The Hungarian World 1938-1940

The Hungarian World
1938–1940
Publications of the Institute for Hungarian Studies 3.
THE HUNGARIAN WORLD
1938–1940
E DI TOR S :
S Z I LV IA R ÁSI – L ÁS Z L Ó TA M ÁS V I Z I
Magyarságkutató Intézet
Budapest, 2021
Reviewed by Zoltán Tefner
Copyreaders (Hungarian edition): Péter Berta, Rita Mayer-Schmidt
Translated by EDMF Language Services Kft.

Proofread by Piscis Aureus Bt.
MKI editorial board: László Tamás Vizi (chairman), Bence Fehér,

József Álmos Katona, Attila Kovács, Péter Pomozi, István Virág
The publication of this book was sponsored by EMMI.

A kötet megjelenését az EMMI támogatta.
© Authors, 2020, 2021
ISBN 978-615-6117-46-5
ISSN 2786-1317
TABLE OF CONTETS
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Zoltán Babucs: Security operations of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of

Budapest in Szilágyság between 11 and 18 September 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . 13
József Botlik: Territorial changes of Carpathian Ruthenia: 1919–1945 . . . . . 43
László Gulyás: The First Vienna Award, the endgame: what happened
on 2 November 1938 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Péter Illik: Evaluation of the Horthy era in Hungarian secondary school
history textbooks (1945–2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Csaba Kása: The role of Mesterfilm Kft. in creating nationalist film
production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Artúr Köő: Are living witnesses from the revision period still telling their
stories, and if so, about what? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Zsombor Szabolcs Pál: The impacts of Portuguese Salazarism
on Hungary between the two World Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Ferenc Szávai: Economic challenges and accomplishments in
post-Trianon Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Nóra Szekér: German pressure and secret societies based on the example
of the activities of the Hungarian Fraternal Community and the
Hungarian Independence Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Éva Teiszler: Lasting works of the St. Stephen Memorial Year . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
László Tamás Vizi: Government efforts to suppress the far-right
in Hungary’s 1939 national elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
The authors of the volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

FOREWORD
FOREWORD
The temporary exhibition entitled “The Hungarian World 1938–1940” was

hosted by the Hungarian National Museum between December 2019 and March
2020. The organisers defined the goal of the exhibition as follows: “to present
the political and social life and art scene of Hungary at the end of the 1930s with
interactive tools and via 20 thematic sections and a café in the way how the people
of the age saw and experienced it; in other words, to create a snapshot”.
We are delighted to state that the exhibition escaped the fate of temporary
exhibits, cessation, as on the one hand, it was transferred to the Dezső Laczkó
Museum in Veszprém and numerous recordings, a “Virtual Tour” and a related
online quiz are also available on the Internet. On the other hand, the present
volume of studies – that will soon be available also in English – contains the
edited presentations delivered at a related conference held with the involvement
of several researchers of the Institute for Hungarian Studies.
István Széchenyi’s book “Világ vagy is felvilágosító töredékek némi hiba ’s
előitélet eligazitására” (in English: Light or Illuminating Fragments to Correct
Some Errors and Prejudices) was published by the Landerer Printing House in
Pest in 1831. Széchenyi’s book can be read as a significant parallel to our age
as the Horthy era is still at the heart of serious historical and public debates
and there are numerous errors, mistakes, misunderstandings and prejudices
around the topic. It is not the intention of either the exhibition or the volume
to contradict them, they rather follow a consistent approach by providing an
unbiased perspective with a focus on hitherto undeservedly ignored details
of lifestyle history instead of dealing with overemphasized political topics and
event history. The book presents lifestyle historical topics within a short time
period with a diversified approach and from a multidisciplinary and micro-
historical point of view.
7
M A G YA R V I L Á G 1 9 3 8 – 1 9 4 0
The present volume of nearly 300 pages contains eleven studies; more
than half of the authors are researchers of the Institute for Hungarian Studies.
Although the studies are arranged in alphabetical order according to the
authors’ names, the topics align a thematic-methodological structure.
The first three studies present a traditional topic of political history. Zoltán
Babucs places his study in the broader context of the topic: “Regarding the
entry of the Royal Hungarian Army into the territory of Northern Transylvania
and Szeklerland between 5 and 13 September 1940, the generally self-flagellant
Hungarian historiography (in unison with the Romanians) tries to highlight
the controversies and – concerning the incidents that took place in Szilágyipp
(today: Ip, Romania) and Ördögkút (today: Treznea, Romania) – attempts to
draw the conclusion that this period was characterised by a series of atrocities
committed by the Hungarian army.” Based on the sources, Zoltán Babucs
concludes: “When Northern Transylvania and Szeklerland were returned to
Hungary, 550 000 fully armed and equipped soldiers were involved. It is a
miracle that weapons were used only a few times. Even though the Hungarian
authorities tried to deal humanely with the Romanian population – while the
Hungarians in Southern Transylvania were constantly being harassed by the
Romanians – in 1944 the Romanian army did not forego the opportunity to
take revenge for “the Hungarian retaliation of 1940”.
József Botlik’s study is a more comprehensive overview of the changes in the
whole historic region, which is also indicated by the title, Territorial changes
of Carpathian Ruthenia: 1919–1945; analysing the region and the hardship.
Examining the region and the difficulties faced by the inhabitants, the author
concludes: “In the meantime, separated Hungarians living in Ukraine still avoid
the politically-charged Transcarpathia expression and self-consciously use the
Subcarpathia expression. The geographical extent of their homeland has not
yet changed.”
László Gulyás’ study titled “The First Vienna Award, the endgame: what
happened on 2 November 1938” is also related to the topic of territorial revisions.
The subject is also integrated into the context of present-day historiographic
assessment: “Nowadays, Hungarian historiography assesses the Vienna Award
in two ways: one of the trends considers it as historical justice, while the other
8
FOREWORD
school tries to relativise it in the spirit of some sort of pseudo-objectivity.”

Finally, the author of this study believes that the First Vienna Award was the
exact and objective implementation of the demarcation of the border on an
ethnographic basis. “Furthermore, it can be stated that the Slovak-Hungarian
frontier of the First Vienna Award was much fairer in every respect – but
particularly in terms of the application of the ethnographic principle – than
the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border demarcated by Trianon. The First Vienna
Award drew a fair border between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.”
Although the topics of the next eight studies vary; all of them are of lifestyle,
mentality and reception historical interest. Péter Illik writes about the evaluation
of the Horthy era in Hungarian secondary school history textbooks and presents
the consistent interpretation of the past in the spirit of socialist ideology. He
concludes that coursebooks published after 1989 do not necessarily evaluate the
Horthy era positively, but they created the illusion of objectivity by omitting the
socialist phraseology from the structure and phraseology of the text.
Csaba Kása’s study guides the readers to the area of cinematography. Films
are analysed in the following cultural-political context: ”Because in Hungary –
where at the time two worlds were living side by side – it was only natural that
both sides used the opportunities inherent in cinematographic art to spread
their own ideas, cultures and life experiences. […] film production in the
1920s and 1930s was a profit-generating business, as well as propaganda for
the lifestyle of one of the two worlds and a mirror of their desires. The other
world – the Hungarian world – could not just idly stand by and watch, but they
did not have many tools at their disposal, precisely because in the era of free
entrepreneurship the film industry also operated perfectly well as a lucrative
line of business.”
Artúr Köő’s study titled “Are living witnesses from the revision period still
telling their stories, and if so, about what?” conducts the reader to the area of
oral history and presents details from his interviews.
Szabolcs Zsombor Pál examines the impacts of Portuguese Salazarism on
Hungary between the two World Wars and concludes that there was strong
interest in developments taking place in Portugal and in the Salazar regime
until 1945. He recites the statement purportedly made by Miklós Horthy: “If
9
M A G YA R V I L Á G 1 9 3 8 – 1 9 4 0
all dictatorships were like this one, it would be the best form of government
known today”.
Ferenc Szávai analyses the Hungarian economic processes in the post-
Trianon Hungary until 1944. Using numerous statistical data, the author
concludes that “… after stabilisation the Hungarian economy developed
relatively quickly. In the Horthy era, the economy also performed well in an
international comparison and responded adequately to the challenges.”
Examining the still relevant topic of secret societies, Nóra Szekér deals with
the question of where the anti-fascist forces of the Horthy era disappeared: “any
form of resistance that could be related in any way to »Horthist elements« was
to be interpreted as state-authorised activity, and consequently a manifestation
of »Horthy’s fascism«. In a country where one of the focal points of organisation
against Hitler’s politics operated within the circles of the political elite, finding
a connection between this elite and any group of resistance was only a matter
of intent. This interpretation of resistance had been outlined from 1945, was
stated in 1947, and remained valid for the entire period of the regime, based
on the argument in the report that states, »As a result of the exploration of
socialist historical science, it can be shown that the dominant circles of the
Horthy system used ‘resistance’ as a pretence to perform activities meant to
preserve their power.«”
In her short summary, entitled Lasting works of the St. Stephen Memorial
Year, Éva Teiszler analyses the St. Stephen Memorial Year from the point of view
of memory politics with a focus on stamps, coins and other works of visual art.
In the final study of the volume, Tamás László Vizi presents radical right-
wing movements and government efforts aimed at their suppression in the
1930s. His final conclusion is that “during the years between the 1935 and
1939 elections, the support for far-right parties and movements increased
enormously. Their rise is indisputable. As well as the fact that the governing
parties used all constitutional and administrative means in order to hinder
this rise. Although this was successful in the 1939 Pentecost elections, …storm
clouds were gathering in the spring of 1939.”
The studies discuss inflammatory, so far neglected or still relevant topics with
great skill. The authors – strictly applying the methodology of historiography
10
FOREWORD
and based on sources and extensive literature – form their opinion and do not
hide behind the disguise of objectivity and value neutrality, as a result of which
the volume provides a detailed and nuanced picture of the Horthy era that is
scientifically sound in every sense, both regarding the topics and the value
judgement.
Budapest, the month of November 2021

The editors
11
S E C U R I T Y O P E R AT I O N S O F T H E 2 N D I N FA N T R Y B R I G A D E O F B U D A P E S T. . .
Z O LTÁ N B A B U C S
SECURITY OPERATIONS
OF THE 2ND INFANTRY
BRIGADE OF BUDAPEST IN
SZILÁGYSÁG BETWEEN
11 AND 18 SEPTEMBER 1940
Regarding the entry of the Royal Hungarian Army into the territory of Northern
Transylvania and Szeklerland between 5 and 13 September 1940,1 the generally
self-flagellant Hungarian historiography (in unison with the Romanians) tries
to highlight the controversies2 and – concerning the incidents that took place
in Szilágyipp (today: Ip, Romania) and Ördögkút (today: Treznea, Romania) –
attempts to draw the conclusion that this period was characterised by a series
of atrocities committed by the Hungarian army. On the 70th anniversary of the
Second Vienna Award, Ignác Romsics wrote the following in the daily newspaper
Népszabadság: “Transfer of the territories took place in a dangerously tense
atmosphere. This tension and the irresponsible behaviour of a few military
leaders led to a number of atrocities in the early days of September.” The article
also points out that the Romanian army and population extinguished the lives
of “only” a few dozen Hungarians, while the Hungarian army killed more
1 Sárándi 2016, p. 38.

2 Ablonczy 2017, pp. 58–65.
13
THE HUNGARIAN WORLD 1938–1940
than two hundred Romanians.3 Although this generalisation provoked the

indignation of former Second World War Hungarian royal military officers still
alive at that time, no written documents have been preserved that demonstrate
their reaction. There is little chance that a joint Hungarian-Romanian historical
committee will ever process these aspects of the events of 1940. While the
Romanian side4 has always made claims with exaggerated figures, Péter Illésfalvi
examined the history of these incidents from the Hungarian point of view.5
Military administration was temporarily established in Northern
Transylvania and Szeklerland when the two were regions returned to the
jurisdiction of the Hungarian Holy Crown following the Second Vienna Award.
“According to the Hungarian terminology of the period, military
administration was generally established where the functioning of the
civil administration in the country was threatened by hostile influence,
or for the temporary administration of occupied foreign territories
that had been seized by the armed forces. In its area of competence,
the military administrative service must ensure the performance of all
necessary administrative work, the regulation of the living conditions
and behaviour of the population, the maintenance of public order and
security, as well as the continuity of economic life. […] The military
administration instituted in the territories reoccupied between 1938
and 1941 – on a temporary basis in all of the areas – was directed by the
Hungarian High Command, based on the guidelines of the Supreme
Defence Council and taking into consideration the provisions of Act
1913:XLIII on the laws of war, as set forth in the Hague Convention.”6
At the time of entry, the Romanian side responded with several attacks
that grossly violated the laws of war; the security forces of the Hungarian
army retaliated against these mercilessly, in the interests of maintaining order
and public safety. The incident that took place at Szilágyipp is an example of
3 Romsics 2010, p. 4.
4 Illésfalvi 2004, pp. 69–72.
5 Illésfalvi 2004, pp. 58–77; Illésfalvi 2005, pp. 33–38.
6 Sebestyén & Szabó 2008, p. 1385.
14
these events. Due to past conflicts, the atmosphere was indeed tense, and both
sides had been initiating smaller or larger armed raids along the Hungarian-
Romanian border since the end of 1938.7
Following the Second Vienna Award, the Romanian army was the first to
use weapons. On 2 September 1940, Hungarians protecting their property from
ransacking Romanian soldiers or protesting against the violence of Romanians
were shot in Bihardiószeg (today: Diosig, Romania) and between Szatmárnémeti
(today: Satu Mare, Romania) and Szamosdara (today: Dara, Romania). Nine
people were killed and many were injured. According to Hungarian sources, it
was in this period that Romanian soldiers, along with armed Romanian civilians,
rampaged and looted in Máramarossziget (today: Sighetu Marmației, Romania).
On 4 September there was a firefight between Hungarian soldiers and Romanian
border guards in Bihardiószeg. A Hungarian national guard shot by Romanians
was buried in the village, and Hungarian army soldiers were allegedly also
present at the ceremony. Shortly after the burial, shooting broke out, in which the
Hungarian soldiers shot dead a Romanian sergeant, a corporal, a lance corporal
and a private, and seriously injured a first lieutenant. First Lieutenant Dumitru
Lazăr died at the Debrecen garrison hospital; a hundred thousand Romanian lei
were found sewn into his jacket, which he had collected in robberies committed
by his subordinates against Hungarians. Moreover, the victims were coerced to
withdraw their reports. On 5 September 1940, the withdrawing Romanian army
shot dead two Hungarian national guardsmen; they were buried a few days later,
after the entry, with Hungarian military honours.8
During the “kissing campaign”, the Hungarian army was greeted with
overwhelming enthusiasm by the Hungarian population, while the Saxons kept
a cool distance and the Romanians showed restraint and sometimes hostility.
The Hungarian army and law enforcement bodies (police, gendarmerie) did
not enter the returned territories with malicious intent, as proven by the
governor’s military order: “We bring liberation to our Transylvanian brothers
7 Illésfalvi 2004, p. 60.

8 Illésfalvi 2004, pp. 62–63; Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, pp. 21–22; Árvay 2011, pp.
43–56.
15
and sisters who have been enslaved for 22 years, and love to the nationalities
within our borders who are loyal to us.”9 According to the provisions entitled
“Guidelines on the Conduct of the Occupying Troops” issued by the Chief of
the General Staff of the Hungarian Army, “The population of Hungarian and
German nationality must be treated with the utmost charity and courtesy. In
our treatment of the Romanian and other nationalities, we must always act with
the dignity, fairness and humanity worthy of the Hungarian soldier.”10 A series
of similar measures were also taken, such as the one issued on 14 September
1940, based upon the orders of the Commander of the “József Nádor” 2nd
Infantry Regiment of Budapest: “The stance of the Hungarian army towards
the other nationalities must be characterised by confidence, supremacy and a
strong hand, and must not lead to the unjustified use of force.”11
Hungarian military intelligence warned of the possibility of attacks and
drew attention to the need to demine and thoroughly inspect settlements, wells
and facilities. According to the instructions, in each of the returned settlements
of more than a thousand inhabitants, contact persons of Hungarian nationality
were to be recruited: these people had to have a thorough knowledge of the
location as well as report on strangers in their village and people hostile to
Hungarians. In order to protect the Hungarian population, it was also permitted
to take hostages, especially people of Romanian nationality who were hostile
towards Hungarians. There are voices that, in retrospect, classify all these
legitimate precautions as “spy and guerrilla hysteria”.12
During the entry of the Hungarian army into Transylvania, the region of
Szilágyság (today: Sălaj, Romania) was one of the most hostile regions: most of
the settlements in the Meszes (today: Meseş, Romania) Mountains were villages
of mixed or entirely Romanian population. Furthermore, one village in the area
called Badacson (today: Bădăcin, Romania), where Iuliu Maniu was born, was
a stronghold of the nationalist guard named after him.13 On 7 September 1940,
9 Babucs 2017, p. 13.

10 Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, p. 17.
11 Babucs & Szabó 2013, p. 46.
12 Ablonczy 2017, pp. 58–59.
13 Babucs & Szabó 2013, pp. 42–43.
16
around noon, the 1st Battalion of the “Bocskai István” 11th Hajdú Regiment of
Debrecen took a long break near Szilágyipp, a village situated between Margitta
(today: Marghita, Romania) and Szilágysomlyó (today: Șimleu Silvaniei,
Romania). After resuming their march, one of the ammunition cars of the 11th
Battalion of the 1st Machine Gun Squadron exploded and two soldiers were
killed as a result. Among other things, the vehicle was carrying hand grenades
that had been found in the Romanian barracks in Margitta; contrary to the
regulations, these had not been destroyed. An impromptu on-site inspection
found that one of the grenades had activated due to the shaking, causing the
explosion.14 From this incident arose the so-called “apple basket story”, which
cannot be confirmed with reliable sources.15
In the days before the transfer of the territories, members of the Iron Guard
had already incited the Romanian population of the area against the Hungarians.
Mrs Imre Máté was shot dead and József Kisfalussy was bludgeoned to death as
a result of incitement by Urpea, the Greek Catholic priest of Szilágyipp.16
Even the Hungarian Telegraph Office reported on the 9 September 1940
incident at Ördögkút:17 “The Maniu guards hiding in the village fired shots
at the Border Guard Battalion passing through Ördögkút, which resulted in
four border guards being seriously injured. Hungarian troops surrounded the
village. The Romanian peasants themselves led the border guards to the hiding
place of the attackers, and after a short fight these were rendered harmless
by the border guards. 16 members of the Maniu Guard lost their lives in the
fight. Upon examining the dead, the border guards were surprised to find that
four of them had manicured hands, in sharp contrast with the peasant clothes
they were wearing.”18 Based on an eyewitness account, Colonel of the General
14 Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, p. 22.

15 Illésfalvi 2004, pp. 63–64; Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, p. 23.
16 Illésfalvi 2004, p. 64; Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, p. 22.
17 For more details on the incident at Ördögkút, see Illésfalvi 2004, p. 64, pp. 67–68; Illésfalvi,
Szabó & Számvéber 2005, pp. 23–24; Illésfalvi & Szabó 2015, p. 130.
18 National Archives of Hungary (MNL), news by the Hungarian News Agency (MTI) 1920–
1956, Daily Reports 1920–1944, 12 September 1940. http://www.library.hungaricana.hu/;
(downloaded on 6 May 2020)
17
Staff Gyula Kádár of Nyárád-Gálfalva19 (in 1940 Lieutenant Colonel of the

General Staff and Chief of the General Staff of the 4th Corps Command of Pécs)
recounted the events decades later, tailored to the expectations of the regime in
power at that time:
“The column of the 6th Corps marched toward Zsibó (today: Jubou,
Romania). The advance guard of the column was the 22nd Border
Guard Battalion, while the main body of troops marched two
kilometres behind them. Colonel Károly Ákosy was the commander of
the Border Guard Battalion.20 […] In the evening before the march to
Ördögkút, a troop cart carrying poorly stored hand grenades exploded
due to the shaking. This incident immediately gave rise to a rumour
according to which the cart was blown up by lurking Iron Guards. The
soldiers were already anxious in the evening. A rumour spread in the
battalion that they would be attacked in the Meszes Mountains. The
next day, when the battalion’s advance guard arrived in Ördögkút, no
one was out in the streets: the Romanian inhabitants of the village hid
in their houses in fright, there was no reception of any kind, and white
flags were displayed on every house. In all likelihood, the Romanian
priest or some other official of the village still wanted to give some
kind of reception. In a village, the tool for a reception is the church
bell. As the men of the advance guard appeared, the bells started
ringing. The overly circumspect battalion commander feared that this
was a signal meant for the hidden Iron Guards. He assigned a non-
commissioned officer to go to the church and demand the bell ringing
cease immediately. The non-commissioned officer stood under the
tower, shouting as loud as he could for the bell ringer to stop. The bell
ringer, who may not even have heard the shouting (and he probably
did not know Hungarian either), kept pulling the bell ropes. The non-
19 Szakály 2003, pp. 160–161; Szakály 2015, pp. 75–76.

20 Károly Ákosy (Miskolc, 1 July 1893 – Kiev, 24 October 1942) was still a lieutenant colonel
at this time; he became an infantry colonel on 1 November 1941. Lukács & Szabó 2015, p.
383; Maruzs 2013, p. 18.
18
commissioned officer reacted by firing into the tower several times. As

soon as the members of the advance guard heard the shots, they began
shouting, “The Romanians have fired!” The machine guns opened
fire on the tower, and as usual in panic situations, random shooting
ensued. The frightened villagers hiding in their small houses started
running towards the nearby forest, apparently in the belief that the
Hungarians intended to exterminate the entire village. The enraged
soldiers began shooting at the running people, who fell one after the
other. The officers were not assertive enough, and they could not – or
perhaps did not want to – stop the shooting. The panic was worsened
by the fact that the village was L-shaped, and the shots from the lower
leg of the letter L were fired towards the upper leg, where most of the
battalion was positioned. At this point, they started shooting as well.
Ákosy gave command to the mortar battalion to fire on the village,
and also ordered the artillery battery assigned to the battalion to take
up firing position. The village was burning, the small wooden houses
were incinerated one after the other, many people burning in them.
[…] Ördögkút was almost completely destroyed. The pandemonium
was put to an end by the arrival and forceful action of Szilárd Bakay,21 a
colonel at that time. After the incident, a series of major investigations
took place not only by the Hungarian side, but also by a joint German-
Italian-Romanian committee. In such investigations, usually everyone
involved lies without scruples. This case was no different either.
During the retreat, the troops at one of the small Romanian forts had
been unable to take along some of their weapons and a few crates
of ammunition. These had been hidden somewhere near Ördögkút.
Later, they were found by the Hungarian troops and used as evidence
before the committee to prove that all they did was avert a prepared
and imminent attack. It does not take much imagination to speculate
21 vitéz Szilárd Bakay (Budapest, 8 September 1892 – Sopron, 17 March 1947), colonel,
lieutenant general from 1 October 1942. He participated in the entry into Transylvania as
commander of the 17th Infantry Brigade of Budapest. Szakály 2003, pp. 33–34.
19
on the testimony given by the handful of frightened, illiterate, simple

Romanians before the committee, in contrast to the routine answers of
the other party. Therefore, no one ended up in trouble – and we can be
thankful that Colonel Ákosy did not receive some prestigious military
medal.”22
After the 17th Infantry Brigade of Debrecen and the 7th Infantry Brigade
of Sopron, the 2nd Infantry Brigade of Budapest,23 commanded by Infantry
Colonel Géza Heim,24 Baron of San Martino del Carso, also marched into
Szilágyság and permanently occupied the villages around Szilágyipp. Sporadic
shots were fired at the corps of the Budapest brigade both during the march
and quartering, although the soldiers did not provoke these attacks in any way.
On 10 September 1940, the 2nd Corps Command of Székesfehérvár received a
report, according to which armed Romanians were hiding in the areas of the
villages of Alsókaznacs, Felsőkaznacs, Márkaszék, Porc, Lecsmér, Somály and
Kémer (today: Cosniciul de jos, Cosniciul de sus, Marca, Porţ, Leşmir, Șumal,
Camăr, all in Romania). The commander of the 2nd Corps staff estimated the
number of the armed individuals hiding in the forests at around 80–100 people,
so he ordered the 2nd Infantry Brigade to search the area and eliminate any
armed resistance.25
22 Kádár 1978, I. pp. 354–356.

23 The 2nd Infantry Brigade included the “József Nádor” 2nd Infantry Regiment of Budapest
(comprising the 1st and 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment of Budapest and the
3rd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment of Jászberény), the 32nd Infantry Regiment
of Budapest, a twin corps set up during the mobilisation (comprising the 1st and 2nd
Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment of Budapest, and the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd
Infantry Regiment of Jászberény), as well as other corps of the capital, such as the 2nd
Hussar Squadron, the 2nd Artillery Regiment, the 2nd Air Defence Machine Gun Platoon,
the 2nd Communications Squadron, the 2nd Train Command, the 2nd Provisioning
Column, the 2nd Ambulance Column and the 2nd Ambulance Vehicle Convoy.
24 vitéz Géza Heim, Baron of San Martino del Carso (Nagyszentmiklós, 20 April 1888 –
Budapest, 3 March 1942), colonel, major general from 1 November 1940, Knight of the
Maria Theresa Military Order. During the period of entry into Transylvania, he served as
commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of Budapest. Szakály 2003, p. 131.
25 Regarding the events that occurred in Szilágyság, see Babucs 2001, p. 38; Illésfalvi 2004, pp.
65–67, pp. 69–72; Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, pp. 22–23; Babucs & Szabó 2013, pp.
42–45.
20
The region of Szilágyság was inhabited mainly by Romanians, and the area
was considered the cradle of the Maniu Guard; therefore, according to a later
report, Colonel Heim transmitted the following order of his superiors to the
32nd Infantry Regiment of Budapest, charged with searching the area: “[…]
in order to set an example, effect immediate, forceful and ruthless retaliation
against any armed or otherwise dangerous attacks by Romanians on troops and
individual members of the military, or any attempts at such attacks.”26
It should be noted that during the preparations for the military occupation
of the returned territories, the Romanian-Hungarian joint military committee,
which met in Nagyvárad (today: Oradea, Romania) on 1 and 2 September 1940,
agreed on several issues supporting the peaceful entry of the army. One of the
points of the agreement set forth that armed civilians using weapons to resist the
entering Hungarian army were to be treated in accordance with international
agreements and were to be regarded as francs-tireurs27 by the Hungarian
military authorities. The negotiators on the Romanian side promised that the
evacuation authorities would do their utmost to collect weapons held by the
civilian population, and similarly, to take action against behaviour threatening
the local population, attacks on persons and property, as well as arson and
destruction.28 However, the collection of weapons took place haphazardly, only
in part or not at all, which had serious consequences when Romanian snipers,
mostly hot-headed, shot at the Hungarian army.29
Once the Hungarian Army occupied the returned region, military
administration was established and then replaced by civilian administration on
26 November 1940.30 During the initial period, it may have proved necessary to
apply martial law. The martial law responsibilities of the Royal Hungarian Army
26 Military History Archives, 1st Corps Command, Box No. 489. 1940. Statement of weapon
use on the territory of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Command. 44993/pres. – 1940.
27 “Free shooters”, i.e. partisans.
28 National Archives of Hungary (MNL), news by the Hungarian News Agency (MTI) 1920–
1956, Daily Reports 1920–1944, 1 and 2 September 1940. http://www.library.hungaricana.
hu/; (downloaded on 6 May 2020); Babucs & Szabó 2013, p. 38; Illésfalvi & Szabó 2015, pp.
32–33.
29 Illésfalvi 2004, pp. 60–61.
30 Sebestyén & Szabó 2008, p. 1417.
21
were set forth in detail by the Regulations (A–15) of 1923 and 1924.31 In his study,
Lieutenant Colonel Dr István Ravasz, a military historian, states the following:
However, in the event that the situation deteriorated to such an extent
that the Hungarian Army had to intervene, strict rules came into
force. The goal was to ensure that the action of the soldiers could be
effective in deciding over, settling and permanently terminating every
such situation ad absurdum. The method to be followed was precisely
described: “Forcefulness, which may be increased to the point of
ruthlessness if necessary, always accomplishes the goal […]”, because
“[…] hesitation and fear of responsibility are the sources of failure.”
In the course of a forceful action, “[…] it is not acceptable under any
circumstances to make any agreement or enter into any compromise.”
In order for all commanders to understand forcefulness in the same way
as the creators of the regulations, it was stressed: “[…] never fire with
blank ammunition or into the air.” The requirement of forcefulness,
and even ruthlessness, can be explained by a principle that was also
described in the regulations: actions by the security forces “[…] should
safeguard the honour of the armed forces in all circumstances […]”.32
On 11 September 1940, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment of
Budapest was marching from Szilágyszeg (today: Sălăţig, Romania) to the village
of Szilágygörcsön (today: Gârceiu, Romania) when the battalion commander
was notified that the population of Debren (today: Dobrin, Romania), a
village situated on their route, was preparing for armed resistance against
the Hungarian army. Lieutenant Colonel Erik Bresztovszky33 decided to send
31 According to the 1924 martial law regulations, “the purpose of applying martial law is to
support civilian authorities in the performance of their legitimate duties, and especially
in their work aiming to maintain or restore state and social order and public security in
cases where the law enforcement bodies under civilian authorities are not sufficient for this
purpose.” Ravasz 2019, p. 374.
32 Ravasz 2008, p. 298; Ravasz 2019, pp. 376–377.
33 Erik Bresztovszky (Gyulafehérvár [today: Alba Iulia, Romania], 24 June 1895 – n. a.),
major, colonel from 1 May 1943. At the time of reoccupying the territories of Northern
Transylvania and Szeklerland, he served as commander of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd
Infantry Regiment. Military History Archives, Registry Sheets No. 300/1896.
22
ahead to Debren a scout patrol composed of a platoon under the command

of re-enlisted Warrant Officer László Jeney,34 one of the non-commissioned
officers of the 1st Rifle Squadron of the 32nd Infantry Brigade. The patrol wanted
to consult with the mayor of the village before conducting the necessary house
searches. After it became obvious that the hostile-minded population was not
going to offer any assistance, Alexa Tyjerán was singled out from the crowd to
help with identifying the mayor. However, Tyjerán started to verbally abuse the
soldiers and then attacked reserve soldier János Tóth, who shot his attacker to
death in self-defence.
On 13 September 1940, at 5 p.m., the Brigade Command received a report
according to which a telephone patrol of the 32nd Infantry Regiment laying a
line between Szilágysomlyó and Szilágynagyfalu (today: Nușfalău, Romania)
had been attacked from the forest situated near the railway and the road
intersection north of Szilágynagyfalu. Led by Major János Ranga,35 a military
police squadron consisting of soldiers of the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry
Regiment of Budapest, led by First Lieutenant Zsolt Bedő36 was already on its
way to Szilágyipp to conduct house searches in the village. First Lieutenant
Bedő had already been instructed in Szilágynagyfalu that the destination of
the squadron was the village where, several days earlier, someone had handed
a time bomb hidden in an apple basket to the Hungarian troops entering the
34 László Jeney of Nagyenyed, nobleman (Kolozsvár [today: Cluj-Napoca, Romania], 11 July

1915 – n. a.), re-enlisted warrant officer, first lieutenant from 1 August 1943. A participant
in the mobilisation and entry into Transylvania as one of the section commanders of the
1st Rifle Squadron Unit of the 32nd Infantry Regiment. Military History Archives, 2nd
Infantry Regiment, Box No. 6. 1939. B. Matters regarding personnel; Military Archives of
the Military History Institute and Museum, László Jeney, Officers’ Documents Collector
no. 34136.
35 János Ranga (10 May 1900 – n. a.), major, lieutenant colonel from 30 September 1942. At
the time of the Transylvanian mobilisation and entry, he served as commander of the 2nd
Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment. No other personal data or information on his
military service are available.
36 Zsolt Bedő (Budapest, 5 December 1911 – n. a.), first lieutenant, captain from 31 March
1942. At the time of the Transylvanian mobilisation and entry, he served as commander of
the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Machine Gun Squadron. Military Archives of the Military
History Institute and Museum, Zsolt Bedő, Officers’ Documents Collector No. 3801
(hereinafter: ODC).
23
village; later, the bomb exploded and killed three soldiers.37 Therefore, the
Hungarian soldiers were quite incensed at their arrival in the village. The
unfortunate incident in Szilágyipp was later reported as follows:
“[…] during the house searches carried out after dark by the military
police squadron in the village of Ipp, 18 members of the Iron Guard,
none of them inhabitants of the village, were found hidden in attics
and barns. When questioned, they resisted on the one hand, and made
an attempt to escape on the other hand; as a result, the squadron used
weapons and shot 16 people on the spot, while two managed to escape.
On 14 September, at 3:04 a.m., the military police squadron, resting at
the school in Ipp, was ambushed by machine gun, rifle and submachine
gun fire from the street opposite the school. In the darkness, the guards
and the aroused military police squadron returned fire with machine
guns, which resulted in 152 deaths among the attackers, some of whom
died during the subsequent pursuit.”38
Eight decades later, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly what happened. It
may be assumed that the officers and soldiers of the military police squadron,
already under considerable nervous tension and affected by the hostile
environment, may have panicked when the shot or shots were fired during
the night. It is unlikely that an armed Romanian group attacked the soldiers
quartered in the school, as the squadron suffered no casualties. One shot may
have been fired at the soldiers quartered in the school from the tower of the
Reformed (sic!) Church, but the identity of the perpetrator is also uncertain.
A man named Viktor Chifor, hiding at a nearby farm, confessed before his
death to having fired the shot, but it cannot be proven that he was indeed the
perpetrator. The manhunt for the Romanian population, organised with the
active participation of the local Hungarians,39 may have started after they failed
39 Most of the Hungarians from Szilágyipp who were involved in the events were sentenced to
20 to 25 years in prison by the Romanian authorities. Illésfalvi 2004, p. 76.
24
to find the sniper who had fired the shot or shots. Executions started at 11 p.m.,
as a result of which 157 Romanian men, women and children were killed. The
bodies were buried in a mass grave in the local Romanian cemetery the next
day. The military police squadron then left Szilágyipp, carrying spoils of war
(one light machine gun, sixteen rifles, two pistols). On 24 October 1940, the
German-Italian special committee arrived on the scene and merely conducted
an inspection, but did not find any substantive information.40
Lance Corporal Antal Kovács41 was a participant in the events as a soldier
in the 7th Rifle Squadron of the 32nd Infantry Regiment of Jászberény. In the
mid-1990s he recounted the events as follows:
“One of our platoons was billeted in the school. There was a church
approximately 30 metres from the school. During the night, the guard
was walking around the school when he was shot at from the tower. No
one was hurt. […] But the alarm was sounded for sure! After sunrise,
everyone received orders. I, too, was ordered to stand on guard at one
end of a street, and make sure that not a single soul could get into or out
of the village. Everyone in the village had to be rounded up in the school.
The mayor and other people were questioned about who were members
of the Iron Guard in the village. Nobody admitted to knowing one. One
of the cadet sergeants demanded the list be submitted immediately. […]
At this time, I was already on guard in the yard. Not a single confession
was made in the interrogation room, so those people were beaten badly
by the cadet sergeant from Árokszállás. Suddenly he calls out to me
through the window, “Kovács! Heat up some iron in the fire! That will
make them confess! […]” But the iron was not needed after all, because
the village ended up being burned down.”42
40 Sárándi 2016, p. 244.

41 Antal Kovács (Jászberény, 13 April 1915 – Szolnok, 23 November 1998), reserve lance
corporal. He participated in the entry into Transylvania as a member of the 7th Battalion of
the 32 Rifle Squadron; it was at this time that he received his rank of lance corporal. Babucs
1997, 7, Interview with Kovács.
42 Interview with Kovács.
25
The weapon collection operations carried out among the population of

the surrounding villages led to further incidents. On 14 September 1940,43
in the village of Somlyócsehi (today: Cehei, Romania), Gábor Veres (sic!),
an Iron Guard member, resisted when he was ordered to surrender his
hidden weapon. The house search was conducted by Cadet Sergeant András
Jámbor,44 reserve officer cadet of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment
of Budapest. Gábor Veres hit him in the chest and tried to take his pistol.
The cadet sergeant shot him dead in self-defence. Late in the evening, First
Lieutenant Bedő’s military police squadron arrived in the village of Zovány
(today: Zăuan, Romania). For the second time that day, pistol shots were fired
at the squadron commander. One of the three shots struck through the torch
on the first lieutenant’s shoulder strap.
A number of new incidents occurred on 15 September 1940 and the
subsequent days. At 5:45 a.m., unknown individuals hidden in the forest near
Márkaszék (today: Marca, Romania) fired shots at one of the rifle platoons
of the military police squadron marching from Szilágyipp to Márkaszék. At
noon, the soldiers taking a long rest at the Márkaszék school were shot at by
gunmen hidden in the cornfield northwest of the village. On the same day,
the Hungarian army received information from the gendarmerie commander
of Szilágy County that Iron Guard groups were present in Alsókaznacs and
Felsőkaznacs, as well as in the areas south of the two villages. The commander
asked for security forces to search and clear the area. Once again, the 32nd
Infantry Regiment was given the task. The military police unit, under the
command of First Lieutenant Zsolt Bedő, contained members of the 8th
and 9th Battalions of the 32nd Rifle Squadron, as well as a platoon of the 3rd
Battalion of the 32nd Machine Gun Squadron, both of Jászberény. Re-enlisted
Platoon Leader András Farkas participated in the enforcement action as the
squad leader of the 1st Platoon of the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Rifle Squadron.
According to his recollection, they took up firing positions outside a settlement,
43 On this day, a ban on alcohol was introduced in the entire quartering area of the 2nd Corps.
Babucs & Szabó 2013, p. 46.
44 No other personal data or information on his military service are available.
26
but did not engage in a firefight.45 The military police unit of First Lieutenant
Bedő was once again forced to use weapons in Felsőkaznacs and Cseres (today:
Cerişa, Romania). The contemporary report of the 2nd Infantry Brigade states,
“[…] as we were trying to round up the Iron Guard members who were hiding
weapons, they attempted to escape at a moment they deemed convenient; the
military police unit then used their weapons against them. One of the captured
Iron Guard members was József Malaga, alleged perpetrator of the bomb attack
at Ipp. 55 Iron Guard members fell at this place.”46
On 16 September 1940, at 4:30 p.m., the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Rifle
Squadron of Budapest arrived in the village of Halmosd (today: Halmășd,
Romania), where First Lieutenant Béla Barabás,47 commander of the squadron,
wanted to inquire with the mayor of the village about weapons possibly hidden
in the village. The mayor led one of First Lieutenant Barabás’ patrols to an
empty house, and then hit the soldier standing next to him in the chest and
ran away. Despite the “Stop!” command of the members of the patrol (Reserve
Lance Corporal Zoltán Halász and Reserve Private József Perei), the mayor
kept running, so the patrol shot him.
The last use of weapons took place on 18 September 1940. The 1st Battalion
of the 32nd Rifle Squadron (150 soldiers, 136 rifles, eight machine guns, two
transport vehicles) under the command of First Lieutenant Kálmán Keviczky
of Keveháza48 received the following order: “Boys, the Colonel says that ‘the
45 András Farkas (Medgyesegyháza, 2 September 1914 – Szolnok, 31 January 2008), re-

enlisted platoon leader, professional Special Service sergeant from 1 November 1942. He
participated in the entry into Transylvania as the squad leader of the 3rd Battalion of the
32nd Machine Gun Squadron. Military Archives of the Military History Institute and
Museum, András Farkas, Subordinate Officers’ Documents Collector No. 3877, Babucs
1996, 15, interview with Farkas.
47 Béla Barabás (Szeged, 2 December 1915 – n. a.), first lieutenant, armoured corps captain
from 20 August 1943. At the time of the entry into Transylvania, he was commander of
the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Rifle Squadron. Military Archives of the Military History
Institute and Museum, Béla Barabás, ODC No. 305/3426, Babucs & Maruzs 2007, pp. 110–
111.
48 Kálmán Keviczky of Keveháza (Ruttka, 21 August 1909 – New York, 27 July 1998), first
lieutenant, captain from 1 May 1941. At the time of the entry into Transylvania he was
27
bullets of the Thirty-Second never miss.’”49 The Hungarian soldiers conducted

a house search in the village of Kémer (today: Camăr, Romania) and arrested
four individuals suspected of being members of the Iron Guard. Reserve
Sergeant József Czakó50 received the task of taking the arrested suspects to
Szilágynagyfalu in transport vehicles. The wheel of one of the carts broke. What
happened next can be found out from the account of Sándor K. Szabó, one of
the three reserve lance corporals assigned to the patrol:
Czakó orders everyone to get off the cart. We surround the prisoners
on the footpath next to the trees, and then just stand there and look
at the cart stuck in the rut. One of the prisoners says something to his
companions in Romanian, and Czakó growls at him:
“Shut your mouth!”
The man gestures unequivocally that he has some business to do in the
forest. Czakó silences him again:
“Wait for your turn.”
The prisoners stand huddled in a close group. We surround them at a
distance of two or three steps. My rifle hangs loosely under my left arm
(I’m a left-handed shooter), while the others hold theirs in their right
hand.
We look away from the four people herded together like sheep, watching
the carters who are struggling with the cart.
The moment, I confess, was tempting; the prisoners run away, and in
two or three steps they are disappearing into the forest. We yell after
them.
“Stop!”
But they keep running like mad… A pistol cracks, one of them falls,
the rifle rumbles under my arm, in my left hand, another one falls. In
an instant, all four prisoners are lying on the dry leaves, because in
commander of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Rifle Squadron. He directed a military training
film on the entry. Military Archives of the Military History Institute and Museum, Kálmán
Keviczky, ODC no. 48207.
49 Szabó K. 1991, p. 147.
50 No other personal data or information on his military service are available.
28
the meantime rifle shots were fired here and there, and none of them
missed.
We stand petrified, looking at each other with pale faces; we don’t
understand how these people dared to risk an escape.
We looked at the wounded hoping that we could help them and deliver
them as ordered, but there was no way to help: they were all dead.
Czakó and I start pondering about what to do with them, as it is
forbidden to carry dead bodies. We consult for a long time, when all of
a sudden we hear horse hooves pounding in the distance, and we see
First Lieutenant Keviczky galloping toward us. He starts shouting from
a considerable distance.
“Czakó! What happened?”
“First Lieutenant, Sir! I humbly report...” he begins and tells in detail
what happened.
“Why didn’t you watch them more closely?” Keviczky asks us.
“It’s not our fault, First Lieutenant, Sir,” we answer unanimously.
After pondering briefly, our First Lieutenant orders the men to be
buried. The spades and shovels are taken out of the toolboxes on the
carts, and the infantry soldiers begin to dig the graves.
The funeral was short; the First Lieutenant said a short speech, and the
sad act was concluded with a silent prayer.
On the way back, our journey was quiet and we were speechless, because
each of us thought of the four lives that were discarded so thoughtlessly,
almost as if in a suicide.51
During these days, the 2nd Infantry Regiment of Budapest also participated
in security operations, but no weapons were used. After the reports sent to the
regiment on 13 September 1940 recounted the crimes that “armed Romanians”
committed on the territory bounded by Szilágysomlyó in the north –
Szilágyperecsen (today: Pericei, Romania) in the north – Szilágycsécs in the east
– Szilágybadacson (today: Bădăcin, Romania) in the north – Somlyógyőrtelek
51 Szabó K. 1991, pp. 153–154.
29
(today: Giurtelecu Șimleului, Romania) in the east – Somlyóújlak (today:

Uileacu Șimleului, Romania) in the east – Szilágycseh (today: Cehu Silvaniei,
Romania), Colonel Imre Kolossváry,52 commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment,
issued the following order:
“The two rifle squadrons and the two machine gun squadrons formed
from the 1st and respectively the 3rd Battalions, under the command
of Captains Latzkovits53 and Berdefi,54 will search and clear of gangs
the areas designated below on the 14th and 15th of the current month.
Reprisals should be applied immediately, on the spot. Tough officers
and sub-officers are to be assigned for the roles of platoon commander
and squad leader, and the military police squadron should be comprised
of volunteers as much as possible. If necessary, the squadron is to take
hostages from the villages in the designated area. The 1st Battalion will
search the western, and the 3rd Battalion the eastern side.”55
According to the order, Captain Berdefi’s unit combed the area northeast of
Szilágysomlyó. While executing its mission, the squadron found nothing but a
few rifle cartridges and bayonets.56 According to the report of Captain Berdefi,
on 14 September 1940, at 3:30 p.m., the following incident occurred:
52 vitéz Imre Kolossváry (Eger, 14 October 1888 – Mátraháza, 30 January 1970), colonel, major
general from 1 May 1941. He participated in the entry into Transylvania as commander of
the 2nd Infantry Regiment. Szakály 2003, pp. 182–183.
53 Béla Latzkovits (Szeged, 11 September 1896 – n. a.), captain, lieutenant colonel from 1
July 1944. He participated in the entry into Transylvania as commander of one of the rifle
squadrons of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment. Military History Archives,
Registry Sheets No. 1386/1896, 2nd Infantry Regiment, Box No. 6. 1939. B. Matters
regarding personnel.
54 Győző Berdefi (Budapest, 5 March 1906 – ?, 1971), captain, major from 1 July 1944. He
participated in the entry into Transylvania as commander of the 7th Battalion of the 2nd
Rifle Squadron. Military Archives of the Military History Institute and Museum, Győző
Berdefi, ODC No. 4270.
55 Military History Archives, 2nd Infantry Regiment, Box No. 6. 1940. Annexes of diaries
from the period of mobilisation and entry into Transylvania. Annex 63 Searching for Vlach
gangs (13 September 1940).
gangs (13 September 1940), a report by Captain Győző Berdefi on the operations of the
military police squadron (Szilágyperecsen, 21 September 1940).
30
“[…] under the command of Captain Tábori,57 we conducted a search

on a farm situated 2 km north of Badacson, during which a bayonet and
eight live cartridges were found. The old woman at the farm resisted
the house search and wounded one of the members of the infantry
with her pocket knife (a minor scratch). According to the civilian
attendant present at the scene, the old woman is feeble-minded. I also
detained her foster son /a released soldier/ present at the farm. […]
During the operation of the squadron, no Romanian armed gangs
were found, and no firearms or explosives were discovered.”58
According to the summary on weapon use on the territory under command
of the 2nd Infantry Brigade prepared at the time, Colonel Heim sought to explain
why he had not encouraged a thorough investigation of the armed retaliations
by the military police units of the 32nd Infantry Regiment in his subsequent
report:
“[…] I did not scrutinise cases of weapon use in my capacity as the
commanding officer, because I did not see the need for this. […] In
all the cases that occurred, I saw either […] an attack or an imminent
threat thereof, and therefore I found every weapon use to be a
legitimate use of weapons carried out in accordance with the orders
issued.”59
In addition to the use of weapons by the military police units in the
Szilágyipp area, the other most significant case of armed retaliation occurred in
Ördögkút, situated in the Meszes Mountains, on 9 September 1940. The units
participating in that incident were the 1st Hajdú Battalion of the 11th Infantry
57 István Tábori (Szolnok, 14 October 1915 – n. a.), lieutenant, first lieutenant from 1
September 1940. He participated in the mobilisation and entry into Transylvania as section
commander of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment. Military History Archives,
2nd Infantry Regiment, Box No. 6. 1939. B. Matters regarding personnel.
gangs (13 September 1940); a report by Captain Győző Berdefi on the operations of the
military police squadron (Szilágyperecsen, 21 September 1940).
31
Regiment of Debrecen, the 22nd Border Guard Battalion of Debrecen and the 3rd
Battalion of the 4th Infantry Brigade of Sopron.60
Some other incidents which are no longer possible to investigate occurred
as well, such as the one at Omboztelke (today: Mureșenii de Câmpie, Romania).
After 1945, the members of the local landowner family, Count András Wass
of Czege, his wife and his son, Albert Wass, were accused by the Romanian
authorities of provoking the incident.61
As mentioned in the introduction, there are some who – based on nothing
more than panic-mongering62 – see the entry of the Hungarian Royal Army
into Transylvania as a series of atrocities and regard the Hungarian rule
between 1940 and 1944 as one of the failed experiments of the old Hungary.
Twenty-two years had passed since the defeat of the Hungarian nation and
the disintegration of Hungary in the autumn of 1918. However, the relations
between Hungary and Romania had become extremely strained even before
1918 (as demonstrated by the exterminations of Hungarians in Transylvania
in the 1848–1849 Revolution and the invasion of Transylvania by Romania in
1916), further aggravated by Romanian imperial rule in Transylvania until 1940.
The situation between the two countries was already characterised by tensions
due to differences in the cultural background of the two nations as well. These
tensions became even more acute as a result of rumours of various murders and
atrocities, the occasional hostile behaviour of the Romanian population and
the recklessness of their armed groups – which provoked martial law measures.
When Northern Transylvania and Szeklerland were returned to Hungary,
550,000 fully armed and equipped soldiers were involved. It is a miracle that
weapons were used only a few times. Even though the Hungarian authorities
tried to deal humanely with the Romanian population – while the Hungarians
in Southern Transylvania were constantly being harassed by the Romanians –
in 1944 the Romanian army did not forego the opportunity to take revenge for
“the Hungarian retaliation of 1940”. The Maniu Guards, arriving in the wake
60 Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, pp. 23–24.

61 Illésfalvi 2004, p. 68; Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, p.24.
62 Ablonczy 2017, p. 58.
32
of the Red Army and the Royal Romanian Army, which invaded Szeklerland
and Northern Transylvania in the autumn of 1944, took revenge in Szárazajta,
Csíkszereda, Csíkszentdomokos, Gyergyószentmiklós, Egeres, Bánffyhunyad,
Páncélcseh, Magyarzsombor, Gyanta, Magyarremete and Kishalmágy (today:
Aita Seacă, Miercurea Ciuc, Sândominic, Gheorgheni, Aghireșu, Huedin,
Panticeu, Zimbor, Ginta, Remetea, Hălmăgel, all in Romania) for imagined or
real grievances suffered in 1940, with the knowledge of the Romanian state,
which transported tens of thousands of Hungarians to internment camps in the
Romanian Old Kingdom.63
63 Gál 2005, p. 41–44; Benkő 2011.
33
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történt atrocitásokról. Pro Minoritate, Spring. pp. 58–77.
Illésfalvi, P. (2005). Atrocitások az 1940-es erdélyi bevonulás során. Rubicon,
15(156). pp. 33–38.
Illésfalvi, P., Szabó, P. & Számvéber, N. (2005). Erdély a hadak útján 1940–1944.
Puedlo Kiadó. Budapest–Nagykovácsi.
Illésfalvi, P. & Szabó, P. (2015). Erdélyi bevonulás, 1940. Second, revised edition.
Tortoma Kiadó–Kiskapu Kiadó. Barót.
34
Kádár, Gy. (1978). A Ludovikától Sopronkőhidáig. I-II. Magvető Könyvkiadó.

Budapest. 1978.
Lukács, B. Á. & Szabó, P. (2015). A somogyi rosseb hadosztály a Don-kanyarban.
Hadiokmányok, harctéri naplók, tábori levelezőlapok, visszaemlékezések és
sajtóhíradások a magyar királyi 10. könnyű hadosztály történetéhez 1942–
1943. Zrínyi Kiadó. Budapest.
Maruzs, R. (2013). Középkereszt, tisztikereszt, lovagkereszt. A Magyar Érdemrend
hősi halottainak emlékkönyve. Zrínyi Kiadó. Budapest.
Ravasz, I. (2008). A Magyar Királyi Honvédség karhatalmi alkalmazása. In: Dr
Holló, J. F. (ed.): Hazánk dicsőségére. 160 éves a Magyar Honvédség. Zrínyi
Kiadó. Budapest. pp. 291–300.
Ravasz, I. (2019). A m. kir. Honvédség karhatalmi alkalmazásának szabályozása
a Horthy-korban, császári és királyi előzményekkel. In: Kincses, K. M. &
Illésfalvi, P. (eds.): Élet az arcvonal mögött. Tanulmányok Szabó Péter
hadtörténész tiszteletére. MoD Military History Institute and Museum.
Budapest. pp. 361–385.
Romsics, I. (2010). A második bécsi döntés. Népszabadság, weekend of 21
August. pp. 1–4.
Sárándi, T. (ed.) (2016). Levezényelt visszacsatolás. A magyar katonai
közigazgatás Észak-Erdélyben, 1940. Pro-Print Könyvkiadó. Miercurea-
Ciuc.
Sebestyén, E. & Szabó, P. (2008). Magyar katonai közigazgatás Észak-Erdélyben
és a Székelyföldön 1940 őszén. Századok, 142(6). pp. 1383–1420.
Szabó, K. S. (1991). Bevonulás Erdélybe 1940. B&K Kiadó. Budapest.
Szakály, S. (2003). A magyar katonai felsővezetés 1938–1945. Lexikon és adattár.
Second, revised edition. Ister. Budapest.
Szakály, S. (2015). A 2. vkf. osztály. Tanulmányok a magyar katonai hírszerzés
és kémelhárítás történetéből 1918–1945. Magyar Napló–VERITAS Research
Institute and Archives. Budapest.
35
INTERVIEWS
Farkas interview Magnetofonszalagra vett beszélgetés Farkas András magyar

királyi hivatásos szakszolgálatos őrmesterrel [Interview with András Farkas
professional Special Service sergeant of the Royal Hungarian Army recorded
on magnetic tape] (Jászberény, 28 May 1996, 12 March 2000) (from Zoltán
Babucs’ archives)
Kovács interview Magnetofonszalagra vett beszélgetés Kovács Antal magyar királyi
tartalékos őrvezetővel [Interview with Antal Kovács reserve lance corporal
of the Royal Hungarian Army recorded on magnetic tape] (Jászberény, 28
May, 27 June and 4 July 1996) (from Zoltán Babucs’ archives)
ARCHIVE SOURCES
Military History Archive of the MoD Military History Institute and Museum
(Budapest)
II. 1239 1st Corps Command Budapest of the Royal Hungarian Army and legal
predecessors 1938–1941
II. 1497 “József Nádor” 2nd Infantry Regiment of the Royal Hungarian Army
1919–1942
Personnel administration documents of officers born before 1900 (Registry
sheets)
Central Archive of the MoD Military History Institute and Museum (Budapest)
Personnel administration documents of officers (professional and reserve
officers born after 1900)
Personnel administration documents of non-commissioned officers and
enlisted soldiers (born after 1900)
36
PHOTOS
Figure 1. The 32nd Infantry Regiment at Vállaj, on 5 September 1940.

(Collection of Babucs Zoltán)
37
Figure 2. The band of the 2nd Infantry Regiment at the roadblocks in front of Hadad,
on 7 September 1940. (Collection of Babucs Zoltán)
38
Figure 3. Concert of Hungarian army band at the main square of Szilágyperecsen

Figure 4. First Lieutenant Zsolt Bedő (Collection of Babucs Zoltán)
39
Figure 5. Lance Corporal Antal Kovács (Photographed earlier as a private without

rank. (Collection of Babucs Zoltán)
Figure 6. Re-enlisted Platoon Leader András Farkas (Collection of Babucs Zoltán)
40
Figure 7. First Lieutenant Béla Barabás (Collection of Babucs Zoltán)
Figure 8. First Lieutenant Kálmán Keviczky (Photographed already as Captain)

41
Figure 9. Captain Győző Berdefi

Figure 10. Procession of the 7th Rifle Squadron of the 2nd Infantry Regiment led
by Captain Győző Berdefi at the occasion of their homecoming. Jászberény, 24
September 1940. (Collection of Babucs Zoltán)
42
T E R R I T O R I A L C H A N G E S O F C A R PAT H I A N R U T H E N I A : 1 9 1 9 – 1 9 4 5
JÓZSEF BOTLIK
TERRITORIAL CHANGES OF
CARPATHIAN RUTHENIA:
1919–1945
The territory of Carpathian Ruthenia (in Czech: Podkarpatská Rus) between

the two World Wars differs from both the preceding and current Carpathian
Ruthenia after 1945. This has led to considerable misunderstanding of this
concept, making it important to analyse and describe its geographical extent
and the changes in its name from the beginnings in the early 19th century to the
present day.
The current wording of the expression first appeared in print on 27 October
1889 in the header of a political and social weekly newspaper launched in
Munkács (today: Mukachevo, Ukraine) under the title Kárpátalja (Carpathian
Ruthenia, literally: Subcarpathia). Yet its history goes back to much earlier
times, which thus need to be discussed. Although in a slightly different form,
it already appeared more than seven decades earlier, in 1817, in the lexicon
describing ‘Current and old nations and countries’ by Johann Hübner (1668–
1731), which was revised, supplemented and published by Franz Xaver Sperl (?–
?) in 1815. This was published by printer and bookseller János Tamás Trattner,
Jr. (1789–1824) “in a Hungarianised form” in 1816–1817. In the location name
lexicon, one of the regions of Szepes County is called “Kárpát allyai” [literally:
base of the Carpathians],1 which must have been known many decades earlier.
1 Hübner 1817, p. 112.
43
The concept was also adopted by the Rusyn ethnic group (in Latin:
ruthen, rutén) living in the county, and then in the neighbouring Sáros and
other counties, in a simple word-for-word translation: подкарпатский,
‘podkarpatszkij’, i.e. in the form of Subcarpathian. Later it also appeared in the first
line of a poem by Alexander Vasilyevich Dukhnovych (Олександр Духнович,
1803–1865), a Greek Catholic priest, poet and writer, as Подкарпатский
русины ‘Podkarpatskij rusin’, i.e. in the form of Carpathian Ruthenian, which
became widespread primarily due to his literary works. The poem was later
set to music, and thus became the national anthem of Rusyns living mainly in
Central Europe. The concept of подкарпатский soon spread in Rusyn Greek
Catholic publications and various works and textbooks, which were published
primarily in Buda by the printing company of the Royal Central Pest University.
The concept already appeared officially in the constitution of the Society of
Saint Basil the Great – Обществo Святого Василия Великого (‘Obshchestvo
Sviatoho Vasyliia Velykoho’) – founded in 1864 in Ungvár (today: Uzhhorod,
Ukraine),2 which was approved by the area council in Buda on 15 December.
Published in Munkács, the most populous town of Bereg County, the
weekly newspaper entitled Munkács reported in the spring of 1886 that István
Thomán (1862–1940), one of the favourite pupils of world-famous composer
and pianist Franz Liszt (1811–1886), had given a highly successful concert in
the Csillag Hotel “in the little Carpathian Ruthenian town”.3
In the premiere issue of the weekly newspaper entitled Kárpátalja launched
on 27 October 1889 in Munkács, editor István Csomár stated in his opening
piece entitled Viszontlátás that the newspaper “[…] received this name when
christened because it is aimed at furthering the interests of peoples living at the
base of the north-eastern Carpathians, whilst interpreting their emotions and
wishes”.4 The Hungarians living there had already used the word Kárpátalja as
a geographical name constructed similarly to expressions such as “Hegyalja”
([literally: base of the mountain] and “Mecsekalja” [literally: base of the Mecsek
2 Mayer 1977, p. 207.

3 Popovics 2004, p. 13.
4 Csomár 1889.
44
mountains] which had been used for many decades, and it only referred to
some parts in the Great Plain and the surrounding hills at the base of the
Carpathians. This denoted the two sides along the line of settlements Ungvár,
Szerednye, Munkács and Nagyszőllős (today: Uzhhorod, Serednie, Mukachevo,
Vynohradiv, all in Ukraine). Changes in the concept of Carpathian Ruthenia
began at the turn of the 19th and 20th century when its territory expanded
significantly.
At the initiative of Yuliy Firtsak (in Rusyn: Юлий Фирцак, 1836–1912),
the Greek Catholic bishop in Munkács,5 14 members of parliament of Bereg,
Ung, Ugocsa and Máramaros Counties submitted an application entitled
Memorandum on the promotion and flowering of the intellectual and material
relationships between Ruthenians living at the base and south of the north-eastern
Carpathians to Baron Dezső Bánffy (1843–1911), Prime Minister.6 The printed,
9-page petition already contained the Kárpátalja (Carpathian Ruthenia) concept
in its title in the form of Kárpátok alján [literally: Subcarpathia]. In the text,
however, the four counties above were referred to as the region south of the north-
eastern Carpathians7 on two occasions. In the memorandum, kárpátaljai vidék
[literally: Subcarpathian region] occurs three times, kárpátalji vidék [literally:
Subcarpathian region] once, kárpátalji nép [literally: Subcarpathian people]
eight times [!], and kárpátaljai nép [literally: people of the Subcarpathians]
once.8 The Memorandum urges the intellectual and material empowering of
the Ruthenian population of the above four counties, while clearly defining the
macro-region and its inhabitants as a Subcarpathian region and Subcarpathian
people, respectively.
The objectives of the Memorandum were pursued by the Hungarian
government. The movement was initially called Ruthenian and then – for
national policy reasons – referred to as the “mountain-region economic
5 Magocsi & Pop 2002, p. 119.

6 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltár (MNL OL.) K 26. 1902–XXXI.–1134. sz. 153–
158.
7 MNL OL. K 26. 1902–XXXI.–1134. sz. 154, 160.
8 MNL OL. K 26. 1902–XXXI.–1134. sz. 153–158 – Az Emlékirat oldalai [pages of the
Memorandum]: pp. 1, 2, 3, 7–8.
45
campaign” [in Hungarian: hegyvidéki gazdasági akció]. It was launched on 4

February 1897, led by Ignác Darányi (1849–1927), Minister of Agriculture. After
thorough inter-ministerial analyses and negotiations, Ede Egán (1851–1901),
an economist, was nominated as Ministerial Commissioner, who established
the Mountain-Region Office of the Hungarian Royal Agricultural Ministry in
the district capital of Szolyva (today: Svalyava, Ukraine).9 This marked the start
of what we would now call a major rural development effort, with the following
main elements: providing poor Rusyn farmers with national farming leases
and mountain pastures, livestock development; founding credit cooperatives
in order to break down the 500 and 1000% [!] usury rates exorbitantly charged
by Jews who immigrated from Galicia en masse, providing low-interest loans,
establishing national warehouse stores, where goods were sold more cheaply
than in grocery stores, etc. The two movements of emigration and continuous
relocation from Galicia that initially appeared “instinctive”, with high Jewish
population growth, also known as the “Khazar question”, have been intertwined
since at least the 1870s. In this context, the Hungarian government’s mountain-
region economic campaign was present as a third element from 1897.10
The spread of Jewish inhabitants who immigrated en masse from the
neighbouring Austrian province of Galicia was significantly promoted by “Act
XVII of 1867 on Jewish equality in terms of civil and political rights” adopted
by King Franz Joseph I (Habsburg) (1867–1916) on 27 December 1867, five
months after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.11 The legislation opened up
great new horizons for the large numbers of Jews immigrating from Galicia and
those already residing in Hungary. In our view, this was in reality a nationwide
expansion of the Jewish population, while from a leftist, liberal point of view
it represented the growth of the Jewish population. We consider the relevant
9 The mountain-region office was later relocated to the centrally located, more appropriate
town of Munkács.
10 Egan 1900, p. 199.
11 The wording of the Act comprises two sections: “§ 1 The Jewish population of the country
shall also be deemed entitled to each and every civil and political right as those of the
Christian population. § 2 Any contrary acts, customs and regulations shall hereby be
repealed.”
46
research results of Alajos Kovács,12 one of the best statisticians and demographers
of that period, corresponding member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
(1920–1949), director and later president of the Hungarian Royal Central
Statistical Office, to be definitive, who establishes in the title of his most
important work that an occupation had occurred.13
Emigration to overseas, mainly to the United States of America, took place
in parallel with immigration from Galicia between 1870s and early 1910s in
north-eastern Upper Hungary, including Carpathian Ruthenia – especially in
Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa, Máramaros and Zemplén, Szabolcs and Szatmár Counties.
At the time, more than 350,000 mainly Ruthenian [Rusyn], Hungarian and Tót
[Slovakian] people emigrated overseas from north-eastern Upper Hungary with
the assistance of several thousand agents operating in secret without official
permits as well as officially with passports.14 At the same time, by the end of
the above period, approximately 250,000 Jews had relocated – mostly without
official Hungarian control – mainly in the place of the emigrants. The houses,
lands, mountain pastures, production equipment, i.e. all of the assets, of those
who had no choice but to leave their homeland because of their debts were
acquired by usurers and innkeepers. Many of them individually received ten,
12 Alajos Kovács (until 1943 dolányi Kovács [literally: Kovács of Dolány], then Alajos Dolányi
1877–1963) was sentenced by the Budapest People’s Court to five years in prison and full
confiscation of property in 1947 on charges of crimes against the people, which was then
reduced to two years following appeal. He was released from prison in April 1950; in the
meantime, in 1949, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences revoked his membership.
13 According to the 1910 census data: 19.9% of owners of land larger than 1,000 acres; 19.0% of
landowners of 200–1,000 acres; 73.2% and 62.0% of the largeholders in the aforementioned
two groups; 27.1% of tenant farmers of 100–200 acres; 43.9% of industrial officials; 54.0%
of sole traders; 42.0% and 62.1% of loan and trade officials; 85.0% of credit institution
owners; 48.9% of doctors; 45.2% of lawyers; 25.6% of those engaged in the judiciary; 37.6%
of private engineers; 42.4% of journalists; 26.2% of those engaged in literature and arts were
Jews; 1. Kovács 1922, pp. 40–48.
14 In north-eastern Upper Hungary, including Carpathian Ruthenia, according to official
data, 91,742 emigrants, i.e. 27.5% of those who left, returned to their homeland between
1899 and 1913. If the number of those who returned home (even before 1899, thousands
returned, but were not officially registered!) is deducted, the number of Rusyn, Hungarian
and Slovakian emigrants is more or less identical to that of Jews immigrating from Galicia
in the period concerned, estimated at 250,000.
47
twenty or even many more houses depending on the debts of the emigrating
Ruthenians, Hungarians and Slovakians, and these holdings were registered
officially in land registries. Assets were then handed over to Jewish families
relocating from Galicia.15 In this manner, an organised exchange of people took
place for decades in the aforementioned seven counties.
Due to the results of the mountain-region economic campaign – and
especially due to the successes achieved in doing away with the 500 and 1000%
[!] usury rates – the lives of the Commissioner of the Minister of Agriculture
and his colleagues were in constant danger. Several assassination attempts were
made against them, and Egán was murdered in a targeted assassination on 20
September 1901.16
On the first of January 1901, the daily political newspaper Ellenzék
[literally: Opposition] published in Kolozsvár (today: Cluj-Napoca, Romania),
which paid considerable attention to the progress of Subcarpathian rural
development, started to publish the series entitled “Kazár földön” [literally: On
Khazar land] by owner and editor-in-chief Miklós Bartha (1847–1905), one of
the most renowned and influential publicists of his time. His works exploring
the social and economic situation and the peculiar conditions in Carpathian
Ruthenia at that time became a volume and were published in a book the
very same year, at the end of 1901.17 His book was the first lasting work in
Hungary in the sociographic genre, a master work. Bartha consciously called
those people “Khazars” who were restricted in their commercial and financial
activities and forced by the authorities to leave the Austrian Empire’s adjacent
province of Galicia, and thus relocated to Carpathian Ruthenia en masse, and
mainly engaged in usury and innkeeping, in order to differentiate them from
the already integrated Jews promoting the growth of the Hungarian homeland.
Mainly as a result of the controversies concerning the so-called Khazar
question analysed above, the national press introduced and popularised the
macroregional concept Carpathian Ruthenia, which within a short period of
15 Botlik 2018, pp. 164–190, pp. 304–307.

16 Bihar 1901, p. 47.
17 Bartha 1901, p. 328.
48
time was fixed in public opinion as an umbrella term for Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa
and Máramaros Counties. All of this originated primarily from the continuous,
outrageous attacks in the liberal press against Ede Egán and the state’s rural
development activity in Carpathian Ruthenia. While the reality was the
following: “To abolish both the Khazars’ privileges and the Ruthenians’ servitude:
that is the aim of the mountain-region campaign,” wrote Bartha. “This will be
the harmonious settlement of rights and obligations. Restraining those who are
too strong, and supporting the weak. […] The mountain-region campaign is
not an anti-Semitic movement. No Jews shall experience any illegality, injustice
or unfairness. No concrete complaint could be lodged against Egán. Prior to
writing these lines [November 1901], 376 newspaper announcements were
published against him. But there is not a single letter in this fuss that contains
a specific charge.”18 The aforementioned book by Bartha entitled ‘On Khazar
land’ was published shortly after the assassination of Egán on 20 September
1901, dedicated to his memory. Under the ministerial leadership of József Kazy
(1856–1923), the mountain-region campaign continued.19
At the turn of the 20th century, this is how the umbrella term Carpathian
Ruthenia was established under these difficult circumstances, denoting Ung,
Bereg, Ugocsa and Máramaros Counties, and thereby creating a new macro-
region that existed until the end of 1918. It covered an area of 17,945 km2, and
had a population of 848,428 people according to the 1910 census, of which
356,067 spoke Ruthenian (41.96%) as their mother tongue, 267,091 Hungarian
(31.48%), and the rest Oláh (Romanian), German and Tót (Slovak). At the time,
128,791 (19.88%) Jews were recorded, which meant that every fifth inhabitant
was Jewish in the operating core area of the mountain-region economic
campaign. In fact, however, there may have been many thousand more, because
– disregarding their religious affiliation – many of them reported that they were
Hungarians or Germans.20
18 Bartha 1901, p. 323 [emphasis added by B. J.].

19 The Hungarian state spent a huge amount, 34,280,693 koronas, on Subcarpathian rural
development between 1897 and 1918, while only 848,676 koronas of taxes and duties were
collected in the counties concerned.
20 At the time of the 1910 census, 128,791 Jews lived in Carpathian Ruthenia, a total of 80,631
49
It must be stated here that in addition to the new Carpathian Ruthenia

macroregional expression, the use of the name Felvidék [in English: Upper
Hungary, literally: high region] was also natural in the early 20th century in this
region. As a geographical, historical and ethnographic expression, it was preceded
by the term Felföld [in English: Highlands, literally: high land], which was used
as an antonym for the Great Plain from the 16th century. Before the early 19th
century, the Hungarian terms Felföld (“Highlands”) and Felső-Magyarország
(“Upper, northern parts of Royal Hungary”) were interchangeable, but referred
to a wider region than the contemporary Felvidék (“Upper Hungary”), which only
encompassed former lands of Royal Hungary now found in modern-day Slovakia.
Even though Felvidék was originally used as a term of literary theory and cultural
geography, it replaced the former two terms. Naturally, Upper Hungary did not
encompass the Kisalföld region, the lowland region north of the Danube, which
includes the completely Hungarian-populated Csallóköz [in Slovakian: Žitný
ostrov] and Mátyusföld [in Slovakian: Matúšova zem]. In their joint work, the
two renowned geographers, Béla Bulla (1906–1962), member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, and Tibor Mendöl (1905–1966) divide Upper Hungary into
two parts. North-western Upper Hungary reaches from the Devín Gate over the
Little Carpathians to the former Sáros County, the source of the Ondava. North-
eastern Upper Hungary extends from around the Zboró (today: Zborov, Slovakia)
Pass to the Borsa (today: Prislop, Romania) Canyon in the upper south-eastern
corner of the former Máramaros County.21 Leaders, deputies and competent
experts of Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa and Máramaros Counties concerned by these
important questions quite naturally also participated at the emigration congress of
Upper Hungary held between 31 May and 1 June 1902 in Miskolc.22
On 25 December 1918, the Károlyi government published People’s Act X
of 21 December 1918 on the autonomy of Rusyn people living in Hungary in the
in the neighbouring Szatmár, Szabolcs and Zemplén Counties, 19,798 in Sáros and Szepes
Counties, i.e. a grand total of 236,414, which was more than twice as many compared to
30 years before. The 1910 census of the countries of the Hungarian Holy Crown. Vol. VI.
Issued by the Hungarian Royal Central Statistical Office, Budapest, 1920, pp. 114, 116.
21 Bulla & Mendöl 1947, pp. 381, 444.
22 National Hungarian Economic Federation, 1902.
50
National Law Archive, in respect of the Carpathian Ruthenia macro-region.23

The legislation provided Ruthenian people with a right of self-determination
regarding home affairs, justice, public education, community culture, religious
practice and language use, and set forth that from the main parts of Máramaros,
Ugocsa, Bereg and Ung Counties of the Hungarian People’s Republic populated
by Ruthenians, “an autonomous legal area (governorate) shall be established
under the name of Ruszka-Krajna (‘Руська Краина’, [in English: Ruthenian
Province])”. People’s Act X dated 21 December [!] was also published in Rusyn
(Ruthenian) with the signature of Government Members, under the title of
‘Hародный законъ числа 10. про самоуправу руського народу живущого на
Угорщини’.24 With this, Carpathian Ruthenia as a macroregion ceased to exist.
Implementation of People’s Act X of 1918 began in the first days of January
1919 and continued even after the proclamation of the Soviet Republic on 21
March in a legal area called the Ruthenian Commissariat with Munkács as the
centre. The Rusyn local government was further developed by the Revolutionary
Governing Council on the basis of national self-determination as well. Yet, this
was only possible in a smaller part of the Ruszka-Krajna area designated under
the Károlyi government: from the Ung river east to the region of Máramaros
County north of the Tisza. Theoretically, the Revolutionary Governing Council
would have established the Ruszka-Krajna Governorate with an area of 20,130
km2 and 980,000 inhabitants in total. The new administrative and political unit
comprised the majority of the above four counties in Carpathian Ruthenia,
except for their regions populated by Hungarians; in addition to certain
districts of Zemplén and Sáros Counties, or a part of them where Rusyns lived.
It must be pointed out that in the spring of 1919 the latter areas, all of Sáros
County and the northern part of Zemplén County – as of 12 January, even
Ungvár – were under Czechoslovak occupation, while the southern part of
Máramaros County was under Romanian military occupation, and in early
23 MNL OL. Microfilm. 7052. no. box. title 8. item X. 24 December 1918. 6570/M. E. I. no.
document.
24 Narodnyj zakon čisla 10. pro samoupravu ruskogo narodu živuŝogo na Ugorŝini.
Subcarpathian Regional National Archives, Ungvár–Beregszász. Fond 59. opisz (item) 1.
odinicja zberihannya nomer (reference number) sztr. 1.(page)
51
January the Romanian army began to occupy the northern part of Máramaros
as well. Consequently, the Ruthenian Commissariat could only be established
in an area of about 9,700 km2 with approximately 460,000 inhabitants, and its
administration was only partially organised.25 The joint attack carried out by
the Czechoslovak and Romanian armies during the final days of April 1919
ended the merely 40-day rule of the Soviet Republic in Carpathian Ruthenia.
At the hearings held at the Paris Peace Conference between 7 June and
12 August 1919, the temporary western borders of Carpathian Ruthenia were
decided, which were, in the beginning, called demarcation lines. These “more
or less follow eastwards” along the railway track between Csap (today: Chop,
Ukraine) and Ungvár, “leaving Ungvár and its surroundings to Podkarpatská
Rus”, then run along the Ung river to the Uzsok (today: Uzhok, Ukraine) Pass,
i.e. the Polish national border.26 There were 32 municipalities in this more than
60 km long narrow zone, located along the Ung river designated as a separating
section, i.e. west of the temporary Podkarpatská Rus–Slovak regional border.
Therefore, these villages were incorporated into Slovakia, but their public
administration was managed from Ungvár.27 At the same time, the demarcation
line south of Ung County crossed the railway track at some point between
Csap and Ungvár, and the three villages located on its eastern side (Kisrát
and Nagyrát and Tiszaásvány (today: Rativtsi and Tysaashvan, Ukraine) were
also incorporated into Slovakia, with their public administration belonging to
Bratislava.28
The Podkarpatská Rus created at the time, i.e. the restricted territory of
Carpathian Ruthenia, became under international law an integral part of the
artificial state that had never existed before, but had been created at the time as
25 Pinczés 1999, p. 11.

26 Král 1924, p. 3.
27 Statistický lexikon obcí v Podkarpatské Rusi (1928). Nákladem Státního Úřadu Statistického,
V Praze. p. 31.
28 Their population according to the 1910 census: Kisrát 599, Nagyrát 606 and Tiszaásvány
404, for a total of 1,609 persons, of which 1,591 were Hungarians (98.88%). Public
Administration Atlas of Hungary 1914. Countries of the Hungarian Holy Crown. 2000. pp.
125, 139, 161.
52
part of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye on the recognition of the independence

of Czechoslovakia and the protection of minority peoples signed on 10 September
1919. In Articles 10–13 of Chapter II of the Treaty, Czechoslovakia obligated
itself to “organise the territory of Ruthenians living south of the Carpathians
in the form of such an autonomous entity that has a most extensive local
government compatible with the entity of the Czechoslovak State”. Its elected
representatives were to participate in the Czechoslovak parliament’s work, and
“officials of the Ruthenian area will be selected from inhabitants of this area
as far as possible”.29 Despite its international obligation and domestic political
promises later made on several occasions, the Czechoslovak government
delayed the implementation of Subcarpathian autonomy for almost two decades.
We assume that the main reason behind this was that if Prague honoured its
obligation as early as the beginning of 1920s, Slovakia should also have been
granted the right of local governance as expected. In light of the Slovak national
movement’s efforts at the time, this would have resulted in the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia by the end of the decade.
The Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye incorporated more than
two thirds (70.7%) of the Carpathian Ruthenia macro-region (17,945 km2),
a total of 12,694 km2 with 606,568 inhabitants, into Czechoslovakia, thereby
modifying the territory of Carpathian Ruthenia for the first time.30 Of course,
the Treaty did not mention the ethnographic line or its inhabitants at the foot
of the Carpathians at the north-eastern border of the Hungarian Great Plain –
the Ung Plain, the Beregi-Tiszahát region and the Ugocsa Plain – which was
essentially populated exclusively by Hungarians.
Few are aware that the capital of Máramaros County, Máramarossziget
(today: Sighetu Marmației, Romania),31 would have been incorporated into
Czechoslovakia by a decision made at the Paris Peace Conference, in order to
29 Halmosy 1983, pp. 89–93.

30 Král 1924, pp. 10–11.
31 According to the 1910 census, the population of Máramarossziget: 21,370 persons, of
which 17,542 Hungarians (80.7%), 1,257 Germans (5.9%), 2,001 Romanians (9.3%). Public
Administration Atlas of Hungary 1914. Countries of the Hungarian Holy Crown. 2000, p.
133.
53
prevent the country’s border from crossing the Csap–Beregszász–Nagyszőllős–

Huszt–Máramarossziget–Rahó–Kőrösmező railway line at two places, around
Taracköz (today: Teresva, Ukraine) and then at the Visóvölgy (today: Valea
Vișeului, Romania) stop. In June 1920, the Czechoslovak government granted
Romania the 10 municipalities located along this railway line, together with the
railway stations, “as evidence and guarantee of good friendship and neighbourly
relations”.32
The newly created territory of Carpathian Ruthenia was not yet fixed,
because Czechoslovakia and Romania were unable to agree on the final
establishment of the national border for years. This was only determined on
4 May 1921, when a correction was also made. According to Jiří Král, Czech
geographer, all of this ended in “a few but relatively drastic changes to the
Czechoslovak borders”.33 The valley of the Tarna stream in Ugocsa County, rich
in coal and minerals, and four surrounding municipalities had to be handed
over to Romania: Avaspatak , Bocskó, Nagytarna and Ugocsakomlós (today:
Valea Seacă, Bocicău, Tarna Mare, Comlăușa, all in Romania).34 In addition,
Czechoslovakia also handed over the glassworks operating at the site in
Ferencvölgy (today: Valea lui Francisc, Romania) below Técső (today: Tiachiv,
Romania), a former Hungarian crown city in Máramaros County.
Romania, however, had to provide compensation for Czechoslovakia’s
territorial losses. Therefore, in return, the “totally insignificant” western and
north-western land between the Batár and Túr (today: Batar and Tur) rivers
in Ugocsa County,35 which was occupied by Romanian troops around 25 April
32 Beneš 1996, p. 35 – The locations concerned: Hosszúmező, Szarvaszó, Máramarossziget,

Szigetkamara, Tiszaveresmart, Tiszakarácsonyfalva, Bocskó, Tiszalonka, Erdészvölgy and
Visóvölgy (today: Câmpulung la Tisa, Sarasău, Sighetu Marmației, Camara Sighet, Tisa
[until 1964: Virișmort], Crăciunești, Bocicău, Lunca la Tisa, Kuzij and Valea Vișeului, all in
Romania).
33 Král 1924, p. 7.
34 Their total population in 1910: 4,275 persons, of which 980 Hungarians (22.9%), the
majority of which, 881 persons, were citizens of Nagytarna, and constituted a relative
majority (45.6%) against the Romanian and Rusyn communities. Public Administration
Atlas of Hungary 1914. Countries of the Hungarian Holy Crown. 2000. pp. 93, 97, 140, 163.
35 Král 1924, pp. 8, 10, 51, Statistický lexikon obcí v Podkarpatské Rusi 1928. VIII.
54
1919, was incorporated into Carpathian Ruthenia. The village of Halmi (today:
Halmeu, Romania), the Transtisza capital of the Ugocsa district, however, still
remained under Romanian jurisdiction, although three Hungarian villages
in its neighbourhood were incorporated into Czechoslovakia. Two of these
were located in Ugocsa: Akli and Fertősalmás (today: Okli and Fertešolmaš,
Ukraine), as well as Nagypalád (today: Velyka Palad, Ukraine) in what had
been Szatmár County: with a total of 2,851 inhabitants, of which 2,792 spoke
Hungarian as their mother tongue (97.9%).36
As a result of the Czechoslovak–Romanian territory exchanges, the territory
of Podkarpatská Rus decreased from 12,694 km2 to 12,653 km2, i.e. by 41 km2,
and its population to 581,059 persons.37 Thus, the territory of Carpathian
Ruthenia was modified for the second time, remaining unchanged for about two
decades.
Meanwhile, the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye signed on 10
September 1919 only mentioned “the territory of Ruthenians living south
of the Carpathians”, and there was nothing about the new Czech name
of Carpathian Ruthenia. Only six months later, the constitution entitled
the Czechoslovak Republic Bill of Rights38 adopted by the Parliament on 29
February 1920, announced and entering into force on 6 March in Issue 121 of
the compendium of laws and regulations, contained the new Czech name of
Carpathian Ruthenia, Podkarpatská Rus, for the first time officially, and for the
second time in the form of Rusínsko. The two official Czech concepts very soon
became widespread thanks to the authorities. The second Czech expression
for Carpathian Ruthenia, Rusínsko, was created following the example of the
Slovensko name. Soon it also became known as Ruszinszkó in a “Hungarianised”
form, which was included in the name of numerous Subcarpathian Hungarian,
Rusyn and other parties, associations and even newspapers from the beginning
36 The population of Halmi according to the 1910 census: 3,455 persons, of which 3,371
Hungarians (97.6%), 51 Germans. Public Administration Atlas of Hungary 1914. Countries
of the Hungarian Holy Crown. 2000. pp. 89, 110, 114, 139.
37 Král 1924, p. 7.
38 Official Hungarian publication: Czechoslovak Republic Bill of Rights. National Publishing
Office, in Prague, 1923, 31 pages.
55
of the 1920s.39 Between the two World Wars, Carpathian Ruthenia was referred
to in Hungary as Ruszinszkó, while Upper Hungary was known as Szlovenszkó
at the time around the Treaty of Trianon.40
It is evident that the above Czech Podkarpatská expression officially
appearing in 1920 is in fact the word-for-word translation of the Hungarian
Kárpátalja [literally: Subcarpathia, meaning Carpathian Ruthenia] concept.
This is a fact, since the Carpathian Ruthenia geographical name already existed
several decades earlier, as discussed earlier in this paper. This means that it does
not reflect reality what some people have been saying for a long time, and even
today, i.e. that the Hungarian name ‘Kárpátalja’ is a mirror translation of the
Czech expression ‘Podkarpatská’ – which is nonsense. This can be traced back
to the early 1930s. The originator was Ivan Olbracht (1882–1952), Czech writer
and one of the founding members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,
who visited Carpathian Ruthenia on several occasions between 1931 and 1936, a
territory always depicted by the Czechoslovak national propaganda as a success
area of the country. It is a credit to Olbracht that in his sociographic writing he
revealed the true situation of the region, in particular the extreme poverty that
afflicted the Rusyn people, thus attracting the attention of everyone.41 Following
one of his – perhaps most famous – writings entitled ‘Země beze jména’ [‘The
nameless land’] published in 1931, the unrealistic and misleading story about
the occurrence of the Podkarpatská Rus expression spread, claiming that the
Hungarian ‘Kárpátalja’ [literally: Subcarpathia] concept was a word-for-word
translation of the Czech ‘Podkarpatská’.42
39 For example: Ruszinszkó Hungarian Party, Ruszinszkó Hungarian Newspaper, Ruszinszkó

Lawyers Association, Ruszinszkó Beekeepers Association.
40 Following the Treaty of Trianon, the concept of Upper Hungary changed, meaning every
former Hungarian municipality incorporated into Czechoslovakia from Bratislava to the
Ung river. At the same time, the country part also meant Slovakia, including the already
detached lands mainly populated by Hungarians from Csallóköz to the western part of the
Ung Plain.
41 Király 1984, p. 624 – Under the very same title ‘The nameless land’, Olbracht also published
his poignant Subcarpathian reports collected in a volume in 1932.
42 Reissue: Olbracht 1956, p. 63.
56
With the First Vienna Award on 2 November 1938, the southern part of
Carpathian Ruthenia populated by Hungarians was reunited with Hungary,
and this was then considered to be the easternmost part of Upper Hungary. This
was clearly stipulated by Act XXXIV of 1938 on reuniting Upper Hungary areas
annexed to the Hungarian Holy Crown with Hungary, adopted on 4 November.43
The legislation re-established Ung, Bereg and Ugocsa Counties with their
returned historical territory, which were temporarily united in terms of public
administration.44 This southern Subcarpathian, Great Plain-like region – the
Ung Plain south-east of the Ung river, the Beregi-Tiszahát region and the
Ugocsa Plain – was considered by contemporary Hungarian public opinion to
belong to Upper Hungary, up until the Soviet military occupation in November
1944.45
In the meantime, on 2 November 1938, the territory of Podkarpatská
“below the Czechs”, and thus the territory of Carpathian Ruthenia changed for
the third time, meaning from then on the mountainous part mainly populated
by Rusyns only. The size of Podkarpatská Rus decreased to 11,094 km2; shortly
before this, the Czechoslovak government had introduced governmental
autonomy on 11 October 1938, retaining the territory as an integral part of
Czechoslovakia. András Bródy (1895–1946), a politician with dual Hungarian–
Rusyn identity, was appointed as Prime Minister, who proposed a referendum
on which nation would have sovereignty over the mountainous Carpathian
Ruthenia at the Council of Ministers on 25 October in Prague. As a result,
the following day he was arrested and imprisoned on formal charges of “high
43 National Law Archive, 13 November 1938 (Issue 18) p. 532.

44 According to the census held on 15 December 1938, the geographical expansion of the
two new counties together with the three cities – Ungvár, Munkács, Beregszász – and
133 villages was 2,023 km2 in total. They had a population of 276,041 persons, of which
236,046 were Hungarians (85.5%), 25,124 Ruthenians/Rusyns (9.1%), the rest spoke other
languages as their mother tongue. Thirring 1939, pp. 456, 461, 474–475, 479, 487.
45 The northern part of Ugocsa, Nagyszőllős and its environs, was part of the mountainous
Carpathian Ruthenia until its return in mid-March 1939. Its south-eastern region (319
km2) remained under Romanian rule until the Second Vienna Award on 30 August 1940
when it was reunited with Hungary, together with northern Transylvania. The government
then re-established the historically independent Ugocsa County.
57
treason”. Ágoston Volosin (Avgustyn Voloshyn, 1874–1945) of Hungarian–

Rusyn origin, a Greek Catholic priest, became the head of the government, who
developed a Ukrainian-oriented political system instead of a Rusyn-oriented
one by dictatorial means. Gradually disengaging from Prague, he strived to
transform the Podkarpatská Rus province with the capital Huszt (today:
Khust, Ukraine) into an independent state and arbitrarily changed its name to
Carpatho-Ukraine (‘Карпатська Україна’, ’Karpats’ka Ukrayina’).46
After Jozef Tiso (until 1918 József Tisó, 1887–1947), Prime Minister of the
Slovak Autonomous Region, declared the formation of an independent Slovakia
on 14 March 1939, Avgustyn Voloshyn, Head of Government, also announced
the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine in his radio speech the same evening.
The following day, on the afternoon of 15 March, the national assembly, the Soim,
was held for the first (and last) time, and elected Avgustyn Voloshyn as President.
It then declared by law the independence of the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine,
headed by the President with Ukrainian as the official language. After that,
Avgustyn Voloshyn escaped from the advancing Hungarian troops to Romania,
and his system remained in place for only four and a half months.
Meanwhile, between 15 and 17 March 1939, the Royal Hungarian Army
liberated mountainous Carpathian Ruthenia in the course of three days and
reunited it with Hungary.47 Since the Czechoslovak government did not draw the
western boundary of Podkarpatská Rus for two decades, despite demands from
Rusyn and Slovak politicians, provincial border fortifications entirely unsuitable
for a national border closed off the Subcarpathian region which was returned to
Hungary. The railway was in the direct vicinity of the demarcation line from Ungvár
to the Uzsok Pass, with the nearby hills and mountainsides mostly belonging to
Slovakia. In order to eliminate border uncertainties and secure the line, the Royal
Hungarian Army launched an attack westward on the morning of 23 March. The
following day, after a roughly 20-km-wide and 60-km-long advance the forces
46 According to the census in February 1939, the population of Carpatho-Ukraine was

552,124 persons, of which 413,481 were Ukrainians (75.9%), 25,894 Hungarians (4.8%), the
rest Jews, Czechs and Slovaks, Romanians and other nationalities. The data of the census
held in a climate of terror were distorted, the true population of Hungarians was 40,000.
47 Botlik 2005, pp. 261–259, 321–332.
58
stopped as the territory occupied by then (1,056 km2, with 74 villages) was sufficient
to securely hold the railway line and the public road between the valley of the Ung
and Ungvár and the Uzsok Pass. As part of the operations in March and April
1939, Subcarpathian territory of 12,141 km2 in total, with 464 villages, including
the city of Huszt, was reunited with Hungary.48 That is how the fourth change in
the territory of Carpathian Ruthenia occurred. In the coming months the use of
the expression was uncertain: Kárpátalja [Subcarpathia], Ruténföld [Ruthenian
Land], Podkarpatska [Podkarpatsko], Ruszinszkó [Rusinsko], Ruszinföld [Rusyn
Land], and even Hungarian Ruszinszkó were used by Hungarian authorities and
the media. Finally, Kárpátalja [Subcarpathia] and Ruténföld [Ruthenian Land]
stuck. In the beginning, the majority of the inhabitants of the returned region
were named Hungarian–Russian people as before, from the turn of 1939–1940
the endonym of the people, Rusyn [Ruthenian], spread, and in the spring and
early summer of 1940 the Latin rutén [Ruthenian] name used from the 13th
century once again stuck.
As a natural result of the operations in the mountainous part of Carpathian
Ruthenia that was reunited with Hungary, military control was introduced, which
was replaced by national public administration on 7 July 1939. Section 6 of Act
VI of 1939 on reuniting the Subcarpathian areas returned to the Hungarian Holy
Crown with Hungary ordered the Prime Minister to “propose a separate act on
the regulation of the local government of Carpathian Ruthenia to the national
assembly”.49 On 22 June, the day the act was adopted, Government Decree No.
6200/1939 on the temporary organisation of the public administration of the
Subcarpathian areas returned to the Hungarian Holy Crown was published.50
Based on this decision, the Subcarpathian Governing Commissariat (after the
border modifications: its territory was 12,146 km2, its population 671,512
persons) with the capital Ungvár was established on 7 July 1939, which was
governed by governors appointed by Miklós Horthy (1868–1957), Head of State.
This position was first occupied by Baron Zsigmond Perényi (1870–1946), and
48 Thirring 1939, pp. 199–200, 236–237.

49 National Law Archive, 23 June 1939 (Issue 6). See also: MNL OL K 774–1939, pp. 55–57.
50 Domestic Gazette, 8 July 1939 (Issue 30) pp. 769–773.
59
then by Miklós Kozma (originally Lázár, 1884–1941) and Vilmos Pál Tomcsányi
(1880–1959).
The territory under the jurisdiction of the Subcarpathian Governing
Commissariat was divided into three units: Ung, Bereg and Máramaros
Administrative Offices, with headquarters in Ungvár, Munkács and Huszt.51 Their
public and specialised administration differed completely from the governance
of Ung County established after the First Vienna Award in the southern flatland
region of Carpathian Ruthenia and that of Bereg and Ugocsa Counties which
were temporarily united in terms of public administration. In the territory of
the governing commissariat, bilingual – Hungarian and Ruthenian – official
administration by the authorities (signs of printed materials, circular stamps,
postal services, public institutions, public roads and railway stations, etc.) and
free use of language were general. Furthermore, the Ruthenian language was
taught from elementary schools to university level (available at the Budapest
University), in addition to a wide range of opportunities for native-language
public education. Bilingualism was served by the Subcarpathian Scientific
Society of Ungvár founded on 26 January 1941 in Ungvár – Подкарпатское
Общество Наук, Унгваръ, the “Rusyn Academy” – which brought together
scientists, researchers and artists of Ruthenian origin, whilst also publishing
Ruthenian books, journals and newspapers.52
Meanwhile, with objectives similar to those from four decades earlier,
in July 1939 the Hungarian government relaunched the mountain-region
campaign led by the martyr Egán, for the purpose of economic, educational
and social advancement of the Rusyns. Count Pál Teleki (1879–1941), Prime
Minister, proposed an act on the local government of Carpathian Ruthenia on
23 July 1940 in the Parliament, which he later withdrew on 5 August due to
the very strained relations between Hungarians and Romanians. Supplemented
by further legislation on administration, the above Government Decree No.
6200/1939 establishing Hungarian–Ruthenian bilingualism, however, remained
51 Benisch 1941, pp. 73–74.

52 Botlik 2005, pp. 352–360. – About the elements of Bilingualism and the Subcarpathian
Scientific Society; Idem, 2005, pp. 9–58.
60
in effect until the Soviet military occupation of Carpathian Ruthenia at the

end of October 1944. The communist dictatorship immediately did away with
bilingualism and even ruined the results of the mountain-region campaign.
Pursuant to the Moscow Agreement signed on 29 June 1945 by the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia, mountainous Carpathian Ruthenia together with
the Ung, Beregi-Tiszahát and Ugocsa flatlands populated by Hungarians were
permanently occupied by the Soviet Union,53 thereby changing its territory for the
fifth time in twenty-five years. Its size increased to 12,800 km2 after the Soviet–
Czechoslovak national border was defined. At the time, the approximately 60
km long and 10–15 km wide region west of the Ung river and north of Ungvár to
the Uzsok Pass was incorporated into the Soviet empire up to the dividing line
between the Podkarpatská Rus and Slovak provinces between 1919 and 1938.
At the same time, the three villages (Kisrát, Nagyrát, Tiszaásvány) south of the
above region in the Ung Plain, east of the Ungvár–Csap railway line, as well
as 17 villages west of them,54 were also annexed to the Soviet Union, although
these municipalities belonged to Slovakia in terms of public administration
between 1919 and 1938, and were governed from Bratislava. According to the
1941 census, 20 villages mainly populated by Hungarians were located in the
Ung region detached and annexed to the Soviet Union. They had a total area of
17,938 hectares, i.e. 179,39 km2 and a population of 14,888 persons, of which
13,998 were Hungarians (94.02%), 467 Ruthenians (3.13%), 20 Germans and
402 spoke other native languages (2.70%).55
53 Botlik & Dupka 1991, p. 53 – Wording and minutes of the Soviet–Czechoslovak Agreement
on the annexation of Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union, pp. 148–150.
54 The 17 detached villages: Bátfa, Botfalva, Csap, Gálocs, Ketergény, [Kincses] Homok,
Kisszelmenc, Kistéglás, Koncháza, Minaj, Őrdarma, Palágykomoróc, Palló, Sislóc, Szürte,
Tiszasalamon, Ungtarnóc (today: Batfa, Botfalva, Chop, Haloch, Rozivka, Kholmok, Mali
Selmentsi, Tijglas, Koncovo, Mynai, Storozhnytsya, Palad’ Komarivtsi, Pallo, Sislivci, Siurte,
Solomonovo, Tarnivci, all in Ukraine). The most populous of them was the village of Csap
on the Tisza river with 3,498 inhabitants, of which 3,416 were Hungarians (97.65%), 26
Ruthenians, 13 Germans and 43 classified as ‘other’.
55 Statistický lexikon obcí v Podkarpatské Rusi 1928, pp. 26–27, 31; Statistický lexikon obcí
na Slovensku. Štátný úrad statistický, V Praha 1927, pp. 128–131; Statistický lexikon obcí v
zemi Podkarpatské. Nákladem “Orbis”, V Praze 1937, pp. 22–23; Kepecs 1996, pp. 105–106,
112–115.
61
After the renewed separation of Carpathian Ruthenia from Hungary,

from October 1944, the Hungarian translation of the very similar Russian
and Ukrainian name of the region, Kárpátontúl [literally: Transcarpathia]
was not adopted in the Hungarian language. There is reason to believe that
it was a difference in approach, since the newly conquered “Soviet” territory,
when looked at from Moscow or Kiev, was indeed “beyond” the Carpathians,
whereas in Hungary it was “hither”, that is, Subcarpathia. It follows that in
the mother country the more appropriate Carpatho-Ukraine or Carpathian
Ukraine spread instead of Kárpátontúl, while it was essentially the same as
the Carpatho-Ukraine country part name arbitrarily introduced by Avgustyn
Voloshyn, Prime Minister of Podkarpatská Rus, at the turn of 1938–1939.56
Likewise, the Carpathian Ukraine expression was used by the communists at
the turn of 1944–1945 in their requests and newspapers sent to Moscow and
Ungvár, who applied for the annexation of South Máramaros to Carpathian
Ukraine, and thus to Soviet Ukraine. The relevant decision was made on 27
January 1945 in Máramarossziget “at an extraordinary meeting unanimously
with enthusiasm”.57
The high command of the Soviet Union originally planned the line of the
Tisza to be a Soviet–Hungarian national border, i.e. it aimed to annex the so-
called Csonka-Bereg region (459 km2). In a serious breach of the Armistice
Agreement with Hungary signed on 20 January 1945 in Moscow,58 with the
knowledge of Marshal Ivan S. Konev (1897–1973), occupying Soviet troops
stationed in the region and Subcarpathian Ukrainian armed forces launched
an attack on the morning of 16 August to detach Csonka-Bereg, i.e. 25 villages
56 Avgustyn Voloshyn was arrested as a fascist leader by retaliatory Soviet troops, the
SMERSH (СМЕРШ) in May 1945 in Prague. He was taken to Moscow, where he died in
July in Butyrka prison on remand. Voloshyn, who was stigmatised for decades, and the
“state” of Carpatho-Ukraine were rehabilitated by the independent Ukraine, recognising it
as its historical antecedent and celebrating its anniversaries. Voloshyn was given the Order
of State in 2002, and posthumously awarded the title of “Hero of Ukraine”.
57 The National Democratic Front unanimously joined Soviet Ukraine. A Nép [literally: The
People]. Democratic journal. Máramarossziget, 28 January 1945 (Issue 6) 1.
58 The Agreement ordered Hungary back beyond the frontiers of Trianon on 31 December
1937.
62
of the Vásárosnamény district. Their units arriving with trucks disarmed the
Hungarian border guards and police in a surprise attack, cut off the telephone
communications and occupied the line of the Tisza. Threatening to execute them,
their commanders forced officials of the villages to apply for the annexation
of their villages to Carpatho-Ukraine and the Soviet Union. In the meantime,
their soldiers raided and caused substantial damages to the movable property,
cereals and animals of inhabitants. In order to intimidate, the retaliatory troops
of the NKVD and the SMERSH deported men aged 18 to 55 from this region as
well – about two thousand people – to the detention camp in Szolyva and from
there to gulags, where the majority died.
Dr István Balogh (1912–2007), lord-lieutenant [Hungarian: főispán] of
Szatmár, Bereg and Ugocsa Counties temporarily united in terms of public
administration, reported to Ferenc Erdei (1910–1971), Minister of the Interior
in the Interim National Government, on the above circumstances of the
illegitimate occupation of Csonka-Bereg between 16 and 28 August 1945 in his
monthly report dated 13 September 1945 in Mátészalka.59 Government leaders
with Hungarian sentiments managed to convince the English and American
members of the Allied Control Commission in Budapest (which had a Soviet
majority) to countermand Soviet Ukrainian troops and their occupying
administration bodies from the Csonka-Bereg villages. In the archives of the
NKVD, 1944–1945 variants of the “Great Carpatho-Ukraine” maps can be
found, on which the majority of the Ung region, Felső-Bodrogköz, Csonka-
Bereg and Túrhát (the neighbourhood of Tiszabecs and the Halmi district) are
already indicated as components of the Soviet empire.60
The above Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement was approved by the
Czechoslovak national assembly on 23 November 1945, and then on 27
November by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The agreement
59 Monthly report by Lord-Lieutenant István Balogh, 13 September 1945. MNL Szabolcs-

Szatmár-Bereg County Archives (Nyíregyháza), XXI. 101/C. Documents by the
Lord-Lieutenant of Szatmár-Bereg County. Documents by public service government
commissioner. (Settlement of public administration borders, official operations.) Ref. no.:
5002/eln., ad 40/1945. eln. no. 1–2.
60 Botlik 2019, pp. 63–73. Attached map: Planned borders of Great Subcarpathia.
63
only entered into force on 30 January 1946, when official documents were
exchanged in Prague. Eight days earlier the above Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet established Zakarpattia Oblast [literally: Transcarpathian region] with
the administrative centre of Ungvár in Decree No. 218 dated 22 January 1946
in Moscow; in the original document with the Russian name Закарпатськaя
область (Zakarpats’ka oblast’). As cited: “It is to be approved that Zakarpattia
Oblast be established with the administrative centre of Ungvár as proposed by
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.”61
Two days later, on 24 January 1946, Decree No. 219 by the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR was published in Kiev, with the following
text: “From 25 January 1946, the legislation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic shall be introduced in Zakarpattia Oblast” (in the original Ukrainian
legislation: Закарпатськa область, (‘Zakarpatszka oblaszty’). The latter
ukase (legislative decree) was required because Transcarpathian Ukraine (i.e.
Subcarpathia; Закарпатська Україна, ЗУ; Zakarpatská Ukrajina, ZU) – which
was dependant on the supreme leadership and national government of Moscow
but locally independent – was essentially operating as an autonomous state
and Soviet republic with the administrative centre of Ungvár. Its government,
Народна Рада (‘Narodna Rada’), i.e. National Council,62 and various central
authorities operated from their establishment on 27 November 1944 for more
than a year (14 months) until 24 January 1946. Meanwhile, in Subcarpathia,
the laws of the Soviet Union were in effect, meaning that it did not belong to
the Ukrainian republic with the administrative centre of Kiev at all, although
today’s Ukrainian historiography tries to confirm this with no basis whatsoever.
The then autonomous state nature of Carpathian Ruthenia is also confirmed
by the fact that one week before the establishment of the National Council, on
19 November 1944, the Communist Party of Zakarpattia Ukraine (CPZU) and
its Central Committee (CC, ‘Комуністична Партія Закарпатської України
Центральний Комітет’, abbreviated in Ukrainian as: КПЗУ ЦК) were
61 Bibikov & Kovács 1970, pp. 2–3, 28 – Oblast [region, its English equivalent is province].
62 In the contemporary Hungarian media ‘Néptanács’ [literally: People’s Council] or
‘Kárpátontúli Néptanács’ [literally: Transcarpathian People’s Council].
64
established in Munkács for the transfer of power.63 The first secretary of the
CPZU CC was János Turjanica, born in Bereg County (later: Ivan Ivanovich,
1901–1905).64 According to the practice in the Soviet Union, the positions of
the leader of the Communist Party and the president of the executive power, the
national council (government), in Carpathian Ruthenia were also held by the
same person, Ivan Turjanica. Shortly after Zakarpattia Oblast (i.e. Carpathian
Ruthenia) was annexed on 25 January 1946 to Ukraine and transferred into
the newest province of the state, its executive, public administration and
services operations organs were eliminated. Its own postal services – Пошта
Закарпатська Україна (‘Posta Zakarpatská Ukrajina’) – that were set up by
the National Council on 3 January 1945 were also terminated.65 The CPZU
in Carpathian Ruthenia was incorporated into the Communist [Bolshevik]
Party of Ukraine; Ivan Turjanica held the position of the first secretary of the
Subcarpathian regional committee of the C(B)PU. The Ukrainian regime tried
to introduce the Transcarpathia expression, which was officially successful, but
it mainly also used Carpatho-Ukraine by necessity.
It is important to note that after the Soviet military occupation in October
1944, Russian was introduced as an official language in Carpathian Ruthenia.
Following that, Ukrainian could only serve as a secondary language, even after
Carpathian Ruthenia was annexed as an independent region (province) to
Ukraine on 25 January 1946. This status was held in the Soviet era for more
than four decades. It only changed on 16 July 1990 when the Supreme Council
of Ukraine (Верховна Рада, ‘Verkhovna Rada’), i.e. the Parliament, declared
partial independence of the country based on national self-determination and
63 Komunisticna Partija Zakarpatskoji Ukrajini Centralynij Komitet, abbreviated: KPZU

CK – In the contemporary local Hungarian Communist media: Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Zakarpattia Ukraine, abbreviated: CPZU CC.
64 János Turjanica, a former 1919 Hungarian Red Army soldier, worked as a chimneysweep
between 1921 and 1925 in Budapest.
65 The Transcarpathian Ukrainian Post overprinted the 103 types of stamps of the Hungarian
Royal Post with Cyrillic script, including famous series (Saint Margaret, Kossuth, Horthy,
Chain Bridge, Generals, etc.) that remained in circulation. The independent postal services
later also issued new stamps with Cyrillic script. Simády 1991, pp. 122, 124, 130, 133–136,
143–147, 150–151.
65
declared Ukrainian to be the official language. Until then Russian was taught at
Hungarian schools in Carpathian Ruthenia instead of Ukrainian.
In relation to the former, the official name of Carpathian Ruthenia
occupied by the Soviet army in October 1944 was Закарпатськaя область
(‘Zakarpatskaya oblasty’) in Russian, and Закарпатськa область (‘Zakarpatska
oblasty’) in Ukrainian, meaning Zakarpattia Oblast, or ‘Transcarpathian region’.
In addition, the abbreviated form of the two concepts soon spread as already
used in the Soviet Union, e.g. Закавказье (Zakavkaz’e), i.e. Transcaucasus, or
Забайкалье (Zabajkaľe), Transbajkal. Following that, Carpathian Ruthenia
was also called Закарпатье (‘Zakarpatye’) in Russian, and Закарпаття.
(‘Zakarpattya’) in Ukrainian, and both were used to denote Zakarpattia
Oblast in public life, in Russian and Ukrainian press and publications alike.66
In Hungarian, it appeared in the Hungarianised form of Zakarpatye, then
Zakarpattya.
In Hungary after the second World War, especially after 1948, the
Communist regime spread the expressions Carpathian Ukraine and Carpatho-
Ukraine in public opinion instead of Subcarpathia, and made them obligatory
in official publications, while the press also advocated for them.
In addition, Transcarpathia and even the Soviet Subcarpathia concept were
occasionally used. Primarily it was not the fate of Hungarians living there
but the modestly evolving literary life that garnered press coverage in the
motherland: in Ungvár one or two poetry anthologies and prosaic anthologies
were published every year.67 Meanwhile, the existence of Carpathian Ruthenia
detached and annexed to the Soviet empire was regarded as a sensitive and even
burning political issue in both the Rákosi and Kádár eras.
After the defeated 1956 revolution and fight for freedom, in 1959 the
opening volume of the New Hungarian Lexicon was published after finishing
its editing in 1958. In volume 4 – which was finally compiled on the first day
66 Personal communications by Sándor Kovács, teacher, author of Carpathian Ruthenian

guidebooks, local historian, photographer (Budapest).
67 Tanuljunk a kárpátukrajnai kolhozparasztoktól. [Let’s learn from Carpatho-Ukrainian
kolkhoz farmers.] Mezőgazdasági Kiadó [Agricultural Publisher], Budapest, 1951, issue 46,
Kulcsár 1959, Krecsmáry 1967, pp. 35–41.
66
of April 1961 – the Subcarpathia concept was only indicated as an entry word
referencing the Carpatho-Ukraine article. Its name variants: Transcarpathian
region, [in Russia: Zakarpatskaja Ukraina. Its territory: 12,900 km2 (in most
sources: 12,800 km2), its population: 960,000 persons (1960), Ukrainians
(75%), Hungarians (16%), i.e. 153,600 persons.68
The relevant article of the official publication of the New Hungarian Lexicon
verified the Carpatho-Ukraine expression. In spite of that, the Subcarpathia
concept already appeared at the end of the 1960s in the title of certain literary
journals’ articles, sometimes alternating with Carpatho-Ukraine even in issues
of the same journal close to one another.69 Not only the Hungarian literature in
Carpathian Ruthenia, but also the minority fate of Hungarians living there was
pointed out by two authors living there, András S. Benedek (1947–2009) and
Vilmos Kovács (1927–1977), in their study published in late 1970 in Hungary.
By describing the historical background and the current situation, they first
tried to present the intellectual life of Subcarpathian Hungarians objectively.70
Their paper was re-published after 12 years in an academic publication, but
with the earlier politically charged title.71 Besides Subcarpathia, the “Carpatho-
Ukraine” concept was also used by the official historical chronology published
in 1982.72
It is remarkable that the two authors still published the following as late as
1982 regarding the work entitled Holnap is élünk [in English: We’ll still be alive
tomorrow] by Vilmos Kovács published in 1965. “The book entered the public
consciousness – citing Pál E. Fehér – as ‘the novel of Carpathian Ukrainian
Hungarians’.”73 While Pál E. Fehér (1936–2013), journalist, critic and deputy
68 Berei 1962, pp. 53, 54 – The history part of the article contains distorted data and even false
facts.
69 Sándor 1969, pp. 126–128; Margócsy 1969, pp. 65–68; Margócsy 1970, pp. 89–90.
70 Kovács & Benedek 1970, pp. 961–966; Part II, issue 12. pp. 1144–1150. – Their writing
caused a stir. Both authors were later reprimanded by Subcarpathian authorities and
dismissed from their jobs. Benedek moved to Budapest in 1976 and Kovács in 1977, who
died three weeks later from an incurable disease.
71 S. Benedek & Kovács 1982, pp. 159–174.
72 Benda 1982, pp. 1020, 1039, 1040, 1125, 1128.
73 S. Benedek & Kovács 1982, p. 166.
67
columnist of the cultural column in Népszabadság, the central party journal,

described in the title of his review published in the literary weekly newspaper:
“The novel of Subcarpathian Hungarians”.74 Ferenc Kiss (1928–1999), a
contemporary literary historian born in Pijterfolvo in Carpathian Ruthenia,
praised it a few weeks later in one of the best local journals as a “Carpatho-
Ukrainian” work of art.75
From the turn of the 1960–1970s, Hungarian public opinion looked at the
situation of the detached Hungarians living across the borders in minority with
increasing attention and worry. Around this time, the Kárpátalja (Subcarpathia)
expression stuck in the public consciousness, and the primarily politically
charged Carpatho-Ukraine concept almost completely diminished from the
turn of the 1980–1990s.
In the meantime, after 1945, the “triumphal progress” of the fairy tale of
Ivan Olbracht, one of the founders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,
also continued. Mainly Hungarian folklorists and historians spread these
misstatements over the past decades. At the forefront were authors László Kósa
and Antal Filep, who published in 1975 in one of the greatest studies of the
time: “The expression Kárpátalja (Subcarpathia) evolved when the territory
was annexed to Czechoslovakia pursuant to the Treaty of Trianon, where it
was governed as an independent public administration unit under the name
Podkarpatska Rus. Following the second World War, it became part of Soviet-
Ukraine as an independent administration unit under the name Zakarpatskaja
Oblasty.”76 The article also mentions the name variant “Carpathukraine”.
74 E. Fehér 1965, p. 4.
75 Kiss 1965, p. 896.
76 Kósa & Filep 1975, p. 127 – The correct name of the territory in Czech: Podkarpatská. In the
same article, a gross mistake: “One group of the Hungarian tribes entered the Carpathian
Basin in this region, through the valley of Ung (Verecke Pass)” (p. 125), As is known, the
Hungarians arrived in the Carpathian Basin through the Verecke Pass near the valley of
the Latorca (today: Latorica) river, and progressed towards Munkács. The book stated
incorrectly that the Verecke Pass is situated by the source of the Ung. The reality is that from
the Verecke Pass the source of the Ung and the Uzhok Pass are situated about 40 km far to
the northwest of the Carpathian Mountains. [The volume by the two authors was revised
by Iván Balassa (1917–2002).]
68
The highest-impact Hungarian propagator of the Olbracht type of legend

was Lajos Kiss, linguist; the first publication of his etymological dictionary was
published in 1978 for the fourth time after ten years. In the spirit of the times, the
name description of Subcarpathian municipalities included in his work begins:
“place in Carpatho-Ukraine (SU)”, i.e. in the Soviet Union. However, in the
“Kárpátalja” [Subcarpathia] article he cites the first paragraph of ‘The nameless
land’ by Ivan Olbracht, the Czech writer, from the volume re-published in 1956
in Czech77 as a major source: “The Hungarian Kárpátalja emerged through a
word-for-word translation based on the Czech Podkarpatsko, the Ukrainian
Subcarpathia, Пiдкарпаття (‘Pidkarpattya’).”78 Although Kiss stated the latter,
he contradicted himself in his article, because he also mentioned the Kárpát
allyai district from the Hübner Lexicon in 1817 and the weekly newspaper
entitled Kárpátalja published in 1889 in Munkács.
The legend originating from Olbracht has further been praised by the
Hungarian Ethnographic Lexicon educating generations of ethnographers. Its
Kárpátalja article reiterates the gross mistake by the Czech writer, even adding
another fault. As cited: “The expression Kárpátalja [Subcarpathia] evolved
when the territory was annexed to Czechoslovakia pursuant to the Treaty of
Trianon, where it was governed as an independent public administrative unit
under the name Podkarpatska Rus. The Hungarian translation of this expression
is Kárpátalja”79 (correctly: Podkarpatská).
It follows from the above that even today the Carpatho-Ukraine expression
– which for decades primarily made a political statement – can also be found in
use by certain Hungarian authors.
Meanwhile, Hungarians in Carpathian Ruthenia found themselves
within the framework of a new state, not without precedent, of course. At the
extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
77 Olbracht 1956, p. 63.

78 Kiss 1988, p. 693 –Lajos Kiss (1922–2003), senior staff of the Linguistic Institute of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (1957–1996), academician and retired scientific advisor
until his death. In some of his works he emphasised excessively the Slavic impact on the
origin of Hungarian geographical names.
79 Ortutay 1980, p. 84.
69
the Soviet Union (CC of the CPSU) on 11 March 1985, Mikhail S. Gorbachev
was elected as General Secretary, who then began to make radical changes to
the empire. He declared the policy of openness and transparency, i.e. ‘glasnost’
(‘гласность’), of politics and information, i.e. publicity, which meant the
lifting of the bans and restrictions so far. Another doctrine was ‘perestroika’
(‘перестройка’), i.e. restructuring, which was aimed at restructuring the
economy and society. Thanks to these policies, the Ukrainian national
movement gained strength, whose secession attempts were further facilitated
by the Chernobyl disaster on 26 April 1986 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Plant operating near the capital, Kiev.
In a milder political climate, on 26 February 1989, the first organisation
protecting the interests of Hungarians living under national repression,
the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia (CAHSC), was
founded in Ungvár, with president Sándor Fodó (1940–2005), linguist and
university teacher. At its general meeting held on 10 September in Munkács,
the Organisation adopted a decision on the establishment of a Hungarian
Autonomous District with the centre of Beregszász (today: Berehove, Ukraine).
During these days, on 8–10 September, the most significant opposition mass
organisation, the People’s Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction, the
Rukh (РУХ), was founded in Kiev, which played a major role in holding
multi-party elections in March 1990 in Ukraine. Following that, on 16 July,
the Supreme Council of Ukraine (Parliament) adopted a declaration on the
partial independence of Ukraine, and declared Ukrainian to be the official
language of the country. One year later, on 24 August 1991, following the
defeated coup attempt in Moscow, the Parliament in Kiev declared the full
independence of Ukraine.
In the referendum on the first day of December 1991, citizens of the country
approved the Supreme Council’s decision on national independence, and Leonid
Kravchuk was elected as President of the Republic. In Carpathian Ruthenia, at
the same time, the opinion of voters was also asked in two additional matters.
78% of the voters voted for the establishment of a local government of the
region (province) with a special status; while the vast majority, 81.4%, of the
Beregszász region voted for the establishment of a Hungarian Autonomous
70
District.80 The latter two initiatives have not been realised since then. The main
reason for that is that five days later, on 6 December, József Antall (1931–1993),
Prime Minister, signed the Hungarian–Ukrainian Treaty in Kiev, in which the
interests of Subcarpathian Hungarians were completely disregarded. Ukraine
implemented a patient minority policy against minorities making up about
half of the country’s population (mainly Russians, but also Poles, Hungarians,
Romanians, etc.) until 1995–1996. At that time the situation changed, and since
then Ukraine has built a nation state with outdated, currently unacceptable
19th-century instruments, focusing on suffocating national education and thus
incorporating minorities into the majority Ukrainian people.
In the meantime, separated Hungarians living in Ukraine still avoid the
politically-charged Transcarpathia expression and self-consciously use the
Subcarpathia expression. The geographical extent of their homeland has not
yet changed.
80 Botlik & Dupka 1993, p. 31.
71
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Belügyi Közlöny (1939). 8 July. 30. pp. 769–773.
A Csehszlovák Köztársaság Alkotmánylevele. (1923). National Publishing Office,
Prague, (Official Hungarian publication).
The 1910 census of the countries of the Hungarian Holy Crown. (1920). Vol. VI.
The Hungarian Royal Central Statistical Office. Budapest, pp. 114, 116.
Statistický lexikon obcí na Slovensku. (1927). Štátný úrad statistický. Praha.
Statistický lexikon obcí v Podkarpatské Rusi. (1928). Nákladem Státního Úřadu
Statistického, V Praze.
Statistický lexikon obcí v zemi Podkarpatské. (1937). Nákladem “Orbis”, V Praze.
Tanuljunk a kárpátukrajnai kolhozparasztoktól. (1951). Mezőgazdasági Kiadó.
Budapest.
Országos Törvénytár (Corpus Juris). (1938). 13 November (18).
Országos Törvénytár (Corpus Juris). (1939). 23 June (6).
76
T H E F I R S T V I E N N A AWA R D, T H E E N D G A M E : W H AT H A P P E N E D O N . . .
L Á S Z L Ó G U L YÁ S
THE FIRST VIENNA AWARD,

THE ENDGAME: WHAT HAPPENED
ON 2 NOVEMBER 1938
1. Introduction
The First Vienna Award was reached as the end result of a diplomatic process
which lasted several months. Even before the Munich Agreement, the leaders
of Hungarian foreign policy had been seeking to satisfy their demands for
revision concerning Upper Hungary with the help of international diplomacy.
Hitler, however, prevented the Hungarian territorial demands from being put
on the agenda of the Munich Conference. Thus the Hungarian (along with the
Polish) issue only appeared in Annex No. 2 to the protocol recording the Munich
Agreement, as follows: “The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare
that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not
settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments,
shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the
four Powers here present.”1
For Hungary, Annex No. 2 opened up the practical possibility of the revision
of the Treaty of Trianon, which had been on the agenda for two decades, at least
1 The text of the agreement is cited by Francia Sárga könyv, n.d., p. 25.
77
with regard to Czechoslovakia. It recognised that the situation of the Hungarian

minority in Czechoslovakia was an international issue, which – if it could not
be solved via direct negotiations – would be settled by the parties to the Munich
Agreement themselves.2
The direct Czech-Slovak-Hungarian negotiations – which took place in
Komárom (today: Komárno, Slovakia) between 9 and 13 October 1938 – were not
successful.3 They were followed by a period of approximately 3 weeks during which
the Hungarian and Slovak governments sought a solution involving international
participation (primarily convening another four-power conference).4 As the
end result of these complicated British-French-Italian-German-Czechoslovak-
Hungarian diplomatic games it became clear that there would not be another
four-power conference, and instead the Hungarian demands concerning Upper
Hungary would be settled by Italian-German arbitration.
On 30 October 1938, the German and the Italian governments officially
announced that the arbitration would take place in Vienna on 2 November.
This study presents the events that transpired on the day of 2 November.
2.1. Location and parties involved

The venue for the First Vienna Award was the Belvedere Palace, located in the
diplomatic quarter of Vienna. The Baroque-style building was built between
1714 and 1724 by Eugene of Savoy, one of the successful military leaders of
the so-called reoccupation wars against the Turks (1683–1699), and designed
by Lucas von Hildebrant. The palace was meant to be a summer residence, but
it was eventually only used by Savoy as a reception venue: its last resident was
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was assassinated in Sarajevo.
It might reasonably be asked: why did the German hosts choose this palace
as the venue for the arbitration? We believe that it was a small act of diplomatic
2 Herczeg 1999, p. 253.

3 For more details on the course of the Komárom negotiations, see Gulyás 2016, pp. 133–143.
4 For more details, see Gulyás 2016, pp. 144–154.
78
consideration towards the Italians since – even though he served the Habsburg
emperor as a German general – Eugene of Savoy was of Italian origin.
The main characters on 2 November were the members of the German,
Italian, Czechoslovak and Hungarian delegations. The persons composing
these delegations are listed in the following table:
German delegation Joachim von Ribbentrop German Foreign Minister

Ernst Woermann Deputy State Secretary of the
German Foreign Ministry
Günther Altenburg Czechoslovak rapporteur of the
Political Division of the German
Foreign Ministry
Paul Schmidt Interpreter of the German
Foreign Ministry, extraordinary
ambassador and authorised
minister
Eric Kordt Head of the Cabinet Office of the
German Foreign Ministry
Italian delegation Galeazzo Ciano Italian Foreign Minister
Bernardo Attolico Italian ambassador to Berlin
Massimo Magisrati Counsellor of the Italian Embassy
in Berlin
Czechoslovak delegation Frantisek Chvalkovský Czechoslovak Foreign Minister
Ivan Krno Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign
Minister
Hungarian delegation Kálmán Kánya Hungarian Foreign Minister
Pál Teleki Minister of Religion and Education
It should be pointed out here that the Czechoslovak delegation was

composed of the Foreign Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister of the
government in Prague. This was despite the fact that some significant changes
had occurred in the state law within the Czechoslovak State in autumn 1938,
as both Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia had been granted autonomy5 and a
5 For details, see Kovač 2001, pp. 201–202.
79
Slovak autonomous government led by Jozef Tiso and a Carpathian Ruthenian

government led by Avgustyn Voloshyn had taken office accordingly. Tiso and
Voloshyn were not official members of the delegation and could only be present
at the Belvedere Palace as observers.
Concerning the Hungarian delegation, it should be noted that the reason
why Pál Teleki was a member of the Hungarian delegation was not because he
was the Minister of Religion and Education, but because as a geographer he had
in-depth knowledge of the ethnographic conditions in Upper Hungary.
2.2. The morning conference

The morning session of the conference started at 12 p.m. It was opened by
Ribbentrop who said that the Kingdom of Hungary and the Czechoslovak
Republic had appealed to Germany and Italy with the request to demarcate the
frontier between the two countries by arbitration. “Our task today is to establish
the final frontier between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on an ethnographic
basis and to find a solution to the questions connected with this.”6 He specifically
noted that both the Hungarian and the Slovak parties accepted in advance the
award to be made, meaning that the decision would be “binding and final”.
He then invited the representatives of the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak
Governments to describe briefly their respective positions. Before doing so,
however, he gave the floor to Ciano, who greeted those present by saying a few
sentences.
Thereafter, Kánya had the opportunity to explain the Hungarian position.
In his short speech, the Hungarian Foreign Minister basically summarised the
diplomatic events of the previous two months (September–October). The key
point was that Hungary had been trying to settle the Hungarian-Czechoslovak
relationship via negotiations in Komárom, pursuant to the Munich Agreement,
but there were such significant differences of opinion on the territorial
6 The protocol of morning session is cited by Szarka 2017, Doc. 216, pp. 479–486.
80
questions that Hungary proposed arbitration. “Hungary looks forward with a

clean conscience to the arbitral award of the two powers and is convinced that the
two Great Powers will give a just verdict, satisfactory to both parties,”7 he said at
the end of his speech.
Thereafter, Teleki supplemented Kánya’s speech by emphasising that the
Hungarian territorial proposal was based on purely ethnographic principles.
“It is a simple matter to draw a frontier on the basis of these principles,”8 he said.
He also noted, however, that at two points – in the case of Nyitra and Kassa
(today: Nitra and Košice, Slovakia) – the application of the ethnographic
principle causes difficulties. He specifically mentioned Pozsony (today:
Bratislava, Slovakia), where none of the ethnic groups has an absolute majority
(i.e. over 50%), although there was a relative Hungarian majority in Pozsony
in 1910. In addition, Pozsony was once the capital city of Hungary during the
Turkish regime. He finished his speech by saying that there were a few towns
on the Slovak-Hungarian linguistic border “which in 1918 were 80-90 percent
Hungarian, but were later denationalised. Hungary therefore raised a claim to
these towns on the grounds of both ancient and recent rights.”9
Thereafter, Chvalkovský, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, was granted
speaking time, who – after a few sentences of diplomatic courtesy – gave the
floor to Ambassador Krno, who presented the following line of reasoning in his
speech: the Munich Agreement gave three months for Czechoslovakia to settle
the question of the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak minority. The Czechoslovak
Government endeavoured to honourably comply with this requirement. It
took part in negotiations with Hungary as early as 9 October, 10 days after the
Munich meeting. However, in the course of the negotiations in Komárom the
Hungarian delegation submitted a proposal which Czechoslovakia could not
accept. In response, the Hungarian party declared the Komárom negotiations
closed. Following the failed negotiations, Czechoslovakia submitted a new
proposal to Hungary on 22 October, but the Hungarians rejected that as well.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
81
After that, the Hungarian Government made a counter-proposal and requested

arbitration or a plebiscite. “Fully relying on the sense of justice of the German and
Italian Governments, the Czechoslovak Government accepted this proposal.”10
Krno continued his reasoning, however, by stating that the ethnic border
between Slovakia and Hungary could not be drawn based on the data of the
1910 census in Hungary. He used Kassa as a specific example, as follows: “In
1910, for example, Košice had a small Hungarian majority, but in 1880 the town
was predominantly Slovak. Therefore, Teleki’s assertion that Hungary demands
these towns based on ancient and recent rights is not totally correct, because if one
ignores the last thirty years, the Slovak side can demand with equal justice that
the 1880 figures should be taken into consideration […]”11
Krno’s arguments were responded to by Kánya and then Teleki. The
Hungarian Minister of Culture explained that in the case of Nyitra and Kassa
the changes that had occurred in the course of time needed to be taken into
account. “The grandfathers of most of the residents who are now identified as
Slovak were Hungarian,” he said.
In the unfolding debate, Chvalkovský asked that Tiso, the Slovak Prime
Minister, and Voloshyn, the “Ukrainian” Prime Minister [meaning Carpathian
Ruthenian - L.G.] be heard. Ribbentrop refused to comply with this request and
called the two politicians mentioned “experts”. He was only willing to promise
to conduct an informal discussion with Tiso and Voloshyn during the official
lunch. In his counter-response, Chvalkovský requested that the two politicians
not be called experts in the protocol. Ribbentrop and Ciano expressed their
agreement. This is how the morning session of the arbitration ended at around
2 p.m.
Thereafter, between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m. the delegates participated in a brunch,
where they had the opportunity to have informal conversations. One such
conversation took place between Ciano and Teleki, while Voloshyn and Tiso
attempted to convince Ribbentrop about where they thought the Hungarian-
Slovak border should lie.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
82
2.3. Demarcating the frontier

At around 4:30 p.m. the two arbitrators – Ribbentrop and Ciano – retreated
into a separate room with their colleagues, where they established the final
frontier. Paul Schmidt, interpreter of the German Foreign Ministry, recounted
this event in his memoirs as follows: “In a smaller room […] the map of the
disputed territories was spread in the centre of a large round table. Ribbentrop,
Ciano and their colleagues were standing around the table. The two foreign
ministers were each holding a thick pencil in their hands, and while they were
talking, they were correcting the new boundary lines indicated by the experts, on
which the arbitration award would be founded.”12
It is clear from the above quote that the line-drawing in Vienna was nothing
more than the endgame; the foreign ministers just made “slight corrections”
to the frontier. The Hungarian party had had an opportunity after 13 October
1938 – when the negotiations in Komárom broke down – to present its
territorial demands in both Berlin and Rome within the framework of bilateral
negotiations. Kálmán Darányi had negotiated on the Hungarian-Slovak frontier
with Ribbentrop in Berlin on 14 and 15 October, while István Csík – head of
cabinet of the Foreign Ministry – travelled to Rome, where he negotiated with
Mussolini and Ciano.
Furthermore, on 29 October, Ciano – keeping it a secret from the Germans
– asked Kánya to send to him a Hungarian team of experts to prepare him for
the Vienna negotiations.13 “In this duel I would like to be the thorough German
and I would like Ribbentrop to be the superficial Italian,” said Ciano.14
The team, consisting of two experts (András Rónai and Béla Kardos, both
colleagues at Teleki’s Institute of Political Science) and one Foreign Ministry
officer (Elemér Újpétery), arrived in Rome on 30 October, after an adventurous
12 Schmidt 1971, p. 208.

13 Juhász 1962, Doc. 607. p. 872.
14 Rónai 1989, p. 158.
83
flight.15 There – in the course of a discussion lasting several hours – the

Hungarian experts prepared the Italian Foreign Minister and his secretary
Cesaro in relation to the characteristics of the Hungarian-Slovak linguistic
border and the associated questions. As Rónai recalled, the Italians asked the
following questions: “Where is there a significant contrast between the statistics
of the two countries? What may the controversial points be and what arguments
can be listed by one party and the other? Which are the sorest spots for one party
and the other?”16
According to Rónai, the preparation produced the following results:
“Ciano became an excellent expert in the Hungarian-Slovak linguistic border,
the geography and the public conditions in Hungary and Upper Hungary; he
outperformed not only his German colleague, but also his experts. He recited
dates and data by heart, he knew their Hungarian and Czech sources, and he was
familiar with the line of the political and the linguistic border to such an extent
that he was able to draw the most disputed territories by heart.”17
Returning to the room at the Belvedere Palace where the two Foreign
Ministers were drawing the boundary lines, Schmidt, who was present,
recorded the following scene: “If you continue to defend the Czechs’ interests
so much you will get a medal of honour from Hacha, said Ciano to Ribbentrop
with an evil smile on his face, and changed the boundaries using thick lines in
favour of Hungary. Ribbentrop – while the specialist rapporteur of the Foreign
Ministry whispered something into his ear – objected by saying: ‘This is definitely
an exaggeration’ – and drew new lines at certain spots.”
We think that the scene described above well supports the opinion we formed
while reading the October diplomacy reports, which is that during the period
between the failure of the Komárom negotiations and the announcement of the
First Vienna Award Hitler and Ribbentrop were supporting the Slovaks against
the Hungarians. It was actually Italy that advocated on behalf of the Hungarian
15 For more details on the journey, see Gulyás 2012, pp. 22–31.
16 For more details on the preparation of Ciano and his secretary, see Rónai 1989, pp. 161–
163.
17 Rónai 1989, pp. 161–163.
84
demands. Moreover, there are recollections suggesting that Ribbentrop made

one last attempt at the Belvedere Palace to award Munkács to the Czechoslovak
State during the arbitration, but finally accepted the Italian position.18 For
all of these reasons, we think that Ciano played a significant role in ensuring
that the First Vienna Award established a fair border between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.
According to Schmidt, the establishment of the new Hungarian-Slovak
frontier ended as follows: “The two Foreign Ministers continued to quarrel for a
while, erratically erasing and drawing, until the pencils wore out more and more
and the boundary lines became thicker and thicker.”19
When writing about the thick lines and the thick green pencils drawing
them, Macartney argues in his book that this was one of the pro-Hungarian
tricks of Ciano. The Italian Foreign Minister deliberately used a thick pencil
to draw the line, then he insisted that the upper edge of the line should be the
Slovak-Hungarian border.20
In reality, the thick line drawn on the map meant a 750-meter-wide
strip of land; moreover, not every village was shown on the map. These two
circumstances provided an opportunity for a couple of villages to be attached
to Hungary upon the physical establishment of the boundary line.21
2.4. The afternoon conference:

announcement of the decision
The afternoon conference was opened by Ribbentrop at 7:10 p.m., who

announced: “The German and Italian Governments have completed the task of
arbitrating in the question of the cession of Czechoslovak territory to Hungary.
18 Szegedy-Maszák 1996, Vol I, p. 227.

19 Schmidt 1971, p. 208.
20 Macartney 2006, p. 392.
21 For more details, see Rónai 1989, pp. 187–192.
85
The task of the arbitrators was extremely difficult. But based on the ethnographic
principle, a decision has been reached which, if correctly carried out, will bring
a lasting and just solution to the questions outstanding between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.”22
Thereafter, Ciano spoke, emphasising that in making the decision they
had made efforts to “find a lasting and just solution of the problem, designed to
introduce a new era and lay the foundations for friendly and good neighbourly
relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.”23
This was followed by the reading of the arbitral award consisting of 7
sections24 and the accompanying25 protocol. Upon the reading of the arbitral
award, an enlarged version of a map of a scale of 1:750,000 – on which the
boundary line was drawn with thick green lines – was displayed.
The accompanying protocol contained the precise description of the new
border. The line precisely followed the Hungarian-Slovak ethnic border and
only left a few Hungarian villages near Pozsony to Slovakia, in order to ensure
some background area for the capital of the Slovak autonomous province. In
the area of Nyitra – where the Hungarian and Slovak villages were mixed in a
way that in the north Hungarian villages were embedded in Slovak linguistic
areas and in the south Slovak villages were embedded in Hungarian ones –
the region was cut in half by the arbitrators. The line used in the region of
Nyitra was the so-called Ciano line. This line was actually created when András
Rónai went to Rome to prepare Ciano. Elemér Újpétery writes about this in
his memoirs as follows: “[…] This confusing border cannot be justified either
economically or administratively anyway. [said Ciano - L.G.] He continued to
smile: “This is my proposal” – then he drew a straight line forcefully in our favour
(later we called it the Ciano line).26
Now back to the announcement of the decision. Let us listen to the
recollections of Elemér Újpétery, an eyewitness to the events: “Everyone was
22 Ránki et. al. 1968, Doc. 155. p. 317.

23 Ibid.
24 The arbitration judgment in Hungarian is cited by Ránki et. al. 1968, Doc. 156. p. 318.
25 The accompanying protocol in Hungarian is cited by Ránki et. al. 1968, Doc. 157. p. 319.
26 Újpétery 1974, p. 81.
86
looking at the enlarged map with interest. It was not a surprise, at most for the
Slovaks, who did not know about the Ciano line. As there was no right to appeal,
both parties remained silent.”27
All we can add to this is that, according to Aladár Szegedy-Maszák, another
person recounting the events, when the decision was announced, Voloshyn was
so shocked by the fact that Ungvár and Munkács were attached to Hungary that
he fainted.28 To the members of the Slovak delegation, Tiso said the following:
“We lost everything. Komárno, Újvár, Losonc, Léva, Rozsnyó and even Kassa...”
(today: Komárno, Nové Zámky, Lučenec, Levice, Rožňava, Košice, all in
Slovakia).29
The Hungarian and the Slovak delegation received one copy, respectively,
of the map showing the frontier. Teleki accepted the map of the Hungarian
delegation wordlessly. In his book Ferenc Fodor, Teleki’s biographer, attributed
his silence to the fact that he was distressed because the Hungarian State was
not able to reclaim Nyitra and Pozsony. This is well illustrated by the fact – as
explained by Fodor in his book – that when the Hungarian delegation returning
from Vienna was greeted by a huge crowd at Hegyeshalom and Győr, Teleki
curtained the window of his compartment, and thus only Kánya and Csáky
received the greetings.30
3. Evaluation of the First Vienna Award

At 11 p.m. on 2 November, Tiso made a speech on Pozsony radio, in which he
evaluated the boundary line as follows: “The German-Italian arbitration did not
decide on the basis of the ethnic situation. There is nothing to do, just to bow our
heads and work. But nobody can prevent us from announcing before the whole
world that the Slovak nation has suffered a tragic insult.”31
27 Újpétery 1974, p. 83.

28 Szegedy-Maszák 1996, p. 228.
29 Deák 2002, p. 34.
30 Fodor 2001, p. 154.
31 Deák 2002, p. 35.
87
The following day the Slovak press assessed the decision as a “cruel wound
inflicted by Vienna”.32 Typical Slovak press coverage ran along these lines: “The
unfavourable decision of Germany and Italy in Vienna deprived Slovakia of a
large portion of land and a great percentage of Slovak population. It’s unlikely that
the wounds will ever heal. The Vienna Award will burn on our nation’s body as a
permanent scar.”33
In summary, it can be said that the autonomous Slovak government (the
leaders of the Slovak Republic from March 1939) and public opinion firmly
rejected the First Vienna Award from the outset. As a result, tensions in the
Slovak-Hungarian relationship escalated after 2 November.
Naturally, the Hungarian side was in a state of euphoria. On the day when
the decision was announced – i.e. on 2 November – Hungarian Prime Minister
Béla Imrédy made a short speech on the radio. In that speech, he praised
the success of the Hungarian diplomatic efforts and expressed his thanks to
Germany, Italy and Poland for supporting the Hungarian objectives. After the
end of the speech, a celebrating crowd gathered in the streets of Budapest, which
primarily concentrated in front of the Italian, German and Polish embassies.
In the course of following days the papers were filled with enthusiastic
articles. The radio, newsreels and propaganda films all celebrated the First
Vienna Award in a similar tone.
The Hungarian army started to occupy the territory on 4 November
and finished the transfer on 11 November. Evacuation and occupation of
the territory took place without any serious military confrontation. Regent
Miklós Horthy participated – on his white horse – in the transfer in person:
he led the Hungarian troops across the Komárom Bridge on 6 November
and he marched into Kassa at the head of the soldiers on 11 November.34 He
describes this event in his memoirs as follows: “Everyone who – like me – saw
the touching and instinctive outbreaks of joy in both cities, and saw people fall
into each other’s arms or fall down on their knees along the road, and cry for
32 For more details on the topic, see Oleknik 2010, pp. 99–110.
33 Gabzdilová 2010, pp. 59–70.
34 Bencsik 2001, p. 200.
88
joy, understood that a real liberation was taking place – and moreover without
war and bloodshed.”35
On 13 November 1938, Act No. XXXIV of 1938 on the reunification of the
territories of Upper Hungary returned to Hungary – proposed by Béla Imrédy
and Kálmán Kánya – was promulgated. János Esterházy – who had been the
main leader of the Hungarian minority in Upper Hungary for many years –
announced that he would stay in Slovakia to represent the Hungarian minority
remaining under the jurisdiction of the autonomous Slovak State.36
The First Vienna Award
Legend: 1. National borders demarcated in 1920; 2. Provincial border of Carpathian

Ruthenia; 3. Territories with Hungarian majority; 4. Border defined in judgment
of Vienna Award. Source: Author’s compilation. Cseh-Morvaország = Bohemia
and Moravia; Lengyelország = Poland; Németország = Germany; Magyarország
= Hungary; Szlovákia = Slovakia; Románia = Romania; Kárpátalja = Carpathian
Ruthenia; Bécs = Vienna; Pozsony = Bratislava; Nagyszombat = Trnava; Nyitra
= Nitra; Trencsén = Trenčín; Zsolna = Žilina; Zólyom = Zvolen; Rózsahegy =
Ružomberok; Rimaszombat = Rimavská Sobota; Losonc = Lučenec; Jolsva =
Jelšava; Rozsnyó = Rožňava; Lőcse = Levoča; Eperjes = Prešov; Kassa = Košice;
Tőketerebes = Trebišov; Ungvár = Uzhgorod (Ужгород); Munkács = Mukachevo
35 Horthy 1990, p. 221.

36 Molnár 2010, pp. 113–114.
89
(Мукачево); Huszt = Khust (Хуст); Komárom = Komárno; Máramarossziget =

Sighetu Marmației; Szatmárnémeti = Satu Mare
Turning to the numbers, Hungary received an area of 12,109 km2 from the
territory attached to Czechoslovakia in 1920. The population of the reattached
territory was 869,000, of which 752,000 people (86.5%) were Hungarian.37 With
the Vienna Award, 117,000 non-Hungarians (Slovak, Ruthenian, German)
were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Hungarian State, while 320,000
Hungarians still remained on the other side of the Hungarian-Slovak border,
that is, in Slovakia.38 The Hungarians who remained under the jurisdiction of
the Slovak State continued to live their lives in an expressly hostile atmosphere.39
It should be pointed out here that the Hungarian academic literature
discussing the Vienna Award uses two different pieces of data concerning the
size of reattached population. Some of the academic writers talk about 869,000
people based on Rónai’s data set, while others specify 1,040,000 people (of
which 879,000 were Hungarians).40 This difference arises from the fact that
Rónai calculated the number of residents returning to Hungary based on the
1930 Czechoslovak census, while the other group of historians calculated those
returning relying on the 1941 census in Hungary.
László Vizi points out in his book that the First Vienna Award was not
achieved as a result of a Slovak-Hungarian compromise, but reflected the will
of Germany and Italy, and was not accompanied by the guarantee of France and
Great Britain. This made the results of the decision doubtful in the long term.41
We agree with Attila Simon, who thinks that the First Vienna Award is
one of the main events that has traumatised Slovak-Hungarian relations up to
this day.42 The decision not only divides public opinion, but also Slovak and
Hungarian historiography. Slovak historiography considers the decision as an
37 Rónai 1989, p. 177.

38 Ibid.
39 For more details, see Kovács 1993, pp. 127–155 and Kamanec n.d., pp. 39–47.
40 See Vizi 2016, p. 81.
41 Vizi 2016, p. 80.
42 Simon 2010, pp. 71–83.
90
offense which resulted in the return of Hungarian oppression. This approach is

typically represented by Ladislav Deák and his work.43
During the socialist era (1945–1990), Hungarian historiography tried to
conceal the significance of the Vienna Award. In the period after 1990 one
important piece of work was published on the Vienna Award: the detailed,
thorough and excellent book of Gergely Sallai in 2002. Nowadays, Hungarian
historiography assesses the Vienna Award in two ways: one of the trends
considers it as historical justice, while the other school tries to relativise it in
the spirit of some sort of pseudo-objectivity. The operation of the trend trying
to conceal the importance of the First Vienna Award is well illustrated by the
book of László Szarka on the history of the Czechoslovak State, published in
2016,44 in which the Komárom negotiations are discussed in a mere two short
paragraphs,45 while the content of the Vienna Award is practically ignored in
the text.
The author of this study believes that the First Vienna Award was the
exact and objective implementation of the demarcation of the border on an
ethnographic basis. Furthermore, it can be stated that the Slovak-Hungarian
frontier of the First Vienna Award was much fairer in every respect – but
particularly in terms of the application of the ethnographic principle – than
the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border demarcated by Trianon. The First Vienna
Award drew a fair border between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
43 See one of his typical studies: Deák 1988.

44 Szarka 2016.
45 Szarka 2016, bottom of page 219 and top of page 220.
91
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tekintettel a rimaszombati járásra. In: Simon, A. (ed.) Visszacsatolás vagy
megszállás? Szempontok az első bécsi döntés értelmezéséhez. Nógrád County
Archives. Balassagyarmat. pp. 59–70.
Gulyás, L. (2012). Egy titkos küldetés története – A bécsi döntés és közvetlen
előzményei. Nagymagyarország, 1. pp. 22–31.
Gulyás, L. (2016). A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája 4. A revíziós sikerek 1. A
Felvidék és a Kárpátalja visszatérése. Attraktor Kiadó. Máriabesnyő.
Herczeg, G. (1999). A szarajevói merénylettők a potsdami konferenciáig. Magyar
Szemle Könyvek. Budapest.
Horthy, M. (1990). Emlékirataim. Európa–História. Budapest.
Juhász, Gy. (ed.) (1962). Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához.
Volume IV. Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest.
Kamanec, I. (n.d). Trauma. Az első szlovák köztársaság (1939–1945). Budapest.
Kovač, D. (2001). Szlovákia története. Kalligram. Bratislava.
Kovács, L. G. (1993). A szlovákiai magyarság a második világháború éveiben.
In: Gyurgyik, L. et. al. (ed.) Fejezetek a szlovákiai magyarság történetéből.
Kalligram Kiadó. Bratislava. pp. 127–155.
Macartney, C. A. (2006). Október tizenötödike. A modern Magyarország
története. Volume I. Gede Testvérek. Budapest.
Molnár, I. (2010). Esterházy János élete és mártírhalála. Méry Ratio. Somorja.
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(ed.) 1938. Visszacsatolás vagy megszállás? Szempontok az első bécsi döntés
értelmezéséhez. Nógrád County Archives. Balassagyarmat. pp. 99–110.
Ránki, Gy., Pamlényi, E., Tilkovszky, L. & Juhász, Gy. (1968). A Wilhelmstrasse
és Magyarország. Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról. 1933–1944.
Kossuth Könyvkiadó. Budapest.
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diplomata emlékirataiból. Volume I. Európa–História. Budapest.
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93
E VA L U AT I O N O F T H E H O R T H Y E R A I N H U N G A R I A N S E C O N D A R Y S C H O O L . . .
PÉTER ILLIK
EVALUATION OF THE HORTHY

ERA IN HUNGARIAN SECONDARY
SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS
(1945–2005) 1
Introduction
Hungarian secondary education is a constant focus of public attention,

and there are several reasons for this. On the one hand, different and often
conflicting interests of all parts of society – teachers, students, parents of
different occupations – converge in this field. That is, public education is deeply
embedded in society. On the other hand, all actors in society have been or are
currently involved in education in some way, and thus everyone feels as if they
were experts in their own point of view.
Even today, one of the basic elements of education is the coursebook,
which – unlike a lesson – can be measured and judged relatively objectively,
considering that verba volant, scripta manent [speech is ephemeral, writing
1 This paper was prepared by correcting, transforming and shortening a text that had already
been published twice. Previous publications: Illik 2017 and 2019. In this study, I have
omitted the footnotes on the historiography of textbook research for reasons of brevity, as
they were included in two previous texts.
95
remains]. This is exactly why coursebooks are the focus of this paper. They can
be assessed on the basis of various, complex pedagogical criteria. However, there
are also examples of comparative and thematic coursebook analyses, with the
latter meaning that a topic is analysed in one or more publications. This study
examines how the Horthy era (the period from the entry of Miklós Horthy de
Nagybánya into Budapest until the appointment of Ferenc Szálasi) is presented
and evaluated in post-1945 Hungarian secondary school coursebooks up to
2005.2 The coursebooks are analysed in chronological order, but specific topics
already discussed in different articles are not covered in this study.
Obviously, there are several turning points for post-1945 coursebooks.
Firstly, the transition in 1989, considering that the change of attitude about the
Horthy era began in the 1980s. “Horthy’s counter-revolutionary regime” was
necessarily denigrated in the obviously politicised coursebooks of the socialist
era. After the change in the political system, this did not shift in the opposite
direction, i.e. towards a clearly positive assessment. Methodologically, instead
of politicised coursebooks, those without a clear opinion became common,
where value judgment can only be read between the lines: from source texts,
images, questions included, and the available facts selected in the main text, i.e.
which ones are used and which are not when describing the era. So what does
the coursebook suggest?
The two-level final examination in the subject of history introduced in 2005
constitutes another significant turning point for this study. Organising entrance
exams is no longer the responsibility of the universities, and additionally
the intermediate and advanced level final examinations were separated,
where, unlike before, the written test also became a part of the exams. At
the intermediate level, the scores were up to 90 points in the written test and
60 points in the oral part. (With the latest changes, this was modified up to
100 points and 50 points in 2016.) There are essay questions in the written
2 I did not examine the educational-political environment of textbooks, i.e. the education
laws or other circumstances of the Kádár era, which influenced the textbooks written up
to 1989, as this was undertaken by Albert (2004). In addition, the book Képek és arcképek
presents an overview of the history textbooks of the Kádár era.
96
examination, both at the intermediate and advanced levels, where students

are expected to write problem-oriented, source-analysing, explanatory texts
(i.e. answering the question “why?”). It is very important that the explanation
here means that a statement should be made for each response element, which
should not “hang in the air”, i.e. it should be accompanied by an explanation or a
conclusion drawn from it (with the changes that came into effect in the summer
of 2016, the final examinations also includes a complex cross-period source
analysis and an essay writing task). Thus, by analysing the coursebooks, this
paper also raises the question of the extent to which the author considers these
coursebooks to be suitable for final examinations, including the preparation for
writing essays, and of the extent to which the main text of these books enters
into explanations.3 Set as a basic requirement, the coursebook alone should
be suitable for this without the teacher’s explanations. This methodological
question is strongly justified because the Horthy era is one of the periods which
gives rise to the most concerns and varied interpretations in Hungarian history
and, moreover, it is still relevant today as it is linked closely to political thought
and public opinion, and thus triggers intense emotional reactions. Furthermore,
this issue is still very much a part of everyday political and ideological currents.
Based on the historical literature and the final examination topics, what are
the problem areas, questions, evaluations I had anticipated, or at least expected
and could expect to be raised in connection with the Horthy era? (1) Who was
Miklós Horthy and how did he become the Regent of Hungary? (2) What was
the White Terror, how can it be assessed, to what extent was it related to Horthy
or the government? (3) What exactly does a “kingdom without a king” mean,
what kind of form of government is it (dictatorial, democratic or other) and
how unique is it in the world? (4) Why did anti-Semitism exist in the era, what
were its origins and characteristics, and later, how did Horthy, the politics and
society relate to this and the Holocaust? (5) How successful was the Bethlen
Consolidation? (6) How can revision be evaluated, what role did it play in the
3 This is obviously a reasonable criterion for textbooks published after 2005. However, an
analysis of earlier textbooks is also indispensable, as they form an “integral part” of the
current ones.
97
process of drifting into the war, how can the behaviour of Hungarian troops be
evaluated during the annexation? (7) Why did Hungary “drift” towards German
politics from the second half of the 1930s, what pressures and coercions did
it face? (8) How did Pál Teleki die? (9) Who bombed Kassa (today: Košice,
Slovakia) and to what extent was it just used as a pretext to enter the war? (10)
How can Hungary’s participation in the war be assessed, and how significant
was the catastrophe at the Don River? (11) Why did the attempt to withdraw
Hungary from the war fail? To what extent is Miklós Horthy responsible for
this and for Szálasi’s appointment?
There are many questions that cannot necessarily be answered, but can
be raised, considered, explained and evaluated. These issues are, of course,
addressed in the literature, and thus it is also possible to receive an implicit
answer to the question of the extent to which academic knowledge and various
professional debates flow into the coursebooks.
Evaluation of the Horthy era

from 1945 to the 1980s
In line with earlier traditions, Kosáry’s coursebook4 is actually a book rather

than a coursebook: it is small in shape and does not contain illustrative figures,
maps or charts.
As early as 1945, using socialist terminology in terms of content, he spoke of
reaction and class domination, thus laying the foundations for later phraseology.
However, the book contains only 10 pages on the Horthy period. He derives the
anti-Semitism prevailing in the Horthy era and, according to the coursebook,
the completely unrealised agrarian reform from dualism.5 He defines the
counter-revolutionary character of the era as being against everything in which
he saw the causes of the revolutions and collapse. These were mainly liberalism
4 Kosáry & Mérei 1945.

5 Idem, pp. 162–163.
98
and internationalism, according to the book. The counter-revolutionary system

“Dropped the hated liberal robe and put on the Christian tunic. Christianity,
however, did not mean the realisation of social […] papal encyclicals, but merely
anti-Semitism. Internationalism […] was replaced by national ideology, which,
however, followed on from patriotism symbolised by the uniforms with Hungarian
soutache at the time of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. After the revolution,
this patriotism ended in revisionism and irredentism […] instead of a spirit of
agreement and peaceful cooperation. Because of its social approach, this thinking
was anti-democratic and hated reforms. Typically, the idea of independence
persisted even after the disintegration of the Compromise. But now in an anti-
Habsburg form, mixed with racist, Turanist elements.”6 After this introduction,
however, the main text gives a fairly concise, objective and factual description
of the establishment of the counter-revolutionary system (the term White
Terror is still used in parentheses), domestic politics, foreign policy relations,
and socio-economic life. Interestingly, the text praises the exit attempt: “The
ruling class opposition of the Germans made another attempt to pull the nation
back from the edge of the vortex and protect it from another tragedy.”7 In this
book, the topic (i.e. the Horthy era) starts with a brief introduction with
completely socialist phraseology, followed by a relatively neutral list of facts.
Basically, this has become common, without the socialist introduction, in post-
1989 secondary school coursebooks too, which list historical facts rather than
giving explanations of problems.
Varga’s coursebook8 summarises the history of the Horthy era slightly
longer, in a main text of thirteen pages. There is no socialist terminology, such
as class struggle, but the following sentence sets the tone for processing the
topic: “The [Trianon] peace treaty could have been one of the greatest turning
points in Hungarian history if leaders had drawn the appropriate political and
social consequences.”9 It seems obvious that the key to interpreting this sentence
6 Idem, pp. 163–164.

7 Idem, p. 170.
8 Varga 1946. (Another textbook discussing the Horthy era in a similar spirit, but even
shorter than this book, namely in about 5 pages: Iván 1947.)
9 Idem, p. 212.
99
could have been the favourable interpretation of the “turning point”; that is, the
correct processing of the Treaty of Trianon could (also) have had promising
consequences, according to the coursebook writer. After that, the Horthy era
and its revisionism can only be a negative element in this book.10 In the same
spirit, domestic politics is also referred to only as a “watchword reform policy”11,
and its “[…] major deficiency was that it lacked serious, but constructive
radicalism; [perhaps this is the only text in a coursebook that does not confuse
radicalism with extremism – P.I.] instead, it merely emphasised pretentious,
powerful slogans.”12 This book makes rather original criticisms of the Horthy
regime: its biggest mistake was not to introduce real reforms and not to take
advantage of the opportunities offered by the situation. It can obviously be
argued whether there were any such opportunities at all, but in any case it does
not take a negative approach to the trauma of Trianon and its ramifications.
The books by Lukács13 already show fully developed socialist assessments.
They contain a complete, whole and coherent thematic unit on the Horthy era
under the heading Counter-revolution and Fascism. Moreover, a fully developed
socialist ideology appears in the phraseology and interpretation of the text.
However, looking behind this phraseology, it is worth mentioning the elements
that survived in post-1989 coursebooks (as will be seen in the later analyses).
The first idea already sets the tone: “After the fall of the Hungarian Soviet
Republic, sad days dawned on our people. It was the beginning of an oppressive,
radically reactionary era of counter-revolution. With the help of the Entente
imperialists, the counter-revolution restored the rule of the capitalist and landowner
classes in Hungary. The working people were handcuffed.”14 This is also a good
indication of the West being guiltier, as the West is the “employer”, the principal,
but the Horthy era is also culpable. This order is important because while both
are responsible, the text even partly exonerates the elite of the Horthy regime to
blame the Western imperialists and later the German Nazis.
10 Idem, p. 222.
11 Idem, p. 216.
12 Ibid.
13 Lukács 1954; Lukács 1950. I analyse this book below; the other one is a later version of it.
14 Idem, p. 127.
100
This is followed by a digression on the merits of the Hungarian Communists,

who fought against the regime and “taught our people to love the Soviet
Union”.15 Only thereafter does the text discuss the White Terror and point out
that the Horthysts betrayed war plans to the Romanians (however this was
not the truth),16 and the Social Democrats (e.g. Károly Peyer) also betrayed
the Communists.17 In this approach, the signing of the Treaty of Trianon was
also in the interests of the counter-revolutionary regime.18 The presentation
of the Communist Party as a topic was significantly reduced in post-1989
coursebooks, and a different understanding of the Trianon peace treaty was
obviously adopted, but the White Terror remained a well-presented topic in
secondary school coursebooks even after the transition.
According to this interpretation, the Bethlen Consolidation followed
from the reactionary traditions of the Monarchy and aimed to preserve the
power of the ruling classes and oppress the workers. Thus, the Bethlen-Peyer
Pact is also a betrayal of the Social Democrats,19 and the implementation of
the Nagyatádi agrarian reform could only have been aimed at conserving the
old large holdings and creating a “new aristocracy”.20 The section on domestic
political consolidation is supplemented with a parallel lesson, which presents
the activities of the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP), then the Hungarian
Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) and Mátyás Rákosi in the same period.21
This is followed by a brief description of the foreign policy of the Bethlen
era, wherein the book already shows the root of the process of becoming
German allies.22 Interestingly, only in relation to anti-Semitism (if at all) did
the post-1989 coursebooks emphasise that in many respects the Horthy regime
carried on the traditions of the Monarchy. Although the Bethlen-Peyer Pact is
15 Idem, p. 128.
16 Idem, p. 129.
17 Idem, p. 130.
18 Idem, p. 133.
19 Idem, p. 135.
20 Idem, pp. 136–137.
21 Idem, pp. 142–147.
22 Idem, p. 148.
101
mentioned in the coursebooks under this name, none of them indicated that
although it was meant to be kept secret, it had “leaked” two years later, so it
was fully known at that time. From the 1960s to 1989, the presentation of the
Communists and their party remained predominant on a thematic level, but
the person of Mátyás Rákosi was naturally excluded from the material. And
after the transition, the whole topic was relegated to the background.
As a failure of Western imperialism, the text compares the Great Depression
with the success of the Soviet Union and the socialist economy23 and highlights
the struggles of the workers as domestic consequences.24 This area has been
paraphrased in modern coursebooks: besides economic restrictions, strikes
and demonstrations are also included.
Lukács sees the 1930s as an advance of fascism and, in a peculiar way,
exonerates to some extent the domestic political elite, as he acknowledges and
emphasises the Nazi economic-political pressure on them,25 while many of the
post-1989 secondary school coursebooks do not do so!
The main reason for drifting into the Second World War is, paradoxically,
Teleki, who committed a political crime even with his suicide: “Under the Teleki
government, Hungary became even more complicit in fascist Germany […] Count
Pál Teleki, who had been a strong supporter of the counter-revolutionary regime
throughout and a faithful servant of fascist Germany, shot himself in April 1941.
With his suicide, he stepped aside and thus paved the way further for a sinful policy
to which he had thoroughly contributed.”26 This is again followed by a description
of communist resistance and Rákosi’s activities.27 Hungary’s entry into the war
clearly comes as a result of the aggression of Horthy and the ruling classes, who
did not accept the Moscow peace offering in 1941 and co-organised the bombing
of Kassa with the Germans,28 Kállay’s “swing policy” failed and the Hungarian
23 Ibid.
24 Idem, p. 151.
25 Idem, pp. 152–153.
26 Idem, pp. 158–159.
27 Idem, pp. 159–162.
28 Idem, p. 165.
102
Second Army was annihilated at the catastrophe at the Don.29 Perhaps the
conceptual legacy of these lessons, however, is that the bombing of Kassa or the
death of Teleki remained unquestioned in later coursebooks. And the catastrophe
at the Don is also interpreted as a complete disaster. However, more recent
coursebooks simply deleted the theory of the German bombing of Kassa, as well
as the idea that Teleki was a servant of the fascists, but did not replace them with
any other particular interpretation. Furthermore, recent research results on the
defeat at the Don have not basically been included to this day.
In 1944, “Ultimately, in order to prevent Hungary from possibly withdrawing
from the war, fascist Germany formally occupied the country on March 19, 1944.
[…] Horthy, the Kállay-led government and the fascist senior officers, did not
even try to resist, and they slavishly accepted the situation.”30 The text blames
Horthy for the Arrow Cross takeover, but not for the failed exit attempt in
October: “Horthy and his followers themselves educated and fed the fascist scum
for years. Even if there were some conflicts between them, their interests coincided
to a much higher degree.”31 This approach has also continued since Horthy and
political decision-makers still appear as a central issue in modern secondary
school coursebooks, in relation to what their sympathies were or who they
penalised more or less in relation to the left and far-right.
The “vandalism of the fascist hordes and their Arrow Cross accomplices”32
was finally stopped by the “heroic Soviet troops”, and on April 4 Hungary was
completely liberated (in fact, this only occurred later).33 The term “Holocaust”
was not even mentioned, only a short sentence was added: “Masses of Jews were
killed on the banks of the Danube, the savagery of the fascists was boundless.”34 (In
general, discriminatory measures against Jews were not included in this book
either.) Subsequent coursebooks differ significantly in this point, as a detailed
discussion of the Hungarian Holocaust was given high priority.
29 Idem, p. 166.
30 Idem, p. 167.
31 Idem, p. 168.
32 Idem, p. 173.
33 Idem, p. 174.
34 Idem, p. 173.
103
This coursebook provides a completely consistent interpretation of the past

in the spirit of socialist ideology, with the help of real, but selected, or partly
real or untrue facts. In this way, it creates a textual tradition, a main focus, and
nodes of interpretation, which, although sometimes in more subtle ways or in
completely different circumstances, are present until 1989. At the same time,
it is also clear that, omitting the socialist phraseology from the structure and
phraseology of the text, this main text is still decisive for modern coursebooks.
Indeed, even today, these events, questions and problems are basically the focus
(and those not appearing here are not really covered later either), enriched with
lifestyle, cultural, and spiritual history lessons.
The multi-author temporary coursebook35 has in many respects adopted the
same approach as the Lukács books published shortly before, so the following
analysis is primarily limited to highlighting the conceptual novelties. The genesis
of the Horthy regime is described as follows: “The counter-revolutionary regime
which came to power using foreign weapons sought to establish a base among the
masses through unbridled nationalist, chauvinist, anti-Semitic incitement and
social demagogy with grand promises to improve the means of livelihood.”36 Unlike
Lajos Lukács, the Treaty of Trianon is explained in a broader sense: “This peace
treaty was an imperialist treaty. The signing of the treaty provided an opportunity
for the Hungarian ruling classes to launch another unbridled demagogic
campaign. The Hungarian ruling classes that actually provoked the Treaty of
Trianon committed the wildest chauvinist incitement against the neighbouring
peoples. They tried to convince the Hungarian public that the serious decisions
of the peace treaty were affecting Hungary because of the Soviet Republic. At the
same time they remained utterly silent about the fact that the Red Army of the
Soviet Republic had begun a heroic struggle to change the demarcation line to be
significantly more advantageous than the borders defined in the peace treaty.”37
At this point, it is worth briefly referring to the Vix memorandum, which is
illustrated vaguely in this coursebook: “[…] Lieutenant Colonel Vyx [sic] handed
35 Nagy, Kempelen, Bellér & Incze 1955.

36 Idem, p. 155.
37 Ibid.
104
over to the Hungarian government a memorandum demanding the evacuation of

completely Hungarian territories.”38 That is true, but the text does not clarify
that it was a question of creating a demilitarised zone. However, several later
coursebooks talk about a Romanian border along the Tisza River and mention
it as a Vix memorandum, even though he only presented the memorandum of
the Entente. On the other hand, it would definitely be worth clarifying whether
the Hungarian Red Army waged a patriotic or a self-defence war.
The coursebook speaks of “increased fascism” from the 1930s, and it was
around this time that terror and demagoguery intensified.39 (From a purely
pedagogical point of view, it would certainly have been important to clarify the
two concepts. This is also a good example of the fact that methodological aspects
were completely subordinated to the transmission of ideology. Incidentally,
conceptual ambiguity is still common in coursebooks to this day.)
The wording of the text, constantly echoed in later coursebooks is very
interesting: “Prime Minister Teleki, seeing the failure of his policy, escaped
responsibility and committed suicide.”40 The blame on Teleki is less strong, but
Hungary did not merely support, and allow the Germans to advance through
the country, as “Horthy gave an order to attack Yugoslavia.”41 The bombing of
Kassa and the annihilation of the Hungarian Second Army at Voronezh are
not even mentioned.42 Subsequent events appear in more subtle ways than in
Lukács’s, but Horthy is more vigorously condemned for the Arrow Cross coming
to power: “In this situation, Szálasi and his fascist gang were the only ones to
serve the German fascists unconditionally. Even on the day the proclamation was
issued, Horthy resigned in favour of Szálasi, at the request of the Germans. Thus,
he let Szálasi’s fascist gangs reign over the Hungarian people. The Horthy regime
and Horthy himself is responsible for bringing the Szálasi gang to power. […]
The scum of society exercised terror over the Hungarian people [i.e. the Arrow
38 Idem, pp. 134–135.

39 Idem, p. 175.
40 Idem, p. 195.
41 Idem, p. 196.
42 Idem, p. 199.
105
Cross].”43 In its approach, wording and structure, this coursebook conveys the
socialist ideology by consistently following the “Lukács path”.
The temporary note44 is a short, 50-page little booklet that essentially discusses
the Horthy era and the few years that followed. In its approach, it consistently
reflects the ideological, substantive and structural guidelines of Lukács’s books,
but due to its brevity it is much more concise. It creates a connection between
the Entente and the White Terror as follows: “The international proletariat, the
Soviet state, and the protests of Western progressive public opinion forced the
governments of the Entente Powers to reconsider the activities of the gangs. […]
however, it was ‘established’ that there was no white terror in Hungary. Thus, along
with Horthy and his associates, the Entente imperialists were also responsible for
the horrors of the White Terror.”45 The explanation of the Treaty of Trianon was
also put into a new perspective: “It was not a joint struggle for freedom between
the Hungarian people and nationalities that led to the collapse of historic Hungary,
but the support of the Entente imperialists, with which the historical ruling classes
restored their counter-revolutionary rule concealing the seeds of new strife and
war, which caused the tragedy of the Hungarian nation and Hungarian people.”46
At this time, Gyula Gömbös was fascist to such an extent that he wanted to
implement a German-style total dictatorship, but this was tolerated not even
by the Hungarian ruling classes.47 Thus Gömbös is portrayed as being even
grimmer than in Lukács’s books. Although the book precisely follows those
works as regards the further description of the era and events.
In its appearance, methodology and ideological message, the Szamuely–
Ránki coursebook48 follows the Lukács direction, but adds several other
ideas. Regarding the White Terror, Horthy was mentioned to have been the
“suppressor” of the Cattaro mutiny (in fact, this was not true) and puts the death
43 Idem, p. 202.
44 Incze 1958.
45 Idem, p. 4.
46 Idem, p. 6.
47 Idem, p. 22.
48 Szamuely & Ránki 1960. (A version of this: Szamuely, Ránki & Almási 1967.)
106
toll at more than 5,000.49 The Treaty of Trianon is given the same interpretation
as before. In describing the consolidation, the focus is again on negative
interpretations: the inadequacy of the Nagyatádi agrarian reform, betrayal of
the Social Democrats (see the Bethlen-Peyer Pact), economic dependency on
Western loans and negotiations with Italian fascists.50 Regarding the nature of
the system, the text identifies the Christian Szeged idea as a chauvinist, clerical,
anti-Semitic and reactionary Hungarian imperialist ideology.51 This is followed
by a description of the struggles of the Communists and workers against the
regime and then the effects of the Great Depression (especially poverty and
strikes). Then follows the presentation of Hungary’s path to becoming fascist,
concluding with a summary.
Hungary’s involvement in the Second World War was included in two
separate lessons in the thematic units presenting the World War. Incidentally,
this structural solution is still typical of most secondary school history
coursebooks. Considering the large nodes, the text comes as no surprise: Teleki
committed suicide because of the weight of responsibility, “instead of turning
the country against Germany”52 (this possibility is a new element of variation),
Kassa was bombed by disguised German aircraft agreed by the chiefs of general
staff of both Germany and Hungary,53 the Hungarian Second Army suffered
one of the greatest defeats in Hungarian military history at the Don,54 and
Horthy compromisingly complied with the demands of the Germans from
the occupation in March 1944 until the appointment of Szálasi.55 Finally, the
“fascist scum”56 was defeated by the Red Army, which liberated Hungary by
April 4. This book is in line with the tradition of coursebooks published in the
1950s, which continues steadily in Endre Balogh’s books.
49 Idem, p. 198.
50 Idem, pp. 201–202.
51 Idem, p. 203.
52 Idem, p. 238.
53 Idem, p. 239.
54 Idem, p. 241.
55 Idem, p. 246.
56 Ibid.
107
Surprisingly, Balogh’s book57 discusses the Horthy era as a whole, from its
genesis to its end, which is typical of few coursebooks. “The armed power of the
counter-revolution was exercised by the officers’ units and the so-called national
army. Their leader, Miklós Horthy was driven by sentiments of hostility towards
the working classes. It is no coincidence that this officer, ruthless and raw against
the workers and the agrarian proletariat, was elevated by the armed forces to be
the leader of the counter-revolution. The only political aim of the officers’ units was
the White Terror, i.e. retaliation and to destroy the achievements of the proletarian
dictatorship, and to ensure the class system.”58 Even if we try to approach the text
‘naively’ and not criticise it with outside knowledge, problems can still arise: 1.
Why was the National Army “so-called”, who called it like this? 2. Was there
only one thing driving Horthy? 3. How did the armed forces elevate him to be
a leader? Exactly who did this? 4. Exactly how many people fell victim to the
White Terror and who were they? The answer to this latter question can be found
in small print: within a few months, the toll was 5,000 dead, 70,000 imprisoned
and 100,000 emigrants.59 Horthy was also elected regent under pressure from the
White Terror,60 but the issue of his power and the form of the state is not addressed
any more. It is interesting about the Bethlen Consolidation: the text does not
mention that the government did not act “equally” with right-wing and left-wing
organisations, as it writes “Bethlen curbed the white terrorist organisations […] at
the same time he outlawed the Communist Party. However, he refused to outlaw
all organisations of the working class.”61 In connection with the consolidation, the
spirit of the regime is indicated as follows: “The term ‘Christian’ meant liberalism,
57 Balogh 1985. It was published annually between 1972 and 1987. Edited by Szabó, K. and
Vértes, R. (This textbook has a specific and an earlier version. The specific one is: Balogh
& Mann, which had 8 editions between 1981 and 1988. Edited by Nagy, E. & Nagy Imréné.
The book covers the period from the Second World War to the late 1970s. Its appearance,
structure, approach, and phrasing are the same as those of the textbook prepared for the
secondary schools of workers. It is an interesting “variant” that, according to the text, it was
clearly German aircraft with Soviet markings that bombed Kassa. 44. The earlier book is:
Eperjessy 1969. This was also printed in parallel, the 8th edition was published in 1975.)
58 Idem, p. 205.
59 Ibid.
60 Idem, p. 207.
61 Idem, p. 201.
108
denial of democracy, an anti-worker and anti-communist approach, as well as

anti-Semitism.”62 “The adjective ‘national’ did not mean legitimate national self-
consciousness in the dictionary of the counter-revolutionary system either, but
extreme nationalism, chauvinism.”63 It is mentioned as an interesting detail, that
Bethlen, with the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome (1927), had already embarked
on a path of becoming fascist,64 while most coursebooks expect Gömbös to “move
to the right.” The lesson on the economy and society closing the 1920s, includes,
as a novelty, a long and detailed description of workers’ movements.65 In the
1930s, the description of Gyula Gömbös, who “made an attempt to introduce total
fascism”, is strongly emphasised.66 The Darányi, Imrédy and Teleki governments
are barely mentioned, but the subject is repeatedly intertwined with the fact that
the Communists were already fighting against the advance of fascism.67 “All of this
meant the complete failure of the manoeuvring policy. Teleki did not want to oppose
the catastrophic policy of the ruling classes; he escaped responsibility and committed
suicide.”68 Teleki’s suicide note is not listed as a source. The reason for Hungary’s
entry into the war in 1941 is also not called into question: the general staff of
both Germany and Hungary co-organised the bombing of Kassa.69 The Újvidék
(today: Novi Sad, Serbia) massacre is also connected to Bárdossy’s activities,
as follows: “He introduced forced labour service and used it to systematically
exterminate left-wing and Jewish citizens. All of this culminated in the massacres in
the vicinity of Újvidék, in which more than 3,000 civilians were killed. […] in fact,
it was organised by the German intelligence […] with the help of certain Hungarian
officers of German descent and Nazi sentiment […] The commander ordering the
massacre fled to German-occupied territory and was convicted in absentia by the
Hungarian court-martial.”70
62 Idem, p. 214.
63 Ibid.
64 Idem, p. 215.
65 Idem, pp. 224–229.
66 Idem, p. 238.
67 Idem, p. 245, p. 248.
68 Idem, p. 251.
69 Ibid.
70 Idem, p. 253.
109
“As a result of the military failures of the Axis powers in 1943 and the
annihilation of the Hungarian Second Army at Voronezh, the Kállay government
sought to remain […] in power by reintroducing an insincere foreign policy.”71
This detail reveals the author’s problems and approach: since the wording had
to avoid the Soviet troops getting a bad reputation, he switched to passive
structures. Then, as he had previously blamed the Hungarian general staff for
cooperating with the Germans and pursuing a “catastrophic policy”, he needed
to avoid praising them for their intention to withdraw: therefore, political virtue
became an ethical sin, insincerity. However, blaming Horthy for the German
occupation and the exit attempt is also mentioned as he remained in power
after the occupation, thus “[…] ensuring the smooth operation of Hungarian
state institutions in favour of the fascists”,72 and the exit attempt was unsuccessful
because he refused to arm the workers.73 This was followed by the Arrow Cross
Rule (11 lines)74 and the Liberation of Hungary (description in one page).75 In
connection with the latter, the text states that Hungary was liberated on April
4,76 even though this was not true.
Jóvérné’s coursebook for secondary schools of workers77 was published in
parallel with the book of Endre Balogh78 and had several editions. It is very
similar in appearance and structure to it, but has been supplemented as a
standard with a chronological table, historical aphorisms, a glossary, and a list
of recommended exam questions.
The book, both in terms of wording and style, is similar to the aforementioned
Balogh book, for example, condemning the “bourgeois” and “capitalist” systems.
There are further similarities: in describing the White Terror, it literally repeats
71 Idem, p. 257.
72 Idem, p. 259.
73 Idem, pp. 260–261.
74 Idem, pp. 261–262.
75 Idem, pp. 263–264.
76 Idem, p. 264.
77 Jóvérné 1987. It was published once again in 1988. Edited by: Balogh, S., Jarmik, I, Nagy, Zs.
L. & Szabó, K.
78 Balogh 1985.
110
Balogh’s data.79 Later on, it also discusses the same topics in the same structure,
using the same text sources, figures, and charts. However, this book is more
radical than Balogh’s regarding the Bethlen Consolidation and the evaluation
and condemnation of the Prime Minister: “Bethlen established a conservative
dictatorship of the ruling classes disguised by ostensible parliamentarism. His
politics also involved neglected, fascist elements. At the same time, the weakened,
but still existing civil Left and the legal workers’ movement formed also an integral
part of the political system. […] three basic elements, i.e. the anti-revolutionary
approach, nationalism, and anti-Semitism were present in the ideas of almost
each group. The idea of a Christian-national Hungary was in focus, where the
word Christian meant anti-liberalism and anti-democracy, suppression of the
workers’ movement and persecution of Communists, as well as anti-Semitism.
Only those who identified themselves with extreme nationalism and chauvinism
and made the fate of the nation dependent on integral revision […] had the right
to be patriots in Hungary in the Horthy era.”80
Unlike Balogh, the author evaluates the developments of the 1930s as
follows: “So in the 1930s, political rivalry was growing between conservative-
reactionary, seemingly parliamentary methods and intensifying total fascist
aspirations. Meanwhile, the country’s leadership gradually moved to the right.”81
According to this coursebook and that of Balogh, Teleki, seeing the failure of
his policy, committed suicide.82 The reason for Hungary’s entry into the war
in 1941 is unclear, but it was likely that German aircraft bombed Kassa.83 The
defeat at the Don is mentioned as follows: “[…] the Hungarian Second Army
was annihilated (40,000 people died, 70,000 were wounded or taken prisoner, and
80% of the equipment was destroyed). In three weeks, Hungarian forces suffered
much heavier casualties at Voronezh, than during the whole War of Independence
in 1848–49. The official propaganda concealed the true casualty rate. The public
79 Idem, p. 205.
80 Jóvérné 1987, p. 142.
81 Idem, p. 156.
82 Idem, p. 208.
83 Idem, p. 209.
111
was not aware of the rates of destruction and the role of the Germans.”84 Basically,
the coursebook does not blame Horthy for the failed exit attempt and then
for Szálasi’s appointment; in fact, it describes the former with a slightly wry
humour: “Horthy’s proclamation via radio on October 15 asking for an armistice
was unexpected for the country.” This surprise effect could obviously be
beneficial. “However, this unprepared move by the regent was not a surprise for
the Germans, but for his own potential allies.”85 The structure, use of concepts,
phrasing and sources of this coursebook are remarkably similar to Balogh’s
book. However, there are significant differences at some points. Observing the
years of publication (1987 and 1988), it is surprising that two years before the
transition, this book carries on the politicised content of Balogh’s coursebook,
which was first published in 1972 and then had 14 editions until 1987.
The transition and what comes after

The first edition of the new Jóvérné coursebook86 was published before the
transition, and the last one after that.87 The version published in 1991 is already
a large-format publication with a colourful cover, pictures and charts, compared
to the other coursebooks written by Endre Balogh and Ágota Jóvérné Szirtes.
Two things are worth considering before reviewing the content: on the one
hand, this book was published in 1991, two years after the transition; on the
other hand, the author(s) notes in the introduction that “It is also natural that
there are […] debates and disagreements among historians in the assessment
of certain events. Our coursebook conveys the current knowledge and values of
historical science.”88
84 Idem, p. 212.
85 Idem, p. 216.
86 Jóvérné & Sipos 1991. Edited by: Balogh, S. & Horányi, I. The first edition was published in
1982 under the name of Jóvérné Szirtes, Á.
87 “[…] suddenly compiled in the year of the transition, this textbook variant was written by
the earlier authors, Ágota Jóvérné Szirtes and Péter Sipos […]” Murányi 2006.
88 Jóvérné & Sipos 1991, p. 5.
112
What is the value system this coursebook represents in 1991 in relation to

the Horthy era? At first sight, it seems the same as the original edition in 1982,
and nothing seems to have changed compared to Jóvérné’s other coursebook
and the texts of Balogh (see above)! The text begins with the fact that the
early Horthy era saw the White Terror “raging” as never before, namely the
extrajudicial killing of citizens had never happened before in Hungarian history.89
However, the tone of the book then changes: István Bethlen no longer wanted
a conservative dictatorship, but a conservative parliamentary democracy;90 the
nature of the Horthy regime is now controversial:91 Some highlight its fascist,
others its liberal, and still others its conservative dictatorial characteristics.92
The Christian-national ideology of the era was “rooted in the deep and sincere
religiosity and related patriotism of most of the masses.”93 Yet Gyula Gömbös was
still considered as a user of dictatorial and fascist methods.94 In the 1930s, a
struggle arose between conservative forces and social groups seeking to establish
a fascist dictatorship and not between conservative-reactionary seemingly
parliamentary methods and total fascism, as Jóvérné’s other book95 also
mentions.96 Teleki’s suicide is put in a different perspective in this coursebook:
“With this act of great moral value, the Prime Minister wanted to warn the nation
of an impending tragedy.”97 The bombing of Kassa also appears in more subtle
ways: “[…] unidentified aircraft bombed Kassa. The military leadership attributed
this action to Soviet aircraft.”98 Description of the catastrophe at the Don, and
the Hungarian exit attempt, as well as Szálasi’s appointment99 remained almost
completely unchanged, compared to the other coursebook by Jóvérné.
89 Idem, p. 99.
90 Idem, p. 103.
91 Idem, p. 105.
92 Ibid.
93 Idem, p. 117.
94 Idem, p. 124.
95 Jóvérné 1987.
96 Jóvérné & Sipos 1991, p. 124.
97 Idem, p. 151.
98 Ibid.
99 Idem, p. 155, p. 158.
113
It is also typical of this coursebook, along with almost all of the previous
ones, that there are indisputable answers to questions disputed in historical
science, and the main text is basically not explaining, but describing the events.
The topics and the structure are both broadly in line with the subsequent
books, except that relatively strong emphasis is still placed on the communist
resistance.100 Nevertheless, the impact of the change in political regime is
substantial for this coursebook, but as regards the method, it follows the
previous editions.
There are no questions, no comprehensive analysis and no thought-
provoking pros and cons in the main text. However, a significant part of the
vocabulary of communist historiography has been removed from the main text,
and many value judgments (except for the evaluation of the White Terror) have
been refined. In fact, these descriptions are remarkably similar to the content
of coursebooks written up to 2005, more specifically, later coursebooks largely
use similar wording. In effect, it is plain to see in this book how socialist content
has been transformed step by step; how it has been refined or just changed to
opposite assessments; and the structure, nodes, issues, at least for most of them,
remained, in essence, decisive later on.
In summary, other coursebooks typically contain an abundance of data,
suggest objectivity by avoiding both ideological, emotional and evaluating
expressions in general. Instead of discussing these books in detail, here are only
a few ideas of how the Horthy era or some of its elements are evaluated.
The coursebook entitled History 4. 1914–1990101 shows a detailed and
data-driven description of 76 years indicated in the title in a total of 325 pages
(including all the annexes). In relation to the spirituality of the era, the book
puts the expressions Christian and national in quotes and also explains it why:
namely, they were interpreted only as rhetorical clichés by many.102 It takes a
stand in favour of Teleki’s suicide, the prime minister “escaped responsibility
100 Idem, pp. 128–130. Lesson entitled Leftist forces against fascism.
101 The book was compiled by a working community invited by the Lajos Magyar Foundation,
including Tamás Krausz and László Szarka. Well-known historians, such as Lajos Izsák and
Ignác Romsics were also added as editors.
102 Ibid.
114
and committed suicide […] He may have hoped his action would provide Horthy
a basis for withdrawing at the last minute.”103 The issue of bombing of Kassa
is not raised in connection with Hungary’s entry into the war.104 Regarding
the atrocities in Újvidék, the author mentions that the chief officers in charge
were convicted and escaped from the country and joined the SS; and beyond
that, Hungarians living in Serbia fell victim to retaliation after the war.105 The
expression “catastrophe at the Don” is not mentioned in this book, instead, it
is simply the annihilation of the Hungarian Second Army, as a result of which
“120,000 soldiers and forced labourers were lost.”106 The text does not blame
Horthy personally for the failed exit attempt and Szálasi’s appointment, but it
describes the withdrawal in detail107 and also gives an in-depth analysis of the
consequences of the Arrow Cross rule (which, unlike by others, is not called a
terror) and the principle of “enduring to the end”.108
Unlike most other coursebooks, the one by László Lator, Jr.109 gives a
description of the White Terror as follows: “Judicial (and extrajudicial)
proceedings were also instituted against the participants in the revolutions
[…]. In general, units continued to autonomously engage in acts of deadly
retribution, sometimes though with implied consent of Horthy. They carried
through with killings which claimed victims including the so-called Lenin
boys, communist leaders, as well as social democrats and sympathisers of
revolutions. Anti-Semitism was gaining ground. Many were imprisoned and
forced to emigrate.”110 The “kingdom without a king” and the powers of
the regent are analysed on the basis of pros and cons: (1) Horthy had the
right to dissolve the National Assembly only in the event that its functions
suffered from “prolonged incapacitation”; (2) the regent’s authority was not
103 Idem, p. 102.

104 Idem, p. 104.
105 Idem, p. 107.
106 Idem, p. 109.
107 Idem, p. 117.
108 Idem, pp. 118–121. At this point, it does not talk about the Hungarian Holocaust, but
earlier, in connection with the German occupation (Idem, p. 115).
109 Lator 1995. First edition. Edited by: Horváth, J. & Salamon, K.
110 Idem, p. 58.
115
hereditary; (3) the regent could be held liable; (4) the regent’s approval was
not required for laws entering into force; and (5) on election day, the military
surrounded the Parliament.111 However, we do not gain a detailed picture
of the consequences of the Trianon Peace Treaty; there is only a one-page
summary of it.112 A description of the 1920s is similar to other coursebooks:
numerus clausus, agrarian reform, royal coups, Bethlen Consolidation.
At the same time, the Frank counterfeit scandal is also included,113 but
the presentation of culture and spirituality of the era was omitted. After
Bethlen’s resignation, Gyula Károlyi (and, unlike in most coursebooks, the
bombing of Szilveszter Matuska) is also mentioned, followed by Gömbös,
who regarded Italian fascist system to be his primary political model.114 In
describing the governments of Prime Minister Darányi and Imrédy, and the
successes of the revision, the theory of “drifting towards Nazi Germany” or
“moving to the right” as well as ethnic conflicts arising during the revision of
the territorial changes, unlike in many coursebooks, are not emphasised. The
death of Teleki and the bombing of Kassa are also not called into question.115
In connection with the catastrophe at the Don, the following data is provided:
40,000 people died, 70,000 were wounded or taken prisoner.116 The exit
attempt and Szálasi’s appointment is not evaluated. However, the text places
a relatively strong emphasis on social and political anti-Nazism, so unlike
most coursebooks, the Hungarian National Uprising Liberation Committee
(MNFFB)117 and the fact that Stalin did not support Hungarian anti-Nazi
partisan movements118 are also mentioned. Although this is not justified in
the text, it remains as a question for the students.119
111 Idem, p. 60.

112 Idem, p. 63.
113 Idem, p. 89.
114 Idem, p. 110.
115 Idem, pp. 158–159.
116 Idem, p. 162. (The data is the same as in Jóvérné’s book published in 1987.)
117 Idem, p. 167.
118 Idem, p 168.
119 Idem, p. 170.
116
Since its first publication, the Salamon book120 has been a focus of public
attention and some of its parts have been criticised or examined by many. The
coursebook is basically centred on political history, including a wealth of facts,
dates and names. This is immediately clear when describing the beginning of
the Horthy era: “The attention of the Friedrich government […] turned to the
National Army, the only armed force with actual power, and its commander,
Miklós Horthy. Even at the time of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Horthy – as
defence minister in the counter-government in Szeged – began raising the National
Army. At the beginning of August, he established the General Command of the
National Army, and then flew to Siófok to set up his headquarters there. Thus,
Central and Southern Transdanubia came under his control.”121
The coursebook compiled by Gyula Hosszú may be the most data-driven
of all.122 It is clear from the fact that it presents thirty years in the title in almost
400 pages. The lesson entitled Victory of the Counter-Revolution first includes a
short biography of Miklós Horthy; it then describes the White Terror in great
detail; and after that, it compares the Red and White Terror, quoting sources on
both grouped in two columns, that is, using the means of comparison, source
criticism, and pros and cons. According to his biography, Horthy is basically
not considered as a talented politician. The opening sentence states: “Chance
played a very important role in his career. The Tisza and Horthy families had
strong ties of friendship.”123 The White Terror appears as follows: “Miklós Horthy,
commander-in-chief of the National Army raised by the counter-government in
Szeged, moved to Transdanubia with his troops. The independence of the General
Command severely undermined the authority of the government in Szeged, so
[…] the government finally resigned. Horthy […] began to operate autonomously
of the Friedrich government too. He recruited soldiers, seized large sums of money
120 Salamon 1995. The first edition was published in 1995 and then reprinted nine times
until 2003. Edited by: Litván, Gy. & Párdányi, M. The book is currently published by the
Nemzedékek Tudása Textbook Publisher, in essentially unchanged form and content
regarding the Horthy era.
121 Salamon 1995, p. 52.
122 Hosszú 1996. Edited by: Horváth, J. & Horváth, P.
123 Idem, p. 52.
117
in financial institutions to buy weapons and ammunition in Austria. His army,

led mainly by gentry officers, […] operated freely […] The officer forces moved
through Transdanubia with cavalry units and punished the local leaders and
sympathisers of the revolutions by beatings and hangings. Jewish descent was
often enough to merit punishment. Jews and communists were the same in the
minds of detachment officers. The White Terror proclaimed an unchangeable
world order, the futility of rebellion. Although Horthy did not initiate terror, he
first acknowledged it.”124 In comparing the pre-1918 and 1920 electoral laws as
well as in describing Horthy’s powers as regent and its expansion in 1937, the
text again uses a very illustrative comparison to describe the democracy of the
Horthy regime.125 The peace treaty concluded in Versailles is elaborated in a 12-
page lesson, including a description of the Treaty of Trianon, ethnic maps and
data tables. In connection with the Christian national idea, and presented as a
contrast, there are many quotations to read from Dezső Szabó, Béla Bangha,
Ottokár Prohászka as well as Gyula Szekfű’s Three Generations.
In a large thematic unit entitled Hungary (1931–1939) there is a brief
description of the Károlyi government, followed by another concise summary
of Gyula Gömbös (the issue of “fascism” is not mentioned, but the reforms),126
and a very extensive section on society, artistic styles, ideas and political trends.
The latter includes a description of Liberals, which is completely missing from
most coursebooks. The text then returns to political history, followed by a
description of the Darányi and Imrédy governments; again, using sources, the
text describes the parliamentary debate pros and cons on the Jewish law grouped
in two columns, unlike most Hungarian coursebooks,127 and also writes about
the negotiations in Bled in connection with the First Vienna Award.128
The topic of the second Teleki government was included in the large unit about
the Second World War. Teleki’s death is clear: “The concept of armed neutrality had
collapsed. In Hungary, there was no basis for an open confrontation with the Germans.
124 Idem, pp. 51–52.

125 Idem, p. 55.
126 Idem, p. 247.
127 Idem, p. 277.
128 Idem, p. 278.
118
Teleki committed suicide at dawn on 3 April. His suicide note was concealed.”129 The
main text gives a detailed description of the bombing of Kassa, as a pretext for
war, and mentions, for example, that not only was there a bombing, but a high-
speed train was also fired on; however, as in other coursebooks, contradictory facts
masking the nationality of the bombing aircraft are not revealed, and, of course,
theories about potential perpetrators are not included either.130 The “catastrophe
at the Don” is also indicated in great detail supplemented by a text source and
a map.131 In connection with the German occupation, the book gives a detailed
description of the meeting in Klessheim, which never or hardly ever appears in
other coursebooks.132 Moreover, it is compared by juxtaposing two sources, a
description by Hitler’s chief interpreter and Horthy’s memoirs:133 Horthy is not
blamed expressis verbis for the failure of the exit attempt, the text only suggests
it: “[…] the commanders of the Hungarian units in the city disobeyed the ‘supreme
warlord’ […], but in the morning, Horthy himself gave an order to cease resistance.
[…] In exchange for assurances that his son would be released from captivity, Horthy
approved appointing Szálasi to serve as prime minister.”134 It is interesting that
Szálasi’s “terror” is not explained in great detail, but Hungarian resistance, such as
the Hungarian National Uprising Liberation Committee (MNFFB),135 which is not
mentioned in other coursebooks (except one), the siege of Budapest136 as well as
the reprisals against Hungarians in the surrounding states are presented in detail.137
Even in the early 2000s, several books were published,138 similar to current
coursebooks as regards their appearance and methodological solutions. However,
they do not achieve a paradigm shift in the evaluation of the Horthy era.
129 Idem, p. 297.

130 Idem, p. 310.
131 Idem, p. 312.
132 Idem, p. 329.
133 Idem, p. 330.
134 Idem, p. 338.
135 Idem, p. 342.
136 Idem, p. 343.
137 Idem, p. 345.
138 Kovács & Kovácsné 2001; Bihari, Dupcsik, & Répárszky 2001; Dupcsik, Répárszky & Ujvári
2002.
119
Summary
In reviewing several coursebooks, it is clear that those published until 1989
were marked by direct, clear socialist phraseology and a negative evaluation
of the Horthy era. As regards the texts, Jóvérné’s book represents an interim
solution, which changed the assessment at a few points and removed most
of the vocabulary of the socialist ideology. The language of the coursebooks
published in the 1990s and 2000s was objective (without anger, with less
emotion and evaluation, thus seemingly objective); and their content included
a large amount of data, factual information and various textual sources. Thus,
unlike pre-1989 coursebooks, they suggest an assessment and an opinion of the
Horthy era only by reading between the lines; this may be concluded from the
number, selection and content of the preferred facts and sources.
120
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Képek és arcképek a magyarországi történelemtanítás múltjából VII. [n. d., n. a.]
http://www.folyoirat.tortenelemtanitas.hu/wp-content/uploads/ 2009/12/
Kepek_es_arckepekVII.pdf (downloaded on 21 May 2020)
Kosáry, D. & Mérei, Gy. (1945). Magyarország története. A szatmári békétől
napjainkig. A gimnáziumok VIII., a líceumok, gazdasági középiskolák és a
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tanító-(nő)-képző intézetek IV. osztálya számára. Szikra. Budapest.

Kovács, I. & Kovácsné Bede, Á. (2001). Történelem tankönyv 12. osztály.
Pedellus. Debrecen.
Lator, L., Jr. (1995). Történelem a középiskolák IV. osztálya számára. Nemzeti
Lukács, L. (1950). Magyarország története 1849–1950-ig. III. rész. Ideiglenes
tankönyv. Tankönyvkiadó. Budapest.
Lukács, L. (1954). A magyar nép története. III. rész 1849-től napjainkig.
Murányi, G. Történelemtankönyvek és ideológiák. http://hvg.hu/
itthon/200615HVGFriss1515156 (downloaded on 21 May 2020)
Nagy Imréné, Kempelen, I., Bellér, B. & Incze, M. (1955). A magyar nép története.
III. rész. 1849–1948. Ideiglenes tankönyv. Tankönyvkiadó. Budapest.
Salamon, K. (1995). Történelem IV. a középiskolák számára. Nemzeti
Szamuely, T., Ránki, Gy. & Almási, J. (1967). Történelem a gimnáziumok IV.
osztálya számára. Tankönyvkiadó. Budapest.
Szamuely, T. & Ránki, Gy. (1960). Történelem. Az általános gimnáziumok IV.
osztálya számára. Tankönyvkiadó. Budapest.
Történelem IV. 1914–1990. (1994). Korona Kiadó. Budapest.
Varga, Z. (1946). Magyarország története II. A szatmári békétől. Gimnáziumok
és leánygimnáziumok VIII. osztály számára. Tiszántúli református
egyházkerület könyvnyomda-vállalata. Debrecen.
122
T H E R O L E O F M E S T E R F I L M K F T. I N C R E AT I N G N AT I O N A L I S T F I L M P R O D U C T I O N
CSABA KÁSA
THE ROLE OF MESTERFILM KFT.

IN CREATING NATIONALIST FILM
PRODUCTION
“I must confess, I consider cinema to be more important than parliament, than

the Monarchy’s politics in the Balkans, the pension law or Pavlik,1 because
[…] it is enormous social propaganda, if they learn how to use it” wrote Dezső
Szabó in the periodical Nyugat in 1912.2 He was not only a thinker with a
prophetic vision on this issue alone, but this particular prognosis turned out
to be fundamentally important. The essence of film production in the period
from the end of the 1930s is generally disguised by saying that “the films of the
period were entertainment industry products, and they were made with this
admitted purpose all around the world,” as István Nemeskürty noted in his
book reflecting socialist cultural policy.3 But this is only half the truth, because
in Hungary – where at the time two worlds were living side by side – it was only
natural that both sides used the opportunities inherent in cinematographic art
to spread their own ideas, cultures and life experiences. Thus, taking Szabó’s
opinion into account as well, the previous statement could be modified to say
that film production in the 1920s and 1930s was a profit-generating business, as
well as propaganda for the lifestyle of one of the two worlds and a mirror of their
1 Obstructing opposition representatives were led out of the Parliament on 4 July and 17
September 1912 by Police Inspector Ferenc Pavlik’s men on the orders of István Tisza.
2 Szabó 1912, Moziban [In the cinema]. Nyugat, 5(24) p. 976.
3 Nemeskürty 1983, p. 361.
123
desires. The other world – the Hungarian world – could not just idly stand by
and watch, but they did not have many tools at their disposal, precisely because
in the era of free entrepreneurship the film industry also operated perfectly well
as a lucrative line of business, and governments were not supposed to interfere
with business. They had no other options but to use indirect tools such as
formulating expectations and a system of funding and censorship, which at
that time was accepted as natural around the world.
Government expectations were straightforward and well-known. “A strong
sense of duty must permeate every aspect of state-controlled Hungarian film
production. […] The Hungarian past and Hungarian life are full of intriguing
issues. Capture those with courage. Let us strive to take part in the spiritually
uplifting work, the successful accomplishment of which the future of the
Hungarian people depends on.”4 This requirement was reiterated to Hungarian
filmmakers by State Secretary Gyula Wlassics,5 Chairman of the Hungarian
National Film Committee,6 in the introduction of the book published for the
10th anniversary of sound film production. In other words, participating in
working towards the Hungarian future with Hungarian dedication through
topics taken from the Hungarian past and present. In short, we can call this
nationalist film production.
In this study, we seek to answer the question why – 10 years after the first
fully Hungarian-talking feature film7 – this still had to be specially requested
4 Lajta 1942, pp. 4–5.

5 The sources of biographical details in this study are primarily from: Gulyás (1939–1944):
Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon 1000–1990. http://mek.oszk.hu/00300/00355/; Magyar írók
élete és munkái. Arranged for publication by János Viczián with the use of Pál Gulyás’
data collections. Vol. VII–XIX. Budapest (1990–2002). Magyar Katolikus Lexikon. http://
lexikon.katolikus.hu/; Magyar zsidó lexikon. http://mek.oszk.hu/04000/04093/; Pallas
Nagy Lexikona. http://mek.oszk.hu/00000/00060/ andhttp://mek.oszk.hu/09300/09332/;
Révai nagy lexikona. http://mek.oszk.hu/06700/06758/; Szinnyei, J. Magyar írók élete és
munkái. http://mek.oszk.hu/03600/03630/.
6 Dr Baron Gyula Lóránt Wlassics, Jr., de Zalánkemén (1884–1962), writer, state secretary.
Obtained his doctorate in political sciences at Budapest University (today: Eötvös Loránd
University). He held various offices in the Ministry of Religion and Public Education
from 1908 until 1944 when he retired. He was Chairman of the Hungarian National Film
Committee from 1940 until 1944.
7 In the literature, the 400. Magyar Világhíradó [the 400th Hungarian World News], which
124
and emphasised. We then describe a film company launched in 1938, which

worked according to the above principles, while generating profit for its owners
and the country as well.
In autumn 1929, the first partly talking film was imported into Hungarian
cinemas from overseas, which was followed by several other such films in the
same year. At the same time, Fox Movietone News recorded a sound newsreel
with Miklós Horthy in which the regent sent a message to the American people.
In the almost 18-minute footage recorded on a hunting trip with Archduke
Joseph August, Prime Minister István Bethlen appears at the side of the head
of state.8 At the time, previously recorded silent films were dubbed afterwards,
and sound films in Hungarian were produced in Paris, where production
conditions were already developed. Market actors saw the business opportunity,
and cinema owners started to acquire the necessary film projection equipment.
The state began laying down the foundations, probably to keep Hungarian
sound film production within the borders of the country. The Hunnia Film
Studio, which was already owned by the state,9 was modernised and expanded.
From the numerous technical possibilities available, the German Tobis-Klang
aired in October 1931, is considered to be the first fully talking newsreel and A kék bálvány
[A Blue Idol], which premiered on 25 September 1931, to be the first fully Hungarian sound
feature film.
8 See Kása 2020c for more details.
9 The first studio with the name Hunnia was built in an area now called Újlipótváros in
June 1911. In 1925, the government took control of reviving national film production. A
regulation was issued to establish the Film Industry Fund and the Hungarian Film Office.
In 1928, the former bought the Corvin Film Studio in Zugló [part of Budapest] which
had gone bankrupt, and at the same time the government established Hunnia Filmgyár
Zrt. to operate the studio and tasked it with feature film production. Distributors had
to pay contributions to the Film Industry Fund on the foreign films shown in Hungary.
This revenue boosted Hungarian film production and the Fund provided working capital
for Hunnia from it. The most modern film studio in Eastern Europe up to that point
was constructed based on the designs of Gyula Jenő Padányi in 1936. Following Soviet
occupation, it was assigned to the authority of the Department of Art in the Ministry of
Religion and Public Education, and communist censorship was exercised by the National
Motion Picture Audit Committee of the Ministry of Interior. In 1948, several film studios
were merged into a so-called national film corporation, which was then nationalised in
1949 and continued operation as the Magyar Filmgyártó Nemzeti Vállalat (MAFILM).
125
system10 was selected, with Minister of Interior Béla Scitovszky11 personally

negotiating the purchase in Berlin. At the same time, the government amended
the film regulations. Distributors had to pay a surcharge to the Film Industry
Fund based on the length of the films produced abroad and imported to
Hungarian cinemas. This income – amounting to 2–3 million pengős – was
spent on developing Hungarian film production: maintaining Hunnia, which
provided the studio facilities, and financing the costs of film shooting periods.
In addition, any company that created at least 400 metres of Hungarian-talking
film footage, received a discount on imported films.
Filming of the first Hungarian sound film began on 29 April 1931 with
Minister of Interior Scitovszky and Minister of Trade János Bud12 present at
the Hunnia Film Studio, which was modernised using the new technology.13 In
his opening speech, the Minister of Interior stressed that “achieving Hungarian
success amidst the cutthroat competition of nations is a hundredfold more
difficult. There is all the more reason to rejoice over a result which provides new
opportunities for the creative forces of the nation. […] I sincerely hope that
this studio will not only produce something Hungarian, but something good as
well.”14 According to the Minister of Trade, the two prerequisites of Hungarian
film production were met by this modern and Hungarian film studio. The tasks
set for the future included: “To have Hungarian capital operate in the studio,
to have Hungarian labour and knowledge benefit there, to have Hungarian art
10 For more details: https://www.hangosfilm.hu/filmenciklopedia/tobis-klang; (downloaded

on 13 May 2020)
11 Dr Béla Scitovszky (1878–1959), Chairman of the National Assembly, minister. Member of
the National Assembly from 1910 until 1935, elected Deputy Chairman twice, Chairman
for one term. Minister of Interior between 1926 and 1931.
12 Dr János Bud (1880–1950), professor at the University of Technology, minister. Minister
without portfolio between 1922 and 1924, Finance Minister until 1928, Minister of
Economy without portfolio between 1928 and 1931, also Minister of Trade from 1929.
13 We found no data on how much the state spent on the reconstruction of the Hunnia.
According to the media coverage of the period, the image and sound recording machines
cost 700,000 pengős. By comparison, in the following years the budgets for individual
films were between 100,000 and 120,000 pengős, and generating this amount exceeded the
potentials of most businesses. This meant that had the state not provided the conditions,
there would not have been sound film production in Hungary.
14 Lajta 1942, pp. 22–23.
126
triumph there and to have the Hungarian general public support the results
of such production; thus Hungarian film production is created.”15 Hence, the
government representatives made their expectations clear. They did not make
these requests without reason, as they had created all of the conditions and
secured the necessary financing in advance. Even Nemeskürty admitted this in
his book published in 1983. “It is a fact that without the firm, untiring support
of the Royal Hungarian Government, Hungarian sound film production could
not have been established.”16
Consequently, everything was in place to establish a fruitful, long-term
cooperation between the two sides – the film production enterprises, and the
state offering finances and infrastructure. But this is not what happened. The
main reason for this, as we see, is that the business side did not fulfil even the
bare minimum expected of it.
What kind of films were made until 1939 when the Chamber of Theatre
and Film Arts was established? Light-hearted comedies that disregarded the
problems of the Hungarian people and the countryside, and were intended
mainly for audiences in Budapest and other large cities. Naturally, the fact that
all the cinemas and thus the audiences were there, was a contributing factor,
while farmers, the rural proletariat and the poor were simply preoccupied with
making ends meet.
Let us take a look at the film Hyppolit, the Butler [Hungarian title: Hyppolit,
a lakáj], the second sound film produced, which premiered in late autumn 1931
and has been referred to as a model film ever since. The plot is well-known: the
lady of the upstart, nouveau riche Schneider family reckons the time has come
– as they have already gathered enough money – to align with the aristocracy,
which they wish to blend into, in appearances if nothing else. She hires a butler,
who previously served at a baron’s house, to force the family into adopting
aristocratic manners. The petty bourgeois head of the family, the chattering-
stumbling Jew cannot and will not participate. Which is cause enough for some
scenes that seem comic to some, but are deplorably tiresome for others. The
15 Lajta 1942, p. 23.

127
topic and the story are entirely removed from Hungarian everyday life and
from Hungarian culture in general. Just remember, one of the “most comic”
scenes where Mr Schneider, the businessman, wants to eat onions with his
dinner in secret in his grand dining room framed with marble columns. At
his wife’s request, saying she will not tolerate onions at the dinner table, he
replies: “What now? Shall I have the roasted duck with violets, or even better
with a-a-anemones?” However, the manners of eating roast duck were not part
of Hungarian culture at all, even then.17
In 1934, the film The Dream Car [Hungarian title: Meseautó] introduces
the genre of comedy, which dominated this kind of film production until 1939.
These are simple love stories focusing on misunderstandings between couples
and finding each other. Variations of the plotline elements of The Dream Car
make up many later films. Certain pieces are set in a bourgeois milieu. One half
of the couple is from a richer or higher social class than the other. The marriage
concluded means progress on the financial or social ladder as well. Comic twists
can be based on love triangles or a third person, such as an opposing parent,
hindering fulfilment. It often happens that a person pretends or is believed to
be someone else, generally someone poorer, than in reality. It can generally
be stated that the conflicts are always resolved and the stories have a happy
ending. “As a result, although Hungarian films of the period do represent the
social inequalities and the desire to reach higher, they do this in a way not
to provoke the established order under any circumstances. The protagonists
do not even think about rebelling and questioning social relations. With luck,
some may have the chance to advance, but the only secure solution for that is
good marriage – it is not by accident that this becomes the central theme of
these films.”18 Hence this type of film is nothing other than a self-portrait of
the bourgeoisie climbing the social ladder. Their desire is to integrate into the
aristocracy. It is not by chance that the protagonists of these films tackle the
obstacles without criticising society or rebelling, nor is it sheer coincidence that
17 The film has been a success with audiences ever since, and many consider it a significant
work.
18 Vajdovich 2014.
128
they always achieve their goals. “A common theme of these films is that upward
financial and social mobility is something one has to earn, and as the fairy tales
go, those who do not strive, will not succeed.”19 At the same time, this is the key
to the success of these films too, since some of the viewers living in Budapest
and other large cities dreamt of such achievements: getting rich without work,
gaining access to higher social groups – and in the manner portrayed in these
films: triumphantly and as heroes.
As opposed to the expectations announced at the start of sound film
production and continuously stressed thereafter, this ideology dominated most
of the Hungarian films of the era. Nemeskürty’s data suggest, that “in the four
years between 1934 and 1939, 75 comedies were produced with the ‘dream car’
pattern in Hungarian film studios.”20 According to his compilation, The Dream
Car was the 26th sound film, while the last sound film released in 1939 was the
135th. This means that 75 of the 110 films produced in the period were made
with a storyline resembling that of The Dream Car. Almost three quarters of
them!
Based on the above, it is understandable that from the middle of the 1930s,
successive governments were searching for methods to regulate film production
in conjunction with nationalist interests. In the first period, they had only one
tool to achieve this: distributing studio time at Hunnia between production
companies, but this only gave them a chance to select from among existing film
proposals. For a while, preliminary and subsequent censorship only examined
legal compliance; later it ensured the protection of the ideal of a national state
and religious sentiments as well. In 1940, adherence to cultural requirements
was included in the evaluation system.21 But this was only enough to fine-tune
the existing film market. These measures did not yet establish nationalist film
production. In our opinion, the initiative of some small groups in this direction
was influenced, supported and encouraged by certain people in government.
19 Ibid.
21 For more detail, see Záhonyi-Ábel 2013.
129
On 29 December 1942, Antal Páger22 performed at the charity gala of the

two magazines Magyar Futár [Hungarian Courier] and Egyedül Vagyunk [We
Are Alone], organised in support of the Red Cross. He held a presentation
on the birth of the Hungarian sound film. “And the truth is, that we are sadly
lagging behind our great foreign competitors with our shallow films. Among
the numerous problems, the most pressing ones were financing and directors.
The situation seemed almost hopeless, when fate graciously came to our aid.
News got out that the ‘colony of Hungarians’, who had emigrated to Berlin a
couple of years earlier and took up positions in the German ‘film and related
industries’, was coming back to Pest. They were dragged back not exactly by
homesickness, they were kind of forced to come. Then they arrived. And since
they were here, they took over the impoverished, floundering Hungarian film
production.”23 This is how Páger recalled the beginnings, which based on the
first part of our study, we could call the “dream car” period. Páger and his friends
also felt the need for change. He did not explain who he talked to, only the fact
that plans were being made. “Yes, we sat down and talked. We were looking
for real Hungarian cinematography, which not only entertains, but to some
extent educates too. The new Hungarian film, which shows our faults as well,
so that we can learn from them. Hungarian cinematography that builds faith
and self-confidence in the common people, who tend to feel looked down on
and oppressed, often unjustly. Depicting peasants, often flouted by comedies,
as human beings. Showing the young generation of educators, what a majestic
profession they have to fulfil, scaring misled Hungarian workers away from
malignant communist teachings, fostering social cohesion without incitement.
In short, how to be Hungarian! This is our goal, this is what we wish to serve
with our humble creative skills. ‘Poverty’, as clever old film professionals used
to say, was finally shown on the big cinema screen. Bathtub and bar scenes
could be replaced by the issues of ordinary people. And if some people call
them propaganda films a hundred times, or even mock our films, so be it! We
22 For biography details, see Kása 2020a.

23 A magyar film és a Magyar Nemzet [The Hungarian Film and the Hungarian Nation]
Ellenzék, 5 January 1943, p. 5.
130
are happy to make propaganda for the Hungarian peasants, for the Hungarian
workers, for the Hungarian educators, for the Hungarian engineers, for the
Szeklers, for the Hungarian mountain ranges, for the Carpathian Mountains,
for a happy Greater Hungary to come!”24
These goals, which had previously been formulated, soon found followers.
One such group was organised from the former leaders of the university youth
movements, and some members of the government supported them.
The founders of Mester Film Kft.25 – Miklós Mester, László Barla and Miklós
Szalontai Kiss, who will be introduced later – also acquainted themselves with
politics in these movements. Mester was Chairman of SzEFHE26 for a year,
Barla and Kiss were Chairman and Secretary General of MEFHOSz.27 Mester
considered Klára Zsindely-Tüdős28 as his political mentor, and in 1938 they
24 Ibid.
25 The press spread the Mesterfilm Kft. name, which the company came to call itself most of
the time in their own advertisements, on posters, and in film reels as well, when they were
not using their logo; therefore, from here onwards we will also refer to it this way, instead
of using the official name.
26 The following five people began organising the Association of Szekler University and College
Students (Hungarian abbreviation: SZEFHE) in 1920–1921: Antal Incze, Áron János,
Mihály Kolosváry-Borcsa, Gergely Sándor Zakariás and György Csanády. In Transylvania,
young people, whose mother tongue was Hungarian and did not know Romanian very well
and wanted a university degree were driven abroad, primarily to Hungary, which meant
leaving their homeland. The aim of the association was to keep alive and strengthen a sense
of belonging among Transylvanian Hungarian university students. In 1925, the Szekler
Cultural House was established on Liszt Ferenc Square, which was later renamed the
Szekler House. The house hosted exhibitions and literary events. The association published
books, it had a paper published weekly or fortnightly called Új Élet [New Life]. After 1945
the communist authorities dissolved the organisation.
27 Magyar Egyetemi és Főiskolai Hallgatók Országos Szövetsége [National Association of
University and College Students, Hungarian abbreviation: MEFHOSZ]. The association of
university and college student organisations was founded in 1920. It united support, self-
training, scientific and religious organisations. It was disbanded in 1945.
28 Klára Zsindely-Tüdős (1895–1980), applied artist, costume designer. From 1915 she
studied at the School of Applied Arts (today: MOME), then at the ethnography faculty of
the Budapest University as István Györffy’s student. From 1925 she was the designer and
head of the costume workshop at the Hungarian Royal Opera House. In 1938 she married
Ferenc Zsindely, state secretary, later minister (her second marriage). She participated in
the movement for exploring villages and supported the establishment of the István Györffy
College. From 1944 she held the position of Chairwoman of the National Reformist
Women’s Association at the request of László Ravasz. She founded Új Magyar Asszony
131
organised the Hungarian art exhibition in Transylvania together, which was to

open on the first day of the following year. Klára Tüdős’ second husband, Ferenc
Zsindely29 was then State Secretary of the Ministry of Religion and Public
Education. In 1939, during the election campaign he asked Mester through his
wife to accept candidacy to become a Member of Parliament.30 Later, Zsindely
held the position of State Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office under the
Teleki government. István Antal31, who worked in the press of the university
youth movements during the 1920s and was State Secretary of Justice at the
time, may have also belonged to this group, which might have been one of the
groups which – upon considering the government expectations – sensed that
with the social restructurings of the time a new need and skill was emerging to
capture the exemplary events of Hungarian history and the issues of Hungarian
fate on film. The cooperation is indirectly supported by several later facts as
[New Hungarian Woman], the newspaper of the Association. After the Arrow Cross Party’s
accession to power she hid Jews in her villa in Buda and the refugee home she operated in
the Darányi House. In 1949, the communist authorities banned her from working at the
women’s association. In 1950 all her wealth and properties were confiscated, and she was
deported together with her husband.
29 Dr Ferenc Zsindely de Borosjenő (1891–1963), lawyer, writer, minister. State Secretary of
the Ministry of Religion and Public Education from 1938, State Secretary of the Prime
Minister’s Office from 1939, Minister of Trade and Transport from 1943 until the German
occupation of the country. From 1931 until 1944 he was a Member of Parliament. In the
1950s his property was confiscated, and he was deported together with his wife.
30 For more detail, see Kása 2018.
31 Dr István Antal (1896–1975) lawyer, minister. He graduated from the Faculty of Law and
Political Sciences at Budapest University. In the 1920s he worked in the press of the university
youth movements; his lawyer’s office was mainly tasked with the legal representation of
Gyula Gömbös. In the first Gömbös government, he led the Press Department of the Prime
Minister’s Office, while in the second Gömbös government he was State Secretary of Policies
at the Ministry of Justice. He was subsequently state secretary in a number of governments.
He was the Minister of State Security and Propaganda in the Kállay government, and
Minister of Justice, Religion and Public Education in the Sztójay government. Between
1935 and 1944 he was a Member of Parliament. Following Szálasi’s accession to power he
was arrested and detained in Sopronkőhida. He was released in exchange for his resignation
as a Member of Parliament. He left for Germany, in the autumn of 1945 where he was taken
prisoner by the Americans. At the request of the Hungarian government, he was extradited
as a war criminal in October 1945 and transported to Budapest where he was sentenced
to death. Zoltán Tildy granted him clemency, and thus the “People’s Court” gave him a life
sentence to forced labour as a main punishment.
132
well. In the Sztójay government, Mester and Antal became State Secretaries of
the Ministry of Religion and Education and they supervised the issues of film
together. Tüdős was the costume designer for several Mesterfilm productions.
The company itself, Mesterfilm Kft., was established in April 1938 by Dr
Miklós Mester, Dr László Barla and Miklós Szalontai Kiss. The three owners
of the same age were working together in the university youth movements and
presumably were good friends as well.
Dr Miklós Mester was born in a Szekler farming family in Rugonfalva (today:
Rugănești Romania) in Udvarhely County in 1906. He passed his secondary
school final exams at the Unitarian Grammar School in Székelykeresztúr,
attended university in Budapest and received his PhD in Central-European
history in 1937. He was one of the founders and then an active member of
the left-wing literature society operating between the two World Wars, which
was named after Miklós Bartha, also born in Rugonfalva and previously a well-
known figure in the area. From 1931, he was Chairman of the SzEFHE. In 1939,
he was elected Member of Parliament for the Party of Hungarian Life by secret
ballot in the Ráckeve constituency. After Béla Imrédy left the government in
1940, Imrédy established the Party of Hungarian Renewal, which Mester also
joined, as he believed in the agrarian reform promised by the party. Thus,
he continued his parliamentary career as an opposition politician. After the
German occupation, he became State Secretary of the Ministry of Religion
and Public Education in the Sztójay government with the endorsement of the
Transylvania Party and prominent figures of Hungarian cultural life, a position
which he retained in the Lakatos government as well. Following the Arrow
Cross Party’s rise to power he went into hiding. After 1945 he was arrested
multiple times and was then deported. He could not continue his work as a
historian even after 1956 and was only able to take low-paid, manual office
jobs. The communist regime considered him an enemy of the state until 1987,
when he was deleted from the register, but only with regard to his age. He died
in Budapest in 1989.32
32 For more details, see Kása 2018.
133
Dr László Barla was born in 1905 in Pécs. He received a doctorate in

political science in 1936 and later became president of MEFHOSz. He was
the leader of the rental department of the Hunnia Film Studio from 1937 and
managing director of Mesterfilm Kft. from 1938 until its termination. In 1940,
he was a member of the organising committee of the 2nd National Film Week,
and from 1943 a member of the Supervisory Board of the Magyar Írók Filmje
Rt. He worked on the production of more than twenty films as a producer or
in various other roles. In 1945 he moved to Pécs and lived there through the
1950s. His time of death is unknown.
Miklós Szalontai Kiss was born in Békéssámson in 1906. He studied law
at university, and was Secretary General and then Chief Financial Officer of
MEFHOSz. In 1937, he trained himself to become a production manager. He was
the managing director and permanent production manager of Mesterfilm Kft.
from 1938 until its termination. Between 1939 and 1940, he was the managing
director of Takács Film Kft., and a member of the Hungarian Film Export
Cooperative from 1942. He was one of the organisers of the first Hungarian film
festival, the National Film Week in 1939. He was the publisher of the magazine
produced specifically for the occasion at the Palotaszálló hotel in Lillafüred.
After 1945 he was banned from working in the film industry by the authorities.
He was supervisor of economic affairs in the National Centre of the Independent
Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (Hungarian acronym: FkgP)
from 1945 until the party’s dissolution in 1950. Later, he worked in state farms
and finally as a chief accountant. He died in Budapest in 1974.
Their joint company was registered at the Royal Court of Budapest under
registration number Cg 40161/3. 28242/1. on 11 May 1938.33 The company’s
managing directors were Dr László Barla and Miklós Szalontai Kiss. It had a
share capital of ten thousand pengős: four thousand under Miklós Mester’s
name, and three thousand under each managing director’s name. The company
was supported with a loan: the National Independent Entrepreneurs Fund34
33 Központi Értesitő, 9 June 1938, p. 410.

34 A financial fund established by Decree 4.600. M.E. of 1937 on reasonable loans to support
the launch of independent careers in economic and intellectual sectors of the industry.
134
contributed forty thousand pengős, while Fritz Eisler (?), a Jewish film-maker
who emigrated from Germany, provided one hundred thousand pengős to help
start the business.35
Between 1938 and 1944, either alone or in cooperation with other film
production companies, Mesterfilm produced twenty-two films. 1938: Uz
Bence [Bence Uz], Szegény gazdagok [Poor Rich], Nincsenek véletlenek
[There are No Accidents]. 1939: A nőnek mindig sikerül [The Woman Always
Succeeds], Jöjjön elsején [Come on the First of the Month], Semmelweis. 1940:
Egy csók és más semmi [Just a Kiss, Nothing More], Dankó Pista [Pista Dankó],
A szerelem nem szégyen [Love is Nothing to be Ashamed of]. 1941: András
[Andrew], Havasi napsütés [Sunshine in the Mountains], Haláltánc [Danse
Macabre]. 1942: Fráter Lóránd [Friar Lóránd], Őrségváltás [Changing of the
Guard], Férfihűség [Male Fidelity], Gyávaság [Cowardice], Négylovas hintó
[Four-horse Carriage]. 1943: Makacs Kata [Stubborn Kata], Sziámi macska
[Siamese Cat]. 1944: Boldoggá teszlek [I will Make You Happy], Fiú, vagy
leány [Boy or Girl?]. Their film entitled Tengerparti randevú [Rendezvous on
the Beach] was produced with Bulgarian cooperation in 1943. Their most
often employed actors and actresses were Zita Szeleczky,36 Bea Goll,37 Antal
Páger, Pál Jávor38 and Gyula Csortos.39
35 ÁBTL 3.1.9. V-91291. 4.

36 For biographical details, see Kása 2020b.
37 Bea (Beatrix) Goll (1927–2014), actress, dancer. She played her first role at the age of 14 and
appeared in seven films altogether. In 1948 she emigrated to Switzerland, became a photo
model and a ballet instructor.
38 Pál Jávor (original surname: Jermann) (1902–1959), actor. He attended the Academy of
Dramatic Arts (today: University of Theatre and Film Arts in Budapest, SZFE) and received
his diploma at the school of the National Association of Actors and Actresses in 1922.
Following a number of contracts in Budapest and the countryside, he was a member of the
National Theatre from 1935. He acted in the last silent film, and by the mid-1930s he had
become the greatest star and male idol of his period. He appeared in 73 films. In 1946, he
emigrated to the USA. He returned to Hungary in 1957.
39 Gyula Csortos (1883–1945), actor. After graduating from the Academy of Dramatic Arts
he performed in several theatres of larger cities around the country and then in Budapest.
From 1924 until his death he was a member, and then an artist of the National Theatre.
From 1912 he appeared in 80 films altogether.
135
After being elected a Member of Parliament, Mester sold his business share
in 1940 to Barla and Szalontai Kiss in a fifty-fifty ratio. Thus, the two managing
directors became the sole owners.40
Of the nine films they produced in the period 1938–1940, we describe three
in more detail, as they are closely related to the topic of our study.
Mesterfilm Kft. made its first film in 1938 based on József Nyírő’s book entitled
Uz Bence published in 1933. We found mention of the fact that the company was
established for the adaptation of this novel in one of the period’s papers.41 There
may have been several reasons why the company managers chose Uz Bence.
Mester, the majority owner of the company, had roots in Szeklerland, which
might have contributed to the decision. His birthplace, Rugonfalva, was only 20
km away from Nyírő’s residence at the time, the county capital Székelyudvarhely
(today: Odorheiu Secuiesc, Romania). No reference could be found in Mester’s
autobiography42 as to when the historian and the writer first met. In 1937, Nyírő
published a glowing review of Mester’s recently published work Az autonóm Erdély
[Autonomous Transylvania] in the Keleti Újság [Eastern Paper].43 Presumably,
they built a strong friendship, because it was in this period that Mester married
Valéria Végh and asked Nyírő to be his best man at the wedding.44 This may have
been the reason why the writer ultimately chose Mesterfilm from the long queue of
production companies eager to adapt his novel. According to other media reports,
the idea to start the adaptation of Nyírő’s novels to the screen with Uz Bence came
from János Bingert, Chief Executive Officer of the Hunnia Film Studio,45 because
40 Due to the lack of resources, we cannot judge whether Miklós Mester played a role in the
company’s operations after selling his share.
41 Film készül Nyirő József Uz Bencéjéből [József Nyírő’s work Uz Bence to be made into a
film]. Brassói Lapok, 29 May 1938, p. 4.
42 Mester 2012.
43 Nyirő, J.: Mit követelt a román nép a magyar uralom alatt? [What did Romanians demand
under Hungarian rule?]. Keleti Ujság, 7 February 1937, p. 6.
44 Nyirő József – Mester Miklós esküvői tanuja [József Nyírő – Bestman at Miklós Mester’s
Wedding]. Keleti Ujság, 5 May 1938, p. 6.
45 Dr János Bingert (1894–1954), Chief Executive Officer. After acquiring a PhD in political
sciences and military service in World War I, he was employed by the Ministry of Interior
where he worked at the Police Department. He became the rapporteur of cinema and film
affairs in 1925. From 1926 he was the Secretary of the Film Industry Fund. In 1928, the
136
“with its excellent characters and exceptionally interesting theme, it is suitable in

every aspect to grab the attention of cinema-going audiences, and it also provides
extensive opportunities to capture the wonderful Szekler world of Transylvania,
which Nyírő depicts in his novels and plays in such a captivating manner.”46
The concept thus complied with all of the state’s cultural-political expectations.
A series of short folk stories from a Transylvanian writer would be adapted for
cinema by a newly established, Christian company. The group of owners had ties
to the government and during their careers so far they had conducted socially
beneficial activities. The reception of Nyírő’s plays that had previously premiered
and were still running at the theatres in Budapest at the time was a guarantee for
success. And this made the anticipated profits all the more probable. All in all, it
seemed an ideal film project, and indeed it fulfilled all the expectations.
The renowned, experienced group of filmmakers and a selection of the
most successful and celebrated actors and actresses of the time foreshadowed
its artistic qualities and excellent production. Attila Orbók47 was asked
to write the script, Jenő Csepreghy48 was the director, István Eiben49 the
fund bought the production site of the Corvin film studio, and the government set up
Hunnia Filmgyár Rt. to operate it. Bingert became a member of the Board of Directors,
the Administrative and Trade Director, then from 1930 the Managing Director. Under
his leadership, the Hunnia Film Studio was developed to European levels and obtained a
leading role for Hungarian sound film production in Central Europe. From autumn 1940,
he was Chief Executive Officer of the studio, in March 1944 he resigned and enlisted in the
army. At the end of 1944, he emigrated to Argentina and settled in Buenos Aires.
46 Jávor Pál játssza Uz Bencét filmen [Pál Jávor Plays Bence Uz in Film]. Esti Ujság, 25 May
1938, p. 8.
47 Dr Attila Orbók (1887–1964), writer, journalist. Obtained a doctorate in law at the
University of Kolozsvár (today: Cluj-Napoca, Romania) in 1910. From 1912 a reporter of
the daily newspaper Magyarország [Hungary]. Member of the National Assembly in 1920–
1922, later a journalist. He wrote a number of novels, plays, film scripts, cabaret shows and
translated several dramas.
48 Jenő Csepreghy (1912–1978), director. He studied at the University of Technology and
worked in film production in Hollywood from 1933. He later became assistant director
at the Metro film studio and returned to Hungary in 1937. Two years later, he established
Csepreghy Filmforgalmi és Kereskedelmi Kft. with his brother. From 1940 he lived in
Portugal and then emigrated to the USA, where he worked under the name John Shepridge.
49 István Eiben (1902–1958), cinematographer. After secondary school, he started his career
as a laboratory technician in 1916. From 1919 he was an independent cinematographer and
then became a permanent associate of the Corvin and Hunnia Film Studios. From 1952
137
cinematographer and Szalontai Kiss the production manager. The main

characters were portrayed by Pál Jávor, László Szilassy50 and Bella Bordy,51 but
they also contracted Sándor Toma, also known as “Pufi”,52 from Kolozsvár,
who was a popular actor.
The new ways in which the film was introduced to the markets is
noteworthy, including publicity for its screening with an effective advertising
campaign. Newspaper reports prepared future viewers from the beginning of
shooting until the premiere, thus catching their attention. For example, the
appearances of the actor Pufi Tompa from Kolozsvár at the shooting became
newsworthy.53 The best advertising was the leaked details and conditions of
the acting role of “Mr Kántor”, a real-life bear. On the way to an external
shooting location in Lillafüred, a Hunnia Film Studio van drifted off the
road near a bend and rolled over: several people were injured, but the “film-
star bear” was unharmed. “The strong metal cage withheld the weight of the
falling van.”54. Newspapers reported on “the kindest movie star” gaining 15
until his death he taught cinematography at the College of Dramatic and Film Arts. He was
awarded the Kossuth Prize and the title of Merited Artist. He participated in the production
of 150 films.
50 László Szilassy (soproni Szabó) (1908–1972), actor. He was a celebrated film star of the end
of the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s. He acted in 42 films. In 1945 he fled the country
and lived in Argentina and Brazil. His films were banned in Hungary.
51 Bella Bordy (Izabella Bordi) (1909–1978), actress, dance artist. From 1924 until 1965 she
was a member of the Opera House. From 1965 she taught stage motion technique for opera
singers in Vienna and Zurich. Between 1938 and 1944 she acted in 14 films, mostly in lead
roles.
52 Sándor Tompa (1903–1969), actor. He studied at the Medical Faculty of the University of
Kolozsvár, and simultaneously attended the acting school of Miklós Izsó. From 1923, he
performed at the Hungarian Theatre in Kolozsvár for 17 years and then in Budapest. From
1941 until 1944 he was at the National Theatre in Kolozsvár and finally at the National
Theatre in Budapest from 1945 until his death. His nickname was “Pufi” [Puffy]. He was
awarded the Kossuth Prize and the title of Merited Artist.
53 Két filmszerep eljátszására szerződtették Budapesten Tompa „Pufi”-t, akit a Nemzeti
Szinház és a magyar rádió is meghivott. [‘Pufi’ Tompa invited by the National Theatre and
the Hungarian Radio and contracted for two film roles in Budapest]. Keleti Ujság, 25 July
1938, p. 4.
54 A filmsztár-medvének nem ártott meg az autószerencsétlenség [Film-star bear unharmed
in car accident]. Esti Kurir, 25 August 1938, p. 4.
138
kilos during the shooting,55 and his photo was published before the film’s
premiere.56
The film was received exceptionally well by the press, both during
production and after the premiere. Emília B. Csűrös57 wrote about shooting at
the film studio: “Nevertheless, that strange, round lamp was the moon, which
poured its cold light over the pine trees of Transylvania the same way as it
did on us, and while we were wandering among the trees of an artificial wild
forest, it might as well have spread a silver veil on the illuminating, beautiful
forehead of József Nyírő under the real pine trees of Udvarhelyszék, to help the
author dream up another miracle for us – his nation, the pine-tree children
raised among boulders. To bring forth another wellspring of beauty and art.”58
According to a critic writing for the Esti Kurir [Evening Courier]: “It is as if
Pál Jávor has only now reached the peak of his success with this role, where he
finally discarded the sometimes expertly tailored tail-coat, at other times the
tightly-woven Attila of the hero of clichéd comedies and sugary love stories,
and has now jumped in front of us and stood up on a mountain top with a loud
shout like Bence Uz would. We do not think Pál Jávor will ever have a more
beautiful role than this […] Mester Film and Hunnia have every right to be
proud of their first, exemplary production.”59
The film premiered on Friday, 18 November 1938. It was right at this time, not
long after the repatriation of the Felvidék (Upper Hungary) that the Federation
of Cinemas took stock of the movie theatres in the reunited territories and
found 30 in a functional state. Thus, Uz Bence was shown in cinemas in Upper
55 Látogatás Uz Bencénél – a filmgyárban [Visiting Bence Uz – in the Film Studio]. Keleti

Ujság, 19 September 1938, p. 10.
56 Négyszemközt Uz Bencével [Face to Face with Bence Uz]. Színházi Élet, 1938. No. 46, pp.
46–47 and No. 47, p. 67.
57 Emília Bérczes Istvánné Csűrös (1897–1970), authoress of youth literature. She obtained
her certificate at the college in Nagyenyed. She became a member of the editorial staff of
Elek Benedek’s children magazine Cimbora and then of Új Cimbora. Her children’s and
youth books started to appear from 1930.
58 Látogatás Uz Bencénél – a filmgyárban [Visiting Bence Uz – in the Film Studio]. Keleti
Ujság, 19 September 1938, p. 10.
59 Uz Bence. Esti Kurir, 20 November 1938, p. 10.
139
Hungary almost at the same time as it premiered in Hungary. One month later,
Szalontai Kiss made the following statement: “The first representative film of
Mester Film was Uz Bence, which premiered right on the evening before the
reunification of the Felvidék. It was the first Hungarian film, which was sent
out on a glorious tour in the cities and towns of the Felvidék. Received with
indescribable enthusiasm and joy everywhere, Uz Bence brought a totally new
voice, the voice of serious issues into Hungarian film production.”60
The first Hungarian film festival, known as the National Film Week, was
organised between 3 and 11 July 1939 in Lillafüred. Minister of Religion and
Public Education Bálint Hóman,61 Minister of Interior Ferenc Keresztes-
Fischer62 and Minister of Industry Antal Kunder63 undertook the patronship.
The event was chaired by Ferenc Zsindely, State Secretary of the Prime
Minister’s Office, while the co-chairman was the younger son of the regent,
60 Filmhős lesz Dankó Pista [Pista Dankó Becomes a Film Hero]. Esti Kurir, 25 December
1938, p. 19.
61 Dr Bálint Hóman (1885–1951), historian, university professor. From 1918 correspondence
member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, regular member from 1929 and director
from 1933. Minister of Religion and Public Education between 1932 and 1938 and between
1939 and 1942. He was stripped of his membership of the academy in 1945 and was
sentenced to life in prison. He died in prison in Vác due to bad conditions and torture. In
2015, the Metropolitan Court posthumously acquitted him of war crimes due to lack of a
crime.
62 vitéz Dr Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer (1881–1948), County Head, Minister of Interior, Member
of the Upper Chamber, graduated from law university, County Head of Baranya and Pécs
from 1921 and also of Somogy county from 1925. Minister of Interior between 1931 and
1935 and between 1938 and 1944 under several governments. From 1936 a Member of the
Upper Chamber. From 1939 a representative of the Party of Hungarian Life. Following the
occupation of Hungary, the Gestapo arrested him and deported him to a concentration
camp in Germany.
63 Antal Kunder (1900–1968), captain in the Hungarian Armed Forces, minister. He graduated
at the Ludovika Academy, then obtained a mechanical engineering diploma at the Technical
University of Budapest and became a captain in the Military Engineering Faculty. He was
a Member of Parliament for Esztergom with the Party of Hungarian Life in the 1938–1939
and the 1939–1944 cycle. In 1938, he was selected State Secretary then Minister of the
Ministry of Trade and Transport in the Imrédy government and was simultaneously
appointed Minister of Industry. He was the Minister of Trade and Transport for the Sztójay
government in 1944. In the Sztójay trial, the People’s Court sentenced him to death as a war
criminal: the sentence was changed to forced labour for life by clemency by the President of
the Republic Zoltán Tildy. He was released in 1956 and emigrated to his family in Brazil.
140
Miklós Horthy, Jr., Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.64

Twelve films were awarded in the feature film category, two of which were
produced by Mesterfilm Kft. Uz Bence received an award for having the most
Hungarian propaganda effect, and Szegény gazdagok was named as the film
having the most literary merit by Miklós Horthy, Jr.65
Mesterfilm’s solemn historical biopic Semmelweis was finished in the same
autumn. The idea came from Szalontai Kiss, who said “After the American
film about Pasteur, the German film about Koch, let us make a film about the
Hungarian medical hero, too! All the more so, since Ignác Semmelweis’ life was
much more novel-like and ‘cinematographic’ than the life of the French doctor
Pasteur or the German Koch.”66 The film was produced with complete historical
fidelity. The makers “thoroughly reviewed the life story of the great doctor, all
of his works published in Jena, and his private letters left behind. They dug up
every drawing and print of the period about the places where Semmelweis spent
time during his life. Based on these images of the period, in the Hunnia Film
Studio they reconstructed the University of Vienna as it looked 100 years earlier
when Semmelweis studied there. Similarly, they recreated the Gynaecology and
Obstetrics Clinic in Vienna, where he had worked as an assistant professor. And
the old Rókus Hospital in Pest, where he headed the Gynaecology and Obstetrics
Department. The streets of Vienna, Buda and Pest where he took his walks with a
face gradually growing grimmer and grimmer, as well as the meeting room of the
Vienna Medical Congress, where insanity finally overcame Semmelweis”.67 The
film was first screened to professionals at the General Meeting of the Federation
of Cinemas in the Capitol Cinema in Kassa (today: Košice, Slovakia) on 20
December 1939,68 and wider audiences could see the film from January 1940.
64 A Filmhét vezérkara [General Staff of the Film Week]. Magyar Film, 1939. 15. p.4.
65 Closing speech of Ministry Department Advisor Dr László Balogh. Magyar Film, 1939. 18.
pp. 5–6.
66 1838: Budáról Bécsbe indul a postakocsi… [1838: Stagecoach Departing From Buda To
Vienna...]. Nemzeti Sport, 14 November 1939, p. 6.
67 Ibid.
68 Jelentkezés a kassai közgyűlésre [Registration for the General Meeting in Kosice]. Magyar
Film, 1939. 43. p. 5.
141
In the meantime, collecting the material and writing the script for Dankó
Pista started in early 1939. Together with film director László Kalmár,69
company directors Barla, Szalontai Kiss and scriptwriter Sándor Nagymihály70
travelled to Szeged, where the protagonist of the film had spent most of his
life. They were looking for living people of his age to bear witness. They laid
a wreath at the statue of Pista Dankó in Szeged, and Mayor Dr József Pálffy71
met the team.72 But at the same time, this and the newspaper reports about
the trip were already part of a well-structured plan to introduce the film to the
broader public. Szalontai Kiss explained to the press why they had chosen this
particular subject: “The famous Hungarian songwriter had a very romantic life
indeed. His diary entries as well as the novelistic biographies written of his life
later all provide evidence of this. Pista Dankó was not a gypsy, but nevertheless
he built up a great reputation for Hungarian melodies and traditional songs
with his violin, mainly, of course, for the songs which were created in his own
head. He travelled the whole world and played before every European head of
state of his day and age. For instance, he was a favoured guest in the court of
the Russian tsar.”73
Shooting began in April 1940 at the Hunnia studios with Pál Jávor in
the leading role. By June, the film was completed. Advertisements prepared
viewers for the screening as the sensation of the film week, which was a spot-
on prophecy. The films of Mesterfilm were received with a shower of awards
at the 2nd National Film Week. The competition took place between 22 June
and 1 July 1940 in Lillafüred at the Palota Hotel. Together with Minister of
69 László Kalmár (1900–1980), director, scriptwriter. In 1916 he was employed by the film
studio as an extra. From 1919 he was a trainee, then a caption drawing artist, editor,
production assistant and assistant director. From 1938 he worked as a director and wrote
film scripts as well. He was awarded the Kossuth Prize and the title of Merited Artist.
70 Sándor Nagymihály (1897–?), writer, scriptwriter.
71 József Pálfy (1874–1944), mayor. After obtaining a degree in law, he started his career in
the public administration of Szeged as a notary. Later he became police commissioner, then
chairman of the board of guardians, then mayor from 1934.
72 Utazás Dankó Pista körül. [A Journey Round Pista Dankó]. Esti Kurir, 27 January 1939, p.
10.
73 Filmhős lesz Dankó Pista [Pista Dankó to become a film hero]. Esti Kurir, 25 December
1938, p. 19.
142
Religion and Public Education Bálint Hóman, State Secretary István Fáy74
undertook the role of chief patrons. The Chairman was Ferenc Kiss, President
and Ministerial Commissioner75 of the Chamber of Theatre and Film Art.76
Twenty-one awards were given, of which the No. 1 of the Ministry of Culture,
which can be considered the main award, was presented to Dankó Pista, a
joint production of Hunnia and Mesterfilm. Semmelweis, another Hunnia-
Mesterfilm production, received the Award of the Chamber. Dankó Pista won
two more prizes from Agfa Film and Kodak Film. Mesterfilm was also awarded
a certificate of appreciation for the work of the set designer of Semmelweis and
Dankó Pista and the directorial work in the film Come on the First of the Month.
In the category of film actors and actresses, Pál Jávor and Margit Lukács were
awarded a certificate of appreciation for their roles in Dankó Pista, Antal Páger
and Ida Turay for their performances in Come on the First of the Month, and
Tivadar Uray for his performance in Semmelweis.77
Dankó Pista not only garnered awards and social recognition for the
producers, it also generated exceptionally large box office revenues. The report
74 István Fáy de Fáj (1881–1953), County Head, Member of Parliament, State Secretary. He
completed his university studies in Budapest and Berlin. From 1902 he held several county-
level positions. From 1920 he was sub-prefect then the County Head of Csanád County.
From 1939 a Member of Parliament for the Party of Hungarian Life, and from this year
until the German occupation he was State Secretary of Religion and Public Education and
State Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office under the Lakatos government. In 1945, he
emigrated to the West and settled in Argentina.
75 Ferenc Kiss (1893–1978), actor, director. From 1919 until 1927 a member of the National
Theatre, from 1927 until 1930 of the Hungarian Theatre, and from 1930 until 1945 again
member of the National Theatre. From 1937 until 1944 he was the director of the Academy
of Dramatic Arts, between 1939 and 1942 the Chairman of the Chamber of Theatre and Film
Art. From 20 October 1944 he was the director of the National Theatre, from 2 November
the Ministerial Commissioner of Theatre and Film Arts. From 1935 he was the holder of
the Corvin Wreath, and in 1937 he became a permanent member of the National Theatre.
In December 1944, he fled to Western Hungary and then to Germany, but the German
authorities extradited him to Hungary. In November 1945 the People’s Court sentenced
him to eight years in prison as a war criminal, which he served in full. After his release, he
worked as a night guard and a slaughterhouse worker. From 1956 he was allowed to act on
stage again. He retired in 1961.
76 II. Nemzeti Filmhét Lillafüreden. [Second National Film Week in Lillafüred]. Magyar Film,
1940. 25. p. 4.
77 A filmverseny díjai [Awards of the Film Competition]. Magyar Film, 1940. 27. p. 4.
143
of the Board of Directors of Hunnia Filmgyár Rt. highlighted the fact that
“from among the films produced by Mester Film Kft. in 1940, ‘Dankó Pista’
was a smashing success both artistically and as a business venture, which is
demonstrated by the sale of the film to several foreign markets”.78 According
to the report, the next year Dankó Pista generated the highest revenue for
Hunnia (the Film Placement Office, i.e. its film rental department, was the
distributor of the film), as “the film generated a result for the company that
no Hungarian film had done before”.79 The distribution rights of the film
were bought by Sweden, Latvia, Finland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Italy, Syria,
Palestine, Egypt, Iraq and Iran even during the production, well before it was
completed. Sixty thousand pengős had already been generated by such sales
before the report was published. Moreover, it appeared clear that Germany
would buy the film as well.80 Bulgaria and Yugoslavia offered prices which
were unprecedented for the foreign sale of Hungarian films at the time.81 We
could not find information on the budget of Dankó Pista, but it may have been
similar to that of the Semmelweis film, which was planned for 133,500 pengős,
and was actually produced on a budget of 134,589 pengős.82 In other words,
the foreign sales up to that point had already covered for almost half of the
production costs.
Following the successes at the 2nd National Film Week, it was natural that
one of the two films representing Hungary at the Biennale in Venice starting
on 1 September 1940 would be Dankó Pista, which was warmly received in the
Italian reviews.83
78 Report of the Board of Directors of the Hunnia Filmgyár Rt. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár
Országos Levéltára [Hungarian National Archives] (hereinafter: MNL OL) Z 869 – 2 – 3.
79 MNL OL Z 869 – 2 – 13.
80 A „Dankó Pista” és a külföld. [“Dankó Pista” and foreign distribution]. Magyar Film, 1940.
29. p. 9.
81 A „Dankó Pistá”-t „lábon” vette meg a külföld. [Dankó Pista bought “in progress” by
foreign distributors]. Magyar Film, 1940. 17. p. 10.
82 MNL OL Z 1126 – 1939 – 102
83 Olasz-német filmhét Velencében. [Italian-German Film Week in Venice] Magyar Film,
1940. 37. p. 4., Magyar filmek sikere Velencében. [The Success of Hungarian Films in
Venice]. Idem, 38. pp. 4–7, Olasz visszhang a magyar filmekről [Italian Reception of
Hungarian Films]. Idem, 39. pp. 5–6.
144
The general public was able to first see Dankó Pista on 16 January at the
premiere held in the Royal Apollo Film Theatre. At the time, Hungarian sound
film production closed its first 10 years, and the profession celebrated the
occasion with the premiere screening of the 200th Hungarian film. Dankó Pista
was hailed as the jubilee film. The solemnity of the gala screening was enhanced
by the appearance of vitéz Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya with his younger son,
Ambassador of Hungary to Brazil, Miklós Horthy, Jr. The Regent was received
by Minister of Culture Bálint Hóman, Minister of Industry József Varga84 and
Minister of Finance Lajos Reményi-Schneller.85 After the national anthem,
one of the lead actors of the film, “Pufi” Tompa, announced the performances
preceding the screening. The first performer was Margit Lukács singing
Cigánydal [Gypsy Song] by Mihály Babits. László Balogh, Ministry Department
Advisor and Secretary General of the National Film Committee,86 praised the
10 years of sound film production and the 200th Hungarian sound film in his
speech. Next came Erzsi Simor reciting one of the most Hungarian poems
84 Dr József Varga (1891–1956), chemical engineer, university professor, Member of

Parliament, minister. From 1939 a representative of the Party of Hungarian Life, State
Secretary of Industry, then Minister of Industry and simultaneously Minister of Trade
and Transport until 1943. In 1932 he was appointed a correspondence member and then
a regular member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1942. Awarded the Corvin
Wreath in 1942 and the Kossuth Prize in 1950 and 1952.
85 Dr Lajos Reményi-Schneller (1892–1946), financial expert, Finance Minister. Graduated
with a degree in law at Budapest University. He was appointed Finance Minister in 1938, an
office which he held in the Darányi, Imrédy, Teleki, Bárdossy, Kállay, Sztójay, Lakatos and
Szálasi governments as well. He fled from the Russians to Germany, and was later extradited
as a war criminal upon the request of Hungary. In the Sztójay trial he was sentenced to
death by the People’s Court and was executed.
86 Dr László Balogh (1898–1954), Ministry Department Advisor. Graduated from the Faculty
of Humanities of Budapest University, received his doctorate degree in Hungarian Cultural
History in 1922. From 1934 he was the rapporteur of film affairs at the Ministry of Religion
and Public Education, from 1938 he received the title of department advisor. Following
this he was sent to the Prime Minister’s Office for two years. From 1940 General Secretary
of the Hungarian National Film Committee, then head of the department for the affairs of
the Hungarian National Film Committee in the Ministry of Culture. From 1942 he was the
rapporteur of the Art Branch of the Ministry, later Deputy Head of the Department and a
member of the Board of Directors of the Hunnia Film Studio. In 1945, he was arrested, and
in 1946 the “People’s Court” sentenced him to four years in prison. Following his release,
he was deported in 1951.
145
about Pista Dankó by Endre Ady. Pál Jávor sang songs from the acclaimed
songwriter with gypsy music accompaniment. Eventually, the time came to
watch the film.87 A brief summary of the premiere was broadcast in the 883rd
episode of Magyar Világhíradó [Hungarian World News].88 “Following the end
of the gala premiere a group of roughly seventy invited guests rode on carriages
to the villa of the Mesterfilm company in Thököli street – reported the well-
informed journalist of the professional journal of the Hungarian Chamber of
Theatre and Film Art – where the elegant assemblage of guests spent a night of
celebration, crowning the day of the big event in a deserving manner. The two
directors of Mesterfilm, Szalontai Kiss and Barla, played the hosts and provided
the entertaining atmosphere for their guests.”89
Looking at the timeline more closely, Dankó Pista was not in fact the 200th
sound film. As mentioned above, it premiered at the 2nd Hungarian Film Week
– between 22 June and 1 July 1940 – which means it was already finished by
then. In his book, which is biased in many respects, Nemeskürty presents
Dankó Pista as the 171st Hungarian sound film.90 Magyar Film [Hungarian
Film], the weekly journal of the Film Chamber reported, that according to the
records of the Hunnia Film Studio and the Hungarian Film Office, production
had finished or was underway for 219 feature films in 1940. The contradiction
was resolved by noting that “shorter or longer periods may elapse between the
shooting and the premiere of a film in various cases, this is how it can be that
Dankó Pista, which was produced in the middle of the year, was celebrated as
the 200th Hungarian film by the profession at the premiere”.91 This indicates that
87 Kötelez a múlt [Bound by the past]. Magyar Film, 1941. 3. p. 1. A hazai film ünnepe. „Dankó
Pista”: a 200-ik magyar film. A Hunnia-Mester jubiláris filmjének díszbemutatója a Royal
Apollóban [Celebrating Hungarian cinema, “Dankó Pista” the 200th Hungarian film. Gala
Premiere of the Hunnia-Mester Jubilee Film in the Royal Apollo]. Idem, pp. 2–3.
88 http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4092
89 A hazai film ünnepe. „Dankó Pista”: a 200-ik magyar film. A Hunnia-Mester jubiláris
filmjének díszbemutatója a Royal Apollóban [Celebrating Hungarian cinema, “Dankó
Pista”, the 200th Hungarian film. Gala Premier of the Hunnia-Mester Jubilee Film at the
Royal Apollo]. Magyar Film, 1941. 3. p. 3.
91 Hány magyar film készült eddig? [How many Hungarian films were made so far?]. Magyar
Film, 1941. 2. pp. 3–4.
146
acknowledging and awarding Dankó Pista as the 200th Hungarian sound film
was a cultural policy decision, which formulated recommendations for future
film productions at the same time.
Why was the film Dankó Pista highlighted – naturally from an existing
selection – as the model to follow? To understand this, we have to go back to
the 2nd National Film Week, where Ministry Department Advisor László Balogh
held a lecture on the relations between society and films. He was searching
for the answer to the question: how can you form a certain collective soul, a
common conscience, a feeling, an atmosphere in a given community? For this,
he deemed film to be an appropriate medium. He mentioned Dankó Pista as
an example of what this common feeling should be like. He thought at the
screening of the film in Lillafüred, that “a collective soul was forming during
the projection. It established the society of Hungarian film. This collective impact
of film is to be captured. If you manage to achieve that, you will make a good film,
an artistic film, a business film, in a nutshell: a success. Success in itself can never
be borne out of external calculations. The sense of duty must be awakened and
must be harnessed. And the tools for that are internal, primarily artistic.”92
92 Dr László Balogh: Társadalom és a film [Society and Film]. Magyar Film, 1940. 28. p. 5.
147
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filmgyártás mérföldkövei és aktualitásai. In: Fekete, D. (ed.) A magyar
hangosfilm plakátjai 1931–1944. Győr–Budapest.
Gulyás, P. (1939–1944). Magyar írók élete és munkái. Megindította id. Szinnyei
József. Új sorozat. I–VI. Kertész József Könyvnyomdája. Karcag. (Magyar
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Kása, Cs. (2018). Mester Miklós élete és munkássága. In: Kása, Cs. (ed.): Mester
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1932–1945. Budapest.
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katasztrofális magyarországi 1944. esztendőre, részint annak előzményeire
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149
ARE LIVING WITNESSES FROM THE REVISION PERIOD STILL TELLING THEIR...
ARTÚR KÖ Ő
ARE LIVING WITNESSES FROM

THE REVISION PERIOD STILL
TELLING THEIR STORIES, AND IF
SO, ABOUT WHAT?
As part of the research programme “23 hours 59 minutes” supported by the

Trianon Museum, I conducted a hundred interviews between 2017 and 2018,
in which eyewitnesses of the territorial revisions told me about their memories.
In addition, we also gathered recollections, diary fragments, photographs and
personal items associated with the events that took place between 1938 and
1941. We planned to prepare for the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon
by studying the most beautiful days in Hungary’s history in the 20th century and
presenting the research results to the public as a response to this tragedy. We
could say that in doing so we wished to duly commemorate Trianon in 2020!
We visited Upper Hungary, Carpathian Ruthenia, Transylvania and Délvidék
[southern part of the Kingdom of Hungary, northern parts of present-day
Serbia situated in the Carpathian Basin]. The persecution of Hungarians in the
successor states has taken its toll over the last half century, and we found many
interviewees within the unjust Trianon borders. However, we were not able to
put all the “pieces of the jigsaw” together, as the project genuinely took place
at the last minute. There were people who would have been very willing to
talk to us, but unfortunately we did not arrive in time. Nevertheless, I can say
that I am one of the lucky ones, who – at the last minute – had the chance to
talk to some of the people who witnessed the events that occurred between
151
1938 and 1941. Thus, I had the opportunity to contribute – even if just to a
minor extent – to collecting the items for the temporary exhibition entitled
“The Hungarian World 1938–1940”. Considering how many people thought
and said at the beginning of the research programme that we would not be able
to present anything new, we produced some significant results. Just to mention
two examples: 100 interviews and 1 linear metre of written documentation.
What I am perhaps most proud of is that we found and acquired the protocol
on the transfer of Kolozsvár (today: Cluj-Napoca, Romania). The document
was signed by Hungarian Royal Military Colonel Albert Beck representing
Hungary, and Victor Pop, Chief Notary for the City, representing Romania.
After signing it, the representatives of the Romanian State left the city, which
by then had been reattached to Hungary even under public law. One of the
protocols was taken to Bucharest, the other one was given to the Hungarian
authorities, but a third copy was also drawn up, which was hidden in the estate
of a family up until now. Beck was accompanied to the signature of the protocol
by Lieutenant István Verebélyi Marssó, who brought the third protocol with
him from Transylvania, and it remained in the possession of Verebélyi’s son,
György Marssó, in Kecskemét until 2017.
We received large quantities of film negatives, among other things relating
to the activities and camps organised by the Hungarian Scout Association in
1938. Dearest to me of all is a photograph of Pál Teleki and a photograph of
Miklós Horthy from 1938. These are photographs that had never been published
before, which were part of the estate of Béla Vezér up until now, preserved by
his descendant, Endre Vezér.1
The witnesses told us their stories in 2017 and 2018 either in person or
through their descendants. Unfortunately, their number is decreasing. As a
little teaser, the following text is a recollection which gives us insight into the
events that took place in Transylvania in August and September 1940. As far as
we know, the memoirs of György Utczás had never been published before. This
is how this eyewitness remembered the events:
1 The pictures depicting Pál Teleki and Miklós Horthy are owned by Endre Vezér. The copies
of the photographs are owned by the Trianon Museum.
152
Ephemeral happiness2
The army truck stopped in front of my grandmother’s house. My
grandmother was waiting for us, leaning against the gatepost. Her face was
sad. My mother and I got out from next to the driver and went up to her
to say goodbye. Tears filled her eyes when she caressed my face. I smiled,
and then my grandmother saw the gap where the two incisors were missing
from my upper jaw.
“Been kissing the girls?” she said, smiling sadly, “they won’t allow you to
cross the border like that. You need to stay here at my house till your new teeth
come out.”
I looked at my mother anxiously, but I soon realised that my grandmother
was just joking to make the moment of farewell more bearable.
She kissed me on the cheek, right and left, then my mother too, and sent us
on our way, saying:
“May God help you cross the checkpoints safe and sound. There are rumours
that the Romanian soldiers are throwing the furniture off the cars if they find
out that Hungarians are fleeing from south to north.” Then she continued, “I
feel we will never see each other again in this life.”
“Don’t say such a thing, Mum!” said my mother, “Soon Southern
Transylvania will be Hungarian too! Take care of yourself, don’t work so much
– you’re not young anymore.”
We got back in the cabin of the canvas-topped army truck that had brought
the equipment of the Romanian army, which was evacuating Northern
Transylvania, to the south. On its way back it was empty, and transported – for
a lot of money, of course – the belongings of Transylvanian Hungarians fleeing
to the northern territories reattached to Hungary by the Second Vienna Award.
The soldier stepped on the accelerator and the vehicle set off towards Torda
(today: Turda, Romania) and Kolozsvár.
2 The recollection is owned by the Trianon Museum.
153
We experienced exciting days and months in the summer of 1940. I was

seven and a half years old; I had completed the first grade of elementary school
– in Hungarian.
Although Fugad (today: Ciuguzel, Romania) was a purely Romanian
village, Count Dániel Bánffy – whose estate and castle were located in this
village – no longer employed Romanian farmhands after Trianon, and instead
gave the job to Hungarians transported from Szilágy County (today: Sălaj,
Romania). He maintained a Hungarian-language school for their children – at
his own expense. Although the Kingdom of Romania allowed Hungarians to
complete the notary course, they were not allowed to work in villages inhabited
by Hungarians. Let this “intruding species” have fewer and fewer intellectuals
if it was not able to prevent the Catholic, Reformed or Unitarian priests from
living together with their congregations.
My father – as a Hungarian district notary – was assigned to a Romanian
village. And so I completed first grade here. Even if I understood little of the
excitement, I saw that my parents were excitedly listening to the Budapest I
radio – with the volume turned down – at noon every day.
Excitement was then replaced by grief and gloom. The Second Vienna Award
left Alsó-Fehér County (today: Comitatul Alba de Jos, Romania) to Romania.
My mother cried, and my father stared straight ahead, speechless. All this
happened in the notary’s flat in secret, as all the neighbours and the population
of the whole village were Romanian. On our way to the administrator’s office, I
saw the Hungarian masons working at the Bánffy estate weeping as they worked.
“Mr Notary, this is awful, unbearable,” they said to my father desperately.
A few days later, the Hungarian radio broadcast the entry to Nagyvárad
and Szatmárnémet (today: Oradea and Satu Mare, Romania). Ecstatic joy,
enthusiasm, thundering applause and euphoric ovation welcomed the entering
Hungarian army. At the same time, there was gloom and sobbing, sadness and
disillusionment in Southern Transylvania. My mother was crying for days; it
was unbearable to be around her. Then one evening my father unexpectedly
announced:
“Erzsi, we are going to Kolozsvár to visit the Mandulas. After all, they are
your relatives and I hope that I will soon be employed as a notary.”
154
I had already long been asleep by then, so I wasn’t aware of anything. It was,
therefore, unusual to wake up to my mother’s singing. “I am praying for you on
red Pentecost day,” she sang happily. When she noticed that I had woken up,
she came to my bed, and she said with a strict face and in an authoritative but
low voice:
“Your father and I decided last night to travel to Kolozsvár to Aunt Erzsi.”
“Will we see Hungarian soldiers there too?” I asked happily.
“Yes, but it’s a secret, and do not tell your friend Dorin, because if he lets
something slip, then we will be taken by the police,” she said to me anxiously.
I thought of this possibility in terror and promised not to tell him. Dorin
was a little Romanian boy who lived next door; he was about 4 years old, and
he would often come over to my place to play. When night was falling and
he wanted to go home, I asked him to stay longer. When darkness fell, it was
me who sent him home; what’s more, I urged him to go. He had to cross a
courtyard full of flowers and bushes to get home. When he got to the middle of
the yard, the devil appeared on my shoulder and I shouted:
“Dorin, vine dracu!” [Dorin, the devil is coming!]
He then started to run back, crying, and of course this repeated itself often
in the evenings. Otherwise, we got along well.
Thursday came – the day when my father had to go to the office of the judge
of servitors in Nagyenyed (today: Aiud, Romania) for the notaries’ meeting.
There were two Hungarian notaries in the district, and it turned out that the
other one had left his village and gone north. After the meeting the judge of
servitors gestured for my father to stay because he wanted to speak with him.
He received my father in his room, and my father courteously bowed when
entering. A superior smile appeared on the face of the judge of servitors, and he
said in the sophisticated dialect of the Romanian Old Kingdom:
“Come closer, Domnu Notar [Mr Notary] and take a seat! In today’s
difficult and chaotic times we need to clarify a few things,” he said
meaningfully and looked at my father searchingly. “I guess you know what
I mean, Mr Notary. Thanks to the Romanian State you have found yourself
in a good position, which is financially rewarding as well. Personally I like
you, more precisely, you’re likeable. I think you are a good worker, loyal to
155
our state and dutiful. I conclude from all this,” here he raised his voice, “that
regardless of the current circumstances – that is, the Vienna Award, which is
unfair and tragic for us – you will remain a faithful officer of the mutilated
Romanian Kingdom, irrespective of your nationality. Give my greetings to
the Ladyship.”
Walking around his table, smiling, he approached my father in full
awareness of assurance; my father, seeing this, suddenly stood up and took a
step backward.
“Mr Judge of Servitors,” my father started confidently (which was out of
character), “I acknowledge that the state has been taking care of me appropriately
in terms of finances, but this is also natural in view of my position and work.
However, I have been made to feel – intentionally or unintentionally – that I am
a second-class citizen in this country, despite the fact I was born here too. My
ancestors lived in this city for centuries. I have only been a tolerated “ungur”
[Hungarian] among the Romanians. I am sorry, I personally hold you in high
regard, but I am primarily Hungarian; I cannot become something else, and I
don’t even want to. This is a historical moment: I’m going north, and will offer
my services to the Hungarian government.”
The judge of servitors stopped, the smile frozen on his face.
“Mr Notary, I am deeply disappointed by you, I hope you won’t regret it,” he
said in a sharp voice, threateningly. “We have nothing more to talk about,” and
he turned his back without shaking hands.
My father found himself standing in the corridor of the Court of Servitors,
wiping his sweaty forehead with his handkerchief. In the street, he got on our
horse-drawn carriage, he didn’t go into any shop – he didn’t even buy the usual
pralines at Czirner for my mother – and saying the order “Come on, Genius”
he slapped our horse and headed to Fugad.
He got home in the early afternoon and immediately told my mother what
had happened.
“He should take his greetings elsewhere,” replied my mother. “Of course,
he didn’t forget those delicious meals, the chicken paprikash and the roasted
meats with red cabbage. It was good for his stomach used to csorba soup and
polenta.”
156
“I’m sorry it happened that way. I wasn’t able to control myself. Pack the
most necessary things in the small suitcase, I need to get out of the village
this evening. I know Ionescu, he will make good on his threat. If I stay, he will
have me arrested tomorrow. I will go to Magyarlapád (today: Lopadea Nouă,
Romania) on foot; from there János (the father of our former maid, Zsuzsi) will
surely give me a ride to Enyed if I ask him, and I’ll take the evening express to
Kolozsvár to the Mandulas,” my father summarised the things to do.
“Was that Zsuzsi who used to tell me the story that went ‘hot water for
the baldy!’?” (scene from Hungarian children’s story – translator’s note) I asked,
because my father reminded me of my favourite nanny.
“Yes, yes,” my father responded, then turned to my mother and continued
“Tomorrow you will walk with Gyurika and Baba to Bandi’s house, borrow the
ox cart, the drivers will load it with the furniture and the chests nailed shut, and
you will take them to Aunt Berta, to Enyed. Don’t forget the cow, the horse and
the sheep: the estate will take them over and Bandi Gere will pay for them. We’ll
need the money, because the Romanian military drivers are not cheap.”
My father had discussed this all well in advance with the administrator of
the Bánffy estate, András Gere. My sister Erzsébet was nine years older than
me, and she went to the public school in Nagyszeben (today: Sibiu, Romania);
her nickname was Baba.
It turned out that my father was right! The next morning, two Romanian
policemen showed up looking for my father. It was lucky they didn’t take
revenge on us for their lack of success.
The following day, we loaded all we had onto the ox carts, and passing
through the villages Magyarlapád, Magyarbagó and Csombord (today: Lopadea
Nouă, Bǎgǎu, Ciumbrud, all in Romania), we traipsed down to Szentkirályi
street – pardon me – Strada Libertății in Enyed, to Aunt Berta’s house.
Aunt Berta was my mother’s aunt, who – for some reason – had inherited the
family house against her four brothers. She was the widow of a manufacturer,
who was successful at one time, but when she was running out of money she
persuaded my mother to buy the house with a right of usufruct by paying in
monthly instalments. They concluded the contract and the monthly instalments
had to be paid in accordance with the official exchange rate of the Swiss franc.
157
After we arrived, my mother quickly agreed with her aunt that she would
continue to receive the instalments as suggested by the lawyer. In other words:
we pay to a relative in Aiud in pengő over there, and she will receive it at home
in leu, in accordance with the exchange rate of the Swiss franc.
Aunt Berta watched with horror as her rooms filled up with our crammed
furniture.
“God almighty! What is this house going to be like!” she sighed.
“Don’t worry, tomorrow all will be empty here,” my mother reassured her.
In the meantime, we found out that one of my mother’s older sisters as well
as her younger sister (with all her family) had already left for Marosvásárhely
(today: Târgu Mureş, Romania) to her other sister’s house. So they were already
in the reattached area.
“Oh, God, let us succeed too,” my mother prayed.
I had confusing dreams at night: streetlights were flashing in the dark, I was
wandering in a lot of mud, I saw soldiers marching, while I had lost my parents,
“Mum, where are you?” I wanted to run, but my feet were mired in the mud
and I suddenly woke up with a sweaty forehead and fast heartbeat, feeling my
mother’s caressing hand.
The following day my mother left early in the morning to get a truck. She
was so nervous that she hired the first one to offer itself, even though it was
obvious that all of the furniture would not fit on it, as it didn’t have a trailer.
So they couldn’t load the dining room furniture, only the bedroom and the
kitchen furniture with all the baggage.
We headed off on this truck – my mother, my sister and I – towards Torda,
after saying our sad farewell to my grandmother.
The soldier stepped on the accelerator and the truck set off. We had left the
last houses of the town when the soldier – I think he might have been a corporal
– who had been telling jokes up to that point, suddenly became serious, and
turned to my mother with a frown and said:
“Doamna, I have undertaken to do a very dangerous thing. Our journey
will only be successful if you strictly follow my instructions. The officers take
it very seriously that the trucks should return empty, so if they spot you, let
alone the furniture, they will catch me and you will also be in trouble, because
158
they will dump your stuff in the ditch. But they won’t outwit me – if you box
clever too. Listen to me! The first checkpoint will be in Torda, in the middle of
the town. I will stop ten metres before it, and I will pretend that the engine has
broken down. When the officer looks the other way, I will motion to you and
then you should run to the truck and get in the cab. Leave the rest to me!
The soldier tried to ease the tension that arose between us in the cab by
telling a few jokes. The engine was murmuring monotonously, the soil was
glowing in the late summer sun rays, and the trees along the road and the
bushes further away were various shades of green.
We arrived in Torda. The soldier slowed down and continued to drive
calmly, apathetically. There were only a few passers-by on the pavement along
the road. We had already left the reformed church behind us on the right, when
we saw some movement, a gathering. There were two trucks standing there, a
hundred metres away from us: an officer with an Entente shoulder-belt lifted up
the tarp of the first one and looked into the cargo area.
The road started to rise slightly, the soldier gradually decelerated, looked
straight ahead tensely, and then stopped twenty metres before the inspection
officer and motioned for us to get off quickly.
“As we agreed, Doamna,” he said whispering to my mother, then set off
slowly. We were staring numbly after the truck, which stopped ten metres away
from the second truck. Our soldier got out, then – watching the major with
one eye – he opened the right hood of the engine compartment of the Opel-
Blitz and bent over the engine. The major, who was getting nervous, glanced
toward the soldier several times. In the meantime, another military truck was
also approaching our truck. We took slow steps towards the Opel-Blitz. The
officer couldn’t remain quiet any longer, and as he was starting to inspect the
second truck, he nervously shouted to our soldier:
“Why are you dawdling there, come closer!”
“The carburettor’s broken, Domnul Maior,” said the soldier, while he was
watching either us or him.
At the moment when the major turned again to the vehicle to be inspected,
the soldier motioned for us to run. We had to run about ten metres to reach the
truck, and the soldier was already behind the steering wheel. I jumped on the
159
stair of the Blitz behind my mother and my sister, and as soon as I sat on her lap,
the soldier stepped on the accelerator and started the truck. The truck – living
up to its name – jumped ahead with a roaring engine, and the officer, who had
just straightened up hearing the noise, did not have time to be surprised, let
alone prevent the departure.
The soldier “reported” the events looking in the rear-view window:
“Now he’s run to the camp phone to notify the post at the end of the town.
When we spot him, hold on tightly!”
We were so anxious that we couldn’t say a word. At the end of the town
the road to Kolozsvár started to ascend slowly. An officer showed up twenty
metres ahead of us, and he waved with his right hand for the truck to pull over
to the right towards the ditch and stop. The soldier was watching tensely with
an impassive face, then slowed down, and steered the wheel to the right. Our
hearts were pounding; my mother unconsciously pressed me up against her,
while she was praying softly. The officer, seeing the situation of the truck, was
calmly waiting with his arms crossed.
The soldier suddenly stepped on the accelerator, and the officer hardly had
enough time to jump aside. When he turned his face towards the soldier and
started to swear furiously, the latter leaned out the window and spat in the
officer’s face. By the time the officer wiped his face and grabbed his gun, we
were already twenty or thirty metres away. His gunshots sounded like faint
pops.
“Did that bastard think he could outwit me?” our driver laughed.
“We’re free,” sighed my mother.
Hardly had our fright faded when we witnessed a sad sight. We saw broken
furniture, scattered wicker suitcases and other stuff at the edge of the ditch on
both sides of the road to Kolozsvár. There were crying women and cursing men
next to them.
“You see, Doamna,” said the driver, “how careful we have to be!” They
would all have fled north like us, but their trucks were stopped, and the army
soldiers dumped their furniture and everything they owned.
Looking wildly left and right we saw so many unfortunate people on the
banks of the ditches.
160
The soldier was driving fast, we climbed up the Felek Hills (today: Feleacu,
Romania), and from the peak we could already see the houses of Kolozsvár,
bathed in the early autumn sunlight.
We arrived at the Mandulas, in Damjanich Street, after so much anxiety. The
interesting thing about the situation was that even our dining room furniture
arrived in the afternoon. What happened was that my cousin Icu had managed
to get a truck with a trailer, but by the time they arrived at Aunt Berta’s house,
we had already left. So they placed the dining room furniture on the trailer,
while the cargo area of the truck remained empty; that’s how they set off after
us.
Aunt Erzsi had mixed feelings of sadness and joy. Other relatives had also
come from the south, and so there was already so much furniture piled up in
the hallway and on the porch that we could only unload our belongings and
sleep on the porch of the opposite house. In the meantime, my Uncle Lőrinc
(my father’s brother) and Uncle Jóska arrived, also from the south. There was a
crowd, but what joy and anticipation filled everyone!
People kept asking each other:
“How long until they come? When will the Hungarian troops finally come?”
The city became no man’s land from one day to the next. Most of the
Romanian army had left the city, but it was not advisable to go out on the
streets in the outer district after nightfall. Members of the rear guard, drunken
Romanian patrols were on the move, and even gunshots could often be heard.
Finally, the big day arrived. It was a sunlit, early autumn morning in
September – the day the Hungarian army entered. The members of the bourgeois
families of Kolozsvár – especially the ladies – had already been preparing for
this day for weeks. The tailors and the seamstresses tailored and sewed so-called
Hungarian garments in secret. The men were wearing Bocskai coats, while the
young men were wearing Bocskai coats and caps. The ladies were wearing long
skirts in shades of green, white blouses, red vests and headdresses.
On the access road of the city from the direction of Bánffyhunyad (today:
Huedin, Romania) – from the edge of the city to the statue of King Matthias
Corvinus – there was a huge crowd on both sides, waiting excitedly and happily.
There were people carrying their cherished, dusty national flags – which they
161
had been hiding in the attic or somewhere else – with tears in their eyes. We
children were waiving small tricolour flags fluttering on sticks. From time to
time we popped our heads up, pushing through the adults, and looked up the
road to the west. It was 8 o’clock in the morning, but still no movement! The
excitement of the crowd was increasing.
My family – my father, my mother, my sister and I – were standing a hundred
metres away from St. Michael’s Church, on the side from which we had to look
westwards by turning our heads to the left. Suddenly, to the west – quite far
away (as we could hardly see it) – some movement started and then cheering
could be heard. The crowd took someone on their shoulders and started to
throw him back and forth. They threw him up and then caught him again. The
news went around: the person being thrown is the first Hungarian soldier. Then
the news spread – no, it’s a policeman’s uniform. It later turned out it was a man
from Kolozsvár, who had kept his police uniform for 22 years and put it on
that day, and the crowd – too excited from the anticipation – mistook him for
a soldier. Everyone had a good laugh at this, but there was not a single soldier
anywhere. Choirs started to sing here and there. A brave man stood in front of
the crowd, shouted and conducted:
“Red-white-green, precious Hungarian land,
Red-yellow-blue, Romania is on fire!”
“Once again” – and the choir, the people of Kolozsvár, roared, while the
impromptu conductor conducted. Then he changed:
“Horthy-Csáky-Teleki, Vlachs, all of you leave!”
Two hundred? Three hundred? – I don’t know how many throats the words
roared from.
Out of the blue, soldiers wearing khaki uniforms showed up pushing
bicycles before them, fully armed.
“Oh, my God,” a man shouted next to me, “the Hungarian soldiers!”
And he threw himself into his wife’s arms sobbing. “We’ve made it, after 22
years!”
I looked up: my mother’s chin was quivering, she was on the verge of tears,
and my father cleared his throat frequently, disguising how moved he was. By
the time the crowd recovered from the euphoria, they had already disappeared.
162
A military brass band showed up; the melody grew stronger. The crowd had
long learned the melody and the lyrics from the radio, and they were singing
full gusto:
“[…] our ancient mountains await you here again,
Sweet Transylvania here we are, we live and die for you.
The Scythian storm, the rushing troop conquers.”
The band changed just as they were passing in front of us:
“Rise, rise soldiers to the battle,
To safeguard the sacred freedom.
The cannon thunders, the sword clashes,
Inspiring the Hungarian to battle!”
Then the infantry platoons showed up in a victory march, one after the
other. In front, the officers with drawn swords, usually with a moustache in the
style of Pál Jávor [a popular Hungarian actor], a rigid body and boots gleaming
in the autumn light. Then the platoon came: helmets on their heads, bayonets
on their shoulders, rifle straps stretched with their right arms, trousers baggy
at the knees, then tightly buttoned on their shins down to the boots, and they
dragged the toes of their boots touching the asphalt, then tapped them onto the
asphalt. Or they would have: the road – from the edge of the city to St. Michael’s
Church – had been sprinkled with flowers by the people of Kolozsvár. They
received the Hungarian soldiers with frenzied enthusiasm. Impromptu choirs
were formed and sang together the martial songs played by the military bands,
chanting the celebratory rhymes.
“Goose liver, duck liver,
No more zece mai!” [Romanian national holiday].
Then, the motorised forces turned up rumbling: the open Botond jeeps,
officers on the right of the driver, soldiers in the back. They were waiving,
smiling, throwing kisses to the enthusiastically clapping crowd. One of the
officers, twirling his moustache and leaning slightly out of the car, waived to
a lovely and pretty unwed girl; she stepped out of the crowd, jumped on the
running board of the car, put her arms around the officer’s neck and kissed
the handsome soldier, while the vehicle trundled on. Thereafter, many similar
scenes took place.
163
Suddenly, young men wearing Bocskai caps appeared in the crowd waving
Hungarian flags, and furiously told the people that they had caught Romanian
priests mingling in the crowd, who were hiding hand grenades under their
cassocks. They were going to make an explosion at the place where His
Excellency the Regent was to make a speech.
“But we noticed and gave them what they deserved with a flagpole to their
faces,” said one of them, and then continued:
“The soldiers said that in one of the villages in Szilágy County they fired
machine guns into the troops marching from the church tower. Well, they
learned their lesson!”
The news about the planned plot proved to be true, because the Regent
came from a different direction than we expected (for safety reasons). He was
sitting with his wife near the grandstand set up in front of St. Michael’s Church,
from where he greeted the happy residents of Kolozsvár.
In the evening, the city was ablaze with lights. In front of the statue of King
Matthias Corvinus, a military band entertained the enthusiastic and happily
strolling crowd. We children – who quickly made casual friends – were playing
between the generals under the main statue; we ran around and admired their
huge arms, guns and flags cast in bronze.
In the streets, ladies and gentlemen wearing Hungarian garments were
strolling. Here and there, elegant young army officers carrying shiny swords
showed up; in their arms they were holding young happy and beautiful
Transylvanian ladies from Kolozsvár, dressed in Hungarian garments.
Suddenly a large group turned up: a group of young maids serving in the
city, wearing red vests, white skirts and green aprons.
“We won’t serve Romanian mistresses anymore,” they chanted loudly and
repeatedly.
This is how the people of the capital of Transylvania celebrated until
daybreak.
That was the first time – when I was seven and a half years old – that I had
felt proudly, happily and freely Hungarian. I didn’t have to bottle up my feelings,
my Hungarianness, I didn’t have to tolerate the mockery and name-calling by
the Romanian kids any longer. It was such an experience for a child preparing
164
for the second grade of elementary school that it determined his nationality for
an entire lifetime.
The lines above may sound odd to an outsider, to my compatriots who have
never lived in scattered Hungarian communities. It is unusual especially for
the younger generations, who have heard more of “magyarkodás” (a pejorative
expression used for being extremely proud of one’s Hungarian nationality),
nationalism, irredentism and populism than how the Hungarians live – or
whether they live at all – in the neighbouring countries. They found out about
this topic only after the political transition, when the Hungarians living outside
Hungary showed up.
I feel that the above experience and the reasons for it require further
explanation. It dates back to the beginning of my human existence. When I was
7 months old, my father was relocated from my native village to the magically
beautiful Remete (today: Râmeț, Romania] – inhabited by the Moți – which
has a lovely landscape of high hills and valleys. There, the Moțis live kilometres
away from each other in special-shaped houses with straw roofs; you can find
edelweiss on the peaks and clear spring water trickles in the valley, cold even
in summertime. It is a pleasant, but bleak land, especially in winter. My father
was promoted from associate notary to district notary. An orthodox priest lived
nearby and from time to time my ten-year-old sister visited him “down the hill”
– as they lived at the bottom of the hill – to practise the Romanian language.
Here, in the close family circle, isolated from the rest of the world, I heard only
Hungarian words. The first words ever pronounced...
165
Figure 1. Pál Teleki on the jamboree organized in Gödöllő in 1933.
166
Figure 2. Miklós Horthy in April 1938 at the airport of Budaörs, when the 25th
anniversary of the Hungarian Scouting was celebrated.
167
T H E I M PA C T S O F P O R T U G U E S E S A L A Z A R I S M O N H U N G A R Y B E T W E E N . . .
Z S O M B O R S Z A B O L C S PÁ L
THE IMPACTS OF PORTUGUESE

SALAZARISM ON HUNGARY
BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS
In my paper, I wish to briefly describe a specific aspect of Portuguese-Hungarian

relations, namely the impacts that the political reforms carried out in Portugal
in the 1930s had on Hungary during the Horthy era. Relations between these
two countries do not have a long-standing history due to their different cultural
orientation, significant geographical distance and differences in the historical
challenges they encountered. However, in the course of their histories, there were
periods when the inhabitants of these two countries started to show increased
interest in each other – this mainly applies to Hungarians, who showed interest in
the Portuguese. However, this attention was not permanent, but one with specific
fluctuations; during the 19th and 20th centuries there were periods when this
interest grew, and then waned after a certain time. Of these periods, the timespan
between the two World Wars stands out as one when Hungarians started to show
increased interest in developments taking place in Portugal.
This interest in Portugal is inseparable from the changes in political,
economic and social ideologies in Europe following World War I. During this
period there was mounting criticism of the major, dominant ideologies of the 19th
century such as liberalism, individualism and the democratic and parliamentary
political regimes, as attention was called to their disadvantages,1 the increasing
1 Bertényi 2000, p. 237.
169
economic disparities and the anarchic character of parliamentary governance.2

In this situation, several attempts were made to tackle the problems, and there
were also attempts to avoid the imminent social explosion by redefining the role
of the state and the relationship between employers and employees.3 According
to some, the earlier liberal ideas were essentially correct and did not need to be
fully discarded; it would suffice to make efforts to renew them.4 Others, such as
those believing in communism and socialism, made efforts to build a society
based on full-fledged egalitarianism,5 whereas, in response to this, the right-
wing experimented with placing the primary emphasis on the community and
authoritarianism in the form of fascism or Nazism.6 The resurgent corporatist
teaching of the Catholic Church described in the papal encyclical entitled
Quadragesimo anno of Pope Pius XI published in 1931 appeared against this
background as a half-way house solution, recognising the problems and trying
to reconcile various solutions.7 It aimed to promote reconciliation between
different classes, accepting the mutual dependence of the owners of capital and
workers, to establish the harmony between property and work by reorganising
social order in a way that prevents class struggle and is based on orders.8
Although this idea was never translated from theory into practice,9 there
were still some states which referred back to it when transforming their political
and social landscape. Portugal was one of them. The smaller country on the
Iberian Peninsula abolished the monarchy in 1910, and then the republic was
proclaimed. However, for the two and a half decades of its history the First
Portuguese Republic was confronted with permanent crises: it did not manage
to stabilise its finances and put its economy on a sustainable trajectory,10 and
the exaggerated powers of the legislative body and the ensuing obstruction
2 Zachar 2014, pp. 21–30, 120.

3 Strausz 2010, p. 89.
4 Lackó 1975, p. 318.
5 Szalai 2002, p. 54.
6 Ibid.
7 Gergely 1977, p. 149.
8 Strausz 2011a, pp. 108–109.
9 Ormos 2009, p. 201.
10 Szilágyi 2015, p. 23.
170
practised by parties rendered the Parliament inefficient.11 While several

attempts were made to transform and renew the regime, these only brought
limited results. Finally, the republican period was put an end to by a military
coup: the right-wing opposition decided to topple the governing regime in
1926 and save the nation. The military coup started in the city of Braga, and
only limited fighting was needed to take over the whole country, even though
Lisbon did not join in.12
With the situation stabilising, a military officer named António Óscar
Fragoso Carmona managed to seize power. However, it was not long before
he had to realise that – apart from plans of saving the country – the military
did not have a coherent programme to manage the daunting challenges facing
ailing Portugal and to remedy the increasingly severe economic problems,
and thus it was necessary to involve civilians with proper expertise in legal,
financial and public administration matters in the government in order to
normalise the situation. He thought that, although the representatives of the
conservative bourgeois circles would be invited to participate in government,
the military would be able to keep the governance of the country under control
by retaining the presidential function, among other things.13 In order to
implement his ideas, he involved the members of the Catholic Centre Party
(in Portuguese: Partido do Centro Católico, PCC), predominantly university
professors from the University of Coimbra, in governing the country. This
is how one of the outstanding figures of the party, already an acknowledged
financial expert at that time and a university professor,14 António de Oliveira
Salazar became the country’s finance minister.15 Salazar, however, set various
conditions for accepting the position,16 through which he managed to establish
a sort of “financial dictatorship” around himself. His measures, however, did
not remain unsuccessful, and through the stringent control and reforms of
11 Szilágyi 2008, p. 10, and Afonso 1972, p. 164.

12 Georgel 1985, p. 78.
13 Szilágyi 2008, p. 31.
14 Carvalho 2008, p. 101.
15 Kay 1970, p. 41.
16 Henriques & Sampaio e Mello 2007, pp. 111–112.
171
central government expenditure, he soon managed to establish budgetary

equilibrium. As this period was deemed a sort of miracle in Portugal at that
time,17 this success further enhanced the recognition of Salazar, and his
influence as a politician became increasingly dominant outside his ministry
as well. Thus, in 1932 he managed to have Carmona appoint him as Portugal’s
prime minister. Following this, a broad space opened up for the ambitious
politician to implement social and political reforms. Though contemporary
right-wing regimes, predominantly fascism, are likely to have had an impact on
these,18 Salazar, when defining the grounding principles of his regime, placed
emphasis on the previously mentioned papal teachings,19 and he was always
careful not to identify with Nazism and fascism;20 as for the strong state, he was
of the opinion that it cannot subordinate everything to the ideal of the nation
or the race,21 and must operate within the boundaries of Christian morals and
law under all circumstances.22
However, in addition to emphasising the principles of the Christian faith,
with the constitution adopted in 1933 – i.e. one year after being appointed
prime minister – Salazar established a regime which in nature was a right-
wing, authoritarian, nationalist regime,23 but it was by no means similar to the
totalitarian regimes which he rejected. Soon, his success attracted attention
domestically as well as abroad. This is very well justified by the reports sent home
to Budapest by the Hungarian embassy in Madrid, in which Salazar’s activities
were described in a tone similar to the following report dated from 1932:
“During my career in foreign policy over the past twenty-five years, I
have hardly met a person more valuable and more interesting than him.
A university professor and a man of science. He has worked miracles
as finance minister /since 1928/ […] A modest, introvert, absolutely
17 Afonso 1972, p. 168.

18 Torgal 2009a, p. 206.
19 Kay 1970, p. 63.
20 Szilágyi 2009a, p. 80.
21 Braga da Cruz 1988, p. 49.
22 Duarte Silva 1989, p. 62.
23 Szilágyi 2009b, pp. 27–28, 34.
172
honest, deeply religious person, the leader of the clerical party. In his
role as finance minister, he transformed a deficit of hundreds of millions
into a major budgetary surplus like a magician, and all this took place
amidst the economic and financial crisis.”24
Unsurprisingly, not long after this, not only diplomats, but the Hungarian
public also started to pay attention to the changes taking place in Portugal. In
Hungary during the first decade following World War I, it was István Bethlen
who made an attempt to restore the old regime and conventional political
ideology while introducing moderate reforms, but during the Great Depression,
after the failure of his policies, the prevailing atmosphere of disappointment in
parliamentarism, liberalism and capitalism became more and more tangible.25
Owing to their unpleasant memories of the left-wing experiences after the end
of World War I, members of the Hungarian political elite were more open to
reforming the regime from the right,26 and due to this, Gyula Gömbös had
already made attempts at the corporative transformation of the country’s
political regime.27 However, the leadership of the Hungarian Catholic Church
did not seem to be particularly open to the social teachings enshrined in the
encyclical letters of Pope Pius XI.28 Instead of renewal, a group emerged in
opposition to the pro-government Catholic party, and in opposition to the
Church leadership, and this group thought that the official Catholic politics of
past years had failed and that something new was needed. The members of this
group were largely influenced by the papal teachings: in line with these, Actio
Catholica and other organisations promoting corporatism were established
at the beginning of the 1930s.29 In the meantime, György Széchényi and the
group of young Catholics centred around him welcomed the above ideas both
politically and ideologically:30 they founded their own paper in 1931 titled
24 MNL OL 1932.
25 Ormos 2004, pp. 207–208.
26 Békés 2006, p. 108.
27 Szalai 2002, pp. 66–68.
28 Gergely 1997, p. 6.
29 Idem, p. 155.
30 Hámori 1994, p. 56.
173
Korunk Szava,31 in which they tried to represent a more progressive Catholic

standpoint than that taken by the conservative clerical press.32
In their paper, they provided ample room for articles and discussions
on corporatism. The staff of the paper seemed to have followed European
examples and experiments with great interest, since presumably they would
like to have proved that the principles advocated by them do not only have
a theoretical appeal, but are also feasible in practice. This is how the Salazar
regime in Portugal came to the forefront of their attention. The first articles
discussing the country and Salazar himself were published in 1934, i.e. two
years after Salazar was appointed and one year after the introduction of the
new constitution, and after this the authors regularly brought up the topic in
the following years. Among many other things, the articles discussed Portugal’s
new constitution,33 the characteristics of the Portuguese regime,34 and Salazar
himself.35 When describing the politician, they were not sparing with positive
adjectives, underlining his deep Catholic faith penetrating even his work as the
prime minister of the country,36 his scientific meticulousness, expertise and the
distance he keeps from dictatorial or authoritarian solutions37 – as they did not
have any personal experience, most probably they were not uninfluenced by the
Portuguese propaganda machinery, increasingly active abroad as well, and the
toposes suggested thereby.38 After the publication of writings in Korunk Szava,
other Catholic publications also started to show interest in the topic, including
Katolikus Szemle,39 and Magyar Kultura40 also published articles on the reforms
introduced by Salazar. In addition, the author of the latter article started to
touch upon an issue which became rather popular only in a few years’ time,
31 Békés 2006, p. 109.

32 Gergely 1977, p. 155.
33 Anonymous 1934, p. 241.
34 Müller 1934, pp. 479–480.
35 Nyisztor 1935, p. 88, and Neller 1935, pp. 243–244.
36 Nyisztor 1935, p. 88.
37 Neller 1935, p. 244.
38 Janeiro 2004, pp. 46–49.
39 Csiszár 1935, pp. 543–549.
40 Fábián 1935, pp. 87–92.
174
namely the parallels that can possibly be drawn between Hungary and Portugal
in some respects,41 and the idea that the country on the Iberian Peninsula could
serve as an example to follow for Hungarians: “We, Hungarian Catholics read
this book on Salazar with envy, because the ideology therein has already taken
shape and the laws of Salazar are already applied. Happy small Portugal!”42
After Gyula Gömbös came to power in 1935, the editorial board of Korunk
Szava split into two, and the advocates of corporatism and its implementation
even through authoritarian means centred around Uj Kor and Vigila,43 whereas
the original paper was the place for those who from then on distanced themselves
from authoritarian regimes and methods.44 Understandably, the enthusiasm for
the state of Salazar of the journalists working for the paper also shrank and
they tried to shift emphasis on messages of other character in relation to the
activities of the Portuguese politician:
“The lesson to learn is the following: the way the small Portugal
progresses bravely and with determination on its own path in between
the temptations of foreign powers and ideologies may be worth
recommending to our small country as an example to follow […]
amongst the clashes of foreign powers and intellectual interests small
nations need to be particularly careful to preserve their own existence,
which they can only do with their own methods and devices.”45
As opposed to this, those at Uj Kor which still maintained their support
for the corporatist ideology, made efforts to prove that authoritarianism is not
identical to dictatorship: although Portugal is also often accused of building a
dictatorship, an authoritarian government led by Catholic politicians according
to Catholic principles of state administration and social sciences was established
there, and the country managed to establish a corporatist state without using
dictatorial means.46
41 Idem, p. 87.
42 Idem, p. 92.
43 Hámori 1994, p. 58, and Vásárhelyi 2002, pp. 133–135.
44 Vásárhelyi 2002, pp. 137–138.
45 Anonymous 1938, p. 507.
46 Anonymous 1935, p. 22.
175
Thus, Korunk Szava, which was the first to show interest in Salazar’s
activities, turned its back on attempts to renew Catholic politics on a corporatist
basis, but this did not mean that the changes in Portugal went unnoticed
by Hungarian intellectuals. The number of articles on this issue started to
increase especially from 1938, perhaps not independently from political
changes in the country, primarily not independently from the appointment
of Béla Imrédy as prime minister in May. He was expected by many abroad
and domestically as well to clamp down on Arrow Cross fascist propaganda.
In the beginning, the politician did meet these expectations,47 because as a
religious Catholic, he announced a reform programme based on the social
teachings of the Church, primarily on the encyclicals Rerum novarum and
Quadragesimo anno,48 which was capable of restricting the popularity of
fascists through the corporatist, collectivist reform of the outdated social
structure, closing the gap between social classes and a bigger role played by
the state in economic governance.49 His appointment as prime minister also
helped Christian religious intellectuals who believed in the feasibility of the
neo-conservative political ideas of the organic model of social organisation
come closer to power.50 When elaborating his reforms, Imrédy may have
had the economic and social solutions of the then-authoritarian regimes in
sight – of which he arguably found the Italian and Portuguese measures the
worthiest of studying and transposing.51 His interest in the Salazarian regime
is also proved by the fact that he did talk about it when the newly appointed
ambassador of Portugal to Hungary, José da Costa Carneiro, made his debut
visit to him in 1938. During this visit, Imrédy told him that he knew Salazar’s
works written in foreign languages and he himself would like to have visited
Portugal in order to take a closer look at the political system of the Portuguese
politician, but as the governor of the National Bank he had not had the time to
do so. During their conversation, he also asked the ambassador to send him
47 Szalai 2002, p. 82.

48 Gergely 1983, p. 416, and Sipos 1970, pp. 40–41.
49 Sipos 2001, p. 23, and Ungváry 2002, p. 4.
50 Lackó 1975, p. 335.
51 Ungváry 2002, p. 11.
176
further literature on the Portuguese system.52 In several of his reports Costa

Carneiro expressed his view that in his programme Imrédy was following the
Salazarian example and after the Hungarian prime minister announced his
programme, the ambassador drew the conclusion: “this programme fits with
the general direction of the current Portuguese reconstruction and certain
details seem to be under the direct impact of his Excellency’s [i.e. Salazar]
governance.”53 He shared this observation of his with Imrédy during the visit
mentioned above, adding that he had followed the work of the Hungarian
prime minister with interest and due to the similarities in their reforms and
ideological convictions, he also reports in detail on it to Salazar.54 The idea
that the former leader of the National Bank of Hungary might become a sort
of Hungarian Salazar was cherished by many of his Hungarian compatriots
due to his competencies, which resemble those of the Portuguese scientist-
politician, his financial insight, deep Catholic faith and planned reforms, and
there were many who did try to draw a parallel between them.55
Despite his interest in the Salazarian regime, Imrédy – as he himself
mentioned to Costa Carneiro – was unable to travel to Portugal to gain first-
hand experience of the reforms and transformation; however, as the governor
of the National Bank, he played a very important role in supporting the
study trip made to Portugal in 1937 by Vid Mihelics, the renowned social
scientist of those times belonging to the initial circle of Korunk Szava and
the circle of the young Catholics, who later joined the editorial board of Uj
Kor.56 Accordingly, Imrédy contributed significantly to the first book written
in Hungarian on the reforms introduced in Portugal.57 Mihelics gave an
account of his study trip in several articles written for Nemzeti Ujság, and
52 Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático 1938b. In any case, from the internal correspondence

of Portuguese departments we know that Imrédy’s request was taken seriously, and the
ambassador was soon sent a list of recommended literature, which Costa Carneiro received
with thanks. See Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático 1938c–d.
53 Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático 1938a.
54 Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático 1938c.
55 See MTI 1938, Sipos 2001, p. 28; Képviselőházi napló 1938, p. 746.
56 Frenyó 2002, p. 24.
57 Mihelics 1941, p. 8.
177
he managed to have personal meetings with several leading officials of the

system, including Salazar himself.58
Nevertheless, he was not the only journalist who decided to visit Portugal
to collect personal experience on the regime being built there. György Oláh,
a sociographer, author of Three million beggars and later member of the circle
of Imrédy, sent home his reports in the summer of 1938 to Uj Magyarság, a
journal which was established as a paper supporting Gömbös, which then
gradually radicalised.59 Hardly had he arrived home from Portugal, when
another major contemporary social scientist and author60 Béla Kovrig – who
also published his articles in Nemzeti Ujság just like Mihelics and who also
had an interest in the corporatist regime – arrived in Lisbon and later wrote
about his experiences.61 He was appointed by Imrédy as head of the Social
Policy Department 5 established at the Prime Minister’s Office and mostly in
charge of the governmental propaganda, which on paper was responsible for
drawing up social policy recommendations. Later, during the Teleki period,
Kovrig continued to work at the Prime Minister’s Office and participated in
the establishment and governance of the National Policy Service, established to
accomplish similar objectives.62
A major feature of the New Portugal, a book by Mihelics written with
scientific detail but permeated with sympathy for the system, is that – in addition
to a detailed description of the Salazarian regime – it also raises the idea of the
regime being worth following as a model and drew the following conclusion:
although the solutions and examples applied in Portugal might be useful for
Hungary, in the course of their potential transposition it was important not to
fall into the trap of copying them; Hungarians should use the model in line with
their own national specificities and needs:
“We did not show Portuguese corporatism for the sake of showing
it, but also with the idea in mind that we should show what can be
58 As for these see Mihelics 1937a–d.

59 His articles related to his trip: Oláh 1938a–e.
60 Kerekes 2004, pp. 253–256, and Strausz 2011b, p. 181.
61 His writings related to his trip: Kovrig 1938a–d, and Kovrig 1940.
62 Szabó 1996, p. 147.
178
taken over by Hungary from this big experiment. Copying the system
in its entirety did not seem to be a desirable solution. The lesson to
be learned is that the new Portugal has been able to reap the benefits
of the system by giving up integral corporatism as opposed to other
corporatist attempts in other countries, and by opting for economic
pluralism; this makes it absolutely obvious that when implementing
this mixed economic system, every nation needs to take into account
their own production relations and essential needs. […] It is clear that
in our country the production sectors which might require a corporatist
organisation are different from those in Portugal.”63
The interest in Portugal is also very well illustrated by the critical acclaim
received by the book, which otherwise was also closely monitored by Salazar.64
Individual book reviews, beyond summarising their authors’ views on
Salazar, also reflected on whether it would be worth implementing similar
transformation in Hungary. Some were in favour, emphasising that in Portugal
the new regime was built upon actual Christian foundations, and therefore
provided a very important orientation in times of ideological uncertainties,65
and the results achieved by the Portuguese prime minister were by all means
remarkable;66 in addition, “people would have got much further in every
country, had they known and studied Salazar’s solution properly”.67
At the same time, there were several authors who – in addition to
acknowledging certain merits of Salazar – warned against praising his regime
unconditionally. The Christian Democrat István Barankovics, for example,
criticised the Portuguese regime for several reasons including on the basis of
state theory, its diversion from the principle of the separation of powers, the
subordination of freedom to authority and the excessive dependence of the whole
regime on the person of Salazar himself.68 He emphasised: “as the Salazarian
63 Mihelics 1941, p. 240.

64 Frenyó 2002, p. 56.
65 Fábián 1939, and Nyisztor 1939.
66 Cavallier 1939.
67 I. B. 1939, p. 10.
68 Barankovics 1939.
179
construct and success are decisively based on the personality of Salazar, his
construct in my eyes is much more of a great experiment, whose proved lessons
we need to apply, (rather) than an example to follow with minor or major
modifications”.69 Others – while recognising the results of Salazar – voiced
their reservations concerning the system and its exemplary character based on
economic grounds, underlining that Portugal, even with its achievements taken
into account, is a rather underdeveloped country, and beyond that, its success
was not unambiguously due to its novel principles, but rather to application
of the classical recipes of economics.70 Such criticism is demonstrated by the
following excerpt from an article published in Közgazdasági Szemle:
“[…] And yet, the final conclusions of Mihelics need to be taken with a
certain degree of reservation. The author is looking for a way out from
current social and moral chaos and – even if he does not say that the
Portuguese corporatism and the underlying ideology are the panacea –
he is of the opinion that they are the closest to what can be considered
as the right direction. However, we must not forget that, on the one
hand, economic development has not been smooth, even in Portugal,
in the last decade, and certain important sectors still stagnate; on the
other hand, it is hardly possible to follow the example of a country,
which in spite of all laudable efforts is still at about the end of the list
in Europe in economic terms. Finally, the question remains whether
the undeniable Portuguese results are in fact closely related to the new
social order (or the social order, which is at least called “new”).”71
Interestingly, at the same time there were several critical authors who –
despite all their concerns and doubts – reflecting upon the Hungarian and
European state of affairs found it important to mention: it is by all means a
welcome development that Mihelics draws attention to Portugal as an example
which still belongs to the more normal ones in chaotic ideological times: “[from
the material accumulated by Michelics] it seems that in the huge pool of bad
69 Idem, p. 253.
70 Nagy 1940.
71 Major 1939, p. 322.
180
examples and options, which are more and more numerous every day, this is
still the least bad one”.72
During his term of office as prime minister, Imrédy gradually drifted further
and further away from corporatist ideas, and following his visit to Germany he
articulated a new direction, which after the removal of its conservative features,
would have transformed the Hungarian political system into an authoritarian
regime.73 This change led to his forced resignation in 1939, but his downfall did not
put an end to the political impacts exerted by Salazarism. The idea of reconstructing
the Hungarian political system on corporatist fundaments was also contemplated
by his successor, Pál Teleki, since he also wanted to use it as a device to weaken
the strengthening ambitions of the extreme right, as was the initial intention of
Imrédy,74 guarding against the totalitarian ambitions and properly transforming the
Parliament according to what he thought had been required in those times.75 In
the course of the planned transformation, he might have had Italian and Austrian
examples and the Portuguese experiment in mind. In his speech delivered in the
Upper House of the Parliament during the debate of the draft constitutional reform
dated 1940, he made a reference to it by saying: “[…] Portugal is a small state, and
therefore it provides much more lessons to learn for us than the machineries of
large states, which can afford to do a lot of things a small state cannot”.76 In an
earlier speech in the Parliament he also announced to have the intention of having
Salazar’s book translated in order to have a better understanding of state machinery
he had developed and make it more known.77 This translation – the Hungarian
version of Salazar’s Peaceful Revolution – was finally published in 1940 for the first
time, followed by a second edition in 1941.78
Teleki received the book itself directly from Salazar with the help of the
Portuguese ambassador, Carlos de Almeida Alfonseca de Sampaio Garrido,
72 Gáspár 1939, p. 75.

73 Sipos 1999, pp. 16–18.
74 Ablonczy 2000, p. 123, and Czettler 2008, p. 24.
75 Ablonczy 2005, p. 333.
76 Felsőházi napló 1940, p. 174.
77 Képviselőházi napló 1943, pp. 1182–1183.
78 Salazar 1940, and Salazar 1941.
181
appointed in November 1939, who also managed to have the book dedicated
by the politician himself to the Hungarian prime minister.79 Teleki thanked
Salazar for the gift in a letter, in which he also informed his Portuguese
counterpart of his long-standing admiration of his work, and then he asked for
permission from Salazar to have the book translated.80 From the reasons given
in the letter it also becomes clear: he found it important to have the Hungarian
translation because in his opinion the Portuguese nation had been resurrected
under the reign of Salazar and this resurrection might have much to teach to
his own compatriots, since Portugal and Hungary had much in common in
terms of their size and problems, whereas the solutions applied by nations
larger than Hungary would be unreasonable to copy. He also elaborated on the
principles that he wanted to permeate the Hungarian nation with and which
are very similar to those voiced by Salazar. It goes without saying that Salazar
gave his permission to have the book translated; what is more, he claimed
Teleki’s request had filled him with pride,81 Teleki sent a translated copy to his
Portuguese counterpart.82 The publication of the book in Hungary was so dear
to the heart of the Hungarian politician that he even wrote the foreword in
which he says the following:
“I requested permission from Oliveira Salazar to have his book
translated into Hungarian. I deemed it important for Hungarian people
to have a better understanding of this great and serious man and his
consistent work building up his country. In these times of profound
transformation in the world and having to meet our own daunting
challenges, I deemed it important for the Hungarian nation to learn
about similar problems, ambitions of as many countries and nations
as possible, furthermore to learn about statesmen and their work of
governance.”83
79 Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático 1940a.

80 Torre do Tombo 1940, pp. 727–728.
81 Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático 1940b.
82 Torre do Tombo 1940, p. 729.
83 Teleki 1941, pp. 5–6.
182
The other foreword of the book84 was written by György Ottlik85 who made
a personal visit to Portugal at the invitation of the Salazarian state.
According to the reports made by the Portuguese ambassador, Salazar’s
book was received with great acclaim by the Hungarian public.86 Certainly,
it is true there were positive reviews: these emphasised, in the first place,
the Christian foundations of the system, the balance maintained between
dictatorship and freedom and the distance kept from the overindulgences of
the then fashionable state ideologies,87 and also the fact that “Those advocating
dictatorship erroneously and deceptively include Salazar in the group of those
who follow this principle of governance and justify the righteousness of these
regimes.”88 However, negative reviews were also published, emphasising among
other things the improper functioning of the corporations and the dictatorial
features of the system, doubting its adaptability in Hungary in any way.89
Teleki passed away in 1941. This and Hungary’s drifting into war caused
the issue of state reform to be removed from the political agenda once and
for all. However, the interest in Portugal was maintained, even if at a lower
intensity. In 1941 a short, translated text was published on the issue dedicated
to the memory of Pál Teleki, but it received no particular attention,90 and in
the following year Elemér Pajzs, translator-author-journalist, publishing
several articles on Portugal and therefore maintaining close relations with the
Portuguese Embassy in Budapest91 also published a book on this topic. This
work92 was mostly a compilation of material prepared by the propaganda
84 MTI 1940.
85 Ottlik also wrote several articles in Pester Lloyd and Nemzeti Ujság on his experiences
during his trip. See Ottlik 1940a–h. These were published by Pester Lloyd in a collection,
see Ottlik 1940i.
86 Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático 1941.
87 Lacza 1942.
88 Ajtay 1941, p. 166.
89 B. M. 1941.
90 Szedlár 1941.
91 Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático 1943a. The Portuguese propaganda machinery made
efforts to broaden the cooperation with the author as they thought Pajzs was very useful in
promoting the country. See Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático [s.a.].
92 Pajzs 1942.
183
machinery of Salazar, and therefore did not provide any substantive, new
narrative concerning the regime or its applicability in Hungary.
Though from this time onwards, the Portuguese system with its political
reforms was less and less touted as a model in Hungary, for some the country
still served as an example being one of the very few European states which
managed to avoid being drawn by foreign powers into a war which set the
whole continent ablaze:
“One particularly specific feature of Salazar’s system is the fact that this
Christian form of dictatorship received recognition in the opposing
camps. […] The fascist, national socialist states praise its bravery and
supremacy in breaking with the liberal, free competition-based social
system and helped the principle of authority come into power in an
extremely restless country with revolutionary inclinations. At the same
time, Salazar preserved the fairest conduct towards the Anglo-Saxon
powers, […] the Portuguese government is alert in monitoring every
turn of international politics, but it is stable in maintaining its peaceful
conduct in the context of clashes between neighbouring great powers.
[…] Its Christian system and the stable political status rooted in people
make Portugal, the work of Salazar, an extremely precious factor in
European development.”93
The role of small nations during and after the war was the core message
and lesson learned, which came to the centre of attention in 1943, the year
preceding the German occupation, when Hungary was visited at the invitation
of the government94 by João de Ameal, Portuguese academic and politician,
who played a very important part in articulating the ideology of the Salazarian
regime and the anti-liberal, anti-democratic views it was based on.95 In an
interview Ameal himself expressed the idea which later was reflected on in the
articles of several Hungarian authors:96
93 -X- 1942.
94 MTI 1943.
95 Torgal 2009b, pp. 83–86, and Pinto 1994.
96 See e.g. Passuth 1943, and Dessewffy 1943.
184
“Throughout the arduous centuries, Portugal and Hungary always found the
most appropriate paths that their historical traditions obliged them to follow. This
is the key to the weight and power of the two states, regardless of the fact that
they belong to the so-called “small nations”. There is no knowing what peace
will follow and on what foundation Europe will be reconstructed. But it is for
sure that this peace and this reconstruction will need the Hungarian nation.”97
After the war ended, in the new political environment taking shape in
Hungary, due to its right-wing nature the Portuguese example and its adaptability
were finally taken off the agenda. Books on Salazar describing Salazarism were
all banned98 and the experts studying this issue were reprimanded for their
former views.99 In any case, interesting and also symptomatic of the way of
thinking the elite had between the two World Wars is the statement purportedly
made by Miklós Horthy in his exile in Portugal:
“[…] here I found a power which I have always had to look at with an ever-
increasing admiration and which is guaranteed by the perfect administration
under the paternal and safe rule of Dr Oliveira Salazar, this broad-minded
statesman with clear vision. […] If all dictatorships were like this one, it would
be the best form of government known today.”100
97 Konkoly 1943.
98 See temporary national government decree 530/1945. M.E. on the destruction of fascist,
anti-Soviet and anti-democratic publications.
99 As for the case of Mihelics, see Frenyó 2002, p. 79.
100 Pándi 1991, pp. 136–137.
185
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193
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN POST-TRIANON HUNGARY
F E R E N C S Z Á VA I
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
IN POST-TRIANON HUNGARY
The literature is still rather divided over the evaluation of the Horthy era, and
the same applies to the assessment of the results of the Hungarian economy.
Fortunately, more recently works have been published which made efforts
to realistically discuss this issue, based on actual calculations.1 In this study,
the Horthy period is presented in the context of international comparisons,
and the results achieved compared to the base year of 1920 are evaluated in
actual terms. The development of the Hungarian economy after the Great
Depression is compared to the growth rate in the USA and in the Western
European economies, with the latter considered to be the average European
growth rate, behind which the Hungarian economy lagged only slightly.2 Based
on an examination of the Hungarian welfare system in light of economic
modernisation, it is clear that the performance of the whole system determined
the development of the welfare system and its coverage. Prior to World War II,
the Hungarian welfare system achieved the level which in the following period
would have allowed for development along European lines.3
Undoubtedly, the Hungarian economy experienced several successful
periods in the 20th century. One such period was the economic growth in the
1 Romsics 1999, p. 172.

2 Romsics 2017, p. 388.
3 Szávai 2017.
195
era of dualism, but what can be said of the Hungarian economic recovery after
the Peace Treaty of Trianon? Is it true that the imposed peace treaty only had
a moderate influence on economic output or that it did not have a significant
detrimental impact on the economy? In my opinion, economic output was
substantially impacted by the loss of wealth and income resulting from the peace
treaty, the scope of which basically determined the conditions of development
going forward.
Up until the 1990s, economic performance was measured using gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita. Relying on this method and comparing
European countries (calculating in 1990 Geary–Khamis4 international dollars),
we see an interesting and balanced situation as regards the performance of
the Hungarian economy between the two World Wars. Economic policy
consistently played an outstanding, key role in this regard.5 First, we must
account for the centuries-old difference between countries in the European
centre and on the periphery.6 In 1913, the last year of peace, the output of the
Hungarian economy was nearly identical to economic output of the Czech
territories, whereas Austria outperformed both.
If we also take into account the countries in the Balkans as well, Hungary’s
economic output was considerably higher than the average for the Balkans and
Central Europe between the two World Wars. In the past, textbooks usually
emphasised the negative aspects of the economy during the Horthy era. Our
intention is to refine the previous opinions and align them to reflect actual
economic performance. Accordingly, we can state that Hungary’s economic
indicators were close to those of the Italian and Czech economies and were
better than those of Portugal, Spain and Poland.
In this period, there were times when the output of the Hungarian
economy approached that of Finland, even though the economic situation
4 In the historic overview of GDP, the values are represented in “Geary–Khamis dollars”
(G–K dollars or international dollars). This indicator was created in 1990 to promote the
comparison of countries. The method is based on differences in purchasing power and
average international commodity prices.
5 Szávai 2010.
6 Domonkos 2016.
196
in Hungary had changed drastically. From an economic policy perspective,

a new era started, the fundamental principles of which included autarchy, an
import-substituting industrial policy and a selective agricultural policy, new
customs tariffs and export subsidies, as well as a new foreign trade strategy.
Table 1. Net domestic product per capita in crowns (1913)
Austria 516
Alpine regions 790
Czech, Moravian, Silesian regions 630
South Tyrol, Trieste, Istria 450
Slovenia, Dalmatia, Bukovina 300
Galicia 250
Hungary 435
Territory after 1920 521
Territories of “successor states” 374
Croatia-Slavonia 295
Habsburg Monarchy 475
Source: Eddie, S.M. 1989.
Naturally, there were preconditions which had to be taken into account

by Hungary’s economic policymakers. What was behind the macroeconomic
developments that supported the above statistical facts? The economic
integration of the Habsburg Monarchy was followed by a particularly difficult
economic environment:7
7 Maddison 2003.
197
Chart 1. Gross domestic product in European countries, 1890–2000
25 000
United Kingdom
France
Geary–Khamis international dollars in 1990
20 000 Austria
Switzerland
Sweden
Finland
15 000
Italy
Spain
Hungary
10 000 Czechoslovakia
Poland
5 000
0
1890 1900 1910 1913 1920 1929 1930 1939 1950 1960 1970 1973 1980 1989 1900 2000
Source: Author’s own compilation based on Maddison 2003.
The new framework for economic policy:

economic exhaustion and loss of wealth
World War I consumed the equivalent of two-and-a-half years of Hungary’s

peacetime national income. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was exhausted by
the constant pressure to ensure the necessary troop strength and capital.8
Wartime exhaustion required large-scale state intervention, centralised
state control and the manufacture of replacement materials in large volumes.9
The direct war expenditures were to be covered with the help of the central
8 Berend & Ránki 1973, pp. 522–523.

9 Szterényi & Ladányi 1934.
198
bank and the issuance of war bonds in both parts of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. All of this was accompanied by mounting inflation. According to some
estimates, the war cost Hungary 32 billion gold crowns. The debts incurred
during the war were imposed upon the countries which started the war, while
the debts dating from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were
split up between the new owners of territories after the disintegration of the
Monarchy.10 Together with changes in the sources of income and economic
structure, Hungary’s loss of wealth was significant. According to calculations
by Frigyes Fellner, from the wealth of the countries subject to the Holy Crown
of Hungary, which rounded up to 41.521 billion gold crowns, Hungary’s wealth
after Trianon amounted to 15.676 billion gold crowns.11 The peace treaty of
Trianon enshrined the transfer of territories, which resulted in a loss of wealth
for the new Kingdom of Hungary and the Republic of Austria. National wealth
was distributed to the successor states as follows:12
Table 2.
Elements of
Post-Trianon Hungary Romania Czechoslovakia
national wealth
crowns % crowns crowns
I. Land 7,235,779,054 34.94 4,593,564,283 3,199,940,212
II. Mines and found-
915,952,464 4.42 911,506,093 370,164,101
ries
III. Buildings 4,533,656,994 21.89 1,561,712,423 1,073,915,881
Real estate 12,685,388,512 61.25 7,046,782,799 4,644,020,194
IV. Means of transport 2,125,021,866 10.26 1,389,228,176 1,013,533,301
V. Moveable property 5,787,527,842 27.94 2,951,513,100 2,098,572,594
VI. Foreign claims 112,882,026 0.55 20,340,209 7,173,430
Total gross national
20,710,820,246 100.00 11,407,864,284 7,763,299,519
wealth
10 Gratz & Schüller 1930, pp. 149–164.

11 Szávai 2004, pp. 80–81.
12 See: Szávai 2014, and Szávai 2011.
199
Foreign debt 5,034,532,777 24.31 1,242,109,587 955,216,393

Net national wealth 15,676,287,469 75.69 10,165,754,697 6,808,083,126
Elements of The city of Fiume

Yugoslavia Austria
national wealth and its district
crowns crowns crowns
I. Land 4,385,430,277 393,857,405 30,146,415
II. Mines and
24,455,041 1,111,593 -
foundries
III. Buildings 1,204,549,622 75,869,191 125,232,916
Real estate 5,614,434,940 470,838,189 155,379,331
IV. Means of transport 1,164,358,498 103,780,504 1,400,007
V. Moveable property 2,129,809,815 233,383,904 108,763,729
VI. Foreign claims 49,720,977 401,807 1,735,703
Total gross national
wealth 8,958,324,230 808,404,404 267,278,770
Foreign creditors 1,021,588,088 110,613,346 31,338,189
Net national wealth 7,936,736,142 697,791,058 235,940,581
There was no single economic policy characterising the whole period, as the
challenges resulting from the economic situation required various responses
from economic policymakers. For the Horthy era as a whole, the number of
finance ministers was almost twenty, and István Bethlen – shortly after his
appointment as prime minister – also filled this position temporarily for a
couple of months. Of course, the finance ministry was not alone in shaping
economic policy, as other sectoral economic ministries also contributed.
Therefore, in addition to examining developments over time, a thematic
approach also seems reasonable, which can be illustrated methodologically by
describing the relevant challenge and the responses.
200
Economic consolidation: 1920–192513

One important reference point for economic policy was the League of
Nations. On the one hand, this was due to the looming economic problems, and
on the other hand, due to economic reconstruction. Economic and financial
consolidation in Austria and Hungary posed a special problem. During this
period, the most important challenge was to restore the economy and establish
equilibrium in public finances. Obtaining a loan from the League of Nations
was the instrument to achieve this. There was an example for Hungary to
follow, since after the final negotiations Austria was granted a nominal loan
of net 650 million gold crowns by the League of Nations in May 1923. After
attempts by finance ministers Lóránt Hegedűs and then Tibor Kállay, not only
financial experts (János Teleszky, Alajos Szabóky), but the prime minister also
came to realise that foreign loans were needed to stabilise the economy.14
At the end of the first fiscal year, it became clear that roughly one quarter of
the loan was sufficient for public finances to be in a state of equilibrium.
Amidst the internal political consolidation, Bethlen did not want to ruin
public support for the system by taking unpopular measures, such as raising
taxes. Nor did the introduction of a wealth tax seem feasible.
As a first step, in April 1923 Hungary requested the release of liens from
the Reparations Commission. Initially, after lengthy negotiations following the
League of Nations’ commitment to issue a loan at the end of September 1923,
the Reparations Commission wanted to apply part of the loan to reparations.
As the first step, accompanied by a group of experts, Sir Arthur Salter, head of
the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, arrived in Budapest at the
beginning of November. Salter consulted with Hungarian experts and politicians
on the economic situation. During the discussions, it became clear that, as in
Austria, the most important tasks in Hungary were to stabilise the national
currency, establish budgetary and trade equilibrium, halt inflation and set up
13 Szávai 2009.
14 Péteri 2003.
201
an independent central bank with exclusive issuance rights. The delegation

was of the opinion that the necessary measures required a reconstruction
loan issued under the auspices of the League of Nations and suggested that a
commissioner in charge accountable to the Financial Committee be appointed
to guarantee implementation. The position of the Commissioner-General was
filled by Jeremiah Smith.15
As a result of negotiations, the parties concerned signed Protocol I-II of the
reconstruction plan in Geneva on 15 March 1924. The reconstruction plan was
similar to that signed by Austria, and the Committee undertook responsibility
for the execution thereof. The economic programme is basically contained in
Protocol II, which provides detailed guidance on curbing inflation, stabilising
the domestic currency and setting up an independent Hungarian central bank.
Furthermore, it provides for the extension of a reconstruction loan amounting
to 250 million gold crowns with the purpose of covering the budgetary deficit
up until 30 June 1926. The bulk of the loan (168 million gold crowns) was
provided by Great Britain, with much smaller amounts contributed by the
USA, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Sweden.16
On this occasion, the Hungarian government asked for permission to
spend the portion of the League of Nations loan which was not necessary
to safeguard budgetary equilibrium and the budgetary surplus on reviving
investment activity, which by then had already been suspended for 10 years.
This was approved by the League of Nations in 1925 up to a certain amount.
As opposed to the view widespread a few decades ago, namely that the League
of Nations loan was spent on prestige projects, it seems more likely that part of
it served investment purposes. This is supported by annual budgetary figures,
but also by Act XLII of 1928,17 which by virtue of its provisions wished to
strengthen the process launched during the term of the League of Nations
loan, namely establishing equilibrium in public finances and reinforcing the
economy.
15 Péteri 1985.
16 Ruttkay 1939, p. 265.
17 Ezer év törvényei 1928.
202
In fiscal 1928–1929, discussions focused on the residual portion of the loan

to be paid off in instalments (I) and the investments due and authorised at the
end of the fiscal year to be funded from the surplus revenue (II), the contents of
which are presented in the table:
Table 3.
I. Investment to be fund- Construction of postal and telegraph offices, Pengő

ed pursuant to section commercial and industrial ports, public roads
3(a) of Act IV of 1924 and bridges, housing, railway investments 39,300,000
(League of Nations loan)
II. Investment from Reconstruction of royal buildings, ministerial
amounts payable in buildings, archives, police headquarters,
1928/1929 and to be increase of equity, expansion of the state
funded from the surplus printing office, retail loan, development of
revenue of the fiscal air traffic, agricultural development, support
year 1927/1928 and the for milk cooperatives, reconstruction of 90,000,000
principal and interest vineyards in Tokaj, development of hospitals,
repayment on loans potable water, construction and support
authorised to be spent of schools, investment in state-owned iron,
on investment steel and machinery plants, investment in
state-owned coal mines
I-II together 129,300,000
Economic upswing: 1926–1929

The success of Hungarian economic policy was reflected by the fact that the
first fiscal year following disbursement of the loan (1 July 1924 to 30 June 1925)
featured an extremely positive balance. Budgetary equilibrium made it possible
to relaunch trade activities. In contrast to the previous budgetary deficit, the
country closed the period with a surplus of 63 million gold crowns.
In the second fiscal year, this success story continued. Commissioner-
General Smith considered Hungary’s currency to be stable and safe, and he was
also of the opinion that the country had managed to come close to budgetary
equilibrium. Part of the loan was spent on reorganising public administration.
203
There was an upswing on the labour market as well. In the second fiscal
year after the loan, the number of unemployed decreased by one fourth in the
course of one year, even though a large number of civil servants were dismissed
due to the reorganisation of public administration. The mandate of the
Commissioner-General expired in June 1926. The 253.8 million gold crowns
received in the form of the loan was not only sufficient to cover the budgetary
deficit, but had also enabled large-scale state investments.
The real importance of the loan provided by the League of Nations was
the role it played in the reconstruction of the economy, while at the same time
opening up opportunities for foreign capital investment.
The loan was placed primarily on foreign financial markets in the form
of bonds. Placing these bonds primarily on the London and New York Stock
Exchanges was relatively easy at a low exchange rate and a high interest rate.
The bonds were issued in seven denominations, in addition to the Hungarian
currency. In 1924, the financial situation was better than expected, with a
higher growth rate.18
Economic crisis: 1930–1938

After the recovery of the Hungarian economy and the economic upswing,
economic policymakers had a new challenge to face: the downturn in production
and the unemployment caused by the global economic crisis. Similarly to
European tendencies, Hungarian economic policy also used state intervention
as an instrument to respond to the crisis. Most countries had no other tools at
their disposal. Several countries in the region had accumulated considerable
amounts of short- and medium-term debt, and British and American creditors
started to quickly withdraw these credits. The termination of loan agreements
became more frequent after the bankruptcy of Creditanstalt (1931). The process
was followed by the closure of banks, and the stock exchange also closed.
18 Rádóczy 1984, pp. 23–25.
204
The competition between French and British loans and the German market
was won by the latter. The French, British and Czech economic plans had the
intention of putting the five countries along the Danube under one umbrella;
however, these plans fell through, either due to the opposition of the Little
Entente or that of the Great Powers.
To serve as a solution, a grain voucher system (known as the ‘boletta’ system)
was introduced in Hungary in July 1930 in order to counter the rapidly falling
prices of agricultural products; this system remained in effect for four years.
Specifically, the state provided a price subsidy of 3 to 6 pengős for each quintal
(100kg) of cereals sold by obliging the customer to pay one voucher per quintal
(with a value fluctuating between 3 and 6 pengős in the aforementioned years),
which then could be used by the seller as tax relief when paying taxes. However,
this was only the beginning, as a new wave of state intervention started from 1934,
when the state started to monopolise trade by monopolising the commercial
activities related to agricultural produce through semi-state-owned cooperatives.
The agro-industrial countries of the region, such as Hungary and Poland,
were hit hard. The sectors impacted the worst by the industrial crisis in Hungary
were sectors which manufactured capital goods, primarily the iron and steel
industry, the construction materials industry and machinery manufacturing.
When the low point was reached in 1932, their combined output amounted
to 52% of the pre-crisis level (with machinery production falling to 45%, the
production of crude iron to 10% and the production of iron ore to 20%). In this
dramatic situation, the Hungarian economy was under very severe pressure to
export, and thus loans were not viewed as a potential solution, but rather the
necessity to acquire markets.19
In mid-August 1931, the decree on gold pengő was issued, stipulating that
debts dating from before 15 August had to be paid in gold pengő. The other
measure of great significance stipulated that payments in foreign currency could
only be made and foreign loans could only be taken out with the permission of
the National Bank of Hungary.
19 Berend & Ránki 1976.
205
There was no major decline in banks’ balance sheet totals, but incomes
plummeted during the crisis. The decrease in banks’ capital absorption capacity
also influenced their industrial relations. The central bank performed an
increasing number of official tasks as an authority, conducting foreign trade in
securities and the notification of gold stocks.
A significant change was visible after 1935, but even in 1938 net profits still
fell short of the figures from 25 years earlier. Settlement of agricultural debts
started in 1938. During the agricultural crisis, a huge number of agricultural
producers became insolvent.
The state investment plan of 1938 increased the state’s dominance in
financial matters. From 1941, the financial needs of the wartime economy were
increasingly met by issuing unsecured banknotes, and from 1944, this was
nearly the only source of money.20
One basic question of wartime financial policy was the transition from
the gold currency to the MEFO bond (labour voucher). With the transfer
moratorium of 1931, Hungary did not abandon the system of the gold currency.
One major step in this direction was the amendment of the statutes of the
National Bank of Hungary after the financial review carried out by the League
of Nations after the spring of 1938. The loan transactions, which were necessary
to safeguard the equilibrium of public finances and meet the needs of the state
on a continuous basis, naturally resulted in an increase in public debt. Of the
public debt amounting to 7 billion pengős at the end of the war, 57% was linked
to financing Hungary’s participation in World War II.21
At the same time, the characteristics of the Hungary economy changed
substantially, since – based on the census of 1910 – 19.2% of Hungary’s territory
and 16.9% of its population was transferred to Czechoslovakia, 19.5% of its
territory and 19.8% of its population was transferred to Yugoslavia, and 31.4%
of its territory and 25.1% of its population was received by Romania. In 1930–
1931, 2.5 million ethnic Hungarians were registered in the three countries.22
20 Tomka 2000.
21 Csikós 1996, p. 105.
22 Elekes 1934.
206
All in all, due to the territorial changes from 2 November 1938 until mid-April
1941, Hungary’s territory increased by 79,106 square kilometres, representing
24.6% of its pre-war territory, and the more than 4.5 million people constituted
24.6% of its pre-war population.23
Boom in military industry: 1938–1944

The crisis essentially transitioned into a boom for the military industry as
the development of Hungary’s military potential was put on the agenda. As
in the European economy and even the American economy, the response
to this challenge was the development of this industrial sector. At the same
time, market acquisition was also indispensable: for the Hungarian economy
one decisive objective was to increase agricultural exports and it also served
as an instrument in this phase of economic development.24 Wartime public
expenditures provided to industry in the form of investment and orders
amounted to 16 billion pengős in the period between 1938 and 1939. This
accounted for 22% of Hungary’s national income. The process was launched by
the Győr Programme. However, it went far beyond that.
Speaking in Győr on 5 March 1938, Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán
Darányi announced the “one billion programme” to last for five years, which
was conceived as a development programme for the military.
The programme was nothing more than the foundation for the military
development programme named Huba, which was launched on 3 February.
From the programme, 600 million pengős was directly earmarked for
rearmament and 400 million pengős for indirect defence development. It was
scheduled to last 5 years, and the first phase was planned to be implemented
by the end of 1940 (this included the most urgent development). This meant
launching research for military purposes, introducing wartime economic
23 Idem, p. 45; Tilkovszky 1982; Buday 1922.

24 On the gradual development of the German large-space economy (Großraumwirtschaft),
see Domonkos 2017, pp. 9–21.
207
management in certain parts of Hungarian industry and supplying the army

with the most essential weapons. In the second phase, the objective was to
achieve a qualitative and quantitative development of a well-established
army.
The 400 million pengős was used to finance the development of agriculture,
transport, infrastructure and mining. The objective of the programme was to
raise and spend 1 billion pengő in five years. This was planned to be financed
from long- and short-term loans, combined with a one-off wealth tax. 400
million was to be provided from loans and 600 million from the one-off
wealth tax.
The 400 million pengős to finance indirect expenditure was distributed as
follows: 210 million was spent on infrastructure development, 20 million on
agricultural development, 19 million on agricultural trade development and
the development of services, 75 million on agricultural loans, 30 million on
public education, 36 million on the supply of potable water and other social
development, and the remaining 10 million was earmarked to finance mining
and the exploration of raw materials.25
From the mid-1930s, the export pressure on the Hungarian economy was
stronger and stronger, and markets for agricultural products had to be found.
This coincided with the ambition of German economic policy to integrate
the agricultural surplus of the region, including that of Hungary, into its own
economy by operating a specific clearing system. The military industry boom
was also in line with the “Neuer Plan” conceived to promote German economic
rearmament and resolve foreign trade difficulties, which implemented total
state control over the flow of international payments. The plan associated with
Hjalmar Schacht strongly limited the quantity of imports and regulated the
volume of total imports, but differed radically from previous trade principles: it
was based on bilateral trade and payment agreements concluded with the most
important commercial partners.
25 Kaposi 2002, pp. 317–320.
208
In contrast to previous practices, the quota-based system was

supplemented with an export reimbursement system. This meant that the
Hungarian government could spend 22 million pengős annually on price
subsidies for agricultural products exported to Germany. This arrangement
provided more favourable trading opportunities than the world price level.
The export subsidy paid by the Hungarian government was reimbursed by
Germany, i.e. the reimbursement by the German government from its own
financial resources made it possible for Hungary to exploit and fully utilise
the export quotas.
The trade agreement dated February 1934 was supplemented with a new
payment agreement in March, according to which German importers paid
the consideration for Hungarian products in marks to the Reichsbank for
the National Bank of Hungary as the beneficiary. The Reichsbank handled
the incoming amounts differently, broken down according to the types of
Hungarian commodities exported. The National Bank of Hungary used these
amounts to pay German exporters for deliveries.
They maintained the clearing system by means of which not the full amount,
but only 90% of the consideration for Hungarian export was to cover the price
of German deliveries, whereas the remaining 10% was at the disposal of the
National Bank of Hungary on the so-called conto ordinario.26
The manufacturing index was steadily rising, and there was an 11%
increase in 1940 after which it fell. However, the war against the Soviet Union
triggered a second boom for the military industry. All of this also resulted in
considerable wage increases.27 The wartime expenditure of the state (in the
form of investment and orders) amounted to 16 billion pengős between 1938
and 1939, accounting for 22% of Hungary’s national income.
26 Ránki 1988, pp. 5–50.

27 Csikós 1996, p. 101.
209
Table 4. Increase in manufacturing during the war
Year Manufacturing growth index

1938 100
1939 121
1940 133
1941 130
1942 135
1943 142
Source: Csikós Nagy 1996, p. 100.
During the second boom for the wartime economy, one instrument was the
establishment of aircraft engine manufacturing in Hungary.28
State intervention was the most dominant in solving raw material and
energy-related issues, and the production of raw material. In 1940 a decree
was issued on blocking agricultural products. In 1941 fat also had to be
surrendered, and pork fat, fats, bacon and cereals were rationed. In 1942 there
was a significant increase in the amount of products requisitioned.
Trade in products was still monopolised. In 1942 a new system of
surrendering goods was introduced, the so-called Jurcsek system, with the aim
to make it possible for the state to have a constant amount of goods available.
The surrender obligation was established based on the net income of the arable
land registered: for each golden crown (a measurement unit of the quality
of agricultural land) 50 kg of bread grains had to be surrendered. Debts to
Germany were on the rise and already amounted to 2 billion pengős in 1944.29
In addition to the rearmament programme announced in Győr, the one
billion programme to help agriculture intended to provide support for the
sector in the spirit of a command economy. By 15 September 1941, Dániel
28 Szávai 2001.
29 Berend 1984, pp. 1131–1141.
210
Bánffy had introduced the plan to the representatives of the governing party.
After consultation with individual ministries and adoption by the Council of
Ministers and the Regent, the plan was submitted by the minister of agriculture
to the House of Representatives on 12 December 1941. After its adoption by the
Upper House, it was proclaimed as Act XVI of 1942.30
The essential purpose of the Act was to increase the productivity of
Hungarian arable land and the quantity and quality of agricultural production,
and thus boost national income. The Act intended to accomplish the objective
by extending agricultural education and advisory services, granting allowances
and preferences, ensuring the order of agricultural production and organising
agricultural production and trade. The Act planned for the one billion pengős
to be used over ten years.31
Together with German debts, military expenses also increased, rising by
20% in 1941, 28% in 1942, 35% in 1943 and 44% in 1944. The deficit rose from
100 million pengős in 1938 to 2 billion pengős in 1943. These deficits were
managed with the help of loans. 42% of the growth in banknotes was caused by
the debt payable to Germany. During the years of the war, this debt amounted
to 4,765 million pengős, whereas the value of banknotes in circulation between
1938 and 1944 was 11,357 million pengős.32
In addition to manufacturing in factories, small industrial businesses
remained significant with an employment rate of 35%. In several cases orders
from large factories represented major orders for small industrial businesses.33
30 Pataky 1943, pp. 10–16.

31 Idem, pp. 39–40.
32 Berend & Ránki 1976, pp. 580–581.
33 Kaposi 2002, p. 294.
211
Summary
In Europe, there was a 30% drop in economic growth during World War I, but
World War II resulted in a smaller setback. After World War I, it took 4 to 5
years for most countries to reach pre-war levels, which after 1945 took only 4
years. In Europe, the average growth rate was 1.8% between 1913 and 1929,
and then 3.9% between 1920 and 1929, whereas between 1929 and 1938 it fell
to a mere 1.1%. Compared to this, the average growth rate of the Hungarian
national product was lower at 1.1% between 1913 and 1929, but was better
in the period 1920–1929 at 5.2%, after which it corresponded exactly to the
continental average.34
In Northern and Western Europe, economic performance improved at
an increasing pace, especially after World War II, meaning that the average
GDP per capita in those regions was two to three times higher than in Eastern
European countries. This is partly due to earlier differences, and partly to the
fact that growth rates in several Western European countries were higher
than in Hungary. The most recent literature also makes attempts at a more
refined description of the economy of the Horthy era, according to which
– mostly based on Maddison’s data – Hungary at the beginning of the 20th
century approached the Western European economies to a small degree, with
this process reaching its peak in the years of World War I, when the level of
development in Hungary amounted to 60.4% of the Western European average.
On the eve of the global economic crisis, it reached 57.1%, then in 1939 was at
58.3% of the Western European average, which was indicative of the level of
relative economic development before World War I.35 The data below served as
the dataset for Chart 1.
34 Ambrosius & Hubbart 1986, p. 136.

35 Tomka 2011, pp. 101–179. Table on p. 168.
212
Table 5. GDP per capita in European countries, 1890–2000

(in 1990 Geary–Khamis international dollars)
1890 1900 1910 1913 1920 1929 1930 1939 1950 1960 1970 1973 1980 1989 1990
United
4009 4492 4611 4921 4548 5503 5441 6262 6939 8645 10767 12025 12931 16414 16430
Kingdom
France 2376 2876 2965 3485 3227 4710 4532 4793 5271 7546 11664 13114 15106 17730 18093
Netherlands 3323 3424 3789 4049 4220 5689 5603 5544 5996 8287 11967 13081 14705 16695 17262
Belgium 3428 3731 4064 4220 3962 5054 4979 5150 5462 6952 10611 12170 14467 16744 17197
Ireland 2225 2495 2736 2736 2533 2824 2897 3052 3453 4282 6199 6867 8541 10880 11818
Germany/BRD 2539 3134 3527 3833 2986 4335 4049 5549 4281 8463 11933 13152 15370 18015 18685
Austria 2443 2882 3290 3465 2412 3699 3586 4096 3706 6519 9747 11235 13759 16369 16905
Switzerland 3182 3833 4331 4266 4314 6332 6246 6360 9064 12457 16904 18204 18779 20931 21482
Sweden 2086 2561 2980 3096 2802 3869 3937 5029 6739 8688 12716 13494 14937 17593 17695
Denmark 2523 3017 3705 3912 3992 5075 5341 5993 6943 8812 12686 13945 15227 18261 18452
Finland 1381 1668 1906 2111 1846 2717 2666 3408 4253 6230 9577 11085 12949 16946 16866
Norway 1777 1937 2256 2501 2780 3472 3712 4516 5463 7208 10033 11247 15129 18177 18466
Itali 1667 1785 2332 2564 2587 3093 2918 3521 3502 5916 9719 10634 13149 15969 16313
Spain 1624 1786 1895 2056 2177 2739 2620 1915 2189 3072 6319 7661 9203 11582 12055
Hungary 1473 1682 2000 2098 1709 2476 2404 2838 2480 3649 5028 5596 6306 6903 6459
Czechoslovakia 1505 1729 1991 2096 1933 3042 2926 2882 3501 5108 6466 7041 7982 8768 8513
Poland 1284 1536 1690 1739 2117 1994 2182 2447 3215 4428 5340 5740 5684 5113
If we compare all of this to the level of development in the era of dualism,

we can conclude that average growth rate of Hungarian GDP in the period
1924–1938 was 3.3%, which was considered remarkable in Europe at that
time. Very interestingly, this exceeds the growth rate under dualism, which
between 1870 and 1910 was approximately 2.3% in respect of the territory of
present-day Hungary. All of this means that after stabilisation the Hungarian
economy developed relatively quickly.36 In the Horthy era, the economy also
performed well in an international comparison and responded adequately to
the challenges. The loss of wealth and income in 1920 significantly impacted
the conditions and framework of economic output.
36 Kaposi 2010, p. 49.
213
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216
GERMAN PRESSURE AND SECRET SOCIETIES BASED ON THE EXAMPLE...
NÓRA SZEKÉR
GERMAN PRESSURE AND

SECRET SOCIETIES BASED
ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE HUNGARIAN
FRATERNAL COMMUNITY AND
THE HUNGARIAN INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENT
Miklós Mester was a Member of Parliament under the Imrédy government and
State Secretary for Public Education in the Sztójay and Lakatos governments as
well as a member of two secret societies, the Hungarian Fraternal Community
and the Hungarian Independence Movement. Speaking in 1986, Mester
explained “At that time, there were about a dozen secret, semi-secret and very
closed societies with limited membership. Within these, it was virtually decided
who would fill the leading positions, how the ruling party would be formed, who
could run as representatives, who would be the prefects, sub-prefects, sheriffs,
gendarmerie commanders, and who could be members of the Regent’s narrow
circle of advisers.”1 Mester’s lexicon-like biography suggests the outlines of a
1 The 1956 Institute’s Oral History Archive (OHA). Miklós Mester – Interview No. 45,
conducted by János Gyurgyák and Tamás Varga in 1986. p. 53, (hereinafter: Mester –
interview).
217
strongly pro-German, “reactionary” politician. However, a deeper analysis

of his life, including his role in the two secret societies, alters this impression
significantly.2
Mester was born in 1906 in Rugonfalva (today: Rugănești, Romania), in the
former Udvarhely County, to a Reformed family. His parents cultivated twenty
acres of land, which permitted them to support their son’s higher education. In
1937, as a student of Benedek Jancsó,3 he received his doctorate in history. In
his doctoral dissertation, he dealt with the issue of Transylvanian autonomy,
breaking with the contemporary official idea of a great revision. In his book
entitled Autonóm Erdély [Autonomous Transylvania]4 published in 1936, true
to the spirit of the poem Dunánál [At the Danube] by Attila József that he had
chosen as his motto, he takes an open stance in favour of the national and ethnic
equality of the peoples living together along the Danube. He became a member
of the Hungarian Fraternal Community during his university years. He started
his career in politics in 1939, and the personal connections he established in
this society contributed greatly to the advancement of such. At the proposal
of society member Ferenc Zsindely, he was nominated as a parliamentary
representative of the ruling party led by Pál Teleki. Mester recalls, “As a Member
of Parliament, I pushed for two things. Agrarian reform, and then, after Hungary
had regained its former territories, the issue of nationalities. […] Teleki rejected
my proposals in both of these matters.”5 Mester claimed that this was the reason
why he left the ruling party and joined the faction of the Party of Hungarian
Renewal, since this party promised radical social reforms and was backed by a
team of economic experts including the prestigious Béla Imrédy. In his memoirs
written in 1986, Mester also emphasises that it is wrong to try to understand the
2 For an analysis of Mester’s life, see Szekér 2013; Mester 2012, 2018.
3 Benedek Jancsó (1854–1930): educator, minority policy and national history writer. Head
of the Nationalities Department of the Bánffy Government, Nationalities Lecturer at the
Austro-Hungarian Military Command in Bucharest in 1917 and 1918. From 1922, professor
of the Ferenc József University of Szeged and a corresponding member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences. His field of research was the population history and political and
ideological movements of the Romanians in Transylvania.
4 Mester 1937.
5 Mester – interview, p. 64.
218
commitment to a party in Hungary between the two world wars based upon the
political conditions of the 1980s. “One thing must be said honestly: regarding the
ideological approach, a previously unknown culture emerged after 1945. People
today cannot understand that I was a member of Imrédy’s party, but I was very
far from the persons sitting next to me. Imrédy never made suggestions about
how things should be viewed. No one was required to have certain ideas about
anything; such a thing simply didn’t exist.”6
On 19 March 1944, German troops occupied Hungary, and a government
loyal to the Germans was formed under the leadership of Döme Sztójay. Mester
was appointed State Secretary by this government. However, he was not pro-
German, but rather an undercover agent of the resistance. His appointment as
State Secretary was the result of the work of anti-Nazi forces, the Hungarian
Community and the Hungarian Independence Movement, as well as a myriad
of personal and institutional connections. In this position, he enjoyed the
approval and support of the Reformed Church and László Ravasz, as well as of
the Transylvanian Party, Ferenc Herczeg, Ferenc Zsindely and Endre Fall, and
of opposition politicians active in the resistance such as Zoltán Tildy and Endre
Bajcsy Zsilinszky.7
What did it mean in practice to be part of a pro-German government
as a confidante of anti-German forces? Mester explains, “A State Secretary
for Religion and Public Education should have taken serious cultural policy
measures, but at that time this was out of question. People’s lives were at stake,
and I was dealing with issues in an unusual way.”8 It had to be ensured that
neither the Prime Minister nor the ministers became aware of any measure or
plan directed against the Germans; the only possibility was to act in accordance
with the rules of conspiracy. Mester’s work was mainly guided by Gyula
Ambrózy, head of the Regent’s cabinet office, with whom Mester was in direct
contact. Ambrózy also acted as a liaison between Regent Horthy and the anti-

7 Bokor & Mester 1982, p. 143.
8 Mester – interview. p. 82.
219
German groups.9 Mester’s main responsibility was the rescue of Hungarian

Jews; this task was all the more suitable for him given that during his previous
work he had formed personal relationships with many of the leading figures
in the Jewish community.10 News of abuse and brutality against the Jews were
reported to the leaders of the Jewish Council, who passed on this information
to Mester. “I immediately went to the cabinet office with the news, telling them
what had happened and that they should take action. And they did.”11 The letters
of exemption issued by Mester saved the lives of a considerable number of
Jewish people. “We kept pondering what could be done in those conditions. There
was a contingent for issuing exemptions reserved for the Minister of the Interior.
It was Ambrózy’s idea that it would be the best if the Regent himself obtained
the right to issue exemptions. Now, a certain constitutional procedure had to be
played out in order for the Regent to obtain this right, and to be able to exercise
it without restriction. […] But an impossible situation arose here, as the Council
of Ministers […] said that the names had to be disclosed. This meant that the
idea of exemptions was impossible to carry out. […] Now, Ambrózy and I had
another idea: people who submitted their request for exemption would receive a
letter with a ministerial seal and the letterhead of the Ministry of Religion and
Public Education, stating that they had submitted a request for exemption, the
exemption is in progress, and they are under the Regent’s protection. […] We
issued many such letters, which affected about thirty thousand people in total.”12
In addition to rescuing Jews, Mester – as the patron of the Györffy College –
also did much for the protection of college members who were in contact with the
illegal Communist Party, and he personally advocated for the release of Gyula Sipos
and future Prime Minister András Hegedüs. He also took part in organising the exit
from the war. After the Arrow Cross coup, an arrest warrant was issued against him,
and thus he had to flee. Using fake identity documents, he hid in Klastrompuszta
and then in Bethesda Hospital in Budapest until the end of the siege.
9 For more details, see Haraszti 32007. p. 271.

10 On Mester’s rescue work, see also Schmidt 1990.
11 Mester – interview. p. 85.
12 Mester – interview. pp. 86–90.
220
As mentioned above, the two secret societies (the Hungarian Fraternal

Community and the Hungarian Independence Movement) provided important
background assistance in the resistance work. However, before I begin to
introduce these two organisations, it is necessary to briefly return to Mester’s
statement quoted in the introduction, in which he emphasises that a dozen
secret, semi-secret, and very closed, exclusive memberships played a decisive role
in the political life of that period. He continues by explaining that the National
Casino and the Hungarian Casino were the meeting places of the highest circles
of the social elite, whose members made decisions regarding the top positions
and the appointment of ministers and state secretaries. He names the Etelköz
Association (referred to as EX or EKSZ) as the secret society with the most
influential and extensive network of contacts.13
The EX was already a force to be reckoned with during the consolidation of
the political system of the Horthy era, and it provided an apparatus layer loyal
to the system throughout the entire period. Exponents of the association were
also present in a fairly large number in the Parliament, public administration, the
judiciary system and among the army officers; an appropriate EX recommendation
was indispensable for filling certain positions. In addition to influencing public
offices, it coordinated the large number of social organisations and associations
of the period as the top connecting background body. In the words of Dezső
Szabó, the EX operated in the spirit of a secret fraternity, and – as a background
power loyal to the regime – its activity was closely intertwined with daily politics.
The power relations, divisions and guidelines within the elite were also reflected
within the EX. The initially radically irredentist and anti-Semitic alignment of
the organisation became less pronounced in the period of consolidation during
the Bethlen government. Under the prime ministership of Gyula Gömbös, one
of the key figures of the Association, the supporters of the German orientation
and a more radical tone became dominant. The members were divided on the
basis of their relationship to the far right and Hitler’s politics, but the leaders of the
Association essentially supported loyalty to the utmost to the German alliance.
13 Fodor 2008; Szekér 2017, pp. 80–81.
221
The EX background present in the military and public sector also played a role
in the success of the Arrow Cross Party’s accession to power. At the same time, a
group of people associated with the EX took a strong anti-German stance and also
supported the Regent in organising the exit from the war.14 Thus, the EX was the
offspring of the political system of the Horthy era, and its activities also depended
on it; after the collapse of the system, it lost its purpose and ceased to exist.
Mester does not mention either the Community or the Independence
Movement when listing the secret societies serving as the background of the
governing power structure, given that these two organisations had completely
different foundations. Their activities were discussed by Mester when the
conversation turned to resistance to Nazism.15
Founded in the early 1920s after the Treaty of Trianon, by intellectuals who
had moved to Hungary from Transylvania, the Hungarian Community revived
the traditions of a several centuries old secret society linked to struggles for the
independence of Transylvania.16 Its aim was to enforce Hungarian interests and
Hungarian sovereignty more effectively. In the case of the Community, this was
not only an international and domestic political endeavour, but also a struggle
for “internal independence”, where sovereignty also meant ensuring, in both
spiritual and existential terms, autonomous self-assertion and the opportunity
for a good quality of life for all strata of society. As such, the endeavour also
undertook a social programme which, between the two world wars, related the
Community to the ideology of writers of the popular movement, and also made
it open to opposition groups rejecting the Horthy regime. At the same time, it
must be emphasised that the Community was not specifically associated with
any political party or ideology. It did not work out a programmatic guideline of
what it considered to be the right way to enforce Hungarian interests; instead,
it aimed to leave the possibilities open to many different alternatives. Also,
given that the Community functioned in the manner of a movement organised
from the bottom up, members were not entrusted with specific tasks or action
14 Fodor 2008, p. 155.

16 For more details, see Szekér 2017, pp. 58–107.
222
plans developed by the organisation. It was due to the bottom-up nature of the
movement that it emphatically functioned in the spirit of self-organisation. As
Károly Kiss, the leader of the Community explained in his statement to the State
Protection Department (AVO) in 1947, “After filling a position, each member was
expected to realise the ideas of the Community through their individual actions.
[…] If one has embraced the ideas of the Community, we found it natural that he
would work in this spirit, instead of upon some express request.”17 Members were
inaugurated if they were seen as committed to Hungarian ideals and willing
to act for the benefit of the community. From this point on, however, every
member could promote the “cause of Hungarians” according to their own
conscience, and the Community – primarily through its network of contacts –
merely provided a background for their activity.
Therefore, the basic position of the Community was not to reject any
political direction; in fact, it was open to all social organisations and political
groups from the right to the left wing, and it tried to strengthen the principles
and guidelines it represented within these groups. Through its approximately
4,000–5,000 body of members organised in cells, it had extensive contacts
to parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties, social organisations and
institutions, regardless of political affiliation. However, the Community
rejected on principle any aspirations that jeopardised Hungarian sovereignty.
Consequently, it opposed the German, and then, after the war, the Soviet
imperial politics as a baseline position. As a result, from the mid-1930s onwards
the Community increasingly considered its mission to counter Nazism, and its
members were called to action in the same spirit.
The organisational framework of the Hungarian Independence Movement
was ensured, on the one hand, by Prime Minister Pál Teleki’s secret practical
activities against imperial Germany performed in the open political arena, and
on the other hand by the work of the so-called Circle of Five.18 The formation of
17 Budapest City Archives (BFL) XXV. 1.a. 1837/1947. 548. d., Testimony of Károly Kiss, 17
January 1947.
18 Ráday Archives (RL) C_80, 2. d. Szent-Iványi, D. n.d. (hereinafter: The True History of the
Hungarian Independence Movement), Szekér 2017, pp. 187–189.
223
the Circle of Five “resistance cell” started from 1937–1938 with the participation
of economist Gábor Forintos, diplomat Kálmán Kossuth, gendarmerie detective
Lajos Kudar, Captain of the 2nd General Staff of the Armed Forces Lajos Pados
and university professor Barna Kiss, who was also one of the leaders of the scout
movement. “Managing director Forintos represented the economic and Christian
political lines, Kossuth dealt with the affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(and partly of the Prime Minister’s Office), and tried to compile and evaluate
the situation of the foreign policy on a regular basis. Kudar and Pados dealt
with the issues of the army and the gendarmerie (including the Ministry of the
Interior) and were also in charge of the news services. Professor Kiss kept in touch
with academia and youth movements,”19 summarised Domokos Szent-Iványi,
the future leader of the Hungarian Independence Movement, explaining the
responsibilities of the members of the Circle in his 1946 study on resistance.
The creation of the Circle was motivated on the one hand by the continuous
strengthening of Hitler’s power, and on the other hand by the realisation that
National Socialist ideas had found a significant following in Hungary.20 By
the beginning of 1939, the Circle had prepared its “work plan” adapted to the
existing conditions. The starting point was the assessment of the situation,
according to which war was inevitable and – in the opinion of the members
– it was not going to lead to an overwhelming German victory. However, they
saw that open separation from the Germans was not possible for Hungary, as it
would have led to military occupation. The best interest of the country, in their
view, was to avoid entering the war which was imminent due to the German
influence – but the Circle of Five did not see much chance of that either. Pro-
German attitude was strong in influential political and military circles, but at
the same time, according to a 1939 evaluation, “the old anti-Nazi liberal set
– István Bethlen, Gyula Károlyi, Lajos Walkó, Károly Rassay, etc. – had lost
19 RL C_80, 2. d. The True History of the Hungarian Independence Movement. p. 60.

20 In 1937, Szálasi’s motto was, “1938! This year is ours!” His support peaked in 1938–1939,
when his party grew to approximately 25,000-30,000 members. In the 1939 elections,
candidates of various National Socialist parties won 25% of the votes, and thus, with 49
seats, they became the largest opposition group in the Parliament. For more details on the
election, see László Tamás Vizi’s study published in this volume.
224
much of their prestige (especially in relation to land reform and social problems
in general), so as a result, and despite being specifically anti-Axis, they will be
unable to prevent the country from drifting into war.”21 Since Hungarian society
also did not have a united view on the German issue, open confrontation would
not only have carried the danger of occupation, but also of civil war. As a result,
it was considered necessary to prepare for long years of continuously increasing
Nazi German influence, and under the given circumstances, counterbalancing
the German orientation was believed to be possible if managed primarily from
the background.
Their idea was to build an influential relationship system based on personal
acquaintances. Teleki, with whom the members of the Circle had a friendly
relationship, was seen as the main coordinator of this system of relations: “In
the summer of 1939, the Circle of Five began work in full force. First of all, it
established contacts with Pál Teleki’s closest friends and colleagues (Kálmán
Darányi, István Bárczy, Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, Domokos Szent-Iványi, Minister
of Industry József Vargha, Ferenc Zsindely, Baron Dániel Bánffy and others) and
maintained close connections and cooperation with them. Unfortunately, Kálmán
Darányi died in October 1939 and thus his support was lost. At the same time, the
‘Five’ entered into the closest contact with certain bodies and groups of the army
(Chief of 2nd Defence Staff: Koffa, Def., Special, Registry) and the gendarmerie
(Investigation Department). The ‘Five’ were closely related to the 9th Department
of the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerial Advisor József Antall).”22
Relying on the Circle of Five and in conformity with the plans of the Circle,
Teleki organised two departments of the Prime Minister’s Office in the summer
of 1939: the 4th Information Department (ME IV.) under the leadership of
Domokos Szent-Iványi and the National Political Service (ME V.) directed by
Professor Béla Kovrig. Sándor Molnár, an associate involved in both legal and
illegal activity, recalls that23 the National Political Service “carries out social and

23 On the operation of the National Policy Service, see Hámori 1997; Ablonczy 2005, pp. 483–
485; Molnár 2001; Nyári 2015, pp. 96–104. On the activity of Béla Kovrig, see Petrás 2019.
225
literary political activities on the outside, but on the inside, the underground, it
will be the secret workshop of the most ruthless anti-Nazi, anti-German and anti-
Arrow Cross propaganda war.”24 The officially defined task of the department was
to deal with problems of ethnic regions and Hungarians living in other countries
on the one hand, and with supporting cultural life on the other. Meanwhile,
under the cover of the department, illegal publications of Nazi counter-
propaganda were produced and distributed. According to Sándor Molnár’s
recollection, thirty to forty thousand leaflets were printed and distributed per
week, within the framework of the strictest conspiracy. Thanks to the secret
organisational work of the department several books were published, including
Lajos Iván’s book Németország háborús esélyei a német szakirodalom tükrében
[Germany’s Chances in the War in Light of German Scientific Literature],
which in 1939 already predicted – citing economic factors – the probability
that Germany would lose the war, and Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky’s book entitled
Helyünk és sorsunk Európában [Our Place and Fate in Europe].25
Teleki removed the management of matters related to information on
foreign affairs from the scope of duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which was basically pursuing a German-oriented policy, and transferred it
to the competence of the Information Department.26 This became the official
scope of activities of the department, in addition to the management of Teleki’s
private and scientific relations abroad. These measures created an opportunity
to bypass the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and build an alternative system of
foreign relations and an Entente-friendly line of foreign affairs. Besides this,
the Information Department maintained direct contact with all ministries,
public administration bodies and major social and scientific organisations,
considering that this was necessary “in order to ensure the harmonisation of
Hungarian aspirations abroad”.27 The contact person was appointed by the
24 Molnár 2001, p. 40.

25 Molnár 2001, pp. 80–83.
26 On the establishment and operation of the Information Department, see Szent-Iványi 2013,
196–202.
27 Excerpt from the circular issued by Teleki on 28 August 1939. RL C_80, 2. d. The True
History of the Hungarian Independence Movement, p. 143.
226
Department, taking into account the person’s worldview. In this way, it was
possible to establish a network of anti-Nazi contacts that had ties to the entire
Hungarian institutional system and provided the legal framework for contact
between the Prime Minister and the anti-Nazi forces.
After Teleki’s death, both departments of the Prime Minister’s Office
were abolished. However, the circle of contacts organised under the auspices
of the Information Department continued their activities under the name
of Hungarian Independence Movement.28 In this new form, the Hungarian
Independence Movement continued to attempt to coordinate the activities
of anti-Nazi forces, but still did not establish, either secretly or legally, an
organisational structure. The Hungarian Independence Movement did not have
organisational and operational statutes, and its members were not registered;
it merely coordinated a network of contacts led by Domokos Szent-Iványi and
involving a few dozen more people, without a true organisational framework.
Due to this form of operation, the insiders also called the network the “Teleki
Nebula”. By May 1946, the “operators” of the Independence Movement
had compiled a report entitled A Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom őszinte
története [The Honest History of the Hungarian Independence Movement].
The confidential summary of the nature and secrecy of the operations states
the following: “The Hungarian Independence Movement never meant to be a
separate party or faction, but an action committee that sought to locate all anti-
German Hungarian democratic forces and coordinate these in order to achieve
the above goals. […] The movement operated along several lines, but for the
sake of secrecy, the various groups and individuals were not informed about
the other groups’ members or their work. […] [The background] was always
the operation of the Hungarian Independence Movement, even when those
participating in its work had no idea about this. […] The very close connection
between the military and political lines was one of the main strengths of the
organisation, and this was the key factor that enabled it to function with
relatively high efficiency.”29
28 Szent-Iványi 2016, pp. 41–47; Szekér 2017, pp. 199–201.

29 RL C_80, 2. d. The True History of the Hungarian Independence Movement, p. 153.
227
To illustrate the significance of this circle of relationships, here are the

names of several persons who collaborated within the framework of the
Hungarian Independence Movement: Géza Shoos, leader of the Reformed
youth movement Soli Deo Gloria; as Secretary of the Prime Minister, he was
Szent-Iványi’s alternate and most confidential colleague, was involved in the
secret activities of the office and played a prominent role in the rescue of Jews.
Szent-Iványi involved the Circle of Five in the work, along with its entire network
of contacts. The network included Minister of the Interior Ferenc Keresztes-
Fischer, State Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office and then Minister of
Trade Ferenc Zsindely, Minister of Agriculture Dániel Bánffy, and, also from
the Prime Minister’s Office, State Secretary István Bárczy, a personal friend of
Miklós Horthy. In the Ministry of the Interior, members of the community
Gábor Benczur-Ürmössy, László Osváth and József Antall, Sr. were in direct
contact with Szent-Iványi. The contact group included former Prime Minister
István Bethlen and, from the Regent’s entourage, Head of the Regent’s Cabinet
Office Gyula Ambrózy and Commander of the Hungarian Royal Guard Károly
Lázár. In terms of British relations, the person of Professor C.A. Macartney,
the Oxford historian is very significant.30 Macartney, of Irish descent, was a
member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) from
1926, as an expert on the issue of Central and Eastern Europe. He was the main
theorist of the view that an ethnic-based adjustment of the Treaty of Trianon
was necessary. At the beginning of 1940, he came to Hungary on behalf of
the Foreign Research and Press Service (a semi-official advisory body of the
Intelligence and Analysis Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and
a close relationship developed between him and Domokos Szent-Iványi. Their
relationship of trust is revealed by the fact that in 1946, before his arrest, Szent-
Iványi entrusted Macartney with the safe-keeping of the documents on the
diplomacy of the Horthy era that he had collected (these documents became
some of the most important sources of Macartney’s two-volume work on the
era entitled October Fifteenth31). During his six years of expert work, Macartney
30 On Macartney’s work, see Beretzky 2005, pp. 107–120.

31 Macartney 1956.
228
drafted 143 memoranda on the Danube Basin and Hungary, which significantly
influenced the confederation-based concept supported by the Americans and,
before the Soviet Union switched sides, had also been seen by British foreign
policymakers as a realistic option for post-war regional planning.32
Close links were established with the secret services and law enforcement
bodies along a number of lines, mostly thanks to cooperation with the Circle
of Five. The members of the confidential circle were Lieutenant Colonel of the
General Staff Jenő Padányi (Ministry of Defence, Intelligence and Emergency
Response Department); Gendarmerie Lieutenant Colonel Lajos Kudar; Oszkár
Moór, head of the law enforcement team of the Political Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chief Inspector of the gendarmerie Gábor Faragho;
Gendarmerie Colonel Rajmund Ridegváry. Andorka Rudolf, the ambassador
of Madrid, was also involved in the work. Due to the high importance of
cultural relations, the organisation had a separate scientific group made up
of scientists. It also had liaisons to social organisations and churches. Endre
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, who was supported by a significant network of contacts due
to his openly anti-German stance, played a decisive role in the activity of the
group.33
However, in order to work effectively, this diffuse operation also required
a cover organ, the back-up support of some kind of established organisational
structure. With the liquidation of the Information Department, the legal
organisational framework linked to the state administration was lost. The
Hungarian Independence Movement tried to compensate for this loss by
building wider social relations. On the one hand, this was ensured by the
connections to churches and social organisations established during the period
32 Beretzky 2005, p. 127.

33 Géza Paikert, Tibor Gerevich, Sándor Eckhardt and Tivadar Thienemann served as liaisons
to the Academy. The experts in cross-border cases were Béla Bokor, László Makkai, László
Hadrovich, András Abonyi and Sándor Vajlok; László Pálinkás was the expert on Italian
issues, István Bartha and Béla Teleki on German issues, and Adorján Divéky, István
Mészáros and Sándor Borsitzky on Polish issues. The cartography experts were Péter K.
Kovács and András Rónai, and the members of the Hungarian history group included
Tibor Joó, Domokos Kosáry, Kálmán Benda, József Deér, Alajos Kovács and Árpád Markó.
Szent-Iványi 2013, pp. 273–280.
229
of the Information Department, but the most effective and conspiratorial

framework was established by the Hungarian Fraternal Community. The basis
for cooperation between the Hungarian Independence Movement and the
Hungarian Fraternal Community was the rejection of Hitler’s policy by both
organisations and the overlaps in membership (Lajos Kudar and Géza Soos
played a key role in building this cooperation). The Community thus became
a kind of secret cover organisation for the network of the Independence
Movement. Thanks to this cooperation, the Hungarian Independence
Movement was based on broad social foundations, organised membership
and a conspiratorial background, while the Community had a network of
contacts that reached the highest levels of political life. Special importance
was conferred on this joint work by the fact that the Hungarian Independence
Movement left the framework of the political elite and the state administration,
and the cooperation between the two organisations combined the anti-Nazi
aspirations of the elite with those of the wider circles of Hungarian society.
Thus, the movement brought together certain political and social groups whose
work would have been impossible to coordinate in the open arena.
On 19 March 1944, German troops occupied Hungary. The German
military intervened directly in political life, public life and all areas of everyday
life. The government was replaced, and a hunt was launched for Jews and those
opposed to Nazism. The new conditions meant new tasks, opportunities and
dangers for the resistance. In this situation, a more organised and top-down
form of anti-German work became necessary. At this point the bottom-up,
movement-based community suspended its organisational framework – or
“went dormant” in conspiracy terms – while the Hungarian Independence
Movement organised its previously network of contacts into a hierarchically
structured organisational framework that was no longer self-organising but
operated upon instructions and action plans developed from above. While
in “peacetime” the Community served as the organisational backbone of the
Hungarian Independence Movement, the situation had now changed: the
newly established organisational framework of the Movement provided the
institutional background for the communities involved in the resistance and
their network of contacts.
230
In the new context of the occupation, the Independence Movement

considered that – since Miklós Horthy’s position as Regent continued to provide
the legitimate authority needed for a separate peace – the realistic possibility
in the struggle against Germans was not an armed fight, but the preparation of
an exit from the war. To organise this, the Hungarian Independence Movement
had at its disposal the so-called Special Office (referred to by posterity only as
the Exit Office) and a coordinated system of contacts reaching the highest levels
of state power.
Here, a short digression is needed to explain the work of the Office.
According to the recollection of Domokos Szent-Iványi, in the summer of 1943
the members of the Hungarian Independence Movement decided to join the
attempts of Prime Minister Miklós Kállay and become involved in organising
the exit from the war on a practical level.34 This decision was prompted
primarily by the fact that much information came into the possession of the
Movement, according to which German retaliation was to be expected due
to Kállay’s “suspicious” policy, which would primarily affect the government,
but presumably the person and position of the Regent would remain safe.
Therefore, the Movement developed an emergency plan independent of the
government. As part of the plan, they set up the so-called Special Office on 10
January 1944. Miklós Horthy, Jr. was appointed as the head of the Office, and
Domokos Szent-Iványi was assigned by credentials to organise the Office and
coordinate its work. Officially, the Office handled the affairs of people wishing
to re-establish their residence in Hungary, but in fact it was the cover body for
organising the exit from the war. The institution was not under the control of
the government, but under the direct control of the Regent. Just as the founding
of the Office, the undercover exit attempts were secretly coordinated by the
contact system of the Independence Movement.
The information received by the Hungarian Independence Movement
proved to be true: the Germans did not want to change Horthy’s role as Regent.
The Office, as an institution under Horthy, did not come under German control
34 Szent-Iványi 2016, pp. 76–104.
231
even after the occupation, so it could remain a pillar of the resistance work, which
basically had two directions: the exit and organising the rescue of people. In both
activities, the Hungarian Independence Movement took advantage of the room
for manoeuvre arising from the power of the Regent. After the occupation, the
significance of the Independence Movement was assessed by Tibor Hám,35 one
of its members: “[the Hungarian Independence Movement] was the closest to the
concept of an underground government, since it was led by Szent-Iványi, the actual
leader of young Horthy’s Exit Office, and the majority of its associates were persons
opposed to the German occupation who still held positions in the administration
and army, including Horthy’s entourage.”36 At the community level, the Hungarian
Independence Movement also had the opportunity to reach out to anti-German
social organisations and political groups.37
Mester’s resistance work, focused mainly on rescuing the persecuted, is
an example of cooperation of the “lower and upper levels”. The work of writer
János Kodolányi, who helped in organising the exit from the war, is another
illustrative example of the coordination of the Community’s social circles and
the Independence Movement’s elite circles.38 Kodolányi was a member of the
Community from the mid-1930s. It was a great support to his work that, as
the organiser, secretary and editor of the writers’ self-help organisation called
35 Tibor Hám (1914–1990), doctor, politician. In 1941 he was a founding member of the
Pál Teleki Working Group, and later he became its president. He was also a member of
the Independent Smallholders’ Party from 1943. From 15 October 1944, he became a
participant in the resistance line led by Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, and one of the organisers of the
Hungarian Uprising Liberation Committee. He spent six weeks in the prison of the Arrow
Cross Party. After 1945, he became the president of the Smallholders’ Party of the 7th
District of Budapest, and later, from April 1945 to March 1946, held the position of Lord-
Lieutenant of Sopron County. From 4 November 1945, he became a member of Parliament
as a representative of the Smallholders’ Party. Within his party, he belonged to the group
close to Ferenc Nagy, the so-called “Holy Innocents”. In the lawsuit against the Hungarian
Community, he was acquitted at the court hearing. He emigrated in 1948 and settled in the
United States in 1951. He played an active political role in the emigration. He was a member
of the National Committee. In 1966, he founded the Hungarian American Cultural Center.
As an emigree, he earned a living from his medical practice.
36 Quoted by Saláta 1989, p. 96.
37 On the role of the Community in the resistance, see Kővágó 1994, pp. 16–17.
38 On the resistance activity of János Kodolányi, see Szekér n.d.
232
the Writers’ Economic Association and of several newspapers, he had insight

into the system of relationships organised on the basis of intellectual identity.
Kodolányi was a permanent employee of the periodical Magyar Élet [Hungarian
Life], a magazine of national significance published with the covert support of the
Community. A section of the magazine, entitled Esti beszélgetések [Evening Talks],
was one of the defining writings of the paper. The Community also supported
the publication of the daily newspaper Tiszántúl [Trans-Tisza], edited with the
participation of Kodolányi. Zoltán Bay, a renowned scientist and member of
the Community, recalls in a letter he wrote 1988: “The Hungarian Community
had a cell at the University of Technology, which was led by my colleague István
Náray Szabó. The members of the cell were mainly professors of the University of
Technology, but some of them, including János Kodolányi, were outsiders. […]
Apart from a collegial relationship, Náray Szabó and I were great friends. […] In
the 1941–1942 academic year, he was appointed Dean of the Faculty, which brought
him a considerable income. He told me that he would donate his entire Dean’s salary
to support the goals of the Community, and especially to buy the ‘Tiszántúl’, which
could then be moved to the capital. János Kodolányi became the leading editor of
‘Tiszántúl’. […] Therefore, the organisation behind the ‘Tiszántúl’ was actually the
Hungarian Community. […] My friend István also took part in the organisation
of the Community at a higher level, […] and he donated his dean’s income to give
voice to the threatened Hungarian national consciousness during the vigorous
organisation of the Arrow Cross Party occurring at that time.”39
Kodolányi’s activities with the Community’s newspapers were also
facilitated by the fact that he was regarded as a trusted insider. Furthermore,
he was also of paramount importance in the life of the Community, given that
he undertook to write materials meant to guide the spirit of the organisation
and to set out its ideological principles. Therefore, he was seen by many of the
members as the main spiritual leader of the Community.40
39 Zoltán Bay’s letter to Mária G. Merca. Washington, 9 April 1988. Csűrös 2001, pp. 57–58.
40 Cf. Testimony of Antal Gyenes, 18 January 1947. Historical Archives of the State Security
Services (HASSS) 3.1.9 V-2000/33. 196; Testimony of János Tóth, 23 February 1947 HASSS
3. 1. 9. V-2000/20. p. 196.
233
He warned emphatically, not only in the internal materials of the

Community but also in his public writings, about the dangers of Nazism: “Since
1933, I have considered the German danger more threatening than any other
issue. I concentrated all my abilities against it. […] And as the German pressure
grew, so did my anxiety, my anger, and then my despair. But I reckoned that […]
we should not let others make a revolution, a workers’ movement, democracy or an
anti-German movement; instead, we should make these ourselves,”41 he confessed
in his 1945 essay entitled Szilveszteri számvetés [New Year’s Eve Account]. For
Kodolányi, resistance meant mainly intellectual struggle up until the German
occupation, and it was mostly aimed at raising awareness of the shallowness of
Nazi ideology and the true nature of German imperial aspirations.
As one of the leaders of the anti-German intellectual movement, on
19 March Kodolányi was added to the list of those to be arrested. Colonel
General Gábor Faragho, Chief Inspector of the Gendarmerie and Police and
one of the leading figures of the Independence Movement, took immediate
action to protect him. A few days after the occupation, he had a confidential
meeting with Kodolányi in his apartment on Naphegy Street.42 Here, he
provided him with a secret identification document, and they discussed what
could realistically be done under the given circumstances. “We instructed him
to organise a group of Hungarian writers that would include everyone whose
trustworthiness he was convinced of, and encourage them into spiritual resistance
against the Sztójay government. Based on the discussion with us, he was requested
to draft a memorandum on the foreign and domestic political, military and
cultural situation of the country, and explain the methods that could be used to
organise internal resistance effectively and efficiently,” Faragho wrote in his 1945
testimony, aiming to clear Kodolányi.
At Faragho’s suggestion, Kodolányi retreated to his summer home in
Akarattya. “Faragho instructed the gendarmerie in Kenes to keep an eye on our
house at all times, and if they learned that my father was going to be arrested
41 János Kodolányi: Szilveszteri számvetés; Csűrös 2001, pp. 139–140.

42 Kodolányi 1988, p. 123.
234
by the Germans, they were to forestall them and arrest my father themselves,”43
recalls Júlia, the writer’s daughter. But as Kodolányi himself expressed in his
writing Szilveszteri számvetés [New Year’s Eve Account], “I lived in retreat at
Akarattya, but I was not exactly idle.”44 He tried to maintain as close contact
as possible with his like-minded friends, and on 2 June 1944 he convened a
conspiratorial meeting of writers at 20 Rákóczi Street to discuss political
positions and harmonise the proper behaviour of writers. Kodolányi suggested
to those present that since the Sztójay government was unconstitutional, they
should not take part in public life under the German puppet government.45
Kodolányi received his most important mandate from the Independence
Movement in mid-July 1944. At a confidential meeting held at Faragho’s farm
at Kohárimajor with the participation of Domokos Szent-Iványi, Kodolányi was
involved in the preparation of the armistice talks and was charged with drafting a
memorandum on the necessary political and social measures. “One day [Faragho]
had me taken in his car to a confidential meeting held at his place. […] We analysed
the world’s political situation, the balance of power, the military situation and the
frightening mass of internal troubles and difficulties of the Hungarians. […] It
was then that I learned who were the generals that wanted to steer the country in
a radically different direction. The difficulties seemed insurmountable. We could
hardly see a way out of the impasse. It was then that I was commissioned to draft
a memorandum on how I see the state of the country as a writer, and what I think
should be done to recover from the disaster that threatened us with extermination.
It took me two days of feverish work at Akarattya to write the memorandum. At
the time, I considered it the most important to immediately turn the country into ‘a
party capable of negotiating’. […] I recommended direct action, […] and the most
radical internal reforms and democracy to ensure immediate exit from the war.
[…] Later, a representative of the young Horthy approached me and told me that
the memorandum was in his hands and that the secret operation was launched.”46
43 Kodolányi 1988, p. 124.

44 Csűrös 2001, p. 141.
45 Cf. Letter from János Kodolányi to Lord-Lieutenant of Pécs Béla Fischer, 10 July 1944,
quoted by Kodolányi 1988, pp. 129–132; Csűrös 2001, p. 141.
46 (He quotes a report written on 5 May 1945.) Kodolányi 1988, pp. 125–126.
235
The original copy of Kodolányi’s memorandum has not been found so far,
and therefore only summaries of its content are available;47 from these, it is
revealed that Kodolányi does not argue for the need to break with the Germans,
as he considered this to be an indisputable starting point. As he writes, “It
is unnecessary to debate the necessity and urgency of this task.” In the given
situation, the two key questions are whether the Hungarian elite can overcome
its fears and reservations and cooperate with the Soviet Union, and whether it
will be able to carry out this change of direction relying on Hungarian society.
Kodolányi states that it is the responsibility of the country’s leaders to act, as
the solution is in the hands of the politicians and the soldiers. However, if they
are determined to do so, society would follow them in this step. Nevertheless,
it is not enough to calmly acknowledge this social support. The conclusion of
an armistice, as a precondition for an exit from the war, is a diplomatic task,
and its execution is up to the political elite. But the exit must be made in
organic cooperation with society: “a broad-based democratic government must
be formed, relying predominantly on the masses of workers and peasantry.”48
Switching sides in the war is the task of the Hungarian military elite and the
Hungarian officers following Horthy’s orders, but it is also necessary to involve
and arm the workforce, so that switching sides is accompanied by an armed
uprising: “We have to arm the workers so that we can show strength to the
Germans inside the country.”49
The 80-page draft became an important starting point for the political
preparation for the exit. Faragho considered the release of some of those
arrested after the occupation as one of the direct results of the draft. “In
accordance with the requirements of the memorandum, we began requesting the
release of internees... Thus, at the suggestion of Kodolányi, after great difficulties
and a dangerous search, I freed Miklós Somogyi and Péter Veres. I also managed
to set free two leading personalities of the university youth, also recommended
47 Csűrös 2001, pp. 141–142; Darvas 1945, pp. 119–122.

48 Csűrös 2001, p. 141.
49 Csűrös 2001, p. 141.
236
by Kodolányi.”50 The democratic parties forced into illegality as a result of

the occupation were condensed in the Hungarian Front, which would have
become a “broad-based democratic government” in the event of a successful exit
from the war. “The memoir of the Hungarian Front is completely in line with
my memorandum. The points of the claims are also the same, word for word,”51
Kodolányi recalled later, evoking the significance of his work.
The official delegation, led by Gábor Faragho, with the participation of
Domokos Szent-Iványi and Géza Teleki, travelled to Moscow to hold armistice
negotiations on 28 September.52 By 11 October, a preliminary armistice
agreement had been reached, which was accepted by Horthy via a telegram, and
solemnly signed by the members of the committee. However, the agreement
never entered into force. On 15 October 1944, the Arrow Cross coup removed
Horthy from power. The attempt to exit the war failed, and Hungary remained
on the side of the Germans in the war. Most leaders and contacts of the
Hungarian Independence Movement were forced to flee, while some joined the
work of Bajcsy-Zsilinszky’s National Liberation Commission and the armed
resistance.
However, the end of the war did not bring them the relief and recognition
for their courageous actions. In fact, the opposite happened. The victims of the
first show trials of the communist dictatorship were actors in the Community
and the Independence Movement. In 1947, they were convicted as “fascist
conspirators” and charged of scheming to overthrow the republic. A little
more than two years earlier, many of them were imprisoned for being “anti-
fascist” by the Gestapo or the Arrow Cross. But in these lawsuits, a verdict was
also handed down for resistance activity. An excerpt from the state security
report assessing community lawsuits: “The investigating authorities rejected the
defence of the suspects, according to which they had participated in the resistance
movement. […] The basic premise is that an anti-German attempt linked to
50 Csűrös 2001, p. 142.

51 Csűrös 2001, p. 142.
52 Szent-Iványi 2016, pp. 184–287.
237
Horthy’s entourage cannot be called resistance.”53 Therefore, according to this

argument, any form of resistance that could be related in any way to “Horthist
elements” was to be interpreted as state-authorised activity, and consequently a
manifestation of “Horthy’s fascism”. In a country where one of the focal points of
organisation against Hitler’s politics operated within the circles of the political
elite, finding a connection between this elite and any group of resistance was
only a matter of intent. This interpretation of resistance had been outlined from
1945, was stated in 1947, and remained valid for the entire period of the regime,
based on the argument in the report that states, “As a result of the exploration of
socialist historical science, it can be shown that the dominant circles of the Horthy
system used ‘resistance’ as a pretence to perform activities meant to preserve their
power.”54
53 HASSS 2. 1. XIV/5-1. Report on Evaluation of the Case of the Hungarian Community by

Police Major Dr Endre Benedek, Police Lieutenant Colonel Dr István Horváth and Police
Colonel Ferenc Ács, 15 January 1970.
54 Ibid.
238
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Ablonczy, B. (2005). Teleki Pál. Osiris. Budapest.

Beretzky, Á. (2005). Scotus Viator és Macartney Elemér: Magyarország-kép
változó előjelekkel, 1905–1945. Akadémia. Budapest.
Bokor, P. & Mester, M. (1982). Egy naiv ember – bársonyszékben. In: Bokor,
P. Végjáték a Duna mentén – Interjúk egy filmsorozathoz. RTV–Minerva–
Kossuth. Budapest.
Csűrös, M. (ed.) (2001). Kodolányi János – Én vagyok. Nap Kiadó.
Darvas, J. (1945). Város az ingoványon. Budapest.
Fodor, M. Z. (2008). Az Etelközi Szövetség története. In: Bugyinszki, I. &
Matits, F. (eds.) A Nógrád megyei múzeumok évkönyve. Organisation For
The Nográd County Museums. Salgótarján. pp. 118–156.
Hámori, P. (1997). Kísérlet egy „propagandaminisztérium létrehozására
Magyarországon – A Miniszterelnökség V., Társadalompolitikai
Osztályának története 1938-1941. Századok, 131. pp. 353–380.
Haraszti, Gy. (ed.) (2007). Vallomások a holtak házából – Ujszászy István
vezérörnagynak, a 2. vkf. Osztály és Államvédelmi Központ vezetőjének az
ÁVH fogságában írott feljegyzései. Corvina. Budapest.
Kodolányi, J. (1988). Apám. Magvető Kiadó. Budapest.
Kővágó, J. (1994). Emlékezés a Náci-ellenes Magyar katonai Ellenállásra. Püski.
Budapest.
Macartney, C. A. (1956). October Fifteenth. I-II. Edinburgh.
Mester, M. (1937). Autonóm Erdély. Budapest.
Mester, M. (2012). Két tragikus kor árnyékában. Tarsoly Kiadó. Budapest.
Mester, M. (2018). Küzdelem a nemzeti munkaállamért – Társadalompolitikai
írások, 1932-1945. Self-published. Budapest.
Molnár, S. (2001). Teleki Pál titkos tevékenysége a Sándor-palotában. In: Vigh,
K. (ed.) Ismeretlen fejezetek Teleki Pál életéből. Századvég. Budapest. pp.
31–92.
Nyári, G. (2015). A Sándor-palotától a ravatalig – Teleki Pál második
miniszterelnöksége, 1939–1941. Kairosz. Budapest.
Petrás, É. (2019). Egy tudós útja a szociálpolitikától a kereszténydemokrácia
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felé – Kovrig Béla portréja. In: Petrás, É. (ed.) A modern magyar katolikus
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Saláta, K. (1989). Fejezetek a Független Kisgazda Párt 1945-ös küzdelmeiből.
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Szekér, N. (2013). Adalékok a történelmi fogalmak bonyolultságához. In:
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Szekér, N. (2017). Titkos társaság – A Magyar Testvéri Közösség története. Jaffa
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Szent-Iványi, D. A magyar függetlenségi mozgalom igaz története 1939–1945.
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240
L A S T I N G W O R K S O F T H E S T. S T E P H E N M E M O R I A L Y E A R
É VA T E I S Z L E R
LASTING WORKS OF THE

ST. STEPHEN MEMORIAL YEAR
To commemorate the 900th anniversary of the death of the first Hungarian

king, the founder of the state, King Saint Stephen I (1001–1038), the Hungarian
Catholic Church announced a Jubilee Year and – as this was the year when
Budapest hosted the 34th International Eucharistic Congress – it also declared
1938 a dual Holy Year. The Hungarian state commemorated this anniversary by
organising the St. Stephen Memorial Year.
Although their ethos and spirit was mutually reinforcing,1 these three
series of events, need to be considered as separate, with their own boards of
organisers2 and the main events taking place on different dates.3 Nevertheless,
historical memory as well as the then-contemporary press4 have treated
them as one, especially the events of the Jubilee and the Memorial Year.
This is hardly surprising, as both the Congress and the Jubilee enjoyed full-
1 Ligeti 2018.
2 Organisation of the Memorial Year was the responsibility of the National Board of the
St. Stephen Memorial Year (chief patron: Miklós Horthy) and the National Executive
Committee subordinated thereto, the Eucharistic Congress was organised by the Chief
Preparatory Board of the Eucharistic World Congress (chief patron: Magdolna Purgly,
wife of Miklós Horthy), whereas the events of the Jubilee Year were organised by Actio
Catholica.
3 The Eucharistic Congress took place between 25 and 29 May 1938 in Budapest. The official
events of the Jubilee Year started the following day, on 30 May 1938. The main events of the
St. Stephen Memorial Year took place between 15 and 22 August.
4 See, for example, Szent István országa. A Pesti Hírlap Naptára, 1938. pp. 113–120.
241
ranging government support in political as well as financial terms,5 and the

messages they conveyed, especially to the Hungarians, were also identical. The
continuity of jointly organised events and events organised on their margins
also contributed to the three series of events becoming one single celebration.
The Jubilee Year and the Memorial Year linked to the Eucharistic Congress
put Hungary at the centre of tremendous interest from abroad, thereby providing
an opportunity for the country to break out from its isolation. The more
pronounced presence of Hungary in the world press offered an opportunity to
show the efforts the country had made at recovery, to shed light upon its role as
a bastion,6 and at the same time to present Budapest as a cosmopolitan city and
popularise Hungarian culture worldwide.7
For the Hungarian nation traumatised by the Treaty of Trianon, the St. Stephen
Year was first and foremost a source of strength for an inner revival. For those who
lived outside and inside Hungary after the new frontiers were drawn up, it gave
the experience and knowledge of belonging together spiritually, intellectually and
historically and sent them a message of hope, since Hungary’s Holy King, the founder
of the state and his activities had been surrounded by cultic respect since the Middle
Ages. Thus, the 900th anniversary of his death provided a moment for the nation torn
apart to recall the ethos of the state created by St. Stephen and ideologically reinforce
the peaceful revisionist efforts based on that.8 The events organised by the state
together with the Catholic Church and the standalone events of the Jubilee Year with
the participation of local and national political government and supported by the
state demonstrated the well-established relationship and coordinated activities of the
government and the Church, and also projected the same to happen in the future.
This was justified ex-post when the territories reannexed to Hungary between 1938
5 See Állami költségvetés az 1937/38. évre. Sommázat. 15, 74. Állami költségvetés az 1938/39.
évre. Sommázat. 15, 72. Állami költségvetés az 1939. évi julius hó 1. napjától az 1940. évi
december hó 31. napjáig terjedő 1939–1940. számadási időszakra. 15.
6 Várkonyi 1963.
7 Vass 2003.
8 A magyarországi evangélikus egyházegyetem 1938. évi november hó 12. napján, Budapesten
tartott évi rendes közgyűlésének jegyzőkönyve. 4–5. https://library.hungaricana.hu/hu/
view/EvangKozgyulJkv_1938_11_12/?query=eml%C3%A9k%C3%A9v&pg=3&layout=s
(downloaded on 25 March 2020)
242
and 1941 were reintegrated into the structure of Church administration with the
support of the Holy See.9 In the meantime, the Memorial Year announced by the
state brought the Hungarian nation together in many other respects. The memorial
events and celebrations organised by the Catholic Church themselves would not
have been able to sufficiently cover the entirety of the nation. In the prevailing
situation, Protestant denominations and Israelites were not able to join a national
and religious celebration dominated by the Catholic Church, and the only way for
them to join and relate to the historical past, express and live these emotions was to
celebrate the anniversary purely as a national day.10 Therefore, the role of the state
events in the nation’s inner revival was as significant as the role played by the timing
of the Eucharistic Congress (1938) in an international context.
In response to societal needs at the time, the Hungarian government
identified the major issues of national policy as expected, and also wanted
to satisfy the needs related to memory politics: therefore, it made efforts to
record the events and the messages they conveyed in 1938 for the benefit of
future generations. A book dedicated to the events of the Memorial Year was
published,11 a historical monograph dedicated to the memory of St. Stephen,12
and several studies, articles and other publications were released.13 Based on
the official news coverage of MTI [Hungarian News Agency], daily papers with
national circulation, media at the county level, local and church press regularly
published reports, the radio regularly broadcast thematic programmes and
news coverage, motion pictures were made of major celebrations,14 and a cult
and report film was produced of St. Stephen, commissioned by the state.15
9 See Gergely 1999.

10 Giczi 2010; Csíky 2016 – especially: pp. 70–78, cf. Tóth 2012–2013.
11 Moravek 1940.
12 Serédi 1938.
13 Their compilation would only be possible in a dedicated bibliography, therefore we mention
but a few examples here. Hóman 1938, Kuthy 1938, Magyar Jogászegyleti Értekezések és
egyéb tanulmányok, 6. (1938) no. 21–24. 1938. Rendkívüli szám; Magyar Jogászegyleti
Értekezések és egyéb tanulmányok, 7. (1939) no. 25–28.; Dénes et al. 1938; Komoróczy
1938; Clauser 1938; Lukinich 1938.
14 Cf: Demeter 2000. https://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=2930 (downloaded on 20
March 2020.); Moravek 1940, pp. 67–73.
15 Moravek 1940, pp. 56–58.
243
A call for music pieces invited by Bálint Hóman, Minister of Religion and
Education, to commemorate the St. Stephen Memorial Year was published in
the Budapest Official Gazette on 1 December 1937.16 The call for music pieces
covered three categories: 28 pieces were submitted, including 8 oratoria, 9 pieces
for choir and orchestra, 10 pieces of four movements written for orchestra and
one piece for choir.17
The year was also made memorable by commemorative stamps issued in
two different series. The first stamps of 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 16, 20, 25, 30, 32, 40, 50
and 70 Hungarian fillérs were in circulation from 1 January 1938; they were
designed18 by Sándor Légrády,19 painter, goldsmith, graphic artist and stamp
designer.20 A second series – put into circulation from 12 August21 and sold
at a surcharge of 100% – was designed by Antal Diósy,22 Munkácsy-award
winning painter and graphic artist.23 Of the stamps sold throughout the year
the 20- and 70-fillér stamps – the former depicting St. Stephen sitting on
his throne and the latter depicting the Holy Crown – were later reprinted
following numerous proofs with the graphic design unchanged, but in
different colours, with the inscription “Homecoming 1938”. These two stamps
were put into circulation by the Royal Hungarian Post on 1 December, a date
nearly coinciding with the date of military entry into Upper Hungary24 and
were in use until 30 June 1939.25
16 Zenei pályázat. 14.393/1937. no. III. Budapesti Közlöny 1 December 1937. 4.

17 Moravek 1940, pp. 53–55.
18 Kisfaludi 1997, p. 287.
19 http://lexikon.katolikus.hu/L/L%C3%A9gr%C3%A1dy.html (downloaded on 12 March
2020)
20 Decree 124.000/1937. IV. 3. of the Hungarian Royal Minister of Trade and Transport
(1937). Budapesti Közlöny, 2 December, pp. 2–3.
21 Kisfaludi 1997, p. 289.
22 Fitz 1999, pp. 474–475.
23 Decree 108.747/1938. IV. 3. of the Hungarian Royal Minister of Trade and Transport
(1938). Budapesti Közlöny, 18 August, pp. 1–2.
24 Kisfaludi 1997, p. 290.
25 Kostyál 2013.
244
To commemorate the Memorial Year, 600,000 coins26 were put into

circulation known by collectors as the “St. Stephen 5-Pengő”, which in terms of
weight, size and silver content (640 thousandths silver, weighing 25 grams) was
equivalent to the 5-pengő coin used at that time. Lajos Berán,27 sculptor, coin
artist and chief engraver at the State Mint, prepared two designs and several
proofs beforehand. Of these, the one minted in high numbers was the coin
with an ornate edge, on the front: the coat of arms with the inscription Magyar
Királyság (Kingdom of Hungary), the year on both sides, the value indicated
under the coat of arms on the front, on the reverse side: inscription Szent István
969 + 1038 with the portrait of St. Stephen facing right and the name of the
designer.28 In the 1960s, using the original master dies and proofs, ARTEX
Foreign Trade Company issued a series of the coins not put into circulation
before, to be sold abroad. The coins known by collectors as the “Standing St.
Stephen” 5-pengő and 100-pengő coins were made of silver and gold; the former
has a rectangular version, as well (rectangular St. Stephen 5-Pengő). The front is
identical to that of the coin in circulation – with the exception of the inscription
100 pengő on the gold version – on the reverse St. Stephen standing facing
left, with the circular legend “Készült Szent István halálának 900. évfordulójára”
[Commemorating the 900th anniversary of the death of St. Stephen]. In terms of
size and weight, the Standing St. Stephen silver coin issued in about 4,000 pieces
is identical to the silver pengő put into circulation, whereas the rectangular
version issued in fewer than 1,100 copies weighs more than 50 grams. As few as
89 of the golden 100-pengő coins were made, weighing 28.96 grams.
In addition to coins in circulation, various commemorative coins and
bronze plaques were made. Several associations and towns issued their own
coins to commemorate the event. Of the commemorative coins issued by cities,
26 Explanatory Memorandum of Act IX of 1938 on issuing 5-pengő silver coins in memory of

King St. Stephen (https://net.jogtar.hu/getpdf?docid=93800009.TVI&targetdate=&print-
Title=1938.+%C3%A9vi+IX.+t%C3%B6rv%C3%A9nycikk+indokol%C3%A1sa&refer-
er=1000ev downloaded on 6 March 2020)
27 Éber 1935, pp. 99–100.
28 Decree 72.042 of 1938 of the Hungarian Royal Finance Minister (1938). Magyarországi
rendeletek tára 72, Booklet 1–3, 1728 (274).
245
the best known are those issued by the two main cities where celebrations were
organised: one of them is Székesfehérvár (coin designed by Walter Madarassy),
the other is Esztergom (coin designed by Béla Hellebrand) and as for the
commemorative plaques, the best known are those issued by the capital of
Budapest (designed by József Ispánky and Walter Madarassy).29 These coins and
plaques were primarily intended to be presented to guests of honour attending
the events at those locations.
Regarding calls for works of art, the call for paintings with a total budget of
6,000 pengő was the most popular with the highest number of works submitted.30
These were exhibited in the Műcsarnok [Museum of Contemporary Art] in
May-June 1938 at the St. Stephen exhibition. 58 paintings submitted by 38
painters were on display, in addition to works of art submitted outside this call,
and those submitted for the call issued by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference
to commemorate the Jubilee Year. The Best Mural Design Award was won by
Vilmos Aba Novák with his design of the St. Stephen composition made for the
mausoleum in Székesfehérvár, whereas the Best Painting Award went to István
Szőnyi for a scene from his work titled “Stephen’s Apotheosis”.31
The state intended to present the most outstanding works of art and other
paintings commissioned or made in the framework of the restricted tender to
cities in the countryside, which in some particular way cherished the memory
of St. Stephen. A precondition for that was the city’s ability to create a work
of art of similar value.32 This is how a relief was awarded –among others – to
Baja, Debrecen, Esztergom, Kalocsa and Sopron. Paintings were intended to
be given to, for example, Hódmezővásárhely, Kassa (today: Košice, Slovakia),
Kecskemét, Komárom, Miskolc, Szombathely and Vác. However, some of these
were destroyed during the war (e.g. the painting by Gábor Döbrentei at the
Town Hall in Szombathely) or were never completed (Kassa), or they did not
arrive at the venue they were intended for (e.g. the oil painting entitled Princes
29 As for the artists and their plaques, see Kaposi 2008, pp. 24, 37, 67.
30 Budapesti Hírlap (1937) 57 (244) p. 11.
31 Komáromi Kacz et. al. (1938); Moravek 1940, pp. 30–32.
32 Moravek 1940, pp. 29–30.
246
László and Géza on a Hunting Trip and the Foundation of the Cathedral,
dimensions: 300x500 cm, to be displayed in the Assembly Hall in Vác).33
As for works given to different towns, the tapestries deserve specific
attention due to their peculiar character. Many of the embroideries meant to be
displayed in the mayors’ offices in Győr (Jenő Remsey), Nyíregyháza (Noémi
Ferenczy), Pécs (Endre Domanovszky), Szeged (István Pekáry), Székesfehérvár
(István Pekáry) and Szombathely (Barna Basilides) are still kept with great
respect and put on display from time to time.34
Due to local and state commissions, the number of public monuments also
increased. Sculptures depicting St. Stephen and his activities were unveiled in
several cities (e.g. Székesfehérvár, Szombathely, Kalocsa, Veszprém), decorative
fountains were erected (e.g. in Kaposvár, Máriaremete, Szombathely). Seccoes
and frescoes were also produced in large numbers to celebrate the anniversary,
these were made by the most renowned artists (Vilmos Aba Novák –
Székesfehérvár, Pannonhalma, Budapest – Városmajor), as well as by less known
artists (e.g. Ernő Jeges: St. Stephen builds Székesfehérvár; Bakonysárkány,
Roman Catholic church).35
These works displayed in public spaces fit into urban development
programmes launched in the 1930s which reached their peak in the Memorial
Year. One priority venue of the Memorial Year was a particular frontrunner in
this area, namely Székesfehérvár, developing into a modern city in this period,36
and Veszprém, which was busy renovating the Castle and its surroundings and
in the process of constructing the St. Stephen viaduct.37 No major investment
or reconstruction was necessary to name or rename streets in different places,
and yet this act left a lasting impact on the memory of local communities (for
example Győr, Kalocsa) or city quarters (e.g. Eger).
33 Schleininger 2007, p. 42.

34 Zombori 2001.
35 Szücs 1987. passim; Sasvári 1996, pp. 50–56; Salgótarján történelmi kronológiája I. A
kezdetektől 1944-ig. (Data, sources and studies from the Nógrád County Archives 20.)
Salgótarján, 1996. passim.
36 Demeter 2000, pp. 9–44; 2017; Demeter & Gelencsér 2002.
37 Csiszár 2010.
247
Unfortunately, the collection and historically focused processing of valuable

works with lasting impacts generally described above have not taken place yet.
Though research of local history has revealed some interesting findings over
the past few decades,38 their comprehensive presentation is yet to come.
38 Some examples: Varga 2002; Petrov 2006, Melléklet. 1; Tóth G. 2008, pp. 345–379; “Késő
maradékainknak tétessen jegyzésben!” Írásos emlékek Vác város múltjából, pp. 1074–1990.
Váci Történelmi Tár 1. Vác, 1996 p. 623; Csécs 2000.
248
REFERENCES
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Csécs, T. (2000). Szent Istvánról és az államalapításról a Tudományos
Gyűjteményben. Arrabona, 38(1–2). pp. 195–218.
Csiszár, M. (ed.) (2010). Válság után – háború előtt. Veszprém az 1930-as évek
végén. Veszprém.
Csíky, B. (2016). 1938 szimbolikus eseményei a magyarországi zsidó sajtó
tükrében. Egyháztörténeti Szemle, 17(2). pp. 60–78.
Demeter, Zs. (2000). “Alba Regia él és ünnepel”. Az 1938-as Szent István-év
Székesfehérváron. Honismeret, 28(4).
Demeter, Zs. (2017). “Szent Istvánhoz méltó emlék” Városfejlesztés két ünnep
között Székesfehérváron. (Műhelytanulmányok a Műemléki topográfiához
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G O V E R N M E N T E F F O R T S TO S U P P R E S S T H E FA R - R I G H T I N H U N G A R Y ’ S . . .
L Á S Z L Ó TA M Á S V I Z I
GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO
SUPPRESS THE FAR-RIGHT IN
HUNGARY’S 1939 NATIONAL
ELECTIONS
Radical right-wing movements and their

organisations in the first half of the 1930s
From the early 1930s, the increasingly tangible activity of radical right-wing
organisations and movements gradually emerging in Hungarian political life
and in various social classes was mainly explained by the following factors:
1. The impact of Italian fascism on Hungarian politics and society. From
1927 onwards, strengthening ties between Italy and Hungary provided the
background for this.1 The agreements with Italy gave hope to the Hungarian
political elite and public that Hungary, which was excluded from foreign
policy after the Treaty of Trianon, could break out of the surrounding
Little Entente with the help of Italy and become a foreign policy partner
of Italy, which was one of the winners in the World War I and was playing
1 Prime Minister István Bethlen held talks with Mussolini in Rome in April 1927, in Milan
in April 1928 and again in Rome in April 1930. At their first negotiations, on 5 April 1927,
the parties signed a treaty of permanent peace and eternal friendship between Hungary and
Italy, thus bringing Hungary’s foreign policy isolation to an end. The negotiations and their
results are described in Gulyás 2013, pp. 53–59, 70–73.
253
an increasingly important role at the international level. As a result of

improving and strengthening Italian-Hungarian relations, political figures
and the public learned about the economic successes of Italian fascism, its
social impacts, and the totalitarian political system developed by Mussolini,
who introduced a one-party model that did away with parliamentary
democracy. This political system was then considered as a model by certain
Hungarian political circles and its adaptation to Hungary was set as a goal.
Thus, the formation of an Italian-style fascist party soon became one of
the main objectives of Hungarian far-right politicians. In the late 1920s,
however, these attempts to establish a party in Hungary along Italian-type
fascist lines remained unsuccessful.2
2. The impacts of the economic crisis spreading to Hungary. As a result of the
spill-over of the economic crisis to Hungary, radical right-wing movements
enjoyed growing public support, because due to the crisis the widespread
poverty, and social and economic marginalisation was conducive to
political forces offering radical solutions. Thus, the economic recession –
which plunged the middle class, poor peasants, masses of workers and,
last but not least, the lumpen elements of society into a financial and
existential crisis – provided fertile conditions for right-wing movements.
It is therefore no coincidence that during the years of the economic crisis,
a great number of far-right parties and movements claiming to be national
socialists sprung up, and a real “party-forming” process started to take
place. In 1931, at the peak of the crisis, the National Socialist Hungarian
Workers’ Party was formed under the leadership of Zoltán Böszörmény
and Zoltán Meskó, which then became the Scythe Cross Movement from
1933. In the summer of 1932, the Hungarian National Socialist Workers’
Party and the Hungarian National Socialist Agricultural Labourers’ and
Workers’ Party, which adopted the swastika as their emblem until they were
banned, were founded by Zoltán Meskó and Count Fidél Pálffy, and then at
the end of 1933, the Hungarian National Socialist Party was established by
2 Paksa 2007, pp. 69–70.
254
Count Sándor Festetics. The list of such parties could be expanded, as the
self-appointed party leaders regularly disagreed with each other, prompting
them leave the party and establish a new one under a different name.3
3. Developments in Germany and German national socialist propaganda
from the early 1930s.
4. These served as models for the Hungarian followers of national socialism.
Most Hungarian “sister parties” followed the same social demagoguery as
the German Nazis, trying to adapt it to the Hungarian conditions. They also
adopted the Nazi symbols, wore similar uniforms to the SA, and tried to
form parties along the same lines.
The 1935 national elections and the

results of the national socialists
The first serious test of the Hungarian national socialist movements took place
at the end of March and beginning of April 1935,4 with the national elections
held for the fifth time in Hungary within the post-Trianon borders.5 However,
the national socialists, who emerged as a right-wing opposition to the ruling
party, did not achieve their objective of rallying enough support to reach their
expected number of seats in the National Assembly, even though the social
unrest caused by the economic crisis and the favourable opportunities offered
by the international political situation seemed to be suitable for achieving
this purpose. The main reasons for losing the elections were the personal
conflicts between the self-appointed politicians with high ambitions, the
3 For a detailed discussion on the national socialist movements unfolding in Hungary during
the global economic crisis, see Paksy 2009, pp. 202–237; Paksa 2007, pp. 70–71; Stankovits
1997, pp. 101–103.
4 For further discussion on the political antecedents of the 1935 elections, electoral issues,
the campaign and the results of the elections, see Sipos 1999, pp. 146–175.
5 During the interwar period, National Assembly elections were held in post-Trianon
Hungary in 1920, 1922, 1926, 1931, 1935 and 1939.
255
resulting fragmented party structure, the lack of a clear and meaningful social
programme and, last but not least, inefficient propaganda which failed to
mobilise voters. As for the national socialist parties, the Hungarian National
Socialist Party, led by Count Sándor Festetics was ultimately elected to the
National Assembly, winning two seats:6 Sándor Festetics from the Enying
district of Veszprém county and7 István Balogh, Jr. from the party list in the
Debrecen constituency.8
Although the results of the national socialists in the 1935 election, i.e. the
two seats which were won, seem modest, looking at the support of the national
socialist parties (Hungarian National Socialist Party, Party of National Will),
it should be noted that the number of votes cast in open ballot single-member
constituencies was only a couple dozen less than 65,000 votes, representing
4.45% of the electorate. The number of secret ballot votes cast for the
Hungarian National Socialist Party was approximately 18,000, accounting for
3.45% of votes cast in secret ballot. In total, nearly 83,000 people voted for the
national socialist parties, accounting for 4.2% of the votes per party.9 Behind
this contradiction between the number of seats won and the support of the
national socialist parties was an electoral system based on a form of majority
rule, which did not lend itself to fragmentary votes. As fractional ballots were
not transferred to any other candidates, they were completely lost. However,
the rising support for and the sudden advance of the national socialists served
as red flags for other political parties.
6 Hubai 2001a, p. 59.

7 For biographical details on Sándor Festetics as a representative, see Parliamentary Almanac.
On the 1935–1940 National Assembly (Sturm’s Parliamentary Almanac), Haeffler, I. (ed.).
Magyar Távirati Iroda Rt., Budapest, 1940 (hereinafter Parliamentary Almanac 1935–1940)
pp. 257–258.
8 Idem, p. 205: Note that in 1936, István Balogh left the party led by Festetics and joined
together with Fidél Pálffy.
9 Hubai 2001a, p. 58.
256
Rise of far-right parties in

the second half of the 1930s
1935 was a turning point in the history of the Hungarian national socialist
movements not only because they managed to be elected to the National
Assembly for the first time, but also because an actor appeared on the far-right,
who significantly influenced and then dominated the radical right-wing of the
political spectrum for the next ten years. This was Ferenc Szálasi, who had been
increasingly explicit in expressing his political views from the spring of 1933.10
After the Major General retired from his position and a promising military
career, on 1 March 1935, he founded the Party of National Will11 on 4 March.
That same month he published a 15-page party programme book entitled “Goal
and Demands” accompanied by a National Will propaganda leaflet.
Szálasi did not stand in the 1935 parliamentary elections, although
Gömbös offered him a seat as a candidate on the ruling party list. By contrast,
he supported Lajos Csoór who contested the elections in the constituency of
Tura and was the founder of the Party of People’s Will, an organisation similar
in name to the party established by Szálasi.12 Szálasi then contested the by-
elections of 2 April 1936, but failed miserably, winning less than a thousand
votes in the Pomáz electoral district.13 Not only did Szálasi fail to achieve
good results, attempts at unifying the far-right national socialist parties in the
spring of 1937 also failed. In addition, the Party of National Will, which was
described as an “extremely inciting” movement, was dissolved on 16 April 1937
10 Szálasi’s first work was published in March 1933 entitled “Plan for the building of the
Hungarian state 1.”
11 For a detailed discussion on the party programme of the Party of National Will, see Paksa
2013, pp. 31–35; Karsai 2016, pp. 54–57.
12 Lajos Csoór was finally elected to the National Assembly representing the Party of People’s
Will, but despite their agreement, he did not follow Szálasi’s programme, who supported
him. Parliamentary Almanac 1935–1940, p. 241.
13 Paksa 2013, p. 42; Karsai 2016, pp. 60–61.
257
by Minister of Interior József Széll. The previous day, Szálasi had been arrested
and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment.14
At the assembly held in the Vigadó performance hall in Buda on 24 October
1937, however, some of the far-right parties that had so far been unable to
cooperate seemed to have settled their personal conflicts and established the
Hungarian National Socialist Party, subtitled the Hungarist Movement, under
the leadership of István Balogh, Jr., Ferenc Szálasi and Lajos Széchenyi.15 The
new party headquarters was located at 60 Andrássy út, courtesy of Lajos
Széchenyi. However, the party, formed with great enthusiasm, was dissolved
after four months, on 21 February 1938 by the Minister of Interior in the
Darányi government, just like the Party of National Will, claiming that the
Hungarian National Socialist Party was the successor of the Party of National
Will.16 For the second time, Minister of Interior József Széll had disrupted the
plans of Szálasi and his allies.
March 1938 then marked another turning point in the history of the
Hungarian National Socialist-Hungarist Movement. Following Germany’s
annexation of Austria [the “Anschluss”] in mid-March 1938, the Kingdom of
Hungary became a close neighbour of the German Third Reich, with all its
consequences. Events taking place in Austria received attention in Hungary
as well. The far-right movements celebrated, became louder and more
demanding, and thought that their time was coming. Prime Minister Kálmán
Darányi tried to stop the swift rise of the far-right and force the movement
into a constitutional framework by offering Szálasi a kind of compromise pact,
while placing dozens of leaders of the dissolved party under police surveillance.
However, in the second half of March 1938 Darányi conducted negotiations not
with Szálasi, but with one of his close colleagues, Kálmán Hubay, who joined
the movement in 1937. As a result of the agreement, the ruling party did not
nominate a candidate against Kálmán Hubay in the by-elections in Lovasberény
on 27 March 1938, who thus won a seat in the National Assembly. With this
14 Paksa 2013, p. 45.

15 Paksa 2013, pp. 45–46; Karsai 2016, pp. 79–82; Paksa 2007, p. 72.
16 Paksa 2013, pp. 47–48; Karsai 2016, pp. 60–61.
258
move, Darányi hoped that he could force the far-right movements, which
frequently used the means of aggressive street politics, to abide by the rules of
Parliament, and that he would be able to divide the already disruptive far-right
forces by offering them the opportunity to win seats in the National Assembly.
However, Darányi was disappointed by this, and his political gestures towards
the far-right proved to be a serious mistake.17
Hubay, who won a seat in the National Assembly, quickly became active. On
4 April 1938, under his “presidency and leadership”,18 he formed an organisation
called the National Socialist Hungarian Party – Hungarist Movement.19 Szálasi
was only able to join the party after 29 May, after police surveillance against
him was lifted.20 With the founding of the party led by Hubay, a new phase
began in the history of the far-right movements, coinciding with a change in
political style. Street politics, which was not free of populist, violent action,
was replaced by more palatable parliamentary politics, which also marked the
beginning of preparations for the next National Assembly elections.
However, the National Socialist – Hungarist Movement did not contest
the next national elections with the name and structure announced in April
1938. Although the name of the party was changed to the Hungarian National
Socialist Party – Hungarist Movement on 12 November 1938, this did not dispel
the climate of mistrust in government policy. The government took numerous
administrative steps to reduce the influence of the far-right as much as the
foreign policy situation would allow. One example of this was “Regulation No.
3400/1938 M.E. on the disciplinary liability of civil servants and other employees
17 Kerepeszki 2014, pp. 113–114.

18 Karsai 2016, p. 121.
19 Historians who publish on the subject of the founding of the National Socialist Hungarian
Party – Hungarist Movement usually say that the formation of the party was announced
by Hubay at the 4 April 1938 session of the House of Representatives. See Kerepeszki 2014,
p. 114; Paksa 2013, p. 48. However, according to an entry in the Journal of the House of
Representatives of 5 April 1938, Kálmán Hubay, along with several of his fellow MPs, was
absent without authorisation from the 4 April 1938 session. Consequently, he was unable to
announce the formation of the National Socialist Hungarian Party – Hungarist Movement.
Journal of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly convened for 27 April
1935. Volume 17. Budapest, 1939. p. 531.
20 Paksa 2013, p. 48.
259
who violated the provisions on association membership”,21 which was clearly

directed against the far-right movements. According to the Regulation:
“A civil servant or other public servant may not be a member of a party
which: 1) prescribes for party members distinctive clothing or peculiar
form of dress which is capable of giving the appearance of a uniform
or clearly expressing membership of a party; 2) seeks, through overt
or covert propaganda, to spread fake news and deliberate rumours,
to damage prestige, disturb the social peace and discipline necessary
for constructive work, or if this propaganda leads to these situations;
3) engages in propaganda, verbally or in writing, so as to cause great
excitement or general unrest among the masses.”22
As a further administrative step of the government, on 21 February 1939,
Minister of Interior Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer banned the Hungarian National
Socialist Party – Hungarist Movement by regulation, as one of the first
measures of the Teleki government, which took office on 16 February 1939. This
happened in response to the Arrow Cross assassination attempt at the Dohány
Street Synagogue on 3 February 1939, which also resulted in fatalities.23 Police
initiated the arrest of protesters who responded to the government’s actions
with demonstrations.
However, the immunity protecting Hubay provided an opportunity for the
Movement’s parliamentary leader to found another party – called the Arrow
Cross Party – on 8 March 1939, a few days after the previous party was banned.
Hubay announced the formation of the party prior to the agenda at the meeting
of the House of Representatives on 8 March 1939:
“Honourable Members of the House! Traditionally, when a new
party is emerging in political life and this party has parliamentary
representation, the members of the party introduce themselves in
front of the House Members through their Member of Parliament.
I am following this old parliamentary tradition as I inform the
21 Külügyi Közlöny (10 June 1938): Vol 18, No 4. pp. 16–17.

22 Idem, p. 17.
23 Karsai 2016, p. 434.
260
Honourable House of a new political party called the ‘Arrow Cross

Party’, founded under my leadership by István Dobó, retired Hungarian
Royal Lieutenant General, Dezső Mokcsay, retired Hungarian Royal
Colonel, Artúr Bogyay, retired Hungarian Royal Hussar Colonel,
imperial and royal chamberlain and János Halmay, retired Captain,
and which is represented in the House of Representatives by myself
and my fellow Members of Parliament, Artúr Haám and Dr Kálmán
Rátz.”24
The first national test of the Arrow Cross Party soon took place, in the so-
called Pentecost elections held on 28–29 May 1939.
Political antecedents of the

1939 Pentecost elections
In the history of Hungarian interwar parliamentarism, something unexpected

occurred in the second half of November 1938, which was hitherto
unprecedented in the nearly twenty years of the system’s existence. On 22
November, 54 representatives from the ruling Party of National Unity (NEP),
led by Sándor Sztranyavszky25 announced their intent to leave the party,
followed by another four Members the next day. The number of so-called
dissidents, including those who had left in mid-November, thus rose to 62.
Consequently, the ruling party lost its comfortable parliamentary majority. The
NEP had only 99 members left, barely exceeding 40% of the mandates in the
House of Representatives, which led to the ruling party in minority being voted
down by the opposition 115 to 94 in the debate on 23 November 1938.26
24 Journal of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly convened for 27 April
1935. Volume 22. Budapest, 1939. p. 192.
25 Hungarian Parliamentary Almanac. Five hundred Hungarian lives 1931–1936. Lengyel, L.
– Vidor, Gy. (eds.). Globus Nyomdai Műintézet Rt., Budapest, 1931. pp. 289–291; Parlia-
mentary Almanac 1935–1940, pp. 373–375.
26 Hubai 2001a, p. 61; Sipos, Stier & Vida 1967, pp. 602–620.
261
This marked the beginning of a government crisis lasting several months

that severely divided Hungarian domestic politics and also involved open,
aggressive action by the far-right. One possible way out of the crisis was the
resignation of Prime Minister Béla Imrédy, the appointment of a new Prime
Minister capable of uniting the Christian-national, conservative political forces,
reorganisation of the ruling party, early dissolution of the National Assembly
and the announcement of new elections.
First news of the possible dissolution of the National Assembly leaked out
in mid-January 1939. Although pro-government circles tried to refute this,
opposition representatives considered dissolving the National Assembly and
calling new elections as the only way to resolve the political crisis.27
In late January and early February 1939, Regent Miklós Horthy – who
had supported Imrédy at the end of November 1938 and had not accepted the
Prime Minister’s resignation – realised that Imrédy had to resign. The Regent
was more and more concerned about Imrédy’s increasingly dictatorial actions
and complained in particular about the Prime Minister not having sought the
consent of the head of state on important bills such as the forthcoming land
law and the Second Jewish Law. This provided the background for Imrédy’s
dismissal on 15 February 1939 and the appointment of Count Pál Teleki as
Prime Minister the following day.
Teleki presented his government’s programme in the National Assembly
on 22 February 1939.28 In the introduction to the “Government Statement”,
the Prime Minister emphasised: “I have to explain to the Honourable
Members of the House, why I took this place, this task, why with the same
programme as my predecessor or predecessors, why with the party that is
behind me, or more precisely, around me.”29 There is no doubt that the new
27 [Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (hereinafter SZFU) (14 January
1939): News spread about the dissolution of the House and impending elections, XLI (11).
p. 1.
28 For Pál Teleki’s introductory speech to the Parliament on 22 February 1939 [Government
statement], see Journal of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly convened
for 27 April 1935. Volume 21. Budapest, 1939. pp. 494–506.
29 Idem, p. 494.
262
Prime Minister, proclaiming continuity in his programme, highlighted the

pursuit of the previous government goals as a key objective. The party, to
which Teleki referred in his speech, and which secured the parliamentary
majority needed to implement the programme, was the new government
party, the Party of Hungarian Life, which also supported the political goals of
the Hungarian Life Movement at the meeting of the Party of National Unity
on 7 March 1939. The papers published at the beginning of March 1939 also
reported on the formation of the party: “[…] the Party of National Unity and
the Hungarian Life Movement have united their forces and organisations and
will henceforth continue their activities as a political party under the name
of the Party of Hungarian Life […]”. At the meeting of the party, which was
opened by Deputy Party Leader Bálint Hóman, Prime Minister Teleki also
addressed the issue of elections before the deputies. He did not, however,
mention early elections. Instead, he spoke only of the elections due in a year’s
time and focused on political preparations for such.30
However, Teleki clearly perceived that Imrédy still had significant support
and influence in the Party of Hungarian Life as well as in many areas of
economic and public life, which could seriously jeopardise firm governance.
Additionally, the spectacular rise of the national socialist parties and movements
gave the Prime Minister cause for serious concern. For Teleki therefore, it
became increasingly clear that the positions of the ruling party could only be
strengthened and stabilised by holding early elections. Another explicit and
implicit motive for the early elections was to suppress the far-right movements,
overthrow their leaders, and thus prevent far-right leaders from winning seats
in the National Assembly.31
30 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (9 March 1939): There will be elections within a
year. Important statements by the Prime Minister on the next national elections. XLI (56).
p. 2.
31 Paksa 2007, pp. 71–73.
263
The 1938 Electoral Law as a legal

instrument to suppress the far-right
Based on information leaked from government circles, in early April 1939 the
press reported the news of the upcoming elections as a fait accompli.32 Very soon,
Regent Horthy made it clear that he himself was in favour of early elections and
agreed with the political initiative of his Prime Minister. Therefore, on 4 May
1939, he dissolved the House of Representatives with a regent’s rescript and
convened the new parliament on 10 June. The head of state’s decision was fully
in line with the will of a country that had already been wildly excited about
the elections weeks earlier. The day after the rescript, on 5 May 1939, a Decree
of the Minister of the Interior setting the date of the elections was published,
which called elections on 28–29 May 1939, the Pentecost holiday.
The excitement was even greater, considering that Act XIX of 193833
on National Elections, promulgated on 3 June 1938, had made significant
amendments to the provisions of the previous Act XXVI of 1925.34 The most
important change was the abolition of the open ballot and, at the same time,
the establishment of universal voting by secret ballot. However, upon the
introduction of voting by secret ballot, education and age restrictions were
imposed on the right to vote in National Assembly elections. The number of
single-member constituencies was also reduced and it was defined as a general
32 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (5 April 1939): This morning, the Council of
Ministers decided on the constituency boundaries. Elections are called for mid-May. XLI
(77). p. 1.
33 Act XIX of 1938 on the Election of Members of Parliament
https://net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=93800019.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev-
torvenyei%3Fpagenum%3D41 (downloaded on March 2020); With this, the legislator
brought the right to vote in the parliamentary elections to the same level as the right to vote
in the municipal elections which was regulated by Act XXX of 1929 on the Settlement of
Public Administration. Zachar 2005, I. pp. 66–79.
34 Act XXVI of 1925 on the Election of Members of Parliament https://net.jogtar.hu/
ezer-ev-torveny?docid=92500026.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev-torvenyei%3Fpagenum%3D39
(downloaded on March 2020).
264
principle that each county and municipal town forms a separate district with
territorial party lists. As a result, 135 individual electoral districts and 125
districts with territorial party lists were established. With the introduction of
the electoral deposit system, the recommendation and nomination mechanisms
for candidates were also re-regulated. Candidates or parties had to deposit 2,000
pengős in single-member constituencies and 3,000 pengős in the case of party
lists. Thus, financial risk also emerged in addition to political risk, especially
in the light of the fact that the party forfeited the deposit and the amount
was transferred to the state treasury if the individual candidate did not win
one-quarter of the votes. By contrast, the number of signed recommendation
slips needed to stand as a candidate in a single-member constituency
decreased significantly. Candidates needed to obtain 500 signatures on official
recommendation forms in order to appear on the ballot in single-member
constituencies and needed 1,500 signatures to appear on party lists. However,
the law strongly favoured parties that were able to win at least four seats in
the previous 1935 elections. These so-called national parties needed only 150
signed recommendation slips to stand in single-member constituencies and
500 in order to appear on the party lists. This system of recommendation slips
clearly benefitted the governing parties, and, at the same time, attempted to
undermine the emerging, mainly far-right, national socialist-hungarist parties.
The rules for distributing seats were also changed, enabling candidates to win
elections held in single-member constituencies if they received only a relative
majority of 40% of the votes cast. As for the party lists, using the largest
remainder method, the list with the highest score won a seat.35
35 Hubai 2001a, p. 61; Pintér 1999, pp. 179–185; Laczkóné Dr Tuka 2003, pp. 82–83; Guóth
2009, pp. 219–229.
265
Success of the ruling party –

Failure of the far-right in the 1939
Pentecost elections. A case study:
Székesfehérvár and Fejér County
In the following section, the example of Székesfehérvár and Fejér County will
be presented as a case study, which illustrates how the governing party was able
to win all of the parliamentary seats in the city and the county and how it was
able to prevent the Arrow Cross Party from gaining political ground. Of course,
other factors were essential to this success, such as Bálint Hóman’s charismatic
personality and his work for the development of Székesfehérvár, as well as the
checks hidden in the electoral law which proved to be suitable for stymieing
the Arrow Cross.
Pursuant to Section 4 of Act XIX of 1938 on the Election of Members of
Parliament, Fejér County and the municipal town of Székesfehérvár received a
total of 8 parliamentary seats. On 3 May 1939, a Decree of the Minister of Interior
was issued, which contained the new constituency boundaries.36 Accordingly,
the press not only described the new constituency boundaries in detail, but also
gave a detailed report on possible pro-government and opposition candidates.37
In Fejér County, the constituencies of Adony, Mór, Sárbogárd and Vál remained,
but that of Hercegfalva was completely abolished by the decree, and a new
district, the Székesfehérvár district, was established with the administrative
centre of Székesfehérvár instead of the district of Lovasberény. This thorough
redrawing of previous county constituency boundaries undoubtedly favoured
the ruling party. With regard to the municipal town of Székesfehérvár, the
electoral law also required that it form a single-member constituency. The law
also prescribed that the county and the town could jointly decide on two more
36 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (4 May 1939): New constituency boundaries have
been published. XLI (100). p. 1.
37 Idem, pp. 1–2.
266
seats on the party list. Székesfehérvár and Fejér County were thus allowed to
elect a total of eight deputies to the next National Assembly.38 There was no
doubt that Bálint Hóman, a Member of Parliament for the town, would stand
for election on behalf of the ruling party in the single-member constituency of
Székesfehérvár.39
Meanwhile, it also became clear that constituents of Székesfehérvár and
Fejér County would vote on the first day, 28 May,40 and that András Tasnádi
Nagy, the Minister of Justice, and a former State Secretary of Hóman would be
at the top of the list of the Party of Hungarian Life in Fejér County.41 András
Tasnádi Nagy was deliberately chosen as the leader of the party list, and it
definitely seemed to be a wise political move, as Hóman was able to campaign
for his former deputy well known to the constituents of Székesfehérvár and at
the same time, specifically support the territorial party list led by Tasnádi Nagy.
Thus, in the expected election battle, the name of András Tasnádi Nagy was
more than promising for the ruling party both in the city and in the county.
However, the public in Székesfehérvár was the most concerned about
whether Bálint Hóman would be challenged. In this respect, the Social
Democratic position became known earlier, on 4 May. According to this,
considering mainly party-political propaganda aspects, the Social Democratic
Party planned to run an individual candidate in Bálint Hóman’s constituency.
However, this posed a serious financial risk to the party, as they might easily
38 Idem, p. 1; Farkas 2009, p. 120.

39 Bálint Hóman had represented the city of Székesfehérvár in the National Assembly since
the by-elections of 20 November 1932; Ujváry 2010, pp. 70–74; SZFU (30 April 1939): Who
are the candidates representing Fejér County, XLI (97). p. 1.
40 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (6 May 1939): Székesfehérvár and Fejér County will
vote on the first day of Pentecost. XLI (102). p. 1.
41 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (5 May 1939): Latest news on the elections. XLI
(101). p. 1; András Tasnádi Nagy served as Political State Secretary at the Ministry of
Religion and Public Education under Bálint Hóman from March 1935 to March 1938. As
Hóman’s Deputy, he dealt mainly with the affairs of Protestant churches and with artistic
issues. He resigned when he was elected national president of the Party of National Unity
in March 1938. He headed the Ministry of Justice from November 1938 to November
1939. He was removed when he was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives on 9
November 1939. Parliamentary Almanac 1935–1940, pp. 378–379.
267
lose the 2,000-pengő deposit required by the electoral law if their candidate lost
against Hóman.42
On 6 May 1939, however, another piece of news was announced. This
time the daily paper reported on a possible opposition candidate of the Arrow
Cross. The press believed that Béla Kerekes, a company manager in Budapest
originally from Székesfehérvár, who was also Kálmán Hubay’s secretary, would
run as an Arrow Cross candidate as Bálint Hóman’s local opponent.43
In the meantime, the list of members of the Electoral Commissions and the
number of eligible voters in each constituency were also made public. According
to this, there were 8,995 eligible voters in the single-member constituency of
Bálint Hóman in Székesfehérvár and 90,527 on the joint register of the city
and the county. In the single-member constituency of Székesfehérvár, Dr Emil
Fábián and Dr Mózes Gáspár held the positions of electoral commissioners,
while Dr Béla Hlavathy and Dr László Gáspár filled the same position for the
territorial list.44
At the same time as this news, the Székesfehérvár organisation of the
Independent Smallholders Party also made an important announcement. They
stated that they did not want to run a candidate against Hóman, but would
stand in the election and contest the territorial list of the Party of Hungarian
Life.45
As the mayor of Székesfehérvár, referring to Decree of the Minister of
Interior No. 266.300/1939, published the official notice on the acquisition and
signing of recommendation slips46 for the national elections on 9 May 1939, the
party led by Hóman started to collect the recommendation slips immediately
after the recommendation form was authenticated. Pursuant to the law, the
42 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (4 May 1939): New constituency boundaries have
been published. XLI (100). p. 2; Ultimately, the Social Democratic Party did not nominate
a candidate against Hóman.
43 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (6 May 1939): Székesfehérvár and Fejér County will
vote on the first day of Pentecost. XLI (102). p. 2.
44 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (9 May 1939): The Independent Smallholders Party
stands in the election against the Party of Hungarian Life in Fejér County. XLI (104). p. 1.
45 Ibid.
46 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (9 May 1939): Official notice. XLI (104). p. 3.
268
candidates of the national parties – including Bálint Hóman of course – needed

to obtain 150 signatures to appear on the ballot paper, and that could only be
increased by a maximum of 50 percent for the purpose of replacement. No
more recommendations could be accepted by the electoral commissioners.
Under that provision, therefore, Hóman’s party had to collect a total of 225
signatures. This did not seem like many in a constituency with an electorate
of nearly 9,000, but there was another condition for validity. The signatures
on the recommendation forms could be considered valid only if they were
signed by the eligible voters before the district court or the officials or notaries
appointed in the town hall.47 Thus, the eligible voters had to appear in person
at the designated place, which was in any case a challenging organisational and
coordination task. However, this was not a problem for Hóman’s party.
Hóman and the governing party in the city supporting him left nothing to
chance. The Minister did everything he could to meet his constituents, listen to
their concerns and problems, and at the same time outline national and local
political goals. The fact that no opposition party was able to run a candidate
against Hóman in the single-member constituency in Székesfehérvár until
mid-May demonstrated the success of the campaign and his popularity and
outstanding support.48 Thus, it became almost certain that Hóman would be
the only candidate to win the seat in Székesfehérvár unanimously, i.e. without
holding an election. However, this had to wait until 20 May, the final deadline
for submitting candidate recommendation forms.
Pursuant to the electoral law, in locations where the vote would take place
on Pentecost Sunday, the required number of recommendation slips had to
be submitted to the electoral commissioners by 1 p.m. on 20 May. On the
final date, Hóman’s party was the first to submit the recommendation forms,
and since no other candidate appeared from Székesfehérvár, Hóman won the
mandate unanimously without elections, pursuant to the law. Thus, despite
47 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (9 May 1939): Collection of signed recommendation
slips for the Hóman party. XLI (104). p. 3.
48 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (16 May 1939): Final list of candidates for the
county seats. XLI (110). p. 3.
269
the initial enthusiasm, the Social Democrats and Arrow Cross Party did not
succeed in running an opposition candidate against Hóman. Ultimately, Béla
Kerekes,49 the secretary of the Arrow Cross party leader Kálmán Hubay, who
had originally planned to run as an Arrow Cross candidate, did not stand in the
election against Hóman, but did stand in the multi-member constituency of the
municipal town of Pécs and as a candidate at the top of the list of the Arrow
Cross in Heves County.50 As it later turned out, without success.51
Incidentally, the governing party collected and submitted the
recommendation forms in all single-member constituencies of Fejér County by
the deadline. Just like Hóman, László Magasházy from the ruling party became
a representative in the constituency of Vál without an opposition candidate.52
The Party of Hungarian Life was also the first to submit the recommendation
slips needed to announce a party list in the county. Along with the ruling party,
only the Arrow Cross Party was able to do so. After that, it was entirely up to
the electoral commissioners to accept the recommendation forms. They had to
declare this by 22 May and inform the candidates and the parties concerned.53
On the one hand, the ruling party was pleased and excited that Hóman
won the seat unanimously, without an opposition candidate in the single-
member constituency of Székesfehérvár, but on the other hand, it posed a
potential threat to the party list. Hóman’s success could have sent the message
to more uninformed voters in Székesfehérvár that they no longer needed to go
out and vote on Pentecost Sunday. For them, the vote was no longer at stake.
But this belief was incorrect. In accordance with the county’s list voting law,
Székesfehérvár formed one constituency together with Fejér County. The pro-
49 I would like to thank Dr Ágnes Tuka Laczkóné, József Vonyó, Zoltán Paksy and Attila Márfi
for helping me with my research on Béla Kerekes, a candidate of the Arrow Cross Party, and
for drawing my attention to a number of circumstances unknown to me – L.T. Vizi.
50 Hubai 2001b, p. 117. p. 120; Paksy 2009, pp. 214–216; Laczkóné Dr Tuka 2003, p. 88.
51 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (24 June 1939): A petition was submitted against the
mandate of Béla Kerekes, an Arrow Cross candidate from Székesfehérvár. XLI (141). p. 2.
52 Parliamentary Almanac. On the 1939–1944 National Assembly. Haeffler, I. (ed.), Magyar
Távirati Iroda Rt., Budapest, 1940, pp. 242–243.
53 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (21 May 1939): The candidates had to submit the
recommendation forms by noon today. XLI (114). p. 1.
270
government voters in Székesfehérvár therefore still had to be mobilised and

convinced to participate in the elections and vote for the list of the Party of
Hungarian Life on Pentecost Sunday. However, the week before the elections
was an election silence period, a “silent week”, as it was then called, so this
could no longer be achieved by organising political rallies. The only possible
solution was the press. Therefore, an announcement was published in the
Székesfehérvár Friss Ujság on 21 May, which informed the pro-government
voters in detail about the election process, expressly drawing their attention to
the voting behaviour necessary and essential for success:
“Although no opposition candidate is running against Dr Bálint Hóman,
voters must appear before the ballot box, because it is very important
that those who want to vote for the list of the Party of Hungarian Life
cast their votes. The registered ballot paper will contain two lists namely
the list of the Party of Hungarian Life and then the list of the Arrow
Cross Party. Both lists will be preceded by an empty box and voters
must place a cross in the box of the party list they wish to vote for. We
also draw voters’ attention to the fact that signing a recommendation
form does not impose any obligation on the voter. Thus, regardless of
the form they signed, they can vote for either party. Voters should not
be misled in any way. We would also like to remind you that names
other than those on the ballot paper should not be entered, as only
candidates on the list have the right to stand in the election and any
such alteration would spoil the ballot paper.”54
Providing such highly detailed information was not only aimed at mobilising
the urban voters of the Party of Hungarian Life (although this certainly was the
main objective), it was also necessary due to the fact that the electorate had
to face a comparatively new process in the 1939 elections of voting by secret
ballot.
The real surprise, however, came on 22 May, when the electoral
commissioners reviewing the recommendation forms “did not approve the list
54 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (21 May 1939): Information on the election of
Members of Parliament. XLI (114). p. 2.
271
of the Arrow Cross because the submitters of the forms did not appear among
the signatories to the recommendation forms […]”55 This, however, was set
forth as a binding requirement in paragraph (2), Section 84 of the Electoral
Law in force. It was made compulsory by said law that “the recommendation
form must be handed over in person by two supporters who are personally
known to the electoral commissioners or who present proof of their identity
before them.”56 The Arrow Cross Party made a mistake when their list was
submitted to the Electoral Commission by two persons, Ferenc Ács and István
Dominó, who were not included in the recommendation form as supporters.
Registration of the Arrow Cross list was therefore correctly rejected by the
Electoral Commission headed by Dr Béla Hlavathy.57 Thus, the intricate maze
of the electoral law in Fejér County proved to be suitable for preventing the
Arrow Cross Party from gaining a parliamentary mandate.
All of this resulted in an entirely novel situation with regard to the party list
voting in Fejér County. Namely that a party other than the Party of Hungarian
Life could not legally compile an electoral list, as a result of which the list of
the Party of Hungarian Life was the winner of the elections in Fejér County
without voting and without an opposition candidate. Given this situation, the
county voters did not have to vote for any party list. On Pentecost Sunday, the
elections were held only in the single-member constituencies of Adony, Mór,
Sárbogárd and Székesfehérvár.
The rejection of the Arrow Cross list led to a new situation for the citizens
of Székesfehérvár. This meant that they did not have to cast any votes during
the elections: neither for an individual candidate nor for a party list. The
voters of Székesfehérvár received official information about this on 27 May,
the day before the vote. They were also informed that the competent Electoral
Commissions would hold a short meeting at 8 a.m. on the morning of the vote
55 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (23 May 1939): The list of the Arrow Cross Party
was rejected in Fejér County by the Chairman of the Electoral Commission. XLI (115). p. 1.
56 Act XIX of 1938 on the Election of Members of Parliament: Paragraph (2), Section 84.
57 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (24 May 1939): Why did the electoral commissioner
reject the list of the Arrow Cross Party in Fejér County. XLI. (116). p. 1; SZFU (24 May
1939): The list of the Arrow Cross Party. XLI (116). p. 3.
272
to establish the unanimous outcome of the election and to issue the mandates
to the elected representatives. According to the statement: “On 4 June, Ödön
Csiky, chairman of the Electoral Commission, will perform the ceremony for
the representative of the city, Dr Bálint Hóman, Minister of Culture, who will
be on the balcony at the town hall and at the same time, will give a longer
speech.”58
The governing party won the National Assembly elections in Fejér County
held on 28 May 1939. In addition to the list of the Party of Hungarian Life,
Bálint Hóman and László Magasházy gained mandates unanimously, i.e.
without opposition candidates, in the constituencies of Székesfehérvár and Vál,
while on the day of the vote, in all of the pending single-member constituencies
the candidates of the ruling party, Ferenc Simon (Adony district), Antal
Czermann (Mór district), Béla Jurcsek (Sárbogárd district) and István Sigray
(Székesfehérvár district) received the majority of votes.59 However, the result of
around 40% for the Arrow Cross candidates in the county served as a red flag
for the future. Their results were even better in the constituency of Mór, where
they won 49% of the vote and the ruling party was only able to narrowly win
the election.
Results of the national socialist-hungarist

parties in the Pentecost elections
To conclude our study, we examine the results of the national socialist-

hungarist parties in the 1939 Pentecost elections and compare them with those
of 1935. First of all, it should be noted that in the 1935 elections only two far-
right parties stood for election: the Hungarian National Socialist Party led by
58 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (27 May 1939): The Electoral Commission will meet
in Székesfehérvár on Sunday morning at 8 a.m. XLI (119). p. 2.
59 [Without signature and initials], SZFU (31 May 1939): Election results today at 1 p.m. XLI
(121). p. 1; Hubai 2001b, pp. 127, 129, 132.
273
Sándor Festetics and the Party of National Will led by Lajos Csoór. The former
won two seats, while Lajos Csoór also won a mandate. In the 1939 elections,
by contrast, no less than ten far-right parties competed with each other for the
seats.60 Six parties managed to compile electoral rolls: the United Hungarian
National Socialist Party, the Christian National Socialist Front, the Hungarian
National Socialist Agricultural Labourers’ and Workers’ Party, and the National
Front were able to do so in one county, the Arrow Cross Party in eight counties
and the Independent far-right in two counties. There were only two parties –
the National Front and the Arrow Cross Party – that were able to announce
party lists; the former in five cities, the latter in six cities.61
In the elections, 382,588 people voted for the far-right county lists and
166,149 for the city lists. The results of the Arrow Cross Party list were of
paramount importance. They took nearly 199,000 votes for their party lists in
the counties and 139,000 for their party lists in the cities, winning a total of
338,000 votes.62
The ten far-right parties that were able to nominate candidates in the
single-member constituencies received a total of 378,566 votes. The Arrow
Cross Party obtained the majority of the votes cast, namely 192,000.63 15.41%
of the voters voted for the Arrow Cross lists, and 12.88% for the individual
candidates. Overall, this accounted for more than 14% of the vote. The other
national socialist parties obtained 7.7% of the vote,64 which meant that far-right
parties could prepare for the parliamentary term holding 22% of the vote.
The question was: What was this enough for and how many seats did the
approximately 900,000 votes cast for far-right parties and candidates result
in? In the counties, 19 far-right representatives were elected to the National
60 The ten parties were as follows: United Hungarian National Socialist Party, Christian
National Socialist Front, Hungarian National Socialist Agricultural Labourers’ and Workers’
Party, Hungarian National Socialist Party, National Front, Arrow Cross Party, Independent
far-right, Hungarian Racial Defence Party, Independent racial defenders, Party of National
Will. Hubai 2001a, pp. 62–63, 67.
61 Hubai 2001a, p. 65.
62 Hubai 2001a, p. 66.
63 Hubai 2001a, p. 67.
64 Hubai 2001a, pp. 66–67.
274
Assembly from the party lists, 9 of whom were candidates of the Arrow Cross
Party. It was only the Arrow Cross candidates, a total of 13, that won seats via
the party lists in towns. The total number of seats via the far-right party list was
32, of which 22 were taken by the Arrow Cross Party.65
Far-right parties managed to win 17 seats in single-member constituencies.
These 17 seats were shared by 8 parties. Again, it was the Arrow Cross Party
that won most of the seats, taking 7.66
Overall, the far-right won 49 seats in the 1939 Pentecost elections, of
which the Arrow Cross Party alone won 22 seats from the party list, and 7
seats from individual electoral districts, thus securing a total of 29 seats in the
National Assembly.67 This provided the Arrow Cross Party with 11.2% of the
parliamentary seats and the other far-right parties with 7.7%, representing a
total of 18.9% of all mandates in the legislature.
It is not the purpose of this study to provide a further in-depth analysis
of the results of 1939 elections. It should be noted, however, that if checks
had not been incorporated into the electoral law that led to the success of the
ruling party, the votes cast for the far-right parties could have resulted in a
much larger number of seats in the National Assembly. These efficient checks
included a significant curtailment of the census suffrage, the introduction of
an electoral deposit, strict rules on recommendations, a special procedure
for distributing seats, the submission of a petition against the results, the
annulment of far-right mandates by the Administrative Court, and a number
of intricate mazes in the electoral law, which were well known to the members
of the pro-government Electoral Commissions and, as we could see in the case
of the Székesfehérvár election, were also applied effectively. However, it was
also unfavourable for the far-right parties that they were unable to resist the
urge to form new parties over and over again as in the early 1930s, to settle
the almost constant interpersonal conflicts, and to remedy the shortcomings in
party organisation, which ultimately made it impossible for far-right parties to
65 Hubai 2001a, p. 69.

66 Hubai 2001a, p. 68.
67 Hubai 2001a, p. 68.
275
join together. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that during the years between
the 1935 and 1939 elections, the support for far-right parties and movements
increased enormously. Their rise is indisputable. As well as the fact that the
governing parties used all constitutional and administrative means68 in order
to hinder this rise. Although this was successful in the 1939 Pentecost elections,
those who closely followed the domestic policy developments and perceived
their shift to the right amid the rising popularity of far-right ideology in Europe,
could rightly feel that storm clouds were gathering in the spring of 1939.
68 As an example, on 13 April 1939, at the beginning of the election campaign, the government
banned the only newspaper of the Arrow Cross for three months, thereby completely
undermining the Arrow Cross election campaign.
276
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éven belül választ az ország népe. A miniszterelnök fontos kijelentései a
legközelebbi képviselő választásról. 9 March. XLI (56).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). A ma
délelőtti minisztertanács határozott a választókerületi beosztásokról. Május
közepére írják ki a választásokat. 5 April. XLI (77).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Kik a
fejérmegyei képviselő jelöltek. 30 April. XLI (97).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Megjelent a
választó kerületek uj beosztása. 4 May. XLI (100).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Legujabb
választási hirek. 5 May. XLI (101).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Pünkösd
első napján választ Székesfehérvár és Fejérvármegye. 6 May. XLI (102).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). A Független
Kisgazda Párt felveszi a küzdelmet a fejérmegyei MÉP listával. 9 May. XLI
(104).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). A Hóman-
párt ajánlásainak gyűjtése. 9 May. XLI (104).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Hatósági
hirdetmény. 9 May. XLI (104).
278
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). A

fejérmegyei képviselőjelöltek végleges névsora. 16 May. XLI (110).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Ma délig
kellett beadni a képviselőjelölteknek az ajánlásokat. 21 May. XLI (114).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Tudnivalók
a képviselőválasztással kapcsolatban. 21 May. XLI (114).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Elutasitotta
a választási elnök a nyilasok fejérmegyei listáját. 23 May. XLI (115).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Miért
utasitotta vissza a választási biztos a fejérmegyei nyilas listát. 24 May. XLI
(116).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). A nyilas
lajstrom. 24 May. XLI (116).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Vasárnap
reggel 8 órakor ül össze a választási bizottság Fehérváron. 27 May. XLI
(119).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939). Választási
eredmények ma déli 1 órakor. 31 May. XLI (121).
[Without signature and initials], Székesfehérvári Friss Ujság (1939).
Megpeticionálták a fehérvári származásu Kerekes Béla nyilas képviselő
mandátumát. 24 June. XLI (141).
Az 1935–1940. évi országgyűlésről (Sturm-féle országgyűlési almanach). (1940).

Haeffler, I. (ed.) Magyar Távirati Iroda Rt. Budapest.
Az 1939–44. évi országgyűlésről (Sturm-féle országgyűlési almanach). (1940).
Haeffler, I. (ed.) Magyar Távirati Iroda Rt. Budapest.
Az 1935. évi április hó 27-ére hirdetett országgyűlés képviselőházi naplója.
(1939). XVII. Budapest.
1938. évi XIX. törvénycikk az országgyűlési képviselők választásáról https://
net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=93800019.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev-
torvenyei%3Fpagenum%3D41 (downloaded on March 2020)
1925. évi XXVI. törvénycikk az országgyűlési képviselők választásáról https://
net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=92500026.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev-
279
torvenyei%3Fpagenum%3D39 (downloaded on March 2020)

Külügyi Közlöny. (1939). 10 June. XVIII (4).
Magyar Országgyűlési Almanach. Ötszáz magyar élet 1931–1936. Lengyel, L. &
Vidor Gy. (eds.) Globus Nyomdai Műintézet Rt., Budapest.
280
THE AUTHORS OF THE VOLUME
THE AUTHORS OF THE VOLUME
Zoltán Babucs, a managing-expert of Research Centre for History within the

Institute of Hungarian Research.
Dr. József Botlik, a retired associate professor at Pázmány Péter Catholic

University.
Prof. Dr. László Gulyás, a science advisor of Research Centre for History
within the Institute of Hungarian Research, a professor at University of
Szeged.
Dr. Péter Illik, a research fellow of Research Centre for History within the
Institute of Hungarian Research and a highschool teacher.
Csaba Kása, a managing-expert of Research Centre for History within the

Artúr Köő, a research assistant of Research Centre for History within the
Institute of Hungarian Research, a history teacher at the István Benkő
Reformed Primary School and Gymnasium.
Dr. Zsombor Szabolcs Pál, a researcher at the Antall József Knowledge Centre.
Prof. Dr. Ferenc Tibor Szávai, a professor at the Károli Gáspár University of
the Reformed Church in Hungary and the Szent István University.
Dr. Nóra Szekér, historian at the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State
Security.
281
Dr. Éva Teiszler, a research fellow of Research Centre for History within the
Dr. László Tamás Vizi, Scientific Deputy Director General at the Institute
of Hungarian Research, a Director of Research Centre for History and Vice-
Rector at the Kodolányi János University.
282
This book was published by the Institute for Hungarian Studies (MKI).
Postal address: 1014 Budapest, Úri utca 54–56.
Web: mki.gov.hu
Email: kiado@mki.gov.hu
Chief publisher: Gábor Horváth-Lugossy, Director General of MKI
Chief editor: István Virág
Graphic design, technical editing: Gábor Tóth, Mihály Tóth
Press and bookbinding: OOK-PRESS Nyomda, Veszprém, ookpress.hu

The Hungarian World 1938-1940

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The Hungarian World 1938-1940

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The Hungarian World

Translated by EDMF Language Services Kft.

MKI editorial board: László Tamás Vizi (chairman), Bence Fehér,

The publication of this book was sponsored by EMMI.

© Authors, 2020, 2021

Zoltán Babucs: Security operations of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of

The authors of the volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

The temporary exhibition entitled “The Hungarian World 1938–1940” was

school tries to relativise it in the spirit of some sort of pseudo-objectivity.”

Budapest, the month of November 2021

1 Sárándi 2016, p. 38.

than two hundred Romanians.3 Although this generalisation provoked the

7 Illésfalvi 2004, p. 60.

9 Babucs 2017, p. 13.

14 Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, p. 22.

Staff Gyula Kádár of Nyárád-Gálfalva19 (in 1940 Lieutenant Colonel of the

19 Szakály 2003, pp. 160–161; Szakály 2015, pp. 75–76.

commissioned officer reacted by firing into the tower several times. As

on the testimony given by the handful of frightened, illiterate, simple

22 Kádár 1978, I. pp. 354–356.

ahead to Debren a scout patrol composed of a platoon under the command

34 László Jeney of Nagyenyed, nobleman (Kolozsvár [today: Cluj-Napoca, Romania], 11 July

40 Sárándi 2016, p. 244.

The weapon collection operations carried out among the population of

45 András Farkas (Medgyesegyháza, 2 September 1914 – Szolnok, 31 January 2008), re-

bullets of the Thirty-Second never miss.’”49 The Hungarian soldiers conducted

51 Szabó K. 1991, pp. 153–154.

(today: Giurtelecu Șimleului, Romania) in the east – Somlyóújlak (today:

“[…] under the command of Captain Tábori,57 we conducted a search

60 Illésfalvi, Szabó & Számvéber 2005, pp. 23–24.

63 Gál 2005, p. 41–44; Benkő 2011.

Ablonczy, B. (2017). A visszatért Erdély 1940–1944. Third, revised edition. Jaffa

Kádár, Gy. (1978). A Ludovikától Sopronkőhidáig. I-II. Magvető Könyvkiadó.

Farkas interview Magnetofonszalagra vett beszélgetés Farkas András magyar

Figure 1. The 32nd Infantry Regiment at Vállaj, on 5 September 1940.

Figure 3. Concert of Hungarian army band at the main square of Szilágyperecsen

Figure 4. First Lieutenant Zsolt Bedő (Collection of Babucs Zoltán)

Figure 5. Lance Corporal Antal Kovács (Photographed earlier as a private without

Figure 6. Re-enlisted Platoon Leader András Farkas (Collection of Babucs Zoltán)

Figure 7. First Lieutenant Béla Barabás (Collection of Babucs Zoltán)

Figure 8. First Lieutenant Kálmán Keviczky (Photographed already as Captain)

Figure 9. Captain Győző Berdefi

The territory of Carpathian Ruthenia (in Czech: Podkarpatská Rus) between

1 Hübner 1817, p. 112.

2 Mayer 1977, p. 207.

5 Magocsi & Pop 2002, p. 119.

campaign” [in Hungarian: hegyvidéki gazdasági akció]. It was launched on 4

15 Botlik 2018, pp. 164–190, pp. 304–307.

18 Bartha 1901, p. 323 [emphasis added by B. J.].

It must be stated here that in addition to the new Carpathian Ruthenia

National Law Archive, in respect of the Carpathian Ruthenia macro-region.23

25 Pinczés 1999, p. 11.

part of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye on the recognition of the independence

29 Halmosy 1983, pp. 89–93.

prevent the country’s border from crossing the Csap–Beregszász–Nagyszőllős–

32 Beneš 1996, p. 35 – The locations concerned: Hosszúmező, Szarvaszó, Máramarossziget,

39 For example: Ruszinszkó Hungarian Party, Ruszinszkó Hungarian Newspaper, Ruszinszkó

43 National Law Archive, 13 November 1938 (Issue 18) p. 532.

treason”. Ágoston Volosin (Avgustyn Voloshyn, 1874–1945) of Hungarian–

46 According to the census in February 1939, the population of Carpatho-Ukraine was

48 Thirring 1939, pp. 199–200, 236–237.

51 Benisch 1941, pp. 73–74.

in effect until the Soviet military occupation of Carpathian Ruthenia at the

After the renewed separation of Carpathian Ruthenia from Hungary,