Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

FREEDOM, 

SOCIETY AND 

THESTATE 

An Investigation into the 

Possibility of Society 

without Government 

DavidOsterfeld 

COBDEN PRESS 

1800 Market Street 

San Francisco, CA 94102

Copyright 1986 by David Osterfeld 

ISBN 0-930 439-08-2

To Emmy 

iii

2. The Defense of Private Property: 

Natural Rights Versus Utilitarianism 56 

3. The Implications of Universal Private 

Property 62 

III. The State as a Caste Institution 

1. The·Origin of the State 

2. The Persistence of the State 

3. The Gr'owth of the State 

a. Democracy 

b. War 

c. Economic Intervention 

4. The Total State 

5. Who Rules the State? 

6. Comments and Evaluation 

IV. The State, Imperialism, and War 

73 

73 

79 

82 

83 

86 

87 

88 

93 

95 

117 

1. Three Theories of Imperialism 119 

a. Autarky 119 

b. Planned Scarcity 121 

c. Inflation 125 

d. Imperialism and Popular Support 127 

2. Evaluations 131 

a. Is the United States Imperialistic? 131 

b. Analysis of the Theories of 

Imperialism 135 

3. Conclusion 140 

Part Two: The Individualist Anarchist 

Paradigm 

VI 

149

V. Some Justification for the State 

1. The Argument from the Common Good 

a. The Totalist Common Good 

b. The Personalist Common Good 

2. The Argument from Necessity 

3. The Argument from Convenience 

4. The Argument from Natural Rights 

5. The Argument from Utility 

6. The Argument from Liberation 

7. The Argument from Economic Justice 

8. Conclusion 

VI. Philosophical Anarchism 

151 

151 

151 

155 

157 

158 

159 

160 

165 

168 

170 

177 

1. Josiah Warren and the Outlines for 

Individual Sovereignty 180 

2. William B. Greene and Currency and 

Banking Reform 189 

3. Joshua K. 

of Land 

Ingalls and the Ownership 

195 

4. Benjamin Tucker, Lysander Spooner and 

the Provision of Police and Court 

Services 198 

5. Tucker and His Journal, "Libertyff: 

Philosophical Anarchism Matured 208 

6. Conclusions: The Decline of 

Philosophical Anarchism 211 

VII. The Politico-Economic Perspective of 

Individualist Anarchism 

V) ) 

221

1. Social Coordination 

a. Priorities 

b. Efficiency 

c • Dis t r ibu t ion 

d. State, Economy, and Conscious 

Coordination 

221 

223 

224 

226 

226 

2. Laissez .Faire, Power and Freedom 230 

a. Power Defined 230 

b. Ramifications of the Rothbardian 

Influence-Attempt Taxonomy 236 

c. Freedom Defined 239 

3•. The PI ight of the Poor 

a. Government and the Poor 

b. The Culture of Poverty 

c. Poverty Statistics 

d. Poverty Programs 

e. The Market and the Poor 

f. Care for the Truly Poor 

4. Monopolies and the Free Market 

5. Government and Utility 

6. The Business Cycle and Depression 

7. Government and Taxation 

8. Democracy and the Market 

VIII. The Areas of Anarehist-Minarchist 

Agreement 

1. Roads 

a. Cost 

b. Eminent Domain 

. c. Inconvenience 

d. Price Gouging 

e. Safety 

2. Education 

3. Occupational Licensing 

vii i 

241 

241 

242 

243 

244 

247 

250 

250 

252 

253 

257 

260 

273 

273 

274 

275 

278 

280 

281 

282 

289

FORWARD 

by 

William O. Reichert 

Professor of Political Science 

Bowling .Green State University 

When Thomas Hobbes chose to title his theory of 

the modern state, The Leviathan, he could not possibly 

have known just how prophetic that caption was to 

prove to be in our day. Hobbes, of course, did not 

have in mind the Old Testament version of the word 

Leviathan, viz., a sea monster portending evil. In 

Hob b e s' min d the t e r m Lev i a t han s ym b0 1 i zed an 0 c ean 

going vessel Which, when attached to his social contract 

theory, was meant to convey the idea of a mighty 

ship of state capable of withstanding the most ferae 

i 0 us g a I e san d tern pes t u 0 us sea s t hat h uma n na t ur e 

could invent. Today the symbolization of the state as 

a ship more logically brings to mind the ill-fated 

TIt ani c as its un k tot he bo t tom 0 f t he At lantic wi t h 

its cargo of humanity caged within its iron hull. 

Clearly, the modern democratic theory of the state is 

inc r i sis, for not a n I y ha veman y peopIe losteon f i 

dence in the state's abi I i ty to keep order within 

society but there is a widespread, ominous feeling that 

we are being sucked into a whirlpool that is heading us 

all toward a political version of Davey Jones' locker. 

David Osterfeld's Freedom, Society, and the State is 

addressed to the quest ion of how we might save ourselves 

from this unsavory fate. 

In ·the pages that follow, Osterfeld, drawing 

heavily upon the tradition of individualist thought as 

out I ined by Benjamin R. Tucker and other American libertarians 

of an earlier era, presents a synthesis of 

.anarchism and capitalism, a mission that is apt to be 

considered by many as futile as Hobbes' attempts to 

S quaret he c 1 r c 1 e • Soc i a lis t sin pa r ticu 1a r will be 

wary of thIS synthesis, for the free mark t economics 

that Osterfeld employs in his argument s generally 

thought of as the stock-in-trade of a power ul elite of 

we a I t h t hat use s the s tat e t 0 rna i n t a init s posit ion 0 f 

special economic privilege and political domination. 

But the uneasiness socialists experience at the mention 

xi

off r e e rna rk e t . e con om i c t heor y is based upon an outmoded 

conception of the nature and function of the 

state as it relates to the general welfare as well as a 

serious misunderstanding of what anarchism is all 

about. Addressing himself directly to these misperceptions, 

David Osterfeld throws a great deal of light 

upon the topic of human freedom in comtemporary times. 

One of the widely held mi s per c e p t i onsat t a c ked by 

Osterfeld is the mistaken notion that all anarchists 

are totally opposed to the institution of private property. 

The basis of that notion, most probably, is 

Proudhon's notorious assertion that "property is 

theft." But when Proudhon condemned private property, 

hewa s not t h ink i n g 0 f goo d s prod uc e d by the wo r ke r 

through his own labor which he had every moral right to 

use for his own sustenance, but only those large accumulat 

ions of unearned income wrestled from the worker 

and pro t e c ted i nth e han d s 0 f cap ita 1 i s t s by laws 

est a b 1 ish e d by the s tat e • L ike Adam Sm i t h, from wh om 

mu c h 0 f his e nth u s i a s m for I a iss e z fa ire the 0 r y wa s 

der ived, Proudhon had no misgivings whatever concerning 

capital, if by capital is meant that necessary property 

the i n d i v i d u a I· ereate s by his own ef for t s wi t hi n an 

economic system characterized by unqualifIed freedom of 

choice and action. What anarchists like Proudhon cond 

em n i s pro per t y righ t s rna i n t a i ned inthe i n t eres t 0 f 

certain privileged individuals or social classes by 

force of state laws artificially imposed without regard 

as to who actually produced the property in question. 

With respect to political theory, Osterfeld's 

position is determined in large measure by the antis 

tat ism 0 f F ran z 0 p pen h e i mer and 0 ther I i ber tar ian 

thinkers who see modern democratic political ideology 

as the principal source of the confusion that characterizes 

the quest for social justice in contemporary 

soc i e t y • A Ion g with Ma r x and 0 t he r soc i a lis t s, i nd i 

vidualist anarchist theory recognizes the enormous 

contribution made by capital during the early indust 

riaIre v 0 I uti 0 n tothera i sing 0 f huma n 1 i v i ng s tandar 

dsan d the wid e s preadd i s t ributi 0 n 0 f the com for t s 

of modern 1 i fe. Contemporary individual ist anarchist 

the 0 r i s t s a Iso a c know1edgethe ce n t r a I r 0 lethat c I ass 

confl iet and state power have played in bringing about 

the inequitable distribution of wealth that is evident 

i n mod ern soc iaIr e I a t ions • Un 1 ike bo t h the L i be r a I 

and the Mar XIS t, h owe ver, the i nd i v i d uali s tanarchis t 

does not look to state power as the savior of those who 

are domInated and exploited by the irresponsible monop- 

xii

o lie s 0 f we a I t h t hat h a v e com e abo ut, for follow ing 

Oppenheimer's viewpoint, it is the state that is the 

principal cause of the exploitation and monopolization 

of the means of production. That is so, according to 

individual ist anarchist theory, because it would be 

virtually impossible for the super-rich to have 

achieved the enormously inequitable positions of 

economic privilege and dorninati.on they presently hold 

wit h 0 u t the ass i s tan e e 0 fIegal rna chi ne ryer e c ted by 

the modern state. A way out of this imbroglio can be 

found only bya d 0 P ting a thoroughly r a diea I solution, 

the rejection of state power as the central force in 

human relations. 

In the place of the "political means" utilized by 

the s tat e tor e g u I ate the e con om i c and s 0 ci a I a f fa irs 

of people, Osterfeld and other individualist anarchists 

opt for a soc i e t y regu Iated by f r e e rna r k e t for cesthat 

ope rat e f r e e 0 f the art i fie i a I rna nipu I a t ion imp 0 sed 

upon people by the state's legal apparatus. In calling 

for a social order structured within the framework of 

laissez faire principles, liberals, especially, will 

accuse free market anarchists of turning the lambs over 

to the wolves, for one of the essential beliefs held by 

the liberal thinkers is that government is absolutely 

n e c e s s a r y i f the robber bar on s of cor porat e cap italism 

are to be held in check. How could there be social 

order, the liberal demands, if the power of the state 

dId not exist to effect reform and attempt to establish 

social justice? Osterfeld's answer to this is that 

g 0 v ernmen tin t e r ven t ion i n e con om i c a f fa irs m0 reof ten 

than not takes place for the specific purpose of helpi 

n g the supe r - r i e h t 0 rna i n t a i nor ext end the i r posit ion 

of supremacy rather than aid the disadvantaged; one 

need merely review the history of urban renewal projects 

in this country to understand Osterfeld's reasoning 

on this point. And even when the motives of 

reformers are pure, the help that is extended to the 

poor and under-privileged inevitably leads to an 

increase in the bureaucratic regUlations they already 

suffer so that human freedom once again is victimized. 

The argument out I ined in favor of indIvidualist 

a n archis m by Os t er f e Idin t his book ish i gh I Y comp I ex , 

drawing upon the wisdom of a wide range of social, 

economic, and political theorists. Of particular merit 

is the convincIng argument he makes in favor of a legal 

order that operates without the assistance of the 

professional legal monopoly that has come to maturity 

in America in recent years, a monopoly that depends 

xii i

almost exclusively upon the expertise of juridical 

specialists while ignoring the, real needs and social 

instincts of the very people it is supposed to help. 

Here Osterfeld dares to refer to the ideas and 

theoretical insights of a number of unconventional but 

extremely provocative thinkers, social theorists like 

Lysander Spoo'ner, Friedrich A. Hayek, Murray N. 

Rothbard, Gabriel Kolko, Ludwig von Mises, Robert 

Nisbet, Walter Grinder, and Randolph Bourne. Convinced 

t ha t t her e· is 1itt Ie hope for human freedom to be found 

in the the 0 r i e s 0 f e i the r Ma r x 0 r Keynes, Os t er f e I d 

leads his readers in a quest for a more intelligent 

sol ut ion to the prodigious problems imposed upon us by 

modernity. This book most certainly gives the reader a 

percept ive guide to an understanding of contemporary 

libertarian thought and the logic of individualist 

anarchism as a means to regain our freedom. 

xiv

contrary, it would not be too strong to describe classIcal 

liberalism's attitude toward anarchism as one of 

both contempt as well as fear. It was contemptuous because 

as one classical liberal philosopher wrote, anarchism 

"would be practicable only in a world of angels" 

and the "liberal understands quite clearly" that "one 

must be in a position to compel the person who will not 

respect lives, health, personal feelings, or private 

property of others to acquiesce in the .rules of life in 

soc i e t y • " ( 2 ) And c I ass i cal liberalism had fear edana rchism 

because, while encompassing a broad spectrum of 

thought ranging from the rampant individualism of Max 

St i rner to the communism of Peter Kropotkin, the dominan 

t s t r a i n 0 fan archism 0 s tens i bl Y p I aced itsquareI y 

within the socialist camp. Daniel Guerin put the matter 

succinctly. Anarchism, he says, "is really a synonym 

for social ism."(3) And, while acknowledging "Stirner's 

complete rejection of all polictical, moral, and tradit 

ion a 1 ti e s of t he i nd i v i d ua I , " Max Ad I e r goes· s 0 fa r a s 

to argue that Stirner cannot even be considered an anarchist 

since anarchism is only "a definite political 

trend within the socialist labor movement," and Stirner 

was not a socialist.(4) 

Hence, not just the state but the capitalist economic 

system were the principal evils for the majority of 

a narc his t t h ink e r s 0 f the n i net e en t h c e n t ur y • I t wa s 

not accidental that in Kropotkin's delineation of the 

three cardinal aims of anarchist communism the first was 

an. i n j un c t Ion a g a ins t capita 1 ism: " Ema n c i pa t ion from 

the yoke of capital; production in common and free consum 

p t io n 0 f a 1· I the pro d u c t s 0 f common I abo r • " On I y 

after his exhortat ion to abol ish capitalism does one 

fInd a call for "emancipation from government" and 

"emancipation from religion."(S) The views of the 

I t a I i an ana r chi s t, Err i coMa 1ate s t a (6 ) and the 

Britisher, William Morris(7) were similar. Both equated 

anarchism with communism and called for the free distribution 

of all goods. Bakunin, while a collectivist 

rather than 8 communist, also advocated ·the liberation 

fro m cap ita lis m . ( 8 ) Eve n inthe wr i tin gs 0 f the mo r e 

individualist-oriented anarchists one finds condemnations 

of capitalism coupled with panegyrics to socialism. 

In a striking phrase, Proudhon not only declared 

that rrproperty is theft,rr but also exclaimed "What is 

the capitalIst? Everything! What should he be? 

Nothing!"(9) Similarly, the English anarchist, William 

Godwin, asserted that "it follows upon the principles of 

equal and impartial justice, that the good things of the 

world are a common stock, upon which one man has as 

2

state intervention to protect profits and institutionali 

z e the poSIt ion 0 f the pr 0 per t y- own i ngel ass . When the 

sociological definition is used, capitalism becomes incomprehensible 

without control of the state by the bourgeoisie. 

For with the power of the state behind them, 

the bourgeoisie are able to protect their privileged 

positions from the threat of competition by the estab 

1 ishment of tariff barriers, licensing restrictions, and 

other statist measures. 

The propon en t s 0 f cap italism, howe ve r, had 0 n I y the 

economic definition in mind when they defended capitalism.(14) 

Far from intending to defend state intervent 

ion to preserve artificially high profits, it was, in 

fact, such pro-capital ist writers as Adam Smith who vehemen 

t 1 y condemned such "mercant i list" arrangements and 

urged their replacement by free trade capitalism.(15) 

Since comparison can only be made when definitions tap 

the same domain, confusion occurred because of these definitional 

differences, and critics and opponents of 

cap ita lis m t a Ike d pas tea c hot her when rna ny werei n 

basic agreement. But if the economic spectrum is analyzed 

from the point of view of the economic definition 

on I y, the n com par i son can berna d eon the f 0 I low i ng 

bas is: cap ita lis m w0 u I d beequa ted wit h the rna r ke t , 

communism with the absence of the market, and mercantilism 

with a mixed or restricted market. 

communism mercantilism capitalism 

0:-------------------:-------------------:100 

non-market restricted market market 

We are now in a pas i t i on to reassess the ant icapitalism 

of the anarchists. What is evident in such a 

taxonomy is that while certain anarchists such as 

Kropotkin and Bakunin must certainly be classified as 

social ist or communist, others like Proudbon, Godwin and 

especially the native American anarchists such as Josiah 

Warren, Benjamin Tucker, and Victor Yarros, despIte 

their characterization of themselves as socialists, must 

be placed within the capitalist camp. A closer look at 

the anarchists themselves will make this clear. 

4

1. THE EOONCNIC SPECTRUM OF ANARCHISM: CXM\1UN ISM TO 

CAPITALISM 

a. Anafcho-communism. 

At one end of the anarchist spectrum we find those 

who, like Kropotkin and his followers, blend anarchism 

and commun i sm. The anarcho-communists oppose exchange, 

money, the division of labor, private property, and the 

wage system. Capi tal ism, they argue is just as "barbarous" 

as feudalism; only the forms have changed. "The 

worker is forced, under the name of free contract," says 

Kropotkin, "to accept feudal obligations. For turn 

where he will he can find no better conditions. Everything 

has become private property and he must accept, or 

die of hunger." Since the capJtalist owns the means of 

production he can dictate wage rates. This puts the 

worker at a distinct disadvantage. The wage system 

therefore reduces the worker to poverty. 

On the other hand, despite the advance in technology 

which has made a life of abundance possible for all, 

"the owners of capital constantly reduce the output by 

restricting production," thereby keeping prices high. 

Labor is further squandered by the production of luxur 

i es for the capi talist class, as well as by the money 

spent on armaments, salaries for judges, prison guards, 

policemen, etc. All money spent by governemnt is useless, 

says Kropotkin, since there is a definite relat 

ion s hip betwe encr i me and pove r t y • Hen ce, i f 0 nee I iminates 

capitalism, poverty and thus crime would nearly 

di sappear, and government would become unnecessary. 

Social behavior would be regulated by voluntary compliance 

to "unwritten customs." As Kropotkin's biographer, 

Mar tin Mille r, put it, "t he t r a d i t ion 0 f aut h 0 r i t y wa s 

to be replaced by the authority of tradition."(16) As 

for the "few anti-social acts that may still take 

place," says Kropotkin, "the best remedy will consist 

in loving treatment, moral influence, and liberty." And 

if that doesn't work then the aggressor can "of course 

·be expelled from fellowship."(17) 

Private property, whether that of capitalism or 

mercantilism, is likewise condemned. Since everything 

material as well as mental is a product of the contributions 

of countless individuals, past as well as present, 

it is impossible to determine the actual contributions 

of each. Consequently, argues Kropotkin, property cannot 

rightfUlly be private, but only common; all have a 

5

proletariat of the land which it cultivates with its own 

han d s • " ( 2 3 ) The pea san t s, a c cording tot he prom i n en t 

Bakuninist James Guillaume, wIll then have the option of 

either owning and working their plots individually or 

assocIating Into collectives. Because of the advantages 

of the collective in. creating "a communal agency to sell 

or exchange the i r products," it is expected that the 

collect i ve wi II be the dominant form of organizat lon, 

but no coercion will be used to compel individual peasants 

to join the collectives.(24) A similar arrangement 

is envisioned for industry. Large-scale production, of 

course, would entail collective ownership, but handicrafts 

and other small Industry may well be individually 

owned. As for remuneration, whereas anarcho-communism 

intends to follow the formula "From each according to 

his ability to each according to his needs," the collectivists, 

at least initially, adhere to the much different 

maxim of "From each according to hIS means to each 

according to hIS deeds."(25) 

To meet their needs it will be quite natural for 

the collectives to organize themselves into federations 

of collectlves.(26) Then, as Guillaume describes the 

operation of the anarcho-collectlvist society, "the 

workers' associations as well as the individual producers. 

• WIll deposit their unconsumed commodities In 

the f a c iIi tie s pro v Ide d b Y the Ba n k 0 f Ex c han ge, the 

value of the commoditIes having been established In advance 

by a contractual agreement between the regional 

cooperative federations and the various communes•••The 

Bank of Exchange Will reml t to the producers negot lable 

vouchers representIng the value of the products: These 

vouchers wi 11 be accepted throughout the territory included 

in the federation of communes."(27) 

The important difference between anarcho-communism 

and anarcho-collectivism is that while for the former 

the wage system and all other market phenomena will be 

abolished, the collectivists retain not only a modifIed 

wage system but other exchange relationships as well. 

Gui llaume, for example, acknowledges that so long as any 

pro d u c t s are ins h 0 r t sup ply the y wo u I d have to be 

treated as commodities WIth theIr prices set by the Bank 

of Exchange according to the dictates of supply and 

d em and • Its h 0 u I d be poi n ted 0 ut, howe v e r, t hat the 

collectIvists believe that collective labor will be so 

productive that all shortages will eventually disappear 

and wi th it the need for any type of pr ice mechanism.(28) 

Once this plateau of plenty is reached, the 

structures of anarcho-communism and anarch-collectivism 

7

will become practically indistinguishable. 

c. Anarcho-syndicalism. 

Syndicalism is both an organizational structure and 

a method of overthrowing the capitalist system. As a 

method, syndicalism, as popularized by Georges 

Sorei ( 29 ), i sarno v em en t pr em is ed on t he "my t h of the 

general strike" and the use of force. Violence, it is 

held, is necessary to overthrow both capitalism and the 

capitalist state. But to galvanize the workers into 

act ion, the y mu s t be 1 i eve inthe i nex 0 r a b 1e t r i urn ph 0 f 

their cause. It is this function that the "myth" fulfills. 

For by believing that the general strike will 

produce the triumph of their cause, it brings into relief 

the class antagonisms of the capitalist system. In 

do i ng so it un it es the proletar iat, producing an "epic 

state of mind" which rouses the proletariat to acts of 

"heroism."(30) This triumph of the proletarian will 

wi 11 eventually culminate in the overthrow of capitalism. 

Bel ief in the myth of the i r inev i table vi ctory, in 

other words, produces a will to action that does, 

indeed, make their victory inevitable.(31) Such, briefly, 

is the method of syndicalism. 

We are most interested, however, in the organizational 

{ramework that will prevail once syndicalism has 

tr iumphed. There is an important difference between 

synd i ca 1 ism and communism on the quest ion of the ownership 

of the means of production. While both aim to expropriate 

these from the capitalist, under communism, as 

envisioned by Kropotkin, all workers would collectively 

own all capital. Under syndicalism, however, only those 

workers in a particular industry would own the means of 

product i on wi thin that industry. This bears an obvious 

resemblance to the collectivism of Bakunin, and Bakuninism 

may actually be seen as a variant of syndicalism, as 

can the mutualism of Proudhon. 

The essential aspect of syndicalism is workers' 

control according to industry. While these syndicates 

o r i n d u s t ria lor g ani za t ion s are t 0 be aut 0 nom 0 us, they 

are n eve r the 1 esst 0 bel00s ely con federa t ed, bot h ge0g 

rap h i cal I y a s weI 1 a s fun c t ionall y • The wo r k e r sin 

each locality, according to Rudolph Rocker, will join 

the unions of their respective trades. All the unions 

in a given region will then be combined into Labor 

Chambers. It would be the responsibility of the Labor 

Chambers "to determIne the needs of the inhabitants of 

their districts and organize local consumption." On the 

8

to really own their portion of the industry. Since 

sociologically ownership is defined as the power to dispose 

of property', that individu.al or group within the 

s y n d i cat e wit h the power toprev e n t the wo r k e r from 

sel I ing "his" share to whom he wishes is the actual owner 

and controller. Rather than workers' control, there 

has merely been a change in form: one set of owners has 

replaced another. But if individuals within each industry 

really own a share of that industry then they must 

be permitted to dispose of their shares.as they see fit. 

This means that they can sell their shares to those outs 

i de of the industry. But such a pol icy would entai I an 

end to "workers' control" and a reemergence of the separation 

of ownership and labor which it was the aim of 

syndicalism to overcome. Similarly, the same dilemma 

pre sen t sit s elf i f the 0 rig ina 1 wo r k e r s - own e r s 0 f the 

more prosperous syndicates decide to hire workers as 

simple wage earners and not as part owners of the industry. 

To prevent them would be a denial of worker control; 

but so too would adoption of such a policy. 

Aga in, th ings would tend to return to the pre-syndicalis 

t, i. e • , cap i tal is t, s tat e of a f fa irs. 

T h us, wh i 1 e s y n d i c a lism rna y aim toe lim ina t e pr i 

va t e ownersh i p of the means of product ion, the wage syst 

em, the mar ke t, and e conom i c i nequa 1 i t y, the s t r uc t ur e 

of syndicalism itself forces a return to the paraphernalia 

of the market, if only in a somewhat modified 

form.(35) 

d. Mutual ism. 

Despite his famous remark that "property is theft," 

Proudhon was, in fact, a staunch defender of the small 

property owner. He distinguished between property, in 

effect absentee ownership, and possession. His argument 

was that the land really belonged to those who worked it 

and hence "possession," or "occupancy," "negated property."(36) 

He not only defended private ownership but the 

rights of barter, sale and hereditary property as well, 

and felt that individual liberty could be protected only 

if property were subject to no restriction but that of 

size. . 

The three cornerstones of Proudhon's ideal society 

are contract, exchange, and property. The state is to 

be abol i shed and all relations betwen individuals and 

collectives are to be handled by contract. "The notion 

of contract precludes that of government," writes 

10

Proudhon. And again, "Instead of laws we would have 

con t r act s. N0 I a ws wo u I d be passed e i the r by rna j 0 r i t Y 

vote or unanimously. Each citizen,each commune or corporation, 

would make its own laws."(37) The corollary 

of con tract is exchange; people contract wi th each other 

to exchange their products. Accordingly, Proudhon defines 

mutualism as "service for service, product for 

product. ."(38) Proudhon was not so much an opponent 

oft h e cap ita lis tic rna r ke t s ystem as 0 find us t rialism• 

He envisioned a society of numerous small and independent 

producers, voluntar i ly contract ing to exchange 

their products on an equitable basis. Where the nature 

of production makes such a framework impossible, 

Pro u d h 0 n a d v 0 cat e s a s ynd i c a listar rang emen t wh ere the 

workers in each industry would own the means of production 

in that industry. Relations between the syndicates 

and other syndicates or individual producers are to be 

handled in the same way as relations between individual 

producers: exchange and contract. But for contract and 

e x c hanget 0 berne ani ng f u I theremus t be pr i vat e owne r 

ship; one cannot exchange what one does not own. 

Proudhon, in fact, proclaims that property "is the only 

power that can act as a counterweight to the State•••" 

T h us, pro per t y he says, "i s the basis 0 f my s ystem 0 f 

federation."(39) It is not surprising to find, therefore, 

that Proudhon was in fact a bitter opponent of 

communism, which he defined as "the exploitation of the 

strong by the weak." Any society failing to recognize 

the right of private property, he felt, must inevitably 

breed a stUltifying rigidity and uniformity that is incompatible 

with "the free exercise of our faculties, •• 

• our noblest dreams, .•• our deepest feelings."(40) 

On the quest ion of crime in an anarchist society, 

Proudhon thought that contract was the sine qua non of 

just ice, and that a fully contractual society would be a 

fully just one. And he further believed, perhaps naively, 

that a just society would alleviate much of the tenden 

c y t.owar dand need for c rim ina I beha v i 0 r • The 0 c c a 

sional anti-social individual, Proudhon thought, could 

be handled through the method of voluntary reparation. 

The c rim ina 1 w0 u 1 d b e askedt 0 rna kerepar a t ion to his 

'victim, and the threat of being the target of public 

disapprobation if he refused would all but insure compliance. 

And since reparation accords the criminal "as 

much respect as he lost through his crime..•[h]is repa 

rat ion i sal so are h a b iIi tat ion." F ina II y, anyone 

regularly violating the norms of the society, and refusing 

to make reparation, what Proudhon terms the "hopelessly 

obdurate scoundrel," can legitimately be subject- 

11

ed to physical suffering and even death.(41) 

In short, despite Proudhon's famous statement on 

property and his regular condemnations of flcapitalism," 

the essent ial components of mutualism are private property, 

exchange, and contract. With the one SIgnificant 

exception of his stricture concerning the size of property, 

mutualism is, in most other respects, not incompatibLe 

with capitalism.(42) 

e • Godwi n i sm .. 

H. N. Bra i I s ford says of Godwi n that fl intensely 

equal i tar ian, he permits property only that it may be 

given away."(43) A close look at William Godwin, however, 

reveals that despite his repeated condemnations of 

"accumulated property" he was probably an even more 

vigorous defender of private ownership than Proudhon. 

The idea of property, says Godwin, "is a deduction from 

the right of private judgement." Thus, he continues, 

pro per t y is, "i nthe 1a s t res 0 r t, the pa 11 ad i urn 0 f all 

t hat ought to be dear to us, and mus t never be approache 

d but wit haw e and ve n era t ion • " ( 44 ) I n fa c t, wh i I e 

otherwise eschewing violence, Godwin even goes so far as 

to remark that the "right of property, with all its inequalities•.should 

be defended if need be by 

coe rei on. . ." 

Godwin views property according to "three degrees." 

The fir stand most fundamental is that a person may own 

property provided U a greater sum of benefit or pleasure 

wi II resul t, than could have arisen from their being 

otherwise appropriated." From this he believes it foIlow 

s "that noma n rna y, i nordina r y ca s e s, rna k e use 0 f my 

apartment, furniture or garments, or of my food, ••. 

without fIrst having obtained my consent." The crucial 

function of the "flrst degree of property," is that if 

everyone is granted a certaIn sphere of property, no one 

wou I d be subject to the whims of another. Hence property 

will provide everyone WIth a sphere of action where 

he can exercise his judgement free from the influence of 

others. 

The second degree of property is the right of every 

man "over the produce of his own labor." While this is 

less fundamental than the fIrst degree, the latter does 

not automatically take precedence. Instead, the fIrst 

degree can only be attained by persuasion and the force 

of public opinion. 

12

ished or expelled from the Union. And further, while 

there are neither rights nor duties, and power is the be 

a 1 I and end a I 1, sothat 0 ne own son I y wh a the has the 

power to control, it is clear that Stirner believes that 

the utility of a secure property structure would encourage 

the Unions to protect that institution. "Unions 

will ,n hewr i t e s, "mu I tip I Y the i nd i v i d ua I 's me a nsand 

SeCure his assailed property."(51) 

Asin 0 the r t ypes 0 fanarchism, the ego i s tic wr i tings 

of Stirner contain a sustained condemnation of capital 

ism and "legal property." A closer view,however, 

makes it evident that what Stirner opposes is actually 

the mercant i list, or state capitalist,system. Thus he 

wr i t esthat "t heState i sac0 mm 0 ner' s [merchant's] 

State. ""Under the regime of the commonality," he 

says, "the laborers always fall into the hands of the 

possessors -- i.e., of those who have at their disposal 

some bit of the State domains, ••• especially money 

and 1and; 0 f the ca pit a lis t the ref 0 r e. " And aga in: 

"The commoner is what he is through the protection of 

the State, through the State 's gr ace. " ( 52 )Thesestatemen 

t s, i nth ems e 1 ve s, are compa t ib 1e wit h f r e e -ma r ke t 

capitalism. Further, Stirner was such a bitter opponent 

of any type of communism that Karl Marx wrote that 

S t i r n e r 's It ego i s ticalpr ope r t y • • • is not h i ng more 

than ordinary or bourgeois property sanctified."(53) So 

wh i I e hewa s vag u e concern i ng wh a t r ole the rna r ketand 

private property would play in a Stirnerite society, 

Charles Madison accurately captures the thrust of 

S t i r n e r ism when herema r ks t hat "i ron i ca I 1yen0 ugh, the 

h a r d s elf ish n e s s 0 f t his i n d i v i d ua listanarchism wa s 

admira b 1 Y ad 8 pte d tothe' rug g edind i v i d u 8 I ism' 0 f 

modern capitalism."{S4) It might also be pointed out 

that such prominent exponents of egoism as John Babcock 

and John Henry Mackay considered private property sacrosanct 

and reserved a central role for voluntary contract 

and exchange for mutual benefit. But both, it should be 

noted, were also heavily influenced by the prominent ind 

i v i d uali s tor "ph i los 0 phi cal" a narchis t, Ben jamin 

Tucker. (55) 

g. Philosophical Anarchism. 

What is usually termed the philosophical anarchist 

tradition received its fullest expression in the writings 

of the nineteenth century American anarchists, and 

in particular'Benjamin Tucker and Victor Yarros. Tucker, 

1 ike other anarchists, couc'hed his arguments in socialist 

terminology. Yet an examination of his ideas, as 

15

Mu r ray Rot h bar d a g r e e wit h the 0 vera I 1str uc t ur e of the 

Tucker i tes: th.e state is to be abolished and everything 

is to be handled by, or at least open to the possibility 

of, competition on the free market. There is one signifie 

ant d iff erenee t howe ve r • Wh i leTueker, adher i ng t 0 

the labor theory of value, felt that competition would 

reduce price to cost, thereby eliminating profits, rents 

and interest, the individualist anarchists reject the 

labor theory of value and adopt, in its place, the subj 

e c t i ve val u e-ma r gina I ut iIi t Y approach. Fr ee compe t ition 

would indeed tend to reduce prices and raise wages, 

the y say, but the Tuck e r i t e s are i n err 0 r in believ ing 

t hat t his mea n s t hat profit sandin t eres t wo u 1d a Iso 

disappear. Instead, their maintenance is seen as a 

requisite for economic rationality, and even society 

itself.(58) 

2. THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM OF CAPITALISM: ANARCHISM TO 

HYPERARCHISM 

A b r i e f 0 v e r view 0 f the e con om i c s pee t r urn 0 fana r 

chism revealed a wide array of economic arrangements. 

Similarly, the proponents of capitalism traverse the ent 

ire pol i tic a I s p e c t rum from a narchism towhat rna y be 

c a I led tl h Yper arc his m . " 0 n I y by view i n g t his a r ray 0 f 

groups and then comparing the political spectrum of capita 

lis m wit h the e con om i c s pee t r urn 0 fanarchism can the 

relative positions of the individualist, or free market, 

anarchists be ascertained. 

a. Individualist Anarchism. 

The previous discussion of individualist anarchism 

focused on its place in the anarchist school. Its posit 

ion wit h i nth e cap ita 1 i s t s pe c t r urn s til I need s t 0 be 

discerned. The sanctity of private property and the 

market lie at the heart of laissez faire capitalism. 

From a logical point of view, the more things are handled 

by the market, the more capitalistic the society. 

Co n sis ten t I yap p 1 ied, a r g u e the i n d i v i d ua lis t ana r.- 

.chists, capitalism leads to anarchism. Hence, they 

argue, the minarchists, or limited-government libertarians, 

place themselves in a contradiction for, while believing 

that property rights must be protected and the 

market maintained, they also believe that these services 

--the police and court functions--are by their nature 

col I e c t i v e and can not be prov ided by the rna r ke t . Thus 

the y are f or c edt 0 reI y on an agencyou t s i de t he rna r 

kett i.e., the government. The minarchist, it is ar- 

17

he sees no reason why government would have to enforce 

its 0 wn 1a w • I n f act, h e a c k n.O w1e dgesthat "pr i vat e 

police forces are doubtless much more efficient than 

those run by governmen t." (66) There is therefore an 

economic advantage to permitting police protection to be 

han dieden t ire I y b Y the rna r ke t • The 0 n 1y res t ric t ion 

that would be necessary to impose upon these private 

police companies -- a restriction that Hospers feels 

would be impossible to impose in an anarchist society -is 

that t1they should be able to enforce only the law of 

the land. ."(67) Beyond this, police companies would 

have complete freedom to compete against one another 

just like firms in any other field. Anyone desiring 

policaprotection could purchase it from the firm of his 

choice. And while no one would be compelled to purchase 

protection, only those paying the protection fee would 

r e c e i v e pro t e c t ion • " I f you wa n t po I ice prot e c t ion you 

have to pay a fee to obtain it, but of course you are 

free not to want it or pay for it, in which case," 

Hospers cont inues, "you wi II not have the protection 

even if you need it."(68) 

In short, Hospers maintains that while "laws should 

.be enacted by the state, ••. the enforcement of 

them migh t be Ieft topr i vateage nc i e s • n ( 69 ) The prov i 

s i on of bot h pol ice and court services would be handled 

on a fee-for-service basis, with individuals free to 

purchase or not to purchase these services as they see 

fit, but unable to purchase the services of any maverick 

pol ice agency or court which adhere to norms at variance 

with those laid down by the state. 

It is interesting to note that since a Hosperian 

state would render protection only to those purchasing 

it, i t doe s not me e t the c r i t e rion 0 f ami n i rna1state 

which, by definition, must provide protection for everyone 

within its territorial boundaries regardless of paymen 

t • We rna y, theref 0 r e, b 0 r r ow ater m co i ned by phi 10sopher 

Robert Nozick, and refer to Hospers as an "ultraminarchist." 

But it is possible that even this appellation is 

too s t ron g . On e 0 f the e ssen t i a I c r i t e ria 0fa" s tat e " 

is that it must be generally recognized as exercising a 

legitimate monopoly on the use of force within a given 

area.(70) But since, in a Hosperian society, the use of 

force would presumably be handled not by the "government" 

but entirely by private police agencies, this 

raises the question of whether the Hosperian framework 

meets this monopoly criterion. Hospers might, of 

20

course, argue that his entire system -- the legislature 

plus fee-for-service courts and the private police agencies 

-- constitutes a "state." 

But however one may resolve such definitional problems 

this still leaves open the really crucial question 

of how, if the use of force is to be left up to private 

police agencies, could the Hosperian proviso that these 

agencies must only enforce the legislature's statutory 

laws be enforced? What would happen if one, or two or a 

d 0 zen e n for c ementage nc i esstart edenfor c i ng norms t hat 

confl icted wi th the laws enacted by the legislature? 

There are, so far as I can see, two possible scenarios. 

Fir s t, H0 s per s mig h t con tend t hat sinc e thesernaverick 

agencies would clearly be acting illegally either they 

would not receive public patronage and so go out of 

business. or other police agencies, perceiving the 

threat of the illegals, would join forces to crush them. 

But since these are exactly the same measures Rothbardian 

anarchists rely on to insure the enforcement of 

the i r comm0 n I a w, H0 s pers' u I t ram ina r chi s m beeomesal I 

but i n dis tin g u ish a b I e from Ro t hbar d ian a narchism• But 

Hospers might argue for a second course, that of permitting 

the pUblic legislature to diversify into the provision 

of police services. The public agency might then 

not only enact laws but have enough force at its disposal 

to punish or crush any maverick agency. But since 

Hospers admits that private agencies are much more efficient 

than pUblic ones it is difficult to see why anyone 

wou I d pu r cha se protect ion from the la t ter. Consequent 

I y, the 0 n 1 y way s the pub 1 i c age n c y cou I d r ema i n i n 

business would be either by outlawing not just maverick, 

but all, private police agencies, or by charging every 

pol ice agency a fee sufficiently high to cover the pub 

I i c age n c y 's los s e s • Sinc e the pub 1 i c agenc y wo u 1d now 

hold an effective monopoly on the use of force it would 

meet the criteria for a state, although if it continued 

to operate on a fee-for-service basis it would remain a 

less than minimal state. But, it must be noted, neither 

oft he s e 0 p t ion s can be r e con c i led wit h 1 i be r tar ian 

principles. The outlawing of all private agencies would 

·constitute a restriction on peaceful activities, while 

the fee charged every agency would be neither voluntary(71) 

nor paid in exchange for services rendered. It 

would therefore be a tax in the full sense of that word. 

Ins h 0 r t, H0 s persis PI acedin a d i 1emma: e i the r he 

must accede in some restriction on peaceful activities 

and/or taxat ion, thereby violating his libertarianism, 

o r hem u s t reI y for the en for cern e n t 0 f his n s tat utor y 

21

law" on non-monopolistic mechanisms, thereby abandoning 

his archism. Thus, Hosperian ultraminarchism appears to 

con t a ina s e rio usin t ern a 1 con t r ad i c t ion wh i c h wo u I d 

logically compel it to move either to complete anarchism 

or fUll-fledged minarchism. 

e. Minarehism. 

Thosewhod 0 not believethat a rna r ke t for prot e ct 

ion s e r vic e s w 0 u I d bee i the r e conom i cal I y v i a b 1e 0 r 

morally permissible must therefore endorse some sort of 

s tat e • And thosew i t h i ntha t g r 0 up wh 0 rna i n t a i ntha t 

the provis ion of such services is the only proper function 

of government must therefore advocate a minimal, or 

completely laissez faire, state. The "minarchist" position 

has received its most recent and perhaps ablest -at 

any rate most ingenious -- expression in the "invisible 

hand" argument of philosopher Robert Nozick. 

Nozick begins with a discussion of a hypothetical 

free market anarchist society. But protective services, 

he says, di ffer from other types of services in that 

they employ the use of coercion. Therefore, in defending 

their respective clients they would come into confl 

i ct wi th each other, the result being that one dominant 

protect ive agency would eliminate its competition 

and emerge as the single such agency in the particular 

geographical region. This, says Nozlek, would eOllstitute 

an "ultraminimal state," which differs from the 

minimal state of the classical liberals in that the 

-former, by the law of supply and demand, eliminates its 

competition in 8 particular area, thereby maintaining "a 

monopoly over the use of force" but providing "protection 

and enforcement services only to those who would 

purchase its protection and enforcement policies."(72) 

The classical liberal state, on the other hand, held 8 

legal monopoly over the use of force and supplied protection 

services to all its citizens. 

But, a r g u e s N0 z i c k, the "u I tram i n i rna 1state" wi I I 

s 0 0 n t rans formit s elf i n t 0 ami n irna1state, for underan 

"ultraminimal state" individuals would still be free to 

extract "private justice." But "the knowledge that one 

is living under a system permitting this, itself, produces 

apprehension," with individuals never knowing how 

or wh en the y ma y r e c e i ve "re t r i bu t ion" from a pr iva t e 

agent·. Fear will pervade the entire society. Thus private 

justice constitutes "a public wrong." To protect 

its c i i e n t s, the d 0 min ant pro t e c t i ve agen c y rna y then 

"prohibit the independents from such self-help enforce- 

22

There is, however, the potential for an additional 

pro b I em. Sup po s e, the 0 r i z e s Roy Ch i Ids, t hat in the 

midst of an establ ished minimal state an agency arises 

which uses procedures identical to those of the state's 

agents. Since, under this condition, the incipient 

agency could not be any more risky than the state, a 

s tat e 0 per a tin g 0 n N0 z i c k ian pr inc i pies wo u I d ha ve no 

grounds for prohibiting its activities. But, continues 

Chi Ids, since the state was already compensating those 

who would have patronized agencies using risky procedures, 

the new agency would not have to assume this burden 

and could therefore charge lower prices for the same 

qual i ty service. This would, in turn, create an economic 

incentive for people to subscribe to the new agency, 

thereby forcing the minimal state to abandon its own 

compensation policy. But this would mean that the minimal 

state had reverted to the ultraminimal state. But, 

cont inues Chi Ids, provided the new agency continued to 

win new cl ients, and other entrepreneurs, seeing the 

success of the new agency, entered the field themselves, 

the u I t ram i n i mal s tat e W 0 u 1 d de g e n era t e in to a me r e 

dominant agency, and eventually that into "simply one 

age n c yam 0 n g mIi n y • " Insh0 r t, Ch i 1ds a r gue s, therei s 

no reason, on strietly Nozictian grounds, why the invisible 

hand could not strike back.(80) 

But regardless of how it is justified, the minarch 

i s t advoca t es 8 single agency wi th a monopoly on the 

use 0 f for c e ins 0 c i e t y and wh 0 S e sol e fun c t ion i s the 

protection of individual rights. 

d. Evolutionary Individualist Anarchism. 

) 

An interesting view, which proposed a minimal state 

for the present, wh i Ie espousing an anarchist society 

for the future, was that advanced by the nineteenth 

century English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, and the 

French economist, Frederic Bastiat. Both condemned any 

extens ion of government beyond the minimum necessary to 

protect the natural rights of every individual. Spencer 

argued that "every man has freedom to do as he wills, 

provided he infringes not the equal freedom of every 

other man." From this it follows, he believed, that if 

government does anything more than protect individual 

rights "it becomes an aggressor instead of a protector." 

(81) Thus Spencer was an ardent opponent not only 

of any. regulation of commerce, religion, health, education, 

etc., but of taxation as well. Indeed, Spencer 

goes even further and declares that the individual has a 

"right to ignore the state." His reasoning is instruc- 

24

logic of the Beairdian analysis, every property owner 

would have the right to contract with the government of 

his choice. But this can only mean that all governments 

would operate on a fee-for-service basis. For any government 

endeavoring to provide free protection for the 

poor would be forced to raise its premiums to cover the 

subsidy. But this, of course, would encourage its patrons 

to seek protection from other governments not prov 

i dingas u bsid y and the ref 0 rein a posit ion toof fer 

lower rates. Thus, under the Beairdlan proposal only 

those paying for protection would receive it. But this 

is. c I ear I y a t 0 d d s with Rand's ass e r t i on that un deran 

objectivist government everyone, including the poor, 

would receive protection.(95) Thus, while Rand opts for 

a minarchist state, Beaird's proposal would be consistent 

with, at most, an ultraminarchist state. 

Sec 0 n d 1y, Rand's ma j 0 r c r i tic ism 0 f "fr e e rna r ke t 

anarchism" is its failure to solve the problem of jurisd 

i c t ion • Beair d, 0 f cour s e, rei t e ra t esthis· c r i tic ism 

and maintains that this would not be a problem under his 

proposal since "only one government" would have "authority 

on a plot of land at a time." But surely this would 

not be sufficient to alleviate the jurisdictional problem. 

Ironically, Rand's criticism of anarchism would 

a p ply wit h e qua I i f not grea t e r for c e tothis Ra nd- a 1a 

Beaird proposal. For it would certainly be possible for 

a Beairdian society to be confronted with a situation in 

which "Mr. Smith, a customer of Goverment A, suspects 

that his ••• neighbor, Mr. Jones, a customer of Government 

B , has rob bed him," and ne i ther Go ve r nme n t r e cogn i ze s 

the other as legitimate. In fact, if every property 

owner were free to subscribe to the government of his 

c hoi c e, the n umb e r 0 f go v ernmen t s wo u I d be 1ike 1y to 

increase enormously -- theoretically there could be as 

many gover nments as property owners -- thereby magni fying 

the potential for the type of jurisdictional problems 

Rand is so anxious to avoid. 

Finall y, itis i n t eres ting t hat Ra nd ca lIs the idea 

of "competing governments" -- the idea that "every citizen" 

should be "free to 'shop' and to patronize whatever 

government he chooses," -- a "floating abstraction" and 

a "weird absurdity." But how else could one classify 

the Beair d ian pro p 0 s a I e x c e ptin t e r ms 0 f "compet i ng 

governments" and the right of "every citizen••• to 

'shop' and to patronize the government of his choice"? 

28

expands and more areas are subject to vote, the scope of 

the market becomes progressively more restricted. Of 

t his pro b 1em, Misesca n me reI y hope t hat the rna j 0 r i t Y 

wi II exercise such self-restraint that government will 

remain miniscle.(99) 

The doctrinaire liberal also faces another dilemma. 

On the one hand he is passionate in defending the right 

oft he in d i v i dual tor un his life as he de ems fit. 

Mises, as we have seen, terms the extension of government 

beyond the protection of rights an "evil." But 

since government is necessary, and since it must have 

revenue, "taxes are necessary_"(lOO) If it is evil to 

confiscate part of the earnings of individua1s for some 

things, however, why is it not just as evil to confiscate 

them for other things such as court and police services? 

To this Mises can merely say that "the expenditure 

caused by the apparatus of a liberal community is 

so small" that it will be of little burden to the individual.(lOl) 

But the dilemma remains: taxation, whether 

large or small, constitutes a violation of the principles 

of liberalism so cherished by men like Mises. 

In short, while what government exists is to be 

d em 0 c rat i c, the doc t r ina ire I i ber a Idesirest 0 res t rict 

government activity as much as possible; he is a procapitalist 

first and a democrat second. The positions 

are reversed, however, for the moderate liberal, for he 

is prepared to see, and in fact often advocates, the extension 

of government into areas that the dogmatic liberal 

would consider anathema. The prototype of this 

group, which would include the bulk of the classical 

liberals, is John Stuart Mill. "The purpose for which 

power can rightfully be exercised over any member ofa 

c i viii zed c omm un i t Y a ga ins t his wi I 1 ," says Mil I, "j s t 0 

pre v en t h arm toother s • His own good. • • i s not a s u f 

f i c i e n twa r ran t • "( 10 2 ) Wit h s uchastateme n t Mil I a ppears 

to fall into the dogmatic liberal tradition. But 

as George Sabine wrote of Mill, he was uncompromising in 

the abstract, "but having stated the principle, he proceeded 

to make concessions and restatements until in the 

end the original theory was explained away without any 

new principle being put in its place."(103) 

T h u s the s tat e rna y ifit wi shes, he says, regu Iate 

t r a d e 8 s weI I a s the h 0 u r s 0 f t a v ern s • I t rna y even 

" con f "i net h e power 0 f sell i ng thesecomm 0 d i ties. • • t 0 

persons of vouched-for respectability of conduct." The 

state has the duty to enforce "universal education" and 

to he I p to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of 

30

tal of nations, and of ages ••• Prejudice 

renders a man.'s virtue,·his habit; and not a 

series of unconnected acts. Through just 

prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his 

na t ur e • ( 109 ) 

One of the conservative traditions is the reluctance 

to rely on the government to solve social evils. 

Hence, conservatives opt for a limited government and a 

generally laissez faire economic system. But not only 

dot hey not 0 p P 0 set h e use 0 f for c e toprot e c t thos e 

"true values" that are viewed as necessary to maintain 

the social order, they feeIi t ' s one's duty to use force 

for such ends. Thus, force is advocated against such 

things as pornography, prostitution, labor unions, communism, 

and the like. Another fact of conservatism is 

that it consciously eschews delineating a positive program, 

wh i ch it condemns as abs tract theorizing. Instead, 

its overriding characteristic is its resistance 

to "the enemies of the permanent things."(IIO) The most 

feared enemy is communism. The Conservatives feel that 

it is man's moral duty to oppose communism by any means 

necessary and therefore advocate the use of government 

coercion on this regard. "The communists," argues noted 

conservative writer, James Burnham, "are serious and•• 

• are irrevocably fixed on their goal of a monopoly of 

world power • Because the communists are serious, 

they will have to be stopped ••• by superior power and 

will. Just possibly we shall not have to die in large 

numbers to stop them; but we shall certainly have to be 

willing to die."(lll) 

But, as has often been pointed out by their critics, 

conservatives place themselves in a serious dilemma. 

First, while they are in general opposed to government 

power and endorse a market economy, their willingn 

esst 0 use go v ernmen t for ce toprot e c t "the pe r rna nen t 

t h i n g s ," nee e s sitate s res t rict ionson the ma r ke t t hat 

are far fro m min i rna 1 • Fur ther, the f ear 0 f "the wo rldwide 

communist menace," has meant their endorsement of a 

military large enough "to defend the West against all 

.challenges and challengers."(112) Not only is it difficuI 

t t 0 see how the r equi r emen t s 0 f s uchala r gemiii 

tary can be reconciled with their espousal of a minimal 

state, but a huge military can only be financed by massive 

taxation which, itself, constitutes further restrictions 

of the market. Thus, while the conservatives 

generally endorse a market economy they are also perfectly 

willing to restrict its operations for goals they 

con sid e r m0 rei mp 0 r tan t • Inthe ins i gh t f u 1 c ommen t 0 f 

33

top indicates the political range of capitalism; the 

u n b r 0 ken v e r ticall i ne i ndieates ' the e con om i esc0 pe 0 f 

anarchism.(118) 

Box [1] entai Is both a capi tal ist ic economic system 

and a nanarchis tic pol i tica 1 s t rue t u r e • Th i s wo u I d 

include the contemporary individualist anarchists such 

as Rothbard and Friedman as well as the philosophical 

anarchists such as Tucker and Spooner., Still squarely 

with i nth e a n 8 r chi s t s peet r urn but rno v i ng s 1 i g h t 1Y awa y 

from capitalism would be Stirner and Godwin. On the 

other hand somewhat less anarchistic but still ardently 

capitalistic would be the ultraminarchists such as 

Hospers. 

Box [2] entails a limited form of government 

c 0 u pIe d withaca pit a lis t ic e c on om i cstrue t ur e • This 

would include the minarchists, like Nozick, the 

e vol uti 0 n a r y a n 8 r chi s t s, 1 ike Spen c e r 8nd B8 s t i at, as 

well as the objectivists. Also included in this 

category would be the doctrinaire classical liberals 

such as Humboldt and Mises, and thei r more moderate 

counterparts like Mill and Smith and, more currently, 

Hayek. 

Box [3] entails a highly interventionist state coupled 

with a market economy. Such a state would restrict 

its interventionist activities to the social realm, regu 

1 a tin g s pee c h, pre s s, d rug use, and t he I ike, wh i Ie 

permi tt ing the market to function freely. While this 

cat ego r y is, per haps, 0 f rather 1 imit e d emp i ricalimport, 

probably the closest thing to capitalist-hyperarchi 

s m w0 u I d bethe cons e r vat ism 0 f Bur ke and de Ma i s t r e 

and, more currently, Buckley, Kirk, and Burnham. 

Box [4] entails an anarchist political framework as 

in Box [1], but a less capitalistic economic structure 

than prevailed in Boxes [1-3]. There would still be 

much market phenomena and individual ownership, however 

some form of collectivism or workers' control is also 

envisioned. This would include the mutualism of 

Proudhon and Warren and, while somewhat more collectively 

oriented, the syndicalism of Sorel, Rocker, and 

Goldman. 

Box [5] e n t a i 1st helimit a t ion 0 f the rna r ke t by 

interest group democracy which extends government into 

areas that under Boxes [1-3] would be handled by the 

market. This includes the modern exponents of pluralism 

and the partisans of contemporary liberalism and the 

36

welfare state such as John Rawls. 

Box [6] e n ta i Iss everei imita t i ons on the rna r ke t • 

Democracy is also rejected in favor of rule by elites. 

It includes the mercantilists and cameralists of the 

eighteenth century, and the extreme conservatives as 

well as the exponents of fascism and nazism such as 

Rockwell and Gentile. 

Box [7]. entails the rejection of the state coupled 

wi th a pronounced movement toward a marketless economy. 

T his would inc1ude the a narch0 - colI e c t i vism of Ba kun in, 

and the more extreme anarcho-communism of Kropotkin. 

Box [8] entai Is a social ist economy coupled with 

some form of limited statism. It would include the 

quasi-anarchist ic Guild Socialism with its reliance on 

fun c t ionaIr e pre sentat ion, wh ere the 0 n 1y r ole for the 

state is to mediate between the functional groups when 

controversies could not be otherwise resolved. Close to 

t his w0 u 1 d b e F a b ian ism (1 8 8 9) wit hit s em phas i son 

universal suffrage and municipal or local control of 

industry. 

Box [9] entails a socialist or communist economic 

framework with planning to be done through the instrumen 

t a lit Y 0 f the s tat e • This wo u Idinc Iude the Br i tis h 

Labor Party (1937) with its call for nationalization of 

industry and a 1t general state plan." Close to this is 

Fa b ian ism (19 0 8) wit h em p has i s on na tiona I i za t ion 0 f 

sue h i n d u s t r i e s as wa t e r wo r ks, the mine s, and the ha r 

bors, as well as a large dose of state planning. Also 

included in this category would be Marxism, which advocated 

a planned economy, but one in which all individuals 

participated in both the planning and the execution 

of the plans, and the elite-planned socialist technocracies 

outlined by Saint-Simon and Edward Bellamy. 

If the foregoing is correct, the traditional view 

that anarchism is incompatible with capitalism is clearly 

incorrect. Both anarchism and capitalism traverse a 

·w ide s p e c t rum oft h 0 ugh t, and wh i Ie s orne varian t s 0 f 

anarchism are incompatible with some variants of capitalism, 

other types are quite compatible. Moreover, the 

place of the individualist anarchists in both the economic 

and the political sepctrums has been pointed out, 

and the initial groundwork has been laid for the study 

of individualist anarchism. 

37

FOOTNOTES 

(l)Onemay distinguish between "states" and governments." 

For example, John Sanders says that "states are 

not taken to be the same as governments••• They are 

communities-with-governments." Government therefore is 

a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a state. 

Since Sanders defines government "in terms of coercion," 

and since government is a necessary condition for a 

s tat e, the s tat e too isinher en t 1Y coer c i ve. See John 

T. Sanders, The Ethical Argument Against Government 

(Washington, D.C.: University Press of American, 1980), 

p p. x i-xii i • Since the purpos e 0 f t h j sstudy i s topr e 

sent and analyze a particular voluntary model of social 

organization and to compare it with the coercive model, 

unless otherwise noted, I will use the terms "government" 

and flstate" interchangeably. 

(2)Ludwig von Mises, The Free and Prosperous 

Commonwealth: An Exposition of the Ideas of Classical 

Liberalism (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), pp. 

26-37. 

(3) Dan i e 1 Guer in, Anarehism, From Theory to 

Practice (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 12. 

(4)Max Adler, "Max Stirner," Encyclopedia of the 

Soc i a I Sci en c e s (N e w Yo r k: Ma cm illan, 1948), v0 I. 14, 

p. 393. Also see George Woodcock, "Anarchism," 

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 

19 6 7 ), v 0 I. 1, P p. 111- 14 , and e s pecia I 1Y P • 11 3 wh ere 

Stirner is described as being on the "dubious fringe" of 

anarchism. 

(5) Pet er Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism," The New 

Encyclopedia of Social Reform, eds. William Bliss and 

Rudolph Binder (New York: 1908), p. 47. 

(6)George Woodcock, Anarchism, A History of 

Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Cleveland: Meridian 

Books, 1969), pp.163 and 204. 

(7)William Morris, News Prom Nowhere (London: 

1891). 

(8)Mikhail Bakunin, "Stateless Socialism: 

Anarchism," The Pol i tiealPh i losophY 0 f Ba kun in, ed • 

G. P. Maximoff (New York: Free Press, 1953), pp. 298-99. 

Also see Woodcock, A History, p. 164. 

(9)Pierre Joseph Proudhon, "What is Property?", 

Socialist Thought, eds. Albert Fried and Ronald 

San d e r s (N ew Yo r k: Do ubI e day, 1964), p. 202; and 

Woodcock, Anarchism, A History, p. 129. 

(10)William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political 

Justice (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1976), p. 705. 

(11)Benjamin Tucker, "State Socialism and 

38

ma j 0 r rep res en tat i v e fig u res 0 f each a narchis t type. 

Thus only Kropotkinwas dealt wi·th here. However, Leo 

Tolstoy and Paul Goodman could also be classified as 

"anarcho-communists." For 8 good summary of Tolstoy's 

views see Eltzbacher, pp. 149-81. Also see Paul and 

Percival Goodman, Communitas (New York: Vintage, 

1960). On the simi larities between Kropotkin and Paul 

Goodman see William Merill Downer, "Kropotkin in 

America: Paul Goodman'S Adaptation of the Communitarian 

Anarchism of Peter Kropotki.n" (Paper presented .at the 

1977 Midwest Political Science Convention, April, 1977). 

Also in the Kropotkinian tradition is Murray Bookchin. 

See his The Limits of the City (New York: Harper, 

1974). . 

(23)Mikhail 8akunin, "On the Morrow of the Social 

Revolution," The Political Philosophy of Batunin, ed. 

G.P. Maximoff (New York: Free Press, 1953), p. 410. 

( 2 4 ) Jam e s Gu i I I a ume, " 0 n Bu i I ding the New Soc i a I 

Order," Bakun in on Anarchy, ed. Sam Dolgoff (New York: 

Al fred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 360. 

(25)Woodcock, Anarchism, A History, p. 164. 

Witness Bakunin's remark that "any persons who, though 

robust and of good heal th, do not want to gain their 

livelihood by working shall have the right to starve 

themselves to death. ""On the Morrow of the Social 

Revolution," p. 412. 

(26)According to Bakunin, the collectives will form 

themselves into federations, the federations into regions, 

the regions into nations and, ultimately, the nat 

ions into what he terms an "international fraternal 

association." See Bakunin, "Stateless Socialism: 

Anarchism," p. 298. 

(27)Guillaume, p. 366. 

(28)lbid., p. 368. 

(29)lt should be pointed out that the anarchosyndicalist, 

Rudolph Rocker, explicitly repudiates Sorel 

and maintains that Sorel neither "belonged to the movement, 

nor had ••• any appreciable influence on its internal 

development." See Rudolf Rocker, "Anarchism and 

Anarc h 0 - 5 Yn d i c a lis m," a p pen d i x toPa u I E I t z bacher, 

Anarchism (New York: Chips, n.d.), p. 250 •. 

( 30 ) Ge 0 r g e SoreI, Ref 1 e c t ions 0 n Vi olence (N ew 

York: Doubleday, 1941), p. 294. 

(31 )See Mul ford Sibley, Political Ideas and 

Ideologies (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 547. 

(32)Rocker, pp. 253-55. 

(33)Emma Goldman, "Syndicalism," Liberty and the 

Grea t Lib e r tar ians, e d. C h a r I e sSp r a din g ( New Yo r k : 

Arno Press, 1972), p. 507. Also see the quotation of 

H ins in Rocke r, p. 247. 

40

Paul, "Anarchism and Natural Rights" (Paper Presented at 

the Associat ion for the Philosophic Study of Society, 

October 6, 1977). 

(62)David Friedman is one of the few individualist 

anarchists to recognize the distinction between libertar 

ian ism and a narchism, and he ext ricates hims elf from 

this possible dilemma by refusing to classify himself as 

ali b e r tar ian • See his The Machi n e r y 0 f Preedom (New 

York: Harper and Row, 1913),pp. 173-78. 

(63)John Hospers, "What Libertarianism Is," The 

Libertarian Alternative, ed. Tibor Machan (Chicago: 

Ne I son- Ha 11, 1974), p. 13. 

( 6 4 ) I b i·d ., P p. 7 - 8.; a n· d H 0 S per s , 

Libertarianism, pp. 61-62. 

(65)Hospers, Libertarianism, p. 386-87. 

(66)John Hospers, "Rothbard's Free-Market Justice," 

p. 21. (67)Ibid. 

(68)Hospers, Libertarianism, p. 387. 

( 69 ) H0 s per s, " Rot h bard's F r e e -Ma r ke t Jus tice ," p. 

21. 

(70)See, for example, Max Weber, Law in Economy 

and Soc i e t y, e d. Ma x Rh e ins t e i n ( New Yo r k: S im0 nand 

Schuster, 1954), pp. 338-39. 

(71)lt would certainly be stretching the point to 

maintain that the fee would be voluntary since consumers 

could forego purchasing protection altogether, and those 

providing protection could enter a new line of work, if 

either objected to the fee. This is tantamount to arguing 

that the obligation to pay income tax is "voluntarily" 

assumed when the individual "chooses" to earn a 

living. 

(72)Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New 

York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 15-26. 

( 73) Ibid., pp. 110-13. 

( 74) I bid., pp. 33-5 • 

(75)Ibid., p. 156. 

(76')See ibid., pp. 22-25. 

( 77 ) I bid., p • 109 • ( em phas isin 0 rig ina 1 ) • 

(7S)See John Sanders, "The Free Market Model Versus 

Government: A Reply to Nozick," The Journal of 

. Libertarian Studies (Winter 1977), pp.' 35-44. 

(79)Nozick, p. liS. 

(SO)Roy Childs, "The Invisible Hand Strikes Back," 

The Journal of Libertarian Studies (Winter 1977), pp. 

23-33. ( 8 1 ) Her b e r t S pen c e r, Soc i a 1Sta ties ( New Yo r k: D. 

Appleton, 1892), p. 125. 

(82)Herbert Spencer, The Right to Ignorelhe 

State (Cupertino, Cal.: Caymen Press, 1973), p. 5. 

43

aut h 0 r 's Ene m i e s 0 f the Per man en t T h i n g s (N ew 

Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969)•. 

(111 )James Burnham, Suicide of the West (New 

Rochelle: Arlington House, 1964), pp. 290-91. 

(112) Ibid., p. 288. 

(113)L. T. Sargent, Contemporary 

Political Ideologies (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 

1972), p. 99. 

(114)Kirk, Enemies, p. 282. 

(115 )Burnham, p. 139. 

( 11 6 ) " Co n s e r vat i v e s res pee t the wi s d om of the i r 

ancestors ••• They think society is a spiritual reality, 

possessing an eternal life but a delicate constitution: 

it cannot be scrapped and recast as if it were a 

machine." Kirk, The Conservative Mind, p. 6. 

(117)For analyses that point out the authoritarianism 

0 f con s e r vat ism see Ed i thEf fron, f1 Cons e r vat ism: A 

Libertarian Challenge," The Alternative (October 

1975), pp. 9-13; Murray Rothbard, "Conservatism and 

Freedom: A Libertar ian Comment," Modern Age (Spring 

1961), pp. 217-20; Murray Rothbard, "Confessions of a 

Right-Wing Liberal," Ramparts (June 15, 1968), pp. 

4 7 - 5 2.• The con t em p 0 r a r y soc i 0 log is t, Ro be r t Ni s bet , 

sees as least the traditional conservatism of Burke, 

Lemmenais and DeBonald not only as highly pluralistic 

but as a bulwark against political centralization and 

the authoritarian state. See his "Conservatism and 

Libertarians: UneaSy Cousins," Modern Age (Winter 

1980), pp. 2-8; "Conservatism and Sociology," The 

American Journal of Sociology (September 1952), pp. 

167-75; and "DeBonald and the Concept of the Social 

Group," Journal of the History of Ideas (June 1944), 

pp. 315-31. In emphasizing the role that the "social 

group" and tradition played in impeding the growth of 

centralized power, Nisbet has highlighted an important 

and un jus t I Y neg1e c ted aspe c t 0 f cons e r vat ism .' But t his 

st i 11 doesn't negate the authoritarian streak in much of 

conservative, particularly modern conservative, thought. 

(118)Two things should be mentioned regarding the 

"political spectrum." First, it might be argued that 

thereisan i n v e r s ere 1a t ions hip betweenthe e con om i c 

and political spheres -- as one increases the other must 

decrease -- so that both spectrums are merely measures 

of the same things. This, however, not only overlooks 

the I a r ge bodY 0 f tho ugh t t hat f eItthat the rever s e wa s 

true -- that the market presupposed a highly interventionist 

and authoritarian state -- Marx, for example, 

and Kropotk in -- but also ignores that group which desired 

neither the market nor the state -- Kropotkin, 

Bakunin and Berkman, to name just a few. It seems to me 

46

PART ONE 

The Individualist Anarchist. 

Critique 01 Government 

T he b u 1 k 0 f t his stud Y f 0 c use s on the i nd i v i d ua 1ist 

anarchist alternative to the state. But before one 

can deal meaningfully with that question it must first 

be asked why should one be concerned with an alfernat 

i vet 0 the s tate a t a II ? Whatis i t about the na t ur e 

oft hestate t hat rna kesit anin t r ins i cal I y dange r 0 us 

or aggressive institution? 

Chap t e r s I I, I I I, and I V wi I 1 a t t em pt to dea 1 wit h 

the individualist anarchist response to that question, 

the reb y I a yin g the g r 0 u n dw0 r k for Par t Two 0 f t his 

study: the development of a positive alternative to 

the state. 

49

power s 0 f go ver nme n t can be rna de as Iongas soc i e t y i s 

divided into two hostile camps and the laborer is, econom 

i cally s peaking, a s 1a vet0 his emp loye r. • •Butin 

a society where the distinction between capitalist and 

laborer has disappeared, there is no need of such a 

go v ernmen t • • The no - capitalis t s Ystem imp 1 iesthe 

no-government system."(4) And Berkman says that "when 

government is abol ished, wage slavery and capitalism 

must also go with it, because they cannot exist without 

the support and protection of government."(5) Thus the 

collectivist anarchist believes that private property 

i$ a form of coercion and can exist only when supported 

by t he power of the sta tee The abol it ion of government 

is therefore the means to the abolition of private 

property. 

The individualist anarchist,on the other hand, 

argues that while the premise is correct the conclusion 

doe S not n e c e s s a r i I Y f 0 I 1ow • From the cognit ion t hat 

government uses its force to protect the interests of 

the property-owning class, it does not follow that property 

rights, themselves, are coercive.(6) Rather, he 

not only contends that [1] in the absence of property 

rights there can be no rights at all, but also that [2] 

far from"upholding property rights, a$ contended by the 

collect ivist anarchist, the state. by its very nature, 

is the single greatest violator of these rights. 

The i n d i v i d uali s tanarchis t reas ons as follows. 

That individual (or group) who is able to determine how 

a good will be utilized is the actual owner. regardless 

of the legal fictions to the contrary. Sociologically. 

own e r s hip i s the a b iIi t y to rna ke the determ i n i ng dec i 

sions regarding the disposition of property.(7) It is 

clear that it is impossible to eliminate ownership in 

the sociological sense of the term, for decisions conc 

ern i n g the use 0 f properties havet0 be rna de i n ever y 

society. Whoever makes these decisions is the owner. 

From th i s cogn it i on the individual ist anarchist concludes 

that if an individual is not permitted to retain 

what he has earned, i.e., either produced himself or 

obtained by means of voluntary exchange, his life is 

dependent upon whoever determines the disposition of 

pro per t y • Reg a r die s s 0 f wh e the r s uc h de t e r mina t ion s 

are made by a single individual--a tyrant, a group of 

individuals--an oligarchy, or a majority--a democaracy, 

such "human rights" 8S those of freedom of speech, assembly, 

religion, etc., are. if not meaningless, at 

least perpetually precarious, for the individual cannot 

a f for d t 0 inc u r the dis pIeas ureof thos e wh 0 hoI d his 

52

promptly proceeded "to destroy private property with 

force." The result ,as is well' know, was n the revival 

of despotism in Russia."(9) 

The anarcho-collectivist might well agree with the 

thrust of the abo vear gum e ntbutar gue t hat libe r t y 

would be secure in his society since, according to 

Kropotkin, there will be "common possession of the necessaries 

for production" and all decis'ions will be "the 

work of all, ••• a product of the constructive genius 

of the great mass."(lO) The individualist anarchist 

would contend, however, that such an arrangement does 

not materially alter the validity of his ar,gument, for 

a n unp 0 p u 1a r 0 r non- con for ming min 0 r i t y rna y s t i 11 find 

i t se I f con fron ted wit h the c hoi c e of ei the r con for ming 

or starving. 

The colle ct· i vi s t - a n arc hi s t , he bel i eve s , has 

placed himself in two serious dilemmas. First, while 

he proclaims himself to be an advocate of individual 

autonomy, i.e., the right of every individual to the 

"free development of all his faculties," he believes 

that this entails the liberation from private property. 

But if the individual is not permitted to own what he 

has produced then he becomes dependent upon "society," 

thereby losing his autonomy. But if he is permitted to 

own the fruits of his labor then private property is 

admitted. In short, the individualist anarchist believes 

that autonomy and collectivism are mutually contradictory.(11)(12) 

Second, the anarcho-collectivist 

is opposed to all forms of coercion. But what if some 

individuals decide they would like to retain what they 

have produced and either consume it themselves or eng 

8 ge i n v 0 I u n tar y exchange? I f the a narch0 - col I e c t i vists 

would permit this, they would be permitting privat 

e pro per t y • But i f they wo u 1d ref use tope r mit it, 

they would be in i t iat ing the use of force, or the 

threat of its use, in order to prohibit non-aggressive 

act ion s, i. e ., the y wo u I d been gag i n gin coercion. 

Thus the individualist anarchist also concludes that a 

society cannot be both collectivist and free at the 

same time.(13) 

The individualist anarchist goes even further, 

however, and contends not only that there can be no 

liberty without property rights but that there are no 

rights other than property rights. Rothbard, for example, 

argues that "there is no such thing as separate 

'r ight to free speech'; there is only a man's property 

right: the right to do as he wills with his own or make 

54

ish." Second, it is argued that "It is physically imp 

0 s sib I e for eve r yone t 0 ke e peontin ua I tabson eve r yone 

else and thereby to exercise his equal quotal share 

o f par t 1 a lown e r h sip 0 vereve r y 0 ther rna n . I n pr a ctice, 

then, any attempt to institute universal and 

equal other-ownership is utopian and impossible, and 

sup e r vis ion and, t·her e f or e , con t r 0 I and own e r s hip 0 f 

others would necessarily devolve upon specialized 

groups of people who would thereby-become a 'rUling 

class.' Hence, in practice, any attempt at Communist 

society will automatically become class rule, and we 

would be back at our rejected first alternative."(19) 

To summarize, most individualist anarchists adopt 

a Lockean natural rights posItion. They then proceed 

to. argue that [1] if one accepts the premise of selfownership 

there is no alternative to recognition of 

private property, and [2] if one rejects the premise 

then one must adopt the view that (a) A has a right to 

own himself as well as B, while B is denied any right 

of ownership, or (b) that everyone can own everyone 

e I s e but i s den i edther i gh t to own hims elf. Bothof 

the s e posit ion s, he fee Is, are s elf - con t r ad i c tor y • 

Hence the only logically consistent position is that of 

t he L 0 c k e a n p r inc i pIe s 0 f (a) s elf - own e f s hip and (b) 

its corollary, the fIght to retain the fruits of one's 

labor. 

2. THE DEFENSE OF PR I VATE PROPERTY: NATURAL RIGHTS 

VERSUS UTILITARIANISM 

The f act t hat the for ego i ng a na I ysis rna y show t hat 

the alternatives to prIvate property are logically contradictory 

and/or lead to consequences that everyone 

considers disastrous does not, in itself, morally validate 

private property. What, then, is the individualist 

anarchist's ethical defense of property rights? 

Free market anarchism is composed of two divergent 

f act ion s. The d om ina n t f act Ion i s t he Rot hbar d iananarchists, 

which adopts a "natural rights" defense of 

pro p.e r t y; the com pet i n g f act ion i s the F r i e drna nit ea 

n arc his t s, wh i c h de f e n.d s pro per t y on "util ita ria n" 

grounds. The latter will be dealt with first. 

Like the philosophical anarchist Benjamin Tucker 

before him, David Friedman believes that an anarchist 

society will protect private property not because it IS 

a natural or human right but because it is useful. 

56

Freedom, he says, "is efficient--the value to me of 

being able to order you around IS rarely as great as 

the cos t toy 0 u 0 f be i n g 0 r dered a r 0 un d • Go i ng from 

coercive to libertarian law is on net profitable, so a 

system which produces law for profit will rarely produce 

coercive laws. t1 (20·) While the natural rights 

anarchist believes that laws against drugs, pornography, 

prostitution, and the like, are immoral, Friedman 

see s not h i n gin her e n t I Y wron g wit h them. Un d e r his 

utilitarian-anarchism laws would be produced on the 

market. And if those laws are what people want, that 

is what the market will produce. He is confident, 

however, that such laws would be the exception; that 

because of its social utility, an anarchist society 

would be biased toward freedom.(21) , 

An ex c e I I en t c r i tic ism of uti I i tar i an ism has been 

prov ided by Murray Rothbard. The ut iIi tar ian, he 

notes, must regard the laissez (aire principles of 

self-ownership and property ownership not as an "absolute 

and consistent yardstick," but simply as a tendenc 

y 0 r r u leo f t h urn b t hat the rna j 0 r 1 t Y i s f r e e toove r 

rIde at will. Consequently, Rothbard hypothesizes, 

suppose that the majority "considers all redheads to be 

agents of the Devil and therefore to be executed whenever 

found. Let us further assume that only a small 

number of redheads exist In any generation•.. The 

utilitarian libertarian might well reason: 'While the 

murder of isolated redheads is deplorable, the execut 

Ion s are sma I lin n urn b e r; the vas t rna j 0 r i t Y 0 f the 

pub I 1 c • . a chi evesen 0 r m0 us ps y chi c sat i s fa c t Ion from 

the pub 1 icex e cut ion 0 f red hea ds • The soc i a 1 costis 

negligible, the social, psychic benefit to the rest of 

society is great; therefore, it is right and proper for 

society to execute redheads'."(22) 

I tis 1 ike 1 y t hat F r i e dma n wo u I d r e c 0 i 1 from s u c h 

a conclusion. Yet, he cannot logically reject it while 

remaining consistent with his utilitarianism. Clearly, 

utilitarianism provides only a shaky defense for the 

principles of self-ownership and private property. 

Murray Rothbard, on the other hand, has endeavored 

to defend these rights on ontological grounds. It 

s h 0 U 1 d b e a c k now 1 e d g ed, howe v e r, t hat the c losest he 

has come is in his book, The Ethics of Liberty. 

WhIle he does say "it is not the intentIon of this book 

to expound or defend at length the philosophy of natural 

law" but rather "to elaborate that subset of the 

57

natural law that develops the concept of natural 

rights,"(23) the principles from which his ontological 

defense would be derived are clearly presented in Part 

One of that manuscript. 

Rothbard begins by arguing that man, like all 

other ent i ties, must have a specific nature: " ••• if 

apples and stones and roses each have their specific 

natures," he asks, "is man the only' entity, the only 

bei n g, t hat can not h a v e one ? An d i f rna n doe s ha ve a 

nat u r e, why cannot itt00 be 0 pen tora t iona 1 obs e r vat 

ion a nd ref Ie c t ion? " He the n rna i n t a ins t hat sinc e 

"man's reason is objective, i.e., it can be employed 

to yield truths about the world," reason can' be used to 

study man and to ascertain what his nature really consists 

of. Once this is done it is possible, again 

t h r 0 ugh the use 0 f rea son, to de due e a na t urallaw 

ethic which, since it is grounded in man's nature, is 

valid for, and morally binding on, all men. 

Fol lowing the phenomenologist, John Wild, Rothbard 

equates virtue, or goodness, or value, with what Wild 

terms "the fulfillment of tendencies determined by the 

structure of the existent entity." Evil is defined as 

"that mode of existence in which natural tendencies are 

t hwar ted and d e p r i ved 0 f rea 1 i za t ion • " ( 24 ) Hen c e ma n 

is held to have a specific nature which is discoverable 

by man's reason and this discovery leads to the deduction 

of an ethic based on objective, absolute values. 

Act ion s t hat are inc 0 n formit y wit h rna n 's na t urear e 

'virtuous; those that are in conflict with it are evil. 

Inc 0 n t r a s t toecon om i c s, wh ere val ue s are t rea ted as 

subjective phenomena, Rothbard believes that natural 

law is able to demonstrate that there are moral 

values which are, in fact, "objective." "The natural 

law," he says, tIel ucidates what is best for man--what 

ends man should pursue that are most harmonious with, 

and bes t tend to fu 1fill, his nature." Since, as we 

have seen in the previous section, Rothbard believes 

that society, and even life itself, is impossible without 

recognition of self-ownership and private property, 

these are necessary to enable man to fulfill his 

nature. 

Rothbard's position can be formulated as follows: 

1. The behavior of any entity having a nature 

ought to be in accord with its nature. 

2. Man has a nature. 

3. Henc'e, man ought to act in accord with it. 

58

But as Arnold Brecht, among others, has noted, 

while there are no logical links between the is and 

the ought, there may be factual or empirical links 

bet wee nthe two. ( 26 ) This dis tinc t ion i s rna dec I ear i n 

the following syllogisms: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Syllogism A 

Man exists. 

Murder terminates 

that existence. 

Hence, murder is 

wrong. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Syllogism B 

Man has a right to 

exist. 

Murder terminates that 

existence. 

Hen c e, mur d e r i s wr 0 ng • 

Syllogism C 

1. Fred believes that man has a right to exist. 

2. Murder violates that existence. 

3 • Hen ce, itis wr 0 ng for Fred tomur de r • 

I tis 0 b v i 0 u s t hat inS y 1 log ism A the norrna t i ve 

conclusion that one ought not to murder does not follow 

log i c a I I Y fro m the f act ualp rem isethat rna n ex i s t s • 

T h j sis a c 1 ear v i 0 I a t ion 0 f the i s - 0 ugh t d i c hot omy . 

It is at least conceivable that man should not exist, 

in which case murder would be morally good. The moral 

i n j u n c t ion not to. mu r d e r does f 0 I 1ow log i c a I I Y from 

its prem i s e inSy 1log ism B. The prob I em her e, tho ugh, 

is that of demonstrating the validity of the premise. 

Unless its val idi ty can be demonstrated it is nothing 

m0 ret han a n ass e r t ion wh i c h, even i f t rue, cannot be 

ver i f i ed. Thus, it has no more logical val idity than 

.its conve r s e : rna n has nor i g h t toexis t • Insy I log ism 

C, however, the conclusion that one ought not to murder 

a v 0 ids bot h 0 f thesediff i cuI ties : ( a ) the mo ralinjunction 

follows logically from the premise and (b) the 

prem i s e has a f act u a lor em p i rica 1 s tat us wh i chi s 

capable of verification (or falsification). 

I believe that the Rothbardian position can be reformulated 

after the fashion of Syllogism C. This can 

be done, moreover, in a way which enables it both (a) 

to meet the problem of the is-ought dichotomy while (b) 

sti 11 keeping its comprehensive scope virtually intact. 

The reformulation would read as follows: 

1. If one values life more highly than death 

then he ought to adopt measures to sustain 

I i f e. 

2. Self-ownership and property ownership are 

necessary to sustain life. 

3. Everyone wants to live. 

60

e it he r on his own proper ty or on the proper ty of someone 

who has agreed, as a gift or in a rental contract, 

t 0 a 1 low him 0 nth e prem i s e s • n C1ear I y, any leg i s I a 

tion intended either to extend or restrict this scope 

of free speech would be a violation of property rights. 

S i mil a r 1y, wit h t he n righ t of as semb I y tt : " I f a I I ownership 

were private, it would be quite clear that the 

cit izens did not have any nebulous 'right of assembly.' 

The i r rig h t wo u 1d bethe proper t y righ t 0 f us i ng the i r 

money inan effort to buy or rent space on which to 

make their demonstration, and they could do so only if 

the owner of the street agreed to the deal."(30) 

Rothbard then proceeds to apply his universal private 

ownership approach to Just ice Holmes' argument that 

rights cannot be absolute since they must be balanced 

against the "common good"; that one does not have, for 

instance, a right to yell "fire" in a crowded theater. 

The trouble with Holmes' position, he says, is that 

there is neither a right to free speech nor a "public 

good." I t is therefore imposs i ble to 1 imi t one for the 

sake of the other. Instead, the individualist anarchist 

reasons as follows. The person yelling "fire" 

must be either (a) the owner, (b) a guest of the owner, 

or (c) a paying customer. If it is the owner then he 

has commit ted f r a ud up 0 n his c us t om e r s by t a king the i r 

money in exchange for the promise of showing a motion 

picture, but instead disrupts the performance by his 

action. "He has thus willfully defaulted on his contractual 

obligations and has therefore violated the 

pro per t y rig h t S 0 f his pa t ron s • " Ifit we r e e i the r a 

patron or a guest who yelled, then that person has viol 

ate d the 0 b I ig a t ion t 0 res pee t t he owner' s proper t y 

rights as well as those of the customers who have paid 

to see the performance, and must therefore make restit 

uti 0 n tot h e vic tim s • " The per son wh 0 rna 1 i c i 0 usly 

cries 'fire' in a crowded theater, therefore, is a 

criminal, not because his so-called 'right of free 

s pee c h ,. mu s t b e p r a gma ticall y res t ricted 0 n beha I f 0 f 

the s 0 - c a lIe d 'pubI i c good' but be c a use he has c 1e 8 r 1y 

and obviously violated the property rights of another 

human being. There is no need, therefore, to place 

limits upon these rights."(31) 

We are now in a position to understand the individualist 

anarchist's belief that "the State has always 

beenth e g rea ten em y and in va de r 0 f the righ t s 0 f p r i 

vate property."(32) In contradistinction to the collectivist 

anarchists, the individualist anarchists argue 

that by its very nature it is impossible for the 

state to exist without violating property rights, and 

63

In brief, in contrast to the collectivist anarchi 

s t, the i n d i v i d ua listanarchis t rna i n t a ins t hat the 

state is an aggressive institution because it entails 

the violation of property rights, not because it upholds 

them. And, contrary to the libertarian-rninarchist, 

he holds that this violation inheres in the 

nature of the state, rather than being incidental to 

it. (40 ) 

Wit h t his i n rn i n d the view t hat the s tat e· isan 

institution which violates property rights by its 

pro tee t ion 0 f the i n t e r es t s 0 f the p r ope r t y- own i ng 

groups becomes intelligible. 

66

FOOTNOTES 

{I )Alexander Berkman, ABC of Anarchism (London: 

Freedom Press, 1973), p. 9. 

(2 )Peter Kropotkin, "Law, the Supporter of Crime," 

Patterns of Anarchy, eds. Leonard Krimmerman and 

Lew i s Per r y ( New Y0 r k : Do ubI e day and Co., 19 68 ), p • 

292. 

(3)Peter Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread (New 

York: Benjamin Bloom, 1968),p. 18; Berkman,pp. 74-75. 

(4)Peter Kropotkin, "A Scientific Approach to 

Com m u n i s t Ana r chi s m," Pat terns of An arc h y, e d s • 

Leonard Krimmerman and Lewis Perry (New York: Doubleday 

and Co'., 1968), p. 226. . 

( 5) Be r kma n, p. 31. 

(6)Richard and Ernestine Perkins, Precondition for 

Peace and Prosperity: Rational Anarchy (Ontario: 

Private Publication, 1971), p. 9. 

( 7 ) L u dwig von Mis e s, Soc i ali s m ( London: J. Cape , 

1969), pp. 37-42. And Murray Rothbard, Power and 

Market (Menlo Park, Calif.: Institute for Humane 

Studies, Inc., 1970), p. 139. 

(8)Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to' Serfdom 

(Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1967). See especially Chapter 

Ten, "Why the Worst Get on Top," pp. 134-52. For a 

reply to Hayek see Herman Finer, The Road to Reaction 

( B 0 s ton: Lit tie, Brownan d Co., 1945). Wh i Ie Hayek 

sees corruption and the abuse of power as endemic to 

po lit i cs, Finer sees them as largely a funct ion of \he 

type of political order and, in a democracy at least, 

the ex c e p t ion rat her t han the r u Ie. Robe r t Ni s be t , 

however, has recently advanced the interesting proposition 

that, if anything, these things would occur with 

greater regUlarity in a democracy than in other political 

orders: "Democracy, with its tacit responsibility 

to the electorate, with its accountability in some deg 

r e e to leg i s I a t u res, pre s s, and pub 1 i c, ca r r i e s a 

larger 'potential for deception than is likely in other 

forms of government simply by virtue of this accountabiii 

t Y • " The Tw iIi g h t 0 f Aut h 0 r i t Y (N ew Yo r k: Ox ford 

University Press, 1975), p. 17. Regardless of whether 

one subscribes to the Hayekian and Finerian explanation 

of political corruption and abuse of power, empirical 

documentat ion of these phenomena in this country is 

certainly abundant. Watergate, of course, comes first 

to mind. Of the legions of books now written on the 

sub j e c t, The 0 d 0 r e Whit e 's The Brea c h 0 f Fa i t h ( New 

York: Dell, 1975) is the most balanced and reflective 

t 0 a p pea r t h u s far. Someat t em ptis now be i ng rna d e to 

place Watergate in historical perspective. Jarol 

67

Mannhelm's Deja Vu (New York: St. Martin's Press, 

1 9 7 6) com par esit wit h the C r 'e d i t Mob iIi e r s ca nda I 

d uri n g the Gran tAdmin i s t rat ion and the Teapot Dom e 

S can d a 1 un d e r Ha r din g . The parail e 1s be tween Tea po t 

Dome and Watergate are especially striking. Also 

noteworthy is Victor Lasky's It Didn't Start With 

Watergate (New York: Dell, 1977) and David Wise's The 

Politics of Lying (New York: Vintage, 1973). Both 

chronicle the extensive Watergate-like activities in 

every administration from Franklin Roosevelt tD Lyndon 

Johnson. Also valuable are Michael Dorman's Dirty 

Poli tics From 1776 to Watergate (New York: Delacorte, 

1979), and Morton Halperin, et.al., The Lawless State 

(New York: Penguin, 1976). Lest one think that such 

activities are confIned to America, see John Barron, 

KGB (New York: Bantam, 1974). And one should not 

forget that it was precisely the rampant corruption in 

the sixteenth century Italian city-states that prompted 

Machiavelli to write The Prince. See George Sabine, 

A His tor y 0 f Pol i tica 1 The0 r y (N ew Yo r k: Hen r y HoI t , 

1947), pp. 337-38. Finally, the interested reader 

should consult Harry Elmer Barnes' (ed.), Perpetual 

War For Per pet ualPe ace (Ca I d weI I: Ca x ton, 19 5 3 ) , 

WhICh presents an unorthodox interpretation of 

America's entry into World War II. If correct, thIS 

would certainly make the aetions of Franklin Roosevelt 

the most serious abuse of power in US history. 

(9)Alfred Cuzan, "Political Profit: TaXIng and 

Spending in Dictatorships and Democracies," American 

J 0 urn a 1 0 f E conom i csand Soc i 01 0 gy ( 0 c t 0 be r 19 81 ), pp • 

329-40. 

(lO)Kropotkin, "A Scientific Approach," pp. 227 and 

230. 

(11)See, for example, the argument by the individ 

u a lis tanarchis t, J 0 hn Hen r y McKay, "Comm un is t s Ca nnot 

be Anarchists;" Patterns of Anarchy, eds. Leonard 

Krimmerman and Lewis Perry (New York: DOUbleday, 1968), 

p. 31. 

(12)Since individuals can own property they certainly 

have every right to divest themselves of it and 

voluntarily form a communal society if they so desire. 

However, such a society is a result of the voluntary 

contributions of each individual's personal property, 

and as such it is st i 11 based on the recognition of 

pr iva t e pr operty. Any member, of course, could therefore 

withdraw from that arrangement any time he 

des ired. See my "Notes Toward Understanding Capitalism 

and Socialism," The Alternative (October 1972), p. 

21 • (13)Murray Rothbard, "Anarcho-Communism," 

68

Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature. and Other 

Essays (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review Press, 

1974), p. 121-24. 

(14 )Rothbard, Power and Market, p. 176. Also see 

Morris and Linda Tannehill, The Market for Liberty 

( Lansing, Mi c h .: P r i va t e Pub I i cat i on, 19 70 ), pp • 60 - 64 • 

(15}The only exception is that of David Friedman 

who, like his father Milton, is a utilitarian. See 

Da v i d F r i e dman, The Mac h i n e r y 0 f F r e e d om ( New Yo r k : 

Harper and Row, 1973). 

( 1 6 ) J 0 h n L 0 c k e ,Of C i viI Go v er n men t. Sec 0 n d 

T rea tise(Chi c ago : Henry Reg n e r y, 1968), p. 22 • It 

should be noted at this juncture that Locke did put two 

1 imi tat ions on the right of ·property: scarcity and 

spoi lage. Man can, by his labor, remove property from 

the common stock provided "there is enough, and as good 

left in common for others." Locke, himself, however, 

does not seem to feel that this isa serious restriction, 

for later he expressly states that "Nature and 

the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials 

as in themselves," and that "the property of labor 

should be able to overbalance the community of land. 

For it is labor indeed that puts the difference of 

value on everything" (pp. 32-35). And elsewhere he 

acknowledges that private property so facilitates produe 

t ion a s t 0 I e a verno r e, not I e s s, for ever yoneel s e 

(p. 29). As for spoilage, Locke's original position is 

that since "Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or 

destroy" no one has a right to accumulate more than he 

can use wit h0 u t wa s t e· (p. 25 ) • Yet, he I ate r says t hat 

"t he in ven t i on of money••• introduced larger possess 

ionsandar i g h t tothem" ( p. 29) • Itis theref 0 rea t 

least arguable that Locke's limitations on property do 

not really constitute limitations at all. 

At any rate, the individualist anarchists feel that 

the essence of the Lockean doctrine is its justification 

of private property as a "natural right." For 

t hat r e'a son, wh eneveranyon e inthiss t ud Y i s referr e d 

to asaL0 eke an - nat u r aIr i g h t s the 0 r istit wi 11 be 

meant in this sense, i.e., that every man has a natural 

right to his own body and by extension to the fruits of 

his own labor. 

(·17 ) AYn Ra n d, "Ma n 's Rig h t s ," Capitali s m : the 

Unknown Ideal, ed. Ayn Rand (New York: Signet Books, 

1967), p. 322. 

(18)Murray Rothbard, "Justice and Property Rights," 

Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature, and Other 

E s say s (We s h i n g ton, D. C.: Lib e r tar ian Rev i ew Pr e s s , 

1974), p. 59. 

(19)Ibid., pp. 59-60. 

69

(20)David Friedman, "The Anarchist Reply," Reason 

(August 1976), p. 37. Also see his Machinery of 

Freedom, pp. 173-78. 

(21)Even though he speaks of "natural rights," 

Gilbert Harmon subscribes to a utilitarian position 

similar to Friedman's when he speaks of rights as 

g r 0 un d e din ff con v en t ion" and be i n g the 0 u t come 0 f 

"implicit bargaining" among individuals of varying 

strengths. See his "Moral Relativism as a Foundation 

for Natural Rights," The Journal of Libertarian 

Studies (Fall 1980) pp. 367-72. A very interesting 

and far more elaborate defense of property rights by a 

ut il i tar ian can be found in James Buchanan, The Limits 

of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chic'ago Press, 

1975). Although Buchanan has on occasion referred to 

himself as a "philosophical anarchist" he is more 

accurately placed in the minarchist camp with Robert 

Nozick. While Nozick relies heavily on Locke, Buchanan 

is essentially a Hobbesian. For a provocative synthesis 

of Nozick and Buchanan see Lawrence Moss, "Optimal 

Jur isdictions and the Economic Theory of the State: Or, 

Anarchy and One World Government Are Only Corner 

Sol uti on s ," Pub1 i c Cho ice (N o. 1, 1980), pp. 17 - 26. 

( 2 2 ) Mu r ray Rot h bar d, For ANew L i ber t y ( New Yo r k : 

Macmillan, 1973), pp. 24-25. 

(23)Murray Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty 

(Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 

1981). 

(24)John Wild, "Natural Law and Modern Ethical 

The 0 r y ," E t h i c s (0 c t 0 b e r 19 S 2 ), pp. 1-13, quoted in 

-ibid., p. 14. 

(2S)Thomas Spragens,Understanding Political 

Theory (New York: St. Martin's, 1976), p. lOS. 

( 2 6 ) A r n 0 I d Brecht , Pol i t ica 1 Theory (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 367 ff. 

(27)Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (Chicago: 

Henry Regnery, 1966), pp. 11-29; Lionel Robbins, The 

N8 t U rea n d S i g n i fie a n ceof Econom i eSc i enc e ( London: 

Macmillan, 1962), pp.- 83-94; and Murray Rothbard, 

"Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare 

Economi cS," On Freedom and Free Enterprise, ed. Mary 

Senholz (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965), pp. 225-35. 

(28)For a fuller presentation of this position see 

my "Reflections on the Substantive and Epitemological 

Aspects of the Rothbardian Natural Rights Ethic," 

(Paper presented at the Fifth Libertarian Scholars 

Conference, Princeton University, October 21-23, 1977). 

For a c r i t i que 0 f t his posit ion see Do ug I a s Ra smussen , 

"A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End," The 

Journal of Libertarian Studies (Winter 1980), pp. 

70

CHAPTER II I 

The Stale IS I Casle Institution 

1. THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 

For his views on the origin and nature of the 

state, the individualist anarchist owes a heavy intellectual 

debt to the sociological writings of Herbert 

S pen c era n d s u c h me mb e r s 0 f the·. Ger rna n s c h 0 0 lor 

historical sociology as Ludwig Gumplowicz. Gustav 

Ratzenhofer, and, in particular, Franz Oppenheimer. 

Since Oppenheimer introduced the distinction between 

the "political" and the "economic means," a distinction 

which has assumed a central position in the individualist 

anarchist analysis of the state, one cannot understand 

this analysis without some familiarity with the 

wr it ings of this early twentieth century German 

sociologist. 

Oppenheimer's fundamental insight was that man can 

sat i s f y his des ire s t h r 0 ugh two mu t ua I lyexcI us i ve 

means. One is work; the other robbery. Work, by which 

he means one's labor as well as what one receives in 

exchange for one's labor, he designated as "the economic 

means." 

Robbery, the "unrequited appropriation of the 

labor of others , " is termed the "political means." 

Whi Ie these two means are mutually exclusive, their 

purpose is identical: the acquisition of wealth. 

o p pen h e i mer the ref 0 rev i ews It a I I wo rId his tor y. f r OJTl 

p rim i t i vet i me sup toour own· c i viI i za t ion n s imp I y as 

"a contest. .between the economic and the political 

means." . Such is Oppenheimer's conceptual framework and 

world view. 

There are two ramifications of this conceptual 

framework which Oppenheimer is quick to point out: (8) 

the s tat e i s the ins tit uti 0 nali zed em bod i men t 0 f the 

pol it ical means, and (b) since production necessarily 

precedes robbery society, by use of the economic means, 

must have obtained a certain level of economic development 

before the emergence of the state was possible. 

This latter point, Oppenheimer feels, explains why 

no state ever existed among such groups as the primi- 

73

tive peasants (grubbers) or the primitive huntsmen. 

The grubbers, for example, are attached to the land and 

live in both abject. poverty and relative isolation. 

Such a situation provides no foundation for the rise of 

a state, for the primitive peasants are too impoverished 

to support one and too scattered from one another, 

ph Ysica I 1y, toor gani z e even for the i r own defens e • I t 

is much different,however, with the herdsmen. Acciden 

t s 0 f n Ii t u r e (I u c k) a s we 11 as the c I ever ne s s and 

d iIi ge nee 0 f the b r e e de r produce dis tinc t i onsin for 

tune an d ,c0 n seq ue n t I y, dis tin c t i ons of c I ass. Bu t 

since luck .can not be controlled and such t r a i t sas 

cleverness are not hereditary, economic equality soon 

begins to re-emerge. It is quite natural for the 

existing wealthy to block this trend by recourse to 

violence. This utilization of the political means is 

of the utmost significance, says Oppenheimer, because 

with it economic and social equality is "destroyed 

permanently," and the foundation of the state is laid. 

Theft is easier and more exciting than the tedious 

and disciplined routine of production. Thus the political 

means tend to breed on its own success. Its succ 

e s s f u Ius e i non e caseencouragesitsuse inot her s . 

Consequent Iy, the herdsmen began to turn more and more 

to the pol i tical means. The weaker huntSmen are able 

to flee before their onslaught, but "the peasant cannot. 

His I i vel ihood being tied to the land, he yields 

to SUbject ion, and pays tribute to his conqueror; that 

i s the g e n e sis 0 f the 1and s tatesin the old wo rId. " 

.The state therefore emerges, according to Oppenheimer, 

when the developing economic means of the peasantry are 

subordinated, by the use of the political means, to the 

direction of the herdsmen. 

Analyt ically, Oppenheimer sees six stages in the 

de vel opmen t of t he s tat e • The fir s t s tage en t a i1sthe 

use of the political means ini t s most rudimentary 

form: random robbery and killing of peasants by roaming 

bands of herdsmen. The second stage is begun when the 

peasant finally accepts his fate and ceases to resist 

the attacks. The herdsman then discovers that except 

where it is necessary to keep the subjects suitably 

cowed or to crush an occasional rebellion it is in his 

interest to enslave rather than kill the peasant. 

After all, "a murdered peasant can no longer plow." 

The k.ey difference between the first two stages is presented 

in terms of an analogy. In the first stage he 

says, the herdsman is like the bear who, for the purpose 

of robbing the beehive, destroys it. In the sec- 

74

con t r a s t toth0 searea s suehas the Ama z 0 n basin wh i c h 

,h a dna 1m0 stun1 imit ed 8 grIcu 1t uralland • " Wh i 1e the r e 

was f r e que n t wa r far e ins uc h pIa c es, he says, t his did 

not lead to the rise of the state, for the defeated 

groups merely fled to another part of the forest. 

Hen c e the e f fee t 0 f war far e ins u c h P I ace s wa s t 0 

" dis per s e villa g e s 0 verawide area, and to ke e p them 

autonomous." 

By contrast, fl ight and re-settlement in an area 

1 ike the coastal valley of Peru, which was surrounded 

by mountains to the back, the sea to the front, and 

deserts on both sides, was impossible. As population 

pressure increased, so did the demand of each independent 

village for more land. Such pressure culminated 

i n 1and war sand "a village de f eat edin wa r t h us fa c e d 

g rim pro s pee t s ," says Ca r n e i r 0 • " Ifit wa s a II owed to 

rem a i non its 0 wn 1and, ins tead 0 f be i ng ex termina ted 

or expelled, this concession came only at a price. And 

the price was political subordination to the victor." 

The d e f eat e d v i I I age wasincor porat e d wit h t hat 0 f the 

victor's, forming chiefdoms. As land shortages continued, 

the warring units now became large chiefdoms, and 

the process was begun anew. Hence, "autonomous neolithic 

villages were succeeded by chiefdoms, chiefdoms by 

kingdoms and kingdoms by empires." 

From the point of view of the individualist anarchi 

s t, the d ifferenees betwe e n Oppen he i mer and Ca r n e i r 0 

are far overshadowed by the agreement of these two notable 

scholars on one vital issue: the coercive origin 

of the state. As Carneiro says, "there is littlequest 

ion that, in one way or another, war played a decisive 

role in the rise of the State."(2) But coercion, ipso 

facto, entails exploitation. It is the method by 

wh i ch the dominant group in society is able, by use of 

the "political means," to institutionalize its socioe 

con 0 mi e posit ion a t the ex pen s e 0 f the sub0 r dina te 

group. 

It should be pointed out that the conflict theory 

has been cr i tic i zed as being one-sided. "There is no 

doubt that conquest played a part in most if not all 

processes of state formation," Lawrence Krader remarks. 

But" the conquest theory fai led as a general theory of 

t he or i gin of the state because it introduced only ext 

ern a I f act 0 r s, and fa i I ed tota ke i n t 0 a c c 0 un tin t e r 

nalprocessesin the for rna t ion 0 fag i ven s tat e • " P r i 

o r t 0 con que s t, h e rna i n t a ins, theremus t ha veexis ted 

" a tIea s t the ge r m 0 f soc i a1strat i f i cat ion, 0 fan ad- 

77

ministrative system, of an ideology of superiority and 

o f r u 1 e r s hip, and 0 f a bur g e 0 h i ng e con omy wit h s om e 

differentiations of economic functions."(3) Anthropolo 

g i s t s suehas R • M. Ma c I verandR. H. Low i e (4) ha ve 

concentrated on internal factors and contended, along 

what i s e s s en t i a 1 I Y A r i s tot eli an line s ( 5 ) , that the 

state emerges from the existence within society of 

associations which were voluntarily formed by independen 

t bands for such speci f ic purposes· as the preservat 

ion 0 for d e r 0 r the rna i n tena nee 0 fareli g i 0 uscu It. 

As these associations gradually develop their own rules 

and enforcement mechanisms, they tend to break down the 

tr ibal bonds of kinship, thereby uniting several formerly 

independent bands into the larger association. 

While these various associations are autonomous under 

the pain of necessity they are willing, at specific 

times and for specific purposes, to cooperate in the 

formation of a larger political unit and to temporarily 

delegate their authority to it. This process, according 

to Lowie, leads toward the voluntary formation of 

the state, which would be attained once such delegation 

of power became permanent. For empirical support Lowie 

cites the eight Associations of the Crow Indians of 

North America. Once every year, at the time of the 

hunt, these associations would delegate their authority 

to an agreed upon central power. They would do so 

because to be successful a hunt required the cessation 

of inter-association conflicts during its duration. 

Once the hunt was over, however, the associations would 

again assume their independent status and authority. 

While Lowie claims that the tendency was toward the 

emergence of the permanent state, the Crow Indians were 

conquered by the government of the United States before 

the final state was reached. While admitting "definite 

validity" to certain aspects of the Lowie-MacIver thesis, 

the confl ict theor ists rebut that since the stage 

of autonomous associations had existed among the Crow 

Indians for centuries there was in fact no tendency 

toward the emergence of a permanent state. Hence, they 

say, the the 0 r y i sun a b let0 ace0 un t for "the' j urn p , 

from non-state to state."(6) 

Another theory, also concentrating on internal 

factors, has been propounded by Morton Fried. Fried is 

in basic agreement with Oppenheimer's analysis regarding 

the emergence of economic inequality and social 

s t rat i fie a t ion . Toprot e c t the i r posit ion s, howe ve r , 

the wealthy must not simply resort to occasional violence, 

but must establish "powerful institutions of 

political control." Thus, the stratified non-state 

78

tain a perpetual flux.(12) But regardless of how powe 

r f u 1 the s tate, its powe r is a Iwa y s fin i t e • Thus, no 

g 0 v ernmen tean beeom pIetel y "t 0 t a lita rian" and nos 0 

ciety can be completely atomized. Moreover, the central 

point still holds, for even with an atomized society 

no government could persist if large numbers of individuals, 

despite their isolation, suddenly decided to 

res i s t the s tat e • Hen ce, wh i lethe moret0 t a lita r i 8 n 

countries can coerce obedience from greater numbers 

than can the more open societies, the extent and effectiveness 

of coercion still remains limited. 

But if both the carrot and the stick are confined 

to the minority, the brunt of the burden falls on the 

third category of political indoctrination. There are, 

the individualist anarchist argues, two types of justificat 

ions propounded by the apologists for the state: 

[1] the rulers are good and wise, and [2] the rule of 

the s tat e i s neee s saryandine v ita bIe. Un de r the I a t 

ter one finds arguments such as [1] anarchism is chaos 

and hence the state is inevitable, and [2] the state is 

the great benefactor of the people, protecting them 

from both foreign invasion and domestic violence. 

Other means of securing support, Rothbard says, are 

such ploys as [1] patriotism, [2] "tradition," [3] exaltation 

of the collectivity, and [4] guilt. First, 

the state is able to generate patriotism by identifying 

itself with such common objects of love as one's homeland. 

Thus, one comes to think of the entire territory 

over which the state rules as "my country." Second, the 

rulers exhort their subjects to "worship your ancestors" 

and "uphold old customs and institutions," while 

the y p 0 r t ray t h em s e I v e s a s the 1 e gi t i rna t e he irs of 

theseancest 0 r san d t he prod uc t 0 f thesecus t oms. ( 13 ) 

Third, individual dissent is discouraged by appeals to 

n a d jus t to soc i e t y" 0 r "heedthewi I I 0 f the rna j 0 r i t Y• " 

And finally, "Any increase in private well-being," says 

Rothbard, "can be attacked as 'unconscionable greed,' 

'mater ial ism' or 'excessive affluence'; profit-making 

can be attacked as 'exploitation' and 'usury,' mutually 

beneficial exchanges denounced as 'selfishness,' and 

s 0 me how wit h the con c 1 us ion a I wa y s be i ng dr awn t hat 

more resources should be siphoned from the private to 

the 'pubI i c sector • ' The i nduee d gu i 1t rna kesthe pub 

I i c m0 r ere 8 d Y t 0 do jus t t h8 t • For wh i 1e i nd i v i d u8 I 

persons tend to indulge in 'selfish greed,' the failure 

of the State's rulers to engage in exchanges is supposed 

to signify their devotion to higher and nobler 

causes--parasitic predation being apparently morally 

and esthetically lofty as compared to peaceful and pro- 

81

ductive work."(14) 

It is through a combination of all of these devices 

that the state is able to make itself appear both 

benef icial and legi t imate and thus to secure popular 

support, ranging from enthusiasm to simple resignation. 

A way in which the state is able to obtain acquiescence 

by comb i n in g the use of such methods as appea I s to patriotism 

and the threat of coercion is well illuStrated 

b y the ant i - s tat i s t Randol ph B0 urn e • Men are t 0 I d, he 

writes, that 

they will enter the military establishment of 

their own volition, as their splendid sacrifice 

for their country's welfare, and that if 

they do not enter they will be hunted down 

and punished with the most horrid of penalties; 

and under a most indescribable confus 

i' 0 n 0 f d e m0 c rat i cpr ide and per sona I f ear 

they submit to the destruction of their livelihood 

if not their lives, in a way that 

would formerly have seemed to them so obnoxious 

as to be incredible.(15) 

A final word should be mentioned concerning the 

crucial role compulsory public education has in inducing 

acceptance of the state ideology. The state gets 

the child at a young and impressionable age. The child 

is then taught to be patriotic, love his country, and 

revere his ancestors. Anarchism is either equated with 

chaos or disregarded altogether. Hence, the child is 

indoctrinated into the habit of thinking in terms of 

the state. He becomes a prisoner of his educational 

environment, incapable of thinking in terms beyond the 

statist paradigm. Particular government A or particular 

government B may be bad, but government itself is 

never questioned. It is through such educational indoctr 

ination that the individual becomes so susceptible 

to the statist ideology he encounters later in life. 

3. THE GROWTH OF THE STATE 

The fact that the state originated in violence and 

exploitation does not, in itself, go very far in explaining 

how and why the state grows, and grows not 

just in size but in the power it exercises over its 

subjects. An answer was hinted at earlier. 

Oppenheimer's world view was that there were two exclus 

i v e mea ns, the e conom i cand the pol i ticaI, for 0 b t a i n 

i n g the same 0 b j e c t : rna t e ria 1 sat i s fa c t ion. Sin c e the 

82

latter is the embodiment of violence while the former 

entails voluntary and peaceful exchange of goods, it 

should not be suprising that the political means gain 

a t the ex pen s e 0 f the e conom i c • And sinc e itis the 

state that maintains a monopoly of the political means, 

it should likewise not be surprising that it is able, 

as James Madison once remarked, to turn "every contingency 

into a resource for accumulating force in the 

government.(16) 

But this answer, by itself, is too abstruse. What, 

more specifically, do·. the individualist anarchists see 

as the means that the state uses to augment its power? 

Drawing heavily on the writings of such men as Bertrand 

d e J 0 u v e n e 1, Am e rica nan t i - s tat i s t s s uchas Ra ndol ph 

Bourne, and such laissez faire economists as Ludwig von 

Mi ses, a few of the more important means can be 

indicated. 

a. Democracy. 

Bertrand de Jouvenel agrees with Oppenheimer that 

"the state is in essence the result of the successes 

achieved by a band of brigands who superimpose themselves 

on small distinct societies ••. It pursues no 

just end; its one concern is the profitable exploitat 

ion 0 f con que red and s u bm iss i ve sub j e c t s . I t lives 

off the subject populations."(17) But with the passage 

of time the governmental units expanded beyond the 

a b iii t Y 0 f the king toex e r t per sona leon t r 0 I. Con s e 

quently, control over particular areas was delegated to 

the kin g T s sub 0 r dinatesand f r i ends, i n pa r ticu Iart0 

those mi I i tary figures who had supported the king in 

his s t r ugg I e for power. These areas gradually emerged 

into all but completely independent political units, 

viz., fiefdoms, possessing their own courts, military 

for c e san d sou r c e s 0 f reven ue • Inth i s wa y the king 

became largely dependent for his revenue on the support 

of those elements independent of him, i.e., the feudal 

lords. Since there was an inverse relationship between 

the power of the king and that of the aristocracy, the 

latter were always careful to view the king as a person 

in opposition to themselves. They were jealous of 

their independent prerogatives and relinquished them to 

the kin g 0 n I y g r u d gin g 1 Y and wh entheye i therag r e e d 

with the king's policies or were presented with no alt 

ern a t i ve . T h us i twa s rat her d iff i cui t for the employment 

of the pol it ical means, or "State power" to 

use Albert Jay Nock's term, to grow at the expense of 

the economic means, or "social power. 

83

But the emergence of demo,cracy and the idea of 

pop u I a r s 0 v ere i g nt y grea t 1y fa c iii tatedthe growthof 

s tat e power. " I twa s not t hat the t hrone wa s 0 ve r 

thrown," says de Jouvenel in speaking of the French 

Revolution, "but that the whole, the nation-person, 

m0 u n ted it. Its I i f e wa s as t hat 0 f the king itsuc 

ceeded, but it had one great advantage over him: for 

subjects are in regard to a king--whC? is seen to be a 

person different from themselves--naturally careful 

to secure their rights. Whereas, the nation is not a 

different person: it is the subject himself, and yet 

it is more than he--it is a hypostatized We."(18) 

Since the state is now controlled by "the people" it is 

no longer feared as a dangerous instrument but looked 

upon as the means to achieve the "common good." 

Democracy serves to facilitate the growth of state 

power in yet another way. By possessing an independent 

base the aristocracy in the feudal period were able to 

block or at least retard, the growth of the king's 

power. But the democratization of society, says de 

Jouvenel, entai 1 ing as it does the elimination of all 

such independent bases of power, removes all obstacles 

to the centraLization and augmentation of state power. 

For regardless of such devices as the written Constitution 

and the division of the government into several 

separate branches, the fact remains that all branches 

derive their power from the same source: the majority 

of the peopl e. (19) The individual ist anarchist agrees 

and therefore denies that even a constitutionally es 

"tabl ished "independent judiciary" is able to serve as a 

check. The jUdges themselves, they argue, are employed 

by and are therefore part of the state. Thus, says 

Rothbard, over the years the state has been able to 

t ran s for m j ud i cia 1 rev i e w from "a 1 imit i ng device t 0 

yet another instrument for furnishing ideological legitimacy 

to the government's actions. For if a judicial 

decree of 'unconstitutional' is a mightly check to government 

power, an implicit or explicit verdict of 'const 

i tut ional' is a mighty weapon in fostering pUblic acceptance 

of ever-greater goevernment power."(20) The 

idea of checking the government by a written constitution 

is seen as "a noble attempt that failed." It 

fai led because "when you give the State itself the 

fin a I power t 0 i n t e r pre t the ve r yins t r ume n t t hat i s 

supposed to I imi t the State, you will inevitably find 

the Crinstitution being stretched and distorted •.• "(21) 

De Jouvenel' s fear is that as democracy matures 

power is ever more easily delegated to the state while 

84

individual liberty is subordinated to the "common good" 

or "s.ocial justice." Under the rubric of popular sovereignty, 

he says, Parliaments were established and inv 

est e d wit h the power 0 f 1a w- ma kin g • This wa s not 

s imp I y a t ran s fer 0 f aut h0 r i t Y rr om the king to" the 

people" or their representatives, he points out, but an 

addition to state power of immense proportions. In 

pre-democratic societies the king was not sovereign but 

waS seen as the mandatory of God or of the gods. But 

God I s law was immutable. Hence, the king had no power 

to make or change the law. Hec0 u 1d obtain obedience 

only if he himself remained obedient to the divine law. 

T his con fin edt h e king , sact ions wit h i n rat her na r row 

and predictable limits. 

Pos i t i ve leg i s I at i on appeared only when the idea 

of popular sovereignty replaced that of divine sovereignty. 

Since the people were now sovereign they were 

em power edt 0 rna k e the law, and the Age 0 f Ra t iona lism 

served to reinforce this by teaching that any order was 

merely conventional and hence changeable at will. This, 

says de Jouvenel, was a great breakthrough for state 

power. By ident i fying themselves with the state, the 

people were willing to delegate more and more power to 

it. Democratic theorists erred, he says in quoting 

Montesquieu, in confusing the power of the people with 

the lib e r t y 0 f the pe 0 pIe, for the powe r 0 f the s tat e 

"i s command, and everyone cannot command. Sovereignty 

of the people is therefore nothing but a fiction," and 

one whie h "c 0 n fer s on the r u Ie r s the aut h0 r i t Y 0 f the 

whole."(22) 

Whi Ie the emergence of democracy opened the doors 

for the expansion of state power at the expense of social 

power, the growth of the state beyond 8 certain 

po i n t assumes a Ii fe of its own; expans ion of the state 

in one area requires expansion in other areas as well. 

For, "when the State is so large, when everything is 

political, one cannot say 'I will live in a certain 

way • I What hem u s t say i s'T0 I i ve ina ce r t a i n wa y 

my s elf, I mu s t s e i z e the con t r 0 Isof the grea t rna chi ne 

and em p loy themin s u c hamanneras sui t s me. I " In 

this way every issue becomes politicized and requires 

the i n t e r v e n t ion 0 f the s tat e • Dem 0 era c y, de J 0 uve ne I 

therefore concludes, is merely "the time of tyranny's 

incubation."(23) 

85

. War. 

A second, vi tally important, means for the growth 

oft hest ate i s wa r . Her e the i nd i v i d ua listanarchis t 

turns, in part icular, to the wr i t ings of Randolph 

B 0 urn e • Bourne be I ieve s that the s tate is" the ins t r ument 

by which the whole herd is wielded for the benefit 

of a class." It follows that the more powerful the 

s tat e, the mo r e en t r enc hedther u 1 i n g .e lite, the bet t e r 

able it is to benefit itself. Hence, says Bourne, "The 

ideal of the State is that within its territory its 

power and influence should be universal." But even in 

a .d em 0 era c y the rna j 0 r i t y migh t we 11 res i s t na ked a t 

tempts by the state to restrict free speech or impose 

an overriding uniformity. Hence, what is required is 

some justification for state action. And since it is 

precisely in war that this justification is most easily 

and clearly found, Bourne concludes that "war is the 

health of the state." Once war breaks out "Old nationa 

I idea 1 s are taken out, re-adapted to the purpose and 

use d a sun i v e r sal to uc hs ton e s, 0 r mo Ids i n t 0 wh i c h a I 1 

thought is poured." Dissent, which was permitted in 

times of peace, is usually outlawed in times of war. 

"Criticism of the State, objections to war, lukewarm 

opinions concerning the necessity or the beauty of cons 

c rip t ion, are rna des ub j e c t t 0 fer 0 c i 0 us pena I ties far 

exceeding in severity those affixed to actual pragmatic 

cr imes. Publ ic opinion •.• becomes one solid block. 

y Loyal t y " 0 r rat her war 0 r thodox y, bec omesthe sol e 

test for all professions, techniques, occupations."(24) 

But what is especially striking is the realization 

that once the population is infused with a war psychology, 

all else follows automatically. For wars, at 

I e a s t 0 U r mod ern "d em 0 era tic" wa r s wh i c h depend for 

the irsuc c e s son rna s s suppo r tanden t h us i am, are i nva r 

iably presented in terms of a struggle for righteous 

and human i tar ian goals. The enemy is dehumanized and 

the complex and often subtle differences in culture and 

policies are presented in simplistic black and white 

terms. (25) War is thereby transformed into a moral 

crusade to "make the world safe for democracy," to 

" des t roy tot a lit a rian ism," 0 r to" con t a i n Comm un i s TTl • " 

And not only does this crusade provide a welcome contrast 

to the mundane chores of daily living but, perhaps 

even more importantly, it infuses life with a 

meaningfulness it never had during peacetime. It is 

th i s tha t largely explains that striking phenomenon of 

the outpouring of voluntary sacrifice, of millions of 

men w i I lin g 1 Y rna r chi ng tot he i r near 1y c e r t a i n dea t h s , 

86

that is so characteristic a feature of modern war. For 

it is only through voluntary sacrifice that one can 

become a part of, belong to, the crusade. Thus it is 

during war in particular that government has rarely to 

compel sacrifIce. It has only to ask but to 

receive.(26) 

Hence it is only in wartime, as Bourne notes, that 

the nation is able to "attain a uniformity of feeling, 

a hierarchy of values, CUlminating at the undisputed 

apex of the state idea." This "could not possibly be 

produced through any other agency than war."(27)(28) 

c. Economic Intervention. 

There are two major economic factors the free 

market anarchist can and does cite to help explain the 

growth of government. First is the inequality of costs 

and bene fit s of government programs, and second is the 

dynamic of the market process. 

The costs of government programs are usually widely 

dIffused, while the benefits are highly concentrated. 

Since the benef i ts a government can offer to a 

particular interest group can be substantial, that 

group wi II lobby vigorously for them. But so long as 

the costs are distributed widely throughout society it 

wi II genera 11 y come to no more than a few cents per 

person per program. Since this would be less than the 

cost of organizing an effort to oppose the program, 

such is not done. It is therefore usually politically 

profitable for the politicians to implement the programs 

desired by the interest groups.(29) 

Sec 0 n d I y, the a n arc his t em phas i zesth e del i cat e 

interdependencies of the modern market economy. Since 

any tampering with the market process has ramifications 

throughout the entire economic system, the policymakers 

wi 11 therefore be confronted with the choice of 

either abandoning the original interventionist policy 

altogether or expanding it into ever more areas. The 

government, for example, may desire to "stimulate" the 

economy by increasing the supply of money. This will 

result in rising prices and the policy-makers may then 

find it politically necessary or expedient to impose 

maximum prices on some or all goods. But since this 

w ill red u ceorev en eli minate profit rna r gins, I n ve s t 

ment wi II be discouraged in those areas where the controls 

were enacted, thereby causing a reduction of output 

and hen c e ash 0 r t a ge 0 f t hose goods. This wi 1 1 

87

have several imporant consequences. First, in an effort 

to st imulate production, ·price controls for the 

factors of product ion wi 11 also have to be imposed. 

But since this will discourage production of factors, 

the policy of price controls will have to be expanded 

into ever wider areas. Second, to cope with the shortage, 

the g 0 v ernmen t rna y a 1sode c ide to adopta po I icy 

of rationing. And third, if rationing is resorted to, 

the government wi 11 almost certainly' be forced to expand 

greatly its police force in order to cope with the 

black markets, which are the inevitable accompaniment 

of rat ioning.(30) All of this must entail the progressive 

extension of government control into areas that 

were heretofore independent and, as a corollary, the 

concentration of ever more power in the hands of 

government. 

In short, the individualist anarchist believes 

that there is an inherent tendency for state power to 

expand at the expense of social power. The state, commen 

t s Ro t h ba r d, " has i nvaria b 1Y shown a s t r i king tal en t 

for the expansion of its powers beyond any limits that 

might have been imposed upon it."(31) The general reason 

liesin what J 0 hn Ca I h 0 un referredt0 a s the propensity 

of the dominant power in society to abuse its 

power. Since normally the dominant power is that which 

is in control of the government, Calhoun felt that 

Constitutional res·trictions "would ultimately be annulled 

and the government converted into one of unlimited 

powers."(32) The political means, as Oppenheimer 

·would say, quite naturally prevail over the economic 

me a n s • Dem 0 c r a c y, war and e c 0 nom i c i n t e r ve n t i on are 

just three of the more important ways by which the political 

means are implemented. 

4. THE TOTAL STATE 

The individual ist anarchist as written little on 

the twentieth century phenomenon of the totalitarian 

s tat e. However some men t i on of it shou I d be made since 

i tis the log i cal cui min a t ion 0 f wh a the sees as the 

statist dynamic. 

Totalitarianism is the logical extension of the 

con c e p t 0 f s 0 vere i gn t y • Wh i 1e the devel 0 pmen t 0 f t hat 

term owes much to the wr i t ings of Jean Bodin in the 

sixteenth century, it was Thomas Hobbes a century later 

who made that concept the center of his entire politic 

a I s y s t em. Be 1 i e v i ng t hat therewa s nos 0 C i e t y wit hout 

order and no order without a sovereign, Hobbes 

88

qui tel 0 g i c a I I y con c Iudedt hat s 0 ve rei gn t y wa s the 

creator, the sine qua non, of society. WithoMt the 

state, said Hobbes in his most famous passage, the life 

of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." 

Since order required that all power be centralized 

i nthestate the r e co u I d ben 0 room for ind e penden t 

associations. Associations could only undermine the 

unity of power required for peace and order.(33) Thus 

the Church, the ·university, and even the family fall 

vi ct im to Hobbes t sover e ign. But it is important to 

rea liz e t hat for Hobbe s sovere i gn t y wa s not an end i n 

its elf but was ne c e s a r y, as Ni s bet po i n t sout, topr 0vide 

a secure and "impersonal environment of law within 

which individuals may pursue rationally their proper 

interests." And far from infringing upon individual 

freedom Hobbes bel i eved that sovereignty and freedom 

went hand- in-hand. The sovereign state was the agent 

for the liberation of the individual from the petty 

tyrannies of "church, guild or any other form of intermediate 

association." Thus while Hobbes believed that 

the state was the creator of society he did not endeavor 

to abolish the distinction between the two. 

I twa s R 0 u sse a u who, r e cogn i z i ng t hat rna n t s ps y 

chological need for attachment conflicted with the impersonality 

of Hobbes' Leviathan, preceeded with such 

an abolition. Like Hobbes, Rousseau desired the liberat 

ion of man from the constraints fo traditional society. 

And also like Hobbes, he recognized that this required 

a powerful and highly centralized state. It is 

the cognition of this fact that makes explicable 

R 0 u sseau' sotherwi s e pa r adox i ca I r ema r k t hat rna n i s t 0 

be "forced to be free." But if the atomization of society, 

as Hobbes knew, was a necessary condition for 

sovereignty, and if sovereignty, as he believed was a 

n e c e s s a rye 0 n d i t ion for soc i a lorder, i t wa s not, as 

Roussea'u fully realized, a sufficient condition. For 

per hap s the m0 S t fun dam e n t a I 0 f rna n 's ps yc hoi 0 g i ca I 

nee dsis the nee d t 0 bel 0 ng, to fee I a pa r t 0 f some 

thing. Thus, if sovereignty demanded destruction of 

all intermediate associations, something would have to 

be sub s tit utedin the i r p I ace. Ro us sea u 0 f fer e d as the 

funct ional equivalent of membership in the plurality of 

independent and autonomous associations membership in 

the monolithic, overarching political community; 

membership, that is, in the total state.(34) 

It is therefore in the writings of Rousseau in the 

eighteenth century that one fInds a description of the 

89

essentials of the modern totalitarian order that did 

not em e, r g e for n ear I y an 0 the r two c e n t uri e s . For 0 ne 

cannot understand totalitarianism by focusing on such 

p hen 0 men a a s the mas s mur de r 0 f Jews by the Na z is, 0 r 

the extermination of the kulaks in Soviet Russia. As 

Nisbet points out, totalitarianism "cannot be reduced 

tot h e 0 per a t ion 0 f for c e and t err 0 r • " As t rag i cas 

such occurrences are, they are merely i,ncidental rather 

than essential elements of the totalitarian order. 

For ce wi II be used against recalci trant minor it ies but, 

as we .have already seen, it cannot be used effectively 

against the majority. Thus, to understand totalitarianism, 

one must explain its appeal to the masses. 

His tor i c a I I y, the emerge nceof tot a lita rianor de r s 

have followed a period of extreme fluctuations and 

rapid SOCIal decay in which the customs and stability 

oft h e 0 I d 0 r derareov e r t urn e d • This wa s as t rue 0 f 

pre - 19 1 7 R u s s i a asit wa s 0 fIt a I y and Ge r rna nyin the 

1920' sand 1930' s. But as Rousseau recognized, and a 

pIe tho r a 0 f soc i 0 log i s t s 0 f whom Em i leDur k he im wa s 

only the most famous have confirmed, man is simply not 

equipped, psyhologically, to live in such an atomized 

and uncertain environment. Hence the emphasis by the 

totalitarian state on mass demonstrations and parades, 

such as the May Day parade, the extensive use of such 

symbols as the swastika, and such special forms of address 

as "comrade." All are cultivated in the con'scious 

attempt to generatein the individual a feeling 

,of attachment and community.(35) But undoubtedly the 

most significant element in the creation of attachment 

to the total state is the ideology, such as that of the 

"master race" or the "proletariat." For, as Jacques 

Ellul says, the ideology or myth, being comprehensive, 

envelops the individual and therefore renders him immun 

e from a 1lother i n flue n c e s • (36 ) 

But if it is the creation of the political community 

that largely explains the appeal of totalitarianism, 

its appeal holds only in the absence of other, 

competing communities. Hence the necessity for the 

pol i tiC a 1 communit y t 0 be come tot a 1. Hen ce, too, its 

increasing appeal as it becomes total. For when the 

s tat e bee 0 me s the 0 n 1 y commun i t y, rega r dIe s s 0 f how 

artificial it may be, life becomes identified with the 

state.• Dissent can be undertaken in only the most 

serious of cases and by only the most intrepid. For 

open dissent risks ostracism from the political community. 

And when that is the only community, this means 

con s i.g nmen t tot he ps y c hoI 0 g i c a Idea tho f compIe t e i s 0 - 

90

I a t ion. T his ex p I a ins s u c h ot her wi s e i nex p I i ca b 1e 

phenomena as the willingness, even desire, of the 

"enemies of the people' to confess, during the Soviet 

purge-trials, to nearly any charges levelled against 

them. (37) For such is the route to psychological peace 

and, no matter how remote, the possible return to the 

flock. As Nisbet has explained in a particularly insightful 

passage, "the State becomes powerful not by 

what itta ke s from the i nd i v i d ua I, but by what itta ke s 

from the spiritual and social associations which compete 

with it for man's devotion." 

One can now see the role that violence plays in 

the totalitarian state. Since a totalitarian order is 

possible only in the absence of intermediate associat 

ionsat 0 t a lit a ria n r u 1 e r, un I e s s his r i set0 powe r 

itself follows upon the disintegration of the old order 

and the a tom i z a t ion 0 f soc i e t y, mus t t a k e me as ures to 

create atomization. Hence the violent assault upon 

all intermediate associations. And since there is a 

natural tendency for such associations to reemerge, the 

per pet u a t Ion 0 fat om i z a t ion r eq u ire s the per i od i c 

recourse to violent measures to forestall such an 

occurrence. 

The foregoing highlights the salient role intermediate 

associations play in the preservation of a relatively 

free and stable social order, and some have contended 

that this poses a serious question for the libe 

r tar ian • The f r e e rna r ketanarchis t 0 f ten a ppea r s to 

be oblivious to such associations. His alternative to 

the state is simply The Individual, restricted only 

by the" Ii ber tar ian non-aggression axiom" and his own 

voluntary contractual agreements. The role of custom 

and tradition is downplayed, if not held in outright 

contempt. And the result is a view of the social order 

as a mechanical process, changeable at will and with no 

side effects, and held together largely by the heavy 

hand of the government in a statist society, and purely 

by contractual agreement in the anarchist. The libertarian's 

emphasis is invariably on the individual in 

the abstract, the completely rational and unemotional 

individual. The focus is not on attachment, but on release; 

and not release from the state to permit attachmen 

t too the r comm un i tiesand ass 0 cia t ions, but 0 n r e 

lease, per se. But atomization, goes the argument, 

is the same whether it is created by the Leviathan 

State or the "Libertarian Nonagression Axiom." This, 

however, ra I ses the quest ion of whether a society constructed 

along pure laissez faire lines could ever be 

91

stable, or would it, as paradoxical as it may seem at 

fir s t, act ua I I Y pavethe wa y for' anew totali tar ian ism? 

For "It is ludicrous," warns Robert Nisbet, "to hold up 

the assorted charms of individual release and emancipation 

to popUlations whose burning problems are those 

ar ising, today, from moral and social release. To do 

s 0 i s but t 0 rna ke the wa y for the GrandInqui sit 0 r the 

easier. For this is the appeal, as we have seen, of 

the to tal ita ria n pro p h e t - - to' reI e a s e' rna sses 0 f 

atomized individuals from their intolerable 

individualism"(38) 

The old laissez faire failed, Nisbet continues, 

beea u s ei t focused on the abstract, imaginary, rational 

individual at the expense of kinship and community. 

What is needed is a "new laissez faire" which will present 

an environment within which "autonomous groups may 

prosper." (39) 

While this analysis of contemporary society is 

profound, as a criticism of libertairianism it is based 

on a misunderstanding. Libertarianism is a political, 

not a m0 r a lor soc i a I, phi los 0 PhY a nd assuc h con cerns 

i tsel f wi th the use of force in society.(40) Its premise, 

the "non-aggression axiom," is that initiated 

for c e i s n ever jus t i fied • Put d ifferen t 1y, t his me a ns 

that any and all peaceful activity is legitimate. Libertarians 

therefore oppose coercively imposed attachments. 

But if individuals do have a psychological need 

for a t t a c hmen t therei s not hi ng topreve n t them from 

,associat ing voluntarily. Given the requisite freedom, 

David Friedman argues, not only will groups of likemin 

d e d .i n d i v i d u a I s nat u r a I I Y g r a v ita t e t owa r d eac h 

other, but those with conflicting values will just as 

naturally migrate away from each other. The result, 

accor ding to Fr i edman, would be a plethora of more or 

less autonomous communities populated by like-minded 

individuals, with each community subscribing to its 

own, and in many cases quite unlibertarian,'laws, and 

cult ivat iog its own identity, customs and 

traditions.(41) 

T hus, far from con f lieting wit h rna n 's need for attachment' 

on closer analysis libertarianism actually 

appears to offer precisely that environment which 

Nisbet's community-oriented "new laissez faire" 

requires. 

92

5. WHO RULES THE STATE? 

It is clear that the validity of the individualist 

anarchist view of the state is dependent upon the 

existence of a ruling elite; yet this elite has not 

been ident i f ied. Who, then, constitutes this domInant 

g r 0 up? 1 n p rim i t i ve tim esit waseas y t 0 s po t • On e 

g r au p, em p I a yin g the pol i tic a 1 me a ns, wo u 1d sub j e c t 

an 0 the r to its wi I 1 and beg i n to ex t rae t t r i bu t e from 

them. Gradually, as this arrangement persisted, it 

came to be accepted and the extraction of tribute became 

sys terna t i zed in the per iodie payment of taxes to 

the "government." As 'economist Walter Grinder summari 

zes it, "I tis to th j s more powerful group that the 

wealth, plundered by the political means, accrues. In 

time this group becomes entrenched both politically and 

economically, through its plundered wealth."(42) 

But this relatively straight-forward process 

becomes much more complicated in today's world. Now, 

all areas are ruled by governments. Hence, one cannot 

simply organize a military band, impose one's will on a 

stateless society, call oneself a government, and begin 

to collect taxes. Further, since the government is the 

most powerful institution in society, a direct assault 

is usually doomed to fail. While in primitive societies 

the rUling elite was able to set up its own government, 

today this is no longer, or only rarely possible. 

The ruling elite of today is that group which, 

working through the existing power structure, is able 

to obtain control of the government and use it for its 

own purposes. This means that the vast bulk of the 

go v ernmen t bur e a u c r a c y are not rea I I Y mem be r s 0 f the 

el i te except in the broades t sense of the term, but 

rather conscious or unconscious servants of that group. 

It also means that, and this is perhaps more important, 

the essence of the state has remained unchanged from 

p rim i t i'v e time s • It isstill the ins tituti ona 1 i za t ion 

oft h e po lit i cal means for the purpose of the trans fer 

of wealth from the producing group to the exploiting or 

ruling group. 

Though it might at first seem paradoxical, the Individualist 

anarchists believe that the rUling group of 

today is composed of the upper echelons of the capitalist 

class, or what Walter Grinder refers to as the 

ttcorporate-financial super-rich. tt They reason as follows. 

The pos i t i on of the entrepreneur on the market 

i sal waysinsecu r e . Jus t as the rna r ke t prov idesopp 0 r 

tunities for the acquisition of wealth, it also pre- 

93

sents the possibility of loss. This means that the ent 

rep r e n e ureou 1d neve r reI a x • Nos00n e r wo u I d he t r i 

umph over one competitor than he would be met by others 

i n ten t u p 0 n cut tingin t 0 his s hare 0 f the rna r ke t • No 

sooner would he uncover a lucrative area for returns on 

investment than other entrepreneurs would follow suit, 

the increasing production forcing the profit rate down. 

And ass 00 n ash e wo u I d fa i Ito t a ke a d van tage 0 f the 

latest investment opportunities or .adopt the latest 

met hod s 0 f produe t ion he wo u I d r iski 0 sing his i nves t 

men t tot h 0 sewhod i d. And beh i nd a I I of th i s t he r e 

is, of course, the ever present possibility of entrepreneurial 

error. Since the first concern of the capitalist 

is to realize a profit, and since the rigors of 

the market mean that this is a difficult and perpetual 

struggle for an ever elusive object, the capitalist has 

n 0 con c ern for the rna r ke t, .ass uc h • Hen c e i t wa son I y 

natural for him to turn, whenever possible, to the 

state which, with its monopoly on the use of force, 

could institutionalize profits by implementing various 

statist measures such as tariffs, subsidies, licensing 

res t ric t ion s, etc., inor de r to ke e p 0 uteompet i t ion, 

r a i s e p ric e sand ke e p wa gerat e s I ow . The f r e e rna r ke t 

anarchist is therefore in complete agreement with the 

anti-statist Albert Jay Nock's contention that, contrar 

y t 0 con ve n t .ion a 1 wi s d 0 m, " Arne r i can bus i ness never 

followed a policy of laissez faire, never wished to 

follow ii, never wished the State to let it alone."(43) 

In other words, the individualist anarchist believes 

that there is a natural affinity between wealth 

and power. Those who have political power can use it 

too b t a i n we a 1 t h • On the 0 the r hand, the we a I thy are 

able to use their wealth to obtain political power. 

Once in control of the state, they are in a position to 

use the pol i tical means to perpetuate and even enhance 

the i rown p 0 sit ionsin the soc i 0 - e con om i chi era r c hy • 

As the individualist anarchist sees it, this creates a 

vicious circle: wealth can be used to acquire political 

power which in turn can be used to acquire more 

wealth. While the circle is not completely closed, its 

opening is certainly quite small. The "rise to the 

top" by tho s e fro m the lower e con om i cst rat a i s not 

ruled out completely. However, its occurrence which 

would be difficult under any circumstances is made even 

more so by the artificial obstacles imposed by the 

elite. Such, in brief, is the individualist anarchist 

theory of the state as an instrument of elite rule. 

94

6. COMMENTS AND EVALUATION 

Before evaluating this argument, two points need 

to be clarified. First, although the individualist 

anarchist often uses the term "class analysis" to descr 

i be hi s pos it ion, that term has not been used here. 

Instead the term "caste" has been adopted. This has 

been done for two reasons. First, "class analysis" is 

C ommo n 1 y 1 inked wi t h Marx ism. But ther e ar e fundamental 

differences between the Marxist and libertarian 

a n a 1 y s e s .. Wh i 1 e bot h see the capita lis t cIas s, 0 rat 

least part of that class, as the ruling group, they 

draw quite different conclusions from this. The 

Marxists believe that wealth itself confers power and 

hence that the only means to end exploitation is to 

nat ion a liz e the mea ns 0 f prod uc t ion • The f r e e rna r ke t 

anarchist, on the other hand, argues that wealth does 

not init s elf con fer power sin c e the capit a lis t ca n 

ma i n t a i n his posit ion 0 nthe f r e e rna r ke ton I y by s e r ving 

others better than anyone else. Since the state is 

the 0 n I y mea n·s for the ins tit uti ona 1 i za t ion 0 f pr 0fit, 

the individualist anarchist believes that "the 

State, as the institutionalization of force, is the 

source of all exploi tat ion, either directly or indirectly."(44) 

Thus, while the Marxist sees private property 

and wealth inequality as the sources of exploitat 

ion the i n d i v i d ua lis tanarchis t s e 'e s. i tin the s tat e . 

Con seq u e n t 1y, the Ma r xis top t s for the nat iona liza t ion 

oft hem e a n s 0 f produe t ion; the f r e e rna r ketanarchis t 

advocates the abol it ion of the state.(45) To avoid 

confusion with its Marxian counterpart the anarchist 

position is referred to as a "caste analysis." 

Second, and more important, the term "caste" more 

accurately denotes the anarchist position than "class." 

The key distinction between "class" and "caste" is that 

the former is characterized by fluidity; the latter by 

rigidity. Individuals may move into and out of a 

class; such movement is precisely what is missing in a 

caste.(46) 

The distinction is crucial for grasping the anarchi 

s tan a I y sis . I tis a c ha rae t e r i s tic 0 f the rna r ke t 

process that wealth is dispersed unevenly. But if the 

market is free there are no external impediments preventing 

an individual, or even an entire group, from 

rising from a lower to a higher economic position. For 

e x amp Ie, the vas t rna j 0 r i t Y 0 f i mm i gran t s t 0 Am e rica 

we repennil e s sup0 nthe irar r i val. This we s a s t ric t 1Y 

t em p 0 r a r y phas e . Aft era d jus tin g t 0 Am e rica n I i fe, 

95

which usually meant adjusting to the shock of moving 

from a rural to an urban environment, these individuals, 

and in fact entire ethnic groups, began to ascend 

the economic ladder, their places at the bottom being 

t a ken b y sue c e e din g ge nera t ion s 0 f i mm i gran t s • Thus, 

wh i let her e is a perma nen t "bo t tom twen type r cen t" the 

i nd i v i dua 1 occupan ts of that category were constant ly 

changing.(47) In brief, markets produce classes. 

In contrast, a caste is characterized by its rigid 

i t y: on e bo r n in t 0 a cas t e r ema ins in i t for 1 i f e. If 

the individualist anarchist is correct and the wealthy 

are able to use government to institutionalize their 

p 0 sit ion 0 n e can ref e r tothis as the t rails forma t ion 

of a class into a caste. What is important for the 

anarchist position is that it is only through governmen 

t t hat a soc i 0 - e conom i cposit ion can be ins tit uti 0 n 

ali zed. Ass hown i n Fig. 1, t his me a n s t hat wh i 1e rna r 

ket results in classes, governments produce castes. 

These concepts are pure types. The question is not: 

wh i ch is pr esent class or caste? Elements of both can 

market 

government 

I 

class 

caste 

(fluidity; movement 

(rigidity; no 

between groups) 

intergroup 

movement) 

Fig. 1: Class and Caste Distinctions 

be found in all societies. The key question is the 

cause of the relative mix of class and caste. If the 

anarchist analysis is correct, one would expect to find 

relat ively fewer castelike features, i.e., more fluidit 

y, i n m0 r e rna r ketor i e nted soc i e ties t han inthe m0 r e 

go v ernmen t d 0 min atedon e s. A d i c tat 0 r s hip wo u 1d be 

expected to contain more castelike features than a 

democracy. 

For both of these reasons, to avoid confusion with 

the Mar x ian a n a I y sis and t 0 rna ke c 1ear the a narchis t 

bel ief that in statist societies the distinction between 

the rul ing el i te and other social groups is qui te 

rigid, the term caste has been adopted. 

The second point needing clarification is the 

notion of conspiracy. The anarchist's caste analysis 

should not be interpreted as a conspiracy theory. 

Analyses of the distribution of power in society are 

96

One must admit that it is an accurate description 

o f d i c tat 0 r s hip s.. I nth e Sovie t Un 1 on t he Comm un i s t 

Party monopolizes control of the government and through 

it the entIre society. It is the sole political party; 

no 0 the r s are per mit ted toexis t . Adm iss ion tot he 

party is rigidly controlled with party membership kept 

to about five percent of the general population. Within 

the party power is concentrated in the hands of a 

very small group known as the Politburo. Since the 

Pol i tburo determines its own membership, it is a selfper 

pet u a tin g 0 I i gar.c h y • I tis c I ear t hat pa r t y members, 

and in particular party officials, monopolize 

power. Not surprisingly, this group also "enjoys the 

benefits that power brings." Officially, wealth is 

distributed fairly evenly. But this is quite misleadi 

n g b e c a use 0 f the hug e econ om i cand soc i a I ben e fits 

that accrue to party membership. Because of these 

benefIts, there is a waiting list for admission to the 

party. 

Large, centralized dictatorships such as the 

So vie tUn ion fit the a n arc his t 's ca s t e ana I ysis: a 

smal I, distinct ruling group monopolizes power and uses 

that power for its own benefit. But what of democracies 

such as the United States? Isn't it precisely 

bee a use d e moe raeyin t rod ucescom pet i t ion and t h us the 

eve r - pre sen t po s sibiii ty 0 f r emova I from 0 f f ice, t ha t 

the rulers neither [1] constitute a ruling caste nor 

[2] are able to use their power to their own advantage? 

Is there a rUling caste in the United States? Although 

space precludes a full-scale historical investigation, 

the evidence is at least very suggestive. 

While more open than in the Soviet Union, acquiring 

elite positions in the United States can hardly be 

said to be equally accessible to all. Political scientists 

Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone among others have 

concluded that the wealthiest twenty percent of the 

fami I ies in this country supply about ninety percent of 

the elite. Of the remaining ten percent about nine 

percent are drawn (rom families in the second twenty 

percent, with the remaining one percent scattered among 

the bottom sixty percent.(49) This is shown in FIg. 3. 

99

used cars, rather than direct corporations 

that sell them • When the list is 

comp i I ed of poss ible appointees to the 

Cabinet or possible candidates for the 

ambassadorship, it seems never to include the 

skilled, personable, hard-working used car 

salesman.(51) 

A finale 0 n sidera t i on i s t hat i nd i v i d ua 1s tend to 

associate with others of the same social status. It is 

qui.tena t u ra 1, the n, t hat t he r u 1 i ngel i t e wo u 1d r e 

cruit most heavi ly from those with upper class backgrounds 

similar to their own, just as those with upper 

class backgrounds naturally gravitate toward elite 

positions. For the same reason those from lower 

classes tend to enter less esteemed positions. The son 

of the president of General Motors is far more likely 

t 0 b ec om e a cor po rat e ex e cut i vethan a me c han i c; t he 

son of a garage mechanic is much less likely to become 

a corporate executive than a mechanic. 

In br i ef, the evidence does suggest that there is 

a ruling elite, that this elite is largely closed and 

tends to perpetuate itself, that elite recruitment is 

based on achievement but that there is a close affinity 

between achievement and birth. Moreover, none of this, 

i twa s a r g u ed, imp liesac0 ns p irac y • On the con t r a r y , 

the method of recruitment and self-perpetuation is 

qui tena t u r a I • A1though i t rna y bet00 s t rong tore fer 

to the rUling elite as a caste, it does exhibit a 

ca s tel ike qua lit y. The ques t ion tha t now mus t be addressed 

is: does this elite use its position to benefit 

itself? 

Even granting the existence of a ruling elite, 

doesn't compet i t i on for votes insure that the rulers 

will be responsive to the demands of the ruled? According 

to Anthony Downs this is precisely the case. 

The goa I of a po 1 it i ca I party, according to the 

Downsian model, is to win elections. As such it can be 

com par edt 0 the firmin the bus i ne s s wo rId. Jus t as i n 

a com pet i t i v e sit ua t i on the fir m wi 11 max i rn i z e profit s 

by maximizing sales, so a party will win elections by 

ma x i m i z i n g v 0 t e s. And jus t as the profit rno t i ve i nsur 

e s tha t the en t repreneur wi 11 respond to the demands 

of the consumer, the vote mot i ve, assuming that the 

voters are well informed, constrains the political entrepreneurs 

to respond to the demands of the electorate. 

The moment the entrepreneur, in either case, 

101

Responsiveness 

D ------------- 

W 

D' 

Information 

Fig. 4: Responsiveness as a Function of Information 

ut iii ty, and if the number of par"ties is sufficiently 

small, collusion rather than competition may be the 

opt ima I strategy. In fact, what is most interesting is 

that the better informed the electroate, the greater 

the incentive for collusion. As shown above, the better 

informed the electorate the more benefits the competi 

t ive party would have to provide the voters. This, 

of co u r s e, i s precis ely Downs' po i n t • Bu t t his a 1so 

means the fewer the benefits retained by the party. 

Thus, party competition with informed voters would all 

but el iminate the benefits to .party members. In such a 

situation instead of competing against one another to 

serve the voters, it becomes rational for parties to 

col 1 udew i thon e a not her a g a ins t the v0 t e r s • Ma j 0 r 

issues are then avoided, the competition is limited to 

"advertising and product differentiation," and the voters 

are denied a choice on fundamental policy issues. 

Collusion prevents the benefits from flowing to 

the voters. They are retained by the parties for int 

ernaId i s t ributi 0 n • T hus, e i the r wa Yt ace0 r ding to 

Wi t tman, the voters lose. If voters are completely uninformed 

the parties might compete but they will adopt 

policies that will provide themselves with all of the 

benefits. With two parties, each party would have a 50 

percent chance of winning 100 percent of the benefits. 

If voters are informed parties will collude, in which 

case each party will have a 100 percent chance of 

receiving 50 percent of the benefits. This is shown in 

Fig. 5. 

103

Utility 

of 

Party 

B 

A 

Percent of Income 

A = Expected Ut iii ty wi th 50% chance of 100% of the income 

and 50% chance of 0% of the income (competit 

ion) • 

B = Expected Ut iIi ty wi th 100% chance of 50% of the income 

(collusion). 

Fig. 5: Party Utility Under Competition and Collusion 

I n b r i e f, inc 0 n t r a s t tot h e Down s ia n modeli n 

wh i c h par tie s are viewed ass a I e s -rna x imi z i ng fir ms , 

Wittman depicts them as profit-maximizing oligolopists: 

Just as 01 igolopists often collude against 

the consumers, the parties may collude 

a g a ins t the v 0 t e r s • Insuc h casesthe dis 

tinct ion between multiparty systems and one 

party systems may not be very great.(53) 

F or 0 u r pur po s esit i s not nee e s s a r y to prove 

co II us ion, a I t hough several examples come immediately 

to mind: the 1940 agreement between Roosevelt and 

Wilk i e t 0 a v 0 i d the iss u e 0 f the wa r i n Eur 0 pe ; the 

apparently tacit agreement between the parties to avoid 

such issues as civil rights in the 1950's and the war 

in Vietnam in the 1960's. Since Downs' model hinges on 

the correlation between responsiveness and information, 

we need only examine this relationship. Public opinion 

studies consistently indicate an appalling lack of political 

knowledge on the part of the average citizen. 

On 1 y abo u t f i f t y per c e n t even know t hat ea c h s tat e has 

two Senators; fewer still can name their Congressman or 

know the length of his term, much less what party he 

belongs to or how he voted.(54) Given this dearth of 

in forma t ion, mos t voters would be much closer to W,W' 

t han D, D'. T hat i s to say, i n for rna t ion Ieve 1s are too 

low to insure much in the way of responsiveness. 

104

u n b a I a needin f a v0 r 0 f a ( we a I thy) min 0 r i t Y.n And, he 

add s, pro b ab I y "a b 0 u t 90. per c e ot 0 f the peopIe cannot 

get i n tot he pres sur e s ystem. " ( 57 ) This me an s t hat in 

sofar as the government responds to the demands of int 

ere s t g r 0 ups, and thosedema nds are mo reor I e s s r estricted 

to a wealthy minority, government policies 

will reflect the interests of this minority. Politicians, 

wr i tes Al fred Cuzan, "have no incentive to redis 

t ribute inc 0 mea n d we a I th from t t"h e rich t to' the 

poor • 1 A po lit i cia n g a ins no t hi ng t ax i ng we 11 - or ganized, 

well-informed, high-income groups and spending 

the money among a larger number of unorganized lowincome 

people who might not even realize the benefits 

of the action. On the contrary, the organized, highinc 

0 meg r 0 ups w i I lop p 0 s e him wh i lethe uno r gani zed 

p 0 0 r w i I I don 0 t h i n g • " " Pol i tica I profit i s rna de, " 

Cuzan continues, "by taxing the uninformed and the 

unorganized and spending on the informed and organized." 

The former tend to be poor; the latter the 

ric h • C u zan t· e r ms t his the "i ron I a w 0 f po1 i t i ca I 

redistribution."(58) . 

Far from representing the interests of the public 

at large, as claimed by the pluralists, the interest 

group system is, in fact., almost ideally suited to the 

interests of a wealthy elite. Thus, neither political 

par tie s nor i n t eres t gr 0 ups preve n t the emerge nee 0 f a 

r u lingel i t e • Nor, i t wo uIdse em, dothey preve n t t hat 

elite from using its position to benefit itself. 

From the foregoing one would expect that government 

would make class lines more rather than less 

fluid. A full scale test of this hypothesis would take 

us too far afield. But a cursory review of the data 

does lend support for it. 

The standard interpretation of the Progressive 

Period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries holds 

that many businesses had achieved monopolistic positions 

which they were using to gouge the public. Responding 

to pUblic pressure government intervened to 

subject business to regulatory control. Recent historical 

and economic scholarship has largely discredited 

this view by showing that the business elite actually 

favored government regulation. Why? Far from tending 

toward monopolism markets in practically every area 

were becoming increasingly competitive. To cite a single 

example, in 1894, A.T.&T. was the only company in 

its field. By 1907 A.T.&T. found itself in competition 

with over 22,000 companies. Similar, if less dramatic 

106

oft his eve r rea c h e s the poor. M0 s t of i t get s eaten 

upin bur e a u eratic 0 ve r heador s' i ph 0 ned 0 f f by Pr i vat e 

contractors.(64) 

We can now conclude this chapter. According to 

the anarchist caste analysis the upper classes are able 

to use their wealth to capture control of government. 

They are then able to use the coercive arm of government 

to institutional.ize their positions. In this proces 

s econom i c and social mobil i ty becomes more 

restricted as the economic class congeals into a political 

caste. This holds true, according to the theory, 

regardless of the type of government. 

Although dictatorships are more castel ike than democracies, 

the evidence does indicate support for the 

anarchist position. Neither political parties nor interest 

groups have prevented a rUling elite from emergi 

n g • Wh i lethis eli t e i s not c ompietel y c losed, i t 

does appear to be relatively permanent enough to be 

termed castelike, if not actually a caste. And finally, 

evidence was adduced which indicates that this 

elite does "enjoy the advantages that power brings." 

108

able to the majority." Human Action (Chicago: Henry 

Regner y, 1966), pp. 188-89. , 

(10}Those who deny the existence of the court 

his tor ian s s h 0 u Ide 0 n sui t Ha r ryE 1mer Ba r n e s , 

"Revisionism and the Historical Blackout," in 

Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, ed., Harry Elmer 

Barnes (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953), 1-78. On the 

strategic role of the intellectual in the United States 

i n man u f act uri ng the wa r ps y choI 0 g y neee s sa r y t 0 figh t 

the fir s two rid wa r see Ro be r t Ni s bet, The Twiii gh t 0 f 

Authority (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 

pp. 71-84. 

(ll)Nisbet, ,p. 189. 

(12)See, for example, Hanna Arendt, The Origins 

ofT0 t a lit a rian ism ( New Yo r k: Wo rid Publisher s, 19 71 ) , 

pp. 341-479. The pI i ght of the atomized individual 

a g a ins t the s tat e i sexcelie n t I Y po r t rayed in two 

novels, Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (New York: 

Bantam Books, 1972); and Franz Kafka, The Trial (New 

York: Vintage Books, 1969). The latter is particularly 

i n t rig u i n g sinc e i t wa s wr itt en prio r tot he consci 0 us 

development and employment of such tact ics in the 

1930's and 1940's by Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler. 

(13 )Wi toess, for example, the great, and at times 

absurd, lengths to which our government went to promote 

the celebrat ion of the bi-centennial. But it must be 

pointed out that thi's "veneration of tradition" is 

strictly one-sided. For while venerating particular 

traditions the state must simultaneously endeavor, as 

Nisbet points out, to sever all connections with the 

past that would conflict with one's duty and loyalty to 

the state. And in their places, he continues, the 

state will create "new ceremonies and symbols." Robert 

Nisbet, The Quest for Community (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1953), pp. 194-96. 

( 14 ) Rot h bar d, " Anat 0 my," p p. 37 - 4 1 • Bo t h the 

structure and the substance of this chapter draw heavilyon 

"The Anatomy of the State." 

(15)Randolph Bourne, "The State," The World of 

Ran dol ph B 0 urn e, e d. L ill ian SchI isse 1 ( New Yo r k: E. 

P. Dut ton and Co., 19 6 5 ), Pp. 261- 62 • 

(16)Quoted in Albert Jay Nock, Our Enemy, The 

State (New York: Free Li fe Edi t ions, 1973), p. 11. 

Also see John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on 

Go vernmen t (I n d ian a pol is: Bob b s -Me r r i I I Co., 19 5 3 ) , 

pp. 25-26. 

( 1 7 ) Be r t ran d de J 0 u v e n e I, 0 n P owe r tIts Nat ur e 

and the History of Its Growth (Boston: Beacon Press, 

1967), pp. 100-11. 

(18)Ibid., p. 48. 

110

(19)Ibid., p. 298-99. 

(20)Rothbard, "Anatomy," p. 43. 

(21)Murray Rothbard, "Conservatism and Freedom: A 

Libertarian Comment," Modern Age (Spring 1961), p. 

219 . 

(22) de Jouvenel, pp. 200ff. 

(23)Ibid., p. 11. Compare this with Proudhon's 

s t r i kin g commen t t hat "D em 0 era c y i s me rei y the s tat e 

raised to the nth power." Cited in Robert Nisbet, "De 

Bonald and the Concept of the Social Group," The 

Journal of .the History of Ideas (June 1944), p. 326, 

fn. 

(24)Bourne, pp. 248-50. 

( 25 ) See Ra 1ph K. Wh i t e' s exce 11 en t Nobody Wan ted 

War (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), especially Part 

Three, "Black-And-White Thinking," pp. 241-336. 

(26)Nisbet, Twilight, pp.181-82. 

( 2 7 ) B 0 urn e, p. 2 6 O. B0 urn e 's ant i s tat ism wa s a 

corollary of his pacifism for, he concluded, "We cannot 

crusade against war without crusading implicitly 

against the state," p. 260. The contemporary anarchist, 

Paul Goodman, also noted the link between pacifIsm 

and anarchism. See hIS interesting article, "The 

Ambiguities of Pacifist Politics," Patterns of 

A n are h y, e d s ., Leona r d Kr i mm ermanand Lew i s Per r y ( New 

Yo r k : Do ubI e day and Co., 19 68 ), p • 29 2 • 

( 28 ) The ex ten s I ve use 0 f the i n tel lee t ua I s -academics, 

writers and artists -- by the Wilson 

Administrat ion to manufacture, even prior to America's 

entry into World War I, a war psychology that functioned, 

as Bourne observed, to suppress every hInt of dissent, 

has long been overlooked. Thus, Nisbet's seemingly 

incredible comment that "the West's first real 

exper ience with totalitarianism -- political absolutism 

extended into every possible area of culture and society, 

education, religion, industry, the arts, local commun 

i ty and fami ly included, with a kind of terror always 

waitIng in the wings -- came with the American war 

state under Woodrow Wilson," (Twilight, p. 183), has 

a great deal of truth to it. 

(29)See, for example, Milton Friedman, "Playboy 

Interview," Playboy (May 1973), especially pp. 54, 

55, and 58. Also see Allan Mel tzer, Why Government 

Grows (Los Angeles: International Institute for 

Economic Research, 1976). 

(30)See, for example, two essays by Ludwig Von 

Mises in his Planning for Freedom (South Holland, 

Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1969), "MIddle-of-the-Road 

Pol icy Lea d s t 0 Soc iali s m," pp. 1 8 - 35; and " I n f I a t Ion 

and Price Control," pp. 72-82. Also see John Hagel, 

111

III, "From Laissez-Faire to Zwangswirtschaft: The 

Dynamics of Interventionism," -paper presented at the 

sym.pos.ium on Austrian Economics, University of 

Hartford, 22-28 June 1975. 

(31)Rothbard, "Anatomy," p. 48. 

( 32 ) Ca I h 0 un, p • 27 • 

( 3 3 ) Hob be s, Lev i a t han (N ew Yo r k: Wa s h i n g ton 

S qua reP res s, 19 69 ) • Espe cia I I Y see Chapt e r XX I I, "0f 

S Ys t em e s Sub j e c t , Po 1 i ticall and Pr i vat e ," pp. 157 - 69 , 

and C hapte r XX IX, "0f thoseth i ngs t hat We a ken, 0 r tend 

to the Dissolution of the Common-wealth," pp. 229-40: 

"Another infirmity of a Common-wealth is immoderate 

g rea t n e s s 0 faT 0 wn • • As a Iso the g rea t numbe r 0 f 

Corporations; which are as it were many lesser commonwealths 

in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the 

entraylesof a naturall man."p. 239. 

(34)For this perspective on totalitarianism I am 

heavi ly indebted to Robert Nisbet, especially his In 

Quest of Community, pp. 121-52. 

(35)Jacques Ellul points out a second reason for 

the emphasis on getting the individual to take an act 

i ve pa r tin the movement. The intent is to entangle 

the individual in the totalitarian web by enticing him 

to perform actiVIties for the party or ideology. If 

thesec0 n f 1 i c t wit h the i nd i v i d uaI' s bel ie f s, ps y c hoi 0 

gical stress, or "cognitive· dissonance," results. The 

individual desires to relieve this stress by eliminatting 

the conflict between his actions and his beliefs. 

This can be accomplished either by altering one's actions 

or by altering one's beliefs. But, notes Ellul, 

. sin c e act ion s are s t ron gerand mo r e coneret e t han be 

I iefs, and once committed cannot be retracted, the normal 

response is for the individual to alter his beliefs 

to conform with his (deviant) actions. Jacques Ellul, 

Propaganda, The Formation of Men's Attitudes (New 

York: Vintage, 1965). 

(36)Ibid., p. 11. 

(37)Aleksander Solzhenitsyn has understood and related 

th-is phenomenon very clearly in his anecdote on 

Bukharin. Stalin, he says, put Bukharin through psychological 

hell by not arresting him. In his purge of 

the rightists, Stalin had arrested all of BUkharin's 

comrades. Yet Bukhar in, as leader of the rightists, 

was not. Hewa sin for me d 0 f the c ha r ge s rna d e a ga ins t 

him by his former comrades, Kamenev and Zinoviev. Much 

earl ier in his career he was threatened with expulsion 

from the Party, and Bukharin promptly renounced his 

views to remain in it. He was prepared to do the same 

thing now, but Stalin refused to answer his numerous 

letters. A.nd, say.s Solzhenitsyn, "no one visited him 

112

See my "Class Analysis and Economic Systems," The 

Libertarian Forum (October 1975), pp. 5-7. The same 

theme is pursued further in my "Karl Marx, Benjamin 

Tucker and Class Ana lys is," (Paper Presented at the 

Libertarian Scholars Conference, October 22-24,1976, 

New York, New York.) 

( 4 6 ) Gera 1 d Ve r reman, "The Con c e p t 0 f Ca s t e ," The 

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New 

York: Macmillan, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 333-39. There are, 

of course, other characteristics, such as heredity, but 

rigidity Beems to be the most important. 

( 47 ) See Thoma s S owe I I, E thn i c Amer i ca (N ew Yor k : 

Bas i c Boo k s, 19 81 ) • On the use 0 f e con om i csta tis tics 

bearing on the issue of upward mobility-see Thomas 

Sowell, KnOWledge and Decisions (New York: Basic 

Books, 1980), pp. 344 and 364-66. 

(48)Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50. 

(49)Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, The Ruling 

Elites (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 136-37. 

(50) See ibid., pp. 137-38; Michael Parenti, 

Dern 0 c r a c y for the Few ( New Yo r k: St. Ma r tin's, 19 7 7 ) , 

pp. 34- 35; Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of 

Dem0 c r a c y (M 0 n t ere y, Ca 1.: Dux bur y, 19 8 1 ), PP • 29 - 64 , 

and Albert Jay Nock, Our Enemy. 

(51)Prewitt and Stone, pp. 143-44. 

( 5 2 ) Ant h 0 n y 0 \0 w n s, An E con om i c The 0 r y 0 f 

Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). 

(53)Donald Wittman, "Parties as Utility 

Maximizers," American Political Science Review (June 

1973), pp. 490-98. Fig. 5 is taken from p. 497. 

(54)See Dye and Zeigler, p. 191. 

( 5 5 ) Down s, pp. 2 0 7 -76 • AIso see Go r don Tu 11 0 c k , 

Toward a Mathernat i cs of Pol it ics (Ann Arbor: 

University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 82-143. 

(56)See David Truman, The Governmental Process 

(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951); Robert Dahl, Who 

Governs? (New Haven: Yale, 1962); and Earl Latham, 

The Group Basis of Politics (New York: Octagon Books, 

1965). 

(57)E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign 

P e 0 pie (H ill s dale, I 1 1 .: Dry den Pre s s, 197 5), pp. 

34-35. (58)Alfred Cuzan, "Political Profit: Taxing and 

Spending in the Hierarchical State," American Journal 

of Economics and Sociology (July 1981), pp. 265-71. 

(59) See Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of 

Conservatism (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967); 

Gab r i elK 0 1 k 0 "P 0 we ran d Cap italismin 20 t h Cen t ur y 

America," Liberation (December 1970), pp. 21-26; D. 

114

T. Armantano, The Myths of Antitrust (New Rochelle: 

A r 1 i n g ton H 0 use, 1 9 7 2 ) ;. .A• S. 0 ew i ng, ItA Stat i s tica 1 

Test of the Success of Consolidations," Quarterly 

Journal of Economics (1921), pp. 84-101; Yale Brozen, 

"Is Government the Source of Monopoly?" The 

Intercollegiate Review (Winter 1968-69), pp., 67-78; 

and Ron aId Rado s han d Mu r ray Rot h bar d, e d s ., ANew 

History of Leviathan (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1971). 

Kolko is a New Left writer who is not at all friendly 

to the free market. For attempts to fit Kolko into a 

I ibertarian framework see Roy Childs, "Big Business and 

the Rise of American Statism," The Libertarian 

Alternative, ed. Tibor Machan (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 

1974); and my "The Free Market and the 'Tyranny of 

Wealth'," The Freeman (December 1976), pp. 749-56. 

( 6 0 ) Jam e sMa r tin, " Bus·i n e s san d the New 0 e a 1 , " 

Reason (December 1975), p. 26; Prewitt and Stone, pp. 

44-50; and Radosh and Rothbard, pp. 111-87. 

(61) Jos eph Pechman and Benjamin Okner, Who Bears 

The Tax Burden? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 

InstItution, 197f), p. 10. 

(62 )Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty (New 

Yo r k: Ma cm ill an, 1974) p. 190. 

(63)Walter Williams, "Commentary," Newsweek 

(September 24, 1979), pp. 57-59. 

(64)AIso see George Stigler, "Director's Law of 

Pu b I i c Inc 0 meR e dis t ributi 0 n ," The J 0 urna 1 0 f Law and 

Economics (April 1970), pp. 1-10; Gordon Tullock, "The 

Ch a r i t Y 0 f the Un c ha r ita b Ie," We s t ern Econom i c J 0 urna 1 

(December 1971), pp. 379-92; and my "The Government, 

the Market and the Poor," The Freeman (November 

1980), pp. 643-59. 

115

116

tion for the phenomenon of imperialism. This does not 

mean that either libertarians in general or the free 

mar keta narc his t sin pa r tic u I a r den y the ex i s tenceo f 

imp e ria 1 ism. On the con t r a r y, thereappea r s t 0 bege neral 

agreement that imperialism does exist, although 

there is nothing resembling what can be termed "the 

libertarian theory of imperial ism." In fact, three 

dis tin c t v e r s i on s can bed i s c ern ed, all 0 f wh i c h , 

ass umin g the val i d i t Y 0 f Say' s Law, see the mo t i ve 

for ceof impe ria lism not inthe rna r ke.t but inthesta t 

ist restrictions on the market. 

1. THREE THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM 

General overproduction might be impossible. But 

i n t e r fer e n c e wit h the rna r ke t proc e s s dis r up t s the i nformation 

flow of the price mechanism, resulting in 

shortages of some goods and unsaleable surpluses of 

o the r s • Sma 1 I erna t ion s are 1 imit e d to a 11 ow ing t he 

economy to falter, abandoning the interventionist policy 

and perm itt i ng the painful readjustment process to 

take place, or attempting to stimulate the economy 

through further domestic interventionist measures. But 

the larger and stronger nations have an important additional 

option: imperialism and aggressive nationalism. 

There are three types of domestic intervention that 

libertarians see as having imperialistic ramifications. 

a. Autarky. 

Libertarians argue that interference with the 

pr ice mechanism of the market has international ramificat 

ions which push the interventionist nation toward 

aut ark y, i. e ., a pol icy 0 f nat ion a lee0 nom i c self 

sufficiency. Regardless of whether the government intervened 

to benef i t the workers, the consumers or the 

entrepreneurs the effect is the same: prices for some, 

or in certain circumstances all, goods are forced above 

their would-be market prices. If wages are raised 

abovet h e irmar ketIevel s the i mme d i ate impact will be 

to raise production costs, thereby reducing the income 

oft h e e n t rep r e n e u r s . T his will d r i vethe rna r gina 1 

producers out of business and discourage additional inves 

tmen tin t hos e fields. The resul t ing reduct ion in 

output wi 11 then cause the prices in those fields to 

r i s e . T h us, go v ern men tin t e r ven t ion to hoi d wa gesup 

wi 1 1 have the same effect as attempts to hold prices up 

for the benefit of businessmen: domestic prices at 

above world-market levels. Efforts to hold prices down 

119

concludes, "planning means autarky."(l'2) 

The dilemma of intervention, however, is that 

wh i lei t for c esana t ion tow a r d aut ark y, c omp 1e t e 

autarky "is not practical anywhere." Even in a country 

as large and well-endowed as the United States, there 

are s u c h e ssen t i a 1 rna t e ria 1s as rubberand tin t hat we 

do not possess.(13) But, if intervention necessitates 

autarky and if autarky is impossible for most countries 

and p 0 s sib 1 e on 1y a t very grea t s a cr. i f ices for others. 

the n go ve r n rn e n tin t e r ven t ion mustiead to a po 1 icy 0 f 

imperialism and/or war to make autarky possible.(14) 

Libertarians see autarky as a major factor in both 

world wars. The domestic interventions which were occurring 

with increasing rapidity during the last half 

of the· nineteenth and first part of the twentieth cent 

uri e s produeedthe pre- WorId Wa r I tar iff rna n i a • The 

reSUlting economic isolationism, with its consequent 

drive for territorial aggrandizement, made the outbreak 

of war only a matter of time.(IS) While immensely complicated 

by both the personality of Adolf Hitler and 

the world-wide depression of the 1930's, the explanat 

ion for the 0 u t b reak 0 f wa r i n E ur 0 p e i n 19 39 i s fun 

damentally the same. As the depression hit Europe each 

nat ion adopted prohibitive tariffs as a. device to stimulate 

their economies by encouraging the purchase of 

domestically produced goods. Similarly, since every 

nat ion was eager to protect its wage levels against encroachment 

from nations with still lower wage levels, 

very strict anti-immigration laws were passed by all 

E u r 0 pea n nat ion s • The res u 1 t wa s t ha t once againa 

European war was made all but inevitable by the resulting 

drive of each nation toward autarky, i.e., for 

"Lebenstraum."(16) 

b. Planned Scarcity. 

A closely related view is that imperialism is a 

result of what may be termed a policy of "planned 

scarcity," i.e., granting privileges to a few firms, 

permitting them to restrict production in order to 

r a i s e p ric e s. Fir s tad van c e d by Adam Sm i t h in his 

critique of mercantilism as early as 1776, and in the 

twentieth century by Joseph Schumpeter under the rubric 

of "export monopolism" and by John Flynn, it has been 

defended more recently by Joseph Stromberg.(17) 

According to this theory, big business never wantedt 

0 bel eft a Ion e • I twa n ted to be f r e e from the 

121

isks of competition and to institu'tionalize its posit 

ion i nth e e con om i cand soc i a 1 s t rue t ur e • Sinc e t his 

required licensing restrictions, tariffs, subsidies and 

the 1 ike, such economic stabilization entailed close 

relations with government.(18) Thus, big business quite 

naturally gravitated toward government, and the destruction 

of the political power of the southern agricultural 

interests in the Civil War proved to be acrit 

i ca I wa t er shed in Amer i can. his tory for the only opposit 

ion tot he' nor the r n i nd us t rialin t eres t s wa s elimi 

nated. The post-bellum period was therefore characteri 

zed by. g 0 v ernmentin t e r vent ion des i gned to aid big 

business by keeping prices up and wages down. Monopolistic 

privileges were granted toa few favored firms, 

per mit tin g them t 0 s e I I a tab0 vema r ke t price s, wh i I e 

tar i ffs were enacted to keep out foreign competition. 

Aside from the autarkical dimensions of the policy, 

there are other serious ramifications. 

S t rom be r g bel i eve s t hat ago v e r nmen t po I icy of 

planned scarci ty mus t, of necessity, result in imperialism. 

"Briefly," he says, "steep tariffs enabled a 

great many American firms to price their goods well 

above the world market levels. At these prices the 

quantities produced could not be sold. But to take 

f u I I a d van tag e 0 fee 0 nom i c s 0 f sealethesequantit i e s 

had to be produced. At this point, the cry went up for 

foreign markets for the unsold surplus."(19) 

A var iat ion of the foregoing' is that monopolies 

may be pr 0 fit a b 1 e bu t t hey become more prof i table as 

the area covered by the monopoly expands. Hence, if 

there is a pol it ico-economic elite powerful enough to 

use the government to obtain monopoly profits for 

thems e I vesther e i s noreas 0 n wh y they wo u I d not a Iso 

be powerful enough to increase their profits by expanding 

production beyond what can be sold in the home market 

and then using the government to extend the area of 

their monopoly beyond their own borders. This view,in 

fact, was an essential part of Adam Smith's critique of 

mercant i 1 ism. Permitting the colonists to trade only 

wi th England, he noted, enabled the few favored English 

merchants to increase their monopoly profits far beyond 

what they would have been if the monopoly had been restricted. 

to England. The only beneficiaries of mercantilism, 

he said, were "the rich and powerful."(20) 

This, according to the proponents of the theory, 

is a major factor in Amer ican foreign pol icy throughout 

the twen"tieth century, manifesting itself in the 

122

Spa n ish - Arne ric a n War, the two Wo rId Wa r sand the Co 1d 

War. Man y I i be r tar ian s are inag r e erne n t wit h the rev i 

s ion i s t his tor ian Rob e r t S mit h, wh 0 c I aims t hat the 

United States "wanted to preserve an international 

order in which the country could have the fruits of an 

imperial position. The British and French empires were 

important elements in the maintenance of this system•.• 

Thus ,when the Fr-ench collapsed and the British began 

to falter in mid-1940, the United States officials were 

faced with the di lemma of when and. how militarily to 

engage the disruptors of the status quo."(21) Thus, 

the Roosevelt administration had a vested economic interest 

in the adoption of a policy of imperialism and 

war. 

They also believe that the Truman Doctrine, which 

is the basis of the United States Cold War policy, has 

merely supplied a new ideological justification for the 

consistent American foreign policy of economic expansion 

and global hegemony. While the American policy 

rna k e r ssp 0 k e 0 f c 0 mm un i s taggres s ion and the powe r 0 f 

the Soviet Union, this was primarily a ploy to generate 

popular support. In actual fact, they believe, far 

from fear of Soviet power, the American policy makers 

were well aware of the Soviet weakness vis-a-vis the 

United States and used this advantage to expand American 

economic and political controls.(22) 

But a pol icy 0 f pIanned s car cityen t a i Is two s i gnificant 

ramifications. Not only is there unemployment 

resulting from the reduced production,but the result 

of the monopoly profits on the one hand, together with 

the restriction of production on the other, results in 

the ph e nomen 0 n 0 f sur p Ius capit a I. Wh i lethe I a t t e r 

may be solved by overseas expansion as Stromberg sugges 

t s, the problem of unemployment remains. The traditional 

method of handling unemployment in the intervent 

ionist system is to make government invest the savings 

that private business will not. But the government investment 

must be in areas outside the economic system, 

for otherwise the additional production in the 

areas where the government invests will force some of 

the private firms out of business. In that case, government 

investment would simply replace private investment 

in those areas, and neither additional investment 

nor job s w i I I ha ve res u I ted . Wh i leothe r pro j e c t s rna y 

be found, Flynn feels that since the project [1] must 

be 0 net hat w i I I sat i s f yeo n s e r vat i ve and t a x paying 

elements of the country, and [2] must be, at least in a 

federal system, handled entirely at the federal level, 

123

pIe and interest to the government bondholders is by 

ado p tingap 0 1 ICy 0 fin f 1a t ion, i. e ., by Pr i nting mo r e 

money. Inflation, however, is seen as having an 

imperialistic dynamic of its own. 

c. Inflation. 

Relying heavily on the "Austrian" theory of the 

business cycle, some libertarians see the cause of imperial 

ism in inflation. Economist W&lter Grinder notes 

that since the state prints the money it reaps a pure 

economic gain from its activities. But it reaps a 

pol it ieal gain as well, since it is usual-ly easier for 

the government to finance its activities simply by expan 

din g the m0 n e y sup ply rat her t han at tern pting to 

raise taxes. But other beneficiaries of the inflationary 

process are also noted. "When the state buys from 

a 'private' contractor," says Grinder, "both the contractor 

and the bank have gained: the contractor, because 

he can pay for resources before their prices 

r is e, and t he bank, because its reserves and therefore 

its loanable funds (assets) ha ve been expanded. In the 

initial stages of inflation, it would appear, the 

state, the banks and the government contractors have a 

vested interest in inflationary polieies."(25) But regardless 

of why inflationary policies have been adopted, 

some libertarians feel that a nearly inevitable 

corollary of domestic inflationary policies is that of 

imperialism. 

According to the "Austrian" business cycle theory, 

an increase in the supply of money and credit forces a 

reduct ion in the rate of interest. Since interest becomes 

an increasingly important cost factor the further 

removed a stage is from the point of final consumption, 

the reduction stimulates production in the capital 

goods industries at the expense of the consumer goods 

i n d us t r i e s. One impor tan t conseq uen ce oJ t his accor di 

n g t 0 J 0 h n Hagelis t hat "comme rica 1 act i v i t y a b r 0 a d 

wi 11 therefore be increasingly supplemented by longterm 

investment in producing facilities--both foreign 

manufacturing enterprises and resource extraction ind 

u s t r i e s . " T his sit u a t ion i scornp0 un ded by the fa c t 

that since inflation encourages production in such capital 

goods areas as resource extraction, it will tend 

to encourage investment in less developed countries 

which ordinarily export resources to the more developed 

nat ionsin e x c han ge for fin ishe d good s . Co nseq ue n t I Y, 

inflation will tend to increase the ratio of foreign to 

domestic investment which, in turn, will mean that cer- 

125

t his recur r i n g s p e c t a c I e of increasing inventor i e s of 

unsaleable goods that is largely responsible, according 

to these theorists, for the persistent popularity of 

the overproduction doctrine. But if the libertarians 

are correct, these periodic "surpluses" are not the 

res uIto f g e n era I 0 ve r pro due t ion but 0 f rna linves tmen 

t, wh i chi n t urn 0 c cur s not fro m the rna r ke t but 

from the government spawned inflation. 

But Hagel points out that it is. no.t the objective 

causes of the business cycle but the subjective percept 

ion s 0 fit by the pol icy rna ke r s t hat de t e r mine what 

the pol icy wi 11 be. "Since rapid expansion of foreign 

investment characterized the earlier period of economic 

pro s per i t y, itis not sur p r i sing ," he says, "that rna ny 

draw the conclusion that expansion abroad provides the 

key to renewed domestic prosperity." Thus, "foreign 

markets are mistakenly perceived as an essential 'safety 

valve' which will permit an indefinite postponement 

of that period of readjustment." 

The s eli be r tar iansse e con sidera b 1e his tor i ca I 

support for this variant of the imperialistic dynamic. 

I ntheye a r s p rio r tot h e 0 u t b rea k 0 f the Span ish- 

American War in 1898 America was mired in the throes of 

the worst depression it had experienced up to that 

tim e • The cry was r a i sed t hat wh a t wa s neede d we r e 

"new outlets for American capital and new opportunities 

for American enterprise."(20) It is not generally recog 

n i zed t hat Roo s eve 1 t f S New De a I pol i c i e s fa i 1edt0 

revive the American economy during the 1930's. Unemployment 

was at a height of 14.6 percent even as late 

a s 1 9 4 O. Con seq u e n t 1Y, itis a r g ued, Ro 0 s eve I t began 

to look at war and foreign expansion as a cure for the 

economic difficulties. As New Left historian Robert F. 

Smith noted, "the New Deal recovery program was based 

par t 1 Y u P0 ntherecover y and ex pans ion 0 f for e i gn rna r 

kets."(30) Hence, the expansionist policies of Japan 

and Germany were viewed with increasing fear. 

d. Imperialism and Popular Support. 

If the individualist anarchists are correct, the 

chief beneficiaries of the combined policies of domestic 

intervention and foreign imperialism are the elite. 

And since a policy of domestic intervention is believed 

to restrict output, create unemployment and lower the 

standard of living, and since imperialism is often 

accompanied by blood shed by the common man, the majori 

ty would seem to be the long run losers. An important 

127

question then becomes "why the majorities pay the expenses 

and fight the wars necessitated by imperial 

expansion."(31) 

One reason would seem to be that while the majority 

might lose in the long run the reduction in unemployment 

does give it an immediate gain (rom imperialism. 

And there is little doubt that the short run is 

felt more keenly than the long run. Second, and perhaps 

more important, is what may be termed the "1984 

ploy. " The 1984 ploy is seen as a me t hod used by the 

eli t e togen era t e po pu I a r supportf0 r its po 1ic i e s by 

means of conscious deception. The interventionist syst 

em, say s F I,Yn n, " des pit e its prom i e s 0 f a bundan c e , 

nee e s sitate s g rea t per sona I and financia I sac r i fiee s , 

whie h p e 0 pie cannot be i ndueedt0 rna ke i nthe i n t eres t 

ofor din a r y 0 b j e c t i ve s 0 f c i villi f e and wh i c h they 

wi 11 submi t to only when they are presented with some 

national crusade or adventure on the heroic model 

touch ing deeply the spr ings of chauvinistic pride, 

interest and feeling," or, he says elsewere, with "the 

fears of. the aggressive ambitions of other 

countries."(32) 

The classic example of this, according to the anarchist, 

is in the Roosevelt Administration's policy 

pri'or to America's entry into World War II. For the 

short-run reason of lifting the country out of the 

depress ion and for the long-run reason of preserving 

and promoting an internaitonal economic order conducive 

to American dominance, the Roosevelt Administration 

ado pte d a pol icy 0 f impe ria 1 ism and wa r • But a d iff i 

cult problem faced by Roosevelt was that throughout the 

1930's opinion polls consistently indicated that eighty 

per c en t of the Arne r i can People opposed enter i nga Eur 0pean 

war. Even as late as July, 1941, the figure remained 

as high as seventy-seven percent. Consequently, 

Roosevelt adopted a policy consciously designed to "lie 

us into war." Roosevelt's policy of increasing truculence 

toward Germany, manifested by such programs as 

the destroyer deal with England, Lend-Lease, and conv 

0 yin g, wasintendedt0 prod Ge r rna nyin t 0 a t t a c king the 

U.S. But it was officially justified on the grounds 

t hat sue h a po liey 0 f "s t r eng t h" wa s neee s sa r y to ke e p 

us out of war. Roosevelt not only promised "again and 

again and again" that he would not send American boys 

into any foreign war, but characterized his policy as 

one des i g ned 11 t 0 i sol ate 0 u r s e 1 ve s from wa r . nTh i s 

same pol.icy was followed toward Japan. Since an incident 

was required to swing public opinion behind him, 

128

ass urethe sur v i val and sueces S 0 f 1 i be r t y ," and Lyndon 

Johnson's "shrunken world theory of defensive war," 

which held that "warfare anywhere on earth could, if 

the President so judged, constitute an attack on the 

Uni ted States and thereby authorise him to wage 'defensive' 

war without congressional consent."(36) But not 

only did the conservatives usually adhere to the goals 

of "liberal internationalism," theysuppl"emented these 

goa I s wit h the i rown pol icy 0 fan ticomm un ism and the 

two bee arne a I I but i ndis ting u isha b Ie. The res u I t wa s 

the emergence of the "bi-partisan" foreign policy of 

the postwar period which, according to Bresler,. "immobil 

ized opposition to the executive and denied the public 

a focal point for debate."(37) 

Quite clearly, both "liberal internationalism" and 

" i n t ern a t ion a 1 ant i c omID un ism" r e qui red a n act i ve for e 

ign pol icy. An active foreign policy in turn necessitated 

the centralization of power in the executive 

branch, and the absence of any organized foreign policy 

debate reSUlting from "bi-partisanship" permitted that 

centralization. Whether unwittingly or not, the ideology 

of 1 iberal internationalism, says Bresler, played 

into the hands of the corporate elite who required just 

such an active foreign policy to insure world stability 

and the protection of their investments.(38) Thus 

"liberal internationalism" is believed to have provided 

the necessary ideological cloak for a policy of imperialism 

and economic exploitation. 

But whenever that policy resulted in bloody wars, 

and support for it began to wane, reliance on the other 

e 1 em e nt, the f ear 0 f for e i g n enem i es, wa s uti lize d • 

The active foreign policy of "liberal internationalism" 

includes the establishment of military bases throughout 

the world and these, in turn, insure that enemies 

wi 11 always be found when they are needed. George 

Lundberg commented that 

Ace 0 r din g toe u r r en t pol icy, 0 ur na tiona I 

secur i ty demands mi 1 i tary bases around the 

W 0 rid and e 1 abo rat e mil itaryes tab 1 i s hme n t s 

off the shores or on the frontiers of other 

nations. .It is solemnly affirmed that 

these provisions are for defense only, and 

an ype r son , party, or foreign nat ion t hat 

fails to take our word for this intent is 

roundly abused and is accused of aggressive 

designs upon us.(39) 

130

pol icy. But this, of course, is not' history at all; it 

is merely dogma. 

What 0 f the nob j e c t i ve n e v idenee? Ha ve Am e rican 

i n t e r v e n t ion s c 0 inc ided wit h Ame rica n bus i ne ssint e r 

ests? Once again, the evidence provides little support 

of the theory. In fact, argues Slater, "There is no 

case in which it can persuasively be argued that Washi 

n g ton res 0 r t edt 0 serious covert political action or 

the us.e 0 far me d .for ceon beha I f 0 f pr ivateeconom i c 

interests as such."(45) Korea and Vietnam, America's 

two majorpost-1945 wars, cannot be explained by economi 

c factors. Both were immensely costly in both human 

and material terms. Yet neither nation possessed 

e i the r i ndis pens a b 1eraw rna t e riaIsor the 1ureof grea t 

markets. The same is true of such interventions as 

Laos, Cambodia, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala. 

New Left historians like Williams are aware of the diff 

i cui t y and h a vet r i edt 0 res cue the i r pos i t i on by 

claiming that such economically counterproductive interventions 

were necessary to preserve the capitalist 

system as a whole. But as Slater points out "a theory 

t hat iss 0 b r 0 ad t hat i tis c a pableof 'exp I a i n ing , 

bot h A and its 0 P P os i te B (i n t e r ven t i on and non in t e rv 

e n t ion, i n t e r v e n t ion t hat i sec0 nom i c a I I Y prod uc t i ve 

and i n t e r ve n t ion t hat isec0 n om i c a I 1Y cos t I y). • • i s no 

theory at all, but simplydogma."(46) 

Moreover, many cases which appear on the surface 

to 'be in conformi ty wi th the theory do not hold up 

un d e r dee per a n a I y sis • I tis we 11 known t hat in the 

ear ly 1950's the CIA played a major role in undermining 

the Mossedegh government in Iran and restoring the 

Shah. A popular explanation of this is that the CIA 

intervened because Mossedegh had nationalized foreignown 

e d 0 i I hoi din gsin 1 9 5 1 • But s eve r a I t h i n gs rna ke 

this scarcely credible. First, Iran continued to receive 

substantial American foreign aid throughout 1952, 

eve n afterna t ionali z a t ion. And sec 0 nd, the r e we r e 

n 0 Arne ric a n - 0 wned 0 i 1 compan i esin I ran a t t his time • 

Thus, intervention could not have occurred to protect 

Am e ric a n bus i n e s sin t ere s t s • I n fa c t, sinc e Am erica 

was an oil exporter at this time, the cut off of 

Iranian oil shipments proved to be a boon for American 

oil interests. What actually precipi tated the CIA move 

was Washington's increasing unease at Iran's leftward 

drift, symbolized by the signing of an oil sale agreement 

wi th Eastern European countries. Washington felt 

i t e sse n t i a 1 t hat a s tab 1e, non c omm un i s t I ran be pre 

served. 'It should also be pointed out that the restor- 

134

This is in conformity with the th'eory. However, the 

stu d y a Iso s howe d t hat rna ny 0 f the co un t r i e s wit h the 

highest inflation rates were also relatively weak: 

Vietnam, Brazil, Chile, and Uganda.(51) The conclusion 

seems to be that there is no relationship between 

inflation on the one hand and imperialism, or at least 

the 0 p t ion 0 f pur sui n g anirn per i a lis tic po I icy, 0 nthe 

other. 

One major problem with the theory is theassurnpt 

ion t hat LDes sup ply raw rna t e ria1st0 the devel 0 pe d 

countr ies and the latter supply manufactured goods to 

the LOCs. Ths distinction is unfounded. All engage in 

bot h res 0 u r c e ext r act ion and rna nu fa c t uri ng • The distinct 

ion is one of degree, not kind. Currently, over 

25 percent of all exports from LOCs are manufactured 

goo d s, and t his fig u re i srising rap i d 1Y• Co un t r i e s 

such as Singpore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and 

Brazi 1 have all become major exporters of electronic 

e qui pm e n t s u chas TVsand r ad i 0 s • And aut om 0 b i I e product 

ion has recent ly been increasing at a yearly rate 

of 14 percent in Brazil and nearly 10 percent in 

Mexico, compared to only 4.4 percent in the U.S. and 

3.4 percent in Britain. And the Philippines, South 

Korea and Malaysia are also becoming major producers of 

aut 0 mob i 1 e s. Con ve r s ely, devel 0 pe d co un t r i e s 1 ike the 

U.S. are major exporters of agricultural products or, 

in the case of Canada, major sources of raw 

materials.(52) 

Since inflation is supposed to stimulate the resource 

extraction industries while harming the manufact 

uri n g sec tor s, and sinc e nea r I y a I I nat ions are mix 

tures of both, inflation, even granting the logic of 

the the 0 r y, w0 u 1 d not n e c e s sa r i I Y rna k e a nat ion mo r e 

d e pen den t u p 0 n "k e y raw rna t e rialinput s from a br 0 ad. t1 

This would depend upon such factors as what resources a 

country needed but had to import, what manufacturing 

industries it possesses and the relative mixture of 

resource extraction and manaufacturing. 

But perhaps the kernel of truth in the theory is 

that as a nation enters a depression and goods pile up 

unsold while unemployment begins to rise, there naturally 

begins a frantic search for new markets as outlets 

for these goods. And new markets usually mean foreign 

markets. This is plausible and it is quite possible 

that such considerations were at least contributing 

factors in some of the wafS that have occurred in the 

last two' centuries. But motivations are difficult to 

138

determine and an examination of this aspect of the 

theory is not possible here. 

However, influenced by the New Left historians 

man y an arc his t s, a s we have seen , be 1 ie ve that Pres i 

dent Roosevelt intentionally maneuvered the United 

States into a war with Japan in order to stimulate the 

economy and reduce unemployment. In view of the overrid 

i n g his tor i c a limp 0 r tanceof Ame rica's en try i n t 0 

W0 rid Wa r I I, 0 nemus t ask: i s t his i.n t e r pretat ion consistent 

with the available evidence? This much is beyond 

dispute. Even as late as the early 1940's the 

economy was still sluggish and unemployment high. The 

Japanese code had been broken and the leaders in 

Was h i n g ton, inc Iud i ng Ro 0 s eve1 t, knew t hat the J a pane s e 

were preparing to attack the United States, probably on 

Dec e mb e r 7, but the exact tar get wasst ill un c e r t a in. 

And, Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor were not adeq 

u.a tel yap p r i zed 0 f t his i n for rna t ion. The reason s for 

this have never been clear. In Infamy, the most 

recent study of Pearl Harbor, historian John Toland 

argues that as the Office of Naval Intelligence monitor 

ed the approach of the Japanese a t tack force, Roosevelt 

was faced with three options: [1] publicize the 

fact that the U.S. was tracking the Japanese carrier 

fleet. This "would indubitably have forced Japan to 

turn back;" [2] take appropriate military measures inc 

Iud i ngin for min g Ki mm e 1 and Sh0 r t • Sinc e the suec e s s 

of the Japanese attack depended upon secrecy, this too 

would have forced them to turn back; and [3] keep 

Kimmel and Short and "all but a select few in ignorance." 

Ths last option is logical only on the assumpt 

ion t hat i twa s Roos eve 1t 's i n ten t ion toge t Ame rica 

i n tot hewa r. Thus, the thesis t hat Ro 0 s eveltdesir e d 

war in order to stimulate the economy is at least consistent 

with the known facts surrounding the Pearl 

Harbor catastrophe. But this by no means proves the 

thesis, for it is not the only one that is consistent 

wit h the d a t a . Anot her ex pIanat ion i s t hat Ro 0 s eve I t 

sincerely believed that the total destruction of 

Western civilization was a distinct possiblity in the 

absence of American intervention against Nazi Germany. 

Since the country was badly divided on the issue he required 

some dramatic event which would unify the nation 

and galvanize the American people for the Crusade to 

save Western civilization. As Toland puts it, "The 

first bomb dropped on Oahu would have finally solved 

the pro b 1 em 0 f get tin g a n Am e ric a - - hal f 0 f wh 0 s e 

people wanted peace -- into the crusade against 

Hitler ."(53) Roosevelt's mistake, says Toland, is that 

139

explained by psychological, not economic, factors. 

What the I i be r tar ian the 0 r i e s ass e r tis a ca usa I 

con nee t Ion bet weeneer t a i n domest icecon om i c po lie i e s 

and international conflict and war. For the most part 

the theories are valid in the sense of being internally 

consistent. Moreover, the assumptions on which they 

are based are plausible. This is especially true of 

the autarky and planned scarcity theories. It is likely, 

for example, that the significant increase in government 

regulations in practically all nations during 

the 1930 t s was partially responsible for the drive for 

autarky by both Germany and Japan, and there is little 

doubt that the drive for autarky was an important cause 

of hostilities in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. 

The theor ies are able to explain the relationship 

between particular domestic economic policies and 

international turmoil quite well. Similarly they can 

b e use d topred i e t t hat ce r t a i nee0 nom i cpo1 i c i e s are 

likely to result in foreign conflict. But the theories 

cannot claim that international conflict results only 

from these policies. Thus, if the theories are viewed 

not a s the e x pIanat ion 0 f impe ria lismand wa r but a s 

one explanation among several, they are on solid 

ground. 

It should also be pointed out that there is no 

logically necessary connection between the existence of 

a domestic elite and a policy of imperialism and war. 

It is quite possible for the elite to subscribe to a 

policy of international conciliation or even isolation. 

Similarly, it is conceivable for a nation even in the 

absence of an el i te to adopt a policy of aggressive 

nat ion a lis m • T h us, the findingsin Chapt e r I I I 0 f a 

governing elite in the United States coupled with the 

conclus ion of Chapter IV of a non-imperialistic 

American foreign policy is in no way contradictory. 

Finally, despite all the words that have been 

written on both sides of the imperialism debate one is 

compel led to ask: what does it matter? Imperialism may 

be viewed as a species of the broader concept of intervention, 

i.e., the imposition of one nation's will on 

another through the use of force or the threat of its 

use. Since libertarianism is inherently nonintervent 

Ion i s t, i n t e r v e n t ion wo uIdse em t 0 be a far moreimportant 

concept for evaluating a nation's foreign polic 

y t han imp e r i. a lis m. Sin c e i tis 1e s s sus c e p t i blet0 

definitional ambiguity it is easier to document. The 

141

ev i dence is abundan t and the can'c 1 us ion is clear. 

Historically, all powerful statist societies, includi 

n g bat h the u. S •. and the U. S • S •R. in the twentie t h 

century, have been interventionist. The difference has 

been merely one of degree, not one of kind. 

142

Capitalism (Boston: Houghton MIff} in, 1951), pp. 

21-23 and 67-73; H.W. Speigel, The Growth of Economic 

Thought (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 

261-63; and I. H. Rima, Development of Economic 

Analysis (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1972), pp. 99-101. 

(11)Mises, Omnipotent Government, p. 72. 

(12)John Flynn, As We Go Marching (New York: 

Free Life, 1973), pp. 199-200; also see Mises, 

Omnipotent Government, p. 66. 

(13 )Flynn, p. 199. 

( 1 4 ) A sid e from F} Yn nan d Mis e s, Om nip 0 ten t 

Government, also see Lionel Robbins, Economic 

Planning and International Order (London: Macmillan, 

1937); and my ffThe Nature of Modern Warfare," The 

Freeman (Apr i 1 1972), pp. 205-11, reprinted in the 

The L ib e r tar ian Al t ern a t i v e, e d .• T i b 0 r Machan 

(Nelson-Hall, 1974), pp. 350-56. 

(15)The classic book on this topic is Mises, 

Omnipotent Government. 

(16)See ibid. Also see Flynn, and Charles 

Callan Tansill, The Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry 

Regnery, 1952), especially pp. 339-50, 441-42. See pp. 

494-508 for a description of the role of autarky in 

producing the war in the Pacific. Also relevant is 

Watershed of Empire eds., Leonard Liggio and James 

Martin (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1976). 

Especially see the selections by Murray Rothbard and 

Robert Freeman Smith. 

(17)Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 2 vols. 

(New Rochelle: Arlington House, n.d.); Schumpeter; 

Flynn; and Joseph Stromberg, "Amer ican Monopoly 

S tat ism ,It The Lib e r tar ian For um ( S e p t em be r 19 7 3 ), p • 

1-5. 

(18)Flynn, pp. 193-94. 

(19)Stromberg, p. 2; also see Schumpeter, pp. 

79 - 80 • 

(20)See Adam Smith, 2:207-62. 

(21 )Rober t F. Smi th, "American Foreign Relations 

1920-1942," Toward a New Past ed., Barton Berstein 

(New York: Random House, 1968), p. 250. For other 

revisionist works dealIng with America's entry into the 

Second World War that have influenced the anarchists 

see Tans ill; Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., Perpetual War 

for Per pet ualP e ace ( C a I dwell, I da h0: Cax ton, 19 5 3 ) ; 

Will i am Hen r y C ham b e rIa in, Am e rica's Sec0 nd Cr usade 

(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950); Admiral Robert 

Theobald, "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor," U.S. 

News and World Report (April 1,1954), pp. 44-93. 

Also important in thIS regard is the February 1976 

"revisionist" Issue of Reason. For a critique of the 

144

Imperialism in 1891, cd. T. Greene' (Lexington: Heath, 

1955, pp. 21-26. 

( 30 ) R. F. Sm i t h, p • 24 6 • 

(31)Parker T. Moon, quoted in Hagel, p. 1. 

(32)Flynn, pp. 162 and 213. It is important to 

be a r i n min d t hat 0 r wei I 's 1984 wa s wr itt en in 1948 

and that h.is original title was actually "1948." As 

James Martin explains, "Orwell was not writing science 

fiction but describing what was already fully developed 

in 1948." '" Defense' Origins of the New Imperialism." 

Revisionist Viewpoints (Colorado Springs: Ralph 

Myles, 1971), p. 6 fn. 

(33 )Quoted in Percy Greaves, "FOR's Wa'tergate: 

Pearl Harbor," Reason (February 1976), p. 20. 

(34)The landmark book on this interpretation is 

Barnes, Perpetual War, Ope ci t. Also see Tansill, 

e s p e cia I I Y c hap t e r XXV, 11 Ro 0 s eveItSe e ksaPretext for 

War wit h Ge r man y ," and Chapter XXV I, " J a pan I s Ma ne uveredin 

t 0 Fir i ng the Firs t Shot a t Pea r I Harb0 r • " The 

best pre sen tat ion 0 f the even t s i rnm e d i ate I y pre c e eding 

and surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor is 

T he 0 bald t s "The F ina I Secret of Pear I Harb 0 r , 11 0 p. cit. 

Also very good are Bruce Bartlett, "The Pearl Harbor 

Cover-Up," Percy Greaves, "FOR's Watergate: Pearl 

Harb 0 r ," and Ga r y Nor t h, 11 Wo rid Wa r I I· rev i s ion ism and 

Vie t n am, n a IIi n Reason ( Feb r ua r y 19 7 6 ) • Ro 0 s eveItt s 

duplicitous foreign policy is admitted even by his 

admirers. Thomas Bailey, The Man in the Street (New 

Yo r k: 1 9 4 8 ), f ran k I Y a d mit s t hat "Fran k lin Ro 0 s eve 1 t 

repeat e d I y dec e i vedt h eArn e ric a n P eo pie d ur i n g the 

period before Pearl Harbor." Bailey likens this to 

"the physician who must tell the patient lies for the 

pat i e nt' sown good. • •The coun try wa s 0 ve rwhelm i ng I Y 

non-interventionist to the very day of Pearl Harbor, 

and an over t attempt to lead the people into war would 

have resulted in certain failure and almost certain 

o u s tin g 0 f Ro 0 s eve I tin 19 40, wit h conseq uen t de f eat 0 f 

his ultimate aims." 

(35)See Robert Bresler, The Ideology of the 

E x e cut i veState (Men loPark, ea I .: Ins tit ute for Huma n 

Studies, 1973), pp. 2-4; also see Murray Rothbard, For 

A New Liberty (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 287. 

(36)Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency 

(New York: Popular Library, 1973), p. 183. 

( 3 7 ) B res I e r, p. 6. On the dome s tic aut h 0 r itarian 

dynamic created by a foreign policy of imperialism see 

Will i am Mar ina t sex c ell e n t Egalita rian ism and Emp ire 

( Men loPark, ea I .: Ins tit ute for Hurna neSt udies, 197 5 ) ; 

aI-so see Randolph Bourne, "The State," The World of 

Ran dol P Ii B0 urn e, e d. L ill ian SchI iss e 1 ( New Yo r k: E. 

146

P. Dutton, 1965), pp. 243-85. 

(38)Bresler, pp. 2-3. 

( 3 9 ) G e 0 r geL u n d b erg, " Ame rica n For e i gnP0 I icy i n 

the L i g h t 0 f Nat ion a I I n t ere s tat the Mid- Cen t ur y , " 

Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, ed. Harry Elmer 

Barnes (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953), p. 183. 

(40)Jerome Slater, "Is United States Foreign 

Policy 'Imperialist' or 'Imperial'?," Political 

Science Quarterly (Spring 1976), p. 69. 

(41)Williams, pp. 11 and 45. 

(42)Robert James Maddox, The New Left and the 

Or ig ins 0 f the Co I d War ( P r ince t on: P r ince t on Un i ve r 

sit Y Pre s s, 19 7 3 ), pp. 1 8 - 19 • Ma d d 0 x has presen ted a 

devastating critique of the New Left. He painstakingly 

examined the sources New Left historians have relied on 

to bolster their thesis and discovered that when the 

desired evidence did not exist, which was most of the 

time, the y s imp I y rna n u fa c t ured i t by s P lie i n g toge the r 

quotat ions from different individuals or from the same 

individual made at widely different times or about 

completely different subjects. In fact, he says, they 

have, on occas ion, even resorted to changing words in 

d ire c t quo tat ion s (se e, for e x amp 1e, p • 150 ). Ma d d 0 x 

concludes that" it is history by irrelevant evidence, 

m i sus e d quo tat i ons, j urn b led fig u res and d i. s t or t ion s of 

documentary materials" (p. 158). This charge is dir 

e c ted s p e c i f i c a I I Y a t L loyd Ga r d n e r 's Archit e c t s 0 f 

Illusion, but it is clear that he believes it applies 

to most of the New Left historians including Williams, 

Aporovitz and Kolka. 

{43 )Maddox, pp. 29 -30. 

( 44) S I a ter, p. 70, fn. For excerpts of NSC-68 see 

Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston: Houghton 

Miffl in, 1977), pp. 401-02. 

(45)Slater, p. 72. 

(46)It;>id., pp. 71-72. 

(47)John Spanier, Games Nations Play (New York: 

Praeger, 1978), pp. 411-12. 

(48)See Slater, p. 72. 

( 49 ) S I ate r, pp. 82- 87. A I so see Da vi d Os t e r f e 1 d , 

"Assessing the New International Order: Prospects for 

Third World Development," The Journal of Social, 

Pol i tica 1 and E con 0 m i cSt udies ( S p r i n g / S umm e r 19 8 2 ) , 

pp. 3-26. 

(50)Alan Reynolds, "Problems of the Developing 

Countries," Journal of International Relations 

(Spring 1978), p. 92. 

(51)Henry Hazl itt, Man vs. The Welfare State 

(New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969), pp. 140-52. 

(52)John Kimball, "The Trade Debate: Patterns of 

147

u. S. T r a de," and Ge 0 f f r e y God s e l'1, It Torno r row's Big 

Power s: ' Con f u cia n W0 r k Et hie' T hr lis t s Sma lINa t ions 

Into Big League," both in· World Politics, 80/81, ed. 

Chau T. Phan (Guilford, Conn.: Dushkin Pub., 1980), pp. 

1 0 7 and 1 6 3 • A Iso reI e vantis P •T. Ba ue r 's 1andma r k 

work, Dissent on Development (Cambridge: Harvard 

University Press, 1972). 

(53 )John Toland, Infamy, Pear 1 Harbor and Its 

Aftermath (New York: Doubleday, 1982), pp. 72-73 and 

318. 

(54)ln John Toland. Hitler (New York: 

Ba 11ant i ne. 19 7 6 ). p • 27 7 • 

148

PART 'IWO 

The Individualist Anarchist Paradigm 

Having presented the individualist anarchists' 

cr i t ique of government we are now ready to examine 

their alternative to government•.Chapter V will present 

various arguments for government in order to evaluate 

better and more clearly the individualist anarchist 

paradigm. Chapter VI will present the views of 

the major predecessor of contemporary individualist 

anarchism: philosophical anarchism. 'And Chapters VII, 

VIII and IX will present and critically analyze the 

contemporary individualist anarchist proposals for a 

society without government. 

149

150

which we are concerned -- is why would individuals ever 

give. their consent to obey the state? Why don't they 

flee? 

Plato's answer, like Locke's, is utilitarian: We 

benefit from it. Thus, Plato's argument is that we 

must obey the state because of the benefits we receive 

from it. And what benefits do we receiv'e? Everything. 

"We (the state) brought you into being, ••• 

brought you up, educated you, gave you and all the 

other citizens a share of all the beautiful things we 

could." And since everything the individual has comes 

from the state, Plato logically concludes that the individual 

owes total allegiance to the state: "you 

must • do wha t ever she commands; you mus t bear in 

quiet anything she bids you bear, be it stripes or 

p r i son; 0 r i f she I e ads you to wa r, to be wo unded 0 r to 

die, t his you mu s t do, and it.isri ght; • • • i n wa r 

and in cour t and everywhere you must do whatever ci ty 

and country commands, or else convince her where the 

r igh t lies. Violence is not allowed against mother or 

father, much less against your country."(2) Clearly, 

Plato's argument for the state begins with his recognition 

of the obvious utility of society coupled with his 

realization that society presupposes order. 

Plato is often considered the "first great politic 

a I phi los 0 Pher" 0 r "the 0 ne wh 0 wo r ked 0 ut the fir s t 

of the great systems of political thought."(3) But politics 

involves competition for power; it involves confl 

iet between both groups and value systems. Not only 

was P I a t 0 awareof t his, he explie i t I Y r e j e c ted it. I n 

a political society, Plato remarks in the Laws, "each 

party watches the other in jealous apprehension of insurrecti.on. 

• Such societies ••• are no constitut 

ion a 1 s tat e s • men wh 0 are for a pa r t y, we say, 

are factionaries, not citizens, and their so-called 

rights are empty words."(4) The strife which politics 

en t a i led i n t rod u c e din s tab iIi t yintothe po lis. I t 

dissolved public life into a "whirlpool" of "incessant 

movement of shifting currents." Politics, Plato argued, 

was evidence of a diseased polis. We can then 

find Sheldon Wolin correct when he says that Plato was 

not a political philosopher at all but a philosopher of 

antipolitics, or perhaps more accurately, "architectoni 

cs." (5) Wha t he des ired was the replacement of the 

unseemly strife and disorder of politics by a wellordered, 

harmonious social order, and such order required 

that the social units or classes be "ar·tfully" 

com bin e·d i n t 0 ani n t e g rat e d wh 0 Ie. Any" me dd ling and 

152

i n t e r c han g e betweenthe t h r e e cIasse s (t r a desrna n, a ux 

iii a r y, gua r dian) would be the grea tes t damage to the 

city, and would rightfully be entitled evildoing in 

chief . The greatest evildoing towards one's own 

city is injustice ..• So this is injustice. On the 

other hand, let us put it in this way. The opposite of 

this, own-dealing of each class, money-makers, assistants 

and guardians, each one of these doing its own 

bus i n e s sin the city, w0 u I d be jus tice and wo u I d rna k e 

the cit Y jus t • " ( 6 ) Sinceo r d e r, .p 1a. t 0 ass ume s, r equires 

the conscious direction and integration of the 

social units, the state becomes the indispensible agent 

not only for justice but for the good life of every 

individual. 

Plato's argument can be put in syllogistic form: 

1. Civil society benefits every 

individual. 

2. Civil society presupposes order. 

3. Order, in turn, requires the conscious 

direction and integration of the parts. 

4 . Co n sci 0 u s d ire c t i on n e ce s sit ate s a 

d ire c tor and the ref 0 r e e n t.a i 1 s the 

state. 

5 • The s tat e i s the ref 0 ret h e e s s en t i a 1 

age n t for the at t a i n men t 0 f the good 

life of every individual. 

Rousseau's argument in the Social Contract is 

n ear 1 y ide n tic a Ito t hat 0 f P I a to' s • ( 7 ) n I ass ume t tt 

says Rousseau, "that me'n have reached a point at which 

the obstacles that endanger their preservation in the 

state of nature overcome by their resistance the forces 

whie h e a chi n d i v i d u a I can ex e r t wit h a view t 0 rna i n 

taining himself in that state. Then .this primitive 

con d i t ion can nolo n g e r subsis t, and the huma n raee 

would perish unless it changed its mode of existen 

c e . tt ( 8 ) R 0 us sea u 's vehie I e for c hanging t his ttmo de 

of ex i s tence tt is the social contract. "Rightly understood, 

n says Rousseau, the terms of the contract "are 

reducible to one only, viz., the total alienation to 

the whole community of each associate with all his 

rights." But he adds, since "each gives himself to 

all, he gives himsel f to nobody; and as there is not 

one associate over whom we do not acquire the same 

rights which we concede to him over ourselves, we gain 

the equivalent of all that we lose, and more power to 

preserve what we have."(g) Clearly, Rousseau, like 

Plato, believes that individuals enter into civil so- 

153

c i e t y b e c a use 0 fit s uti lit Y and t ha t a v i a b I e soc i e t y 

pre sup p 0 s e s or de r • The ref 0 r e , the state , be i ng the 

suppl ier of order, becomes the indispensable agent for 

the common good. 

Furthermore, both Plato and Rousseau deny that the 

comm0 n goodis s i rn ply the wi I I 0 f the rna j 0 r j t Y• For 

them the common good has an objective existence which 

mu s t bed i s C 0 vered, not c rea ted • For PIa t 0 i t wa s the 

"Form of the Good;" for Rousseau, the "General Will." 

Bot h bel i eve d t hat the ex i s ting, ear t h 1Y soc i e t y wo u I d 

fun c t ion bet t e r the m0 r e c losely itapprox i rna ted the 

" For m 0 f the Go 0 d " 0 r the "Genera 1 Wi 1 1 • " The' c r ucia 1 

difference between the two lies in their methods of 

dis c 0 v e r y • For PIa to, the idea 0 f the c ommo n go0 d, 0 f 

the well-ordered, just or ideal society can be grasped 

only by a few who, by virtue of this insight, receive 

the right -- even duty to govern. "In no community 

wh a t so eve r ," PIa to saysin the S ta tesman, "cou I d i t 

happen that a large number of people received this gift 

of political wisdom and the power to govern by pure intel 

ligence which would accompany it. Only in the hands 

of the select few or of the enlightened individual can 

we look for the right exercise of political power which 

isit s elf the 0 net rue con s tit uti 0 n • n tI I t rna ke s no 

difference," he comments, "whether their subjects be 

willing or unwilling."(lO) Thus, for Plato, the discovery 

of the common good requires the existence of a 

rul i ng el i te, whose purpose it is to consult the unchanging 

and truthful "Form of the Good" and to construct, 

like an artist, he says, a society in its 

i rna g e • ( 11 ) What P I a t 0 desir e d wa s t he rep 1acemen t of 

the "opinions" of politics by the "truth" of philosphy. 

And the constituency of the philosopher-kings, as Wolin 

poi n t sout, w0 u 1 d not bet he mem be r s 0 f the c omm un i t Y 

but rather the "idea of the good community."(12) 

For Rousseau, on the other hand, everyone is, at 

least potentially, able to perceive the common good. 

But in order to do so individuals must ignore their 

private or particular will and consciously search only 

for the "General Will. tt "When a law is proposed in the 

assembly of the people,tt Rousseau says, 

what is asked of them is not exactly whether 

they approve the propos i tion or reject it, 

but whether it is conformable or not to the 

general will, which is their own; each one in 

giving his vote expresses his opinion thereupon; 

and from the counting of the votes is 

154

obtained the declaration of the general will. 

When, therefore, the opinion opposed to my 

ow n pre va i Is, t hat s imp I y shows t ha t I wa s 

mistaken; and that what I considered to be 

the general will was not so. Had my private 

opinion prevai led, I should have done something 

other than I wished; and in that case I 

should not have been free.(13) 

The tot a lis m 0 f bot h P I at 0 and B.ous s ea u is ev iden 

t. Both see order as intr icately connected wi th and 

indispensable for the common good; both see a vigorous 

state with extensive regulations as necessary for 

order. Thus, the state becomes the sine qua non of 

the common good. Anytime the "private good" conflicts 

wi t h the "common good" the former must yield. To rei terate 

Plato's remark in the Crito, "you must do whatever 

(the state) commands." 

b. The personalist common good. 

A s 1 i g h t 1Y d ifferen t ve r s ion 0 f the C omm 0 n goodis 

presented by the Thomist philosopher, Jacques Maritain. 

Be i n gaThom i s t, Mar ita inac c e p t s Ar i s tot 1e f s d i c t urn 

that man is a social animal. Not only the good life 

but survival itself is possible only in a social context. 

This raises the question: "Does society exist 

for each one of us, or does each one of us exist for 

soc i e t y ? n ( 1 4 ) Any if u nil ate r a 1 an swe r ," Me. r ita i n r e 

plies, would lead to either chaos, as in the former 

case, or totalitarianism, as in the latter. What is 

r e qui red i s wh a the c a I Isa" b i I ate r a 1 an s w e r • " 

Maritain distinguishes between the "individual" and 

the "p e r son 0 If The i nd i v i d ua lis but "a f r a gmen t 0 f the 

species, a part of the universe."(15) Since the whole 

is, by definition, more important than its individual 

components, the "individual" has value only as it contributes 

to the "good of the whole," i.e., only as a 

means. Thus, the "publ ic good" or the "proper good of 

the whole" "relates the parts to itself alone and 

sacrifices them to itself."(16) 

But if the individual is only a part, the person, 

on the other hand, is a whole, or an end in himself. 

Mar i tain, therefore, arrives at the seemingly anamolous 

pos i t ion t ha t "society is a whole composed of wholes. 1f 

The If tension" between the human being as person and the 

human being as individual, between the common good and 

the public good, is only apparent, he believes. It is 

resolved by a double or dialectical movement of "reci- 

155

procal subordination": the individua·l can be sacrificed 

for the common good; but the common good, in turn, must 

"flow back" to the person.(17) 

More concretely, the common good obtains when "the 

con ere t e per son g a ins the grea t est po s sib I e me as ur e , 

compat ible with the good of the whole, of real independence 

from the servitudes of nature."(18)· This entails 

bot h rig h t san d cor rei a t i ve dutie s • Ma n 's righ t sinelude 

"the right to exist, to keep one's body whole, to 

found a fami ly ., the right of association, the 

right to the private ownership of materia.l goods." It 

a Iso inc 1 udes the rig h t t 0 wo r k and t 0 f r eely ch0 0 s e 

one's 0 c cup a t ion, the righ t to a "j us i wa ge " and the 

right to relief, unemployment insurance, sick benefits, 

social security and the like.(19) Since these rights 

are "grounded on the very nature of man," says 

Ma r ita in, they "arei na lienab Ie. " ( 20 ) 

As for man' s d uti e s, Ma r ita'i n comme n t s t hat "unlike 

a farmer's cooperative or a scientific association, 

which require the commitment of only part of the 

interests of the members, civil society requires the 

citizens to commit their lives, properties and 

h 0 nor • " ( 2 1 ) But, he rna i n t a ins, therei s no con t r ad i ction 

between the person's inalienable rights and the 

individual's duty to, if necessary, sacrifice even his 

life for the good of society: 

the sheer fact of existing is neither 

the supreme good nor anyone of the absolute 

goods to wh i ch the person as such is ordained. 

It is, however, the first prerequisite 

condition of the person's ordination to these 

goods. A human life is less precious than 

the moral good and the duty of assuring the 

salvation of the community••• (22) 

Wh i 1 e not eve r y t h i n g t hat i sinc 1udedin Ma r ita in' s 

version of the common good requires the state, certainly 

some, perhaps most, do. 

We h a vetw 0 dis tin c t ve r s ion S 0 f the c omm 0 n good 

jus t i fie a t ion for the s tat e . The per sona listeomm 0 n 

good of Maritain, building on the philosophical substructure 

laid by St. Thomas Aquinas, differs from the 

total ist commond good of Plato and Rousseau in its emphas 

i s on the completeness, wholeness and moral transcendence 

of the human person and its attempt to protect 

the inalienable rights of the person against the de- 

156

mands of the majority by including them in the meaning 

oft he comm0 n good. T hus, for Ma r ita in, the r e ca n be 

rig h t s 0 r c I aimsaga ins t the s tat e, some t h in g wh i c h 

P I a t 0 and R 0 u sseau, wit h the i r em phas i son tot a I submission, 

could never grant. What these two versions of 

the comm0 n goodar g ume n t for the s tat e show is not so 

much an agreement on the content of the common good as 

the belief that the state is, regardless of the content, 

the indispensable agent for attaining the common 

good. 

2. THE ARGUMENT FROM NECESSITY 

A line of reasoning similar to the public-good 

jus t i f i cat ion for the s tate, a 1tho ugh f 0 c using rno r e on 

the uti lit Y tot h e i n d i v i d u a I rat her t han the mo r a I 

duty of sacrifice, is the argument from necessity advanced 

most articulately and consistently -- some would 

say ruthlessly -- by Thomas Hobbes. 

Hobbes ut iIi zed the phi losophical fict ion of the 

"state of nature." According to Hobbes' mechanistic 

psychology , man is i n e Ie c tab I y attracted to pleasure 

and repelled from pain. Since the experience of pleasure 

presupposes life, life becomes the greatest of all 

goods. The fatal flaw of life in the state of nature, 

he rna i n ta i ns, is tha t all men are by nature equal in 

the sense that any man can kill any other man. The result 

is complete insecurity and perpetual fear. The 

state of nature, says Hobbes in a particularly pungent 

pas sage, isac0 n d i t ion 0 f " war, wh ere eve r y rna n is 

Enemy to every man." It is a condition 

wherein men live without other security, than 

what the i r own s t r eng t h, and the i r own i n ve n 

tion shall furnish them withal! ••• And the 

life of man (is) solitary, poore, nasty, 

brutish and short.(23) 

This perpetual fear of violent death, endemic to 

the state of nature, is a powerfUl sensation. Since 

man is repelled from pain he naturally tries to extricate 

himself from this situation. His reason informs 

him that if there were a code of laws which indicated 

what each could and could not safely do, coupled with 

sufficiently powerful penalties to back it up, all 

would have their lives secured. ThUS, if all individuals 

-- except, of course, the sovereign -- would surr 

end e r the i r "n a t u r air i g h t Tl t 0 kill, the y wo u 1d no 

longer have to fear being killed. No longer required 

157

to fear one another, man could live' in peace. Reason, 

con tin u e s Hob b e s, a Iso i n for ms rna n how t 0 a t t a i nth i s 

con d i t ion: e a chi n d i v i d u a I wi 1 I r emo ve hi ms elf from 

the state of nature by contracting with others similarly 

situated to submit to a "common sovereign," who 

would be limited only by the extent of his power. 

Man contracts out of the state of nature because 

such a condition is absolutely intolerable. He submits 

to the sovereign because submission is instrumental in 

experiencing pleasure, i.e., because of the benefits 

a c c r u i n g fro m the ex i s tenceo f the s tat e • And wh a t 

benef i ts accrue? Hobbes' answer is, like Plato's, 

everything. Without the security supplied by the 

sovereign, says Hobbes, 

there is no place for Industry; because the 

fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently 

no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation; nor 

use 0 f the commod i ties t hat rna y be imp 0 r ted 

by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments 

of moving, and removing such things as 

require much force; no Knowledge of the face 

of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no 

Let t e r s; noS 0 C i e t y; and wh i chi s wo r s t 0 f 

all cont inuall feare, and danger of violent 

death.(24) 

In contrast to Plato's state, which would supply 

practically everything, Hobbes' sovereign would provide 

only security. However, this seemingly significant 

difference dissolves when we realize that, for Hobbes, 

such secur ity is the prerequisite for everything else. 

Hence, like Plato, Hobbes believes that all of the social 

benefits we experience on a daily basis flow from 

the state. 

The crucial difference between Hobbes and the 

common-good advocates is that the latter believe that 

since the individual benefits from the state he has a 

corresponding moral duty to obey. No such duty exists 

for Hobbes. Self-preservation is the only law. The 

individual is under no moral obligation to obey the 

sovereign. He does so only because and so long as his 

life is better secured by submission than revolt. 

3. THE ARGUMENT FROM CONVENIENCE 

An argument simliar to but more moderate than the 

Hobbesia'n-necessity justification of the state is pro- 

158

vided in John Lock's argument from convenience. 

L ike Hob b e s, L 0 c k beg ins wit h rna n ina s tat e 0 f 

nat u r e • A s we ha ve air e a d y seen, L0 c ke rna i n t a ins t hat 

individuals have the right to "life, liberty and property." 

The law of nature, he states, "teaches all 

Ma n kin d wh 0 wi lib u t con suitit t ha t be i ng eq ua I and 

independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, 

Health, Liberty or Possessions."(25) Furthermore, bel 

i eves Locke, man is naturally both. sociable and reasonable, 

and most people do consult the law most of. the 

time. Thus, in contrast to Hobbes, Locke depicts life 

in the state of nature as characterized not by perpetual 

war of all against all but, in general, by peaceful 

relations among individuals. Consequently, while 

Hobbes derived society and all of its benefits from the 

state, Locke sees society as prior to the state. 

Nevertheless, since not everyone consults the 

natural law all of the time, there is a nagging element 

of uncertainty for which the establishment of government 

is the remedy.(26) While Hobbes felt that life in 

the state of nature was "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish 

and short," Locke viewed it as inconvenient. Only 

the state, he argues, can eliminate this residual uncertainty 

by translating the moral natural law into "an 

established, settled, known Law." Only the state can 

prevent the abuse that naturally results from each individual 

being the judge in his own case by establishing 

a "known and indifferent Judge, with Authority to 

determine all differences according to the established 

Law." And finally, only the state can render the execution 

of this law less dangerous and uncertain by 

establishing an executive and investing him with the 

"Power to back and support the sentence, when right and 

to give it ,due Execution."(27) 

For all of these reasons, for a legislature, for 

an execut i ve and for an independent judiciary, Locke 

believes that the state, while not perhaps necessary, 

is certainly very convenient. 

4. THE ARGUMENT FROM NATURAL RIGHTS 

An argument that bears some simi larity to the 

Lockean-convenience justification for government is the 

argument from natural rights advanced by Herbert 

Spencer. 

Spencer himself subscribed to the Lockean-natural 

159

ights position: "Clearly the con'ception of 'natural 

rights' originates in the recognition of the truth that 

if life is justifiable, there must be a justification 

for the performance of acts essential to its preservation; 

and, therefore, a justification for those liberties 

and claims which make such acts possible."(28) 

But if every individual does in fact'have a natural 

right to "life, liberty and property," then they 

must also. have a corresponding obligation to refrain 

from interfering with the equal rights of others. This 

is what Spencer refers to as the "law of equal liberty." 

While similar to traditional Lockean doctrine in 

its emphasis on individual freedom, the argument from 

natural rights has the merit of rendering(29) the 

Lockean social contract expedient for justifying government 

irrelevant. For if these natural rights are 

indeed universally valid, it makes no difference 

whether any particular individual personally consented 

to obey the state or not. So long as the state protects 

rather than violates these rights it is legitimate, 

and its policies are legitimately binding on all 

individuals.(30) 

5 • THE ARGUMENT FRQ\1 UT I L I TY 

Whatis often thought to be one of the most powerful 

arguments for government is utilitarianism, an argument 

advanced in one form or another by numerous 

wr i ters, but commonly associated with the late eighteenth 

century leader of the English Philosophical 

Radicals, Jeremy Bentham. 

Bentham contemptuously dismisses natural law, tradition 

and contract, stating that they are nothing more 

than "nonsense." The only standard of right and wrong, 

Bentham asserts, following Thomas Hobbes and David 

Hume, is the "principle of utility." "All other principles 

than that of utility must be wrong."(31) And 

what, precisely, is meant by utility? Bentham's answer 

is, simply, the excess of pleasure over pain. "A thing 

is said to promote the interest •.. of an individual 

when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures; 

or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum 

total of his pains." Thus, pleasure and pain are, he 

proclaims, the "standard of right and wrong," of good 

and evil.(32) Bentham now makes two crucial assumptions: 

first, he maintains that the only differences 

bet we e n va r i ous types of pI easures and pa i ns ar e quantitative', 

and not qualitative, and that these quanti- 

160

Mulford Sibley pungently notes, this can be justified 

on moral or natural rights, but certainly not on utilitar 

ian, grounds. (37) One may speak in hypothetical 

t e r ms, a sec 0 nom i s t sseem so f 0 nd 0 f do i ng, 0 fin d i v i 

dual "utiles," but, even granting the very dubious proposit 

ion that one may "quantify" onels "utility scale," 

we sti 11 have no warrant for supposing that one individ 

uaI' ssen sat ion s 0 f pIe a sur e and. pa i n,. and t h us his 

"ut iIi ty scale," is the same as another's. "We do not 

need to ·be slavish behaviorists," Professor Lionel 

RObbins comments, 

to realize that here is not scientific eviden 

c e • Therei s nomeans 0 f t est i n g the rna gnit 

ude of At s sa t i sfact ion as compared wi th 

B' s. I f we tested the state of their bloodstreams, 

that would be a test of blood, not 

satisfaction. Introspection does not enable 

A to measure what is going on in B's mind. 

There is no way of comparing the satisfaction 

of different people.(38) 

How, for example, can we really know whether the 

amount of pleasure Jones receives from being exposed to 

the aroma of P-U Pipe Tobacco is greater or less than 

the pain or discomfort Smith undergoes by the same exposure? 

Thus, the "greatest happiness" formula, upon 

which the entire Benthamite-utilitarian ediface is 

bu i It, is i tsel f based upon an unproven, unprovable and 

clearly arbitrary assumption.(39) In short, despite 

its seeming simplicity and plausibility, Bentham's uti 

I i tar ian i sm affords no test whatsoever as to whether 

government action is justified in any particular case. 

A mu c h mo res0 phi s ticated ver s ion 0 f the c I ass i ca I 

ut iIi tar ian doctrine is found in the "collective goods" 

and "externalities" or "neighborhood effects" arguments 

of many contemporary economists and social scientists. 

The government, it is argued, is necessary to supply 

certain goods and services that are generally considered 

to be (a) essential, or at least highly desirable, 

and (b) incapable, or impracticable, of being 

supplied on the market. This incapacity derives from 

the bel ief that particular goods and services cannot, 

by the i rna t u res, bed i v idedin t 0 rna r gina I un its and 

sol d t 0 i n d i v i d ua I buyer s . Co nseq ue n t I y, inor de r for 

such a good to be supplied to anyone, it must be suppI 

ied to everyone, i.e., it is a collective good. The 

reasoning behind the collective goods justification for 

162

government is as simple as it is persuasive. If payments 

for the collective good were voluntary the rational 

individual will, quite naturally, cease payment, 

since he would continue to receive the benefits of the 

good or service irrespective of his individual contribution. 

But since everyone will reason in the same 

fashion, no one will pay and the collective good, which 

everyone presumably des ires -- and in fact considers 

essential -- will not be provided to anyone. National 

defense is a good example. If·Jones were to purchase 

pro t e c t i· 0 n f r om a n u c I ear at tack , then his next door 

neighbor, Smith, will receive simultaneous protection, 

regardless of his payment, and vice versa. It is impossible 

to defend one without likewise defending the 

other. Thus, Jones would leave payment up to Smith and 

Smi th would leave it up to Jones. The result is that 

neither would pay, and thus, the "collective good" of 

nat ional defense, which both desire, would be supplied 

to neither. Therefore in the area of collective goods, 

rational action leads to irrational results. 

Now it is certainly conceivable, especially in a 

very simplified two-person interface situation like 

that above, that Jones and Smith could arrive at some 

comprom i seag r e em entin wh i c h bo t h wo u Idshare a po r 

tion of the cost. But such agreements become progressively 

more difficult, and thus costly, the greater the 

number of people involved, so that while providing 

the s ego 0 d son the rna r ke t rn i gh t . bethe 0 ret i c a I I Y conc 

e i v a b Ie, i tis p ragmat i c a I I Y i rn p0 s sibIe. As Go r don 

Tullock points out: 

In many cases the bargaining costs are so 

h i g h t hat i nor din a r y s pee c h we wo uIdsa y 

that bargains were impossible. We turn, 

therefore, to some type of collective 

decision-making process; that is, some 

arrangement under which individuals are 

compelled to carry out the wishes of others. 

Thus we finally come to the role of the 

state, and this role superficially appears to 

be a very modest one -- that of reducing the 

costs of bargaining.(40) 

In short, certain goods and services, like national 

defense, police and court services, pollution control, 

education, roads, parks and the like, are thought 

to be both (a) essential and (b) collective, or at 

least "quasi-collective." It is therefore argued that 

the y can not be sup P lie d wit h 0 u t some deg r e e 0 f coe r- 

163

i n d 00 r s, and an ext e r na I dis e con omy ins umme r when he 

must put up with the smell or close his own windows. 

No one seriously proposes to eliminate, or even to 

require compensation for, all externalities. The governmen 

t, ace 0 r din g tot h e mo de r nut iii tar ians, wo u I d 

only concern itself with the most serious externalities, 

i. e., on 1 y when the expected cos t of government 

act ion is less than the actual cost of the externality. 

(44) Thus, whi I e We II s could smoke his pipe wi th 

his win dowsope nor c losed, far me r Pit c h for k wo u 1d no 

doubt be required to bear his "fair share" of the cost 

of the dam, and Fred Middleclass might receive compensation 

from Golden Arch Hamburgers. 

In brief, the modern variant of the utilitarian 

creed argues that "the role of government," as Milton 

Friedman says, 

i s t 0 do s 0 met h i ng t hat the ma r ke t cannot do 

for itself, namely, to determine, arbitrate, 

and en for c e the r u I e s 0 f t he game. We may 

also want to do through government some 

things that might conceivably be done through 

the market but that technical or similar condi 

t ion s r end e r i t d iff i cui t to do in t ha t 

way. These all reduce to cases in which 

strictly voluntary exchange is either exceedingly 

costly or practically impossible. 

There are two general classes of such cases: 

monopoly and similar market imperfections 

[ col lee t i vego 0 d s] and ne i ghb0 rh00d e f fee t s 

[externalities].(45) 

6. THE ARGUMENT FROM LIBERATION 

Laissez-faire liberalism, whether from the Lockean 

natural rights or the Benthamite utilitarian variety, 

held sway in theory, if not always in practice, 

throughout much of the nineteenth century. This view, 

a s we ha ve seen, emphas i zed the freedom of the ind i vidual 

from outside coercion by others or by the state 

itself. No individual had any legal claim on any 

o the ran d the 0 n 1 y lega lob I i gat ion wa s t 0 I e a veea c h 

other alone. The only proper function of the state, 

especially as far as the Lockean natural rights advocate 

was concerned, was simply to supply a framework 

wherein the freedom of the individual in the sense of 

freedom from outside force would be secured. 

165

A transformation of this classical liberal view of 

freedom occurred largely, but certainly not solely, 

through the influence of the British Idealist philosopher, 

Thomas Hill Green. Green was instrumental in alt 

e r i n g the c omm 0 n mea n i ng 0 f the t e r m libe r t y from the 

negative view adhered to by liberals from Locke and 

the Bent ham i t e Ra d i c a 1st0 Her be r t S pen c e r, to a pos i 

tive view, which has come to prevail in our century. 

Liberty did not mean, said Green, freedom from outside 

constraint but freedom to do certain things. We shall 

probably all agree, says Green, that freedom, "rightly 

understood," is the greatest of all blessings. But 

we s h 0 U I d car e f u I I Y conside r wh a t we me a n by 

it. We do no t mean merely freedom from restraint 

or compulsion ••• We do not mean a 

freedom that can be enjoyed by one man or set 

of men at the cost of freedom to others. 

When we speak of freedom as something to be 

highly prized, we mean a positive power or 

capaci ty of doing or enjoying something worth 

doing or enjoying••• (46) 

Phi los 0 phi c a I I y, the j ump from L0 c kean i nd i v i d ua I 

ism toG r e en ian 0 r gani cism, from wh a t Sabine t e r ms the 

old to the new liberalism(47) is not as great as it may 

seem at first. For Green explicitly rejected Hegel's 

glorification of the state and, in a statement that 

could have been written by Locke himself, noted that 

"we cannot significantly speak of freedom except with 

reference to individual persons."(48) Thus, in retaining 

individual freedom as the goal of state action, 

Green remained true to the spirit of liberalism. But 

in altering the definition of freedom to cope with the 

conditions of poverty, disease and ignorance he be 

Ii eyed wer e cr ea ted and perpetuated by the Industr ial 

Revolution, he deviated from the letter of the old liberal 

doctrine. It is in the significantly invigorated 

role of the state, entailed by his positive view of 

freedom, that Green's radical departure from classical 

libera lis m i s to be f 0 un d . I tis, in 0 the r wo r ds, not 

in the philosophical principles or goals but in the 

methods of implementing or realizing them that the 

differences between the old and new liberalisms are 

found. 

Following the tentative suggestions of John Stuart 

Mill in On Liberty(49) that tl a State ought to be considered 

as a great benefit society, or mutual insurance 

company,· for helping (under the necessary regulations 

166

for prevent ing abuse) that large proportion of its 

members who cannot help themselves," Green maintained 

that the State ought not always to be seen simply as an 

agent for I imiting individual freedom. On the contrary, 

it can bea vital and positive force in extending 

f r e e d 0 m • The c I ass i c a IIi be r a Is, he rna i n t a i ned, had 

only a "one-sided view of the function of laws; the 

view viz., that their only business is to prevent 

interference with the liberty of the individual." 

Cia s sicall i b era 1 ism was i n dee d v111 ua bleinthatit 

he I ped to get rid of many" laws which •.. were really 

mischievous." But its one-sidedness limited its 

usefulness. 

Ha v i n g don e its wo r k, the the0 r y now tend s to 

become obstructive, because in fact advancing 

c i v iIi z a t ion b r i ngs withit moreand morei nterference 

with the liberty of the individual 

to do as he likes, and this theory affords a 

rea son for res i s tin g a I I posit i ve ref 0 r ms , 

all reforms which involve an action of the 

state in the way of promoting conditions 

favorable to a moral life.(50) 

The nega t i ve view of freedom, for example, has as 

its corollary the absolute right of contract. But 

often the existing economic conditions weight the terms 

of the contract against the worker. The result is a 

perpetuation of such unnecessary, and therefore inexcusable, 

social maladies as poverty and disease. By 

I imi t ing such rr freedom, rr or rr ignorant license," the 

state may, says Green, actually increase the "general 

freedom of its members." Every injury to the health of 

the individual is, he argues in his lecture, "Liberal 

LegiSlation and Freedom of Contract," 

a public injury. It is an impediment to the 

general freedom. to make the best of 

ourselves. Society is, therefore, plainly 

within its rights when it limits freedom of 

contract for the sale of labor, so far as is 

done by our laws for the sanitary regulation 

of factor i es, workshops, and mines. It is 

equally within its right in prohibiting the 

1a bo r 0 f women and young persons beyond certain 

hours 

It is similar for such things as education. Without a 

basic education, 

167

if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely 

propose the contrary principle." The principle of 

fairness dictates that all prior knowledge of one's 

f u t u res 0 cia I posit ion be wit hhe I d . Now, "s ince all 

are similarly situated and no one is able to design 

principles to favor his particular condition, the 

principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement 

or bargain."(53) 

And what would the rat ional jndividual in this 

" 0 rig ina 1 posit ion" c h 0 0 s e ? Two pr inc i pies wo u I d be 

c h 0 sen, Rawlsi n for msus wit h 0 u thesita t ion : " the 

fir s t r e qui res e qua 1 ·i t yin the ass i g nmen t of bas i c 

rig h t san d d uti e s, wh i lethe sec0 nd hoi d s t hat soc i a 1 

and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of 

wealth and authority, are just only if they result in 

compensat i ng benef its for everyone, and in particular 

for the least advantaged members of society."(54) Quite 

c I ear I y, the sec 0 n d prj n c i pie, wh i c h Raw1ste r ms the 

"difference principle," means that a truly just, or 

Rawlsian, society would have strict limits on the range 

of permissible economic inequalities. 

Just how much inequality would be permissible 

under the "difference principle" is difficult to say. 

For tunate 1y, i tis i r rei e van t for 0 ur pur pos e s • Wh a t 

is clear is that Rawls embraces what Robert Nozick has 

termed an "end-state" or patterned theory of justice. 

That is, a society is considered just provided the dist 

r i bu t i on of weal th is in accordance wi th a part icular 

pattern or design.(55) The important point here is 

that, as Nozick points out, "no end-state or distributional 

patterned principle of justice can be continuously 

realized without continuous interference with 

people's I ives."(56) Since a patterned theory of justice 

I ike Rawls' presupposes "continuous interference" 

to maintain the pattern it obviously necessitates a 

large and very active state. 

Rawls is perfectly aware of this as the functions 

he assigns to his state indicate. Beyond the usual 

fun c t ion s 0 f governmen t, RawI s propos esan " a I I 0 cat ion 

branch" changed with, among other things, "identifying 

and correcting, say by suitable taxes and subsidies and 

by changes in the definition of property rights, the 

more obvious departures from efficiency caused by the 

fai lure of prices to measure accurately social benefits 

and cos t s . " The r e wo u I d a Iso be·a "s tab iii za t ion 

bra n c h" des i g ned to" b r i ng abo u t rea sona b I Y full employment," 

and a "transfer branch," assigned the re- 

169

spons i b iIi ty .of insuring everyone a "social minimum." 

And finally there would be a "distribution branch" 

whose task would be "to preserve an approximate justice 

in distributive shares by means of taxation and the 

necessary adjustments in the rights of property."(57) 

What is of concern here is not so much the size of 

the s tat e 0 r the pa r ticu 1a r act i v i tiesit wo u 1dunder 

take as the realization that if justice can be shown to 

mandate a particular pattern of wealth distribution, 

thenthestate, wh i c h the pa t t ernedthe 0 ryen t a i Is, i s 

ipso facto, justified. 

8. CONCLUSION 

The above br i ef survey certainly makes no claims 

t 0 compIe ten e s s • Nomen t ion wa s rna de 0 fAr i s tot 1e 0 r 

St. Augustine, Burke or Hegel. But the survey did 

pre sen t a va r i e t y 0 far g ume n t s for go ve r nme n t from a 

variety of viewpoints: 

1. The "common good" argument of Plato, 

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jacques 

Ma r ita i nth a taIlor mos t 0 f the compon 

e n t s 0 f the "g 0 0 d 1 i f e" r eq u ire conscious 

direction and coordination and 

thus presuppose the state; 

2. The "necessity" argument of Thomas 

Hobbes that while not all of the benefits 

of society presuppose the state, 

the y d 0 presupp0 s e 0 r de r wh i c h, i n t urn, 

presupposes the state; 

3. The" convenience" argument of John Locke 

that while order doesn't necessarily 

presuppose the state, the state does 

render the natural social order more 

stable; 

4. The "natural rights" argument of Herbert 

Spencer that the state is, if not 

necessary, at least justified provided 

i tis 1 i mitedt 0 the pro t e c t ion 0 f rna n ' s 

rights of "life, liberty and propertyll; 

5. The llmodern util.itarian" argument of 

Gordon Tullock and others that the state 

i s n e c e s s a r y t 0 suppIemen t the s h 0 r t comings 

of the market in two crucial areas, 

170

collective goods and externalities; 

6. The" I iberat ion" argument of T. H. Green 

that a strong and vigorous state can 

augmen t i nd i vidual freedom by el iminating 

obstacles to liberty; and 

7 • The" e con 0 m i c justice n a r g ume n t 0 f J 0 hn 

Rawls that a strong and vigorous state 

is necessary in order to. pr.eserve the 

pattern of wealth distribution compatible 

with a just society. 

This compilation or arguments for government will 

prove to be an invaluable aid in assessing the capabili 

ties, the s t r eng t hs a s we I I as the we a kne sses, 0 f the 

individualist anarchist paradigm, and we will return to 

it after our presentation of that paradigm. 

171

FOOTNOTES 

(l)Plato, "The Crito," Great Dialogues of Plato, 

eds. Eric Warmington and Philip Rouse (New York: 

Mentor, 1956), p. 456. 

(2)Ibid. The totalitarian implications of 

P I a to' s phi los 0 P h Y a r. e mad e .. c I ear in' KariP0 pper's 

excellent, if controversial, The Open Society and its 

Enemies, The Spell of Plato, Vol. 1, (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1966). 

(3)Mulford Sibley, Political Ideas and 

Ide 0 log i es (N e w Yo r k: Ha r per and Row, 19 70 ), p. 61. 

Also see George Sabine, A History of Political Theory 

(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1937), p. 35: The ancie 

n t Gr e e k s c h 0 0 Is"rna r k the beg inn i n g 0 fEur 0 pean phi 

10sophy, especially in its relations with politics and 

o the r soc i a 1st u die s • I nth i s fie I d the wr i tings 0 f 

Plato and Aristotle were the first great pioneering 

operations in the European intellect." 

(4)ln Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision 

(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), p. 40. 

(5)Wolin, pp. 38-43. 

(6)Plato, "The Republic," Great Dialogues of 

Plato, eds. Eric Warmington and Philip Rouse (New 

York: Mentor, 1956), p. 233. 

(7)The identity is not, of course, accidental. 

Rousseau acknowledges that his primary influence was 

PIa to. See Robe r t Ni s bet, " Ro us sea u and the Pol i tica I 

Tradi t ion," in Tradition and Revolt (New York: Random 

House, 1968), p. 29 fn 22. Nisbet's article is the 

c I ear est and be s t pre sen tat ion 0 f Ro usseau's tho ugh t 

that I have read. While Nisbet makes clear the totalitar 

ian imp 1 i cat ionsin Ro usseau' s tho ught, the t remendous 

impact of Rousseau on later European thought and 

action, especially during the French Revolution, is 

out 1 i ned i n J. L. Ta 1m0 n 's rna s t e r f u1study, The 0 rigins 

of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Norton, 1970). 

(8)Jean-Jacque Rousseau, The Social Contract 

(New York: Washington Square Press, 1967), p. 17. 

(9)Ibid., p. 18 • 

. (10)Plato, "The Statesman," Political and Social 

Philosophy, eds. Charles King and James McGilvray (New 

York: McGraw-Hill, 1973) pp. 36 and 41. We need not 

deal here with how the select few are to be discovered. 

Suffice it to say that in Book II Section 7 and Book 

III Section 8 of TIThe Republic,TI Plato does outline in 

considerable detai I a rigorous educational ordeal for 

this purpose. 

(11)Plato, l1The Republic,TI pp. 298-99. 

172

(12)Wolin, p. 46. 

(13)Rousseau, p. 113. 

( 1 4 ) J a c que sMa r ita in, The Per son and the Commo n 

Goo d (N 0 t reDarne, I n d .: Not r e Dam e Pre s s, 19 7 2 ), P . 

11. For a clear, if less than critical, presentation 

of Maritain'srather complicated and sometimes difficult 

argument see Charles Fecher, The Philosophy of 

Jacques Maritain (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 

1953), pp. 197-226. 

(15)Maritain, p. 38. 

( 16) I bid., pp.50- 51 • 

( 17) I bid., pp. 65- 66 • 

(18)Ibid., p. 54. 

(19)See Jacques Maritain, Man and the State 

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 114. 

(20)Ibid., p. 101. 

(21 )Mar ita in, The Person and the Common Good, p. 

54. Also see p. 68. 

( 2 2 ) I bid ., p p. 6 6 -67 • "And wh en • • . rna n f r eel y 

accepts death," Maritain remarks, "not as an enslaved 

fan a tic 0 r b lin d vic tim, but a s a rna nand a cit i zen , 

for the sake of his people and his country, in that 

very act of extraordinary virtue, he affirms at the 

same time the supreme independence of the person in re 

I a t ion tot h e t h i n g s 0 f t his wo rid. I n los i ng itself, 

in the temporal sense, for the sake of the city, the 

per son sacr i f icesits elf, inthe m0 s t rea I and com pie t e 

fashion. Yet the person is not defeated. The city 

still serves it because the soul of man is immortal and 

because the sacrifice gives grace one more change." p. 

66. 

(23)Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: 

Washington Square Press, 1969), PP. 84-85. 

(24)Ibid. For a modern variation of the Hobbesian 

a r gum e n t see Win s t on Bush, "I nd i v i d ua I We I farei n 

Anarchy," Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, ed. 

Gordon Tullock (Blacksburg: Center for the Study of 

Public Choice, 1972), pp. 5-18. 

( 25 ) J 0 h n L 0 c k e, " Second Tr eatis e ," Two Tr ea tises 

of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: New 

Arne rican Lib r a r y, 1963), p. 311. 

( 2 6 ) I tis c I ear t hat therei s rnorethan a g r a i n 0 f 

truth in Professor Leo Strauss's observation that Locke 

is really Hobbes in sheep's clothing. But, while Locke 

may be Hobbes in sheep's clothing, he is not just that. 

See Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1953). 

(27)Locke, pp. 395-99. 

(28)Herbert Spencer, The Man Versus the State 

(Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1960), p. 196. 

173

(29)Or should render. Spencer unfortunately 

muddied the waters of his own argument by introducing a 

contractual argument for government. But, as Ellen 

Paul has persuasively argued, the natural rights position 

is in conflict with the contract position: "If 

natural rights are proved then consent of individuals 

to government is purely extraneous to the question of 

legi t imacy" and is ,. therefore, "in contradiction to a 

natural rights position." See her, "Contra Spencer and 

Nozick: The Time Frame Theory of Governmental Legitimac 

y " ( Pap e r Pre sen ted a t the Arne rica n Ass 0 cia t ion for 

the Philosophic Study of Society, October 6, 1977), pp. 

1 0 - 11. A Iso see Wi I I i am son Eve r s, " Soc i a I Con t r act: A 

Cr i t ique," The Journal of Libertarian Studies (Summer 

1977), pp. 185-94. For the same argument from a utilitar 

ian po i n t of view see Oa vi d Fr i edman, The Mach i nery 

ofF r e e d om (N ew Yo r k: Har per and Row, 1973), pp. 173 

78. 

(30) Some con temporary phi losophers who argue in a 

Spencerian-natural rights vein are Robert Nozick, 

Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Bas i c Books, 

1974), and John Hospers, Libertarianism (Santa 

Barbara, Cal.: Reason Press, 1972). Also of interest 

is Ellen Paul, Ope cit., and Jeffrey Paul, "Anarchism 

and Nat u r a I Rig h t s ," ( Pape r Presen ted a t the Ame rica n 

Association for the Philosophic Study of Society, 

October 6, 1977). 

(31)Ibid., pp. 17-18. 

(33)Ibid., p. 18. 

(34) John Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern 

Political Thought (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 

1950), p. 213. 

(35)This is the sense which renders utilitarianism 

tautological. Individuals are assumed always to act so 

a s toma x i m i z e the i rut iii ties; but 0 ned i s cove r s wh a t 

i n d i v i d u a 1 s bel.i eve w i I I rna x i mi z e the i rut iii ties by 

looking at their actions. See Ludwig von Mises, Human 

Action (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963), pp. 11-29. 

(36)See J. W. Allen, "Jeremy Bentham," The Social 

and Pol i tica I Idea s 0 f Some Representat i veTh inke r s 0 f 

the Rev 0 1 uti 0 n a ryE r a, e d. F. J. C • He a r n s haw (N ew 

York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), pp. 192-93. 

(37)Sibley, p. 493. 

(38 )Lionel Robbins, The Nature and Significance 

of Economic Science (London: Macmillan and Co., 1962), 

pp. 139-40. 

(39)For a brilliant critique of utilitariansim 

from a slightly different angle see John Rawls, A 

Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University 

Press, 1911), pp. 22-23. 

174

176

CHAPTER VI 

Philos 0phicaI Anarc hism 

Whi Ie it is erroneous to consider anarchism merely 

as a particular type of socialism, it is no doubt true 

t ha t, with a few notable except ions such as Max 

S t i r n e r, John Hen r y Ma c k ay, Gu s tav· de" Mo 1 ina r i, and 

more currently, S. E. Parker, European anarchism has 

been collectivist-oriented, advocating small workercontrolled 

communities where property would be owned by 

the community rather than the individual. While less 

pro n 0 u n c e din Pro u d h 0 nthani n Ba k un in, and s om ewha t 

less in Bakunin than in Kropotkin, this collectivist 

or i en tat ion i scI ear 1 y the do minant t r ad i t ion amo n g 

European anarchists. 

This orientation can probably be attributed, in 

large part at least, to environmental factors. Regulat 

ion, wh e the r b y the c e n t r a 1state 0 r by s om e 0 the r 

g 0 v ern men t a I b o.d y, wa san eve r - presen t f act 0 f I i f e 

throughout European history. Consequently, there was 

I ittle separation between state and society. Oppenheimer, 

for example, remarks that in Germany "the two 

terms were used as synonymous." And Emil Kauder points 

out that in Austria the Hapsburg monarchy refused to 

permi t the publ i cat ion of any textbo.ok based on the 

principles of Adam Smith until 1848. "In the eyes of 

the Vie n nacen s 0 r ," Ka ude r says, "Adam Smit h wa s arevolutionary. 

The principle of laissez faire ran coun-. 

ter to old Austrian statesmanShip and social 

philosophy."(l) 

Our i n g the feu d a I per i 0 d the r ewe r e rna nor sund e r 

the absolute control of the lords. The modern state 

emerged when the rising capitalist class found it necessary 

to destroy feudal ism in order to extend their 

markets. To do so, however, required the concentration 

of power in the central government. And so long as 

they controlled the state, they found little interest 

in decentral izing power once the destruction of the 

feu d a 1 s y s t em had bee n c om pIe ted. T his mean t t ha t 

nearly all markets were strictly regulated by the state 

and for the i n t ere s t s 0 f the capitali s telass. ( 2 ) I t 

also meant that being regulated by the state, markets 

could not fulfill their crucial function of indicating 

priorities and coordinating production by means of the 

dissemination of economic information throughout the 

177

society. It is not surprising, "therefore, that the 

European anarchists did not adhere to individualist 

premises. Their only experience with a market economy 

was one hampered by government restrictions established 

p rima r i I Y for the bene fit 0 f pa r ticu Ia r mem be r s 0 f the 

capitalist class. But the only alternative to the 

market as a method of economic coordination is some 

foro m 0 f d ire c t con t r 0 I, and sinc e the s tat e wa s to be 

eli mina t ed, there was no poss i ble method of implementing 

economic coordination on a large scale. Hence, it 

was quite natural for the European anarchists to opt 

for small autarkic or semi-autarkic, worker-controlled 

communities where production would be directly controlled 

by all the members. 

American anarchism was just as individualist as 

E u r 0 peananarchism wa s collec t i vis t • And t his too can 

probably be explained by environmental factors. Attempts 

were made to transplant the European feudal 

structure in colonial America by means of royal and 

proprietary colonies that regulated nearly every aspect 

of 1 ifeand demanded a rigid conformity. The Puritans 

oft heM a. s sachuse t t s Ba y Co Iony, says Eun ice Sc h us t e r , 

"demanded of each individual absolute conformity to a 

s t ric t cod e 0 f tho ughtand act ion - - a code i mm uta b Ie, 

divinely conceived, and ordained by God."(3) But these 

"feudal thrusts,tI almost without exception, failed due 

to one condi t ion absent in Europe, the open frontier. 

Hence, says Rothbard, "not only relative freedom, but 

e ve n 0 u t rig h tanarchistins tit uti ons grew up ear Iyin 

the interstices between the organized, despotic English 

colonies."(4) Individualism can be seen as a natural 

outgrowth of frontier conditions. As Schuster notes: 

The per i 0 dun dere 0 nsidera t ion wa s a period 

of westward expansion. Only a small portion 

of the country had even been observed by 

white men. To the West lay land to be had 

for the t a kin g 0 fit • The We s t wasst i I I a 

haven of escape. If conditions became unb 

ear a b Ie, 0 r bus i n e s s f a i led, i t wasst ill 

poss ible for a courageous, adventurous family 

to assemble its worldly goods and try its 

fortune in the West. If they survived the 

attacks of the Indians, the rigors of the 

climate, crop failures, and all the trials of 

pioneer life, they did so by good fortune and 

the i r own ph Ysica 1 s t r eng t h . In genera 1 the y 

did not wa n t the go ve r nrne n t to in t e r fer e wit h 

them. The government had not assisted them 

178

in the ir personal struggle. They asked only 

complete personal sovereignty. And although 

practice tended to build up fairly rigid 

codes of social behavior, an individualism 

which broached no 'organized or governmental 

force was the natural product of pioneer 

life.(5) 

T h us, the con d i t ions 0 fAme rica n I i f e produee d a 

pragmatic individualism that "asked government to int 

e r fer eon I y when i t wa s toth e a dvan t 8. ge 0 f the particular 

group to do so."(6) This individualism resulted 

in an antistatist ethos that at times reached outright 

anarchism. It is therefore not surprising to 

fin d, a s Cor inn e J a c k e r has r ema r ked, t hat "the mo s t 

recent form of anarchism to develop, individualist 

anarchism, waS found almost entirely in the United 

States."(7) 

The difference between the two broad types of anarchism 

can be briefly summed up in the fact that while 

col lee t i vis t .a narchism rna n i f estsits elf inthe for m 0 f 

a radical democracy, philosophical anarchism gives prima 

c y tothe" s 0 vere i gn t y 0 f the i nd i v i d ua I • " 

American or philosophical anarchism can be divided, 

chronologically, into two distinct stages. The 

first stage can be dated from the early seventeenth 

century to the first half of the nineteenth century. 

It was generally religious in its inspiration and "negative" 

in that while it supplied some excellent critiques 

of secular authority, its only alternative to 

government lay in rather vague exhortations to live 

according to the Christian Law of Love. 

Early representatives of this negative anarchism 

would include the Antinomians, led by Anne Hutchinson, 

who settled in Rhode Island in the 1630's and the early 

Quakers, who settled in Pennsylvania in the 1680's. 

Bot h g r 0 ups r e qui r ed t ha t the i nd i v i dua I follow God's 

Law, wh ich was, in the words of Quaker Robert Barclay, 

"written within, on the table of the heart."(8) This 

clearly placed the individual above all man-made 

law.(9) Later figures would include the Transcendentalists, 

such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David 

Thoreau, radical abolitionists like William Lloyd 

Gar rison and Henry C. Wr i ght, and such exponents of 

Christian communalism, or "religious perfectionism," as 

J 0 h n Hum p h r e y N0 yes and Ad i n Ba I lou, f 0 un d e r s 0 f the 

Oneida and Hopedale Communities, respectively.(lO) 

179

The s h 0 r t com i n g s 0 f wh a t S c h us t erap t I Y dubs t his 

"adolescent anarchism" are evident in the reply of Adin 

Ballou to the question "What are you going to do with 

the w0 1 v e sand t i g e r s 0 f h uma n kind ? " "I ha ve a righ t 

toe x p e c t, and I doc0 n f iden t 1Y ex Pe c t ," wrot e Ba 1 lou, 

"that in practi·cing the sublime virtue of non-resistance 

for the kingdom of heaven's sake, God will keep 

all that I commi t to him in perfect safety, even here 

on earth, as long as it is for my good to be exempted 

from loss and suffering. I do firmly believe that in 

acting out these principles steadily and consistently, 

I shall continue longer uninjured, longer in the enjoyment 

of life, longer safe from the depredations, assaults 

and murderous violence of wicked men, than with 

all the swords, guns, pistols, dirks, peace officers, 

sheriffs, judges, prisons and gallows in the world. If 

t his i s the fa i tho f a f 001, then I am will ing to be 

accounted a fool, till time shall test the merits of my 

posit ion • "( 11 ) C1ear 1y, s u c h ana r chi s m wasapp I i cab 1e 

only to a select few, living in small communities and 

capable of adher ing to an extremely high standard of 

individual behavior. Its plight was best summed up by 

Will i am Maccall: "Benevolence shows well on one of the 

C h r i s t i an graces , but it cuts a poor figure as apr i me 

social force."(12) 

But beginning in the second quarter of the ninetee 

nth c e n t u r y, the foe u s 0 fanarchism s h i f ted from 

religion to economics, from "benevolence" to "selfish 

interest." The thrust of anarchist thought likewise 

shifted from the merely negative critique of government 

tot h e d eve I 0 pm e n t 0 f posit i ve a 1 t erna t i ve s t hat co u 1d 

be implemented in the absence of the state and serve to 

insure harmonious action among individuals. 

1. JOSIAH WARREN AND THE OUTL I NESFOR INDIVIDUAL 

SOVEREIGNTY 

After listening, in 1825, to a speech in Cincinnati, 

Ohio, by Robert Owen, Josiah Warren joined the 

socialist Owenite community at New Harmony, Indiana. 

Warren spent about a year there, after which he returned 

to Cincinnati to reflect upon the causes of the 

sudden collapse of the Owenite experiment. Warren's 

thought can be seen as a reaction to his experiences at 

New Harmony. 

The failure to recognize individual property 

rig h t s, War r en bel i eved, 1a y a t the heart 0 f the fa i lure. 

Communal ownership entailed the accumulation of 

180

es p 0 n sib iii ties wh i c h rna d e i timp0 s sib I e ,t 0 t r ace the 

impact 0 fan yind i v i d ua I 's act ion s . Co nseq uen t 1y, a I 1 

feelings of individual initiative and responsibility 

were lost. Furthermore, communal ownership was intended 

as a means to insure social cooperation. But, in 

Warren's view, a worse method could hardly have been 

found. When individual responsibilities and individual 

interests are accumulated, disagreements can be solved 

on I y bye 0 n f 1 i ct. " I f my i n t eres t we r e un i ted wit h 

yours," says Warren, "and we differ at any point in its 

management •• one must yield and the other must decide, 

or, we must leave the decision to a third party," 

viz., a government.(13) But disagreements, he held are 

an inevitable fact of nature. "There are no two obj 

e c t sin the un i v er s e wh i c h are pr e cisely alike ," a rgues 

Warren's follower, Stephen P. Andrews. "Each has 

its own constitution and peculiarities, which distinguish 

it from every other. Infinite diversity is the 

universal law."(·14) But if individuality is indeed an 

immutable law of nature it follows that the more interests 

are combined the larger and more intense the scope 

of conflict. And the larger the conflict, the greater 

the need for more and stronger government. But government 

cannot create social cooperation; it can only enforce 

conformity. Further, the more government, the 

less control each individual has over his own life and 

therefore the less free he is. The solution, thought 

Warren, lay in the opposite direction: the disconnection, 

rather than the aggregation, of interests. 

Since" infin·ite diversity is the universal law," 

harmony can only be attained by allowing each individual 

the greatest possible freedom to follow his own conscience 

and his own desires. Harmony, in other words, 

can preva i I only when every individual is his own sovereign. 

The "sovereignty of the individual" .clearly 

does not mean the power to attain any goal desired by 

the individual. Rather, it means the freedom from restraints 

imposed by others upon the use of one's own 

life and property. Only when society is broken down 

into its individual parts can the law of cause and effect 

operate and the consequences of each individual's 

actions be made to redound upon himself, alone. If A 

can shift the costs of his actions onto B, then B is 

not sovereign and, therefore, not free. He is a slave 

w0 r kin g for the ben e fit 0 fA. Thus, f r e e dom en t a i I s 

each individual "living and acting at his own 

cos t • " ( 1 5 ) Clear I y , such a s 0 ci e t y is cons i s ten t on 1y 

wi th the recogn it ion of private property. As Andrews 

writes, "The essential condition of freedom is discon- 

181

neetion -- ,individualization -- disintegration of int 

ere s t s • T he e sse n t iale0 nd i t i on of dis eonnee t ion i s 

that that be given to each which belongs to eaeh."(16) 

But disconnection should not be construed as implying 

isolation. On the contrary, it is argued that only 

when society is completely individualized can the individual 

parts be free to work in harmony, voluntarily 

combining when it is to their benefit, and acting individually 

when it is not. "All harmonic unity is a result 

of growth from the prior individuality of the 

separate monads."(17) Thus, Warren believed that the 

individualization of society permits a highly flexible 

social structure capable of achieving harmony 'without 

either requiring or enforcing uniformity. Individualizat 

ion even permits cooperation among people with wide 

I y dis par ate goa Is. " The 1abo r e rsin a rna n ufa c t uri ng 

est a b 1 ishmen t ," And r e ws poi n t sout, " ha ve no c ommo n 

interest, no partnership, no combined responsibilities. 

The ir interests are completely individual ized, and yet 

they work together."(18) 

In shor t, Warren bel ieved that society could be 

harmonious only if every individual were given the 

freedom to follow his own interests. But he could be 

free only if he were not involuntarily dependent upon 

or burdened by anyone else. Hence, the soveriegnty of 

the individual required the complete individualization 

of society which, in turn, implied that every individ 

ualbear the cos t 0 f his own act ions • As Wa r r en put 

it: 

When one's person, his labor, his responsibilities, 

the soil he rests on, his food, his 

pro per t y, and all his i n t eres t s are sod i sconnected, 

disunited from others, that he 

can control or dispose of these at all times, 

according to his own views and feelings, 

without controlling or disturbing others; and 

when his promises are sacred to himself, and 

his person is not approached, nor his time 

and attention taken up, against his inelinat 

ion, thenth e i n d i v i d ua 1 rna y be said t 0 be 

practically sovereign to himself.(19) 

The crucial concept in Warren's ideas is that of 

cost. Individuals can only remain sovereign when each 

bears the cost of his own actions. This means that in 

any exchange cost is the only just or "equitable l1 

p ric e, for i f 0 nere c e i v e s rno ret han the cos t 0 f the 

good to him he is shifting the cost of his actions onto 

182

another, thereby violating the latter's sovereignty. 

Since the only equitable price was that determined by 

the cost to the producer rather than the value to 

the receiver the profit system, i.e., the view that 

"value is the limit of price," is accordingly denounced 

asa" s y s tern 0 f c i v iii zed can nibali s m by wh i c h the 

masses of human beings are mercilessly ground to powder 

for the accumulation of the wealth of the few."(20) 

Fur the r, wh i 1e cos t wa s t 0 bethem0 r a Ide t e r minant 0 f 

price, Warren believed that cost, in turn was determined 

by labor. He did recognize, however, that an hour's 

labor in one occupation might not be equal to an hour's 

labor in another, and modified his labor theory of 

va I ue to compensate for such di fferences. The equitable 

or just price was not based simply on the number of 

hours worked, but on "equivalent labor," and the most 

"repugnant" occupations, being the most "costly," were 

therefore to be accorded propo r t iona I Iygrea t errern un 

eration. If the labor of A is "doubly as costly to 

comfort, clothing, tools, etc.," as the labor of B, he 

remarks, then five hours of A's labor ought to exchange 

for ten hours of labor by B. This "would constitute 

the equitable reward of labor to both parties."(21) 

True to his principle of individual soverei.gnty, 

Warren believed that the only way to determine the 

equivalence of different labor was to allow each indiv 

i d u a Ito est irna t e the cos t 0 f his own I abo r • Corn pet i 

tion, he believed, would tend to insure honesty: 

I f A set s his est i mat e 0 f the rna king 0 f a 

certain kind of coat at 50 hours, and B sets 

his at 30 hours, the price per hour, and the 

known qualities of workmanship being the same 

in both, it is evident that A could get no 

business while B could supply the demand. It 

is evident at A has not given an honest estimate, 

or, that he is in the wrong position 

for the general economy ••• (22) 

The final price of a good, said Warren, would then 

be set at the average number of hours expended on its 

product ion. Thus, if the average number of hours for 

the production of a pair of shoes is, say, ten hours, 

and if one individual can produce them in only six, he 

can still, in justice, charge ten hours of labor.(23) 

Such are the principles which Warren believed constituted 

a viable exchange system. Price was to be based 

on the number of hours worked, modified by both the 

f1repugnancefl as well as the intensity of the labor. The 

183

final price would include all labor' expended including 

wear and tear, or depreciation, on the tools utilized 

in production. 

Two other points should be noted. First, if individuals 

are to be sovereign, they must be permitted to 

dispose of themselves as they wish. Hence, they could 

hire themselves out if they so desired. Warren, therefore, 

had no objection to the wage system, and his doctr 

ines lack the class consciousness found in much of 

the other radical literature of the period. Second, it 

follows from his labor theory of value that "allnatural 

wealth" should be "rendered free and accessible to 

all without price." Thus Warren anticipated Henry 

George in condemning any unearned increment accruing 

from the ownership of land. A person could charge for 

the cos t 0 f imp r 0 vern e n t she rna d e inthe 1and, but he 

could not justly charge a price for the value of the 

1and itself. Wa r r en wa s t rue to his pr inc i pies wh e n he 

sold his property, several city blocks in the heart of 

the Cincinnati business district, at the cost of his 

own labor rather than at its value resulting from its 

prime location.(24) 

Warren and his followers also believed that exchange 

based on the cost pr inciple would eliminate 

speculation and price fluctuations and provide a secure 

and ce r t a i n f ram ewo r k for even econom i c deve I opmen t • 

"Cost is a thing which looks to the past," says 

And r e ws, "a n d i, s theref 0 r e c e r t a in. Val ue isath i ng 

which looks to the future and is therefore contingent 

and uncertain. A bushel of potatoes lies before us. 

It is poss ible to est imate wi th accuracy how much human 

labor it ordinarily takes to produce that amount of 

that article, and how disagreeable the labor is compared 

with other kinds, and then we have the standard 

cos t 0 f the art i c 1e; but wh 0 wi I I un d.e r t a ke to say wh a t 

the val u e 0 f t hat bus heli s as itstandsin the rna r 

ket?" Thus, "every exchange based on the comparison of 

values," is seen as merely "speCUlation upon probabilities 

of the future and not a scientific measurement of 

that which already exists."(25) The result of the 

value principle is therefore perpetual price fluctuat 

ionsan d the con c 0 mm itan t g 1u t sand famin e s . " Val ue 

being iniquitously made on the basis of price," summarized 

Warren 

produces all the ruinous fluctuations in 

t r a de, the un c e r t a i n t y 0 f the rewa r d 0 fin 

dustry, and the inadequacy of Its reward; it 

184

produces poverty, and the fear of poverty, 

a va ric e, and the all - a b so r bin g pu r sui t 0 f 

proper ty, wi thout regard to the rights or 

sympathy for the sufferings of others, and 

trains us, in the absence of all knowledge or 

rule or right, mutually to encroach upon and 

invade each other; allof which, including 

the encroachments of governments, give rise 

to the INSECURITY OF PERSON AND PROPERTY. (26) 

But the adoption of the cost principle would terminate 

a I I Pric e flu c t u a t ion by prov i din g a concr e t e 

and "scientific" basis for price determination. "All 

labor being equally rewarded according to its cost," 

says Warren, "there would be no destructive competition 

-- markets would be steady•••"(27) The cost principle 

was viewed, therefore, as the means to insure a 

scientific and harmonious adaptation of supply and 

demand. Warren felt that the implementation of the 

cost principle would immensely facilitate production. 

And, be i ng i nfl uenced by the environmental determinism 

of Robert Owen, he believed that men were essentially 

products of their environment. Since the increase in 

pro d u c t ion wo u 1d r a isethestanda r d 0 f 1 i v i n g , i t wo u1d 

eliminate crime, except for occasional cases of social 

deviants who should be treated in hospitals rather than 

placed in prisons, and thus remove the need for governmen 

t. As he summar ized his own view of the cost principle: 

Co s t be i n g the 1 i mit 0 f p ric e wo u 1d .pu t a 

stop to ·all fluctuat ions in pr ices and in 

trade, compel everyone to produce as 

much as he consumed, would distribute the 

bur the r n 0 f 1abo r among all , and r educe t he 

amount of labor of each to one, two or three 

ho u r s per day, would rai se everyone ABOVE THE 

TEMPTATION TO INVADE ANOTHER, and everyone 

w0 u 1d, con seq u e n t 1y, fee 1 sec u refr om any 

encroachments -- government and laws would 

not then be thought necessary, in order to 

restrain men from encroaching on each other, 

and t his e x c use for theirexis ten c e wo u I d be 

swept away."(28) 

Warren's attempts at the practical implementation 

of his principles shed more light on his ideas. He 

ope rat e d severa I "Time S tor e s , " as he cal led them. The 

fir s twa s beg u n inCinc inn a t i in 1827 , and a 11 we r e 

operated on the principle of disconnection. The cost 

185

er day it might only buy two bushels. Further, the 

fact that the right to issue money was monopolized by 

chartered banks meant that its money could be sold at 

far above its cost. Warren believed that a circulating 

me dIu m wh i c h wa stir e presen tat I ve 0 fad e fin I t e qua ntit Y 

of propertytlwould prove to be a stable and therefore a 

jus t me c han ism for f a c iIi tat i ngin d irec t ex chan g e • 

T his tI de fin i t e qua n tit Y 0 f pro per t y tI wo u I d be 1a bo r 

hours. Once exchange ratios between occupations were 

est a b lis h e d b Y mea n s 0 fin d i v i d ua I .est i rna t e s 0 f cos t s 

and a n a v era g e p ric e i n h 0 u r s for e a c hoc c u pa t ion 

emerged, labor notes could circulate. in place of money. 

AIl that was r e qui red was to choose If s omepart i cuIa r 

kind of labor, the average repugnance of which is most 

easily ascertained • and use it as a standard of 

comparIson .• for measuring the relative repugnance 

of other kinds of labor."(32) Warren believed that 

t his n s tan dar d nco U I d be f 0 undIn co r n • I fit we r e 

the n f 0 u n d t hat the a v era g e pro d u c t ion 0 f cor n wa s 

twenty pounds per hour, any occupation whose average 

repugnance was rated by the estimates of the members of 

the community at one half more difficult would then 

receive the equivalent in labor to thirty pounds of 

corn. Any occupat ion rated one-half less difficult 

w0 u 1 d on 1 y r ec e i v e the labor equi valent of ten pounds 

of corn. Each individual would be perfectly free to 

iss u e his ow n I abo r not e s wit h his I abor, but Wa rr en 

saw no diffiCUlty here. Anyone who exaggerated the 

repugnance of his labor, refused to honor, or overissued, 

his own notes, would be unable to find anyone 

wi 11 ing to accept them.(33) Warren therefore believed 

that necess i ty would compel honesty in the issue of 

notes. These notes would then circulate as dollars do 

now, but having the advantage of representing something 

definite and stable. Hence, if A issued a labor note 

to B in payment for a service and B didn't require A's 

type of labor, he could exchange it for an equivalent 

amount of labor from C, who needed the type of labor 

offered by A.(34) 

By making each man his own banker, Warren saw 

another advantage in his labor note system: it would 

break the government-banker money monopoly and thereby 

red u c e i n t eres t tot he cos t 0 f rna kin g the t ran sac t ion. 

The t1costtl of any loan transaction, however, would include 

all sacrifice or burden endured by the lender, 

including that of uncertainity or risk. But since information 

on demand would be available to all, no unwanted 

goods would be produced. Investment would 

therefore be riskless and the cost or sacrifice to the 

187

lender would be el iminated, resulting in the virtual 

elimination of interest. Further, since everyone would 

be able to issue his own notes, there would be "plenty 

of cirCUlating .medium always at hand." Hence, "exchange 

and d i vis i on of labor would not be I imi ted for 

want of money."(35) The result would be constant 

prosperity. 

s uchi s t he 0 uti i n e 0 f J 0 s i a h Wa r r en's a I t erna t i ve 

to government. As Stephen Pearl Andrews sums up 

Warren's outlook, the basis of social harmony is human 

Ii ber ty. And human I iberty is grounded in "the Sovereignty 

of the Individual; and the sole basis upon which 

the e x e r cise 0 f t ha t S 0 vere i gn t y can res t .i sEq u i t y, - 

the render i ng to each of that which is his. The Cost 

Principle furnishes the law of that rendering. That, 

and t h-a t a Ion e, a d min i s t e r sEqu i t Y• Hen ce, i t PI aces 

all in a condition of independence. It dissolves the 

re I a t i on of protectors and protected by render i ng prot 

e c t ion un nee e s s a r y • " ( 3 6 ) Itsh0 u ld a Iso be po i n ted 

out that while they felt that free competition tended 

to reduce pr ice to cos t, it would not do so in every 

case. And while they argued that the only just determinant 

of price was that of cost, they could find no 

way other than persuasion to enforce the cost principle. 

Every individual, said Andrews, "must be left 

absolutely free to commit every conceivable 

breach of the principle itself, since absolute freedom 

is another of the essential principles of harmonious 

society."(37) 

Wh i let h e soc i a - e conom i c ideas 0 f Wa r r en eX e r ted 

an immense influence on later philosophical anarchists, 

by 1862 all of the Equitable communities had been terminated. 

Moreover, Warren's "labor check" system, with 

1abo r not e s s i g ned by the iss u e r, and his "wa n t - ad" 

method of balancing supply and demand were suitable 

only for small, non-industrialized communities populated 

by jacks-of-all trades. While Warren's philosophical 

principles -- the "sovereignty of the individual," 

"cost the 1 imi t of pr ice ,n private property and free 

compet i t ion -- remained at the heart of philosophical 

anarchism throughout the nineteenth century, it quickly 

became ev i dent to Warren's successors that in order to 

make them relevant in the age of industrialization and 

urban life, the practical aspects of his proposals required 

modification. 

188

- 2. WILLIAM B. GREENE AND CURRENCY AND BANKING REFORM 

An early modification of Warren's thought emerged 

in the banking ideas espoused primarily by William B. 

Greene, al though Lysander Spooner and Ezra Heywood, 

whose ideas along with those of Greene were largely a 

prod u c t 0 f what Jame s Ma r tin t e r ms the "cur r enc y r a d i 

c a lism t hat ace 0 mpan i edand f 0 1lowed the bus i ne s sand 

financial panic of 1837,"(38) advocated reforms along 

parallel lines. All three believed. that the business 

cycle was a direct result of the "money monopoly" 

Which, in turn, was seen as a product of legal privilege 

conferred by the government upon banks. Thesep 

r i v i legesc 0 n sis ted 0 f the res t ric ting 0 f ba nking 

rights to those banks chartered by the state, and the 

passage of legal tender laws. Their proposals were 

designed, at least in part, to make Warren's labor 

exchange ideas applicable to an industrial iociety. 

A s Gr e e n e saw it, the 0 n I y pur po s e 0 f a ban k wa s 

to serve as a clearing-house for borrowers and lenders. 

The borrowers were those with just their own labor but 

n 0 cap it.a I. The len d e r s had tools and raw rna t e ria I s 

but no I abo r e r s. One wit h 0 u t the 0 the r wasuse I e s s . 

The funct ion of the bank was to provide the service of 

bringing the two together. If banking were free, 

Greene believed, competition would eliminate interest 

and reduce the payment to the bank to the cost of its 

services, which was estimated at below one percent. 

However, by getting the government to require a charter 

for all banks, creditors were able to all but eliminate 

compet it ion in the supply of loans and therefore to 

prevent the fall in the rate of interest. Thus state 

bank charters placed the creditors in what Greene 

called the position "to enable the few to bring the 

many under tribute."(39) 

Even more important, however, were the legal tender 

laws. Since all exchange, inclUding that for 

m0 n e y, was e sse n t i all y not h i ng morethan .ba r t e r, a I I 

property, they argued, was money. And if any individual 

should choose to conduct his exchanges in values 

other than gold or silver, they believed that he should 

ha vet ha t r i gh t. Lega I tender laws were seen as drastically 

altering the conditions of exchange by legally 

placing the owners of those particular types of metals 

in a monopoly position. By declaring that only gold or 

silver were money and that all transactions had to be 

made in those metals, the amount of money in circulation 

was arbitrarily restricted. This served to bene- 

189

fit the creditors in three ways: [1] by reducing the 

amount of money that could be loaned it kept the interes 

t ra te high; [2] it enabled those pr i vi leged few possessing 

the metals to control the monetary system. And 

since the business of the nation could not be conducted 

by simple or direct barter it therefore enabled them to 

con t r 0 1 n ear 1y eve r y aspe c t 0 f the e conom i c a f fair s 0 f 

the country. As Heywood remarked, "since money is the 

common measure of products, and eXhange must be made in 

the accepted currency, it is apparent that if speculation 

control this medium, dictating its nature, amount, 

and value, they are masters of both labor, and trade, 

and can tax us on the chance to do business, ,and also 

for the privilege of living";(40) and [3] combined with 

other laws allowing the owners of specie to issue notes 

up to twice the face value of the specie, the legal 

ten d e r I a ws per mit ted c red ito r s toea r n pr 0 fit s by 

s pecui a tingin 0 the r p eo pies' mi s e r y: "N ow the banks 

have everything in their hands," said Greene, 

They make great issues, and money becomes 

plenty; all other commodities 

become dear. Then the capitalist sells what 

he has to sell, while prices are high. They 

draw in their issues, and money becomes 

s car c e , allot her c omm 0 d i ties become 

cheap. The commun i ty becomes distressed for 

money, individuals are forced to sell property 

to raise money -- and to sell at a loss on 

account of the state of the market: then the 

capitalist buys what he desires to buy, while 

everything is cheap • The operation of 

the banking system is evident ••• (41) 

s u c h s p e cui a t ion wasseen as the ca use 0 f the bus i n e s s 

cycle with all its attendant fluctuations and uncertainties. 

Moreover, the legal limitation of money to 

gold and silver reduced the supply of money, theyargued, 

below that which was necessary to purchase all of 

the goods produced, thereby intensifying the business 

cycle. 

Perhaps the most interesting arguments against 

government banking laws were advanced by Lysander 

Spooner. Adhering to a Lockean natural rights position, 

Spooner argued that every individual owned his 

own body, and by extension, whatever he produced by his 

own labor, whether physical or mental. If a person 

really owned his property, it followed that he had a 

right to contract to dispose of it in any voluntary way 

h e c h 0 s e . Con seq u e n t 1 y, hear g uedin his Co n s tit utional 

L'aw Relative to Credit, Currency and Banking, 

II To iss u e b ill S 0 fer e d it, t hat 1 S, prom iss 0 r y not e S , 

190

i sana t u ra I r j g h t . The righ t of bank i ng , or of 

con t rae tin g deb t s b Y g i v i n g prom iss 0 r y not e s for the 

payment of money is as much a natural right as that of 

manufacturing cotton." Everyone, as Spooner saw it, 

had an equal right to enter the banking business and to 

issue his own money. Hence, government grants of legal 

pr i vi leges to banks, whether in the form of bank chart 

e r s 0 r leg a I tend e r I a ws_, werea v i 0 I a t ion 0 f nat ur a 1 

rights.(42) 

Spooner attacked legal tender laws with special 

vi gor. The Cons tit ut ion grants to Congress the power 

to coin money, but it does not, he noted, give Congress 

the power flto establish monopolies of any kind whatsoever." 

Consequently, he concluded, flCongress has no 

power to outlaw any private coinage of currency.fI "Nor 

could there consistently have been any such prohibition 

unless on the supposition that the people were incompetent 

to make their own bargains. fI (43) Spooner noted 

t hat Art i c 1 e I, Sec t ion 1 0 0 f the Co n s tit uti 0 n s pee i 

fically stated that fino State shall impair the obligat 

ion 0 f con t rae t s • " This meant, he sa i d, t hat the Con 

st i tut ion specifically acknowledged the right to enter 

into contracts and hence, any law restricting the right 

of individuals to make contracts, including any law 

prohibiting private banking, was in clear violation of 

the Constitution.(44) But Spooner even went a step 

fur the randel aimedt hat i t wa s log i ca I I Y imp 0 s sib I e 

for any government to have exclusive power in any area. 

The Pream blet0 the Co n s tit uti 0 n c I ear I yindieate s t hat 

the government was established by flthe People." Consequently, 

as Spooner argued in his The Unconstitutionality 

of the Laws of Congress Prohibiting Private 

Mails: 

In matters of government the people are the 

principals, and the government mere agents ..• 

Now it is perfectly clear that a principal, by 

simply authorizing an agent to carryon a particular 

business in his name, gives the agent 

no promise that he, (the principal,) will not 

also himself carryon business of the same 

kind. He plainly surrenders no right to carry 

on the same kind of business at pleasure. And 

the agent has no claim even to be consulted, 

as to whether his principal shall set up a 

rival establishment to the one that is entrusted 

to the agent. The whole authority of 

the agen tis I imi ted s imply to the management 

of the establ ishment confided to hirn.(45) 

191

No power granted to the government, 'even that of making 

war, he contended, could possibly be exclusive, for 

that would entail a logical impossibility, viz., that 

government (the agent) would dominate and control the 

people (the principals). In short, Spooner was of the 

op in i on tha t "the money monopo ly is one of the most 

g I a r i n g v i 0 I a t ion s 0 f men' s nat u r a I righ t s to rna ke 

their own contracts, and one of the most effective 

perhaps the most effective-- for enabling a few men to 

rob everybodyelse."(46) 

The philosophical anarchists expected great things 

from free banking. Once individuals were able to monet 

i ze any and all property, every individual would become 

his own banker and the "money monopoly" would collapse 

since the bankers would no longer be in a position 

to control the money supply. The supply of money 

would then, as Spooner phrased it, be subject to "an 

indef ini te increase." The interest rate, accordingly, 

would be reduced to the cost of issuing money, and 

speculation would be eliminated altogether. The "natural" 

price, based on labor cost, would then be equal 

tothe" mar k e t" Price, bas e don sup ply and dema nd • 

Capital would become plentiful and could be obtained by 

any 0 newhod e sir e d it, and produe t ion, i n t urn, wo u 1d 

increase dramatically. And finally, the business cycle 

would be terminated since, with no "shortage" of money, 

all that was produced could be bought. 

The monetary views developed by Greene, Heywood 

and Spooner were des igned to provide a cirCUlating 

medium based on labor but without the limitations of 

Warren's labor exchange system, with notes signed by 

the issuer and redeemable only in the issuer's labor. 

They rema i ned a t the heart of .phi los 0 ph ica 1 a narchism 

in the nineteenth century. As late as October 18, 

1890, one finds Benjamin Tucker, in whom philosophical 

a n archis m rea c h e d its f ulIma t urat ion, wr i tingin his 

journal, Liberty, that 

It is true that I expect lending and borrowing 

to disappear, but not by any denial of 

the right to lend and borrow. On the contrary, 

I expect them to disappear by virtue of 

the affirmat ion and exercise of a right that 

is now denied, namely the right to use 

one's own credit, or to exchange it freely 

for anot her's, in such a way that one or the 

other of these credits may perform the function 

of a circulating medium, without the 

192

3. JOSHUA K. INGALLS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 

The later anarchist position regarding the nature 

of land and its ownership also constitutes an advance 

bey 0 n d the 0 rig ina 1 War r en i t e ideas. On e 0 f Wa r r en' s 

central principles was "cost, the limit of price." 

Ea chi n d i v i d ua I wa sentit led tothe produe t 0 f his own 

labor, no more, no less. This means, said Warren, that 

tt Nat urea c k now led g e s n 0 0 wn e r s hip 0 reon t r 0 1 i n rna n 

save as a result of exertion •.•. Sbe recognizes no 

claim but that of labor."(52) Thus, while "Every individual 

has the right to appropriate so much of the common 

natural wealth as is requisite to the supply of his 

wants,"(53) one could not justly acquire another's 

we a 1 thex c e p t b y g i v i n g an·e qua 1 am 0 un t 0 f 1abor i n 

ret urn. The 0 n 1 y "ren t" wh i c h the own e r cou 1d jus t 1Y 

colle c two u I d the ref 0 rebe for the rna i n tena nee 0 f the 

premises. In fact, argued Andrews, if the tenant left 

the prem i s e sin bet t e r s hape t han wh en he a r r i ved, the 

owner would actually owe "rent" to the tenant. But 

since under a sys t em of labor exchange there would be 

"no advantage in owning land which one does not want 

for his present uses" it was not only believed that 

"all temptation to monopolize the soil" would be 

"ex·tinguished," but also that no great inequalities of 

wealth could even arise.(54) Hence, it is not too surprising 

that Warren did not devote much time to clarifying 

the nature of ownership. But with the emergence 

of industrialization, large corporations, and the business 

tycoon in the post-Civil War period, anarchists 

had to fa c e the prob 1em 0 f own e r s hip. Th e i r wr i tings 

constitute not so much a departure from the thought of 

War r e n a s the f u lIdeve I 0 pmen t 0 f the idea s t hat we r e 

expressed only more or less implicitly in his labor exc 

han g e s y s tern • The p ion e e r i nth i s area wa s J 0 shua 

Ingalls, whom Martin refers to as the William Greene of 

land reform. 

Ingal Is premised his entire argument on the belief 

that "The whole produce of labor belongs to the Iabore 

r, and ish i s nat u raIrewar d . " Gr 0 un d- r en t wa s the r e 

fore unjust, since it was the acquisition of wealth 

without labor. It was exploitive because it deprived 

the worker of the full value of his product. Hence, he 

con c Iud ed, a bs en tee - own e r s hip wasacI ea r vi 0 I a t ion 0 f 

the labor theory of value.(55) 

Rent, he continued, was not an economic but a polit 

ical concept. Whereas David Ricardo had argued that 

it was the 'increase in populat ion that produced rent by

forcing the less productive land int.o use, Ingalls conten 

d edthat the revers e wa s t rue: the ex i s tenceof r en t 

forced the use of less productive land. While the need 

for land increased with the increase in population, 

Ingalls believed that the title-holders to the land, 

backed by the power of the government, were able to 

demand payment for the mere right to use land that 

w0 u I dot her w i seli e f a I 1ow • Th us r en t the a r g ued, wa s 

aresuI t 0 f go v e. r n men t a I pro tee t. i on of land tit Ies 

beyond that of occupancy and use. 

If, then, land titles were based on the principles 

of equity, viz., the exchange of labor for an equivallent 

amount of labor, ownership could not extend beyond 

actual occupancy and rent would be eliminated. Not 

only would implementation of the occupancy principle 

eliminate the problem of wealth concentration but 

I n g a I I s eve n bel i eve d t hat i t wo uIds0 decen t r a lize 

1and 0 wn e r s hip a s to rna k e Wa r r en' s Iabo r c he c k s Ystem 

practical. Ingalls proposed a gradual transition from 

legal "ownership" to actual "occupancy," where the curr 

e n tie g a lown e r s 0 f Iand wo u I d ret a i nthe i r proper t y 

rig h t suntil the i r dea t hs, aft e r wh i c h proper t y righ t s 

would be determined by use or occupancy.(56) 

Ingalls' view that land holdings should be limited 

b y 0 c c u pa n c y i san imp 0 r tan t ref i nerne n t 0 f Wa r r en's 

principle that labor-cost should be the limit of price. 

It is also significant in its impact on subsequent anarchist 

thought. "Occupation-and-use-tenure of land," 

says Martin, "a nearly-forgotten theory in non-radical 

circles, became firmly established in anarchist teaching 

from the time of J. K. Ingalls."(57) 

The only major nineteenth century philosophical 

a n archis t not a d her' i n g tot h e view t hat 1and own e r s 

should be 1 imi ted by occupancy was Lysander Spooner. 

In 1853, Spooner published his The Law of Intellectual 

Property which was intended to demonstrate that individuals 

had, by natural law, perpetual property right 

ina 1 1 proper ty, tang i ble or in tangi ble. Star t i ng from 

his Lockean natural rights position of individual self 

own e r s hip and, byex ten s ion, 0 ne 's own e r s hip 0 f the 

fruits of his labor, Spooner maintained that: 

The . p r inc i pie 0 f proper t y is, t hat the own e r 

of a thing has absolute dominion over it, 

whether he have it in actual possession or 

not, and whether he himself wish to use it or 

not;· t hat noon e ha s a rig h t tota ke po ssession 

of it, or use it, without his consent ... 

196

There is, he continued, 

no middle ground between absolute communism, 

on the one hand, which holds that a man has a 

right to lay his hand on anything, which has 

no other man 1 s hands upon it, no matter who 

may have been the producer; and the principle 

of individual dominion, as against all other 

men, over the products and acquisitions of 

his 0 wn 1abo r, wh e ther hereta Ln them i n his 

actual possession or not.(58) 

For S poone r, theref 0 r e, the 0 c c upan c y pr inc i pIe wa s not 

only a contradictory middle-of-the-road position between 

commun ism and individual sovereignty, but a viol 

a t ion 0 f the nat u r a I righ t s pr inc i pie 0 f s elf own e r 

s hip, a s well. Howe ve r, S po0 n e r s tood virt uall y a Ione 

on this issue. Benjamin Tucker was extremely critical. 

11 I call Spooner 1 s work on Intellectual Property positively 

foolish,1I he wrote 

because it is fundamentally foolish, -- that 

is to say, its discussion of the acquisition 

of pro per t y s tar t s wi t h a bas i c pr opos i t ion 

that must be looked upon by all consistent 

Anarchists as obvious nonsense. I quote this 

basic proposition. 'The natural wealth of 

the world belongs to those who first take 

possession of it • So much natural 

wealth, remaining unpossessed, as anyone can 

take possession of first, becomes absolutely 

his property.'(59) 

Later anarchists, like Tucker, followed Ingalls to 

the letter. Writing in 1890, Tucker said: 

[ L ] e t us sup p 0 sethat the Ana r ch i s t 

view that occupancy and use should condition 

and 1 im it landholding becomes the prevai 1 ing 

view • E v ide n t I Y thenth e s e mun i c i pa lit i e s 

wi 11 proceed to formulate and enforce this 

view. Wha t the for mu I a wi libe noon e can 

foresee••. [W]e will say that they decide to 

protect no one in possession of more than ten 

acres, then particular lands will be open to 

those there first to claim it.(60) 

197

4. BENJAMIN TUCKER, LYSANDER SPOONER AND THE 

PROVISION OF POLICE AND COURT SERVICES 

The development of philosophical anarchism into a 

complete system reached its fruition in the writings of 

Benjamin Tucker and Lysander Spooner on the difficult 

problem of the protection of individual rights within a 

no-government system. Josiah Warren" sUbscrib"ing to 

the Owenite belief in environmental determinism, believed 

that crime was a product of an environment characterized 

by poverty and disorder. Since the implementation 

of his ideas, he believed, would produce a har-monious 

society characterized by an ever increasing 

standard of living, it followed that individuals would 

I ear n t 0 I i vet 0 get her h arm 0 n i ously, and c rime, and 

therefore the need for government, would disappear. 

Warren's successors took a somewhat less sanguine view 

of human na t u r e. They agreed that a society based on 

"individual sovereignty" would end economic injustice 

and allow for a much greater degree of flexibility as 

well as a higher standard of living. While they felt 

these factors would eliminate most of the causes of 

cr ime, they doubted that crime would cease altogether. 

But 0 nee sue han a dmiss ion i s rna de, the que s t ion t hat 

mu s t be i mme d i ate I y fa c edis wo u I d not suehas0 c i e t y 

b e p I ace d a t the mer c y 0 f the r ema i n i ng c rim ina I e I e 

men t, whie h pres uma b I Y wo u I d not hesitate toengage i n 

violence whenever it suited its purpose? 

Tucker admitted that "Where crime exists, force 

mu.st exist to suppress it" and denied that anarchism 

was simply a "revival of non-resistance."(61) He defined 

anarchism in terms of the "sovereignty of the individual" 

and Herbert Spencer's "law of equal liberty," 

and contended that the use of force was not necessarily 

incompatible with either pr"inciple. Force, he pointed 

out, could be either invasive or non-invasive. The 

former was defined as the initiation of the use of 

coercion and was incompatible with anarchism since it 

was a clear violation of the "sovereignty of the 

individual." The latter, however, was the defensive 

use 0 f co ere ion, i. e ., the mea n s by wh i c h the nona 

g g res s i ve i nd i v i d ua I wa s a blet 0 protee t hims elf from 

those who would initiate the use of coercion. The noni 

n vas i ve use 0 f for c e wa s per f ec t I Y compa t i blew i t h 

anarchism, he argued, since it not only did not violate 

t he p r inc i pie 0 fin d i v i d u a Iso verei gn t y but wa s, i n 

fact, the only means by which that principle could be 

upheld in the face of attempted violation. Since 

crime, by defInition, involved the invasion of the 

r i gh t s of others, Tucker and his colleagues argued that 

198

far fro m g ran ting c rim inalsi mm un i t y for the irerime s , 

anarchism entailed the exact opposite: its complete 

suppression. 

Their own individualist assumptions, however, precluded 

reliance on government institutions as the vehicle 

for the protection of individual rights. The community, 

they contended, is merely the sum· of its parts 

and can have no more rights than that possessed by its 

individual members. This assumption .leads logically to 

the conclusion that the state is, by its very nature, 

an invasive and thus a criminal institution. As 

Tucker's close associate, Victor Yarros, summarized: 

Individuals, and individuals only, have 

rights. This proposition is the corner-stone 

of the anarchist doctrine, and those who accept 

it are bound to go the full length of 

anarchism. For if the community cannot 

rightfully compel a man to do or refrain from 

doing that which private and individual memb 

e r s thereof cannot 1e g i t i rna tel y for c e him to 

do or forego, then compulsory taxation and 

compulsory cooperation for any purpose whatever 

are wrong in principle, and government 

is merely another name for aggression. It 

will not be pretended that one private individual 

has a right to tax another without his 

con sen t; how, then, doe s the rna j 0 r i t Y 0 f the 

members of a communi ty obtain the right to 

tax the minority without its consent? 

T h us, the phi los 0 phi c a I a narchis t s den i edthat i t wa s 

possible for any government, regardless of size or 

type, to protect individual liberty. Since they both 

entai led the initiation of the use of force, government 

and c rim e' weres e e n a s m0 reo r 1e s s s ynon ym 0 us. I n 

fact, Yarros maintains that crime "involves not the 

abolition of government, but the widest possible 

extension of it."(62) 

Even granting that anarchism is consistent with 

the non - i n vas i v e use 0 f for c e, wo u I d not any soc i e t y 

lacking a central institution with a monopoly on the 

"legitimate" use of force, viz., a government, be 

characterized by the indiscriminate use of force and 

thus result in a state of chaos and insecurity? Tucker 

tho ugh t not. T u eke rand his f 0 I lowe r s we r e, 1ike the 

nineteenth century classical liberals, great believers 

i n f r e e com pet i t ion and the rna r ke t pro c e s s . The rna r - 

199

the moral duty, of all other children, and 

all other persons, to assist the injured party 

in defending his rights, and redressing 

his wr ongs. These are fundamental pr inciples 

of natural rights which govern the most imp 

0 r tan t t ran sac t ion s 0 f rna n wit h rna n • Yet 

children learn them earlier than they learn 

t hat t h r e e and t h r e ear e six, or' five and 

five are ten. Their childish plays, even, 

c 0 u 1 d not be car r i e don wit h0 uta cons tan t 

regard to them; and itis equally impossible 

for persons of any age to live together in 

peace on any other conditions.(70) . 

"If justice be not a natural principle," he continued, 

"then there is no such thing as injustice; and all the 

crimes of which the world has been the scene, have been 

no crimes at all; but only simple events, like the 

fall ing of the rain ••." But if, on the other hand, 

justice was a natural principle, then "it is necessarily 

an immutable one; and can no more be changed -- by 

any power i n fer i 0 r tothat wh i c h esta b lished i t - - t han 

can the law of gravitation, the laws of light, the 

principles of mathematics, or any other natural law or 

principle whatever."(7l) 

Co n seq uen t 1y, all huma n 1e g i s 1a t i on , so I on g as i t 

was in violation of natural law, was morally null and 

void and was legally nothing more than "an absurdity, a 

unsurpation, and a crime." If every man had a natural 

right to the fruit of his labor then, Spooner believed, 

he had a natural right to the fruit of his labor; and 

i twa s jus t a s mu c h rob b e r y for any rna n, 0 r g r 0 up 0 f 

men, even if they call themselves "government" and 

the irac t i v i tie s "t a x a t ion ," tota k e a I lor pa r t 0 f 

another's property, without the latter's consent, as if 

i t weret a ken by a common highwayman. S im i 1a r 1y, if a 

man was only under obligation to perform duties to 

which he freely consented, then he was under obligation 

only to perform duties to which he freely consented; 

and no man or group of men, even if they called themselves 

"government," could impose upon him any additional 

obligations. This meant, as he pointed out in 

No Treason, Number One, all "governments, if they can 

rightfully exist at all, can exist only by consent," 

i • e ., "t h e i n d i v i d uale 0 n sen t 0 f eve r y rna n . . . ( 7 2 ) 

In No Treason, Number Six, Spooner further argued 

that since no group of men, however numerous, was able 

to bind .another group of men, however small, then in 

like manner, no generation of men could bind a succeedi 

n g g e n era t ion . Conseq uen t 1y, the Co n s tit uti 0 nco u 1d 

204

social expediency. 

After reading Stirner, Tucker declared that 

Anarchism of the 'natural right' type is out 

of date. The Anarchism of today affirms the 

right of society to coerce the individual and 

of the individual to coerce society so far as 

either has the requisite power .•• practical 

i n d i v i d u a Iso v ere i g n t y - -. t h.atis, the 

g rea t est am 0 un t 0 f lib e r t y compat i blewi t h 

equality of liberty -- is the law of social 

I i fe, the 0 n lye0 n d i t ion up 0 n wh ich h uma n 

be i ngs can 1 i ve in harmony. When the truth 

is ascertained and acted upon, we shall have 

individual sovereignty in reality-- not as a 

sacred natural right vindicated, but as a 

social expedient agreed upon••• (79) 

Tucker's endorsement of egoism produced a split in 

the movement. Natural rights theorists such as Henry 

Appleton, M. E. Lazarus and John Kelly (Spooner died in 

1887, pr ior to Tucker's rejection of natural rights) 

s eve red the ire0 nne c t ion wit h Libe r t y, wh i leeg 0 i s t s 

1 ike J. L. Wa 1 k e r, and J. B. Rob i nson came to the defenseof 

Tucker. The split never completely healed and 

probably contributed at least somewhat to the ultimate 

decline of philosophical anarchism. 

Nevertheless, it should be noted that just one 

month after his initial rejection of nat·ural law, 

Tucker reaffirmed his attachment to Spooner's "common 

law jury": "under Anarchism all rules and laws will be 

little more than suggestions for the guidance of juri 

e s , • • and a 1 I dis put e s, wh e t he r abo u t land or anyt 

h i ngel s e, will b e submit ted t 0 j uri e s wh i c h wi I 1 

judge not only the facts, but the justice of the law, 

its applicabiliity to the given circumstances, and the 

penalty or damage to be inflicted because of its infraction 

."(80) Thus, both the egoist as well as the 

natural rights strains of individualist anarchism advocated 

the same institutional framework: competitive defense 

companies to provide protection and the trial by 

j u r y, wit h dec i s ion s bas e don comm 0 n law, t 0 set tie 

disputes. Their real disagreement was philosophical: 

whether common law was based on natural rights principles 

or social expediency. 

207

5 • TUCKER AND HIS JOURNAL, "L I BERTY'" : PH I LOSOPH I CAL 

ANARCHISM MATURED 

Phi los 0 phi c a I a n arc his m r e c e i v e d its rna t ures t 

expression in the writings of Benjamin Tucker. While 

Tucker did not produce a systematic exposition of his 

ideas, his philosophy can be constructed from his 

writings in his journal, Liberty, which spanned a 

period of nearly thirty years, from 1881 to 1908. 

For Warren and Andrews, the principle of "cost the 

I imi t of pr ice" was more a prescription for a harmonious 

society than a description of actual conduct. 

The i r rei ian ceonthe I aborexc hange s ystem meant t hat 

the scope of the market and therefore of competition 

was strictly limited. Hence, they believed that competit 

ion was 0 n 1y pa r t i a 1 I y a b 1e to ins urethe 0 per a t ion 

of the cost principle. Instead, they relied heavily on 

moral exhortat ion and· enlightened self-interest, "We 

poi n t 0 u t c e r t a i n p r inc i piesin the na t ur e ·0f t h i n gs 

which related to the order of human society," commented 

Andrews, "in conforming to which mankind will find 

their affairs harmonically adjusted, and departing from 

wh i c h the y w i I I run i n t 0 con f us ion • " ( 81 ) 0 ncernan r e 

cognized these "scientific" principles, he would find 

it in his own interest to follow them. 

But in the hands of Warren's successors, "cost the 

I imi t of pr ice" was gradually extended into the realm 

of description, as well. Through Greene the labor 

ex c han g e s y s t em was rep 1aced by a c i r cuI a ting me d i urn 

based on the monetization of property, in an effort to 

provide a much fuller scope for the role of the market. 

And b y the time 0 f Tuc ke r, i t wa s f e 1t t hat the imp e r 

sonal forces of the market could direct all production 

by means of supply and demand, and that competit 

ion would insure that profit, interest, and rent would 

be, i f not eliminated, atieas t reducedt0 ami n i mum • 

The existence of interest, rent and profit, argued 

Tucker, was the direct result of "the denial of libert 

y, t he sup pres s i on 0 r res t ric t i on 0 f com pet i t i on [ by ] 

the 1ega I c rea t ion 0 f m0 no pol i e s . It ( 82) I tis wo r t h 

following his argument in some detail. There were 

four, and only four, monopolies: The land monopoly, 

the banking monopoly, the tariff monopoly, and the 

patent and copyright monopoly. And all four were, he 

said, the direct result of government privilege. Patents, 

copyrights, and tariffs restricted or eliminated 

competifon in the areas of their application, thereby 

208

producing "monopol istic profit" for the beneficiaries 

oft h e s e leg a I p r i viI e ge s; r en t wa s the res uItof the 

legal protection of land titles not based on occupancy, 

"thereby compelling the non-owning users to pay tribute 

to the non-using owners as a condition of admission to 

the compet i t i v e mar k e t "; and i n t eres t res u I ted from 

denying the right of each individual to issue his own 

notes, i.e., by decreeing that only gold and silver 

were "legal tender," thereby compelling all non-holders 

of go I dan d s i I ve r to pa y t rib ute. ta the ho I der s of 

these metals for the privilege of conducting transactions.(83) 

Once these legal monopolies were abolished, free 

money, free land, and free trade would prevail. And 

under the force of the reSUlting competition, "interest, 

profit,and rent on buildings will almost entirely 

disappear; ground-rents will no longer flow into a few 

hands; and practically the only inequality remaining 

will be the slight disparity of production due to 

"s u per i 0 r i t Y 0 f s 0 i I and ski 1 1 • n ( 84 ) Un dera s y s t em 0 f 

free competition, insisted Tucker, the trusts, which 

"instead of growing out of competition, as is so genera 

I I Y sup p 0 sed, ha ve been rna de pos sibleon I y by the a b 

sence of competition. only, in short, by those 

arb i t r a r y lim ita t ions of compet i t ion wh i ch we find in 

those law-created privileges and monopolies of which I 

have just spoken,"(85) would be crippled. Further, in 

a society governed by free competition, prices would be 

determined by their labor-costs, and the wage system 

would no longer be a vehicle for exploitation. Under 

the influence of free competition, he said,· "it will 

make no difference whether men work for themsleves, are 

employed or employ others. In any case they can get 

nothing but that wage for their labor which free competition 

determines. n (86) Thus, according to TUCker, 

free compet i tion would eliminate exploitation by elimina 

tin g a I I profit, r en tandin t erest. I t wo u I dinsur 

e, i·not her .w0 r ds, t hat cos t Wo u I d bethelimit 0 f 

price. It was felt that in such a society everyone 

would receive his due and the antagonistic struggle 

between capital and labor would be replaced by harmonious 

cooperat ion. Since wealth would increase dramatically 

and economic justice would prevail, crime would 

be significantly reduced. Whatever crime remained 

could be handled by competitive defense agencies offeri 

n g theirse r viceson the f r e e rna r k e t, and the t ria I by 

jury, whose decis ions would be guided by the common 

law. 

209

6. CONCLUSION: THE DECLINE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM 

Phi losophical anarchism never did attract a large 

following,(89) and after the mid-1890's the movement 

began to decline. Between 1892 and 1897 Liberty 

changed from a weekly to a bi-weekly publication, after 

wh i ch it appeared only irregularly. Phi losophical anarchism 

all but ceased to exist in 1908 when, after the 

destruction of his book shop by fire, Tucker ceased 

publication of Liberty altogether •. (90) For the next 

twenty years, the only anarchism that remained in any 

organized fashion in the United States was the anarchocommunism 

of Emma Goldman'S journal Mother Earth. 

The reasons for the decline of philosophical anarchism 

are several. First, as Eunice Schuster points 

out, since its proponents were neither wage nor class 

con sci 0 us, i t wasspurn e d by bot h the cap ita lis t s, because 

of "its demands to secure the just distribution 

of wealth," and by labor, which "had had enough of what 

it thought was competition and individualism."(91) Second, 

the i r bel ief that the solut ion to the trust problem 

and the concentration of wealth lay in less government 

and freer competition, rather than in more government 

and the regUlation of business, appeared hopeless 

I y n a i v e and, a s C ha r I e s Madis 0 n sa i d, "fa i led t 0 i mpress 

anyone but themselves."(92) Third, as Victor 

Ya r ro s no ted, a n arc his m ' s cry for the eli mina t ion of 

g 0 v ern men twa s bee om i nginerea sing I Y i r rei e van t sinc e 

" the wholet re ndin po 1 i tics and e con om i c s sinc e the 

end of the last century had been away from individualism 

and 1a iss e z - f air e - ism. The· s tat e, 0 b v i 0 us I y, wa s 

not dying of inanition or making room for voluntary 

ins tit uti 0 n s ," and "eve r y body, insh0 r t, wa s I 00king to 

the state for aid and support."(93) And finally, philosophical. 

anarchism continued to adhere to the labor 

theory of value, apparently oblivious to the marginalist 

revolution in economics occurring in the 1870'S. 

Yet, des pit e its s h 0 r t com i n gs, wh i c h we r e nowh ere 

more evident that in its economics, philosophical anarchism 

must be acknOWledged as the first, and at that 

tim e the 0 n I y, bra n d 0 fanarchism topr 0 po un d a complete 

system, both a critique of government and a positive 

alternative not founded on a previous transformation 

of human nature. And in its depiction of the 

institutional framework of an anarchist society, in 

partiCUlar its views regarding the provision of police 

and judicial services, nineteenth century philosophical 

anarchism bears a marked similarity to its more sophis- 

211

t icated cousin, twentieth century individualist 

anarchism. 

212

FOOTNOTES 

( 1 ) F ran z 0 p pen h e i mer, The S tat e ( New Yo r k: F r e e 

L i feE d i t ion s, 1975), p. x x xi; a 1s 0 see pp. 96-1 01 ; 

Emil Kauder, "The Intellectural and Political Roots of 

t he 0 1 de r A u s t r i an Schoo I ," Z e i t sc h r i f t fur 

Nationalokonomie XVII (1958). pp. 420-21; also see 

Ludwig von Mises, The Historical Setting of the 

Austr ian School of Economics (New Rochelle: Arlington 

H0 use, 19 69 ), Pp. 29 - 34 • 

(2)See, for example, Yale Brozen, "Is Government 

the Source of Monopoly?," The Intercollegiate Review 

(Winter, 1968-1969), pp. 67-68; and Adam Smith, The 

Wealth of Nations (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 

n.d.), especially Vol. II, pg. 72: fl ••• it is the interest 

of the merchants and manufactures of every country 

t 0 see uret 0 thems e I ve s the m0 n 0 pol Y 0 f the home 

mar k e t. Hene e, i n Great Br ita in, and i n mo s tother European 

countries, the extraordinary duties upon almost 

a 11 goods imported by al ien merchants. Hence the high 

d uti e sand proh i bit i onsup0 n a I I thos e for e ign rna n u f aet 

u res whie h e a n e 0 me i n toe 0 mpet i t ion wit h 0 ur own. 

Hence too the extraordinary restraints upon the import 

a t ion 0 f a I m0 s t a I Iso r t s 0 f good s from thosec0 un 

tries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be 

disadvantageous." 

(3)Eunice Schuster, Native American Anarchism 

( New Yo r k: AL\1S Pres s, 19 7 0 ), D • 1 3 . 

(4)Murray Rothbard, "-Individualist Anarchism in 

the United States: Origins," Libertarian Analysis 

(Winter 1970), p. 14. 

(S)Schuster, p. 42; also see Corinne Jacker, The 

B I a e k F I agofAn archis m (N e w Y0 r k: Cha r I e sSeribne r 

and Sons, 1968), pp. 25-26. 

(6 )Schus ter, p. 41. 

(7)Jaeker, p. 10. David Deleon, in his The 

American as Anarchist (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 

1978), argues that the individual ism of indigenous 

American anarchism is rooted in three factors: religion, 

the great open frontier, and capitalism. Protestantism 

certainly did individualize religion. But 

since it would have the same impact on both sides of 

the A t 1ant i c, I don T t see how i t ca n be a fa c tor explaining 

the individualism in America as distinct 

from the collectivism in Europe. Moreover, it should 

not be for got ten t hat man y 0 f tho s e wh 0 a r r i ve d at 

their anarchism via their religious individualism did 

not become individual ist anarchists at all, but 

anarcho-communists. Leo Tolstoy in Russia and John 

213

Hum p h r e y N0 yes i nAmerica are two s·uc hex a. mpies • Fin 

a 11 y, wh i 1 e many rei igious sects came to Amer ica seeki 

n g "r eli g i 0 u s f r e e d 0 m ,n wh a t the y me ant by t his wa s 

not freedom for the individual worshiper, but freedom 

for the sec t a s a wh 0 Ie, co upIed wit h rig i d con formit y 

b Y the mem b e r s 0 f the sec t • The Pur itansat Ma s sach usetts 

Bay are an outstanding example. They wanted 

" rei i g i 0 u s f r e e d om" topraetice inthe i r . own wa y • But 

theyes tab lis h e d a the0 c r a c y d om ina ted by are 1 i g i 0 us 

aristocracy. The primary functions of the state were 

to compel church attendance, collect taxes for the suppor 

t of the church and to preserve rei igious orthodoxy. 

I t was in pursuit of the latter end that such religious 

dissenters as Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson were 

e x pel led. T hus, the impact 0 f rei i g ion 0 nthe emerge n c e 

of American individualism is difficult to gauge. Certainly 

it is not a one way street. The other difference 

between Deleon's interpretation and mine is his 

treatment of the open frontier and capitalism as two 

dis tin c t f act 0 r s • But itse em s tome t hat the ex i sten 

ceo f the 0 pen fro n tie r wa s I a r gel y res ponsib I e for 

the emergence of capitalism. As noted in the text, in 

n ear 1 y everye 0 Ion y a con c e r t ed e f for t wa s rna d e to 

transplant the European feudal structure and these 

attempts failed because of the presence of the open 

frontier. 

(8)10 Schuster, p. 35. 

(9 )On Anne Hutch inson, the early Quakers and the 

Antinomian Doctrine and its relation to anarchism see 

Schuster, pp. 13-39; Rothbard pp. 14-28; and Deleon, 

pp. 14-23. 

(10 )For a good presentation of the principles of 

Transcendental ism and a summary of the views of two 

leading exponents, Emerson and Thoreau, see A. J. 

Bei tzinger, A History of American Political Thought 

( New Y 0 r k: Do d d , Meadand Co., 19 7 2 ), Pp. 341 -47. AIso 

see Alpheus Mason, "Romantic Individualism," Free 

Go v ernmentin the Ma kin g, e d: A• T. Ma son ( New Yo r k : 

Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 474-79. On the 

reI i g i 0 usb a sis 0 f rna n y 0 f the r ad i c a Ire I i g i 0 usana r 

chi s t comm u nit i e s 0 f the n i net e en t h c e n t u r y, see Lew i s 

Perry's excellent "Versions of Anarchism in the Antislavery 

Movement," American Quarterly (Winter 1968), 

pp. 768-82. Also see Schuster, pp. 410-86. For a description 

of John Humphrey Noyes' Oneida Community 

see Stow Persons, "Christian Communitarianism in 

Am e ric a ,It Soc i ali sma n d Am e rican L i fe, V0 I. 1, e d s . : 

Dona ld Drew Egbert and Stow Persons (Princeton: 

Princeton UnIversity Press, 1952), pp. 127-51. Also of 

interest' is Morris Bishop, "The Great Oneida Love-in," 

214

American Heritage (February 1969), pp. 14-17. For a 

statement of the principles of Adin Ballou, the founder 

of the Hopedale Community, see his Christian Non 

Resistance (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970). For a 

commentary on the Hopedale experiment, as well as many 

other anarchist and social ist communities in early 

n i net e e nth c en t u r yAm e rica, see J 0 hn Hump h r e y Noyes, 

History of American Social isms (New York: Hillary 

House Pub., 1961), especially pp. 119-32. 

(11)Adin Ballou, "Remarks at. tbe First Annual 

M e e tin g 0 f ·t heN 0 n - Res i s tan c e Soc i e t y, B 0 s ton , 

Massachusetts, September 25, 1839," Patterns of 

Anarchy, eds.: L. I. Kr immerman and Lewis Perry (New 

Yo r k : Do ubi e day and Co., 19 6 6 ), PP • 14 6- 47 • 

(12)ln Schuster, P. 116. 

( 1 3 ) J 0 s i a h War r en, Eq u itab I e Comme r ce (N ew Yo r k : 

Bur t Frankl in, 19 5 2 ), P• 58 • For apr e sentat ion 0 f the 

d eve lopmen t 0 fin d i v i d uali s tic a narchism t hat i n rna ny 

ways parallels that taken here see Lawrence Moss, "Privat 

e Pro per t y Anarchism: An Am e rica n Va riant, n Fur ther 

Explorat ions in the Theory of Anarchism, ed.: Gordon 

Tu·llock (Blackburg, Va.: University Publications, 

1974), p. 1-31. 

(14)Stephen P. Andrews, The Science of Society 

(Weston, Mass.: M and S Press, 1970), p. 13. For an 

ex c ell en t, s u c c inc t, s tat erne n t a f And r ews' views see 

Bowman Hall "The Economi c Theories of Stephen Pearl 

Andrews: Neglected Utopian Writer," The South African 

Journal of Economics (March 1975). Hall's conclusion 

is that Andrews provided a "lucid and concise statement 

of the ideas originally but chaotically proposed by 

"Josiah Warren" and that "his philosophy can be said to 

carry the Lockean ideas found in the Declaration of 

Independence and the ideas found in the The Wealth of 

Nations to their logical extreme." On both counts 

Hall is surely correct. 

(15)Warren, P. 57. 

(16)Andrews, p. 63. 

(17)Ibid., p. 63. Note the striking similarity 

between the thought of Warren and Andrews and the ideas 

being propounded independently in France by P. J. 

Pro u d h 0 n . Pro u d h 0 n bel i eve d t hat "L i be r t y wa s the 

Mother, not the Daughter, of Order." 

(18)Ibid., p. 64. 

(19)Warren, p. 61. Warren admitted that there 

might be a few cases where individualism was impossible. 

In such cases he allowed for a "Deliberative 

Council" which would be composed of community leaders 

or exper ts. The Counci 1 would be called into session 

to dISCUSS a particular problem and dissolve itself 

215

immediately following its decision.' Further, the members 

were to be paid only after they rendered their 

services. See Schuster, p. 102. 

( 20 ) And r e ws, p. 53; a Iso see Wa r r en, p. 41. Bo t h 

Warren and Andrews merely said that the only just price 

was that based upon cost. They acknowledged that the 

p r inc i pie of II i nd i v i d ua I sovereignty" left i t up to the 

discretion of the individual to respect or reject this 

moral cost principle. 

(21)Warren, pp. 43-48; also see Boman Hall, "The 

Economic Ideas of Josiah War r-eh· , First American 

A n arc his t ," His tor y 0 f Pol i ticalEconomy, 6, (19 7 4 ) , 

p. 99. 

(22)Warren, p. 85. 

(23)See James Martin, Men Against the State 

(Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles PUblishing Co., 1970), 

p. 27. Whether such "modifications" as repugnance and 

intensity can be reconciled with the labor theory of 

value is indeed doubtful. 

(24)Warren, p. 76; also see Schuster, p. 105-06. 

(25)Andrews, pp. 96-98, and Warren, pp. 65-67. 

(26)Warren, p. 49. 

(27)Ibid., p. 66. 

(28) Ibid., p. 49. Harold Barclay has argued 

that Warren was, at least in his later years, only 

"peripherally anarchistic" and in fact advocated a 

"I imi ted government much in the tradition of Thomas 

Jefferson. tl See his "Josiah Warren: The Incomplete 

A n arc his t ," An arc h y (Ma r c h 1968), p p. 90 - 9 6 • The 

argument is interesting but unconvincing in that 

Barclay's case rests on the false assumption that anarchi 

sma n d the use 0 f for cear e incompat i b 1e • Fur the r , 

whether Warren was or was not an anarchist is really 

irrelevant for our purpose, for it cannot be doubted 

that his concept of "individual sovereignty" was the 

foundat ion for what his successors developed into the 

American doctrine of "philosophical anarchism." 

(29 )For a good explanat ion of this process see 

Hall, p. 96. 

(30)Warren, p. 47. 

(31)Ibid., p. 80. 


(33)Hall, p. 106. 

(34)Andrews, P. 70. 

(35)Warren, p. 68; and see Andrews, p. 138, and 

Hall, ltJosiah Warren," p. 197. 


(37)Ibid., p. 44. 

( 38 ) Via r tin, p. xii. 

(39)ln Ibid., p. 128. 

216

( 4 0 ) I nib i d . ,... p. 1 1 2 • He yw00dar g uedthat lega I 

tender laws were "class currency." 

(41)ln ibid., p. 130. 

(42)Lysander Spooner, "Constitutinnl Law, Relative 

t 0 C red it, Cur r e n c y and Bn nkin g ," The Co lIec ted Wo r k s 

o fLy san d e r S p 0 0 n e r, Vo. V ( We s ton ,Mas s .: Mand S 

Pres s, 19 71 ), P• 24. 

(43)Ibid., p. 27. 

(44)See ibid. Also see Carl Watner, "The Works 

of Lysande r Spooner," address before .the ed i tor s of the 

Liberty Book,n.d., pp. 2-3. 

(45)Lysander Spooner, "The Unconstitutionality of 

the Laws of Congress Prohibiting Pri vateMail s , fiThe 

Collected Works of Lysander Spooner Vol. I (Weston, 

Mass: M andS Press, 1971), p. 7. 

(46)Lysander Spooner, "Letter to Grover 

Cleveland," The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner, 

Vol. I (Weston, Mass: M and S Press, 1971), p. 42. 

(47)Benjamin Tucker, "An Unwarranted Question," 

Ins tea d 0 f aBo 0 k (N e w Yo r k: A r no Pres sand The New 

York Times, 1972), p. 208. 

(48}Greene's description of the operations of the 

mutual bank can be found in his "The Mutual Bank," in 

American Radical Thought, ed.: H. J. Silverman 

(Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 197.0), pp. 138-41. 

A 1 s 0 see Mar tin, p p. 1 3 1 - 32 • On e can ea s i I Y see the 

simi lar i ties between Proudhon's mutual bank and that 

espoused by Greene. The Proudhonian influence on 

Greene is clearly documented in Wiliam Reichert, 

Partisans of Freedom (BoWling Green: Bowling Green 

State University, Popular Press, 1976), pp. 100-16. 

For a good summary of Proudhon's banking ideas and a 

critique of mutual banking see Herbert Osgood, 

"Scientific Anarchism," Political Science Quarterly 

(Ma r c h 1889 ), Pp. 15- 18, 34- 36 • 

( 49 )Ma r tin, p • 1 7 6 • 

( 50 ) I bid., p p. 2 1 2 -13; a 1so see Mur ra y Ro t hba r d , 

11 The S po 0 n e r. - T u c k e r Doc t r i n e: An Econom i s t 's View, 11 

Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature, and Other 

Essays (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Press, 1974), p. 

133; and Osgood, pp. 34-36. 

(51)ln Martin, p. 138. 

(52)ln Schuster, p. 105. 


(54)Ibid., p. 145. 

(55)Ibid. 

( 56 )Ma r tin, pp. 144- 48 . 

(57)Ibid., p. 153. 

(58) Lysander Spooner, "The Law of Intellectual 

PropertY,TI Collected Works of Lysander Spooner, Vol. 

217

III (Weston, Mass.: M and S Press, 1971), pp. 27-8, 

80-9. (59) I n Car I Wa tner, "Lysander Spooner: From 

Const·itutional Lawyer to Individualist-Anarchist," 

(Address delivered at the Third Libertarian Scholars 

Conference, October 5, 1975), p. 13. For an excellent 

and in-depth analysis of the Spooner-Tucker debate on 

this issue see Carl Watner's two part article "A 

Question of Property: two opinions," The dandelion 

(Spring and Summer, 1977), pp. 4-21; 4-12, 

respectively. 

( 6 0 ) T u eke r, "P r 0 per t y Un de r Ana r chi sm," Ins tead 

of a Book, p. 311. On Ingall's influence on later 

anarchists also see Moss, op.cit., pp. 10-11. 

( 61 ) T u eke r, "w her e We S ta nd ," Ins t ead of a Book, 

p. 52. (62)Victor Yarros, "Individualist or Philosophical 

Anarchism," The New Encyclopedia of Social Reform, 

eds.: W. D. P. Bliss and R. M. Binder (1908), p. 42. 

( 6 3 ) T u eke r, " Con t raetor 0 r gani s m, What' s That t 0 

Us? tt, Ins tead 0 f a Bo 0 k t P• 33. 

(64)Tucker, "Competitive Protection," Instead of 

a Book, p. 327. 

(65)Gustave de Molinari, The PrOduction of 

Security (New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, 

1977), pp.6-9. 

(66)Ibid., p. 8. 

(67)ln Carl Watner, "Les 'Economistes' 

Libertaires," Reason (January 1977), p. 26. 

(68)Ibid. This article provides a good 

discussion of the entire French controversy over this 

matter. For more on the early nineteenth century 

F r e n c h r a d i c a lin d i v i d ua lis t ssee Ma r k We i nbur g, "The 

Soc i a I A n a I y sis 0 f T h r e e Ear 1 y 1 9 t h Ce n t u r y F r en c h 

Liberals: Say, Comte, and Dunoyer," The Journal of 

Libertarian StUdies (Winter 1978), pp. 45-63. 

(69)Lysander Spooner, "Natural Law, or the Science 

of Justice," Collected Works of Lysander Spooner Vol. 

I (Weston, Mass.: M and S Press, 1971), p. 6. Also 

relevant for Spooner's natural law position is his 

Vices are Not Crimes: A Vindication of Moral Liberty 

(Baltimore, 1977). This pamphlet was published 

a non y m0 u sly i n 1 8 7 5. Sin c e its aut h 0 r s hip wa s not 

discovered until recently, it was not included in his 

Collected Works. 

(70)Spooner, "Natural Law," pp. 9-11. 

(71)lbid., pp. 11-12. 

(72 )Lysander Spooner, "No Treason, Number One," 

The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner (Weston, 

Ma s s .: Mand S Pre s s, 19 7 1 ), p • 6. 

218

(73)Lysander Spooner, "No Treason, Number Six," 

The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner Vol. 

(Weston, Mass.: Mand S Press, 1971), pp. 1-59. 

( 7 4 ) F red Mille r, " L Ysan dera n d Lim i ted Go vern 

ment," Reason (May, 1976) pp. 19-21, asserts that 

Spooner's argument is actually consistent only with 

1 imi ted government, and not anarchism. To some extent, 

this is a matter of semantics. If we define.government 

so as to make it compatible with no initiated force, 

then Spooner's philosophy is consistent with limited 

government. But then so are the philosophies of all 

other anarchists. 

(75)Lysander Spooner, "An Essay on the Trial by 

Jury," The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner, Vol. 

I I ( We s ton, Ma s s .: Mand S Pres s, 19 7 1 ), P • 6. 

(76)Ibid. For a sneering "analysis" of 

Spooner's ideas see A. John Alexander, "The Ideas of 

Lysander Spooner," The New England Quarterly (June 

1950), pp. 200-17. For a more sympathetic treatment of 

Spooner see such works as CarlWatner, "Lysander 

Spooner, Libertarian Pioneer," Reason (March, 1973), 

pp. 20-23; Carl Watner, "Lysander Spooner: From 

Constitutional Lawyer to Individualist Anarchist," Ope 

cit.; Martin, pp. 167-201; and Reichert, pp. 117-40. 

Also of interest is Charles Shively's "BIography" of 

Spooner in The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner, 

V0 I. I ( We s t on, Ma s s .: Mand S Pre s s, 19 7 1 ), Pp. 15 - 62 . 

( 7 7 ) Ma x S t i r n e r, The Ego and His Own ( New Yo r k : 

Dover PUblishing, 1973), p. 5. 

(78)Ibid., p. 179. 

( 79 ) T u c k e r, "I n d i v i d u a ISo v ere i gn t y Our Goa I , " 

Ins tea d 0 f aBo 0 k, P • 1 32 • Ric ha r d His k e s has rna d e a 

very strong case that "to the extent that Tucker 

believes in equal liberty he is no egoist." See his 

Community and Freedom: The Political Theory of Cooperative 

Individualism (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: 

Indiana University, 1979). See especially, p. 128: "To 

advocat'e egoism or the view that the 'only source of 

reasons for action lies in the interests of the 

agents,' precludes one from making demands or claims on 

others on any other basis than that of the power or 

·brute force one has to back up the claims. As a pacifist, 

Tucker would shrink at such a prospect; as an 

anarchist he must reject it, for of all types of political 

discontents anarchists are without doubt the most 

'resentfUl' of the political world in which they live." 

Further, Hlskes notes, Tucker's concern for "the law of 

equal liberty" actually smuggles in natural law principles 

(pp. 129-30). 

(80)Tucker, "A CrIticism That Does Not Apply,fl 

219

CHAPTER VII 

The Politico-Economic Perspective 

of Individualist Anarchism 

The i nd i v i dual ist anarchist paradign is a synthesis 

0 f phi los 0 phi c a I a narchism wit h mo der n e conom i c s • 

The ph i losophical anarchist framework of competing police 

agencies sell ing their services on the free market 

i sad 0 pte d • But the phi los 0 phi ca I ana r ch i s t s, s ubscr 

i bing to the labor theory of value, bel ieved that 

free competition would eliminate profit, rent and interest 

by reducing price to cost. This belief in the 

labor theory of value is replaeed by the subjective 

value-marginal utility approach of modern economics. 

The individualist anarchists do not believe that free 

competition would eliminate profit. Rather, it is the 

phenomenon of profit and loss as they see it, that performs 

the essential social function of directing economic 

activity into the satisfaction of consumer demand. 

By blending the institutional framework of philosophical 

anarchism with the marginal utility approach of 

modern economics, the individualist anarchist believes 

t ha t he has developed the out line for a workable 

government less society. 

This chapter deals with a series of diverse topics 

that wi 11 clar i fy the organizational principles upon 

which individualist anarchism is based. It is only 

after this general framework has been articulated that 

the specifics of the individualist anarchist framework 

can be examined. 

1. SOCIAL COORDINATION 

All societ ies must have some means for coordinating 

the act ions of the individual members. The larger 

and m0 r e compie x the soc i e t y the morediff i cuI tand 

crucial this problem becomes. How the individualist 

a n arc his t soc i e t y w0 u 1d a pproa c h t his prob I em ca n be 

seen by contrasting the operations of the collective 

anarchist society with that of individualist anarchism. 

Bot h t Ypes 0 fan arc his mad v 0 cat e e con om i c f r e edom. 

Yet, it is clear that they mean widely different things 

by this. The collectivist anarchists believe that 

economic freedom entails the abolition of the entire 

market paraphernalia of exchange, private property, 

wages, profit and loss, while the indIvidualist anar- 

221

chist advocates the sanctity of private property and 

the entire market system. 

For analytical purposes collectivist anarchism can 

be divided into two broad types: anarcho-syndicalism or 

fun c t ion a 1 collec t i vism• and a narch 0 - comm un ism 0 r ge 0 

graphical collectivism. Under anarcho-syndicalism society 

would be organized on the basis of functions. 

Each industry would be owned and operated by the worke 

r sin t hat pa r ticu 1a r i nd us try. The mine r s wo u 1down 

and 0 per ate the co a lind us try; the t r uc ke r s wo u I down 

and make all of the decisions within the trucking ind 

us try. etc. Pre suma b 1y. the r e wo u I d be on e supr asyndicate 

to integrate the operations of the independent 

syndicates with each other.(l) Anarcho-communism. 

on the other hand. is organized on the basis of geography. 

"The revolution," says Kropotkin, "must strive 

toenablee v e r y c omm un j t y t 0 sus t a init s elf. t 0 be come 

mat e ria I 1yin d e pen den t • " ( 2 ) T husea c h c omm unit y 0 r 

commune is to be large enough to be completely selfsupporting. 

Kropotkin, for example, refers to the 

communities as consisting of "a few millions of inhabitants."(3) 

They would be primarily agricultural, but 

industry would also exist. Modern technology, he argues, 

would make agricultural production so plentiful 

that" our h y pot h e t i cal i nha bitant s would be led ne c e s 

s a r i 1 Y t 0 em p loy the i r lei sur e i n rna n u f act uri ng, art i s 

tic, scientific, and other pursuits."(4) 

Regardless of which type of collectivist anarchism 

is advocated, all money, wages, exchange and prices 

would be abolished. "There will be no buying and selling," 

says Berkman. "Exchange will be free." Each 

group of producers or each syndicate will deposit their 

produce at the community warehouses and be given in return 

whatever they need. Need rather than profit will 

d e t e r min e what i s prod u ced, and c omm 0 n sensewi I I tel I 

the members of the community what is needed and how it 

should be produced. "As much coal will be mined as 

will be necessary to satisfy the need. Similarly, will 

as much food be raised as the country needs. It will 

be the requirements of the community and the supply 

obtaining which will determine the amounts it is to 

receive. This applies to coal and food as to all other 

needs of the people."(S) 

Inc 0 n t r a s t towhat may be ca lIed the rna n ua lor 

conscious coordination endemic to anarcho-collectivism, 

the individualist anarchist opts for what he believes 

to be the automatic or spontaneous coordina- 

222

t ion a f for de d by the rna r ke t s ystem. In fa c t, the individualist 

anarchist is very critical of the principle 

of conscious coordination for two reasons: for the 

political reason that the principle itself entails the 

rei n t rod u c t ion 0 f the s tat e; and for the e con om i c 

rea son t hat therei s no a I t erna t i vet 0 the rna r k e tin 

any soc let y abovet h e mo s t s imp 1 e and econom i caII y 

backward. 

There are three problems of coordination that must 

be solved in any socio-economic system: [1] the problem 

of priortities, i.e., what goods and services should 

be produe e d; [2] t he pro b I em of ef fie i en c y, i. e. , 

what c om bina t ion 0 f res 0 ur c esus edin the prod uc t ion 0 f 

a commodity will (a) not impede the production of goods 

des i red more intensely by the consumers, and (b) leave 

the largest bundle of resources left over for the product 

ion of other goods and services; and [3] the problem 

of distribution, i.e., how to compensate each 

participant in the productive process.(6) 

Both the individualist anarchist critique of the 

principle of conscious dIrection and the view of the 

market process as a method of spontaneous coordination 

can b e h i g h I i g h ted by i n d i cat i ng how the y bel i eve t hat 

the market system approaches and is able to solve these 

three problems. 

a. Priorities. 

The individualist anarchists argue that since consumers 

only buy what they intend to use, one can make a 

profIt only by producing what others desire. Hence, 

there can be no distinction between production for use 

and pro d u c t ion for profit. Wit h I n a rna r ke t s ystem 

priorities are therefore set by the consumers' buying 

and abs t en t i on from buying. Entrepreneurs, anxious to 

maximize their profits, will tend to produce those 

goods with the greatest discrepancy between total 

rev e n u e and tot a I cos t • I tis inth i s wa y t hat the 

unhampered price system is able to disseminate the 

needed informat ion to market participants. One need 

only be concerned with the prices that are relevant to 

him. If consumer demand for any good increases or its 

supply decreases, its price would rise, thereby encouraging 

Its increased production. Conversely, if consumer 

demand decreased or the supply increased, the price 

would fall thereby discouraging production. Thus the 

i n d i v i d uall s tanarchis t s a r gue t hat the rna r ke t pro C e s s 

works in such a way as to produce precisely those goods 

that consumers wish to buy. 

223

A common criticism of this type of reasoning is 

that there are many examples where the market cannot be 

said to reflect the priorities of the consumers. It is 

assumed, for example, that bread is more important than 

diamonds while it is noted that the price of diamonds 

is much greater than that of bread. The error in this 

1 i ne of reason i ng is tha t individuals are never confronted 

with a choice between diamonds in the abstract 

and bread in the abstract. Instead,. they choose between 

individual units of bread and diamonds. Since 

under normal conditions that quantity of bread greatly 

exceeds that of diamonds, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction 

caused by the addition or loss of any particu 

1a run itof bread , i.e., its rna r gina 1 uti 1 i t Y , i s reI a 

tively low compared with that of any unit of diamonds. 

Were, by some quirk of fate, the quantity of bread 

great ly reduced or that of diamonds significantly increased, 

the marginal utility of the units of bread and 

diamonds would be altered causing the price of bread to 

rise and that of diamonds to fall. It can therefore be 

seen, a r g ue the i nd i v i d ua listanarchis t s, t hat the rna r 

ket does in fact reflect the priorities of the consumers 

and does so without the need for any conscious direction 

and control. In fact, any such control would 

only impede consumer satisfaction for, as the economist 

I s rae 1 K i r z nern0 t e s, " any non - rna r ke t 0 bs t a c I e s p I aced 

in the way of the pricing process thus necessarily 

interfere with the priority system that the consumers 

have set up."(7) 

I t should be noted at this juncture that this view 

of price formation indicates a significant difference 

between the modern individualist anarchists and their 

nineteenth century cous ins, the philosophical anarchists. 

The labor theory of value, so dear to men like 

Tucker, has been replaced by the modern principle of 

sub j e c t i v e val ue, and its coroll a r y, rna r gina I uti lit Y• 

Prices for the individualist anarchist are to be determined 

not by the quantity of labor involved in product 

ion but b Y wh a t the rna r ke t wi 1 I bea r, i. e., by supply 

and demand. 

b. Efficiency. 

For the i nd i v i d uali s tanarchis t the prob 1em 0 f the 

efficient allocation of resources is to be handled in 

the Same way that the problem of priorities is to be 

handled: the price system. To produce their goods the 

entrepreneurs must bid for the needed resources. They, 

therefore, stand in the same relation to the sellers of 

224

esources as the consumers do to the sellers of final 

go od s. Thus, pr ices for the var i ous factor s of product 

i on tend to reflect the demand for them by the entrepreneurs. 

Since what the entrepreneur is able to bid 

is limited by his expected yield on the final sale of 

his product, the libertarians believe that the factors 

of production are channeled into production of the 

goods most in demand by the consumers. Those who best 

serve the consumers earn the greatest profits and, 

hence, are able to offer the highest bids for the resources 

they need. If returns are not high enough to 

cover the cost of a particUlar operation, this means 

that there is, in the eyes of the consumers, a more 

important use for the factors of production elsewhere. 

The market, therefore, allocates resources to their 

m0 s t pro due t i ve poi n t reI a t i vet 0 the prior i t y s ystem 

that the consumers have established. 

This can be demonstrated by the following. Assume 

t hat the rna r k etis in eq u iIi br i urn. Al so as s ume t ha t a 

new technological breakthrough has enabled the product 

i on of a new commod i ty that is highly valued by the 

consumers. The production of the commodity, however, 

requi res the use of factor A. Those entrepreneurs who 

perceive this new profit opportunity will begin to bid 

for the fa c tor. T his inc rea sed competit ion for the 

available supply of A will cause its price to rise, 

forcing some of the users of A to curtail their purchases. 

But who wi II be the ones forced to curtail 

the i r pur c has e s ? C I ear 1y, i t wi I I beth0 seemp loye r s 

of A who are receiving the least remuneration for their 

product from the consumers, i.e., those who are employi 

n g A init s I e a s t produe t i ve poi n t • Inth i s wa y, the 

use 0 f A i s c han n e 1 e d f r om use s t hat the cons urn e r s 

value less highly into uses that they value more highly. 

But fur ther, the rise in the price and therefore 

the prof it margins of A will encourage other entrepreneurs, 

also anxious to make profits, to expand the 

supply of A. 

In other words, the individualist anarchists believethat 

the price fluc t ua t ion s 0 f the rna r k e t proc e s s 

automatically coordinate the actions of all participants 

in the system by transmitting the relevant know 

1 e d g e pre cis ely tot h 0 s e wh 0 r equi ret hat pa r ticu 1a r 

information to guide their actions. For example, informa 

t i on about rubber is commun i ca ted to tire manufacturers, 

while information about steel is communicated 

to automobile manufacturers, etc. As F. A. Hayek 

states, "The marvel is that Without an order being 

225

issued, without more than a handful of people knowing 

the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity 

cou 1 d not be as cer ta i ned by months of invest igat ion, 

are made to••• move in the right direction."(B) 

c. Distribution. 

Since under the free market those eager to earn 

profits can do so only by producing better than their 

competitors what the consumers desire to buy, the individualist 

anarchists contend that there can be no distinction 

between production and distribution. The more 

sa tis factor i ly one serves the consumers, the more profits 

he will earn. "The only means to acquire wealth 

and to preserve it in a market economy not adulterated 

by government-made restriction," says Ludwig von Mises, 

"is to serve the consumers in the best and cheapest 

way."(9) 

This means that wealth is not dispersed on the 

basis of personal moral merit but purely according to 

one's a b iIi t y top r 0 v ide 0 the r s wit h wh a t the y wa n t • 

While this may be considered unjust from some higher 

point of view, the libertarians regard It as one of the 

market's greatest merits. The demand for a "just" distribution 

of wealth, argues Hayek, implies that wealth 

be distributed according to moral merit. But this 

mea n s t hat s om e per son 0 r s om e g r 0 up mus t be compIe tel y 

cognizant of all the motivations that prompted any individual 

to engage in any particular action and then 

allocate rewards accordingly. But since "we cannot 

know or isolate all the circumstances which determine 

mer it, tf wit h 0 u t the compIetee1 i mina t ion 0 fin d i v i d ua 1 

privacy, the allocation of wealth according to "merit" 

is incompatible with a free society.(lO) 

The dispersion of wealth in a market society, libertarians 

argue, is in itself neither just nor unjust. 

It is functional from the point of view of facilitating 

the satisfaction of all market participants; it is also 

an integral aspect of a free society. 

d. State, Economy and Conscious Coordination. 

Since the market process spontaneously coordinates 

the act ion s 0 f a II me r ke t pe r tic i pe n t s tIt canoperat e 

wit h the u t m0 s t dec e n t r ali z a t ion 0 f know 1e d ge. S uc h 

ope rat ion permit s eve r yon e t 0 de vis e and pur sue his ow n 

p I a n s, run n i n g the gam u t from pur ely s elf ish to a 1 t r uist 

IC. It makes no difference what ends any individual 

226

may c h 00 s e; the fa c t r ema ins t hat the mo resa tis fa c tori 

ly .one produces what the others desire, the more money 

he will earn and hence the better able he will be to 

pursue his own goals, whatever they may be. But, in 

the absence of the price system the coordination of 

individual actions cannot be spontaneously generated. 

Rather, it requires conscious coordination and control. 

T his, howe v e r, c rea t esad i I amma for collec t i vis t 

a n arc his m • Sin ceo u t put s are rna t e ria I Iyin t e r depen 

den t, not on I y mus t product ion quotas be set for each 

i n d u s try insuc h a wa y as to coo r dinate the 0 u t put s 0 f 

all industr ies wi th one another, but all resources, 

including labor, must be allocated so as to enable each 

industry to attain its particular production quota. If 

i tis dec ide d by the C en t ralP1ann i n g Boa r d t hat the 

expansion of production in branch A would be desirable, 

res 0 u r c e s mu s t bet ran s fer red to i t from some 0 the r 

branch or branches. On the market this would be done 

by means of the pr ice system. If there is a need for 

expansion in one area, prices for the respective factor 

s, inc Iud i n g 1abor, wo u 1d r i s e in 0 r de r t a a t t r act 

them into that area. But in the absence of the price 

system the transfer requires conscious direction. Ind 

i v i d u a Ism u s t betran s fer red from bra n c h B, wh i chi s 

considered economically less desirable to the more 

economically desirable branch A. A crucial problem 

a r i s e s i f we ask what wi I I bet h e pol icy 0 f the n c omm un 

i tyn if the individuals who must be transferred balk? 

There are only two alternatives: [1] coerce them, or 

[2] allow them to go their own way. If the former is 

adopted, then clearly the state has not been abolished, 

for coercion is being initiated against individuals who 

themselves have not coerced anyone. But if the second 

alternative is adopted, the production quota of branch 

A wi II not be met. This, in turn, means that the industries 

dependent upon the output of A will, likewise, 

be una b let 0 me e t the i r pro d u c t ion quo t as, etc., in 

ever widening circles. 

Since plan attainment requires that resources be 

.allocated in the correct proportions, any spontaneous 

act ion wi II prevent the anticipated outputs from being 

attained. Plan fulfillment is therefore contingent 

u p 0 n e i the r [1] eve r yon e vol u n tar i 1 Y f 0 I 1ow i n g the 

directives of the planning authority, or [2] investing 

the CPB with an apparatus of compulsion and coercion. 

Kropotkin envisions the anarchist commune as consisting 

of several million people. But in such a society voluntary 

acquiesence is highly improbable. As Hayek 

227

poi n t sout tit i s not en 0 ugh to ha ve a g r e em e nton pIa n 

ning in the abstract; there must be 100 percent agreemen 

t on every aspect of the plan - pr i or it i es, resource 

all 0 cat ion, and dis t ributi 0 n - 0 reo ere i on mus t be 

utilized.(ll) Since it is doubtful that the several 

mil I ion p e 0 pIe com p 0 sing the c omm un e will a t a I I time s 

adhere,to exactly the same scale of values, plan fulfillment 

in a collective anarchist society of the size 

envisioned by Kropotkin would demand" a uniformity of 

action that is probably impossible to attain without 

the use of an agency possessing a monopoly on the use 

of compulsion and control, viz., the state. 

However, some have pointed out that the successful 

opera t i on of a market no less than a non-market economy 

r e qui res the em pI 0 ym en t 0 f res 0 ur c esin cor r e c t propor 

t ions. They conclude that the respective processes 

o f a I I 0 cat ion rna keli ttl e d ifferen c e . The Ind i v i d ua I 

i s tanarc his t 0 b j e c t s tot his con c I us ion. To pa r aph 

r a s e Hayek, the d if ference iss imi lar to tha t between 

erecting street signs and permitting each individual to 

chart his own course, on the one hand, and telling the 

people which road they must take, on the other.(12) 

The pr ice system, it is argued, does not command anyone 

t 0 do any t h i n g • Eve r yon e i s f r e e to devis e his own 

plans and to follow or not to follow the market signals. 

"It would be . accurate to state," claims 

Rot h bard, "that inthe f r e e rna r ke t therei s s 0 vere i g n t y 

of the individual: the Individual is sovereign over 

his own person and actions and his own property. This 

may be termed individual self-sovereignty. To earn a 

monetary return, the individual producer must satisfy 

con sum e r d emand, but the ext e n t t 0 wh i c h he pur sues 

o the r non m0 net a r y fa c torsis en t ire I y a rna t t e r 0 f his 

own free cholce."(13) In the absence of the price systern 

i n d i v i d u a I sea n not be per mit ted the f r e e d om to 

choose their own goals, occupations, etc., for it is 

unl ikely that free choice will produce an allocation of 

labor in exactly the proportions required for plan 

f u I f ill men t. The 0 n I y wa y to ins ureth e cor r eetaI I 0cat 

ion of labor is for the CPB to transfer laborers 

wher eve r nee d e dan d top u n ish d e v i a t ion s from the 

orders. ThUS, the indivIdualist anarchist contends 

that collectivist anarchism is contradictory: a collectivist 

society of the size envisioned by Kropotkin 

presupposes the existence of a state.(14) 

The rei s yet an 0 the r prob 1em . Sin c e the r e wo u 1d 

ben 0 buy i n g 0 r s ell i n g, the r e wo u 1 d ben 0 mar k e t . 

T his pIa cest h e CP Bin a d I 1 emma . I nor de r t 0 de VIS e 

228

its plans, the CPB would require information about the 

p re fe r e n c e s 0 f "s 0 c i e t y • " T he prob 1em i s t hat s u c h 

information is neither static, centralized, nor independent 

of the preferences of the individuals who comprIse 

the "society." The information needed by the CPB 

i sin for rna t ion abo u t the needsand des ire s 0 fin d i v i d ualso 

By its very nature such information is radically 

deeentralized: it exists only in the minds of each 

and every individual in society. Such information is 

dynamic, changing as often as individuals alter their 

preferences. I t is also sUbjective. An individual's 

preferences can be known, even to himself, only through 

his act s 0 f c h 0 0 sing . On e rna y c I aim topreferA to B, 

but u n til and u n I e s she act uall y rna kesth e c hoi c e, he 

can never be certain. 

We I ive in an uncertain and ever-changing world. 

Information is scarce and costly. The problem of ignorance, 

of incomplete knowledge, is perhaps the key 

social and economic problem. But, argue libertarians, 

i tis jus t t his p r ob 1em t hat the co I lee t i vis t i gn 0 res 

by posit i n g the eX i s ten ceof a CPB wh i c h e i the r po s 

sesses, or is capable of obtainIng at little or no 

cost, all of the information needed for the construction 

of the economic plan. 

The virtue of the market process, libertarians are 

fond of pointing out, "IS the economy of knowledge with 

which it operates, or how little the individual 

particIpants need to know in order to take the right 

action."(15) The price system acts as a sensoring 

dev i ce wh i ch not only moni tors the ongoing changes in 

consumer priorities and other economic data, but 

rewards those who adjust to these changes while punishing 

those who do not. 

The economi c problem facing any society organized 

on pure collectivist, i.e., non-market, principles, is 

that if there is no market, the CPB would have no information 

and thus no economic basis on which to construct 

its plans. True, high speed computers could be 

used to collect data, but the decentralized, dynamic 

and subjective nature of the information required would 

render such data practically worthless. From an econom 

1 cpo i n t 0 f view, the dec i s ion s 0 f the CPB wo u 1d 

therefore be totally arbitrary. The resulting inefficiencies 

and distortions would entail capital decumulation 

WhICh, in turn, would mean progressive impoverlshrnent.(16) 

229

T h us, for two reasons, the e conom i erea son 0 f the 

absence of economic calculation in a socialist economy, 

and the pol i tical reason of the inevitable reintroduct 

ion 0 f the s tat e, the i nd i v i d ua listanarchis t rna i n 

tains that even a moderately sized collectivist anarchIst 

society is simply not possible. The only possible 

alternative would be to establish communes so small 

as to permit every individual to have both personal 

contact with every other individual and complete knowled 

g e 0 f eve r y f ace t 0 f the c omm un e • I nth i s wa y the 

community would be small enough to permit every individual 

to participate in every decision. The problem, 

however, is that such a society would have to be so 

small as to all but entirely eliminate the division of 

labor. But without a division of labor, no capital 

machinery could be utilized. While such a society 

might funct ion as a collectivist anarchist community, 

It would have to be almost solely agricultural using 

primitive instruments and sUbsisting in grinding 

poverty.(17) 

Ins h 0 r t, the i n d i v i d u a lis tan archis t be lieve s 

that a state is the sine qua non of a large scale 

collectivist society and that while a small anarchist 

commune might be possible, it would be most 

unattractive. 

2. LAISSEZ FAIRE, POWER AND FREEDOM 

a. Power Defined. 

Libertarians argue that a libertarian society 

w0 u I d beeh a rae t e r i zed by the a bsenceof powe r rei ations. 

But the libertarian definition of power and 

freedom solely in terms of the presence or absence of 

violent activities, and the threat of such activities, 

has been criticized for disposing of the question of 

power relations by means of a semantic sleight-of-hand. 

Warren J. Samuels' critique of Rothbardian anarchism IS 

a good example of this line of thought. 

While anarchism would be a "system without a 

state," Samuels says, it would not be a system without 

power relationships, for "power, coercion and externalit 

ies are ubiquitous." They exist in all social 

sys terns. "The anarchist ideal, contemplated In terms 

of strict or absolute autonomy, is impossible."(lS) 

T h US, on e ca n l! sol veT! the prob I em 0 f powe r ina soc i e t y 

only by arbitrarily defining it in terms of certain 

types of coercion but not others. It is only through 

230

such "selective perception of mutual coercion," Samuels 

maintains, "that the anarchist ideal is sensible -- and 

that selectivity begs the critical issues."(19) 

Rot h bar d's de fin i t ion 0 f power and f r e e d om in 

t e r ms 0 f p h Ysic a I v i ole nee com e sin for es p e cia 1 1Y 

c a u s tic c r i tic ism • " Con C e n t rat ion up 0 n ph Ysica I v i 0lence 

and obedience is an undue narrowing of the focus 

upon the full range of mutual coercion," he charges. 

Rothbard's "nonaggression axiom" is "misleading and 

s e lee t i ve wit h reg a r d to' invas ion s ' • " He" can on I y 

pretend to abolish invasions by selectively admitting 

them, i.e., (he) abolished only certain invasions and 

coercion." And what invasions would Rothbard's axiom 

abol ish? Since his conception of voluntarism and freedom 

are "specified only in terms of market exchange," 

the y are "i n compIetean d s e I e c t i ve • " T hus"Ro t h bard's 

system" says Samuels, "would permit the operation of 

mu t u a I c 0 e r c ion i nthe rna r ke t, but he doe s not see i t 

as pejoratively and analytically coercion. In other 

words, he would abolish only the coercion he is willing 

to acknowledge."(20) Given his arbitrarily narrow view 

of power, Samuels continues, Rothbard cannot see -- or 

a tIe a s two n 't ad mit - - t hat the rna r ke t s y stem isits 

elf co ere i ve and t hat "i t g i v e s e f f e c t to wh ate ve r 

structure of private power operates through it." Thus, 

the "s tat e I e s s n e s s If 0 faRo t hba r d ian soc i e t y is a me r e 

"pretense"; it IS a "play with words" that "only functions 

to mislead." Consequently, not only would there 

be the functional equivalent of a state but it would be 

a state "skewed in favor of a propertied elite." 

Rothbard's "anarchism" "is not anarchism but a cleverly 

designed and worded surrogate for elitist or aristocratic 

con s e r vat ism. " I t wo u I d res u I tin a "p1 utoeraey" 

in the truest sense of the word, and "it cannot claim 

attent ion as a work of serious scholarship." In brief, 

"there is more to coercion, to voluntarism, and to 

freedom than Rothbard's system admits," and it is only 

by his "spur i ous" and, Samuel s strongly impl ies conscious 

"sleight-of-hand of narrowly contemplating ext 

ern a lit i e sandinvas ion s" t hat he i s a blet 0 sol vethe 

spector of power in his society.(21) 

This is a stinging critiCIsm that, despite its 

truculent and polemical tone, does raise an important 

question: is the Rothbardian -- and more generally the 

lIbertarian -- resolution of the power problem simply a 

product of the (conscious?) abuse of the language; of a 

semantic sleight-of-hand? 

231

Wh i let her e is, a dm itt e d I y, ve r y lit tIe a g r e em e n t 

e i the r i nor din a r y I a n g u age 0 reve n am 0 ngpolit i cal 

scientists regarding the meaning of the term "power," 

what little consensus there is follows, I believe, the 

path taken by such poltical scientists as Robert Dahl, 

Harold Lasswell and Morton Kaplan. Since there is 

lit tIe doubt that theirs is a respected approach to the 

question of power, it will, perhaps, be worthwhile to 

examine the libertarian definition in terms of the 

Dahl-Lasswell-Kaplan approach.(22) 

What is interesting about their analysis is the 

distinction they make between power and influence. For 

them, influence is a generic term that includes an entire 

family of more specific concepts such as power, 

authority, coercion, persuasion, force, etc. Power, on 

the other hand, says Dahl, is "defined as a special 

case of influence involving severe losses for noncomp 

I ian c e • " ( 23 ) S imil a r I y, La s s we I I and Ka p Iann0 t e t hat 

"it is the threat of sanctions that differentiates 

power from influence in general. Power is a special 

case of the exercise of influence: it is the process 

of affecting policies of others with the help of 

(actual or threatened) severe deprivations for nonconformity 

with the policies intended."(24) 

A problem with the Samuels' critique is immediatelyapparent. 

For Samuels, power is ubiquitous, but 

on I y bee a use h e (i mpi i cit I y) de fin esit ass y non ym 0 us 

with influence. But if the Dahl-Lawwell-Kaplan approach 

is followed power is clearly not ubiquitous. It 

is only one specific type -- that involving severe deprivations 

or losses -- of the much more inclusive concept 

of influence. Rothbard never denied that influence 

may be ubiquitous, but power certainly is not. If 

there is any abuse of language it lies with Samuels, 

not Rothbard. 

Even if one follows this approach, the question is 

far fro m be i n g res 0 I v e d . For is the r e, 0 r canthere 

be, market influence strong enough to constitute severe 

deprivation, i.e., can there be "economic power?" 

The rearet w 0 s tan dar d wa y s 0 f proc e e ding : t hat 

o f c I ass i fie a t ion and t hat 0 f compar i son . The met hod 

or per hap s morea c curate 1y, teeh n i que - - 0 f c I ass j 

fication establishes two or more mutually exclusive and 

exhaustive categories or classes and then assigns the 

phenomena to one or the other of the classes. The 

comparative technique proceeds by establishing a con- 

232

lence if they did not comply. However, if (a) the 

employees agree to ban together and present a united 

fro n t tothe i r em ploye r, and i f (b) the em p loyerag r e e s 

that he will not hire anyone who does not belong to the 

union, a closed shop will have been voluntarily agreed 

upon. Coercion, i.e., the initiation of the use of 

violence, in this ease was entirely absent. True, if 

a n em p loy e e wa n t s to wo r k for t hat pa r tic u I a r em p loye r 

he must join the union. But this is not coercion, for 

as the I tal ian legal theorist Bruno Leoni has commented, 

"You do not 'constrain' someone if you merely refrain 

from doing on his behalf something you have not 

agr eed to do. ft (32) The only thing the members of the 

union did was to agree among themselves not to work for 

the employer unless he agreed to hire only union memb 

e r sand the em ploye r, i n ret urn, a g r eedt 0 the dema nd . 

It makes no more sense, the individualist anarchist bel 

ieves, to say that non-union members are being coerced 

in this situation than to say that one is coercing 

Gimbels by buying a tie from :'r1acys. But if the employer 

were told by the union that unless he agreed to 

their conditions his factory would be burned, or by the 

government that he would be fined or imprisoned, the 

closed shop agreement would be coercive in this ease, 

since it was obtained via the threat of violence. The 

sam e w0 u I d bet rue i f the em ploye r h ired s t r ike - brea k 

e r s toe r u s h the un ion 0 r i f Ma c y s h ired agen t s t 0 use 

violence against Gimbels' shoppers. 

The siutuation IS identical for acts of private 

dis c rim ina t ion. I n a lib e r tar ian wo rId a I I proper t y 

wo u I d b e p r i vat ely own edandanyind i v i d u a 1 wo u 1d ha ve 

the right to use his property in any non-violent way he 

desired. "It might be charged that all this will allow 

freedom 'to discriminate' in housing or the use of 

streets," acknowledges Rothbard. And "there is no 

quest ion about that." "Fundamental to the libertarian 

creed is every man's right to choose who shall enter or 

use his own property, provided of course that the other 

person is willing."(33) Clearly, if private discrimina 

t i on is simply the right of an owner to determine who 

shall use his property it is, according to the libertarian 

definition of the term, "non-coercive." It is a 

method of exercising voluntary influence over another. 

What would be coerCIve, however, would be an order by 

an uninvited third party which included the threat of 

physical sanction for noncompliance of either discriminatory 

or nondiscriminatory behavior on the part of any 

individual. As with a closed or open shop, neither 

discriminatory nor nondiscriminatory behavior is in 

237

itself coerCive, but either may be depending on how 

they are undertaken. 

While voluntary private discrimination would be 

permitted, it should be noted that individualist anarchi 

s t s bel i eve t hat the rna r ke t wo u I d ten d tom i n i mi z e 

such behavior by placing the cost squarely on the 

shoulders of the property owner involved. Suppose, 

says Rothbard, that a landlord of an apartment building 

is a great admirer of six-foot Swedish 

Americans. and decides to rent his apartments 

only to fami 1 ies of such a group. In the 

f r e e soc i e t y i t wo u 1d be full yin his rig h t 

to do so. bu t he wo u 1del ear 1y s u f fer a I a r g e 

monetary loss 8S 8 result. For this means 

that he would have to turn away tenant after 

tenant in an endless quest for very tall 

Swedish-Americans. While this may be considered 

an extreme example, the effect is exactly 

the same, though differing in degree, for 

any sort of personal discrimination in the 

marketplace. If, for example, the landlord 

dislikes redheads and determines not to rent 

his apartments to them, he will suffer 

losses, al though not as severely as in the 

first example.(34) 

This argument is not altogether convincing, for the 

market is ethically neutral and will, as a general 

r u Ie. ref I e c t the val ue s dom ina ntin the c omm un i t Y. I t 

i s c e r t a i n 1yeo nee i v a b 1 e t hat ina c omm un i t Y wh ere 

ant i - b 1a c k. ant i - s em i tic 0 ran t i - redh e a d fee lin g isextremely 

high. the "costs" of doing business with a member 

of such an anathematized group would also be very 

high. In" fact, a businessman who is not himself prejudiced 

may find tha t his employees refuse to work wi th 

blacks or Jews, or that his customers refuse to buy 

from him if he employs such "undes"irables." In such 

cases the market would actually intensify discrimination 

by imposing a heavy cost for not discriminating. 

Still, it is likely that the overall effect of 

the market is to reduce rather than intensify the incidence 

of discrimination. For, as Milton Friedman has 

poi n ted 0 u t, nth e pur c has e r 0 f b rea d do e s not know 

wh€ther it was made from wheat grown by a white man or 

a Neg r 0, b Y a C h r i s t ian 0 r 8 J ew . " I tis precisely 

this "impersonality of the market,l1 he notes, that 

It s epa rat e sec 0 nom i cae t i v i t i € S from po lit 1 ca I views 'I , 

238

thereby protecting indIviduals from "being discriminated 

against in their economic activities for reasons 

that are irrelevant to their productivity -- whether 

these are associated with their views or color."(35) 

A related confusion is the role of leaders in an 

anarchist society. One view seems to be that anarchism 

impl i es the absence of leaders. This is only partially 

true. Individualist anarchists reject political 

leaders, not because they are leaders but because their 

f·unction is to exercise the use of coercion over 

others. They not only have no objection to leaders who 

have the voluntary assent of their followers, they recognize 

that such leaders are necessary. Their position 

is that 

Because of the uneven distribution of abiliti 

es, el i tes wi II tend to emerge from the 

ranks of the better qualified through a natural 

process of emerging hierarchy in all 

are a s 0 f hum a n act i v i t y. • • The f r e e rna r ke t 

society, then, is a society of evolving 

(ascending and descending) elites, or, as 

Vi I fredo Pareto put it, a 'ci rcula"tion of 

el i tes.' Since change is the fundamental 

c h a r act e r i s tic 0 f the f r e e rna r ke t soc i e t y , 

the emergence of elites and their continuing 

circulation is both natural and desirable for 

it promotes optimization of both economic efficiency 

and social harmony.(36) 

I tis f eItthat the I e a d e r sand dec i s ion rna ke r sin 

a la i ssez fa i re society would be able to retain their 

pos i t ions only by continued service to their followers. 

The moment a leader ceased such service the rank-andfile 

would take their support elsewhere and that partie 

u I a r I e a d e r wo u 1d los e his posit ion. Wh i leitis r ecog 

n i zed t hat a I a iss e z fa ire s y stem, as in fa c tany 

soc i a I s ystern, r e qui res dec i s ion rna ke r s, the a narchis t s 

bel i eve t hat i tis 0 n 1 y the rna r k e t, wit hit s constraint 

of serving the consumers, that prevents the 

leaders from using their leadership positions for purposes 

of exploitation. 

c. Freedom Defined. 

Freedom, as defined by the libertarians, is simply 

the absence of interpersonal violence, i.e., the use of 

initIated force or violence, or its threat, against the 

person or property of another. In this sense it is not 

239

only "negative" but, as Hayek points out, it "refers 

solely to a relation of men to·other men, and the inf 

r i n gementon itis coe r c ion by 0 the r me n • " ( 37 ) De fin 

ing freedom in this fashion means that in a libertarian 

society everyone would have an equal amount of freedom, 

i.e., the right to engage in any non-violent activity 

they desired. But it is important to realize that this 

does not mean that everyone would have an equal abil i ty 

to use that freedom. While the poor would have the 

same amount of freedom as the wealthy, the range of opt 

ions is undoubtedly more 1 iroi ted for the poor than the 

wealthy. Unlike the wealthy, the prospect of an ocean 

cruise on the Car ibbean or a vacation on the French 

R i v i era w0 u I d not be wi t h i n the ran g e of effect i ve 

choice for most poor. The cognition that the ability 

to use one's freedom is partly a function of one's economic 

position is probably what Harold Laski meant by 

his remark that "liberty in a laissez faire society is 

attainable only by those who have the wealth or 

opportunity to attainit."(38) 

Not only Harold Laski, but "progressives" such as 

J. R. Commons and John Dewey and "idealists" such as T. 

H. Green also define freedom as the "effective power 

t 0 do s p e c i f i c t h ings ," thereby viewing itin t e r mS 0 f 

the number of options open to a person. Libertarians, 

however, maintain a strict distinction between the absence 

of coercion and the power or ability to engage 

ins p e c i f i c t hi ngs, and res e r vethe t e r m "f r e e dom" for 

the former. While acknowledging that the range of opt 

ions open to an individual is an important question, 

it is, argues Hayek, not synonymous with freedom: 

the roc k eli mb e ron a d iff i cuI·t pit c h wh 0 

seeson Iyone wa y ou t to s a ve his I i f e i sunques 

t i onably free, though we would hardly say 

he has any choice. Also most people will 

st i II have enough feel ing for the original 

use of the word "free" to see that if the 

same cl imber were to fall into a crevasse and 

were unable to get out of it, he could only 

fig u rat i vel Y be called "un f r e e ,n and t hat t 0 

speak of him as being "deprived of liberty" 

or of being "held captive" is to use these 

t e r msin a sensed ifferen t from t hat in wh i c h 

they apply in social relations.(39) 

Since in a libertarian society no one would have the 

right to initiate violence, such a society would, aee 

0 r din g t 0 Ro t hbar d , be "t 0 tally f r e e . " That is, si nc e 

240

feel ings of one individual with another. Is the degree 

of pa in tha t Jack Benny regards as ·severe of the same 

intensity as that which Helen Keller, or the Marquis de 

Sade, or Joe Smith regard as severe? And even if it 

is, how can we ever tell? In short, the application of 

the comparative technique to the concepts of power and 

influence robs these terms of any empirical import. 

What of the classification teehnique? This 

approach, as we have seen, does not compare things 

according to "more/less" but establishes criteria to 

construct mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories 

and thenap p lie s the c r i t e ria t 0 ass i gnthe phe n omena 

either to one or the other of the categories. This is 

the approach adopted by Rothbard. While it tends to be 

I e s s dis c rim ina ting t han the compar a t i vete c hn i que, i t 

does possess the inestimable value in this case of giving 

the concept of power what the comparative technique 

could not: empirical import. 

Rothbard doesn't deny the ubiquity of influence. 

But rather than trying to determine the degree of 

Influence one person exercises over another, he looks 

to the meaDS one uses to obtain influence. Those 

attempts to influence others by violent means, defined 

in Lockean-fashion as physical force, or its threat, 

against the person or property of another, is termed 

power. All nonviolent, or what may be termed persuasive, 

methods of influencing others are designated as 

voluntary. What of "economic power"? Since the only 

"economic power" anyone can exercise is the ability to 

refuse to agree to an exchange, and since this is nonviolent 

according to Rothbard's definition, it is not 

con sidere d power a t a I I . Thus, the rna r ke t, ace0 r ding 

to this definition, is a system of social coordination 

in which power is completely absent.(28) 

Two caveats should be borne in mind. First, 

Rothbard looks at the means to influence rather than 

the degree of influence actually exercised. His taxonomy 

says nothing about the effectiveness of any particular 

influence-attempt in any particular situation. 

It is certainly consistent with his taxonomy for nonviolent 

methods of influence to be more effective in a 

particular case or with a particular individual than 

violent methods. To use Jack Benny again, it is conceivable 

that the use of "economic sanctions" such as 

the ref usa I to make an exchange prof itable to Jack 

would be a more effective method of influencing his 

behavior than to threaten him with bodily harm. 

234

Second, SInce one can define a concept in any way 

one desires, it is technically meaningless to speak of 

the "correctness" of a definition. But to be understandable 

a definition must bear some congruence with 

the way the term is commonly used. It would be ridiculous 

to define power in terms of, say, the length of 

one's shoe laces. But within this limit the ambiguity 

surrounding the term provides one with fairly wide discretion 

to st.ipulate a particular definition. Rothbard's 

definition of power in terms of physical violen 

c e c e r t a i n I y f a I I s wit h i ntheli mit S 0 f commo n 

usa g e • For, a s Da h I not e s aftera c knowledging the 

ambiguity of the term, "probably among all people" 

physical violence such as "exile, imprisonment and 

death would be considered as severe punishment."(29) 

Da hId 0 e s not lim i t power tot heseac t s as Ro t hbar d 

does. But his statement, if correct, does indicate 

that the acts that Rothbard denotes as violent are the 

ones that everyone can agree as being powerful. One 

can disagree with this definition of power and, given 

the s tip u I a t i ve asp e c t 0 f de fin i t ion s, i t wo u I d be 

poi n tIesst 0 a r g u e t hat Ro t h ba r d's de fin i t ion is the 

"only correct" one. But it certainly must be admitted 

to be a correct and plausible use of the term.(30) It 

is therefore highly unfair to argue, as does Samuels, 

that Rothbard's definition of power is an abuse of 

language and a (consciously) misleading semantic 

sleight-of-hand. On the contrary, H. E. Frech, who is 

otherwise critical of Rothbard, applauds him for "excellently 

sharpening the language," precisely in the 

ambiguous area of power relationships.(31) 

We are now ina pos i t ion to fIe s h ou t the r ema ining 

elements of what may be termed the Rothbardian influence 

taxonomy. While power has been defined as the 

use of violence, we have not distinguished between its 

legitimate and illegitimate uses. Yet Rothbard does 

draw such a distinction. For him, as for Tucker and 

the philosophical anarchists, the initiated use of 

power is illegitimate, while its defensive use is 

legitimate. This fits perfectly with the Dahl- 

.L 8 ssw e I I - K a p I 8 nap pro a c h, wh i c h a Iso rna kesthis distinction 

between the legitimate and IllegItimate uses 

of power. Power that "is said to be legitimate," -however 

that term may be defined -- notes Dahl, is 

"generally called authority," while that which is saId 

to be illegitimate is referred to as "coercion." 

The Rothbardlan influence taxonomy can now be 

summarIzed as follows: 

235

freedom is automatically restricted by any coercive 

act, t heg0 v ernmen t a I t ran s fer 0 f s eve r a I rn i I I ion dollars 

from a mi II ionaire to a group of indigents would 

res t ric t f r e e d om eventh 0 ugh i t mig htinereasethe 0 ptions 

open to the indigents without perceptibly limiti 

n g the 0 p t ion s 0 f the mill ionair e • Itis en t ire I y 

p 0 s sib Ie, the ref 0 r e, t hat f r e e d om co u 1d be res t ricted 

at the same time that the number of alternatives open 

to particUlar individuals or groups might increase. 

This raises the question of how important such 

freedom actually is. The welfare state could not exist 

in the absence of the state. What would happen to the 

poor in such a society? It is to this issue we now 

turn. 

3. THE PLIGHT OF THE POOR 

a. Government and the Poor. 

Libertarians of all persuasions are confident that 

the substantial reduction or even the total elimination 

of government, including the dismantling of the government 

poverty programs, would actually benefit the poor. 

Recall that in Chapter III it was noted that government 

transfers wealth according to influence, not need. 

Since the poor tend to lack the three things necessary 

to influence government -- time, money and expertise -government 

policies actually transfer wealth away from 

the lower and to the middle and upper income groups. 

This is done in any number of ways of which subsidies, 

lieens i n g res t ric t ionsand tar iff s are 0 n 1y the rno s t 

obvious. It has been estimated, for example, that government 

regulatory boards actually cost consumers about 

$ 1 3 0 b i I I ion e a c h yea r • ( 40 ) The po 0 rcan I e a s t a f for d 

high pr ices. They are therefore the ones most hurt by 

these agencies. 

If the foregoing is correct, if the poor are the 

victims of governmental redistribution of wealth, it 

follows that they would benefit from its termination . 

.Hence, if government were abolished or substantially 

reduced, with taxes correspondingly eliminated or drastically 

cut, libertarians believe that the position of 

the poor would improve. 

Not only do libertarians argue that government policies 

harm the poor, they also maintain that the free 

market works to their benefit. In order to understand 

this argument a few preliminary observations are necessa 

r y. 

241

a I' ," Cha r I es Murray has noted, "are di fferent at di fferent 

economi c levels."(42) But the dilemma created 

by the recogni t ion of this fact, i.e., are people poor 

because they live in the present or do they live in the 

present because they are poor, is only apparent. There 

is no doubt some truth to both, although it is seldom, 

if ever, the case that they have no choice. Nevertheless, 

why people adopt the lifestyle they do is 

one que s t ion; the con seq u e nees t hat res u 1 t r r om t hat 

choice is quite another. And there can be little doubt 

that "living in the present" impedes, if not precludes, 

economic advance. 

Wh i 1erea d i I Y a c k now led ging t hat therear e rna n y 

rea s· 0 nsf 0 r po v e r t y, i tis, says Ba n fie I d, f 0 un d disproportionately 

among those exhibiting the values of 

the T1 lower c I ass men t a lit Y• " This po i ntis sign i f i 

cant, believes the libertarian, because it has an important 

bearing both on determining the number of those 

who are actually poor and on the ability of government, 

eve n ass urn i n g the bes t 0 fIn t en t ions, to dea I wit h the 

problem. It is to these two issues that we now turn. 

c. Poverty Statistics. 

Approximately 12 percent of the popUlation of the 

United States have, according to offical statistics, 

incomes below the poverty line. The libertarian believes 

that these statistiCS exaggerate the amount of 

actual poverty. First, wealth is partially a function 

of age. The wealthy, says Thomas Sowell, "are likely 

to be elderly individuals who have finally paid off 

the i r m0 r t gag e s, and wh 0 rna y we I I ha ve been amo n g the 

statistical 'poor' when they were younger." Similarly, 

the median age of blacks is nearly a decade less than 

the median age of whites. When such factors as age and 

education are controlled, the income differences bet 

we e n b 1a c ksan d whit e s dis a ppear. This mean s , says 

Sowell, that "the poor" do not really constitute a socioeconomic 

class "in the usual sense of people stratified 

in a certain way across their lifetimes." Rather, 

those who are statistically poor are often simply those 

in a temporary, and quite normal, part of their economic 

life cycle.(43) 

A second reason statistics inflate the incidence 

of actual poverty is that living in the present the 

lower class individual has an affinity for risk, action 

and 1 mp u I s e be h a v i 0 r. G i ven t his a f fin i t y, rna ny wh 0 

are class if J ed as poor have high risk and/or seasonal 

243

jobs. Therefore, "their incomes rise and fall with 

changing employment conditions."(44) The result is 

that the tur.nover rate among those with incomes below 

the p 0 v e r t y lin e i s abo u ton e - t h i r d per yea r • °T his 

means that if poverty were based on a two or three, 

instead of a one, year period the actual number of poor 

would be significantly less. 

Fin a I I y, sincetaxes are pa i don 0 incom e s, therei s 

a built-in tendency for income to be underreported. 

This means that basing poverty statistics on reported 

incomes inflates the statistics. In testimony before 

the House Hear ings on the Economic Opportunity Act of 

1964, Margaret Reid disclosed that those reporting incomes 

under $1,000 per year were actually spending an 

average of approximately $2,500 per year.(45) Reinforcing 

this is the fact. that such high-risk, actionoriented 

occupations as gambling, loan sharking, prost 

i tut ion and the like attract a disproportionate share 

of "lower class" individuals. Since these activities 

are illegal, this income cannot be reported. Although 

the amount of Income from unreported transactions is 

difficult to gauge, a 1978 estimate placed it at about 

$700 billion.(46) Regardless of what one thinks of 

such activities, it is clear, says the libertarian, 

that if this income could be taken into consideration 

"a considerable percentage of the 'poor' 

cities would turn out to be well-off."(47) 

in large 

Wh i Ie acknowl edg i ng that there are those who are 

legi t imately poor, the I ibertarian believes that the 

official figure of about 12 percent is inflated. 

d. Poverty Programs. 

The concept of the "culture of poverty" also indicates 

just how limited is the ability of the government 

to help the poor, even assuming the best of circumstances. 

Cons ider the government policy regarding educat 

ion. One of the reasons for compulsory, "free" grade 

and high school education, and zero or minimal tuition, 

taxpayer supported, state universities, was to make education 

accessible to children of poor famIlies. This, 

it was reasoned. would break the "cycle of poverty" by 

providing such children with the skills needed to enter 

high paying occupations. What happened, libertarians 

argue, was instructive. The payoffs from education lay 

several years in the future. Consequently, while mid- 

244

dIe and upper class individuals began attending staterllnuniversities 

in droves, the poor were not particu 

I a r I y a t t rae ted, eve n when i t wa s "f r e e • " Ins tea d , 

the yen t ere d the w0 r k - for c e, us u a I I Y get ting lowskilled, 

low paying jobs and began paying taxes, some 

of which went to provide low-cost, subsidized, education 

for middle and upper class chi ldren at state 

universities.(48) 

A not her g 0 v ernmen t pro g ram wa s "j 0 bs t r a i n i ng , " 

wh i ch began wi t h much fanfare in the "War on Poverty" 

programs of the 1960's. This too proved a failure and 

for the samerea son : 1 ike e d ucat ion, the pa yo f f s from 

t ra in i ng programs lay months, maybe years, in the future. 

In fact, the entire program was based on a contradiction. 

A program designed to train the poor for 

good jobs could not succeed for the same reason that 

the poor do not have good jobs in the first place: 

both good jobs and successful training are futureoriented; 

the poor live in the present.(49) 

The minimum wage is yet another example. Many 

lIbertarians feel that this is the most pernicious of 

a 1 I " an t i - p 0 v e r t y" leg i s I a t ion • Wages are de t e r mi ned 

by the marginal productivity of labor. And since the 

poor as a rule do not have the skills that would enable 

them to become hIghly productive members of the labor 

force the only jobs open to them are low-paying ones. 

This is most unfortunate but good intentions are not 

e n 0 ugh • Sin cern i n i mum wage leg i s I a t ion doe s not, and 

can not, increaset he rna r gina I prod uc t 1 V i t Y 0 f the poor 

its only effect is to eliminate their jobs. If an ind 

i v i d u a 1 w0 r k e r 's rna r gina 1 val ue . toth e fir m i s $ 3 • 00 

per h 0 ur, ani ncr e as e i nthe min i mum wa g e from $ 2 .90 to 

$3.10 per hour means that the worker will lose his job. 

T h us, the 0 n e s m0 s t h u r t by min i murn wa gel aws are the 

least productive members of society, i.e., the 

poor.(SO) If the foregoing is correct, then the ability 

of government to eliminate poverty is most limited, 

indeed. 

Once the cui tural basis of poverty is recognized, 

the government appears to have but two options: [1] to 

insure everyone a minimum income and/or [2] to somehow 

change the t ime- frame of the poor from a present to a 

future orientation. The problem with the former is 

that if the minimum is set high enough to eliminate 

poverty it would also be hIgh enough to have a disincent 

ive effect on those whose incomes are only slightly 

above the mInimum. If some of this group quit not only 

245

Put differently, government poverty programs enc 

0 u rag e, p e. r hap sun.w itt i n g 1 y, the adop t ion 0 f wh a t 

Banfield termed the "lower class mental ity." The 

result is that these programs actually increased the 

number of poor. 

e. The Market and the Poor. 

Granted that government programs have failed, the 

quest ion is, given the "culture of poverty," would pure 

laissez faire prove any more effective? Libertarians 

believe that it would. 

As noted earlier in Section 1 of this chapter, the 

libertarian maintains that the unhampered market tends 

to employ every factor of production at its most value 

productive point. Since it is the poor who can least 

afford the squandering of scarce resources, it is they, 

says the libertarian, who most benefit by the market 

process. What of the objection that although this is 

very well for the "able-bodied poor," most who are poor 

today have I ittle education and/or physical handicaps? 

Such unskilled workers do not benefit from the market 

process since their productivity tends to be so low 

that they cannot even find jobs. Libertarians respond 

that such individuals cannot find jobs not because of 

their low productivity but because minimum wage laws 

establish wages in excess of their productivity. 

For example, in the 1950's and early 1960's most 

e I e vat 0 r s we reoperated rna n ua I I Y and rna n y res tauran t s 

had their dishes washed by hand. These jobs were 

usually filled by the unskilled: the young, uneducated 

and the handicapped. They did not pay much, but that is 

jus t the poi n t. As the min i mum wag e wa s r a isedt 0 

$.75, then to $1.00 and then to $1.25 per hour, the 

bui lding owners discovered that it now was economical 

to automate their elevators, thereby eliminating these 

jobs. The same was true with dishwashers. As the minimum 

wage was ra i sed, they were replaced by automated 

dishwashing machinery.(52) 

The root of the problem, therefore, is not the low 

productivitiy of the unskilled worker. It is the fact 

that, being prevented by the minimum wage from offering 

a compensating difference for his low productivity, his 

labor, under this condition, is overpriced and he is 

therefore unemployed. 

But, i teo u ] d b e 0 b j e C ted, wit h 0 u t the min i mum 

247

wage the unskilled might find jobs. They would pay so 

little however that such workers would still have to 

rely on government for assistance. The libertarian 

response is two-fold. First, most of the lowest paying 

jobs are not had by the breadwinner but by other family 

members desiring to supplement the family income. And, 

second, wage rates do not depend on the individual 

w0 r k e r 's phYsica I prod uc t i v i t Y but on the rna r gina I produet 

i vi ty of labor. Barbers and butlers perform their 

services today in much the same way they did two hund 

red yea r s a go. Yet, says economi s t Ludwig von Mi ses, 

the wagera t e sea r ned by s uc h "wo r ke r s are today muc h 

higher than they were in the past. They are higher bee 

a use the y are de t e r mine d by the rna r gina I prod uc t i v i t Y 

of labor. The employer of a butler withholds this man 

from employment in a factory and must therefore pay the 

equivalent of the increase in outputwhich the additiona 

I emp I oymen t of one man in a factory would br ing 

about."(53) 

This means that while the unskilled worker would 

s e I d om be c om ewe a I thy his wa ge rat e wo u I d ten d to be 

h i g her t han c omm 0 n 1 y tho ugh t, pro v ide d the r e we r e 

alternative means of employment open to him. What is 

needed are more jobs available for the unskilled. But 

the effect of such regulations as the minimum wage and 

licensing restrictions is to eliminiate just those 

job s • Rep e a I 0 f s uchi e g i s I a t ion wo u I d beex pe c ted t 0 

pro v ide a d e qua t e, but not I u c rat i v e, wa ge s for the 

unskilled. 

In br i ef, the movement from government to the market 

would reduce poverty in two ways. First, the disman 

t 1 i n g 0 f the weI farestate wo uIde1 iminate the i ncentiveto 

fail which is inherent in government poverty 

programs. Second I y, the low-paying jobs generated by 

the repe a 1 0 f the min i mum wa g e wo u 1d s e r vet 0 enco urage 

such valuable job skills as hard work, cooperation with 

others, punctuality, etc., which are valuable steppingstones 

to better, higher-paying jobs. 

The mar k e t pro c e s s, libe r tar ian s say, wo u I d a 1s 0 

help the poor in their capacity as consumers. Consider, 

for example, the "ghetto merchant." Since prices 

in the ghetto average about 10 percent more than prIces 

for goods in other neighborhoods, the ghetto merchant 

is often excoriated for exploiting the poor. But the 

key question is why is the ghetto merchant able to 

charge, and receive, such prices; why don't such prIces 

attract additional competitors? The answer is that 

248

f. Care for the Truly Poor. 

There is one final question to be dealt with. 

What would happen to those few who were in fact incapacitated 

and could not take care of themselves? Regardless 

of the socioeconomic system, such people can be 

provided for only out of "surplus production." The 

complete el iminat ion of government intervention would 

h a vetwoe f f e c t s: [1] i t wo u 1del i minate the pove r t y 

unnecessarily created by such government policies as 

minimum wages and I icensing restrictions; and [2] it 

would increase output and thus "surplus production." 

There is, of course, no guarantee that this "surplus" 

w0 u 1 d got 0 the tr u I y need y • Yet, i n 19 78 Arne rican s 

donated nearly $40 billion to charity.(55) If one assumest 

hat u n dera pur e I a iss e z fa ire e con omy the r e 

wo u Ids till be abo u t 8 or 10mi II i on poor, th i s wou 1d 

prorate out to $5,000 for every poor individual in the 

country or $20,000 for every poor family of four. And, 

given an even more productive economy coupled with the 

s i g n i f i can t I Y lowe r t a xes res u I ting from the disrna n t I 

ing of the weI fare state, it is conceivable that this 

sum would be even greater under pure laissez faire. 

In short, the libertarian believes that there is 

every reason to believe that the poor would fare better 

under the market than under the government. 

4. MONOPOL I ES AND THE FREE MARKET 

Libertarians believe that the substitution of a 

completely laissez faire economic system for the political 

system of government intervent ion would el iminate 

the pr ob I em of power. But in the absence of a governmentally 

imposed anti-trust policy, would not voluntary 

cartelization or "cut-throat" competition result in the 

emergence of a few giant corporations able to use their 

monopol ist ic positions to exploit consumers?(56) Libertarians 

answer in the negative. 

Assuming a free market, the first question is how 

one attained a monopoly position in the first place? 

Since profit can only be earned by supplying consumers 

wit h wha t they wan t bet ter than anyone el se, the "monopolist" 

IS seen as actually increasing their satisfact 

i on beyond the abi Ii ty of any other producer. Otherwise, 

he would never have obtained his position. This 

situation is unchanged even after he has become a 

"monopolIst," for an attempt to restrict production and 

raise prices would only serve to attract competitors 

250

endeavoring to gain access to the lucrative profits, 

and the expanded supply would force the price back 

down. But if a monopolist is confronted by new competitors, 

why can't he either reduce his prices again in 

order to drive the newcomers out of business, or buy up 

his rivals' plants? As for the former, even if a 

smaller firm is driven into bankruptcy, its physical 

plant remains intact and may therefore be bought by new 

compet i tors at extremely low prices. This means that 

these new compet i tors would then be in a position to 

s eve reI y damage the w0 u 1 d - be mo nopol i s tand ke e p the 

price low for a considerable time. Moreover, a policy 

o f bUy i n g 0 uta I I compet itorsis seen as i nor dinate 1y 

expens ive. A small efficient firm could demand a high 

price for its plant as the price for selling its 

ass e t s. But if the monopol is t would then try to recoup 

his losses after such a purchase by raising prices, he 

would only encourage the entrace of new competitors, 

thus necess i tat ing the "buying out" process allover 

again. 

The foregoing means that, provided they are voluntary, 

successful mergers, price-fixing agreements or 

cartelizations do not harm the consumer. On the contrary, 

like all voluntary transactions, they help to 

find the most value-productive point for the allocation 

of resources. Therefore, they help to increase the satisfaction 

of all members of society. Assume, for example, 

that firms A, Band C find that by merging they 

can increase their profits byrest ricting prod uc t ion . 

The "restriction" means that some factors of production 

w i I I now b e c om e i dIe • But solongas therea r e no i n 

stitutional, i.e., governmental, impediments to their 

use, resources cannot long remain idle. Their employment 

in other areas wi 11 expand production in those 

areas. If so, production has not been restricted at 

all. What occurred was a shifting of factors from one 

area to another. But the merger would take place only 

if the participants believed that it would increase 

their profits. Since the market correlates profits and 

consumer satisfaction, the merger will, provided the 

.expectat ions of the participants are correct, actually 

increase consumer satisfaction. That is, while physical 

output will have remained about the same, the value 

of that output, from the standpoint of the consumers, 

has been augmented. 

Libertarians further argue that the larger the 

firm in relation to the market, the more limited it is 

i nit s a b iIi t y toe a 1cuI ate and the ref 0 ret he mo r e 

251

susceptIble it is to losses that would preclude further 

expansion. Since monopolies and cartels eliminate the 

market in the area of their operations, they would have 

no economic signals to guide them in allocating their 

resources or making investment decisions. Since this 

means that their decisions would be economically arbitrary 

they would suffer severe losses and, in the absence 

of governmental protection, collapse. There is, 

in other words, no economic difference between a monopoly 

and a socialist economy and both would collapse 

for the samereas 0 n : the a bsenceofee 0 nom i c ca 1cui a 

tion.(57) 

Consequently, the libertarian believes that the 

size of the firm is limited by the limits of calcula 

b iii t y and den i esthat the rna r ke t ena b Iesany fir m, 

regardless of size, to exploit the consumer or victimize 

society. The popular fear of the "tyranny of 

we a I t h" u n d e r the f r e e rna r ketis theref 0 rese en asan 

illusion.(58) 

5. GOVERNMENT AND UTILITY 

There is one significant ramification of the libertarian 

monopoly theory. Government itself is a 

m0 n 0 pol Y• Hen ce, .therei s no wa y for i t rat iona I 1Y to 

a I I 0 cat e "i t s" res 0 ur c e s • I t rna y, for examp Ie, c I aim 

tha t taxes must be raised because there is a "shortage" 

o froads, pol ice, tea c her s, etc. Howe ver, a r g uesthe 

anarchist, it actually has no idea whether there really 

is a s hor tage of these th i ngs, too many of them or jus t 

enough, since ther e is no market test for these goods 

and services and therefore no way for the consumers to 

evaluate their utility. Demands may be made on the polit 

i c a I s y stem, but t his inn0 wa y sol ve s the prob I em • 

Pol i tic s res p 0 n d s t 0 i n flue nee and, a s rna ny ha ve a r 

gued, the influence any group is able to exert is near 

I y the rever s e 0fit s s i z e . As Ma ncur 0 Ison has po i n t 

ed out, an individual in a large group "cannot make a 

noticeable contribution to the group, and since no one 

i nth e gr 0 up wi I 1 rea c t i f he rna ke s no con t ributi 0 n, he 

has no incentive to contribute."(S9) A smaller group, 

of course, is easier to organize. And, further, not 

only are individuals in a smaller group able to see the 

impact 0 f the i r con t r i bu t ion, butit is a Iso ea s i e r to 

exert social pressure on the members to insure that 

each individual continues to do his part. Hence, the 

smaller, better organized groups are usually able to 

exert greater pressure on the political system. The 

result is that, even If the political leaders honestly 

252

desire to represent the views of the community, the 

signals conveyed to the politcal leaders will almost 

invariable depart from the actual state of demand by 

the commun i ty. Thus, despite the demands made on the 

political system, government is ipso faeto an island 

of calculational chaos, and it is therefore impossible 

for it to operate efficiently.(60) This, in turn, means 

that even if people desire such things as education, 

roads, and police protection, it would"be more advantageous 

for them to purchase these on the market. 

The very fact that the government uses its monopolyon 

the use of force to outlaw competition with itself 

demonstrates this point, they argue. For if it 

actually provided its customers, i.e., the taxpayers, 

wit h the best pos siblede fen s e s e r vicesther e wo u I d be 

no need for it to ban competitors.(61) 

6. THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND DEPRESSION 

Another problem that must be dealt with is the 

business cycle and, its corollary, depression. Aren't 

government contra-cyclical policies needed to moderate 

the tendency of the market to gyrate wildly between 

boom and bust,· between inflation and depression? 

There are many different explanations of the business 

cycle. Most of these -- such as the Keynesian 

over- investment argument, Schumpeter's "cluster" of entrepreneurial 

error thesis, and the "acceleration principle," 

associated with the names of the American econom 

i s t, J. M. C I ark and the Eng 1 ish e conom i s t, R. F 0 

Harrod(62) -- see the cause of the cycle in some aspect 

of the market process and generally see the solution in 

some form of government activity. One explanation that 

reverses the causal flow and sees the cause of the 

bus iness cycle in government manipulation of the economy 

and "Its solution in a completely unhampered, or 

laissez faire, economy is the "Austrian," or monetary, 

theory of the trade cycle. While this explanation can 

cIa i m 0 n I yam i nor i t Y f 0 I I ow i n g am 0 n g e con om i s t s , ( 63 ) 

it is hardly surprising that the overwhelming majority 

of individualist anarchists subscribe to the "Austrian" 

explanation. At some risk of over-simplification, the 

Austrian theory is presented below. 

The problem that must be explained by any theory 

of the business cycle is why do entrepreneurs, who only 

obtain their positions by being better forecasters than 

others, suddenly, collectively and so grieviously mis- 

253

per c e i vet h e act u 8 1 e conom i cstate 0 f a f fa irs? Sin c e 

the Austrians contend that the unhampered market is alwayshea 

dj ng for equi 1 i b I' i urn, the I' e i s not h i nginher en t 

in the market process to account for this sudden cluster 

of errors, and thus for the cycle. Individual entrepreneurs 

may well make isolated errors, but the 

sudden emergence of mass entrepreneurial error must 

have some general cause. Since the only thing that ties 

the va rio u s rnark e t s tog e the I' i s rno ne y, the Au s t ria n s 

argue that the trade cycle can only be explained by a 

monetary theory.(64) 

The rate of interest is the crucial factor in the 

Austr ian theory. The interest rate serves to allocate 

resources between the consumer and capital goods industr 

ies so that the entire structure of production is in 

congruence wi th the. "social rate of time preference," 

i. e., the general demand for consumpt ion goods immediately 

-- consumer goods demand -- relative to the demand 

for consumption goods in the future -- capital 

goods demand. Interest, in other words, is the payment 

for the use of one's savings for a particular length of 

time; and the rate of interest is simply that price 

that will insure that at any particular time all that 

iss a v e d will be i n ve s ted, i. e ., t hat the dema nd for 

sa vi ngs wi 11 equal the supply of savings. The point at 

which equilibrium is reached is referred to as the 

"natural rate of interest." 

The problem is that an increase in the supply of 

money, and it should be noted not of actual savings, 

wi 11 upset this equil ibrium. If banks suddenly obtained 

additional money they would be unable to loan it out 

at the prevailing rate of interest and would conseque 

n t 1Y be for cedt 0 lower the i r rat e • In t his wa y 

the ma I' k e t I' ate 0 fin tel'est dev i ates from the nat ur a 1 

rate. At this lower market rate of interest some ventures 

that were once too costly now appear profitable. 

Since interest is the payment for time and since 

there is more production time involved in the capital 

goods industries than in the consumer goods industries, 

the change in the rate of interest has its biggest impact 

on the former. In other words, since the costs of 

production in the capital goods industries declines 

wit h the dec 1 i n e i ntherateofin t ere s t, pI' 0 fit rna rgins 

are correspondingly increased. Spurred by these 

profIts, entrepreneurs will expand production of capital 

goods. Factor pI' ices then begin to rise as producers 

of these goods begin to bid factors away from 

producers of consumer goods. 

254

ere d t t e x pan s ton ereate s rna linvestrn e n t s t hat wi lIsur 

face as soon as the policy ceases. If the government 

des i res to avoid the depressionary effects inherent in 

the re-adjustment process, it will have to try to 

shore-up the malinvestments by continuing the influx of 

new money. But, as Hayek points out, "inflation acts 

as a stimulus to business only insofar as it is unforeseen."(66) 

If the prices are rising at, say, five percen 

t per year, people will soon come to expect future 

price rises of five percent and ma"ke adjustments in 

ant i c i pat ion 0 f tho s e inc rea s e s • Conseq ue n t 1y, for 

the policy of credit expansion to be successful it must 

be more than expected. Iff i ve percent is expected 

the government must expand the money supply by, say, 

seven percent. But then seven percent will come to be 

expected, forcing the government to expand the money 

supply by, say ten percent .. Clearly, if the policy of 

credit expansion is not terminated it will lead to what 

the Austrians refer to as the "crack-up boom," i.e., 

the point where the "prices at which people would be 

prepared to part with 'real goods' discount to such an 

extent the expected progress in the fall of purchasing 

power that nobody has sufficIent cash at hand to pay 

for them." But once this point is reached "The monetary 

system breaks down; all transactions in the money 

co nee r ned c e a s e; a pan i c ma k esits purchas i ng power 

van i sh al together. People return ei ther to barter or 

to the use of another kind of money."(67) This point 

was reached at several tImes in the past including 1781 

colonial America, 1796 France, 1920 Russia, and 1923 

Germany. 

The Austrians believe that their theory was borne 

out by the depression of the 1930's. Between July 1921 

and July 1929, they note, the supply of money in the 

United States increased from $45.3 billion to $73.3 

b ill ion, 0 ran inc rea s e if 61.8 per cen t . Meanwh i Ie, 

product i on of such durable goods as iron and steel increased 

by 160 percent and production of non-durable 

goo d s r 0 s e b y 6 0 per c e n t. Conseq ue n t I y, the genera 1 

pr ice level rose only slightly. What is of importance 

for the Austrians, however, is not the aggregate 

pr ice level but the changes in the prices between the 

consumer and capital goods industries. Credit expans 

ion, say the Austr ians, forced the interest rate below 

what it would have been on the unhampered market. ThIS 

caused the bulk of the new money to enter the capital 

goods market, forcing prIces in those industries to 

rise. Since the existing consumption/savings proportions 

were pulled out of balance wIth the social rate 

256

of tIme preference, the collapse came once the credit 

ex pan s ion was h a I ted • T h us, the rna 1ad jus t men t s surfaced 

the moment the Federal Reserve terminated its 

easy money policies in mid-1929, and the depression 

ensued.(68) 

What are the policy implications of the Austrian 

theory? According to the proponents of contra-cyclical 

policies, government is supposed to stablilize the economy 

by reducing taxes and increasing expenditures in 

times of economic downturns in order to increase aggregate 

spending and thus st imulate the economy. Conversely, 

in times of economic boom, the government is 

to increase taxes and reduce expenditures in order to 

k e e p the e con 0 my from "0ve r hea ting • " I nth i s wa y, i t 

is argued, the economy can be stabilized and permanent 

prosperity and full employment maintained.(69) 

The Austrians contend that such a policy will only 

rna k e rna t ter s worse. I f the depress ion is the necessary 

process of adjust ing to the malinvestments caused by 

the preceding boom, and since the boom was a direct result 

of government credit expansion, renewed expansion 

can only postpone the inevitable and the process induce 

fur the r mal i n v est men t s wh i c h wilIon 1y rna ke the r e 

adjustment process, which must ultimately come, even 

more severe. Once again, the Great Depression illustrates 

this point. The deficit financing of the Hoover 

and Roosevelt Administrations, as well as other policies 

of public works, subsidies, price supports, minimum 

wages, etc., argue the Austrians, obstructed the 

adjustment process and hence needlessly prolonged the 

depression. 

The Austrian prescription is both simple and quite 

congenial to the individualist anarchist. The governmen 

t s h 0 u Idstop i n f I a ting i mm e d i ate 1y and then rem0 ve 

all forms of intervention. This will permit the admittedly 

painful adjustment process to be completed in the 

shortest time. After that, the government should stay 

completely out of the economy and refrain from any type 

o fer e d i t man i p u I a t ion. 1fthis isaccom pI ished, the 

Au s t ria n s bel i eve t hat e con om i c pr os per i t y wou I d be 

assured and economic development would proceed at a 

fairly even, gradual pace. 

7. GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION 

It is generally assumed that to survive all governments 

must tax, and IndiVIdualist anarchists have 

257

accused the minarchists of inconsistency by championing 

the individual's natural right to property on the one 

hand and arguing for a government, regardless of how 

restricted, on the other. It is charged that government 

must tax and that taxation violates the individual's 

property right. Recently, however, minarchists 

suehas Ay n Ra nd, J 0 hn H0 s persand Ro be r t No z i c k, ha ve 

responded to this criticism by proposing a government 

fin a nee d not bye 0 e r c i vet a x a t ion but by vo I un tar y 

contributions. 

One ve r s ion i s the g i f t me thod 0 f finan c i ngadv0cated 

by Ayn Rand. Rand believes that the wealthy 

s t rat a, i. e ., thos e wh 0 wo u I d havethe mo s t to los e i f 

there were no protection against anti-social individuals, 

would voluntarily pay for government protection. 

Since police protection is assumed to be a collective 

good, "those on the lowest economic levels••• would 

be virtually exempt [from payment] -- though they would 

st i II enjoy the benefits of legal protection, such as 

that afforded by the armed forces, by the police and by 

the courts dealing with criminal offenses."(70) Provided 

government were small enough, the costs would be 

only a small burden to the wealthy contributors. One 

of the mer its of the system, as Rand sees it, is precisely 

that it would serve to keep government from expanding 

beyond its only proper function of defending 

individual rights. The individualist anarchists are 

c r i tic a I 0 f t his pro p 0 s a I on two coun t s • Fir s t, "i t 

con t i nues that disjunction between payment and receipt 

of service which constitutes one of the great defects 

of a taxing system." This, of course, tends to perpetuate 

the calculational problems endemic in any government 

operation. Second, the fact that everyone will 

continue to receive services regardless of whether or 

not he contributes will tend to discourage contributions. 

Since company A will receive protection regardless 

of its contributions, it will be able to obtain an 

edge on its competitors by ceasing its contributions 

and lowering its prices to attract more customers. 

This, anarchists hold, will force other companies to do 

the same, and the voluntary contributions would soon 

corne to a halt.(71) 

A second alternative, that of "voluntary taxation," 

was originally advocated by such men as Herbert 

Spencer and Auberon Herbert and more recently by John 

Hospers and Robert Nozick. - Under this system one agency 

would be invested with 8 monopoly on the use of 

force. No one, however, would be compelled to purchase 

258

Its serVIces. Instead, the agency would charge a price 

for its services and each member of the community could 

then either purchase protection at that price or go 

without protection. "If you want police protection," 

says Hospers, "you will have to pay a fee to obtain it, 

but 0 f co u r s e you are f r e e not to wa ntit 0 r pa y for 

it, in which case you will not have the protection even 

if you need it."(72) While this does have the merit of 

eliminatIng the "payment-benefit disjunction," the ind 

i v i d uali s tanarchis t rna i n t a ins t hat the propon e n t s 0 f 

voluntary taxation are inconsistent. tlIf the government 

elected to outlaw all competing defense agencies," 

notes Rothbard, 

it would no longer function as the voluntary 

society sought by its proponents. It would 

not for c epa ym en t 0 f t a xes, but i t wo u 1d say 

to the citizens: "You are free to accept and 

pay for our protection or to abstain; but you 

are not free to purchase defense from a 

com pet i n gag e n c y • nThlsi s not a f r e e rna r 

ket; this is a compUlsory monopoly, once 

again a grant of monopoly privilege by the 

Sta te to it sel f. Such a monopoly would be 

far less efficient than a freely competitive 

system; hence, its costs would be higher, its 

service poorer. It would clearly not be 

neutral to the market.(73) 

One fInal alternative is the "voting" or "poll" 

tax. Voters would be charged a fee. But voting would 

be voluntary so this would not be a tax. Whether a 

"poll tax" would be able to generate revenues 

s u f fie i e n t t 0 rna i n t a ina go vernmentis do ub t f u I • Even 

when voting is free barely fifty percent of those 

eligible consider voting important enough to do so. It 

seems likely that if a fee were charged even that 

percentage would drop considerably. But as the number 

of vot er s dec I i ned, the government would only be able 

to support itself by increasing the burden on the 

remaining voters, thereby discouraging voting even 

more.(74) The result would be that either the 

government would collapse or it would have to raise the 

poll tax to such heights as to disenfranchise the poor, 

leaving government policy to be determIned almost 

exclUSIvely by the wealthy. Thus, the individualist 

anarchist is highly skeptical of any proposal for the 

fInancing of government by means of voluntary 

contributions. 

259

The ·individualist anarchist appears to have the 

bet t e r 0 f the iss ue • Fir s t, v 0 ting i s a h i gh 1Y rna r gina 

I act for the vas t rna j 0 r i t Y 0 f cit i zens, so itse em s 

doubtful that government could be financed by the "poll 

tax." Second, the gift method would create an incentive 

to evade payment. Whether this would create an 

insuperable problem is an empirical question. Its prop 

0 n e n t s, s u c has Ra nd, bel i eve t hat solongas govern 

ment was 1 imited to the provision of defense and court 

services its cost would be so small that little or no 

competitive edge could be obtained by not contributing. 

Moreover, such a society is seen as being so prosperous 

that the payments, small to begin with, would become 

increasingly less burdensome as the standard of living 

rose. Whether these factors would alone make the gift 

proposal feasible cannot be answered by recourse to 

the 0 r y a Ion e. Th i r d, sincern0 stind i v i d ua I s pr e sen ted 

with a choice between no protection and paying a stipulated 

fee would be likely to pay the fee, the "voluntary 

taxat ion" method would be the most likely to succeed. 

But the individualist anarchist is correct in 

pointing out that to the extent that their proponents 

conceive of these proposals as establishing a purely 

voluntary society they fail, for all are contingent 

u p 0 nth e e xis tenceo f a sin g I e agen c y rna i n t a i n i ng a 

rnonopolyof the use of force within a given geographical 

area. Thus, the concept of "voluntary government 

fin a n c i n g " i samy t h : tothe ex ten t t hat i t wo u 1d be 

successful, it would not really be voluntary; to the 

extent that it would be voluntary it would not be 

successful. 

8 • DEM

of participants, whenever government acts, one particular 

policy must be chosen for the entire society and 

then imposed on those who disagree with the choice. 

In contrast, argues the anarchist, when the choice 

ishand led 0 nthe rna r ketc0 ere ion i s a bsentand a wid e 

variety of alternatives is present, permitting not just 

the majority but a multitude of minorities to get their 

way as well. The distinction between democracy and the 

market can be illustrated by the following example. 

Assume that three individuals, Larry, Curly and 

Moe, are trying to determine the "correct" amount of 

life insurance coverage. After examining the benefits 

of the coverage and comparing them to the costs, each 

individual would arrive at an amount of coverage which, 

all things considered, would maximize his utility. 

It is likely that the optimum, or equilibrium level, 

w0 u I d d iff e r for e a chi n d i v i d ua I • Sin c e La r r y has a 

large family and a risky occupation, being a window 

washer on a skyscrapper, he desires considerable coverage. 

Moe, on the other hand, is single and has terminalea 

nee r. G i v e n his rna r ita1sta t usan d the e x orb i 

tant premiums, he desires only a minimum amount. Curly 

is an accountant with a small family. He desires an 

intermediate amount. Their optimal insurance levels 

are depicted in Fig. 1. The solid sloping lines simply 

indicate that one's utilitv declines as one moves awav 

from one's optimum. - - 

Utility U 

Curly Larry 

low------------------> high 

Figure 1: Optimum Coverage Levels 

If insurance were supplied on the market, Larry 

would purchase more than Curly and Curly more than Moe. 

E 8 C h w0 U 1 d 8 d jus t his pur c has e s s 0 a s t 0 rna x i rn i z e his 

ut iIi tv. But if the issue were decided democratical lv, 

only Curly would obtain his optImum. If a candidate 

took a position at or near Moe's optimum he would be 

defeated by a candidate taking a position at or near 

261

wr itt en, " The consis ten c y 0 f rna r ketchoi c e i sachie ve d 

Wittlout the overruling of minority values as would be 

in the case if ordinary political voting were made consistent. 

Therefore, in a very real sense, market decisions 

are comparable to political decisions only when 

unanimity is present."(76) 

The inefficiency of democracy relative to the market 

is widely acknOWledged even by democrats. The obvious 

question is why not dispense with democracy and 

rely entirely on the market? The usual response is that 

in many cases those affected by an exchange are not the 

sam e a s thoset ran sac tin g the ex chan g e • Co 1 I e c t i ve 

goods are goods whose benefits cannot be restricted to 

the transacting parties, but ttspillover," gratis as it 

wer,e, onto third parties. Since individuals will reap 

the benefits of the collective good regardless of 

whether they pay the costs, there is no incentive to 

pay. But if everyone thinks this way, no one will pay. 

Thus, if payments were voluntary, the collective good 

would not be provided at all, or at only a suboptimal 

level. Coercion, i.e., government, is required to 

overcome the "free rider" problem. 

The real choice, according to the democrat, is 

not between permitting each individual to purchase his 

optimal qua n tit Y 0 fag00d 0 r s e r vice ,andimposing 0 n 

the e n t ire soc i e t y a pa r ticu 1a r qua ntit Y t hat i s nonopt 

imal for all but the median voter. Rather, it is a 

choice between providing a good, albeit at a nonoptimal 

level for most, and not providing it at all. Since 

everyone is assumed to desire at least some quantity of 

the good, a nonoptimal supply is better than none at 

all.(77) 

In response, the anarchist argues that the number 

of collective goods is exaggerated and that nearly all 

goo d sea n be b r 0 ken down i n t 0 rna r gina I un its and sol d 

onth e mar k e t. And for tho s e goods t hat ar e act ua I I Y 

collective, effective noncoercive means can be found 

for their provision. 

With this in mind we can now examine the specifics 

of the anarachists paradigm. 

263

FOOTNOTES 

(l)See Rudolph Rocker, "Anarchism and Anarcho 

Syndicalism," appendix to Paul Eltzbacher, Anarchism 

(New York: Chip's, n.d.), pp. 227-72; and George 

Woodcock, "Syndicalism, the Industrial Expression of 

Anarchism," Patterns of Anarchy. eds. L. I. 

Krimmerman and L. Perry (New York: Anchor, 1966), pp. 

38-42. Also see Mulford Sibley, Political Ideas and 

Ideologies (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 547 

48; and Get D. H. Cole, Social Theory (London: 1920), 

especially pp. 128-43. 

(2)Peter Kropotkin, "Fields, FactorieS and Workshops," 

The Essent ial Kropotkio. eds. E. Caporya and 

K. Thomp kin s ( New Yo r k : L i verigh t, 19 7 S), pp. 27 0 - 7 2 ; 

and Alexander Berkman, The ABC of Anarchism (London: 

F r e e d om Pre s s, 1973), p. 76. 

(3)Kropotkin, p. 282. 

(4)Ibid., p. 272. 

(S)Berkman, pp. 68-69. Such statements as these 

by Berkman and Kropotkin abound in the literature. They 

c I ear I yindieate ami sun d e r s tanding 0 f how e con om i c 

systems -- all economic systems -- function. The purpose 

of an economic system is to produce and distribute 

goo d san d s e r vice s • But, a s Thoma s S owe 11 po i n t S ou t , 

"what is crucial for understanding the way it functions 

is that it is a system for rationing goods and services 

that are inadequate to supply all that people want." 

This is true for all economic systems, including communism. 

Because goods were so abundant that rationing 

was not necessary, "the Garden of Eden was not an economic 

system." Writers such as Berkman and Kropotkin 

seem to assume that scarcity is not a fact of nature 

but a product of the capitalist economic system. Scarci 

ty will disappear when the economic system is changed 

to socialism. Witness Berkman's comment that under socialism 

"as much food will be raised as the country 

needs." But, as Sowell notes, "because economic systems 

are essentially systems of rationing, any successfu 

1 funct ion ing economic system would have unmet needs 

everywhere. The alternative would be to completely 

satisfy all of some category of needs -- the most urgent, 

the moderately important, and the trivially marginal 

thereby leaving still more unsatisfied (and 

far more urgent) needs unmet elsewhere in the economy 

The mundane fact of insufficiencv must be insisted 

upon and reiterated because so many discussions of 'unmet 

needs' proceed as if 'better' policies, practices, 

ora t tit u des wo u Id's 0 1ve' the prob I em a t han d wit h 0 u t 

264

creat ing deficIencies elsewhere. Typical of thIs attit 

u d e i s the commen t t hat 'I f weean send a rna n tot he 

moon, why can't we --' followed by whatever project the 

speaker favors. The fact that we sent a man to the 

moon is par t of the reason why many other things could 

not be done." Thomas Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions 

(New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 45-46. 

( 6 ) I s rae I K i r z n e r, Ma r k e t The 0 r y and the Pr ice 

System (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1963). 

( 7 ) I bid., p. 39. 

(8)F. A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order 

(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972,), pp. 86-87. 

( 9 ) L u dwig von Mis e s, Soc i ali sm (London: J. Cap e , 

1969), p. 535. 

(lO)F. A. Hayek, "What is 'Social'? What Does It 

Mea n ? ,n StudiesIn Phi los 0 phy, Pol i ticsandEc0 nom i c s 

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 244. Also see 

E. C. Pasour, "On Economic Justice," Modern Age 

(Summer 1981), pp. 290-99. 

(11) F.A. Hayek, The Road to Ser fdom (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 61-64. 

(12)Ibid., p. 74. 

(13)Murray Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State 

(Los An gel e s : Nash, 19 7 0 ), pp. 5 60 - 61 • 

(14)Murray Rothbard, "Anarcho-Communism," Egalitarianism 

as a Revolt Against Nature, and other essays 

(Washington, D. C.: Libertarian Review Press, 1974), 

pp. 121-24. 

(15)The pioneering work on this topic was F. A. 

Hayek's "The Use of Knowledge in Society." See his 

Individualism and Economic Order, pp.77-91. Also 

see Thomas Sowell's brilliant and in-depth study, 

Knowledge and Decisions, op cit. Also valuable is E. 

C. Pasour, "Economic Efficiency: Touchstone or Mirage," 

The Intercollegiate Review (Fall/Winter 1981), pp. 

33-44. 

(16)The classic work on the subject of economic 

calculation was done by Ludwig von Mises. See his 

Human Action (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), pp. 

200-31 and 689-715; and his Socialism. Also see F. 

A. Hayek, ed., Collectivist Economic Planning 

(Clifton, New Jersey: Augustus M. Kelley, 1975), and 

Don Lavoie, National Economic Planning: What is 

Left? ( Cam b rid g e : Ba I I I nge r, 19 85 ). Os car La n g e a 1legedly 

"refuted ll Mises on this point. But see Paul 

Craig Roberts, "Oskar Lange's Theory of Socialist Planning," 

Journal of Politicsl Economy (May 1971), pp. 

562-77. Also of great interest is the entire Winter 

1982 issue of The Journal of Libertarian Studies 

WhICh is devoted to Ilan economic critique of soclal- 

265

ism." For a simple presentation of the argument, see 

my" Mar x, Mis e san d Soc i a lism,." The F r e ema n (0 c t 0 be r 

1974), pp. 605-11. 

( 1 7 ) See Mu r ray Rot h bar d, F r e e d om , I n equalitY, 

Primitivism and the Division of Labor (Menlo Park, 

Cal.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1971). 

(18)Warren J. Samuels, "Anarchism and the Theory 

of Power," Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, 

ed. Gordon Tullock (Blacksburg, Vir.: University 

Publications, 1974), p. 40. 

(19)Ibid., p. 48. 

(20)Ibid., p. 51. 

(21)Ibid., pp. 49-56. 

(22)See especially, Robert Dahl, Modern Political 

Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice 

Hall, 1970), pp. 14-34; Robert Dahl, "Power," International 

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New 

York: Macmillan, 1968), vol. 12, pp. 405-15; Harold 

Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New 

Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). 

(23)Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 32. 

(24)Laswell and Kaplan, pp. 74-76. 

(25)See Arthur Kalleburg, "The Logic of Comparison: 

A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of 

Political Systems," World Politics (October 1966), 

p p. 6 9 - 8 2. AsKa II enbur g rna kescI ear, the two t e c hn i 

quesare not inherently mutually exclusive but may at 

times be complementary. 

(26)Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 32. 

(27)Not everyone, however, regards the lack of 

"operationalizability" as a liability. See, for example, 

Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative 

Politics," The American Political Science 

Review (December 1970), pp. 1033-53, and especially p. 

1045: "Now, we are surely required to reduce ambiguity 

by cutting down the range of meanings of concepts. But 

the operational criterion of reducing ambiguity entails 

drastic losses in conceptual richness and in explanatory 

power. Take, for instance, the suggestion that 

r social class r should be dismissed and replaced by a 

set of operational statements relating to income, occupation, 

education level, etc. If the suggestion were 

adopted wholesale, the loss of conceptual substance 

would be not only considerable, but unjustified. The 

same appl ies, to cite another example, to 'power.' To 

be concerned with the measurement of power does not imply 

that the meaning of the concept should be reduced 

to what can be measured about power -- the latter view 

would make human behavior in whatever collective sphere 

almost inexpl icable." Two things are worthy of note 

266

here. First, the use of imprecise concepts may well be 

w 0 r t h w h i Ie, evennee ded, .. a t t.h e I eve I 0 f res ear c h • But 

this can hardly be the case at the level of applicat 

ion, i. e ., as use d by dec i s ion rna ke r s • And i tis the 

level of appl i cat ion that Rothbard is concerned with. 

Second, even at the research level, "conceptual richness" 

may well prove to be merely a euphemism for "conceptual 

confusion." 

(28)See, for example, Rothbard, Power and Market 

(Menlo Park, Cal.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1970), 

pp. 168-73 and 194-96. Milton Shapiro has aptly noted 

t hat abe t t e r tit I e for t his boo k w 0 u I d h a ve bee n 

Power or Market. See hi s "Power OR Market: government 

and the economy: a review," Libertarian Analysis 

( V0 I. 1, Nurn b e r 4), Pp. 2 2 - 29 • 

(29)Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, pp. 32-33. 

(30)For other definitions of power see Dahl's 

" Power • " A Iso see J 0 h n C ham p 1 in, e d •• Power ( New 

York: Lieber, 1971); Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz. 

"Two Faces of Power," The American Political Science 

Rev i ew (D e c e mb e r 1 9 6 1 ), PP • 9 47 - 52; and the i r n Dec i 

sions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," The 

American Political Science Review (September 1963), 

pp. 632-42; and Harry Eckstein. "Authority Patterns," 

Compar a t i v e Pol i tic s : Not e s 8 n d Read i n g S teds. Ra y 

Macridis and Bernard Brown (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 

1977), pp. 271-99, to ci te just a few. 

(31)H. E. Frech III, "The Public Choice Theory of 

Murray N. Rothbard, A Modern American Anarchist," 

Public Choice (Vol. 14, 1973). pp. 149-50. 

(32)Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law (Los 

Angel es: Nash, 1971), p. 55. 

(33)Murray Rothbard, For A New Liberty (New 

York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 208-09. 

(34)Ibid., p. 209. 

(35)Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 21 

and 109. 

( 3 6 ) Wa 1 t erG r i n d erand J 0 hn Hage I I I I, "Towa r d a 

Theory of State CapItalism: Ultimate Decision-Making 

and Class Structure,: The Journal of Libertarian 

Studie s (W i n t e r 1 9 7 7 ), P • 67. A1S 0 see Ro t hbar d, For 

A New Liberty, p. 53. 

(37)F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 

(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1971), p. 12. 

(38)Harold Laski t "Liberty," Encyclopedia of the 

Soc i 8 I Sci e nee s V 0 I. 9. ( New Yo r k : Ma cm i I I an, 19 4 6 ) , 

p. 443. 

(39 )Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty. pp. 

12-23. 

267

(40) See, for example, '''The Regulators,' They Cost 

You $130 Billion a Year," U.5. News and World Report 

(June,30, 1975), pp. 24-28. 

(41)Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City 

Rev i sit e d (B 0 s ton : Lit tie, Brown and Co., 19 7 4 ), PP . 

57-61. 

(42)Charles Murray, Losing Ground, American 

5 0 cia I Pol icy. 1 9 5 0- 19 80 (N ew Yo r k : Basic, 19 8 4 ), p. 

155. 

(43)Sowell, pp. 257-58 and 344. 

(44)Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Poverty in Cities," 

The Metropolitan Engima. (New York: Anchor, 1970) 

ed., James Q. Wilson, p. 369. 

( 45 ) I n Banfie I d, P • 129. 

( 46 ) Pas 0 ur, " Econ om i c Jus tice ," p. 29 1 • 

(47)Banfield, pp.128-29. 

(48)See, for example, George Stigler, "Director's 

Law of Public Income Distribution," Journal of Law and 

Economics (April 1970), pp. 1-10. The same holds true 

for programs like social security. First, since the 

tax is regressive, the poor pay a higher percentage of 

their earnings in social security taxes. Second, since 

the poor usually do not go to college, they tend to ent 

e r the w0 r k for ceea r lie r than middle and upper income 

individuals. They therefore begin paying social security 

taxes much earlier. And finally, statistics show 

that the poor have a shorter life expectancy than other 

economi c groups. The result is that the poor tend to 

pay the most into social security and receive the 

fewest benefits. 

(49 )See, for example, Reo Chr istenson, Challenge 

and Decis ion (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 

79-86. Especially see p. 80: "about one-fourth of the 

(Job Corps) recruits stayed less than a month. Less 

than half stayed for six months, though strongly 

encouraged to stay for nine months." 

( 5 0 ) Wa 1 t e r Wi I I i am s , Yo u t hand Min0 r i t y Un employment 

(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978). 

(51)Murray, p. 9. 

(52)See Yale Brazen, "Wage Rates, Minimum Wage 

Laws, and Unemployment," The Libertarian Alternative 

( Chi c ago : N e Iso n - Hal I, 1 9 7 4) ed ., T i b 0 r Ma c han, pp • 

380-99; and Wal ter Block, Defending the Undefendable 

( New Yo r k : FIee t Pres s, 19 7 6 ), pp. 2 32- 3 3 • 

( 5 3 ) L u d wig von Mis e s, The Ant i - Ca pitali s t 

Mentality (New York: Van Nostrand, 1956), pp.88-89. 

(54)See Block, pp.154-70. 

(55)Pasour, "Economic Justice," p. 297. 

(56)See, for example, L. T. Sargent's TlNozick and 

the Libertarian Tradition," Paper presented at the Mid- 

268

west Political Science Convention, Chicago, April 26 to 

\1ay 1, 1976 ... Sar.gent's assertion that "the most thoroughly 

unexplained assumptIons" of libertarians "are 

those that state that capitalism will produce sufficient 

goods and will remain a reasonably open system, 

and that "capitalism is simply placed with God, Motherhood, 

and the Flag and not examined," (p. 6) is completely 

inexplicable to me. Sargent gives no evidence 

to support this charge, and libertarians in general are 

more often criticized for spending too much time dealing 

with economics. Included among Rothbard's economic 

w r i tin gsis Man, E con om y and S tate, a 9 8 5 page t r eatise 

on economics. Other libertarian economists, to 

name just a few, include James Buchanan, Israel 

Kirzner, Walter Block, Walter Grinder,D. T. Armantano, 

and Don Lavoie. One may disagree with their economics, 

and man y do. But toeh a rae t e r i ze the e con om i cposit ion 

of libertarians as based on "thoroughly unexamined 

assumptions" IS simply untrue. 

( 57 ) See Rot h bar d, ME S, p p. 560 - 660; Ro t h ba r d , 

Power and Market, pp. 28-33,43-47,58-59. Also see 

D. T. Armantano, The Myths of Antitrust (New 

Rochelle: Arlingt.on House, 1972); and John Sanders, 

The Ethical Argument Against Government (Washington, 

D. C.: Un i ve r sit Y Pre s s 0 f Am e rican 19 8 0 ), pp. 1 3 3 - 54 • 

(58)lt should be pointed out that the Rothbardian 

or individualist anarchist monopoly theory is, as Frech 

says, "a novel one," and one that is not, it must be 

noted, shared by many other economists. Even von 

Mises, "whom Rothbard claims as his mentor," comments 

Frech, argues in Human Action that "monopoly .prices 

are an important market phenomenon," that "some world 

cartels would exist even in the absence of any government 

interference," and that the consumer "is not so 

well served under monopoly prices as under competitive 

prices." Frech, pp. 150-51. Whether or not the Rothbardian 

monopoly theory is correct is difficult to say. 

I t has been largely ignored by economists. Other than 

the v e r y b r i e f F r e cher i t i que, the 0 n 1y e conom i cana 1y 

sis that I have been able to find was by Walter Block. 

Block supports the Rothbardian position. See his 

"Austrian Monopoly Theory -- A Critique," The Journal 

of Libertarian StUdies (Fall 1977), pp. 271-79. For 

empirical support for this position see the works cited 

in Chapter III, footnote 59, p. 114. 

( 5 9 ) Man cur 0 Ison, The Log i c 0 f ColIec t i ve Act ion 

(New York: Shocken Books, 1968). 

(60)Rothbard, Power and Market, pp. 126-28. 

( 6 1 ) I bid ., p. 6,; A ] s 0 see \1 u r ray Rot h bar d , 

'TToward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Econo- 

269

mics," On Freedom and Free Enterprise (Princeton: 

Van Nostrand, 1956), ed.,Mary Senholz, pp. 250-53. 

(62)John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of 

Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt, 

Bra ce and Wor I d, 1936); Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory 

of Economic Development (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1967). For a good presentation of the "accelera 

tor p r inc i pIe ," see Ca r I Da utenand Lloyd Val en tine , 

Bus iness Cycles and Forecasting (Cincinnati: South 

Western PUblishing, 1974), pp. 101-06. The anarchist 

c r i.t i que 0 f theseex p I a nat ions can be f 0 undin Ro t h 

bard, MES, pp. 661-764. 

(63)The general feeling among economists seems to 

be that the Austrian theory would hold only under the 

unus u a 1 c i r cum s tanceo f "fu 11 em p I 0 ym e n t • tt See, for 

example, Dauten and Valentine, p. 101: "The thesis that 

credit, which is created when the market rate of interest 

differs from the natural rate, goes to the higher 

stages of production and leads to an imbalance between 

consumpt i on and investment would be generally true und 

e r cond 1 t ion s 0 f con tin u0 us f u I I em p I 0 ym en t • Howe ve r , 

the ups win g 0 f the c y c I estartsat a time wh enthe 

economy has unused resources, and the production of 

both producer goods and consumer goods can be expanded 

before full em p loymen tof res 0 ur c e s is reached." For 

an "Austrian" reply to this type of criticism see F. A. 

Hayek, " F u I I Emp loymen t, PIa n n i n g and I n f I a t ion, " 

Studiesin Phi los 0 ph y, Pol i ticsand Econom i cs (N ew 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), pp. 270-79. 

(64)See F. A. Hayek, Monetary Theory and the 

Trade Cycle (London: J. Cape, 1933), p. 101. 

(65)For a good summary of this process see Mises, 

Human Action, pp. 538-86; LUdwig von Mises, The 

Theory of Money and Credit (Irvington-on-Hudson: 

F.E.E., 1971), pp. 261-410; F. A. Hayek, Prices and 

Production (London: George Routledge, 1932), pp. 

76-84; Rothbard, American's Great Depression 

( P r inc e ton : Van Nos t ran d, 1 9 6 3 ), p p. 1 1 - 79; Ga r y 

North, "Repressed Depression," The Freeman (April 

1969), pp. 224-34; LudWIg von Mises,tttElastic Expect 

a t ions' and the Aus t r i'a nThe 0 r y 0 f the Tr a d e Cy c Ie, " 

Economic8 (August 1943), pp. 251-52. A concise and 

excellent presentation is also found in the second 

e d i t ion 0 f M u r ray Rot h bar d's For ANew Libe r t y (N ew 

Yo r k: Ma cm ill an, 19 7 8 ), Pp. 18 3 - 9 3 . 

(66)F. A. Hayek, "Inflation Resulting From the 

Downward Inflexibility of Wages," Studies in Philosop 

h y, Pol i ticsandEc 0 nom i c s ( N ew Yo r k : S i m0 nand 

Schuster, 1969), p. 296. 

( 6 7 ) Mis e s, Hum a n Act ion, p. 4 2 7; ,L u d wig von 

;\1 i s e s, " F l' 0 m Cran k - up t 0 Cr a c k - up." Libe r tar ian For urn 

270

to carry out the wishes of others. Thus we finally 

come to the role of the state -- that of reducing the 

costs of government. The reducing of bargaining costs 

rn a y not beterr i b I Y dig n i fied, but itis a rna t t e r 0 f 

great practical importance••• " 

272

CHAPTER VIII 

The Areas of Anarchist-Minarchist Agreement 

There is considerable agreement between the anarchists 

and the minarchists. The single, though very 

important, difference between the two factions of libertarianism 

centers on the issue of police, court and 

nat ional defense services. While "minarchists" such as 

Ayn Rand, John Hospers, and Robert Nozick do not believethat 

the rna r ketca n fur n ish s uc h s e r vicesandadvocate 

a "night watchman" state to provide them, the 

anarchists maintain that the market can be extended 

into these areas as well. 

While a "blueprint" for the operations of such a 

society cannot be presented for every area, their proposal 

s for deali n g wit h the rna j 0 r iss ue s ca n be ind i 

cated. The areas of agreement between the anarchists 

and minarchists will be the focus of this chapter. The 

anarchist proposal for providing protection services, 

both domestic police and courts and "national defense," 

will be examined in Chapter IX. 

1. ROADS 

In the absence of government all roads would, of 

course, be privately owned and operated; they would be 

run on the same profit/loss principles as any other 

bus iness. Since roads are commonly thought to be a 

classic example of a "collective good," the typical 

reaction is that a viable private road system would be 

impossible. Yet libertarians argue that "there is 

not h i n gun i que abo u t t ran s po r tat ion; t hat the e con om i c 

p r inc i pie s we a c c e ptas a rna t t e r 0 f cour s e i n prae t i 

ca lly every other area of human experiences are appl icab 

I e her e too." ( 1 ) Per haps the bes t wa y topres en t 

the libertarian proposal in this area is by examining 

their responses to several of the more common criticisms 

that can be raised against the prospect of private 

roads. These are: 

8. Cos t • 

The cost 

be so high as 

enterprise. 

of producing and maintaining roads would 

to be prohibitive if left up to private 

273

. Eminent Domain. 

If the r e we r e non rig h t 0 f em i n en t doma in" the 

result would be that (a) the costs of road construction 

would skyrocket, making the entire system economically 

untenable, and (b) roads would have to be built around 

those refusing to sell, resulting in numerous bends and 

detours. 

c. Inconvenience. 

The owners of roads would have to charge their 

customers for the use of their roads. Methods of collect 

ion, such as toll booths, would render such a system 

far more inconvenient than public roads, financed 

by taxes and permitting unlimited use by drivers. 

d. Price Gouging. 

Since there can be only a limited number of roads 

ina n y g i v e n area, rna r ketcom pet i t ion wo u 1d bel imit ed, 

enabling road owners to charge exorbitant prices. Simi 

I a r I y, i n d i v i d ua I s wo u I d be p I aced a t the mer c y 0 f the 

owner of the road onto which their driveways entered. 

e. Safety"l 

Since an owner could set any regulations he desired 

for the use of his roads, private roads would 

result in a confusing array of regUlations that would 

jeopardize the safety of the drivers. 

Libertarians, both anarchists and minarchists, bel 

i eve tha t a pr iva tely owned and operated road system 

is not only practical but attractive, and offer the 

following rebuttals: 

a. Cos t. 

Libertarians see this argument as the least tenable 

of the five and give it short shrift. The cost of 

construction and maintenance is high, they agree, but 

then so is the number of drivers using the roads. This 

cost pro-rates out to roughly $130.00 per person per 

yea r (i n 1 9 7 5 dol 1 a r s ). To a r g ue t hat t his wo u 1d be 

too expensive IS to ignore the fact that we are already 

paying this amount through gasoline taxes and the like. 

Hen c e, "i f the cos t 0 f us i n g p r i vat e r oa d s we ret h e 

same or even somewhat more than the cost of using pub 

1 ic roads," argues Jarret Wollstein, lIdrlvers obviously 

274

could afford to pay these costs since they are already 

paying them. One hundred and twenty-eight dollars is 

clearly the same amount whether it is collected by the 

state through taxes or by private road companies 

through tolls and other fees."(2) 

b. Eminent Domain. 

The issue of eminent domain presents both a more 

d 1 f f i cuI ta ndam 0 rei n t eres ting que s t ion • Wh i lethe 

Rothbardian or natural rights variant of individualist 

anarchism must, of course, repudiate the entire concept 

of eminent domain as nothing more than legalized theft, 

the ut iIi tar ian, or Friedmanite, variant finds itself 

inn 0 s u c h m0 r a 1st r a i g h t - j a c ke t • For F r i e drna n, a s for 

Tucker in the nineteenth century, private property is 

def ined not as a moral or natural right but as a social 

expedient, a valuable one to be sure, but a social exped 

i en t none theless. As such, the problem of the lone 

holdout would not appear to be an insurmountable one. 

Since property is a social expedient there is nothing 

to prevent the courts in the anarchist society -- whose 

operation will be ,discussed in detail in the next chapter 

-- from incorporating into their Law Code a provision 

permitting, in extreme cases, such occasional violations 

of property rights as eminent domain. Thus, if 

a sin g I e hoi do u t we r e pr even ting the con s t r uc t i on 0 f a 

much needed road or bui Iding there would be nothing 

from the utilitarian point of view to prevent the 

courts from seIzing the property, ascertaining its 

"fair ll market value, and then awarding it to the construction 

company on the stipulation that the company 

pay the dispossessed owner for it. 

All of this would be anathema for the libertarian 

moralist, for whom any such coerced exchange, even one 

grant ing the owner the full market value of his propert 

y, is i mmo r a I. As Wo lIs t e i n pu t sit: 

For an economic transaction to be properly 

regarded as trade rather than theft, it is 

necessary that the parties involved (in this 

case the government and the property owner) 

mutually consent to all of the terms of the 

transaction, including price. The property 

own e r has the right to set any pr ice he 

wishes for the purchase of his property, or 

tor e f use t 0 s ell i t for any price wh a t s 0ever. 

It makes no difference what prlee 

eve r y 0 the rho use in the b 10 c k wa s sol d for. 

275

The i n d i v i d u a I has the righ t to set his own 

price for his own property. 

To sub s tit ute the f r e e rna r k e t for em inen t doma in, he 

concludes, is simply to "substitute justice for 

injustice•••"(3) 

The eli min a t ion 0 f em i n en t doma i n me an s t hat any 

property owner would have the right not to sell his 

property until or unless his conditions were met. The 

critical questions that must be faced by libertarians 

are therefore whether the repudiation of eminent domain 

would (a) so raise the cost of road construction as to 

render the idea of a privately financed road system 

untenable and/or (b) result in a confusing network of 

bends, curves and detours by forcing companies to build 

their roads around every hold-out. 

Libertarians argue that [1] privately constructed 

r 0 ads nee d benolessst r a i gh t t han thosewe now ha ve 

and [2] while paying the property owner a just price 

for his property might tend to increase the cost of 

road construction, other factors would reduce costs. 

First, since a business can make a profit only by satisfying 

consumers better than its competitors, and 

sin c e the m0 s tat tract i ve r 0 ad from the s tand poi n t 0 f 

both cost and convenience would probably be a relatively 

inexpensive road with occasional turns, rather than 

either arrow-straight roads constructed at exorbitant 

costs or cheap roads with sharp turns at every block, 

.t ha tis the type of road it wi 11 pay the road entrepreneur 

to build. Second, Wollstein points out that 

much of the va I ue of commercial structures 

and houses stems from the social environment 

in which they exist. Thus, if a road building 

company buys all of the houses in a given 

area, so that there are no more neighbors for 

a family to socialize with, or customers for 

a business to sell to, the value of a home or 

business in that area would greatly decrease. 

Such considerations then discourage the 

rational home or business owner from holding 

out for too long, or for asking for too much 

money for his property. In the extreme, if a 

person held out Indefinitely ... he might 

well find himself living in the center-strip 

of a highway--not a very pleasant thought.(4) 

Third, since there are typically alternative 

276

outes that are possible, albeit of varying convenience, 

this means, points out economist Walter Block, 

that the maximum amount that could be charged by any 

holdout could be no more than the cheapest of all the 

alternatIves. Moreover, Block continues, 

The road developer, knowing that he will be 

satisfied with any of five trajectories, can 

purchase opt ions to buy the land along each 

sit e • Ifar e c a I cit rantho I do u t rna t e ria 1 i z e s 

on anyone route, he can shift to his second, 

t h i r d, f 0 u r thor f 1fth cho ice.. The compe t itition 

between owners along each of these 

passages will tend to keep the price down.(5) 

And finall y, even i nthe wo r s t pos sib I e case, t hat 

of a holdout occupying an absolutely essential plot, 

libertarians remain undeterred.· It is at least conceivable, 

they maintain, for a developer to build 

either a tunnel underneath or a bridge over the land. 

Thus, they argue, for all of the these reasons it is 

not a t alIeI ear t hat the e I 1m ina t ion 0 f em i n en t doma i n 

would, in fact, increase the cost of road construction. 

But eve n i f t his we reth e Ca s e I I be r tar ians rep I y t hat 

this is so only because the full cost of the roads 

would then be borne by their users rather than being 

partially passed off onto the hapless property owners 

who, under eminent domain, often receive less than the 

minimum for which they would have sold their property. 

But libertarians do not stop here. They argue 

that in all likelihood the cost of road construction 

w 0 u I d act u a 1 I Y bel e s sin the f r e e rna r k e t • P r i vat e 

enterprise is constrained to strive for profit. In 

contrast to "pUblic" projects, efficiency is a prime 

consideration. And, as previously noted, the libertarian 

bel i eves that government intervention must suspend 

the mar k e t pro c e s sin any and a 11 areasin wh i chi t 

operates, thereby creating islands of calculational 

chaos. Since this means that there'is no way for the 

government to allocate flits" resources efficiently, 

production costs for government operations tend to be 

considerable higher than comparable projects in the 

p r 1 vat e sector. Th us, con c 1 ude rna n y 1 i be r tar ians, p r i 

vat e r 0 ad con s t rue t ion, even wit h 0 u t em i n en t d oms in, 

w0 u 1 d pro b a b I Y b e c h e ape. r t han pub lie r 0 a d con s t rue 

tion, even with eminent domain.(6) 

Finally, libertarians note that road placements 

are now commonly determined by political criteria. 

277

qUIckly find hImself with few customers. Rothbard and 

B I 0 c k fur the r a r g u e t hat i two u I d be c us t oma r y for 

homeowners to negotiate long term contracts with the 

road owner prohibiting just such capricious price 

hikes. "With this sort of 'easement' provided in advance 

by contract," Rothbard writes, "no such sudden 

blockade would be allowed, since it would be an invasion 

of the property rights of the landowner."(12) 

e. Safety. 

The final objection is that since a private road 

s y s tern w0 u I d permit the own e r s to set the i r own r u I e s 

and regulat ions, it would result in a confusing array 

of contradictory regulations which, in turn, would jeopardize 

the safety of the drivers. Libertarians mainta 

i n tha t such a scenar io is highly improbable. True, 

road owners would be responsible for regulating their 

own property. If a company were negligent in the upkeep 

of its roads, permitting dangerous potholes to remain 

unrepaired, or if it were lax in the stipulation 

and enforcement of appropriate h'ighway rules, permittin 

g r e c k I e s s d r i v e r s t 0 endange r the I i ve s of 0 the r s 

- - 0 r if it in any other way made cond it ions i nconvenient 

for its patrons -- it would soon find its custome 

r s us i ng other roads. Thus, says Rothbard,. "any rna verick 

road owner who insisted on a left-hand drive or a 

green for' stop' instead of 'go' would soon find himsel 

f wi th numerous accIdents and the disappearance of 

customers and users."(13) 

On the related question of safety the libertarian 

finds it ironic that anyone could defend the current 

system against one privately run by citing the issue of 

safety. The current publIC system routinely results in 

the deaths of 50,000 Americans a year. This can hardly 

be termed a raving success. As Block puts it, "a worse 

job than that which is presently being done by the government 

road managers is difficult to envision." The 

problem stems precisely from the disjunction between 

income and performance inherent In the very nature of a 

government operation. A civil servant, argues Block, 

draws hIS annual salary regardless of the 

accident toll piled up under his domain. But 

1 f hewer e apr 1 vat e own e r 0 f the r 08 d . 

then he would indeed lose out if his road 

com p i led a poor sa f e t y r e cor d. . . He wo u 1d 

then have every incentive to try to reduce 

281

accidents, whether by technologIcal innovations, 

better rules of th'e road, improved 

methods of selecting out drunken and other 

undesirable drivers, etc.(14) 

I n b r i e f, far fro rn rna king d r i v i n g rn 0 r e ha z a r dous, the 

1 ibertarian believes that private roads would result in 

a substantial reduction in death and injury tolls. 

Such is the libertarian proposal for a privately 

run road system. What can be said in the way of evaluation? 

First, the fact that private roads flourished 

in eighteenth century England and in nineteenth century 

United States until they were nationalized by the governrnent,(15) 

does not, in itself, demonstrate their 

pract ical ity or desirability today. In the nineteenth 

century land was open and could be obtained rather 

cheaply. Today, however, it is neither open nor cheap. 

Second, since there can be only a limited number of 

r 0 ute s bet weenan y two po i n t s the a b iii t Y 0 f compe t i 

t ion t 0 ins u reI ow pricesand h i gh qualit Y s e r vicererna 

ins somewhat quest ionable. Next, the response of the 

libertarian moralist to the problems of eminent domain, 

wh i len 0 ton I yin g e n i 0 usa n d bas i c a I I Y sou nd, rna y 

nevertheless be overly optimistic. Would it really be 

as simple as libertarians apparently feel either to 

meet the demand of everyone whose home lay in the path 

of some future road or to circumvent the problem of the 

individual holdout by merely building over, under or 

around hIm? Whether or not a system of private roads 

co u I d pro v ide sol uti ons tothesediff i cui tie s r ema ins 

to be seen. Yet, on balance, the libertarian has acquitted 

himself well. In trying to determine whether 

or not an anarchist society could work, we must focus 

not so much on its desirability as its feasibility. 

Thus, even if the elimination of eminent domain would 

in fact raise the cost of road construction, this could 

place its desirability in question, even though such a 

system would still be feasible. And while a private 

road system may not be quite as desirable as the libertarian 

depicts it, he has, I believe, been able to demonstrate 

Its feasibility. 

2. EDUCATION 

Libertarians oppose compUlsory state education for 

a number of reasons: 

1. PubliC educat ion is viewed as a very dangerous 

Instrument by which the state is able to seize control 

282

3. For the natural rights advocate public school 

i s i mm0 r a I for a n add i t iona I r e'a son :. "i t de p r i vesthe 

tax victims of' their right to their entire income."(22) 

4. Finally, libertarians believe that public 

schooling invariably engenders social conflict. The 

government must make decisions concerning the standards 

and curricula of "its" schools. Regardless of how the 

decisions are made, i.e., whether they are democratic 

or not, the fact remains that the decisions become the 

policy of all the schools within the government's juri 

s die t ion. Con s e qu e n t I y, wh enthere are no a I t erna 

t i ves to the state, parents can obtain the type of education 

they want for their children only by grabbing 

control of the school board and imposing their personal 

preferences on everyone's children by making them the 

official government pol icy. Hence, we are daily met 

with conflicts over busing, sex education, school prayers, 

liberal versus vocational education, relevance in 

the cur ric u 1 urn, etc. But i nthe a bsen s e 0 f com pu Iso r y 

state education these controversies would disappear, 

for a wide variety of educational alternatives would 

pre sen t thems e I veson the f r e e rna r ke t • Eve r yone, libertarians 

feel, could then purchase the type of educat 

i on he des ired wi thout inter fer ing wi th the right of 

others to obtain the type of education they desired. 

Before one can discuss the type of educational 

system advocated by libertarians, two things should be 

noted. First, they deny that anyone has a "right to an 

education." As we have seen earlier,(23) libertarian 

moral ists believe that rights, by definition, inhere in 

the nature of man. They are universal and timeless, 

i.e., they belong to all men irrespective of the circumstances 

prevailing at anyone time or place. To 

"speak of a 'right' as something which can only be fulfilled 

in modern industrial conditions," they contend, 

"is not to speak of a human, natural right at all." 

Since schooling is just such a good it is "not embedded 

in the nature of man, but requires for its fulfillment 

the existence of a group of exploited people who are 

coerced into providing such a 'right'."(24) Second, 

libertarians maintain a sharp distinction between 

schooling and education. Education is seen as a lifelong 

process. "When the child plays or listens to 

parents or friends, or reads a newspaper, or works at a 

job, he 0 r she i s be com i n g e d u cat e d . n ( 2 5 ) For rna ] 

school ing is seen as only one part of one's education 

and for some, such as those who are good with their 

hands but who have little or no interest in Shake- 

284

speare, calculus or political theory, not only is formal 

schooling a minimum part of their education, it may 

wei Ire tar d the ired u cat ion a Ide vel 0 pme n t . Art h u r 

Stinchcombe, for example, notes that much of the current 

schooling is useless for both the student and pros 

pee t i veemp loye r • " Em p loye r s con c erne d wit h securi n g 

reI iable workers may require high school diplomas as 

evidence of good discipline," he says. "Otherwise they 

can train workers better and cheaper than a high school 

can, on the job."(26) 

What is the libertarian proposal? Very simply, 

they argue that education should "be an entirely private 

affair." Insofar as there is a demand for education 

this would be met on the market just like any othe 

r d e man d • But permit ting e d ucat ion tog0 c omme r cia I , 

they believe, would entail a number of consequences. 

First, competition between schools to attract customers 

would mean innovation in the curriculum as well 

as a variety of alternatives. The current conflicts 

over such issues as segregated or integrated, liberal 

o r v 0 cat iona 1 s c h00 I s wo u I d be sol ved i f eve r yon e cou I d 

purchase the type, quality, and quantity of education 

he or she desired. Those who wanted vocational educat 

ion C 0 u I d 0 b t a i nit 0 nthe rna r k e t wit h 0 utimp e ding the 

a b iii t Y 0 f tho sewhod e sir e ali be r a I ed uca t ion from 

acquiring it for themselves.(27) 

Second, since those who received the service would 

be paying for it, the only ones in school would be 

those who wanted to learn or, for those who were still 

living with their parents, those whose parents felt 

they should learn. This, they feel, would all but 

el iminate the discipline problems prevalent in today's 

publ ic schools. As one libertarian wag remarked at the 

h e i g h, t 0 f the studen t rio t s 0 f the 19 60 ' S, n nob0 dyev e r 

sits in at Berlitz."(28) 

T h i r d, sin c e bus i n e sse s can not a f for d to bor e 

their customers or turn out shoddy merchandise, libertarians 

feel that there would be a strong pecuniary 

inc en t i v e for teachers to prepare good, interest in g 

lectures. This would mean that the tenure or status 

or ientation of the teaching profession would be replaced 

by an ability orientation. Those who could not 

teach well, i. e .. were unable to provide their customers 

with a high quality service, would soon find themselves 

with no students and thus no job in the teaching 

profess Ion. (29) As Scot t Bixler notes, "the govern- 

285

ment expert has no incentive to really care about his 

'clients,' as he is paid regardless, whereas the private 

expert has every conceivable incentive to look out 

for his elientts interest."(30) 

Not 0 n I y dol i be r tar ians believethat compet i t ion 

among schools would raise the quality of education, 

they believe it would also force the schools to operate 

more efficiently, thereby reducing the cost of education. 

Increasing government funding has placed public 

school ing in a virtual monopolistic position vis-a-vis 

private educational institutions. It is not surprising 

t hat pub 1 i esc h 0 0 1 s h a v e per formedin the rna nne r 0 f 

other protected monopolies: costs have risen while service 

has deteriorated. Between 1972 and 1977, costs 

per pupil rose by 58 percent; professional staff 

increased by 8 percent. Our ing the same time, the 

number of students declined by four percent. And in 

terms of quality, as measured by standardized tests, 

the de c lin e in" e due a t iona lou t put U wa s fa r g rea t e r • 

Thus, the increasing monopolization and centralization 

of the education industry has produced increasing inputs 

and declining outputs.(31) 

Lib e r tar ian s a Iso not e t hat i tis p rima r i I Y the 

chi Idren of upper and middle income families who attend 

pUblic universities and colleges. Children of poor 

parents tend to enter the work force. Since they begin 

paying taxes, part of which goes to subsidize public 

e d u cat ion, thereisan e t t ran s fer tota x mo n e y from 

the poor to the rich. To make matters worse, college 

graduates tend to earn more in their lifetime than noncollege 

graduates. Thus, the low-sk i lIed poor are 

taxed to pay for the training of the wealthy, who are 

then able to use this training to perpetuate their posit 

ion i nth e soc i 0 - e con om i chi era r c hy . ( 32 ) For t his 

reason libertarians feel that while reducing overall 

costs for everyone commercial education would be especially 

beneficial for the poor. But what if the family 

were still too poor to provide for a child's education? 

Wollstein points out that 

There are numerous possible solutions to such 

a problem which do not involve coercion: [1] 

the parents could take out a lon.g-term loan, 

[ 2] fro m h i g h s c h 0 a I on, the son co u I d wo r k 

part-time, [3] schools might take the boyan 

as a charity case (as private physicians took 

on poor patients as charity cases before 

Medicare), [4] the boy mIght sign a contract 

286

probablility of better overall results for children 

u n d e r the f r e e e d ucat iona I s ystem seemscI ear • I tis, 

after all, the parents of this or that child who will 

make the decision for the welfare of the child. These 

may not be excellent or even responsible at all times; 

but the relationship between parent and child, character 

ized at least by affection and some sense or a feeling 

of responsibility on the parents' part, has a good 

c hanceo f res u 1 tingin ma x i mum per sona I con c ern 0 ve r 

education."(35) 

Libertarians have presented an excellent case for 

the overall superiority of voluntary, private education 

over compulsory, public schooling. But such superiorit 

y doe s not, init s elf, d em 0 n s t rat e the des ira b iii t Y 0 f 

the former. A listing of the possible combinations indicates 

that there are two additional alternatives between 

the two extremes discussed thus far: 

1. CompUlsory public schooling 

2. Voluntary public schooling 

3. Compulsory private schooling, and 

4. Voluntary private schooling. 

What of the second alternative, that of schooling 

provided by the state but which was voluntary, in that 

pa r en t s cou I d -- so long as they were able to bear the 

additional expense -- send their children to private 

schools, or keep them out of school altogether? From a 

libertarian point of view, its voluntarism would make 

its up e rio r to com p u Isorye d u cat ion. Bu t since i t 

would continue to be provided through taxes, it would 

still be considered immoral. Beyond this obvious 

point, the need to "lure" children into the pUblic 

schools would probably increase the variety and quality 

of education. But how significant this would be is 

diffIcult to tell. Real competition in the "educational 

industry" would be mitigated by the fact that parents 

desiring to send their children to a private inst 

i tut ion would have to pay twice: directly, to the 

private institution at the point of service, and indirectly, 

to the public institution, through taxes. 

This, of course, would render competition from private 

institutions rather feeble. Thus, the only viable alternat 

ive to state schooling would be no schooling. It 

is likely therefore, that the concern on the part of 

public educators with the variety and quality of their 

education offerings would probably not be noticeably 

increased by a policy of voluntary, public education. 

288

What of the other option of making schooling compulsory 

but private? The voucher plan, where students 

would be given educational vouchers by the state to be 

redeemed at the school of their choosing, is the best 

known variant of this option. From the libertarian 

point of view the requirement of compulsory education 

would clearly render it unacceptable. But one of the 

mer its 0 f the program, i tis c omm 0 n I y thought, i s t hat 

the voucher would insure education which was responsive 

tot h e des ires 0 f the studen t s - - 0 r pa r en t s - - rat her 

than the pUbl i c author it ies. Those schools offering 

the best educational programs would get the bulk of the 

vouchers and thus make the most money. Thus, the compe 

tit i on between school s wou ld enhance the qual i ty and 

variety of education. This argument is indeed dubious. 

It seems unlikely that the state would long permit 

vouchers to be redeemed anywhere. Rather, it is 

likely that a voucher program would include the stipulation 

that the vouchers would be redeemable only at 

those schools meet ing certain requirements -- educational 

and social -- and/or only at those schools located 

in the school district in which one lived. But 

wi th such restrictions there would certainly be little 

room for educational competition and without such 

competition there would ·be little incentive to increase 

the quality and variety of their educational 

programs.(36) 

Libertarians feel that the current system of comp 

u Iso r y and s tat e - sup p 0 r ted s c h 0 0 lis i mm 0 r a Ion two 

co u n t s • Fir s t, com p u Iso r y s c h 001 in g i s v i ewed a s a 

form of involuntary servitude, and second, "free" pub 

I ic education is a violation of the rights of those who 

are taxed to pay for it. Further, they believe that a 

private voluntary educational system would be able to 

funish high quality education at a lower cost than any 

alternative. 

While the results of voluntary private education 

may not be everything that the libertarian expects, the 

argument is cogently presented and the proposal strikes 

·me as not only feasible but probably desirable as well. 

3. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 

Limiting the number of individuals or groups who 

can en t era par tic u I a r fie I d res u Its, I i be r tar ian s 

argue, in rigidity, inefficiency, and higher rices. 

But, even more importantly, since licensing enta Is the 

use of government violence against anyone ende voring 

289

to ···enter a lIcensed field without government permission, 

libertarians see it as violating natural law by 

employing violence to prevent nonaggressive actions of 

other individuals. In fact, occupational licensing is 

seen as a return to a type of guild system similar to 

that of the feudal period,(37) and libertarians call 

for the removal of all forms of government regulations, 

from the licensing of occupations to the prohibition of 

private drug use.(38) 

The moral issue aside, the practical problem with 

go v ernmen t lieens i ng i s t hat wh e the r i t wa s 0 rig ina I I Y 

implemented to regulate industry for the benefit of the 

consumer or was established to benefit entrepreneurs by 

shielding them from competition is irrelevant. Since 

the interest of "the public" is diverse and diffuse it 

is unable to focus its interests on any particular 

pro b I emf 0 r a sus t a i ned per i 0 d 0 f time • On the 0 the r 

hand, the interest of an industry is "direct and focused." 

The automobile industry, for example, has a dir 

e etand i mme d iate in t eres tin the dec i s ion S 0 f the Environmental 

Protection Agency. But individual members 

of the pUblic are affected only minimally. Hence, the 

automobile industry would be willing to devote much 

time and energy to influence the agency's decisions 

while the "public" will not. Moreover, since an agency 

cannot make decisions concerning the industry it regulates 

unless it possesses knOWledge about that industry, 

the agency officials must either be drawn from the 

very industries they regulate or develop close contacts 

with those in the industry. It is hardly surprising, 

notes economist Milton Friedman, that the regulatory 

" 0 r g ani z a t ion s h a v e beeom e the s e r van t s 0 f thosethey 

were supposed to protect the public from."(39) Walter 

Gellhorn, in fact, estimates that 

Seventy-five percent of the occupational 

licensing boards at work in this country 

today are composed exclusively of licensed 

practitioners in the respective occupations. 

The s e men and worn en, m0 S t 0 f wh am are 0 n I y 

part-time officials, may have a direct economic 

interest in many of the decisions they 

make concerning admiSSIon requirements and 

the defInition of standards to be observed by 

licensees. More importantly they are as a 

rule directly representative of organized 

groups WIthin the occupations.(40) 

290

hand, these delays have caused 21,000 to 120,000 additional 

deaths during the same time period. Thus, on 

balance FDA regulations have resulted in between 4 and 

12 deaths for every life saved.(44) 

In other areas, a recent study of the effects of 

the ban on adver tis ing prescr i ption drugs, which is 

universally supported by the retail pharmacists' organizations, 

revealed that prices in -the 34 regulated 

states were 5.2 percent higher than in the 16 non-regulated 

states, and may cost consumers as much as $380 

mi II i on per year. (45) Another study, by Thomas Gale 

Moore of Stanford University, indicated that various 

reg u I a t ion s 0 f the I n t e r s tat e Comm e r ce Comm iss ion, 

which are supported by both the American Trucking Associat 

ion and the Teamsters Union, may cost consumers $16 

billion a year.(46) And a study of television repair 

Ii cens ingby the Federal Trade Commission, which compar 

e d Lou i s ian a, wh i c h has rna nda tor y I icensing, wit h 

California, which requires registration without restrictions 

on the number of people registered, and the 

District of Columbia, with no controls, revealed that 

pr ices in Louisiana were a full 20 percent higher than 

in ei ther Cal i fornia or the District of Co!umbia.(47) 

And independent studies have estimated that licensing 

restrictions and other government regUlations cost the 

consumers $130 billion per year.(48) Clearly, says the 

libertarian in responding to these kinds of studies, 

the effect of regulations is not to reduce prices for 

the benefit of consumers but, on the contrary, to raise 

them for the benefit of the industries. 

The 1 i ber ta r ian feels, therefore, that government 

regUlation works to the benefit of the very industries 

being regulated. And since there is a natural tendency 

for the wealthy to use their wealth to obtain political 

power, he is skeptical of proposals to reform the regulatory 

commissions for the benefit of the poor. While 

such reforms might prove successful in the very short 

run, the bel iefthat s uchastit ua t ion can bema i n t a i n 

ed is akin to believing that water can run uphill. The 

interests of consumers, Milton Friedman notes, "are diverse 

and diffuse. You buy a thousand things, but you 

make your living producing a single product...When 

the chips are down, your willingness to promote your 

interest as a consumer of a thousand things will be far 

less than your willingness to engage in something that 

wi 11 promote your interest as a producer." Consequent 

1y, areg u 1a tor y c omm iss ion may bees tab 1ishe d wit h the 

intent ion of protecting the consumers. But, "after the 

292

initial, faddish interest in the project dies down, the 

producers will move in with pressure for exemptions and 

other special rulings."(49) The libertarian, therefore, 

opposes all regulation not only on moral but on 

practical grounds as well. 

But how would the market be able to protect the 

interests of the consumers in the absence of regulation? 

Libertarians believe that there are any number 

of noncoercive ways that this could be handled. First, 

Hospers points out that a company's good name is its 

best guarantee of its future business. Businessmen are 

no more inherently trustworthy or honest than any other 

soc i a 1 g r 0 up. But the f r e e rna r ke t p I acesam0 net a r y 

inc e n t i veon h 0 nest y • Chea ting rna y res u Itin ash0 r t 

term gain, but a company that incurs a reputation for 

c h eat i n g its pa t ron s wi I Iso0 n fin d itself wit h 0 utany 

patrons and, thus, going out of business. Since the 

market works to reward honesty and penalize dishonesty, 

it is believed that a totally free market would actually 

serve to raise rather thanWlower standards.(SO) 

It is also likely that a laissez faire society 

w0 u 1 d g i v e r i set 0 m0 rema g a z i n e s s u chas Cons ume r 

Rep 0 r t s, pro v i din g sub s c rib e r s .wit h i n for rna t ion 0 n 

eve r y t h i n g fro m the qua lit Y 0 f pa r ticu Iarbrand s 0 f 

safety pins to individual physicians. While certainly 

not a I 1, 0 rev e n m0 s t, w0 uIdsubs c ribe t 0 s u c h rna ga 

zines, economists such as Friedman contend that even 

the careless shopper would be better protected in the 

absence of government controls. "Producers," he says, 

work on a margin, like everybody else. If 

the five percent of shoppers who are carefUl 

spot a clever misrepresentation, they'll 

leave the store. That's enough pressure on 

the store owner. The infrequent shopper 

assumes this when he goes to a store that's 

popular. There has to be a reason for its 

popularity, he decides. The reason is that 

it appeals to those who are very carefUl 

about measures and labels and that sort of 

thing.(Sl) 

There are other devices by which consumers would 

be able to protect themselves. While anyone in a libertarIan 

society would be able to enter any occupation 

he desires, includIng those of physician and lawyer, 

libertarians do not regard this as a problem. First, 

the market would insure that only the most competent 

293

ter to indirect exchange when individuals begin to 

realize that they can facilitate their ability to exchange 

for goods they desIre by first obtaining goods 

wit h high rna rketabi Ii ty. Consequen t Iy, cer ta i n commodities 

emerge spontaneously as a general medium of exchange 

as more and more individuals begin to demand 

these goods not so much for their use as consumption 

goods but for their use in facilitating exchange. Eventually, 

this second use becomes dominant, and the commod 

i t Y comes to be demanded almost solely for its use 

as a general medium of exchange.(55) 

What kind 0 f goods wi 1 1 emerge as mo ne y has va r i e d 

from soc i e t y t 0 soc i e t y ? S ome a gricu 1t ur a Isoc i e ties 

have used cows; fishing societies have used fishhooks 

or seashells, etc. But generally metals, and in particuI 

a r gold and s i I ver, ha ve pre va i led for a n urn be r 0 f 

reasons. They are durable, fairly portable, and highly 

divisible. All of these greatly facilitate exchange. 

Whi Ie the state, whether for purposes of obtaining easy 

revenue or to protect society from fraud, has gradually 

assumed a monopoly on the issue of money -- the United 

States government, in fact, did not finally prohibit 

private coinage until 1863(56) -- the important point 

i s t hat m0 neyemer g e d s pon tane 0 us I Y from the rna r k e t . 

Libertar ians note that some economists even contend 

that it was impossible for the state to create money by 

declaring some good legal tender and ordering the public 

to accept it. "It IS not the State, but the common 

practice of all those who have dealings in the market, 

that creates money," says LUdwig von Mises. "It follows 

t hat S tatereg u 1a t Ion a t t ributi n g g e nera I powe r 0 f 

deb t - 1 i qui d a t ion t 0 a c omm 0 d i t Y i suna bleofit s elf t 0 

make that commodity into money."(57) 

1fthestate wa s not r e qui rOe d to br i ng mo neyin to 

e xis ten c e, ne i the r isit ne c e s sa r y topres e r ve it. Go vernment 

control over the monetary system leads to at 

least two very serious problems. First, since money is 

the n e r veeen t e r 0 f the en t ire e con omy, the libe r tar ian 

believes that if "the state is able to gain unquestioned 

control over the unIt of all accounts, the state 

wi II then be in a position to dominate the entire system, 

and the whole society.n(5S) And second, if any 

one person or institution such as the government can 

obtain control over the supply of money, there IS nothing 

to prevent It from using this control to add to its 

wealth simply by printing new money. There is, they 

contend, no real difference between the printing of 

new money by the government. and the activities of a 

296

counterfei ter. Both act ivi ties reduce the value of 

the monetary unit by increasing its supply. The effect 

in both cases is to transfer purchaSing power from all 

other members of society to the government or the count 

e r f e i t e r. Not 0 n I y i s t his not h i n g moret han the f t , 

but, they argue, it reduces popular control over government 

by enabling the government to expand its expenditures, 

and thus the scope of its activities, without 

first having to obtain popular consent for increasing 

taxes. (59 ) 

The individualist anarchist chides those individuals, 

such as the members of the Chicago School, who advocate 

freedom of competition for nearly all goods 

except money. One argument in favor or a government 

money monopoly is that money can fulfill its function 

as a med i urn of exchange only so long as it is scarce. 

Since money can be printed at practically no cost, free 

compet it ion would lead to hyper-inflation. Thus the 

supply of money must be governmentally controlled to 

prevent the breakdown of the monetary system. 

It is admitted that free banking in a monetary 

system based on paper would lead to its destruction. 

Yet, this is precisely what most libertarians and all 

individualist anarchists desire. Not only does a paper 

system require government control but, since its supply 

can be so easily Increased, it is seen as the cause of 

the t r ad e eye Ie. F r e e ban king wo u 1dIead tothereemergence 

of "natural" money, i.e., one that spontaneous 

1y emerged from the market process. Because of such 

a d van tage s 0 r s carcit y, d i vis i b iIi t y, po r tabiii t y, d u r 

abi 1 i ty and homogeneity this would almost certainly be 

gold and/or silver. Since it is difficult and costly 

to dig these metals out of the ground their supplies 

could not, like those of paper, be increased at will. 

Thus, not only would their values be stabilized and secure 

but the prospect of inflation and depression would 

be greatly reduced. 

Far from leadIng to perpetual inflation free banking 

would, they argue, actually lead to a much sounder 

monetary system than we now have. "Suppose that I decided 

to abandon the slow, difficult process of produc 

Ing services for money, or of mining money, and instead 

deCIded to print my own," hypothesizes Rothbard. 

What w0 u 1 d P r 1 n t ? I mig h t rna n u fa c t urea 

paper ticket, and pr int upon it "10 

Rot h bar d s . II I co u 1d the n procIa 1m the tiC ke t 

297

In shor t, 1 i ber tar ians do not bel ieve that money 

requires thesuper.vision of government. Far from free 

banking leading to hyper-inflation, the libertarian bel 

ieves that the reverse is true. The money monopoly, 

says James Rolph Edwards, "has the defect of all monopolies, 

that one must use their product even if it is 

unsatisfactory." It is only with "currency substitution·," 

i.e., competition between alternative monies, 

that "money of stable and reliable value" can be 

insured.(63) 

Since private mipters could not force people to 

use their money, they could stay in business only by 

developing a reputation for honesty. The more sterling 

one's reputation the more willing individuals would be 

to use a minter's coins or a printer's certificates. 

The lib e r tar ian poi n t s to his tor y to bo1st e r his ca s e • 

Private coins circulated widely throughout the world, 

inclUding this country. During the Civil War, for example, 

the federal government took coins out of circulation 

to help relieve the metal shortage. This in 

turn produced a shortage of coins, which was alleviated 

by the appearance of private mint-masters. It is reported 

that possibly 10,000 varieties of private coins 

circulated during this time. In the 1830's an individual 

named Christopher Bechtler entered the minting 

business and within nine years minted nearly two and 

one-half million dollars. HIS coins received such wide 

circulation that as late as 1920 the Bechtler dollars 

were st ill be ing accepted in parts of this country at 

par with "official money."(64) 

Finall y, how rna nycur r en c i e s w0 u I d beex pe c ted t 0 

e mer g e ? Lib e r tar ian sadmit t hat therei s no wa y t 0 

know for sure. But given the transaction costs inherent 

in currency conversions, Edwards argues that the 

"public would not permit more than three or four currencies 

to circulate widely at anyone time."(65) 

Wha t can be sa i d abou t such a proposal? At the 

least, it is certainly ingenious. But is it pure fantasy? 

I think not. Not only is the argument presented 

logically but a wealth of historical examples are also 

introduced to demonstrate its feasibility. But quest 

ion sst i I I r ems in. W0 u 1d the con c ern for 0 ne 's reputation 

be enough to prevent fraud, or at least hold it 

to a minimum? To this the libertarian might respond 

that whatever fraud would occur would no doubt be less 

than that perpetuated by the government through its 

dollar monopoly. And is fra·ctional-reserve banking 

299

i n her en t I Y f r a u d u 1en t, as the lib e r tar ian rno r ali s t 

claims? What if banks frankly told their customers 

'8 b 0 u t the i r fr act iona I - res e r ve p r act ice, inc 1 uding its 

advantages -- such as no fee for deposits -- and its 

disadvantages -- such as a remote possibility that one 

might not be able to redeem one's deposit in an economicc 

r i sis? Solong a s a ban k f rank I Y a dm itte d its 

practice, I do not see how it can be accused of fraudulent 

behavior. And if consumers desired such a policy, 

I do not see how libertarians could prevent the market 

from supplying it. But this is a minor point. The 

libertarian proposal for the deregulation of money is 

convincing. 

5. EOOLOGY 

Libertarians believe that an adequate solution to 

the problems of pollution and conservation can be found 

only in a system of universal private property. 

a. Pollution. 

Pollut ion may be defined as "the transfer of harmful 

matter or energy to the person or property of another 

without the latter's consent."(66) 

Government has considered certain types of property 

as too important to be privately owned. It ha,s designated 

these areas as "public property" and assumed 

control over them. Lake Erie as well as Lake Baikal In 

the S 0 vie tUn ion are "pubi i c I y own e d . " R i ve r s, too, 

are owned by the "public" as is air space. And it is 

pre cis ely i nth e sea rea s t ha t we s u f fer from rna s s i ve 

and harmful poll ut ion. Conversely, one does not find 

i n d i v i d u a I s po I I uti ng e i the r the i r own 0 r the i r ne ighbor's 

property. This is so, libertarians contend, because" 

in the normal course of events, an individual 

finds it much easier and more rational to protect 

things which he owns, rather than things he does not 

own."(67) Libertarians therefore seek the solution to 

the pollution problem in the extension of individual 

pro per t y rig h t sintot h 0 seareasin wh i c h they are now 

denied. 

Government spawns pollution, they argue, because 

the entIre concept of "public property" is a myth. "The 

publIC" is merely a hypostatized construct that has no 

counterpart in real ity. If the "publ ic" does not 

ex i s t, I t can not ow nan y t h i n g . " Pub 1 i c good s II are 

actually owned by the offIcials running the government 

300

at any particular time. It is the decision of the government 

that determines how much or how little pollution 

of air and water we are to have. But how does the 

government arrive at these decisions? The public policy 

was to treat air space and water as "free goods" unowned 

by anyone. Since no one was permitted to own any 

particUlar unit of the air space or water, no one had 

either the incentive or even the means to prevent any 

par tic u 1 a run i t fro m b e i n g des poi led • Con seq ue n t I Yf 

sewage of all kinds was disposed of by dumping it into 

the wa t e r 0 r byin j e c t i. n g its r ema ins i ntothe air. 

But as air and water became more polluted, the government, 

as owner, eventually altered its policy. Air and 

water were no longer considered "free goods" equally 

accessible to all, but were to be regulated by the government 

in the "public interest." The question, howe 

v e r, ishow mu c h 0 r h ow lit tie po II uti on is in the 

" pub lie i n t e re s t " ? The go vernmen t rna y use "sc i en t i f i c 

tests" to determine at what level pollution becomes a 

heal th hazard and then permi t pollut ion up to that 

point. But, as important as such studies are, even 

t his met hod i s arb i t r a r y . S om e i n d i v i d ua I s rna y be 

e s pee i a I 1 Y sensit i vet 0 po 11 uti on and wou I d pr e fer a 

lower level, while others might prefer a higher level 

pr ov i ded it would lead to a higher standard of 1 i ving. 

At the Stockholm Conference in 1972, for example, the 

less developed countries made it clear that they would 

not t a k e any s t e pst 0 red u c e pol I uti 0 nth a t wo u I d 

i n h i bit i n d u s t ria Idevel 0 pm en t . ( 68 ) M0 reov e r, solong 

as the decision is made by the government, libertarians 

feel that it will be a political decision. Most businesses 

are opposed to strict pollution standards, at 

least for their area of operations. And as already 

noted there is no reason to believe that the interest 

of the "public" will triumph over that of "business." 

The interest of the "public" is diffuse and often contradictory 

while that of "business" is concrete and 

immediate. The automobile manufacturers, for example, 

are adversely affected in an immediate and concrete way 

by the impos it ion of auto-emission standards, and can 

be coun t ed on to lobby strongly in oppos i t ion to them. 

The "public" may be in favor of such standards. But 

its interests are neither as immediate nor as concrete 

a s tho s e 0 f the aut 0 rna n u fa c t u r e r s, and i tis un I ike I y 

that many individuals would be willing to sacrifice the 

time and money necessary to effectively counter that 

group. And even some of the "public," such as those 

who intend to buy new cars and would have to pay the 

extra cost of the pollution equipment, might oppose 

emission standards altogether. ThIS means, at best, 

301

that the government policy would be some sort of 

compromise between the interests of the "public" and 

tho s e 0 f' "b u sin e s s • " Itse em s I ike I y, howe ve r, t hat 

those of business would gradually emerge dominant. 

Libertarians, in short, believe that government 

itself is solely responsible for pollution. Its 

failure to recognize property rights in water and air 

spa c e has res u I ted i nth em be i n g t. rea ted a s n f r e e 

goods," which meant that since no unit of these goods 

would be individually owned or valued, they were abused 

and wasted, i.e., polluted. And they further argue 

that no government can deal effectively with pollution 

si nee i nth e a b senceofIn d i v i d ua I owner s hip of air 

space and water, there is no market in these areas. 

Thus the government has no way of determining how the 

sup ply 0 f air spac e and wa t e r 0 ugh t to be a I I 0 catedt 0 

enhance the ut iii ties of all members of society. The 

only alternative is to establish arbitrarily a certain 

1 eve I 0 f pol I uti 0 n a s the rna x i murn and then imp0 s e i t 

upon everyone. But since many would be willing to endure 

greater amounts in return for such benefits as a 

h i g her s tan dar d 0 f I i v i ng, wh i leothe r s wo u I d pre fer a 

lower level of pollution, this method satisfies practically 

no one. 

We do not have a problem of land pollution. A 

cannot dump his garbage into B's backyard. It is important 

to realize that this is so only because property 

rights in land are usually well defined. Once proper 

t y rig h t sin air spa c e and wa t e r we repe r mit ted, 

lib e r tar ian s rna i n t a i ntha t the prob I em 0 f pol I uti 0 n i n 

these areas would likewise cease to exist. In a system 

of universal private property, A's injection of soot or 

noise into the air space of B would be just as much a 

violation of the latter's property rights as if A willfully 

destroyed B's shrubs by pouring poison on them. 

The remedy I ies in the courts upholding the neighbor's 

pro p er t y rig h t s by for c i ng t he po I I uter, i. e ., t he inv 

a d e r 0 fan 0 the r 's pro per t y, t 0 rna keres tit uti 0 n to 

the victim. 

The question of how much pollution should exist 

would be determined by the actions of each property 

owner.(69) Each individual would be free to use his 

property as he saw fit but would be responsIble for any 

" s p ill 0 v e r" 0 n t 0 a not her's proper t y • Thosewhow0 u I d 

be willing to suffer a higher level of pollution in 

ex c han g e for m0 net a r y com pensat Ion from the po I 1uti ng 

source would be free to do so. Consequently, such 

302

and therei s nor e a son the Uti lit a ria n wo u I d proh i bit 

this. Thus, a firm might enter into an agreement in 

which an owner grants the firm the right to pollute his 

property above the limit stipulated by the courts in 

return for compensation. Or, an individual who felt 

the legal limits were too high could pay a firm to keep 

its pol I uti 0 n below the lim it. Nurn e r 0 usot her 

scenarios are conceivable. 

While more complicated, the difficulties such 

problems pose for the libertarian moralist are not, I 

think, fatal. The application of the Lockean "homes 

tea din g a x i om ," viz., t hat un own e d proper t y bel 0 n g s to 

its first user, would be instrumental in resol ving many 

of the seeming difficulties. "If a town were to spring 

up around a remote· paper mi 11, or a new subdivision 

were to be built at the end of an airport runway," 

remarks Wi 11 iam Burt, "subdivided properties could be 

sold with the contractual understanding that air or 

noise pollution will be tolerated. (Even where this 

understanding was not historically defined in deeds, we 

would have to grant that the pollution rights had been 

already homesteaded at the time of property sale.)"(71) 

This means that a Mr. Clean could not bring the 

city to a halt or that a Mr. Slick could not hold it up 

for ransom. For, in the absence of clear and valid 

contractual evidence to the contrary the "pollutIon 

rights," as Burt says, "had been already homesteaded at 

the tIme of property sale." What Mr. Clean, or Mr. 

Slick, could do would be to buy the pollution rights 

over his home from the current homesteaders. Thus, if 

the A-I Widget Factory were next door, Mr. Clean could 

purchase A-I's pollution rights to the space above his 

home. This would mean that A-I could no longer pollute 

Mr. Clean's proper ty. But another homesteader, the 

Acme Frisbee Company located on the other side of Mr. 

C I e an' s pro per t y, w 0 u Ids til Ire t a i nit s po I I uti 0 n 

rights over that air space until and unless it sold 

them to :\1r. Clean. In short, air space, or at least 

pollution rights to it, would become a commodity just 

like land. While it might become customary for air 

space and land to be sold in one package this would not 

be mandatory and would depend on the particular contractual 

arrangements. Thus, one could buy land that 

became historically "separated," as it were, from the 

air space above it. And just as one is free to purchase 

land adjacent to one's property, so one could 

purchase the space above one's property as well. 

304

There is another method by which such apparently 

thorny problems could be handled, viz., that of restrictive 

covenants. A convenant is simply an agreement 

in which the parties mutually agree to abide by 

certain stipulations on the use and sale of their land. 

The covenant would probably be the most convenient device 

for use by owners of new subdivisions, shopping 

malls and the like. Thus, subdivision owners might 

sell their units only to those who agree to respect 

certain noise, water or pollution standards. The 

covenant is an extremely flexible device that would 

g rea t I Y s imp I i f y the prob I em s 0 f po I I uti 0 n con t r 0 lin a 

libertarian society. As Burt points out: 

Covenants can also be useful in presenting 

a corporate phalanx to the non-consenting 

world. A prospective polluter, in the first 

place, would have to deal with only one representative 

in order to obtain pollution 

rights over the covenanted properties. And 

this cuts two ways: a group of neighbors who 

despise automobile exhaust could Improve 

their ability to stop it by organizing into 

an "air pollution district" such that when 

aut 0 mob i 1 e poIlu t ion inc rea sed they wo u I d 

on I y h a vet 0 provet hat s 0 me 0 f them we r e 

invaded by fumes. 

At the s imp I est I eve Is, covena n t s are 

merely bilateral agreements. Inclusion of 

more participants may be demanded to deal 

with certain kinds of environmental conflict 

(as with the air pollution district), and 

more specificity or elaboration may be 

needed to handle subtler kinds of goods. The 

latter becomes especially important when the 

law recognizes no independent method to establish 

simple property in such goods as 

"neighborhood character" or other esthetic 

values. The peak of inclusion and elaboration 

is that womb of security, the proprietary 

community, wherein management of the 

social aspects of living has been left 

(either by deed restriction or subsequent 

c 0 v e nan t) t 0 ace n t r a I c omm unit y "I and lor d ft 

who res 0 I v e sal 1 i n te rna 1 envir 0 nmen tal disput 

e sout 0 f co u r t . Examp I e s 0 f t his ph en om 

enon may be seen in huge shopping malls, 

hot e I com pIexes, r e c rea t ion a 1 comm unit i e s , 

and industrial parks.(72) 

305

The foregoing is a highly imaginative approach to 

the pro b I e m 0 f pol I uti 0 ncon t r o·}. Wh i I e per haps m0 r e 

cumbersome than the more direct regulatory approach 

currently in use, it has the advantage of great flexib 

iii t Y • And wh i let heli be r tar ian 0 r na t urair i g h t s 

approach would be even more complicated than the utilitarian, 

its program strikes me as being at least Ceasib 

1 e . Wh e the r its compIex i t Y rna kesit des ira blei s 

another question. It could well be, however, that 

these complexities are exaggerated by the failure to 

rea liz e the rna r ketinc e n t i veexis tingin t his cas e for 

the simplification of procedures. As Burt says, "we 

have every reaSon to expect the system to be only -as 

complicated and 'utopian' as it needs to be."(73) 

b. Conservation. 

Lib e r tar ian s a r g u e t hat the prob I em 0 f res 0 u r c e 

conservation could be solved in the same way. Richard 

and Ernestine Perkins argue that universal private property 

would create a "cycle of protection." They note 

that while such endangered species as seals, birds and 

f ish are i n va ria b I Y f 0 undon governmen t - own e d air, I and 

or wa t e r, ani ma 1sthat are p r i vat ely own e d s uchas 

t u r key s, chi c ken s, h 0 r s es, cows, etc., are not inany 

danger of extinction. The reason for this is obvious. 

Sin c e there co u ] d be no chi eken breeders wi tho u t chi c kens 

the owners must make sure that they breed at least 

as many as they kill.(74) Universal private property 

would permit the extension of the "cycle of poverty" 

into many areas in which it is now inoperative. "Baby 

seals, as well as many other wild animals whose fur or 

meat has commercial value," contend the Perkinses, 

would be deliberately and scientifically 

farmed on a business basis, in the same way 

that thousands of chickens and turkeys are 

raised in farms specializing in their production. 

The unreasonable killing of animals, 

inclUding birds, whose lives are of value in 

the ecologIcal cycle, simply would not occur, 

because the property in which they lived 

would be privately owned. The owners would 

pro tee t the m, jus t as dome s tic ani rna 1s are 

protected today. When nearly all such property 

is privately owned, there would be as 

much chance of reading in the newspapers of 

the senseless slaughter of seals, as there is 

today of the senseless slaughter of an 

English farmer's dairy herd.(75) 

306

allocating resources between current and future uses. 

If forests were privately owned, and a lumber shortage 

was expected the forest owners would have every incent 

i v e bot h toeur t a i I theireur r en t produe t ion 0 f I urn be r 

and to plant more trees in the expectation of selling 

at a higher price in the future. These activities 

would benefit consumers and conserve resources. On the 

other hand, if lumber was becoming very plentiful or 

wa s to be replaced in the near future by another rna terial, 

the forest owners would rush to produce as much 

lumber now, when it would still be of some value, as 

they could. Hence, notes Rothbard, "the market economy 

contains a marvelous built-in mechanism whereby the 

resource owner's decision on present against future 

produe t ion w i I I bene fit not 0 n I y the i r own incom e and 

we a 1 t h, but a Iso t hat 0 f the rna s s 0 f cons ume r sand 0 f 

the national and world economy."(77) 

Economist E. J. Mishan argues that there cannot be 

proper ty rights in air and water because, in contrast 

to land, "they do not take on physically identifiable 

forms."(78) But the libertarians do not believe that 

t his i s a s e rious, prob I em . Fir s t, they poi n t 0 u t t hat 

many goods now on the free market do not have identiflabl 

e forms. Music is one; ownership of radio frequenc 

i es is anot her. And second, t hey note tha t modern 

technological advances such as electronic fencing have 

faci Ii tated the development of property rights in these 

areas. 

Whether Mishan is correct cannot really be decided 

un til the e f for tis rna de to devel 0 p proper t y righ t sin 

these areas. It should be remembered that prior to the 

d eve lopmen t 0 f pro per t y righ t sin Iand, itt00 wa s a 

" col lee t i ve goo d • " Its e ems 1 ike 1y tome t hat sueh 

problems are solvable by the universal private property 

approach. But this merely means that it is one possible 

method for dealing with the problems of pollution 

control and conservation. It does not mean that it is 

the best or most desirable approach. It could be that 

its complexities would make it less convenient than 

direct regUlation. On the other hand, its greater 

fie x i b iii t yeo u I d rna ke t his a p pr oa c h qui teef fie i en t . 

But these issues cannot be settled so long as the government 

policy is to arrogate to itself ownership and 

control of air space and water. 

6. PUBLIC UTILITIES 

How would "public utilities" such as gas, electricity,- 

water, sewage dIsposal, and telephones, be han- 

308

a1 either market or non-market -- means of providing 

such services. 

After an extensive search for goods that are inherently 

public or collective, ranging from insect cont 

r 0 1 top 0 I ice pro t e c t ion, co u r t s, pa r ks, r 0 ads and 

eve n nat ion a Ide fen s e, e conom i s t Kennet h Go I din con 

c 1 ude d t hat ff caseaf t e r cas e, a 1thoug h in i t i a 1 I Y P Iausible 

has failed to fit the framework of public goods 

theory." The evidence suggests, he continued, 

that we are not faced with a set of goods 

and services which have the inherent charact 

e r i s tic s 0 f pub 1 i ego 0 d s • Ra ther, we are 

faced with an unavoidable choice regarding 

eve r y goo d 0 r s e r vic e: s ha lIeve r yon e ha ve 

e qua I ace esst 0 the s e r vice (i n wh i c h ca s e 

the s e r vice will bes i milart0 a pu b I i c good) 

or shall the service be available selective 

1y: t 0 s 0 me, but no t too the r s ? In pr a ct 

ice, publ i c goods theory is often used in 

such a way that one overlooks this important 

cho ice problem. Often it is suggested that a 

c e r t a ins e r vic e i s a pub lie good. And on ce 

this suggestion is made, it is usually 

assumed that the service must be equally 

available to everyone. But this is seriously 

misleading as, in general, equal access to 

government services is neither necessary nor 

efficient.(81) 

Lighthouses, Goldin points out, are often considered 

a "textbook example" of a public good, simply 

because "economists cannot imagine a method of exclusion." 

But lighthouse owners have been routinely doing 

the unimaginabLe for years. Since lighthouse users 

mus tal so be harbor users, one method has been to make 

harbor use contingent upon the payment of lighthouse 

fee s. A I I t his pro ves, Go I din dry I y r ema r ks, "i s t hat 

economists are less imaginative than lighthousekeepers."(82) 

And insect control is also often classified 

as a public good, which generally means that the local 

government must hire an airplane or a fleet of trucks 

to spray the entire city. But, Goldin notes, there are 

actually a plethora of alternatives to such a policy. 

For example, it can simply be left up to each citizen 

to bu y his own chemi ca I s and spray his own yard. "Although 

this may be more costly than airplane spraying," 

he says, "efficiency does not depend on costs alone. 

Hand spraying allows greater diversity in chemicals, 

310

tim i n g, and ext en t 0 f s pray i ng, and rna y y i e 1d subs tan 

tially greater benefits."(83) 

Example could be piled upon example, but what is 

vi tall y impor tan t about the Goldin art icle is that he 

cogently demonstrates that in every area commonly 

assumed to be collective, and thus entailing equal and/ 

or unrestricted access for all, the method of distribut 

ion is, inac t uali t y, a rna t t e r 0 f c hoi c e, and t hat i t 

is on I y a I a ck of imag i na t i on among academi cs tha t has 

prevented them from recognizing this. 

But even if there are no goods that are inherently 

collective, this still does not mean that such goods as 

gas 0 r tel e p h 0 n e s e r v icesoug h t to· be prov idedon the 

f r e e mar k e t. For· a s Go I din f r eel y a c knowledg es, 0 ne 

may have a choice of distribution systems but the economically 

rational choice for some goods might still be 

to treat them as if they were collective. Thus, while 

i t mig h t bee0 n c e i va bleor pos s j b 1e torely 0 nthe ma r 

ket for the provision of a certain set of services, 

t his w0 u Ide n t a i I wa s t e f u 1 d upi i cat ion and s hodd Y s e r 

vice and could therefore not be practical or desirable. 

But, argue both minarchists and anarchists, this 

once again underrates the flexibility and adaptability 

ofthemark e t s y s tern and the i nge nu i t Y 0 f the rna r ke t 

particip1lnts. A free market telephone system, for 

example, is popularly depicted as lining every street 

with a plethora of telephone lines and with customers 

unable to call anyone subscribing to a competing agency. 

But, as John Hospers points out, 

no private telephone company that wanted to 

del i ver the best service at the lowest price 

compatible with making a profit would dream 

o f h a v i n g s u chan u t t e r I y c r a z y s ystem • • • 

The fa c tis, 0 f co u r s e, t hat jus t as in the 

case of water supply, private companies would 

dea I wi t h one another for thei r mutual benefit 

and prof it. Company A would make it easy 

for its subscribers to call the subscribers 

of Company B, and Company B would do the same 

for the subscribers to Comapny A -- not particularly 

because each wanted to confer profit 

s on the other one, but because that would 

be the on 1 y way to get them. If there was a 

telephone company that refused to cooperate 

with the other ones, it would get only a 

sma 11 number of subscr ibers, for one would be 

311

less likely' to subscrIbe to a company that 

could reach only five percent of the populat 

i on than to one that could reach most or a I I 

ofthem. ( 84) 

Moreover, even if the most efficient selling unit 

for s e r vic e s I ike wa t e r supply, gas and e 1e c t ric i t Y 0 r 

sewage disposai, proved to be a city block, a neighborhood 

or even an entire city, instead .of the household, 

wri ters like Rothbard and Spencer Heath MacCallum argue 

that there is no reason why the market couldn't adapt 

its elf tot his con d i t ion. ( 8 5 ) As was the ca s e for 

po 11 uti on con t r 0 1, probably the eas iest means in such 

cases would be the formation of community corporations 

or proprietary communities. A developer could make 

membership in such a corporation a condition of ownership 

in a new subdivision, or the corporation could be 

formed af t er the fact by means of covenants. The possibilities 

are numerous. The corporation could then 

appoint a single body to represent it in negotiations 

with "outside" utility firms to supply such services as 

gas, electricity, and water, either to the community as 

a whole, i.e., on an equal access basis,or selectively, 

in which case individual households would be 

charged on the basis of use. Not only are such arrangements 

possible, they are, in fact, in use now. The 

Rural/Metro Fjre Department Inc. is a private company 

that, since 1952, has contracted with Scottsdale, Arizona, 

a ci ty of nearly 100,000 people, for the provision 

of fire protection. The Rural/Metro operates at a 

prof i t and yet is able to provide its services at only 

$5.70 per person per year, or less than one-fourth the 

national average of $24.39 for cities of comparable 

size. Not only is the cost much less, but the service 

is considerably better. "Over the past 12 years the 

per capita fire loss in Scottsdale has averaged $4.44 

per year. The national average over this period was in 

the $12 range." Rural/Metro is so successful that "The 

company added three stations in 1971, five in 1972, 

s eve n i n 1 9 7 3, and e i ghtin 19 7 4 . As 0 f 19 7 6 the company 

is providing fire protection to thirteen ArIzona 

commun it ies -- in seven on a contract basis and in the 

o the r six to i nd i v i d ua I subs c ribe r s . ( Rur a I /M e t r 0 a 1s 0 

provides contract security patrol service to fIve new 

towns, and ambulance service to five communities.)"(86) 

And a recent study of private waste collection companies, 

or "refuse agglomerates" as they are called, disclosed 

that there are over 10,000 private sector refuse 

fIrms with total revenues of $3.5 billion a vear. What 

is significant is that a survey of thirty c'ities util- 

312

izing prIvate contractors revealed that: 

Cities, without exception, reported that the 

contractors had been both responsive and 

reliable. The contractor, of course, has a 

vested interest in doing a good job ••• Of 

all of the cities contacted, not one jndicat 

edt hat the con t r act 0 r had fa i 1edt 0 me e t 

the standards required••• What about going 

back to a municipal operation? Says [A. G.] 

Raymondi [Superintendent of Public Works for 

the cit Y 0 f Qui n c y, Ma s s • ] ,. "We wo u 1d never 

be able to get back to it now."(87) 

Several recent studies have disclosed that public 

colle c t ion s e r vic e s are a p prox i rna tel y f 0 u r times as 

costly as private ageneies.(88) 

But community corporations would not have to contract 

out. In "mutualistic" fashion a la Proudhon they 

cou I d, ei ther independent ly or in federat ion wi th other 

c omm un i tie s 0 reo r po rat ion s, buy the i r own capit a I 

equipment and then either operate the utilities themselves 

or hire outside firms to do so.(89) Such corporations 

might even find it profitable to sell their 

s e r vicest 0 sur r 0 unding c omm un i tie s . 0 r the c omm un i t Y 

corporations might even find it wise to combine the two 

approaches. For services in which the capital investment 

would be relatively small and/or mobile, like fire 

and gar bag e col lee t ion, a c omm unit yeo r po rat ion migh t 

wish to bring in outside firms. For if dissatisfied 

with the quality of the service they could fire the 

current firms and bring in new ones without much disr 

u p t ion 0 f s e r vice s • But the supply 0 f wa t e r, gas and 

electricity is much different. Here, the capital 

e qui pm e n t d emand e dis bot h I a r g e and s tat iona r y • On e 

could not fire one firm and hire a new one without some 

disruption of service. In thiS case, a community corpo 

rat ion mig h t fin d i t be s t to ownit sown capita 1 

equipment and either operate its own plants or hire an 

outs ide firm to run them. Numerous other possibilities 

are con c e i v a b I e and precisely wh i c h 0 n e s wo u I d preva i I 

is impossible to tell in advance. 

The libertarian wrItings on public utilities tend 

to be rather scarce and theoretically abstract. Consequently, 

I have taken these occasional and theoretical 

remarks and tried to construct various scenarios, consistent 

wIth the lIbertarian paradigm. What the foregoing 

indIcates is that, gIven the ingenuity of the 

313

market, probably fewer services than is commonly 

thought need to be suppl ied on a collective or equal 

access basis. This means that it would be practical to 

supply most of such services on a selective basis 

directly to the individual household or subscriber. 

M0 reo v e r, g i v enth e fIe x i b iIi t Y 0 f the rna r ke t, even 

those situations in which it would be more efficient or 

convenient to treat certain services as if they were 

collective, would probably not preclude their provision 

through the market. But as in earlier sections, it 

must be cautioned that to say that such a policy is 

feasible is not to say that it is desirable. This is a 

value decision that must be left up to the individual 

reader. 

Thus far we have dealt with the libertarian proposals 

for the provision of services in which the use 

of violence is absent. While we have not been able to 

con c Iud e t hat s u c h a I a iss e z f air e soc i e t y wo u I d be 

superior in every aspect to any alternative, it is 

significant that we also have not encountered a problem 

whose solution would necessitate government. That is, 

while the implementation of some of their proposals 

might render life less convenient, we have thus far not 

uncovered a flaw in the paradigm that would make such a 

society impossible or unfeasible. In short, up to this 

point the libertarian pradigm must be pronounced 

sound. It is now to the more difficult question of 

the pro vis ion 0 f s e r vicesin wh i c h the use 0 f vi 0 len c e 

is present that we now turn. 

314

FOOTNOTES 

( 1 ) Wa 1 t e rB 1 0 c k , "Free Market T ran s po r tat ion: 

Denationalizing the Roads," The Journal of Libertarian 

8 t udies ( 8 umm e r 19 7 9 ), p. 2 1 4 • 

(2)Jarret Wollstein, Public Services Under 

Laiseez FAire (Private Publisher, n.d.), p. 35. 

(3)Ibid., pp. 45-48. 

(4)Ibid., pp. 46-67. On these points also see 

John Hospers, Libertarianism (Santa Barbara: Reason 

Press, 1971), p. 359. 

(5 )Block, p. 218. 

(6)For a devastating and eXhaustive critique of 

government attempts to rationally allocate its roads, 

see Walter Block, "Congestion and Road Pricinf," 

Journal of Libertarian Studies (Summer 1980), pp. 

299-330. 

(7)See Clarence Carson, War on the Poor (New 


( 8 ) M u r ray Rot h bar d, For aNew Libe r t y ( New Yo r k : 

Ma cm ill an, 1973), p. 214. 

( 9) w0 lIs t e in, p. 4 0; and Rot h bard, New Libe r t y , 

pp. 217 -1 8 • 

(10)Robert Cervero, "Deregulating Urban Transport 

a t Ion ," The Cat 0 J 0 urn a I (S p r i n g / S umm e r 19 85 ), PP • 

236-38. 

( 11 ) B 10 c k, "F r e e Ma r k e t ,T1 Pp. 234 - 35 • 

(12)Rothbard, New Liberty, p. 205; Block, "Free 

Market," pp. 219-21. 

(13)Rothbard, New Liberty, p. 210. 

(14)Block, "Free Market," p. 216. 

(15)Rothbard, New Liberty, pp. 217-18; and 

Wi II iam Wooldr idge, Uncle 8am the Monopoly Man (New 


(16)Rothbard, New Liberty, pp. 136-38. 

(17)Murray Rothbard, Education, Free and 

Compulsory (Wichita: Center for Independent Education, 

n.d.), p. 7. 

(18) Rothbard, New Liberty, p. 153. 

(19) Ibid., p. 134; and Rothbard, Education, p. 

9 • 

(20)Rothbard, New Liberty, pp. 154-55. 

(21)Rothbard, Education, p. 13. 

(22)Richard and Ernestine Perkins, Precondition 

for Peace and Prosperity: Rational Anarchy (St. 

Thomas, Ontario: Phibbs Printing, 1971), p. 116. 

(23)See above, Chapter II. 

(24)Rothbard, New Liberty, p. 150-51. Also see 

Hospers, p. 377, and Perkins and Perkins, pp. 115-16. 

315

(49 )M. Friedman t "Playboy Interview," p. 56. Good 

historical documentation of this'tendency for the commi 

ss ions to be "captured" by the industries they regu 

1ate can b e f 0 u ndin Jar 0 1 Man n h e i m, De j a Vu ( New 

Y0 r k: St. Ma r tin t s Pres s, 19 7 6 ), e s pee i all y pp. 1 61 - 8 6 • 

Interestingly Mannheim then argues for new and stronger 

regulatory measures, including a Department of Consumer 

Affairs. 

(SO)Hospers, p. 364. 

(51)M. Friedman, "Playboy Interview,"p. 56. 

(S2)M. Friedman, Capitalism aod Freedom, pp. 

1 5 5 - 5 8 • For a n e I aborat i on of these idea s see ibid., 

pp. 149-60; Hospers, pp. 363-67; and D. Frjedman, pp. 

56-60 and 121-25. 

(53)William J. Baumol, "Reasonable Rules for Rate 

Regulation: PlauLible Policies for an Imperfect World," 

The Crisis of the Regulatory Commissions, ed. Paul W. 

MacAvoy (New York: Norton, 1970), pp. 196-97. 

(54)Edward Renshaw, "Possible Alternatives to 

Direct Regulation," The Crisis of the Regulatory 

Commiss ions, e d. P a u I W. MacA v 0 Y ( New Yo r k: Nor ton, 

1970) pp. 209-10. 

(55)See Rothbard, Mao, Economy and State (Los 

Angeles: Nash, 1970), pp. 653-58. An excellent case 

study is found in R. A. Radford, "The Economic 

Organization of a Prisoner of War Camp," Economica 

(November 1945), pp. 189-201. In WfJ II P.O.W. camps, 

R a d for d not e s, "c i gar e t t e s r 0 s e from the s tat us 0 f a 

normal commodity to that of currency." 

(56)Wooldridge, p. 54. 

(57)L. von Mises, The Theory of Money aod Credit 

(Irvington-on-Hudson: F.E.E., 1971), p. 78. Also see 

Car I Men g e r, P r inc i pIe s a fEe0 0 om i c s (G lencoe, I I I • : 

Free Press, 1950). 

(58 )Mur ray Rot hba r d, The Case for a 100 Percent 

Gold Dollar (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review 

Press, 1974), p. 2. 

( 59 ) I bid., pp. 2- 3. 

( 60 ) I bid., p. 7. 

(61)Rothbard t MES, pp. 867-71; also see L. von 

Mises, Humao Action (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), 

pp. 434-48. 

(62)Rothbard t 100 Percent, pp. 24-27. 

(63)James Rolph Edwards, "Monopoly and Competition 

in Money," The Journal of Libertarian Studies (Winter 

1982), p. 107. 

(64 )On the role of private coinage in history see 

Wooldridge, pp. 54-74. Interestingly, the Nobel Prizewinning 

economist, F. A. Hayek, has endorsed a system 

permitting private coinage of money. See his address, 

318

other ways that animals could be protected. Zoos and 

w i I d - I i f e soc i e tie s are two t hat come tom i nd • Sueh 

g r 0 ups w0 U1 d des ire toprot ectan i rna 1s for the i r own 

sake and there is no reason they could not protect 

endangered animals. Even hunting groups would desire 

well-stocked game areas. 

(75)Perkins and Perkins, p. 128. 

( 7 6 ) Rot h bar d, " Con s e r vat ion ina F r e e Ma r k e t ," p. 

113. 

( 77 ) I bid., P • 112. 

(78)E. J. Mishan, Technology an4 Growth (New 

York: Praeger, 1969), p.37. ' 

( 7 9 ) The p ion e e r i n g w0 r k on non exc 1udab iIi t yi s 

Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (New 

York: Shocken, 1965). The pioneering work on nonrivalry 

is Paul Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," 

Review of Economics and Statistics (November 

1954), pp. 387-89. 

(80)Paul Samuelson J "Aspects of Public Expenditure 

Theory," Review of Economics and Statistics (November 

1958), p. 332. For a good critique of "public goods" 

theory from a libertarian perspective see Barry 

Brownstein, "Pareto Optimality, External Benefits and 

Public Goods: A SUbjectivist Approach," The Journal of 

Libertarian Studies (Winter 1980), pp. 93-106. 

(81)Kenneth Goldin, "Equal Access vs. Selective 

Access: A Critique of Public Goods Theory," Public 

Ch 0 j c e (S p r i n g 19 7 7 ), pp. 53- 54 • Ro t h ba r d a Iso rna ke s 

the pungent comment that if a pure public good dId 

exist it would not be an economic good at all but "a 

natural condition of human welfare, like air superabundant 

to 

p. 885. 

all, and therefore unowned by anyone." MES, 

. 

( 82 ) Go I din, p • 62. 

(83)Ibid., p. 54. 

(84)Hospers, pp. 351-52. 

(85)See Rothbard, MES, pp. 883-90; and Spencer 

He a I t h MacCal I um, The Art 0 f C omm unit y (M enloPark, 

Ca I .: Ins tit ute for Huma neSt udies, 19 70 ) • 

(86)Robert Poole, "·Fighting Fires for Profit," 

Reason (May 1976), pp. 6-11. For more on the question 

of private fire companies see Wollstein, pp. 

28-31; Hospers, pp. 352-54; and Wooldridge, pp. 124-27. 

Also see Wi II iam D. Burt, Local Problems; Libertarian 

Solutions (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian National 

Corom itte e, n. d . ), Chapte r 5, pp. 1-10. 

( 8 7 ) Wi I I i a m For est ell, "Re f use Agglomera t e s: \\ hY 

Cities Use Them," The American City (April 1974), p. 

46. Many other such examples could be cited. See, for 

example, Hospers, pp. 349-50; and Wooldridge. 

320

( 88 ) See, for e x amp Ie, Rob e r t R in ger, Res tor i ng 

the American Dream (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 

pp. 118-22. 

( 8 9 ) The i de a 0 f the pro p r i eta r y comm u nit y i s 

ex c ell en t 1 Y de vel 0 p e d by Ma cCa I I urn in his TheArtot 

Community (New York: Laissez Faire Books, n.d.). Note 

here the similarity between this scenario and the proposals 

of many New Leftists and socialIsts. See, for 

example, Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government 

(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976); and Murray 

Bookchin, The Limits of the City (New York: Harper 

and Row, 1974). I do not see any incompatibility bet 

weenthe prop r i eta r y comm un i t yon the 0 ne hand 8 nd the 

operat ion of the market on the other, for such corporat 

ions, regardless of their internal structure, would 

s til I be 0 per a tin g wit h i n 8 nove r a I I f ram e wo r k 0 f 

market coordination. See, for example, Assar Lindbeck, 

The Political Economy of the New Left (New York: 

Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 93-95. 

321

322

CHAPTER IX 

Controlling Aggression: 

Anarchism's Uilique Solution 

It is at this juncture that the agreement between 

the minarchist and anarchist factions of libertarianism 

is s evered. Wh i lethem inarchis t s deny t hat the rna r k e t 

can adequately provide for the provision of police and 

c 0 u r t s e r vic e s, and the r e foreop t for a "n i g h t wa t c hrn 

an" s tate, the a narchis t sextend the irma r ketana 1ysis 

into these areas as well. The individualist anarchist 

program will be the focus of this chapter. 

1. POLICE AND THE COURTS 

a. The Rule of Law. 

Probably the most common criticism of anarchism in 

general, and one that is often directed against individualist 

anarchism as well, is that anarchism is inconsistent 

because, while its goal is liberty, not only 

liberty but even society itself is impossible without a 

rule of law. The goal of a rule of law is to let the 

individual know in advance what he may and may not do. 

By establishing formal rules applicable to everyone the 

rule of law facilitates social cooperation by reducing 

or el iminating altogether the arbitrary use of power by 

any agent in society. Not only ooes the rule of law 

faci I i tate the protection of liberty, runs the common 

argument, but liberty cannot be preserved by any other 

means. For, in the absence of the rule of law there 

would be no check on man's aggressive instincts and the 

me mb e r s 0 f soc i e t y wo u I d be p I aced at the me r c y 0 f the 

strongest, and "rights" and "justice" would be determi 

ned by him who could garner the greatest power. Might 

w0 u I d b e rig htand even t ua I 1Y the s t rongest wo u I d prevail. 

Anarchism is contradictory precisely because, 

Richard Taylor argues, "It is.•. through the legal 

order. that human freedom becomes possible." This 

means, he concludes, that "Freedom is therefore possible 

only within a legal order, or which is the same 

thing, only within a vastly powerful state."(l) 

This is probably the most persistent criticism of 

Individualist anarchism. The libertarian "rninarchist," 

John Hospers, for example, points out that "Law... is 

a necessity for any form of social organization," and 

323

then adds that "since there is no government, there is 

no law." Consequently, individualist anarehism "would 

simply be a war -- civil war --among various groups 

holding different convictions."(2) And Richard Wheeler 

argues that in the absence of a legal order "there is 

nome a n s b y wh i c h the cond i t ions t hat cons tit ute the f t 

can be established other than on the basis of individual 

arbitrary whim. In such a society any and all definitions 

of what constitutes one's property can claim 

e qua I val i d i t y, and theref 0 r e node fin i ti 0 n 0 f proper ty 

rights in such a society has any validity whatsoever." 

Thus, "if no rights are possible without property 

r· i g h t s, and no pro per t y rig h t s .are pos siblewi thou t 

legal i ty -- then in a. society that dispenses with legali 

t y, suehas t hat a d v 0 cat e d by free rna r ke t anarchism, 

no rights are possible."(3) Peter Crosby maint 

a ins t hat nthe d i I emma for the a narchistis t hat itis 

o n I yin the con t ex t 0 f a s ystem 0 f pr i rna r y law t hat a 

case for the connection between profits and morality 

can bedeve lop e d • On e migh t even a r g ue t hat the ve r y 

point of a legal system is to make sure that crime 

doesn't pay." But, "since the anarchist eschews all 

talk of law; constitutional, statutory or even common," 

there is "no way to legally guarantee anything."(4) 

The result would be chaos and/or despotism. 

This would indeed be a devastating criticism of 

individualist anarchism. The problem, however, is that 

far from oppos ing law, one finds continual references 

in individualist anarchist literature to "natural law," 

"objective law," "common law," the "libertarian law 

cod e ," etc. ( 5 ) What the a narchi s t soppose i s not 1aw 

but legislation. Not only do they recognize the crucial 

importance of the rule of law but one of their 

arguments is that legislation itself constitutes a 

violation of a true rule of law. The rule of law, as 

we have seen,. is intended to eliminate the arbitrary 

use of violence. But, the Tannehills argue that the 

dilemma of legislation is that it must make laws that 

are universally applicable and inflexible on the one 

hand, and flexible enough to apply to a wide range of 

cases on the other. Insofar as they are inflexible, 

men wi II of t en be convicted or released not on the intent 

of the law but on "nothing more than the technical 

interpretation of an obscure wording in some statute." 

But, insofar as the legi slat ion is flexible, the law 

becomes simply a grant of arbitrary power to be used at 

the discretion of the agent. Thus legislation is 

caught, or so it is argued, on the horns of a dilemma. 

The rule of law IS supposed to guide the individual in 

324

king but was a completely novel phenomenon that appeared 

only when popular sovereignty supplanted the concept 

of divine sovereignty during the seventeenth and eighteenth 

centuries.(ll) Bruno Leoni said that it was only 

o v e r the I a s t few cen t ur i es the t t he view emer ged the t 

rather than being discovered, law was a command or some 

" s 0 r t 0 f d i k t e t t hat the winn i ng rna j 0 r i tiesin the legislative 

assemblies impose upon the minorities ••• "(12) 

Historian Norman Cantor admits that the English common 

law "had no concept of eit·her legislation or royal 

authority to make law by the kingfs will." And, he 

adds, "Not unt i I the seventeenth century is the idea 

that legislation is the manufacturing of new law 

clearly formulated and grasped."(13) And Frederic J. 

Stimson stated that 

The "I a w" 0 f the A ng 10 - S a x 0 n peopIe wa s r e 

garded as a thing existing by itself •.. It 

was 500 years before the notion crept into 

the minds, even of the members of the British 

Pa r I iaments" that they could make a new 

law. What they supposed they did, and what 

they were understood by the people to do, was 

mer ely t 0 dec 1are the I a w, asit wa s the n 

and as it had been from time immemorial. 

"The notion of law as a statute, a thing passed by 

a legislature, a thing enacted, made new by a representative 

assembly," he continued, "is perfectly modern, 

and yet it has so thoroughly taken possession of our 

minds. that statutes have assumed in our minds the 

main bulk of the concept of law as we formulate it to 

ourselves."(14) 

But if law need not be a command from above, i.e., 

ei ther enacted by a legistature or imposed by a king, 

how did j t emerge and, moreimp 0 r tan t 1y, a c qui reva lidity 

for the members of the society? Both Hayek and 

Leon i have ar gued that both classical Roman civi 1 law 

and Engl ish common law were "almost entirely the product 

of law-finding by jurists and only to a very small 

ext e n t the pro d u c t 0 fIe g i s I a t ion. rr ( 15 ) "The Roma n 

j uri s t ," say s Leon i, "wa s a so r t 0 f sci en tis t: the obi 

e c t i ve s 0 f his res ear c h weret he sol uti on s to ca s e s 

that ci t i zens submitted to him for study, just as industrialists 

might today submit to a physicist or to an 

engineer a technical problem concerning their plants or 

the i r product ion. Hence, private Roman law was something 

to be described or dIscovered, not something to 

be enacted."(16) 

326

Whi Ie this no doubt took place, its extent is a 

matter of dispute and it is possible that Leoni exagg 

era t est h earn 0 u n t 0 f j udie i a} I a w- rna king by Roma n 

jurists and, accordingly, underrates the importance of 

legislation. The renowned legal historian Edward 

Jenks, for exampl e, points out that the Roman Emperor 

c I aim ed, and wa sacknowledgedt 0 posse s s, the "r i g h t t 0 

leg i s I ate." And J e n k s a r g u e s, i n fa c t, t hat leg is 1a t ion 

is a product of Roman ideas.(17) And H. F. Jolowicz 

notest hat the two for ma Iso u r ces 0 f Roma n Law we r e 

statute and professional opinion and writings; ttit is 

eve n do u b ted," he adds, "whe the r the c I ass i cal j uri s t s 

recognized custom as a source of the law at all ••• " 

However, Jolowicz goes on to point out that the import 

a nee 0 feu s tom " was i mmens e • Not on} y werethe s y s 

terns with which the revived Roman law came into contact 

themselves customary, but the medieval mind looked to 

custom as the ultimate authority in any case•••"(18) 

What eve r the rei a t ion between c us t om and leg i s I a 

tion in ancient Roman law, there can be little doubt as 

the relatively greater signficance of custom in the 

Eng lis h comm0 n I a w . This i s no t t 0 say t hat leg is} a 

t ion was tot a I 1Y a bsen t • P I uc knet t c ommen t s t hat even 

in this bastion of common law "we find a fairly cons 

tan t s t ream 0 f }e g is} a t ion, from the ve r y beg inn i n g 0 f 

authentic Anglo-Saxon legal history about the year 600 

cont inuously down to the present day." But, he quickly 

adds, thi s was generally used for "only comparatively 

t r i v i a I mat t e r s • " ( 1 9) And, a s Ca r t erand Her z po i n t 

out, 

If all legislation in England and the United 

States were suddenly declared null and void 

there would still be a body of common law and 

equity on which to depend ••• If, on the 

other hand, common law and equity were suddenly 

swept away, the basic foundation in 

bot h coun t r i es for the rules governing such 

matters as contracts, wills, trespass, or 

I i bel would be missing, except insofar as the 

r u 1 e sin the s e fie 1d s ha ve been em bod i edin 

1e g i s I a t ion. ( 20 ) 

The common law is law based on custom and tradition, 

and Pre-Norman England had a complicated network 

of "county courts" rendering decisions based on existi 

n g c u s tom s. And a I tho ugh Will i a m the Ba s tar d, 0 r 

Wi II iam the Conqueror as he was better known, appointed 

his own men to pr e ide over these courts in the elev- 

327

ficiency of the common law as the sole method of lawrna 

kin g . A c cordin g toth i.s ·c r i tic ism, the ve r yina b i 1fty 

of the judge to alter the law is not only the 

strength but also the weakness of the common law. "The 

development of case law," says Hayek, 

is in some respects a sort of one-way street: 

when it has already moved a considerable 

distance in one direction, it often cannot 

ret rae e its s t e p s whensom e impliea t ions 0 f 

earlier decisions are seen to be clearly 

undesirable. 

Fur ther, the gradual development inherent in common 

law "may prove to be too slow to bring about the 

desirable rapid adaptation of the law to wholly new 

circumstances." In such situations, not only is the 

judge, as we> have see, unable to alter the law but it 

would be undesirable even if he could, for it would be 

unjust to apply the new law 

to transactions which had taken place when a 

different rule was regarded as valid. In 

such situations it is desirable that the new 

rule should become known before it is enforced; 

and this can be effected only by 

pro m u I gat in g anew r u I e wh i chi s t 0 be 

applied only in the future. 

Consequently, concludes Hayek, while the overwhelming 

b u I k 0 f I a w 0 ugh t t 0 bethe s pon taneously emerg i ng and 

evolving common law, one cannot dispense with positive 

legislation entirely. Legislation is required to remedy 

the occasional shortcomings of the common law.(23) 

This raises a very serious question for the individualist 

anarchists for, if they are unable to find 

some way around this problem, it would appear that 

there would be no alternative to at least occasional 

legislation and therefore to some form of government. 

Yet, surprisingly, I have been unable to uncover any 

·direct attempt by any individualist anarchist to deal 

with this question. 

However, the wr it i ngs of some non-anarchist authorities 

on the common law do place the validity of 

t his c r i tic ism i n t 0 que s t ion. Wo r mserac know1e d ge s 

that theoretically the principle of stare decisi$ 

should make the common law static or fixed law that 

could be changed only by legislation. But, he contln- 

329

ues, in actuality, "the common law has been able to 

grow wi thout constant interference by legislation because 

judges have b.een able in various ways to circumvent 

disagreeable or obstructive precedents."(24) 

P I u c k net t, for ex amp Ie, 0 b s e r ve s t hat i n rna nyca sest he 

facts are such that the real question is which of 

several possible precedents or customs, or which combination 

of them, to use. This, clearly, gives the 

j u d g e s s om e I a tit u de inad apt i ng the law to new and 

changing situations, or at least guiding it away from 

clearly outmoded precedents.(25) 

Another important device for this has been noted 

by wr i ters such as James B. Scott and Sir Henry Maine. 

It "grew out of actual practice," says Scott in speaki 

n g 0 f the a n c i e n t Rom a n I aw 0 f the jus gen t i urn , and 

was "molded and interpreted in response to the needs of 

daily life." But sometimes conditions changed or unfor 

e see n sit u a t ion s a r 0 s e for wh i ch no I aw ex i s ted. 

And it was here, he says, that "theory came to the aid 

of practice." The jurisconsults looked for legal or 

phi los 0 phi cal p r inc i piescornpat i b lewi t h the pr act i cal 

common law. These principles were then used as guides 

for applying the common law in new cases as well as 

pro v j din g new i n t e r pre tat ion s 0 f ex i s ting c omm 0 n I aw 

where new situations made such law outmoded or undesirab 

Ie. The j ur i sconsul ts found the natural law aspects 

of the Greek doctr ine of Stoicism quite useful here, 

and it was in this way that the common law gradually 

became associated with natural law. "If Rome conquered 

Greece materially," says Scott, "Greece conquered Rome 

spiritually."(26) And Maine points to the simIlar 

de vel 0 pm entin the Eng lis h common law. " I t wa s ," he 

says, "taken absolutely for granted that there is somewhere 

a rule of known law which will cover the facts of 

the dispute not litigated, and that, if such a rule be 

not dis covered, itis 0 n 1y t hat the ne c e s sa r y patienee, 

knowledge, or acumen is not forthcoming to detect 

it."(27) Thus, by this "system of rationalization," 

Wormser adds, "law was found where it did not exist, 

and a I I the c I eve r device s 0 f the log i cian we r e use d to 

this end."(28) 

Qui t e c I ear I y, the for ego i n g prov ide s a wa yin 

which an anarchist common law legal system might be 

able to deal with the question raised by critics like 

Hayek. One example, say that of pollution control, 

ought to suffice to illustrate the process. The important 

point here is that not that the common law dId not 

recogn ize ownership rIghts to air space but rather that 

330

u n til r e c e n t I Y c I e a n air wa s soplen t i f u I t hat i t wa s 

not an economic good and hence the question of 

ownership rights to it never really arose. But as 

pol I uti 0 n b e c am e a grow i n g prob I em , c 1e a n air, for the 

first time, became a relatively scarce, and hence an 

economi cally val ued, good. Thus, a judicial decision 

declaring pollutants to be a violation of property 

rights would constitute not so much the creation of an 

altogether new law as simply the application of the 

existing law prohibiting violation of another's life 

and/or property into a new area, i.e., air space. It 

is also important to realize that since the decision of 

the common law judge is binding only on the immediate 

parties in a dispute, he has no power to impose his 

dec i s ionson "s 0 c i e t y • " Thus, wh e the r 0 r not s uc h a 

legal opinion would be upheld would depend largely on 

the state of both public opinion and the views of other 

judges. In this case, too, reference to the routine 

pro c e s s b Y wh i c h the t r a d i t ion a I c omm 0 n I aw handied 

such problems is of relevance here. Doubt created by 

gaps in the law, Wormser points out, were dispelled 

when fl a further case decides the point about,which the 

earl ier judge speculated. And if the judge who uttered 

the dictum was well respected, other judges after him 

might continue to follow it."(29) I see no reason why 

such an approach could not be made to work today. And 

if this is so, it should be possible to extend the 

common law into such novel areas as those of pollution 

once it is recognized that new conditions have arisen 

which required the reinterpretation of existing law. 

For if the initial decision were warmly received, it is 

likely that it would be followed by other judges and 

gradually become part of the body of law. 

But this raises an additional question: could the 

evolution of the law take place with the rapidity required 

to cope successfully with the changed circumstances? 

Legislated law is at an advantage here. It 

can literally change the law overnight. But I think 

that the speed with which the common law can change is 

often underrated. Plucknett, for example, argues that 

ntheremar k a b I e f eat ureof c us tom wasits fiex i b iii t Y 

and adaptabi I i ty. n fl In modern times," he says, fl we 

hear a lot too much of the phrase 'immemorial custom.' 

Ins 0 far as t his ph r a s e imp 1 i est hat c us tom i s 0 r 

ought to be immemorially old it is historically inaccur 

ate. n I n fa c t, PI u c k net t sa ys, a cu s tom wa s considered 

old if it had been in existence for ten to 

t wen t y yea r s, ve r y old 1 fit da ted from abo u t t hi r t y 

years, and ancient if It had been around for as long as 

331

forty years.(30) In short, while it may not react as 

quickly as legislation, I see,no reason why the pure 

common law approach could not successfully deal with 

changing situations. 

T his r a i s esan0 the r que s t ion: i f the c omm 0 n 1aw i s 

really so flexible, how can this square with the very 

certainty and stability of law that is supposed to be 

its greatest attribute? It is no doubt true that the 

art iculation of the common law into novel areas, or the 

al ter Lng of the meaning of old precedents, does create 

an element of instability. This is unfortunate and 

should bern in imized as much as possible. But it ought 

to be real i zed that the idea of a gaplesslaw is just 

that : an ideal • Even legislated law wi I 1 inevitably 

con t a ins 0 mega p s, and, as not e d earl i e r, t he un c e r 

tainty of such law tends to be compounded by the very 

process of legislating ever new or more laws. It is 

probably impossible to say precisely what is the "best" 

mix of stability and flexibilty. This is a personal 

val ue judgement that depends on many factors. What can 

be done is to indicate in a general way the relative 

strengths and weaknesses of judge-made as opposed to 

legislated law. 

The strength of legislated law is not only the 

speed wi t h wh i ch it can adap t to chang i ng ci rcumstances, 

but since it is law that is consciously created 

by a body of men and presented to the public in 

closely worded written statutes, it tends to be more 

precis e t han the comm0 n law. On the 0 the r hand, the 

m0 r e compre hen s i veon e t r i est 0 rna kea' s tat ute, the 

more likely it will be for a clause to conflict with a 

c I au s e inanot her precis ely wr itten, c losely wor ded , 

comprehensive statute, or even to conflict with another 

clause in the same statute. Perhaps more importantly, 

since the legislature created the law, it can change 

it, and change it overnight. The strength of legislated 

law is the certainty of the law it provides in the 

short run; its weakness is the instability and uncert 

a i n t y i ten t a i I s for the Ion g run. Con ve r s ely, the 

weakness of the common law is not only that it must 

adapt more slOWly to changing situations but also the 

instability that is created by the transition. Its 

strength is that because no one can repeal existing law 

or create completely new law the continuity of the 

law is maintained, thereby giving individuals the 

secur ity of knowing what the law is day in and day out. 

That is, while there is greater transitional, or short 

run, u nee r t a i n t y ass 0 cia ted wit h the c omID 0 n I aw, the r e 

332

is also far greater long run stability.(31) 

There is one final procedural problem that must be 

dealt with. Assuming that a judge in our previous example 

does hand down a decision declaring pollution to 

be a viola t i on of proper ty rights, how can the poll uter 

be held responsible for actions that were not in violation 

of the law when they were performed? This is a 

technical problem that would arise only during the occasional 

adaptations of the common law to novel situations, 

but its importance should not be ignored. There 

would appear to be no reason why a situation like this 

could not be handled in much the same way that legislation 

would handle it: do not hold the individual responsible 

for his past actions but enjoin him not to 

pollute in the future. Then, if after a stipulated 

period of time the pollution had not ceased, he could 

be held responsible for his actions and ordered to make 

restitution to those he subjected to the pollution, 

i.e., the victims. After the injunction against pollution 

became incorporated into the law and it became 

clear to everyone that pollution constituted an invasion 

of property rights, the original proviso would be 

meaningless and pollution would then be treated as a 

violation of property rights on a par with any other 

violation. 

The above remarks are not meant as a conclusive 

rebuttal to Hayek, but rather one possible avenue by 

which the individualist anarchist might respond to the 

Hayek ian c r i t i que 0 f the pur e c omm 0 n I a w a pproa c h . At 

any rate, the anarchist believes that a system of spontaneously 

emerging common law not only has many advantages 

over legislation but also that it is the social 

c 0 u n t e r par t, 0 r "twin," 0 f the i r I a iss e z fa ire e con om i c 

program. "If legislation is replaced by such judgemade 

law," argues Rothbard, 

fixity and certainty (one of the basic 

requirements of the 'rule of law') will 

replace the capriciously changing edicts of 

statutory legislation. The body of judgemad 

e 1awe han g e s ve r y s I ow 1y; fur the r rna r e , 

sin c e j u d i cia Idecis ion s can 0 n I y be rna d e 

when parties bring cases before the courts, 

and since decisions properly apply only to 

the particular case, judge-made law -- in 

contrast to legislation -- permits a vast 

body of voluntary, freely-adopted rules, bargains, 

and arbitrations to proliferate as 

333

soc i e t y • But the imp 0 r tan t poi ntis t hat wh i len0 

legal system, and particularly that of the common law, 

can long run widely counter to views dominant in the 

communit y, c omm 0 n I a w j ud i cia Idecis ion s mus t res u Itin 

a body of law establishing the protected domains of individual 

action. Consequently, the common law probably 

moves the community in a libertarian direction. 

A further point should be made. Since the common 

I a w wa s not enact e d and no i nd i v i dual or g r 0 up had the 

power to change it, the common law served as a barrier 

to power, and in particular, government power, But 

sin c e law as made by the sovereign, i. e • , the king ora 

1e g i s I a t u r e, i sacomma nd by the s 0 vere i gnand binding 

on all its sUbjects, it is no longer a barr ier to power 

but "an instrument for the use of power."(33) It is 

therefore not surprising that the anarchists find 

common law, though f I awed, fa r more acceptable than 

legislated law. Rothbard, for example, advocates 

" t a kin g the I a r gel y lib e r tar ian c omm 0 n 1aw, and corr 

e c tin g i t b Y the use 0 f rna n 's rea son, be for e ens h r i n 

ing it as a permanently fixed libertarian code or 

construction."(34) 

The problem with this position is that the common 

law must reflect the prevailing views of the community. 

Thus a "permanently fixed libertarian code" can be enshrined 

only within an overwhelmingly libertarian communit 

y • The comm0 n 1a w ma "y pus h the c omm un i t yin a 

libertarian direction, but it seems unlikely, even 

within an anarchist society, that it would ever be completely 

successful in this. There will probably always 

b e abod y 0 f tho ugh t 1a r geenough topreve n t the complete 

and permanent triumph of the libertarian code. 

The foregoing enables us to deal with the 

anarchist-minarchist debate raised in Chapter I. The 

minarchist charged that the natural rights anarchist 

placed himself in a dilemma since the institutional 

framework of anarchism rendered him incapable or protecting 

the substantive principles he purports to 

cherish. The anarchist replied that the natural rights 

minarchist was hImself in a contradiction since the 

I ibertarian "non-aggression axion" was, strictly speaking, 

imcompatible with government. Probably both are 

right: the anarchist because government is inconceivable 

wi thout at least some initiated coercion; and the 

min arc his t b e c a use therei s lit tIe do ub t t hat the common 

law would ever become the complete exemplification 

of pure 1 i b e r t.a ria n ism . Buta reformulation of the 

335

que s t ion w i I I permit us tog0 bey 0 n d t his rat her em p t Y 

answer: which system, anarchism or minarchism, is more 

I ikely to result in a more libertarian society? 

Given, on the one hand, the libertarian propensity of 

the common law and, on the other, the historical tendency 

for states to expand, I think it likely that the 

anarchist is more correct on this issue than the 

minarchist. 

b. The Courts. 

Even granting that there can be law in the absence 

of legislation, would it be possible for the common law 

to operate in the absence of government. It. is to this 

question that we now turn. 

The first thing to be noted is that the anarchist 

simply assumes that the legal order would exist within 

a lib e r tar ian soc i e t y, i. e., a soc i e t yin wh i c h the use 

of violence would tend to be justified only against 

those who had ini t iated its use. Rothbard, for exampIe, 

s tatest hat "t h e en t ire 1 i be r tar ian s ystem ineludes: 

not only the abolition of the State, but also 

the general adoption of a libertarian law code." It 

"seems clear to me," he continues, "that if the majori 

t Y 0 f the publie are not I i be r tar ians, the Stat e wi I I 

not be abolished. "(35) And likewise, David 

Friedman remarks that an lI a narcho-capitalist society 

would be heavily biased toward freedom."(36) 

It is important to recognize what is not being 

claimed here. The anarchist is not assuming that 

everyone would be libertarian, but that the environment 

would be largely libertarian. Isn't this simply 

que s t ion - beg gin g ? I s n 't he ass urn i n g precisely t hat 

which is most in need of demonstration? 

I do not think so. The popular view of law, derived 

from the "mechanical" and power-grounded philosophies 

of Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, and John Austin, 

views law as the command of the "sovere i gn" to the subjects. 

But this exaggerates both the extent and the 

effectiveness of power. Law, as the legal philosopher 

Lon Fuller correctly notes, does not operate in a 

social vacuum. Law is not so much "vertical·," i.e., a 

command from the sovereign, as "horizontal," in that 

any functioning legal order is dependent upon the 

"existence of a relatively stable reciprocity of 

expectat ions between law giver and subject..."(37) 

Much the same thing has been noted by Friedrich Hayek: 

336

I t would•.• probably be nearer the truth if 

we inver ted that plaus i ble and widely held 

idea that law derives from authority and 

rather thought of all authority as deriving 

from law--not in the sense that law appoints 

authority but in the sense that authority 

commands obedience because (and so long as) 

it enforces a law presumed to exist independently 

of it and resting on a diffused 

opinion of what is right.(38) 

Thus, while laws will tend to be obeyed so long as they 

are seen as worthy of obedience, i.e., as "legitimate," 

the decisions of the legal order will no longer be generally 

felt as binding if they are continually at variance 

with popular opinion of what is right. The American 

experience with alcohol, gambling, prostitution, 

and drug laws are obvious cases in point. I think it 

true to a point seldom realized that no social system 

of which the legal order is a major component -- can 

long endure without the, at least passive, support of a 

large majority. I therefore do not see any problem, 

for purposes of exposition, in granting the anarchist 

his initial assumption of a generally libertarian environment. 

Whether, in actuality, that point could 

ever be reached is another question altogether. 

What, specifically, would be the process by which 

the rule of law would emerge and be enforced in an 

anarchy? In the absence of government there would be 

no tax-supported and government-imposed "protection 

service." No one would have to purchase protection if 

he did not des ire it. Yet, law is obviously a good 

highly valued by most, if not all, of us. In the wake 

of the abolition of the government monopoly in this 

area, anarchists believe it is likely that, as in other 

industr ies, companies would quickly form to supply defense 

o.r protect ion services to those who want them. 

There is little doubt that this would entail some 

i nit i a I u nee r t a i n t y as. compan i e s 0 f fer e d a va r i e t y 0 f 

leg a leodes and "p rot e c t ion packages" to con s ume r s , 

although much would depend on the nature of the transition, 

i.e., radical abolition or a gradual phase outph 

a s e i n pro c e s s . But, a r guesthe f r e e rna r ketana r 

chist, there are factors that would facilitate the 

rather quick emergence of a rule of law, even in such 

"morally underdetermined areas" as legal procedures.(39) 

First of all there is what may be termed 

"economies of standardization." A plethora of conf 

I 1 C tin g leg a I cod e s w0 u 1d rna ke the provis ion 0 f de- 

337

f e ri s e- s e r vic e s bot h needie s sly i n e f fie i entand proh i 

bit ively expensive. In order for any protection agency 

to offer reliable service in such a situation, it would 

have to enter' into an extensive series of negotiations 

wi th all other companies offering different packages. 

Only in this way could it be decided which provision of 

wh i ch code would take precedence in the event of a di spute 

between its client and that of an agency offering 

a SUbstantially different package. As a result, argues 

John Sneed, 

there would .•• be a tendency for codes to 

standardize, especially in minor detail, due 

t o· con sid era t ion s 0 f t ransac t ions cos t sand 

the costs of maintaining a stock of knowledge 

of other cOdes. Di fferences in codes would 

pe r sis t on I y in those areas where the demand 

for non-standard enforcement over-rides the 

economies of standardization. These areas 

WOll ld cons i s t largely of enforcement demands 

based upon moral and religious convictions, 

which, while not irrational, can be classed 

as non-rational and not subject to profitmaximization 

behavioral assumptions. Thus, a 

substantial move toward standardization would 

occur in the treatment of crimes of violence 

and infractions of commercial codes, while 

d 1 ve r sit Y w0 u I d per sis tin the dema nd for 

mores-enforcement.(40) 

The uncertainty of the transition would be minimized 

by a second factor. Given the assumption of a 

largely libertarian society it is likely, believe the 

anarchists, that the protection packages offered would 

tend to be based on the already existing -- and largely 

1 ibertarian -- body of common law. Moreover, since all 

property would now be -privately owned, the "public 

arena" will have ceased to exist. That part of the 

existing law dealing with that arena, i.e., the nonlibertarian 

provisions, will have become irrelevant, 

leaving only those laws regulating the use and abuse of 

private property. Still assuming a libertarian society, 

it is likely that demands for non-libertarian stipulations 

on property use would be too small to make it 

profitable for most companies to include such provisions 

in their packages. Asa result, the anarchists 

bel ieve that not only would a rUle of law emerge, but 

it would emerge along generally libertarian lines. 

Would this mean that everyone, even non-libertarians, 

be forced to live according to libertarian life-styles? 

338

The answer is clearly negative. Since a libertarian 

code would contain only the injunction against the 

i nit i a t ion 0 f v i 0 lence, i two u I d permit the emergen ce 

of a complex system of voluntary contractual relations, 

or "bilateral law." Such laws would be created on the 

s pot by the i n d i v i d u a I s con C ern e d • The y wo u 1d be 

des igned to deal with a particular problem and would be 

bin din g 0 n 1 y up 0 nth 0 s e v0 I un tar i I Y bindin g thems e 1ves 

to it. And they would autoffia t i cally lose the i r val idity 

as soon as the conditions which they were designed 

t 0 d e a I wit h no Ion ge r he 1d • An ex amp lewill rna ke t his 

clear. Since the purchase, sale and consumption of 

drugs does not constitute the initiation of violence, 

there could be no proscription of these activities in a 

1 i b e r tar ian leg a 1 s ystem. Neve r the 1e s s, the own e r 0 f 

an apartment building might rent to someone only under 

the condition that the tenant agreed not to use drugs 

on the premi ses. Bi lateral law would be created between 

the apartment owner and a tenant with the signing 

of the contract or lease. This law would be binding 

on I yon the par tie s d irec t I Y can cernedand wo u 1d I a s t 

o n I y a s Iongas the i n d i v i d u a I r ema i ned atenantin 

that buiding. Since the owner has the right to set any 

condition for the use of his property that he desires, 

the violation of the contract by the tenant is a violation 

of the owner's property rights. Similarly, a 

landlord wi th a par t i cu larly acute aversion to noise 

might decide to rent only to those who agree that they 

wi II not listen to radio or television or stereo and be 

i n bed bye i g hto' c 1 0 c k eve r y n i g h t • Itis proba b I e 

t hat sue h a I and lor d w0 u I d fin d few tenant s • I f he 

were to relax his restrictions to attract more tenants, 

he would be deciding that tenants and few restrictions 

is better than no tenants and rigid restrictions. Simi 

larly, the tenants would be deciding that the contract 

offered by the landlord is a better "package" than that 

of any other landlord. In this way, the anarchist 

feels, the common law provides for the working out by 

means of voluntary contract or bilateral law an immensely 

complex and flexible set of arrangements that 

i s not 0 n 1 y a b 1 e tot reateac h ca s e on its own me r its 

but, since i t r eq u ires the vo I un tar y comm i tmen t 0 f ea ch 

and every individual concerned, must be to the mutual 

benefit of all parties. 

It takes little imagination to envision just a few 

oft h e po s sib iii tie s t hat suehal egalor de r wo u 1d permi 

t. For example,those who find capitalism Tldistasteful" 

could pool their property and establish socialist 

339

or collective communities. As Jerome Tuccile once 

wrote, nObv i ous ly, some people prefer a collectivist 

style of life and, as long as they do it voluntarily 

wit h 0 u t for c i ngot her s t 0 sup p 0 r t them, therei s no 

reason why they cannot 'coexist' peacefully alongside 

the i rca pit a lis tic ne i g h b 0 r s • Peopie co u I d then compare 

differing life styles and perhaps adapt varying 

e I erne n t sintot h e i rown wa y 0 f I i f e • n ( 41 ) I n a ve r y 

s i mil a r v e i n Ka r I He s s rna i n t a ins t hat agenera I libe r 

tar ian or laissez faire framework 

i s the 0 n 1 y for m 0 f soc i a I / e con om i corgani 

zation that could tolerate and even bless a 

kibbutz operating in the middle of Harlem, 

a hippie selling hashish down the street and, 

a few blocks farther on, a firm of engineers 

ou t to do in Det roi t wi th a low-cos t nuclear 

vehicle. 

The kibbutz would represent, in 

effect, a voluntary socialism... The hash 

seller would represent institutionalized-but 

voluntary -- daydreaming, and the engineers 

would represent unregulated creativity. 

All would represent laissez faire capitalism 

ina c t ion and non e wo u 1 d nee d a po 1 i t i ca I 

off iceholder or a single bureaucrat to help, 

hinder, civilize or stimulate.(42) 

While the foregoing may be overly fanciful, it 

. doe s ill u s t rat e what the a narchistin pa r ticu I a r, and 

the libertarian in general, believes to be the innate 

ability of a libertarian legal order to reconcile 

otherwise incompatible life styles. This raises an 

interesting question. Libertarians tend to believe 

that in the absence, or even the minimization, of the 

state the market would become all but universal; buying 

and selling would become practically the only relationship 

between individuals. I suspect, however, that 

t his i s not what w0 u 1 d hap pen • The prob I em i s t hat 

Ii ber tar ians tend to ignore the social sphere. When 

they look at society they see only the individual and 

the state and they see these as antagonistic. This is 

true in many cases, especially today. But as noted in 

a n ear lie r c hap t e r ( 43) i tis his t or i cal I y fa 1se: ind i 

vidual ism and the state both emerged with the break-up 

oft h e c omm un i t Y s t r u c t ureof the me dieval w0 rId . M0 r e 

importantly, the social and psychological dimensions of 

man tend to be ignored. This has important ramifications 

for the free market anarchist perspective of what 

340

would "naturally" prevail in the absence of statist restrictions. 

As Emile Durkheim noted in his Suicide, 

and hewa son 1yon e 0 f man y soc i 0 log i s t s t 0 rna ke the 

sam e 0 b s e r vat ion, 0 n e 0 f rna n 's rno s t fun damen t a I need s 

is that of attachment, of belonging, of security. 

Sin c e t his i s d iff i cui t t 0 a chi eve 0 nthe pur e rna r k e t , 

many peopl e, as Tucc ill e commented. simply prefer a 

col I e c t i vis t I i f e - styIe. I s us pect. therefor e, t hat a 

1 i be r tar ian 1ega lorde r wo u I d res u I t not ina so r t 0 f 

universal market permeating all aspects of everyone's 

life, but rather in a variety of communities, some of 

wh i ch wo u 1 d no doubt es tabl ish themsel ves -- or try to 

-- on collectivist or socialist principles, thereby becoming 

oases for refugees, so to speak, from the market 

system. So long as these were operated vo1untaristically, 

I do not see what the individualist anarchist 

could do about them. In fact, while libertarians might 

con d e mnit asec0 n om i cal I y i r rat ionaI, therei s nore a 

son why some propr ietary communities could not stipulate, 

say, minimum wages, or even some sort of tariffs, 

for their communities. 

But none of this, it should be cautioned, is necessar 

i Iy incompatible with the market as a coordinating 

mechanism. Exchange could still take place not only 

between individuals regardless of their attachments to 

their communities, just as "international" trade now 

takes place between individuals of two different count 

r i e s, but i t c 0 u I d a Iso t a ke p I ace between c omm un i 

ties, themsel ves, much in the "mutual istic" fashion 

advocated by Proudhon. 

In short, I think the lure of both individualism 

and the mar k e t ten d s t 0 beexa ggera ted by rna n y libe r 

tarians. People are more than economic atomatons; life 

is more than buying and selling. Rothbard is fond of 

referr ing to the market as "the natural system of liberty." 

It is certainly a wonderfUl -- and indispensable 

- coordinating agent, but I suspect that it is 

m0 rea c cur ate tor e fer tot hemarketasone comp0 

nent, albei t the most important, of the natural system 

of liberty. Since the only requirement of that "systern" 

is the principle of voluntarism, it is potentially 

compatible with any number of competing economic, and 

soc i aI, 1 i f e - sty 1 e s, s om e 0 f wh i ch wou I d no doub t be 

es tabl i shed. 

Finally, the foregoing enables us to deal with a 

persistent criticism of the individualist anarchist 

mora lis t. The legal order of such a society, goes the 

341

"Secondly and similarly, the two parties, unable to 

rea c hag r e e men t, may dec ide t 0 s ubm i t v0 I un tar i I Y t 0 

the decision of an arbitrator." This agreement, says 

Rothbard, may "arise either after a dispute has arisen, 

or be provided for in advance in the original contract."(46) 

This, too, as the anarchists are fond of 

point ing out, is a method often used in our society to 

an ex t en t not us uallyre cogn i zed • Wi IIi am Wooldridg e 

has noted that insurance companies regularly settle in 

excess of 50,000 claims each year. And in 1970 the 

American Arbitration Association 

con d u c ted 0 v e r t wen t y- two tho usa ndarbit r at 

ions. I ts twenty-three thousand associates 

avai lable to serve as arbitrators may outnumber 

the total number of jUdicial personnel -federal, 

state and local -- in the United 

States ••• Add to this the unknown number of 

individuals who arbitrate disputes within 

particular industries or particular localitie 

s, wit h 0 u t AAA a f f iIi a t ion, and the qua n 

titatively secondary role of official courts 

begins to be apparent.(47) 

T h i r d 1 y, the r e wo u I d be no pro b I em inca s e s wh ere 

both parties subscribed to the same court company or 

arbitration agency. Since both parties had contracted 

to abide by the court's decision, that decision would 

be binding. 

But what if the parties subscribed to different 

agencies? There would be no diffculty if both courts 

reached the same decision. This, argue the anarchists, 

is not as unlikely as it may seem at first glance, 

since no court company could stay in business by rendering 

unjust decisions in order to protect the illicit 

activities of its clientele. If the Smith Court Company 

acquired a reputation for protecting criminals, it 

would attract criminals as clients. But, anarchists 

ask, who would be willing to sign a contract with a 

criminal-client of the Smith Company agreeing that in 

the event of a dispute between the two individuals, it 

w0 u I d bet a ken tot h e Smit h Com pan y ? Sin c e bot h the 

Smith Company and its clients would be suspect, a nonclient 

would be willing to do business with a Smith 

Company client only if the latter signed a contract 

a g r e e i n g tot a k e a dis put e t 0 ani nd e penden t com pan y . 

Consequently, argue the anarchists, the only disputes 

that would be Submitted to the Smith Company would be 

those between its own clients. If it then rendered 

343

decisions unjustly favoring one of its clients over 

an 0 the r, i t wo u I d los e a pa r t 0 fit sown eli en tel e • In 

this way the Smith Company would be forced to render 

just decisions or go out of business. 

It is important to realize that this position is 

not predicated on the naive belief that all, or even 

most, are good or desire justice.(48) It is based, 

rather, on the proposition that no one desires to be 

s win die d • Ami g h t wi s h to s i g n a con t rae t to buy a 

piece of land from B which would include an agreement 

to take any future dispute concerning the land to an 

agency A knew would favor him. B would desire to have 

an y dis pu t e taken to a company tha t would be favorable 

to him. Since, 'Obviously, neither would agree to the 

other's terms, the transact ion could be consummated 

on 1 y i f A and Bag r eedt 0 s u bm itan y dis put e to a 

neutral agency. This means, the anarchist believes, 

that the greater a judge's reputation for honesty the 

more cases he will receive. "An arbiter who sells his 

services in a free market," comment the Tannehills, 

"knows that he must be as scrupulously honest, fair, 

and i m pa r t i a 1 a s pos sibleor no pa i r 0 f dis putant s wi I 1 

bUy his services to arbitrate their dispute."(49) 

Similarly Rothbard says that 

What k e e p s A& P h 0 n est i s the c ompetit ion, 

actual and potent.ial, of Safeway, Pioneer, 

and countless other grocery stores. What 

keeps them honest is the abi I i ty of consumers 

to cut off their patronage. What would keep 

the free-market judges and courts honest is 

the lively possibility of heading down the 

block or down the road to another judge or 

c 0 u r t i f sus pic ion s h 0 u I d des cend upon any 

particUlar one. • These are the real, 

active checks and balances of the free market 

economy and the free society. 

Consequently, he concludes, "in a totally free 

society, any suspicion of a judge or court will cause 

their customers to melt away and their 'decisions' to 

be i g nor e d • T his i s a far m0 r e e f f i c i en t s ystem 0 f 

keeping judges honest than the mechanism of 

government."(SO) 

But how would a dispute be handled when agencies 

did arrive at different decisions? If, argue the anarchi 

s t s, 0 negran t s sue h fir ms even a mod i cum 0 f Comm 0 n 

sensea n d for e s i ght, itse ern s proba b 1e t hat toprot e C t 

344

themselves and their customers from attempts by con men 

and other unscrupulous people to playoff one court 

against another for their own benefit, the various 

courts, as part of their policies, would have worked 

out a g r e em en t s wit h 0 n e an 0 the r s p e c i f ying to wh i c h 

appeals court a legal proceeding involving two differen 

t courts would be taken. Prudent ial and Metropol i tan 

Co u r t Compani es, for exampl e, may dec i de in advance to 

take all differences betwee.n them to Acme Appeals Court 

Company. But Prudential and Zenith Companies may agree 

tot a k e s uc h casest0 Que e n CityAppea 1s Cou r t Com pany • 

In th i s way the cho i ce of appeals courts would be a 

routine matter. The decision of the appeals court 

would be binding.(51) 

Finally, what of a dispute where one or both 

parties do not have prior contractual agreements and 

one 0 f the par ties ref used to s ubmitthe cas e to arb i 

tration? In the first place, argue the anarchists, 

" the rep uta t ion 0 f a rna n wh 0 ref usedar bit rat ion wit hout 

good reasons would suffer. People would hesitate 

do i ng bus i ness wi th him for fear that they, too, would 

be involved in a protracted legal dispute."(52) But 

eve n i f 0 nest i I Ire f used, the a narchis t rna i n t a ins t hat 

there is no reason why the judicial process could not 

pro c e e d . I f S mit h b r i n g s c ha r g esin Co u r t A a g a ins t 

Jones then "Court A can only invite rather than subpoena 

Jones to attend his trial. Of course if Jones 

refused to appear or send a representative, his side of 

the case wi II not be heard. The trial of Jones proceeds." 

If Court A finds Jones innocent then that 

would be binding. But if Court A finds Jones guilty 

the n Jonesca n e i the r a c c e p t the j ud gmentor con t est 

the dec i s ion by t a king itt0 Cou r t B for r e - t ria I . I f 

Court B upholds the original decision then Jones is 

guilty. But if the courts disagreed they would submit 

the matter to a previously agreed upon appeals 

court.(53) 

What if the courts do not have a prior agreement 

.and can no t agree on an a ppea I s cour t ? This i s f e I t to 

be amos t un likely occurrence. There would be a monetary 

incentive for the courts to reach an agreement. 

The i r CllS t orner s, after all, are paying them to decide 

the issue and if they are regularly unable to decide 

they will lose their clients. Moreover, if the 

Maver ick Court Company acquired a reputation for delaying 

and disrupting the proceedings, other courts would 

simply announce to their own customers that they will 

refuse to handle disputes involving clients of 

345

Maver ick. This would make individuals most hesitant to 

h a v e bus i n e s s d e ali n g s wit h the pa t ron s 0 f Ma verick • 

Hence, Maver ick's clients would be for'ced to use other 

c 0 u r t sin all 0 f the i r bus i n e s s deali ngsand Ma ve rick 

would have to either mend its way or go out of 

business. 

A t t his poi ntit mig h t be weI 1 to s u mm a r i z e 

briefly the anarchist view of the legal process: 

[1] I f two parties belong to the same court 

company, the decision 6f that court would be binding. 

[2] I f they have no contractual agreement but 

a g r e eon wh i c h compan y t 0 s ubmitthe dis put e to', the 

decision of that court would be binding. 

[3] If they subscribe to separate courts, the 

decision is binding if the two courts agree. If they 

di s8/gree they wi II subrni t the dispute to an appeals 

court, which will usually have been chosen in advance, 

and that decision would be binding. If there is no 

pr i or agr eemen t and the courts cannot decide on which 

appea I s court to take the issue to, then the individual 

parties can work out an agreement on their own. If 

this, too, cannot be done, then no decision can be 

made. This is considered most unlikely, for if a company 

continual.ly engaged in protrated and costly legal 

proceed ings, dther courts would refuse to do business 

wit hit, ca u sin g itt 0 los e rna n y 0 r mo s t 0 fit s 

customers. 

[ 4 ] I f 0 n e i nd i v i d ua Iref uses to s ubmita dis put e 

for arb i t rat ion, the 0 ther par t y rna y goaheadand submi 

t it to his company and the decision of that court 

would be binding unless the original party then submits 

his case to another court. In that case, the decision 

wi II be binding if the two courts agree. If they disagree, 

it would be submitted to an appeals court as 

described in point [3]. 

But wha t if someone pledged to abide by the decision 

of the arbitrator and then reneged? The anarchists 

believe that this would be unlikely since, argue 

the Tanneh ill s t such a man would be very unreal iable 

and 0 the r bus i n e ssm e n W 0 u I d, 0 u t 0 f the i r own self 

interest, cease doing business with him. To avoid 

ostracism it would therefore be to his interest to 

comply wi th the decislon.(54) Some empirical support 

for this proposition can be found In the Anglo-American 

346

mer c han t I a w • Mer c han t sin bothEng I and and Arne rica 

developed a system of private and voluntary law that 

wen t a cons i derable way in replacing government law in 

this area. These private courts were highly successful 

and their decisions were nearly always complied with. 

not e s Wool d rid g e. des pit e the fa c t t hat they we r e 

unenforceable in the government courts prior to 1920. 

Like their medieval forerunners. merchants in 

the Americas did not have to rely on any 

sanctions other than those they could collectively 

impose on each other. One who refused 

to pay up might find access to his association's 

arbitral tribunal cut off in the 

future. or his name released to the membership 

of his trade association; these penalties 

were far more fearsome than the cost of 

the award with which he disagreed. Voluntary 

and private adjudications were voluntarily 

and privately adhered to. if not out of 

honor. out of sel f- interest of businessmen 

who know that the arbitral mode of dispute 

settlement would cease to be available to 

them very quickly if they ignored an 

award.(55) 

And Rot h bar d bel i eve s t hat sin c e "moder n t e c hno logy 

makes even more feas i ble the collection and dissemination 

of information about people's credit ratings and 

records of keeping or violating their contracts or 

arbitration agreement." the system of voluntary justice 

would be even more effective today.(56) 

Moreover, argue the anarchists, if one still refused 

to abide by a decision the victim would "have the 

right to make whatever arrangements [he] could with 

other individuals or companies who had financial dealings" 

with the aggressor. 

P rae ticall y s pea kin g, m0 s t ban k s wo u I d no 

doubt have a pol icy of cooperating••• in 

such matters, since a policy of protecting 

ban k a c co un t s from jus t cIa i ms wo u I d tend to 

attract customers who were undependable. thus 

increasing the cost of banking and forcing 

the bank to raise its charges. The same 

would tend to be true of employers only more 

so. Most employers would hesitate to attract 

un d e pen dab leI abo r by ins e r tin g a cIa use in 

the i r employment contracts guaranteeing pro- 

347

teet ion from just claims against them.(57) 

Thus, while the anarchists feel that the use of 

retal iatory force is justified in forcing the aggressor 

to reimburse the victim for the damages caused him, 

they also believe that it would be only rarely 

required. 

c. Police Protection. 

Even granting that physical force would be 

required only occasionally, a crucial question is how 

c 0 u Ids u chas y s t em cop e withitsus e when i t wa s 

required? 

The a n arch.i s t s a r g ue t hat 0nat0 t a I I Y f r e e rna r ke t 

many defense agencies or police companies would emerge 

and provide protection services to consumers on a cont 

rae t u a I bas is. Wh i 1 e therea r e n ume r 0 us wa y s t his 

could be done, perhaps the most likely is that "such 

services would be sold on an advance-subscription 

bas is, wi th premiums paid regularly and services to be 

supplied on call."(58) The various defense agencies or 

pol ice companies would offer their services on the mark 

e t. Any i n d i v i d u a 1 couIde i the r prov ide for his own 

defense or purchase the services of one of the various 

police companies. Just as with any other good, the 

market would provide for a plethora of protection policies 

offered at different rates and designed to meet a 

h 0 s t 0 f d iff ere n t con sumerne e d s sothat thos e wh 0 

desired twenty-four-hour-a-day bodyguards could hire 

them, while those who merely desired an occasional 

nightly check of the premises could get what they wante 

d • N0 0 new0 u 1 d be for c ed, i. e ., t a xed, to pay for 

protection he did not want and everyone would be free 

to purchase the quant i ty and qual i ty of protection 

services he desired, including none at all. 

It is impor tant to real ize exactly what the anarchi 

s t s are referr i ng to wh enthe y s peak 0 f con t raeting 

for protective services, for there has been much confusion 

on this issue. Charles J. Wheeler, for example, 

says that the anarchist is opposed to government 

because "the government must be a coercive monopoly, 

which logically entails the initiation of force against 

would-be compet i tors to remain in existence." Since 

anarchists are opposed to this monopoly they therefore 

must have "no objection to a society that has more than 

one institution, i.e., several, that enforces rules via 

ini tiatory force••. Free market anarchism posits... 

348

a SOcIety, not in which no institution can initiate 

force, but in which any institution can initiate 

force."(59) This is surely a misinterpretation. With 

the sin g leex c eDt ion 0 f 0 a v i d Fr i e dma n, f r e e rna r ke t 

a narc his m s tar t s from the nat u r a I law pos i t ion t ha t 

eve r yon e has a righ t to his own I i f e and tothe f r u its 

of his own labor. It follows, they believe, that 

everyone has a right to defend his life and property. 

This he can do either himself, or by contracting the 

services of another. Since specialization results in 

both cheaper and better services, anarchists believe 

t hat the a g en c i e sspe cia 1 i z i ngin s uc h s e r vice s wo u 1d 

be the primary means by which protection would be handled. 

But when one contracts the services of a police 

com pan y t hi s me an s t hat "the agen t rna y t a k e any act ions 

whie h the man hims elf wo u I d ha vether i g h t tota ke but 

may not do anything which the man himself would not 

have the right to do. ."(60) Since no one has the 

fIght to initiate the use of violence, police companies 

could not legally use violence against noninvasive individuals 

and could be sued if they did. If companies 

e i the r i nit i ate d for ceo r pro t e c ted thos e wh 0 did, 

"they would not be competing agencies of retaliatory 

force at all. Rather, they would be criminal gangs 

pur e and s imp 1 e • " ( 61 ) Thus, wh i 1e Wh eel e r i s cor r e c t 

in pointing out that anarchists view government as a 

coercive monopoly, he is incorrect in stating that they 

oppose government because it is a monopoly. They have 

no objection to non-coercive monopolies, i.e., those 

monopolies that maintain themselves by providing better 

services at cheaper prices than any competitor. They 

oppose government because it is an agency of initiated 

force. Consequently, as Louis Rollins points out, far 

from advocating a society in which any individual or 

agency has the right to commit aggression, free market 

a narc hismad v 0 cat esa" soc i e t yin wh i c h no ins tit ution 

holds any authority to commit aggression."(62) 

The only exception to this is the alternative propo 

sed by Oa vi d F r i e dma n • Sinc e F r i e dma n i s aut iii tar 

ian rather t han a nat ur a 1- righ t sadv0 cat e , he takes the 

pos i t ion tha t pol ice and court companies would enforce 

those "laws" which were most profitable. There would 

s til 1 bear u 1 e 0 f 1aw, he fee 1s, sinc e not even rna ny 

"murderers would wish to live under laws that permitted 

the m t 0 k ill and b e k i I led . " Conseq uen t 1y, s uchIaws 

as those prohibiting murder and other common crimes 

would arise in every society and any agency that simply 

sold "justice by deciding in favor of the highest 

bidder" would be driven out of business. "That would 

349

e sUIcidal," Freidman says, for "unless they maintained 

a reputation for honesty, they would have no customer 

s - - u n I ike 0 u r pre sen t j u d ge s • " F r i e dma n fee I s 

that since most people "are willing to pay a much higher 

price to be left alone than anyone is willing to pay 

to push them around," the "laws of an anarcho-capitalist 

society should be heavily biased toward freedom." 

Whi Ie acknowledging that his system might well lead to 

I a ws pro h i bit in g the use of dr ugs, even on one's own 

property, or to laws discriminating against racial 

minor i tie s , he feels that this wo u Idre sui t in addicts 

or racial minorities leaving areas where they were discr 

iminated against. A resident of Los Angeles might be 

willing to pay a high price to obtain laws against 

drugs in Los Angeles, but he "would have little to gain 

by paying a much higher price to have heroin illegal in 

New York, as well." The result would be a complex netw0 

r k 0 f s epa rat e C omm unit i e s repres entingamu I tit ude 

of individualized life-styles and all dispersed in such 

a faShion as to insure their autonomy. Thus, Friedman'S 

exception to the natural law prohibition of acts of 

i nit i ate d for c e i s not a s g I a r i ngas i t rna y seem a t 

first blush.(63) 

Several arguments have been advanced against the 

idea of competing police agencies. An examination of 

these, together with the anarchist responses, will 

serve to clarify several important aspects in the prop 

0 s a Ito pro v ide .pol ice s e r viceson the rna r ke t . Th e s e 

arguments are as follows: 

[1] The argument that either a "minimal 

s tat e " 0 raMa f i a Age n c y wo u I d erne r ge 

through economic competition. 

[2] The argument that a Mafia Agency would 

emerge through aggression. 

[3] The argument that selling defense 

services on the market would be both 

inconvenient and unjust. 

[4] The argument that domestic peace is a 

"public good" which cannot be supplied 

on the market. 

Each of these will be examined in turn. 

[1] The Competition Argument. 

350

Phi losopher Robert Nozick, as we have seen in 

Chapter I, maintains that the system of competing protect 

ion agencies will give way to single "dominant protection 

agencies," or DPAs, operating in geographically 

distinct areas. This is due to the nature of the service 

being offered. Nozick believes that the degree of 

protection any agency can provide varies positively 

with the s i zeof the agency. Thus, as one agency 

begins to prosper, individuals will clamor to join. As 

the income of the compet ing agencies declines, the 

scope and qual i ty of the protect ion they can offer 

likewise declines. The competing agencies, he says, 

get "caught in a declining spiral," and the result is 

the emergence of a DPA. 

Nozick believes that the DPA should proceed to 

provide protection services to everyone in its geographical 

area. It would therefore become a minimal, 

or "nightwatchman," state.(64) But philospher John 

Hospers argues that the agency could also use its 

dominant pos i t ion to victimize rather than to protect 

"its" clients. "Perhaps the most important assumption 

of all," says Hospers, 

is that there would continue to be a group of 

defense agencies (and courts) which would 

remain competitive. This is indeed one way 

in which the scenario could be written. But 

there are other ways. Suppose that one 

agency became so superbly efficient•.• that 

it became la rger than any of the other agencies, 

and continued to grow larger with time, 

until it had, say 99% of the business for a 

thousand miles around••• We would then have 

a defense agency grown so swollen with success 

that it could do just what it liked: it 

co u I d t urn in t 0 a c rim ina I g an g. • • Th is 

wou'ld be in fact, if not in name, a military 

takeover. And the result would be again in 

fact if not in name, a government -- an 

aggressive bandit government.(65) 

In response, the anarchists note that Nozick and 

Hospers envision the emergence of a number of dominant 

agencies whose areas of operation are geographically 

distinct. But if the advantages of being a client of 

the dominant agency are so irresistable, and if, as 

N0 z i c k commen t s, "e con 0 m i e s 0 f sea 1e U are posit i vel y 

correlated with increased size, the Uthe protection 

agency of optimal size will include the whole world." 

351

Apparently, says Lawrence Moss, 

something imposes a limit on the expansion of 

a single protection agency in a given geog 

raphiea 1 area • If, for examp1e , the rna rginal 

cost of adding individuals to the protection 

agency rises, there may come a point, 

wi t h r is i ng average cost, at which the marg 

i oa I sacr i f ice of pr i vate goods ·as percei ved 

by the choice-making individual is greater 

t han the mar gina I ga i n inse cur i t Y• At t his 

poi 0 t.. the 0 p t i rna 1 s i z e for the pro t e ction 

agency has been achieved.(60) 

In the United States today there are approximately 

40,000 pol ice forces, ranging in size from one man to 

3 0 tOO 0 men. Eve·n i f the 0 p tima lee0 nom i c s i z e 0 f a 

pro tee t ion age n c y weresuc h t hat the rna r ke t wo u I d not 

support 40,000 agencies, the anarchist believes that 

therei s nor e a son t 0 sup p 0 s e, s h 0 r t 0 f rna king the 

unrealistic assumption that average costs will steadily 

decl ine as the size of the agency increases, that this 

will lead to the emergence of a dominant agency. 

The empirical evidence appears to support the anarchist 

on this issue. According to conventional wisdom 

the consolidation of many of the 40,000 departments 

would result in much more efficient and effective police 

service. This wisdom was placed in considerable 

doubt, however, when several recent studies, such as 

thosed 0 n e 0 fIn d ian a pol is, I n d iana; Grand Ra p ids, 

Michigan; St. Louis, Missouri; and Nashville-Davidson 

County, Tennessee, all indicated that relatively small 

pol ice forces were not only more efficient but also 

more economical. In summarizing the findings of a 

nation-wide study conducted at Indiana University, 

Vincent Ostrom wrote: 

our colleagues found that most statistically 

significant relationships ran contrary 

to the hypothesis that an increase in the 

s i z e 0 f j uri s die t ion wo u 1d be pos i t i ve 1y 

ass 0 cia ted wit h h i g her 1eve 1 s 0 f po lice 

performance. In examining different size 

ranges they found that for the smaller size 

range, service levels increase with the 

city size to an optimum size of approximately 

20,000 for suburban communities and 

100 , 000 for c en t ere i tie s . Beyond t hes e 

sizes, the relationship reverses so that 

352

large SIze is associated with lower levels 

of performance.(67) 

But i f 1 a r g e j uri s die t ion s are e con om i c a I I Y and 

socially irrational, they would not be supported on the 

free market. And if that is the case, the scenario 

depicted in the Nozick-Hospers critique could not 

o c cur. Not 0 n 1 y i s the r e no e con om i ereas 0 n to 

expect the emergence of a dominant agency, if the 

foregoing studies are correct the optimal size might be 

such tha t the number of agenc i es opera t i ng in the 

te?ritorial United States would actually increase. 

[2] The Aggression Argument. 

Another criticism is that there would be nothing 

to prevent an agency from using force to conquer or 

absorb weaker agencies until it attained a position of 

u n c h a lIe n g e d d 0 miance, wh i chiteou 1d thenuse to ex 

plo it its subjects. In contrast to the previous objection, 

the Mafia Agency would achieve its domiance 

through aggression rather than economic competition. 

While not specifically directed at anarchism, this is 

the cr iticisrn that George Berkley and Douglas Fox raise 

against any decentralized political system. Germany's 

Weimar Republic, they point out, rested on a federal 

ba s e. Mos t German s ta tes out lawed the Naz i Par ty, but 

Bavaria did not. "This gave the Nazis a sectional base 

on which to build. Then, when they did become a 

nationwide movement, they found that the individual 

governments of the states ••.were each too weak to curb 

their frequently unruly and unlawful tactics. There 

were thirty-three police forces in Germany at the time 

and the Nazi Party soon became stronger than anyone of 

them." In contrast, the French government was centralized 

and acted with vigor. With a single police force 

for the entire country it was able to take decisive 

act ion a g a ins t the a t t emptedNa z iand Corom un i s t t a ke 

overs of 1934.(68) 

T his i san i n t ere s tin g c r i tic i sm. Wha tis the 

.anarchist reply? The anarchist believes that the forego 

i n g ish i g h I Y un I ike I y and rna i n t a ins, in fa c t, t hat 

violence, or any use of force, would probably decline 

in an anarchy. What is the basis for this conclusion? 

The anarchist begIns with the assumption that most 

people are opposed to aggression. "In a profound 

sen s e ," remark s Rot h bar d, Tl nos 0 cia I s ystem, wh e the r 

anarchist or statist, can work at all unless most 

353

people are 'good' in the sense that they are not all 

hellbent upon assaulting and robbing their neighbors. 

If everyone we're so disposed, no amount or protection, 

whether S tat eor private, could succeed in staving off 

chaos."(69) . 

Starting from this assumption, i.e., that while 

nearly everyone desires protection only some will desire 

aggression against others, he be.1ieves that those 

companies most adept at providing protection will get 

the bulk of the protection business. But the moment 

any agency turned from attracting customers by providing 

protection services to coercing individuals into 

buying its policies, it would simply "compel them to 

buy prot e c t ion fromit scornpet itor sand d r i ve itself 

out of business."(70) If an agency initiated violence 

against individuals who were not its customers, continues 

the anarachist scenario, it would be forced to deal 

wi t h the i r defense agencies. Since other agencies are 

paid toprot e c t the ireu s t ome r s wh i lethe a g gres s i ve 

organization is paid to terrorize others, it would find 

itself in direct confrontation with all other agene 

i e s • This W 0 u I d rna ke wo r kin g for the c rim ina I agenc y 

increasingly risky and it would have to pay its employees 

more money to compensate for this. Aggression 

would become correspondingly less profitable and therefor 

e 1 e s sat t r act i ve as the inc rea sed cos t s tot he 

criminal company compelled it to raise its premiums. 

The victims of theft, argues David Friedman, 

will b e will i n g t 0 pay m0 ret 0 be pro t e c ted 

than the thieves will pay to be able to steal 

(since stolen goods are worth less to the 

thief than to the victim). Therefore the 

noncr iminal protection agencies will find it 

profitable to spend more to defeat them. In 

e f f e c t, the c rim ina I s fig h t a hope I e s s wa r 

with the rest of society.(71) 

Further, since the defense agencies are paid to protect 

their clients from aggression, they would have no reason 

to cooperate with the criminal agency. Even if the 

criminal agency had its own "court," it is unlikely 

that its decisions would be heeded, for any other court 

honor ing the decisions would begin to lose its own customers. 

Finally, since insurance companies indemnify 

their policy-holders against the destruction or theft 

oft h e i r pro per t y, a n arc his t s a r g ue t hat the y wo u 1d 

have a "vested interest in seeing that values are prot 

e c ted and a g g res s i v e v i ole n c e h e I d t 0 ami n i mum. " 

354

"Coercive acts are destructive of values," note the 

Tannehills, "and value-destruction is expensive for 

insurance companies." Consequently, not only would 

insurance policies "probably specify certain standard 

protective measures which the insured must take in 

order to buy at the lowest rates -- burglar alarms 

connected to the defense company's office, for 

example," but 

Policies would also state that the insured 

mus t buy hi s protect ion from a defense agency 

which met the standards of the insurance company, 

to avoid having him hire an inefficient 

or fly-by-night defense agency at a cheap 

price while counting on his insurance to make 

up for any loss which their ineffectiveness 

caused him. 

Thus, it is held, 

Insurance companies, without any resort to 

physical force, could be a very effective 

f act or i n b r i n gin g an un r u 1y de fenseage n c y 

to its knees via boycott and business ostracism. 

It would be difficUlt, indeed, for 

any defense company to sur v i vei f the major 

insurance companies refused to sell insurance 

not only to it, but to anyone who dealt with 

it. Such a boycott would dry upa major part 

of the defense company's market in short 

order; and no bus iness can survive for long 

wi thout customers. There would be no way for 

a defense agency to break such a boycott by 

the use of force. Any threatening or aggress 

i v e act ion s towa r d the ins u rance compan i e s 

involved would spread the boycott as other 

bus i n e ssesandind i v i d ua Isat t empted to s t a y 

as ,far away from the coercive agency as 

possible.(72) 

The p 0 S sib iIi t Y 0 f col Ius ion am 0 ng s ever a 1 agen - 

,cies would not alter the situtation. The anarchist bel 

ieves that there would be numerous agencies operating 

in the protect i on area. We have seen that there are 

goo d rea son s, bot hana 1y tica 1 and em p i ricai, for t his 

bel i ef. Thus, even if a Mafia Cartel were formed, the 

pre senceofin d e pendentage nc i e s wo u 1d mo s t ass ured 1y 

bring about its quick collapse for the reasons already 

discussed. 

355

The anarchists contend that this particular criticism 

is actually far more app,licable to gove nments 

than anarch i es. An anarchy would be character zed by 

multiple centers of power. But the state, w th its 

monopoly on the use of force, is characterized by a 

single center. Since it would be much easier for a 

tyrant to take over a single center of power than 

multiple centers, "the objection that a tyrant might 

take over is actually a devastating, argument against 

government."(73), Further the anarchist argues that 

those who argue for a state on the ground that the 

pol ice companies might ban together to obtain a 

monopoly on the use of force are inconsistent, for what 

they are rea lly saying is that we should have a state 

bee a use a n archis m mig h t res u I tin the emerge nee a f a 

state.(74) 

In short, anarchists argue that the prospect of 

society being victimized bye Ma f i a Police Agency or 

even a Mafia Cartel is quite remote. Moreover, given 

the expected negative returns on aggression, the free 

market anarchist believes that both the crime rate and 

the use of force would be well below what it is in our 

statist society. 

The foregoing argument is difficult to evaluate. 

Anarchism is not a panacea. Problems would exist and 

the poss i bi I i ty of a Maf ia Agency cannot be entirely 

dismissed. But this possibility must be placed in pers 

pee t i v e • Jus t a s the r e c 0 u 1 d beerim inalor Ma f i a 

.agencies in an anarchy, so there could be, and as the 

widespread pol ice and government corruption clearly 

shows, there are, state and city police departments 

that can only be termed criminal.(75) It is significant 

that since citizens have no alternative to these 

pol ice agencies, there are no, or only weak, checks on 

police corruption and victimization. If so, one would 

expect to find less police corruption in a system in 

which police services were offered on a private basis 

and in which individuals could take their business 

elsewhere than in a system where competition is absent. 

The empirical evidence on this issue is, of course, 

min i ma I. However, the c losest examp leof a compietel y 

private, autonomous police agency is the Protection 

Section of the American Railway Association. This 

"Section" was studied by Jeremiah Shallou for the 

Amer ican Academy of Political and Social Science in the 

1930' s, when it constituted a force of over 10,000 men. 

The record compiled by the railway police, or "private 

arm i e s" asS h a I lou c a lIs them, wa s not h i ng I essthan 

356

incredible. Between 1919, when they were organized, 

and 1 9 29, when S h a I lou's stu d y wasund e r t a ken, the y 

S lJ c c e e d e din red u c i ng f rei gh t c I aim pa ym e n t s for robberies 

from $12,726,947 to $704,267 per year, or by 

97.7%. And their percent of arrests turning into convic 

t ion s was I i kew i s e phe nom e na I : regu I a r I y 0 ve r 80% • 

But what par tic u I a r Iyin t eres ted Sha I lou wa s the compor 

tmen t of the ra i lway agents themselves. "The fact 

that so few complaints have been directed against 

them," says Shallou, "is eloquent of the efficiency 

with which they are controlled by the railroads. In 

Pen n s y 1 van i a .the s tat e exere i s e s no con t r 0 1 whateve r 

over these pol ice••• Rai lroad police are responsible 

to the company by which they are employed and paid, and 

to no one else."(76) And as William Wooldridge 

pungently notes: 

Shallou's reference to the railway police's 

widespread reputation for good character and 

high ability contrasts with the present stat 

u s 0 f rna n y big- citY pub I i c for c e s: san c t ions 

against misconduct are so ineffective or 

roundabout that they may as well not exist, 

however theoretically comforting the forces' 

status as servants of the people may be.(77) 

The foregoing by no means "proves" that criminal 

agencies would be non-existent in an anarchy. But it 

does serve to put this criticism into perspective. 

Criminal agencies might exist in an anarchy. But one 

must not forget that they do exist in today's statist 

societies. The important question is which system is 

more likely to result in a greater amount of criminal 

act i v i t Y on the par t 0 f t h os e who are ex p e c ted to 

u Phoi d the I a w ? The a narchis t s ha vemad e a ered i b I e 

case. And if a competitive system automatically works 

to minimize the incidence of corruption and criminality 

b y the pol ice, i t wo u I d I i kew i s e wo r k tom i n imi z e the 

possibi'lity of would-be dictators, of contemporary 

Hitlers, from gaining the "Bavarian base" they require 

to launch their programs. 

[3] The Inconvenience and Injustice Argument. 

In addition to his argument that the provision of 

defense services on the market would lead to the emergence 

of a dominant agency, Nozick contends that the 

knOWledge that one is I iving in a society permitting 

individuals to engage in acts of "private justice" 

would produce insecurity. A protection agency, he 

357

says, may therefore forbid even nonmembers from engaging 

in acts of self-defense against clients of the compan 

y pro v ide d "t he c lien t s 0 f the prot e c t i ve agen c y • • • 

compensate the independents for the disadvantages imposed 

u p 0 nthem by be i ng proh i bit e d self - he 1penfor c e 

ment of their own rights against the agency's clients." 

Compensat ion would be in the form of "protective services 

to cover those si tuations of conflict with the 

paying customers of the protective agency."(78) Since 

competition would ostensibly reduce the number of protective 

agencies, and since the principle of compensat 

ion permit s the d om inan t proteet i ve agenc y t 0 for bid 

even nonclients (including their agencies) from defendi 

n g thems e 1 v e s pro v ide d the y r e c e i v e compensa t ion, 

N0 z i c k fee Ishe has pro v ide d a jus t i fica t i on for a 

minimal state. 

Nozick's criticism is two-fold: the practical consider'ation 

that such a society would be most inconvenient, 

and the moral proposition that such types of nonaggressive 

act ivi ty as "self-help enforcement" can be 

forcibly prohibited provided compensation is granted. 

As noted above, the anarchists deny that their society 

wou I d be i nconven i ent. On the contrary, they bel ieve 

that since no one could legally initiate force for any 

reason and s i nee er ime would not pay, there would be 

considerably less need for punishment of any kind, 

"private" or "public," and thus little need to fear it. 

Further, since everyone would be held responsible for 

the actions he performs, accidents, excessive use of 

for c e, etc., W 0 u I d,. not r e c e i ve imm unit y because they 

occurred in the "pursuit of justice." As the Tannehills 

note, "In the process of collecting from the aggressor, 

the victim (or his agents) may not carelessly or viciously 

destroy values belonging to the aggressor or 

take more from him than the original property (or an 

equivalent value) plus costs occasioned by the aggress 

ion • " ( 7 9 ) I fanyin d i v i d ua lor em p loye e 0 f a 

defense agency did 

negl i gently or aggressively apprehend individ 

u a 1s, the imp r 0 per 1y de t a i ned i nd i v i d ua 1 rna y 

c h a r get h e de fen sea g e n t employe e withaggression 

or negligence. The mistakes by defense 

agents will be covered by the insuring 

bonding company. Under these conditions, a 

d e fen sec 0 mpan y w i I I not ret a inan em p loye e 

making an unreasonable number of mistakes, 

because the cost of insuring such personnel 

would soon become prohibitive for them. There 

358

i s t h us an aut oma tic pr 0 tee t ion 0 find i v i d ua I 

rights as well as protection against "police" 

brutality, which cannot occur in a legal 

society.(80) 

Two fin a I poi n t s s h 0 u I d bema de inth i s con t ext • 

First, its supporters hasten to point out that anarchism 

does not necessarily mean that every individual 

nee d pro v ide for his own defenseat a I I times • I tis 

en t ire I y con c e i va blethat Iand lor d s wo u 1d supply the i r 

tenants with police protection just as various other 

util i ties are usually supplied now. Insurance compani 

es, anx i ous to keep crime rates down, might provide 

protect ion to their subscribers as part of their policies. 

And the owners of var ious business complexes 

such as shopping centers or downtown areas would have 

to rna i n ta in safe and pleasant surroundings in order to 

attract customers to their stores. Any number of other 

scenarios are possible. 

And second, not only would protection be better 

and more convenient in an anarchy but, they contend, 

since government operations are inherently inefficient 

due to the absence of the market, they would be much 

less expensive as well.(81) 

As for the moral consideration, 

distinction," says Randy Barnett, 

"The crucial 

is while voluntarily paying a purchase price 

makes an exchange permissible, compensation 

does not make an aggress ion permissible or 

justified. It is not permissible to deprive 

you 0 f f r e e s p ee c h pro v ided I "com pensat e " 

you. You would have the right to defend 

yourself. If you were unsuccessful, unable 

or unwilling to defend yourself, you would 

then, in add it ion, have a right to compensation. 

Put in more analytic terms, voluntar 

iness is a necessary condition for a 

morally permissible exchange of values. Compensation 

is not a sufficient condition for 

justifying or permitting a violation of 

rights.(82) 

The compensation argument is easy to evaluate. If 

one believes in natural rights, aggression is impermissible, 

regardless of whether compensation is offered. 

T heo the r issues are more difficult. Assuming the 

ex i s t ence of a clear rule of law, and gIven the advan- 

359

tages of specialization, it seems reasonable to suppose 

t hat 8 c t s 0 f "p r i v 8 t e jus tice" wou I d be few and fa r 

between and, wh e n pe r formed, wouI d be done wit h a fa i r 

degree of care. If so, the possibility that such acts 

could occur should generate little insecurity. 

One fin a 1 ques t ion t hat i s reI e vantat t his po i n t 

i s what 0 f the i n d i v i d ua 1 wh 0 i s too po0 r topur c has e 

pro t e c t ion? W0 u 1 d h e 0 r she be for cedt 0 go wit h0 ut 

protection? It must be admitted that this is 8 possibi 

1 i ty. Al though it is to be lamented, it should be 

b 0 r n e i n min d t hat it" i s not un i que tothe f r e e rna r 

ket ar rangement ••• There have always been groups of 

people in human society who have been inadequately protected 

by their governemnts."(83) Few can contend that 

American blacks or Russian Jews receive adquate protect 

ion from the i r g 0 v ernmen t s • Mo reover, i f the a na r 

chist is correct and the incidence of poverty would 

decl ine in an anarchy while the provision of protective 

services on the market would be cheaper than the current 

tax-based monopoly, there would be very few who 

could not afford protection. Finally, as one anarchist 

wrote, there is nothing to prevent a poor individual 

from getting "together with others in a similar situation 

to cooperatively provide the most important of 

defensive services, in a protection association."(84) 

For a I 1 0 f th e s erea s on s , the f ear t hat the poor 

w0 u I d r e c e 1 ve inad equa t e pro t e c t ion wo u I d not a ppea r to 

be a s e rio u s pro b 1 em. I tis 1 ike I y t hat they wo u 1d 

recei ve as much protection as they do now from government, 

and probably more. 

[4] The Public Goods Argument. 

A very common view is that "law and order," or 

"domest ic peace," is a "public good." This means that 

it cannot be broken down into marginal units and sold 

on the market. One individual cannot obtain order or 

peace without others also obtaining it, i.e., it is 

nonexcludable. We have already noted the Olsonian 

argument that individuals will have little or no incentive 

to contribute to the provision of a nonexcludable 

good. This means that if it were provided voluntarily, 

through the market, it would be supplied only suboptimally, 

if at all. Hence, coerced contributions, i.e., 

taxes and a government, are necessary for its 

provision. 

John Sanders has taken up the Olsonian gauntlet. 

360

that i tma k e s little difference whether an individual 

punished for say, rape, is ac.tually guilty of the 

crime. Since punishment is justified on the ground 

t hat i t w i I Ide t e rother s from comm itt i ng c rimes, the 

act u a I g u i I t o:r inn 0 c e nee 0 f the per son be i ng pun ishe d 

is, strictly speaking, irrelevant. 

I t i 's precis ely t his aspe c t 0 f de t err ence, i. e • , 

sacr i f icing one individual for the good of others, that 

the natural rights anarchists find objectionable. These 

anarchists therefore reject deterrence and justify punishment 

of criminals on the grounds of either retribution, 

i.e., that the individual deserves to be punished, 

or restitution, i.e., that the individual violated 

someone else's rights and therefore ought to provide 

compensation to his victim. 

A difficulty for the natural rights anarchist, 

howe v e r, i s t hat itis dub i 0 us wh e therei the r pa r a d i gm 

can, in itself, afford a complete and satisfactory 

set 0 f p r inc i pie s for d e t e r min i ng wh en, and to wh a t 

extent, punishment is justified. Since all anarchists 

incorporate some form of restitution into their paradigms, 

we will examine this proposal first. The principle 

that the criminal ought to pay compensation to 

the vict im so as to restore the latter, as closely as 

possible, to the position he occupied prior to the 

c rime, i s qui tea t t rae t i ve • Howe ver, s eve r a I a r g ume n t s 

have been raised against it. 

It is some times argued that murder presents a dilemma 

for the restitutionist: since the victim is deceased, 

how can the criminal possibly make restitution? 

The restitutionist replies that restitution is owed the 

victim. Since he can't collect, it rightfully belongs 

to his heirs. Yet another criticism of restitution is: 

how can 0 ne pos sibI Y be so ca I lous as toplac e a "g0 i ng 

rat e " 0 r "ex c hange val ue " 0 n a huma n I i f e ? Tothis the 

restitutionist responds by pointing out that there is, 

in fact, a "going rate" now. The only difference is 

that now it is set in time rather than in money or services. 

The rea I problem, says Randy Barnett, is "one 

of incommensurability": 

Just as there is no rational relationship between 

a wrongfUlly taken life and ten years 

in prison, there is little relationship between 

that same life and twenty thousand dollars. 

Still, the nature of this possibly insoluble 

puzzle reveals a restitutional ap- 

362

proach theoretically superior to punishment. 

For it must be acknowledged that a real, tang 

i b 1 e los s had 0 c cur red. • • Re s tit uti 0 n provides 

some tangible, albeit inadequate, compen 

sat ion for per son a lin j u r y • Pun i s hme n t 

provides none at all."(87) 

Another common fear is that if compensation would 

de t e r min e the limito f f us t i f i a b 1 e pun i s hme nt, the 

"cost" of the crime to the criminal would be practical 

1 y nil: if one gets caught steal ing $100 then the only 

justifiable punishment would be to return the $100. 

Even worse would be a situation in which A fires a gun 

at B with the intention of murdering him. But A, being 

a bad s hot, miss e s Ban d mer e 1· y b rea ks his wind ow • 

Wouldn't compensation limit punishment to replacement 

of the window? And if A's shot were completely errant, 

would A then get off with no punishment at all? Since 

s imp 1ere s tit uti 0 n, a c cor din g tothe c r i tics, wo u I d 

place the criminal in a "no lose" situation, it would 

actually encourage crime. Restitutionists object to 

this conclusion. "The goal is not the suppression of 

crime," says Barnett·, ·"it is doing justice to victims." 

And full compensation, no more and no less, is what the 

victim is entitled to. But, he points out, total costs 

are act u a I I Y qui t e h i gh • " I n add i t ion toeom pensat ion 

for p a inan d s u f fer i ng, the c rim ina I mus t pa y for the 

costs of his apprehension, the cost of the trial and 

the legal expenditure of both sides."(88) But what of 

the case of attempted murder? The restitutionist might 

res po n d t hat B did s u f fer dama gesand they we r e qui t e 

severe: he had the wits scared out of him. The damages 

would also include B's anxiety from knowing that unless 

A were apprehended and punished he might try again, and 

th i s time wi th better results, at least from A's point 

of view. A would not be punished in order to deter him 

from f u t urea t tern p t s t 0 k i I I B, a I t ho ugh t hat rna y be 

one 0 f .its con seq u enc e s • Ra ther, B wo u I d beentit led 

to compensation for the severe psychological damages 

caused by A. 

But theres til Irerna ins atIeas t the po s sibiii t Y 

t hat the nat u reo f the c rim e W 0 uIdse em to dema nd a 

punishment more severe than that permitted by restitution. 

Attempted theft would be a good example. Since 

nothing was stolen and since it is ordinarily unlikely 

that the same "criminal" will try to rob the same "victim" 

more than once, there would be no physical damage 

an d ve r y lit tie ps ychologi ca I damage. Such cases appear 

to contain an asymmetry between the amount of 

363

This doe s I' a i sea n i n t ere s tin g que s t ion. Who 

would receive the "second tooth," i.e., the excess 

between the full compensation received by the victim 

and the full penalty paid by the criminal? The victim 

would be entitled to the first tooth but surely not the 

sec 0 n d • But i f not the vic tim, then wh 0 ? I nth0 s e 

rare asymmetric cases where the penalty stipulated in 

the 1ega I cod e e x c e e dedthe victim's compensat ion t I 

see no reason why it could not become common practice 

for a judge to award any excess to The Salvation Army, 

the Uni ted Negro College Fund, The American Diabetes 

Association or some other charitable or nonprofit 

organization of the victim's choice. Under such a 

proposal, the viet im would receive full compensation, 

the c I' i min a I wo u I d I' e c e i ve his full pena I t y, and ye t 

neither party would benefit from criminal activities. 

We can now examine the proposal for the operation 

of prisons. What if the criminal either refused or was 

unable to make restitution? "If the aggression were 

not of a violent nature and the aggressor had a record 

of trustworthiness," the Tannehills maintain, "it might 

be sufficient to leave him free and arrange a regular 

s c h e d u leo f paymen t s, jus t a s wo u I d bed0 n e for any 

ordinary debt." But, they continue, if the person were 

untrustworthy or found guilty of a violent crime, some 

confinement would probably prove necessary. In a statist 

society the criminal is placed in jails operated by 

the state. It is obvious that in the absence of the 

state, jails would have to be operated privately and 

t hat, 0 f co u r s e, mea n son apr 0 fit / los s basis. How 

would such a system operate? 

The viet im, according to the anarchist scenario, 

could handle his case on his own and, through the 

courts, arrange wi th the criminal a regular "schedule 

of payments." But since this would be inconvenient and 

time-consuming for him, the anarchist believes that 

m0 s tin d i v i d u a I s w0 u Idinsur e thems e I vesaga ins t v i 0lence 

and would thus be immediately indemnified by the 

insurance company in the event of a'loss. Since the 

company would then assume the loss theerim i na I would 

now owe the company. In such a case, argue the anarchists, 

Because it would be in the insurance company's 

interest to have the aggressor's reparations 

installments as large as possible, it 

would have him confined to no greater degree 

than his own actions made necessary, since 

365

mar k e t p r inc i pie s tothe prob I ern 0 fag gres 

sion provides a built-in rehabilitiation system. 

This is in sharp contrast to governmentrun 

prisons, which are little more than 

"schools for crime," where young first 

offenders are caged with hardened criminals 

and there is no incentive or opportunity for 

rehabilitation.(91) 

S uchi s the a n archis t 's view 0 f the n p r i son s y s 

tern." Could it work? Jails are very expensive operations 

and the feasibility of such a system would depend 

largely on whether the earning power of criminals would 

be enough to (a) make reparations, (b) provide a profit 

for the penal agency and (c) leave enough left over to 

support the criminal and, perhaps, his or her spouse 

and children. In some cases the answer would no doubt 

be yes.(92) But since criminals are not generally 

known for their marketable skills, it is debatable 

whether profit-oriented prison companies could sustain 

themselves. But market arrangements are amazingly 

flexible. It could well be that insurance companies 

would either operate penal agencies themselves or provide 

some of the operating funds to particular penal 

agencies on a contractual basis. The interesting thing 

about this possibility is that it would probably not 

require higher insurance premiums. This is because the 

ability to confine dangerous or unreliable criminals 

would drastically reduce the default rate on restitut 

ion payments. Those insurance agencies that were not 

able to confine such criminals would no doubt find them 

evading payments by "skipping town." Since it would be 

forced to charge premiums high enough to cover the loss 

from its high default rate and the cost of reapprehendi 

n g thesecrim ina Is, itis qui t e pos siblethat prem i urn s 

charged by insurance companies operating prisons would 

be the same as, or even lower, than those that did not. 

It is a'lso conceivable that companies like Holiday Inn 

and Best Western might find it profitable to diversify 

into this area. Or, if prisons were in chronic financial 

difficulty it might be possible to distribute the 

"excess" in asymmetric cases among. these companies 

instead of awarding them to charities. No doubt other 

possibilities could be found. 

A stateless society, as its critics point out, 

would no doubt contain risks. But that is the nature 

of life. Anarchy is a method of social organization. 

It is not a utopia. Crime would not completely disappear. 

People would still be robbed and murdered. al- 

367

is rigorously limited to the individual 

criminals. We may judge for ourselves how 

many wars or conflicts in history have met 

this criterion.(93) 

While the "bow and arrow could be used for aggressive 

purposes. it could also be pinpointed to use only 

against aggressors," he continues. But "Nuclear 

weapons, even' conventional' aerial bombs, cannot be. 

These weapons are ipso facto engines of indiscrimininate 

mass destruction••• We must, therefore, conclude 

that the use of nuclear or similar weapons, or the 

threat thereof, is a sin and acrime against humanity 

for which there can be no justification."(94) Thus, 

contemporary states, with their panoply of modern 

weaponry, can "protect" their citizens only by exposing 

them to the perpetual risk of total annihilation. 

Also important for the anarchist is the fact that 

modern wars are (a) financed by taxes and/or inflation 

and (b) fought by conscripts. This means, that war can 

be waged only by governmental aggression against the 

states' own citizens. Hence, far from the state protecting 

its citizens it is actually the citizens who 

are both duped, by pleas to defend the "fatherland" 

from the "foreign aggressors," and forced, by taxes and 

conscription, into defending the state and its ruling 

group. "A State can only 'die' by defeat in war or by 

revolution. In war, therefore, the State frantically 

mobilizes the people to fight for it against another 

State, under the pretext that it is fighting for 

them."(95) In short, maintains the anarchist, the view 

that the state is necessary to protect its citizens is 

a myth. 

But how could such a society defend itself against 

foreign aggression? Anarchists believe that it is possible 

to defend the nonstate in the same way that they 

see 0 the r pro b 1 ems be i ng handIed: the rna r ke t • Jar ret 

Wollstein argues that private defense companies could 

raise capital by selling "defense bonds" and repaying 

the p r inc i pIe and i n t eres t from reven ue 0 b t a i ned by the 

sale of either products or rights to inventions resulting 

from technological spin-offs.(96) Even granting 

that private companies would operate more efficiently 

than governmentally operated defenses, it is doubtful 

that the number of technological spin-offs would be 

enough to cover the costs, must less to leave enough 

left over for profit. The same problem would apply to 

Da v i d F r i e dman's s u g g est ion t hat a I lor pa r t 0 f the 

369

cos t s of na tiona I defense would be funded by such devices 

as tipping and charitable contr"ibutions.(97) 

Another proposal is that "because of the close natural 

connection between insurance companies and defense 

agenci es, it would probably be most feasible to sell 

defense against foreign aggression in the form of insur 

a nee pol i c i e s • " ( 9 8 ) The ins uran c e company 0 r companies 

would then provide for defense out of the proceeds 

from the sale of their policies. But the problem 

wit h t his is, as Da v i d F r i e dma n po i n t sout, 0 the r i nd i 

viduals in the same geographical area would be protected 

even though they were not insured, or were insured 

by a compet ing company which would not have to pay the 

expense of actually providing defense services and 

could therefore offer lower rates. Hence, the national 

defense insurance company would lose its customers and 

go bankrupt. (99) The same problem exists in the proposal 

that national defense could be provided by the 

agreement of local 'police companies to pool part .of 

their resources to finance the development of national 

or at least regional defense equipment, for any agency 

concerning itself solely with local police protection 

could avoid the additional costs and force the other 

agencies out of business by charging lower rates. The 

fatal flaw in these proposals is that national defense 

isac0 lIe c t i vego 0 d • I teannot bed i v idedin t 0 rna r 

gin a I unit san d t his, i n t urn, rna k esit d iff i cui t t 0 

see how i t c 0 u I d b e sup p 1 i e d b Y any 0 f the rna r ke t 

oriented alternatives.(lOO> 

Moreover, the very concept of "national defense 

agencies" is difficult to reconcile with natural 

rights. Natural rights anarchists argue, of course, 

that these defense companies could never be used 

aggressively since "No army could grow beyond what the 

market would support, and the market would never support 

an army larger than was actually necessry for 

defense, because force is a non-productive expenditure 

of energy."(lOl) Yet, as Rothbard has pointed out, 

"the old cliche no longer holds that it is not the arms 

but the will to use them that is significant in judging 

matters of war and peace. For it is precisely the 

characteristic of modern weapons that they cannot be 

used selectively; cannot be used in a libertarian 

manner." (102) Since the destruction wrought by modern 

weapons is so devastating that it could not be restricted 

to the aggressors, a national defense company 

would inevitably murder innocent individuals if it 

utilized such weaponry. But it would probably be unable 

to defend its clientele if it did not. Thus, 

370

national defense agencies strike me as being not only 

imp r act i c a I but from the na t ur a I righ t s po i n t 0 f view 

jus t a s i mm 0 r a 1 a s the s tat e • W0 u I d therebe any me a n s 

to defend the nonstate if the concept of national 

defense companies were abandoned? 

Two mea n s by wh i c h de fenseaga instinvas ion migh t 

be effected are nonviolent civilian defense and guerrilla 

warfare. Nonviolent civilian, or nonmilitary, 

d e fen s e i s d e fin e d a s a s t rat e g y wh i c h "a i ms t 0 de f eat 

mi 1 itary aggression by using resistance by the civilian 

popUlation as a whole to make it impossible for the 

enemy to establish and maintain political control over 

the country."(103) As such it does not depend upon the 

defense of physical terrain from enemy occupation but 

on passive resistance to enemy rule by the civilian 

populatione It is based on the belief that all governmental 

power must ultimately come from the consent of 

the governed, that "so long as the citizens remain firm 

and refuse to cooperate and obey, the real power lies 

with them."(104) Nonviolent defense is actually an 

integral part of the anarchist tradition going back at 

least to Etienne de La Boetie in the sixteenth century 

and including anarchists as disparate as William 

Godwin, Leo Tolstoy and Benjamin Tucker.(lOS) But how 

would such defense proceed? 

Gene Sharp points out that an invasion is not an 

end in itself but a means to a higher end. This end 

must be one of two goals: (a) to eliminate the fear of 

invasion by striking first, or (b) to occupy the 

invaded territory for economic or political purposes. 

Since it would be impossible to use the civilian 

d e fen s e for a g g res s i v e pur p 0 s e s, i t wo u I d not 0 n I y 

dis pel the bel i e f by an 0 therna t ion t hat a coun try employing 

a civilian defense could constitute a threat, 

but it would also eliminate the possibility of a 

nat ion, desiring to wage an aggressive war against such 

a country, using the time-honored excuse of defending 

itself from an imminent attact by striking first. Conseq 

u e n t I y, any nat ion i n vadin g a coun try em p loy i n g a 

civilian defense would brand itself as the clear 

a g g res s 0 r for bot hitsown cit i zensand a I I the W0 rId 

to see. 

While a civilian defense would have no means to 

stop an invasion from taking place, it is designed to 

prevent the invader from obtaining the objetive(s) for 

which the invasion was made. This would be done by the 

refusal to cooperate with the invader and/or by the use 

371

of obstructionist tactics such as mass strikes in occupations 

like communications and transportation, the 

blocking of highways and airports with thousands of 

abandoned automobiles, the refusal of police to make 

political arrests, etc.(106) 

This would have a number of ramifications. First, 

it would force the invader either to abandon the invasion 

or to crack-down on the resistance. If he chose 

the latter he would lose even more support in the world 

community. More importantly, the increasing use of 

repression and violence against individuals who were 

clearly innocent and nonviolent could provoke a moral 

and p s c Yhoi 0 g i cal dis 0 r i entat ion am 0 ng the i n vad e r ' s 

soldiers charged with carrying out the repressions 

against the civilian population. This might not only 

cause the soldiers to question the justice of their 

c a use and, u I timate I y, tor e f use toea r r you t the i r 

orders, it might also prompt others, perceiving the 

clear immorality of the invasion, to join the resistance. 

Second, the cost of the massive numbers of 

soldiers required to contain and crush the resistance 

could well outweigh the economic or political benefits 

of the invasion, particularly if the population refused 

to work for the invader. In such a case, the invader 

co u I d be fa c e d wit h no a I t ern a t i ve but go i ng home. 

Th i sis not to suggest that nonviolent defense is easy. 

On the contrary, death tolls could be considerable, although 

no doubt well below those wrought by a conventiona 

I mil it ary defense. And the fact that all of the 

casualities would be suffered by the civilian populat 

ion would no doubt take a heavy psychological toll on 

the members of the civilian defense. This is a problem 

unique to nonviolent defense and one that must be taken 

into account by any proponent of such measures. But, 

as Gene Sharp has noted: 

There" are many instances of effective 

non-violent action, including: the early 

res i s tan c e b y Ame rica ncoIon i s t s, 17 63- 177 5 ; 

Hungarian passive resistance vs. Austrian 

rule, especially 1850-1867; Finland's disobedience 

and political noncooperation against 

Russia, 1898-1905; the Russian 1905 Revolut 

ion, and t hat 0 f Feb r ua r y 1917 (be for e the 

October Bolshevik coup); the Korean nonviolent 

protest against Japanese rule, 1919-1922 

(which failed); the Indian 1930-1931 independence 

campa i gn; German government-sponsored 

res 1 s tan c e tot h e F ran co- Bel g i urn 0 c cupa t ion 

372

of the Ruhr in 1923. 

Later examples include: resistance In 

several NaZI-occupied countries, especially 

Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark; governmen 

1 a I and popu I a r me as ures 10 null i f Y an t i 

JeWIsh measures in several Nazi-allied and 

Nazi-occupied countries, such as Belgium, 

I ta I y, France, and Denmark; the toppl ing by 

popular noncooperation and defiance of the 

die tat 0 r s 0 f E 1 Sal va d 0 ran d G ua t ema I a in 

1944; the 1963 and 1966 campaigns of the 

Buddhists against the Saigon regimes in South 

Vietnam.(107) 

Whi Ie civi I ian defense has no guarantee of 

success, it should not be cavalierly dismissed. It 

has, unfortunately, been given scant attention by the 

anarchists although it could prove one possible means 

of defending the nonstate, as well as the method most 

in accord with their moral principles. 

A sec 0 n d p 0 s sib iii t y, g u err i I I a wa r far e, s h 0 u I d 

also be considered. Guerrilla forces seldom win military 

battles. But they are capable of winning wars and 

ous t ing invaders, provided they are able to retain the 

support of the community. Guerrilla wars are not won 

militarily but, as Andrew Mack has observed, by means 

of the progressive attrition of their opponents' political 

capacity to carryon the war.(I08) This is 

a C com p lis h e d by mea n s 0 f apr 0 t r act e d wa r, i n wh i c h 

the insurgents' goal is to provoke the invader into 

escalating his military commitment. As the war drags 

onandin ere a s esin cos t, b 0 1h h uma nand rna 1e ria I, the 

fact that the war would probably force cutbacks in the 

production of consumer goods a1 home, together with the 

fact that it was being fought against a country that 

p 0 sed not hrea1, co u I d res u I tin the ernerge nee 0 f pol i 

tical 'divisions in the invader's horne country. These 

divisions could hamper the war effort and, in time, sap 

the i n va de r 's wi I Ito prosecute the wa r to a suec e s s f u I 

conclusion. The guerrilla has a fairly good chance of 

WIn n i n g pro v ided he i s a blet 0 fig htaprot rae ted wa r • 

As Henry Kissinger has aptly put it, "the guerrilla 

WIns if he does not lose; the conventional army loses 

if it doesn't win.TI(I09) 

Th is too might prove to be a method for defense of 

the nonstate. In contrast to civilian defense guerril 

I a war far e w0 u I d ern ploy v i 0 len ce, but 1he fa c t t hat i t 

373

w0 u I d ' be 11m i ted and co u I d be d i r ec ted a ga ins t the 

actual invaders would mean that, it could be justified 

as self-defense and thus reconciled with the libertarian 

anarchists' moral code. 

Could either of these two actually provide a 

viable defense for an anarchist community? Neither, of 

course, can guarantee success. But the same is true of 

conventional military defense. And against conventional 

forces nonviolent defense has had'both successes and 

defeats; the same is true of guerrilla warfare. 

The ado p t ion 0 f e i the r de fen s e wo u I d, howe ve r , 

pose special problems for an anarchy. In"particular 

would be the problem of organization and training. Adv 

0 cat e s 0 f non v i 0 len t de fen seemphas i z e the grea t degree 

of discipline and sacrifice that must be endured 

by nonviolent "soldiers" for it to have any chance of 

s u C c e SSe ( 11 0 ) Wh e t her ind i v i d ualsin a soc i e t y wh i c h 

emphasized, not sacrifice, but individual gratification, 

and which was not able to utilize the statist 

device of conscription, could be induced to endure the 

sacrifices, discipline and training required for the 

s u c c e s s f u Idevel 0 pme n t 0 f sueh t act i csis dub i 0 us, a I 

though Gandhi, it should be noted, did utilize nonviolence 

in both South Africa and India without the aid of 

conscription. A similar problem exists for guerrilla 

warfare. While it does not require the large-scale 

coordination that nonviolent defense does, it does 

demand a great deal of endurance and sacrifice on the 

part of individual guerrillas. 

There is a second, related difficulty. National 

defense is, by its nature, a collective effort. What 

incentive would an individual have to participate in 

e i the r t y p e 0 f defen s e ? On e 's own con t ributi 0 n tothe 

overall effort would be minimal. The rational course 

for each individual to pursue would therefore be to 

avoid the risks and seer ifices by not participating. 

In brief, given the discipline and self-sacrifice entai 

led in any defense effort, it is dubious whether any 

society based on the principle of individual satisfaction 

could present a viable defense. 

Thesea r ewe i g h t Y con sid era t ion s w h i c h co u I d , 

conceivably, render such strategies unfeasible in an 

anarchy, especially one in which the principle of individual 

satisfaction was so basic. But man is far 

from unidimensional, and I am constantly amazed at the 

wi II ingness, even desire, of individuals to participate 

374

in, even sacr i f i ce themselves for, a cause or an abstract 

concept like "justice," "freedom," or "democracy." 

As many have noted, causes such as "defense 

against foreign aggressors," can and often do produce a 

feeling of exhilaration and a spiritual uplift in 

people. It frees people from the monotony of their 

daily routine, and the plea for a "total effort" 

infuses even those in the lowliest of jobs with a sense 

of great importance.{lll) The American home front duri 

n g W0 rId War I lis a c I ass i c i I Ius t rat ion • Ma r t ha 

Byrd has recently observed that everyone wanted to "do 

something, anything, to help." And "the government 

responded to the ci t i zens' need for involvement" by 

encouraging various kinds of sacrifices: the buying of 

war bonds, the growing of vegetable gardens, the collect 

ion of scrap metals, the use of car pools, longer 

working hours, reduced travel, fewer vacations and the 

I ike • The res u 1 t ? " M0 r a I e wa s h i g h ." "A fee ling 0 f 

being needed," she says, "contributed to a gratifying 

sen s e 0 f wo r t han d par tic i pa t ion ina common endea vor 

gave intense satisfaction to many."(112) 

Th is is no t to say that there would be a footrace 

to the sacrificial altar. Certainly many would not 

participate and some would even become quislings. But 

i tis 1 ike 1 y t hat rna ny wo u 1d pa r tic i pat e • Wh e the r i t 

would be enough to constitute a successful defense is 

impossible to say. Since the success of non-violent 

defense hinges on mass participation, even a moderate 

number of abstentions would jeopardize the tactic. But 

sin c e g uerr ill a war far e doe s not d e pendon rna s s i ve 

citizen participation its viability would not, ipso 

faeto, be undermined by the presence of a moderate 

number of non-participants. 

The problems of national defense presents a most 

difficult problem for the individualist anarchist. The 

bel ief in some sort of national defense company is not 

only difficult to reconcile with the libertarian moral 

code but is also based on the misperception that 

national defense can, like any other good, be divided 

.into marginal units. Hope does seem to lie in reliance 

on ei ther non-violent civilian defense and/or guerrilla 

war fa r e • 0 f the two, the I a t t e r s t r ike s me as ha v i ng 

the greater probability of success. That an anarchist 

society could successfully defend itself from a determined, 

ruthless foreign aggressor cannot be guaranteed. 

But, of course, the same holds true for the statist 

society. 

375

Such are the individualist anarchist responses to 

the major issue area. In contrast to traditional anarchi 

s t the 0 r y, wh i chi s some times based on the rat her 

na i ve bel ief that the abol it ion of the state would also 

mar k the dis a ppearanceof rna ny 0 f the un s a v 0 r y aspe c t s 

of human nature, free market anarchism is premised on 

the much less demanding proposition that while some may 

be wi II i ng to cheat, no one wishes to be cheated. Not 

only does this constitute a significant departure from 

traditional anarchist thought, but it is a far more 

credible basis' for social organization. It represents 

a new and challenging chapter in the history of 

anarchism. 

376

(38)Hayek, p. 35. 

(39)See Robert Nozick, Anarehy. State and Utopia 

( New Y0 r k: Bas i c Bo 0 ks, 19 7 4), for a c r i t i que 0 fana r 

chism from the "underdetermined areas" perspective. 

For a go 0 d rep I y to th is po i n t of view see Er i c Mack, 

"Nozick's Anarchism," Anarchism, eds.: J. Roland 

Pennock and John Chapman (New York: New York University 

Press, 1978), pp. 55-58. Also see John Sneed, "Order 

Wit h 0 u t Law: Wher e Wi I I the Ana r chi s t s Ke e p the Ma dmen?", 

Journal of Libertarian Studies (Spring 1977), 

p. 122: "The rules of evidence would tend to standardize 

quickly in minute detail, although the admissibilit 

y and wei g h t g i ve n totape r ecordin gs, hea r say, po I ygraph 

••• and other questions of this magnitude would 

probably not be resolved to all companies' satisfaction. 

In the absence of agreement between the companies 

as to the rules of evidence or procedure, the arbitrator 

would generally settle that dispute also, and in 

effect set his own rules." 

(40)Sneed, p. 121. Also see Friedman, pp. 155-64. 

(41 )Jerome Tucci lie, Radical Libertarianism (New 

York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 66. 

(42 )Kar 1 Hess, The Death of Politics (New York: 

Laissez-Faire Books, n.d.), p. 17. Also see the 

excellent elaboration of these possibilities by the 

minarchist, Robert Nozick, pp. 297-374; and Spencer 

Mac Ca I I um, The Art 0 f Communit y ( Men loPark, Ca 1 • : 

Institute for Humane Studies, 1970). 

( 4 3 ) S eea b 0 v e , Chapter I I I , Section 4 • Also see 

Robe r t Nisbet, The Quest for Communi ty (London: 

Oxford, 1953), and his The Sociological Tradition 

(New York: Basic Books, 1966), especially pp. 47-220. 

(44)Jeffrey Paul, "Anarchism and Natural Rights" 

( Pap e r pre sen ted a t the Ame rica n Ass 0 cia t ion for the 

Philosophic StUdy of Society, October 6,1977), pp. 

2-3. This issue is also raised in John Hosper's 

art i c 1 e " Will Rot h bard's Fr e e Ma r ke t Jus tice Suf fiee ? 

No," Reason (May 1973), p. 18. 

( 45 ) This, I t h ink, is wha t Ro t hba r d mean t by his 

statement that "1 see no reason whatever why anyone 

should worry about the consent of criminals to their 

jus t pun ishmen t • " In"Will Rot h bar d's F r e e Ma r ke t 

Justice Suffice? Yes," p. 25. 

(46)Murray Rothbard, "Society Without a State" 

(Paper delivered before the American Society for Polit 

i ca I and Legal Phi losophy, \\ashington, D.C., December 

28, 1 9 7 4 ); rep r i n ted inAn 8 r chi s m, e d s .: J. Ro I and 

Pennock and John Chapman (New York: New York University 

Press, 1978), pp. 191-207. 

(47)William Wooldridge, Uncle Sam the Monopoly 

379

Man (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1970), p. 101. 

(48)This, for example, is the charge made by 

Winston Bush. See his "Individual Welfare in Anarchy," 

Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy (Blacksburg, 

Va.: Center for the Study of Public Choice, 1972), pp. 

5-18. Bush posits two "models of individual behavior": 

The Hobbes ian and the Proudhonian. In the Hobbesian 

model, of course, man is egotistical and, in the absence 

of government, life is "nasty br-utish and short." 

In contrast, he says, "the Proudhonian conception is 

based on the fai th that, once freed from the constraints 

of social rules, individuals will develop 

their mutual talents and live in harmony one with another." 

Since Bush insists on imputing this straw-man 

model to anarchists, it is not really surprising that 

h e fin d sanarchis m unsat i s fa c tor y • Few, i fan y a na r 

chists--including Proudhon--actually take this position. 

See, for example, the comment by the Tannehills, 

p. 73: "a man who refused to pay his debts is a poor 

bus i nessri s k, and insurance companies would undoubtedly 

cooperate in keeping central files listing poor 

risks, just as credit associations do today. If his 

default were serious enough, no one would want to do 

business with him ••• In a free society, men would soon 

dis co v e r t hat h 0 n esty withothersis a s elf ish, mo r a I 

necessity!" 

(49)Tannehill and Tannehill. 

(SO)Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty (New 

York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 245-46. 

(51)This is found in nearly all individualist 

anarchist literature. But especially see Sneed, pp. 

117-24. 

(52)Tannehill and Tannehill, p. 75. 

(53)Rothbard, "Society without a State." 


(55)Wooldridge, pp. 100-01. 

(56)Rothbard, "Society without a State." 


(58)Rothbard, Power and Market, p. 4. 

(59)Wheeler, p. 403. 


( 6 1 ) Jar ret W0 I 1ste in, " Soc i e t y wit h0 ut Co e r c ion, " 

Soc i e t y Wit h 0 u t Go v ernmen t ( New Yo r k: Ar n 0 Pressand 

the New York Times, 1972), p. 2. 

(62)Louis Rollins, "Symposium: Is Government 

Necessary? IV. Reply to C. J. Wheeler," The 

Personalist (Spring 1971), p. 403. 

(63)Friedman, pp. 155-78. Also see Nozick, pp. 

29 7 - 37 4, for the 0 utI i n e 0 f a s imil a r f r amewo r k for 

autonomous communities. Despite the similarities, 

380

Nozick is a natural rights advocate. 

(64)See Nozick. 

( 6 5 ) H0 s per s, "W i I I Ro t hbard's F r e e Ma r k e t Jus tice 

Suffice? No," p. 21. 

(66)Lawrence Moss, "Optimal Jurisdictions and the 

Economic Theory of the State: Or, Anarchy and One-World 

Go v ernmen tareon 1yeo r n e r Sol uti 0 n s ," Pub1 i c Ch 0 i ce 

(84)Ibid., pp. 155-56. 

(85) Ibid., pp. 157-58. 

(86)The paradigms are discussed in Gordon Tullock, 

"Does Punishment Deter Crime?", The Public Interest 

(Summer 1974), pp. 103-11; Marc Plattner, "The Rehabilitation 

of Punishment," The Public Interest (Summer 

1976), pp. 104-14; John Hospers, "Some Problems about 

Punishment and the Retal iatory Use of Force, Parts I 

and I I ," Reason (November 1972 and January 1973), pp. 

1 4 - 2 0 8 n d 1 9 - 2 6, res p e c t i vel y; A I a n Bentand Ra I ph 

R 0 s sum, Pol ice. Crim ina 1 Jus tiee 8 n d the Comm un i t Y 

(New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 143-88. Restit 

uti 0 n isspee i f i cally dis c ussedin Ra f fa e 1e Ga r 0 fa 10 , 

"Enforced Reparation as a Substitute for Imprisonment," 

Considering the V·ietim, eds.: Joe Hudson and Burt 

Galloway (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1975), 

pp. 43-56. 

(87)Randy Barnett, "Restitution: A New Paradigm of 

Criminal Justice," Ethics (July 1977), p. 292. 

(88)Ibid., ppe 296-98. 

( 8 9 ) T his i s dis c u sse d by Ch a r I e sKi n g, "A 

Rationale for Punishment," The Journal of Libertarian 

Studies (Spring 1980), p. 159. 

(90)Tannehill and Tannehill, pp. 126-27. 

(91)Ibid .. Also see Sneed's excellent outline, 

pp. 122-23. 

( 9 2 ) See, for exampIe, Ro u I Tun ley, "Ma king P r i son s 

Pay," Reader's Digest (June 1979), pp. 49-56; also 

see "P r 0 f i 1 e Swe den," i n Co r r e ct ions Magaz i ne (June 

1977), pp. 11-37, and especially pp. 22-25: "Inmates 

.Work for Free Market Wages at Tillberga Prison." Also 

See Kat hIe n e J. 8m i t h, "A euref0 r Cr i me ," Conside r inIt 

the Vietim, eds.: Joe Hudson and Burt Galloway 

(Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1975), pp. 

340-50; and Gilbert Cantor, "An End to Crime and 

Punishment," The Shingle (May 1976), pp. 99-114. 

(93)Murray Rothbard, "War, Peace and the State," 

Ega 1 i tar ian ism As a Revol t Against Nature, and Other 

E s say s ( Was h i n g ton, D. C.: Lib e r tar ian Review Pre s s , 

1974), pp. 71-72. 

(94)Ibid., p. 75; and Tannehill and Tannehill, 

pp. 126-27. 

(95)Rothbard, "War, Peace and the State," p. 79; 

and Tannehill and Tannehill, p. 127. 

(96)Wollstein, pp. 24-27. 

( 97 ) See F r i e dma n, p. 192. 


( 99 ) F r i e dma n, p • 128. 

(100)in ibid., pp. 191-92. 

(lOl)Tannehill and Tannehill, p. 132-133. 

382

(102)Rothbard, "War, Peace and the State." p. 73. 

(103)Gene Sharp, "National Defense without 

Armaments." Peace and War, eds.: Charles Beitz and 

Theodore Herman (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 

1973), p. 352. 

(104)Gene Sharp, quoted in American Friends 

Service Committee, In Place of War (New York: 

Gr 0 s srna n, 19 67 ), P • 44. 

(105)Etienne de La Boetie, The Polities of Obedience 

(New York: Free Life Editions, 1975); William 

Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice 

(Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976), especially 

pp. 255-66; Benjamin Tucker, Individual Liberty 

( Mil 1wood, NY: K r a us Re p r i nt, 19 7 3 ), pp. 7 6 - 81; and Leo 

T 0 1 s toy, 0 n C i viI Dis 0 bed i enc e and Non- Vi olenee ( New 

York: Signet, 1968). 

(106)Sharp, p. 352; also see Gene Sharp, Exploring 

Nonviolent Alternatives (Boston: Porter-Sargent, 

1971), p. 64. The literature on nonviolent tactics is 

quite extensive. In addition to those works already 

cited see Mulford Sibley, ed., The Quiet Battle 

( B 0 s ton: Be a con Pre s s, 19 6 3 ); Ma han d as Ga n d hi, 

Nonviolent Resistance (New York: Schock en Books, 

1974); and Wi 11 iam Mi IIer, Nonviolence (New York: 

Schocken Books, 1966). 

(107) Sharp, "National Defense Without Armaments," 

pp. 354-55. 

( 108 ) See the ex celIe n tar tic I e by And r ew Ma c k , 

"How Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 

Conflict," World Politics (January 1975), pp. 

175-200. 

( 1 0 9 ) I nib i d ., p , 18 5 , On guerr ill a t act i cssee 

especially Mao Tse-tung, Basic Tactics (New York: 

Frederick Praeger, 1967), Ernesto Guevara, Che Guevara 

on Guerilla Warfare (New York, 1961); and Charles 

Thayer, Guerilla (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). 

(110)Gandhi; and Sharp, Nonviolent Alternatives, 

p p. 5 7 - 6 1. A 1 s 0 see J e s s i e Wa 1 1ace Hug a nand Ce c i 1 

Hirshaw, "Toward a Non-Violent National Defense," The 

Quiet Battle, ed. Mulford Sibley (Boston: Beacon 

Press, 1963), pp. 316-56. 

(111 )See Nisbet, Twilight of Authority (New 

Yo r k: Ox for d, 1975), pp. 155- 56 • 

(112)Martha Byrd, "The Home Front -- World War 

lIt" American History Illustrated (July 1979)t pp. 

11-14. 

383

384

desirable. Order is a necessary element in any social 

system; it is not the only element. 

b. The "common good" and "modern utilitarian" 

arguments. 

Not jus tan at t rae t i ve soc i e t y but soc i e t y itself 

is probably impossible in the absence of the provision 

of such goods and services as pollut'ion control, road 

construction and maintenance, garbage collection, 

education, national defense and the like. Both the 

"common good" and "utilitarian" arguments boil down to 

the proposition that government is essential for the 

(effective) provision of these goods and services. The 

"common good" proponent justifies government action in 

these areas in terms of morality, argues that citizens 

have an obligation to follow these state policies, and 

sees the provision of these goods and services as 

e i the r all 0 r par t 0 f the "comm 0 n good • " The" uti I i 

tar ian" on the other hand justifies such state action 

in terms of its necessity or practicality, argues that 

the restrictions on individual behavior are to the long 

run benefit of all citizens, and that it is therefore 

rat ional for the state to provide these services, which 

he terms "collective goods." 

There are, as we noted in Chapter VII, two methods 

to coordinate actions and policies in society: conscious 

coordination, which usually entails the state, 

and spontaneous coordination, which generally implies 

the market. The "common good" advocate tends either to 

be ignorant of, or to discount, the function of the 

market as a coordinating agent and therefore sees no 

alternative to the state. While relying heavily on the 

mar k e t for m0 s t t h i ngs, the " mo dern uti 1itarian" does 

not believe that it can function effectively in the 

area of "collective goods" and "externalitites" and 

concludes that the state is necessary to supply these 

types of goods and to coordinate pol icy in this area. 

The anarchist has argued that there are no -- or few -goo 

d s t hat are i n her e n t lye 0 lIe c t i v e. Ra ther, the 

existence of collective goods today is a consequence of 

the failure, or even refusal, of the legal system to 

permit the extension of property rights into these 

areas. Given the proper (common law) legal system, 

such goods as air space and water could be broken down 

i n toma r gin a I unit s, the reby permit ting the rna r ke t to 

operate effectively in this realm as well. If correct, 

the market could be the functional equivalent of the 

state. This would mean that the state would not, 

386

1 e • S i mil a r I y, far from elimi na ting the pos sibiii t Y 

of an abuse of force, a monop.oly, which by definition 

is without external checks, is far more likely to engage 

in those very abuses feared by Locke than would a 

police or court agency. It is only the latter who face 

the ever-present possibility of dissatisfied customers 

taking their business elsewhere. 

While t he a n archis t pa r ad i gmappear s to be f eas i 

ble, its desirability is difficult to assess. Much 

depends on such things as one's personal values, one's 

view of human nature, and the like. For example, if 

one has a n 0 p tim i s tic view 0 f huma n na t ureandis not 

impressed by the Actonian aphorism that "power tends to 

corrupt," he will not fear concentrations of power. 

Rather, he would tend to look at the good things that 

ostensibly can be done with it, such as eliminating or 

red u c i n gpo v e r t y, red u c i ng rae i a I tens ions, etc. On 

the 0 the r han d, i f 0 net a k esape s s i mi s tic view 0 f 

man's nature he will focus on the evil that can be inflicted 

with such power. Consequently, the former 

would be prone to see anarchism as undesirable, even if 

feasible; the latter would be likely to react more 

favorably to the anarchist position: government is the 

principal threat and ought to be kept as small as possible. 

However, whether he would travel the entire 

route to anarchism is difficult to say. This would 

d e pendon 0 n e 's an swe r s to rna ny 0 the r que s t ions: does 

government have an inherent propensity to expand?; can' 

internal checks be effective in keeping government accountable?; 

would the benefits of legislated law, e.g., 

rapid change, outweigh its problems, e.g., legal uncertainty? 

Not only the answers one would give to these 

and other questions but the weights one would assign to 

the questions themselves would be relevant in determining 

how he viewed the desirability of anarchism. 

d. The "liberation" argument. 

Related to the "convenience" argument is the 

"liberation" argument of T. H. Green and the proponents 

ofthem 0 d ern wei farestate • Gr e e n rna i n t a i ned t hat a 

vigorous state can actually expand individual freedom 

by eliminating certain obstacles to it which inhere in 

any laissez {aire society, anarchist or minarchist. If 

property rights and the market were SUbjected to vari 

0 us lim ita t ion s by the s tat e s uc h pe r enn i a I rna I ad i e s 

asp 0 v e r t y, dis e a s e, and i gnor an c e cou 1d be 0 vereom e . 

The "cycle of poverty" could be broken if the state 

could use some of its tax money to provide universal 

388

"free" education for children; much disease could be 

eliminated if the state would do such things as res 

t ric t the "fr e e d om 0 f con t raet" i nor de r t 0 1 imit the 

n umbe r 0 f h 0 u r s per wee k 1a bo r e r s cou I d wo r k, 0 res 

tab lis h s a f e t y and h e a 1 t h s tandar dsin the wo r ks hop. 

Since the power of the state can be used for such noble 

ends, Green andh i s philosophical successors believe 

that the state ought to so act. There are two crucial 

assumptions in this position: [1] that in the absence 

of state act ion such problems as poverty and disease 

could not be ameliorated or eliminated, and [2] that 

the.y can be successfully dealt with through state 

action. 

The i n d i v i d ua 1 i s tanarc his t, a s we have seen, 

denies both assumptions. Not only does he believe that 

such problems can be solved in a laissez faire society, 

he also maintains that state action is likely to compound 

and perpetuate them. 

Briefly, the anarchist maintains that government 

economic intervention not only usually occurs for the 

benefIt of the "vested interests" but that.even when 

des i g ned t 0 h e 1 p the p 0 0 r itis s elf - d e f eat i ng . Re 

gar die s s 0 fin ten t ions, sueh programs as min i mum wa ge s 

eliminate jobs for the very group, viz., the poor, they 

we red e s i g ned t 0 h e 1 p, wh i leo the r programs suehas 

tariffs, subsidies, and the like, tend to protect the 

positions of the wealthy and politically powerful at 

the expense of the poor. Further, a laissez faire society, 

relieved of the debilitating effects of government 

regUlations, would be extremely productive. This, 

argues the anarchist, would have two significant consequences: 

[1] it would reduce involuntary poverty to 

those incapable of working, and [2] since, regardless 

of the economic system, such people can be cared for 

only with surplus production, the great productivity of 

a I a iss e z f aire s y stem wo u I d ge neratern0 rethan s uf f i 

cient means to provide for these 'people. 

It must be pointed out, however, that in the absence 

of government intervention there is no guarantee 

that any of this surplUS will be channeled into the 

care of the poor. But then it should also be pointed 

out that charitites currently collect billions of 

dollars each year, and there is no reason to believe 

that this figure would be lower in a taxless society. 

In fact, laissez fairists usually argue that with the 

cogni t ion that the handicapped would receive no aid 

from the state, coupled with the increasing standard of 

389

living, doh'ations to charities, churches, etc., would 

actually increase. Whether this would be the case, and 

whether it would be enough to afford adequate care for 

all of the disabled and handicapped, are serious questions 

but ones that cannot be answered with a great 

degree of certainty. 

Whether one finds the "laissez faire" or the 

"liberation" argument the more convincing depends on 

one's answers to the previous two questions. This 

creates four possiblities: 

1. the market can't solve such problems but 

the state can; 

2. the market can so I ve such problems but 

the state can't; 

3. neither the market nor the state can 

solve such problems; and 

4. both the rna r ket and the state can solve 

such problems. 

Clearly, if one subscribes to possibility [1] he 

will be likely, to find the "liberation" or "welfare" 

argument convincing. Just as clearly, one adhering to 

possibility [2] will be likely to find the "laissez 

faire" argument convincing. The two interesting possibilities 

are [3] and [4]. If neither or both the 

mar keta n d the s tat e can solvethe s e prob I em s thenone 

w0 u 1d h a vet 0 rna ke his dec i s ion 0 not her g r 0 un d s • For 

example, if one believes that greed ought not to be 

'encouraged and that this is what the market does, then 

he might still advocate state regulation of market 

activities. But'if one fears the concentration of 

political power then he would be likely to endorse tl1e 

laissez faire position. 

e. The "equality· argument. 

One final argument regarding the desirability of 

g 0 v ernmentis the " e can om i c justice " posit ion 0 f J 0 hn 

Rawls. Subscribing to a "patterned" theory of justice, 

Rawls argues that the social distribution of wealth is 

just only when the range of inequalities is held within 

strict limits. Since economic freedom would permit individuals 

to rise above and fall below the permissible 

I imi ts, the pattern of economic distribution would be 

immediately and continuously upset without intervention 

by the state. 

Moreover, if justice demands economic equality, 

390

G i v e n 0 u r b r i e f 0 v e r vie W 0 f s even pO pu I a r a r gumen 

t s for government and the anarchist repl ies, we are 

left with the following conclusions: [1] individualist 

anarch i sm is a feasible method of social organization 

and therefore ;government is not indispensible; [2] depending 

on one's personal values, individualist anarchism 

mayor may not bea desirable method of social 

organization; and [3] given the radical natural-rights 

position of most individualist anarchists, government 

can never be a morally justifiable institution. 

History shows that freedom is a fragile and fleeting 

possession. It also shows that governments expand. 

It is not likely that the two are unrelated.' 

It was only in the twentieth century that the 

state emerged fully supreme, possessing the complete 

panoply of modern technology and unfettered by economic, 

religious or social restrictions. The results are 

c 1ear for all t 0 see: two w0 rid wa r sand t hat m0 r a I 

monstros i ty, the total i tarian state. But the United 

States suffered neither the awesome destruction of 

world war nor the spiritual destitution of totalitarianism. 

The United States, Americans were fond of 

tel lin g thems e 1 ves, wa sun i que • This wa s the "1 and 0 f 

the free," and government was "of, by and for the 

people," There was no need to worry. 

Yet, by any index -- taxes, expenditures, the size 

of the bureaucracy, the scope of activities, the number 

of departments -- government in the United States has 

also expanded, and that expansion has been dramatic and 

has ga i ned momentum wi th the passage of time. Perhaps 

what ween joyed wa s not a dis pensat ion but a me res t a y 

of execut ion. People are beginning to feel the pinch. 

Wherever one goes today people speak of bloated governmen 

t • Therearet 0 0 man y t a xes, too rna ny laws, too 

much regulat ion, too much waste, and just plain too 

much government. Not only does government restrict 

individual liberty but, with inflation, recession, 

gover nmen t cor r upt i on and the ever-present threat of 

nuclear annihilation, we are beginning to realize that 

neither can it provide security and prosperity. Along 

with this realization comes a search for alternatives. 

The individual anarchist has advanced a number of 

radical and quite exciting proposals which, he 

bel i eve s, w0 u I d po i n t the wa y to a f r e e and pr 0 s per 0 us 

society. It is an alternative that deserves serious 

consideration. 

392

A 

Adier. Max. 2 

Allende. Salvadore. 135 

Anderson. Benjamin, 118 

Andrews, Stephen Pearl, 

181, 182, 184, 188. 

194, 195,208 

Appleton, Henry. 207 

Aquinas, St. Thomas, 156 

Aristotle, 78, 80, 155, 

170 

Augustine. St •• 170 

Austin. John. 336 

B 

Babcock. John. 15 

Bakunin. Michael, 2, 4. 

6, 8, 37, 177 

Ballou. Adin. 179. 180 

Banfield, Edward. 242 

Baran, Paul. 117 

Barclay, Robert, 179 

Barnett, Randy. 359, 362. 

363 

Bastiat, Frederic, 24-26, 

36. 202 

Baumol, William, 294 

Beaird, Paul, 27-29 

Beard, Charles, 118 

Bechtler, Christopher, 299 

Bell.my, Edward, 37 

Bentham, Jeremy, 160-162, 

165, 166 

Berkley, George, 353 

Berkman, Alexander, 51, 

52,210.222 

Bixler, Scott, 285 

Block, Walter, 249, 277, 

280, 281, 283 

Bodin, Jean, 88. 336 

Bourne. Randolph, 82, 83, 

86, 87 

Brailsford, H.N., 12 

Brecht, Arnold, 62 

Bresler, Robert, 129, 130 

INDEX 

393 

Buchanan, James, 262 

Buckley, William F., 32, 

34, 36 

Bukharin, N., 117 

Burke, Edmund, 32, 34, 

36, 170 

Burnham, James, 32, 33, 

36 

Burt, William, 304-306 

Byrd, Martha, 375 

C 

Calhoun, John, 88 

Cantor, Norman, 326 

Carneiro, Robert, 76, 77 

Carter. Owendolen, 327 

Cervero, Robert, 279 

Childs, Roy, 24 

Clark. J .M •• 253 

Collins, Randall, 79 

Commons. John R., 240 

Coquelin, Charles, 202 

Crosby, Peter, 324 

Cuzan, Alfred, 53 

D 

Dahl, Robert, 232, 233, 

235 

DeJouvenel, Bertrand. 

83-85, 87. 325 

DeMa i s t r e. J 0 s e ph. 34. 36 

Dewey, John, 240 

Dionysius, 80 

Dodd, Malurice, 117 

Downs, Anthony. 101-105 

Dunoyer, Charles, 202 

Durkheim, Emile, 341 

Dye, Thomas, 100 

E 

Edwards, James Rolph, 299 

Ellul, Jacques, 90 

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 179

F 

Fisher, J. Greevz, 194 

Flynn, John, 120, 121, 

123, 124, 128 

Fox, Douglas, 353 

Frech, H.E., 235 

Fried, Morton, 78, 79 

Friedman, David, 36, 56, 

57, 62, 92, 275, 336, 

349, 350, 354, 369, 

370 

Friedman, Milton, 165, 

238, 246, 290, 293 

FUller, Lon, 336 

G 

Garrison, William Lloyd, 

179 

Gellhorn, Walter, 290 

Gentile, Giovanni, 37 

George, Henry, 184 

Godw in, Wi II i am, 2, 4, 12, 

13, 35, 36, 371 

Goldin, Kenneth, 310, 311 

Goldman, Emma, 36, 211 

Green, Thomas Hill, 166- 

168, 171, 240, 388, 389 

Greene, William, 189, 190, 

192-195, 208 

Grinder, Walter, 93, 125 

'Guerin, Daniel, 2 

Guillaume, James, 7 

Gumplowicz, Ludwig, 73 

H 

Hagel, John, 125-127 

Hallowell, John, 161 

Harrod, Roy F., 253 

Hayek, Friedrich, 31, 36, 

53, 225, 228, 240, 256, 

325,326,328-330,333, 

336 

Hegel, Ge 0 r ge, 166, 170 

Herbert, Auberon, 203, 258 

Herz, John, 327 

Hess ,Kar 1, 340 

Heywood, Ezra, 189, 190, 

192, 194 

394 

Hilferding, R., 117 

Hitler, Adolf, 121, 139, 

141 

Hobbes, Thomas, 14, 88, 

89, 157-160, 170, 336, 

380, 385 

Hobson, J .A., 118 

Hoover, Herbert, 257 

Hospers» John, 19-22, 36, 

258, 259, 273, 287, 

293, 311, 323, 351, 

353 

Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 

29, 36 

Hurne, David, 79 

Hutchinson, Anne, 179 

I 

Ingalls, Joshua, 195-197 

J 

Jacker, Corinne, 179 

Jenks, Edward, 327 

Johnson, Lyndon, 130 

J 0 I ow i c z, H. F., 327 

K 

Kaplan, Morton, 232, 235 

Kauder, Emil, 177 

Kelly, John, 207 

Kennedy, John F., 129 

Kerensky, Alexander, 53 

Keynes, John M., 253 

Kimmel, Admiral Husband, 

129, 139 

Kirk, Russell, 32, 34, 36 

Kirzner, Israel, 224 

Kissinger, Henry, 373 

Krader,Lawrence, 77 

Kropotkin, Peter, 2, 4-6, 

8, 37, 51, 54, 177, 

222, 227, 228 

L 

La Boetie, Etienne de, 

371

Laski, Harold, 240 

Lasswell, Harold, 2!2, 235 

Lazarus, M.E., 207 

Lenin, Vladimir, 117 

Leoni, Bruno, 237, 325-327 

Locke, John, 55, 56, 62, 

151,152,159,160, 

165, 166, 168, 170, 

190, 196, 203, 304, 

387, 388 

Low i e JR. H0, 78 

Lundberg, George, 130 

Luxemburg, Rosa, 117 

M 

Ma c ca 11, Will i am, 180 

MacCallum, Spencer Heath, 

312 

Machan, Tibor, 287 

MacIver, R. M., 78 

Mack, Andrew, 370 

Mackay, John Henry, 15, 

132, 133, 177 

Maddox, Robert, 132, 133 

Madison, Charles, 15, 211 

Madison, James, 83 

Magdoff, Harry, 117 

Maine, Sir Henry, 330 

Malatesta, Errico, 2 

Ma r ita in, J a cq ue s, 155 

157, 170 

Martin, James, 14, 189, 

194-196 

Ma r x, Ka r 1, 3, 15, 35, 37, 

95, 96, 117 

McCloskey, J.J., 31 

Mi II, John Stuar t, 30-32, 

36, 166 

Miller, Martin, 5 

Mises. Ludwig von, 3. 29, 

30, 32, 36, 79, 83, 

117, 118, 120, 248, 296 

Mishan, E.J., 308 

Molinari, Gustave de, 177, 

201-203 

Montesquieu, Baron De, 85 

Moon, Parker T., 118 

Moore, Thomas Gale, 292 

Morris, William, 2 

Mosca, Gaetano, 98 

395 

Moss, Lawrence, 352 

Mossedegh, 134 

Most, Johann, 210 

Murray, Charles, 243, 246 

N 

Nisbet, Robert " 80, 89-92 

Nixon, Richard, 135 

Nock, Albert Jay, 83, 94 

Noyes, John Humphrey, 179 

Nozick, Robert, 20, 

22-24, 

36, 169, 258, 273, 

351, 353, 357, 358, 

391 

o Olson, Mancur, 252, 360 

Oppenheimer, Franz, 

73-79, 82, 83, 88, 

177 

Ostrom, Vincent, 352 

Owen, Robert, 180, 198 

p 

Parker, S.E., 177 

Paul, Jeffrey, 342 

Perkins, Ernestine and 

Richard, 64, 306, 307 

Philip of Macedon, 80 

Plato, 13, 151-158, 170 

Plucknett, Theodore, 327, 

330, 331 

Prewitt, Kenneth, 99, 

100, 107 

Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 

2-4, 8, 10-13, 16, 36, 

177. 193. 313. 341 

R 

Rand, Ayn, 26-29, 55, 

258, 260, 273 

Ratzenhofer, Gustav, 73 

RawIs, J ahn, 37, 168 , 

169, 171, 390, 39 1 

Reichert, William 0., xi 

Reid, Margaret, 244

Renshaw, Edward, 295 

Ricardo, David, 195 

Robbins, Lionel, 162 

Robinson, J.B., 207 

Rocker, Rudolph, 8, 36 

Rockwell, George, 37 

Rollins, Louis, 349 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 

123, 127-129, 139, 140, 

257 

Rothbard, Murray, 17, 19, 

21, 27, 36, 54-64, 79, 

81, 84, 88, 107, 228, 

230-238, 240, 259, 275, 

281, 283, 291, 298, 

308, 312, 333, 335, 

336, 341, 343, 344, 

347, 353, 364, 368, 370 

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 

89, 90, 151, 153-157, 

170 

S 

Sabine, George, 30, 166 

Saint-Simon, Henry, 37 

Samuels, Warren J., 230- 

232, 235 

Samuelson, Paul, 309 

Sanders, John, 360, 361 

Sargent, L.T., 34 

Say, J.B., 118,119, 201 

Schumpeter, Joseph, 117, 

121, 253 

Schuster, Eunice, 178, 

180, 211 

Scott, James B., 330 

Shallou, Jeremiah, 357 

Sharp, Gene, 371, 372 

Short, General Walter, 

129, 139 

Sibley, Mulford, 162 

Slater, Jerome, 132, 134 

Smith, Adam, 4,36,121, 

122, 177, 201 

Smith, Robert, 123, 127 

Sneed, John, 338 

Sorel, Georges, 8, 36 

Sowell, Thomas, 243 

Spencer, Herbert, 24-26, 

36.• 159, 160, 166, 

396 

170, 203, 205, 210, 

258, 391 

Spooner, Lysander, 36, 

189-194, 196-198, 

203-207 

Spragens, Thomas, 59 

Stal in, Joseph, 133 

Stanwood, Edward, 194 

Stimson, -Frederic, 129 

Stimson, Henry, 326 

Stinchcombe, Arthur, 285 

Stirner, Max, 2, 14-16, 

36, 177, 207 

Stone, Alan, 99, 100, 107 

Stromberg, Joseph, 

121-123 

Sweezy, Paul, 117 

T 

Tannehill, Morris and 

Linda, 64, 65, 324, 

344, 346, 355, 358, 

365 

Taylor, Richard, 323 

Thoreau, Henry David, 179 

Toland, John, 139 

Tolstoy, Leo, 371 

Tuccille, Jerome, 340, 

341 

Tucker, Benjamin, 3, 4, 

15-17, 36, 56, 192, 

194, 197-203, 206-211, 

224, 275, 371 

Tullock, Gordon, 163, 

164, 170 

W 

Walker, J.L., 207 

Warren, Josiah, 3, 4,36, 

180-189, 192-198, 208 

Watner, Carl, 202 

Wheeler, Richard, 324, 

348, 349 

Wild, John, 58 

Wilkie, Wendel, 104 

Williams. William A., 

132-134 

Wittman, Donald, 102-105 

Wolin, Sheldon, 152, 154 

Wollstein. Jarret, 274-

276, 279, 286, 369 

Wooldridge, William, 343, 

347, 357 

Wormser, Rene, 328-331 

Wright, Henry, 179 

y 

Yarros, Victor, 4, 15, 

199, 211 

Z 

Zeigler, Harmon, 100 

397

Freedom, Society, and State - Ludwig von Mises Institute

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