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U.S. Department of Justice<br />
Federal Bureau of Investigation<br />
Washington, D. C. 20535<br />
September 9,2009<br />
MR. GRANT F. SMITH<br />
IRMEP<br />
CALVERT STATION<br />
POST OFFICE BOX 32041<br />
WASHINGTON, DC 20007<br />
Dear Mr. Smith:<br />
FOIPA Request No.: 1135944- 000<br />
Subject: AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITIEE (1999 OR EARLIER)<br />
~ This acknowledges receipt of your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request<br />
to the FBI. The FOIPA number listed above has been assigned to your request.<br />
o<br />
o<br />
o<br />
For an accurate search of our records, please provide the complete name, alias, date and<br />
place of birth for the subject of your request. Any other specific data you could provide<br />
such as prior addresses, or employment information would also be helpful. If your subject<br />
is deceased, please include date and proof of death.<br />
To make sure information about you is not released to someone else, we require your<br />
notarized signature or, in place of a notarized signature, a declaration pursuant 28<br />
U.S.C. § 1746. For your convenience, the reverse side of this letter contains a form<br />
which may be used for this purpose.<br />
If you want the FBI's Criminal Justice Information System (C..IIS) to perform a search for<br />
your arrest record, please follow the enclosed instructions in Attorney General Order<br />
556-73. You must submit fingerprint impressions so a comparison can be made with the<br />
records kept by CJIS. This is to make sure your information is not released to an<br />
unauthorized person.<br />
We are searching the indices to our Central Records System for the information you<br />
requested, and will inform you of the results as soon as possible.<br />
o<br />
Processing delays have been caused by the large number of requests received by the<br />
FBI. We will process your rcquest(s) as soon as possible.<br />
Your request has been assigned the number indicated above. Please use this number in all<br />
correspondence with us. Your patience is appreciated.<br />
Very truly yours,<br />
David M. Hardy<br />
Section Chief,<br />
Record/lnformation<br />
Dissemination Section<br />
Records Management Division
u.s. Department of Justice<br />
Federal Bureau of Investigation<br />
Washington, D.C. 20535<br />
MR. GRANT F. SMITH<br />
IRMEP<br />
CALVERT STATION<br />
POST OFFICE BOX 32041<br />
WASHINGTON, DC 20007<br />
September 7,2010<br />
Subject: FRANKLIN, LAWRENCE A. ET AL.<br />
FOIPA No. 1135944- 002<br />
Dear Mr. Smith:<br />
The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5,<br />
United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure,<br />
with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was<br />
inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked<br />
below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:<br />
Section 552<br />
Section 552a<br />
D(b)(1)<br />
O(b)(7)(A)<br />
O(d)(5)<br />
O(b)(2)<br />
O(b)(7)(B)<br />
0(j)(2)<br />
D(b)(3)<br />
_<br />
:8l(b)(7)(C)<br />
O(k)(1 )<br />
D(b)(7)(D)<br />
D(k)(2)<br />
~(b)(7)(E)<br />
O(k)(3)<br />
O(b )(7)(F)<br />
D(k)(4)<br />
O(b)(4)<br />
D(b)(8)<br />
D(k)(5)<br />
D(b)(5)<br />
O(b)(9)<br />
o(k)(6)<br />
~(b)(6)<br />
O(k)(7)<br />
405 page(s) were reviewed and 405 page(s) are being released.<br />
D<br />
Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other<br />
Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:<br />
o referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.<br />
o referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this<br />
information when the consultation is finished.<br />
I8l You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the<br />
Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW,<br />
Suite 1'1050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60)<br />
days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be<br />
clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your<br />
request so that it may be easily identified.<br />
.<br />
o The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the sUbject(s) of your request was<br />
the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other
individuals, or matters, which mayor may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown,<br />
when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main<br />
file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main<br />
investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing,<br />
and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.<br />
I8l See additional information which follows.<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
David M. Hardy<br />
Section Chief<br />
Record/I nformation<br />
Dissemination Section<br />
Records Management Division<br />
Enclosure(s)<br />
Pursuant to Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.11 and/or 16.49, there is a<br />
fee of ten cents per page for duplication. No fees are assessed for the first 100 pages, upon receipt of these<br />
documents, please 'submit a check or money order payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the amount of<br />
$30.50 for released pages. To insure proper identification of your request, please return this letter or include the FOIPA<br />
number(s) with your payment. Failure to pay for this release within (30) days, will close any pending FBI FOIPA<br />
requests from you. Nonpayment will also cause an automatic denial of any future FOIPA requests. Please send<br />
payment to FBI, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602-4843.
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS<br />
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552<br />
(b)(l)<br />
foreign<br />
(b)(2)<br />
(b)(3)<br />
(b)(4)<br />
(b)(5)<br />
(b)(6)<br />
privacy;<br />
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest ofnational defense or<br />
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;<br />
related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices ofan agency;<br />
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b ofthis title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the<br />
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion onissue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for<br />
withholding or refers to particular types ofmatters to be withheld;<br />
trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;<br />
inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation<br />
with the agency;<br />
personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure ofwhich would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion ofpersonal<br />
(b)(7)<br />
security<br />
records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement<br />
records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B) would deprive a person<br />
ofa right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion ofpersonal<br />
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity ofconfidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or<br />
authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case ofrecord or information compiled<br />
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course ofa criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national<br />
intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law<br />
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or<br />
prosecutions ifsuch<br />
expected to endanger the life or<br />
disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention ofthe law, or ( F ) could reasonably be<br />
physical safety ofany individual;<br />
(b)(8)<br />
(b)(9)<br />
contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use ofan agency responsible for<br />
the regulation or supervision offinancial institutions; or<br />
geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.<br />
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a<br />
(d)(5)<br />
(j)(2)<br />
(k)(l)<br />
(k)(2)<br />
identity<br />
information compiled in reasonable anticipation ofa civil action proceeding;<br />
material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement ofcriminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce<br />
crime or apprehend criminals;<br />
information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest ofthe national defense or foreign<br />
policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;<br />
investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss ofa right, benefit or<br />
privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her<br />
would be held in confidence;<br />
(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President ofthe United States or any other individual<br />
pursuant to the authority ofTitle 18, United States Code, Section 3056;<br />
(k)(4)<br />
(k)(5)<br />
required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;<br />
investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose ofdetermining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian<br />
employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure ofwhich would reveal the identity ofthe person who furnished<br />
information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;<br />
(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government<br />
service the release ofwhich would compromise the testing or examination process;<br />
(k)(7)<br />
person<br />
material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure ofwhich would reveal the identity ofthe<br />
who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.
FBI/DOJ
~. ~ ~aShingtOnpos(¢Om: Mee\lngJcf"::::::~:
·.Page.2 of3<br />
groups and ofseeking to acquire nuclear weapons. While broad agreement exists within the<br />
administration favoring changes in Iran's Islamic government, officials differ on how to accomplish<br />
tnem.<br />
More than two years after the administration began drafting a national security presidential directive on<br />
Iran, the policy document remains unfinished. While the State Department favors increased dialogue and<br />
engagement with potential reformers inside Iran, prominent Pentagon civilians believe the policy should<br />
be more aggressive, including measures to destabilize the existing government in Tehran.<br />
The Iran-contra scandal erupted over, a decision by the Reagan administration to s,ell weapons to Iran in<br />
an effort to win the release ofU.S. hostages in Lebanon. The proceeds ofthe arms sales were illegally<br />
funneled to contra fighters opposing Nicaragua's leftisrSandinista government.<br />
Ghorbanifar was enlisted in the effort, helping to arrange the delivery by-Israel of508 TOW antitank<br />
missiles to Iran. The White House had drafted him as an intermediary despite warnings from the CIA<br />
that he was a cheat and had failed lie-detector tests.<br />
The intelligence agency had instructed its operatives not to do business with him.<br />
News ofthe Pentagon's contact with Ghorbanifar was first reported yesterday by Newsday, and<br />
Rumsfeld was asked about the story when he emerged with Bush from a meeting at the president's ranch<br />
in Crawford, Tex.<br />
Saying he had just been told ofthe Newsdayarticle by a senior aide. and by Rice, Rumsfeld<br />
acknowledged that "one or two" Pentagon officials "were approached by some people who had<br />
information about Iranians that wanted to provide information to the United States government."<br />
He said that a meeting took place "more than a year ago" and that the information received was<br />
circulated to various federal departments and agencies but did not lead to anything.<br />
"That is to say, as I ~nderstand it, there wasn't anything there that was ofsubstance or ofvalue that<br />
needed to be pursued further," he said.<br />
Asked ifthe Pentagon contact was intended to circumvent official U.S. exchanges with Iran, Rumsfeld<br />
replied: "Oh, absolutely not. I mean, everyone in the interagency process, I'm told, was apprised ofit,<br />
and it went nowhere. Itwas just _. this happens, ofcourse, frequently, that in -- people come in, offering<br />
suggestions or information or possible contacts, and sometimes they're pursued. Obviously, ifit looks as<br />
though something might be interesting, it's pursued. Ifit isn't, it isn't."<br />
'<br />
Standing by Rumsfeld's side, Bush was asked ifthe meeting was a good idea and ifhis administration<br />
wants a change in government. "We support the aspirations ofthose who desire freedom in Iran," the<br />
president said, then took a question on a different subject.<br />
According to the account given later by the senior Pentagon official, the contact in 2001 occurred after<br />
Iranian'officials passed word to the'administration that they had information that might be useful in the<br />
global war on terrorism. Two Pentagon officials met with the Iranians in several sessions over a threeday<br />
period in Italy. Ghorbanifar attended these meetings, "but he was not the individual who ,had<br />
apprQached the United States orthe on~ with the information,It the official said.<br />
What h~s role W3:S, however, the official did not know.<br />
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36669-2003Aug8?language=printer 8/12/2003
:Page :3 013 .<br />
The official said the June meeting involved one ofthe two Pentagon representatives who had been<br />
present at the 2001 meeting, buthe declined to say which one.<br />
Staffwriter Dana Priest contributed to this report.<br />
© 2003 The Washington Post Company<br />
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36669-2003Aug8?language=--printer 8/12/2003
Page l'ofl<br />
Iraq War Planner Downplays Role<br />
Conservative Strategist Denies Running Stealth Intelligence Operation<br />
By Thomas E. Ricks<br />
Washi~gton Post Staff Writer<br />
Wednesday, October 22,2003; Page A27<br />
In normal times, the chiefofthe Pentagon's office for Middle Eastern policy toils in obscurity, a third-level functionary<br />
hardly noticed inside the building, let alone outside it.<br />
Not so Deputy Undersecretary William 1. uti. The day..to-day manager ofthe Defense Department's Irag policy, he<br />
has the highest profile ofanyone to eve old his post.<br />
A recent Google search uncovered 1,340 Internet hits mentioning him; many ofthem depicting him as a stealthy<br />
Svengali ofIraq policy, operating at the center ofa network connecting Vice President Cheney, former House speaker<br />
Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and Undersecretary ofDefense for Policy Douglas J. Feith -- all people for whom Luti has<br />
worked in the past seven years. Some Web sites associated with fringe political player Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr. attack<br />
him in lurid terms as an lIignoble liar" and "Satan."<br />
The critics are especially suspicious ofhis Office ofSpecial Plans, which was created last year. The purposely<br />
ambiguous title -- it was an office to work on policy for invading Iraq -- gave rise to speculation that Luti was running a<br />
shadowy intelligence operation intended to second-guess the CIA and provide the Pentagon with findings that<br />
supported its policies. The office has since been closed.<br />
IIrhe conspiracies out ofthis are quite stunning," Luti said in a recent interview in his crowded office in an<br />
unfashionable inner corridor ofthe Pentagon. "We are a consumer ~f intelligence rather than a provider."<br />
He insists that he is not as influential as some ofhis critics suspect. liTo paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors ofmy<br />
power are greatly exaggerated," he said.<br />
He has been attacked, he said, because "we work tough issues, we work controversial issues.." But he insisted he does<br />
not preside over a secret miniature version ofthe CIA. "For the umpteenth tiine," he said, showing a bit of<br />
exasperation, "we do policy work. II What that means, he said, is developing defense policy options and monitoring their<br />
implementation -- not collecting intelligence, planning wars or implementing policy.<br />
But he also seems to have attracted attention because ofhis zealous manner. "I know he's a lightning rod,".said Richard<br />
Shultz, Luti's doctoral thesis adviser at Tufts University. "That's partly because he is so passionate, and partly because<br />
he is so devoted to policies that have been divisive."<br />
Defense intelligence experts say Bruce Hardcastle, a senior Def~nse Intelligence Agency official for Middle Eastern<br />
~ffairs, began avoiding meeting with Luti after sharply disagreeing with him over the past 12 months about the<br />
imminence ofthe threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.<br />
"It'syery ?ifficult to inf0:m people who already know it all," said op.e Pentagon official familiar with the strained ,;I<br />
relationship between Lutl and Hardcastle.<br />
r 1 u<br />
"Basically, he [Luti] didn't like other.people's information ifit didn't agree with his opinion," a former DIA an~ls.t ~<br />
~ . 00~<br />
Hardcastle declined to copunent for thisarticle.' . ir IP<br />
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washitlgtonposlcom: IraqWar PlannOownPl~YS Role .... . 0<br />
Over~I:Luti said ofhis critics, they are· 'either confuse4, malicious, or both.'" -<br />
Page 2 of.3·,<br />
He added, "Policy people and intelligence analysts perform different functions, but what's important is that they work<br />
!ogether, not that they agree on everything."<br />
Those critical views are hardly universal. John Trigilio, a fomler DIA official who works with Luti on defense policy<br />
issues, described him as "a straight shooter, professional, honorable," and called the notion that he manipulated<br />
intelligence "ridiculous." Adm. William 1. Fallon, who commanded Luti when Luti was skipper ofthe USS Guam,<br />
remembers him as an extremely competent leader who did not skew data.<br />
"I've heard the allegation, and I've kind ofchuckled at it," said Fallon, who recently became commander ofthe Atlantic<br />
Fleet. "I never saw anything along those. lines."<br />
Luti's 26-year Navy career was an unusual mix ofsea duty and high-level Washington policy positions. After serving<br />
as a weapons officer for EA-6B Prowlers -- aircraft that jam enemy electronics -- he studied strategy and diplomacy at<br />
Tufts University. He went there for a master's degree, "but he was such a damned good student that we admitted him to<br />
the doctoral program," recalled Shultz, an authority on international politics and military operations.<br />
In the early 1990s, while deputy director ofthe chiefofnaval operations' executive panel, a civilian advisory group,<br />
Luti became interested in the views ofone member, strategy guru Albert Wohlstetter. A mentor to Deputy Defense<br />
Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, Defense Policy Board member Richard N. Perle and several other prominent<br />
conservative defense thinkers, Wohlstetter became Luti's entree into their world.<br />
From there, while still in the Navy, Luti became.a congressional fellow in the office ofthen-Speaker Gingrich. His time<br />
there, in part spent working on legislation related to arming and training Bosnian Muslims, again brought him into<br />
contact with interventionist conservatives.<br />
"We were talking with people like Perle and Wolfowitz about doing the right thing in Bosnia," recalled Randy<br />
Schuenemann, who then was a foreign policy aide on the Hill, and later, as a lobbyist for an organization that<br />
advocated toppling Hussein, worked with Luti on Iraq issues.<br />
Gingrich, who has stayed in touch with Luti through meetings ofthe Defense Policy Board, described his former<br />
employee as "very smart, very aggressive, slightly impatient, and ... with a very deep feeling that the world is more<br />
dangerous than many ofhis colleagues in the Pentagon, in the services, understand."<br />
Luti's last major Navy assignment was as captain ofthe USS Guam, an aging helicopter carrier with a crew of700.<br />
"Guam was one of!he oldest ships in the. fleet," recalled Fallon, but Luti kept it in "marvelous condition. 1I<br />
When the Bush administration came into office, Luti was asked to work for Cheney on Middle East-policy. A few<br />
months later, he retired from the Navy to take his current position.<br />
He was in Cairo on Sept. 11, 2001, and, with commercial traffic stopped, got back to the United States aboard an Air<br />
Force KC-135 refueling jet. On the way home, he recalled, the plane flew over New York City, escorted by F-16<br />
fighters, and the pilot lowered a wing so those aboard could get a full view ofthe smoke plume rising from the rubble<br />
ofthe World Trade Center.<br />
When the jet finally landed, he recalled, "we had this war on our hands.,11 Since then, he has had a total of 12 days off.<br />
C 2003 The Washington Post Company
washillgtOP.l;.ost.conl~ In Profile· .<br />
,v ~<br />
washingtonpost.c.~m<br />
In'Profile<br />
Wednesday, October 22,2003; Page A27<br />
William J. Lut;<br />
Title: Deputy undersecretary ofdefense for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs.<br />
Age: 49.<br />
Education: Bachelor's degree in history, the Citadel; master's degree in national security and strategic studies, U.S.<br />
Naval War College; master's and doctorate in international relations, Tufts University.<br />
Career highlights: Served abm~rd the USS John F. Kennedy during the 1991 Persian Gulf War; congressiont;ll fellow,<br />
office ofHouse Speaker Newt Gil1grich (R"Ga.), 1996-97; commander, USS Guam, 1997-98; special adviser to Vice<br />
Pre~ident Cheney for national security affairs (Middle East), 2001.<br />
Pastime: Golf. '<br />
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. wa')~i~l&to~P'ostco~n: Iraq War Planp~owllPlayS Role<br />
waSbirigtonp9st.com<br />
. AI. L HJP"OnH1..TI m'1 CONrAINED<br />
HEREIN IS TJIYICLAS"-tED ..' .<br />
DATE 07-29-.2010~oi24 u~ baw/seb/ l~g<br />
Page·! of3<br />
Iraq War Planner Downplays Role<br />
Conservative Strategist Denies Running Stealth Intelligence Operation<br />
By Thomas B. Ricks<br />
Washington Post StaffWriter<br />
Wednesday, October 22, 2003; Page A27<br />
In normal times, the chiefofthe Pentagon's office for Middle I;astern policy toils in obscurity, a third-level functionary<br />
hardly noticed inside the building, let alone outside it.<br />
Not so Deputy Undersecretary William J. LutL The day-to-day manager ofthe Defense Department's Iraq policy, he<br />
has the highest profile ofanyone to ever hold his post.<br />
A recent Google search uncovered 1,340 Internet hits mentioning him, many ofthem depicting him as a stealthy<br />
Svengali ofIraq policy, operating at the center ofa network connecting Vice President Cheney, former House speaker<br />
Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and Undersecretary ofDefense for Policy Douglas J.Feith-- all people for whom Luti has<br />
worked in the past seven years. Some Web sites associated with fringe political player Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr. attack<br />
him in lurid terms as an "ignoble liar" and "Satan. 1I<br />
The critics are especially suspicious ofhis Office ofSpecial Plans, which was created last year. The purposely<br />
ambiguous title -- it was an office to work on policy for invading Iraq -- gave rise to speculation that Luti was running a<br />
shadowy intelligence operation intended to second-guess the CIA and provide the Pentagon with findings that<br />
supported its policies. The office has since been closed.<br />
liThe conspiracies out ofthis are quite stunning,II Lutisaid in a recent interview in his crowded office in an<br />
unfashionable inner corridor ofthe Pentagon. IIWe are a consumer ofintelligence rather than a provider."<br />
He insists that he is not as influential as some ofhis critics suspect. liTo paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors ofmy<br />
power are greatly exaggerated, II he said.<br />
He has been attacked, he said, because "we work tough issues, we work controversial issues.II But he insisted he does<br />
not pres.ide over a secret miniature version ofthe CIA. "For the umpteenth time," he said, showing a bit of<br />
exasperation,'''we do policy work. II What that means, he said, is developing defense policy options and monitoring ~heir<br />
implementation -- nofcollecting intelligence, planning wars or implementing policy.<br />
But he also seems to have attracted attention because ofhis zealous manner. "I know he's a liglitning rod," said Richard<br />
Shultz, Luti's doctoral thesis adviser at Tufts University .. "That's partly because·he is so passionate, and partly because<br />
" he is so devoted to policies that have been divisive."<br />
Defense intelligence experts say Bruce Hardcastle, a senior Defense Intelligence Agency official for Middle Eastern<br />
affairs, began avoiding meeting with Luti after sharply disagreeing with him over the past 12 months about the<br />
imminence ofthe threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.<br />
"It's very difficult to inform people who already know it all," said one Pentagon official familiar with the strained<br />
relations4ip between Luti and Hardcastle.<br />
"Basically, he [Luti] didn't likeother people's information ifit didn't agree with his opinion,1I a former DIA analyst<br />
agreed.<br />
Hardcastle declined to comment for this article.<br />
uw~<br />
\. 4'S~~. • ~~"'S-'t-.\C.....b6<br />
wasliiDgtonpostcom: Iraq War Plann~ownplllYS Role, ' . 0<br />
ovttian, Luti said ofhis critics, they ~either conftlSed ll tnalicious, or both."<br />
Page2.of3 '<br />
He added, "Policy people and intelligence analysts perform different iUnctions, but what's important is that they work<br />
together, not that they agree on everything."<br />
Those critical views are hardly universal. John Trigilio, a former DIA official who works with Luti on defense policy<br />
issues, described him as "a straight shooter, professional, honorable," and called the notion that he manipulated<br />
intelligence "ridiculous." Adm. William J. Fallon, who commanded Luti when Luti was skipper ofthe USSGuam,<br />
remembers him as an extremely competent leader who did not skew data.<br />
"I've heard the allegation, and I've kind ofchuckled at it," said Fallon, who recently became commander ofthe Atlantic<br />
Fleet. "I never saw anything along those lines."<br />
Luti's 26-year Navy career was an unusual mix ofsea duty and high-level Washington policy positions. After serving<br />
as a weapons officer for EA-6B Prowlers -- aircraft that jam enern,.y electronics -- he studied strategy and diplomacy at<br />
Tufts University. He went there for a master's degree, "but he was such a damned good'student that we admitted him to<br />
the doctoral program," recalled Shultz, an authority on international politics and military operations.<br />
In the early 1990s, while deputy director ofthe chiefofnaval operations' executive panel, a civilian advisory group,<br />
Luti became interested in the views ofone member, strategy guru Albert Wohlstetter. A mentor to Deputy Defense<br />
Secretiuy Paul D. Wolfowitz, Defense Policy Board member Richard N. Perle and several other prominent<br />
conservative defense thinkers, Woh~stetter became Luti's entree into, their world.<br />
From there, while still in the Navy, Luti became a congressional fellow in the office ofthen-Speaker Gingrich. His time<br />
there, in part spent working on legislation related to arming and training Bosnian Muslims, again brought him into<br />
contact with interventionist conservatives.<br />
"We were talking with people like Perle and.Wolfowitz about doing the right thing in Bosnia," recalled Randy<br />
Schuenemann, who then was a foreign policy aide on the Hill, and later, as a lobbyist for an organization t4at<br />
advocated toppling Hussein, worked with Luti on Iraq issues.<br />
Gingrich, who has stayed in touch with Luti through meetings ofthe Defense Policy Board, described his former<br />
employee as "very smart, very aggressive, slightly impatient, and ... with a very deep feeling that the world is more<br />
dangerous than many ofhis colleagues in the Pentagon, in the services, understand."<br />
I<br />
Luti's last major Navy assignment was as captain ofth~ USS Guam, an aging helicopter car.rier with a crew of700.<br />
"Guam was one ofth~ oldest ships in the fleet," recalled Fallon, but Luti kept it in "marvelous condition."<br />
When the Bush administration came into office, Luti was asked to work for Cheney on Middle East policy. A few<br />
months later, he retired from the Navy to take his curre!1t position.<br />
He was in Cairo on Sept. 11,2001, and, with commercial traffic stopped, got back to the United States aboard an Air<br />
Force KC-135 refueling jet. On the way home, he recalled, the plane flew over New York City, escorted by F-16<br />
fighters, and the pilot lowered a wing so those aboard could get a full view ofthe smoke plume rising from the rubble<br />
ofthe World Trade Center.<br />
When the jet finally landed, he recalled, "we had this war on our hands." Since then, he has had a total of12 gays off.<br />
© 2003 The Washington Post Company
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Mother Jones Magazine<br />
January/February 2004<br />
The Lie Factory<br />
Only weeks after9/11, the Bush administration set up a secret Pentagon unit to create the<br />
case for invading Iraq. Here is the inside story for how they pushed dlslnformation and<br />
bogus intelligence and led the nation to war.<br />
By Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest<br />
It's a crisp fall day in western Virginia, a hundred miles from Washington, D.C., and a breeze is<br />
rustling the red and gold leaves of the Shenandoah hills. On the weather-beaten wood porch of a<br />
ramshackle 90-year-old farmhouse, at the end of a winding dirt-and-gravel road, Lt. Colonel<br />
Karen Kwiatkowski is perched on a plastic chair, wearing shorts, a purple sweatshirt, and muddy<br />
sneakers. Two scrawny dogs and a lone cat are'on the prowl, and tne air is filled with swarms<br />
So far, she says, no investigators have come knocking. Not from the Central Intelligence Agency,<br />
which conducted an internal inquiry into intelligence on Iraq, not from the congressional<br />
inteiligence committees, not from the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. All of those<br />
bodies.are ostensibly looking into the Bush administration's prewar Iraq intelligence, amid<br />
charges that the White House and the Pentagon exaggerated, distorted, or j~st plain lied about<br />
Iraq's links to AI Qaeda terrorists and its possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical<br />
weapons. In her hands, Kwiatkowski holds several pieces of the puzzle. Yet she, along with a<br />
score of other career officers recenUy retired or shuffled off to other jobs, has not been<br />
approached by anyone.<br />
Kwiatkowski, 43, a now-retired Air Force officer who served in the Pentagon's Near East and<br />
·South Asia (NESA) unit in the year before the invasion of Iraq, observed how the Pentagon's Iraq<br />
war-planning unit manufactured scare stories about Iraq's weapons and ties to' terrorists., "It<br />
wasn't intelligence-it was propaganda," she says. "They'd take a little bit of intelligence, cherrypick<br />
it" make it sound much more exciting, usually by taking it out of context, often by<br />
juxtaposition of two pieces of information that don't belong together." It was by turning such bogus<br />
intelligence into talking points for U.S. officials-including lSminous lines in speeches by President<br />
Bush and Vice President Cheney, along with Secretary of State Colin Powell'.s testimony at t~e<br />
U.N. Security Council last February-that the administration pushed Ainerican public opinion into<br />
supporting an unnecessary war.<br />
Until now, the story of how the Bush administration produced its wildly exaggerated estimates of<br />
the threat posed by Iraq has never been revealeCf in full. But, for the first time, a detailed<br />
investigation by Mother Jones, based on dozens of interviews-some on the record. some with<br />
officials who insisted on anonymity-exposes the workings of a secret Pentagon intelligence unit<br />
and of the Defense Department's war-planning task force, the"Office of Special Plans. It's the<br />
story of a close-knit team of ideologues who spent a decade or more hammering out plans for an<br />
attack on Iraq and who used the events of September 11, 2001" to set it into motion.<br />
SIX MONTHS AFTER THE END of major combat in Iraq, the United States had spent $300<br />
million trying to find banned weapons in Iraq, and President Bush was.seekiflg $600 million more<br />
to extend the search., Not found were Iraq's Scuds and other long-range missiles, thousands of<br />
barrels and tons of anthrax and botulism stock, sarin and VX nerve agents, mustard gas,<br />
biological and chemical munitions, mobile labs for producing biological weapons, and any and all<br />
evidence of a reconstituted nuclear-arms program, all of which had been repeatedly cited as<br />
justification for the war. Also missing was evidence of Iraqi collaboration with AI Qaeda.<br />
The reports, virtually all false, of Iraqi weapons and terrorism ties emanated from an apparatus<br />
that began to gestate almost as soon as the Bush administration took power. In.the very first<br />
meeting of the Bush national-security team, one day after President Bush took the oath of office<br />
in January 2001 , the issue of invading Iraq was raised. according to one of the participants in the<br />
meeting-and officials all the way down the line started to get the message, long before 9/11.<br />
Indeed, the Bush team at the Pentagon hadn't even been formally installed before Paul<br />
B~<br />
· ,<br />
,CQ<br />
Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of Defense, and Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of Defense for<br />
policy, began putting together what would become the vanguard for regime change in Iraq.<br />
Both Wolfowitz and Feith have deep roots in the neoconservative.movement. One of the most<br />
influential Washington neoconservatives in the foreign-policy establishment during the .<br />
Republicans' wilderness years Qf the 1990s, Wolfowitz has long held that not taking Baghdad in<br />
1991 was a grievous mistake. He and others now prominent in the administration said so<br />
repeatedly over the past decade in a slew of letters and policy papers from neoconservative<br />
groups like the Project for the New American Century and the Committee for the Liberation of<br />
Iraq. Feith, a former aide to Richard Perle at the Pentagon in the 1980s and an activist in far-right<br />
Zionist circles, held the view that there was no difference between U.S. and Israeli security policy<br />
and that the best way to secure both countries' future was to solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem<br />
not by serving as a broker, but with the United States as a force for "regime change" in the<br />
region.<br />
Called in to help organize the Iraq war-planning team was a longtime Pentagon official, Harold<br />
Rhode, a specialist on Islam who speaks Hebrew, Arabic, Turkish, and Farsi.>Though Feith would<br />
not be officially confirmed until July 2001, career military and civilian officials in NESA began to<br />
watch his office with concern after Rhode set up shop in Feith's office in early January. Rhode,<br />
seen by many veteran staffers as an ideological gadfly, was officially assigned to the Pentagon's<br />
Office of Net Assessment. an in-house Pentagon think tank headed by fellow neocon Andrew<br />
Marshall. Rhode helped Feith lay down the law about the department's new anti-Iraq, and broadly<br />
anti-Arab, orientation. In one telling incident. Rhode accosted and harangued a visiting senior<br />
Arab diplomat, telling him that there would be no "bartering in the bazaar anymore.... You're going<br />
to have to sit up and pay atlention when we say so."<br />
Rhode refused to be interviewed for this story, saying cryptically, "Those who speak, pay."<br />
According to insiders, Rhode worked with Feith to purge career Defense'officials who weren't<br />
sufficiently enthusiastic about the muscular anti-Iraq crusade that Wolfowitz and Feith wanted.<br />
Rhode appeared to be "pulling people out of nooks and crannies of the Defense Intelligence<br />
Agency and other places to replace us with," says a former analyst. "They wanted nothing to do<br />
with the professional staff. And they wanted us the fuck out of there."<br />
The unofficial, off-si~e recruitment office for Feith and Rhode was the American Enterprise<br />
Institute,'a right-wing think tank whose 12th-floor conference room in Washington is named for<br />
the dean of neoconservative defense strategists, the late Albert Wohlstetter, an influential RAND'<br />
analyst and University of Chicago mathematician. Headquartered at AEI is Richard Perle,<br />
Wohlstetter's prize protege, the godfather of the AEI-Defense Department nexus of<br />
neoconservatives who was chairman of the Pentagon's influential Defense Policy Board. Rhode,<br />
along with Michael RUbin, a former AEI staffer who is also now at the Pentagon, was a ubiquitous<br />
presence at AEI conferences on Iraq over the past two years, and the two Pentagon officials<br />
seemed almost to be serving as stage managers for the AEI events, often sitting in the front row<br />
and speaking in stage Whispers to panelists and AEI officials. Just after September 11, 2001,<br />
Feith and Rhode recruited David Wurmser, the director of Middle East studies for AEI, to serve as<br />
a Pentagon consultant.<br />
Wurmser would be the founding participant of the unnamed, secret intelligence unit at the<br />
Pentagon, set up if1 Feith's office, which would be the nucleus of the Defense Department's Iraq<br />
disinformation campaign that was established within weeks of the attacks in New York and<br />
Washington. While the CIA and other intelligence agencies concentrated on Osama bin Laden's<br />
AI Qaeda as the culprit in the 9/11 att.acks, Wolfowitz and Feith obsessively focused on Iraq. It<br />
was a theory that was discredited, even ridiculed, among intelligence professionals. Daniel<br />
Benjamin, co-author of The Age of Sacred Terror, was director of counterterrorism at the National<br />
Security Council in the late 1990s. "In 1998, we went through every piece of intelligence we could<br />
find to see if there was a link between AI Oaeda and Iraq," he says. 'We came to the conclusion<br />
that our intelligence agencies had it right: -There was no noteworthy relationship between AI<br />
Qaeda and Iraq. I know that fora fact." Indeed, that was the consensus amqng virtually all antiterrorism<br />
specialists.
o<br />
In short, Wurmser, backed by Feith and Rhode, set out to prove(what didn't exist.<br />
IN AN ADMINISTRATION devoted to the notion of "Feith-based intelligence," Wurmser was ideal.<br />
For years, he'd been a shrill ideologue" part of the minority crusade during the 1990s that was<br />
beating the drums for war againstlraq. Along with, Perle and Feith, in 1996 Wurmser and his wife,<br />
Meyrav" wrote a provocative strategy paper for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu called<br />
"A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm." It called on Israel to work with Jordan<br />
and Turkey to "contain, destabilize and·roll back" various states in the region, overthrow Saddam<br />
Hussein in Iraq, press Jordan to res'tore a scion of the Hashemite dynasty to the Iraqi throne, and,<br />
above all, launch military assaults against Lebanon and Syria as a "prelude to a redrawing ofthe<br />
map of the Middle East which would threaten Syria's territorial integrity."<br />
In 1997, Wurmserwrote a column in the Wall Street Journal called "Iraq Needs a Revolution" and<br />
the next year co-signed a letter with Perle calling for all-out U.S. support of the Iraqi National<br />
Congress (INC), an exile group led by Ahmad Chalabi, in promoting an insurgency in Iraq. At AEI,<br />
Wurmser wrote Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein, essentially a booklength<br />
version of "A Clean Break" that proposed an alliance between Jordan and the INC to<br />
redraw the map of the Middle East. Among the mentors cited by Wurmser in the book: Chalabi,<br />
Perle, and Feith.<br />
The purpose of the unnamed intelligence unit, often described as a Pentagon "cell," was to scour<br />
reports from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other<br />
agencies to find nuggets of information linking Iraq, AI Oaeda, terrorism, and the existence of<br />
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In a controversial press briefing in October 2002, a<br />
year after Wurmser's unit was established, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged<br />
that a primary purpose of the unit was to cull factoids, which were then used to disparage,<br />
undermine, and contradict the CIA's reporting, which was far more cautious and nuanced than<br />
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith wanted. Rumsfeld particularly enjoyed harassing the CIA staffer<br />
who briefed him every morning, using the type of data produced by the intelligence unit. 'What I<br />
could do is say, 'Gee, what about this?'" Rumsfeld noted. "'Or what about that? Has somebody<br />
thought of this?'" Last June, when Feith was questioned on the same topic at a briefing, he<br />
acknowledged that the secret unit in fact looked at the connection between Iraq and terrorism,<br />
saying, "You can't rely on deterrence to deal with the problem of weapons of mass destruction in<br />
the hands of state sponsors of terrorism because [of] the possibility that those state sponsors<br />
might employ chemical weapons'or biological weapons by means of a terrorist organization<br />
proxy...."<br />
Though Feith, in that briefing, described Wurmser's unit as an innocent project, "a global<br />
exercise" that was not meant to put pressure on other intelligence agencies or create skewed<br />
intelligence to fit preconceived policy notions, many other sources assert that it did exactly that.<br />
That the White House and the'Pentagon put enormous pressure on the CIA to go along with its<br />
version of events has been widely reported, highlighted by visits to CIA headquarters by Vice<br />
President Cheney and Lewis Libby, his chief of staff. Led by Perle, the neocons seethed with<br />
contempt for the CIA. The CIA'S analysis, said Perle, "isn't worth the paper it's printed on."<br />
Standing in a crowded hallway during an AEI event, Perle added, "The CIA is status quo oriented.<br />
They don't want to take risks."<br />
That became the mantra of the shadow agency within an agency.,<br />
Putting Wurmser in charge of the unit meant that it was being run by a pro-Iraq-war ideologue<br />
who'd spent years calling for a pre-emptive invasion of Baghdad and who was clearly<br />
predisposed to find what he wanted to see. Adding another layer of dubious quality to the<br />
endeavor was the man partnered with Wurmser, F. Michael Maloof•. Maloof, a former aide to<br />
Perle in the 1980s Pentagon, was twice stripped of his high-level security clearances-once in late<br />
2001 and again last spring, for various infractions. Maloof was also reportedly involved in a<br />
bizarre scheme to broker contacts between Iraqi officials and the Pentagon, channeled through<br />
Perle. in what one report called a "rogue [intelligence) operation" outside official CIA and Defense<br />
Intelligence Agency channels.
o<br />
As the momentum for war began to build in early 2002, Wolfowitz and Feith beefed up the<br />
intelligence unit and created an Iraq war-planning unit in the Pentagon's Near East and South<br />
Asia Affairs section, run by Deputy Undersecretary of Defense William Luti, under the rubric<br />
"Office of Special Plans,,"or OSP; the new unit's director was Abram N. Shulsky. By then,<br />
Wurmser had moved on to a post as senior adviser to Undersecretary of State John Bolton, yet<br />
another neocon, who was in charge of the State Department's disarmament, proliferation, and<br />
WMD office and was promoting the Iraq war strategy there. Shulsky's OSP, which incorporated<br />
the secret intelligence unit, took control, banishing veteran experts-including Joseph McMillan,<br />
James Russell, Larry Hanauer, and Marybeth McDevitt-who, despite years of service to NESA,<br />
either were shuffled off to other positions or retired. For the next year, Luti and Shulsky not only<br />
would oversee war plans but would act aggressively to shape the intelligence product received by<br />
the White House.<br />
Both Luti and Shulsky were neoconservatives who were ideological soulmates of Wolfowitz and<br />
Feith. But Luti was more than that. He'd come to the Pentagon direct,y from the office of Vice<br />
President Cheney. That gave Luti, a recently retired, decorated Navy captain whose career ran<br />
from combat aviation to command of a helicopter assault ship, extra clout. Along with his<br />
colleague Colonel William Bruner, Luti had done a stint as an aide to Newt Gingrich in 1996 and,<br />
like Perle and Wolfowitz, was an acolyte of Wohlstetter's. "He makes Ollie North look like a<br />
moderate," says a NESA veteran.<br />
Shulsky had been on the Washington scene since the mid-1970s. As a Senate intelligence<br />
committee staffer forSenator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, he began to work with early<br />
neoconservatives like Perle, who was then an aide to Senator Henry Jackson. Later, in the<br />
Reagan years, Shulsky followed Perle to the Pentagon as Perle's arms-control adviser. In the<br />
'90s, Shulsky co-authored a book on intelligence called Silent Warfare, with Gary Schmitt.<br />
Shulsky had served with Schmitt on Moynihan's staff and they had remained friends. Asked about<br />
the Pentagon's Iraq intelligence "cell," Schmitt-who is currently the executive director of the<br />
Project for the New American Century-says that he can't say much about it "because one of my<br />
best friends is running it.,"<br />
According to U. Colonel KWiatkowski, Luti and Shulsky ran NESA and the Office of Special Plans<br />
with brutal efficiency, purging people they disagreed with and enforcing the party line. "It was<br />
organized like a machine," she says. "The people working on the neocon agenda had a narrow,<br />
well-defined political agenda. They had a sense of mission." At NESA, Shulsky, she says, began<br />
"hot-desking," or taking an office wherever he could find one, working with Feith and Luti, before<br />
formally taking the reins of the newly created OSP. Together, she says, Luti and Shulsky turned<br />
cherry-picked pieces of uncorroborated, anti-Iraq intelligence into talking points, on issues like<br />
Iraq's WMD and its links to AI Oaeda. Shulsky constantly updated these papers, drawing on the<br />
intelligence unit, and circulated them to Pentagon officials, including Rumsfeld, and to Vice<br />
President Cheney. "Of course, we never thought they'd go directly to the White House," she<br />
adds.<br />
Kwiatkowski recalls one meeting in which Luti, pressed to finish a report, told the staff, "I've got to<br />
get this over to 'Scooter' right away." She later found out that "Scooter" was none other than<br />
Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Cheney's chief of staff. According to KWiatkowski, Cheney<br />
had direct ties through.Luti into NESA/OSP, a connection that was highly unorthodox.<br />
"Never, ever, ever would a deputy undersecretary of Defense work directly on a project for the<br />
vice president," she says. "It was a little clue that we had an informal network into Vice President<br />
Cheney's office."<br />
Although Feith insists that the OSP did not seek to gather its own intelligence, Kwiatkowski and<br />
others sharply disagree. Staff working for Luti and Shulsky in NESA/OSP churned out<br />
propaganda-style intelligence, she says. As an example, she cited the work of a U.S. intelligence<br />
officer and Arabic specialist, Navy Lt. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, who was a special<br />
assistant to Luti. "His job was to peruse the Arabic-language media to find articles that would<br />
incriminate Saddam Hussein about terrorism, and he translated these.II Such raw intelligence is<br />
usually subject to a thorough vetting process, tracked, verified, and checked by intelligence
e<br />
o<br />
professionals. But not at OSP-the material that it produced found its way directly into speeches by<br />
Bush, Cheney, and other officials.<br />
According to Melvin Goodman, a former CIA official and an intelligence specialist at the National<br />
War College, the OSP officials routinely pushed lower-ranking staff around on intelligence<br />
matters. "People were being pUlled aside [and being told], We saw your last piece and it's not<br />
what we're looking for,'" he says. "It was pretty blatant." Two State Department intelligence<br />
officials, Greg Thielmann and Christian Westermann, have both charged that pressure was being<br />
put on them to shape intelligence to fit policy, in particular from Bolton's office. ''The AI Oaeda<br />
connection and nuclear weapons issue were the only two ways that you could link Iraq to an<br />
imminent security threat to the U.S.," Thielmann told the·New York Times. "And the<br />
administration was grossly distorting the intelligence on both things."<br />
BESIDES CHENEY, key members of the Pentagon's D~fense Policy Board, including Perle and<br />
ex-House Speaker Newt Gingrich, all Iraq hawks, had direct input into NESAlOSP. The offices of<br />
NESA were located on the Pentagon's fourth floor, seventh corridor of 0 Ring, and the Policy<br />
Board's offices were directly below, on the ttaird floor. During .the run-up to the Iraq-war, Gingrich<br />
often came up for closed-door meetings with luti, who in 1996 had served as a congressional<br />
fellow in Speaker of the House Gingrich's office.<br />
As OSP got rolling, Luti brought in Colonel Bruner, a former military aide to Gingrich, and,<br />
together, luti and Bruner opened the door to a vast flow of bogus intelligence fed to the Pentagon<br />
by Iraqi defectors associated with Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress group of exiles. Chalabi<br />
founded the'lraqi National Congress in 1992, with the help of a shadowy CIA-connected publicrelations<br />
firm called the Rendon Group, one of whose former employees, Francis Brooke, has<br />
been a top aide to Chalabi ever since. A scion of an aristocratic Iraqi family, Chalabi fled Baghdad<br />
at the age of 13, in 1958, when the corrupt Iraqi Hashemite monarchy was overthrown by a<br />
coalition of communists and the Iraqi military. In the late 1960s, Chalabi studied mathematics at<br />
the University of Chicago with Wohlstelter, who introduced him to Richard Perle more than a<br />
decade later. Long associated with the heart of the neoconservative movement, Chalabi founded<br />
Petra Bank in Jordan, Which grew to be Jordan's third-largest bank by the 1980s. But Chalabi<br />
was accused of bank fraud, embezzlement, and currency manipulation, and he barely escaped<br />
before Jordanian authorities could arrest him; in 1992, he was convicted and sentenced in<br />
absentia to more than 20 years of hard labor. After founding the INC, Chalabi's bungling"<br />
unreliability, and penchant for mismanaging funds caused the CIA to s0l.!r on him, but he never<br />
lost the support of Perle, Feith, Gingrich, and their allies; once, soon after 9/11, Perle invited<br />
Chalabi to address the Defense Policy Board.<br />
According to multiple sources, Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress sent a steady stream of<br />
misleading and often faked intelligence reports into U.S. inteUigence channels., That information<br />
would flow sometimes into NESA/OSP directly, sometimes through Defense Intelligence Agency<br />
debriefings of Iraqi defectors via the Defense Human Intelligence Service, and sometimes<br />
through the INC's own U.S.-funded Intelligence Collection Program, which was overseen by the<br />
Pentagon. The INC's intelligence "isn't reliable at all," according to Vincent Cannistraro, a former<br />
CIA chief of counterterrorism.<br />
"Much of it is propaganda. Much of it is telling the Defense Department what they want to hear,<br />
using alleged inform~nts and defectors who say what Chalabi wants them to say, [creating]<br />
cooked inform~tion that goes right into presidential and vice presidential speeches."<br />
Bruner, the aide to Luti and Gingrich's former staffer, ''was Chalabi'shandler," says Kwiatkowski.<br />
"He would arrange meetings with Chalabi and Chalabi's folks." she says, adding that the INC<br />
leader often brought people into the NESA/OSP offices for debriefings. Chalabi claims to have<br />
introduced only three actual defectors to the Pentagon, a figure Thielmann considers "awfully<br />
low." However, according to an investigation by the los Angeles Times. the three defectors<br />
provided by Chalabi turned up exactly zero useful intelligence. The first. an Iraqi engineer,<br />
claimed to have specific information about biological weapons, but his information didn't pan out;<br />
the second claimed to know about mobile labs, but that information, too, was worthless; and the<br />
third, who claimed to have data about Iraq's nuclear program, proved to be a fraud. Chalabi also
.. • • t<br />
G<br />
-<br />
claimed to have given the Pentagon information about Iraqi support for AI Oaeda. 'We gave the<br />
names of people who were doing the links," he told an interviewer from PBS'S Frontline. Those<br />
links, of course, have not been discovered. Thielmann told the same Frontline interviewer that the<br />
Office of Special Plans didn't apply strict intelligence~verification standards to "some of the<br />
information coming out of Chalabi and the INC that OSP and the Pentagon ran with~"<br />
In the war's aftermath, the Defense Intelligence Agency-which is not beholden to the<br />
neoconservative civilians at the Pentagon-leaked a report it prepared, concluding that few, if any,<br />
of the INC's informants provided worthwhile intelligence.<br />
SO FAR, DESPITE ALL of the investigations underway" there is little sign thatany of them are<br />
going to delve into the operations of the Luti-Shulsky Office of Special Plans and its secret<br />
intelligence unit. Because it operates in the Pentagon's policy shop, it is not officially part of the<br />
intelligence community, and so it is seemingly immune to congressional oversight.<br />
With each passing day, it is becoming excruciatingly clearer just how wrong U.S. ~ntelligence was<br />
in regard to Iraqi weapons and support for terrorism. The American teams of inspectors in the<br />
Iraq Survey Group, which has employed up to 1,400 people to scour the country and analyze the<br />
findings, have not been able to find a shred of evidence of anything other than dusty old plans<br />
and records of weapons apparently destroyed more than a decade ago. Countless examples of<br />
fruitless searches have been reported in the media. To cite one example: U.S. soldiers followed<br />
an intelligence report claiming that a complex built for Uday Hussein, Saddam's son, hid a<br />
weapons warehouse with poison-gas storage tanks. "Well," U.S. Army Major Ronald Hann Jr. t~ld<br />
the Los Angeles Times, "the warehouse was a carport. It still had two cars inside. And the tanks<br />
had propane for the kitchen."<br />
Countless other errors and exaggerations have become evident. The thousands of aluminum<br />
tubes supposedly imported by Iraq for uranium enrichment were fairly conclusively found to be<br />
designed to build noncontroversial rockets. The long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, allegedly<br />
built to deliver bioweapons, were small, rickety, experimental planes with wood frames. The<br />
mobile bioweapon labs turned out to have had other, ,civilian purposes. And the granddaddy of all<br />
falsehoods, the charge. that Iraq sought uranium in the West African country of Niger, was based<br />
on forged documents-documents that the CIA, the State Department, and other agencies knew<br />
were fake nearly a year before President Bush highlighted the issue in his State of the Union<br />
address in January 2003.<br />
"Either the system broke down," former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who was sent by the CIA to<br />
visit Niger and whose findings helped show that the documents were forged, told Mother Jones,<br />
"or there was selective use of bits of information to justify a decision to go to war that had already<br />
been taken."<br />
Edward Luttwak, ~ neoconservative scholar and ~uthor, says flatly that the Bush administration<br />
lied about the intelligence it had because it was afraid to go to the American people and say that<br />
the war was simply about getting rid of Saddam Hussein. Instead, says Luttwak, the White House<br />
was groping for a rationale to satisfy the United Nations' criteria for war. "Cheney was forced into<br />
this fake posture of worrying about weapons of mass destruction," he says. "The ties to AI<br />
Qaeda? That's complete nonsense."<br />
In the Senate, Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) is pressing for the Intelligence Committee to<br />
extend its investigation to look into the specific role of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, but<br />
there is strong Republican resistance to the idea.<br />
In the House, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) has introduced legislation calling for a commission<br />
to investigate the intelligence mess and has collected more than a hundred Democrats-but no<br />
RepUblicans-in support of it. "I think they need to be"looked at pretty carefully,II Waxman told<br />
Mother Jones when asked about the Office of Special Plans. "lid like to know whether the political<br />
people pushed the intelligence people to slant their conclusions."<br />
Congressman Waxman, meet Lt. Colonel Kwiatkowski.
-T'<br />
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Document 8 of 8<br />
Copyright 2003 The Washington Post<br />
The Washington Post<br />
June 15, 2003 Sunday<br />
Final Edition<br />
HEADLINE: Pressure Builds for President to Declare Strategy on Iran<br />
BYLINE: Michael Dobbs, Washington Post Staff Writer<br />
BODY:<br />
Soon after George W. Bush took office In January 2001, his advisers began drafting a strategy fo'r dealing with Iran, a radical Islamic<br />
state long suspected by Washington of supporting International terrorism and pursuing weapons of mass· destruction.<br />
More than two years later, the national security presidential directive on Iran has gone through several competing drafts and has yet<br />
to be approved by Bush's senior advisers, according to well-placed sources. In the meantime, experts In and outside the government<br />
are focusing on Iran as the United States' next big foreign policy crisis, with some predicting that the country could acquire a nuclear<br />
weapon as early as 2006.<br />
Critics on the left and the right point to the unfinished directive as evidence the administration lacks a coherent strategy toward a<br />
country Bush described as a key member of the "axis of eVil," along with North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Ir~q.<br />
"Our policy toward Iran Is neither fish nor fowl, neither engagement nor regime change," said Flynt L. Leverett, a Bush adviser on<br />
the Middle East who left the National Security Council staff In March and Is now with the Brookings Institution.<br />
The Bush·admlnlstratlon has yet to formulate a true Iran policy, agreed Michael A. Ledeen, a Middle East expert with the American<br />
Enterprise Institute. With other neoconservative Intellectuals, Ledeen has founded the Coalition for Democracy In Iran, which Is<br />
looking for ways to foment a democratic revolution to sweep away the ~ullahs who came to power In 1979.<br />
Senior administration officials refused to talk about the status of the Bush polley directive on Iran, on the grounds that It Is<br />
classified, but they say they have had some success In mobilizing International opinion against Iran's nuclear weapons program. As<br />
eVidence, they cite recent threats by Russia to cut off nuclear assistance to Tehran and moves by the International Atomic Energy<br />
Agency to censure Iran for failing to report the processing of nuclear·materials.<br />
While the officials have stopped short of embracing a policy of "regime change" In Iran, U.S. officials from Bush down have talked<br />
about prOViding moral support to the "reform movement" In Iran In Its struggle against an uneleeted government. As defined by<br />
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, the U.s. goal Is to speak directly to the Iranian·people "over the heads of their leaders to let them<br />
know that we agree with them.n<br />
The Internal and external debate about what to do about Iran.has been brought to a head by recent revelations suggesting the<br />
Iranian nuclear weapons program Is much further along than many suspected. Tomorrow, the IAEA Board of Governors In Vienna Is<br />
to discuss findings shOWing that Iran has a wide range of options for producing fissile material for a nuclear bomb, from using heavy<br />
water reactors to produce plutonium to experiments In uranium enrichment.<br />
U.S. officials have also accused Iran of harboring members of the al Qaeda terrorist network who escaped from Afghanistan after the<br />
fall of the Tallban In December 2001. Th~y say some al Qaeda supporters hiding In Iran appear to have known In advance about<br />
recent terrorist attacks In Saudi Arabia, although there Is no direct evidence of operational ties between the Iranian government and<br />
al Qaeda.<br />
The escalating Iranian nuclear threat and suspicions of Iranian ties to terrorists have sharpened long-standing divisions In the<br />
administration over how to deal with Tehran. In the past, the State Department has put the emphasis on opening a dialogue with<br />
r~forF!.llst elements In the .~ranla~ leadership while the Pentagon has been more Interested In looking for ways to destabilize the<br />
authoritarian Islamic government.<br />
'----
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Page2of2<br />
I BU,reaucratlc tensions have reached the level where eac~ s!de has begun accusing the other of leaking unfavorable storiesto the<br />
•mpdla to block policy Initiatives. "The knives are out,1I said a Pentagon official, who criticized national security adviser Condoleezza<br />
Rice for failing to end the dispute by Issuing clear policy guidelines.<br />
Powell, meanwhile, Insisted to Journalists that there has been no change In policy on Iran, despite what he depicted as frenzied<br />
media speculation "about what this person In that department might think or that person In another department might thlnk."<br />
The Iran debate goes back to a failed attempt by the Clinton administration to open an "unconditional dialogue" with Tehran. Even<br />
though the Iranians rejected the U.s. offer of unconditional talks, some Bush administration officials led by the State Department's<br />
director for policy planning, Richard N•. Haass, favored making renewed overtures.<br />
The proposals for a dialogue with Iran were partly Inspired by the 1994 framework agree~ent With North Korea under which the<br />
North Korean government agreed to accept International controls over Its nuclear program In return for economlc,asslstance,<br />
Including the construction of a civilian nuclear reactor. But the State Department approach ran Into strong opposition from the<br />
Pentagon and Vice President Cheney's.office, and was shot down In Interagency meetings at the end of 2001.<br />
While there would be no "grand bargain" with th!! Iranian leadership, the Bush administration agre,ed to a more limited diplomatic<br />
dialogue, focusing on specific areas such as the war In Afghanistan or cooperation over Iraq. Several rounds of such talks took place<br />
In Geneva and Paris, with the Involvement of a special presidential envoy, Zalmay Khalllzad, but were suspended after the bombings<br />
In Saudi Arabia on May 12.<br />
The administration debate has been echoed by a much more public debate among Middle East analysts, nuclear proliferation<br />
experts, and leaders of the Iranian dlaspora. Congress has also weighed In with legislation sponsored by Sen. Sam Brownback (R<br />
Kan.) that would funnel more than $ 50 million to Iranian pro-democracy Initiatives, Including prlyate California-based satellite<br />
television and radio stations set up by Iranian exiles.<br />
"We are not calling for a military attack on Iran," said Brownback, whose proposed IraI') Democracy Act has drawn bipartisan support<br />
but Is opposed by the leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee. The goal,he said, Is to support Iranian democracy activists,<br />
Including students Who took to the streets of Tehran again last week to protest the closure of opposition ne~spaper and the jailing of<br />
dissidents.<br />
Just how far the United States should go In supporting the protests Is the subject of heated argument Inside and outside the<br />
government, even among conservatives. Some argue Iran Is ripe for revolution. Others contend there Is little guarantee of radical<br />
change In Tehran In the three-year period some Independent proliferation experts estimate it will take before Iran could acquire<br />
nuclear weapons, and the United States should be thinking about other options, including preemptive action against suspected<br />
nuclear sites.<br />
"The Internal democratic forces In Iran are real and growing,. but they're not going to save us from having to think about what we •<br />
are going to do about theJranlan nuclear program and support for terrorlsm," said Reuel Marc Gerecht, a CIA case officer for Iran<br />
now with the American Enterprise Institute.<br />
Some analysts say that U.S. financial and propaganda support for the Iranian democracy movement could be counterproductive. lilt<br />
allows the hardliners to argue that there Is an external threat, and they must crack down In the name of national unlty," said Kaveh<br />
Ehsanl, an editor of the pro-reform journal Dialogue In Iran, now visiting the United States. ''There Is a kind of an unholy alliance<br />
between the Bush administration and the Iranian hardllners."<br />
•<br />
"We have tried appeasement, we have tried containment, and we h'ave tried engagement," countered S. Rob Sobhanl, a co-founder<br />
of the Coalition for Democracy In Iran and adjunct professor of government at Georgetown University. "All these policies have failed.<br />
What have we got to lose by empowerment?"<br />
The White House has avoided taking a position on the Brownback legislation and has restricted Its encouragement of democracy In<br />
Iran to verbal broadsides against the mullahs. In comments Thursday, Rice described Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction<br />
as "not acceptable" and said that the United States "cannot tolerate circumstances In which at Qaeda operatives come In and out of<br />
Iran." She also accused Iran of stirring up trouble among ShIIte communities In southern Iraq.<br />
'<br />
"We have to stand with the aspirations of the Iranian people which have been clearly expressed," she told a meeting in los Angeles,<br />
as thousands of Iranians took to the streets of Tehran In anti-government protests.<br />
LOAD-DATE: June 15, 2003
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"=' Re~Ole Change In Iran'? One Man's Secret Plan.<br />
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'Newsweek<br />
December 22, 2003<br />
Periscope<br />
ALL FBI INFO~~TION CONTAI~mD<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
Regime Change In Iran? One Man's Secret Plan.<br />
Iran's Cllalabi? Manucller Gizorbanij'ar says he talked secretly witll Pentagon officials<br />
ahoutplansfor regime cllallge in Iran<br />
By Mark Hosenball<br />
What was international man ofmystery Manucher Ghorbanifar up to when he met with top Pentagon<br />
experts on Iran? In a NEWSWEEK interview in Paris last month, Ghorbanifar, a former Iranian spy who<br />
helped launch the Iran-contra affair, says one ofthe things he discussed with Defense officials Harold<br />
Rhode and Larry Franklin at meetings in Rome in December 2001 (and in Paris last June with only<br />
Rh9de) was regime change in Iran. Ghorbanifar says there are Iranians capable oforganizing a peaceful<br />
revolution against the ruling theocracy. He says his contacts know where Saddam Hussein,hid $340<br />
million in cash. With American help, he says, this money could be retrieved and halfused to overthrow<br />
the ayatollahs. (The other halfwould be turned overto the United States.) Ghorbanifar says he told his<br />
U.S. interlocutors that ousting the mullahs would be a breakthrough in the war on terror because top<br />
Qaeda leade.rs, including Osama bin Laden, are in Iran. (ltyou wonlt be surprised ifyou find that Saddam<br />
Hussein is on one ofthe Iranian islands.It) Among other intel Ghorbanifar says he arid associates gave the<br />
Pentagon: a warning that terrorists in Iraq would a~ck hotels. He also says he had advance info about<br />
Iranian nukes and a terrorist plot in Canada. Financial gain was never his objective, he says: "We wanted<br />
to give them the money, not to take the money."<br />
lofl<br />
The Pentagon cut offcontact with Ghorbanifar, whom the CIA years ago labeled as a fabricator, after _<br />
news about the talks broke last summer. But controversy about the Iranian still reverberates in<br />
Washington. Administration sources say that when White House officials OK'd what they believed was a<br />
Pentagon effort to gather info about Iranian terrorist activity in Afghanistan, they didn't know<br />
Ghorbanifar was involved. When senior officials learned in 2002 about Ghorbanifar--and that regime<br />
change was on his agenda-they decided further contacts were "not worth pursuing." But Ghorbanifar<br />
says he continued to communicate with Rhode, and sometimes Franklin, by phone and fax five or six<br />
times a week until shortly after the Paris meeting last summer. (The Pentagon says any such contacts<br />
were sporadic and not authorized by top officials.) In Congress, investigations into the Ghorbanifar story<br />
have sparked partisan tensions. Democrats'want to know ifthe Ghorbanifar contacts are evidence of<br />
"rogue" espionage by a secretive Pentagon unit that allegedly dealt with controversial Iraqi exile Ahmad<br />
Chalabi; Republicans want to know whether the CIA refused to meet with potential informants merely<br />
because the middleman-Ghorbanifar--was someone the agency distrusted. A. Defense official says any<br />
discussion that Ghorbanifar had w~th Pentagon experts about regime change was a "one-way<br />
conversation."<br />
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WASHINGTON JOURNAL C-SPAN<br />
7:45 AM JANU~RY 1,2004<br />
ALL INFOP.NATION C01JTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-2~-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
.<br />
U.S. Intelligence in Iraq<br />
CONNIE BROD: Robert Dreyfuss is a contributing editor for Mother Jones and the<br />
January-February edition ofMother Jones has the<br />
hit cover story by him called, liThe Lie Factory.1I What is the lie factory?<br />
ROBERT DREYFUSS [Contributing Editor, Mother Jones]: Well, I called the lie factory.<br />
It's kind ofbroader than "that. There was lies,<br />
but also distortions and exaggerations. I'm referring to the unit inside the Pentagon that<br />
prepared intelligence reports and talking papers<br />
for senior U.S. officials in the period going up to the war with Iraq.<br />
Now, that the war is over and we know that we found exactly zero evidence ofties<br />
between Iraq anp. al Qaeda and zero evidence of<br />
tie~ between Iraq and weapons ofmass destruction, it's way past time that we went back<br />
and looked at how did they get this so wrong?<br />
The administration is already trying to change the subject, as you know, they're saying,<br />
well, it wasn't about weapons ofmass<br />
destruction, Saddam was a bad guy and the world is safer now. I guess I'm amazed that<br />
he's been able to get away with that so far, the<br />
President.<br />
BROD: You went all the way b~ck to the day after the President took office to begin this<br />
story about this office. What happened that<br />
day?<br />
DREYFUSS: Well, one day after the President was sworn in they had a meeting oftheir<br />
national security team. And one ofthe top items<br />
on the agenda ofthat meeting -- this was nine months before 9/11 was regime change in<br />
Iraq. And ofcourse there's a reason for that,<br />
many ofthe senior officials who took up places in the Bush administration have long<br />
been on record, some ofthem for as long as a<br />
decade going back to the first GulfWar that the United States had a responsibility to go<br />
in militarily and get rid ofSaddam Hussein.<br />
So there had been a drumbeat from afairly small but well organized group offormer U.S.<br />
officials, many ofthem intelligence people,<br />
and, ofcourse, the Iraqi exile groups that they were associated with to bring about regime<br />
change. And that meeting that you referred to<br />
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really was the first ofmany efforts to start to focus this administration on Iraq. And they<br />
started to putting into place the people in various<br />
parts ofthe Pentagon~ especially who would undertake tnat. And ofcourse it wasn't until<br />
after 9/11 that the political will suddenly<br />
materialized and they realized thatthey could sell this policy, first ofall to the President<br />
and then second ofall to the America~ people.<br />
BROD: Some ofthe figures who you talk about in here are very well known -- Newt<br />
Gingrich,.Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, but you<br />
also concentrate a lot on a gentleman who may not be as well known, Douglas Feith.<br />
Who is he? And what was his role in this office -.<br />
secret office set up?<br />
DREYFUSS: Well, Doug Feith works directly under Paul Wolfowitz as the person at the<br />
Pentagon in charge ofpolicy. He's a senior<br />
official at the Pentagon, a civilian, not a military person. And he and Wolfowitz both<br />
have long roots in the neo-conservative movement.<br />
Doug Feith's law firm, Feith and ZeU, which had been around for the years before the<br />
administration took power, has a big Israeli office .<br />
and a lot ofties to the right wing Israeli government, the settler movement in Israel, and<br />
so forth. And Feith was a leading advocate in the<br />
1990s for going to war in Iraq long before the Bush administration took office.<br />
So he was kind ofan ideblogue and it was his job to put.together the team that would<br />
undertake the actual war planning inside the<br />
Pentagon and not just war planning in a technical sense, but also the policy and<br />
propaganda aspects ofhow to justify that war.<br />
BROD: Now,_ you talk -- this office, was it physically an office? Could people go the~e?<br />
DREYFUSS: Well, it was physically an office. What happened was under Doug Feith<br />
there is a second office which is sort ofthe .<br />
regional planning components ofthe Pentagon, there's one for each part ofthe world, and<br />
the Near East and.South Asian affairs office,<br />
which is called NESA, was headed up by a man named Bill Lootey, who is a former<br />
N~wt Gingrich aide who is also a longtime<br />
neoconservative and a U.S. Navycap~ain, former captain. And:.Bill Lootey headed up the<br />
office called NESA. And that was because<br />
Iraq is located in Near East, or Middle East. That was the office that Feith used to build<br />
up and create as the Office ofSpecial Plans.<br />
They gave that name to it in 2002 because they didri't want to tip their hand that they<br />
were definitely planning a war, so they gave it a<br />
meaningless name, special plans. But it was really the office for Iraq plans.<br />
BROD: And how did the office work?<br />
2<br />
UNCLASSIFIED
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DREYFUSS: Well~ it started out actually as an intelligence group ofjust two or three<br />
people and it expanded to four or five people, but<br />
it started out right after 9/11 in 2001 when Doug Feith and a man named Harold Rhode,<br />
who 'is another Pentagon official and a<br />
neo~onservative Middle East expert who speaks many languages from the region. And<br />
some others started putting ,together a team to try<br />
to link Iraq to what happened on 9/11. As we all knoW now, there was no connection<br />
between Iraq and 9/11. But they brought in a man<br />
named David Wormser who was at the time the head ofMiddle East Policy at the<br />
American Enterprise Institute.<br />
Now, AEI, American Enterprise Institute is where people like-Newt Gingrich and<br />
Richard Perle and many other neoconservatives and<br />
other conservatives sort ofhang out and use as their exile foreign policy shop. Wormser<br />
was brought in along with a guy named Mike<br />
Maloof and they were the first two p~ople who set up this little intelligence unit in the<br />
Pentagon that eventually grew and expanded and<br />
started churning out all ofthe misleading and distorted apd exaggerated efforts -- pieces<br />
ofinformation that were then handed to the<br />
various U.S. officials to run the propaganda to justify the war.<br />
They wanted to go into Iraq for grand strategic reasons, but they couldn'tjust say that<br />
and get the public behind them and certainly not<br />
Congress behind them. So they had to create the idea that Iraq was an imminent threat<br />
and the only way to do that was to say that Iraq<br />
was tied to terrorists who were planning to strike us and that Iraq had weapons ofmass<br />
destruction that could strike us.<br />
So Wormser and Maloofand then some ofthe other people who were brought into this<br />
job under Bill Lootey, under a guy named Abe<br />
Shulsky"who was later brought in.to run the Office ofSpecial Pl~ns, not only started<br />
picking and choosing among all the intelligence<br />
that's available, you know, there are tens ofthousands ofbits ofintelligence that go into a<br />
con~lusion. Well, they discarded the ones they<br />
didn't like and they seized on the ones that justified the cause that they were trying to<br />
pursue. And they would write up talking points in<br />
papers and so forth, which were not real intelligence, in fact, none ofthese people were<br />
intelligence professionals; they were ideologues,<br />
they were people who had a mission. And there's no disputing this, in other words, you<br />
can disput~ whether the war was a good thing or<br />
a bad thing and you can dispute whether Bush is kind ofa dunce or a genius. But you<br />
can't dispute the fact that this office was made of<br />
people who were first ofall not intelligence professionals and who purged -- fired,<br />
transferred a number ofpeople who were intelligence<br />
professionals because they disagreed with the conclusions that these ideologues were<br />
coming to.<br />
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They brought into this office as it expanded into probably a couple ofdozen people with<br />
maybe 50 or 100 people who would pass in ·<br />
and out ofit as contractors and helpers and supporters, they brought into people who<br />
were committed ideologically to the cause and<br />
who would come up with the conclusion they wanted. So all ofthe information that we<br />
later heard from people like Vice President<br />
Cheney and even the President about the aluminum tubes, about the uranium from Niger,<br />
about tlie unmanned aerial vehicles that could<br />
strike the United States, about thousands oftons ofterrible gasses and chemicals that<br />
were stored in Iraq, about its reconstituted nuclear<br />
program, about biological mobile labs, none ofthis existed. It was all a complete<br />
mythology.<br />
BROD: This is a complicated story and you have laid out the kind ofthe flow chart for<br />
this office in your piece and ifour camera could<br />
just go down you'll see some ofthe names ofthe people that youhave talked about. Our<br />
phone lines are also open. You can start dialing<br />
now ifyou're interested in talking with Mr. Dreyfuss.<br />
My question to you is: Who are your sources for this?<br />
DREYFUSS: Well, many ofthe people we talked to, we talked to on the record and they<br />
are quoted in there. I think the most<br />
courageous person ofall is Lieutenant Colonel Karen Ketkowsky who is now retired, but<br />
she served in the Office ofNESA, the Near<br />
East and South Asian affairs office for about a year and saw this up close. And she<br />
described to me in detail sitting on a wood porch in<br />
her farm now, she lives out in western Virginia. She described to me in detail how people<br />
she knew were purged and forced into -<br />
retirement in this office and how people were encouraged to come up with the kind of<br />
conclusions that the President and the Vice<br />
President seemed to want. She talked about how Vice President Cheney had his staff<br />
working directly with this Pentagon office, which is<br />
highly unusu~l. In otl!er words, this office was four levels down in the Pentagon.<br />
Normally its work would go to Bill Lootey, and then to<br />
Doug Feith, and then to Paul Wolfowitz, and then to Secretary ofDe(ense Rumsfeld. But,<br />
in fact, you had people like Newt Gingrich<br />
coming in constantly, people like Richard Perle and people like Vice President Cheney<br />
and his office, who were tasking this unit, saying<br />
what about this and what about that? And getting reports from, them. I mean it's highly<br />
unusual for the Vice President's office, which is<br />
not part ofthe Pentagon, as we know to have a direct working relationship with an office<br />
in the bowels ofthe Pentagon's civilian<br />
bureaucracy.<br />
4<br />
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BROD: Let's get-to some phone calls for you, first off, Westwood, New Jersey,<br />
Republican. Good morning.<br />
CALLER: Connie, happy New Year to you and Robert.<br />
DREYFUSS: Thank you.<br />
CALLER: I'm very, very interested in your flow chart and I'm a veteran ofWorld War<br />
II. My parents taught me never to lie. And so lies<br />
are very important to. me. The big lie at the present time, I think, is that judges have the<br />
right to make laws and I think you should be<br />
more interested in that because that has more far-reaching effects on everything,<br />
including what you're talking about. The big lie is that,<br />
for example, in Roe v. Wade.<br />
BROD: Caller, I'm sorry, but this is really way offthe subject ofwhat we're talking<br />
about this morning. We're going to let you go and<br />
try to stay on topic this morning. Burlington, Massachusetts, Democrat.<br />
,<br />
CALLER: Hi, good morping, Robert Dreyfuss.<br />
DREYFUSS: Good morning.<br />
CALLER: Fantastic subject this morning. Very similar to really an awesome chapter in<br />
the AI Franken book about lies and how that was<br />
-- when that administration came in it seemed like they were really trying to warn them<br />
about terrorist activities and they were trying to<br />
ignore it and ignore it and put their own thing into place and I'm sorry I don't have the<br />
book in front ofme, but it's a fantastic chapter<br />
right next to which you're talking about and I think everybody should read it.<br />
BROD: Have you read it, Mr. Dreyfuss?<br />
DREYFUSS: I haven't read AI's book yet, but it's on my list ofNew Year's reading.<br />
BROD: Greenville, South Carolina. Republican.<br />
CALLER: Good morning, how are you?<br />
BROD: Great.<br />
CALLER: I think that his whole premise is ajoke. And I think that you're just trying to<br />
grasp with straws to put down President Bush<br />
who is doing a.greatjob by the way I might add.<br />
BROD: Grasping at straws, Mr. Dreyfuss?<br />
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DREYFUSS: That's a silly comment. The President may be doing a great job or not<br />
doing a great job. This is a story about whether' ...<br />
there were weapons ofmass destruction in Iraq, which was the main rationale for<br />
mobilizing our entire nation to go to war. And the<br />
things weren't there and I thi~ we're going to ask why and what happened and why was ,.<br />
the President so wrong? I mean Senator Bill<br />
Nelson from Florida said the other day that he was told in a closed briefing that Iraq had<br />
unmanned aerial vehicles that can carry<br />
chemical weapons and biological weapons to the East Coast ofthe United States. Things<br />
like this are simply not true. When we finally<br />
got there we found these rickety old Wright brothers looking planes that couldn't have<br />
gotten out ofBaghdad airport, which were not<br />
'<br />
really military by the way at all.<br />
So the kinds ofexaggerations and distortions that got into the President's speeches, he<br />
said that in Cincinnati in a modified way about<br />
these vehicles that could attack the United States are ludicrous. And I'm just stunned at<br />
the fact that even supporters ofthe President<br />
and Republicans in Congress just dismissed this and say, well, Iraq is better off, so why<br />
are we bothering even to talk about these<br />
weapons when that was hammered and hammered and hammered for months that Iraq<br />
was an urgent threat to the·United States.<br />
BROD: Besides writing for Mother Jones as a contributing editor, Mr. Dreyfuss is also a<br />
contributing editor for The Nation magazine<br />
and a contributing writer for The American Prospect and a frequent contributor to Rolling<br />
Stone.<br />
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PIA HomeIWhat's New IProduetsJ)y T)3)el Products by Re8ionI~ I&1R.<br />
Mother Jones Magazine<br />
January/February 2004<br />
Pg.34<br />
The Lie Factory<br />
ALL FBI INFORMATION CbNTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS TlNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
Only weeks after 9/11, tile Busl, administration set up a secret Pelltagon unit to create<br />
ti,e casefor invading Iraq. Here is ti,e inside storyfor I,OW tlley puslied disinformation<br />
and bogus intelligellce and led ti,e nation to war.<br />
By Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest<br />
It's a crisp fall day in western Virginia, a hundred miles from Washington, D.C., and a breeze is rustling<br />
the red',and gold leaves ofthe Shenandoah hills. On the weather-beaten wood porch ofa ramshackle<br />
90-year-old farmhouse, at the end ofa winding dirt-and-gravel road, Lt. Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski is<br />
perched on a plastic chair, wearing shorts, a purple sweatshirt, and muddy sneakers. Two scrawny dogs<br />
and a lone cat are on the prowl, and tne air is filled with swarms<br />
So far, she says, no investigators have come knocking. Not from the Central Intelligence Agency, which<br />
conducted an internal inquiry into intelligence on Iraq, not from the congressional intelligence<br />
committees, not from the president's Foreign·Intelligence Advisory Board. All ofthose bodies are<br />
ostensibly looking into the Bush administration's prewar Iraq intelligence, amid charges that ~he White<br />
. House and the Pentagon exaggerated, distorted, or just plain lied about Iraq's links to Al Qaeda terrorists<br />
and its possession ofnuclear, biological, and chemical weapons., In her hands, Kwiatkowski holds<br />
several pieces ofthe puzzle. Yet she, along with a score ofother career officers recently retired or<br />
shuffled offto other jobs, has not been approached by anyone. .<br />
Kwiatkowski, 43, a pow-retired Air Force officer who served in the Pentagon's Near East and South Asia<br />
(NESA) unit in the year before the invasion ofIraq, observed how the Pentagon's Iraq war-planning unit<br />
manufactured scare stories about Iraq's weapons and ties to terrorists. "It wasn't intelligence-it was<br />
propaganda," she says. "They'd take a little bit ofinteIligence, cherry-pick it, make it sound much more<br />
exciting, usually by taking it out ofcontext, often by juxtaposition oftwo pieces ofinfonnation that don't<br />
belong together." It was by turning such bogus intelligence into talking points for U.S. officials-including<br />
ominous lines in speeches 1?Y President Bush and Vice President Cheney, along with Secretary ofState<br />
Colin Powell's testimony at the U:N. Security Council last February-that the administration pushed<br />
American public opinion into supporting an unnecessary war. -<br />
Until now, the story ofhow the Bush administration produced its wildly exaggerated estimates ofthe<br />
threat posed by Iraq has never been revealed in full. But, for the first time,a detailed investigation by<br />
Mother Jones, based on dozens ofinterviews-some on the record, some with officials who insisted on<br />
anonymity-exposes the workings ofa secret Pentagon intelligence unit and ofthe Defense Department's<br />
war-planning task force, the Office ofSpecial Plans. It's the story ofa close-knit team ofideologues who<br />
spent a decade or more hammering out plans for an attack on Iraq and who used the events ofSeptember<br />
11, 2001, to set it into motion.<br />
_SIX MQNTHS AFTER THE END ofmajor combat in Iraq, the United States had spent $300 million<br />
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" trying to find banned weapons in Iraq, and President Bush was seeking $600 million more to extend the<br />
search. Not found were Iraq's Scuds and other long-range missiles, thousands ofbarrels and tons of<br />
anthrax and botulism stock, sarin and VX nerve agents, mustard gas, biological and chemical munitions,<br />
mobile labs for producing biological weapons, and any and all ~vidence ofa reconstituted nuclear-arms<br />
program, all ofwhich had been repeatedly cited as justification for the war. Also missing was evidence<br />
,ofIraqi collaboration with Al Qaeda.<br />
The reports, virtually all false, ofIraqi weapons and terrorism ties emanated from an apparatus that began<br />
to gestate almost as soon as the Bush administration took power. In the very first meeting ofthe Bush<br />
national-security team, one day after President Bush took the oath ofoffice in January 2001, the issue of<br />
invading Iraq was raised, according to one ofthe participants in the meeting-and officials all the way<br />
down the line started to get the message, long before 9/11. Indeed, the Bush team at the Pentagon hadn't<br />
even been formally installed before Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary ofDefense, and Douglas J.<br />
Feith, undersecretary ofDefense for policy; began putting together what would become the vanguard for<br />
regime change in Ira~.<br />
Both WolfoWitz and Feith have deep roots in the neoconservative movement. One ofthe most influential<br />
Washington neoconservatives in the foreign-policy establishment during the Republicans' wilderness<br />
years ofthe 1990s, Wolfowitz has long held that not taking Baghdad in 1991 was a grievous mistake. He<br />
and others now prominent in the administration said so repeatedly over the past decade in a slew of<br />
letters and policy papers from neoconservative groups like the Project for the New American Century .<br />
and the Committee for the Liberation ofIraq. Feith, a former aide to Richard Perle at the Pentagon in the<br />
1980s and an activist in far-right Zionist circles, held the view that there was no difference between U.S.<br />
and Israeli security policy and that the best way to secure both countries' future was to solve the<br />
Israeli-Palestinian problem not by serving as a broker, but with the United States as a force for "regime<br />
change" in the region.<br />
Called in to help organize the Iraq war-planning team was a longtime Pentagon official, Harold Rhode, a<br />
specialist on Islam who speaks Hebrew, Arabic, Turkish, and Farsi. Though Feith would not be officially<br />
confirmed until July 2001, career military and civilian officials in NESA began to watch his office with<br />
concern after Rhode set up shop in Feith's office in early January. Rhode, seen by many veteran staffers<br />
as an ideological gadfly, was officially assigned to the Pentagon's Office ofNet Assessment, an in-house<br />
Pentagon think tank headed by fellow neocon Andrew Marshall. Rhode helped Feith lay down the law<br />
about the department's new anti-Iraq, and broadly anti-Arab, orientation. In one telling incident, Rhode<br />
accosted and harangued a visiting senior Arab diplomat, telling him that there would be no "bartering in<br />
the bazaar anymore.... You're going to have to sit up and pay attention when we say so."<br />
Rhode refused to be interviewed for this story, saying cryptically, "Tho~e who speak, pay."<br />
According to insiders, Rhode worked with Feith to purge career Defense officials who weren't<br />
sufficiently enthusiastic. about the muscular anti-Iraq crusade that Wolfowitz and Feith wanted. Rhode<br />
appeared to be "pulling people out ofnooks and crannies ofthe Defense Intelligence Agency and other<br />
places to replace us with," says a fonner analyst. "They wanted nothing to do with the professional staff.<br />
And they wanted us the fuck out ofthere."<br />
The unofficial, off-site recruitment office for Feith and Rhode was the American Enterprise Institute, a<br />
right-wing think tank whose 12th-floor conference room in Washington is named for the dean of<br />
neoconservative defense strategists, the late Albert Wohlstetter, an influential RA~·analyst and<br />
University ofChicago mathematician. Headquartered at AEI is Richard Perle, Wohlstetter's prize<br />
protege, the godf~ther ofthe AEI-Defense Department nexus ofneoconservatives who was chairman of<br />
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the Pentagon's influential Defense Policy Board. Rhode, along with Michael Rubin, a former AEI staffer<br />
who is also now at the Pentagon, was a ubiquitous presence at AEI conferences on Iraq over the past two<br />
years, and the two Pentagon officials se~med almost to be serving as stage managers for the A.EI events,<br />
often sitting in the front row and speaking in stage whispers to panelists and AEI officials. Just after<br />
September 11,2001, Feith and Rhode recruited David Wurmser, the director ofMiddle East studies for<br />
AEI, to serve as a Pentagon consultant.<br />
Wurmser would be the founding participant ofthe unnamed, secret intelligence unit at the Pentagon, set<br />
up in Feith's office, which would be the nucleus ofthe Defense Department's Iraq disinfonnation<br />
campaign that was established within weeks ofthe attacks in New York and Washington. While the CIA<br />
and other intelligence agencies concentrated on Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda as the culprit in the 9/11<br />
attacks, Wolfowitz and Feith obsessively focused on Iraq. Itwas a theorY that was discredited, even<br />
ridiculed, among intelligence professionals. Daniel Benjamin, co-author ofThe Age ofSacred Terror,<br />
was director ofcounterterrorism at the National Security Council in the late 1990s. "In 1998, we went<br />
through every piece ofintelligence we could find to see ifthere was alink between Al Qaeda and Iraq,"<br />
he says. "We came to the conclusion that our intelligence agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy<br />
relationship between Al Qaeda and Iraq. I know that for a fact!' Indeed, that was the consensus among<br />
virtually all anti-terrorism specialists.<br />
In sh~rt,<br />
Wurmser, backed by Feith and Rhode, set out to prove what didn't exist.<br />
IN AN ADMINISTRATION devoted to the notion of'·Feith-based intelligence," Wurmser was ideal. For<br />
years, he'd been a shrill ideologue, part ofthe minoritY crusade during the 1990s that was beating the<br />
drums for war against Iraq. Along with Perle and Feith, in 1996 Wurmser and his wife, Meyrav, wrote a<br />
provocative strategy paper for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu called"A Clean Break: ANew<br />
Strategy for Securing the Realm." It called on Israel to work with Jordan and'Turkey to "contain,<br />
destabilize and roll back" various states in the region, overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq, press Jordan to<br />
restore a scion ofthe Hashemite dynasty to the Iraqi throne, and, above all, launch military assaults<br />
against Lebanon and Syria as a "prelude to a redrawing ofthe map ofthe Middle East which would<br />
threaten Syria's territorial integrity."<br />
In 1997, Wormser wrote a column in the Wall Street Journal called "Iraq Needs a Revolution" and the<br />
next year co-signed a letter with Perle calling for all-out U.S. support ofthe Iraqi National Congress<br />
(INC), an exile group led 'byAhmad Chalabi, in promoting an insUrgency in Iraq. At AEI, Wurmser<br />
wrote Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein, essentially a book-length version of<br />
"A Clean Break" that proposed "an alliance between Jordan and the INC to redraw the map ofthe Middle<br />
East. Among the mentors cited by Wurmser in the book: Chalabi, Perle, and Feith.<br />
The purpose ofthe unnamed intelligence unit, often described as a Pentagon "cell," was to scour reports<br />
from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies to find<br />
nuggets ofinformation linking Iraq, Al Qaeda, terrorism, and the existence ofIraqi we~pons ofmass<br />
destruction (WMD). In a controversial press briefing in 0ctober 2002, a year after Wurmser's unit was<br />
established, Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that a primary purpose ofthe unit was<br />
to cull factoids, which were then used to disparage, undermine, and contradict the CIA's reporting, which<br />
was far more cautious and nuanced than Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith wanted. Rumsfeld pa~icularly<br />
enjoyed harassing the CIA staffer who briefed him every morning, using the type of~ata produced by the<br />
intelligence unit. "What I could do is say, 'Gee, what about this?'" Rumsfeld noted. "'Or what about that?<br />
Has somebody thought ofthis?'" Last June, when Feith was questioned on the same topic at a briefing, he<br />
acknowledged that the secret unit in fact looked at the connection between Iraq and terrorism, saying,<br />
"You can't rely on deterrence to deal with the problem ofweapons ofmass destruction in the hands of<br />
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s~te sponsors ofterrorism because [of] the possibility that those state sponsors might employ chemical<br />
weapons or biologicatweapons by means ofa terrorist organization proxy...."<br />
Though Feith, in that briefing, described Wunnser's unit as an innocent project, "a global exercise" that<br />
was not meant to put pressure-on other intelligence agencies orcreate skewed intelligence to fit<br />
preconceived policy notions, many other sources assert that it did exactly that. That the White House and<br />
the Pentagon put enonnous pressure on the CIA'to go along with its version ofevents has been widely<br />
reported, highlighted by visits to CIA headquarters by Vice President Cheney and Lewis Libby, his chief<br />
ofstaff. Led by Perle, the neocons seethed with contempt for the CIA. The CIA'S analysis, said Perle,<br />
"isn't worth the paper it's printed on." Standing in a crowde~ hallway during an AEI event, Perle added,<br />
liThe CIA is status quo oriented. They don't want to take risks.,"<br />
That became the mantra ofthe shadow agency within an agency..<br />
Putting Wurmser in charge ofthe unit meant that it was being run by a pro-Iraq-war ideologue who'd<br />
spent years calling for a pre-emptive invasion ofBaghdad and who was clearly predisposed to find what<br />
he wanted to see. Adding another layer ofdubious quality to the endeavor was the man partnered with<br />
Wurmser, F. Michael Maloof. Maloo~ a former aide to Perle in the 1980s Pentagon, was twice stripped<br />
ofhis high-level security clearances-once in late 2001 and again last spring, for various infractions.<br />
Maloofwas also reportedly involved in a bizarre schemeto broker contacts betweenJraqi officials and<br />
the Pentagon, channeled through Perle, in what one report called a "rogue [intelligence] operation"<br />
'outside officiai CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency channel~.<br />
As the momentum for war began to build in early 2002, Wolfowitz and Feith beefed up the intelligence<br />
unit and created an Iraq war-planning upit inthe Pentagon's Near East and South Asia Affairs section,<br />
run by Deputy Undersecretary ofDefense William Luti, under the rubric "Office ofSpecial Plans," or<br />
OSP; the new unit's director was Abram N. Shulsky. By then, Wunnser had moved on to a post as senior<br />
adviser to Undersecretary ofState John Bolton, yet another neocon, who was in charge ofthe State<br />
Department's disarmament, proliferation, and WMD office and was promoting the Iraq war strategy<br />
there. Shulsky's OSP, which incorporated the secret intelligence unit, took control, banishing veteran<br />
experts-including Joseph McMillan, James Russell, Larry Hanauer, and Marybeth McDevitt-who, despite<br />
years ofservice t9 NESA, either were shuffled offto other positions or retired. For the next year, Luti<br />
and Shulsky not only would oversee war plans but would act aggressively to shape the intelligence<br />
product rece~ved by the White House.<br />
Both Luti and Shulsky were neoconservatives who were ideological soulmates ofWolfowitz and Feith.<br />
But Luti was more than that. He'd come to the Pentagon directly from the office ofVice President<br />
Cheney. That gave Luti, a recently retired, decorated Navy captain whose career ran from combat<br />
aviation to command ofa helicopter assault ship, extra clout. Along with his colleague Colonel William<br />
Bruner, Luti had done a stint as an aide to Newt Gingrich in 1996 and, like Perle and Wolfowitz, was an<br />
acolyte ofWohlstetter's. "He makes Ollie North look like a moderate," says a NESA veteran.<br />
Shulsky had been on the Washington scene since the mid-1970s. As a Senate intelligence committee<br />
staffer for Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, he began to work with ~arly neoconservatives like Perle,<br />
who was then an aide to· Senator Henry Jackson. Later, in the Reagan years, Shulsky followed Perle to<br />
the Pentagon as Perle's arms-control adviser. In the '90s, Shulsky co-authored a book .on intelligence<br />
called Silent Warfare, with Gary Schmitt. Shulsky had served with Schmitt on Moynihan's staffand they<br />
had remained friends. Asked about the Pentagon's Iraq intelligence "cell," Schmitt-who is currently the<br />
executive director ofthe Project for the New American Century-says that he can't say much about it<br />
"because one ofmy best friends is running it."<br />
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According to Lt. Colonel Kwiatkowski, Luti and Shulsky ran NESA and the Offi~e ofSpecial Plans with<br />
brutal efficiency, purging people they disagreed with and enforcing t~e party li~e. "It was organized like<br />
a machine," she says. "The people working on the neocon agen~a had a narrow, well-defined political<br />
agenda. They had a sense ofmission." At NESA, Shulsky, she says, began "hot-desking," or taking an<br />
office wherever he could find one, working with Feith and Luti, before formally taking the reips ofthe<br />
newly created asp. Together, she says, Luti and Shulsky turned cherry-picked pieces ofuncorroborated, .<br />
anti-Iraq intelligence into talking points, on issues like Iraq's WMD and its links to Al Qaeda. Shulsky<br />
constantly updated these papers, drawing on the intelligence unit, and circulated them to Pentagon<br />
officials, including Rumsfeld, and to Vice President Cheney. "Ofcourse, we never thought they'd go<br />
directly to the White House," she adds.<br />
Kwiatkowski recalls one meeting in which Luti, pressed to finish a report, told the staff, "I've got to get.<br />
this over to 'Scooter' right away." She later found out that "Scooter" was none other than Lewis "Scooter"<br />
Libby, Vice President Cheney's chief ofstaff. According to Kwiatkowski, Cheney had direct ties through<br />
Luti into NESAlOSP, a connection that was highly unorthodox.<br />
"Never, ever, ever would a deputy undersecretary ofDefense work directly on a project for the vice<br />
pre.sident," she says. Illt was a little clue that we had an informal network into Vice President Cheney's<br />
office."<br />
Although Feith insists that the OSP did not seek to gather its own intelligence, Kwiatkowski and others<br />
sharply disagree. Staffworking for Luti and Shulsky in NESAlOSP churned out propaganda-style<br />
intelligence, she says. As an example, she cited the work ofa U.S. intel1~gence officer and Arabic<br />
specialist, Navy Lt. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, who W8;S a special assistant to Luti. "His job was<br />
to peruse the Arabic-language media to find articles that would incriminate Saddam Hussein about<br />
terrorism, and he translated these. II Such raw intelligence is usually subject to a thorough vetting process,<br />
tracked, verified, and checked by intelligence professionals. But not at aSP-the material that it produced<br />
found its way directly into speeches by Bush, Cheney, and other officials.<br />
According to Melvin Goodman, a former CIA official and an intelligence specialistat the National War<br />
College, the OSP officials routinely pushed lower-ranking staffaround on intelligence matters. "People<br />
were being pulled aside [and being told], 'We saw your last piece and it's not what we're looking for,t1t he<br />
says. "It was pretty blatant. II Two State Department intelligence officials, Greg Thielmann and Christian<br />
Westermann, have bot~ charged that pressure was being put on them to shape intelligence to fit policy, in<br />
particular from Bolton's office. tithe Al Qaeda connection and nuclear ~eapons issue were the only two '<br />
ways that you could link Iraq to an imminent security threat to the U.S.," Thielmann told the New York<br />
Times. IIAnd th~ administration was grossly distorting the intelligence on both things. It<br />
BESIDES CHENEY, key members ofthe Pentagonls Defense Policy Board, i!1cluding Perle and<br />
ex-House SpeakerNewt Gingrich, all Iraq hawks, had 4ir~ct input into NESAlOSP. The offices ofNESA<br />
were located on the Pentagonls fourth floor, seventh corridor of0 Ring, and the Policy Board's offices<br />
were directly below, on the third floor. During the run-up to the ;Jraq war, Gingrich often came up for<br />
closed-door meetings with Luti, who in 1996 had served as a congressional fellow in Speaker ofthe<br />
House Gingrich's office.,<br />
As OSP got rolling, Luti brought in Colonel Bruner, a former military aide to Gingrich, and, together,<br />
Luti an4 Bruner opened the door to a vast flow ofbogus intelligence fed to the Pentagon by Iraqi<br />
defectors associated with Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress group ofexiles. Chalabi founded the Iraqi<br />
National Congress in 1992, with the help ofa shadowy CIA-connected public-relations firm called the<br />
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Rendon Group, one ofwhose former employees, Francis Brooke, has been a top aide to Chalabi ever<br />
since. A scion ofan aristocratic Iraqi family, Chalabi fled Baghdad at the age of 13, in 1958, when the<br />
corrupt Iraqi Hashemite monarchy was overthrown by a coalition ofcommunists and the Iraqi military.<br />
In the late 1960s, Chalabi studied mathematics at the University ofChicago with Wohlstetter, who<br />
introduced him to Richard Perle more than a decade later. Long associated with the heart ofthe<br />
neoconservative movement, Chalabi founded Petra Bank in Jordan, which grew to be Jordan's<br />
third-largest bank by the 1980s. But Chalabi was accused ofbank fraud, embezzlement, and currency<br />
manipulation, and he barely escaped before Jordanian authorities could arrest him; in 1992, he was<br />
convicted and sentenced in absentia to more than 20 years ofhard labor. After founding the INC,<br />
Chalabi's bungling, unreliability, and penchant for mismanaging funds caused the CIA to sour on him,<br />
but he never lost the support ofPerle, Feith, Gingrich, and their allies; once, soon after 9/11, Perle<br />
invited Chalabi to address the Defense Policy Board.<br />
According to m!1ltiple sources, Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress sent a steady stream ofmisleading and<br />
often faked intelligence reports into U.S. intelligence channels. That information would flow sometimes<br />
into NESA/OSP directly, sometimes through Defense Intelligence Agency debriefings ofIraqi defectors<br />
via the Defense Human Intelligence Service, and sometimes through the INC's own U.S.-funded<br />
Intelligence Collection Program, which was overseen by the Pentagon. The INC's intelligence "isn't<br />
reliable at all," according to Vjncent Cannistraro, a former CIA chiefofcounterterrorism.<br />
"Much ofit is propaganda. Much ofit is telling the Defense Department what they want to hear, using<br />
alleged informants and defectors who say what Chalabi wants them to say, [creating] cooked information<br />
that goes right into presidential and vice presidential speeches."<br />
Bruner, the aide to Luti and Gingrich's former staffer, "was Chalabi's pandler," says Kwiatkowski. "He<br />
would arrange meetings with Chalabi and Chalabi's folks," she says, adding that the INC leader often<br />
prought people into the NESA/OSP offices for debriefings. Chalabi claims to have introduced only three<br />
actual defectors to the Pentagon, a figure Thielmann considers "awfully low." However, according to an<br />
investigation by the Los Angeles Times, the three defectors provided by Chalabi turned up exactly zero<br />
useful intelligence. The first, an Iraqi engineer, claimed to have specific informatio~ about biological<br />
weapons, but his information didn't pan out; the second claimed to know about mobile labs, but that<br />
information, too, was worthless; and the third, who claimed to have data about Iraq's nuclear program,<br />
proved to be a fraud. Chalabi also claimed to have given the Pen~gon information about Iraqi SliPport<br />
for AI Qaeda. "We ga~e the names ofpeople who were doing the links," he told an interview~r from<br />
PBS'S Frontline. Those links, ofcourse, have not been discovered. Thielmann told the same Frontline<br />
interviewer that the Office ofSpecial Plans didn't apply strict intelligence-verification standards to "some<br />
ofthe information coming out ofChalabi and the INC that OSP and the Pentagon ran with...<br />
In the war's aftermath, the Defense Intelligence Agency-which is not beholden to the neoconservative<br />
civilians at the Pentagon-leaked a report it prepared, concluding that few, ifany, ofthe INC's informants<br />
provided worthwhile intelligence.<br />
SO FAR, DESPITE ALL ofthe investigations underway, there is little sign that any ofthem are going to<br />
delve into the operatidns ofthe Luti-Shulsky Office ofSpecial Plans and its secret intelligence unit.<br />
Because it operates in the Pentagon's policy shop, it is not officially part ofthe intelligence community,<br />
and so it is seemingly immune to congressional oversight.<br />
With each passing day, it is becoming excruciatingly clearer just how wrong U.S .. intelligence was in<br />
regard to Iraqi weapons and support for terrorism. The American teams ofinspectors in the Iraq Survey<br />
Group, which ha_s employed ~p to 1,400 p~op~e to scour the country and analyze the findings, have not<br />
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http://delphi.dia.ic.gov/adminlEARLYBlRD/040106/82004010624<br />
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been able to find a shred ofevidence ofanything other than dusty old plans and records ofweapons<br />
apparently destroyed more than a decade ago., Countless examples offruitless searches have been<br />
reported in the media. To cite one example: U.S. soldiers followed.an intelligence report claiming that a<br />
complex built for Uday Hussein, Saddam's son, hid a weapons warehouse with poison-gas storage tanks.<br />
"Well," U.S. Army Major Ronald Hann Jr. told the Los Angeles T~mes, "the warehouse was a carport. It<br />
still had two cars inside. And the tanks had propane for the kitchen."<br />
Countless other errors and exaggerations have become evident. The thousands ofaluminum tubes<br />
supposedly imported by Iraq for uranium enrichment were fairly conclusively found to be designed to<br />
build noncontroversial rockets. The long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, allegedly built to deliver<br />
bioweapons, were smal~, rickety, experimental planes with wood frames. The mobile bioweapon labs<br />
turned out to have had other, civilian purposes. And the granddaddy ofall falsehoods, the charge that<br />
Iraq sought uranium in the West African-country ofNiger, was based on forged documents-documents<br />
that the CIA, the State Department, and other agencies knew were fake nearly a year before President<br />
Bush highlighted the issue inhis State ofthe Union address in January 2003.<br />
"Either the system broke down," former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who was sent by the CIA to visit<br />
, Niger and whose findings helped show that the documents were forged, told Mother Jones, "or there was<br />
selective use ofJJits ofinformation to justify a decision to go to war that had already been taken."<br />
Edward Luttwak, a neoconservative scholar and author, says flatly that the Bush administration lied<br />
about the intelligence it had because it was afraid to go to the American people and say that the war was<br />
simply about getting rid ofSaddam Hussein. Instead, says Luttwak, the White House was groping for a<br />
rationale to satisfy the United Nations' criteria for war. :'Cheney was forced into this fake posture of<br />
worrying about weapons ofmass destruction," he says. liThe ties to Al Qaeda? That's complete<br />
no.nsense."<br />
In the Senate, Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) is pressing for the Intelligence Committee to extend its<br />
investigation to look into the specific role ofthe Pentagon's Office ofSpecial Plans, but there is strong<br />
Republican resistance to the idea.<br />
In the House, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Cali£) has introduced legislation calling for a commission to<br />
investigate the intelligence mess and has collected more than a hundred Democrats-but no<br />
Republicans-in support ofit. "I think they need to b~ looked at pretty carefully," Waxman told Mother<br />
Jones when asked -about the Office ofSpecial Plans. "I'd like to know whether the political people pushed<br />
the intelligence people to slant their conclusions." -<br />
Congressman Waxman, meet Lt. Cololl:el Kwiatkowski.<br />
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DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
The United States and Shi'ite<br />
Religious Factions in Post-Ba'thist Iraq<br />
Juan Cole<br />
In post-Saddam Husayn Iraq, Shi'ite militias rapidly established their authority<br />
in East Baghdadand other urban neighborhoods ofthe south. Among the various<br />
groups which emerged, the Sadr Movement stands out as militant and cohesive.<br />
The sectarian, anti-American Sadrists wish to impose a puritanical, Khomeinist<br />
vision on Iraq. Their political influence is potentially much greater than their<br />
numbers. Incorporating them into a democratic Iraq while ensuring that they do<br />
not come to dominate itposes a severe challenge to the US Administration.<br />
In planning the war on Iraq, the American Defense Department and intelligence<br />
organizations appear to have been unaware that millions of Iraqi Shi'ites had joined a<br />
militant and puritanical movement dedicated to the establishment of an Iran-style<br />
Islamic Republic in Iraq, even though these developments had been detailed in many<br />
Arabic-language books -and articles.. On February 18, 2003, Deputy Secretary ofDefense<br />
Paul Wolfowitz gave an interview on National Public Radio in which he maintained<br />
that "The Iraqis are . '0 • by and large quite secular.. They are overwhelmingly<br />
Shi'a which is different from the Wahabis of the peninsula, and they don't bring the<br />
sensitivity of having the holy cities of Islam being on their tenitory.~'1 Even more<br />
disturbingly, this quote shows that Wolfowitz did not realize thatreligious Iraqi Shi'ites<br />
are extremely sensitive about foreigners in their shrine cities such as Najafand Karbala,<br />
or that these cities are religious power centers of great symbolic potency.<br />
YS Defense Department leaders such as Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld<br />
and his deputies, Wolfowitz and Douglas F~ith, mistakenly thought that the middle<br />
and lower strata of the Ba'th bureaucracy, police, and army would survive the war,<br />
and that they could simply hand it over to secular expatriate figure Ahmad Chalabi<br />
and his Iraqi National Congress. Although from a Shi'ite background, Chalabi was<br />
largely unknown in Iraq and was wanted in Jordan on embezzlement charges. The<br />
CIA and the State Department broke with Chalabi late·in 2002 when he proved unable<br />
-Juan Cole is Professor ofModern Middle Eastern and South Asian History at the University of ~ichigan.<br />
He is editor of the International Journal of Middle Bast Studies, and author of numerous books and<br />
articles. His recent works include Modernity and the Millennium (New York: Columbia University Press.<br />
1998) and Sacred Space and Holy \Var.· The Politics, Culture and History ofShrite Islam (London: I.B.<br />
Tauris. 2002). .<br />
1. "Deputy SecretaryWolfowitz Interview with National Public Radio:' February 19,2003 at http:/<br />
Iwww.washingtonfile.netl2003IFeblFeb21IEURS09.HTM.<br />
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to account for about $2 million of the $4 million they had given his Iraqi National<br />
Congress. The major religious Shi'ite groups with which the Americans were negotiating<br />
were part ofChalabi's group and included-the Tehran-based Supreme Council<br />
for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the London branch of the al-Da'wa Party, and the<br />
J{hoei Foundation, of which only al-Da'wa had much popularity on the ground in<br />
Iraq. The US was ignorant of the Sadr Movement, the main indigenous Shi'ite force..<br />
This ignorance was to cost the US great political capital in the first mont~s of the<br />
occupation.<br />
When the Ba'th fell on April 9, 2003, Shi'ite militias seemed suddenly to emerge<br />
and take control of many urban areas in the south of the country, as well as in the<br />
desperately poor slums ofEast Baghdad. The moral authority ofGrand Ayatollah Ali<br />
Sistani and his more quietist colleagues in Najaf had been known to the US, but it<br />
transpired that other ayatollahs and leaders had more political clout. The rank and file<br />
of Iraqi Shi'ites in the urban areas was far more radicalized by the last decade of<br />
Ba'th rule than anyone on the outside had realized. These developments alarmed<br />
Washington, given that some 60% to 65% ofIraqis are.Shi'ites, and this group would<br />
therefore predominate in a democratic Iraq. The religious groups constitute only one<br />
section ofthe Shi'ite population, perhaps a third or more, but they are well organized<br />
and armed. -<br />
My thesis here is that the Sadr Movement is at the moment the most important<br />
tendency among religious Shi'ites in post-Ba'thist Iraq, and that it is best seen as a<br />
sectarian phenomenon in the "sociology of religions" sense. It is· primarily a youth<br />
movement and its rank and file tend to be poor•. It is highly puritanical and xenophobic,<br />
andit is characterized by an exclusivism unusual in Iraqi Shi'ism. To any extent<br />
that it emerges as a leading social force in Iraq, it will prove polarizing and destabilizing.<br />
In spring and summer of2003 its leadership had decided not to challenge actively<br />
the coalition military. In contemporary theories of the sociology ofreligion, a "sect"<br />
is characteri~ed by a high degree of tension with mainstream society, employing a<br />
rhetoric of difference,antagonism, and separation. 2 The "~igh-tension" model ofthe<br />
sect predicts that it will attempt strongly to demarcate itself off from the mainstream<br />
of society. It will also cast out those members who are perceived to be too accommodating<br />
of non-sectarian norms. That.is, it demands high levels of loyalty and obedience<br />
in the pursuit ofexclusivism.<br />
IRAQI SHI'ISM IN HISTORY<br />
Under the Ottomans, a Sunni political elite flourished in what is now Iraq, with<br />
political ties to Istanbul. Shi'ism remained vigorous, however. In the eighteenth and<br />
nineteenth centuries, many tribespeople of the south converted to-the Shi'ite branch<br />
of Islam, under the influence ofmissionaries sent out from the shrine cities of Najaf<br />
and Karbala, where Shi'ite holy figures Imam 'Ali and Imam Husayn were int~rred.<br />
-2. Rodney Stark an~ William Sims Bainbridge, The Future ofReligion (Berkeley and Los Angeles:<br />
University ofCalifornia Press, 1985), pp. 19·34, 135.<br />
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THE US AND SHI'ITE RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ*545<br />
'Ali was the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad, and Husayn was the<br />
prophet's grandson. This tribal conversion movem~nt appears to have been a protest<br />
ofthe weak, a way of using religion to resist the power of the Sunni Ottoman bureaucracy•.<br />
Over time, it created a Shi'ite majority in what was to become Iraq. This<br />
region also witnessed the victory among Shi'ites in the eighteenth and early nineteenth<br />
centuries ofthe Usuli ,school ofjurisprudence, which held that all lay believers<br />
must follow or "emulate" a learned Shi Cite jurisprudent with seminary training. They<br />
are to implement the rulings of this "object of emulation" (marja t<br />
al-taqlid) with<br />
regard to disputed points ofIslamic law. They can only follow a living jurisprudent or<br />
mujtahid, however, with regard to any new issues that arise after the old one's death.<br />
The Usuli school gave to Shi'ite clerics a leadership position much more powerful<br />
and central than typically was bestowed by Sunni Muslims on their clerics. 3<br />
The British conquered Mesopotamia during World'War' I, and created out of<br />
Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra provinces (Arabic wi/ayat) a colonial state they called<br />
Iraq, which became formally independent in 1932..They cobbled together a big Kur4ish<br />
community in the north, $ome Thrkmen tribespeople, Sunni townspeople of the cen<br />
'ter, and the Shi'ite tribes and settled urban and rural groups of the south, into a new<br />
state. The Shi'ite majority probably grew larger in the course of the 20th century, but<br />
Sunnis remained in control politically and economically, under the monarchy, then<br />
the officers-ruled republic of 1958-.968, and then the Ba'th (Arab nationalist) regime<br />
of 1968-2003. The.Ba'th massively persecuted the religious Shi'ites of the<br />
south. It especially feared the aI-Da'wa al-Islamiyya Party, founded around 1958,<br />
which aimed at establishing a'Shi'ite-dominated Islamic state. 4 The rise of the Islamic<br />
Republic of Iran in 1978-79 frightened the Ba'th , which launched a war against<br />
the Khomeinist state there, and simultaneously, cracked down hard on the radical<br />
Shi'ite clerics in Iraq such as Muhammad Baqiral-Sadr (d. 1980), who theorized an<br />
Islamic state.. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, "Sadr I," was executed alorig with many<br />
-+-.<br />
-3. For the historical background ofmodem Iraqi Shi'ism, see Pierre-Jean Luizard, Lafonnation de<br />
l'Irak contemporain [The Fonnation ofContemporary Iraq] (Paris: Editions du Centre national de la<br />
recherche scientifique, 1991); Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is 'ofIraq (Princeton: Princeton University<br />
Press, 1994); MeirLitvak, Shi'ite ScholarsofNineteenth Century Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University<br />
Press, 1998); Juan Cole,SacredSpace andHoly War: The Politics, Culture, andHistoryofShi'ite<br />
Islam (London: I. B.. Tauris, 2002), and Faleh Abdul-labar, ed., Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues<br />
(London: Saqi Books, 2(02).<br />
•<br />
4. Sal~ al-Khursan, Hiw al-Da'waal-Islamiyya: Haqa'iq wa watha'iq [The Islamic Da 'wa<br />
Party: Facts and !Jocwnents] (Damascus: al-Mu'assassa al-'Arabiyya li'I-Dirasat wa'I-Buhuth aJ<br />
Istratijiyya,1999); RUhaimi; '7he Da'wa Islamic Party:' in Abdul-Jabar, Ayatollahs, pp. 149-161;<br />
Keiko Sakai, "Modernityand tradition in the Islamic movements inIraq:'Amb Studies Quarterly, Vol.<br />
23, No.1 (Winter2001), pp. 37-52; MahanAbedin, "Dossier: Hezb aJ-Daawaal-Islamiyya: Islamic Call<br />
Party:' Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 5, No.6 (June 2003) at: http://www.meib.orglaniclesl<br />
0306Jraqd.htm; HannaBatatu,"Shi'iteOrganizations in Iraq: AI-Da'wahal-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin:'<br />
In Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie,.eds., Shi'ism and Social Protest (New Haven: Yale University<br />
PreSs, 1986), pp. 179-200; Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement ofIraqi Shi'ites (Boulder, Co.:<br />
LynneRienner, 1992).<br />
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546*MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL<br />
other activists. 5 The al-Da'wa Party g~ve birth to splinter groups like the Suprem~<br />
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (founded by expatriates in Tehran in 1982)<br />
and the Sadr Movement, while remaining a separate party in its own right. In contrast,<br />
the mainstream Najaf clerical tradition in Iraq, exemplified by Abu al-Qasim al<br />
Khu'i (d. 1992), tended to be quietist and to reject Khomeini's theory that the clergy<br />
should rule (vilayat-e faqih).6 But unbeknownst to the outside world, many Iraq!<br />
Shi'ites, inspired by al-Sadr and his suc~essors, were being radicalized by the eP<br />
ample of Iran and by the brutality of the Ba'th persecution.<br />
THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF IRAQI SHrISM<br />
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THE US AND SHI'lTE RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ* 541<br />
substantial numbers of followers of the Sadr Movement, and of the Supreme Council<br />
for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, about which more below.<br />
A little over a fifth of Iraqi Shi'ites therefore live in the big cities. Another<br />
important stratum lives in important towns in the south. These towns average populations<br />
between 100,000 and about 600,000 persons. They include al-Zubayr (l74,000),<br />
Samawah (128,000), Nasiriyya (560,000), 'Amara (351,000), Kut (400,000),<br />
Diwaniyia (443,000), Hillah (548,000), Kufa (119,000), Najaf (585,000), Karbala<br />
(572,000), and Baquba (295,000). Samarra' (207,000), a northern town with a Shi'ite<br />
quarter, can also be listed here. 9 These substantial towns accounted for nearly 4.5<br />
million residents in 2003, largely Shi'ites, and therefore for about a third of the Iraqi<br />
Shi'ite population. Many Shi'ites Jiving in them are merchants and shopkeepers, insofar<br />
as government employment Was often denied to them or seep as undesirable by<br />
them under the Ba'th. lo The towns differ among themselves in character. Najaf, KarbaIa<br />
and Samarra stand out in being shrine cities, where Imams are buried that Shi'ites<br />
consider rightful heirs and successors to the prophet Muhammad. They also have<br />
seminary establishments, training clerics. The clerics of Najaf in particular enjoy<br />
great prestige in Iraq and throughout the Shi'ite world, and in the twentieth century<br />
outside Iran the co.nvention has been tharthe most senior grand ayatollah in Najaf is<br />
the chief legal and religious authority for lay Shi'ites.<br />
Each town has a different religious and political orientation. The al-Da'wa Party<br />
,seems particularly strong in Nasiriyya. Baquba and Kut, in the east near Iran, are<br />
under the influence ofthe Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).u<br />
This group had its origins in the al-Da'wa Party but became a separate organization in<br />
1982. In 1984, Muhammad Baqir aI-Hakim came to head it" and he remained at the<br />
helm thereafter, until his assassination in the car bombing outside the Shrine of 'Ali in<br />
Najaf on August 29, 2003. 12 SeIRI was based .in Tehran for two decades .. Kufa, like.<br />
East Baghdad, is a stronghold of the Sadr Movement. Some other substantial towns<br />
are more tied to the tribes and the rural areas, and have seen recent large influxes of<br />
marsh Arabs and other political refugees from the countryside. These relatively newly<br />
settled townspeople are used to being armed, and so for them, the Anglo-American<br />
troops' a~tempts to confiscate their rifles have produced a great deal oftension.<br />
Another large proportion of Shi'ites lives in small towns and villages in the<br />
countryside. The rural Shi'ites are now a minority. They tend to be organized by tribe<br />
though few are any longer pastoral nomads, and to practice a folk Shi'ism at variance<br />
.-9. Population statistics are from Stefan Helder, "WorldGazetteer:'athnp:l!www.world-glll.etteer.com!<br />
frlfr_iq.htm; an imponant recent overviewofShi'itecurrents in Samma' is Hazim aI-Amin, IiSamarra'<br />
wa Ikhwatuha," ["Samarra' and its Sisters"] AI-Hayat, IS July 2003.<br />
10. Ma'd Fayyad, ~~Shahid 'ala Rihlatal-Khu'i ilaal- ~lraq." [Witness to the Journey ofaI-Khu'i to<br />
lraq"],AI-Sharq al-Awsat, April 28, 2003. -<br />
11. Juan Cole, "Mariage mal assoni entre les radicaux chiites irakiens et les Etats-Unis:' ["Mis~<br />
matched Marriage Between Radical Shi'ites and the US"], Le Monde Diplomatique (July2(03).<br />
12. Mukhtar aI-Asadi, AI-Taqsir al-Kabir bayna ai-Salah wa al-Islah [Mere Passive Goodness<br />
Falls FarShort ojActiveRejorm](Beirut: Dar aI-Furat, 2001).<br />
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548*MIDDLE EASTJOURNAL<br />
with the more scholastic and bookish Shi'ism of the seminary cities. They invest their<br />
tribal shaykhs with great authority, and often with some religious· charisma, as well<br />
(the shaykhs often claim to be Sayyids or Sharifs, i.e., descendants of the prophet.)<br />
On July 8,. a convention was held by Iraqi tribal leaders, representing the rural Shi'ite<br />
tribes of the center and south of Iraq called ''The'Bloc of Democratic Iraqi tribes."<br />
They 'aimed at ensuring they have a voice in the governance of Iraq. The convention<br />
chair, GhaIib al-Rikabi, insisted that Iraqis themselves draft the new constitution and<br />
demanded early elections for an Iraqi govemment. 13<br />
A subset of the rural Shi'ites is the so-called marsh Arabs, said to be about<br />
500,000 strong. They once dwelled in the swamps of southern Iraq, working as fishermen,<br />
hunters, farmers and smugglers. In the 1990s, the swamps were used by Iranbased<br />
paramilitary organizations of Iraqi expatriates to infiltrate into Iraq and strike<br />
at Ba'th targets, and the marsh Arabs themselves often resisted Ba'th rule. They were<br />
organized politically and militarily by the Iraqi Bizbu'llah, a radical group that fought<br />
a guerrilla war against the Iraqi·state. The Ba'th found it difficult to operate in the<br />
.marshes and therefore drained them. The marsh Arabs were forced to settle in poor<br />
southern towns such as Majar al-Kabir, or to go to small cities like Amar:a, where they<br />
largely subsisted in poverty, having lost their livelihoods.<br />
In the aftermath ofthe second GulfWar, 'Abd aI-Karim Mahmud al-Muhammadawi,<br />
a marsh Arab who had fought guerrilla actions against the Ba'th under the nom de guerre<br />
ofAbu Hatim, emerged as an important civic leader in Amara. He provided security with .<br />
the help of his tribal militia (presumably Hizbullah). Although an observant Shi'ite, he<br />
decries "religiousfanaticism" and urges tole~tion. In early July 2063, he was also insisting<br />
on the quick formation ofan indigenous Iraqi government and an early end to what he<br />
caIled American occupation. 14 The tragic clash between British troops and residents of<br />
Majar al-Kabir on June 23 and 24, in'which six British trQOps were killed, came about in<br />
large part because the British insisted on disanning the population. Arab tribesmen origi.,<br />
nally from the marshes saw this step as a way of dishonoring them and rendering them<br />
defenseless. for people who had lost everything, being without arms to protect their<br />
families was afrightening prospect. IS Muhammadawi himself played an important role in<br />
calming tensions after the clash. 16<br />
Of all these groups, the urban religious Shi'ites are the most highly networked<br />
for political and crowd action. Najaf, the chief shrine city, provides much of the<br />
leadership and organization, whereas the slum dwellers ofEast Baghdad can easily be<br />
bused as foot soldiers to the center of Baghdad for rallies. Other urban populations<br />
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THE US AND SHI'ITE RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ* 549<br />
have also demonstrated a potential for crowd action. Some 10,000 demonstrated in<br />
Basra against the US occupation in June. As many as 20,000 demonstrated in Nasiriyya<br />
in late April, and there have also been-demonstrations in Baquba.<br />
THE AFl'ERMATH OF THE 1991 UPRISING<br />
The religious movements of contemporary Iraqi Shi'ites today have important<br />
roots in the failed rebellion against the Ba'th of spring, 1991. 1 7. During the first Gulf<br />
War, President George H. W. Bush called up0D: the Iraqis to rise up and overthrow<br />
Saddam Husayn. When Saddam was forced to withdraw from Kuwait and seemed<br />
weakened, the people did just that. It is alleged that 17 of 19 provinces were lost to the<br />
Ba'th government in the popular uprisings ofMarch and April, 1991. In major Shi'ite<br />
population centers such as Basra, Nasiriyya, and Najaf, local Shi'ite religious figures<br />
emerged as popular political leaders supplanting Ba'th authority. The leaders were<br />
aware that the uprising could succeed Oldy ifit received US support. But the request<br />
for assistance by Grand Ayatollah Khu'i on March 11 was rejected by the US. The<br />
Ba'th military, ~eeing that the US had decided to remain neutral, massacred tens of<br />
thousands. It also rounded up the prominent clerics of Najaf and Karbala, seen as<br />
ringleaders of the southern revolt, and over 200 were executed or made to disappear.<br />
Others escaped into exile in Tehran or London. The property of many clerics was also<br />
expropriated by the regime. The major scholars who remained lived under virtual<br />
house arrest, their movements and statements closely watched by the Ba'th secret<br />
police. How many persons were killed and buried in mass graves may never be known,<br />
. but it certainly ran into the .tens of thousands._ Iraqi Shi'ites have for the most part<br />
never forgiven the US for its callous policy of standing by during these massacres.<br />
Najaf's seminary establishment -was gutted ~nd its student body shrank precipi-<br />
tously. The preeminent Grand Ayatollah in Najaf in the 1970s through his death in<br />
1992 at the ag~ of .93 was Iranian-born quietist Abu al-Qasim al-Khu'i. After his<br />
death, one of his sons, Taqi, garnered respect as an ayatollah in Najaf, but died under<br />
suspicious circumstances in an automobile accident in 1994. His remaining son, 'Abd<br />
ai-Majid al-Khu'i, had relocated to London, where Khu'i senior had in 1989 established<br />
the Khoei Foundation (that is how the family spells the name in English). 'Abd .<br />
ai-Majid, then only 40, Was too young to become the object of emulation for Iraqi<br />
Shi'ites, but he did become involved with Iraqi expatriates aiming.for the overthrow<br />
of Saddam. Husayn.<br />
The repression ofthe Shi'ite establishment was so severe in the aftermath ofthe<br />
crushed uprising that Najaf became a shadow of its former self, and its twentieth<br />
century position as a center of Shi'ite leadership and learning was threatened with<br />
oblivion. In 1900, Nakash estimates that there had been 8,000 seminary students in<br />
Najaf, but the shrine cities declined under the British Manda~e and the Sunni monar-<br />
-17. Keiko Sakai, "The 19911ntifadah in Iraq: Seen through Analyses ofthe Discourses ofIraqi<br />
Intellectuals:' in Keiko Sakai, ed.,Social frotests andNation-Building in the Middle East and C.entral<br />
Asia (Chiba, Japan: Institute ofDeveloping Economies, 2003), pp. 156·172.<br />
101&'2003, 4.:COPU<br />
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550*MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL<br />
chy, so that by 1957 there were only about 2,000 students there. There may have been<br />
a slight rebound during the "golden age" of intellectual activities in the shrine cities<br />
during the 19605 and 1970s. But after the Ba'th crushed the movement of the late<br />
1970s and began deporting lraqis of Iranian heritage, Najaf's student body shrank<br />
. once again, to only a few hundred. 18 In the 1990s the decline became even more<br />
steep. Clerics pulled back from teaching anything but the most basic classes in Shi'ite<br />
law and practice, lest their teachings be viewed by the secret police as seditious.<br />
~ Friday prayers were for the most part banned, and clerics often declined to hold them<br />
in public.. ~9 Qom, in Iran, emerged as the intellectual center of Shi'ism, as Najaf's<br />
campuses became a virtual ghost town. Najaf the city continued to flourish, as a<br />
provincial capital, growing to over 500,000 residents in the late 1990s from 134,000<br />
in 1965. Reversing the historical situation that had obtained for two or three centuries,<br />
"town" thus became substantially more'important than "gown."<br />
Even in the tense and repressed circumstances of the 1990s, religious leadership<br />
did emerge in the shrine cities. Grand'Ayatollahs 'Ali Sistani, 'Ali al-Gharawi, and<br />
Shaykh 'Ali Muhammad Burujirdi were among the m9re prominent, though Ayatollah<br />
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr also began to become respected for his small symbolic<br />
acts ofdefiance against the regime. Sistani, who was born around 1930 in Mashhad,<br />
had come to Najaf in 1~52. He came to have the largest reputation outside 'Iraq,<br />
gradually succeeding to the position ~I-Khu 'i had enjoyed, ofchieflegal anq religious<br />
authority for many Shi'ites in Lebanon and elsewhere outside Iran and Iraq. He also<br />
garnered support from the older generation of Iraqi Shi'ites that had followed al<br />
Khu'i. His growing reputation worried the Ba'th regime, which in 1996 launched an<br />
unsuccessful assassination attempt against him, in which two employees of his office<br />
were killed and two others wounded. 20 He was not the only target, or the only postuprising<br />
leader to enjoy new prominence. In April of 1998, Grand Ayatollah Murtada<br />
.Burujirdi was shot down by an unknown assailant, who escaped. In June ofthe same<br />
year, gunmen sprayed Kalashnikov fire at the car of Grand Ayatollah Ali Oharawi,<br />
killing him and three others in the car. The regime attempted toimply that the deaths<br />
were the result ofinternecine fighting within the clerical establishment, and executed<br />
several minor Shi'ite clerics whom ,it accused of the assassinations.: n No one inside<br />
the Shi'ite community doubted that these were the actions of~a'th Party death squads.<br />
-+-.<br />
THE SADR MOVEMENT IN THE 1990s<br />
An up-and-coming figure in the 1990s was Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr.. His rival,<br />
Sistani, enjoyed the greatest reputation as a scholar and a jurist, especially outside<br />
-18. Nakash, The Shi'isofIraq, pp.256, 259;he gives only 150as the number ofNajafseminarians<br />
in the 19808; this seems low for that period; see a high~r numbercited in Footnote 19.<br />
19.MukhtarAsadi,Al.Sadral-Thani:al-shahidwa t l-shahid,al-zahirawa-rududal-ji'1[Sadrll:The<br />
Witnessandthe Martyr, the Phenomenon andthe Reaction], ([Iran]: Mu'assasat ai-Acraf, 1999), pp. 53-54;<br />
he says in the 19808 the number ofstudents fell to 700. See the preceding footnote for anotherestimate.<br />
20. Al-Ha)'at, Dec. 3, 1996, via BBC Summary ofWorld Broadcasts, Dec. 4, 1996.<br />
21. AI-Thawra, March 14, J999, via BBC Summary ofWorld Broadcasts, March 17,1999.<br />
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THE US AND SHI'ITE RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ* 551<br />
Iraq. Sistani's cautiousness about getting involved in politics, however" appears to<br />
have made many local Iraqis impatient with him. The more militant younger generation<br />
of Iraqi Shi'ites turned to Muhammad Sadiq, a cousin of the martyred revolutionary<br />
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was executed in 1980. Muhammad Sadiq was<br />
born March 23, 1943, into a prominent clerical family. He married the daughter of his<br />
paternal uncle, who bore to him four sons, Mustafa, Muqtada, Mu'ammal, and Murtada.<br />
The first three of these married daughters of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. lie also had<br />
two daughters. Educated in the seminary founded by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, he<br />
received his certificates of independent legaJ reasoning (ijazat al-ijtihad) in 1977,<br />
when he was only 34. The diplomas were granted by Muhammad Baqir aI-Sadr and<br />
Abu al-Qasim al-Khu'i. He studied law with Ruhu'llah Khomeini (who labored in<br />
exile in Najaf 1964-1988). Muhammad Sadiq had a wide-ranging intellect. He not<br />
only excelled in the Islamic branches of knowledge, but also learned fluent English,<br />
and studied psychology and. history. AI-Asadi says that I!is history tutor,Dr., Fadil<br />
Husayn, considered him his best student and presented him with a rare copy of The<br />
Paris Commune (presumably the one authored by Karl Marx).22 This anecdote suggests<br />
the way in which leftist and Marxist influences circulated even in clerical circles<br />
in the shrine cities, a phenomenon that went back at least to the 1950s. Muhammad<br />
Sadiq wrote a Shi'ite commentary on the 1789 "Rights ofMan" issued by the French<br />
revolutionaries.<br />
Muhammad Sadiq was briefly imprisoned by the Ba'th in 1972 and again (with<br />
over two dozen others) in 1974. The second time, he was tortured, though he escaped<br />
the fate of five of his colleagues who were secretly executed. 23 On his release in<br />
1915, he turned to Shi'ite mysticism (al-'ir/an), and engaged in ascetic practices. His<br />
self-denial went to the extent that Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr advised him to be more<br />
moderate. 'bfan is a Shi'ite form of individ~alisticSufism, and although some cler-.<br />
ics have been attracted by it, it is unusual. for someone so centrally located in the<br />
,seminaries to pursue it (though Khomeini also had a keen interest in the works of<br />
medieval Sufis). Muhammad Sadiq studied the subject with a common wage-earner<br />
in Najaf, provoking astonishment. When pressed on the issue, he explained that close..<br />
ness to God does not depend on knowledge, but rather on the goodness ofthe self, and<br />
he cited the prophetic saying, HGod has hidden his $aints among his servants!'24 He<br />
remained a mystic all his life, and the egalitarian ethical and spiritual outlook it<br />
fostered appears to have made him especially beloved by the poor and the co~mon<br />
people.<br />
Under the influence ofKhomeini and ofMuhammad Baqir ai-Hakim, Muhammad<br />
Sadiq came to believe in the necessity to establish an Islamic state. Indeed, he main-.<br />
.-+-<br />
-22. Al..Asadi, AI-Sadr al-Thani, pp. 28..29.<br />
23•. 'Adil Ra'uf, Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr: marja'iyat ai-maydan: mashru'a al-.<br />
thaghayyiri wa-waqa'i' al-;ght;yal [Muhammad MuhammadSadiqal-Sadr: The ReligiousLeadership<br />
ofthe Arena: His Transformational Plan and the Facts ofthe Assassination.] (Damascus: Markaz al..<br />
'Iraqi Ii'l-I'lam wa-al..Dirasat, 1999), p. 92; Phebe Marr, The Modem History ofIraq (Boulder, Co.:<br />
Westview Press, 1985), p. 237. .<br />
24. AI-Asadi, al·Sadr al-Thani, pp. 29·30.<br />
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552*MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL<br />
tained that Islamic law could not be fully implemented without such a state. In 1984,<br />
four years after the execution of his cousin, "Sadr r' (Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr), he<br />
began functioning as an object ofemulation for lay Shi'ites. He was imprisoned for a<br />
third time after the 1991 uprising, for having issued a strong statement in its support.2.S<br />
On his release, he threw himself into organizing the Shi'ite community, especially<br />
in populous East Baghdad. He established informal Shi'ite courts that would<br />
adjudicate issues among Shi'ites outside the secular Ba'thist legal system. He also<br />
gained wide influence among the settled tribes. Unlike most clerics, he worked with<br />
tribal leaders to find ways of addressing clan customs and law in the framework of<br />
Shi'ite jurisprudence. 26<br />
He took increasingly controversial stances as the 1990s progressed, forbidding<br />
membership in the ruling Ba'th Party and forbidding Iraqis to hold Friday prayers in<br />
the name ofthe secular authority, "The Leader-President" (i.e. Saddam Husayn). He<br />
forbade cooperation with the Mujahidin-e Khalq, an anti-Khomeinist Iranian guerrilla<br />
group that was given bases in Iraq by the Ba'th. He accepted Khomeini's theory<br />
of the guardians~ip of the jurisprudent, which required ultimate clerical control of<br />
society, and called upon his students and congregations tQ esta!>1ish a state like it in<br />
Iraq. He condemned-women for coming in public unveiled, saying that for even one<br />
hair of her head to show is religiously prohibited.2'7, He is also said to have ruled that<br />
even Christian women living in lVIuslim societies must veil..<br />
He took hard line·stances against Israel anq the United States, maintaining that<br />
ifonly the Shi'ite clerics would unite; they could easily defeat Israel. A recording of<br />
his Friday sermon for December 25, 1998, reveals his congregants chanting, "No, no<br />
to falsehood; No, no to America; No, no to Israel; No, no to imperialism; No, no to<br />
arrogance; No, no to Satan!" He made war against the influence ofAmerican popular<br />
culture, and discouraged his followers from wearing clothing with American labels.<br />
He scolded one couple who had put their toddler in American clothes, saying words to<br />
the effect that "Why do you imitate the West, when they try to subject you to their<br />
monopoly!. Think!. Analyze!"~8<br />
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr criticized Grand Ayatollah Sistani for locking the<br />
outer door ofhis office, thus barring casual visitors, after the assassinations ofGharawi<br />
and ~urujirdi. He said that ifthis were done as a sign ofmourning and as a protest, it<br />
was understandable, but if it was done out of fear, there was nothing to fear. He also<br />
developed a theory of the "silent jurisprudent" and the "speaking jurisprudent," saying<br />
that quietist Shi'ite leaders i,mplicitly uphelQ the oppressive status quo, and insisting<br />
that the only ethical course for an object of emulation was to speak out against<br />
tyranny., This h~lfsh condemnation of Sistani and other quietist clerics in· Najaf provoked<br />
a severe split in the Shi'ite population. He appointed as his successor Sayyid<br />
Kazim al-Ha'iri. An Iraqi cleric resident in Qom, Iran, and associated with the al-.<br />
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THE US AND SHI'ITB RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ* 553<br />
Da'wa Party, al-Ha'iri had also embraced Khomeini's theory of vilayat-efaqih or the<br />
rule of the clerical jurisprudent and had attempted to subordinate the Iranian branch<br />
ofal-Da'wa to the authority ofthe SupremeJurisprudent(Khomeini and then Khamenei)<br />
in Iran. 29<br />
Despite the Ba'th prohibition on the holding of Friday prayers, Muhammad<br />
S~diq insisted on trying to revive them, giving moving and defiant sermons at his<br />
mosque in Kufa on social issues that thrilled his congregations. He sent representatives<br />
(wukala') to mosques throughout Iraq, but especially in East Baghdad, who<br />
opened the mosques on Fridays and preached to crowds as large as 2,000, despite<br />
Ba'th opposition. His representatives were tightly networked and had the reputation<br />
ofbeing young, upright and highly competent. Unlike those of.other Objects of Emulation,<br />
his representatives were forbidden to represent anyone but him, an exclusivism<br />
that clashed with pluralistic Najaf traditionJO He considered holding Friday prayers<br />
to be an unambiguous duty, even though this was a minority position in Shi'ite legal<br />
thought, because they were a symbol of Islam at a time·and place where it was under<br />
attack. Crowds began chanting slogans at the prayers such as "Our frophet is<br />
Muhammad, our leader is Muhammad, our messiah is Muhammad," and "Our first is<br />
Muhammad, our middle is Muhammad, an4 our end is Muhammad." The middle<br />
term, their leader, was of course Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr himself. This adulation<br />
seems to have gone well beyond the typical veneration for an "object of emulation."<br />
In one of his last sermons, he compared.Saddam Husayn to the medieval Umayyad<br />
Caliph al-Mutawakkil, who is vilified by Shi'ites. for his persecution of them. 31 The<br />
Ba'th regime was extremely disturbed by these sentiments, and by Muhammad Sadiq's<br />
defiance in holding the Friday prayers and in establishing a dense network of activist<br />
mosques. One of his fatwas is said to have stipulated that it was not wrong to kill a<br />
, Ba'thist persecutor, and he met with some members of th~ paramilitary Badr Corps,<br />
based in Iran, which snuck across the border to strike at Ba'thist targets in lraq.32.<br />
AI-Hayat newspaper reported that Ba'th internal security warned Muhammad<br />
Sadiq about his defiance in early 1999, but was rebuffed. 33 On February 18, 1999, he<br />
was gunned down in his car with sons Mustafa and Mu'ammal as he was driving home<br />
from his office on the outskirts of Najaf. Southern Iraq erupted in demonstrations and<br />
riots, which were brutally put down. Over 100 were killed in Najaf, and 54 more in<br />
East. Baghdad, while demonstrations spread to provincial cities. The total.death toll<br />
was put at 200.<br />
After Muhammad Sadiq',sdeath, Iraqis were divided on to whom to pledge their<br />
religious allegiance. Some followed Sistani, while others turned to Muhammad Sadiq's<br />
appointed successor, Sayyid Kazim al-Ha'iri. 34 The latter, however, had the disadvan-<br />
-29.AI-Asadi,Al.Sadra.l-Thani, pp.ll ff.,94,99-100, 109, 221-222; Khursan,HizbaI.Da 4 wa,PP.<br />
411-420.,<br />
.30. Ra'uf, Sadiq al·Sadr, pp. J42 ff., pp. 160-161.<br />
.31. AI-Asadi, Al-Sadrai-Thani., 57-63.<br />
.32.. Ra'uf, Sadiq al-Sadr, pp. 216-217•<br />
.3~. AI.Hayal, February 22, 1999 (Arabic text)•<br />
.34. AI-Hayat, March 9, 1999, BBC Summary ofWorld Broadcasts, March II, 1999.<br />
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tageofresiding in Qom and ofbeing somewhat distant from the daily realities in Iraq.<br />
The young Muqtada al-Sadr (born in the early to mid-1970s), on~ of Muhammad<br />
Sadiq's surviving sons, now went underground, using his father's networks to establish<br />
a tight, clandestine organization among the poor and repressed Shi'ites of Kufa<br />
and East Baghdad. He had not finished his studies and so was not a legitimate Object<br />
of EmulatioQ for the laity in his own right. But he won their hearts as a leader.. He<br />
retained the loyalty ofmany of his father's devotees and agents, and, unbeknownst to<br />
the outside world, established the most effective religious opposition movement in<br />
Iraq. His followers became k:nown as al-Sadriyyun, or the Sadrists, and their organization<br />
was Jama'at al-Sadr al-Thani, the Sadr II Movement. They were characterized<br />
by a Puritanism, militancy and intolerance that was very different from the genteel<br />
Najaf tradition. They held that only the legal rulings of Muhammad Sadiq alaSadr<br />
could be followed, rejecting any other religious authority. They insisted that the leadership<br />
of Iraqi Shi'ites be invested in Iraqis, a slam at Iranian-born Sistani.. The strict<br />
code of moral conduct to which they aspired, their opposition to movie theaters, the<br />
serving of alcohol, and the appearance of wQmen unveiled in public, on the other<br />
hand, simply reflected the social and religious milieu of Najaf itself.?S For the moment,<br />
they constituted a proscribed and clandestine movement, but political events<br />
would soon allow them to make claims on local power. .<br />
THE SI\DR MOVEMENT AFTER THE FALL OF THE BA'TH<br />
Muqtada al-Sadr, underground in Najaf, saw the fall ofthe Ba'th coming in the<br />
spring of 2003, and arranged for the extensive mosque network of the Sadr Movement<br />
to be reactivated as $oon as th~ government collapsed under the weight of the<br />
Anglo-American invasion. He was aided in this endeavor by the quietism ofhis rivals,<br />
who had acquiesced in the Ba'th prohibition on Friday prayers, and so had not been<br />
running mosques. Even before the Sadpam regime fell on April 9, Sadr Movement<br />
militias rose against the Ba'th and expelled its police and soldiers from al-Thawra<br />
(Saddam City), which they promptly renamed Sadr City. (Accounts differ as to whether<br />
this uprising began on April 7 or April 8.) The mosques were immediately reopened,<br />
at least for organizational purposes, by Sadr Movement preachers such as Shaykhs<br />
Muhammad alaFartusi and 'Ala' al-Mas'udi. On April 8, Sayyid Kazim al-Ha'iri, the<br />
appointee of Sadr II living in Qom, Iran, is~ued a fatwa calling on Iraq's Shi'ites to<br />
ignore the Americans and simply take control ofIraq themselves, fighting against the<br />
cultural corruption the US would bring with it. He also made Muqtada his representative<br />
in Iraq, more or iess giving him authority to do as he pleased in alaHa'iri's<br />
name. Muqtada sent money around, made appointments of followers to take over<br />
public institutions, and signed numerous decrees posted on walls throughout Iraq.36<br />
-.35. Fayyad, "Shahid.:' April 28. 2003•<br />
.36. Craig Smith, IIShiite Clerics Make Bid for Power:' New York TImes, April 26, 2003.<br />
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556*MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL<br />
troops from it in hopes of tricking them into harming the shrine and enraging the<br />
Shi'ite public. "The US military declin~d to fall for the trick. Eventually Saddam's<br />
forces became so exposed that they departed the shrine. The Sadr Movement militia<br />
immediately replaced them and claimed the weapons stockpi'e there. 40<br />
One ofal-Khu'i's companions, Ma'd Fayyad, an Iraqi journalist, described what<br />
happened next in an eyewitness account. 41 His account is largely corroborated by the<br />
narrative of Jabar Khani la'far, the deputy keeper of Imam 'Ali's shrine. 42 .Al-Khu'i<br />
decided that the easiest way to assert control over the shrine, wresting it from the Sadr<br />
Move~ent, was to rehabilitate the shrine keeper, Haydar Rafi'i Kalidar. The Kalidars<br />
had overseen the shrine for generations, and so al-Khu'i seems to have believed they<br />
would have legitimacy. But Kalidar had allowed himself to be co-opted by the Ba'th<br />
department of religious affairs, and had gained the reputation among many Najaf<br />
Shi'ites as a collaborator with Saddam Husayn as a result. The Sadr Movement,<br />
which mourned the martyrdom ofSadr II at the hands ofBa'th a~sassins, was particu-.<br />
lady bitter about prominent Shj"ites who they felt had secured their lives by collaborating.<br />
On April 9, al-Khu'i told Kalidar to start coming back to his office at the<br />
shrine, an attempt to install him there. Kalidar was there on April 10 wh~n al-Khu'i<br />
and his companions performed the rites of "visitation" or pilgnmage to the shrine..<br />
Fayyad says that an angry crowd gathered in the square outside the shrine,<br />
chanting slogans in favor of Muqtada al-Sadr. -Determined to prevent 'Kalidar from<br />
becoming established at the shrine, they demanded that he be surrendered to them.<br />
They were also enraged that al-Khu'i was accompanied by Mahir al-Yasiri, an Iraqi<br />
Shi'ite. settled in Dearborn, Michigan, who was part of an expatriate group helping<br />
the US forces and who was wearing a.US flack jac~et. The encounter became a<br />
firefight when someone in al-Khu'i's party, perhaps al-Khu'i himself, fired,a pistol<br />
over the heads of the Sadr Movement mob. They replied with gunfire, and killing aI<br />
Yasiri. Eyewitness Ma'd Fayyad says that after an hour-long standoff, al-Khu'i and<br />
his party surrendered. He then maintains that al-Khu'i and others were bound and<br />
taken to Muqtada al-Sadr's house, but that the latterdeclined to admit them and that<br />
the word came back out that they should be kill~d in the squar~. Fayyad admits,<br />
however, that he had loosened his ropes and escaped before this point, so that he may<br />
have had this story second hand... Other accounts suggest a more spontaneous mob<br />
action, in which the crowd closed on al-Khu'i and Kalidar and stabbed them to death.<br />
If the Anglo-American Coalition had in fact entertained hope that al-Khu'i could<br />
exercise a moderating "influence in Najaf, the attempt died with him.· There seems<br />
little doubt that al-Khu'i fell to angry members of the Sadr Movement.<br />
/<br />
-40. Fayyad, '·Shahid 'ala Rih/at al·Khu'; ila al.~lraq," [UWitness to the Journey of al..Khu'i to<br />
Iraq"], Al.Sharq al.Awsat, April 30, 2003. (Second Part ofa two-part story previously cited.)<br />
41. Ma'dFayyad, "Ightiyalal-7A';m al·Shi'i tAbdal-Majidal-Khu'ijiNajaf," [Assassination ofthe<br />
Shi 'iteLeader 'Abd al·Majidal..Khu'i in Najaf;' Al-Sharqal-Awsat,Aprilll, 2003. .<br />
42. Meg Laughlin and Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, "Shiite Killing Described:' Knight Ridder News<br />
Service, April 27, 2003.<br />
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THE US AND SHI'ITB RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN"IRAQ*557<br />
Crowds from the Jama'at al-Sadr al-Thani, inclpding 50 armed'men, now surrounded<br />
the houses of Grand Ayatollah 'Ali Sistani and his colleague Ayatollah<br />
Muhammad Sa'id ai-Hakim, both of whom had been rivals of Sadr II and both of<br />
whom he had criticized by name..They gave the two 48 hours to leave Najaf, demanding<br />
that the Iraqi Shi'ite leadership, be solely in the hands of Iraqis.~3 'Sistani had,<br />
however, already left his home and gone into hiding, which was one reason al-Khu'i<br />
had never been able to meet him. The mobs made a similar demand of other major<br />
clerics, including the Afghan ayatoll~h, Ishaq al-Fayyad. The crisis lasted until Monday,<br />
April 14, when city elders brought armed tribal elements loyal to them into the<br />
town to restore order. The Sadr Movement crowds were dispersed and a modicum of<br />
security was regained. 44 The US military forces were, throughout, careful not to<br />
intervene directly, because of the sensitivities ofShi'ites to the presence offoreigners<br />
at the shrine. Since the CIA had long cultivated the Iraqi tribes, and had spent millions<br />
to encourage them to rise against Saddam during the war, it is not impossible<br />
that the iribal take-over of the city was in part the Agency's doing. In the aftermath,<br />
the US forces appointed a Sunni ex-Ba'th officer who claimed to have turned against<br />
Saddam during-the war as the mayor of Najaf, and he kept order with his supporters<br />
until he was finally dismissed two months later for corroption and kidnapping.<br />
The battle for Najafwas inconclusive, though itis likely that Sistani retained his<br />
position mainly among the older inhabitants, while many of the youth gravitated to<br />
Muqtada. When for the ,first time Muqtada came out into the open and led Friday<br />
prayers at his father's old mosque in Kufa, on April 18, thousands attended. Sistani<br />
and. his senior colleagues remained much more circumspect about coming into public,<br />
for which Muqtada derided them. At his first Friday prayers sermon after the war, on<br />
April 18 in Kufa, Muqtada thanked God rather than the US "for religious freedom<br />
and for liberating us from-dictatorship." Thousands had flocked to hear him from<br />
among local laborers and farmers, suggesting the class base of his movement. He<br />
complained about the lack- of electricity and water, and implied that the US was<br />
deliberately withholding services. He also criticized then-SCIRI leader Muhammad<br />
Baqir aI-Hakim, saying, "Religious people who went'into exile should not have left.<br />
The country needed them." Since Muqtada's father died for his insistence on remain-.<br />
ing, one can understand his bitterness. The slam at aI-Hakim was more than rhetorical.<br />
Shaykh 'Ali al-Maliki, the leader of the paramilitary branch of the Sadr Movement,<br />
toldjoumalist Lara Marlowe that his forces had driven Badr Corps fighters out<br />
of East Baghdad on April 17. She concluded that the rumors that Shi'ite militias were<br />
fighting off "Ba'thists" and "Wahhabis" were a cover for. internecine battles among<br />
Shi'ite forces themselves.4 s<br />
-43. ··Jama'at Muqtada al·Sadrtuhasir Mandl al·Sistan;," [''The Muqtada ~-Sadr Movement Besieges<br />
the House ofAl-Sistani:·] Al.Sharqal·Awsat, April 14, 2003.<br />
44. 14TadakhkhulShuyukh Qaba'ilal·Furat," ["Intervention ofthe Shaykhs ofthe EuphratesTribes n ].<br />
Al.ShalrJ al·Awsat, April IS, 2003.<br />
45. Lara Marlowe, report from Najar, The Scotsman, Apri119, 2003.<br />
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AL-THAWRA TOWNSHIP OR "SADR CITY"<br />
+.<br />
The more important political action took place in the poor quarters of East<br />
Baghdad or al~Thawra, now informally known as Sadr City, where the Sadr Movement<br />
became a "youth movement" par excellence. s46 Journalist Muhammad Husni<br />
reported firsthand on April 17 that Sadr Movement militias had filled the power<br />
vacuum created by the fall of the Ba'th Party, establishing patrols and engaging in<br />
firefights with infiltrators. They had also organized the return of looted goods, and<br />
were providing food aid (rom the mosques. He reported strong anti-American sentiments<br />
among the Friday prayers leaders at the Sadr mosques, who insisted that the US<br />
leave as soon as possible. The movement leaders told flusni that the enemy infiltrators<br />
were "Arab volunteers:' with the implication that they wereal-Qaeda or Sunni Arab<br />
·nationaIists. 4 7, We have aiready seen that Marlowe concluded they were actually fighting<br />
the Badr Corps.<br />
The following day, on Friday, April 18, the Sadr movement helped staged one<br />
of the largest demonstrations yet seen in post-war Iraq, with an estimated 20,000<br />
Baghdadis coming out for it. Sadr Movement supporter Shaykh Muhammad al-Fartusi<br />
and self-styled "head Qf security" gave a rousing sermon at the al-Hikmah mosque in<br />
al-Thawra, saying that the Shi'ites would not accept a brand of democracy "that<br />
allows Iraqis to say what they want but gives them no say in their destiny," adding,<br />
"this form of government would be worse than that of Saddam Husayn.~' fie urged<br />
believers to follow the decrees of the Najaf religious establishment (by which he<br />
meant Muqtada al-Sadr), and listed ~ four-point code ofconduct, stressing that music,<br />
imitation of Westerners, women going unveiled, and preferring tribal custom to Islamic<br />
law are aU forbidden. After Friday prayers (where the congregants received<br />
their instructions), crowds poured into the streets, demanding that the US depart from<br />
Iraq and insisting on an Islamic state. Placards read, "OetoutNow," and "No to Bush,<br />
no to Saddam, Yes to Islam!." The largely Shi'ite crowds were joined by Sunni Islamists.<br />
Asupporting large demonstration was held the same day in the holy shrine city of<br />
Karbala, spurred on by the sermon of Sadr Movement preacher Kazim al-'lbadi al<br />
Nasiri at the mosque attached to the shri~e of Imam Husayn, also demanding an<br />
immediate departure of US troops, saying "We reject this foreign occupation, which<br />
is a new imperialism."4& '<br />
The religious rites of commemorative pilgrimage carried out by Shi'ites to<br />
Karbala that began over the weekend ofApril 19 and 20 did not, as some radicals had<br />
-46. A good overview is al·Amin, "Baghdad allati lam taral/' and by the same author, "Madina<br />
tahkumuha shabakat masajidal-Hawzaal-Natiqa," ["City Governed by the Networks ofthe Mosques<br />
oftheSpeaking Religious Authority:'A1.Bayal, July'12, 2003, both parts ofa6-part series on Muqtada<br />
and Iraqi Shi'ism.<br />
47. Muhammad Husni, "Rijal aJ-Din al-Shi'a yandafi'una Iimil'al·Firagh al·Si)·asi.fi al- 'Iraq,"<br />
[Shi'iteClerics Rush in to Fill the Political Void in lraq"],AI.Quds ai-'Arabi, April 18, 2003.<br />
48. Hasan Hafiz, ~'Muzaharat Hashida," ["Mass Demonstrations"), AI·Quds ai-'Arabi, Apri119,<br />
2003; Mohamed Hasni, "iraq's Friday Prayers IssueWarnings to US:'Agence France-Presse, April 19,<br />
2003; "The Search Continues:' Monday Morning (Beimt),ApriI28, 2003.<br />
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THE US AND SHI'ITB RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ*559<br />
hoped, tum into an anti-American political protest. The large crowds, in their hundreds of<br />
thousands, remained peaceful and apparently more interested in the pilgrimage itselfthan<br />
politics, though a small group occasionally chanted against the US occupation. Many<br />
followers of Sadr II stopped off at his tomb in Najaf to pay their re~pects.49 Shaykh<br />
Fartusi visited Najaf over that weekend to get instructions from Muqtada, and returned to<br />
Baghdad late Sunday,,after the curfew. He was stopped by Marines at a checkpoint, and<br />
they found a pistol in his car. They arrested him, apparently unaware of his importance.<br />
The next day, Monday April 21, the Sadr Movement mobilized and bused 5,000 protesters<br />
to the center ofBaghdad, who chanted for the release ofFartusi. The rallies ofthe previous<br />
Friday had been much less visible, because they took place in neighborhoods. This<br />
demonstration was the largest yet staged at the center of the city. It was repeated on<br />
Thesday, but then the Marines, finally aware oftheir mistake, released Fartusi. He maintained<br />
that he had been beaten and mistreated, saying thatthe US was "worse than Saddam!'<br />
.so The Sadr Movement continued to express strong anti-Western feelings, with gangs<br />
threatening and closing down liquor stores and cinemas, and enforcing the veil on women.<br />
Some Sadr Movement clerics nevertheless cooperated thereafter with US military community<br />
development effoi:ts, and they continued to have great sway in East Baghdad,<br />
supplying food and other aid paid for by Iranian sources. 51<br />
Muqtada has taken a rejectionist but non-violent stance toward the US presence<br />
and its ~fforts to establish a new Iraqi government. He was invited by Jay Garner, the<br />
first US civil administrator of the country, to participate in a leadership conference<br />
held at Nasiriyya on April 28, but refused. 52 He said, "I don't want the chair of the<br />
government because it will be controlled by the US and I don't want to be controlled<br />
by the US" Eyewitness journalist Nir Rosen reports that, "When asked ifthat meant<br />
he would want to attack the Americans, he snorted and replied with the colloquial<br />
Arabic equivalent of 'Why would I want to f**k myself1"'~3 The al-Da'wa Party also<br />
opposed that meeting, because it was being held by a former US General under Pentagon<br />
auspices. SelRI $ent a low-level delegation. Later, when Garner was replaced<br />
by civilJan L. Paul Bremer Ill, both SCIRI and al-Da'wa proved ultimaJely willing to<br />
join the new Governing Council that declared itselfon July 13 after negotiations with<br />
the US. Muqtada, however, refused, denouncing the plan at his June 14 Friday sermon<br />
at Kufa.$4 He later expressed severe reserva~ions that the Americans could establish<br />
a just government in Iraq, since they were opposed to a Shi'ite state.<br />
Muqtada called on May 2 for strict Islamic law to be applied to Iraq's Christians,<br />
as well, including the prohibition on bars and on allowing women to appear<br />
-49. Richard Uoyd Parry, "Pilgrimage represents Rebirth ofShia Faith:' The 1i'mes,April 21, 2003<br />
(reporting from Najaf).<br />
50. Nadiya Mahdid, "AI·Quwwat al-Amrikiyya tufrij 'an Rajul Din," ["American Forces <strong>Release</strong><br />
Cleric PIJ, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 23 2003; same author., ''AI-Fartusir,Al-Sluzrq al-Awsat, 24 April<br />
2003; Craig S. Smith, "Shiite Clerics make Bid for Power:' New York limes, April 26, 2003.<br />
51. Anthony Shadid, "Troops Test Cooperation With Clerics:' Washington Post, May 23, 2003.,<br />
52. Nadim Ladki, "Gamerto Meet Prominent Iraqis:' Reuters,· April 27,2003 (via Lexis Nexis).<br />
53. Nir Rosen, "Shiite Contender Eyes Iraq's Big Prize:' 'lime Magazine Online, May 3, 2003.<br />
54. AI-Zaman, June 16,2003.<br />
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unveiled. 55 This ruling appears to be a restatement of one of his father's fatwas, but<br />
this time the al-Sadr family had the authority to make it stick in some parts of Iraq. In<br />
contrast, Grand Ayatollah Sistani issued a statement saying that the Najaf establishment<br />
had not called for forcible veiling. Muqtada also forbade Iraqi merchants to deal<br />
with Kuwaitis, and his mentor Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha'iri forbade Iraqis to seUland to<br />
Jews, calling for such Jewish buyers to be killed. 56 The Sadr Movement stranglehold<br />
on power in al-Thawra continued to be strengthened in May, June, and July. Sadrists<br />
established informal Shi'ite courts in mosques to deal with local disputes, including<br />
over burglary and murder. Sadr II had run such courts clandestinely, but now they<br />
were the de facto tribunals ofjustice in many neighborhoods.<br />
The al-Muhsin Mosque 'was a key Sadr Movement institution in East Baghad.<br />
Shaykh Kazim 'Ibadi al-Nasiri called in his sermon on May 9 there for vigilante<br />
reprisal killings of Ba'thists, referring to a fatwa of Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha'iri. 5 7, In<br />
his sermon from the same mosqu~ on May 16, Shaykh Muhammad Fartusi thundered,<br />
"The cinemas in AI-Saadun Street show indecent films. I warn them: ifin a week they<br />
do not change, we will act differently with them. We warn women and the go-betweens<br />
who take them to the Americans: If in a week from now they do not change their<br />
attitude, the murder ofthese women is sanctioned (by Islam). This warning also goes<br />
out to sellers.of alcohol, radios and televisions., The torching of cinemas w~uld be<br />
permitted," he said, if cinemas did not change their ways.58 In fact, many liquor<br />
shops, cinemas, and cosmetic shops·were closed by threats or in some instances tire<br />
bombings.<br />
DEMONSTRATIONS<br />
The Sadr Movement attempted to provoke numerous demonstrations in Baghdad<br />
and Basra, calling for a withdrawal ofAnglo-American troops, as a way of showing<br />
its popl:llar influence. On May 14, hundreds of Shi'ites demonstrated in downtown<br />
Baghdad for an Islamic government, saying that it should be Shi'ite because they had<br />
suffered most under Saddam. On May 15, Shaykh al-'Ibadi al-Nasiri preached a<br />
thunderous sermon to 30,000 congregants at the Imam Sadr Mosque in East Baghdad,<br />
accusing US troops of using night vision goggles to see through women's clothes and<br />
of passing out pornography to children in the form of candy wrappers. He all but<br />
called for terror attacks on US forces. Ironically, the US forces had provided special<br />
security to the mosque. His sermon appears to have alarmed Muqtada al-Sadr back in<br />
Najaf, and it was announced that it had not been approved and that henceforth the<br />
-.55. Mohamed Hasni, uSadr Calls for Iraqi Christians to Follow Islamic Law;' Middle East Online,<br />
May 2, 2003•.<br />
56. Ulraqi Fatwa Bans Trading with Kuwaitis;' Arab nmes (Kuwait), July 12, 2003; "Cleric Calls<br />
for Killing ofJews who Buy Land;' Reuter, June 28, 2003.<br />
57. James Drummond and Nicholas Pelham, "Shia Clerics Urge Faithful to Attack Returning<br />
Ba'athists;' Financial 7imes, May 10,2003.<br />
_58•."Shiite Leader in Baghdad Warns Women, Alcohol Sellers, Cinemas;' Agence France Presse,<br />
May 16,2003 (via Lexis Nexis).<br />
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THE US AND SHI'ITE RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ* 561<br />
Najaf religious establishment (i.e. Muqtada) would have to pre-approve such sermons.<br />
Muqtada has steadfastly refused to sanction violence against A~ericans. That<br />
weekend, Shi'ite clerics like Shaykh Fartusi began calling for a million man march<br />
on Monday, May 19, the Shi'ite commemoration of the death of the Prophet<br />
Muhammad, wh~ch they had been forbidden by the Ba'th to mark on a day different<br />
from the one honored by the Sunnis. bn May 19, Shi'ites conducted the commemorative<br />
procession to a mosque, and about 10,000 Sadrists turned the occasion into an<br />
anti-American rally, demanding an Iraqi government overseen by the Najaf ayatollahs<br />
and the departure of the Americans. s9 Given the difference between Fartusi's<br />
predictions and the actual turnout, arid given that even it depended on the holy day<br />
procession, this outcome can only be seen as a setback for the Sadr Movement. Most<br />
Iraqi Shi'ites clearly were still willing to give the US time.,<br />
On Thursday, May 29, hundreds of Shi'ites, including 50 clerics, gathered in<br />
downtown Baghdad to chant against the US for using troops to make arrests of armed<br />
clerics in Najaf. They also chanted against Israel, and called the US "the number one<br />
source of terrorism.~'60 The same day, a Baghdad cinema near the demonstration was<br />
rocked by a grenade attack, after defying·demands from the Sadr movement "punishment<br />
committee" to close down. On June 3, hundreds of Sadr Movement Shi'ites<br />
demonstrated against the US in downtown Baghdad, protesting the brief detention of<br />
Shaykh Jasim Sa'adi on weapons charges. Among those protesting were members of<br />
the breakaway Fadilah Party, a faction of the Sadr Movement headed by Shaykh<br />
Muhammad Ya'qubi. 6l On Saturday, June 21, 2,500 Shi'ites demonstrated jn downtown<br />
Baghd~d at the behest of Sadr Movement preachers, demanding that the Najaf<br />
religious authorities establish and supervise the new Iraqi-government, and denouncing<br />
the Americans as occupiers. This protest came at a time when US civil administrator<br />
L. Paul Bremer seemed determined to relegate Iraqi leaders to a merely ~dvisory<br />
role. During his Friday Prayers sermon, Shaykh Kazim 'Ibadi al-Nasiri had told his<br />
10,000 congregants that they were engaged in a "clash of civilizations," and urged<br />
them to gather downtown during his Friday prayers sermon. They were joined by<br />
worshippers from Kazimiyya and Shuala. 62<br />
June saw three big demonstrations against the British authorities in Basra, on<br />
June 1(5,000), June 7 (2,000), and June 15 (10,000). The BBC online reported ofthe<br />
June 7 rally, "They were said to have rallied on the instructions of an organisation<br />
named after Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr . " ."63 Although ShiCite-unrest in<br />
-,59. "Shiites call for Iraqi government free offoreign influences:' Deutsche Press Agentur, 15 May<br />
2003; Warren Richey, "Reverberations from an I~q PrayerMeeting:' Christian Science Monitor, May,<br />
19, 2003; "Shiites o~nly mark Mohammed's birthday in Iraq as lawlessness still reigns;' A~ May<br />
19,2003.<br />
60. "Hundreds ofShiites hold anti-US rally in Baghdad:' Agence France Presse, May 29, 2003.<br />
61"Iraqis protest at arrest ofShiite dignitary," Agence France Presse, June 3,2003.<br />
62. Patrick1Yler,"'2,000 at Rally Demand Jslamic Supervision ofElections:' New York 'limes, June<br />
22, 2003; Anthony Shadid, "Iraqi Shiite Leader Uneasy With U.S. Role," Washington Post, June 23,<br />
2003.<br />
63. "Basra protest against British presence:' BBC New~ Online, June7,2003 at http://news.bbc.co.uk1<br />
Continued on Next Page<br />
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Basra is often blamed on al-Hakim's Supreme Council for Isiamic Revolution in Iraq,<br />
the Sadr Movement is a considerable force in the city in its own right. 64 Still, the<br />
demands of the protesters were remarkably local, having to do with discontents about<br />
the way the British were running the city and with their appointees to the governing<br />
council.<br />
FACIIONAUSM<br />
Muqtada al-Sadr ma4e a trip to Iran for a week beginning June 7, meeting'with<br />
high Iranian authorities and with his mentor, Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha'iri. Given the<br />
subsequent tension that developed between the two, this meeting may not have gone<br />
well. The Iranians had supplied food and other aide to Sadr Movement clerics in East<br />
Baghdad, allowing them to gai.n popularity by providing services to the people. Muqtada<br />
may have been seeking further such aid. If so, the Iranians wanted a quid pro quo.<br />
They wanted the exclusivist and sectarian Sadr Movement to avoid any further internal<br />
Shi'ite clashes such as had broken out over al-Khu'i's arrival in Najaf in early<br />
April. Former Iranian president and head of the Expediency Council, 'Ali Akbar<br />
Hashemi Rafsanja~i, said "All Iraqi Shiite groups and fighters, especially those ofthe<br />
Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, should keep their unity and<br />
work for Iraq's interests by combatting internal and external conspiracies."6S<br />
Rafsanjani's pleading was not entirely successful. By late June, Muqtada was<br />
telling journalist Hazim aI-Amin that there was no coordination between him and the<br />
other Shi'ite leaders in Najaf, and that itwas the fault ofGrand Ayatollah Sistani and<br />
his colleagues, who were apolitical because they were not Iraqis. (This is a reference<br />
to his father's theory ofthe "al-Hawza al-Natiqa" or the "Speaking Religious Authority:'<br />
the mantle of which Muqtada now claims). AI-Amin also reported thatSistani<br />
and Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir aI-Hakim of SCIRI had grown closer, in hopes of<br />
uniting against the threat of the exclusivist and powerful Sadr Movement. Muqtada<br />
told him that he believes in the Khomeinist theory of the role ofthe jurisprudent, but<br />
-Continuedfrom Previous Page<br />
Ilhilworldlmiddle_east/2972308.stm ; "Iraqis protest against new British. roler in Basra :' Agence<br />
france Presse, June I, 2003; "Iraqis protest against British role in Basra:'Agence France Presse, June<br />
IS, 2003.<br />
64.. Andrzej Rybak, "Irak.Tageblicher: Basra holt Schwung JUr den Neubeginn," ["Iraq Diary:<br />
Basra gets Momentum for a New Beginning:' Financial 'limes Deutschland, AprilS, 2003 at http://<br />
www.ftd.deJpw/inlIOS0940024444.html?nv=tn-rs. He says, "Viele unterstiitzen den jungen<br />
'Religionsgelehrten Muqtada al·Sadraus Nadschaf, der gegen die Priisenzder USA in Irak. '.• eintritt."<br />
[Many .Support the Young Religious Scholar Muqtada al·Sadr of Najaf, who Stands against the US<br />
Presence in Iraq:']<br />
65. "Iran's Rafsanjani Appeals for UnityAmong Rival Iraqi ShiiteGroups:'Agence France-Presse,<br />
June 8,2003,. See also "Muqtada al·Sadr)'abhathfi Qumm lawdatal-Ha'iriila al-Najaf," ["Muqtada<br />
al-Sa~r discusses in Qom the Return ofal-Ha'iri to Najar'), AI-ZLzman, June 6, 2003..<br />
1CW12oo3. 4:00 PM
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THE US AND SHI'ITE RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ*,563<br />
that the supreme jurisprudent of Iraq would be a different person than the supreme<br />
jurisprudent ofIran (among believers in the th~ory, a big debate has raged for over a<br />
decade over whether Iranian Supreme Jurisprudent 'Ali Khamenei's authority extends<br />
to aUShi'ites or is country-bound). Muqtada reaffirmed that he refused to cooperate<br />
with the American administratio!l, but also declined to oppose'it. 66<br />
June and July witnessed an- outbreak of fierce rivalry in Karbala between the<br />
Sadr Movement and followers of Grand Ayatollah Sistani over the right to preach in<br />
the mosque attached to the shrine of Imam Husayn, among the' more prestigious<br />
venues in the Shi'ite world. An agreement was initially reached to alternate each<br />
Friday, but then in e~rly July Muqtada issued a typically exclusivist decree that only<br />
Sadrist clerics had the right to lead prayers. On July 4, the two factions came to blows<br />
inside the shrine of the Imam, leaving the city polarized and tense. 6 1. In July, as well,<br />
the Sadr Movement and SCIRI quarreled over the shrine of Imam 'Ali in Najaf..<br />
In early JulY,Muqtada, who is said to be on the brink of being an independent<br />
jurisprudent (mujtahid) and Object of-Emulation himself, also began being,critical of<br />
his supposed mentor, Ayatollah Kazi1!l al·Ha'iri, for refusing to come ba,ck to Najaf<br />
from Qom, and suggesting that he did not after aU recognize him as a superior. 68 For<br />
his part, according to the Iranian newspaper Baztab, al-Ha'iri began backing off his<br />
support for Muqtada, saying that offices dedicated to the memory ofSadr II should tie<br />
closed except in Najaf, and that the activities of the Muslims should henceforth be<br />
conducted under the shadow of. the quardian (Wafi) of the Muslims (i.e. al-Ha'iri<br />
himselt).69 IfBaztab is to be believed, AI-Ha'iri was positioning himself to succeed .<br />
to Sadr II and sideline Muqtada. He received some help, inadvertent or not, when on<br />
July 16 Shaykh Muhammad Ya'qubi finally declared himself an Object of Emulation,<br />
making formal the split of his al-Fadila group from the Muqtada loyalists.. His followers<br />
demonstrated again~t threats ~o him in Najaf, though the Muqtada group maintained<br />
that he had no local support and just brought in some'armed tribes~en to stage<br />
the demonstration. Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha'iri is said to have blessedYa'qubi's schism,<br />
saying he had the prerequisites for being an Object of Emulation. '<br />
°<br />
The movement o( Muqtada al-Sadr seems likely to survive this minor schism,<br />
and it continued to show, great popular strength through late summer.. Sadrists appear<br />
to have been involved in riots against Marine patrols in Karbala in late July, resulting<br />
-66.' Hazim aI-Amin, "Arwiqatal-Hawzah fi at-Najaftadijj bi inqisamat:' [The Halls ofthe Hawzain<br />
Najaf are Riven with Divisions"] AI-HaYlJt, June 27,2003. "<br />
67. Hamza Hendawi, "Once Showcased as Example ofPeace, Holy Shiite City now Moving in<br />
Opposite Direction:' Associated Press, July 15,2003.<br />
68. AI-Amin, "Madina tahkumuha shabakat."<br />
69. "Awj-giri-yiTanish miyan-i Sadri-ha va Majlis-i A'la:' ["Tensions Peak Between the Sadrists<br />
adn SCIRI"] Baztab, July 13, 2003122 Tir 1384 at http://www.baztab.com(<br />
index.asp?ID=9120&Subject=News<br />
70. IIInshi'ab darSadriha," ["SplitAmong the Sadris"] Bazrab, July 16, 2003/25 "lir 13~4 at: http:/<br />
Iwww.baztab.comlindex.asp?ID=9299&Subject=News; theYa'qubi schism, which began last spring,<br />
is also reported by a)-Amini ,cMadina," andjournalist Nir Rosen in Najafkindly sent me an unpublished<br />
report he had done on aI-Fadila. I am also grateful to Trudy Rubin of the Philadelphia Inquirer for<br />
sharing inSights from her 3-week trip to Najafand other Shiite sites in May-June, 2093. -<br />
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564*MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL<br />
in one dead and nine wounded when the Marines replied to gunfire and shot into the<br />
crowd. In a Friday sermon in early August, Muqtada called on the IVJ;arines to be tried<br />
for murder in accordance with the sharia. Sadrists were definitely involved in major<br />
riots in Basra the weekend of Augus~ 9-10.. Followers of Muqtada have significant<br />
power in Basra, and are said to hold a third ofthe seats on the current city council. On<br />
August 15, Shi'ites in East Baghdad rioted against the United States because a military<br />
helicopter had blown a Shi'ite banner off a telecom tower. The banner invoked<br />
the promised one of Shi'ite.Islam, the Imam Mahdi, and appears to have been placed<br />
on the tower by Sadrists who believe he is· about to come back. Muqtada had announced<br />
that he would begin recruiting a militia called the "Mahdi Army," though he<br />
pledged it would be non-violent. Some 10,000 young men are ,said to have joined,<br />
and the banners put up in East Baghdad may have been in part celebrating the militia's<br />
formation. Muqtada continued to call for an immediate withdrawal from Iraq of<br />
American and British troops.<br />
When Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir aI-Hakim was killed along with nearly 100<br />
others in a huge truck bomb in Najaf on August 29, SCIRI leaders began demanding<br />
an immediate US military withdrawal, as well.'Because ofreligious sensitivities about<br />
close Marines patrols in Najaf, after the bombing the US civil administrator Paul<br />
Bremer winked at the emergence of armed par~militaries in Najaf, including Badr<br />
Corps fighters trained by the Revolutionary Guards in Iran and members ofMuqtada's·<br />
.Army of the Mahdi. The US military had been dead ,set against such paramilitaries<br />
appearing in public with arms, and indicated that it would not be tolerated for long.<br />
The bombing brought SCIRI and the Sadrists closer in their position on the Coalition<br />
military forces. It also removed an important rival to Muqtada, though Muhammad<br />
Baqir ai-Hakim never had the young al-Sadr's widespread popularity, in any case.<br />
Muqtada's enemies among the Sunnis accused him of blaming them for the bombing<br />
and of provoking Shiites to expropriate their religious sites., The Sadr movement<br />
remains significant in Iraqi street politics despite·its exclusion from the Americanappointed<br />
Interim Governing Council and the new cabinet appointed in early September.<br />
71 Observers on the ground rep9rt that the Sadr Movement controls the major<br />
mosques, Shi'ite community centers, hospitals and soup kitchens in East Baghdad,<br />
Kufa and Samarra', and has a strong presence in Najaf, Karbala and Basra, as well. Jt<br />
is highly networked, and its preachers have taken a strong rhetorical line against. what<br />
they view as an Anglo-American occupation. It is sectarian both in its demographic<br />
base (poor, urban and young) and its dedication to the themes of difference, antagonism<br />
and separation. Politically, jt must be seen as a movement of the populist Right,<br />
seeking to impose rellgious authority on the public, to. institute corporate techniques<br />
of control, to -reduce women to second class citizens, to exclude foreign influence,<br />
and to subordinate ihe minority Sunnis to Shi'ite religious leadership.<br />
-71.AcontinuingchronicleofShi'ite movements in contemporary Iraq, with citations, may be found<br />
at http://www.juancole.com; for these points, see theAugust and September2003 archives.}<br />
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the mosque attached to the shrine ofImam Husayn. They have separated their congregation<br />
from the one led by Sistani's appointee. Their antagonism to these other groups<br />
is in part rooted in their attempt to monopolize sacred space in Iraq.<br />
Can the Sadrists maintain their political momentum? Ifthe Defense Department<br />
scenario comes to fruition, and Iraq holds relatively free and fair elections~ in late<br />
2004 or early 2005, the Sadr Movement's political" power may be diluted in a new<br />
Iraqi parliament that. they cannot hope to· dominate. Assuming they agree to field<br />
~andidates, they could only hope to play in it the sort ofrole that the Lebanese Hizbullah<br />
does in the Lebanese parliament, where the radical party is often forced to cooperate<br />
with the Maronite Christians and other forces .. If, on the other hand, Iraq begins to<br />
collapse into insecurity and angry urban crowds seek an early exit ofCoalition forces,<br />
the Sadr Movement networks and militias will stand them in good stead in asserting<br />
power in East Baghdad and the south. It seems clear that the future of Iraq is intimately<br />
wrought up with the fortunes of the Sadr Movement.<br />
+.<br />
II<br />
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+.<br />
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42. Th,e. Iranian Hand<br />
UNCLASSIFIED<br />
o<br />
ALL INFORMATION CONTAII~D<br />
HEREIN IS UlJCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/!sg<br />
Michael Ledeen, Wall StreetJournal, 16 April2Q04, Page A14<br />
Much is being made about the irony of an Iranian envoy arriving in Iraq to<br />
help negotiate a solution to the U.S. standoffwith radical Shiite cleric Muqtada<br />
al-Sadr. How could,we al~owa charter member of President Bush's"Axis of Evil"<br />
~o negotiate a "peace" with the thuggish Sadr and his band offanatical militants?<br />
Indeed, the irony is as thick as Sadr's own beard. But the fact that Iran<br />
holds sway over him and otherShiite militants in Iraq should surprise no one.<br />
Despite. repeated denials by the State. Department, it is an open secret throughout<br />
the Middle East that Sadr has b~enreceiving support- if not precise orders -<br />
from the mullahs in Iran for some time now.<br />
That the. war.beingwaged by Shiite militants throughoutIraq is notjusta<br />
domestic "insurgency" has been documented by the, Italian Military Intelligence<br />
Sendce. (Sismi). In a report prepared before the current wave of violence, Sismi<br />
predicted "a simultaneous attack by Saddam loyalists" allover the country, along<br />
with a series ofShiite revolts.<br />
The Italians knew thatthese actions were not just par~of an Iraqi civil war,<br />
nor a response, to recent actions taken by the Coalition Provisional Authority<br />
against the forces ofSadr. According to Italian intelligence, the, actions were, used<br />
as a pretext by local leaders of the, factions tied to an Iran-based ayatQIlah, Kazem<br />
al-Haeri, who was "guided in his political and strategic choices by<br />
ultraconservative Iranian ayatollahs in order to unleash a long planned general<br />
revolt.II The. strategic. goal of this revolt, .says Sismi, was "the, establishment of an<br />
Islamic government of Khomeinist inspirati~n."The Italianintelligence agency<br />
noted that "thepresence of Iranian agents of influence and military insmtctors<br />
has b~enreported for s,ome. time.Ii Our own governm~ntwill not say as much<br />
publicly, but Dona\d'Rumsfeld and Gen. John Abizaid, the commanderof U.S.<br />
force.s in Iraq, have/recently spoken of "unhelpful actions" by Iran (and Syria).<br />
/<br />
The Lonq.on-based Al-Hayat reported on April 6 that the Iraqi Governing<br />
Council was actiyely discussing lithe major Iranian role in the events that took<br />
place in the. Iraqi Shiite cities,'· noting that the Iranians,were. the predominant<br />
financiers ofSadr. Another London newspaper, Al Sharq Al-Awsat', quoted a<br />
recent Iranian intelligence defector that Iranian infiltration of Iraq started well<br />
before Operation IraqiFreedom. Hundreds of intelligence agents were sent into<br />
Iraq through the north. After thefall'of Saddam, greater numbers came across<br />
the uncontrolled border, masquerading as students, derics and journalists -- and·\<br />
as religious pilgrims to the now-accessible holy cities ofNajaf and Karbala. ./\ r ~'-t tu~<br />
UNCLASSIFIED<br />
G5R-w r-~G~ts:-~C<br />
&~mlḶ -
·ḃo·<br />
t<br />
/<br />
e<br />
UNCLASSIFIEjD<br />
The editor of the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Seyassah ~ecent1y ~ote a front-.<br />
page editorial saying ~atHezbollah and Hamas were workingwithSadr,<br />
"backed by th~ ruling religious fundamentalists inTehran and the. nationalist<br />
Baathists ill Damascus. 1I No classified information was required for that claim,<br />
sinceSadr himself has publicly proclaimed that his militia is the fighting arm of<br />
both Hezbollah and Harnas. Nonetpeless, the State Department still doesn't<br />
believe - or won't admit publicly - that there's a co~ection betweenSadr's<br />
uprising and Iran's mullahs. Just last week, State's dep~ty spokesman, Adam<br />
Ereli; told reporters that "We've seen reports of Iranian involvement, c9llusion,<br />
provocation, coordinaqon, etc., etc. But I think there's a dearth of hard facts to<br />
back these"things up.."<br />
o<br />
,I<br />
Iraq cannot be peaceful and secure. so long as Tehran sends its terrorist<br />
cadres across theborder.. Naturally, our troops will engage -- and kill-- any<br />
infiltrators they encounter. But we·can be sure that ~here will beothers to take<br />
th~ir place~ The only way to end Tehran's continual sponsorship of terror is to<br />
1;>ring about, the demise of the. present Iranian regime. And as it ;happel19i we<br />
have an excellent opportunity to achieve. this objective, without the direct use of<br />
military power against Iran. There is a critical mass of pro-democracy citizens<br />
there, who woulp1ike nothing more than to rid themselves of.their oppressors.<br />
They ne~d help;fbut they neither need nor desire to be liberated ~y force of arms.<br />
Above all, they want to hear our leaders state clearly and rep.eatedly -- as<br />
Ronald Reagan did with the "Evil EmRire" -- that regime change in,Iran is the<br />
goal of American policy. Thus far, they have heard conflicting statements and<br />
mealy-;mouthed half truths of the sort presented by Mr. EreH, along with<br />
astonishing procl~ations,such as the one by Deputy Secretary of State Richard<br />
UNCLASSIFIED
It<br />
e<br />
UNCLASSIFIED<br />
o<br />
.<br />
Armitage, in which he averred that Iran is Ita democracy.II (One wonders whether<br />
he will liken Muqtada aI-Sadr to Patrick Henry.)<br />
, Mr. Armitage notwithstanding, we can reach the'Iranian people by<br />
providing support to the several Farsi-language radio and TV stations in this<br />
country, all currently scrambling for funds to broadcast a couple of hours a day.<br />
We can encourage Brivate foundations and individuals to support the Iranian<br />
democracy movement. Thecurrent leadership of the AFL-CIO has regrettably<br />
abandoned that organization's traditional role of supporting free trade unions<br />
inside tyrannical countries, but there are some individual unions that'could do it.<br />
This sort of political campaign aimed at toppling the Iranian regime -<br />
allied to firm punitive. action wi~l).in Iraq against terrorists ofall stripes -- will<br />
make our task in Iraq manifestly less dangerous. Ultimately, security in.Iraq will<br />
come in large. measure from freedom and reform in Iran (as well as in Syria and<br />
Saudi Arabia). This is a truth thatwe should not hide from, nor be fearful to take<br />
on.<br />
Mr. Ledeen, resident scholar at the. American Enterprise Institute, is the<br />
author of tithe War Against the. Tert"or Masters" (St Martinis, 2003).<br />
, ,<br />
UNCLASSIFIED<br />
,',<br />
0, ....
Priht Q<br />
~:~<br />
ALL<br />
INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HERE IN IS UNC LASS I FIED /!!\.<br />
~ DATE 07-29-2010 BY 6032~baW/SabJlsg<br />
Page 1 ofl<br />
Print Window I crose yti!laow<br />
Document 4 of 522<br />
Copyright 2004 Natlonwl~e News pty Limited<br />
PNG Post-Courier<br />
April 19,2004 Monday<br />
SECTION: FLARE UP IN IRAQi Pg. 15<br />
LENGTH: 237 words<br />
HEADLINE: US policies to blame<br />
BODY: ~<br />
TEHRAN: Iran yesterday said Americas iron-fisted policies and the lack of security undermined Iranian efforts to bring calm to Iraq.<br />
And that It would no longer co-operate with Washington In such efforts.<br />
Iran had sent a diplomatic delegation to Iraq In an effort to Improve security but Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefl<br />
said the team did not make the contacts It had hoped, and blamed the Americans.<br />
The latest setback to Iranian efforts came after an Iranian diplomat was killed in Baghdad on Thursday, causing Iran to distance<br />
Itself from mediation efforts to end a standoff between Iraqi mllitlas,loyal to anti-US cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and US forces.<br />
From the very beginning of the crisis, Iran tried to help ease tension but Washington s employment of an Iron-fist policy further<br />
complicated the situation" Mr Asefi said.,<br />
He was referring to the Increasing use of force by the US military, which laid siege to FaliuJah last week after the killing and<br />
mutilation of four US civilians.<br />
Mr Asefl also said America s policies caused the failure of the mission of an Iranian diplomatic delegation to Iraq last week.<br />
He said Hossein Sadeghi, a top Iranian Foreign Ministry official, failed to meet with al-Sadr and Grand Ayatollah All al-Husselnl ai-<br />
,Slstanl, Iraq s most powerful Shi Ite cleric.<br />
'<br />
We couldn t meet Sadr or Ayatollah Sistani becaus~ of lack of security, Mr Asefi said.<br />
LOAD-DATE: April 19, 2004
.<br />
. Att HI;FORHATION CONTAlNED '.<br />
~IN IS UNCLASSIFIED' 0'<br />
~ 07,29-2010 BY 60324UC baw/s~~ ~<br />
, ~<br />
~SOUBOB<br />
--- .~ ,By RichardLeiby<br />
". '.<br />
t,<br />
"Tb.eir<br />
corruption,"<br />
corruption<br />
declares<br />
isour<br />
. a remarkably candid<br />
insider's assessment<br />
ofalleged kickbacks, patronage<br />
and other woes pJaguingthe<br />
U.5.-selected provisional<br />
govenunent in Iraq. 'The leaked<br />
memo haSforeign policywOnks<br />
playingaguessing game: Who is<br />
the importantIraqi officW<br />
desch1>edasa'1tappydnmk"?<br />
Who is theKurdish politician who<br />
seems to be actingoutapartin'<br />
11leGodfather"? .<br />
Penned byaPentagon adviser<br />
attached to the Coalition<br />
Provisional Authority, the chatty<br />
March memo offersa series of<br />
observationsand suggeStions after<br />
several months in Iraq as the· ' .<br />
author heads into non-goVernment<br />
life. "Despitethe progress evident<br />
in the streetsofBaghdad, much of<br />
whichhappens despite us rather<br />
than because of.us. Baghdadis have<br />
an uneasysense that theyare ,<br />
heading toward civil war," the<br />
memo reports. Peopleare<br />
stoekPiliJ)gguns, the'author saYs,<br />
..and "CPAis ironicalJy driVingthe •<br />
• weapons..market: Iraqi police sell .<br />
their19st' U~S.-6Upplied Weapo~ on th~ black<br />
market; tJterare promptly resupplied."· •<br />
The~ was.thesubject ofa storYdistributed<br />
lastwee1Cby the AssociationofAlternative'<br />
Newsweeklies (aan.org): While the nameS of<br />
certainIraqifigUres andthe memo's"recipient<br />
were redacted, the missingname that Prompted<br />
the most speculation Was thai of the auth'or. Three<br />
~urces tell usPte ciitique was ~tten by Michael<br />
,Rubin, a thirty-somethingneOcon intellectual who<br />
• promptly became ascholar at the~kiSh<br />
American Enterprise Institute ~t re~to<br />
t~ By GARR~ TRUDEAU • •<br />
Speak, Memger<br />
......!!!II!I!II!.....---.......<br />
s<br />
TUESDAY, APRIL 2,1, 2,00+<br />
Did Michael Rubin, left,<br />
write the warning about<br />
conditions In Baghdad?<br />
He isn't saying.<br />
Washington. 11lesky is'not falling" in.<br />
Iraq; he wrote early this month for<br />
National Review Oliline.<br />
In hisarticles and biography, Rubin'<br />
says he served as a CPA political officer for<br />
nine months and previouslyworked on<br />
Iraq and Iranissues while onDefense<br />
Secretary Donald ~feld's staH. N~tiona1<br />
Review Online desCribes Rubin as the only CPA<br />
politi,cal officerin Baghdad "who lived outside the<br />
American security bubble." 'The memo, ~ch ~<br />
mentions continuingelectrical outagesand .<br />
"frequentexplosions, many ofwhich are not.<br />
reported inthe mainstream media," faults U.s.<br />
officials for their isolation from ordinary Iraqis. .<br />
Rubin wouldn'tconfinn or deny that he wrote<br />
• the memo. Lastweekhe told an AEI<br />
spokeswo~ he didn'twantto talk about it, ~d<br />
he didn'treturn our canyesterday.<br />
C3<br />
t '<br />
..<br />
. -.<br />
I
. ALL INFOR!1ATION'CONTAINED<br />
~. . H . hlEREIN IS UNCLASSI~<br />
OqIme New.: our: IraqIs to be Sent I(Je?-- May 4, 199tATE 07-29-2010 EY~24 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
~,,~ I ·1 I" .t I'<br />
~age 1of5<br />
ONLINE FOCUS<br />
BACK TO IRAQ?<br />
May 4, 1998<br />
T/~C New.~Hollr<br />
"'illl Jim Lehrer Trnllsc~iQt<br />
After bringing them to America, the u.s. government has decided that six Iraqis pose a security risk and<br />
must return home. However, the government won't say how theypresent a risk to national security; tlra!<br />
information is classified.<br />
JEFFREY KAYE: Imprisoned in a federal detention center south ofLos<br />
Angeles, six men·from Iraq face deportation. Although the United States<br />
brought them here, the goverpment now considers them national security<br />
risks. the case has attracted attention because its t:elian~e on c~assified<br />
evidence has prevented the six from rebutting accusations a ainst them.<br />
That, ~ccording to Rabih Aridi ofthe human rights p:: ~ ~{t~":. #~~~~~'% ~<br />
group Amnesty International, violates basic ," "". ':~;~ :L<br />
standards ofjustice. ~ -<br />
"RABIH ARIDI: We believe they have been denied ~ ;,<br />
due process because they were not allowed to<br />
examine the evidence that was used against them.<br />
Nor were their lawyers. We are talking about a right that is clearly stated in<br />
the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and that-is the right to a fair<br />
trial.<br />
JEFFREY KAYE: The INS, the immigration & Naturalization Service,<br />
maintains the men are not entitled to classified information. Paul Virtue is<br />
INS general counsel.<br />
A Constitutional question: h~s due process been<br />
provided or denied to these men?<br />
PAUL VIRTUE, INS: We believe that full due<br />
.~ process has been provided to the extent we're<br />
required to do so under the Constitution.<br />
JEFfREY KAYE: The plen say they bel~nged to<br />
U.S.~backed Iraqi opposition groups formed after the<br />
1991 GulfWar. In 1996, opposition members and thousands ofother<br />
refugees fled to the border \vith Turkey after the Iraqi army attacked rebel<br />
strongholds in Northe~ Iraq. The U.S. flew 6,500 Iraqi refugees to the U.S.<br />
.I~land ofGuam'in the PaCific. The evacuees included som~ 600 opposition '<br />
• A RealAudio<br />
version of this<br />
segment is available.<br />
NEWSHOUR LINKS:<br />
April28, 1,998<br />
Amb. Butler discusses<br />
efforts to verify the<br />
destruction of Iraqi<br />
weapons.<br />
Apri/27,1998<br />
lm..qi exiles search for an<br />
alternative to Saddam<br />
Hussein.<br />
March 13, 1998<br />
A panel ofexperts debate<br />
whether it is time to lift<br />
,SJInctiC?na on Iraq.-.<br />
Online Forum<br />
Noam Chomsky and James.<br />
Wool~ debate U.S.<br />
- foreign polley.<br />
March 4, 1998<br />
An interview with U.N.<br />
Secretary General Kofi<br />
Annan.<br />
March 2, 1998<br />
An interview with Iraq's<br />
Ambassador to the U.N.<br />
NizatHamdoon.
Online NewsHour: Iraqis to be Sent ~e? - May 4, 1998<br />
~ members and their families., Thegovernment felt a moral obligation to<br />
• provide a haven, says fonner Defense DepartmentOfficial Zalmay<br />
Khlilzad, now with the policy research institute, Rand.<br />
o<br />
February 27, 1998<br />
Congressional vi~w~ .of the<br />
U.N_. deal with ltag.<br />
Page20f5<br />
ZALMAYKHLILZAD:. They had worked with us<br />
closely. They had put their lives at risk. And also it's<br />
possible that they would have been killed or jailed,<br />
and ifthey had gone all over the Middle East, I don't·<br />
II: ~ know who would have been able to provide them a<br />
1I2.'I!·~~}'~1 ;. . " safe haven, since the Turks were unwilling.<br />
"They had worke~ "'lith us closely. They had put their<br />
lives at risk.II<br />
•<br />
February 24, 1998<br />
James Baker and William<br />
Perry discuss the deal's<br />
impact on U.S. foreign<br />
p-oI1cy.<br />
February 20, 1998<br />
A' panel of experts examine<br />
the crisis from the Iraqi<br />
Rerspective.<br />
February 19, 1998<br />
An exploration of.Rublic .<br />
JEFFREY KAYE: Evacuees stayed on Guam for five months while INS and §J!RPJUl for the use of force<br />
FBI agents investigated their applications for political asylum~ The vast in 'raq as compared to past<br />
majority ofrefugees were settled in America, but government investigators<br />
concluded that 25 didn't qualify for asylum.<br />
PAUL VIRTUE: The U.S. Government has had some concerns that because<br />
we had to evacuate people fairly quickly, without an opportunity to vet them<br />
overseas, as we mentioned, that people within the evacuee group might, in<br />
fact, have also been involved with the Iraq government and working on<br />
behalfofthe Iraqi government.<br />
JEFFREY KAYE: The 2.5 refugees were flown to<br />
California and placed in detention. After hearings,<br />
some eventually received asylum. Of.the six still<br />
detained in LA as security risks, two are doctors;<br />
three deserted the Iraqi military to join the<br />
opposition; and one fonner soldier, Safa Batat,<br />
says he was shot and bOlnbed by Saddam<br />
Hussein's troops, and poisoned by one ofhis agents.<br />
SAFA AL-BATAT: (speaking through interpreter)<br />
I've been fighting the Iraqi government since 1991.<br />
And the evidence Qfthat is apparent in my body-<br />
evidence, not words--traces ofthe bullets and<br />
shrapnel. An4 even now I suffer frolp the effect of<br />
Thallium, which is still present in my body._<br />
Frustration from h'!ving classified evidence presented<br />
behind closed dOl;~S.<br />
-:J:~ •. ." ,....~;u. .,'..~~~(;::Aia . -'-., .,..;..~ ""'~JEI",FREYKAYE ~ .. .., : I' n ImmIgration . . court<br />
hearings held b~hind c!osed doors, the INS<br />
i)!~~~~~'~:=~~~}~'~~<br />
.~. mr:i~~.Ji;'~~~~?1f~~ pl:esented claSSified eVld~nce and secret .<br />
~.,~ ~r.~iJ~J>~~~~)~~:~; t ~~ \Vltnesses. In March, the Judge ruled the men<br />
~ .;~~~~~:~f:ri:::~ .:!; "pose security risks to the United States." Her<br />
~)1j:~~'i~Vki1~($;f~ f~; ~~ public report cited inconsistencies in the men's<br />
~t\'=;:;:::=!~ !~1: sto~ies. A separate, 92-pa~e classified decision<br />
.J \,::.·.'~~t,;o·~~·~·,,,·.,;;':·'.;l·~rehe~ mostly on secret-evidence. The·men<br />
. testifie'd, but the' fact they couldn't respond to !he classified evidence agains~<br />
conflicts.<br />
February 9, 1998<br />
Regional commentators<br />
give local perspectives on<br />
the growing crisis with<br />
Iraq.<br />
January 14, 1998<br />
Iraq's U.N. Ambassador,<br />
Mizar Hamdoon, defends<br />
his country's actions.<br />
January 13, 1998<br />
Amb. Butler discusses the<br />
latest disagreement With'<br />
Iraq.<br />
Online Forum:<br />
What's the be~t way to ~e~1<br />
with Iraq?<br />
November 13, 1997<br />
Newsmaker interview with<br />
Deputy PM Aziz who<br />
defends his country's<br />
expulsion of U.N. weapons<br />
inspectors.<br />
November 12, 1997<br />
UN Ambassador Bill<br />
Richardson discusses the<br />
Security Council's vote to<br />
impose stricter sanctions<br />
on Iraq.<br />
November 10, 1997<br />
pefense Sec. Cohen<br />
discusses the situation<br />
with Iraq.<br />
Browse the NewsHour's<br />
cov~:age ofthe Middle.
,.,.,. -r-<br />
oipine NewsHour:.Iraqis to be Senthe?•• May 4, 1998<br />
~ them fru~trated their lawyer, N~Ffenzen.<br />
NEILS·FRENZEN: If,sOlneone told us we suspect<br />
Mr. X ofbeing a foreign intelligence officer, or we<br />
suspect Mr. Y ofbeing a foreign intelligence agent,<br />
-we could respond to that perhaps by guessing. But<br />
nothing has been ruled ou't. We have simply had these- i-<br />
vague generalities ofnational security that have been ."~.... ..ra....aaIIlll<br />
directed in our direction, with no idea ofwhat the eviden~e is. And so our<br />
East and the United<br />
Nations.<br />
OUTSIDE LINK:S:<br />
The United Nations.<br />
- .<br />
Irag~ArabNet.<br />
case has been one ofguesswork... 'the use ofsecret eyidence in a situation<br />
where one's life Qepends on it, and where one's life depencJs on being able to respond to that secret<br />
evid~nce;there's no place for it in the American legal system.<br />
PAUL VIRTUE: I think we have to ptit1this in context. I think the use ofclassified<br />
infonnation in immigration court proceedings is very rare. We've usedli~ a couple of<br />
dozen tinles in the last two.years, during which immigration courts considered about<br />
four hun4red thousand cases, so we're talking a very minuscule percentage.<br />
Jl~FFREY KAVB: To get the classified evidenc~ in th.is case, the legal team brought<br />
fn R.. Jatnes Woolsey, the man on the left. As a former head ofthe CIA, Woolsey<br />
was privy to the nation'$ top secrets. rIe still holds a security clearance. In March, he came from<br />
Washington to meet with the Iraqis and to criticize the government he once served.<br />
R. James Woolsey: "This case at this point stands as really, I think a stain oli<br />
the honor of,the United States.II<br />
R. JAMES WOOLSEY~ This case at this poiptstands as really, I think a stain on the honor ofthe United<br />
States.<br />
JEFFREY KAYB: Woolsey signed on as the Iraqis' co-counsel, and filed a motion to obtain the classified<br />
evidence.. -<br />
R. JAMES WOOLSEY: I believe. whether it's me or someone else, that an attorney<br />
with security clearances, in order for fairness to be done, ought to be able to review<br />
this material on behalf ofthese men. Ifthe government doesn't,want to share the<br />
classified information \vith counsel who are cleared, it would be my very strong<br />
suspici~n it's because the governmenthas made some serious mistakes and has<br />
something to hide. -<br />
JEFFREY KAYB: Virtue says the INS has n~ intention ofproviding Woolsey with a classified document<br />
because his clients have no legal standing in this country.<br />
PAUL VIRTUE: These are people who are seeking admission to t4e United States..Essentially they're<br />
knocking at the door, asking for the United ~tates to protect them as refugees. The due process<br />
requirements are different for someone who has not been lawfj.tlly admitted to the United States.<br />
~'&~"~~~~~~::~.:l ~~?f.,s~~tJ~mR. JAME~ WOOLSEY: They were brought to Guam, a t~rrit9rial possession<br />
;.~: 3;~.:· ,~' ~,~. "n},~' ofthe United States, by the U.S. Government, and they were taken fro~<br />
,~ r~\1.~' ,', • ~ , ~, Guam to California by the U.S~ Government. And $e INS is maintaining this<br />
.'.. legal position that they have not been admitted to the United States, so it<br />
~,;~~~:~~~~~:~.~:~~~~~~ won't have to grant them any procedur.al rights ofthe sort that an individual<br />
~,~~~~~ ...~~ does-·have ifhe's.been admitted bu! ~et:l ~~ i~ r~s~ ofbe~~g deported,:<br />
•• } "II! • II ;... - - ........ - - ......<br />
Page 3 of5
OlJ1ine NewsHour: Iraqis to be Sent!he?-- May 4, J 998 0 Page 4 of5<br />
;\ JE~REY KAYE: The detainees say t!tey are victims ofmisunderstandings<br />
by INS investigators, as well as the,.factional in-fighting amo~g I~qi_s. D~. Adil Hadi Awac!h, Who joined<br />
tJIe oppositi~n in 1996, after deserting from a military hospital,says Saddam Hussein fostered a culitire of<br />
suspicion in order to undermine his foes.<br />
DR. ADIL HADI AWADH: We've been living among the~e accusations since a<br />
long time in Iraq. So it's a very ~xpected thing to be regarded as a traitor in Iraq<br />
simply because ofjust the revenge purposes.<br />
JEFFREY KAYE: The detainees say on Quam rivals unjustly fingered them. The<br />
.refugees included men once ousted from the opposition who denounced the<br />
detainees., according to MQhanuned Tuma, a deserter from the Iraqi army.<br />
MOHAMMED TUMf\: (speaking through interpreter) No doubt; they were trying to get back at those who<br />
expelled them from the opposition. And the responsible parties in Guam listened to them and~~didn't listen<br />
to us. And I don't know why.<br />
PAUL VIRTUE: I d011't believe that simply a disagreement or some problems between the factions would<br />
have led to this--would have led to people continuing to.be detained in this circumstance.<br />
JEFFREY KAYB: The decision was based on more substantive information?<br />
PAUL VIRTUE: I believe so, yes.<br />
~ ii' ';-$":" ~t~~~ · . . JEFFREY KAYE: But Virtue said he could not disclose that information. However,<br />
;~• '. ".. ~~ on~man with intimate knowledge ofthe Iraqi Qpposition says at least two ofthe<br />
~ ." mf~~~ detainees are who they claim to be. Warren Marik is a retired CIA case officer. In<br />
~tI
• • -<br />
f"~"""'~~"'" ..'<br />
.-' -- . - - - -. ,--;---------<br />
i On}in,.e NewsHbur: Iraqis to be Senthe? -;- May '4, 1998 ~<br />
I .~ agents o~ddam Hussein. They' are not agentS .of~dam Hussein.<br />
I<br />
JEFFREY KAYB:, Does that mean you can persoJially vouch for them?<br />
·Page SofS·<br />
AHMED CHALABI: 1 kJIO\V three ofthem personally., The three people who belong to thelNC, I mow<br />
them personally.<br />
A bleak future if th~ men are forced to return tQ Iraq.<br />
JEFFREY KAYE:. The detainees say ifforced backto I~q, they will be killed.<br />
MOHAMMpD AL-AMMARY.: (speaking through interpreter) Theverdict ofthe~·II'iI~.~<br />
judge is a death ~entence. All that is left is for the verdict to be executed.in<br />
Baghdad. That's all that's left.<br />
JEFFREY KAYB: The INS says ifthe men are eventually deported, they could<br />
try to fin~ refuge in another country, besides Iraq. But in any event, both the<br />
government and .the Iraqis' lawYers expect a protracted legal battle over the use<br />
ofclassified evidence.<br />
.........-._------~-----------------<br />
honus IIQV.1JlOur index search forwn polilicahwap lette... eaays&dJalogu.s offcUlora<br />
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Copyright © 2004 MacNeillLehrer Productions. All Rights Reserved.
.~. 4<br />
~n.DteaJriirJg OfTehran<br />
http://deJphi.dia.ic.gov/adminlEARLYBIRD/04033J1s20040331271511.html<br />
Q<br />
The Nation<br />
April 12, 2004<br />
Pg. 16<br />
ALL FBI INFOPMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
Still Dreaming OfTehran<br />
By Robert Dreyfuss and Laura Rozen<br />
The Bush Administration's hawks and their neoconservative allies atthe American Enterprise Institute<br />
(AEI) and The Weekly Standard are engaged in a high-risk and high-stakes effort to restore their fading<br />
power in Washington by pressing for a confrontation with Iran. It's no secret that the neocons' star has<br />
fallen since the war with Iraq. The intelligence scandal plaguing the White House and the ongoing crisis<br />
in Iraq itselfcan both be laid at their doorstep, and it's widely believed that President Bush's re-election<br />
team would deariy like to extricate the President from the Iraqi tar baby.,<br />
But the neocons aren't giving up, and they are trying to pull the White House in even deeper. Not only are<br />
they undeterred by the chaos in Iraq, but they are pressing ahead to advance their regional strategy, one<br />
that calls for regime change in Iran, then Syria and Saudi Arabia. Says Chas Freeman, who served as US<br />
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the first GulfWar and a leading foe ofthe neocons, "It shows that<br />
they possess a level offanaticism, or depth ofconviction, that is truly awesome. There is no cognitive<br />
dissonance there."<br />
What makes the neocon strategy on Iran especially risky is that with Iraq teetering on the brink ofcivil<br />
war, neighboring Iran has significant clout inside Iraq, including ties to various Iraqi Shiite factions and a<br />
growing paramilitary and intelligence presence. IfIran chooses, it can help ease the daunting task that the<br />
United States faces in trying to put together a sovereign Iraqi government. But ifit seeks confrontation, it<br />
can help spark an anti-US revolt in southern Iraq, home to most ofIraq's Shiite majority. In that case.,<br />
nearly all analysts agree, the American occupation could be overwhelmed.<br />
Leading the charge against Iran is AEI's Michael Ledeen, perhaps best known for setting in motion the<br />
US-Israeli arms deal with Iran in the mid-1980s that became known as Iran/contra. Supporting Ledeen's<br />
position are two other AEI fellows: Richard Perle, the ringleader ofthe neocons and a former member of<br />
the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, and David From, a Weekly Standard contributing editor and the<br />
former White House speechwriter who coined the phrase "axis ofevil." In their new book, An End to<br />
Evil, Perle and Frum call for a covert operation to "overthrow the terrorist mullahs ofIran." Speaking to<br />
retired US intelligence officers in McLean, Virginia, in January, Ledeen called Iran the "throbbing heart<br />
ofterrorism ll and urged the Bush Administration to support revolutionary change. "Tehran," he said, "is a<br />
city just waiting for us."<br />
Ledeen is viewed skeptically by many experts, including at the State Department and the Central<br />
Intelligence Agency. "Ledeen doesn't know anything about Iran," says Juan Cole, a professor at the<br />
University ofMichigan who is an expert on the Shiites ofIran and Iraq. "He doesn't speak Persian, and I<br />
believe he has never been there." But Ledeen does have connections in the Iranian exile community. For<br />
the past two years, he has maintained a relationship with Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian<br />
wheeler-dealer who worked closely with him in Iran/contra. Ledeen introduced Ghorbanifar to a key<br />
neoconservative official, Harold Rhode, a longtime Pentagon staffer who speaks Arabic, Farsi, Turkish<br />
10f3<br />
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and Hebrew and who until recently served in Iraq as a.liaison between the Defense Department and<br />
Ahmad Chalabi. Rhode and another Pentagonofficial, Larry Franklin, have been talking to Ghorbanifar<br />
about options for regime change in Tehran. "They were looking at getting introduced to alleged sources.<br />
inside Iran, who could give them some inside information on the struggles in Iran," said Vince<br />
Cannistraro, a former CIA counterterrorism chief. Ghorbanifar, he said, was spinning tall tales about<br />
alleged (but unsubstantiated) transfers ofIraqi uranium to Iran's nuclear weapons program.<br />
Rhode and Franklin were critical players in the campaign for war against Iraq. In 2002 they helped<br />
organize the Pentagon's Office ofSpecial Plans, the Iraq war-planning unit whose intelligence staffers ar~<br />
now under investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for allegedly manipulating<br />
evidence about Iraq's nonexistent weapons ofmass destruction and ties to terrorism. Both the OSP and<br />
the Rhode-Franklin effort on Iran were run out ofthe office ofDouglas Feith, the Under Secretary of<br />
. Defense for:Policy and a key neocon ally. Their initiative on Iran reportedly drew a sharp protest from<br />
the State Department. Newsday quoted a US official who said that the entire effort was designed to<br />
"antagonize Iran so that they get frustrated and then by their reactions harden US policy against them."<br />
There is widespread disagreement about both Iran's intentions in Iraq and the extent of i~ capability to<br />
cause mischief there. But there is a consensus that Iran can exercise significant power. Ithas close ties to<br />
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, whose Badr Brigade paramilitary force ofabout<br />
10,000 was trained by Iran's Revolutionary Guard, and to the forces ofMuqtada al-Sadr, a 30-year-old<br />
Shiite firebrand. "There are thousands ofIranian intelligence agents and operational agents inside Iraq<br />
today, and the border is completely op~n," says Amatzia Baram, an Israeli expert on Iraq.<br />
So far, analysts say, Iran has chosen to playa waiting game. Ken Katzman ofthe Congressional Research<br />
Service says that Iran "views its interest to play it low-key, to keep a low profile'and continue to promote<br />
a cohesive Shiite bloc in Iraq in order to be in a position to become dominant once the United States<br />
leaves."<br />
The "realists!' inside the Bush Administration, led by Secretary ofState Colin Powell and Coalition<br />
Provisional Authority head Paul Bremer in Iraq, are well aware that Iran could deal a fatal blow to the<br />
already faltering US efforts. Partly as a result, they've engaged in·a quiet dialogue with Tehran.<br />
According to the Financial Times, last May Iran offered a "road map" for normalizing US-Iranian<br />
relations. Since then, Powell and his allies have sent assistance after the devastating earthquake in<br />
southeast Iran, and offered to send a delegation led by Senator Elizabeth Dole. They've also supported<br />
efforts by Germany, France and Britain to work a deal with Iran over its nuclear weapons program.<br />
(Germany's intelligence service also brokered a prisoner exchange between Israel and Hezbollah, which<br />
is close to Iran.) But oflate, some ofthose conciliatory efforts have stalled. A planned Congressional<br />
staffdelegation to Tehran, the first since the rise ofAyatollah Khomeini's regime in 1979, was canceled<br />
by the Iranians, according to the office ofSenator Arlen Specter, whose staffwas to participate. And after<br />
the·initial harmony, signs are emerging ofa serious split between Washington and Europe over Iran's<br />
nuclear program, with echoes ofthe US-Europe split over Iraqi WMD.<br />
How the differing approaches--the neocons' war cries and the realists' more conciliatory strategy-·are<br />
viewed by Iran's leadership is anybody's guess. But there are at least several factors that might push the<br />
Iranian ruling elite in the direction ofthe confrontation the neocons want. First, the hard-line clergy are in<br />
the midst ofa crisis with the so-called reformists. In the past, the mullahs have used anti-US rhetoric, and<br />
even militant actions, to trump liberal and reformist rivals. Second, while Iran welcomes the rise of<br />
Shiite power in Iraq, it is at the same time uneasy about losing influence to the mullahs in Najafand<br />
Karbala. According to several experts on Shiism, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is now the leading<br />
Shiite cleric in the wod.d, whi
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has foiled US policy in Iraq by insisting on direct elections,.he has refusea to denounce the US<br />
occupation and may cooperate with a UN-brokered compromise for creating an Iraqi government.<br />
IISistani is a double-edged sword for Iran," says Juan Cole. And third, there is the Bush factor. Some<br />
neoconservative strategists argue that Iran will act decisively in order to prevent Bush from being<br />
re-elected. R~Ymond Tanter, a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a pro-Israel think<br />
tank, predicts, IIThey are going to launch a political-military campaign in an effort to defeat President<br />
Bush, because they believe that ifBush is re-elected, he will do to them what he did to Iraq."<br />
It's unclear that Iran would risk a confrontation with the United States in Iraq even ifthe mullahs do<br />
believe that they are next on Bush's invasion list. But the mullahs are famous for misunderstanding US<br />
politics, just as Americans have failed repeatedly to understand Iran's.<br />
In a way, the neocons' Iran project is very similar to the early phase ofthe~r Iraq one. It includes a steady<br />
drumbeat ofthreats and warnings, Washington lobbying, a media offensive and support for exile<br />
groups--in Iran's case a mishmash that combines supporters ofKhomeini's grandson; Reza Pahlavi, the<br />
son ofthe fallen Shah,and the Iranian monarchists; and the Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK), a 3,800-strong<br />
exile force based in Iraq. In one ofthe strangest events ever to occur at a Washington think tank, last<br />
September Khomeini's grandson--dressed in rough-hewn black and brown robes and crowned by a<br />
turban, with dark brooding eyes like his grandfather's--took the podium at AEI, introduced by Michael<br />
Ledeen, to call for US assistance to overthrow the Iranian government. He even welcomed an alliance<br />
with the Pahlavi monarchists.<br />
Many analysts view the prospects ofa Pahlavi-Khomeini-MEK alliance with exceeding skepticism. And<br />
they note that the neocons, having bungled Iraq, don't have a lot ofcredibility left on Middle East policy.<br />
But it,would be wrong to count them out. A former CIA officer, who took part in the debate over Iraq<br />
policy in the 1990s recalls how the neocons.ultimately prevailed. liThe neocons had this idea ofworking<br />
with the Iraqi opposition to arm and train them and to overthrow Saddam Husseili, and people like me<br />
said, 'That is really stupid,'" he says. "But you get people to think about it, you get the President engaged,<br />
then options expand and then when opportunities come along, you seize them. That's what they did. They<br />
got people to buy in. Before September 11, people told them, 'It's never going to happen.' Come<br />
September 12, the rules changed. tt An explosion in Iraq, and some Iranian mischiefthere, and the rules<br />
could change again.<br />
Robert Dreyfuss is a contributing editor o/The Nation. Laura Rozen is ajournalist who covers national<br />
security issuesfrom Washington.<br />
.30f3 413012004 5:03PM
NO. iSS<br />
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aftu t:h.e 'Dnitecl Statell aoouse4 syz:ia' of allowing' tenoJ:1sts to enter :tra;<br />
an4 Sadd•• Hussein'.~ b.enalmlen .to leave- it, ••1:£4 Gba4¥y informally<br />
UDve11ecl hi. l.efozm Jlazoty of Syxola. H. uae4 the ocsClulcm of. the American<br />
BDtazprla. tDatitute l ••aa0n4 co lase. weekly briefing on x~aq~ ~a 8~ie8<br />
tha .illllt:i.t:uee o=tgazUlle4 to ·ooinoide with the- wu--to go public- with hi.<br />
oppo8it1ozs .£fO:l:t8. Ghac!zy--who plans to azmcnmce a Syzoima gove=ment in<br />
exil. iD the aonWIS mcmthll·-asJc.ec1 thea panel o~ WaabiDgt= -hawks', from the<br />
auc1i8Da~, th8 ,quG.tion on 8VeryOl1e" m.1D41 'WhAt about zoeg1ma ~e foZ"<br />
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!)cmalcll.wufe1cl JW:l aeDt ~. W12.1te HoUse a "Roacl Map for BYz'ian_-~ a<br />
do_. lUValy pmitlve pol1ay opt1cm8 8pun:ec1 ))y the :PeDt:agoft.'. assessment.<br />
-that .a.m~1:'iean .olcti.e~. we~e enc!aDgerG4 :by SY%'ials open-J.:)o:4e: policy<br />
d1u"1rlg the wax". Thea -memoI. pxoposal., Tha Mew Reptml1a has lea=ed,<br />
inCludadoc:1dJ:ig Ul~ai:r:cZ'a£t cU:l:i.i: within Syrian tU~itoria1 waterSl,<br />
ua!ng prox1.. t.o ·unde!:mi216 Sy2iian ,intel-ligenc:a agata wide L~,<br />
inte%'diot1ng' :l:rwan fligbt. to Helllbollah p08itiOl18 .in LebanoD, &Dc!<br />
.enclinsr AIne!.CWlforGes ove~ the sYz':l.m boZ'cler in llhot p=,uit n or: .enio%'<br />
I~aq1 off~aia.1•• MeanWh11e, CongJ:8SSl waa aeveloping a set of new ,8nClcioft8<br />
agaiDat J)ama8ou.a that were tougher than the limited -J:)anl on weapons and<br />
othor item. ~ UDited States has al%8&4? pa88a4. COUld ~a be a better<br />
moment foZ' the SyziaD Ahmec1 Cbalabl to emeqe?<br />
-pufo,.-tunat:*ly, :!~g _<br />
libU'al cIi••ic1eAt. with a base of 8UPPO~t 1D sy¥1a makes ·finc:1inS ,1ibG1:'al<br />
4l&J8ic1cmt. wlth a bas. of aup»o:tt in x:raq looJc .ally. The S?rian oPpo81ti=<br />
1- OY.ftl1a~lypopulated by fundamentalist••- And Syr1u l~aral. have<br />
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seem .t~iJd.nS. Ghad%y, like Chalab1, baa hac! his sbare of bad. clays in<br />
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"'PI oollap&Jec1 -amidst. a11egat:LoIJ:8 of :fi~a:la1 f~auc1" OhaQ:r:y. owne.d<br />
Hamubal _, Cof~.a<br />
'<br />
Co., a chain of Ama~laan Goffe. .hops that: wen1: })azikX'UPt<br />
in 1196. LiJca Chalabi, Ghadzoy walk•.and-· talks the languaseof :Libe~al<br />
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sr~~•.TM ..foal Pa~ty of Syria haa even ckafte4 & modal<br />
ccmatlt\ltloD tMt: would .8:=iu no~ cm1y "81a zoight:8 of apeach,<br />
u.embly. life, aDd pzocpezty but allo lnOJ:le i4ea1!st:La goal', suah as a<br />
pol1utiOA-fZ'.. ttIl'ri=mnent, fa12: la]:)o~ practice.,. uel aesc... to health<br />
cu.. Gbacby allO aupport. peace with %8rael. "Why 40 ~ have to be<br />
e ••• with QUI' lSeighbcZ'?1I he uu, admitt.ing that he :baa ~een impt'a,uIK<br />
:by :t8:r..l'. UIIIO':&CSY' ADd viJ=ant. a1vil "oaiety on business visits to the<br />
countzy. CIbacIzy, aaccmJ..hingly enough, i. eYeD • merabu of the AmeZ'icaD<br />
%axaal ~:Lia At~a1r. Committe••<br />
Oth~ anti-gOYUllUDt axila. bav."<br />
.taRed to amuga .. well. on Ap~il 24, 120 Syrian exiles of all<br />
" ideologiG&l .t~1p••, ranging' iZ'om c:ommUDiata to Alaw1te :bus:LDesuJmeD,<br />
sa:Lgned. an open lett.Z' in Al-Hayat, a leading ~ab new8pape~ puhl1shed. :I.D<br />
LcmdcD, to Baabu' Assaad, Gall1q cm.h11ll 1:0 allow exiled. dissident. to<br />
ntum to tu CQUUC2:Y. to aboli8h m11itaxy-t~. oo=ta, and to c!ismaJltle<br />
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fum&Dt remaw. In &.%'&2:8 interview last mcmth with SyZ'ian ~afo=a:. in<br />
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lookinS' fo~••We have done lloth1ng eo tJUltivat. Or enaow:age •• ,<br />
cppoait:Lcm (to Sy~1.'8 :reg:Lme) e1theZ' abroac!oZ' 1zl the count:y, a ,ay. ODe<br />
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AmuicaA ambassador to· Syria. After dec:ac:1es of being closely l:LDked. to<br />
Leb&nCZl, aay Am.ex'iclA official., many Sy~:l.a.D8 have coma to associate<br />
pxo-W••te= l:U:leal. with Leban••• Ch:I:;f.at;L8I18, who mq.y SY~UDa :blame foZ'<br />
oppressing **lim. !D LeJ)anou anc! for b.~ evpporta4 by :r.rael.<br />
aaaotDi.iq the 8~iaJl libeZ'al.' lack of • POWU" base, llumsteld.'. policy<br />
memo c1id not advoaat•••ekiDs' out. Sy:iaD exile. and. diSlideDt. for an<br />
OPP08:l.t1= lDO'VamaDt, a. the PeDtagOD did :I.D the Wa..t BaDJc aDd. Ciaza aft.xcba<br />
p~e.i4ent'. apaedh la.~ ~ Galling fo~ & newPaleatiDian lea4eZ'.bip.<br />
HOJ: did .'!Jft\.fll1c1' a plu aet a81~ l\JDc!.iq fo~ cSi••idtmt.. w:Lda Sy:a:ia, .a<br />
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Ghacb:y :LlluatZ'at.. tha point. His oZ'gaDizat:LOD. i8 ODly now<br />
g8t.t!ng of! Ue g:round. ADcl a Syr:Lan who belong.. to em. of %8X'.el" ma:J.n<br />
lobby:I.Dg 9:a:ouP. i. DOt exactly a st%'ODS polit1cal candidate in a aount2:Y<br />
that :remain. 011. of the most: ~ab:Lc!1y anti-:l:8~ael in the zoegi=. At Ghadty<br />
himself admit., -'1'M S;v:c'ian8 are not ready foZ' someone who WaDt. to make<br />
peaoe with I.rae1.·<br />
A.,ad', moat. powerful opponct, admit. one en<br />
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ecmaultmt with extaaiva ~wlec!gG of Syx"ia, ia the tbeoaJ:'atia M\Jlll:1.m<br />
B~ot.hu~. ''&8 cmly' oppos1t:1on J: know 01: 1n 'p:La i8 t~ MWl1im<br />
B~o~hood,·<br />
Iclwuel Walke. %Ddee4, aaco~cU.Z1g' to Youssef M. %brahim, a fOnl8Z Middle<br />
IUt Ipa1a11at at the caunail = raza:l.gn :ae1ati0D8, Aslsacl baa ·g:a:cwn so .<br />
f.~ful o! tU D'otheJ:h004'1I ah111¢Y to, 8P~ ~ad:Laa1 Xslam that he hag<br />
;begun uJciDg tpMohe. 4en1gratizlg nl!giou8 extremism.aa4. ohast:Lsing'<br />
:r.lam:L.t-iAfl1aC011d mec1iaal _....--<br />
.ohoola fo:r: mixin£l science and. ::t.lam.<br />
B:r:otba:r:hoocl--wh:Lch AaaadI8 :eathe:r:, Hafel, banned.... 08 cough ah&rac:t82:8.<br />
III. 1112, 1:Ile1~ Sy2:ian b~antJh laUlltJhed a bloody :LDtifada,against tb.8 %'egtma<br />
that 1nolw!84 :r:ULC!OlIlly usuabatiDglQGmbo%'& of the nlill9' Alita. ·What'_<br />
mo:r:., they chum out. a ataa4y atme of anti-, 18:r:ae1 and anti-U'-S.<br />
:r:hato:ria. JIveD wo:c••, Newsweek bae reported. that Ame:r:icaD aDd. German<br />
inv••t:Lgato:r:. kaaliava that: ~embe:r:.<br />
of the S~ian MIl.lim B%othe~boo4playad<br />
o:r:it::Loal rolu ill ,uppoJ:t:Lng anc! :reezuit:1ng the HambUX'S'~baBec1 lea4ers ot!<br />
the A1 aa.s& cell. that. CU't'ied cut th8 Septembezo 11 attaaka.<br />
roJ:' the .<br />
t:Lme be:LDg, Buh .ami ai .t=at:1cm hawJc8 W&ft1: eo !~1:heZ' :l.801at:. Aallaa mel<br />
thWlp~••aw:a him to ahange. '.t'hey b.liaw tbi. pr•••u.re will, lead mo1:e<br />
SyzoiAZl. di••idlme. 1:0·acme out o~ t~ woodwozk. seoretuy of state COlin<br />
lowell'. raCl*4t Yi.it to Damascue may uncie:r:i1co:r:e tb1. strategyl By<br />
infomilll b:Lm that the United States could tum the scr:ewa em. Sy:ia,<br />
lowell off.at! Aggad,. like Yui2: ~a!at: beF02:8 last. JUne'" ..peach, a final<br />
oppoZ'~UDity to ahcge. trl1fo~tuna.tely, i£ AsSac! 40.8. not aome U'oun4,<br />
wulUngton JhI¥ di8coveJ: :Lt aannot 'f:Lnd UyODe .it. likes to J:eplace him.<br />
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Ill"" .... ,. '\. ......-<br />
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':~~~if,n oli Iraq. :Their P?iitico..(influ~~~is potentially much gre~te~ th4n their'<br />
,.';21wuiers.lncorporaiing them'into ademocratic Iraq while ensuringt1UJt they do<br />
'Y:~iconi~ todoinidate it'posis.tQ severe chailenge to the US Administration.<br />
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Isl~~;R~' ~~1i&~iii iia~~~~~veri ~ih~J8)1~di~~d~v~io"iii~~ts bad been detaiieJ in fu~ .<br />
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~~~.»i~t ''!I1e.Iia~i~,~":~ ~~by.~~',~~guJ~~,s~jJ!~.~ey ~ ~~~be~rigl~<br />
SI]!;~!,1}fchIS dlffe~n! fro~ the W8hapls :9ft#!~,pe~n~ula, and they,dc;m't bnng the<br />
se,nsi(~ii of h.aving' ~e· hoJy ~ities of.Isl~·¥ing.9,n .their te¢tofy~'1 Even more<br />
di~rniIY:'this quote sh~w~ thatWOlfoWiJ;qid hot realize.that religious Iraqi Shi'ites<br />
• are~tl;mely sensitive about foreigners in the~shrine cities such as Najafand Karbala,<br />
Ju: uJ s:"", "'f .. ... ... ~~ , "'''. ~ ,. .. • ~<br />
0f~ ~a!...thc!s~ citi~s are,religious power ~nters ofgreat symbolic potenC?y.·<br />
~.~:~.•}lS pefense. Dep~e.!1t leaders such as ~ecretaJ:Y<br />
ofDefense Dona!d Rumsfel~<br />
aR!!Jus. ~~pu~es, W~lfo~tz ~d·Douglas F~itbt mistalCeq!y thought that ~e rnUJdle<br />
and lower strata of.the:Bafth bureauCla9'. wHee, and army w0!11d .smyive the war,<br />
and'that they.c'ould·simply~~hand it over to secular expatriate-figure i\hmad'ChaJabl<br />
and hIS Iraqi NatiQ~~
I<br />
I<br />
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
, 1"'""'----; ~__DA:_-,,! 7-29-l:.010 B 60324 uc Vab/lSg<br />
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Copyright 2003 U.P.1.<br />
United Press International<br />
April 8, 2003 Tuesday<br />
HEAOLJ;NE: Senator asks $50M to aid Iran dissidents<br />
-'<br />
BVLINE: By MARK BENJAMIN AND ELI LAKE<br />
DATELINE: WASHINGTON, AprilS (UPI)<br />
BODY:<br />
A leading member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee plans to introduce legislation Wednesday authorizing $50<br />
million a year to aid democratic activists inside Iran seeking a peaceful end to that country's regime. .<br />
A copy of an amendment to be offered by Sen. Sam Brownback, R,:,Kansas, obtained by ~nited Press International, says,<br />
lilt shall be the policy of the United States to support efforts to achieve democratic reform inside I~ari, including support<br />
for the thousands of protesteJ1> who have expressed a desire for the government to, hold a referendum vote that could<br />
permit Iran to move toward a secular, democratic government that resp.ects human ,rights and dC?es not seek to possess<br />
weapons of mass destruction.n<br />
The senator plans to attach the legislation to a bill authorizing next year's foreign assistance budget for the State<br />
Department. .' •<br />
Andy Fisher, a spokesman for Senate Foreign Relations Com'mittee Chairman Richard Lugar, R-Ind., said Lugar suppo~<br />
efforts to establish a friendly democracy in Iran. It is unclear if Lugar supports the.proposal.<br />
"There is an opportunity in,Iran to make some differences and take advantage of dramatic demographic shifts hi the<br />
country," Fisher said.<br />
A spokeswoman for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee told UPI her organization supports the amendment.<br />
The move comes at a critical moment in U.S. relations with the Islamic world. President Bush in his 2002 State of the<br />
Union address identified Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as- part of an "axis of evil!'<br />
As the United States moves to mop up r~sistance in Baghdad, the Bush administration is hoping to confront ~he twin<br />
challenges of Installing a new government there ~nd convlnclng,the Islamic wo~rld the invasion of Iraq does not signal a<br />
new e'ra of American occupation In the region. .<br />
I:-ast month, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld threatened to treat Iranian proxies that moved. Into Iraq as ~nemy<br />
corr-bataQts in pperati~n, Iraqi Freedom. ,On March 24, U.S. intelligence issued a report detailing minutes of the Islamic<br />
RepUblic's National Security Council where the leaderShip of the country decided on a strategy to send in irregular<br />
fighting units to five large Iraqi cities.<br />
In Iranian local elections earlier this year, few Persians took to the polls, with voter turnout in the single'digits. Iranian<br />
stude'nts, union workers and intellectuals have intermittently over the past year taken to the streets in the capital and<br />
large cities demanding a political referendum on the current regime.<br />
While Iranians are allowed to vote for the president, they may not elect the country's supreme leader who'oversees<br />
Iran's militC!ry and'security services and appoints religious clerics as judges for the courts.<br />
Under Brownback's proposed legislation, the State ,Department would allocate $~O million annually to an Iran<br />
Democra~foundati9tl. T~ p_u.rpose of the fo~ndati~n ~s t~ support "pr~·democracy broadcasting to Iran,II such as the<br />
satellite television and radio stations b~sed irf~os Angeles'that many Iranians watch and~listen to already;~suppor:t:<br />
training for the"If~uiian;;Americ~ncommunity to,reach out to:Iranian dissidents; and fund h~m~n rights ~,I}~ ~iVii soc!eo/
- I'".. .'<br />
Do~Q.m~nt Results.<br />
g{o~P.$ ~orking'i11s{de Ir:an.<br />
'0<br />
The proposal Is very sfmTiar to'ideas pro'posed iast'June by Pen.tagon staffers In the~Bush<br />
review discus~lons.·But c:onsensus was never reache,d ins.i~e the QQvernment.<br />
administration's Iran policy'<br />
The amend~ent does not c~1I for regime change'per..se, but It.does state, "Del1locratic change within Iran ~ould .<br />
contribute greatly to Increasing the stability of the entire region and would serve as a beacon to·the p'eople of Iraq and<br />
Saudi Arabia to als~ seek der'!'l0cratic reform from within." . .<br />
This language hi the amendr:nent is very sim!lar to the'Iraq Liberation Act, ~hi.ch Congress, pa~sed in 1998. That<br />
legislation first enshrined regime change as' an .open policy goal for. the UniteCi States in Iraq.· Sen. Brownback was an<br />
early supporter and a~thor of the legislation. ~ . .<br />
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C?S News., C~labi Tipped Iran To Cf1f Break IJune 1, 2004 21 :39:57 0<br />
Page 1 of2<br />
.. Ghalabl Tipped Iran To C'o1le Break ALL INFORHATION CONTAHIED<br />
' . .t_ . " HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
. June 1, 2004 DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
(CBS/AP) CBS News has learned new<br />
details involving the Iran espionage<br />
~ U.S. Intel Passed To Iran? allegations against Ahmad Chalabi, the<br />
Iraqi exile leader who was one touted<br />
as a possible president to lead Iraq in<br />
thepost-Saddam transition.<br />
"<br />
On May 20, Iraqi police backed by<br />
American soldiers raided the Baghdad<br />
home and offices of Chalabi. Chalabi is<br />
a controversial figure who provided the<br />
Bush administration with prewar<br />
intelligence on supposed weapons of<br />
mass destruction in Iraq - including the<br />
(Photo: CBSJAP)<br />
now-discredited information about<br />
mobile labs whose true use is still a<br />
matter of debate.<br />
After the raid, 60 Minutes<br />
Correspondent Lesley Stahl reported<br />
that the U.S. had evidence Chalabi has<br />
been passing highly-classified U.S.<br />
intelligence to Iran.<br />
Ahmad Chalabi displays a family<br />
photo he says was smashed during<br />
the May 20 raid on his<br />
home. (Photo: AP)<br />
CBS News has since leamed that<br />
Chalabi recently told an Iranian<br />
intelligence official the U.S. has<br />
cracked Iranian codes, allowing it to<br />
read communications on everything<br />
from Iran's sponsorship of terrorists to<br />
its covert operations inside Iraq<br />
CBS has also been told FBI agents are<br />
questioning Defense Department<br />
officials about who gave such top<br />
secret U.S. information to Chalabi in<br />
the first place.<br />
U.S. troops outside Chalabi's home<br />
during May 20 raid. (Photo: AP)<br />
Stories:<br />
• The Latest<br />
Interactives:<br />
• Hostages Held<br />
- Fallen Heroes<br />
• WMD Fallout<br />
- Daily Photos<br />
Attacks Map:<br />
-The Postwar Insurgency<br />
Videos:<br />
Chalabi is still active and visible on the<br />
scene in Iraq where he is a member of<br />
the handpicked Iraqi Governing<br />
Council.<br />
Over the Memorial Day weekel)d,<br />
Chalabi was reportedly involved in<br />
negotiations to maintain a falter cease<br />
fire in the city of Kufa-between U.S.<br />
military and radical Shiite cleric<br />
Muqtada al-Sadr. Chalabi and other<br />
Shiite leaders met with al-Sadr<br />
,representatives and declared there was<br />
"a momentum for peace."<br />
But Chalabi's star has definitely fallen<br />
in U.S. eyes. Despite his seat on the<br />
Iraqi Governing Council. it seems the<br />
Bush. administration is going out of its<br />
way to ensure that the man who made<br />
a career lobbying.to get rid of former<br />
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has<br />
no American-backed political future in<br />
Iraq.<br />
Other tense situations in recent months<br />
between the Bush administration and<br />
Chalabi include:<br />
("Iv<br />
')LI'Qr~Cl1<br />
0;~'\l>r- ~Slt;,-Alee;c~.<br />
_.
-- -----------------------------------------<br />
~BSNews IChalabi Tipped Iran To ~ BreakIJune 1, 2004 21 :39:57<br />
oVideo Archive • AmeWlt officials have complained<br />
(_<br />
privately that Chalabi was interfering<br />
11 r with an inquiry into money skimmed<br />
.~~~;~~~ Down Saddam from the U.N. oil-for-food program.<br />
• Chalabi has recently accused the<br />
U.S.-led coalition of not going far<br />
enough to give Iraqis sovereignty. He<br />
also fiercely resisted U.S. military commanders' recent decision to soften rules<br />
blocking former members of Saddam's ruling party from government jobs.<br />
Chalabi still has strong supporters in Washington, and the Pentagon<br />
continued to pay for intelligence provided by his organization until recently.<br />
Danielle Pletka,'a vice president at the conservative American Enterprise<br />
Institute. after the May 20 raid that she believed the raid was likely "political<br />
manipulation in order to disable somebody who has been a thorn in the side<br />
of the CPA."<br />
'We need the United Nations right now, and Chalabi is the prime mover<br />
behind the investigation in the oil-for-food program/, Pletka said.<br />
o<br />
P~ge2 of2
iiiii<br />
-~<br />
/1<br />
Print<br />
ALL INFORHATION CONTAII~D<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 B¥ 6~ uc baw/sab/lsg Page 1 of2<br />
Print Window I C1~se W~ndow<br />
Document 41 of S4<br />
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company<br />
The New York Times<br />
June 2, 2004 Wednesday<br />
late Edition - Final<br />
SECTION: Section A; Column 3; Foreign Desk; THE REACH OF WAR: :THE OFFENSE; Pg. 1<br />
LENGTH: 1178 words<br />
I:IEADUNE: Chalabi Reportedly Told Iran That U.S. Had Code<br />
BYLINE: By JAMES RISEN and DAVID JOHNSTON<br />
DATELINE: WASHINGTON, June 1<br />
BODY:<br />
Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi leader and former ally of the Bush administration, disclosed to an Iranian official that the United States<br />
had broken the secret communications code of Iran's Intelligence service, betraying one of Washington's most valuable sources of .<br />
Information about Iran, according to United States Intel,ligence officials.<br />
The general charge that Mr. Chalabi provided Iran with critical American intelligence secrets was Widely reported last month after<br />
the Bush administration cut off financial aid to Mr. Chalabl's organization, the Iraqi National Congress, and American and Iraqi<br />
security forces raided his Baghdad headquarters.<br />
The Bush administration, citing national security concerns, asked The New York Times and other news organizations not to publish<br />
details of the case. The Times agreed to hold off publication of some specific Information that top Intelligence officials said would<br />
compromise a vital, continuing Intelligence operation. The administration Withdrew Its request on Tuesday, saying Information about<br />
the code-breaking was starting to appear in news accounts•<br />
.Mr. Chalabi and his aides have said he knew of no secret Information related to Iran' and therefore could not have communicated<br />
any Intel1lgence to Tehran. ~<br />
American officials said that about six weeks ago, Mr. Chalabl told the Baghdad statton chief ofIran's Ministry of Intelligence and ®<br />
Security that the United States was reading the communications traffic of the Iranian spy service, one of the most sophisticated InD~A V ~<br />
the Middle East.<br />
Pi"\~<br />
According to American officials, the Iranian official In Baghdad, possibly not believing Mr•. Chalabl's account, sent a cable to Tehran<br />
detailing his conversation with Mr. Chalabi, using the broken code. That encrypted cable, Intercepted and read by the United States,<br />
tipped off American officials to the fact that Mr. Chalabi had betrayed the code-breaking operation, the American officials said.<br />
American officials reported that in the cable to Tehran, the Iranian official recounted how Mr. Chalabi had said that one of "them ll -<br />
a reference to an American .-, had revealed the code-breaking operation, the officials said. The Iranian reported that Mr. Chalabi<br />
said the American was drunk.<br />
The Iranians sent what American Intelligence regarded as a test message, which mentioned a cache of weapons Inside Iraq,<br />
belieVing that if the code had been broken, United States military forces would be qUickly dispatched to the specified site. But there<br />
was no such action.<br />
'<br />
The account of Mr. Chalabi's actions has been confirmed by several senior American officials, who said the leak contributed to the<br />
White House decision to break with him.<br />
It could not be learned exactly how the United States broke the code. But Intelligence sources said that In the past, the United<br />
States has broken Into the embassies of foreign governments, Including those of Iran, to steal Information, Including codes.<br />
The F.B.I. has opened' an espionage Investigation seeking to determine exactly what information Mr. Chalabi turned over to the<br />
Iranians as well as who told Mr. Chalabi that the Iranian code had been broken, government officials said. The Inquiry, stili In an<br />
early'phase, Is focused. o~ a verY. small number of people who were close to Mr. Chalabi and also had access to the highly restricted<br />
inf~rmatlon about the Iran code. . . _ 6S\t,,\\lf-~
Print<br />
t<br />
o<br />
o<br />
Page 2 of2<br />
Sdme of the people the F.B.I. expects to Interview are civilians at the Pentagon who were among Mr. Chalabi's strongest supporters<br />
anCi served as his main point of contact with the government, the officials said. So far, no one has been accused of any wrongdoing.<br />
,<br />
In a television Interview on May 23, Mr. Chalabi said on CNN's "Late Edition" that he met In Tehran In December with the Iranian<br />
supreme leader, Ayatollah All Khamenel, and the Iranian president, Mohammad Khataml. He also said he had met with Iran's<br />
minister of information.<br />
Mr. Chalabi attacked the C.I.A. and the director of central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, saying the agency was behind what Mr.<br />
Chalabi asserted was an effort to smear him.<br />
"I have never passed any classified Information to Iran or have done anything •• participated In any scheme of Intelligence against<br />
the United States," Mr. Chalabi said on "Fox News Sunday." IIThis charge Is false. I have never seen a U.S •. classified document,<br />
and I have never seen •• had a U.S. classified briefing."<br />
Mr. Chalabi, a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, said, "We meet people from the Iranian Embassy In Baghdad regularly," but<br />
said that was to be expected of Iraqi officials like himself.<br />
Some defenders of Mr. Chalabi In the United States say American officials had encouraged him In his dealings with Iran, urging him<br />
to open an office In Tehran In hopes of improving relations between Iran and Washington. Those defen·ders also say they'do not<br />
believe that his relationship with Iran Involved any exchange of Intelligence.<br />
Mr. Chalabi's allies in Washington also saw the Bush administration's decision to sever Its ties with Mr. Chalabl and his group as a<br />
cynical effort Instigated,by the C.I.A. and longtime Chalabi critics at the State Department. They believe those agencies want to<br />
blame him for mistaken estimates and incorrect Information about Iraq before the war, like whether Iraq possessed weapons of<br />
mass destruction.<br />
One of those who has defended Mr. Chalabi is Richard N. Perle, the former chairman of the Defense Polley Board. ''The C.I.A. has<br />
disliked him passionately for a long time and has mounted a campaign against him with some considerable success," Mr. Perle said<br />
Tuesday. "rve seen no evidence of Improper behavior on his part. No evidence whatsoever."<br />
Mr. Perle said he thought the C.I.A. had turned against Mr. Chalabi because he refused to be the agency's "puppet." Mr. Chalabi<br />
"has a mind of his own'" Mr. Perle said.<br />
American Intelligence officials said the F.B.I. investlgatlon Into the Intelligence leak to Iran did not extend to any charges that Mr.<br />
Chalabi provided the United States with Incorrect Information, or any allegations of corruption. .<br />
American officials said· the leak about the Iranian codes was a serious loss because the Iranian Intelligence service's highly encrypted<br />
cable traffic was a crucial source of information, supplying Washington with information about Iranian operations Inside Iraq, where<br />
Tehran's agents have become increasingly active. It also helped the United States keep track of Iranian Intelligence operations<br />
around the world.<br />
Until last month, the Iraqi National Congress had a lucrative contract with the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide Information<br />
about Iraq. Before the United States Invasion last year, the group arranged for Iraqi defectors to prOVide the Pentagon with<br />
Information about Saddam Hussein's government, particularly evidence purporting to show that Baghdad had active programs to<br />
develop weapons of mass destruction. Today, the American Intelligence community believes that much of the Information passed by<br />
the defectors was either wrong or fabricated.<br />
URL:<br />
LOAD-DATE: June 2,2004
War and Piece: June 2004 Archives ~L INFOrotA.TION CONTAUJED ~<br />
! l"" Hr IS UNCLASSIFIED 0<br />
: '-- 0'1-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/<br />
l:1une 02, 2004<br />
Page 1ofl<br />
Can we expect to see Richard Perle start to def~nd Chalabi's leaks ofthe most sensitive US intelligence to the Iranian .<br />
terror masters?·Ledeen? Harold Rhode? Michael·Rubin? I hear Larry Franklil) isn't defending Chalabi any more.<br />
There are only two defenses I can see: it's not true (seems the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of, it's true). Or, it's<br />
okay that Chalabi did it.<br />
Or, there's a third. How about, WE WERE WRONG. We were fQ.QJs, and dupes. But none. of these people seem to have the<br />
moral capacity to admit they were wrong. What kind of blindness,. what kind of pathological arrogance, prevents these<br />
people from ever admitting they are wrong?<br />
MORE: A friend says Chalabi supporters may also use the defense, ChaJabl was framed by Iranians who wanted him to<br />
be politically neutralized In Iraq. [As if he even needed to b,e neutralized by outside forces!] That the two Iranians who<br />
were detected in an intercept to be discussing what Chalabi ~upposedly gave them ~o~ld have been trying to frame him.<br />
I find this deeply unconvincing. [Remember how each shred of bogus intel about ties between al Qaeda and Saddam<br />
.<br />
these very same neocons clung to as the holy grail? This Is that In reverse].<br />
A question. Is Chalabi simply believed to have conversationally told'an Iranian source that the US had broken XYZ<br />
communications code? Or is he actually believed to have had physical access to some sort. of code breaking technology<br />
itself? Why does this matter? Because the. number of US officials who might have known the formerls certainly greater<br />
than the latter. Even a civilian Pentagon official known to be very close to Chalabi and who believes himself a huge<br />
expert on Iran and the Middle East might have heard the_latter and"passed it on to Chalabi.<br />
Posted by Laura at 10:56 AM
War and.Piece 1+.L1 INFORMATION CONTAINED 4 Page 1 ~f31<br />
~·~;·==-=·========~~~~~~~F~<br />
~ ~1~ UI ~~-~u~o ~1 ou~~~ ac ~awjs~~<br />
Warand Pi ec~l~n_e1_4-,--,:-2_0_04_"-----.-;;...<br />
-'.' '6_~~_~'~"~_=__.~__~_~_~'=~~~~~~<br />
ABOUT WAR<br />
AN-D' PIECE<br />
War and Piece is written<br />
by Laura Rozen, a<br />
journalist who report~<br />
on national security and<br />
foreig n policy issues<br />
from Washington, D.C.<br />
(Mo,re)<br />
J1m.~itI~:h!OO!tt~I 2002 torture mgmo the<br />
Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel prepared at<br />
Jdhft ~el5bftfl1tfe9Nbite!f~eS9~~.D.<br />
Cdmtb~d\Q~its!2r14R!t~q1dttbcgenmmt.tb.edf<br />
JtJbVkecOeiibetrluat1b:emepart~lsawnlaW~e~~at<br />
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Qm~~tB~I.~e\~teJa~S~~~slte~~uGhraib began<br />
alerting.senior US military officers in November 2003 to<br />
Mtiaa~EtheHWld9trerJ~J!§IttIaSEmsmaf1ilmit)Of<br />
mU~~§~iabSJtr~tS~¢ttfl.nGtl~rbegahe<br />
Reunion after the<br />
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Photograph by Roger<br />
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SEARCH<br />
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RECENT<br />
ARTICLES<br />
"Chalabi Sm~ckdown,-"<br />
The AmeriCan Prospect<br />
Online" May 201, 2004.<br />
."y'e at L~ttle Feith,"_The<br />
American Prospect, May<br />
18, 2004.<br />
alet:l1itsg samlbaQJ1f9an;Utary officers in November 2003 to<br />
the abuse!, This contradicts what senior military<br />
cJ'nWirJjlli~ h9V~cs§\tH4k~~~dldnot learn of the<br />
abuse until January.<br />
June 13, 2004<br />
Posted by Laura at 05_: 2? ~~<br />
Here's a~ interesting February 2001.~ on the<br />
J'iltit90J.'3;n!OO4es to INC intelligence chiefAras<br />
Kareem.<br />
Here's an interesting February 2001 ~ on the.<br />
pJA~Lig8,f~~~1hg tie~~~l~~IIgWNle ~Q~ger<br />
K~\Dn.<br />
Notice ttl~ aa¥e Q{ ~evBPIlf6rll{Rg<br />
11th.<br />
6$~J~~ber<br />
administration will revamp U.S. Iraq<br />
policy, Pentagon officials began meeting<br />
IntbisetafaJb~ittntbtalhiqf~OPEttatiBoslfor<br />
aetlni~a 0fn~mJiSJfa$lt:trG~uPs<br />
pcHfnWJAsntaberi~Natibe9a6ongetlrig...<br />
this week. with the chief of operations for<br />
t~rBfu~PeRarsfTr8q'i"imiQfaX~al-'6ups<br />
krfOWni
ALL<br />
INFOIU·1ATION CONTAINED<br />
,"d"'- ~:'B Y NOd AEI b ~ K . k ki HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.<br />
SlaI1 mg y our R an y v'>D. Wlat ows DATE 07-29-2010 BY 0'1 uc bawlseb/1sg<br />
LewRoakwell.aol:ll<br />
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Standing By Your NRO and AEI<br />
by Karen K,viatko,vski<br />
by Karen Kwiatkowski<br />
GeSAVETHIS C!IS2JEMAIL THIS
Stlliidmg By Your NRO·lind AEI by On Kwiatkowski 0<br />
-Page 2 of3<br />
When Jon Stewart at the-Comedy. Chapnel cQffi!ll~~ts on-the Gi~t M~ss-0':'P9t~ia,<br />
he's not kidding. Somehow, I see a sweaty Michael Rubin ~ack in the kitchen ..<br />
wiping his hands on ~is stained apron. No, Mighael, the damned spot won't come<br />
out. Trust me.<br />
Rubin's NRO tirade thematically centers on the presumed "Kwiatkowski-LaRouchegrand-conspiracy-to-pick-on-neoconservatives-and-make-<br />
them-look-like-really<br />
foolish-blunderers-by-getting-us-int9-an-u~ecessary-war~killing-more-than-750<br />
American-soldiers- and-suggesting-the horror!-that-some-neoconservatives-~re..;<br />
even-war-criminals.II His article is in key ways factually incorrect, wrong, and in<br />
some ways, a little bit stupid. But-smears usually are, aren't they?<br />
Some key mistakes include the old AEI charge that I have something to'do with<br />
LaRo~che, that I didn't know where the asp offices were loca~ed, that I left the<br />
Pentagon because I felt others had gotten promotions and I didn't, that I said L!!!!y..<br />
Franklin used his wheelchair-bound wife as a cover·for galliyanting atounaihe_<br />
worm: on secret missions,.analliat rliave a fringe ideology, among others. 'For the<br />
t'ecord, no on LaRouche, yes on the.location ofthe asp spaces, no on the promotion<br />
question (I never even stayed long enough to meet my first 0-6 board), no on Larry<br />
Franklin and his wife and secret missions, and I'm not sure on the nfringe171eology."<br />
Rubin never really explains what fringe id~ology he's talking about.<br />
I can only say with a high confidence that it isn'tthe same fringe ideology embraced<br />
by the National Review and the American Enterprise"Institute these days.<br />
When Mfcha~l Rubin says he knows something about sOplethil1g, it seems he really<br />
doesn't know much. The little he knows appears not to be supported by either facts<br />
or evidence, and is somewhat hope-based: Whether he is advising the Pentagon on<br />
Iraq and Iran, or,trying to smear me, Rubin gets it wrong, again and again.<br />
Like Tammy Wynette's h~roine, he's going onfaith,in and love for the neocon<br />
agenda, and loyalty to his neocon friends. Faith and love and loyalty are wonderful<br />
things, but Micha~l, dear, it's hard sometimes, isn't-it? All ~atabuse, and people<br />
giving you a har4 time, saying you made bad choices, all those reasons to leave but<br />
you just can't do" it. I think Tammy says it best:<br />
Sometimes it's hard to be a woman<br />
Givin' all your love to just on~ man<br />
You'll have bad times and he'll have good times<br />
Doin' things that,you don't understand<br />
J3ut ifyou love him, you'll forgive him<br />
Even though he's hard to understand<br />
And ifyou love him, oh be proud ofhim<br />
'Cause after all he's just a man<br />
Karen Kwiatkowski [send her mail] is a retired USAF<br />
lieutenant colonel, who spent herfinalfour and a halfyears<br />
i~ u.niform working at [he 'Pentqgon. She now lives with her<br />
May 19, 2004
SHlhdingBy Yo~r NRO and AEI by ran Kwiatkowski 0<br />
Page 3 of3<br />
freedom-iovingfamily in the Shenandoah Valley, and writes_ a bi-w~ekly column on<br />
defense issues with a libertarian perspective for militaryweek:.com.<br />
Copyright 0 2004 LewRockwell.com<br />
Karen Kwiatkowski Archives<br />
Back to LewRockwell.com Home·Page
~ -- .- ...... ~ -<br />
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?ods (Jerusalem) Force, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC - Pasdaran~ Intelligence Agencies Page 1of4<br />
FA~ I I~telligence'l WoQAgencies IIran 11I11 IndJrI Search IJoinFAS<br />
t .'<br />
't<br />
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
Qods (Jerusalem) Force DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
Iranian Revolutio~aryGuard Corps (IRGC - Pas4arane<br />
Inqilab)<br />
While the Constitution ofIran entrusts the military with guarding Iran's territorial<br />
integrity and political independence,. it gives the Revolutionary Guard [pasdaran] the<br />
responsibility of guardi~gthe Revolution itself. Established under a decree issued by<br />
Khomeini on May 5, 1979, the Pasdaran was intended to guard the Revolution and to<br />
assist the ruling clerics in the day-to-day enforcement ofthe government's Islamic codes<br />
and morality. The Revolution also needed to rely on a force ofits own rather than<br />
borrowing the previous regime's tainted units.<br />
By 1986 the Pasdaran consisted of350,000 personnel organized in battalion-size units<br />
that operated either independently or with units ofthe regular anned forces. In 1986 the<br />
Pasdaran acquired small naval and air elements. By 1996 the ground and naval forces<br />
were reported to number 100,000 and 20,000, respectively.<br />
Domestic Operations<br />
The Pasdaran has maintained an intelligence branch to monitor the regime's domestic<br />
adversaries and to participate in their arrests and trials. Khomeiili implied Pasdaran<br />
involvement in intelligence when he congratulated the Pasdaran on the arrest ofIranian<br />
communist Tudeh leaders. The Baseej (volunteers) come under the control ofthe<br />
ReYolutionary Guards. In 1995, up to 900,000 baseej were moQilized. The Baseej<br />
allegedly also monitor the activities ofcitizens, and harass or arrest women whose<br />
clothing does not cover the hair and all ofthe 1Jody except hands and face, or those who<br />
wear makeup. During the year ending in June 1995, they reportedly "notified 907,246<br />
people,verbally and issued 370,079 written notices against 'social corruption' and<br />
arrested 86,190 people, and also broke up 542 'corrupt gangs', arresting their 2,618<br />
members, -and seized 86,591 indecent videocassette_~ alld pQ9tqgraphs.<br />
http://fas.orglirp/world/iranlqods/ 6/15/04
Qods (Jerusalem) Force, Irani,an Revo~onary Guard Corps (IRGC - Pasdaran~ Intelligence Agencies Page 2 of4<br />
the Ashura Brigades force W reportedly created in 1993 h!ler anti:'government riots<br />
e;upted iri various Iranian cities and it consists of17,000 Isla~ic militia men and women.<br />
The Ashura Brigades are reportedly composed ofelements ofthe Revolutionary Guards<br />
(Pasdaran) and the Baseej volunteer-militia<br />
In August 1994, some Pasdaran units, rushed to quell riots in the city ofGhazvin, 150<br />
km. west ofTehran, reportedly refused orders from the Interior Minister to intervene in<br />
the clashes, which left more than 30 people dead, 400 wounded ~nd over 1,000 arrested.<br />
Subsequently, senior officers in the army, air force and the usually loyal Islamic<br />
Revolutionary Guard reportedly stated that they would no longer order thei.r troops into<br />
battle to quell civil disorder. A Pasdaran commander was among four senior army<br />
officers who are said to have sent a letter to the country's political leadership, warning the<br />
clerical rulers against "using the armed forces to crush civilian unrest and internal<br />
conflicts. II In a communique sent to Ayatollah Ali Khameini, stated that "the role ofthe<br />
country's armed forces is to defend its borders and to repel foreign enemies from its soil,<br />
not to control the internal situation or to strengthen one political faction above another."<br />
They· are said to have then recommended the use ofBaseej volunteers for this purpose. In<br />
a move believed to indicate a shift in the trust ofthe ruling clerics from the Pasdaran to<br />
the Baseej volunteer force, on 17 April 1995 Ayatollah Ali Khameini reportedly<br />
promoted a civilian, veterinary surgeon Hassan Firuzabadi, to the rank offull general,<br />
placing him above both Brigadier-General Mohsen Rezai, commander-in-chiefofthe<br />
Pasdaran and Brigadier General Ali Shahbazi ofthe regular armed forces.<br />
Foreign Operations<br />
The foreign operations by the Guardians, which also encompass the activities of<br />
Hizballah and Islamic Jihad - are usually carried out through the Committee on Foreign<br />
Intelligence Abroad and the Committee on Implementation of Actio~sAbroad. As<br />
with agents ofMinistry ofIntelligence, Pasdaran personnel operate through front<br />
companies and non-governmental organizations, employees or officials oftrading<br />
companies, banks, 'cultural centers or as representatives ofthe Foundation"ofthe<br />
Oppressed and Dispossessed (Bonyade-e- Mostafazan), or the·Martyrs 'Foundation.<br />
The Qods (Jerusalem) Force ofthe Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is<br />
responsible for extraterritorial operations, including terrorist operations. A primary focus<br />
for the Qods Force is training Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. Currently, the Qods<br />
Force conducts training activities in Iran and in Sudan. The Qods Force is also<br />
responsible for gathering information required for targeting and attack planning. The<br />
Pasdaran has contacts with underground movements in the Gulfregion, and Pasdaran<br />
members are assigned to Iranian diplomatic missions, where, in the course ofroutine<br />
intelligence activities they monitor dissidents. Pasdaran influence has been particularly<br />
. http://fas.orglirp/worldliranlqods/ 6/15/04
?OdS (Jerusal~m)<br />
--- -----<br />
Force, ~ranian ReV~lutiona~ ?uard ~orps (IROC - pas~aran~n Intelligence Agencies Page 3 of4<br />
Important In KuwaIt, BahrAdthe Umted Arab EmIrate~<br />
The·largest branch ofPasdaran foreign operations consists ofapproximately 12,000<br />
Arabic speaking Iranians, Afghans, Iraqis, Lebanese shi'ites and North Africans who<br />
trained in Iran or received training in Afghanistan during the Afghan war years. Presently<br />
these foreign operatives receive training in Iran, Sudan and Lebanon, and include the<br />
Hizballah ["Party ofAllah"] intelligence, logistics and operational units in Lebanon<br />
[Hizballah is primarily a·social and political rather than military organization]. The<br />
second largest Pasdaran foreign operations relates to the Kurds (particularly Iraqi Kurds),<br />
while the third largest relates to the Kashmiri's, the Balouchi's and the Afghans. The<br />
Pasdaran has also supported the establishment ofHizballah branches in Lebanon, Iraqi<br />
Kurdistan, Jordan and Palestine, and the Islamic Jihad in many other Moslem countries<br />
including Egypt~ Turkey, Chechnya and in Caucasia. Hizballah has been implicated in<br />
the counterfeiting ofU.S. dollars and European currencies, both to finance its operations<br />
and to disrupt Western economies by impairing international trade and tourism.<br />
The Office ofLiberation Movements has established a GulfSection tasked with<br />
forming a GulfBattalion as part ofthe Jerusalem Forces. In April 1995 a number of<br />
international organizations linked to· international terrorism --including the Japanese Red<br />
Army, the Armenian Secret Army, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party -- were reported to<br />
have met in Beirut with representatives ofthe Iraqi Da'wah Party, the Islamic Front for<br />
the Liberation ofBahrain, Hizballah, Iran's "Office ofLiberation Movements," and Iran's<br />
Guardians ofthe Revolution. Tehran's objective was to destabilize Arab Gulfstates by<br />
supporting fundamentalists with military, financial, and logistical support. Members of<br />
these and other organizations receive military training at a Guardians ofthe Revolution<br />
facility some 100 kilometers south ofTehran. A variety ofoftraining courses are<br />
qonducted at the facility for fundamentalists from· the Gulfstates, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia,<br />
and Lebanon, including naval operations, mines, and diving operations in a special camp<br />
near the Orontes River.<br />
Sources and Methods<br />
• SPECIAL AND IRREGULAR~D FORCES_ in JRA1'1-_A C0UD:t!y Stu~y<br />
Library ofCongress Federal Research Division<br />
• "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC" OF IRAN EXPORT OF REVOLUTION FLAG OF<br />
- -- - - - -<br />
FREEDOM ORGANIZATION OF IRAN (FFO) SPECIAL REPORT August 12,<br />
1997<br />
• Counterfe~t U.~._ Currency Abro~d:_ Issues a~d U.S. Deterrenc~ Eff,?rts (GAO Letter<br />
Report, 02/26/96, GAO/GGD-.96-11)<br />
• "Alleged Extremist Plans To Destabilize Gulf' FBIS-NES-95-092 : 10 Feb 1995<br />
[Source: Paris ~-WAT~N AL-'ARABI, 10 Feb 95 pp 14-1.6.]<br />
http://fas.org/irp/worldliran/qods/<br />
---<br />
6/15/04
Qods (Jerusalem) Force, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC - PasdaranlJlan Intelligence.Agencies Page 4 of4 .<br />
,:
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Iran Liberation<br />
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIlmD<br />
HEREIN IS UNC~IFIED ~ 0<br />
• ~ DATE 07-29-20llJ,;lY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsqr-'_-,<br />
t~PUblicationL ~~<br />
No.<br />
170<br />
Tehran Poised to Attack<br />
Mojahedin,<br />
Sieze Iraqi Territory<br />
April 7, 2003<br />
:Iriil UtiiiatfOn,<br />
.. .,.., " ......~.."..",-<br />
,J1~"(11~!.<br />
.p.tevi~~sfJ~f~~<br />
lVl1omen'<br />
... ~ .... ~ I ....<br />
i!.!~;i~~I!~'<br />
,p.re'vfOus:15suei.<br />
,. ... ........ ..,. ".' ~.. ~ • ...,.. tI'<br />
,,!!qf1.&~~.~q<br />
tievi issue<br />
.i!~~f~~~~~u~~<br />
I<br />
I<br />
Page 1 of5<br />
Contrary to the consecutive denials<br />
and reiterations that it does not<br />
intend to interfere in Iraq, the clerical<br />
regime is poised fully to take<br />
advantage ofthe developments in the<br />
region and attack the Mojahedin and<br />
capture parts of Iraqi territory. To<br />
this end, the People's Mojahedin<br />
Organization of Iran issued a<br />
statement on April 1, exposing parts<br />
of the activities of the regime which<br />
are as follows:<br />
1. The regime has stationed a total of<br />
46 brigades and an assortment of<br />
weapons, equipment and missiles in<br />
the border region. The following<br />
activities have been undertaken in<br />
the past 10 days:<br />
2. Transferring the 3rd Brigade ofthe<br />
21st Hamzeh Division from Marand<br />
to Chehel Zari (along the border<br />
region in Kermanshah Province);<br />
http://www.iranncrfac.org/Pages/Publications/IL/IL170/pages/Tehran%20poised%20to%20attack%20mojahed 6/15/04
Iran Liberation<br />
" 3:.Transferring partQf the 28th<br />
· Sanandaj Diyision to the city of<br />
\,<br />
Mehran (a border town in Ilam<br />
Province);<br />
4. Transferring part of the Guards<br />
Corps 10th Division to Mehran;<br />
5. Transferring parts of the 16th<br />
Qazvin Armored Division to Sar-pol<br />
Zahab (in the border region in<br />
Kermanshah Province);<br />
6. Transferring 1st and 2nd brigades<br />
of 81st Kermanshah Division from<br />
Kermanshah and IslaIlJ.-Abad to the<br />
border region and deploying five<br />
tank battalions along Qasr-e Shirin;<br />
7. Transferring the 35th Commando<br />
Brigade from Kermanshah to<br />
Mehran and Gilan-e Gharb;<br />
8. Transferring parts of the 55th<br />
Airborne Brigade from Shiraz to Sarpol-Zahab;<br />
9. Transferring the 2nd Brigade of<br />
the 84th Division from Khorramabad<br />
to Bostan;<br />
10. Transferring part of the 64th<br />
Orumieh Division to Abadan (south<br />
of Khuzistan Province, oPPQsite<br />
Basra);<br />
11. Transferring the 45th Commando<br />
Brigade from Shushtar to<br />
Khorramshahr and Bostan;<br />
12. Transferring the 2nd Brigade of<br />
the Revolutionary. Guards- 7th Valio<br />
Page 2 of5<br />
http://www.iranncrfac.org/Pages/PublicationsIIL/IL 170/pagesrrehran%20poised%20to%20attac~%20mojah(... 6/15104
Iran Liberation<br />
. ,<br />
~<br />
Asr Division from Qehbahan to<br />
· Sousangerd (in the border region in<br />
Khuzistan Province);<br />
13. Transferring part of the 2nd<br />
Brigade ofthe Revolutionary Guards<br />
4th Division from Ilam to Mehran;<br />
14. Transferring part of the 3rd<br />
Brigade ofthe Revolutionary Guards<br />
4th Division from Hamedan to Qasre<br />
Shirin;<br />
15. Transferring parts of the<br />
intelligence and operations<br />
headquarters of the Revolutionary<br />
Guards Divisions from different<br />
provinces to· Qasr-e Shirin to assess<br />
the situation and order the<br />
operational forces of those divisions<br />
ifneeded;<br />
16. Concentrating the Intelligence<br />
Ministry's terrorist groups and forces<br />
in the Qasr-e Shirin in order to<br />
infiltrate the Iraqi territory and carry<br />
out terrorist operational against the<br />
Mojahedin in Khanaqin, Jalawla,<br />
Baquba and Baghdad;<br />
17. Transferring a part of the 64th<br />
AI-Hadid Missile Brigade of the<br />
Revolutionary Guards to Howeizeh<br />
(border region in Khuzistan<br />
Province) to carry out missile attacks<br />
with Fajr 3 and 5 missiles;<br />
o<br />
Page 3 of5<br />
18. Transferring a part of the 65th<br />
Special Airborne Force from Tehran<br />
to. the so-called Abuzar in south of<br />
Sar-pol-Zahab. The probe and<br />
units of the brigade<br />
J;ecoI1J:lais~ance<br />
- - .<br />
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Iran Liberation<br />
. -.<br />
• have so far carriePout several<br />
reconnaissance missions on<br />
Mojahedin bases in Khosravi<br />
Khaneqin and Sumar-Mandali axes.<br />
Page 4 of5<br />
19. Transferring ammunition and<br />
equipment inside Iraq by the<br />
Revolutionary Guards Fajr Base<br />
(belonging to the extra-territorial<br />
terrorist Qods Force) in Ahwaz, in<br />
Bostan, Shat-Ali, Howeizeh and<br />
Tala'ieh (border region in Khuzistan<br />
Province);<br />
~o.. Transferring 40 truck-loads of<br />
ammunition from Kermanshah to<br />
Iraqi territory through Azgaleh to<br />
Maydan and Darbandikhan by the<br />
Revolutionary Guards Zafar<br />
Garrison;<br />
21. Redeploying mercenaries of the<br />
9th Badr Corps from Kermanshah to<br />
Marivan and Iraqi Kurdistan and<br />
from Dezful to Howeizeh as well as .<br />
helping groups of them to infiltrate<br />
the Iraqi territory in Mandali,<br />
Mehran and Howeizeh by the extraterritorial<br />
terrorist Qods (Jerusalem)<br />
Force.<br />
22. According to the Qods Force's<br />
operational scheme, the 9th Badr<br />
Corps is planning, similar to 12 years<br />
ago, to pour into Basra, Nasseriyah<br />
and AI-Amara. Revolutionary<br />
Guards Brig. Gen. Ahmad<br />
Forouzandeh, in charge of the Iraqi<br />
Crisis Headquarters, is currently<br />
based in Ahwaz (Khuzistan<br />
Province);<br />
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Iran Liberation ..<br />
". 2~ .. Commanders ofaQods Force,<br />
. • including its commander B~ig. Gen.<br />
\ Qassem Soleimani, his deputy Brig.<br />
Gen. Iraj Masjedi, Brig. Gen. Hamid<br />
Taghavi, Ramezan Garrison's<br />
commander of operations, and Brig.<br />
Gen. Obeidavi, Fajr Garrison's<br />
commander, are making the military<br />
and terrorist preparations in Iraqi<br />
territory. Occasionally, they use<br />
ambulances to enter Iraqi territory;<br />
24. All of the so-called Ashura and<br />
Az-Zahra battalions of the<br />
Revolutionary Guards paramilitary<br />
Bassij forces across the country have<br />
been armed to confront the<br />
Mojahedin. The Revolutionary<br />
Guards Divisions have been put on<br />
alert across the country;<br />
25. Eight warplanes in Hamedan's<br />
Nojeh air base, eight in Dezful's<br />
Vahdati air base, two in Bandar<br />
Abbas air base and two in Bushehr<br />
air base are on a state of readiness<br />
round-the-clock. They are armed'<br />
w,ith air-to-air missiles.<br />
26. The clerical regime has so far<br />
stationed a total of 46 b~igades with<br />
an assortment of weapons,<br />
equipment and missiles in hopes of<br />
taking advantage of the Iraqi<br />
situation and attack the Mojahedin.<br />
o<br />
Page 5 of5<br />
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ALL INFORMATION COlrTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS lnlCLASSIFIED ~<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 ~W/Sab/1Sg<br />
Page 1 of5<br />
P~!_nt ~indow I Close Window<br />
SECTION: FACfi Annals Of National Securityi Pg. 54<br />
LENGTH: 5151 words<br />
HEADLINE: PLAN Bi<br />
As June 30th approaches, Israel looks to the Kurds.<br />
BYLINE: SEYMOUR M. HERSH<br />
Document 4 of 24<br />
Copyright 2004 The Conde Nast Publications, Inc.<br />
The New Yorker<br />
June 28, 2004<br />
BODY:<br />
In July, 2003, two months after President Bush declared victory In Iraq, the war, far from winding down, reached a critical point.<br />
Israel, which had been -among the war's most enthusiastic supporters, began warning the Administration that the American-led<br />
occupation would face a heightened Insurgency-a campaign of bombings and assassinations-later that summer. Israeli Intelligence<br />
assets In Iraq were reporting that the Insurgents had the support of Iranian Intelligence operatives and other foreign fighters, who<br />
were crossing the unprotected border between Iran and Iraq at will. The Israelis urged the United States to seal the nlne-hundredmile-long<br />
border, at whatever cost.<br />
The border stayed open, however. liThe Administration wasn't Ignoring the Israeli Intelligence about Iran," Patrick Clawson, who Is<br />
the deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and has close ties to the White House, explained. "There's no<br />
question that we took no steps last summer to c1ose_ the border, but our attitude was that it was more useful fC?r Iraqis to have<br />
contacts with ordinary Iranians coming across the border, and thousands were coming across every day':'for Instance, to make<br />
pilgrimages'" He added, "The questions we confronted were 'Is the trade-off worth It? Do we want to Isolate the Iraqis?' Our answer<br />
was that as long as the Iranians were not picking up guns and shooting at us, It was worth the price."<br />
Clawson said, liThe Israelis disagreed quite Vigorously with us last summer. Their concern was very straightforward-that the Iranians<br />
would create social and charity organizations In Iraq and use them to recruit people who would engage In armed attacks against<br />
Americans.n<br />
The warnings of Increased violence proved accurate. By early August, the insurgency against the occupation had exploded, with<br />
bombings In Baghdad, at the Jordanian Embassy and the United Nations headquarters, that killed forty-two people. A former Israeli<br />
Intelligence officer said that Israel's leadership had·concluded by then that the United States was unwllllng·to confront Irani In<br />
terms of salvaging the situation in Iraq" he said" "It doesn't add up. It's over. Not militarily-the United States cannot be defeated<br />
militarily In Iraq-but polltlcally."<br />
Flynt Leverett, a former C.I.A. analyst who until last year served on the National Security Council and Is now a fellow at the Saban<br />
Center for Middle East Polley, told me that late last summer lithe Administration had a chance to turn it around after It was clear that<br />
'Mission Accomplished' n_a reference. to Bush's May.speech-nwas premature. The Bush people could have gone to their allies and got<br />
more boots on the ground. But the neocons were. dug in-'We're doing this on our own.'"<br />
Leverett went on, liThe President was only belatedly coming to the understanding that he had to either make a strategic change or,<br />
If he was going to Insist on unilateral control, get tougher and find the actual insurgency." The Administration then decided, Leverett<br />
said, to "deploy the Guantanamo model in Iraqll-to put aside its rules of Interrogation. That decision failed to stop the insurgency<br />
and eventually led to the scandal at the Abu Ghralb prison.<br />
In early November, the President received a grim assessment from the C.I.A.'s station chief in Baghdad, who filed a special field<br />
appraisal, known Internally as an Aardwolf" warning that the security situation in Iraq was nearing collapse. The document, as<br />
described by Knight-Ridder, said that "none:of the postwar Iraqi political Institutions and leaders have shown an ability to govern the<br />
country" or to hold elections and draft a constitution.<br />
A few days later, the Administration, rattled by the violence and the new intelligence, finally attempted to change Its go-It-alone<br />
polley, and set June 30th as the date for the handover of sovereignty to an Interim government, which would allow It to bring the<br />
United Nations Into the process. "November was one year before the Presidential election," a U.N. consultant who worked on Iraqi<br />
Issues told me. "They panicked and decided to share the blame with the U.N. and the Iraqis."<br />
A former Administration official who had supported the war completed a discouraging tour of Iraq late last fall. He visited Tel AViv<br />
afterward and found that the Israelis he. met with were equally discouraged. As they saw It, their warnings and advice had been<br />
Ignored, and the Amerlcan·'war against the. insurgency was continuing to founder•."I spent hQurs. ~alklng to the. senior' m~m~ers. ~f
o ~<br />
tile Israeli political and Intelligence community," the former official recalled. "Their concern was IYoulre not going to get It right In<br />
~faq, and shouldn't we be planning for the worst-~ase scenario and how to deal with It?' ..<br />
Pant<br />
Page 2 of5<br />
Ehud Barak, the former Israeli Prime MinIster, who supported the Bush Admlnlstrationls Invasion of Iraq, took It upon himself at this<br />
point to privately warn Vice-President Dick Cheney that America had lost In.lraqj according to an American close to Barak, he said<br />
that Israel I'had learned that there's no way to win an occupation." The only Issue, Barak told Cheney, "was choosing the size of<br />
your humlllatlon.'1 Cheney did not re_spond to Barak's assessment. (Cheneyrs office declined to comment.)<br />
In a series of Interviews In Europe, the Middle East, and the United States, officIals told me that by the end of last year Israel had<br />
concluded that the Bush Administration would not be able to bring stability or democracy to Iraq, and that Israel needed other<br />
options. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's government decided, I was told, to minimize the damage that the war was causing to Israel's<br />
strategic position by expanding Its long-standing relationshfp with Iraq's Kurds and establishing a significant presence on the ground<br />
In the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan. Several officials depicted Sharon's decision, which involves a heavy financial<br />
commitment, as a potentially reckless move that could create even more chaos and violence as the Insurgency In Iraq continues to<br />
grow.<br />
Israeli Intelligence and military operatives are now quietly at work in Kurdistan, providing training for Kurdish commando units and,<br />
most Important In Israel's view, running covert operations inside Kurdish areas of Iran and Syria. Israel feels particularly<br />
threatened by Iran, whose position in, the region has been strengthened by the war. The Israeli operatives Include members of the<br />
Mossad, Israel's clandestine foreign-intelligence service, who work undercover In Kurdistan as businessmen and, In some cases,<br />
do not carry Israeli passports.<br />
Asked to comment, Mark Regev, the spok~sman for ~he Israeli Embassy In Washington, said, "The story Is simply untrue and the<br />
relevant governments know it's untrue," Kurdish officials declined to comment, as did a spokesman for the State Department.<br />
However, a senior C.I.A. official acknowledged in an interview last week that the Israelis were Indeed 'operatlng In Kurdistan. He<br />
told me that the Israelis felt that they had little choice: liThey think they have to be there.'1 Asked whether the Israelis had sought<br />
approval from Washington, the official laughed and said, 1100 you know anybody who can tell the Israelis what to do? They're always<br />
going to do what Is In their best interest." The C.I.A. official added that the Israelipresence was widely known In the American<br />
Intelligence community.<br />
The Israeli decision to seek a bigger foothold in Kurdistan-characterized by the former Israeli Intelligence officer as IIPlan BII-has<br />
also raised tensions between Israel and Turkey. It has provoked bitter statements from Turkish politicians and, In a major regional<br />
shift, a new alliance among Iran, .Syria, and Turkey, all of which have significant Kurdish minorities. In early June, Intel Brief, a<br />
privately circulated Intelligence newsletter produced by Vincent Cannistraro, a retired C.I.A. counterterrorism chief, and Philip<br />
Glraldl, who served as the C.I.A.·s deputy chief of base In Istanbul in the late nineteen-eighties, said:<br />
Turkish sources confidentially report tha~ the Turks are Increasingly concerned by the expanding Israeli presence In Kurdistan and<br />
alleged encouragement of Kurdish ambitions to create an independent state~ •.• The Turks note that the large Israeli Intelligence<br />
operations In Northern Iraq Incorporate anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian activity, InclUding support to Iranian and Syrian Kurds who are<br />
In opposition to their respective governments.<br />
In the years since the first Gulf War, Iraq's Kurds, aided by an internationally enforced no-fly zone and by a U.N. mandate providing<br />
them with a share of the country·~ 011 revenues, have managed to achieve a large measure of Independence In three northern Iraqi<br />
provinces. As far as most Kurds are concerned, however, historic IIKurdistan" extends well beyond Iraq's borders, encompassing<br />
parts of Iran, Syria, and Turkey. All three countries fear that Kurdistan, de_spite public pledges to the contrary, will declare Its<br />
Independence from the Interim Iraqi 90vernment if conditions don't improve after June 30th.<br />
Israeli Involvement In Kurdistan is not new. T.hroughout the ,nineteen-sixties and seventies, Israel actively supported a Kurdish<br />
rebellion against Iraq, as part of its strategic. policy of seeking alliances with non-Arabs In the Middle East. In 1975, the Kurds were<br />
betrayed by the United States, when Washington went along with a decision by the Shah of Iran to stop supporting Kurdish<br />
aspirations for autonomy In Iraq.<br />
Betrayal and violence became the_ norm in the next two decades. Inside Iraq, the Kurds were brutally repressed by Saddam Hussein,<br />
who used afrpower and chemical weapons against them. In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers Party, or P.K.K., Initiated a campaign of<br />
separatist Violence in Turkey that lasted fifteen yearsj more than thirty thousand people, most of them Kurds, were killed. The<br />
Turkish government ruthle_ssly crushed the. separatists, and eventually captured the P.K.K.'s leader; Abdullah Ocalan. Last month,<br />
the P.K.K., now known as the Kongra-Gel,. announced that it was ending a five-year unilateral ceasefire and would begin targeting<br />
Turkish citizens once again.<br />
The Iraqi Kurdish leadership was furious when, early this month, the United _States acceded to a U.N. resolution on the restoration of<br />
Iraqi sovereignty that did not affirm the interim constitution that granted the minority Kurds veto power In any permanent<br />
constitution. Kurdish leaders Immediately warned PreSident Bush in a letter that they would not participate in a new ShIIte-controlled<br />
government unless they were assured that their rights under the interim constitution were preserved. liThe people of Kurdistan will<br />
no longer accept second-class citizenship in Iraq,," the letter said,<br />
There are fears that the Kurds will move ~o seize the_ city of Kirkuk, together with the substantial oil reserves In the surrounding<br />
region. Klrkuk Is dominated by Arab Iraqis, many of whom were relocated there, beginning in the nineteen-seventies, as part of<br />
Saddam Husseinls campaign to "Arabi~~" the region" ~ut the Kurds consider Kirkuk and its oil part of their historic homeland. IIIf<br />
Klrkuk is threatened by the Kurds" the Sunnllnsurgents will move in there~ arong with the Turkoinen; and there will be a bloodbath,"
Print<br />
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Page 3 of5<br />
al) American military expert who is studying Iraq told me. "And, even if the Kurds do take Klrkuk, they can't transport the 011 out of<br />
tHe country, since all of the_ pipelines. run through ~he Sunnl-Arab heartland."<br />
A top German national-security official said In an interview that "an independent Kurdistan with sufficient 011 would have enormous<br />
consequences for Syria, Iran, and Turkey" and would lead to continuing Instability In the Middle East-no matter what the outcome In<br />
Iraq Is. There Is also a widespread belief" another senior German official said, that some elements Inside the Bush Administration-he<br />
referred specifically to thefaction headed by Deputy .Secretary of Defense Paol Wolfowltz-would tolerate an Independent Kurdistan.<br />
This, the German argued, would be. a mistake. "It would be a new Israel-a pariah state In the middle of hostile nations.II<br />
A declaration of independence would trigger a Turkish response-and possibly a war-and also derail what has been an Important<br />
alliance for Israel. Turkey and Israel have become strong diplomatic and economic partners In the past decade. Thousands of<br />
Israelis travel to Turkey every year as ~ourists. Turkish opposition to the Iraq war has strained the relationship; stili, Turkey<br />
remains oriented toward the West and" despite the victory of an Islamic party In national elections in 2002, relatively secular. It Is<br />
now vying for acceptance In the European Union. In contrast" Turkey and Syria have been at odds for years,at times coming close<br />
to open confrontation, and Turkey and Iran have long been ,regional rivals. One area of tension between them Is the conflict<br />
between Turkey's pro-Western_stand and Jran·s rigid theocracy. But their mutual wariness of the Kurds has transcended these<br />
divisions.<br />
A European foreign minister, in a conversation last month, said that the "blowing Up" of Israel's alliance with Turkey would be a<br />
major setback for the region. He went on, "To avoid chaos, you need the neighbors to work as one common entlty.1I<br />
The Israelis, however, view the neighborhood, with the. exception of. Kurdistan, as hostile. Israel Is convinced that Iran Is on the<br />
verge of developing nuclear weapons, and that" with .Syria's help, it_ is planning to bolster Palestinian terrorism as Israel withdraws<br />
from the Gaza Strip.<br />
Iraqi Shiite militia leaders like Moqtada al-Sadr, the former American Intelligence official said, ~re seen by the Israeli leadership as<br />
"stalking horses" for Iran-owing much of their success in defying.the American-led coalition to logistical and communications support<br />
and training prOVided by Iran. The former intelligence official said, "We began to see telltale signs of organizational training last<br />
summer. But the White House. didn't want to hear it: 'We canlt take on another problem right now. We can't afford to push Iran to<br />
the point where we've got to have a Showdown. ~ II<br />
Last summer, according to a document I obtained, th~ Bush Administration directed the Marines to draft a detailed plan, called<br />
Operation Stuart, for the arrest and, if necessary,. assassination of.Sadr. But 'the operation was cancelled, the former Intelligence<br />
official told me, after it became clear tha~ Sadr had been "tipped ofr' about the plan•.Seven months later, after Sadr spent the winter<br />
building support for his movement, the American-led coalition ,Shut down his newspaper, provoking a crisis that Sadr survived with<br />
his status enhanced, thus insuring ~ha~ he will playa major, and unwelcome, role In the political and military machinations after<br />
June 30th. .' ,<br />
"Israel's Immediate goal after June 3Qth Is to build up the Kurdish commando units to balance the .Shiite militias-especially those<br />
which would be hostile to the kind of order in southern Iraq that Israel would like to see," the former senior Intelligence official said.<br />
"Of course, If a fanatic Sunni Baathis~ militia took control-one as hostil~ to Israel as Saddam Hussein was-Israel would unleash the<br />
Kurds on It, too.II The Kurdish armed forces" known as the peshmerga, number an estimated seventy-five thousand troops, a total<br />
that far exceeds the known Sunni and .Shiite militias.<br />
The former Israeli Intelligence officer acknowledged that .slnce late. last year Israel has been training Kurdish commando units to<br />
operate In the same manner and with the_ same effectiveness as Israel's most secretive commando units, the Mlstaravlm. The Initial<br />
goal of the Israeli assistance to the Kurds, ~he former officer ,Said, was to allow them to do what American commando units had been<br />
unable to do-penetrate, gather Intelligenc~on, and then kill off the leadership of the Shiite and Suno,l insurgencies In Iraq. (I was<br />
unable to learn whether any such mission had yet. taken place.) "The feeling was that this was a more effective way to get at the<br />
Insurgency," the former officer .sard. "But the growing Kurdish-Israeli relationst,ip began upsetting the Turks no end. Their Issue Is<br />
that the very same Kurdish commandos trained for Iraq could infiltrate and attack In Turkev."<br />
•<br />
The Kurdish-Israeli-collaboration inevitably expanded, the Israeli said. Some Israeli operatives have crossed the border Into Iran,<br />
accompanied by Kurdish commandos, to install sensors and other sensitive devices that primarily target suspected Iranian nuclear<br />
facilities. The former officer said, "Look" Israel has always supported the Kurds in a Machiavellian way-as balance against Saddam.<br />
It's Realpolitik." He added,. IIBy aligning with the Kurds, Israel gains eyes and ears in Iran, Iraq, and Syria." He went on, "What<br />
Israel was doing with the Kurds \yas not so unacceptabl~ In the. Bush Administration."<br />
Senior German officials told me, With ala(.ffi, that their Intelligence community also has evidence that Israel is using Its new<br />
leverage Inside Kurdistan, and within the Kurdi~h communities in Iran and .Syria, for Intelligence and operational purposes. Syrian<br />
and Lebanese officials believe that Israeli intelligence. played a role. in a series of violent protests In Syria in mid-March In which<br />
Syrian Kurdish dissidents and .Syrian troops clashed" leaving at least thirty peopl~ dead. (There are nearly two million Kurds living In<br />
Syria, which has a population of seventeen million.) Much of the fighting took place In cities along Syria's borders with Turkey and<br />
Kurdish-controlled Iraq. Michel ,Samaha" th~ Lebanese Minister of Information, told me that while the disturbances amounted to an<br />
uprising by the Kurds against the leadership of ~ashirAssad" ,the .Syrian President, his government had evidence that Israel was<br />
"preparing the Kurds to fight all around Iraq, In Syria" Turkey, and Iran., They're being programmed to do commando operations."<br />
The top German national-security official told me that h~ believes that the Bush Administration continually misread Iran••IThe<br />
Iranla~s waJlted~to k~ep America tied down In Iraq, and to keep it busy there" but t~ey didn't want chaos,1I he said. One of the .<br />
senior German officials told me, )-The critical question is 'What will the behavior of Iran be-if there is an Independent Kurdistan with _
o<br />
G<br />
close ties to Israel?' Iran does not want an Israeli land-based aircraft carrier"-that Is, a military stronghold-"on its border."<br />
Jfl<br />
Proint<br />
Page 4 of5<br />
Another senior European official said, liThe Iranians wouid do something positive In "the south of Iraq If they get'somethlng positive'<br />
In return, but Washington won't do it. The Bush, Administration won't ask the Iranians for help, and can't ask the Syrians. Who Is<br />
going to save the United States?" He added that, at the. start of the American Invasion of Iraq, s~veral top European officials had<br />
told their counterparts In Iran, ")'00 will be the wlnner~ In the region. II<br />
Israel Is not alone in believing that Iran, despite Its protestations, is secretly hard at work on a nuclear bomb. Early this month, the<br />
International Atomic Energy Agency" which, is re_sponsible for monitoring nuclear,prollferation, issued Its fifth quarterly report In a<br />
row stating that Iran was continuing to misrepresent its re.search into materials that could be used for the production of nuclear<br />
weapons. Much of the concern centers on an underground enrichment facility at Natanz, two hundred and fifty miles from the Iran<br />
Iraq border, which, during previous I.A.E.A., Inspections, was discovered to contain centrifuges showing traces of weapons-grade<br />
uranium. The huge complex, which is still under construction, i~ said to total nearly erght hundred thousand square feet, and It will<br />
be sheltered In a few months by a roof whose design allows it to be covered with sand. Once the work Is completed, the complex<br />
"will be blind to satellites". and the Iranians could add additional floors underground," an I.A.E.A. official told me. liThe question Is,<br />
will the Israelis hit Iran?1I<br />
Mohamed ElBaradel, the I.A.E.A. director, has repeatedly stat~d that his agency ha~ not IIseen concrete proof of a military program,<br />
so It's premature to make a judgment on that." David Albright" a former U.N. weapons inspector who is an expert on nuclear<br />
proliferation, buttre.ssed the I.A.f;.A. claim. "The United States has ,no concrete evidence of a nuclear-weapons program,II Albright<br />
told me. "It·S just an inference. There's,no smoking gun." (Last. Friday" at a meeting In Vienna, the I.A.E.A. passed a resolution that,<br />
while acknowledging some progress" complained that Iran had yet to be as open as It should be, and urgently called upon It to<br />
resolve a list of outstanding que_stions.)<br />
The I.A.E.A. official told me. that the. I.A.E.A. leadership has been privately warned by Foreign Ministry officials in Iran that they are<br />
"having a hard time getting Information" from th~ hard-line. religious and military leaders who run the country. liThe Iranian Foreign<br />
Ministry tells us, 'We're just diplomats" and we don't know whether we're getting the whole. story from our own people,' n the official<br />
said. He noted that the Bush Administration has repeatedly advised the I.A.E.A. that there are secret nuclear facilities In Iran that<br />
have not been declared. The Administration will not say more, apparently worried that the information could get back to Iran.<br />
Patrick Clawson, of the Institute for Near east Policy, provided another explanation for the reluctance of the Bush Admlnlstratlonto<br />
hand over specific intelligence. "If we wer~ to identify a site," ,he told me, "it's conceivable that It could be qUickly disassembled and<br />
the I.A.E.A. Inspectors would arrive"-international inspections often take weeks to organlze-"and find nothing." The American<br />
Intelligence community, already discredited because of its faulty reporting on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, would be criticized<br />
anew. "It's much better," Clawson said, ,lito have the I.A.E.A. figure out' on its own that there's a site and then find evidence that<br />
there had been enriched material there."<br />
Clawson told me that Israel's overwh~lmingnational-security cOl'lcern must be Iran. Given that a presence In Kurdlstan would give<br />
Israel a way to monitor the. Iranian nuclear effort" he. said" "it would be. negligent for the Israelis not to be there. n<br />
At the moment, the former American .senior Intelligence official said, the Israelis' tie. to Kurdistan "would be. of greater value than<br />
their growing alliance with Turkey. 'We. love Turkey but got to keep the pressure on Iran..' "The former. Israeli Intelligence officer<br />
said, "The Kurds were the last surviving group clos~ to tl)e. United States with any say in Iraq. The only question was how to square<br />
It with Turkey."<br />
There may be no way to square. It with Turkey. Over breakfa~t in Ankara, a senior Turkish official explained, "Before the war, Israel<br />
was active in Kurdistan, and now it i~ active .agaln. This is very dangerous for us, and for them, too. We do not wa",t to see Iraq<br />
diVided, and we will not ignore it." Then, citing a popular Turkish proverb-"We will burn a blanket to kill a f1ea ll -he said, "We have<br />
told the Kurds, 'We are not afraid of you, but you ~hould be afraid of os." II (A Turkish diplomat I spoke to later was more direct: "We<br />
tell our Israeli and Kurdish friend~ that Turkey's good will lies in keeping Iraq together. We. will not support alternative solutions.")<br />
"If you end up with a divided Iraq, It will bring.more blood, tears, and pain to the Middle East, and you will be blamed," the senior<br />
Turkish official said. "From Me.xico to Russia, everybody will claim that the United States had a secret agenda In Iraq: you came<br />
there to break up Iraq. IfIraq Is diVided, America cannot explain this to the world." The official compared the situation to the<br />
breakup of Yugoslavia" bu~ added, "In the Balkans, you did not have oil." He said, "The lesson of Yugoslavia is that when you give<br />
one country Independence everybody will want it." If that happens, he said, "Kirkuk will be. the. Sarajevo of Iraq. If something<br />
happens there, It will be 'impossible. to contain the crisis."<br />
In Ankara, another senior Turkish official explained that his government had "openly shared its worries" about the Israeli military<br />
activities inside Kurdistan with the.Jsraeli Foreign Ministry. "They deny the training and the purchase of property and claim It's not<br />
official but done by private persons. ObViouslyI, our intelligence" community Is aware that it was not so. This polley Is not good for<br />
America, Iraq, or Israel and the Jews.i\<br />
Turkey's Increasingly emphatic ,and public. complaints about Israel's missile attacks on the Hamas leadership In the Gaza Strip Is<br />
another factor In the growing tensions between the. allies. On May 26th, Turkey's Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, announced at a<br />
news conference in Ankara that the Turkish government was bringing its Ambassador in Israel home for consultations on how to<br />
revive the Middle East peace proce.ss., He also told the Turkish pafliament that the government was planning to strengthen Its ties to<br />
the Palestinian Authority, and" rn conver~ations with, Middle. Eastern diplomats in the past month, he expressed grave concern about<br />
Israel. In one such .talk,.one diploma~ lold me, G~I d~scribed Israeli activities, and the. possibility of an Independent Kurdistan, as<br />
~p.re~f!nting us ~i~h a_c~oi~e that is not ,a real choice·b~tweeri su"rvival and alliance-;" -
Pant<br />
o<br />
PageS of5 \<br />
A,thirdTurklsh official told me that. the Israelis were "talking to us I~ Qrder to appease our concern. They say, 'We aren't doing<br />
anything In Kurdistan to undermine. your interests. Don't worry.' "The officiai added, "If it goes out pUblicly what they've been<br />
doing, It will put your government and our government. in a difficul~ position. We can tolerate 'Kurdistan' if Iraq Is Intact, but<br />
nobody knows the future-not even th~ Americans."<br />
A former White House official depict~d ~he Administration as eager-almost desperate-late this spring to Install an acceptable new<br />
Interim government in Iraq before President. BuSh~s declared June .30th deadline for the transfer of sovereignty. The,Administratlon<br />
turned to lakhdar Brahimi, the U,nited" Nations special envoy, to "put together something by June 30th-just something that could<br />
stand Upll through the Presidential election, th~ former official said. Brahlml was given the task of selecting, with Washington's public<br />
approval, the thirty-one. members of Iraq's ,interim government. Nevertheless" according to press reports, the choice of Iyad Allawl<br />
as Interim Prime Minister was a disappo.lotment to Br~hjmi.<br />
The White House has yet to deal with. AlIawi's past. His credentials as a neurologist,'and his involvement during the past two<br />
decades In anti-Saddam activities, as the founder of th~ British-based Iraqi National. Accord, have been widely reported. But his role<br />
as a Baath Party operative while Saddam struggled for control, in the nineteen-sixties and seventles-Saddam became President In<br />
1979-ls much less well known. "Allawi helped Saddam get to power," an American intelligence officer told me. "He was a very<br />
effective operator and a true. believer." Reuel Marc Gerec.ht, a former C.I.A. case officer who served In the Middle East, added, "Two<br />
facts stand out about Allawi. One" ,he.like.s to think of himself as a man of ideas; and, two, his strongest virtue Is that he's a thug. 1I<br />
Early this year, one. of Allawi's former medical-school c1assmate.s, Dr. Haifa al-Azawl, published an essay In an Arable newspaper In<br />
London raising questions about his character and his.medical bona fides. ,She depicted Allawi as a "big husky man ••• who carried a<br />
gun on his belt and frequently brandished it, terrorizing the medical.students." Allawi's medical degree, she wrote, "was conferred<br />
upon him by the Baath party." Allawl moved to London in 197.1, ostensibly to continue his medical education; there he was In charge<br />
of the European operations of th~ Baath ,Party organization and the local activities of the Mukhabarat, Its intelligence agency, until<br />
1975.<br />
"If you're asking me if Allawi has blood on his hands from his days in London, the answer is yes, he does," Vincent Cannlstraro, the<br />
former C.I.A. 'officer, said. "He was a paid Mukhabarat agent for the. Iraqis, and he was Involved In dirty stuff." Acabinet-level Middle<br />
East diplomat, who was rankled by the U.S. indiffer~nc~ to Allawi'spersonal history, told me early this month that Allawl was<br />
Involved With a Mukhabarat "hit team" ~hat sought out, and killed Baath Party dissenters throughout Europe. (Allawl's office did not<br />
respond to a request for comment.) At some. point, for reasons that are not. clear, Allawl fell from favor, and the Baathlsts organized<br />
a series of attempts on his life. The third attempt, by ,an axe-wielding ,assassin who broke into his home near London In 1978,<br />
resulted in a year-long hospital stay. ' .<br />
The Saban Center's Flynt Leverett said of the. transfer of sovereignty, "If it doesn't work, there is no faliback-nothlng. 1I The former<br />
senior American intelligence officJal told me, similarly,. that "the. neocons .stlll think they can pull the rabbit out of the hat" In Iraq.<br />
"What's the plan? They sayI. "We don't need it. Democracy is .strong enough. We'll work it out.' "<br />
Middle East diplomats and former C.I.A. operatJve.s who now consult in Baghdad have told me that many wealthy Iraqi businessmen<br />
and their families have deserted Baghdad in recent weeks in anticipation of continued, and perhaps heightened, suicide attacks and<br />
terror bombings after June ,30th."We'U $~e. Christians" .Shiites, and Sunnis getting out," Michel Samaha, the Lebanese Minister of .<br />
Information, reported. "What the resistance is doing is targeting the'poor people who run the bureaucracy-those who can't afford to<br />
pay for private guards. A month agol, tri.ends of mine who are important landowners in Iraq came to Baghdad to do business. The<br />
cost of one day'S security was about ,twetve thousand dollars.'\<br />
Whitley Bruner, a retired Intelligence officer who was a senior member of the C.I.A.·s task force on Iraq a decade ago, said that the<br />
new Interim government. in Iraq is urgently seeking ways to provide affordable security for second-tier officials-the men and women<br />
who make the government work., In early.June, two such officials-Kamal Jarrah, an Education Ministry official, and Bassam Sallh<br />
KUbba, who was serving as deputy foreign minister..were assassinated by unidentified gunmen outside their homes. Neither had<br />
hired private guards. Bruner, who returned from Baghdad earlier this month, said that he was now working to help organize Iraqi<br />
companies that could provide high-quality security that Iraqis could afford. "It's going to be. a hot summer," Bruner said. itA lot of<br />
people have decided to get to Lebanon, Jordan" or the Gulf and wait this one out." . .<br />
LOAD-DATE: June 28, 2004
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-In the Pentagon, a suspected spy allegedly passes secrets,<br />
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...~ ~"",~ ...<br />
.Ii ; ':r::~.. :,,'.~_A~... ...~ ...~tt Peterson I Getty Images<br />
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By Michael Isikoff And ~'~k1Hi»sei1'ii~if;'.:". I': ~<br />
Newsweek .~ ~'. ".' • , ' • ~ •<br />
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Sept. 6 issue" It was~~¥~,~~,~~sni#o~t~lun~h-onethat the FBI<br />
happened to be monitoring~ .Nearly a year-,and a half ago, agents<br />
were monitoring a conve]~ation between·~9jl.sraell Embassy<br />
official anq a lobbyi~t ~of~A:merlcan IsraetR~4~IJc_ Affairs<br />
Committee, or AIPAC, as"'"pai-rbf a 'probein~o possible Israeli<br />
spying. Suddenly, ~nd~%!~ff&\$nexp'~~~edlY~ in the description-of<br />
one intelligence offiCiC!r,.@..i)Olh.f!f Ameri~ap.:'l.l~alked In" to the lunc<br />
out of the blue. Agentjj~.t\first·dldn~e·kn6~Ytho the man was.<br />
They were stunned to...Qiscover he was LarrV,'.Franklin, a desk<br />
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Page 4 of7
\\flYW. Iiaa rctz. to Di<br />
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Last update - Q1:57 29/08120Q~<br />
Order was out - no ~pying on U.S., says<br />
former Mossad chief<br />
By "t1IJ~ ~\l't"(t~Gide~n Alan and Nathan Guttman<br />
A fonner head·ofthe Mossad and military secretary to former defense<br />
minister and p~e minister Yitzhak Rabin says an unequivocal order<br />
tQ the in~~lligence Community prohibits illegal activity in the U.S. and<br />
operating a person to collect infonnation.<br />
"I hope the infotl11ation is false and thete are no gro~ds for<br />
suspic"io.n," rviK Danny Yatom (Labor), who was Mossad chieffrom<br />
1996 fof ayear and Ii half, stUd. "<br />
. "'.<br />
.......<br />
Accord~g to Yatom, in spite ofthe prohibition, the U.S.<br />
!l~~~!~tqtt~o~; ~pCi=~!~HY !h~' !tt!eHigen~ ~ntm~.ityl ~~9~ ~tr~~g<br />
suspicions ofIsrael being involved in intelligence-gathering activities.<br />
Th~ tUn ~Xt~nto.(d.l~ sqJpi~io~ WQ$ ~y~led ill J9?7 wh~ VIS!<br />
media p!lbJisl!eQ repQrts QfFDJ i)\v~tJgl\tlQ»s Qtt9 a)legatioflS tl);tt ~<br />
Mossad agent was involved in running an intelligence agent within the<br />
admiriistnltioii. As a result, tHen-CIA chiefGeorge Tenet asked Danny<br />
Yatom for cbirifications in both a phone call and in writing. A letter<br />
that Yatom ~nt to' Tenet containirigclariftcations di~ not Satisfy the<br />
Americans, and Yatom had to fly to Washington tor a meeting with<br />
Tenet. When it eventually became clear that the alleg~tionwas false,<br />
Tenet wrote Yatom a·letter ofapology•<br />
Itsubaequelltly tum6d out that thQ fBI, which listens in Oil all home<br />
and office p1)one calls oflSraelj djplomats, bad ihtercepted a cal'<br />
between two Mossad officiais stationed in the U.S., Yoram Hassel,<br />
head ofdie Mossad miSsion, ~d anotlier individual, involved in the<br />
workings ofTevel, an intelligence unit responsible for liaison with the<br />
CIA and other ~tel1igence organizationS. The two spoke in code and<br />
mentioned the word "mega... Unaware that "mega" was th~.Mos~'s<br />
c,ode word for the CIA, the U.S. thought mega was an agent run by the<br />
Mossad.<br />
Cf.ta!nnan ofthe Knc;sset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee MK<br />
Yuval Steinitz told Haaretz yesterday, "I am certain !hat this story is<br />
groundless. This is certainly not a case ofPollard II.~'· Steinitz sai~ that<br />
~ sj!1~ ~e P~II~4 !lfffl!r, J~~l ~~ J!~t 9~~F!t~ ~p'j~ ~'!!lS~ tIl~ U.~:,<br />
and that there were gooCi relations in the area ofintelligence between<br />
ls.rael, the u.S., and other Western countries against terror - and no<br />
need to resort to spying.<br />
'<br />
"I would be very surprised jfin the flnal analysis itturned out that<br />
there is any basis to this story," Steinitz said."fAt most, W.s possibl~<br />
that certain people may have said things t~ey were not authorized to<br />
say, but I ~ say with certainty that evt?Jl ifsomeone passed<br />
i' oft
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'/#<br />
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...... #, " '".<br />
,infotm~~orfabout.WinteHouSe poli~y. on Ute Irania4 isSue, th~ ~as<br />
iio~ '~~n~, ~ ~,:" ~~~sf .~f ~~eJ or
Haaretz ~ ~ews http://www.haarefz.comlJiasenlpages!AtticleNew"s.jlitri}I?:...<br />
E.> ALL INFOPnTION CONI'AlNED 0<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
I . . DATE 07-29-2010 BY' 60324 uc baW
'Haaretz - News<br />
e, •<br />
•q<br />
"<br />
9<br />
'L'" w<br />
o<br />
I wortc;~ Qn CapitQlHili fQf five yePnt.<br />
AIPAC is aespfsed lOOre fof jJus~liig<br />
~emb~rs of c;ongress at'C!und. 00 you<br />
think that all these resolutions of<br />
$Upport indicate that Congress cares<br />
about Ismel? They don'- They just<br />
indicate how easily Congress can be intimidated.<br />
http://www.haaretz.comlhasen/pages/ArticleNews.jhtml?...<br />
O·<br />
,~ ThIS scandal won' hurt Israel<br />
unless Israel sticks too,closely<br />
to AIPAC.<br />
Peter Ross, Los Angeles. United<br />
States ofAmerica .<br />
ii'<br />
•1Q<br />
My boss was Jewish and cared deeply about Israel. He despises AIPAC for<br />
using Israel for its own ends. I called him today to ask how he feels about the<br />
~py ~11.d;lI: tf~ ~id tflat !lmaybe noyI tsra!!tis¥till un.4~"tpfla that ~IP~Q hJJris<br />
them badlY up here. You can't win friends or keep friends through intimidation.<br />
Uml~1 ia at GrAlt any ofAii'llttica but I WOuld ltewr trust AIPAC and, you knoW<br />
~at. I'd.guess t1!at !JQQ of the 435 H9use me~bers feel the sar:ne '!iay I do. ~t is<br />
the most unpopUlar lobby in town. This scandal won't hurt Israel unless Israel<br />
slicks too dosely to AIPAC. Itshould throw them to the wolves."<br />
PeterRoss, Los Angel.. UnitedStstesofAmerica<br />
Ifanything waws ever mentioned about a fraction of U.S. espionage activities,<br />
Mr. Franklin's sneakel}' would pale to nonexistence.<br />
Gllma Ramirez, Canu/el, Israel<br />
The Lebanon<br />
withdrawal<br />
Ifthe allegation is true. and even ifit is false, it will raise the canard ofdual<br />
loyalty. AIPAe. may los~ ii~ t~ e~empt ~tatU$, ilild the U.S. CQogress may ~vofd<br />
the organization. It's troubling that Palestinian groups in the U.S. could laurich a<br />
~~S~Qqp9P !\Ilt ~!i~ ~~~pth!; i~~\1e ~liY~. 11l~ '~it ~~Id contend tfiit since<br />
fUndS WUf8 cut for Arab organlZ.aUO~f lik~ for Israel or its 'pro" lobby.<br />
Ricardo Arias, Houston, United States ofAmerica<br />
With both major Al11erf~n.political parties st~n9 to outdo o~e another in<br />
slavish devotion to Israel. I cannot see Utat this affair is memly something<br />
sQll'lttUJing ctlQked \fA by mllepl}ten~ trvipg tQ lfl1~r ih~ BUIll administration•.<br />
J~" IIC1tfo,;lgI(:; Edgewiferi FI;, tinnedstat. ofAriicmm<br />
The publication of the affair might serve the U.S. administration in appeasing<br />
voters ~!fii~ 6y lh8 Close ie!8tioiiSf!ip 68tween lfii l!.S. ana Ii"!,!. It may<br />
elJso be trying lc) atten~ ita failure to aChieve progress In the<br />
IsraeliIPalestinian conflict. and hence find a pretext to distance itselffrom<br />
Sharon, who isn't rewarding It at a time when It could use a boost. whether there<br />
is any merit.fn the anegations, either ofthese tactics will harm. U.S.-Israel<br />
relations..<br />
The timing of the allegations and the paucitY. offindings revealed so far appear<br />
to be a calculated move to counter this administration"s reorganization efforts of<br />
tI!~ Vjl(ioq~(nte!lig,"ce gptp,rjng ;lgftflcjes. In the process, allegiances of<br />
Jewisll office holders rriay be qiJestioned.<br />
I. Gat, Los Angeles, Unlteil StSfes ofAmerica<br />
The 'new<br />
antl-Sem.itlsm'<br />
Je'Wisli e'idiemlsm:<br />
HOwiealthe<br />
threat?<br />
It ~pp~", th~t !h~ -"fl!ir- i! m91lJ f'fI1"Y f!I![1 fgct, !~ t~ timf}i~g gf t~<br />
r~,~,S! 9! t~~! inf9nn~~lon is ~1gf\1y !~,p~ ~!'~ p'01!~~11y !,,!qpv~!~~. Am~~?n<br />
Jews ha~G n~thln9 to filar: there a.r~ no targets on th~l~ baCkS, nO.Whlsp6.fS Of<br />
traitor when they leave the roam. Haaretz feeds Into this paranoia by asking this<br />
fool~ Qutl$tIQrI.<br />
lion $/gurw; Miami. lIaiti:d State# ofAmerica<br />
Tho West Bank<br />
separation·'-nce<br />
ii: UnfQrtpnately. ttl, Iflternts of<br />
Contrary to the popUlar and<br />
misinfonned belief that Jewish lobbies the U.S. and Israel don't always<br />
and neo-conservative Jews in the coincide. ".<br />
Pe!"fagon -c;ontrQl f9!elgn P.O~g': q!tf¥! Jail PieterVerhey, Huizen, The<br />
U.S. in the Middle East, the facts tell a Nethellands'<br />
different st0'Y~ ItJS the CI1s~s.l~ the ..' .• . •<br />
non~emocratic Arab wol1d. Islamic terrorism. as well as rampant anti~emitlc<br />
incitement agafnsi Israel and Jews. Thai forces the u.s. to be invoived there in<br />
Wf~ fp Y4llch it st~'Il·t \y@!!l tCJ ~~ illVQ!v~4 t91!egin yAtI1~<br />
Before 9111. th~ B~h gov~rnmen~ aim~ at coQ~ntrating on dOm~UC affairs<br />
and it was Bin Laden who basically took control ofthe U.S. agenda for the<br />
Middle East. And had the Palestinians radically renounced all violent struggle<br />
8/30/2004 ?:47 PM
Haaretz - News<br />
http://wWw.ha~e~.comlhasen/pagesl Article~ews.jhtm1?...<br />
O~J . -<br />
against Israel and chosen the path ofnon-violent resistance, a final seWement<br />
could have been reached already long ago. The Arabs might want to lobby in the<br />
U.S. for such non-violent struggle and take Martin lUther King aOd Gt1andi as<br />
their heroes and martyrs, instead of suicidal terrorists. As long .as this doesn't.<br />
happen, Israel might need some spies around to know the true agenda of<br />
countries like Iran that develop nudear WMO and support antJ.lsrael terrorists<br />
groups. Unfortunately, the interests ofthe U.S. ancflsrael don't always coincide.<br />
Jan P/eter Vedle}', Hulzen, The Netherlands<br />
After thousands ofyears, the woltd Is stiD persecuting Jews. albeit disguised in<br />
different ways. The way the Unitect Nations view Israeli actions in the OcCupied<br />
Territories as compared to how they view Palestinian suicide bOl11.bers is a prime<br />
example. I justcannot fathom why the UN willingly condemn legitimate Israeli<br />
actions against Palestinian militants but only give Palestinians a light slap on'<br />
,their wrists with regard to PalestlnJan suicide bombers who wantonly blow up<br />
innocent Israeli women, Children, old folk and men.<br />
It seems that even the U.S. media has Joined in this madness with reg~rd to the<br />
Lany Franklin affair. The FBI has not even conduded their investigations and we<br />
already see the U.S. media portraying Israel as the culprit.<br />
•<br />
I would like to appeal to all to wait for the official condusion before making your<br />
judgement. Please note that it is also election season in U.S. now ~nd some<br />
unscrupulous American pofitlcal supporters might want to lea~ some bias~d<br />
news to boost their hidden agenda.<br />
Gabriel Ho, Singapore, Singapore<br />
For all Intents and purposes, Israel has secured effective control over.U.S.<br />
,foreign policy in the Middle East. through various sophisticated means, iQduding<br />
AIPAC's lobbying. as well as placfng at the top decision.making echelonS<br />
right..wing Zionists who view Israers Interests· from a"Ukud perspective, of<br />
course - as far more relevant than American interests, when the two do not<br />
converge. .<br />
.<br />
0 •<br />
The Franklin affair has the potential ofannouncing the begiooing of the end of<br />
this unquestionable control Israel has enjoyed for many years nOW.<br />
Omar Barghoutl, Acre, ~srael ' .<br />
°w..e are living with this -dualloyalism •<br />
~n ute tiJl1e·1llj~11\ what an{l.~",ites,<br />
out of fresh accusations or smearS<br />
auain~~ ~ ~~'h fioyre in PC?Ii~~.<br />
revert to. The difference is that Jews<br />
no longer feei the need to defend their<br />
1000ltY'tQ A"!f:lica 3nd ttteir s:arq !o.r<br />
J~rAg,: Np~ino Yrl'! ett'~rigft \h9<br />
relationitiip betWeen me tWO friends.<br />
They need each other and they'lIIm<br />
each other and scamiats ~nCQ~ by<br />
"~9thI~g ~!I ~!1g!flI'<br />
nllltl~nshfp b.tw~bh ~.l\YCS<br />
friends. They need each other<br />
~il~ i~~!! ~!l99~~4l!j<br />
~P.tb WhO wantto huttthl<br />
,reiationship wlii find thai they.<br />
a'-liiiocldil W til"IrfieadS to Die<br />
~I: :. ".'c' 9 ••, ... ,. .. " ".<br />
Batya Dagan, Los Angeles.<br />
ujl!~ ~I:f~ ofMl+ric]f<br />
.,'<br />
people who want to hurt the relationship will find that they are knocking their<br />
rieads to'the wall. .<br />
Batya Dagan, Los A!'gcles, United States ofAmerica<br />
Ifits tn.te. to bite the hand that is feeding us shows arrogance and contempt for<br />
our friends, as well as the rest ofthe world. This is why the resentment to rsrael'<br />
is justified and not juSt another case of anti-Semitism, as many Jews would have'<br />
it. When I was young I saw Israel as morally right but now 1m not so sure.<br />
~on,!ie Wolman, Toronto, canada-<br />
'<br />
Of COUISG it will badly harm the relations Israel has with the USA. Worse, ail the<br />
allegations ofthe Arab World that the U.S. is govemed by the "Zionist Lobby"<br />
WIll be proven correct. to their satisfaction. 00Jews of the dlaspora and Israel<br />
needs this? . , 0<br />
,ClaUde Myriam Hasson. Sao Paulo, Brazil<br />
The damage has been done by Israel. They denied the Jonathan Pollard story<br />
for 13 years. They still deny their involvement in the NeW Zealand Passport<br />
story. The Sharon government and the rest oftheir group are not the friend of<br />
'Unit~.States but an open enemy, and very soon it will be proved before the<br />
November eledions. , .<br />
,__ 30f6<br />
8/30/2004
-Haaretz - News<br />
o<br />
..<br />
Sal Azam, Chicago, United states ofAmerica<br />
http://www.haar~tz.comlhasen/pag~s/ArticleNews.jhtml?.. ~<br />
OJ<br />
To love America and care for Israel's security is not dual loyalty. Afew people<br />
made some mistakes. that does not represent all of Americas Jews.<br />
Gabriel G, San Francisco, United States 01America<br />
Ped1aps history and the events ofWW2 have convinced some Jews that their<br />
fate can never again rest in tIM; hands of the -Goyim- but itwould be very •<br />
careless of Israel to saaific:e the good will ofthe American people by treating<br />
them With arrogance. presuming that Israel knows whars best for both of them.<br />
Dan McAllnden, Los Angeles, United States ofAmerica<br />
From the timing atone one can jtt From the timing alone one can<br />
conclude this Is a political ploy either of conClude thIS Is a Political plot<br />
the CIA - which has a weakened eitherofthe CIAora Democrat U<br />
connection to Israel according to<br />
AI Stein, Mendocino. United<br />
Haaretz today- or much more likely to States ofAmerica<br />
the Oe!"Qqat who ~s the anony-mous . _• 0 0 •<br />
SQurce ofthe leak. There are aWhole bunch Qf Americans who never got oYer<br />
letting Jews into their countly dubs who now and again dabble in the latest fann<br />
of Jew 6iitfng YmiCii iiiW lakes tfi8 fomi of lYing 860m JdWiifi spies;<br />
AIStein, Mendocino, United States ofAmerica<br />
75% ofAmerican Jews are reported to be voting for sen. Kelly In the upcoming<br />
election, the AIPAC so leaning towards the Ukud. hardly represent American<br />
Jewry and should take this blame and not share itwith people they do NOT<br />
represent.<br />
Johanes Franzen, Stockholm, Sweden<br />
Ifthe spy case against Franklin is true. all it does is serve ~o reinforce the<br />
opinions ofthe Arabs. who suspect the Jews ofdesiring world dominion. the<br />
antJ.Semites. who claim the Jews control the government. and the mainstream.<br />
who distrust the Jews but choose to hideitwhen it's unpopular., The Arabs<br />
already believe Israel perpetrated 9-11. Iraq, and many other horrors. The spy<br />
case Is simply'fodder for analready·loaded cannon, pointed at the Jews for3ooo<br />
years.<br />
Jorr:lan Hirsch, Dallas, United States ofAmerica<br />
The so-called ·spy affair" should be reported more carefully In the media.<br />
Joumalist should reassess their responsibility in reporting such matters. Mr.<br />
Franklin Is still innocent until proven guilty, At this point It appears to be a matter<br />
ofinappropriate handling ofclassified documents a charge that even sandy<br />
Berger has to face. Unfortunately. the damage has been done and itfuels the<br />
hate-propaganda of all those believing In the •Jewish-Zionist" world conspiracy.<br />
Bernd Wollschlaeger, Miami, United States ofAmerica<br />
The spy story was invented to blame the Iraq war on Jews. justas Jews have<br />
always been blamed throughout history for major problems and mistakes made<br />
by Gentiles. We were blamed for the black plague. Gen:.nany's loss in World War<br />
I. we are blamed for the Arab world's InCC!mpetence and cruelty, and now we are<br />
being blamed for the war in Iraq. The result will harm U.S. Jews. Within the next<br />
few hundred years discrimination and violence against Jews In America wil<br />
increase drastfcally. Itwill get to the point where every U.S. Jew Is either dead or<br />
In Israel.<br />
BISayetta, San Francisco, United States ofAmerica<br />
It is time for Israel to divest itself ofIts<br />
~i I'Is tlpte for Israel to d,,1 with<br />
,,~t~_'!Stlip- ~ ~lpAg. A:lPAC ..ItseIf· theu.s:fJO!cin",~ tao '..~ ~ _<br />
a rogue operation dedicated to the<br />
government notthrough AlPAC,<br />
aOQtaDditAlfU!1U ofAIPAC. Itiinot '!falem ~ ~ omm~~ .1!n~, @ ....<br />
p~l~el.It Is pro-AIP~C .... ~1I~ve ~8 ~e!1.nDw, da'!Qe~us. ., U.<br />
that the neo~nservative AIPAC types Art Rabinowitz. Brooklyn, United<br />
~t th~ Q~p'a(trnefll Qf QQf@(lt!8 g~'lg ~f!~~ ~J Afrlen~<br />
!nfC)iIp~qqn tq A~~MI !li1~ If!i! ~PAC<br />
tooK itto impi"d18 1M Idraelii oftfieir iJflpdrtahdd, I do not tielieVe fiiraal wail<br />
runnlnq this operation. Ehud Y!I!.Om is right. So Is Shara~s~. Israel Is Innocent<br />
but the power mangers at AIPAC and the wannangers at ~elthis operation are<br />
guilty as sin. I hope AIPAC Is destroyed.by this anjj we American Jews can<br />
4.of~<br />
8/30/2004 5:47 PM
Haaretz - News<br />
:,..<br />
~~<br />
:<br />
" ..<br />
http://www.haareiZ.com/hasen/pages/ArticleNewsJhtmI?...<br />
O·<br />
replace itWith a truly pro-Israel opeiation. one that Is not on a power trfp. I just<br />
hope that AIPAC's shenanigans do not hurt Israel. As Rabin suggested in 1992.<br />
it Is time for Israel to deal with the U.S. government to government not through<br />
AIPAC. which Is both outmoded and. as we see now, dangerous.<br />
Arl Rabinowitz, Brooklyn, United States ofAmerica<br />
On the contrary. the Pentagon spy scandal will greatly benefit U.S. Jews and<br />
Israel. By drawing attention to AIPAC, the organization will be exposed as the<br />
pompous, propagandistic fraud Ulat it is. Thus. U.S. Jews will be more likely to<br />
think rationally and humanely about the Israel-Palestinian conflict. They Will<br />
listen more closely to the uplifting message of Jewish peace and justice groups.<br />
Israel. with dIminished U.S. support for its outrageous and Immoral conduct: will<br />
also benefit. The greatest gift the world can give to Israel is to Insist that the<br />
nation bring peace and justice to Palestinians. First step: End the OCQIpation<br />
and bring all the sewers home.<br />
David Howard, Olal, California, United States ofAmerica<br />
There is somethIng smelly about the -franklinlAIPAC" affair. Govem~ents and<br />
their security agencies by rule do not go pubrlC in matters of·sples· until they<br />
have been nailed and indicted. So far this reeks of a malicious leak or of capital<br />
ineptitude ofthe FBI. or bothl ~<br />
Egon Lazarus, MORAGA, United States ofAmerica<br />
The point about the American spies is good. and so is the point about this<br />
incident being set up to blame the Iraq mess on Israel. Wake up people and<br />
smell the coffeell think I speak for.lots of people in Canada. the U.S., and Israel<br />
when I say that Israel had nothing to do with the war on Iraq. Was it Israel who<br />
told Saddam to act like a crazy dictator? It wasn't Israel who told Saddam to fire<br />
scuds at Israel, nor to kill Iraqis. No. This spy business is to rehash the theory<br />
that Israel set up thewar on Iraq. The fact Ulat Israel actuaRy sent spies to bring<br />
this upon themselves seems utterly stupid. It is appalling to think that any right<br />
minded human being would think otherwlsel<br />
Tyrone Nimerowskl, Winnipeg, ClInada<br />
Larry Franklin should be viewed as innocent unless found guilty in a court oflaw.<br />
but even ifhe's convicted ofespionage, that wouldn't have a big anti-Jewish<br />
backlash In Amedea. MostAmericans now consider Amerlean Jews part ofthe<br />
national mainstream. .<br />
IfAmedcan Jews' special ties to Israel is -dual loyally,· what about the 30 million<br />
or so American Christian Zionists? They are Israel·s strongest bastion of support<br />
in America. Yes, most politically consdous Americans befl8V8 by now that the<br />
Iraq war was mastenninded by neo-conservatives to ernninate a blUer enemy of<br />
Israel. But again. I don't see that spawning much IIf..feellng among Americans<br />
against Jews or Israel because of their deep loyalty toward the" Jewish state.<br />
What the Israelis may need to wony about is the war's disastrous effect of<br />
America. their only real ally In the worfd. The Iraqi quagmire is dramatically<br />
• exposing the limits ofAmerica's power and eroding Its dout In the Middle East<br />
and the wodd. And it's happening when Israel sbuggles to extricate itselffrom its<br />
own quagmire In Gam and the West Bank.<br />
Mus""aMalik, Cheverly, Md., United States ofAmerica<br />
Nobody in the White House is going to say anything negative about Israel right<br />
now. Bush needs some Jewish votes in florida and Ohio, and November's<br />
election wall dictate poSey until November. This issue will die quietly and quickly.<br />
Paul Mann, Chicago, United States ofAmerica<br />
The "macho· attitude which permeates all Israeli soc.iety. does not make this a<br />
farfetched possibility. The InvincibUity trait runs high and cORUpts one and an. On<br />
an optimist point this may tum to be nothing but a political smoke screen by the<br />
GOP to fend off ifs supposedly pro-Israel stand. On a pessimist view. nothing is<br />
too stupid to put it beyond any level of Israel's govemment. To advance Israel's<br />
advantage (supposedly) then any risk Is worthwhile.<br />
Ness/m Dayan, Ashdod, I~I -<br />
It is amply clear that Israel and its powerful lobby In Washington were behInd the<br />
American invasion and OCQIpation of Iraq last year. Now Israelis trying to get '<br />
the US to invade Iran and is using Jewish Americans to get the job done.<br />
Israelis should stop thinking that America plays the role ofmonkey and Israel<br />
the organ glinder<br />
.50f6<br />
8/30/2004 5:47 PM
,Haaretz,-'~ews:<br />
.....<br />
e'· , .<br />
·Kl}aJld SulelmaiJ: :ieniialem, ~sraei: " ...<br />
l1ttp://.W\VW.ha~e~'.com/llaseiiJpa:ge~ AJticl~Ne~s.jhiinl? i.~<br />
g:<br />
This charge smells of political, ,....Why woul~ ~9 ~llealt this tOt<br />
,diversion. Why would the FBlle'ak this' the press before ~rresUng<br />
to the press beforearresting Franklin if Franklin Ifthey have kept the<br />
they I!~v~ ~eP,t tf!e ~r !ornJ, . year long In~gatl~n quiet _,~<br />
inv~ation quiet before nOW? ,before noW?, ~ ~"<br />
Perria~because the U.S.' had a major Usa S~, Michigan. United ~ .<br />
defeat in Iraq this week; the economic States of A;,ITI8rica<br />
numbers are bleak and the ,<br />
~~!'l~frti9M.b~~~ qi, ~us!, ~!PPlllgn @f1~ the §W!tl qo~t ads ~re.beComing<br />
clelater•• ~. •• ~ .<br />
LIiiii simtItld, ~ICI!lgln, unltdll~ofAmDrit:S<br />
During the Pollard affair. Rabin said that he caught "two Americans. spying'In.<br />
Olmona and they were politely sent out of the country. So Why this hullabaloo,<br />
•when ~e did not even !,oa~ythin9? . .' ,<br />
richardcohen, U'!1ted Ki~gdom.<br />
I highly doubt Israel wOuld risk JeopardiZing relations with the U.S. Ifit turns out<br />
that indeed therewas aspy I doubt relations wOuld be h!lrm~: first because it<br />
was not as if an enemy was spYing; and the informatlon on' Iran Is something,<br />
Israel should MOW. without having to spy for its surviVal. AlSO relations wiD<br />
remain wann bec8use th8 interests. hopes values and destinies ofboth<br />
·coun~ are completely interwOven. . • , '.' . -.<br />
D Vi~nlkov, NY,. United States'ofAm,eric.<br />
This is obViously'Part ofan eloit ~o blame the'iraq war mess on Israel ahead of<br />
the U.s. elections: But AIPAC'stiould knoW better than'to'maintain lobbying •<br />
•Contact With bureauaatS in the Department ofDefense.1he solution Is to<br />
prevent these types ofscurrilous charges frOm occurring In the first place as<br />
there Isno shortage ofpeople willing to·use these types of Inddents for their<br />
own political motives. Contacts of this nature should be between government<br />
officials on both sides.'ine' like anY'other independent nation has a foreign<br />
ministry and a defense department with-liaison officers forthis. Let AIPAC lobby<br />
In Congress. . - - . , _. - ., .' . . .<br />
'Henl)' Cittoj1e, ~NeV! Yolk, United S~tes olAmeric.a<br />
Ifthis turns out to'be trUe. this is one 'of the dumbest things Israel could have<br />
done.,HoW on earth could they-haVe"thought thafthis'was a good idea?, •<br />
Jackie, HB"a~ Israel' . - -<br />
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www.haaretz.com<br />
http://www.haaretz.comlhasenlobjectslI<br />
Q INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS TlNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
JQi . , - _ "~L A*'- =- ..4=:-*-13 1 0( 4 J( _C:=1C2<br />
Last update· 21:14 30/0812004<br />
Shalom: Mol~ affair is<br />
exaggerated 'media nonsense'<br />
ByNathan Guttman, Haaretz Correspondent, Haaretz<br />
Service and Agencies "<br />
Officials confirmed Monday that a senior Israeli<br />
diplomat in Washington met several times'with<br />
Larry Franklin, a Pentagon analyst being<br />
inv~tigated by the FBI on suspicion he passed<br />
classified information on Iran to the American<br />
Israel Public Affairs Committee.<br />
However, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom·<br />
4enying allegations of ~spionage• said such<br />
meetings are commonplace and the two<br />
governments routinely share secrets.<br />
\<br />
"Israel and the United SUites have intimate ties<br />
... arid the infomiation Heing exchanged is milch<br />
more classified than any conversation that may<br />
have taken place," Shalom told a join~ news<br />
conference with his German counterpart,<br />
Joschka Fischer., •<br />
.The Israeli diplomat was identified as Naor<br />
Oilon, head ofthe political departm~t at<br />
Israel's embassy in Was~ington, and a specialist<br />
on n~clear weapons proliferatioll, ~rael says<br />
I~ and its nuclear.~bitions pose the greatest<br />
threat to the Jewish state.<br />
Shalom did not mention GilOD by name, but<br />
when asked about contacts between Oilon and<br />
Franklin did not deny they had taken place.<br />
A statement issued after the weekly cabinet<br />
meeting said that tlin discussing the Larry<br />
Franklin affair, he [Shalom] note4 that Foreign<br />
Ministry checks have shown that the entire<br />
Israeli Embassy acted accordin$ to procedures. tI<br />
Shalom said Monday that Israel already<br />
receives all'the classified information it needs<br />
from the U.S. governnient through shared<br />
intelligence. He called the Franklin affair<br />
"media-nonsense" that has been taken out ofall<br />
proportion, Army Radio reported.<br />
"There is no troth whatsoever in the claims that<br />
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Israel spi~d or in any way acted against our<br />
great friend and aUy, the United States," Shalom<br />
told reporters in Jemsalem.<br />
"I think the ties between Israel and the United<br />
States are intimate. The cooperation and l~vels<br />
ofinformation are so close, so intimate, that the<br />
information that is exchanged is much mo~<br />
classified that any conversation or. another," he<br />
said.<br />
The pro-Israel'AIPAC lobby denied serving as a<br />
conduit for documents from the analyst<br />
connected to U.S. Defens~ Secretary Donald<br />
Rumsfeld's office.<br />
Newsweek magazine reported on Sunday that<br />
the FBI began investigating Franklin after<br />
tailing Gilon, the minister ofpolitical affairs at<br />
the Israeli embassy in Washington, who met an<br />
AIPAC representative for lunch.~Franklinreportedly<br />
approached their table and engaged<br />
in a warm conversation with them.<br />
However, Shalom said any meetings Franklin<br />
might have hel4Jwith pro-Israeli officials were<br />
simply part ofdiplomatic work, acc~rding to~<br />
Army Radio.<br />
IIAmerican embassy offi9ials meet regularly<br />
with Israeli goverJ1t11~~t officials," said Shalom.<br />
lilt's an accepted thing."<br />
The magazine also said Franklin was once<br />
posted at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv when<br />
he served in the U.S. Air Force Reserve.<br />
Accordirlg to the report, Federal Bureau of<br />
Investigation counter~intelligence agents were<br />
following Franklin when they saw him attempt<br />
to pass a classified policy document on Iran to<br />
an unnamed surveillance target.<br />
Th~ U.S. adplinistration believes that the FBI<br />
will refrain from c~g Franklin with<br />
espionage, American media saidSunday. The<br />
FBI apparently lacks any evidence thattl!e_<br />
Pentagon data analyst was operated by either<br />
Israel or-AlPAC.<br />
Franklin, an analyst in the Pentagon's Near East<br />
and South Asia Bureau; could be charged with<br />
mishandling a classified document. However,<br />
the FBI has yet to make an official<br />
pronouncement on whether Franklin will be<br />
arrest~ an~ what charges he might face.<br />
Nevertheless, investigators are broadening their<br />
.<br />
http://www.haaretz.com!liasenlobjects/I<br />
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tiro,be and inteii.:i~g figures at !Ile~~fen.se, ';<br />
D.ep~..ent, the State Dep~ent an~ o\u.tsl~e"1. ,i<br />
thf~slrlitiOti. \ ' ..., . ,<br />
The investig~tio~ currently, cen~rs 'Qn f ~mgl~ ~l<br />
,doc'!W~nt ~I~ting t~ a di~c~ssion held ~~,~~D1~r<br />
administration offic;ials, about U.S. poli~y~on<br />
111m. Fr8rlk1in is s~speCted of~anding ~~ ,<br />
document· which was classified'· to AIPAC, 1;<br />
whioh conveyed the document or its co'iite1itS Jto '<br />
I~me!i gov~metit repre8entatlyes.<br />
J ,: .'<br />
The ~s Angeles Times reported Sup~y that<br />
Franklin may have'conveyed tlie,claSsified:.<br />
info~atipn jDnocently, not realizing he w~<br />
~reaking the"law. ~<br />
.. .. 'I<br />
/<br />
"Th~_ ~an is not a ~py~ he's ~'idio~~' an official. ~<br />
familiar ~ith the investigation told the paper.<br />
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~dditio~ to English). Oh top ofhis work ~t th~<br />
Pentagon, Franklin teaches history at Shepherd<br />
University mW~st Virginia.<br />
http://wWw.haaretz.comlhas~rilobjects/I<br />
In conversations about Franklin with his<br />
coJleagues, one' ofthe words that com~s up<br />
again and again is IInaive.." He is described as an<br />
ideologue who believes wholeheartedly in the<br />
neo-conservative approach. "Everything by him<br />
is black and white," said someone who has<br />
worked with Franklin iJ1 the P~lltagon. "He is a<br />
very nice person, very conservative, not at all<br />
arrogant," said the colleague, adding that one of<br />
the reaso~s he was ~rought intQ_ th~ Near East<br />
and South Asia desk was his political beliefs.<br />
Franklin's political opinions are similar to those<br />
ofhis bosses - Douglas Feith, undersecretary of<br />
defense, and William Luti, the depu~<br />
undersecretary ofdefense responsible for Near<br />
EJ\Stem and South Asian affairs. Like them,<br />
Franklin supports the policy ofacting to bring<br />
democracy to Arab regimes and,build up<br />
pro-American allies in the Middle East.<br />
But those who have worked with Frankljn also<br />
say he was a bit extreme in his work patterns,<br />
attitude and behavior. They occasionally<br />
referred to him ~ "Planet Larry">as a way of<br />
expressing the extent to which he "lives in a<br />
world ofhis own," colleagues said.<br />
People who have worked with Franklin believe<br />
that it was his ~demartc naivete that got him in<br />
trouble, saying Franklin was not aware ofthe<br />
severity ofhis activities, and so did not try to<br />
hide or mask them. Franklin visited Israel eight<br />
times while he served in the U.S. Air Force and<br />
wo~ked at the Pen~gon. Most ofbis visits.<br />
appear to have Deen related to his reserve duty<br />
service as an officer dealing with international<br />
c~ntacts. Accord~ng to his resume. Franklili<br />
served as a reserve air forCe colonel between<br />
1997 and 2004. worl~ing with Ute p.S. military<br />
attache in Tel Aviv. Beforehand he was<br />
involved in analyzing counter-intelligen~ in<br />
the air force.<br />
Had the current accusations not come to light,<br />
Franklin's job at the Pentagon would have<br />
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depen~~d on the presid~~tial e1t!ctiQD.s, hi$<br />
_,?6wQr~e!"8 ~ai~. I(:pemocra~i6_ candidate John<br />
Kerry wins the next electiQn, colleagues said,<br />
it's doubtful that F~in will move up'.due to<br />
his \veil-known political views. .<br />
"He was considered a little s~ge even for the<br />
neo-cons," a coworker said. "They're probably<br />
saying to themselves - oh, tarry again."<br />
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lhasenlobjects/pagesiPrintArtlcleEn.jhtml?itemNo=470856<br />
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8/
'l1aaretz - israel News - Mak1ng a mountain into a molehill<br />
· 0 ALL IIIFOrolATION COIITAINED' Q<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
I Hqmepage<br />
News Updates Mon" August 30,2004 Blull3, 5764<br />
·Print Edition<br />
M$klng a<br />
mountain into a<br />
molehill<br />
http://www.haaretz.comlhasenJsp:<br />
Sear~h site l<br />
Israel Time: 02:19 (GMT+3)<br />
News<br />
Business<br />
Editorial & Op~Ed By Aklva Eldar<br />
B Srnd bJ e·rnai<br />
Features<br />
It now looks by all<br />
@*S81d resplIIse<br />
Sports ~ccounts like t.,arry<br />
Art & Leisure F~anklin w~II, at w~rst, be Top Articles<br />
BOQks<br />
tried for mishandling<br />
Letters tlen~itive rnateri~l. hi other Chutzpah:<br />
words, he'll be charged Class 101<br />
Food & Wine with leakinQinformation to Sarah<br />
Tourism th~ p-to·lsr~u~llobby Augerbraun<br />
Real Estate AIPAC. "Sensitive" data of knew she<br />
this sort, or of an even wasn't In<br />
Cartoon more s~nsitlve nature, i~ Florida<br />
Friday Magazine routinely conveyed during anymofe<br />
meetings between when standIng<br />
Week's End Anieri~n officials and In line at h~r<br />
Anglo File Israeli diplomats under the local<br />
W~ Bank- fence ruling bright lights .of upscale supermarket,<br />
t t th h rt f a man tried to<br />
Disengagement plan 'res a~ran S In e e~ 0 cut in front of<br />
Washington, D.C. h<br />
Ara "I' I' d<br />
b snapshots . ere rea Ize<br />
Shopping service T.he real problem I had two<br />
- threatening options,"<br />
Pre~l~u! ~~~~Ions fsraei-U.s. recalls the<br />
, Select tI 'relations and the former<br />
" .,- Jewl"sh Hebrew<br />
~ teaQfier. "l<br />
IBm community does co~ld hav~<br />
J I nQt reside in. this either yelled at<br />
_<br />
small·frY from th~ him or just<br />
Pentagon and the ign9r~d It."<br />
..<br />
ThIS Day mHaaretz<br />
cll;lssifiQatiofl<br />
grade of the<br />
By Daphna<br />
Berman<br />
Today's Papers leaked document, but<br />
. ra~her in the $uspicipn of<br />
An<br />
Map ofIsrael<br />
something fishy at the top. expiration<br />
Useful Numbers The murky waters ofthis date<br />
In..depth affair will provide ample In a few .<br />
About Haaretz ~shlng grou;'d~ ~or poiltlcal ~~~~~~~hen<br />
Tech Support rivals and conspiracy magazines list<br />
l'ofS<br />
,8/
l1aaretz - Israel News - MakIng a mountain mto a molehill http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/sp;<br />
o<br />
Q<br />
Paper in PDF fonnat p~Jfs. First they'll land the great<br />
Headlin~ N~wsbox Franklin's boss, -m,9yle hits of<br />
~ Undersecretary of Defense 2004, not only<br />
~ fQr P6lipy Q6uglas Feith, !tSpi~erman ~:'<br />
and then they'll hook the . ~~d ~hrek 2<br />
entire group of<br />
~dl star ~t ~he<br />
neoconservatives of which top o! thehst.<br />
•....<br />
So will one<br />
he IS .one of the leaders. documentary.<br />
That IS th~ gr~up?f. B Uri Klein<br />
Israel's friends, fncll)dmg Y<br />
many Jews, that pushed<br />
Pr~siden\ Bush to go to<br />
war in Iraq.<br />
The bet!t fQrm of defense<br />
being off~nse,<br />
spokesp~ople<br />
Isr~eli<br />
for the<br />
gQv~rnJ1lent<br />
Insinuated that anti-Israel<br />
elements are behind the<br />
affair; R~p'yblic;an<br />
representative~ 'point to<br />
"Democratic agents"<br />
among $en~or FBI Officials<br />
who want to spoil things<br />
for Bush on the eve of his<br />
party's convention.<br />
They may Qe right. But you<br />
don't need Franklin and<br />
the classified rranian<br />
qoc~nient to draw fire at<br />
the conspiracy to take over<br />
Iraq. As members of think<br />
t~r1ks several yearE~ago,<br />
Feith and his friends<br />
volunteered an open<br />
dO"QlJmerit'in which they<br />
laid bare their<br />
Israeli-American plot to<br />
change the face of ~he<br />
entire Middle East. In<br />
1996, a conservative<br />
Isra~n-American research<br />
institute invited Feith and<br />
9thers, Including Riohard<br />
Perle who headed an<br />
advisqry panel to the<br />
Pentagon known as the<br />
Special<br />
Offers<br />
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8/
t;taareti..; '~srae! News~ M~g'~ ~O~!ain m(il-'a· m61~Jti~l :<br />
. -<br />
. , .<br />
Q'<br />
Def$l1se p(~)licy I3Qard i to<br />
puftog~ttier ~:strateglc·<br />
manual, for tlJeincoming<br />
p.rim~ minister Benjamin<br />
NeJahyahu;<br />
'~ttp:l/wwjl.Jt~~~:coinll:tasetVspi;<br />
O·<br />
~l<br />
, .<br />
F~ith: is t~sponsi~l~ for ~he<br />
folloWing pa~graph f"'o~<br />
,that document: "Israal.can<br />
sh~pe its _~tra~eg,c ~<br />
'environment: "in<br />
.~o~p'9r~tio~ with Turkey<br />
and-Jord@n. ,by, '!'eakel1ing,<br />
~o~taining. and evan<br />
rqJling b~c~~. ~yr.i~. r~is<br />
effort can focus.on<br />
r~.m6vi!1g Saddam<br />
Hussein .frQm power-hi-Iraq<br />
- an important Israeli ',<br />
~tra~egic" objecti~Ei in its<br />
own right ~-as ~ means'of<br />
f~iling Sy~i~'s region'sf"<br />
,am~itions:" '<br />
rhe ~ocument.gqes on to<br />
,state that "Jordan has<br />
ch~llerig~d'$Yri~'s/'r~gional<br />
ambition.s recently by .<br />
suggesting the restor.a~iori<br />
of the Hashemit~~<br />
in..lr-aq<br />
... Sirt~,e :(r~qts .fu~ure 'could<br />
~ffect:tl1e ~trategio balance.<br />
; in the Middle East<br />
profou'ndly, :it'woiild be<br />
:4"derstancJ~ple .Jtiat Isra~1<br />
lias'an interest in<br />
,supportina t~e Hashemites<br />
in,their efforts-to redefine<br />
Iraq/!" ,.,. -'<br />
:~ixfy~ars i~ter, ""e,mbers<br />
of that sa~e "grQup _<br />
- supported.the, half-baked<br />
idea to.crown.Jordan's<br />
priric~ H~assah as:lraq'~<br />
ruler. .<br />
If.'anyonewas lookfng:to,<br />
~se_~Fr~nk!ira tg s091< Fe.itti,<br />
. - -, ·s(-<br />
.'4 .-
Haare~ - Israel News - Making a mountain into a molehill<br />
o<br />
!<<br />
Feith and his friends<br />
promised in that document<br />
that l$ra~1i sup,pqrt for the<br />
missile plan would assist<br />
efforts to relocate the U.S.<br />
.embassy in Isra~1 from Tel<br />
Aviv to Jerusalem. Ttiat<br />
initiative._sponsored by the<br />
RepltbUcan presidential<br />
candidate Bob Dole, was<br />
the brainchild of the<br />
neoconservatives ~nd their<br />
friends at AIPAC. It utterly<br />
contravened the view held<br />
by president Bill·GUntan<br />
and prime minister Yitzhak<br />
~abin that initiatives of •<br />
that sort QQ not help ~uild<br />
trust between Israel and<br />
the Palestinians. Perhaps<br />
40f5 8/
Ha.aretz .. israel News .. Making a mountain into amol~hil1<br />
';<br />
\,;I ~<br />
th~tJs the strongest-proof<br />
of all that the<br />
neoconservatives and<br />
Jewish IQbbylsts do not<br />
"serve two masters. Th.ey<br />
serVe themselves, and<br />
that's t~e trouble.<br />
Ii<br />
Top<br />
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Mon<br />
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~~~2:08eAdd White House - AP Ca~inet p& State to My Yahopi<br />
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By CURT ANDERSON, Associate"d Press Writer<br />
WASHINGTON - High-ranking officials at the<br />
Pentagon (~ .. web sites) and State<br />
Department have been inteiviE),wed or briefed by<br />
Fal (~ews .. web sites) agents investiQating a<br />
Def~nse Department arialy~t<br />
suspected of<br />
passing to Isra~lclassitie~<br />
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mate~ials<br />
on Iran.<br />
. Among those briefed by the FBI<br />
! ; was Douglas J. Feith, the Pentagon<br />
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--.......... investigation, said governm~nt<br />
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.. FuU .Coverage, Th~ offiQi~J$ !?pok~ Monday on<br />
More about conditio"n pf anonyr:nity Qeca~se t~e prob~ is<br />
Espionage & ongoing.' "<br />
Intelligence The Fa, ~gents briefed Feith Qn ~\Jnday in his<br />
Related News Stories office at tl1Q pentagon· and als~<br />
as~eq<br />
. • Israel, Iran Trade<br />
'q~estions, the 6f{ici$ls $~iQ. AI$o r~Q~ntly<br />
briefec;l by the FBI wa$ Deputy Defens~<br />
Threats As FBI<br />
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz .they said<br />
Investigates Spying at ".,<br />
The Washington Post<br />
Others at State and Defense have been·<br />
(reg. req'd) (Aug 30,"<br />
Interviewed or briefed over the course of the<br />
?904) . probe, but tt}e officials declined to provide ~ny<br />
• Shalom: Franklin<br />
other names.<br />
affair is 'media<br />
There"was no immediate indication that the<br />
nonsense' at<br />
criminal investigatiqn'"has widened b~yond the<br />
Jerusalem Post '<br />
single an~lyst.<br />
identified previously by senior<br />
(registration req'd) (Aug<br />
law enfoi-gement officials as Larry Franklin. .<br />
30,2004)<br />
Franklin. who has not responded to telephone<br />
• Top Officials Queried<br />
messages seeking .comment. work$ in al1 office<br />
in Israel Probe AP via<br />
dealing the.Middle East affairs and has access<br />
Yahool News (Au~ 30,<br />
to clas$ified government information.<br />
2004)<br />
The investigation focuses on whath~r Franklin<br />
Opinion & edltorla~s passed classi~ed U.S. material on Iran to the<br />
American Israel 'Public Affairs Committee. the<br />
• ~:king almh~~n~ain inti.uantiallsraeli lobby"jng o~ganizatiori in<br />
In 0 a rna e I a . " '. .' .<br />
H tz (A 30 2004) Washington! and whether anYQne In that group<br />
aara ug, •forwarded the.information on to Israeli officials.<br />
• Israeli Mole in the AIPAC and ,~raal have·strenuou~IY d~nied the<br />
Pentagon at'<br />
allegations.<br />
AIJazeerah,lnfo (Aug 30, • . •<br />
2004) 'J~raeh offiC;lals ,did confirm Monday that a senior<br />
Israeli diplQm.at in Washington has met with<br />
Feature Articles Franklin. Those offlcif:)ls. alsQ $~eaking on<br />
• Spy probe tests<br />
pondition of anqnymity, identified tne diplpmat<br />
US-Israel ties at as·Naor ~ilOn. head of the Israeli Embassy's<br />
Christian Science p~litical department. .<br />
Monitor (Aug 30, 2Q04) Gilon tqld the Isr~eli newspap~r Maariv th.at he<br />
• Analyst at center of did nothing wrong ~l:It was concerned that he<br />
spy flap called naive.<br />
may no longer be able to work in Washington<br />
ardently pro-Israel at becaiJs~ of the investigation.<br />
Haaretz(Aug 30, 2004)<br />
Re~ated 'Web SI~e8<br />
"Now, people will be scared to talk with me,"<br />
Gilon said.in a story published Monday.<br />
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ALL nrForotGN CONTAINED<br />
HEP-EIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabJ1sg<br />
Last update· 02:0l 29/0812004<br />
Analysis I A ~old wind blowing from the<br />
CIA<br />
By<br />
Befo~ fonner U.S. Central Intelligence Agency head George Tenet<br />
retired, he made stinging comments on various occasions to Israeli<br />
officials in the intelligence communityJ especially the MossadJsaying<br />
Israel had a spy in America.<br />
The acellSaUon was rejected out ofhand - Tenet was even lOUdly<br />
challenged tQ eateh any such agent and expose him publicly. The<br />
exchange ofremarks was pass~d on to Isrnel J evokilig siliPdse at tHe<br />
politl~l ievel over ~e accusations. .<br />
Qq Fti4ay I,ljght the: Am~rt~ J!l~~~a ~v~~~ ~!! ;tA ~lJv~t!gatj(m<br />
was proceeding into a suspected Pentagon mole who was transmitting<br />
!~tmltiQt\<br />
to MPAC (t~~ Ameri~ lSnlet P-bbUq Aftllittl<br />
CQJtY1).j~) ~d 119m tb~~ to ISA~Il\bQut the \\il:lJt~ HQ!JS4 i S war<br />
plans for Iraq.<br />
A person named Larry Franklin was mentiQrtecIr who works in the<br />
offICe ofundersecreiary ofdefense Douglas Feith. Between La1Ty<br />
Franklin and Doug Feith there are at least three levels ofbureaucratie<br />
~ierarchy. .<br />
AlPAt insisted last night that it heard Franklin's name ror the first<br />
time on Fridll-Y when investigators Cjme to them. They also said that<br />
AIPAC provided the autborities with documents and information that<br />
investigators had requested orasked about.<br />
In any ease, it is difficult to imagine that an organization like j\IPAC,<br />
considered professional and very experiencedJwould get itself<br />
involved in maintaining a mole in the American security<br />
establishment.<br />
The timing ofthe affair's exposure is connected with the U.S. election<br />
campaign and the struggle against the group ofneoconservatives in<br />
the administratioriJwho are accused ofleading President Bush to war<br />
with·Iraq.<br />
While j\IPAC claims it never heard ofLarry Franklin, he is known to<br />
the ism~1i int~lIigence community. H~ has. appeared more than puce at<br />
meetings with ISfaeli iiitelllgelice!, especially with military (iUelligeiice,<br />
mostiy in a group setting. .<br />
Israel has noticed that relations between the CIA and the Mossad had<br />
begun to cool. Senior Israeli and American officials say the chill may<br />
have a number ofcauses. One mighi have been the leaking ofsecret<br />
1of3.<br />
8/30/2004 5:41 PM~
And Now a Mole?<br />
e·<br />
UNCLASSIFIED - ~OUO<br />
Newsweek<br />
Sept~mber 6, 2004<br />
And Now a Mole?<br />
ALL<br />
FBI INFORMATION CONTAIloJED<br />
HEREIN IS lTNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
III ti,e Pentagon, a suspected spy allegedly passes secrets aboutIran to Israel<br />
By Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball<br />
It was just a. Washington lunch-one·that the FBI happened to be monitqring. Nearly a year and a half<br />
ago, agents were monitoring a conve~sation between an Israeli Embassy 9fficialand a lobbyist for<br />
American Israel Public Aff3:irs Committee, or AlPAC, as part ofa probe into possible Israeli spying.<br />
Suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, in the description ofon~ jntelligence official, another American-'<br />
Itwalked in u to the lunch out ofthe blue. Agents at first didn't know who the man was. They were stunned<br />
to discover he was Larry Franklin, a desk officer with the Near East and South Asia office at the<br />
Pentag°rt·<br />
Franklin soon became a ~ubject ofthe FBI investigation as well. Now he may ~ace cpar~es,<br />
accuse.d of<br />
divulging to Israel classified infonnation on U.S. government plans regarding Iran, officials say. While<br />
some U.S. officials warned against exaggerated accusations ofspying, one adl)'linistration source<br />
described the case as the ~ost significant Israeli espionage investigation in Washington since Jonathan·<br />
Pollard, ~n America~ who was imprisoned for life ,in 1987 for passing U.S. Navy secrets to the Israeli~.<br />
The FBI and Justice Department are still reviewing the evidence, but one intellige~ce<br />
source believes<br />
Franklin may be arrested shortly..<br />
The probe itselfamounts to another ep:1barrassing problem for Donala Rumsfeld, the beleaguered<br />
Defense secretary. It come~during ~ week in which violenc~<br />
flared up ag~in in Iraq arid a Pentagon<br />
investigation indirectly blained Rumsfeld for poor oversight in the Abu Ghraib prisoner-~~use<br />
scandal. In.<br />
a statement, the Defense Department said it Ithas been cooperating with the Department ofJustice on this<br />
matter for an extended period oftime."<br />
Atfirst'blush, officials close to the investigation say, Franklin seemed an ~likely suspect: he was<br />
•<br />
described as a midlevel policy "wonk" with a doctorate who had toiled for. some time on Mideast affairs.<br />
Yet he had previously worked at the,Defense I~te1l1gence<br />
Agency, and there was at least one other ~pect<br />
to his background that caught ,the FBI's attention: although-Franklih was not Jewish, he was an Army<br />
reservist who did his reserve duty at the ,U.S. Embassy in rei Aviv.<br />
FBI counterintelligence agents began,tracking him, and at one point watched him allegedly attempt to<br />
pass a classified U.S. policy document on IraIl to one ofthe surveillance targets, according to a U.S.<br />
intelligence official. But his alleged confedera~e<br />
was "too sma~, II the official said, and re~sed to take it.<br />
,Instead, he asked Franklin to briefhim on its contents-and-Franklin allegedly obliged. Franklin also<br />
passed informati9n gleaned from more highly classified documents, the official said. Ifthe government.is<br />
correct, Franklin's motive appears to have been ideological rather than financial. There i~<br />
no evidence<br />
that money changed hands. ufor wl!atever reason, the guy hates Iran passionately," the 9fficial said,<br />
referring to the Iranian govermrient. .<br />
.<br />
10f2<br />
813112004 1:30 PM
. ".<br />
And Now a Mole?<br />
bIlp'JIWWWodi"O/adminlEARLYBIRDI0408301s20040830316062.btml<br />
NEWSWE~KIS efforts to reach Franklin or a lawyer representing him were unsuccessful. But a close<br />
friend, MicliaerLedeen ofthe American Enterprise Institute, said he believes the charges against<br />
Franklin are "nonsensical.II Officials say that Franklin began cooperating about a month ago, after he was<br />
confronted by the FBI. At the time, these officials say, Franklin acknowledged meetings with the Israeli<br />
contact. Law-enforcement officials say they have no evidence that anyone above Franklin at the Pentagon<br />
had any knowledge ofhis activities.<br />
Israeli officials, meanwhile, bristled at the suggestion ofespionage. Ephraim Sneh, a member of<br />
Parliament and a retired general who has been monitoring the development ofnukes in Iran for years,<br />
said that Israel would be crazy to spy on its best friend. JlSince Pollard, we avoid any intelligence activity<br />
on U.S. soil,II Sneh said in an interview. "I know the policy; I've been in this business for years. We avoid<br />
anything that even smells like intelligence-gathering in the U.S. II Another Israeli official contended that<br />
the Israelis had no cause to steal secrets because anything important on Iran is already exchanged<br />
between the CIA and the Mossad, Israelis spy agency. In a statement, AlPAC denied that any ofits<br />
employees received information "they believed was secret or classified,II and said it was cooperating.<br />
U.S. investigators would not reveal w~at kind ofinformation Franklin was allegedly trying to divulge to<br />
Israel. But for months the administration has been debating what to do about IraI\'S clerical regime as<br />
well as its alleged program to build nuclear weapo~-a subject ofkeen interest to the Israelis, who have<br />
quietly warned Washington that they will not permit Tehran to gain nuclear capability.<br />
. Franklin was known to be one ofa tightly knit group ofpro-Israel hawks in the Pentagon associated with<br />
his immediate superior, William Luti, the hard-charging and impassioned protege offormer flouse<br />
speaker Newt Gingrich. As deputy assistant secretary ofDefense for Near East aff~irs,<br />
Luti was a key<br />
player in planning the Iraq war. He, in tum, works in the office ofUnder Secretary Douglas Feith, a<br />
career lawyer who, before he became the Pentagon's No.3, was a sometime consultant for Likud, Israeli<br />
prime Minister Ariel Sharon's political party. Officials say they have no evidence that either Feith or Luti<br />
had any' knowledge ofFranklin's discussions with the Israelis.<br />
Franklin has also been among the subjects ofa separate probe being conducted by the Senate intelligence<br />
committee. Part ofthat investigation concerns alleged "rogue" intelligeJ!.ce activities by Feith's staff:<br />
Among these activities was a series ofmeetings that Franklin and one ofhis colleagues, Harold Rhode,<br />
had in Paris in late 2001 with Manucher Ghorbanifar, the shadowy Iranian arms dealer made infamous<br />
during the Iran-contra scandal ofthe 1980s. One purpose ofthose meetings was to explore a scheme for<br />
overthrowing the mullahs in Iran, though Rumsfeld later said the plan was never seriously considered.<br />
But so far, there is no evidence that the Ghorbanifar contacts are related to the espionage probe. And<br />
officials famili~ with the ~ase suggest that the political damage to Bush and the Pentagon may prove to<br />
be more serious than the d~age to national security. -<br />
With Michael Hirsh and Daniel Klaidman in Washington and Dan Ephron in Jerusalem<br />
f·<br />
2of2<br />
8/3112004 1:30 PM
~~I Looking Deep Into Qefense Office<br />
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Philadelphia Inquirer<br />
August 29, 2004<br />
ALL<br />
FBI INFOrot&TION CONTAlNED<br />
HEREIN IS TJNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
FBJ, Looking Deep Into Defense Office<br />
A probe goes beyond wlletller a ":lidlevel analyst gave an Iran policy docum.ent to !s.r~el,<br />
sources said. .<br />
By Warren P. Strobel, Inquirer Washington Bureau·<br />
WASHINGTON - An FBI irivestigation into the handling ofclassified material by Pentagon civilians'is<br />
broader than previously reported and goes well beyond allegations that a single m~dlevel<br />
analyst gaye a<br />
top-secret Iran policy document to Israel; three ~ource.s familiar with the investigation said yesterday.<br />
The probe; more than two,years old, also ha~ fo~used<br />
on othe~ Pentagon civilians, the sources, who have,<br />
firsthand knowledge ofthe subj~ct, said on c~ndition ofanonyinity.<br />
~n additin, one said, FBI investigators in recent week~·have condQcted interviews to detelJllin~ whether<br />
Pentagon officials gaye cl~sified<br />
u.s. intelligence to a leading Iraqi exile grQup, the Iraqi National.<br />
Congress, which'may,have in tum passed it to Ira!!. The exile group's leader, Ahmed Chalabi,.has de.nied<br />
his group was involved in any wrongd
FBI Looking Deep Into Defense Office<br />
o<br />
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.<br />
http://www.di..O IadminlEARLYBIRD10408301s200408303IS93I.htm1<br />
Franklin, a former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst who lives in West Virginia, could not be reached<br />
for comment yesterday.<br />
Investigators are said to be looking at whether Franklin acted with authorization from his superiors, one<br />
official said.<br />
Two sources disclosed yesterday that the information believed to have been passed to Israel was the draft<br />
ofa top-secret presidential order on Iran policy known as a National Security Presidential Directive.<br />
Because ofdisagreements over Iran policy among President Bush's advisers, the document is not<br />
believed to have been'completed.<br />
Having a draft ofthe document - which some Pentagon officials may have believed was.insufficiently<br />
tough toward Iran - would have allowed Israel to influence U.S. policy as it was being made. Iran is<br />
among Israel's main security concerns.<br />
Two or three staffmembers ofthe pro-Israel lobby have been interviewed in the case. In aprepared<br />
statement, the lobby said any allegation ofcriminal conduct was "false and baseless.II It is cooperating<br />
fully with investigators, the statement said.<br />
Israeli officials insisted they stopped spying on the United States after the exposUre ofJonathan Pollard,<br />
who was arrested in 1985 and sentenced to life in prison for spy'ing for Israel.<br />
White Hou~e spokesman Scott McClellan would not discuss the investigation.<br />
I1Qbviously any time there is an allegation ofthis nature, it's a serious matter," he said while traveling<br />
with the President in Ohio.<br />
Other sources said the FBI investigation was more wide-ranging than initial news reports suggested.<br />
They said it had involved interviews ofcup-ent and former officials at the White House, Pentagon and<br />
State Department.<br />
Investigators have also asked about the security practices ofseveral other Defense D~partment civilians,<br />
they said.<br />
,<br />
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Pentagon Spy Flap Isn't Open-And-Shut Case<br />
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Lqs Angeles Times<br />
Augu'st 29, 2004<br />
ALL FBI INFO~HATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS T~iCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE'07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
Pentagon Spy Flap Isn't Open-And-Shut Case<br />
u.s. and Israel often sl,are data, officials say. But tl,e latter I,as rile4frlelldly nations<br />
befor~' .<br />
By Laura King and,Tyler Marshall, Times Staff Writers<br />
JERUSALEM -<br />
Not just in espionage thrillers,but in real life as well, it can be difficult ~o tell trusted<br />
.friend from double-crossing spy.<br />
That's especially tru~<br />
Qetween close- allies such as Israel and the United States, in a world where<br />
g~vernmentofficials,<br />
lobbyists, diplomats, Jhink-tank analysts and !ntelligepce veterans fr~m both sides<br />
o~en move in overlapping political ~nd social circles -<br />
a pattern that can blur the line between cordially<br />
informal exchanges ofinformation and espionage. ·<br />
After U.S. authorities disclosed that a Pentagon analyst specializing in Iranian affair~<br />
is under<br />
-investigation for possibly spying for Israel, the government ofPrime Minister Ariel Sharon flatly denied<br />
that it had illicitly acquired any classified American material.<br />
r<br />
But cases such as these are not always ~pen and: shut. Longtime observers ofthe intelligence scene note<br />
that the U.S. and Israel often share sensitive data, particularly when one has assets the other lacks.<br />
For example., the ranks ofIsrael's diplomatic and intelligence corps are:h~neycoinbed.with<br />
native Arabic<br />
spea~ers, many ofthem Jews whose families emigrated from elsewhere in the Middle East. They are i~<br />
many cases far better equipped than their relatively sparse U.S. counterparts to carry out sophisticated<br />
analyses ofpolitical and military developments in the region, and the fruits ofsuch labors are routinely<br />
handed over to America.<br />
Before and during the war in Iraq, Israel and the United States engaged in intensive sharing of<br />
inte~ligence- some ofwhich turn~d out to be tainted, military and inte~ligence officials on both si~es<br />
have said.<br />
Among Arne~jcan<br />
Jews, the subject ofIsraeli spying is fraught with tension because offears.ofbeing<br />
tarred as a "fifth'column" that pu~ Israel's interests'ahead ofAmerica's. ~ome act~vi~ts<br />
for Jewish and<br />
Isra~li<br />
causes believe that it took-years to recover from the damage done by the case ofU.S. naval<br />
intelligence analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard, who was convicted ofspying for Israel and sentenced in 1987<br />
to l.ife in prison.<br />
i<br />
I<br />
I I !,<br />
In t~~ current case, such concerns are complicated.by investigators' s~spicions<br />
that the American Israel<br />
.Public Aff~if§ Committee, the foremost lobby group in Washingto~ for Israeli causes, may have served<br />
as a conduit for infonnat!on improperly passed to the Israeli'government. AlPAC has denied any<br />
wrongdoing.<br />
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Pentagon Spy Flap Isn't Open-And-Shut Case .<br />
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.For.Israel,.part ofthe. problem w~~n confronted.wit~:a<br />
spy scandal like this is that in the past, its,<br />
protestations ofinnocence sometimes proved Jess:than. creaible:<br />
In recent years, under the watches ofseveral prime ministers, Israel has antagonized a string offriendly<br />
nations, inclpding Switzerland, Cyprus, Jordan an4.Canada, either by using their soil as a staging ground<br />
for spy activity or by having' ~ossad age~ts pass themselves offas these ~ountries' riationals. .. '<br />
Israel ~uffered<br />
one ofits.·worst cases of"blowback"-. espio~ageparlance for unanticipated and highly<br />
unwelcome consequences - when Mossad agents tri~d, ineptly, t~ assassinate Hamas le~der Khaled'<br />
Meshaal in Jordan in 1997 by injecting him in th~. ear with poison.<br />
To retrieve its disgraced agents, Israel wasJorced to free Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin, who<br />
returned to the Gaza Strip in triumph and was a driving force behi~d the campaign ofPalestinian suicide<br />
bo~bings until he was ass~sinated by Israel in March.<br />
.Authorities in New Zealand were infuriated last spring when two Isra~lis<br />
were caught trying to<br />
fraudulently procure a New Zealand p~spoi1.<br />
Prosecutors s~id a disabled New Zealand man waS<br />
unwittingly used as the phony passport ~pplicant. .<br />
Israel ha~,<br />
not acknowledged that its nationals were spies, but New ~aland says there is little room for<br />
doubt.<br />
"<br />
Bungles suc~ as these have done much to dent the.Mossad's image a~ a skilled and subtle practi~ioner<br />
the art ofespionage, and high~profile<br />
errors nave pro~pted ,calls in Is~el to rein in the spymasterS:<br />
of<br />
In the aftermath ofthe Pollar~ case, Israel made ~trenuous pledge~ to refrain from spying on the United<br />
States. Senior diplomatic sources apd analysts interviewed Satw:day expressed doubt that Israel WQuld<br />
have'dsked involving ~tself in such an operation at thi~ j\Ulcture.<br />
"Isr,ael is not spying on American soil, full stop,in the sense that it's not trying to locate potential agerits,<br />
it's n9t approaching them, it's not iecmiti.ng $em, it's not running the~, and it's not paying mo~ey for<br />
information," said Yossi ~elman, an author Who special~zes in ~srael's intelligence community.<br />
"And it very much depend~<br />
on the extent and detail ofthe information involved," Melman added. ~IIf<br />
someone at the Pentagon actually passed a confidential document directly to Israel, it would-be very, very·<br />
se~ous, but ifsomeone si~ply tell~ a third partY, 'Well, it seems the American thinking on this subject is<br />
such ~d such: then it's·all much more murky."<br />
In Washington, the reports ofthe FaI inv.estigation al$o raised. questions aliout why Israel might be<br />
willing to risk a major-spy scandal involving its closest ally. After all, Sharon's government can open<br />
doors even at the highest ~eve!s oJ~e Bush acJ1lJinistra~iQn, Washington-based diplomats and Middle<br />
East experts noted.<br />
"It would be kind ofreckless for Israel to dO.this c
Y:"7 n Spy Flap Isn' Open-And-Shut Case0<br />
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believes.<br />
Earlier this year, senior Israeli officials predicted that Iran could gain nuclear weapons capa~ility<br />
by next<br />
year, and some hinted that Israel would be prepared to attack facilities at the Iranian portofBushehr if<br />
Tehran achieved that capacity. Iran has threatened Israel as well.<br />
"Ifthe Zionist entity attacks us, we are capable ofstriking its nuclear reactors, It Iranian news reports<br />
quoted Gen. Yedalla Jawani, a senior commander in the Revolutionary Guard, as saying recently.<br />
A U.S. inteiligence estimate this year suggested that Iran was still several years away from building a<br />
nuclear bomb.<br />
"Some Israelis have recently adjusted to a prediction oftwo to three years, but they have~taken<br />
a much<br />
more alarmist position on this [than the U.S.] ·all along," said Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and<br />
director ofthe nonproliferation'program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Pea~e<br />
in<br />
Washington. "There are ~learly differences." .<br />
Understanding details ofthe U.S. assessment ofIran's nuclear program·or gaining inside knowledge of<br />
how America might reac~ to a possible Israeli preemptive military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities<br />
would be extremely valuable for the Jewis~ state, regional experts say.<br />
The subject ofthe FBI's investigation is believed to have dealt with Iran pdlicy in a part ofth~ Pentagon<br />
that has had considerable influen~e<br />
on U.S. policy in the region.<br />
Almost no one in the Israeli leadership echelon believes that intelligence-gathering,in and of i~elfis<br />
necessarily a hostile act, even when conducted in friendly countries., Part ofany diplomat's job is to read<br />
the newspapers, talk t~ politicians 'and policymakers, visit military and industrial installations when<br />
invited to do so -<br />
and report back.<br />
"All over the world, in the embassies ofany country, you have people with job titles like cultural attache<br />
or agricultural liaison, and in reality, they gather infonnation ofuse to their home country's intelligence<br />
apparatus," said a former Israeli diplomat, speaking on condition ofanonymity. "Everyone does it.tI<br />
Israel has dozens ofmilitary and military intelligence officials, and at least two ranking Mossad agents,<br />
as part ofits overt operations in the United States. The Mossad has a liaison to the CIA, who also ~cts<br />
on<br />
behalfofIsrael's domestic security agency, the Shin Bet, in dealings with the FBI.<br />
Because Israelis such a melting pot, with immigrants from all over the world, it has many citizens who<br />
hold dual mitionality. When smart, multilingual young Israelis holding foreign passports are ready tQ<br />
enter the job market, they sometimes find themselves approached --albeit discreetly -<br />
by Mossad<br />
rec~iters.<br />
Separately, the Mossad is known to seek out foreign Jews to serve informally as volunteer<br />
tipsters, known in Hebrew as sayanim, or Ithelpers. 1t<br />
Whatever its outcome, the spy flap comes at an awkward time for both Sharon and President Bush. The<br />
Israeli prime mipister is on far friendlier terms these days with Washington than he is with members of<br />
his own party and has no wish to jeopardize that. And in an election season, no U.S. leader would court a<br />
public spat with Israel.<br />
Bush has lately gone far out ofhis way to support Sharon.<br />
30f4<br />
813112004 1:30 PM
Pentagon Spy, Flap Isn't O~n·Aii(l·Sliut Case - http://www.dia.ic.~oY/admintEARLYBlRD/04"0830/s200408303IS922.html<br />
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~ex large Jewish settle~ent blocs in:the'W~st Bank'in e.xc~uingefor Israel relinquishing settlements'in<br />
the Gaza_Str~p.,<br />
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August 29, 2004<br />
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sq<br />
Analyst. Who Is Target QfProb~ Went-To Israel<br />
By Thomas E. Ricks and Robin Wrigh~ Washington Post StaffiWriters<br />
The FB~ investigation into whether classified inforination was passeq to the IsraelLgov:ernment is<br />
focused on a P,entagon:analyst.~ho has served as an Air Force reservist in Israel, and tne.probe'has ~e~n<br />
broadened'in recent days to in~lude<br />
interviews at the State and Defense departments and.with Middle<br />
~astem affairs speci~lists<br />
outside government, officials and
-. ~ ()<br />
Analyst Who Is Target OfProbe Went To Israel .<br />
. http://www.dia.ic.gov/adminlEARLYBIRD/040830/s2004083031S928.html<br />
O'<br />
liThe whole thing makes no sense to me;II said Dennis Ross, speciar'envoy on the Arab-Israeli peace<br />
process in the first Bush administration a~d the Clinton presidency. "The Israelis have.access to all sorts<br />
ofpeople. They have access in Congress and in the administratipn. They have people who talk about<br />
these things," said Ross, ~ow a seniQr fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.<br />
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's office issued a statement yesterday saying Israel was not involved in the<br />
matter and conducts no espionage in the United States. AlPAC has strongly denied any wrongdoing and<br />
said it is "cooperating fullyll with the probe. ~<br />
The FBI investigation was touch~d<br />
offmonths ago when a series ofe-mails was brought to investigators'<br />
attention, said a U.S. official familiar with the case. The investigation move4 into Jrlgh'gear in re~ent<br />
days, another official said. On Friday, Justice Department officials briefed some Pentagon officials about<br />
the state ofthe inquiry.<br />
"1 think they are at the end oftheir investigation and beginning to briefpeople in the chain ofcommand,<br />
partly to make sure that the acts weren't authorized,II one official said.<br />
Pentagon co-workers expresse~<br />
shock at the news. IIIt's totally astonishing to all ofus who knew him,"<br />
said a Defense Department co-worker who asked not to be identified because ofthe investigation. "He is<br />
a career guy, a mild-mannered professional. No one would think ofhim as ev~l<br />
or devious."<br />
Franklin works in the office ofWilliam 1. Luti, deputy undersecretary ofdefense for Near Eastern and<br />
South Asian affairs. For years a bureaucratic backwater, the office has been in the thick ofthe action<br />
since 2001 because it fonnulates Pentagon policy on Iraq. It played a centralt'ole as the U.S. military<br />
prepared for the spring 2003 invasion and"since then as the Pentagon has overseen the occupation.<br />
Luti's office is part ofthe policy operation Ul1der Feith.<br />
Feith has been a controversial figure in U.S.-Israeli affairs since the mid-l990s, "Yhen he was part ofa<br />
study group ofAmerican conservatives, then out ofgovernment, who urged Israel's then prime minister,<br />
Binyamin Netanyahu, to abandon the Oslo peace accords and reject the basis for them .- that Israel<br />
should give up land in exchange for peace..<br />
More recently, Feith has been a target ofcriticism from Democrats who claim that two offices in his<br />
branch -- the Office ofSpecial Plans, headed by Luti; and the Counteperrorism Evaluation-Group _.<br />
sought to manipulate intelligence to improve the Bush administration's case for war against Iraq. House<br />
and Senate intelligence·committee investigators found no evidence for allegations that the Pentagon<br />
offices tried to bypass the Clt\ or had a major impact on the prewar debate. But in the Senate panel's<br />
report on prewar intelligence, three Democratic senators -- John D. Rockefeller IV (W.Va.), Carl M.<br />
Levin (Mich.), and Richard 1. Durbin (III.) .-specifically criticized Feith's operation. .<br />
In Kearneysville, W.Va., about 80 miles from the Pentagon, neighbors ofthe Franklins interviewed<br />
yesterday said they did not know the family well. Though nobody answered the door, voices were heard<br />
i~ the house, which had a "God Bless Our Troops" sticker and an American flag i~ the window.<br />
People who know Franklin from different phases ofhis life offered contrasting accounts ofhis political<br />
views.<br />
A U.S. governm~nt<br />
official familiar with the investigation said Franklin was very outwardly supportive<br />
20f4<br />
813112004 1:30 PM
Analyst Who Is Target OfProbe Went To Israel http://www.dia..~V/adminlEARL YBIRD/040830/s2004083 03 IS928.html<br />
.. ~ () ~<br />
ofIsrael, for example. But a fo~er co-worker at the DIA disputed that characterization, saying that h~<br />
did not recall In years ofworking with him any strong political statements about Israel or anYthing else.<br />
Franklin, he said, was a solid, competent analyst specializing in Iranian political affairs, especially the<br />
views oftop leaders and the course ofopposition movements. .<br />
In February 2000, Franklin wrote an op-ed piece for the Wall Street Journal's European editiop. that was<br />
sharply cri~ical<br />
ofIranian President Mohammad Khatami, arguing that the leader was launching a "chann<br />
offensive" that was simply a "ruse" to make the Iranian government look better to Westerners while it<br />
continued to abuse human rights.<br />
Details ofFranklin's Air Force service, and especially his time in Israel, could not be learned yesterday.<br />
A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv declined to comment.<br />
In Israel yesterday, Sharon's Qffice issued a statement. ItIsrael does not engage in intelligence activities in<br />
the U.S. We deny all these reports,1t the stateme~t<br />
said, according to the Associated Press. That followed<br />
a strong statement Friday by the Israeli Embassy· in Washington denYing any wrongdoing.<br />
One Israeli of(icial familiar with the situation said yesterday that his government had checked· lI every<br />
organ here" to make sure that no part ofgovernment was involved. "We checked everythiJ}g possible, and<br />
there's absolutely nothing. It's a non-event, from the Israeli point ofview. Someone leaked this to [hurt] .<br />
. . the president, AIPAC and ~e Jews on the eve ofthe R~publican convention,1t he speculated.<br />
He added that Israel would not have been involved in such activities, "because we have a trauma here in<br />
Israel. It's called Pollard. It<br />
That was a reference to the case in which a U.S. Navy intelligence analyst, Jonathan J. Pollard, admitted<br />
in 1987 to selling state secrets to Israel. Pollard was sentenced.to life in prison, and Israeli officials have<br />
said since then they do not conduct espionage against the Uriited States.<br />
At AIPAC, spokesman Josh Block said the organization had no comment yesterday beyond its Friday<br />
statement that the organization and its employees denied any wrongdoing and were cooperating with the<br />
government. A former A~AC employee also said he was baffled by the news ofthe FBI investigation. "I<br />
have a hard time figuring out what this is about, II he said. Ifthe Israelis or their supporters want to know<br />
about deliberations in the Bush administration, he,said, "all they have to'do is take people to lunch. II<br />
Others in Washington, however~<br />
maintained that Israel does present a problem for the United States in<br />
certain aspects ofintelligence, such as sensitive defense technologies and Iran policy.<br />
-<br />
Israel sees Iran as the single biggest threat to its existence, and so closely monitors all possible mov~s in<br />
Washington's Ira~ian pol~cy -- especially as the Bush administration presses Tehran to disclose more<br />
about the state ofits nuciear program..<br />
One former State Department officer recalled being told that U.S. government experts considered the<br />
countries whose spying mo~t thr~~tened<br />
the United States were Russia, South Korea and Israel.. III also<br />
know from my time in Jerusalem that official U.S. visitors to Israel were warned about the<br />
counterintelligence threat from Israel:' he said.<br />
Taking a slightly different view, others speculated that the very closeness ofthe relationship between the<br />
United States and Israeli governments -- and especially the'tight connections between ~he Israelis and<br />
Feith's policy office -- may have led officials to become sloppy about rules barring release ofsensitive<br />
30f4<br />
813112004 1:30 PM
Analyst Who Is Target OfProbC Went To Israel<br />
.:;,; . ~<br />
"I '-J<br />
,information.<br />
Staffwriters John Ward Anaerson in Jerusalem, 'Dan Eggen, Ami!. f?. Paley, Steven Ginsberg pndJerry<br />
Markon. in Washington a~nd staffresearcher Madonna Lebling ~ontributed<br />
to,this report..<br />
40f4<br />
8/3 112004 1:30 PM'
!teport On Iran Key To Spying Inquiry<br />
,.~ · 0<br />
UNCLASSIFIED - fOUO<br />
Los Angeles Times<br />
Aug~st 29, 2004<br />
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
Report On Iran KeY,To Spying Inquiry<br />
Investigators are looking closely at Pentagon'policy analyst Larry Franklin's<br />
relations/lips Wi~/l<br />
advocl;ltes for IsraeL<br />
By Mark Mazzetti and Richard B. Schmitt, Times StaffWriters<br />
·WASHINGTON -<br />
The man at the center ofan FBI investigation into possible Israeli espionage in<br />
Washington is a career Pentagon employee, a colonel in the Air Force reserves and a national security<br />
~nalyst who at the end ofthe Cold War taught himself Fa~si' and refashio't:led himselfas a!1 expert on Iran,<br />
officials said Saturday.<br />
T!le FBI is trying to detennine whether he is also aspy.<br />
U.S. officials ~onfinned Saturday that the target ofthe investig~tion was Larry'Franklint the Pentagon's<br />
top Iran policy analyst and a confidant ofDeputy.Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and Douglas J.<br />
Feith, whot as undersecretary for policy, was t~e Pentagon's t~ird-r~n.king<br />
official.<br />
The FBI is trying to ascertain whether Franklin turned' over a draft presidential direc~ive<br />
Qn policy toward<br />
Iran last year to two people affiliated with·the Washington..bas~d American Israel Public Affairs<br />
Committee, which may have given the information to Israel.<br />
Officials are concerned because the-directive was still being debated by U;S.· policymakers at the time,<br />
possibly putting the ISll\eli government in a position to influence the final document, officials said. U.S.<br />
policy toward Iran is vital to I~~ael, which is gravely concerned' about the expandi~g nu~lear capability of<br />
th~ country run by Shiit~<br />
MuslJm clerics.<br />
Tne probe, which is being handled by the FBI's counter- espioQage ~ivisiont<br />
.espiopage charges against Franklin.<br />
might not result in<br />
Instead, the Pentagon analyst could be charged with lesser offenses such as i,mproper discl9sure or<br />
mishandling ofclassified information. Or he could be exonerated.<br />
A U.S. official with knowledge ofthe case expressed doubts Saturday that Franklin's alleged actions rose<br />
to the level ofespionage. Insteadt he said it was more .likely that Franklin, who maintaiI].S close ties with<br />
Israeli officials, passe~ documents to Israel without knowing the seriousness of.his actions.<br />
"Frqm everything I've seen, the guy's not a sPY,"·the official said. liThe guy's an idiot"<br />
Acc9rding to the official, th~ closeness ofthe U.S. relationship with Israel means that top officials ofthe<br />
two nations often share sensitive infonnation. Nevertheless, Fratiklin should have knoWn what<br />
'i~fonnation was and,was.no~ p.~~i~~ib.1e t(J ~e_shared, he said. .<br />
..... - .....<br />
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8/3112004 1:30 ~M
Report On Iran Key To Spying Inquiry<br />
-0<br />
o<br />
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1<br />
"<br />
;<br />
~ "We knew this guy had the relationship for a while, and he shareCl some stuffb~yond what he should·be<br />
sharing," the official said.<br />
Franklin did not respond to phone messages Saturday seeking comment.<br />
Sources said that Franklin, a longtime official withthe Defense Intelligence Agency, three years ago<br />
joined the Pentagon's Office ofNear East and South Asian Affairs, the group charged with developing<br />
the Pentagon's policy for the Middle ~ast.<br />
The office is run by William J. Luti, who in turn reports to<br />
Feith.<br />
Since joining Luti's office, Franklin has been the Pentagon's leading Iran policy analyst, ajob that took<br />
on greater importance after President Bush included Iran in his "axis ofevil" and his appointees at the<br />
Pentagon advocated a hard line toward Iran.<br />
As a member ofthe Air Force reserves, Franklin is assigned to a DIA reserve unit based in Washington.<br />
.<br />
APentagon statement released Friday characterized Frankli~<br />
as a "desk officer" with no significant<br />
influence on U.S. policy. Yet some who have worked with him offer a different picture, saying he was<br />
very influential in high-level Pentagon policy debates..<br />
"You're not talking about someone toiling away in the bowels ofthe U.S. government," said a former<br />
Pentagon official who worked fOf Feith until last year and spoke on condition ofanonymity.<br />
"Franklin was t!Ie. go-to guy on Iran issues for Wolfowitz and Feith. 1t<br />
In addition, the former official characterized Franklin as an ideological ally ofWolfowitz, Feith and Luti.<br />
The three men were among the Bush administration's leading advocates ofwar with Iraq, and the Middle<br />
East policy office and the Office ofSpecial Plans, both ofwhich reported to Luti, produced analyses<br />
bolstering the U.S. case against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hus~ein.<br />
"Their analysis wasn't whether we should invade Iraq, but whether we should do it on Tuesday,<br />
Wednesday or Thursday," the fonner official said.<br />
FBI investigators fear that Franklin -<br />
given his influential position and high-level security clearance-.<br />
may ,have been in a position to compromise government information,about Iraq and the U.S. war effort"'\<br />
. ..<br />
.<br />
..<br />
Sometime after the Sept. 11 terrorist attac~s,<br />
Franklin took a secret trip to,Rome with Harold Rhode,<br />
anot~er civilian official jn the Pentagon, to meet with Iranian dissiden~<br />
who reportedly promised to<br />
provide information to'them 'that would aid the U.S.-declared war on terrorism.<br />
One ofthe dissidents the pair spoke to was Manucher GhorbaIiifar, an arms dealer and former Iranian spy<br />
who was a central figure in the Iran-Contra scandal ofthe 1980s.<br />
The White House blessed the trip. Yet when news ofthe meeting ieaked two years later, officials said<br />
they had not known that Ghorbanifaf would be among the dissidents Franklin and Rhode met.<br />
According to Def~nse Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, th~t meeting and a subsequent one between Rhode<br />
and Ghorbanifar "went nowhere. II<br />
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Report On Iran Key To Spying Inquiry<br />
htqi:l/WwYioCliaO/adminIEARLYBJRDi040~0Is2~O~03JS933.h1ml.<br />
, ...<br />
Michael Ledeen t a, scholar at,the American-Enterprise I~s~i~te<br />
in Wasllington Who specializes in Mideast<br />
,affairs, arranged the contacts betw~en the Pentagon' officials and the Irariian dissidents, wh~ch he said led<br />
to American lives being saved in Afghanistan~<br />
Asked' Saturda~<br />
for ~omment on th~ investigation, Ledeen ~aid he expected the FBI probe to yield<br />
nothing incriminating abqu~ Franklin, whom Ledee'n has known for years.<br />
"1 don'fbelieveLarry Franklin would ever do anythiIJg improper with class.ified'inf0l'll':ation," said<br />
Leqeen, who worked as a consultant to the Nation~l<br />
Security Council and the State and Defense<br />
• depart~ents during the adritinistrati~n ofRo~ald Reag~. -.<br />
L~deen ~aid the information Franklin was suspected oftransferring was well knowniamong foreign<br />
policy observers. 'f!1e U.S= h~d not developed a co4erent Iran policy, he said, and th~divergent<br />
views of<br />
various administration officials were publi~ly<br />
known and available.<br />
"There is no Americ~n policy on Iran," L~deen s~id.<br />
"What is,he telling them? What can there possibly<br />
be that is classified about-American po~icy on Iran that.we do not know about from the publ~c<br />
debate?"<br />
Franklin and Rl!ode also have clos'e ties with Iraqi politic!an Ahmad Chalabi, whose Iraqi National<br />
Congress was the dissident org~nization<br />
most favored by Pentagon officials during atisseiI)'s rule.<br />
Chalabi met ofteri.with top.officials at the Pentagon and Vice President Dick Cheney's office to a4vocate<br />
regime change in ~raq'.<br />
Chalabi himself has been investigated by American officials in connection with the transmission ofU.S.<br />
secrets to Iran. It is unclear whether the investigations into Franklin and Chalabi ~re connected.<br />
-. ~<br />
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Sharansky': Pentagon-CIA Rivalry Led To Spy Charge<br />
,0<br />
http://wWw.dia.ic.gov/ad!DihlEARLYBIRD/040830/s200408303is913.html<br />
UNCLASSIFIED .. FOUO<br />
Jerusalem Post<br />
August 30, 2004<br />
ALL<br />
FBI INFORMATION COlrfAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY' 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
•<br />
Sharansky: Pentagon-CIA Rivalry ,Led To Spy Charge<br />
By Associated Press<br />
Allegations of I~raeli'spying in the United States are false and may be th~ result ofintemal conflicts<br />
between.th~ Pentagon and ~he CIA, Diaspora.Affairs minister Natan Sharansky said Sunday, but analysts.<br />
admitted that even so, damage has been done to cmcial'ties between the two countries.<br />
American officials said S.aturday that the'FBI has spent more than a year investigating whether a<br />
Pentagon analys~ funneled highly classified material to Israel..<br />
The material described White House policy tow~d Iran. 'srael says I~n .. and its nuclear ambitions <br />
pose the greatest single threat to.the Jewis~ state.<br />
Sharansky, the frrst Israeli Cabinet minister to spe8k in public about the matter, told Canadian<br />
Broadcasting Corp. television that Israel enforces a ban on spying in the United States.<br />
"I hope it's all a mistak~ or misun4erstanding ofsome kind, maybe a rlvaJry between different bodies," he<br />
said, singling out "the P~ntagon and the CIA."<br />
SharansIcY said the ban ori e~pionage<br />
in the 'United states dates to the scandal over Jonathan Pollard, an<br />
American Jew caught spying for Isr!1el in 1985. Sharansky, who belongs to P.rime Minister A~el Sharon's<br />
ruling Likud Party, said he pas "personal experience" with the ban, but he did not elaborate.<br />
"There are absolutely no attempts to involve any member ofthe Jewish community and any general<br />
Ameri~an citiz~ns to sPY fQr Israel against the United States:' he.said.<br />
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's office issued a denial late SatUrday, saying "Israel does not engage in<br />
intelligence activitie~<br />
in the U.S. II<br />
The scandal dominated Israeli news media on Sunday. In numerous interviews, both current and former<br />
Israeli intelligence officials said it was pighly unlikely t~at<br />
Israel would have to spy on the.U.S.<br />
government.<br />
Legislator Ehud Yatom, chairman ofthe parliamentary su6committee on covert intelligence, said he<br />
expected the allegations to be quickly withdrawn.<br />
"I imagine that within a few days the United States will come oqt wi~ an'announcement that Israel has<br />
no connection whatsoever with t~e supposed spy and his activities," he told Israel Radio.<br />
Uii Arad~ a former senior offlcial in the Mossad spy agency, said the allegations were-leaked to hurt tile<br />
pro-Israel lobby in Washington. ~<br />
,...<br />
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Sharansk:y: Pentagon-CIA Rivalry Led To,Spy Charge<br />
· a -_' .<br />
http://www.dia.ic.gov/adminlEARLYBIRD/040SjO/s2004083031S913.html.<br />
~They way.it was repofle~,<br />
they pointed out- in which office, (franklin) worked, II Arad told Israel Radio.<br />
"They pointe~<br />
at people like "Doug Feith or other defense officials who have long been under attack<br />
within the Arileri~an bureaucracy. II •<br />
!--<br />
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Spy Probe Tests US-Israel Ti~<br />
UNCLASSIFIED .. FOUO<br />
o<br />
http://w\l-wodia.C:f/admin/EARJ.YBIRDI0408301s20040~303IS937ohtml<br />
..<br />
Christian ScIence fylonitor<br />
August 30, 2004<br />
Spy Probe Tests US-Israel Ties<br />
ALL ,FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
Atissue: wlietller a Pentagon analystpassed secrets to an Israeli lobby group, l;lnd<br />
wlletller tI,at group passed ti,e material to-Israel.<br />
By Faye Bowers, Staffwriter ofThe Christian Science Monitor<br />
VIASHINGTON _. The n~scent spy' probe unfolding in .t~e<br />
nation's capital could end up complicatJng ties:<br />
between the US,and Israel ~~ a'critical time in the war on terror for the Bush administration - and raise<br />
new questiq~s a1?out how closely the two allies should cooperate on sensitiv~ iss~es.<br />
Word l~aked over the weekend that for more than ayear the FBI has been i~vestigating aPentagon<br />
official for possibly pr
.. o<br />
.Spy Probe Tests US-Israel Ties<br />
hUp:lIwww.di..CSV/adminlEARLYBIRD10408301s200408303IS937.html<br />
-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said in a statement.<br />
- - .<br />
AlPAC, too, proclaims innocence. IIAny allegation ofcrimJnal conduct by AlPAC or our employees is<br />
false and baseless,II a statement says.<br />
StilJ, now that the probe has become public, speculation will contiriue until a conclusion,is reached. And<br />
whether Israel is guilty or not, there wil~<br />
be residual damage to the relationship, experts say. For one<br />
thing, it reminds people ofthe time Israel was caught spying on the US once before. In 1987, a US Navy<br />
intelligence analyst, Jonathan Pollard, ~mitted to selling state secrets to the Israelis. "I think this will<br />
'escort us for many years to come,1I says ,Danny Yatom, a fonner chiefofthe Mossad, Israel's foreign<br />
intelligence ann. IIThere was one attempt made by Pollard, and since then there is still an assessment that<br />
Israel will try again whenever it is l?ushed into a comer.."<br />
In ~ddition,<br />
experts say the relationship,between the US and Israel has become so lax - because'ofthe<br />
cozy ties between the two countries at the moment - that there was bound to be this sort ofproblem. "The<br />
Israelis have always had more access tnan other friendly countries," says Patrick Lang, fonner head of<br />
Middle East intelligence at the Defense, Intelligence Agency. tiThe liaison relationships between the<br />
Israeli and American services are highl)' developed, codifie4, and have functioned for many years. II<br />
In this climate, he says, it is easy to share information without checking the rulebook, which can lead to<br />
problems. Indeed, some experts say the' level ofsharing will provoke other questions, even ifthe incident<br />
turns out not to be serious.<br />
"Why does this guy thjnk he should share this type ofinfonnation? asks Mr. Walsh. IIIfthis is just<br />
standard operating procedure, then it does raise serious policy issues."<br />
It is still not clear whether'the cl.1arge~<br />
Will be serious (possibly espionage), or something more mundane<br />
(mishandling ofdocuments), or whether there will be charges at all. FBI officials reportedly were tipped<br />
to a potential problem months ago by ai series ofemail exchanges. The investigation recently ratcheted up<br />
to the point where Justice Department officials have begun briefing Pentagon officials.<br />
- Josh Mitnick contributedfrom .Tel Av(".<br />
20f2<br />
8131120041:31 PM
\Israel Denies Spying Against U.s.<br />
• : ;r<br />
UNCLASSIFIED - FOUQ<br />
New York Times<br />
August 29, 2004<br />
Israel Denies Spying Against U.S.<br />
ALL" FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS T~iCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg.<br />
By Steven Erlanger<br />
JERUSALEM, Aug. 28 - News that the F.B.1. has Deen investigating a Pentag9rl official on suspicion of"<br />
passing secrets to Israel has caused a diplomatic scramble here, with officials rushing'to deny spying on'<br />
Washington and to assure the United States ofits friendship.<br />
Administration officials say the Pentagon official, who has been identified in some news reports but who<br />
could not be reached for comment early Saturday, works in the office ofDouglas J. F~ith,<br />
the under<br />
secretary ofdefense for policy.<br />
Officials who have been briefed about the inquiry say the official'is suspected qfpassing a classified<br />
policy draft on Iran to th~ American Israel PubJic Affairs Committee, a pro-.Israellobby group, which in<br />
tum is thought to have prQvided the information to Israeli intelligence.<br />
Publicly, the Israeli government, through its spokesmen here and in Washington, have called the<br />
allegations wrong and outrageous, as has Aipac, the lobbying group.<br />
"The United States is Israel's most cherished friend and ally,"said David Siegel, the Israeli Embassy<br />
spokesm~n.<br />
"We have,a strong ongoing relationship at all levels, and in no way would Israel do anYthing<br />
to impair this relationship."<br />
Aipac called the allegations ltbaseless and false."<br />
After the hugely emoarrassing spying scandal of 1985, when Jonathan Pollard, an American intelligen~e<br />
analyst, was arrested and convicted ofspying for Israel, the Israeli government made a firm decision to<br />
stop·all
Israel Den~es Spying Against U.S..<br />
o·<br />
Mr. St.einitz in particular cpnsiders Iran a nuclear s~perpower<br />
i~ the m~ng, working on weapons that<br />
can hit Europe, as well as Israel, and he urg~d 'Washington and Europe to deal with Iran Itbefor~<br />
it is too<br />
late." .<br />
Still, reports ofthe F.B.I. investigation caused a furor here. And officials went to pains on Saturday to.<br />
say that despite the importance ofsuch iQ.telligence, Israel oqly works openly in America, including<br />
diplomatic conversations and relationships with a full range ofsources, from ~he White HoUse ~d<br />
Congress to Aipac, which has its own sources. "America is the great exception," on~ official said. Mr.<br />
Steinitz said, "People leak so~etimes<br />
when they shouldn't, that goes on everywhere;butthat's a different<br />
matter. II<br />
\<br />
While Israel has representatiyes bfthe Mossad, its intelligence agency, and military intel1~gen~e<br />
in<br />
Washington, they are attache~<br />
to the embas~y and their presence is known to American authoriti.es,<br />
officials said.<br />
Yossi Melman, an intelligence and terrorism e~pert w~th the Israeli daily Haaretz, said Saturday tliat<br />
since the case ofMr. 'Pollard, who remains in prison in the United States, "I know there has been a<br />
decision not to run any operations on American ~oil<br />
or to recruit Americans tospy for IsraeI.'•<br />
,<br />
Mossad, he said; is uhder'inst~ctio'ns<br />
to have.no direct contact even with officials from Aipac, "and I<br />
know that Israel is very, very sens~tive<br />
about having ev~n open contacts with Jewish members ofthe<br />
administration, because ofthe ramifications ofPollard" and the concern that Isr~el<br />
would be accused of<br />
playing on any duall~yalty<br />
that an A~erican Jew mig4t feel.<br />
This is.a case ofan American accused ofp~sing inform~tionto an American organiz~tion,<br />
Mr. Melman<br />
.said. "While Aipac is pro-Israel, and maintains contacts with ~he ~sraeli<br />
Embassy and shares ana!ysis, it<br />
does not deal withIsraeli intelligence services," he said. IIIf Aipac passed on a secret document, that<br />
would be a sensitive matter for Israel. But ifAipac said, 'It's oUr understanding that the Americans in<br />
Doug Feith's office are thinking this and that,' th.at's 4ifferent," he said. .<br />
But the lines are often har4 to draw, especially with an"issue as sensitive as the one involving Iran, ~hich<br />
is considered by American and Israeli offic~~s to be working on ilucle~r weaponry even though it has<br />
said its program is only to ge~erate<br />
electricity - in a sens~,'preseIiting a publicly ambiguous stance, much<br />
as does Israel, which has developed nuclear weapons ,as a deterrent but refuses to discuss the matter. Iran<br />
is also interesting to Israel, although less so to $e United Sb!tes, for the ~nancial<br />
and military support it<br />
provides Hezbollah, the militaht ~nti~Israel<br />
group based in Lebanon and active in the West Bank.<br />
For Mr. Steinitz, a hawk with Likud, Iran js a clear and present danger for $e entire West. lithe Iran<br />
nuclear program is so ambitious that after pr9ducing a first bomb, they could produ~e<br />
20 bombs a year, II<br />
he said. "This isn't North Korea or Iraq or ~yen P~istan.<br />
Iran will soon become a glob~l power with<br />
~ntercontinental<br />
missiles that will threaten Europe and NATO, with disastrous political results for Israel,<br />
the moderate Arab world and the United States,II he said.<br />
But the problem ofJran is global, he said., lilt's liP to t4e.Americans and Europeans to'solve Iran, not little<br />
Israel. II<br />
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813112004 1:31 PM
Officials Worry About Effects OrSpy Accusations<br />
UNCLASSIFIED· FOUO<br />
Washington Times<br />
August 30, 2004<br />
Pg.17<br />
hUp:llwwwodi"O/adminlEARLY0!RDf0408301s200408303160S9.html<br />
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PIA Home IWha(s New IProdUctS byTiDe IProdUcts by RcgiOQ I~ 1lliJJ!<br />
'\Jr. to" l.~ "": _\,. .. ~ ;""\1l",:,~...::-.~=---~~~~ __<br />
ALL<br />
FBI INFORMATION C01JTAII~D<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
-Officials Worry A~outEffects OfSpy Accus~tions<br />
Hope Pentagon reports arefound to be a 'misunderstanding'<br />
,<br />
By Abraham'Rabin~vich;<br />
The Washington Time~<br />
"~<br />
JERUSALEM -<br />
Israeli officials yesterday said reports that a Pentagon analyst passed classified<br />
infonnation to Israel seriously could damage the nation's image in America, even as t~ey denied any role .<br />
in such an operation. .<br />
"There is no doubt that these publications are damaging, [and] even though they are false, they are<br />
d~~ging,"<br />
said Natan Sharansky, who as minister for diaspora affairs is responsible for tlie effects of<br />
anti-Semitism on Jews worldwide.<br />
American officials said thi~<br />
weekend that the FBI has spent more than a year investigating whether a<br />
PeQtagon analyst funneled highly classified material to Israel concerning U.S. policy toward Iran.<br />
. "<br />
Bo~h-Israel and toe United S~tes are wQrried that Iran'~<br />
nuclear-energy program is a front for an effort to<br />
develop J;luclear weapons.<br />
"I hope [the investigation] is all a mistake or misunderstanding ofsome kind," Mr. Sharansky told the<br />
Canadian Broadcasting Corp;<br />
Mentioning tithe Pentagon and the CIA" specifically, Mr. Sharansky suggested that the probe ~ight have<br />
resulted from "a rival!}' between different bodies."<br />
Former Mossad chie(Danny Yatom saic\ the Israeli government laid down strict guidelines to prohibit<br />
espionage against its major ally after the arrest in 1985 ofIsraeli spy Jonathan Pollard.<br />
Pollard, a former-official in U.S. Naval In~el1igence,<br />
"is serving a life sentence iri the United Sta~es.<br />
Although the two countries have very close defense and political ties, the American intelligence<br />
community has·been sensitive to the possibility oflsraeJi iI!telligenc~ penetration ever sin~e Pollard's<br />
arrest.<br />
With the issu~<br />
dominating Israeli public-affairs show~ yesterday, Mr. Yatom pointed out that Israeli and<br />
American officials and acad~mics<br />
have.hundreds offormal and informal meetings every year.<br />
"It could be that someone [in the United States] innocently did something that is forbidden by American<br />
law. But there was no mopilization ofagents by Israel'or"instructions given to them about what ~o look .<br />
for, as with Pollard," he said. ,.<br />
lof2<br />
813112004 I:31 PM
•O~:ial~ Worry About Bffects OfSpy ACCUS8
Infonna~ion·Passing Inquhy Could ~pand<br />
UNCLASSIFIED - FOUO<br />
USA Today<br />
August 30, 2004<br />
P~.13<br />
ALL<br />
FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
Information-Pa,ssing Inquiry Could Expand<br />
u.s. secrets may I,ave gone to Israel<br />
By Toni Locy and Barb~a Sla~in,<br />
USA Today<br />
WASJ1INGTON -<br />
Ah investigation into wheth~r a midlevel Pentagon an~lyst passed information about<br />
.U.S. policy on hanto pro-Israe. lobbyists could expa~d into a·brqader inquiry into whether more U.S.<br />
.secrets were shared with Israel, two federal law enforcement offici~l~,s~id<br />
Sunday.<br />
Pentagon analyst Lawrence Franklin is suspected ofhaving given either an internal administration<br />
document oran oral summary ofits contents to the American Israel P~blic<br />
Affairs Commi~ee (AWAC),<br />
said the officials, who have knowledge ofthe case but asked not to be named because the investigation is<br />
ongoing.-One official said charges as serious as espionage c~uld be filed soon. Th~ other official said the<br />
FBI hopes Franklin will cooperate. 'Ifhe does, he may face a lesser charge. such as mishandling classified<br />
documen~.<br />
Spokesmen for AlPAC ~nd the Israeli gov~rnnlent have denie~ the n~tion, first reported Friday by CBS<br />
News, that Franklin shared the.contents ofa draft U.S~ policy document on Iran ,with AlPAC members<br />
who then passed t,he information to israel.<br />
. "Any allegation ofcriminal conduct by.AIPAC or our employees is false at:ld baseless,II the organization<br />
said in ~ statement on its Web site; "Neither.AIPAC nor any ofits employees has violated any laws or<br />
. rules, nor'has AlPAf; or its employees'ever received information they believed was secret or classified."<br />
Much about the,case is puzzling..The dQcument Franklin is suspected ofhaving shared, an internal<br />
statement on U..S. policy on Iran, :was nevetpublished because ofdifferences within the Bus~<br />
administration about how to deal with that country.<br />
'<br />
Israel, which fears Iran is c~ose to developing ~uclear weapons, has myriad w~ys offinding out and<br />
influencing U.S. policy, as does AIPAC, a half-century old organization considered. the niost influential<br />
foreign affai~ lobby.in the Vn~ted States. .<br />
"AIPAC doesn't need to d~al with midlevel people I~ke this guy," says Dennis Ross ofthe Washington<br />
Institute for Near ~ast Policy,.a think ta~ whose trustees include AlPAC members. "Why create a risk<br />
by dealing with someone who is not at the policy level? it doesn't.add up to me at all. II<br />
The investigation is taking place in an"atmosphere ofpolitica! recriminations .in Washington focused on<br />
so-called neoconservatives - strong supporte~ ofls~el who lobbied for the U.S. invasion ofIraq and<br />
downplayed the difficulties U.S. fo~ces<br />
would face there.<br />
the Frariklih investigation'comes as aseparateJnq~iry ~oo~s.into w~o leaked information about U.S.<br />
.. ...:. _ _ _ l'" _<br />
. • - -<br />
lof2<br />
813112004 I:36 p.~
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Wall Street Journal (wsj.com)<br />
August 29, 2004<br />
ALL<br />
FBI INFORMATION CONTAI~mD<br />
'HEREIN IS U]JCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
FBI's Pentagon Probe .Is, Ano·ther Bur(len For Rumsfeld<br />
Dow Jones Newswires<br />
WASHINGTON(AP)·-The FBI investigation into whether·a Peritagon analyst passed classified<br />
information to Israel is yet another political weight on Defense Secretary Donald H,. Rumsfeld, still<br />
fending offcriticism ove~ the Iraq war and prisoner abuse.<br />
It is not clear whether the investigation will result in charges ofespionage at the Pentagon. At the least,<br />
the pro~ complicates Rumsfeld's position as congressionatc9Jn.mittees that oversee the Qefense<br />
Depart~ent<br />
prepare for more hearings on the abuse scandal.<br />
Rumsfeld has no~ commented publicly o~ the FBI's investigation. Whil.e the FBI has spent more than,a<br />
year on the case, it only became p~blic<br />
Friday.<br />
Officials~<br />
speaking on condition ofanonymi~,say the inyestigation is foc:used on Lawren~e A. ~ranklin,<br />
an analyst ofIranian affairs who works in a policy office headed by pouglas J. Feith, the undersecretary,<br />
for policy. Feith ~as been accused.by Democrats of see~ingto manipulate intelligence.to help make the<br />
case for going to'-war in Iraq. Congressional investigati9ns hav~ found no eVidence ofthat.<br />
" -<br />
Th~ New York Times reported on its.Intemet site in a storY for Monday's editions that government<br />
officials say.Franklin had been coopeiatiJig with federal agents for several weeks and was'preparing to<br />
Jead them to contacts inside the Israeli gov~rnment<br />
when work ofthe investigation, first reported by CBS<br />
News, was leaked late last week.<br />
The Israeli gove~ent has denied spying o~ the United States.<br />
'Efforts to reach Fr~lin by telephone have been unsuccessful. Local law eriforcement officers have kept<br />
reporters and photograpqers away from his secluded home in rural West Virginia, about a 90-minute<br />
commute from Washington.<br />
The Washington Post reported Sunday that $e FBI investigation has broadened to include interviews<br />
with individuals at the State and Def~nse departments as well as MideaSt affairs specialists outside the<br />
government. Israeli officials predi,cted ~hat the allega~ion<br />
it got secret information on White HoUse policy<br />
toward Iran f~om the Pentagon analyst would prove false.<br />
Vincent Cannistraro, a retired CIA officer and former director ofWhite House intelligence progfams<br />
~uring the Reagan administration, ~aid<br />
Sunday, "It's another scandal for the Pentagon," with the potential<br />
in this case ofgoing beY9nd the singl~<br />
individual under investigation.<br />
Larry Di Rita, Rumsfeld's chiefspokesman, said ~unday·that<br />
the Penqtgon is sticking"by its initial<br />
s~atement Friday.that it imderstands the investigation is limited in scope. He said it would be<br />
lnapprC?pria.te for him or RUlQ.sfeld to comment further because it is an active investigation.<br />
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8131120041:36 PM
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FBI's Pentagon Probe Is Another Burden For Rumsfeld<br />
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.. • As for the possible political implications for Rumsfelrl at the height ofapresidential election campaign,<br />
Di Rita said, "I would not try to predict how the political season will affect,this."<br />
Early in his tenure at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld spoke out publicly against the unauthorized release of<br />
classified information. He undertook a special investigation when some elements ofPentagon planning<br />
for war in Iraq leaked to the news me4ia in 2002.<br />
In his 3 1/2 years as secretary, Rumsfeld has had a sometimes rocky relationship with Congress. When<br />
the administration began a global fight against terrorism in response to the attac"s ofSept. iI, 2001, ~is<br />
stock rose quickly and he gain~d popularity for his tough approach.<br />
But as the insurgency in Iraq took hol~ in the summer of2003 and the casualty toll for American troops<br />
mounted - more than 950 have be~n killed - Rumsfeld became a target ofcriticism on Capitol Hill.<br />
A Time magazine poll released Saturday said.39% ofthose surveyed approve ofthe job Rumsfeld has<br />
done and 37% disapprove., They were split on whether President Bush should replace Rumsfeld : 49%<br />
said Rumsfeld should go and 48% preferred that he stay.<br />
Rumsfeld, 72, took much political heat when the Abu Ghraib prisoner scandal came to light in April with<br />
photographs ofU.S. soldiers abusing and sexually.humiliating Iraqi prisoners.<br />
Two official investigations found that the highest levels ofthe Defense Department shared blame for<br />
management lapses that may have contributed to the problems at Abu Ghraib. ~ut those reviews found<br />
no evidence to sugg~st that Rumsfeld.ordered, encouraged or condoned any abuse ofiraqis.<br />
To the suggestion that Rumsfeld resign over the abuse scandal, former Defense Secretary James<br />
Schlesinger said last week that such a development would be a "boon to all ofAmerica's enemies.II<br />
Schlesinger headed an in~ependent<br />
panel that looked into the abuse. Asecond panelist, former DefeQse<br />
Secretary'Harold Brown, agreed that Rumsfeld acted appropriately.<br />
"lfthe head ofa department had to resign every time anyone'down below did something wrong, it would<br />
be a ver;. empty Cabinet table" Brown said.<br />
That was just days before news broke ofthe FBI investigation at the Pentagon.<br />
20f2<br />
8131/2004 1:36 PM
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UNCLASSIFIED - FOUO<br />
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Wolfowitz.<br />
At one point in !he run-up to the Iraq war in early 2003, Mr. Er~lin was, brought in to help arrang
.Officials Say Publicity Derailed S~ts InquiryO<br />
w ~ T<br />
Franklin is one 9f.aboutl,SOO people who·~ork<br />
for Mr. Feith.<br />
http://www.dia.~.Q.adminlEARLYB}RD10408301e200408303IS889.html<br />
When he..transferred to the Pentagon policy office, Mr. Franklin was assigned to the Northern Gulf<br />
directorate to work on issues related to Iran. After the attacks ofSept. 11, 2001, that office was expan~ed<br />
and renamed.the Office ofSpecial Plans, and did most ofthe policy work on Iraq in the run-up to the<br />
war. Mr. Franklin was a part ofthat office but continued to work on Iran.<br />
In his job, Mr. Franklin is one oftwo Iran desk officers in the Pentagon's Near Eastern and South Asian<br />
Bureau, one ofsix regional policy sections. The Nell! Eastern office is supervised by William J. Luti, a<br />
deputy under secretary ofdefense, who also ovefSaw the Pentagon's Office ofSpecial Plans, which<br />
conducted some early policy work for the 2003 invasion ofIraq.<br />
According to former colleagues, Mr. Franklin was originally a.Soviet specialist at the D.nA. who<br />
transferred.to the agency's Mlddle,East division in the early 1990's. He learned Farsi and became an Iran<br />
analyst, developing extensive contacts within the community ofIranians who opposed the Tehran .<br />
government.<br />
'<br />
"He was very close to the anti-Iranian dis,sidents," one former colleague said. "He was a good analyst of<br />
the Iranian political s~ene,<br />
but he was also someone who would go offon his own.II<br />
Richard A. Oppel Jr. contributed reportingjrom West Virginiajor this article, and Steven Erlangerfrom<br />
Jerusalem. .<br />
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.. .. UNCLASSIFIED - FOUO<br />
, Washington Post<br />
August 31, 2004<br />
Pg.3<br />
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FBI Interviews Senior Defense Officials I~ Probe Of A~~lyst<br />
Investigators Looking·At Contacts Witl' Israelis<br />
By Brad~ey<br />
Graham and Dan Eggen, Washington Post ~taffWriters<br />
The FBI has interviewed several senior Pentagon officials-in recent days in connection With an<br />
investigation ofa Defense Department analyst who is suspected ofproviding classified 40cuments to<br />
Israel but has been cooperating with investigators for several weeks, government officials said yesterday.<br />
Douglas J.Feith, undersecretary for policy, and Peter Rodman, assistant secretary for international<br />
security affairs" are among those who met with FBI agents on Sunday an4 Monday abou~ the case, which<br />
has·focused on contacts between a lower-level Pentagon analyst, Lawrenc~<br />
A. Franklin, land the<br />
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AlPAC), officials said. .<br />
Higher-11lnking government officials 'have also been,briefe4 about the FBI investigatiQn lin recent days,<br />
incl~ding<br />
Secretary of.State Colin L. Powell. State Department spokesman Richard Boufher·said Powell<br />
was briefed over the weekend during a telephone call ~y James B. Comey, ~e deputy a~orney general,<br />
and told his senior a~des at a meeting yesterday to "coQperate in any way with any reque~ts<br />
that might<br />
come from the investigators. II<br />
I<br />
U.S. gov.ernment oftjcials familiar with-the Pentagon interviews, who declined to be ide~tified-b~cause<br />
ofthe senSitive nature ofthe case, characterized them as an attempt by FBI investigato~<br />
to determipe<br />
whether Franklin received authorizatioQ. from any superior to engage in the actions that 1~vestigators<br />
ar~<br />
probil!g. The FBI has been forced to accelerate its investigation since the case broke int
..F~lll!terviews<br />
Se~ior Defense 9fficials In Pro.,....,-Analyst<br />
~ ~<br />
and an ~IPAC ()ffici~lthat-was being monitored by FBI.counte~intelligence agents, two law enforcement<br />
officials said yesterday.<br />
Law enforcement and defense officials have declined to say what that original investigation was about,<br />
'and whethe~ it continues apart from the Franklin probe or has been abandoned. One law enforcement<br />
official who has been briefed on the Franklin case said it is part .of a broader FBI inquiry, but the official<br />
declined to elaborate.<br />
Defense officials familiar with the case empha,sized yesterday thatthe number ofthose at the Pen~gon<br />
approached by the FBI should not be taken as a sign that the'investigation was widening. They<br />
characterized the meetings as part interview, part briefing session, used by FBI authorities not only to<br />
gain information for their probe but also to briefsenior defense officials about the status ofthe case,<br />
which c~e as a surprise to many at the Pentagon.<br />
The list ofthose interviewed: over the past several days runs from William J. Luti, who heads the section<br />
on Near East and South Asian affairs where Franklin is assigned as,a desk officer on Iran, through<br />
Rodman and Feith. All told the FBI that they did not give Franklin perniission to giv~ AlPAC or the<br />
Israelis any ofthe material at issue, officials said.<br />
At the Pentagon, before Friday~ disciosure, only D~fense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Qeputy<br />
Defense Secretary'PauID. Wolfowitz and department lawyers had been informed ofthe investig~tion,<br />
which has been underway for more than a year, officials said.<br />
"The FBI is focused on one suspect," one officHl1 said. "The briefings and interviews that they're doing<br />
have been a routine part oftheir probe --not it broade~ihg<br />
ofthe list ofs~spects."<br />
At t~e same time, several' ~efense officials said the FBI hits not told them everyt~ing that investigators<br />
have learned in the course ofthe probe, making.it difficult to be certain ofthe outcome;<br />
The premature disclosure has caused proBlems for investigators, according to numerous law enforcement<br />
officials speaking on the condition ofanonymity because the probe is ongoing. .<br />
"This has severely hampered their investigation,!' one law enforcement official said. "It's impossible to<br />
tell what plight have.been lost beca~se ofall this."<br />
An Israeli official in Wash!ngton said the embassy has not received any formal noti,ce from U.S.<br />
authorities that th.ere is an investigation ofthe Franklin case. He also said reports of~~ case were<br />
growing increasingly exaggerated.<br />
1'.<br />
nOiv.en ~he level ofdialogue between the ·United States and Israel, this makes little sense," the official<br />
said. "We basically pick up the phone and call when we want to discuss policy. We have formal and<br />
transparent and open djscussions on all th~se<br />
issues. It's not like there are differences on these subjec~;"<br />
Naor Oilo!), the embassy's top political diplo~at, who.has been identified in several media ~ccopnts as<br />
having met with Franklin, said in an inten;.iew with the Israeli newspaper Maariv published.yesterday<br />
that "my hands are clean."<br />
"All my activities·are well within the parameters ofaccepted diplomatic norms and procedures," he said,'<br />
adding that he was concerned the scandal.will affect his -work in Washington: "Everyone would t!tink<br />
twi.c~<br />
n~C!w before talking to me."<br />
20f3<br />
813112004 1:37.PM
l~~ IntCtvi~wsSenior pe~ OIlici~!n prn$Analyst<br />
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ft .~ ~ • .... .. ...." In Jerusalem ye_sterday, Foreign Minlster Silv'an'Shalofu to~d'iiieqibeis _.<br />
of.tl1e Jsraeli~cabinet}~~at tl).ere~<br />
was no tr:uth;to' allegatiQns ofspying ~d said the,embassy",'nev.er deviatt:
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UNCL~SSIFIED - FOUO<br />
Boston Globe<br />
.August 31, 2004<br />
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DATE<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc bawjsab/lsg<br />
2d Probe At The Pentagon Examines. A,ctions On Iraq<br />
By Bryan Bender, Globe Staff<br />
WASHINGTON -- The Pentagon office in .which an analyst is the focus ofan investigation into the<br />
possible passing ofsecret documents to Israel is at the heartofanother ongoing ptobe.on Capitol Hill.<br />
The broader probe is trying to determine whether Defense Departl{lent officials wen~ outside normal<br />
channels to gather intelligence on Iraq or overstepped their legal mandate by meet!ng with dissiden!S ~o<br />
plot against Iran and Syria, according ~o Bush admiriistratio~<br />
and·congressional officials.<br />
Senate Intelligen~e and Hou;se Judiciary Co~mittee staffmembers say inquiries. into the Near East and<br />
South Asia Affairs division have found preliminary evidence tha! some officials gathered questionable<br />
information on we~pons<br />
ofmass destruction from Iraqi exile's such as Ahmed Chalabi without proper<br />
authorization, whic4 helpl!d build President Bush's case for an invasion last year.<br />
The investigators are also looking into a more serious concern: whether the office engaged in illegal·<br />
activity by holding unauthorized meetings with foreign-n~tionals to ~establize Syria ~d Iran without the<br />
presidential approval required for covert operations, said one senior congressiopal inves~igator<br />
who has<br />
longtime experience in. intellig~nce<br />
oversight.<br />
Government officials seeking the cooperatioQ. offoreign nationals to·take secret action against other<br />
countries p.eed a so-call~d presidential finding to engage in such activity.<br />
The office, I~d by Will~am<br />
J. Luti, a former Navy captain and a4viser to then-House Speaker Newt<br />
Gingricli,.is a.powerful cog in Bush administration policy making, populated by some<br />
ideologically-minded i~dividuals<br />
who se~ their goveriUnent service as a way to promote democracy in<br />
the Middle East and improve :US-Israel ties, according to colleagues inside ~nd outside government.<br />
Th~ recent investigation into whether analyst Larry Franklin provided documents on Jran.to a pair of<br />
lobbyists with the pro-Israel American-Israel Public Affairs Committee -- who then allegedly passed<br />
them to the Israeli government -- has placed the little-noticed Pentagon office in the national spotlight at<br />
a time when. the Bush administration is attempting to convince vot~rs<br />
that the president has been a<br />
; 2~ Probe At The Pentagon Bxamines Actio~ 00q<br />
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Both Perle and senior Defense officials, spe~ing on the condition ofanonymity, deny that the P9licy<br />
office or two controversial subgroups have ever engaged in intelligence-gathering activities. The<br />
division's work, they said, has consis.ted only ofdrafting policy options for superiors.<br />
They contend that the now-defunct P9licy Counterterrorism Coordination Group, set up after the Sept. 11<br />
attacks to search for links between Al Qaeda and state sponsors such as Iraq, never gathered intelligence;<br />
it only reevaluated previous government findings. The Iraq War planninggroup called the Office of<br />
Special Plans,meanwhile, did not engage in any wrongdoing or questionable contacts, they said.<br />
Butinvestigators for the Senate Intelligence Committee, which is closely scrutinizing the office as part of<br />
a formal probe ofpre-Iraq War intelligence-gathering, and Democratic members ofthe House JudiciarY<br />
Committee, who are conducting a preliminary probe, say that the full picture ofthe office's·activities may<br />
include more than meets the eye. They are seeking additional documents and interViews from policy<br />
officials.<br />
After months ofdelay, the investigators said, they are getting cobperation from Feith and his staff:<br />
Some ofthe incidents that prompted the probes are already known.<br />
Franklin and another employee, Harold Rhode, met secretly with Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian arms<br />
dealer, in Italy in December 200i and subsequently in Paris. The Paris meeting was not approved by<br />
Pentagon officials.<br />
Ghorbanifar, who has been linked to the Iran-contra scandal ofthe 1980s, has said the men discussed<br />
ways to destabilize the Iranian regime, labeled a part ofPresident Bush's tlaxis ofevil tl for support of<br />
terrorist groups and suspected development ofwe~ponsofmass destft:lction.<br />
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said I~t fall that the meeting was requested by Iranian officials<br />
to dis
•~ P~be At The Pentagon Examines Aetions0(1<br />
hllp:llwww.dia.i(5.ladminlEARL.(B1RD1040831/e20040831316433.html<br />
The official said he is ttying to determine ifsome ofthe office's activities may have been prohibited by<br />
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which holds that all activity to undermine a foreign government must be<br />
approved by the president in a specific document approving such activity.<br />
Supporters ofFeith and his policy advisers roundly deny accusations that the office is a rogue .opemtion.<br />
They say the two ongoing FBI inquiries into alleged leaks ofclassified infonnation amount to what one<br />
called "McCarthyism," a sustained campaign by opponents ofBush's policies to discredit their views and<br />
brand them as pawns for the Israeli lobby merely because they are pushing for stronger action against<br />
terrorist states.<br />
They note that no arrests have been made, only charges a~d leaks to journalists fr9m unnamed officials.<br />
"It sounds to me that it'is an investigation that was leaked for maximum adverse affect on the office,<br />
which has been subjected to a lot ofother criticism," said'Frank Gaffney, president ofthe conservative<br />
Center for Security Policy and a former assistant defense secretary under President Reagan. "You have<br />
people who are-controversial. They are taking positions that last time I checked, the president ... was<br />
closely associated with, that are opposed by other people in the bureaucracy.<br />
"One ofthe tricks ofbureaucratic warfare is to attack them in the press. It makes them less effective,"<br />
Gaffney said. -"I think that is going on here." .<br />
30f3<br />
813112004 1:31, PM
__<br />
Israel's Albatross: U.S. NeoeoDS<br />
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Los Angeles-Times<br />
August 31, 2004<br />
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.<br />
and Deputy Defen~e ~ecretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, the two strongest promoters inside the administration<br />
..,.. ofpreemptively invading Iraq. He also was part ofthe unit that funneled intelligence chum up the food<br />
chain and into Bush's now..discredited speeches claiming Saddam Hussein's regime posed an imminent<br />
danger.<br />
These are the folks who bought the disinfonnation pumped out by Iraqi exile.Ahmad Chalabi, whom<br />
they promoted as the George Washington ofthe new Iraq state. Now the neocons distance themselves<br />
from Chalabi, who'has been accused ofspying for Iran and harangues radical Iraqi Shiite crowds with<br />
anti-American rhetoric. That can't be good fOf Israel, which is threatened by Iran's n~clear program.<br />
The neocons are unstable ideologues, more in love with their own radical dream ofbreaking the world to<br />
remake it in their image than they are with protecting Israel or the U.S. Such unbounded arrogance,<br />
embraced by Bush, has greatly amplified the voices ofthose persistent anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists<br />
in the Muslim world and beyond who are now seizing upon the latest Israeli spy rumors. .<br />
tilt revives the old charge that Israel is not an ally but a treacherous country," Nathan Guttman wrote<br />
Monday in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.<br />
That charge is false. What is troe is thatnot every Bush administration hawk who claims to support Israel<br />
is actually a'reliable friend.<br />
20f2<br />
8131120041:38 PM
.. _The Iranian Bomb<br />
.http://wWw.dia,i~~inIEARLYBlRDi040831/e2l10401i313 t6364.h1m!<br />
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UNCLASSIFIED _FOUO<br />
Washington T~mes<br />
August 31, 2004<br />
Pg. 16<br />
The Irani~n Bomb<br />
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~y Frank J. Gaffney Jt.<br />
One could be forgiven, !n light ofrecent headlines and'press accounts, for \yondering precisely who the<br />
enemy is in this war on terror: For some people, it cle~rly seems the list should include - i€not be<br />
headed by - a.aemocratic ally that has bee~ subjected, per capita,to considerably more sustained .and<br />
deadly terrorist attacks 'than tile Unit~d States: Is"rael.<br />
This argument requires Israel to be seen not for what it is - n~mely, a longstanding U.S. partner in,a<br />
strategically vital region ofthe' world where few exist, one that shares America's values and is a bulwark<br />
against the risin~ tid~ ofanti-We~tem I$lamist extre1l!is!D. Israel must, instead? be portrayed as<br />
perfidi~us, p~rsuing an intematio*al agenda divergent from (ifnot actu~lly at odds with) that ofthe<br />
'United States an4 a liability, rathe~ t!tan an asset. -<br />
Those who wo~ld portray Israel ~n .suc~ an unflattering light doubtless are gleeful over leaks claiming the<br />
Jewis.h State surreptitiously obtained state secrets from. a U.S. government employee working for t~e<br />
Pentagon. At thJs ,writing, no evidence has beeq. provided to support'such charges. Nor has anyone'been.<br />
api>reherided - although, for s~veral ,d,ays, the FBfhas been described as poised to arrest someone<br />
employed by the Defense Department's·policy organizatio~. On~y time will tell whether anyone actually<br />
is taken into custody, the type ofcharges and wh~ther he is actually found guilty..<br />
In the meanti~e, thes~ leaks have already divert~d attention from a' nation that genuin~ly,should head the.<br />
, list ofAmerica's foes: the terrorist-sponsoring, nuclear-arming and ballistic missile-wielding Islatnist<br />
gov~rnment ofIran. This effect haS been all the·more ironi9 insofar as, according tO,press accounts, the<br />
classified information the FBI thinks was improperly purveyed to Israel involved documents shedding<br />
light on America's evolving policy toward the Irani~n. mulhihocracy.<br />
Strategic analyst Steven D~ka~ recently offered a reminder ofthe peril posed by Iran: "While the Islamic<br />
Republic ofIran as a state is technically not at war with the U.S., Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa calling-for<br />
total war by all Shl'ites, regarciiess ofcitizenship, against the 'Great Satan ~erica' remai~s in effect ~ it<br />
has never.been rescinded" and in fact was expanded to include killing Americans as being a necessary<br />
part ofa defens~ve jihad to make the world sa(e for Islam. Khohteini's pioneering pseudo-theology was<br />
later picked up by Sunni ex~remists,including Osama bin Laden. II ..<br />
IIi a t~oughtful article in the Aug. 23 New York Post, ~ir Taheri recounted how 19tomeirii and his<br />
succe~sors have translated that fatwa into a 25~year-Iong war against the United States - wag~d<br />
asymmetricaUy, both directly (for ~xample, in'attacks against U.S. embassies and personnel) and<br />
indirectly (through terrorist proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq and Shi'ite<br />
.warlords i~ Afghanistan). Mr. Taheri correctly Qbsetves "the Khomeinist revoluti9n defines itselfin<br />
opposition to a vision of the world.that it regards as an American imposition.... With or without nuclear<br />
weapon.s, the I~lamic Republic, in its present shape,.represents a clear and pr~sent threat to the kind of<br />
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Middle East that President Bush says he wants to shape."<br />
Therefore, for the '(:J.S., stopping Tehran's Islamist government before it obtains the means.to carry out<br />
threats to attack Americans forces in Iraq and elsewhere should .be an urgent priority. FQr Israel, however,<br />
denying the ruling Iranian mullahs nuclear arms is literally a matter ofnational life and death.<br />
Israel's concern about the growing existential threat from Iran can only be heightened by overtures Sen.<br />
John Kerry and his running mate have been making lately to Tehran"" In remarks Monday, vice<br />
presidential candidate John Edwards said a Kerry administration would offer the Iranians a "great<br />
bargain":'They could keep their nuclear energy program and obtainfor it Western supplies ofenriched<br />
uranium fuel, provided the regime in Tehran promised to forswear nuclear weapons. According to Mr.<br />
Edwards, ifIran did not accept this "bargain," everyone - including our European alliesl~ would<br />
recognize the true, military purpose'ofthis program and would,"standwith us" in!evying on'lran "very<br />
heavy sanctions."<br />
There is just one problem: Based oJ) what is knoWn about Iran's program and intentions -let alone its<br />
history ofanimus toward us - only the recklessly naive could still believe such a deal is necessary to<br />
divine the mullahs' true purposes.<br />
While it may be inconvenient to say so, Iran is clearly putting into place a complete nuclear fuel cycle so<br />
as to obtain both weapons and power from its reactor and enrichment facilities. And a deal like that on<br />
offer from Messrs. Kerry and Edwards failed abysmally in North Korea.<br />
Ifthe United States is unwilling to take concrete steps to prevent the Iranian Bomb from coming to<br />
fruition, its Israeli ally will·likely feel compelled to act unilaterally - just as it did with the 1981 raid<br />
that neutralized Saddam Hussein's nuclear infrastructure. At the time, the Reagan adminis~tionjoined<br />
the world in sharply protesting Israel's attack.<br />
A decade later, however, the value ofthe contribu~ion thus made to American security was noted by<br />
then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, who said he thanked God every day during Operation Desert Storm<br />
that Israel had kept Iraq a nuclear-free zone. Ifsuch a counterproliferation strategy becomes necessary<br />
once again, it will be in all ofour interests to have Israel succeed.<br />
Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is president ofthe Center[or Security Policy and a coiumnis(for The Washington<br />
Times. ...<br />
20f2<br />
813112004 1:38 PM
.. Hand Rumsfeld Hi~ Walking Papers.<br />
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Seattle Post-Intelligencer<br />
August 31', 2004 ,<br />
Hand Rumsfeld His Walking Papers<br />
!3y Helen Thomas, Hearst Newspapers<br />
ALL FBI INFORHATION CONTAUJED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
WASHINGTON ,;,-The tillie has come for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to leave:His'Pentagon<br />
post, either by dismissal or resignatio~.<br />
Two separ~te reportsJast week make it clear that Rumsfeid and other t~p PeJ.1tagon officials were<br />
ultimate!y responsible for the sadistic abus~ of.prisoners in Iraq's infamous Abu Ghraib.<br />
Areport by a four-member panel headed by foriner Defense Secretary James SchlesiJ!ger traced the<br />
mistreatment ofprisoners 'in ~q to failures that went all the way up the chain lof com~and in the<br />
Pentagon.<br />
Another military report Wednesday said 27 people attached to intelligence agencies as well as four<br />
private cont~ctors participated in abuses, some tantamount tp torture, ofprisoners.<br />
"We.discovered serious misconduct and a loss ofmoral-values," said Army Gen. Paul Kern, ,head ofthe<br />
investigation. This gives the lie to early Pentagon efforts'to paiht the prison abuses as the work ofa<br />
handful oflow-level MPs, acting out their frustrations.<br />
The Kern report also noted that eight "ghost detainees" were conceale~ from the Ipterna~ional Committee<br />
ofthe Red Cross. One ofthem died in custody.<br />
The origiQ ofthe scandal·traces back to Feb. 2, 2002, when President Bush abrogated the Geneva<br />
Conventions requiring humanitarian treatment ofprisoners. Bush declared that ~ose rules did~'t apply to<br />
the U.S. war against terrorism. Bush has been scrapping ou:r international agreements since he came into<br />
office, but for this one he has paid dearly in t~rms ofjust plain decency.<br />
'I.<br />
When he canceled the
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Top military officials ignored the mistreatment ofprisoners until the graphic photographs ofnaked<br />
prisoners piled in a pyramid at Abu Ghrail? horrified the public. ,<br />
Red Cross reports about prison abuses fell on deatears at the P~ntagon until the administration ..was faced'<br />
with exposure.<br />
Several reviews ofthe military mistreatment ofprisoners have been under way but the Schl~singer<br />
was the first to assign any responsibility to the highest levels ofthe Pentagon.<br />
panel<br />
IIThere is both institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels, II the Schles~nger<br />
report said.<br />
Schlesinger said the prisn problems were "well known ll and corrective actions "could have been taken. ,<br />
and should have been taken~ II<br />
Despite all ofthis, the report concluded that Rumsfeld and other-senior leaders, including Air Force Gen.<br />
Richard Myers, chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs"ofStaft; should not be forced to resign.<br />
Since he is a Washington "establishment" figure who headed the Pentagon in the Nixon era, Schlesinger<br />
was not about to go any higher than a brigade commailder to parcel out responsibility.<br />
Schlesinger said Rumsfeld's resignation would be "a boon to all ofAmerica's enemies and consequently,<br />
I think that it wQuld 'be a misfortune ifit were to take place. It<br />
Wrong. It would show the world that Americans are not afraid to topple leaders when the country is<br />
dishonored on their watch. For those who have lived under totalitarian rule, a challenge to the leadership<br />
could have dire consequences. But.that's not our system. In a democracy, public servants must be held<br />
accountable.<br />
Rumsfeld should have thrown in the towel months ago for this scandal.<br />
In the run-up to the invasion ofIraq, the Rumsfeld coterie bragged about the "shock and awe" ofthe<br />
p'anned U.S. invasion. The secretary has since lost some ofhis swagger and is no longer a]\T rock ~tar.<br />
As the gravity ofthe scandal gradually sunk in around the world, Rumsfeld has become virtually<br />
invisible to the public.<br />
Rumsfeld stands indicted by the very panel that he appointed to assess responsibility. The fact that the<br />
S'chlesinger panel vee~ed sharply atthe last curve and said Rumsfeld should keep his job can't bury the<br />
reality that they traced the footprints right to Rumsfeld's office.<br />
It's time for him to take responsibility for this scandal. It's time for him to leave office.<br />
20f2<br />
813112004 1:39 PM,
;A7 AI Center OfSpy Flap Called ~aive, '1;1~ ~Is...1 http://www o dia.t;/@llminIBARLYBIRDI040831/s2004083131641I.hllitl<br />
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Tel ~viv Haaretz<br />
August 31, 2004<br />
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw!sab/1sg<br />
Analrst At Center OfSpy Flap Called Naive, Ardently Pro-Israel<br />
By Nathan Guttman<br />
WASHINGTON - Larry Franklin, the Pentagon analyst suspected ofpassing classified material about<br />
Iran to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, has never hidden his unequivocal support ofIsrael.<br />
Colleagues from the Near East and South Asia desk at the Defense Department said yesterday that his<br />
sympathy for Israel was overt and public - he didn't refrain from praising Israel and he held aggressive<br />
views about seve~l Arab governments, primarily the ayatollahs' regime in Iral\ and Saddam Hussein's<br />
dictatorship in Iraq.<br />
"Everyone kn~W he was·a friend ofIsrael;·but he didn't go about it in any unusual way," a Pentagon<br />
coworker said. "He was always accessible t9 everyone. II<br />
Franklin~s r~sumedescribes his current positi~n, which he has held since 200I, as: "Office·ofthe<br />
Secretary ofDefense,-Policy, Near EastlSou~h Asia, Iran desk analyst, Office ofSpecial Plans Iraq. Focus<br />
Projects: Hizboll~, Islam, Saudi Arabia." But the official re~ume reveals only a few details about the<br />
man at the center oCtbe affair.<br />
franklin, a religious Gatholic in his late 50s, lives in Kearneysville, West Virginia, a 90-minute ~rive<br />
from"the Pentagon..But living in the distantsubur~ assured a high quality oflife. for F:ranklin, his ~ife<br />
Patricia ana t~eJr ~v~ children, some ofwhom are college-age. Franklin has a doctorate in East Asian<br />
studies from St. Jo~'s University, a,Catholic ~iversity in New York City, and speaks Farsi, Arabic,<br />
French, Spanish, Russian and Chinese (in addition to English). On top ofhis work atthe Pentagon,<br />
Franklin teaches history at Shepherd University i~ We~t Virginia.<br />
In conversations about Fr~nklin with his colleagues, one ofthe words that comes up again and again is<br />
"naive." He is described as an ideologue who believes wholeheanedly in the neo-conservative approach.<br />
tI~verything by him is blac~ and White," said someone who has work~d with Franklin in the P~ntagon.<br />
tlHe is a very nice ~erson, very conservative, not at all arrogant,~' said the colleague, adding that one Qf<br />
the reasons he was brought into the Near East and South Asia desk was his political beliefs.<br />
Franklin's political-opinions are similar to those ofhis bosses .. Douglas Feith, ulJ,dersecret.ary ofdefense,<br />
and William L.uti,.the deputy ~de~ecretary ofdefense responsible for Near Eastern and South Asian<br />
affairs: Like th~m, Franklin supports the. policy ofacting to bring·democra~y to AraQ regimes and build<br />
up.pro-American allies in the Middle East<br />
But those who have worked wi,th"franklin also say he was a bit extreme in his work patterns, atti~de and<br />
behavior. They occasionally referred to him as "Planet Larry" ~ a·way ofexpressing the extent to which<br />
he "lives in a world ofhis own," colleagues said.<br />
People who have 'Yorked with Franklin believe that it was his trademark naivete that gothim in trouble,<br />
s~ying F~anklin was not aware ofthe severity ofhis activi~ies, and so did not try to hide or mask them.<br />
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813112004 1:39 'PM
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.FranJdin.visited Israel eight tiqles ~hH~ he ~~rV~.d.in the ll..§. A!r,:Force and worked.at the Pen~gon ...<br />
~Most ofhis.visits app'ear to have be~eii<br />
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:Jerusalem Post<br />
August 31,'2004<br />
Analysis:<br />
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tilA HOme1What's New IProduCt!rt by Type I Produ~s by Region I~i~<br />
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
U:,t~t~;:~~::'~~~..1<br />
Affair Won't 'Harm Strong US-ISrael Ties<br />
By Gerald M. Steinb~rg, The Jerusal~m Post<br />
By their very: na~e, allegations ofespionage and abuse ofcla~sifiedmaterial get huge headliiie~,<br />
although the. evidence;... ifany - usually remain,s murky and hidden from public scrutiny. This is<br />
particularly th.e case regarding the l}S and Israel, reflecting the wide ~ecurity cooperation that has<br />
developed in response to terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and other mutual threats. Mixed with hints of<br />
conspiracy and dual loyalty, such cooperation presents a huge target for the relatively small ~u~ber of<br />
American offi~ials ~d journalists who want to see tpis relationship halted.<br />
For many years, claims involving Israel and spying have been manipulated in the effort tQ drive a wedge<br />
betw~en Washington and Jerusale~, particularly after the Pollard fiasco. The damage to relations in' that<br />
case was extensive, and its echoes are $till being fett today, making another "affair" the dr~am ofall<br />
those who wis.h to disruptUS-Isniel cooperation. But th~ lessons from Pollard ~ppear to have been<br />
learned by both the:Israeli government and the US. At the same time,.the absence ofreal and juicy spy<br />
scandals has spurred the' invention offictiti9us ones.<br />
A few years ago, false charge~ ~at Israel was stealing and selling the Pentagon's technical secrets to<br />
China were later revealed to have been part ofa personal campaign ofreve.nge involving two American<br />
officials working for different branches ofthe go~emment. And headlines claiming ~at Israel was<br />
eavesdropping on the Os ;vvere also exposed ~'nonsense. In another case, the he~d ofthe CIA - George<br />
Tenet - sent. an apolpgy to then Mossa~ head Danny Yatoro"apologizing for accusations linking Israel to<br />
espionage.<br />
These periodic leaks and allega;tions, including the current case,.reflect a wider agenda. Th~ Ara~ lobby<br />
in Washington is gaining influence and access to the media,· and peddling ,such stories is one means of'<br />
moving the focus awaytfrom te~orism and t~e growing pressure from many Americans to end.support<br />
for the corrupt regimes in the Middle :East. In addition,·fringe Republican Pat Buchanan and his<br />
adherents clingto·the classical anti-Semitic myths in which Jews are po~ayed'as all powerful,·and<br />
secretly manipulating US policy.<br />
The post~war complic"ations inlrag and tlie charge'that a neo-conservative kabal"(code for Jews and'<br />
Zionists, even though the top two neo-cons - Secretary .0fDefense Rumsfeld and Vice Pr~sident'Cheney<br />
are neither) led America "into this confrontatiol) have,revived the~e myths. This may explain the ~ttempt<br />
to involve AIPAC - the "powerful" pro-Israellob~y - and the timing ofthi~ leak at the heightofthe US<br />
election campaign. .<br />
Yet ~espite these efforts and short-lived I:t~adlines, US-Israel security coope~tio~ has be,?ome,stronger,<br />
reflecting an understanding ofthe necessity ofsharing resQ~~ces and; knowledge in order to counter the<br />
threats ~9 both. In addition, the underlying shared values ofdemocracy and freedom remai~ central~ and<br />
lof2<br />
.813112004 1:40 PM
Affair Won't Hann ~tiOng US-Israel Ties<br />
mark the difference between American and European attitudes towards Israel.<br />
http://www.dia.ic.gov/adminlEARLYBIRD/04083I1s20040831316215.html<br />
"<br />
As ~ result, in th~ earlier alleged espionage cases, including JJ1e Pollard affair, after the dust cleared, this<br />
coxp.mon core re"mained intact,'and there is no re~on to expect the outcome tO'be dlfferent this time.<br />
Indeeq, investigatjons into the sources Qfthe allegations and the erqbellis~ent add~d by CBS News may<br />
deter the next round ofthis game.<br />
Prot.·Gerald M Steinberg directs the Program on Conflict Management at Bar-llan University.<br />
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8131120041:40 PM
;'iran Intrigue<br />
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hltp:/lwww.dia.tl.adminlEARLYBIR1!10408311s20040831~16431.html<br />
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~oston Globe<br />
August 31, 2004<br />
Iran Intrigue<br />
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
THE MOST instructive aspect ofthe FBI's interest in Larry Franklin, an Iran desk officer in the Defense<br />
Department, is the light it casts on, the incohere~ce ofpolicy-making in the Bush adininist~ation tat4er<br />
than any conspiracy to pilfer America~ secrets for Israel.<br />
There" is a crucial background to the FBI's investigation ofFranklin, who has come-under suspicion for<br />
supposedly passing a classified presidential policy directive about Iran to a leader ofthe American Israel· .<br />
Public Affai~s ,Committee who allegedly passed the material on to an Israeli official.<br />
A neoconservative colleague ofFranklin in the Defense Department, Harold Rhode, and the' neocon<br />
promoter Michael Ledeen had been involved in secret back..chaJ:!llel meetings in Paris starti~g as early as<br />
l)ecember 2001 with th~ shady Iranian arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar, a key.figure hi the<br />
Reagan-era folly r~membered as the Iran-Contra affair~<br />
The CIA had long since proscribed'dealings wit!t Ghorbanifar. The agency had hi~ classified as'a<br />
chronic liar. When a US ambassador in Italy got wind ofthe meetings, he and the CIA station'chiefin .<br />
Rome notified superi~rs at the.State Depai1Ipent and the CIA. George Tenet, the" fonner CIA director, in<br />
turn persuaded the number two official on the National Security Couit9il, Stephen Hadley, to prohibit<br />
further meet~I.lgs with the Iranian a.nps merchant and the, so-called Ir~nian dissidents he was presenting to<br />
neocons avid for regime change in Tehran.<br />
This White House prohibition against the back-channel meetings arranged' by Ghorbanifar was to no<br />
avail. There were at l~ast two and possibly several more m~etings. Ghorbanifar, living up' to his .<br />
. reputation for indiscreet gabbiness, has boasted about further meetings to reporters for the Washington<br />
Monthly.<br />
This is the outline ofa policy quarrel that one faction has Qeen ~aging surreptitiously. Not only ~he FBI<br />
but also the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have been investigating the neocons' secret<br />
me~tings inParis to promote regime change in Tehran.,<br />
The regime in Tehran does pose a threat by virtue ofits nuclear program, its sponsorship ofthe Lebanese<br />
Shi'ite militia Hezbollah, and its meddling in Iraq. The Bush administration, however, has"been unable to<br />
settle on a coherent strate~ to cope with the challenge from Tehran.<br />
It is quite possible that no ,prosecution will result from the FBI's in~~rest in Franklin's suspected.<br />
disclosure ofclassified infofuatiQn about President Bus~'s Iran policy, as it is unlikely Israel would<br />
"permit an intelligence operation that targeted the Bush adrninistration.•ButifBush does ~ot take control<br />
of h~s own adn;linistration's policy-making process, the nation could be 4rawn into another Gulfwar by<br />
one faction ofthe conservative constellation in his own administration.<br />
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8131(2004 2:08 PM<br />
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Espionage Intrigue<br />
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hUp:l/WWWodi"O/adminlEARLYBIRDI04083I1s200408313164I6.html<br />
Baltimore Sun<br />
August 31, 2004<br />
Espionage Intrigue<br />
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabllsg<br />
THE DENIALS are loud and resounding. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee called<br />
allegations that the American Jewish lobby received secret information about U.S. poiicy on Iran from a<br />
Pentagon analyst, and passed it onto Israel, "baseless and false." The government ofIsrael· was just as<br />
emphatic about the charge: "false and outrageous. II The reported FBI investigation touched a nerve. It<br />
raised the specter ofdivided loyalties, Israel spying on its chiefally and benefactor, mudslinging at a<br />
pro-Israel presi4ent on the eve ofhis renomination.<br />
I<br />
There's plenty there to provoke alanning headlines, sharp rhetoric and legitimate cause for concern -- if<br />
the allegations prove true. Iran's nuclear program poses a threat to the United States and Israel, though for<br />
the Americans it's strategic and for the Israelis it's considerably more immediate. Tehran's insistence on<br />
producing Quclear material has pushed Israel to threaten a strike on an Iranian nuclear facility. In 1981,<br />
Israel took out Iraq's nuclear reactor to quell similar ambitions.<br />
Yet an'Iranian-Israeli face-offwould have devastating consequences for the West and for the Islamic<br />
world.<br />
The reports about Pentagon analyst Lawrence Franklin, who is at the center ofthe investig~tion, are<br />
contradictory. But the fact that he works in a policy office overseen by the ideological Douglas J. Feith<br />
clouds the issue. Mr. Feith is a controversial neo-conservative who trumpeted the fall ofSaddam Hussein<br />
as an engine for democracy in the Mideast. He was an ardent champion ofAhmad Chalabi, the<br />
discredited Iraqi expatriate now thought to have had links to Iranian intelligence.<br />
The contradictions also extend to Israel. President Bush is such an unabashed supporter ofIsraeli Prime<br />
Minister Ariel Sharon that it's unfathomable that Israel couldn't get information on U.S.-Iranian policy if<br />
it asked. Would it risk an espionage scandal like the Pollard affair of1985?<br />
What's ironi~ i~ that ifthe espionage allegations are true, Israel will have likely confirmed that the United<br />
States in fact has no coherent or cogent policy on Iran. And the need for one is urgent, given Iran's '<br />
nuclear ambitions and its less-than-candid dealings with international atomic energy inspectors. The<br />
campaign ofDemocratic presideQtial candidate John Kerry has unveiled its plan to persuade Iran to give<br />
up its nuclear weapons capability -- itwould retain its nuclear energy plants in exchange for any nuclear<br />
bomb-making fuel.<br />
Mr. Bush has painted himself into a comer with his hm:sh position on Iran and its inclusion in the "axis of<br />
evil." The International Atomic Energy Agency is expected in early September to release its report on<br />
Iran's nuclear program. Mr. Bush should be prepared to respond with a substantive plan to engage Iran<br />
instead ofhis usual, polarizing rhetoric.<br />
I ofl<br />
8/3112004 2:08 PM
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oALL IN:ORMATI~~ CONTAINED 0<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
~unday,Sep.05,2004<br />
A Web OfIntrigue<br />
Inside the Israel espionage investigation<br />
By BR;IAN BENNETT, ELAINE SHANNON AND ADAM ZAGORIN<br />
TIl\1E MAGAZINE<br />
It was a hot, late August afternoon when the Iraqi exile got a call on his cell phone. Over the<br />
crackling line, the Iraqi says, the caller identified himself as Larry Franklin, an analyst for the<br />
Defense Department in Washington. Franklin rattled offa series ofquestions. He wanted to<br />
know ifthe Iraqi, who had spent, the past decade working with Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National<br />
Congress (I.N.C.), could recall whether anyone at the I.N.C. had discussed the U.S.'s ability to<br />
intercept and decode Iran's secret communications. The Iraqi, who knew Franklin's name but had .<br />
never met him, was startled by the call. "How about discussing Iranian codes with a drunken<br />
American? Had anyone ever done that?" Franklin wanted to know. For nearly halfan hour,<br />
Franklin quizzed him about Pentagon officials and Iranian spycraft. "That was 'really scary,"<br />
recalls the Iraqi. "I told him, II don't remember anything."1<br />
That phone call, which the Iraqi described to TIME last week, seems to be an indication that two<br />
complicated spy cases have become linked. Several weeks ago, according to federal lawenforcement<br />
officials, Franklin, who had been under investigation by the FBI for giving<br />
classified information to the American ~srael Public Affairs Committee (AlPAC), agreed to<br />
cooperate in a probe into whether the pro-Israel group was passing sensitive U.S. secrets to<br />
Israel. .<br />
Franklin's call to the ex-I.N.C. man, who has provided Tllv.IE with credible information in the<br />
past, suggests that Franklin was also assisting the FBI in a separate inquiry into how highly<br />
classified details ofAmerica's ability to decode Iranian intelligence messages may have fallen<br />
into the hands ofChalabi's organization and been passed on to Iran in February. A U.S. law-·<br />
enforcement official confirms that the Iraqi's account ofthe conversation is consistent with the<br />
types ofcalls Franklin was making on behalfofthe FBI.<br />
According to law-enforcement officials, Franklin began cooperating with the FBI after agents<br />
first confronted him with evidence that he'had given classified material to AlPAC, one of<br />
Washington's most powerful· lobbying organizations. Israel and AlPAC have denied the spy<br />
allegations; neither the Pentagon nor Franklin would comment. The law-enforcement officials<br />
say Franklin was persuaded in recent weeks to make "pretext calls"-scriptedconversations<br />
monitored by FBI agents and designed to tease out incriminating evidence about other suspects.<br />
It was within this time frame that Franklin approached the ex-I.N.C. official who spoke to TIME.<br />
The two investigations are among the most politically charged espionage cases in years. Israel<br />
and the I.N.C. are longtime allies ofthe U.S., though the CIA has for years warned that Chalabi<br />
was not to be trusted. Allegations ofIsraeli espionage have been a hot-button issue since<br />
American naval intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard was imprisoned for life in 1987 for passing<br />
U.S. military secrets to Israel. Ever since the Pollard affair, Israel has publiclyinsisted it no<br />
C/
, ."<br />
longer spies on the U.S. "I can tell you here very authoritatively, very categorically, Israel does<br />
not spy on the United States," Israel's U.S. ambassador, Daniel Ayalon said last week. "We do<br />
not gather infonnation on our best friend and ally."<br />
Federal law-enforcement officials say they re~ain on the lookout for signs that Israelis still<br />
pursue U.S. secrets. A fonner congressional official told TWE that in the 1990s Israelis in<br />
Washington were known to routinely seek copies ofclassified documents such as secret portions<br />
ofthe annual Javits report, a U.S. compilation on arms sales.<br />
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and her deputy Stephen Hadley were informed of<br />
the FBI's probe into AIPAC at least two years ago, according to a U.S. official. But that did not<br />
hinder numerous contacts between AIPAC and top Administration officials as well as<br />
congressional leaders ofboth parties. The lobbYing group derives its power from its backing<br />
among influential Jewish Americans. Just last May, President George W. Bush attended AIPAC's<br />
annual conference in Washington and thanked the organization for "serving the cause of<br />
America" and bringing to public attention the threat ofIran's developm.ent ofnuclear weapons.<br />
At that time, the FBI was alrea.dy deep into its investigation ofAlPAC. A former U.S. official<br />
interviewed by the FBI more than·a year ago told TIME that the bureau sought information on<br />
key AIPAC personnel, their meetings with White House and other national-security officials in<br />
Washington and ev.en details about their personal lives. At one point, the FBI was surveilling a<br />
meeting between an Israeli diplomat and an AIPAC official when the Pentagon's Franklin<br />
suddenly appeared, igniting concerns. Franklin, a former :Air Force Reserve officer, served<br />
briefly in the U.S. military attache's office in Israel in the late 1990s. Since the summer of2001,<br />
he has worked as an Iran expert for Douglas.Feith, the Pentagon's third ranking official, a<br />
neoconservative long in favor oftougher measures against Iran. In 2001 Franklin and a Pentagon<br />
colleague were dispatched to Rome for a meeting with Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian arms<br />
dealer who had been a key figure in the 1980s' Iran-contra scandal. They were seeking<br />
inteliigence on Iran from him. But the CIA h3$ long considered Ghorbanifar unreliable, and the<br />
Bush Administration later cut offthe contacts.<br />
According to a former U.S. government source, the material Franklin passed to AlPAC included<br />
a draft ofa National Security Presidential Directive dealing with U.S. policy on Iran. The<br />
document, a source says, had gone through several ve~ions without ever achieving the status of<br />
official U.S. policy pecause ofdeep disagreements within the Administration over how to cope<br />
with Iran. A source familiar with multiple drafts ofthe document said it was a "glorified Op-Ed<br />
looking at how engagement [with Iran] doesn't work and how the U.S. needs a more robust<br />
strategy. II A former senior U.S. official who also saw the drafts told TIME the directive did not<br />
explicitly call for regime change in Tehran and left open the possibility ofcooperation with the<br />
Iranians on matters ofmutual interest.<br />
. Meanwhile, a former case officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency says that when he was<br />
questioned in thel.N.C. case, the FBI seemed fntstrated in that investigation. That case officer,<br />
who worked alongside I.N.C. intelligence gatherers at the time ofthe alleged breach, says he was<br />
interrogated and polygraphed by the FBI. He contended to TIME that the allegations against the
"F --:-------- - ---------------<br />
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September 6, 2004<br />
Spy Case Renews Debate Over Pro-Israel Lobby's Ties to Pentagon<br />
By JAMES RISEN and DAVID JOHNSTON<br />
ASHINGTON, Sept. 5 - Itbegan like most national security investigations, with a squad of<br />
Federal Bureau ofInvestigation agents surreptitiously tailing two men, noting where they went<br />
and whom they met. What was different about this case was that the surveillance subjects were<br />
lobbyists for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and one oftheir contacts turned out<br />
to be a policy analyst at the Pentagon.<br />
The ensuing criminal investigation into whether Aipac officials passed classified infonnation<br />
from the Pentagon official to Israel has become one ofthe most byzantine counterintelligence<br />
stories in recent memory. So far, the Justice Department has not accused anyone ofwrongdoing<br />
and no one has been arrested.<br />
Aipac has dis·missed the accusations as baseless, and Israel has denied conducting espionage<br />
operations in the United States.<br />
Behind the scenes, however, the case has reignited a furious and long-running debate about the<br />
close relationship between Aipac, the pro-Israel lobbying organization, and a conservative group<br />
ofRepublican civilian officials at the defense department, who are in charge ofthe office that<br />
employs Lawrence A. Franklin, the Pentagon analyst.<br />
Their hard-line policy views on Iraq, Iran and the rest ofthe Middle East have been controversial<br />
and influential within the Bush administration.<br />
"They have no case," said Michael Ledeen, a conservative scholar at the American Enterprise<br />
Institute and a friend ofMr. Franklin. "Ifthey have a case, why hasn't anybody been arrested or<br />
indicted?"<br />
Nearly a dozen officials who have been briefed on, the investigation said in interviews last week<br />
that the F.B.I. began the inquiry as a national security matter based on specific accusations that<br />
Aipac employees had been a conduit for secrets between Israel and the Pentagon. These offi~ials<br />
said that the F.B.I.,.in consultation with the Justice Department, had established the necessary<br />
legal foundation required under the law before beginning the investigation.<br />
A halfdozen people sympathetic to Aipac and the civilian group at the defense department said<br />
they viewed the investigation in different terms, as a politically-motivated attempt to discredit<br />
Aipac and the Pentagon group. Supporters ofAipac have said the organization is being dragged<br />
into an intelligence controversy largely because ofits close ties to a Republican administration<br />
and the Israeli government ofPrime Minister Ariel Sharon. .<br />
Friends and associates ofthe civilian group at the Pentagon believe they are under assault by<br />
adversaries from within the intelligence community who have opposed them since before the war<br />
in Iraq. The Pentagon civilians, led by Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, and
o<br />
Douglas 1. Feith, the unders~cretary for policy, were among the first in the immediate aftermath<br />
ofthe Sept. 11 attacks to urge military action to topple the regime ofSaddam Hussein in Iraq, an<br />
approach favored by Aipac and Israel.<br />
Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Feith were part ofa larger network ofpolicy experts inside and out ofthe<br />
Bush administration who forcefully made the case that the war with Iraq was part ofthe larger<br />
fight against terrorism.<br />
The Pentagon group circulated its own intelligence assessments, which have since been<br />
discredited by the Central Intelligence Agency and by the independent Sept. 11 commission,<br />
arguing that there was a terroristalliance between the Hussein regime and Al Qaeda.<br />
The group has also advocated that the Bush administration adopt a more aggressive policy<br />
toward Iran, and some ofits ~embers have quietly begun to argue for regime change in Tehran.<br />
The administration has not yet adopted that stance, however, and the Pentagon conservatives<br />
have been engaged in a debate with officials at the State Department and other agencies urging a<br />
more moderate approach·to Iran.<br />
To Israel, Iran represents a grave threat to its nation~l security. Pushing the United States to adopt<br />
a tougher line on Tehran is one ofits major foreign policy objectives, and Aipac has lobbied the<br />
Bush administration to support Israel's policies.<br />
Mr. Franklin was an expert on Iran in the office ofMr. Feith and among the material he is<br />
suspected ofturning over to Aipac is a draft presidential policy directive on Iran, which would<br />
have provided a glimpse at the Bush administration's.earIy plans.<br />
But skeptics ofthe case have said that the United States and Israel routinely share highly<br />
sensitive information on military and diplomatic matters under an officially sanctioneq<br />
understanding. In addition, most ofthe contents ofpolicy drafts ilffecting either country are well<br />
known to people outside the government who follow American-Israeli affairs.<br />
As a result, some ofMr. Franklin's associates regard his efforts as an attempt to obtain Aipac's<br />
help to influence the Bush administrationrather than an effort to provide Israel with information.<br />
They believe the case is the latest in a series ofassaults by intelligence and Jaw enforcement<br />
agencies, who they believe are determined to diminish the influence ofconservative civilians at<br />
the Pentagon.<br />
In their view, there have been other attempts to embarrass them. In May, American officials said<br />
that Ahmed Chalabi, the leader ofthe Iraqi National Congress and a longtime ally ofthe<br />
Pentagon conserva~ives, had told Iranian intelligence officials that the Unit~d States had broken<br />
Iran's communications codes.<br />
The F.B.I. began a still-open investigation to determine who in the government had told Mr.<br />
Chalabi about the secret code-breaking operation. The investigation, which has included the use<br />
ofpolygraph examinations, has focused on Defense Department employees who both knew Mr.
' ...-.=----. II-~<br />
o<br />
Chalabi and knew ofthe highly classified code-breaking operation.<br />
The F.B.l's inquiry ofthe Chalabi leak may overlap with the Pranklin case because some ofthe<br />
same Defense Department officials had access to infonnation that was believed to be<br />
compromised.<br />
But officials who have briefed on the case say they remain two separate inquiries being<br />
conducted by separate teams ofinvestigators, one with jurisdiction over Iranian matters and one<br />
with jurisdiction over Israel issues.<br />
The focus and direction ofthe Franklin investigation, which was publicly disclosed Aug. 27,<br />
remains unclear. The officials said the inquiry first focused on A~pac, but later became more<br />
intense after F.B.I. agents gathered evidence indicating that Aipac officials had obtained<br />
classified information from Mr. Franklin, which was turned over to Israel.<br />
But it is unclear who, ifanyone, is likely to be charged with wrongdoing and whether the<br />
government is more interested in Aipac, Mr. Franklin or the Israelis who may have received the<br />
classified material. Officials say Mr. Franklin has been cooperating with the F.B.I. since being<br />
confronted by agents several weeks ago.<br />
Two officials at Aipac, Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, have also been interviewed by the<br />
bureau.<br />
ItI know that this is part ofa campaign against us," said MichaelMalo04 a former Pentagon<br />
analyst who worked in a special-intelligence unit created by Mr. Feith after Sept. 11. Mr. Maloof<br />
lost his security clearances because ofan investigation that he believed was unfair.<br />
He now believes that Mr. Franklin is being unfairly targeted as well. "They are picking us of~<br />
one by one," Mr. Maloofsaid.<br />
But leading critics ofthe Pentagon hard-liners have repeatedly argued that Mr..Wolfowitz, Mr.<br />
Feith and others have used the Sept. 11 attacks as a pretext to pursue issues that in some ways<br />
mirror the interests ofIsrael's conservative Likud government.<br />
One piece ofevidence repeatedly cited by the critics is a 1996 paper issued by the Institute for<br />
Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, an Israeli think tank, calling for the toppling ofSaddam<br />
Hussein in order to enhance Israeli security. Entitled "A Clean Break," the 1996 paper was<br />
intended to offer a foreign policy agenda for the new Likud government ofBenjamin Netanyahu.<br />
The paper argued: "Israel can shape its strategic environment, incooperation with Turkey and<br />
Jordan~ by weakening, containing and even rolling back Syria. This effort can focus on rell)oving<br />
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq - an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right - as<br />
a means offoiling Syria's regional ambitions.':<br />
Among those who signe~ the paper were Mr. Feith; David Wunnser, who later worked for Mr.
o<br />
I '6 • •<br />
-.-..;.--<br />
Feith at the Pentagon and now works for Vice President Dick Cheney; and Richard Perle, a<br />
leading conservative who previously served as chainnan ofthe Defense Policy Board, a group of<br />
outside consultants to Secretary ofDefense Donald H. Rumsfeld.<br />
In the Reagan administration, Mr. Feith served as Mr. Perle's deputy at the Pentagon.
Page 1of3<br />
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dmJ Print This Story<br />
BEHIND THE HEADLINES<br />
7 Used to working behind the scenes,<br />
I<br />
AIPAC suddenly thrust into limelight<br />
By Matthew E. Berger<br />
NEW YORK, Aug. 30 (JTA) -In its outreach to potential supporters and to the<br />
media, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee touts its access to the<br />
highest levels of government.<br />
Now it's,that very access that has thrust the pro-Israel lobby, accustomed to<br />
working behind the scenes; into the limelight.<br />
Accusations that AIPAC officials received classified information from a Pentagon<br />
staffer and forwarded it on to Israel broke on the eve of this week's Republican<br />
National Convention in NewYork, where AIPAC is hosting several policy forums<br />
for Republican contributors.<br />
According to media accounts" a non-Jewish officer on the Iranian desk at the<br />
Pentagon, Larry Franklin, is being investigated for passing at least one classified<br />
document to AIPAC officials, which may then have been forWarded to Israeli<br />
officials in Washington.<br />
Reports have suggested that Franklin could face charges ranging from<br />
espionage to the mishandling of classified information.<br />
The Jerusalem Post reported that the AIPAC officials involved were Steven<br />
Rosen and Keith Weissman, and that they h~ve spoken to federal investigators~<br />
Rosen is AIPAC's director of research and considered one of the most influential<br />
people in the organization. He has been with AIPAC since 1982, and mentored<br />
both Howard Kohr, AIPAC's current executive director, and Martin Indyk, the<br />
former U.S. ambassador to Israel.<br />
Weissman is deputy director of foreign policy issues and specializes in relations<br />
with Iran" Syria and Turkey.<br />
AIPAC would not confirm or deny the reports.<br />
New reports also suggested that Naor Gilon, minister of political affairs of the<br />
Israeli embassy in Washington, was the subject of an FBI investigation on<br />
suspicion of espionage for Israel when Franklin came to the investigators'<br />
attention more than a year ago. -<br />
Both Israel and AIPAC deny any impropriety in the case. Many U.S. Jews<br />
believe, or hope, that no charges will be filed and that the issue will fade from<br />
the headlines in coming days.,<br />
But the charges, and their prominent play in the media, have reopened<br />
questions about the way 'AIPAC does business with the U.S. and Israeli.<br />
-- governments.<br />
http://www.jta.orglpage-print_story.asp?intarticleid=14440 8/31/2004
ITA Print News<br />
o<br />
AIPAC's grassroots ~dvocacy and political lobbying departments get most of the<br />
attention. but the organization also has a thriving think tank that works to<br />
influence Middle East policy at the highest levels of government.<br />
To those who work with AI PAC in Washington, or have worked for the<br />
organization itself, the idea of information being passed from government<br />
officials to AIPAC st~ffers to Israelis seems almost commonplace.<br />
After all, these people see each other on almost a daily basis, at think-tank<br />
lunches and policy meetings throughout the capital. Information is exchanged<br />
and each participant tries to show his importance by touting what he knows and<br />
whom he has access to.<br />
-The easiest thing to learn in Washington is that no one likes to be surprised,"<br />
said Jon Alterman, a former State Department official. -AIPAC doesn't like to be<br />
surprised and nobody wants to surprise AIPAC.,·<br />
In that sense, AIPAC is like any other policy organization in Washington.<br />
-Information is the currency in Washington," said Morris Amitay. AIPAC's<br />
executive director from 1974 to 1980. MAIPAC meets regularly with officials at<br />
the State Department and Defense Department, trying to find out what's going<br />
on:'<br />
It's unclear how much of the information AIPAC receives is forwarded to Israeli<br />
officials, but the coordination between the Jewish state and its advocates in<br />
Washington is considerable.<br />
Most Israeli officials who travel to Washington meet with AIPAC and exchange<br />
information. But Israeli officialS also have strong ties to the Bush administration,<br />
and receive much information directly from American governmental sources"<br />
without need of intermediaries.<br />
One congressional staffer said it was understood in Washington that AIPAC had<br />
access to the highest sources in both the U.S. and Israeli governments, and<br />
could get most information it wanted.<br />
-They are very astute at knowing who will know what they would like to find out,·<br />
said the staffer., who spoke on condition of anonymity because the FBI<br />
investigation is ongoing. -It's simply understood, based on the success they've<br />
had:<br />
But because of the issues AIPAC deals with. policy discussions can easily cross<br />
into areas of national security. increasing the chances that classified information<br />
will be passed.,<br />
-There's always a real possibility that in giving a briefing. certain information that<br />
is classified could come out by the government briefers: said Neal Sheri who<br />
served as AIPAC's executive director from 1994 to 1996 and formerly worked in<br />
the U.S. Justice Department. -The lines are real blurry.·<br />
But Sher said the briefer would be the one committing the illegal act, not the one<br />
who gets the information.<br />
-Anyone with half a brain. ifsomeone is giving you a classified document. would<br />
say, 'I don't want to look at it.' • Amitay said. -Because it could be a sting:<br />
According to Newsweek. that's what occurred in the current case. Franklin<br />
reportedly tried to give documents to an AIPAC staffer, who wouldn't take them<br />
but asked for the information to be summarized orally.<br />
o<br />
Page 2 of3<br />
.http:/7wwwJta.orglpage-print_story.asp?intarticleid=14440 8/31/2004
JTA Print News<br />
When it comes to documents, federScials wHh security clearances are given 0<br />
little leniency.}Most desks have two computers; one for classified material and<br />
one for unclassified. The e-mail systems are separate and diskettes are not<br />
allowed to be inserted into the classified system.<br />
Page 3 of3<br />
But there's a lot more leeway when government officials brief outsiders.<br />
MHow far you go in telling people what's going on in a classified environment is a<br />
decision you have to make every daY,1II Alterman said. -There is a perception<br />
that you can trust the people you're talking to. III<br />
The congressional staffer added that much of what is classified already has<br />
been reported by the media.<br />
The recent focus on AIPAC's business practices is counter to the way the<br />
organization likes to work. AIPAC likes to shift focus away from its own<br />
professionals and onto the lay leaders and lawmakers pUblicly expressing<br />
support for the Jewish state.<br />
But that hasn't always been easy. Because Israel is such a heated topic in<br />
Washington and around the world, and because AIPAC has been successful in<br />
its mission" the group often is at the center of questions regarding U.S. support<br />
for Israel.<br />
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Israel won't ask U.S. to clarify why<br />
official was being tailed<br />
By Nathan Guttman<br />
WASHINGTON· Larry Franklin, the Pentagon'data<br />
analyst suspected of funneling classified documents<br />
to Israel through the Jewish I~bby AIPAC, had been<br />
helping with the investigation for several weeks before<br />
the story broke in the media, the New York Times<br />
reported yesterday citing sources familiar with~ the<br />
case.<br />
ii!i_~~!P.ii<br />
(See'IHT for further ,details)<br />
Safar, the details available point to<br />
Naor Gilon, political adviser at the<br />
Israeli embassy in Washington, as<br />
the FBI surveillance target that led<br />
investigators to Franklin.<br />
Israeli sources could 'nqt say<br />
~~~~IrIIiG.D yesterday why Gilon had been<br />
til<br />
under surveillance, but Israel does<br />
not intend to seek clarifications or protest in the<br />
matter. lilt's neither the first nor the last time diplomats<br />
have been tailed in this town," an Israeli official said<br />
yesterday.<br />
Another source said there is nothing unusual in the<br />
FBI monitoring meetings of diplomats, but said it's<br />
unlikely this was mundane surveillance, so it's<br />
possible there was suspicion ~f some kind about<br />
information reaching the Israeli embassy. Gilon knew<br />
Franklin and kept an ordinary working relationship<br />
with him as part of his job.<br />
The Israeli embassy declined comment on the affair<br />
yesterday and banned Gilon from talking to the media.<br />
An embassy official yesterday repeated.the line that<br />
these are "groundle~s and vicious allegations."<br />
Embassy sources were worried reports on the affair<br />
could hamper Gilon's duties as the main official in<br />
charge of political ties to U.S. administration officials<br />
by making them wary of meeting him.<br />
Gilon's meetings with Franklin and other<br />
administration representatives have been described<br />
by the embassy as the .daily routine of diplomats in<br />
that post. "It's exactly what all diplomats in<br />
Washington do, it's their job," an Israeli source said.<br />
A communique released by embassy officials said "as<br />
representatives of th~ state, we conduct an intensiv~<br />
ThiS Day In. Haaretz dialogue on an'array of.topic~ wi!h o~r colleagues, in.<br />
Today's',Papers - -- all,branch~s,~~f ~,h~ a~ministrati~n~ !h~S ~i~l~gue takes<br />
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place in a responsible, credible, professional, and<br />
completely transparent manner, as befits the nature of<br />
relations between Israel and the.United States."<br />
Still, the question remains as to why Gilon was being<br />
watched. One possibility mentioned is that the FBI'<br />
obtained information that administration documents<br />
were being leaked to Israel and wanted to track route<br />
ofthe leak.<br />
Another possibility is that elements opposed to Israeli<br />
[ AD] policy tried to set up Gilon and Israel on false<br />
accusations. Gilon, who was on vacation for a family<br />
event in Israel, has returned to Washington and is<br />
back at work.<br />
Israeli sources said the embassy staff, Gilon included,<br />
will continue meeting as usual with administration and<br />
congressional representatives and with Jewish<br />
community leaders.<br />
The FBI has applied to neither Israel norits U.S.<br />
based representatives for any information on the affair<br />
and it has not come up in meetings with U.S. officials.<br />
Page 2 of2<br />
., :.;<br />
».<br />
y<br />
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Meanwhile, the America Israel Public Affairs<br />
Committee is also presenting a business as usual<br />
face. The powerful Jewish lobby noted with pride that<br />
all its events scheduled for the current Republican<br />
National Convention in New York are attracting<br />
capacity crowds.<br />
Shalom: Mole story has been exaggerated out of<br />
proportion<br />
A Foreign Ministry investigation of the Larry Franklin<br />
affair indicates that Israel's embassy in Washington<br />
acted completely according to procedure.<br />
lilt never violated the rules of diplomacy and good<br />
dialogue that we maintain with the United States.,"<br />
Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said yesterday.<br />
Referring to Naor Gilon, the embassy's political<br />
attache, Shalom said: "He meets senior administration<br />
officials in the course of his work, and there's nothing<br />
unusual about that. The fact [the FBI] is following him<br />
shows this matter has been blown completely out of<br />
proportion." (Aluf Benn)<br />
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JPost.com »~ » SeGurity·PlplQmacv ~ Article<br />
Aug. 31, 2004 0:55<br />
Diplomat-tied to alleged mole returns to US<br />
By tiEBS KEINON ANQ lANltlE ZACHABIA<br />
~a;~~:("~i ~l»';<br />
~ • .It ......,'...~,\.;...,. J"" ~<br />
Naor Gilon, the diplomat at<br />
Israel's embassy in Washington<br />
who reportedly had contact with<br />
alleged Pentagon "mole" Larry<br />
Franklin. returned to the US on<br />
Sunday after spending a<br />
vacation in Israel.<br />
Foreign Ministry officials said<br />
Gilon, the political affairs<br />
minister and number three at the<br />
embassy, returned to<br />
Washington because he "did<br />
nothing wrong," and "had<br />
nothing to hide:'<br />
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Newsweek reported on Sunday<br />
that FBI agents monitoring a lunchtime conversation between an Israeli embassy official,<br />
believed to be Gilon, and a lobbyist for AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs<br />
Committee), discovered Franklin when he "walked in" to the lunch out of the blue. Franklin,<br />
according to Newsweek, soon became a subject of the FBI investigation as well.<br />
Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom responded publicly on Monday to the allegations for the first<br />
time, calling them "media nonsense" that has been blown way out of proportion.<br />
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"Israel would not do anything that could harm our best friend, the US," Shalom said at a<br />
joint press conference with German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer.<br />
liThe government of Israel categorically rejects the accusations that it spied or is spying on<br />
its best friend, the US," he said.<br />
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Shalom said that meetings between embassy and US Administration officials are routine,<br />
ordinary, and part of the regular diplomatic work in Washington. He said that similar<br />
meetings and exchanges ofinformation take place in Israel among US Embassy and Israeli<br />
government officials.<br />
Shalom said Gilon is a "dedicated worker who - as part of his job - met with administration<br />
officials, there is nothing unique or extraordinary about this. I think this has been blown out<br />
of proportion•."<br />
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Shalom said~Foreign Ministry has been dealing with this case since Friday afternoon.<br />
:::t;! Estat..Q before the allegations were air~~ on CBS. Israel, Shalom said" has a firm policy that it has<br />
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not strayed from of not conducting any espionage activities in the us.<br />
Shalom said he believes there are reasons for the timing of the leak about the investigation<br />
of Franklin, but refused to say what he thinks those reasons are.<br />
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However, other Israeli officials over the last two days have said th~ allegations, coming on<br />
the eve of the Republican National Convention, are meant to embarrass US President<br />
George W. Bush, and are part of an ongoing poliCy battle in Washington being waged<br />
among officials in the State Department, CIA, and Pentagon who are at odds over US policy<br />
in Iraq.<br />
Asked whether Israel was concerned that one ofits senior diplomats was being trailed by<br />
FBI agents, Shalom replied "you don't know if he was being followed." Other minister<br />
officials in the Foreign Ministry said that the "tail" on Gilon should not come as any surprise,<br />
and that the operative assumption of most diplomats abroad is that they are under a certain<br />
degree of surveillance.,<br />
In New York on Monday, Sen. Gordon Smith (R·Oregon) told the Anti-Defamation League's<br />
New York regional board that the allegation of espionage made little sense.<br />
"It doesn't add up to me because I know how closely we share with the State of Israel now,"<br />
said Smith, "and there is no reason for there to be any espionage operations either way. I'm<br />
very skeptical'and I've got a lot of questions to ask when we get to the appropriate<br />
hearings."<br />
One House Democratic staffer said: "My impression is that the Justice Department is<br />
backing off."<br />
VVhile CBS news originally reported'on Friday that the Justice Department was poised to<br />
"r~1I up" some agents as early as this week, the New York Times reported on Monday that<br />
no arrest appears imminent since authorities are unsure if Franklin even broke the law.<br />
Continued<br />
11~1~<br />
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Analysis I Damage done - true9r<br />
not<br />
By AmicQren<br />
Acting Foreign Ministry Director-General Ron<br />
Prushauer called two senior intelligence officials<br />
Friday night: Mossad chief Meir Dagan and Yehiel<br />
Horev. the defense establishment·s chief of secu~ty.<br />
Both gave him the same answer: No, we are not<br />
involved in the Larry Franklin affair.<br />
Advertisement .Prushauer gave half a sigh of relief:<br />
, '~'k~~=:xl"'~ If ~agan and Horev.are to be<br />
·"{'·~~~f~;. ~ beheved, and there IS ~urrently no<br />
.;,\¥:~.,,,,~<br />
..: ),." reason not to. then neither the<br />
; ::~;'_;/,/(-\ ..J: Mossad nor Horev's Malmab unit -<br />
ti·::.:4~· .~.; which. in its previous incarnation.<br />
• was responsible for running<br />
Jonathan Pollard - is involved in the<br />
• ' affair. which threatenes to<br />
·'..;,'.. HelJ ,t..Mnl-, .:'. reawaken all the old demons.<br />
-; Q '<br />
But it was only haifa sigh of relief, because the<br />
Foreign Ministry's own internal investigation has no~<br />
yet ended. Thus documents could yet be uncovered<br />
for which Franklin served as a source, whether<br />
directly or indirectly. Moreover. as the investigation<br />
progresses. suspects' confessions or polygraph tests<br />
could implicate Israel. In that case. Israel would<br />
appear to be a liar. even if its denials now are<br />
genuinely based on the best currently available<br />
information. And should Israel eventually hand over<br />
evidence against Franklin. it would appear to be a<br />
double traitor - first against its benefactor, the U.S.,<br />
and then against its agent.<br />
Finally. even if official Israel proves innocent, the pro<br />
Israel lobby in Washington. AIPAC. has already be~n<br />
hurt.<br />
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The importance of the Franklin affair goes far beyond<br />
the importance of the information that he allegedly<br />
gave to two AIPAC members, who in turn allegedly<br />
transmitted it to Israel. The documents, which<br />
included a draft decision by President George Bush,<br />
were all the type of staff work that is routinely .<br />
discussed by Israel·s diplomatic attaches and U.S.<br />
officials.· Indeed. getting information from U.S. officials<br />
is one of the diplomatic attaches' main jobs.,<br />
Moss~d representatives and military attaches also<br />
maintain ties with American officials. The Military<br />
Intelligence representative is responsible for ties with<br />
the Defense Intelligenc~ Agency, which is the<br />
.Defense,Department's intelligence,arm and Franklin's<br />
fOJ!r1~r ~mp"loyer: . -. . ,. .<br />
"<br />
J<br />
~<br />
. http://www.haaretz.comlhasen/spages/470420.html 8/30/2004
Haaretz - Israel News - AnalYSiS(;5amage done - true or not<br />
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o<br />
Under certain circumstances, any of the above<br />
embassy officials could have had reason to speak<br />
with someone working, as Franklin most recently did,<br />
for DougJas Feith, the undersecretary of defense for<br />
policy.<br />
Feith was one of the leading administration advocates<br />
of a tough line on Iran, the war in Iraq and strong<br />
support for Israel. Others include Undersecretary of<br />
State John Bolton, Vice President Richard Cheney"<br />
Cheney's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, and Deputy<br />
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. This group is<br />
opposed on all three issues by the CIA, Secretary of<br />
State Colin'Powell and other State Department<br />
officials.<br />
Page2of2<br />
1 ..<br />
y<br />
Thus Israel has been caught in the crossfire of a<br />
policy war within the U.S. administration - one unlikely<br />
to end even if Bush is reelected in November.<br />
Wolfowitz, whom Bush likes, would probably have<br />
trouble getting Senate confirmation for a promotion;<br />
Feith was considered a leading candidate for ouster<br />
even before the Franklin affair; Bolton's status has<br />
been undermined; and the entire group viewed Bush's<br />
nomination of Porter Goss for CIA director as a blow,<br />
as Goss has close ties with the agency and its<br />
outgoing head, George Tenet, the group's long-time<br />
rival.<br />
Another agency whose battle for survival is liable to<br />
hurt Israel, albeit unintentionally, is the FBI, whose<br />
signal failure to prevent the September 11, 2001<br />
attacks led both to the creation of the Department of<br />
Homeland Security and to calls for removing<br />
counterterrorism from the FBI's aegis and transferring<br />
it to a new agency, similar to Britain's M15. The FBI is<br />
thus determined to prove to be outstanding at the top<br />
two items on its new agenda: preventing terrorism and<br />
preventing espionage.<br />
The man who is heading the FBI's investigation<br />
against Franklin, Dave Szady, has repeatedly said<br />
that he views no person, agency or country as above<br />
suspicion. In his view, Israel, along with Taiwan,<br />
France, Japan, India and others, is on the list of<br />
friendly countries that "nevertheless try to steal our<br />
secrets. n He once stated in an interview that only the<br />
prevention of mass-casualty terror attacks is more<br />
important than counterespionage. He added that<br />
today, it is not only America's enemies, but also its<br />
allies that try to steal its secrets - and while<br />
embassies and consulates remain the bases for such<br />
activity, he continued, foreign governments today also<br />
employ stUdents" scientists and nfront n companies.<br />
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Aug. 29, 2004 22:08 I Updated Aug. 30, 2004 19:00<br />
Background: Not AIPAC's first controversy<br />
By CAl.E\I BEN-DAYIQ<br />
'a,flgt~ Si·i)·=<br />
~ .... ' ..... 1> ,,_ ... _.~.<br />
"A lobby is like a night flower; It<br />
thrives in the dark and dies in<br />
the sun."<br />
So wrote Steven Rosen, AIPAC<br />
director of foreign policy issues,<br />
in an internal organizational<br />
memo several years ago.<br />
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Unfortunately for the influential<br />
,pro-Israel lobbying group, this<br />
new affair is turning far too much<br />
of the media spotlight on an<br />
organization that prefers to work<br />
behind the scenes on Capitol<br />
Hill. But it is hardly the first time<br />
AIPAC has found itself at the<br />
center of public controversy, although never in such a serious matter as receiving classified<br />
security material.<br />
In 1988, the investigative show 60 Minutes ran a critical piece on AIPAC using information<br />
supplied by its former communications director (and ex-Jerusalem Post reporter) Barbara<br />
Amouyal. Among the material supplied by Amouyal was an internal memo suggesting that<br />
the media be fed stories regarding Jesse Jackson's private life.<br />
Also induded in the 60 Minutes report was another internal memo which seemed to direct<br />
how political action committees should donate money to specific pro-Israel ca~didates, a<br />
possible violation of federal law forbidding lobby groups such as AIPAC from directly<br />
involving themselves in elections. A subsequent investigation by the Federal Elections<br />
Commission deared AIPAC of any violations.,<br />
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Nonetheless, AIPAC continues to face accusati()ns that it unduly interferes in the electoral<br />
process, especially'from politicians who credit their defeats at the polls to the organization's<br />
efforts., The most notable example in recent years was the 2002 congressional race, in<br />
which two Georgia Democrats, incumbents Cynthia McKinney and Earl Hilliard, were<br />
defeated in party primaries by contenders perceived as more pro-Israel. McKinney<br />
subsequently commented: "Despite the fact that I easily won the Democratic vote, 40,000<br />
Republicans maliciousl~ crossed over and overtook the Democratic Primary. And because<br />
AIPAC had telegraphed in newspaper arti~esJhat they wer~ goinJJ to target ~oth Earl<br />
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Jerusalem PostIBreaking Newse:; Israel, the Middle East and the Jewi~h World,<br />
Specials Hilliard and me, the Democratic Party was paralyzed." 0<br />
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AIPAC has sometimes even found itself on the receiving end of criticism from the Israeli<br />
governments whose positions it is charged to support. This was especially so during the<br />
early years of the Oslo Accords. when an organization viewed by many on the Jewish left<br />
as traditionally more right-leaning, seemed slow to adjust itself to Israel's sudden political<br />
shift.<br />
In 1992. newly elected prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, in a closed-door meeting with AIPAC<br />
leaders in Washington" reportedly told them in harsh terms they had gone too far in<br />
antagonizing the Bush administration in the battle to gain loan guarantees sought by the<br />
previous Shamir govemment. The next year AIPAC vice-president Harvey Friedman<br />
referred to deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin in the presence of a reporter as a "little<br />
slimebaU:' after Beilin had complained that Friedman had spoken approvingly of transferring<br />
the Palestinians. Friedman SUbsequently left AIPAC as the organization sought to improve<br />
ties with the Rabin govemment.,<br />
AIPAC's efforts to keep a low media-profile have also led to accusations that it has put<br />
undue pressure on journalists, especially from the Jewish press, who cover it critically.<br />
Among them is Washington Jewish Week reporter larry Cohler, who earlier this year told<br />
an Internet site: ''Their mission statement doesn't say anything about them mucking around<br />
in Jewish newspapers.<br />
Page 2 of2<br />
AIPAC tried to get me fired, [and editor)'Andy [Silow-Carrol] fired [from The Washington<br />
Jewish Week in 1992]." (AIPAC has denied those charges.)<br />
Given its task, it is inevitable that AIPAP will serve as a perennial whipping-boy for anti<br />
Semitic Jewish conspiracy theorists. and as the phantom spoiler by disgruntled anti-Israeli<br />
politicians who fall short at the ballot box. But its reported involvement in the Pentagon-leak<br />
story will force it to handle mainstream-media damage control of the like the organization<br />
has not yet known.<br />
SECURITY-DIPLOMACY<br />
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Haaretz - Israe.l News - Making't:runtain into a molehill<br />
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Searc~ siter<br />
Making a mountain into a molehill<br />
By Aklya Eldar<br />
It now looks by all accounts like Larry Franklin will. at<br />
worst, be tried for mishandling sensitive material. In<br />
other words, he'li be charged with leaking information<br />
to the pro.;.lsraellobby AIPAC. "Sensitive" data of this<br />
sort, or of an even more s~nsitive nature, is routinely<br />
conveyed during meetings between American officials<br />
and Israeli diplomats under the bright lights· of upscale<br />
restaurants in th~ heart of Washington,' D.C.<br />
Advtrtlstmtnt<br />
.The real problem threatening Israel-<br />
'.t-:~. ..7 '..A'i~'~'" , u.s. relations and the Jewish<br />
.~~~\~~ . ~ community does not reside in this<br />
~~ ~~..;;1.~~:~::. ~ small-fry from the Pentagon and the<br />
.1- ~. ~~;Ii ~ ~~:.::J classification grade of the leaked<br />
t~l1'~ ,f.~:I":': ;; document, but rather in the<br />
• suspicion of something fishy at the<br />
top. The murky waters of this affair<br />
will provide ample fishing grounds<br />
for political rivals and conspiracy<br />
~...;.z;:l .........~~,;wbuffs. First they'lIland Franklin's<br />
boss, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas<br />
Feith, and thenthey'll hook the entire group of<br />
neoconservatives of which he is one of the leaders.<br />
That is the' group of Israel's friends, inclUding many<br />
Jews, that pushed President Bush to go to war in Iraq.<br />
Th~ best form of defense being offense.<br />
spokespeople for the Israeli government insinuated<br />
that anti-Israel elements are behind the affair.<br />
Republican representatives point to "Democratic<br />
agents" among senior FBI officials who want to spoil<br />
things for Bush on the eve of his party's convention.<br />
They may be right. But you don't need Franklin and<br />
the classified Iranian document to draw fire at the<br />
conspiracy to take over Iraq. As members of think<br />
tanks several years ago. Feith and his. friends<br />
volunteered an open document' in which they laid bare<br />
their Israeli-American plot to change the face of the<br />
entire Middle East. In 1996, a conservative Israeli<br />
American research institute invited Feith and others,<br />
including Richard Perle who headed an advisory<br />
panel to the Pentagon known as the Defense Policy<br />
Board, to put together a strategic manual for the<br />
incoming prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.,<br />
Feith is responsible for the following paragraph from<br />
that document: "Israel can shape its strategic<br />
environment. in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan,<br />
by weakening, containing, and even rolJing back<br />
Syria. This effort can focus on removing Saddam<br />
Hussein fr9m power in Iraq - an importar)t Israeli<br />
strategic objective in its own right'- as'a means of<br />
""foiling Syria'sregional ambitions."<br />
[AD]<br />
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~hutzpah: Class 101<br />
Sarah Augerbraun knew<br />
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either yelled at him or just<br />
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An expiration date<br />
In a few months, when<br />
American magazines list<br />
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the to·p ofthe list. So will·<br />
one documentary.<br />
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The document goes on to state that "Jordan has<br />
challenged Syria's regional ambitions recently by<br />
suggesting the restoration of the Hashemites in Iraq ...<br />
Since Iraq's future could affect the strategic balance in<br />
the Middle East profoundly, it would be<br />
understandable that Israel has an interest in<br />
supporting the Hashemites in their efforts to redefine<br />
Iraq."<br />
Six years later, members of that same group<br />
supported the half-baked idea to crown Jordan's<br />
Prince Hassan as Iraq's ruler.<br />
If anyone was looking to use Franklin to sock Feith in<br />
the weak spot of dual loyalty, in order to hurt Bush,<br />
they could have located its sources in that very same<br />
open document. Its authors provided the head of a<br />
foreign government tips on manipulating U.S.<br />
members of Congress. They suggested that he take<br />
advantage of the period remaining before the<br />
November '96 presidential and congressional<br />
elections to obtain "a benign American reaction" for<br />
his/their policy. In exchange for the free advice. they<br />
asked for Netanyahu's help in recruiting members of<br />
Congress who "care 'Very much about missile<br />
defense" to counter an agreement with Russia on<br />
reining in proliferation of long-range missiles.<br />
Feith and his friends promised in that document that<br />
Israeli support for the missile plan would assist efforts<br />
to relocate the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to<br />
Jerusalem. That initiative, sponsored by the<br />
Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole, was the<br />
brainchild of the neoconservatives and their friends at<br />
AIPAC., It utterly contravened the view held by<br />
president Bill Clinton and prime minister Yitzhak<br />
Rabin that initiatives of that sort do not help build trust<br />
between Israel and the Palestinians. Perhaps that is<br />
the strongest proof of all that the neoconservatives<br />
and Jewish lobbyists do not serve two masters. They<br />
serve themselves, and that's the trouble.<br />
[AD]<br />
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DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg •<br />
~lran-Sonira 11'/" b~ Joshua Micah M~rshall, Laura Roze... http://www.wasftingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/041 ..... \<br />
nji;ni]iiIE~fl!m5i1Era<br />
Nev~.r#r!lis~.a:.Sin~~~ ~~~~e<br />
Subscribo ol>fit'le<br />
&save 33% off'<br />
_ne\'Vs51oltdimce<br />
Respond to this Article September 200,.<br />
Iran-Contra II?<br />
Fresh scrutiny on a rogue Pentagon operation.<br />
By JosbuaMicab Marsball, Laura Rozen,·and Paul Glastris<br />
i __'_ .....1x:;zs -4ZS;;;:_<br />
=<br />
azaSA : _ U_S ;SQ............. t<br />
On 'ri~a~ tv¢rUn~, ~as N¢\VS t¢pOt1~d. ttiat Jf)~ FlU i~ Jny~sJi~aUh~ a~u~peqt~d<br />
mole intlie Department ofDefeiise wlio allegedlY passed to Israel, yilt apro-ISraeli<br />
Ip~bYiiig otgatiii.iltl~ii, classifled Am~i¢~ iiittiUlg~ttc~ abQit~ Iron. Tne fp~U~ (Sflhe<br />
iIive~tigiUiofi, according to u.s. government 6fficiiUs, is Larry VtanIdhi, aveteran<br />
Oe&"s~ Int~mg~n~ A&e~¢y Itati ~~IY$t tiQW wotk!t\g bi Ui¢ olli\:e. b.fthe<br />
Pentagon's nuiiiber tliree civilian official, UlidersecreWf ofDefeiiSe for PoJic~<br />
Douglas Feith. ..<br />
The investigation ofFranklin is now shininB. a bript lig,ht on a shadowy struggle<br />
within the Bush adminislration over the direction ofU.S. policy toward Iran. In<br />
partic~J1ar, the FBI is lookin~ with renewed interest at an unauthorized back-chann~l<br />
between Iranian dissidents and advisers in Feith's office, which more senior<br />
administration . officials first tried in vain to shut down.<br />
and then later attempted to<br />
cover up.<br />
ftanlUin, a,IOiig Witlt at\~tlt~t coU¢,{igU¢ f(iPi F¢Uh's ~Uli¢~, Bp9.lyg)QI Midgl~ EftSt<br />
expert name(f Harold Rhode, were tlie two offichils involved in tfie back-cliiiiiiiel,<br />
wJii~h ifivolv¢d on-going m~~tjng~ iUl4 ~6fi~c~ \YUh h1lmaii ijnn~ d¢aler Manucher<br />
Glioi'biiiiifar and other Itaiiian eXiles, dissidentS and government officials.<br />
QhQrbsmif(\r- i$ nsfQri¢(j figUf~ WI'4$5 PI4ye.
':lran-Contralrr by Joshua Micah Marshall, Laura Roze...<br />
.~.~ ~ ~' b<br />
http://www.washingtonmonthly.comlfeatures/2004/041 ...<br />
Q<br />
WMhlngtQl1 Miilltl11y<br />
admhustiilUQi) PoJicY-ttiftKlng. And an UiVestigaQQn,by 1'h~<br />
m6ludiiig a tareS ililehriew willi Ghorb8.iiifar - adds w6iglit to those concerns. The<br />
tftc.¢tlngS {\1m Qut to hAve ij~eil (clt·m6i~ E}xten~UV9 (lp(l mU9h l¢s~ "tidefW"it~<br />
House ~onti'61 tlian otigmally reponed. One ofthe meetingS, wliich Pentagon<br />
Qfli4ilU~ lia.Y~ long 9bc)ia¢t~ii~d AS metely (l "Qhl\il
'~Iran-Gmtra II?" by Joshua Micah Marshall, Laura Roze...<br />
~--~ . 0<br />
http://WWW.WaGgtonmOnthIY.COmlfeaturesl2004/04l...<br />
A~¢~tdin~ tQ u,s! ~QV~tntnent $()yt
'i,ran-C,ontra ll?" by Joshua Micah M\U'Shall, LauraRoze...<br />
J2~. ,••.~ • O.<br />
'..<br />
.' http://www.was~gtonmonthly.comlfeaturesl2004/041...<br />
nckiioWI~dg~d U1¢ $~~Qnd tij¢etifig jn P.C\ii~ tti JlJn~ ?o.OJ, ~UI msi~te(l. that It \v~ the<br />
resUlt ofa ",cliaiice encoiJiiter" betWeen Gli6i'baiiifar and a P.eii~6ii omci.tU. The<br />
administration has,kept to the "chance encounter" story to this day.<br />
Ghorbanifar, however, lau~s offthat idea. "Run into each other? We had a prior<br />
arrangement," he told The Washington Monihly.: "It involved a Jot ofdiscussion and<br />
a lot ofpeople."<br />
9y~r !he J~t Y~!I'; th~ ~~q~tc: JtJ,eIJjg~n9~ ~9mf!lj~~~ ~!lS _con~!1c~~9 1imjt~9 in.q!1iry<br />
into the meetln~, inoluding interviews with Feith and Ledeen. But under terms ofa<br />
QQmpt9mi~~ agr~~4 to ~y "9th P~i~i @wit inv~tigtltiqn intQ th~ fn;~!ter WM nl!t off<br />
until after the November eleotion. Republioans on the committee, many of whom<br />
$YR1P~!p.f~ wjqt th~ tt~gi.l!le ~h~g~ri·~gen~~ ..l!t ~Q.D, P~v~. JJ~n 1~~1~.~! .!9&~':lth<br />
investigations, calling them an election-year fishing expedition. Democrats, by<br />
~'. ,LEXIS®-NEXIS® View Prin~e Page<br />
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Page 1 of4<br />
\<br />
Copyright 2004 Los Angeles Times<br />
All Rights Reserved<br />
Los Angeles Times<br />
September 3, 2004 Friday<br />
Correction Appended<br />
Home Edition<br />
SECTION: MAIN NEWS; National Desk; Part A; Pg. 1<br />
LENGTH: 1614 words<br />
HEADLINE: TijE WORLD;.<br />
Israel Has Long Spied on U.S., Say Officials<br />
'"<br />
BYLINE: Bob Drog~,n and Greg Miller, Times StaffWriters<br />
DATELINE: WASHINGTON<br />
BODY:<br />
Despite its fervent denials, Israel se
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. . ()<br />
'''They undertake a wide range oftechnical operations'and human operations," the former official said.<br />
"People here as liaison ... aggressively pursue classified intelligence from people. The denials are<br />
laughable.II<br />
Current and former officials involved with Israel at the White House, CIA, State Department and in<br />
Congress had similar appraisals, although not all were as harsh in th~ir assessments. A Bush<br />
administration official confirmed that Israel ran intelligence operations against the United States. "I don't<br />
know ofany foreign government that doesn't do collection in Washington,1I he said.<br />
Another U.S~ official familiar with Israeli intelligence said that Israeli espionage efforts were more<br />
subtle than aggressive, and typically involved the use ofintermediaries.<br />
But aformer senior intelligence official, who focused on Middle East issues, said Israel tried to recruit<br />
him as a spy in 1991.<br />
"I had an Israeli intelligence officer pitch me in Washington at the time ofthe first Gulf War," he said. "I<br />
said, 'No, go away,' and reported it to counterintelligence."<br />
The U.S. officials all insisted on anonymity because classified material was involved and because ofthe<br />
political sensitivity ofIsraeli relations with Washington. Congress has shown little appetite for vigorous<br />
investigations ofalleged Israeli spying.<br />
In his fust public comments on the case, Israel's ambassador, Daniel Ayalon, repeated his governmen~'s<br />
denials this week. til can tell you here, very authoritatively, very categorically, Israel does not spy on the<br />
United States," Ayalon told CNN. "We do not gather information on our best friend and ally." Ayalon<br />
said his government had been "very assured that this thing will just fizzle out. There's nothing there.II<br />
In public, Israel contends it halted all spying operations against the United States after 1986, when<br />
Jonathan Jay Pollard, a former Navy analyst, was convicted in U.S. federal court and sentenced to life in<br />
prison for selling secret military documents to Israel.<br />
U.S .. officials say the case was never fully resolved because a damage-assessment team concluded that<br />
Israel had at least one more high-level spy at the time, apparently inside the Pentagon, who had provided<br />
serial numbers ofclassified documents for Pollard to retrieve.<br />
The FBI has investigated several incidents ofsuspected intelligence breaches involving Israel since the<br />
Pollard case, including a 1997 case in which the National Security Agency b'pgged'two Israeli<br />
intelligence officials in Washington discussing efforts to obtain a sensitive U.S. diplomatic document.<br />
Israel denied wrongdoing in that case and all others, and no one has been prosecuted.<br />
But U.S. diplomats, miljtary officers and other officials are routinely warned before going to Israel that<br />
local agents are known to slip into homes and hotel rooms ofvisiting delegations to go through<br />
briefcases and to copy computer files.<br />
"Any official American in the intelligence' community or in the foreign service gets all these briefings on<br />
all the things the Israelis are going to try to do to you," said one U.S. official.<br />
. At the same time, experts said relations between the CIA and Israel's chiefintelligence agency, the<br />
Mossad, were so close that analysts sometimes shared-highly classified "code-word" intelligence on<br />
sensitive subjects. Tel Aviv routinely informs Washington ofthe identities ofthe Mossad station chief<br />
and the military intelligence liaison at its embassy in America.<br />
https:/lwww.nexis.com/researchlsearchlsubmitViewTagged 10/6/2004
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nuClear threat from Iran.<br />
(;)<br />
Page 4 of4<br />
Washington and Tel Aviv differ on their assessments ofIran's nuclear weapons development. Israel<br />
considers Iran's nuclear ambitions its No. 1security threat, and the issue is the top priority for AlPAC.<br />
The Bush administration takes the Iran nuclear threat seriously, but its intelligence estimates classify the<br />
danger as less imminent than do the Israeli assessments.<br />
What mystifies those who know AIPAC is how one ofthe savviest~ best-connected lobbying<br />
organizations in Washington has found itselfemrieshed in a spy investigation.<br />
Although never previously implicated in a potential espionage case, AlPAC has frequently been a<br />
subject ofcontroversy. Its close ties to Israeland its aggressive advocacy ofIsraeli government positions<br />
has drawn criticism that it should be registered as an agent ofa foreign country. Others, noting its ability<br />
to organize significant backing for or against candidates running for national office, have demanded th~t<br />
it be classified as a political action committee.<br />
So far the group has avoided both classifications, either ofwhich would impose major restrictions on its<br />
activities.<br />
Three years ago, Fortune magazine ranked AIPAC fourth on its list ofWashington's 25 most powerful<br />
lobbying groups -- ahe~d ofsuch organizations as th~ AFL-CIO and the American Medical Assn.<br />
Times staffwriters Mark Mazzetti and Tyler Marshall in Washington contributed to this report.<br />
CORRECTION-DATE: September 05~ 2004<br />
CORRECTION:<br />
Lobbying group -- An article in Friday's Section A about allegations ofIsraeli spying in the United<br />
States misidentified the American Israel Public Affairs Committ~e, a pro-Israel·lobbying group, as the<br />
American Israel Political Action Committee.<br />
GRAPHIC: PHOTO: DENIAL: Daniel Ayalon, Israeli ambassador to the U.S., says his nation doesn't<br />
spy here. PHOTOGRAPHER: Neal Hamberg Associated Press<br />
LOAD-DATE: September 5, 2004<br />
https://www.nexis.com/reseaichlsearchlsuomitViewTagged 10/6/2004
The sloe Sentinel<br />
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Pentagon A~~lyst St
The SlOe Sentinel<br />
But officials also have said that the draft, which originated at the Pentagon's Near.East and South Asian<br />
Affairs office, where Franklin worked, contained little in the way ofsensitive secrets that had not been<br />
reported by the media already. In-addition, after more than two years ofdebate among top U.S.<br />
officials, an NSPD on Iran has yet to be agreed upon by top officials and signed by the president.<br />
G<br />
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D~n~~~ ~yalon, to correct myself. Mr. Ambassaddr, ~e's al~ over the<br />
p~ess this week, the FBt js·invest~9ating an official of tbe Defense<br />
. Depar~ment, Lawrence Franklin, tor allegedly passing classified<br />
documents or materials or data from the White House that the White<br />
House plans ~e9a~din9, Iran the Wh~te House's plan~ on I~an and<br />
Israel. .<br />
ls Franklin spying tor your coun~ry?<br />
AMB. AYALON:. No, not. at. all, John. I. can tell you here. -- and thank you<br />
~o~ giv~ng me this opportunity to $ay categorically and very<br />
authoritatively, lsrae~ does no~ spy on th~ United States, no~ do we<br />
gather any intelligence on the U.S~ We do not do it because it'$ our<br />
best friend and ally. And secondly, we don't really need it because we<br />
a~e in such close, close xelations -~ strategic, polibical -- and we<br />
see eye to eye on most of the ~ssues t~ave~;ng the M~dd~e ~ast, whether<br />
;~'s ter~or or weapons of ma~s destruction, or Iran that we just talked<br />
about.<br />
And also, John, you emp~asi~ed i~'s press repQrts. Let me a+so say here<br />
that I'm not going to contend with or argue with some anonymous leaks<br />
or some faceless allegations o~ $ources. I can tell you here ~lS9 ~ha~<br />
in al~ my contacts with the U.S. government, there was no way that<br />
formally or ~nfo~mally we were di~cussing any of tpese alle9ations.<br />
So it's in the press. 4 don'~ know the motivations of i~. I hope jt<br />
will be revealed because there is nothing there wha~soever.<br />
MR. MC~UGHLIN: There's no grand jury that's been impaneled?<br />
AMB. AYALON: I ha~e no details on that, and no~ am I conce~ned becaus~<br />
we know exactly wha~ ~he facts are. And whoeve~ is leakjng, whoeve~ is<br />
feeding the press on ~hat, l would say ~t could be tWQ ~eason~. Eithe~<br />
it'~ $ome incompetence of not unde~standing reality o~ misunderstanding<br />
or misin~erpretin9 the activities that we engage ~n witb the U.s.<br />
government, or maybe ev~n a malicious intent. I don't. know.<br />
~~t I can t~~l you ag~;n, 9;~~gi.ally we-have not heard anything,<br />
.neither formal.J.y nor' i.l'lformally. - -<br />
M~. MC~U~~L1N: So we q~n ~e9a~Q.this as an oF~ic~al denial on the par~<br />
of the government of I$rael, what you're saying?<br />
~B, AY~OH: Yes. Ye$. And I would say it'$ more than that; for us it's<br />
a non-issue.<br />
LI<br />
, t. ?<br />
MR. MCLAUGH N: I t s a non-~ssue.<br />
AMB. AYA~ON: Exactly.<br />
M~. MC~UGHLIN: Now, you a~e aware, with ali due ~espect, Mr.<br />
Ambassador, that Israel Qenied that Jonathan Pollard was a spy for 13<br />
years, and then ~t. concu~red after that tha~he·was a spy.<br />
~a. ~YhtON: That wasn't qu~te t.he case. We too~ ~esponsib;l~ty -- ;t<br />
w~~ a sad ca~~. It was ~ $ad qase. And i~ w~~ an ~solated, ve~y unique<br />
case o£the ~as~ ove~ 20 years ago, and w~ all bore the consequences<br />
,..<br />
b6<br />
b7C
o<br />
for.:- it.<br />
MR t MCLAUGHLlN: Well, I think the gene~al assumption is tha~ nations<br />
sPY on each other'whethe~ theY'~e friendly or not.<br />
AMB. AYALON: Absolutely.<br />
.MR. MCLAUGHLIN: And there isn't ve~y much doub~ in my mind tha~ we have<br />
our spies, if they are earn~ng some o~ that $40 billion that we pu~ out<br />
for CIA, et cetera, ~here are spies in your government working for us.<br />
Absolutely? .<br />
AHB: ~Y~ON: ~o~lr~ fi9h~ ~h~t -- no, y~yl~~ ;ig~t ~nqt n?~~O~$f even<br />
friendly ones, do spy on each othe;-. 1his .is a common, .let.ts say,<br />
understanding. But 'afte~ Pollard, l can t~ll you he~e aga~n that rs~ae~<br />
MR. MCLAUGHLIN: The Pol~ard case.<br />
AMa. AYALON: After th~ Pollard case fro~ 20 so y~ars agQ, we took .~<br />
lsrael tQok ~ strategic defense -- strategic -decision nQt. to do any<br />
kind ot intelligence gat.hering of ~hat. ~ype on the United States, and<br />
we adhere to i~ and we don't. want even anytning which will be remotely <br />
c10se to such activ~ty because o£ the unique relation$hip between<br />
Israel and the United States. The relationship is un1que jn te~ms of<br />
clos~ness. . .<br />
MR. .MCLAUGHLIN;<br />
And preciou.s.<br />
AMB. ~YALON: Not just. ~Qe pres~ur~.<br />
MR. MCLAUGH~IN: Precious.<br />
AMB. AYALON: Not just -- very precious, ¥oulre right. Very precious. We<br />
cherish it. We wil~ not do anyth~ng to ~mpair ~t. And a9ain, no~ do we<br />
MR: MG~UGHL~N: I ~hin~ thQs~ genia~s a~~ ~eassu~~99. lIm not. $ure it<br />
clears my hurd~e of that people in yo~r station are required by the<br />
circumst~nces ot your dtp~6matic status to automatica11y d$ny<br />
everything, but I think you've gone a ~tep beyond that. -<br />
~. _ _. w __<br />
~yt ~ nav~ ~ que~t;09 w;th ~~9a~9 ~o ~IPA9. AI~~C ~~ ~ f~0~~i~~in9 qnd<br />
very successful lobby. It. does exce~l~nt. work 9n the par~ of Israel,<br />
but ;it. is -- i~ appears that. AIPJ\C is functioning as an intermedia~y,<br />
a~ this sto~y has been d~~eloped and pu~ forward. Now AI~AC den~ed any<br />
involvement, but 1 want to reaq you the lan9uage: .<br />
"Any al_legatio~ of criminal. conduct. by J\IPAC OL: ou~ employees is false<br />
and baseles~. Ne~the~ AIPAC no~ any of its employees bas vio!a~~d any<br />
laws o~ ~ules, nor has ~~~~G 0;- its employees ever rece~ved ~nformat;on<br />
they believed was secre~ or classified."<br />
Does that sound like ~<br />
categorical denial to you?<br />
AMB. A¥ALON: I think so. 1 cannot. speak, ot cQu~se, .foL: AIPAC. I think<br />
it's a very, very g09d American organizati9n, and we very much ,
o<br />
appre9~ate ~ts aqtivity on be~alf of the u.s. -- American ~trategiq<br />
alliance. I~ is ve~y impor~ant.<br />
~~: M9~UGH~~~: ~gt ~~ ~t ~9t. cu~;o~~ th?t ~h~E~ ~~ ~ig9*e ~09~ in that.<br />
statement, and the operat.tve words are "they believed was sec~et or<br />
classified?" Th.is puts the monkey on Wl;. franklin's back. AIPAC doesn't.<br />
deny passing the information on to Israeli it denies that. it. did so<br />
knowing that the information was classif~ed. They didn't know it was<br />
cla~si~ied. So a~e you putt.ing -- a~e ~ou putting Franklin out to d~y?<br />
~~. AY~tO~: l w6u~q -- yo~ ~now, ~o~n, was~~n9ton is a place, ~~k~ any<br />
other cap~tal, of jnformation shar~n9. Obviously, we do meet. with ~IPAC<br />
¢n a ~egular basis, like we do meet w~tn ot.her think tanks ~-<br />
MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, he --Frank~in --<br />
AMB. AYALON:~ -~ and wit.h administrat.~oo people<br />
MR. MG~QGH~~N: ¥eah.<br />
~B. ~YALON: ~~ CQngre~speople, academi~ people, media people. ~heY'~e<br />
all meeting and talkin9~-<br />
~ don't ~hin~ th~~e w~~ ~~yth~ng w~~ng~~th tn~~, and ~e ~;+l continue<br />
to do that. And r thin~ that the statement. speak$ for itself. ~ don't.<br />
have a~¥thin9 to add. r'm not. a ~pokesman for t.hem~<br />
MR. MCLAUGHLIN: But yo~ understand how t.hat "they believed" prQvides<br />
that. wi9gle ~oom? Can you see that?<br />
AMB. AYALON: ,}: .-- .no( I'm not. sur~. t.ha~ I t~.l.ly ~ndel;stand, you .know,<br />
tb1s legal~~tiq language~<br />
I can tel~ you that. --<br />
MR. MCLAUGHLIN: But AIPAC is presenting itself as possiply'an unwitting<br />
recipient. of clas~i~~ed ~nformation, whicb it ~ay have pa~sed on.
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Cloak and Swagger<br />
The Larry Franklin spy probe reveals an escalating fight over control ofIran policy.<br />
By Laura Rozen and Jas~n Vest<br />
Issue Date: 11.02.04<br />
Pr~nt ~riendly IEmail Article<br />
.<br />
To Washington's small and sometimes fractious community ofIran experts, it was becoming<br />
obvious: What to do about Iran and its fast-developing nuclear program was set to.rival Iraq as the<br />
most pressing foreign-policy challenge for the person elected president in 2004. By the spring and<br />
early summer ofthis year, the city was awash in rival Iran task forces and conferences. Some<br />
recommended that Washington engage in negotiations with Tehran's mullahs on the nuclear<br />
issue; they drew scorn from the other side, which preached regime change or military strikes.<br />
In late·July, as this debate raged, a Pentagon analyst named Larry Franklin telephoned'an<br />
acquaintance who worked at a pro-Israel lobbying group, the American Israel Public Affairs<br />
Committee (AlPAC). The two men knew each other professionally from their long involvement<br />
in the Washington Iran and Iraq policy debates, A Brooklyn-born Catholic father offive who put<br />
himselfthrough school, earning a doctorate, as an Air Force reservist, Franklin had served as a<br />
Soviet intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency until about a decade ago, when he<br />
learned, Farsi and became an Iran specialist. At their July meeting, Franklin told the AlPAC<br />
employee about his frustration that the U.S. govemmentwasn't responding aggressively enough<br />
to intelligence about hostile Iranian activities in Iraq. As Franklin explained it, Iran had sent all of<br />
its Arabic-speaking Iranian agents to southern.Iraq, was orchestrating attacks on Ir~qi state oil<br />
facilities, and had sent other agents to northern Iraq to kill Israelis, believed to be operating there.<br />
Iran had also transferred its top operative for Afghanistan to the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad. The<br />
move, Franklin implied, signified Tehran's intention to cause more trouble in Iraq.<br />
A couple ofweeks afteJ;' this meeting, in mid-August, the AIPAC official was visited by tWo FBI<br />
agents, who asked him about Franklin. From the line ofquestioning, it wasn't clear to the AlPAC<br />
official whether Franklin was being investigated by the FBI for possible wrongdoing or ifhe was<br />
simply the subject ofa routine background investigation for renewal ofhis security clearance.<br />
But on August 27, when CBS broke the story that the FBI was close to arresting an alleged<br />
"Israeli mole" in the office ofthe Pentagon's No.3 official, Douglas Feith, it became clear that<br />
Franklin was in trouble, News reports said that the FBI had evidence that Franklin had passed a<br />
classified draft national-security presidential directive (NSPD) on Iran to AIPAC. What's more,<br />
reports said, the FBI wasn'tjust interested in Franklin. For the past two years, it had been<br />
con~ucting a counterintelligence probe into whether AlPAC had served as a conduit for U.S.<br />
intelligence to Israel, an investigation about which National Security Adviser Condoleez:?:a Rice<br />
was briefed shortly after the Bush administration'came into office.<br />
?JJ'-<br />
In the flurry ofnews reports that followed, the scope ofthe FBI investigation seethed potentially<br />
enormous. Citing senior U.S. officials, The Washington Post reported that "the FBI is examining ") .\(,.<br />
whether highly classified material from the National Security Agency ... was also forwarded to<br />
~t'<br />
Israel," and that the investigation Of.Franklin was "coincidental" to that broader FBI probe. Time "'£n'lJ\<br />
magazine reported that Franklin had been enlisted by the FBI to place a series ofmonitored ,"p~ b 6<br />
.telephone calls (scripted by the FBI) to get possible evidence on others, including allies ofAhmad .b7C<br />
Chalabi, a favorite ofPentagon neoconservatives, Chalabi was alleged to have told his Irtu"""·........-~~<br />
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intelligence contacts that the United ~tates had broken'their commun!cations codes -- a breach<br />
that prompted a break in U.S. support for Ch.alabi last spring -- and the FBI wanted to know who<br />
had shared that highly classified information with Chalabi. What's more, an independent expert<br />
on Israeli espionage said he had been interviewed by the FBI in June and in several follow-up<br />
calls, and that the scope ofthe senior FBI investigators' questioning was broad and extremely<br />
detailed.<br />
In the wake ofthe first news reports, AlPAC strongly denied that any ofits employees had ever<br />
knowingly received classified U.S. information. Israel also categorically denied that it had<br />
conducted intelligence operations against the United States since the case ofJonathan Pollard, a<br />
U.S. Navy intelligence analyst who was convicted ofspyi~g for Israel in 1987.<br />
At the time the CBS report aired in late August-- incidentally, on the Friday evening before the<br />
opening ofthe Republican national convention -- custody ofthe Franklin investigation was being<br />
transferred from the head ofthe FBI counterintelligence unit, David Szady, to U.S. Attorney Paul<br />
McNulty, a Bush appointee, in Alexandria, Virginia, as the case moved to the grand-jury phase..<br />
And then, in mid-September, news ofthe Franklin investigation went dark.<br />
***<br />
The classified document that Franklin allegedly passed to AlPAC concerned a controversial<br />
proposal by Pentagon hard-liners to destabilize Iran. The latest iteration ofthe national-security )<br />
presidential directive was drafted by a Pentagon ci~ilian and avid neocon, Michael Rubin, who .--1<br />
hoped it would be adopted as official policy by the Bush administration. But in mid-June, Bush's<br />
national-security advisers canceled consideration ofthe draft, partly hi response to resistance from<br />
some at the State Department and the National Security Council, according to a recent memo<br />
written by Rubin and obtained by The American Prospect. No doubt also contributing to the<br />
administration's decision was the swelling insurgency and chaos ofpostwar Iraq.<br />
Rubin, in his early 30s, is a relative newcomer to the neoconservative circles in which he is<br />
playing an increasingly prominent role. Once the Iraq and Iran desk officer in the Pentagon's<br />
Office ofSpecial Plans and later a Coalition Provisional Authority adviser in Iraq, these days the<br />
Yale-educated Ph.D~ hangs his hat at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and serves as editor<br />
for controversial Middle East scholar Daniel Pipes' magazine, The Middle East Quarterly.<br />
In an article published in the Republican-oriented quarterly Ripon Forum in June, Rubin suggests<br />
that the administration resolve its Iran warning by turning against the current regime. "In 1953<br />
and 1979," he wrote, "Washington supported an unpopular Iranian government against the will of<br />
the people. The United States should not make the same mistake three times." In other words,<br />
President Bush should step up his public condemnation ofthe Iranian regime and break offall<br />
contact with it in hopes ofspurring a swelling ofthe Iranian pro-democracy movement. In short,<br />
Rubin, like his fellow Iran hawks, urges the administration to make regime c~ange in Iran its<br />
official policy.<br />
This invocation of"moral clarity" has a long intellectual pedigree among neoconservatives. It's<br />
the same argument they made to Ronald Reagan about the Soviet Union more than 20 years ago.<br />
"Ifwe could bring down the Soviet empire by inspiring and supporting a small percentage ofthe<br />
people," Michael Ledeen, a chiefneoconservative advocate ofregime change in Iran and freedom<br />
scholar at AEI, recently wrote in the National Review, "surely the chances ofsuccessful<br />
- _.~<br />
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revolution in Iran-are more likely.u<br />
Was it to this end that Franklin was allegedly observed by the FBI passing the ~raft NSPD on Iran<br />
to AIPAC? Was he trying to inform AIPAC, or Israel, about the contents ofthe draft NSPD? Or<br />
rather, and perhaps more plausibly, was he trying to enlist the powerful Washington lobbying<br />
organization in advocating for a Iran-destabilization policy? In other words, is the Franklin case<br />
really about espionage, or is it a glimpse into the ugly sausage-making process by which Middle<br />
Eastpolicy gets decided in Washington and, in particular, in the Bush administration?<br />
***<br />
Arguably past the apogee ofits power, AIPJ\C nonetheless remains one ofWashington's most<br />
influential organizations. Successor to the E!senhower-era American Zionist Council ofPublic<br />
Affairs, AIPAC came into its own during the Reagan years, thanks largely to the efforts offormer<br />
Executive Director Thomas Dine. When Dine assumed his pqst in 1981, the organization had an<br />
annual budget ofa little more than $1 million, about two dozen employees, and 8,000 members;<br />
when he left in 1993, a budget of$15 million was being administered by a staffof158, and the<br />
committee had 50,000 members.<br />
'<br />
An assiduous networker and fund-raiser, Dine also quickly became indispensable to the Reagan<br />
White House as a promoter ofvarious neoconservative foreign-policy initiatives. He also forged<br />
alliances between AlPAC and other interests, including the Christian right. (Another former<br />
AlPAC executive director, Morris Amitay, has long been active in neoconservative ventures, ~<br />
both a business partner to Feith and Richard Perle and co-~ounder, with Michael Ledeen, ofthe<br />
Coalition for Democracy in Iran.) By the mid-'80s, AlPAChad been a prime mover in the defeat<br />
or crippling ofinitiatives and legislators not to its liking, and the passage ofbillions in grants to<br />
Israel., It had also taken on an increasingly pro-Republican (and pro-Likud) tilt.<br />
While many regarded AlPAC's power as lessened during the Clinton administration, since 2001<br />
AlPAC has been powerful enough that even the Bush administration couldn't get the committee<br />
and its congressional allies to tone down language in a 2002 resolution in support ofIsraeli<br />
military actions against the Palestinians. AIPAC's 2002 annual conference included 50 senators,<br />
90 representatives, and more than a dozen senior administration officials; this year's conclave<br />
boasted President Bush h~mself, plus ~ouse Majority Leader Tom DeLay and an array ofState<br />
and Defense department officials.<br />
But while AlPAC is a powerhouse, It is not clear that it would have been the perfect vehicle for<br />
the kind ofIran-destabilization lobbyi~g that some in Washington have been pushing. There are a<br />
wide variety ofIsraeli positions on how to deal with Iran. Many ofWashington's Middle East<br />
hands who are pro-Israel believe destabilization will not likely succeed, and they fear it will not<br />
deal with what they consider the real threat from Iran: nuclear weapons.<br />
"Ifyou mean trying to promote the peaceful overthrow ofthe regime in Iran, I think the prospects<br />
-for success are highly uncertain,u says Patrick Clawson, deputy director ofthe Washington<br />
Institute for Near East Policy, a pro-Israel think tank. Pro-Israel activists in Washington want to<br />
make sure that the United States considers Iran's nuclear program first and foremost, an American<br />
.problem, the response to which could include, ifnecessary, air strikes against Iran's nuclear<br />
facilities. Iran's nuclear prgram, one such activist recently told the Prospect, "has to be seen as<br />
Washington's problem."<br />
... ..<br />
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There are other competing positions within the Israel-policy community. One Isra~1i official i!l<br />
Washington this summer for diplomatic -meetings discussed regime change in Iran with a reporter<br />
from The American Prospect on the condition th!lt his identity not be disclosed. He believes that<br />
Iran is ripe for democratic revolution, that it has one ofthe most pro-Western populations in the<br />
region, and that Iranian opposition forces would be electrified by a vigorous show ofU.S.<br />
presidential support. But he believes that any sort ofmilitary intervention in Iran would set back<br />
copsiderably these promising regime-change forces. Still'another group ofIsraeli policy-makers<br />
seem more inclined toward a military option, as evidenced by Israel's well-publici~edpurchase of<br />
500 "bunke~-buster" bombs from the United States in September and its failed efforts to launch a<br />
spy satellite to monitor Iran's nuclear-program developments.<br />
Yet another policy position became evident in Seymour Hersh's article in The New Yorker in<br />
June, in which Hersh reported that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, sensing that the U.S.<br />
created chaos in Iraq could leave an opening for anti-Israel efforts in Iran, was pursuing a "Plan<br />
B" that had Israeli operatives covertly training and equipping Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Syria for<br />
possible future covert action to counter any such measures. As Hersh reported: "Israeli<br />
intelligence and military operatives are now quietly at work in Kurdistan, providing training for<br />
Kurdish commando units and, most important in Israel's view, running covert operations inside<br />
Kurdish areas oflran and Syria.... Some Israeli operatives have crossed the border into Iran,<br />
accompanied by Kurdish commandos, to install sensors and other sensitive devices that primarily<br />
target suspected Iranian nuclear facilities."<br />
The Israeli government insisted the story wasn't credible, and that it was sourced by Turkey,<br />
which is panicked, as ever, about foreign designs on Kurdistan. But a source told the Prospect<br />
that Franklin expressed the conviction that the United States has intelligence that affirms Hersh's<br />
report to be largely accurate. A second fonner U.S. diplomatic official who recently visited the<br />
area told the Prospect that there are Israeli intelligence officials·operating in Kurdish Iraq as<br />
political advisers, and others under the guise ofbusinessmen.<br />
All ofwhich raises questions, like what exactly was in the draft NSPD that Rubin wrote and<br />
Franklin allegedly shared with AlPAC? And does the destabilization plan pushed by<br />
neoconservatiyes in the draft NSPD in fact advocate that the United States or its proxies ann the<br />
Iranian opposition, including the Kurds, as part ofits efforts to pursue regime change?<br />
The public sfatements by the neoconservatives emphasize that regime change in Iran would not<br />
require U.S. military force. Then again, the neoconservatives' inspiration for the Iran plan has its<br />
roots in Reagan-era NSPDs that, while providing nonmilitary support to Poland's Solidary<br />
Movement, also had the CIA aggressively arming and training the Afghan mujahideen, the<br />
NicaraguanContras, and other anti-communist rebels. There's also no denying that some ofthe<br />
chief advocates ofthe Iran regime plot come out ofthe Pentagon, America's military command<br />
center. And some ofthose same Iran hawks have discussed the Iran regime-change issue, for<br />
instance, with Parisian-based Iran Contra arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar -- not exactly the<br />
kind ofgo-to guy for a nonviolent regime change plan, one might think.<br />
***<br />
Whatever the nuances, the neocons are facing one oftheir biggest challenges in Washington<br />
today: persuading the administration to adopt their regime-change policy toward Iran even while<br />
their regime-change policy in Iraq appears to be crumbling. Since the Iraq invasion, Feith's office<br />
has come under the intense scrutiny ofcongressional investigators, investigative journalists, and<br />
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Democratic critics for its two controversial prewar intelligence units, the Office ofSpecial Plans<br />
and the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group. It was those units that had helped convince<br />
the Bush White House ofan operational connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda -- a<br />
claim since disproved by the independent September 1'1 commission, among others. Those<br />
secretive intelligence units had also been among the administration's strongest champions of<br />
Cbalabi, who allegedly told Iranian intelligence agents that the United States had penetrated<br />
Iranian communications channels.<br />
An FBI counterintelligence investigation ofwho had leaked this information to Chalabi was<br />
reportedly under way by spring 2004, and many ofChalabi's neocon allies were incredibly<br />
anxious: Misjudgment about Chalabi's virtues or postwar Iraq planning was one thing; passing<br />
secrets to another nation would be an accusation ofan altogether graver magnitude.<br />
All ofthese investigations put Franklin and other neoconservatives associated with Feith at the<br />
white-hot center ofa raging controversy: What would any second-term Bushforeign policy look<br />
like? Would controversial neocon figures like Feith remain in power? Or would it mark the rise of<br />
pragmatists and realists? For the neoconservatives, the fight to clear-Franklin and themselves has<br />
become a fight against their internal administration rivals. And they're fighting it in classic<br />
neocon fashion: dirty and disingenuously.<br />
Among intelligence professionals, it's hardly a state secret that even nations whose relationships<br />
go beyond mere alliance and constitute friendship spy on one another. That's one reason nations<br />
have counterintelligence capabilities as well. As such, investigations ofespionage and<br />
mishandling ofclassified documents are not uncommon in Washington; the Bush administration',s<br />
Justice Department, for example, has opened investigations to probe allegations ofChinese,<br />
Taiwanese, and Saudi espionage, including ones that involve ranking officials at the FBI and State<br />
Department. With the investigations into AIPAC and Franklin, the Justice Department has<br />
renewed its interest in snooping by our ally, Israel.<br />
Since the Pollard case, U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement sources have revealed to the<br />
Prospect that at least six sealed indictments have been issued against individuals for espionage on<br />
Israel's behalf. It's a testament to the unique relationship between the United States and Israel that<br />
those cases were never prosecuted; according to the same sources, both governments ultimately<br />
addressed them through diplomatic and intelligence channels rather than air the dirty laundry. A<br />
number ofcareer Justice Department and intelligence officials who have worked on Israeli<br />
counterespionage told the Prospect oflong-standing frustration among investigators and<br />
prosecutors who feel that cases that could have been made successfully against"Israeli spies were<br />
never brought to trial, or that the investigations were shut down prematurely. This history had led<br />
to informed speculation that the FBI -- fearing the Franklin probe was heading toward the same<br />
silent end -- leaked the story to CBS to keep it in the public eye and give it a fighting chance.<br />
But the pro..lsraellobby and some neoconservatives, fighting for their poiiticallives, have turned<br />
the leak on its head. They claim that the AlPAC and Franklin investigations have nothing to do<br />
with the substance ofthe Iran-related leaks. Rather, they say, investigators are going after Jews. In<br />
the current probes ofFranklin and AlPAC, Michael Rubin has led the strident charge. On<br />
September 4, during the media flap over the investigations, Rubin sent an e-mail memo -<br />
obtained by the Prospect -.. to a list offriendly parties targeting two ofWashington's more<br />
respected mainstre~m journalists, calling them key players in an "increasing anti-Semitic witch<br />
hunt." The memo fingered Deputy Secretary ofState Richard Armitage as one likely source ofthe<br />
leaks about the investigation, and also urged that, ifthe accusations had any merit, the White<br />
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House demand the evidence be made public. "Pm increasingly c,oncemed about the l~a~s<br />
spinning offfrom the Franklin affair,u Rubin wrote. celt was bad enough when the White House<br />
rewarded the June 15,2003, leak oy canceling conside~ation ofthe NSPD. Itshowed the State<br />
Department that leaks could supplant real debate.... Bureaucratic rivalries are out ofcontrol. u<br />
Rubin's memo showed up in a similar form almost a month later in the op-ed pages ofThe<br />
Washington Times under the byline ofNational Review staffer Joel Mowbray, and echoes ofit can<br />
be seen in the pages ofthe neocon-friendly Jerusalem Post.<br />
Meanwhile, FranKlin was involved in some pushback ofhis own. In late August, the Franklin case<br />
was referred from Szady to U.S. Attorney Paul J. McNulty, a Bush-Ashcroft appointee who heads<br />
the U.S. District COU!! for the Eastern District ofVirginia. A grand jury was seated on the case in<br />
September and had subpoenaed at least some witnesses to testify about Franklin. Then, on<br />
October 1, The New York Sun reported that Franklin had fired his court-appointed attorney (whom<br />
he had·presumably retained for financial reasons), halting grand-jury proceedings while he found<br />
new couns~l. On October 6, the Los Angeles Times reported that Franklin had stopped cooperating<br />
with the FBI entirely. He had hired ~ high-profile lawyer, Plato Cacheris (ofAldrich Ames and'<br />
Robert Hanssen fame), and had rejected a proposed plea agreement whose terms Franklin<br />
considers "too onerous,u according to the Los Angeles Times.<br />
Who pushed Franklin -- who for months seemed vulnerable -- to stop'cooperating? And wQo is<br />
paying for his expensive new lawyer? At this writing, we do not know, Also unknown is the<br />
status ofthe larger FBI counterintelligence probe ofalleged Israeli espionage into which Franklin<br />
stumbled. But we do know that his recent decisions would seem to immensely help any ofthe<br />
people against whom he could have testified. At least for now, that~s a rQund won by a clique<br />
intent on pushing freelance crypto-diplomacy to its limits.<br />
Laura Rozen reports onforeign-policy and national-security issuesjrom Washington, D,C. Jason<br />
Vest is a Prospect senior correspondent.<br />
'<br />
Copyright © 2004 by The American Prospect, Inc. Preferred Citation: Laura Rozen and Jason<br />
yest, "Cloak and Swagg~r'_',_The ~f!lerican Prosnect OnUne,_Nov 1, 2Q04, This article may not be<br />
resold" reprinted, or redistributed for compensation ofany kind without prior written permission<br />
from the author.'Direct questions about permissions to nermissions@nrosnect.org.<br />
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All Rights Reserved<br />
Los Angeles limes<br />
April 4, 2004 Sunday<br />
Home Edition<br />
SECTION: OPINION; Editorial Pages Desk; Part M; Pg. 1<br />
LENGTH: 979 words<br />
HEADLINE: Iraqi Democrats Feeling Sidelined<br />
BYUNE: Michael Rubin, Michael Rubin Is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and was<br />
a governance team advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority In Iraq.<br />
'<br />
DATELINE: WASHINGTON<br />
BODY:<br />
Last summer, as Iraqis sweltered outside, the Coalition Provisional Authority met in the marbled<br />
corridors and air-conditioned offices of one of Saddam Hussein's former palaces to hash out how to fund<br />
political parties. The State Department was adamant, insisting that the CPA should maintain "an even<br />
playing field" and should not favor one party over another. Parties affiliated with the Iraqi Governing<br />
Council's militant Islamists and liberal secularists should receive the same treatment. There should be no<br />
special consideration given to groups seeking to unite Iraqis rather than dividing them by ethnlclty or<br />
sectarian affiliations. -<br />
This may sound like the way to ensure fair elections•. But while the CPA has maintained its neutrality, our<br />
adversaries have shown no such compunction.<br />
Until recently, I worked for the CPA, living in a nondescript house outside Baghdad's Green Zone. I<br />
traveled the country with Iraqi friends, paying spot checks on borders, political parties, shrines and<br />
markets. Because I was not In a convoy or traveling with heavily armed guards, Iraqis could easily<br />
approach me. Professionals, politicians and religious figures telephoned at all hours for meetings,<br />
knowing they would not have to wait at the fortified gates of the palace complex. I quickly learned that<br />
most political business In Iraq happens not at Governing Council sessions, but In private homes between<br />
9 p.m. and 3 a.m.<br />
One February evening, a governor from a southern province asked to see me. We met after dark at a<br />
frlend's house. After pleasantries and tea, he got down to business. "The Iranians are flooding the city<br />
and countryside with money," he said. "Last month, they sent a truckload of silk carpets across the<br />
border for the tribal sheikhs. Whomever they can't buy, they threaten." The following week, I headed<br />
south to Investigate. A number of Iraqis said the Iranians had channeled money through the offices of<br />
the Dawa Party, an Islamist political party, led by Governing Council member Ibrahim Jafarl. On separate<br />
occasions In Baghdad and the southern city of Naslrlya, I watched ordinary Iraqis line up for handouts of<br />
money and supplies at Dawa offices. The largess seems to be having an effect: Polls Indicate that Jafari<br />
is Iraq's most popular politician, enjoying a favorable rating by more than 50 % of the electorate.<br />
The CPA's evenhandedness may be well-intentioned, but to a society weaned on conspiracy theories, the<br />
United States' failure to support liberals and democrats signals support forthe Islamists~Equal<br />
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opportunity may exist In Washington, but not in Baghdad. Why, Iraqis ask, wouid the ,CPA ignore the<br />
Influx of Iranian arms and money into southern Iraq if It had not struck some secret deal with Tehran or<br />
did not desire the resulting increase in militancy? Why would the Iranian border be largely unguarded a<br />
year after liberation?<br />
Iraqi liberals are especially sensitive to signs of support for Shiite politician Abdelaziz Hakim, leader of<br />
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution In Iraq, whose visit official Washington welcomed in January.<br />
Students affiliated with the Badr Corps, Hakim's militia, roam Basra University, forcing women to wear<br />
the veil. Signs proclaiming the supremacy of Hakim are affixed to doors across the university, and<br />
professors say they are afraid to remove them. In Naslriya and Karbala, Iraqis lament they can no longer<br />
speak openly, lest they become the subject of retaliation by Iranian-funded gangs.<br />
While Sense John F. Kerry of Massachusetts and carl levin of Michigan demand yet another government<br />
audit of the Iraqi National Congress (previous audits have found no wrongdoing), radical-clerics find their<br />
pockets full, their Iranian sponsors more Interested In mission than political cannibalism. last month, I<br />
Visited a gathering of urban professionals in Najaf. They repeatedly asked why ti:'e CPA stood ~y while<br />
followers of firebrand Shiite cleric MUQtader Sadr invaded homes, smashed satellite dishes'and meted<br />
out punishment in ad hoc Islamic courts. We may dismiss Sadr as a grass-roots populist, ~ut his rise<br />
was not arbitrary. Rather; his network.lS"'based:~pon~ample~fundlna he'receives through Iran-based"<br />
cleric Ayatollah Kazem al Haerl, a close"'assocfate"orrranian·Supreme LeaderAyatollah All Khamenei.·,<br />
In signing the bill authorizing $87.5 billion for reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan in November,<br />
President Bush called the massive campaign to rebuild bottl nations "the greatest commitment of Its kind<br />
since the Marshall Plan'!." There is daily progress. Shops have opened. Roads are repaved. But, the CPA<br />
remains hampered by a strategic communications strategy geared more toward Washington than Iraq.<br />
American newspapers may report our $5.6 billion Investment in Iraq's electrical infrastructure 1 but what<br />
Iraqis see are signs such as a billboard of Hakim, the radical politician, affixed to a newlY'refurblshed<br />
Ministry of Electricity office in Baghdad.<br />
On March 26, a team of United Nations election specialists arrived In Baghdad to prepare the country for<br />
elections following the scheduled June 30 transfer of sovereignty. Iraqis may welcome elections, but It<br />
would be an abdication of American leadership If we do not support our allies, especially as Iraq's<br />
neighbors fund proxy groups and radicals with goals Inimical to democracy.<br />
We should not be more willing to help our adversaries than our friends. Democracy Is about not only<br />
elections, but also about tolerance, compromise and liberty. Twenty-five years ago, Ayatollah Ruhollah<br />
Khomeinl, leader of the Islamic Revolution In Iran, declared "the first day of God's government." In a<br />
rushed referendum supervised by armed vigilantes, Iranians voted for theocracy. For a quarter century,<br />
they have struggled to undo their mistake. It would be a betrayal of'Bush's vision as well as 24 million<br />
Iraqis if we replicate It In Iraq.<br />
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Copyright 2004 IPS-Inter Press Service/Global Information Network<br />
IPS-Inter Press SelVice<br />
April 9, 2004, Monday<br />
HEADLINE: IRAQ: NEO-CONS SEE IRAN BEHIND SHIITE UPRISING<br />
BYLINE: By Jim Lobe<br />
DATELINE: WASHINGTON, Apr. 9<br />
BODY:<br />
Neo-conservatives close to the administration of President George W Bush are pushlng'for'retribution<br />
aga,~~st Iran for; they'say, sponsoring this'week's'Shiite uprislng'in'Iraq'led by radical'cleriC"Moqtada~al~<br />
s-a~t<br />
Despite the growing number of reports that depict the fighting as a spontaneous and indigenous revolt<br />
agains~ the U.S.-led occupation, the influential neo-cons are calling on Bush to warn Tehran to·cease its<br />
alleged backing for al-Sadr and other Shla militias or face retaliation, ranging from an attack on<br />
Iraniap' nuclear facilities to covert action designed to overthrow the government.<br />
But independent experts say that while Iran has no doubt provided various forms of assistance to Shia<br />
factions In Iraq since the ouster of former President Saddam Hussein one year ago, its relations with<br />
Sadr'have long been rocky, and that it has opposed radical actions that could destabJllse the situation.<br />
"Those el~ments closest to Iran among the ShIIte clerics (In Iraq) have been the most moderate through<br />
all of this," according to Shaul Bakhash, an Iran expert at George Mason University here.<br />
Many regional specialists agree that Iran has a strategic Interest In avoiding any train of events that<br />
risks plunging Iraq Into chaos or civil war and partition.<br />
Neo-conselVatives centred in Vice President Dick Cheney'S office and among the civilian leadership in the<br />
Pentagon have strongly opposed any detente with Iran, and have frequently blamed it for problems the<br />
United States has encountered in both Afghanistan and Iraq.<br />
Neo-conselVatives outside the administration, such as former Defence Policy Board chairman Richard<br />
Perle and his colleagues at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Michael Ledeen and Reuel Marc<br />
Gerecht, called even before the,Iraq war for Washington to support Indigenous efforts to oust the<br />
"mullahcracy" in Tehran, which Is seen as an arch-enemy of both the United States and Israel.<br />
Some neo~conservatives have seized on Sadr's uprising ~s a ,new opportunity both to raise tensions<br />
against Iran and to divert attention from Washington's bungling of relations with the Shia community in<br />
Iraq. .<br />
Top U.S. officials both here and in Iraq have not yet named Iran as the hidden hand behind Sadr,<br />
although a senior reporter at the right-wing 'Washing~on_llmes~, Rowan Scarborough, quoted<br />
unnamed:"militarv.'.sources~WednesdaY'as"te1lifig~hinltthat:SadG:ISihelnQ;!ldea;;:direetly:bY;-lran~s·<br />
Revoliitr{fnaIYGiiard;';:_and:I:iy:Hezbolrah~ciir'iraniari~created terrorist'group-:bijseC:l:rn':tetianon~<br />
Unnamed "Pentagon offidals" gave a similar account to the 'New York Times', although 1lmes reporter<br />
James Risen stressed that CIA offidals disagreed with that analysis, adding, som~ intelligence officials<br />
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believe that the Pentagon has·been eager to link Hezbollah to the violence in Iraq to link th~ Iranian<br />
regime more closely to anti-American terrorism".<br />
o<br />
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The Iran hand was first raised In connection with Sadr's revolt by Michael Rubin, who just returned as a<br />
"governance team advisor" for the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) In Iraq to his previous<br />
position as a resident fellow at ~EI.<br />
In a column published In the 'Los Angeles TImes' on Sunday, he complained that Washington and the<br />
CPA had failed to provide liberal and democratic Iraqi leaders with anything like the kind of support that<br />
Iran was supplying to radical Shla leaders and their "gangs".<br />
Rubin said that on a Visit to the Shla-domlnated south he found that Iranians were pouring money and<br />
arms to key Islamlst parties,.Including the Da'wa, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution In Iraq<br />
(SCIRI), and Sadr himself, whose rise over the past year, according to Rubin, is explained by the "ample<br />
funding he receives through Iran-based cleric Ayatollah Kazem al Haeri, a close associate of Iranian<br />
Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamelni".<br />
Another'senior CPA adviser,.Larry: Diamondi·a'neo=,conservative·who:speclalisestin'democratlsatl~~:at.the~<br />
CalifornIa-based Hoove...Instltution:-told'IPS:thr~weerc-that Sadr's' Mahdi ArmYi,;.and~othe~Shiaimll~~as,~_ '<br />
are'beIng' armed. and.financed by'Iran with the:alm·of.·lmposlng:"anothe,...rrai1laiFstyletheoCracy~- -<br />
"Iran is embarked on a concerned, clever, lavishly-resourced campaign to defeat any effort for any<br />
genuine pluralist democracy in Iraq," said Diamond. "The longer we wait to confront the thug, the more<br />
troops he'll have in his army, the more arms he'll have and financial support -- virtually all coming from<br />
Iran -- the more he will Intimidate and kill sincere democratic actors in the country, and the more<br />
Impossible our task at building democracy will become".<br />
"I think we ,should tell the Iranian regime that if they don't cease and desist, we will play the same<br />
game, that we will destabllise them," he added.<br />
On Tuesday, the 'Wall Street Journal's editorial page took up the same theme, arguing that Sadr has<br />
talked "openly of creating an Iranian-style Islam!c Republic In Iraq (and) has visited Tehran since'the fall<br />
of Saddam•••• hl~ Mahdi militia is almost certainly financed and trained by Iranians," the editorial<br />
continued, adding, "Revolutionary Guards may be Instigating some of the current unrest".•<br />
"As for Tehran, we would hope the Sadr uprising puts to rest the iIIuslon,that the mullahs (In"Tehran) can<br />
be appeased. As Bernard Lewis teaches, Middle Eastern leaders interpret American restraint as<br />
weakness. Iran's mullahs fear a Muslim democracy in Iraq because Is It a direct threat to their own<br />
rule."<br />
"If warnings to Tehran from Washington don't Impress them, perhaps some cruise missiles aimed at the<br />
Bushehr nuclear site will concentrate their minds," the Journal suggested.<br />
On Wednesday, 'New York Times' columnist William Safire asserted'the existence ofan axis Involving<br />
Sadr, Iran, Hezbollah and Syria. "We should break the Iranian-Hezbollah-Sadr connection in ways<br />
that our special forces know how to do", he wrote.<br />
But this line of reasoning appears particularly curious to Bakhash, who notes that the Sadr family,<br />
including Moqtada himself, is precisely the kind of Iraqi Shiite who would be deeply suspicious of Tehran.<br />
"Sadr's father was a strong Iraqi nationalist, like Moqtada himself", he told IPS. "He often used to<br />
question why there were in Iraq ayatollahs who spoke Arabic with. a Persian accent."<br />
Uke other experts, Bakhash believes that Iran has Indeed been heavily Involved with the Iraqi Shla<br />
community, but sees the leadership providing far more support to SCIRI and Its·Badr brigades than to<br />
Sadr, who, from Tehran's point of vieYl, is seen as untrustworthy.<br />
Bakhash also questions the neo-conservatlve assumption that Iran wants to destabilise Iraq now.<br />
"Obviously the Iranians are not unhappy to see the Americans discomfited in Iraq, but I don't think it's<br />
the policy of theIranian government to destabilise Iraq right along its own border," he said.<br />
Middle East historian Juan Cole of the University of Michigan also questions the notion of a link between<br />
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,I Iran and Sadr in the current uprising. While Sadr's views on theocratic government are consistent with<br />
, those of Iranian hardliners, according to Cole, his outspoken Iraqi nationalism poses a major challenge to<br />
Khameini's claim to authority over all Shiite religious communities, including those outside Iran.<br />
Contrary to the Journal's assumptions, adds Cole, Sadr'did not receive much encouragement from the<br />
Iranians leaders he met in Tehran. "The message he got •••was that he should stop being so divisive and<br />
should cooperate more with the other Shiite I~aders".<br />
Geoffrey Kemp, an Iran specialist at the Nixon Centre and Middle East adviser on former president<br />
Ronald Reagan's National Security Council staff, says he has little doubt the Iranians have Influence with<br />
several different Shiite groups, and that there might even be "rogue elements" inside Iraq who back<br />
Sadr.<br />
But he agrees that Tehran's strongest ties are with SCIRIand the Badr Brigades, who were trained by<br />
the Revolutionary Guard inside Iran during Hussein's rule. "TIle situation is far too complex to: make<br />
simplistic statements about what Iran is or is not doing," Kemp told IPS. "But to suggest that-this is<br />
an Iranian-inspired insurrection is a stretch".<br />
"The neo-conservatives are all so heavily invested In the success of Iraq.that instead of blaming the<br />
Pentagon for some extraordinary blunders, they want to blame everyone else -- the State'Department,<br />
the Iranians,4the Syrians for the mess that was partly of their own making."<br />
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Copyright 2004 Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc.<br />
Voice of America News<br />
< prey Document 6 of 14 n~ ><br />
April 19, 2004<br />
SECTION: RADIO SCRIPTS - BACKGROUND REPORT 5-55191L<br />
LENGTH: 625 words<br />
HEADLINE: IRAN I IRAQ<br />
BYLINE: GARY THOMAS<br />
TEXT: WASHINGTON<br />
INTRO: An attempt by Iran to mediate an end to the fight in neighboring Iraq between the forces of a<br />
radical Muslim cleric and U-S troops was not successful. But, as correspondent Gary Thomas reports, the<br />
effort underscores Iran's bid to wield some clout In postwar Iraq.<br />
To Iran, the United States Is still, officially speaking, the Great Satan. And from the U-S perspective,<br />
Iran Is one of the two remaining members of what President Bush famously termed an axis of evil. But<br />
Iran sent a delegation to Iraq to try mediate an end to the standoff between radical Shl'lte Muslim cleric<br />
Moqtada al-Sadr and the U-S occupation authority - and the United States made no move to stop the<br />
effort.<br />
An Iranian diplomat was gunned down In Baghdad during the visit and the mediation subsequently broke<br />
down. Nevertheless, say analysts, the Iranian effort In Iraq was symptomatic of a broader political<br />
struggle In Iran for influence, power, and International legitimacy.<br />
Just how. much clout Iran has In Iraq - and just who In Iran wields it - Is murky.<br />
Juan Cole, a professor of Middle East and South Asian history at the University of Michigan, says the<br />
Iranian mission to Iraq is part of an effort by, President Mohammad Ali Khatami and his fellow reformists<br />
to regain some Influence they had lost'to the hardliners. President Khatami has pointedly distanced<br />
himself from Mr. al-Sadr.<br />
[COLE ACT]<br />
That faction has been under enormous pressure inside Iran. Of course, it was sidelined in the recent<br />
elections by the hardliners. And so reaching out and playing this kind of positive role in the region may<br />
be one way for the reformiSts to break back out of their isolation.<br />
[END ACT]<br />
But Michael Rubin, who was until last month a political advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in<br />
Baghdad, says the Iranian role in Iraq was anything but positive. He says Iran is meddling and trying to<br />
set up Its own cells in Iraq.<br />
[RUBIN ACT]<br />
~ ~hlnk having Iranian Involvement In Iraq is like having the arsonist volunteering to put out the fire.<br />
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[END ACT]<br />
Moq~da al-Sadr .. the cleric tumed Insurgent - is believed to have strong backing from the hardllne<br />
elements-in Iran. His mentor, say analysts, Is Ayatollah Kazem al-Husselni al-Hairi, a senior Shi'ite cleric<br />
in the Iranian holy city of Qom .. although how much Influence he actually exerts on Mr. al-Sadr Is not<br />
c1e~a:. And while supreme leader Ayatollah All K~amenei has welcomed the forced departure of Saddam<br />
Hussein .. who led a bloody decade-long war against Iran .. he has sharply condemned the U-S-Ied<br />
occl:lpation of Iraq.<br />
Mr. Rubin says Iran is actively helping'Mr. al::"Sadr's forces.<br />
[2ND RUBIN ACT]<br />
The Iranians have-been funding some of the radicals with arms, with Revolutionary Guards. The Iranian<br />
charge d'affaires In Baghdad is actually not a diplomat. He is a member of the Qods force,.which Is the<br />
unit of the Revolutionary Guards dedicated to the export of the Islamic revplutlon. The last.thing Iraqis<br />
want is for us to Involve non-Iraqis In this matter.<br />
[END ACT]<br />
But Professor Cole says Iran's role In Iraq is not as pervasive as Mr., Rubin and like-minded analysts<br />
portray.<br />
[2ND COLE ACT]<br />
There are persistent reports that Iran has, and the hardliners in Iran have, provided material support ~o<br />
Moqtada and his faction. I personally think those reports are overblown. I think this is largely an<br />
indigenous Iraqi movement, but it may have gotten some money. Lots of Iraqi groups.have gotten<br />
money from Iran, including some of the more secular politicians.<br />
[END ACT]<br />
Analysts.say Iran Is not likely to allow its once-powerful neighbor to be reconstituted without trying to<br />
have some influence over t~e matter. (SIG!'IED)<br />
NEB/GPT/RH/RAE<br />
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Copyright 2004 The News and Observer<br />
Th~ News &. Observer. (Raleigh, North Carolina)<br />
,<br />
SECTION: NEWS; Pg. A26<br />
June 6, 2004 Sunday<br />
Anal Edition<br />
LENGTH: 576 words<br />
HEADLINE: Ustening post;<br />
Ideas and issues under discussion in the Triangle<br />
BODY:<br />
llred of losing? Stay the course<br />
COMMENTARY<br />
From Carolina Journal, a publication of the John Locke Foundation, a commentary by editor Richard<br />
Wagner'!,<br />
"If you ever have a player who's afraid he's going to lose, take him out." A legendary baseball-managerin<br />
my hometown uttered that advice to a protege about 40 years ago. The statement, seemingly simple,<br />
actually embodies a much deeper philosophy of commitment, success and leadership In everyday life.<br />
That advice can be applied also to the nation's morale and the war on terrorism being waged, for now, In<br />
Iraq and Afghanistan.<br />
The losers in our society say we can't win in the Mideast. They say President Bush duped Americans Into<br />
thinking Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein' had weapons of mass destruction. They say we have entered a<br />
"quagmire" In Iraq, like we did in Vietnam. They said the same thing before U.S. troops liberated<br />
Afghanistan.<br />
The losers are the same people who refuse to recognize the simple fact that terrorism is nothing new.<br />
Islamic terrorists have been at war with the United States for about 30 years. Observers of recent<br />
history remember that the long string of terrorism began with the hijacking of airlines, the taking of<br />
hostages and the slaughter of innocent victims in the 1970s.<br />
Then it progressed, among other events, into the bombing of U.S. military barracks, U.S. embassies, the<br />
USS Cole and the World Trade Center.<br />
Then came Sept. 11 •. Until then, the terrorists were at war with us, but we weren't at war with them.<br />
Americans woke up when al-Qaeda terrorists flew airliners into the World Trade Center towers and the<br />
Pentagon. Only a few years later, the losers lulled themselves into a false sense of security, closed their<br />
eyes ~nd went b~ck to sleep. 11ley're stili asleep today. .<br />
Now, according to some national surveys, the losers are infecting others with their disease. More<br />
Americans are beginning to doubt themselves and to lose their will to fight.<br />
file://C:\DOCUME-l \agbmkram~QCALS-l \Temp\H9DE4R6D.htm 11/16/2004
Some leaders, however, are slapping the nation with some cold facts. One of them, retired Lt. Gen.<br />
Thomas·McInemey, a military analyst for Fox News Channel, spoke at a recent luncheon sponsored by<br />
the John Locke Foundation. Some of his revelations were:<br />
- Syria got $300 million from Saddam Hussein to hide Iraq's weapons of mass destruction;<br />
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Page2of2<br />
- The recent outbrea~othostilitie&l!Nthe.:last..ga~p.e.~y....the radical Islamists to ensure that we do not get<br />
a successfurtumover in Iraq and Iraq becoming a growing democracy";<br />
- Iran is sponsoring and funding Muqtada al-Sadr in the recent fighting In Iraq;<br />
- Terrorist organizations,. such' as Hezbollah and Hamas, are an arm of Iran and Syria;<br />
- Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Ubya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and North Korea form a "web of terror"<br />
that supports terrorism. "If these web of terror nations did not support terrorism, terrorism Withers," he<br />
said. Ubya and Afghanistan are no longer on the list. .<br />
- Sadr, too, remembers Vietnam. One of his objectives is to sow discord in the United States so we will<br />
lose our resolve. .<br />
I believe McInerney and the president.<br />
For some Americans, losing Is a way of life. To them, America, likewise, is always a loser. They made<br />
Vietnam a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now they want to do the same in Iraq.<br />
If the losers are allowed to endure, sure enough, we will allow freedom to be held hostage again~ Our<br />
nation eventually not only could surrender, it could succumb. The enemy this time has entered our back<br />
yard and prepa[es to torch our home.<br />
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Copyright 2004 U.P.I.<br />
United Press International<br />
June 8, 2004 Tuesday<br />
LENGTH: 908 words<br />
HEADLINE: Analysis: Despite Iraqi gains, Sadr remains<br />
BYLINE: By GAOl OECHTER<br />
DATELINE: WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI)<br />
BODY:<br />
Despite a recent spate of positive political news Iraq-watchers of diverse stripes·agree that renegade<br />
cleric Moqtada Sadr remains the critical thorn in the country's side, and not likely to be extirpated any<br />
time soon.<br />
Incoming Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawl formally outlawed on Monday the defiant Shiite cleric's Mahdi<br />
Army, a private militia of 2,000..3,000 fighters that has repeatedly clashed with U.S. forces in recent<br />
months, and barred Sadr and his lieutenants from holding public office for three years.<br />
The order is an exception to a new Iraqi policy of Including private militias and their leaders in a postwar<br />
political process In exchange for their disbanding and pledging to work with the new government, which<br />
is scheduled to take over sovereignty from coalition forces on June 30. Nine other Iraqi political parties<br />
and movements pledged on Monday to comply with the order.<br />
Juan Cole, a University of Michigan history professor and frequent commentator on the Middle East said<br />
that banning Sadr from mainstream Iraqi politics would only endanger the fragile truce between the<br />
Mahdi Army and U.S. forces in the holy ShIIte cities of Najaf and Kufa, a cease-fire that has held since<br />
Friday.<br />
"I think there Is every prospect of drawing (Sadr) Into the political process," Cole told United Press<br />
International Tuesday. "(Sadr's) forces can be potentially drawn off into the regular army and it Is better<br />
to do that than confront him."<br />
Among the obstacles to Sadr's Inclusion in mainstream Iraqi politics Is an outstanding warrant for his<br />
arrest Issued In April by an Iraqi jUdge, on charges that Sadr allegedly murdered a rival cleric last year.<br />
A State Department spokesman said Monday it believes Iraqi authorities should prosecute SadrI<br />
"It Is our view that Moqtada Sadr Is a subject of Iraqi law and that law should be applied to him, as well<br />
as to any other Iraqi citizen who has been accused of violating the law," Adam Erell told a briefing In<br />
Washington.<br />
But the Iraqi government could take advantage of the transitional nature of Iraqi politics to amend<br />
Sadr's current fugitive status, said Cole.<br />
"The charges ~galnst (Sadr) were arbitrary anyway, since no grand jury has met and had him charged.<br />
They could be allowed to lapse or given over to the clerics to handle Internally," he said.<br />
Turning the outlaw cleric into a legitimate political player would not necessarily neutralize him as a<br />
security th~at,.and may In fact increase his power; according to Amatzia Baram, a senior fellow at the<br />
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United States Instltut~ of Peace, a federally funded think tan~.<br />
"can (Sadr) be bought off? He can be bought off, yes. But only as a stepping-stone to total power.<br />
Namely, he'll do the same thing that Saddam Huss~in has done, that Hitler has done. He'll cooperate up<br />
to a point and then he'll try to take over and replace the system," said Baram, who Is also a professor of<br />
Middle Eastern history at the University of Haifa In Israel.<br />
"Unless Sadr is captured or killed he will remain a thorn In the side of the new Iraqi government," agreed<br />
,Nimrod Raphaell, a senior analyst at the Middle Eastern Media Research Institute, an organization that<br />
monitors and analyzes Middle East media reports.<br />
Whatever strategy the new Iraqi government ultimately pursues, experts agree that disbanding the<br />
Mahdi Army,. whether by force or persuasion, Is a practical challenge of ~Imost overwhelming difficulty.<br />
Unlike Kurdish militias and the Badr Corps -- the armed force of the Supreme Council for Islamic<br />
Revolution In Iraq, or SCIRI, which Is one of the groups that has reportedly agreed 'to disband -- Sadr's<br />
militia Is undisciplined and may not respond even to their leader's commands to lay down weapons.<br />
liThe Mahdi Army Is not a militia in the same way that the Badr Corps Is, and cannot be disbanded. It's<br />
just a congeries of ShIIte ghetto youth gangs, mainly from ,East Baghdad," said Cole. "They are like the<br />
Crlps and the Bloods in Los Angeles. As long as there are ghettos and as long as the poverty-stricken<br />
young men In them are armed, they will be something of a problem."<br />
Moqtada Sadr, 30, Is the fourth son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Muhammad Baqlr Sadr, a Shiite<br />
leader who was killed, along with two of his children, by agents of Saddam Hussein In 1999. The Sadr<br />
family traces Its origins to the prophet Muhammad and Is one of the most venerated In ShIIte Iraq.<br />
His fiery serm9.ns are characterized by Intense anti-American hostility and.afundamentallst<br />
Interpretation of Islam.similar to that promulgated by the Iranian government, from-whom he is believed<br />
to receive funding. .<br />
"His vision for Iraq is probably a government similar to that of Iran," said Raphaell.<br />
After Sadr's weekly paper, AI-Hawza, was dosed by the Coalition Provisional Authority on March 28, his<br />
forces took over holy ShUte shrines in the cities of Najaf and Karbala and declared open rebellion against<br />
the U.S.-led occupation. Fighters In the Mahdi Army occupied buildings and mosques In as many as six<br />
Iraqi cities In April, holding out longest in Najaf and Kufa.<br />
Those cities have been relatively quiet for about a week, following a cease-fire between American and<br />
Sadr forces mediated by mainstream ShIIte authorities. U.S~ forces appear to have given upon their<br />
threats to "capture or kill" Sadr and have reportedly decided to let the new Iraqi prime minister decide<br />
how to handle the rebellious cleric.<br />
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Copyright 2004 U.S. News a. World Report<br />
U.S. News&' World Report<br />
Document 1 of 2 ~ ><br />
November 22, 2004<br />
SECTION: SPECIAL REPORT; COVER PACKAGE; THE IRAN CONNECTION; Vol. 137 , No. 18; Pg. 34<br />
LENGTH: 6480 words<br />
HEADLINE: Special Report: The Iran Connection<br />
BYLINE: By Edward T. Pound; Jennifer Jack<br />
BODY:<br />
In the summer of last year, Iranian intelligence agents in Tehran began planning something quite<br />
spectacular for September 11, the two-year a'nnlversary of al Qaeda's attack on the United States,<br />
according to a classified American intelligence report. Iranian agents disbursed $ 20,000 to a team of<br />
assassins, the report said, to kill Paul Bremer, then the top U.S. civilian administrator In Iraq. The<br />
Information was specific: The team, said a well-placed source quoted In the intelligence document, would<br />
use a Toyota Corona taxi and a second car, driven by suicide bombers, to take out Bremer and destroy<br />
two hotels In downtown Baghdad. The source even named one of the planners, Hlmin Bani Shari, a hlghranking<br />
member of the Ansar ai-Islam terrorist group and a known associate of Iranian intelligence<br />
agen~. .<br />
The alleged plan was never carried out:- But American officials regarded Iran's reported role, and Its<br />
ability to make trouble In Iraq, as deadly serious. Iran, said a separate report, issued in Nov~mber 2003<br />
by American military analysts, "will use and support proxy groups" such as Ansar ai-Islam "to conduct<br />
attacks in Iraq in an attempt to further destablize the country." An assessment by the U.S. Army's V<br />
Corps, which then directed all Army activity In Iraq, agre~d: "Iranian intelligence continues to prod and<br />
facilitate the infiltration of Iraq with their subversive elements while providing them support once they<br />
ar~ in country."<br />
With the Pentagon's stepped-up efforts to break the back of the Insurgency before Iraq'S scheduled<br />
elections in late January, Iran's efforts to destabilize Iraq have received little public attention. But a<br />
review of thousands of pages of Intelligence reports by U.S.' News reveals the critical role Iran has played<br />
In aiding some elements of the anti-American· insurgency after Baghdad fell--and raises Important<br />
questions about whether Iran will continue to try to destabilize Iraq after elections are held. The<br />
classified intelligence reports, covering the period July 2003 through early 2004, were prepared by the<br />
CIA; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Iraq Survey Group, the 1,400-person outfit President Bush<br />
sent to Iraq to find weapons of mass destruction; the Coalition Provisional Authority; and various military<br />
commands and units in the field, Including the V Corps and the Pentagon's Combined Joint Special<br />
Operations Task Force. The reports are based on ,Information gathered from Iraqis, Iranian dissidents,<br />
and other sources inside Iraq. U.S. News also· reviewed British Intelligence assessments of the postwar<br />
p~ase in Iraq.<br />
'<br />
$ 500 a soldier. Many of the reports are uncorroborated and are considered "raw" Intelligence of the type<br />
seldom seen by those 'outside the national security community. But the picture that emerges from the<br />
sheer v~lume of the reports, and as a result of the multiplicity of sources from which they were<br />
generated, leaves little doubt about the depth of Iran's involvement in supporting elements of the<br />
insurgency and In positioning Itself to move quickly In Iraq Ifit believes a change In circumstances there<br />
dictates such action. "Iran," wrote an analyst with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations on Dec.<br />
5, 2003, "poses the greatest long-term threat to U.S. efforts in Iraq." An analyst at the V Corps<br />
summarized m~tters this way: "Iranian intelligence agents are conducting operations in every major city<br />
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with a significant Shla population. The counterintelligence threat from Iran Is assessed to be high, as<br />
locally employed people, former military officers, politicians, and young men are recruited, -hired, and<br />
trained by Iranian Intelligence to collect [Intelligence] on coalition forces."<br />
Even as Bremer's Coalition ProVisional Authority and the U.S.-led military were pressing last year to<br />
consolidate their grip on Iraq, the intelligence reports Indicate, the seeds of the Insurgency were<br />
growing, In some cases with funding and direction from Iranian government ~actions. "Iranian<br />
Intelligence will not conduct attacks on CF [coalition forces] that can be directlY linked to Iran," wrote' a<br />
senior Army analyst, "but will provide-lethal aid to subversive elements within Iraq ••• in the form of<br />
weapons, safe hOUSes, or money." In an interview, David Kay, the former chief weapons inspector for the<br />
Iraq Survey Group, said he believes that factions within the Iranian government have been plotting with<br />
and funding some insurgency groups. "I think we are In an intelligence war with Iran," Kay said. "There<br />
are Iranian lntellfgence agents all over the country [Iraq]." Another former American official, Michael<br />
Rubin, who worked for the Pentagon and the Coalition Provisional Authority, agrees. "Iran feels It should<br />
be the predominant power In the region," Rubin said. "With the U.S. out of there, they [will] have no real<br />
competition.n<br />
The Intelligence reports reViewed by U.S. News appear to supportthose assessments. Examples:<br />
Iran set up a massive Intelligence network in Iraq, flooding the country with agents In the months after<br />
the U.S.-led coalition toppled Saddam Hussein's regime. Sources told American intelligence analysts that<br />
Iranian agents were tasked with finding information on U.S. military plans and Identifying Iraqis who<br />
would ,be willing to conduct attacks on U.S. forces that would not be linked to Iran.<br />
Iranian Intelligence agents were said to have planned attacks against the U.S.-led forces and supported<br />
terrorist groups with weapons. Iranian agents smuggled weapons and ammunition across the border Into<br />
Iraq and distributed them "to Individuals who wanted to attack coalition forces," according to one report,<br />
citing "a source with good access." SeparC!tely, an Iraq Survey Group report said that Iranian agents<br />
"placed a bounty" of $ 500 for each American soldier killed by insurgents and more for destruction of<br />
tanks and heavy weaponry. "<br />
Iran trained terrorists and provided them with safe havens and passage across the border Into Iraq,<br />
several of the reports say. The Iranian-supported Ansar ai-Islam began carrying out bombings and other<br />
attacks against coalition forces and Iraqi citizens in tile summer of 2003. One report, describing an<br />
interview with a source, said: "There were approximately 320 Ansar ai-Islam terrorists being trained In<br />
Iran ••• for various attack scenarios including suicide bombings, assassinations, and general subversion<br />
against U.S. forces In Iraq." The reports linked Ansar ai-Islam to al Qaeda and to Abu Musab Zarqawl,<br />
the most wanted terrorist In Iraq. "Among the more capable terrorist groups operating in Iraq," an<br />
analyst wrote In another report, "are al Qaeda, the al Zarqawl network, as well as Ansar ai-Islam."<br />
Iran.has.been·a·prlncipal supporter of Moqtada al-Sadr, a radical Shiite cleric whose black-clad Mahdl<br />
Army fighters have clashed often with U.S.-led forces. Months before the worst of the insurgency In<br />
southern"Iraq began last April, U.S. intelligence officials tracked reported movements of Iranlan·money<br />
and arms to forces loyal to·Sadr. According to a V Corps report written In September 2003, "There has<br />
been an increase of Iranian Intelligence officers entering" Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, and Amarah.<br />
Sa"dr's fighters later engaged in fierce battles wl~h coalition forces In each of those cities.<br />
"Double game." Iran's permanent mission to the United Nations In New York did not respond to repeated<br />
requests for comment from U.S. News. In a sermon given last April, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi. Rafsanjanl,<br />
a leading political figure In Iran, said that Americans were "a very effective target" but that Iran "does<br />
not wish to get involved In acts of adventurism." Separately,.In New York last September, Iranian<br />
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi denied that his country had funded or armed Sadr's Mahdl Army.<br />
U.S. government officials, questioned about the Intelligence reports reviewed by U.S. News, say the<br />
evidence of Iran's destabilization efforts in Iraq is persuasive. "We certainly do have a lot of evidence of<br />
Iranian mischief making," a senior Pentagon official said In an Interview, "and attempts [at] building<br />
subversive Influence. I would never underestimate the Iranian problem••.• Iran Is a menace In a basic<br />
sense."<br />
Looking at the overall problem in Iraq, however, the official identifies Sunnl Muslim extremists as the<br />
"hard core" of the insurgency. They Include for:mer supporters of Saddam and some foreign fighters-<br />
most prominently Zarqaw', whos.e network has claimed responsibility for some of Iraq's bloodiest<br />
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bombings and the beheading of American Nicholas Berg and other western captives. Some terrorists, the<br />
official noted pointedly, are also using Syria as an outpost and safe haven.<br />
More than a year ago, the Defense Intelligence Agency reached similar conclusions In a secret analysis<br />
headlined "Iraq: Who·Are We Fighting?" The analysis cited foreign jlhadlsts as· "potentially" the most<br />
"threatening." An analyst with the- Iraq Survey Group concluded that "[a]s time passes and more and<br />
more terrorists and foreign fighters come into Iraq, the situation will become more dangerous because<br />
you will get a more experienced enemy, with more training, resources, and experience. II<br />
Iran has obvious interests In Iraq. In the 1980s,. Iran and Iraq fought a brutal eight-year war that<br />
claimed more than a million casualties. Despite the hostilities, the ShIIte communities of both countries<br />
have deep ties. Shiites compose the majority of the population In both Iran and Iraq, accounting for 60<br />
percent of the latter's 25.4 million people. Iraq Is home to some of Shiite Islam's most important holy<br />
sites, and thousands of Iranians have taken advantage of newly opened borders to visit them. During.<br />
Saddam's three decades of repression, Iran provided support and refuge for many of Iraq's Shiite<br />
religious leaders. Patrick Clawson, a leading expert on Iraq and Iran at the Washington Institute for Near<br />
East Polley, says It is not surprising that Iran Is heavily Involved In Iraq. "It only makes sense that the<br />
government of Iran would want to have a network of contacts with the Insurgents, develop friends,<br />
develop Intelligence sources, provide them Information about American assets and capabllities," he said<br />
In an interview. " ••• It is In their national Interest." At the same time, Clawson says, Iran Is playing "a<br />
double game"--stirrlng up trouble In Iraq while publicly professing support for Iraqi elections.<br />
Understanding Iran's precise motives In Iraq Is no simple matter. Ahmed Hashim, a professor of strategic<br />
studies at the U.S. Naval War College, says that the Islamic regime In Tehran does not always speak With<br />
one voice. "I think Iran has Its hand In a lot of what's going on [In Iraq], but we shouldn't assume the<br />
government Is unified," he says. "When you look'at th~ Iranian system of government, if you say Iran, It<br />
could actually be the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the [charitable] foundations, or various<br />
agencies of the government. They act almost independently." Another Iran expert, Kenneth Pollack, who<br />
served In the Clinton White House as director of Persian Gulf affairs on the National Security Council<br />
staff, ,believes Iran does not want chaos in Iraq. "The Iranian leaders are terrified of chaos In Iraq," he<br />
says, "and the spillover" aspect. Iran, PoHack adds, wants a stable, "Independent" government headed<br />
by ShIItes.<br />
Whatever Its objectives In Iraq, Iran has a well-documented history of supporting terrorist groups. For<br />
years, the State Department has Identified Iran as the.world's pre-eminent state sponsor of terrorism.<br />
American officials say the regime has provided fundin'g, safe havens, training, and weapons to several<br />
terrorist groups, Including Lebanon-based Hezbollah.,The commission Investigating the 9ill attacks said<br />
In Its final report that al Qaeda has long-standing ties to Iran and Hezbollah. Iran favors spectacular<br />
attacks, officials say, citing Its alleged role In the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers In Dhahran, Saudi<br />
Arabia, that claimed the lives of 19 U.S. servicemen. Six of the Hezbollah terrorists Indicted In the attack<br />
"directly implicated" senior Iranian government officials "In the planning and execution of this attaCk,"<br />
former FBI Director Louis Freeh wrote last year.<br />
A wolrs claws. F~eeh named two Iranian government agencies, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security,<br />
or MOIS, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, an elite fighting unit and enforcer for the clerical<br />
regime. As the Insurgency developed in Iraq,·both played central roles In planning and funding some of<br />
the attacks on coalitionJorces, according to the Intelligence reports reviewed by U.S. News. Early on,<br />
MOIS and the revolutionary guard corps were tasked with the job of creating instability In Iraq, the<br />
reports say. In some cases, Iran's agents allegedly worked with former Saddam loyalists, an odd<br />
marriage but one that shared a common goal: to drive U.S. forces out of Iraq. The reports detail how<br />
Iranian agents sought to recruit former regime loyalists and how one former Iraqi Intelligence Service<br />
officer, who had close ties to Saddam's late son, Uday, reportedly setup a front company for Iranian<br />
Intelligence operations In Baghdad.<br />
Only weeks after Saddam was ousted, In April 2003, Iran publicly signaled support for Violence against<br />
the coalition. In a sermon on May 2, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannatl, secretary general of Iran's powerful<br />
Council of Guardians, called on Iraqis to stage suicide attacks to drive U.S.-led forces from Iran. The<br />
Iraqi people, he said, "have no other choice but to rise up and stage martyrdom operation~•••• The<br />
Iraqi people were released from the claws of one wolf and have been caught by another wolf." Two<br />
months later, U.S. News has learned, coalition forces uncovered a document describing a fatwa, or<br />
religious edict, that had reportedly been Issued In Iran for Its ShIIte supporters In Iraq. The fatWa urged<br />
"h~ly fighters" In Iraq to get close to the enemy--the U.S.-led troops. These fighters, the fatwa said,<br />
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should "maintain good-relations with the coalition forces" but afthe same time create "a secret group<br />
that would conduct attacks against American troops." U.S. analysts could not confirm that the ruling was<br />
issued by Iranian clerics, but they believe it was credible. Wrote one analyst: "It seems that they [the<br />
Iranians] want them [Iraqi Shiite supporters] to be close to the coalition forces and outwardly respect<br />
them so that they can gather Intelligence that will assist them in their mission."<br />
Before long, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security stepped up Its Intelligence operations In Iraq,<br />
many of the Intelligence reports suggest. Agents set up "significant" Intelligence cells In key Iraqi cities,<br />
several reports said, Including Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Kut, Basra, and Klrkuk. MOIS agents also.set up<br />
a "listening post" In a city In southeastern Iraq to monitor the activities of U.S. forces. In southern Iraq,<br />
10 Iranian agents reportedly began operating out of two rooms at a Shiite mosque. Iran, according to<br />
the reports, also sought to place spies within Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority, then running Iraq's<br />
affairs, and they followed and photographed coalition forces. Four Iranians, believed to be MOIS agents,<br />
were detained In late July 2003 for photographing a hydropower plant near the central city of Samarra.<br />
Power plants became a frequent target of insurgents. In one case, U.S. Intelligence officials learned that<br />
a MOIS agent, a man named Muhammad Farhaadl, videotaped coalition operations In Karbala, a city<br />
south of Baghdad, then took the tape 'back to Iran.<br />
During the summer and fall of 2003, U.S. analysts' reports describe how MOIS and Its operatives sought<br />
to develop information from ShIItes In the south and from Sunnls in the north on the activities of U.S.-led<br />
forces. In the fall of 2003, an analyst for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations wrote: "Iranian<br />
intelligence has infiltrated all areas of Iraq, posing both a tactical and strategic threat to U~S. Interests."<br />
Bribes and border crossings. MOIS also sought to cultivate former Iraqi Intelligence officers who might<br />
help develop Intelligence on the plans and activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and U.S.-led<br />
forces, several reports said. "Former lIS [Iraqi Intelligence Servlce]offlcers are highly sought-after<br />
targets by U.S. intelligence," said an October 2003 report issued by the Air Force Office of Special<br />
Investigations, "not only for their current and former knowledge of Iraqi activities but also because many<br />
US officers will likely have a wealth of Intelligence information on Iran. Iran knows this and will striveto<br />
recruit former ns officers before the U.s. Is able to do so. The environment is ripe for double-agent<br />
operations, and loyalties can never be certain. n<br />
The Intelligence reports detail precisely what Iran was after. Its "collection priorities" included finding out<br />
what weapons U.S. troops were carrying and what kind of body armor they were wearing. Iranian agents<br />
also sought Information on the location of U.s. Army and intelligence bases; on the routes travel.ed by<br />
U.S. convoys; on the operations of the Special Forces' elite Delta Force; and on the plans of the U.S.<br />
military and Intelligence Inside Iraq. A military report said a source had reported that the Iranians were<br />
pressing to find out whether the Israeli Intelligence agency, Mossad, was active In Iraq. According to the<br />
report, MOIS directed its agents "to collect Information on the Israeli Intelligence presence In northern<br />
Iraq." Iran's "primary objective In Iraq," wrote another analyst, citing a good source, "Is to create<br />
Instability so coalition forces will focus on controlling the unstable situation rather than concentrating on<br />
reconstruction efforts."<br />
MOIS agents carried cash, reports said, to bribe Iraqi border pollee In order to obtain safe passage Into<br />
Iraq. In reality, however, all the IranJans had to do was walk across the border at any number of<br />
crossing points, where they could blend In amid Iranians coming to Iraq to visit relatives, do business,<br />
and worship at ShIIte shrines, according to the Intelligence reports and several senior Army officers<br />
Interviewed by U.S. News. "The borders were wide open," says one senior officer. "It suggests that<br />
terrorists could come over pretty easily. My God, there were busloads of Iranians crossing· the border<br />
without Interference." Another U.S. Army officer was so concerned that Iranian spies and Islamic<br />
jlhadlsts were crossing Into Iraq that he visited a border site in a mountainous region northeast of<br />
Baghdad last January. "I saw over 1,200 people come over [to Iraq] In an hour, and there were no<br />
[coalition] troops there," the officer recalls. "I did not see them armed, but then a lot of them came<br />
across in carts and some In vehicles and donkeys, and you wouldn't know. Ifonly 1 percent of them<br />
were combatants," he adds, "you can see the problem."<br />
Iranian agents f.1ad plenty of help waiting Inside Iraq. Numerous Intelligence reports say that members of<br />
a ShIIte militia group In Iraq known as the Badr Corps aided Iran In moving agents, weapons, and other<br />
materiel Into southern Iraq--sometlmes under the cover of humanitarian organizations. The Badr Corps<br />
has served as the armed wing of one of the most popular Shiite political parties In southern Iraq, the<br />
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI. The leaders of both SCIRI and the Badr Corps,<br />
which now calls Itself the Badr Organization, have maintained close ties to Iran for about two decades.<br />
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Iraqis associated with SClRI and Badr opposed Saddam's regime and fled to Iran In ~he ea~ly 1980s,<br />
where their organizations were established. They began returning to Iraq in droves after U.S.-led troops<br />
invaded Iraq in March 2003, prompting Defense Secretary Donald .Rumsfeld to warn the Badr Corps not<br />
to Interfere In Iraq. Badr leaders say they have no hostile Intentions toward U.S. forces, but their<br />
loyalties remain much In doubt. Just last month, Iraq's national intelligence chief, Mohammed al<br />
Shahwanl, accused the Badr Organization of killing 10 of his agents on orders from Iranian leaders. Badr,<br />
which denied the charges, was said to have disarmed this past summer, as part of an agreement with<br />
the new Iraqi government that would allow its members to serve in the new Iraqi Civil Defense Force~<br />
Yet Badr's historical ties to Iran, as described in U.S. and British Intelligence reports, offer little In the<br />
way of reassurance. While saying that SClRI and Badr have "made some attempts to emphasize<br />
independence from Iran," a British Defence Intelligence Staff report on "Armed Groups in Iraq," dated<br />
Nov. 21, 2003, says that the Badr Organization retains "strong links" to ,Iran's Islamic Revolutionary<br />
Guard Corps." The IRGC, the report says, "has funded, trained, and armed" the militia group, whose<br />
membership it estimated at between 18,000 and 20,000. The report says that some Badr members were<br />
unhappy with their leader, Abul Azlz ai-Hakim, who commands both SCIRI and Badr, and had returned to<br />
Iran. At the time, the report says, Badr was "well equipped" with "small arms, mortars and RPG s<br />
[rocket-propelled grenades]," T-55 series tanks and a "variety of artillery and antlalr pieces." Other<br />
intelligence reports say that an Iranian government agency--probably the IRGC--had provided Badr with<br />
global positioning systems to better target U.S.-led forces.<br />
Some of the most important Information on Iran has been provided by an Iranian exile group, the<br />
Mujaheddln..e-Khalq. The MEK fled Iran after the 1979 revolution and later relocated with Saddam's<br />
support to Iraq, where it continued to advocate the overthrow of the Iranian clerical regime. U.s~ forces<br />
now are guarding Its 3,800 members at Camp Ashraf, the MEK's sprawling compound northeast of<br />
Baghdad. Designated a terrorist organization by the State Department, the MEK neve.rtheless has<br />
provided American officials with Significant intelligence on Iran's nuclear weapons programs. The MEK,<br />
wrote one Army analyst, is "quite proficient at intelligence collection." Other analysts said that the MEK' .<br />
also had provided valuable on-the-ground intelligence to Army Special Forces after the invaslonlof Iraq. te:<br />
"The SF guys claim the [MEK] are a valuable intel asset," wrote an Army sergeant who had met'.<br />
frequently with the MEK, "and are generally reliable." At the same time, an Army team wrote that It.was.l'<br />
Important to be mindful that, given that its stated goal is to topple the government In Tehran, the MEK'stt' ~<br />
reports "were designed to Inform as well as Influence American policy toward ••• the Iranian regime.~ ~<br />
A red'truck. Relying on Its own agents inside Iran and other sources, the MEK has given Army personnel<br />
detailed reports on what it says have been Iran's efforts to destabilize Iraq. In its reports, some of which<br />
were reviewed by U.S. News, the MEK reported on the Intelligence-collection methods of Iran's MOIS,<br />
arms shipments from Iran to Iraq, and· the involvement In these operations of the Islamic Revolutionary<br />
Guard Corps's so~called Qods Force, or "Jerusalem Force."<br />
In December last year, MEK intelligence officers provided the Army with a detailed report and maps on<br />
what it called "a widespread network for transferring and distributing arms from Iran to Iraq" through<br />
the Ilam region in ~estern Iran. The MEK said its sworn enemy, the Badr Organization, was involved In<br />
the network. According to the MEK's operatives, both Badr and the Iranian command staff were based in<br />
Iran at the border town of Mehran. "In order to control and manage the intelligence and terrorist<br />
activities in Iraq," a MEK intelligence officer wrote, "the Qods Force has recently moved part of its<br />
command staff from Tehran to the border city of Mehran." His report also Identifed the areas In western,<br />
northwestern, and southern Iran where Qods Force commanders operated, along with the identities of<br />
more than a dozen commanders.<br />
The MEK's reports contain detailed information on arms shipments. On Dec. 4, ~003, the MEK reported,<br />
Iranian agents moved 1,OOO.rocket-propelled grenades and seven boxes of TNT from western Iran to<br />
Iraqi resistance groups. A week later, Iran's Qods Force moved "a number of Mirage submachine guns"<br />
into Iraq In a "truck loaded with cement bags under which the arms were hidden," according to another<br />
report. later that month, the MEK said, an Iraqi working for Iran drove a red fruit truck..-a "cover for a<br />
consignment of arms," including RPG s, mortars, and Kalashnlkov rifles--across the border into Iraq.<br />
The dissident Iranian group also provided American intelligence officers with information on how<br />
Hezbollah was aiding Iran In gathering Intelligence in I~q. Hezbollah, a bitter enemy of Israel with close<br />
ties to Iran and Syria, collected information on American and, British troops, photographed them, then<br />
sent the information to Qods Force commanders In Iran, according to MEK intelligence reports.<br />
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Intelligence officers for the MEK also said they had learned that Hezbollah had some 800 operatives In<br />
Iraq as of last January, including assassination teams. "The teams assassinate their opponents," a MEK<br />
intelligence officer reported, "and carry out sabotage operations." The MEK claimed that Hezbollah had<br />
assassinated an Iraqi man who had prOVided information to coalition forces.<br />
Other sources prOVided similar information, including Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency. Mossad<br />
warned U.S. intelligence officials in October 4003 that Hezbollah planned to set up a resistance<br />
movement that would cause mass casualties, according to a report prepared by the Defense Intelligence<br />
Agency's Joint Intelligence Task Force--Combating Terrorism. Iran, the report said, was calling the shots.<br />
"Should such mass casualty attacks be considered," the task force wrote, "they [Hezbollah] must first<br />
receive approval from Iran." The Iranians "do not want the U.S. and the coalition to focus attention on<br />
Iranian support for terrorist networks or other anti-coalition activities they're involved with," said a<br />
report by an analyst for a U.S. Central Command support team in Iraq. "Iran Is also trying to ensure it<br />
has a great deal of influence in Iraq, and one way of doing that Is to supply weapons to anti-coalition<br />
groups."<br />
Iranian agencies put the intelligence they gathered to practical use, planning, funding, and training<br />
attackers, according to many of the intelligence reports reviewed by U.S. News. In November of last<br />
year, the Iraq Survey Group received information that Iran had formed small groups of fighters to<br />
conduct attacks in cities across Iraq. "Iran had reportedly placed a bounty on U.S. forces of U.S. $ 2,000<br />
for each helicopter shot down, $ 1,000 for each tank destroyed, and $ 500 for each U.S. military<br />
personnel killed," the Iraq Survey Group reported. Iranian agents were also suspected in the<br />
assassination of at least two prominent Iraqis. In the fall of 2003, there were two reported plots against<br />
Bremer, the Coalition Provisional Authority administrator. The Iraq Survey Group, citing a source who<br />
"has provided reliable information In the past," said a senior Iranian cleric in Tehran set up a special 100<br />
member army, known as al Saqar, which means eagle in Arabic, to assassinate Bremer and carry out<br />
other terrorist attacks. The Eagle Army, the Iraqi Survey Group was told, had trained for 30 days at an<br />
Iranian terJ:0rist camp. This alleged plot and others reportedly planned against Bremer came to nothing.<br />
There were many reported plots against Bremer during his one-year tenure in Baghdad, and throughout<br />
his time there he was prOVided with blanket security. He declined to be interviewed for this story.<br />
Mastermind. Jihadlsts saw Iraq as an opportunity. In a report quoting a source who was not otherwise<br />
characterized, a U.S. Special Operations task force wrote that "the lebanese Hlzballah leadership<br />
believes that the struggle In Iraq is the new battleground in the fight against the U.S." In fact, other<br />
analysts wrote, Hezbollah and Ansar ai-Islam were among the most active groups in Iraq, although al.<br />
Qaeda operatives also were believed to be operating there soon afterthe invasion.<br />
Ansar ai-Islam Is a small group of Arabs and Iraqi Kurds that Is believed to have figured in some of the<br />
most violent attacks in Iraq. American and British Intelligence, the reports show, concluded that Ansar al<br />
Islam was working closely with Iran, and alsoal Qaeda, In Its terrorist attacks against coalition forces.<br />
Military intelligence reports suggested that the group was believed to be linked to two horrific bombings<br />
in Baghdad last year--the attack on the Jordanian Embassy on August 7, In which 17 people were killed,<br />
and the August 19 bombing that devastated the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad. That attack<br />
killed 22 people, including U.N. envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. Intelligence reporting Indicated that the<br />
mastermind of the U.N. attack was Zarqawi, the terrorist who has continued to bedevil coalition forces,<br />
and that al Qaeda operatives also played a role. A "reliable source with good access" said that Zarqawl<br />
had coordinated his plans for attacks in Iraq with Ansar ai-Islam's top leader, Abu Abdullah al-Shafii. The<br />
reports did not link Iran directly to either the U.N. attack or the Jordanian bombing. But one British<br />
defense,report noted pointedly: "Some elements [of Ansar ai-Islam] remain In Iran. Intelligence<br />
indicates that elements" of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps "are providing safe haven and basic<br />
training to Iran-based AI [Ansar ai-Islam] cadres."<br />
Funneling money. A separate report from the British Secret Intelligence Service, quoting a source who<br />
"has proved fairly reliable,., said that Iranian government agendes were also secretly helping Ansar al<br />
Islam members cross Into Iraq from Iran, as part of a plan to mount sniper attacks against coalition<br />
forces. There were also multiple American intelligence reports Identifying Iran as a chief supporter of<br />
Ansar ai-Islam. U.S. intelligence received information that an Iranian was aiding Ansar ai-Islam "on how<br />
to build and set up" Improvised explosive devices, known as lED s. An analyst for the'U.S. Central<br />
Command offered this assessment: "AI [Ansar ai-Islam] is actively attempting to'improve lED<br />
effectiveness and sophisticationt<br />
As might be expected, given the volume of the intelligence reports reviewed by U.S. News, some of the<br />
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information was contradictory. In some cases, Hezbollah, for Instance, was said to be planning direct<br />
attacks against coalition forces. In others, It was said to be working only behind the scenes in fomenting<br />
violence in Iraq.<br />
Perhaps Iran's most significant involvement.ln Iraq has been Its support for Moqtada al-Sadr, the ..<br />
radical, anti-U.S. cleric. His Mahdl Army militia engaged In a series of vicious battles with coalition forces<br />
in the holY.. southern.Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala, and in the teeming Baghdad slum known as Sadr<br />
City, between-Aprirand.Oetober:thfsqtear. Uke most of Its operations in Iraq, the Intelligence reports<br />
indicate that the Iranian regime has tried to mask Its support of Sadr. He visited Tehran in June 2003 for<br />
a ceremony marking the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeinl, the spiritual leader of the 1979<br />
revolution, but it is riot known whether he received any commitment from Iran at that time. U.S.<br />
intelligence reports say thatIran used Hezbollah to train and,provlde.funds·to~Sadr·sMahdi:Army'and:<br />
may'also have used front·companies'to~funnel~money:to:him:'l'For-a.time; the·reports=suggest;;Sadr<br />
appeared to be getting funds'from-a"senior-Shiite religious leader living In Iran, the Grand Ayatollah<br />
Kazem al-Haeri, who advocates an Islamic state In Iraq. But by mid-October 2003, according to a special<br />
operations task force, Haeri withdrew his "financial support" from Sadr. The ayatollah later publicly cut<br />
his ties with Sadr. ..<br />
There.was no such break with Hez~ollah•.lhe first sign that the terrorist group planned to support Sadr<br />
is reflected"ln a-July' 29; 2003; U:S: intelligence,report. Citing~Israeli·military-intelligence,-the report says<br />
Hezbollah "military activists" were attempting to establish contacts with Sadr and his Mahdi Army. The<br />
next month they did. By late August, according to a report prepared by aU.S. military analyst, Hezbollah<br />
had established "a team of30 to 40 operatives" in Najaf "In support of Moqtada Sadr's Shia paramiltary<br />
group." The report, based on a source "with direct access to the reported information," said that<br />
Hezbollah was recruiting and training members of Sadr's militia. A later report, citing "multiple sources,"<br />
said that Hezbollah was "buying rocket-propelled grenades ..• antitank missiles" and other weapons for<br />
Sadr's militia.<br />
Intelligence analysts also tied Sadr to Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah. "Reporting<br />
also confirms the relationship between •.•• Sadr and Hassan Nasrallah," an Army report said. The report<br />
cited unconfirmed Information indicating that a top adviser to Nasrallah, who Is based In Lebanon, had,<br />
delivered funds to Sadr In Najaf.<br />
Other reporting indicated that the Mahdi Army may have received support from former Saddam<br />
supporters .and other antlcoalition groups. Intelligence analysts were aware, as early as the fall of 2003,<br />
that Sadr could become a serious problem. At that time, there had been no confirmed attacks on<br />
coalition forces, only Sadr's tough rhetoric, in which he denounced the United States and called the Iraqi<br />
Governing Council Illegal. But, as a British defense intelligence report said, "stockpiling of heavier<br />
weapons, along with public antl-CF [Coalition Force] rhetoric, could indicate a willingness to take more<br />
direct action against CF."<br />
"111e honeymoon Is over." Dlrect.action ..was precisely what Sadr took, after Bremer ordered his Baghdad<br />
newspaper shut down, in March this year, accusing It of "inciting violence" against U.S.-led forces. Days<br />
later, after American soldiers arrested a Sadr aide, fierce fighting erupted between U.S. troops and<br />
Sadr's forces. In August, Sadr's Mahdl Army surrendered the Imam All Shrine in Najaf, and last month<br />
he reached a cease-fire with the United States and Iraq's Interim government. Sadr's fighters began<br />
turning in their weapons, as part of an agreement to disband, and Sadr signaled his Intention to get<br />
involved in the political process. He remains influential with many ShIItes, and American officials know<br />
that, if the Iraqi venture is to succeed, they must do everything they can to keep the majority Shiites<br />
happy.~ "Beware if we lose the goodwill of the Shl'ites. The honeymoon is over/' an Army captain wrote in<br />
October 2003, months before the battles with.Sadr's forces began. "Arresting Sadr, the son of a martyr,<br />
will only fuel Shiite extremists' animosity, and strengthen their recruiting efforts."<br />
Managing the Sadr situation, some government and intelligence officials say, is a microcosm of the far<br />
more difficult challenges America faces In responding to Iran's activities in Iraq. Iran clearly has the<br />
potential to stir up far more trouble than it has, partiCUlarly in the largely Shiite southern half of Iraq.<br />
But so far, as It continues its elaborate dance with the West over its ambitious nuclear program, the<br />
Islamic regime has yet to turn the heat up full blast In, Iraq, evidently secure in the knowledge that it can<br />
do so when and· if it sees the need to. "I would not put it past them to carry out spectacular attacks,"<br />
says David Kay, the former chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, "to demonstrate the cost of a hostile<br />
policy. That Is the policy issue--can we learn to live with Iranian nuclear capacity?"<br />
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The Ties to Tehran<br />
Agents from Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps<br />
infiltrated several Iraqi cities (yellow) to collect Information on U.S.-led forces and work with insurgent<br />
groups after the ouster of Saddam Hussein. Other Iranian agents crossed the long, porous, border with<br />
Iraq, intelligence reports said, to support t~e Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization.<br />
[MAP LABELS]<br />
IRAQ<br />
IRAN<br />
Tehran<br />
Iraq-Iran border crossings<br />
Hajj Umran<br />
Baneh<br />
Halabjah<br />
As Sulaymaniyah<br />
Khanaqln<br />
Mehran and Baramadad<br />
Chamsarl<br />
Hoveyzeh<br />
Darsiyah<br />
Shalamchah<br />
Khorramshahr<br />
Abadan<br />
Active Iranian intelligence cells<br />
Mosul<br />
Klrkuk<br />
Baghdad<br />
Karbala<br />
Kut<br />
Najaf<br />
Amarah<br />
Basra<br />
[LABELS-GLOBE INSET]<br />
IRAQ<br />
IRAN<br />
Area of detail<br />
Sources: U.S. intelligence and State.Department reports; United Nations<br />
Rob Cady--USN&WR<br />
AN UNHOLY ALUANCE<br />
BADR ORGANIZATION. This group served as the armed wing of a Shiite political party in Iraq known as<br />
the Supreme Council for IslalJlic Revolution. Members of the Badr group opposed Saddam Hussein's rule,<br />
and fled to Iran In the early 1980s. A British intelligence report says that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary<br />
Guard Corps "funded, trained, and armed the group, as well as assigning IRGC personnel in a support<br />
file:IIC:\DOCUME-l\agQJ!1~m\LO~ALS-!\Te~p\CI96ZFQ;F.htm 11116/2004
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,'''' capacity." Members returned to Iraq after the coalition invasion in March 2003.<br />
Page90f9<br />
HEZBOLLAH (THE PARTY OF GOD) was created In 1982 after Israel invaded Lebanon. Hezbollah Is a<br />
Lebanon-based Shiite Muslim group inspired by the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late<br />
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeinl. The organization is funded by Iraq. Syria also supports this group.<br />
ANSAR AL-ISLAM is a Sunnl Muslim group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs established in December 2001. It is<br />
closely allied with al Qaeda and the terrorist network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Intelligence reports<br />
indicate that elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have provided safe haven and training<br />
for Ansar ai-Islam members. Reports also say that Ansar ai-Islam and al Qaeda have crossed into Iraq<br />
from Iran and Syria. Additionally, they suggest an Ansar ai-Islam tie with former members of Saddam<br />
Hussein's Fedayeen paramilitary force. .<br />
MAHDI ARMY. This is the armed militia group of the radical Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. Intelligence<br />
reportS say that Iran used Hezbollah to train and provide funds to Sadr's militia and may have also used<br />
front companies to fund Sadr's attacks against coalition forces.<br />
Sources: U.S. Intelligence and State Department reports, United Nations<br />
GRAPHIC: Picture, CARNAGE. After the bombing of the U.N. headquarters In Baghdad. Two groups with<br />
ties to Iran are suspected in the August 2003 attack. (GEERTVAN KESTEREN--AGENTUR FOCUS /<br />
CONTACT)j 'Picture, HOLY MAN. Iran's Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati told Iraqis they have no other choice"<br />
but to rise up against U.S. forces there and drive them out. (VAHID SALEMI--AP); Picture, BEUEVERS.<br />
Members of Iran's elite Revoutiomiry Guard Corps. In Iraq, reports say, the guard helped plan and<br />
finance attacks on U.S.-led forces. (DAMIR SAGOU--REUTERS I CORBIS); Pictures: ALL HANDS. At<br />
prayers in a Shiite shrine in Karbala (left). A customs office on the Iraq-Iran border displays "terrorist<br />
"wanted" posters. (ABBAS--MAGNUMi HUSSEIN MALLA--AP); Pictures: TEHRAN TIES. Followers of<br />
Moqtada al-Sadr (left); Abdul Azlz ai-Hakim (right, with glasses), the head of the Supreme CoiJncii of<br />
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (PAOLO WOODS--ANZENBERGERj MURAD SEZER--AP); Picture, TARGET?<br />
Intelligence reports linked two alleged plots to ~iII Paul Bremer, the top U.S. official In Baghdad, to<br />
Iranian-backed groups. (GEERT VAN KESTEREN--AGEN11JR FOCUS I CONTACT); Picture, On the attack.<br />
A member of Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army preparing to fire a rocket-propelled 'grenade at an American<br />
tank In Baghdad (KAELAlFORD--PANOS); Picture, Ansar ai-Islam fighters in Iraq (CHANG W. LEi;--THE<br />
NEW YORK TIMES); Map, The 'lies to Tehran (U.S. intelligence and State Department reports, United<br />
Nations; Rob cady--USN&WR)<br />
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Copyright 2003 Agence France Presse<br />
Agence France Presse -- English<br />
July 7, 2003 Monday<br />
SECTION: International News<br />
LENGTH: 742 words<br />
HEADLINE: Iran brings Israel within missile range, digs in on tougher UN nuclear probe<br />
BYLINE: SIAVOSH GHAZI<br />
DATELINE: TEHRAN, July 7<br />
BODY:<br />
Iran has conducted a final test of its Shahab-3 ballistic missile, the Iranian foreign ministry ,confirmed<br />
Monday, in a move that brings arch-enemy Israel well within range of the Islamic republic's armed<br />
forces.<br />
The announcement sparked Immediate alarm in Israel, and also came as Iran's clerical leaders dug in on<br />
their refusal to allow tougher UN inspections of their civil nuclear programme, seen by the United States<br />
as a cover for nuclear weapons development.<br />
"The test took place several weeks ago. The range of the missile is what we declared before," foreign<br />
ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told reporterS, adding the test was the final one before the<br />
missile was handed over for operation by the country's army.<br />
Officials here have previously said the missile -- based on North Korea's No-Dong and Pakistan's<br />
Ghauri-II -- has a range of 1~300 kilometers (810 miles). It can reportedly carry a warhead weighing up<br />
to 1,000 kllogrammes.<br />
In Farsi, Shahab means "meteor" or "shooting star".<br />
Asefi was reacting to a report in the Israeli Haaretz newspaper last week which said Iran had conducted<br />
the test just over a week ago and was now capable of hitting the Jewish state, American forces in~the<br />
Gulf or the Indian subcontinent.<br />
"This is nothing new," Asefi said. "Apparently the Israelis are a bit late with their Information."<br />
In Israel, government spokesman Avi Pazner told AFP that the Jewish state was "very concerned" at the<br />
development.<br />
"We are very concerned, especially since we know that Iran is seeking to acquire the nuclear weapon,"<br />
he said.<br />
Iran has fiercely denied accusations it has a nuclear weapons programme, and asserts its missile<br />
development is· purely for its own defence.<br />
But confirmation of the test came as Iran was set to face more scrutiny over its nuclear programme,<br />
with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director Mohamed EIBaradel set to visit Wednesday to<br />
press demands for tougher Inspections. -<br />
But Asefl again rebuffed mounting international demands to immediately and unconditionally allow<br />
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tougher UN inspections of its nuclear facilities, asserting instead that drawn-out negotiat!ons may be<br />
necessary.<br />
"There is no have-to involved. We hope that in negotiations with Mr. EIBaradei, the two sides can cover<br />
subjects that allow us to build mutual trust,'· he said, adding that lIif not, negotiations must continue'·.<br />
The IAEA has been urging Iran immediately sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol to the<br />
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would allow its teams to conduct surprise inspections of<br />
suspect sites.<br />
So far the Vienna-based UN body is only allowed to,pay pre-arranged visJts to declared sites, but Iran<br />
has been urged to open up its nuclea·r programme amid widespread fears it is also seeking t9 acquire a<br />
nuclear arsenal.<br />
EIBaradei has been backed up by G8 leaders and the European Union. Individual states, Japan, France,<br />
Britain, Australia, Russia and the United States, have also echoed the demand. Foreign diplomats here<br />
have asserted they are not prepared to see lengthy negotiations on the issue.<br />
But Asefi said that for Iran, the additional protocol problem is "not a black and white Issue·'.<br />
IIFor every problem there is a solution, and for this problem we must negotiate and we are fully ready to<br />
listen,II he told reporters.<br />
In June, EIBaradei said the Islamic republic had not fully respected the NPT by failing to inform the IAEA<br />
of some of its nuclear activities, including the import of uran'um in 1991.<br />
Iranian officials have dismissed the criticism.s as technicalities, and have consistently asserted they are<br />
ready to allow a tougher inspections regime, but only on the condition that other,NPT signatories first<br />
assist its nuclear power programme -- one of their treaty obligations.<br />
Asefi also dismissed threats from some EU quarters that negotiations over a trade and cooperatiop<br />
agreement -- which the EU hopes will YJeld progress on political, human rights and military concerns in<br />
Iran -- could be torpedoed by Iranls intransigence on inspections.<br />
liThe commercial cooperation accord would be profitable for both -sides, so this cannot be used as<br />
leverage and the Islamic republic will not accept such pressure,'I he said.<br />
I'Sanctions against the Islamicrepublic have been ineffective. The Europeans should be careful about<br />
what they say and avoid using threats."<br />
sgh-sas/ps<br />
Iran-missile-nuclear-IAEA<br />
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[] Copyright 2003 Defense & Foreign Affairs/International Strategic Studies Association<br />
Defense &Foreign Affairs Daily<br />
SECTION: Vol. XXI, No. 111<br />
LENGTH: 2761 words<br />
July 25, 2003 Friday<br />
HEADLINE: Iranian Clerical Leaders Continue to Defy Opposition, Causing Hardening of Position by its<br />
Allies<br />
BODY:<br />
Analysis. By Jason Fuchs, GIS staff. Iran's clerical leadership has begun to harden Its position against<br />
internal and perceived US-supported opposition following its successful suppression of the July 9, 2003,<br />
protests against the Administration. At the same time, the clerical leadership has embarked on a<br />
campaign -- which repeats a process successfully undertaken on several occasions In the past -<br />
designed to show that it was cooperating with the US and other states in the "war on terror" when, in<br />
fact, it continues to harbor major anti-Western terrorists.< 1><br />
Reports on July 22, 2003, to the effect that it had detained ~enior al-Qaida leaders were almost identical<br />
to remarks made over earlier months to the US, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. No evidence has been provided<br />
that the Iranian claims were true, and nor have any such senior al-Qaida terrorists been handed over to<br />
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as promised, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia had -- as part of a supposed<br />
reciprocal deal -'! handed over Iranian terrorists to the Iranian authorities. Suggestions that the Iranian<br />
clerics had detained, and would hand over, al-Qaida deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, were ridiculed by<br />
informed Tehran sources, following the hints by Iranian clerical sources to Western media that such an<br />
prisoner was being held.<br />
Sources in Iran indicated that the.psychological operations initiative had worked in the past to·suppress<br />
US support for the Iranian opposition, and they noted that senior Iranian Administration officials believed<br />
that it would work again; , ,<br />
MeanWhile, the successful Iranian suppression of the mounting waves of Internal opposition, supported<br />
by the US, also gave encouragement to Iran's allies and other anti-Western states.<br />
In the wake of the st1:date Year="2003" Day="9" Month="7" July 9, 2003 'I demonstrations marking<br />
the fourth anniversary of the 1999 student demonstrations in Tehran, the Iranian leadership, satisfied<br />
with the outcome of its suppression of the protests, appeared resurgently defiant of US-Western<br />
demands for transparency regarding the indigenous Iranian nuclear program and, by late July 2003,<br />
Tehran's allies, both regional and otherwise, appeared to have taken note. The jamming of US-based<br />
satellite feeds into Iran that began on st1:date Year=".2003" Oay="S" Month="7" July 5, 2003 ,<br />
reportedly from sites in Cuba, emphasized this. Cuba's blocking of the transmissions, which continued<br />
through July 24, 2003, served as a reminder to the US Bush Administration that states like Cuba, Syria,<br />
and Libya _.. referred to as the rrjunior varsity axis of evil" by a Bush AdministratioQ official in April 2003<br />
-- continued to look to Tehran as a barometer for their own dealings with the US.<br />
There was now also growing US concern over the status of the Iranian nuclear weapons program,<br />
following reports, reportedly confirmed by both US and Israeli Intelligence services, tha~ Pakistani<br />
nuclear weapons technology had now been acquired and had accelerated ~he pace of Iranian Indigenous<br />
nuclear development.<br />
Significantly, whil~ the North Korean (OPRK) Administration of Mar. Kim Jong-il out~tripped Iran in real<br />
militarY terms, it too had looked to Tehran in the aftermath of th~ US-led Coalition-Iraq War of Marchhttps:/Iw3.lexis.com/lawenfsolutions_securedlsearchforms/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=...<br />
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April 2003. Reports of a second DPRK nuclear facility In mid-July 2003 along with the North Korean<br />
declaration tnat it had· produced enough fissile material to build an additional six nuclear weapons had,<br />
by late July 2003, refocused international attention on the DPRK nuclear program, with the International<br />
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) citing the the Kim Jong-il Administration as the greatest threat to world<br />
peace. The DPRK 's continuing diplomatic offensive against the US appeared to have been at least<br />
partially resultant of the continuing hard-line Iranian stance, Insofar as long-standing and continuing<br />
diplomatic and military understanding between Pyongyang and Tehran. Indications bystl:date<br />
Vear=1I2003" Day="24" Month="7 11<br />
July 24, 2003, were that Pyongyang would continue to heighten<br />
tensions on the Korean peninsula, parallel to the increasing US pressure on Tehran and Dama~cus •<br />
An exchange of fire between North and South Korean troops along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on July<br />
17, 2003, appeared to reaffirm this intent.<br />
GIS/ Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily had extensively reported on the North Korean military nuclear<br />
capability and related delivery systems. In a January 9, 2003 , report entitled Iraq, Iran, North Korea<br />
and WMD: Threat Activated, i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted:<br />
"Even by early 1994, it was known that the DPRK had 10 nuclear warheads of SOkt yield deployed on<br />
ballistic missiles, plus two additional SOkt devices suitable for vehicle or aircraft delivery. i style="msobidi-font-style:<br />
normalllDefense & Foreign Affairs sources believe that the number of warheads available<br />
to the DPRK would now be substantially higher, given the fact that it has had an additional eight-years to<br />
work on the program."<br />
As Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reported in late June 2003, the Iranian leadership had evaluated the<br />
new realities of the post-Saddam Middle East and, increasingly threatened both by the neighboring US<br />
military presence In both Afghanistan and Iraq and demonstrations within Iran, decided to initiate an<br />
anti-Western offensive for the very survival of Iran as an Islamic Republic. A i style="mso-bidi-fontstyle:<br />
normal"Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report on June 30, 2003, In particular noted the<br />
assemblage of a so-called l'Anti-July 9 Crackdown Committee" to suppress the planned July 9, 2003,<br />
anti-Government demonstrations. The fruits of these efforts were made evident by the Government's<br />
largely successful containment of the st1:date Year=1I2003" Day="9" Month=1I7" July 9, 2003,<br />
protests, which, though sizable in number [upwards of 10,000 according to reports] failed to act as any<br />
sort of catalyst to spur further Widespread support and/or action within the Iranian populace or military.<br />
While the protests of stl:date Year=1I2003" Day=1I9 11<br />
Month="7" July 9, 2003, may have played a key<br />
role In the anti-Government movement, it was decidedly not the decisive turning point that some within<br />
the Iranian opposition had hoped for.<br />
The result of this perceived success was that the ayatollahs appeared more willing than ever to oppose<br />
US and Western demands. For th~e Iranian leadership, the effective suppression of the protests had<br />
served as a much-needed victory against the US and the West. Whether the West actually saw events in<br />
these terms was immaterial; in the run-up to st1:date Year="2003 11 Day="9" Month="7" July 9, 2003 ,<br />
particularly.during the protests of June 2003, state-run Iranian media made clear in stark terms that<br />
the anti-Government demonstrators did not represent the Iranian people and were instead agents of the<br />
US or other Western "dlsruptors". On st1:date Year="2003" Day="18" Month="7" July 18, 2003 , the<br />
Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported that i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"Ayatollah<br />
Ahmad Jannatl had told worshippers attending Friday prayers at Tehran University that stl:date<br />
Year=1I2003 tl Day="9" Month="7- July 9, 2003, was "a day of disgrace for the US and its agents, as<br />
their efforts did not succeed" and characterized the July 9 protests as "minor" and "Insignificant"_.<br />
This style of rhetoric served more than one purpose for the Iranian Government. While these comments<br />
served to minimize the support base of the protestors they also gave the ayatollahs an opportunity to<br />
finally win a battle against the West. Iran had proved incapable of denying Western victories in<br />
Afghanistan or Iraq and appeared, by late July 2003, to have grown increasingly frustrated with the<br />
Islamic world's inability to respond to the US-led Coalition invasion of Iraq with significant attacks on the<br />
Western home front. Thus, while efforts to rectify these situations were well underway by June-July<br />
2003, the "defeat" of the stl:date Year="2003" Day="9" Month="7" July 9, 2003 , protests served as<br />
a welcome interim victory, and doubtless a morale booster amongst the Iranian leadership.<br />
Iran's aggressive strategic stance toward the US , Israel, and the West was emphasized on stl:date<br />
Year=12003" Day="20 11<br />
Month="7" July 20, 2003 , when the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali<br />
Hoseini-Khamene'i, officially Inaugurated the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. The Shahab-3 reportedly has<br />
a range of between 1,300 and 1,500 kilometers and Is capable of carrying a 1,000-760 kilogram<br />
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" warhead. The Iranian Government and Western media had reported since early July 2003 that the<br />
missile had been successfully tested in June 2003. The July 20, 2003 , ceremony marked the<br />
missile's entrance into operational service, according to i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"Ayatoliah<br />
Khamene'I, who remarked: "Today our people and our armed forces are ready to defend their goals<br />
anywhere."<br />
However, the authoritative Middle Eastern web-based information service, Debka.com, which clearly has<br />
strong sources within the Israeli intelligence community, stated in astl:date Year="2003" Day="23"<br />
Month="7" July 23, 2003 , dispatch that the missile had, in fact, failed its most recent test. According<br />
to the Debka.com report, Iranian officials were, as of late July 2003, in North Korea attempting to<br />
expedite shipment plans for new engines in hopes of fixing the i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"Sh a<br />
i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"hab-3 's remaining defects. It remained unclear whether the<br />
st1:date Year="2003 1 ' Day="23" Month="7" JUly 23, 2003 , report of North Korean-Iranian missile<br />
shipments was linked to the arrival of a large Iranian cargo ship to a North Korean port at Haeju Harbor.<br />
in the Yellow Sea during early July 2003. On st1:date Year="2003" Day="9" Month="7" July 9, 2003 ,<br />
an unnamed South Korean official had speculated to the South Korean JoongAng Daily that the Iranian<br />
cargo ship had taken on small patrol boats. [The Iranian Navy maintains at least/three Zafar -class<br />
(North Korean built Chasho -class) FAC(G) patrol boats purchased from North Korea in the early 1990s.<br />
Western intelligence agencies believed that an additional six patrol boats had been shipped to Iran In<br />
December 2002 in a package sale including two gunboats and five semi-submersibles capable of carrying<br />
two torpedoes each.]<br />
Thus, with uncertainty as to the current strategic viability of the Sh a hab-3 missile, what appeared<br />
most evident by late JUly 2003 was the Importance which the Iranian Government continued to place on<br />
propaganda and the projection of force. The message of the missile test -- failed or otherwise -- had<br />
been aimed directly at the US , Israel, and the West. And, though, the test gained only the passing<br />
attention of most US and European media, Israeli news outlets paid close watch, with the daily i<br />
style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"Yedioth Ahronoth blaring across its front page during mid-July 2003:<br />
"The Iranian threat -- the missile that can hit every house In Israel".<br />
The importance of the missile test, insofar as achieving a strong Iranian front to the West, could not be<br />
overstated. Iran had long depended on the threat of Widening any US-led war in the Middle East to<br />
include Israel as a major deterrent to US action against the Tehran-Damascus-Baghdad axis.US Pres.<br />
Bush had proved willing to risk that eventuality to achieve US strategic goals in removing the Iraqi<br />
Administration of former Pres. Saddam Hussein. With this US decision, the Iranians had hoped for<br />
Saddam to make good on this long-promised threat, not only to punish Israel, but also to deter further<br />
US action against Iran or its staunch ally Syria • The Iraqi inability to widen the war to Israel made the<br />
clerics recognize, more than ever, the necessity for a demonstration of the Iranian capability to strike<br />
Israel. The some 10,000 medium-to-short range rockets in Southern Lebanon, controlled jointly by<br />
Tehran, Damascus, and, to a degree, HizbAllah, were well within the Iranian sphere of influence, yet,<br />
Tehran's Willingness to rely on its neighbors to attack Israel if necessary appeared to have waned in the<br />
wake of the Iraqi failure. US efforts in June 2003 to'sway the HizbAllah from the Iranian sphere of<br />
influence, though fruitless by late July 2003, may also have raised the attention of the Iranian<br />
leadership. Thus, Tehran sought to warn the US against taking action toward "regime change" In Iran by<br />
reminding Washington that it retained the ability to widen any conflict with the US to include Israel by<br />
means within its own borders. Although perhaps unnecessary, this should have registered in Damascus<br />
as a reminder that Syria remains str~tegically dependent on Iran, and not the other way around.<br />
Notably, Cuba's blocking of US-based satellite feeds into Iran, which continued as of July 24, 2003,<br />
signaled that Havana continued to pay close attention to Tehran's policies vis-a-vis the US as an<br />
indicator for its own relations with Washington. Initially, following the September 11,2001 , attacks,<br />
Havana had shown a more conciliatory attitude toward the US, most notably by remaining relatively<br />
acquiescent to the US use of Guantanamo Bay as a detention camp for al-Qaida detainees. The Russian<br />
closure of the Lourdes Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) facility follOWing the September 11, 2001, attacks<br />
on the US, though begun in August 2001, also seemed to indicate a more amiable Cuban posture. Yet,<br />
Iran's unflinching stance in the face of the US pressure to end support for terror groups, abandon its<br />
indigenous nuclear weapons program, and. begin a process of political and economic liberalization<br />
appeared to have affected Havana's strategic approach. By late July 2003, it seemed clear that Cuba<br />
would continue a policy of overt hostility. towards the US • This was evidenced by the Cuban decision to<br />
help Iran block US satellite feeds into Iran, particularly at a time as sensitive as the stl :da~e<br />
Year="2003" Day="9" Month="7" July 9, 2003, protests, for which the US had voiced support. A denial<br />
issued by the Cuban Foreign Ministry on Juty 19, 2003, made no attempt to mask this hostile tone,<br />
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declaring: "This is a new campaign of anti-Cuban lies ••• adding to a long list of hostile and aggressive<br />
actions that the imperial administration of George W. Bush has taken against our country."<br />
So, as July 2003 came to a close, Iran's aggressive stance came, unintentionally, with intense political<br />
pressure on the.U5 Bush Administration,' The Democrats, the US opposition party, continued to pursue<br />
Pres. Bush on the question of the Iraq War's legitimacy, the continuing (although low) US death toll In<br />
US-occupied Iraq, and the US economy. Damascus, Pyongyang, Havana, and Tripoli, thus, seemed to<br />
have one eye on the emboldened Iranians and another on Pres. Bush's slipping poll numbers. Tehran<br />
and its allies appeared ever more confident that in spite of the US-declared "war on terror" their<br />
respective governments might yet outlive the US Bush Administration. .<br />
Footnote:<br />
1. The US Central Intelligence Agency "confirmed" to US media company ABC that al-Qaida senior<br />
military figure Saif al-Adel was being held by Iranian authorities. However, GIS sources in Tehran<br />
indicated that the "detention" was, if it could be described as that, was almost certainly symbolic.<br />
Egyptian authorities have for some months been demanding the extradition of Salf al-Adel, an Egyptian<br />
national, for trial. However, reports surfaced on July 24, 2003, that because· he was "of Libyan origin",<br />
Libya had requested his extradition to Tripoli for trial. Given the close Iranian-Libyan relationship -<br />
particularly given the fact that Libya essentially has taken responsibility for the Iranian-managed<br />
bombing of Pan Am PA103 flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 -- it seems almost certain that this<br />
move was a canard designed to demonstrate "Iranian compliance" in the "war on terror", while still<br />
ensuring that Saif al-Adel was able to be safeguarded.<br />
2. International pressure on Iran's clerics is, however, far from over. The Canadian Ambassador to<br />
Tehran was recalled on July 23, 2003, over Canadian protests that Iranian-born Canadian<br />
photojournalist Zahra Kazemi was tortured, possibly raped, and th~n killed by Iranian officials.<br />
See also:<br />
Defense & Foreign Affair~ Daily, ~uly 10, 2003: Iranian Protests Take Place Despite Massive<br />
Suppression; Worldwide Expatriate Protests Against Clerics •<br />
LOAD-DATE: July 24, 2003<br />
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" 0 ALL INFOPHATImr CONT&'<br />
HEREIN IS LmrCLASSIFIED<br />
DEB~file- Iran-Based Al Qaeda Threat Much Closer than Shehab-3<br />
DEBKAfile - We start where the media stop DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
Page 1 of2<br />
Iran-Based AI Qaeda Threat Much Closer than Shehab-3<br />
DEBKAflle Special Analysis<br />
JIIly 22, 2003, 9:30 AM(GMT+02:00)<br />
Israel has more cause for concern from the presence ofsenior alQaeda operatives in Iran than from the<br />
prospect ofIran shooting a Shehab-3 medium-range missile any time soon, despite the handover<br />
ceremony Iran's bellicose spiritual leader Ali Khamenei staged with Iran's Revolutionary Guards on<br />
July 20. According to DEBKAjile's military experts, the missile is not yet operational; neither is it<br />
precise enough or capable ofdelivering an unconventional warhead. The Shehab-3 will need another<br />
two years at least to be ready for service. Only then, will Israel's anti-missile Arrow missile system be<br />
required to live up to the Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz's encomium, that the Arrow is Israel's<br />
answer to the Iranian missile.<br />
Meanwhile, the Shehab-3 is meanwhile grounded by two daunting obstacles:<br />
A. The fmal version ofthe missile's engine is far from complete; tests are still mnning on various North<br />
Korean versions including the Nodong-l upgraged with Russian technology and Iranian improvements.<br />
DEBKAjile's intelligence sources report that Iranian missile engineers and operators went to North<br />
':If;' r{ 1,. .: r', • .~<br />
'-.f. :.... ,< ~<br />
Mussab Zarqawi - At ..<br />
Qaeda's ticking bomb<br />
in Iran<br />
Korea at the end ofJune to speed delivery ofthe new engine parts ordered and paid for last year, after the first version engine<br />
proved faulty. Some ofthe missiles test-fired crashed shortly after launch.<br />
While pressing for delivery ofthe engine parts, Tehran is cocking an anxious ear to the war ofwords flying between<br />
Washington and Pyongyang. Iran's leaders fear that sooner or later the disputants will come to an understanding over North<br />
Korea's nuclear weapons program rather than letting it slide into outright confrontation. For Iran's program, this spells<br />
curtains in more than one way.<br />
1. The moment North Korea's nuclear program accepts a regime ofcontrols and limitations, the full blast ofinternational<br />
heat, especially from Washington, will veer round to compel the Iranians to fall in line and give up the development ofa<br />
nuclear bomb.<br />
2. North Korea will be bound under such an agreement by non-proliferation clauses banning the export ofnuclear and missile<br />
technologies alike. Once the Pyongyang door is slammed, Iran can forget about North Korean assistance in bringing its<br />
ballistic missile engines up to scratch. Tehran is therefore racing to get what it can out ofNorth Korea before Pyongyang<br />
resoles its dispute with the Washington.<br />
B. The Iranian program faces another major hurdle. Their twin object is to produce enough enriched uranium for the<br />
manufacture ofnuclear bombs and warheads by the latter halfof2005, also completing the development ofdependable<br />
engines for their ballistic missiles in the same time frame. Ifall goes according to plan, Tehran will by that date have a<br />
nuclear weapon plus several missiles for delivering it. However, it is hard to imagine the United States and/or Israel allowing<br />
the Islamic RepUblic to reach that point unopposed<br />
These difficulties place the Shehab-3 menace in the middle distance and bring the Iran-based al Qaeda threat to the Middle<br />
East including Israel into much sharper focus.<br />
TIle thinking in Jerusalem is that since the Islamic theocrats did not semple to give al Qaeda logistical backing from their<br />
towns for the May 12 string ofsuicide attacks against Riyadh, they will be as willing to help the same terrorists mount strikes<br />
against Israel. Tuesday, July 22, Tehran again denied granting the network's leading lights sanctuary, contradicting President<br />
George W.. Bush's accusat~on the day before that Syria and Iran harbored and assisted terrorists. He also warned them they<br />
would be held accountable.<br />
http://www.debka.com/article..print.php?aid=527 11/29/2004
Ai f'\aeda.Threat Much Closer than Shehab-3<br />
Page 2'of2<br />
'. ·'. . 'b . G><br />
DBBKAfile ~.'Iian-Based<br />
. '1 ~o one~ows for',sure ifIran:~ al Qaeda "guests" ~~e enjoying a comfortable fonn ofdetention or are preparing the next<br />
wave ofteriorist'attacks with local connivance. (See also earlier DEBKAftle story on this page.) The theory going round<br />
some circles in Washington is that Iran's logistical aid in the Riyadh attacks was meant to hint to the US government at the<br />
extent ofdamage the Iranians are capable ofcausing US interests in Iraq and other parts ofthe Middle East ifthe heat is not<br />
reduced on the nuclear issue.<br />
Israel is keeping a very close eye on the Jordanian-born terror master Mussab Zarqawi, who just before the Iraq War was<br />
assigned; according to Israeli security'sources, with executing ~ 9/1 I-scale attack in Israel. Six months ago, Zarqawi was<br />
sighted several times in Damascus, Beirut and places in Western Europe. He always went back to Iran after what are believed<br />
to have been t:ecruiting missions for the atta~k from among the al Qaeda group sheltering in southern Lebanon and operatives<br />
who infiltrated I~f'lel and the West Bank. '<br />
Zarqawi could not have move~ around south Lebanon without the knowledge and assent ofSyrian army intelligence and the<br />
Iran-backed Hizballah.<br />
There is nothing to say that Zarqawi b~ck in Iran ever gave up preparing for his Is~el assignment. Ifsuch an operation is<br />
indeed afoot, then the Iran-based al Qaeda would be a greater and'more tangible threat to Israel than any semi-functioning<br />
Iranian missile.<br />
US-Israel Postscript<br />
DEB~jile's Washington sources disclose tha! President Bush's accusations against Syria and Iran on Monday we~ also<br />
mea!!t for the ears ofIs~aeli prime .mini~ter Ariel Sharon, who has been invited for talks in the White House on July 29. On<br />
Friday, July 25, the Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas will be received by the US president in Washington for the<br />
first time. He is coming with ashopping list, at the top o(which is a demand that Israel free a large number ofterrorists from<br />
its prisons, including terrorists "with blood on their hands" and Hamas andJihad Islami members.<br />
Sharon, limited by government decisions from setting the latter categories loose, sought to create a diversion by developing<br />
an independent peace channel to Damascus. By attacking Syria as a sponsor ofterrorists, Bush effectively blocked Sharon's<br />
ploy. The implication is that ifthe Israeli leader is not too squeamish to do ~usiness with ~ard.line regimes like that ofBashar<br />
Assad which-harbor al Qaeda and Hamas and Jihad Islami command centers, it can certainly bring itselfto make concessions<br />
to t~e non-terrorist Abb~s and his interior minister Dahlan. -<br />
There are indications that the Bush administration is cross with Sharon for his Syrian initiative and, to make things worse,<br />
using a UN official, Middle East envoy Terje Roed-Larsen as his go-between. Bush ha,s no great love for UN officials and<br />
even less for silrprises, especially when they come from Sharon who until now worked in perfect harmony with the White<br />
House. . ..<br />
.<br />
I,<br />
From the us capital, the israeli prime minister is seen to be' shutting out ofhis counsels his defense and foreign ministers,<br />
Shaul Mofaz and'Silvan Shalom - both,ofwhom he has found indiscreetly forthcoming to the media on govemmentpoJicy,<br />
an~ barri~adi!lg himselfbehind a hard shell in readiness for his White House talks. Quite aside from the real concerns posed<br />
by al Qaeda in Iran, Syria and Lebanon, Bush advisers are intent on cracking the Israeli leader's shell so as to bring him<br />
round to advancing the concessions on the list brought by Palestinian leaders. '<br />
Coprright 2000-2004 DEBKAfile. All Rights Reserved.<br />
".<br />
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Copyright 2004 Gale Group, Inc.<br />
ASAP<br />
Copyright 2004 Middle East Forum<br />
Middle East Quarterly<br />
SECTION: No.2, Vol. 11i Pg. 45i ISSN: 1073-9467<br />
IAC-ACC..NO: 118416733<br />
LENGTH: 5232 words<br />
HEADLINE: How to tame Tehran.<br />
BYLINE: Berman, IIan<br />
March 22, 2004<br />
BODY:<br />
Over the past year, Iran has become a major cause of concern in Washington. The Islamic Republic has<br />
been discovered to possess a robu'st nuclear program, of a scope well beyond p~evious estimates. It has<br />
also made substantial breakthroughs in its ballistic missile capabilities. Less noticed, but equally<br />
significant, has been Tehran's growing activism in the Persian GUlf, the Caucasus, and Iraq.<br />
There is a vision and a method to Iran's policies. In the words of Mohsen Reza'i, secretary"of Iran's<br />
Expediency Council, Iran believes it is destined to become the "center of international power politics" in<br />
the post-Saddam Hussein Middle East. (1) Iran's new, more confrontational strategic doctrine even has a<br />
name: "deterrent defense." According to foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, this national security concept<br />
is designed to confront "a broad spectrum of threats to Iran's national security, among them foreign<br />
aggression, war, border Incidents, espionage, sabotage, region.al crise~ d~rived from the proliferation of<br />
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), state terrorism, and discrimination in manufacturing and storing<br />
WMD." (2)<br />
Under the rubric of "deterrent defense," Iran is exploiting U.S. preoccupation with Iraq to build<br />
capabilities that will establish its hegemony in its immediate neighborhood and enhance its role across<br />
the Middle East. Iran's moves, if unchecked, will create a grave and growing challenge to U.S. aims in<br />
the region. At stake are nothing less than the geopolitical balance in the Middle East and the long-term<br />
achievement of U.S. goals, from stability in Iraq to regional peace.<br />
How has Iran's policy changed? And what can the United States do to thwart Iran's new drive?<br />
STRATEGIC AMBITIONS<br />
For years, policymakers in Washington had suspected Tehran's rulers of pursuing an offensive nuclear<br />
capability. They had viewed with alarm the growing strategic ties between Iran and Russia and had<br />
publicly expressed concerns that the centerpiece of that cooperation, the $ 800 million light-water<br />
reactor project at Bushehr, could lead to significant Iranian nuclear advances.<br />
Then, in the summer of 2002, an Iranian opposition group disclosed the existence of an extensive<br />
uranium enrichment complex at Natanz in central Iran. This revelation and a series of subsequent<br />
discoveries by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--ranging from advanced clandestine<br />
nuclear development to the presence of trace weapons-grade uranium-"revealed the true extent of Iran's<br />
nuclear endeavor.<br />
This effort turns out to have been far broader and more mature than originally believed. Iran is now<br />
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thought to have some fourteen other facilities, including heavy- and light-water reactors in Isfahan and<br />
Arak, and suspect sites In Fasa, Karaj, "and Nekka. Together, these constitute all the makings of an<br />
ambitious national effort to develop nuclear weapons. (3) Iranian officials, meanwhile, have hinted at the<br />
existence of still other, as yet u-ndisclosed, facilities essential to the country's nuclear program. (4)<br />
Iran appears to have agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment activities under an October 2003 deal<br />
with France, Germany, and Great Britain. Similarly, international pressure succeeded In prompting Iran<br />
to sign the Additional Protocol to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), permitting snap<br />
inspections and invasive monitoring of segments of Iran's nuclear sector by the International Atomic<br />
Energy Agency. However, two of Iran's main atomic suppliers,' Russia and China, wield veto power on<br />
the United Nations Security Council, making it improbable that Iranian nuclear violations would result In<br />
meaningful censure. And in fact, ongoing IAEA deliberations have so far failed to yield decisive<br />
international action, despite mounting evidence of Iran's atomic breaches.<br />
There is also a lingering uncertainty over Tehran's nuclear time line. While informed American observers<br />
contend that Iran is still some two years (and possibly longer) away from an offensive nuclear capability,<br />
(5) others believe that an Iranian bomb could materialize much sooner. In November 2003 testimonybefore<br />
the Israeli parliament's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Mossad chief Meir Dagan warned<br />
that Iran could reach a "point of no return" in its nuclear development by mid-2004, following which time<br />
an Iranian offensive capability would become a virtual certainty. (6) President Bush has himself warned<br />
that the United States "will not tolerate" a nuclear-armed Iran. (7) But if estimates are off, even by a<br />
few months, Iran could present the world with a nuclear fait accompli.<br />
At the same time, major breakthroughs in Iran's strategic arsenal have made it an emerging missile<br />
power. In June 2003, the Islamic Republic conducted what it termed the final test of its 1,300"<br />
kilometer range Shahab-3 ballistic missile. The launch was a success, confirming Iran's ability to target<br />
U.S. allies Israel and Turkey, as wen as U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. Since then, with great fanfare,<br />
the Islamic Republic has inducted the advanced rocket Into its Revolutionary Guards (the Pasdaran). (8)<br />
This potential for proliferation is hardly the only worry. If recent signals are any indication, the Shahab<br />
3 has already evolved well beyond its.officially declared capabilities. In September 2003, at a military<br />
parade commemorating the anniversary of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the Shahab-3 was officially<br />
described as possessing a range of 1,700 kilometers. (9) Additionally, opposition groups have charged<br />
that Tehran's overt missile development actually masks a much broader clandestine endeavor-.-one that<br />
includes development of the 4,OOO-kllometer range Shahab-5 and even a follow-on Shahab-6<br />
Intercontinental ballistic missile. (10)<br />
Such efforts have only been strengthened by Iranian perceptions of U.S. policy. The Bush<br />
administration's rapid dispatch of Saddam Hussein's regime, and its contrasting hesitancy in dealing with<br />
a newly nuclear North Korea, has had a profound impact on Iran's calculus. North Korea's nuclear<br />
maneuvers, and its ability to successfully stymie U.S. strategy, have led Iranian officials to express their<br />
admiration for Pyongyang's resistance to U.S. "pressure, hegemony and superiority.II (11) There has<br />
indeed been some internal debate in Iran about the risks of stepping over the nuclear threshold. Yet<br />
even leading Iranian reformers appear to have gravitated to the notion that nuclear weapons are<br />
necessary to shift the regional "equilibrium." (12)<br />
CHARM OFFENSIVE<br />
These strategic advances, however, are only part of the picture. In tandem with Iran's nuclear and<br />
ballistic missile breakthroughs, a significant transformation has also begun in Iranian foreign policy.<br />
For Tehran, the overthrow of Hussein's regime has only fueled mounting fears of a danger0t!s str~tegic<br />
encirclement. The U.S. destruction ofthe Taliban regime in Afghanistan had already ensconced the pro<br />
Western--albeit fragile--government of Hamid Karzai In Kabul. For Iran, the extremist Sunni Taliban<br />
posed an ideological threat, but a U.S. foothold on Iran's eastern border is regarded as even more<br />
threatening. Regime change In Baghdad, therefore, confronted officials in Tehran with the two-fold<br />
danger that Iran could be pinioned between two U.S.. client-states, and that Iraq's fall might be a prelude<br />
-to a similar U.S. drive to transform their country.<br />
In response, Iran formulated its new strategic doctrine of "deterrent defense." In practice, this has<br />
entailed a major expansion of Iran's military capabilities. Heavy defense expenditures, and ongoing<br />
strategic partnerships with both Russia and China, have made possible a far-reaching national military<br />
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,: rearmament. Defense acquisitions made over the past several years have steadily broadened Iran's<br />
strategic reach over vital Persian Gulf shipping lanes, to the point that Tehran now possesses the ability<br />
to virtually control oil supplies from the region. (13) Iran has also increased its diplomatic activism In the<br />
region, redoubling its long-running efforts to erect an independent security framework as a<br />
counterweight to the expanding U.S. military footprint. (14)<br />
As part of this effort, in February 2004, Iran codified an unprecedented military and defense accord with<br />
Syria"-one formally enshrining an Iranian commitment to Syria's defense in the event of a U.S. ~r Israeli<br />
offensive. Iranian officials have subsequently made clear that these mutual defense guarantees also<br />
extend to Lebanon-and to the Islamic Republic's most potent regional proxy: Hizbullah. (15)<br />
Iran has also raised its military and diplomatic profile in the Caucasus. In April 2003, foreign minister<br />
Kharrazi embarked on a diplomatic tour of the region intended to marshal support for a common regional<br />
security framework for Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, and Turkey as an alternative to<br />
cooperation with "external forces." (16) But lukewarm regional responses have prompted the Islamic<br />
Republic to nudge these·countries into alignment through less subtle means. In mid-October 2003, Iran<br />
commenced large-scale military maneuvers In its northwest region, near Azerbaijan. The exercises,<br />
reportedly the largest conducted by Iran in recent memory, massed troops on the Iranian-Azeri border in<br />
a Clear show of force aimed at dissuading the former Soviet republic from expanding cooperation with<br />
the United States. (17) A corresponding Iranian naval buildup Is now visible In the Caspian Sea in<br />
response to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan's growing military relationships with Washlngton~<br />
U.S. advances in the region are regarded by Iran as potential threats, but paradoxically they have also<br />
presented Iran with opportunities that it has been quick to exploit.<br />
* The coalition campaign against ~addam Hussein's regime succeeded in eliminating the threat posed by<br />
Tehran's most Immediate adversary, thereby cementing Iran's dominant regional standing, Iran has<br />
exploited'the postwar political vacuum In Iraq to foment Instability through a variety of measures,<br />
ranging from political support of radical Shi'ite·elements to an increase in drug trafficking. (-18) This<br />
broad offensive has reportedly included the Infiltration of hundreds ,of Pasdaran operatives into Iraq<br />
where they"have engaged in active recruitment,·influence operations, and assassinatlons--at a cost to<br />
Iran of some $ 70 million per month., (19)<br />
* Hussein's overthrow has also effectively defanged a lingering threat to Tehran: the MUjahldeen-eKhalq<br />
Organization (MKO), a wing of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Since the spring of 2003,<br />
coalition forces under a U.S.-imposed cease-fire have curtailed the anti-regime group's operations In<br />
Iraq. And a subsequent December decision· by Iraq's new governing council has labeled the MKO-<br />
preViously tolerated and even supported by the Baathlsts--as a terrorist organization. (20)<br />
* To Iran's east, meanwhile, the fall of the Taliban has removed an ideological competitor for Muslim<br />
hearts and minds while lingering factionalism and tribal rivalries have allowed Iran to perpetuate<br />
Afghanistan's instability.<br />
Iran Is clearly determined to remake its strategic environment in its favor. Iran J'las mobilized its<br />
technological resources to give it greater reach and has used political, economic, and military clout to<br />
encourage a tilt in its direction in its immediate neighborhood. Paradoxically, the United States, by<br />
breaking up the old order in states neighboring Iran, has given Tehran hitherto unimagined opportunities<br />
to influence the reg ion.<br />
FALSE STARTS<br />
Can International diplomacy deflect Iran's newe~t drive for regional hegemony? It hardly seems likely.<br />
From 1991 to 1997, the European Union (EU) engaged in a "critical dialogue" with the Islamic Republic,<br />
attempting to moderate Iran's radical policies through trade. But by 1997, critical dialogue had actually<br />
achieved exactly the opposite result, infusing Iran with much needed currency while failing to alter<br />
Tehran's support for terrorism, its pursUit of WMD, and its violations of human rights. Diplomacy has had<br />
a limited effect because the EU countries have allowed their economic interests to· undercut their<br />
diplomatic efforts. For example, in late 2002, In the midst of revelations regarding Iran's advanced<br />
nuclear development, the EU signaled its intention to commence new negotiations with the Islamic<br />
Republic on a sweeping trade and cooperation pact. (21)<br />
The United States has also wavered in its application of diplomatic pressure. The May 1997 election of<br />
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soft-line cleric Mohammad Khatami to the Iranian presidency--and his subsequent, much-publicized<br />
"dlalogue of civilizations" intelView on CNN--convinced many in Washington that Iran was moving toward<br />
pragmatic accommodation. Since then, U.S. policymakers, despite reiterating their continued<br />
commitment to containment of Iran, have time and again qualified Iran's membership in the "axis of<br />
evil." Most notably, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in a February 2003 interview with the<br />
Los Angeles Times, distinguished between Iran on the one hand and North Korea and Iraq, on the other-<br />
on account of Iran's "democracy." (22)<br />
This, too, is an illusion. The Islamic Republic In recent years has engaged in a widening governmental<br />
campaign of domestic repression--one that includes stepped-up crackdowns on the press and the brutal<br />
persecution of regime opponents. The repression reflects a governmental effort to grapple with the<br />
groundswell of political opposition that has emerged among Iran's disaffected young population in<br />
response to the country's rising unemployment and economic stagnation.<br />
At the same time, Iran's theocrats remain deeply antagonistic to all U.S. overtures. This was<br />
demonstrated most recently by the· quiet contacts between Washington and Tehran in the aftermath of<br />
the devastating December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran. Despite deep support for dialogue among<br />
reformist parliamentarians, clerical hard-liners opposed to such a rapprochement ultimately cut short the<br />
contacts. (23)<br />
If the United States wants to alter Iran's behavior, It cannot expect results from the tried-and-failed<br />
approaches of "critical dialogue," "dialogue of civilizations," and other false starts.<br />
U.S. OPTIONS<br />
Yet a policy that reassures allies, deters Iranian aggression, and curbs Iran's expansionism is more than<br />
feasible. It requires the United States to do four things: broaden containment to include counterproliferation;<br />
revive Gulf defense alliances; mobilize Turkey; and woo the Iranian people.<br />
Expanded containment. Far and away the most urgent task now facing Washington is arresting Iran's<br />
nuclear progress. Over the past year,· U.S. policymakers have expressed increasingly vocal concerns over<br />
the corrosive global potential of an Iranian nuclear breakout, ranging from a nuclear arms race in the<br />
Middle East to Tehran's growing capacity for nuclear blackmail. Yet the United States could assume a<br />
more proactive role In preventing nuclear technology transfers to Iran.<br />
This is the concept behind the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the counter-proliferation partnership<br />
launched by President Bush In May 2003. (24) Since Its inception, the PSI--designed to prevent the<br />
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue nations through more aggressive intelligencesharing<br />
and interdiction efforts--has already charted some notable successes vis-a-vis North Korea,<br />
inclUding a clampdown on illicit North Korean smuggling operations by both Australia and Japan. And<br />
recent maneuvers by PSI-member nations in the Coral Sea and the Mediterranean suggest a growing<br />
role fpr the alliance in the Middle. East, both as a mechanism to intercept illicit WMD trafficking in the<br />
Persian Gulf and as a means to target proliferation networks (such as the recently unearthed nuclear ring<br />
led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan) now active in the region.<br />
But the PSI is not the only tool In Washington's arsenal. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, the United<br />
States Is quietly moving ahead with Caspian Guard, an initiative designed to bolster regional security<br />
through expanded maritime patrolS, aerial and naval sUlVeillance, and border protections. As part of this<br />
effort, the United States has stepped up military exercises with Azerbaijan and has committed some $ 10<br />
million to strengthening the former Soviet republic's naval capability and border security. This includes<br />
beefing up Azerbaijan's communications infrastructure and helping to carry out counter-proliferation<br />
operations. (25)<br />
SimilarlyI' under a five-year defense accord signed with Kazakhstan in 2003, Washington has bankrolled<br />
the construction of a Kazakh military base In tl)e Caspian coast city of Atyrau and has allocated millions<br />
to equipment and training for the Kazakh army, maritime and border-patrol forces. (26) Central to this<br />
effort is the prevention of WMD proliferation through the region, not least the transfer of technology<br />
from Russia to Iran.<br />
The early successes of the PSI and Caspian Guard suggest that both initiatives can and should be<br />
expanded to address more comprehensively the threat from the Islamic Republic.<br />
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Reviving Gulf defense. Over the past several years, fears of a rising Tehran have begun to drive many<br />
Arab Gulf countries toward accommodation with Iran. For example, such concerns led Oman to establish<br />
a modus vivendi with the Islamic Republic through the codification of a sweeping agreement on military<br />
cooperation in 2000 (albeit one that has since been denied by Oman). (27) Kuwait subsequently followed<br />
sUit, striking a similar bargain In October 2002., (28) Even Saudi Arabia, preViously a strategic competitor<br />
of Iran, capitulated on a long-discussed framework accord with Tehran in late 2001, in the wake of two<br />
multi-billion-dollar Russo-Iranian defense accords. (29)<br />
But for many of these countries, such bilateral partnerships are a product of necessity--a function of ttie<br />
inadequacy of national defenses and regional alliances In addressing Iran's rising expansionism. The<br />
distrust of Iran still runs very deep. As a recent editorial in London's influential·Arab-language Ash-Sharq<br />
al-Awsat newspaper emphasized, Iran now poses a threat to "Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan,<br />
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, which share with Iran a land border of 5,400 kilometers and a sea border<br />
of 2,400 kilometers .,. The Iranian nuclear danger threatens us, first and foremost, more than it<br />
threatens the Israelis and the Americans!' (30)<br />
\, Such worries have prompted the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprised of Saudi<br />
Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, to initiate a feasibility study for an<br />
alliance-wide antimissile system. At the same time, individual countries in the Arab Gulf (most notably<br />
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) have initiated efforts to upgrade their individual missile defense capabilities.<br />
(31) Recently uncovered nuclear contacts between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan suggest that at least one<br />
of Iran's neighbors has begun to actively contemplate the need for a strategic deterrent against the<br />
Islamic Republic. (32)<br />
All this suggests that a U.S. strategic initiative toward the Arab Gulf may find ready customers. On the<br />
one hand, a deepening of Washington's bilateral military dialogue and defense contacts with individual<br />
Gulf nations might lessen regional dependence not only on .Iran but on an increasingly volatile and<br />
unpredictable Saudi Arabia as well. (33) On the other hand, the creation of a formalized American<br />
security architecture over the region could reinvigorate Washington's regional partnerships while<br />
excluding and isolating Iran. (34) Common to all of these efforts is the need to prOVide Tehran's<br />
neighbors with the tools to counter its growing potential for nuclear and ballistic missile blackmail.<br />
Talking Turkey. Ties between the United States and Turkey have been tepid since Ankara's unexpected<br />
refusal to grant basing rights to U.S. troops on the eve of the spring 2003 Iraq cam'paign--a move that<br />
torpedoed U.S. plans for a northern front against Hussein's regime. Since then, however, policymakers in .<br />
both countries have begun to mend fences. As· part of that process, the United States should insist that<br />
Turkey do more to hedge Iranian ambitions in the Caucasus and Central Asia.<br />
Unfortunately, Turkey's historic role as a strategic competitor of Iran has been substantially eroded.<br />
Indeed, over the past two years, Ankara has steadily drifted toward a new relationship with Tehran.<br />
Much of this movement has been underpinned by energy. Turkey's growing dependence on Iran--which<br />
could provide roughly 20 percent of total Turkish natural gas consumption by the end of the decade<br />
(35)--has diminished Ankara's economic leverage vis-a-vis Tehran.<br />
But politics play an important role as well. Since Its assumption of power in November 2002, Turkey's<br />
Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has gravitated toward closer ties with its Muslim neighbors<br />
under the guise of an '·independent'· foreign policy, Iran has been one of the chief beneficiaries of these<br />
overtures, and bilateral contacts and economic trade between Ankara and Tehran have ballooned over<br />
the past year. This political proximity has only been reinforced by common worries over Iraqi instability<br />
in the aftermath of Hussein's ouster.<br />
Nevertheless, Ankara's deep ethnic and historical ties to the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia<br />
make it a natural counterweight to Iranian-sponsored religious radicalism In those regions. Given<br />
Turkey's deep interest in expanding trade and development in the Caspian, Turkey also remains<br />
suspicious of Iran's maneuvers there. Meanwhile, Tehran's ongoing sponsorship of terrorism, including<br />
the Kurdish variety, has put Iran and Turkey on very different sides of the war on terrorism.<br />
These commonalities have led observers to suggest that Turkey's most constructive role might be as a<br />
force multiplier for U.S. interests in its "northern neighborhood." (36) In fact, Ankara and Tehran's<br />
divergent strategic priorities--on everything from Central Asian Islam to Caspian energy to the future<br />
political composition of postwar Iraq--suggest that Turkey and Iran could become competitors again. The<br />
United States should encourage such competition by creating incentives for Turkey to play Its historic<br />
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role.<br />
Wooing the Iranians. One of the Bush administration's most enduring challenges in prosecuting, the war<br />
on terrorism has been effectively communicating its goals and objectives to a skeptical Muslim world.<br />
Over the past two and a half years, that need has spawned an expanded public diplomacy effort. This<br />
has included media outreach on the part of top administration officials like National Security Advisor<br />
Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.<br />
Iran, however, has been included only belatedly in these plans. More than nine months after September<br />
11, with U.S. officials saturating the airwaves of Arabic networks like Qatar's al-Jazeera, not one highranking<br />
U.S. official had granted an inteaview.to a Persian-language television outlet. (37) (This is<br />
despite the existence of dissident channels, such as the Los Angeles-based National Iranian Television<br />
[NITV], capable of effectively carrying the U.S. message.) Even when the United States did finally<br />
overhaul its public diplomacy toward Iran with the launch of the Persian-language Radio Farda in'<br />
December 2002, the station's entertainment-heavy format led criti~ to complain that the United States<br />
had diluted its democratic message. (38) Since then, broadcasting to Iran has continued to be funded at<br />
minimal levels, despite Congressional. efforts to expand outreach. Such a lackluster effort reflects<br />
continuing confusion within the U.S. government about' exactly whom to engage within Iran.<br />
In fact, the success of, public diplomacy hinges upon a clear American vision of Iran's desired direction<br />
and the sustained political will to assist Iran in reaching that goal. In that light, there should be only one<br />
answer to the question of whom to engage: the nascent democratic opposition. The United States should<br />
demonstrate its support for that opposition by expanding expatriate and government-sponsored<br />
broadcasting, using it to highlight and criticize Tehran's bankrupt clerl~al rule.<br />
(1) Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Mar. 5, 2003.<br />
(2) Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, cited In Saisat-e Rouz, Feb. 18, 2003.<br />
(3) Defense News, Jan. 12, 2004; Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Programs," Middle East<br />
Intelligence Bulletin, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at ht.tp:llwww,mglb.grg@rtlclgs/0203 irnl._btm~<br />
(4) Ahmad Shlrzad, Iranian member of parliament, Nov. 24, 2003, remarks before legislative session,<br />
RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) Iran Report, Dec. 8, 2003.<br />
(5) "Iran: Breaking out without QUite Breaking the Rules?" Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, May<br />
13, 2003, at ~tp.;.lIwww.DP_e~eb....o.mLP..aQ..esLk~w.J1tm.<br />
(6) Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), Nov. 18, 2003. Israeli officials have further threatened to t~ke.preemptive<br />
military action, if necessary, to prevent this from happening; Agence France-Presse, Dec. 21, 200~.<br />
(7) The New York Times, June 18, 2003.<br />
(8) Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, July 20, 2003.<br />
(9) Agence France-Presse, Sept. 22, 2003.<br />
(10) Middle East Newsline,Oct. 25, 2002.<br />
(11) IRNA, Dec. 14,,2003.<br />
(12) The Washington Post, Mar. 11, 2003.<br />
(13) Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Defense Intelligence Agency director, "Current and Projected<br />
National Security Threats to the United States," statement for the record, Senate Select Committee on<br />
Intelligence, Feb. 11, 2003, at http.;Uwww!fsts~o.rglIr~/congress/2003_hr/021103jacoby.html.<br />
(14) M. Javad Zarif, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, commentary in The New York Times, May<br />
10, 2003.<br />
(15) IRNA. Feb. 27 and Feb. 29. 2004; Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), Feb. 29, 2004.<br />
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\ (16) !tar-TASS (Moscow), Apr. 29, 20Q3.<br />
(17) Uch Nogta (Azerbaijan), Oct. 22, 2003.<br />
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(18) See, for example, AI-Hayat (London), Nov. 28, 2003, and Jan. 5, 2004.<br />
(19) Ash-Sharq al-Awsat (London), Apr. 3, 2004.<br />
(20) The New York Times, Dec. 19, 2003.<br />
(21) Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), Dec. 12,2002.<br />
(22) Los Angeles Times, Feb. 16, 2003.<br />
(23) Mohsen Armin, deputy chairman of the National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, Iranian<br />
Islamic Consultative Assembly (majles), Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA), Jan. 4, 2004.<br />
(24) Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,<br />
Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States currently make up the core membership of<br />
the PSI, while over sixty other nation--including Turkey--have voiced their backing for the initiative.<br />
(25) Associated Press, Jan. "3, 2004.<br />
(26) Radio Free Europe, Oct. 8, 2003.<br />
(27) Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network I, Apr. 10, 2000.<br />
(28) Xinhua News Agency, Oct. 2, 2002; Reuters, Oct. 3, 2002.<br />
(29) Middle East Newsline, Apr. 18, 2001.<br />
(30) Ash-Sharq AI-Awsat (London), Oct. 8, 2003.<br />
(31) Defense News, May 23 and Dec. 1, 2003.<br />
(32) the Washington Time, Oct. 22, 2003.<br />
(33) For more on existing defens~ ties between the United States and the Gulf states, as well as the<br />
potential for their expansion, see Simon Henderson, The New Pillar: Conservative Arab Gulf States and<br />
U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003).<br />
(34) See, for example, Kenneth Pollack, "Securing the GUlf," Foreign Affairs, July-Aug. 2003, pp. 2-15.<br />
(35) "Turkish Energy Policy,'1 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at<br />
.I:)ttp:l!www·mfa,gO\£.trlgrypS'/aO/goUcy,htrn·<br />
(36) Soner Cagaptay, "United States and Turkey in 2004: Time to Look North," Turkish Policy Quarterly,<br />
Winter 2004, at http_:lLwww.wa.shlngt.9ni_~stitu_t~...!.o..rgll1.lepJ9Lca.9~pJayl cagaptay020204.pdf. '<br />
(37) Interview with Iranian dissident, Washington, D.C., July 2002.<br />
(38) See, for example, Jesse Helms, "What's 'POpl in Persian?" The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 2002;<br />
Jackson Diehl, "Casey Kasem or Freedom?" The Washington Post, Dec. 16, 2002•<br />
. REGIME CHANGE<br />
The United States has been guilty of sending mixed signals to Iran over the past few years. Most<br />
significantly, it has apologized for the Central Intelligence Agency's role in the coup of 1953--an early<br />
case of regime change--and it has declared Its goal in Iran to be behavior modification rather th~n<br />
regime change. The mixing of signals simply reflects a confusion·of policy--a confusion that has become<br />
positively dangerous, both to U.S. interests and the security of Iran's neighbors.<br />
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In fact, the U.S. objective in Iran is closer to the regime change it imposed on Iraq than to the<br />
behavioral change it brought about in Libya. The Iranian regime is not one mercurial man, whose<br />
behavior can be reversed by determined action. Iran has a ruling elite with many members, a shared<br />
sense of history, and a consistency of purpose that has been tested in revolution and war. This regime<br />
will not change, which is why the ultimate objective of U.S. policy must be to change it. That should not<br />
be forgotten, even if regime change in Iran cannot be pursued by the military means used in Iraq.<br />
Short of military intervention, the United States needs a comprehensive strategy to block Iran's nuclear<br />
progress, check Iran's adventurism in the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus, and give encouragement to the<br />
Islamic Republic's nascent domestic opposition. Through a strategy that bolsters Iran's vulnerable<br />
regional neighbors, rolls back its military advances, and assists internal political alternatives, Washington<br />
can blunt the threat now posed by Tehran--and set the stage for the later pursuit of its ultimate<br />
objective.<br />
Hijab Couture<br />
TEHRAN -. Since Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979, hijab, the obligatory dress code, has required women<br />
to wear clothes which disgUise the shape of the body and cover the hair. Fashion shows are normally<br />
held secretly In private homes. But last month the Iranian authorities allowed designer Mahla Zamani to<br />
hold one in public. It. was an all-female affair and photographers were banned.<br />
The snow was denounced by Tehran's conservatives as a plot to undermine Islamic values. lilt is a<br />
hypocritical attempt to realize the evil aims of foreigners by snatching the Islamic covering from Muslim'<br />
Iranian women," thundered the conservative Jomhuri-ye Eslami daily.<br />
Zamani introduced a collection of traditional Persian designs that may augur a sartorial sea-change In<br />
what is Islamically permissible. "It is a cultural endeavor to revive traditional costumes. Why shopld we<br />
get fashion from the West?" she said.<br />
But another patron thought the designs did not match up to those of Western designers. "The patterns<br />
are not elaborate and complex enough to be compared with Western designs, especially couture,n said<br />
Leela, a 25-year-old aerobics Instructor.<br />
Reuters, Nov. 20, 2003<br />
IIan Berman is vice president for policy at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.,<br />
where he directs research and analysis on the Middle East and Central Asia.<br />
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Dec. 5, 2004 0:09 J Updat~d Dec. 5, 2004 12:00<br />
Exclusive: How the FBI set up AIPAC<br />
By JANINE ZACHABIA<br />
AIPAC, the powerhouse pro·Israel lobby currently embroiled in allegations of spying for Israel, was set up by<br />
the FBI, The Jerosa/em Post has learned.<br />
FBI agents used a courier, Pentagon analyst larry Franklin" to draw two senior AIPAC officials who already<br />
knew hil'!'l into accepting what he described to them as "classified" information, reliable government and<br />
other sources intimately familiar with the investigation have told the Post.<br />
One of the AIPAC pair then told diplomats at the Israeli Embassy in Washington about the "classified t •<br />
information, which claimed Iranians were monitoring and planning to kidnap and kill Israelis operating in the<br />
Kurdish areas in 1J0rthern Iraq, the Post has been told.<br />
It is unclear whether the "classified" information was real or bogus.<br />
AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) denies any wrongdoing.<br />
Knowingly transferring classified information to a foreign power can be a breach of US~ espionage statutes.<br />
Legal experts have told the Post that passing on bogu~ ctassified information may be used to demonstrate<br />
intent to violate the law but does not itself constitute a crime.<br />
Frank~in,<br />
an Iran expert, was already under investigation by the FBI for allegedly passing classified<br />
information to AIPAC when, the Posts sources say" FBI counterintelligence agents approached him to play<br />
a central role in the setup operation this past summer.<br />
The FBI had been monitoring AIPAC's activities for some two years when, last year, its agents observed two<br />
AIPAC official~, Steve Rosen, director of foreign policy issues" and Keith Weissman, a senior Middle East<br />
analyst with the lobby, at a lunch meeting with.Franklin in Washington.<br />
At this lunch, it has been widely reported, Franklin allegedly briefed the AIPAC pair on the content of a draft<br />
national security presidential directive on Iran.<br />
Details of the draft, which included proposed measures the US could employ to destabilize the Iranian<br />
regime" were already circulating a! the time. According to some reports, an Israeli diplomat at the embassy<br />
in Washington, Naor Gilon, was also present at the lunch.<br />
Earlier this year, the FBI informed Franklin that, as a consequence of the lunch meeting, he was under<br />
investigation. The Pentagon analyst, hoping for leniency" agreed to cooperate with FBI agents in what would<br />
become the setting up of AIPAC, a process designed to bust the lobby for passing secrets to Israel.<br />
. The FBI agents told Franklin to request a meeting with Rosen and Weissman. He initiated contact with the<br />
AIPAC pair,_and told them that he needed to discuss a ticking-bomb situation.<br />
4ll~~/f-;<br />
G~\t'\JJ~~~l~-!JC-<br />
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o<br />
Franklin was then dispatched to meet the two AIPAC officials and outline the alleged threat to Israelis in<br />
northem Iraq, the Post has been,told.<br />
Saying his access to the White House was limited, Fran,klin also expressed concern that the Bush<br />
administration was underestimating the extent to which Iranian agents were operating in Iraq and asked the<br />
AIPAC officials to stress this point in their meetings with US officials.<br />
The agents' hope, plainly, was that the AIPAC pair would be so troubled by the apparent life-and-death<br />
content of the information from Franklin as to risk a breach of US espionage statutes and transfer ~hat they<br />
believed to be classified material to a foreign power" Israel.<br />
And that, the Post has been told, Is precisely what happened.<br />
Franklin, according to news reports, cooperated with the FBI until about two months ago. In early October,<br />
he abruptly stopped working with authorities, dropped his court-appointed attorney and sought the legal<br />
counsel of Plato Cacheris, a prominent Washington defense la~er who has represented numerous<br />
accused spies.<br />
Continued<br />
"Obviously his was a bad deal," says one source familiar with Franklin's decision to stop cooperating with<br />
the bureau.<br />
News of the initial Franklin-AIPAC lunch broke last summer: CBS led its August 27 Nightly News broadcast<br />
with a report of a "full-fledged espionage investigation underway," saying the FBI was about to "roll up" a<br />
suspected Israeli "mole" in the office ofthe secretary of defense in the Pentagon.<br />
CBS reported that, using wiretaps, undercover surveillance and photography, the FBI had documented the<br />
passing of ~ classified presidential directive on Iran from the suspected mole to two people who work at<br />
AIPAC. Sources familiar with the matter, however, said no documents exchanged hands.<br />
CBS's sensational allegation immediately conjured up memories of the Pollard affair, the 1985 arrest and<br />
SUbsequent conviction in 1987 and life imprisonment for espionage of US naval intelligence analyst<br />
Jonathan Pollard for passing classified information to Israel.<br />
The investigation into Franklin and the AIPAC officials continued qUietly, with IitUe subsequent media<br />
coverage, i!" recent months. No indictments were issued and most reports scaled back the accusations<br />
aJJainst Franklin from alleged espionage to mishandling of classified evidence.<br />
But the"investigation burst back into prominence last Wednesday, when FBI agents made their first visit to<br />
AIPAC's Capitol Hill offices since Augu~t. Armed with a warrant, the agents seized computer files relate
;... ., \. o o<br />
The four subpoenaed officials, who are considered witnesses,.not targets, of the"investigati0l"!, are AIPAC<br />
Exe~utive Director Howard Koh·r, Managing Director Richard Fishman, Communication~ Director R~nee<br />
Rothstein and Research Dir~ctor Rafi Danziger.<br />
A Washington criminal justice expert said Friday that the issuing of the subpoenas suggested the FBI was<br />
"getting ready to indict."<br />
AIPAC has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing.<br />
"AIPAC has done nothing wron"g•.Neither AIPAC nor any member of our staff has broken any law, nor has<br />
AIPAC or its employees ever received information they believed ~as secret or classified. We continue to<br />
cooperate fUlly with the governmental authorities and ~elieve any court of law or grand jury will c:onclude that<br />
AIPAC employees have always acted legally, properly and appropriately," AIPAC said in a statement.<br />
"Despite the fals~ and baseless allegations that have been reported, AIPAC will not be distracted from our<br />
central mission of supporting America's interests in the Middle East and advocating for a strong relationship<br />
with Israel," the statement said.
AL~FORMA.TION CONTAUJED' 0<br />
HE~ IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
BEHIND THE HEADLINES<br />
FBI waited more than a year<br />
to make. move against AIPAC<br />
By Edwin Black<br />
WASHINGTON, Dec. 21 (JTA) .:-. The FBI's investigation of the<br />
American Israel Public Affairs Committee did not go into high gear until<br />
more than a year after the Pentagon's top Iran analyst allegedly passed<br />
foreign policy strategy information to two AIPAC officials.<br />
,..<br />
The investigation only intensified in July 2004, when the FBI allegedly<br />
directed the same Pentagon analyst, Larry Franklin, to conduct a sting<br />
operation against AIPAC officials, providing them with purPo.rtedly<br />
classified information to pass on to Israel, according to sources close to<br />
the investigation. , '<br />
A month later, the FBI raided AIPAC offices, confiscating files from two<br />
senior staffers.<br />
On Dec. 1, the FBI returned to the headquarters of the pro-Israel lobby,<br />
searching staffers' offices. The FBI also issued SUbpoenas to four<br />
AIPAC staffers to appearbefore a grand jUry at the end of this month.<br />
Most accounts of the AIPAC investigation have focused on the Franklin<br />
lunch with Steve Rosen, AIPAC's director of foreign policy issues, and<br />
Keith Weissman, an Iran specialist, a meeting, it has been learned, that<br />
occurred on June 26, 2003, at the Tivoli restaurant in Arlington, Va.<br />
The chronology is important, say several sources with direct access to<br />
the prosecution's case, because it suggests that that meeting produced<br />
insufficient grounds for the FBI to pursue a case against AIPAC.<br />
"We always wondered why there had been no contact by the FBI from<br />
.June2003 to August 2004,· when AIPAC's headquarters were raided,<br />
said a source familiar with the government's investigation. "That's more<br />
than a year."<br />
~<br />
"It never made sense, if this violation" that is alleged to have taken place<br />
at the Tivoli lunch "was so serious," the source said•.<br />
Instead, the probe of AIPAC appears to have intensified only after the<br />
FBI monitored a call between Franklin and reporters at CBS News in<br />
May 2004, in which he allegedly disclosed information about aggressive<br />
• Iranian policy in Iraq.<br />
One of those reporters was Adam Ciralsky, a former attorney at the<br />
Central Intelligence Agency who sued the CIA after he quit in 1999 on<br />
the grounds that he was harassed for his Jewish rpots and connection to<br />
Israel.<br />
After the call in May, the FBI's counterintelligence division, headed by
'"<br />
'.<br />
o<br />
David Szady, who also·supervised the alleged campaign against<br />
Ciralsky, confronted Franklin, according to sources familiar with the<br />
case.<br />
o<br />
Threatened with charges of espionage and decades of imprisonment,<br />
Franklin was deployed to set up a sting against AIPAC, the sources say.<br />
According ~o sources, he was also involved in initiating contact with<br />
some neoconservative defense experts, several of them Jewish, who<br />
supported Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi, the president of the Iraqi National<br />
Congress, ha~ deep tie~ to Bush administration officials.<br />
Chalabi's political adviser;, a non-Jewish American, was also targeted"<br />
according to sources.<br />
Chalabi is at the vortex of a Pentagon-intelligence community squabble<br />
ov~r pre- and post-war policy in Iraq.<br />
AIPAC had been under intense scrutiny by the FBI throughout early<br />
2003, but the law enforcement officials had seen nothing to justify<br />
prosecutorial action, sources said.<br />
At the Tivoli restaurant lunch with AIPAC, Franklin allegedly verbally<br />
mentioned information from a classified Pentagon policy paper<br />
purportedly written by defense expert Michael Rubin while Rubin was<br />
still at the Pentagon. But Franklin did not actually pass along the<br />
document, according to multiple sources familiar with the document and<br />
the pro~ecution's case. .<br />
Rubin is now at the American Enterprise Institute,. a conservative thil1k<br />
~~ .-<br />
The Pentagon policy paper reportedly proposed an American strategy to<br />
destabilize Iran in the face of its growing nuclear potential, according to<br />
the sources.<br />
The Tivoli lunch didn't trigger an immediate prosecution: No document<br />
was passed, sources say, and while the verbal information allegedly was<br />
drawn from a Pentagon document that did enjoy ~ low-security<br />
classification - as do many such planning debate documents in<br />
Washington - much of its content already had been aired in the media.<br />
AIPAC steadfastly has denied that it violated any laws, and insists it is<br />
the victim of a witch-hunt.<br />
Franklin refused to speak about the matter.<br />
Franklin had been under increased scrutiny since disclosure of a secret<br />
meeting in Decen:'ber 2001 with former Iranian spy and arms merchant<br />
Manucher Ghorbanifar that some in the Washington establishment<br />
claimed was unauthorized. Ghorbanifar was on a CIA "burn list- of<br />
individuals who could n~t be contacted, according to informed
"',<br />
o<br />
intelligence community sources.<br />
o<br />
Franklin didn't know it, but the FBI's counterintelligence division was<br />
monitoring his May 2004 phone conversation with the CBS reporters,<br />
including Ciralsky. - ,<br />
In the conversation with CBS, Franklin's remarks reportedly revealed<br />
sensitive intelligence intercepts, potentially compromising sources and<br />
methods of intelligence gathering, according to some sources aware of<br />
the call. Others aware of the call say the FBI would,be hard-pressed to<br />
prove Franklin's comments actually breached national security.<br />
Friends and colleagues describe Franklin as a dedicated pUblic servant<br />
deeply concerned ~bout growing Iranian influence in Iraq.,<br />
"He ran off at the mouth. and hated the intelligence community for what<br />
he saw as recklessness." one colleague said. "He was Willing to take<br />
matters into his own hands for what h~ saw as the good of the nation."<br />
Another who knows him added, "Franklin spoke to CBS reporters in an<br />
effort to ring an alarm" about White House indifference to a looming<br />
threat. "but it was clearly wrong if it involved classified information."<br />
Shortly after the CBS call. agents from Szady's FBI counterintelligence<br />
division confronted Franklin, sources say.,<br />
During this time, Franklin was not represented by an attorney, and the<br />
governmen~ placed him on unpaid leav~ ..<br />
Franklin, who is the sole breadwinner for five children and a wheelchairbound<br />
Wife, was terrified by the threats, according to multiple sources<br />
familiar with his situation.<br />
Szady's FBI counterintelligence division then devised a strategy to use<br />
Franklin as a plant to set up AI PAC" ac~rding to sources.<br />
FBI officials refused to discuss the matter.<br />
The FBI sting, first reported by Janine Zacharia in The Jerusalem Post,<br />
allegedly directed Franklin to offer AIPAC officials supposedly urgent<br />
classified information about Iranian plans to kidnap and murder Israelis<br />
operating in northern Iraq. Whether the information was manufactured or<br />
accurate is not ~Iear.<br />
The exact date and location of the sting, which came in the form of a<br />
meeting, have not previously been disclosed, but according to sQurces<br />
with access to prosecution information, it took place on July 21,2004, at<br />
a suburban Virginia mall. .<br />
Believing they had a life or death situation on their hands, AIPAC<br />
officials reportedly contacted the Israeli Embassy, thereby prompting<br />
action by the FBI counterintelligence division.
o<br />
AIPAC officials declined all comment on the July meeting.<br />
However, one source familiar with access to the prosecution'~ case<br />
against AIPAC asked, "If the June 2003 incident was strong enough to<br />
prosecute, why did the government need Franklin to perp~trate a ~ting<br />
more than a year later? Answer: The first encounter aid not amount to<br />
anything. The FBI needed more."<br />
Among those Franklin was directed to call as part of an alleged series of<br />
sting operations was Francis Brooke, Chalabi's political adviser in<br />
Washington. Brooke said he turned aside Franklin's request for<br />
information on the code-breaking information Chalabi is accused of<br />
prOViding to Iran, telling him "it is all.horse dung."<br />
During June, July and August, Franklin, still apparently being directed by<br />
the FBI, made a series of calls to prominent personalities <br />
conversations that have been labeled by the recipients as "weird,·<br />
"curiou~".and "totally out of keeping for Larry." At least some of these<br />
calls were at the behest of Szady's counterintelligence unit, according to<br />
several sources, but it is not known which.<br />
Around late June 2004, Franklin called Richard Perle, an American<br />
Enterprise Institute defense policy strategist and a key planner of the<br />
2003 war in Iraq, according to several sources familiar with the call.<br />
Perle is former chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board and a<br />
close associate of Paul Wolfowitz, the undersecretary of defense•.<br />
Perle was just dashing out the door and readying for summer travel, and<br />
did not enter the call into his telephone logs, the sources said. But he felt<br />
the call was "weird" and took no action, according to on~ source.<br />
Perle declined to comment on the call.<br />
In August 2004, Franklin also called Ciralsky, who by this time had<br />
moved to NBC News, where he was covering security developments in<br />
Iran, sources said. Franklin apparently tried to set up a meeting with<br />
Ciralsky, but no such meeting ever occurred, according to sources<br />
familiar with the call.<br />
Ciralsky declined all c9mment.<br />
By the end of August, Franklin ~ad been assigned a court-appointed<br />
attorney whose name was sealed under court order, according·to<br />
sources familiar with Justice.Department filings in the case. That<br />
attorney advised Franklin to sign what sources familiar with the case<br />
termed "a really terrible plea agreemenr tJlat would have sU~jected him<br />
to a very long prison term under the most severe espionage laws.<br />
In September, a friend referred Franklin to renowned Washington<br />
defense attorney Plato Cacheris. In the past, Cacheris has represented<br />
accused spies and eve~ Monica Lewinsky. Franklin fired his court-
..<br />
\, o<br />
o<br />
appointed attorney and Cacheris began representing him pro bono.,<br />
Meanwhile, on Aug. 27,2004, the FBI counterintelligence division raided<br />
AIPAC. The raid and the information about a Pentagon "mole" working<br />
with AIPAC were immediately leaked to CBS.<br />
Leslie Stahl led with the story on the network's evening news. On its<br />
Web site, CBS headlined, "The FBI believes it has 'solid' evidence that<br />
the suspected mole supplied Israel with classified materials that include<br />
secret White House policy deliberations on Iran." A picture of the FBI's<br />
Szady was prominently displayed next to the headline.<br />
FBI investigators again searched AIPAc's headquarters on Dec. 1. The<br />
agents subpoenaed four top officials to appear before a grand jUry in<br />
Virginia. The four are Howard Kohr, the group's executive director;<br />
Richard Fishman, the managing director; Renee Rothstein, the<br />
communications director; and Raphael Danziger, the research director.<br />
FBI officials refused to discuss the search and subpoenas. Szady" who<br />
has been decorated twice by the CIA for distinguished service,<br />
answered one critic by writing, "I am not at liberty to comment on<br />
pending investigations."<br />
An FBI source with knowledge of Szady's investigation bristled at the<br />
intense media coverage of the counterintelligence division's tactic. Said<br />
the source: aWe are just following the evidence and seeing where it<br />
leads."<br />
Meanwhile, four congressional Democrats have asked the Bush<br />
administration to brief Congress on the FBI probe.,<br />
In a letter last week to President Bush, U.S. Reps. Robert Wexler (0<br />
Fla.), Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), and Gary<br />
Ackerman (D-N.Y.) ,said that with the case intensifying, Bush should<br />
qlear up concerns about the probe's integrity.,<br />
Citing reports about the alleged AIPAC sting and leaks to the media, the<br />
letter said, "Mr. President, an honorable organization is on the line, as<br />
are the reputations of dignified individuals, and Congress has yet to hear<br />
from you or your ~dministration on this issue despite previous requests."<br />
Franklin, meanwhile, is working menial outdoor labor jobs to support his<br />
family, and remains uncertain where the case against him is going. Said<br />
one source who knows him: ~He is literally shaking. He has been<br />
destroyed."<br />
(Award-winning New York Times best-selling investigative authorand<br />
reporter Edwin Blac/< has covered allegations ofIsraelispying in the<br />
United States since the Pollard case. Black's current best seller is<br />
"Banking,on Baghdad"(Wiley), which chronicles 7,000 years ofIraqi<br />
h~ro~) • .
.. The Jewish Joumai Of Greater Los Angeies<br />
.. .. 0<br />
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DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60~c baw/sab/1sg<br />
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FBI.Stings Seen as Part of Policy 'War'<br />
by Edwin BI~ck, Jewish Telegraphic Agency<br />
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Last June, leading neoconservative Richard Perle received an unexpected<br />
phone call at his home. It was Larry Franklin calling. Franklin is' the<br />
veteran Ira~ specialist in the Pentagon's Near ,East So~th Asia office and<br />
the key Iraq War planner who had been'pressured by the FBI into<br />
launching aseries of c9unterintelligence stings. Perle, a former chairm?,n<br />
of the Pentagon's Defense Policy' Board, was' an architect of the 2003 Iraq<br />
~~. .<br />
Franklin, who never had phoned. before, asked .Perle to "convey a message<br />
to Chalabi" in Iraq, according to. sources aware of the call. Ahmad Chalabi<br />
is the embattled p'resident of.the Iraqi National Congress. He is currently at<br />
the vortex of'a Pentagon-intelligence community conflict ov~r pre- ~nd<br />
post-war policy"but is stili endorsed by,neoconserVatives, such a~ Perle•<br />
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.Something about Franklin's unexpected call struck Perle as "weird,"<br />
according to the sources. Why was Franklin calling?<br />
In the recent past, Perle had only encountered Frankliria few times in<br />
passing, the sources said. Perle became "impatient" to end his brief .<br />
conversation with Franklin, and finally just declined to pass a message to.<br />
Chalapi.or to cooperate in.any w.ay, accor~ing to the sources.<br />
Perle refused to coma:nent.<br />
Wolle the purpose of the·mysterious call to Perle is still.unclear, a source<br />
with knowledge of Franklin's calls suggested t~at: Franklin might have been<br />
trying to warn· Perle and Chalabi that conflict between the<br />
counterintelligence community alJd the neoconservatives and the Chalabi<br />
camp was spinnil)g out of control. . ~( ~~ • ~ ~ CI<br />
~ ~\~f f' .~••- ).1<br />
.. . ~ :'\.Uf:~~b 3~·r-_...<br />
Unbeknownst to Franklin, the FBI was listening.<br />
~\(.~.<br />
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By the tiQ'le Franklin phoned Perle, Franklin had been under surveillance<br />
for at least a year by the FBI's counterintelligence division, which is led by<br />
controversial counterintelligence chief David Szady. Franklin had been<br />
monitored since a meeting June 26, 2003, at the Tivoli Restaurant in<br />
Virginia, where he discussed a classified Ira~ policy document with officials<br />
of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).<br />
He also was monitored late last May while responding to a routine media<br />
inquiry by CBS reporters about Iran's intelligence activities in Iraq,<br />
according to multiple sources. The CBS call was pivotal.<br />
Among the reporters who spoke to Franklin In late May, according to<br />
multiple sources with direct knowledge of the call, was former CIA attorney<br />
Adam Ciralsky, who had joined CBS as a reporter. During that call,<br />
Franklin purportedly revealed classified information, according to the<br />
sources.<br />
,.<br />
In late June, Szady's FBI counterintelligence division finally confronted a<br />
shocked·Franklin with evidence of his monitored calls. The bureau<br />
arranged for Franklin to be placed on administrative leave without pay,<br />
and then threatened him with years of imprisonment unless Franklin<br />
engaged in a series of stings against a list of prominent Washington<br />
targets, according to multiple sources with direct knowledge of the FBI's<br />
actions in the case. .<br />
Terrified, needing to provide for a wheelchair-bound wife and five children<br />
and without the benefit of legal representation, Franklin agreed to ensnare<br />
the' individuals on the FBI sting list, the sources said. The list might include<br />
as many as six names, according to sources.<br />
In a special Jewish Telegraphic Agency' investigation, this reporter first<br />
revealed Franklin's stings and the circumstances surrounding them.<br />
AIPAC was stung July 21. That day, Franklin met an AIPAC official in a<br />
Virginia mall and urged that information be passed to Israel that Israelis<br />
operating In nqrthern Kurdlstan were in dang~r of being kidnapped and '<br />
killed by Irallian intelligence, according to multiple sources. That<br />
information - the validity of which has been questioned - was reportedly<br />
passed to the Israeli Embassy, thereby providing the FBIwith a basis for<br />
search warrants and threats of an 'espionage prosecution against AIPAC<br />
Policy Director Steve Rosen and AIPAC Iran specialist Keith Weissman,<br />
according to the sources. "<br />
AIPAC officials contacted declined to comment.<br />
Attorneys familiar with FBI security prosecutions identified Sec;tlon 794 anCi<br />
798 of the Espionage Act as ideally suited to the FBI's sting strategy.<br />
Section 798, titled, "Disclosure of Classified·Information,"-applies to<br />
"whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes [or] transmits .::..<br />
for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United<br />
States any classified information - concerning the communication of<br />
intelligence activities of the United States or any fo~eign government." The<br />
sweeping statute would cover classified information not only about America<br />
but also about Iran aQd Iraq.<br />
Reporter Janine Zacharia first revealed initial news of the July AIPAC sting<br />
in The Jerusalem Post.<br />
Page ~ of5<br />
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After the AIPAC sting on or about Aug. 20, Franklin - still without.legal<br />
representation - was directed by his FBI handlers to launch a sting<br />
against ChalabJ's Washington-based political adviser, Francis Brooke,<br />
according to multiple sources with direct knowledge of Franklin's stings.<br />
At the time, Washington intelligence circles were accusing Chalabl of<br />
passing sensitive American intelligence code-breaking information to<br />
Iranian intelligence. The charges agail1st Chalabi have since fallen from<br />
view.<br />
Brooke, a southerner who lives in a Washington-area home owned by<br />
Chalabl, .took the August call from Franklin on the kitchen phone.<br />
"Franklin called," Brooke related, "and said, 'You have a real problem on<br />
you'r hands with Iran and Chalabi.' I told him, 'It Is all horse--.' Larry got<br />
very angry at me. He said it was 'deadly serious.' I said, 'What the hell, if<br />
you say it is serious, OK. But we have no information about American<br />
code-breaking of Iranian intelligence.'"<br />
"So Larry says, 'I am talking to a bunch of media people, and I can spin<br />
this - but you need to level with me to get this straight,'" Brooke recalled.<br />
"This was not very much like Larry, and I just said, 'There is nothing to<br />
spin.'"<br />
Brooke dismissed the entire effort as part of a "vendetta against Chalabi<br />
organized by [then-CIA Director George] Tenet and others at the CIA."<br />
Franklin refused to comment.<br />
In August, Franklin, still without legal counsel, was also directed by the FBI<br />
to call Ciralsky, who by this time had moved from CBS to NBC, where he<br />
. was working on security developments in Iran, according to multiple<br />
sources with direct knowledge of Franklin's calls. Franklin tried to set up a<br />
• meeting with Ciralsky, but no such meeting ever occurred, according to<br />
sources familiar with the call, because shortly thereafter, on Aug. 27, the<br />
FBI's AIPAC raids were leaked to CBS. Franklin actions were now public.<br />
Before joining CBS, reporter Ciralsky was working as an attorney for the<br />
CIA but was allegedly forced out in 1999 during the course of an inquiry<br />
into his family background and his Jewish affiliations. Ciralsky later filed a<br />
harassment lawsuit against the CIA that is still pending.<br />
The man who supervised much of the CIA investigation of CJralsky and<br />
then the FBI's investigation of Franklin following the May conversation with<br />
Ciralsky was Szady. In a JTA investigation, this reporter revealed<br />
exclusively his involvement ~ith Ciralsky.<br />
Critics of the current investigation point to Szady's involvement in the<br />
probe of Ciralsky a decade ago to raise questions about a possibly larger<br />
agenda. One q~estion involves the media.<br />
Because Ciralsky is a reporter with NBC, some critics raised the specter of<br />
Szady's FBI counterintelligence division consciously trying to entrap a<br />
member of the media engaged in routinely contacting sources. One source<br />
with direct knowledge of Franklin's stings said it amounted to an "enemies<br />
list."<br />
http://www.jewishjoumal.com/home/preview.php?id=13528 1114/2005
·The Jewisli Journal OfGreater Los Angeles<br />
o<br />
Ciralsky refused to comment.<br />
o<br />
Page 4 of5<br />
FBI officials repeatedly refused to discuss the Franklin stings. The bureau<br />
also refused to respond to questions about whether members of the media<br />
- including those at CBS, NBC and even this reporter - are under<br />
surveillance as part of their investigation. But at one point, a senior FBI<br />
official with knowledge of the case finally stated, "I cannot confirm or deny<br />
that Information [due to] the pending investigation."<br />
Some Washington insiders believe that the FBI's multiple stings are far<br />
from routine counterintelligence but represent a "war" between the<br />
counterintelligence community and policymakers, especially neocons.<br />
One key insider explained the war this way.: "It ,is two diametrically<br />
opposed ways of thinking. The neocons have an interventionist mindset<br />
willing to ally with anyone to defeat world terrorism, and they see the<br />
intelligence community as too passive. The intelligence community sees<br />
the neocons as wild men Willing to champion any foreign source - no<br />
,matter how specious - if it suits their ideology." .<br />
Leading neoconservative figure Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise.<br />
Institute added ~is own thought.<br />
"This is a war of the intelligence community vs. the neoconservatives,"<br />
Rubin observed. "It involves both the right and the left of the· intelligence<br />
community. It is a war about policy, the point being, the CIA must not be<br />
involved in policy. The CIA's role is to provide intelligence. and let the<br />
policymakers decide what to do with it, and it appears they are not sticking<br />
to that role - and that is a dangerous situation."<br />
"This is the politicizing of intelligence," he continued. "But the CIA, by its<br />
establishing principle.s, is not to be involved in politics."<br />
Rubin added that the sting effort "against AIPAC is the culmination of a 20-<br />
year witch-hunt from a small corps within the counterintellige'nce •<br />
community" that Rubin labeled "conspiracy theorists." He added, "What is<br />
the common denominator between the Ciralsky case and the AIPAC case?<br />
David Szady.,"<br />
.Szady, who has been decorated twice by the CIA for distinguished service,<br />
answered one critic, writing, "I am not at liberty to comment on pe~ding<br />
investigations." Szady had issued a statement to this reporter earlier that<br />
he "has no anti-Semitic views, has never handled a case or investigation<br />
based upon an individual's ethnicity or religious views and would·never do<br />
so."<br />
One neoconservative at the center of the counterintelligence war said:<br />
"This is just the beginning. Nobody knows where this war is going."<br />
Edwin Black is the authorof "IBM and the Holocaust" (Crown, 2001).<br />
Black's current best seller is "Banking on Baghdad" (Wiley), which<br />
chronicles 7,000 years ofIraqi history. This article first appeared in the.<br />
Forward.<br />
Let's talk about it... CS><br />
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~ AIPAC Comes Under Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel Espionage Probe<br />
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J<br />
C!~ PRINTTHIS<br />
WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EASTAFFAIRS<br />
Washington Report, December 2004, pages 22-23, 25<br />
Israel and Judaism<br />
AIPAC Comes Under Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel<br />
Espionage Probe<br />
By Allan C. Brownfeld<br />
It has been widely reported that the FBI Is Investigating the possibility that Lawrence Franklin, a<br />
Pentagon analyst, passed c1asslfted material to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee<br />
(AIPAC), which then handed the Information over to the Israeli Embassy In Washington (see<br />
November 2004 Washington Report, p. 26).<br />
Reported the Sept. 4 economist: "The unfolding saga surrounding Lawrence Franklin Is•••that he<br />
gave classified documents on Iran to Israel. But there Is groWing speculation that the FBI<br />
Investigation of Mr. Franklin Is the tip of an Iceb~rg. The reported anger of federal agents at the<br />
leaking of the story Indicates a bigger probe that may have been under way for at least a<br />
year•••Mr. Franklin allegedly passed draft: documents on American policy toward Iran to AIPAC, a<br />
hugely Influential lobbying group In Washington, which In tum allegedly passed them to Israeli<br />
officials. Both AIPAC and Israel have denied any wrongdoing. The Israelis. maintain that they have<br />
been ultra-careful since the huge embarrassment In 1985 when Jonathan Pollard, an American<br />
Intelligence analyst, was caught spying for Israel•••The scandal Is difficult for Israel, which wields<br />
considerable Influence on American foreign policy•••It Is hard to put a positive spin on a spy In the<br />
Pentagon, even If he Is talking to your frlends.&rdquo<br />
Janes Intelligence Digest noted on Sept. 10 that, "Shortly before he retired In June as CIA<br />
director, George Tenet alleged on more than one occasion that an Israeli agent was operating In<br />
Washington. Tenet was challenged to Identify the agent, but for reasons that were never<br />
explained he did not do so. Nonetheless, the episode underlined grOWing unease In some quarters<br />
In Washington about the Influence Israel's right wing has In the Bush administration through the<br />
pro-Ukud neoconservatives-largely In the Pentagon-and the powerful American Israel Public<br />
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Its associated organizations such as the Washington Institute for<br />
Near East Policy.&rdquo<br />
The document.alleged to have been passed to AIPAC al1d the Israelis relates to U.S. policy.toward<br />
Iran. According to Jane's, "U.S. officials are concerned because that document was being debated<br />
by pollcymakers at the time, possibly putting the Israeli government lobbyists In a position to<br />
Influence the final directive. U.S. policy toward Iran Is crudal to the Israelis, who have drawn up<br />
plans to launch pre-emptive strikes against Iran's nuclear Installations to prevent the Islamic<br />
Republic acquiring nuclear weapons that could be used against Israel.&'rdquo<br />
Four ofthe leading neoconservatives have been accused in the past<br />
ofillegally providing classified information to Israel.<br />
Philip Glraldl, a former CIA officer, wrote In the.Oct. 11 Issue of The American Consentatlve that, ~ tl ~ljocS'<br />
http://Wrmea~printthiS.clickabilitY .cOinlptlcpt?actioti=tpt&title=AlPAC+Comes+Under+Scr... 1~812005 .)<br />
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AIPAC Comes U~der Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel Espionage Probe<br />
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"The Franklin case stems from Investigations of Israeli diplomats that developed from the<br />
prosecution of spy Jonathan'Poliard. Pollard's conviction In 1987 provided little In-the way of a<br />
resolution: the Israeli government never cooperated In the Inquiry and did not provide an<br />
Inventory of the documents that Pollard had stolen. The FBI also knew that a second spy, believed<br />
to be In the Pentagon, passed Pollard classified file numbers that were desired by the Israelis.<br />
Hoping to catch the second spy,.the FBI continued its probe. Two years ago, the Investigators<br />
began to suspect that highly sensitive National Security Agency documents'were winding up In<br />
IsraeJrhands, possibly wlth"t1'ie connivance ofAIPAC. In the judgment of counterintelligence<br />
specialists, the Israelis did not wish a repeat of the Pollard case, so they decided against<br />
recruiting another U.S. official and turning him Into a salaried spy. Instead, they opted to<br />
establish relationships with friends In the government who would voluntarily provide<br />
Information•••AIPAC would have served as a useful Intermediary or 'cut out' In such an<br />
arrangement, limiting the contact between the American government official and the Israeli<br />
Embassy.&rdquo<br />
Page 2 of5<br />
Four of the leading neoconservatives have been accused In the past of illegally providing classified<br />
Information to Israel, though none was ever prosecuted. In 1970, the FBI recorded Richard Perle<br />
discussing classified Information with an Israeli Embassy official. Stephen Bryen, then a Senate<br />
Foreign Relations Committee staff member and later Perle's deputy at the Department of<br />
Defense, narrowly avoided Indictment In 1979 after he was overheard offering classified<br />
documents to an Israeli Embassy official. Douglas Feith, who In a position paper prepared for<br />
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for a "clean break from the peace process, H was<br />
fired In 1982 from the National Security Council on suspicion of passing confidential docum~nts to<br />
the Israeli·Embassy. He was Immediately re-hlred by Richard Perle at the Pentagon. 'Paul<br />
Wolfowltz--was InveStigated In 1978 over charges that he had provided a classified documel1t to the<br />
IsraeU-embassy'by'way of AIPAC.<br />
While AIPAC has long been· viewed as one of Washington's most effective lobbying groups, It has<br />
become Increasingly controversial, both within the Jewish community and In the larger society.<br />
Many have objected to Its close ties to the Ukud Party. In one Widely publicized exchange, Israeli<br />
Prime Minister Yltzhak Rabin asked AIPAC to concentrate on lobbying Congress and leave<br />
pollcymaklng and the.Whlte House alone.<br />
The current affair, wrote Orl Nir In the Sept. 3 Forward, "has cast light on the fine line that AIPAC<br />
walks between advocating a strong American-Israeli alliance and as acting as the representative<br />
of a foreign government. Both activities are legal, but serving a foreign government requires<br />
registration with the Department of Justice and entails severe legal restrictions, not applied to<br />
pro-Israel groups, Including AIPAC.&hellipAIPAC enjoys the support, admiration and even awe of<br />
Jewish organizational officials, many of whom raced to AIPAC's defense. Stili, some pro-Israel<br />
activists In Washington are privately suggesting that the current scandal prOVides AIPAC with a<br />
chance, In the words ofone communal official, for 'some soul-searching and reappraisal'<br />
regarding Its general modes of operatlon.&rdquo<br />
According to Nlr, "Critics also have accused AIPAC of adopting an agenda that too clearly mirrors<br />
the hawkish agenda of neoconservatives In the Bush administration, thereby fueling conspiratorial<br />
notions that President Bush was duped, Into Invading Iraq In order to advance Israeli Interests.<br />
Now, critics say, with Its Increasing fOC;us on Iran, AIPAC risks fueling the claims of those who<br />
would accuse the Jewish community of working with Washington neoconservatives to convince<br />
the White House to pursue regime change In Tehran.&rdquo<br />
Several Jewlsh'communalleaders complain that AIPAC officials have not done enough to maintain<br />
a clear wall between the lobbying group and Israel. AIPAC officials have reft the organization to<br />
serve In the Israeli government. Lenny Ben-David, formerly known as leonard Davis, for<br />
example, worked at AIPAC for 25 years-first In Washington, then in Jerusalem-before he was<br />
tapped by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1998 to be the deputy chief of mission In Israel's<br />
Washington Embassy.<br />
AIPAC and some of Its supporters have suggested that the FBI and the CIA are pursuing a<br />
vendetta against Israel, the Pentagon, neoconservatives, and possibly Jews In general. The<br />
neoconservatives have lashed out In a memo drafted by Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise<br />
Institute, alleging that the probe Is motivated by anti-Semitism. The memo criticizes the White<br />
House for not refuting press reports on the FBI investigation. "If there Is any truth to any of the<br />
http://wrmea.priiltthis:clicKabilitj:comlptlcpt?action=cpt&title=AIPAC+Comes+Uhder+Scr...1/8/2005
AIPAC Comes Under Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel Espionage Probe<br />
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Page 3 of5<br />
\ accusations, why doesn't the White House demand that they bring on the ev~dence?On the<br />
record," the memo stated. "There's-an Increasing anti':Semltlc witch hunt.&rdquo<br />
Continued Rubin, a former member of the Pentagon's policy planning staff who dealt with Iran<br />
policy: "I feel like I'm In Paris, not Washington. I'm disappointed at the lack of leadership that let<br />
things get where they are, and which Is allowing these bureaucrats to spin out of control.&rdquo<br />
The role played by AIPAC has produced some soul-searching within the organized Jewish<br />
community. "Several Jewish activists, speaking on condition of anonymity, cautioned against what<br />
they described as a defiant reaction on the part of some communal leaders who raised the specter<br />
of anti-Semitic conspiraCy," the Sept. 10 Forward reported. "'If every single time we get Into<br />
trouble we cry anti-Semitism, no one Is going to believe us when we confront the real· problem of<br />
anti-Semitism,' a senior official of a Jewish organization said. Another organizational official said:<br />
'It's ridiculous to react like that before you know what happened there. In the absence of accurate<br />
knowledge, any comment Is Just sllly.'&rdquo<br />
The fallout for AlPAC, wrote Doug Bloomfield In the Sept. 9 WashIngton Jewish Week, could be<br />
serious: "There have been persistent charges•••that AIPAC directs the network of pro-Israel<br />
political action committees (PACS); campaign finance bundlers and Individual contributors. AIPAC<br />
has successfully fought such accusations all the way to the Supreme Court to avoid being<br />
designated a PAC because of the Impact that would have on the way It operates and raises<br />
money. The current probe could renew calls from the organization's critics for new Investigations<br />
by the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) and demands to know what has been uncovered by<br />
the FBI•••There will be questions about AIPAC's operations and Internal accountability. A penchant<br />
for hubris and Institutional mlndset of secrecy-reflected In Its hostile and contentious relationship<br />
with the media-add to the suspicion that there Is something to hlde•.,&rdquo<br />
Shortsighted Strategies<br />
The problems facing AIPAC come not only from Its enemies, argued the Sept. 3 Forward, but also<br />
are "partly a result of shortsighted strategic decisions by Israel's advocates. Faced With a shifting<br />
landscape, they have gambled on a risky strategy that may be blOWing up In their faces. For<br />
years, Israel's friends In this country have operated on the principle that Israel could not be held<br />
responsible for Its troubles. They have maintained that whatever Israel's mistakes, Palestinian<br />
hostility could not be blamed on Israel's policies. More recently, they've. broadened the principle<br />
to Insist that Arab and Muslim hostility to the U.S. cannot be blamed on its support for Israel.<br />
Both positions are becoming ,hard to maintain. GrOWing numbers of Israelis, up to and Including<br />
the military chief of staff, are openly acknowledging that Israeli actions can raise and lower the<br />
level of Palestinian rage and violence. As for the global terror war, the Idea that It Is related In<br />
part to America's reiatlonshlp to Israel Is now thoroughly mainstream. You can read It In the<br />
report of the 9/11 Commission•••As the urgency of discussion grows, resentment seems to mount<br />
against those who dedare the discussion illegitimate. It's a dangerous positionto be In.&rdquo<br />
AIPAC's role has been controversial for many years. In 1995, Jonathan Mitchell, regional vice<br />
president for Southern California AIPAC, chastised a senior Israeli official for argUing that<br />
Congress and American Jews should not concern themselves with Palestinian behavior. Mitchell<br />
called Deputy Israeli Foreign Minister Vossl Beilin "absurd and arrogant" for comments he made In<br />
Jerusalem at a meeting With the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish<br />
Organizations. Beilin countered by accusing Mitchell of "trying to be more Israeli than the<br />
Israelis." Beilin was critical of those who urged an end to aid to the PlO, and said, "It Is not the<br />
business ofJeWish organizations, not AIPAC's, not the American Jewish Congress' and not of any<br />
other country In the world except the State of Israel. The kind of people who are trying to be<br />
more Israeli than the Israelis themselves are causing damage to the pure national Interests of the<br />
State of Israel.&rdquo .<br />
In March 2003, about 5,000 AIPAC actiVists met In Washington and embarked upon a lobbying<br />
blitz against the Bush administration's "road map" for Middle East peace. AIPAC was not happy<br />
with speeches at Its meeting by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of<br />
State Colin Powell dedaring that Israel must freeze settlement activity In the territories once the<br />
Palestinian Authority takes serious steps to curb terrorism. "Settlement activity Is simply<br />
Inconsistent with President Bush's two-state Vision," Powell said, draWing Jeers from some AIPAC<br />
members.<br />
http://Wrmea.printthis.clickability.conilptlcpt?action=epf&title=AIPAC+Comes+Under+Sci... 1/8/2005·-
AIPAC Comes Under Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel Espionage Probe<br />
o 0<br />
A number of Jewish leaders spoke In support of the Middle East peace plan and In criticism of<br />
•<br />
AIP,,"C and other groups who'were opposing It;In-a letter toCongn!ss, these leaders said they<br />
wanted to "express our concern over recent efforts to sidetrack Implementation of the 'road map.'<br />
While the plan Is neither perfect nor a panacea, as 'passlonate supporters of Israel, we also know<br />
that the Jewish state needs this kind of energetic American dlplomacy.&rdquo<br />
Page 4 of5<br />
Among those signing this statement were Edgar M. Bronfman, president of the World Jewish<br />
Congress, and current past presidents of the national United J~wlsh Appeal and Its successor the<br />
United Jewish Communities, Including Stanley Chesley, Lester Crown, Irwin Field, Alex Grass,<br />
Marvin Lender, Peggy Tishman and Larry Zucklln.<br />
Henry Siegman, once a leader In the American Jewish Congress and now a senior fellow at the<br />
Council on Foreign Relations, charges that many ~merlcan Jewish organizations, such as AIPAC,<br />
have substituted blind support for Israel for the traditional Jewish search for truth and justice.<br />
"We have lost much In American Jewish organlzatlonalllfe,R Siegman says., "I was a student and<br />
admirer of Rabbi Abraham Heschel. I read his books. We were friends. We marched together In<br />
the South during the civil· rights movement. He h~lped me understand the prophetic passion for<br />
truth and justice as the keystone of Judaism. This Is not, however, an understanding that now<br />
animates the American Jewish communlty••.Amerlcan Jewish organizations confuse support for<br />
the State of Israel and Its people with uncritical endorsement of the actions of Israeli<br />
governments,even when these governments do things that In' an American context these Jewish<br />
organizations would never tolerate. It was Inconceivable that a Jewish leader In America 20 or 30<br />
years ago would be silent If a political party In the Israeli government called for the transfer of<br />
Palestinians-In other words, ethnic cleansing. Today, there are at least three such parties, but<br />
there has never been a word of criticism from American Jewish organlzations.&rdquo<br />
The fact that many Jewish groups and leaders are rushing to AIPAC's defense before all of the<br />
facts are known Is hardly unexpected. These same groups have campaigned for manyyears on<br />
behalf of convicted spy. Jonathan Pollard, whose guilt Is well known-and was admitted.<br />
While AIPAC's guilt or Innocence In this particular case remains to be seen, the probe Is moving<br />
forward. A federal grand Jury is expected to begin Interviewing people In connection to the<br />
Investigation. What we do know Is that AIPAC has used Its considerable influence to shape U.S.<br />
foreign policy in a manner that appears to have been harmful to long-term U.S. Interests In the<br />
Middle East and harmful, as well, to prospects for'peace between Israel and the Palestlnlan~.<br />
Whether AIPAC Is guilty of espionage or not, It must bear responsibility for advancing a narrow<br />
agenda which may be pleasing to Israel's right wing, but which misrepresents the views of both<br />
the majority of Israelis and the majority of American Jews. American Jewish groups would be wise<br />
to walt until all the facts are in before rising to AIPAC's defense-something they seem reluctant<br />
to do. The evidence that AIPAC Is not worthy of such support Is Widespread-and growing.<br />
Allan C. Brownfeld is a syndicated columnist and assodate editor ofthe Uncoln Review, a journal<br />
published by the Uncoln Institute for Research and Education, and editorofIssues, the quarterly<br />
Journal ofthe American Council forJudaism.<br />
Find this article at:<br />
http://www.wnnea.comlarchiveslDecember_2004/0412022.html<br />
CJ Check the box to indude the list of links referenced in the article.<br />
~ttp:l/wrme~~print!his.~lic~abili!y.com/ptJcpi?action=Cl?t&tit1e=AIPAC+Comes+Uilde1+Scr... 1/8/2005
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Pentagon analyst Franklin retur~s to work<br />
By Nathan Guttman, Haaretz Correspondent<br />
WASHINGTON - Pentagon analyst Larry Franklin was reinstated a<br />
few weeks ago, ~er sitting at home for halfa year and being barred<br />
from returning to his job on the Iranian desk in the Department of<br />
Defense's policy division. Franklin was at the center ofa lengthy FBI<br />
investigation after suspicions arose that he transferred classified<br />
information about U.S. policy on Iran to members ofthe pro-Israel<br />
lobby AlPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee).<br />
In the seven months since the affair made headlines on the CBS<br />
evening news, the investigation has been kept under tight wraps, but<br />
its ramifications are already being felt.<br />
While Franklin is back at work, and, say well-placed sources, is<br />
expected to reach a plea bargain, the spotlight has moved to the<br />
AlPAC officials- two senior members were suspended for the<br />
duration ofthe case and four other senior officials were forced to<br />
testify at length before the special investigative jury in Virginia,<br />
whose proceedings are classified.<br />
Even ifthe investigation is nowhere near completion, it has definitely<br />
reached a crossroads, at which investigators must decide on the<br />
suspects in the case- Larry Franklin alone; Franklin and two AIPAC<br />
officials, Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman; or whether, on top of<br />
those three, the entire AIPAC organization has acted unlawfully.<br />
Sources close to the investigation suggested recently that it would end<br />
in a plea bargain. Franklin would plead to a lesser crime of<br />
unauthorized transfer ofinformation, Rosen and Weissman would be<br />
charged with receiving classified information unlawfully, and AIPAC<br />
would remain unstained. Franklin's lawyer, Plato Cacheris, Thursday<br />
denied the reports, stating: "We have not entered any plea ofdefense<br />
with the Justice Department."<br />
AlPAC refused to say anything about the possibilitY ofa plea bargain.<br />
As for Franklin's reinstatement, a Pentagon spokesman, Maj. Paul<br />
~)Il~~r<<br />
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65'Q,vJt=-~~15-,uL<br />
-0<br />
Swiergrosz, confirmed that "Dr. Franklin is still a u.s. government<br />
employee," but declined to identify his position. Haaretz has learned<br />
that Franklin has been moved to a post different from the one he held<br />
previously and kept from handling classified information.<br />
From AlPAC's standpoint, the issue at hand is containment: can the<br />
affair be limited to Rosen and Weissman, or is the investigation<br />
directed at the lobby as a whole? It is clear that the FBI has as its<br />
objective an extensive investigation against AlPAC. Investigators<br />
have been looking into AlPAC's entire manner ofoperating, notjust<br />
in the Franklin instance. An official questioned twice by the FBI, ..as a<br />
witness, was astounded by itlvestigators' intimate familiarity with<br />
AIPAC. "They know everything there. They asked very precise<br />
questions regarding the organization's operations," he said.<br />
The intended breadth ofthe investigation is also evident from the<br />
FBI's dramatic moves - raiding AlPAC offices in December and<br />
issuing subpoenas to its four top executives. Executive Director<br />
Howard Kohr, Managing Director Richard Fishman, Research<br />
Director Rafael Danziger and Communications Director Renee<br />
Rothstein appeared before the investigative jury and were questioned<br />
at length.<br />
Investigators also reportedly tried to use Franklin, after th_e affair<br />
'erupted, to incriminate as many senior AlPAC officials as possible.<br />
The Jerusalem Post reported four months ago.that investigators<br />
informed Franklin ofthe suspicions against him and asked for his<br />
cooperation. In a sting operation, he received information from the<br />
FBI agents that Iran was planning to attack Israelis operating in the<br />
Kurdish region in Iraq. Franklin, at the FBI's instructions, telephoned<br />
AIPAC's Rosen and Weissman and gave them the information, and<br />
they rushed to pass it on to Israeli diplomats, thereby falling into the<br />
FBI trap,<br />
AIPAC refuses to comment on the case, saying, "We do not comment<br />
on personnel matters!' A spokesman for AlPAC, Patrick Dorton, said<br />
Thursday that "it would not be appropriate for AlPAC to comment on<br />
issues that have to do with an ongoing federal investigation."<br />
The suspension ofthe two AlPAC officials, though never officially<br />
explained, is certainly a key turning point in the case. According to<br />
one assessment, AIPAC understands that regardless ofwhether a plea<br />
bargain is reached, it will be tough to get those two offthe hook, so<br />
AlPAC is keeping its distance for now. Their lawyer, Nathan Lewin,<br />
refused requests from Haaretz·for a comment.
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News<br />
U.S. Aide Arrested Amid Signs That Lobby Probe<br />
W~dens<br />
By'ORI NIR<br />
Maya, 2005<br />
W.AsHINGTON - Arecent FBI interrogation of an Israeli defense expert may indicate that<br />
the Justice Department's investigation into the contacts between America's pro-Israel lobby<br />
and a. Pentagon analyst is broader inscope than previously believed.<br />
The expert, Uzi Arad, head ofthe Institute for Policy and Strategy at Israel's<br />
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, said that two months ago FBI agents interviewed him<br />
about his contacts with the Pentagon Iran specialist, LariyFranklin. During the hour-long<br />
interview, he said, tile FBI agents brought up the name of anAmerican Jewish Committee<br />
official, Eran Lerman; who is a former senior official in Israeli military intelligence.<br />
Franklin was arrested and charged Wednesday with "disclosing classified information<br />
related to potential attacks upon U.S. forces in Iraq to individuals not entitled to receive the<br />
information." The Justice Department did not name the individuals who allegedly received<br />
$e.c~ssified information from Franklin, but media reports claim they are Steven Rosen<br />
and~Keith Weissman, two former officials at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee<br />
wh9;were recently dismissed by the pro-Israel1obbying organization.<br />
Arad's comments, an unusual disclosure ofa small wrinkle in the otherwise ultrasecretive<br />
FBI investigation, may suggest that the FBI is investigating more than the alleged unlawful<br />
contac~ between Franklin and Aipac officials. Franklin is the first person to beindicted in<br />
the FBI investigation. Rosen and Weissman have not been charged.<br />
lnitialJy,·press reports said that Rosen and Weissman's alleged transfer ofsecret<br />
information by Israeli diplomats was the focus of the investigation. The questioning ofArad<br />
may confirm speculation by some in the Jewishcommtmity that the investigation is related<br />
to a larger inquiry into Israeli or pro-Israeli attempts to influence America's security<br />
eStabUslunent and its policy in the.Middle East.<br />
,- ~ ,<br />
Arad said the FBI agents asked him, among other things, wpy he had sent tq Franklin, less<br />
than a year ago, a research paper by Lerman on ways'to re~eIiergize America's relationship<br />
with Israel. ''They asked me who was Bran Lerman, althopgh theyclearly knew who he<br />
was," Arad told the Forward in a telephone interview.<br />
Arad was a policy adviser to former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and once<br />
headed the research department ofIsrael's Mossad intelligence service.<br />
~4~<br />
~<br />
Lerman joined th~ staffqfthe AJGo~ttee in ~OOl. Kenneth Ban91er, a spokesman for the '5\l0\ (n j<br />
AJCommittee, said he had no comment on the FBI's questioiling- regarding LeIman. ~l ,:<br />
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:radsaid that his strategicpQ,institute had commissioned Ler~ to write the paper.<br />
He said that he did not reIl)em~er sending the article to Franklin but that the.FBI<br />
investigators showed him a letter that accompanied the article, carrying his signattir~.' 4rad.<br />
said he explained to the investigators thatthis was a nie'chanized'signatiire on an<br />
information package sent en masse to a mailing list of s~veral hundred former participants<br />
in the Interdisciplinary Center's annual strategic-affairs conference, commonly known as<br />
the Herzliya Conference.<br />
Franklin attended the December 2003 Herzliya Conference, though he did not deliver an<br />
address.<br />
In his paper, Lerman wrote that the once-dynamic U.S.-Israel strategic relationship had<br />
fallen into a "maintenance mode" in recent years and ought to be re-enermzedfor the<br />
benefit ofboth countries. At the December 2004',Herzliya Conference, L~an~delivered.an<br />
address based on his research paper.<br />
Arad said the FBI agents asked him about his conversations with Franklin at the conference<br />
and several months later at a meeting between the two in the Pentagon cafeteria. H~'also<br />
said that both conversations were briefand that he could hardly remember their content.<br />
The FBI interview was also brief, as well, he noted.<br />
Itwas arranged in haste, as Arad was rushing to catch a plane from New York to Israel, and<br />
took place in a car while he on his way to the airport.<br />
This week, Franklin h~ded himself in, and was scheduled to make an initial appearance at<br />
a Northern Virginia courtbypress time..<br />
In a statement, the Department ofJustice said that Franklin, S8, surrendered to authorities<br />
at the FBI's Washington Field Office following the filing Qf a criminal complaint Tuesday<br />
and the unsealing Wednesday of the indictment against him. The statement notes that the<br />
violation Franklin is charged with carries a maximum penalty of10 years in prison.<br />
Recently Franklin was transferred from the Office ofthe Secretary of<br />
Defense, where he served as an Iran desk officer, to a less sensitive position in the Pentagon.<br />
The criminal complaint filed in the U.s. District Court for the Eastern'District ofVirginia,<br />
alleges that on June 26, 2003, Franklin had lunch at a restaurant inArlington, Va., with two<br />
individuals, identified as "U.S. Person 1" and "U.s. Person 2."<br />
At the lunch, according to the Justice Department, Franklin disclosed classified information<br />
that has been designated "Top Secret" and related to potential attacks upon American forces<br />
in Iraq. The government claims that neither ofFranklin's lunch companions has the security<br />
clearance to receive the information.<br />
Allegedly Franklin told the two individuals that the information was "highly classified" and<br />
asked them not to "use" it, according to the Justice Department statelllent.<br />
This portion of the Justice Department statement implies that Franklin's lunch companions<br />
- alleged in press reports to have been Rosen and Weissman - knew that they were<br />
ha~dling information from a highly sensitive document. According to press reports, the FBI<br />
~~ ~v~stigatin~ cl~s that after the ll:Jllch the two former Aipac officials transferred the
-- - - - ------:----<br />
f , •<br />
"s~cret information to an IsraQdiPlomat inWashington.<br />
o<br />
The Justice Department statement says that a search 6fFranklin's Pentagon office in-June<br />
2004found the June 2003 classified document containing the information that Franklin<br />
allegedly disclosed to the two individuals.<br />
The criminal co~plaint against Franklin also alleges that on other occasions he disclosed,<br />
without authorization, classified American government infonnation to a foreign official and<br />
to members of the news media. Inaddition, according to the Justice Department statement,<br />
about 83 separate classified American government documents were found during a search<br />
of Franklin's West Virginia home in June 2004, most ofthem classified as top secret or<br />
secret.<br />
The dates ofthese documents spanned three decades.<br />
The investigation into this matter is continping, the Justice Department stated.<br />
The charges against Franklin disclose several other new details:<br />
.<br />
• According to an FBI affidavit that accompanies the charges, Franklin admitted during an<br />
FBI interrogation inJune 2004 that he provided the information contained in the secret<br />
document to the two individuals.<br />
• The information that Franklin is charged with disclosing is related not to Iran - contrary<br />
to previous reports - but. to "potential attacks upon U.S. forces in Iraq."The government's<br />
main concern, according to the FBI affidavit, is that such information could be used to harm<br />
the-United States by "a country's discovery of our intelligence sources and methods."<br />
• Contrary to previous media reports, charges against Franklin do notallege the transfer ofa<br />
secret document. Instead itis charged that he "verbally disclosed" information that "was<br />
contained" inatop-secret document. The distinction is important, legal experts say, because<br />
verbally transferring such information is a less serious offense.<br />
• The documentin question, according to the affidavit, was marked "on the first and last<br />
pages with a caption in all capital letters,II which identified it as "TOP SECRET with a<br />
denomination ofits SCI [Sensitive Compartment Information] status" - the highest<br />
security classification. .<br />
)j0ml .I Qm1ig I Subscrlb, I About Tht fQrward<br />
Copyright 2005 © The Forward
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DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
Matthew E. Berger<br />
Lawrence Franklin. left. a Pentagon analyst charged by the FBI with<br />
leaking classified information to AIPAC officials. leaves a courthouse on<br />
~ay 4 with his attorney. John Richards.<br />
BEHIND THE HEADLINES<br />
Criminal charges in AIPAC case<br />
leveled against Pentagon analyst<br />
By Ron Kampeas and Matthew E. Berger<br />
ALEXANDRIA, Va., May 4 (JTA) - Criminal charges against a Pentagon<br />
analyst, for allegedly leaking classified Iraq war information to two top officials at<br />
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, raise new questions about whom<br />
the FBI is targeting and whether the pro-Israel powerhouse will be harmed as<br />
the case unfolds.<br />
Lawrence Franklin, who turned himself in for arrest Wednesday, was accused in<br />
an FBI criminal complaint ofdisclosing classified information "related to potential<br />
attacks on United States forces in Iraq" to two U.S. civilians over lunch in an<br />
Arlington, Va., restaurant on June 26, 2003.<br />
Franklin's two interlocutors, identified In the document only as "U.S. Person 1<br />
and U.S. Person 2," are Steve Rosen, AIPAC's policydirector, and Keith<br />
Weissman, its senior Iran analyst, JTA has established. AIPAC fired the two last<br />
month in an apparent bid to distance itself from the case.<br />
Read as a whole, the criminal complaint contained some good news for AIPAC'J<br />
It suggests that beyond the allegations against Rosen and Weissman, AIPAC as<br />
an organization had no involvement in leaking any information.<br />
"AlPAC has been advised by the government that it is not a target of the<br />
investigation,," a source close to the organization told JTA.<br />
On the other hand, the headlines could hinder A1PAC's efforts to project a<br />
"back-to-business" face to grass-roots supporters ~nd Washington<br />
powerbrokers weeks before its annual policy conference, and at a time when it<br />
is trying to build support for Israel ahead ofIsrael's planned withdrawal this<br />
summer from the Gaza Strip.<br />
The policy conference is AIPAC's annual show of strength, culminating in a<br />
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dinner expected to. be .att~nded by some 5,000 people at which~AlPAC leaders<br />
shout out the names of dozens of congressmen and'Cabinet officials present..;..<br />
nearly 200 last year. Ifa significantly lower number show up this year, it could<br />
be embarrassing.<br />
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Franklin, an Iran analyst who lives in Kearneysville, W. Va., was released on a<br />
$100,000 bond after appearing at U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Va. A<br />
preliminary hearing was set for May 27.<br />
"He intends to plead not guilty" and expects to be vindicated at trial, said his<br />
attorney, John Thorpe Richards.<br />
The criminal charge sheet was the first official accounting of a case that first<br />
made headlines last August, when FBI agents raided AIPAC's Washington<br />
headquarters and confiscated.files.belonging"'to Rosen and Weissman.<br />
"The information Franklin disclosed relating to potential attacks upon U.S" forces<br />
in Iraq could be used to the injury of the United States or to ,the advantage of a<br />
foreign country," special agent Catherine Hanna said in drafting the complaint.<br />
The'damage, she said, could arise from "jeopardizing the viability of the sources<br />
and methods."<br />
The information was from a document classified as "top secret," Hanna said.<br />
While the June 2003 lunch appears to be the linchpin of th~ criminal charges,<br />
there are other allegations, including that Franklin leaked classified information<br />
to journalists and to an unidentified "foreign official," and that he kept three<br />
decades' worth of classified information on his computer hard disk at home.<br />
Reports have suggested that Franklin also met with an Israeli Embassy official.<br />
The reference to a "foreign official" might point in that direction.<br />
However, the FBI has not gotten in touch with the Israeli Embassy,<br />
representatives say, and Israeli officials continue to maintain that they would<br />
never participate in illicit information gathering in the United States.<br />
IIlsrael does not carry out any operation in the United States that would be liable,.<br />
God forbid; to harm its closest ally," Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom told<br />
Israel Television. "Therefore all the brouhaha around this matter has nothing to<br />
do with the State of Israel."<br />
The United States, he added, "is a nation with which we conduct very intimate<br />
ties, with exchanges ofthe most classified kinds of information. So anyone who<br />
thinks we were involved - this is completely bogus."<br />
The complaint suggests answers to two major questions that have surrounded<br />
the investigation: Who is the target? And to what degree is AIPAC in danger?<br />
The question ofa target arose after last.year's.raids,.when it emerged that<br />
agents had watched Rosen, Weissman and Franklin chatting over a meal at<br />
Tivoli in June 2003. Was the FBI agent in the restaurant following Franklin, or<br />
Rosen and Weissman?<br />
The arrest Wednesday lends support to the theory that Franklin had been the<br />
target of an investigation that reportedly was at least a year old at thatlunch<br />
meeting.<br />
Franklin's enthusiasm for a tough line against Iran had drawn the attention of<br />
colleag~~sin t!l~ Pentag.on. ~
.~ JTA previously has reported that FranQhad" been under sClUtiny since he 0<br />
•.:. ~-r '1 -<br />
'.<br />
allegedly met i~ December 2001 with former Iranian spy and arm~ merchant<br />
Manucher Ghorbanifar, who was on a CIA "burn lisr of people who could not be<br />
contacted, according to intelligence community sources.<br />
AlPAC could take heart from the fact that the criminal complaint did not mention<br />
the organization, or even suggest any organizational affiliation for the two "U.S.<br />
Persons" Franklin met with.<br />
'<br />
Still, the complaint raised at least as many questions as it answered:<br />
• What now for Rosen·and Weissman? Leaking classified information has much<br />
clearer legal ramifications than receiving it, since reporters in Wa~hington<br />
routinely receive and relay classified information to their readers•.<br />
The complaint makes clear that the exchange in the restaurant was "verbal." It's<br />
unclear what, ifany, charges could be brought against Rosen and Weissman for<br />
simply listening to Franklin unload. -<br />
On the other hand, the FBI had a clear interest in Rosen and Weissman,<br />
evidenced by the August raid at AIPAC headquarters and another one in<br />
December, and by the appearance earlier this year oftop AIPAC staffers before<br />
a federal grand jury.<br />
It was information arising out of the grand jury encounters that led AIPAC to fir~<br />
the two men, AIPAC has said..<br />
Rosen's lawyer said in a statement that no documents were exchanged, which<br />
dovetails with the FBI's claim that the exchange was verbal.<br />
"Steve Rosen never solicited, received or passed on any classified documents<br />
from Larry Franklin, and Mr. Franklin will never be able to say otherwise,"<br />
Rosen's lawyer, Abbe Lowell, said in a statement.<br />
• U.S. Attorney Paul McNulty convened a grand jury in the case; why didn't he<br />
bring an indictment instead of a criminal complaint, which carries less weight?<br />
One answer could be that the FBI and Justice Department have been burned by<br />
reporting that depicts the case as a politically motivated jeremiad against Jewish<br />
lobbyists and/or neoconservatives such as Franklin. Indictments often are<br />
sealed. but a criminal complaint allows the FBI to explain at length why it feels<br />
charges are justified.<br />
• Finally, what did Rosen and Weissman learn at the Tivoli lunch? Until now,<br />
sources close to the two have suggested that the information related to White<br />
House policy on Iran - which, after all, was the specialty of both Franklin and<br />
Weissman - and that it had a relatively low secrecy classification. Hanna. the<br />
FBI special agent, alleges that the information was top secret, and related to<br />
dangers posed to U.S. troops in Iraq.<br />
A former FBI official said the complaint suggests a larger investigation, butgives<br />
few clues about where the probe starts and ends.<br />
"My best estimate is this was part of an already existing investigation, and from<br />
their perspective, they got lucky," the former official said. "They were either<br />
following Franklin or they were following these two guys," he said, referring to<br />
Rosen and Weissman.<br />
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DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1s:g<br />
Pentagon Analyst In Israel Spy Case Is<br />
Call'ed a 'Patriot'<br />
BY ELI LAKE - StaffReporter ofthe Sun<br />
May 27, 2005<br />
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/14523<br />
WASHINGTON - A Pentagon analyst charged with mishandling classified information at<br />
first cooperated·with an FBI probe oftwo lobbyists for the American Israel Public Affairs<br />
Committee when he allowed the bureau to surveil a meeting with Aipac lobbyist Keith<br />
Weissman in July 2004.<br />
Plato Cacheris, the lawyer for the Pentagon Iran analyst Lawrence Franklin, ~old The<br />
New York Sun yesterday that the FBI persuaded his clie~t to set up a meeting with Mr.<br />
Weissman on July 9, 2004, before being threatened with jail time. "They appealed to his<br />
sense ofpatriotism, and he cooperated,II Mr. Cacheris said 1n an interview.<br />
The charges against the two lobbyists, Mr. Weissman and Steven Rosen, will hang on<br />
their July 9, 2004, meeting with Mr. Franklin when he allegedly shared information<br />
verbally with Mr. Weissman - while under FBI surveillance - that American soldiers and<br />
Israeli agents in northern Iraq were under threat from Iranian Revolutionary Guard units.<br />
Mr. Rosen, after receiving the information from his colleague, Mr. Weissman, then<br />
allegedly shared it with the Israeli Embassy and the Washington Post. Sources familiar<br />
with the FBI's case said that the Justice Department is prepared to charge that Mr. Rosen<br />
passed the classified information on to the embassy and the newspaper.<br />
Until August 2004, Mr..Franklin was unaware that the FBI was prepared to charge him<br />
with a crime, Mr. Cacheris said. It was after he voluntarily told the bureau that he had<br />
kept 83 classified documents at his home in West Virginia and had agreed to convey the<br />
intelligence to Mr. Weissman that the FBI said that it would press charges and arranged<br />
for a court-appointed attorney for Mr. Franklin. Originally, the bureau, according to Mr.<br />
Cacheris, asked Mr. Franklin to plead guilty to espionage, specifically under section 794<br />
ofthe U.S. Code forcriines of IIgathering or delivering defense information to aid a<br />
foreign government. ,', Notorious Soviet spy Aldridge Ames was charge4 under this<br />
section ofthe U.S. Code, which carries a maximum penalty ofexecution or life in prison.<br />
Mr. Franklin sought Mr. Cacheris out, the lawyer said, after he was asked to admit that he<br />
was a spy. Mr.. Cacheris, who represented Mr. Ames as well as Monica Lewinsky, agreed<br />
to take the case free ofcharge. "I feel the government is overreaching in this case. I think<br />
he's a patriot and a loyal American who intends no harm to this country," Mr. Cacheris<br />
said.<br />
;-l-\~<br />
Following Mr. Cacheris's agreement to defend Mr. Franklin, the bureau offered a deal<br />
whereby Mr. Franklin would plead guilty to the lesser charge ofmishandling classified<br />
material, or section 793 oftlie U.S. Code. The lesser charge carries a maximum penalty ~ ~~<br />
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of 10 years in prison. Mr. Cacheris said he refused the deal and that he intends to take the'<br />
case to trial. Despite turning down the offer and ceasing to cooperate with the FBI, Mr.<br />
Franklin was charged with ~nly mishandling, not espionage, on Tuesday.<br />
Mr. Cacheris likened Mr. Franklin's conduct to that ofa fonner national security adviser,<br />
Samuel Berger, who was recently charged with a misdemeanor for stealing documents<br />
from t:Qe National Archives in his socks, and a former CIA director" John Deutsch, who<br />
had taken classified material'to his home. In both these cases, Messrs. Berger and<br />
Deutsch were charged with misdemeanors. "We don't think Mr. Franklin's conduct was<br />
any more egregious," Mr. Cacheris said.<br />
Mr. Cacheris told the Sun yesterday that he believed the FBI did not originally intend to<br />
investigate Mr. Franklin. "We believe there was a pre-existing investigation that Larry<br />
Franklin is not involved in," he said yesterday. While Mr. Cacheris refused to discuss the<br />
details ofthe meetings, other sources familiar with the case told the Sun that Mr. Franklin<br />
first approached Messrs. Rosen and Weissman in February or March 2003 for a meeting<br />
at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Pentagon City, Va., with the intention ofpassing on threat<br />
information regarding Iran's plans for American soldiers in Iraq.<br />
"<br />
According to one source familiar with the case, Mr. Franklin was told by an aide to an<br />
undersecr~tary ofdefense, Douglas Feith, that the two Aipac lobbyists could get the<br />
threat information to the National Security Council. Mr. Rosen, in particular, has a<br />
reputation for high-level contacts with policy-makers in the executive branch. According<br />
to sources familiar with the case, the three men at this 2003 meeting discussed passing<br />
the threat information to National Security Council official Elliott Abrams.<br />
By March 2003, the Bush administration had decided to work with Iranian-sponsored<br />
opposition groups to build an interim government in Baghdad. Indeed, the recently<br />
elected prime minister, Ibrahim Jafari, was initially a leader ofan Iranian-supported<br />
party, Dawa, and was included in the first Iraqi Governing Council. At the same'time,<br />
American envoys were holding intensive negotiations about Iraq with the Iranians under<br />
the auspices ofa U.N. multicountry group designed to coordinate Afghanistan policy.<br />
These developments, according to Mr. Franklin's former colleagues and other<br />
government officials, worried the Pentagon ~alyst, who, in tum, attempted to reverse<br />
what he saw as a disastrous policy decision. Mr. Franklin had, in his work on Iran at the<br />
Pentagon in late 2001, identified what one source described as "Iranian hunter-killer<br />
teams" in Afghanistan that were threatening American Special Forces. By the spring of<br />
2003, he believed American forces in ~raq would be under a similar threat from units of<br />
Iran's Revolutionary Guard and that this information had to get to the White House.<br />
On June 26, 2003, Mr. Franklin held a second lunch with Messrs. Weissman and Rosen<br />
and discussed, among other things, developments in the formation ofan Iran policy paper<br />
and new threats he had learned about in Iraq. In that meeting, Mr. Cacheris said he<br />
provided the two lobbyists with a list ofevents and names ofIranian officials that he had<br />
compiled personally elaborating the threat to American soldiers. IINo classified
o<br />
· - ...<br />
documents were passed," Mr. Cacheris said. '~A lis~ ofevents and names on Iran arid Iraq<br />
was'passed in the June 2003 meeting." Mr. Cacheris emphasized that this list was neither<br />
a classified nor official document.<br />
Mr. Franklin would not meet with Mr. Weissman again for more than a year, when he<br />
would meet him in northern Virginia under :fBI surveillance on July 9. A grand jury<br />
convening in Alexandria, Va., is expec~ed to relea~e a formal indictment ofMr. Franklin<br />
today.
Message<br />
O<br />
HEREIN<br />
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~~ KRAMARSIC, BRETT M. (WF) (FBI)<br />
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IS UNCLASSIFIED A<br />
DATE 07-29-2010' BY 60324 uc ba~Jlsg<br />
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From:<br />
Sent:<br />
PORATH, ROBERT J.(WF) (FBI)<br />
Friday, June 03,20057:59 AM<br />
To: FORTIN, 'BRIAN G. (WF) (FBI); DOUGLAS, STEPHANIE (WF) (FBI); KRAMARSIC, BRETT M.<br />
(WF) (FBI); HANNA, CATHERINE M. (WF) (FBI); MCDERMOTT. WILLIAM R.(WF) (FBI);<br />
BRIDGES, TRACEY J. (WF) (FBI); ODONNELL, THOMAS J. (WF) (FBI); ANDERSON, JESSICA<br />
T. (WF) (FBI); PAULLING. SCOlT M. (WF) (FBI); LOEFFERT, JANICE S. (WF) (FBI); MARKLEY,<br />
JAMES S. (WF) (FBI); LURIE, ERIC S. (WF) (FBI); FALLER. LARISSA (WF) (FBI); THOMAS,<br />
KIMBERLY J. (WF) (FBI); JOHANSEN, MARK D. (CD) (FBI); WRIGHT, SUSAN C. (CD) (FBI);<br />
BUTlER, M J. (CD) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI);<br />
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Subject: article<br />
.uNCLASSIEIEQ<br />
NON.RECORQ<br />
FBI Tapped Talks About Possible Secrets<br />
Case Against Ex-AIPAC Officials Could Focus On Several Contacts With Defense Analyst<br />
The Washington Post<br />
By Jerry Markon<br />
June 3, 2005<br />
ARLINGTON, VA --In July 2004, a Defense Department<br />
analyst and a senior official from an influential pro-Israel<br />
lobbying group met at the Pentagon City mall in Arlington.<br />
Amid the stores and shoppers, the-analyst warned that Irjlnian agents were<br />
planning attacks against American soldiers and Israeli agents in Iraq, sources<br />
familiar with the meeting said. Alarmed, the American Israel Public Affairs<br />
Committee official, Keith Weissman, left the mall and went to the office of<br />
colleague Steve Rosen. The-two men then relayed the information to the<br />
Israeli Embassy in Washington and a reporter for The Washington Post. What<br />
the AIPAC officials did not know, the sources said, was that the fBJ was<br />
listening in -- to both the meeting and their subsequent phone calls •• and that<br />
the Pentagon analyst, Lawrence Franklin, was cooperating in an investigation<br />
of whether classified U.S. information was being passed on to the<br />
government of Israel.<br />
That meeting and those phone calls are a focus of a criminal case
Message<br />
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d<br />
Page 2 of3<br />
jobs at AIPAC, according to multiple sources familiar with th~-investigation.<br />
Franklin has already been charged, and a looming court battle will probably<br />
turn on whether he and others were illegally passing government secrets or<br />
were merely conduits of the type of policy-related information that is<br />
frequently bandied about in official Washington. The meeting at the mall is<br />
Ilot mentioned in the publicly filed charges, and new details are emerging<br />
about a series of fBI-monitored meetings between Franklin and the former<br />
AIPAC officials dating back to early 2003. But many questions remain<br />
unanswered, such as whether the information Franklin allegedly passed along<br />
at those sessions was classified, and if it was, whether Rosen and Weissman<br />
knew it was classified, and whether any damage was done to U.S. national<br />
security.<br />
Rosen and Weissman have been notified that prosecutors are preparing to<br />
charge them with disclosing classified information, sources familiar with the<br />
investigation said. Federal prosecutors and the FBI would not comment, nor<br />
would John Nassikas, an attorney for Weissman. An attorney for Rosen,<br />
Abbe D. Lowell, said that "when all the facts come out, the government will<br />
have more to explain about its conduct than Steve Rosen will about his."<br />
Earlier, he said that Rosen "never solicited, received or passed on any<br />
classified documents" from Franklin. A spokesman for the Israeli Embassy<br />
did not return phone calls. A Post spokesman confirmed that the report~r,<br />
Glenn Kessler, recently declined a Justice Degartme~~requestto be<br />
interviewed. Kessler would not comment yesterday.<br />
Franklin's attorney, Plato Cacheris, confirmed that Franklin briefly cooperated<br />
with investigators in the summer of 2004, during the time of the meeting at the<br />
mall. Cacheris said'that Franklin, whom he described as a "loyal and patriotic<br />
American citizen," is no longer cooperating and plans to go to trial. Last<br />
month, Franklin was charged in a criminal complaint in U.S. District Cou·rt in<br />
Alexandria with disclosing classified information related to potential attacks<br />
on U.S. forces in Iraq. Court documents did not reveal who received the<br />
information, but federal law enforcement sources have said that Franklin<br />
disclosed it to Rosen and Weissman at an Arlington restaurant in June 2003.<br />
The sources also said the attacks would have been carri~d out by Iran. At the<br />
time, the U.S. government was concerned about Iranian activities in Iraq after<br />
the U.S.-led invasion that year. Federal prosecutors in Alexandria have<br />
notified Franklin that he would be indicted bya grand jury, and Franklin has<br />
been told to appear in federal court June 13. Sources familiar with the case<br />
said the court appearance relates to a sealed indictment. Franklin was also<br />
charged again last week in federal court in West Virginia with possessing 83<br />
classified documents dating back three decades. They were found at his<br />
West Virginia home.<br />
6/3/2005
Message<br />
Q<br />
Page 3 of3<br />
The contacts between-Franklin, an Iran specialist, alJd form~~ AlpAC policy<br />
director Rosen and senior analyst Weissman extend back before the June<br />
2003 lunch. In February 2003, the three met at the Ritz-Carlton Pentagon City<br />
hotel in Arlington in a session th~t they only learned later was under F~I<br />
surveillance, sources said. It is unclear whether agents were following<br />
Frankl'n or the AIPAC officials. After the 2004 meeting, sources said that<br />
Rosen and Weissman called Kessler and relayed what Franklin had told<br />
Weissman about possible Iranian attacks against Americans and Israelis in<br />
Iraq. Law enforcement sources said that Ke~sler, who did not write an article<br />
based on the phone· conversation, is not a target of the investigation.<br />
UNCLASSIFIED<br />
6/3/2005
~fwaship.gtonP9st.com: u.s. Ey~ressing Uprising In Iran<br />
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Page 1 of3<br />
washingtQDJ;lost.~<br />
U.S. Eyes Pressing Uprising In Iran<br />
Officials Cite Al Qaeda Links, Nuclear Program<br />
By Glenn Kessler<br />
Washington Post StaffWriter<br />
SundaYt May 25t 2003; Page AOI<br />
AdvertiMment<br />
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The Bush admini~tration, alanned by intelligence suggesting that al Qaeda operatives in Iran had a role<br />
in the May 12 suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia, has suspended once-promising contacts with Iran and<br />
appears ready to embrace an aggressive policy oftrying to destabilize the Iranian government,<br />
administration officials said.<br />
Senior Bush administration officials will meet Tuesday at the White House to discuss the evolving<br />
strategy toward the Islamic republic, with Pentagon officials pressing hard for public and private actions<br />
th~t they believe could lead to the toppling ofthe government through a popular uprising, officials said.<br />
The State Department, which had encouraged some form ofengagement with the Iranians, appears<br />
inclined to accept ~uch a policy, especially ifIran does not take any visible steps to deal with the<br />
suspected al Qaeda operatives before Tuesday, officials said. But State Department officials are<br />
concerned that the level ofpopular discontent there is much lower than Pentagon officials believe,<br />
leading to the possibility that U.S. efforts could ultimately discredit reformers in Iran.<br />
In any case, the Saudi Arabia bombings have ended the tentative signs ofengagement between Iran and<br />
. the United States that had emerged during the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq.<br />
u.S. and Iranian officials had met periodically to discuss issues ofmutual concern, including searchand-r~scue<br />
missions and the tracking down ofal Qaeda.operatives. But, after the suicide bombings at<br />
three residential compounds in Riyadh, the Bush administration canceled the next planned meeting.<br />
"We're headed down the same path ofthe last 20 years," one State Department official said. "An<br />
inflexible, unimaginative policy ofjust say no. II<br />
u.S. officials have also been deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear weapons program, which has the<br />
support ofboth elected reforiners and conservative clerics. The Bush administration has pressed the<br />
International Atomic E~ergy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, to issue a critical report next month<br />
on Iran's nuclear activities. Officials have sought to convince Russia and,China -- two major suppliers of<br />
Iran's nuclear power program -- that Iran is detennined to possess nuclear weapons, a campaign that one<br />
U.S. official said is winning support.<br />
But a major factor in the new stance toward Iran consists ofwhat have been called "very troubling<br />
intercepts" before and after the Riyadh attacks, which killed 34 people, including nine suicide bombers.<br />
The intercepts suggested thatal Qaeda operatives in Iran were involved in the planning ofthe bombings.<br />
Earlier this week, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld accused Iran ofharboring al Qaeda members.<br />
"There's no question but that there have been and are today senior al Qaeda leaders in Iran, and they are<br />
bUSY," Rumsfeld said. Iranian officials;however, have vehemently denied that they have granted al<br />
Qaeda leaders safe haven in the country.<br />
Until the Saudi bombings, some officials said, Iran had been relatively cooperative on al Qaeda. Sinc~;~ \S-IJ C-<br />
(O~-\JIr-~ l 'lo<br />
. ~~ -'<br />
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dynlA35772-2003May24?language=printer 6/7/2005 {f>
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~~washipgtonp?st.com: U.S. Ey~ressing Uprising InIran<br />
U<br />
Page 2 of3<br />
the Sept. 11,2001, attacks, Iran~has turned over al Qaeda officials to Saudi Arabia and Afgha~stan. ~n<br />
talks, U.S. officials had repeatedly warned Iranian officials thatifariy al Qaeda operatives in Iran are<br />
implicated in attacks against Americans, it would have serious consequences for relations between the<br />
two countries.<br />
Those talks, however, were held with representatives ofIran's foreign ministry~ Other parts ofthe<br />
Iranian government are contr911ed not by elected reformers, but by conservative mullahs.<br />
A senior administration official who is skeptical"ofthe Pentagon's arguments said most ofthe al Qaeda<br />
members -- fewer than a dozen -- appear to be located in an isolated area ofnortheastern Iran, near the<br />
.border with Afghanistan. He described the area as a drug-smuggling terrorist haven that is tolerated by<br />
key members ofthe Revolutionary Guards in part because they skiqt money offsome ofthe activities<br />
there. It is not clear how much control the central Iranian government has over this area, he said.<br />
"I don't think the elected government knows much about it;" he said. "Why should you punish the rest of<br />
Iran," he asked, just because the government cannot act if! this area?<br />
Flynt Leverett, who recently left the White House to join the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for<br />
Middle East Policy, said the administration may be taking a gamble. "It is imprudent to assume that the<br />
Islamic Republic will collapse like a house ofcards in a time frame that is going to be meaningful to us,"<br />
he said. "What it means is we will end up with an Iran that has nuclear weapons and no dialogue with<br />
the United States with regard to our terrorist concerns."<br />
Ever since President Bush labeled Iran last year as part ofan "axis ofevil" -- along with North Korea<br />
and Iraq ~- the administration has struggled to define its. policy toward the lslamic republic, which<br />
terminated relations with the United States after Iran's i 979 revolution. The administration never<br />
formally adopted a policy of"regime change," but it also never seriously tried to establish a dialogue.<br />
In July, Bush signaled a harder line when he issued a strongly worded presi~ential statement in which he<br />
praised large pro-democracy street demonstrations in Iran. Administration officials said at the time that<br />
they had abandoned any hope ofworking with President Mohamm.ad Khatami and his reformistallies in<br />
the Iranian government, and would tum their attention toward democracy supporters among the Iranian<br />
people.<br />
But the prospect ofwar with Iraq reopened some discreet contacts~ which took place under U.N.<br />
supervision in Europe. The contacts encouraged some in the State Department to believe that there was<br />
an opening for greater cooperation.<br />
In an interview in February with the Los Angeles Times, Deputy Secretary ofState Richard L. Armitage<br />
drew a distinction between the confrontational approach the administration had taken with Iraq and<br />
North Korea and the approach it had adopted with Iran. "The axis ofevil was a valid comment, [but] I<br />
would note there's one dramatic difference between Iran and the other two axes of'evil, and that would<br />
be its dem09racy. [And] you approach a democracy differently," Armitage said.<br />
At one ofthe meetings, in early January, the United States signaled that it would target the Iraq-based<br />
camps ofthe Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MEK), or People's Mujaheddin, a major group opposing the Iranian<br />
government. -<br />
The MEK soon became caught up inthe policy struggle between the State Department and the<br />
Pentagon.<br />
http://www._washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dynlA35772-2003May24?language=printer 6/7/2005
•.ili"i\Vashitjgtonpllst.com: u·s· Eye
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Page 1 of2<br />
Pdnt)yindqw I pqse Window<br />
Document 1 of 1<br />
Copyright 2003 Saint Paul Pioneer Press<br />
All Rights Reserved<br />
Saint Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota)<br />
Ma,Y 231, 2003 Friday<br />
SECTION: MAIN; Pg. SA<br />
LENGTH: 778 words<br />
HEADLINE: Bush advisers weigh undermining Iran regime<br />
BYLINE: BY WARREN P. STROBEL; Washington Bureau<br />
BODY:<br />
WASHINGTON .... Prompted by evidence that Iran Is harboring top al-Qalda operatives linked to last week's suicide<br />
bombings In Saudi Arabia and fears that Tehran may be closer to bUilding a nuclear weapon than previously<br />
believed, the Bush administration has begun debating whether to try to destabilize the Islamic republic, U.S.<br />
officials said Thursday.<br />
Officials In Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's office are using both Issues to press their view that the United<br />
States should adopt overt and covert measures to undermine the regime, said the officials, who are Involved In the<br />
debate.<br />
Other officials argue that such a campaign would backfire by discrediting the moderate Iranians who are demanding<br />
political. reforms.<br />
Although one senior official engaged In the debate said "the military option Is never off the table," others said no<br />
one was suggesting an Invasion of Iran.<br />
However, some officials say the United States should launch a limited alrstrlke on Iran's nuclear weapons facilities If<br />
Iran appears on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon. By. some estimates, Iran could have a nuclear weapon<br />
within two years.<br />
'<br />
Some Pentagon officials suggested using the remnants of an Iranian opposition group once backed by Saddam<br />
Hussein, the Mujahedeen el..Khalq (MEK), to Instigate armed opposition to the Iranian government. U.S. military<br />
forces In Iraq have disarmed the roughly 6,OOO-strong' MEK, which Is on the State Department's list of foreign<br />
terrorist groups. But the group's weapons are In storage, and It hasn't disbanded.<br />
However, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and other top officials rejected the Idea, saying that while<br />
some might consider the MEK freedom fighters, "a terrorist Is a terrorist is a terrorist," according to officials<br />
Involved In the debate.<br />
Bush has designated Iran a member otan "axls of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea. But until now, he's<br />
pursued a middle course with Iran, approving talks on Issues of common concern such as Afghanistan, while not<br />
trying to-re-establlsh diplomatic ties.<br />
A formal statement of U.S. policy toward Iran, called a National Security Presidential Directive, has been on hold<br />
about a year because of Internal administration debates and the war In Iraq, American officials said. The document<br />
Is being resurrected, they said.<br />
Bush's senior foreign-polley advisers were to have met at the White House on Thursday to discuss Iran policy, said<br />
a knowledgeable administration offiCial, but the meeting was postponed until next week to give Iran several more<br />
days to meet U.S. demands that it turn over the suspected al-Qalda terrorists.·If It doesn't, Washington Is likely to<br />
react with harsher measures, the official said.<br />
The United States has suspended a series of meetings between U.S. and Iranian diplomats In Geneva at which the<br />
two countries .... which have no formal diplomatic relations .... have been discussing terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq.<br />
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o<br />
Page 2of2<br />
'rhe suspension followed Intelligence data, Including intercepted telephone calls, Indlcatlr)g that an al-Qalda cell<br />
based In Iran helped organize the bombings In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which were apparently part of a larger al<br />
Qalda plot that was partially foiled by saud,l authorities. The bombings killed 34 people.<br />
The cell of 10 or so al-Qalda members Is run by top al-Qalda operative salf al Adel, who Is third on the U.S.<br />
government's list of most-wanted al-Qalda'ieaders, following Osama bin Laden,and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri.<br />
"There's no question but that there have been and are today senior al Qalda I~aders In Iran, and they are busy,"<br />
Rumsfeld said this week.<br />
Iranian officials have denied harboring al-Qalda fugltl~es, and U.S. officials acknowledge that Iran has turned over<br />
some al-Qalda suspects to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and blocked others from entering Iran.<br />
On Thursday, a close aide to Iranian President Mohammad Khataml demanded that Washington prove Its charges.<br />
Saeed Pourazlzl said In Tehran that It was Iran's pollc{to crack down on al-Qalda -- not support It·- and that the<br />
network "I~ a terrorist group threatening Iran's Interests."<br />
"Its extremist Interpretation of Islam contradicts the Islamic democracy Iran Is trying to promote., There Is no<br />
commonality of anything between us."<br />
The senior U.S. Intelligence official said It wasn't clear whether al-Adel's group, which Is believed to be In an area of<br />
southeastern Iran near the Pakistan border, was operating with the acqUiescence o,f at least part,of the Iranian<br />
government.<br />
'<br />
Advocates of regime change want to bolster popular opposition In Iran to the religious leadership.<br />
The Associated Press contributed to this report.<br />
LOAD-DATE: May 23, 2003<br />
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Copyright 2003 The Washington Post<br />
QrbtWtl5f)iugtonf$M<br />
wQshingtonpost.com<br />
The Washington Post<br />
Page 24 of26<br />
June 15,2003 Sunday<br />
Final Edition<br />
SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A20<br />
LENGTH: 1448 words<br />
HEADLINE: Pressure Builds for President to Declare Strategy on Iran<br />
BYLINE: Michael Dobbs, Washington Post StaffWriter<br />
BODY:<br />
Soon after George W. Bush.took office in January 2001, his advisers began drafting a strategy for<br />
dealing with Iran, a radical Islamic state long suspected by Washington ofsupporting international<br />
terrorism and pursuing weapons ofmass destruction.<br />
More than two years later, the national security presidentialdirective on Iran has gone through<br />
several competing drafts and has yet to be approved by Bush's senior advisers, according to well-placed<br />
sources. In the meantime, experts in and outside the government are focusing, on Iran as the United<br />
States' next big foreign policy crisis, with some predicting that the country could acquire a nuclear<br />
weapon as early as 2006.<br />
Critics on the left and the right point to the unfinished directive as evidence the administration lacks a<br />
coherent strategy toward a country Bush described asa key member ofthe "axis ofevil,tI along with<br />
North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq.<br />
"Our policy toward Iran is neither fish nor fowl, neither engagement nor regime change," said Flynt L.<br />
Leverett, a Bush adviser on the Middle East who -left the National Security Council staff in March and is<br />
now with the Brookings Institution.<br />
The Bush administration has yet to formulate a tme Iran policy, agreed Michael A. Ledeen,a Middle<br />
East expert with the American Enterprise Institute. With other neoconservative intellectuals, Ledeen has<br />
founded ,the Coalition for Democracy in Iran, which is looking for ways to·foment a democratic<br />
revolution to sweep away the mullahs who came to power in 1979.<br />
Senior administration officials refused to talk about the status ofthe Bush policy directive on Iran, on<br />
the grounds that it is classified, but they say they have had some success in mobilizing international<br />
opinion against Iran's nuclear weapons program. As evide~ce, t~ey cite recent threats by Russia to cut<br />
offnuclear assistance to Tehran and moves by the International Atomic Energy Agency to censure Iran<br />
for failing to report the processing ofnuclear materials.<br />
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Page 25 of26<br />
While the officials have stopped short ofembracing a policy of"regime change" in Iran, U.S. officials<br />
from Bush down have talked about providing moral support to the "reform movement" in Iran in its<br />
struggle against an unelected government. As defined by Secretary ofState Colin L. Powell, the U.S.<br />
goal is to speak directly to the Iranian people "over the heads oftheir leaders to let them know that we<br />
agree with them.II<br />
The internal and external debate about what to do about Iran has been brought to a head by recent<br />
revelations suggesting the Iranian nuclear weapons program is much further along than many suspected.<br />
Tomorrow, the lAEA Board ofGovernors in Vienna is to discuss findings showing that Iran has a wide<br />
range ofoptions for producing fissile material for a nuclear bomb, from using heavy water reactors to<br />
produce plutonium to experiments in uranium enrichment.<br />
u.s. officials have also accused Iran ofharboring members ofthe al Qaeda terrorist network who<br />
escaped from Afghanistan after the fall ofthe Taliban in December 2001. They say some al Qaeda<br />
supporters hiding in Iran appear to have known in advance about recent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia,<br />
although there is no direct evidence ofoperational ties between the Iranian government and al Qaeda.<br />
The escalating Iranian nuclear threat and suspicions ofIranian ties to terrorists have sharpened longstanding<br />
divisions in the administration over how to deal with Tehran. In the past, the State Department<br />
has put the emphasis on opening a dialogue with reformist elements in the Iranian leadership while the<br />
Pentagon has been more interested in looking for ways to destabilize the authoritarian Islamic<br />
government.<br />
Bureaucratic tensions have reached the level where each side has begun accusing the other ofleaking<br />
unfavorable stories to the media to block policy initiiltives. "The knives are out,1I said a Pentagon<br />
official, who criticized national security adviser Condoleezza Rice for failing to end the dispute by<br />
issuing clear policy guidelines.<br />
Powell, meanwhile, insisted to journalists that there has be~n no change in policy on Irail, despite what<br />
he depicted as frenzied media speculation "about what this person in that department might think or that<br />
person in another department might think."<br />
The Iran debate goes back to a failed attempt by the Clinton administration to open an "unconditional<br />
dialogue ll with Tehran. Even though the Iranians rejected the U.S. offer ofunconditional talks, some<br />
Bush administration officials led by the State Departmentts director for policy planning, Richard N.<br />
Haass, favored making renewed overtures.,<br />
The proposals for a dialogue with Iran were partly inspired by the 1994 framework agreement with<br />
North Korea under which the North Korean government agreed to accept international controls over its<br />
nuclear program in return for economic assistance, including the construction ofa civilian nuclear<br />
reactor. But the State Department approach ran into strong opposition from the Pentagon and Vice<br />
President·Cheney's office, and was shot down in interagency meetings at the end of200l.<br />
While there would be no "grand bargain" with the Iranian leadership, the Bush administration agreed to<br />
a more limited diplomatic dialogue, focusing on specific areas such as the war in Afghanistan or<br />
cooperation over Iraq. Several rounds ofsuch talks took place in Geneva and Paris, with the<br />
involvement ofa special presidential envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, but were suspended after th~ bombings<br />
in Saudi Arabia on May 12.<br />
The administration debate has been echoed by a much more public debate among Middle East analysts,<br />
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Copyright 2003 The Washington Post<br />
~t Wtl5f)inghm ~g.Gt<br />
wa~hingtoripost.com<br />
The Washington Post<br />
Page 21 of26<br />
August 9, 2003 Saturday<br />
Final Edition<br />
SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. 1\01<br />
LENGTH: 1059 words<br />
HEADLINE: Meetings With Iran-Contra Arms Dealer Confinned<br />
BYLINE: Bradley Graham and P~ter Slevin, Washington Post StaffWriters<br />
BODY:<br />
Defense Secretary Donald H.Rumsfeld acknowledged yesterday that Pentagon officials met secretly<br />
with a discredited expatriate Iranian arms merchant who figured prominently 'in the Iran-contra scandal<br />
ofthe mid-1980s, characterizing the contact as an unexceptional effort to gain possibly useful<br />
infonnation.<br />
While Rumsfeld said that the contact occurred more than a year ago and that nothing came ofit, his<br />
aides scrambled during the day to piece together more details amid other reports thatRumsfeld's account<br />
may have been incomplete.<br />
Last night, a senior defense official disclosed that another meeting with the Iranian anns dealer,<br />
Manucher Ghorbanifar, occurred in June in Paris. The official said that, while the first contact, in late<br />
2001, had been formally sanctioned by the U.S. government in response to an Iranian government offer<br />
to provide information relevant to the war on terrorism, the second one resulted from "an unplanned,<br />
unscheduled encounter."<br />
A senior administration official said, however, that Pentagon staffmembers held one or two other<br />
meetings with Ghorbanifar..last year in Italy. The sessions so troubled Secretary ofState Colin L.<br />
Powell, the of~cial said, that he complained to Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's<br />
national security adviser.<br />
Powell maintained that the Pentagon activIties were unauthorized and undennined U.S. policy toward<br />
Iran by taking place outside the terms defined by Bush and his top advisers. The White House instructed<br />
the Pe,ntagon to halt meetings that do not conform to policy decisions, said the official, who requested<br />
anonymity.<br />
The Defense Department personnel who met with Ghorbanifar came from the policy directorate. .<br />
Sources identified them as Harold Rhode, a specialist on Iran and Iraq who recently served in Baghdad<br />
as the Pentagon liaison to Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi, and Larry Franklin, a Defense<br />
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Intelligence Agency analyst.<br />
U<br />
Page 22 of26<br />
State Department officials were surprised by news ofthe latest meeting with Ghorbanifar. ren~ion runs<br />
deep in the Bush administration between State an~ the Pentagon, which under Rumsfeld has aspired to a<br />
powerful role in foreign policy. The two agencies have sparred repeatedly over strategy toward Iran and<br />
Iraq.<br />
The United States does not have formal relations with Iran, although a small number ofsanctioned<br />
meetings between U.S. and Iranian officials have taken place, most notably to address U.S. war plans in<br />
Afghanistan and Iraq.<br />
The Bush administration has struggled to develop a coherent and consistent approach to Iran. In his<br />
State ofthe Union address last year, Bush characterized Iran as being part ofan axis ofevil, along with<br />
Iraq and North Korea, and administration officials have repeatedly accused Iran ofsupporting terrorist<br />
groups and ofseeking to acquire nuclear weapons. While broad agre~ment exists within the<br />
administration favoring changes in Iran's Islamic government, officials differ on how to accomplish<br />
ili~.<br />
'<br />
More than two years after the administration began drafting a national security presidential directive<br />
on Iran, ilie policy document remains unfinished. While the State Department favors increased dialogue<br />
and engagement with potential reformers inside Iran, prominent Pentagon civilians believe the policy<br />
should be more aggressive, including measures to destabilize the existing government in Tehran.<br />
The Iran-contra scandal erupted over a decision by the Reagan administration to sell weapons to Iran in<br />
an effort to win the release ofU.S. hostages in Lebanon. The proceeds ofthe anns sales were illegally<br />
funneled to contra fighters opposing Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government.<br />
Ghorbanifar was enl~sted in the effo~, helping to arrange the delivery by Israel of508 TOW antitank<br />
missiles to Iran. The White House had drafted him as an intermediary despite warnings from the CIA<br />
that he was a cheat and had failed lie-detector tests.<br />
The intelligence aget).cy had instructed its operatives not to do business with him.<br />
News ofthe Pentagon's contact with Ghorbanifar was first reported yesterday by Newsday, and<br />
Rumsfeld was asked about the story when he emerged with Bush from a meeting at the president's ranch<br />
in Crawford, Tex.<br />
Saying he had just been told ofthe Newsday article by a senior aide and by Rice, Rumsfeld<br />
acknowledge4 that "one or two" Pentagon officials "were approached by some people who had<br />
information about Iranians that w~nted to provide information to the United States government."<br />
He said that a meeting took place "more than a year ago" and that the information received was<br />
circulated to various federal departments and agencies but did no~ lead to anything.<br />
"That is to say, as I understand it, there wasn't anything there that was ofsubstance or ofvalue that<br />
needed to be pursued further, II he said. .<br />
Asked ifthe Pentagon contact was intended to circumvent official U.S. exchanges with Iran, Rumsfeld<br />
replied: "Oh, absolutely not. I mean, everyone in the interagency process, I'm told, was apprised ofit,<br />
and it went nowhere. Itwas just -- iliis happens, ofcourse, frequently, that in -- people come in, offering<br />
suggestions or information or possible contacts, and sometimes they're pursued. Obviously, ifit looks as<br />
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though something might be interesting, it's pursued. Ifit isn't, it isn't."<br />
Page 23 of26<br />
Standing by Rumsfeld's side, Bush was asked ifthe meeting was a good idea and ifhisadministration<br />
wants a change in government. "We support the aspirations ofthose who desire freedom in Iran,1I the<br />
president said, then took a question on a differentsubject.<br />
According to the account given later by the senior Pentagon official, the contact in 2001 occurred after<br />
Iranian officials passed word to the administration that they had information that might be useful in the<br />
global war on terrorism. Two Pentagon officials met with the Iranians in several sessions over a threeday<br />
period in Italy. Ghorbanifar attended these meetings, "but he was not the individual who had<br />
approached the United States or the one with the information,II the official said.<br />
What his role was, however, the official did not know.<br />
The official said the June meeting involved'one ofthe two Pentagon representatives who had been<br />
present at the 2001 meeting, but he declined to say which one.<br />
Staffwriter Dana Priest contributed to this report.<br />
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Copyright 2003 Guardian Newspapers Limited<br />
The Observer<br />
Page 17 of26<br />
August 10, 2003<br />
SECTION: Observer News Pages, Pg. 22<br />
LENGTH: 863 words<br />
HEADLINE: IRAQ CONFLICT: Make Iran next, says Ayatollahs. grandson: Khomeini calls US<br />
freedom the best in the world from base in occupied Baghdad<br />
BYLINE: by Jamie Wilson, Baghdad<br />
BODY:<br />
SAYYID Hussein Khomeini is sitting cross-legged on a sofa inside a garish palm-fringed mansion<br />
nestled on the banks ofthe Tigris. It is the very heart ofAmerican-occupied Baghdad, not the frrst place<br />
that you might look for the grandson ofAyatollah Khomeini. The late Iranian leader built his Islamic<br />
revolution on a deep hatred ofeverything associated with the Stars and Stripes.<br />
But then very little about the younger Khomeini is quite what might be expected.<br />
'American liberty and freedom is the b~st freedom in the world,' he said, puffing on a cigarette and<br />
sipping a glass ofsweet tea. 'The freedom for the individual that is 'written into the American<br />
Constitution you do not see in such concentration in any other constitution in the world. The Americans<br />
are here in Iraq, so freedom is here too.'<br />
It is an extraordinary statement from a man whose grandfather labelled the US 'the Great Satan', but<br />
what Khomeini has to say about the current situation in Iran is even more radical: 'Iranians need freedom<br />
now, and ifthey can only achieve it with American interference I think they would welcome it. As an<br />
Iranian, I would welcome it. I<br />
Not surprisingly, Khomeini, 45, has caused something ofa stir in Baghdad, with the US media beating a<br />
path to the door ofthe house where he is staying.<br />
According to his armed bodyguards, the luxurious house has been taken over by an Iraqi cleric, who<br />
shares Khomeini's view that religion and state should be separated. Itused to belong to Izzat Ibrahim,<br />
vice-chairman ofthe deposed Revolutionary Command Council and one ofSaddam Hussein's closest<br />
advisers. The King ofClubs on the list ofmost wanted Baathists, Ibrahim remains at large, although he<br />
is unlikely to return to evict the current tenants. There is, however, plenty to remind the visitor ofthe<br />
previous owner. A black Rolls-Royce with a golden grill is gathering dust in the drive, while the sitting<br />
room, with its three gold-trim. sofas, is also home to a couple ofenormous glass tanks containing dozens<br />
oftropical fish and several cages ofcanaries, chirping away merrily.<br />
Wearing a black turban - a piece ofclothing that marks him out as a descendant ofthe Prophet<br />
Muhammad - Khomeini dismisses. as 'nonsense' a question about whether his grandfather would approve<br />
ofhis support for the Americans. 'He is not here, and in this case we cannot predict what position he<br />
would take,' he said.<br />
As for Iraqi resistance to the US occupying forces - or liberators as Khomeini insists on calling them - in<br />
his opinion there is none.<br />
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'The pe~sons·who are carrying out the attacks have been paid previously to attack the US and the<br />
Americans arejust in a position.ofdefending themselves,' he said.<br />
So what is a man whose grandfather cemented the Islamic theocracy in Iran by exploiting the 1979 US<br />
Embassy hostage crisis doing espousing views that could 'have come straight from an American ,foreign<br />
policy briefing or have been written by the press office ofthe Coalition Provisional Authority situated in<br />
the former presidential palace a couple ofmiles down the road?<br />
Exactly how close Khomeini's ties are with the US is not clear, but the cleric has met officials from the<br />
CPA on several occasions. 'He's.my favourite Khomeini!', one senior US official joked at a dinner the<br />
other night. A spokesman said that they found his ideas about the separation ofreligion and state<br />
'interesting'.<br />
Although he does not command a wide following, the very fact ofwho he is could in time make him a<br />
significant player, while any voice helping to dilute calls from some Iraqi'Shia leaders fora system of<br />
clerical rule in Iraq will be welcomed with open arms by the Americans.<br />
But'the US might just have bigger plansJor Khomeini. He spent 14 years ofhis life in Iraq, between<br />
1964 and 1979, while his grandfather was plotting the Islamic revolution and conducting a campaign"of<br />
snapping at the,heels ofthe Shah from the holy city ofNajaf. Listening to his grandson condemning the<br />
current situation in Tehran, it is difficult not to get a sense that perhaps history is repeating itself.<br />
The Bush administration, which includes Iran in its diminishing axis ofevil, has repeatedly accused the<br />
country ofsupporting terrorist groups and seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. But apart from general<br />
agreement that a change ofgovernment in Iran would be a good thing, there is no broad consensus<br />
within the administration about how'best to achieve that aim. It is two years since the State Department<br />
began drafting it national security presidential directive on Iran, but the document remains .<br />
unfinished.<br />
Doves in Colin Powell's State Department are said to favour increased dialog':le with potential reformers<br />
in the country, while Donald RumsfeId's Pentagon is thought to be intent on pursuing aggressive<br />
destabilisation tactics towards Tehran.<br />
Whatever way the administration decides to play it, Khomeini could be useful to both sides.<br />
Asked when he thought he might return to Iran, Khomeini replied 'Inshallah' - Jt is God's will.<br />
But some observers might argue that it is just as"likely to be the Pentagon's.<br />
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sa<br />
~ ...... ·~The Herald-Mail ONLINE - Franklin case goes to grand jury (print view)<br />
-OO'R-. '- ~<br />
ALL INFO~~TION CONTAI~D .<br />
The Herald-Mail ONLINE HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
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Page 1 of2<br />
Lawrence Franklin, center,<br />
surrounded by his attorneys,<br />
leaves U.S. District Court in<br />
Martinsburg, W.Va., Thursday.<br />
(Photo credit: by Kevin G.<br />
Gilbert I Staff Photographer)<br />
Friday June 10, 2005<br />
Franklin case goes to grand jury<br />
by PEPPER BALLARD<br />
pepperb@herald-mail.com<br />
MARTINSBURG, W.Va. - Probable cause was found Thursday<br />
at the U.S., District Courthouse in Martinsburg to send to a<br />
grand jury a charge that a Pentagon analyst illegally took<br />
classified government documents to his Kearneysville, W.Va.,<br />
home.<br />
The charge against Lawrence Anthony Franklin, 58, who holds<br />
a doctorate in Asian studies and taught history courses at<br />
Shepherd University for the past five years, will be referred to<br />
the next grand jury, U.S. Magistrate JUdge David J. Joel said<br />
Thursday after his finding at the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West<br />
Virginia.<br />
"Dr. Franklin knowingly and unlawfully possessed classified documents in a place he was<br />
not permitted to keep them," Joel said. "He admitted he possessed these'documents."<br />
Franklin faces up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine if convicted of the charge.<br />
A June 30, 2004, search of Franklin's home turned up 83 classified documents, 37 of<br />
which were classified as top secret, meaning the release of which would cause<br />
"exceptionally greatdamage" to national security, and 34 of which were classified as<br />
secret, meaning the release of which would cause "great damage" to national security,<br />
FBI Special Agent Thomas Convoy, who spe9ializes in counterterrorism and espionage,<br />
testified Thursday.<br />
The charge centered on six documents, written between Oqtober 2003 and·June 2004,<br />
which included CIA docum.ents about al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden, terrorism<br />
documents and an Iraq memorandum, Convoy testified.,<br />
Franklin was authorized to carry classified documents in Maryland, Virginia and ~ ~<br />
Washington, D.C., but not in West Virginia, Convoy testified.<br />
'4 r<br />
Convoy testified that Franklinwas a member of the Department of Defense since 197'...If"j<br />
and held top-secret clearance since then, but it since has blilen revoked.<br />
~1tlt.a,JV<br />
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,6/19120qS;.<br />
- f2SR. ...WF- ~3·)S ... J\1·~<br />
~'c..~~
~ ~,~e Herald-Mail ONLINE - Franklin case goes to grandjury (printview) Page 2 of2<br />
~....,' ~ -... 0 0<br />
F:ranklin'.$ attorney, Plato Cacheris, contended that his client was inappropriately charged.<br />
"There is no allegation in this complaint that he intended to injure the U.S.," Cacheris said.<br />
He said that such an allegation would have needed to support the claim that Franklin<br />
unlawfully held the documents.<br />
Franklini wearing a dark suit, sat. behind Cacheris' chair throughout the hearing, nearly<br />
motionless.<br />
Cacheris said Franklin "had those documents in his home because he was preparing for<br />
an interview" for a government position.<br />
Convoy testified Franklin was under surveillance prior to the search.,<br />
"Did you see him transmit those documents to any unauthorized people?" Cacheris asked<br />
Convoy.<br />
"No, I did not," he responded.<br />
u.S. AttomeyThomas E.. Johnston, of West Virginia's northem district, said Franklin "was<br />
not authorized to retain these documents, at least at his home."<br />
"There is no evidenc~ he delivered them to the employee or officer of the U.S. intended to<br />
receive the,m," he said.<br />
Johnston said Cacheris' contention that he had to show intent to cause injury to the<br />
country "does not apply to this particular charge.II<br />
Joel, 'in announcing his finding, said, "\Nhether or not the government properly charged"<br />
Franklin is "a matter for another day."<br />
In May, Franklin was charged with providing top..secr~t information about potential attacks<br />
against U.S.. forces in Iraq to two executives of the American Israel Public Affairs<br />
Committee, the influential pro-Israel lobbying group.<br />
Already out on $100,000 bond on the May charge, Franklin was released after this mostrecent<br />
charge on $50,000 bond. Joel ordered Thursday that Franklin continue on his<br />
present bond.<br />
The Associated Press contributed to this story.<br />
CopyrightThe Herald-Mail ONLINE<br />
hup:/Iwww.herald-mail.com/?inodule=displaystory&story_id=114919&format=print 6/10/2005
Page'! of2<br />
Foundation for Defense of Democracies> In the. Me9ia > Cheers for Wolfy<br />
Cheers for Wolfy<br />
ALL INFOPRATION CONTAINED<br />
HEPEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabJ1sg<br />
The New York·Post<br />
May 31, 2003<br />
http://www.nypost.com/seven/05312003/postopinion/opedcolumnists·/35893.htm<br />
Last Sunday saw a remarkable event in Washington - one that defied stereotypes about Muslims,and<br />
the Bush administration's "hard-liners": Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, widely identified<br />
(and denounced) as the main architect ofAmerica's Iraq intervention, won 'multiple standing ovations<br />
from an audience ofhundreds of Muslims<br />
He praised the coalition's use of force to remove evil. and he hailed the new reality in Irag. For the<br />
first time in 26 years, he said. Shia Muslims had freedom to observe their Arbaeen f~stival in Iraq.,<br />
The room exploded in applause.<br />
The venue~ the first-ever national convention of Shia Muslims from the United States and Canada.<br />
Wolfowitz is said to be ~he hardest of neoconse.rvative hardliners. The Shias h~v.e a reputation as the<br />
most extreme. anti-Western, ultraradical Muslims. Yet they came'together through the ideal of<br />
freedom, and the principle of liberation through the exercise of U.S. military power.<br />
Pundits and experts have been wrong about both Wolfowitz and his Shia hosts.<br />
Most of the media paint Wolfowitz as an arch-conspiratorial fanatic. Yet the truth. as anybody who<br />
has met with him quickly learns•.is that he has an extensive apd nuanced understanding of Islam. He<br />
served as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia for three years under President Ronald Reagan.<br />
He is also a defender of democracy. taking pride in his key role in helping change the Philippines in<br />
the 1980s. He supported the removal of dictator Ferdinand Marcos and the triumph of democratic<br />
champion C6razon Aquino.<br />
Shia Muslims. for their part. are typically described as extremists in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini -'<br />
dismissed with claims that all Shias everywher~ support the Lebanese radicals of Hezbollah. The<br />
most recent dire prediction is that the Shia majority in Iraq will establish a rigid Islamic order.<br />
But Shias are victims of mass murder in Pakistan, where followers of the Saudi-backed Wahhabi sect<br />
hunt and kill them relentlessly. When the Pakistani group Sipah-e-Sahaba (Order of the Prophet's<br />
Companions) murdered American reporter Daniel Pearl, he was their first victim who was not a Shia<br />
Muslim. Before him, the group had slain hundreds of innocents.<br />
I~ addition, Shia Muslims, including a con~idera,b!e,community in the New York are~, are better<br />
educated than many other Muslims. Their dedication to self-improvement often makes them a target.<br />
In Saudi Arabia, wh~re they are the majority in the oil-rich Eastern Province, they are also an<br />
~conomic elite. But within the Saudi kingdom, they still suffer extraordinary cruelties at the hands of<br />
the Wahhabis, who teach in Saudi schools that Shia Islam is the product of a Jewish c9nspiracy.<br />
Life is tough forShi8;s, a, minority of 200 millio~, or 15 percent of the world's Muslims. In America,<br />
where estimates of the total Muslim popUlation vary from 2 million to 10 million, one in four is Shia.<br />
Most came here from Pakistan and Iraq to escape violence.<br />
T.h.e Shia na.tion_al cor:tyention.in. Wa~shington, h~ld ~y the Universal MusOm Association o(America<br />
http://www.defenddemocracy.orglcnlib/custom_tags/contentlprin~_ email_doc.htm?action=p... 6/9/2005
Foundation for Defense OfDe~'ocracies - In the Media<br />
}.r:J~ · .• . n<br />
(UMAA) with 3~OOO participants, epresented a new trend in American Musli~e. Until now~ the<br />
discourse on Islam in America was dominated, from the Muslim side. by the "Wahhabi lobby" - groups<br />
toeing the extremist line of the Saudi regime.<br />
The "Wahhabi lobby" includes such entities as the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and<br />
the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). These groups have skewed discussion of Islam and<br />
Muslims in this country, by presenting America as an aggres~ive power internationally and as an<br />
enemy of Muslims.<br />
Shia Muslims living in America see the world in very differef}t t~rms. Agha Shaukat Jafri, a Shia<br />
community leader in New York and organizer of the UMAA convention~ said~ "We see America as our<br />
homeland and ourselves as American Muslims. We consider ourselves an integral part of its body<br />
politic. We condemn all forms of terrorism, and we consider these so-called Muslim fighters, who<br />
carry out terror, as enemies ofour faith. i '<br />
He described the reception for Wolfowitz as "very warm." He added: 'We should thank the Bush<br />
administration for liberating the Shias of Iraq. I think Dr. Wolfowitz understands our viewpoint and our<br />
deep opposition to extremism. We were thrilled to have him attend and to hear his words."<br />
Others, including non-Muslims, who attended the event were struck by the enthusiasm shown to Paul<br />
Wolfowitz. But Jafri put the emphasis in the right place: liThe convention inaugurated a n~w period in<br />
the history of American Muslims, of heightened awareness of our responsibilities to the country we<br />
live in and hope for the future flourishing of Islam and democracy. At our convention next year, we<br />
would like to have President Bush as a guest."<br />
And why did a story like this go unreported in the rest of our media?<br />
Stephen Schwartz is author of "The Two Faces ofIslam: The House ofSa'ud From Tradition to<br />
Te"or, "published by Doubleday, and director ofthe Islam and Democracy Program at the<br />
Foundation for the Defense ofDemocracies.<br />
Page 2 of2<br />
Media Type: Print & Online<br />
[~~!lt] I [C~ose t~is.~.ndow]<br />
@ Copyright 2005 The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies<br />
an iaPRs site<br />
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~<br />
L<br />
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,ATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabJ sg<br />
For Official Use Only<br />
FOREIGN MEDIA PERCEPTION SUMMARY<br />
Tuesday, July 22, 2003<br />
ITerrorism I Afghanistan I<br />
I Iraq aZ) lIZ-North I IZ-Centrall IZ-South I<br />
I IZooWMD I IZ-RegimelPoIiticall IZoo Humanitarian Issues I<br />
I YemenlHorn ofAfrica I Iran I GCC I IndialPakistan I Central Asian States I<br />
Disclaimer: The articles presented in the Foreign Media Perception are derived<br />
entirely from open sources in and around the CENTCOM AOR. The articles<br />
selected are a"representative sample ofthe local media vie\vs and interpretations of<br />
current events. The "GeneralThemes" section is a summary ofthe most prevalent<br />
messages and is not an endorsement ofthe validity ofthe information contained in<br />
the articles.<br />
General Themes: A foreign media source in the CENTCOM AOR reported that an<br />
organization calling itself AI-Jihad Brigades Organization called on the Iraqis not<br />
to deal \vith the ne\v provisional Governing Council. They threatened to kill<br />
anyone who supports the Governing Council and the coalition forces occupying Iraq.<br />
Foreign media sources report that the Iraqi Christian Democratic Party has refused<br />
to recognize Iraq's transitional Governing Council, describing its members as<br />
administrative 'workers \vithout po\vers. Foreign sources report that Pakistan is<br />
seriously considering sending troops to Iraq as a result of the formation of the<br />
Governing Council should the Iraqi people request support.<br />
13. Jedda Arab News (Saudi Arabia): Tis the Season to Be Worried<br />
Paul Wolfowitz, in the latest Vanity Fair, basicallyjustified using a "convenient"<br />
argument, i.e. weapons ofmass destruction, to achieve the great goal:, Iraqi oil. Such<br />
politically vulgar messages are not new from Wolfo\vitz and his neo-con gang, but they<br />
spread reasonable doubt regarding America's "democratic" intentions for the Middle East.<br />
Now as Wolfo\vitz is visiting Baghdad, his face can't conceal a sense ofworry.<br />
Worry regarding the exposed lies, the increased number ofkillings ofAmerican military<br />
personnel, and the growing public opinion against the war. Wolfo\vitz is like a stray cat<br />
stuck in a comer. Stray cats when stuck in a comer usually attack .The question that is<br />
asked frequently is: Who fed all these lies about the Iraqi weapons WMD program to the<br />
president? Most fingers point at the Pentagon's Office ofSpecial Plans, headed by Adam<br />
Shulsky, a hard-line neo-conservative. The Office ofSpecial Plans was set up in the fall<br />
of2001 as a two-man shop, but it grew into an eighteen-member nerve center ofthe<br />
Pentagon's effort to create disinformation, alleging that Iraq possessed WMD and had<br />
connections with terrorist groups.
-------- --- --------<br />
o<br />
Much ofthe garbage produced by that office found its"way into speeches by Rumsfeld,<br />
Cheney and Bush. Itshould be noted that the office was created after Sept. 11 by two of<br />
the most fervent and determined neo-cons: Paul Wolfo,vitz himself, the deputy defense<br />
secretary, and Douglas Feith, undersecretary ofdefense for policy, to probe into<br />
Saddam's WMD programs and his links to al-Qa'ida, because, it is alleged, they did not<br />
trost ot~er intelligenc~ agencies ofthe US government to come up with the goods. Most<br />
prominent neo-cons are right-wing Jews, and t~nd to be pro-Israeli zealots who,believe<br />
that Amer~can and Israeli interests are inseparable -- much to the alarm ofthe liberal pro~<br />
peace Jews, whether in America, Europe, or Israel i~elf. Friends ofAriel Sharon's Likud<br />
party, they ten9 to loathe Arabs and Muslims.<br />
For them, the cause of"liberating" Iraq had little to do with the well being ofIraqis, just<br />
.as the cause of"liberating" Iran and ending its nuclear program -- recently advocated by<br />
Shimon Peres -- has little to do with the well being ofIranians. What they seek is an<br />
improvement in Israel's military and strategic environment. So-who will put the brakes<br />
on this madness, defend US national interests and give the administration wise counsel?<br />
Congress? Itdoesn't appear that way. The issue should go back to the American people.<br />
The integrity and credibility oftheir values and their future economic prosperity are very<br />
much at stake here. Pe9ple in the Middle East need to see the.ugly words ofWolfo,vitz<br />
and his like muted, and they need to see objective democratic results. Only then will<br />
Wolfo,vitz and his gang be m~ginalized. At least for a while.
IL<br />
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The United States and Shi'ite<br />
Religious Factions in Post-Ba'thist Iraq<br />
JuanC91e<br />
In post-Saddam Husayn Iraq, Slli'ite militias rapidly established their authority<br />
in East Baghdad and other urban 1Zeighborhoodsofthe south. Among the vqrious<br />
groups which emerged, the Sadr Movement stands Ollt as militant and cohesive.<br />
The sectarian, anti-American Sadrists wish to impose a puritanical, Khomeinist<br />
vision on Iraq. Their political influence is potentially milch greater than their<br />
numbers. Incorporating them i~to a democratic Iraq while ensuring that they do<br />
not come to dominate it poses a severe challenge to tile US Administration.<br />
1 planning the war on Iraq, the American Defense Department a~d· intelligen
------------------<br />
IL<br />
,544*MIDDLE EASTJOURNAL<br />
to account for about $2 million of the $4 million they had given his Iraqi National<br />
.Congress. The major religious Shi'ite groups with which the Americans were negotiating<br />
were part of Chalabi's group and included the Tehran-based Supreme Council<br />
for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the London branch of the al-Da'wa Party, and the<br />
Khoei Foundation, of which only al-Da'wa ·had much popularity on the ground in<br />
Iraq. The US was ignorant of the Sadr Movement, the main indigenous Shi'ite force.<br />
This ignorance wa~ to cost the US great political capital in" the first months of the<br />
occupation. -<br />
When the Ba'th fell on April 9, 2003, Shi'ite militias seemed suddenly to emerge<br />
and take control of many urban areas in the south of the country, as wen as in the<br />
desperately poor slums ofEast Baghdad. The moral authority of Grand Ayatollah Ali<br />
Sistani and his more quietist colleagues in Najaf had been known to the US, but it<br />
transpired that other ayatollahs and leaders had more political clout. The rank and file<br />
of Iraqi Shi'ites in the urban areas was far more radicalized by the last decade of<br />
Ba'thrule than anyone on the outside had realized. These developments alarmed<br />
Washington, given that some 60% to 65% ofIraqis are Shi'ites, and this group would<br />
therefore predominate in a democratic Iraq. The religious groups constitute only one<br />
section ofthe Shi'ite population, perhaps a third or more, but they are well organized<br />
and armed.<br />
My thesis here is that the Sadr Movement is at the moment the most important<br />
tendency among religious Shi'ites in post-Ba'thist· Iraq, and that it is best seen as a<br />
sectarian phenomenon in the "sociology of religions" sense. It is prima,rily a youth<br />
movement and its rank and file tend to be poor. It is highly puritanical and xenophobic,<br />
and it is characterized by an exclusivism unusual in Iraqi Shi'ism. To any extent<br />
that itemerges as a leading social force in Iraq, it will prove polarizing and destabilizing.<br />
In spring and summer of2003 its leadership had decided not to challenge actively<br />
the coalition military. In contemporary theories of the sociology of religion, a Usect"<br />
is characterized by a high degree of tension with mainstream society, employing a<br />
rhetoric of difference, antagonism, and separation. 2 The "high-tension" model ofthe<br />
sect predicts that. it will attempt strongly to demarcate itself off from the mainstream<br />
of society. It will also cast out those members who are perceived to be too accommodating<br />
of non-sectarian norms. That is, it demands high levels of loyalty and obedience<br />
in the pursuit of exclusivism.<br />
+.<br />
IRAQI SHl'ISM IN HISrORY<br />
Under the Ottomans, a Sunni political elite flourished in whatis now Iraq, with<br />
political ties to Istanbul. Shi 'ism· remained vigorous, however. In the eigh~eenth and<br />
nineteenth centuries, many -tribespeople of the south converted to the Shi'ite branch<br />
of Islam, under the influence of missionaries sent out from the shrine cities ofNajaf<br />
and Karbala, where Shi'ite holy figures Imam 'Ali and Imam Husayn were interred.<br />
-2. Rodney StarkandWilliam Sims Bain~ridge, The Future ofReligion (Berkeley and LosAngeles:<br />
University ofCalifomia Press, 1985). pp. 19-34, 135.<br />
II
o<br />
The Rulemt~e Turbail:<br />
Last September, Paul Wolfolvitz was the special guest at a memorial service in Arlington,<br />
Va.~ for an influential Shiite cleric killed in a car bombing in Najat: Iraq. The deputy<br />
defense secretary hailed Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir ai-Hakim as a Ittrue Iraqi patriot;"<br />
and he quoted from the Gettysburg Address as he likened the slain leader to the Union<br />
soldiers who haq died to preserve their country. It was a eulogy that ai-Hakim undoubtedly<br />
wouid have found jarring. His Islamist political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic<br />
Re~olution in Iraq, and its 15,OOO-man militia had been funded by Iran, a member gg<br />
President Bush's "axis Pi evil." And ai-Hakim himselfhad long been wary ~perceived<br />
American'imperialism in the Middle East, even as his party, known as SCIRI (pronounced<br />
"SEA-ree") [and otherwise also known in Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in<br />
Iraq (SAIRI)], cooperated. with the Coalition Provisional Authority on the.transfer to Iraqi<br />
sovereignty -- the likely reason he was targeted for assassination.<br />
As symbolism goes, the memorial service served to highlight the tangled politics in post<br />
Saddam Iraq, where idealized notionsM"friend" and "foe" have dissolved into a murJder<br />
reality. Once, Pentagon war planners like Wolfowitz envisioned the toppling ~ Saddam<br />
Hussein with clarity, predicting that the long-suppressed Shiite majority in Iraq would<br />
greet Americans as liberators and that democracy would naturally flower. But clarity has<br />
!Jeen washed away by images ~ charred American bodies swinging from bridges and<br />
naked Iraqi prisoners on dog leashes. Yet to emerge is a clear outline 9i a new Iraq, which<br />
has been tugged in opposite directions by official enemies -- Iran and the United.States -<br />
that happen to have shared a common interest in Sadda~'s removal. As the largest<br />
mainstream Shiite party, SCIRI is an important player in Iraq's future, but one with an<br />
ambivalent history with the United States. Itwas oneMthe opposition groups that the<br />
United States counted on to help bring down Sad9am.<br />
Yet SCIRI is also a vehicle in which Iran has invested heavily in a bid for influence in<br />
post-Saddam Iraq. And so despiteWolfowi~'s hailing 2fthe slain Ayatollah aI-Hakim as a<br />
kind ~ Shiite Abraham Lincoln, it is far from clear that his Islamist party, which supports<br />
an Iraqi government run according to Islamic principles, will help build the kind ~ secular<br />
democracy that the United States said it hoped to leave behind in Iraq. It is likely that the<br />
new Iraqi constitution will be influenced in some manner by Islamic principles, but it's<br />
anyb04Y's guess whether a sovereign Iraq -- assuming it stays united -- will look more like<br />
a secular Turkey, a cleric-run Iran or something in between.<br />
There are too many competing motives and agendas to predict any outcome with certainty,<br />
no matter what face US policymakers put on it. The blurring ~ Iranian, American and<br />
Iraqi interests came into shm> relief last month when Iraqi and American forces raided the<br />
Baghdad home and offices )ifIraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi on suspicion<br />
that the one-time Pentagon favorite had betrayed US secrets to Iran. It was a c.onfusing<br />
turn ~ events, made even more perplexing by the fact that Chalabi, a Shiite, had worked<br />
openly with Iranians for many y-ears, most prominently-through his contacts withSCIRI,<br />
which was knQwn to be an arm ~ Iranian intelligence. In fact, SCIRI was active in<br />
Chalabi's INC from 1992 through 1996 and was named in the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act,<br />
signed into law by President Clinton, as one ~ the opposition groups that the United States<br />
should work with to topple Saddam. It was thus no secret that Chalabi had, a relationship
I , • ..,..<br />
o<br />
o<br />
with Iranian intelligence. But the salient question quickly became: Which American<br />
official was so stupid as to tell the INC leader that the United States h~d broken Iran's<br />
secret communications code, information that US intelligence said Chalabi then passed on<br />
to Iran? Chalabi had long been an informal conduit between the United States and Iran,<br />
which have not had formal diplomatic relations since American hostages were seized in the<br />
1979 Islamic revolution.<br />
Through SCIRI, the United States kept a back door to Tehran propped open. Had that<br />
game now gone awry? SCIRI was founded in 1980, at the beginning ~the Iran-Iraq war,<br />
by Iraqi Shiite clerics who sought a haven from oppression by Saddamwith fellow Shiites<br />
in neighboring Iran. But the relationship was controversial from the beginning, according<br />
to Imam Mustafa al-Qazwini, an Iraqi-born Shiite in Los Angeles whose father was a<br />
founder R! SCIRI. A handsome 42-year..old with a neatly trimmed, graying beard, al<br />
Qazwini wears a black turban, symbolizing his family's descent from the prophet<br />
Mohammed. A naturalized.US citizen, he speaks fluent, colloguial En lish. We met earlier<br />
this month at a "%ashington conference ~the J!!ii~~.t~~L~ii!iim\*s~ocHltioil~pf \nieric',<br />
an organization !ifpolitically active AmericanShiite Muslims. His father, Ayatollah<br />
Mortada al-Qazwini, broke with SCIRI's ai-Hakim soon after the group's founding amid a<br />
dispute about its alliance with Iran, al-Qazwini told me. His father believed that Iraqi<br />
Shiites would be better served by leaders who remained independent ~ foreign<br />
governments -- Iranian or American.<br />
In the mid-1980s, the Qazwini clan left Iran for the United States and its open political<br />
system. The elder al-Qazwini returned to Iraq last year, settling in Karbala, and, in the<br />
model b1 Grand Ayatollah Ali al..Sistani, remains aloof from politics in the beliefthat<br />
clergy should not playa direct role in governance, his son told me. AI-Qazwini said that he<br />
and his father have rebuffed overtures from the US State Department and the Central<br />
Intelligence Agency over the years because they did not want to align themselves with any<br />
foreign governments. "I always feel, ifyou can work freely from these governments you<br />
should," al-Qazwini said. "Generally Iraqis don't like the ideaMdependence. Once<br />
someone is seen as collaborating with a foreign government, they might not be as trusted. II<br />
That has been a problem to varying degrees for both Chalabi and SCIRI in Iraq, he added.<br />
Still, SCIRI, now led by Ayatollah al-Hakim's younger brother, Abdul Aziz ai-Hakim,<br />
retains significant clout as the best organized Shiite party, in part because [{the support it<br />
had from Iran. SCIRI is believed to have taken from Iran an amount similar to the more<br />
than $30 million Chalabi's INC accepted in U.S. funding before being abruptly cut offlast<br />
month. And despite its quasi..official relationship with the United States, SCIRI mostly<br />
kept the Great Satan at arm's length.<br />
Until 2002, most contacts with the United States were made informally through Chalabi<br />
and Kurdish representatives, according to SCOO's US-based representative, Karim Khutar<br />
al-Musawi, who told me about the Eroup over coffee recently in Washington's Mayflower<br />
Hotel. Aside from acting as a kin~ ~ liaison between the United States and Iran, in the<br />
mid..'90s SCIRI agents also worked openly with Chalabi in northern Iraq on operations to<br />
undermine Saddam. Chalabi was then working for the CIA, whose small team in northerri<br />
Iraq was headed by former CIA operative Bob Baer. "SCIRI was never under any sort ~<br />
Western supervision or control. They did exactly what they wanted. And they reported to<br />
Tehran,II Baer told me. As an American agent, Baer was keen to learn all he could about<br />
Iran. Chalabi invited him to meet his contacts in Tehran, but Baer had to decline. "I would
(!'-<br />
o<br />
o<br />
have been happy to, but that was a firing offense. The State Department would have gone<br />
nuts," he said. But there was no restriction on meeting with SCIRI, which, after all, was<br />
partmthe American-backed Iraqi National Congress. .<br />
So, Baer said, he talked often with SCIRI agents in northern Iraq, where the Americans<br />
and Iranians shared a common enemy in Saddam Hussein. A master manipulator, Chalabi<br />
frequently played Iranian and American intelligence offeach other, Baer said. The most<br />
serious stunt occurred in February 1995, wheri'Chalabi was gathering support for an<br />
uprising against Saddam. The Americans were noncommittal and, among other moves, the<br />
INC leader went fishing for Iranian support. He forged a letter from America's National<br />
Security Council that appeared to direct him to assassinate Saddam, then left it on his desk<br />
for Iranian intelligence agents to read, hoping the disinformation would convince the<br />
Iranians thatthe United States was serious about toppling Saddam, Baer said. "He was<br />
being very practical about this. He needed the Iranians to thinkth~lan would go through<br />
so they would let loose with the Badr Brigades,II the armed wing !!f SCIRI. Chalabi's<br />
uprising, and a parallel coup planned by Sunni Iraqi military officers inside Iraq, collapsed<br />
amid betrayals by the Kurds and continued ambivalence from Washington.<br />
The debacle caused both the CIA and SCIRI to part ways with Chalabi in 1996. But by<br />
2002, when it looked as ifPresident Bush was serious about toppling Saddam, SCIRI<br />
began sniffing around again. Its representative, al-Musawi, set up shop in Washington.<br />
And in August 2002, SCIRI logged its first formal contact with the United States when<br />
Ayatollah al-Hakim~ounger brother, Abdul, traveled to Washington as its representative<br />
for a pre-war round 91 meetings with Bush administration officials. AI-Hakim "and other<br />
Iraqi opposition figures met with Secretary ~. Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary ~<br />
State Colin Powell and (via satellite hookup) Vice President Dick Cheney, al-Musawi said.<br />
Also at the 2002 meetings were Chalabi, Iyad Allawi -- the recently named interim prime<br />
minister ~ Iraq, who has longtime ties to the CIA -- and two Kurdish representatives,<br />
Massoud Barzani and lalal Talabani. "This was the first official contact for SCIRI, because<br />
before we did not ~utomatically believe in the American direction -- whether they meant it<br />
or not," al-Musawi said, referring to the United States' historical ambivalence toward<br />
removing Saddam, most prominently its failure to support Kurds and Shiites in their revolt<br />
after the Persian Gulf War, which Saddam brutally suppressed.<br />
Graham <strong>Full</strong>er, former vice chairman ~the National Intelligence Council at the CIA and<br />
an expert on Islam,.said that the United States must deal with SCOO, despite America's<br />
preference that Iraq have a strictly secular government. Although SCIRI wants Iraq's<br />
government to be run according to Islamic principles, that probably does not mean an<br />
Iranian-style theocracy <strong>Full</strong>er said. SCOO's al-Musawi confirmed that view, explaining<br />
that the party wants a "kind gj separationMchurch and state" in which clergy would not<br />
become politicians or government officials. Added <strong>Full</strong>er ~ SCIRI: "They are<br />
uncomfortable with American goals in the region, and they would see the American policy<br />
as hostile, rightly or Wrongly, to any Islamic state, however you interpret that ... They're<br />
warymAmerican imperialism in general. But that dQesn't mean they weren't willing to<br />
cooperate in furthering the greater goal ~ removing Saddam. II Abdul Aziz ai-Hakim<br />
became SCIRI's representative on the United States' handpicked Iraqi Governing Council<br />
after the March 2003 invasion &f Iraq. But when his brother was killed in the car bombing<br />
at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf last August, aI-Hakim blamed the United States for<br />
creating instability and demanded an end to the occupation. Such positions are part ~
-- -----<br />
o<br />
SCIRI's balancing act, <strong>Full</strong>er said. "As t~e majority, the Shiites are the beneficiary J!i [any]<br />
democracy, so they're willing to cut the United States a lot ~ slack as long as the US is<br />
bringing about the goalMdemocracy. But once they get to democracy, they want the<br />
United States to please leave," he said.<br />
A SCIRI member, Adel Abdul Mahdi, will serve as Iraq's finance minister in the interim<br />
government that takes power in Iraq June 30. Mahdi recently declared that the majority<br />
Shiites would not stand for limited Kurdish self-rule in the north, setting the stage for a<br />
showdown with the Kurds who have said they will secede from the central government<br />
without some guarantee Rf autonomy. Shiites, meanwhile, believe that radical Sunni<br />
Muslims -- both Iraqis and those newly arrived from other countries -- are targeting their<br />
leaders for assassination.with suicide bombings in an attempt to drive a wedge between the<br />
twq sects. What's more, "AI-Qaida is trying to make a war between the Sunni and Shia, to<br />
destroy the" American project in Iraq and break up the country so the Wahhabis can have<br />
influence" with Sunnis, asserted al-Musawi, referring to the strict fu~damentalist brand ~<br />
Islam that is the official.state religion in Saudi Arabia. In that regard Iran, like the United<br />
States, also faces uncertainty about its interests in post-Saddam Iraq. A Wahhabi foothold<br />
in its next-door neighbor would be an unwelcome development for Iranian Shiites, whom<br />
Wahhabis loathe as infidels. Saddam had kept both Sunni and Shiite religious fervor in<br />
check through his authoritarian rule. But now there is no guarantee it can be contained.<br />
Looming behind this internal political struggle between religious factions are the two<br />
major. powers Rl the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iran.<br />
I<br />
The degree to which Iraq might become a chessboard on which they move their pawns<br />
remains uncertain. There are already indications that Wahhabi Islam is taking root in Iraq,<br />
worried Shiites say. AI-Qazwini, the Shiite imam from Los Angeles, said that on a recent<br />
visit to Baghdad he discovered that the Urn al-Tubul mosque had been renamed after 13th<br />
century Islamic theologian Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, an intellectual founder ~ Saudi<br />
Arabia. IlThere are big signs for the Ibn Taymiyya mosque now. You can see $.em from<br />
the highway," al-Qazwini said. <strong>Full</strong>er thinks it makes sense, with all the countervailing<br />
forces in the region, for the United States to deal with all major players, even those that<br />
have ties to Iran. liThe United States has slowly come around," he said. "The first Bush<br />
administration didn't want to touch the Shia. They were afraid the Shia would take over in<br />
Iraq" with an Iranian-style theocracy. But, he added, "I think now the US has leamed<br />
something about the Shia and their more complex nature. The Shia do not love us, but. they<br />
are grateful that we threw out Saddam. Now they want us to complete the job and leave. II It<br />
remains unclear which ler~cy will have the most lasting imprint in the new Iraq -- that ~<br />
Abraham Lincoln or that ~ the turbaned clerics in Tehran.<br />
Source: Salon (US), Mary Jacoby, June 16,2004<br />
http://fairose.laccesshost.comlnews2/salon24.htm<br />
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May 28, 2004<br />
Chalabi-gate: None Dare Call ItTreason<br />
Neocons behindbars? Sounds goodto me••••<br />
byJustin Raimondo<br />
The fallout from Chalabi-gate continues to rain down on the heads of the<br />
War Party, opening up the exciting prospect that some neoconsmight well<br />
wind up behind bars.<br />
The charge? Espionage, as Sidney Blumenthal informs us:<br />
'~t a well-appointed conservative think tank in downtown Washington and<br />
across the Potomac River at the Pentagon, FBI agents have begun paying<br />
quiet calls on prominent neoconservatives, who are being interviewed in an<br />
investigation of.potential espionage, ac.cording to intelligence sources. 'Who<br />
gave Ahmed Chalabi· classified information about the plans of the U.S.<br />
government and military?"<br />
This information, says Vince Cannistraro, formerly at the CIA and the<br />
Pentagon, was so "very, very sensitive" that only a few U.S. government<br />
officials had access to it:<br />
"The evidence has pointed quite clearly, not only the fact that Chalabi<br />
might be an agent of influence of the Iranian government and that<br />
[Chalabi's intelligence chief, Aras Karim Habib] may be a paid agent of<br />
the Iranian intelligence service, but it is shown that there is a leak of<br />
classified information from the United States to Iran through Chalabi and<br />
Karim and that is the particular point that the FBI is investigating. In<br />
other words, some U.S. officials are under investigation on suspicion of<br />
providing classified information to these people that ended up in Iran."<br />
Blumenthal }tas more:<br />
'~ former staff member of the Offic.e of Special Plans and a currently<br />
serving defense official, two of those said to be questioned by the FBI, are<br />
considered witnesses, at least for now. Higher figures are under suspicion.<br />
Were they· ,witting or unwitting? If those who are being questioned turn<br />
ouf to· be misleading, they can- be charged ultimately with perjury an,q<br />
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; , - Page 2 of6<br />
., obstruction ofjustice.Qr them, the Watergate PrinQZe applies: It's not<br />
the crime, it's the coverup."<br />
The lie~ Chalabi fed to Washington policymakers, who eagerly scarfed them<br />
up and regurgitated them to the American public, originated with Iranian<br />
intelligence, as we are beginning to learn. But the neocon-Tehran<br />
information superhighway ran in both directions. As Julian Borger reports in<br />
the Guardian:<br />
'~n intelligence source in Washington said the CIA confirmed its long-held<br />
suspicions when it discovered that a piece of information from an<br />
electronic communications intercept by the National Security Agency had<br />
ended up in Iranian hands. The information was so sensitive that its<br />
circulation had been restricted to a handful of officials. 'This was 'sensitive<br />
compartmented information' - SCI - and it was tracked right back to the<br />
Iranians through Aras Habib,' the intelligence source said."<br />
UPI's Richard Sale reports that "the Federal Bureau of Investigation has<br />
launched a full field investigation into the matter,II and gives more<br />
information on what was compromised and how the Iranians pulled off this<br />
intelligence coup:<br />
"Chalabi allegedly passed National Security Agency/CIA intercepts to<br />
intelligence agents of the Iranian government using intermediaries or 'cutouts'<br />
or 'gophers' within the INC, another former CIA agent said. Some of<br />
the intercepts, dated from December, were the basis for a rec~nt Newsweek<br />
story, but there are others of a later date in possession of the FBI, this<br />
source said."<br />
How did Chalabi get his hot little hands on highly secret information?<br />
That's why the FBI - instead of going after, say, Brandon .Mayfield, or some<br />
other completely innocent person, as per usual - is now calling on<br />
"prominent" neocons at Washington's poshest thinktanks. I hope they're<br />
bringing an ample supply of handcuffs. But whom might they be<br />
handcuffing and frog-marching out the door, into a waiting paddywagon?<br />
UPI gives us the scoop, citing "a former very senior CIA official" as saying:<br />
"'Chalabi passed specially compartmented intelligence, extraordinarily<br />
sensitive stuff, to the. Iranians.' This source said that some of the intercepts<br />
are believed to have been given Chalabi by two U.S. officials of the<br />
Coalition Provision Authority, both of whom are not named here ·because<br />
UPI could not reach them for comment."<br />
Well, they aren't named, but they might as well have been:<br />
"Qne former CPA official has returned to the United States and is<br />
'employed at ·the American Enterprise Institute, the fQrme~ very senior<br />
file:/IQ:\DOCUME-l\agolwink\LOCALS-l\Temp\XN729MWP.htm 6/13/2005
~ offi;ial s~id, a fact wQh FBI sources confinned wQout additional<br />
comment. The other is still (l working Pentagon official, federal law<br />
enforcement officials and former CIA officials said."<br />
Page 3 of6<br />
Independent journalist Bob Dreyfuss, whose excellent articles on the<br />
neocons in The American Prospect and Mother Jones puts him up there<br />
with Jim Lobe, Michael Lind, and Joshua Marshall as a veritable maven of<br />
neocon-ology, names names:<br />
"The two officials in the UPI story are, according to my sources, Harold<br />
Rhode, an officzal'in the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, and Michael<br />
Rubin, now at the American Enterprise Institute."<br />
Rubin, formerly of the Office of Special Plans and the CPA, who served as<br />
liaison with Chalabi's group, the Iraqi National Congress, certainly fits the<br />
bill. No wonder he's been so tI' cranky lately, what with FBI agents barging<br />
into his office and giving him the third degree.<br />
Rhode, a longtime Pentagon official assigned to the Office of Net<br />
Assessment and a specialist on Islam, is reportedly Douglas Feith's chief<br />
enforcer of the anti-Arab party line among the civilian Pentagon hierarchy.<br />
In refusing to be interviewed by Dreyfuss for a piece on the neocons in<br />
Mother Jones, Rhode's laconic reply was:<br />
"Those who speak, pay."<br />
Prescient words, arid truer than perhaps even Rhode realized at the time.<br />
Hauled up before·a grand jury, however, Rhode, Rubin, and the. rest of<br />
Chalabi's Pentagon fan club may have .no choice about speaking - especially<br />
with the prosp~ct of a long "vacationII at a ·federal facility staring them in<br />
the face. -<br />
Much is being made of bow the Iranians "duped" us into invading Iraq, and<br />
"used" the U.S. in getting rid of Saddam Hussein and "paving the way," as<br />
Julian Borger puts it, for a Shi'ite-ruled Iraq. But a simple map of the<br />
region- and rudimentary knowledge of the history of the past ~ecade or so<br />
would ha~e revealed as much. As I wrote in this space over a year ago:<br />
"In view of Iran's growing sphere of influence in Iraq, it seems rather<br />
disingenuous to destroy the Sunni minority government run by the Ba'ath<br />
Party and then deny any responsibility for the Shi'ite-y outcome. The U.S.<br />
has made a gift of Iraq to Teheran, reigniting the religious passions that<br />
overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah Reza· Pahlavi of Iran and propelled<br />
Khomeini to power."<br />
In charting the outlines of "phase two" of the invasion of Iraq, that same<br />
week ,last year, I pointed out:<br />
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"<br />
Page 4 of6<br />
• . ~ IITh~ mai~ political c£equence of the war, internatjg is to increase<br />
Iranian influence: iffree elections were held in the southern Shi'a provin_ces<br />
of Iraq, they would undoubtedly usher in some sort of 'Islami~ Republic.'<br />
The effort by the neocons in the administration to install Ahmed Chalabi as<br />
the Pentagon's puppet, far from forestalling this possibility, only makes it a<br />
more c~edible threat to the postwar order."<br />
But why would the militantly pro-Israel neocons, American partisans of the<br />
ultra-nationalist Likud party, act as patrons and promoters of an outfit,<br />
Chalabi's INC, that was really a cover for Iranian intelligence - their alleged<br />
mortal enemies? That's what I couldn't quite figure out, at least not until I<br />
read Robert Parry's excellent piece on the subject, and here's the money<br />
quote: -<br />
'~s Chalabi's operation fed anti-Saddam propaganda into the u.s. decisionmaking<br />
machinery, Bush also should have been alert to the Israeli role in<br />
opening doors for Chalabi in Washington. One intelligence source told me<br />
that Israel's Likud government had quietly promoted Chalabi and his Iraqi<br />
National Congress with Washington's influential neoconservatives. That<br />
would help explain why the neoconservatives, who share an ideological<br />
alliance with the conservative Likud, would embrace and defend Chalabi<br />
even as the CIA and the State Department denounced him as a cpn man.<br />
"The idea of Israel promoting an Iranian agent also is not far-fetched if<br />
one understands the history. The elder Bush could tell his son about the<br />
long-standing strategic ties that have ~isted between Israel and Iran, both<br />
before and after the. Islamic revolution of 1979. It was Menachem Begin's<br />
Likud Party that rebuilt the covert intelligence relationship in 1980. Since<br />
then, it has been maintained through thick and thin, despite Iran's public<br />
anti-Israeli rhetoric."<br />
The enemy of my enemy is my friend: it's a principle, often invoked to<br />
justify a course of action seemingly in contradiction to the professed<br />
ideology of the actors. Lined up against a common enemy, American<br />
Likudniks and Ahmed Chalabi, an Iranian intelligence asset, teamed up to<br />
drag us into the Iraqi quagmire, with both members of this oddly coupled<br />
tag-team benefiting from the deal. While the neocons fed Chalabi - and his<br />
intelligence chief, Arras Karim Habib, a paid Iraqi agent - a steady diet of<br />
u.s. secrets, Chalabi fed the neocons (in government and much of the<br />
American media) a fresh serving- of tall tales cooked up in the INC's<br />
kitchen, and delivered piping hot to Judith Miller's doorstep.<br />
The Iranians, for their part, feasted on u.s. secrets so deep and dark that<br />
only a few top officials were privy to them - and had a good chunk of Iraq<br />
handed to th~m, while a d~ facto Kurdish state emerged as a buffer<br />
between Isr~~l an9. the ~hfite power rising in the East. The whole thing- was<br />
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," Page 5 of6<br />
, ..' sup;osed'to have beeQresided over by the ostensiQpro-Western Chalabi,<br />
t4e neocons' Alger Hiss. That was the pl~Jl, at any rate, but something<br />
seems to have gone awry....<br />
As in the Abu Ghraib photo-gallery of horrors, the nature of the crime<br />
suggests that a few lowly spear carriers -Rubin is just barely out of knee<br />
pants, and Rhode was certainly not in the loop on super-sensitive<br />
intelligence - didn't pull this off all on their own. Before it's all over,<br />
Chalabi-gate will reach into the favored nesting place of the neocons, the<br />
very top echelons .of the Pentagon.<br />
As UPI editor Martin Walker reports:<br />
"The real target goes beyond Chalabi. The hunt is on, in the Republican<br />
Party, in Congress, in the CIA and State Department and in a media<br />
which is being deluged with leaks, for' Chalabi's friends and sponsors in<br />
Washington - the group known as the neo-cons. In particular, the targets<br />
seem to be Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the former assistant<br />
secretary (in Reagan's day) Richard Perle, Vice President Dick Cheney's<br />
national security aide Scooter Libby, and the National Security Council's<br />
Middle East aide Elliott Abrams. The leaking against them - from sources<br />
who insist on .anonymity, but some CIA and FBI veterans - is intense.<br />
Some of the sources are now private citizens, making a good living<br />
through business connections in the Arab world."<br />
Speaking of business connections, how does Richard Perle maKe his living<br />
except by using his governmentconnections to profit handsomely from the<br />
war-driven neocon agenda? Oh well, never mind that: let's get to the juicy<br />
'part. Walker also reports that these poor persecuted neocons "are now<br />
beginning to fight back, II and in a familiar fashion:<br />
"Richard Perle told this reporter Tuesday that the gloves were off. ... Perle<br />
has no doubts that some of the attacks on him are- coming directly from<br />
the CIA, in. order to cover their own exposed rears, attacking Chalabi's<br />
intelligence to distract attention from their own mistakes. 7 believe that<br />
much of th~ CIA operation in Iraq was owned by Saddam Hussein,' Perle<br />
said. 'There were 45 decapitation attempts against Saddam - and he<br />
survived them all. How could that be, if he was not manipulating the<br />
intelligence?'"<br />
Gee, I guess this means that, on account of all those failed IIdecapitation<br />
attempts" on Fidel Castro over the years, the Cuban Communists exercised<br />
joint ownership of the CIA along with Saddam's Ba'athists. Oh, what a Perle<br />
of wisdom, but the Prince of Darkness was just getting started:<br />
"Perle went on to suggest an even darker motiv_e behind the attacks on the<br />
neo-cons; that the real target was Israel's Likud governm~nt a11:d the<br />
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Page 6 of6<br />
.." sta~nch ~upportfor /;tel's prime minister Ariel sOon in the Bush<br />
administration. When this was put to one CIA source, the reply was<br />
mocking: 'That's what they always do. As soon as these guys get any<br />
criticism, they scream Israel and anti-Semitism, and I think people are<br />
finally beginning to see through that smokescreen.'"<br />
How and why an investigation into Iranian penetration of our most closely<br />
guarded secrets constitutes evidence of "anti-Semitism" is a question I'll<br />
leave (or weightier intellects to ponder. But such an unseemly outburst<br />
ought to put to rest any' doubts about a neocon-Iranian convergence of<br />
interests: we know something's afoot when both Richard Perle and the<br />
Iranian mullahs sound absolutely identical in tone as well as content.<br />
We knew what the neocons were capable of: smearing their enemies, lying<br />
about practicallyanything, even outing a CIA agent doing high-priority<br />
undercover work. Is anyone surprised that they're capable of espionage?<br />
Perle is right about one thing:· it's time to take the gloves off.<br />
-Justin Raimondo<br />
Find this article at:<br />
hltp:/lwMY.antiwar.comijustinl?articleid=2683<br />
o Check the bOx to include the list of links referenced in the article.<br />
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THE NEW YORKER.<br />
FACT<br />
lEfTEI\ A\0a"1 WASHINGION<br />
REAL INSIDERS<br />
by JEFFREY GOLDBERG<br />
A pro-Israel lobby and an F.B.I. sting.<br />
Issue of 2005-07-04<br />
Posted 2005-06-27<br />
Several years ago, I had dinner at Galileo, a Washington restaurant,. with Steven Rosen, who was the<br />
the director offoreign-policy issues at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. The group, whi(<br />
is better known by its acronym, AIPAC t lobbies for Israel's financial and physical security. Like many<br />
.lobbyists, Rosen cultivated reporters, hoping to influence their writing while keeping his name out of<br />
print He is a voluble man, and liked to ,demonstrate his erudition and dispense aphori~ms. One that he<br />
ofte~ repeated could serve as the credo ofK Street, the Rodeo Drive ofWashington's'influence ~<br />
industry:. "A lobby is like a night flower: it thrives in the dark and dies in the sun."<br />
Lobbyists tend to believe that legislators are susceptible to persuasion in ways that executive-branch<br />
bureaucrats are not, and before Rosen came to AlPAC, in 1982 (he had been at the RAND Corporation, t<br />
defense-oriented think tank), the group focussed mainly on Congress. ButRosen arrived brandishing f<br />
new idea: that the organization could influence the outcome ofpolicy disputes within the executive<br />
~ranch-in particular, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the National Security Council.<br />
Rosen began to court officials. He traded in gossip and speculation, and his reports to AlPAC's leaders<br />
helped them track currents in Middle East policymaking before those currents coalesced into executivi<br />
orders. Rosen also used his contacts to carry A1PAC'S agenda to the White House. An early success car<br />
in 1983, when he helpedlobby for a strategic cooperation agreement between Israel and the United<br />
States, which was signed over the objections ofCaspar Weinberger, the Secretary ofDefense, and<br />
which led to a new level of-intelligence sharing and -military sales.<br />
AlPAC is a leviathan among lobbies, as influential in its sphere as the National Rifle Association and th<br />
. American Association ofRetired Persons are in theirs, although it is, by comparison, much smaller.<br />
(AIPAC has ~bout a hundred thousand members, the N.R.A. more than four million.) President Bush,<br />
speaking at the annual AIPAC conference in May of2004, said, "You've always understood and warneagainst<br />
the evil ambition ofterrorism and their networks. In a dangerous new century, your work is<br />
more vital than ever." AIPAC is unique in the top tier oflobbies because its concerns are the economic '<br />
health and security ofa foreign nation, and because its members are drawn almost entirely from a sing<br />
ethnic group.<br />
AIPAC's pr~fes~ional staft'=-it employs about a hundred people at its headquarters, two blocks from the<br />
Capitol-analyzes,congressional voting records and shares the results with its members, who can then<br />
contribute money to candidates directly or to a network ofproIsrael political-action committees~ The<br />
Center for Responsive Politics, .a public-policy group, estimates that between 1990 at!d 2004 these PA(<br />
gave candidates and parties more than twenty million dollars~<br />
Robert H. Asher, a former AIPAC president, told me that the PACs are usu8Ily given euphemistic names<br />
eel started a PAC called Citizens Concerned for the National Interest," he said. Asher, who is from<br />
Chicago, is a retired manufacturer oflamps and shades, ,and a member ofthe so-called Gang ofFourformer<br />
presidents ofAlPAC, who steered the group's policies for more than two decades. (The three 0<br />
others are Lany Weinb~~ a California real"estate developer and a fonner owner ofthe Po~and T!"lIiI- ? ~<br />
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Blazers;'Edward Levy, a construction-materials executive from Detroit; and Mayer "Bubba"<br />
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AIPAC, Asher explained, is loyal to its friends and merciless to its enemies. In 1982, Asher led a<br />
campaign to defeat Paul Findley, a Republican congressman from Springfield, Hlinois, who once<br />
referred to himself as "¥asir Arafat's best friend in Congress," and who later compared Arafat to<br />
Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.<br />
"There was a real desire to h~lp Findley out ofCongress," Asher said. He identified an obscure<br />
Democratic lawyer in Springfield, Richard Durbin, as someone whQ could defeat-Findley.. "We<br />
met at my apartment in Chicago, and I recruited him to run for Congress," he recalled. "I probed;<br />
his views and I explained things that I had learned mostly from AIPAC. I wanted to make sure,we<br />
were supporting someone who was not only against Paul Findley but also a friend of.Israel."<br />
Asher went on, "He beat Findley with a lot ofhelp from Jews, in-state and out-of-state. Now,<br />
how did the Jewish money find him? I travelled around the country talking about how we had the<br />
opportunity to defeat someone unfriendly to Israel. And the gates opened." Durbin, who 'Went on<br />
to win a Senate seat, is now the Democratic whip. He is a fierce critic ofBush's Iraq policy but,<br />
like AIPAC, generally supports the Administration's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.,<br />
Durbin says that he considers Asher to be his "most loyal friend in the Jewish community."<br />
Mayer Mitchell led a similar campaign, three years ago, to defeat Earl Hilliard, an Alabama<br />
congressman who was a critic oflsr~el. Mitchell helped direct support to a young Harvard Law<br />
School graduate named Artur Davis, who challenged Hilliard in the Democratic primary, and he<br />
solicited donations from AIPAC supporters across America. Davis won the primary, and the seat.<br />
"I, asked Bubba how he felt after Davis won," Asher said, "and he said, CJust like you did when<br />
Durbin got elected.' " Mitchell declined'to comment.<br />
AIPAC's leaders can be immoderately frank about the group's influence. At dinner that night with<br />
Steven Rosen, I mentioned a controversy that had enveloped AIPAC in 1992., David Steiner, a<br />
New Jersey real-estate developer who was then serving as AlPAC's president, was caught on tape<br />
boasting that he had "cut a deal" with the Administration ofGeorge H.·W.. Bush to provide more<br />
aid to Israel. Steiner also said that he was "negotiating" with the incoming Clinton<br />
Admini~tration over the appointment ofa pro-Israel Secretary ofState. "We have a dozen people<br />
in his"-Clinton's-"headquarters .. " and they are all going-to get big jobs," Steiner said. Soon<br />
after- the tape's existence was disclos~d, Steiner resigned his post. I aske~ Rosen ifAIPAC suffered<br />
a,loss ofinfluence after the Steiner affair. A halfsmile appeared on his face; and he pushed a<br />
napkin across the table. "You see this napkin?" he said. "In twenty-four hours, we could have the<br />
signatures ofseventy senators on this n~pkin~"<br />
Rosen was influential from the start. He was originally recruited for the job by Larry Weinberg,<br />
one ofthe Gang ofFour, and he helped"choose the group's leaders, including the current<br />
executive director, Howard Kohr, a Republican who began his AIPAC career as Rosen's deputy.<br />
Rosen, who can be argumentative and impolitic, was never a candidate for the top post. "He's a<br />
bit ofa kochleJlf'-the Yiddish term for a pot-stirrer, or meddler-Martin Indyk, who also served<br />
as Rosen's deputy, and who went on to become Preside~t Clinton's Ambassador to Israel, says.<br />
Rosen has. had an unusually eventful private life, marrying and divorcing six times (he is living<br />
again with his first wife); and he has a well-developed sense ofparanoia. When we met, he would<br />
sometimes lower his voice, even when he was preparing to deliver an anodyne pronouncement.<br />
"Hostile ears·are always listening," he was fond ofsaying.<br />
Nevertheless, he is a keen analyst ofMiddle East politics, and a savvy bureaucratic infighter. His<br />
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views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not notablY"4aw.kish;' he. onc~ c~l~ed bimselfCCtoo<br />
right for the left, and too left for the right." He is a hard-liner on.only one subject-Iran-and this<br />
preoccupation help"ed shape A1PAC's position: that Iran poses a greater threat to ~srael than any<br />
other n~tion. Inthis way, AIPAC i~ in agreement with a long line ofIsraeli leaders; including<br />
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who fears Iran's nuclear intentions more than lie ever feared<br />
Saddam Hussein's. (AIPAcJobbied Congress in favor ofthe ~q war, but Iraq ~as not been one of<br />
its chiefconcems.).Rosen's main role at A1PAC, he once told me, was to collect evidence of·<br />
"Iranian perfidy" and share it with the United States.<br />
Unlike American n~oconselVatives,<br />
who have openly supported the Liktia Party over the m~re<br />
liberal Labor'Party, AIPAC does not generally take sides,in Israeli politics. But on Iran AIPAc's<br />
views resemble those ofthe neoconselVatives. In 1996, Rosen and other AIPAc,stattmembers<br />
helped write, and engineer the passage ot: the Iran and'Libya Sanctions Act, which imposed.<br />
sanctions on foreign oil companies doing business with tliose two countries; AIPAC ,is determine~-,<br />
above all, to deny Iran tl!e ability to m~ufactUre nuclear weapons. Iran was a main focus ofthis<br />
year's AIPAC policy conference, which was held in May at t~e Washington Convention Cente~.<br />
Ariel Sharon and ~ecretary ofState Condoleezza Rice, amorig others, addre.sse
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The conversation at the banquet~ and just about everywhere else in official Washington at that<br />
time, centered on the coming war in Iraq. "We may well hope that With the demise ofa truly evil<br />
and despotic regime in Iraq, we will see the liberation ofone ofthe most talented peoples in the<br />
Arab world," Wolfowitz said in his speech. Franklin did not seem especially concerned with the<br />
topic at hand: As we stood outside the banquet hall, he said that Iran, not Iraq, would tum out to<br />
be the most difficult challenge in the war on terror. ·<br />
Then, as now, the Administration was divided on the question ofIran. Many ofthe political<br />
appointees at the Defense Department hoped that America would support dissidents in an- attempt<br />
to overthrow·Iran's ruling clerics, while the State Department argued for containment. Even<br />
within the Defense Department, many officials believed that it would be imprudent to make<br />
regime change in Tehran a top priority., "There are neocons who thought Iran should come sooner<br />
and neocons who thought it should come later/' Reuel Marc Gerecht, ofthe American Enterprise.<br />
Institute, told me., As for Franklin~ Gerecht, a fo~er Iran specialist in the c;:lA.'sDirectorate of<br />
Operations, said, "It's fair to say that Lany was imp~tient with Bush Administration policy on<br />
Iran." In the Pentagon's policy office, I learned later, it was sometimes said that Franklin<br />
inhabited a place called planet Franklin., Gerecht referred to him as "sweet, bumbling Larry."<br />
A year later, onareporting assignment in Israel, I ran into Franklin at the Herzliya Conference,<br />
which is the Davos ofthe Israeli security establishment. He said, that he was there on Defense<br />
Department business., We talked briefly about Iraq-itwas eight montHs after the invasion-~d,<br />
as we spoke, General Moshe Ya'a1on, then the Israeli Army chiefofstaff: swept into the room<br />
surrounded by bodyguards and unifonned aides. "Wow," Franklin said.<br />
We stepped outside, and he talked only about Iran's threat to America. "Our intelligence is<br />
blind," he said. "It's the most dangerous country in the world to the U.S.,.and we have nothing on<br />
the ground. We don't understand anything that goes on. I mean, the C.I.A. doesn't have anything.<br />
This goes way deeper than Tenet"-George Tenet, who was the director ofcentral intelligence at<br />
the time.> He continued, "Do you know how dangeroys lran.is to our forces in the Gulf? We have<br />
great force~oncentration issues now'~-the presence of Americ~troops in Iraq-~'and the<br />
Iranians are very interested in making life difficult for American forces. They have the capability.<br />
You watch what they're do,ing in Iraq. Their infiltration is everywhere.."<br />
Franklin seeme~ more frustrated with American policy in Iran than he had the year before. "We<br />
don't understand that it'"s doable-regime change is doable," he said. "The people are so<br />
desperate to become free, and the mullahs are so unpopular. They're so pro-American, the<br />
people." Referring to the Bush Administration, he said, "That's what they don't understand," and<br />
he added, "And they also don't understand how anti-American the mullahs are.," Franklin was<br />
convinced that the Iranians would commit acts ofterrorism against Americans, on American soil.<br />
"'J;hese guys are a threat to us in Iraq and even at home," he said.<br />
Franklin was not a high-ranpng Pentagon official; he was five steps removed in the hierarchy<br />
from Douglas Feith, th~ Under-Secretary for Policy. For two years, though, he had been trying to<br />
change Atp.erican policy., His efforts took many fonns, including calls to reporters, meetings with<br />
Rosen and Weissman and with the political counsellor at the Israeli Embassy, Naor Gilan.<br />
According to Tracy O'Grady-Walsh~ a Pentagon spokeswoman, he w~ not acting on behalfof<br />
his superiors: "IfLanyFranklin was fonnally or infonnally lobbying, he was doing it on his<br />
own." ,<br />
Franklin also·sought infonnation from Iranian dissidents who might aid his cause. InDecember<br />
of2001, he and Rhode met in Rome with Michael'Ledeen and'a group ofIranians, including<br />
Manucher Ghorbanifar. Ledeen, who helped arrange the meeting, told me that the dissidents gave<br />
Franklin and Rhode infonnation about Iranian threats against American soldiers in Afghanistan.<br />
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(Rhode- did not return calls seeking comment.) Franklin was initially skeptical~about the meeting,<br />
Ledeen said, but emerged believing that America could do business with these dissidents.<br />
Franklin's meetings with Gilon and with the two AIPAC men make up the heart ofthe indictment<br />
against him. The indictment alleges that Rosen-"CC;.I," or "Co-Conspirator 1"-caIIed the<br />
Pentagon in early August of2002, looking for the name ofan Iran specialist. He made contact<br />
with Franklin a short time later, but, according to the indictment, they did not meet until February<br />
of2003 .. In their meetings, according to seve~ people with knowledge ofthe conversations,<br />
Franklin told the lobbyists that Secretary ofState Colin Powell was resisting attempts by the<br />
Pentagon to formulate a tougher Iran policy. He apparently hoped to use AIPAC to lobby the<br />
Administration.<br />
The Franklin indictment suggests that the F.BJ. had been watching Rosen as well; for instance, it. .<br />
alleges that, in February of2003, Rosen, on his way to a meeting with Franklin, told someone'on' ,<br />
the phone that he "was excited to meet with a 'Pentagon 8\1Y' because this person was a 'real<br />
insi~er..' " Franklin, Rose~, and Weissman met openly four times in 2003 .. At one point, the<br />
indictment reads, somewhat mysteriously, "On or about March 10,2003, Franklin, CC-I and CC<br />
2"-Rosen and Weissman"'::"~cmet at Union Station early in the morning. In the course ofthe<br />
meeting, the three men moved from one restaurant to another restaurant and then finished the<br />
meeting in an empty restaurant."<br />
On June 26, 2003, at a lunch at the Tivoli Restaurant, near the Pentagon, Franklin reportedly told<br />
Rosen and Weissman about a draft ofa National Security Presidential Directive that outlined a<br />
series oftougher steps that the U.S. could"take against the Iranian leadership. The draft was<br />
written by a young Pentagon aide named Michael Rubin (who is now affiliated with the<br />
American Enterprise Institute). Franklin did not hand over a copy ofthe draft, but he described its<br />
contents, and, according to the indictment, talked about the "state ofinternal United States<br />
government deliberations." The'indictment also alleges that Franklin gave the two men "highly<br />
classified" information about potential attacks on American forces in Iraq.<br />
In mid-August of2002, according to the indictment, Franklin met with Oilon-'identified simply<br />
as "FO," or "foreign official"-at a restaurant, and Oilon explained to Franklin that he was the<br />
"policy" person at the Embassy. The two met regularly, the indictment alleges, often at the<br />
Pentagon OfficerS' Athletic'Club, to discuss "foreign-policy issues," particularly regarding a<br />
"Middle Eastern couniry"-Iran, by all accounts-and "its nuclear program." The indictment<br />
suggests that Franklin was receiving information and policy advice from Gilon; after one<br />
meeting, Franklin drafted an "Action Memo" to his supervisors incorporating Oilon's<br />
suggestions. Oilon is an expert on weapons proliferation, according to Danny Ayalon, the Israeli<br />
Ambassador, and has briefed reporters about Israel's position on Iran. A-ccording to Lawrence Di<br />
Rita, a Pentagon spokesman, it is part ofthe "job description" ofDefense D~partment desk<br />
6ffigers to meet with their foreign counterparts. "Desk officers meet with foreign officials all the<br />
time, not with ministers, but interactions with people at their level," he said.. The indictment<br />
contends, however, that on two occasions Franklin gave Oilon classified information.<br />
The is~ue ofIsrael's activities in Washington is unusually sensitive. Twenty years ago, a civilian<br />
Naval Intelligence analyst named Jonathan Pollard·was caught stealing American secrets on<br />
behalfofan Israeli intelligence cell-a"rogue" cell, the Israelis later claimed. Pollard said that he<br />
'was driven to treason because, as a Jew, he could not abide what he saw as America's<br />
unwillingness to share crucial intelligen~ with Israel. Pollard's actions were an embarrassment<br />
for American Jews, who fear the accusation of"dualloyalty"-the idea that they split their<br />
allegiance between the United States and Israel. For Israel, the case was a moral and political<br />
disaster. And there are some in the American intelligence community who suspect that Israel has<br />
never stopped spying on the United States.<br />
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~ii~rthis month, Ayalon told me iliat lS~el dQes not "collect any intelligence on the United<br />
S~tes, period, full stop.. We won't do anything to risk tpis most important relationship.~' In any<br />
case, he said, there was no need to spy, ~'because cooperation is so intimate and effective between<br />
Israel and th~ U.S." Ayalon als9,said that Gilon, who is returning ~o Jerusalem later this summer,<br />
remains an important member ofhis staff; in recent months, Gilon has attended meetings at the.<br />
State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House.<br />
a...-<br />
n June of2004, F.B.I. agents searched Franklin's Pentagon office and his h9me in·West<br />
.rginia, and allegedly found eighty-three classified documents. Some had to do with the Iran<br />
ebate, but some pertained to Al Qaeda and Iraq. (A separate federal indictment, citing the<br />
ocumentS, has be~anded d~~. i_n.}\'~t VIrginia.) ~~9r:d~pg.tQ a~p'er:sQn;:with.~owl~~g~ of<br />
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{!~ni'e1i,*;Soon,he was wired, and was asked to contact the two AIP!\C employees. On July-21s~~<br />
Fiiiiidin called Weissman and said that he had to speak to him immediately-that it was a matter<br />
oflife and death: They arranged to meet outside the Nordstrom's department store at Pentagon<br />
€ity..<br />
A month before that meeting, The New Yorker had published an article by Seymour HerSh about<br />
the ~ctivities o(Israeli intelligence agents in northern Iraq. Franklin, who held a top-secret<br />
security clearance, allegedly told Weissman that he had new, classified info.rmation indicating<br />
that Iranian agents were planning to kidnap and kill the Israelis referred to by Hersh. American<br />
intelligenc~ Iqtew ~out tile threat, Franklin ~aid, but Israel ~ight not. He also said that the<br />
-Iranians had infi~trated southern Iraq, and were planning attacks o~ American soldiers. Rosen and<br />
Weissman, Franklit) hoped, .could insurethat senior Administration officials received this news..It<br />
is unclear whether what ;FranklilJ. relayed was troeor whether it had been manufactured ~y the<br />
F.B.I. TheBureau has refused to comment on the case.<br />
Weissman hurried back to AlPAC's headquarters. and briefed Rosen and Howard Kohr, AIPAC's<br />
executive director. According to AIPAC sources, Rosen and Weissman-asked K.ohr to gtve the<br />
information to Elliott Abrams, the senior Middle East official on the National Security CounciL<br />
Kohr didn't get in touch with Abrams, but Rosen and W~issman made two calls. They called.<br />
Oilon and told him about the threat to Israeli agents in Iraq, and then they called Glenn Kessler, a<br />
diplomatic correspondent at the Washington Post. and told him about the threat to Americans.<br />
A month later, on the morning ofAugust 27,2004, F.B.I. agents vi~ited Rosen· at his home, in<br />
Silver Spring, Maryland, se~king to question him. Rosen quickly called AlPAC'S lawyers. That<br />
night, CBS News reported that an unnamed Israeli "mole" had been discovered in ~he Pentagon,<br />
and that the mole had been passing documents to two officials of.AI?AC, who were passing the<br />
documents on tQ Israeli officials.<br />
Within days, the names ofFranklin, Rosen, and Weissman were made p~bl~c. The F.B:I.<br />
informed Franklin that he was going tQ be charged with illegal possession ofclassified<br />
documents. Franklin was said by friends to be frightened, ~nd surprised. He said that he could not<br />
afford to hire a lawyer. The F.B.I. arranged for a court-appoiIited' att~rney to represent him .. The<br />
lawyer, a former federal prosecutor, advised him to plead guilty to espionage charges, ana receive<br />
a prison sentence ofsix to eight years.<br />
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policy. "Icalled him and said, 'Larry, what's going on?' "·Ledeen recalled. "He said, 'Don't<br />
worry.. Sharansky' "-Natan Sharansky, the former Soviet dissident-" 'survived years in the<br />
Gulag, andI'll survive prison, too.' I said, 'What are you talking about?' He told me what was<br />
going on. I asked him ifhe had a good lawyer."'Ledeen called the criminal-defense attorney Plato<br />
Cacheris. "I knew him from when he served as Fawn's attorney," Ledeen said, referring to Fawn<br />
Hall, who was Colonel Oliver North's secretary at the time ofthe Iran-Contra affair. Cacheris has<br />
also represented Monica Lewinsky and the F.B.I. agent Robert Hanssen, who spied for Moscow.<br />
Cacheris offered to represent Franklin pro bono, and Franklin accepted the offer..<br />
AIPAC launched a special appeal for donations-for the organization, ~ot for Rosen and<br />
Weissman.. "Your generosity at this time will help ensure that false allegations do not hamper our<br />
ability or yours to work for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship and a safe and secure Israel," AlPAC'S<br />
leaders wrote in the letter accompanying the appeal.<br />
But in December four AIPAC officials, including Kohr, were subpoenaed to testify before a grand<br />
jury in Alexandria, Virginia. In March, AlPAC's principal lawyer, Nathan Lewin, met with the<br />
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District ofVirginia, Paul McNul~, who agreed to let Lewin see<br />
some ofthe evidence ofthe Pentagon City sting. According to an AIPAC source, an eleven-second<br />
portion ofthe telephone conversation between Rosen, Weissman, and the Post's Glenn Kessler,<br />
which the F.B.I. had recorded, was played for Lewin. In tha~ conversation, Rosen is alleged to<br />
have told Kessler about Iranian·agents in.southem Iraq-information that Weissman had received<br />
from Franklin. Inthe part ofthe conversation that Lewin heard, Rosen jokes about "not getting in<br />
trouble" over the infonnation. He also ~otes, "At least we have no Official Secrets Ace'-the<br />
British law that makes journalists li~ble to prosecutiQn ifthey publish classified material.<br />
Prosecutors argu~d to Lewin that this sPltement proved that Rosen and Weissman were aware that<br />
the info~ation ,Franklin had given them was classified, and thatRosen must therefore have<br />
mown that he was passing classified information to Oilon, a foreign official. Lewin, who<br />
declined to comment on the case, recommended that AlPAC fire Rosen and Weissman. He also<br />
told the board that McNulty had promised that AIPAC itselfwould not be a target ofthe espionage<br />
investigation. An AIPAC spokesman, PatrickDorton, said ofthe firing, "Rosen and Weissman<br />
were dismissed because they engaged in conduct that was not part oftheirjobs, and because this<br />
conduct did not comport with the standards that AIPAC expects and requires ofits employees.tt<br />
When iasked Abbe Lowell, Rosen's lawyer, about the firings, he said, "Steve Rosen's dealings<br />
with Larry Franklin were akin to his dealings with executive-branch officials for more than two<br />
decades and were well1a).own, encouraged, and appreciated by AIPAC.."<br />
and Rosen in Lowell's office, which these days is a center of<br />
Washington sqandal management.. (He also represents the fallen lobbyist Jack Abramoff.) Lowell<br />
had instructed Rosen not to discuss specifics of}he case, but Rosen expressed disbeliefthat his<br />
career had'been ended by an F.B.I. investigation. "I'm being looked at for things I've done for<br />
twen~-three years, which other foreign-poli9Y groups, hundreds offoreign-policy groups, are<br />
doing," Rosen said, and went on, "Ourjob.at AIPAC was to understand what the government is<br />
doing, in order to help fonn better policies, in the interests ofthe U.S. I've never done anything<br />
illegal orharmful to the U.S. I never even dreamed ofdoing anything harmful to the U.S." Later,<br />
he said, "We did not knowingly receive classified infonnation from Lany Franklin." Lowell<br />
added, "When the facts are known, this will be a case not about Rosen and Weissman's actions<br />
but about the government's actions." Lowell said that he would not rehearse his arguments<br />
against any charges until there is an indictment. J'<br />
Lastmonth, I met with Low~ll<br />
Rosen said that he was particularly upset by the al~egation that, because he had informed OiloD<br />
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that Israeli lives might be in danger, he.was a spy forIsrael. "IfI had been given information that<br />
British or Australian soldiers were going to be kidnapped or killed in Iraq, I think I would have<br />
done the same thing," he said."'!'d have tried to warn them by calling friends atthose e~bassies."<br />
He wants to believe that he could return to AIPAC ifhe is exonerated, but this does not seem<br />
likely. AIPAC leaders are downplayillg Rosen's importance to the organization.. "AIPAC is focussed<br />
primarily on legislative lobbying," Dorton told me. Rosen's severance pay will end in September,<br />
although AIPAC, in accordance with its bylaws, will continue to pay legal fees for Rosen and<br />
Weissman.<br />
Rosen's defenders are critical ofAIPAC for its handling ofthe controversy. Martin Indyk, who is<br />
now the director ofthe Saban Center for Middle East Policy, a think tank within the Brookings<br />
Institution, thinks that AIPAC made a tactical mistake by cutting offthe two men. "Itappears<br />
they've abandoned their own on the battlefield," he says. "Because they cut Steve on: they leave.<br />
him no choice." Indykwouldn't elaborate, but the implication was clear: Rosen and Weissman<br />
will defend themselves by arguing that they were working in concert with the nighest officials of<br />
the organization, including Kohr.<br />
Until there is an indictment, the government's full case against Rosen and Weissman cannot be<br />
known; no one in the Justice Department will comment. The laws concerning the di~semination<br />
ofgovernment secrets are sometimes ambiguous and often unenforced, and prosecutors in such<br />
cases face complex choices. According to Lee Strickland, a former chiefprivacy officer ofthe<br />
C.I.A., prosecutors pressing espionage charges against Rosen and Weissman would have t9 prove<br />
that the information the two men gave to Gilon not merely was classified but rose to the level of<br />
"national-defense information," meaning that it could cause dire harm to the United States.. Yet a<br />
reporter who called the Embassy to discuss the same iJiformation in the course ofpreparing a<br />
story-thus violating the same statute-would almost certainly not be pro~ecuted., Strickland<br />
continued, "Twice in the Clinton Administration we had proposals to broaden the statutes to<br />
include the recipients, not just the leakers, ofclassified information.. TheNew York Times and the<br />
Washington Post went bat-shit about this legislation. They saw it as an attempt to shut down<br />
. leaks." IfAmerican law did punish those who receive, and then pass on, or publish, privileged<br />
information, much ofthe Wasllington press corps would be in jail, ~ccording to Lee Levine, a<br />
First Amendment lawyer. So would a great many government officials, elected and appointed, for<br />
whom classified information is the currency ofconversation with reporters and lobbyists.<br />
Strickland, who said that he had spent much ofhis career a~ the C.I.A. "shutting down" leaks,<br />
called the AIPAC affair ''uncharted territory." It is uncommon, he said, for an espionage case to be<br />
built on the oral transmission ofnational-defense information. He also said, "Intent is always an<br />
element. IfI were a defense attorney, I would-argue that this was a form ofentrapment. The<br />
F.B.I. agents deliberately set my client up, put him in a moral quandary.." He added, however, that<br />
although ajury might recognize the quandary, the law does not. "Just because you have<br />
information that would help a foreign country doesn't make it yourjob to pass that information."<br />
Even some ofAIPAC's most vigorous critics do not see the Rosen affair as a tradi~onal espionage<br />
case. James Bamford, who is the author ofwell-received books about the National Security.<br />
Agency, and an often vocal critic ofIsrael and the pro-Israel lobby, sees the case as a cautionary<br />
tale about one lobbying group's disproportionate influence: "What Pollard did was espionage.<br />
This is a much di(ferent and more unique animal-this is the selling ofideology, trying to sell a<br />
viewpoint." He continued, ''Larry Franklin is not going to knock on George Bush's dOOf, but he<br />
can get AIPAC, whic~ is a pressure group, and the Israeli government, which is an enormous<br />
pressure group, to try to get the American government to change its policy to a more aggressive<br />
policy." Bamford, who believes that Weissman and Rosen may indeed be guilty ofsoliciting<br />
information and passing it to aforeign government, sees the cas.e as a kind ofbmshback pitch, a<br />
way oflimiting AIPAC'S long-and, in Bamford's view, dangerous-reach..<br />
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Other AIPAC critics see the lobby's behavior as business as usual in Washington. "The No.. !<br />
game in Washington is making people falking to you feel like you're an insider, thatyou've got<br />
infonnation no one else has," Sam Gejdenson, a fonner Democratic congressman from<br />
Connecticut, says. When Gejdenson opposed a proposal to increaSe Israel's foreign-aid allocation<br />
at the expense of'more economically needy countries, AIPAC, he sai~, responded by "sitting on its<br />
hands" during his reelection campaigns, despite the fact that he is Jewish. "It's like any other<br />
lobbying group," he said. "Its job isn'tto come up with.the best ideas for mankind, or the U.S.<br />
It's narrowly focussed."<br />
AIPAC officials insist that the case has not affected the organiiation's effectiveness. But its<br />
operations have certainly been hindered by the controversy ofthe past year, and the F.B.I.. sting<br />
may force ~obbyists ofall sorts to be more careful about trying to penetrate the,e~ecutive<br />
branch-and about leaking to reporters. And AIPAC now seems acUtely sensitive to the<br />
appearance ofdual loyalty. The theme ofthis year's AIPAC conference was "Israel, an American<br />
Value," and, for the first time,'1'{atikvah," the-Israeli na~onal anthem, was' not sung. The only<br />
anthem heard was "The Star-Spangled Banner.." +<br />
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National News<br />
Lawye:r; Franklin Used In AIPAC Sting<br />
Ron Kampe~ and Ma~thew E. Berger<br />
Special to the Jewish Times<br />
JULy 11~2005<br />
Washington<br />
Lawrence Franklin, the Pentagon analyst at the center ofthe<br />
gove~entts espionage case ~gainst two fonner employees ofthe<br />
American Israel-Public ~airs Committee, "walke4 onstage" in,to an<br />
on$Qing investigation ofAlPAC offici~s, according ~o his attorney: '<br />
Plato'Cacheri~"o~e ofWashingtonts best-knoW!} espionage lawyers,<br />
told ITAin a recent interview that,he is representing Franklin for.free<br />
because he feels his client was unfairly targeted.<br />
til felt for him,It Cacheris said. "I fett pe was unfairly put upon. It<br />
.Franklin was indicted lastmonth'on charges th~t he conspired to<br />
reveal classifie9 information to two AlPAC officials; former policy<br />
director SteveRosen andfonner Iran analyst-Keith Weissman, and an<br />
Israeli Embassy employee"<br />
Franklin's trial is se~ to start-Sept. 6. The midlevel Iran analyst has<br />
plead not guilty.<br />
"Franklin~'Yalkoo onstag~; there already was an inve~tigation going<br />
on not involyinghim,II Cacheris said.<br />
I _. - -http;/Iwww;jewishtimes.comlNewsl4833.stm....<br />
Pro~ecutors and other g~vemment o~cials hav~ refused to comment<br />
on the case.<br />
The infQrm~tion that F~nklin allegediy relayed to Rose.~ and<br />
Weissman centered on Irant~ activities in post-invasion Ir~q.<br />
·Cacheris t assertion th~tFranklin was an accidental target,in the case<br />
reinforces the perception held by tho~e close to the defense of<br />
Weissman a~dRoserl that the't}Vo former AlPAG eD:lployees were the<br />
FBrs original targets. -<br />
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Indeed, Franklin's in~ictmetit cites as evidence apparently tapped<br />
phone conversations ofRosen even before he met Franklin,<br />
suggesting that the government stumbled across Franklin in the<br />
course oftracking Rosen.<br />
Another source familiar with the government's case against Rosen<br />
says an investigation was launched as early as September 2001<br />
because the Bush administration wanted to quash what it believed<br />
was a promiscuous culture ofleaking in Washington. Rosen was<br />
renowned for his access t9 inside infonnation.,<br />
.Cacheris would not speculate about the government's rationale for the<br />
case. "There seems to me there is something driving it,II he said.<br />
"What it is, I don't know yet."<br />
Five ofthe six charges in Franklin's indictment focus on his<br />
relationship with Rosen and Weissman; the sixth involves his<br />
relationship with Naor Oilon, head ofthe political desk at the ~sraeli<br />
Embassy in Washington.. According t~ the indictment, Franklin's<br />
acquaintance with Oilon predates his meetings with Rosen and<br />
Weissman.<br />
Cacheris said a relationship between Gilon and Franklin - two men<br />
with a professional interestin Iran - was hardly surprising. He<br />
characterized the indictment's implication that Franklin sought<br />
some$ing from Israel in exchange for infonnation as "rather flimsy.."<br />
The indictment mentions a store giftcard Franklin received from<br />
Oilon and a letter ofreference Oilon 'wrote on behalf ofFranklin's<br />
daughter, who was going to visit Israel.<br />
Franklin sought Cacheris' legal· assistance late last year after the FBI<br />
said it would press charges againsthim, even though he had<br />
cooperated with the government's investigation ofRosen and<br />
Weissman.<br />
Asked why Franklin agreed to the FBI's alleged request last June to<br />
participate in a sting operation involving Weissman and Rosen<br />
without even asking for a lawyer or any quid pro quo, Cacheris<br />
smiled..<br />
"Larry's a little bitguileless - maybe a lot guileless - and maybe a<br />
bit unsophisticated for a guy with a Ph.D. in Asian studies," said<br />
Cacheris, a Southerner with an awncular manner and a fondness for<br />
seersucker suits. liThe questions that you would have asked, he didn't<br />
ask."<br />
tllf he had a lawyer up front, we wouldn't be talking today," Cacheris<br />
said.<br />
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In the alleged sting on July 21,2004, Franklin called Weissman and<br />
insisted that they meet as soon as possible., When they met later that<br />
day at a shopping mall, Franklin told Weissman that Iranian agents<br />
planned to imminently kidnap, torture and kill Israeli and American<br />
agents in northern Iraq, according to sources.<br />
Franklin reportedly asked Weissman to relay the information to<br />
Elliott Abrams, then the assistant national'security adviser at the<br />
White House in charge ofdealing with the Middle East. The<br />
presumption was that AlPAC would have better access to the White<br />
House than a mid-level Iran analyst at the Pentagon.<br />
The reliability ofthe information has never been verified, but<br />
Cacheris insists Franklin was embroiled in a sting operation.<br />
"He was given a script, II the attorney said.<br />
Weissman relayed the information to Rosen, and together they told<br />
their boss, AIPAC's executive director Howard Kohr, asking him to<br />
pass it on to Abrams, according to multiple sources. There is no<br />
evidence that Kohr shared the infonnation with Abrams or anyone<br />
else or that he knew itwas classified.<br />
The government has assured AlPAC that nei~her itnor Kohr are<br />
targets in the investigation, AlPAC has said..<br />
Cacheris said he does not know ifthe alleged sting was directed at<br />
anyone beyond Rosen or Weissma~.<br />
The two AlPAC staffers also relayed the information to Gilon at the<br />
Israeli Embassy and to Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post's State<br />
Department correspondent, according to sources close to the defense.<br />
Those two conversations are expected to be central to the case against<br />
Rosen and Weissman.. Indictments against the two are expected to be<br />
handed down sometime this summer..<br />
The government will "argue that relaying classified infonnation to a<br />
foreign agent is an act ofespionage and that Rosen and Weissman<br />
made it clear in their conversation with Kessler that the information<br />
was classified, according to defense sources familiar with the<br />
government's case.<br />
Weissman and Rosen will say they did not know that the information<br />
was classified and that the·government is distorting their conversation<br />
with Kessler, according to sources close to the former AIPAC<br />
officials.<br />
In ~ugust 2004, about a month after the alleged sting, FBI agents<br />
raided the offices ofRosen and Weissman atAlPAC headquarters. In<br />
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January, the government convened a grand jury in Virginia to<br />
consider the case.<br />
Cacheris, famous for handling high-profile espionage cases <br />
including those against the FBI's Robert Hannsen and the CIA's<br />
Aldrich Ames -- doesn't believe the government has a lot to go on.<br />
The exchanges that Rosen, Weissman and Franklin allegedly had are<br />
"very comJ:llon," Cacheris said. "People in this city are talking every<br />
day about stuffthey're not allowed to talk about. It's not<br />
inappropriate."<br />
AIPAC fired Weissman and Rosen in March, after months of<br />
defending their integrity, citing infonnatio~ that ar.ose out ofthe FBI<br />
investigation.<br />
Franklin also faces charges in West Virginia, his place ofresidence,<br />
where he is alleged to have violated a ban on removing classified<br />
documents from the Virginia-Maryland-D.C.. region by taking some<br />
items home.. Franklin was reprimanded in the late 1990s for the same<br />
reason but was allowed to keep his security clearance.<br />
Cacheris said he wasn't currently negotiating a deal 'for Franklin..<br />
"We will not plead to an espionage count because we don't think that<br />
is justified,tI he said.<br />
Cacheris did not rule out agreeing to a plea bargain on a lesser charge<br />
in the future.<br />
This story reprintedcourtesy of~he Jew~sh_Telegraphic Agencv.<br />
To read more, pick.up a copy ofthe Jewish Times at one ofour<br />
newsstand ~.
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Click here to return to the browser-optimized version ofthis page.<br />
This article can be found on the web at<br />
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20050801&s=rozen<br />
The Big Chill<br />
by LAURA ROZEN<br />
[posted online on July 14,2005]<br />
A chill has taken hold lately among both government officials and the US media. It<br />
comes in the wake ofa US district court's decision to jail a New York Times reporter for<br />
refusing to reveal to a grand jury her sources in the Bush Administration and the FBI<br />
investigation ofa Pentagon Iran analyst for leaking classified information to former<br />
officials with the pro-Israel lobby group A.IPAC. As a result, those who engage in what<br />
have long been standard Washington practices--reporters ferreting out information from<br />
government sources, those sources confiding in policy associates, lobbyists and reporters<br />
-have become increasingly inhibited in carrying out their jobs.<br />
Even as a press frenzy surrounds a grand jury investigation ofwhether top presidential<br />
advisor Karl Rove leaked a CIA officer's identity to the press, unease in the Washington<br />
policy and journalistic communities is also evident. In the wake ofTimes reporter Judith<br />
Miller's jailing and in fear ofgovernment prosecution, the Cleveland Plain Dealer has<br />
decided, on the advice ofits lawyers, not to publish two major articles based on ieaked<br />
government inform~ion. At a recent gathering in a suburban Maryland living room, the<br />
conversation among a handful offoreign policy experts and reporters was about the sense<br />
offear and clampdown. One government expertwas convinced office phone<br />
conversations were regularly monitored by higher-ups, and reporters noted that senior<br />
government sources, intimida(ed by the Franklin investigation, have become more tightlipped.<br />
While the Franklin!AlPAC investigation is often described as-a counterintelligence case,<br />
it too is really about government leaks, and the B~sh Administration's determination to<br />
plug them. On September 9, 2001, the New York Times published a story by then-State<br />
Department correspondent Jane Perlez, who reported a major shift in what had been the<br />
Bush Administration's rejection ofthe ClintonAdministration'sde~p engagement in<br />
trying to broker a peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. Perlez reported that<br />
after months ofrefusing to meet with Yasir Arafat, George W. Bush would grant the
o 0-<br />
Palestinianleader' his first audience with the new,US President at an upcoming UN<br />
General Assembly gathering in Ne~ York IIifprogress, were made. irihigh-ievel talks<br />
between ~he Palestinians.and the Israelis. 1t<br />
That meeting between -Busli and Arafat never happened.'Two ,days after the Times story<br />
appeared, Al Qaeda terrorists c~hed planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon<br />
and a field in Pennsylvania,·killing"ahnost' 3,'000 people. In,the aft~.l'!lla~ ofthose attacks~<br />
few people recalled tqat for a briefmoment in the late'summer of2001, the Bush<br />
Administration had considered meeting with Ara~at and deepening its poUtic~1<br />
involv~ment in the Israeli..Palestinian co~ict.<br />
Everyone forgot, except the FBI. According to a recent report by the Jewish,Telegraphic'<br />
Agency, it w~ that September 2001 hew~ article; based on leaks ofsensitive<br />
A4ministration deliberatiQns, that prompted then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza<br />
Rice to. demand'~ FBI leak inves_tigatio~ that has since taken on.a dramatic life ofits<br />
~wn. Mo~t recently, the i~vestigation has led to the federal grand jury indi~tment,<br />
unsealed last ~onth' ofPentag9~Iran desk officer Larry Franklin op charges involving<br />
conspiracy to disclose classified national defense infonnation ~o unauthorized recipients!<br />
It is expected to lead to indictments, under the.Espionage Act, oftwo recently dismissed<br />
employees 9fthe American Israel Pu1?lic Affairs Committee for engaging in a conspiracy<br />
to receive and-pass on to other unauthorized-recIpients what they knew to be classified<br />
information. They are AIPAC's former director offoreign pol~cy research, ,Steve Rosen,<br />
:and his deputy, Iran specialist I{eith WeissIl:l~. Among .those the FBI reportedly wants to<br />
interview as a potential witness in its'investigation is a"Washington Postjoumalis~ who<br />
was allegedly briefed on some of.the classifie
------ ---------<br />
o<br />
o<br />
In interviewing several s~urces knowledgeable about the investigation, what emerges is a<br />
complex portrait ofWashington Mideast policy-making at a critical time, in the aftermath<br />
ofthe September 11 attacks, when ther~ were near-constant interagency battles over the<br />
direction ofUS policy, not just on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but toward Iran and<br />
Iranian-backed forces in Iraq as well. What also emerges is a more detailed picture ofthe<br />
modus operandi ofa brilliant and, some say, ruthless bureaucratic infighter at the<br />
country's premiere Mideast lobbying group, who was emboldened by his long<br />
relationships with figures in and around the Bush Administration and the Washington<br />
.scene to behave almost as an unofficial diplomatic entity in' his own right.<br />
The fact that that brilliant player, Steve Rosen, could become the target ofa<br />
counterintelligence investigation during this Republican Administration is rich inJrony.,<br />
Several former Rosen associates describe him as a genius at political strategy and<br />
subterfuge, the Karl Rove ofJewish-American politics, who helped engineer the lobby<br />
group's shift to the right on the American political spectrum; helped broker a strategic<br />
alliance between the pro-Israel lobby and Republican far-right legislators, including<br />
Senator Jesse Helms, in the 1980s; and who marshaled his organization's resources to<br />
conduct de facto intelligence operations ofhis own.<br />
As former associates and AlPAC officials describe it, those operations were replete with<br />
enemies' lists ofjourn~listsand public figures. Rosen sent AlPAC interns as spies to take<br />
notes on the political views ofother members ofthe small world ofJewish community<br />
political activism. One former AlPAC intern told The Nation that he was sent by Rosen<br />
to Arab-American conferences disguised as a WASP-y, pro-Palestinian liberal to find out<br />
which US Congressional candidates the attending groups were supporting. Former<br />
associates recite a list ofAlPAC officials with Democratic staff ~onnections on Capitol<br />
Hill who were purged from the organization in part, they allege, because ofRosen's<br />
strategic efforts to move AIPAC decisively to the right. (Sources close to Rosen say that<br />
he wasn't acting on pis own in any ofthese endeavors, but as part ofthe organization. A<br />
source close to AI;PAC downplays these activities and suggests that many ofthem ended<br />
years ago.)<br />
Rosen's "entire goal was to shift the organization away from a heavy reliance on<br />
Democrats and switch it to Republicans," says M.J. Rosenberg, director ofthe<br />
Washington office ofthe Israel Policy Forum and the former editor ofan AIPACweekly<br />
newsletter who overlapped with Rosen at the organization in the early'1980s. "Why?<br />
Because he thought, maybe correctly, that the wave ofthe future was the right wing of<br />
the Republican Party."<br />
While such alleged efforts have made Rose.n an object ofcontroversy among some more<br />
left leaning members ofthe politically-active Washington Jewish policy communitx,<br />
even those who are not his fans do not believe Rosen is a spy. They describe a man<br />
motivated not so much by concern for Israel as a quest for behind-the-scenes power in<br />
WashingtoJ;l. "Steve Rosen doesn't give a damn,about Israel," a Jewish community<br />
activist who requested anonymity explained. "These are game players. For them, it's all<br />
about the game."
o<br />
o<br />
For Rosen, that game became focused on Iran some time ago, in the early 1990s.<br />
According to fonner AIPAC sources, the reasons included a request by then-Israe~i Prime<br />
Minister Yitzhak Rabin thatAIPAC to stay out ofdelicate OS-Israel negotiations over<br />
the Mideast peace process.<br />
"From...when Rabin came in, Steve's mandate has been to go after Iran, largely because<br />
Rabin didn't want him messing around with the peace process, It says one veteran lobbyist<br />
who requested anonymity. "Steve took it and ran with it beyond anyone's expectations.<br />
So what comes out ofit is that you have a [US] Iran'policy that AIPAC is driving. And<br />
this went well into the last [Clinton] Administration.<br />
"Then along comes a new Administration that is made up ofthe same neocons that _were<br />
promoting the [hawkish] Iran policy," the veteran lobbyist continued, "but this<br />
Administration was divided down the center.... On the one hand, you have the<br />
neocons...on the other side, you have Powell and Richard Armitage and the State<br />
department [and the CIA], who want to try to open up a dialogue. One is for<br />
confrontation, and one is for dialogue.... So the neocons, the Iran hawks, know that they<br />
have got a natural ally...at other think tanks around town who feel the same way they<br />
do.... They also have AIPAC, which has made [Iran] its number-one issue.... My guess is<br />
that they went to AlPAC and the others with the same message: 'You have friends we'<br />
don't have. Help us to persuade them to see it our way.ttI<br />
Persuading political heavyweights to see things his way was what Rosen was all about.<br />
Sources tell The Nation that Rosen has a long history ofcultivating executive.branch<br />
sources [see Rozen, "Hall ofMirrors," posted here in May], milking them for<br />
information, boasting about his access to AIPAC's funder~ and leadership, and engaging<br />
in strategic press leaks as a regular part ofhis efforts to influence policy and engage in<br />
bureaucratic warfare.<br />
Indeed, the unsealed twenty-page Franklin indictment offers a fascinating peek into the<br />
government's view ofthe Pentagon analyst and the AIPAC officials cultivating one<br />
another, presumably attempting to tip the Bush Administration toward a harder line<br />
against Iran. For the AIPAC officials, Franklin--who often appears frustrated at<br />
bureaucratic obstacles to this harder line-seems to have offered grumbling and insights on<br />
the bitter interagency Iran policy debates inside the AdministratioQ..For Franklin, the<br />
AlPAC officials must have seemed like sympathetic political sophisticates, freed from<br />
the tyranny ofworking in *e govemment'bureauc~cybut with impressive influence<br />
among high-level officials in the White House and key members ofCongress. Indeed, in<br />
a fascinating reversal ofthe ordinary official-lobbyist relationship, it appears from the<br />
indictment that Franklin thought Rosen could bypass the bureaucracy and take Franklin's<br />
infonnation straight to the White House, and possibly "put in a good word for him" to get<br />
ajob at the National Security Council. .<br />
But the Franklin indictment raises a key question: What exactly is the nature ofthe<br />
conspiracy the government believes it has uncovered? The kind ofinfonnation the<br />
AlPAC officials seemed most interested in wasn't intelligence but policy inf0t:rnation: .
t •<br />
.,<br />
o<br />
o<br />
who in the bureaucracy was arguing which position on Iran, who were the obstacles to<br />
the adoption ofhard-line policies and the like.<br />
"I don't think anyone's spying for anyone,II says a Jewish community activist, no fan of<br />
Rosen's, -who asked not to be named. "Rosen is not working for Israel, because' he was<br />
working for a separate'sovereign entity [AlPAC]. Franklin just wanted to be' a policy<br />
nerd, to advocate for a policy he thought wasn't getting enough attention."<br />
But there, are seeming anomalies to this benign interpretation ofthe relationship to be<br />
found in the Franklin indictment as well. The most interesting·and surprising'part ofthe<br />
indictment describes fourteen meetings between Franklin and ,an "FO" (foreign officer),<br />
widely reported to be Israeli Embassy political officer Naor Oilon. They met in;the op~en,<br />
at the Pentagon Officers' Athletic Club.and Washington-area coffee shops and<br />
restaurants, between 2002 and 2004. The last part ofthe indictment asserts that at some<br />
point Franklin disclosed to Oilon "clapsified United States government information<br />
relating to a weapon~.test conducted by a Middle Easte11l country," presumably Iran. It is<br />
hard to discount such an unauthorized disclosure to a foreign government official as an<br />
ordinary leak.<br />
Another intriguing issue: The indictment describes Franklin's returning from one ofhis<br />
meetings with Oilon in May 2003. and drafting an "Action Memo to his supervisors,<br />
incorporating suggestions made by the FO during the meeting." This suggests the FBI<br />
may be interested not only in alleged leaks ~om Franklin to unauthorized recip~ents but<br />
in the possibility ofFranklin's feeding information from those officials back into the<br />
system, in an effort to influence US policy toward Iran. This raises the question of<br />
whether tqe government thinks the nature ofthe conspiracy was not only a matter of<br />
unauthorized leaks but also a coordinated effort by Franklin and perhaps his alleged coconspirators<br />
to shape the US policy environment in a kind ofagent-of-influence scenario.<br />
The US Attorney's office declined to comment on the case.<br />
.--........---.-"-.-----............<br />
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4~~..~~Ji(rNdiion -has le~ed that among the ~o~uments the FBI ~1s. hiitS possessi~ii:isa~Fn:to<br />
-·wntten by Rosen In 1983, soon after he JOined AIPAC, to hiS then-boss descnblng hi~. J<br />
,liaving been informed about the contents ofa classified draft ofa White House positionj<br />
I, .~aper concerning the Middle East and telling his boss that their inside knowledge o(iti.~<br />
',4raft might enable the group to influence the final document. The significance wou!d<br />
~~em to be an effort by the FBIto establis~ a pattern ofRosen's accessing classifi~d· .r .<br />
f<br />
i '!hformation to which he was not authorized, not just from Franklin but over_tnany -Y~ars.<br />
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Stephen Green, a Vermont state legislator and former UN official who in the-1980s<br />
pursued independent scholarship critical ofIsraeli-US relatiqns including by requesting<br />
thrpugh the Freedom ofInformation Act (FOIA) State Department documentation on<br />
counterintelligence probes, says the FBI's concerns about Rosen pre-date the September<br />
2001 news leak incident. Green says in meetings with FBI investigators'last year, "I was<br />
told by investigators ~at his name has showed up in wiretaps more than '!nce over time, II
o<br />
o<br />
Green told Th!! Nation. What's mort!, Green says, he believes the FBI considers Franklin<br />
only a little fish useful to getting Rosen.<br />
For,mer FBI attorney Harv~y Rishikof says that both theories, that this investigation is<br />
a~out leaking, or that it is motivated by graver counter- intelligence concerns, could be<br />
true. "They are not necessarily opposing theories,1I Rishikof told The Nation. IIIfyou are<br />
worried about counterintelligence.issues, and counterintelligelwe issues are also related to<br />
leak issues, so that individuals are using strategic leaks baSically for counterintelligence<br />
purposes, you then'link up the two threads...If you were the government, the leaks then<br />
become the method py which you are able to shut down what appears to be a<br />
counterintelligence problem."<br />
The full picture ofthe government's·case against Rosen will not emerge until an<br />
i~dictment is handed down, assuming there even is one. It is not even clear how he<br />
originally appeared on the FBI's radar screen. But ifprosecutors focus on Rosen's alleged<br />
long-term cultivation ofexecutive branch sources, who might have improperly shared<br />
with him privileged information about US national security deliberations, it's a twist on<br />
what we"understand·as a typical spy story, because such behavior, at l~ast in its<br />
unclassified form, is the very currency ofthe capital: Washington lobbyists cultivating<br />
inside sources and trading information with them to influence policy.<br />
Whether it was the FBI's intent~on or not, one result ofthe franklin!AlPAC investigation,<br />
along with the jailing ofMiller in the Wilson investigation, has been the fortressing ofthe<br />
executive branch; the danger is that this could enable t~e Bush Administration to shape<br />
policies with even less consultation from the public and Congress.,
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Last update - 09:42 09/08/200~<br />
The $ilence of'the Jewish le~ders<br />
By Shmuel Rosner<br />
Last week, an indictment was issued agaiilst Steve Rosen and Keith·<br />
Weissman, two former AIPAC. employees.-They are c~arged'with<br />
passing claSsified security information, received~during their work at<br />
the Jewish lobQY, to various people, including employees ofthe<br />
Israel~ Embassy in Washington~ This charge sheet r~ises trou!,ling<br />
questions. But is this the whole ~torY?.Is·,this why Rosen-was under<br />
surveillance for six years?<br />
'Commentators, reporters, legal expert~ .and va~ous organizations<br />
have already begun delving into the material. Lucy Dalglish,~<br />
executive director· ofthe Reporters CQll)mittee for:F~eedom 'ofthe<br />
Pre~s, was.quoted in a sho~t"article in The New York Times as saying<br />
s~e was concerned ~bout-the chilling effect such an investigatipn will<br />
have on journalists. The same word was used by, Laura Rosen in T~e<br />
N'ation,-a radical left institution which cannot be accused of<br />
ip.stinctive sympathy f~r AlPAC, under '~he headlipe liThe Big Chill.II<br />
'.<br />
They both appear'to believe that the investigation serve~ the interests<br />
ofthe Bush administration, 1Vhi~h is stricter onJ~aks th.an its<br />
predecessors •. Ifone buys this explantion; the meaning is simple:<br />
Rosen and Weissman are the victims through ~hoin a message is<br />
being delivered. Anyone who tries to get information will have to<br />
.face.Fecieral·investigators~l;3ad news for media representatives,<br />
lobbyists an~ memqers ofresearch institutes. .<br />
The investigation is also bad n~ws for the Jewish community. Dozens<br />
ofpeople, most ~fthem Jews, have already been questioned. rhere'<br />
were those who felt anger, particularly whel.1 asked questions such as,<br />
"Does AIPAC have dualloyalties?" or "Why do Jews actually have to<br />
act on'behalfofIsrael?" They'told their friends they were asked '<br />
"strang~ questions." Som~ ofthem called one Jewish organization or<br />
another in order to ask, "Why-don't you say something? Why don't<br />
you make your voice heard?"<br />
They are still waiting. Jewish leaders are keeping silent·-- but not<br />
becau~e·they have nothing ,to say. On the co.ntrary, in private<br />
,
~'<br />
o<br />
conversations in the U.S. and'Jemsalem they have a great deal to say<br />
about the investigatiqn. For example: "The motives behind it are not<br />
pure. Even ifI did not always like the organization [AlPAC], I don't<br />
,feel comfortable with this inquiry;" or "The FBI's motives are anti<br />
Semitic. It is no coincidence that they made problems for [former<br />
ambassador to Israel] Martin Indyk because ofa computer he took out<br />
ofthe office, apd [the former national security adviser] Sandy Berger<br />
about pocuments. They suspect all the Jews;" or "There is nothing to<br />
this affair. It is total nonsense. Someone decided to latch onto AIPAC<br />
to take them down a peg or two;" or "There are people who don't like<br />
the idea that an organization connected with Israel has so much Rower<br />
and influence. They anyway consiger the Jews' loyalty as<br />
questionable.. They are going to trY people for somethiJ:lg that is done .<br />
in Washington every day.." -<br />
This is how leaders on the right and left, Orthodox and Reform, heads<br />
ofcommunities and organizations put it. Dozens ofconversations<br />
revealed almost identical opinions. It is amazing: In private ..<br />
conversations t)ley will talk, but in public they keep mum. No .<br />
persecution, no anti-Semitism and noexaggeratiqn.<br />
",<br />
Jewish leaders believe that enmity toward Israel or toward Jews has<br />
made someone go crazy. But they remain quie~ because this enmity<br />
paralyses them. It leads Jews to wonder whether it is worthwhile to<br />
get involved in a public debate that will end in sensitive questionsof<br />
dual loyalty. A depate that those who hate Israel would be happy to<br />
see and use to sow dou!>t and suspicion and to incite. The media and<br />
the Internet are already full ofstupid or b~d people who are eager to<br />
use the affair to lambast "the.JewishlIsraelilneo-Conservative lobby."<br />
Those who wish ~osen w~ll are prepared to e-mail anyone who<br />
requests it an article by Prot: Aaron Kirschenbaum, liThe Bystander's .<br />
Duty t~Rescue in Jewish Law." The charges against Rosen include<br />
using classified information in order to warn the Israeli embassy<br />
about Iranian agents who might abduct Israeli soldiers in Iraq. Is there<br />
any Jewish leader who would get informatiol) ofthis kind and keep<br />
silent? It's a difficult question. The answer cannot always be<br />
explained easily to the public.<br />
Therefore it is possible that the decision to remain silent makes sense<br />
from a tactical point ofview. Perhaps, as one ofthose who is keeping<br />
quiet told Haaretz, it is best to "let the legal au~oriti~s do their job" in<br />
the hope that the pair will be exonerated. Perhaps, as one expert<br />
lobbyist proposed, "There are tacit ways to deal with matters like<br />
this," or perhaps, "We have to wait until the facts ~e completely<br />
clear."<br />
..
Q<br />
Only it.wouid have ~~en tl)uch'easier tQ'beii~ve all.ofPtese<br />
explanations. ifthose ~ho:express them did..~ot already have firm<br />
opinioris apout t.he·iJivestjgation, without waiting:for ~he !'facts~' a~d<br />
without rely~ng oil !'theJegal'syst~in." A re~onable opinion,<br />
considering the fliiI!sy'nature ofthe ~harges.<br />
If I'm not mist~¢n~ ·it was law j>.rofesso~ AlaJ:l Dershowitz wlig~aid<br />
that" Jews in America are not "g~ests-in someone else's ho~se/ ·but<br />
their silenc'e about the·AIPAC· affair sometimes seems like the silence<br />
of~' guest. Even -if'ft i~ justified for'reasons o£caiit~QIi or etiquette, .<br />
even if ~t cmi be understood, it ~everlheless makes' o~e' feel- somewhat<br />
un.easY·<br />
...<br />
·~om€? ofthe .Jewis!l'leadets aQmit t9 this. ~ut onlY.in private..<br />
lh,ase:n/obje~ts/pagesiPrintArticleen.jhtml~itemN~=610107<br />
~ .<br />
close win~~w·<br />
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(!)TE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baW/SabJE)'<br />
Page 1 of4<br />
r.<br />
I.<br />
,<br />
KRAMARSIC, BRETT M. (WF) (FBI)<br />
From:<br />
Sent:<br />
8/22/2005<br />
BRIDGES. TRACEY J. (WF) (FBI)<br />
Friday. August 12. 2005 8:09. AM<br />
To: PAULLlN.G. SCOTT M. (WF) (FBI); LOEFFERT. JANICE S. (WF) (FBI); ODONNELL. THOMAS J ..<br />
(NY) (FBI); PORATH. ROBERT J. (WF) (FBI); FORTIN. BRIAN G. (WF) (FBI); LURIE. ERIC S.<br />
(WF) (FBI); MARKLEY. JAMES S. (WF) (FBI); DOUGLA,S. STEPHANIE (WF) (FBI); MCDERMOTT.<br />
WILLIAM R. (WF) (FBI); KRAMARSIC. BRETT M. (WF) (FBI)<br />
Subject: FW: WpO l"iOO for you guys...<br />
Two Ex-AIPAC Staffers Indicted<br />
JewishTimes.com<br />
Ron Kampeas and Matthew E., Berger'<br />
August 11. 2005<br />
'ALEXANDRIA, VA -- The indictment of two former officials<br />
of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee suggests<br />
that the government wants to prove ~n extensive pattern<br />
· of trading classified information.<br />
Paul McNulty, the U.S. attorney for eastern Virginia who handed down the<br />
indictment here Aug. 4, decisiyely counted out the pro-Israel lobby as a t?rJ ..<br />
target in the inqUiry. Still, the broad scope CSf the charges -- stretching back V<br />
more years and covering a broader array of U.S. and Israeli officials than was C2~AI/<br />
previously known _. is sure to send a chill through Washington's lobbying U' · \,~<br />
community. The indictment charge~ Steve Rosen, AIPAC's former policy<br />
\ director,.and Keith Weissman, its former Iran analyst, with "conspiracy to<br />
communicate national defense information to people not entitled to receive<br />
it," which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. Rosen is also<br />
charged with actual communication of national defense information, also<br />
punishable by 10 years in prison.<br />
The charges against the former AIPAC staffers do not rise to the level of<br />
espionage, which the defendants and their supporters had·feared. Weis~man<br />
and Rosen are expected to appe~r in an Alexandria, Va., federal court on<br />
Aug. 16. Attorneys for Rosen and Weissman expressed confidence that they<br />
would handily beat the charges. "The charge~ in the indictment announced<br />
today are entirely unjustified,~'said a statement from Rosen's attorney, Abbe<br />
Lowell. "For 23 years, Dr. S~eveRosen ha!fbeen a passionate advocate for<br />
America's national interests in the Middle East. He regrets that the 1'4<br />
government has moved ahead with this indictmeot but looks forward to being" G<br />
- {~D..,,\iJF- ~~6%"-JJc../<br />
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vindicated at tri~I." Weissman's lawyer, John Nassikas, said he looked<br />
forward to challenging th~ charges "vigorously in court."<br />
o<br />
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AIPAC announced last Friday that it had hir~d former Justice Department<br />
officials who now work-for Howrey LLP, a major Washington-based 'aw firm<br />
that consults with organizations engaged in lobbying, to r~viewits lobbying<br />
practices. "The conduct of Rosen and Weissman was clearly not p~rt of their<br />
job," an AIPAC official said. "However, we made a decision that the events of<br />
the last year warranted an internal review'of policies and procedures related<br />
to information collection and dissemination." "The goal is to ensure that<br />
nothing like this can ever happen again," the official said. Previously<br />
disclosed government documents have focused only on activity dating back<br />
to 2003. . .<br />
Those documents outlined interactions with only one midlevel government<br />
official, former Pentagon Iran analyst Larry Franklin, who has already b~en<br />
indicted ~in the case, and one Israeli diplomat, political officer Naor Gilon, who<br />
ended a three-ye'ar tour of duty in early August. The indictment lists charges<br />
invo·lving incidents dating-back to 1999, four years before the AIPAC staffers<br />
met Franklin. The charges are re.lated to information o~ °lran and terrorist<br />
attacks in Central Asia and Saudi Arabia that was allegedly exchanged with<br />
three U.S. government officials and three staffers at Israel's Embassy in<br />
Washington. A source close to the defense said pne of the U.S. officials<br />
involved, who has not been indicted, was rec~ntly appointed to a senior Bush<br />
administration post.,<br />
The source, who asked not to be identified, wo.uld not name the official. The<br />
indictment for the first time acknowledges ttlat the 1:81 used Franklin in a<br />
sting operation against Rosen and Weissman. It includes five charges<br />
against Franklin in addition to thpse against the two former AIPAC staffers,! In<br />
indicting all three with "conspiracy to com.municate national defense<br />
inform~tion to persons not entitled to receive it," McNulty made it clear that<br />
the target was much broader: those in Washington who trade in classified<br />
information. "Those entrusted with safeguarding our nation's secrets must<br />
remain faithful to that trust," McNulty said. "Those not authorized to receive<br />
classified information must resist the temptation to acquire it, no matter what<br />
their motivation may be."<br />
The charges against the two former AIPAC staffers do not rise to the level of<br />
the crime committ~d by Jonathan Pollard, who plead guilty in 1986 to spying<br />
for Israel. Pollard plead guilty to a single count of conspiracy to ~eliver<br />
'national defense information to aid a foreign government, which is punishable<br />
by life imprisonment. The indictment agail:Jst Ros_en and Weissman does not<br />
anywhere allege that Israeli officials ever solicited the information, nor does it<br />
say that Israel compensated them for the information. McNulty suggested he<br />
8/22/2005
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1- would' argue~thaftheintent was critical. He'described Franklin, ·Ro.sen~n~<br />
'Weissmaf) as."individuals who put their own interests and. views of A.merican<br />
foreign policy af.lea~ of America's national security.1I Lowell, Rosen's,<br />
attorney, described the charges as a "misguided attempt to criminaliz~the<br />
·public's right to pa.rttcipate in the politlcal·process."<br />
The ind~ctment includes' a'iaundry list of contacts Rosen and Weissman, had<br />
with U;~.governm~ntoffici~ls and Israeli Embassy officials. ,It notes that'<br />
Rosen had security clearance when he was an official at the Pentagon-allied<br />
. Rand Corporatio~ think tank in the late 1970s and early 1980s, apparently to<br />
underscore that Rosen would have known the implications of receiving<br />
classified Information. The in~ictment also,'lists conversations 'Ro~en<br />
allegedly had with an Israeli. diplomat in 1999 ab9ut terrorist act~ in Central<br />
Asia that Rosen allege~ly described as "an extremely sensitive piece of<br />
intelligence."'It does not name the official. Also outlined is aconversation<br />
that Weissman had in 1999 with the same official about a, 1996 attack on U.S.<br />
troops in Saudi ArabiCjl, in Yihich Weissman discu~sed what"he allegedly<br />
called a "secret .FBI, classified F_BI. report."<br />
In. 2000, the indictment alle"ges, Rosen relayed classified inform~tion from a<br />
U:S•.government official'to' the. media. The information, according to the<br />
indic'tment, concerned U.S. sfrategy in the Mid~le East. hi 2002, Ro~en<br />
relay~d information about the terroris~ group AI·Qaida from 81l0ther '<br />
. government official -- the official a defense source ~ays,was recently<br />
promoted to a senior gove-:-nment position •• to other AIPAC officials, the<br />
indictinent..alleges. In Mar~h 2003, Rosen and Weissman allege~ly r~~eived'<br />
classified informati~n from Franklin on U.S. policy on Iran and relayed"it to<br />
another IsraeU di~lomat. He also allegedly disclosed the information to a<br />
"senior fellow·at a Washington, D:~~, think tan~" and to the media, the<br />
indictment said.<br />
In ~uoe of the s"ame year, Franklin allegedly relayed to·Weissman 'and Rosen,<br />
classifi~d. information about Iranian activity ~n Iraq, newly occ,upied by a ~.S.:<br />
led force. By, July 2004', the indictment said, the gov.ernment,had: co-opted<br />
Franklin and used him to set up Weissman and Rosen in-a sting. In that<br />
operation, Franklin allegedly war~ed Weissman that Iranian a'gent~ planned to<br />
kidnap, torture and kill U.S. and Isra~li C!gent~ in northern·lraq. The<br />
indictment-alleges that Franklin made clear that the informa'tion was "highly<br />
classified. 1I .<br />
According to well-placed sources, Weissman relayed this information to ,<br />
Rosen, who relayed it to Gilon at the Israeli Embassy; Glenn Kessler, the<br />
State Departme~t correspon~,ent at The Wa~hington Post; and Howard Kohr,<br />
AIPAC's executive director, identified in the indictment as "another AIPAC<br />
employee." IYIcNulty made it cl.ear that neither AIPAC nor any.of its other.<br />
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emp~oyeeswere targets. "We have no ba.sis for charging anyone else for<br />
unlawful disclosure of classified information," he said. "And I might add also<br />
that AIPAC as an organization has expressed its concern on several<br />
occasions with the allegations against Rosen and Weissman, and, in fact,<br />
after we brought some of the evidence that we had to AIPAC's attention, it did<br />
the right thing by dismissing these two individuals."<br />
4"l'!Ic~JH~~ !'9~ld_notcommen~.pnWJ1~tprol1)p~d_theJriitialj~~~!lg~~iQlflntQ .~<br />
~fi~AII?AC-.Q..ff!.cialS:Bu(~Q.~_rc~~s ..~I.Q_s~:-:to~..jhe_de.f~n.sJ~_b_e.lie.v~JsraeILofficials.in)<br />
rWashington"wereDeing~monitoredJn401999.1AIPAC fired Rosen and Weissman<br />
..this....pastApril;Eiigilfinonths after the EBI probe came to light. "AIPAC<br />
dismissed- Rosen and Weissman because they engaged in conduct that was<br />
not p·art of their jobs and because this conduct did not comport in any way<br />
with standards that AIPAC expects of its employees," spokesman Patrick<br />
Dorton told JTA on Aug. 4, repeating the group's previous position. "AIPAC<br />
could not condone or tolerate the conduct of the two employees under any<br />
circumstances. The organization does not seek, use or request anything but<br />
legallly obtained, appropriate information as part of its work."<br />
A source close to AIPAC said the group is not concerned that the indictment<br />
identifies two occasions •• in 2002 concerning the AI·Qaida information and in<br />
2004 concerning the sting -- when Rosen allegedly shared information with<br />
AIPAC staffers. "There was no indication by Steve Rosen within AIPAC that<br />
he was" obtaining classified information, said the source, who asked not to<br />
be identified. AIPAC has already scaled back its lobbying of the executive<br />
bran.ch of government .- something the indictment pointedly notes was<br />
Rosen's expertise. Kohr, the group's executive director, has said that AIPAC<br />
is instituting changes in how it operates ~s·a rft!sult of the investigation,<br />
without providing details. Israeli officials have confirmed tQ JTA that the FBI<br />
is seeking an interview with Gilon. It is not clear if the FBI also wants to talk<br />
with the two other Israeli Embassy officials cited in the indictment; they are<br />
not named.<br />
"It's premature to comment on the substance of the affidavit since we've just<br />
received it,II an Israeli official said. "We're fu~ly confident in the professional<br />
conduct of our diplomats who fully cond~ctthemselves in accordance with<br />
diplomatic practice. We have seen no infQrmation that would suggest<br />
.anything to the contrary." The F:BI raided AIPAC's offices on Aug. 27, 2004,<br />
the first time the investigation was made public. One major question likely to<br />
come up during the trial is why the two U.S. government officials listed in the<br />
indictment as leaki~g the information are not facing trial. "They should be<br />
going after all the guys who gave the information,II said Malcolm Hoenlein,<br />
the executive vice president of the Conference of Presidents of Major<br />
American Jewish Organizations. Soliciting classified information is hardly<br />
unusual in Washington, Hoenlein said. "Reporters do it every single day."<br />
8/22/2005
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New revelations in AIPAC case<br />
raise questions about FBI motives<br />
By Matthew E. Berger<br />
WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 (JTA)- New revelations in t.he ca'se against two<br />
former American Israel Public Affairs.Committee staffers raise questions<br />
about why FBI investigators ,have been focused on the pro-Israel lobby..<br />
The New York Times reported Thursday that David Satterfield, the NO.2 man<br />
at the U.S. mission in Baghdad, was one of two government officials who<br />
allegedly gave classified information to Steve Rosen, AIPAC's former director<br />
of foreign 'policy issue~, but he wasn't named in the indictment handed down<br />
against Rosen and ~~ others earlier this month.,<br />
Satterfield allegedly spoke with Rosen on several occasions· in 2002 - when<br />
Satterfield was th.e deputy assistant ~ecretary of state for.Near Eastern affairs<br />
- and shared classified information. At one point, Rosen allegedly relayed'<br />
the secret information in a memoranCJum to other~AIPAC staffers.<br />
Th~ fact that"Satterfield is not a t~rget of the case' and was allowed to take a<br />
s~nsitive position in Iraq has raised questions about the severity of the<br />
information allegedly given to AIPAC officials, as well a~ about the .<br />
g'overnment's motives for targeting Rosen and Keith·Weissman, a former<br />
AIPAC Iran analyst, neither of whom had classified access.<br />
i<br />
rhe defendants and AIPAC supporters see the new revelations as evidence<br />
that federal pr9secutors are targeting the powerful pro-Israel lobby for simply<br />
conducting the normal Washington practice of trading sensitive information.<br />
Officials inside and outsi~e government privately acknowledge that classified<br />
information routinely changes hands among influential "people iii the foreign<br />
policy community and that the exchanges often are advantageous to<br />
diplomats. .<br />
"If, in fact, Satterfield passed on classified information. that other people<br />
should not have had, then they ~hould all be. guilty of the same thing,", said<br />
Malcolm HOEmlein, the executive vice chairman of the Gonference of<br />
f>residents of Major Americ!ln Jewish Qrganizat!ons. "The fact that Satterfield<br />
hasn't been' prosecuted suggests that's not the case."<br />
Rosen and Weissman both pleaded not gUilty Tuesday to a charge of<br />
conspiracy to communicate national ;defense information. Rosen also is<br />
charged with communicating national defense information to people not·<br />
entitled to receive it.<br />
•<br />
Larry Franklin, aPentagon Iran analyst" has been c~arged with five similar<br />
counts, including conspi~acy to communicate classified information to a.<br />
foreign agent. Franklin, who also pleaded,not guilty, is accuse~,of passing.<br />
classified information to Rosen and Weissman from 2002 through last year~.<br />
Observers say the case is likely to create a chill among.lobbyists and others
\<br />
o<br />
o<br />
who seek to gamer foreign-policy information from the government.<br />
The second U.S. government official, who allegedly met with Rosen and<br />
Weissman in 2000, remains anonymous but reportedly has left government<br />
service. Their identification is seen as central to the government's case that<br />
the AIPAC staffers followed a pattern of seeking classified information and<br />
disseminating it to journalists and officials at the Israeli Embassy in<br />
Washington. A spokeswoman for Paul· McNUlty, the.U.S. attorney for the<br />
Eastern District of Virginia, would not qomment.<br />
Attorneys for Rosen and Weissman, who are collaborating on their defense,<br />
will likely use the same information to show that sharing documents and other<br />
information was normal practice between government officials and AIPAC.<br />
Leaders of other pro-Israel groups say State Department and other<br />
government aides handling the Middle East portfolio frequently share<br />
information.<br />
"When we discuss issues, it's an exchange. It's not one-sided." Hoenlein<br />
said. "What people forget is they benefit from these exchanges too" because<br />
they learn things from us."<br />
Those who have worked with Rosen say a,large part of his task was<br />
capturing sensitive material and that numerous government officials aided his<br />
pursuits over the years.<br />
(Tom·l?~ne;:(fC?~~e~~~if~~:.-~~e2~t!~.~re~!
',"<br />
{<br />
,~<br />
'.<br />
are ~xpect~d and requir~d to up,hold'this stand~ud."·<br />
Satterfl,eld is not co'n'sidereda subject of the government's probe, alJd 'he<br />
reporte~ly was cleare,d,by, th~'Jus,tice Department for his Iraq po~t.<br />
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said he could not comment<br />
,.o.n an'ongoi~g inv~s~igati6n. " .<br />
MI will say, though, that David:Satterfield is an outstanding public servant, he<br />
is a ~istinguished'Foreign Se'ryic;e officer and ~iplomat, and tha~ he.t1as<br />
w~rked on behalf of the American people fota"~4mber of years," McCormack<br />
said Tl1u~sday. .<br />
~ State Departm~nt official said i,t was withiJ:tSatte~eld's portfolio to work<br />
'with poli~y'groups'such ~s AlpAC. As.the.deputy assistant secretaryJor Near<br />
'l;astern aff~irs, Satterjield led the State pep~rtmEmt group. de~l!ng with t~~·<br />
l~raeli·Palestinian conflict, as.well as other regional issues on AIPAC;s '<br />
a~e~~a~ ., ,<br />
'.<br />
Mit wasn't ou(of the'normal,at all:tor adep'utY assistant secretary, as he was,<br />
to ~e meeting with AlpAC on a regUlar ba~i~,1J saiCt the offi~i~I, who spoke on<br />
coraditionof anonymity. "Our offiqe trie~ to meet wit~'inter~sted people of all<br />
'~ro~ps, an~ it's su~posed to be.~1i in~orma!i(;mal.exchange."<br />
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I:.awrenee A. Franklin, center, with his lawyers, Plato ~c:heris,left, andJohn Hundleyin .Alexan,~va. alit~r<br />
admittingyesterday thathehadpassed secretinformation 10pro--Israeli lobbyists and -.Israe=li ~fficiai.<br />
~ ... •.<br />
·Pentag()n AnalystAdmitsSharingSeeretData<br />
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r 7<br />
i By ERIC LICHTBLAU trat1oD's dealingswith Iran.. tivlties In Iraq ~doth~rtssues.<br />
• : ALEXANDRIA, Va., Oct. 5 - A Some of the morebawklsh officials' Mr; Frank~ said!Ieassumed that<br />
*nior Defense Department aJJalyst ID theadmlnlstratlon have pushed such ~dblts \\tere lilireatdy knoWD to<br />
~dmltted Wednesday .that,he sbared for a barder line In confronting lrm Israe~and he ~ldthatthe Israeliof.<br />
secret military Information wld1 two about its nuclear ambitions, but the flclal gave Il\~far mco~ information<br />
gra-Israell lobbyists and an Israeli ~mlnlstration has been deeplyen- than I gavehltll.!'<br />
dfflcialln an effort to create a ""ack. Vlded about how to-engage with the Prosecutors said Mr. FrankllB<br />
channel" to the Bush administration • country. knew that th~ classtm~ information<br />
on Middle Eastpolley. Mr. Franklin worked for a time as he shared "cc)uld be \lSf:d to the inju.-<br />
: The analyst, Lawrence A. Frank· a senior analyst on Iran under Doug. ry of the Untted Stalte$ or to the ad-<br />
• lin, pleaded guilty In federal court las Feith. a former under se~retary vantage ofaforeign. nation.... But Mr.<br />
Jiere to three criminal cOunts for 1m.. atthe Pentagon. Mr. Franklin said D1 Franklin Sald, flit wra$ never my inp'r0P.erly<br />
retaining and disclosing court that he believed the Alpac lo~ tentto harm the Uniteet States""<br />
clas$ified information, :and he gave byfsts had ac¢e~ and influence at He said !\e did IliOt even consider<br />
the first account of his. motives and the National Security Counell, which one of the clocuments cited by pros..<br />
thinking in establishing secret Uai- coordinates policy_ Issues for the ecutors to have·been classlfled but<br />
sOns with people outside the govern- president and was deeply involved in when he started to discuss the docu.<br />
ll1ellt. - setting the administration's course ment In o~n court - referring to a I<br />
The offenses carry a maximum of on Iran. :. one-page tax witb t\ "list of mur..<br />
i; years In prison, but as part of a He said he hoped the lobbyists ders," aPparently in Iran - lawyers<br />
pies'agreement, prosecutors are ex- could help Influence polley by pass- from both Sides jumPed up to cuthim<br />
pected _to recommend leniency for lng on information that he knew was off. The jUdge, T. S. Ellis agreed at<br />
Mr.-Franklin in return for his (ooper· classified. "I asked th.em to use theIr the ur~1ng of proseeutor; to put Mr.<br />
ation in a continuing investigation In contacts to g.et thIS lnfor~atlon Franklm's reference to the list under<br />
• the January trial of the two lobbyists.· backchannels' to people at the sealln the court record.<br />
Steven J. Rosen and Keith Weiss:.. N.S.C.:'hesaid. Mr. FrlUlklln will lose his govern.<br />
man. . Mr. Franklin was also applying for ment penSion, but his wife will be ala<br />
The lobbyists were dismissed last a position at the N.S.C. in early 2003 lowed to keep her surVivor'S benefits<br />
year by the American ISn:lel Public:: and asked Mr. Rosen to "put in a from the government in thedeal off,..<br />
Affairs Committee. 'or Aipac, arter good word" for him, according to a elalssaid. '<br />
the investigation becamepublic. filing on Wednesday by proseOltors Mr. Franklin bas been financially<br />
Mr. Franklin, 58. 'said in enterlng as part of the plea agreement. Mr. struggling since his arrest last year<br />
his guilty pleas that he had shared Rosen sai~, "Tilsee what I can do." and he told the Court he bas bee~<br />
with the lobbyists Umy frustrations In addition to his contacts \\i.tb the working as a waiter and bartender at<br />
~ with a particular policy'· during re- lo~byists. Mr. Franklin admitted a pUb, and as a Vtdet at a racetrack<br />
peated meetings from 2.002 to 2004. mteting Wilh an official with the Is- and has also been teaching course:<br />
He did not divulge the particular pol- raeH Embassy and passing oJ). classi-. on Asian history and terrorism a<br />
icy. but officials i.n the case,said he tied information regarding weapons Shepherd University near his hom<br />
was referring to the Bl1Sh admi!lis- .teslS in the Middle East, militar,Y ae'!. in West Virginia.
Ii<br />
ALL INFonMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg<br />
NATIONAL NEWS:<br />
THE WASHINGTON POST<br />
I~~~~~:f'~~~~~~~<br />
, Defense An~yst Guilty in IsraeliEspion~eCase-,<br />
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BY JElUl.Y MumN'<br />
eralinvestiption.<br />
Washinp" Po8C StaJfWrittr<br />
Legal expeitS ca1ted the plea a major<br />
develo~t ili the long-r:unning<br />
A Defense Department analyst<br />
iJM;9tigaliolfOf.whether U.s.'secrets<br />
pl~~ed guilty~tQ passing were pasSeditO the Istaeli governgovernment<br />
secrets to two employees<br />
nient. FrankliD. said he disclosed da&.. •<br />
of aprooIsraellobbying group and reo<br />
sifted data to two fonner employeesof<br />
vealed for· the first lime that he also<br />
the American, Israel Public Affairs<br />
gave classified infonnation direclIy to<br />
Committee. Those empIoyees: Steven·<br />
anlsraeli government officialin Wash-<br />
J, Rosen and·:Keith WeisSman, have<br />
, ington. beenclwged,inwhatprosecutorssaid<br />
. Lawrence A. Franklin ,told a judge was a broad conspiracY to obtain and<br />
in u.s. District Court in Alexandria<br />
i1legaIIy pass:"c1assified infonnation to<br />
tliat he met at least eight limes with<br />
foreign offi~ and news reporters.<br />
Naor Giloo,'who was the Political ofti..<br />
Franklin· probably wiD become the<br />
. eel' at the IsraeU Embassy before be- ..,-.cu.-IMI_rost starwitness ag2instRosen and Wei8&-<br />
ing reca1Ied last swnmer. Lawrence Fraillelln, left, with attorney man. "'Ibis is not good news for the<br />
The guilty plea and Fran1din's Ie> ~ohn Richards; after pleading guiltyto other defendants or for AIPAC~"-said<br />
count appeired to cast doubt on lOng." glvl~g classified Informallon to israeL Michael GreeDberger, a: former 111&0<br />
stanepng denials bY IsraeH officials<br />
tice ~t official who heads<br />
that they engage in any intelligence Franklinentered hisplea, he disclosed' the Center'fciHealth and Homeland<br />
activities in" the United States. The that some of the material he gave the SeCurity at t& University of,MarypOSst'biJity<br />
of continued Israeli spying lobbyistsie1ated toIran. Hisattorneys 'land.:" ,<br />
in 'Washington has been a sensitive stopped him from speaking furtheI; -' Prosecutors have said they have no<br />
subject between the tWo governments' and prosecutors immediately accused .immediate plaDs to ;charge anyone<br />
\ since Jonathan J. Pollard, a US. Navy Franklin of revealing classified in- else, but Franklin's cooperati~ could<br />
intelligence analyst; ~tted to spy- fonnation in court.. . change that, said Preston Burlo~ a<br />
ing for Israel in'1987 and was sen- Franklin said, he .passed the in- Washington defense 1aw)oerwith long<br />
tenced to life in prisOn. fonnation becausehe was "frustrated" experience inespionage cases. " ~<br />
David Siegel, a spokesman for the with the direction of US. poliCy and' "Espionage debtiefings are exhaua-<br />
Israeli Embassy, said Israeli ,officials th~t he could influence it by hay.. live and meticulous: 'said Burton,<br />
have been approached by US; in-" ing'themrelaythedatathrough"back whoisafonner lawpartnerofaFrankvestiptors<br />
and are cooperating. "We channels" to officials on the,National lin attorney, Plato Cacheris, but is not<br />
have fun confidence in our diplomats, • Security'Council He said he never in-<br />
involVedin theFranklin case.<br />
who 'are dedicated professionals"who tended to hann. the United- States, AlsO uncertain is how yesterday's<br />
conduct themselves in fun accordance "notevenforasecond," andthathe reo developmentswill affectU.s. tieswith<br />
with estabUshed diplomatic prae> ceived far more information from Gi- Israel, The ~has complicated relatices,"Siegelsaid.'<br />
Ion than he'gave.."1 knew in myheart tiona between the two counbies:<br />
Court documents filed along with that his govenunent already had the' wJiich are' close aBies, and angered<br />
Franklin's pleasaid he provided,~ informatiOD," he said. 'manysupporlers ofthe AmericanISrafied<br />
data - including infonnation . Franklin. 58, a~on Iran, elcommittee.whichis considered one<br />
about a Middle Eastem·eountry's Ie> pleaded guilty to twO conspiracy of Washington's JqOSt iDfluentiiJ.lob- '<br />
tivities in lJaqand weapons tests con- ,coUnts and a third charge "of P9S8«t' byingorganizations.<br />
dueled by a foreign countty - to an sing classified documents: As part,of; " . GiIOnis a career Israelif~ set'-<br />
W1JIa111ed"foreign officia1." the plea a;reement, ,Franklin has' vice offiCer who spent three years in<br />
The country was not named, but as agreed to cooperate'in the larger fed-' Washinitonfocusing on weapons pro-<br />
Iiferation issues. His, recaD to Israel<br />
Was Unrelated to the investigation:<br />
Siegel said, and he is awaiting a neW<br />
foreign posting.<br />
·One of Rosen's a~eys, AbbQ<br />
LoweD, said Fr3nk1in's plea "has nQ<br />
impact on our case because agoverni<br />
ment employee's actions in dealing<br />
with classified information is simpbt<br />
not the same as a pri~te person,<br />
whether that person is a reporteror a<br />
~~~" I<br />
Rosen, 63, of Silver Spring, is<br />
charged with two countsrelated to un-:<br />
lawful disclosure of national delenlM=<br />
inforination obtained from Frank1in<br />
andother unidentified government officials<br />
since 1999 on topics incIumng<br />
.Iran. Saudi Arabia' and at Qaeda. Rosen<br />
was the American Israel commit~<br />
'tee's director offo. policy issuQ<br />
and was iristnimeri.ta1 in making th~<br />
committee a fonnidable politic3l<br />
force.<br />
weissman. 53. of, Bethesda, faces<br />
one count 'of ~cy to illega1lx<br />
communicate national defense infort<br />
matiGn. His attorneys did not return<br />
calls late last night. American Israel·<br />
Public Affaita Committee officials det<br />
dined comment. !<br />
Franklin pleaded guilty.to two<br />
coun~ of conSPiring to communicalc:<br />
secret infonnation and a third Chargtt<br />
of keeping numerous classified documents<br />
at his West VIrginia home. H~<br />
said he took the documents home to<br />
,keep up hiS expertise and prepare for<br />
"point..,1aDkquestiona" from his~<br />
es",including Defense secretary Don;<br />
aIdH. Rwrisfeld. 1<br />
1heDefense Department suspend,<br />
ed Pran1din, who said in court that he<br />
.works as a waiter and bartender and<br />
ata racetraclc. He faces up to 25 years<br />
in prison athis sentencingIan, 20. . I<br />
'<br />
o<br />
·0.
INFORMATION CONTAINED '0-~<br />
O·ALL HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED -<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 603~4 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
P~ge 1 of~'<br />
Kramarsic, Brett M.<br />
From: Strzok, Reter P. II<br />
Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 7:48 A""<br />
To: Porath, Robert J.; Kramarsic, Brett M.<br />
Did you see this 0!1 JTA? Need to start calling-Reilly "That's Classifjed!" instead.<br />
Fonner Pentagon man pleads guilty,<br />
will testify against ex-AlPAC officials<br />
By Ron Kampeas<br />
~~f'ANDRIA, Va., Oct 6 (JTA) - Lawrence Franklin's pleabargain<br />
p~edge to cooperate with the U.S. government in its case<br />
against two former AIPAC officials was"put to the test as soon as itwas<br />
made.<br />
"Itwas unclassified and it is unclassified," Franklin,'a former Pentagon<br />
analyst, in~isted in court Wednesday, describing a document that the<br />
government maintains is classified. The document is central to one of<br />
the conspiracy charges against Steve Rosen, the fonner foreign policy<br />
chiefofthe American Israel Public Affairs Committee..<br />
Guilty p~eas usually are remorseful, sedate ~airs. But Franklin<br />
appeared defiant and agitated Wednesday.as he pleaded guilty as part<br />
ofa deal that may leave him with a reduced sentence and part ofhis<br />
government pension.<br />
Franklin's prickliness c,ould prove another setback for the U.S.,<br />
gove~ment in a case that the presiding judge already has suggested<br />
could be dismissed because ofquestions about access to evidence..<br />
Franklin',s performance unsettled prosecutors, who will-attempt to<br />
prove that Rosen and Keith WeJssman, AIPAC's former Iran analyst,<br />
conspired with Franklin to communicate secret information. The case<br />
goes to trial Jan. 2.<br />
The argument over tlie faxed document furnished the most dramatic<br />
en~unterWednesday~<br />
"Itwas a list ofmurders," Franklin began to explain to U.S. District<br />
Judge T.S. Ellis when Thomas Reilly, a youthful, red-headed lawyer<br />
from the Justice Department, leapt from his seat, shouting, "Your<br />
Honor, that's classified!"<br />
·Ellis agreed to seal that portion ofthe hearing. JTA has learned that the<br />
fax was a list ofterrorist incidents believed to have been backed by<br />
Iran..<br />
- -I0/11/2005 .."<br />
G9Q....\i)f- '9aG~\5'-Alei~~~<br />
,.-?~~
..<br />
'\l<br />
o<br />
There were other elements ofFranklin's plea that suggest-he is not<br />
ready to cooperate to th~ fullest extent. The governn:te~t says Franklin<br />
leaked information to the AlPAC employe~s because he thought it<br />
could advance his career, but franklin says his motivation was<br />
"frustration with policy" on Iran at the Pentagon..<br />
o<br />
Page20f4<br />
Franklin said he believed Rosen and Weissman were better connected<br />
than he and would be able to relay his concerns to officials at the White<br />
House'sNational Security Council.<br />
He did not explicitly mention in court that Iran was his concern. But<br />
ITA has learned that Franklin thought his superiors a~ the Pentagon<br />
were overly distracted by the Iraq war in 2003 - when he established<br />
contact with Rosen and Weissman - and weren't paying enough<br />
attentio~ to Iran.<br />
The penal code criminalizes relaying,information that "could be used tothe<br />
injury ofthe United States or to the advantage ofany foreign<br />
nation.." Franklin's testimony would not be much use to the prosecution<br />
ifhe believed Rosen and Weissman simply were relaying information<br />
from the Pentagon to the White House, sources close to the defense of<br />
Rosen and Weissman said.<br />
"Iwas convinced they would relay this information back-channel to<br />
friends on the NSC," he said.<br />
In any case, the section ofthe penal code that deals with civilians who<br />
obtain and relay classified information rarely, ifever, has been used in<br />
a prosecution, partly because it lUDS up against First Amendment<br />
protections for journalists and lobbyists, who frequently deal with<br />
secrets. .<br />
A spokesman for Abbe Lowell, Rosen's lawyer, said Franklin's guilty<br />
plea "has no impact on our case because a government employee's<br />
actions in dealing with classified-information is simply riot the same as<br />
a private person, whether that person is ~ reporter or a lobbyist."<br />
The essence. of,Franklin?s guilty pl~a seemed to ~e only that he knew<br />
the recipients were unauthorized to receive the infonnation. Beyond<br />
, that, he insisted, he had no criminal intent.<br />
Admitting guilt to another charge, relaying information.t9 Naor Oilon,<br />
the chiefpolitical officer at the Israeli Embassy in Washington,<br />
Franklin said that he wasn't giving away anything that the Israeli didn't<br />
already know..<br />
"I knew in my heart tl,at his government had this i~fonnation,"<br />
Franklin said. "He gave me far more infonnation than I gave him."<br />
Franklin turned prosecutors' heads when he named Gilon, the first<br />
1011112005 -
'jI<br />
>J •<br />
o 0<br />
public conflnnatlon that the foreign countrY hi~ted at in in~ictments is<br />
Israel. Indictments refer to a "foreign official."<br />
-The suggestion'that Franklin was mining Oilon for information;1 and<br />
not the other way around, turns on its head the hype around the case<br />
when it first was revealed in late August 2004, after the FBI raided<br />
AIPAC's offices. At the time, CBS desciibed Franklin, as an "Israeli<br />
spy."<br />
Asked about his clien~' s outburs~ Franklin~s lawyer, Plato Cacheris,<br />
said only that it was "gratuitous."<br />
, .<br />
But Franklin's claim reinforced an argument put forward by Israelthat<br />
Oilon was not soliciting anythi!1g untoward in the eight or nine<br />
meetings he had with Franklin beginning in 2002.,<br />
"We have full confidence in our diplomats, Who are dedicated<br />
professionals and conduct themselves in accordance with established<br />
diplomatic practice," said David Siegel, an embassy spokesman. "Israel<br />
is a close ally ofthe l.lnited States, and we exchange information on a<br />
formalized ,baSis on these issues. There would be no reason for any<br />
wron~doing on the part ofour ~iplomats .." I<br />
Franklin also p~eaded guilty to removing classified docum~~ts from the<br />
~uthoriz~d area, which encompasses Maryland, Virginia and'<br />
Washington, when he brought material to his home in West Virginia.<br />
He sC?unded.another defeQsive note in explaining the circumstances: He<br />
brought the material home on June 30, 2004, .he said, to bone up for the<br />
sort oftough questions he Qften fac;e4 from Defense Secre~ Donald<br />
Rumsfeld and Ru~sfeld's then-~eputy, Paul Wolfowitz.<br />
Franklin, who has five children and an ill wife, said he is in dire<br />
circumstances, parking cars at a horse-race track, waiting tables and<br />
tending bar t~) make ends meet. Keeping part ofhis government<br />
pension for his Wife was key to Franklin's agreement to plead guiltY,<br />
Cacheris told ITA.<br />
Frankl~n ple~ded guilty to $ree different charges, one I!aving to. do<br />
with his alleged dealings with the fonner AIPAC offiCials; one having<br />
to dq with Oilon; and,one for taking classifie~ documents home..<br />
.The language ofthe plea agreement s~ggests that the government will<br />
argue f9r a soft sentence, agreeing to Franklin's preferred minimumsecurity<br />
faci~ity and allowing for, concurrent sentencing. But itconditions<br />
iis recommendatio!1s'~n Franklin being "reasonably<br />
available for debriefing and pre-trial conferences." .<br />
The prosecution aSked for sentencing to be PostpoI;led until Jan. 20, .<br />
_more th~ two wee~s' ~fter the trial against Rose~ and Weissman '<br />
- > 10/l1/2005·<br />
Page 30[4
,0<br />
i begins,'suggesting that gov~rnment leniency w~ll be proportional to<br />
Franklin's performance.<br />
Franklin is a star witness, but be's not all the g9vernment bas up its<br />
sleeve. The charges against Rosen and Weissman, apparently based on<br />
wiretapped conversations, allege that the two former AIPAC staffers<br />
shared classified information with fellow AlPAC staffers, the media<br />
and foreign government officials.<br />
Two other U.S~ go-v,emment officials who allegedly supplied Rosen and<br />
Weissman with information have not been ~~arged. They are David<br />
Satterfield, then deputy assistant secretary ofstate for Near Eastern<br />
affairs and now the No.. 2 man at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and<br />
Kenneth Pollack, a Clinton-era National Security Council staffer who<br />
is .now an analyst at tbe Brookings Institution..<br />
The problem with the wiretap evidence lies in the government's refusaI<br />
to share much ofit or even to say exactly how much it bas.. In a recent<br />
filing, the government said that even the qqantity ofthe material should<br />
remain classified..<br />
In a Sept. 19 hearing, Ellis suggested to prosecutor Kevin DiGregori<br />
that his (ailure to share the defendants' wiretapped conversations with<br />
the defense team could lead to the case being dismissed.<br />
'~I am having a hard time, Mr.. DiGregori, getting over the fact that the<br />
defendants can't hear their own statements, and whether that is so '<br />
fun
ALL INFOP.HATION CONTAINED<br />
tr\HEREIN IS mrCLASSIFIED ~<br />
\ ~DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/s~sg<br />
~ iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiL-__""'-- _<br />
From:<br />
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h ridalt 'lallban5 2005 11"33 AM<br />
"""';F=-w--:";';[F=-w..oo:d~:_ L:-e--x-:-is':":N:""""ex-:is~(~R~>'E=-m-a-:i~1 R=-e-q-ue-s-:-t~(":"::18::::2:-=2-::::6~59~1:-::3=75:::7~)]=----------1..<br />
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld<br />
b6<br />
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-----Original Message----<br />
Fr01. I<br />
To: .<br />
Sent-:--=S-at~.~O=-c-:'t-. "::'1"'='5--:::-08~:3~4:-:-=5~4~20~0=-:5=---------<br />
Subject: [Fwd: LexisNexis(R) Email Request ~1822:65913757})<br />
S~CTION: Pg-. 13<br />
LENGTH:<br />
HEAD~INE:<br />
2968 words<br />
Low Clearance<br />
BYLINE: by e~i lake<br />
HIGHLIGHT:<br />
BODY:<br />
Troub~e<br />
tor journalists.<br />
Copyright 2005 The New Republic, LLC<br />
The New Republic<br />
October 10, 2005<br />
Eli Lake is a reporter for The New York Sun.<br />
In January '2006, a court in Northern Virginia w~ll hear a case in which, for the first<br />
time, the federal government has charged two pr~vate citizens with leaking state secrets.<br />
CBS News first reported the highly classif~ed investigation that led to this prosecution<br />
on the eve of the Republican National Convention. on August 27" 2004, Lesley Stahl told<br />
her viewers, that" in a IIfull-fledged espionage invest,j.gation," the FBI would soon ";'011<br />
up" a "suspected mole" who had funneled Pentagon policy deliberations concerning I~an to<br />
Israel. At-the heart of the probe, CBS said, was one of Washington's most powerful<br />
lobbying g~oups, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (aipac).<br />
With~n th~ee days, the lobbyists involved were ,j.dentified as aipac's directo~ of ,foreign<br />
policy, Steve Rosen, andap Iran specialist named Keith Weissman; the mole was outed as<br />
Lawrence Franklin, an Iran analyst-at the Detense Pep~rtment.<br />
But weeks and then months passed, and the~e were no arrests. Franklin, after initially ~<br />
being put on leave (and taking a job parking ca~s at a nearby restaurant), returned \Q<br />
b~ief~y to his desk at the Pentagon; and, unti~ April, Rosen and Weissman were still :~~<br />
writing memos, meeting journalists and government officials, and going about their daily \~~.<br />
business at aipac. When the indictments from the federal government finally came down this<br />
summer, none ot these men were charged with spying. ~\~<br />
~nstead, all t~hree were indicted for conspiring "to communicate national defense . /~t'<br />
informat~on ... (to] persons not entitled to receive it. II To t_he lay reader, that. may '1 '\<br />
simply sound like espionage-lite. After all, some of ~he people not entitled to receive<br />
1 0SQ,\))~- g.g.G~\5-~c...<br />
\<br />
~ the national defense informJ::ln in this case were ISraeli d~rnats. But, in fact, a<br />
Q prosecution of this kind is unprecedented~<br />
Far from alleging the two aipac o!ficials were foreign agents, u.s. Attorney Paul McNulty<br />
is contending that the lobbyists are legally no different than the government officials<br />
they lobbied, holding Rosen and Weissman to the same rules ~or protecting $ecrets as<br />
Franklin or any other bureaucrat with a security clearance. The indictment even says that,<br />
because Rosen long ago held a security clearance wben he worked as an analyst for the rand<br />
Corporation, he was duty-bound to protect any classified information be came across after<br />
the clearance expired--on JUly 6, 1982. "steve Rosen and Keith Weissman repeatedly sought<br />
and received sensitive information, both classified and unclassified, and then passed i~<br />
on to others in order to advance their policy agenda and professional standing," the u.s.<br />
attorney said at a press conference announcing th~ indictment.<br />
aut, if itls illegal for Rosen and Weissman to seek and receive "classified<br />
,informat.ion, It t.hen many invE}stigative journalists a~e also .crimi.nals--not. to mention<br />
~ormer government. officials who w~ite for scholarly journals or t.he scor;es of men and<br />
women who petition the federal government on defense' and foreign policy. In fact, the<br />
leaking o~ classified information is routipe in Washington, where such data is traded as a<br />
kind of currency. And, while most administrations have tried to crack down on leaks; they<br />
have almost always shied away from going after those who rece~ve tbem--until now. At a<br />
time when a growing amount o~ information is being classified, the pr;osecution of Rosen<br />
and Weissman-threatens to have a cbilling effect-~not on the ability of fore~gn agents to<br />
~n~luence U.S. policy, but on the ability of the American public to understand it.<br />
Since tbe inception of tbe national security state, tbe ~ntelligence commun~ty has<br />
worried that ou~ free press is a security risk. In an ~nterview in<br />
1954 with U.S. News and World Report, under the headline "we tell the russians too much,"<br />
CIA Director Allen Dulles remarked, fIr would give a good deal if I could know as much<br />
about the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union can lear;n about us merely by reading the<br />
p~ess."<br />
Nonetheless, the federal governmen~ has tradit~onally resp~cted an implicit First<br />
Amendment right of publishers and private citizens to determine the public's right to<br />
know about national security~ Without journalists' ability to disclose secret information,<br />
the executive branch would be the sole' arbiter of what information the public could have<br />
about its government's foreign policy. .<br />
And, when the public. j.,s kept. ,in the aa~k, it! s hard to combat excesses. For example, it.' s<br />
unlikely tbat the Pentagon would have taken steps to correct abuses in its detention<br />
facilities had "60 Minutes II" not obtained photographs of naked prisoners stacked in a<br />
pyramid at Abu Ghraib. Had u.s. law been similar to the British Official Secrets Act,<br />
which gives 10 Downing Street the autbority to prosecute journalists fo~ disclosing<br />
classified materia~, itls unlikely the pUblic. would know about the network of contractors<br />
responsible .for t,be rendition of terrorists to nations t.bat.. tor~ure prisoners or the<br />
internal debates within the Bush administration ~egarding the application of the Geneva<br />
Convention. To be sure, the~e are cases in which the press could do great harm to national<br />
security, sucn as publishing the details of how we keep $u~ve~llance on our enemies. But,<br />
as any reporter who cove~s these matters will tell you, most of the timejou~nalists<br />
negotiate an agreement.--without. the threat of prosecu~ion--on how to report. $ensitive<br />
material in a way that minimizes harm to intelligence-gathering and military operations.<br />
"We've al~ held back information when a responsible government official makes a compelling<br />
case that it.'.s 90in9 to cause some damage," says Newsweek reporte~ Michael Isikoff.'<br />
And, wbile every administration has ~ade internal efforts to go afte~ leakers, criminal<br />
prosecutions have been extremely rare~ In the two major anti-leaking cases invo~ving<br />
classified secrets brought in the last 35 years, both leaker~ were prosecuted for slipping<br />
government proper;ty to reporters. In the case of Daniel Ellsberg, it was a classified<br />
history of the deliberations of three adm~nistrations regarding Vietnam known as the<br />
Pentagon Papers; jn the case of Samuel Mo~ison (the only succes$ful ant~-~eaking<br />
prosecution)" it was classified aerial photograph$ of a Soviet. naval aircraft carrier,<br />
which he provided to Jane's Defence Weekly. No one has ever been prosecuted--as Rosen and<br />
Weissman currently are--tor conveying national security info~mation orally, with no<br />
documents involved. -<br />
Steve Pomerantz, the former chief of counterterrortsm fo~ the FBI, says that his<br />
division--which, in the early I~OS, also investigated classified disclosure cases--never<br />
got very !ar in their inve$tigations. "I! you look at this as a conspiracy, then there are<br />
two part.ies:, t.he le~ker and the reporter," he says.<br />
2
'.<br />
I "As a matter of practice, wJC:lver wen~ near the reporters'''
And, al;guably, the ,abilit;y of the press to ,seek out. and publish classified information<br />
is more important. now than ever before. Last. year, t.he National Archives Information<br />
Security Oversight Office, which tracks the prolifera~ion of classified information, said<br />
that government'agen~ies reported lS,64~,237 decisions to classify material, a 10 percen~<br />
increase from the yea~ before. I~'s hard to believe that ~he Justice Departmen~ or the FBI<br />
can or should protect that many secrets.<br />
There are .those who argue tha; t~e war o~ terroris~ pecessitates more secrecy than past<br />
4
~ conflicts. Representative pe>>oekstra, the chai~an of the C:>se Select Committee on<br />
~ Intelligence, says he is so concerned about recent leaks that he plans to hold hearings,<br />
beginning thls month, on whethe~ ~~IS necessary to revise the espionage statute to give<br />
the Justice Department mo~e authority to prosecute leakers. 'But Hoek$tra also ~ants' to<br />
revise t_he way information is classified to curb what. he calls "excessive<br />
overclassification."<br />
Until that happens, leaks arguably serve a vital functio~ jn U.s.<br />
democracy--helping to ensure that the pUblic can make informed decisions about national<br />
security policy. A~ Max Frankel, the former executive editor of The New York Times, put it<br />
.in 1971, during the Ni.xon administration I s case against_ t.be paper for p;inting the<br />
·Pentagon Papers, II [Pl ractically everythi_ng t_hat our Government. does, plans, thinks, hears<br />
and contemplates jn the realms o{ foreign policy is $tamped and treated as secret--and<br />
then unraveled by that same Government,· by the Cong;ess and by the' press in ope continuing<br />
round of professional and social contacts and cooperative and competitive exchanges of<br />
information." The question--to be decided by a Virginia jury next year--is whether that<br />
unravel~ng will ~ontinue any longer.<br />
LOAD-DATE: September 29" 2005<br />
5
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To:<br />
Subject:<br />
Attachments: 0155.pdf<br />
Media Advisory - U.S. v. Franklin<br />
January 20, 2006<br />
Media Advisory<br />
United States v. Franklin<br />
b6<br />
b7C<br />
A $10,000 fine imposed this morning on Lawrence Franklin at his sentencing hearing has been vacated because<br />
he had previously agreed to forfeit his government pension, according to an order Issued this afternoon by U.S.<br />
District JUdge T.S. Ellis,-III, in Alexandria, Virginia. A copy of the order is ~ttached.<br />
'<br />
The other aspects of the sentence imposed this morning by Judge Ellis on'Mr. Franklin - 151 months in prison<br />
an~ three years of supervised release - remain in effect. He will begin serving the sentence on a date to be<br />
determined, after he coope.rates with prosecutors. He remains free on an unsecured bond of$109,000.<br />
Mr. Franklin, a former employee of the U.S. Department of Defense, was sentenced in U.S. District Court for the<br />
Eastern District of Virginia after pleading gUilty on October 5 to three charges: conspiracy to communicate<br />
national defense information, conspiracy to communicate classified information to an agent of a foreign<br />
government, and'unlawful retention of national defense information.<br />
If you have questions about this media advlso<br />
officer, a<br />
lease contact<br />
the court's public information<br />
- -<br />
1/20/2006
...<br />
n<br />
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From:<br />
b7C<br />
~:~t:IFrida v ,'annaN 20 2006 2·57 pM<br />
Subject: JPost<br />
Mjtiia'2% Wi ONLINE EDITION<br />
JERUSALEM POST<br />
Israel: Franklin's trial won't aUeet us<br />
Nathan Guttman, THE JERUSALEM POST Oct. 8,2005<br />
Israel alleged that it would not-be affected by Lawrence Franklin's plea bargain or by the fact that the names ofIsraeli<br />
diplomats were mentioned in court. Israeli diplomatic sources said Thursday that Naor Gilon, the form~r political<br />
officer at the Israeli embassy in Washington, who was in contact with convicted Pentagon analyst Franklin, had no idea<br />
that the information he got from Franklin was classified.<br />
"We are not r~sponsible for what is said to us by Atperican officials", said the diplomatic source, "even ifan American<br />
official did something he was not authorized to do, we had no way ofknowing that."<br />
Mark Regev, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, saidin response to the incident that "the Israel embassy staffin<br />
Washington conduct themselves in a completely professional manner in accordance with all international conventions,<br />
and no one serious has made any allegations to the contrary."<br />
Naor Giton met between eight and twelve times with Larry Franklin and discussed with him issues regarding Iran's ~<br />
nuclear program and the internal political situation in Iran. Israeli sources described these meetings asroutine and ~<br />
common practice for any diplomat.<br />
Franklin himself, in a court hearing Wednesday in which he pleaded guilty to three counts ofcommunicatitlg classified<br />
information and holding documents at his home, said he "knew in his heart" that the Israelis already possessed all the<br />
information he was giving Gilon. Franklin added that he received more information from the Israeli diplomat than he<br />
had given him.<br />
In a short formal reaction to the Franklin plea bargain, David Siegel, spokesman for the Israeli embassy, said, "we have<br />
full confidence in our diplomats who are dedicated professionals who conduct themselves in full accordance with<br />
established diplomatic practices".<br />
Israel and the US have not reached yet an understanding concerning the method in which Gilon and two other Israeli<br />
diplomats from the embassy will be interviewed by investigators probing the case.. Israeli suggested th~t the US relay<br />
its questions to the Israelis and -will get in return written answers, but there was yet to be an American response to th~· slg<br />
~ ~\/~<br />
. v:::~rr<br />
~\Ur-~~\CS-AJ C-<br />
1126/2006 ~lI\r.- {§0 J-
t'<br />
'Page~,6f2<br />
\ ~<br />
,,- 'Whi1~ Israel was mentioneg:only:in.passing and ~ourt 90qumen~~~io.n·sJt~w~d ~t.:w~s~not accus~d 9J~any wrongdoing!, .<br />
the t*osecutors focused on"two former officia~s at the pro-Israel·lobby. The_ trials qfSteve Rosen, Jormer~AIPAC :~<br />
dire,ctor 9fpqIicy, and'Keit~ Weiss~an, fonnerJran analyst at the lobby, were slated,to be~in on January 3rd.<br />
J.\bbe Lowel}, the attom~:y' r~presenting Rosen in the ~as,e, said·Wednes~ay that he was ~ot suipri~~d by the fact that<br />
Franklin, who was under great,pressure struck a deal with the prosecutiop. lilt ~as no it).1pa~t on our case because, a<br />
gov~rnfuent ~mployee's. ~ctions in dealing ,with classiqe4 information are simply not the same as ~ privat
·'<br />
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---;:::=======:;---------------------__~b6<br />
Sent: Wednesday. January 25, 2006 10:30 AM<br />
To: 1... ........<br />
Subject: JTA article<br />
--- _<br />
FOCUS ON ISSUES<br />
Sentence in F'ranklin case sends<br />
chill through free-speech community<br />
By Ron Kampeas<br />
WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 (JTA) -Itwas surprising enough that the judge<br />
quadrupled the prosecution's recommended sentence for Lawrence Franklin"<br />
from three years to more than 12.<br />
But the true bombshell at the sentencing of the former Pentagon analyst, who<br />
is at the center of the case involving pro-Israel lobbyists and classified<br />
iriforll}ation,~~awyers were shutting their briefcases last Friday.<br />
That't\!Q~.. y:~..:'.QJ~triqr~ji~ge;l~.;I;IIiS;IIJ:toldJt)~<br />
...cQ.urjr.o~mJn.Alexandria,<br />
Va., th~ h!t ~.eJi~~~cl~ilialJs·ar~~j4st·~s:UapJe_Cl~g9Y~(mlJ~ntemp.loyees._7<br />
~der laws goY~ro.ing Jh~..~ssemi!Wlg!l~9f.9J~~i.(LE!.d.J.rl£r!rl..sYg!)~ ...._<br />
(:!'..!l~.§n.s wli~Jl~~~,~'l.~~QJ~9~!~~!i~~.d,~mo~~~J!l!!·i[lto unau~~~~~7<br />
!'pbsse~~19Q ~(.q~~~!~~~ inf~r:":l~t,on, ~~st ~P.!9!..2~ the (awl Ellis.said.LT!i~9·<br />
applies to acaCtemics, lawyers·"journ..alists, professors:w~atever~i<br />
irwas difficult to assess wneth....er-Ellis'Was·thinking·out"loud·or was<br />
pronouncing tiis judicial philosophy. The jUdge·earned a reputation as a<br />
voluble off-the-cuff philosopher when he adjudicated the case of John ~Walker<br />
Lindh, the "AmericanTaliban."<br />
But if those are Ellis' jury instructions in April. when two former staffers of the<br />
American Israel Public Affairs Committee go on trial, the implications could<br />
have major consequenc.es - not just for Stev~ Rosen and Keith Weissman,<br />
but for how American~ consider national security questions.<br />
Defense lawyers for Rosen and Weissman have joined a free speech<br />
watchdog in casting the case as a major First Amendment battle.,<br />
liThe implications of this prosecution to news gatherers and others who work<br />
in First Am~ndment cas~s cannot be overstated," lawyers for the former<br />
AIPAC staffers wrote in a brief earlier this month supporting an application<br />
. _from ~h~ R~port~rs Committe.e for the Freedom of tJle Press to file an amicus<br />
1/26/2006<br />
I'<br />
"
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bri~f.<br />
The case is believed to be the first in U.S. history to apply a World War I-era<br />
statute that criminalizes the dissemination of classified information by U.S~<br />
civilians.<br />
Franklin pleaded guilty to a similar statute barring government employees<br />
from leaking classified information.·That statute rarely has been prosecuted;<br />
before Franklin, the last successful prosecution experts can recall was in the<br />
1980s.,<br />
JTA has learned that the defense team for Rosen and Weissman last week<br />
filed a brief by Viet Dinh, the former assistant attorney general who was the<br />
principal drafter of the USA Patriot Act, arguing that federal prosecutors in<br />
this case were int~rpreting classified information protections much too<br />
broadly.<br />
Dinh confirmed to JTA in a brief phone conversation that he had signed the<br />
brief, which is classified.,<br />
Franklin, a mid-level Iran analyst at the Pentagon, admitted to leaking<br />
information to Rosen and Weissman in 2003 because he wanted his<br />
concerns about the Iranian threat to reach the White House.<br />
His Pentagon colleagues were focused on Iraq, and Franklin believed AIPAC<br />
could get his theories a hearing at the White House's National Security<br />
Council. He also leaked information.to Naor Gilon, the former chief political<br />
officer at the Israeli Embassy.<br />
By the summer of 2004, government agents co-opted Franklin into setting up<br />
Rosen and Weissman. He allegedly leaked classified information to<br />
Weissman about purported Iranian pl~ns to kill Israeli and American agents<br />
in northern Iraq.<br />
Weissman and Rosen allegedly relayed that information to AIPAC<br />
colleagues, the media and Gilon. AIPAC fired the two men in March 2005.<br />
In sentencing Franklin, Ellis described the former Pentagon analyst's motives<br />
as "laudable," but said his motives were beside the point.<br />
"It doesn't matter that you think you were really helping," Ellis said. "That<br />
arrogates to yourself the decision whether to adhere to a statute passed by<br />
Congress, and we can't have that in this country."<br />
Those views could be bad news for Rosen and Weissman, who hoped to rest<br />
part of their defense on an altruistic desire to save lives.<br />
More to the point, it suggests Ellis believes government statutes are<br />
sacrosanct, however little they have been used. That's what cOl1cerns freespeech<br />
advocates.<br />
"These provisions of the Espionage Act are widely recognized in the legal<br />
literature as incoherent," said Steven Aftergood, who heads the government<br />
secrecy project for the Federation of American Scientists, a nuclear<br />
watchdog that relies heavily on leaks for its information.<br />
'We do not arrest and charge every reporter who comes into possession of<br />
classified information. We do not arrest people who receive leaks of<br />
classified information, we never have," he said. "For the judge to suggest<br />
otherwise is quite shocking."<br />
Lucy Dalglish, the Reporters Committee executive director, described the<br />
case as "terribly important."<br />
"If we had a situation where journalists can be punished for receiving<br />
information, hello police state," she said.<br />
At the Herzliya Conference in Israel - an annual gathering for top Western<br />
security officials that Franklin once attended - participants said the case<br />
was a central behind-the-scenes topic of discussion, and they girded<br />
themselves for the consequences of the Rosen and Weissman trial.<br />
Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents<br />
of Major American Jewish Organizations, told the Jerusalem Post that the<br />
climate in Washington was "unacceptable.~'<br />
That "two patriotic American citizens who are working for Jewish<br />
organizations who did nothing to violate American security should have to<br />
stand trial and be subject to the public scrutiny and public humiliation, frankly<br />
I find very disturbing, and a matter that we all have to look at in a much more<br />
1/26/2006
,<br />
o<br />
Page 3 of3<br />
se~us way," Hoenlein said.<br />
Franklin's sentence seemed exceptionally tough, given the prosecution's<br />
tentative agreement to recommend a three-year sentence if Franklin<br />
cooperated in the case againstRosen'an~ Weissman. •<br />
I;lIis' sentence - abiding by strict govemm~nt sentencing guidelines - was<br />
mainly a technicality, since Franklin'is not going to go to'jail until his<br />
cooperation with the prosecution is complete. Prosecutors said they would<br />
exercise their prerogative to consider freeing Ellis from applying government<br />
sentencing guidelines.<br />
In that case, Ellis is likely to apply the three-year deal proseciJtors worked out<br />
with Plato Cacheris. Franklin's lawyer.<br />
1126/2006
'ALL INFFION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN CLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-~9-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabjlsg<br />
0(\9 tngton • ost<br />
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HOME EDITION<br />
35¢<br />
NATIONAL NEWS<br />
)for Passing Government Secrets<br />
olobbyists. who<br />
and are awaiting °<br />
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to communicate classified information to<br />
an agent of a. foreign government, and un·<br />
lawful retention of national defense iu.<br />
formation.<br />
Court documents saidFranklinprovided<br />
classified data - including information<br />
about a Middle Eastern cou.ntrYs activities<br />
in Iraq and weapons tests conducted by a<br />
foreign country --- to the lobbyists and to<br />
an unnamed "foreign official·<br />
The Middle Eastern country was not<br />
named, but Franklin disclosed at his plea<br />
hearing that some of the material related<br />
to Iran. He also said in court that the foreign<br />
official was Naor GUon. who was the<br />
political officer at the Israeli Embassy be.<br />
fore beingrecalled last summer. Israeli officials<br />
have said they are cooperating in the<br />
investigation. and they denied any wrongdoing.<br />
Franklin is e~ed to testify against<br />
the two former AlPAC lobbyi~ Steven J.<br />
Rosen and Keith Weissman. at their trial.<br />
which is scheduled for April.<br />
Rosen, of Silver Spring, is charged with<br />
two counts related to unlawful disclosure<br />
of national defense information obtained<br />
from Franklin and other unidentified government<br />
officials on topics including Iran,<br />
Saudi Arabia and al Qaeda. Rosen was Al<br />
PAC's director of foreign policy issues and<br />
was instrumental in making the committee<br />
a formidable political force.<br />
Weissman. of Bethesda. faces one count<br />
of conspiracy to illegally communicate national<br />
defense infonnation.<br />
The FBI monitored a series of meetings<br />
between Franklin and the former AIPAC<br />
officials datingback to early 2003, multiple<br />
sources familiar with the investigation<br />
have said At one of those meetings, a session<br />
at the Pentagon City mallinArlington<br />
in July 2004, Franklin warned Weissman<br />
that Iranian agents were planning attacks<br />
against U.S. soldiers and Israeli agents in<br />
Iraq, sources said.<br />
THE WASHINGTON POST<br />
BY UVItf WOlf - MSOCMlIll fII($S<br />
Lawrence A. rrm1Un has said he..<br />
fretrMed wItII tile cIireetIon.,U.s. poIiCJ :<br />
and thougllt lie could Influence It.<br />
Franklin had faced a maximum sentence<br />
of 25 years in prison. Ellis said Franklill<br />
would not have to go to jan until he fiI\<br />
ished his cooperatiOD with the goverqmenta<br />
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• DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
VId. Ban on Gay Marriage<br />
rites<br />
auwho<br />
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8"- 'r.i __<br />
auilioa<br />
~1CDJe.<br />
Iava1Iebeplainerbythe<br />
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rs Mar1"<br />
deeiBioIl<br />
d:entioue<br />
mdU.S.<br />
tIa1JJau4<br />
L, a $100 Million Question<br />
vfqy End Supportfor u.s.-Funded Coca Eradication<br />
..-we're not doiDg anything the$e<br />
.,. one soldier said, ignoring the<br />
~ aJJchting on his .expoeed<br />
It a mud- forealm& -we're just waiting to hear<br />
Jmrlanda whaf. goirJ«to happen next.·<br />
.5OBoIiv- It's the $100 million question in 80<br />
~Ie "Hm.: What wiD. become of the u.s.<br />
_ coca' financed program to eradicatecoca, the<br />
'Ilt weeki plant used to make c:ocain~ now that<br />
Ide cntcle the longtime head of the coca growers'<br />
I sagaing union, Rw Morales, isabout to become<br />
!by mer the counbYa president?<br />
sthe U.S. Morales..46.who will be inaugurated<br />
Sunday, said during his campaign that<br />
he miIht withdraw Bolivia'. support<br />
for the eradication program, akeystone<br />
of the U.S.-backed anti-drug and alternative<br />
crop development campaign<br />
here. He has hinted at deaimmaHzing<br />
the tu1tivation of coca, which is legally<br />
chewed asastimulant andusedintraditional<br />
medicines, and he has criticized<br />
regional us. anti-drug programs as<br />
false pretextsfor establishingamilitaty<br />
~.<br />
But Morales has toned down his<br />
Se~ BOJ..lVlA..A 14. Col. 1<br />
DC''' KU"~lU""-......, ~.......... ------ -- - -_.<br />
foral.transit, increase highway construction Lly<br />
90 and revive stalled road projects.<br />
Th ey would help build a connected network<br />
of carpool or express toll lanes on all of Northern Vtrginia's<br />
major highways. buy railears for VirgiDia Railway<br />
Express andMetro, widen Interstates 95and 66,<br />
and fix traffic botUeneeks.<br />
-We don't need any more studies. We don't need an<br />
extended session,II Kaine told reporters Friday after-<br />
See VIRGINIA, A10. Cot 3<br />
Pentagon Analyst<br />
Given 12~ Years<br />
In Secrets Cra:se<br />
By JEBJlY MAuoN<br />
Wash.ington Post SmffWriler<br />
A former Defense DepartmeDt analyst was. sentenced<br />
to more than 12 years in prison yesterday for<br />
passing government secrets to two employees of apro<br />
Israel lobbying group and to an Ismeli government of.<br />
ficial inWashiDgton.<br />
U.s. District Judge T.S. Ellia msaid Lawrence A.<br />
Franklin did not intend to harm the United States<br />
when he gave the classified data, to the employees of<br />
the American Israe1 Public Affairs Committee, or ~<br />
PAC, oue ofWashingtoD.'smost intluentiallobbyingorganimtions.<br />
When he pleaded guilty, Franldia, an Iran<br />
specialist, said he was frustrated with the direction of<br />
U.s. policy and thought he could influence.itthrough<br />
'"back channels.II<br />
"Ibelieve, I accept, your explanationthat you didn't<br />
want to hurt the United States, that J01l are a IoyaI<br />
American: said Ellis, who added that Franklin was<br />
-concerned about certain threats tothe Umted Statesand<br />
thought he had to hand information about the<br />
threats to others to bring it to the attention ofthe National<br />
Security CoundL<br />
But Franklin. still must be punished, Ellis sai~ because<br />
he violated important laws govemfug the nondisclosure<br />
of secret information.<br />
'1t doesn't matter that you think you were really<br />
helping,- EJHe said as he sentenced Franklin to 151<br />
months -12th yeatS - in prison. -nat a:rn>gItes to<br />
See SECREI'S. A6. Col. 1<br />
INSIDE<br />
IW lOIS IIMIllII10 - TIlE YMSHINGTDIl POST<br />
De 'Rogue' Writer<br />
Osama bin Laden invited the<br />
world to read his book. For<br />
Washington's William Blum, it's<br />
.. , .• _._.j1r_. __l .._4_<br />
Cuba Call PIa, Ball<br />
'The 16-nation World<br />
Baseball Cassie gets the<br />
help itneeds to bring Fidel<br />
Castro·s team to the<br />
tournament. SPOIlS, E1<br />
tflOi8St! vs. Ha»use<br />
Six bedrooms or justone<br />
with four bunks? Two<br />
distinct views of the house<br />
of the future.<br />
Also, a bigincrease in<br />
first-time buyers puttingno<br />
mo~down.<br />
Lessons Leamed in Iraq<br />
Show Up in Army Classes<br />
Culture Shifts to<br />
Counterinsurgency<br />
By THOMAS E. fuexs<br />
Washington Post S.affWriter<br />
FORT LEAVENWORTH, !
,<br />
An.~~ l~ Years fo~ Pass=-&ment Secre~-r-_T_NIW_"'H...-IIIO'I'II_~P~ •.-<br />
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Hoenlein: Franklin sentence 'disturbing l<br />
- -<br />
----------~----------------------------------~---------~------------------------<br />
Hilary Leila Krieger, TH~ )ERUSALEM POST Jan. 23, 2006<br />
----~-------------------~-----~-----------------~~-~-~-------------~--~----~-~--<br />
American Jewish leader Malcolm Hoenlein on sunday blasted the sentence handed down<br />
two days earlier to the. Pentagon analyst who admitted passing on classified<br />
information to Israeli diplomats and pro-Israel lobbyists.<br />
Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the conference of presidents of Major American<br />
Jewish organizations, labeled the ruling "disturbing,1I a comment greeted by applause<br />
from the audience to whom he spoke about US-Israel relations at the •<br />
Interdisciplinary Centerls Herzliya conference.<br />
The former analyst, Larry' Franklin, was sentenced to 12 years and seven months in<br />
prison for three counts of conspiring to communicate national defense information<br />
unlawfully. The sentence was part of a Rlea bargain between Franklin and the<br />
prosecution in which he agreed to testify against two staffers of the pro-Israel<br />
lobby American Israel Public Affairs committee (AI PAC) , Steve Rosen and Keith<br />
weissman, whose trial begins in late April.<br />
nThe very fact that this kind of climate can exist in the capital of the united<br />
.States is unacceptable," Hoenlein said of the. sentencing as wel.l as subtle<br />
anti-Semitism heard in the corridors of power.<br />
He added, "[That] two patriotic. American citizens who are working for Jewish<br />
organizations who did nothing to violate American security, should have. to stand<br />
tr1al and be subject to the pub11c scrutiny and public humiliation, frankly I find<br />
very disturbing and a m~tter that we all have to look at in·a much more serious<br />
way."<br />
Hoenlein also cautioned Israel about its attitude toward the oiaspora.<br />
IIThere are more Jews in Tel Aviv than in New york and the majority of Jews will live®<br />
her.e," he noted. IIS0 there's no need to diminish the importance or the achievements<br />
of the oiaspora in order to emphasize the centrality an~ singular significance of<br />
Israel in all of our live~."<br />
I<br />
Hoenlein was preceded by Rabbi vechiel Eckstein, who also had some words of ~~<br />
criticism -. of oiaspora Jewry.<br />
He slammed Jewish leaders for making a "major .strategic mistakell by criticizing<br />
growing ties between evangelical christians and the State of Israel, arguing that<br />
evangelicals pose one of American Jewryls largest threats since their values are so<br />
different from tha~ of Ameri~an Jews. '<br />
"YOU don't need to accept their vision of America. But you donlt need to make them<br />
the enemy," said Eckstein, president of 'the International Fellowship of christians<br />
and Jews. lilt is the height. of irresponsibility for American Jewish leaders to<br />
jeopardize the critical support for Israel and the fight again$~ radical Islam and<br />
growing anti-Semitism that evangelicals bring to the table." Eckstein warned Israel<br />
not to take the support of evangelicals for granted.<br />
He did, however, praise Acting prime Minister Ehud olmert and former prime Minister<br />
Binyamin Netanyahu for understanding the importance of this constituency.<br />
Another speaker at the same session, American pollster Frank Luntz, also heaped ~<br />
accolades on olmert. concludin9 a lecture on how to use la.nguage effectively to get ~<br />
Israel's message across - "it 1 S not what ~ou say that matter.s in communi cation; \-,,,<br />
; t 's what people hear" - he, ,sa;d that the former Jerusal em mayor had mastered h~~\,<br />
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He played a short video clip of olmert defending Israeli policies in heavil~<br />
accented English on international TV.<br />
"This ;s absolutely perfect communication to Americans," said Luntz, who ;s a<br />
consultant to the Israeli aavocacy organization, The Israel project. He described<br />
the clip as lI.some of the. best communication of any Israeli spokesperson. Tilank God<br />
he is where he is right now.II' .<br />
page 2
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DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabJ1sg<br />
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w w w . h a are t z . com<br />
haaretz article.txt<br />
---------------~----~------------~------~----~-------~~----~--------~------~-~-~<br />
Last update ~ 10:59 23/01/2006<br />
u.s. Jewish leaders concerned by Franklin conviction<br />
By shlomo Shamir and-Amiram Barkat<br />
Two days after former pentagon analyst Larry- A. Franklin was sentenced to 12 years<br />
and seven months in jail for sharing classified information with pro-Israel<br />
lobbyists, $everal American Jewish community leaders echoed. a singl~ refrain:<br />
There's reason to worry, but no need to feel like this is a crisis.<br />
Franklin pleaded guilty ;n october to sharing the information with AIPAC lobbyists<br />
and Israeli diplomat Naor Gilon. Steve Rosen and Keith weissman, who were ~ired from<br />
AIPAC in 2004, are facing charges of disclosing confidential information to Israel,<br />
apparently abou~ Iran.<br />
Some American Jewish leaders are concerned by the influence the trial could, have on<br />
th~ relations between Jewish groups and the administration.<br />
Anti-Defamation leagu~ director Abe Foxman said the Franklin affair could<br />
potentially pose a thre~t to all Jewish lobbyists.<br />
Foxman said it is not clear what exactly is allowed in-terms of the relationships<br />
between the administration and the media and between nongovernmental.organizations<br />
and foreign governments. The lack of clarity, he said, could have a destructive<br />
influence on the activities~of all u.s. Jewish groups.<br />
Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of presidents of Major<br />
Jewish organizations, said yesterday that he found Franklin's sentence Idisturb1ng."<br />
liThe very fact that this kind of climate can exist in the capital of the u.S. is<br />
unacceptable," he said at the Herzliya Conference.<br />
'<br />
Rosen and weissman, he said, lIare two patriotic American citizens working for a<br />
Jewish organization, who did nothing to violate the American security."<br />
page 1
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED "<br />
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1\,. '~ ~ATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc ,baW/S~'3g<br />
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SUbject:<br />
FYT<br />
UNCLASSIFIED<br />
NON-RECORD<br />
I assume you worthies saw this...<br />
-Formel7 Official Backs Lobbyists In Leak C~se<br />
The Washington Post<br />
By Walter Pincus<br />
February 14,2006<br />
WASmNGTON, DC -- The former hea'd ofthe Justice Department's<br />
Office ofLegal Policy helped write a 'memorandum oflaw calling for ~<br />
dismissal ofEspionage Act charges against two pro-Israel lobbyists,<br />
arguing that, in receiving leake4 classified Information and relaying i~<br />
to others, they were doing'what reporters, thiilk~tankexperts and<br />
congressionai staffers "do ,perhaps 'hundreds oftime~ every day~"<br />
Viet D. Dinh, who'helped draft the USA Patriot,Act after the_Sept.t1, 2001, attacks, has<br />
joined with lawyers defend:ing Steven J. Rosen and ~eith Weissman, former employ~es of<br />
the American Israel Public AffairsCommitte~(AIPAC), who last year became the first<br />
non-U.S. governmentlemployees to be indicted for ,allege~ly violating provisions ofthe<br />
Espionage Act. "Never has a lobbyist, reporter, or any other non-government e~pJoyee<br />
·been charged ••• for receiving oral information tl;te government alleges to be national<br />
defen~e matf?rialas part ofthat person's normal"First Amendm~nt protected activ_ties,"<br />
the defense memorandum states.<br />
In additio.n, since no classified docum~nts are involved, the two lobbyists are being<br />
accused of receiving or~1 cla,ssified informatiQD during conversations with'government<br />
officials, one ofwhom warned Weissman that "the information he was about to rece~ve<br />
was highly~ classified tAgency stuff,t " according to the indictment. That government<br />
-official in'·this instance was-Lawrence'A.Franklin, who at the time worked in the policy<br />
offi~e at the Pentagon. He recently pleaded guilty to violations ofthe'Espionage Act and<br />
was provisi~nally sentenced to ~2 years in prison, with tJte sentence to be reviewed<br />
depending on his cooperation with the governmenti~ t~eRosen-Weissmantrial aJi~ anx.. CC}<br />
other relat~4 investigations.<br />
. J<br />
.'.
!~<br />
-~-<br />
". 0 9<br />
!. The defense memorandum was filed under seal in U.S. District Court for the Eastern<br />
'District ofVirginia on Jan.19 and, according to Rosen's attorney, Abbe D. Lowell, was<br />
unsealed last Thursday at the request ofthe defense. In the 90 years since the act was<br />
originally drafted, according to the Dinh memorandum, "there have been ·no reported<br />
prosecutions ofpersons outside government for repeating information tha~ they obtained<br />
verbally, and were thus unable to know conclusively whether or to what extent that<br />
information could be repeated." Dinh, who has returned to teaching at Georgetown<br />
University Law Center after leaving the Bush administration, said in an interview<br />
yesterday that the espionage statute is very broad and vague in its language and normally<br />
requires "bad faith" on the part ofthose in violation.<br />
The memorandum quotes Patrick J. Fitzgerald, special counsel in the CIA leak case, who<br />
said in a news conference that the espionage law is "a difficult statute to interpret" and<br />
"a statute you ought to carefully apply." "Prosecuting the leakee for an oral presentation<br />
••• presents a novel case because the listener has no evident indicia for knowing what<br />
relates to national defense," Dinh said. He noted that he could find only one case in which<br />
the disclosed information may have been made only orally. In that case, an Army<br />
intelligence officer leaked defense inforptation and only he was charged. He was<br />
acquitted, "indicating that the government should have thought twice before now trying<br />
to stretch the statute even further."<br />
The memorandum notes that the statute contemplates the passing ofphysical evidence,<br />
such as documents with classifi.cation stamped not just on each page but also alongside<br />
each paragraph. One section ofthe law says that a person who has improperly received a<br />
classified leak commits a crime if"he willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to<br />
the officer or employee entitled to receive it." The memorandum says that the provision<br />
cannot cover orally received information since recipients tt 'retain' it in memory and it is<br />
physically impossible to 'deliver' it back to the United States."<br />
Another reason for dismissing the case, according to the memorandum, is that "ifthe<br />
instant indictment and theory ofprosecution are allowed to stand, lobbyists who seek<br />
information prior to its official publication date and reporters publishing what they learn<br />
can be charged with violating section 793" ofthe espionage statute. The memorandum<br />
also points out that"on many occasions, the media boldly state that they have classified<br />
material," which they publish after soliciting and receiving leaks.<br />
Lowell said that his client and Weissman "have been indicted as felons for doing far lessthan<br />
for what reporters have been awarded Pulitzer Prizes." In the memorandum,<br />
reference is made to Washington Post reporter Dana Priest's articles on CIA secret<br />
prisons for alleged terrorists, for which a leak investigation is underway. FBI agents are<br />
also investigating the leak to the New York Times about the National Security Agen~y's<br />
domestic surveillance program. .<br />
I,<br />
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. 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabJ1sg~<br />
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From:<br />
Sent:<br />
To:<br />
SubjeCt:<br />
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---~~-~----~~-------~~~-~~<br />
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld<br />
b6<br />
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-----Original Message-----<br />
Sent: Wed Feb 15 18:45:50 2006<br />
Subject: NY Sun article -t<br />
lintervie~ed<br />
C}hat_' s 1l...__lemail?<br />
Big Impact Seen In Israel Spy Case<br />
BY JOSH GERSTEIN - Staff Reporter of the Sun February 13" 2006<br />
URL: http://www.nysun.comlarticle/27429 ~<br />
Lawyers for two former pro~Israel lobbyists under indictmen~ for leaking classified ~<br />
information have denounced the prosecution as an assault on the First Amendmen~ and warned~~~<br />
that a vas~ array of policy advocates and journalists could ,be in jeopardy if the case<br />
goes forward.<br />
The two lobbyists, Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, were fired from their jobs at the<br />
American Israel Publi~ Affairs Committee last year as the probe unfolded. A former<br />
Pentagon. official charged wich providing classified information to the pair, Lawrence<br />
~ranklin, is cooperating .:with prosecutors after pleading guilty. He was sentenced last<br />
month to more than 12 years in prison.<br />
In a brief filed in January and released last week, the lawyers for Messrs. Rosen and<br />
Weissman argue that the statute barring unauthorized' release of classified material has<br />
never been applied to private citizens.<br />
"The breathtaking application of that law to this set of facts breaks new legal ground,"<br />
the defense team wrote. "There has never been a successful prosecution of an alleged leak<br />
by persons outside government persons with no contractual or legal obligation to preserve<br />
classified information."<br />
Messrs. Rosen and Weissman are scheduled to go on trial in federal court in Alexandria,<br />
Va., on April 25. The indictment charges tha~ they received classified information from<br />
Franklin and other officials, and passed that data on to members o~ the press and agents<br />
of a foreign government. ~/<br />
Prosecutors have not offered a public description of 'the information that was alleg~dly ~{~<br />
relayed, nor have they disclosed which reporters or foreign agents were al~egedly<br />
involved. ~owever, Franklin was the Iran desk officer at the Defense Department and some ~ I'<br />
~{ the d~t~ he has a~tted to passing on ~ppear to h~ve pertained to Iranian influence in<br />
1<br />
Allt~'<br />
-. _05lt,~~~3\5- ,u c"<br />
~cB~ -Le'-l-v
t'<br />
'n ~.<br />
I~aq. The foreign diplomats~o received classified information in the alleged scheme<br />
~<br />
Ii a~;>pear to have been Israelis.<br />
In court papers asking that the charges be dismissed, the defense lawyers argue that the<br />
prosecution is attempting to criminalize the traditional give and take of information<br />
b-etween lobbyists, journalists, and government, officials. "This is what. members ot the<br />
media, members of the Washington policy community, lobbyists ~nd members of congressional<br />
staffs do perhaps hundreds of times every day, II the lawyers wrote. liThe exchange of<br />
informa~ion between members of, the government and non-governmental organizations is<br />
p,recisely what policy lobbying (as well as everyday news reporting) is all about. II<br />
The prosecution's response to the motion·was filed late last. month, but. has not yet been<br />
made public. In an unusual arrangement, mos~ papers filed in the case remain secret for a<br />
time while they are reviewed for classified information.<br />
In an interview yesterday, Mr. Weissman's attorney, John Nassikas III, said the<br />
p,rosecution should be of concern to all those who play a role in Washington policy<br />
debates. IIHopefully, there will be some resonance out, in the community over this," the<br />
l,awyer said. "We think that the government prosecution is off-base and we're challenging<br />
in every way, legally and factual·ly. II<br />
H,owever, Mr. Nassikas acknowledged that the defense may face an uphill battle in trying to<br />
c,onvince Judge Thomas Ellis III, who is presiding over the case, that the prosecution<br />
would jnhibit the free exchange of ideas and information vital to American democracy. At<br />
Frank~in's sentencing last month, the jUdge expressed no qualms abou~ punishing<br />
j,ournali:5ts or others who wind up with classified information and pass it. on. IIPersons who<br />
~ave ,unauthorized possession, who come into unauthorized possession of classified<br />
information, must abide by the law," Judge Ellis said in remarks first reported by the<br />
~ewish Telegraphi~Agency. ,iThat applies to academics, lawyers, journalists, professors,<br />
whatever. II<br />
. .<br />
The brief filed on behalf of Messrs. Rosen and Weissman was co-authored by a conservative<br />
Georgetown University law professor and for:mer Justice Department official, Viet Dinh. 'Mr.<br />
Dinh's opposition t~ th~ department's stance in this case is notable because he has #<br />
generally supported aggressive prosecution tactics and was an architect of the 2001 law<br />
that broadened the government's anti-terrorism powers, the USA-PATRIOT Act.<br />
"He's obviously an ~xpert on constitutional law issues, and there have been a-lot of<br />
constitutional law flaws in the government's application of this statute," Mr. Nassikas<br />
said. He said Mr. Dinh was enlisted by Mr. Rose~'s attorney, Abbe Lowell. Messrs. Lowell<br />
and Dinh did not ~eturn calls yesterday seeking comment for this story.<br />
The case has drawn criticism from some Jewish activists as well as a journalists' group,<br />
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the"Press, which has sought to file an amicus brief<br />
on behalf of the two eX-lobbyists.<br />
Legal analysts often distinguish the American .lega~ system's approach toward breaches.of<br />
classified information fro~ t~e tack taken in Britain, where the country's Official<br />
Secrets Act can be used to prosecute and silence journalists and ordinary citizens who<br />
come into possession of sensitive infor:mation. In America, the~e have 'been repeated, but<br />
unsuccessful, efforts to pass a similar statute that would crimdnalize all leaks of<br />
classified information regardless of the harm caused or the intent or identity of the<br />
leaker.<br />
In 2000, President Clinton vetoed ~egislation that would have made the release ot any<br />
classified information a crime.<br />
lilt would be fundamentally unfair for the Justice Department to usurp the province of<br />
Co~gress and create some type of Official Secrets Act through the prosecution of a test<br />
case," the defense team argued in their brief.<br />
The brief also quotes a prominent federal prosecutor, Patrick Fitzgerald, about the perils<br />
of bringing criminal charges in connection with leaks' o~ classified information. "You<br />
sho~ld be ver.y careful in applying that law because there are a lot. ·of interests that<br />
c,ould '.be imp~i.cated," Mr. Fitzgerald said at a press conference last. year discussing his<br />
2.
~ decision not to charge a WhO House aide, I. Lewis Libby, wO"leakiDg a<br />
J identity. Mr. Libby, who has pleaded not guilty, was charged with perjury<br />
of justice in the ,probe.<br />
CIA officer's<br />
and obstruc~ion<br />
Details of the defense filing were first reported by an online newsletter, Secrecy News,<br />
which is published by the Federation of American Scientists.<br />
Mr. Nassikas declined to say yesterday whether he plans to call journalists as witnesses,<br />
an effort which could prompt further legal confrontations. "Neither side has indicated<br />
what witnesses will be called a~ this point. It's clear there are reporters involved in<br />
the facts of the case," the attorney said.<br />
In recent months, Messrs. Rosen and Weissman have been at odds with their fo~er employer,<br />
Aip~c, over payment of legal fees in the case. "That is not resolved," Mr. Nassikas said.<br />
He said Mr. Weissman plans to launch a legal defense fund this week to cover costs that<br />
Aipac has, declined to pick up.<br />
Efforts to reach an Aipac. spokesman last. night were unsuccessful.<br />
3
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
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It ~ 07-29.,..2010 B·:r 60324 l.lC baw/sabll..<br />
!ll<br />
From:<br />
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Subject:<br />
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......_~-------------<br />
I:=bQl8N15.2006 6:12 PM<br />
------~--~~-~~--~---------<br />
Sent from my BlackBerry Wirele~s,Handheld<br />
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Pre-trial strategies suggest unwanted<br />
exposure of AIPAC's lobbying practices<br />
By Ron Kampeas and Matthew E. Berger<br />
WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 (JTA) -- Federal investigators are asking questions about ties between<br />
lay leaders of the American Israei Public Affairs Commdttee and two former staffers<br />
charged in a classified-information case.<br />
The renewed investigation comes as Viet Dinh, a forme~ assistant u.s. attorney general and<br />
principal architect~f the Patriot Act, argued in a brief on behalf of Steve Rosen and<br />
Keith Weissman, the former AIPAC staffers, that the case against them lacks merit because<br />
it violates thei~ First Amendment rights.<br />
Taken together, the defense and government actions suggest the shape of the trial to start<br />
April 25: The defense will argue that culling and distributing inside government<br />
information was a routine lobbying actiVity.<br />
It also anticipates the media event AiPAC insiders have said they fear: One that picks<br />
apart, ina public forum, exact~y how ~PAC goes about its business.<br />
No one suggests that AIPAC's activities are in any way illegal, and the prosecutor in the<br />
case already has made clear that t~e organization is not suspected o~ wrongqoing. B~t<br />
AIPAC closely guards its lobbying practices, and is loath to reveal them to the genera~<br />
Washington community.<br />
In his brief, Dinh, now a law professor and attorney in private practice, argues that the<br />
First Amendment protects the practice of seeking information from executive branch<br />
officials.<br />
~This is what members of the media, members of the Washington policy community, lobbyists<br />
and members of congressional staffs do perhaps hundreds of times a day," Dinh argues,<br />
describing the acts alleged in the indictment against Rosen, the former AIPAC foreign<br />
policy director, and Weissman, a former Iran specialist.<br />
FBI agents' questions to other former AiPAC staffers inte~viewed in recent weeks suggest<br />
that the government is trying to assess whether receiving and disseminating classified<br />
information was routine at AIPAC.<br />
The form~+ staffers told ~A that .t~e FBI agents asked questions about Rosen's<br />
1 _
elationship with<br />
of Beverly Hills,<br />
influential AI~AC<br />
three pa~PAC presidents -- Robert Ashe~f Chicago, Larry Weinberg<br />
Calif., and Edward LeVy of Detroit, as well as Newton Becker, an<br />
donor from Los Angeles.<br />
The for.mer employees all spoke on condition ~f a~onymity, because the FBI has told them<br />
not to speak with the media.<br />
The office of u.s. Attorney ~aul McNulty, who is trying the case, would no~ comment.<br />
Weinberg, reac~ed Tuesday, refused to comment. Levy was on vacation and could not be<br />
reached, and Asher and Becker did not respond to messages.<br />
The new round of FBI questions is important because the indictment, based on a World War<br />
I-era espionage statute, rests not simply on receipt of the allegedly classified<br />
information but on its further dissemination.<br />
The indictment, handed down las~August, all~ges tha~.Rosen and Weissman relayed the<br />
infor.mation -- on Iran and on Al-Qaida -- to fellow AIPAC staffers, journalists and<br />
diplomats a~ the Israeli Embassy in Washington.<br />
Establishing whether Rosen also briefed board members on the allegedly classified<br />
information would bolster the defense claim that the acts described in the indictment are<br />
routine. Board members are regularly briefed, often in lengthy one-on-one phone calls, on<br />
meetings between the mos~ senior AIPAC staffers and top administration officials.<br />
Rosen routinely made such phone calls, a former staffer said.<br />
~He made sure board members knew he was responsible and he was the one doing the work,H<br />
the staffer said.<br />
~roving that such briefings are routine, however, will 'not necessarily deter the<br />
government from going ahead with th~ case: Judge T.S. Ellis, who is' hearing t~e case, has<br />
suggested that the routine nature of such exchanges doesno~ preclude prosecution.<br />
~~ersons who have unauthorized possession, who come into unauthorized possession of<br />
classified information, must abide by the law," Ellis said last month in ~entencing Larry<br />
Franklin, the for.mer ~entagon analyst who pleaded gUilty to ~eaking information to Rosen,<br />
Franklin and others. ~Tha~ applies to academics, lawyers, journalists, professors,<br />
whatever." -<br />
A defense source said the defendants ~ould no~ recall board member brtefings about the<br />
central charge in the, indictment, involving allegedly classified information on supposed<br />
Ira~ian plans to kill American and Israeli agents in northern Iraq.<br />
However, other alleged leaks in the indictment migh~ have been relayed to board members,<br />
JTA has learned. One in 2002 involved David Satterfield, then· a deputy ~ssistant secretary<br />
of state and now deputy ambassador to Iraq. Satterfield relayed information to Rosen on<br />
A!-Qaida, the indictment says.<br />
McNulty's office would not comment on whether i~ planned to bring charges against<br />
Satterfield. Satterfield did not. respon~ to previous JTArequests for comment.<br />
The defense will maintain that Satterfield would have been authorized to release the<br />
infor.mation. The administration routinely used.AIPAC as a conduit. to ~nfluence Israel on<br />
matters where there were differences between Israel and the United States, for instance on<br />
Israeli arms sales to China. In those cases, the information migh~ have been classified.<br />
The information Satterfield allegedly relayed to Rosen apparently related to Iran's ties<br />
to a wanted Lebanese terrorist.<br />
Dinh's brief was filed last month, but was made publiq only last week. JTA reported on the<br />
brief las~ month, and has been has been researching for several mont~~ interactions<br />
between Rosen, Weissman and government officials.<br />
Patrick Dorton, an AIPAC sppkesman, previou~ly ~as ~aid that Rosen and Weissman were fired<br />
. 2
~as: ~rCh because infoxmat~ arising out of the FBI inves~tion uncovered ~conduct<br />
that was not part of their job and was beneath the standa%ds of what AIPAC expects of<br />
their employees."<br />
A December 2000 AIPAC staff handbook does not say how to handle classified information. A<br />
1985 internal memo by Rosen,' recently obtained by JTA, outlines his plans to shifeAIPAC's<br />
lobbying emphasis from Congress to the executive branch. He explicitly calls for the<br />
cultivation of mid-level, non-elected officials -- a description that would include<br />
Franklin.<br />
Outlining the advantages of such lobbying, Rosen wrote; UThey work for secretive rather<br />
than open institutions and agencies. And, perhaps m9st important o~ all for effective<br />
communications, they are in many cases experts in our subject themselves, as oppose~ to<br />
the 'generalist' in Congress who might be convinced by a few general 'talking points'<br />
explained by a layman."<br />
Former staffers say Rosen's memo p~ofoundly influenced AIPAC's mission. AIPAC has never<br />
repudiated the document, though las~ yea~ the organization said i~ had changed some<br />
lobbying practices -- without specifying which ones.<br />
UAIPAC continues to discuss perfectly appropriate and legal informati~n with people on<br />
Capitol Hill and in all levels of the administration every single day," Dorton said<br />
Tuesday.
, , ---..~ .' .~ - ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED I"'a18 I or l<br />
_~.,
~j:-- '\ ' '. 'b6 '::r' .~.- -_••• ~_.~:.<br />
~ 't •. b7C '" ·0 .::,<br />
f AwItnes8 said that the kJJtenI h8d on'~ jack~. wom .<br />
;'L ..,-JheY:itepped oulof..tli8lt..v8liJde;........ ""... biilleti"trito the victims at' . nt-blank range, cheCked the bodlM do8eIy to en .'<br />
1!<br />
.U =~-: ~·;:~~Ut1_.l8IgelBd88d18yd;$~..~.<br />
• ' one1*"6ieii ~'~~. a sal for the deportation toAmerfcaofYousef. .'t":J'<br />
01 j Yesterday's mur dens wece probably d8eIgnid to"aVenge the guilty venfJd passed by an American court on Mlr Aimal KasI, a 1.~.. ~<br />
. t fOur yeat8 ago. He could face the death penalty. ~ .<br />
tfi ;. ~eaki8tan national who IciJJed two CIA employees outside the agency's headquarters In Langley. near Washington, !flOI'8~ :f:'<br />
Kasralawyers are pleading with ajury to spare his life and sentence him to life In prison without parole. The defence<br />
produced family membefw. teachers, friends and fonneremployena to show that Kasf had lived a non-violent life before the<br />
kJnlngs. The US State Department had given a warning on Tuesday that Americans could betargets after the KasI verdic.t.<br />
Mike MeCuny, President C&nton's spokesman, saki there was no Immediate direct evidence to link the KaI8Chi murders with<br />
the KasI conviction, but officials were watchfng for any connection that developed.<br />
Condemning yesterdayis Karachi attack as barbarous and outrageous. MrMcCuny said that it would not affect Mr CUnton's<br />
visit to Pakistan next year.<br />
LOAD-DATE: November 14, 1997<br />
Copyright.O 2005 LexJsNexfs. a division ofReed Elsevier Inc. AD rights reserved.<br />
Your use ofthis seNfce fa governed by TJmn~~i!&o.J... Please~ them.<br />
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- R/~/?nnfi
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
~IN IS UNCLASSIFIED ~<br />
~ 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabJl~<br />
BRIEF ON IR:AN<br />
No. 798<br />
Tuesday, December 9, 1997<br />
Representative OfOce of<br />
The National Council ofResistance ofIran<br />
Washington, DC<br />
Spying on Foreign Reporters in Tehran, Iran Zamin News Agency, December 8<br />
P<br />
~~··1>;'I!11;;;P2~J'~":' ~.~" .~.<br />
age' ,01." :~" •.,;"<br />
Dt.s~s~.~<br />
C1tle<br />
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The regime's Ministry of Intelligence is doing it utmost to prevent foreign reporters from gaining access to the<br />
realities of the Iranian society.<br />
According to reports from Iran, the regime has instructed the majority of foreign reporters to leave Tehran<br />
immediately after the summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference•.<br />
The reporters·have reportedly asked to go to Com and meet with dissident clergymen. Meanwhile, the regime has<br />
imposed more restrictions on Montazeri, form.er successor to Khomeini. MOl')tazeri's comments against Khamenei<br />
in recent weeks escalated the power struggle within the regime.<br />
Protest Gathering ofMojahedin Families in Tehran, Iran Zamin News Agency, December 8<br />
According to reports from-Iran, simultaneous with the Organization ofIslamic Conference's<br />
meeting in Tehran, large groups offamilies ofMojahedin martyrs and political prisoners gathered<br />
today in the Iranian capital's Behesht..e Zahra cemetery to protest the clerical regime's repressive<br />
policies.<br />
The families gathered despite security measures by the regime and chanted slogans against the<br />
regime's leaders, and in support ofthe National Liberation Army and the Resistance's leaders.<br />
The protesters condemned the regime's efforts to take advantage ofthe OIC summit to legitimize<br />
their atrocities in the name of.Islam.<br />
The Revolutionary Guards attacked the gathering ofMojahedin families and arrested and took<br />
a'way dozens of people, including elderly mothers, the reports say.<br />
Iran Denies. It's Involvement in Killing ofFour Americans, Agence France Presse,<br />
December 8<br />
ISLAMABAD - Iran Monday denied its nationals were involved in the killing of four US business executives in the<br />
Pakistani city of Karachi last month.<br />
\E Police in Karachi said Sunday security agencies had detained eight Iranian nationals in connection wilhthe<br />
1\ murder of the Americans •.<br />
The detainees included two people suspected of involvement in the theft of the car the assailants used in the<br />
November 12 slaying, the police said.<br />
A police official said that investigators were working on a number of theories including suspicions ofan Iranian<br />
c9nnection in, the slaying.
-<br />
Cf. · Q .. . a<br />
V~ Police were questioning the Iranians but none·of them had confessed to involvement in the crime. said Saud<br />
)t .Mirza. a senior superintendent of Karachi police.<br />
Trail Heats Up in '94.Argentina Bombing, The Los Angeles Times, December 6<br />
BUENOS AIRES--The hunt for terrorists who slaughtered 86 people in the bombing of a Jewish community center<br />
here in 1994 has picked up unexpected momentum...:<br />
Investigators believe that the attack also involved Iranian terrorists and members of Modin, a rightist political party<br />
of former military officers known for coup attempts and anti-Semitic violence.<br />
The latest and most politically prominent investigative target is congressional Deputy Emilio Morello, a former<br />
army captain and Modin member. Under questioning by the commission last week, Morello denied allegations<br />
that he met with Iranian diplomats ~nd traveled secretly to the Middle East....<br />
Meanwhile. Judge Juan Jose Galeano sought another piece of the puzzle: the suspected Iranian connection.<br />
After gathering information in France and Germany on Iranian terrorism, Galeano ftew to Los Angeles to reinterview<br />
witness Manouchehr Moatamer, an Iranian defector who lives in California.<br />
Moatamer, who fled Iran in 1994, describes himself as a former well-placed Iranian operative with powerful family<br />
connections. He says he had access to meetings where intelligence officials plotted the Buenos Aires bombing.<br />
During his testimony last week in the Argentine Consulate in Los Angeles, he provided purportedly official Iranian<br />
90cuments on the plot to back his claims...<br />
Iranian officials, who deny any role in the bombing, call Moatamer a con man. But investigators believe that he<br />
can help them. During his 1994 testimony in Venezuela, he predicted a bombing at the Israeli Embassy in London<br />
that occurred days later during a worldwide terror offensive.<br />
19th Dissident Assassinated Abroad During Khatami's Tenure, Iran Zamin News Agency,<br />
DecemberS<br />
yvednesday, December 3, terrorists dispatched by the Iranian mullahs' regime assassinated Seyyed Jamal<br />
Nikjouyan, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran~ in Kouysenjaq, Iraqi Kurdistan.<br />
..<br />
He was the 19th dissident assassinated on Iraqi territory since Khatami has taken office.<br />
r-I: Back to Brief on Iran<br />
http://www.tran-e-azad.orglenglish/boil07981209:-97.html<br />
5/1'1/2005
• ",,.:'':'1... •u" ""f.' ,<br />
Briefon' irah:'NO:~866~" .~ ,.<br />
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ALL:LION CONTAINED<br />
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DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg<br />
O . C( ,... t. \l~" M Page 1 of2<br />
- D1S~~ I Ptl:J (<br />
_ -BRIEF ON IR..w ,~~o..(L
,No. ~U()<br />
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lI!: . rorist attack last month in Karachi, a southern port city, left four Houston oil co~pany e';'ployees dead••••<br />
_~ ~ .. ...~~_ .... ~ ........_.. _..... _ ~_ ...................lIIr.4 tIl'l~" .. .: • • _ "f ~.' .. r_JIY. I<br />
Women Resist Raw Deal in Islamic Iran, Reuter, December 15<br />
TEHRAN (Reuters). Women were in the vanguard of the Iranian revolution that ousted the Shah 18 years ago,<br />
but they ha~e had a raw deal in the Islamic republic and are increasingly demanding greater rights.<br />
I,<br />
Few of the counUess thousands of women. who poured into the streets, defying the Shah's soldiers to<br />
demonstrate for change, can have imagined that the revolution would turn the clock back more than half a century<br />
for their sex.<br />
Yet that, according to feminist lawyer Mehrangiz Kar, is exactly what happened.<br />
"The family protection law enacted in the last four years of the Shah's regime, which improved many things for<br />
women, was abolished and they returned to the previous law approved 66 years earlier: she told Reuters in an<br />
interview.•..<br />
In the name of Islam, the ruling Shi'ite Muslim clergy reinstated laws that give men an absolute right to divorce<br />
their wives without having to produce any justification and, in the vast majority of cases, custody over the children.<br />
Women are entitled to keep boys only up to the age of tWo and girls until seven. After that the father has the right<br />
to custody••..<br />
"Although the mother has a very lofty place in Iranian literature and religious tradition, legally she is next to<br />
nothing," Kar said.<br />
Women are barred from serving as judges, although there were many on the bench before the revolution. They<br />
face explicit discrimination in the criminal law and an unwritten "glass ceiling" in ~mployment.<br />
A woman's evidence in court is worth only half a man's. Kar said, and for some offenses., women's evidence is not<br />
admissible at all....<br />
Blood money for a murdered woman is only half that for a man. Moreover, in an Islamic version of Catch 22, if a<br />
murdered woman's family insists on her male killer's execution, her relatives have to pay his family the full blood<br />
money in compensation,Kar said.<br />
[jiiiiii'IBack to Brief on Iran<br />
httn:llwww.iran-e-a7ad.on!/enqli~hlhoi/OR06121997.html 5/11/2605
..<br />
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.• NrnttU ~UUlUC;Lnupun ~UUU ~1J"U:i~n • '<br />
.. '-! ALL INFOIDlATION CON:rAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
~<br />
PROJECT \;b-<br />
"P~hQr,S"<br />
DATE<br />
Pakistan (1992 • first combat deaths)<br />
Update: .February 2005 .<br />
o<br />
07-29-2010 BY 60324.. uc baTN:/~~l~ag,-,,-::-._~>!!!!"~.:...... ...J~.~~<br />
ARMED CONFLICTS<br />
REPORT 2004<br />
..••.<br />
DlS~<br />
TAB<br />
A<br />
Summary:<br />
2004 Sectarian fighting con~nu6din 2004 as attacks on civilians andsecurity<br />
forces, bombing ofmosques, and drive-by shootings ofpoliticians killed<br />
between 100 and 170 people. Most casualties were civilians who died in the year<br />
Jfi two mostserious attacks, both bombings ofSunni mosques. President<br />
Musharrafwas entrenched as headofthe government andarmy untilatleast<br />
2007 bya billapprovedby Pakistan iiilowerhouse.. Pakistan was declareda tt<br />
ajorally"by US President Bush In recognition ofPakistanIicontribution to the<br />
fight against al-Qaeda.<br />
2003 Sectarian violence claimed approXimately 100 lives this year, with Shia Muslim<br />
civilians accounting for most of the casualties. President Musharraf continued a<br />
crackdown on militant groups, to which may be linked an attempt on his life in<br />
December.<br />
2002 Sectarian violence claimed dozens oflives this year with Islamic militants<br />
stepping up attacks against Pakistani Christians and foreigners.<br />
2001 Sectarian violence continued in 2001 with targeted killings ofprominent<br />
members ofthe community. In August. the Sindh provincial government initiated a<br />
crackdown on Islamic mifitants. According to one Pakistani media source, more than<br />
50 people were killed In the violence dUring the year.<br />
2000 Although violence has declined since the military coup ofOctober 1999, sectarian<br />
tensions persisted between the majority Sunni and the minority Shimte Muslim groups<br />
in Karachi. The killing ofprominent religious leaders and political activists resulted in<br />
violent protests. At least 25 people were killed in the violence.<br />
1999 Despite the central government. imposition of Govemorfi Rule in late 1998 in<br />
response to Sindh violence, political and sectarian killings persisted in Karachi, albeit<br />
at a much reduced level. At least 75 were killed during the year, down from the<br />
estimated 1,000 conflict deaths in 1998.<br />
1998 In 1998 reprisal killings between militants ofthe Muttahida Qami Movement<br />
(MOM) and a break-away faction increased violence in the city ofKarachi.<br />
Type ofConflict:<br />
State fonnationJ Failed state.<br />
Parties to the Conflict:
Nm.,u \Junruct neport ~uuu -<br />
o<br />
....aKlstan<br />
1) Government<br />
o<br />
t'age ~ or~·<br />
b6<br />
b7C<br />
b7E<br />
As of October 1999, led by Chief Executive General Pervez Musharaf foll~wing the overthrow of the<br />
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 8 military coup. Under the previous Prime Minister<br />
Benazir Bhutto. the government engaged the Pakistani ponce Force, Paramilitary~angers· and<br />
troops from the Frontier Corps (Constabulary) in the conflict<br />
2) Armed groups:<br />
Several parties opposed to the government (and each other) are involved in the violence. These are<br />
seen to be primarily ethnic or religious groups.<br />
(a) Jeay Sindh (Qadir Magsi Group) representing Sindh nationalists;<br />
(b) Mohajir-Qaumi-Movement (M-Q-M) led by Altaf Hussain On exile in London since<br />
1992) representing Mohajirs(migrants) who moved to Pakistan in 1947 when India<br />
was partitioned. NamE!changed to Muttahida Qaml Movement in 1998:<br />
(e) M-Q-M (Haqiqi), a breakaway faction led by Afaq Ahmed; 1<br />
r--------.., MUlat-i! israiJ\tYe PaklStaii (MIP), previously known as S1p8h.&baha-Pakistan, Wh~" ,••~ fP'<br />
represents Sunni Moslems with support from fundamentalist groups In saudi Arabia ~"'~:I, ~-f ~:~ ...<br />
and Libya;<br />
Islaml Tahrik-e Pakistan (ITP), previously known as Tehrik-l..Jaffaria-Pakistan, which<br />
rePresents.ShiJite Moslems with sOme finanCial support fiom Ira" .Led by<br />
Mohammad Baqar Najfi;<br />
-,<br />
(d) Lashkar-e-Jhangvl, suspected of having links with Osama Bin Laden. al-Qaeda.<br />
In aac ltion, criminal elements, some working through the above groups, also contribute to the<br />
Violence, a legacy ofPakistan. involvement in the war in Afghanistan and the related drug trade.<br />
In January 2002, President Musharraf banned five ,Islamic militant groups inclUding, Sipah-8abaha<br />
Pakistan and Tehrik-I-Jaffaria. This ban was extended 'in 2003 following the renaming of.several of<br />
the groups.<br />
• ban Imposed on three Islamic organizations by the Pakistani government over the weekend. In a move 1hat saw dozens ofIslamic<br />
activists rounded uP aerosa the country, was the continuation ofa ban imposed last year, acconfll1g to a senior government otIidaI.<br />
WIlls Is a conUnuatJon ofthe old ban on groups that had become active under new names,- Infonnation Minister Sheikh Rashid<br />
Ahmad told IRIN....<br />
'<br />
Among the ouUawed groups were the Sunnl organisation. SIpa~e Pakistan. which laterre-emerged as MIJIat.e JsIamI.ye<br />
Pakistan (MIP): and its rival. the ShHih group, Yahrik-e Jaliari-ye PakIstan. which. thereafter. renamed itself IsIami TaMk-e<br />
Paldstan (ITP). Both the new organisations have been banned••••(IRlN, November 17. 2oo3J<br />
Status ofFighting:<br />
2004 Anned violence continued in the form of attacks on civilians, bombing of<br />
mosques, drive-by shootings of politicians and attacks on security forces. The<br />
most serious Incidents of the year were March and October bombings of Sunnl<br />
mosques that killed over 80 people and wounded hundreds more.<br />
Itxtremilt strikes and sectarian attacks across the countJy toQeUMH'wtth minHnsurgendes In two ofPakistan 's four provinces have<br />
increased public insecurity and criticism ofPresident Pervez Mushal1'8f.-(SBeNews. July 1. 2004]<br />
.oIlceIn the Pakistani city ofKarachi have fir9d tear gasatthousands ofangry moumeISafter an attack onaShIa mosque killed at<br />
least 20. Ttouble en.tpted after funeml prayers for 1.01 those killed In Monday's attack. which officials beUeve was a sectarian suicide<br />
•
I"\IIII"U VUIIIIICL nOIJUrL ~UW - t'aKititan<br />
. Q o<br />
tJage ~ or tI<br />
bombing. The funerals i)Iowovernight unrest In whJeh three people died In duheIwiIh the police.·span atytea"mso-bIcI-tlnt-weight<br />
- bold: font.famlJy: Mar> [BBC News, June 1, 2OCM)<br />
ltaklatanl police say a bomb hawounded 13 police and soIdleta In the IOUth-westem city ofQuetta •Those Injured were tnMIIIInQ<br />
In a truck when the bfast occurred. Police haveyet to identify the attackets. One report said a bomb on a bIcyde had been detonated<br />
by remote control: another said a grenadewas thrown from a motoreyde. Quetta has been a target for lllamic mltltants -In March<br />
over 40 people died In an attack on Shla MuaUms. -[BBC News. May 24. 2(04) _ •<br />
• car bomb that exploded on Thursdayoutalde a bible society. ofIIce In the southern port city of I Pakistan President PeMIZ Musharrafnanowty escaped an assassInatSon atIernpt when a bomb<br />
exploded Just afterhis motoR:ade had passed by••• 0fIIdaIs saJcllt was too eady to saywho was behind the 8Uack. but the most IiIc8Iy<br />
suspects 818 radical haIdInets opposed to MUlllanaffi policy on Afghanistan •his crackdown on extremism and his etbtsto rebm<br />
islamic schools. Tbe AssocIated Press reported.-[CNN.com. December 14, 20031<br />
.rycrowds rampaged through Pakistan. capital on Tuesday. a day after a prominent Sunni Seaderwas shot dead near<br />
Islamabad••• Maufana Azam Tartq. the leader of the Mifat..lslamiya.... was gunned down by unknown US8IIantI on Monday...-(IRJN,<br />
Oc;tober1, 2003) -<br />
rilazara ~Jda community leaders have called 101' Increased security, despite lie nttumlng to nanna' foUowfng a Sumlmilitant attacfc<br />
on a mosque In the southwestern Pakistani city ofQuettaon" July. The Lashkat+Jhangvl organisation claimed responsibiUty for the<br />
attack In which 60 people died... -<br />
Thousands ofSunnl and Shla Muslims have been IdIIed In Pakistan over1he past two decades In sectarian violence... [which has<br />
been) mostly limited to the eastern Punjab and the southern Sfndh pnMnces. However. In re Karachi Witnessed an atIack on the US consulate In June and a auIdde bombing against French naval engineets<br />
In May. -(BBC News. september25,2002]<br />
2001 Sectarian violence persisted in 2001 with attacks by extremists from all sides.<br />
,.. '" I""",.
. .<br />
Q<br />
o<br />
Sunnl extremists changed their strategy to targeting prqminent community members<br />
such as doctors, lawyers a.nd businessmen.<br />
rca~" ,. u. ~<br />
. "/<br />
• once In PaldUan I1targest city KarachI are under Intense Pr8SSUrelo end en upsurge In sectarian murders ofdocbaand other<br />
professionals In Ihe city. Extremlsta from the majority Sunnl cOmmunity have been blamed for the IdWng of four ShIa dodorIsince<br />
Apt1I. as wed althe high profile murder ofthe head ofPakbtan Sta1e Oil. Shaukat Mirza. Fanab from both sides have canted out<br />
many deadly attacb In Katachl over the years. but the new tactic Is to target promfnent penonaIldea In the community.-(SSC.<br />
september 3.2001)<br />
"<br />
2000 Although violence has declined since the militaly coup of october 1999. sectarian<br />
ten~ions persisted between the majority Sunnl and the minority Shiate Muslim groups<br />
In Karachi. The killing ofprominent religious leaders and political activists resulted In<br />
violent protests. In September. Pakistani police arrested 250 ~mbers of the hardline<br />
Sunnl Muslim group. Sipah-e-8ahaaba. Other police and anny operations targeted the<br />
two leading ethnically-based parties In Sindh, the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM)<br />
and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM).<br />
(Soun:es: BSC News. 13 September2000.21 September2000)<br />
.asked gunmen ambushed a school van.1dUfng five Sunnl MusIfrM and wounding three others In the lateat round ofrellQfoul<br />
violence In Karachi •PakIstan • pollee said. The attack ted to violent protests. with hundreds ofSunnl Muslim students pelting poUce<br />
wfth stones, 88Ufng cara on Ire and vandallzlng bIlIboaIdl.·(R6ute~ and AS$OCiatedPress. 28 January 2001)<br />
• prominent Pakistanii'eUgioulleadet has been shot dead in KarachI ... Or Quresht. Is a former leader ofJamsat-e IsIamI (Party of<br />
Islam) and a focmer memberof the Sindh provincial assembly. In recent years, Dr Qureshi hadsuppolted calls tw islamic law to be<br />
introduced In Pakistan .-(BBC News. 18 December2000)<br />
• leaderof. ainaJI Pakistani Shute Mua&m group has been shot dead In U1e IOU1hem dtyof Karachi •Police say S8rdar Husaaln<br />
Jafrf. who headed the IitIfe..known group caJted thevOIce OfShia. died on the spot. A person who Identifted himself88 RIaz BaInI,<br />
leaderofthe extremist antl-Shlite group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvl. phoned the SBC shortly afterthe attack to claim mponsIbiUty.'(BBC<br />
News, 15 May 2000)<br />
It.ararnUituy rangers and poUce In SIndh province launched a crackdown against aetMsts and leaders ofthe JSQM and the MQM on<br />
FebnJaly 19, 2000 afterthe two parties jointly called for a strike against the governments dismissal of400 PakIstan Steel MIls<br />
workers. Paramlltary troops and rangers responded with searth and siege operations In the cities and a searth for JSQM ae:tMsts In<br />
tural8l88s ofSlndh. resultfng In the arrestofabout forty adivIsts.-span 1ang='"EN-CA- styIp'"rnso-IJfdf..t)n-slze: 10.0pt; font·famUy:<br />
Aa1a1; mso-bkfl..t)nt·famiIy:,T1mes New Roman; mso-anaI-tanguage: EN.CA~ [1UnM RlIhU WMch %001 Wortd Report)<br />
1999 Despite the central government. imposition ofGovern0r8 Rule in late 1998 in<br />
response to Sindh violence. politICal and sectarian killings 'persisted in Karachi. albeit<br />
at a much reduced level. The intensity of the violence dropped even further after the<br />
military assumed federal powers in an October coup.<br />
Itolitically motivated violence and sectarfan violence continued to beaproblem, although In the weeks following the 0dDbet12 coup<br />
there were few Ifany reported casea ofsuch violence. Govemor's Rule, Imposed to correct a serIoUs law and onferproblem created<br />
In part by poIitfcaI tensions In the province. continued In Slndh untl the coup.-/span> ( PaWanOXIntry Repotton Human Rights<br />
Practk;e$ for1999, BureauofDetnocraey. Human RIghts, and Labor. US Department ofState. February. 2000)<br />
1998 In 1998 tit-tor-tat killings between the Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM) and a<br />
break-away faction increased the level ofviolence in Karachi _,<br />
.<br />
"he MQU. which changed Ita name to Mutfahlda Qaml Movement from 1M MohaJir QamI Movement. Is locked In a bfaody conflict<br />
with a dissident 1adfon called the MQM Haqlql. Hundreds ofpeople have died In f8Ceflt months In tIt.fOr4at killings by the mHitants of<br />
the two 1aclfons.'(1beAssociatedPress. November20. 1998)<br />
....cethe early summer more Chan 100 people i;I1 the city have died In gun battfes between rival pofltical factions each month. In<br />
recent days the violence has gathered pace.-[The Guan1ian Weeldy. 0Ct0bet 18, 1998. p5]<br />
Number ofDeaths:<br />
Total: Estimates range upwards from 5.000.<br />
Ahousands ofSunnl and Shia Muslins have been kiDed in Pakistan over the pasttwo decades In sectarian violence fueled by<br />
htto://ww'W.oloumshares.ca/cnntAnt/ AnR/ A~Rnn / A~Rnn-p~lt;~~" "'+",,1
Armea liOntllCt Keport ~UUU - t"8K1stan<br />
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extremist outfits ofthe two Muslim sects.·[/RIN. July 17,2003)<br />
"he MOM launched an anned uprising In 1993 after the city government was dismissed, and brought KarachI to Its tcnees.1e8vIng<br />
more than 5.000 people dead and afppIIng the economy ofPakIstan .. main c:ommetdal centre. Karachi" descent reached Its<br />
nadir last year when more than 2.000 people, including 242 poIce otIk:ers, dfed In nfghUy street baUfes.· [. st1 :Clty w:sta'"on'"> Karacht<br />
pays high price for peace.'John Stackhouse. Globe a['dUall. OCtober 28. 1998)<br />
2004 Between 100 and 170 people, primarily civilians, were reported killed in<br />
sporadic Intercommunal violence.<br />
ftroops have been caRed In to maintain order In tbe Paldstanl ctty of Mullan after a car bomb kJISed at least 40 people at a meetInG of<br />
Sunnl Musllms.·(SBC News, October 7,2Q0.4]·<br />
•<br />
litleast 11 people have died In a gun attack on the motorcade ofthe army commanderIn Pakistan's lOutbem ctty ofKarachi •the<br />
authorities say. [BBC News. June 10,2004]<br />
Itonce In the Pakistani city of Karachi have ftt'8d tear gas at thousands ofangry mourners after an attack on a Shls mosque killed at<br />
least 20.'ISBC News, June 1, 2004]<br />
• bomb attack on a packed Shls mosque In the southern Pakistani city of Karachi has left at least 15 people dead, ofllclals say••<br />
[BBC News, May 7, 2004) ..<br />
litleast 42 people have been killed and over 100 wounded In an atiac:k on Shla Musftms In the Paldstanl city ofQuetta , hospital<br />
ofllclals say.'[BBCNews. March 2,2004)<br />
2003 Independent media reports indicate that approximately 100 hundred people, the<br />
majority of them Shia Muslim civilians, were killed in 2003.<br />
~ violence and tensions continued to bea serious problem uuoughout the country••• At least 100 persons were kiUed In<br />
sectarian violence durfng the year, most can1ed out by unldentifted gunmen.-(US State Depattment ofState. Mountry Repods on<br />
Human RJQhts PractIces· 2003.·February 25. 2004]<br />
2002 A number of media reports estimate that dozens ofpeople were killed in<br />
sectarian violence and attacks on government officials.<br />
Ahere have been sevenli attacks on foreign targets In Sindh induding"....<br />
S A suicide attack on a navy bUs In KarachI In Maywhich IcIIJed 1.. people••••<br />
SA eat bomb at the US consulaf8 in Karachi In June, which killed 12 peopIe.-[SSC News. september 24,2002)<br />
.tleast 36 people have been killed and about 100 Injured In sevetal violent attacks this year against Christian and western targets•••<br />
Police in Karachi have arrested dozens of alleged Muslim extremists in connecUon with the recent attacks on Christian targets••<br />
ISBC News. september29, ~OO2J<br />
2001 According to at least one Pakistani media source, more than 50 people were<br />
killed in sectarian violence in Karachi. •<br />
b6<br />
b7C<br />
AIle highest number oftsrrorist atfacks was recorded In Karachi where In 33 incidems,54 pefSOI1S were kIaed. The second [highest) .<br />
remained FATA. where 81 pelSCX1SWet8 killed In seven Inddenta ofsectarlan violence. Dera lsamilKhan remained [third highest)<br />
where 10 people were kiUed and 19 injured In 8 terrorist attacks. 1.. people were IcIHed and 8 InjunKI In 5 attacks In lahore ,,,killed<br />
and 3 Injured in 3 incidents In Multan ... kiIIed in 2 atMaiIsy.·(PakNews. August 21, 2001]<br />
2000 At least 25 people were kiUed in Karachi ,mostly due to sectarian violence.<br />
Marlier. gunmen riding In two C8IS Intercepted a van belonging to the~Madrfa Sunnl Muslim schoolon a congested road<br />
and opened fire with automatic assauft rifle$, wItne8ses said. 1111'88 deftcI. a teenage student and the drlveiwere kIIed Immedlatefy,<br />
while three other people.lnc:fudlng a poUceman guarding the van, were wounded. police said.·[ReutaI3 and AasocIaIed Press, 28<br />
January 2001] • •<br />
ItaldstanlIawyer and Shite leader has been shOt deed byunidentified gunmen In KarachI. Waqar,NaqvI, .'ieidot~Orthe<br />
ShIIte group. Tehrik+JafMa. was Idled along with histeen. son and his driver as "he"was taking his c:hDdren,1D schoOl No group<br />
has said It canied out the leiltfnga. but a spokesman for Tehrik+Jaftiia Hasan Turabl blamed a mlHtant SuMI Muslim group - SIpaha<br />
Sshaba ~aJdstan .'(BSCNews, 7 April 2000] -<br />
, .. , , .. ,<br />
.... ..--. ...........-_ ...... _ ......... -- It!'
·1U1Tl8a vOnTtlct Naport ~UW - ot"aKJstan<br />
"<br />
"here has been wfdeIpread cPatuptfon In the Pakistani dtyofKarachI •foIfowfng the IcIBng of.a pmmInent...SunNI Mudm~<br />
Mullah rUMLudhIanvf. tit Ludhianvr. drtvetwas alsO kited and his son serlouIIy wounded.-lBBC IHWI. 18 May 2000]<br />
1999 At least 75 people were killed in Karachi due to'political violence.<br />
i!espfte improved security conditions under Governocis Rule. bnwore 75 deaths 1hat were presumed to be the resutt of poIItJcaI<br />
violence In Kar8chI.~1 Pakittan CountlyRepotfon Human R1Qhb Practk:ea for 1999. Bureau ofDemoaacy, Human RIghts. and<br />
Labor. US DepaI1mentofState. FebnJary.2000J<br />
1998 More than 1,000 people died in violence.<br />
(Aasociated PreS$. November 20. 1998]<br />
.tleast 750 people have been kIIJed In KaraChI this year. mainly. says tt1e MOM. as a result ofattacks on Itself by a breakaway<br />
factlon.-(T1Je Economist. November 7. 1998)<br />
Political Developments:<br />
2004 President Pervez Musharrafwill remain head ofthe army and government<br />
until at least 2007, after a bill passed in Pakistan • lowerhouse extended his<br />
tenure in both roles_ Musharref also named Shaukat Aziz, a political novice, as<br />
Prime Minister in August_ Although the government ordered an inquiry in~o a<br />
March attack on civilians, several strikes were called (mainly in Sindh province)<br />
to protest government handling ofthe conflict. The Sindh provincial govemment<br />
failed to fonn a fBoalition of national unity-with the seven opposition parties In<br />
an attempt to stem the tide of conflict and the minister ofthe Sindh province<br />
resigned after violence escalated in June_ US President Bush declared Pakistan<br />
a ttajorally·in recognition of its contribution to the fight against al-Qaeda<br />
allowing Pakistan access to special benefi~ including expanded foreign aid and<br />
priority delivery of military equipment.<br />
-st1:pIace w:st="on"> Pakistan's lower house ofpar1iament has passed a blH allowing Gen Pervez Mushanafto remain as both<br />
president and head ofthe amy. The biD will artaw the president to keep both posts unUl2007.-(BBC News. OCtober 14. 20041<br />
.rale ti Of 9<br />
ahe reins ofpa.ver ~e once again been handed overIn PaJdstan •And once again. It's a man hand.pIcked by the c:ountry'a military<br />
ruler. Gen Pervez Musharraf. And though ithas all been done constitutionaJJy. thequestion being asked Is whethera poIitk:aJ novICe<br />
Ike Shaukat AzJz. has the competence and capability to deal with thecounby's complex poIitJcal and laW and Older situation. or even<br />
bigger issues IJke combatfng aJ.Qaeda-backed terrorism.·(BSC News, August 28. 2004] .<br />
•<br />
atln Paldstan the chief ministerofthe southern province ofSindh has resigned aftera series of'vIol8nt Jnddents over the last few<br />
weeks. The provincial governor told reporters thatchief minister AU Mohammed Mehr had JeSlgned b'petIOn8I reasons.-[SBC<br />
News. June 7.2004]<br />
• strike called by Pakistan 's hardllne Islamic paItfes In r8sponse to a week ofsectarian violence has been aJmost fully obserVed In'<br />
Karachi. There were sporadic reports ofunrest as worshippers attended Friday prayers In 1he tense southern dty~:[BBCNews, ,June<br />
".2004] •<br />
Ahe govemin9 Pakistan Muslim League party (PML) In the southern pnMnce ofSIndh hasoffeced lofonn a coalition with seven<br />
opposition parties. It wants to form a government ofnational unity In Sindh to tackle the law and order crisis thenJ. The move comes<br />
afterthree days of\riolence between Shuand Sunnls left over 23 people dead In the provincial capital. Karachi •But there Is<br />
disagreement as to who should be the d1lef mlnister.-(BBC News. June 3, 2004J<br />
JluthOfftles In Pakistan have ordered an Inqulty Into an attack on Shla Muslims which left at least 43 people dead as they marked the<br />
holy day ofAshwa. A curfew Is in place In the clty ofOuetta wheAt the attack took place. with soldiers patrolling Its snet:s.-(BBC<br />
News. Marth 3. 20041 .<br />
2003 The leader ofthe militant Sunni organization Miffat-e Isrami-ye Pakistan (MIP)<br />
was assassinated in OCtober, leading to rioting in Islamabad. The govemment·<br />
sustained a crackdown on banned Sunni and Shia militant groups and arrested their<br />
leaders. President Musharraf continued to support US Initiatives in the J§ar"on terror-In<br />
neighbouring Afghanistan •a position not welcomed by many Pakistani citizens.
.. .<br />
"<br />
- -----------<br />
--~-<br />
'0<br />
~ ITP [IsIamI Tahrfk-e PaJdstan)Ieader. sajld N8qvf. was anested In a late-nlght taJd In 1aIamabad. butiwas notckt8rwhether his<br />
8IT'8It wuIn his c;apacIty aUte leaderofthe MCfatian outftt. or becawe he Is deged to have been InvcMId In the nwnSet ofhis mllf<br />
rtval. Azam Tariq:of the MIP;Who was gunned down In • hal ofbuleta by unknown aasaJIanta earty last month near the Paldltanl __.......__-,<br />
capltal.-(/R/N. November 17. 2003)<br />
o<br />
2002 lri'.aanUaJYi the' go~emment ~nn.~.!i"e mill1aDtlslam1egnS(i"ps. Induding the-<br />
Slpah-8abaha-Pakisfan and TehnlC-I.Jaffiiiia. Ai\umber of groups reacted to the ban<br />
and to Pakistan" support of the US-Ied liaron terror'by.attacking foreigners and<br />
Pakistani Christians. prompting the Christian community to demand protection from the<br />
government and the international community. The government responded by<br />
introducing new security measures around non~uslim places ofworship. Fighting<br />
continued between the Sunn; and Shia communities in Sindh despite govemment<br />
efforts to increase security in the province•<br />
• sulclde bomber blew up a bus y88tanIaY In Paldatan • port city of KsIIChI.1dlIfnQ 1
• _ Armea ~Ont1lct Heport 2UUU -Oklstan<br />
~<br />
o<br />
complexity ofconflict. Sindhis are calling for a Sindhi state; the mohajirs, led by the MQM, are<br />
seeking a separate state around the provincial capital, Karachi; and there are sectarian differences<br />
~tween'the majority Sunni and minority ShiJite Muslims. The proximity ofthe Afghanistan war has<br />
fed the violence by providing weapons. crimina) elements, including drug traffickers, and reported<br />
foreign support for Muslim extremism. From June 1992 to November 1994 the Pakistan Army was<br />
deployed in a major, and ultimately unsuccessful, operation to control Karachi and after the anny.<br />
withdrawal, police and paramilitary troops contributed to a rising toll of·shooting deaths in the city<br />
Following earfy 1997 elections, the MQM joined the majority Muslim League in the national and<br />
Sindh provincial governments. A month after the MQM walked out ofthe provinCial government<br />
coalition in late 1998, the then federal prime miQister. Nawaz Sharif, declared Govemor1fl Rule (a<br />
state ofemergency) in Karachi, called out the anny to quell the violence, and announced the<br />
establishment of military courts for the city_ Since a coup in OCtober 1999, the Pakistan government<br />
has been controlled by the military under General Pervez Musharraf and sectarian violence has<br />
declined. The Pakistani government intensified its crackdown on militant sectarian groups following<br />
the 2001 US invasion and occupation ofAfghanistan , fueling further resentment between the<br />
extremist groups and the government Several attempts have been made in r~t years on<br />
President Musharraftii life.<br />
QCJn Slndh, open gun battles between the Muhajlr Qaumi Movement (MQM), which represents Urdu-epeaJdng migrants from India ,<br />
S1ndhllandlonllashkars (private milltfas) and the anny are daily occurrences. The MQM has begun to."..b'the sepAt8tJon of<br />
Karachi tram the rest ofthe provfnce. VIolence threatens 10 pamlyze the capital. even though the anny has had dlr8c:t msponslbtRty<br />
for Its administration slnce June. 1992. A plan announced recently to replace the miIitaty presence with police and rangers Is unlikely<br />
to ease tensJons.-(-au:CJty w:"on'"> J
•,.6<br />
'.<br />
EMAIL<br />
ARMED CONELIC~S RI;.P0.BI PAGE;<br />
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_TlME.com PrintPage: NatioroExclusive: Feds Probe a Top DemOCCORelation~p<br />
wi... Page 1of3<br />
-<br />
TIME<br />
NATION<br />
Friday, Oct. 20, 2006<br />
Exclusive: Feds Probe a Top Democrat's<br />
Rela.tionship with AIPAC<br />
The Department ofJustice is investigating whether Rep. Jane<br />
Harman and the pro-Israel group worked tog~ther to get her<br />
reappointed as the top Democrat on the House Intelligence<br />
Committee<br />
By TIMOTHY J. BURGERJWASHINGTON<br />
Did a Democratic member ofCongress improperly enlist the support ofa<br />
major pro-Israel lobbying group to try to win a top committee assignment?<br />
That's the question at the heart ofan ongoing investigation by the FBI and<br />
Justice Department prosecutors, who are examining whether Rep. Jane<br />
Harman ofCalifornia and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee<br />
(AIPAC) may have violated'the law in a scheme to get Hannan reappointed<br />
as the top Democrat on theHouse intelligence committee, according to<br />
knowledgeable sources in and out ofthe U.S..government.<br />
The sources tell~ that the investigation by Justice and the Federal<br />
Bureau ofInvestigation, which has simmered out ofsight since about the<br />
middle oflast year, is examining whether Harman and AIPAC arranged for<br />
wealthy supporters to lobby House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi on<br />
Harman's behalf: Harman said Thursday in a voicemail message that any<br />
investigation of- or allegation ofimproper conduct by.-·her would be<br />
"irresponsible, laughable and scurrilous." On Friday, Washington GOP<br />
super lawyer Ted Olson left voicemail messages underscoring that Hannan<br />
has no knowledge ofany investigation. "Congresswoman Hannan has<br />
asked me to follow up on calls you've had," Olson said. "She'is not aware<br />
ofany such investigation, does not believe that it is occurring, and wanted<br />
to make sure that you and your editors knew that as far as she knows, that's<br />
not true....' No one from the Justice Department has contacted her.n It is .<br />
not, however, a given that Harman ,would know that she is under<br />
investigation. In a follow-up phone call from California, Olson said<br />
Hannan hired him this morning because she takes seriously the possibility<br />
ofa media report about an investigation ofher, even though she does not<br />
believe it herself.<br />
A spokesman for AIPAC, a powerful Washington-based organization with .<br />
more than 100,000 members across the U.S., denied any wrongdoing by the<br />
group and stressed that it is not taking sides in regards to the committee<br />
assignment. Spokespersons for Justice and the FBI decline4 to comment.<br />
The'case is a spin-offofa probe that has already led to charges under the<br />
Espionage Act against two AlPAC lobbyists, whose case is still pending,<br />
and to a 12-and-a-half-year prison sentence for fonner Defense Intelligence<br />
Agency official Lawrence A. franklin. Franklin pleaded guilty a year ago<br />
http://www.time.comltimelnaQonlprin!outlO.88 I~, 1.S49Q~9,OO.h~1<br />
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED<br />
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg
TIME.com Print Page: Nati0ne>Exclusive: Feels Probe a Top DemocrabRelationship wi... Page 2 of3<br />
to three felony counts involving improper disclosure and handling of<br />
classified information about the Middle East and terrorism to the two<br />
lobbyists, who in tum are. accused ofpassing it on to ajoumalist and a<br />
foreign government, widely believed to be Israel. The two lobbyists, who<br />
have denied any wrongdoing but were dismissed by AlPAC in April of<br />
2005, were indicted on felony counts ofconspiring with government<br />
officials to receive classified infonnation they were not authorized to have<br />
access to and providing national defense infonnation to people not entitled<br />
to receive it.<br />
Around mid-200S, the investigation expanded to cover aspects ofHannan's<br />
quiet but aggressive campaign to persuade House Minority LeaderNancy<br />
Pelosi to reappoint her to the prestigious position on the House intel panel.<br />
The alleged campaign to support Hannan for the leadership post came amid<br />
media reports that'Pelosi had soured on her California colleague and might<br />
name Rep. Alcee Hastings ofFlorida, himselfa major supporter ofIsrael,<br />
to succeed Harman.<br />
Th~ sources say the probe also involves whether, in exchange for the help<br />
from AIPAC, Hannan agreed to help try to persuade the Administration to<br />
go lighter on the AIPAC officfals caught up in the ongoing investigation. If<br />
that happened, itmight be construed as an illegal quid pro quo, depending<br />
on the context ofthe situation. But the sources cautiQn that there has been<br />
no decision to charge anyone and that it is unclear whether Hannan and<br />
AIPAC acted o~ the idea.<br />
AIPAC spokesman Patrick Dorton denies that the organization has engaged<br />
in any improper conduct.. "Both Congressman Hastings and<br />
Congresswoman Hannan are strong leaders on issues ofimportance to the<br />
pro-Israel community and would be exemplary Democratic leaders for the<br />
House intelligence committee,tI Dorton said. IIAlPAC would never engage<br />
in a quid pro quo in relation to a federal investigation or any federal matter<br />
and the notion that it would do so is preposterous. AIPAC is not aware that<br />
the Justice Department is looking into issues involving the intelligerice<br />
committee, and has not been asked any questions or contacted by the<br />
government on this matter, but certainly would cooperate with any<br />
inquiry." Dorton added that AlPAC has previously been assured that the<br />
organization and its current employees' are not being investigated.. Inthis<br />
same investigation, the JU$tice Deparbnent has previously suggested that<br />
AlPAC had questiQnable motives in trying to help a valued government<br />
contact remain in a sensitive national security post. The Justice Department<br />
alleges in its indictment ofFranklin that he asked one ofthe two AlPAC<br />
lobbyists to "put in a good word" for him in seeking assignment to the<br />
National Security Council. The document says the AlPAC official noted<br />
that such ajob would put Franklin "by the elbow ofthe President ll and said<br />
he would lido what I can."<br />
AIPAC lists praise from Pelosi among a series ofquotes from world leaders<br />
on its website: "The special relationship between the United States·and<br />
Israel is as strong as it is because ofyour [AIPAC's] fidelity to that<br />
partnership..." But congressional sources say Pelosi has been infuriated by<br />
http://www.tim~.comltimtVna~onlprintoutlO.8816. 1549069,00.html 1012312006
TIME.com Print Page: NalionOXclusiV!l: Feds Probe a TQp Democra()ReIaliOnSbiPwi... Page 3 of3<br />
pressure from some major donors lobbying on be~alf ofHannan. In a story<br />
touching on tensions between Pelosi' and Hannan, an alternative California<br />
publication, LA. Weekly, r~orted in May that Harman "had some major<br />
contributors call Pelosi to'impress upon her the importance ofkeeping Jane<br />
in place. According to these members, $is tactic, too, hasn't endeared<br />
Hannan toPelosL"<br />
"<br />
A congressional source tells TIME that the lobbbying for Harman has<br />
included a phone call several months ago from entertainment industry<br />
billionaire and major Democratic party contributor Haim Saban. A Saban<br />
spokeswoman said he could not be reached for comment. A phone call<br />
pushing for a particular member's committee assignment might be<br />
unwelcome, but it would not normally be illegal on its own. And itis<br />
unclear whether Saban - who made much ofhis fortune with the Mighty<br />
Morphin Power Rangers children's franchise -mewthat lobbying Pelosi<br />
might be view~d by others as part ofa larger alleged plan.<br />
Saban has donated at least $3,000 to Harman's campaign, according to<br />
Federal Election Commission records, and the Saban Center for Middle<br />
East Policy, which he sponsors at the prestigious Brookings Institution,<br />
boasts Hannan among its biggest fans. "When the Saban Center talks, I<br />
listen," Hannan said at aSaban Center briefing in Feb~ary on U.S. strategy<br />
in Iraq. Hannan quipped that, in order to attend the session at Brookings,<br />
she had to "blow off" .a senior intelligence official's appearance before a<br />
House committee.<br />
'<br />
Copyright 0 2006 Time Inc. All rights reserved.<br />
Reproduction In whole or in part without permission is prohibited.<br />
PriYaey Polley<br />
.http://www.time.coml~melpati9n1priQtol:ltlQ.88~6J1549069.OO.html 10123/2006
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. next week with O'Donnell and another<br />
. _~ agent) William McDermott, at the Sun<br />
Spot Cafe, adjacent to the lobby.of<br />
AIPAC's office building. Over a bever·<br />
age and cigarette, Weissman described<br />
having metwith Franklin four or five<br />
times over the previous two years to talk<br />
about non-j\rab Middle East countries,<br />
primarily Iran) according toa court doc~<br />
ument..The agents asked him ifFranklin<br />
had ever disclosed classified information<br />
to him oranyone else he knew, and they<br />
noted his answer: "No." ,<br />
~<br />
The two AIPAC officials) hunch that<br />
a phone call to the post had found its<br />
way onto the'FBPs radar was correct.<br />
They had shared what law-enforcement<br />
officials considered "national-defense<br />
information" with Post reporter Glenn<br />
Kessler about stepped-up Iranian activ-,<br />
ity in Iraq. Thegovernment would later<br />
charge that Rosen described it to Kes-,<br />
sler as "agency information" from an<br />
"American intelligence source."<br />
But tha~ call to the Post was<br />
a small piece ofthe story. And<br />
contrar¥~o what agent Hanna<br />
told Rosen, this was"acriminal<br />
matter.." }3y the time the agents<br />
approached Rosen and Weiss-.<br />
man, they were nearing the,<br />
final stageS ofan investigation<br />
into leaks ofclassified informa-.<br />
tion that would wreck the two<br />
men's careers and throw oneof .<br />
Washington's most powerful<br />
lobby groups on the defensiv~.<br />
The FBI prQbe included<br />
hours ofWiretaps approved<br />
by the secret Foreign lntele;<br />
Iigence Surveillance Court in<br />
Washington and surveillance of<br />
o·<br />
mation, there is a clear line in the law,"<br />
then-US attorney Paul McNulty said<br />
when the indictments were announced<br />
in August 2005 •. "Today's charges are<br />
about crossing that line."<br />
Rosen, Weissman, and Franklin were<br />
accused under a rarely used section of<br />
the World War ~-era Espionage Act.,<br />
A conviction could land Weissman, a<br />
father ofthree, in prison for up to ten<br />
years and Rosen, also afather of. thre~<br />
who faces an additional charge, for up<br />
to 20.. But the potential impact extends<br />
beyond these two men and AIPAC. It<br />
could also send a chill through the ranks<br />
ofWashington lobbyists and consultants<br />
for foreign governments.<br />
To influence the US government or<br />
even react knowledgeably to US actions,<br />
many countries thinkan·embassy staffed<br />
with diplomats isn't enough. They'r~<br />
willing to pay large fees to hire Ameri...<br />
cans with contacts at high levels and<br />
an understanding ofhow po~iqmakers<br />
• Former Pentagon analyst Lawrence Franklin, middle, pleaded<br />
guilty to conspiracy and helped the FBI set up asting. Lawyer<br />
meetings at Washington-area r-Ia~r cach:is, left, hopes his client's cooperation will mean a<br />
restaurant$. It also included a 19 er sen nee.<br />
search ofAlPAC's offices in 2002 that ,think. Often these are ex-government<br />
appears to have been surreptitiously officials. While barred from lobbying<br />
conducted, because the offices' entrance former colleagues immediately upon<br />
is monitored 2ihours a day and no one leaving office) they nonetheless bring .<br />
appeared with a search warrant ~round valuable experience and eventually get.<br />
that time_<br />
inside for meetings and to open doors<br />
Federai prosecutors theorized that. for foreign visitors.<br />
Rosen and Weissman had engaged in a For instance, when India was negofive-year<br />
conspiracy to cultivate govern-, tiating its 2006 civilian nuclear agree~<br />
ment sources with 'the aim ofobtaining ment with the J3tish administrationsensitive<br />
«national-defense informa-. fraught with strategic implications for<br />
tiont which they would pass on to col-, both countries-it enlisted the lobby-.<br />
leagues at AIPAC, Israeli officials, and ing firm Barbour Griffith & Rogers for<br />
journalists. By August 2005, prosecu-: advice. The firm had previously signed<br />
tors persuaded a federal grand jury in on the former US ambassador to New<br />
Alexandria that the two NPACofficials I:;>elhi, Rob.er~ Blackwill. Although<br />
were not only assiduous in collecting Blackwill wasn't involved in getting the<br />
classified information but almost flam-. firm's India contract:, he has since been.<br />
boyant in sharing it with others.. a prominent advocate for a n~w US/In·<br />
"When it comes to classified infor~ dia partnership.<br />
78 I WASHINGTONIAN I JANUARY 2008<br />
o<br />
Robert Litt, a d~fense lawyer who has<br />
represented people caught up in leak<br />
investigations, sees the indictment of<br />
Rosen and Weissman as partofa broad<br />
crackdown on leaks by tJle Bush admin-,<br />
istration: "People formerly in the intelligence<br />
community are looking at [the<br />
AIPAC case] and the leak investigations ,<br />
widl great trepidation."<br />
But a conviction is by no means a<br />
sure thing) due in part to'an aggressiv~<br />
dlree-year fight by the defense team, led<br />
by Abbe Lowell for Rosen and by John<br />
Nassikas III for Weissman.. The law~<br />
yers' no·stone-unturned litigation fills a<br />
foot-thick file ofmotions and rebuttals<br />
in US District Court in Alexandria. I\.<br />
series ofrulings by the resolutely even..<br />
handed presiding judge, T.S •. Ellis III,.<br />
has knocked $ome ofthestuffing outof<br />
the government's case and required the<br />
Bush administration to'put some ofits<br />
top officials on the wiUless stand.<br />
In fact, what the US attorney called the<br />
"dearline in thelaw" isn'tdear<br />
at all, particularly where the<br />
question ofintent coines into<br />
play. When the case comes to<br />
trial in late ~pril, assistant US<br />
attorneys Kevin DiGregoiyand<br />
William N. Hammerstrom Jr..<br />
will have to meet a big burden<br />
ofproof•. Showing that Rosen<br />
and Weissman obtained, talked<br />
about', and relayed sensitive<br />
national-defense information<br />
won't be enough. Prosecutors<br />
will have to prove that the two<br />
men did so knowing that ifthe<br />
information were revealed, it<br />
would damage US national<br />
security and also knowing tha~<br />
disclosing it was illegal.;<br />
Convincing ajury that Rosen<br />
and Weissman possessed this criminal<br />
state ofmind won't be easy., TQ counter<br />
the charge, defense lawyers intend to lay<br />
bare th.e largely hidden world ofbackchannel<br />
Washington diplomacy. They<br />
will try to'show that senior officials reg~<br />
ularly'gave AlPl\C officials sensitive in'"'<br />
formation With the full expectation that<br />
it would be passed along t~ Israelis and<br />
others. In that way, they will comend<br />
that AlPAC played a role in developing<br />
US foreign policy.<br />
Over prosecutors' objections, defen...<br />
dams won court approval to subpoena<br />
15 current and former top administra"l.<br />
tion officials. Their names read like the<br />
lineup for a crisis meeting in the White<br />
House Situation Room during Presi-,<br />
dent Bush's firsnerm: national-security<br />
adviser Condolee~za Rice (now secre...
ta.~y ofState); current national-security<br />
adviser Stephen Hadley; Richard.Armitage,<br />
former deputy secretary ofState;.<br />
William Burns, US ambassador to Rus-,<br />
sia; Marc Grossman, former undersec-.<br />
retary ofState for political affairs; David<br />
Satterfield, now the State Department's<br />
coordinator for Iraq; Elliott Abrams,<br />
deputy national-security advis~r; Paul<br />
Wolfowitz, former deputy secretary of<br />
Defense; and D!luglas Feith: for:mer underSecretary<br />
ofDeferise..<br />
Judge Ellis didn't okay these subpoenas<br />
lightly. He did so after being<br />
persuaded that each ofthese officials<br />
would be able to testifY about specific<br />
meetings or conversations--either with<br />
the !\yo defendants or with others at<br />
,AIPAe-that dealt with information<br />
comparable in sensitivity to the kind<br />
Rosen and Weissman allegedly obtained<br />
and passed on.<br />
Ellis also knew that the subpoenas<br />
might derail dle case., Ifthe administration<br />
balks at allowing sworn testimony<br />
by senior officials about sen" .<br />
sitive conversations, the case<br />
against Rosen and Weissman<br />
could be dismissed.<br />
The line'between inform;ttion<br />
thatcan and can't get passed is<br />
blurred by the amount ofof~<br />
ficially sanctioned daily intel-.<br />
ligenee sharing between the<br />
United States and its ~lIies..<br />
Such exchanges are particularly<br />
intense between the United<br />
States an~ Israel" which regu-,<br />
larly trade information and<br />
assessments on terrorism and<br />
otherperceived threats.<br />
"It's absurd for anyone. to<br />
think that. the Israelis have<br />
to enlist people to spy," says<br />
Sandra Charles, a forme~ Pentagon and<br />
..National Security Council official who<br />
consults in Washington for Persian Gulf<br />
Arab governments. "They can go t
",<br />
"TJiis Is the FBI'?<br />
continuedfrom page 79<br />
~ouncil staffunder President Bill Clin'!<br />
\;;Ion. Merward, Rosen allegedly ~lked to<br />
a reporter about then-classified US stratcountries<br />
in a ~ariety ofspheres froni mis- egy options against Iraq. In January 2002,<br />
sHe defense to homeland security._ The aid Rosen metwith David Satterfield, a senior<br />
package for Israel tends to be the engine State Department Middle East official,<br />
thatgets the whole US foreign-aid budget about the sharing ofintelligence between<br />
through Congress.<br />
t,he United States and Israel following the<br />
While nonpartisan and not direcd¥ in- Karine A episode, in which the Israelis<br />
volvedinpoliticalcampaigns,AIPACkeeps seized a large Palestinian arms shipment~.<br />
its !llembership ofmore than 100,000 ap- Theepisode damaged the US relationship<br />
prised ofcongressional votes importantto' with Yasser Ararat. Thegovernmentalleges<br />
Israel. This kind ofscrutiny can have an that, in a memo to other AIPAC staffers,<br />
intimidating effecton lawmakers because Rosen included classified information he<br />
it has the potential to influence where had picked up.<br />
AIPAC members send their campaign<br />
contributions. Critics have contended that The lobbyists' co·ntacts with Lawrence<br />
~PACshould be required to register as a Franklin developed in 2002 when the de...<br />
political:'actioncOf!lmittee. Butneither the fense analyst joined the Pentagon's newl¥<br />
courts nor the Federal Election Commission<br />
has forced the issue•.<br />
Douglas Feith..<br />
formed Office ofSpecial Plans under<br />
Other detractors contend that because Rosen had been watching with growing<br />
it lobbies for aid and policies that benefit alarm the signs thatTehran's cleric-domi-,<br />
> Israel, AIPAC ought to register ,vith the nated regime was seeking to develop a<br />
Jus~ceDepartment as a foreign agc:nt. But nuclear weapon, compounding thedanger<br />
unlike organizations and firms that represent<br />
foreign interestS and governments,<br />
posed by Iran'~supportfor terrorist and<br />
AIP~Cdoesn't get money from and is not<br />
contractually l.inJ
ought hom~ illegally over three decadeS..<br />
..... Franklin was vulnerable.. He had a record<br />
01'security breaches for taking documents<br />
~o.me. Lacking substantial assets and with<br />
a.wife afflicted with crippling rheumatoid<br />
arthritis, Franklin did not hire a lawyer; in..<br />
stead: heagreed to cooperate with theFBI.<br />
Authorities enlisted Franklin in a sting~ In<br />
July 2004, he attempted to arrange meetings<br />
with Rosen and Weissman, armed with<br />
the kind ofinformation'that clearly would<br />
be ofinterest to Israel. At one point, he re..<br />
quested an urgent meeting with Weissman,<br />
telling him lives were in danger. When the<br />
two met, Franklin, who was wired, warned<br />
him that Iran had discovered the presence<br />
ofIsraeli agents in northern Iraq: The in-.<br />
formation was highly classified "agency<br />
stuff," and Weissman could get in trouble<br />
for having it, Franklin told him.<br />
Weissman in turn told that to Rosen,<br />
and-the two contacted Naor Gilon, a po",<br />
Utical officer at the Israeli Embassy. Rosen<br />
and Weissman aJso called Glenn Kessler at<br />
the Post to report an increased threat to<br />
US soldiers in Iraq from Iranian-backed<br />
militias.<br />
Franklin also helped thee FBI witb a<br />
counterintelligence probe ofChalabi,<br />
who has denied divulging any US secrets.<br />
Among those hecalled was Francis Brooke,<br />
a Chalabi aide in Washington. Accord-.<br />
ing to Brooke, franklin also called active<br />
members ofthe Iraqi National Congress,<br />
Chalabi's political party..<br />
"He. was asking questions about Ahmad<br />
Chalabi and my dealings with Iranian of-.<br />
fidals,"· Brooke says. Herecalls that Frank~<br />
lin said, "There's a lot ofstuffgoing on.<br />
: You should tell me the straight story. I'm<br />
:1 in contact with journalists, and I could<br />
Ii spin it for yo~."<br />
~ Says Brooke.: "I thought he was offhis<br />
rocker."<br />
The Chalabi probe foundered, but tbe<br />
AIPAC investigation gained momentum.<br />
The calls to Naor Gilon and Kessler pro:<br />
vided what prosecutors considered new<br />
evidence that Rosen and Weissman had<br />
violated a section ofthe 1917 Espionage<br />
Act, barring the possession and transferof<br />
"national-defense information" by anyone<br />
not authorized to have it.. .<br />
. .<br />
Three....ve~ks after their meeting with Weiss...<br />
. man a~ the Sun Spot Cafe, FBI agents<br />
knocked on Rosen'$door in Silver Spring<br />
shordy before 8 AM. They told Rosen they<br />
knew Franklin had provided classified in-.<br />
fonnation to an Israeli official. What would<br />
•Rosen say, they asked him, ifthe Israeli of...<br />
. ficial told Franklin thatthe information had<br />
already been supplied to him by Rosen? Ac..<br />
cording to the agents' report, "Rosen said<br />
he had done nothingwrong."<br />
~gents confronted Weissman out...<br />
side~ome in Bethes~a. They played<br />
him a recording ofthe July conversation<br />
between Weissman and Franklin. "Look,"<br />
Weissman told them, "Iwas told by people<br />
at the office nor to talk to you~"<br />
Tha~ afternoon, the FBI searched<br />
Rosen's office atAlPAC headquarters, this<br />
time presenting" a search warrant.. CNN<br />
cameras filmed the agents entering the<br />
building. Apparendy tipped offbefore the<br />
raid, CBS called AlPAC with questions.<br />
Initially, AIPAC circled the wagons<br />
around its two officials, defending them<br />
in public statements, assigning them legal<br />
counsel, and paying the legal fees. Rosen<br />
and Weissman both received bonuses at<br />
the end of2004.. But the investigation<br />
continued. Although AIPAC was assured.<br />
in December that it was not a target, four<br />
senior AIPAC staffers were called to testifY<br />
before a federal grand jury in Nexandria.<br />
According to defense documents, in<br />
February 2005, US attorney Paul Mc-<br />
Nulty--who later became deputy attorney<br />
general-metwith AlPAC's executive di-.<br />
Weissman and Rosen<br />
were fired. AIPAC also<br />
halted payment Of<br />
their legal fees.<br />
rectorand AIPAC lawyers and urged them<br />
to cooperate. AIPAC,'s counsel called law-.<br />
yers for Rosen and Weissman the next day"<br />
·telling them that McNulty "would lik~ to<br />
end itwith minimal damage toAI-PAC. He<br />
is fighting with the FBI to limit the investi-.<br />
gation to Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman<br />
and to avoid expanding it." Prosecutors<br />
disclosed to AIPAC lawyers someevidence<br />
they had obtained under a secre~ warrant.<br />
Rosen and Weissman were fired. AIPAC<br />
also halted payment; oftheir legal fees. At:<br />
the time, the Justice Department viewed<br />
an organization's payment oflegal feeS for<br />
employees u~der investigation as a sign of<br />
a lack ofcooperation with the probe. An<br />
AIPAC spokesman" Patrick Dorton, de-.<br />
nied thattheorganization had acted under<br />
government pressure:. "~y suggestion<br />
thatAlPAC acted at the government's be~<br />
hest is completely false. Our decisions on<br />
dismissal and legal fees w~re made inde·.<br />
pendendy, b;lSed on the facts and ourcom~<br />
mitment to doing the right thing in a very<br />
difficult siwation." .<br />
One source dose to AlPAC noted that<br />
Weissman and Rosen had refused to waive<br />
their rights to sue the organization. Re-.<br />
cendy, Dorton repeated a statement he had.<br />
made atdie time ofthe indicnnent: "Rosen<br />
and Weissman were disinissed .beca~ they<br />
engaged in conduct that was not partof<br />
their jobs and ~use tJtis conduct did no~<br />
comport~hestandards that AIPAC ex-·<br />
peets and ~es ofits employees."<br />
Franklin" despite helping with the sting,<br />
was indicted along with the two AIPAC<br />
lobbyists. He pleaded guilty to two con··<br />
spiracy counts in October 2005 and drew<br />
a 12"year prison sentence. Judge Ellis held<br />
J;he sentence in abeyance until the AlPAC<br />
case is over. Theattorney Franklin acquired<br />
late in the probe, Plato Cacheris, expects<br />
his client to be called as a witness. He<br />
hopes, as a result off'ranklin's cooperation<br />
\vith the prosecution, that his sentence will<br />
be reduced to a "minimal" t~rm.<br />
The FBI's investigation didn't end with<br />
the conspiracy'indictments ofRosen and<br />
Weissman in August 2005, a year after<br />
Weissman gotthatinitiaJ phonecall in Bos...<br />
ton.o. One reason maf have been a gap ~n<br />
the government's case. The two men were<br />
charged with oral receipt and transmission<br />
ofnational-defense information. There is<br />
no evidence that classified documents ever<br />
exchanged hands.<br />
The next year, the FBI and one ofthe<br />
prosecutors approached the family ofthe<br />
late muckraking columnist Jack AO.derson"<br />
seeking access to his ar~hive. Anderson's<br />
son Kevin told a congressional panel that<br />
he was told they "wanted access to Dad's<br />
documents to 'see ifeither Rosen's or<br />
Weissman's fingerprints ~ere on any gov'!<br />
ernment documents•." Anderson's widow<br />
initially consented to the request, but the<br />
family coUectively decided to refuse.<br />
When the trial gets under way, parts of<br />
it will be closed to the public. Judge BI·.<br />
lis has allowed the introduction ofsome<br />
classified evidence that only the jurors will<br />
see or hear in fitU. He also has allowed the<br />
defense to probe potential jurors for indio,<br />
cations ofanti-Jewish bias..<br />
AIPAGhas regained its place as one of<br />
Washington's premier lobbying groups<br />
and is building a newheadquarters. Within<br />
the last few months, AIPAC agreed to pay<br />
Rosen's and Weissman's legal fees, which<br />
have climbed into the millions ofdollars.<br />
No explanation was given, although the<br />
decision came after Ellis ruled tha~ any<br />
government pressure on AIPAC was "in",<br />
appropriate and fraught. with the risk of I<br />
constitutional harm.."<br />
Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman have<br />
all failed to find permanent employment<br />
while the case is pending. Franklin works<br />
atodd jobs, his lawyersays. Rosen received<br />
financial help from friends and has done<br />
part-time consulting. Weissman spends a<br />
good deal oftime with his children-his<br />
•daughter is studyingArabic at·college; one<br />
son is a high-school senior, and another is<br />
in middle school-walking his two golden<br />
retrievers and pondering bookprojects, including<br />
one on rock ,n, roU.<br />
lVl<br />
JANUARY 20081WASHINGTONIAN 1167<br />
I<br />
ț<br />
"'
The sloe Sentinel<br />
ALL INFORMATION CONTAI~mD<br />
~IN ISl~CLASSIFIED ~<br />
~ 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabJ1~<br />
Page 1 of7<br />
Defense For AIPAC SPY: Suspe~~s:<br />
Haaretz.com<br />
OS:33<br />
By Josh Gerstein<br />
November 3, 2008<br />
Data At Cor~ Of~ase y.I~s Not.Really tT~p Secretl<br />
RICHMOND, VA -- The defense oftwo pro-Israel lobbyists accused ofillegally obtaining and<br />
disclosing American national security secrets will argue that some ofthe data the men allegedly<br />
conspired to reveal came directly from the Israeli government and was not truly secret, defense lawyers<br />
told a federal appeals court last week.<br />
Three judges from the U.S. Court ofAppeals spent mo~e than 90 minutes Wednesday wrestling with the<br />
issue of~ow much classified information the defense should be pennitted to introduce in the case of<br />
Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, former employees ofthe American Israel Public Affairs Committee<br />
(AlPAC). The beginning ofthe unusual court session was held in public, but the lawyers and the judges<br />
retreated behind closed doors in a specially-cleared and guarded courtroom to discuss the most sensitive<br />
aspects ofthe case about halfway through the hearing. As they waited for the arguments to begin,<br />
defense lawyers leafed through fat binders marked i~ orange with the words, "TOP SECRET."<br />
Rosen and Weissman were indicted in 2005 on charges that they gathered secrets from U.S. officials<br />
and passed the 90nfidential information to journalists, Israeli diplomats and others in violation ofthe<br />
United States Espionage Act. Rosen and Weissman are not charged with receiving or distributing any<br />
classified documents, but solely with relaying information orally. Some-free speech advocates have<br />
argued that what the two men allegedly did is not much different from what journalists do every day.<br />
Prosecutors have indicated that covert wiretaps captured the men acknowledging they knew the·data was<br />
classified.<br />
Trial dates for the pair, who were fired from AlPAC, have been repeatedly canceled as wrangling<br />
dragged on.over what classified information could be revealed at trial, which could take place as soon as<br />
February. A parade.ofprot:Uinent witnesses are expected, including Secretary ofState Condoleezza<br />
Rice, fonner U.S. Army General Anthony Zinni and leaders ofU.S.-based pro-Israel groups. Rosen<br />
and Weissman, who have pled not guilty, face the possibility oflengthy prison terms ifconvicted. A<br />
Pentagon analyst who admitted leaking information to the duo, Lawrence Franklin, was sentenced to<br />
more than 12 years in prison and is cooperating with prosecutors. .<br />
The government filed the appeal last week, arguing that the trial judge, T.S. Ellis lIT, erred when he<br />
ruled the defense was entitled to use a classified State Department document and another from the<br />
Federa. Bureau o(InyestigatiQn. "That information is not actually relevant to the crim~ that was<br />
charged," an attorney in the Justice_Department's counterespionage. section, Thomas Reilly, told the<br />
judges. Rosen's attorney, Abbe Lowell, said the State Department document shows that Israel was<br />
circulating the intelligence reports Rosen is accused ofdisclosing to 9ther AlPAC employees and a<br />
foreigner not named in the indictment. "You have to be able to prove what the Israelis knew," Lowell<br />
said. "In our defense, it is important that this infonnation,· discussed down the .line by,our client, is<br />
Israel-based."<br />
Lowell did not detail the Israeli information in the open session, but declassified court records .indicate<br />
the document describes intelligence about the Karine A, a ship seized by Israel in 2002 in the Red Sea.<br />
Israel sai~ the vessel was loaded with rifles, anti-tank missiles,·rockets, mortars and other weapons<br />
destined for the Gaza Strip. Sources close to the case said the State Departinent memo relates to a<br />
briefing Israeli Gen. Yossi KUp'erw~ser_gave.American.diplomats.aboutiheJ{atjlle A du~n!l a trip to<br />
Washington in January, 2002. lRosen.gQt.a.similar_briefing.from Kupe[Wa§!~rJhe.satTI~ d!y~ - /J.. ~<br />
Lowell suggested that the State Department memo was nearly identical to a note Rosen sent to fellow<br />
AlPAC employees. "you'd be able to draw a line between the allegation and the assertion and where it's<br />
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from, '," Lowell said. Lpwell alsQ said a forme~ State Department official, Carl Ford Jt., was prepared to<br />
testify that the bulk ofthe memo was actually unclassified. "Who gets.io define what's classified is the'<br />
Executive Branch," Reilly insisted. The nature ofthe FJJ.l document was less clear, but a lawyer for<br />
Weissman, Baruch Weiss,··said prosecutors want to prevent the defense from disputing which portion of<br />
the report made it so sensitive. "The government wants to use the part ofthe document that is helpful to<br />
them and they don't want us to use the part ofthe document that is helpful to us," Weiss said.<br />
The appeals judges, Robert King, Roger Gregory and Dennis Shedd, issued no immediate decision, but<br />
Shedd said he was reluctant to disturb the rulings Ellis arrived at after protracted hearings. "You have a<br />
very high hill to climb, especially with the timethe judge spent in this case," he told Reilly. All three<br />
appeals jurists expressed skepticism about the government's claim that the ruling o~ classified<br />
information opened up Judge Ellis' .other decisions for immediate appe,!l. "That wQ.l!ld be a change to<br />
what we nonnally apply," Shedd said. Generally, federal prosecutors in America cannot appeal p're-trial<br />
rulings on legal and evidentiary issues and defendants can do so only ifthey are coftvicted. Weiss said<br />
those basic rules should be kept despite the classified information issue. "I was a prosecutor myself.<br />
Many times, I lost things I'd have loved to appeal," Weiss said. "I was stuck. 1t<br />
Reilly argued a law passed in 1980 to govern the use ofclassified information in criminal cases made<br />
clear that Congress wanted court proceedings involving national secrets handled differently. liThe point<br />
is to get it right before classified information is disclosed," he said. Through his attorney, Rosen asked<br />
to be admitted to the secret portion ofthe argument but was never allowed in. The three-judge panel<br />
assigned to the case is fairly diverse politically, with Shedd appointed to the bench by the elderBu,~h,<br />
King named, by President Clinton, and Gregory on the panel via an unusual recess appointment from<br />
Clinton a~d a subsequent nod from the current President Bush. Either the defense ,or prosecution could<br />
ask for reconsideration ofthe appeals judges' ruling by the full II-judge bench ofthe 4th Circuit or<br />
review by the Supreme Court, but such requests are rarely granted. .<br />
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From:<br />
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NON-RECORD<br />
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IMFOPXATION COI~AINED<br />
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D~07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/ls<br />
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You should see the actual paper today. It is not only on the front page, it is the top story all the way across the front page.<br />
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Subject:<br />
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UNCLASSIFIED<br />
NON-RECORD<br />
Note the author<br />
Israel's National Security Aide Bal1·ed From U.S.<br />
. .<br />
The Washington Times<br />
By Eli Lake<br />
March 17, 2009<br />
TEL AVIV, ISRAEL -- Uzi Arad, who is expected to serve as national security adyiser in the next Israeli<br />
government, has been barred from entering the United States for nearly two years bn the grounds that he is an<br />
intelligence risk.<br />
Mr. Arad, a former member and director ofintelligence for the Mossad, Israel's spy service; is mentioned in the<br />
indictment ofLawrence Franklin, a fOlmer pentagon analyst who pleaded guilty in 2005 to providing classified<br />
information about ~ran in a conversation with two employees ofthe American Israel Public Affairs Committee<br />
(AlPAC). Beyond Mr. Arad's status, Prime Minister-designate Benjamin Netanyahu is likely to face difficulties<br />
abroad because ofhis choice, announced Monday, ofAvigdor Lieberman to serve as foreign minister in a<br />
narrow new rightist government. :<br />
Mr. Lieberman, head ofthe Israel Is·Our Home party, has advocated requiring Israel's 1.46 million Arabs to take<br />
a loyalty test or risk expulsion. The choice ofMr. Arad for national' security adviser has been reported in the<br />
Israeli press and was confirmed by sources close to Mr., Netanyahu, who has been tasked with forming the next<br />
government. Mr. Arad acknowledged to The Washington Time$ thathe has not been able to obtain a visa to<br />
come to the United States but said the Israeli government is trying to change that. ."The director-g~neral.of.the _,<br />
Israel Foreign Ministry did tell his American counterparts that there has been no cause to deny !1\et~~risa'~'>Mr'l ~ l I<br />
Arad told The Times. I ' t" ~ t<br />
" • , r 5!<br />
I ': t T t. I<br />
Israeli and U.S. officials said Mr. Arad has been denied a U.S. visa since June 2007 under sectio~:~~2 ~(~) of. .<br />
the Immigration and Nationality Act. This gives consular officers and the Justice Department' ati.i4~rity··to bar,- (' ~<br />
people who may seek "to violate any law ofthe United States relating to espionage or sabotage~' ft
,...<br />
o 0<br />
l~ the past 21 months, pro11?-inent Israelis and Americans have quietly'but unsu'ccessfully pressed U.S. officials<br />
to grant Mr. Arad a visit. "Overtures were made, and, by. and large, tHere was not a satisfactory answer," said<br />
Herb London, president ofthe Hudson Institute, where Mr. Arad worked from 1972 to 1975 after obtaining a<br />
doctorate from Princeton University. "He has invited luminaries from around the world to talk about foreign<br />
.policy at the annual Herzliya conference," Mr. Lpndon said. "There are people from the left and the right who<br />
recogni~e that he has extraordinary insight into the foreign policy issues ofour time. II<br />
In a June 18, 2007, letter to U.S. officials, the president ofthe Interdisciplinary Center at Herzliya, Uriel<br />
Reichman, wrote, "I very much hope that such visa will indeed be granted as expeditiously as possible since<br />
prof~ssor Arad's travels to the United States are essential for his work at the Interdisciplinary Center." One<br />
mystery about Mr. Arad's difficulties in obtainiQg a visa is that Mr. Franklin did not plead guilty to spying.<br />
Indeed, the U.S. attorney handling the case against Mr. Franklin andiwo former AIPAC employees, Steven J.<br />
Rosen' and Keith Weissman, charged all three men with mishandling national defense informatioh, a count listed<br />
in the U.S. code under the Espionage Act but less serious than being"an agent ofa foreign power.<br />
Mr. Rosen and Mr. Weissman are fighting the charges, which are controversial because they are the first private<br />
citizens to be accused ofleaking classified information. The indictment against Mr. Franklin makes two<br />
references to "a person previously associated with an intelligence agency of[foreign official's] country." Two<br />
former U.S. officials and a former Israeli official have confirmed that Mr. Arad is the Ilperson." The passage<br />
refers to a meeting between Mr. Franklin and Mr. Arad on Feb.. 20, 2004, at the Pentagon cafeteria and an<br />
earlier recommendation by an Israeli diplomat that Mr. Franklin meet with Mr. Arad.<br />
In his letter, Mr. Reichman referenced the section ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act that deals with<br />
espionage issues, saying, "it being absolutely certain to me and to all who know him, that none ofthe causes<br />
specified ... apply to him. 1I A Washington immigration lawyer, Glen Wasserstein, said Mr. Arad was being<br />
barred under the section Qf law that Ilallows the government to deny entry to those foreign nationals it deems as<br />
spies or saboteurs, and those who help or assistJn such spying or sabotage. II Mr.. Wasserstein said the president<br />
or attorney general could waive the restriction on the visa.<br />
Buck Revell, a former associate director ofthe FBI who oversaw counterintelligence investigations at the<br />
bureau, added that as national security adviser, Mr. Arad would not be in a position to engage in espionage or<br />
intelligence activities. Nonetheless, Mr. Revell said, the suspicion surrounding Mr. Arad could hamper U.S.<br />
Israel relations. liThe [Israeli] national security council chairman has access to all ofIsrael's intelligence and all<br />
the intelligence we share with them, normally, II Mr. Rev~ll said.<br />
IlWhether or not our agenci~s would restrict any type ofintelligence from going to him would be very<br />
problematic. That is something they will have to deal with." A senior official ofthe incoming Netanyahu<br />
administration, Who spoke.on the condition that he not be naqtedbecause ofthe sensitivity ofthe issue, told The<br />
Times that he,expects Mr. Arad to be able to travel to the United States for official business. "This is an i~sue<br />
that the new government ofIsrael trusts can be resolved," the official said.<br />
UNCLASSIFIED<br />
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---<br />
Politico.com<br />
10:48 PM EST<br />
By Josh Gerstein<br />
June 1.1, 2009<br />
ALEXANDRIA, VA -- A federal j~dge ~as virtually ':Viped out the prison sentence ofmore than 12<br />
years he first imposed on a Pe!1tagon analyst "Yho pled guilty to leaking classified information to two<br />
pro-Ismellobbyists.<br />
At a hearing Thursday evening in Alexandria, Va., Judge T.S. Ellis reduce4 the sentenc~ for the former<br />
defense QfficiaI,Larry Franklip., to probation plus 1omonths in "community confinem~nt," likely a<br />
halfway house. Prosecutors had'asked the judge to drop the sentence t~ 8 years in light ofFranklin's<br />
cooper~tion, w~ile a def~nse lawyer (or Franklit.t, Plato Ca~heris" aske.4 for "no seJ:}tence at all." In<br />
explaining his decision to dr~atically reduce Franklin's sentence, Ellis cited the lack ofpunishment and<br />
light punishments imposed on other leakers, as well as Franklin's ~ooperation in the prosecution ofthe<br />
two lobbyists later ~red from the America~ Israel Public Affairs committee, ~teven Rosen and Keith<br />
Weissman.<br />
. .<br />
Last month, days ~efore the case against the p~ir was' setto go to trial, t,he government dropped the<br />
prosecution. Th~ Justi~~ Department said legal ridings in the case and'the threat ofnew disclQsq~es of<br />
classified information maae a trial unadvisabl~. "I~'~.a very difficult and unusual situation," Elli~ said.<br />
"'~his one is unique." The judge said he did not quib~le with the government's decision to drop the<br />
Rosen and Weissman prosecutions, but that the move was '''significant'' and had· "some relevance" to<br />
what punishment Franklin should receive. He said, it was "very disputable" whether some ofthe<br />
information at the heart ofthe case was actually the kil}d of"national defense information" it is illegal to<br />
relay outsid~ the government. -<br />
Ellis railed Thursday against p~ople who leak classified information, including those whQ leaked<br />
na~ional intelligence estimates about Iran and revealed the existen~e ofthe warrantless w~retapping'<br />
program maintained.by: the National Security Agency. How~ver,Jle also said he had no p~oblem with<br />
people"YhQ disclosed such information as. an act ofcivil disobedience and accepted what follpwed.<br />
"Disclosing it was ok~y, ifa per~on is willing to stand' up and say, II.dia it. Give me the consequences,llt<br />
the judge,said. Ellis said he wanted Frank!in's punis.hmeQt to serve as a "b~acon" to' other officials,that .<br />
they wou~d face serious consequences ifthey committed similar breaches.<br />
"Secrets a~e important to a nat~on. Ifwe couldn't keep our' secrets, we would be at great risk," ~he judge<br />
said. Franklin pled guilty it\,2005 to thr~e felony,counts involving illegal distribution and possession of<br />
classified information. He had been free pe~ding the.trial for the two ex-Aipac officials. His attorney,<br />
Plato Cacheris,'saia the fonile~ policy'analyst h~d trouble finding good work. "He's been digging<br />
ditches. H~ls been cleat:ling cesspools," the attorney said. The infonnation that Franklin gave to the two<br />
AIPAC lobbyists has never,been officially detailed, but it related to the threat Iran posed to U.S. fo~ces<br />
in.the region. He also acknowledged numerous meetings with an Israeli diplomat,':Nao! Gilon.<br />
In a pleaJor lenienctThursday,:Ftanklin said he was,motivated solely by "love ofour republic and by<br />
the safetY ofour militarypersonnerthat were about to go' into Iraq." ..He insisted .~e wasn't tryipg.toJeak <br />
anything, but simply to use a'back channel to alert "a particular NSC source" to the danger~\hi,Iraq .. .The,~- .<br />
ex-Pentagon analys~ didn't know at th~ time that Rosen and Weissman worked for th~ pro-i~i~J 1 t ~ ! i<br />
lobby~ng group. Franklin said he wanted to spend time'instructing Y0'!1lg people ~'about th¢ t~e~t that I!. ~'f<br />
civilization faces from those who would replace us," who he indicated were theJorces of "~ad~~ai' I .i't ... \<br />
Islam.". "0~e object of..our ~dversaries is to force us to change internally. What I did was P.1!ly'.~~g into; ~ -'1" t.<br />
that obJectJ.ve,"·Franklm satd. l .\ . 1I -I<br />
Franklin said he was "grateful to' b.e.in a countrY. where the rule ofla~ Rlld a respect for hurpa*$gh~is \ ~ " :~<br />
r I,! 4"<br />
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}~ vibrant." Ellis quickly interrupted. "You believe rule ofla'V is i.1nportant? ....I've lived in-countries<br />
where there isn't rule oflaw. I was born in one," the Colombian-bomjurist said. "And what really<br />
[matters] is whether government officials obey the law." Franklin said he did believe in the rule oflaw<br />
and he acknowledged "serious errors in judgment. II That triggered another salvQ from the judge: IIAn<br />
error is putting on the wrong color tie," Ellis sai4. "We're talking about crimes."<br />
Earlier, Cacheris argued that the.govemment's request ofeight years imprisonment for Franklin "smacks<br />
ofvengeance" stemming from the decision to abandon the prosecution against Rosen and Weissman.<br />
"It's just not justified," the defense attorney said. He insisted the decision to drop the case against the<br />
two ex-lobbyists "was not because ofanything Mr. Franklin did." Cacheris's description ofFranklin's<br />
cooperation also produced some intriguing news. "He's given them other cases involving people who<br />
cannot come into this country, II the defense lawyer said cryptically. Cacheris also sugge...sted that<br />
Franklin was the target ofwitness tampering in the Aipac case. ~<br />
"Someone came to approach Franklin to have him, in effect, disappear," the defense attorney said. He<br />
said Franklin immediately reported the incident to authorities. -Cacheris did not elaborate Qn the<br />
episode, but it could help explain why the EJU sought to interview Jewish leaders several years ago<br />
about attempts to provide financial assistance oremployment to Rosen and Weissman. Prosecutor Neil<br />
Hammerstrom suggested Franklin deserved more severe punishment than Rosen and Weissman, had<br />
they been convicted.<br />
"I~ many ways, he was a more significant violator than Rosen and Weissman ever were alleged to be,"<br />
the prosecutor said. "Ifyou don't have people like Mr. Franklin in government doing that, you don't<br />
hav~ people [outside] passing classified information." Hainmerstrom also noted that Franklin took topsecret<br />
information to his home even after being disciplined for such activity. "You have before you an<br />
individual that just can't seem to f~llow the law when it comes to cl~sified information," the prosecutor<br />
said. He said Frankliti deserved credit for cooperating, but that his assistance had not been "ideal."<br />
In response to a question from Ellis Thursday, Franklin confirmed speculation thathis rende~ous with<br />
Rosen and Weissman was arranged by Michael Makovsky, a former energy analyst for the Pentagon.<br />
Makovsky, who has left the government, was not charged in the case and was expected to be a witness<br />
at the trial ofRosen and Weissman Before the main hearing Thursday, lawyers spent nearly halfan hour<br />
arguing behind closed doors about whether the re-sentencing snould be open to the public.<br />
The judge eventually allowed the press and public into the courtroom, though he said portions ofcourt<br />
,filings about Franklin's sentence will remain under seal. As the hearing concluded i!1 the case, which<br />
has been the subjected ofhard-fought legal battles for nearly four years, the judge stniggled to<br />
maintained his composure. He praised prosecutors and defense lawyers. "You all did a very goodjob,"<br />
said Ellis, who is now semi-retired. -<br />
..<br />
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