AusbildungauamizIiutzea. Dies, gilt Liieuer
e1-rte :1ite
n~icht In der Stailujngafront eizi~obetzsten Truppen. Aber auch
den eing6e3etztefl Verbaenden wfrd si~ch txn~itteltsaz l4ntor der -
Front Gelegenhoit bieten, in beochraenktom Rahmen eauszibilden.

!Nachstehend geob 'ich eihi~ge wonigo Richt~linien,. d-ie den Aus_
bildungs-Befehlon~dcr Divis3ionc-i den Vracgern der Xuabil-
-
dung Grundo zu,ýegan ~sind.

-zu
1.) Der Axgi f~ und bloibt dia besto Yortoidigung. flahor

utoht dige~ Kampfform im Vordorgrund der Ausbildung.
2.)Elmru'no Ab%,hr kan~n nie den Erf Id1g bringon, der den
*angraif ndon Crgner n~c'xrri~gt. Joade Abwhr mnuqs viel-'
miahr i~n Angriff viebergghon, w~o sich nUZ~cino Gelegonhecit
dezu. btie~tt. -Dor Entachluus dazu wi~rd mcist auos dor
wlilc-nKam~filage heraus oft. b~jitz'~hnoll 6ofa"at
wordenn uoeeon. Dcr Crqgon~ioss it dahor Aufgabe doe
cortlihm
Fuoro~s E 'da.arn goochult saem.'D
gehloor-t zur Fuohrerausbiidung. -Dor Gegcnsngriff i.st
Auifga'be dor. hoehercn Fuobrung. Jo' schncillor* ud jo
.bo sacr vqrborcijtc tr loobi~,u~ ror iat 4cr'
3.Paa un'bbdLrýt Halto-der Stall'Un-' o aRuockbioht ecauf-K

PIankontbcd&rohung, Duc ruoh 13,6 art1do n n

27 1
8or~u$~pp. i dr ao eofccdhtevorposten und der

HU.Z.Le tefoben worden'.-
-. Pie Gote h+avorposto~n unid vbr'oooee o ut id

4:6o io H. L . zu14o. I~r 7uo)trerk Geefccht -
vo on-dart gtX8ntvcý ýa Tjdod~~eeha
-'-rb.. do .V-
VO~O~tO S
pfObcani.Auch cilO' Unt eeb~u
rbe~n
naých i ec .iaer'is kani cinen solchcn Ent'ochlusS uioht rdcht-
II.- Im Zizln
.)C cin Fahron von ungcpanzerten Kfz. in don zur.A~bwehr gcglie-7

darten Feind .obna Sichorungen (Pner, Pz.Sp'~.ehwsagan) *6rau~s-,
K.e inc Zuiarnncnballunj9n von Kfz.-und'TPcmp-fera.
1.2.) WN61it Scholbe zejg~a~u~nd ltegel.0 flagego n: Tmrnen,-jh?'

G-1eflndO aip~aaseri ~un in- dio Erda gehan boi jcdenlct
3.) Sp'ae'htruppt Ausbildung von Spach- _and Stoestruppe ~itit dern

ZJ03: aaf ziklaeren, moo glichat Viel Gofamgeno'cinztibiicn .f
_Vnd don Foind durch Pcuorr zu vernichlton -
4.') ýchii3lib3 Uoberwifldcnl von fd1l.)(non'ed~ n reen

sow3.o dor'dahintcriegognd3ný flralthindernisso' -fm.A U hr-ý
fouýr a.f1.imno~ifold
z dprf 'niebt :tun ~Totcngraeboir-a'J~do~i
41-herue
'~1 unRgcn nooqtig. n---
*;.- des Y,6indIts,. - Bi lthibbo1

-?1derbIallme dasaenw soaf3d~h'
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot A-9

Unt 0 mfd e t Z,1 iaffoni R 'orfujx, zu aorgc-n1 ia ýi; o au
66:u~uzclar Zrfo' d&an~o ordor do^ 6F4-a'ie z &11or Tintecr"

u 3n ciini.chl1 AxtiicA~itdi~hisHiahlc
fuz
X
dcr jr iat o rio.
1 Oft w~ii~l dias ,a-'uigoohdb.0 "
-7.) Fou rdiizipliflt Gozioltos P.ou6r Ji 'ancýacl

Gowchrms ]Thzu Wcndigkoit dOs~pcuorLi lr tftrtozvne-s
welffon auf~ wirkung"olic Schudý3cntfori1mugcn.
8.) Gobratuch cdor !Tcahkenpmf mitto1 I. ar~dgra~tcn, Bajonott) Spc~týn..

Fistolcnl'
9.) Aubiýid un~id Schulu~ng der Untorfuohxor bis hinauf zu dcn

Koimpanicfuchrcrn. Hicrzu untoi'.eIdoxt~bi an~l1etp in klain-
cston Rahmcfl..
10.) 'Weffenausbildxng a~n woc~ichst violcni Weffon cinisjchj.Bouto-

WESfcon,
1.2.) ForrJicrdionat nuir 'ur Fosti~guzg der Maimoazucht, nitc ucbcr

cino hajbc Stunde.
Dcr 0bcrb-cchlsb.abcri
Gcnc:,'cJ. dcr Fam.crc 4P'.11.~.
A-10 BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Liglilfoot

APPENDIX B
8t ARMY OPERATIONS ORDER FOR OPERATION LIGHTFOOT'
LIGHTFOOT
14 September 1942
GeneralPlan of Eighth Army
OBJECT
1. To destroy the enemy forces now opposing Eighth Army. The operations will be designed to 'trap' the enemy in
his present area and to destroy him there. Should small elements escape to the West, they will be pursued and dealt
with later.
PLAN IN OUTLINE
2. The enemy will be attacked simultaneously on his North and South flanks.
3. The attack on the North flank will be carried out by 30 Corps with the object of breaking in to the enemy
defences between the sea and inclusive the MITEIRIYA Ridge, and forming a bridgehead which will include all the
enemy main defended positions and his main gun areas. The whole of this bridgehead will be thoroughly cleared of
all enemy troops and guns. 10 Corps will be passed through this bridgehead to exploit success and complete the
victory.
4. On the South flank, 13 Corps will:
a) Capture HIMEIMAT
b) Conduct operations from HIMEIMAT designed to draw enemy armour away from the main
battle in the North.
c) Launch 4 Lt Armd Bde round the Southern flank to secure DABA and the enemy supply and
maintenance organization at that place, and to deny to the enemy air the use of the air landing
grounds in that area.
30 CORPS OPERATIONS
5. The break-in attack will be carried out in the moonlight and will be supported by a great weight of artillery fire.
Zero hour will be after moonrise on D1 i.e. probably about 2200 hours. See para. 12.
6. The following troops will be available:
9 Aust Div.
51 (Highland) Div.
23 Annd Bde.
2 NZ Div (less such troops as are not required for the task allotted).
I SA Div.
7. The troops of NZ Div will be used to capture and hold the MITEIRIYA Ridge West of the QATARA track.
These troops will return to command 10 Corps at a time to be arranged mutually between 10 Corps and 30 Corps.
1 SA Division will swing forward its right to join up with NZ troops on the MITERIYA Ridge.
8. The attached tracing shows:
a) Objectives of 30 Corps.
b) Assembly area 10 Corps.
c) The two areas where gaps in the enemy minefield are to be made by 10 Corps.
d) Routes from 10 Corps assembly area forward to the battle area.
e) Deployment areas of armoured brigades of 10 Corps.
f) Subsequent areas to be occupied by 10 Corps. As to whether these precise areas are actually
occupied will depend on the development of the battle.
9. It is essential to the success of the whole operation that leading armoured brigades of 10 Corps should be in the
deployment areas (para. 8(e)) ready to fight at first light on D2. They must not become embroiled in local fighting
on the early morning of D2 whilst moving in to their deployment areas.
IAs extracted from Monty, the Making of a Gcneral. 1887-1942, by Nigel Hamilton, ISBN 0-07-025805-8, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New
York, 1981, pages 732-741. Author's note: this order was revised or "fragged" on 6 October 1942 as discussed in Section 5.1, but no written
change seems to have been published.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot B-1

Therefore, 30 Corps will ensure that the deployment areas and the routes to them are thoroughly cleared of
all enemy troops and guns before the annoured brigades begin to move in to them.
10. Gaps in our own minefields will be cleared, marked, and lit by 30 Corps.
11. The successful result of the whole operation will depend on whether 30 Corps achieve success in the break-in
attack, clear the bridgehead area, and hold securely the ground gained. A great deal will depend on the proper
employment of the artillery. Up to about 400 guns will be available and the concentrated use of this great firepower
should ensure success.
In order to make certain that the best use is made of the available artillery resources the [Corps Chief of
Royal Artillery] 30 Corps will, for this attack, assume command of all the artillery in 30 Corps. Once the
bridgehead area has been secured, artillery must reach out to deal with targets further afield and to assist in beating
off counter-attacks.
12. 30 Corps will report the desired zero hour for the attack, consulting with 10 Corps. The ruling factor is as given
in para. 9 above. A full moon will be assumed.
10 CORPS OPERATIONS
13. See attached tracing referred to in para 8 above.
14. The operations of 30 Corps are so designed that 10 Corps can pass unopposed through gaps in the enemy
minefields and be launched into territory West of these main minefields. 10 Corps will then pivot on the
MITEIRIYA Ridge, held by its own NZ Division, and will swing it right round till the Corps is positioned on
ground of its own choosing astride the enemy supply routes.
Further operations will depend on how the enemy re-acts to this initial thrust.
The aim in the development of the further operations will be based on:
a) The enemy being forced to attack 10 Corps on the ground of its own choice.
b) 10 Corps being able to attack the enemy armoured forces in flank.
c) The fact that once the enemy armoured and mobile forces have been destroyed, or put out of
action, the whole of the enemy army can be rounded up without any difficulty.
15. The move of 10 Corps to its assembly area will take place by night, the Corps being assembled by dawn on DI
day. Several nights will be used as may be decided by 10 Corps. See para 25(a).
The move forward from the assembly area to deployment areas will begin after dark on Dl day; see paras 9
and 12.
16. 10 Corps will be responsible for:
a) Marking and policing of its routes from the assembly area up to the gaps in the enemy
mninefields.
b) Clearing its own gaps in the enemy minefields. See para 8(c). CE Eighth Army will arrange
for any additional RE assistance that may be required.
17. 30 Corps will be responsible for:
a) Construction of routes forward from 10 Corps assembly area up to the present forward
positions.
b) AA protection for all gaps in minefields, including 10 Corps gaps in the enemy minefields.
13 CORPS OPERATIONS
18. The task of 13 Corps is twofold:
First. To assist the main annoured battle in the North by drawing off enemy armour to the South.
Second To launch a mobile and armnoured force round the enemy's Southern flank to secure and hold the enemy
supply base, maintenance organizations, and air landing grounds, in the DABA area.
19. For both tasks, and especially for the successful conduct of the first task, a secure base is essential. 13 Corps
will therefore begin its operations by breaking into the enemy positions at or about HIMEIMAT. This attack will
begin at the same time as the attack of 30 Corps; see para. 12.
20. Operations will then be so developed that 4 Light Armd Bde can be launched at first light on D2 to secure
DABA vide [see] para 18.
It will be particularly important to destroy all enemy aircraft found on the ground at DAGA; also to deny
the enemy the use of the landing grounds; holding them for our own use later on.
On arrival in the DABA area 4 Light Armd Bde will come directly under Army HQ.
21. Having launched 4 Light Armd Bde to Daba, 13 Corps will operate with 22 Annd Bde with the object of
drawing enemy armour down to the South and away from the main battle area in the North.
B-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

All enemy MET, and transport generally in rear of the enemy positions in the South will be destroyed;
enemy armoured divisions attack 10 Corps from the South will themselves be attacked from the rear by 22 Armd
Bde.
The operations of 22 Armd Bde will be conducted with the greatest vigour and determination. But in order
to ensure that Eighth Army is at all times properly balanced, and has no need to re-act to enemy thrusts, it is
essential that 22 Armd Bde should not be destroyed by superior armoured forces; it must remain 'in being' on the
Southern flank, operating as indicated above, until it is clear how the battle is going to swing; at the appropriate
moment everything will be thrown into the fight by Army HQ in order to finish off the enemy.
SEA LANDING
22. A combined operation is being planned and organized with the object of landing a small force of tanks, artillery
and infantry on the coast about RAS ABU EL GURUF.
This force, having landed, will operate Eastwards towards SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN and assist the
operations of 30 Corps and 10 Corps.
The time of landing will be synchronized carefully with the main operations of the Eighth Army.
This force will come directly under Army HQ.
AIR OPERATIONS
23. These are being developed on the following lines:
a) Heavy bombing of the enemy's main aerodromes during the September full moon period. No
attack by our land forces will follow.
b) Heavy bombing of the enemy's main aerodromes during the October full moon period.
c) At zero hour on D1 day heavy bombing attacks of the enemy armoured formations. These
will continue all night on a very heavy scale.
DECEPTIONMEASURES
24. Every endeavour will be made to deceive the enemy as to our intentions to attack at all and, if this fails, as to the
direction of our main attack.
25. Offensive intentions are usually given away by concentrations of transport, thereby implying concentration of
troops and force for an attack. It is therefore essential that a certain normal density of vehicles should be decided for
any area and that density be stabilised on 1 October and not altered after that date. This is vitally important in the
following areas:
a) Assembly area of lO Corps. This area must be made a general living area now, and
arrangements made so that the number of vehicles in it by 1 October will be approximately
the same as when 10 Corps is in the area during daylight hours on D1. Furthermore, the
positions of the vehicles should be approximately those of the tanks and vehicles of 10 Corps
will occupy on D1. On the nights before D1 the units of 10 Corps will move into the area,
and the appropriate transport echelons now there will move out. For this scheme to be a
success the most careful plans must be made by 30 Corps, and the most complete cooperation
arranged between 10 Corps and 30 Corps.
b) Area of 9 AustralianDivision. This Division will require a certain amount of transport for use
during exploitative towards SIDI RAHMAN. All other transport should be sent back.
c) Area of 51 (Highland)Division. This Division will require practically no transport, or very
little. 30 Corps must ensure that when the Division moves in to its concentration area for
attack, the density of transport remains unchanged.
d) Area of NZ Division (seepara7). This Division, with tanks co-operating, will capture and
hold the MITEIRIYA Ridge, and later may be required for further mobile operations
Westwards. A good deal of transport will be necessary.
e) Area of] SA Division. This Division will require practically no transport.
26. Orders will be issued by Army HQ regarding the camouflage and formation of dumps in the assembly areas and
further forward. The camouflage will be erected first, before the dumps begin to form.
27. Orders regarding the movements, positioning, and handling of artillery in 30 Corps area will require very
careful organization in order not to give away our intentions to the enemy, but rather to deceive him. Further
detailed orders on this subject will be issued by Army HQ.
28. Work on tracks and routes forward from 10 Corps assembly area will be started now, work being confined to
those places which take a long time to complete. See para. 17(a).
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot B-3

The remaining portions of the tracks will be finished off on the last two nights before DI day.
It is not possible to camouflage long lengths of track, but much can be done by careful organization of
work.
CE Eighth Army will co-ordinate all work in connection with the construction of tracks and routes forward.
It is important that tracks forward should start at the Eastern end of 10 Corps assembly area.
SECRECY
29. It is impossible to over-stress the need for secrecy regarding operation 'LIGHTFOOT'.
Details of the operation will not be communicated below Div HQ, and at Div HQ no officer will be told
anything about the operation except the CRA and GSO 1. All work in connection with preparations for the attack
will be given to officers as part of their normal work, and they will not be told the reason for the work. Nothing will
be written about the operation; all orders will be verbal for the present.
TRAINING
30. All formations and units will at once begin to train for the part they will play in this battle. Time is short and we
must so direct our training that we shall be successful in this particularbattle, neglecting other forms of training.
31. This battle will take place during the period of the full moon.
The initial break-in attack by 30 Corps, the initial operations by 13 Corps, and the move forward of 10
Corps to deployment areas will all be carried out by night with a full moon.
Therefore, full advantage must be taken of the September full moon period to practise operating on a
moonlit night and actually to rehearse the operations concerned, using similar bits of ground.
32. There will be a great weight of artillery fire available for the break-in battle. During the training period,
infantry and other arms must be accustomed to advancing uinder the close protection of artillery fire and mortar fire.
We must have realism in our training and use live ammunition in our exercises with troops, even if this
should result in a few casualties. I will accept full responsibility for any casualties that may occur in this way.
33. The accurate fire of mortars will be of the greatest value in the break-in battle. No troops can stand up to
sustained heavy and accurate artillery and mortar fire without suffering a certain loss of morale; low category troops
will be definitely shaken by such fire, and can then be dealt with easily by our own attacking troops.
34. Tanks that are to work in close co-operation with infantry in this battle must actually train with that infantry
firom now onwards.
35. The individual soldier must be given practice so that he will reach a high degree of skill with the weapons he
will use in battle.
36. Full use will be made of the model in preparation for this battle. Every formation headquarters and every unit
should have a model of the ground over which it is to operate, and on this model all officers will be instructed in the
stage-management of the battle.
Finally all NCOs and men will be shown on the model the part they will play in the battle.
As far as officers and NCOs are concerned the model will be any ordinary piece of ground; the actual place
names must not be shown. As the day of attack approaches more information can be disclosed.
No information about our offensive intentions will be disclosed to any officer or other rank who has even
the slightest chance of being taken prisoner in a raid; this order will not be relaxed until the morning ofD] day.
37. 1 direct the attention of Corps and Divisional Commanders to Eighth Army Training Memorandum No. 1 issued
on 31 August 1942. The fundamentals outlined in that memorandum will govern the conduct of our battle
operations, and will, therefore, form the basic background for all our training.
Battle drill must be highly developed, and a good system organized in every formation and unit.
Unless our standard of battle drill and operational discipline is on a very high level, we shall fight at a
disadvantage.
MORALE
38. This battle for which we are preparing will be a real rough house and will involve a very great deal of hard
fighting. If we are successful it will mean the end of the war in North Africa, apart from general 'clearing-up'
operations; it will be the turning point of the whole war. Therefore, we can take no chances.
39. Morale is the big thing in war. We must raise the morale of our soldiery to the highest pitch; they must be made
enthusiastic, and must enter this battle with their tails high in the air and with the will to win.
There must in fact be no weak links in our mental fitness.
40. But mental fitness will not stand uip to the stress and strain of battle unless troops are also physically fit.
B-4 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

This battle may go on for many days and the final issue may well depend on which side can best last out
and stand up to the buffeting, the ups and downs, and the continuous strain of hard battle fighting.
There will be no tip and run tactics in this battle; it will be a killing match; the German is a good soldier
and the only way to beat him is to kill him in battle.
41. 1 am not convinced that our soldieries are really tough and hard. They are sun burnt and brown, and look very
well; but they seldom move anywhere on foot and they have led a static life for many weeks.
During the next month, therefore, it is essential to make our officers and men really fit; ordinary fitness is
not enough, they must be made tough and hard.
42. This memorandum will not be reproduced or copied. It will form the basis of all our plans and preparations for
operation 'LIGHTFOOT'.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot B-5

APPENDIX C
8 th ARMY OPERATIONS ORDER FOR OPERATION SUPERCHARGE'
OPERATION SUPERCHARGE
EIGHTH ARMY PLAN
MOST SECRET
20 Oct 1942
1. Operation SUPERCHARGE will take place on night 31 Oct/1 Nov. The operation is designed to:
(a) Destroy the enemy armoured forces.
(b) Force the enemy to fight in the open, and thus make him use petrol by constant and continuous
movement.
(c) Get astride the enemy supply route, and prevent movement of supply services.
(d) Force the enemy from his forward landing grounds and aerodromes.
(e) Bring about the disintegration of the whole enemy army by a combination of(a), (b), (c) and (d).
30 CORPS TASK
2. To attack by night from the present forward positions between the 297 and 301 Northing grids. Attack to
penetrate Westwards to a depth of 4000 yds.
3. On reaching the final objective, armoured and infantry patrols to push out farther to the West so as to cover the
debouchment of the armoured divisions and so enable them to get out and deploy the more easily.
4. The flanks of the penetration to be held securely, and their Eastern extremities to be linked up firmly with our
existing positions.
5. The whole area of penetration to be cleared, and organised for free movement, and to be held securely as a firm
base from which to develop offensive operations.
10 CORPS OPERATIONS
6. 10 Corps will break out into the open through the penetration made by 30 Corps.
7. Armoured cars, at least two regiments initially, will be launched through the bridgehead area before daylight on
1 st November and will push out to the N.W., the West, the S.W., and the South.
The task of the armoured cars will be to operate offensively on the enemy supply routes, destroy everything
they meet, and prevent any supplies or reinforcements from coming forward, and prevent any movement from
the forward areas to the rear.
Armoured cars must be prepared to operate on their own for some days, keeping up the stranglehold and
making full use of enemy petrol and supplies.
8. 10 Corps will secure as a first objective the general area Pt 46 in 858299 - Tell el Aqqaqir in 860297. Operations
will then be developed so as to:
(a) Destroy the enemy armoured forces.
(b) Bring about the complete disintegration of the enemy's rear areas.
9. The general axis of operations for 10 Corps, subject to the fulfillment of the task given in para. 8(a) will be N.W.
towards Ghazal Station, so as to get in behind the enemy forces in the Sidi Rahman area and cut them off.
10. The forward movement of 10 Corps will be timed so that the area of the first objective is secured before
daylight on It November, and operations developed from that area as the sun is rising.
11. It will be clearly understood that should 30 Corps not succeed in reaching the final objective vide paras. 2 and 3,
the armoureddivisions of 1O Corps willfight their way to the first objective.
10 AND 30 CORPS
12. 30 Corps will hold N.Z. Div. in readiness to take over the area of 10 Corps first objective vide para. 8, so as to
free 10 Corps for offensive operations against the enemy armoured formations or for a N.W. movement towards
Ghazal Station.
I As extracted from The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Monteomery of Alamein, K.G., by Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, The World
Publishing Company, New York, 1958, pages 121-123.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot C-1

13. Very close touch, co-operation, and liaison will be required between 10 Corps and 30 Corps throughout the
whole operation.
14. This operation if successful will result in the complete disintegration of the enemy and will lead to his final
destruction.
It will therefore be successful.
Determined leadership will be vital; complete faith in the plan and its success, will be vital; there must be
no doubters; risk must be accepted freely; there must be no "bellyaching."
I call on every commander to carry through this operation with determination, to fight their formations
bravely, and to instill optimism and offensive eagerness into all ranks.
SUPERCHARGE will win for us the victory.
13 CORPS
15. 13 Corps will do what is possible on the Southern flank before or after dark on 3 1st October to make the enemy
think an attack is coming on that flank.
16. The corps will be ready to take immediate action the moment it appears that the enemy is beginning to crack.
ARMY RESERVES
17. 7 th Arm. Div. (less 4"h Lt. Army. Brigade).

131st Inf. Bde. (Queens).
These two formations will be held in Army reserve ready for use as the situation develops.
R.A.F. OPERATIONS
18. The R.A.F. are playing a great part in inflicting moral and material damage on the enemy. This is being
intensified, from tomorrow inclusive onwards, and will reach its culminating point as SUPERCHARGE is
launched.
FINALLY
19. We know from all sources of intelligence that the enemy is in a bad way, and his situation is critical. The
continued offensive operations of Eighth Armny and the R.A.F. have reduced him to such a state that a hard blow
now will complete his overthrow.
The first stage in the blow is the operation being staged by 9th Aus. Div. tonight on the North flank; success
in this operation will have excellent repercussions on SUPERCHARGE.
SUPERCHARGE itself, tomorrow night 31st October/1 st November, will be the second blow and a
staggering one, and one from which I do not consider he will be able to recover.
C-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

APPENDIX D
GERMAN ASSESSMENT OF ITALIAN INFANTRY RELIABILITY'
The Italian officers and their men were unready, their tanks too weak, their artillery unable to fire beyond
five miles. Italian troops had no field kitchens and were frequently begging food and drink from their German
comrades. "They're useless except for defense, and even then they're useless if the British infantry attacks with
fixed bayonets." "The ordinaryItalian soldiers are good, their officers are worthless." "The Italian troops have
failed once more exactly as during the last offensive. The reasonsfor this are as follows: the command is not equal
to the mobile direction of battle in desert warfare... The trainingof Italian units does not correspondto the demands
of a modern war. For example, units brought up to replace lost battalionsfor a divisionfiredfor thefirst time near
the front. Officers who had not served since the end of World War I were detailedas battalioncommanders. The
arms of Italian units do not permit the Italiansoldier to withstand British attacks without German assistance. Apart
from the well-known faults of Italian tanks - short range andfeeble engines - the artillery,with its lack of mobility
and inadequaterange (6km - maximum 8km), is absolutely inferior to the British artillery,which is known to be
good Also weak equipment with antitank weapons gives the Italiansoldier afeeling of inferiority. Supply of the
Italian troops is not adequate. Troops have no field kitchen and quantities offood are small. For this reason, the
Italiansoldiers, who are usually extremely contented and unassuming, often come to their German comrades to beg
something to eat and drink. The great difference infood allocation to officers and men has an adverse effect on
morale of the troops. The Italian soldieris not equal to the bayonet attacks of the British infantry. He has not got
the nerve to hold on when enemy tanks have broken through. Continual bombing attacks and artilleryfire quickly
wear down his will to resist. The Italiansoldier can maintain defense only with German support, and then only if
the German soldier bears the brunt of thefighting."
Air Historical Branch Translations of Captured Documents (New Zealand), as sited in Rommel. A Narrative and Pictorial History, by Richard
D. Law and Craig W. H. Luther, ISBN 0-912138-20-3, R. James Bender Publishing, San Jose, California, 1980, footnote 38 on page 179. See
also "Italy as a Military Ally," by GeneralfeldmnarshallAlbert Kesselring, MS# C-015, Foreign Military Studies, Headquarters, US Europe, July
1948 and Beitrag zur Alamnein-Schlacht, unter besonderer Beruecksichtigunge der Kaempfe im Abschnitt der 15. Panzer Division, Heinrich
Mueller, MS 4 D-348 (copy of Gefechtsberichtder 15. Panzerdivision,Schlacht in der el-Alamein-Stelhmng und Rueckzuri in die Marsa-el-Brega-
Stelluno, 23.10-25.11.1942.). Foreign Military Studies. Headquarters, US Army Europe. 1 December 1947, page 22.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot D-1

APPENDIX E
"Sperrplanel Alamein"
AXIS OBSTACLE PLAN AS OF 24 SEPETEMBER 1942
Annex 1. "Sperrplan el Alamein"

Annex 2. italian Obstacle Overview
Annex 3. Detailed Obstacle plan for the 2 nd New Zealand Division Zone of Attack
a) Overview of Mine Box K and L
b) Early Mining Efforts in the Vicinity of Mine Box K and L
c) Detailed Mine Sheet (Bldtter) for Mine Box K
d) Detailed Mine Sheet (Bldtter) for Mine Box L
e) Later Mining Activity in the 2nd New Zealand Division Zone
Annex 4. World War II German Military Symbology
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot E-1

Appendix E, Annex 1.
"Sperrplan el Alamein "
As of 24 September 1942
S Oerr./d, ~el 17/atmeJ'n

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E-2 BRAHN TH DEI'.GRE".,.tinLghfo

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TH9D'.S ADN peainLghfo -
Legend to "Sperrplanel Alamein"
Graphic German English Translation
PanzerDichtminenfeld Tactical minefield composed only of anti-tank mines
UngefihreLage gej)lanterMinenfelder Approximate position of a planned minefield
Panzer Streuninen Randomly emplaced anti-tank mines
Scheinminenfeld Dummy minefield
S-Minen S-mines
Spanndrahtminen Tripwire-fuzed mines
"+ Beobachten-Minen Command-detonated mines
Fliegerbomben(# Stfick) Aircraft bombs rigged as mines (# placed)
ZiindstellefiirBeobachten-Minen Firing point for command-detonated mines
Ziindleitung oder Ziinddraht Firing train or firing wire
•rrrrt S-Rollen (einfach) Barbed wire concertina (single coil)
S-Rollen (zweifach) Barbed wire concertina (double coil)
S-Rollen (dreifach) Barbed wire concertina (triple coil)
Offene Gasse Open lane
Geheime Gasse Secret lane
Sp1?htrupjegasse Reconnaissance patrol lane
Lage des SperrtruppsfiirSchlieflung der Position of troops responsible for closing the lanes
Gassen
Drahtzaun Barbed wire fence
VXXxx Flanderzaun double apron fence
SSteinhazf7n und Kanisterbegrenzung Pile of rocks or canisters to mark minefields
* Versteckte Ladungen Hidden charges (booby traps)
A usgebauterStfitzpunkt Prepared strongpoint
Noch nicht fertig ausgebauterStiitzpunkt Strongpoint under construction
E-4 BREACHING THE "DEVIL 'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Italian Obstacle Overview"
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BREACHING TH "DVL GAREN Oprto Li'ghtfoot E-.

Detailed Obstacle Plans for the 2 nd New Zealand Division Zone of Attack
Appendix E, Annex 3a
Overview of Mine Boxes K and Liii
As of 24 September 1942
.. . :. ~~j ..
S t
p 'A'
\
.1" , [
S+
/ "I
Iilnchluded to help orient the reader. The engineers of the panzerarmee significantly modified the area between mine boxes K and L between 24
September and 23 October (thc beginning of Operation 'Lightfoot'), see Annex 3c. In this overlay, Mine Box L is to the top left, while Mine Box
K is to tile bottomi right of the page. US National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Series T-313, Roll 432, frame 8,724,585.
E-6 BREACHING THE "DEVIL"S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

Appendix E, Annex 3b.
Early Mining Efforts in the Vicinity of Mine Boxes K and LIV
Abt. jI -
-.
vom 2,c. .4Z
.,. 'u Acjusferftigung~r
A-Richt indie c ~PIdý-&:LotiA~7
-Findes fallan Iassdbr) ~ a
rr2..-1~1o
coo Early Mining Efforts
f 41 0rflg6;
~~ 100d
$ ~~~M;F
Lt~ in f I'd,fl~~ cii
f ~ tI. -
Sarebcvon Minenfcdr2'- ~->

'geplaarksSperrgebief, von, Hiner), /<'
feldern zingescblossdrl .
Minanqcisse - -, - ~ -
i Minenpian Nr. 10," Anlage zu Pz. A.O.K. Afrika, Abt. la/Pi, Nr. 1466/42 g. Kdos, yam 28.7.42 (28 July 1942), US National Archives,
El Alatnein-Stellung. Voin
Captured German Records Division, Series T-3 13, Roll 432, frame 8,724,838. See also 'Minenfibersicht A'gypten.
National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Series T-313, Roll 432, frames 8,724,840 to
10.7.1942 bis 31 August 1942." US
8,724,854.

Forward of Mine Boxes K and L (The numbers below correspond to the circled numbers found in the highlighted
box on Minenplan Nr. 10 on page E-7. These numbers are in Obstacle Zone Al from South to North)
53. The 2 nd Company of the 9 0 0th Pioneer Battalion reported on 25 July 1942 that they had laid 200 mines between
the Italian III Battalion, 6 2nd Infantry Regiment and III Battalion, 61st Infantry Regiment in an area 1600 wide and
800 meters deep.
5. The 1' Company of the 900"h Pioneer Battalion reported on 15 July 1942 that they had laid a "Minenriegel vor
Kasta Briehi" of 2419 English mines.
40. The 3rd Company of the 2 2 0 "h Pioneer Battalion reported on 24 July 1942 that they had randomly laid
(streueinsatz) 150 mines to the left and right of the Steinpiste road in this area.
23. The 2nd Company of the 9 0 0th Pioneer Battalion reported on 20 July 1942 that they had laid 100 English mines
along a 300 meter frontage in this area.
54. The 2 nd Company of the 9 0 0 "hPioneer Battalion reported on 25 July 1942 that they had randomly laid
(streumninen) 180 mines 2 kilometers north of Stutzpunkt 1/361.
22. The 2 nd Company of the 900"h Pioneer Battalion reported on 20 July 1942 that they had randomly laid 1800
mines (streuminen) between the railroad embankment and Kampfstqffel Kiel. (Based on this description from the
German records and as marked on "Minenplan Nr. 10", this minefield appears to overlap both Mine Box L and Mine
Box J.)
56. The 7"' Bersaglieri of the Italian XXI Corps reported on 25 July 1942 that they had emplaced 1900 mines in this
area. (As marked on "Minenplan Nr. 10", this minefield appears to overlap both Mine Box L and Mine Box J.)
Along the Forward Edge of Mine Box K (The numbers below correspond to the circled numbers found in the
highlighted box on Minenplan Nr. 10 on page E-7. These numbers are from Southeast to Northwest)
31. The Italian III Battalion, 61 " Infantry Regiment of the XXI Corps reported on 22 July 1942 that they had laid
850 mines at a density of 1 mine per meter of at this location.
43. The Italian II and Ill battalions, 6 2 "0Infantry Regiment of the XXI Corps reported on 24 July 1942 that they had
laid 750 mines to close a gap at this location.
62. On 26 July 1942, the Engineer Command of the Italian XXI Corps reported that II Battalion, 6 2nd Infantry
Regiment had laid 600 mines at this location.
30. The Italian II Battalion, 6 2 nd Infantry Regiment of the XXI Corps reported on 22 July 1942 that they had laid
1,000 mines at a density of 1 mine per meter at this location.
61. On 26 July 1942, the Engineer Command of the Italian XXI Corps reported that II Battalion, 6 2nd Infantry
Regiment had laid 300 mines at this location. (As marked on "Minenplan Nr. 10", this minefield appears to overlap
both Mine Box K and Mine Box L.)
44. The Italian I1 Battalion, 62nd Infantry Regiment and I Battalion, 61st Infantry Regiment of the XXI Corps
reported on 24 July 1942 that they had laid 800 mines to complete the minefield at this location. (As marked on
"Minenplan Nr. 10", this minefield may have actually been within Mine Box K.)
Along the Forward Edge of Mine Box L (The numbers below correspond to the circled numbers found in the
highlighted box on Minenplan Nr. 10 on page E-7. These numbers are from Southeast to Northwest)
E-8 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

61. On 26 July 1942, the Engineer Command of the Italian XXI Corps reported that II Battalion, 6 2 nd Infantry
Regiment had laid 300 mines at this location. (As marked on "Minenplan Nr. 10", this minefield appears to overlap
both Mine Box K and Mine Box L.)
72. The 2nd Company of the 9 0 0th Pioneer Battalion reported on 27 July 1942 that they had randomly laid 250 mines
(streuminen) in the vicinity of the German 1 Battalion, 1 5 5th Infantry Regiment.
45. The Italian II Battalion, 61st Infantry Regiment of the XXI Corps reported on 24 July 1942 that they had laid
700 mines to protect their left flank at this location.
60. On 26 July 1942, the Engineer Command of the Italian XXI Corps reported that the II Battalion, 61st Infantry
Regiment had laid 900 mines at this location.
55. On 25 July 1942, the Italian XXI Corps reported that I Battalion, 6 2nd Infantry Regiment and Ii Battalion, 61st
Infantry Regiment had laid 500 mines at this location.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot E-9

Appendix E, Annex 3c.
Detailed Mine Sheets (Bllitter)for Mine Box K in the 2 dNew Zealand Division Zonev
Overview E- 1I
Blatt 1 E- 12
Blatt 2 E- 13
Blatt 3 E- 14
Blatt 4 E-15
Blatt 5 E- 16
Blatt 6 E-17
Blatt 7 E- 18
Blatt 8 E-19
Blatt 9 E-20
Blatt 10 E-21
Blatt 11 E-22
Blatt 12 E-23
Blatt 13 E-24
Blatt I E-25
Blatt II E-26
Minenriegel A E-28
Minenriegel B E-20
Minenriegel C E-30
Minenriegel D E-31
For the period between 11 and 22 August 1942, Oberleutnant Junkersdorf of 1 st

Company, 2 2 0 th Pioneer Battalion reported that the work completed in Mine Box K included the
emplacement of 7533 mines (1233 Tellermines, 2092 French mines, 3956 Egyptian mines, and
252 English mines), laid at a density of 1 mine per meter (except in the minefields reported on
Blliter 12 and 13, where the mines were laid at 1 mine per 2 meters). Presumably, all anti-tank
mines. In addition, he notes that within Mine Box K aircraft bombs had been emplaced as mines
(31 on 16 August and 16 on 25 August, with 156 bombs as of 24 September 1942 according to
Appendix E, Annex 3a) controlled from 63 firing points. These bombs were fuzed with
tellermines, tripwires, or controlled with pull firing devices. OberleutnantJunkersdorf does not
include the mines covered in "Early Mining Efforts in the Vicinity of Mine Boxes K and LU
(Appendix E, Annex 3b) in this report. In this same report, OberleutnantJunkersdorf noted that
these minefields were marked with a high barbed wire fence with iron stakes on the friendly side.
v This overview of Mine Box K (on page E-11) shows the arrangement of the related "Blitter" (literally leaves or sheets) within this mine box.
"Bldtter" 1, 2, 11-13, I, and II were in the I'"SoUth African Division zone of attack. US National Archives, Captured German Records Division,
Series T-313, Roll 430, frames 8,723,323 to 8,723,346 or in "Historical Minefield Database (El Alamein)," by William Schneck and Fred
Clodfelter, CD-ROM, 1998. The reader should be aware of the north arrow on each Blatt. Most of the time, North is not at the top of the page.
The summary by Ober/,utnantJunkersdorf is at Frame 8,723,324.

OVERVIEW OF MINE BOX Kvi
KK
Overview of Mine Box K as of 22 September 1942 Numbers 61, 30, 62, 43, and 31 correspond roughly
with the northeastern edge of Mine Box K
4..,
vi fI
x K This sketch shows the distribution of the various

This sketch shows planned additions to Mine
(Command detonated aircraft bombs, S-mines, etc.) Kand
and L blatt within Mine box K
the minefield that was placed between mines boxes
as of 6 October 1942
viThis illustration depicts relationship between Mine Box K and its individual mincficlds (as depicted on the subsequent Bl~itter) as well as
later in Appendix E, Annex 3c). It
previous (numbers 31, 43, 62, 30, 61, and 44 on the plan to the top right) and later mining efforts (as discussed
also shows the relationship between Mine Box K and the overall obstacle plan.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

E-11I
L,
S//
//
" ", . Ž.
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E-12 BREACHING' T~jE "DVI' GAREN O9rtinghr

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Blatt 3, Mine Box K
E- 14 BREACHING THE "1DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLight~foot

Vol
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4677
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Blatt 5, Mine Box K
Note: Blatt 13 (page E-24) also adjoins Blatt 5 near its southern end.
E-16 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Liglitfoot

AAI
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7
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i'af~c/ere~nZ/p~nFe/cer46
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Blatt 6, Mine Box K
Note: Blatt 10 (page E- 21) also adjoins Blatt 6 on its northern end.

111)c-1101a0111'1'1J1C1) 026'N- ~ ~ A1`lh~ kn ý,0 7o
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16-
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/+++- " +.' >• -
BRACIN THE° "D VI+ -GARDEN"

Oprto"igtotE2
S/Bit, 1, Mine Bo K "
BREA HIN THE "DEVI uL-'SGARDEN"l Lighf. o

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Blat 13, Mineea
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BMi ne Bo K( p g E-o
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with
E-24 BRACHINGTHE "D VIL'SGARDEN 5COprtoLihft

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TH
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Noe
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(seE-8. pag
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THE "DVL GREN"hf!/
Opraio ' ligfotUei/½j/
St~ndig~e Anlagen Nur f Or den Qlenstgebraucht
I Lagiplan iV66ooo~
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I. riame1 d er-Minensperre: 2. VetI qt an::(4..'....3 inenpIan gezeichnet ami:.Zeý

g . durch/"'/'~L 1.1 ~5Z2 durch, ' r2'&.n2~.
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I Entsicher4ungsdrAhtcn CT-Mintn) ., t'X:..
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.T.Mi.Z...................
10, 8es.1nderes: 3'o vor e:1!011 / . ý ,7•6
s 11-. Vcrý!,rntv.(IIcWh j 12. Abibs&,ng.tm. I.-. IV V

Name, .
Otenstgrad -. ', '-'--- Dlu
. ldpost-Nr-. . .. -
Datum : I" .1 Neue Antage 4Nr.

17ý7-7
<
'V.1
Mineniege "A",MineBox
Note -aBlt 1(aeE2)ajisMieree A t otened
E-28BRECHIN TH "DEILSGARDN" peraionLighfo/

=A/V/
46 /r/,0iczc /,
Mieree "B" Minei/ Box~ K/
BREA CHN HADVLI'ADN"OeainLgtotE2

69/
... 'JpsLQ
"
Np
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Minerieel
"", ine ox/
~ ~ ~BRACIN~
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TEDEVSGR ~ ~ .~ N"OeainLihfo
_____________ //~.//77~ ~;~b~e /,YJ~1
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ra_ aoghfrwr_(othat)edeofMneBx_._looe__thesfelnethogh____egl D i otsow o heoerl
obstcle lan pageE-6)
BREACHING
TH ~
DVL '~
ADN peainLgtotE3
Appendix E, Annex 3d.
Detailed Mine Sheets (B1dtter) for Mine Box L in the 2nd New Zealand Division Zonevii
Overview E-33
Blatt I E-36
Blatt 2 E-37
Blatt 3 E-38
Blatt 4 E-39
Blatt 5 E-40
Blatt 6 E-41
Blatt 7 E-42
Blatt 8 E-43
Blatt 9 E-44
Blatt 10 E-45
Blatt 11 E-46
Blatt 12 E-47
Blatt 13 E-48
On 28 and 30 August 1942, Gefreiter Ulbricht of the 2 nd Company, 9 0 0 th Pioneer

Battalion reported on the work thus far completed in Mine Box L. He noted that they had
emplaced a total of 10,424 mines (5864 French mines, 2742 Egyptian mines, and 1818 English
mines (marks II - IV), presumably all anti-tank mines) at a density of 1 mine per meter and
covering a frontage of 10,590 meters. This does not include the mines covered in "Early Mining
Efforts in the Vicinity of Mine Boxes K and L" (Appendix E, Annex 3b). In the same reports,
Gefreiter Ulbricht noted the emplacement of 11,150 meters of barbed wire fence in Mine Box L.
In addition, the records of the panzerarmee pioneer commander, Oberst Hecker, note that within
Mine Box L the 2 2 0th Pioneer Battalion had emplaced 279 aircraft bombs as mines (202 in
August, followed by 77 more in September).
Vii This overview of Mine Box L (on page E-33) shows the arrangement of the related "B/lteiF' (literally leaves or shects) within this mine box.
"Bhltdte" 4-6, 10, and I I were in the 51' Highland Division zone of attack. US National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Series T-
313, Roll 430, frames 8,723,355 to 8,723,372, or in "Historical Mineficld Database (El Alamein)," by William Schneck and Fred Clodfeltcr, CD-
ROM, 1998. The reader should be aware of the north arrow on each Baltt. Most of the time, North is not at the top of the page. The summaries
prepared by G'freiterUlbricht at frames 8,723,355 and 8,723,364 contain arithmetic and/or transcription errors. The numbers given on this page
arc taken directly from the individual B/l•iler.

OVERVIEW OF MINE BOX Lviii
)~e .i.7 6
roY1 J,
1 11
vii
T i lutaindpcsrlto
, si ewenMn9 n t niiulmnfcd asdpce ntesb e u n lte)a ela
prvosan ae inn fots(sdsuse aeri pedi ,A nx c.I ls hw terltonhpbtee ieBxs n h
overal obtacleplan
BRACIN TH DVL'ADNIpeainLgfotE3
,Zj; 20 ___ ___yq
________IN /JOfc
/-0
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* -4 ~574- ,' 2 4-m~,

-Z5t m- 1 "-foom
I~2~ n A5J ,, 2O*5
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177 CZ LL07'~ &6e- /~176c4:
tl1ia 9*~6 ~~p,.

~~~~~~17ie ausc Go-fo;n14'io 5
E-34~ c4eTH-DVL
~BREACHING5 ADN prto ihfo
v.-
24 ý
44 v Z., ckz a;-J4 ~
e-le 4Pj3~ ~ ~
BREACHING~4.C'~
THE'3 VISGADN Oeaio igfiolE3 ,ODE.
V--
Blat
ine ox
1,
Note
ttheolde
No-cfrene i Itlia-lad
mae mnefcld(motlylikey nmbe 45or~ ontheMinnpla~r.10,agcE-7 whch an lon
th frwrd(orhest
dg o M neBx . ls ot tatBlt 1 (ag -4) s oatd o henrt o Bat . lat pae -4)adois h
west~~ ofBltt1 ;n
E-36BREAHIN THE"DEVILSGAREN" pertionLigflio
A`
P. r.
Blatt 2, MieBo
BRAHN A
TH "D SGREN prto LgtotE3
- c .~at(
3/ ~~( /jKJ0
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loco,
Blat 3, MieBo
E-8 RECHNGTH "EVLSGADE" peatonLihtoo

-4D 00
4r 4
Nr3
Blatt~* o 4,Mn
BRECHNGTHE"DVI'S AREN OpeainLgtotE3

41)00.
I - 27
A'I, 5
BlattBox 5, Min
Noe
I I2 (page.
Blat E-6)ajonsBat 5a is eten otoit
E-40~~2 BRAHN H DVLSGRDN prto ihfo

Nr~
C-X e.
ý1 63
Blt 6, MieBo
Not:
oftheto
Te rght(nrth
ro adoin
en wih he eft(sothen)endof he ,n
ottm ow.TheItaianmiefi~d t te rgh (nrth o
Blatt 6,MieBo.

Q7-~
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N,~'
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ze-flsk-en
Blatt
Blt ,Mn o
an -15 -7 epetvl)
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Note Th e east endof
E-42BREAHIN THE"DEIL'SGARDN" 1wraionLighfoo

fee,
-' ~LiL ~. cv
V,
Blt 8, Mie7o
BREAHIN
"DVIL TH
GADEN"Opeatin LghtootE-4
* V 7
1
-ýL V. K.!
Ii.' i~ ve
'I24
. . .0 . . . . . . .
UA
-~ , 46=:3
1Hnz
316 MI
~&
* ~~lt 9, Min Box L ~ ~ ~y½
E-44 REA HING HE"EVIL G ARDN Opraio Lihfo

B~ath.j 710
Blatt 10, Mine Box L

4-
Bltt11 MneBof
~ ~ ~ ~tenrh
Note:~~~~~~
don ~ ~ Bltk
n paeE4)
fBlt 1
E-46BREAHIN THE"DEIL'SGARDN" peraionLighfoo

*54
I,'k,
Biatt IV• L22
Blatt 12, Mine Box L
Note: Blatt I (pagc E-36) is located to the south of Blatt 12.

-Bic
1'Z
Blat 13 iewo
Noe Blt pg -1 slctdt h eto lt 3
E-48BREAHIN THE "EI'S ADN prtoihfo

Appendix E, Annex 3e.
Later Mining Activity in the 2rd New Zealand Division Zoneix
On 6 October 1942, the 16 4th Leicht Afrika Division published a document that addressed the emplacement
of new minefields, randomly laid mines, command-detonated mines, wire obstacles and material requirements,
which stated that the division still had 4,400 antitank mines, 890 aircraft bombs, 2500 rolls of wire and 375 long
pickets allotted to it. The division directed that in the future both antitank and antipersonnel mines were to be
emplaced at a density of 1 mine per meter, while the command-detonated bombs were to be emplaced at a density of
10 per 100 meters of front. The remaining wire was to be used to provide a more complete tactical obstacle to the
front, while a perimeter fence was to be emplaced around each company. In an area that included part of Mine Box
"K," all of "L," and part of "J," the division reported the employment of 3600 antitank and 7000 S-Mines, along
with 700 bombs, 3000 rolls of wire, 2625 long pickets, and 5250 short pickets. Six hundred antitank and 7000 S-
Mines, along with 1500 rolls of wire, 2625 long pickets, and 5250 short pickets were still available to this sector.
This left an estimated short fall of 3000 antitank mines, 700 bombs and 1500 rolls of wire.
Mine Box "K"

In September, the 220th and 9 0 0th pioneer battalions reported emplacing 455 antitank and 164 antipersonnel
mines in Mine Box K. In October, they reported the emplacement of 3115 antitank and 1213 antipersonnel mines in
Mine Box "K." For example on 11 October, Hauptmann Streitz, commander of the 2 2 0th Pioneer Battalion,
reported that "Between 'K' and 'L' the emplacement of an antitank minefield was begun. 408 Tellermines were
emplaced along of length of 800 meters."
Mine Box "L"

In September, the 2 2 0th Pioneer Battalion reported emplacing 1406 antitank and 64 antipersonnel mines.
For 10 October, Hauptmnann Streitz, commander of the 2 2 0th Pioneer Battalion, reported that "In 'L' - in the western
part, emplaced 82 command-detonated bombs and 432 S-Mines at a length of 450 meters along the length of the
antitank minefield." The battalion emplaced another 288 antipersonnel mines in Box "L" on the same day. During
the battle, the 2 2 0 th Pioneer Battalion emplaced 4751 antitank mines in front of the 2 nd New Zealand Division (see
section 6.7.9. and 6.10.2.2.).
Documents:
1. "Erlduterungenzur Deckpause iiber neuanzulegende Minenriegel, Streuminen, Beob.-Minen,
Verdrahtungen und Materialbedarf."
2. "Vordinderungen im Zuge des Ausbaues der neuen HK.L. von 6.10. - 10.10.1942."
3. "Deckpause zur Karte El Alamein"
ix
US National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Series T-313, Roll 432, frames 8,724,856 to 8,724,867.

Document 1, Appendix E, Annex 3e.
"Er/iiuterungenzur Deckpause fiber neuanzulegende Minenriegel, Streuminen, Beob. -Minen,

Verdrahtungen und Materialbedarf."
v! C . "
Xiv Ge St.)
----------- - -- ------------
draattK z
1. lwcl Z ý oM~Y 0~o

0 '800 j2. 1o 375...
de's ral Z':ri
te'nýA - L1ol
2. !, sch g or,~d.-
2tcr 16 10-
*h -D' tv~ 1 1ii.,ik ard. 1\r2.

s-) :~~ic't
S I Mire auf 1 r
&~ ~ oc .DFrcL1'nf
rhlodernzaur
E-50 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfool

4 11
A
Ali
/C
~ n~-~2 Lr) C3
Q)-
LLU
BRAHN H "DEVI'SADN Operaio Lihtoo E5

Nk
N;
I. 1/-
Sý/
IMi
E-5 BRAHN TE"EIL ADN'Oeainihfo

"Vordnderungenim Zuge des A usbaues der neuen H.K.L. von 6.10. - 10.]0.]942."x
iene~ aa~iien22.
, 31C)ZeOmAtl-ado der t~aAzerarlkee~ .A I 94
flt~~ rUA-ei ix Zuage der.Atilbanes der'mneuen H.X..L.>

---- --------------------
- -
- - -
- - -
-- -- --------------
1.Der 1Nerdrie.-el der Blalle "19" warde v411kouxeXn gerdumbt"

A~s~-ide ax 6.1o,. als waufzwe wien~eu-e*detek 38qie* lbe~fandex
sick im I1ordriegel weiter keime Vimem.-
2. Ju AAGCklU~s am den Querxisemriegel yos 'a?11e "Z" wtarde na`ok OSO

ecX yMmxeriezei Toll i.e.. a 1ANce ,ieYe~et(.kZO
(9
3. Jx Zuwe des Ausloaues der nettem H.i.L w eiX.Mix enriee yen

Deir el Skeill bis ax Fatle "I"nit 2 02.'9 ýT'-Mý ies, in& 1,.'213 S ,-Min e'n
in einer Lixne Tom dca. 4 L/2.km, neoigegt.' 40r,14,figz:,a-dsgespart
wurdeA ki&'.ei nit T- umd S-1Mimen die jetzig'e" S'tellung des`R~tfl.-G.Ct--
St. ?bz.Gren.R~t. 433, nit S-111Iime, der taeioeAbcnt(sSki a-
4. ZwisciaeK ".&-"umd fIL"J warde xit der Ania:e timer. :?z --Mi Ienri e~e1Q
'be;sxmen. 4.8 T-11-imen wurden auf eime Lzii:e Yom, 8*. ii verle~t (a.
5. .Jn "L"' - Ystteil wurdem 832 ieols.-Jesabex iumd lamlas des poz.L.tinexrie--
zeis in e-iner IL4nze Yon 45o, a 432 S-IlimeA 'rerlewt(S.Slihzze).
LA1
Ana -,
US National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Serics T-3 13, Roll 430, frames 8,723,489 and 8,723,490.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighifoot E-53

)inL ufe
vovn
PTr
E 54BRECHIN TH DEVL SGARDN" peraionLighfoo

"Dec/pause zur Karte El Alamein"
c>1 'T'4
~Lc4 I~e~, Arik-Divs

i~. Dv.Gei .1,','taxid, den. Es;1O.-1942,
Za 2.C/4&.Ycis. 3Ausi'ertiguxien
Ois:Cbkdoc,; 1Pz -r _ýl "La 3" /ý os.v 9 Z
()be'r'onmman.&o de'r Panzezn-Arrnee L\fnik-,.
tart I "'C it beabsicht1i-ten Trupen~ei-rsatz wird~ ais

Ln", arýe Io c-ci c ht-
~r
b)t~*i~r~x~erS-c ' ]Ozeiitaie
Cs Arlre'' vorgesehen.'
biJ] er.fo±g iff engrstce 'in~veri5.ehmen. mit cter

Jr ~~iovircc~in.~ie1
i o ~soalo. aer Aiusba-a cer
~ a~r nc e,, n c~i. x'-ctOIfele so weit Zortgeschritten ýist,*
,K.-L h'inmicnendci
miC H.~~Ctn 'eiher smd.
,~ri-n rie tseri Ausbwanzustu-.-n a vrd von. Onr'Div. cccr.A Tag
u. 1el1 a- und. uer C TaG (v2_1 Jal.?i L~estgesetz-bU6 Die ciaburns'-
Mýe F ,tSeU~z C d" ecx S 3ý Tage ist Voneainande 'r un~abh~n.gig.
.i~VC~l vi<ru, der A~, B und C "ag S pe stens au dn17.10.
~cc~buseten. odaiz 'die Umý-ruppiervaqg. dptes'ten~s a Oi.
ist Vorsorcr-.ý ~ct-rcdlcn., ciaB xvvhren~a der' Ulruppierungstage

I akCen. in A~~tbvichr-x. ron' ni'clt en~tstehaa..
C) V irn~un.L2Cn.
11 H~ rni u'en. und MatveriaibedarZ' siehe Plani-
,.)a,3s AnILase 2K
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" operation Lightfoot E-55

.01
I! i:-Iir N
//' u
E-56 BRAHN1TE"EIL ADN Oeain ihf

APPENDIX E, Annex 4.
WORLD WAR II GERMAN MILITARY SYMBOLOGY`I
The symbols in this work are based on the official German handbook of military symbols (H.Dv. 272) of
24.03.1941, (with changes up to November 1941) and the actual symbols used in the organizational charts
(Kriegsgliederungen des Feldheers, (15.05.1941 through May 1942)). Where symbols in the latter are at variance
with the former, those symbols of the organizational charts have been used.
In German organizational charts (and, as reflected here), the headquarters symbol represents two purposes.
First, it indicated the size, function, and mobility of the unit. And, second, it also indicated the headquarters of that
echelon itself, i.e., there was no separate symbol for this echelon's headquarters. For all headquarters units with (and
sometimes important units without) separate KStN (Kriegsta.rkenachweisung - equivalent to a "Table of
Organization and Equipment"), the corresponding symbols were placed to the right of the echelon's symbol. The
same applied to those units that were directly assigned to the echelon's headquarters.
The different functions and mobility additions were used to enhance the echelon's symbol to indicate a
specific purpose. Company-sized units and sub-units symbols were also modified in a similar fashion.
The Germans numbered their units on organizational charts from the right, i.e., the first company was on
the far right, and the last company was on the far left. The same applied to battalions and regiments.
An interesting feature of company and sub-unit symbols is that their-size and shape dimensions could be
altered to fit the diagram being depicted with them. Several infantry companies, for example, were placed side-by-
side, elongated upwards, (so that all weapons symbols could fit within), and only the left-hand company had the
thickened edge used to indicate its size (more of this below). The variations in size and shape followed the original
configuration, so that the basic symbol was still recognizable as such.
The symbols were intended to be mnemonic. The headquarters symbols reflected the units' pennants used
on vehicles or the standards themselves. (These flags and pennants were of different colors to represent the various
combat arms, and usually had a number, letter, and/or heraldic symbol superimposed upon them). Hence, any
German looking at one of these symbols could immediately recognize the unit type being depicted. The colors in
real life were substituted by the unit function and mobility modifiers above and below the symbols. In addition, a
simplified version of the organizational symbols was, for example, painted on unit vehicles.
The mobility of the unit was also quickly recognizable. The two small circles ('wheels') underneath a
symbol identified the unit as being motorized. In case these wheels were over the symbol (applied only to artillery-
type units), this indicated that the unit was motorized by half-tracked prime movers. Elongated ovals ('tracks')
applied underneath the symbol meant that the unit was self-propelled.
All units assigned to Panzer divisions were at least motorized, so that it was thought that the addition of the
motorization wheels to the upright staff symbol could be dispensed with, and that the Panzer-Truppen pennant was
indication enough.
Although the official handbook indicated that armored infantry units should have the halftrack symbol
underneath them instead of the motorized symbol, this practice was not yet followed in most organizational charts at
that time. The diagrams in this book reflect this usage.
The lozenge symbol represented armor. All tank units used this symbol. It was shaped to reflect World War
I tanks, and hence provided a good memory assist.
"Xi"German Army, 1941 - 1942 Organizational Symbols High Command," by Leo Niehorster, available online at:
http://www.orbat.com/site/ww2/drlco/011 Permanv/symbols/ symbols 41.html, "an excerpt of the 176 page handbook (H.Dv. 272 - "Musterftir
faktische Zeichen des Heeres", dated 24.03.1941.

Aside friom a very few specialized symbols, which were quickly memorized, all company-sized and smaller
unit symbols tended to reflect the units' function or at least their main weapon. In most cases, a unit too difficult to
depict easily was instead represented by a box with a corresponding abbreviation inside. In case it belonged to a
particular arm, the arms symbol could be placed on top of or within this box. Where various modifiers applied, these
were all added to the symbol.
Company-sized units had, somewhere within their symbol, a thickened part, usually a side.
Excluded from this were the firing artillery (tube, rocket-launcher, and Army anti-aircraft) batteries. There,
the weapon symbol itself in firing batteries (usually with the number of guns underneath) indicating a battery.
(Firing artillery, in units smaller than battery size was depicted on a smaller scale). None-firing batteries of the
artillery arm followed the normal form of thickening a portion of the symbol to indicate their size. Infantry-type
artillery (anti-aircraft and infantry gun) as well as machine gun companies followed the normal practice, and the
weapon symbols representing these types of companies had the upright stems thickened accordingly.
Where several columns, platoons, or detachments were gathered into a headquarters company or heavy
company (and each of these sub-units had its own KStN), these symbols were enclosed in a box without a thick side.
Units smaller than companies appeared on organizational charts only if they had their own Table of
Organization. Exceptions occurred, particularly if headquarters sub-units had specialized equipment. They were
depicted on a smaller scale than company-sized units.
Staffel
(Detachment) An elastic designation for several components under a headquarters section, these
components being from section to platoon size. Often this was merely an administrative grouping, and the
components were distributed to other sub-units in combat. It could either have its own small headquarters section, or
one of the components' leaders could carry out a dual function.
Kolonne
(Column) An independent transportation unit, varying from platoon to company size, transporting
equipment or supplies such as a bridge column (which in fact did not actually build the bridge it was transporting),
or even as a light 'infantry' column (which consisted of a set number of horse-drawn vehicles capable of transporting
a fixed tonnage).
Zug
(Platoon) An independent unit or the typical main sub-division of companies and batteries. Usually, the 1st
and 2nd platoons in each company-sized unit, and also of independent platoons, were lead by a lieutenant, while the
other platoons were headed by a senior NCO.
Trupp
(lit. Troop; Section) A small unit equipped with specialized equipment; it could also be used as the
designation for a headquarters echelon unit (Kompanie-Trupp: Company Headquarters; Zug-Trupp: Platoon
Headquarters, etc.).
The units indicated below were not depicted as separate symbols.
Halb-Zug
(lit.: Half-Platoon) Some platoons, for example HMG Platoons, could be divided into two parts.
Gruppe
(Squad, Section) This was normally the smallest sub-unit that existed in the German Arrmy. In this work,
the word "Squad" has only been used for infantry and reconnaissance infantry units. All other units of this size have
been designated as "Sections".

Halb-Gruppe
(lit. Half-Squad, i.e. Team) In the case of infantry and reconnaissance units, squads could be broken down
into two parts. Infantry and reconnaissance squads were built up around the squad LMG. Where only one LMG was
provided, the LMG team provided cover while the other team was the movement element. Where two LMG were
available, the teams covered each other in turns. Reconnaissance teams, on the other hand, were trained to work
independently, although they too could function as a squad.
SIZE, FUNCTION, MOBILITY
General Army Group Army Group Corps Division Brigade Regiment Batalion Company Meseneger
Headouarters Headquarter Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters Headquarter Headquarte P atoon Band
CeLnee coV
Motor Panzer Recon- Combat Bridge Railroad
Infantry Transport Troops Cavalry nainsence Signal Engineer Engineer Engineer Supply Medical Veterinary
Mixed Military Traffic

Infantry Mountain Bicycle Machine Dun Mobility Motodaed Motorcyole Tank Anti-Tank Construction Police Control
ArttlryElBk
Mountain Artillery
It
Rocket
II
Infantry Army Luftwaffe Assault
1-
Recoilless
Fortress
Field
Feldern.
Replacement
Sick
Security
Artillery Dhser vatlon Artillery Antiaircraft Antiaircraft Antiaircraft Artillery Artillery
Foot• Pack Miced Halftraok- Motor- Self-

Bicycle Motorized Motorized Motorcycle Towed Towed Propelled Halftracked Train
Horse- Drawn Mountain Animal
WEAPON SYMBOLS
+ I 28rm
t
20gm
I
377mm 47mm
IkYIt 50mm 75mm Bmm
Light Heavy Anti-Tank Anti-Task Anti-Ta -Tnk Anti-Tank Anti-Tank Anti-Tank Anti-Tank
Machine Gun Machine Gun Rifle Rifle Gun Gun Gun Gun Gun Gun
s12 -6ii jL iji iijoi1 1

60mm 81mm 75rm 150gm 20mm 20mm Quad 37mm BSm
Light Heavy ighT Heavy Flame Antiaircraft Antiaircraft Antiaircraft Antiaircraft Antiaircraft
Mortar Mortar Infantry Gus infantry Gun Thro.er Gun Gun Gun Gun Searchlight
INFANTRY UNITS AND MOUNTAIN UNITS
E 1 :7 ( W
bIL
Infantry Infantry Infantry Infantry Infantry Light Medium Infantry
infantry Infantry Heavy Bicycle Pisneer Signal Anti-Tank Infantry Gun Antiaircraft Anrialtoraflt Mounted Infantry
Platoon Company Company Platoon Platoon Platoon Platoon Company Co. (rot) Co. (mot) Recon. Pit, Light Column
Mountain Mountain Mountain Mountain Mountain Hvy Infantry Light Medium Machine Gun Mountain
Mountain Mountain Heavy Bicycle Pioneer Signal Anti-Tank Gun Compuny Antia-tota.tCc..Antiutaitcc. Company Transport
Platoon Company Company Platoon Platoon Platoon Co. (root) [stlf-prep tltd) gs.fpreptlld) inelf-prepelledl (motorized) Column
Infantry Infantry Heavy Motorycle Infantry Infantry Lt Inf. Gun Infantry Gun Lt. If. Gun infantry Gun Lt. Mtn.
Platoon Company Company Infantry Pioneer Signal Platoon Company Company A roi-Aircraft Infantry
(motorized) (motorized) Pit (mot) Pit (rot) (motorized) (motorized (motorized) Co. (mot) Light Col. (mot)
ENGINEER UNITS
Mountain Engineer Light Armored Engineer Road Engineer Engineer Engineer

Engineer Engineer Engineer Company Engineer Engineer Assault Boat Construction Construction Snow Clearin Equipment Searblight
Platoon Company Company (motorized) Co. (rof ) Company Company Company Company PFt.(mwt) pit (mot) Pit. (mot)
CW OC
_ T7C
_ _H
T W~ -Fe7 aýS _
Bridge Bridge Bridge Bridge Unit of Bridge Unit of Bridge Unit of Bridge Railroad Bridge Unit BrldgeColumn Bridge
Column B Column K Column C Bridge Platoon D Equipment Equipment Equipment Combet with Escort Unit B Encot Engineer
(motorized) (motorized) (motorized) Column T (motorized) "H l .. S Bridge Detachment Detachment Company
Engineer Railroad Railroad

Engineer Assault Boat Engineer Engineer Engineer
LightCol.(mot) Col. (mot) Park Company Park

MOBILE TROOPS
Motorized Motorized Motorized Motorized Heavy Armoored Armored Armored Armored Heavy Motorized Motorized
Infantry Infantry Machine Gun Company Infantry Infantry Machine Gun Company Pioneer Infantry Gun
Platoon_ Company Company (Typical Example) Platoon Company
Motorcycle Mototcycle Motorcycle motorcyc M le Motorized

Infantry Infantry Machine Our Armored Car Armored Car Recon. Recon. Reconnaissance Company Recon, Signal Recon.
Platoon Company Company Platoon Company Platoon Company (Typical Example) Company Platoon Lighttol.(mot)
Cavalry Cavalry Cavalry Cavalry Cavalry Cavalry Cavalry Motorized Cavalry Cavalry
Cavalry Cavalry Machine Gun Bicycle Bicycle Recon. Infantry Gun Pioneer Anti-Tank Heavy Company Signal
Platoon Company Company Company Recon.Co, Platoon Company Platoon Platoon (Typical Example) Platoon
Panzer Reserve Tank Tank Armored Motorized

Light Tank Light Tank Medium Tank Heavy Tank Flame Tank Headquarters Tank Maintenance Maintenance Signal Panzer Anti-Tank
Platoon Company Company Company Company Company Detachment Platoon Company Platoon LightCol.(mot) Company
ARTILLERY UNITS
75rmm
Field Gun
II + M~+
7Smm Mtn. 75mm Field
Gun Battery Gun Battery
76mm Cao.
Gun Battery
76mm Field Assault Gun
Gun Battery Battery
Light
I,T 105mm Field 105mm Field
Field Howitzer Howitzer Bty. Howitzer Bty.
I 106mm
Gun
j J
10mm Gun
Battery
105mm Gun
Battery
Battery (GK 1S) (FK 16 nA) (FK 16 nA) (FK 18 oA) (Sd.Kfz. 142) Battery (I. FH 16) (I. FH 18) Battery (K 17) (K 18)
150mm Gun 150mm Gun 1t0mm Gun 150mm Gun 210mm Gun 210mm Gun 210mm Gun 240mm 240mm Gun Heavy 160mm Field 150mm Field
Battery Battery Battery Battery Battery Battery Battery Gun Battery Field Hooitzer Hooitzer Bty. Howitzer Bty.
(K 16) (K 18) (K39) (Hour. Base) (K 12) (K 38) (K 30) Battery (K3) Battery (sn, FH 13) (s. FH 18)
210mm 218mm 240mm 305mrm 365mm 42 600gm 2grm Army S7mm Army 88mm Army Antiaircraft 76mm
Howitzer Howitzer Bty Howitzer Bty Howitzer Howitzer Bty Howi Howi tzer Bty. Antiaircraft Antiaircraft Antiaircraft Searchlight Recoilless
Battery (M 18) (M 3S) Battery (M 1) Battery (Karl Gerit) Battery Battery Battery Battery Bty. (LG I)
Decon- 105mm 10mm 150ram 210mm 280/320r6m Headquarters Pz. Division Assault Army Rocket Artillery
lamination Rocket Bty. Rocket Bty. Rocket Bty. Rocket Bty. Rocket Bty. Battery Artillery Artillery Antiaircraft Artillery Observation
Bty. (mot) INbVW. 35) (Nb.W. 40) (Nb.W. W42) Wfr.40/41) (motorized) HHqs. Bty. Hqs. Bty. Hqs. Bty. Hqs. Bty.
Calibration Printing Sound- Flash- Artillery Balloon Army Rocket Artillery

Detachment Weather Detachment Calibration Ranging Ranging Ol.seration Battery Artillery Antiaircraft Artillery Motor Touing
(motorized) Detachment (motorized) Battery Battery Battery Battery (motorized) LightCol.(mDa)eLightCol.(mot)lighCol(mot) Detachment
SIGNAL UNITS
Propaganda Signal Telephone IMountain Telephone Wire Telephone Radio Interception Signal Radiw
Company Comp-ny Cumpany -Telephone Construction Construction Operations Company Company Company Company Signal
(motorized) (motorized) (motorized) Company Company Company_ Company (motorized) (motorized) -(armored) -(armored) LightCol.
(mot)
REAR ECHELON UNITS
IS. pi F=7
Horse-Draun Horse-Drawn Horse-Drawn 3Ot 6ht Supply 25chm 50chm 6ochrm Water Maintenance Maintenance
Transport Transport Transport Transport Transport Company P.0.L P.0.L. Transport Platoon Company
Col. (16t) Col. (30t) Col. (60t) Col. (mot) Col. (mot) (motorized) Col. (mot) Col. (mot) Col. (mot) (motorized) (motorized) Park
Tire P.0.L. Gasoline MilitaryPolice MiliiaryPolice TrafficControl Survey Survey Survey Mapping Printing
Transport Examination Enrichment Platoon Company Company Construction Printing Detachment Company Detachment Platoon
Det. (mot) Det. (mot) Get. (mot) (motorized) (motorized) (motorized) Company Get. (mot) (motorized) (motorized) (motorized) (motorized)
Bakery Butchery Rations Field Post Casualty Light Casualty Medical Ambulance Horse
Company Company Admin. Detachment Tianspoil Field Field Company Platoon Veterinary Transport
(motorized) (motorized) DetIchment (motorized) Compang Hospital Hospital (motorized) (motorized) Company Col. (mot)
E-60 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

APPENDIX F
GERMAN MINE WARFARE DOCTRINE AND POLICY
Annex 1. Extract from Ausbildungsvorschriftfur die Pioniere,Teil 4b, Minen und Ziinder, H. Dv. 220/4b, I
October 1939.
Annex 2. Special Orders for Mine and Obstacle Employment from Oberst Hecker and his Staff
a) New Method of Arranging Minefields ("Mine Boxes")
b) Special Order for Mine Employment Nr. 8
c) Special Order For Obstacle Employment Nr. 3
Annex 3. Chapter IV. "Tactics," Section VII. "Minefields," extracted from Handbook on German Military Forces,
TM-E 30-451, War Department, Washington, D. C., 15 March 1945.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL 'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot F-I

APPENDIX F, ANNEX 1.
Extract from Ausbildungsvorschrift /fr die Pioniere, Teil 4b, Minen und Ziinder,
H. Dv. 220/4b, 1 October 1939.
F. Mining of Roads, Paths and Areas
134. For mine obstacles to delay enemy movement on roads and paths (march obstacles), the
following are in effect:
a) Gravel, asphalt, or concrete roads are only mined where speed and perfect camouflage are
possible. These roads can only be obstructed by mining soft shoulders or fair weather paths.
There, perfect camouflage is possible. Also with broad roads, these shoulders must suffice.
b) When the mining of paved roads is executed, places with poor paving stones or thin pavement are
most favorable. Perfect camouflage is possible here.
c) This mining must not be too dense and must have great depth.
Even 100 meters or more with only one mine has a great effect. With dense employment, the
enemy detects them easily, and the mines are quickly found and neutralized.
d) Dummy emplacements are used on this occasion, especially on hard road surfaces, as well as
asphalt and concrete roads. The scattering of unarmed mines increases the delay effect.
On the furthest side toward the enemy, unarmed mines are placed for laying.
135. The positioning of mine obstacles on the terrain as tactical obstacles is determined by the situation,
mission, site, terrain form, weather, illumination, time, strength, and number of mines more than
manner of laying and pattern.
Illustration 71-81, especially 77, 78, and 81 give examples thereof.
The maximum extent for continuous minefields is prescribed:
a) for buried minefields go to Illustration 77,
b) for surface laid minefields 100 meters.
Gaps of 50 paces are directed to be placed between continuous minefields. They serve as
protective strips against sympathetic detonation. The gaps are covered by overlapping minefields (see
Illustration 78). Prevent the constant use of protective strips against sympathetic detonation as
passage lanes through the minefield. The wheel tracks and worn paths can be detected by the enemy
and show the way through the minefield.
As more supplies of mines become available, minefields can be reinforced with additional
minefields, which can be laid right behind them, for example, a minefield with 1 Tellermine per meter
of front can be increased to 2 Tellermines per meter of front.
136. Dimensions for Distances between Mines:
a) For buried camouflaged mines, at least 5 paces (4 meters) from center to center for Tellermines.
b) For surface laid, superficially camouflaged or un-camouflaged mines, at least 10 paces (8 meters)
from center to center for Tellermines.
For intact minefields, the probability of effect against motor vehicles of all types is:
2 Tellermines per meter about 60%
1 Tellermine per meter about 30%
1 Tellermine per 2 meters about 15%
137.
a) The form of the squad in combat can be regarded as a prop for the emplacement of mines.
Thereby, each man in the 12-man squad is assumed to have 2 Tellermines. The most practical
form of emplacement is the "Mine Pack" (previously the Rifleman's Pack).
The "Squad Column" is the form selected for blocking a hollow or defile.
By giving up minefield depth, the "Mine Skirmish Line" (previously the fire skirmish line)
swiftly obstructs a wide area.
b) Measurement of emplacements with the two-meter staff or tape measure is cancelled. The
distance between mines will only be paced, in so far as they are not already given through the
battle formations. It is prohibited to emplace Tellermines in depressions (Illustration 24). To
begin with, each man lays down his first Tellermine, then he moves the prescribed number of
paces forward and to the right (or left) and lays down his second Tellermine. After the
F-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Tellermines have been laid down, the squad leader moves to the front of his minefield and
corrects any disparities (for instances, inaccurate pacing between two Tellermines).
c) After emplacing and arming the Tellermines, the Tellermines are buried and camouflaged. The
Tellermines are armed on a special order. The arming begins with the Tellermines laid closest to
the enemy. As these Tellermines are armed, the men move back, and then the next Tellermines
are armed and so on. The arming wires with hook are given to the squad leader. These are kept
so that later the mines may be removed and collected.
138. For standardized training, the following signals are used:
Emplacement of Tellermines- Squad leader turns his head and thrusts out his arm and thrusts
the other arm under it while bending slightly forward with the
upper part of the body down (movement of emplacement);
Proceed to the emplacement of the
second Tellermine- Squad leaders thrusts his arm several times high;
Begin Arming- Squad leader strikes in "Straddle Position"-facing the squad-
under forward bend of the upper part of the body with a slight
forward extending of the arm between the legs to the rear
(movement of arming).
In darkness the same signals are given with a dimmed flashlight.
With the use of a whistle:

Halt! -1 short whistle,
Lay down Tellermine -2 short whistles,
Proceed to lay the second Tellermine -5 short whistles,
Begin arming -twice alternate a long and a short whistle.
139. In case a squad, due to having to employ a machine gun or casualties, has a strength of less than 12
men, they will begin to emplace on the enemy side a part of each squad minefield in the ordered
density (ref. Illustrations 71 & 72), and then proceed to emplace the rest of the 24 Tellermines.
For instance, when a squad is only 9 men strong, it will begin by laying the first 18 Tellermines
(each man with 2 Tellermines), while the remaining 6 Tellermines are laid at the appropriate interval
and echeloned right (or left) by 3 men (each man with 2 Tellermines).
Legend for Illustrations 71 to 81.1
4
-=Approach direction of the enemy
X=Pace
-=FirstTellermine of each man
O=Second Tellermine of each man
The Tellermines are distinguished because there are no tailor-made symbols, especially for large-scale
drawings.
a) For minefields emplaced in the ground and camouflaged, the center-to-center spacing of the
Tellermines is at least 5 paces (4 meters). Only a rough estimate.
140. Illustrations 71 and 72 show squad minefields, patterns, and Mine Packet, in various densities.
Command of the squad leader:

To the left (or right) at five pace interval (laterally between mines) and ten pace spacing
(longitudinally between soldiers) - Mine Packet!
Each man lays his second Tellermine five paces forward and three paces left (or right) of his first
Tellermine.
This legend does not apply for registration on maps and mine plans (Illustration 82 (not included)). Therefore refer to Table 4. "Tactical Mine
Symbols Etc."
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot F-3

12rn'112m.j5'
I 1
55
0 Iq
0 11I i
I iii i~ i4
Iý -1 U
i iI-
Il 11n YIýl
Width of the squad minefield: 15 pace-=12 meters; Depth of the squad minefield: 40 paees=32 meters
illustration 71. Squad Minefield, 2 Tellermines Per Meter,

Laid by One Squad of 12 Men, Each Man with 2 Tellermines
(Schematic representation, with Tellermines marked in a standard lay out.)
iT-Nrnve dess
ý0- 0
Wit
ftesudmnfed 0 pac I4mtr
Det ftesudmnfii:4 ac&2mtr

Ilusraion7. SudMnfed elr ePrMtr
Laidby. On qa f1 eEchMnwt elrie
F-4 BRECHING HE"DEIL IS 0ADN prto ihfo

Command of the squad leader:
To the right (or left) at ten pace interval (laterally between mines) and spacing (longitudinally
between soldiers) - Mine Packet!
Each man lays his second Tellermine five paces forward and five paces right (or left) of his first
Tellermine.
141. Illustration 73 shows the obstruction of a defile with Tellermines, laid using the Squad Column.
V.
(1/
"
'VV
\
Center-to-center spacing between Tellermines at Icast 5 paces.
Illustration 73. Obstruction of a Defile with Tellermines, Laid using the Squad Column,
by 1 Squad of 12Men, Each man with 1 Tellermine.
142. Illustration 74 shows a squad minefield, with the Mine Skirmish Line chosen as the configuration.
II
Lai 0 12MnEc
0yOeSudo Ma ih2Tele ns
Pce
Commnd: t Fve
nteral-ine'kirish ine
echeon g th m io eph ae o n p r ose siut onn teri . Ilutain.

o 7 n 6 s o
N p" er an
1 Le igt ne F--t
BREA CHIN E VSkir
THEe "DMi Li
platoon opn7
minefields, llustration 4
ieil.
platon minfieldIllstraton77aucomanytionefiel.
SquAdCMINefel E
in MinEV LinDEN Opaterain, TLerinhtoo Pe2Mtes
"Skims
Other methods of echeloning are possible; however, care must be taken that the mines along the
seam are placed no closer than five paces (4 meters). The squad leader must balance those cases where
Tellermines are placed closer than five paces. For this reason, he plans for an interval of 1 meter
between individual squad minefields.
Echeloned Right
LL 1' 12
0 . -.-L-- -- ------ U
Plaoo Coman
9 KI
ae=2mee ie20pcs26mtrwdIelrieprmtr
F-6 REACING HE "EVIL GAREN" peraion ighfo

Illustration 75 (cont'd).
Platoon Wedge.
I, 0
12.15 '
I 0
L --
-
K20
* I
1 .
20
52I 'o'•O' 0 0
I 0 o l
32-0
* aI
".1
I.I I
Sa *
0
I I a
01
SI 0
I t
The same level for the rearward

i
squad is not necessary.
II
I ,,' • 1 " . -
t+ii20:I_ __
IlusREAtion 75 ( G E "tDEVLI).DN"OeainLihfo-
Th
aelve oh fowr squa is no necesary
BREACING THE "DVL'GADN Opr.o .ighfo

Echeloned Right
-.......... ..........----------
. --
*
-l I.I
I
I"
•0
____
"
J
D', * .. .. .. .. .
| •
L1 0 I I
II * I
M n wt el r i
L id by I Plt o f3,eE
"•'001 c
• II I
II II.
0 II
I~ I j
Illustration 76. Platoon Minefield, 1 Tellermine Per Meter,

Laid by 1 Platoon of 36 Men, Each Man with 2 Tellermiines
Illustration 76 (cont'd).
Platoon Wedge
F .. ................. . - __-__ , -
0 II
I °-
V 2117V A
° ' * ii
tI I I
C
0 o o
The same level for the rearward squad is not necessary.
F-8 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

Illustration 76 (cont'd)
Platoon Broad Wedge
-_-_--_- - -- -. -~
--
T11 o 0
, ° I 0. °
-- - -1.. . . . . .
0"I ---------
i b I 0 M E i
"LI... - oi o ,
rd-j-v1 0 0 C
01
-~-0
* * •I * F.
I-o 0 " a" |
0 l 0 I 0 0
i o I I
01 I 0 j
~i 0Q 0
0 T17
• t0
• I * I
Illsrto.7 Co pan-. Mieil,2-lem sPrM tr

I
BRAHN TH "DVI ISGADE" Oeaio °ihfo -

. . *..
_ _1 . ..
I
LLt
Ilutato- 7 Copn Mineield 2 elemns eMtr
Lai by Copn
-- of10 en-ac-Mnwih2-elemie
BRAHIGTH-DEI'SGRDN Oprto igfoot F-

Advantages of Echeloning:
a) Makes reconnaissance difficult
b) Artillery effectiveness reduced
c) Slight risk of sympathetic detonation by very large explosive charges (refer to figure 151 (not
included)).
If a minefield was emplaced according to Illustration 77 with 1 Tellermine per meter, then the combined
width is 216 meters.
a) Camouflaged company minefield that is laid with a protective strip through company minefields.
S. .. ...............
. .. .. •..... a T
.5 0x
aX
50ý
a
.t
...........................
a=minefields with 2 Tellermines per meter.
b mninefields with I Tellermine per meter.
Illustration 78. Example of a Minefield with a Protective Strip

to Counter Sympathetic Detonation.
b) Camouflaged company minefield that is laid with a protective strip through camouflaged squad
mminefields.
Y. b
............... j
a=minefields with 2 Tellermines per meter.

b=minefields with I Tellermine per meter.
Illustration 78 (cont'd)
F- 10 BREACHING THE "DEVIL 'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

c) Surface laid minefield with a protective strip through surface laid squad minefields.
• ... .... r . .... ...............
C C
C ox d
",asosl
-_Y n
c=surface laid minefields with 1 Tellermines per meter, according to Illustration 79.
d=surface laid minefields with 1 Tellermine per 2 meter, according to Illustration 80.
b) Surface laid Tellermines (superficially camouflaged or un-camouflaged) emplaced by pioneer

reserves in snow and frost as well as a rapid counter against an armored attack in the depth of the
main battle area for instance. The center-to-center spacing of the Tellermines is at least 10 paces (8
meters).
144. For the rapid emplacement of surface laid Tellermines, the following configurations are practical:
a) Emplacement from march order (Illustration 79),
b) Emplacement by a line of 2 ranks (Illustration 80).
145. The minefield from march order is emplaced upon the command:
Mine Emplacement from March Order! On whistle or hand signal.
J
I. * I
Illustration 79. Teller minefield Surface Laid by I Squad (12 Men), Each Man with 2 Tellermines,
1 Tellermine Per Meter of Front.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot F-I1

For drill practice:
1. Squad X 10-pace interval (to right (or left) or to right and left).
II. 1 st rank 60 paces forward,
2 d rank 40 paces forward,
3 rd rank 20 paces forward
4 th rank remains standing.
Ill. I"Srank remain standing,
2 "drank I pace to the right,
3 rd rank 3 paces to the right
4 th rank 4 paces to the right.
IV. Each man lays his first Tellermine and places in it an armed Tellermine fuze.
V. All 10 paces forward, 5 paces to the right.
VI. Each man lays his second Tellermine and places in it an armed Tellermine fuze.
On order, the first rank arms the Tellermines laid closest to the enemy, the 2nd rank arms the
Tellermines and moves back and so on.
A second squad employed behind the first, results in a minefield with 2 Tellermines per meter.
146. In the platoon and company, squads are placed side-by-side, without echeloning, so that a platoon
front is 90 paces (72 meters) and a company front is 270 paces (216 meters). The density of the fields
is 1 Tellermine per meter of front.
Deep echeloning, for example the employment of one company behind another, results in a
minefield with 2 Tellermines per meter of the current front.
147. The minefield from the line in 2 ranks on the command:
Mine laying from the line in 2 ranks! By whistle or hand signal.
For drill practice:
1. Both ranks at 10 pace interval (to right (or left) or in combination with adjacent man to right or
left)
I]. I"'rank 20 paces forward, 2nd rank 5 paces to the right.
Ill. Each man lays his first Tellermine and places in it an armed Tellermine fuze.
IV. Both ranks 10 paces forward, 3 paces to the right.
V. Each man lays his second Tellermine and places in it an armed Tellermine fuze.
48m-60"
S--------tx-.. ~ '0
L1 0 0 0
0
• 0
Illustration 80. Surface Laid Tellerminefield by I Squad,

Each Man with 2 Tellermines, I Tellermine Per 2 Meters of Front
F- 12 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Arming will be on order. The l" rank will begin with the Tellermines laid closest to the enemy,
the 2 "drank arms their first mine when the 1 st rank arms their second Tellermine and is moving back.
Two squads placed one behind the other; result in a minefield with 1 Tellermine per meter of
front.
In a platoon and company, with squads placed side-by-side, free of echeloning, results in a platoon
front of 180 paces (144 meters) and a company front of 540 paces (432 meters). The density of the
minefield: 1 Tellermine per 2 meters of front.
Deep echeloning (with two companies placed one behind the other) results in a minefield of 1
Tellermine per meter of the current front.
148. Illustration 81 shows a surface laid company minefield with various emplacement configurations
applied.
Also, using the squad configurations in the buried minefield in Illustrations 71 and 72, it is
possible to follow Illustration 81. With the buried configurations, reduce the spacing appropriately.
This minefield, with both surface-laid and buried mines, has the fewest risks against the
destructive effects of bombs, artillery shells and explosive charges.

(The following pages (95-1 16) have been extracted from the German Warfare
Doctrine)
F. ~Zecrtincit L'ot 6tra~cn, Oegett nub'
134. a-fir MIJiteitfprrett, bic aur 2q~crgerung

fehinblcfyr &wccungen nuH~fSrftet unib U3cgett
* a) ecI~otter,, Wjtpf~altý ober 2toujtra~en ivcrbcii

111t butt cruilintf mu cfdpiuffe unb hinmaubfrcic
biefe Straf~en niur anl bell nitcft befeffigten MIailb,
jircifcn ober auf Sumimcrincgcn venutint lucrben.
Zort ift cinmcutbfreic Zarnung inibgficl. waud) bei
brcitcn C-traf~eu luerbcu bicfe TJiduber beiiu~t.
b) &3rrmirntniq inun gcpffnfterteii Ctraf~cn ift auý-
(3uffiiljrc. W~ill gfilftigftcnl ift fCfecf~t0, Ro~pf::
Tcn nulb fcillp~after. S)ier ift einivarrbfreie
e) £icfe crinnc bfiafcu ricfjt a11 bicfjt fein
imib nififfen grufw Ziefe f)aben.
Sellift auf Ic 100m innb barifiber riut chic
MDine f)nit gruf~c Virfung. TO3c 6u bi{)tem (Ell::
fati, bet feinblicf)60, epil-rei erleicfjtert, luerbent
MUinen rhfcf) gcfunbet nulb uitfcf~db~icf) ymnac~t.
d) Gcfyinaiuaycn finb fj icrbci anl~iivenben, tbe%
funlberF anlf fe ftlen~traf~eulbcucu, anid) auf
Wjfpfnftý inib Q3 tonftrafjcu. (-inftreiter ))ot
fcljarfen WMinen crifjQt bic beqbLgernbe 5U3irfulg.
Mit u: iteftelt feilibludittjhub jtet.Fý fdJoric 9Jiulei
sit ucegfeyt.
135. 93ein i flegcn ))on 9fliuenjperren int Nldiube
of-?,~ (ufccr~tý,fperreii enlrdfyiben 23agc, Wtnftrag, (330,
Ubibc, &~bcnformi, 53beinart, Vetter, 23efeucf~tung,
* 3cit, S~raifte unb ~Uinc113af)f fiber &3r~egungattnulb fornt.
Zie T3ilber 71-81, in~Fobfovnbce 77, 78 ntub 81,
* gcbllc T~cifpicle bafilr.
F-i14 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'IS GARDEN" operation Lighitfoot

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BREACHtING rTHE "DEVIL"S GAR•DEN" OperationLightffool F- 19

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F-24BREACHIG TH "DEVIL GAREN" pertionLighfoo

116
2 (rppn4ci ,treffeffloeffe" eing~cfebt, eTgebcn eml
VDineufe~b, mit 1 T:-Minc je 1 m !ý-ontbreite.
ýrni tug uub lit bet Romp~anic werbert bie 03ruppen
nebeucuitauber angeje~t, Staffeting freigefteift, fo bai3
clue Bugfirrite iort 180 (Gcfritt -144 mn nub elite
Rompanicbreite bont 540 ecd)titt = 432 in eutttef~t.
Z)ifjte be-P a-~e[We. 1 T-in je 2 mn &rotbreite.
ten 5PYompaniie) ergifbt en Minenfleb Don 1 rJ7%yjne
aulffb m rontbreite.
i48. Tifb 81 5eigt ehi Plompaiie-iuieithelb, offen
bertegt, be! bern bie betidjiebeniten 23erfequngýý
formten angemuanbt flub.
Wi f5r
ut m oben gectarnt !oerleqte Mineufelber
lit ben (05ruppeitforrnen nata beit ý3ilberii 71 uitb 72
iji bie 35orrn itad) ý3iib 81 m~igfi4). Tel getaruter
&rlcfgung~forin trriugcrn fit bie MUafe c eiýt
h1,redyneb.
ZieleO ~Vliitefelb lit fotwtjtf offeit, wiie hit Qobeit
getarnt uerleft, gegeit ,3etitbwirtunig burci) 3oumhen,
WQrtiflerie geicfjofe nub e4preuglaburtgen ant wvenig-
liege~i~rbet.
C. w12fincilpfiue Hub millclarten att
149. MUinenfperren affer W2rt hiub fatteunnia~ig feft,
p~egqeit, nut if~re 2nftanbfjattuug nub &Jeeltigung
burcf) bie cigeite Zruppe tictrquitelflenunub nut elie
S(Bejdf~rbung bet eigenent Zru~pp 3u berljiubern.
ffierqu roerben titn jeber $3ionlereiitfeit, boon bet
n9iueniterren berfegt roerb en ViienpuIdne jut
6R~Uafjtab 1 : 2500 angefertigt (3Ilber 82 nuab 83).
Uieje iUneuptIdne jhub fbobenititinbig. &3iW615fmuig
jiub jie unter forgfaltiger, i6rtlictjer Unwfurnciuu 51
fibergeben.' 11bergafie nub i~bernaTpijc iji Icf)riht~icf)
an tucibei. Z)ie V~ i it e it p I hi u e erijalten n it r bie
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot F-25

2
APPENDIX F, ANNEX 2a.
Special Orders for Mine and Obstacle Employment
From Oberst Hecker and his Staff
Headquarters, Panzerarmee Army Headquarters, 5 October 1942

Afrika
Abt.Ia/Pi Nr.1924/42 secret command issue. 2 Copies
2 nd Copy
With Reference To: Army High Command General Staff of the Army/General der Pioniere und Festigungen (Pi 2)
Az 80M Nr. 987/42 secret command issue from 28.8.1942.
Subject: New Method of Arranging Minefields ("Mine Boxes").
To
Army High Command
General Staff of the Army/General der Pioniere und Festigungen
1_. Naming:
The "Mine Boxes" in the subject are called "obstacle areas" here.
11. Construction of the Obstacle Areas:

1.) For the position and expansion of the obstacle areas within the context of the El Alamein front go to
Appendix I (drawn in red).
2.) Description of the Obstacle Areas:
Average width 3.0 kin, depth up to 4.0 km. As much as possible, each point of the obstacle areas must
be able to be covered by the heavy weapons of the infantry as well as Flak and artillery fires.
3.) Construction of an Obstacle Area:
The entire obstacle opens on a small battle area of about 500 to 800 meters deep at the forward edge
(for combat outposts or forward deployed companies) with orders to stand within the mine-covered
area.
Here dense, random and dummy minefields are laid and large numbers of command-detonated mines
are emplaced, with fuzes leading to the edge of the positions on the obstacle area.
For example see Appendix 2. (Obstacle Areas H, J, L).
4.) Emplacement Configuration of the Minefields:
A) Emplacement Configuration of the individual dense minefields: Mine Panel.
B) Mine Density:
With dense minefield against tanks 1 mine per meter of front
With random minefield against tanks 1 mine per 3 meters of front
With dense minefield against riflemen 1 mine per meter of front
C) Death of the Minefields: 56 meters for dense minefields (anti-tank and anti-personnel) laid within
a 300meters deep irregularly laid strip.
2-400 meters with random minefields
D) The range of the minefield from the forward positions: about 100-200 meters, each position of
mines within the 300-meter wide strip.
5.) Command Detonated Mines.
Employed in the greatest possible number in the obstacle areas as well as in front of the combat
outposts. Here we use principally captured English aircraft bombs of 10 to 50 kilograms weight,
additionally more mines (for instance: mine clusters of 5 captured mines) and explosive charges
(English munitions).
About the placement of command detonated mines as well as the firing point see Appendix 2.
6.) Fuzing Methods:
Each fuze device used the available electric initiator and pull-fuze (the latter with up to 1,000 meters
length).
2 US National Archives, Captured German Records, Division 4.

The cutting of the firing wire by artillery fire occurs frequently, when the firing wires were not buried.
Due to the large amount of frictional resistance, pull wires cannot be buried.
Because of the vulnerability of the initiators, each command-detonated mine was fuzed with three
additional pressure mines and tripwire mines within a radius of 10-30 meters and linked with
detonating cord.
Foreign anti-personnel mines were also used as pressure mines.
The effect of the command-detonated mines was increased (fragmentation and morale effects), when
they were emplaced upon the ground. Here the business of camouflage toward the enemy is important.
(Here camelthorn, sheet metal from destroyed vehicles, barrels and useless canisters).
7.) Employment of Minefield Fencing (see Appendix 2): A) All minefields received a fence on their
friendly side. In general, this was coincided with the positions wire obstacles. Within an obstacle area
it was given no wire of any kind. B) Near the squad strongpoint(s) of the combat outposts' perimeter
mining and wiring was carried out. (The mines on the enemy side were not marked!)
Ill. The average expenditure of mines, munitions, and material for 1 obstacle area including front mining (for
details see Appendix 3):
1.) Mines: 26,700 anti-tank mines and 8,000 anti-personnel mines.
2.) Bombs of all types -250 (used as mines):
3.) Fuzing:
A) 5 Blasting Machines (or batteries)
125km of firing wire, (captured cable)
250 Electric Blasting Caps
19 km of detonating cord
250 blasting caps
Or
B) 125km of smooth wire,

250 pull-fuzes,
19km of detonating cord, and
250 blasting caps.
3.) Barrier Materials for Fencing:
36km barbed wire (or S-Rolls),
2,400 long pickets,
1,800 short pickets
3 Appendices [not found] For the Army High Command

The Chief of the General Staff

~~a..
NIEVARTIQCNAGt VON UmtNFEcLDERR--(,ILNEKAlE8TEN-,
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F-28 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighitfoot

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BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'IS GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot F-29

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BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot F- 31

~%{t2 r. .H.O.I.
"KUR ZE P7AEHLC. -E
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E Aftas~o~~o
I R CHEF 0( GENRASTSE
F-32 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Ligh/foot

APPENDIX F, ANNEX 2b. 3
Headquarters, Panzerarmee
Afrika
Abt.Ia/Pi Nr. 1468/42 secret command issue. 15 Copies
2nd Copy
Special Order for Mine Employment Nr. 8.
1. Obstacle Areas:
1.) The new El Alamein position will be through obstacle areas
A) In front of our front (for instance: Al and A2)
B) In the depth of the defensive zone (B, C, D, E, J, H, K) - Appendices 1-5
Strengthened.
2.) Purpose is:

To A) to make the enemy's approach and penetration more difficult,
To B) to lure the enemy into the obstacle areas and destroy him it through mines and the fire
effects of the troops surrounding the obstacle area.
3.) The battle is to be conducted such that the general fronts of the minefields are to be defended to the
utmost. The minefields, lying under the constant overwatch of our own fires, can only be cleared by
the enemy with great difficulty and large losses. Overwatched minefields are the best tank obstacle.
On the other hand, from the fronts of the obstacle areas into the depth of the defensive zone, only small
battle groups are defending at this time.
4.) Upon the order of the unit commander the last evacuates with strong enemy pressure on both sides.
The element that evades the enemy is immediately returned again to the battle.
5.) Unit leaders are responsible for the timely closing of gaps into neighboring areas. Special gaps are to
be marked for the combat leadership and reconnaissance of the obstacle areas, the troop commander,
based on tactical requirements, determines the position and characteristics of these gaps. The
commander of the troops deployed in the obstacle area and the senior pioneer of the division are
instructed to work together in the strictest understanding.
6.) A part of the obstacle areas are already completed. The approximate position and design of the
remaining planned obstacle areas in conjunction with the mining of the front continues forward as
shown in Appendices 1-5. Their exact location will be set based on the tactical point of view of the
sector commander, in cooperation with the army pioneer commander. The pioneer commanders of the
divisions will be brought in for that purpose. The army pioneer commander assumes responsibility for
the overall management of the construction of the obstacle areas.
7.) It will be constructed:

Obstacle Area Al My XXI Italian Corps and the 1641 Infantry Division, with the
A2 commitment and temporary support from the army pioneer
H commander (9 0 0th Pioneer Battalion). Obstacle Area K is to
J be begun only with dummy positions without armed mines
K emplaced. Because of the present shortage of wire all
boundaries here are to be marked with stone piles and English
canisters.
Obstacle Area B By X Italian Corps (the eastern portion of B has already been
finished by the 9001h Pioneer Battalion).
Obstacle Area C My Deutsches Afrikakorps (finished).
3 US National Archives - Captured German Records Division.

Obstacle Area D By XX Italian (Motorized) Corps.
Obstacle Area E By 90L"Light Infantry Division.
8.) Technical Details: Obstacle areas Al and A2 are placed outside of dense minefields and placed in
randomly mined ground.
Obstacle areas B-K are, according to Appendices 1-5, to be provided with a strong wire fence along
the outside. Danger signs are to be posted for our own troops. (Additional information on the
locations of the dense minefields is given in Appendices 1-5). The gaps through the obstacle areas are
marked by a simple wire fence. Both sides of the wire fence are left free of mines for 10 meters. The
mining of this area is completed through random mining. Random mines are especially to be
emplaced there, so that an attack of the enemy is checked. Their emplacement follows without a mark
on the ground, their position is carefully hidden.
It. Mine Density:

The densities of all existing minefields of the El Alamein position (with the exception of random
minefields) are to be increased to one mine per meter of front. This will be done through the emplacement
of additional minefields toward the enemy, or only when the enemy situation forces it, on the friendly side.
The new minefields and mine belts in obstacle areas C, D, E, J, H, and K will be laid with a density of one
mine per meter of front.
This warning order is through the decision of 27 July effective.
Ill. S-Mine Employment:

Begin immediately strengthening the defense through the employment of S-mines. Because of the shortage
of S-mines, for the time being these will only be used on especially endangered positions of the front.
A) Approval to emplace S minefields is restricted to the army pioneer commander.
B) S minefields are to be laid with a density of one mine per meter of front.
C) S mines are only to be randomly emplaced in a small extent in special defiles in the terrain. The bulk
of the S-mines are to be installed in minefields.
D) The friendly-side fence of S minefields is to be built especially strong. Numerous warning signs will
be set up for our own troops.
Careful measurement of the S-minefields is directed.
IV. Command Detonated Mines:

Immediately begin the installation of command-detonated mines.
A) Command detonated mines will be laid on the approaches to the forward line at a distance of up to 400
meters. Their triggering requires special observers to find the enemy.
Since all types of mines can be command-detonated mines, especially heavy improvised mines and
aircraft bombs will be used. Aircraft bombs will be arriving in 2-3 days at the forward pioneer parks.
B) The main effort for the emplacement of command-detonated mines is in the approaches, in defiles and
likely penetration points.
C) Fuzing with all available means is authorized. An emplaced explosive charge is sufficient to cause the
detonation of a mine or a bomb.
Attention is called to the following:

Electric fuzing with blasting machines or batteries,
Non-electric firing systems with time fuze and detonating cord,
Pull firing device with time fuze 24 or
Safety fuze and pull wire.
V. Contamination of Wire Obstacles:

Immediately begin strengthening wire obstacles through the emplacement of booby traps and Italian anti-
personnel mines.
A) Booby traps in wire obstacles are to be small explosive charges, detonated through the movement of
the wire, yet not destroy the wire obstacle.
B) Use all types of explosive munitions with pull fuzes.

C) The Italian hand grenades can with simple means be used to make a light anti-personnel mine. Their
employment in wire obstacles is called to the attention of all Italian troops.
VI. Overwatching of Mine Lanes:

All of the mine lanes are to be overwatched by pioneers or infantry pioneers.
Be prepared to lay rapidly emplaced obstacles especially mines to quickly close the lanes. With the
shortage of pioneer power infantry will be employed with only short training in rapid obstacles especially
mines.
The tactical leader of the sector is responsible for adequate security measures especially for rapid closing.
This warning order is through the radio traffic of 27 July effective.
VII. All-Arms Engineer Missions:

The strengthening of positions, wiring and installation of dummy minefields is the business of the pioneer
services of all arms. Your attention is called once more to the shortage of pioneer forces.
First reference to decision of 23 July 1942.
For the Army Command

By Order and Proxy
Signed v. Mellenthin
5 Appendices! [not found] For Accuracy:
Oberleutnant

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BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'S GA RDEN" Operation Lightfoot F-39

APPENDIX F, ANNEX 2c.4
SECRET COMMAND ISSUE
Headquarters, Panzeranrnee Army Headquarters, 10 October 1942

Afrika
Abt.la/Pi Nr.2138/42 secret command issue. 6 Copies
6 th Copy
Special Order For Obstacle Employment Nr. 3.
1.) X Corps and Jaeger Brigade Ramcke as top priority construct a new front between grid line 255, Deir el
Munassib and Deir Umrnm Khawabir. There, where the line of combat outposts are not mined like the
approaches to the M.L.R., carry out the strengthening of the defensive power of the first line through antitank
and antipersonnel mines in the fastest manner. It is important for everyone for the defense of the corps sector to
check the minefields, especially English ones, that they have been thickened. Report the execution and results
by 25 October. Established gaps are to be closed immediately.
To the X Corps and Jaeger Brigade Ramcke will be given priority for the supply of mines and obstacle material.
2.) Hill 62 (1.5 km SSW of Deir el Shein) is to be secured by Jaeger Brigade Ramcke against tanks and infantry by
including it within the combat outpost positions and through immediately emplaced mine obstacles. (Verbal
Go-Ahead).
3.) XXI Corps and 1641-' Leicht Afrika Division urgently secures the new M.L.R. between obstacle areas with mine
belts.
The delivery for the mines required for completion of the construction probably follows on 20 October 1942.
With the withdrawal of the M.L.R., the area east of Obstacle Area "K" as an approach is to be overwatched day
and night, so that the current strong minefields remain effective against an expected tank attack.
Inoperable firing wires to command detonated mines are to be removed. As far as possible, the valuable bombs
are to be linked by detonating cord with a mine.
4.) For the present, no further barrier materials will be available to the D.A.K. for the Qatani strip. The Qatani strip
will be maintained primarily by the D.A.K. (It is important to avoid accidents).
The open and secret lanes as well as the gaps are to be secured. Pioneer forces and barrier materials are
provided for the rapid closing as the enemy attacks. The intended employment is to be reported.
5.) The troops are once more to learn that:

a) A minefield only has a purpose when it is defended;
b) Antitank rninefields constitute little if any obstacle to infantry;
c) With the currently small number of anti-personnel mines, especially careful overwatch of the minefields
with small arms is of great importance.
6.) With all new mining, immediately reduce 20% of all antitank mine are to be secured for resumption.
The most careful management of the list of mine plans is indicated.
For the Army Command

By Proxy
Distribution (Excerpt)
Draft = 6th Copy
XXI Corps =1I" Copy
X Corps =2ld Copy
D.A.K. =3rd Copy
4US National Archives - Captured German Records Division.

1 64 th Leicht Afrika Div. = 4 th Copy
Jaeger Brigade Ramcke = 5th Copy

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APPENDIX F, ANNEX 2d.
Pz. Pi. Btl. 200 Battalion Headquarters, 8.8.42

Abt. la Az. D
Br. Br. Nr. 247/42 geh.
Secret
Experiences in Mine Employment in the Last Months
1. Tactical:
The employment principles have once more worked completely. A division of pioneers as reinforcements have
always proved inappropriate. Pioneers, especially when only available in limited strength, are instructed to
cooperate, as this has shown to be more favorable.
11. Technical:
I. Mine Types. Except the German Teller- and S-mines, English Mark 11, IV and V were laid
without difficulties. With the Egyptian mines, some special safe handling procedures had to be
established.
2. Installation times. The mass of mines was laid during night operations. Special difficulties
were caused in attempting to lay the mines after a pattern caused, above all due to enemy action
and terrain difficulties (rocky ground). The installation of S-mines at night and in enemy
proximity appears advisable only if one does intend to take them up later.
3. Methods of Emplacement. The past schemes have worked satisfactorily. During direct enemy
action and at night the pattern sketched in the plans worked best (Anlage [appendices] 1, 2).
Here could all things be brought to full employment with partially trained replacements at short
notice. The double stacking of Mark II mines, as well as the installation of bombs encountered
serious difficulty in rocky soil. The time, which must be allotted at beginning, does not always
stand in relation to the number of mines laid.
4. Minefield Marking. Marking the friendly and enemy sides with a high wire fence is most
appropriate; a low fence is too easily overlooked and driven over. Friendly and enemy marking
should appear 500 - 800 meters away to deceive the opposition. It is often a simple matter to
build at this distance at night, above all if the minefields do not run in a straight line. K- and S-
concertina rolls have proved useful as well for fast emplacement.
5. Mine Clearing. The English mines were generally easy to recognize during the day because of
their poor camouflage. The battalion has suffered larger personnel losses only because the
forces used in mine clearance in all cases had to create for themselves the conditions necessary
to proceed with their assigned work, i.e. overpowering the enemy directly covering the mined
obstacle. The mine detectors have proven themselves well, if maintained, that it is extremely
sensitive in a combat zone.
6. Successes Through Mine Employment. The defensive power of mines was proven again
during the English attacks around 21 July. Enemy forces were not only denied their freedom of
movement, but numerous enemy tanks and motor vehicles were put out of action by mines.
signed Andres.
Hauptmann and Battalion Commander
F.d.R.d.A.:
Oberleutnant

1. Anlage zu Pz.Pi.Btl. 200, Br.B.Nr. 247/42 geh. Copy
Description of Mine Doctrine for the Emplacement of

1 Tellermine per Meter, or 1 English Round Mine
_7_ Squad Minefields of 1 Tellermine per Meter

For the emplacement of 1 Tellermine per meter, the rminefield must
be divided into squad minefields according to figure 1, which are
S''* then appropriately aligned with the entire minefield. For a squad
S.i . -minefield one needs a squad with a strength of 1/12 (i.e. 1 non-
commissioned officer and 12 enlisted soldiers). Each man lays 2
. mines. Prerequisite for exact and fast mine emplacement is careful
training, practice and experience within the squad. Each man must
stop at a certain direction and exact pace count. In the case of
- X nocturnal employment, particularly on dark nights, experience
:. indicates that these difficulties result in inaccurate emplacement or a
significant reduction of speed.
0 ,For this reason the company created and tested a Tellermine doctrine
0 <- M--•• ý- 0-o for I mine per meter. The instructions are given by a teaching troop
............. •-- - of 1/6. The carrier troop of 1/12 lays the mines as directed at places
------ 30 X -- ' marked by loops of white engineer tape. Since the squad minefield is
too large to be covered by this instruction, it is divided in two.
The first part (figure 2) gives the distances. The markers are made of
linen bindings, parachute cords or the like. To that, according to the
,, 2~. illustration, place and fasten the white loops. The first part of the
k r- lesson is demonstrated by 4 men according to the process of the
minefield.
Figure 3
The second part of the instruction covers the gaps. It is produced like
•f• !_0 . the first part, and is continued by two men.
BRAHN Tp
* 1*
BREACHING THlE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighifoot F-45

Emplacement occurs in the following manner. After the basis of the minefield is fixed, the first part of the mine
lesson is laid out by figure 4.
Now Part 2 of the teaching troop (2 men) follows and behind it the
1k carrier troop 1/12 (figure 4). Part 2 of the lesson now puts point "a"
on point 1 parallel to the basis. The first file of the carrier troop
puts its first mines on to the points a, b, c.
P ,8 Part 2 of the lesson one takes up and again places it parallel to the
"basis at point 2. The first file of the carrier troop puts down its
second mine. Thus Part 2 of the lesson up to the point 8 is always
6. placed in the same manner. and the carrier troop in each case lays its
.-P. mines.
"ThenParts I and 2 of the lesson is taken up and placed on the left or

-p right, with the next squad minefield, while the carrier troop prepares
new mines to lie according to the lesson.
_,. °-- In the same manner one can also lay 2 Tellermines per meter with
""2.3
. appropriate changes to the Tellermine doctrine.
F.d.R.d.A.:
Oberleutnaht
F-46 BREACHING THE "DEVIL IS GARDEN" Operation Lightffrot

Anlage 2 zu Pz.Pi.Btl. 200, Br.B.Nr. 247/42 geh. COM
Description of the Emplacement of 1 S-Mine per Meter
Since with emplacement by S-Mine doctrine one often does not know the local soil conditions in the places where
the mines are to be placed, which the S-Mine doctrine determines, one developed the following types of
emplacement.
Placement of the base line [Basislinie], fixed points [Festpunkte] and auxiliary points [Hilfspunkte] occurs as with
the emplacement according to the S-Mine doctrine. 2x [paces] from the first comer mine is the safety stake
[Sicherheitspfahl] struck. At a distance of 20 meters the numbered intermediate stakes [Zwischenpfdhle] are placed
up to fixed point 1. The fixed point is specified and marked by a large stake and stones lying about.
The fixed point is secured by three auxiliary points. They are placed at a predetermined distance and pace count
from the fixed point to the safety stake and from fixed point to the auxiliary points. In the same way, at the ends of
the minefield, safety stakes, auxiliary points and fixed points are set.
Troop organization:
a) Survey Troop
b) Fencing Troop
c) Layout Troop
d) Digging Troop
e) Emplacement Troop
f) Security Troop
The strength of these troops depends on the number of non-commissioned officers and crews available.
For the method of emplacement, see the following sketch.
_ J+5_
H -4P
yr-- _ ,~~ ~~ ~
:-
-4- *,•-3+|r. .- "• .- , i ,• -
In the same manner, 2 S-Mines can be emplaced per meter, by doubling the number of S-Mine rows.
In opinion of the company, sympathetic detonation seems impossible with this manner of emplacement.
F.d.R.d.A.:
Oberleutnant

Abt- 19. Az. D
Br.Br.,Nr. 247/42 gobh.
YErfahz-..ngcn im lMinenoinzatz der lotzten IUofats.
Die EinaatugrundtLitze haben sich erneu~t 'roll bew~ihrt. Rine

Aafteilu~ng von Pionleren unter Zagat~Lrks hast sich setts ale
unzweok~lmig ervwiesen. ?ioniere, vorallem wena mar wanig Kra-f-
to zu~r Verflgun~g stoeher, auf Zusanr-mnarbeit eanzwawisen hat
eich ale vorteilhaftor gezeigt etle eine Unterstellang.
11. Technischen:
1. 1lineaaxteh. AuBer den doutechen T- an'd S-Y-inen warden engi.
M~ark IIv IV u. V ohno Schwierigkoiten verlogt.
Bei. den 8-gyptiaohen NAinon witrde ein. geringe Handhabuana-
l3icherhoit. featges'tellt.
2. Einbauzoiton. Die )iasee der ?Linen wuxrde im Naahteiziaatz
verlegt Feodero Schwierigkeite.nbereitete dabei. das Ver-
legen nach Schoma, voirallem bedingt duro~h Feindoinwxlku~xig
and. GelAndeschwierigkeiten (Poinboden).
Eirtbna von S-4¶inea bei ?Nacht and in Feindntihe erscheInt niir
ratercvav voin gin aptoroa ).ufnebren niclit Piolir in Frege
komrnt.
3. vorn ung(a~rten. Die biaherigen Scheinn habon Bich bewfl-irt1
Bei anmittelbaror ?eindeinwirkuang und boi Nacht hat sich das
3
in der anluge skizzier'te Schema bestens bewahr't (An-lage 1A~)
Hierbei, konnten vorallen. Dingen die zum Toil kurzfristig
nausgbildeten F-reaty.annachaften vall zam Einsatz gebracht
Dtaa do~ppelte Verlegen. von bJAark II-Minon, soawie der Einbau. von
Bomben at~iit boi felelgen Boden auf gro~o Schwierigkeiten.
Dio Zeit, die da-fUr in Anzatv. gobraclit warden =uB, steht niclit
tIzzar Im Verhliltnis za der ZahJ. der eiagebauten Minen.
4. Kennzei hnu~np nnedr Begrenzung freand- und feind-
T,-,nts mit hohem Drahtzaun. ist am ~we~ieon'drx
Zatin witd za leiclit tUboreehen and damit tiberfabron.
Fixcund- and. feindwiitige Bogrouuang 500 - 800 intr. auaein-
andecr mu. leogn ersehait ztir TtUaehuxig doe Gognera zwook-
xntiI3igo In diesemz Abstand. zu -batie ist bei Nacht oft ziicht
einfachs vorallem wenn die IMinonfulder niclat genadlinig
vorlaufen-6 Ala gut braucbbar - -rmil schnell ausazle'gn.n
habon si'ch K- and S-Rollert erwie nea.
F-48 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighitfoot

5. Minenirgmen.- Die a ag1. lhtinea, vaz*,a im allgemoin/ W,-,gOXI
iErer sckie oht~en Tamung 'beai Tag gu,~ renn D"e Bti
hat grugare. pe'riajneUe Ausfal11 detadirh orlitten, dah die ztmm
Millelrg~w~ eing~ietztei Xri~ft a in a lien P"tien sieli grat
die Yoreausntzzng96a za ibhrer eistatlicban Arbeit, d.ho Nie-
derkcupfuang dea unrnittelbar auf die Ilnnpreeindirken-
don Faindect schaffen mniite.
Das Minennuchgeo~bt hat sich gut bew~hrt, weanz gleich BichL
erneut. gezeigt hat, 4asB as im Fenerbereich A.ugerat *nipfind-,
liCh iiet.
6. Erfolge du~rch Eiaeneinaaatzo Die Abwohxkraft der !Linan hat
sich bei. den englo Angrif~fen urn den 21#7. herusn erneutt
gezeigto Die fdlo Xrftte wurden aicht nu-- in ihrer Bewegungs-
freiheit gabindert, sonilern zahjlreiche fd1."Panzer and
Kraftfalrzeu~ge waLrden da-rol 1Minem aauetr Gefeclit geaetzt.
gez. Andrea.
Hw.ipt~mann and Btl. Kdr.
ob erleutnt;&rit-
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Liglqfoot F-49

7- BoeachxribWig o~nem MWWi " 9ý-'ýferloeg
1,b* : V*on:
1T-?Aine Vil 1m~, 64ir 1. engiv3. au~4mlin
GruE22n.rmiuanfeld 1 -T-Mino auif I. n

F"
Boi der YVJexlig~,uart 1, T4Xiuf. daf 1 a miuB
deaa )1±nenfeld in Grupponuid!.0uf1d*Tr. Abb. 3I
edxfgstoilt werde-as d~i* 4.a=,1daz eutepreochn-w
ciodon Yg*arlfA dein Gai06itxdfq14QS anplaaader ge-
-egt W.Iinon.,Vorsa.Restimzg fur ar

30 4Kae
und vohii,11es Ypriegeii der Xlar ta-b s~rjf~ti-
go .L.Ja..dag Ma ud Fxf-'-- imuerhalb der
' '~Gruappe. Joder Nana ixz gn.
ex bectimit at1
0Rohtun~g
und genaxue Shrittzahlen irnaehaltera.. Be± lllt
p:l ichotz Rinn1atzx, inebosondere in don du~nklan
V Niichtea, orgobea sioh orfuh ungagem
SSchvwierig)keiten, die zu unngnauoza Verleeon
dabei
odor zta bedouteader Herobsetsuang des Tompos

f U-ire m.
Aus diorsom Grundo ha~t die romzaipee eiao
2'. T-i4LAnealolxre fir 1-Minie suf I EL ý;aobafferi
* ~, r unci Bmu8)pobieX't."Die Lehwo wird vom einem
Lp~hermtrupp 1/6 gehalten. Der Trggortrtapq
1/1~2 vcrlogt &=an die lMiren'sn don, an der
I/)hro durch. Schoiofen. wi weif~e.m Trnasierband
g cmizejc~amrouon StiAlon. D~a daq3 Grupp~xio
fcad
zuS ietpt am durch eino'Lehre iibor-
dcocit zu wno'deng imt diami ia zrai Tolle zer-
A Dor orsto Toil- (. Abb6. 2 ) gibt die AbsUndi-(e

anv Dieo L-ihro wird anda Bindeleinan, Fall
4 e~~~ohtrxmchnifrea odor~ Uhlichen agrti
-~~ An don, aum der Abblld~Ag ersio)htlIchen Stel-
ormte Toil der L-ohre wird' von 4 Mann ant-
£cprac~aend dexn Vor3.nuf des Minoenfedea ange-
Der z2icito Toil. der Lebro gibt die Zwlaohou-

/ z1g-tuma an. E~r iet gefortigt wi~e der erste
Toil, nund iwird von 2 ann angobhalten.

Da Yr1~sesbihtaf A-t. ffachdea2' die toida
!a~c~
~* iiufede fat~~et at3 wr eTel1 der Xinenlebre a'a-
1u.zi fr1 Toi 2 'der Lehr catx'up(2 Im

un.hiter 3rn4~
T~r~or rPD 1/12
Ab,4 )'eTal 2-4er L~hme vird: eoti
4asI6 go egt. Dig, orat oe
g~irtupps logt ibre iris )Liti in dies
Pwnkteo bo
Tel-2 der, Lshre, wlrd aufigno=-eu lxnd
andelegt. De rt ot dsrtgrtip
legt lhre-zweleXita~ne ab. ,So' wird. Toil 2-
deL hr is m Au2mktý4ii~ in ei
chaaaalst'ud
Ar drTr~lgertrupp
* le gt jGewil13 88ifle mAiner inaid.
-p i=n
, wird Toil I.wid 2 dex' Lehre' sufý-
gononmaJI und links oder reohtiu, beiim
ndichstern Gr arunefl ele ~gt.
CL vdhzend d~r Trgertru~pp die 'von ihma
_P11 t' erlogton 1XnaeneinbAut, wa~rden vo-m
7 ~-i, ~S - ,-y ni~chaten Tr grl-rup ..bereits3 naue
I i~nen nach der~Lahro verlegt.,
6 1.n SleichO3? Art lcan- man naah iont-
6 6 prochendori Urmbnt der IT-Malraehx.8
6 ~~acb.e 2 T-iMineai auf 1 n verlegen,
d .ý
A.
Obcrleutnantil
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot F-5 I

Pt ýaPP-tLBtl., 1200, 247/42 0 nchh f
B6.3hceibtin f1bor dac Velee von S-Yllnzn I Maite auf 1, m
Da bei do=a Yerloegn mitt d~r S-inealchr- die Ilanon bol don
hieontgen lDcde verhltrisnt~en 8fterp, ntoht cm don StO11on
oirkgobaut w~rdea )~nnans iiolche dice 3-Z.:'In~onlre bqE3-zAl,
ist folenidzo Verlegunimart entvrickalt wior'don.
IDaz Anlagea der Jiaunodcxr F~oslpunkt-eumid IIA-1ispuxkta
gechi~eht wie belmin crlegan mit dor ianoao 2x von dor
urLaten E~ckninrto wird1 der S3icherheitsjpfchl ialzu
A Ab-
stam," von 20 xi'crfolgan. 'die ~w Zwir± honpf~lblo bipo
u12d urzheriiegandi ýjtocUnom at-itgalegt und gokermyltch2ot.
r oz P, tpnitr vixd durcth drol Jilfnmankto 'naiohort. LE yj~
fntlge nýtellt 1,tftrwingj LmdI -. irX ~ 7ah ~I 'von) Yc.ntnkiA;-z ... 0-a
Iliii: oprl-t £l
.4P h gl- ioil o r tx o.adn.
ar, c'ad c ! Fo lda r ~.13her
Ix) AVorurosmm 0trup

b) rit,;otqzpp
0)Ab
3- tr P
dN
-A.
(Ž44
F-52 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'IS GA RDEN" Operation Lighffoot

Nac 40 a ich de Ae aooi~~
DatconatloniipUber ý.,
tragwag be~i ~ Y~e
Ob erleutavtzat

Annex 3.
Chapter IV. "Tactics," Section VII. "Minefields,"
(Extracted from Handbook on German Military Forces, TM-F 30-45 1, War Department,
Washington, D. C., 15 March 1945 .) 5
Secton Vii. OvN EFIELS Marttch totjeea has ci i itise gminthIotin at 4 is

iniocatetd -with the letters, ,11K,7. The G~ermans
1. Genrilal uset the onaa•,;viica as rt it!h and always proceed inl
TI Mak
a ourrm xtensive ore of mt-a It-i Mkihr stirvex frotin tite frientdly toward thc ucirtym
they Consider a. mlost effeeiive tifens erasheixa htiti dvnaeost
?c nficid a are tol. i 'idetkcheflyi to rocr-ate belev thti s',ot"T st
actions anid ret teats, al ullit-ittcl ntc s siad chain of referenee Pt-intS 600 lo
a55-onatinuouts
of the at in offensive ztitt ot i- for. flankc 1'rtectio- 900 feet ap~art. throughi a <-ivsiun sector. This
In a static situiation the. Ge-r-oy'l-S rep-rýd chain cl!1 hec used to di tttt ocll the location of
£ icli as an letel of tipe f ront I it-' ill n titerw, Irettlache, olb.- n and4Pillbotxes, as well
Ivi ou tt accord io to an ov tr-all trk ptt d & as' Iiinefield a. 1I1ividis oal I0 oilts are destgnated
Ope(d itn Close. (ol.4Tnt60t
t i N~tth is- ,-- tl'c fivlIs
i th~ wit Poioata a itmetal startitng~ oin the rig'ht flank
of foec of all w%-ap~ors. NVitititt retcoti-o n:,ts of titt div-tajon s(e--dr
stattdard Get-man doctri-ic for iii to ftc 1-
has he(_en notodiiGd. hIn at di of Iayh)'s-nvs4t-sl ilt- 3. Laying of Minefi iddi
field in fromt of t he ttn Jaittmt
of iestor
t b a.e PAtvtwtiza. To as-ante the greatipsii
tI't'ttt-t m A il twwowt .stin t tttt it- ftn-ti- citý I-true laid outtt in
trinefi edda rio-tooly folits
t
edwiitti
pt-ptC tl' tt ttatt 'tl ttt pat tt er Dia.TeQmrra ta nae an ecept ion to thi
2.f Mnefildspaci
Srveing ctt-, howecver, hn sectors whore, thea'y do nto!
2. Min{'teds
Srveyng o Uiinn to un clct-al e oiftet-tsivo actionrs. Thcro they-
TIhe Gerrn tans consfider it ttece s;r e to nstree' th 4 tspetraei the rotr ait-repttlat-lys in tite aremti tt--
lnvot-titr of nOtitelids wstiOtlai taulto ies "400 tweaitt tlcftttse Positions.
the vanhwftcltta. Certn~tt enrjletti 'el ilsntv The main blicks of a it aior sod tankl toin efi cid
to choose rt'terence o hnps (loopnk. ort FPt ) Idd itn Iifnorotpat tn ttn Orally coeittt SIof attt-
tot- tnntoeiekld whkichl easýils ctan r iA t 1 inno1i ~ o mnea wtto, a ajs:'hittsiig oif atttipersotttei
a 1 araecl erstia t tlte ittiQO.t -ýsc.itt-i o: tx in it tie ttra-a'trt' edge- or the fildl~. Bloth
1 troct-t roaldsý, at thIe wie dg(i at vill",%
- 0 st- 'i type0 n ax'l e fittet-l seitis anti-li f i:-g dIe it-a tontin
st-.it favsormillc- lt ~
tit't it ::itt ho dwo' iTh-It cof ii' ~l
a-t-cottl
ic O nl Itistits htave trip wit-c'
itruityt ttt
aif ~
Insot Qil ttt
ttt e iv n.'e auil '' '1hte . fitt slnwit sawc: tlo-o a ar
ily ied'tt~t tore
Jtohn Icte a-tl -- Wl)it a ins Ith tet a-i-.s It--c- thtt dii on-t wies
are ix(Ivctot-c-t'gcht-J'
p-ttt-~ -of t iti-1 Ipt-arorsfcnict- with trtpl wires fastened
A 151-,. of -ttw'tltars ft-ite ttt~
tt('tl tn itt t
-aovef to thei dingoasi-k
pt-acttcahlt 15Ot- thce' te
C o an tt ot'I'' mt tt-t-tta I- tt' ttol---w a ` alnttttt 1 vto 'es art- latid itl tht-
with Asti 5
I5 to 2 - fe-' ttIm ti own W 5 fomt t ce-e ofta-tJ ~
-- imitI tait--ds to Me-ct
nettdOl Od~ lY~r-k- 1,-i oq~aMw'pet -oar '-'- t o-wr

oo orý,fc<
ccric I to aln t-i
a~dt Inh d0
Itl ''tttl a-a e w ~ r m o w rg n n
he reesta-blishsed estily kec-it-e hinv

CVCt'tO Ming f mi Idt (if all typ - oft' t ate. sow-n wtth
tttltt-
'wil I raid de-tý)it noa-Ire ti,-at- e, or taw-o- ci a rpes'p],-]e'd tlttwoodlen botxes fltted
ex-~lttaýivs-
lts
A orithiefit Id is injit-d hv four cortter potl anTttiit-;l~et'soiael sines Icd bostttht~ike tir
(i eetrIoloa. h il
c-itckvn'iso A, 'att- A, ftrttin-i tic- httit lint- os-
tIt--o :ide I The survty isof tlhe It'' ci rcfc- to itt %-alc of tatsta reg'ttiar anltsItdpattiu-It
out-- (1ar kiatli J1 a ttla taf tue, lisc litne. Atixiliar iart it ttfront' of Jaelittit-'
i'-t
t-tt ll fourtd- wi-del-
be'
fixid 1tctitsts coiled ''to t' 'i-%cs (. t't -i-t) ' . or" t-'I aL
t t lit'lro int untattarit-d
tsed~ if t'.-ecs'sacv
u~t y F. -c 1,oats 'i-a-' ''t rifý-f Uhltti
MtctSit 1ý litd ilSpI~teS runrtngo
C'tate ptlittt5 foutttd Col lt-- lual-)or 2 t -1x --r fie t
cit at rtitltt -tngiaI foct-I '' ft-ita-a-C edge of h
ittiitt a eýat tltia till kt ithe ttt p'-. T TE ttI i t~idto 4 to at-1ýg'VC'hideS- m-teiriLg atlong' 'thit
tttt;tstrecl itt tttteri;t ti?.ll tit rcat ctii-'
hg ittIIt se-trck of 'tinc
htold'n
2-43
SSee als Land Muts and Boobytraps, FM 5-3 1, War Departmnent, Washsington, D. C., I Novemrber 1943.
F0-4 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighffoot

END RING 'CROSS BRCB
MINE MEASURING WIRE.
RING -4
Q Q
BURIED T MINES IT MINE 42 OR T MINE 431 WITH 2-METER SPACING BOTH LATERALLY AND IN DEPTH.
0- 0I
x,~O RINGI
7- !-4 RINGI
T-MINES (T-MINE 42 OR T MINE 43) LAID ON SURFACE, WITH 4-METER SPACING BOTH LATERALLY AND IN DEPTH.
lix
* 'j- .F~E-H K-~ i--I- _5(
--- !oclooR) RING-j5--
3g "W// 1 RING I
RIEGEL-MINES 43, BURIED OR LAID ON SURFACE.

AS A RULE TWO ROWS OF MINES ARE USED. BUT FOR EXTRA PROTECTION IN SPECIAL SECTORS FOJUR
ROWS ARE LAID, WITH THE THIRD AND FOURTH ROWS MOVED TWO "RINGS" TO THE LEFT WITH REFERENCE
TO THE FIRST AND SECOND LINES.
Figure' l7.-M~ine ileasurinig Wire an;d Mnllcifi.'d l'afllrts.
244

from old telephonc wire. (Sec. Figurc 15.) The between fixed points, serves to lay out right an-
mine-Pleasuring wire is 24 meters (about 2-5 gles by staking out a triangle with sides of 6,
yards) long, and every meter (3 feet 3 inches) 8, and 10 meters respectively. Spaces between
is marked with a piece of wood. The rings on the mines are determined by reference to the marks
ends are about 5 inchies in diamecter. The Incas- on wire ; thIe four rings on one end are usedl to
tiring wire, in adCditionl to measuring the distance offset the rows.
Q I §~ 2i9 ~ ~ V.9YQO RINGI
*1
9 Q Q )t0 RINGI
Q Q Q-,INQ
_Q
2 2 L . 9b 4 ~ 2 ~ o o RIN
S-MINES WITH 2-METER SPACING BOTH LATERALLY AND IN DEPTH.
7Q -~ 9CIX : ~JO0RING I
4I
14K
-~ -4•~ )~ ~RING I
S MINES WITH 4-METER SPACING BOTH LATERALLY AND IN DEPTH.
+T>
%~7< - t t RING I
4i v
__ RING 2t
SCHU-MINES 42, SPACED '%-METER LATERALLY AND I-METER IN DEPTH. THE MINES ARE PLACED AT
'/2-METER INTERVALS ALONG THE MEASURING WIRE.
245
F-56 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighifoot

Interval Number of Density per 1
Typc of Mine How Laid between Mines Rows Meter of Front
T-Mine 35 Buried 4 T71 (4.4 yds) 8 2

12 3
16 4
T-Mine 42 Laid on Slurface 4 in (4.4 yds) 8 2
T-Mine 43 12 3
16 4
Buried 2 mn (2.2 yds) 4 2
6 3
8 4
R-Minc 43 Buried or about 2
laid on surface 4 on (4.4 yds) 4 1
S-Mine 35 Buried 4 mi (4.4 yds) 4 1

8 2
12 3
2 in (2.2 yd&) 2 1
4 2
6 3
Schfi-Mine 42 luried I mi (1.1 yds) 1 1
2 2
3 3
n (0.55 yd)
i/2 1 2
2 4
The density of a minefield depends upon the types of mines, which often are unmarked and
interval between mines and the number of rows. show every evidence of hurried laying. The con-
The table above represents the density. sequent lack of pattern unifortnity makes their
Mine lanes are left open for patrols, and pas- detection and clearance a laborious and dangerous
sage lanes for assault troops. For permanent pa- task. Though no consistency is noted in layout
trols new lanes are made from time to time, and and types of mines used in such fields, the Ger-
the old ones closed. A mine-free safety strip is mans show certain preferences in their choice of
provided on the Germans' side. sites for them.
The Germans normally lay mine belts in indi- b. LOcATION. In general, mines are laid either
vidual sections 80 by 105 feet. The sections usu- close to, or on, roads; on airfields and railways:
ally are staggered, ond, for extensive mine belts, and along telegraph routes. Surfaced portions
they are combined in units of three or four to of roads ustially are avoided by the hasty mine
form forward or reverse arrowheads, or echelons. layer, hut khaki-fminted T-Mines sometimes are
Minefields arranged in echelon are surveyed by placed on the surface at dips in the road, in the
using corner posts on the hostile side of inter- hope that drivers will be unable to check their
mediate minefields as survey points, vehicles in time to avoid them. The Germans also
The Germans emphasize that minefields must place mines along the shoulders of the road oppo-
be covered by fire, although during a hasty with- site narrow places where drivers have to detour
drawal they often do not follow this princilple. It to pass, and at the entrances to defiles where they
is common for a regular minefield to have a listen- have to pull off the road to wait for vehicles
ing post with two men at the rearward edge; moving in the opposite direction. Other places
about 70 or 80 yards farther to the rear there usually sown with antitank mines are turnouts.
usually is a covering party of four or five men sharp bends, the unsurfaced islands sometimes
armed with one or two light machine guns. found at crossroads, herms, and well worn wheel
When the Germans are in hash, withdrawal.. ruts.
they usually lay a large number of small nuisance c. CONCEALMENT. The Germans, with great
minefields. These fields contain many different ingenuity, attempt to mnake their mines difficult
246

to detect. They bury them as much as 24 inches real mines, is placed in shallow holes to cause
below the surface where they explode only after a reaction in the mine detector. Dunmmy mines
passage of a number of vehicles has compacted often are wired in and connected with booby
the earth cover sufficiently to operate the fuze, traps.
They put explosives in wooden boxes to prevent
the effective operation of ordinary mine detectors,
and mark tire prints in the earth on top of the The Germans stress the marldng of minefields
mine by drawing a detached axle and wheels and attempt to mark them in such a manner that
over it. they cannot be recognized by the enemy but can
The Germans also show considerable ingenuity easily be found by their own troops. Their meth-
in siting randorn antipersonnel mines on the line ods of marking rninefields are not uniform. The
of the hostile advance. Road demolitions are front edge of a field often is unmarked and un-
plentifully sown with S-Mines, and kilometer wired; the rear edge seldom so. Some fields have
posts at points where vehicular drivers have to been found unmarked, but because of many
dismount to read directions are similarly treated, accidents caused by their own minefields, the
S-Mines also are placed in ditches, often close to Germans issued orders within recent months
to the trip-wire peg of another mine. making proper marking obligatory.
Nuisance fields on lines of communication gen- The following are typical examples of mark-
erally are closely spaced, occasionally so closely ings by the Germans, the type used depending
as to cause sympathetic detonation. This is par- on the situation and terrain: corner-post mark-
ticularly possible when mines are laid with their ing stakes; double-apron fence on the enemy side
pressure plates almost flush with the surface of and a single trip wire on the friendly side, or the
the ground and only lightly covered with earth, reverse; single knee-high wires; cattle fencing:
German dumrny minefielcds take various forms, empty mine crates; and signs.
In some cases a trip wire is laid to give the ap- The length of marking stakes varies with the
pearance of a minefield perimeter wire, with the terrain. They are flattened on one side for a
usual lanes, and the ground is disturbed at regu- length of about 8 inches. The flat surface is
lar intervals. Scrap metal, often dispersed with painted red, with the letter XI (Afinen) in black.
- 20-24 IN.C---- GAP MINES
- APPROX RD R D
RD':, RED
MINE STAKE ACTUAL MINEFItELD SIGN DUMMY MINEFIELD SIGN MINEFIELD GAP SIGN
GAP, MINES REMOVED
OTHER TYPES or SIGNS AT ACTUAL MINtEFIELDS OTHER TYPES OF MINEFIELD GAP SIGNS
Figure I-i~i~Isq
247
F-58 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighffoot

Mie btae',7o~i ~~
-/'f7'~ ~'~mine,Pb 0 : 6_ ___
~
toco~i~ri: - Restricted {i 7-4 j r
Ab 1Mt 0.
No. Types andS Igatieri
- ~~~~~~1270
S-wbfie wIa- -f'r /k,/r~
Mine Patr eni)
Distnpytrlbing ISW -
Mop e ne t~qiie/0 L-.6
date mini field -~of Ž~ -oLJ

- - -__ date dan- .1-911.j
Scale: 1"'1000 Distribution,
3 ~ %~-AIWAYY ROAIG
-x x x
x-x)'~ xx
'. 't+ * 3
\ 1P~
'2
(2~
7. )( "'1
7___ 9 Q.
(K, 58%z ~ s, ~~~ i 1
(2il (2W
k[k. Z,&r ,s SV r -
- KZ.79
ied
Mir o1717~
15k kMAB
!FN 'rIYmwie;V
A ~~~ ~ ~ ~
t/k4n ~ 44,e~
~erlGl
~ ~~i P.-
Mill fied o Afiw< MilMe fie 14," 14 ie.

A/d .r
2 /flock mitlee 7 /;~reo,

/e -,;pA W1ew/f
t'Aii.
Firgurc 20 -Gm'nsun U C i
248
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot F-.59

Minc~bf~c& • ___ -- - Minec Plan: ~ 1
9,y
Co B. RoOt 1ýi
Loc~io~ 3
~Vh
YK~£//"%a" ~Restricted1 5 122
~ . Types and lgif~

No,~
War,,nin Fenrcc:___
•ffd C v_____
Mop RcFna
2
doe ine field, was 41ýZO
/.roc 5
ýLJý,z date cwy U
dote chc cked_.B..At -4'y 3

dote S-yed' on ;?6,4
by ?"/C' yY- 17.qBl o
Scale: a4,bproVX .0 Distribution:
/ / B:- POWrf PZLANT
1<>~ P1Fw
/I Ifo ~ 5:r
ION
f o/o j ,
(K14m~io~kN~249
F-60 THE "DE

BREACHING~~~N UVIL ADN"Oeain ihfo
Such stakes are used only on the friendly edges (7) Day of surrey and instrument used (old
of minefields. or new comnpass-Gts-man issue).
Signs are painted in red and white on boards (8) Name and rank of officer or noncommis-
or pieces of sheet metal, and fastened to two sioned officer in charge of survey.
stakes. The edges of minefields are marked with b. MINE1 DATA TN; L[AP. The following data
signs showing horizontal stripes. Edges of laneg are given on the mi=es:
through the fields are shown by vertically divided (1) Number, tvr,Ž and igniter. (Example:
signs with the white portion on the side of the 72 T-Mine with T-Mi.Z. 42, booby-trapped.)
lane, and the red portion on the side of the mine- (2) Whether or not the mines are. dug in.
field (danger). The reverse side of the signs (3) Number of rows, and number of mines
(the side toward the enemy) is painted olive drah. per row.
If red paint is not available, the Germans substi- (4) Fence (Ex_-%mple: warning fence on
tute black-and-white signs. They are painted with frienidly side.)
tZe following words: (5) Special feaaures (Example: destroyed
A•-inen-for mines enemy tank in cen-r, on enemy side.)
Gasse or Gossen-for mine lanes C. MINEF•ELD-TYE IDENTIFJCATION IN MAP.
Entimint-for an area cleared of mines. Colored lines draws diagonally across the upper
Minefields are marked with vertical lettering, right-hand field oi the mine map identify the
dummy minefields with slanting letters. This dis. type of the minefie"4 as follows:
tinction, however, is supposed to be made known (1) A red diagonal line designates fields which
only to the German engineer troops because other cannot be cleared !ecause some or all mines are
troops may divulge the location of d(umimy mine- booby-trapped.
fields by crossing them. (2) A yellow diagonal line designates fields
which can be cleared by using data from mine
5. Mine Plans, Ske~ches, and Reports document.
A German mine plan shows one or more fields (3) A green dit.,onal line designates dummy
in all necessary technical details. A German mine minefields.
map, on the other hand, shows all mine obstacles (4) Mines takez up or exploded are marked
within one front sector and their tactical sig- in red.
nificance, but without technical details. The number of the minefield plan and unit
The Germans use a number of different forms designation appears on the upper right-hand cor-
for their reports and sketches, although all are ner of the sheet. P-attalion, regiment, and division
based on the same principle. Figure 17 shows a engineers make thtcr notes in the space provided
very commonly used form. The upper third of for them.
the mine map form provides space for written For S-Mines la~d 50 meters (55 yards) from
specifications and a small situation sketch. Thtý the German lines, a note is made in red letters:
drawing is made on the blank space provided. VORSIClIT, IYUP 50 1IFETER ABSTAND!
It is the engineers' responsibility to draw up (Caution, only 50 sieters distance!)
mine maps, and to keep them up to date. Addi- In case electrica. ignition is provided, a note
tional remarks sometimes are placed on the back is made showing how the igniters will be disposed
of the sheet. of, if the unit w-ich has laid the minefield is
a. DITAILS Or MINE MAP. The German mine relieved.
map usually shows the following details: d. INFORMATION IN MINEFIELD DRAWING.
(1) Name of the obstacle and designation of The drawing of zh.e minefield is made in the
the unit which laid it. blank space on the lower part of the sheet. The
(2) Name of the area in which the obstacle is scale is from 1 :5C0 to 1:2,000 whenever possible.
located. The following information is included:
(3) Grid reference and particulars of the map (I) Shape and size of minefield.
sheet referred to. (2) Pattern.
(4) Obstacle shown in the little sketch in red. (3) Location of hooby-trapped mines.
(5) Date minefield was laid. (4) Location of survey points with azimuth
(6) Name arid rank of officer or noncommis- and distances.
sioned officer in charge of laying field. (5) Type and location of warning fence.
250
BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot F-61

Mine Sketch Minelields laid on 17 May 1943"
.10 S-Mines
60 S- Mines in small wood 4-0 S-Mine•wiIpresre
30 with pressure type igniter type ignites on and along-
- 450 .ys
k§? ~RED
LINE
-
S70 yds. S.-
I ~ 7 0 S -Mines with pressure

= ~type igniters on and afont-
5ide road for about
Skt Schmaltz
_____l_____ I__I-It !'tCo. 46 '-fEllr Bn
Approx. /ooo yds.
Figure 22.--Germtan mipic shetch.
251

CONVENTIONAL SIGNS FOR MINE MAPS (6) Location of the front lines and fortifica-
rn 0m, tions.
Terrain impassable for tanks (7) Neighboring minefields, mine lanes, ter-
Antitank ditch or obstacle rain features, special features.
The Germans believe that it is not necessary
mine field SAntitank
to mark on the minefield drawing the location
[ii • Antipersonnel mine field of every single mine, if a partial drawing is suf-
- 31 ficient. The German mine plans contain the de-
4 Mines per meter width of front tail symbols shown in Figure 18, while simple
tactical signs are sufficient for minefield maps.
CONVENTIONAL SIGNS FOR MINE The Germans complete their mine plans at
PLANS AND SKETCHES company or battalion command posts, based on
* *
e Antitank mines sketches and data compiled while the field is
0, "* S, Index number to be used only being laid out. They) make five copies of all mine
, *.2 S, if different types of mines are laid plans and distribite them as follows.: One for
=1 in the same field, engineer company which is in charge of the mine-
field; two for division; one for army; one for
o 0 0 Improvised antitank mines central file in Dessaii-Rosslau.
j i j S-Mines Changes in the minefield are recorded on the
back of the mine plan. After three changes a
• * * Stock Mines new mine plan is drawn.
I * * Schit.Mines 42 A mine sketch is a simplified Thine plan used
to transmit information on a minefield as rapidly
r=m 17-1
- Improvised antipersonnel mines as possible. It is not drawn to scale, and is drawn
Smaill hidden charges dwhenever the tactical situation, bad weather, or
other circumstances prevent the preparation of
B if I La r hidden, charges mine plans.
eFront-line troops receive from the engineers
instructions or sketche-s showing the approximate
Booby-trapped mines location and e-xtent of the minefield. These
sketches, as a rule, do not contain details on types
)K Taken-up or destroyed of mines or igniters, pattern, and survey points.
Scattered mines Engineer units in charge of minefields keep
,"- 3*--
Deliberate mine field records of changes in ininefields under their care
and keep these recordsv with their units, while
Ili 41 Mines lying on the surface plans are turned over to the relieving units.
e. MIixE Riet'Oa-Rcs. Armies generally designate
-Mines below the surface certain areas for fields of scattered mines. In this
SMine field cleared or destroyed case mine reports take the place of mine plans.
Normally, mine reports contain:
(1) Number of the order authorizing scatter-
Gps through mine fields
(s ins of mines.
• • Dumlmy mine fields (2) Designation of units scattering the mines.
(3) Name and number of field containing scat-
_fetered mines.
Built-in hidden charges (4) Map location of scattered minefield.
no Survey points (VP) and Fix points (FP) (5) Number of mines scattered, subdivided by
types and igniters.
-w--w-- Warninq fences (6) Number and type of booby-trapped tiines.
E Direction of enemy attack kind of booby trap.
252

APPENDIX G
MINES AND FUZES USED BY THE AXIS AT EL ALAMEIN'
Annex 1. German
a) Anti-tank Mines
Tellermine 35
Tellermine 35 (Stahl)
Tellermine 42
b) Anti-personnel Mines
S-Mine 35
SD-2 ("Butterfly Bomb")
W-1
c) Fuzes
T.Mi.Z.35
T.Mi.Z.42
S.Mi.Z.35
Z.Z.35
Z.u.Z.Z.35
B.Z.39
Annex 2. Italian
a) Anti-tank Mines
B-2
V-3 and N-5
CS 42/2
b) Anti-personnel mines
B-4
Annex 3. British
a) Anti-tank Mines
A.T. MK II
A.T. L.P. (Local Pattern) MK II
A.T. MK III
A.T. MK IV
A.T. MK V (Models G.S. and H.C.)
A.T. MK V (Models G.S. and C.)
A.T. E.P. MK V
Hawkins Grenade Mine, No. 75, MK I and MK 11
b) Anti-personnel Mines
Shrapnel Mine, MK I
Shrapnel Mine, MK ii
c) Fuzes
Pressure Fuze, No. 1, MK I
Pressure Fuze, No. 3, MK I
Annex 4. French
a) Anti-tank Mines
M-1935
M-1936
b) Fuzes
M-1935 and M-1936
Extracted from: North Africa, 1940-1943, Appendices, Landmine and Countermine Warfare, by Robert Thomsen, Engineer Agency for
Resources Inventories, Washington, D.C., June 1972, Appendix 0.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot G-1

Appendix G, Annex 1
German Mines and Fuzes
A) GERMAN ANTI-TANK MINES
Tcl lermine 35 (T.Mi.35)

SAFETY BOLT SHARF ARMING DIAL
CLAW
WIRE
This steel mine is 31.7 centimeters in di- Installing and Arming.

ameter and 8.2 centimeters high. The large, (1) Place the mine in a hole with the
circular, steel press-ure plate has a spring be-- carrying handle in the horizontal or
tween it and the mine body. This spring is down position.
placed in the centrally located main fuse well. (2) Unscrew the wooden shipping plug'
It has two secondary fusze wells. One is lo- from the main fuze well and insert
cated in the side directly acrcss from the car- a detonator in the fuze well.
rying handle and the other is located in the (3) Screw in the threaded washer to hold
bottom in the center. the detonator in place and then screw
Characteristics. in the adjusting collar (a special
wrench is provided for this and the
threaded washer).
5L.p o, ,,• ((4) Place the rubber or leather washer
i°'a, .•i Ba,,,r in the groove of the adjusting collar.
__- _(5) Screw the Tellermine fuze 35 into the
main fuze well until it bears on the
Circular.. 35 200 to 11 ]b. TNT 9 oz. racnthrite. rubber or leather washer.
4001lb. or CZ/35 (FETN,(TýT
preb.- amotol or 50/50). (6) If a secondary fuze is used, screw any
siure. so/. pull fuze with standard threads into
tetrytol. the secondary fuze well.
(7) Turn the screw head arming dial in

F.-.,. . the top of the Tellerfuze 35 so that
the red dot points to scharf (armed).
?ercu&rion cap .......... A presure bar to interconnaect (8) Pull out the safety bolt by the wire
minas may be uiaed. attached to the safety bolt claw.
Disa7rming Procedure.
Use. The Tellermine 35 is used as an Check orforantilift
(1) fuses dev-ices.any secondary
and remove
antitank mine. This mine may be found en- (2) Carefully press in the sIf safety bolt.
eased in a waterprooffit jacliet.
ca ()Crflypesi h aeybl.i
does not move easily, do not force
Fanctioeing. Pressure on the pressure it.
plate is transferred to the top of the fuse. This (3) Carefully unscrew the fuze from the
pressure forces the striker-shaft down, shears mine.
on the shear pin, and fires the percussion cap. (4) Separate the detonator from the fuze.
't'hepercussion cap in turn fires the detonator, Turn the arming dial to sicher (safe).
booster, and mine. (5) Transport the mine and fuse to a
safe storage or disposal area.
G-2 BREA CHING THE "DEVIL 'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

Tellermine 35 (Steel) (T.Ali.35 Estceel
PRESSURE PLUG
PRESSURE FUZE ADAPTER
PLATE
DETON4ATOR,
RET AINING
COLLAR
_____ ACTI VAT ING

FUZE WELL
DEOAOBOOSTER CHARG~E
This steel mine is 31.7 centimeters in diame-

ter and 8.8 centimeters high. It differs from
the Telle~rmine 35 by having a fluted pressure Functionirg. Pesr ntepesr
sad foniblovin of in
platth tokee plug or tePressure plate is transmitted to the
desterto kreep,Ithes sond cenroml blocaing otrain top of the fuze. This forces the striker shaft
fuse well that is hidden by a pressure plug don shar dhseto atr boote, andfrsthe mpe.-
when either the Tellermine 42 or 43 fuze is usions capndetndto
Ar otemndthmne
used, but is not used with the Tellermine 35 Isaln n rig
7"fuse. One secondary fuze well is located in the (1) Tellerminefuze 85.
bottom of the m~ineL case directly in line with (a) Place the mine in the ground.
the, carrying handle, and another in the side of Mb Unscrew the Pressure- Plug from
theth ~ri ca-e ofthe
vicnit i arringthe main fuse Well and insert, a
the rhie cs ntevcnt ftecryn detonator. The pressure Plug is
Chc~actri~sicr (c Screw in the threaded washer to
hold the detonator in) place and
E~m~vthen screw in the adjusting col-
8h~ r~O~ti~xlar. A speciail wrench is provided
c~trg~in the f uze Packing box for screw-
Ing ill the thlreaded washer and
20 I.
Circlar oz pe-
. TMi 5'
121b.0 2the adjusting collar.
Czxa.T.Mi 4520 lb.s b.Ozpth
TNT 2t (d) Place the rubber or leather
T.Mi 43 (Pnhrt Washer in the groove of the ad-
iE 1lý.s usting collar.
TINT .50/ We Screw the Tellermin'e fuze 35 into
50). the main' fuse well until it bears
on) the rubber or leather washer,
~rn ~ (f If a secondary fuze is used, screw
Iany
___________L Pull fuse with standard
Percumnion cap. "T.Mi.3S5/T.Mi, Luga are
added to threads into a secondary fuze
Z."4i2"inwbite- late models for well and arm as specified.
attaching trip- Wg Turn the screw head arming dial
in the top of the Tellermine fuse
35 so that the red dot points, to
Use. This mine used as an antitan'k mine sz rfamed ) .
inaras.
dser t my aso ,eenasedin an (h) Pull the safety bolt out by the
eartflenWare waterproof jacket, wire attached to the safety bolt
claw.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighifoot G-3

Tel leirimino 42 (T.Mi.42)
- - XLt.5URE PLATE SPRING
AC VA I
FUZE
't,
ACTIVATING
(1) 1(`7lci-min faze 4.Pressure applied

on the pressure plate forces the pres-
sure qleeve down, shearing the main
shear pin, then permitting the retain-
TIhis~ ';tol mnen is 32.'2 celntincters in dimon- ing balls to escape and releasing the
ter aind 10A1 centimneters higrh. It has a cir- striker against the percussion cap.
cular stecl pjre~s-ire plate 15.2 centimneters, in Pesr ees
ojiee.A ZaCubP.Jodi1 Pr1eSaUre P.Uf"g 17n tne the unscrewving, of the hexagonal pres-
center of tho pressure plate covers the mnain sure plug, which releases the striker
fuze well. There are two secondary fuze aanttI,) ecsincp
well,_-cue in the side of the mine ease close (2t theen~i
pueruso ca.P.esr o h
to te eirrvin
he thehacllcý,
inthebotornpressure plate shears the shear pin,
of the mine. case slightly off-center in the direr- releasing the striker against the per-
tion of the carrying handle. csincp
________ r'Stcs Installingq end A rmnzin.
(1) Pla~ce then rine ini the ground with the
Y~,
.- Ox.', carrying handle horizontal or down.
~(2)
boc, Unscrew the hexago-nal pressure plug
fromn the main fuze well,
_______ ____-(3) Screw delonator retaining collar with
Circuhtr. T.Mi 42 2.50 to 12 lb. !12 oz. 2 detonator to the fuze.
or 400 rN
1?FI'TN;/ (4) Insert the fuze with detonator into the
'r.Mi -,,3 Ill. W S, 9 1/9 main fuze well.
pe pre rex) (55) Screw in the hexagonal pressure plug.
If the Tellermnine fure 43 is used,
F ___ -- screw the hexag-onal pressure plug
}~,, MAit~ .down until a click is heard. This as-
sures that the Lure is armed.
~rU'lflrlp ttymltrC' ditte Pnd nunmber Ditar-minyg Procedure. Do not attempt to
secondaryV fuze lvlb in white on the to,. disarm this -h-e, as the pressure plug Cannot
-____ ----- ______ be removed in order to identify the fu7,e. Bo
Use. This antitank mine is laid in roads thle mineit jdnrllre.

Additional Precautions, If for any reason
and mninefields. the mnine cannot; be blow,,n in place, check for
and remove any secondar'y fuzes or antilift de-
vices, and carefully pick UP the mrine and carry
it to the closest safe disposal area,
B) GERMAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
G-4 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighffoot

B) GERMAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
S-Mine 35 (S.di .35)

BASE OF
FUZE
DETONATOR FUZE WELL TUBE
WELL PLUGS (3) Z E U
FILLER PLUG
DETONATOR , "LLS(3)
- WATERPROR
L
MAIN CHARGE SEAL
____ CAVITY
STEEL
BALLS ~ I
SPRING P C
DETONATOR 1
dD12ha
ac Cle
SEC
ELA MINE CASE sta.lng ad
PELLEAYL L. SHIORT DELAY
PELT STEEL _ _PELLET
PARTITION
MINE CAVITY FOR!

CONTINER PROPELLING CHARGE
This is a steel cased mine 10.1 centimeters in

diameter and 12.7 centimeters high. It has Installing and Arming.
a pressure fuze, detonator, main charge, pro- (1) Remove the three screw plugs from
pellant charge, and a 4½,,--second delay pellet, the detonator wells and insert three
which permits the mine to jump about 1 meter detonators OPEN END DOWN.
>'Jinto the air before it explodes, scattering its (2) Replace screw plugs.
300O to 350 steel balls or shrannel in all di- (3) Remove fuze-well plug and screw
rections. in a pressure fuze (or a Y or W
a. Chara~cteristics, adapter for two or three pull and/or
pressure fuzes).
(4) Place mine in a hole so that the ends
F,. or-•g I -- of the pressure prongs or pull rings
I.. .are just above ground livel.
_ ___Disarming Procedure.
(1) Pressure fuze: Insert a nail or other
eur.u- safety pin through the safety-pin hole
hr.-S.NfiZ-35 4 to 5 lb. 8 to 14 oz. 20 grrrn3.
and E.S. cast or bl-ck in the fuze and unscrew the fuze from
?MIiS-S35 powdered p-owder. the mine. Unscrew the detonator well
pressure; TNT, plugs and slide the detonators out of
nZ.7-5 the mine.
z.U-35
(2) Pull fuzes and trip wires. Trace and
pull. cut all slack trip wires attached to
fuzes and unscrew fuzes from the
b. Use. This mine is laid as an antiperson- mine Remove detonators.
nel obstacle, either singly or in groups of 2 Note.. If a taut trip wire is attached
to 5 mines, with one pressure fuze or 2 or 3 to one of the fuzes, DO NOT CUT IT but
fuzes and rigged with tripwires or with an insert a safety pin through the safety-pin
electrical circuit with up to 8 electric fuzes hole in the fuze first, then cut the wire and
laid around the mine in parallel, proceed as above.
(3) Remove the mine and fuzes to a safe
Functioning. Ignition of the fuze sets storage or disposal area.
off the 4½/-second delay pellet. The pellet Additional Precautions. Some, but not all,
ignites the propelling charge which projects models of this mine have a supplementary fuze
the 'mine upward and at the same time ignites well in the bottom for inserting a pull fuze for
tYle short-delay pellets. The short-delay pellets boobytrapping purposes.
set off the detonators and main charge when
the mine is from 1 to 1½ meters in the air.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot G-5

Gesrman B3utterfly IDomb
V;EiGH.-. !l
EXPLOSIVE.', Yeloo-
EFF~
ltis T.
-wthi aý.u o ./1fee
aus,,sa ridis-
EMPLOMENT.Djoppd fro lowSlyn~iimi
CAUETION mta
EfuzeC iasijsteablo s wf
dcth- ay rds10,20
of for'1 i te. E'*
1. Cntainer holdsn'onbomsoesafe
23 .~ngpccýr
2. Sp ~ es offoreap art hlen

ring beo ofr bombciin sn b. I u
3.elector cfe icand
be o Zbutetl
T vate to bm scond
topocl
aftnder Nvrnnr,armatnA to epod nimatiCrb.okh
fu. ism djustabes fo pre 10,m20trr, on i0minactsor NvI
hanok! AZ ftepndn are th.is fue frdecpin.
tamped ofnuz
DFUNCTONNG
mIre diFcstillis~ alow ingbor bis toamc
catdter.my e e
SpInf force iapartu
moe. two aite ofmnts'asebomb eto
bipindl wire,~j bomb.
warmingon fo ehn ,ýdn~s u
bombd leh depend ogseonf
typeil
of fuse ý~ tnotlltd
G-6 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighifoot

AA
1~
/1. DETONATOR
I CHARGE
BODY
a. Desci iplic. The improvised amtip;erson- b. E~wplolioncO This Mineisc used in anti-
Del Minle W-1 is made from n French tank mine Wl-hs to bider reconnaissance and
50-mm mortar shell. The tail fOns and the nose breaching parties. It is lbid iNpa ths ditches,
fuze are removed. A Duck chcemical fuze and other places where foot 'soldiers are m1ost
is inserted hinthe niose by means of a phs- ikely to walk.
tA KOMlter c. Fin~ctom*ing. A pressure of about 15
pounds crushes the corrugated aluminum cylin-
den of the Duck chemical fuze, exploding the
mine.
BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot G-7

C) GERMAN MINE FUZES
PrenSS11re FLIZO T.Nli.Z.35
AOJUSI~iG tyy....~ARMING DIAL
SAFEY OOT -Oj3 ROTTED HOLE
SunEy' Inr FUZE CASE
SAFETY POLT SRKRSRN
I SPINDLE
STOP PIN CA
SHEAR PIN ---- - NO-rOc
i
THREADE CO~ARS~IFRIKER
THPFAFD COI.AFýQ PE RCUSSION CAP
Section of T. Ms Z.35
(see page 1 for overall of markings)
C'kecctcz~ttcs.attairhed to a slotted screw head on the arming
- ------ dial in the top of thie fumse, with a cam at the
I lower cad. JWIheD the crwhead is turned to
-~.-____ -~sichcr (snfc), the earn engages the strilier and
(* Y]i) takes the pressure of the striker spring off the
drical IW ~ Nlc..chrmicn!, 20to III di:qrnlirlg shear pin. When the Screw he~ad is turned to
wit'% 400I :1). mnns con Wailr (armed) , the eamn is disengaged fromn
Ohcor pin taininj; tOi the striker.
ihm andFuvctioning. After armngf proper pres-

schr,'ý!nuld sure on any part of the. lid of the mine wAill
be disre- mnove the igniter body downward until it rup-
luý
c'arded, tureS the Shear pin, which-permjits the springr
they have to force the Striker agal nat the percussionl cap
toben pur to unlder-taie the firing chain.
MOY puruhztrdrlg
ill and Arming.
ero.(1) Screw the fuze into tile f use well of
________________the mine,
Emnploymennt. This fuse was designed es- (2) Turn the Setting dial counterclockwise
peciall~y for use in the Tellerrnine 35. until the red spot is opposite the red
line under scliarf.
is .3 entietý,rs igh(3)
TI& uzellrmin WithdraW the safety bolt until it is
This elleminefuseis53
cetimeers igh atched by the mtop Ain.
and 41. centimeters in diameter. It is composed Dhsvminbg Procedure, Unscrew the fuze
of a case that contains a spriniq-Joaded striker fromn the nine and remove it to a safe storage
WatNed by a shar pin to a cylindrical housing or disposal area,
Lowsey retained in the fue case by a threaded
collar. The percussýion cap screw.s into the. base,
of the striker hlousing'. The fuse has two
sn~futy deovics*-a horizontal safety bolt that
Passes through a hale in the strike, anId a red
G-8 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'AGARDEN" Operation Lighifooi

Pressure Fuze T.Mi.Z.42
PRESSURE HEAD
SHEAR PIN
-- STRIKER SRN
~ \~-LONGITUDINAL
SLOT
STRIKER POINT BD
.. PERCUSSION CAP
FrETAINING CAP
DETONATOR
External and sectional view of T.Mi.Z.42 pressure fuze
This, is a Tellermine fuze with a body 5.2 mciil Pesr

cenitimeters long and 2.1 centimeters in diarne- Fucinn.Pesr apledt
plidt th
ter
ic-eiv o stike, tricr prig,
boed th striker head br~eaks the shear pin and releases
ter, beoredtorrceip thestnriTer striker is donng the Striker to fire the percussion cap and inliti-
and etoatorcaphouing.Thestrker s dme- ate the fi'ring train.
shaped at the upper end. The lowver end has a 7t0W1a7zAri?. sthsfe11S
collar that formns a seat for the striker s '-1g noSfI nstalling and
Y arming a thire f Mzrha
A longritudinal inclined Slot is machineOd in the than. to screw the detonator retaining collar
lower end to prevent air cushioning. A retain- with the detonator to the base of the fuze and
ing calp, screwed to the detonator cap housing, isert th -sebyit h ie
holds the detonator in a central pnsition. in heassembly intoethe.mie
Chcr~et~i~rtrs.(1) Remove the fuze from the mine.
S. c-, .,t-ti
..O 0;ti force (2) Unscre-w the detonator retaining col-
_______ _____________ ____ lar from the base of the fuze and re-
move thr, detonator.
Cylindrical. Stel ..... Fressure ine- 2.50 to 400 1b. (3) Remove the fuze to a safe storage or
chanical,
with heardisposal area.
pin i-clhe.a
Use. This igniter was designed to actuate

the steel Tellermine 35, Tellerminei 42, and
Mushroomn Tellermine 43- The fuze hias non-
3standard German threadin~g.

Pressure Fuze S.mi.z. 35
STEEL ~ /
\~~~ ANTENNA \ h
SAFETY PIN SRN
I PRESSUPE..
I ~ ~SPIG ~ ~ J &KV\LANISNG
STRIKER
SPRING SI R KE R
RETATING I ~CNE
PERCSSIO
CAPHOUSING
a prnPopdpesr
The~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S F,
I..2
-s w~inn; rsueapido h
ILI
coTVl usI pr 3e sse aspringand plu prerssur e rtain p int,th Peressuo reaples otherean
has three prongs attached to R~S Upper End& The iag balls and releases the. striker, which is then
cedlral housing serves as a guide for the drvnit h ecsincp hfircS the
plunger; and the lower part contains the p)er pei-cusslon cap and continues the firing chain.
Clisslon cap and threands for attachment to tMe Ins&nflzagnd Arntia.
mine. The fune is 9.5 centimeter long and 1.t (U) Sare the fue into the mine.
C.Ontinme'AerS in dirlme1ter. (2) Place thle Mine in the ground.
Cheroteri~cs.(3) Unscrew the retaining nut from the
S ~ - h, C end of the safety pin and withdraw
5h~p~the safety pin.
DisarnningProcedure.
Cylhiodricsl Alumoinumi. Pressure mcý- 8 to 10 1h. (1). Insert a nail or wire in the safety-
w~iMOW(2 pin hole. fr rmtemn n
With ball (2) ~Remove
the fz rmtemn n
unscrew, the percus~sion cap.
(3) Tale the fuze to a safe st-orage or 015-
Use. This is a specially designed fuze for posal area.
the S or bounding mine. U1sually the tips of the
prongs or antennae extend above the ground.
GOO1 BREA CHIN"G THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Pull Fuze Z.Z.35
TRIP.WIRE HOLE SAFETY PIN
RETAINING NUT
RES-STANCE -4 AFETY CLIP

STRIYER SPRING
PLUNGER---Z
STRiKER-ETAINING -- TlE
BALLS (2)
PERCUSSION CAP
/ -1.-- HREADED BASE
'The body of this fuze is in four parts: tile are for'ced oat10X iid, when they come opposite
main houIsing; .the guide piece, -Which is screwved to the open spaces, releasing the striker. The
to tile iflaij hOUsJilg ; he space Piceu l~~ s, strilkcr the)), Lu-adai the force o~f its spring, Sets.
screwed to the guide piece; and the lower piece, off the perc'iss'on cap.
which is Screwed to the Space piece. The main 1-n.stalling ard Arnzing.
hou~sing: contains the sliding cylinder and the (1) Insert a standard detonator in the
conipression sprin~g. Wvithiin the sliding cylinder base of the fuze.
are the Striker spring, the striker, and the two (2) Screw the faze into the mine or
retaining balls that hold the striker in place. chargre.
The lower piece cont~ains the percussion cap. (3) Attach a slack trip\\'ire to an 'anchor
The fuze measures 7.2 centimeters in length and then to the hole in the top of the
and 3.0 centimeters in diameter. fuze.
Characteristics. (4) Unscrew the retaining nut from the
end of the safety pin and remove the
I,,tra, ,Stion Op-t.ing fom safety pin.
Disarmivg Procedure.
Cylinidrical... Brass .... Mcclj,nnjcal, 15 to 20 lb. (1) *Insert a wire or nail in the safety pin
with locking hole.
pin release. (2) Cut any slack tripwires and remove
__________I __ the faze from the mine or charge.
Use. This faze is the standard igniter for (Taut wvires must be checked first.)
S-mine and prepared charges, boobytrapping (3) Separate the percussion cap and deto-
Tellermiac, and boobytraps with tripwires. The nator from the faze.
threaded base fits all standard charges, gre- (4) Take the fuze to a safe storage or dis-
nadles, and mines. posal area.
Fucnctioning. A pull on the tripwire pulls
*he plunger upw.ard against the resistance of
he compression spring. The two locking balls
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'IS GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot G-1 1

Pull and Tension Release Fuze Z.u.Z.Z.35
~J,. COLLAR
MAIN HOUSING UNIT
SLIDING CYLINDECOPRSSR
SPRING
~~JIH
LISTRIKER SPRING
*iirwi P 2 RETAINING
Irr~jr IPIN
PERCLISION CAP SPACER
This fuze has a spring loadecd striker with a Ue hstp fintri eeal
pml release. It has four parts, the main housing Ue hstp fintri eeal nn
yli~lorandconlreýion
vjththeslidng stalled in mines and charges actuated by wires
spring-, the guide Piece, ti-e spacer piece, an~d intso.
the lower piece, wvhich contains the percuss-ion In7sto llig andArn~bjn.
cap. At the top of the sliding cylinder Is a (I) Insert a detonator into-the base of the
hole for tying- the trip-wire or tension wire. The
length of the fuze is 11.0 centirneters; and the (2) Screwo the fuze into) the mine or
diameter, 1.2 cenlimeters. charge.
Cheocerstcs(3) Attach a, tauit tripwvire to an anchor
and to the safety, pinl hole.
force(4) Unscrew the retaining nut from the
. ..... .end of the safety pin and remove the
Cylin.safety pi n.
dre. tss.Field graY. Mvhameald 9 to 13 Ill. Notc. This igniter proves so dangerous
With tnut to use thatý a rnumber wvere returned to the
tripwire factory and niodif.ed. In these, the tension
and relveas feaiture was removed by cutting the
locking trip wire slot from the end of the sliding
pill cylinder slid attaching the tripwire to the
Iese safety pin.
_____________________
_________ -______Disar?)ing Procedure.
Functioning. A pull onl the taut trip w\ire (1) Cut any slack trip wires and wire or
pulls out the sliding cylinder against the re- tape the safety pin or nail or wire
Sistance of the compressionl spring. This also securely inl place.
forces the retaining pins into the upper open (2) Unscrew the fuze from the m-ine and
space and frees the striker. Cutting or break- remove the detonator.
ing the trip wire permits the compreCssion (3) Take the fuze to a safe storage or (lis-
spring to force the sliding cy'linder dowvnwards, posal area.
freeing' the retaining pinls into the lowver open
space and releasin~g the striker. In both cases
.'the freecd strik~er hits, and fires the percussion
Cap.
G-12 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighitfoot

Mdodified Z.u.Z.Z.35 (functions on pull only)
SAFETY PIN
RETAINING NUT SArETY.PIN HOLE SAFETY-PIN SLOT
MAIN SPRING .. BRASS COLLAR
STRIKER SPRING ~ i PULL CYLINDER
-- BRASS CASE
UPPER RECESS
STRIKER
LOWER RECESS STRII(ER-RETAINING PINS (2)
___PERCUSSION CAP STANDARD BASE
The s iential wth

uze odifed he pll-FunCtiO17hig. A tog onl the tripwire pulls
T hens fuze isidetieptit
modifieds th pl-at Out the saIfety pin. The Pull cylinlder', under
t .QtensiopN-re ),Ole-It he301d5 texpilcept thatr pr-essure of the manin spring-, then moves down-
tli tn~vu
a th edhoe o th iul ciiner ward until the striker retann isecp
iscut off. This prevents tile fuze from func- it h oe eess eesn h pig
tioning by t~ension-release and permiits fune- lon'-'cd strik-er to fire the percussion cap and
tioning only by Pull. dtntr
Characteristics.__ ______________ Instofllig and Arming.
Thtrnl Cse
S}~~ O~r~~g Msr~(1) Insert a detonator in the base of the
oxki~n
forcefuze and screw the fuze into the mine
_____
_______ ____
-or charge.
(2) Attach a slack tripwire to a~n anchor
dricni. Met.l.. Medianical, 40 Ib N111 ZUG- and to the safety pin ring.
Vvith P11ll (approx). ZU-NDIR (3) Unscrew the retaining nut from the
pin nrid .st,.rped end of the safety pin.
retaining on the DsrigProcec? ae.
pin case. (1) Cut any slack tripwvires.
_______________ __________________(2) Wire or tape the safety pin securely
inl place.
Use. This fuze has a variety of uses-in(3Uncethfuerotemi.
the stake mine, S-mines, side fuze wells of()Seatehedontrfmtefue
Tellermines, and boobytraps with Pull Wires. (5) Remove the fuze and mine to a safe
storage or disposal area.

Friction-pull fuze B.Z.39
ADAPTER CELLOPHANE DISC
FLASH RUJBBER WASHER

CONVPOSITION
IGNITER B3ODY
DELAY
COMPOSITICN-
DISTANCE TUBE
MATCH ... PULL "'IRE

~;~/COMAPOSITIO1N
\.
The body of this friction fuze has a wall of Furc~tioninig. The coiled part of the puh
two thiiclknessos forming a Shoulder on1 wh-ich wire is drawn through the friction compound,
heditncetubetht p~rcNrcnts the loniLI-
ress producing a flas tat ignites the delay compo~-
tuclinal mlovemlent, of the coated p)art of the pill! sition, which after 7 seconds sets off the gre-
,wire. The 7-sccwi~d delay compoition is black, nade or mine.
Powder ccv'cred wiha small quantity ()f flash Installing and Ar'Mi7g.
compoundf. The whole filling is p~rotected by a (1) Attach a detonator to the base of the
cello)phane) disk held in place by a rubber fuze.
washr.s 7. hecetimeerslongand(2)Place
fze the fuze and detonator into the
O.G e. h centimeters
inp.
uediameter
s7C mine charge or boobytrap.
O cnaractcristinCS nlt r (3) Attach a pull wire.
______________________________________ _ DisarmingProccdurc.
sh~j C- lntrn" Ct ~o-mr fr- (1) Remove the fuze from the mine,
_ _I__-_---- charge, or boobytrap.
llll-ricion
Cylidri~lAhidrw 20b (pprx)- (2) Separate the detonator and fuze.
Cyl~l~aI.
iunnum .~1'ul-ficion.. 2 l~rro). (3) Remove the fuze and mine or charge
Use. The BZ-39 fuze is used primarily

to a safe storalge or disposal area.
in hand grenades, but is adaptable to use AS a
pull fuze in TellIerilinle-S, S-11ines and booby-
traps.
G-14 BREACHING THE "1DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Appendix G, Annex 2
Italian Mines
A) ITALIAN ANTI-TANK MINES
Antitank Mine, B-2
DETONATING CORD -. 2..
DETONATOR HOUSING
PERCUSSION CAP HOLDER

STRIKER STRIKER-RETAINING WIRE
The Italian B-2 and Spanish B3-2 antitank Installing and A77ning.
-.- mines are almost identical. They consist of a (1) Remove the cover.
- metal case, 106, 66 by 12.7 by 12.7 centimeters, (2) Cock the striker by turning the wire
with a detachable lid or pressure cover sup- tensioning nut in a clockwise direc-
ported on two coil springs. The two fuzes are tion until the safety lever falls into the
retained cocked by a retaining wire that is notch in the striker.
sheared by a cutter fastened to the under side (3) Insert the safety pin into the hole
of the pressure cover. The two explosive through the side of the mine and into
charges are placed one at each end. the fuze case.
Characteristics. (4) Screw on the detonator and attach
the detona*ting cord.
(5) Insert the percussion cap holder into
the hole in the housing in front of the
a..detonator.
Rectangular.. Integral, pull. 300 lb. or 6 lb. (6) Replace the detachable cover, cover
the mine with earth, and from a safe
distance, withdraw the safety pin.
Use. This mine is used against taiks. It Disarming Procedure.
must be emplaced at a distance of at least 2 (1) Check for and remove any antilift de-
meters between mines, to avoid sympathetic vices.
detonation. (2) Carefully lift the mine cover.
Functioning. Pressure on the pressure (3) Insert a safety wire through the
cover moves it downward against the compres- safety-pin hole in the side of the mine
sion springs, clearing the safety levers from case.
the strikers and cutting the retaining wire. (4) Cut the detonating cord at the fuze
I Thiss releases
r the strikers to fire the mine, end and unscrew the percussion cap
holder.
(5) Unscrew the detonator from the fuse.
(6) Allow the striker to go forward.
(7) Transport the mine and fuze to a safe
storave or disnosal area.

Antitank Mine, V-3 and N-5
Gerinan nomienclature: Sprengmine V-3 u. V-5
This Italian bar mine consists of a sheet-

metal case with a removable pressure cover.
It has a built-in fuze with a spring-ioadc-.d
striker and plunger at cach end. The mine is
114.3 centirneters, long, 6.2 centimeters wvide,
and 6.8 Centimeter., high.
CUTTER
C vrnT I ;LJ1DE,-
CO PtZRp PIN
PRE.SSURE.AAjU5TM
WENTeN77
REAR Sl10ULOr-P-
- ~ ~ ~r
.- OTONATOR W'LL
STRI~rRoSHAF
i-i ;%~~~ ~ ACTUATING Pin rq~ UsO A
SAFITY-PIN IlL
iC-t C
~ 7 'K STRIKEF?
USHAPED S7 114G CLIP
'~ -'5 STPKEPRERTAINIrNG PiNr,
Y; CCYCr.ING TUBE
_CC- KrNG TIJOS HANDEm
Charac t eristics.
Sh. ~ F- O,rrtinz
0;c ~ lcev (1) Pressure on the pressure cover forces
_____
___ _________ ___I _ the Cover downward causing the cut~-
Iter-1
Ret~nulr.. 2- lý n itn r,1) ter to cut the Copper pinl in the cutter
}teekrngu
ar. . . ] tcgrM 22 (2) The
g i e Plunger
20 1lb. anti pcnkI
22ibnrnper b in one or both fuzes is
nero!.depressed against the resistance of
the coil spring onto the actuating pn,,,
P.~rr~kswhich in turn depresses the U-
shaped spring clip.
If tire copper piuis Id1t out [,d the~ presur njeetrec (3) The UJ-shaped Sp~ring clip then de-
nut is not userl, it becomes en antipereonnre-1 mine, presses the Striker retaining pill end
_________________________ __________-of the flat retaining spring, releasing
the striker to fire the percussion cap
Use. This mine is usually laid in road and the mnine.,
bloclks and at road junctions because. of its
large-area coverag~e.
G-16 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighifoot

Wooden Antitank Mine, CS 42/2
PRESSURE COVER
STORAGE
RECESSES
DETONATOR
RECESSES
FELT SEAL
LOCATING BOARD PRESSURE-COVER-

RETAINING CLIP
This is a wooden box-type unit with four

plastic fuzes, but with enough metal to make it Function7ing. Pressure on the top breaks
detectable. It has three parts-a box for the the fragile supports of the pressure board and
explosive, a frame to support the pressure forces it down on the fuzes, actuating them and
board, and the pressure board. The top is detonating the mine.
covered with cloth.painted or dyed in a camou- Instali7ng and Arming.
flage pattern. This mine is no longer produced, (1) Remove the lid.
but will remain in service until present stocks (2) Remove the four wooden cylinders
are consumed. The mine measures 34.0 by 28.9 (false fuzes) from the fuze wells.
by 16.0 centimeters. (3) Remove the fuzes from their trans-
Characteristics. port recesses.
(4) Attach OTO detonators to the fuzes
•F••• or:,tr~• E•,i•c (42/2) and place the fuzes in the
__________ _______
______ ___________-wells,
Rect ingur Pressure.. 29-0 1b. 11.0 lb. T4NT in (5) Replace and lock the lid on all four
box. (approx). cartridge form sides.
-25 7 oz. DisarmingProcedures.
cartridges. (1) Check for and remove any antilift de-
vices,
Use. It is laid in pattern in minefields to (2) Remove the lid and the fuzes from the
damage tracký of armored vehicles by concus- fuze wells.
sion. By the substitution of the Model PMC 43 (3) Separate the detonators from the
buiton type fuze for the Model 42/2 pressure fuzes.
fuze and by weakening the pressure board sup- (4) Remove the mine and fuzes to a safe
ports so that they fail under a man's weight, it Storage or disposal area.
may be converted to an antipersonnel mine.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot G- 17

B) ITALIAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
Antiper-sonnel Miine, B-4

Ger-man iioienejati-re: Reisz- (StoIpCer-)lMjlne n-4
STRIKER ISHAFT
ACTUATINiG LEVER
. ACTUATING KEY
SAEY PIN ~-W ,~-Ž--GUIDE PRiG
-~ 2 - -~ ~-LOOE TRP~WIRE
iii TROWI TAUT TR.IP WIRE
FUZE HOUSING ~ ~ I PRU5O A
PERCSSIO ~ ~ PERTOSSTONCA
The B-4 is composed of two concentric steel FunctioninD.

cylinders with a conmcmo base and superim- (1) Hyth SIQ Ck i i/SbT .&Cpull on the.
posedl top cover. The mine is 6.8 cen~timeters slack tripw ire pull the aacu ting hy3
in di-ame-,- riand 119. centi metcrs high. In the away from the striker shaft per-
flintencrl "orioin of the outer cylinIder are six roitting the striker sha~ft to slip
slIksfOr og the~u
;ne agakost a tre or through the circular hole in the actu-
post A percxusson-cap holder ik irserted dia- ating NWy. Tie reklead striker thwn
mtundchl-, thr:ough the side of the mine case. sets off the percusson cap and fires
T~he dete'.na~ci' noid boo~ster are iIn55Yted in a the mine.
weli in the botlom of the fuze housing. Trip- (2) Wit/ Wet tr-iw~n. The cuttng or
wires, w.oiund on sp-ools, uor carried in recesses breaking of the tou trip wire releases
in the top portion of the care and covvered by a the spring-laded actuatin lever
hinged &Da closed by a pin. 'Whs pin aiso serves against the actuating key. The actu-
as a srfety pin for arming the mninie. On somne ating key is then pushed outward un-
models, an auxiliary firing mechanism is pro- . til the strikler shaft slides through the
vided---a spring-loaded aotuating lever held circular Woe in the keg. After this the
corked b~y a taut tripwire. released] striker sets off the percussion
c/in roctcrisýt~ics. cap and fires the mine.
Cyvdlorcsl 11nteg"InI 0( t o 20 It,.. 0.235 P).

fliticncd on pull.. TNT.
amrWe.
Use, This mine is employed in antitAnk

rnineficdds h in i irregular line in the front. It
may also be found in antipersonnel minefields
and wire obstacles along with other mines.
G-l8 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Appendix G, Annex 3
British Mines and Fuzes
A) BRITISH ANTI-TANK MINES
-Gernial nomen17c:lature: Pz .Mi *402 Ce)
PRESSURE PLATE SPRING PLATE
BOOSTER
NOTCH
LU
MAIN CH-ARGE CAVITY(
Jscr-ijpiOl. Tlie IBri 13h

De. 6~. s gnr .Jia~ha/ ~ .o oas F1 ,O
sl()anit it ink iliine, Mark 11 consist, (1) A. pressuri f;lponsCo nre i
of a steel case, 7i½ inhes in dninetr an~d R!' thw piressHlC COVNFcinw-ly the bWass ])les-
inhes lii gliwih a rounded top end a flvo bottom. snC cap of tMe smz.
The casýe is darkt greelin aColor, exceept for tie (2) Tie nresnev hcid and Ole pilunger of the
bottom, which is yellow wilh n red and greeli crows. buin are fMWe dowlin pu~ini aide the
T1he fuze well is cent ially located hin Ohe bottom of foli-. prlig.,- on th bas si et sleeve and
lhe cese and is surr-oun ded b3y a boositer clieigcg. COliliroýillŽ5iJg the -Iýfihi Springi'.
Two fillr ])lugs alre alo located in the bWtto of (3) The siiz-rtiii alsreforced out-
thic case. Ths inine uISes lie presure fuze. anti W'ard boto a ress Win vnplinigm r.eleis-
tank. 'No. 1, Mark I I A pressure cover ~ nig (lie sprijg-lailedl SI riker againist, tle
hits over the case, and is held ini playc b3- four ]ock- perewAsoll cap am t My le [lidniL.
thig
ing cove phins on Ohe side of twewcas. - A sj)Jiii- d. I,.M1hwog OWL7 - l./,i
likec phit e riveted to the undersde of the cover (1i) InScr t ieSiiluii
Ow ph, hw~ton the fine
exerts a light 1)le~ssti on lt'v caise so as to hold the wIll in M e Wqt wiin of tHie Minie,
covt-r firln]l age inst the lockill-i Cover pinus. 'I'hie (2) ]J ISert t1fIi fZe in t he film well ii,7] SVcrew
yninle -weigh., a total of S15 pan~ iid nciilidiu 4h ingrt h ig lit.
pounds of explo5tive. (3i) Place the nuiine ill a1 hole so the Cover is
1'. Empiydoynifa. This nowi is emlloyed fluh with le sunm-fc of the ground.
nA~tixt vel icks andit light ta abs in tacica and e.a'cb-leI&i.
hlastyN InuliO fields anill in load blockst. (1) Searichl for ulld iolit tlisze any ocia"tItiC
flizes.
(2) Illnsc'vw the fuz/e fronil the liottoln of the
mite.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighffoot G419

Mine, A.T.L.P. (local pattern) Mk.II (Egypt)
, PLUNGER SHEAR WIRE.
CARRIER, MAI
/DETONATOR
"
CARRIER
DETONATOR iGNiTER AMPOULE
Cover retaining
straps Section of "Egyptian" pattern mine
This antitank mine consists of the steel mine

body, mine cover, and mine fuzing arrange-
ment. The mushroom-shaped mine cover is at- Irnstaling and Arming.
tached by four hooked straps. The mine has a (1) Insert the ampoule cartridge, red end
a channel that leads to the central well, which No. 8 and seal withf luting.
"isclosed by a small metal tab during shipment (2) When ready to lay the mine, remove
and storage. The fuze (E.P. Mark 2) consists the steel rod from the hole in the mine
of a plunger inserted into the central -. ell and body and insert the detonator as-
retained by a shear pin, and a detonator and sembly, ampoule end first, without
ampoule cartridge inserted in the side channel, using force.
The mine is 25.4 centimeters in diameter and (3) Bend the tab over the end of the as-
10.1 centimeters high. sembly and place the mine in the
Ch aractcristics. ground.
6o6";.6r I l.!oh- Disarming Proced•dre.
(1) Check for and remove any antilift de-
vices.
(2) Remove the wire holding the mine
room.. Integral, 200 lb. 4 ,i lt). Onec laid,thl~e cover in place and remove the mine
per- (aep- Wines should cover,
cussion prox), not be used (3) Remove the plunger from the mine.
type. agamn, even (4) Loosen the metal tab which covers the
if disarrned. detonator assembly on the side of the
_______-
______ - ______
____ -mine case and carefully remove the
Use. This mine is used in defense against detonaeor assembly.
armored cars, tanks, and other vehicles. (5) Destroy the detonator assembly.
Functioning. Pressure on the mushroom- (6) Transport the mine to a safe storage
shia~ped top forces the plunger through tle or disposal area.
sheaped opinanownrces inst
p
the auoulehctheAdditional Precautions. If the detonator
shear pin and down against the ampoule car- assembly does not come out easily, destroy the
;tridge, crushing it and causing a chemical reac- mine in place.
tion that fires the detonator.
G-20 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GA RDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Mine, A.T.Mk III.
German nomenclature: Pz.Mi.403(e)
SHEAR WIRE SAFETY-PIN HOLE
STRIKER PERCUSSION CAP
DETONATOR
Section of Mine, A.T.Mk III
This steel mine is 15.2 centimeters in diarre-

_r and :12.8 centimeters high. It has a flat- Functioning. Pressure on top of the mine
surfaced circular steel pressure cover that fits. cover forces it down on the striker, shearing
loosely over the top of the mine case and is the shear wire and releasing the striker against
raised slightly in the center to form a pocket the percussion cap, and initiating the explosive
for' the plunger of the fuze. The Germans train. II
manufactured a pressure igniter, the Mi.Z. 530, Installing and Arming.
(e) to be used in this mine, which was an al- (1) Place the mine in tlie ground.
most exact copy of the No. 2 Mark 1, (2) Remove the mine cover.
Characteristics, (3) Insert the fuze in the fuze well.
(4) Withdraw the safety pin from the
E~p~oiv,.fuze.
S1h.pc u. . (5) Replace the mine cover.
Me chK B&ete Disarming Procedure.
- :ý I -(1) Check for and remove any antilift de-
Circular... Contact. 350 lb. 4.5 lb. CF, pellet vices.
No. 2, pmes TNT (CE is (2) Remove the cover from the mine.
Mark I. - sre. (approx). Tetryl). (3) Pull out the fuze from the fuze,%vell.
- ______
- _____(4) Remove the mine and fuze to a safe
Fule baw.d storage or disposal area.
Detonator assemnbly.
Use. The Mark 3 G.S. was used as an

antivehicular mine.
BREACHING THE "1DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot G-2 1

Mine, A.T.Mk IV
German nomenclature: Pz.Mi.404(e)
SAFETY' PiN HOLZ

PNHOLE
STIE STRIKER
ST RKE t.....•SPRI.NG
PERCUSSION CAP RUBBER
DETONATOR,,GSE
UEWELL.
BOOSTER CHARGE
Section of Pressure Fuze, No.3MjkI
I•staliing and Arming.
The British G.S. Mark 4 is fitted with the (1) Remove the pressure cover and the
Mark 4 pressure cover and the pressure fuze fuze protection cap.
No.. 3, Mark 1. The steel mine case and the (2) Place the mine in a hole so that the
Mark 5 case are identical, except that the top of the pressure cover, when re-
former locks the circular in:er wall. The miac placed, will be less than 2.5 centime-
with its steel pressure cover is 20.3 centimeters ters below the ground surface.
in diameter and 12.7 centimeters high. (3) Inspect the fuze to see that the shear
Characlcristics. pin is in position.
(4) V, 'ithdraw the safety pin from the
S.sfuze.
hap(5) Insert the fuze into the fue ell. Do
not use force; it should fit easily.
Gy'liudrira ..... ur" 350 to 450 lb. 5.25 lb. (6) Replace the fuze protective cap and
the pressure cover, making sure that
the lockihg pins engage properly in
Use. The British laid this mine in large the slots in the holding straps. Be
tactical minefields
ag aaindand in tles
st ighehi hasty
a k sv road blocks teery saotsul th p u tholding
carefu l to sraps Bee
no p ressu re on th
against vehicles and light tank.top of the fuze or the pressure cover.
FuZnctioenin. Pressure on the pressure Di~sarningProcedure.
cover crushes the protective, cap over the fuze, (1) Check for and remove any antilift de-
shears the shear pin, and thus frees the spring- vices.
driven striker to fire the percussion cap and ex- (2) Remove the pressure cover and fuze
plode the mine. protector cap without putting any
pressure on the fuze.
(3) Insert a safety pin or a substitute in
. the safety pin hole.
(4) Remove the mine and fuze to a safe
G-22 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

Ifine, A.T. Mk V (Mc~cdels G. S. and !H.C.)
'This steel land mine mlay be found in two Fu~th..d R vIArksg
t:ervic~e) and the Marlc 5, II.C. (higher con-

tent). The tvwo mlodels arc idlentical Ill appear- Percussion up, Contractors' nmark 1. The fute Cannot
ance~~ ~ ~i n ~ 01ea ~ an ~ie(03c -
dtoaor, rind and date of as- bc separated
h %1h).sihe (20.3Clifllcc i dthatd 0he Moel booster. Senibiv Z%
t telm- from the in-
ciffreice
hith) Th onys, batthe'Kolelciled on thccsde. tegral pcorrus-
IJ.c. has e:xplOsjivo onl bothl sides of the inner . ion crip dcl-
Wall of the case. The fuze wYell, located at the 1.2 cm green ban-d cnator Bnd
top center of thec ca.se!, is covered with a mietal searmtne tonosboser
cap seated onl a rubbecr gaskect. Both ynodels 2. Botll modcels arc
mnay be found~l fitted with either thle 'Mark. I1. mrdbn osltht
or1the Mark 11 pressuIre spidler whIichl is he1ld near the botAtom "sistocks still
in )Aa:ce by four slottedl netal straps. ofteclrrsiturthep many,
whele.
Opr~treUse. As aintitankl mines, these mod'els a-re

SaeB-1,Pc capable of stoppin g most medium tanlks, but
_____________
________ ____- gainst heavy tankls they must be laid dlouble.
Cylinderical No. 3, 350 to 400 4.5 l~b. TNýT/CF7 Functioningq. Pressure on the spider
Mak p n 0on3 TNT (HC) crushes thle protective cap over the fuze and
pressore. (C S) severs thle shear pinl, releasing the spring
loadeld str ike-r against the percussion cap and
6.3 lb. (CE is frnth lieie
TNT Tctryl) frn h
BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighffoot G-23

Mine, A.T. Mks. V (Models GS &C)
SHEAR PIN HOLE
STRIKERSTRIKER SPRING
PERCUSSION CAP RUBBER GASKET
CETONATOR
BOOSTER CHARGE '
Section of Fuze,
Pressure, No. 3 Mls 1.
These steel mines are approximately 20.3
centimeters in dianmeter and 12.7 centimeters
isalnadA7Mlg
high. Both mines use the Mlark 4 circular, (1) emov ten Arm -ing. a inig h
steel, flat surfaced pressure cover held in place (1 th ,eo~
adeietp idn
by tour Jugs that engage four slotted strans jjtýýgt vjhJtt P.Ž 61ý 111111t and runiove
attachied to the mine case. the pressure plate.
Choe cerstis.(2) Place the mine in the ground and re-
Chaactrisics move the paper seal from the fuze
I well.
shp -I ormtu ......... ___._. (3) Inset the fuze to be sure that the
shear pin is in position, and then in-
"~S~ sert the fuze and remove the safety
pin. If it does not come away easily
Circular_ o. 3, 350o lt.
NMk4CS. 9.3 MIA CS: discard the fuze.
Mk pres- Ib. TNT CE/ Dismrming Proceditre,
s.ure.NIL c: TNT (1) Check for and remove any antilift de-
4. 5ID. T NT (CE i5
or baratol tetryl). vcs
_______________________________(2) Remove the pressure cover.
F-1, h Rua,± (3) Insert a safety wvire into the safety
pin hole of the fuze.
Booster asrscrnlily.The Mark zSc
is identical to the Mark (4) Lifspot the
fune outno the
mine to.
5 except that it is fitted with I 5 rnpr h i~ n h uet
Mark 4 precssure cover instead of a safe storage or disposal area,
pressure spider. Additiona~l Precautions. Handle the fuze
carefully even when the safety pin is present
Use. These are generally used as anti- because of the integral percussion cap, deto-
vehicular mines, nator, and booster. Keep the fuzes separated
from the mines at all times. except during emn-
Functioning. Pressure on the pressure placement in the ground.
cover crutshes the protective cap over the fuse
and severs the shear pin, relcasing the spring-
inaded striker ag~ainst the pecrcussion cap, firing
it, and in turn the detonator, booster, and the
mine.
G-24 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Antitank Mine, Mk.V (Egyptian Pattern)
SHEAR WIRE WOODEN PRESSURE PLUNGER
\(•i ji"BOOSTER
PL.UNG ER 1
External view IGNITER AMPOULE DETONATOR
Section of A.T. Mine, Mk. V (E.P.)

showing use o± AoP. Mine No.5 as the
detonator
(Chemical pressure fuze, (EoPo) No. 2)
This metallic mine consists of a body, ex-

ploder mechanism, and cover. The cover is Installingand Arming.
fastened down by three pins that engage in_ (1) Lay the mine in the ground and re-
slots in three retaining straps attached to the move the cover.
mine body. The mine has a centered well for (2) Place an exploder in the inverted
the special fuzes, exploders No. 1 and No. 2, cover and insert an ampoule, red end
which operate on the shear wire principle. In first, into a detonator No. 8,
the side of the exploder body, near the base, (3) Fill the open end of the detonator
is a channel for the inserting of the ampoule flush with luting.
cartridge and detonator assembly. The mine is (4) Insert this end with luting into the
20.3 centimeters in diameter and 6.2 cer.ti- hole in the side of the exploder body.
meters high. (5) Slide the assembly home and seal in
place with more luting.
Characteri•tics. (6) Grease the exploder and insert it into
the fuze well.
sh•re FpU,, Expioie (7) Refit the cover,
force Disarming Procedure.
(1) Check for and remove any antilift de-

Mushroom. Integral per- 250 to 350 lb. 4,1 lb. TNT vices.
cussion pressure. (2) Remove the pressure cover.
exploder. (3) Remove the wooden pressure plunger
from the fuze.
Use. The mine will break the tracks of (4) Carefully remove the fuze from the
light or medium tanks and disable vehicles, mine.
(5) Pull out the detonator assembly by th6
Functioning. Pressure on the top of the tape ends projecting out of the hori-
mine forces the plunger through the shear wire zontal fuze well at the bottom of the
and down onto the ampoule cartridge, crushing fuze case.
it and firing the detonator, booster, and main (6) Transport the mine and fuze to a safe
charge. storage or disposal area.

llnwkins Grenade Mine, No. 75, Mlk .
CHEMICAL FUZEI
DETONATOFP
]Fxternal. vie,,; of Mine and fuzes
PRESS'URE PLATE
BOOSTER CHARG"--
M.A I CHARGE
Hawkins Grenade, No. 75, Mk. 1. (in section)
The Hawkin's grenade mine No. 75, Mark 1, the metal block with the pressure pinl. The
is an earlier moMe of the Hawkin's grenade pressure plate has a transverse groove instead
mire No. 75, Mark 11. The fuze -wells are ]o- of a longitudinal ridge. In all other charac-
cated parallel to each other, instead of in a V- teristics, this mine is similar to the Hawkin's
sha'pe as in the Mark 11. The fuze is similar grenade mine No. 75, Mark IL Disarming is
to the chemical pressure fuze NO. 99, but lack-s merely removing the fuzes.
G-26 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'IS GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Hawkins Grenade Mine, No. 75, Mk. II.
DETONATOR •-.,-
13LLOCAK .
CHEMICAL Fuze being

AMPOULE inserted
No. 98 Chemical
Pressure fuze r7 (7
External view
Functioning. Pressure on the pressure

Hawkin's grenade mine No. 75, Mark I1 con- plate causes it to bend, forcing the pressure pin
sists of a steel case containing a main charge of one fuze, or both, against the ampoule of
and a booster charge. A filler cap is located chemical and crushing it. A chemical reaction
in the end of the case. The top of the case is takes place producing a flame which sets off the
fitted with two fuze wells which lie flat in a V- detonator, firing the mine.
shape. These fuze wells are covered with a Installing and Arminig.
pressure plate with a longitudinal ridge. The (1) Insert the ampoules and detonators in
chemical pressure fuze No. 98 is employed with the fuzes.
this mine. The mine is 17.7 centimeters long, (2) Insert the fuzes in the fuze wells un-
10.1 centimeters wide, and 6.2 centimeters high. der the pressure plate, pushing in the
Charactcristics. detonator end first.
(3) Insert the fuze pin through the holes
s operating ,, in the ends of the fuzo wells.
(4) Place the mine in the ground with the
filler cap pointing in the direction of
Tubular Two No, 9S 80 to 100 lb. 1.5 lb. the opposing forces. When installing
flattened. Chemical
ateed rhem, the mines in pairs, place one mine on
pressure. top of the other. Make sure that the
pressure plate of the upper mine is
Use. This dual-purpose mine is employed flush with the surface of the ground.
in security and protective type minefields, It is DisarmingProcedure.
jalso installed in tactical minefields (in pairs (1) Check for and remove any antilift de-
."and groups of four) and in roadblocks. One vices.
mine will seriously injure a man stepping on it. (2) Withdraw the fuze pin and pull out
Min.s laid in pairs will disable trucks and break the fuzes.
the tracks of light tanks. Four mines laid to- (3) Remove the mine and fuzes to a safe
gether mas, break the track of a medium tank. storage or disposal area,

B) BRITISH ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
Antipersonnel Schrapnel MIine, 14k I.

German nomenclature: 5.M4i.441(e)
SAFETY PIN PULL PLATE

PROPELLING CHARGE FUZE
LEVERSTEEL PROJECTILE CASE
STRIKERMAIN CHARGE CAVITY
DETOATORASSEBLYBLANK CARTRIDGE
DETOATORASSEDL~CASTIRON CASE
PROPELLING CHAMBER
External view Schrapnel tMine, Mlk 1. (in section)
The B~ritish antipersonnel shrapnel mine, Characteri~stics.

lfarký 1, is an earlier miodel of the shrapner ___-___ ___-____. - ___
maine, MTark II It is identical to the Fu"e

Mark 11 except for the following diffcy-ences Sae CaeDe n
the lever on tlIe detonating, fuze in the MTark I anbaePoiIat

isshort and does not extend the full depth of
the maine case; the percussE-ion-cap-anid-detonaptor- Cylin- Cast 4 lb. Me Ichan- Pull, re- I lb.
assemibly in the Mark I has a delay pellet; the drical iron, pull. ical quiring arna-
mnine case of the. M\ark I has '71A" stenciled Vith~ lever- 4 lb. Ll
on it in black, and the Mark I has a leather bulge relme-~e force
on one for
carrying strap instead.c of a wire ha-ndle. flide release.
for the
Two red Btripes nre painted Fround the case.
G-28 BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'IS GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Bounding Antipersonnel Mine, Mk II.
SAFETY PIN
MAIN CHARGE FUZE

PROPELLING CHARGE FUZE
STRIRIEE SPRINGG
STRIKER I STEEL PROJECTILF ASE
MAIN HARcGE
CA'VIY CARTRIDGE
BILANK
a ASTIRON CASE
"4).ASEMBLYT PROPELLING CHAMBER
-LEVER WELL MACHINE SCREWVS
Exterior view Bounding A.P. Mine Mk II

(-in p½'
This is a bounding fragmentation mine con- i72stallig and ArminQ.
sisting of a cast iron case 13.9 centimeters high (1) Unscrew the propelling charge fuze
and 8.8 centimeters in diameter, containing a with a wrench.
steel-cased cylindrical projectile fastened to the (2) Insert the blank cartridge in the fuze
bottom of the case by two machine screws. The well and replace the fuze.
mine has two mechanical fuzes, one for firing (3) Unscrew the main charge fuze.
the propelling charge and one for the main (4) Insert the detonator assembly with
charge. Although the effective casualty radius with the percussion cap uppermost
is 9 to 14 meters, it is dangerous to p&sonnel and replace the fuze with its striker
at distances up to 46 meters. retaining lever extended downward
Use. This mine is laid in antipersonnel into its well.
minefields for sec.rity and in antitank mine- (5) Place the mine in the hole so that the
fields to hinder reconnaissance and breaching pull plate of the propelling charge
parties. fuze is just above ground level.
Functioning. Force applied to the trip- (6) Attach the tripwire to an anchor and
wire of the propelling fuze pull-plate pulls out to the pull plate.
the plate releasing the spring-driven striker (7) Remove the safety pins from both
against the blank cartridge: The pressure from fuzes.
the blank cartridge explosion breaks the screws DisarmingProcedure.
holding the projectile to the case and propels (1) Check for and remove any antilift de-
it into the air. The lever retaining the striker vices.
of the main charge fuze clears the well on the (2) Insert a safety pin or rail in the
side of the case and springs outward, which safety-pin hole of each fuze.
* eleases the spring-actuated striker against the (3) Trace and cut the tripwire,
.•'cetonator assembly and fires the main charge (4) Unscrew the propelling charge fuze
at about 1 meter above the ground. and remove the blank cartridge.
(5) Unscrew the main charge fuze and re-
move the detonator assembly.
(6) Transport mine and fuzes to a safe
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot G-29

C) BRITISH MINE FUZES
pI-C'Fs-M-'e 1uz,
10o.], Ilk I.
SPRESSURE CAP
PRESSURE HEAD
1< Nt SISTANCE COLLAR
PLUNGER
_,TRIK•ER SPRING
SLEEVEPRGSG iKr. -RETAINING
SSSE-I
""•v
BRASSPRDq
SAFETY BRAS.eS SAFETY
SLUEEVE
PERCUSS)ON A, " $IRIKER
D TOI'ATO R
a. Dscri'j/tion. "Jlie Bi-it sh 1pies•,'e raize, C. Piuict;&iiiy.
ank! No. 1 Nmlark I is of the in- (1) A pressu'e of 350 pouttbs crushes tio
stkn t mwomS. meh:aknica] type and co•at.nn a brmss pressure cap.
springloaded striker with n ball release. It con- (2) Vie press',re head an d the plunger are
ynriecal biass case iomsi'Ng a pressure
sists of a c"l .forced down, puI]hing aside the four
head, a plauger. a brWss safety sleeve wth fomr piongs on the brass safety sleeve and
prongs that retain the piuiger and the pressure cOmpIC'si g the stWiker spring.
heand, n spring-lo:ded stritler held in place by (3) The stbriheretainiug halls are forced
two strbjei-reta inhin ~ls.Au,and n brass Ies~stnnaec outwarl into a rece!ss in the plunger, re-
collar surrounding tOe pressure ihad. A percuS- lr,:iing the spmiOn-laldvd strihei :igAinst
tOe pgrcswon c:ip.
sion pap and a deton:tor are built into the base
d.
(Ics- Ii.,.fdliug and A jo' 1f. This fuze lain no
of the fuze. A br'aýss lrc, -ir'e Cap covers tihe devices.
ely S. S rewm the fuze i tlo fuse well of
•i,.saf e C. antitankSmine, Iai 11.
sure head.fe- hG
b. lmly .,.' This fuze Wns des5igneI .spe-
cifically for u.:ec with lie G.. S. ( service)
sgeneral ,,. , AIthoigh this fuze lhaz nO
.0 ,.aftv ithe high presture Mequh'ed to ac-
.ntit.n
u artkte it makes it fairly safe to Knodle. nlicrew
the fuze from the miie.

Pressure Fuze No. 3 Mkic
SAFETY PIN WOE
CASE
PERCUSSION CAP RBE

DETONATOR-GSE
BOOSTER CHARGE W4
nns4. 11304i ih
The~fiOi oiCssiiC fuzmn Fimnct/oniiqq. A priie~ of frioum 400 to 500
Whaimnk. 'To, 3. Mark I is of the irmsamm pounids on the cnd of tihe rt v Oinkm saf slmcums thme
InneiomiS, mnechanuical type and( Contains a Sprwing- sOmm' pim d iiNN toe Mriimglemdd Mitrier
]o; dCCi S¶ riker- xith a shear-pin ITeeaSe. The10 ngaht thme jptim-usOio Calp and Brin g Wie det o-
Striker is held inl place by a shear pinl that. is ill- Imitom' an'd tile booster elm rge.
serteci thrmough thme Mtnkhr Sha ft So as to benr di. hm~Inu;;g amlAvid. nmby. Place time fiMze in
against, time op of thme case. A cotlCr-pin type time mnime and withld 1 my tme znmfvt y pin.
Safety p)in iS iii-,eitvd thog he erbrshmAf e. M' mm/inAlrg. Insert a W e"y pIn or a nail in
"mnsabove tie shear pinl. Thme top of the cylim- the Sa fety-pimi hole. fl0cami"Wofowie hghpmesm-c'
drical steel ease is largur ii diin meter tlioi timebasc. nees~in 10 Waenr thme shear Ilim lhe Wie woni11 he
Crimped WmmOO t101"
,beOf tbe Wie iS amc"p tha~t Wae to h idle if it were not fur tiw Imiilt-im deto-
hiod. a ddtmmctor- aimmi q booster amnd~ boostter echarge. 13 ecolvse of thle (le00-
Ih"-.m~itor
hi. E omjlom,'mmm't. '1k AMiCfi is ued ill time G.. iiatommrm im tie bojoster mie vixt reime care Sholmmd
antitank~~"'ar~ V~~~~m 0.le iI- etknwie1:1(~n"di le vl hltl
(ln nn.'NakVICthle (3. s. aliti- b ~km hl imilim ~efme vnweitm
mm m ,Mar~nik
uk wimmi Vc and the G. S. svmfety piml is inl place.
ant itanik minime. Mark IV
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot G0-1

Appendix G, Annex 4
French Mines and Fuzes
A) FRENCH ANTI-TANKS MINES

11-1935 11eavy AT-mine
SHIPPI14G PLUG
--- OOSTER CHARGE
~~------~--FUZE WELL
7
a, c)eipliom Tile Fei-enh heaivy ant it ail (I. lit-510 iin, n Arming1.
s a recetng-ular steel
haf-p: (1) Plice the minije ill a; bleo dep1 enlough for
c~n' re
cii, ierweled AcOee base. rheivine the topQof the min1101o be fh][Sh with thU
i~sI Gly Wk ln ong, (0 Winces wide, and 41 iniches gioiiii lsnfaee orn ]ilitho below it. Whell
hll.' It 'wtt1ll5 27 J)Olidy hwhd ill 305 pond iayiit ]nine' flit-ds wr bcl(t, heep G-foot,
of e \j hioýivce A hied sel ivlwlir coTVe mst in eiA , at Ienk, between nmins.
ov I ith cl i-e ennidninr and is hold in1 IiceITCl (2) Lift lup tile Ihl>num euver and unscreW
t
twowin tits.Inthe
opof iethie en~lerthe s'liippiuir pluzg fioni 1the fuze well. or
~in'eilefueusewel.vedin tn mie tinve ;h onfet (1)111 fronti altmid-tllht
tie p resire finz. antilink, 3I!)U15anti VAlG fuze if Owi mnew is Wiiippd with the fmtz
A dotiiiiiswiI tal-(;ný( t booster in jlaueo.
WTiVtis 15 60 td is ]IdUiYl hit be Wue xveli
anii~el (8) 1ulert tue Iwoutcr eiar", ill te fuzte wvehi
when1 thle mino i., armedý A Atlireated sllipping ~ Im, Oe inl 1)le'>lv fuze. nAitittnkz,
j~l~ lo~st!he fuse0 well1 A Muetail sa fetvh C0lh:ir11pv1 9P i l e-st~te1;
b.Loploiaeot. Thisý m tne wias des:iplvi(e foran etoltoa--iIA.
1
emiploymenit in perniatletit dlefenlsive isthtin. (4) lfwtteJesiccvr am
fte it
c. Pimuu.A jvcsý;nre of about ý00wi i the N\ing ii ts.
pontlds 0il The lpte~z~lit i over eirllý,h CS the cover .. liPf,(./q
until ii etsallt the"ihter slft of tie fuse. (1) Checei for and teientali/.e i0v~ttt
SileaTiI tile 0her Niti. Sitilinn tie pitt relevase f ups.
tile th ITIe
petensOll
apiid~idtlctlgail~l:t (2) Tholi pressn re covet. Illa Ila\'e :1)1 act tvatt*
cnl fitil, (he ))tlinetO. itiL fue1 11teliedck. A fter ltliflAtellillg
the witiý- nuits. pulil tue0 covet. 11p with a1
fronti lie liinte.

(8) VUtnetew tile fuse(.
(41 lllh(leIO tin,' le1t5il111alile~
tol. na;.mnttld frulm ti bt, toot'l of till fit:cc.
()Lift witt tile iiwitiut d~iln o
G-32 BREACHTINMG TH1E "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighifoot

M-1936 Lighit AT-mine
PRESSURE BAR PRESSURE COVER
- -~ ~PRESSURE 13AR
SArEtY BAR
FU E- --- Z
a. De-iq/wn.The Frclctic light an tit :1u i.l n .- rbg

)ine, 'M-l1)-3G h;a ]ecaagilat steel (1) IJauce tIN notne in a lode deep etnoug ir r
chtaige ('('ailer
1
91 ic ln. A1 hwle "w'½ the lp of Oh tnow to he Awlt with IQ
'i2iuiiii ~ hr ;n.=e 14.5 lii I.h lbriw itI. AVl.he
ar'itlttlc
Il
potitidsiutl i tir 5.5 pnOt~~ of exlksive. It Living nt:tt held "r belt loep G3-f,t
UResI liw §Mnuri e faze.ati Manitc Mf-1015 aitd 1916 iiitirtil Mt LOAt beit WcM none,-;.
Ivo hoe1 w~as 0,' loc.a ted in the top (2) M~iove tie Iptcsm:rc ovr and1 secw two
of the chnity canfifaint. The floiyed base, plate pressure flina., mlt itnant. M- 1035 'Ind
has at hole ill each cornerl fol. hold-downi bolt;z 100 )'6J iltit rcnssýi on-ca p-ancld-Jto a t or
Awen the tni ne is ilad in Iviltnanent defensi e asnlis int t h fuze wells.
])o~it iois. A corrugate preiluriCC\Citý covert O0el1 (3) 1ItscrI (li e safety 411. thronlig1 the holes in
the chatrge conitniuneend is stttgtiomphod by a weal Ow e"; of w e -csnure C=M*.
strlip. Two iet ia plonmvtt- by, am- we~~hlded to the (4) Rej 'lace thle prst-cssi ICcover and put thie
Ullde-si de of the hilVessare cover aind are posýitiond wit or chnini o-r Ow hook to hold it ipt
aoetile fizes whIEil t1e cOVer tS ill place.A
chlattld-sltald a~ultimtinuln ii ba i- e lotigi- (5) WYithidraw the safety bar.
a linia Ill t h olugh thle pr essur coenl ret ~~ ov er Xeut rl-0ninyl.
the fuines, pr-evettting thLent front beintu act ittted. ()Check for and neat rahize any wciathing
Wires or cliaitns attached to bi th ends of the base fuzes. Tihe plessitte corer itt avite itt
plate fit ovver hooltý onitli 1110~ ui coNvir to hohl "ctina g fuze MOMt A i- i
the cover ini plae. One of the wires or c~in is oe .msui tialend. Eza
thnitike the
peritna tntIt ly a tfached totlihe precýsti re covet litit thle wire or c~a in off the hooký.
base plate, (2.) Lift. the pretssure cover. If there is 'Imti
b. Emploiotne0. Tbhis minle was rbŽ-igi ed forCiitieO ctiopllhepsat
cIettido fe iti en in ositi oit s. ai m l ll t t i t i -cover off w ritht a rope or w~\ire. S tay a
V.li (l fk~V po itm
n i a f Ts.3 0 1 t 0 d istattee of 50 vat-il; ftro nt the mnine.
pol nd ý o n thes~ M ic:: ofWfro nt 300t o (3 ) 171itsc ietv a nld re tiiio v e b oth fao es.
p110Viii011 on the att
-ese c ilveprc:-l-eo h liiwiiwaidl (41) U mt'Scm-w tile tts i a p- tddt n-
tittvtit'it
heatieli~ ~rc~ii-eha-.-agitsttor
f assenihhis fl-et the hoauttis of the
tOe A6Tio -AMt of mwt ot 6hi~tI of the fame shAm>fims
ittg I lie -hei r pil. th poit11-leases the
:Itiiritn Ile
spritto-Mihi s acr :itetillt tilie PVYIýitet
il n~('a]),
litilig thie nitie.
BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighifoot G-33

B) FRENCH MINE FUZES
Pi-esslure fuzes, 1,11935 and H1-iS36
SHEAR Pi1N
STRIKER
'1 CAP
DITONA7OR
AS EM PLY
v'. Tii.'he ielIlat

Fr.Icj lnkll mi ne WiIl a :isp ii5 il-ALfIdea It01tO1
4;n
fz.I d;,c anid Pj:2G iýf then~~. hl tin M-d faizo is Ima' t e of auii
ll o
lgi~it
511ý11 l l ie .ii sh:111d n
col~ itils '.1 a 111116111111
W l, \i~t~ii :11
IIle ýIlic I p~in j)3)k t ill iiedl tuIe Krhilsr shi:ft ajl .1hj&/iC T.Ihis filze'. tl sed inl 1)0th thef
010 to]) (If (Ile faize ;1-0,J.(.h' peit~cwiolin C;1l) is lig1t m Ihe kV
heaVy IeIm 1e niln
.00(conator.helem nl is hlhi, inl
contaiiiid inlhedl
plice lwalo owSi i elr c1tesrke .[ecl', A pre-ci- to. of .100 pci nih', or.
mlg.y
icc((s to the C.,1p. 'Ilme detowiatim ihoidemn h~s into liel
mat.on stiehFtlicai11w2li sIlear pinlln
the Ibcttaein (f tile fn'ze andl is,hel--d ill placo iw the vdeleasL'$ the spiialnne Iviikr :ag':111nst thme Per-
delonitor. ý1-lllhly whmich srecs jinto tile bottom (Sýýlul (ci, firiinU tlil dotoilator.
of the fmize'. The )1li1m 033 is inrid of steel

APPENDIX H
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
TERRAIN OVERVIEW
Generalfeldmarshall Rommel remarked that at El Alamein, "Rivers of blood were poured out over
miserable strips of land which, in normal times, not even the poorest Arab would have bothered his head about."'
The Sahara Desert is mainly characterized by vast, hot, dry, and barren plains with large diurnal ranges in
temperature with a few widely spaced settlements. The terrain has many large flat plain surfaces, thousands of
square miles of sand dunes; several fairly large areas of rugged, rocky hills and mountains; numerous steep-sided
escarpments, wadis, and depressions with salt marshes. Ever since the British occupation of Egypt, the El Alamein
Line had been recognized as the best position on which to defend the cultivated area along the Nile River and the
Suez Canal against attack from the west. The line was sited between the Mediterranean Sea coast northeast of El
Alamein and the northern edge of the Qattara Depression at Naqb Abu Dweis. It straddled the narrowest part of the
coast belt on a front of about 60 kilometers and rested its flanks on the Sea and the impassable depression. The few
natural obstacles and marked features on the line had an importance, which explains much of the course of the
fighting. Afternoon temperatures in the summer (June through September) usually ranged from 900 to 120' F (32 to
490 C) or more. The nights are cool while winters are mild.
OBSERVATION
Generally, observation was excellent in the desert. The dust clouds raised by moving vehicles were
particularly obvious and favored the defender.
RIDGES
Low-lying ridges in the area provided a degree of improved observation. Miteiriya Ridge (5 to 6 meters
above the surrounding desert) was southwest of El Alamein while the Ruweisat Ridge (10 to 20 meters above the
surrounding desert) ran eastward from near Deir el Shein. Towards the Qattara Depression, the ground along the
escarpment is broken into small flat-topped hills such as Qaret el Himeimat (215 meters), the El Taqa Plateau
(218m), and Qaret el Khadim (174 meters). Qaret el Himeimat towered 100 meters over the surrounding desert. On
a clear day, one could see the Mediterranean Sea, 49 kilometers to the north.
DESERT HAZE
The high daytime temperatures in the desert cause an atmospheric haze that adversely affects visibility.
When this haze condition is at its height, usually in mid-afternoon, a crawling man is obscured or his figure
completely distorted at 200 meters. This haze phenomenon was often used as a cover for reconnaissance.
WIND
The winds of the Sahara Desert affected operations in several ways. Fast moving winds heavily laden with
sand and dust often reduced visibility. In other situations, sand and dust storms (variously called Shamals,
Khamsins, or Ghiblis) restricted visibility to only tens of meters.
COVER AND CONCEALMENT
DEPRESSIONS
Of the sparse terrain features in the area, some of the most notable were the depressions such as Deir el
Shein, Deir el Mreir and Deir el Munassib. These shallow depressions, typically about 10 to 20 meters below the
surrounding desert, were located near the middle of the front and provided some cover to their occupants.
FIELD FORTIFICATIONS
The open desert was generally devoid of any cover or concealment. Therefore, soldiers were forced to
make their own. Throughout the length of the line, the ground was generally rocky, requiring power tools and
"explosives for entrenchment. In the few areas of sand or sandy soil, field fortification was relatively easy to
The Rommel Papers, by Erwin Rommel (edited by B. H. Liddell Hart), Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1953, page 306.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot H-l

establish. Such conditions, however, did not exist over wide stretches of the desert plateaus. In many areas, the
ground is flat and stony with barely a covering of dust to hide the rocky sub-mantel. In some places, even the dust
cover is missing and nothing but solid rock exists.
OBSTACLES
Inland from the seacoast, there is a strip of salt marsh and then a belt of sand and dunes about 200 meters
wide. The land then rises about 20 meters in a ridge along which the coast road runs. South of the road is the
Egyptian Republic Railway, which runs along an elevated embankment for portions of its length in the battle area.
This embankment formed a significant obstacle to north-south movement in places. From the road and railway, the
ground gradually rises over a wide and rather featureless plain to the escarpment, which has an elevation of about
210 meters above sea level. From the escarpment, the ground drops precipitously some 230 meters into the
impassable Qattara Depression (10 to 20 meters below sea level). This relatively narrow strip, between the
Mediterranean Sea and the Qattara Depression, canalized all land traffic. This line could be penetrated, but not
turned.
QATTARA DEPRESSION
This terrain feature is the reason the panzerarmee and the 8th Army fought at El Alamein. The salt marshes
and sand dunes of the Qattara Depression make it impassable to vehicle columns of any size. Consequently, it was
the only position in Egypt and Libya that could not be outflanked to the south. Nevertheless, small raiding parties in
light vehicles could and did traverse the area on fragile caravan routes over the soft ground.
WADIS
A wadi is normally a dry, steep sided ravine. These frequently constituted a natural obstacle in its own
right. Many of the Saharan wadis were sufficiently wide and deep to significantly effect military operations. Wadis
were nearly always mined, particularly at likely crossing places. In several instances, they were used as a structural
part of defensive positions with minefields in front, within and sometimes behind their course. When it rained, the
wadi could become a rivulet or a torrent. Their mined bottoms were affected accordingly.
RAINFALL
The Sahara Desert has no season of regular rains. The rain that it does receive it owes to the passage of
storms, the dates of which are entirely erratic and the effects more or less confined to single localities. The Saharan
rainfall is characterized primarily by its irregularity. It might rain for only short periods but it could be a heavy
deluge.
ESCARPMENTS
The various escarpments, located south of the coastal plains of the Sahara Desert, rise sometimes abruptly,
sometimes in several tiers, but always steeply and up to heights of about 200 meters above sea level. They
effectively block traffic wishing to move from the coast to the desert plateau above. Access can be gained only
along a few roads or tracks that climb steeply through certain passes. The escarpment itself is almost impassable to
wheeled or tracked vehicles for about 200 kilometers west of Naqb Abu Dweis. These passes up the escarpments
consistently received the attention of opposing sappers and miners. The passes in Egypt, situated nearest the
frontier, were mined very early in the conflict. The Italians, for example, hit their first British mines at Halfaya Pass
at the start of their 1940 invasion of Egypt.
MILITARY (REINFORCING) OBSTACLES

The vast openness of the North African plateau environment, in conjunction with a very early recognition
of the effectiveness of mines, encouraged the use of mines on a massive scale. Mass mining was first employed by
the British 8"' Army in the construction of its line at Gazala in March, April and May of 1942. The 8 1hArny applied
the same mine tactics at El Alamein in July and August of the same year. An estimated half million or more mines
were emplaced in each of these lines. GeneralfeldmarshallRommel, obviously impressed by the British "Mine
Marsh" tactics at Gazala and El Alamein, employed the same concept, with added dimensions, in his own defense of
the El Alamein position against the 8th Army. The panzerarmee's defenses contained no fewer than 481,000 mine
devices by the time they were attacked on 23 October 1942. Mine-laying was relatively easy and routine in sand or
sandy soils with depths of 30 centimeters or more. Such sand and soil depths, however, do not exist over wide
stretches of the desert plateaus. In many areas, the ground is flat and stony with barely a covering of dust to hide the
H-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

rocky sub-mantel. In some places, even the dust cover is missing and nothing but solid rock exists. Conditions can
vary even in areas with shallow soil depths. Mine-laying was a very difficult task under such circumstances.
KEY TERRAIN
The vast and barren desert plains of the El Alamein region have relatively little key terrain. Aside from the
Qattara Depression in the south, Qaret Himeimat and Miteiriya Ridge were the most significant terrain features of
the battlefield. These low-lying ridges provided a degree of observation. As stated earlier, Miteiriya Ridge (5 to 6
meters above the surrounding desert) was southwest of Alamein while the Ruweisat Ridge (10 to 20 meters above
the surrounding desert) ran eastward from near Deir el Shein. Towards the Qattara Depression, the ground along the
escarpment is broken into small flat-topped hills such as Qaret Himeimat (215 meters), the El Taqa Plateau (218m),
and Qaret el Khadim (174 meters). After the Battle of Alam Halfa in September, General Montgomery directed that
the panzerarmee be allowed to retain control of Qaret Himeimat. This hill towered 100meters over the surrounding
desert. As part of his deception plan, General Montgomery wanted the panzerarmee to see the activities of XIII
Corps in order to convince them that this was the main effort. Once the battle was underway, it was imperative for
X1I1 Corps to force the Axis off of Qaret Himeimat. If they remained on the hill, they would be able to observe and
interfere with the British breaches of the minefields to the east and to direct artillery fire on to them.
Although the low-lying Miteiriya Ridge was only 5 to 6 meters above the surrounding desert, it was
nevertheless, key terrain to the Axis forces because it provided a reverse slope defense against the Commonwealth
armored units. However, while the position provided some initial protection against Allied direct fire, defending
from the reverse slope also prevented the Axis units from covering their forward obstacles with effective direct fire.
Later, during the battle, the ridge provided the defenders a critical advantage over the British armor, which was
attempting to exploit the initial success of the 2nd New Zealand Division.
AVENUES OF APPROACH
The approaches to the position follow three main lines - 1) the coast road and railway, 2) the Barrel Track
from Fuka through the Deir el Munassib and 3) the Qaret el Himeimat to Cairo Road then along a narrow,
trafficable strip running north of the escarpment. Patches of camel thorn scrub, soft sand, and rocky outcroppings
complicate movements by wheeled transport.
COASTAL PLAINS
The coastal plains carried the main lines of communications, including the all important 3000-kilometer
long main east/west coast road running from Alexandria in Egypt to Tunis. This road ran near the coast,
occasionally swerving inland, to touch the bigger towns. At several points, these inland swerves crossed rather
formidable escarpments. Among the towns and other localities situated along this main road, and of military
importance, were El Alamein, El Daba, Fuka, Matruh, Sidi Barrani, Sollum, Bardia, Tobruk, Gazala, Benghazi,
Agedabia, El Agheila, Tripoli, and Medenine. The harbor facilities at Tobruk, Benghazi and Tripoli increased the
military importance of the coastal plains. The only railroad located within the fighting zone of the region also ran
along the coastal plain proceeding westward from Alexandria. From time to time this line was extended to serve the
operational needs of the British forces and eventually reached Tobruk.
The coastal road and its adjacent verges were constantly mined because of its military importance in
pursuit or retreat. Off-route mining was usually tied to the salt marsh obstacles that were also mined on a number of
occasions. The road and off-road mining and countermining incidences related in Chapter 7, are representative of
some of the most intense mining and countermining operations that were carried out in the coastal plains area. Off
the main road in the coastal plain, motorized going ran the gamut from good to bad. Patches of deep sand and salt
marshes were the principle obstacles.
DESERT PLATEAUS
The desert plateaus lying south of the escarpments provided space enough for sweeping maneuver. Natural
terrain obstacles constraining such movements were few, particularly obstacles blocking movement eastward and
westward. As GeneralfeldmarshallRommel observed in his survey of the North African battlegrounds, that there
was only one position in Egypt or Libya, the one at El Alamein, which could not be turned at its southern flank. The
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot H-3

first real obstacle to east and west movement, the Qattara Depression, was some 60 kilometers inland from El
Alamein.
MAP 16
Ul ALAMELIN
CORRE[CT IG4DING MA4P
StFORE mm-t-t4.
CONTiNU LOW 4EAR.
H-4~~BRAHNbHyDVI'
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ADN
~ ~~01Y
prainLgif
APPENDIX I. AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE'
(As of 23 OCT 1942, unless otherwise noted)
PanzerarmneeAfrika: commanded by General Der Kavallerie Gcorg Stumme (until KIA 24 OCT) then GeneralfeldmarshallErwin Rommel,
senior Pioneer: Oberst Hans Hecker replaced OberstGerhard Jordan, 29 Oct 41, later (8 Nov 42) replaced by GeneralmajorKarl Buelowius. For
many units of the panzerarmee, the most current equipment strength report predates the Battle ofAlam Halfa. During this battle, the Germans
lost 1,859 men and 38 tanks, while the Italians lost 1,051 men, 50 guns (47mm or larger) and about 400 trucks. The Germans had 12,600
vehicles (including the Luftwaffe), while the Italians had 3,500 vehicles.
Afrika Korps, GeneralleutnantRitter von Thoma page 1-3
XX Italian Motorized Corps, Lieutenant General Giuseppe de Stcphanis page 1-18
X Italian Corps, Lieutenant General Enrico Frattini (acting) page 1-28
XXI Italian Corps, General Alessandro Gloria (acting) page 1-33
PanzerarmeeAfrika Troops page 1-36
11 Fliegerkorps, GeneraloberstBruno Loerzer, in support page 1-40
51hSquadra, Regia Aeronautica, in support page 1-43
PANZERARMEE AFRIKA STRENGTH

DAK X CORPS XX CORPS XXI CORPS ARMY TROOPS ARMY Total
Personnel 35,335 11,301 11,670 10,176 10,036 104,000*
Infantry Battalions 24 17 9 (-) 14 3 67 (-)
Tanks Pz IVf2 30 - - - - 30
Pz IV (kz) 10 - 10
Pz IjIj 87 - 87
Pz III (kz) 96 - - 96
M14 - - 279 279
TOTAL MED. TANKS 223 - 279 502
L6 - - 22 - 22
Stuart (captured) - - 10 10
Pz I1 33 - 33
MK VI (captured) - - 2 2
Pz Bcf 8 - - - 8
TOTAL 264 - 301 565
Artillery (Divisional) 7.5 cm lcIG 18 17 - - - 17
75/18 Semoventc SP - - 30 5 35
15 cm sIG 33 8 - - - 8
5cm slIG SP 19 - 19
65/I7 gun - 36 36
7.5 cm LG40 8 - 8
7.5 cm GK15 8 - - - 8
75/27 gun - 60 60 47 - 167
7.62 cm Russian - -5 5
77/28 guns - 24 - 24
8.75 cm British 29 - - - 21 50
100/17 howitzer - 24 20 38 8 90
105/28 gun - 12 24 - - 36
10.5 cm LG40 8 - - 8
10.5 cm French 4 4
10.5 cm IcFH 18 60 - - 60
15 cmsFH 18 16 - 4 20
15 cm sFH13 SP 8 - - 8
(Corps & Army) 10 cm K17 8 - - 8
10 cm KI8 - 8 8
11.4 cm gun (captured) - 3 3
149/28 gun 5 - 5
149/40 gun 9 - 9
15 cm K16 - 18 18
152/37 guns 2 2
The Axis order of battle was compiled from numerous sources. The most useful were the following: 1) US National Archives, Captured
German Records Division, Series T-313, Rolls 430, 431 (particularly frames 8723688-8723703) and 470; Series T-314, Roll 16, Series T-315,
Rolls 666, 1156, and 1474, 2) "Orders of Battle, El Alamein, 23 October 1942," by Doctor Lco Nichorstcr, available online at:
htJltt://www.orbat.com/sitciww2/drlco."500 eto142-10-23 north-africa.htmil , 3) The Afrika Korps. An Organizational History, 1941-1943, by
George F. Nafziger, privately published, Pisgah, Ohio, 1997, 4) Italian Order of Battle. World War II, Volume 1, (Armored, Motorized, Alpini,
and Cavalry Divisions), by George F. Nafziger, privately published, Pisgah, Ohio, 1996, and 5) Italian Order of Battle. World War I11Volume 3,
(Black Shirt, Mountain, Assault and Landing Divisions, Corps Troops, and 1944 Liberation Army), by George F. Nafziger, privately published,
Pisgah, Ohio, 1996.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot I-1

15.5 cm French 10 10
17cmKI8 7 7
21 cm Morser 18 - - - - 6 6
TOTAL 192 96 134 125 131 678
Anti-Tank Rifles PzBu39 54 (?) 54 (?)
PzBu41 23 (?) 23 (?)
20mm Soluthum - 129 28 126 283
TOTAL 77 129 28 126 360
DAK X CORPS XX CORPS XXI CORPS ARMY TROOPS ARMY Total
Anti-Tank Artillery 3.7 cm Pak 36 108 - 108
4 cm Pak (c)(captured) - - 6 6
47/32 AT gun - 142 128 111 - 381
4.7 cm Pak (t) 14 - 14
4.7 cm Pak (t) SP - 11 11
5 cm Pak 38 109 3 112 (290?)
5.7 cm Pak (c) (captured) 4 5 9
7.62 cm Pak (r) 3 - 3
7.62 cm Pak (r) SP 4 2 6(?) 68 total?
TOTAL 242 142 128 111 27 650, 522,
744?
Anti-Aircraft Artillery 8.8 cm Flak 18 8 12 24 42 86**
90/53 AA/AT gun - - 8 - 8
75/50 AA/AT gun - 10 (?) - 10 (?)
2 cm Flak 38 42 - 191 233
2 cm Flakvierling 38 6 - - - 6 6
Italian 20amm AA gun - 14 26 2 - 42
TOTAL 56 26 68 (?) 2 239 397 (?)***
Armored Cars Light (Sd Kfz 222 & 223) 20 - - - - 20
Hvy (Sd Kfz 231 &232) 4 - 4
Autoblinda 41 - 18 18
TOTAL 24**** 18***** - 42******
Engineer Companies Pionecr 13 10 5 2 - 30
Construction - - - - 4 4
Note: The numbers in this and subsequent tablcs may not necessarily tally up as the unit reports and roll ups changed from day-to-day due to
maintenance and other considerations, thus making exact numbers impossible to determine.
*Not including 77,000 Italian troops in Africa, but not under GeneralfeldmarwhallRommel command.
** Not including 52 guns employed around the airfields and port facilities
***1264 according to Italian sources (Le Operazioni in Africa SeutIntiooale. Vol. Ill-El Alamein).
****47 according to Italian sources (Le Operazioniin Afirica Settentrionale. Vol. lll-El Alamein)
*****72 according to Italian sources (Le Operazioniin Afi-ca Setntrionale Vol. Ill-El Alamein)
******* 192 according to British sources (The Destruction of Axis Forces in Africa, The Mediterranean and Middle East. Volume IV)
2
PANZERARMEE AFRIKA STAFF
POSITION INDIVIDUAL DATE ASSUMED POSITION
Chief of Staff OberstleutnantSiegfried Westphal 10 SEP 42
Ia (Operations) Major Feige (acting) After 14 AUG 42
lb (Quartermaster) Major Otto DEC 41
Ic (Intelligence) Major Zolling APR 42 (Westphal indicates 9
SEP 42)
Ila (Adjutant) Major Schraepler
lVb (Medical) OberstartztDr. Asal
Artilleriekommandeur GeneralmajorFritz Krause DEC 41
Pionierkommandeir Oberst Herrnann-Hans Hecker OCT 41
Nachrichtungsfuhrer Oberst Buchting JUL 41
Fliegerfuhrer Afrika Generalder FliegerHans Seidernann JUL 42
2
"The Campaign in North Africa 1941/3, Volume 2, The Campaign in the Year 1942," by General der Panzertruppe Walther Nehring, MS # T-
3, Foreign Military Studies, Headquarters, US Army Europe, 1948, Anlage (Appendix) 18, pages 2 and 3. Sec also Erinnerungen,by Siegfried
Westphal, v. Hase & Koehler Verlag., ISBN 3-7758-0886-8, Mainz, 1975, page 174.
1-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

Afrika Korps: commanded by GeneralleutnantRittcr von Thoma, assumed command 20 Sep, replaced GeneralleutnantWalther Nehring WIA 30
Aug, senior Pioneer: Major Bloch KIA 2 SEP 42 (no replacement has been identified).
15'h Panzer Division, GenerahnajorGustav von Vaerst page 1-5
21St Panzer Division, GeneralmajorHeinz von Randow page 1-8
9 0 'hLight Division, Genera/majorTheodor von Sponcck page 1-11I
16 4 1h Light Division, GeneralmajorKarl Lungerhausen page I-15
2 2nd (Ramckc) Fallschirmjager(Airborne) Brigade (GeneralmajorBernard Ramcke) page 1-18
Corps Troops (about 3,000 in late August)
4 7 5 'h Motorized Signal Battalion
1VMotorized Wire Construction Company
2nd Motorized Wire Construction Company
3YdMotorized Telephone Company
4 1h Panzer Radio Interception Company
one motorized light signal transport column
572 d Panzer Supply Battalion
V through 6 1h 60 Ton Motorized Transport Columns
W651 60 Ton Motorized Transport Column
7 th 50 cubic meter Motorized POL Transport Column
one motorized maintenance company
6 0 9 'h Munitions Supply Company
6 6 8gh Supply Company
5 76 th Mapping Section (attached to Corps Headquarters)
AFRIKA CORPS STRENGTH

15 Pz Div 21 Pz Div 164 Div 90 Div Ramcke Bde Corps Total
Personnel 3,940 3,972 6,342 2,827 3,379 27,175*
Infantry Battalions 3 3 9 6 3 24
Tanks Pz IVf2 15 15 - - - 30
Pz IV (kz) 7 3 10
Pz IIIj 43 44 87
Pz III (kz) 53 43 96
Stuart (captured) - - -
Pz II 19 14 33
Pz Bef 6 2 8
TOTAL 143 121 - 264
Artillery 7.5 cm lIcG 18 4 1 12 17
15 cm sIG 33 4 3 4 11
15cm slG SP 8() 6 - - 14(?)
7.5 cm LG40 - - - 8 8
7.5 cm GK15 8 - 8
7.5 cm French - - - - -
8.75 cm British 5 10 14 - 29
10.5 cm LG40 - - - - 8 8
10.5 cm French - - 4 - 4
10.5 cm leFH 18 28 20 12 60
15 cm sFH K18 8 8 - 16
15 cm sFH13 SP 8 - 8
10 cm K17 4 4 - - - 8
TOTAL 69 52 40 14 16 191
Anti-Tank Rifles PzBu39 - - 9 45 - 54
PzBu4l I 4(PzBu39?) - 18 23 (?)
TOTAL I 4 9 63 77
Anti-Tank Artillery 3.7 cm Pak 36 2 2 33 35 36 108
4 cm Pak(c) - - - - - -
4.7 cm Pak (t) - - - 14 14
5 cm Pak 38 7 35 56 11 109
5.7 cm Pak (c) 4 - - - 4
7.62 cm Pak (r) 3 - 3
7.62 cm Pak (r) SP - 4 - - 4
TOTAL 16 41 89 60 36 242
Anti-Aircraft Artillery 8.8 cm Flak 18 8 - - - - 8
2 cm Flak 38 24 18 42
2 cm Flakvicrling 38 6 - 6
TOTAL 38 - 18 56
Armored Cars Light (Sd Kfz 222 & 223) 9 11 - 20
Hvy (Sd Kfz 231 & 232) 2 2 4
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLighffoot 1-3

TOTAL 1, 13 - - - 24
Engineer Comp anies 13 3 13 13 111131
*Oftlesc, 12,147 were infantry, 11,217 artillery (including flak and AT gunners), 1,464 panzer troops, 1,420 recon, and 1,322 pioneers.
3
AFRIKA KORPS STAFF
Chief of Staff Oberst Fritz Bayerlein 3 OCT 41
la (Operations) Major Frevert 5 JAN 42
Ib (Quartermaster) Major Willers OCT 41
Ic (Intelligence) ?
Pionier Ftihrer Vacant?
Nachrichtungsflihrer Major Baron Behr
3FThe Campaign in North Africa 1941/3, Volume 2, Thc Campaign in thc Year 1942," by General der Panzertruppe Walther Nchring, MS # T-
3, Foreign Military Studies, Headquarters, US Army Europe, 1948, Anlage (Appendix) 18, pages 2 and 3. Sec also Erinneringen, by Siegfried
Westphal, v. Hase & Kochler Verlag., ISBN 3-7758-0886-8, Mainz, 1975, page 174.
1-4 BREACHING THE "DE VIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

15 'hPanzer Division: commanded by GeneralmajorGustav von Vaerst, wounded May 1942, returned to duty 25 AUG 1942, combat strength of
171/696/3073 out of ration strength of 237/87/1571/6106 as of 21 Oct 42 out of approximately 12,000 men authorized. 4 The men of this division
were primarily from Kaiserlautem (except 8'hPz Rgt from Stuttgart). By I Nov, the division was down to 12 Sd Kfz 251s of 33 authorized, 0 Sd
Kfz 251/6 of 4 authorized, I Sd Kfz 250 of 2 authorized, and I Sd Kfz 250/3 of 2 authorized). In addition the division had the following major
items of equipment available as of 2l Oct 42: 12 Pz 11,38 Pz III kz, 43 Pz Illj, 2 Pz IV (kz), 14 Pz IVf2 (1g), I Command Pz, 336 MGs, 3 light
mortars, 16 8 cm mortars, I sPzBu, 4 sIGs, 7 3.7cm PAK, 71 5cm PAK, 4 5.7cm antitank guns (Captured British 6 Pounders), 19 7.62 cm self-
propelled anti-tank guns, 24 IcFH 18s, 8 sFH 18s, 4 10 cm K17 guns, 8 sFH 13 (self-propelled), and 5 8.76 cm gun-howitzers (captured British
25 Pounders). In addition, 8 8.8cm FLAK, 24 2 cm FLAK and 6 quad 2cm FLAK guns were attached to the division.
8 th PanzerRegiment commanded by Oberst Willy Teege (arrived Spring 1942) (combat strength of 43/230/698 with a ration strength
of 57/505/6101 and 32 LMGs as of 21 Oct 42)
Pz II Pz III kz Pz III I Pz IV kz Pz IV Ig PzBef Total
Authorized 25 -111 I - 30 6 172
Available 19 53 43 7 15 6 143
Operational 12 38 43 2 14 1 110
Headquarters section
one light panzer platoon (authorized 5 20mm and 5 LMGs, available 4 20mm and 2 LMGs)
one panzer signals section (assigned 2 50mm Pak 38s and 2 LMGs)
one panzcr maintenance company
Is Panzer Battalion (Hauptmann Otto Stiefelmayer, available 3 Pz 11, 23 Pz III kz, 14 Pz IIIj, 8 Pz IVf2 (1g))
Headquarters
one light panzcr platoon
one panzer pioneer platoon
one motorcycle platoon
one 20mm FLAK section (authorized 5 20mm guns)
one panzer signals platoon
I" - 3 d Light Panzer Companies
4 1h Medium Panzer Company
2`1 Panzer Battalion (Hauptmann Siemens, available 5 Pz II, 14 Pz I11kz, 18 Pz IIj, 2 Pz IV kz, 7 Pz IVf2 (1g))
Headquarters
one light panzer platoon
one panzer pioneer platoon
one 20mm FLAK section (authorized 5 20mm guns)
one panzer signals platoon
5" - 7 1h Light Panzer Companies
8 "h
Medium Panzer Company
115'" Panzcr Grenadier Regiment commanded by OberstleutnantFreiherr von Eckardtstcin replaced OberstleutnantBaadc (JUL 42),
combat strength of 49/218/1126 with a ration strength of 63/9/404/1632, assigned 178 MGs, 16 80mm mortars, 4 150mm Heavy
Infantry Guns, 2 37mm Pak 36, 56 50mm Pak 38, 3 76.2mm Pak (r), 4 6-pdr, 4 25-pdr gun-how., and 1 28mm Pz Bu 41, as of 21 Oct
42)
Headquarters Section
One motorized support company
one motorized signals platoon
one motorized pioneer platoon (authorized and assigned 3 LMGs)
one motorcycle messenger platoon (authorized 6 LMGs)
one motorized panzerjager platoon (authorized & assigned 3 50mm Pak 38 AT guns and 3 (1 assigned) LMGs)
I" Battalion (Major Busch) (4 companies (1 s'- 4'h), each authorized 18 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 28mm PzBu41, 3 80mm
mortars, 6 50mm Pak 38s)
2 nd Battalion (Hauptmnann Wcichscl) (4 companies (5'h- 8'h), each authorized 18 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 28mm PzBu41, 3
80mm mortars, 6 50mm Pak38s)
3 " Battalion (4 companies (91h- 12 th), each authorized 18 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 28mm PzBu4l, 3 80mm mortars, 6 50mm
Pak 38s)
13th Company (assigned 4 20mm self-propelled FLAK guns and 3 LMGs)
141h (Motorized) Pioneer Company (not available? authorized 10 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 28mm PzBu4l, 3 80mm mortars, 3
50mm Pak 38s)
15"' (Motorized) Heavy Infantry Support Gun Company (assigned 4 150mm sIG33, 4 8.75 cm guns (e))
3 3rd Panzer Artillery Rcgiment commanded by Oberstleutnant Eduard Crasemann (JUL 41), acting division commander during MG
Vaerst's absence, May-Aug '42), combat strength of 56/154/785 with a ration strength of 63/11/262/1017, assigned 32 MGs, 24 IeFH
18s, 8 sFH 18s, 4 10 cm K17 guns, 8 sFH 13 (self-propelled), and 1 8.76 cm gun-howitzers (captured British 25 Pounders) as of 21
Oct 42.)
One motorized regimental staff battery
4 Die 5. (lei.)/21. Panzer Division in Nordafi-ika, 1941-1943, by Heinz-Dietrich Aberger, Preussischer Militar-Verlag, Reutlingen, 1994, pages
279, states that 15"' Panzer Division had an actual strength (tatsachlichestarke) of only 3,940 men KTB Nr. 26, Pz.AOK/Ia (RH-19 VIII/20) on
the morning of 23 October 1942. See also US National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Series T-315, Roll 666, Frame 315.
Personnel strengths will be annotated either aa/bb/ccc (indicating the numbers of officers/non-commissioned officcrs/cnlisted respectively) or
aa/bbb (indicating the numbers of officcrs/enlisted respectively).
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot 1-5

1" Battalion, (HIaoptonannFreiherr Grote) one motorized staff battery and 1"through 3 d Batteries (each authorized and
assigned 4 105ram IcFH 18s and 2 LMGs)
2"" Battalion, one motorized staff battery and 4"' through 6 "hBatteries (each authorized and assigned 4 105mm IeFH 18s
and 2 LMGs)
3 r` Battalion (Ilaiuptmann Broeckerhof), one motorized headquarters battery, 7 'hBattery (authorized and assigned 4 10 cm
K17 guns and 2 LMGs), 8"h& 9 1h Batteries (each authorized and assigned 4 150mm sFH K18s and 2 LMGs)
4"' Battalion (available 8 self-propelled 150ram sFH 13s)
3 3rdMotorized Artillery Observation Battery
one motorized heavy munitions supply column (60 ton)
707"' Self-Propelled Infantry Support Gun Company (attached?, authorized 6 150mm sIG (2 assigned) and 3 LMGs)
1" Battalion (Motorized). 43"' Luftwaffe Flak Rcgimcnt (combat strength of 18/51/382 with ration strength of 21/2/144/944,
assigned 8 8.8cm FLAK, 24 2cm FLAK, and 6 Quad 2cm FLAK, attached from Panzerarmce Afrika)
1'`-2" Motorized Flak Batteries (assigned/authorizcd 4-88mm guns each)
4"h-5"' Motorized Flak Batteries (assigned 24 20mm guns, 6 4X20mm guns)
33 •dPanzer Reconnaissance Battalion (Major Linau replaced Rittmneister der Reserve Heraucourt in the summer of 1942, 17/492
assigned (as of 22 Aug), detached, placed behind the Folgore Div. in the southern sector)
one Armored Car Company (0 Sd Kfz 221 assigned, 10 authorized, 7 Sd Kfz 222 assigned, 7 authorized, 2 Sd Kfz 223
assigned, 4 authorized, I Sd Kfz 231 assigned, 3 authorized, I Sd Kfz 232 assigned, 3 authorized, also available 18
37mm pak 36, 24 MGs)
one (halftrack) infantry company (available 5 50amm PAK 38 SPs (on Sd. Kfz. 25! s?), 2 HMGs, 3 80mm mortars)
one (motorized) support company with, one heavy weapons platoon (assigned 3 50mm Pak 38s, 5 37mm Pak 36s), one
pioneer platoon (assigned 2 LMGs), one signals section
one (motorized) 105mam lcFH battery (assigned 4 105mm IcFH 18, 2 LMGs)
one light reconnaissance supply column
33"d PanzerjiýQer Battalion (lauponann Dr. Zahn (Oberleuinant Beil?) since May 41, combat strength of.9/48/158 with a ration
strength of 11/3/57/296, authorized 3 companies each with 14 antitank guns, assigned 20 LMGs, 12 5cm PAK, and 16 7.62cm self-
propelled anti-tank guns)
one headquarters section (with a motorized signals platoon (available 2 LMGs))
1"•Motorized Panzcrjagcr Company (assigned 12 50mm PAK 38, 12 LMGs)
2"'-3" Sclf-Propcllcd Panzcrjagcr Companies (assigned 16 Marder Is (captured Russian 76.2mm Pak on a Czech T-38 hull)
and 6 LMGs)
3 3 •dPanzer Pioneer Battalion (Ilaoplnann Hinrichs replaced Oberstleutmant Obcrcmbt (KIA early JUN 42), combat strength of
9/22/179 with a ration strength of 11/3/57/296 of 22/834 authorized, assigned 31 LMGs, 2 50mm Pak 38s, 3 20cm leichter
Ladunswercfrr (spigot mortars, literally "light charge throwers"), organized in 3 companies (authorized Sd Kfz 251half-tracks). On
average, each pioneer battalion in the Afrika Korps was authorized 170 vehicles (53 motorcycles, 25 PKW, 92 LKW, and 18 panzers
(33"' and 200"' pioneer battalions only), close combat material (28 flamethrowcrs, demolition sets 28 (a), 10 (b), 40 (c), 25 (d),
Sprenginuttelsatz a,b,c,d, Detonator sets (ziidmnittel kasten satz) 12 (a), 20 (b), 6 (c) and 3 zi'ndnittelftir "S" mninen,) power tools (2 I
power saws, 8 compressors, 8 well drilling equipment sets, 2 welding sets ( 3 3 "dand 200"' pioneer battalions only), bridging equipment
(7 large rubber rafts, 9 small rubber rafts, various rope), and entrenching tools (270 spades, 122 axes, 133 hatchets, 65 wire cutters, 73
mattocks, 42 c-tools, 34 augers(?), 43 tape measures. The nominal basic load of ammunition was 351 kilograms of explosive (in 100,
200, 1000, and 3000 gram blocks), 2600 meters of detonating cord, 936 smoke grenades, 1140 Tellermines, 1934 "S" mines. The
nominal basic load of barrier material was: 306 rolls of K-roll (plain (unbarbcd) concertina), 100 rolls of S-roll (barbed wire
concertina, each 6-8 meters in length), 73 rolls of barbed wire, 21 rolls of plain wire, and 1550 sandbags).5
No. I Company (LeuoIant Weiss (as of 15 April 42), authorized 18 LMGs, 3 28mm PzBu41, 6 50mam Pak 38s, assigned 2
37mm Pak 36, 9 LMGs)
No.2 Company (Oherleutoant Gamon (as of 15 April 42), authorized 18 LMGs, 3 28mm PzBu41, 6 50mm Pak 38s,
assigned 1 37amm Pak 36, 9 LMGs)
No. 3 Company (Obcrheutnant Beheim-Schwarbach (as of 15 April 42), authorized 18 LMGs, 3 28mm PzBu4l, 6 50mm
Pak 38s, assigned I 37mm Pak 36, 1 28mm PzBu41, 9 LMGs)
one motorized light pioneer supply column
33"' Field Replacement Bn (authorized 4 replacement infantry companies each with 1 50mam Pak 38 and 6 LMGs, not available)
78"•Panzer Signal Battalion (combat strength of 5/24/127 with a ration strength of 7/2/44/230, assigned 19 LMGs, 1 37mm PAK 36 as
of 21 Oct 42)
one panzcr radio company
one panzer telephone company
one light (motorized) signals supply column
33"' Supply Battalion, (assigned 22/15/134/1900 18 LMGs, 4 37mm PAK 36, as of 21 Oct 42)
33'd (Motorized) Light Supply Company
1V(Motorized) Maintenance Company
1 - 8"' Light Supply Columns (each with I LMG)
9"'- II"' Heavy (Motorized) POL Supply Columns (each with I LMG)
12"' & 13"' Heavy (Motorized) Supply Columns (each with I LMG)
5 Sec US National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Series T-313, Roll 430, frames 8,722,655-8,722,656; The German Infantry
Handbook, 1939-1945, by Alex Buchner, Schiffer Military History, Atglen, Pennsylvania, 1991, pages 95-96; Handbook of the German Army,
December 1940, published by Battery Press, ISBN 0-89839-258-6, Nashville, Tennessee, reprint of "Notes on the German Army in War,"
General Staff, War Office, London, pages 127-136; and Handbook on German Military Forces, TM-E 30-451, I September 1943, Military
Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D.C., pages 128-158.

two motorized motor vehicle repair companies
Medical (assigned 8/3/28/152 and 6 MGs as of 21 Oct 42)
1/2/3/33'd Ambulance Companies, 1/2/ 3 3rdMotorized Medical Companies
3 6th Motorized Field Hospital
Other Support Troops (assigned 4/14/53/290): 3 3 rdMotorized Field Post Office (assigned 0/1 9/I/11), 3 3rd Motorized Military Police
Platoon, 3 3rd Motorized Division Quartermaster Company, 3 3rd Motorized Bakery Company, 33rd Motorized Butcher Platoon, 3 3rd
Mapping Section (assigned to division headquarters)
15 "hPANZER DIVISION STAFF6

la (Operations) Major Heinrich Mueller 15 JAN 42
lb (Quartermaster) Major Freiherr von Loeffelholz 15 JAN 42
Ic (Intelligence) Hauptmann Kirchner JUN 41
Division Adjutant Major von Meyer Mid 1942
Task Organization of the 15 th Panzer Division with the Italian 133rd Littorio Armored Division7
Kampfgrappe Nord (Oberst Crasemann)

Staff/33rd Panzer Artillery Regiment (with Staff Battery)
1/115 " Panzer Grenadier Regiment
11/3 3'd Panzer Artillery Regiment
3 "dCo., 6 17 h FLAK Battalion
LI (Italian) Armored Battalion, 133Pd Armored Regiment
Kamnpfgruppe Mitte (Major Schcmcl)
Staff/I 15 "hPanzer Grenadier Regiment (with Staff Company)
/ 1hPanzcr Regiment
11 8
111/1 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
13'h (Infantry Support Gun) Company, 115 1h Panzer Grenadier Regiment
15h Company, II 5 'hPanzer Grenadier Regiment (captured guns)
111/ 3 3 'dPanzer Artillery Regiment
Staff/ 13 3 rd(Italian) Armored Battalion
IV (Italian) Armored Battalion, 133d Armored Regiment
XXIII Battalion, 12 "h(Italian) Bcrsaglicri Regiment
XXIX Battalion, P (Italian) Artillery Regiment
5 5 6 1h (Italian) Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion
Kaimpfgruppe Sud (Oberst Tcege)
Staff/8Wh Panzer Regiment
1/8'h Panzer Regiment
11/115' Panzer Grenadier Regiment
1/3 3 rdPanzer Artillery Regiment
Staff/I 2 h(Italian) Bersaglieri Regiment
XII (Italian) Armored Battalion, 1 3 3,d Armored Regiment
XXXVI Battalion, 12 h (Italian) Bersaglieri Regiment
11Battalion, 3 rd(Italian) Celere Artillery Regiment
5 5 4 "h(Italian) Self-Propcllcd Artillery Battalion
15 th Panzer Division Reserve (Haupitnann Hinrichs)
3 3 rdPanzer Pioneer Battalion
33 d PanzerjdgerBattalion
1 0 1h Battery, 3 3 rdPanzer Artillery Regiment (sfl)
Equipment available: 70 50mm PAK 38s, 8 88mm FLAK, 4 100mm KI7, 24 100mm (105mm?) howitzers, 8 150mm howitzers, 4 150mm sIG
33, 5 25-pdr (captured), 4 6-pdr (captured), 16 Marder Is, 8 150mm SP Howitzers, 41 Italian guns
1/4 3 rd FLAK Battalion remained under the direct control of the Headquarters, 15th Panzer Division.
"6"The Campaign in North Africa 1941/3, Volume 2, The Campaign in the Year 1942," by General der PanzertrappeWalther Nchring, MS # T-
3, Foreign Military Studies, Headquarters, US Army Europe, 1948, Anlage (Appendix) 18, pages 9 and 10.
7 See the order of battle for the Littorio Armored Division in this appendix (page 1-23) for a more detailed breakout of this unit at the beginning of
the Second Battle of El Alamein.

21" Panzer Division: commanded by GenerahmajorHeinz von Randow assumed command on 20 Sep from GeneralmajorKarl Lungerhausen,
acting commander since I Sep, when GeneralmajorGeorg von Bismarck, was killed by a mine) (ration strength of 9,312 of 11,418 authorized
(9,208 combat soldiers and 2210 support soldiers) as of 20 OCT 42, primarily from Prussia and Silesia, note: most of the data for this division is
from Aug 22 and may be out dated)
5"' Panzer Regimcnt commanded by Oberst Gerhard Muller, combat strength of 824 men (as of 20 OCT 42), authorized 82/441/1920.
Pz II Pz Ill kz Pz Ill Ig Pz IV kz Pz IV I1 PzBef Total
Authorized 46 I111 30 6 193
Available 14 43 44 3 15 2 121
Operational 12 38 43 2 15 1 I1I
Regimental HQs
two light panzer platoons
one panzer signals section
one regimental band
one panzer maintenance company
1" Panzer Battalion (available 3 Pz 11,23 Pz Ill kz, 14 Pz llIj, 8 Pz lVf2 (1g))
Headquarters
one panzer platoon
one panzcr replacement platoon
one panzer pioneer platoon (not on-hand)
one motorcycle platoon (not on-hand)
one 20mam FLAK section (not on-hand)
one panzcr signals platoon (not on-hand)
I" - 3 MdLight Panzer Companies
4"'iMedium Panzer Company
2"' Panzer Battalion (available 5 Pz 11,14 Pz III kz, 18 Pz llj, 2 Pz IV kz, 7 Pz lVf2 (1g))
Headquarters
one light panzer platoon
one panzer replacement platoon
one panzer pioneer platoon (not on-hand)
one motorcycle platoon (not on-hand)
one 20ram FLAK section (not on-hand)
one panzcr signals platoon (not on-hand)
5"' - 7"' Light Panzcr Companies
8"' Medium Panzer Company
104"' Panzer Grenadier Regiment commanded by Oberrt Ewert (MAR 42) combat strength of 1,792 men (as of 20 OCT 42),
authorized 28/240/1015 per battalion)
headquarters company
one motorized pioneer platoon (authorized 3 LMGs)
one motorcycle messenger platoon (authorized 6 LMGs)
one motorized panzerjager platoon (authorized 3 50mm Pak 38 AT guns and 3 LMGs)
one motorized signals platoon
1" Battalion (authorized 4 companies (1' - 4"'), total 20 LMGs, 14 HMGs, 4 80amm mortars, 9 50mm Pak 38s)
2"' Battalion (authorized 4 companies (5"'- 8'), total 36 LMGs, 6 HMGs, 3 80mm mortars, 7 50ram Pak 38s)
3"' Battalion (authorized 4 companies (19"'- 12"'), total 42 LMGs, 7 HMGs, 5 80mm mortars, 5 50mm Pak 38s)
13"' Company (authorized 4 20mm self-propelled FLAK guns and 3 LMGs, not on-hand?)
14"' (Motorized) Pioneer Company (authorized 10 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 80mm mortars, 3 50mm Pak 38s, 3 28mm PzBu41)
15"' (Motorized) Heavy Infantry Support Gun Company (assigned 3 150rmm slG33s and 1 7.5 cm IcIG 18)
708"' Self-Propelled Infantry Support Gun Company (attached, authorized and assigned 6 150mm sIG and 3 LMGs)
155"' Panzer Artillery Rcgiment commanded by Oberst Bruer (JUN 41), combat strength of 1,180 men (as of 20 OCT 42) of
49/204/1076 authorized.
One motorized regimental staff battery
I" Battalion
one motorized staff battery
I " through 3"' Batteries (each authorized and assigned 4 105mm IeFH K I8s and 2 LMGs)
2"" Battalion
4"' & 5"' Batteries (each authorized and assigned 4 105mm IeFH KI 8s and 2 LMGs)
6"' Battery (authorized 4 105mm IcFH KI8s, assigned 4 8.76 cm Gun (c) (captured 25-pdr))
3"' Battalion
7"' Battery (authorized and assigned 4 100ram K17 guns and 2 LMGs),
8"' Battery (authorized and assigned 4 150mm sFH K1 8s and 2 LMGs)
9"' Battery (authorized 4, assigned 3 150mm sFH KI8s and 2 LMGs)
one self Propelled Battery (11 sFH 13s available on 23 OCT 42)
one self propelled flak battery (not on-hand)
one motorized heavy munitions supply column (60 ton)
155"' Motorized Artillery Observation Battery

3 rd Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion (Oberstleutnant Hans von Luck, combat strength of 430 men (as of 20 OCT 42), 23/124/632
authorized) (detached, at Siwa Oasis)
I`sArmored Car Company (4 Sd Kfz 221 assigned, 10 authorized, 5 Sd Kfz 222 assigned, 14 authorized, 2 Sd Kfz 223
assigned, 4 authorized, I Sd Kfz 231 assigned, 3 authorized, I Sd Kfz 232 assigned, 3 authorized)
2 "d (halftrack mounted) Infantry Company (assigned 3 Sd Kfz 251 s (as of I Nov), 4 50mm PAK 38, 13 LMGs,
2 HMGs, 2
AT rifles)
3 (motorized) Support Company (assigned 9 LMGs, 12 HMGs, with one pioneer
Yd platoon, one heavy weapons platoon,
one signals platoon)
one (motorized) battery (authorized 4 105mm leFH 18, assigned 6 8.76 cm (c) (captured 25-pdrs))
one light armored car supply column
39'h PanzeriCgerBattalion (Major Pfeiffer, combat strength of 824 men (as of 20 OCT 42) authorized 20/111/491)
one headquarters section (with a motorized signals platoon)
two self-propelled Panzerjager companies (assigned 4 Marder Is (Czech T-38 mounting captured Russian 76.2mm Paks)
and 14 50mm Pak 38s (as of 22 Aug), authorized 6 Marder Is and 6 LMGs per company (as of 20 Sep))
2 0 0
1h Panzer Pioneer Battalion (Hauptimann Endres (as of 15 April 42), combat strength of 221 men (as of 20 OCT 42) assigned
8/45/344 (as of I Nov), 2 37mm Pak 36, 15 LMGs, 2 AT rifles, authorized 22/834. On average, each pioneer battalion in the Afrika
Korps was authorized 170 vehicles (53 motorcycles, 25 PKW, 92 LKW, and 18 panzcrs ( 3 3 d and 2 0 0 1h pioneer battalions only), close
combat material (28 flamcthrowers, demolition sets 28 (a), 10 (b), 40 (c), 25 (d), Sprengmittel satz a,b,c,d, Detonator sets (ziindmniftel
kasten satz) 12 (a), 20 (b), 6 (c) and 3 ziindnittelfdr "S" minen,) power tools (21 power saws, 8 compressors, 8 well drilling
equipment sets, 2 welding sets ( 3 3 d and 2 0 0 'h pioneer battalions only), bridging equipment (7 large rubber rafts, 9 small rubber rafts,
various rope), and entrenching tools (270 spades, 122 axes, 133 hatchets, 65 wire cutters, 73 mattocks, 42 c-tools, 34 augers(?), 43
tape measures. The nominal basic load of ammunition was 351 kilograms of explosive (in 100, 200, 1000, and 3000 gram blocks),
2600 meters of detonating cord, 936 smoke grenades, 1140 Tellcrmines, 1934 "S" mines. The nominal basic load of barrier material
was: 306 rolls of K-roll (plain (unbarbed) concertina), 100 rolls of S-roll (barbed wire concertina, each 6-8 meters in length), 73 rolls
of barbed wire, 21 rolls of plain wire, and 1550 sandbags).'
No.1 (Motorized) Company (Leutnant Biedermann (as of 15 April 42) authorized 18 LMGs, 3 28mm PzBu41, 6 50mm
Pak 38s)
No.2 (Motorized) Company (Hauptmiann Hundet (as of 15 April 42) authorized 18 LMGs, 3 28mm PzBu41, 6 50mm Pak
38s)
No. 3 (Motorized) Company (arrived in North Africa in the summer of 1942, authorized 18 LMGs, 3 28mm PzBu4l, 6
50mm Pak 38s)
One motorized light pioneer supply column
2001h Field Replacement Battalion (authorized 4 replacement infantry companies each with 1 50mm Pak 38 and 6 LMGs, not on-hand)
2 0 0
1h Panzer Signal Battalion (combat strength of 287 men as of 20 OCT 42, authorized 8/58/274)
one panzer radio company
one panzer telephone company (authorized 6 LMGs)
one light (motorized) signals supply column (authorized 3 LMGs)
200'h Supply Battalion (ration strength 5/143 as of 20 OCT 42)
I s,- 3 ,d (Motorized) Maintenance Companies
3" - 81h& 12"h Light Supply Columns
I`, 2 sd, I 0 th, I 1h Heavy (Motorized) Supply Columns
91h Heavy (Motorized) POL Supply Column)
2 0 0
1h (Motorized) Supply Company
2001h (Motorized) Panzer Replacement Transport Column
5 7 9 'h (Motorized) LW (transportation?) Company
589'h Light Water Filtration Column
Other Support Units (total support units authorized 20/164/1131)
200'h Motorized Military Police Detachment
1/2/200'" Ambulance Companies
1/2/200'h Motorized Medical Companies
200'h Motorized Field Hospital
2 0 0 'h Motorized Field Post Office z.b.V.
2001h Motorized Division Quartermaster Company
2 0 0
1h Motorized Bakery Company
200'h Motorized Butcher Company
2 0 0
1h Mapping Section (assigned to division headquarters)
See US National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Series T-313, Roll 430, frames 8,722,655-8,722,656; The German Infantry
Handbook, 1939-1945, by Alex Buchner, Schiffer Military History, Atglen, Pennsylvania, 1991, pages 95-96; Handbook of the German Army,
December 1940, published by Battery Press, ISBN 0-89839-258-6, Nashville, Tennessee, reprint of "Notes on the German Army in War<"
General Staff, War Office, London, pages 127-136; and Handbook on German Military Forces, TM-E 30-451, 1 September 1943, Military

______________2 21 " PANZER DIVISIONSTAFF' ___________
POSITION INDIVIDUAL DATE ASSUMED POSITON

] a (Operations) Major von Heuiduck JAN 42
-lb (QUartermaster) Major Boehles NOV 41
Ic (intelligence) ?___________________ _______________
Ila Adjutant Major Garke DEC 41
Task Organization of the 21" Panzer Division with the Italian 1 3 2 "d Ariete Armored Division'
Kampfgruppe NordI (Oberst Ewert)
11/5'Panzer Rcgimecnt
IX/ 132'"(Italian) Armored Regimient
1/104"' Panzer Grenadier Regiment
V/8"' Bersaglicri Regiment
VI (Italian) Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion
Kaonip/i-uppc' Mitic (Major Pfeiffer)
XIII/I 32'' (Italian) Armored Regiment
111/8"' Bersaglieri Regiment
No. I Company, 39"' Iauze]ijiger Battalion
Komnqrpf',pe Sud (Ohcgt Muller)
Il/5S' Panizer Regimient
X/1 32'" (Italian) Armored Regiment
XI1/8"' Beraaglieri Regiment
No. 2 Company, 39!' Pemzeit(7gei Battalion
Still under 21"~ Panzer Division control
155"' Panzer Artillery Regiment
200"' Panzer Pioneer Battalion
I"and 2"" Batteries, 617"' Flak Battalion
Divisional Reeon Platoon
"9"The Campaign in North Afriea 1941/3, Volumec 2, The Campaign in the Year 1942," by General deirPanzelrtruppc Walther Nebring, MS # T-
3, Fýoreign Military Studies, Headquarters, US Army Europe. 1948, Anlage (Appendix) 18, pagea 9 and 10.
to See the order of battle for the Ariete Arniored Division in this appendix (page 1-15) for a more detailed breakout of this unit at the beginning of
the Second Battle of El Alaniein.
1-10 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

9 0thLeicht Afrika Division: commanded by GeneralmajorTheodor von Sponeck from 22 SEP replaced GeneralmajorKleeman, WIA 1 SEP (in
the interim, GenerahnajorRamcke, and Oberst Schulte-Heuthaus commanded the division), combat strength of 99/352/1989 out of a ration
strength of 181/60/843/3955 as of 20 OCT 42 (not including SV 288) of approximately 8,000 authorized. "
Division HQs (authorized 34 medium motorcycles, 7 Kfz 1, 9 Kfz 15, 1 Kfz 21, 5 light trucks, 11 medium trucks, 3 medium columns,
I Sd Kfz 261)
Signals Company (Motorized) (authorized 8 motorcycles, I Kfz 2, 1 Kfz 2/40, 1 Kfz 12, 9 Kfz 15, 18 Kfz 17, 2 Lt. Pkw.
(o), 20 medium trucks)
Mapping Detachment (Motorized) (authorized I Kfz 1, 1 Lt. Command Car)
15 5t•hMotorized Grenadier Regiment commanded by Oberstleutnant Kolbeck (OCT 42, replaced Oberst Marks), combat strength of
22/96/51/1145 of 20 OCT 42.
Regimental HHC (authorized 15 medium motorcycles, 3 heavy motorcycles, 26 heavy motorcycles with sidecar, 4 Kfz 2,
1 Kfz 2/40, 13 Kfz 15, 4 Lt. Pkw. (o), 10 Lt. Trucks, 10 medium trucks, I medium command car)
Motorcycle Platoon
Motorized Engineer Platoon
Motorized Signal Platoon
IS Battalion (OberstleutnantKaiser)
Battalion Staff (authorized 8 medium motorcycles, 4 medium motorcycles with sidecars, 5 Kfz 1,2 Kfz 2, 5 Kfz
15, 1 Kfz 31, 5 It trucks 4 medium trucks)
three rifle companies (each authorized 12 LMGs, 3 PzBu39, 3 28mm PzBu41, I 50mm mortar, 6 76.2mm
Russian PAK guns, I Kfz 1, 3 It. Trucks, 8 medium trucks)
one heavy company (authorized 6 HMGs, 6 80mm mortars, 2 37mm PAK 36, 2 50mm PAK 38, 1 Kfz 15, 3 Kfz
1, 3 It trucks, 8 medium trucks)
2"" Battalion (Major Kost)
Battalion Staff (authorized 8 medium motorcycles, 4 medium motorcycles with sidecars, 5 Kfz 1,2 Kfz 2, 5 Kfz
15, 1 Kfz 31, 5 It trucks 4 medium trucks)
three rifle companies (each authorized 12 LMGs, 3 PzBu39, 3 28mm PzBu41, 1 50mm mortar, 6 76.2mm
Russian PAK guns, I Kfz 1, 3 It. Trucks, 8 medium trucks)
13th Motorized Infantry Gun Company (2 150mm guns, 4 75mm L18 guns, 3 LMGs, 3 Kfz 1, 1 Kfz 15, 8 It. Trucks, 4
medium trucks, 2 Sd Kfz 2)
14 1h Pioneer Company (6 75mm or 76.2mm AT guns) (on-hand?)
200"' Motorized GrenadierRegiment commanded by Oberst Koester (OCT 42, replaced Oberst Geissler), combat strength of
19/78/401 of 20 OCT 42.
Regimental HHC
Motorcycle Platoon
1" Battalion
Russian PAK guns, I Kfz 15, 3 Kfz 1, 3 It. Trucks, 8 medium trucks)
2 "d Battalion
Russian PAK guns, I Kfz 15, 3 Kfz 1, 3 It. Trucks, 8 medium trucks)
13 1hMotorized Infantry Gun Company (2 150mm guns, 4 75mm L18 guns, 3 LMGs, 3 Kfz 1, 1 Kfz 15, 8 It. Trucks, 4
14 'hPioneer Company (6 75mm or 76.2mm AT guns) (on-hand?)
361" Motorized Grenadier Regiment commanded by OberstleutnantPanzenhagen (1 JUL 42, replaced Oberst Menny), combat
strength of 24/79/309 as of 20 OCT 42, composed of repatriated Germans who had served in the French Foreign Legion before the
war.
Regimental HHC (authorized 27 Kfz 1, 3 Kfz 2, 11 Kfz 12, 5 Kfz 17 radio trucks, I Kfz 23, 1 Lt. Truck, 20 medium
trucks, 1 medium command car, 35/919 assigned as of 22 Aug)
Motorcycle Platoon
1S Battalion (Major Ryll, replaced OberstleutnantPanzenhagcn)
three rifle companies (each authorized 12 LMGs, 3 PzBu39, 3 28mm PzBu41,3 50mm mortar, 4 French 75mm
guns, (or4 37mm PAK 36), 2 37mm PAK 36, 1 Kfz 15, 3 Kfz 1, 3 It. Trucks, 8 medium trucks)
Die 5. (lei.)/21. Panzer Division in Nordafiika, 1941-1943, by Heinz-Dietrich Aberger, Prcussischcr Militar-Vcrlag, Reutlingen, 1994, page
279, states that 9 0 th Leicht Afirika Division had an actual strength (tatsachlichestarke) of 2,827 men, based on KTB Nr. 26, Pz.AOK/Ia (RH-19
VIII/20) on the morning of 23 October 1942. See also Krieestagebuch Nr.3, 90'h Leicht Af"ika Division, US National Archives, Captured
German Records Division, Series T-315, Rolls 1155-1159, starting on frame 405.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot 1-11

2"' Battalion (Hauptmann Rotschuh, SEP 42)
three rifle companies (each authorized 12 LMGs, 3 PzBu39, 3 28mm PzBu41, 3 50mm mortar, 4 French 75mm
guns, (or4 37mm PAK 36), 2 37ram PAK 36, 1 Kfz 15, 3 Kfz 1, 3 It. Trucks, 8 medium trucks)
13 "hMotorized Infantry Gun Company (2 150mm guns, 4 75mm LI8 guns, 3 LMGs, 3 Kfz 1, 1 Kfz 15, 8 It. Trucks, 4
14"' Pioneer Company (6 75mm or 76.2mm AT guns) (on-hand?)
190"' Panzer Battalion (three companies of light tanks and one of mediums, not in Africa)
190"' Artillery Regiment (combat strength of 328 men as of 20 Oct 42, not officially on hand until NOV 42)
Regimental Staff Battery
I"•Battalion (HauptnannKrcupa (JUL 42, replaced Hauptmann von Schrimpff, captured JUL 42) combat strength
16/39/273 as of 20 OCT 42 (including 19 0 "hMotorized FLAK Company), authorized 2 motorized 105mm IcFH 18
batteries & one motorized 100mm K 17 gun battery, each with 2 LMGs)
190"•Motorized FLAK Company (authorized 12 20ram FLAK guns)
2nn Battalion (authorized 2 motorized 105mm lcFH 18 batteries & one motorized 100mm K17 gun battery, each with 2
LMGs, apparently not on hand at this time)
580' Reconnaissance Battalion (Major Voss, detached from the division, combat strength 387 men as of 20 Oct 42)
one armored car platoon (on-hand 2 Armored Cars, 4 MTW, 2 self-propelled gun carriages, as of 15 August)
one motorized reconnaissance company (on-hand 18 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 PzBu 39, 4 50mm PAK 38s, as of 15 August)
one heavy reconnaissance company (on-hand 21 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 1 80mm mortar, 8 50mm PAK 38, as of 15 August)
one panzcrjager platoon (3 self-propelled 75mm or 76.2mm AT guns, as of 15 August)
one pioneer platoon
signals platoon
one motorized artillery battery (7 British 25-pdrs, as of 15 August)
190'" Panzcrii5gcr Battalion (combat strength of 7/21/144 as of 20 OCT 42, authorized 2 motorized AT companies each with 7 50mm
PAK 38s)
900' Motorized Pioneer Battalion (Major Kuba, combat strength 8/21/211 of 17/545 authorized as of 20 OCT 42, authorized 12 5 cm
PAK (4 on-hand) and 28 machine guns (9 on-hand), also, 4 s. PzBu4l and 7 20cm leichter Ladungswerfre (spigot mortars, literally
"light charge throwers") on-hand. On average, each pioneer battalion in the Afrika Korps was authorized 170 vehicles (53
motorcycles, 25 PKW, 92 LKW, and 18 panzers ( 3 3rd and 200"' pioneer battalions only), close combat material (28 flamethrowers,
demolition sets 28 (a), 10 (b), 40 (c), 25 (d), Sprengnittel satz a,b,c,d, Detonator sets (ziindnittel kasten satz) 12 (a), 20 (b), 6 (c) and 3
zundmittelfiir "S" Minen,) power tools (21 power saws, 8 compressors, 8 well drilling equipment sets, 2 welding sets (33"'I and 200"'
pioneer battalions only), bridging equipment (7 large rubber rafts, 9 small rubber rafts, various rope), and entrenching tools (270
spades, 122 axes, 133 hatchets, 65 wire cutters, 73 mattocks, 42 c-tools, 34 augers(?), 43 tape measures. The nominal basic load of
ammunition was 351 kilograms of explosive (in 100, 200, 1000, and 3000 gram blocks), 2600 meters of detonating cord, 936 smoke
grenades, 1140 Tellermines, 1934 "S" mines. The nominal basic load of barrier material was: 306 rolls of K-roll (plain (unbarbed)
concertina), 100 rolls of S-roll (barbed wire concertina, each 6-8 meters in length), 73 rolls of barbed wire, 21 rolls of plain wire, and
1550 sandbags). 12
Staff (5 medium motorcycles, 4 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, 3 Kfz 1, 2 Kfz 2, 3 Kfz 15, 1 Kfz 31,4 It trucks, 6
medium trucks)
No.1 Company (OberleutnantBesant (as of 15 April 42) authorized 12 LMGs, I PzBu39, 2 28mm PzBu4l, 2 37mm PAK
36, 4 medium motorcycles, 10 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, I Kfz 1,2 Kfz 2, 4 Kfz 15, 2 It. Trucks, 18 medium
trucks)
No.2 Company (lhouinptann Streitz assumed command of 2 2 0 h Pioneer Battalion before the battle, authorized 12 LMGs, I
PzBu39, 2 28ram PzBu41, 2 37ram PAK 36, 4 medium motorcycles, 10 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, I Kfz 1, 2
Kfz 2, 4 Kfz 15, 2 It. Trucks, 18 medium trucks)
No. 3 Company (Ober'eufuant Knees, arrived in North Africa in the summer of 1942, authorized 12 LMGs, I PzBu39, 2
28amm PzBu41, 2 37ram PAK 36, 4 medium motorcycles, 10 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, I Kfz 1, 2 Kfz 2, 4 Kfz
15, 2 It. Trucks, 18 medium trucks), 850"' Pioneer Sturm Company (re-designated 3/900"h Pioneer Battalion, attached
from PanzerarineeAfrika) further detached to SV 288)
one light pioneer column (authorized 5 medium motorcycles, 4 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, I Kfz 1, 2 It trucks, 15
medium trucks, 2 compressors, I long wood trailer)
190"' Panzer Signal Battalion (only one company on hand, apparently the battalion headquarters was not yet in North Africa, as of
20 OCT 42)
one panzer telephone company (newly raised I Aug 42, apparently not in North Africa as of 20 OCT 42)
one panzer radio company (190"' Nachrichten Company, combat strength of 3/18/173 as of 20 OCT 42)
one motorized light signals supply column (newly raised 1 Aug 42, apparently not in North Africa as of 20 OCT 42)
SV (Sonderverband, Special Unit) 288 (Oberst Daumiller (replaced Oberst Menton), attached, on 31 Oct. 42, re-designated Panzer
Grenadier Regiment Afrika, a special unit with an assigned strength of 37/1042 (as of 22 Aug), assigned equipment included 6
12 See US National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Series T-313, Roll 430, frames 8,722,655-8,722,656; The German infantry
Handbook, 1939-1945, by Alex Buchner, Schiffer Military History, Atglcn, Pennsylvania, 1991, pages 95-96; Handbook of the German Army,
December 1940, published by Battery Press, ISBN 0-89839-258-6, Nashville, Tennessee, reprint of "Notes on the German Army in War<"

3.7 cm Pak 36, 2 PzBu39, and 21 LMGs (as of I Oct))
Headquarters Company
one armored car platoon
one motorized pioneer platoon
I" Motorized Battalion (four motorized companies (1" through 4th) assigned a total of 7 5 cm Pak 38s, 5 80mm mortars, 10
HMGs, 37 LMGs)
2 "dMotorized Battalion (four motorized companies (5 'hthrough 8 h) assigned with a total of 24 5 cm Pak 38s, 4 37mm Pak
36s, 8 80mm mortars, 8 HMGs, 72 LMGs)
9 'hMotorized Infantry Gun Company
I 0 thMotorized Pioneer Company
11 h Motorized Flak Company (with 8 (reduced to 0 by I Oct) 20mm Flak guns of 12 authorized)
2 8 8 'h Motorized Signal Company
one medical platoon
one maintenance platoon
2 8 8 th Motorized 30 Ton Transport Column
Supply (ration strength of 3/214 as of 20 OCT 42)
Staff (7 light motorcycles, 5 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, 7 Kfz 1, 3 Kfz 2/40, 3 medium Pkw., 1 Lt command car, 9
medium trucks, I medium command car)
one motorized supply company (authorized I medium motorcycle, I Kfz 12, 2 Lt trucks, 11 medium trucks
four motorized heavy columns (1 medium motorcycle, 2 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, I Lt Pkw (o), I It truck, 21
medium trucks)
one motorized heavy column (water)
four light columns (authorized I medium motorcycle, 2 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, I Kfz 1, I It truck, 10 medium
trucks
one motorized light column (filtration)
two motorized fuel columns (authorized I medium motorcycle, I Kfz 1, 1 It truck, 10 medium trucks, 5 Sd. Ahn 106
trailers, I Sd 35, 1 generator, 3 medium command cars)
Administration
Staff (authorized I It motorcycle, 1 medium motorcycle,2 Kfz 1, 10 medium trucks
One motorized bakery company (authorized 4 medium motorcycles, 3 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, I Kfz 1, 1 Kfz
2/40, 1 medium Pkw. (o), I It truck, 17+ medium trucks)
one butcher company (authorized I It motorcycle, 1 heavy motorcycle with sidecar, I Kfz 1, 4 heavy trucks, I medium
command car, I Ahn 24 heavy machine)
one field post office (authorized I Kfz 15, 2 It trucks, I heavy command car (33 seats))
one motorized field hospital (authorized 2 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, 2 Kfz 1, 1 heavy Pkw (o), 2 Kfz 321, 1 It
truck, 8 medium trucks, 3 It command cars)
two medical companies (authorized I medium motorcycle, 4 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, I Kfz I, 1 Kfz 2/40, 4 Kfz
15, 8 Kfz 31, 3 It trucks, 12 medium trucks, I It command car (15 seat))
two ambulance companies (authorized 4 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, I Kfz 1, 15 Kfz 31, 2 It trucks)
one workshop company (3 platoons, authorized I medium motorcycle, 5 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, 4 Kfz 1, 6 It
trucks, 7 medium trucks, 2 heavy trucks, 2 Kfz 79, 2 medium command cars, 2 Zgkw Sd. 7, 2 heavy machine shops)
one workshop company (2 platoons, authorized I medium motorcycle, 3 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, 4 Kfz 1, 5 It
trucks, 2 medium trucks, 2 heavy trucks, 2 Kfz 79, 2 Zgkw Sd. 7, 2 Sd 24 heavy machine shops)
one motorized military police troop (authorized 14 medium motorcycles, 4 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, 14 Kfz 1,2
It trucks)
Attachments (ration strength 203/67/955/4515, as of 20 OCT 42)

6 0 5th PanzerjdgerBattalion (combat strength 10/21/100 of ration strength of 12/2/58/263, as of 20 OCT 42)
6 0 6 1h FLAK Battalion (ration strength 7/4/41/207, as of 20 OCT 42)
Versuchs-Kdo. F. L. Tropen (ration strength 3/1/13/90, as of 20 OCT 42)
PanzerarmeeAfrika Troops in the Area of Operation of the 9 0th Leicht Afrika Division (ration strength 1685)
10th Panzer Signals Regiment (-) (965 men as of 20 OCT 42)
4 7 5th Motorized Signal Battalion (605 men as of 20 OCT 42)
Panzer Propaganda Company Afrika (43 men as of 20 OCT 42)
Kr. Kw. 1/33 (20 men as of 20 OCT 42)

EQUIPMENT ROLE UP FOR THE 9 0" LEICHTAFRIKA DIVISION
Equipment Authorized Available Short Remarks
LMGs 341 229(67%) 112 (33%) Includes 21 with SV 288
HMGs 42 38(90%) 4(10%)
Pz13u39 66 45 (68%) 21 (32%) Includes 2 with SV 288
PzI3u4I 69 18 (26%) 51(74%)
20 mm FLAK 12 18(150%) 0
37ram PAK 36 68 41 (600X) 27 (40%) Includes 6 with SV 288
47tnm PAK (t) Czech 27 14(52%) 13 (48%)
50mm PAK 38 14 11 (79%) 3 (21%)
75mm PAK (f) French M1897 24 0 24(100%)
76.2mm PAK (r) Russian SP 9 0 9 (100%)
76.2mm PAK (r) Russian 54 0 54(100%)
50mm mortar 63 2 (3%) 61 (97%) Includes 2 with SV 288
80mm mortar 42 15 (36%) 27 (64%)
75ram leIG 12 4(33%) 8(67%) 4 in I'I"Co/104 Inf. Rgt
150ram slG 33 6 1(17%) 5(83%) 1 in I I" Co/104 Inf. Rgt
75rm FK 18 12 0 12(100%)
Light motorcycle 9 3 (33%) 6 (67%)
Medium motorcycle 193 6(3%) 187(97%) 4 captured from Allies
Heavy motorcycle 3 3(100%) 0
Heavy motorcycle with sidccar 199 32(16%) 167(84%)
Lt. Pkw Kfz 1 270 20 (7%) 250 (93%)
Lt. Pkw Kfz 2 36 4(11%) 32(89%)
Lt. Pkw Kfz 2/2 1 1 (100%) 0
Kfz 2/40 8 6 (75%) 2 (25%)
Kfz 3 1 0 1 (100%)
Kfz 12 23 5 (22%) 18(78%)
Kfzl5 150 17(11%) 133(89%)
Telephone Truck Kfz 17 18 0 18 (100%)
Radio Truck Kfz 17 I1 2(18%) 9(82%)
Kfz21 I 0 1 (100%)
Lt. Pkw (o) 0 29 0 1 captured from Allies
Medium Pkw (o) 5 5(100%) 0 4 captured from Allies
Heavy Pkw (o) 0 3 0
Kfz 23 3 0 3(100%)
Kfz 31 60 4 (7%) 56 (93%) I captured from Allies
Lt truck 285 25 (9%) 260 (91%) 25 captured from Allies
Medium truck 705 149 (21%) 556(79%) 27 captured from Allies
Heavy truck 8 1 (13%) 7(87%) 1 captured from Allies
Trailer 106 5 0 5(100%)
Trailer An Sd 35 1 0 1 (100%)
Gcencrators 1 0 1 (100%)
Air Compressor 2 0 2 (100%)
Water trailer 0 1 0 1 captured from Allies
Workshop truck 0 1 0 1 captured from Allies
Kfz 79 workshop 5 1 (20%) 4 (80%)
Workshop equipment I 1 (100%) 0
Light compressor 6 1 (17%) 5(83%)
Medium compressor 18 2(11%) 16(89%)
Heavy compressor 1 0 1 (100%)
Sd Kfz 10 10 11(110%) 0
Sd Kfz 7 15 9(60%) 6(40%)
Sd Kfz 261 1 1 (100%) 0
Sd Ahn 32 9 4 (44%) 5 (56%) Ammunition trailer
Sd Ahn 24 6 0 6(100%) Heavy machine set
Sd Ahn 115 10 9(90%) 1 (10%)

9 0 th LEICHTAFRIKA DIVISION STAFF13
la (Operations) Major Schumann JUL 42
lb (Quartermaster) Hauptmann Moeller AUG 42
Ic (Intelligence) OberleutnantHiltmann 1 AUG 42
Adjutant Hauptmann Mattes 7 OCT 42
Pioneer Officer Major Mueller 1942
13"The Campaign in North Africa 1941/3, Volume 2, The Campaign in the Year 1942," by General der PanzertruppeWalther Nehring,
MS # T-
3, Foreign Military Studies, Headquarters, US Army Europe, 1948, Anlage (Appendix) 18, pages 9 and 10.

164"' Leicht Afi-ika Division: commanded by GeneralmajorKarl Lungerhausen, assumed temporary command of 21"' Panzer Division on 31 Aug.
after GeneralmajorBismarck was killed by a mine, Oberst Hecker, the panzeraroieepioneer officer, assumed temporary command from 31 Aug
to 20 Sep when GenerahnajorLungerhausen returned) (242 officers and 10,490 men assigned, primarily from Wehrkrcis XII, except 125"'
Regiment from Saarbrucken, only 300 vehicles on-hand including captured ones, note: most data for this unit is from Aug 22 and may be out
dated) '4
1251h Panzer Grenadier Regiment commanded by Major Nobel, acting commander after Oberst Graf Hardenberg was killed during
the summer of 1942; 65 officers and 2,895men assigned as of 22 Aug 42
Regimental HHC
Pioneer Platoon
Bicycle Platoon
Signal Platoon
Regimental Band
I"' Battalion (four infantry companies with a total of 6 (2 authorized) 80mm mortars, and 3 37mm PAK 36 (in place of the
3 authorized PzBu 41), 5 (6 authorized) 50ram PAK 38, 37 LMGs (18 authorized), 12 (2 authorized) HMGs on-hand)
2"' Battalion (Major Phillip Wendel, four infantry companies with a total of 6 (2 authorized) 80mm mortars, and 3 37mm
PAK 36 (in place of the 3 authorized PzBu 41), 5 (6 authorized) 50mm PAK 38, 37 LMGs (18 authorized), 12 (2
authorized) HMGs on-hand)
3 rdBattalion (four infantry companies with a total of 6 (2 authorized) 80mm mortars, and 3 37mm PAK 36 (in place of the
3 authorized PzBu 41), 5 (6 authorized) 50mm PAK 38, 37 LMGs (18 authorized), 12 (2 authorized) HMGs on-hand)
13' Infantry Gun Company (6 (6 authorized) 75mm lcIG, 2 (none authorized)50nmm sIG 33 guns, on hand)
one motorized infantry supply column
3 8 2""Panzer Grenadier Regiment commanded by Oberst Hirsch, 55 officers and 2452men assigned as of 22 Aug 42.
Regimental HHC
Pioneer Platoon
Bicycle Platoon
Signal Platoon
Regimental Band
I"' Battalion (HauptoannJulius Pieper, four infantry companies with a total of 6 (2 authorized) 80mm mortars, and 3
37mm PAK 36 (in place of the 3 authorized PzBu 41), 5 (6 authorized) 50mm PAK 38, 32 LMGs (18 authorized), 10 (2
authorized) HMGs on-hand)
2"' Battalion (I-ouptmnann Alfred Krupfganz, four infantry companies with a total of 6 (2 authorized) 80mm mortars, and 4
37amm PAK 36 (in place of the 3 authorized PzBu 41), 5 (6 authorized) 50mm PAK 38, 36 LMGs (18 authorized), 12
(2 authorized) HMGs on-hand)
3"' Battalion (four infantry companies with a total of 5 (2 authorized) 80ram mortars, and 3 37mm PAK 36 (in place of the
3 authorized PzBu 41), 5 (6 authorized) 50ram PAK 38, 22 LMGs (18 authorized), 10 (2 authorized) HMGs on-hand)
13' Infantry Gun Company (6 (6 authorized) lcIG 75mm, 2 (none authorized) 150mm sIG 33 guns)
4 3 3 "dPanzer Grenadier Regiment commanded by Oberstleutant von Ncindorf; 4lofficers and 1689men assigned as of 22 Aug 42.
Regimental HHC
Pioneer Platoon
Bicycle Platoon
Signal Platoon
Regimental Band
I" Battalion (four infantry companies with a total of 6 (2 authorized) 80ram mortars, and 3 37mm PAK 36 (in place of the
3 authorized PzBu 41), 9 (6 authorized) 50mam PAK 38, 37 LMGs (18 authorized), 12 (2 authorized) HMGs on-hand)
2'lBattalion (Major Otto Koppitsch, four infantry companies with a total of 6 (2 authorized) 80mm mortars, and 3 37mm
PAK 36 (in place of the 3 authorized PzBu 41), 0 (6 authorized) 50ram PAK 38, 37 LMGs (18 authorized), 12 (2
authorized) MGs on-hand)
3r" Battalion (four infantry companies with a total of 6 (2 authorized) 80mm mortars, and 3 37mm PAK 36 (in place of the
3 authorized PzBu 41), 9 (6 authorized) 50mm PAK 38, 37 LMGs (18 authorized), 12 (2 authorized) MGs on-hand)
13' Infantry Gun Company (6 (6 authorized) lelG 75mm, 2 (none authorized) 150mm slG 33 guns)
220'" Artillery Regiment commanded by Oberst Becker, assigned 38 officers and 898 men assigned as of 22 Aug 42, reduced to a
combat strength of 587 as of 20 Oct 42.
I Battalion (battalion staff battery and 3 motorized 105mm IcFH 18 batteries each with 4 howitzers (authorized and
assigned)
2' Battalion (2 mountain batteries each with 4 7.5 cm GK 15 pack guns (authorized and assigned) and one battery of 4
French 105amm guns (not authorized))
220"' Reconnaissance Battalion (arrived 10 Oct 42) (three reconnaissance companies, a signal detachment and one motorized light
reconnaissance column with a total assigned strength of 6 37mm PAK 36, 8 50mam PAK 38, 12 50ram mortars, 22 LMGs, combat
strength of 272 as of 20 Oct 42)
one armored car company (authorized 20 37ram and 40 LMGs)
Die 5. (lei.)/21. Panzer Division in Nordiofriika, 1941-1943, by Heinz-Dictrich Abcrger, Prcussischer Militar-Verlag, Reutlingen, 1994, page
279, states that 164"' LeichlAfi'ika Division had an actual strength (tatsachlichestarke) of only 6,342 men, based on KTB Nr. 26, Pz.AOK/Ia
(RH-19 VIII/20) on the morning of 23 October 1942. Panzeramee Afrika reported ration strength of 8,814 (plus 809 attachments) for this
division as of 20 October 1942, with the infantry reporting a combat strength of 5,076 men (see US National Archives, Captured German Records
Division, Series T-313, framcs 8,769,112 to 8,769,114).

one (half-track) rccon company (authorized 18 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 28mm PzBu41, 9 50mm PAK 38)
one heavy (motorized) reconnaissance company
one panzerjager platoon (authorized 3 50mm PAK 38, 1 28mm PzBu41)
one pioneer platoon (authorized 3 LMGs)
one light (motorized) reconnaissance column
2 2 0th Panzeri~igcr Battalion (authorized 2 antitank companies each with 9 50mm AT guns and 6 LMGs)
220•" Panzer Pioneer Battalion (HauptmannStrcitz replaced Oberstleutant Springorum after 6 Sep 42)(combat strength of 304 men (as
of 20 Oct 42) of 11 officers and 315 men available of 21 officers and 637 men authorized, 37 LMGs and 9 PzBu 39 on-hand. On
average, each pioneer battalion in the Afrika Korps was authorized 170 vehicles (53 motorcycles, 25 PKW, 92 LKW, and 18 panzers
( 3 3rd and 2 0 0 'h pioneer battalions only), close combat material (28 flamethrowers, demolition sets 28 (a), 10 (b), 40 (c), 25 (d),
Sprengmittel satz a,b,c,d, Detonator sets (ziindmittel kasten satz) 12 (a), 20 (b), 6 (c) and 3 ziindmittelfi.r "S" minen,) power tools (21
power saws, 8 compressors, 8 well drilling equipment sets, 2 welding sets (3 3rd and 2 0 0 "hpioneer battalions only), bridging equipment
(7 large rubber rafts, 9 small rubber rafts, various rope), and entrenching tools (270 spades, 122 axes, 133 hatchets, 65 wire cutters, 73
mattocks, 42 c-tools, 34 augers(?), 43 tape measures. The nominal basic load of ammunition was 351 kilograms of explosive (in 100,
200, 1000, and 3000 gram blocks), 2600 meters of detonating cord, 936 smoke grenades, 1140 Tcllermines, 1934 "S" mines. The
nominal basic load of barrier material was: 306 rolls of K-roll (plain (unbarbed) concertina), 1005 rolls of S-roll (barbed wire
concertina, each 6-8 meters in length), 73 rolls of barbed wire, 21 rolls of plain wire, 1550 sandbags)). '
No.1 Company (Leutnant Junkersdorf (authorized 3 50mm PAK 38, 3 PzBu 39, 9 LMGs)
No.2 Company (Leutnant Laurcnz later Lieutenant Pfanzagcl (authorized 3 50mm PAK 38, 3 PzBu 39, 9 LMGs)
No.3 Company (Leumnant Drexel (authorized 3 50mm PAK 38, 3 PzBu 39, 9 LMGs))
One light (motorized) pioneer column
220 'h Signal Battalion (Hauptmann Kullc?, authorized one panzer telephone company, one panzer radio company and one light
motorized signals column, only one company with a combat strength of 194 men was on hand as of 20 Oct 42)
Supply (Major Obcrlander, 7 officers, 123 men as of 20 Oct 42)
1" - 3,d/220t" Light Supply Columns
2 2 0 'h Maintenance Company
2201h Supply Company
Other Support Units (total support units authorized 20 officers, 164 non-commissioned officers and 1131 men)
2 2 01h Motorized Military Police Detachment
1/2/220'h Ambulance Companies
1/2/220"h Motorized Medical Companies
2201h Motorized Field Post Office z.b.V.
2201h Motorized Divisional Administration
2201h Motorized Bakery Company
220'h Motorized Butcher Company
16 4 th LEICHTAFRIKA DIVISION STAFF16

la (Operations) OberstleutnantMarkert
lb (Quartermaster) Major Gerhardt (Major Eltrich?)
15 See US National Archives, Captured German Records Division, Series T-313, Roll 430, frames 8,722,655-8,722,656; The German Infantry
Handbook, 1939-1945, by Alex Buchner, Schiffcr Military History, Atglcn, Pennsylvania, 1991, pages 95-96; Handbook of the German Army,
December 1940, published by Battery Press, ISBN 0-89839-258-6, Nashville, Tennessee, reprint of "Notes on the German Army in War,"
16"The Campaign in North Africa 1941/3, Volume 2, The Campaign in the Year 1942," by General der PanzertruppeWalther Nehring, MS # T-
3, Foreign Military Studies, Headquarters, US Army Europe, 1948, Anlage (Appendix) 18, page 14.

Task Organization of the Artillery of the 1 6 4 th Leicht Afrika Division
with that of the Italian 1 0 2 nd Trento Division'7
220"' Artillery Rcgiment

5"' Battery, 220' Artillery Regiment (equipped with 2 10.5 cm IeFH 18s)
Artillery Group Rossi (LTC Vincenzo Rossi, commander of IV Battalion, 4 6th Artillcry Regiment)
11Battalion, 220"' Artillery Regiment (ttauptmann Kaiser)
4"' Battery (equipped with one 7.5 cm gun with a reported range of 10 kilometers (FK 38?))
6"' Battery (equipped with four 15.5 cm (French?) guns)
7"' (?) Battery (equipped with four 7.5 cm GK 15 Mountain Pack Guns)
357"' (Italian) Artillery Battalion "Frontier Guards" (Captain Macri, attached from XXI Corps)
F' Battery (equipped with four 77/28 guns)
2n" Battery (equipped with three 77/28 guns)
3r"' Battery (equipped with three 77/28 guns)
IV (Italian) Battalion, 4 6 'h Artillery Regiment (Captain Cena (acting commander for LTC
Vincenzo Rossi), from Trento Division)
10"' Battery (equipped with four 75/27 guns)
I 1" Battery (equipped with four 75/27 guns)
12"' Battery (equipped with four 75/27 guns)
Artillery Group Gennero
I Battalion, 220"' Artillery Regiment
I" Battery (equipped with three 10.5 cm IcFH 18s)
2"" Battery (equipped with three 10.5 cm IeFH I8s)
3"d Battery (equipped with two 8.76 cm guns (captured British 25 pounders), not combat
ready)
11(Italian) Battalion, 46"' Artillery Regiment (Captain Oggeri, from Trento Division)
One battery (equipped with four 100/17 guns)
Artillery Group Randi (Colonel Randi)
I (Italian) Battalion, 46"' Artillery Regiment (Captain Bortolani, from Trento Division)
One battery (equipped with two 100/17 guns)
One battery (equipped with three 8.76 cm guns (captured British 25 pounders))
III (Italian) Battalion, 46"' Artillery Regiment (Captain Casini, from Trento Division)
One battery (equipped with one 75/27 gun)
One battery (equipped with three 8.76 cm guns (captured British 25 pounders))
Heavy Artillery Group Falconi (Colonel Falconi)
I ' Battery, LII (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (equipped with two 152/37 guns, attached from
XXI Corps)
I" Battery, CXXXI (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (equipped with three Krupp 149/28 guns,
attached from XXI Corps)
2"' Battery, CXXXI (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (equipped with two Krupp 149/28 guns,
attached from XXI Corps)
Artillery Group Vignali
One battery, XXXIII (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (equipped with two 149/40 guns, attached
from XXI Corps)
One battery, XXXIII (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (equipped with three 149/40 guns, attached
from XXI Corps)
III Battalion, 2"' Africa Artillery Regiment (Schadc, formerly the German 5 2 3rd Artillery Battalion, 10 4 'h
Artillery Command, attached from PanzerarneeAfi'ika)
7"' Battery (equipped with three 11.4 cm guns (captured British 4.5 inch guns), formerly the I`
Battery, 5 2 3 "dArtillery Battalion, 104"' Artillery Command, attached from PanzerarmeeAfirika)
9"' Battery (equipped with six 15.5 cm French guns, formerly the 3rd Battery, 523"d Artillery
Battalion, 104"' Artillery Command, attached from PanzerarweeAfrika)
III Battalion, I" Africa Artillery Regiment (formerly the German 408"' Artillery Battalion, 10 4 1h Artillery
Command)
7"' Battery (equipped with three 8.76 cm guns (captured British 25 pounders), formerly 2"'
Battery, 5 3 3,d Artillery Battalion, 104"' Artillery Command, attached from PanzerarneeA.fi'ika)
8"' Battery (equipped with four 15 cm sFHI8s, formerly 1` Battery, 4 0 8 'h Artillery Battalion, 104"'
Artillery Command, attached from PaonzerarneeAfirika)
9"' Battery (equipped with three 21 cm Mrs 18 howitzcrs, formerly 7"' Battery, II Battalion, 115"'
Artillcry Regiment, 104"' Artillery Command, attached from PanzeraroueeAfiika)
10"' Battery (equipped with six 7.62 cm guns (captured Soviet guns), formerly the 364"'
Battery, 104l' Artillery Command, attached from PanzerarmeeAfi-ika)
3"' Battery, I Battalion, 2"' Africa Artillery Regiment (equipped with two 17 cm K18 in Mrs Laf(?), formerly the 362"' Artillery
Battery, 104"' Artillery Command, attached from PanrerarmeeAfrika)
7 Krieigstat'eIhoch Nr. 5. des Komnnandos dr 15. Panzer-Diivion-Foehr/ngsvabteihmgnc-mon7 23.10. bis 25.11.1942. Anlage 9, Captured German
Records. U. S. National Archives. Series T-315, Roll 666.. See also the orders of battle for the 104"' Artillery Command, XXI Corps, and 10 2 "d
Trento Division in this appendix for a more detailed breakout of this unit at the beginning of the Second Battle of El Alamein.

22 d (Ramcke) Fallschirmiszer(Airborne) Brigade: commanded by GenerahnajorBernard Rameke, also called Is' Luftwaffe Jiigcr
Brigade, 47/2,241 assigned (as of 22 Aug), 'ration strength' of 4,610 on 20 Oct 42 and an actual strength of 3,379 on 23 Oct 42, with
the infantry reporting a combat strength of 2,380 men as of 20 Oct 4 2 )"X
Kampfgruvppe von der Heydte (Major von der Heydte, Vs Battalion, Yd 3 FallschirmjdgerRegiment, a signals platoon, 5
companies with a total of 4 7.5 cm LG 40 (?), 6 3.7 cm Pak 36, 7 8cm mortars, 6 HMGs, 70 LMGs, (as of 22 Aug))
Kampfruppe Hubner (Major Huebner, 2 d Battalion, 5 th FallschirmjdgerRegiment, 4 companies with a total of 2 7.5 cm
LG 40 (?), 6 3.7 cm Pak 36, 7 8cm mortars, 14 HMGs, 54 LMGs, (as of 22 Aug))
Kampfgruppe Burckhardt (Major Burckhardt, FallschirmnjgerLehr Battalion X1 Fliegerkorps,4 companies with a total of
2 7.5 cm LG 40 (?), 6 3.7 cm Pak 36, 7 8cm mortars, 14 HMGs, 54 LMGs, (as of 22 Aug))
Kamnpfruppe Schweiger (Schweiger replaced Major Hans Kroh, 1 s Battalion, 2 "dFallschirnijdgerRegiment, 4 companies
with a total of 2 7.5 cm LG 40 (?), 6 3.7 cm Pak 36, 7 8cm mortars, 14 HMGs, 54 LMGs, (as of 22 Aug))
2 "d Battalion, 2ndM FallschirmjigerArtillery Reziment (Fenski? Kagerer?, 6 10.5 cm LG 40 Recoilless Rifles (in 3
batteries of 4 guns?), with a combat strength of 652 men as of 20 Oct 42)
Panzerijiger Company (Hasender, assigned 12 3.7cm Pak 36 (as of 22 Aug), combat strength of 175 men as of 20 Oct 42)
2"d Pioneer Company, (from Major Rudolf Witzig's 11 h (Corps) FallschirrnpioniereBattalion) (Hauptmann Cord Tictjen,
combat strength of 85 men as of 20 Oct 42)
Signal Company (only one platoon of 54 men on hand as of 20 Oct 42)
one light supply column
As of 29 Oct 42, the Brigade had the following vehicles on hand: 201 motorcycles, 60 Kettenkrader, 55 Kfz 1, 17 Kfz. 2, 13 Kfz. 4, 22 Kfz.
12, 15 Kfz. 15, 3 Kfz. 17, 2 le. PKW (o), 11 m. PKW (o), 2 s. PKW (o), 2 le. LKW (o), 82 M. LKW (o), 5 s. LKW (o), 15 captured LKW, plus 9
others. 19 LKW class vehicles were only useable on roads. The brigade had another 300 vehicles awaiting shipment in Greece.

XX Italian Motorized Corps (Lieutenant General Giuseppe de Stephanis replaced Gen Ettore Baldassare (KIA 25 Jun), Senior Engineer COL
Vittorio Raffaelli (KIA 25 Jun), 279 M14s (as of 23 Oct), plus 16 command tanks (as of 23 Oct) and 22 L6 light tanks on-hand as of 22 Aug)
132'1 Ariete Armored Division (Gen Francesco Arena) page 1-20
133'f Littorio Armored Division (Gen Gervasio Bitossi) page 1-23
101" Trieste Motorized Infantry Division (Gen Francesco Ferla) page 1-26
"Corps Troops" (service troops about 1,500)
one motorized Bcrsaglicri regiment (authorized two motorized infantry battalions of 3 companies, only two motorcycles
companies of the 2"" Bersaglicri Regiment on-hand as of 22 Aug, authorized 3 47/32 AT guns, 3 20mm AT guns, 3
HMGs, 6 LMGs)
one tank battalion (authorized three companies with 52 medium tanks, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
one motorized artillery regiment (assigned 16/320"1as of 22 Aug, regimental headquarters not on-hand as of 22 Aug, Corps
Artillery Commander COL Salvatore Nicolini)
XV (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (detached to the Aricte, authorized 12 105/28 guns, in three batteries of
4 guns)
1"Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 105/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
2 d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 105/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
3 r` Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 105/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
11(Motorized) Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 105/28 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns, not on-hand as of
22 Aug)
V1Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 105/28 guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
2 "d Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 105/28 guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
3`1 Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 105/28 guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
III (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 105/28 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns, not on-hand as
of 22 Aug)
1" Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 105/28 guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
2"' Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 105/28 guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
3 "dMotorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 105/28 guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
one AA battery/132"" Artillery Regiment (attached from the Aricte, assigned 8 20mm AA guns as of 22 Aug)
24" Motorized Engineer Battalion (battaglionc dcl gcnio) (CPT Fasano)
1"Motorized Engineer Company
2"" Motorized Engineer Company
one motorized engineer communications battalion
one motorized telephone company (not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
one motorized radio company
one supply battalion
one 60 cubic meter water transport column
one 50 cubic meter POL transport column
one 30 ton motorized transport column
one motorized ambulance platoon
one motorized administration company
XX CORPS STRENGTH
Arictc Littorio Trieste Corps Troops Corps Total
Personnel 4,872 3,225 3,573 - 11,670
Infantry Battalions 2 2 4 1(-) 9(-)
Tanks M 14 129 116 34 - 279
L6 - 22 - 22
TOTAL 129 138 34 301
Artillery 75/18 Semovcntc SPs 14 16 - 30
75/27 Guns 19 12 19 60
100/17 Howitzers - 8 12 20
105/28 Guns 24 - - 24
TOTAL 57 36 31 124
Anti-Tank Artillery 47/32 AT Guns 51 54 23 128
Anti-Tank Rifles 20ram Soluthurn AT Rifle 8 12 8 28
Anti-Aircraft Artillery 88/55 AA/AT Guns 12 12 - 24
90/53 AA/AT Guns 8 - 8
75/50 AA guns - 10? - 10?
20amm 10 - 8 8 26
TOTAL 30 12 18? 8 68?
Armored Cars Autoblinda 41 12 6 18
Engineer Companies I I 1 2 5
19 Personnel strengths will be annotated either aa/bb/ccc (indicating the numbers of officers/non-commissioned officers/enlisted respectively) or
aa/bbb (indicating the numbers of officers/cnlistcd respectively).

13 2 "dAriete Armored Division (divisione corazzata) (Gen Francesco Arena (replaced Gen Adolfo Infante in Sep) authorized 8,600 men, 189
medium tanks, 250 anti-tank guns, 18 AT rifles, 70 artillery pieces (including 20 Semovente SP guns), 34 medium mortars, 900 automatic
weapons (MGs & SMGs), 918 trucks, 54 tractors (prime movers), 205 miscellaneous 20vehicles, 40 armored cars, 504 motorcycles), assigned
196/4676 (as of 22 Aug), 129 MI4s (as of 23 Oct) and 14 Scmovente (as of 22 Aug))
Regiment (LTC de Flamincis replaced COL Enrico Marctti (replaced Colonel Pasquale Prestissimone, captured at Bir
13 2 "dArmored
Hacheim on 27 May, authorized 78/218/1511 and 179 M14s, assigned 42/989 (as of 22 Aug) and 129 M 14 tanks (as of 23 Oct))
Command Company and Reserve Tanks (authorized 6/38/272 and 33 Ml4s (including 6 radio tanks))
command section (authorized a signals platoon, service squad, field office radio, 2/7/50)
radio platoon (authorized 6 radio central 'M' tanks, radio squad, courier and batman squad,1/6/67)
three reserve tank platoons (each authorized 9 M 14s, 9 heavy trucks, 9 trailers, 1/8/44)
transport detachment (authorized 2 command cars, 5 light trucks, 3 heavy trucks, I ambulance, I trailer, 6
motorcycles with sidecars, 0/1/20)
IX Armored Battalion (LTC Lasagna, authorized 24/60/413 and 52 M 14 tanks in three companies, only two companies and
28 tanks on-hand as of 22 Aug)
Command Company (authorized 9/15/155 and 4 M l4s (including 2 with radios))
Command Platoon (authorized 2 Ml4s and 2 MI4s with radio, 1/8/62)
Staff Squad (authorized 4 motorcycles)
Service Squad
Transportation Detachment (authorized 2 cars, 3 all-terrain trucks, 5 heavy trucks, I
trailer, I tank truck, 6 motorcycles, 4 motorcycles with sidecars)
Maintenance Platoon (authorized 2 maintenance squads, total: 1/4/42)
Recovery Platoon (authorized 3 recovery squads each with I heavy truck, 1 repair truck, I special
carriage, total: 1/3/51)
three tank companies (each authorized 16 M14 tanks and 5/15/86)
Command Platoon (each authorized I M14 tank, 4 motorcycles, 2 motorcycles with sidecars, a car, I
all-terrain truck, 3 heavy trucks, I light truck)
three tank platoons (each authorized 5 M 14 tanks)
X Armored Battalion (Captain Grata, authorized 24/60/413 and 52 M14 tanks, three companies and 38 tanks assigned as of
22 Aug)
Command Company (authorized 9/15/155 and 4 Ml4s (including 2 with radios))
Command Platoon (authorized 2 MI 4s and 2 MI 4s with radio, 1/8/62)
Service Squad
Recovery Platoon (authorized 3 recovery squads each with I heavy truck, I repair truck, I special
XIII Armored Battalion (LTC Baldini, authorized 24/60/413, three companies assigned as of 22 Aug, none on-hand)
Command Company (authorized 9/15/155 and 4 M14s (including 2 with radios))
Command Platoon (authorized 2 M14s and 2 Ml4s with radio, 1/8/42)
Service Squad
Maintenance Platoon (authorized 2 maintenance squads, total 1/4/42)
carriage, total: 1/3/51 )
three tank companies (each authorized 16 M14s and 5/15/86)
three tank platoons (each authorized 5 M14 tanks)
one 20mm AA company (8 guns assigned as of 22 Aug)

one maintenance company
8"h(Motorized) Bersaglicri Regiment (COL de Gherardini, 28/969 assigned as of 22 Aug, authorized 63/124/1204)
Command Company (authorized 3/10/88)
20
See the order of battle for the 21 " Panzer Division in this appendix (page 1-8) for the task organization of these two divisions at the beginning
of the Second Battle of El Alamein.

Command Platoon (authorizcd a clerical squad and an information squad)
Communications Platoon (authorized one radio squad (3 light trucks), one telephone/lineman squad (I light
truck), one observer/signal squad, one motorcycle courier squad (9 motorcycles))
Service Platoon (authorized I car, 2 light trucks, 2 heavy trucks)
V Motorized Bersaglieri Battalion (Major Ferrari, assigned three motorized infantry companies with a total of 13 47/32
Model 37 antitank guns (12 authorized), 4 20mm antitank rifles (12 authorized), 12 HMGs (12 authorized), 13 LMGs
(12 authorized), as of 22 Aug, authorized 20/43/389)
Command Platoon (authorized one command squad, one signals squad (4 motorcycles), one service squad (6
light trucks), 5/4/56)
three infantry companies (each authorized I command platoon (3 heavy trucks), one rifle platoon (three
squads), one machine gun platoon (three squads with one machine gun each), 20mm AT platoon (three
squads each with 1 20mm AT rifle), 47/32 AT platoon (three squads each with 1 47/32 AT gun), total
5/13/111)
XII Motorized Bersaglieri Battalion (Major Cantella, assigned three motorized infantry companies with a total of 14 47/32
Model 37 antitank guns (12 authorized), 4 20mm antitank rifles (12 authorized), 12 H1MGs (12 authorized), 11 LMGs
(12 authorized), as of 22 Aug, authorized 20/43/389)
squads), one machine gun platoon (three squads with one machine gun each), 20 mm AT platoon (three
squads each with I 20mm AT rifle), 47/32 AT platoon (three squads each with 1 47/32 AT gun),
total 5/13/1I1)
Ill Motorized (Anti-Tank) Bersaglieri Battalion (Major Panti, authorized 20/31/338)

light trucks) 5/4/56)
three antitank companies (each assigned 8 47/32 Model 37 antitank guns (8 authorized) as of 22 Aug,
authorized 5/9/94, 11 medium trucks, 7 motorcycles, authorized one command squad (3 motorcycles (one
with side car), 3 light trucks), four gun platoons (each with I motorcycle, 2 gun squads (each with 1 47/32
AT gun and I light truck))
132" Armored Artillery Regiment (COL Mamcli, assigned 101/2223 and 14 total 75/18 Semovente as of 22 Aug:)
one staff platoon (authorized I observation section, 1 calibration section, 1 signals section, 1 reserve section)
three observer platoons (each authorized I observation section, I signals section)
I (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 75/27 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)

1"Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 2 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
3 rdMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
It (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 75/27 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)

I" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
III (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 105/28 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
2 "dMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 6 105/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
3 r"Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 105/28 guns, none on-hand as of 22 Aug)
one 20amm AA platoon (2 guns assigned as of 22 Aug)
501 " (Motorized) Anti-Aircrafi Artillery Battalion (sometimes identified as the IV/132"' Artillery Regiment, authorized 12
90/53 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns, & two batteries of 8 20mm AA guns (one battery detached to XX Corps Troops)
I' Motorized Battery (assigned 4 90/53 AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
2"'t Motorized Battery (assigned 4 90/53 AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
3 rd Motorized Battery (assigned 8 20mm AA guns as of 22 Aug)
4"' Motorized Battery (assigned 8 20mam AA guns as of 22 Aug)
551 " Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (sometimes identified as the V/132"" Artillery Regiment, 10 75/18 Semovente
assault guns authorized in 2 batteries of 4 and 2 with the battalion headquarters)
Headquarters Battery (authorized 2 75/18 Scmovente assault guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
1" Battery (assigned 4 75/18 Scmoventc assault guns as of 22 Aug)
2"' Battery (assigned 4 75/18 Scmovente assault guns as of 22 Aug)
552"" Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (sometimes identified as the VI/132"" Artillery Regiment, 10 75/18 Semovente
assault guns authorized in 2 batteries of 4 and 2 with the battalion headquarters)
Headquarters Battery (authorized 2 75/18 Semovcntc assault guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
1-22 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighffoot

VSBattery (assigned 3 75/18 Semovente assault guns as of 22 Aug)
(assigned 3 75/18 Semovente assault guns as of 22 Aug)
2 nd Battery
XV (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (attached from XX Corps, authorized 12 105/28mm guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
VstMotorized Battery (assigned 4 105/28mm guns as of 22 Aug)
2 "dMotorized
Battery (assigned 4 105/28mm guns as of 22 Aug)
3 Motorized Battery (assigned 4 105/28mm guns as of 22 Aug)
Yd
XXXI Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Bn (authorized 12 88/55 AA/AT (German) guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
V Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 88/55 AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
2"d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 88/55 AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
3 rdMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 88/55 AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
3 (Rccon) Battalion ofNizza Cavalleria Regiment (assigned 12 Autoblinda 41 (?) armored cars (39 authorized) and 15/259 as of 22
Yd
Aug, 20/43/243 authorized)
Command Company
Armored Car Couriers (authorized I armored car)
Service Squad
Transportation Detachment (authorized 2 command cars, 4 light trucks, 2 heavy trucks, 2 recovery trucks, 2
motorcycles)
Reserve Armored Car Platoon
Maintenance Squad (I heavy truck, I workshop truck)
Armored Car Section (4 reserve armored cars)
4 'h Armored Car Company
Command Platoon (I armored car, service squad (authorized 10 motorcycles, I command car, 2 light trucks, I
heavy truck))
four armored car platoons (each authorized four armoured cars)
5'hArmored Car Company (assigned 12 Autoblinda 41 (?) armored cars as of 22 Aug)
heavy truck))
four armored car platoons (each authorized four armourcd cars)
32 "dMotorized Mixed Engineer Battalion (battaglionedel genio e di collegamenti) (LTC Franceschini, assigned 10/236 men (as of 22
Aug) of 16/465 authorized)
13 2 "d Motorized Engineer Company
132"' Motorized Signal Company
42 d Supply Regiment
I Battalion (assigned 3 HMGs as of 22 Aug)
four 30 ton motorized transport columns (assigned as of 22 Aug)
II Battalion (assigned 2 HMGs as of 22 Aug)
two 30 ton motorized transport columns (assigned as of 22 Aug)
two 50 cubic meter motorized POL columns
132"d Motorized Medical Company
13 2 "d Motorized Administration Platoon
one motorized vehicle maintenance company

133"' Littorio Armored Division (divkione corazzata) (Gen Gervasio Bitossi, authorized 8,600 men, 189 medium tanks (not including 58 L6 light
tanks, these appear to have been substituted for the Autoblinda 41 armored cars in the recon battalion), 250 anti-tank guns, 18 AT rifles, 70
artillery pieces (including 20 75/18 Scmovente SP guns), 34 medium mortars, 900 automatic weapons (MGs & SMGs), 918 trucks, 54 tractors
(prime movers), 205 miscellaneous vehicles, 40 armored cars, 504 motorcycles), assigned 116 M14s (as of 230ct), 22 L6s and 16 Semovente
(as of 22 Aug), and 183/3042 (as of 22 Aug)) 21
13 3 "dArmored Regiment (COL Giuseppe Bonini, assigned 76/1041 as of 22 Aug)

Command Company and Reserve Tanks (authorized 6/38/272 and 33 M14s (including 6 radio tanks))
command section (authorized a signals platoon, service squad, field office radio, 2/7/50)
radio platoon (authorized 6 radio central 'M' tanks, radio squad, courier and batman squad, 1/6/67)
three reserve tank platoons (each authorized 9 M l4s, 9 heavy trucks, 9 trailers, 1/8/44)
transport detachment (authorized 2 command cars, 5 light trucks, 3 heavy trucks, I ambulance, I trailer, 6
motorcycles with sidecars, 0/1/20)
IV Armored Battalion (LTC Casamassima, authorized 24/60/413, 40 MI4s on-hand as of 22 Aug)

Command Platoon (authorized 2 Ml4s and 2 Ml4s with radio, 1/8/62)
Service Squad
carriage, total: 1/3/5 I)
Command Platoon (each authorized I Ml14 tank, 4 motorcycles, 2 motorcycles with sidecars, a car,
I all-terrain truck, 3 heavy trucks, I light truck)
three tank platoons (each authorized 5 Ml14 tanks)
XII Armored Battalion (authorized 24/60/413, three companies assigned, 34 M14s on-hand as of 22 Aug)
Command Company (authorized 9/15/155 and 4 M14s (including 2 with radios))
Command Platoon (authorized 2 Ml4s and 2 M14s with radio, 1/8/62)
Service Squad
Transportation Detachment (authorized 2 cars, 3 all-terrain trucks, 5 heavy trucks, 1
Recovery Platoon (authorized 3 recovery squads each with 1 heavy truck, I repair truck, I special
carriage, total: 1/3/51 )
Command Platoon (each authorized 1 M 14 tank, 4 motorcycles, 2 motorcycles with sidecars, a car,
I all-terrain truck, 3 heavy trucks, I light truck)
LI Armored Battalion (LTC Zappala KIA 30 Jum, authorized 24/60/413, 29 Ml4s assigned as of 22 Aug)
Command Platoon (authorized 2 M14s and 2 Ml4s with radio, 1/8/62)
Service Squad
Recovery Platoon (authorized 3 recovery squads each with I heavy truck, 1 repair truck, I special
Command Platoon (each authorized I Ml14 tank, 4 motorcycles, 2 motorcycles with sidecars, a car,
1 all-terrain truck, 3 heavy trucks, I light truck)
three tank platoons (each authorized 5 Ml14 tanks)
Ill Armored (Recon) Battalion of Lancicrie (authorized 20/60/286 and 58 L6 Light Tanks in two companies, 22 on hand
as of 22 Aug)
Command Company (authorized 6/10/78 and 2 L6s (including 2 with radios))
Command Platoon (authorized 2 L6s and 2 L6s with radio, 1/10/78)
Service Squad (authorized I car, I light truck, 3 heavy trucks)
Maintenance Squad (authorized I car, 2 heavy trucks)
21 See the order of battle for the 15' Panzer Division in this appendix (page 1-5) for the task organization of these two divisions at the beginning
of the Second Battle of El Alamein.

two light tank companies (each authorized 27 L6 tanks and 7/25/104)
Command Platoon (each authorized 2 L6 tanks (I with radio), 8 motorcycles (2 with sidecar), I
command car, 5 heavy trucks, 3 light trucks, I recovery truck)
four tank platoons (each authorized 5 L6 tanks)
reserve tank platoon (each authorized 4 L6 tanks and 2 trains (each with I heavy truck, I trailer, I
ramp)
one 20mm AA company (8 guns assigned as of 22 Aug)
one maintenance company (not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
1 2 'h (Motorized) Bersaglieri Regiment (COL Amoroso, infantry battalions from Milan, assigned 31/790 as of 22 Aug)
Command Company (authorized 3/10/88)
Command Platoon (authorized a clerical squad and an information squad)
Communications Platoon (authorized one radio squad (3 light trucks), one telephone/lineman squad (I light
truck), one observer/signal squad, one motorcycle courier squad (9 motorcycles))
Service Platoon (authorized I car, 2 light trucks, 2 heavy trucks)
XXIII Motorized Bersaglicri Battalion (assigned three motorized infantry companies with a total of 14 47/32 "Model-37"
antitank guns (12 authorized), 2 20mm antitank rifles (12 authorized), 7 HMGs (12 authorized), 8 LMGs (12
authorized), as of 22 Aug, authorized 20/43/389)
squads each with 1 20mm AT rifle), 47/32 AT platoon (three squads each with 1 47/32 AT gun),
total 5/13/111)
XXXVI Motorized Bersaglicri Battalion (assigned three motorized infantry companies with a total of 6 47/32 "Modcl-37"
antitank guns (12 authorized), 5 20mm antitank rifles (12 authorized), 6 HMGs (12 authorized), 7 LMGs (12
authorized), as of 22 Aug, authorized 20/43/389)
squads each with 1 20mm AT rifle), 47/32 AT platoon (three squads each with 1 47/32 AT gun),
total 5/13/111)
XXI Motorized (Anti-Tank) Bersaglicri Battalion (authorized 20/31/338)

light trucks) 5/4/56)
three antitank companies (each assigned 8 47/32 Model 37 antitank guns (8 authorized) as of 22 Aug,
authorized 5/9/94, 11 medium trucks, 7 motorcycles, authorized one command squad (3 motorcycles (one
with side car), 3 light trucks), four gun platoons (each with I motorcycle, 2 gun squads (each with 147/32
AT gun and I light truck))
3 rd Celere Artillery Regiment (assigned 76/1211 as of 22 Aug, 41 guns total (?), originally the divisional artillery regiment to the
Sabratha Infantry Division, assigned to the Littorio while that division was forming after the destruction of the Sabratha in July)
one staff platoon (authorized I observation section, 1calibration section, I signals section, 1 reserve section).
three observer platoons (each authorized I observation section, 1 signals section)
11/ 3rd Cclerc Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 75/27 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
Is Celere Artillery Battery (assigned 4 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
2 ndCclerc Artillery Battery (assigned 4 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
3 Celere Artillery Battery (assigned 4 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
Pd
CCCXXXII Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 100/17 howitzers, in three batteries of 4 howitzers)
VstBattery (assigned 4 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
2"' Battery (assigned 4 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3 "dBattery (authorized 4 100/17 howitzers, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
XXIX Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 88/55 AA/AT guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
It Motorized Anti-Aircraft Battery (assigned 6 88/55mm AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
2 "dMotorized Anti-Aircraft Battery (assigned 6 88/55mm AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
5'h Motorized Anti-Aircraft Battcry/133rd Artillery Regiment (assigned 6 20mm AA guns (as of 22 Aug))
DLIV Self-propelled Artillery Battalion (sometimes identified as the V/ 3rd Celerc Artillery Regiment or CLIV Self-
Propelled Artillery Bn, 10 75/18 Semovcntc self-propelled assault guns authorized, 2 batteries of 4 & 2 with Bn HQs)
Headquarters Battery (authorized 2 75/18 Semovente assault guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
Is Battery (assigned 4 75/18 Semovcnte assault guns as of 22 Aug)
2"d Battery (assigned 4 75/18 Scmovcnte assault guns as of 22 Aug)

DLVI Self-propelled Artillery Battalion (sometimes identified as the VI/ 3 rd Celere Artillery Regiment or CLVI Self-
Propelled Artillery Bn, 10 75/18 Semovente self-propelled assault guns authorized, 2 batteries of 4 & 2 with Bn HQs)
Headquarters Battery (authorized 2 75/18 Semovente assault guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
I" Battery (assigned 4 75/18 Scmovcnte assault guns as of22 Aug)
2n" Battery (assigned 4 75/18 Semovente assault guns as of 22 Aug)
406"' Anti-Aircraft Battery (20ram AA guns)
XXXIII Motorized Mixed Engineer Battalion (battaglione delgenio e di collegamenti) (authorized 16/465, not on-hand as of 22 Aug,
not mentioned in any correspondence prior to 23 Oct, however, it is listed in the Order of Battle for 23 Oct 42 in the Italian official
history, (Le Oerazioniin Afiica Settentrionale. Vol. Ill-El Alameni, page 68 1), organized with one motorized engineer company
and one motorized communications company
one motorized medical company
one motorized maintenance company and one administration platoon
one motorized supply regiment

I Motorized Supply Battalion (authorized four 30 ton motorized transport columns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
It Motorized Supply Battalion (authorized two 30 ton motorized transport columns and two 50 cubic meter motorized POL
columns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
1-26 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLighifoot

101" Trieste Motorized Infantry Division (Gen Francesco La Ferla, assigned 181/3392 (as of 22 Aug) and 34 M14 tanks (as of 23 Oct),
authorized 5,932, 322 vehicles, 244 motorcycles, 74 LMGs, 74 HMGs, 18 81 mm mortars, 36 47mm AT guns, 12 88/55 AA/AT guns, 54
20mm AA guns, 24 75mm guns, 24 105mm howitzers, and 52 medium tanks)
one motorized division staff company (authorized 2 20mm AA guns, 2 HMGs, 2 LMGs)
65 h Motorized Infantry Regiment (COL Gherado Vaiarini KIA 17 July, from Valtellina, 34/586 assigned as of 22 Aug)
I Motorized Infantry Battalion (assigned two companies with a total of 6 47/32 AT guns (9 authorized), 6 anti-tank rifles (9
20mm ATRs authorized), 6 HMGs (9 authorized), 12 LMGs (18 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
11Motorized Infantry Battalion (assigned two companies with a total of 6 47/32 AT guns (9 authorized), 6 anti-tank rifles
(9 20mm ATRs authorized), 6 HMGs (9 authorized), 12 LMGs (18 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
motorized mortar company (authorized 9 81 mm mortars, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
6 6h Motorized Infantry Regiment (COL Umberto Zanetti KIA 22 July, from Valtellina, 29/551 assigned as of 22 Aug)
I Motorized Infantry Battalion (assigned two companies with a total of 5 47/32 AT guns (9 authorized), 6 anti-tank rifles (9
20mm ATRs authorized), 6 HMGs (9 authorized), 12 LMGs (18 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
II Motorized Infantry Battalion (assigned two companies with a total of 6 47/32 AT guns (9 authorized), 6 anti-tank rifles
(9 20mm ATRs authorized), 6 HMGs (9 authorized), 12 LMGs (18 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
motorized mortar company (authorized 9 81 mm mortars, not on-hand as of 22 Aug?)
XI Armored Battalion (MAJ Gabriele Verri, 29/478 assigned as of 22 Aug, authorized 52 (40?) M14, 34 on hand (as of 23 Oct))
Command Company (authorized 9/15/155 and 4 MI4s (including 2 with radios))
Command Platoon (authorized 2 Ml4s and 2 Ml4s with radio, 1/8/62)
Service Squad
Transportation Detachment (authorized 2 cars, 3 all-terrain trucks, 5 heavy trucks, I trailer, I tank
truck, 6 motorcycles, 4 motorcycles with sidecars)
Recovery Platoon (authorized 3 recovery squads each with I heavy truck, I repair truck, I special carriage,
total: 1/3/51)
Command Platoon (each authorized I M 14 tank, 4 motorcycles, 2 motorcycles with sidecars, a ear, I all-terrain
truck, 3 heavy trucks, I light truck)
three tank platoons (each authorized 5 M14 tanks)
21' Motorized Po Artillery Regiment (assigned 59/1200 as of 22 Aug, authorized approximately 2,300 men and 275 vehicles)
one headquarters company (authorized 13/125)
I Motorized Artillery Battalion (detached to 18 5th Folgore Division, authorized 21/808, 12 100/17 howitzers and 6 HMGs)
1` Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
2"d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3 rdMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
II Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 21/808, 12 100/17 howitzers and 6 HMGs)
Is` Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
2 "dMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3 d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
III Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 21/808, 12 75/27 guns and 6 HMGs)
1"Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 (4 authorized) 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 (4 authorized) 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
Yd
3 Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
IV Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 21/808, 12 75/27 guns and 6 HMGs)
I" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 (4 authorized) 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
2 'd Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 2 (4 authorized) 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
3 rdMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
V Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion (not on-hand as of 23 Oct?)
1"Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/50 AA guns as of 22 Aug)
2 "dMotorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (assigned 3 (4 authorized) 75/50 AA guns as of 22 Aug)
3 rdMotorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (assigned 3 (4 authorized) 75/50 AA guns as of 22 Aug)
14 6 1h Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (assigned 8 (Christian-5?) 20mm guns (8 authorized) as of 22 Aug, in
support of I" Bn/2 I" Artillery?)
41 1th Motorized AA Artillery Battery (detached to the Folgorc Div., assigned 5 20mm guns (8 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
VII Bcrsaglieri Annored Car Battalion (assigned 15/272 and 6 Autoblinda 41 armored cars as of 22 Aug, 20/43/243 and 39
Autoblinda 41s authorized)
Command Company
Armored Car Couriers (authorized I armored car)
Service Squad
Transportation Detachment (authorized 2 command cars, 4 light trucks, 2 heavy trucks, 2 recovery trucks, 2
motorcycles)
Reserve Armored Car Platoon

Maintenance Squad (1 heavy truck, I workshop truck)
Armored Car Section (4 rcserve armored cars)
one armored Car Company (6 Autoblinda 41s assigned as of 22 Aug)
heavy truck))
four anrorcd car platoons (each authorized four armourcd cars)
one armorcd car company (not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
heavy truck))
four armored car platoons (each authorized four armoured cars)
LII Motorized Mixed Engineer Battalion (Misto Genio) (assigned 13/305 as of 22 Aug of 522 authorized)
28"' Motorized Engineer Company
91" Motorized Communications Company
90" Medical Company
Supply Regiment (assigned 14 30 ton motorized supply columns in three battalions plus 1 50 cubic meter POL column)
176"' Administration Platoon
one motorized cavalry reconnaissance platoon (not on-hand?)
one motorized field post office (not on-hand?)
1-28 BREACHING THE "DE VIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

X Italian Corps (Lieutenant General Enrico Frattini (acting) after GEN Federico Orsi was killed by a mine 18 Oct)(Senior Engineer COL
Converso)
17 1h PaviaInfantry Division (Gen Nazarcno Scattaglia) page 1-29

2 7 1h BresciaInfantry Division (Gen Brunetto Brunetti) page 1-30
1851h Folgore Parachute Infantry Division (Gen Enrico Frattini, also acting X Corps Commander) page 1-31
"Corps troops" (assigned 62/1255 (however, officer totals arc included in the strength of the XXXI Combat Engineer Battalion))
9 th Motorized Bersaglicri Regiment (assigned 22/511 as of 22 Aug)
XXVIII Motorized Bersaglicri Battalion (assigned 3 companies with 8 47/32mm AT guns, 2 AT Rifles, 2
HMGs, 15 LMGs as of 22 Aug)
XXX Motorized Bersaglieri Battalion (authorized 3 companies with 9 47/32mm AT guns, 9 AT Rifles, 9
HMGs, 18 LMGs, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
one tank battalion (authorized three companies with 52 medium tanks, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
1 6thMotorized Artillery Regiment (assigned 23/348 as of 22 Aug)
XLIX Motorized Artillery Battalion
I` Motorized Battery (assigned 4 105/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
2nd Motorized Battery (assigned 4 105/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
Yd
3 Motorized Battery (assigned 4 105/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
CXLVII Motorized Artillery Battalion
IVMotorized Battery (assigned 4 149/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
2 "dMotorized Battery (assigned 3 149/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
XXXI Combat Engineer (battaglioneguastatori)Battalion (Major Paolo de Sillavcngo replaced LTC Dante Caprivi 21
Aug, elements detached to Folgorc and ?, assigned 610 as of 22 OCT including 300 replacements that arrived that date)
1" Company (ILT Dc Rita)
7 t1hCompany (CPT Piero Santini)
8 "hCompany (CPT Renato Amorctti)

Engineer Regiment
1 0 1h
X Motorized Engineer Mechanics Battalion (battaglionedel genio artieri,assigned 17/224 as of 22 Aug)
I" Motorized Engineer Mechanics Company
2"d Motorized Engineer Mechanics Company
151h Company Defense Engineers (LT Procacci, assigned 3/129 as of I Aug)
X Motorized Engineer Communications Battalion (Genio Colleganmenti)
8 9
1h Motorized Telephone Company
124 1h Motorized Radio Company
X CORPS STRENGTH
Pavia Brescia Folgore Corps Troops Corps Total
Personnel* 1,077** 4,094 4,375 1,255 11,301
Infantry Battalions 4 5 6 2 17
Tanks M 14 - - - - -
L6
TOTAL
Artillery 75/18 Semovente SPs - - - -
75/27 Guns 12 24 24 60
77/28 Guns - - - -
100/17 Howitzers 12 12 - 24
105/28 Guns - - 12 12
149/28 Guns - - - 7 7
TOTAL 12 36 36 19 103
Anti-Tank Artillery 47/32 AT Guns 37 54 34 17 142
Anti-Tank Rifles 20mm Soluthum AT Rifle 48 34 36 11 129
Anti-Aircraft Artillery 88/55 AA/AT Guns - 12 - - 12
90/53 AA/AT Guns - -
75/50 AA guns - -
20mm 14 - 14
TOTAL 14 12 36
Armored Cars Autoblinda 41 1 - - -
Engineer Companies I 1 1 4 12
*Does not include attachments/detachments
"**Includesonly the manpower strength of the infantry regiments

17"' Pavia lnfantry Division (Gcn Nazarcno Scattaglia, assigned 74/1003 (this is only the total strength in the infantry regiments) as of 22 Aug,
authorized 7,000 men, 72 anti-tank guns, 72 AT rifles, 60 artillery pieces, 16 light AA guns, 146 light mortars, (rifle grenade launchers? Fucili
mtr), 18 medium mortars, 92 MCs, 142 trucks, 72 tractors (prime movers), 35 miscellaneous vehicles, 147 motorcycles)
27"• Infantry Regiment (assigned 25/425 as of 22 Aug (reorganized into of two battalions by 23 Oct according to Massoglia &
Nofziger))
I Infantry Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns (12 authorized), 12 20mm AT rifles (12
authorized), 12 HMGs (12 authorized), 24 LMGs (24 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
11Infantry Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns (12 authorized), 12 20mm AT rifles (12
III Infantry Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns (12 authorized), 12 20mm AT rifles (12
authorized), 12 HMGs (12 authorized), 24 LMGs (24 authorized) as of 22 Aug, disbanded by 23 Oct?)
one mortar company (assigned 9 81ram mortars as of 22 Aug, not on-hand?)
28"' Infantry Regiment (assigned 47/578 as of 22 Aug (reorganized into two battalions by 23 Oct according to Massoglia and
Nofziger))
I Infantry Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 3 47/32 AT guns (12 authorized), 5 20mam AT rifles (12
authorizcd), 6 HMGs (12 authorized), 12 LMGs (24 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
11Infantry Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 10 47/32 AT guns (12 authorized), 5 20mm AT rifles (12
authorized), I 1HMGs (12 authorized), 22 LMGs (24 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
III Infantry Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns (12 authorized), 12 20mm AT rifles (12
authorized), 12 HIMGs (12 authorized), 24 LMGs (24 authorized) as of 22 Aug, disbanded by 23 Oct?)
one mortar company (assigned 6 81mm mortars as of 22 Aug)
26"• Motorized Rubiconc Artillery Regiment
I Motorized Artillery Battalion (not on-hand as of 23 Oct)
1" Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 100/17 howitzers or 105/28 guns, not on hand as of 23 Oct)
2"' Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 100/17 howitzers or 105/28 guns, not on-hand as of 23 Oct)
Yd
3 Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 100/17 howitzers or 105/28 guns, not on-hand as of 23 Oct)
I1Motorized Artillery Battalion
I" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Modcl 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
3 r"Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
III Motorized Artillery Battalion (supporting the Folgore Division)
2"' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
IV Motorized Artillery Battalion (supporting the Folgorc Division)
1" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"' Motorizcd Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
3 r" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
V Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion (not on-hand as of23 Oct)
I"'Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (4 authorized 88/55 AA/AT guns)
2"' Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (4 authorized 88/55 AA/AT guns)
3"' Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (4 authorized 88/55 AA/AT guns)
77"' Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (assigned 6 20mm guns (8 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
432"" Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (assigned 8 20ram guns (8 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
18'l (17"' ?) Semi-Motorizcd Mixed Engineer Battalion (battoglion, del genio e di collegamenti)
46"' Scmi-Motorized Engineer Company (assigned 5/83 as of I Aug)
17"' Scmi-Motorized Engineer Communications Company (assigned 1/104 as of I Aug)
21" Medical Company (Scmi-Motorized)
3 "dMotorized Administration Company

2 7 'hBrescia Infantry Division (Gcn Brunctto Brunetti replaced Gen Alessandro Predieri, KIA mine 13 Oct, assigned 214/3880 as of 22 Aug,
authorized 7,000 men, 72 anti-tank guns, 72 AT rifles, 60 artillery pieces, 16 light AA guns, 146 light mortars, (rifle grenade launchers? Fucili
mtr), 18 medium mortars, 92 MGs, 142 trucks, 72 tractors (prime movers), 35 miscellaneous vehicles, 147 motorcycles)
19 1h Infantry Regiment (68/1067assigned as of 22 Aug)
II Infantry Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 11 47/32 AT guns (12 authorized), 7 20mm AT rifles (12
authorized), 13 HMGs (12 authorized), 25 LMGs(24 authorized), as of 22 Aug)
III Infantry Battalion (authorized 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns, 12 20mm AT rifles, 12 HMGs, 24 LMGs,
not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
one mortar company (assigned 9 81mm mortars (9 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
2 0
1h Infantry Regiment (82/1365 assigned as of 22 Aug)
II Infantry Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns (12 authorized), 7 20mm AT rifles (12
III Infantry Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of no 47/32 AT guns (12 authorized), 3 20mm AT rifles (12
authorized), 7 HMGs (12 authorized), 20 LMGs (24 authorized), as of 22 Aug)
one mortar company (authorized 9 81mm mortars, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
I" Celere Artillery Regiment (50/1105 assigned as of 22 Aug)
I Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 100/17 Model 14 howitzers in three batteries of four)
I"SMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 Model 14 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
2 nd Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 Model 14 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3rP Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 Model 14 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
11Motorized Artillery Bn (authorized 12 100/17 Model 14 howitzers in three batteries of four, not on-hand as of 23 Oct?)
I"'Motorized Artillery Battery (4 authorized 100/17 howitzers)
2 "dMotorized Artillery Battery (4 authorized 100/17 howitzers)
P Motorized Artillery Battery (4 authorized 100/17 howitzers)
III Motorized Artillery Battalion (3 rd/I " Light Eugenio di Savona?, in support of the Folgore Division)
I' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
3PaMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
IV Motorized Artillery Battalion
1VMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
2 "d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
3rP Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
V Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion
I" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 88/55 AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
2"d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 88/55 AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
Pd
3 Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 88/55 AA/AT guns as of 22 Aug)
401s' Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (authorized 8 20mm AA guns)
4 0 4 1h Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (authorized 8 20mm AA guns)
2 61h Semi-Motorized Mixed Engineer Battalion (battaglionedel genio e di collegamenti) (assigned 14/343 as of 22 Aug of 522
authorized)
5 2 "d Semi-Motorized Engineer Company
2 7 "hSemi-Motorized Communications Company
3 4 thSemi-Motorizcd Medical Company
3 4 h Motorized Administration Company

185"' Folgore Parachute Division (Gcn Enrico Frattini, assigned 369/4006 as of 22 Aug, 11/2 8 'hPavia attached?, 31" Sappers attached?) update
based on 22 AUG OB)
185"' Parachute Infantry Regiment (82/962 available in two battalions) (regimental headquarters not available as of 23 Oct?)
186"' Parachute Infantry Regiment (COL Tantillo, 125/1394 available in three battalions)
Headquarters Detachment
5"hParachute Infantry Battalion (authorized three companies with a total of 3 47/32 AT guns, 6 20mm Soluthurn AT rifles,
10 HMGs and 60 LMGs, assigned 13"', 14 1h & 15"' Parachute Infantry Companies as of Aug, not on-hand as of 22 Aug?
see 2"' battalion)
6"' Parachute Infantry Battalion (authorized three companies with a total of 3 47/32 AT guns, 6 20mm Soluthurn AT rifles,
10 HMGs and 60 LMGs, assigned 16"', 17 1h & 1 8 h Parachute Infantry Companies as of Aug)
186"' Anti-Tank Company (authorized two platoons of 4 47/32 AT guns each)
187"' Parachute Infantry Regiment (COL Bechi Luserna replaced COL Camorosso, WIA, 82/962 available in three battalions)
Headquarters Detachment
2"d Parachute Infantry Battalion (authorized three companies with a total of 3 47/32 AT guns, 6 20mm Soluthurn AT rifles,
10 HMGs and 60 LMGs, assigned 4"', 5" & 6 1h Parachute Infantry Companies as of Aug)
10 HMGs and 60 LMGs, assigned 12"', 13"' & 14 'h Parachute Infantry Companies as of Aug? see 5"' battalion)
10 HMGs and 60 LMGs, assigned 25"', 2 6t & 2 7 'hParachute Infantry Companies as of Aug, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
10"' Parachute Infantry Battalion (authorized three companies with a total of 3 47/32 AT guns, 6 20mm Soluthurn AT
rifles, 10 HMGs and 60 LMGs, assigned 2 8 h, 2 9th & 30"' Parachute Infantry Companies as of Aug, not on hand on 23
Oct?)
187' Anti-Tank Company (authorized two platoons of 4 47/32 AT guns each)
Ruspoli Group
10 HMGs and 60 LMGs, assigned 19"', 20"' & 21" Parachute Infantry Companies as of Aug)
8"' Parachute (?) Combat Engineer Battalion (battaglioneguastatori)(attached, assigned 22/237 as of 22 Aug, authorized
18/630 in the line companies)
battalion headquarters
22"" Parachute (?) Combat Engineer Company (authorized 6/210)
headquarters section (authorized 2/19)
three combat engineer platoons (3/144 total authorized)
one labor platoon (authorized 1/47)
MT (Motor Transportation?) Park (authorized a headquarters, and one section each for the company
headquarters, labor platoon, and each combat engineer platoon)
23"' Parachute (?) Combat Engineer Company (authorized 6/210)
24"' Parachute (?) Combat Engineer Company (authorized 6/210)
185' Parachute Artillery Regiment (assigned 58/451 as of 22 Aug)

V"Parachute Artillery Battalion
1•"Parachute Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 47/32 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"' Parachute Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 47/32 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"' Parachute Artillery Battalion
3"' Parachute Artillery Battalion (asthorized, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
5"' Parachute Artillery Battery (authorized 4 47/32 guns)
6"' Parachute Artillery Battery (authorized 4 47/32 guns)
Ill Motorized Artillery Battalion (3"'/l" Light Eugenio di Savona?, in support of the Folgore Div, from the Brescia Div)
1/21" Motorized Artillery Battalion (attached from 101 " Trieste Div., authorized 21/808, 12 100/17 howitzers & 6 HMGs)
I" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
2"' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3"' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)

14 6th Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (assigned 8 (Christian-5?) 20mm guns (8 authorized) as of 22
Aug, in support of I Bn/2 I" Artillery?)
III Motorized Artillery Battalion, 260h Motorized Rubicone Artillery Regiment, 17 th Pavia Infantry Division (in support of
the Folgore Division)
2 "dMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
Yd Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
IV Motorized Artillery Battalion, 2 6th Motorized Rubicone Artillery Regiment, 17th Pavia Infantry Division (in support of
the Folgore Division)
Is Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
3 rdMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 75/27 Model 06 guns as of 22 Aug)
41 1h Motorized AA Artillery Battery (attached from 101" Trieste Div., assigned 5 20mm guns (8 authorized)
as of 22 Aug)
1/3 d Motorized Artillery Battalion (Light Duca D'Aosta, from the Sabratha?, authorized 21/808, 12 100/17 howitzers & 6
HMGs)
1I'Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
2 d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3rd Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 (4 authorized) 100/17 howitzers as of 22 Aug)
2 0th Mortar Company (assigned 12 81mm mortars (12 authorized) as of 22 Aug)
1 8 5 'hParachute Engineer Company
1 8 5 th Signals Company
18 5 th Mixed Carabinicri Section
2 60 1hField Post Office
2 0 1hSupply Section
I 85 'h Transportation Detachment
1 85 'hMedical Detachment
BREACHING THE "DE VIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot 1-33

XXI Italian Corps (General Alessandro Gloria (temporary) later Lieutenant General Enca Navarini?) (Senior Engineer COL Formica)
25" Bologna Division Gen Alessandro Gloria page 1-34
102'1 Trento Division, Gen Giorgio Masina page 1-35
"Corps troops" (assigned 70/1491 as of 22 Aug, another source says 3,700 as of late Aug)
7"' Motorized Bcrsaglicri Regiment (COL Scirocco, assigned 25/579 as of 22 Aug)
X Motorized Bersaglicri Battalion (assigned 4 companies with 8 47/32 AT guns, 3 20mm AT Rifles, 8 HMGs,
19 LMGs as of 22 Aug)
XI Motorized Bersaglicri Battalion (assigned I company with 2 47/32 AT guns, 2 20mm AT Rifles, 2 HMGs, 6
LMGs, as of 22 Aug)
XVI Tank Battalion (authorized three companies with 52 medium tanks, not on-hand 22as of 22 Aug)
8"' Motorized Artillery Regiment (Raggnippamcnto, assigned 45/1212 as of 22 Aug)
LII (Motorized) Artillery Battalion
2"' Motorized Artillery Battery (not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
XXXIII (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 149/40 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns as of 22 Aug)
1VtMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 149/40 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 2 149/40 guns as of 22 Aug)
3Yd Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 149/40 guns as of 22 Aug)
CXXXI (Motorized) Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 Krupp 149/28 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
1` Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 Krupp 149/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 2 Krupp 149/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
3" Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 149/28 guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
254"h Artillery Battalion (detached to the Trento Division, sometimes identified as the 354"' Artillery Battalion,
authorized 12 77/28 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
I" Artillery Battery (assigned 4 77/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"nArtillery Battery (assigned 4 77/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
3 "dArtillery Battery (authorized 4 77/28 guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
355"' Artillery Battalion (detached to the Trento Division, sometimes identified as the 357"' Artillery Battalion,
authorized 12 77/28 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
1" Artillery Battery (assigned 4 77/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
2"' Artillery Battery (assigned 4 77/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
3"` Artillery Battery (assigned 4 77/28 guns, as of 22 Aug)
9P' Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery
XXVII Motorized Engineer Mechanics Battalion (battaglione dcl genio artieri)
I" Motorized Engineer Mechanics Company (assigned 4/96 as of I Aug)
2"' Motorized Engineer Mechanics Company (assigned 4/115 as of I Aug)
LXV Motorized Engineer Communications Battalion (Genio Collegamenti)
127" Motorized Telephone Company
113"' Motorized Radio Company
XXI CORPS STRENGTH

Bologna Trento Corps Troops Corps Total
Personnel* 4,000 4,615 3,700 10,176
Infantry Battalions 6 6 2 14
Artillery 75/27 Guns 23 24 - 47
77/28 Guns - - -
100/1 7 Howitzers 24 14 - 38
149/28 Guns - - 5 5
149/40 Guns 9 9
152/37 Guns - - 2 2
TOTAL 47 62 16 125
Anti-Tank Artillery 47/32 AT Guns 72 39* - IIl
Anti-Tank Rifles 20amm Soluthurn AT Rifle 69 52 5 126
Anti-Aircraft Artillery 88/55 AA/AT Guns - - - -
20mm 2 2
TOTAL 2 2
Fingineer Companies I 1 2
*Strength of attached 4"' Antitank Battalion not available/included
22
See the order of battle for the 164"' Leicht A'frika Division in this appendix (page 1-15) for the task organization of the XXI Corps artillery at
the beginning of the Second Battle of El Alamein.

2 5 'hBologna Division (GEN Alessandro Gloria (also acting commander for the XXI Corps), assigned 206/3794 as of 22 Aug, authorized 7,000
men, 72 anti-tank guns, 72 AT rifles, 60 artillery pieces, 16 light AA guns, 146 light mortars, (rifle grenade launchers? "Fucili ltr"), 18
medium mortars, 92 MGs, 142 trucks, 72 tractors (prime movers), 35 miscellaneous vehicles, 147 motorcycles)
3 9th Infantry Regiment (assigned 74/1588 as of 22 Aug)
I Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns, 12 20mm AT rifles, 12 HMGs, 24 LMGs as of 22
Aug)
II Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns, 12 20mm AT rifles, 12 HMGs, 24 LMGs as of 22
Aug)
III Battalion (CPT Attilio Caimi, assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns, 12 20mm AT rifles, 12 HMGs,
one mortar company (assigned 9 81mm mortars as of 22 Aug)
4 0
th Infantry Regiment (LTC Arrigo Dall'Olio, assigned 65/1162 as of 22 Aug)
I Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns, 11 20mm AT rifles, 13 HMGs, 28 LMGs as of 22
Aug)
11Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns, 10 20mm AT rifles, 15 HMGs, 28 LMGs as of 22
Aug)
II Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 12 47/32 AT guns, 12 20mm AT rifles, 12 HMGs, 24 LMGs as of 22
Aug)
one mortar company (not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
2 0 5 th Motorized Artillery Regiment (assigned 67/1044 as of 22 Aug)
I Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers in three batteries of 4 howitzers)
I" Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers as of 22 Aug)
2nd Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3 rdMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers as of 22 Aug)
11Motorized Artillery Battalion (LTC Fatiganti, authorized 12 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers in three batteries of 4
howitzers)
2"d Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3 rdMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers as of 22 Aug)
III Motorized Artillery Battalion (this may be the CCCLVII Motorized Artillery Battalion, authorized 12 75/27 guns in
three batteries of 4 howitzers)
Is Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
2nd Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
IV Motorized Artillery Battalion (this may be the CCCLVII Motorized Artillery Battalion, authorized 12 75/27 guns in
three batteries of 4 howitzers)
Is Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
2 "dMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
Yd
3 Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 75/27 guns as of 22 Aug)
V Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 88/55 AA/AT guns in three batteries of 4 howitzers, not on-
hand as of 23 Oct)
IVMotorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (authorized 4 88/55 AA/AT guns)
2 d Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (authorized 4 88/55 AA/AT guns)
3 d Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (authorized 4 88/55 AA/AT guns)
4 'h Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (20mm, not on-hand as of 22 Aug?)
4 3 71h Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (20mm, not on-hand as of 22 Aug?)
2 5 'hSemi-Motorized Mixed Engineer Battalion (battaglionedel genio e di collegamenti, including one company (6 2 "d?) of
combat engineers (Guastatori),under control of Panzerarmee?Nofziger)
6 3 'd Semi-Motorized Engineer Company
25th Semi-Motorized Communications Company
24"' Semi-Motorized Medical Company
171h Motorized Administration Company

102"" Trento Division (Gen Giorgio Masina replaced Gen Scotti, assigned 252/4363, authorized 7,000 men, 72 anti-tank guns, 72 AT rifles, 60
artillery pieces, 16 light AA guns, 146 light mortars, (rifle grenade launchers? Fucili mtr), 18 medium mortars, 92 MGs, 142 trucks, 72 tractors
(prime movers), 35 miscellaneous vehicles, 147 motorcycles)
61" Infantry Regiment (COL Mcnzio)(from Sicily, assigned 86/1423 as of 22 Aug)
I Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 8 47/32mm AT guns, 9 20mm AT rifles, 12 HMGs, 26 LMGs as of 22
Aug)
II Battalion (assigned 4 companies with a total of 7 20mm AT rifles, 12 HMGs, 26 LMGs as of 22 Aug)
III Battalion (CPT Attilio Caimi, assigned 4 companies with a total of 6 47/32mm AT guns, 9 20mm AT rifles, 8 HMGs,
one mortar company (assigned 12 81 mm mortars as of 22 Aug)
62"" Infantry Regiment (from Sicily, assigned 90/1521 as of 22 Aug)
I Battalion (MAJ Vavassori, assigned 4 companies with a total of 7 47/32mm AT guns, 10 20mm AT rifles, II HMGs, 27
LMGs as of 22 Aug)
11Battalion (CPT Manassei, assigned 4 companies with a total of 10 47/32mm AT guns, 8 20mm AT rifles, 11 HMGs, 24
LMGs as of 22 Aug)
IllIBattalion (MAJ Perotti, assigned 4 companies with a total of 8 47/32mm AT guns, 9 20mm AT rifles, 8 HMGs, 24
LMGs as of 22 Aug)
one mortar company (assigned 13 81mm mortars as of 2223Aug)
4 6 "' Motorized Artillery Regiment
(assigned 64/1096 as of 22 Aug)
I Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 100/17 Model 14 howitzers in three batteries of 4 howitzers)
2"nMotorized Artillery Battery (assigned 4 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3"f Motorized Artillery Battery (not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
11Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 100/17 Model 14 howitzers in three batteries of 4 howitzers)
1' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers as of 22 Aug)
2nd Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers as of 22 Aug)
3"' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 100/17 Model 14 Howitzers as of 22 Aug)
III Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 75/27 guns in three batteries of 4 howitzers)
IV Motorized Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 75/27 Model 06 Guns in three batteries of 4 howitzers)
V' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 75/27 Model 06 Guns as of 22 Aug)
2"' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 75/27 Model 06 Guns as of 22 Aug)
3"' Motorized Artillery Battery (assigned 3 75/27 Model 06 Guns as of 22 Aug)
V Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion (authorized 12 88/55 AA/AT guns in three batteries of 4 guns, not on-hand
as of 23 Oct)
I` Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 88/55 AA/AT guns)
2"" Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 88/55 AA/AT guns)
3"' Motorized Artillery Battery (authorized 4 88/55 AA/AT guns)
254' Artillery Battalion (attached from XXI Corps, sometimes identified as the 354"' Artillery Battalion, authorized 12
77/28 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
1VArtillery Battery (assigned 4 77/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
3"' Artillery Battery (authorized 4 77/28 guns, not on-hand as of 22 Aug)
355"' Artillery Battalion (attached from XXI Corps, sometimes identified as the 357"'Artillery Battalion (both shown on
maps!), authorized 12 77/28 guns, in three batteries of 4 guns)
I' Artillery Battery (assigned 4 77/28 guns as of 22 Aug)
3"' Artillery Battery (assigned 4 77/28 guns, as of 22 Aug)
412"' Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (assigned 2 20ram AA guns as of 22 Aug)
414"' Motorized Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery (20ram, not on-hand as of 22 Aug?)
51` Semi-Motorized Mixed Engineer Battalion (battaglionedelgenio e di colleganmenti) (CPT Alberti, assigned 12/323 as of 22 Aug)
15"' Semi-Motorized Engineer Company
96"' Semi-Motorized Communications Company
4"' Antitank Battalion (Granaticri di Sardegna) (MAJ Buragginc, attached)
51" Semi-Motorized Medical Company
51 Motorized Administration Company
23 See the order of battle for the 164"' Leicht Afrika Division in this appendix (page 1-15) for the task organization of the Trento Division's
artillery at the beginning of the Second Battle of El Alamein.

PanzerarmeeAfrikaTroops (325/9,711 assigned as of 22 Aug, another source states about 25,000 by late Aug, not including 10 40h ARKO and
XIX Flak Division)
Stab der Armee (Armneeoberkommnando)
Brigade Stab z.b.V. (mot) 15
Kampfgruppe Kiehl (17/416 as of 22 Aug)

one staff section
one panzcr company (assigned 10 captured Stuart Light Tanks and 2 captured MKVI light tanks)
one panzerjager company (assigned 3 5cm Pak 38, 5 5.7cm (c) (captured 6-pdr), 8 20mm Flak guns)
one battery (assigned 6 8.75 cm (c) guns (captured 25-pdrs))
Giovani Fascisti Division (Gen Ismacle Di Nision)

Giovani Fascisti Regiment (of two battalions)
13 0h
6 Italian Artillery Regiment (Italian Senior Artillery Commander Mancadi Mores)
14 'h Battalion (3 batteries of 65/17mm guns)
15 1h Battalion (3 batteries of 65/17mm guns)
16 th Battalion (3 batteries of 65/17mm guns)
17'h Battalion (2 batteries of 100/17mm howitzers)
8 8 1hAnti-Aircraft Battery (20mm)
one AT battalion
15'h Italian Engineer Battalion

9'4 Independent Infantry Battalion
8
1h Bcrsaglicri Regiment (not on-hand, did not arrive until December)
3Pd Battalion of Monferrato Armored Car Regiment (19 armorcd cars assigned, did not arrive until December)
7 0 7 Artillery Company (attached to 15 1h Panzer Division)
h
7 0 6rh Artillery Company (attached to 21 " Panzer Division)

131h Company, Lchr-Regimcnt "Brandenburg" 800
10 4 'h ArmyArtillery Command (GeneralnajorWeber, combat strength 2,331 of ration strength of 3,069 as of 20 OCT 42. The
command was reorganized on 23 SEP 42 with all equipment data as of that date. However, it would appear that the old unit
designations still frequently appeared on maps and in correspondence.) 24
1" Afrika Artillery Regiment (headquarters formed from the 221" Artillery Regiment)
I Battalion (headquarters formed from II Battalion, II 5'h Artillery Regiment, assigned one 30 ton transport
Column)
I" Battery (equipped with four 8.76 cm guns (captured British 25 pounders), formerly 3rd Battery,
5 3 3 rd Artillery Battalion)
2nd Battery (equipped with four 10 cm K1 8 guns, formerly 3rd Battery, 408" Artillery Battalion)
3 d Battery (equipped with three 21 cm Mrs 18 howitzers, formerly 6"' Battery, II Battalion, 115,"
Artillery Regiment)
II Battalion (headquarters formed from the 533rd Artillery Battalion)
4"1Battery (equipped with four 8.76 cm guns (captured British 25 pounders), formerly I" Battery,
533rd Artillery Battalion)
51hBattery (equipped with four 10 cm K18 guns, formerly 2 "aBattery, 408'h Artillery Battalion)
6"hBattery (equipped with three 21 cm Mrs 18 howitzers, formerly 5 'hBattery, I1Battalion, 115"'
Artillery Regiment)
III Battalion (headquarters formed from the 408"' Artillery Battalion, assigned one 30 ton transport column,
detached to 220th Artillery Regiment, 16 4 'hLeicht Afrika Division)
7t" Battery (equipped with three 8.76 cm guns (captured British 25 pounders), formerly 2 "dBattery,
533rd Artillery Battalion)
8"' Battery (equipped with four 15 cm sFHl8s, formerly I" Battery, 408'h Artillery Battalion)
9th Battery (equipped with three 21 cm Mrs 18 howitzers, formerly 7 1h Battery, II Battalion, 1151h
Artillery Regiment)
10 1h Battery (equipped with six 7.62 cm guns (captured Soviet guns), formerly the 364"h Battery)
2 nd Afrika Artillery Regiment (newly formed headquarters)

1I` Battery 6 12 1h Self Propelled Flak Battalion (assigned II 2cm Flak guns, attached from XIX Luftwaffe Flak
Division)
I Battalion (newly formed headquarters based on the 9 0 2 "d Artillery Battery)
I" Battery (equipped with three 17 cm K18 in Mrs Laf (?), formerly the 902r" Artillery Battery)
2 "dBattery (equipped with three 17 cm K18 in Mrs Laf(?), formerly the 4'h Battery, 149,h Artillery
Battalion)
Pd
3 Battery (equipped with three 17 cm K18 in Mrs Laf(?), formerly the 3 6 2 "dArtillery Battery,
detached to 220'h Artillery Regiment, 164"h Leicht Afirika Division)
II Battalion (headquarters formed from the 528'h Artillery Battalion, assigned 14/279)
4'h Battery (equipped with four 15.5 cm French guns, formerly I` Battery, 528" Artillery Battalion)
5
1h Battery (equipped with four 15.5 cm French guns, formerly 2 "dBattery, 5281h Artillery Battalion)
24 See the order of battle for the 16 4 1h Leicht Afrika Division in this appendix (page 1-15) for the task organization of some the 10 4
'h ARKO's
artillery at the beginning of the Second Battle of El Alamein.

6'hBattery (equipped with four 15.5 cm French guns, formerly 3 rd Battery, 5 2 8 th Artillery Battalion)
III Battalion (Schadc, hcadquartcrs formed from the 5 2 3rd Artillery Battalion, assigned 17/303, detached to 2201h
Artillery Regiment, 164'h Leicht Afrika Division)
7"' Battery (equipped with three 11.4 cm guns (captured British 4.5 inch guns), formerly the 1"
Battery, 5 2 3 rd Artillery Battalion)
8"' Battery (equipped with four 15.5 cm French guns, formerly 2"d Battery, 5 2 3 rdArtillery Battalion)
9"' Battery (equipped with four 15.5 cm French guns, formerly 3rdBattery, 5 2 3sd Artillery Battalion)
IV Battalion (headquarters formed from the 529"' Artillery Battalion)
10"' Battery (equipped with four 15cm K16 guns, formerly I" Battery, 529'h Artillery Battalion)
I1'h Battery (equipped with four 15cm K 16 guns, formerly 2"" Battery, 529"' Artillery Battalion)
12"' Battery (equipped with four 15cm K16 guns, formerly 3"' Battery, 529"' Artillery Battalion)
11"' Artillery Observation Battalion
one motorized staff section
1VMotorized Battery (sound ranging)
2"" Motorized Battery (flash ranging)
621"' Motorized Calibration Column
Vcrmessungs-Trupp (mot) 722-723-724-725
Luftwaffe 19"' Flak Division (commanded by GeneralmajorHeinrich Burckhardt (since 15 August 1942) with his la Major Wilhelm Peter
Sieber, combat strength 4,384 of ration strength 6,302 as of 20 OCT 42 of approximately 10,000 assigned, division headquarters did not
arrive in Africa until Aug 42, all other data as of 22 Aug)
102"" Motorized Flak Regiment (commanded by Oberst Hans-Georg Nicolai since July 1942, arrived Aug 42)
I" Battalion, 43"' Flak Regiment
one signal company
1` Motorized Battery (assigned 3 8.8cm Flak guns)
2 d Motorized Battery (assigned 2 8.8cm Flak guns)
3 Motorized Battery (assigned 3 8.8cm Flak guns)
Yd
4"' Motorized Battery (assigned 7 2cm Flak and 1 2cm flakvicrling)
5"'Motorized Battery (assigned 7 2cm Flak and 1 2cm flakvicrling)
one 30 ton transport column
1"Battalion, 5 3 d Flak Regiment
one signal company
I" Motorized Battery (assigned 2 8.8cm Flak guns)
2"' Motorized Battery (assigned 2 8.8cm Flak guns)
3"'rMotorized Battery (assigned 4 8.8cm Flak guns)
4"' Motorized Battery (assigned 9 2cm Flak and 3 2cm flakvicrling)
5"' Motorized Battery (assigned 9 2cm Flak and 3 2cm flakvierling)
1' Battalion, 3 3 d Flak Regiment
1` Battalion, 6"' Flak Regiment
1•"Motorized Battery (assigned 4 8.8cm Flak guns)
135"' Motorized Flak Regiment (commanded by OberstAlwin Wolz since 14 February 1942, arrived December 1941)
1' Battalion, 18"' Motorized Flak Regiment
one signal company
I"'Motorized Battery (assigned 4 8.8cm Flak guns)
4"' Motorized Battery (assigned 4 2cm Flak guns)
2"" Battalion, 12 5 'h Motorized Flak Regiment
one signal company
1" Motorized Battery (assigned 4 8.8cm Flak guns)
2"" Motorized Battery (assigned 4 8.8cm Flak guns)
3"" Motorized Battery (assigned 3 8.8cm Flak guns)
Separate Flak Battalions
606"' Self-Propelled Flak Battalion
1' Self-propelled Battery (assigned 12 2cm Flak guns)
2"" Self-propelled Battery (assigned 12 2cm Flak guns)
3"' Self-propelled Battery (assigned 10 2cm Flak guns)
609"' Self-Propelled Flak Battalion (Laffcttcn noch nicht uberf (uberfahren?) carriages not yet across)
1" Self-propelled Battery (assigned 12 2cm Flak guns)
2"'"Self-propelled Battery (assigned 12 2cm Flak guns)
3"' Self-propelled Battery (assigned 12 2cm Flak guns)
612"' Self-Propelled Flak Battalion
2"" Self-propelled Battery (assigned 11 2cm Flak guns)
3 d Self-propelled Battery (assigned 11 2cm Flak guns)

41h Self-propelled Battery (assigned 12 2cm Flak guns)
617'h Self-Propelled Flak Battalion
1VSelf-propelled Battery (assigned 6 2cm Flak guns)
2 "d Self-propelled Battery (assigned 62 2cm Flak guns)
3 d Self-propelled Battery (assigned 11 2cm Flak guns)
605"h PanzerjigerBattalion (attached to 9 0 'hLeicht Afrika Division at the beginning of the Second Battle of El Alamein, combat
strength 10/21/100 of ration strength 12/2/58/263 as of 20 Oct 42, authorized 27 47mm SP PAK guns (24 on-hand), 4 Pz lb
command tank (3 on-hand), Three sclf propelled companies (each authorized 3 medium motorcycles, 10 heavy motorcycles with
sidecars, 2 Kfz 2, 2 Kfz 15, 8 It trucks, 6 medium trucks, I Kgkw Sd 10, 1 Pz Ib 101 tank, 9 Pz lb tanks with 47mm Czech guns),
on-hand 6 Marder I (?))
Staff Company (authorized 3 medium motorcycles, 3 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, 4 Kfz 1,5 Kfz 15, 1 Kfz 31, 5 It
trucks, 6 medium trucks, I Kfz 79, 1 equipment truck, 10 Ahn Sd 115 trailers, 2 Kfz 17, 1 medium command car, I
Zgkw 10, 10 Zgkw 7, 1 Pz lb Command Tank, I Heavy Machine Shop 24)
IS Company (assigned 6 4cm Pak (e) (captured 2-pdr) on a tank chassis(?) or towed? (as of 22 Aug))
2 "dCompany (assigned 11 4.7cm Pak (t) as of 22 Aug)
3Yd Company (assigned 2 Marder I as of 22 Aug)
Signals Company
Engineer Troops (Oberst Hecker)

581h Boa (Construction Engineer) Battalion (HauptmannKaiser, assigned 25/138/1038 as of 30 July, of 35/193/1437
authorized)
Battalion staff (assigned 8/5/12 of 8/7/12 authorized)
No. I Company (assigned 3/23/182 of 4/27/231 authorized, working in Ghazal area)
No. 2 Company (assigned 3/25/177 of 4/27/231 authorized, working in Tobruk area)
No. 3 Company (assigned 3/24/184 of 4/27/231 authorized, working in Benghazi area)
No. 4 Company (assigned 2/23/170 of 4/27/231 authorized, working in Ghazal area)
778'h Pioneer Landing Company (assigned 4/26/188 as of 21 July, authorized 9/62/344, equipped with 3 of 10
(authorized) Siebcl Ferries, 12 of 6 SS Ferries, 3 of 2 Auboschlepper, 6 of 0 Flossack Ferries, 4 of 4 small
landing boats, I Landwasserschlcpper, and 4 of 12 large landing boats.)
one heavy construction column (assigned 2/12/105 as of 21 July of 2/16/157 authorized)
8 5 0 'hPioneer Sturm Company (Oberleutnant Knees, detached to SV 288, 90"' Leicht Afirika Division)
140h Italian Company Defense Engineers
twenty Italian labor companies (approx. 100 men each)
Signal Troops (Oberst Buchting)

I01hPanzer Signals Regiment
VST
Motorized Battalion
I" Motorized Company
2"d Panzer Radio Company
3 d Motorized Radio Company
one light signal transport column
2 d Motorized battalion
4 th Motorized Telephone Construction Company
5 1h Motorized Wire Construction Company

61hMotorized Wire Construction Company
one light signal transport column
10"' Signals Equipment Park
Propaganda Company Afrika
V. Heeres-Funkstelle
V11.Heeres-Funkstelle
XIII Heeres-Funkstelle
XVII. Heeres-Funkstellc
XVIII Heeres-Funkstelle
"Tripolis" Heeres-Funkstelle
Funk-Truppe z.b. V. "Afrika"
OTHER SUPPORT TROOPS Nachschub-Bataillon (mot) 149 - Italian

Nachschub-Botaillon (mot) 529
Armnee-Kartenstelle (mot) 575 Nachschub-Bataillon(mot) 532
Stab Koluft Libyen (Konanandeurder Luqtwqfjl,) Nachschub-Bataillon(oot)533
Auqflarungsstab 2 (Heer)/14.Panzer Nachschub-Bataillon(mot) 902
Kurierstqlfel Nachschub-Bataillhn(mnot) 909
Nachrichten-Zug 937 Kraftfahrzeoginstands'etzungs-Abteilhng(mnot) 548
Nachschub-Regimnent (mot) 585 Panzer-Berge-Zug(mot)
Stab Nachschub-Bataillhn (mot) 619 Reifenstqffel (mot) 13
Entlade-Stab z.b. V. (mot) 681 Reifen and Ersatzteillager(mnot) 548
Stab Nachschub-Bataillonz.b. V. (mot) 792 Reifen Instandsetzungsstqffel (mot) 573
Stab Nachschub-Bataillonz.b. V (mot) 798 Kraqfatagenwerkstatt-Zug(mot) 534
Nachschub-Bataillon (foot) 148 - Italian Volkswagen Kraftwagenwerkstatt-Zug (fnot)

Bosch Krafmwagecnwerkstatt-Zug (mat,)
MAnitiiionsýieerwa~ltun~g-Zuig (mot,) 542-543-544-545-546-547
Bctic'sstfflacsncung- Tupp(mat) 12
J-Iceres-Betriehsstaiffi'e,-wltungs-Zug (maot)5
Betrich(sstaffli'erwialtiungs~-Zutg (moot,)979-980-981
Cur-ate- Veurwa~lltungscieuste (mot01)
Hueeres-Krafifiiulo-ParA- (mat,) 560
fleeres-Kr-qftfahr-Park (mat) 566
FUeldzcigdienst-Zug(mat,) 1-2-3
1./Backerei-Kompaanie (mat) 554
Schlachterei-Kompaanie (mat,) 445
Verpfleugongsoat (maot)445
Verpflegungsaint 'Afrika" (mat,)
Stab Kdt. V.A. 556
2./Sanitals-Kapnpanie (maot) 592
1./Krankentranspart- Kampanie (',nat) 705
"Tr-ipalis"-Kr-icgslazar-ett ('iiat,)
5./Kriegslazarett (mat) 542
Kriegslazarett (mot,) 667
Leicht Kranken Kriegsla~arett (mat)
Sanitatspark (mat,) 531
Gehcime Feldpolizei (tmot)
1loimpt-Streifueiditiste (loot,)
Wach-Botatmlan "Afiika"
Ortskma~nnadant "Mlisia-ata" 615
Ortskompn~oadant "Barce'" 619
Oriskaminnandant "Tripolis" 958
Ortskmalnoadant "Buaghazi" 959
Ortskaonmandant "Durna"
Tripolis-Laiger Kdr. ('kml5)
Kriegsge.1imigeu-Di~ieioruganglagur- 782
Transport Standaric "Speer"
1'eldl/)051011t z.h. V. (loot,) 659
Iuldpostamit z.1). V. (lmot,) 762
luldpostaint z. h.V. ('fir die Ltu/ma/lu) (matl)
K nstelle
FuIl/)()staint
z.
h.V Armee- Brief ste/lu
(lmot)
1-40 BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

AXIS AIRPOWER 25
Luff/lotte 2: headquarters at Frascati near Rome, commanded by GeneralfeIldmarschallAlbert Kesselring since 12 January 1940, with
GeneralmajorPaul Deichmann as Chief of Staff (since 25 August 1942) had 916 aircraft (of which only 528 were operational) in the entire
Mediterranean Theatre) (In Outraged Skies, noted airpower historian Edward Jablonski (page 10) states, "Kesselring on papermay have
appearedto have an impressive array of airpower at his disposal. But as Commander in Chief South, the about 3000 planes under his
command were dispersed quite tenuously throughout the vast Mediterraneanand the Balkans. And the new FliegerfuehrerAfrika [Generalder
FliegerHans Scidcmann since 30 August 1942 and located at Fuka], could count on little more than 600 of those ratherwidely scatteredforces.
On the eve of Montgomery's offensive he had about 380fighters, of which most were Italian and only 165 Me- l09Fs; he had about 150
bombersplus 75 Italian attack planek and afew seaplanes and reconnaissanceaircrqft. But of these only about half were operational,thanks in
part to the disruption ofAxis supply routes into north Afica by Allied airand sea effort.")
11Fliegerkorps,commanded by GeneraloberstBruno Loerzer since 11 October 1939 and stationed at Taormina, with about 360
aircraft available (according to La Regia Aeronautica, 1939-1943, Volume Terzo. 1942 L 'Anno Della Speranza: 35 Ju. 88s, 153 Bf
109 fighters, 27 Bf 109 fighter-bombers, I ll Ju. 87 Stukas, 18 Bf I IOs, and 18 reconnaissance aircraft (a mix of FW 189s, Hs 126,
and Bf 109fs), as well as about 40 support aircraft (medevac: Fi 156, Do. 17, Do. 24; Ju. 52 transports, W. 34 (communications), and
FW 58 (liaison)). Of these, about 110 total aircraft were operational. However, The Italian Army Official History (Le Operazioni in
Afriica Settentrionale, Vol. I1-El Alamein ) reports 156 operational bombers and 58 operational fighters composed of four groups of
ME-109s fighters and seven bomber groups, (six of JU-88s and one of HE-1I Is). This last source appears to include "cooperating"
aircraft from X Fliegerkorps.
AXIS AIRCRAFT IN THE COMBAT ZONE*

CLASS OF UNITS TOTAL (ON-HAND, NOT
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL)
German (Combat aircraft) Dive-Bombers 9 squadrons 95 aircraft
Fighters 12 squadrons 125 aircraft
Fighter-Bombers 9 squadrons about 70 aircraft
Reconnaissance 3 squadrons 29 aircraft
Subtotal (Combat aircraft) About 320 aircraft
(thereof 50% operational) 160 aircraft
(support aircraft) Desert rescue 10 aircraft
Transport 15 aircraft
Liaison 10 aircraft
Courier 15 aircraft
Subtotal (support aircraft) 50 aircraft
Total (German) 370 aircraft
Italian Fighters I wing 60 aircraft (30 operational)
Fighter-Bombers I wing 60 aircraft (30 operational)
Reconnaissance 10 aircraft (5 operational)
Liaison 30 aircraft
Transport 25 aircraft
Total (Italian) 185 aircraft (65 operational)
Axis Total 420 aircraft (155 operational)
* Includes eastern Cyrenaika (except Benghazi and Tripoli), does not include "cooperating" aircraft of the
X Fliegerkorpssince they seem to have played only a minor role in operations Ligthfoot and Supercharge.
25 As noted earlier for the ground forces, the numbers in this and subsequent tables may not necessarily tally up. The best source on the German
Luftwaffe's order of battle is at http://www..wvw2.dk/ with an extensive bibliography at: http:,w/
w w .v2.dkibliourapiv.htbin . See also La
Regia Aeronautica, 1939-1943, Volume Terzo, 1942 L'Anno Della Speranza, by Nino Arena, Stato Maggiore Acronautica, Ufficio Storico,
Rome, 1984, pages 227-233. Regia Aeronautica. Vol. 1. A Pictorial History of the Italian Air Force, 1940-1943, by Christopher Shores, ISBN 0-
89747-060-5, Squadron/Signal Publications, 1976, page 43. Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale, Vol. 111-El Alamein, by Mario Montanari,
Official History, Rome, 1993, page 657. "The Campaign in North Africa 1941/3, Volume 2, The Campaign in the Year 1942," by General der
PanzertruppeWalther Nchring, MS # T-3, Foreign Military Studies, Headquarters, US Army Europe, 1948, Anlage 12. Die deutsche Lu, affo
in Afiika-Feldzu, 1941-1943, by Werner Held and Ernst Obcrmaier, Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart, 1979. "Der Einsatz der Luft/lotte 2 (O.B.
Sued) ob November 1941 his zur alliierten Landung November 1942," by General der Flieger Hans Seidemann, MS # D-160, Foreign Military
Studies, Headquarters, US Army Europe, 10 April 1947, pages 41, 42. "The Luftwaffe in Libya and Cyrenaica, (Oct-Nov 1942)," by
Generahnajor Hans-Joachim Rath, MS # D-123, German title: "Der Einsatz der Lufwvaffe im Rueckwaertigen Gebiet Libyen-Cyrenaika
Oktober/November 1942," Foreign Military Studies, Headquarters, US Army Europe, pages 3, 4. Outraged Skies, by Edward Jablonski,
contained in Airwar, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, New York, 1971, page 10, lists General der Lu/ftwaofe Hoffman von Waldau as the
new FliegerfuehrerAfrika, however, it would appear that he only held this position from 12 April to 30 August 1942 when he became the
commander of X Fliegerkorps and was replaced by General der Flieger Hans Scidemann. See also Desert Warfare: German Experiences in
World War 1I, Alfred Toppc, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 1991,
page 27.

Ja,'deeschiwader27 (92 Bf 109 fighters (including 4 with the headquarters) commanded by Oberstletnanot Eduard
Neumann since 10 June 1942, headquarters at based at Mumin Busak)
1. Gruppe (18 Bf 109F and 5 Bf 109G fighters as of I October 1942, commanded by Hauptmann Gerhard
Homuth since 8 June 1942, based at Pachinothis unit included Hans-Joachim Marseille, an "ACE" with 158
kills, which died in an air crash on 30 September 1942)
1' Squadron
2"" Squadron
3 `1Squadron
II. Gruppe (35 Bf 109F fighters as of 1 October 1942, commanded by Hauptmann Gustav Rbdel since 20 May
1942, based at Quotaifiya)
4 "hSquadron
5 1h Squadron
6'h Squadron
III. Grnppe (30 Bf 109F fighters as of ! October 1942, HauptnannErnst Dflllberg since 11 October 1942,
based at Turbiya)
7"hSquadron
8"' Squadron
9 "'Squadron
Stozkampf,,esc'hwader 3 (95 Ju-87s (including 3 assigned to the headquarters) as of 1 October 1942, commanded by
Oberstlcutnant Walter Siegel since 1 September 1942, headquarters at Haggag el Qasaba)
1.Gruppe (32 Ju-87Ds as of 1 October 1942, commanded by Major Herbert Spangenberg since July 1942,
based at Haggag el Quasaba)
1VSquadron
2 "dSquadron
3 d Squadron
I. Gruppe (28 Ju-87Ds as of 1 October 1942, commanded by Houptmiann Heinrich Heine since July 1942
based at Haggag el Quasaba South or Elmas)
4"' Squadron
5 "'Squadron
6'' Squadron
111.Gruppe (32 Ju-87Ds as of 1 October 1942, commanded by Haoponann Kurt Walter since 13 January 1942
replaced by Major Bernhard Hamester on 26 October for unspecified reasons, based at Haggag el Quasaba
West)
7"' Squadron
8"' Squadron
9"'1Squadron
sea rescue squadron (Do. 24, based at Mersa Matruh)
Jabo,horoppe Afi'ika ("Fighter-Bomber Group Africa," organized 31 August 1942 with three squadrons of Bf 109 fighter-
bombers, based at Haggag cl Quasaba East)
1` Squadron (formerly 101' Squadron, Jagdgeschwader 27)
squadron (formerly 10' Squadron, Jagdgeschwvader 53, with 7 Bf 109F fighter-bombers as of 31 July 1942)
Ill. Grupp, Jagdgeschwalder53 (33 Bf 109F fighters as of 1 October 1942, commanded by Hauptoann Franz G6tz since
October 1942, based at Quotaifiya)
7"'1Squadron
8"' Squadron
9 "hSquadron
Ill. Gruppe, Ze1stirergeschwader1(24 Bf I IOA/F and 2 Bf I IOD/E fighter-bombers as of I October 1942, by 31 October
the Bf 110 A/Fs had been turned in and replaced with 17 Me 210As, commanded by Hauptanon Fritz Hobein since
September 1942, based at Bir el Abd and Trapani)
7"' Squadron
8"' Squadron
9"' Squadron (under X Fliegerko0ps at Kastelli in late October 1942, drawing their new Me 210s?)
8"' Squadron, Ill. Gruppe, Zewtirergeschiwader26 (57 Bf 110 fighter-bombers, commanded by I-auptoann Gcorg
Christi since 25 December 1941, headquarters with 10 h Squadron, Zerstorergeschwader26 at Kastelli Crete, 8"'
Squadron based at Barce/Dema)
10"' Squadron, Zerskr'ergeschwvader26 (2 Do 17Z and 4 Ju 88C light bombers, based at Kastelli Crete)
12' Squadron, Experimental Bomber Wing (Ju. 88s, based at Barce/Derna)
I ' Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (F), Autfklirungsgruppe 121. (10 Ju. 88Ds as of 1 October 1942, based at

Fuka/Derna)
4 h Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (H), AuJkldrungsgruppe 12. (12 Bf 109F, I Bf 109E, I Bf I IOF, based at Bin cl
Abd)
Reconnaissance Squadron (H), Autkldrungsgruppe 14. (received 5 Bf 109Fs during the October 1942, based at
2 nd Tactical
Bin el Abd)
support troops (including: one air signal battalion and one logistical support team)
X Flie2erkorps, commanded by GeneralleutnantHofmann von Waldau (since 31 August 1942) with his Chief of Staff Oberst
Sigismund Frciheer von Falkenhausen (since 1 April 1942), headquarters at Kiphissa near Athens), directed to "cooperate" with
FliegerfuhrerAfrika,many of his units had recently been withdrawn from Sicily and were now based in Greece)
11.Gruppe, Kamopfgeschwader 100 (27 He 11 Hs and I Ju 88As as of I October 1942, commanded by Major Hcrmann
Dick6ttcr since 15 October 1942, based at Kalamaki near Athens with elements at Catania and Comiso)
4'h Squadron
5'h Squadron
6 ih Squadron
111.Gruppe, Kampfgeschwader 100 (12 He I1IHs and 18 Ar 196As as of I October 1942, Major Schulz since 20
September 1942 based at Salamanca and Kalamaki)
7 1h Squadron
8 Squadron
Wh
9
1h Squadron
111.Gruppc, Zerst6rergeschwaderI (9'h Squadron? Me 210s, based at Kastclli, Crete, reinforced by 1 6 'h Squadron,
Kaonpfgeschwader6 the Erprobungskonmmando("Experimental Command") Me 210 and reassigned in October as II'h
Squadron, Zersttirergeschwader1)
2 d Squadron (F), Au. kl/rungsgruppe 123. (Strategic) (3 Ju. 86Rs and 12 Ju. 88Ds as of I October 1942, based at Kastelli,
Crete)
2 'd Squadron (See), A ukldrungsgruppe 125. (Ar 196s, based at Suda Bay, Crete)
Yd
3 Squadron (See), Autklirungsgruppe 126. (Ar 196s, based at Skaramanga, rc-dcsignatcd Wh9 Squadron, Kamp/•,eschwader
100 on 20 September 1942)
Lehrgeschwader I (training unit, commanded by Oberst Franz von Bcnda since June 1942, headquarters at Elcusis and
possibly at Iraklion, Crete)
I. Gruppc (Ju 88As, commanded by Major Joachim Hclbig since 31 December 1941, based at Iraklion, Crctc)
1V,Squadron
2 "d Squadron
3 rd Squadron
11.Gruppe (training unit, Ju. 88As, based at Iraklion, Crete)

4 th Squadron
5 1h Squadron
6 'hSquadron
IV. Gruppe (training unit, re-dcsignatcd I. Gruppc, Sturzkoampfgeschwader5 on 27 January 1942 with 39 Ju
87Rs as of I October 1942, commanded by Major Erwin Schulz, based at Elcusis, Crete? Information on this
unit is contradictory)

Refia Aeronautica (about 400 aircraft (26 Cant. 1007 Bis bombers, 30 SM.79 torpedo bombers, 107 CR.42 biplanes, 73 MC. 200 fighters, 60 MC
202 fighters, 43 G.50, 26 Cant. 501 and Cant. 506, and 23 Ca. 311. Of these, about 260 (65%) were operational. In addition, the Italians had
about 50 auxiliary aircraft including the 10 3'd and 104"' squadrons APC (with a mix of SM.79, SM.81, and Ca. 309 aircraft) and 14 51hGruppo T.
(with SM.82s) as well as three bomber groups (Cant. Z. 1007), one dive-bomber group (JU-87 Stuka), one fighter-bomber group (Re.2001), and
three fighter groups (MC. 202) based in Sicily with a total of about 8 dive-bombers, 18 level bombers and 62 fighters which were operational)
5"hSquadra Acrea (General Mario Bernasconi)
Eastem Sector Command (Colonel Michele Grandinetti, based at Fuka)

3`1 Stormo C.T. (MC 202 fighters, based at Abu Haggag-Bir cl Astas)
18'h Gruppo (based at Abu Haggag)

8 3 ,d Squadron
85h Squadron
9 51h Squadron (MC 200 fighters)
23"' Gruppo (based at Abu Haggag)

70' Squadron
74Th Squadron
7 5 'h Squadron
4"' Stormo C.T. (based at Fuka South)
9"' Gruppo C.T. (MC 202 fighters, based at Fuka South)

73,d Squadron
96"' Squadron
9 7 'h Squadron
10"' Gruppo C.T. (MC 202 fighters, based at Fuka South)

84"' Squadron
90"' Squadron
91 " Squadron
101'" Gruppo d'assalto (attached from 5"' Stormo, Ju-87 Stukas, based at Abar Nimeir)
208"' Squadron
238"' Squadron
50"' Stormo Gruppo d'assalto (attack, based at Abar Nimeir)
158"' Gnuppo (CR. 42s-biplane night fighters, based at Abar Nimcir)

2 3 6 'h Squadron
387"' Squadron
388"' Squadron
159"h Gruppo (based at Abar Nimeir)

389h Squadron
390"' Squadron
391"• Squadron
191"' Squadron B.T. (attached from 3 5 "hStormo, based at Mersa Matruh)

94"' Squadron C.T. (attached from 2"" Stormo, based at Sidi Barrani)
12"' Squadron A.P.C. (based Siwa)
Central Sector Command (General Augusto Bacchiani)
2"" Stormo C.T. (based at Bu Amud)
8"' Gruppo da Caccia (MC 200 fighters, based at Bu Amud)

92"" Squadron
93`1 Squadron
13"' Gruppo da Caccia (MC 200 fighters, based at Bu Amud)

77"' Squadron
78"' Squadron
82"" Squadron
150"' Gruppo Autonomo C.T. (MC 202 fighters, being repatriated (to Italy?), based at Benghazi/
K.3)
363"' Squadron

3 64rh Squadron
3 65 'h Squadron
15 'hStormo Assaulto (CR. 42s-biplanc night fighters, based at Benghazi/K.3)
4 6 'h Gruppo (based at K.3)

2 0 'h Squadron
2 1" Squadron
4 7 'h Gruppo (based at Abu Amud)

53rd Squadron
5 4 'h Squadron
6 6 1hGruppo O.A. (based at Barce/Bcnghazi)

8 7 'h Squadron
131 S Squadron
Squadron R.M. (based at Menclao)

14 8th
19 6 'h Squadron
R.M. (based at Benghazi)
6 14 'h Squadron S. (CR.42 biplanes and Cant.506/S, based at Benghazi)
3 5 1hStormo B.T. (Z. 1007 bis medium bombers, based at Barce)
860h Gruppo (based at Barce)

19 0 'h Squadron
191 S,Squadron (attached to Eastern Sector Command)
8 9 1h Gruppo (based at Barce)

2 3 0 1hSquadron
23 1s"Squadron
131 " Gruppo Autonomo A.S. (based at Dema)

2 7 9 1hSquadron
2841h Squadron
133rd Gruppo Autonomo A.S. (based at Derna)
1741h Squadron
Air Force Command Tripolitania (General Mario Boshi, based at Tripoli?)
6 8 1h Gruppo O.A. (based at Zuara-Misurata)

2 4 1h Squadron
3 3 rd Squadron
16 0 'hGruppo Autonomo C. T. (CR. 42s-biplane night fighters, based at Castel Benito-Misurata)

3 6 3 rd Squadron
3 6 4 'h Squadron
3 6 5 'h Squadron
17 5 "hSquadron A.S. (detached from 133rd Gruppo, based at Castel Benito)

14 5 'h Squadron R.M. (based at Pisida)

APPENDIX J. ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE
(As of 23 Oct 1942, unless otherwise noted)
8'- Army: commanded by Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery (as of 15 Aug 1942), Chief of Royal Engineers (CRE): Brigadier
Frederick H. Kisch. 1
X Corps, Lieutenant General Herbert Lumsden page J-2

XIII Corps, Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks page J-5
XXX Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese page J- 10
8'h Army Troops page J-19
8 1h ARMY STRENGTH
X Corps XIII Corps XXX Corps 8 1h
Army Control 81hArmy Total
Personnel 28,000 46,000 80,000 231,000"*****
Infantry Battalions Regular 3 20 44 3 (reforming) 67+3 reforming
Motorized 6 2 1 - 9
Machine Gun 1(- 2(-) 5(+) 8
Reconnaissance I I - 2
TOTAL 10(-) 5(-) 7(+) 3 (reforming) 22+3 reforming
Tanks Shcrmans 216 - 36 66 318
Grants 62 71 37 76 246
Crusaders 173 57 64 114 408
Valentines - - 186 37 223
Stuarts - 86 34 52 172
Churchill 3 - - - 6
Matildas - - - 6 6
Scorpions 6 6 13 0 25
TOTAL 460 220 372 318 1373**
Field & Medium Artillery 25-pdr gun-howitzcrs 120 288 408 21 837
25-pdr SP - - 16 - 16
105mm SP 24 - 24
4.5" guns - - 32 32
5.5" guns - 4 16 - 20
TOTAL 144 292 472 21 939***
Anti-Tank Artillery 6-pdr AT guns 272 224 273 101 870
2-pdr AT guns 24 172 322 86 604
18-pdr AT guns - - 3 - 3
50rm PAK 38 1 6 7
75mm Model 1897 - 22 - - 22
TOTAL 296 419 604 187 1506****
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Bofors 40mm guns 154 160 256 176 746
3.7" AA guns - - - 48 48
TOTAL 154 160 256 224 794
Armored Cars 143 206 64 87 500*****
Universal Carriers 302 678 (est.) 1570 (est.) - 2550 (est.)
S********(est.)
Engineer Companies Sqdn & Field Comp. 9 11 17 (+)* 2 & I rcforming 39+1 reforming
Mine Detectors 180 117 202 - 499
Field Park Comp. 4 5 5 - 14
Pioneer& Labor Co. 25 25*******
*Does not include 6 6"hMortar Company Royal Engineers (18 4.2" mortars)
** Of this total, 1161 were fit for duty (including 25 Scorpions), the rest appear to be replacements (about 200) or in the shop (Tobruk and El
Alamein estimates that 1,000 were in the workshops)
***Of this total, 908 were fit for duty
****Of this total, 50 2-pdrs and 21 6-pdrs were not available
*****Of this total, 188 Humbers, 212 Marmon-Harrington, 96 Daimler, 4 AEC, 382 were with armored car regiments, 53 as headquarters escort,
and 65 in rescrve/transit/workshops
•****'*195,000 "fighting strength."
*******twenty-four additional pioneer and labor companies in General Headquarters reserve.
*********2350 universal carriers authorized (# on-hand uncertain, estimate based on Joslen's statement that on average, each infantry battalion
had 31 carriers and each armoured division had 151).
Orders of Battle, Volume I1,United Kingdom and Colonial Formations and Units in the Second World War, 1939-1945, by H. F. Joslen, Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1960, and Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale, Vol. Ill-El Alamein, by Mario Montanari, Official
History, Rome, 1993.
BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot J-1

X Corps: commanded by Lieutenant General Herbert Lumsden (CRE Brigadier P. A. Clauson, Headquarters: 2 Grants, 457 total tanks,
approximately 28,000 men assigned (not including corps troops, attachments and detachments))
I" Armourcd Division, Major General Raymond Briggs page J-3

10"' Armoured Division, Major General Alcc H. Gatchouse page J-4
8"' Armoured Division, Major General C. H. Gairdner (CRE Licutcnant-Colonel C. E. A. Browning, under command of 8"' Army),
Only the headquarters and a few attachments)
Hammerforce (detached to I" Armoured Division)
24' Armored Brigade (detached to 10"' Armoured Division)
145"' Field Park Squadron Royal Engineers (in X Corps reserve)
HQs, 1VBattalion, The Newfoundland Regiment (Machine Gun) and Y Company (reforming)
6"' Ficld Squadron Royal Engineers (detached to 10' Armoured Division)
9"' Field Squadron Royal Engineers (detached to I" Armoured Division)
143r" Field Park Squadron Royal Engineers
8 " Armoured Division Signals
X Corps Troops
two troops, 73" Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery (guarding X Corps HQs, 8 6-pdr AT guns, 4 guns per
troop)
one troop, 56' Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (guarding X Corps HQs, 4 Bofors 40mm AA guns)
one troop, 5 3 'd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (guarding X Corps HQs, 4 Bofors 40mm AA guns)
CRE, Licutenant-Coloncl E. N. Bickford
570' Corps Field Park Company Royal Engineers
571 " Field Company, Royal Engineers (attached to 10 "hArnoured Division)
572"" Field Company, Royal Engineers (attached to I" Armoured Division)
573"' Field Company, Royal Engineers (attached to 10 h Armoured Division)
X Corps Signals
12"' Light Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps)
151" Light Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps)
X CORPS STRENGTH
I' AD 10' AD 8' AD X Corps Troops Corps Total
Personnel 14,000 14,000 - 28,000
Infantry Battalions Regular - 3 3
Motorized 4 2 6
Machine Gun 2 Comp. . Comp. 1 0-)
Carriers
Tanks Shermans 92 124 - 216
Grants 1 59 2 62
Crusaders 76 97 - 173
Valentines - - -
Churchill MK IV 3 3
Stuarts - -
Matildas - - -
Scorpions 3 3* - 6*
TOTAL 175 280 2 457
Field & Medium Artillery 25-pdr gun-howitzers 48 72 - 120
25-pdr SP - - -
105mOm SP 24 24
4.5" guns - -
5,5" guns - - -
TOTAL 72 76 - 144
Anti-Tank Artillery 6-pdr AT guns 168 96 8 272
2-pdr AT guns - 24 - 24
18-pdr AT guns - -
50rm PAK 38
75rmm Model 1897
TOTAL 168 120 8 296
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Bofors 40ram guns 76 70 8 154
3.7" AA guns - - - -
Armored Cars 106 46 152
Universal Carriers (based 151 151 (est.) 302 (est.)
on authorization) (est.)
Engineer Companies Sqdns & Field Companies 4 5 - 9
Field Park Companies 1 1 1 I 4
*Detached 3 Scorpions to 2'" New Zealand Division (giving them a total of six for the attack to Phase Line Oxalic), all functional
Scorpions were to revert to 10"' Armoured Division control for the attack to Phase Line Pierson.
J-2 BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

1- Armoured Division: commanded by Major General Raymond Briggs (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel K. Mackay, Headquarters: 8 Crusader MK Ils,
6 Armored Cars, 172 total tanks and approximately 14,000 men assigned (not including attachments and detachments), authorized 13,235 men,
280 tanks, 64 artillery pieces, 219 antitank guns, 348 AT rifles, 88 light anti-aircraft guns, 64 armored cars, 151 universal carriers, 18 medium
mortars, 60 light mortars, 868 automatic weapons, 1,415 trucks, 53 prime movers, 956 motorcycles, 134 trailers, 374 miscellaneous vehicles)
2n-" Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier A. Frank Fisher, Headquarters: 2 armored cars, 161 tanks: 92 Shcrmans, I Grant, 39
Crusader MK Ils, 29 Crusader MK Ills, including tanks attached to the Minefield TF.
2 "dDragoon Guards Regiment, "The Bays" (-)
9'h Lancers Regiment (-)
1 0 1h Hussars Regiment (-)
Yorkshire Dragoons Regiment (motorized infantry bn with 16 6-pdr anti-tank guns)

8 Armoured Division, with 12
X Company, 1I'Battalion, The Newfoundland Regiment (Machine Gun), (attached from Wh
Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
7L Motorized Brigade: commanded by Brigadier T. James B. Bosville, Headquarters: 3 Churchill MK IV, 12 tanks total, 9 included in
2"d Armoured Brigade's total.
7 th Battalion, The Rifle Brigade (16 6-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"' Battalion, The King's Royal Rifle Corps (16 6-pdr anti-tank guns)
Support Company, 2 "dBattalion, The Rifle Brigade
Mincfield Task Force (9 tanks total, included in 2 "dArmoured Brigade's total)
2 "dBattalion, The Rifle Brigade (-) (16 6-pdr anti-tank guns, support company detached to 7 1h Motorized
Brigade)
one troop, 2 d Dragoon Guards Regiment (attached from 2 d Armoured Brigade, 3 tanks)
one troop, 9'h Lancers Regiment (attached from 2 "dArmoured Brigade, 3 tanks)
one troop, 1 0 h Hussars Regiment (attached from 2 "dArmoured Brigade, 3 tanks)
7 th Squadron Royal Engineers
9WhField Squadron Royal Engineers (attached from 8 th Armoured Division)
Field Company Royal Engineers (attached from X Corps)

5 7 2 "d Army
Signals and provost detachments
Hammerforce (attached) (composed of units of 8th Armoured Division formed 18 Oct under the Command of the CRA (Chief of Royal
Artillery) 8 "hArmoured Div)
4/6 South Africa Armoured Car Regiment (-) (43 armored cars, detached I troop (3 armored cars (?)) to XIII Corps and 3
troops (9 armored cars to XXX Corps )
Z Company, V Battalion, The Newfoundland Regiment (Machine Gun), (12 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
14 6 1h Field Regiment Royal Artillery (detached to 9 "hAustralian Division)
7 3r•dAnti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery (-) (40 6-pdr AT guns, 2 batteries of 16 guns & I battery of 8 guns, 24 guns
detached to 10 h Armoured Div (I battery of 16 guns) and X Corps Troops (2 troops of 4 guns each ))
5 6 1h Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (-) (28 Bofors 40mm guns, I battery of 16 guns & I of 12 guns, 20
guns
detached to 10 1h Armoured Division (1 battery of 16 guns) and X Corps Troops (I troop of 4 guns))
Division Troops
12'h Lancers Regiment (55 armored cars)
Royal Artillery
2"d Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
4 h Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
I1 h (Honorable Artillery Company) Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (24 Priest 105mm SP (Self-Propelled)
guns, in three batteries of 8 guns)
7 8th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (detached, 3 troops (12 guns) to 51 " Highland Division & 3 troops (12
guns) to 2 d New Zealand Division)
76"' Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery (64 6-pdr AT guns, 4 batteries of 16 guns)
4 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (48 Bofors 40ram guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
Royal Engineers
VSTSquadron Royal Engineers (one troop of three Scorpions attached)
I" Field Park Company Royal Engineers
1"Armoured Division Signals

1` Light Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps)
15 h Light Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps)
BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot J-3

I.01b
Armoured Division: commanded by Major Gencral Alec H. Gatehouse (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. McMeekan, Headquarters: 7
Crusader MK Ils, 280 total tanks and approx. 14,000 mcn assigned (not including attachments and detachments) authorized 13,235 men, 280
tanks, 64 artillery pieces, 219 antitank guns, 348 AT rifles, 88 light anti-aircraft guns, 64 armored cars, 151 universal carriers, 18 medium
mortars, 60 light mortars, 868 automatic weapons, 1,415 trucks, 53 prime movers, 956 motorcycles, 134 trailers, 374 miscellaneous vehicles.
8"' Armoured Brigade, commanded by Brigadier E. C. Neville Custance, 133 tanks total: 31 Shermans, 57 Grants, 33 Crusader MK
Its, and 12 Crusader MK Ills.
3 `1Royal Tank Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel H. E. "Pete," Pyman, estimated to have 16 Crusaders and 30 "medium"
tanks (Grants and Shemaans)
Sherwood Rangers (Nottinghamshire Yeomanry) Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel "Flash" Kellett, 13 Crusaders, 20 Grants,
I I Shernians)
Staffordshire Yeomanry Regiment (Major J. A. Eadic, replaced Lieutenant Colonel Cox on 6 OCT 42, assigned 16
Crusaders and 27 "medium" tanks (Shermans and Grants)
1V'Battalion, Royal East Kent Regiment, "The Buffs" (motorized infantry battalion, 16 6-pdr anti-tank guns)
9Ll'Armoured Brigade (detached to 2 nd New Zealand Infantry Division)
24' Armoured Brigade, commanded by Brigadier A. G. Kenchington, attached from 8"' AD, 140 tanks total: 93 Shermans, 2 Grants,
28 Crusader MK lls, 17 Crusader MK Ills)
41" Royal Tank Regiment
45"' Royal Tank Regiment
47"' Royal Tank Regiment
1I"'Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps (motorized infantry, 16 6-pdr anti-tank guns)
one battery, 7 3rdAnti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from Hammerforec, 16 6-pdr AT guns)
one battery, 56"' Light Anti-A-ircraft Artillery Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from Hammcrforce, 16 Bofors 40mm AA
guns)
133L Lorried Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier A. W. Lee, attached from 4 4 1h Infantry Division.
2" Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
4"' Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
5"' Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
W Company, 1VBattalion, The Newfoundland Regiment (Machine Gun) (attached from 8"' Armored Division, with 12
Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
Minefield Task Force (Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. McMeckan CRE, 1 0 1h Armoured Division, under command of 133"'
Lorried Infantry Brigadc=OPCON?)
3'' (Cheshire) Field Squadron Royal Engineers (Major Peter Moore)
571 Army Field Company Royal Engineers (Major Yeatcs, attached from 8 'hArmy)
573`1 Army Field Company Royal Engineers (Major Brinsmcad, attached from 8"' Army)
detachment, 141" Field Park Squadron Royal Engineers (detached from 10"' Armoured Division Troops)
Division Troops
Royal Horse Guards Regiment (?), "The Royals" (46 armoured cars)
Royal Artillcry (Douglas Packard)

V"Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-howitzer, in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
104"' Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
98"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery (-) (detached 3 troops (12 guns) to 2 "dNZ Div, 12 25-pdr gun-how., in 3
troops of 4 guns on-hand)
5"' Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (-) (detached 3 troops (12 guns) to IV'SA Div, 12 25-pdr gun-how., in 3
troops of 4 guns on-hand)
84"' Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery (64 6-pdr AT guns, 4 batteries of 16 guns)
5 3 d Light Anti-Aircrafi Regiment Royal Artillery (-) (44 Bofors 40mm guns, 2 batteries of 16 guns, 1 battery of
12 guns, one troop detached to X Corps Troops)
Royal Engineers (one troop of three Scorpions attached, detached to 2"d New Zealand Division; these plus any other
operational Scorpions with the 2"" New Zealand Division were to revert to 10 "hArmoured Division control at Phase
Line Oxalic)
2 nd Field Squadron Royal Engineers (Major Perrott, attached to 8"' Armoured Brigade)
6"' Field Squadron Royal Engineers (Major Collins, attached to 24"' Armoured Brigade)
141 " Field Park Squadron Royal Engineers (-) (Major Carr, detachments Mincficld Task Force and with 133Id
Lorried Infantry Bdc)
10"' Armoured Division Signals

3'' Light Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps)

XIII Corps: commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Brian G. Horrocks (C.R.E. Brigadier C. de L. Gauscn, Hcadquartcrs: 13 armored cars, 220
total tanks, 46,000 men assigned (not including corps troops, attachments and detachments).
7 1hArmoured Division, Major General John Harding page J-6

5 0th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, Major General J. S. Nichols page J-9
4 41h InfantryDivision, Major General Hughes page J-8
XIII Corps Troops
one troop, 4/6 South African Armoured Car Regiment (3 (?) armored cars, detached from Hammerforcc, 10 h Armoured
Division)
I I8'h Royal Tank Regiment (dummy tanks)
1 24 th Royal Tank Regiment (dummy tanks)
HQs 4 th Survey Regiment Royal Artillery
One composite Battery
CRE Lieutenant-Colonel N. A. Armitage
5 7 7'h Army Field Company Royal Engineers
5 7 8th Army Field Company Royal Engineers (attached from 8 1hArmy)
5 7 6th Corps Field Park Company Royal Engineers
XIII Corps Signal
Repair and service troops
XIII CORPS STRENGTH

7h AD 4 4 1hDiv 50" Div XIII Corps Troops Corps Totals
Personnel 14,000 16,000 16,000 46,000
Infantry Battalions Regular 3 6 11 20
Motorized 2 - - 2
Machine Gun - 1 3 Comp. 2 (-)
Reconnaissance I - - I
TOTAL 6 7 12 25
Tanks Shcrmans - - - -
Grants 71 71
Crusaders 57 57
Valentines - -
Stuarts 86 86
Matildas - -
Scorpions 6 6
TOTAL 220 - - 220
Field & Medium Artillery 25-pdr gun-howitzcrs 88 96 104 288
25-pdr SP _______
105mm SP
4.5" guns - -
5.5" guns 4 - - 4
TOTAL 92 96 104 292
Anti-Tank Artillery 6-pdr AT guns 112 48 64 224
2-pdr AT guns 24 60 88 172
18-pdr AT guns - -
50rm PAK 38 1 1
75mm Model 1897 6 - 16 22
TOTAL 143 108 168 419
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Bofors 40mm guns 64 48 48 160
3.7" AA guns - - - -
Armored Cars 190 - - 16 206

Universal Carriers 151 186 341 - 678 (est.)
(est.) (est.) (est.)
Engineer Companies Sqdns & Field Comp. 3 4 4 - 11
Field Park Companies I 1 1 2 5

7L"Armoured Division: commanded by Major General Sir John Harding (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. C. Withers, Headquarters: 7 Crusader
MK Its and 5 armored cars, 221 total tanks, and approximately 14,000 men assigned (not including attachments and detachments) authorized
13,235 men, 280 tanks, 64 artillery pieces, 219 antitank guns, 348 AT rifles, 8 light anti-aircraft guns, 64 armored cars, 151 universal carriers, 18
medium mortars, 60 light mortars, 868 automatic weapons, 1,415 trucks, 3 prime movers, 956 motorcycles, 134 trailers, 374 miscellaneous
vehicles.)
40' Light Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier M. G. Roddick, Headquarters: 9 armored cars, 78 total tanks
4 t078 " Hussars (4"h Hussars Regiment and one squadron from the 8 h Hussars Regiment (48 Stuarts)
Royal Scots Greys Rcgt. (-) (14 Grants, 16 Stuarts, not including one troop of 3 Stuarts with 4 4 'h Reconnaissance Rcgt.)
1"Battalion, The King's Royal Rifle Corps (motorized infantry, 16 6-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"' Derbyshire Yeomanry Regiment (attached from Division Troops, 50 armored cars)
3"' Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (attached from Division Troops, 24 25-pdr gun-how., in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
one Ordnance Field Park
one Workshop
2211` Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier G. P. B. Roberts, Headquarters: 4 Crusaders, 129 total tanks (of the 42 Crusaders,
42 were MK Ils and 8 were MK Ills)
I` Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment (24 Grants, 19 Stuarts)
I Company, I" Battalion, The Rifle Brigade (attached, plus attached 6-pounders from the VstBattalion HQs)
5"' Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment (24 Grants, 18 Crusaders)
C Company, I" Battalion, The Rifle Brigade (attached, plus attached 6-poundcrs from the I" Battalion HQs)
4"' Clyde and Lotharshirc Yeomanry Rcgiment (9 Grants, 28 Crusaders)
1"Battalion, Rifle Brigade (motorized infantry, 16 6-pdr anti-tank guns, I and C Companies (with some 6-pounders)
detached to 1` and 5"' Battalions, Royal Tank Regiment)
44"' Reconnaissance Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Corbett-Winder, attached from 44'h Infantry Division, in Universal
Carriers, functions as minefield task force)
One troop of 3 Stuarts, Royal Scots Greys Regiment (attached)
4"' Field Squadron Royal Engineers (attached from division troops)
detachment from 21 " Field Squadron Royal Engineers (attached from division troops)
Two troops with 6 Scorpions (attached from 1"Army Tank Brigade?)
4"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from Div Troops, 16 25-pdr gun-how., in 2 batteries of 8 guns)
97"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from Div Troops, 16 25-pdr gun-how., in 2 batteries of 8 guns)
one Ordnance Field Park
one Workshop
13 1P Infantry Brigade (attached to 7 "hArmored Division)

I" /5"' Battalion, The Queens Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
1" /6' Battalion, The Queens Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
1"!/7' Battalion, The Queens Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
I I"'Field Company Royal Engineers (detached with 131V Infantry Brigade to 71 Armored Division)
headquarters (authorized 2/45)
three sections (each authorized 1/64)
V` Free French (FF) Brigade Group commanded by Brigadier Jean-Pierre Koenig, under command of 7' Armored Division
OPCON?)
I` Battalion Foreign Legion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"' Battalion Foreign Legion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
3•' Battalion Infantry Marine Pacifique (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
IVFree French Flying Column (under command of 1" Free French Brigade Group=OPCON?, one sqd of (12?) armored
cars, 1•"Moroccan Spahis)
1" Free French Artillery Regiment (16 25-pdr gun-how. (2 batteries of 8 guns), & 4 5.5"guns)
3"' Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (attached from Div troops?), 16 25-pdr gun-how. (2 batteries of 8 guns))
2"" Anti-Aircraft Company, 1" Fusiliers Marine (12 Bofors 40mm guns)
2"' Free Frcnch Anti-Tank Company (16 6-pdr anti-tank guns)
22"" North African Anti-Tank Company (2 (French Model 1897 MI) 75mm guns)
I" Free French Engineer Field Company ( 2 "dField Company?)
I" Free French Anti-Tank Company (under command of I" Free French Brigade Group=OPCON?, Portee Troop I1
Moroccan Spahis) (4 (French Model 1897 MI) 75mm guns, one 50mm gun (German PAK 38?))
Anti-Aircraft Troop, 1' Battalion Foreign Legion (under command of I" Free French Brigade Group=OPCON?, 4 Bofors
40amm AA guns)
Division Troops
Household Cavalry Regiment (53 armored cars)
11" Hussars Regiment (61 armored cars) (reserve)
2"' Derbyshire Yeomanry Regiment (detached to 4"' Light Armoured Brigade, 50 armored cars)
Royal Artillery
3"' Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (detached to 4"' Armored Brigade, 24 25-pdr gun-how., in 3 batteries of 8
J-6 BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

guns)
Pd
3 Field Regiment Royal Artillery (detached to I" Free French Brigade Group?)
4 1h Field Regiment Royal Artillery (detached to 2 2nd Armoured Brigade, 16 25-pdr gun-how., in 2 batteries of 8
guns)
9 71h Field Regiment Royal Artillery (detached to 2 2nd Armoured Brigade, 16 25-pdr gun-how., in 2 batteries of
8 guns)
6 5th Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery (Norfolk Yeomanry, 64 6-pdr AT guns, 4 batteries of 16 guns)
15 1h Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (48 Bofors 40mm guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
Royal Engineers
4 "hField Squadron Royal Engineers (detached to 4 4 1h Reconnaissance Regiment)
21' Field Squadron Royal Engineers (-) (detachment with 4 41h Reconnaissance Regiment)
14 3 rd Field Park Squadron Royal Engineers
7 th Armoured Division Signals

Royal Army Supply Corps
No. 5 Company
No. 10 Company
No. 58 Company
No. 67 Company
No. 287 Company
No. 432 Company
No. 507 Company
Royal Army Medical Corps
2 "d Light Field Ambulance
Vh
7 Light Field Ambulance
14 th Light
Field Ambulance
15 1h Light
Field Ambulance
Divisional Ordnance Field Park
151h Light A.A. Workshop

44"' Infantry Division: commanded by Major General J. T. P. Hughes (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Lambert, approximately 16,000 men
assigned (not including attachments and detachmcnts) ), on average, each infantry battalion had 31 Universal Carriers and 57 other vehicles,
authorized 17,300 men, 72 artillery pieces, 136 antitank guns, 444 AT rifles, 48 light anti-aircraft guns, 6 armored cars, 256 universal carriers, 56
medium mortars, 162 light mortars, 48 machine guns, 1,999 trucks, 159 prime movers, 1,064 motorcycles, 197 trailers, 268 miscellaneous
vehicles).
131" Infantry Brigade (attached to 7 'h Armored Division)

1V/5 h Battalion, The Queens Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
1V/6' Battalion, The Queens Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
IV/71hBattalion, The Queens Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
132'' Infantry Brigade

2"d Battalion, Royal East Kent Regiment, "The Buffs" (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
4"' Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
5"' Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
13 3 d Infantry Brigade (detached to 10"' Armoured Division)
Division Troops
6"' Battalion (Machine Gun), The Cheshire Regiment (48 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
44"l' Reconnaissance Regiment (detached to the 7"' Armoured Division)
Royal Artillery
57"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
58" Field Regiment Royal Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
65"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
53"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from where?) (24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
57"' Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery (48 6-pdr and 16 2-pdr AT guns, 4 batteries of 16 guns)
30"' Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (48 Bofors 40mm guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
Royal Engineers
I•I"' Field Company Royal Engineers (detached with 131" Infantry Brigade to 7"' Armoured Division)
209"' Field Company Royal Engineers
577"' Army Field Company Royal Engineers (attached from 8 h Army)
211"' Field Park Company Royal Engineers (authorized 3/153)
headquarters
workshop section
bridging section
field stores section
a light aid detachment of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers was generally attached (authorized
1/12)
44"' Infantry Division Signals

131" Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps)
132"' Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps)

50' (Northumbrian) Infantry Division: commanded by Major General J. S. Nichols (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel K. A. Lindsay, approximately
16,000 men assigned (not including attachments and detachments), on average, each infantry battalion had 31 Universal Carriers and 57 other
vehicles, authorized 17,300 men, 72 artillery pieces, 136 antitank guns, 444 AT rifles, 48 light anti-aircraft guns, 6 armored cars, 256 universal
carriers, 56 medium mortars, 162 light mortars, 48 machine guns, 1,999 trucks, 159 prime movers, 1,064 motorcycles, 197 trailers, 268
miscellaneous vehicles).
690 Infantry Brigade

5"' Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
61hBattalion, Green Howards Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
7'h Battalion, Green Howards Regimcnt (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
151L' Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier J. E. S. Percy

6'h Battalion, Durham Light Infantry Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
8'h Battalion, Durham Light Infantry Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
Wh
9 Battalion, Durham Light Infantry Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
11 Greek Infantry Brigade Group

I" Greek Battalion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"d Greek Battalion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
3 dGreek Battalion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
I` Greek Field Regiment Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
I` Greek Machine Gun Company (12 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
I"'Greek Field Company Engineers (includes a 'stores section')
I" Greek Field Ambulance
2d Free French Brigade Group (under command of 501h Infantry Division=OPCON?)
51h Battalion de Marche (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
I I"h Battalion de Marche (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
21" North African Anti-Tank Company (12 French (Model 1897 MI) 75mm guns)
2 3 'dNorth African Anti-Tank Company (4 French (Model 1897 MI) 75mm guns)
2 nd Free French Field Engineer Company
2 nd Frec French Field Ambulance
Division Troops
two companies, 2 "dBattalion The Cheshire Regiment (Machine Gun) (24 Vickers .303 medium machine guns)
Royal Artillery
7 41h Field Regiment Royal Artillery (16 25-pdr gun-how., 2 batteries of 8 guns)
I 11' Field Regiment Royal Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., 3 batteries of 8 guns)
1241h Field Regiment Royal Artillery (16 25-pdr gun-how., 2 batteries of 8 guns)
1541h Field Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from where?) (24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, 3 batteries of 8 guns)
10 2 "dAnti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery (64 6-pdr anti-tank guns, 4 batteries of 16 guns)
3 4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (48 Bofors 40mm guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
Royal Engineers
2 3 3 "dField Company Royal Engineers
5051h Field Company Royal Engineers (? not in RE history)
235'h Field Park Company Royal Engineers (authorized 3/153)
headquarters
workshop section
bridging section
1/12)
501h Infantry Division Signals


XXX Corps: commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese (CRE Brigadier K. Ray (S.A.E.C.), 380 total tanks, approximately 80,000 men
assigned (not including attachments and detachments).
4"' Indian Infantry Division, Major General Sir Francis Tuker page J-18
9"hAustralian Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Leslie Morshcad page J-12
51 " Highland Infantry Division, Major General D. N. Wimbcrlcy page J-1 4
2"" New Zealand Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Frcybcrg page J-15
I " South African infantry division, Major General Daniel Pienaar page J-I 7
23"d Armored Brigade Group (Brigadier G. W. Richards, detached from?, XXX Corps reserve, 49 total tanks)
46"' Royal Tank Regiment (49 Valentines)
8"' Royal Tank Regiment (detached to I' South African Infantry Division)
40"' Royal Tank Regiment (detached to 91hAustralian Infantry Division)
50"' Royal Tank Regiment (detached to 51 ' Infantry Division)
121" Field Regiment Royal Artillery (16 Bishop 25-pdr SP (Self-Propelled) guns)
168"' Battery, 56'" Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from Hammerforee, 16 Bofors 40mm
gulls)
295"' Army Field Company Royal Engineers (-) (3'd Troop under command of 5 1"Highland Infantry Division)
XXX Corps Troops
XXX Corps Defence Squadron
3 troops, 4/6 South African Armoured Car Regiment (9 (?) armored cars, detached from Hammcrforce, 10'h AD)
Royal Artillery, Brigadier M. E. Dennis (Chiefof Royal Artillery)
7"' Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery (2 batteries, one of 8 4.5" guns & one of 8 5.5" guns)
64"' Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery (2 batteries, one of 8 4.5" guns & one of 8 5.5" guns)
69"' Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery (16 4.5" guns, in two batteries of 8 guns)
one composite battery, 4"' Survey Regiment Royal Artillery
Royal Engineers
I1"' South African Engineer Field Company (under CRE, I"'South African Division)
13"' South African Engineer Field Company (under CRE, I" South African Division)
22"" South African Engineer Field Park Company (under CRE, 1" South African Division)
HQs & 2"" Section, 66"' Mortar Company Royal Engineers (6 4.2" mortars, smoke?)
XXX Corps Signals
XXX CORPS STRENGTH
9"' Aus. 51' 2"" NZ I" SA 4"' Ind. 23 d Corps Corps
Div Div Div Div Div Armd Troops Totals
Personnel 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 80,000
Infantry Battalions Regular 9 9 7 10 9 44
Motorized - - I - - I
Machine Gun I I (+) 1 5(+)
Reconnaissance - I - - - - -
TOTAL 10 1I 9 1I(+) 1 43(+)
Tanks Shermans - - 36 - 36
Grants - - 37 37
Crusaders 15 - 49 64
Valentines 42 44 - 51 49 186
Stuarts 5 29 - 34
Scorpions 3 3 6 3 16**
TOTAL 65 47 157 54 - 49 372
Field & Medium Artillery 25-pdr gun- 96 84 96 84 48 - 408
howitzers
25-pdr SP - - - - - 16 16
105ram SP -
4.5" guns 32 32
5.5" guns - - - - - - 16 16
TOTAL 96 84 96 84 48 16 48 472
Anti-Tank Artillery 6-pdr AT gun 64 48 59 48 54 - - 273
2-pdr AT gun 72 16 56 96 82 322
18-pdr AT gun - - - 3 - 3
50m PAK 38 - - - 6 - 6
TOTAL 136 64 115 153 136 604
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Bofors 40amm 48 48 48 48 48 16 - 256
Armored Cars - - 55 - - 9 64
Universal Carriers 331 279 271 310 379 - - 1570 (est.)
(est.) (est.) (est.)
(est.) (est.)
Engineer Companies Sqdns & Field Co. 3* 3(4) 3 4 3 1 (-) 17 (+)
Field Park Comp. I I I I 1 5
*Plus 2/3 Australian Pioneer Battalion and the 66"' Mortar Company Royal Engineers (-) (12 4.2" mortars)
** Headquarters & 2"" Section, 66"' Mortar Company Royal Engineers (6 4.2" mortars)
J-10 BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLighitfoot

***Salute the Sappers, Part 1. The Formation of the South African Engineer Corps and its Operations in East Africa and the Middle East to the
Battle of Alamein, by Neil Orpen with H. J. Martin, Sappers Association, Johannesburg, 1981, page 432.
BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot J-1I

9'± Australian Infantry Division: commanded by Lieutcnant General Leslie Morshcad, (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. H. Risson, WIA during
battle, replaced by Licutenant-Coloncl A. S. Gchrman, 65 total tanks, approximately 16,000 men assigned (not including attachments and
detachments), infantry battalion strength varied from 30 officers, 621 enlisted to 36 officers, 740 enlisted out of an authorized strength of 36
officers and 812 enlisted, on average, each infantry battalion had 31 Universal Carriers and 57 other vehicles. In addition, the division had 71
captured "Spandau" machine guns (probably MG-34s). Authorized 17,300 men, 72 artillery pieces, 136 antitank guns, 444 AT rifles, 48 light
anti-aircraft guns, 6 armored cars, 256 universal carricrs, 56 mcdium mortars, 162 light mortars, 48 machine guns, 1,999 trucks, 159 prime
movcrs, 1,064 motorcycles, 197 trailers, 268 miscellaneous vehicles.
201' Australian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadicr Wrigley (42 tanks total)
2n'"/13"' Australian Infantry Battalion, LTC Turner, (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"'/15"' Australian Infantry Battalion, LTC Magno, (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"'/177" Australian Infantry Battalion, LTC Simpson, (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
40"' Royal Tank Regiment, LTC J. L. T. Finigan, (under command=OPCON? of 20"' Australian Brigade (42 Valentines)
somc had Spiked Fowler Rollers fitted)
240' Australian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Arthur H. L. Godfrey (KIA I Nov)
2"'/28"' Australian Infantry Battalion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2 n'1/3 2 "" Australian Infantry Battalion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"d'/43"'' Australian Infantry Battalion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2_6L Australian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier D. A. Whitehead

2"'/23'l Australian Infantry Battalion (detached to division and corps reserve, 8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"1/24"' Australian Infantry Battalion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"'d/48"' Australian Infantry Battalion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2"`/7"' Australian Engineer Field Company in support
Composite Force, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel E. MacArthur-Onslow (also commander of 2"'/2"' Australian Machine Gun
Battalion)
company of 2n"/2`1 Australian Machine Gun Battalion (detached from div troops)
company of 2`1/3`t Australian Pioneer Battalion (detached from div troops)
squadron of 91' Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment (detached from division troops)
Anti-Tank detachment from 3"dAnti-Tank Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery (detached from division troops)
Division Troops
40"' Royal Tank Regiment Lieutenant Colonel J. L. T. Finigan, (attached from 2 3 " Armoured Brigade Group, under
comniand=OPCON? of 20"' Australian Brigade (42 Valentines))
one troop of 2 Scorpions (attached from 1" Army Tank Brigade sec 2/13 Field Company)
9"' Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment (-) (squadron detached to Composite Force, 15 Crusader MK Ils, 5 Stuarts, 52
Universal Carriers)
2"'/2"" Australian Machine Gun Battalion (-), LTC E. MacArthur-Onslow (also commander of Composite Force, one co.
detached to Composite Force, 48 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
Division and Corps Reserve

2"'/23"' Australian Infantry Battalion (attached from 26"' Australian Infantry Brigade, 8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
46"' Royal Tank Regiment (equipment?)
Division Artillery
2"d/7" Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., 3 batteries of 8 guns)
2"' /8" Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., 3 batteries of 8 guns)
2''"/12"' Field Rcgiment, Royal Australian Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., 3 batterics of 8 guns)
146"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from I' Anotoured Division, 24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, in 3
batteries of 8 guns)
3"' Anti-Tank Rcgimcnt, Royal Australian Artillery (-) (detachment with Composite Force, 64 6-pdr, 4 batteries
of 16 guns)
4"' Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery (48 Bofors 40mm guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
7"' Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery (XXX Corps asset) in support for certain periods
one battery of the 64"' Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery (XXX Corps asset) in support for certain periods
Division Engincers commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Risson (Chief of Engineers, WIA I Nov, field companies used
somc pilot trucks)
2""/ 3 "'Australian Engineer Field Company
2"1/7" Australian Engineer Field Company (in support of 26" Australian Brigade)
2 `d/133' Australian Engineer Field Company (+), Major Gehrmann (absorbed a company from 2/3 Australian
J- 12 BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

Pioneer Battalion, doubling its strength, one troop of 3 Scorpions attached)
2 "d/2 4 'h Australian Engineer Field Park Company (authorized 3/153)
headquarters
workshop section
bridging section
1/12)
2 nd/3 d Australian Pioneer Battalion (-) (one company detached to Composite Force, in addition to authorized
weapons, this Bn also had many captured weapons including 63 Bredas (6.5mm to 47mm, 15 81rmm mortars,
5 Bcsa machine guns, and other weapons)
l't & 3`~1 Sections, 6 6 1h Mortar Company Royal Engineers (attached, 12 4.2" mortars)
9'h Australian Division Signals

2 "d/3 'dAustralian Field Ambulance
2 "d/8 th Australian Field Ambulance
2n"d/Ith Australian Field Ambulance

5.1 Higlhland Infantry Division: commanded by Major General D. N. Wimbcrley (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. Giblin, 44 tanks total,
approximately 16,000 men assigned (not including attachments and detachments), on average, each infantry battalion had 31 Universal Carriers
and 57 other vehicles, authorized 17,300 men, 72 artillery pieces, 136 antitank guns, 444 AT rifles, 48 light anti-aircraft guns, 6 armored cars,
256 universal carriers, 56 medium mortars, 162 light mortars, 48 machine guns, 1,999 trucks, 159 prime movers, 1,064 motorcycles, 197 trailers,
268 miscellaneous vehicles).
152Z"'
Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier George Murray
2"' Battalion, Scaforth Highlanders Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
5"' Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
5"hBattalion, Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
1531" Infantry Brigade

5"hBattalion, Royal Highland Regiment, "The Black Watch" (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
I• Battalion, Gordon Highlanders Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
5"/7"' Battalion, Gordon Highlanders Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
1541' Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Houldworth

I'` Battalion, Royal Highland Regiment, "The Black Watch" (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
7"' Battalion, Royal Highland Regiment, "The Black Watch" (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
7"' Battalion, Argyllc and Sutherland Highlanders Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
Division Troops
50"' Royal Tank Regiment (attached from 23 d Armoured Brigade Group (44 Valentines))
1'/7"' Battalion (Machine Gun), The Middlesex Regiment (48 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
51 ' Reconnaissance Regiment
Royal Artillery
126"' Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-how., in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
three troops, 78"' Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (12 25-pdr gun-howitzers, attached from 1't Armored
Division)
61" Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery (48 6-pdr and 16 2-pdr AT guns, 4 batteries of 16 guns)
40"' Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (48 Bofors 40ram guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
Royal Engineers (one troop of 3 Scorpions attached)

274' Field Company Royal Engineers
276' Field Company Royal Engineers
239"' Field Park Company Royal Engineers (authorized 3/153)
headquarters
workshop section
bridging section
1/12)
3"' Troop, 295"' Army Field Company Royal Engineers (under command of 51 " Infantry Division=OPCON?
From 23"' Armored Brigade Group)
51" Infantry Division Signals


21'-New Zealand Infantry Division: commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Bernard C. Freyberg (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. H. Hanson,
Headquarters: 4 Stuarts (from division cavalry regiment), 157 total tanks, approximately 16,000 men assigned (not including attachments and
detachments), on average, each infantry battalion had 31 Universal Carriers and 57 other vehicles, authorized 17,300 men, 72 artillery pieces, 136
antitank guns, 444 AT rifles, 48 light anti-aircraft guns, 6 armored cars, 256 universal carriers, 56 medium mortars, 162 light mortars, 48
machine guns, 1,999 trucks, 159 prime movers, 1,064 motorcycles, 197 trailers, 268 miscellaneous vehicles)
5ii New Zealand Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Sir Howard K. Kippenberger since Jan 42
21s" New Zealand Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel (?) Ralf Harding) (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2 2nd New Zealand Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel (?) Tom Campbell) (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns, 35/628 assigned)
2 3 d New Zealand Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel (?) Reginald E. Romans) (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
A & B companies, 2 8th New Zealand Infantry Battalion (Maoris) (-) (Lieutenant Colonel F. Baker, 4 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
4 Company, 2 7 1h New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion (MAJ A. W. Cooper, attached to 5 1h Brigade, 12 Vickers .303
Medium Machine Guns)
10 Platoon (Lieutenant J. T. H. Halkett, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
11 Platoon (Lieutenant L. Morgan, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
12 Platoon (Second Lieutenant G. Kaye, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
2 troops (6 tanks total) of Crusaders were attached from Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry Regiment and detached to the 21 S"and
2 2 "dinfantry battalions (one troop per battalion)
32"" Battery, 7 1h Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (3 troops of 4 6-pdr anti-tank guns each; 12 total)
7 th Engineer Field Company (+) (Major Jerry Skinner)(troop of 3 Scorpions in reserve (attached from I" Army Tank
Brigade) and mine roller equipped "pilot" trucks)(one section from 6Ch Engineer Field Company)
5 th Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (Lieutenant Colonel Sprosen, in support, 29 officers & 408 enlisted
assigned of 42 officers & 653 enlisted authorized, 24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
60 New Zealand Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier William (Bill) G. Gentry replaced Brigadier Clifton (Royal New Zealand
Engineer captured 4 Aug)
2 4 1h New Zealand Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel F. J. Gwillian) (29 officers and 619 enlisted assigned, only three
rifle companies, 8 2-pdr AT guns)
2 5 h New Zealand Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Bonifant, WIA 24 Oct, replaced by MAJ Porter) (only three rifle
companies, 8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2 6 "hNew Zealand Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Den. J. Fountaine) (only three rifle companies, 8 2-pdr anti-tank
guns)
C & D companies of 2 8 1h New Zealand Infantry Battalion (Maoris) (4 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
3 Company, 2 7th New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion (Major E. J. Tong, attached to 6 1h Brigade, 12 Vickers .303 Medium
Machine Guns)
7 Platoon (Lieutenant D. B. Beard, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
8 Platoon (Lieutenant N. F. Gardiner, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
9 Platoon (Second Lieutenant T. K. Thomson, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
2 troops (6 tanks total) of Crusaders were attached from Royal Warwickshire Yeomanry Regiment and detached to the 2 5th
and 2 61h infantry battalions (one troop per battalion)
3 3 rd Battery, 71h Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (4 troops of 4 6-pdr anti-tank guns each, 16 total)
8 'hEngineer Field Company (+) (Major Murray Rcid)(includcs troop of 3 Scorpions in reserve (attached from I",Army
Tank Brigade) and mine roller equipped "pilot" trucks) (one section from 6th Engineer Field Company)
6 1h Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (in support, 38 officers & 474 enlisted assigned of 42 officers & 644
enlisted authorized, 24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
9L"Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier John C. Currie, attached from 10 1h Armoured Division, Headquarters: I Sherman, 3
Crusaders, 122 tanks total (of the Crusaders, 37 were MK Ils and 12 were MK Ills))
3 •d Hussars Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Sir Peter Farquhar (8 OCT 42), assigned 12 Shermans, 9 Grants, 16 Crusaders)
Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry Regiment (Peter Sykes, assigned 10 Shermans, 14 Grants, 13 Crusaders (of which 2 troops (6
tanks total) of Crusaders were attached to 21 " and 2 2nd infantry battalions (one troop per battalion), 5th New Zealand
Infantry Brigade))
Royal Warwick Yeomanry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Guy Jackson, assigned 13 Shermans, 14 Grants, 17 Crusaders
(of which 2 troops (6 tanks total) of Crusaders were attached to 2 5 1h and 2 6 'h infantry battalions (one troop per
battalion), 6th New Zealand Infantry Brigade)
14 'h Battalion, Sherwood Foresters Regiment (motorized infantry battalion (16 6-pdr AT guns))
31" Battery, 7 1h Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (attached, 4 troops of 4 6-pdr anti-tank guns
each, 16 total)
4 'h Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (attached to 9"' Armoured Brigade at the completion of the lifting
barrage, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, 36 officers & 497 enlisted assigned of 42 officers & 644 enlisted authorized, 24
25-pdr gun-howitzers, in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
16 6th Light Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps)
Division Troops
2 n' New Zealand Division Cavalry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Sutherland replaced Lieutenant Colonel Nicoll who
was injured on 5 Oct, at least 23 Universal Carriers, 25 Stuart tanks on-hand, 4 more detaehed to 2 ,d New Zealand
Infantry Division Headquarters).
Headquarters Squadron (Captain R. B. McQueen)
A Squadron (Major G. H. Stace)
B Squadron (Major W. G. Handley)
C Squadron (Major A. van Slyke)
Detachment, 5 1h Field Park Company
2 7h New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel A. W. White, 48 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
I Company (Captain L. A. Joseph, 12 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)

I Platoon (Lieutenant J. E. Crisp, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
2 Platoon (Lieutenant H. D. Ball, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
3 Platoon (Lieutenant W. R. Lowther, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
2 Company (Captain I. S. Moore, 12 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
4 Platoon (Lieutenant D. W. Farquharson, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
5 Platoon (Lieutenant K. Dixon, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
6 Platoon (Lieutenant N. G. Blue, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
3 Company (Major E. J. Tong, detached to 6 'hBrigade, 12 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
7 Platoon (Lieutenant D. B. Beard, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
8 Platoon (Lieutenant N. F. Gardiner, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
9 Platoon (Second Lieutenant T. K. Thomson, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
4 Company (Major A. W. Cooper, detached to 5" Brigade, 12 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
10 Platoon (Lieutenant J. T. H. Halkctt, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
II Platoon (Lieutenant L. Morgan, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
12 Platoon (Second Lieutenant G. Kaye, 4 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
28"' New Zealand Infantry Battalion (Maoris) (Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Baker, line companies attached to 5,h and 6 th
brigades)
Division Artillery commanded by CRA Brigadier "Steve" C. E. Weir, 170 officers & 2453 enlisted assigned of 218
officers & 3683 enlisted authorized, not including attachments/detachments.
4"' Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (detached to 9 1h Armoured Brigade at the completion of the
lifting barrage, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, 36 officers & 497 enlisted assigned of 42 officers & 644 enlisted
authorized, 24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
5"' Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (Lieutenant Colonel Sprosen, in support of 5"' Brigade, 29
officers & 408 enlisted assigned of 42 officers & 653 enlisted authorized, 24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, in 3
batteries of 8 guns)
6"' Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (in support of 6"' Brigade, 38 officers & 474 enlisted assigned
of 42 officers & 644 enlisted authorized, 24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, in 3 batteries of 8 guns)
three troops, 78" Field Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from I" Armored Division, 12 25-pdr gun-howitzers,
4 guns per troop)
three troops, 98"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery (attached from I " Armored Division, 12 25-pdr gun-howitzers,
4 guns per troop)
one battery, 69"' Medium Artillery Regiment Royal Artillery (8 4.5" guns) in support (XXX Corps asset)
7"' Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (31 officers & 462 enlisted assigned of 49 officers & 699
enlisted authorized, 61 6-pdr AT guns, 2 batteries of 16 guns and 2 of 12 guns with 5 in reserve)
14"' Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (Lieutenant Colonel Bretherton, 27 officers &
549 enlisted assigned of 32 officers & 962 enlisted authorized, 48 40mm guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
Division Engineers, commanded by CRE Lieutenant Colonel Frederick M. H. Hanson, headquarters authorized 6 officers,
I attached medical officer, 31 Enlisted, total 8/844)
6"' Engineer Field Company (-) (Major Woolcott KIA 24 Oct, mine, replaced by Major Anderson, authorized
5/237) (two sections detached from 6" Field Company, one attached to each 7"' and 8" field companies, the
rest of the company was detached to the Division Reserve Group)
7" Engineer Field Company (+) (Major Jerry Skinner)(troop of 3 Scorpions in reserve (attached from 1" Tank
Brigade) and mine roller equipped "pilot" trucks, detached to 5" New Zealand Infantry Brigade, authorized
5/237)
three sections (each authorized 1/64) (plus one section from 6" Engineer Field Company)
8"' Engineer Field Company (+) (Major Murray Reid)(includcs troop of 3 Scorpions in reserve (attached from
I• Army Tank Brigade) and 2 mine roller equipped "pilot" trucks, detached to 6 h New Zealand Infantry
Brigade, authorized 5/237)
three sections (each authorized 1/64) (plus one section from 6"' Engineer Field Company)
5"' Engineer Field Park Company (Major Anderson at first, later replaced by Major Rix-Trott, as of 24 October
(officially 28 October), authorized 3/153)
headquarters
workshop section
bridging section
a light aid detachment, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers was normally attached (authorized 1/12)
Division Reserve Group (under Lieutenant Colonel A. W. White, commander, 27"' New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion)
27"' New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion (minus 3 and 4 companies, which were attached to 5 & 6 brigades)
34"' Battery, 7"hAnti-Tank Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery (3 troops of 4 6-pdr anti-tank guns each, 12
total)
6"' Engineer Field Company (-) (Major Woolcott, two sections detached from 6"' Field Company, one attached
to each 7"' and 8 1h field companies, the rest of the company had been combined with elements from the 5"'
Engineer Field Park Company was attached to the Division Reserve Group)
2"" New Zealand Division Signals
5" New Zealand Field Ambulance
6" New Zealand Field Ambulance
J-1 6 BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

1 South African Infantry Division: commanded by Major General D. H. Picnaar (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel Mill-Colman, 54 total tanks,
approximately 16,000men assigned (not including attachments and detachments), on average, each infantry battalion had 31 Universal Carriers
256 Universal carriers, 56 medium mortars, 162 light mortars, 48 machine guns, 1,999 trucks, 159 prime movers, 1,064 motorcycles, 197 trailers,
I ' South African Infantry Brigade
I' Battalion, Royal Natal Carabiniers Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
I" Battalion, Duke of Edinburgh's Own Rifles Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
I` Battalion, Transvaal Scottish Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
2 "dRegiment Botha (detached to I' SA Division Reserve Group)
2" South African Infantry Brigade

1 t/2 "d Field Force Battalion (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
1VBattalion, Natal Mounted Rifles Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)

Battalion, Cape Town Highlanders Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
VSt
3YSouth African Infantry Brigade

IVBattalion, Imperial Light Horse Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
1" Battalion, Royal Durban Light Infantry Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
1V'Battalion, Rand Light Infantry Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
I_-South African Division Reserve Group (in effect from 23-31 Oct)
81hRoyal Tank Regiment (attached from 2 3,d Armoured Brigade Group, 51 Valentines)
3Yd South African Armoured Car Regiment (-) (31 armored cars, two squadrons with division troops)
one Scorpion Troop (3 Scorpions, attached from 1"Army Tank Brigade)

2sd Regiment Botha (attached from VS' South African Brigade, 8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
one battery, 1VAnti-tank Regiment, Royal South African Artillery (16 6-pdr AT guns)
one troop, VStLight Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal South African Artillery (4 Bofors 40mm guns)
Division Troops
Two squadrons, 3 d South African Armored Car Regiment (24 armored cars)
President Steyn Machine Gun Regiment (48 Vickers .303 Medium Machine Guns)
one company, Die Middelandse Machine Gun Regiment (12 Vickers .303 MMGs)
Division Artillery
VSS Field Regiment, Royal South African Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, 3 batteries of 8 guns)
4 "hField Regiment, Royal South African Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, 3 batteries of 8 guns)
7S" Field Regiment, Royal South African Artillery (24 25-pdr gun-howitzers, 3 batteries of 8 guns)
three troops, 5," Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (attached from IVArmored Division, 12 25-pdr gun-
howitzers, 4 guns per troop)
I" Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal South African Artillery (-) (one battery detached to Division Reserve Group (16
6-pdr AT guns), 32 6-pdr, 16 2-pdr, 3 18-pdr, 6 50mm (German PAK 38))
1" Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal South African Artillery (-) (one troop detached to Division Reserve
Group (4 Bofors 40mm AA guns), 44 Bofors 40mm guns, 2 batteries of 16 guns & one of 12 guns)
Division Engineers (with a troop of 3 Scorpions attached)
1" South African Engineer Field Company
2 "d South African Engineer Field Company
3 South African Engineer Field Company
Yd
5'h South African Engineer Field Company
19 1h South African Engineer Field Park Company (authorized 3/153)
headquarters
workshop section
bridging section
1/12)
11 1 South African Engineer Field Company (attached from XXX Corps)
13 1h S A Engineer Field Company (with mine roller equipped "pilot" trucks, attached from XXX Corps)
2 2 d South African Engineer Field Park Company (attached from XXX Corps)
I` South African Division Signals
12 'h South African Field Ambulance
15 1h South African Field Ambulance
18 h South African Field Ambulance

41' Indian Infantry Division (Mountain Capable): commanded by Major General Sir Francis I. S. Tuker (CRE Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Blundell,
approximately 16,000 men assigned (not including attachments and detachments), on average, each infantry battalion had 31 Universal Carriers
256 universal carriers, 56 medium mortars, 162 light mortars, 48 machine guns, 1,999 trucks, 159 prime movers, 1,064 motorcycles, 197 trailers,
5L` Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier D. Russell (Corps reserve)

1"/4"' Battalion, Essex Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
4"7/6"' Battalion, Rajput Rifles Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
3V/100"' Battalion, Baluchi Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
7'" Indian Infantry Brigade

1"Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
I `/16"' Battalion, Punjab Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
I` Battalion, 2"' Gurkha Rifle Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
161 Indian Infantry Brigade

I" Battalion, Argyllc and Sutherland Highlanders Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
1V/1 Battalion, Punjab Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
40'/7"' Battalion, Rajput Regiment (8 2-pdr anti-tank guns)
Division Troops
6"' Battalion (Machine Gun), Rajput Rifles Regiment (48 Vickers .303 Mcdium Machine Guns)
Division Artillery
I" Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (16 25-pdr gun-how., in 2 batteries of 8 guns)
3 2 "dField Regiment, Royal Artillery (16 25-pdr gun-how., in 2 batteries of 8 guns)
149"' Anti-Tank Regiment (54 6-pdr and 10 2-pdr anti-tank guns, 4 batteries of 16 guns)
57"' Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (48 Bofors 40mm guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
Division Engineers
2"d Field Company Indian Sappers and Miners
4"' Field Company Indian Sappers and Miners
12"' Field Company Indian Sappers and Miners
11"' Field Park Company Indian Sappers and Miners, authorized 3/153)
headquarters
workshop section
bridging section
1/12)
4"' Indian Division Signals

17"' Indian Field Ambulance
26"' Indian Field Ambulance
75"' Light Indian Field Ambulance
J- 18 BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

Formations Under 8 'hArmy Command (6 tanks total with headquarters)
8L Armoured Division, commanded by Major General C. H. Gairdncr (CRE Licutenant-Colonel C. E. A. Browning, under command
of 8th Army, Only the headquarters and a few attachments under the control of the division headquarters)
Hammerforce (detached to I" Armoured Division)
2 4 'h Armoured Brigade (detached to 101h Armoured Division)
14 5 1h Field Park Squadron Royal Engineers (in X Corps reserve)
HQs, I" Battalion, The Newfoundland Regiment (Machine Gun) and Y Company (reforming)
6 'hField Squadron Royal Engineers (detached to 10 1h Armoured Division)
9 'hField Squadron Royal Engineers (detached to I" Armoured Division)
143rd Field Park Squadron Royal Engineers
8 h Armoured Division Signals
1 Army Tank Brigade (Scorpion troops detached to X, XIII, and XXX corps, this brigade may also have been equipped Canal
Defense Light (CDL) tanks at this point)
61h Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment (2(4?) troops of 3 officers, 25 enlisted men and 3 Scorpions each) (uncertain)
4 2 d Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment (2(4?) troops of 3 officers, 25 enlisted men and 3 Scorpions each, also
equipped with Matildas equipped with "Canal Defense Lights," not used, in training)
4 4 'h Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment (2(4?) troops of 3 officers, 25 enlisted men and 3 Scorpions each, also
equipped with Matildas equipped with "Canal Defense Lights," not used, in training)
2 1M Indian Infantry Brigade (reforming, used for headquarters protection, camouflage and guard duty)
S`s/61hBattalion, Rajput Rifles Regiment
3 d/71h Battalion, Rajput Regiment
2 "dBattalion, 8 th Gurkha Rifles Regiment (less one Company)

9
1h Indian Field Company Indian Engineers
2 9 'hIndian Field Ambulance
11 Armoured Brigade (holding unit)
4'h Hussars Regiment (details, reforming)
8WhHussars Regiment (details, reforming)
2 nd Royal Gloustershire Hussars Regiment (in quarantine)
12L Anti-Aircraft Brigade (for Wh

8 Army area protection)
14 1h Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (48 Bofors 40mm guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
160h Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (48 Bofors 40mm guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
2 7'h Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (32 Bofors 40mm guns, 2 batteries of 16 guns)
8 8'hHeavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery
(16 3.7" Anti-Aircraft guns, 2 batteries of 8 guns (where is the 3 d
battery?))
9 4 1h Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery
(16 3.7" Anti-Aircraft guns, 2 batteries of 8 guns (where is the 3rd
battery?))
two troops, 2 71h Searchlight Regiment, Royal Artillery (5 searchlights (used to "bounce" light off clouds to illuminate the
enemy)
2ý' Anti-Aircraft Brigade (for headquarters and railway protection)

2 "d Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (48 Bofors 40mm guns, 3 batteries of 16 guns)
1 9 9 1h & 261" Batteries, 6 9 'h Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (16 3.7" Anti-Aircraft guns, 8 guns per battery)
Army Troops
B Squadron, 6 1h Royal Tank Regiment (from? 8 1h Army HQs protection with 6 Matilda (?) tanks)
one troop, 6th South African Armoured Car Regiment (from? 8 1h Army HQs protection with 6 armd cars)
Tank Delivery Regiment
one squadron from the Special Air Service Regiment (raiding forces)
Chief of Royal Engineers (Brigadier Kisch)

DCE Roads, Colonel Shannon
14 DCE, Colonel C. Topham
3 CRE, Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. West
62 CRE, Lieutenant-Colonel B. M. Archibald
72 CRE, Lieutenant-Colonel N. A. Armitage
82 CRE (Airfields), Lieutenant-Colonel M. R. M. Cubitt
295'h Army Field Company Royal Engineers (detached to 2 3 d Armored Brigade Group)
5 6 6 1h Army Troops Company Royal Engineers
5 885h Army Troops Company Royal Engineers
2 5 'h Road Construction Company, South African Engineer Corps
2 7 1h Road Construction Company, South African Engineer Corps
31" Road Construction Company, South African Engineer Corps
4 th Mobile Landing Ground Construction Party
5 1h Mobile Landing Ground Construction Party
21 " New Zealand Mechanical Equipment Operating Company, Royal New Zealand Engineers

22"' South African Workshop and Park Company, South African Engineer Corps
36"•South African Water Supply Company, South African Engineer Corps
V• Camouflage Company Royal Engineers
85"' Camouflage Company, South African Engineer Corps
95"' South African Bomb Disposal Company, South African Engineer Corps
twenty-five pioneer and labor companies plus twenty-four more in General Headquarters reserve
5"hBoring Section
detachment, 114"' Mechanical Equipment Workshop and Park Company
Director of Survey, Colonel V. E. H. Sanceau
517"' Field Survey Company
13"' Field Survey Depot
4 6th Survey Company, South African Engineer Corps
Lines-of-Communications, transportation and headquarters units, "It is regretted that it is not possible
2 to
include a list of (these) which contributed so materially to the success of the Eighth Army."
3"' Libyan Arab Forces (guard duties)

8"' Army Signals
six tank transporter companies
fifty-three general transport company equivalents
2 History of the Royal Engineers, by Derck Boyd, Leo Cooper Ltd, London, 1975, page 395.

Desert Air Force (note: the exact nature of the Desert Air Force's relationship with 8'hArmy is unclear. 104 squadrons were available in the
Middle East (including these incomplete squadrons: RAF 64, Fleet Air Arm 7, South African Air Force 16, Royal Australian Air Force 6, Royal
Canadian Air Force 2, Rhodesian 1, US Army Air Force 13, Greek 2), with a reported total of 1600 aircraft (about 3600 fighters, 400 fighter-
bombers, 600 medium bombers, and 63 heavy bombers), plus 500 in reserve, note: these numbers are inconsistent)
Air Headquarters Western Desert (based in Cairo)
Tactical Air Command (based at Wadi el Natrun)
Fighters (twenty-five fighter squadrons)
No. 211 Group ('Force A', with 299 fighters and fightcr-bombers, based at Bir Hooker)
No. 233 Wing (3 squadrons of P-40 Kittyhawks and one of P-40 Tomahawks)
No. 239 R.A.F. Wing (based at El Kubri)
No. 3 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force (Kittyhawks, based at El Kubri)
6 6th Fighter Squadron, U.S. Army Air Force (P-40f)
No. 112 Squadron (Kittyhawks, based at El Kubri)
No. 450 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force (Kittyhawks, based at El Kubri)
No. 244 R.A.F. Fighter Wing (based at Mariut)
No. 80 Squadron (Hurricanes, based at Cairo)
No. 92 Squadron (Spitfires, based at Mariut)
No. 238 Squadron (Hurricanes, based at Mariut)
No. 274 Squadron (Hurricanes, based at LG. 154)
No. 341 Squadron (Hurricanes, based at Mariut)
US 5 71hFighter Group (2 squadrons of P-40 Kittyhawks, see U.S. Army Middle East Air Force below)
No. 6 Squadron (Hurricane liD tankbusters)
No. 7 South African Air Force Squadron (Hurricane liD tankbusters)
No. 212 Group ('Force B', with 128 fighters (including 75 flown by US pilots))
No. 7 (South African Air Force) Wing (four squadrons of Hurricanes)
No. 243 R.A.F. Fighter Wing (based at Bir Hooker)
No. I Squadron South African Air Force (P-40 Kittyhawks, based at Mariut)
No. 73 Squadron (Spitfires, based at LG. 89)
No. 118 Squadron (based at El Mirbat)
No. 145 Squadron (Spitfires, based at LG. 154)
No. 601 Squadron (Spitfires, based at El Mirbat)
No. 211 R.A.F. Wing (based at LG. 97)

No. 260 Squadron South African Air Force (Kittyhawks, based at El Kubri)
No. 240 R.A.F. Wing (based at Imayd)

No. 5 Squadron (P-40 Tomahawks and Kittyhawks, based at LG. 97)
No. 94 Squadron (P-40 Tomahawks and Kittyhawks, based at LG. 97)
Day Bombers
No. 3 South African Air Force Bomber Wing (based at Benha)
No. 12 Squadron (Bostons, based at Abu Qir)
No. 14 Squadron (Baltimorcs, based at Imayid)
No. 21 Squadron (Baltimorcs, based at Imayid)
No. 24 Squadron (Bostons, based at LG. 99)
No. 55 Squadron (Baltimores and Blenheims, based at Tell el Kcbir)
No. 60 Squadron (Maryland, Based at Wadi Natrun)
No. 233 Squadron (Baltimores, based at LG. 98)
No. 3 South African Air Force Fighter-Bomber Wing (based at Benha)

No. 2 Squadron (P-40 Kittyhawks, based at LG. 85)
No. 4 squadrons (P-40 Kittyhawks, based at LG. 85)
No. 232 Wing (2 day-bomber squadrons, equipped with Baltimores)
No. 247 Bomber Wing (based at Giananclis)

No. 15 South African Air Force Squadron (Blcnhcims, based at Burg el Arab)
No. 38 Squadron (Wcllingtons, based at Giananclis)
3 La Regia Aeronautica, 1939-1943, Volume Terzo, 1942, L 'Anno Della Speranza, by Nino Arena, Stato Maggiore Acronautica, Ufficio Storico,
Rome, 1984, pages 233-234. The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume IV, The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, by I.S.O. Playfair
et.al., Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1966, pages 3, 11, 13.

No. 47 Squadron (Beauforts and Albacores, based at Amrya)
No. 459 Squadron (Hudsons and Blenheims, based at Gianaclis)
No. 22 Squadron (Beauforts, based at Gianaclis)
No. 39 Squadron (Beauforts, based at Mariut)
No. 221Squadron (Wellingtons, based at Gianaclis)
2057"' GR Flight (Beaufighter, based at Gianaclis)
Ind. Flight (Wellington/Fairchild, at Gianaelis)
Reconnaissance
No. 285 Wing (3 reconnaissance squadrons and 2 flights)
two tactical reconnaissance (Hurricane) squadrons
one strategic reconnaissance (Baltimore) flight
one survey reconnaissance (Baltimore) squadron
one photographic reconnaissance (Spitfire) flight
U.S. Army Middle East Air Force commanded by Major General Lewis H. Brcrcton, re-dcsignatcd 9 1h US Air Force in November 1942.
Equipped with Forty B-24s, six B-17s, thirty-five B-25s, and forty-nine P-40s, another thirty-five, a sampling of all types, were not operational at
this time (October 1942).4
9!! Bomber Command (Brigadier General Patrick W. Timberlake, with 51 heavy bombers became operational on 12 OCT 42)
9 8th Heavy Bomber Group (B-24 "Liberators," based at Ramat David)
345"' Heavy Bomber Group (B-24 "Liberators," based at LG. 224)
376"' Bomber Group (absorbed the B-24Ds of Colonel Halverson's Project No. 63 in October, based at Lydda)
9 "hSquadron, 7"' Bombardment Group (only 7 B-17s on hand on 28 June 1942, may have been absorbed into another unit)
12!! Mcdium Bombardment Group (equipped with B-25 Mitchell medium bombers, based at Deversoir)
81t Bomber Squadron (B-25 "Mitchells," based at LG. 99/244)
8 2 "dBomber Squadron (B-25 "Mitchclls," based at LG. 99/244)
83"' Bomber Squadron (B-25 "Mitchells," based at LG. 99/244)
84"' Bomber Squadron (B-25 "Mitchells," based at LG. 99/244)
57..._Figlhter Group (in support of No. 211 Fighter Group, based at ldku)
64"' Fighter Squadron (equipped with P-40f"Warhawks," based at Nicosia)
65"' Fighter Squadron (equipped with P-40f"Warhawks," based at ldku)
78a1Fightcr Group (equipped with P-40f"Warhawks," based at Tanta)
Available 'to reinforce'
No. 201 Royal Navy Air Wing (two pathfindcr squadrons of Albacores, based at Dikheila)
No. 755 Squadron (Albacores and Swordfish, based at Dikheila)
No. 805 Squadron (Hurricanes, based at Dikhcila)
No. 815 Squadron (Swordfish, based at Port Said)
No. 821 Squadron (Albacores, based at Dikheila)
No. 826 Squadron (Albacores and Swordfish, based at Dikheila)
No. 205 Bomber Group (Wellington medium night bombers, based at Abu Smcir)
No. 231 Bomber Wing (based at Abu Smcir)
No. 37 Squadron (Wellingtons, based at Abu Smcir)
No. 70 Squadron (Wellingtons, based at Abu Smeir)
No. 236 Bomber Wing (based at Kabrit)
No. 104 Squadron (Wcllingtons, based at Kabrit)
No. 108 Squadron (Wcllingtons, based at Kabrit)
No. 148 Squadron (Wellingtons, based at Kabrit)
No. 238 Bomber Wing (based at Shallufa)
No. 40 Squadron (Wellingtons, based at Shallufa)
No. 109 Squadron (Wcllingtons, based at Shallufa)
No. 140 Army Cooperation Wing (based at Imayd)

No. 40 Squadron (Kittyhawks, based at Burg cl Arab)
No. 208 Squadron (Hurricanes, based at Bir Hooker)
No. 1437 Flight SR (Baltimorcs and Marylands, based at Tanta)
No. 201 Naval Cooperation Group (based at Alexandria)
Outraged Skies, by Edward Jablonski, contained in Airwar, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, New York, 1971, pages 7 to 11. Edward
Jablonski states that the Western Desert Air Force had 1200 aircraft in Egypt and Palestine (predominantly fighters) and of these, more than 800
were ready to fly in October. See also Log of the Liberators. An Illustrated History of the B-24, by Steve Birdsall, Doubleday & Company,
Garden City, New York, 1973, pages 5 to 9.

No. 29 Fighter Squadron (Fulmars, based at Alexandria)
No. 775 FAA Squadron (Sea Gladiators, based at Alexandria)
No. 38 Bomber Squadron (Hudsons, based at Alexandria)
No. 216 Group (four squadrons with various types of transport aircraft)
In Palestine
No. 235 Bomber Wing (based at Akka)

No. 203 GR Squadron (Beauforts, based at El Kantara)
No. 13 Squadron (Blenheims, Hudsons, Marylands, based at Gaza)
No. 230 RC Squadron (Sunderlands and Catalinas, Abu Qir)
No. 700 GR (Albacore, based at Beirut)
No. 29 Squadron (Marylands, based at Idku)
No. 252 Squadron (Beaufighters, based at Idku)
No. 272 Squadron (Beaufighters, based at Idku)
No. 235 Fighter Wing (based at Akka)

No. 335 Squadron (Hurricanes, based at Dikheila)
French Alsace Squadron (Hurricanes, based at El Firdan)
Yugoslav Squadron (Hurricanes, based at ldku)
No. 242 Bomber Wing (based at Fayd)

No. 162 Squadron (Wcllingtons, based at Fayd)
No. 187 Squadron (Wcllingtons, based at Fayd)
No. 245 Bomber Wing (based at Aqir)

No. 227 Squadron (B-24 Liberators, based at Aqir)
No. 9725 Squadron (B-24 Liberators, based at Aqir)
No. 249 Bomber Wing (based at Ismailia)

No. 10 Squadron (Halifaxes, based at Ismailia)
No. 76 Squadron (Halifaxes, based at Ismailia)
Air Headquarters Egypt
No.I French Lorraine Squadron (Blenheims, based at Rayak)

No. 451 F. Squadron (Hurricanes, based at Rayak)
No. 1413 F. Squadron (Gladiators, based at Ramle)
No. 1438 F. Squadron (Gladiators, based at Haifa)
Other squadrons, including some equipped with long-range fighters, were available to give direct support to the army. Axis air reconnaissance
before the battle showed the following: I) Area around Alexandria: 705 aircrafts of which 481 were fighters, 215 medium bombers, and 9 four-
engine bombers. 2) Around Cairo-290 aircraft of which 179 fighters, 101 medium bombers, and 10 four-engine bombers. And 3) Around Suez-
590 aircraft of which 186 were fighters, 400 medium bombers, and 4 four-engine bombers.

APPENDIX K
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS,
6" NEW ZEALAND BRIGADE ZONE
21 OCTOBER TO 1000 HOURS 24 OCTOBER 1942
DATE TIME EVENT

21 October Late Afternoon 2 NZ DIV moves to Assembly Area
22 October Gen. Montgomery's pre-battle message is read to the troops
Night 8 NZ Fd Coy clears two 40yd lanes on Bottle Track
23 October 1700 10 AD closes on Assembly Area on Qattara Track
2000 Tanks from 8 & 24 Armd Bde form up
2100 NZ IN BNs form up on the LD (Line of Departure)
2130 24 BN crosses LD, moves to IV barrage lift
2140 8 " Army begins counter-battery fire
-Sappers tum-on markers on routes through 8 'hArmy minefields
2200 Artillery begins timed concentrations
2223 Barrage begins to move forward with 24 BN right behind it. They soon
encounter 7 Co, 382"d Grenadier Regt.
2230 C & D Coy, 28 BN begin to advance
2245 26 BN leaves Assembly Area
2250 25 BN leaves Assembly Area
2300 NZ 8 Fd Coy and 3 Fd Sqdn advances
2320 3 Fd Sqdn's pilot vehicle immobilized by a mine
2305 Lifting barrages ceases
-24 BN seizes intermediate obj. on PL Red
2330 Route 'A' through V"Axis mineficld completed
24 October 0030 25 BN deploys on start line along PL Red
0040 26 BN deploys on start line along PL Red
0055 Lifting barrage begins again
-No. 2 Section (8 Fd Coy) trips lED, 4 KIA, 12 WIA
0140 15 min pause in lifting barrage while preplanned concentrations on
Miteiriya Ridge are fired
0200 B/25 BN reaches what it believes to be its obj. and begins to dig in
0213 6 Fd (Artillery) Regt program completed
0222 4 Fd (Artillery) Rcgt lifting barrage completed
0230 All four NZ breaches completed through I" Axis minefield
0245 Planned time under Opn Lightfoot for 2 NZ DIV to seize objs on PL
Oxalic
-0300 HQ 26 BN reaches eastern slope of Miteiriya Ridge
-9 Armd Bde at I" Axis minefield
0330 Rifle Coys of 26 BN complete consolidation along PL Oxalic in the
sector of the II Bn, 3 8 2 "d Grenadier Regt
0400 Planned time under Opn Lightfoot for 9 Armd Bde to conduct Passage
of Lines through 2 NZ DIV
-Breaches of 2 d Axis minefield along Routes 'A' & 'B' begin
-BG Gentry moves forward
0430 -10 AD abandons 'Hat' Track
0500 -Breaches on Routes 'A' & 'B' completed
-Royal Warwickshire Yco Regt begins attempt to pass tanks forward
-0600 -Beginning of morning nautical twilight
-leading sdqns, Royal Wiltshire Yco Rcgt cross crest of Miteiriya Ridge
in 5 NZ Bde zone
-0620 Sunrise
0630 3 sd Hussar Rcgt moves in reserve
0800 The guns and panzers of KG Sud halt Royal Wiltshire Yco Rcgt
1000 26 BN casualties reach 100
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot K-1

APPENDIX L
BREACHING ACCOUNTS OF OTHER UNITS,
DURING THE 2 nd BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN
ANNEX 1. "Breaching Operations, Xiii Corps, Operation Lightfoot," by Christian Childs.
ANNEX 2. , 9 th Australian Division Breaching Operations during Operation Lightfoot," extract from Tobruk and El
Alamein.
ANNEX 3. "New Zealand Engineer Breaching Operations during Operation Supercharge," extract from New
Zealand Engineers, Middle East.
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot L-1

APPENDIX L, ANNEX 1
BREACHING OPERATIONS, XIII CORPS,
OPERATION LIGHTFOOT
By Christian Childs
OVERVIEW
Xl11 CORPS
The mission of XIII Corps, under the command of Lieutenant-General Brian G. Horrocks, was to deceive
the enemy, by convincing them that the main attack would occur in the south. This would prevent the 2 1St Panzer
and Ariete Armored divisions from reinforcing the northern defensive positions. Montgomery also ordered
Horrocks to avoid any tank casualties; Montgomery wanted all tanks available for follow-on operations.' H-Hour
was set for 2200 hours on 23 October.
From north to south the XIII Corps consisted of the 5 0 th Division, 440 Division and 7 th Armoured Division.
The corps would have to breach two former British minefields from east to west, code named January 2
and February.
The minefields were about 3000 yards apart and extended to the foot of Gebel Himeimat (Map LI).
The 44"h would launch a supporting attack on the north flank of the 7th Armoured Division and breach one
mine lane about 300 yards north of the 7 th, which would clear two lanes about 100 - 200 yards apart (Sketch LI and
L2). In an independent operation, the Free French Brigade would capture Himeimat. The corps would conduct the
entire operation behind an intense artillery barrage - first on positions behind January and then shifting to those
3
behind February.
The commander of the 7 1h Armoured Division, General Harding, planned to breach the minefields
immediately north of Himeimat, and to capture Himeimat hill and the escarpment (a steep bluff similar to a butte in
the American west), to the west. The carrier-mounted 44t" Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment, task organized
from the 44"' Division, would breach the minefields. The 44"' Reconnaissance Regiment was specially organized
and trained for such a mission, and they would have priority of fires from all the artillery of the 7th and 44th
Divisions. The Armored Brigades would establish bridgeheads on the far side of the minefields, and the 4 4 th
Division would follow-on and take control of them. 4
Since the panzerarmee knew that an attack was imminent; the best the Commonwealth forces could hope to
do was confuse the enemy about the location of the main effort. General Montgomery implemented an intricate and
comprehensive deception plan. General Horrocks describes some of the elements of this plan:
"Monty's very able staff under the direction of Freddy de Guingand, worked out in detail the
number and position of all vehicles and guns which would be requiredfor the assault. These were
concentrated in their proper places behind 30 Corps fiont veiy early on; but they were not the real
operational vehicles. They were spares and, above all, dummies. Though the German aircraft
photographedthese concentrations constantly, they always remained the same, and there was no sudden
increasejust before the battle. As the assaulting divisions moved into position, their operationalvehicles
merely replaced the dummies, the change-over takingplace, of course, at night.
In my sector dumnmY dumps and workshops began to spring up like mushrooms, all supplied by
dummy,pipelines and water installations. On the night of the attack it was arrangedfor the wireless sets of
a complete armoureddivision to operate so as to suggest that large armouredforces were moving forward
in this sector.5
Montgomery created an intelligence cell, in the southern sector, to transmit reports specifically created for
German listening posts. He also had a fuel pipeline built so slowly that German intelligence was completely
deceived as to when it would be completed. Montgomery's deception was successful enough to conceal the arrival
L-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL 'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

of two new divisions with two hundred and forty guns and a hundred and fifty tanks. It thoroughly confused the
6
Germans and made them think the attack would not be ready until the end of November.
1.fc~pj,
) OPERATION 'LIGHTFOOT'
Peir lindaPlan of 13 Corps 23rd/24th Oct
I Ist Phore; down 24th Oct ........
te. 2nd Phone .. .. ...
rm
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Diagramatic layout of minefield bridgehead

Sketch L2
L-4 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lighifool

PANZERARMEE AFRIKA
The Italians anticipated taking the brunt of the initial attack. The typical offensive tactics of the Eighth
Army were to locate the "weak" Italians, smash through them, and envelop the German units. At El Alamein, the
XIII Corps would not be bothered with trying to locate the Italian units - there were no German-manned strong
points in the forward area where they planned to conduct their breaching operations. 7 In this case, the British did not
underestimate their Italian opponents. The Italian 1 8 5th Folgore Division was a grounded paratroop unit that had
"fought ferociously" against the 4 4 1h Division a few weeks earlier.8 The Desert Rats of the 7th Armoured Division
described the Folgore as, "northerners and of higher quality than the average." The 2 1St Panzer and the Ariete
Armored divisions
9
had the mission of counterattacking any breakthrough or penetration of the Italian X Corps' main
defensive line.
INTO THE BREACH
In October 1942 the 2 2 nd Armoured Brigade of the 7 th Armoured Division was holding the line of two
minefields, known as Nuts and May. Two other minefields, January and February, had been under Axis control
since August. Each of these was about 300 meters deep. January was the furthest east, about 9 kilometers to the
west of the XIII Corps line of departure.' About 2,500 meters separated January and February in the area of the
planned breaches. Both minefields extended south of Gebel Himeimat, a hill that overlooked the entire area where
the battle would occur. 10
The 7 th Armoured Division Commander planned to breach January and February immediately north of
Himeimat, and send the Free French Brigade to capture the hill and the escarpment west of it. The 44th Divisional
Reconnaissance Regiment would breach the minefields; they were specially organized and trained for this specific
task (see Table 1). The armored brigades would pass through the breached lanes and establish bridgeheads on the
Colonel J. M. Lambert, the Chief of Royal Engineers (CRE) for the

4 4th Infantry Division, described these minefields in some detail as
follows: "From Alam Nayl to Himcimat ran two former British mincficlds named "January" and "February." These had been laid by us as
defensive mincfields during the previous spring; but on the enemy's arrival at Alamein he had captured them, together with Himeimat, and used
them as his protective minefields. He was well dug in behind and between them and to a small extent in front of them. Of what additions or
alterations he made to them we had little information. We had replaced them, so to speak, by laying two more parallel minefields (called "Nuts"
and "May") about three miles to the east.
In Operation Lightfoot, therefore, the breaching of "January" and "February" seemed likely to be the main engineer tasks. We had no
up-to-date knowledge of "February." Of the nearer "January" we knew the following:
a) The front fence of the minefield was still on its original alignment as surveyed in at the time we constructed it. The further fence, where it
could be seen, also appeared to be intact and unmoved.
b) No material alterations to the mines appeared to have been made, at any rate near the front fence. All mines "stolen" to date had been
British Mark IVs or E.P. (Egyptian Pattern) and none had been found trapped.
c) No anti-personnel mines had been found, other than a small number of Mark II shrapnel mines originally laid by us (most of these,
incidentally, had become non-operative). No "S"mines had been discovered near the front fence-which was the enemy's favorite place for
putting them.
d) The enemy laid tellermines on our side of the front fence to a depth of at least 300 yards. They appeared to have been laid at random in
groups of up to five. They were just buried, sometimes only half buried, in patches of soft sand and unmarked. It seemed probable that
every enemy patrol going out had been given fives mines and told to leave them lying about. (During the course of the battle more than
1,000 of these scattered mines were lifted-all were tellermines. No anti-personnel mines had been laid-for obvious reasons.)
e) The enemy's foremost defended localities were immediately in rear of"January" or possibly inside it in some cases. Some small posts dug
just in front of it appeared to be occupied only at night.
f) There were no substantial barbed wire or other obstacles.
When the plan for "Lightfoot" became firm, it was decided to carry out an engineer reconnaissance of the line of advance up to the
"January" minefield at the place where the breach was to be made... This reconnaissance had obviously to be made on the quiet. Any
reconnaissance in force, or preliminary mine-clearing operation in front of "January" at this point would have given the game away, and defeated
its object by leading the enemy to alter his minefield layout at the crucial point.
At dusk, a few days before the battle, a sapper officer from 4 4 "' Division, R.E., was dropped by armored car about a mile due east of
Point A. He then walked and crawled on a compass bearing due west. The going was reasonably good until about 200 yards short of the
minefield where the ground became broken. He got up to the mincfield but could not see beyond as it lay on a slightly hump-backed ridge. On
returning to the armored car in bright moon-light he was fired on, presumably by a patrol, but got back safely. The site seemed suitable; the
broken ground might necessitate some work on the approaches, but it would provide some cover where it would be needed. There was risk,
which had to be taken, that the enemy had added a "vertical" or cross mincfield between "January" and "February" immediately opposite [the
breach]. The width of the minefield at this point as originally laid was 300 yards." From "Engineers at the Battle of Alamein - the Southern
Sector," pages 20-29.

far side. The 44"' Infantry Division would then take over." Major R. H. W. S. Hastings describes the plan in more
detail:
The plan, which was rehearsedthree times, was for four gaps to be made in our own minefields
[Nuts and May] by the Sappers twenty-four hours before the battle started The next night the
Brigade was to go through these gaps. The advance guard consisted of the 4 4 'h Divisional
Reconnaissance Regiment, Battalion Headquarters[1" Battalion, The Rifle Brigade], "A" and
"B" Companies of the I"SBattalion [The Rifle Brigade] and the Greys [one troop of 3 Stuarts,
Royal Scots Greys] - in that order... The 4 4th DivisionalReconnaissance Regiment, commanded
by a 60"' Rifleman, Lyon Corbett-Winder, was to make four gaps in January correspondingto
those in Nuts and May. As soon as these gaps were complete "A" and "B" Companies were to
push through and take up flanking positions - "A" to the north and "B" to the south - facing
outwards and thus forming a corridor through which the 44"h Divisional Reconnaissance
Regiment could pass to repeat the gapping operation on February. The Greys were to support the
advance guard throughout and when the gaps were finally completed to take up positions on the
other side of the last minefield, where the rest of the Brigade wouldjoin them. The 131st Infantry
Brigade [44'h Infantry Division] would then take over the Battalion'sjob between the minefields
so that it could join the rest of the Armoured Brigade in their battleposition to the west. The gaps
around which all this activity centered were in two pairs - a pair in the north and a pair in the
south, with about two thousandyards between pairs and some two hundred yards between gaps.
The whole operation was to be supported by a barragewhich was to creep forward two hundred
yards ahead of the leading troops, a heavy barragebut not comparable to the tremendous uproar
at the northernend of the line. " 12
The 132"d Brigade, 4 4th Infantry Division, had the follow-up role to the 131"t. They would either pass
through, or, if the 131"t attack went well, open the salient wider. If the attack lost momentum the 132 d would
consolidate any gains.
Table LI. XIII CORPS MINEFIELD TASK FORCE
44"' Reconnaissance Regiment Attached from 44th Infantry Division, mounted in
Universal Carriers
One Troop, Royal Scots Greys Regiment 3 Stuarts Tanks
4"' Field Squadron Royal Engineers Attached from division troops
Detachment from 21"' Field Squadron Royal Attached from division troops
Engineers
Two troops with 6 Scorpions
4"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery Attached from division troops, 16 25-pdr guns, 2
batteries of 8 guns
97"' Field Regiment Royal Artillery Attached from division troops, 16 25-pdr guns, 2
batteries of 8 guns
The 44"' knew they were in for a tough fight with the Folgore to their front.13 From north to south the
Folgore was organized as follows: the 187"' Brigade with the 2 nd, 4th and 9 th Parachute Infantry Battalions; Ruspoli's
Group, made up of the 7th Parachute Infantry Battalion and the 8th Pioneer Battalion; and the 18 6 th Brigade
comprised of the 5"' and 6"' Parachute Infantry Battalions. 14
The British began clearing lanes through their own minefields twenty-four hours before H-Hour. Units
spent the rest of their time on the 2 3rd making final preparations, cleaning weapons and loading vehicles.'" By 1830
hours the Army was prepared to start the attack. The Commonwealth forces moved west through their own
minefields and waited for H-Hour. 16
The operation began with a massive artillery barrage at 2140 hours. Major Hastings described the barrage
as "the most
7
impressive supporting fire that anyone had yet seen. The noise and the flashes were not to be
forgotten." '
L-6 BREACHING THE "DEVIL 'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

According to one soldier in the 2nd Battalion of the Buffs, "The barrage began. It was a shattering fantastic
sound, drowning the subdued whispering of boots in the sand and the occasional clink of a rifle or bayonet as the
infantry moved up. The din of over 1000 field guns firing along the front was like gigantic drumbeats merging into
one great blast of noise."' 8 The Axis soldiers were subjected to "an inferno of explosions, smoke and dust. All
communications were disrupted."'19 The XIII Corps began to move forward toward the enemy minefields.
Countermine tactics and techniques would now help determine the outcome of the battle. The 4 4th Division
was on the northern flank of the 7 th Armoured Division. Their advance was led by sappers on foot whom would
visually search for mines on a 12-foot front. They would remove the mines; the sappers' job was to find a clear
route through the minefield. Behind the sappers were "Snails" - trucks fitted with diesel tanks over the rear tires.
The diesel fed over the tires and onto the desert sand. The diesel left an indelible mark on the sand that could be
seen by a truck driver, even at night. The trucks also proofed the safe lanes; by driving the trucks in echelon the
tires covered the width of the path and hopefully detonated any mines the sappers had missed. The minefield
breaching teams and the carriers of the assaulting battalion followed the Snails. Once the sappers breached January,
the infantry would pass through and form a bridgehead from which they could begin to breach February or any other
minefield. 2 °
Two advance guards led the 7 1h Armoured Division toward January. These leading detachments had a pilot
vehicle, Royal Engineer mine clearing party and a Scorpion. The Scorpion was a tank fitted with a flail. An
auxiliary motor on the tank powered the flail, which was a rotating drum with chains attached. The spinning chains
would beat the ground in front of the tank and detonate any mines in its path. The sappers drove the pilot vehicle
until it struck a mine, which they assumed to be the leading edge of the minefield. They would then bring the
Scorpion forward to begin the gapping drill. While the Scorpion flailed, sappers used detectors to widen and mark
the cleared lane. Both advanced guards had a replacement party of sappers and Scorpion for leap-frogging,
replacements or making additional lanes.21
The following account is from the XIII Corps Engineer Operations Report dated 26 November 1942:
The advanced guardfor the 7 h Armoured Division consisted of 4 4 1h Reconnaissance Regiment

(under 22nd Armoured Brigade) who advanced in two columns, each of which includeda Scorpion,
and detachments of 41h Field Squadron sufficient to provide three detectorparties with lifters and
markers. Local escort was provided by a tank and carrier troop. The R.E. [Royal Engineer]
Detachments had duplicate reserves (from 2 101h Field Company), and there were three spare
Scorpions. The first encounter of mines was by a vehicle striking one. The Scorpions started
thrashing, the detector parties sweeping on their right rear, to produce a gap 12 yards wide. It
was subsequently evident that the first mine was one of a very scattered mine marsh, and clearing
went on for about 900 yards before the main belt (300 yards wide) was met. Meanwhile the
Scorpions had had many troubles, mostly from the tank engine and from hits by enemy shells.
Bringing up new Scorpions caused delay. Progresswas in fact so slow that the Scorpion engines
did not overheatas had been feared.,22
Running into these scattered mines significantly delayed XIII Corps' timeline; the units would not even
begin to breach February until the next night. 23 General Horrocks, XIII Corps commander, received criticism for
delaying his operations. However, his mission was to support the main attack in the north and Montgomery ordered
him to avoid any tank casualties.24 Horrocks had no need to boldly push through January and February.
The 2 2nd Armoured Brigade lost about 250 men (killed, missing and wounded), along with 30 carriers and a
few tanks. The brigade left one damaged Scorpion within reach of the enemy patrols. On the positive side, the 2 2 "d
collected 400 Italian prisoners, mostly from the 1 85th Folgore Parachute Division.
On 7 th Division's right flank lS`/7Ih Queens of the 4 4 th Division and a section of the 11Ith Field Company
advanced as flank protection. They stumbled upon the same scattered mines. The sappers spotted the mines and the
Snails marked the clear path, exactly as intended. Scorpions were having similar success, as well as a psychological
effect on the enemy. Prisoners said they were less frightened by the artillery than by the "strange phenomenon - a
slowly advancing pillar of dust, out of which came dreadful noises of clanking, grinding, and rattling chains." The
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot L-7

Scorpions, which were sustaining heavy casualties, helped the 4 4 t' Division's efforts by drawing enemy fire and
attention to the south. 26
The 7"h Division reached the eastern edge of January at 2300 hours. They had stumbled into the scattered
minefield and were now facing tough resistance from the Folgore. Major Hastings describes the fight through
January:
The enemy brought heavy fire from artillery, mortars and machine guns to bear on those waiting
for the gapping to be completed. "A " Company suffered casualties almost at once. Already the
area was as crowded as the car park at Cheltenham Races, and there was no room anywhere to
maneuver. At the end of half an hour "B" Company reported that No. 3 gap was impassable
because of soft sand In another twenty minutes No. 2 was nearly through, but was directly in the
line of fire of an anti-tank gun whose flashes were identified by Colonel Freddie Stephens in the
moonlight about two thousandyards away. He orderedup "A " Company's machine-gunplatoon,
who engaged the anti-tankgun with all four Vickers guns from their vehicles. The Italiangunners
stoppedfiring at once. "A" Company went straight through the gap at the best speed they could
make. They were then ordered to turn south and clear the western ends of gaps Nos. 3 and 4.
"A" Company overran two enemy machine-gun posts almost at the end of their gap. But the
situation remained. Progress in the southern gaps was slow and it was not until after halfpast
one that "B" Company appearedat the end of gap No. 4. ,27
Axis counterattacks were highly effective. The Kiehl Combat Group of Panzerarmee Afrika, using
captured Stuart Tanks, repulsed every attack. Battalions of the 104"h Panzer Grenadier Regiment and artillery units
of the 21" Panzer Division fought to a standstill, while the 1 0 1h Company held off a battalion-sized attack from the
British 44"h Division for twenty-four hours, between the mine belts. In one incredible example of devotion to duty,
two German soldiers lay under the axle of a damaged anti-tank gun, allowing the gun to continue firing and destroy
two tanks. The Ariete Division, Bersaglieri Battalion, and units of the Folgore Division fought "magnificently" and
foiled any British breakthrough. 28
The Commonwealth units did not reach their planned first-night objectives on the far side of February. In
fact, they would get only to the far side of January. The 4 4th Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment and the 7 th
Division Sappers passed through January during the early hours of the 24th. The armored regiments passed through
and established their bridgeheads just before sunrise.
The Free French Brigade passed on a piece of good news - they had gained a foothold on Himeimat (Map
L2). This hill, defended by the Italian 14"h Company, 5th/ 1 8 6 "' Parachute Infantry Battalion, was vital because it
offered a commanding view of the area of operations. 29 The British artillery and the RAF dropped smoke rounds
north of H-imeimat, between the 6"' and 7"h Parachute Infantry Battalions of the 18 6th Brigade. The smoke obscured
the breaches made by the 7"h Armoured Division through January and prevented the Italians on the hill from seeing
the operation or calling artillery fire on the British.
The Italians in front of the

Armoured Division provided a stubborn fight. The companies who took the
7 th
brunt of the main attack were the 2 4th/ 8 th, and the 19 t'/ 7 t" (Map L3). Major Paolo Caccia-Dominioni da
6 th/2nd,
Sillavenge, commander
2
of the Italian 3 1 "t Pioneer Battalion, relates a story about a soldier in the 7"h Parachute
Infantry Batlalion:
Another of the 7""'s paratroopers,Leandro Lustrissimi, kept enemy tanks at bay with his flame-
throwerfor twenty-four hours. When he.finally ran out of inflammable liquid, he continued to do
what he could with petrol bottles, in spite of being wounded. Almost unconscious, he was taken
prisoner. Then, however; he recoveredsomewhat and led his comrades in a furious hand-to-hand
fight with their captors. They managed to free themselves and re-occupy their position. Then a
group of tanks came on the scene. With his bare hands Lustrissimi dug up a mine and flung it
2 Caccia-Dominioni, 235. The maps in the official Italian history show the
2 2 ""/8h rather than the 24"'/8"' almost directly behind January. The
map shows the 241h behind Febnrary on 24 October.
L-8 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

beneath the leading enemy tank. He was himself killed by the
explosion. He was twenty-four
years old and came from Subiaco. '30
ý500
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MAP L3
L-10 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

When sunrise came the soldiers of the 71h Armoured Division were digging in between January and
February. 31 Attempting to breach February would be too costly during the daylight. The enemy was alerted and had
a general idea where the British would make their assault. This was compounded by the unfortunate news that a
German counterattack, led by the 3 3ra Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, had driven the French from Himeimat.
General Harding, the Division Commander, decided to resume the attack that night. Axis artillery pounded the
tanks and infantrymen all day long.32 The division had two functioning Scorpions for that night's operation.33
The Italians asked for a truce that evening to collect and bury their dead; the British refused. Major
General G. L. Vemey describes the 7th Armoured Division's experiences on the 2 4th and 2 5 th:
The 131st (Queens) Brigade [from the 4 4th Division] was put under command of the Divisionfor
the night's operations and two battalions, the 1S`/51h and js/16Ih Queens Royal Regiment, quickly
secured a bridgehead west of the second enemy minefield, "February." Then troubles began.
The infantry were pinned to the ground by the enemy's fire, and efforts to clear the lanes for the
armourproved slow and costly. At last two gaps were reportedclear, and the 4rh CLY (Clyde and
Lotharshire Yeomanry) and the I" Royal Tanks moved forward. Both Regiments immediately
began to lose tanks and in view of the instructions that General Harding had had, there was no
alternative but to make no further attempts to move the armour through, so he decided to hold the
ground gained with34the Is Rifle Brigade and the two Queens Battalions with an armoured
regiment in support.
The 115 th and 1/6 th Queens were now dug in "precariously" on the western side of February. They suffered
very heavy casualties during the attack, many of which were attributable to 'S' mines, which Axis engineers had
liberally scattered throughout the minefield. 35 MG Verney continues his description of the 7th Armoured Division's
actions:
On the morning of the 2 5 1h the Corps was ordered not to press this attack in the southern sector.
In the afternoon, the 4,h/ 8,h Hussars, who were covering the right flank of the Division, were
ordered to advance north-westwards in support of operations by the 50'h Division on the right.
Almost at once they ran into minefields covered by anti-tankguns and began to lose tanks, so this
operationalso had to be called off 36
According to the maps from the official Italian history, the 7 h/186 h Parachute Infantry Battalion repelled
this attack.
Vehicles and soldiers crowded the area between January and February throughout the afternoon of the 25"'.
They were completely exposed to the heavy and continuous artillery from the Italians. 37 The Folgore received
considerable artillery support from the 1st/ 3 rd Light Duca d'Aosta, the 3rd/Ist Light Eugenio di Savoia, the 3rd and 4th
of the 2 6 th Pavia Artillery and the lSt/21st Trieste Artillery. By the end of the battle the Folgore claimed 120
damaged and destroyed British tanks and more than 600 casualties from the XIII Corps. 3 Folgore soldiers used
Molotov cocktails extensively against the British armor because of the ineffectiveness of the 47/32 anti-tank gun
that, in one instance, needed 20 hits to record one kill! The British were able to recover many of their tanks from the
battlefield because the Italian engineer commander did not follow orders to destroy the immobilized enemy tanks.38
As for the Folgore's casualties, their field-grade officers suffered 9 KIAs and 4 WIAs out of 18 assigned.
Over the next few days the 4 4 1h Division, reduced to the 13 2nd Infantry Brigade, assumed responsibility for
the front. The 7th Armoured Division, including the 2 2 "d Armoured Brigade and the 13 1S"Queens Brigade (recently
attached to the 7th Armoured Division) became supporting units in the north in preparation for Operation
Supercharge.
39
The 4 th Light Armoured Brigade remained in the south, but soon rejoined the 7 th Armoured
Division.
3 Caccia-Dominioni, 234-236. According to the official British history, 31 British tanks were lost. It would appear that the Italians either
inflated the number or they counted the armored infantry universal carriers as "tanks."
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot L- 11

Five days later the 44"' Division finally broke through February, the scattered mines on the western side
and the minefield eight miles further away.40 George Greenfield, an officer in The Buffs (2nd Battalion, Buffs
Regiment, assigned to the 13 2 "dInfantry Brigade), gives a vivid description of the "breakthrough:"
There were only two narrow gaps through the minefields in fr-ont of us allotted to The Buffs, and vehicles
were ordered to go through one at a time in longish intervals between, just in case the Luftwaffe managed
to raise a Stuka or two for a sneak raid. So it was a long and tedious business getting the hundred or so
vehicles through the minefields.
Too long and tediousfor the FreeFrench, who were to follow us through. A squadron of them in Bren gun
carriersformed up in a line abreastat about 10-yard intervals along the edge of the minefield. There was
no question of bothering about gaps where the mines had been lifted. Their leader blew a blast on his
whistle and the column charged into the minefield. There were thunderclaps of bangs and crashes as one
Bren gun carrierafter another blew up. Some went up within the firstfew yards; a few dodged their way
aheadfor 50 yards or more. But one after the other, with inevitable doom, the carrierssmashed themselves
to grounded hulks on the mines. It was magnificent and it was futile, a fitting epitaph to a famous
BR
victoly. "4

SECTION ENDNOTES
The Desert Rats: the History of the 71 Armoured Division 1938 to 1945, Major-General G.L. Verney, Grecnhill Books, London, Presidio
California, 1954, 130. Press,
The Rifle Brigade in the Second World War 1939 - 1945, Major R.H.W.S. Hastings, Aldershot, Gale & Poldcn Ltd., 1950, 150.
"3"Mineand Countermine Experience, 7 1h Armored Division, Battle of Second Alamein", Lambert, Landmine and Countermine Warfare, North
Africa 1940 - 1943, Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Washington, D.C., 1972, 137.
4Verney,
130.
A Full Life, Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks, Colins, London, 1960,
131.
6 Foxes of the Desert, Paul Carell, Schiffer Publishing, Atglen, PA,
1994, 284.
7 Alamein 1933 - 1962. an Italian Story, Paolo Caccia-Dominioni, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London,
1966, 234.
8 ,The Fighting at Alamein", George Greenfield, 1088. (need more complete
data)
9Verney, 129.
10 Hastings, 150.
11 Vcmcy, 130.
12 Hastings, 150.
13Greenfield, 1088.
14Caccia-Dominioni, 235.
15Vcrmey, 130.
16 Hastings, 151.
17Ibid.
18Greenfield, 1088.
19Carrell, 285.
20 Lambert, 138.
21 Lambert, 137.
22 Lambert, 138.
23 Lambert, 138.
24 Horrocks, 136.
25 Alam Halfa and Alamein. Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45, Ronald Walker, Historical Publications Branch
Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand, 1967, 285.

26 Lambert, 138-139.
27 Hastings, 152.
28 Carell, 287.
29 Vecmey, 130.
30Caccia-Dominioni, 238-239.
31 Vemey, 131.
32 Verney, 131-132.
33 Lambert, 140.
34Vemey, 132.
35Lambert, 140.
36 Vemey, 132.
37Verney, 132.
Rommel's North Africa Campaign, September 1940 - November 1942, Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, Combined Books,
Pennsylvania, 177.
39 Vemey, 133.
40 Lambert, 141.
41 Greenfield, 1092.

APPENDIX L, ANNEX 2
9 th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION BREACHING OPERATIONS
DURING OPERATION LIGHTFOOT*
When the hour for action was drawing near, a throbbing, at first half imagined, then faintly heard, stole
through the night and grew into rhythmic, surging sound. The bomber aircraft that were to support the army's
assault approached from the east and passed over. A few distant points of light then flickered unimpressively
from the desert on the British side; they came from the muzzles of the long-range guns opening up in advance
of the shock moment so that their first shells would fall in the same split second as those from the massed field
artillery. In an instant, at the stroke of 9.40 p.m., flashes from hundreds of guns were seen sparkling in a long
line across the desert.
For fifteen minutes the counter-battery bombardment continued unabated. Suddenly the guns were
silent. There was a breathless stillness, as if their force was spent. Above the Eighth Army's hidden battle array
two searchlights pointed long, still fingers into the sky. Five minutes passed. At 10 p.m. the two beams swung
inward, intersected and stopped, forming a pointed arch dimly seen in the moonlit vault, like a remote symbol
of crossed swords. At that instant the British guns opened a barrage of unimaginable intensity, eclipsing their
first performance, and to the urgent drumming of the guns the infantrymen stepped out from their start-lines in
slow, measured paces at the even rate of 75 yards per minute.
Well practiced in exercises in keeping to the exact speed required, the infantry maintained, as they
advanced, a straight extended line on either side of their company guide group, which set the speed and
direction. In the centre line with stakes driven in at intervals of 100 yards, on each of which was placed a
rearward shining torch emitting a colored beam; various colors were used to differentiate the centre lines of
different units. Later the road for following tanks and vehicles would be taken along, the centre line to the left
of the stakes. The signalers meanwhile were running their lines forward well to the right of the stakes, to be
clear of later vehicle movement. Not far behind the guide parties the engineers followed, ready to come right
forward as soon as a minefield was struck, and instantly to commence clearing a gap. Farther back again were
other groups which, as they advanced, established traffic control points which would later be in direct
communication with battalion headquarters and would control the movement forward, as required, of tanks or
vehicles carrying ammunition and consolidation stores. An efficient administrative machine was set in motion
behind the infantrymen as they moved into the fight.
Right along the front of the XXX Corps the enemy's front-line defenses were breached and the
objectives for the first phase successfully taken but it was soon found that the job of minefield clearance was
much bigger than expected.
On the extreme right of the corps attack the 2 /2 4th Battalion (Lieut-Colonel Weir) advanced with two
companies--- Lieutenant McNamara's on the right and Captain Serie's on the left. One small minefield was
encountered on the start line and cleared without difficulty. The enemy soon opened defensive fire with mortars
and machineguns and one of the supporting 25-pounders was dropping its shells short. At 10.30 the two
companies reached the minefield while the artillery concentrations were still falling just beyond and went to
ground until the barrage lifted while the engineers came forward and blew gaps in the wire with bangalores.
Meanwhile the sappers were working feverishly to clear lanes through the minefields so that anti-tank
guns and vehicles laden with ammunition, mines and consolidation stores could be got forward. At 11.20, after
35 minutes work under fire, two eight-yard gaps had been cleared in the first minefield but ten minutes later
another field of five rows was met. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was heavy and some sappers were hit, but by
12.5 a.m. gaps had been completed. This was the main field but farther on two more fields were found and had
to be gapped.
* Extracted from Tobruk and El Alamein, by Barton Maughan, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1966,
pages 665-728.

In the first phase the 2 0 th Brigade attacked with the 2 / 17th (Lieut-Colonel Simpson) on the right and the
2/ 15th (Lieut-Colonel Magno) on the left. Major Brien's company on the right of the 2/171h (which attacked with
three companies forward) met heavy opposition and many men were hit, including Brien himself, mainly while
overcoming two strong positions. One of these was knocked out and the occupants killed by a section of four
men led with great dash by Corporal Harris. (Though hit in both thigh and shoulder Harris continued to lead his
section until the following night when he was again wounded.) Lieutenant Hannaford took command of Brien's
company and the men reached their objective on time. The centre company and the left one too reached their
objectives without excessive casualties; by this time the battalion had lost 15 killed and 47 wounded and 14
others were not accounted for.
The 2 / 15 th on the left took its intermediate and final objectives with relatively light losses but the
audacious Captain Cobb, whose company was leading on the right, was among those killed. In all 5 were killed
and 40 wounded.
The sappers with the 2 / 1 7th did not have undue difficulty in making gaps in the minefield but the area
through which the 2 / 15 th advanced was found to be alive with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and it was not
until 12.30 a.m. that a lane had been cleared.
The success of the XXX Corps' attack for the first phase augured well for the second, but it was soon
to be found that the first line of defense which on British maps of enemy defenses had bristled with obstacles
and weapons of every kind was but a comparatively lightly held outer line to cover the main line of defense
sited in rear at considerably depth.
On the right flank the 2/481h Battalion (Lieut-Colonel Hammer), coming up along the 2 / 2 4 ths centre
line, had seen the 2 / 2 4 ths success signal go up just before it reached its start-line for the second phase. At 12.38
the battalion began to advance with two companies forward - Captain Robbins' on the right, Major Edmunds'
on the left--towards the enemy's second line of defense. The defenses were wired, mined and booby-trapped but
these obstacles were efficiently dealt with. At first there was stiff resistance. In Robbins' company Lieutenant
Lewin was hit. Sergeant Kibby took over the platoon and Robbins ordered him to attack a troublesome enemy
post holding up the advance and pinning down Kibby's platoon. Kibby promptly dashed forward firing his
Tommy-gun and silenced the post, killing three men and taking the surrender of 12 others. The advance was
resumed.
The forward companies halted 2,500 yards from the start-line and the rear companies (Captains Bryant
and Shillaker) passed through and advanced to the objective 1,400 yards farther forward. The smoke and dust
raised by the bombardment had formed a dense pall and the Bofors guns, firing four rounds every five minutes
along the centre line, were a great help. The success signal was sent up at 3.45 a.m. The 2 / 4 8 th had advanced
3,900 yards from its own start-line and 6,900 yards from the brigade start-line. Patrols sent out to cover
reorganisation met no opposition; but although Major Edmunds' company had established contact with the
2/ 1 3 th Battalion on the intermediate objective the companies on the final objective could find no sign of the
2/13th on their left.
The 2 6 th Brigade's attack on the Eighth Army's northern flank had succeeded brilliantly.
Reorganisation to form a firm front to the flank was at once put in hand. The ground on which the companies
dug in on the northern side was for the most part beyond the boundary of the objective prescribed in the orders.
In the 2 / 4 8th Robbins' company on the right faced north, Bryant's company, which was the right corner peg of
the Eighth Army's new front, faced both north and north-west and on its left Shillaker's company faced west.
On Shillaker's left flank, however, the ground was still held by the enemy. Meanwhile the toiling engineers had
been unrelentingly pushing their mine-free lanes forward through ground constantly harassed by fire from the
enemy's un-attacked positions opposite the northern flank. As soon as the way was clear Major Tucker brought
in the vehicles with consolidation stores, and the men, toughened by Hammers's hard training policy, put up a
tremendous effort to get the often rehearsed job done. 'We were perfectly reorganised by dawn,' wrote hammer,
in his report of the battle, & with 2,400 Hawkins laid and dug-in very solidly.' All supporting weapons were in
place and all men dug-in with galvanized-iron overhead protection against airburst.
BREACHING THE "DE VIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot L- 15

The 2 /24 "'1Battalion, which had been not quite so pressed for time, had also reorganised facing north,
pushing the left-rear company (Harty's) forward and left into the gap between the 2 /2 4 th and the 2 /4 8th and
likewise pushing out the right-rear company to cover the right flank beyond which the composite force had
established its strong-points in the old no-man's land to link with the coast sector defenses.
Lieut-Colonel Macarthur-Onslow's composite force was in position by 2 a.m., and digging in on a line
3,500 yards on through East and West minefield begun by the 2 /3 rd Pioneers on the two nights before the battle
Point 24 and farther west. Six posts had been established and finished on the 2 3rd- 2 4t". There was no
interference by the enemy except for some artillery fire.
The 2 0th Brigade's task in the second phase was assigned to the 2 / 13 th Battalion (Lieut-Colonel
Turner), with the 40"h Royal Tank Regiment in support. Unlike Hammer, Turner had no open flank and did not
have to worry about holding a long front to the north, but his battalion had to advance to the same depth as
Hammer's and on a wider front - 2,400 yards as against 800. Having regard to what was known of the enemy
defenses, Turner had allotted in each phase a frontage of 900 yards to the right company and 1,500 yards to the
left. The frontages were too great to be effectively covered by a straight infantry company attack, so various
strong-points selected from the overprint maps were given as special tasks to platoons and fighting patrols. The
attack had been rehearsed as one of cooperation between infantry and tanks, tanks being needed to help mop up
so wide an area. It had been expected that the main minefield to be traversed in the first phase of the corps
attack would be 250 yards deep and the plan allowed for this (and more) to have been cleared before the
second-phase attack began. However, the route to the start-line of the 2/13th and 4 0th RTR was traversed by
many secondary minefields so that mines had to be cleared for almost 1,600 yards. The lanes could not be made
ready for the tanks despite Herculean efforts by Major Gehrmann's 2/13t" Field Company, so the battalion
attacked on time but without the tanks.
In the first 1,700 yards Captain Handley's and Captain Cribb's companies encountered as expected
only small outposts, from which the occupants made off, with the exception of one strongpoint which Sergeant
Carson's platoon had been detailed to attack. Carson led out his platoon on the required bearing to the post,
which was overcome with grenades and the bayonet, contacted the 2/48"' on his right, and then had his platoon
ensconced in an adjoining position. Having heard enemy fighting on the left he set out to find his company
headquarters, encountered a German post and single-handed captured nine German prisoners.
Meanwhile, from Captain Cribb's company on the left, Sergeant Easter had set out with his platoon to
contact the neighboring Gordon Highlanders and take part in a joint attack with that battalion on a strong post
and anti-tank gun locality on the inter-divisional boundary. Much later, Easter returned to report that he had
contacted the Gordons and led his platoon with them in an attack on their next objective, which, however, did
not succeed.
By 3 a.m. Captain Wilson's company and Captain Sanderson's had passed through, but still the tanks
had not got forward. These companies came up against the enemy's defense line and soon met intense fire from
the front and flanks and suffered heavy losses.
Wilson's company ran into crossfire from a line of German posts. Soon Wilson and the commanders of
two of his platoons were wounded and their platoons pinned down. The third platoon, led by Lieutenant Pope,
charged and overcame one post whereupon some of the enemy shouted in English, as a ruse, 'Hold your fire.
We are coming.' The Australians ceased fire whereupon some Germans ran back and re-occupied some of the
positions. Lieutenant Treweeke took command of the company and twice attacked the nearest centre of
resistance, succeeding on the second attempt in overcoming it; 12 Germans were killed and 23 surrendered.
Treweeke decided to wait until the tanks came tip before continuing the attack.
Sanderson's company, on the left, had also been in a fire-fight and taking casualties. Sanderson saw
some Germans approaching as if they wished to surrender, ordered his men to cease fire and stood upright. He
was immediately shot down. Lieutenant Norrie, though wounded, took command and ordered the men to assault
but as he led them forward was also killed. Lieutenant O'Connor, also wounded, took over and after calling for
volunteers led 12 men from his platoon against one of the posts. After hand-to-hand fighting the post was
overcome, but not before O'Connor had been wounded again, this time mortally. Nearly all the NCOs had been
L- 16 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

killed or wounded and the survivors, under the only remaining officer, Lieutenant Bissaker, were withdrawn to
the intermediate objective where Captain Cribb later absorbed them into his company.
Meanwhile, Colonel Turner had sent Captain Cribb back to bring up the tanks. Brigadier Wrigley
warned the 2 /17th to have two companies ready to move forward to help the 2 / 1 3th but when it became evident
that they could not reach the area before daylight, the 2 / 13th was ordered to dig in where it was. At dawn the
forward companies which were skylined on a slight crest came under heavy fire and were forced to withdraw to
dead ground a short distance back. Soon the tanks arrived in line ahead. The infantry pointed out the
troublesome posts that were still un-subdued nearby and the tanks promptly destroyed them.
While the attack had been proceeding, the 2 4th Brigade had carried out its diversionary operations. Just
before midnight a group of 50 dummies which had been earlier placed in no-man's land forward of the 2 /4 3 rd
and 1,000 yards from the enemy's forward positions were raised by remote control and illuminated from time to
time by sweeping searchlights to simulate men moving in to the attack, so as to invite retaliatory fire, which the
enemy brought down in abundant measure.
A reinforced platoon of the 2/4 3r, under Lieutenant Thomas, set out to raid enemy positions east of
Kilo 110. After covering 600 yards under increasingly intense fire the patrol blew two gaps in the enemy wire,
penetrated to its objective and there destroyed an anti-tank gun and inflicted about 30 casualties. After the
withdrawal had been ordered, Thomas and two others were hit. Lance-Corporal Bingham ( 2/3rd Field Company)
began to carry Thomas out. On the way, Bingham shot a German with this pistol then bailed up three others
who helped him carry Thomas back. A total of five German prisoners were brought in; one Australian was
killed, 8 were wounded and 7 were missing.
From Trig 33 the 2 /2 8 1hsent out a raiding party 34 strong. Lieutenant Barnes' platoon with sappers and
others, advancing under fire and in the light of flares, broke through several belts of the enemy's wire and
reached its objective. There one forward section got into the strongly-wired enemy post and silenced a
machine-gun, but the other failed to break through the wire. Barnes, who had been seriously wounded, ordered
a withdrawal. Sergeant Moore took command and ably organized the rescue of the wounded and withdrawal of
the survivors. The stretcher-party carrying Barnes was later hit by a mortar bomb and the stretcher was
smashed, but Barnes managed to make his own way back. Moore organized a rescue party and brought in other
wounded. Of the 34 men on the raid, 3 had been killed and 9 wounded. Two were missing.
The 24th Brigade's operations achieved their aim of drawing artillery fire, which came down on them
for four hours. Prisoners taken later in that sector declared that they thought that they had defeated part of the
main attack.
In the attack so far the 9th Division had taken 127 German prisoners, all from the 11 3 8 2 "dBattalion and
264 Italians mainly from the I and III Battalions of the 62nd Regiment.
Elsewhere on the XXX Corps front the assaulting infantry had had similar experiences to those of the
Australians. The first objectives were taken in about two hours without great opposition but again minefields
proved to be much more extensive than expected and the strongest resistance was encountered in the second
line.
When the sun lit up the desert on the morning of the 2 4th, the enemy, if he had been able to observe the
situation clearly through the battle-fog and tumult, would have seen the front of the 9 th Australian and 5 1St
Highland Divisions in the shape of a bay between two headlands. Southwards from where the 2 6th Brigade's
positions jutted out on the extreme right flank, the front-line receded across the front of the two divisions but
came out again on the New Zealand front where it remained out beyond the corps' objective--the Oxalic line--in
front of the Miteiriya Ridge until the left New Zealand battalion was reached, when it again receded in front the
Oxalic line on the New Zealand division's left flank and across the South African division's front to come out
again to the objective on the left flank of that division and of the XXX Corps' bridgehead. All along that front
the infantry were waiting to meet the expected armoured counter-attacks. The armour of the X Corps had failed
to get out beyond the Oxalic line to place itself astride the enemy's supply routes in a challenging posture.

On the first night of the battle, the Eighth Army had not accomplished what its commander had
ordered. Only one of the three bridgeheads for the anrour had been secured and cleared of mines to the
prescribed depth, and that too late. None of the three armoured divisions had pushed through to the enemy's
rear. Only one had made an attempt to do so.
Montgomery's second plan was less ambitious than the discarded first plan. The change had been
made, he declared, because his troops were insufficiently trained for the tasks he had set them. But the assault
forces were well trained for the tasks they were given on the night of 2 3rd October, and fully rehearsed. No
troops could have been better spirited. Montgomery had seen to that himself. What the orders prescribed and
the forces faithfully and with great sacrifice strove to do was not accomplished because the tasks Montgomery
had laid on the infantry divisions and minefield task forces of the armoured divisions for that night were still too
great for them to undertake. That, at least, was an opinion held afterwards at XXX Corps Headquarters.
On the morning of the 24"h the attention of the armoured commanders, the corps commanders and the
army commander himself was attracted to the Miteiriya Ridge sector where the Oxalic Line had been reached
and lanes for the passage of armour cleared. General Freyberg, forward in his tank in the early morning, was
perturbed at the reluctance of the 10th Armoured Division's tanks to push forward. Unable to contact Lumsden,
he sent a message to Leese, who thereupon came forward to see Freyberg. Leese and Freyberg reconnoitered
the front together and then returned to Freyberg's headquarters to confer by the "blower" with Montgomery.
There Lumsden soon joined them, having seen nothing that morning, it may be presumed, to diminish his
dislike of issuing in line ahead through minefield lanes to attack an enemy gun-line. Freyberg, whose counsel
the higher commanders probably valued more highly than anybody's, thought that the attack should be resumed
that night, which may have helped the corps commanders to reach the same conclusion. Montgomery probably
needed no prodding to decide that the risks could, should and would be accepted. Montgomery told Lumsden
that the I i0'Armoured Division was to get out into the open and manoeuvre beyond the Miteiriya Ridge.
In outline, Montgomery's orders of the continuation of the battle were, with some modifications, to
carry out by the morning of the 251i' such of the tasks ordained for the 241i1 as had not been completed. The 9t1'
Australian and 51 " Highland Divisions were to secure the rest of the Oxalic line, the armour was to debouch by
night and advance to the Pierson bound. The action of the armour, however, was not to be dependent on
completion of the infantry tasks - the armoured divisions were to fight their own way forward. The ls' and 10ti'
Armoured Divisions were to advance westwards, the 9"' Armoured Brigade and the New Zealand division's
cavalry (armed with Honeys) southwards, all four armoured brigades to link on the Pierson bound. The thrust of
the 911'Armoured Brigade was to prepare the way for later southward infantry thrusts by the New Zealand
division. The 13 3r0 Lorried Infantry Brigade from the 10"1 Armoured Division was to take over the part of the
New Zealand front adjoining the Highland division. De Guingand later recorded that Lumsden was "obviously
not very happy about the role his armour had given" and Montgomery wrote that he told Lumsden to "drive" his
divisional commanders. In the XIII Corps the 4411' and 7'11Armoured Divisions were also to carry out their tasks
uncompleted on the first day.
By daylight that morning, the 91h Division's front had erupted with fire of every kind - fire from field
guns, machine-guns, mortars and snipers directed at the infantry, high velocity fire aimed at the tanks, and fire
from British tanks and guns in rear engaging targets. The pandemonium was to continue - with some periods of
great intensity - for several days.
Soon after sunrise the forms of enemy tanks could be seen approaching from the west. The German
15' Armnoured Division was coming in to make its first attack on the bridgehead. By 7.15 a.m. the tanks were
reported about 1,000 yards west of the 2/48l'"s left forward company and also forward of Trig 33. The battle fire
quickened. Soon the three Australian field regiments and the 7t11Medium Regiment were firing pre-arranged
concentrations on the areas into which the German tanks had moved and some Shermans in rear of the Highland
division's front and of the left flank of the Australians' front were also engaging them. A little later lorried
infantry appeared west of the 2/481i'. In time, the enemy armour drew back from its first encounter with the
XXX Corps artillery and the Shermans' long-range gunfire, leaving several tanks burning on the battlefield.
Some Shermans were also burning.
L- 18 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

On the northern flank the prospect at daylight had at once revealed that the tactical key to the security
of the flank was Trig 29, north of Hammer's battalion. Whitehead's brigade, by comparison with other fronts,
was faced by a less subdued enemy infantry, which the main artillery storm of the night assault had by-passed.
Enemy artillery to the north was also active though most of its shelling was behind the forward battalions, but
soon the enemy began patrolling to find the flank of the penetration.
Meanwhile, sappers were busy throughout the day widening lanes, bringing the diamond, boomerang,
double bar and square tracks up to the foremost localities and clearing minefields from congested areas. In the
evening hot meals were brought right up to the forward troops.
At 4 p.m. the commanding officer of the 2 / 13th Battalion, Colonel Turner, and the adjutant, Captain
Leach, were wounded, Turner mortally; both had to be evacuated. Major Colvin was promptly brought forward
to take over and, on the way, received orders from Brigadier Wrigley for the renewed attack up to the Oxalic
line, which was to open at 2 a.m. next morning. The 20' Brigade was to capture the ground originally assigned
to the 2 / 13 th on the first night, but the task was now to be carried out by two battalions, the 2 / 16th on the right
and the 2 / 13th on the left. The attack was to be made with full artillery support. After the Australians had
secured their objective the 7/Rifle Brigade was to pass through, take Point 32 and form a bridgehead for the
tanks beyond the Oxalic Line.
Colvin found the 2 / 13th practically without officers, and General Morshead agreed to allow all
left-out-of-battle officers to be sent forward. Early that night Sergeant Easter of the 2 / 13th, who had a reputation
for cool and reliable judgment under fire, returned from a patrol which had failed to find any sign of the
1/Gordons on the battalion's left. He expressed the opinion that there would not be much opposition to the night
attack. Thereupon Colvin conferred with Colonel Simpson of the 2/17th and it was agreed to make a silent attack
without artillery support. The 4 0 th Royal Tank Regiment was to support the attack.
The 2 / 17th on the right advanced with two companies forward, took the objective without having to
fight for it and began to dig in. The battalion's vehicles came forward but soon afterwards were shelled and
bombed by aircraft. An anti-tank gun portee was set alight there as well as an ammunition vehicle in the 2 / 13ths
area, both providing most unwelcome illumination. Some enemy posts nearby began harassing the 2/17th with
machine-gun fire as reorganization proceeded. In the right company Lieutenant Wray was a steadying influence
walking through it all pipe in mouth while carrying a heavy load of mixed ammunition for one of his sections
which had reported that it was running short. A vehicle in charge of Sergeant Cortis of the machine-gun platoon
was hit and set alight, but Cortis coolly off-limbered a gun, got it into action, engaged some of the enemy posts
and silenced them. Captain McCulloch of the left forward company was killed by machine-gun fire and the
company's only remaining officer wounded; Sergeant Williams took command. The men were very weary and
jaded, having been without sleep for 48 hours and throughout that time frequently under intense fire.
On the left the 2 / 13th had encountered machine-gun fire after about 500 yards but advanced through it.
The right company surprised two posts and took the occupants prisoner. By 3.15 a.m. the troops were digging in
on the objective with patrols out. The enemy began to lash the forward companies with machine-gun fire from
close in front, but the 4 0 th Royal Tanks came up behind and effectively engaged the enemy nests with tracer
machine-gun fire. At 4.50 a.m. contact had been made with the Gordons on the left. By 7 a.m. shallow digging
had been completed and supporting arms sited.
Before dawn the air was raucous with the noise of tanks approaching from the rear but the 7/Rifle
Brigade had not yet appeared when the horizon showed the first signs of approaching day.
The break-out battle was soon to reach its climax. On the Highland front the main tank force of the Vs?
Annoured Division (2nd Armoured Brigade) had been moving up to the Oxalic line except on the division's left
where an enemy strong-point, which the division had lacked the strength to attack, still held out to the right of
the gallant 7/Black Watch. It was beyond the Highlanders, however, where the southern bridgehead reached
across the Miteiriya Ridge that the battle's most dramatic developments had been occurring that night. An hour
and a half had been allowed to the sappers to clear lanes forward for each armoured regiment before, at 10 p.m.,
the guns fired the barrage behind which the three armoured brigades of the 1 0 th Armoured division were to

debouch. The time proved all too short and the enemy, as could hardly have been otherwise, was expectant and
ready for counter-strokes.
The 8"' Armoured Brigade, in the centre, encountered the greatest misfortune. On one lane (Hat Track)
the enemy captured the mine reconnaissance party and the exit was covered by at least one 88-mm gun. The
lane was abandoned. It was then decided that two regiments, the Nottinghamshire Yeomanry and 3rd Royal
Tanks, would use the Boat track but enemy aircraft reconnoitered with flares when the bombardment opened
and the Notts Yeomanry were bombed with high explosive and incendiaries and shelled, so that the lane was
soon illuminated by burning vehicles, in the light of which the column was harassed by enemy fire. It was
decided that this lane was also unusable. The commander of the 10 th Armoured Division, General Gatehouse,
who was on the Boat track, had seen all this. Lumsden called for a report from Gatehouse.
Irreconcilable accounts have been given of the incidents that followed in which Montgomery,
Lumsden and Gatehouse figured and the "friction of war" manifested itself and to which perhaps too much
publicity has since been given. It must suffice to recount some salient facts that do not appear to have been
disputed. Gatehouse feared that daylight would find his regiments exposed and vulnerable and likely to be shot
to pieces by the enemy's anti-tank artillery. Lumsden, who had no authority to break off the attack, reported this
to army headquarters, which was also keeping closely in touch through report centres and by analyzing what
could be heard of the much-jammed radio traffic. De Guingand concluded that "a feeling in some quarters was
creeping in which favoured suspending the forward move, a pulling back under cover of the (Miteiriya) ridge"
and decided to take what was apparently regarded as a risk even on that battlefield. He woke the army
commander and called a conference with the corps commanders for 3.30 a.m.
Three of the four armnoured brigades to make the advance to the Pierson line had encountered no
insuperable difficulties or problems beyond those to be expected in such a difficult operation. It is
understandable, therefore, that the army commander should have decided that the operation should proceed, for
he could expect at least some 400 tanks to debouch. He gave very firm instructions that they should. The
original orders were partly changed, however, presumably in recognition of the fact that only one of the 8"'
Armoured Brigade's three lanes - the Bottle Track on which the Staffordshire Yeomanry were to debouch - was
regarded as usable. One of the brigade's three regiments was to advance and link with the New Zealand
division's 9"' Armoured Brigade but the rest of the brigade was to remain on the Miteiriya Ridge and improve
the gaps. After the conference Montgomery kept Lumsden behind and (he has since written) 'spoke very plainly
to him ... Any wavering or lack of firmness now would be fatal. If he himself, or the commander 10t" Armoured
Division, was not 'for it', then I would appoint others who were.'
Gatehouse was no less averse than Morshead to accepting orders to commit his troops to operations
which he thought unjustifiable but by comparison was less advantageously placed, not deriving his authority
directly from a government. Lumsden wished Gatehouse to receive the instructions from the army commander
himself. Gatehouse had gone back to his main headquarters so that he could be contacted by telephone, and
there Montgomery telephoned him. Montgomery spoke 'in no uncertain voice' and nettled Gatehouse by
ordering him 'to go forward at once and take charge of his battle'.
The orders were masterful. It remains to see what effect they had on the battle. At dawn on the 25t1, on
the left of the 9'11Division's area revealed the Queen's Bays deploying among the infantry close to the end of
the bridgehead; the tank commanders, dressed with great individuality for the hunt and bedecked with colorful
cravats, standing up in their cockpits unperturbed by the battle-fire's cacophony and coolly surveying the
terrain. There and for some considerable distance to the South the armoured brigades tanks sat about the
foremost defended localities, the target of a vigorous bombardment, as if the limit of their advance had been
reached. However hard and however often the "GO" button had been pressed on the army control panel, its
impulses were not motivating these tanks whose commanders, though as brave as they were bizarre, evinced no
intention to advance 'at all costs' to the Pierson bound. Their presence there to do battle was not very welcome
to the infantry who regarded the ground of the anrmour's choosing as their own. Meanwhile, about 6 a.m., part of
the 7/Rifle Brigade had arrived in rear of the 2/13"I's forward companies where their vehicles attracted heavy
fire, having insufficient space between the minefields for proper dispersal.

The enemy gunners were not too proud to shoot at sitting ducks. The carnage was terrible to watch.... It
was not long before a flood of casualties swamped the 2 / 1 3 th RAP, which was already working at full pressure
to cope with the unit's own casualties. Captain Phil Goode and his men were equal to the occasion.
On the morning of the 2 5th Freyberg persuaded Leese and Montgomery to cancel the proposed
southward infantry attacks of the New Zealand division. Freyberg thought that the main infantry attack had not
failed by much to pierce the enemy's defence girdle and that, therefore, a further westward infantry attack on
the pattern of the first should be made to extend the bridgehead. Again, the top commanders conferred at the
New Zealand division's headquarters. Montgomery decided about midday to cancel the New Zealand division's
"crumbling" operations because they were likely to prove very costly, and instead to start "crumbling" on the
northern flank, using the 9th Australian Division. The armour was to be withdrawn except on the north of the
XXX Corps front (where the Ist Armoured Division took the 24th Armoured Brigade under command), and in
the far south the XIII Corps was to go over entirely to the defensive.
A counter-attack was expected on the 2 /4 8 th's front but did not develop. At dusk an enemy group was
seen near the forward companies and fired on. Several Germans were killed and three captured including the
acting commanders of the 1251h Regiment and that regiment's II Battalion. The battalion commander had a map
of the area to be attacked that night showing the enemy's minefields and the disposition of his troops. The map
showed that the track leading to Trig 29 along which Hammer's carriers were to advance was free of mines; this
was confirmed by Hammer's interrogation of the prisoners. Interrogation also established that the Germans had
just reinforced Trig 29.
To have captured the map was rare good fortune. When it was studied at Whitehead's headquarters, it
revealed that the planned axis of the 2 /24 ths attack ran straight along the leg of a minefield. The forming-up
place and bearing of attack were therefore altered so that the sappers, instead of having to clear mines to a depth
of 1,000 yards or more, would require to make only one gap 200-yards deep.
The 2 / 17 th relieved the 2 /4 8th at 10 p.m. on the 2 5th. The barrage opened at midnight and the leading
companies of the 2/481h moved forward on foot; Captain Robbins' company on the right and Captain Shillaker's
on the left. They pressed on through enemy defensive fire - which became particularly heavy on the right - to
their intermediate objective some 200 yards short of Trig 29, and halted. Then the carriers under Captain
Isaksson moving four abreast with Captain Bryant's company aboard charged through with synchronized timing
onto the smoky dust-shrouded centre objective as the barrage stopped.
When the carriers reached the spur the infantry leapt out and charged, one platoon coming left and one
right while one went straight on to Trig 29.
As soon as the objective had been taken Colonel Hammer contacted Major Tucker and asked him to
bring forward the vehicles loaded with consolidation stores, which were being held back along the track some
500 to 600 yards to the east of the point from which the attack had started. Just at that moment a stray shell hit a
mine-laden truck, which with five other trucks also loaded with mines exploded with an astounding detonation.
Tucker was at first dazed, but soon got the undestroyed vehicles moving and sent Captain Potter back to "B"
echelon. Potter returned with five composite reorganisation stores trucks. By first light 2000 mines had been
laid. Bryant's company was facing north, Shillaker's west. Edmunds' company, on the battalion's left, facing
west and northwest, had linked with the 2 / 1 7th Battalion in the 2 /4 8thS old positions. The battalion was now
firmly established, though only shallow trenches had been dug and everyone was very weary.
Meanwhile, at 12.40 a.m. the two leading companies of the 2 /24th had crossed the start-line, striking
northeastwards on the right of the 2 /4 8 th. It had been realized that an advance of 3,000 yards along a line of
enemy posts was a difficult assignment, but the army's Intelligence service expected them to be held by Italians.
On the contrary, they proved to be mainly held by Germans, and where there were Italians there were usually
Germans with them.
Major Mollards's company on the right attacked along the frontal wire with one platoon in front of the
wire and two on the left behind it. They fought their way forward without any serious check until less than 100
yards from the company objective when they were held up by a strong-post. This was assaulted and taken but

not before Mollard had received a disabling wound. The post was found to have a garrison of more than 40
mixed Germans and Italians and to house an 88-mm gun. Captain Mackenzie led the company forward to its
objective.
The left leading company under Lieutenant Geale had to advance the prescribed distance then move
left, contact the 2 /4 8ti Battalion and dig in on the northeast spur of Trig 29. This the company did but Geale was
badly wounded and Lieutenant Doughan, the only surviving officer took over. Doughan was wounded later in
the day and Sergeant-Major Bailey then took command. A number of posts were taken. Sergeant Berry was
foremost in the affray in the attack on three of these and took two positions single-handed.
Captain Harty (on the right) and Lieutenant Greatorex followed up the centre-line, then led their
companies through the forward companies towards the Fig Orchard. Each had to overcome three posts on the
way. Harty's company took the Fig Orchard post, which was found to be a headquarters with offices sunk in the
ground to great depth. Greatorex's company overshot the Fig Orchard and came up near the outer edge of the
defences covering the heavily defended locality known as Thompson's Post. Both companies were troubled by
anti-tank and mortar fire from a post 300 yards ahead. Harty and Greatorex reconnoitered to plan an assault.
Greatorex was wounded (for the second time that night) and Sergeant-Major Cameron taking charge of his
company got permission to withdraw it - now numbering only 14 of the 63 who started - to along-side Harty's.
The 2/24th had carried out a methodical destruction of the enemy as prescribed by the master plan, to
which the number of enemy dead and prisoners bore witness, but Colonel Weir, after going forward, decided at
4 a.m. that the battalion was too depleted to hold the extended front on which his men were digging in. The
forward companies were therefore withdrawn about 1000 yards where by 5 a.m. they had consolidated behind a
reverse slope running northwest from Point 22 to Trig 29. On the right flank, the composite force which had
been held up in its advance by fire from Thompson's Post, found itself in an exposed situation.
Onl that night of much action the enemy launched an attack with infantry and a few tanks against the
2/13th Battalion, following up by dark the daylight attack that had failed. Three tanks were knocked out by
Hawkins mines and Treweeke's company knocked out two tracked troop carriers when they were within 60
yards. Artillery and infantry weapon fire broke up the attack. At dawn the 2 / 17 th discerned 12 enemy tanks
sitting on a ridge to the northwest, where they remained all day, harassing the Australians with guns and
small-arms fire and knocking out vehicles. On the left of the divisional front the 1s Armoured Division made its
morning visitation and the Australians saw 30 Sherman tanks engaging the enemy. No foolhardy attempt was
made to push through the enemy gun-line and behind the coast salient.
By the evening of the 2 6t' Montgomery had decided that the New Zealand division should be
withdrawn into reserve and rested, that the 1s Armoured Division should also be drawn into reserve for refitting
and relieved by the 10th and that he would rely on the 9th Division's northward attack to retain the initiative.
Consequently a substantial regrouping was to be effected on the night of 2 7ti- 2 8t'. The northward shift of the 9 th
Division and the withdrawal of the New Zealand division would greatly extend the front to be held by other
formations. The XIII Corps was directed to make available all the infantry it could spare for operations in the
north and to extend its front to include the South Africans' sector. The 4th Indian Division was to relieve the
South Africans, and they in turn to relieve the New Zealanders, who would be withdrawn. The 5 1st Division
was to relieve the 20' Australian Brigade thus enabling the 9t"Division to have one brigade freed from holding
duties and available to attack.
These instructions were given by Lesse to Morshead and the other divisional commanders on the night
of the 26"'.
The policy, laid down by Montgomery on the 2 6th, of continuing the attack northwards towards the sea
on the 27"' and succeeding days, appears to have been originally embarked on as a crumbling operation with the
general object of destroying the enemy in the salient by the coast, and not with the specific intent that the
arnmour should debouch there. At that stage a break-out point does not appear to have been indicated, nor indeed
had the planning evinced any haste to get ready for a chase. No immediate intention to break out along the coast
road is suggested by the written orders nor by the narrative dealing with this stage in the 9 th Division's report.

With the Army Commander's brief direction to 'Attack North', consideration was given to the staging
of a further attack in this area on the night 27h -28t October. On the arrival of XXX Corps Operation
Instruction No. 85 of 261h October, which ordered a policy of mopping up and the completion of the capture of
the final objective by all divisions on 2 7th October, it was decided to plan the further attack northwards on the
night 2 8 th -2 9 th October - one night later.
In the plan submitted to the army commander by Morshead on the morning of the 26 th, however, his
intention had been to attack at once to seize and open up the main road from the enemy's front-line westwards
for three kilometers. Perhaps it was the contemplation of this plan that implanted the idea later tentatively
adopted that the armour might next debouch along the coast road. A subsidiary object of Morshead's plan was
to secure the road and the area south of it for use by the division's vehicles, thus shortening its long and exposed
supply and evacuation routes.
The plan was an ambitious one. The task was to be accomplished in progressive phases and required
the employment of all three brigades. For the operation the 2 3rd Armoured Brigade less two regiments was also
placed under Morshead's command, and the artillery of tile 5 1St, 2 nd New Zealand and 1Oth Armoured Divisions
and of three medium regiments was to be ill support. Including the division's own artillery; there would be 360
guns
Both battalions of the 2 0 th Brigade opened their attack at 10 p.m. on 2 8 th October. The 2 / 1 3 th on the
right was a depleted unit, with rifle companies averaging only 35 of all ranks, and an exhausted one, after five
sleepless nights. It had attacked on two successive nights, been counter-attacked on the next two, and on the
night preceding this attack had been on the move, arriving only just before dawn in an area overlooked and
constantly shelled by the enemy. The troops crossed a start-line laid farther back than the plan provided but
soon caught up with the barrage and had to pause until it lifted. The attack by the 2 /2 4 1h on the 2 6th October had
cleared the enemy from the ground covered in the first phase except for some isolated survivors who offered no
resistance, but the enemy, apparently aiming behind the shell-burst of the British barrage, brought artillery fire
down on the battalion transport and in the midst of the rear companies. The Fig Orchard, which was the first
objective, was reached in 50 minutes. Captain Gillan's company dug in close behind the orchard with battalion
headquarters near by. Soon Lieutenant Barrett's company and Lieutenant Vincent's passed through and
continued down a track leading towards the coast. They took up position some 800 yards because the protective
artillery barrage was too close. Captain Burrell's company then patrolled deeply ahead, but without making
contact.
With companies barely stronger than platoons, the battalion's attack with two companies forward had
inevitably been on a narrow frontage. The path taken missed enemy positions on the left flank, which now
became troublesome, heavily mortaring battalion headquarters and Gillan's company. Moreover, the whole area
was found to be strewn with anti-personnel mines. Casualties were mounting and it fell to Gillan's company to
deal with two enemy posts which were mainly responsible. The first patrol of 10 men under Lieutenant North
met with disaster when a mortar bomb landed in its midst, killing or seriously wounding all except the
commander. North returned and organized a second patrol to bring his men back. Colonel Colvin had
meanwhile ordered Gillan to send out another patrol with firm orders to subdue the other post. Corporal
McKellar, who was given the task, moved with ten others through a minefield, attacked with grenades two
machinegun crews giving covering fire to a mortar crew, and captured the guns and their crews. Next they
rushed and overcame the mortar crew some 30 yards away and returned with their prisoners carrying the
captured weapons. After one more post was silenced by patrol action it appeared that local opposition had at last
been subdued. Meanwhile, Burrell's company had returned and dug in a short distance behind battalion
headquarters.
On the left the 2 / 15 th attacked northward from Trig 29. As the battalion was forming up it was heavily
shelled and Colonel Migno and his adjutant were wounded, Magno mortally. Strange took command and led the
battalion in a vigorous, well-executed attack. Advancing through machine-gun and mortar fire they encountered
posts manned mainly by Italians 900 yards from the forming-up place, overcame them and secured their
objectives. In the attack 89 Italians were killed and some 130 Italian and German prisoners were taken. No
minefields were found and the vehicles had no difficulty in moving up. The battalion dug in. It had lost 6 killed,
including Captain Jubb, a company commander, and 36 wounded; 3 men were missing. Soon after first light

two enemy tractors approached towing anti-tank guns. The guns and 22 Germans with them were promptly
captured.
The fresh 2 /2 3rd (Lieul-Colonel Evans) and the 46th Royal Tanks (Licut-Colonel T.C.A. Clarke), who
were to execute the advance to the Main road, had trained together for semi-mobile operations. To gain surprise
and save time Evans planned to advance to the objective with his assault troops (one company) mounted on the
tanks and two companies following on his own carriers and those of the 2/2 4th. By the time the 2 0 th Brigade's
attack began all were lined up ready at the forming-up place, there to await that brigade's success signal. An
alerted enemy was also ready. When the barrage opened and the advance started the tanks and carriers and the
men mounted on them were exposed to sharp fire. Some of the tanks, not having the assistance of moonlight as
broad as that laid on for the earlier attacks, missed the marked gaps in the home minefield and were
immobilized. Others, according to the diarist of the 2/2 3rd, moved right and left contrary to instructions to
search for others gaps and "an extremely confused situation" developed, into which the enemy pumped shot and
shell from weapons of every kind. In the left company, in which casualties were severe and all the officers
wounded, the company sergeant-major, Warrant-Officer Joyce, rallied the survivors and led them forward
without the tanks to overcome the foremost enemy positions in hand-to-hand fighting and take 40 prisoners; but
elsewhere the attack did not progress.
It was decided to reset the attack and the sappers were directed to widen the gaps, but much time was
lost. 'The difficulties of this period,' states the 91h Division's report, 'were added to by communications
between the commanding officers of 2/23 Battalion and 4 61h Royal Tanks breaking down and the headquarters
of 2 6th Brigade and 2 3rd Armoured Brigade, which were situated close to each other, not being in touch.' So no
doubt it appeared to the staff at divisional headquarters. Evans had lost touch because Clarke and most (if not
all) of his squadron leaders had been wounded. Whitehead and Richards had gone forward together to keep
closer touch.
After the gaps had been widened the advance was resutmed until the tanks again reported mines.
Engineer sweeping operations were undertaken but failed to discover any. It was 12.55 a.m. before the tanks
moved forward again, but then they came under fire from six 50-mm anti-tank guns, whereupon they dispersed
taking their infantry with them. The enemy became very active and casualties mounted fast.
The operation was developing into the type of muddle for which there were several derisive epithets in
common army parlance. Colonel Evans gathered what men he could - only 60 or 70 - and organized an attack
which at 3.15, after a hard fight, took the main German position with its six guns and 160 men. About that time
another group of infantry and 15 tanks who were out of touch with Evans, advanced east of Evans' position
towards the railway. After 800 yards they came tinder fire from German guns, including one 88-mm; nine tanks
were knocked out and many of the infantrymen were hit. At 4 a.m., Evans reported that he was digging in about
1000 yards forward of the original FDLs because he had so few men and was not in touch with any responsible
officer of the 46tl' RTR. The 2/2 3 "r had suffered very severe losses in the attack, having lost 29 killed, 172
wounded and 6 missing. The casualties included 2 majors, 4 captains, and 10 lieutenants.
Meanwhile, Brigadier Whitehead had made a new plan: to attack with the 2/24th and 2 / 4 8 th Battalions
from the area firmly held by the 2/1 5 th. General Morshead made the 4 0th RTR available to him, but the 2 3rd
Armoured Brigade could not at such short notice give a definite time for the 4 0th's arrival at the forming-up
place and it became apparent that the fresh battalions would probably have insufficient time to reorganize on
their objectives before daylight. Morshead, therefore, postponed the attack and ordered Whitehead to ensure
that the 2 /2 3rd was securely established and made contact with the 2 / 13th on its right and 2 / 1 5th on its left: the
2/24"' and 2 / 4 8th were to return to their lying-tip areas. The few tanks of the 4 6th RTR still in running order -
only eight - were withdrawn.
Dawn on the 2 9 "hfound the 2 / 13th' Battalion in an isolated, rather precarious position, with open left
flank and a gap of 400 yards (protected, however, by an enemy-laid minefield) between the two left companies;
opposite the gap were known enemy fortified posts, which might be still occupied. Behind the battalion there
was an open flank for almost 1,000 yards.

From 7 a.m. onward heavy and accurate artillery fire fell on the battalion headquarters. Three shells
penetrated the dug-outs; the third wounded and incapacitated Colonel Colvin, killed the adjutant, Lieutenant
Pinkney, and wounded the anti-tank officer, Lieutenant Gould. Captain Jones, the command post officer,
notified the catastrophe to Windeyer's headquarters and the two forward companies through his radio links. The
intelligence officer (Lieutenant Maughan) who was the only officer left on the headquarters, asked brigade
headquarters to find Major Daintree, the second-in-command, and in the meantime Captain Gillan had come
across from his company to take charge. Major Daintree could not be found. Later it was ascertained that he had
been wounded while reorganizing the transport and evacuated. Thereupon Windeyer asked Morshead to make
available Captain Kelly, a former adjutant of the unit, who was then serving on divisional headquarters.
Morshead agreed and promoted Kelly to the rank of major. Kelly arrived in the afternoon and took command.
Finding that the four rifle companies had between them only about 100 men, he reinforced them with men from
"B" Echelon and the Headquarters Company. Gillan later wrote: 'To the dazed and battered troops, it was like a
shot in the arm to see Major Joe back in the fold.'
It was against the 2/ 1 5 th and the 2 / 17th, however, that the enemy's main efforts were directed on the
2 9 Fourteen tanks stood hull-down near Trig 29 all day and the whole area came under tempestuous fire. After
th.
dawn it became evident that the enemy had only a confused idea of the Australian position; several enemy
vehicles drove into the Australian lines and were destroyed or captured. Later in the morning enemy infantry
and tanks formed up and two counter-attacks in which both tanks and infantry were employed were directed at
Trig 1 29 - one in the morning, and another in the early afternoon. The afternoon attack, which was made with
greater determination, was sustained for three-quarters of an hour. Both were repelled, but on the second
occasion not before six of the Australian anti-tank guns had been knocked out. At 5 p.m. the 2 / 15 th and 2 / 17th
sustained a still more determined attack launched at the junction of the two battalions; it was pressed until
darkness fell. In coping with these attacks Colonel Simpson and his supporting artillery were greatly assisted by
reports from Captain Dinning, who had moved across from his company headquarters to an exposed
observation post on Trig 29 to watch the enemy's moves. It could be seen that dreadful casualties had been
inflicted on the attackers. As the light faded the enemy could be observed digging in at distances varying from a
quarter of a mile to a mile from the Australian front. Shortly after midnight one Italian officer drove up with a
truckload of Italian wounded to the 2 /2 7th Battalion's RAP; which was then crowded with wounded from the
2/15th.
Several more attacks were to be made before the enemy gave up the attempt to dislodge the 2 / 15 th and
2/ 17th Battalions. The Australians' training in quick and thorough consolidation together with effective artillery
protection had provided the answer to the German practice of counter-attacking quickly rather than deliberately.
The enemy, unless able to counter-attack within two hours or so of the capture of a position, had little hope of
breaking the front of these battalions, depleted though they were, except by a deliberate set-piece operation.
At 1.10 a.m. on the 2 9 th the 2 0th Brigade assumed responsibility for the whole northern sector and the
2/ 2 3rd Battalion was placed under Brigadier Windeyer's command. After learning of plans for a renewed attack
by the 2 6th Brigade on the 3 0th -3 1st, Windeyer ordered the 2 /2 3 rd to advance its positions 1,000 yards on the
night of the 2 9 th so as to link the northeast part of the 2 / 15th with the 2/13'h. This was done without incident.
The break-out operation was to be a decisive attack, called SUPER-CHARGE and the plan written that
day, provided that it should be delivered on the night of 31st October-1 st November.
It was essential to maintain relentless pressure on the enemy until the break-out operation took place
and it fell to the lot of the 9'h Division to do so by renewing its northward attacks.
The 2 /3 2 "dBattalion (Lieut-Colonel Balfe) assembled for its attack on the night of the 3 0 th, for which
the accompanying barrage was to begin at 10 p.m. Before it started two officers of the battalion had been
wounded by a sniper while reconnoitering - Major Joshua (who nevertheless carried on) and Captain Jacoby,
wounded mortally. The two leading companies, commanded by Captains Huitfeldt and Eacott, set off ten
minutes after the barrage began. Encountering no strong opposition, they soon caught up with it [the barrage].
The railway line - the intermediate objective - was reached in good time; 175 prisoners, nearly all German from
the 1/3 6 1s"Battalion, had been taken. After a pause on the railway line to re-form the advance continued against
heavier opposition, and casualties mounted. After the forward troops had crossed the railway Colonel Balfe and

his wireless operator were on the railway line when six Germans moved forward, evidently to surrender. One
drew a pistol and shot Balfe in the arm. Balfe emptied his revolver into the Germans and made off.
When the final objectives had been reached, two companies remained in reverse slope positions
covering the road while two moved left and occupied an area south of the railway facing west. The engineers
were clearing mine-free tracks leading forward and had begun breaking down the 12-foot railway embankments
to enable vehicles to cross. But the truck bringing their explosives and equipment had not arrived and they were
reduced to doing the job with shovels and using Hawkins mines for explosive charges. Within the area captured
by the 2/ 32nd Battalion was a blockhouse which had been used by the enemy as a main casualty station. Three
German medical officers and their orderlies remained on duty. Field Marshal Rommel had always enjoined a
scrupulous adherence to the rules of war. True to these traditions and those of their service, the German doctors
and orderlies toiled that night and in the following days to minister without discrimination to the wounded of
both sides as they were brought in. There they were soon joined by the 2 /3 2 "dS medical officer, Captain
Campbell, and his men and by Captain Grice and his section of the 2/1 1th Field Ambulance.
The 2/48t' Battalion under Lieut-Colonel Hammer, the 2 /2 4th under Lieut-Colonel Weir and the 2 /3rd
Pioneer Battalion under Lieut-Colonel Gallasch set off in turn from the Trig 29 area, at 10.30, 10.40 and 11.00
p.m. respectively, in the wake of the 2 /3 2 nd Battalion, and each had some action on the way. Two platoons from
separate companies of the 2 /3 rd Pioneers assaulting, separately, and saved just in time from mistaking each other
for the enemy by the inimitable profanity of their language, attacked one troublesome post to the left of the
track leading to the 2 /3 2nd and overcame it in close hand-to-hand fighting, taking more than 50 prisoners.
The battalions dug in near the 2 /3 2nd while waiting to go forward, the area being harassed by fire. A
platoon of the pioneers went over to help the engineers with their task of gapping the railway embankment. The
enemy had begun closing in from the west and was soon raking the gap with fire. A platoon of the pioneers and
a company of the 2/ 3 2nd independently attacked the positions mainly responsible with eventual success and
again some misunderstandings were sorted out by descriptive language.
Casualties were coming fast. Balfe was hit a second time and carried out and Major Joshua took
command of the 2/32"". A German 88-mm gun shot up many carriers and vehicles attempting to bring
ammunition and stores forward and many did not get through, including those of one company of the 2 /3 2nd.
About 3.45 a.m., after three hours work by 50 men, the crossing over the railway was complete and the "A"
Echelon vehicles of the 2/32 d companies north of the railway crossed over; but the enemy was now pressing
along the railway from the west and bringing heavy fire to bear on the gap. The 2 /3 2 "d had taken up will
henceforth be called the Saucer because that is what it was to look like when dawn revealed their situation to the
men of the 2/ 3 2nd and that is what they, and others who later went there, called it. In the next two days the
Saucer was to become the focal point in the struggle between the two armies.
The 2 /2 4t"' and 2/48"', numbering scarcely 450 men between them, had meanwhile set off on their
desperate eastward advance of 2,250 yards, marching to the sound of the guns - not to the distant sound of the
enemy's, but in the face of the close, harsh bombardment of their own - and were strewing the desert way of a
long fight with fallen wounded and dead, yet sustaining still their task with a greatness transcending its purpose.
The start-lines had been laid north from the railway to Barrel Hill, but not before the 2 /4 8 th had fought for the
ground by clearing a neighboring post. The barrage opened at I a.m.
Major Edmunds' company on the right and Captain Bryant's on the left led the advance. As they
reached the road they ran into deathly fire, but with numbers dwindling pressed on and with hard hand-to-hand
fighting for almost two hours forced their way through the enemy positions to the intermediate objectives. In the
right company casualties came fast; Lieutenant Caple was killed assaulting a post, another platoon commander,
Lieutenant Butler, was badly wounded and evacuated. Sergeant Ranford having taken command of his platoon
led assaults on two posts, overcoming both, and on the second occasion damaging beyond repair two
machine-guns and an 88-amm gun. Ranford, badly wounded, continued to lead his platoon, then only seven
strong, until hit again.
The reserve companies also had to fight their way forward to the intermediate objective, having to deal
with un-subdued enemy posts on the edge of the depleted forward companies' path. Passing through they took

the full force of the enemy's mortar and machine-gun fire. Captain Shillaker leading the right company was
soon badly wounded and Lieutenant Hamilton was killed. Sergeant Derrick led the company forward but it was
forced to ground near the objective. Captain Robbins' company on the left swung out to avoid a minefield and
continued the advance, but the rest of the battalion lost touch with them.
After Caple had been killed and Butler wounded, Edmunds ordered Lieutenant Allen to deal with
mortar and machine-gun posts that had brought his advance to a stand-still and as Allen led a successful bayonet
charge against them in the face of whipping fire, Edmunds resumed the advance with only six men. Allen's
platoon took 15 prisoners but suffered severely; it was reduced to three men (including him). On Allen's right
Edmunds led his six men in an assault on another post but was badly wounded by machine-gun fire as they
moved in. Allen, who was also wounded, was the only officer remaining to command the company's survivors,
then numbering only five.
Battalion headquarters, coming up between Shillaker's and Robbins' companies, also passed through
the original two forward companies and continued up the centre but soon found themselves well ahead of the
forward companies and began taking casualties from enemy fire from positions near the final objective. The
Regimental Sergeant Major, Warrant-Officer Legg, led an assault by five men on a post but four were lost.
Meanwhile, Captain Bryant, the only senior company commander apart from Robbins (who was still
out of touch), brought up what was left of the two companies that had taken the first objective and took charge,
amalgamating his with Shillaker's company (now commanded by Derrick who, though he had been hit, was still
carrying on) to form a composite company of 45 men, and then, accompanied on the right by Lieutenant Allen
commanding the few survivors of what was Edmunds' company, resumed the advance, organized a charge with
grenades and bayonet, and overcame the post that had held up Derrick's men.
Hammer had heard no word from Robbins, whose company had pressed on close to the objective,
because Robbins had been killed and all his platoon commanders and his headquarters men had been either
killed or wounded. The company had been caught in open ground as it approached the end of its advance and 16
men were killed assaulting the objective. When Robbins had been killed and the officers commanding the other
two platoons severely wounded, Sergeant Kibby took command and organized an attack on the objective with
the survivors, perhaps a dozen men, in two converging groups. The attackers were forced to ground within 20
yards of it. Kibby jumped up and charged, hurling grenades which silenced the post, but not before he had been
caught by the enemy's fire, which cut off the life of a soldier whose gallantry in this and earlier actions at El
Alamein could not have been surpassed. So was the left objective assaulted on the ground that Major Mollard's
company of the 2/2 4th, attacking from the other side, had briefly captured some months before.
Colonel Hammer called a conference of all who were now acting as commanders of what remained of
his battalion and ordered that the men were to dig in and hold the ground they had attained. The battalion, now
reduced to 41 men, had no communications, all signal sets having been shot up and lines mutilated. He decided
that he would make contact with the 2 /2 4th Battalion to see whether it would be feasible to hold the ground
where he was, north of the road, while the 2 /2 4th held ground south of the road. Handing over command to his
adjutant, Captain Reid, who had been thrice wounded, Hammer set off alone armed only with a pistol, to find
the 2 /2 4th. Later he returned, having been shot through the face, but with two prisoners. He had found the
headquarters of the 2 /24th, but Weir was not there. He then ordered a withdrawal to the blockhouse, saying that
he believed the 2/ 24th would also be withdrawing.
Colonel Weir's patrol to Thompson's Post had penetrated the outer wire without incident but was fired
on soon afterwards a short range. One man killed; another was wounded as the patrol quickly withdrew. Private
O'Brien, a stretcher bearer, turned back, however, and brought the wounded man out. The fire showed
Thompson's Post to be very much occupied.
When Weir returned to his battalion's firm base, he was given an oral message to the effect that,
because Hammer's battalion was so depleted, Hammer proposed to withdraw; so Weir decided to do likewise.
Hammer, on the other hand, had decided to withdraw only because after making contact with the 2 /2 4 th while
Weir was absent leading his patrol to Thompson's Post he had gathered that Weir had decided to withdraw. Still
it was all for the best, and both battalions came back just before dawn to the Saucer. On the way, however, the

2/24(' passed through a minefield of aerial bombs, two of which detonated. There were 28 casualties; Lieutenant
Kearney and 11 others were killed and Colonel Weir so badly wounded that Captain Harty (who was a
temporary captain on only three months' standing) had to take command. The devoted O'Brien moved
fearlessly among the wounded, dressing all 16. Later two of the battalion's carriers came up and brought out
these and other wounded just before first light.
Harty led back the 54 survivors of the 2 /2 4 th to the 2 /3 2 nd Battalion's base where they took up a
position on the left of the 2 /3 2nd Battalion. Weir was taken to the casualty station at the blockhouse and Major
Gebhardt took command after first light. Of the 206 men (including only five officers) with which the 2/ 24 'hhad
entered the attack, 42 had been killed and 116 wounded (though some of these were still carrying on); two men
were missing. The battalion had taken 48 German and 14 Italian prisoners and a formidable array of weapons:
one 88-mm gun, two 50-mm guns, two 20-mm guns, 12 Spandaus, one medium mortar, one light mortar, and
seven howitzers.
Hammer had also withdrawn his few - his very few - to the base at the Saucer, where they dug in just
to the east of the 2 /3 2 nd Battalion. The 2 /4 8 th Battalion had taken some 200 German prisoners. It had lost 47
killed, 148 wounded and 4 were missing. Among the 18 officers who took part in the attack only four now
remained alive and unwounded. On 2 3rd October this battalion had 30 officers and 656 other ranks; of which 21
officers and half the men had since been killed or wounded.
The prisoners taken by the division in the operation totaled 544 of which 421 (including 7 officers)
were German and 123 (including 5 officers) were Italian.
In the early hours of the 31" an important reinforcement reached the small Australian force of three
depleted battalions astride the main road - one which was soon to play an important and possibly decisive role
in a battle which was of some importance to the Eighth Army's prospects of a successful break-out. The 2 8 9th
Battery R.A., a battery of Rhodesian anti-tank gunners manning 6-pounders who had earlier been sent up from
the XIII Corps to help with operations in the north and were now attached to the 2 /3rdAnti-Tank Regiment, had
been allotted to the 2 /3 2n"Battalion's support. In the dark their commander sited three troops (one being still in
reserve) to cover, on the right, the approaches to the crossing from north and west - this troop's guns being on
either side of the crossing - and on the left, to prevent close envelopment of the 2/32nd battalion's left flank and
rear by tanks moving round the front of the battalion's protective minefield and through the gap between the
2/32"'• and 2/15"' battalions. Here were two troops, one close to the railway and one farther out, in the gap.
Also in the Saucer the next morning were three troops of Major Copeland's 9(1'Battery of the 2 /3rd
Anti-Tank Regiment - Lieutenant Kessell's in support of the 2 /3 2 d Battalion on its northern flank, "B" Troop
and "C" Troop (in support of the 2/24"' and 2/48"' Battalions) being south of the railway.
A situation map showing the 9"' Division's dispositions at dawn on the 3 1st, if one could then have
been correctly drawn from the scanty information available, would have presented a vastly (and gravely)
different picture from that expected to be seen on completion of the operation. The coast road was not opened
nor were the well-developed defenses north and south of it cleared. It is strange that it could have been expected
that they would be. The overprint map and all other information had given clear warning that the defenses about
the road were formidable. There are some indications that a belief had been nurtured that the enemy was
thinning out and might by then have been demoralized; but if there was some evidence to that effect there was
more plain evidence to the contrary.
Dawn revealed that an enemy locality had been penetrated and there were many isolated pockets which
were quickly mopped
Pioneers, which up. The
found itself 2/32
in the midstBattalion took position,
of an enemy some 200 tookprisoners.
47. Major Rosevear's company of the
The two isolated companies of the 2 /3 2nd Pioneer Battalion received the enemy's first attention.
Captain Stevens' company, holding no ground of vantage, and under observation from the enemy on the
sand-dunes, was in the worst position. Stevens sent a patrol of 17 under Lieutenant Dunn to some dunes out in
front to enfilade the enemy from the flank. Some of the men were cut down by fire. Lieutenant Dunn extricated
the patrol but not before all the NCOs had been killed or wounded, and more casualties were suffered as they

came out. Dunn was badly hit and Captain Owens went out and carried him back. Only four of the 17 returned
unwounded. Stevens' company was pinned down, any move attracting fire, until about 10.30 a.m. when the fire
ceased and a German officer approached under a white flag and advised surrender, as the alternative to
annihilation. He was told, 'If you want us, come and get us', some other remarks not in the best taste were also
addressed to the envoy. After he had withdrawn the Germans completed the company's encirclement and
continued to lacerate it with fire throughout the morning.
Greater efforts were being made by the enemy to force the issue against the men in the Saucer to the
south of Stevens' and Owens' companies, but the Australians had meanwhile received an important
reinforcement. In the early hours of the morning the 4 0th RTR (Lieut-Colonel J.L.T. Finigan) less one squadron
had been slowly moving northward, as sappers cleared a path for them, behind the enemy's original front-wire,
by the track past the fig orchard which ran north to the railway along the western edge of Thompson's post.
About dawn, and not without mishaps, Finigan brought his squadron past Thompson's Post and up to the 2 /4 8th
Battalion, by which time he had received orders that be was to support that battalion. There is some evidence
that the purport of Finigan's assignment was that Hammer and he should organize an attack on Thompson's
Post. Be that as it may, Finigan carried out to the letter his orders to support Hammer's battalion and his tanks
stayed beside the 2 /4 8th through the day, two troops - no more had space for manoeuvre between the minefields
- going into hull-down positions north of the railway.
The first German counter-attack was made about 11.30 a.m. Fifteen German Mark Ill and Mark IV
tanks advanced north of the road and swung in between the road and railway near the Barrel track while
infantry advanced on their right flank. The Rhodesians' guns and the Valentines engaged them. The German
tanks probably expected a "walk-over" and panic but met strong fire and steady defence and soon withdrew.
The infantry attack was smashed by artillery and other fire.
The main attack on the Saucer was made in the early afternoon, again coming in from the northern side
of the ridge. While the 6-pounders engaged the German tanks to the north, Valentine tanks south of the railway
came forward to meet them. Two of the Rhodesian 6-pounders were put out of action but other Rhodesian guns
knocked out four German tanks. The German tanks fought their way forward, knocking out many Valentines,
and overran Captain Eacott's company of the 2 /3 2 nd Battalion, grinding in the infantry positions and taking
prisoner most of the company's survivors. During the action the enemy attempted to bring forward an 88-mm
gun but it was knocked out (but more British than German) and a Valentine and a German Mark III were in
flames. In this action, an anti-tank gun of the 2 /3 rd Regiment wounded Gunner Schwebel whom was the least
disabled, though severely injured in his arms and legs. Schwebel managed to get the other two wounded men
across to the blockhouse. Typifying the spirit of defense, he returned to the gun and had it ready to fire before
the next attack. It was then hit again, whereupon Schwebel seized a Bren gun and fought with the infantry.
It was decided to bring in the reserve squadron of the 4 0th RTR. The squadron arrived at Windeyer's
headquarters. Captain Williams then guided the tanks forward under fire, at first in a jeep and later on foot, to
the 2 / 1 5 th Battalion, whence most went on. Soon afterwards, however, the Valentines were withdrawn from the
Saucer. No other comment need be made on the performance of the commanders and crews of the Valentine
tanks in the fighting on 3 1st October than that of the historian of the 2/4 8th Battalion, which had earned the right
to judge how others fought: 'The courage of these men,' he wrote, 'made their action one of the most
magnificent of the war.'
About 4 p.m. the German tanks attacked again from the north but eight were stopped by gunfire and as
the clay ended they withdrew. They had, however, achieved part of their objective by pushing the British off the
road; for in a lull in the fighting towards 5 p.m. Rosevear's company, isolated by the earlier break-through
behind them, was withdrawn. That left the international blockhouse with its tireless workers, in effect, in a
no-man's land. From it the enemy had permitted casualties to be evacuated throughout the day. When darkness
fell the Pioneers reorganised and dug in close to the railway embankment on its south side. In the attacks on the
Saucer that day, the Germans had repeatedly brought up infantry with their tanks, but on each occasion the
concentrated gunfire of the defence had dispersed the infantry.
It was not until late afternoon that it was known at Morshead's headquarters just how weak the
depleted battalions at the Saucer had become. It then became obvious that their strength was insufficient to

maintain the defense of the place against a violently reacting enemy, but to have given up the ground seized
would have accorded neither with the army commander's plan nor with Morshead's character. The relief of the
2 6t1 Brigade by the 2 4th as previously contemplated would have involved, if all had gone according to plan,
merely a change-over between battalions which would then have been alongside each other; a relief at the
Saucer, the most hotly contested ground on the whole front, where an attack might well occur, while units were
changing over, was another matter. But Morshead at once decided that it must take place. The orders were
issued about 7.30 p.m. The relief, effected at night with transport using circuitous routes, was completed by
3.30 a.m., which reflected some credit on the division's standard of staff work and training. The exhausted
enemy did not attack while it was proceeding.
Brigadier Godfrey took over command of units in the Saucer from Brigadier Whitehead. The 2 /2 8'h
Battalion - which Lieut-Colonel Loughrey had had rebuilt after the Ruin Ridge disaster and molded in so short a
time into a first-rate combatant unit - relieved the 2 /2 4th Battalion; the 2/43 d Battalion (Lieut-Colonel Wain)
relieved the 2 / 4 8 th. The 2 / 3 2 nd (Now back in its own brigade) and the 2 / 3rd Pioneers were not relieved. Brigadier
Godfrey established his command post in the Saucer.
The changes in dispositions that had been made in the Saucer under pressure of attack during the
afternoon had not been known when the relief orders were issued, so that the fresh battalions arriving there by
night found their instructions inapplicable and the situation confused. Colonel Loughrey acted with great vigour
in consulting other commanders and having his companies quickly disposed, by his own siting, in tenable
positions interlocking with the other units' defenses. The improvised dispositions adopted in the dark in a
precarious situation on un-reconnoitered ground were - in the words of a unit historian - 'the ultimate in
unorthodoxy', but were to be proved the next day and found not greatly wanting by the ultimate test of severest
attack. The defended locality's front-line (facing west) comprised one company of the 2 /4 3 d astride the main
road, then on its left two companies of the 2 /2 8th between road and railway then on the left of the railway the
depleted 2 / 3 2 nd Battalion, holding a flank out towards the 2 / 15t" defenses; the other three companies of the
2/43r1 were in depth behind the two forward companies of the 2/28"', and the other two companies of the 2/281h
were in depth behind the 2 / 3 2 "0 Battalion. Farther still to the left was the 2 / 3rd Pioneer Battalion. The 2 / 4 3 rd
faced east and north (with its northern flank platoon on Barrel Hill), the 2/28"' and 2 /3 2nd northwest and west
and south-west. Thus it was astride the road itself that the defense had least depth. The men dug themselves in
as best they could but the ground was in many places unyielding nor had they any head cover.
The anti-tank defense was improved by disposing a troop of the 12"' Battery's guns with the 2/15"' to
cover the gap between that unit and the 2 /3 2 d. (It was further strengthened the next day when the reserve troop
of the Rhodesian Battery was driven in helter-skelter and established south of the railway as an attack was
imminent.) A minefield had been laid on the north-west side and the front was enfiladed from the 2 / 15th
positions by machine-guns also brought forward during the night.
The survivors of the 2 /4 2 d and 2/48"', who bad suffered more casualties during the day, were taken
back to the original front-line on the coast sector (the defenses opposite to which were still occupied by the
enemy) to sleep the night and muster next morning at their saddest roll-calls ever.
Dawn on Sunday 1I"November in the Saucer revealed to the incomers numerous enemies all around
them, at distances only 800 to 1,000 yards away. The Germans were doubtless no less surprised than the
Australians at what daylight revealed.
The enemy promptly opened fire with small arms, mortars, 88-mm guns firing airburst shells, and a
variety of field guns. Most of the fire came from the west and north-west but some from the north-east and
south-east. An artillery duel soon developed in which, of course, the Germans fared worst, not only because
they had fewer guns but because those they had were alarmingly short of ammunition. However, it was the
enemy's turn next, it seemed, when at 8.40 a.m. German dive bombers, escorted by 15 fighters, were seen
making for the Australian position; but they were intercepted by British and American fighters and jettisoned
their bombs on their own troops. Seven were shot down. The enemy's infantry were seen assembling about 10
a.m. and at the same time it was reported that the British Intelligence service had intercepted a message for
Field Marshal Rommel ordering the 21s' Armoured and 90"h Light Divisions to attack the Barrel Hill salient
along the axis of the road and railway. Their terms of the message indicated that Rommel thought only one

strong-point remained, which would not withstand a resolute attack. Morshead drove down to the tempestuous
Saucer and conferred there with Brigadier Godfrey.
Later in the morning more troops were seen moving south-east from Sidi Rahman. Against this
dangerous British outpost presumed to be so weakly held, the Germans at midday opened an attack which they
were to sustain and press without much avail throughout that long day and into the night with a succession of
determined and most desperate attempts to fulfill their commander's injunction to destroy it. The brunt of the
attacks came in between the road and railway on the 2 / 4 3 rd and 2 / 2 8 th Battalions, but the 2 / 3 2nd were also in the
fire fight and, good neighbors as they were, judged it better to give than to receive. Their mortars were busy
throughout the afternoon and very effective.
The first attack, made in the late forenoon by about a battalion and a half of infantry in conjunction
with numerous tanks, was supported by sustained artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. At least eight 88-mm
guns were firing air-burst over the Australians. Both then and throughout the day the number of tanks employed
could seldom be estimated because of the dust and smoke. As the assault was coming in, the enemy was
attacked by a "football team" of bombers answering a call from the division. At 12.45, six tanks were closing in
on the 2 /4 3rd from the north-west. By 1.25 one platoon of the north-east company had been thrust off Barrel Hill
but the position was regained by prompt counterattack. Anti-tank fire had knocked out three German tanks and
one 88-mm gun north of the 2 / 4 3 rd.
In front of the 2 /2 8th tanks advanced close to the forward companies, went into hull-down positions
and fired mainly on the anti-tank guns. All four guns of Lieutenant Kessell's troop of the 2 /3 rd Anti-Tank
Regiment were knocked out. Soon twelve 6-pounders and two 2-pounders had been put out of action. The
forward troops, who in the opinion of the battalion's diarist, were 'not impressed by the close proximity of the
tanks' met the challenge with sustained, accurate fire from all weapons. Casualties mounted but about 2.30 p.m.
the German tanks apparently realized that their infantry could not get through and backed out. The Germans had
singled out the Rhodesians for special attention. Eight of their anti-tank guns were put out of action. In a lull
Major Copeland sent Lieutenant Wallder's troop across the railway to replace them and Wallder managed to get
his guns into action under the enemy's observation and fire.
At 3.25 p.m. the enemy resumed the tank and infantry attack against the 2 / 4 3 rd and 2 / 2 8 th. This assault
came in from the northern side and was pressed home against the north-west company of the 2 /4 3 rd commanded
by Captain Hare, overrunning a platoon on Barrel Hill, which was captured. Hare was killed. Sergeant Joy,
whose platoon had been partly overrun, reorganised his men and regained all the lost positions but one and
eventually the enemy withdrew. On the 2 /2 8thS front the attack had fallen mainly on Captain Taylor's company
and Captain Newbery's, both of whom proved inspiring leaders. The 2 /2 8th had no artillery Forward
Observation Officer nor line communication to the rear and, therefore, the artillery fire could not be directed to
best effect. Some ground was given up but the attack was withstood and the forward companies held on.
Some of the German tanks pushed on past the Australian position down the road to the east towards
Thompson's Post. Later - about 3.50 p.m. - 27 tanks were observed north of Thompson's Post. At the same time
enemy infantry began forming up astride the road and railway about a mile or so to the west of the Australian
positions, but were effectively shelled. The enemy next began probing, apparently seeking weak spots, after
which an advance against the 2/2 8th was made by infantry riding on tanks and with several self propelled guns
coming forward to support, but the German infantry were quickly persuaded by accurate Australian fire to go to
ground. Two self-propelled guns were soon knocked out.
By 5 p.m. the enemy appeared to have accepted failure of that attack but half an hour later tanks and
infantry formed up to assault from the east while from the other side about 100 infantry advanced with
determination between the road and railway. These were halted by steady fire and the attack from the east did
not develop.
At dusk, adopting the traditional German tactic of advancing out of the setting sun, tanks and infantry
half concealed by dust and smoke attacked from the west while a simultaneous thrust was made from the
north-east, covering fire was given from the ground seized on Barrel Hill. The force attacking from the
north-east comprised at least three tanks and 15 lorry-loads of infantry. Again the attacks failed to penetrate the
defensive fire.

The German onslaught continued after dark. An assault supported by an artillery bombardment was
made at 8.30 p.m. and withstood, but the fire fight continued. Colonel Evans, appointed to take over the
command of the brigade, arrived at 9.30 p.m. Soon afterwards all lines of communications to the Saucer and
throughout most of the division was cut by British tanks moving forward through the divisional area. Still the
fire continued to rage in the Saucer. Before it died down at 2.30 a.m. the next morning an intense British gun
barrage had opened up farther south. Operation SUPERCHARGE had begun.
The 20"1 Brigade was harassed by shelling throughout the 1st. When the German attack opened at
midday, the 2/15"' now cormnanded by Major Grace was heavily shelled and the other battalions were also
under intermittent fire. In the 2/17th an outstanding company commander, Captain McMaster, was mortally
wounded.
On the afternoon of 1st November, Colonel Macarthur-Onslow of the composite force had been
warned to send machine-guns, anti-tank guns and two platoons of Pioneers to strengthen the right flank of the
2/ 4 3rd between the railway and the main road. The thin-skinned vehicles could not get through in daylight.
When Captain Williams (2/ 2nd Machine Gun Battalion) reached the 2 /4 3rd, Colonel Wain told him that as a
result of the counter-attacks his battalion and the 2 /2 8th were in so confined an area that it was not advisable to
bring so large a force forward; instead the detachment was sited in support between both battalions. It reached
its position at 3.30 a.m. on the 2nd.
During the rest of the night of the 1I"-2 nd the battalions of the 2 4 th Brigade were reorganised so as to
give each battalion more room and to bring a reserve battalion back into a position in depth. The 2/4 3rd was now
north of the railway with the composite force detachment to the east, the 2 /3 2 nd south of the railway with-the
2/28"h to the east. The 2 /3 d Pioneers were on the left of the 2/32nd and linked with the 2 / 15 th.
Throughout that fiery first day of November the infantry had received formidable support from the
Desert Air Force, though targets were hard to find because of the dispersal of the enemy's vehicles.
Stark evidence of the severity of the fighting was found the next day when a patrol of the 2 /3 2 "d
Battalion counted 200 enemy dead in front of that battalion's positions. The salt marsh beyond Barrel Hill was
so closely pock-marked with shell holes that it would have been difficult to find a square yard that had not been
cratered.
In the fighting in that area from 30"' October to 2 "dNovember, the four battalions of the 2411' Brigade
had 487 casualties, most of which were received before Operation SUPERCHARGE began. The 2 /4 3 'd had 43
killed (and 7 missing), the 2/32(nd 21, the 2/28"' 13 (and 10 missing), the 2 /3rd Pioneers 14 (and 46 missing).
Thus, the 9"' Division had carried out its "crumbling" mandate to attack northwards and to draw into
the northern sector and upon itself as much of the enemy's fighting strength as possible while the Eighth Army
was making its preparations for SUPERCHARGE. That was the division's contribution to the final break-out.

APPENDIX L, ANNEX 3
NEW ZEALAND ENGINEER BREACHING OPERATIONS
DURING OPERATION SUPERCHARGE*
151 BRIGADE, NIGHT OF 1-2 NOVEMBER
NORTH LANE, 151 BRIGADE, NIGHT OF 1-2 NOVEMBER
Lieutenant Standish, responsible for the northernmost lane, found employment 600 yards from the start
line and No. 3 Section went into action:
We cleared a lane - not many mines - the distance required,with tanks following immediately behind
us. When I thought we were through all the mines and gone the distance ordered,I told the leading tanks, and
all the tanks, about 30 of them, carriedon past us to support the infantry who were having a pretty rough time
.... I was getting hectic messages back from the infantry to hurry the tanks up as much as possible. This was
altogether a pretty sticky show and we had some casualties,1 forget how many.... Visibility was so bad in this
show I remember, due to smoke and dust etc., that we left continuous white tape along the ground behind us as
we went forward so that the tanks could see to follow us. There was supposed to be tracer to steer us, but we
could never see it and had to go by compass.'
SOUTH LANE, 151 BRIGADE, NIGHT OF 1-2 NOVEMBER
No. 2 Section (Lieutenant Page) was in trouble right from the start; they were under fire before they
reached the start line and their trucks were soon burning. Page writes:
Things got a bit disorganisedfora time and meanwhile the support vehicles started to bank up behind
us. Eventually on foot and with what blokes and gear we could muster we set forth with the pack hard on our
heels. Fortunately we did not, initially, encounter any mines but were in trouble almost immediately with
pockets of (enemy) machine gunners in burnt out vehicles and gun pits. These fellows had been left behind by
the advancing infantry. When a hold up of this nature occurredthe support vehicles would come to a halt afew
yards behind us. The drill was then evolved to bring one forward to shoot out the obstruction, move on to the
next and repeat the process. The prisoners that accrued in the meantime we faced in the general direction of
our lines and sent on their way.
We were makingfairly heavy weather of it in thisfashion when we discovered, I don't remember how,
that John Standish was aheadaccording to plan, his line of advance was taped, and there didn't appearto be
anybody using it at this state of the proceedings. The obvious thing to do seemed to change direction right with
our column and lead them on the taped line. This was done but not if 1 remember rightly, without argument
about lines of approach, etc. From this point on things went reasonably well. To my mind this was John
Standish's night, he did a greatjob.
Lieutenant Page was awarded an MC for his inspiring leadership and initiative during the battle.
Casualties for the night were two killed, thirteen wounded, three missing. Major Skinner's car went up on a
mine but he escaped with bruises and scratches.
CENTRAL LANE, INTER-BRIGADE BOUNDARY, NIGHT OF 1-2 NOVEMBER
Major Anderson detailed No. 3 Section to do the gapping for 6 Field Company. Lieutenant St. George
had not been replaced and Sergeant Brown still commanded, but in view of the importance of the assignment
the company second-in-command (Captain Goodsir) took over the conduct of the operation.
* Extracted from New Zealand Engineers, Middle East, by Joseph F. Cody, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War
1939-45, War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand, 1961, pages 363-369.

The section took its place behind the advancing infantry, who were soon lost in the dust and smoke of
the barrage. There was no delay at first minefield, which after a quick examination appeared to be a dummy;
how the second field was discovered is explained by Captain Goodsir:
Some hundreds of yards further on we ran into mortarfire and then heavy anti-tank and machine gun
fire at very close range without having visually detected any suggestion of a minefield. While we were pinned
down Sergeant Brown came up.from the rear and reportedthat the two right hand trucks had gone up on mines.
Brown was told to return to the trucks and look out for the section, which would be sent back in small
parties to avoid further casualties beyond the several already Sustained. Captain Goodsir saw the last sapper
moving back and made another quick search for his reconnaissance party before he followed them. Instead of a
gapping team organized and working he found Major Anderson and a few sappers clearing the lane by
themselves. The explanation was that Sergeant Brown had been wounded and evacuated, while the men, with
nobody to command them, had dispersed and taken what shelter they could find. It was fortunate that Major
Anderson and Lieutenant Hermans had arrived in the former's jeep. Hermans was sent forward to try to find
Captain Goodsir, who at that moment was himself looking for his 'recce' party before returning. Major
Anderson found that:
Things were not so good Sergeant Alan Freeborn(our Orderly Room Clerk) was with me and we had
to take over the platoon. We taped the line, made a hasty recce for mines lifted about a dozen and it was then
that we used the Scorpion it blew only one mine in passing the gap.'As a matter offact it also nearly 'blew'
Captain Goodvir, who had been missed by Lieutenant Hernmansand was returning after his fruitless search.
The leading tanks, waiting impatiently for a cleared lane, were asked to subdue the enemy fire while
the reserve section was brought up and the scattered No. 3 Section collected again. The sight of Sergeant
Lawrence calmly getting his gapping team working so restored the confidence of the rather shaken men that
they joined in the visual search for mines. Captain Goodsir took command of the augmented reserve section
while Lieutenant Morgan stood by with the transport and spare men. In the morning they found that they were
sharing the same piece of desert with about a hundred Italians who had decided early in the night that silence
was golden.
By this time the gap had been proved, the enemy fire silenced, Lieutenant Hermans had returned from
his quest for Captain Goodsir, and the advance resumed. Time was running short but the ground appeared more
open and the sappers cracked on the pace. Smoldering hessian camouflage and two upturned anti-tank guns
explained the lack of opposition after the pandemonium of a short time earlier. Major Anderson and Lieutenant
Hermans went on ahead in the scout car to get the lie of the land. Lieutenant Hermans wrote:
We pressed on with our scout car in the lead and "Andy" getting a bit concerned because we were a
bit behind schedule and time was running out. I was scanning ahead with my binocularsand remarked to Andy
that there seemed to be some peculiar troop movement ahead with people moving out of our way and going out
to our flanks. I couldn't make out what the "Infantry" were doing .... we came upon a derelict vehicle a
hundred yards or so to our left and there seemed to be somebody taking cover behind it. We paused to take
stock of the position and lo and behold! a platoon of infantry came up from our rear, deployed, and advanced
on the derelict.., the picture was beginning to unfold Instead of being ahead of us the infantry was behind and
the troop movement I had observed was the enemy forward troops getting out of the way when they saw or
heard the column of tanks rumbling along behind us. We were just a bit lucky the tanks had caught up with us
when they did or things would have been very sticky.
Regarding the tanks, Major Anderson says:
We were in contact with the tanks all the way. In fact they were treading on our heels and the
Brigadier used to give me hell whenever there was a briefhold up. We marked the route with green lamps every
tenth of a mile - by speedo - and the.first tank to pass always knocked the lamp over. I had several "Where the b
h -----are your lamps "firom the Brig.'
-----

With the armour out in the open and the sky starting to lighten, the section returned to the trucks and
began to dig in. Something white attracted attention and Lieutenant Hermans went to investigate. He returned
with three very nice Biretta (sic) pistols and four very shaken Italians from a dug-in tank that was flying a white
flag.
The reason for the extraordinarily heavy fire the company had encountered was made clear at daylight.
They had missed a 50-feet wide gap through the enemy minefield by yards and the gap had been covered by the
tank, several anti-tank guns and supporting machine guns, all of which our tanks had put out of action. The
minefield was put down with our own Hawkins mines hastily but effectively concealed beneath clumps of
desert scrub.' When the scattered No. 1 Section had been collected in the daylight it contained the lost 'recce'
party. They had not seen the mines but had run into one of the anti-tank guns, which they captured and held the
crew prisoner. They were then captured themselves by other Italians until the fire of our tanks presented the
opportunity of parting from their captors. The cost to 6 Field Company of the night's operation was five
wounded and one died of wounds, all from No. 3 Section.
152 BRIGADE, NIGHT OF 1-2 NOVEMBER
On the left of the attack 8 Field Company had a complicated route to follow before it could form up
behind 152 Brigade and in front of the tanks, anti-tank guns, carriers and assorted vehicles that carry the
supporting arms of an assaulting force.
Lieutenant Pickmere (3 Section), right, and Lieutenant Hanger (1 Section), left, advanced with their
sappers in two lines fifty yards apart and with their sandbagged trucks following in line abreast. There was no
information as to where mines might be found and the idea was that if the sappers prodding in front with their
fixed bayonets missed the mines the trucks would connect and, by the resulting explosion, disclose the field.
The keenest eyes could see no signs of disturbed sand, but the ground was hard and stony and the half-moon
obscured by cloud made the going slow.
NORTH LANE, 152 BRIGADE, NIGHT OF 1-2 NOVEMBER
The terrific din of the barrage drowned the noise of incoming missiles and five men went down - two
killed - when something exploded between the two lines. The Sappers carried on until it seemed that they would
be up with the forward infantry of transport following so nothing had been missed. At last there was a Dingo car
that had obviously hit a mine, and when Pickmere went to investigate he saw half-buried some lengths of what
appeared to be steel rail. On closer inspection it turned out to be a new type of mine - an Italian V3
anti-personnel as well as anti-tank mine, and the first encountered.
While the sappers were getting ready to give the new nuisances the primer cord treatment because
nobody knew anything of their mechanism or characteristics, Lieutenant Pickmere explored the belt and found
that it was only about one hundred yards wide and that beyond it the track-marks of German tanks were clearly
visible. Major Reid came up at this time and the two walked perhaps a quarter of a mile farther west until they
were quite convinced that it was now clear country.
When we came back the lane clearing was going well and it was not long before the sappers had the 8
or 9 mines and suspicious objects which had been located in the first 8 yd strip all set to blow up-a charge of
gelignite on each and the whole connected with primer cord. We made the mistake of placing our small
blistering charges ofgelly on the centre of these long mines instead of over one end where the mechanism was;
with the result that 2 or 3 did not go off when we detonated the line and we had to have several attempts at
them. All this was wasting valuable time while the tanks were impatiently waiting to get through. Major Reid
finally came up, lifted the remaining ones holus bolus and threw them clear of the lane.
SOUTH LANE, 152 BRIGADE, NIGHT OF 1-2 NOVEMBER
Lieutenant Hanger had some unexpected assistance on this occasion:

Had more hick this thne as we caught the Hun laying the minefield and] was able to make them pick
up afew and we were able to clear our gap pretty smartly... My main trouble was a dug in tank firing 88 AP
straightup our lane. A little disconcertingto have a white hot AP shell whizzing past your nose periodically
through the night. One of my other troubles was a Tommy Colonel, who wanted to halt his tanks in the gap
while he talked to his Brig. on the blower. However, after using a bit of good Kiwi language not usually used on
a senior officer we got him moving.
Ninth Armoured Brigade, which 6 Field Company had seen safely through the minefield and which
was to use the infantry objective as its start line and then, with the aid of a barrage, advance a further mile
before first light and smother the enemy gun line, did not fully succeed in its mission. It did not reach its final
objective although it knocked out at least seven 88-millimetre and thirty other guns, plus a dozen tanks, after an
all-day fight. The brigade commander had been ordered to accept if necessary 100 per cent casualties to make
good his objective, and that is very nearly what happened. The brigade left the assembly area with 133 tanks,
many of which were patched up battle casualties with strange crews; some dropped out during the 25-mile
approach march and it was not known exactly how many went into battle that morning, but when they were
reorganised into one regiment only 35, which included some that had got up during the morning, could be
mustered.
The brigade report on operations has a good word for the New Zealand sappers in spite of the trouble
with the lamps:
In the centre R Wilts had been seriously held up by afield of Hawkins mines irregularlylaid by our
own troops, in the clearing of which 6 NZ FD COMPANY NZE, whose work throughout this operation had been
of superlative quality, lost reanJ casualties in personnel and vehicles.... The work of the sappers in lifting
minefields in the dark and under enemy fire was beyond all praise,and without them the armour would never
have been able to advance.
The battle went on all day and after dark (2-3 November) No. 2 Section, 8 Field Company (Lieutenant
Wildey), and No. 1 Section, 7 Field Company (Lieutenant Foster), laid a protective minefield in front of the
Maoris. There was no enemy interference for the reason, unknown at the time, that Rommel was too busy
packing up and organising a fighting withdrawal. His first step was to put a holding force on the Fuka
escarpment. The Desert Air Force was not making his problem any easier and armoured-car elements were
beginning to worry at his communications. If a breakthrough occurred on a large scale the Italian division,
having no transport, would have to be left as souvenirs of the battle. The large-scale breakthrough did occur and
the Italians were left to contemplate an eventual safe return to sunny Italy.
The sappers passed the third day of the month widening lanes and destroying derelict tanks and
captured guns. A gap had been forced through the enemry defences at last and General Freyberg was told to get
his division concentrated as soon as possible after first light (4 November) and block the retreat through the
Fuka position. For this assignment he was given 4 Light Armoured Brigade in addition to 9 Armoured Brigade,
reduced now to a composite regiment.
The Field Companies reverted to the command of the brigades: 7 Field Company to 5 Brigade, 8 Field
Company to 6 Brigade, 6 Field Company to 9 Armoured Brigade; 5 Field Park Company was divided into a
water and demolitions party (Corporal Purvis) attached to Engineer Headquarters, a battle group to move with
Divisional Supply Column and a rear party with Divisional Reserve Group.
Fourth Light Armoured Brigade, whose mission was to cover the Division during the advance, passed
through the narrow gap soon after daybreak; 9 Armoured Brigade had collected its components under nearly
impossible conditions. They were spread all over the battlefield, where columns were crossing each other's
lines of advance in the darkness and each moving object created its own smoke screen of dust. Sixth Field
Company eventually found its place and the column began to move south-west in a wide sweep south to avoid
the battle I Armoured Division was still waging to the north.

Main Divisional Headquarters, which included Divisional Engineer Headquarters and part of 5 Field
Park Company, went next, followed by 5 Brigade with 7 Field Company during the afternoon, and finally about
dusk 6 Brigade (with 8 Field Company) got clear of the forward defended localities."
It was 1.50 a.m. on the morning of 2 November when every gun on the Corps' front opened up a
terrific barrage. One hundred and fifty thousand rounds were fired on a 4000-yard front during the next four and
a half hours. Under this umbrella the assault brigades advanced. New Zealand sappers worked with the British
infantry, lifting mines and marking lanes through which tanks and guns could advance in close support. Shortly
after 4 a.m. word came through that the first objectives had been taken, and two hours later both brigades were
on their final objectives and consolidating. Meanwhile, 28 (Maori) Battalion had cleared out the enemy pocket
on the right flank and linked up with the Australians. At a quarter past six 9 Armoured Brigade passed through
to carry on the attack. In a fierce and most gallant battle against a powerful anti-tank screen, the three armoured
regiments fought their way forward. Their casualties in tanks were extremely heavy but the result of their attack
was decisive. Enemy ranks counter-attacked our salient in the afternoon, but 1 and 10 British Armoured
Divisions were deployed forward in time. All but one of our armoured divisions were engaged and the entire
enemy's.
Throughout the night of 2-3 November and the next morning the battle continued along the whole
front. On the New Zealand sector the infantry came forward during the night, taking over from the assault
brigades, and held the salient securely on 3 November while our armour widened the gap. It was clear that the
enemy's resistance had been broken, and on 3 November our tactical reconnaissance aircraft observed lines of
enemy transport moving west, against which the bomber force flung its full strength. On the night of 3-4
November 9 Australian Division advanced its line north towards the coast, the Highlanders advanced across the
Rahman track, and early the next morning 10 Corps, including 2 NZ Division, began the chase. At the same
time 13 Corps in the south advanced. What was left of the Afrika Korps, with some remnants of the Italian
Mobile Corps, was in full retreat, leaving five Italian infantry divisions to their fate.

APPENDIX M
OPEN QUESTIONS
Question 1: Which division is the XXX Corps main effort during Operation Lightfoot? It appears to be the 2 dNew
Zedland Division. From section 5.1
Question 2: Is there a photo available of Abraham S. J. du Toit, South African Army? From section 5.4
Question 3: Is there a photo (or drawing) available of the 8 th Army's Pram Mine Detector? From section 5.4 Yes, see
The Sappers' War, with ninth Australian Division Engineers, 1939-1945, by Ken Ward-Harvery, published by
Sakoga Pty Ltd in conjunction with 9 th Division RAE Association NSW, 1992, page 73, "Diagrams... redrawn by
the Author [Ken-Harvey] from 'Report on Lightfoot Operations' in War Diary AWM [Australian War Memorial]
ref5/5/13 Nov 1942".
Question 4: Is there a photo available of the 'Snail' mine marking system? From section 5.4
Question 5: Who (the 8th Army or Middle East Forces) controlled the 24 labor and pioneer companies in 'General
Headquarters Reserve'? From section 5.4
Question 6: What does D.D.M.E. stand for? From section 5.4 Deputy Director Mechanical Engineering
Question 7: How did General Montgomery intend to keep the Axis infantry from withdrawing, and thus preventing
his 'crumbling' operation? From section 6.1.1.
Question 8: Are copies of the Operations Orders issued for the Second Battle of El Alamein by XXX Corps, X
Corps, 2nd New Zealand Division, and 10 th Armoured Division (or their subordinate maneuver and engineer
elements) available? From section 6.1.1.
Question 9: Are copies of the Operations Orders issued for the Second Battle of El Alamein by the 16 4th Leicht
Afrika Division, 15 th Panzer Division, the Afrika Korps, 10 2 nd Trento Division, and the 13 3 rd Littorio Division (or
their subordinate maneuver and engineer elements) available from section 6.1.5.
Question 10: Was the Allies impression that they had achieved tactical surprise based on the Axis reaction or from
intercepted and decoded Enigma transmissions? From section 6.2.6.
Question 11: What was the relationship between the 2 6th Infantry Battalion's "Special Group" and No. 3 Section, 8th
Field Company? From section 6.4.2.3.
Question 12: Why not use the 13 3rd Lorried Infantry Brigade, already assigned to the 1 0 th Armoured Division, as
part of the division's attack to Phase Line Pierson on the night of 24/25 October? From section 6.6.3.
Question 13: Are copies of the Axis maps captured by Captain Rutherford on 25 October 1942 available? From
section 6.9.1.1.
Question 14: Are copies of the 8th Army after action report, "Lessons from Operations October and November
1942," available? From section 7.5.
Question 15: What was the actual quantity and distribution of universal carriers with the 8 th Army? From Appendix I
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot M-1

APPENDIX N
AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
William C. Schneck is a senior project engineer for the Countermine Systems Division, Night Vision and
Electronic Sensors Directorate, Fort Belvoir Virginia. During Operation Restore Hope, he deployed to Mogadishu,
Somalia as a subject matter expert in mine warfare. During the Gulf War, he was deployed to Southwest Asia as a
Subject Matter Expert in countermine warfare with the 2 0 th Engineer Brigade (Airborne). During Desert Shield, he
trained 19 US engineer battalions in Iraqi mines and mine warfare techniques. He is currently serving as the
commander of the 2 7 6th Combat Engineer Battalion. Previous military assignments include Assistant Division
Engineer, 2 9 th Infantry Division (Light), S-3, 1 / 17 0th Infantry, Battle Captain, 2 9 th Infantry Division (Light) tactical
command post; Sapper Company Commander, B/ 2 2 9th Engineer Battalion (Light) (Combat); and combat engineer
platoon leader, 2 7th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) (Combat). He is a graduate of CGSC, CAS3, the Infantry Officer
Advanced Course; Engineer, Armor and Infantry Officer Basic Courses, and the Sapper Leader Course. He is a
Professional Engineer and holds a master's degree in mechanical engineering from Catholic University as well as a
bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology.
N
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BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot BI-1

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BI-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

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BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot BI-11I

GLOSSARY
A. A. - (German abbreviation for Aufklaerungeabteilung) Reconnaissance battalion

A-Tag - German equivalent to D-Day (not the invasion of Normandy, but a secret or as yet undetermined day for
the beginning of an attack).
Abteilung - German term used for a detachment or some battalion sized units or staff sections
A.K. - (German abbreviation for Armeekorps) (Army) corps
A.O.K. - (German abbreviation for Armeeoberkommando) A field army headquarters
ARKO - (German abbreviation for Artilleriekommandeur) Artillery Commander
Art. - (German abbreviation for artillery)
A.R. - (German abbreviation for artillery regiment)
a.D. - (German abbreviation for ausser Dienst) Retired
Btl, Bn - (German abbreviation for Bataillon) Battalion

Befehlspanzer - German term for command tank
Brueko - (German abbreviation for Brueckenkolonne) Bridging column
Chef d. Gen. St. - (German abbreviation for Chef des Generalstabes) Chief of the general staff
Ers. - (German abbreviation for ersatz) Replacement
(f), (fr) - (German abbreviation for franzoesisch) French, generally used to designate captured French equipment in
German use
Faehnrich - German term for cadet or officer candidate
Feldwebel - German term for sergeant major
Fest. - (German abbreviation for Festung) Fortress
FH - (German abbreviation for Feldhaubitze) Field howitzer
FK - (German abbreviation for Feldkanone) Field gun
FLAK - (German abbreviation for Flugabwehrkanone) Antiaircraft gun
Flammenwerfer - German term for flame thrower
Flivo - (German abbreviation for Fliegerverbindungsoffizier) Air liaison officer
Fkl - (German abbreviation for Funklenk) Radio-controlled
Fs - (German abbreviation for Fallschirmjaeger) Airborne or parachute unit
G, Gesch - (German abbreviation for Geschuetz) Gun

Geb - (German abbreviation for Gebirg) Mountain unit
Gefreiter - German term for corporal
Gef. St. - (German abbreviation for Gefechstand) Command post
Generalmajor - German rank equivalent to a US brigadier general
Generalleutnant - German rank equivalent to a US major general
General der Artillerie - German rank equivalent to a US lieutenant general
General der Kavallrie - German rank equivalent to a US lieutenant general
General der Infantry - German rank equivalent to a US lieutenant general
General der Panzertruppe - German rank equivalent to a US lieutenant general
General der Pioniere und Festungen - German rank equivalent to a US lieutenant general
General Oberst - German rank equivalent to a US (full) general
Generalfeldmarschall - German rank equivalent to a US general of the armies
Gp, gep - (German abbreviation for gepanzert) Armored
Gren - (German abbreviation for Grenadier) Infantry
Gr. - (German abbreviation for Gruppe) Squad or section sized unit
Gr. Wf. - (German abbreviation for Granate Werfer) Infantry mortar
Hauptmann - German term for the army rank of captain

Heere - German term for the army
HKL - (German abbreviation for Hauptkampflinie) Main line of resistance
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot GL- 1

la - German designation for 1st General Staff Officer (leadership) roughly equivalent to a US G-3/S-3 (operations
officer)
lb - German designation for 2nd General Staff Officer (supply) roughly equivalent to a US G-4/S-4 (logistics
officer)
Ic - German designation for 3 'dGeneral Staff Officer (intelligence) roughly equivalent to a US G-2/S-2 (intelligence
officer)
Ila - German designation for the staff adjutant
1ib - German designation for the personnel section
IVa - German designation for administration
IVb - German designation for the medical staff officer
ID - (German abbreviation for Infanteriedivision) Infantry division
Inf. - (German abbreviation for Infanterie) Infantry
IG - (German abbreviation for Infanterie-Geschuetz) Infantry gun
i. G. - (German abbreviation for im Generalstab) The additional designation given to a member of the General Staff
Corps
lng. - (German abbreviation for lngenieur) Engineer (civilian title with nominal military rank) generally involved in
logistic engineering functions, not a combat engineer
IR - (German abbreviation for Infanterieregiment) Infantry regiment
3g, Jaeg. - (German abbreviation for Jaeger) Light infantry or a fighter aircraft
K, Kan - (German abbreviation for Kanone) Cannon

Kdo - (German abbreviation for Kommando) Command
Kfz. - (German abbreviation for Kraftfahrzeug) Motor vehicle
KG - (German abbreviation for Kampfgruppe or Kampfgeschwader) Battle group or aircraft bomber wing
kl. - (German abbreviation for klein) Small, light
Kol - (German abbreviation for Kolonne) Colunm
Kompaniechef- German term for company commander
Kp - (German abbreviation for Kompanie) Company
KStN - (German abbreviation for Kriegstaerkenachweisung) Table of organization
KTB - (German abbreviation for Kriegstagebuch) War diary
kz - (German abbreviation for kurz) Short
I, le, lei - (German abbreviations for leicht) light

Ladungswerfer - German term for a spigot mortar, usually used by pioneer units
Landser - German term for an infantryman or common soldier
LG - (German abbreviation for Leichgeschuetz) Recoilless gun
lg - (German abbreviation for lang) Long
LKW - (German abbreviation for Lastkraftwagen) Cargo truck
Lw - (German abbreviation for Luftwaffe) German Air Force
M, Moers - (German abbreviation for Moerser) Heavy mortar or howitzer

m - (German abbreviation for mittlere) Medium
MG - (German abbreviation for Machinengewehr) Machine gun
mot - (German abbreviation for motorisiert) Motorized
Nachrichtenabteilung - German term for signals battalion
Ob - (German abbreviation for Oberbefehlshaber) Commander-in-Chief

Oberleutnant - German term for first lieutenant
Oberschuetze - German term for the rank of private first class
Oberst - German term for colonel
Oberstleutnant - German term for lieutenant colonel
OKH - (German abbreviation for Oberkommando des Heere) Army High Command
OKL - (German abbreviation for Oberkommando des Luftwaffe) Air Force High Command
OKW - (German abbreviation for Oberkommando des Wehrmacht) Armed Forces High Command
GL-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

PAK - (German abbreviation for Panzerabwehrkanone) Anti-tank gun
PD - (German abbreviation for Panzerdivision) Armored division
Pi - (German abbreviation for Pionier) Pioneer, combat engineer
PKW - (German abbreviation for Personenkraftwagen) Passenger vehicle
Pz - (German abbreviation for Panzer) Tank
Pz Bue - (German abbreviation for Panzerbuechse) Anti-tank rifle
Pz Kpfw. - (German abbreviation for Panzerkampwagen) Armored fighting vehicle, usually a tank
PzGr, PzGren - (German abbreviation for Panzergrenadier) Motorized or mechanized infantry
Pz. Jg. - (German abbreviation for Panzerjaeger) Antitank unit
PzPiBn - (German abbreviation for Panzer Pionier Bataillon) Armored pioneer (combat engineer) battalion
Pz. Sp. W. - (German abbreviation for Panzerspaehwagen) Armored (reconnaissance) car
Rgt - (German abbreviation for Regiment) Regiment

Ritterkreuz - German term for the Knight's Cross award
Rollbahn - German term for route of march or main supply route
s - (German abbreviation for schwer) Heavy

Sanitaets - German term for medical units
Schuetze - German term for the rank of private
Sd Kfz - (German abbreviation for Sonder Kraftfahrzeug) Special motor vehicle
sfl - (German abbreviation for selbstfahrlafette) Self-propelled carriage
SPW - (German abbreviation Schuetzenpanzerwagen) Armored personnel carrier
St Pi - (German abbreviation for Sturmpionier) Assault pioneers (combat engineers)
Stab - German term for staff
Storch - A light German aircraft used for liaison, similar to the US Piper Cub
Stosstrupp - German term for assault troops
Stug. - (German abbreviation for Sturmgeschuetz) Assault gun-
Sturmtrupp - German term for assault troops
Unteroffizier - German term for non-commissioned officer
Wehrmacht - German term for armed forces
z.b.V. - (German abbreviation zur besonder Verwendung) "For Special Use"

Zug - German term for platoon
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot GL-3

DISTRIBUTION OF "BREACHING THE DEVIL'S GARDEN,
THE 6 th NEW ZEALAND BRIGADE IN OPERATION LIGHTFOOT,
THE SECOND BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN"
2 Defense Technical Information Center

I Commander, Central Command
I Commander, Training and Doctrine Command
2 US Army Center for Military History
I Commander, US Army War College
2 US Army Military History Institute
1 Commander, US Army Command and General Staff College
2 Combined Arms Research Library
1 Commander, Center for Army Lessons Learned
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2 Clarke Library, US Army Engineer School
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2 Library, US Army Infantry School
1 Commander, US Army Armor Center
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I Commander, National Training Center
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2 Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico
I Project Manager, Mines, Countermine and Demolition
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I Van Noy Library, Ft Belvoir
I British Liaison Officer, US Army Engineer School
1 Commander, British Royal Engineer School
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2 Royal Armour Corps Museum (David Fletcher)
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2 Militfirgeschichtlichen Forshungsamt (Potsdam)
3 Commander, 2 nd New Zealand Engineer Regiment
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I Italian Army Staff College
BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot DIS-1

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Night Vision and

Electronic Sensors Directorate

Breaching the "Devil's Garden"

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5806

Iliaz PitrvSjira12;N. its~iW. 21-2*11)-3ILJ2asdk3

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMEIS: AND ADDRESS(ESI B. PERFDRMING ORGANIZATION

9.SPONSORING) MONITORING AGENCY NAMEIS) AND ADDRESSIESý 10. SPONSORING fMONITORING

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Authorized for Public Release; distribution unlimited. A

13. ABSTRACT ~tiWx;riymju

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OFPAGES

Appendix A Deutch-ItalienischenPanzerarmeeDefense Plan

BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

ii BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

ANNEX 1. GENERALFELDMARSHALL ROMMEL'S DEFENSIVE PLAN, DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1942

BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot A-1

Headquarters, Panzerarmee Army Command Post, 20.9.42

6.) On 25 September 42, present to the Army Headquarters:

I Attachment The Commander-In-Chief

A-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

Die tdglchen Verluste in Steflun~g skri eg erfor emern u

1.) Die vordersten Minensperron (blshcrigo F-X.i~L) ai.nd du~rch Go-

2.) Zwischon 'don rof'cchtnvorpocetn und9 d= ln

3.) I~io R-K-L- i-at i i'rtickwarti9( TT'1ft.nder Sporrgobioto (

IEnuptk~ipffoldoa dor Gr~ssc dr'Tz~ufolag9rt~f cn teprochet-

BREACHING THE "DEVIL'IS GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot A-3

fold aingosatztcn Truppcn eind btwc. 2 km tiof ztx gicdern'..

4..) Einon t~nhý-It fUr don domnv~ch durchzufUh-rondn noUon Ein~antZ

P.is zux- 1.usgcabu aincO r.bctohdortcr. Ytcrkblctttoo ftir Sto2Thun~a-

T1' 6) Zzi2..2aind don j..C.X. vorzulcgcn:'

I3.n£n-1r0. Dor Obc'rbeiohleho.bor:

A-4 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

A-6 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

10.) Weapons training on as many weapons as possible including captured weapons.

11.) Vehicle driver training.

General der Panzertruppen

BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot A-7

-Die %Zeit de'd a-te11uxý,kriegem ist'iweitmoeglichet 'u~rl

Front Gelegenhoit bieten, in beochraenktom Rahmen eauszibilden.

dung Grundo zu,ýegan ~sind.

1.) Der Axgi f~ und bloibt dia besto Yortoidigung. flahor

3.Paa un'bbdLrýt Halto-der Stall'Un-' o aRuockbioht ecauf-K

A-8 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot

8or~u$~pp. i dr ao eofccdhtevorposten und der

-. Pie Gote h+avorposto~n unid vbr'oooee o ut id

.)C cin Fahron von ungcpanzerten Kfz. in don zur.A~bwehr gcglie-7

1.2.) WN61it Scholbe zejg~a~u~nd ltegel.0 flagego n: Tmrnen,-jh?'

3.) Sp'ae'htruppt Ausbildung von Spach- _and Stoestruppe ~itit dern

4.') ýchii3lib3 Uoberwifldcnl von fd1l.)(non'ed~ n reen

*;.- des Y,6indIts,. - Bi lthibbo1

BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Lightfoot A-9

66:u~uzclar Zrfo' d&an~o ordor do^ 6F4-a'ie z &11or Tintecr"

-7.) Fou rdiizipliflt Gozioltos P.ou6r Ji 'ancýacl

8.) Gobratuch cdor !Tcahkenpmf mitto1 I. ar~dgra~tcn, Bajonott) Spc~týn..

9.) Aubiýid un~id Schulu~ng der Untorfuohxor bis hinauf zu dcn

10.) 'Weffenausbildxng a~n woc~ichst violcni Weffon cinisjchj.Bouto-

1.2.) ForrJicrdionat nuir 'ur Fosti~guzg der Maimoazucht, nitc ucbcr

Gcnc:,'cJ. dcr Fam.crc 4P'.11.~.

A-10 BREA CHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" Operation Liglilfoot

BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot B-1

B-2 BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot

BREACHING THE "DEVIL'S GARDEN" OperationLightfoot B-3