Images courtesy of IFP PRE-SONA updates presentation

by DPWH Sec. Mark Villar during (2020)

 Chasing the “Dream Plan”:
Unbundling Challenges and Opportunities for
Accelerated Infrastructure Development
in the Philippine Transport System
(Pre-Covid19)

John Pimentel

Student Number: 657650

Dissertation in Political Studies 15PPOC999-DS1 MSc State, Society, and Development
Word Count: 10,939

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MSc Middle
East Politics of the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London).

Date of Submission: September 30, 2020

 Declaration

I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the School of Oriental and African Studies
concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written
for me, in whole or in part by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or
unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination. I give
permission for a copy of my dissertation to be held for reference, at the School’s discretion.

John Pimentel 30 September 2020

2
 Table of Contents

Abstract 4
Acknowledgment 5
Acronyms 6
List of Figures 7
Chapter 1: Introduction 8
1.1. Literature Review: Infrastructure as Panacea to Growth 8
1.2. The Infrastructure Bundle Framework 9
1.3. Infrastructure Development: A Global Paradigm 10
Chapter 2: Philippine Infrastructure Capital and Financing 11
2.1. Official Development Assistance (ODA) 11
2.2. Private Sector 12
2.3. PPP vs. ODA 14
2.4. Government Budget 16
2.5. Chronic Underinvestment 18
2.6. Problem Statement 20
Chapter 3: Philippine Transport Infrastructure Assets 20
3.1. Poor Road Network Quality: “Uneven” Road Pavement 21
3.2. Spare Railways: The Missing Link in Seamless Commuting 27
3.3. Maritime Transport: Irony of Poor Water Transport in an Archipelago 32
3.4. Liberalized Air Space but Congested Gateways 35
Chapter 4: Regulatory and Competition Framework 38
4.1. Institutional Deficit 38
4.1.a. Inadequate agency planning 38
4.1.b. Poor inter-agency coordination 38
4.1.c. Low procurement capacities 38
4.2. Structural Defects 39
4.2.a. Unclear Property Rights 39
4.2.b. Conflict of Interests 40
4.3. Limited Competition 40
4.3.a. Monopolies: Structural Consequence of Limited Competition 40
4.3.b. Legacy of Path-Dependent Protectionism 43
4.3.c. Limited Liberalization: Loss of Beneficial Foreign Competition 47
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 49
5.1. Engaged Sectors and Value Creation 49
5.1.a. Constraints 49
5.1.b. Opportunities 51
5.2. Development Implications 51
5.2.a. Opportunities: Supportive Budget Policy and Capital Abundance 51
5.2.b. Constraints: Convoluted Government Regulations 51
5.2.b.i. A proper sectoral roadmap 52
5.2.b.ii. Reasonable Liberalization 52
Bibliography 54
Annexes 75

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 Abstract

Literature establishes infrastructure as a catalyst to national growth. In this context, the Philippine infrastructure
development was examined with a particular focus on how transport infrastructure contributes to national growth.

The study finds that the country continues to suffer from transport assets that remain the poorest among top
performing ASEAN economies. Roads, rails, maritime, and air transport assets exhibit common symptoms of severe yet
mendable underdevelopment: 1) poorly maintained and congested facilities, 2) ineffectively regulated and unrationalized
service operators resulting to inconvenient commuting experience and costly accidents, and 3) capital-centric investments
forsaking equitable regional development.

Further data analysis points to two underlying causes: 1) chronic underinvesting and 2) ineffective competition
and regulatory regime. Altogether, these mount serious challenges that continue to undermine any past and present
government effort at accelerating infrastructure development.

Given these, the country appears to struggle to transition from the Enabling Phase, or primary provision of
basic infrastructure, of infrastructure development, into the Transaction Efficiency Phase.

Nonetheless, current market developments and desirable government policy shifts present valuable opportunities
to reverse these trends: increasing financial resources from 1) an unprecedented resurgence of multilateral and bilateral
ODAs primarily from credit-rich China as external assistance, 2) wider fiscal space due to improved tax collection and
supportive budget policy with higher spending (GDP share) targets, and 3) a booming capital market sustained by steadily
high growth rates and creative alternative instruments.

To succeed in accelerating infrastructure development, the study therefore recommends (1) expediting the
National Transportation Plan, which provides an overarching framework for prioritizing projects and streamlining
government functions, alongside sectoral roadmaps that address binding constraints to sectoral growth; and (2) pursuing
either full-scale liberalization or piecemeal amendments of individual governing laws/policy reforms deemed competition-
enhancing. All these would enable the Philippines to attain the Competition-Enhancing Phase, where robust market
competition draws increased private sector participation and synergistic collaboration with government.

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 Acknowledgments

This thesis will not be possible without the support of the following:

My parents, Hon. Johnny and Rosalinda Pimentel, for the unwavering patience, understanding, and moral and financial
support even in times of personal trouble

My former thesis adviser Dr. Laleh Khalili for inspiring me to write on Philippine infrastructure and the politics behind it,
especially in times of confusion and waning interest in my chosen field of research;

My esteemed professors in the program for instilling the value of excellence, diligence, discipline, and strength amidst adversity in the
course of my undergraduate and graduate studies;

The Politics Department Student Officer, Ms. Yvonne Henry; Examinations & Assessment Manager, Mr. Ian Lemey;
Records Officer, Mr. Graham Smith; Mr. Davies Oruma from the Registry; and the rest of SOAS staff and personnel
who have both been very helpful and considerate in my submission of papers and requirements;

My classmates and closest friends in the program and the whole of London, namely Mr. Joel Chong, Ms. Lezanne Janse
van Vuuren, Ms. Clarissa Vélez, Mr. Ronnie del Barrio, Mr. Henrik Bodilsen, Mr. Marlon
Dimaculangan, and Mr. Ryan Evangelista, Mr. Nikolai Almonte and family; for their sympathy over our
common experiences and their incessant encouragement in times of doubt on continuing my postgrad studies;

My flatmates and second family, Ms. Anna Grahovac, Mr. Goran Bečirevič, Ms. Cecilia Zheng, Mr. Dev
Parekh, for accepting me without judgment but reasonable assessment and endless support; and for celebrating my uniqueness;

My best friends, Ms. Camille Adle, Atty. Francine Turo and her partner Ms. Patricia Bonifacio for her patience,
understanding, and provision of various assistance in the course of finishing my thesis proposal and helping proofread my
dissertation;

My dearest friend, Mr. Jhei Sarmiento, for taking care of me during the latter days of my stay in London and providing
support and words of wisdom;

My beloved partner, Mr. John Michael Aguilar, for continuing to encourage me to pursue my passion, dreams, and
aspiration; for meticulously yet patiently proofreading my work and providing unbiased perspective; giving me much-needed moral
support; and for never giving up on us in spite of the toughest times;

And our household staff, notably Ms. Princesita Turtoga-Agad and Ms. Necel Diaz, for their helping me manage my
work and personal affairs and praying with me through the most difficult moments.

This dissertation is a befitting symbol of gratitude, a labor of love for, and a deserving dedication to all of you.

5
 Acronyms

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ADB Asian Development Bank
ASAM ASEAN Single Aviation Market
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer
CAAP Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
CALABARZON Region IV (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Quezon provinces)
CIAP Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines
DPWH Department of Public Works and Highways
DOTr Department of Transportation
EDSA Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue (site of 1987 Democratic Revolution)
EO Executive Order
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GAA General Appropriations Act
GCR Global Competitiveness Report
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HCPTI Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc.
HPPL Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited
ICTSI international Container Terminal Services, Inc.
IFP Infrastructure Flagship Projects
IT Information Technology
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
JV Joint Ventures
LGUs Local Government Units
LRTA Light Rail Transit Authority
MRTC Metro Rapid Transit Corporation
NAIA Ninoy Aquino International Airport
NCR National Capital Region (formal term for Metro Manila)
NEDA National Economic and Development Authority
ODA Official Development Assistance
PAL Philippine Airlines
PCA Philippine Competition Act
PCAB Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board
PCC Philippine Competition Commission
PDMF Project Development and Monitoring Facility
PDP Philippine Development Plan
PIATCO Philippine International Air Terminals Company
PNR Philippine National Railways
PPP Public-Private Partnership
RORO Roll-On/Roll-Off ferries network
ROWA Right-of-Way Acquisition
TEU Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit
WEF World Economic Forum

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 List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1.1. The Infrastructure Bundle Framework 10

Figure 2.1. PDMF Resource Utilization, 2016 13
Figure 2.2. Private Investment (and select project highlights) in Infrastructure, 1990-2015 13
Figure 2.3. NEDA-approved project costs vs. PPP bid costs, 2017 14
Figure 2.4. Project Development to Groundbreaking: Fastest Time (in months) 15
Figure 2.5. Infrastructure Spending by Source of Fund , 2008-2019 15
Figure 2.6. Revenue and Tax Effort, Overall Surplus Deficit (% of GDP), 2008-2019 17
Figure 2.7. Philippine Budget Allocation (GAA 2019 in PhP) 17
Figure 2.8. Philippine Infrastructure Outlays as % of GDP (obligation-based), 1993-2018 18
Figure 2.9. Philippine Government Fiscal Deficit as % of GDP, 1993-2018 19
Figure 2.10. Percentage of GDP used for infrastructure, ASEAN-6, 2007-2016 19
Figure 3.1. WEF-GCR Overall Infrastructure Rankings, ASEAN-6, 2008-2019 20
Figure 3.2. WEF'S The most problematic factors for doing business, Philippines, 2008-2019 21
Figure 3.3. National Road, Length and Annual Growth Rates, 2007-2019 22
Figure 3.4. Luzon Spine Expressway Network 25
Figure 3.5. Simplified map of circumferential and arterial/radial roads in Metro Manila (NCR) 26
Figure 3.6. WEF-GCR Quality of Roads Rankings, ASEAN-6, 2008-2019 27
Figure 3.7. Existing rail network in Metro Manila 28
Figure 3.8. (Proposed) Philippine Rail Line Network 29
Figure 3.9. Visual Comparison of Urban Light Rail Lines of Select ASEAN Capitals 30
Figure 3.10. WEF-GCR Quality of Railroads Rankings, ASEAN-6, 2008-2019 30
Figure 3.11. Map of 3 RORO Nautical Highways 33
Figure 3.12. Cost Differential Between Traditional Shipping vs. RORO 33
Figure 3.13. WEF-GCR Quality of Port Rankings, ASEAN-6, 2008-2019 35
Figure 3.14. Existing NAIA Intersecting Runway Configuration 36
Figure 3.15. WEF-GCR Quality of Air Transport Infra Rankings, ASEAN-6, 2008-2019 37
Figure 4.1. Typical Tendering Process of PPP Projects 39
Figure 4.2. PCAB License Approval, By Type and Annual Growth Rate (%), 2013-2017 48

Table 2.1. Distribution of Total ODA Net Commitments, Infrastructure, 2014-2015 12

Table 2.2. Infrastructure Flagship Projects by Mode of Financing, 2020 12
Table 3.1. National Road, Length and Annual Growth Rates, 2007-2019 22
Table 3.2. Road Density in the Philippines, Per Region, 2005-2019 (km/sq. km) 23
Table 3.3. Regional Trade and Investment Statistics, as of 2018 & 2019 25
Table 3.4. DPWH & DOTr Regional Breakdown of Infrastructure Outlays Budget (GAA 2019, in PhP) 26
Table 3.5. Number of Motor Vehicles Registered, By MV Type & Mode of Registration, 2017-2019 31
Table 3.6. Number of Motor Vehicles Registered, By Region, 2017-2019 31
Table 4.1. Services provided at Ports of Manila 43
Table 4.2. Existing Anti-Trust Laws and Regulations (as of 2002) 45
Table 4.3. Major Competition-Related Regulatory Agencies (as of 2002) 46
Table 4.4. List of Major Players in Government’s Infrastructure PPP Projects 47
Table 5.1. Summary of Philippine Transport Infrastructure Bundle 50

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Literature Review: Infrastructure as Panacea to Growth

Literature suggests that infrastructure development contributes to macroeconomic growth and socioeconomic

development through logistical cost reduction, sectoral spillovers, trade facilitation, and global value and supply chain

creation. Yet, renewed academic and policy interest in infrastructure development only emerged after the Structural

Adjustment Programs (SAPs) during the Washington Consensus era failed to overturn global economic decline following

the ‘80s and ‘90s world crises. Instead, pressure for deepening fiscal austerity and creeping privatization have compressed

public infrastructure spending, dampened growth prospects, and frustrated poverty alleviation efforts (Calderón & Servén

2004:1; Russell 2009:43-44). Thus, finding effective infrastructure policy solutions necessitated exploring conventional and

new economic growth theories.

The positive link between infrastructure development and growth was first illuminated in economic literatures.

Studies show that accelerated infrastructure asset accumulation increases growth rates by 0.9% annually in over 120

countries within 40 years, accounts for 25% of growth differentials between Africa and East Asia and over 40% between

low- and high-growth countries, reduces shipping distance to an equivalent of 2,358 km closer to all trading partners,

improves market access by 10%, and increases labor productivity by 6% for smaller firms (Calderón & Servén 2004:1-26;

Straub 2008:1-30). Conversely, poor or inadequate infrastructure lowers trade volumes by 6% in general and by 60% for

most landlocked African countries, inflates shipping costs by 30-40%, and separates trading partners by an equivalent of

2,016 km (Bonfatti & Poelhekke 2017:91-108; Straub 208:27-30). Large-scale network upgrades also reduce transport costs

and enhance trade, as in the cases of Spanish regional ports’ 35% increase in exports (Bensassi et. al 2015:47-61); US

highways registering a high net social rate of return of 35% (through savings in labor, private capital, and intermediary

inputs) during its 1956-70 construction phase (AECOM 2001:Sec.2.2.1); and Turkish roads reducing average shipment

costs by 70% and enhancing trade gains of USD2 for every USD0.7 road investment in regions with the most improved

connectivity to international gateways (Cosar & Demir 2016:232-244). Another study of freight interfaces across Austria

(Stein et. Al 2016:1553-1561) demonstrates that streamlining soft infrastructure (legal, regulatory standards, IT systems),

alongside upgrading hard infrastructure, equally enhances trade and growth. Indeed, comprehensive studies (Kogan &

Tapeiro 2007:265-276; McCarthy-Byrne & Mentzer 2011:135-160; Platje 2013:36-38; Russell 2009:20-28,38; Van der Vorst

2004:115-116) of successful global supply chains find that shared investments in common infrastructure produce optimal

profit gains by 1) providing a physical or informational structure for the efficient flow of goods and services, 2) reducing

transport costs, 3) easing transaction or market mediation costs, 4) raising trade output and industry productivity, and 5)

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facilitating transfer of knowledge. On the demand side, access to reliable infrastructure improves household incomes, as

in Papau New Guinea where a 3-hour deduction in travel time led to 5.3% decrease in poverty, and enriches human capital

development, as 24 contiguous countries in west and central Africa attest (Njoh 2009:227-243; Straub 2008:32). Therefore,

infrastructure impacts on firm competitiveness and trade growth prospects as an operational cost and a production capital

whilst a positive agent of human development.

However, these mainstream theories overlook the cogency of geography in determining business location

decisions and spatial distribution of infrastructure investments. In Economic Geography, a more systematic scholarship

provides plausible spatial models on how labor population, economic activities, and infrastructure investments tend to

concentrate in cities and regions because of increasing returns vis-a-vis transport costs (Fujita et. al 1999; Russell 2009:1-

27). In general, higher transport costs relative to distance could lead firms to locate in saturated markets where greater

market access increases profitability prospects, closer linkage to suppliers reduces input prices, and the presence of

abundant skilled labor and robust network of industry knowledge spurs constant technological innovation that overturns

diminishing marginal returns (ibid.). As these agglomeration forces amplify, concentrations of economic activity self-sustain

through lock-in effects (Russell 2009:48). This process reverses when transport costs are low enough to allow supply side

forces such as labor and production supply chains to disperse geographically (Straub 2008:9-18). This circular relationship,

however, implies investment trade-offs between national growth and regional equality. Hence, the most optimal

infrastructure investments should facilitate inter-regional diffusion of technological knowledge while improving

infrastructure in poorer regions (Straub 2008:9-14). Such requires smart composition, sequencing, and specific thresholds

of investments to achieve irreversible gains. While Straub (2008:33) recommends the benchmark of East Asian stalwart

economies investing 10% of their GDP, Estaché and Garsous (2012:2-3) propose diagnosing a country’s development

stage to determine optimal investment levels. In sum, Economic Geography offers a thoroughly apposite framework that

directly links spatial forces to the role of infrastructure in facilitating macroeconomic growth (Russell 2009:27-28).

1.2. The Infrastructure Bundle Framework

This operational mechanism serves as the study’s analytical lens. Proposed by Clifford Russell (2009:32-33), the

Infrastructure Bundle Framework (Fig. 1.1.) dissects a country’s infrastructure system by 1) characterizing its asset endowments

and quality, 2) deconstructing asset ownership structures, 3) identifying financial capital sources, 4) analyzing the impact

of regulatory-competition regimes on the performance of economic sectors, and 5) identifying opportunities and

constraints to implementing effective policy interventions and strategies. In examining the bundle, the phases of national

infrastructure development are categorized based on its ability to facilitate market efficiency and competition.

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1.3. Infrastructure Development: A Global Paradigm

As global population swells and inequities pervade, ensuring inclusive and more sustainable development has

instigated paradigm shifts to include infrastructure in orthodox development policies among international organizations.

Multilaterally, the Millennium Development Goals was rebranded into Sustainable Development Goals with a multi-level

framework that conceives transport infrastructure as an omitted but vital conduit for ensuring sustainability of basic human

needs (Estaché & Wodon 2014:21-22; Waage et. al 2015:1-30). Regionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) launched a masterplan to attain seamless connectivity and harmonized policies among its ten member nations

by 2025 and partnered recently with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to establish a pool of funds dedicated to

addressing the bloc’s infrastructure needs (ADB 2019a; ASEAN 2016). Unilaterally, China’s quest for new sources of raw

materials and its drive towards international relevance meant increasing South-South cooperation in the donor community

(Naidu 2011:6-7; Rampa et. al 2012: 247-269). China launched the One Belt, One Road Initiative as a revival of the old silk

trade and later adapted it into the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiative, a global infrastructure

development strategy involving 152 countries and international organizations (World Banka 2018). This initiative provides

10
broader availability of capital to finance infrastructure projects previously considered improbable in most developing

countries.

Chapter 2: Philippine Infrastructure Capital and Financing

2.1. Official Development Assistance (ODA)

The Philippines is a willing beneficiary of China’s AIIB. As President Duterte’s push to improve infrastructure

includes partnerships with foreign governments, his recent state visits were concentrated in China and Japan. From

virtually nothing in 2015, a surge of Chinese ODA is intended to be invested in 25% of the 75 Infrastructure Flagship

Projects (IFPs) with a combined portfolio of USD11.7 billion in 2017, the largest ODA the country has received (MacLean

2017:10; Rosales 2017:6,34). Meanwhile, Japan, a consistent top ODA donor, pledged around USD9 billion for 14.7% of

priority projects (MacLean 2017:10; Rosales 2017:28-35). These conditions present enticing opportunities for relatively

inexpensive financing in the form of (1) longer loan maturity, (2) wider access to technology and best practices, and (3)

accountability mechanisms that catalyze fundamental institutional reforms.

However, the development sector has raised concerns over the recent influx of—particularly Chinese—ODAs

(MacLean 2017:10; Naidu 2011:6-7; Rampa et. al 2012: 247-269). Technically denominated in volatile foreign exchange

rates, ODAs can extraordinarily drain national resources for repayments until bankruptcy when faced with unprecedented

economic crisis (Fantu 1992:503-504; Mkwandre 2005:1-33; Rosales 2017:37). Politically, ODA in rare cases could incite

public unrest over conditionalities requiring strict reciprocal use of labor resources and imposition of technical preferences

(suppliers/contractors) by donor countries (MacLean 2017:10; Rosales 2017:35). The public fracas lies in the lack of

conditionalities of Chinese ODA, whose template deviates from the OECD-Development Aid Committee prescriptions

of at least 25% loan interest and accountability measures akin to IMF SAPs (Fantu 1992:497-512; Mkwandre 2005:1-33).

This raises questions on whether such aid is for development or greater trade openness and market access, especially of

exploitable natural resources, as in the cautionary tale of African countries whose lands are environmentally degraded due

to China’s scramble for resources (Naidu 2011:6-7; Fantu 1992:497-512). Geopolitics and technicalities aside, ODA

remains a viable option for infrastructure financing, with transport infrastructure receiving more than half of the total loan

and grant commitments in 2015 (see Table 2.1)(Rosales 2017:28). 70% of the IFPs are funded through ODAs (see Table

2.2.)(NEDA 2020). Of the six Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects approved in the infancy of the Duterte

Administration, four have already been restructured into ODA projects (Rosales 2017:7).

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2.2. Private Sector

The current administration’s preference for ODA starkly contrasts with the previous administration’s aggressive

pursuit of PPPs (Rosales 2017:7). Under the amended Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law, a PPP project may be (1)

solicited by government or (2) unsolicited from the private sector (Navarro & Llanto 2014:29-31,39-49; Rosales 2017:38).

For this purpose, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), government’s economic planning arm,

through the PPP Center institutionalized the Project Development and Monitoring Facility (PDMF) to (1) mitigate risks,

(2) align interests, (3) provide funds to tap engineering expertise, and (4) encourage cost-effective options for project

implementation until award and financial close (MacLean 2017:11; Rosales 2017:39). Latest available data shows steadily

increasing PDMF utilization rates (90% increase since 2011) that recently stands at 42% (see Fig. 2.1.) and growing private

sector participation (Fig. 2.2.).

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 Current capital market conditions support this significant increase in private sector participation in infrastructure

projects (Navarro & Llanto 2014:40; MacLean 2017:11). With a low-interest rate environment, the banking sector is awash

with money and liquidity, as top four banks in the country boasts assets of over PhP1 trillion (USD19 billion)(MacLean

2017:11). As of September 2019, the size of the local bond market is PHP6.69 trillion (USD129.2 billion), with government

13
bonds comprising 78% (USD107.1 billion) and corporate bonds coveting around 22% market share (USD22.1

billion)(ADB 2019b:131). Consistent high GDP growth rates ranging from 6% to 7% since 2016 have affirmed investment

ratings upgrades and continued to bolster this market expansion (Chandra & Schwartz 2018:par.1; de Guzman 2018:par.1;

de Guzman 2018:par.1-5; de Guzman & Diron 2018:par.1; PSA 2017; PSA 2018).

2.3. PPP vs. ODA

This shift away from PPPs towards ODA financing has, to some extent, revived the debate on cost effectiveness

between the two (Rosales 2017:7). PPPs have shown to generate lower than proposed costs (Fig. 2.3) and take off faster

than ODA-funded projects (see Fig. 2.4.). Regardless, the debate has inspired government to introduce creative policy

instruments to deflate project costs: 1) “hybrid PPPs”, where ODA finances facility construction while the private sector

manages its operation and maintenance (O&M); 2) open policy on unsolicited proposals; 3) joint ventures (JVs) among

Local Government Units (LGUs) and various government levels; and 4) Securities and Exchange Commission rules

allowing existing PPP contractors to reuse project bonds (Rosales 2017:41-42-50).

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 Despite these developments and a marginal increase to 6% in 2019 reflecting the current administration’s

increasing preference for ODA (Fig. 2.5.), historical data shows domestic funds remain the major source of infrastructure

financing (DBM n.d.; Navarro & Llanto 2014:25-26; Rosales 2017:6,12-17).

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2.4. Government Budget

Two significant factors prompted this trend.

The first is stronger policy support from two consecutive presidencies. While they differed in preference of

infrastructure financing modes, both have placed infrastructure at the core of their economic agendas. Infrastructure

development has always merited past government attention, but it was not until 2013 when the Aquino Administration

formally adopted the proposal by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for a comprehensive infrastructure

development plan called the “Dream Plan” (Iwata 2014:1; Iwata 2013:1-2). Aiming to increase public infrastructure

spending from 2.2% of GDP in 2012 to 5% by 2016, the policy was institutionalized by identifying infrastructure

development as a key driver of inclusive growth in the revalidated Philippine Development Plan (PDP) (Balisacan

2014:slideno.2; Navarro & Llanto 2014:9). In 2014, NEDA flagged re-invigorating PPPs in tandem with better-coordinated

sectoral roadmapping as primary strategies for transport infrastructure investment (Balisacan 2014:slidesnos.3-5).

Adopting these policies, the Duterte Administration declared accelerated infrastructure development as a core electoral

platform and later formally launched an ambitious “Build, Build, Build” program to usher in a “Golden Age of

Infrastructure” (Forbes 2018:5; MacLean 2017:10; Rosales 2017:9,50). Pursuant to this, an infrastructure outlay of at least

7% of GDP by 2022 is targeted to fill the infrastructure gap amounting to USD180 billion, a goal considered a milestone

for expanding infrastructure financing opportunities unprecedented in the last 30 years (Diokno 2017:par.7; MacLean

2017:10; Rosales 2017:9).

Secondly, strong economic performance in recent years, alongside well-meaning tax governance campaigns, have

widened fiscal space (Navarro & Llanto 2014:26). Since 2010, tax collection (as % of GDP) has been steadily increasing

to reach a record 17.5% in 2019, the highest in 10 years (DOF 2019:1)(see Fig. 2.6.). The Finance Department credits tax

administration reforms by revenue agencies, including enforcing fiscal discipline among 53 non-remitting government-run

corporations and the enactment of the Comprehensive Tax Reform Package that boosted optimism in using tax revenues

to defray the cost of raising the said funding requirement (DOF 2017:6-15; Padin 2018:par.7; Rosales 2017:28).

Accordingly, the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA), the government’s primary budget instrument,

mandates infrastructure outlays as the third biggest budget allocation for the fiscal year 2019 (see Fig. 2.7.)(DBM 2020:1-

2744). The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Transportation (DOTr) are

allocated the two largest infrastructure outlays of PhP527.9 (USD10.9) billion and PhP44 billion (USD906.6 million),

respectively (ibid.).

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17
2.5. Chronic Underinvestment

Although these recent developments in capital financing present new opportunities for reinvigorating

infrastructure development, years of chronic underinvestment have fortified poor performance in all infrastructure assets

(Llanto 2011:14-16). Infrastructure outlays in the first two years of the Duterte administration are projected to hit 6.3% of

GDP, easily twice the average deficit of 2.7% of GDP. However, historical data (Fig. 2.8.) on public infrastructure spending

reveals substantial underinvestment ranging from a low average of 1.6% to 1.8% under former post-EDSA Revolution

presidents to a fairly significant average of 3.0% under President B. Aquino—all well below the recommended 5% of GDP

target for developing countries and spending of less developed regional neighbors (Fig. 2.10.)(AmCham-TAPP 2018:5;

DBM 2019:par.1-6; Navarro & Llanto 2014:12,39). Two decades of high fiscal deficits have deferred government capacity

to overturn its historical underinvestment in infrastructure (see Figs 2.9.)(DBM 2019:par.1-6).

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19
2.6. Problem Statement

Although the Philippines has one of the fastest growing economies pre-Covid, its growth trajectory is stumped

by chronic underinvestment in infrastructure (Navarro & Llanto 2014:1-64; World Bankb 2018:vii). Surrounded by

competitive neighbors aggressively investing in infrastructure, it is imperative that the country identifies constraints to

infrastructure investments and opportunities to accelerate infrastructure development to further its broader economic

development. The study intends to achieve this scholastic objective by employing the Infrastructure Bundle Model, which

disaggregates a country’s infrastructure sector assets (Chapter 3), financing (earlier discussed in Chapter 2), and the

underpinning competition and regulatory framework (Chapter 4). Conclusions (Chapter 5) on the impact of the country’s

state of infrastructure on enterprise value creation and development policy will be derived from a meaningful analysis of

data on the Philippine transport infrastructure bundle.

Chapter 3: Philippine Transport Infrastructure Assets

This chronic underinvestment has caused the country to rank poorly in overall infrastructure quality reported

annually by the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR). The Philippines continues to

lag behind five ASEAN pioneers. In 2008, it ranked 94th, two to three notches above Indonesia and Vietnam, but only

within a year started to decline and remained at the bottom of ASEAN-6 until 2019 (see Fig. 3.1.). Once only a secondary

concern next to failure of national governance, inadequate infrastructure supply or critical failure of infrastructure is

steadily becoming a top concern among investors in the Philippines (see Fig. 3.2.).

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3.1. Poor Road Network Quality: “Uneven” Road Pavement

The Philippines has an extensive road network of approximately 210,000 km. 15% are classified as national roads

under the jurisdiction of the DPWH and the rest are under various LGUs (Cabral 2018:slideno.6; ADB 2012:1; CIA 2018;

Navarro & Llanto 2014:6). Although this length is comparable to other large ASEAN economies, its quality remains

relatively inferior (ADB 2012:2). In 2019, 97% of 33,018 km of national roads have been paved but only 44.33% are in

good condition (DPWH 2020).

Inequitable investment in national road versus local road pavement accounts for these statistics (Llanto 2011:1-

27). While overall paved roads have steadily increased in the past decade (Fig. 3.3.), the average growth rate in national

road pavement remains marginal and local roads are left mostly unpaved (DPWHe n.d.). In 2018, while 94.4% (31,035

km) of national roads were paved, only 18.9% (33,479 of 177,595 km) of local roads were paved (Cabral 2018:slideno.6).

The discrepancy is further demonstrated by unequal levels of pavement in the capital region vis-à-vis southern regions

(Llanto 2011:7). For instance, national roads in Metro Manila (National Capital Region or NCR) and its neighboring region

CALABARZON (IV-A) are 100% paved and 71% in good condition while in the Zamboanga Peninsula (Region IX), only

89% of declared national roads are paved and 40% in good condition (Table 3.1)(DPWH 2020). Regional road density

further magnifies this disproportion (see Table 3.2.). NCR remains the most paved with densities averaging 180 km/sq.

21
km. of land (DPWH 2020). Its adjacent region, CALABARZON, starkly registers one of the highest densities, along with

Bicol, western and central Visayas (ibid.). In contrast, all regions in Mindanao have spatial road densities below 10 km/sq.

km. Accordingly, Llanto (2011:5-6) argues that while the landmark Local Government Code of 1991 intends to devolve

central government’s public works and infrastructure projects, this has rather facilitated disparate accomplishments in local

road construction due to variegated capacities of LGUs. Cities have better quality roads (61.7% paved as of 2018) than

other LGUs because they tend to benefit from higher fiscal revenues that enable them to rehabilitate and maintain road

quality (Cabral 2018:slideno.6; Llanto 2011:7).

22
 Such disparity reflects two profound implications on the political economy of uneven regional development.

Firstly, the discrepancy in inter-regional road densities suggests that central government disbursement on road

infrastructure can be political in character. In fact, most regions with the highest densities next to NCR are known origins

of past Presidents and their spouses (NEDAa 2017:245): Manuel Roxas from Western Visayas and Ferdinand Marcos

form Ilocos and his First Lady of equal notoriety Imelda Marcos from the island province of Leyte in Eastern Visayas.

23
 Secondly, the skewed focus of road project pipelines suggests that the country’s postcolonial industrialization

strategy has not substantially deviated from the economic role of NCR as an “asymmetric mediating site,” where higher-

value economic production, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), income and consumption, communication networks, and

transportation investments continue to concentrate and spill over to surrounding regions (Table 3.3)(Lambino

2010:156,161-165; Pernia & Quising 2002:4; PSAb 2020). While national government is developing expressway networks

across the archipelago to relieve transport constraints and link local economic hubs, the bulk of priority investments,

PhP633 (USD13) billion, are focused on improving the logistics network in NCR and adjacent provinces (ADB 2012:2;

AmCham-TAPP 2017:50; DPWHa n.d.; Villar 2020:23-79). More than half of the 30 IFP road projects are expressways

or bridges aimed to link business districts within NCR and connect the capital to regional agricultural production centers

in the north and industrial/manufacturing hubs in the south (Fig. 3.4.)(NEDA 2020:1-11; Villar 2020:23-79). As evidence,

agricultural gross value added (GVA) in Central Luzon, the country’s ‘rice bowl’, contributes to 14% of the total national

value and is larger than the average 5% share of other regions (PSAa 2020)(AmCham-TAPP 2017:50-54). Similarly, robust

manufacturing activities in the country are concentrated in CALABARZON (Cavite, Laguna1, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon

provinces), which hosts 31 industrial estates declared as special economic/export processing zones granted with tax

income holidays and similar incentives (DTI n.d.; Pernia & Quising 2002:2-3). In effect, manufacturing GVA in the region

represents 37% of the entire country’s and is 10 times higher than the average GVA in the countryside (ibid.). Together

with NCR, the region also receives more than a third of total approved FDI and is responsible for 75% of total exports

(DTIa n.d.; PSAa 2020a; PSAb 2020). A regional breakdown of government’s infrastructure outlays in 2019 corroborates

this disparity (Table 3.4). Almost 80% of total DPWH and DOTr capital outlays are poured into NCR and its surrounding

regions (DBM 2020:1327-1333). Consistent with spatial economic theories (as cited in Fujita et. al 1999; Russell 2009:22),

this capital-centric road infrastructure clearly suggests firms locate near urban areas to cut costs and capitalize on high

consumer demand in sizeable markets, which implies that NCR as an economic hub is becoming congested.

1The Department of Trade and Industry (n.d.) considers Laguna as the automotive capital or "the Detroit City of the Philippines” with big car
assemblers (Ford, Honda, Isuzu, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and Toyota) and MNCs in the electronics and semi-conductor manufacturers.

24
25
 Nonetheless, the current government is demonstrating benevolent intentions to diffuse road infrastructure

development to underdeveloped regions. The IFP list includes road investments worth PhP528 (USD11) billion in regional

centers in Visayas and Mindanao, particularly in Davao and conflict-ridden areas (see Annexes 1 & 2). The least developed

among regions, Mindanao obtained from the 2019 budget a greater share of DPWH and DOTr resources (Table

3.4.)(DBM 2020:1-2744). Although political in motive given the President’s origins in Southern Mindanao (Davao), this is

a remarkable contrast to past administrations.

For these reasons, the Philippines has overtaken Vietnam as the least performing in road network quality (Fig.

3.6.). Still, the Philippine government must not be complacent considering its relative lateness in appropriating resources

on critical road infrastructure. For instance, the DPWH earlier pronounced that NCR’s road network (Fig. 3.5.) that started

in the 60s remains incomplete, causing traffic congestion and delayed logistics (DPWHc n.d.; AmCham-TAPP 2018:4;

ADB 2012:4).

26
3.2. Spare Railways: The Missing Link in Seamless Commuting

Considered by railroad experts as the smallest in the world, the country’s rail network is sparse and wanting, with

only three urban lines spanning 76.9 km in NCR and two heavy commuter lines of the Philippine National Railways (PNR)

in Southern Luzon (AmCham-TAPP 2017:54; NEDA 2017a:245)(Fig. 3.7.). Two light rails are government-owned and -

operated by the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) while the third was financed and constructed by a private corporation,

the Metro Rapid Transit Corporation (MRTC), and is now operated by the government under a build-lease-transfer

arrangement (ADB 2012:4-5). LRTA lines carry close to 600,000 passengers daily and the MRTC ferries over 460,000

(132% overloaded) despite structurally designed to hold a maximum capacity of only 350,000 daily while the PNR carries

75,000 on old malfunctioning coaches (ADB 2012:5; Gonzales 2018:par.28-34; Llanto & Gerochi 2017:37; Metro Raila

n.d.:1; Metro Railb n.d.). Despite this meager and supposedly manageable number of lines, the existing railway system

faces problems of congestion, poor asset maintenance, and inter-operability due to different gauge and signaling systems

(NEDAa 2017:245). Some segments of the PNR have been essentially nonoperational for years (ADB 2012:5). In its

heyday, three commuter lines ferried 60,000 passengers on 80 daily trips along a 1,000-km track from north to south of

NCR with 73 stations manned by 7,000 personnel (PNR n.d.:par.4-21; FALSE: PNR Bicol 2019:par.6). The Southern Line

from Manila to Bicol halted after sustaining typhoon damages in 2006 and has declined in ridership and freight shipments

since resumption, with only 40 daily trips on a mere 28-km commuter service from NCR to Laguna and a partial 44-km

commuter rail in Bicol, both operated only by 264 personnel (ibid.). The Northern Line has not operated for more than

27
25 years (ibid.). O&M of existing assets prove to be difficult, particularly since equipment and facilities require highly

specialized components and existing regulations only allow a three-month inventory of spare parts (ibid.). Similar to road

networks, the highly concentrated rail network in NCR reflects the disproportion in transport infrastructure investments

in the country.

In spite of this, the incumbent administration demonstrates good intentions in proffering network upgrade plans.

The proposed network (Fig. 3.8.) looks properly ambitious and promising, replete with various funding totaling PhP1.7

billion (USD88.53 million) (see Annex 3 for list of rail projects)(Batan 2018:1-2; DOTra 2018:slidenos.5-6). The long-

awaited resurrection of the PNR north line from Tutuban (Manila) to Malolos (Bulacan) is planned with a USD2.4-billion

loan from JICA. The extension of the line to Clark Green City, an alternative multi-purpose city complex expected to

decongest NCR, is also planned with a feeder line to Clark International Airport. A project for the PNR south line to

connect Laguna to Bicol approximately costing USD3 billion is being negotiated for a loan from China (AmCham-TAPP

2017:54). A first in Philippine history, a China-funded railroad project is also being negotiated for Mindanao, with an initial

103-kilometer segment to connect two neighboring cities in Davao, the President’s bailiwick (DOTrb 2018). Made possible

28
by PhP356 (USD7.3) billion worth of Japanese ODA, the 30-km Mega Manila Subway is another pioneering project in

pre-construction phase that would benefit 370,000 passengers daily around major business districts (Balinbin 202:17-26;

Batan 2018:slideno.10; DOTrb 2018; Villar 2020:94). Accomplishing all these would expand the existing rail from 77 km

to 1,900 km in 2022, drastically reducing travel time to and from NCR from 2-3 hours into an hour and intra-city commute

into 30-40 minutes (ibid.). Considering these outmoded rail lines, realizing this utopic plan requires expediting projects to

satisfy increasing demand (ADB 2012:4; AmCham-TAPP 2017:54; NEDAa 2017:245). Otherwise, doomsday predictions

of policy pundits of NCR being “uninhabitable” is looming (Chanco 2014:par.27; The Philippine Star 2016:par.1).

Currently, the country’s rail network pales in comparison to its ASEAN counterparts. A juxtaposition of metro

rail lines (Fig. 3.9.) in capitals of top performing ASEAN countries illustrates the conspicuously thin network in Metro

Manila. Accordingly, the Philippines has always ranked poorly in the WEF-GCR quality of railroads, declining to 88th

among 141 countries in the latest 2019 report (Fig. 3.10.).

29
30
 With unreliable rail transit, commuters resort to using private cars and ride-hailing platforms that comprise 77%

of all vehicles registered nationwide, mostly operating in NCR (Tables 3.5. & 3.6.)(Cupin 2017:par.1; Forbes 2018:3;

Gamboa 2018:par.8; LTO 2020:4; Paronda et. al 2017:4). Thus, rapid motorization rates growing at 10% annually result

to urban road congestion that causes accidents averaging 299 cases per day and incurring huge economic losses estimated

at 2% of GDP (PhP140 billion or USD3.13 billion), which is projected to double by 2030 (ADB 2012:4; AmCham-TAPP

2017:52; De Vera 2018:par.1-3; Llanto & Gerochi 2017:2; LTO 2020:4; Mijares et. al 2014:3; NEDAa 2017:245; Rey

2018:par. 3-6). Standard traffic management mechanisms such as truck bans were undertaken but failed (NEDAa

2017:245). In 2015, the Metro Manila Development Authority imposed a cargo truck ban to ease traffic congestion, only

to aggravate the situation that culminated in catastrophic port congestion, which delayed shipments and skyrocketed port

handling fees (Patalinghug et. al 2016:20-27).

31
3.3. Maritime Transport: Irony of Poor Water Transport in an Archipelago

The 2015 port congestion fiasco demonstrates the precariously integrated nature of transport infrastructure and

further underlines the importance of port efficiency in streamlining trading-across-border or customs policies, especially

in an archipelago like the Philippines.

Domestic shipping operates three-way: (1) pure containerized cargo shipping; (2) bulk (dry and wet), break bulk,

and small container shipping; and (3) large Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO) ferries with passengers on long-haul routes (Forbes

2010:153). Most are serviced by 1,300 ports, 77% of which are government owned. Of this, about 140 are operated by the

Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) while the remainder are under the management of LGUs and other government agencies

(ADB 2012:2).

International container cargo traffic has grown steadily in recent years, with port cargo volume ballooning from

166 million metric tons in 2010 to 223 million metric tons in 2015 (NEDAa 2017:246). Inter-island transport passengers

also increased from 52.7 million in 2010 to 62.76 million in 2015, partly because of projects intended for ASEAN

integration (ADB 2012:3; NEDAa 2017:246).

Introduced by President Arroyo in 2003 as the Strong Nautical Highway Program, the Ro-Ro network is

composed of western, eastern, and central trunk lines (Fig. 3.11.)(ADB 2012:3; Forbes 2010:153). It reduced logistics costs

by specifically eliminating cargo handling charges and wharfage fees, cutting travel time between Mindanao and Luzon by

about 12 hours, and minimizing freight costs by 30% (Fig. 3.12.) and passengers expenses by 40% (ADB 2012:3; Forbes

2010:153; Magsaysay-Ho et. al 2018:18-19). However, its utilization mounts resistance from PPA, whose revenues will be

32
affected by its promotion as a faster shipment alternative. This ultimately led to its declining passenger traffic (fell by

around 13% between 2003 and 2008) and stagnating (in its mid-90s levels) freight traffic (ADB 2012:3; Forbes 2010:1 53).

33
 This conflicted mandate reinforces port inefficiency (ADB 2012:2-3; NEDAa 2017:246). For passenger

transport, interisland travel continues to suffer from a poor reputation for safety, with an average of 160 maritime accidents

annually (ADB 2012:3). While natural causes such as bad weather and rough seas were to blame for 36% of recorded

incidents, 24% were avoidable human errors such as vessel traffic mismanagement, malfunctioning navigational aids, and

poor ship maintenance (ibid.). For freight transport, the lack of rationalized shipping services (25 operators running 42

vessels) and port inefficiencies trump growth prospects. The massive capital outlay requirements discourage further

prioritization of Ro-Ro port development (ADB 2012:3).

Nevertheless, the PPA is endeavoring to stimulate private sector investments in their flagship projects. The

government’s pipeline (see Annexes 1 for IFP & 4 for port projects) is rife with projects intended to decongest the Port

of Manila and improve the overall Ro-Ro network: 1) a new Ro-Ro terminal in Cavite, to allow alternative transshipment

of 115,000 Twenty-Foot Unit (TEU) of cargo and reduce about 140,000 truck trips to and from the Port of Manila; 2)

expanding the Redondo Terminal in Subic Port to double its existing 600,000-TEU capacity; and 3) over PhP55 (USD1.1)

billion to upgrade major peripheral ports in tourist zones such as Davao, Cebu, Legazpi, Cagayan de Oro, and Batangas

(AmCham-TAPP 2018; NEDA 2020:1-11). Pending full completion of all seaport development projects, shipping lines

still prefer Manila ports because of their proximity to ancillary services (warehouses, forwarders, etc.). This causes

continued congestion of access roads by container trucks plying NCR thoroughfares. Again, this point to both advantages

of existing industrial agglomeration and challenges of adopting a systems approach in port infrastructure provision (Fujita

et. al 1999; NEDAa 2017:246; Russell 2009:22).

Thus far, these port developments have enabled the country to catch up to ASEAN neighbors in the WEF-GCR

port quality rankings. After lagging far behind for years, the country’s ranking jumped 26 places from 114 th in 2015 to 88th

of 141 countries evaluated in 2019 (Fig. 3.13.). Yet, more can be done to make Philippine seaports more efficient.

34
3.4. Liberalized Air Space but Congested Gateways

Air transport in the country faces similar, if not worse, congestion, deteriorating facilities, poor asset maintenance,

and frustrated expansion plans. 215 airports are scattered all over the archipelago. 40% (85) are government-owned and -

controlled by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), while 11 are designated international airports in

tourism zones (ADB 2012:3; Rodolfo 2017:7). Of this, Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in NCR is the busiest,

handling more than half of total passenger movements (64% or 39.7 million) and air freight volume (74% or 680 million

kg of air cargo) as of the latest available data (CAAP 2016a; CAAPb 2016). Other international airports (Mactan-Cebu,

Davao, Kalibo, Iloilo, Laguindingan, Puerto Princesa, Bacolod, Tacloban, Clark, Zamboanga, Tagbilaran, General Santos,

Caticlan, Butuan, and Legaspi) displayed a combined movement of over 20 million passengers and 106 million kg of air

cargo (CAAPa 2016). Dr. Shizuo Iwata (2014:slideno.3), team leader in-charge of drafting the “Dream Plan”, warned that

demand forecast heralds unimaginable congestion as both international and domestic passenger traffic is projected to

reach 101 million by 2040.

Given these trends, serious capacity constraints plague the air transport sector (ADB 2012:4). Since 2015, the

sector has already exceeded its overall target growth of 52.51 million annual international and domestic passenger volume

by 25.8% (NEDAa 2017:245). In 2012, the 32-million passenger traffic in NAIA already exceeded its 30-million capacity

(Iwata 2014:slideno.3; Rodolfo 2017:9). Besides passenger terminal space, NAIA’s intersecting runway configuration (Fig.

3.14.) amplify aviation congestion by limiting aircraft movement to single use at any given time (Rodolfo 2017:10).

International arrivals are allowed only on Runway 06/24 to ensure safety, since arrivals are prioritized over departures as

a general rule in aviation (ibid.). The mixed-use policy allowing general aviation with smaller engines and military planes

35
augments delays by competing with commercial planes for available runway (ibid.). Limited taxiway facilities exacerbate

runway occupancy time (ibid.). The lack of night-time flying capabilities and instrument landing systems (ILS) (air traffic

control, radar, etc.) in other airports prevent airlines to spread flights at night, adding to day-time congestion during core

operational hours (Rodolfo 2017:10). Hence, most passengers, even those from the natural catchment area of nearby

airports, prefer to use NAIA because of more available flights (NEDAa 2017:246). These operational inefficiencies heavily

inconvenience passengers with additional costs due to flight delays and cancellations and raise business costs among

airlines penalized for poor on-time performance.

Nonetheless, the current administration is addressing these congestion problems by proposing efficiency-

enhancing projects with an emphasis on decongesting NAIA through facility renovations and redevelopment of secondary

international gateways (see Annex 5 for pipeline). For the first time in 30 years, NAIA Terminal 1 underwent a PhP1.3

billion (USD26.8 million) rehabilitation while NAIA’s Terminal 2 is undergoing expansion of its arrival and departure halls

to accommodate increasing passengers (Francisco 2016:12). Three airport development projects envisaged to decongest

NAIA are underway: (1) a new runway and passenger terminal in Clark International Airport to accommodate additional

36
8 million passengers from NAIA’s north catchment basin; (2) commercial cargo, military and general aviation reassignment

to Sangley Airport, a former airbase; and (3) a new, bigger airport in Bulacan to accommodate 100 to 200 million passenger

annually from NAIA’s south catchment basin (Villar 2020:87-90). Closer inter-agency cooperation dramatically increased

on-time performance from 40% to 80% through strictly (1) disallowing unslotted non-scheduled flights, (2) requiring

departure of aircraft within 5 minutes of clearance request, (3) limiting operations of private aircrafts and non-scheduled

operators outside peak hours, and (4) operating a new landing system to enhance flight efficiency and improve air

navigational safety (JICA 2018:par.1-5; Rodolfo 2017:17,27; Francisco 2016:par.13-22). Recent reactivation of Runway

13/31 for departures, permission of concurrent flight movements on both runways, extension of old taxiways, and

construction of two new ones also eased congestion (de Silva 2018:par.1-8; Rodolfo 2017:10). This combination of

structural upgrades and policy reforms removed NAIA from the world’s top 20 worst airports, a title it held from 2011 to

2013 (DOTr 2017:slideno.6; Dela Paz 2015:par.1-4; Francisco 2016:par.1-32). Since 2016, the government has invested in

facilities to make secondary airports of Caticlan, Legaspi, Roxas, Dumaguete, among others, capable of handling evening

flights (Rodolfo 2017:10). In 2017, the same poll ranked 4 secondary international airports (Cebu-Mactan, Davao, Iloilo,

and Clark) in the top 25 best airports in Asia (DOTr 2017:slideno.6; Rappler.com 2016:par.1-2). This robust pipeline

registered a 28-place improvement in the latest WEF-GCR airport quality ranking from a historical low of 124 th globally

in 2017 (Fig. 3.15.). Nevertheless, this performance improvement will only be sustained through effective disbursement

of available financing and strong political will to implement the project pipeline.

37
Chapter 4: Regulatory and Competition Framework

A survey of the 10 largest underspending departments finds that ineffectual government institutions and

ineffective competition policies continue to impede infrastructure development in the country, despite enlarged financial

resources (ADB 2012:1-26; MacLean 2017:1-28; Rosales 2017:1-55).

4.1. Institutional Deficit

4.1.a. Inadequate agency planning. Existing government effort to bolster infrastructure spending is

undermined by an unenforced National Transportation Policy (NTP) that synchronizes development goals, identifies

project priorities, determines appropriate funding models, and crafts optimal operational design structures (Public, GOCC,

BOT, O&M, etc.)(ADB 2012:9-10; MacLean 2017: 13). Despite its approval for adoption in late 2017 (see Annex 6), its

IRR was only published in December 2019 (NEDAa n.d..:1-15; NEDAb n.d.:par.3). While this comprehensive roadmap

is a commendable attempt, Dr. Shizuo Iwata (2014:1-11) expressed worry that the plan might not materialize since the

national government has flouted such proposal since the Marcos dictatorship. The dormancy of this centralizing

mechanism may deter prospective investors having to contend with policy uncertainty.

4.1.b. Poor inter-agency coordination. Consequently, this lack of a unified policy has caused uncoordinated

planning among transport agencies and regulators of vital economic sectors (ADB 2012:14; Maclean 2017:31; Rosales

2017:8,16-17). Intermodal integration between transport infrastructure assets is effectively non-existent, permitting

redundant investment decisions instead of considering optimal transport solutions (ibid.). The frequency of project delays

and glitches due to right-of-way acquisition (ROWA) issues demonstrates this acutely (Rosales 2017:8,16-17). For example,

the NAIA Expressway was a year behind schedule due to overlooked interference with a major water pipeline, and

uncoordinated overlapping construction projects (Agcoali 2015:2-7; Camus 2016:par.3; Mocon-Ciriaco 2015:3). Most are

ROWA problems indicating loopholes in agency planning, a hurdle contractors regard as government failure and hence

avoidable (Aquino 2015:par.2-3,7; DPWHb n.d.). In air transport, lack of coordination transpires both between (i.e. new

airports built without adequate road connectivity to/from airport gateways and city/town centers, e.g. Bacolod-Silay,

Laguindingan) and within departments (i.e. new airports inaugurated without navigational aids to handle night operations,

e.g. Laguindingan Airport)(Rodolfo 2017:12).

4.1.c. Low procurement capacities. These bid delays and failures indicate deficiency in the absorptive capacity

of line agencies to disburse an expanding pool of funds, especially given the recent surge of Chinese ODA (Rosales

2017:8,16-17). Taking on average 29 months of heavy research and fastidious coordination among multiple ministries,

little standardization characterizes the lengthy PPP design process from project conceptualization to awarding (Fig. 4.1.),

38
(Rosales 2017:16-17,39). Despite the PPP Center’s ongoing efforts, improvised templates in project implementation cause

trepidation among investors and within implementing agencies themselves (MacLean 2017:14). Consequently, the

tendency of these agencies to rush feasibility studies ironically causes frequent delays for purposes of correcting erroneous

assumptions, ultimately dissolving projects for failure to attract bidders (MacLean 2017:14; Rosales 2017:16-17). As the

North Luzon Expressway-South Luzon Expressway (NLEx-SLEx) Connector Road issue attests, the onset of unsolicited

proposals perturbing line agencies untrained to manage the complexity of such proposals compounds this issue (Dela Paz

2018:9-15). In spite of technical assistance to improve project supervision (e.g. World Bank-ADB DPWH IT project) the

overall quality of projects remains poor as these technological improvements linger in infancy or dormancy (ADB 2012:7).

4.2. Structural Defects

4.2.a. Unclear Property Rights. This institutional deficit reflects a fundamental problem of unclear, un-

rationalized property rights and antiquated laws that breed technical ambiguities and merely encourages political

maneuvering that delays critical infrastructure and malicious ownership layering to skirt nationality restrictions, a

counterproductive corporate practice that defeats the original intent of the laws (Forbes & Griño 2008:95-98; Navarro &

39
Llanto 2014:34,39). For instance, the resolution over the legitimate ownership of MRT-3 took 5 years after top government

officials sued the winning consortium of 10 foreign and domestic corporations for violating the Constitution’s nationality

restriction over public utility ownership (Forbes & Griño 2008; Tatad, Osmeña, & Biazon vs. DOTC Sec. Garcia & EDSA

LRT CORPORATION LTD. 1995). The Supreme Court’s ruling, however, allowed government management over

operations and one of the foreign companies in the winning consortium to retain MRT-3 ownership under a 25-year Build-

Transfer concession (ibid.). Contending the dichotomy between the operation and ownership of public utility in transport

infrastructure, the court ruled that through the BOT law, fully foreign-owned (more than 40% equity) companies are

allowed to build and construct public infrastructure provided they pass the Control Test, i.e. so long as 60% of voting

rights in the firms holding the operating franchise remains with Philippine nationals (ibid.). This sets the precedent for

ambiguously and conditionally permitting foreign equity of only 40% in roads and other transport sectors but 100% in

railway under a Build-Transfer scheme. The NLEx-SLEx connector road encountered 6 years of unnecessary bureaucratic

flipflopping before its final awarding because the implementing departments disputed over unclear policy on unsolicited

proposals (Dela Paz 2018:par.9-15; DPWH n.d.). The completion of NAIA-3 was severely protracted for 15 years by a

highly controversial legal battle for compensating Takenaka and Asahisokan, allegedly unpaid subcontractors for the

original contractor Philippine International Air Terminals Company (PIATCO), after President Arroyo, following the

ouster of President Estrada, did not honor PIATCO’s contract and refused to sign the amended agreement that would

secure ADB financing (Official Gazette 2002; PIATCO vs. DOTC, PIATCO vs. Takenaka, Asahikosan, et. al. 2015). The

development of Subic Port was also encumbered by a 4-year legal scuffle when President Ramos refused to award

Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited, a subsidiary of Hong Kong’s largest container port operator, the project despite

winning the bid twice in favor of International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI), the operator of two major ports

at the Manila Harbor—a move that incited controversy over conflict of interests and palpable collusion (Forbes & Griño

2008:67; HPPL, vs. SBMA, ICTSI, RPSI, and Executive Secretary 2000). Such cases underscore the risk of legal gaps and

regulatory loopholes serving as platforms for intervention by powerful political economic forces, in the form of

presidential nudging and hostile legal interference with legitimate foreign bidders. These demonstrate that in the absence

of a long-term national infrastructure plan that ensures priorities remain constant across administrations, political pressures

of this kind dent the integrity of the whole tendering process.

4.2.b. Conflict of Interests. A more acute cause of these institutional deficiencies is the highly centralized power

structure of sector regulators. For seaports and aviation, the PPA and the CAAP have joint authority over operations and

regulations, engendering conflict of interest and prejudice against private sector investments. Although the PPA is

40
mandated to issue permits to private companies to construct and operate ports, its dual role as port regulator and owner

disincentivizes active modernization and open competition, as it tends to disapprove any permit that would threatens its

interests (Llanto et. al 2005:15-16,24). This explains lower utilization of RORO shipping given diminished cargo handling

revenues. Similarly, the CAAP handles both enforcement of air navigation standards and airport construction, operation,

and maintenance (ADB 2012:7-8; AmCham-TAPP 2017:42-45; Llanto et. al 2005:16). In a civil aviation roadmap launch,

former CAAP Director-General William Hotchkiss stressed the need to divest its role as an airport developer and operator

to a proposed independent agency, a recommendation that concurrent Transportation Secretary Arthur Tugade supports

and foreign and local business communities have long advocated (AmCham-TAPP 2015:1-2; AmCham-TAPP 2017:42;

PortCalls 2017:par.1-2). Doing so will not only relieve mounting fiscal constraints on CAAP’s limited capital resources but

will also streamline aviation regulation to deal with rising airport passenger traffic anticipated by the ASEAN integration.

Both agencies are also mandated to coordinate with LGUs for municipal projects, subjecting both to political pressure to

allocate funds for all LGUs, dissipating limited resources rather than developing major airports and seaports in a more

efficient hub-and-spoke system (Forbes 2010:153; Llanto et. al 2005:14-16).

4.3. Limited Competition

4.3.a. Monopolies: Structural Consequence of Limited Competition. The dual functions of these sector

regulators consented regulatory “capture” that set arbitrary rules barring new entrants, stifling competition, and

engendering the emergence and endurance of sectoral monopolies (Forbes & Griño 2008:48). As Krueger (1974:291-293)

puts it, a governance structure bereft of institutional accountability increases chances of rent-seeking in the form of firms

allocating resources to influence the approval of government licenses or business permits.

Indeed, the first limited-access tollway in the Philippines, the NLEx, was built by the Philippine National

Construction Company owned by a Marcos crony who fled the country when Marcos fell in 1986, leaving behind a

bankrupt company seized by the government since (Forbes & Griño 2008:69-70). Granted a broad franchise for all toll

roads in Luzon, it built limited-access tollways in NCR and surrounding regions in the ‘70s and continued to build the

country’s first elevated expressway, the Manila Skyway, to relieve heavy traffic in NCR’ southern suburbs, amidst

operational and financial difficulties that included the 1997 financial crisis. While delays in completing this Skyway could

not be solely attributed to inefficiencies from market collusion, this structure would set a precedent for limited competition

in other transport sectors.

For over 20 years, Philippine Airlines (PAL) had virtual monopoly as a national flag carrier. Despite being heavily

subsidized, its operations were mired in financial woes, notoriously delayed flights, and unreliable air shipments that earned

41
it derisive acronyms like “Plane Always Late” (Austria 2000:16). In 1995, President Ramos ended its monopoly through

Executive Order (EO) 219, which both deregulated domestic air transport and eased the entry of foreign carriers through

bilateral air service agreements. By 1999, the entry of five new players initially decimated PAL’s market shares by capturing

46% of total passenger traffic (Austria 2000:16-17). While the deregulation momentarily expanded domestic competition

and accelerated growth of domestic travel through lower airfares, it eventually reified PAL’s inefficient monopoly through

market segmentation and consolidation. Being the country’s only international flag carrier, PAL maintained uncontested

market share of international flights while dominating fiercely contested domestic routes with heavier traffic alongside

bigger players. After smaller airlines discovered sectoral survival means thriving on marginal profits, mergers and

acquisitions (M&A) transpired with concentration hikes peaking at 48% between 1995 and 2000 (Austria 2000:15-18).

Market competition improved, nevertheless, when President B. Aquino decreed more aggressive liberalization through

“Pocket Open Skies” policies a year after taking office (EO 28 2011; EO 29 2011; Rodolfo 2017:7). EO 29 permitted

limited entry of foreign carriers in secondary international airports outside NCR while affording greater flexibility in the

Civil Aviation Board to authorize permits with presidential approval to international carriers (CAB 2018; NEDAa

2017:245). EO 28 removed Philippine-based airlines from the negotiating panel, further reducing PAL’s platform for

market influence. In 2015, the ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM) initiative further boosted liberalization efforts by

allowing airlines from ASEAN member states to fly freely throughout the region (ASEAN 2015; Rodolfo 2017:3).

Comparably, seaports ownership, operations, and development remain restrictive to new entrants, being

dominated by two domestic conglomerates highly centralized under PPA (Llanto et. al 2005:13-20). Its charter allows it

10% share from cargo handling revenues, setting a precedent for arbitrary fixing uncomplemented by its ports’

underdevelopment (Llanto et. al 2005:20; Magsaysay-Ho et. Al 2018:18). Notwithstanding North Harbor and policy

pronouncements welcoming multiple operators, the PPA has hitherto served as the only owner-operator of three ports in

Manila: Manila International Container Terminal (MICT), South and North Harbors. In 1996, the PPA Board approved

the construction of a fourth and private terminal, the Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (HCPTI), at the North Harbor

(Llanto et. al 2005:19). However, it took 7 years to issue HCPTI a commercial permit to: (a) operate and handle all types

of domestic vessels and cargoes, and (b) operate foreign vessels and cargoes conditionally (ibid.). Limited competition (see

Table 4.1. for summary) started in 2003 when HCPTI claimed 80% of foreign break-bulk cargoes normally handled at

the South Harbor due to better services and lower (50%) rates (Llanto et. al 2005:22). Despite its regulatory qualification

and proven capacity to compete, the PPA has not permitted HCPTI to handle foreign containerized cargoes to date. By

doing so, the PPA prevents competition against its own ports, cementing a duopoly between ICTSI and Asian Terminal

42
Inc., with the former controlling 64% of international container traffic at Manila’s North Harbor (Forbes & Griño

2008:67). Worse, while bidding for cargo handling contracts is a stated policy, contract award or renewal is mainly by

negotiations, allowing PPA considerable discretion in granting contracts without public bidding and conferring

tremendous rents to the awarded operator (Llanto et. al 2005:22-23). Thus, centralization of port administration leaves

very little room to inter-port competition.

History of government management over rail monopolies has proven inimical to the perennial goal of urban

decongestion and enhancement of commuters’ welfare. For heavy rail, the PNR was given virtual monopoly on land travel

even before commuting on highways and light rail began. Existing since the Spanish conquest, its institution outlasted

wars but its operational quality and railroad coverage deteriorated (as earlier discussed). The PNR itself acknowledges

“continued neglect,” besides damage from natural calamities, as the chief culprit (PNR n.d.:par.4). By contrast, the

insistence of government to continue its fragmented privatization of LRT-1 & 2 and MRT-3 have arguably caused

increasing breakdowns and commuter injuries (The Manila Times 2015:par.1-4). In 2015 alone, the MRT-3 experienced

daily glitches lasting 2-3 days and incurred over three injuries for every 100 million passenger-miles versus USA’s

benchmark of virtually zero injury (ibid.). As over 600,000 passengers depend on a single service provider, urban rail with

limited routes and capacity necessitates a natural monopoly for an orderly operation (The Manila Times 2015:par.4-10).

Privatization with government guarantees, in this case, would encourage decisions on station location and design, operation

and maintenance, and fare pricing on the basis of corporate interests rather than the principle of maximizing

socioenvironmental benefits (ibid.).

4.3.b. Legacy of Path-Dependent Protectionism. These monopolies thrive as a legacy of three decades of

protectionism. Initiated as postwar import-substitution industrial policies, a complex array of regulatory controls and

43
investment incentives collectively failed to allocate domestic economic resources efficiently but instead nurtured high

concentration of industrial capital among a small group while cultivating a feeble culture of competition characterized by

fragmented policies and regulations (Table 4.2.) implemented by various sectoral agencies (Table 4.3.)(Aldaba 2005:2,13).

Despite their number and specificity, general consensus dictates these laws remain ineffective in addressing

anticompetitive behavior due to lack of enforcement (Aldaba 2005:13). Since laws are penal in nature, guilt must be proven

beyond reasonable doubt, requiring tedious amount of evidence to advance cases. While various ministries handle both

competition regulation and promotion in their jurisdiction (Table 4.3), no single, central agency monitors implementation

of competition laws until the landmark Philippine Competition Act (PCA) passed in 2015 after languishing for 24 years in

Congress (Aldaba 2005:13; PCCb 2018:par.1). The PCA establishes the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC), an

independent quasi-judicial body, primarily tasked to promote market competition and ensure public welfare by guarding

against anti-competitive market behavior, investigating flagrantly enormous M&A deals, and penalizing violators with fines

and imprisonment (PCCa 2018). Nonetheless, the lack of litigation in Philippine courts against monopolies attests to the

frail novelty of the PCA and the path-dependence of this protectionism (Gulapa et. Al 2017:par.7-22).

In the absence of this infrastructural power (Mann 1984:185-213), PPP participants and stakeholders opine how

local industry conglomerates persist as oligarchs stifling sectoral competition in infrastructure development (DTI-BOI

2018:2,11-12; Forbes & Griño 2008:101-112; MacLean 2017:12). Maintaining large stakes in diversified sectors from real

estate and agriculture to consumer goods, these family-owned corporations are well capitalized to compete for

infrastructure projects, with the top five controlling an estimated PhP1.6 trillion (USD33 billion) in assets and coveting

big ticket projects prioritized in the national government’s Public Investment Plan (Table 4.4.)(DTI-BOI 2018:2,11-12;

MacLean 2017:12).

44
45
46
 4.3.c. Limited Liberalization: Loss of Beneficial Foreign Competition. These companies comprise a vast

industry spanning over 10,000 accredited contractors (CIAP 2013:2; CIAP 2014:1-2; CIAP 2015:1-3; CIAP 2016a:1-2;

CIAP 2017:2; CIAP 2018:2). While this number appears auspicious, historical data on annual license registration by

government’s primary regulator, the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines (CIAP), and its licensing arm, the

Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board’s (PCAB), strongly indicate high entry barriers. From 2013 to 2017, foreign

participation in the industry remained limited, with new special licenses accounting for just 10% to 15% of total licenses

issued during the period (Fig. 4.2.). In 2016 alone, only 20 of the 1,305 firms granted with special licenses were foreign

contractors (CIAP 2016b:16). Only six more were added in 2017 (CIAP 2018:2). PCAB licensing data also illustrates a

structurally unchanged Philippine construction industry with substantially limited competition, as new regular licenses

comprise only 12% of total licenses issued from 2013 to 2017 (CIAP n.d.; CIAP 2013:2; CIAP 2014:1-2; CIAP 2015:1-3;

CIAP 2016:1-2; CIAP 2017:2; CIAP 2018:2; PCC 2017:1-4).

47
 These restrictions to foreign participation are anchored on the Constitution, which treats transport infrastructure

assets as public utilities whose ownership, construction, and operation must conform to the 60% Filipino-40% Foreign

rule (Forbes & Griño 2008:46-48; Gulapa et. Al 2017:par.7-22). This nationality restriction is enshrined across a plethora

of statutes2 containing subtle provisions that impose layers of substantive barriers to foreign investor participation, ranging

from requiring preferential employment of Filipino laborers to discriminatory licensing (Forbes & Griño 2008:46-48;

Gulapa et. al 2017:par.11-18). For contractors’ accreditation, regular licenses are reserved for domestic construction firms

while a special license is issued to a JV, consortium, or fully foreign contractor for the construction of a single specific

undertaking, an internationally funded/bidded project, or a project implemented through the BOT Law Gulapa et. Al

2017:7-8). Although the PCAB issued a resolution in 2015 allowing conditional participation of foreign contractors

through a special “Regular License with Annotation” category, the requirements are stringent3 and permission limited.

Altogether, these administrative restrictions impose high business costs, estimated to reach PhP176,760 (USD3,650), 12

times the application fee of PhP14,730 (USD304) for a regular license. Prospective investors known to possess beneficial

2 Mainly include the latest Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL), the antiquated Public Services Act (Commonwealth Act 136), the Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) Law of 1990 (RA 6957), later amended in 1993 (RA 7718), and the Government Procurement Reform Act (RA 9184) (Forbes &
Griño 2008:46-48; Gulapa et. al 2017:par.11-18).
3 (1) reincorporation into a Filipino company with minimum capitalization of PhP1 billion (US$20 million) in cash, 2) minimum contract value per

single project of at least PhP5 (US$100 million) in Vertical Projects (high-rise commercial and public buildings, passenger terminals and tourism hubs),
and (3) at least PhP3 billion (US$60 million) in Horizontal Projects (at grade/level transport infrastructure, subterranean and overground
utilities)(Gulapa et. Al 2017:par.10-11); the latter two comprising the bulk of big-ticket projects in the government’s aggressive PPP pipeline.

48
technological knowledge and financial capital are confronted with a lose-lose dilemma between the less costly but more

laborious special license for each specific project or the more stable but exorbitant Regular License with Annotation

(Gulapa et. Al 2017:par.24; PCC 2017:2-3).

The PCC (2017:1-4; as cited in Gulapa et. Al 2017:par.20) believes these restrictions institute an uneven playing

field, dissuading foreign entrants to the market. In fact, through letters addressed to then PCAB chairman Pericles Dakay

and PCC Chair Arsenio Balisacan (2016, M. Schumacher, pers. comm., May 23), contractors from the influential European

Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines protested how anti-competitive rules could prevent beneficial technological

transfer through possible local-foreign firm partnerships and compromise overall project quality by limiting options for

most qualified bidders (Gulapa et. Al 2017:par.23).

The deterrence can already be observed in FDI inflows into the industry. While low FDI levels in the Philippine

construction industry, barely 1% of GDP, cannot be attributed to a single factor, entry barriers across ASEAN countries

reflect similar patterns in FDI inflows. Indonesia and Thailand, which impose foreign equity limitations of up to 67% and

49%, respectively, registered similarly low levels of less than 10% of GDP in 2014 (PCC 2017:3-4). On the other hand,

Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Singapore, where entry barriers are relaxed, attracted higher FDI levels (ibid.). If the

status quo remains, the Philippines risks losing beneficial competition from foreign contractors with useful technological

advancement and expertise (Gulapa et. Al 2017:par.23).

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper seeks to demonstrate how infrastructure can be both an empirical problem and theoretical solution

to the national pursuit of virtuous growth and ultimately irreversible economic development. In this context, the urgency

of examining Philippine infrastructure development policy is conducted with a particular focus on the transport sector.

5.1. Engaged Sectors and Enterprise Value Creation

5.1.a. Constraints. A comprehensive survey of transport infrastructure stocks reveals that the country continues

to suffer from alarmingly inferior assets that constrain economic sectoral expansion and withhold potential for higher

national growth. All assets appear to display common symptoms of severe yet mendable underdevelopment: 1) poorly

maintained and congested facilities lacking intermodal integration, 2) poorly regulated and unrationalized service operators

inconveniencing public commuters and risking costly accidents, and 3) disproportionate concentration of investments in

the capitals forsaking equitable regional development, as spatial economic theories warrant. As a result, the quality of

49
infrastructure assets in the country remains the poorest among top performing ASEAN economies, with railroads and

seaports, two vital nodes for urban mobility and global supply chains, being the worst rated.

While sector-specific problems account for this poor performance, decades of chronic underinvesting, ineffective

competition framework, and unclear property rights continue to undermine any serious effort at accelerating infrastructure

development. A summary of the Philippine transport infrastructure bundle is provided on Table 5.1.

Therefore, infrastructure development in the Philippines is still undergoing the Enabling Phase, or early

injection of basic infrastructure that brings primordial gains in scale and productivity (Russell 2009:51). The prospect of

moving to the next phase, Transaction Efficiency Phase, where the country can benefit from tangible trade and

productivity gains, would entail effective capacity expansion through steadfast provision of previously unavailable hard

infrastructure network connections (intermodal links) and soft infrastructure enhancements that improve trade facilitation

or augment external linkages.

50
 5.1.b. Opportunities. These findings become more relevant in view of huge opportunities presented by the

country’s impending trade integration obligations and the overall global economic outlook. Among global drivers of trade,

container shipping throughput remains high despite a recent slow-down of global trade since 2015, with intra-Asia markets

registering the highest container shipping volume and two major east–west routes (Trans-Pacific and Asia- Europe)

projected to increase up to 5.5% until 2020 (33 million TEU)(Magsasay-Ho et. al 2018:1-4). In aviation, the ASAM is

expected to stimulate at least USD37 billion in regional airport investments and international tourist arrival of 187 million

by 2030, generating 3.4 million jobs and contributing USD23 billion to the Philippine economy (Rodolfo 2017:3-5).

Building world-class logistics transport infrastructure would help the Philippines exploit this enhanced connectivity that

promotes high-value creation and industrial linkages in the economy.

5.2. Development Implications

These external factors are complemented by more favorable domestic developments.

5.2.a. Opportunities: Supportive Budget Policy and Capital Abundance. The country is given a pivotal

opportunity to maximize copious financing for critical infrastructure projects. This newfound abundance of capital arises

from 1) the unprecedented resurgence of multilateral and bilateral ODAs primarily from credit-rich China, 2) wider fiscal

space due to improved tax collection and supportive budget policies with higher spending targets, and 3) a booming capital

market sustained by steady high growth rates and creative alternative financial instruments (Navarro & Llanto 2014:34-36;

Rosales 2017:50). Indeed, Duterte’s ambitious “Build, Build, Build” program offers a watershed policy that instills

institutional commitment to greater infrastructure spending.

5.2.b. Constraints: Convoluted Government Regulation. However, accomplishing this national goal of

accelerating infrastructure development necessitates fortifying the competition framework to curb path-dependent

protectionism and address institutional-structural deficits. Institutional incompetence manifests in inadequate agency

planning, poor inter-agency coordination, and low procurement capacities that leads to costly project delays and failures.

Overlapping agency functions institutionalize conflict of interest that breeds heightened risks for bureaucratic stalemates,

hostile policy reversals, and political manipulation by powerful presidents and judicial intervention culminating in highly

disruptive court cases. Ineffective competition nurtures homegrown monopolies that endeavor to maintain high barriers

to entry of beneficial competition, particularly from foreign investments. The whole system summons the imperative to

clarify infrastructure investment policies to institute clear-cut, reliable property rights for a sound competitive market

(ADB 2012:14; MacLean 2017:15; North 1992:9:15).

51
 While this study does not intend to belabor the whole gamut of reforms, fully unlocking the private sector and

harnessing government resources require implementing a laundry list of policy reforms that will level the playing field and

ensure an effective competition regime anchored on liberalization efforts that fulfills the country’s trade integration

obligations. Salient ones deserve worthy mention.

5.2.b.i. A proper sectoral roadmap. Fast-tracking the implementation of the long dormant national

transportation plan would incentivize increased private sector participation by demarcating the roles and risk allocation

between private entities and government agencies and synchronizing government planning and budgeting to ensure

efficient resource allocation (ADB 2012:9-10). Doing so would overcome the country’s relative lateness in exploiting an

expanding pool of global/regional infrastructure funds (e.g. China’s AIIB) to be at par with highly competitive neighbors

with the same access to such funds but with more bullish infrastructure investment plans.

The plan must be retrofitted to the broader PDP, with a strategic focus on rural-industrial development, which

desirably decongests overpopulated and overburdened metropolises from transport gridlocks and makes growth more

inclusive to underserved regions deprived of viable economic opportunities (ADB 2012:10). This must be complemented

with roadmaps for each transport sector, such as the 10-year Maritime Development Plan completed in late 2018

(MARINA 2018) and the Multimodal Transportation and Logistics Roadmap unveiled in 2016 (PortCalls 2018). These

roadmaps function both as an infrastructure strategy and an industrial policy that can induce sectoral growth (Straub

2008:13).

5.2.b.ii. Reasonable Liberalization. It makes sense to place nationality restrictions in sectors that need to

ensure nationality security such as national defense. However, substantially restricting foreign participation where such

could catalyze competitiveness is unreasonable especially given the proven potency of sectoral inefficiencies from

entrenched protectionism. In reality, restricting liberalization encourages conditional permission that only lends greater

complexity to the already convoluted application procedure for foreign contractors and discourages corporate transparency

through concealment of illegal practices in skirting the 40% equity restriction. So while the Supreme Court ruling on the

MRT-3 ownership issue helps in attracting foreign capital and advanced technology, a more rationalized, clear-cut legal

framework prevents variable judicial interpretation that renders infrastructure investment policy unpredictable. While the

ideal recommendation is a constitutional charter change to overhaul restrictive economic provisions, a pending joint

Congressional resolution conferring the authority and flexibility to legislate foreign investment restrictions to Congress in

lieu of rigidly enshrined constitutional provisions is a step in the right direction. Pending this, policy advocates might have

to traverse the more feasible path of piecemeal liberalization in the form of individual amendments to governing laws

52
considered competition-enhancing: 1) Public Service Act, 2) Government Procurement Act, 3) Retail Trade Act, 4) Ease

of Doing Business/ Anti-Red Tape Act, and 4) charters of relevant transport regulators with monopoly of approvals

(PCAB) or conflict of interests (PPA, CAAP), among others.

Only then will the country advance to the “pinnacle of differentiated infrastructure development”, the

Competition-Inducing Phase, wherein robust market competition advances transport infrastructure development

(Russell 2009:51).

Overall, the market opportunities currently emerging drive the policy momentum toward accelerating

infrastructure development in the country. However, residual governance challenges threaten to place the country in a

constant chase to sustain reform efforts to usher in “the Golden Age of Infrastructure”. Alas, the whole country needs to

take gargantuan steps to making this “Dream Plan” plan a reality.

53
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http://www.investphilippines.info/arangkada/arangkada-philippines-implementing-the-ten-point-socio-economic-

agenda-of-the-duterte-administration/

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Trackers. Makati City, Philippines. Accessed (September 12, 2018) via

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manila-uninhabitable-4-years#vFW1rOL2MSreGvwg.99

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9059019288, 9789059019287.

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AWorld Bank. 2018. “Belt and road initiative”. In Brief of The World Bank website. Accessed (September 9, 2019) via

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74
 Annexes

Annex 1. Infrastructure Flagship Projects, as of July 31, 2019

75
76
77
78
79
 Annex 2. Flagship Road Infrastructure Projects as of September 12, 2018

Funding
Cost Type
(in PhP Private (GPH, Phase/Status
No. Sector Project Name Agency Description
or US$ Counterpart ODA, (Completion Date)
B) PPP,
Private)
Completed
A 4-lane, 7.75 km elevated
expressway and 2.22 km at-
grade feeder road that will
provide access to NAIA
Completed: Phase
Terminals I, II, and III and
2A and Phase 2B
link Skyway and Manila-
operation
Vertex Cavite Toll Expressway. It
commenced on
Road NAIA Expressway Tollways starts at the existing Skyway
1 ₱ 17.93 DPWH PPP September 22, 2016
Project Project (Phase II) Development then follows existing road
and December 20,
Inc. alignments over Sales
2016, respectively.
Avenue, Andrews Avenue,
Fully opened on
Domestic Road, and NAIA
June 1, 2017.
Road, and has entry/exit
ramps at Roxas Boulevard,
Macapagal Boulevard, and
PAGCOR City.
a 4 kilometer, 4–lane paved
toll road that will pass
Muntinlupa–
Ayala through the New Bilibid Completed on
Cavite
Corporation Prison reservation that will December 21, 2016
Road Expressway
2 ₱2.65 DPWH (AC)- MCX connect Bacoor, Cavite to PPP and operational
Project (Daang Hari‐
Tollways, the South Luzon Expressway since February 9,
SLEX Link Road
Inc. and serve as an alternative 2017
Project)
route to/fro Metro Manila and
Cavite
(a) construction and O&M of
additional additional two (2) Completed as of
STAR Project Star lanes of 20-km toll road from May 18, 2015;
Toll
Construction of Infrastructure Lipa City-Batangas City; (b) Sabang bridge
Road Regulatory
3 Stage II, Phase 2 ₱2.32 Development Northbound; Improvement of PPP destroyed by
Project Board
and Improvement Corporation Stage 1 completed in 2001 typhoon fully
(TRB)
of Stage I (SIDC) thru asphalt overlay including repaired by August
the STAR and SLEX TR-3 22, 2017
Interconnection.
Awarded and/or Ongoing Construction

80
 14.82 km. 6-lane elevated
toll road and last of 3 stages
of Metro Manila Skyway
Awarded in 2014;
System. It is intended to
Metro Manila Ongoing
Road CITRA (San connect SLEX to Balintawak
4 Skyway (MMS) ₱ 37.43 TRB PPP construction at 35%;
Project Miguel) in QC before NLEX through
Stage 3 Project Target completion:
Central Metro Manila Area by
2018
using predominantly median
of Quirino, G. Araneta and A.
Bonifacio road networks.
8 km. 4-lane elevated
expressway over PNR right
of way. It starts from C3
Road in Caloocan through
Proposed in 2010;
Manila crossing Espana
Reviewed by the
towards PUP, Sta. Mesa
DOJ in 2014;
connecting Metro Manila
Subjected to Swiss
Manila North Skyway Stage 3. Once
Challenge in 2015;
Road NLEx-SLEx T ollways completed, NLEX-SLEX
5 ₱ 23.20 DPWH PPP Awarded: July 2016
Project Connector Road Corporation Connector road is expected
Pre-Construction: to
(MNTC) to decongest traffic in Metro
start construction in
Manila by providing an
Q1 2018 Target
alternative to C-5 Road,
completion: May
EDSA, and other major
2019
thoroughfares, and cut travel
time between NLEX and
SLEX to 15-20 minutes from
an hour.
4-lane 44.20 km. closed-
Awarded in 2015;
system toll expressway
Groundbreaking
connecting CAVITEX and
June 19, 2017 Pre-
SLEX. Project will start from
Construction (Right-
CAVITEX in Kawit, Cavite
of-Way Acquisition
and end at SLEX-
Cavite - Laguna MPCALA ongoing for
Road Mamplasan Interchange in
6 (CALA) ₱ 35.43 DPWH Holdings Inc. PPP remaining sections.
Project Biñan, Laguna. It will have
Expressway (MPIC) Total
interchanges in 8 locations
accomplishment for
namely; Kawit, Open Canal,
the ROW activities
Governor’s Drive, Aguinaldo
has reached 56.09%
Highway, Silang East, Sta.
as of October 25,
Rosa-Tagaytay Rd., Laguna
2017.)
Blvd., and Technopark.
A 33-km toll road project
connecting SLEx Skyway/FTI Ongoing R-O-W
Metro Manila Citra Intercity
Road in Taguig City and Batasan acquisition; intended
7 Expressway ₱45.00 TRB Tollways Inc. PPP
Project Complex (House of to be operational by
Project (C–6) (CITI)
Representatives) in Quezon 2021
City
A 7.7-km 3-lane toll road
Cavitex project intended to connect
Infrastructure R1 Coastal/Expressway and Construction
Road C5 South Link Corporation C5 road, envisaged to Accomplishment:
8 ₱12.00 TRB PPP
Project Project (formerly connect major business 39.38% as of August
UEM-MARA districts in Makati/Taguig 25, 2018
Phils) area to Cavite, Parañaque,
and Las Piñas
Segment 8.2 is a proposed Segment 8.2 -
Segment 8.35-kms 4-lane divided DPWH ROW Task
8.2 - ₱ expressway from Segment Force was created
7.45 8.1 at Mindanao Avenue to for the acquisition of
billion
NLEX-Harbor Manila North Republic Avenue turning the ROW
Road Link Project Tollways right to Luzon Avenue up to
9 TRB PPP
Project (Segments 8.2 Segment Corporation Commonwealth in Quezon
City. Segment 9-
and 10) 9- ₱1.70 (MNTC)
Completed and
opened to the public
Segment Segment 9 - is a 2.42-km. 4- on March 19, 2015.
10 - lane (2x2) that
connects NLEX Mindanao

81
 ₱15.55 Avenue Link (Segment 8.1) Segment 10 - DPWH
billion at the SMART Connect ROW Task Force
Interchange to McArthur was created for the
Highway in Valenzuela City. acquisition of the
ROW
Segment 10 is a 5.65-km. 4-
lanes divided (2x2) elevated
expressway connecting
McArthur Highway in
Valenzuela City and C-3 in
Caloocan City. It will utilize
the existing PNR railroad
tracks that cut across
Valenzuela City and Malabon
City.
The construction of Plaridel
Bypass Road involves a total
length of 24.61 km. and 11
Awarded in 2016
bridges. It traverses the vast
Road Plaridel Bypass Under Construction
10 ₱ 151.79 DPWH JICA agricultural lands of 5 ODA
Project Road (Phase I-IV) Phase III to start in
municipalities in Bulacan
Jan. 2018
namely; Balagtas, Guiguinto,
Plaridel, Bustos and San
Rafael.
Section 1 (Tarlac-
Rosales,
Pangasinan) -
Substantially
completed. Opened
to motorists on 31
October 2013.
Collection of toll fees
started on 06
January 2014

Section 2 (Rosales-
An 89 km 4-lane expressway
Urdaneta) -
currently under construction
Substantially
north of Manila. It connects
completed. Opened
Tarlac– central to northern Luzon,
Private Infra to traffic last 17
Road Pangasinan–La with its southernmost
11 ₱ 24.40 DPWH Dev Corp. PPP February 2015.
Project Union terminal located in Tarlac
(PIDC) Collection of toll fees
Expressway City and its planned
started 17 March
northernmost terminus
2015
currently slated to be at
Rosario, La Union.
Section 3 (Urdaneta-
La Union) - ongoing
construction (54%
complete)
- Urdaneta City -
Binalonan,
Pangasinan (opened
Jul. 2017) -
Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan-
Rosario, La Union
(opened Dec. 2017)
South Luzon A 4-lane toll road from Sto.
South Luzon Awarded in 2015
Road Expressway Tomas, Batangas to
12 ₱ 13.10 TRB Tollways PPP Pre-Construction:
Project (SLEx)-Toll Road Tayabas/Lucena City in
Corporation ROW ongoing
4 (TR4) Quezon, 56.862 km long
A 21.8 km – 4 lane road
Construction started
including 3 bridges and 2
Bacolod as of February 9,
Road way bike lane that would
13 Economic ₱ 5.79 DPWH GPH 2017; expected date
Project serve as an alternate
Highway of completion:
circumferential road
December 30, 2022
bypassing the busy Bacolod

82
 City Central Business District
that lies in the interior of
Bacolod City.
Located around 7.5 km south
of the existing Mandaue Awarded in 2017
Bridge Cebu-Cordova Bridge, the infrastructure will Under Construction
14 ₱ 28.00 DPWH MPIC PPP
Project* Link Expressway have a total of 8.25-kms toll Target completion:
reach, connecting mainland 2022
Cebu and Cordova.
Sta. Monica-Lawton Bridge
involves the construction of a
Bonifacio Global
4-lane bridge across Pasig
City to Ortigas
River and a 4-lane viaduct
Road Link
structure traversing Lawton
Bridge Project, Sta. Groundbreaking:
15 ₱ 4.01 DPWH Avenue onwards the GPH
Project Monica-Lawton July 19, 2017
entrance of Bonifacio Global
Bridge and
City and the ramp before
Viaduct (Phase I
Kalayaan Avenue in the City
& II-A)
of Makati. The total length of
the projects is 961.427 k.m.
Funding
Cost Type
Phase/Status
(in PhP Private (GPH,
No. Sector Project Name Agency Description (Completion
or US$ Counterpart ODA,
Date)
B) PPP,
Private)
Proposal Submitted for Evaluation by Concerned Agencies
A 4-lane, 91-km expressway
starting from La Mesa Parkway in
Bulacan and stretching
northwards to Nueva Ecija. It
aims to spur provincial and
For evaluation of
regional economic activities,
Road NLEX East NEDA-Investment
16 ₱ 44.61 DPWH TBD provide improved and prompt PPP
Project Expressway Coordinating
delivery of services to people in
Committee (ICC)
serviced areas and to enhance
transport network and
accessibility between provinces
and municipalities particularly in
North Luzon Region.
Unsolicited
Metro Pacific A 20km expressway to connect
Road C-5 Overhead proposal submitted
17 ₱ 50.00 DPWH Investments Corp. C-5 to CAVITEX (Manila-Cavite PPP
Project Expressway for evaluation as of
(MPIC) Expressway).
May 9, 2018
A 4-lane extension of CLLEX
Phase I that connects
Cabanatuan City and San Jose
City passing through
Central Luzon municpalities of Talavera and
Link Llanera in Nueva Ecija of about
Road
18 Expressway ₱12.61 DPWH TBD 35.70 km. in road length that will PPP For rebidding
Project
(CLLEX) Phase provide free-flowing alternative
II route and decongest traffic along
Pan Philippine Highway (PPH)
between said cities of Nueva
Ecija and town of Plaridel in
Bulacan.
102-km Manila to Quezon
Expressway; a tollroad that would
cross Laguna de Bay and link
Grand Metro-
Manila to Pasig City and Candelaria, Proposal
Road Manila Gateway
19 Quezon ₱ 66.70 DPWH Quezon. This will have PPP submitted in 2016
Project Company, Inc.
Expressway interchanges at C5 extension, For Evaluation
(GMMGCI)
Binangonan, Pililla, Jala Jala,
Pila, San Pablo, Dolores and
Candelaria.

83
 Unsolicited
a 59.4 km four (4)-lane toll road proposal submitted
San Miguel extending from the last exit of on February 14,
Road TPLEX
20 ₱ 23.95 DPWH Holdings Corp. TPLEX in Rosario, La Union and PPP 2018 for evaluation
Project Extension
(SMHC) will terminate at San Juan, La by the NEDA
Union through 3 segments Board, PPP
Center, and DOTr
22km, 4-lane (2 on each way)
viaducts above Pasig River from
Integrated
DOTr Delpan Bridge in Manila through
Road Viaduct and AKH General Unsolicited
21 ₱ 52.00 and Bonifacio Drive/Roxas Boulevard PPP
Project Personal Rapid Contractor proposal submitted
DPWH to Napindan Bridge in Taguig
Transit System
where it will intersect Metro
Manila Circumferential 6
17.7-km Manila to Taguig
Expressway; would rise “mostly
DOTr CLGP Philippine along Pasig River” and connect
Manila to
Road and Holdings, Inc. and Rizal province through Pasig, Unsolicited
22 Taguig ₱ 50.00 PPP
Project PNR P.T. Citra Persada Makati, and Manila. Links San proposal submitted
Expressway
DPWH Infrastruktur Miguel Corp.’s Metro Manila
Skyway Stage 3, and Metro
Manila Expressway C-6.
Coastal
Manila Bay Development Coastal Flood Control Sea Barrier
Integrated Consortium (CDC) through the northern part of
Flood Control, of San Miguel Manila Bay covering the coastal
Road For evaluation by
23 Coastal ₱399.66 DPWH Holdings areas of Bulacan, Pampanga and PPP
Project NEDA-ICC
Defense And Corporation connecting Bataan to Metro
Expressway (SMHC) and New Manila, for a concession period of
Project San Jose Builders 50 years.
Inc. (NSJBI)
Metro Pacific
Cavite - Tollways
50 km tollway, including spur For NEDA
Road Tagaytay - Corporation
24 ₱22.43 DPWH roads, intended to decongest PPP endorsement as of
Project Batangas (MPTC) and Metro
Cavite early 2018
Expressway Pacific Tollways
South Corporation
15 kilometer expressway, six (6)
LEX Corporation lanes (2x3 configuration)
NLEX-Cavitex
(formerly MNTC) combined elevated and tunnel For evaluation by
Road Port
25 ₱92.00 DPWH and Cavitex expressway from NLEX Segment PPP concerned
Project Expressway
Infrastructure 10 up to CAVITEX which will agencies
Link
Corporation (CIC) provide an ideal truck route
directly linked to Manila Port Area
Cost Funding
(in Type
Phase/Status
Project PhP Private (GPH,
No. Sector Agency Description (Completion
Name or Counterpart ODA,
Date)
US$ PPP,
B) Private)
Under development: proposal drafting or feasibility studies
Starts at Delpan in Manila, passing through
Delpan- Ayala Ave in Makati and end on Marcos Hiway
Road Pasig- in Marikina through Pasig River. It is an For Feasibility
26 TBD DPWH TBD PPP
Project Marikina elevated expressway and has an indicative Study
Expressway length of 26.84 km. for Option 1 alignment and
24.72 for Option 2 alignment.
Quezon-
The project will start about 2 km from end of
Road Bicol For Feasibility
27 TBD DPWH TBD the proposed TR-4 project and end before start PPP
Project Expressway Studies
of proposed Camarines Sur Expressway.
(QuBEx)
Provincial
Camarines
Government 16 km tolled road envisaged to serve through
Road Sur Under
28 TBD DPWH of traffic going to southern and eastern PPP
Project Expressway Development
Camarines municipalities of the province.
Project
Sur

84
 A 73.75 km highway with 2 km tunnel. It is
divided into three segments: Talisay-Cebu
Road Metro Cebu Under
29 ₱18.02 DPWH City- Mandaue (Segment 1), Consolacion- GPH
Project Expressway Development
Liloan- Compostela-Danao (Segment 2), and
Naga- Minglanilla (Segment 3).
Awaiting
provincial
Mindoro– DPWH- Far East government
15 kilometer Super Bridge, two (2) or four (4)
Batangas Provincial Mega resolution on
Bridge lanes with an optional pedestrian/bicycle lane,
30 Super Bridge TBD Government Builders PPP PPP mode
Project which will link Mindoro Island to the Province
(Floating of Oriental Corporation post-meeting
of Batangas over a 10m – 300m water depth
Bridge) Mindoro (FEMBC) with Governor
Umali held on
May 25, 2018
The construction of Pangul Bay Bridge will
Bridge Panguil Bay connect the City of Tangub in Misamis Under
31 ₱ 4.86 DPWH GPH
Project Bridge Occidental and Municipality of Tubod in Lanao Development
del Norte
A 21.8 km – 4 lane road including 3 bridges
Bacolod and 2 way bike lane that would serve as an
Bridge Under
32 Economic ₱ 5.79 DPWH alternate circumferential road bypassing the GPH
Project Development
Highway busy Bacolod City Central Business District
that lies in the interior of Bacolod City.
The 45km bypass road is needed to reduce
traffic congestion of Davao City urban center
where average travel speed is less than 20-km
Davao
Road ₱ per hour; disperse urbanization outside (the For Feasibility
33 Bypass DPWH JICA ODA
Project 19.10 urban center), which is already over saturated Studies
Road
and strongly support economic activities of not
only Region XI (Panabo) but also the entire
Mindanao.
The 13.8-km road will have three roundabouts
Davao
Road ₱ that are intended as jogging areas, esplanades For Feasibility
34 Coastal DPWH JICA ODA
Project 27.00 for locals and tourists, and fish landing docks Studies
Road
to benefit fisherfolk.
A 60-km. toll road starting at the Bukidnon-
Davao National Highway in Davao City and
Road Davao-Digos terminating at Digos-Sultan Kudarat Road, For Feasiblity
35 ₱TBD DPWH TBD GPH/PPP
Project Expressway envisioned to decongest Davao City by serving Studies
as an alternative route for the Davao-Cotabato
National Highway (AH26)
The MLIN road project shall improve the
logistics infrastructure network in Northern
Mindanao Mindanao, Davao, Soccksargen and Carga.
Logistics This project is geared towards enhancing the
Road ₱ Under
36 Infrastructure DPWH agribusiness competitiveness in Mindanao by GPH
Project 80.41 Development
Network developing an intermodal logistics system that
(MLIN) will address the constraints caused by high
cost of transport and inadequate logistics
infrastructure, among others.
Author’s modified compilation from various sources
Sources: DPWH PPP Road Projects List website and Build, Build, Build portal; PPP Center project tracker; AmCham-TAPP
infrastructure trackers 2018; various news articles

Annex 3. Flagship Rail Construction Projects as of September 12, 2018

Cost Funding Type

(in PhP Private (GPH, ODA, Phase/Status
No. Sector Location Project Name Agency Description
or US$ Counterpart PPP, Private, (Completion Date)
B) PDMF)
Awarded and Ongoing
North-South Phase 1: 50.5 km from the
Railway Project Malolos end of North-South
Rails ₱ Groundbreaking: Jan. 5,
1 Luzon (north line) DOTr Commuter Railway up to Clark ODA/GOJ
Projects 211.42 2019 Completion: 2021
(Malolos-Clark airport will have five stations—
Railway Phase 1) Malolos, Apalit, San Fernando

85
 City, Clark and Clark
International Airport.
North-South Phase 2: 19 km railway to
Railway Project connect airport to Clark Green
Rails
2 Luzon (north line) DOTr City through three more ODA/GOJ n.i.a.
Projects
(Malolos-Clark stations—Calumpit, Angeles
Railway Phase 2) City and Clark Green City.
Ongoing soft renovation
and upgrades of LRT Line
1 existing system;

LRT 1 will be extended from

Baclaran Station to future Groundbreaking for the
LRMC (Ayala
LRT Line 1 Niyog Station in Bacoor, Cavite Common Station held on
Corp, MPIC,
Rails Cavite Extension approximately 11.7km. Of this September 29, 2017
3 NCR ₱ 64.90 DOTr Macquarie PPP
Projects and O&M (of length, 10.5km will be elevated
Infrastructure
existing LRT 1) and 1.2km will be at-grade.
Holdings) Ongoing pre-construction
Eight passenger stations are
proposed to be constructed. activities: ROW
acquisition; relocation of
informal settlers; utility
diversion; finalization of
alignment.
Financing, design,
construction, operation &
maintenance of 23km elevated
railway line with 14 stations
Under Construction On-
Rails MRT Line 7 from San Jose Del Monte, PPP
4 NCR ₱ 69.30 DOTr SMC going civil works (22.63%
Projects Project Bulacan to MRT 3 North (unsolicited)
complete)
Avenue in Quezon City and
22km asphalt road from
Bocaue Interchange of NLEX
to intermodal terminal in Tala.
A 25km underground mass
transportation system
connecting major business
districts and government
centers. It is expected to serve
around 370,000 passengers
per day in its opening year.

The proposed 13 stations of Pre-construction

the subway system are: The $929.1-million
a) Along Mindanao Avenue, borrowing is awaiting
Rails Mega Manila North Avenue, Quezon approval from the central
5 NCR $ 7.00 DOTr JICA ODA
Projects Subway Avenue, East Avenue, Anonas bank's Monetary Board
and Katipunan in Quezon City and special presidential
b) Ortigas North and Ortigas authority, the DOF said in
South in Pasig City a statement. (Jan 2018)
c) Kalayaan Avenue in Makati
City
d) Bonifacio Global City,
Cayetano Boulevard and Food
Terminal Inc. (FTI) in Taguig
e) and the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport in Pasay
City
Groundbreaking - May
LRT-2 east A 4km extension of existing
Rails 2017 Under Construction
6 NCR extension ₱ 1.80 DOTr DM Consunji LRT-2 system from Santolan, PPP
Projects (Target completion Aug.
(construction) Pasig to Masinag, Antipolo.
2018)
Common station will link
SM Prime
existing MRT Line 3, LRT Line
Holdings Inc.,
Rails Common Train 1 and to-be-built MRT-7, Groundbreaking: Sept 29,
7 NCR ₱ 2.80 DOTr SMC., and Light GPH
Projects Station providing a convenient access 2017
Rail Manila
point for 1.5 M commuters
Corp.
daily.
Cost
Funding
(in
Type (GPH,
Project PhP Private Phase/Status
No. Sector Location Agency Description ODA, PPP,
Name or Counterpart (Completion Date)
Private,
US$
PDMF)
B)
For evaluation and bidding
Rails East-West $ A Brown Construction, operation and maintenance of PPP For evaluation by
8 NCR PNR
Projects Rail Project 1.00 Company Inc., 11- station East-West Rail (EWR), a mostly (unsolicited) ICC-TWG

86
 and MTD elevated 9.4km railway line from Diliman,
Philippines, Inc. Quezon City to Lerma, Manila.
Design and construction of LRT2 3km West
extension, which will run from Recto Station
to Pier 4, including the turn-back track.
Rails LRT-2 west ₱ Three proposed additional stations: Tutuban
9 NCR DOTr PPP For bidding
Projects extension 10.12 (next to the Cluster Mall); Divisoria (west of
the Recto Avenue and Asuncion Street
intersection); and Pier 4 (located 50 meters
north of Zaragoza Street).
Approved by the
Financing, design, construction, operations NEDA board in 2015
Rails LRT Line 4 ₱ and maintenance of a new 20km light rail PPP and lapsed and
10 NCR DOTr
Projects Project 1.50 line running west from SM City in Taytay to (unsolicited) removed from
Sta.Mesa, Manila. pipeline after 6
months
JICA to conduct a
Rehabilitation of MRT3 from North Ave.
Rails MRT 3 $ Feasibility Study and
11 NCR DOTr Sumitomo station in Quezon City to Taft station in ODA
Projects Rehabilitation 0.15 refine the scope of
Pasay.
works
Operation &
Maintenance DOTr O&M of the existing LRT Line 2 from Recto
Rails ₱ Proposal under
12 NCR of LRT Line-2 and to Santolan, the 4km East Extension from PPP
Projects 1.20 review
East LRTA Santolan to Masinag.
Extension
Construction of railway from San Mateo
Manila East- connecting to the MRT 7, passing through On-going evaluation
Rails Rail Transit Ortigas Avenue. It will link the municipalities of the members of
13 NCR TBD DOTr PPP
Projects System of Rodriguez and San Mateo in Rizal to the ICC-Technical
Project cities of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, and Working Group
Makati.
Financing, design, construction, operations
and maintenance, including procurement of
rolling stock and systems, of a new 19km
Rails LRT Line 6 ₱ Proposal under
14 NCR DOTr light rail line along Aguinaldo Highway from PPP
Projects Project 65.09 review
Niyog, Bacoor (terminus of LRT Line 1
Cavite Extension Project) to Dasmariñas
City in Cavite.
Funding Type
Cost (in Phase/Status
Private (GPH, ODA,
No. Sector Location Project Name PhP or Agency Description (Completion
Counterpart PPP, Private,
US$ B) Date)
PDMF)
For development: proposal drafting or feasibility studies
North-South
NCR/ Region IV-A 56 km Commuter Line
Rails Railway Project DOTr
15 (CALABARZON)/ $ 3.01 JICA from Manila to ODA/GOJ
Projects (south line) and PNR
Region V (Bicol) Calamba City, Laguna.
(Segment 1)
Long-Haul Line from
Manila to Legazpi City
North-South in Bicol Region (478 km
NCR/ Region IV-A
Rails Railway Project DOTr main line),
16 (CALABARZON)/ $ 3.01 ODA/GOJ
Projects (south line) and PNR which may be
Region V (Bicol)
(Segment 2) developed on a phased
basis based on delivery
of right of way
Long-Haul Line
Expansion consisting For JICA loan
of (a) an extension from funding
Legazpi City to
Matnog in Sorsogon
(117km) (the “Long
North-South Haul Line Extension”)
NCR/ Region IV-A
Rails Railway Project DOTr and (b) a branch line
17 (CALABARZON)/ $ 3.01 ODA/GOJ
Projects (south line) and PNR
Region V (Bicol)
(Segment 3)
from Calamba to
Batangas City (58km)
(the “Long Haul Line
Branch”), to be
developed once right of
way is available.
Mindanao A 105 km segment of
Tagum, Davao del for project
Rails Railway: Tagum- the larger $9 billion,
18 Norte, Davao City, ₱ 31.50 DOTr GAA development
Projects Davao City-Digos 2,000 km Mindanao
Digos, Davao del Sur (May 2017)
(TDD) Segment Railway network.

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Sources: DPWH PPP Road Projects List website and Build, Build, Build portal; PPP Center project tracker; AmCham-TAPP
infrastructure trackers 2018; various news articles

Annex 4. Flagship Seaports Projects

Cost
Funding
(in
Type (GPH, Phase/Status
PhP Private
No. Sector Region Project Name Agency Description ODA, PPP, (Completion
or Counterpart
Private, Date)
US$
PDMF)
B)
Completed
RoRo route connecting
the cities of Davao and
ASEAN Roll-
REGION XI - General Santos in GPH and Completed: April
1 Seaports on/Roll-off
DAVAO Mindanao to Indonesian Indonesia 30, 2017
(Davao-Sulawesi
cites Bitung and Manado
in Sulawesi.
Awarded and Ongoing
In line with the
government’s initiatives
to decongest truck traffic
on roads in Metro
Manila, the development
of a barge and RORO
terminal in Tanza, Cavite Under
will allow transshipment implementation
REGION IV-A - Cavite Barge ₱ 30 of cargo from Manila port PPP
2 Seaports DOTr
CALABARZON GatewayTerminal M to Cavite via barges and (Solicited) Start: April 21
Roll-on-Roll-off 2017 Operational:
operations. Phase 1 of March 1 2018
the project is designed to
support 115,000 TEU
per year, translating to
about 140,000 fewer
truck trips travelling city
roads annually.
Royal Carribean
REGION VI - Purpose-built DOT and Agreement signed
Cruise Ltd.
3 Seaports WESTERN Terminal (Caticlan TBD Province of New Seaport Private as of March 19,
(RCCL)
VISAYAS or Boracay) Aklan 2017
(Proponent)
Under Development: Project Proposal or Feasibility Studies
Decongest Cebu port. Under
85-hectare reclamation development
New Cebu
project consisting of
REGION VII - International GPH and
₱ DOTr and Cebu 1,200-meter-long berth,
4 Seaports CENTRAL Container and ODA- Korea Estimated Start:
10.00 Port Authority 1,000-meter-access July 2018
VISAYAS Bulk (tent)
road, 25-hectare Expected
Terminal
container yard, and 50- Operation: 3
hectare industrial park. years; 2021
Reclamation for the
development of a 200-
hectare mixed-use
complex, including an
international port,
commercial, residential Unsolicited,
Davao Coastline and government office PPP or Under
REGION XI - and Port $ components. ODA-China development,
5 Seaports TBD
DAVAO Development 39.00 (tent) subject to
Project (unsolicited) approval of NEDA
Possible Proponent: and PRA
1. Mega Harbour Port
and Development Inc.

2. PRC government
Development of existing Under evaluation
Davao Sasa Port in by concerned
Davao City into modern, agencies;
Davao Sasa Port
REGION XI - ₱ international- standard ICC-CabCom
6 Seaports Modernization DOTr and PPA ODA
DAVAO 4.50 container terminal that reduced cost to
Project
will improve trade make the
access to Mindanao and investment
Philippines by providing commensurate to

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 a dedicated demand.
containerized port in the DOTr/PPA to
region. submit revised
project scope and
structure.
Build a 600,000 twenty-
REGION III - foot equivalent (TEU)
Under discussion
7 Seaports CENTRAL Redondo Terminal TBD SBMA terminal, which will TBD
by SBMA
LUZON double existing capacity
of the port.
Provide the country with
an efficient “spine” to
facilitate the seamless,
safe, effective, and Under
economical movement of development
Manila,
passengers, vehicles,
Batangas,
and goods, linking Estimated Start
Oriental Mindoro,
Central Spine Luzon, Visayas, and for project
Naga, Aklan, Locally
8 Seaports Roll-on/Roll-off TBD DOTr Mindanao through development :
Iloilo, Negros funded
(RORO) Project combination of road August 1, 2014
Occidental,
systems and RoRo ferry Target end for
Cebu, Bohol,
services passing through project
Zamboanga
selected islands and development:
matching port/terminal December 1, 2018
facilities under the
Central Spine RoRo
Route.
Increase capacity to
Asian Terminal accommodate more
REGION IV-A - Batangas ₱
9 Seaports TBD Inc. domestic passengers Private TBD
CALABARZON International Port 3.80
(ATI)(Proponent) and international
container cargoes.
Accommodate 300-
meter length overall
passenger cruise ship.
The berthing area would
REGION V - Legazpi Cruise ₱ Under
10 Seaports DOT and TIEZA have to be PPP
BICOL Terminal 1.00 development
approximately 300 to
400 meters in length and
about 72 to 100 meters
in width
Under
A nationwide project on development
modernizing the
Modernization of transport system in the
RORO Transport ₱ three major nautical Estimated Start:
11 Seaports NATIONWIDE DOTr GAA September 1,
System in the 5.70 highways (Western,
Philippines Central and Eastern) 2017
and other existing Target end for
RORO routes. development:
December 1, 2018
Source: AmCham-TAPP Trackers 2018; PPP Center trackers 2018; various news articles

Annex. 5 Flagship Airport PPP Projects

Funding
Cost (in Type (GPH, Phase/Status
Private
No. Sector Region Project Name PhP or Agency Description ODA, PPP, (Completion
Counterpart
US$ B) Private, Date)
PDMF)
Completed
The project covers (1) establishment
of priority elements of the new Completed
satellite-based CNS/ATM systems (January 16,
New
in accordance with the ICAO Global 2018)
Communications
Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM
Navigation
Systems (ICAO Doc 9750); (2)
Surveillance/Air
deployment of vital communications, Under
Traffic
1 Airports NATIONWIDE ₱10.87 DOTr navigation, surveillance, and ODA-JICA implementation
Management
information equipment/facilities; (3)
(CNS/ATM)
replacement of aging vital
Systems Start: February
communications, surveillance and
Development 1, 1998
air traffic control equipment/facilities
Project Completion:
at selected airports/sites nationwide.
Package 1 is ATM Center Bldg. & June 1, 2017
ATM Automation Systems, while

89
 Package 2 is Surveillance &
Communications Systems.
The project involves: a) construction
of a new passenger terminal
complex, including air traffic control
tower, cargo building, administration
building, maintenance building, fire Completed (May
Puerto Princesa station building and other support 3, 2017)
REGION IV-B - Airport facilities; b) construction of new
2 Airports ₱4.46 DOTr ODA-Korea
MIMAROPA Development access road; c) widening of runway
Project strip, installation of instrument Start: December
landing system; d) new security 1, 2011
fencing; and (e) installation of new
navigational aids, air traffic control,
communications, and airfield
lighting.
Awarded and Ongoing
NATIONAL DOTr Enable an aircraft to leave Runway Completed and
NAIA Rapid Exit
3 Airports CAPITAL TBD and 06/24 quickly after landing and allow GPH operational:
Taxiways
REGION MIAA more flights to land and take off. September 2018
Under pre-
construction

Clark International
Airport Expansion Engineering,
Project – Procurement,
Engineering, Megawide and Construction
The Clark International Airport
Procurement and Construction (EPC) Contract
Expansion Project involves the
REGION III - Construction Corp. and Awarded:
construction of a new 82,600 m2
4 Airports CENTRAL (EPC) ₱ 9.36 BCDA GMR PPP/GPH(?) December 19,
Passenger Terminal Building of the
LUZON Infrastructure 2017 Signed:
CIA, with a design capacity of 8
(India) February 1,
(1st Phase of million passengers per annum.
consortiu 2018
Master Plan: New
Passenger
Terminal) Estimated
completion:
January 31,
2020
₱ 50.16 New Airport
Under
M New Passenger Terminal -
Construction
REGION IV-B - San Vicente Completed
5 Airports DOTr GPH New terminal
MIMAROPA (Palawan) Airport Parking area, water, electririty
₱ 62.70 opened in June
components - under detailed
M 2017
engineering design creation
Under
Construction -
TransAire Phase 1
Development
REGION VI - Holdings Phase 1: New Passenger Terminal
Boracay-Caticlan DOTr & (2018)
6 Airports WESTERN ₱ 5.3 Corporation Phase 2: Runway extension, 06/24 Private
Airport CAAP
VISAYAS affiliate of San runway total length of 1,800 meters.
Miguel Completed -
Holdings Phase 2
(November 18,
2016)
The Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Project involves the
construction of a new world-class
passenger terminal building at MCIA
with a capacity of about 13 million
Megawide passengers per year and the Under
Construction operation of the old and new construction
Mactan-Cebu Corp. and facilities. DOTr turnedover (June 22, 2018)
REGION VII - International GMR operations and maintenance to the
7 Airports CENTRAL Airport Project ₱ 17.52 DOTr Infrastructure private partner in November 2014. PPP Start: November
VISAYAS (New Passenger (India) Since then, various upgrades and 1, 2010
Terminal Building) consortium changes have been implemented: Estimated
(original greener terminal building with new completion: July
proponent) seats, washrooms are being 1, 2018
renovated, new self-service check-in
kiosks have been installed, new
immigration, customs and
quarantine counters are in place,
among others.

90
 Under
implementation

Completed -
Phase 1 and 2
horizontal
projects
Bicol (Daraga The project will develop a new
REGION V - City) International EM Cuerpo airport with international standards Under
8 Airports BICOL Airport ₱ 4.79 DOTr and JD Legaspi in Daraga, Albay replacing the GPH constructiuon -
REGION Development Construction existing Legaspi Airport to Phase 3 vertical
Project accomodate bigger aircraft. projects

Start: November
1, 2007
Estimated
completion:
December 31,
2020
Under
construction
(August 2018)

Operational by
June 2018 and
REGION VII - Chiyoda- 13,300 hectares new airport with commercial
New Bohol GPH and
9 Airports CENTRAL ₱ 7.8 DOTr Mitsubishi joint 1.9M pax capacity and 2.8km long operation by
(Panglao) Airport ODA-JICA
VISAYAS venture and 45m wide runway. August 2018

Navigational
equipment and
aids for night
flights by
January 2019
For Evaluation and Bidding
mprove, upgrade, and enhance the
operational efficiencies of the
airport.

Proponents: (unsolicited)
1. NAIA consortium (Aboitiz Equity
NAIA PPP Project Ventures, Ayala, Alliance Global,
NATIONAL / DOTr Lucio Tan Group, Filinvest Land, JG Unsolicited
₱156-
10 Airports CAPITAL NAIA and Summit Holdings, and Metro Pacific PPP Under evaluation
350
REGION Rehabilitation MIAA Investments) with Changi Airports by DOTr
Project International as technical partner
(P350 B est. cost, 35-year
concession)
2. Megawide Construction Corp.
and GMR Infrastructure (India)
consortium (P156 B est. cost, 18-
year concession)
Clark International Airport is located
Megawide in Pampanga Province, Central
Construction Luzon. The government intends to
Clark International Corp. and develop Clark International Airport For NEDA Board
REGION III - DOTr
Airport Operations GMR as a major gateway to Northern and approval
11 Airports CENTRAL TBD and PPP
and Maintenance Infrastructure Central Luzon. The project involves Invitation to bid:
LUZON BCDA
Project (India) the operations and maintenance of April 30, 2018
consortium the existing passenger terminal
(Proponent) buildings and the new passenger
terminal.
Construction, operation, and Unsolicited
maintenance of a new modern
airport in Bulacan with a capacity of
New Bulacan 200 million passengers per year, For Swiss
REGION III - International San Miguel consisting of 4 runways and all challenge;
12 Airports CENTRAL Airport Project ₱700.00 DOTr Corp. (original aviation related facilities. 2,500 PPP Approved by
LUZON (Bulakan, proponent) hectares of which 1,168 hectares NEDA Board,
Bulacan) will be an airport complex while the subject to final
remaining 1,332 hectares will serve review of
as a city complex. Completed in six concession
years upon approval. agreement

91
 Proponent: (unsolicited)
New Manila 1. Province of Cavite (US$9.3B)
Unsolicted
REGION IV-A - International 2. Sangley Airport Infrastructure
13 Airports TBD DOTr TBD For NEDA-ICC
CALABARZON Airport Project Group Inc. (All-Asia Resources &
Board approval
(Sangley, Cavite) Reclamation Corp. and Belle
Corp.)(US$12 B)
Construction of a parallel
emergency runway beside the
existing runway so repair and
upgrade of the original runway could
Mactan-Cebu
be undertaken without disrupting
REGION VII - International Unsolicited
operations.
14 Airports CENTRAL Airport ₱208 DOTr PPP For NEDA Board
A longer third runway to
VISAYAS Development approval
accommodate an expected increase
Project
in aircraft traffic, which will involve
land reclamation and relocation of
the existing Mactan Export
Processing Zone.
Under Development: Project Proposal or Feasibility Studies
Proposal to be
submitted
NATIONAL DOTr Philippine
NAIA Terminal 2 Terminal 2 Annex will accommodate
15 Airports CAPITAL ₱20.00 and Airlines PPP If approved in
Annex Project an additional 12 million passengeers
REGION MIAA (Proponent) 2018,
completion by
the end of 2020
Under
development of
updated
feasibility study

On hold (since
May 25, 2017)

For Bid
Operation and maintenance of the Submission
airport as well as provide additional Qualification
Puerto Princesa documents
facilities and other necessary PPP
International DOTr deadline: June
REGION IV-B - improvements to enhance
16 Airports Airport Operations ₱3.2 and 15 2017
MIMAROPA passenger safety, security, access,
and Maintenance CAAP Deadline for bid
passenger and cargo movement
Project proposal:
efficiency, and operational
efficiency. December 8,
2017
Notice of Award:
January 2018

Start: January 1,
2012
Estimated
completion:
December 1,
2021
Bacolod-Silay Airport is located in Unsolicited
Silay City, Negros Occidental and
caters to traffic for Negros Island. It
commenced operations in 2008. Under
The PPP Project involves: (1) development of
Development, operations, and updated
maintenance of existing Bacolod- feasibility study
Silay Airport Facilities; (2)
Expansion/construction of new On hold (since
Bacolod Airport
passenger terminal(s), along with all May 25, 2017)
REGION VI - Operations, Aboitiz Equity
associated infrastructures, facilities, GPH and
17 Airports WESTERN Maintenance & ₱20.26 DOTr Ventures
and equipment; and (3) ODA
VISAYAS Development (Proponent)
Enhancement/development, For Bid
Project
operations, and maintenance of Submission
landslide facilities (new and existing Qualification
terminals) and airside facilities documents
(including apron, runway, and deadline: June
taxiway) to meet the enhanced 15 2017
scale of operations at the airport. Air Deadline for bid
traffic control and air navigation proposal:
services are excluded from the December 8,
project scope. The project will 2017

92
 decongest the airport, enhance Notice of Award:
operating efficiency, safety, and January 2018
security, improve customer
amenities and expand networking
and marketing of the airport. Start: January 1,
2012
Estimated
completion:
December
Under
loilo Airport is the fifth busiest airport development of
in the Philippines. It commenced updated
operations in 2007. The project feasibility study
involves: development, operations,
and maintenance of existing Iloilo
Airport facilities; On hold (since
expansion/construction of new May 25, 2017)
passenger terminal(s), along with all
associated infrastructures, facilities For Bid
and equipment as per applicable Submission
standards; and Qualification
Iloilo Airport enhancement/development, documents
REGION VI - Operations, operations and maintenance of deadline: June
GPH and
18 Airports WESTERN Maintenance & ₱30.40 DOTr landside facilities (new and existing 15 2017
ODA
VISAYAS Development terminals) and airside facilities Deadline for bid
Project (including apron, runway and proposal:
taxiway) to meet enhanced scale of December 8,
operations at the airport. ATC/ANS 2017
are excluded from the project scope. Notice of Award:
The project aims to decongest the January 2018
airport which is currently operating
beyond its capacity, enhance
operating efficiency, safety and Start: January 1,
security, improve customer 2012
amenities, and expand the Estimated
networking and marketing of the completion:
airport. December 1,
2021
Under
New Bohol (Panglao) Airport, development of
located on Panglao island, Bohol updated
province, is a new airport being feasibility study
constructed by the DOTr through
the assistance of JICA. Once
completed, it will replace the On hold (since
existing Tagbilaran Airport in Bohol. May 25, 2017)
The project involves the following:
development, operations and
maintenance of the New Bohol For Bid
(Panglao) Airport; Submission
New Bohol Qualification
expansion/construction of new
(Panglao) Airport documents
REGION VII - passenger terminal(s), along with all
Operations, GPH, ODA, deadline: June
19 Airports CENTRAL ₱4.57 DOTr associated infrastructures, facilities
Maintenance & and PPP 15 2017
VISAYAS and equipment; and
Development Deadline for bid
enhancement/development,
Project proposal:
operations and maintenance of
landside facilities (new and existing December 8,
terminals) and airside facilities 2017
(including apron, runway and Notice of Award:
taxiway). ATC/ANS are excluded January 2018
from the project. The project aims to
enhance the airport’s operating
efficiency, safety, and security, Start: January 1,
improve customer amenities, and 2012
expand the networking and Estimated
marketing of the airport. completion:
January 1, 2020
Zamboanga
REGION IX - International Under
Develop a modern, first-class
20 Airports ZAMBOANGA Airport TBD DOTr TBD development of
international airport at a new site.
PENINSULA Development feasibility study
Project
Laguindingan Airport is in Misamis Under
Laguindingan development of
Oriental 45 km southwest of
Airport updated
REGION X - Cagayan de Oro City and 65 km
Operations, GPH and feasibility study
21 Airports NORTHERN ₱14.62 DOTr from Iligan City. It commenced
Maintenance & ODA
MINDANAO operations in June 2013, replacing
Development
the old Lumbia Airport. The project On hold (since
Project
involves: development, operations, May 25, 2017)

93
 and maintenance of the existing Under
Laguindingan Airport facilities; procurement
expansion/construction of new
passenger terminal(s), along with all
associated infrastructures, facilities For Bid
and equipment; and Submission
enhancement/development, Qualification
operations and maintenance of documents
landside facilities (new and existing deadline: June
terminals) and airside facilities 15 2017
(including apron, runway and Deadline for bid
taxiway) to meet the enhanced proposal:
scale of operations. ATC/ANS are December 8,
excluded from the project scope. 2017
The project aims to decongest the Notice of Award:
airport which is currently operating January 2018
beyond its capacity, enhance
operating efficiency, safety and
Start: January 1,
security, improve customer
2012
amenities, and expand the
Estimated
networking and marketing of the
completion:
airport.
December 1,
2021
Under
development of
updated
feasibility study

On hold (since
May 25, 2017)

For Bid
Submission
This project aims to develop the Qualification
Davao Airport documents
Davao international airport into a
Operations, GPH and deadline: June
REGION XI - "world class" domestic/international
22 Airports Maintenance & ₱40.57 DOTr ODA- China 15 2017
DAVAO hub by opening up the operations
Development (tent) Deadline for bid
and maintenance to prime
Project proposal:
operators.
December 8,
2017
Notice of Award:
January 2018

Start: January 1,
2012
Estimated
completion:
December 1,
2021
1. Filinvest
Development
Corp. and JG
Summit
Holdings with
Changi Airports
International as
technical
partner (P839
Clark International B est. cost, 50- Expansion of terminals and Unsolicited
REGION III - DOTr
Airport ₱250- year runways, operation and Both bids
23 Airports CENTRAL and TBD
Development 839 concession) management of passenger rejected by
LUZON BCDA
Project 2. Megawide terminals. DOTr
Construction
Corp. and
GMR
Infrastructure
(India)
consortium
(P250 B est.
cost, 50-year
concession)
Source: AmCham-TAPP Trackers 2018; PPP Center trackers 2018; various news articles

94
Annex 6. NEDA Board Resolution No. 5, s. 2017 Adopting the National Transportation Policy

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