EURASIAN DISUNION

EURASIAN DISUNION 

Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks 

__________________________________________________ 

By Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova 

Washington, DC 

June 2016

THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION 

Published in the United States by 

The Jamestown Foundation 

1310 L Street NW 

Suite 810 

Washington, DC 20005 

http://www.jamestown.org 

Copyright © 2016 The Jamestown Foundation 

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this 

book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written consent. 

For copyright and permissions information, contact The Jamestown 

Foundation, 1310 L Street NW, Suite 810, Washington, DC 20005. 

The views expressed in the book are those of the authors and not necessarily 

those of The Jamestown Foundation. 

For more information on this book of The Jamestown Foundation, email 

pubs@jamestown.org. 

ISBN: 978-0-9855045-5-7 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Names: Bugajski, Janusz, 1954- author. | Assenova, Margarita author. 

Title: Eurasian disunion : Russia's vulnerable flanks / Janusz Bugajski and 

Margarita Assenova. 

Description: Washington, DC : The Jamestown Foundation, 2016. 

Identifiers: LCCN 2015034025 | ISBN 9780985504557 (pbk.) 

Subjects: LCSH: Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations--21st century. | 

Russia (Federation)--Boundaries. | Geopolitics--Russia (Federation) | 

Geopolitics--Eurasia. 

Classification: LCC JZ1616 .B839 2015 | DDC 327.47--dc23 

LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015034025 

Cover art provided by Peggy Archambault of Peggy Archambault Design.

i 

Jamestown’s Mission 

The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy 

makers and the broader community about events and trends in those 

societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United 

States and which frequently restrict access to such information. 

Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is 

delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only 

source of information which should be, but is not always, available 

through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to 

Eurasia and terrorism. 

Origins 

Founded in 1984 by William Geimer, The Jamestown Foundation 

made a direct contribution to the downfall of Communism through 

its dissemination of information about the closed totalitarian societies 

of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 

William Geimer worked with Arkady Shevchenko, the highestranking 

Soviet official ever to defect when he left his position as 

undersecretary general of the United Nations. Shevchenko’s memoir 

Breaking With Moscow revealed the details of Soviet superpower 

diplomacy, arms control strategy and tactics in the Third World, at 

the height of the Cold War. Through its work with Shevchenko, 

Jamestown rapidly became the leading source of information about 

the inner workings of the captive nations of the former Communist 

Bloc. In addition to Shevchenko, Jamestown assisted the former top 

Romanian intelligence officer Ion Pacepa in writing his memoirs. 

Jamestown ensured that both men published their insights and 

experience in what became bestselling books. Even today, several 

decades later, some credit Pacepa’s revelations about Ceausescu’s 

regime in his bestselling book Red Horizons with the fall of that 

government and the freeing of Romania.

ii 

The Jamestown Foundation has emerged as a leading provider of 

information about Eurasia. Our research and analysis on conflict and 

instability in Eurasia enabled Jamestown to become one of the most 

reliable sources of information on the post-Soviet space, the Caucasus 

and Central Asia as well as China. Furthermore, since 9/11, 

Jamestown has utilized its network of indigenous experts in more than 

50 different countries to conduct research and analysis on terrorism 

and the growth of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda offshoots throughout the 

globe. 

By drawing on our ever-growing global network of experts, 

Jamestown has become a vital source of unfiltered, open-source 

information about major conflict zones around the world—from the 

Black Sea to Siberia, from the Persian Gulf to Latin America and the 

Pacific. Our core of intellectual talent includes former high-ranking 

government officials and military officers, political scientists, 

journalists, scholars and economists. Their insight contributes 

significantly to policymakers engaged in addressing today’s newly 

emerging global threats in the post 9/11 world.

iii 

Table of Contents 

Jamestown’s Mission…………………………………………...i 

Acknowledgements…………………………………………....iv 

Foreword………………………………………………………..v 

Executive Summary……………………………………………1 

1. Introduction: Russia’s Imperial Agenda…………………...3 

2. Northern Flank: Baltic and Nordic………………………..66 

3. Western Flank: East Central Europe…………………….139 

4. South Western Flank: South East Europe……………….219 

5. Southern Flank: South Caucasus………………………....282 

6. South Eastern Flank: Central Asia……………………….370 

7. Conclusion: Russia’s Future and Western Responses…..461 

Appendix I: Maps of Vulnerable Flanks……………………499 

Appendix II: Author Biographies…………………………..504

iv 

Acknowledgements 

We would like to extend our utmost thanks to all the people we 

consulted and debated in Washington and along each of Russia’s 

vulnerable flanks in the Wider Europe and Central Asia. Our sincere 

gratitude to The Jamestown Foundation and its President Glen 

Howard for being at the forefront of prescient analysis on Russia and 

the “Eurasian” world. Finally, exceptional praise for Matthew Czekaj, 

Program Associate for Europe and Eurasia at The Jamestown 

Foundation, for his outstanding and rapid reaction editing.

v 

Foreword 

This monumental work dissects the international ambitions of the 

Russian government under the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Since he 

gained power over fifteen years ago, the former KGB colonel has 

focused his attention on rebuilding a Moscow-centered bloc in order 

to return Russia to global superpower status and to compete 

geopolitically with the West. As a result of the Kremlin’s expansionist 

objectives, the security of several regions that border the Russian 

Federation has been undermined and, in some cases, the national 

independence and territorial integrity of nearby states has been 

violated. 

Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova’s thoroughly researched 

volume not only assesses Moscow’s ambitions, strategies and tactics, 

it also meticulously details the various tools used by the Kremlin to 

integrate or subvert its neighbors and to weaken NATO and the 

European Union. It examines five major flanks along Russia’s borders 

that are particularly prone to Moscow’s aggressiveness—from the 

Arctic and the Baltic to the Caspian and Central Asia—and analyzes 

the various instruments of pressure that Moscow employs against 

individual states. 

No other work of this depth and breadth has been produced to date. 

At a time when Russia’s revisionism and expansionism is accelerating, 

it is essential reading for policymakers and students of competitive 

geopolitics. In addition to examining Russia’s assertive policies, the 

authors assess the future role of NATO, the EU, and the US in the 

Wider Europe and offer several concrete policy recommendations for 

Washington and Brussels that would consolidate a more effective 

trans-Atlantic alliance to ensure the security of states bordering a

vi 

volatile Russia. 

Glen Howard 

President, Jamestown Foundation 

May 2016

Executive Summary 

Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the dismemberment of its territory is 

not an isolated operation. It constitutes one component of a broader 

strategic agenda to rebuild a Moscow-centered bloc designed to 

compete with the West. The acceleration of President Vladimir 

Putin’s neo-imperial project has challenged the security of several 

regions that border the Russian Federation, focused attention on the 

geopolitical aspects of the Kremlin’s ambitions, and sharpened the 

debate on the future role of NATO, the EU, and the US in the Wider 

Europe. 

This book is intended to generate a more informed policy debate on 

the dangers stemming from the restoration of a Russian-centered 

“pole of power” or “sphere of influence” in Eurasia. It focuses on five 

vulnerable flanks bordering the Russian Federation—the Baltic and 

Nordic zones, East Central Europe, South East Europe, South 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. It examines several pivotal questions 

including: the strategic objectives of Moscow’s expansionist 

ambitions; Kremlin tactics and capabilities; the impact of Russia’s 

assertiveness on the national security of its neighbors; the responses 

of vulnerable states to Russia’s geopolitical ambitions; the impact of 

prolonged regional turmoil on the stability of the Russian Federation 

and the survival of the Putinist regime; and the repercussions of 

heightened regional tensions for US, NATO, and EU policy toward 

Russia and toward unstable regions bordering the Russian Federation.

2 | EURASIAN DISUNION 

The book concludes with concrete policy recommendations for 

Washington and Brussels in the wake of the escalating confrontation 

with Russia. The Western approach toward Moscow needs to focus 

on consolidating a dynamic trans-Atlantic alliance, repelling and 

deterring a belligerent Russia, ensuring the security of all states 

bordering Russia, and preparing for a potential implosion of the 

Russian Federation.

1. Introduction: Russia’s Imperial 

Agenda 

Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2014 and the subsequent 

dismemberment of its territory is not an isolated operation. It 

constitutes one component of a much broader strategic agenda to 

rebuild a Moscow-centered bloc that is intended to compete with the 

West. The acceleration of Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperial project, 

prepared and implemented after he assumed the office of President in 

December 1999, has challenged the security of several regions that 

border the Russian Federation, refocused attention on the ideological 

and geopolitical aspects of the Kremlin’s ambitions, and sharpened 

the debate on the future role of NATO, the European Union, and the 

United States in the Wider Europe. 

To enable more effective Western responses to the growing threats 

from Moscow, urgently needed is a comprehensive assessment of the 

dangers stemming from the attempted restoration of a Russiancentered 

“pole of power” or “sphere of influence” in a loosely-defined 

“Eurasia.” This book is intended to generate a more informed policy 

debate by focusing on five regional flanks bordering the Russian 

Federation that remain vulnerable to Moscow’s subversion—the 

Baltic and Nordic zones (northern flank), East Central Europe 

(western flank), South East Europe (southwestern flank), South 

Caucasus (southern flank), and Central Asia (southeastern flank).


The book chronicles the diverse tools applied by the Kremlin against 

targeted neighbors and examines several pivotal questions: the 

strategic objectives of Moscow’s expansionist ambitions; the 

Kremlin’s tactics and capabilities; the impact of Russia’s assertiveness 

on the national security of its neighbors; the responses of vulnerable 

states to Russia’s geopolitical ambitions; the impact of prolonged 

regional turmoil on the stability of the Russian Federation and the 

survival of the Putinist regime; and the repercussions of heightened 

regional tensions for US, NATO, and EU policy toward Russia and 

toward unstable regions bordering the Russian Federation. 

Moscow’s Ambitions 

Following Putin’s installment as Russia’s President on December 31, 

1999, legitimized in presidential elections in March 2000, the Kremlin 

has been controlled by a narrow group of senior military, defense 

industry, and security service leaders, together with loyal state 

bureaucrats and tycoons or oligarchs owning or managing key 

national industries. This ruling elite is presided over by the primary 

decision-maker, former KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 

Bezopasnosti, Committee for State Security) Colonel Vladimir Putin. 

The balance of power between different political factions has been a 

wellspring of speculation for Kremlinologists. Nonetheless, regardless 

of potential factionalism and diverse sectoral interests, Russia’s 

foreign policy objectives have proved relatively consistent under 

Putin’s rule. The narrow elite has exhibited no substantive dissenting 

voices, and key national decisions are reached within the presidential 

administration and not in the government cabinet. In this centralized 

and hierarchical context, it is valuable to consider the contours of 

Russia’s external policy goals. 

Some analysts have difficulties in explaining Putin’s motives. 1 Is 

staying in power the only ultimate goal, as a few observers have 

suggested, or is the prolonged maintenance of power necessary in

INTRODUCTION | 5 

order to achieve certain broader objectives? 2 The notion that the 

Kremlin’s domestic politics rather than its security calculations are at 

the root of Moscow’s foreign policy revanchism is too narrow and 

simplistic, as internal and external policies are closely intertwined. 

The maintenance of domestic power may be undergirded by personal 

ambitions, but it also incorporates broader dimensions to be effective, 

whether populist, messianic, nationalist, or imperialist. Putin appears 

to harbor a messiah complex, convinced that he serves a noble 

historical purpose to restore Russia’s glory and power. 3 For Putin and 

his entourage, Russia is an imperial enterprise. 

Putin spent the first few years of his presidency amassing personal 

control through the “power vertical” and by constructing a “managed 

democracy” beholden to the Kremlin. In this system, central and 

regional governments are selected by the Kremlin, parliament rubber 

stamps presidential decisions, presidential and parliamentary 

elections are defrauded, and the political opposition is harassed, 

marginalized, or outlawed. Putin’s presidential tenure has also been 

substantially extended. Under the amended constitution, Putin was 

elected for the third time on May 7, 2012, for six years and will be 

entitled to run again for President in 2018 for another six-year 

mandate. 

The notion that Putin’s only objective is to stay in power and amass a 

personal fortune regardless of the risk to Russia’s national interests 

fails to explain Moscow's assertive and confrontational foreign policy. 

It can be argued that deeper cooperation with the West would bring 

more extensive economic benefits and international legitimacy that 

would in turn strengthen Putin’s position inside Russia and expand 

his private assets. Engineering conflicts with neighbors and provoking 

disputes with Western governments can undermine the President’s 

position by damaging economic development and undermining 

Russia’s global standing even though, in the short term, the Kremlin 

is able to mobilize society against alleged external enemies to raise 

Putin’s popularity and support government policy.


The primary objective of Moscow’s foreign policy is to restore Russia 

as a major center or pole of power in a multipolar or multi-centric 

world. 4 Following the return of Putin to Russia’s presidency in May 

2012, after the Dmitry Medvedev interlude (2008–2012), the Kremlin 

reinvigorated its global ambitions and regional assertiveness. It also 

made more explicit the overarching goal to reverse the predominance 

of the United States within Europe and Eurasia. Kremlin officials 

believe that the world should be organized around a new global 

version of the 19 th century “Concert of Europe,” in which a handful of 

great powers balance their interests and smaller countries orbit 

around them. This constitutes multipolarity rather than 

multilateralism. In practice, such an approach would entail restoring 

the Yalta-Potsdam post–World War Two divisions, in which Moscow 

dominates Eurasia and half of Europe, but with a substantially 

diminished US presence in Europe. This would provide Russia with 

strategic depth in its active opposition to the West, including its 

professed values and security structures. 

Western observers frequently repeat the observation that Putin is a 

tactician and not a strategist, but invariably fail to distinguish between 

the two. In essence, tactics are short-term methods while strategies are 

longer-term policies, and both are intended to achieve specific 

objectives. While its goals are imperial, Kremlin strategies and tactics 

are flexible and “pragmatic” and this can make them more effective 

than a rigid approach. They include enticements, threats, incentives, 

pressures, and a variety of subversive actions where Russia’s national 

interests are deemed to predominate over those of its neighbors. By 

claiming that it is pursuing “pragmatic” national interests, the 

Kremlin engages in a combination of offensives by interjecting itself 

in neighbors’ affairs, capturing important sectors of local economies, 

subverting vulnerable political systems, corrupting national leaders, 

penetrating key security institutions, undermining national and 

territorial unity, conducting propaganda offensives through a 

spectrum of media and social outlets, and deploying a host of other 

tools to weaken obstinate governments that resist Moscow.


Putin is often depicted in the West as an “opportunist” and not a 

strategist. However, opportunism is simply a means of benefiting 

from favorable circumstances and not an objective in itself. The 

question is what are Putin's objectives in creating or benefiting from 

opportunities to assert Russian power? Several analysts believe that 

the President may not have a coherent plan or goal to extend or revive 

the Russian empire, but may be simply acting out of spite to 

undermine security in neighboring countries and to obstruct Western 

enlargement. 5 Other analysts not only challenge the existence of any 

plans for imperial restoration, but also claim that the Kremlin simply 

acts defensively to protect its interests in neighboring states from an 

expanding and threatening West. 6 

There is some confusion in such assessments between Russia’s 

ambitions and capabilities. While Moscow’s goals remain fairly clear, 

as the government has consistently stated and acted to consolidate a 

predominant sphere of influence in territories designated as the “post- 

Soviet space,” the regional extent of this Russian sphere, the response 

of each targeted country, and the ability to accomplish such a task 

without provoking substantial international resistance are much less 

predictable. Hence, the methods employed by the Kremlin require 

substantial flexibility, eclecticism, opportunism, and improvisation. 

Since Russia’s attack on Ukraine in early 2014, the term “hybrid war” 

has been widely employed to describe Moscow’s subversion of a 

targeted neighbor. 7 While the concept generally signifies that the 

Kremlin deploys a mix of instruments against its adversaries, it fails to 

pinpoint the tactics, objectives, capabilities, and results of Moscow’s 

offensive. It also assumes that the Kremlin has invented a novel form 

of warfare rather than pursuing a modern adaptation of traditional 

attempts to subvert the psychology, economy, polity, society, and 

military of specific states without necessarily engaging in a direct 

military offensive.


Russia’s neo-imperial geopolitical project no longer relies on Sovietera 

mechanisms vis-à-vis bordering states, such as strict ideological 

allegiance, the penetration and control of local ruling parties and 

security services, periodic military force, the permanent stationing of 

Russian troops, and almost complete enmeshment with the Russian 

economy. Instead, sufficient tools of pressure are applied to try and 

ensure the primary goal—for Moscow to exert predominant influence 

over the foreign and security policies of immediate neighbors so that 

they will either remain neutral or support Russia’s international 

agenda and not challenge the legitimacy of the Putinist system. The 

ultimate goal is to establish protectorates around the country’s 

borders, which do not forge close and independent ties with each 

other and do not enter Western institutions. 

In this expansionist international context, it is useful to distinguish 

between Russia’s national interests and its state ambitions. Moscow’s 

security is not challenged by the accession to NATO of neighboring 

states. However, its ability to control the security dimensions and 

foreign policy orientations of these countries is challenged by their 

incorporation in the Alliance because NATO provides security 

guarantees against Russia's potential aggression. 

While pursuing a neo-imperial agenda, Moscow has also calculated 

that if it cannot control the security policies of its neighbors, it is 

preferable to have uncertainty and insecurity along its borders. This 

enables the Kremlin to frighten its own public with perceptions of 

threat to Russia's stability and to undermine the NATO and EU 

accession prospects of several neighbors. An assertive foreign policy 

helps to distract attention from convulsions inside the Russian 

Federation. Putin’s policy is presented as vital to national security by 

protecting Russia from internal turmoil, avowedly sponsored by 

Washington, in which NATO and EU enlargement is portrayed as 

evidence of aggressive “Russophobia.”


In its eclectic ideological packaging, Putinism consists of a blend of 

Russian statism, great power chauvinism, pan-Slavism, pan- 

Orthodoxy, multi-ethnic Eurasianism, Russian nationalism (with 

increasing ethno-historical ingredients), social conservatism, antiliberalism, 

anti-Americanism, and anti-Westernism. At the heart of 

this heady brew is the notion of restoring Russia’s glory and global 

status that was allegedly subdued and denied after the collapse of the 

Soviet Union through a combination of Western subversion and 

domestic treason. 

In reviving the image of greatness, Russia continues to live in the 

categories of World War Two. The officially promoted historical 

narrative of the “Great Patriotic War” has been employed as a source 

of national unity and loyalty to the state. The war is a key element in 

Moscow’s self-glorifying propaganda. Russia is presented as a global 

power with a stellar history, while Stalinism is depicted as a necessary 

system that modernized the state and defeated Nazi Germany. This 

imparts the message that the current authoritarian regime can also 

violate human rights and capsize living standards, as long as it is 

determined to restore the glory of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir). 

World War Two myths in Russia present two stark stereotypes: people 

who support the Kremlin are patriots and antifascists, while those who 

oppose are labeled as fascists regardless of actual political 

persuasions. 8 

The Putin administration believes that it can violate human rights and 

the integrity of neighboring states in the service of restoring Russia’s 

glory. The “ideology of identity” has grown into a vital component of 

national populism, expressed in the concept of the “Russian World.” 

This collectivist formula is both cultural and genetic and supposedly 

includes all Russian ethnics, Russian speakers, and descendants of 

both categories in any country. The term is underpinned by statist 

messianism, whereby the Russian government is obliged by history 

and divine fate to protect this broad community and defend it in 

particular against Western influences. Various elements of Soviet


chekism (or the cult of state security) have also been revived and 

presented as a rebirth of national pride: “Growing reverence for the 

security apparatus reflects a broader trend toward reverence for 

strong statehood in Russia.” 9 Putin is heralded as a chekist patriot who 

is restoring Russia’s internal order and international stature. 

Russia’s Capabilities 

As a resurgent neo-imperialist power that seeks to prove its 

robustness, Russia cannot display weakness toward the West. Hence, 

the country’s economic limitations and escalating internal problems 

are disguised by state propaganda, while the recreation of a Eurasian 

bloc is supposed to demonstrate that Russia is a rising power and not 

a declining empire. Although Putin’s ambition to create a new 

Moscow-centered Eurasian Union is unlikely to be successful, given 

Russia’s ongoing economic decline and the resistance of most 

neighboring states, attempts to create such a bloc could destabilize a 

broad region along Russia’s long flanks, particularly throughout 

Europe’s East and in Central Asia. 

As the largest Kremlin target, Ukraine serves as a valuable example of 

the impact of Moscow’s imperial ambitions. After Putin returned to 

Russia’s Presidency in May 2012, the Kremlin began to intensify its 

pressures on the former Soviet republics to participate in its 

integrationist projects. Moscow became fearful that the post-Soviet 

territories could drift permanently into either the Western or Chinese 

"spheres of influence." Putin’s Eurasian alliance is thereby designed to 

balance the EU and NATO in the west and China in the east. 

Economic linkages are intended to reinforce political and security 

connections, making it less likely that Russia’s neighbors can join 

alternative blocs. 

To achieve its ambitions, Moscow needs to assemble around itself a 

cluster of states that are loyal or subservient to Russian foreign policy


and security interests. Unlike the EU—where states voluntarily pool 

their sovereignty, decisions are taken by consensus, and no single state 

dominates decision-making—in Moscow’s integrative institutions, 

countries are expected to permanently surrender elements of their 

sovereignty to the center. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 

major multi-national organizations promoted by the Kremlin to 

enhance Eurasian integration have included the Commonwealth of 

Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization 

(CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), the Customs 

Union (CU), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The EEU was 

formally established in January 2015 as the optimal multi-national 

format. 10 

The transition to the EEU has been described as the final goal of 

economic integration and is to include a free trade regime, unified 

customs and nontariff regulation measures, common access to 

internal markets, a unified transportation system, a common energy 

market, and a single currency. These integrative economic measures 

are to be undergirded by a tighter political and security alliance both 

through the CSTO and in bilateral arrangements with Russia. 11 

Putin was encouraged in his neo-imperial restorationist endeavors by 

favorable international conditions, most evident in the approach of 

President Barack Obama’s administration. As a by-product of the 

White House accommodating “reset” policy toward Moscow, 

launched in early 2009, Washington curtailed its campaign to enlarge 

NATO and secure the post-Soviet neighborhood within Western 

structures. This increased the vulnerability of several states to 

Moscow’s pressures and enticements and convinced Putin that his 

freedom of maneuver in the post-Soviet sphere was expanding. 

Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Central 

Asian states were not priority interests for the White House, and some 

US policy makers appeared to approve of a Russian political and 

economic umbrella over these countries.


The net impact of the Obama approach was to convince Moscow that 

the US was withdrawing from international commitments after the 

Iraq and Afghanistan wars and had neither the resources, political 

will, nor public support to challenge Russia’s re-imperialization. 

Moscow also concluded that despite the EU’s Eastern Partnership 

outreach program, the European Union would remain divided and 

preoccupied with its internal problems and would not challenge 

Russia’s economic hegemony among its immediate neighbors. 

Moscow’s assumptions have been partly vindicated by the ease of its 

division of Ukraine, through the capture of Crimea, and the limited 

economic sanctions imposed by Western capitals. Nonetheless, 

Russia’s assault on Ukraine has also unleashed protective measures in 

several neighboring states and revived calls for strengthening NATO’s 

presence throughout Europe’s East. 

In the aftermath of the crisis over Ukraine, Moscow has reanimated 

the Western geopolitical scapegoat. It justifies its attack on Ukraine as 

a necessary offensive to counter Western subversion and 

destabilization. Russia’s leaders depict the West as dangerous and 

unpredictable, and accuse the US of using “irregular warfare” such as 

NGOs and multinational institutions, including the International 

Monetary Fund (IMF), to conduct “color revolutions” and destabilize 

Russia. 12 Hence, any attempt at democratization along its borders 

makes Russia more vulnerable to Western machinations. Russia is 

also allegedly the victim of NATO expansion, whereby the 

incorporation of East Central Europe (ECE) in the North Atlantic 

Alliance was primarily intended to undermine Moscow. The next 

stage purportedly planned by Washington is to foster conflicts within 

the Russian Federation by using civil society, mass media, and human 

rights groups and by supporting Islamic insurgencies. Westernization 

is deemed a subversive weapon embodying many elements of 

Russophobia. 

Putin has declared that Russia is under a growing multitude of outside 

threats emanating from the US and its allies. In particular, the West


purportedly organized and provoked the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 in 

order to have an excuse to reinvigorate NATO and deploy Western 

forces closer to Russia’s borders. Moscow will respond by deploying 

new offensive nuclear weapons aimed at Western nations, by 

updating its air and missile defense system, and by producing new 

precision-guided weapons. 13 Moscow is also determined to violate any 

treaty that obstructs its imperial agenda, including the December 1994 

Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances intended to 

guarantee the inviolability of Ukraine’s borders. 

Russia's new military doctrine signed by Putin in December 2014 

describes an increasingly threatening international environment that 

can generate problems at home. 14 It claims intensifying “global 

competition” and direct threats emanating from NATO and the US in 

particular. The document contends that among the most serious 

regional hazards are conspiracies to “overturn legitimate 

government” in neighboring states and establish regimes that threaten 

Russia's interests. Such alleged American ploys are linked with the 

placement of Western forces in countries adjoining Russia and 

NATO’s development of anti-ballistic missile (ABM), space-based, 

and rapid reaction forces. The new military doctrine also calls for 

Moscow to counter the use of communications technologies against 

Russia, such as cyber-warfare and social networks. 

Moscow asserts that it will counter Western attempts to gain strategic 

superiority by deploying strategic missile defense systems. 15 It also 

reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of 

nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its 

allies, and even in case of “aggression” against Russia with 

conventional weapons that would endanger the existence of the state. 

The underlying geopolitical objective of the Eurasian Economic 

Union (EEU) is to create an alternative power center to EU 

integration. 

16 

However, the politically motivated EEU is a 

protectionist arrangement that will cost Russia substantial amounts of


resources, harm its economy, and further alienate the country 

internationally. It may also retard the economic development of other 

integrated states. By contrast, the “deep and comprehensive free trade 

agreements” (DCFTA) offered by the EU to many post-Soviet states 

is based on the removal of tariff barriers and the adoption of a large 

part of EU regulations. The stimulus offered by the EU for integration 

into its internal market restricts Russia’s opportunities to maintain 

political control over these states. It also promotes commitments to 

EU principles of legalism and governance and the application of 

regulatory standards in exchange for access to a market with a 

population of 500 million and with rapid growth potential. 17 

By contrast, EEU membership could mean lower energy prices, freer 

trade in the Eurasian space with a population of 170 million but with 

significantly lower purchasing power than in the EU, as well as slow 

economic restructuring and the strengthening of oligarchic and 

authoritarian management. In exchange for low energy prices and 

access to its domestic market, Russia intends to take over strategic 

sectors of the EEU economies and strengthen its influence within 

member states. This would guarantee that each state remains tethered 

to Russia regardless of leadership changes and the temptations of 

Western integration. 

Through enhanced free trade agreements, the EU does not prevent 

further integration of the post-Soviet countries with each other, but 

once they become parties to Russia’s Customs Union and the EEU, 

they are deprived of the opportunity to have bilateral agreements with 

the EU. Hence, each European capital needs to make a choice, as 

participation in customs agreements involving countries that have not 

harmonized their legislative framework with EU requirements 

precludes free trade with the EU. In sum, the EEU is incompatible 

with the core principles of the EU’s external policy: it remains a 

project for trade simplification between non-liberal regimes.


Russia’s escalating economic difficulties following the drastic fall in 

crude oil prices in 2014–2015 and the gradual impact of Western 

financial sanctions led to a ruble crisis and heightened the risk of 

maintaining close economic ties with Russia. All three of Moscow’s 

EEU partners (Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) have been 

negatively affected by the collapse in value of Russia’s currency. 18 For 

instance, the decline in the Russian market because of Western 

sanctions and the collapse of oil prices has cost the Belarusian 

economy almost $3 billion. 19 Moreover, the EEU is rife with internal 

divisions that will render it ineffective and unattractive to the broader 

region. In a sign of growing friction, after Moscow imposed retaliatory 

sanctions on EU agricultural produce in the summer of 2014, Belarus 

benefitted by re-exporting EU goods to Russia. The Kremlin reacted 

in November 2014 by banning the import of meat and dairy products 

from Belarus. In sum, divisions between an economically unstable 

Russia and its anxious neighbors will result in an ineffective and weak 

EEU. 

The most grievous repercussions of Moscow’s empire building have 

been witnessed in Ukraine, which remains the key prize in Kremlin 

plans to recombine the former Soviet republics. With control over 

Ukraine, Moscow could project its influence into Central Europe; 

without Ukraine, the planned Eurasian bloc would become a largely 

north Asian construct or a patchwork of states most susceptible to 

Moscow’s pressures. 

The anti-Ukrainian war launched in February 2014 was coordinated 

from the Kremlin, as only the President’s office possesses the levers of 

control necessary to conduct such an operation. The Kremlin’s main 

fear in Ukraine was not the avowedly endangered status of the 

Russian-speaking population. Its public paranoia was rooted in the 

prospect of Ukraine developing into a democratic, unified, and 

increasingly prosperous state that moves toward EU accession and 

eventual NATO membership. Such a model of development could 

become increasingly attractive for Russia’s other neighbors and even


for some of Russia’s diverse regions. This would challenge the 

legitimacy and longevity of the kleptocratic and authoritarian Putinist 

system. For the Putinists, an independent and democratic Ukraine 

symbolizes everything that threatens their hold on power and disrupts 

plans to restore a Greater Russia. At the core of this deep hostility is 

the convenient conviction that Kyiv experienced a coup d'état 

camouflaged as a “color revolution” engineered by the West and 

ultimately designed to destroy Russia. 

The various “color revolutions,” whether Rose in Georgia (2003) or 

Orange in Ukraine (2004), are viewed in the West as indigenous 

attempts to prevent authoritarian backsliding, electoral manipulation, 

and popular disenfranchisement in the post-Soviet world. US and 

Western European organizations may have played supportive roles in 

these popular rebellions, but it was local activists who mobilized the 

public against the abusive elites. The ultimate outcome of such 

rebellions may be corroded or even reversed over time, but they 

provide hope that broader sectors of society can have a voice in the 

political process. 

For Russian officials and pro-Kremlin analysts, “color revolutions” 

are negative phenomenon imposed from outside with unpredictable 

consequences. And if the results threaten to culminate in democratic 

reforms and Western integration, then the revolutions must be 

countered. Hence, the covert attack and partition of Ukraine are 

intended to prove that Ukraine is a failing state. Furthermore, in all 

post-Soviet countries, regardless of their political structures, the 

Kremlin seeks to limit national sovereignty by deciding on their 

foreign policy and security orientations. 

In justifying foreign intervention, Aleksandr Bortnikov, head of the 

KGB successor, the Federal Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba 

Bezopasnosti, FSB), stated that his agency would react quickly and 

harshly to any attempt to overthrow existing regimes in the post- 

Soviet countries. 20 This indicates a pervasive fear in the Kremlin that


the Ukrainian revolution against a government devoid of public trust 

could be replicated in Russia itself. Bortnikov claimed that 

“destructive forces” were financed by Western NGOs, thereby giving 

Russia’s security services a license to target social activists, private 

institutions, and the liberal political opposition at home and to 

combat Western-inspired revolutions among its neighbors. 

Arsenal of Subversion 

Moscow employs diverse tools and methods to undermine its 

adversaries and to control its allies. It pursues various forms of 

subversion against specific states, with the exact recipe of policies 

dependent on the vulnerabilities and responses of targeted capitals. 

The Kremlin arsenal consists of a mixture of threats, pressures, 

enticements, rewards, and punishments, and it can be grouped into 

eight main clusters: international, informational, ideological, 

economic, ethnic, political, social, and military. 

International 

1. Diplomatic Pressures: High-level visits by Russian dignitaries or 

the deliberate snubbing of certain governments serve as standard 

diplomatic devices to extract concessions and voice approval or 

disapproval for specific foreign policies. Treaties and other interstate 

agreements are highlighted, ignored, or rejected to exert 

pressure on specific governments. Even when bilateral treaties 

recognizing existing borders are signed with neighbors, their 

ratification by the parliament is deliberately delayed or their 

validity is overlooked. Sometimes, grander historical justifications 

are offered that purportedly invalidate an existing accord, as 

witnessed in the forceful annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 

2014.


The Russian parliament (Duma) also influences the political 

climate through combative statements and radical policy 

prescriptions by deputies that may make the government appear 

more moderate. This injects a sense of threat toward neighbors 

and raises regional anxieties. For instance, some Duma deputies 

have questioned the legality of the break-up of the USSR and the 

independence of the Baltic states and other former Soviet 

republics. 

2. Deceptive Diplomacy: This can include offers of peace talks, 

mediation efforts, and conflict resolution at a time when Moscow 

is pursuing state dismemberment and other forms of subversion 

against specific neighbors. Deception, disinformation, and denial 

of responsibility for aggression are customary hallmarks of 

Russian foreign policy. Deception operations to mislead foreign 

political and military leaders are coordinated and conducted 

through diplomatic channels and government agencies in which 

false information is leaked and actual policy measures are 

camouflaged. Moscow also favors secret and bilateral meetings 

with US and EU representatives that can decide on some pressing 

questions in order to split any unified position by its Western 

adversaries. 

3. Strategic Posturing: Instead of posing as a superior systemic and 

economic alternative to the West, as it did during the Soviet era, 

the Kremlin depicts Russia as an indispensable global partner. 

Supposedly, cooperation with Moscow is vital in resolving 

numerous international problems, including Iran’s and North 

Korea’s nuclear programs, the spread of jihadist terrorism, the 

proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), global 

climate change, economic security, and a number of regional 

disputes. To underscore Russia’s importance and gain advantages 

in other areas, officials engage in strategic blackmail by asserting 

that they can terminate their diplomatic assistance to Washington


or Brussels if they are opposed in some other policy domain. 

Conversely, the positive outcome of US-Russia cooperation may 

be stressed in various arenas to remove the spotlight from 

Moscow’s attack on a neighbor, to discourage Western sanctions, 

and to encourage further collaboration. The overriding message is 

that Russia must be afforded a free hand in its post-Soviet 

neighborhood in return for its cooperation on matters of more 

vital concern to Washington and Brussels. 

4. International Self-Defense: Russian leaders portray the country as 

the bastion of international law and the defender of independent 

statehood around the globe. Russia’s “sovereign democracy” is 

displayed as a valid political model that can be emulated more 

widely, especially as protection against American imperialism. 

Washington is supposedly intent on severing economic ties 

between Russia and the EU in order to boost America’s 

competitive position. It is also encircling Russia with loyal 

regimes, building a missile defense system to disarm Russia, and 

taking other aggressive measures to prevent Moscow from 

restoring its rightful role as a global power. Such policies are 

allegedly mirrored toward other emerging powers, particularly 

China. In an act of self-defense to counterbalance US political and 

economic hegemony, Moscow has formed the Eurasian Economic 

Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization 

(CSTO) on the former Soviet territories and is an active member 

of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS 

(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) initiative. It casts 

itself as the bastion of global protection against the aggressive 

West and a hegemonic America. 

5. Ambassadorial Interference: The appointment of high-ranking 

or Kremlin-connected Russian politicians as ambassadors to 

neighboring states engenders a more intensive involvement in 

domestic politics and resembles a quasi-colonial or protectorate 

relationship. In some cases, as in Serbia, Montenegro, and


Macedonia, Russian ambassadors have been publicly outspoken 

against NATO enlargement and pose as the defenders of 

incumbent governments against Western pressures and US 

interference. Conversely, some foreign diplomats stationed in 

Moscow and other Russian cities have been subject to verbal and 

physical harassment as well as media defamation with the evident 

approval of the authorities in Moscow. 

6. Espionage Enhancement: A substantial increase in Russian 

embassy staff has been recorded in every Central and East 

European capital since Putin’s assumption of power in 1999, 

indicating that espionage activities have greatly expanded through 

Russia’s missions abroad. Russia has hundreds of intelligence 

officers at work in Europe, recruiting thousands of agents. 21 They 

are sometimes based at embassies and other diplomatic missions 

under official cover, but in many cases work as business people, 

academics, or students to penetrate targeted societies. Russia’s 

three major espionage services have benefited from increasing 

funding during Putin’s term: the Foreign Intelligence Service 

(Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, SVR); the Federal Security Service 

(Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB), and the military 

intelligence service (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye, 

GRU). SVR, FSB, and GRU operations against the West have 

expanded to levels reminiscent of the height of the Cold War. 

Many of the spies are younger and more educated than during the 

Soviet era and have an ideological commitment to restoring 

Russia’s global status. 

7. Spy Recruitment: Russia’s espionage networks help identify 

corruptible or otherwise vulnerable politicians, officials, 

businesspeople, journalists, academics, and other public figures in 

the West. They also seek to recruit border guards and law 

enforcement personnel as informers. Moscow has also 

accumulated substantial experience in conducting “false flag”


operations, in which individuals are recruited under the guise of 

different causes, such as environmentalism, media freedom, 

minority rights, or campaigns against government surveillance in 

the West. 

8. Intelligence Penetration: Former intelligence and counterintelligence 

contacts in the former Communist states are utilized 

by Moscow, especially as some governments have possessed a 

limited new pool of agents and continue to employ professionals 

with ex-KGB connections. Western intelligence services remain 

concerned about Communist-era links and have demanded the 

protection of intelligence sources and a thorough screening of 

operatives, especially if a country aspires to NATO entry. Periodic 

revelations about the extent of Russia’s espionage also serve 

Kremlin objectives by discrediting the trustworthiness and 

competence of government agencies in states canvassing for 

NATO accession or already Alliance members but supposedly 

penetrated by hostile foreign services. 

9. Creating Legal Chaos: Russia is creating legal chaos in a number 

of neighboring countries where it has intervened to establish or 

occupy separate territorial units or to annex them. “Frozen 

conflicts” are de facto territories where these is legal confusion for 

local residents. By annexing Crimea, supporting separatism in 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, backing secessionism in 

Transnistria, and propping up independence claims in the 

Donbas region of Ukraine, Russia creates legal pandemonium 

that may never be resolved. 

The main legal problems resulting from these actions concern 

citizenship. In Crimea, a large share of the population retains 

Ukrainian citizenship and opposes Russia’s annexation of the 

peninsula. In the Russian-occupied Georgian provinces of 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thousands of Georgians refuse to 

denounce their citizenship and face harassment and frequent


detention by the self-proclaimed authorities. 22 In Moldova, the 

majority of Transnistria’s residents hold Russian, Ukrainian, or 

some other passports besides Moldovan, as the Transnistrian 

document is not recognized internationally and is not valid for 

travel. However, in 2014, thousands of Transnistrian residents 

applied to obtain Moldovan passports to take advantage of 

Moldova’s newly granted visa-free regime with the EU, despite 

Tiraspol’s request to the Russian Duma to draft a law that would 

allow their territory to join Russia. 23 By the end of 2014, half of 

Transnistria’s residents had confirmed their Moldovan 

citizenship. 24 

Moscow is finding it particularly difficult to bring Crimea into the 

common Russian legal space, because of differences in Ukrainian 

and Russian laws, penal codes, property deeds registration, 

benefits distribution, as well as the existing shortage of judiciary 

staff in the peninsula. According to Russian legal experts, even if a 

complete adaptation to Russian laws is concluded within two to 

three years, implementation will take much longer and the process 

will have an impact on Russia’s own legal system. 25 

10. Criminal Exploitation: Russia’s extensive international criminal 

networks are both a destabilizing socio-economic element and a 

tool of Moscow’s political interests. The security services maintain 

close links with organized criminal syndicates, whereby the 

criminals obtain enhanced protection and the espionage network 

gains intelligence and wider access in targeted states. The Kremlin 

benefits from organized crime to penetrate neighboring 

economies, judiciaries, and political systems, and to operate as a 

shadow intelligence agency. 26


Informational 

11. Cyberspace Warfare: This includes systematic assaults and 

denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on government sites by Kremlinorchestrated 

hackers, as witnessed in Estonia, Georgia, and 

Ukraine during their confrontations with Moscow. It can also 

entail the monitoring of telecommunications and infecting 

targeted networks with various viruses. For instance, in 2014 a 

Russian hacking group exploited a previously unknown flaw in 

Microsoft’s Windows operating system to spy on NATO, 

Ukraine’s government, and other national security targets. 27 The 

group has been active since 2009, according to research by iSight 

Partners, a cyber security firm. Its targets in the 2014 campaign 

also included a Polish energy firm, a Western European 

government agency, and a French telecommunications company. 

12. Trolling Offensives: The Kremlin recruits trolls either to write 

imaginary and inflammatory news reports or to disrupt the social 

media with provocative and disruptive comments. 28 The Kremlin’s 

“troll army” reportedly includes hundreds of paid bloggers who 

saturate Internet forums, social networks, and comments sections 

of Western publications with diatribes lambasting the West and 

praising Putin. Kremlin-sponsored youth groups are believed to 

fund online trolling activities. Following its attack on Ukraine, 

Moscow substantially increased its trolling offensives; Ukrainian 

news outlets have published long lists of people and sites that 

featured the activities of pro-Kremlin trolls. 

13. Propaganda Attacks: Russia’s “information offensive” or overall 

propaganda assault on the West is widely organized and well 

funded. During the Cold War, Soviet authorities used the term 

“active measures” to denote a combination of propaganda and 

action by the KGB to promote Moscow’s foreign policy objectives. 

Subversive propaganda seeks to create an alternative reality in


which all truth is relative and no information can be trusted, 

thereby disguising the facts about Moscow’s regional aggression 

against countries such as Ukraine. 29 Nonetheless, such attacks also 

have a simple underlying narrative: that the US is seeking to rule 

the world and only Russia can stop Washington’s drive for empire. 

This propaganda relies on four main tactics: dismissing the critic, 

distorting the facts, distracting from the main issue, and 

dismaying the audience. 

14. Media Controls: Moscow’s direct or indirect control over 

numerous television and radio outlets in Russia that broadcast 

programs to most former Soviet republics is a valuable instrument 

for influencing public opinion and political elites in neighboring 

states. This has been plainly evident in Belarus, Ukraine, and 

Moldova where a majority of citizens, and not only Russian 

ethnics, regularly watch and listen to the Moscow media, which is 

often more attractively packaged than local stations, in the form 

of “infotainment.” The lack of professionalism and a penchant for 

sensationalism in much of the local media has also assisted 

Moscow’s objectives in planting misleading information for 

political ends. 

15. Disinformation Campaigns: More systematic and pinpointed 

disinformation campaigns are conducted against particular 

governments, politicians, or pro-Western political parties in 

nearby states. They can also target Western ambassadors in 

Moscow or other capitals. Through its smear campaigns, Russian 

state propaganda often combines facts with cleverly disguised 

falsehoods. 30 Moscow’s message is given undue exposure due to an 

inability of some Western editors and journalists to distinguish 

between balance and objectivity, as well as the existence of a 

sizable constituency in the West, including businesspeople, 

academics, consultants, and journalists, whose jobs may depend 

on maintaining cordial relations with Russia. Disinformation can 

combine traditional media with the social media that help spread


hoax stories. It taps into the widespread propensity in all societies 

for repeating and believing conspiracy theories, however 

outlandish. 

16. Media Manipulation: Russian outlets at home and abroad use the 

open Western media to create an environment favorable to 

Moscow by manipulating political and public opinion. This 

includes using intelligence operatives as journalists, bribing 

Western reporters, and presenting a diametrically opposed 

position to that of rivals to create the impression that the truth lies 

somewhere in the middle. For instance, Russian federal television 

and radio channels, newspapers, and online resources were 

employed in the concerted disinformation campaign against 

Ukraine in 2014–2015, in which the Kremlin denied any 

involvement in the war. Diplomats, politicians, political analysts, 

and representatives of academic and cultural elites supported this 

“disinformation front.” 31 The Kremlin media also exploit Western 

commentators to validate the regime’s messages. These “fellow 

travelers” fall into three categories: those who work or worked for 

the Kremlin but do not make their affiliations public; those who 

are apparently independent but support Russia’s policies; and 

those who may not support Moscow’s line, but whose words can 

be quoted in a way that appears to show that they do. 32 

17. Media Creation: Rival media outlets can be established in other 

states, including the television channel RT (formerly Russia 

Today), whose propagandists assert that the public is seeking an 

alternative and trustworthy source of information. The goal is to 

provide information and analysis that contrasts with the Western 

media, alleging that the latter is monolithic and serves government 

interests. 33 However, the stories covered are often skewered and 

incomplete in order to present Western officials in a negative light. 

The Kremlin has also enhanced its global outreach through its new 

Sputnik web and radio service that combines the print and


broadcast services of Voice of Russia with RIA Novosti. This 

propaganda outlet targets over 130 cities in 34 countries and will 

be available in at least 27 languages. All former Soviet republics 

will host a Sputnik hub that will broadcast in local languages and 

English. Moscow substantially increased spending for its foreignfocused 

media outlets for 2015, budgeting $400 million for its RT 

television channel and $170 million for Rossiya Segodnya, the state 

news agency that includes Sputnik News. 

18. Psychological Operations: Russia’s state-linked propaganda 

specializes in spreading confusion, fear, insecurity, panic, hysteria, 

and paranoia among targeted audiences abroad to deflate public 

morale, foster defeatism and demoralization, and reduce trust in 

national governments and international institutions. Propaganda 

can create uncertainty and ambiguity, thereby preventing any 

immediate response to Russia’s aggressive actions. As part of 

Moscow’s propaganda offensive to stoke fear and uncertainty 

along its borders, in June 2015 the Russian Prosecutor General’s 

Office was asked by Duma deputies from the ruling United Russia 

party to examine whether the independence of the three Baltic 

states was legitimate according to the Soviet constitution. 34 Such a 

move served to question the sovereignty of all former Soviet 

republics and to legitimize Russia’s interference in their domestic 

and foreign affairs. 

19. Disarming Opponents: “Psychops” can purposively inculcate 

cynicism among the audience, convincing them that no 

government is truthful and that the Russian and Western 

positions deserve equal treatment. The ultimate goal of all 

psychological operations is to influence political decisions in other 

countries and to undermine the will to resist or oppose Moscow’s 

policies. Russia’s informational wars are often geared toward 

“reflexive control,” in which under the influence of specially 

prepared information the adversary acts in a way that suits the


Kremlin, whether the response is defensive or aggressive. In the 

domestic context, state propaganda may also encourage public 

passivity and fear, so that the Russian population does not 

challenge government policy. Psychops also manipulate and 

channel resentments and grievances inside Russian society toward 

Western scapegoats who are deemed primarily responsible for the 

country’s problems. 

Ideological 

20. Claiming Victimization: State propaganda depicts Russia as a 

victim of Western subterfuge and aggression and periodically 

heightens perceptions of threat and danger to confirm its 

assertions. Officials cultivate a sense of grievance and resentment 

against the West for Russia’s alleged humiliation after the Soviet 

collapse. 35 According to Moscow’s propagandists, the West either 

wants to eradicate Russia or to absorb it in the West: either way 

the purpose is to eliminate its uniqueness. Putin’s rule has ensured 

that Russia will no longer retreat while under pressure from its 

adversaries and will not succumb to destructive Western 

enticements couched as democratization and globalization. 

Victimization provides justification for the maintenance of a 

strong state and an authoritarian leadership that intends to restore 

the country’s military power, territorial reach, regional influence, 

and global ambitions. 

21. Alleging Encirclement: Russia is surrounded by ostensible 

enemies and needs to pursue an aggressive posture to combat 

them. Moscow claims that NATO and the EU are encircling the 

country, pushing it into a corner, and forcing it to lash out. In an 

elaborate justification for its attack on Ukraine in 2014–2015, 

Moscow charges that Washington organized the overthrow of the 

legitimate government in Kyiv primarily to create an excuse for 

reinvigorating NATO and deploying American forces closer to


Russia’s borders. In reality, NATO has been increasing its 

defensive presence in the region to deter Moscow’s escalating 

threats against Alliance members. 

Russia’s leaders also contend that the US uses “irregular warfare” 

such as NGOs and multinational institutions, including the IMF, 

to conduct “colored revolutions” and destabilize Russia’s 

dominions. The next stage planned by Washington is to foster 

conflicts within the Russian Federation by exploiting civil society, 

the liberal opposition, the mass media, and human rights groups, 

and by supporting Islamic insurgencies in the North Caucasus. 

The goal is to destroy Russia’s unity, capture its territory, and 

exploit its natural resources. 

22. Imagining Russophobia: Putin has made the struggle against 

“Russophobia” a cornerstone of his eclectic ideology, depicting 

Russians as an ostracized people despised by Western powers. 

Criticisms of Russian government policy by alleged Russophobes 

purportedly indicates a prejudicial disposition, a psychological 

illness, or a personality disorder. Some propagandists have sought 

to equate Russophobia with anti-Semitism thus depicting 

criticisms of Moscow’s policies as a form of racism, which should 

be internationally condemned and outlawed. Almost any incident 

that casts Russia in an unfavorable light can be depicted as 

motivated by Russophobia. Hence, Kremlin spokesmen have 

portrayed the shooting down of a Malaysian passenger plane over 

Donbas on July 17, 2015, by a missile fired from an area controlled 

by pro-Moscow rebels as a Western plot to discredit Russia. 

23. Russian Supremacism: Moscow’s imperial ambitions are 

undergirded by the concept of the “Russian World” (Russki Mir). 

According to this notion, all ethnic groups living on the territory 

of the former Soviet Union form part of a distinct multi-national 

entity and should be brought within the same state or multi-state 

union. Several categories of people are included in the “Russian


World,” including ethnic Russians, regardless of where they live; 

Russian-speakers and alphabet users, regardless of their ethnicity; 

and “compatriots” and their offspring who have ever lived on the 

territory of the Soviet Union or even in the Russian Empire. 36 

Russian officials and the Kremlin’s ideological preachers 

frequently stress the manifest destiny of the allegedly unique 

Russian culture and the deeply spiritual “Russian soul” infused 

with a “special morality.” They deliberately ignore the deep 

demoralization evident in Russian society, as exemplified in its 

demographic trends including shorter life spans, declining fertility 

rates, and rising alcoholism. Russia’s alleged spiritualty is 

supposed to compensate for its economic failures. 

24. Russian Unification: The concept of a “Russian World’” is based 

on the assumption of a divided nation following the collapse of the 

Soviet Union. By promulgating Russian culture, education, 

language use, and political mobilization in neighboring states, 

Moscow tries to create the illusion in the West that these countries 

belong within Russia’s cultural and political space. Hence, the 

government is simply pursuing a natural course of unification. 

The Russki Mir concept has been introduced into several laws 

creating the legal basis for protecting compatriots abroad. One of 

the laws provides for the legal right to use Russian troops in other 

countries to actively defend these compatriots. 

25. Pan-Slavism: In Russia’s official version of history, Ukrainians 

and Belarusians are considered to be offshoots of the Russian 

nation. 37 This is based on the historically incorrect idea that 

Kyivan Rus (9 th to 13 th centuries AD) was a “Russian” state. In fact, 

there were no distinct Russians, Ukrainians, or Belarusians during 

that period in history but numerous East Slavic tribes and tribal 

unions. After the 14 th century, Muscovite Russians formed an 

enduring state entity that subsequently occupied Ukraine and 

Belarus for long periods and imposed the Russian language,


church, and culture on the local populations. As a result, Moscow 

believes it has the right to control all the East Slavic peoples and 

those that are opposed are dismissed as traitors, as is the case with 

many Ukrainians since the Maidan revolution. Russian pan- 

Slavism is also extended by its proponents to include selected 

South Slavic and West Slavic groups by appealing to those 

nationalist elements that traditionally view Moscow as a protector 

and liberator from Turkic, Germanic, and other occupying 

powers. This often includes Serbia and Bulgaria. 

26. Religious Invocations: The Russian Orthodox Church is vocal in 

defending the allegedly endangered Christian Orthodox faithful in 

neighboring countries. It has a long tradition of serving as an 

instrument of government foreign policy before, during, and after 

the Communist interlude. The Moscow Patriarchate helps to 

maintain Russian influence within the former USSR among 

Orthodox believers and promotes anti-Western, illiberal, and 

anti-democratic values by stressing the divine nature of Russian 

nationalism and pan-Slavism. 

Putin has revived Joseph Stalin’s instrumentalization of the 

Orthodox Church and gained Patriarch Kirill’s blessing for his 

trans-national “Russian World” concept. 38 Moscow steers the 

Patriarchate to exert its influence in states such as Ukraine, 

Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia in order to maintain pro-Russian 

sentiments and undermine any autocephalous Orthodox 

Churches that support independence and disassociation from 

Russia. The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox 

Church seeks to gather other Orthodox parishes under its 

jurisdiction. Many of these had transferred their allegiance from 

the Moscow Patriarchate to the Patriarchate in Constantinople 

after the Bolshevik takeover in 1917. Russian Orthodox churches 

have also been built or planned in several neighboring countries 

despite the misgivings of local officials. 39 These include a church 

in Tallinn, Estonia financed by sources linked to Vladimir


Yakunin, head of Russian Railways, and a church in Macedonia 

funded by a Russian businessman. 

27. Revising History: To undergird its aim to rebuild a Greater Russia, 

Moscow is engaged in extensive historical revisionism. Statesponsored 

propagandists are rewriting the period of Soviet 

occupation as a progressive era of Russian benevolence rather 

than an era of retardation of Central and Eastern Europe’s political 

and economic development through the imposition of a failed 

ideology, a one-party dictatorship, and an incompetent economic 

system. Moscow also claims that the Cold War ended in a 

stalemate, rather than admitting that the failed Soviet system 

disintegrated from within and could not compete with a more 

dynamic West 

According to current historical rewriting, Russia naively tried to 

join the West during the 1990s but was rebuffed and ostracized. In 

reality, Russia failed to qualify for either EU or NATO 

membership because of its glaring inadequacies in the rule of law, 

democratic governance, and market competition, and its 

numerous conflicts with neighboring states. Officials contend that 

NATO and the EU captured the post-Communist countries when 

Russia was weakest, instead of conceding that these states were 

determined to join both institutions as protection against future 

empire building by the Kremlin. Distorted histories justify 

contemporary moves to revise borders and international alliances 

in order to rebuild a Russian sphere of dominance. 

28. War Cultism: One central theme, which has virtually become state 

scripture in Russia, is the official narrative about the “Great 

Patriotic War” against Nazi Germany (1941–1945). By reviving 

history and developing myths about the war, Moscow is seeking 

to generate pride in Russia’s achievements. It stresses the country’s 

sacrifices and victories against the Third Reich and ignores such


facts of Moscow’s active collaboration with Adolf Hitler in 

launching World War Two in September 1939, Stalin’s 

decimation of the Red Army leadership, which left the country 

prone to Hitler’s attack in June 1941 and resulted in millions of 

casualties, as well as the mass murders and ethnic expulsions 

perpetrated by Putin’s Chekist predecessors in all territories 

occupied by the Red Army throughout Europe’s East. 

Wacław Radziwinowicz, the chief Moscow correspondent of 

Poland’s daily Gazeta Wyborcza, has pointed out that the ”cult of 

victory” has been converted into the basis of a civic religion. It has 

become “an indisputable dogma that the state, law and church 

guard with all their strength.” 40 Putin’s Russia lives in the 

categories of World War Two, and the officially promoted 

historical memory is a source of political unity against the 

Western enemy. A focus on the “Great Patriotic War” to define 

Russia’s identity and legitimize the current regime also 

rehabilitates Stalin and glosses over his massacres and repressions. 

It likewise depicts the West as veering toward fascism in a 

purported replay of World War Two. The Kremlin funds 

international “anti-Nazi” organizations, claiming that fascists 

have penetrated several Western governments. The most notable 

is the “World Without Nazism” network, which includes about 

140 organizations in 30 countries and organizes events to 

demonstrate Moscow’s prominence in combating Nazism and 

fascism. 

29. Inciting Anti-Americanism: The West in general and the US in 

particular are depicted as decadent and declining civilizations. But 

even as it allegedly deteriorates, America is charged with pursuing 

“democratic messianism,” in which perverted Western values and 

political systems are forced upon defenseless states. All US 

administrations are accused of a multitude of imperialist designs, 

including unilateralism, militarism, undermining the 

independence of states, overthrowing governments, and breaking


up sovereign countries. The fate of Yugoslavia usually serves as the 

Kremlin’s primary example, even though US administrations 

actually tried to steer clear of the conflict during the collapse of 

Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The US also stands accused of being 

untrustworthy: by criticizing elected governments on the grounds 

of democratic shortcomings and other “ideological” 

misdemeanors, Washington purportedly challenges their survival 

and ignores the will of voters. 

30. Dividing the West: In its propaganda assaults, Moscow seeks to 

drive a wedge between the “Anglo-Saxon” states of the US, 

Canada, and the UK, and continental Europe, with the latter 

viewed as more malleable, corruptible, and exploitable. The 

message is conveyed that American arrogance and hegemony 

limits the sovereignty of all EU member states. In the most 

poignant example, Washington allegedly pushes them into 

unwanted conflicts with Moscow by supporting “political 

adventures” in countries along Russia’s borders. The Kremlin’s 

objective is to divide the West and preclude any lasting trans- 

Atlantic solidarity against Russia and in support of Moscow’s 

targeted neighbors. 

31. Promoting Anti-Europeanism: Among the themes stressed by 

Kremlin propaganda outlets against the EU are: the degenerate 

nature of European liberalism; Western immorality and its alleged 

anti-religious and militant secularist campaigns; lack of sovereign 

state decision making; democratic paralysis and political chaos; 

recurring financial crises in the Eurozone; failed multiculturalism 

and uncontrolled immigration; and an inability to deal with 

radical Islamism and jihadist terrorism. In contrast, Russia is 

depicted as a bastion against Muslim extremism that is avowedly 

enveloping Europe because of the latter’s liberalism and tolerance.


All these themes help Moscow to stimulate and influence a “fifth 

column” of movements and parties inside the EU that resembles 

the Communist International during Soviet times. In particular, 

Moscow exploits an assortment of radical right and ultraconservative 

parties in numerous European states to reinforce its 

message of Western decadence and Russia’s superiority. In 

addition, the Greek economic crisis and the country’s potential 

ejection from the Eurozone currency union have proved beneficial 

to Moscow. Officials and propagandists can contend that the EU 

project is running out of steam and thereby raise the profile of 

Euroskeptics throughout the continent. 

32. Combative Traditionalism: Russia’s allegedly superior Eurasian 

civilization is starkly contrasted with the avowedly decadent 

Atlanticist civilization led by the US and the EU. It supposedly 

embodies the key moral foundations, including social 

traditionalism, “family values,” religious conservatism, sexual 

“normality,” cultural purity, and state patriotism. Russia is 

depicted to both domestic and Western audiences as the true 

defender of traditional values and social morals, while the West is 

allegedly deeply depraved through homosexuality, bisexuality, 

and other “deviations,” while its governments seek to impose an 

intolerant secularist ethic on all societies. In this vein, a personality 

cult has been developed around President Putin, who is depicted 

as a patriotic and fully masculine heterosexual defender of 

traditional values and whose resolute stance is applicable to every 

culture. The traditionalist concoction is also impregnated with 

Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and other forms of racism in order 

to appeal to Christian fundamentalist or white supremacist 

sentiments.


Economic 

33. Economic Enmeshment: Moscow’s objective is to enmesh specific 

states in a web of commercial and financial ties that buttress its 

political penetration. This is particularly evident in the case of the 

Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), established in January 2015 and 

intended to restore Russia’s position as a global “pole of power.” 

Moscow offers a range of incentives to induce neighbors to join 

the EEU, including cheaper gas, financial loans, and preferential 

trade benefits. It also tries to cajole states into the EEU through 

economic blackmail by instrumentalizing trade, energy, and other 

key factors. 

On a broader scale, purchasing strategic economic sectors in 

European states, particularly in energy, banking, and 

telecommunications, helps Kremlin-connected companies to gain 

political clout. In addition, large debts owed to Russia provide 

opportunities for leverage, either by demands for prompt payment 

or debt forgiveness in exchange for ownership of strategic assets. 

Russia’s business penetration also fosters corruption, nontransparency, 

links with organized crime, and various forms of 

political abuse. In the longer-term, some Russian officials and 

analysts believe that Moscow can attract a range of countries into 

the EEU, including current EU members Greece and Cyprus 

together with states rejected by the EU, such as Turkey. 

34. Energy Dependence: As a substantial supplier of crude oil and 

natural gas to Europe, Moscow seeks to deepen the dependence 

of all nearby European states and various useful EU countries. The 

promotion of economic vulnerability through energy dependence 

is a mechanism for both financial profit and political leverage. 

Energy and other strategic resources can be decreased or severed 

at important junctures to exert pressure on particular capitals, or 

their price can be lowered or raised to gain political concessions.


Moreover, Russian company ownership of key energy 

infrastructure in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe, 

such as pipelines, refineries, and storage sites, enables Moscow to 

exert additional political leverage. 

35. Energy Alliances: Following Moscow’s cancellation of the South 

Stream natural gas pipeline in December 2014, the Kremlin has 

tried to mobilize a small circle of allies to lay the groundwork for 

Turkish Stream, a projected alternative to South Stream that 

would enable it to maintain an influential position vis-à-vis the 

EU. 41 According to Putin’s plan, Turkish Stream would traverse 

Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary toward the EU. 

However, doubts persist about the feasibility of the project, as 

Russia is sanctioned from obtaining Western capital, the transit 

countries are cash-strapped, Western companies are hesitant in 

investing in another unpredictable scheme, and Brussels will not 

finance a project that breaches legally binding contracts. 

Nevertheless, as long as there is some prospect that it will be built, 

Turkish Stream hampers rival projects by spawning uncertainty 

and making it more difficult to attract investors for other 

pipelines. 

36. Trade Disruptions: Trade is used as a weapon by Moscow both as 

an enticement, through subsidies of various products and raw 

materials, and as a punishment, through partial or complete 

cutoffs in imports or the imposition of double tariffs on imported 

goods. In some instances, Moscow has reneged on fulfilling its 

trade agreements by refusing to pay for previous shipments on 

fictitious financial grounds. Moscow also uses its national 

ombudsman to prohibit imports, such as dairy products, fruits 

and vegetables, alcohol, and other beverages, from targeted 

neighbors in order to exert political pressure or to exact economic 

punishment. The trade bans are usually based on spurious health 

and safety pretexts.


Ethnic 

37. Cultivating Ethnic Discords: A key instrument in Moscow’s 

arsenal to weaken its neighbors is the promotion and 

perpetuation of ethnic conflicts. The authorities have numerous 

permutations at their disposal to entrap both friends and foes in 

such disputes. Targeted capitals become especially vulnerable if 

they are unprepared for subversion, if they fail to cooperate 

against Moscow’s intrigues, or if they are seduced into supporting 

secessionism in neighboring countries on the grounds of 

defending their ethnic kindred. Moscow can encourage 

numerous demands for territorial autonomy and separatism in 

Europe’s East, which is rife with potential ethnic disputes and 

national aspirations. The principal objective is to squeeze 

adversaries through threats of partition and to unsettle incumbent 

governments that resist Russia’s regional policy. 

38. Meddling Mediation: Russian media outlets and Kremlin 

spokesmen publicize a host of controversies between and within 

neighboring states in order to depict Russia as a defender of 

minority rights, calculating that some discontented factions will 

consequently support Moscow. Potentially pliable populations 

include disaffected non-Russian minorities and regional groups 

in neighboring countries that can be encouraged to oppose 

governments viewed as insufficiently friendly toward Moscow. 

Among numerous examples are the regions of Transnistria and 

Gagauzia (Moldova), Donbas, Transcarpathia, and Bukovyna 

(Ukraine), Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia), as well as Armenians 

in Georgia, Lezgins and Avars in Azerbaijan, and Poles in 

Lithuania. 

39. Inciting Russian Speakers: The most obvious secessionist targets 

for the Kremlin are Russian ethnics in neighboring states, or 

Sovietized and russified populations that use Russian as their first


language and can be directly linked with the “Russian World.” 

Over 25 million Russian ethnics and Russian-speakers reside in 

nearby countries, with Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, 

Belarus, and Kazakhstan being the principal hosts. Kremlin 

officials allege that in several neighboring states Russian 

populations suffer discrimination and are under constant threat 

from pro-Western governments. Claims of national humiliation 

are intended to mobilize society and to justify Russia’s alleged 

retaliation in attacking its neighbors. 

For instance, Moscow’s propaganda deliberately conflates the 

marches of Baltic anti-Soviet World War Two veterans and their 

supporters with rising Nazism and preparations for genocide. 42 

The purpose is to create an atmosphere of intimidation against 

Russian speakers and provide justifications for Moscow’s 

intervention. Underlying this policy of interference is the fear that 

Russians will become fully assimilated in neighboring states and 

will no longer look toward Moscow for identity, support, or 

protection. To counteract such voluntary integration, Russia’s 

Fund to Support and Protect the Rights of Compatriots Living 

Abroad (Pravfond) has been especially active in the Baltic states. 

40. Recruiting Local Subversives: The Kremlin applies pressure to 

grant Russian-speakers enhanced political status, language rights, 

and dual citizenship. It thereby calculates that a loyal political 

corpus will be crafted to support its policies. Moscow thrusts itself 

forward as the arbiter in the separatist conflicts that it promotes, 

as most recently witnessed in eastern Ukraine. In reality, Kremlin 

assistance radicalizes minority leaders and makes conflict 

resolution more problematic. Supportive signals from Moscow 

encourage local militants to pursue their agendas in the belief that 

Russia will defend them. Kremlin-funded agencies reportedly 

conduct surveys of Russian-speaking populations in nearby 

countries to ascertain the extent of support for autonomy and


separatism. Subsequently, secessionist sentiments can be fanned, 

funded, or fabricated. 

41. Fostering Cross-Border Disputes: Russian authorities manipulate 

inter-ethnic tensions between neighboring states in order to 

benefit from the ensuing cross-border conflicts. A major focus for 

secession is the ethnic kindred of states friendly toward Russia 

whose governments can be enticed to support collective rights 

across borders to undermine the integrity of targeted countries. 

For example, Russia has aided Armenia-backed separatists in 

Karabakh both to partition Azerbaijan, whose government is 

often perceived in the Kremlin as excessively pro-Western, and to 

reward Armenia for its close alliance with Moscow. Such support 

can be withdrawn if a government tries to veer away from a pro- 

Kremlin position. 

In another conspicuous recent example, the Kremlin encourages 

Budapest to campaign for Hungarian minorities in nearby states. 

This has pressurized Ukraine in its western region of 

Transcarpathia, which contains a Magyar minority, and will 

potentially affect Romania in parts of eastern Transylvania. Serbs 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosova are also 

supported by various Russian agencies to create constituencies for 

resistance against state integration into NATO and the EU. 

42. Challenging Borders: By voicing support for minority rights or 

national self-determination in selected countries, the Kremlin can 

apply pressure on a government through pliable minority leaders 

seeking outside assistance. Nationalists and separatists on both 

sides of an ethnic divide can be covertly backed in order to 

intensify cross-border conflicts and give Moscow a greater role in 

mediating the ensuing conflict. By sponsoring inter-state 

disputes, Moscow can also claim that many of the post–World 

War Two borders in Central and Eastern Europe are illegitimate 

and should be altered in Russia’s favor.


Political 

43. Fomenting Monochrome Revolutions: Moscow is promoting 

protests to destabilize governments that it seeks to control, 

weaken, punish, or replace. Unlike the Western supported and 

indigenous “colored revolutions” that are intended to strengthen 

democratic rule and uncover the electoral or other abuses of 

incumbent governments, Moscow views street protests and riots 

as useful methods to weaken the democratic process and any 

progress toward Western integration. It has therefore funded 

individuals, parties, and movements to undermine 

administrations in several states, including Moldova and 

Montenegro. In Moldova, Moscow has financed movements that 

stage public protests against the pro-EU administration in an 

effort to replace it with a more Kremlin-friendly government. In 

Montenegro, Russian officials have supported disaffected groups 

and Serbian nationalist parties to try and unseat the government 

of Milo Djukanovic, which has pledged to attain NATO 

membership. 

44. Political Assassination: Russia’s spokesmen and media outlets 

question the trustworthiness of those Central and Eastern 

European officials who staunchly oppose Moscow’s foreign 

policies. They stand accused of corruption, dishonesty, abuse of 

office, susceptibility to blackmail, various mental aberrations, and 

of maintaining contacts with foreign intelligence services. The 

latter charge is particularly troubling to NATO leaders where local 

officials are expected to deal with sensitive Alliance information. 

A wide array of mass media and social media outlets are mobilized 

by the Kremlin for purposes of political assassination. Provocative 

acts are also periodically staged on the territory of targeted states 

to discredit government officials or to accompany propaganda 

offensives. This can include bribery and blackmail accompanied 

by either genuine or falsified information leaked to the media.


45. Funding Political Parties: Russian sources have channeled funds 

to a broad spectrum of parties among their former satellites in 

order to purchase political influence. This has been most evident 

in the case of ultra-nationalist groups in Bulgaria and Hungary, 

but is not confined to one political stream. Radical leftists or even 

ideologically mainstream parties can be financed if it benefits 

Moscow. The Kremlin can assist parties with limited resources 

particularly during national election campaigns in return for a 

Moscow-friendly foreign policy. Companies tied to mother 

organizations in Russia have developed political lobbies in some 

countries and make campaign contributions to political parties 

who are either pro-Kremlin or anti-NATO in their orientation. 

46. Purchasing Political Support: This includes the recruitment of 

politicians, businessmen, journalists, and other professionals to 

support Russia’s foreign policy goals. 43 Over the past two decades, 

several politicians have been bribed or blackmailed into 

promoting Moscow’s regional agenda, including the former 

Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas, who was impeached and 

removed from office in April 2004. Kremlin agencies also possess 

volumes of personal information acquired during the Soviet era, 

which they can publicize and manipulate against uncooperative 

politicians. This compromising material, whether accurate or not, 

is referred to as kompromat. Former prominent Western 

politicians are also recruited with lucrative financial benefits to 

legitimize Russia’s political and economic interests. The most 

glaring example was the hiring of former German Chancellor 

Gerhard Schroder in 2005 as Chairman of Nord Stream AG, the 

joint stock company that operates the undersea pipeline that 

supplies natural gas from Russia to Germany. Gazprom also 

unsuccessfully courted former Italian Prime Minister Romano 

Prodi to become Chairman of the planned South Stream pipeline’s 

construction and operating consortium.


47. Endorsing Anti-Establishment Movements: An assortment of 

political parties, movements, networks, campaigns, and 

influential individuals in the West are openly or covertly courted 

and supported by Kremlin-connected organizations and media 

outlets. Moscow seeks to benefit from anti-establishment 

sentiments across the EU based on popular dissatisfaction with 

Brussels, whether among ultra-leftists, radical rightists, apolitical 

populists, or non-partisan militants. It has focused in particular 

on influential individuals and radical groups espousing antiliberalism, 

anti-globalism, religious and ethnic intolerance, 

Islamophobia, and in some cases combative Christianity. Some 

personalities and parties are invited to Moscow for international 

conferences at which Russia is presented as the bastion of free 

speech for “traditional values” and the West is lambasted for its 

“moral bankruptcy.” 

48. Encouraging Nationalists: Kremlin support for a variety of ultranationalist 

parties throughout Europe is designed to undermine 

EU and NATO integration and even to divide targeted countries. 

This includes populist, ethno-nationalist, militant Christian, and 

other radical parties elected to the European Parliament, which 

criticize further EU enlargement, oppose the creation of a federal 

Europe, defend Russia’s international policies, and vote against 

resolutions critical of Moscow. After the July 2014 EU 

parliamentary elections, approximately one fifth of deputies, 

many from radical rightist parties, reportedly opposed imposing 

any sanctions against Russia for its attack on Ukraine. Moscow 

also covertly backs ultra-nationalist and anti-Russian groups in 

neighboring states, which it can use to foster violence and 

instability, depict its political targets as tolerant of fascism, and 

discredit incumbent governments. For instance, the government 

in Kyiv has charged Russia’s FSB with using ultra-right groups to 

destabilize Ukraine. 44


Social 

49. Social Media Offensives: Kremlin-sponsored campaigns use the 

freely available social media to mobilize supporters or paid 

Internet commentators to bombard various media outlets 

according to precise scripts. The extensive network of online 

contacts has helped Moscow gain a sizable number of fanatical 

supporters who are dynamic and aggressive, if not intelligent or 

well informed. Instead of operating through spontaneously 

formed discussion groups, these offensives are organized through 

vertical structures controlled by headquarters and 

commissioners. 45 

50. NGO Promotion: Russian agencies fund and establish NGOs 

among neighboring states to assist in Moscow's propaganda 

offensive and sometimes bribe Western experts to contribute. 

Such organizations include policy institutes, human rights 

formations, cultural clubs, and environmental groups. For 

instance, Romanian officials believe that Gazprom organized and 

financed anti-fracking movements and protests to prevent the 

development of alternative gas supplies in the country. Moscow’s 

interference was also visible in Lithuania, where Chevron ran into 

a wave of fervent protests by activists, many of whom had 

previously shown little interest in environmental issues. 46 Other 

NGOs funded by Moscow have included veterans groups, 

historical societies, and an assortment of ethnic minority 

organizations. 

51. Establishing Policy Institutes: Several branches of Kremlinfunded 

policy and analytical institutes have been established in 

Western states. They parody either financially independent 

American and European NGOs or Western organizations funded 

by governments but with analytical independence to provide 

reports and advice to administrations. The Russian equivalents


seek to attract various critics of Western policies and claim to 

provide alternative viewpoints. The most well-known outfit is the 

Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISS), directed by a former 

FSB general and close to the Kremlin’s presidential 

administration. 47 The RISS has either established branches in 

several European capitals or funds joint programs with some 

Western institutions. 

52. Radicalizing Youth: Lectures on the greatness of the Soviet Union, 

the threat of NATO enlargement, and the alleged insanity of Baltic 

politicians feature at camps in Russia attended by groups of young 

people from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The “Successors of the 

Victory” camp has been described as an “international educational 

congress of military-sports youth organizations and cadet 

corps.” 48 Baltic security services believe that this may also be a 

training ground for future propagandists and saboteurs. The 

stated goal has been to awaken the “Soviet spirit” among Russianspeaking 

young people in the former Soviet republics. 

53. Propagating Disaffection: Kremlin-linked ideologues and 

“political technologists” endeavor to appeal to a broad range of 

disaffected individuals and groups in Western societies. These 

may not openly or outwardly support Russia’s policies but their 

opposition to Western governments or to capitalist economies can 

be useful for Moscow on various occasions. Such diverse groups 

may include anti-globalists, anti-capitalists, anti-liberals, ultraleftists, 

environmentalists, radical religious sects, neo-Nazis, 

pacifists, nihilists, and anarchists. Moscow also benefits from the 

inherent weakness of civil societies in some post-Soviet countries 

in order to inflame social discontent. It fosters social divisions by 

funding groups and prominent individuals opposing major 

government policies that conflict with Moscow’s objectives. The 

Kremlin could organize its own version of a “colored revolution” 

in a neighboring state whose government it seeks to replace. Social


unrest and government instability would then provide the pretext 

for a more direct Russian intervention. 

Military 

54. Security Entrapment: Moscow established the CSTO (Collective 

Security Treaty Organization) in April 1994 as a political-military 

structure of former Soviet republics and has forged asymmetrical 

bilateral military agreements with a number of CSTO states, 

including Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan. These arrangements enable Moscow to control the air 

defenses and borders of neighbors and to establish Russian 

military bases. Moscow pushes the idea of “equal security” to try 

and equalize NATO with the CSTO. At the same time, it calls on 

Ukraine and other countries to renounce their NATO aspirations, 

thus violating the principles of “equal security” in which every 

country presumably possesses the right to decide on its 

international alliances. To help defend its new security dominion, 

in 2009 Moscow initiated the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces 

(KSOR) within the CSTO whose avowed purpose is to “preserve 

the sovereignty, protect the constitutional order and restore the 

territorial integrity” of CSTO member states. 49 In effect, the 

Kremlin reserves the right to intervene militarily in the internal 

affairs of each CSTO member by mobilizing a collective assault 

that echoes its deployment of the Warsaw Pact against wayward 

allies during Soviet times. 

55. Military Threats: These are periodically issued in response to 

policies pursued by neighbors but opposed by Moscow, such as 

NATO expansion or the installment of a NATO anti-ballisticmissile 

shield. According to its military doctrine, Russia reserves 

the right to conduct a preemptive military strike if it perceives a 

“distinct and inevitable military threat” to the country, or if 

Moscow feels threatened by reduced access to regions where it


possesses “crucial economic or financial interests.” 50 Russia is also 

empowered to use its military within the former Soviet domain if 

a “complex and unstable situation develops” or if there is a direct 

threat to Russian citizens or ethnic Russians. 

56. Close Military Encounters: Moscow uses its military to engineer 

close encounters with several Western states, especially NATO 

members, to raise levels of threat and tension and test the military 

and political responses of rival capitals. 51 This can include aircraft 

overflights or navy incursions. Such threats are in themselves a 

form of psychological influence designed to demonstrate that the 

adversary is either weak or unprepared for a Russian offensive. 

They are deliberately confrontational to increase alarm in NATO 

capitals that an accidental crash or collision with Western aircraft 

or seacraft could result in loss of civilian life and even provoke an 

armed conflict, thus encouraging Western concessions to pacify 

Russia. 

In the Baltic region in particular, Moscow conducts unscheduled 

combat alerts to test the reaction speed of Baltic units and has 

stationed missile systems that will affect the military balance of 

power: the Iskander-M ballistic system and the S-400 long-range 

anti-aircraft system. 52 Moscow has built up its military capabilities 

in the Baltic Sea to be able to stage a rapid assault by regular forces, 

block air traffic, especially the arrival of support units from 

NATO, and hit the majority of land targets to deter the Alliance 

from intervening in a regional conflict. 

57. Active Provocations: These may include personnel abductions, 

sabotage operations, acts of random terrorism, assassination of 

targeted officials, and other diversionary activities in order to 

promulgate public fear in pinpointed states and destabilize 

incumbent governments. Ukraine has been subjected to such 

attacks since the start of Russia’s offensive in early 2014. It can also 

include intimidation and bribing of military and police officers,


with the objective of making them abandon their duties, as was 

evident in Crimea during Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s 

peninsula in early 2014. 

58. Intimidating Exercises: Russian military exercises are notable for 

their magnitude and the frequency of “spot” exercises, involving 

the sudden and unannounced deployment of forces. Since 2012, 

Russia has conducted six major military exercises assembling 

between 65,000 and 160,000 personnel, dwarfing the size of all 

NATO maneuvers. 53 After launching its attack on Ukraine, Russia 

enhanced its capabilities in moving around sizable numbers of 

troops and equipment. The exercises have developed in quality, 

and the armed forces can perform increasingly complex joint 

operations. Moscow has also modernized its electronic and 

technical capabilities, enhanced command and control, and 

improved the use of a digital operational-tactical command 

system. Current reform and modernization programs are focused 

on developing a capability to intervene quickly and decisively in 

neighboring states by allocating resources to a small number of 

elite units, primarily airborne and special operations forces, that 

constitute the core of Russia’s emerging Rapid Reaction Force. 54 

59. Conjuring Confrontation: A major military exercise in March 

2015 assumed an especially threatening posture. 55 It covered 

several regions, including the Arctic, Baltic, and Black Seas and 

simulated a full-scale confrontation with NATO through the 

forward deployment of nuclear-armed submarines, theater 

ballistic missiles, and strategic bomber aircraft. Strategic weapon 

systems were also located near NATO’s borders. By deploying Tu- 

22M3 bomber aircraft, Russia invoked the threat of nuclear 

confrontation and asserted that this was a response to potential 

military support from the West to Ukraine and in reaction to 

NATO beefing up its presence in the Baltic states.


60. Nuclear Blackmail: Kremlin officials have regularly warned that 

they will suspend various nuclear and conventional arms-control 

agreements and maintain tactical nuclear missiles along Russia’s 

western borders. Such threats are combined with regular military 

exercises, including the annual Zapad maneuvers that have 

involved the simulated nuclear annihilation of neighboring 

capitals. 56 Russia’s military doctrine provides for the first use of 

nuclear weapons under threatening circumstances. Such a posture 

also serves to divide the Alliance, as Europe, unlike the US, would 

be directly affected by the use of tactical or battlefield nuclear 

weapons. Russia uses the propaganda potential of its weapons 

deployments, snap exercises, and the destructive capabilities of 

newly developed weapons to induce anxieties among neighbors. 

For instance, the periodically announced deployment of Iskander 

tactical missiles in the Baltic Sea and in Kaliningrad and Crimea 

are intended to demonstrate preparations for the use of nuclear 

delivery weapons. Moscow has also violated the Intermediate 

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Conventional Forces in Europe 

(CFE) Treaty and withdrawn from the Nunn-Lugar program for 

reducing nuclear threats. In June 2015, Putin announced that 

Russia would procure 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBM) “capable of penetrating any possible enemy missile 

defense.” NATO’s Supreme Commander in Europe, US Air Force 

General Philip Breedlove, responded by accusing Putin of 

“ratcheting up nuclear tensions.” 57 

61. Tactical Compromises: Russia’s leaders seek advantages by 

partially stepping back from an initially aggressive stance and 

enticing Western concessions in accepting some of Moscow’s 

gains. Western leaders then trumpet their evident success at 

averting a larger international crisis. The invasion of Georgia in 

August 2008 can be seen in the light of such calculations, where 

EU attention was riveted on dispatching monitors to the “buffer 

zones” carved out by Russian forces deeper in Georgian territory


rather than to the disputed regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 

which Moscow recognized as independent states and where it 

emplaced its military units. Such a “stick and carrot” approach is 

also evident in Ukraine, where Russia’s preparations for military 

action against Kyiv are interspersed with ceasefire initiatives to 

legitimize the separatist enclaves in the Donbas. 

62. Unconventional Offensives: Russian analysts assert that the lines 

between war and peace are blurred. General Valery Gerasimov, 

Chief of the Military General Staff, describes how Russia can 

subvert and destroy states without direct, overt, and large-scale 

military intervention. 58 The Special Operations Forces of the 

Russian Federation (SOF) were established in March 2013 as a 

highly mobile group of forces of the Ministry of Defense 

designated for specific tasks abroad. 59 In addition to sabotage 

operations, the SOF create, train, and supervise foreign guerrilla 

movements. They were used during the seizure of the Crimean 

parliament on February 27, 2014, and subsequently in Ukraine’s 

Donbas. Moscow is working to develop within a few years the 

capability to threaten several neighbors simultaneously on the 

scale of its operation in Ukraine. 60 This would give Russia the 

ability to carry out three such operations during the same 

timeframe without a major military mobilization that would allow 

the West time to respond. 

63. Disguised Subversion: One overarching component of Moscow’s 

unconventional assaults on neighboring states is its use of 

maskirovka, or disguised offensives. This combines several 

elements including surprise, camouflage, maneuvers intended to 

deceive, concealment, the use of decoys and military dummies, 

and disinformation to dupe the adversary. 61 Moscow’s role in such 

low-scale military operations can either be denied altogether or 

depicted as a humanitarian or limited peace-making mission. This 

was evident in eastern Ukraine during the spring and summer of


2014 when Moscow dispatched hundreds of unchecked trucks 

allegedly to provide food and medical aid to the local population. 

64. Proxy Wars: These are intensive operations against neighboring 

states designed to seize territory or topple national governments. 

Moscow engages in covert offensives in support of separatists. It 

creates fake insurgencies by financing and arming front groups; 

infiltrating the foreign territory using Russian special forces, 

mercenaries, and volunteers; corrupting local law enforcement 

bodies; inciting civil unrest; seizing public buildings; setting up 

road blocks and other barricades; disabling the functioning of 

police or military units; and declaring support for alternative 

authorities and security forces. Assistance to irregular fighters is 

designed to subvert and destabilize targeted countries and 

undermine the authority of the local and central governments. 

65. Sponsoring Separatists: Even if majorities in targeted states do not 

support secession, local discontented individuals can always be 

found and funded by Moscow as new ethno-national leaders. The 

Kremlin relies on the passivity and fear of the silent majority in a 

specified region, while rebels are provided with weapons, recruits, 

finances, and media exposure. Russian specialists are infiltrated to 

provide leadership, weaponry, and organization, while crippling 

the capacity of national governments to protect the population. 

Moscow can also deploy a large conventional force along the 

borders to dissuade large-scale state action against the separatists 

that it has incited and supported. 

66. Conventional Intervention: Regular forces can be deployed 

against neighbors in order to supplement unconventional or 

proxy wars, as witnessed in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014– 

2015). Moscow may engage in a large-scale and direct military 

intervention to defeat or dislodge the military of a nearby state 

from a region that it has earmarked for partition or annexation.


Russian forces frequently train to increase the speed of their 

military actions so that the West has little time to implement a 

coherent response. Subsequently, the focus is on peace talks rather 

than reversing Russia’s territorial advances. Moscow’s 

involvement is preceded by the pretext that the local population is 

in danger of genocide and is desperate for military protection. 

This can be accompanied by armed provocations to elicit 

government retaliation, which in turn precipitates Russia’s 

intervention, as was the case in Georgia in August 2008. 

67. Territorial Fragmentation: This entails the invasion, occupation, 

and partition of neighboring states, the recognition of separatist 

entities as autonomous units or independent states, or Russia’s 

outright annexation of conquered territories. In the case of 

Moldova and Ukraine, Moscow has been pushing its own version 

of federalism: in each case, the secessionist regions that Russia has 

nurtured are seeking a confederal arrangement with the central 

government and veto powers over the country’s foreign and 

security policies in line with Kremlin interests. 

An inadequate Western response to the partition of Ukraine and 

Georgia simply encourages Moscow to continue the process in 

other parts of the Wider Europe. In some cases, Moscow has 

pressed for territorial revisions by claiming that regions such as 

Crimea should be considered traditionally Russian and whose 

inclusion in a neighboring republic during Soviet times Russia 

denounces as unlawful. An additional underhanded method is the 

creeping “borderization” of neighboring countries. This has been 

evident in Georgia where Russian units have demarcated the 

border with Russian-controlled South Ossetia deeper into 

Georgian territory. Such actions are intended to demonstrate that 

Moscow can act with impunity in seizing nearby lands.


68. Exploiting Frozen Conflicts: Moscow supports the creation of 

“frozen conflicts” and the maintenance of “frozen states,” as this 

paralyzes the central government and prevents Russia’s neighbors 

from joining Western institutions. The Kremlin seeks 

international legitimacy for separatist enclaves that it has overtly 

or covertly sponsored and it acts as a mediator in avowedly 

resolving disputes with the central government that, in reality, are 

never resolved. This has been evident in several secessionist 

conflicts in the former Soviet Union, particularly in Moldova, 

Georgia, and Ukraine. Moscow indefinitely maintains several 

unresolved conflicts and prevents their resolution. It also holds in 

reserve the prospect of unfreezing these conflicts and unleashing 

further instability through renewed insurgency, intensified armed 

conflicts, and potential direct Russian military intervention. Such 

a threatening posture serves to convince Western governments to 

make compromises that favor Moscow 

Vulnerable Flanks 

In pursuit of a dominant “pole of power” position in Europe’s East 

and in Central Asia, and in order to strengthen its revisionist “Russian 

World,” Moscow is prepared to redraw international borders 

throughout the post-Soviet zone. The de facto annexation of Crimea 

in 2014 and the further division of Ukraine became a logical step after 

Russia’s forced partition of Georgia, in August 2008, and the 

recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, a 

move that brought no punishing international consequences. Putin’s 

aggressive moves into Ukraine and the muted international response 

sent shockwaves throughout the broader neighborhood. States from 

the Baltic Sea to the South Caucasus and Central Asia felt under more 

direct threat of destabilization, dissection, and of being drawn 

involuntarily into Russia’s imperial designs. 

In sum, five of Russia’s flanks are exposed to destabilization and


armed conflict as a result of Moscow’s revisionist and revanchist 

policies. Along Russia’s northern flank, two of the three Baltic 

countries (Latvia and Estonia) contain significant ethnic-Russian 

populations and remain on alert for scenarios of subversion 

engineered by Moscow. Putin may decide on more direct and forceful 

measures to allegedly defend not only Russian ethnics but also 

“Russian-speaking” populations that were settled in these republics 

during the post–World War Two Soviet occupation. 

Alternatively, Moscow may seek to carve out a land corridor across 

Lithuania to connect with its Kaliningrad exclave on the Baltic coast. 

The fact that this would mean direct action against a NATO member 

may prove attractive to Putin, as he could test Alliance unity and 

resolve in defending its territorial integrity. Even without direct 

attempts at partition and annexation, the Kremlin could pursue 

various destabilizing measures through energy pressures, trade 

embargoes, cyber attacks, incitement of ethnic unrest, or by staging 

sabotage or terrorist attacks on Baltic territory. This would also test 

NATO reactions to non-conventional attacks on a member state. 

The Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, are also 

growing increasingly concerned by Moscow’s incursions along their 

borders and inside their territorial waters, which directly threaten 

their national security. They are assessing the possibility of entering 

the Alliance to protect their vital interests. Russia’s attack on any of 

the Baltic states could draw Sweden or Finland into direct 

confrontation with Moscow. 

Along Russia’s western flank are several defensive flashpoints that 

could be triggered by Moscow’s offensives. Poland could become 

embroiled militarily to protect its eastern borders and defend the 

besieged Ukrainian state, as well as its own co-ethnics in Ukraine. A 

Russian military invasion, occupation, and partition of mainland 

Ukraine would spark armed resistance and insurgency against 

Russian forces. Insurgent leaders might then appeal to Poland for


military assistance. If Kyiv itself were bombed or captured, the 

Ukrainian government would likely seek refuge in Poland and draw 

Warsaw more directly into a confrontation with Moscow. Meanwhile, 

the rest of Central Europe would be exposed to a host of instabilities, 

ranging from energy cutoffs and trade disruptions to refugee outflows 

and military spillovers. 

Belarus will seek to ensure its territorial integrity as the government 

of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka endeavors to shield itself from 

the prospect of Russia’s expansionism. Moscow may claim parts of 

Belarus or view unification with Russia as the optimum solution. 

Lukashenka has not supported the annexation of Ukrainian territory 

for fear that this would set a precedent for the potential fracture of 

Belarus. Nonetheless, the Kremlin may call upon Minsk to provide 

“brotherly assistance” to Greater Russia, possibly within the 

framework of the Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty 

Organization (CSTO), or threaten political repercussions. In the most 

far-reaching scenario, if state integrity comes under increasing 

question, Belarus may break with Russia and appeal for international 

protection. 

Romania can become more closely involved in supporting the 

territorial integrity and EU association of Moldova, a country 

threatened by Moscow-sponsored separatism in the Transnistrian 

and Gagauz enclaves. Emboldened by success in Crimea, Putin may 

push for a referendum on federalization or independence for 

Moldova’s wayward regions. Concurrently with targeting Moldova, 

Moscow may forcefully establish an autonomous entity along 

Ukraine’s Black Sea coast between Odesa and Crimea. This would 

create a direct territorial link between Crimea and Transnistria under 

Moscow’s control and further challenge the pro-Western government 

in Kyiv. It would also provide Moscow with control over the entire 

northern coast of the Black Sea, including its maritime resources.


Along Russia’s southwestern flank, NATO members Romania and 

Bulgaria are growing concerned about security in the Black Sea and 

the stability of the wider Balkan region. The seizure of Abkhazia from 

Georgia and Crimea from Ukraine and threats to truncate other 

countries has increased Russia’s preponderance in the region. This 

heightens pressure on all littoral states, challenges NATO’s presence 

and its deterrence projections in the Wider Europe, and provides 

Moscow with a stepping-stone toward Central Europe and the 

Balkans. 

Moscow has also become more active among the post-Yugoslav states, 

seeking greater influence and leverage against Western interests and 

cultivating potential allies among countries that have yet to qualify for 

EU or NATO membership, particularly Serbia, or facing internal 

divisions, in the case of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kremlin 

inroads through energy contracts, corrupt business deals, and the 

exploitation of local nationalisms undermine prospects for Western 

integration and place both NATO and the EU on the defensive. 

Along Russia’s southern flank, Moscow maintains pressure in the 

South Caucasus to undercut the region’s Western connections. The 

governments in Georgia and Azerbaijan voiced dismay at the mild 

Western response to Russia’s partition of Ukraine and what this could 

portend for their own territorial integrity. Benefiting from its 

substantial military presence in Armenia, Moscow could reanimate an 

armed conflict with Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno 

Karabakh, currently controlled by Armenia. It can also sever Georgia 

by forcibly creating a military corridor between Russia and Armenia. 

All these measures, in addition to reanimating an assortment of ethnic 

claims inside both Georgia and Azerbaijan, would have an adverse 

impact on the stability of both governments and may push them into 

an enforced Russian orbit. 

Russia’s offensives could also obstruct the construction of energy 

pipelines between the Caspian Basin and Europe or place these under


Moscow’s control and handicap EU attempts to pursue energy 

diversity. This would also curtail US and European connections with 

Central Asia and reduce prospects for natural gas deliveries from the 

region to Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is planned as a 

network of pipelines that will connect gas fields in Azerbaijan with 

southern Italy via Georgia, Turkey, Greece, and Albania. 62 It is due to 

consist of three sections: the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), the 

Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and the Trans- 

Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The SCP is already online and pipes 

Azerbaijani gas from the Caspian coast to the Georgian-Turkish 

border; TAP will pump gas directly into Italy; and TANAP, presently 

under construction, will link the SCP with TAP. TANAP is expected 

to be concluded by 2019 and TAP by 2020. The further development 

of the SGC could involve a broad energy infrastructure linking 

Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf that 

would exclude Russia. 

Along Russia’s southeastern flank, the Central Asian states are 

increasingly wary of Kremlin policy and growing political 

interference. They are also concerned about the impact of closer 

economic integration through the Eurasia Economic Union (EEU), 

where the cost may outweigh the benefits to their own economies. If 

coupled with an undercutting of state sovereignty and demands to 

“protect” Russian ethnics in Kazakhstan and elsewhere, this could 

raise nationalist voices in the region and precipitate more direct 

conflict with Moscow in opposition to the latter’s integrationist 

agenda. 

Central Asia faces escalating security challenges in the wake of 

NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, limited Western political and 

economic engagement, and Russia’s growing aspirations. This can 

increase the appeal of local nationalists and propel some countries to 

develop closer ties with a more assertive China. Such relations could 

evolve into mutual defense arrangements as protection against a 

revisionist Russia.


The war between Russia and Ukraine has dramatically escalated the 

geostrategic competition between the Western states and a neoimperial 

Russia. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of 

Crimea demonstrates President Putin’s geopolitical ambitions and the 

limitations of Western deterrents. It has challenged the independence 

of other nearby post-Soviet states and exposed America’s newest 

NATO allies, NATO partners, and even the non-aligned European 

countries to the destabilizing regional repercussions of the Kremlin’s 

assertiveness. Although Russia’s military capabilities do not match 

those of its Soviet predecessor, the country presents a destabilizing 

presence in several key regions and employs numerous forms of 

subversion against targeted neighbors. The following five chapters 

systematically examine the threats confronted by Russia’s vulnerable 

flanks and the responses of states that are targeted by Moscow. 

Endnotes 

1 

Consult Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Marius Laurinavičius and Vytautas 

Keršanskas, “Vladimir Putin’s Pyramid of Rule: Who Really Governs 

Russia?” August 4, 2014, Delfi, Vilnius, Lithuania, http://en.delfi.lt/centraleastern-europe/vladimir-putins-pyramid-of-rule-who-really-governsrussia.d?id=65432116. 

2 

Power and wealth are manipulated by the Kremlin’s PR as potent symbols 

of President Putin’s alleged strength. Hence, campaigns against his 

acquisition of substantial wealth may simply reinforce Putin’s public image 

as a powerful Russian leader in the Tsarist and Soviet traditions. 

3 

A valuable analysis of the “Putin Doctrine” can be found in Leon Aron, 

“Putinology,” The American Interest, July 30, 2015, http://www.theamerican-interest.com/2015/07/30/putinology. 

4 

For previous analysis by Janusz Bugajski concerning Russia’s state 

ambitions and strategies see Georgian Lessons: Conflicting Russian and


Western Interests in the Wider Europe, CSIS Press, 2010; Dismantling the 

West: Russia’s Atlantic Agenda, Potomac Books, 2009; Expanding Eurasia: 

Russia’s European Ambitions, CSIS Press, 2008; and Cold Peace: Russia’s 

New Imperialism, Praeger/Greenwood, 2004. 

5 

Check Jakub Grygiel,”The Geopolitical Nihilist,” The American Interest, 

December 10, 2014, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/2014/12/10/the-geopolitical-nihilist. 

6 

See the extract from Richard Sakwa’s book Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the 

Borderlands, January 15, 2015, 

http://theibtaurisblog.com/2015/01/15/extract-frontline-ukraine. 

7 

For a critique of the term “hybrid war” see Jānis Bērziņš, “Russian New 

Generation Warfare is not Hybrid Warfare,” in Artis Pabriks and Andis 

Kudors (Eds.), The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe, The Centre for East 

European Policy Studies, University of Latvia Press, Rīga, 2015, pp. 42–43, 

http://eng.appc.lv/?p=642. 

8 

Konstantinas Ameliuškinas, “Lithuanian Historian: Moscow Does Not 

Have Moral Right to Host End of WWII Celebrations,” Vilnius Delfi, 

February 11, 2015, http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/society/lithuanian-historianmoscow-does-not-have-moral-right-to-host-end-of-wwiicelebrations.d?id=67143936. 

9 

Julie Fedor, Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, 

from Lenin to Putin, London and New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 130. 

10 

Putin’s own description of the EEU initiative can be found in Vladimir 

Putin, “Novyi Intergrationnyi Proekt dlia Evrazii,” Izvestia, October 3, 

2011, http://izvestia.ru/news/502761. 

11 

A useful analysis of the EEU can be found in Nicu Popescu, “Eurasian 

Union: The Real, The Imaginary and The Likely,” Chaillot Papers, 132, 

September 2014, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 

http://www.iss.europa.eu. 

12 

For a concise examination of Kremlin perceptions of the West see Janis


Berzins, “NATO: Russia’s Main Geopolitical Enemy,” in Andris Spruds and 

Karlis Bukovskis (Eds.), Ten Years in the Euro-Atlantic Community: Riga 

Conference Papers 2014, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga, 

2014, pp. 21–31. 

13 

Pavel Felgenhauer, “Kremlin Sees Ukraine Crisis as Part of Overall US-led 

Assault on Russia,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, September 11, 2014, Volume 

11, Issue 159. 

14 

Paul Goble, “Putin's New Military Doctrine Says Russia Faces More 

Threats Abroad -- and at Home,” December 27, 2014, Window on Eurasia, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/12/window-on-eurasiaputins-new-military.html; 

and 

http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf. 

15 

Pavel Podvig, “New Version of the Military Doctrine,” Russian Strategic 

Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2014, 

http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/new_version_of_the_military_do.sht 

ml. 

16 

Consult Eurasian Union: a Challenge for the European Union and Eastern 

Partnership Countries, Eastern Europe Studies Centre, 2012-12-19, Vilnius, 

Lithuania, http://www.eesc.lt/2012-7.html. 

17 

Ibid, p. 28. 

18 

Joseph Dobbs, The Eurasian Economic Union: A Bridge to Nowhere? 

Policy Brief, European Leadership Network, March 4, 2015, 

http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-eurasian-economic-uniona-bridge-to-nowhere_2498.html. 

19 

Interfax, Minsk, June 1, 2015, www.interfax.com. 

20 

Paul Goble, “A Mini-Brezhnev Doctrine? -- FSB Promises to Block 

Revolutions in CIS Countries,” June 7, 2014, Window on Eurasia – New 

Series, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/06/window-oneurasia-mini-brezhnev.html.


21 

For a synopsis see Edward Lucas, “Russia’s Sub Rosa Statecraft,” The 

American Interest, Vol. 10, No. 3, December 10, 2014, http://www.theamerican-interest.com/2014/12/10/russias-sub-rosa-statecraft. 

22 

Interviews by the authors in in Tbilisi, Georgia in July 2015. 

23 

“Moldova's Trans-Dniester region pleads to join Russia,” BBC, March 18, 

2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26627236. 

24 

“Transnistria,” in Freedom in the World 2015, Freedom House, 2015, 

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/transnistria. 

25 

Paul Goble, “Moscow Faces Problems In Absorbing Crimea Into Russian 

Legal Space,” Window on Eurasia, May 15, 2014, 

http://www.interpretermag.com/moscow-faces-problems-in-absorbingcrimea-into-russian-legal-space/; 

Ekaterina Dyatlovskaya, “Вхождение в 

Закон,” (Getting into Law), Novie Izvestia, May 14, 2014, 

http://www.newizv.ru/politics/2014-05-14/201465-vhozhdenie-vzakon.html. 

26 

Martin McCauley, Bandits, Gangsters and the Mafia: Russia, the Baltic 

States, and the CIS, Harlow, England: Longman, 2001, p. 75. According to 

McCauley, nine major mafia-like organizations have emerged controlling 

approximately half of the Russian economy. 

27 

Ellen Nakashima, “Russian Hackers use ‘Zero-Day’ to Hack NATO, 

Ukraine in Cyber-Spy Campaign,” October 13, 2014, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackersuse-zero-day-to-hack-nato-ukraine-in-cyber-spycampaign/2014/10/13/f2452976-52f9-11e4-892e-602188e70e9c_story.html. 

28 

Paul Goble, “How Russian Trolls are Recruited, Trained and Deployed,” 

January 29, 2015, Window on Eurasia -- New Series, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/01/how-russian-trolls-arerecruited.html. 

29 

Ben Nimmo, “Anatomy of an Info-War: How Russia’s Propaganda 

Machine Works, and How to Counter it,” May 15, 2015, Central European


Policy Institute, http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/anatomy-info-warhow-russias-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-counter-it. 

30 

Paul Goble, “Hot Issue – Lies, Damned Lies and Russian 

Disinformation,” Jamestown Foundation, August 13, 2014, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42745#.VWnrFKb9 

oVU. 

31 

Jolanta Darczewska, “The Anatomy of Russia Information Warfare: the 

Crimean Operation, a Case Study,” Point of View, No.42, May 2014, Centre 

for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland, p.5, 

http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2014-05-22/anatomyrussian-information-warfare-crimean-operation-a-case-study. 

32 

Ben Nimmo, 2015, op. cit. 

33 

Johan Wiktorin, ‘Time for a Counterattack on the Kremlin,” September 

12, 2014, http://20committee.com/2014/09/12/time-for-a-counterattackon-the-kremlin. 

34 

Anna Dolgov, “Baltics React With Indignation to Reports of Russia 

Questioning Their Independence,” The Moscow Times Online, July 1, 2015, 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com. Instead of reacting defensively and 

playing into Kremlin hands, the Baltic governments could simply turn the 

tables on Moscow by questioning the legitimacy of the Russian Federation 

that was assembled through conquest, mass murder, and forcible expulsions 

during the Tsarist and Soviet eras. 

35 

Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia and the West: Humiliation as a Tool of 

Blackmail,” The American Interest, June 2, 2015, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/2015/06/02/humiliation-as-a-tool-of-blackmail. 

36 

Speech by Andrei Illarionov at NATO PA Session in Vilnius,” The 

Lithuanian Tribune, June 16, 2014, 

http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/69155/speech-by-andrei-illarionov-atnato-pa-session-in-vilnius-201469155/.


37 

Paul Goble. “Ukrainians and Belarusians are Not ‘Byproducts’ of Russian 

Ethno-National Development,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, April 28, 

2014, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/04/window-on-eurasiaukrainians-and.html. 

38 

Hannah Gaiis, “Putin, Stalin, and the Church,” First Things, May 20, 

2015, http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2015/05/putins-takinghis-cues-on-religion-from-an-unlikely-source. 

39 

Elisabeth Braw, “Mixed Feelings In Macedonia As A Russian Orthodox 

Church Rises,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 25, 2015, 

http://www.rferl.org/content/macedonia-russian-orthodox-churchskopje/27093507.html. 

Estonian intelligence agencies allege that some of 

the money earmarked for construction of the church was channeled to pro- 

Moscow politicians. 

40 

Wacław Radziwinowicz, “Niepokalane Rosyjskie Zwycięstwo,” Gazeta 

Wyborcza, Warsaw, April 4, 2015, 

http://wyborcza.pl/magazyn/1,144507,17700646,Niepokalane_rosyjskie_zw 

yciestwo.html. 

41 

Krisztina Than and Michael Kahn, "New South Stream Will Be Russia’s 

‘Route of Friendship,’" Brussels, EurActiv.com, February 25, 2015, 

http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/new-south-stream-will-berussias-route-friendship-312401. 

42 

Vladislav Maltsev,”March of the Deadheads; Neo-Nazis in the Baltic 

States Are Not Yet Encountering Resistance," Moscow, Lenta.ru, March 18, 

2015, http://lenta.ru. 

43 

“Pro-Russian Pseudo-Elections in the East of Ukraine Disclose Russian 

Agent Network in Europe,” November 7, 2014, 

http://eurasianintelligence.org/news.php?new=165&numm. A number of 

EU citizens were present during the illicit elections in occupied Donbas on 

November 2, 2014. To obtain observer status they had to be licensed by 

representatives of the Russian Command overseeing the militia groups in 

occupied Ukrainian territories. In effect, these EU citizens are collaborators 

with Russia’s intelligence agencies.


44 

Paul Goble, “Putin Using Far Right to Destabilize Ukraine, Poroshenko 

Says,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, September 3, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/09/putin-using-far-right-todestabilize.html. 

45 

Jolanta Darczewska, op.cit., May 2014, p. 29, 

http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2014-05-22/anatomyrussian-information-warfare-crimean-operation-a-case-study. 

46 

Andrew Higgins, “Russian Money Suspected Behind Fracking Protests,” 

November 30, 2014, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/01/world/russian-money-suspectedbehind-fracking-protests.html. 

47 

Official site of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies: http://riss.ru. 

48 

Sarunas Cerniauskas: “What Are ‘Cadets’ From Lithuania Being Taught 

in Russian Military Camp?” Delfi, Vilnius, October 9, 2014, 

http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/society/lithuanian-school-students-are-taken-torussian-paramilitary-camps-according-to-media-reports.d?id=66071036. 

49 

Roger McDermott, “Russia Hosts CSTO Exercises in Western Military 

District,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 1, 2015, Volume 12, Issue 156. 

50 

RFE/RL, Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 190, Part I, October 6, 2003, and Denis 

Trifonov, “’Ivanov Doctrine’ Reflects Moscow’s Growing Confidence in the 

CIS and Beyond,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, Johns Hopkins, 

Washington, D.C., November 19, 2003, 

http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/1657. 

51 

Jonathan Marcus, “Russia's 'Close Military Encounters' with Europe 

Documented,” BBC News, November 10, 2014, 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29956277. The London-based 

European Leadership Network produced a detailed study of assertive 

Russian activity entitled: “Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military 

Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014.” It chronicles almost 40 

specific incidents, which “add up to a highly disturbing picture of violations


of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided mid-air 

collisions, close encounters at sea and other dangerous actions happening 

on a regular basis over a very wide geographical area,” including 

harassment of reconnaissance planes, close over-flights over warships, and 

mock bombing raid missions. The targets include several NATO members. 

52 

Kaarel Kaas, “Russian Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea Region,” 

Diplomaatia, Estonia, August 7, 2014, 

http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/russian-armed-forces-in-the-balticsea-region/. 

Iskanders were reportedly deployed to the 152nd Missile 

Brigade in Kaliningrad. These missile systems provide Russia with the 

capacity to strike strategically important targets, including airports, ports, 

railway junctions, and command centers, from southern Poland to central 

Finland. 

53 

Melinda Haring, “The West’s Strategy Toward Putin Promises Conflict 

and Increases Danger of Wider War: Ian Brzezinski,” 

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-west-s-strategytoward-putin-promises-conflict-and-increases-danger-of-wider-war. 

54 

Douglas Mastriano and Derek O'Malley (Eds.), Project 1704: A US Army 

War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe, an Appropriate 

US Response and the Implications for US Landpower, March 26, 2015, 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=127 

4. 

55 

“Russia Targets NATO With Military Exercises,” March 19, 2015, 

Stratfor, p. 6, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-targets-natomilitary-exercises. 

56 

On July 22, 2014 President Putin addressed the Russian Security Council 

and terminated cooperation between Russia and NATO. His response to 

NATO’s moves to reinforce the security of members close to Russia was the 

deployment of the Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile system along Russia’s 

western borders and in Kaliningrad. See Roger McDermott, “Russia- 

NATO: No ‘Business as Usual,’” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 29, 2014, 

Volume 11, Issue 138.


57 

Pavel Felgenhauer, “Website Publishes Purported Detailed Russian 

Invasion Plan of Eastern Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 18, 2015, 

Volume 12, Issue 114. 

58 

“The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” Military- 

Industrial Kurier, February 27, 2013, 

http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimovdoctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/. 

59 

Vitalii Usenko and Dmytro Usenko, “Russian Hybrid Warfare: What are 

Effects-Based Network Operations and How to Counteract Them,” 

http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/11/05/russian-hybrid-warfare-what-areeffect-based-network-operations-and-how-to-counteract-them. 

60 

According to Lieutenant-General Ben Hodges, commander of US Army 

forces in Europe, in Adrian Croft, “Russia Could Soon Run Multiple 

Ukraine-Sized Operations: US General,” January 16, 2015, Reuters, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/16/us-nato-russiaidUSKBN0KP1F620150116. 

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has 

claimed that Moscow will maintain its modernization plans estimated to 

cost more than 20 trillion rubles ($300 billion) by 2020. 

61 

For a summary of maskirovka operations see Lucy Ash, “How Russia 

Outfoxes Its Enemies,” BBC News, January 28, 2015, 

http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283. 

62 

Emanuele Scimia, "Southern Gas Corridor’s Advances Cool off Energy 

Cooperation Between Italy and Russia," Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 3, 

2015, Volume 12, Issue 145.

2. Northern Flank: Baltic and Nordic 

The Baltic Sea occupies a pivotal position in Moscow’s plans to 

consolidate the northern flank of its expansionist Eurasian project. It 

provides a vital trade route to Russia’s second largest city, St. 

Petersburg, hosts the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline between 

Russia and Germany, and is the location of the Baltic fleet, 

headquartered in the Kaliningrad exclave. Despite Kremlin 

opposition, over the past two decades the Baltic Sea has become 

largely a NATO lake, with six member states having located along its 

coast: the traditional members, Denmark and Germany, and relative 

newcomers Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In addition, since 

Russia’s assault on Ukraine, the remaining two neutral states, Sweden 

and Finland, are moving closer to NATO in an effort to protect their 

security in an increasingly unpredictable region. 

Russia’s northern flank consists of two sets of countries that have 

experienced growing pressures from Moscow: the Baltic and the 

Nordic. The three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) occupy 

the most vulnerable position, especially Latvia and Estonia, which 

contain significant ethnic-Russian and Russian-speaking populations. 

Each state has campaigned for more effective NATO protection to 

counter attempts to unsettle their internal security. In the wake of 

Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the Baltic states formally requested NATO 

to deploy several thousand troops as a permanent deterrent. They are 

seeking a brigade-size unit of approximately 3,000 soldiers so that 

every Baltic country would have at least one battalion stationed on its 

territory. The successful defense of any NATO member in deterring

NORTHERN FLANK | 67 

Moscow’s many-pronged assaults will be a crucial test for the 

credibility of the Alliance over the next decade. If any NATO member 

is dismembered by Russia, then Moscow will not only exact revenge 

for losing the Cold War, it will also have in effect dismantled the 

Western Alliance. 

The Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, have also 

become increasingly concerned by Moscow’s activities along their 

borders. Events in Ukraine in 2014 threw into sharp focus the absence 

of Nordic capabilities following years of drawdowns and a focus on 

crisis management operations instead of territorial defense. 1 Two 

decades of underinvestment in defense and substantial force 

reductions have hollowed out territorial defense capabilities. 

Northern Europe has been left dangerously exposed to military 

coercion at a time of mounting uncertainty. If regional stability was 

threatened because of Russia’s actions, both Sweden and Finland 

could petition for NATO membership, thus expanding the rupture 

between Washington and Moscow and intensifying Russia’s 

justifications for its regional aggressiveness. 

In the event that Moscow decides to directly attack Estonia, Latvia, or 

Lithuania, in an alleged defense of its national interests, it will seek full 

military maneuverability in the Baltic Sea and to restrict NATO's 

response. In flexing its military muscles through large-scale 

maneuvers, the construction of new bases, and frequent violations of 

the air space and coastal waters of littoral states, Moscow has been 

aiming at several objectives. First, the military buildup is supposed to 

demonstrate that Russia is again a great power and can create an 

environment of uncertainty in the Baltic and Nordic regions. Second, 

Moscow is testing NATO's political and military responses and 

adjusting its own tactics and operations in potential preparations for 

armed conflict. And third, in the case of Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania, the Kremlin's military pressures are part of a broader 

multi-pronged offensive to weaken their governments, stir social and


ethnic disputes, and demonstrate that NATO will not be able to 

defend them in the event of war. 

Baltic Front 

The Putin administration has persistently tried to demonstrate that 

the independence of the three Baltic states is an “abnormality” as 

compared to the period when the region was under Russian or Soviet 

rule. 2 Russia’s post-Soviet narrative has depicted the Baltic countries 

as a platform for expanding US interests in Belarus, Ukraine, and 

Russia itself on the pretext of democratization and promotion of 

human rights. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are on NATO’s front 

line, and each capital fears that in the aftermath of Russia’s attack on 

Ukraine, the Kremlin may engage in several forms of incursion to 

demonstrate its strength and underscore Western impotence. 

While Russia's ambitions toward the three Baltic states are clear, its 

pretexts for intervention and its strategies of subversion are varied. In 

terms of objectives, the Kremlin follows two overarching goals. First, 

it seeks to marginalize and isolate the three countries and reduce their 

influence in the post-Soviet neighborhood. It calculates that 

neutralized governments will not challenge attempts to establish a 

Eurasian bloc among the remaining post-Soviet states. Russia’s 

officials understand that the Baltic nations cannot be incorporated in 

its regional organizations, but they want to prevent them from 

supporting any initiatives for a wider EU or NATO that would 

undermine the Eurasian alternative. Despite Moscow’s pressures, all 

three Baltic capitals remain internationally active in support of 

Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other countries that have resisted the 

Kremlin. 

Second, Russia wants to emasculate NATO, especially along their 

common border in Europe’s East. By regularly challenging the Baltic 

countries through troop maneuvers, air space violations, threats of


invasion, or nuclear annihilation, Putin’s officials are intent on 

demonstrating that if Russia decides to attack, the Balts will be helpless 

to resist and NATO’s common defense doctrine will prove worthless. 

In effect, the Kremlin’s ambition is NATO “rollback,” in which 

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may formally remain part of the 

Alliance but are unable to oppose Russian policy and NATO does not 

emplace its infrastructure on Baltic territory. 

Moscow has two main pretexts for pressuring the Baltic countries: the 

status of Kaliningrad and the position of Russian-speaking minorities. 

The Kremlin seeks exclusive control over a transit corridor across 

Lithuania to its exclave of Kaliningrad, a slither of territory on the 

Baltic coast that Russia annexed from Germany at the close of World 

War Two. Officials claim that the region is being isolated through 

international sanctions against Russia, introduced after its assault on 

Ukraine during 2014. They have issued warnings that Kaliningrad 

could be deliberately cut off by Vilnius in an attempted takeover of the 

territory. 

A more likely scenario is a rising movement for autonomy in 

Kaliningrad, demanding closer links with the EU, similar to Ukraine’s 

aspirations, which the Kremlin will be determined to thwart. 

Kaliningrad’s population is showing signs of frustration with 

economic stagnation and Moscow’s neglect, and long-term Western 

sanctions will further diminish living standards. However, Lithuanian 

officials calculate that Russia could stage a provocation along 

Kaliningrad’s border, claim that the local population is in danger of 

isolation, encirclement, or attack, and dispatch a troop convoy to open 

a direct military corridor from Russia across Lithuanian territory. 

Moscow has tried to benefit from political, ethnic, and social 

turbulence in the region in order to keep the Baltic countries off 

balance. It has exploited the Russian minority question to depict the 

Baltic governments as failing to meet European standards for 

minority protection. The Kremlin claims the right to represent and


defend the interests not only of Russian ethnics but all “Russianspeakers” 

in order to raise the number of alleged victims of Baltic 

repression. Assertions by officials that Baltic governments 

discriminate against Russians, despite the conclusions of international 

human rights organizations, contribute to heightening tensions. 

Latvia and Estonia contain sizable Russian-speaking populations. 

Although the greater share of these residents are integrated in the state 

through citizenship, political participation, and economic 

opportunity, a considerable minority have avoided naturalization and 

may be susceptible to manipulation by Moscow’s agitprop offensives. 

According to the 2011 census, out of two million people in Latvia, 

26.9% were Russians, although the pool of “Russian speakers” remains 

larger. Of these, about 290,000 are currently non-citizens, as they have 

not passed an elementary naturalization test or have not applied for 

citizenship. In Estonia, according to the 2011 census, out of a 

population of almost 1.3 million, 24.8% were Russians, with a larger 

number of “Russian speakers,” of which nearly 90,000 are currently 

non-citizens. 

In both countries, non-citizens benefit from all EU-harmonized civil 

rights, aside from being unable to vote in Latvia in line with norms 

evident in other EU states. However, in Estonia non-citizens are 

permitted to vote at the local level. As permanent residents, all noncitizens 

can freely travel to all EU territories and live and work 

anywhere in the country. Nonetheless, a small minority remains 

susceptible to an intense Moscow-directed campaign to manufacture 

or exploit grievances in order to divide Latvian and Estonian societies. 

Conflicts can be incited by spreading anti-government disinformation 

through widely watched Russian television channels and by 

infiltrating these countries using Russian special forces to organize 

local provocateurs. Officials in Moscow can subsequently intervene to 

allegedly protect Russian compatriots. As in Ukraine, the aggressor 

can thrust himself forward as the peacemaker and mediator.


Numerous pressures have been applied over several years against the 

Baltic states by various arms of the Russian government. In addition 

to direct military threats and the exploitation of ethnic divisions, 

Moscow has used energy embargos, economic sanctions, political 

influences, financial corruption, cyber wars, NGO activism, and 

media disinformation campaigns to engender social divisions and 

confrontations and weaken the Baltic authorities. In the aftermath of 

events in Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia have remained on alert for 

another scenario of partition engineered by Moscow on the grounds 

of defending Russian compatriots. Kremlin ambitions may be 

bolstered by its relative successes in Ukraine, especially as the Western 

response proved inadequate in preventing partition. The Baltics also 

have relatively small and weak military forces. As a consequence, each 

state has sought more effective NATO protection of their borders, 

territories, and political institutions to counter attempts to unsettle 

internal security. 

As the major energy supplier in the region after the demise of the 

Soviet Union, Moscow has periodically sought to disrupt the Baltic 

economies in order to gain political advantage. Each government has 

tried to reduce its dependence on Russian energy and its exposure to 

blackmail. Moscow also endeavors to control energy transit routes, as 

this is both financially and politically profitable. Energy supplies are 

used as leverage to purchase shares in local refining and 

transportation systems. Moreover, periodic threats to reduce or halt 

supplies are intended to induce concessions for Russian investments 

in local economies. Another customary form of political pressure 

involves targeted trade sanctions against the Baltic states. For 

instance, in June 2015 Russia’s Federal Veterinary and Phyto-Sanitary 

Oversight Service prohibited the transit of fish and fish products from 

the Baltic countries across Russia to Kazakhstan. 3


Estonia 

According to the 2011 census, Estonia had 1,294,236 permanent 

residents, of whom 68.7% defined themselves as Estonian, 24.8% as 

Russian, and 4.9% as other nationalities. 4 Approximately 85% of the 

total are citizens, 8% are non-citizens, and 7% are Russian citizens, 

with the total number of non-citizens decreasing significantly since 

the country regained independence in 1991. The reluctance of some 

Russian-speakers to integrate into Estonian society has caused 

socioeconomic and political problems, most visibly in major 

industrial areas such as Ida-Viru county, bordering Russia in the 

northeast of the country, and in the capital Tallinn. 

The city of Narva and the wider Ida-Viru county is reportedly 

receptive soil for Moscow’s information war because of the number of 

Russians distrustful of the central government and experiencing 

tough economic conditions. 5 Many residents feel marginalized and 

excluded from national development. In 2013, a third of the 

population in Ida-Viru (33.7%) lived in relative poverty, while 

Estonia’s average was 22%. Only 52% of the county’s working-age 

population was gainfully employed and the unemployment rate stood 

at 13% in Ida-Viru in 2014, almost twice the national average. 54% of 

Ida-Viru residents are Estonian citizens; 17% do not have any 

citizenship, and 28% are Russian citizens. 

However, the Russian-speaking community is not as homogeneous as 

it was at the start of the 1990s. Differences have widened in attitudes 

toward the Estonian state and in the ability to adapt to changing 

economic conditions. According to a study conducted in 2011 by 

Marju Lauristin, professor of sociology at the University of Tartu, the 

Russian-speaking population is split roughly into two: approximately 

half are successfully integrated, the rest much less so or not at all. The 

assimilated sector consists mostly of younger people born and 

educated in Estonia, possessing Estonian citizenship, having a good


command of the language, able to cope economically, and valuing the 

benefits of EU membership. Most live in Tallinn and other larger 

cities. Although there are no Russian ethnic parties in Estonia’s 

parliament, the Center Party appeals mostly to assimilated Russians 

and includes the mayor of Tallinn. The least integrated Russian sector 

is made up of older people brought up in Soviet times with no 

command of Estonian, as well as blue-collar workers, the 

unemployed, and rural residents. 6 The national estrangement of 

members of the unintegrated sector has pushed them deeper into 

Russia’s sphere of influence. 

For many years, the advice from Russia to its Baltic diaspora was not 

to accept the host country’s citizenship. Moscow could then use noncitizens 

to discredit the Baltic governments in international 

organizations, accusing them of human rights violations. Despite the 

fact that Estonia prohibits dual citizenship, Moscow allowed its 

“compatriots” (the term for Russians living outside the country) to 

become Russian citizens in an expedited manner. Moscow 

downplayed the fact that non-citizen residents of Estonia benefit from 

all rights except voting at national level and running for political 

office, in line with EU norms. They can travel freely in the Schengen 

area and do not need visas to visit Russia. The Kremlin also 

manipulates the question of Russian-language education. The reform 

of state schools was designed to expand education in the Estonian 

language, a policy opposed by some Russian activists and older 

teachers who retain a Soviet mentality and refuse to integrate. 

Another source of pressure against Estonia revolves around Russia’s 

manipulation of Finno-Ugric aspirations. Estonians form part of the 

distinct Finno-Ugric language group of northeastern Europe that also 

includes Finns, Hungarians, Mordvins, Sami, Komi, and Mari people. 

Leningrad Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko has claimed that the 

Izhors, a Finno-Ugric group numbering 26,000, some of whom 

support the creation of an autonomous republic in northwestern 

Russia, are a threat to the country’s territorial integrity. 7 This could be


a signal to Estonia and Finland to terminate their support for the 

cultural revival of Finno-Ugric populations in Russia or face another 

pretext for Russia’s multi-pronged interventions to allegedly defend 

Russian interests. 

Moscow has tried to influence politics in Estonia by supporting the 

largely Russian minority Center Party. In the March 1, 2015, 

parliamentary elections, the Reform Party gained 27.7% of the vote 

and won 30 out of 101 seats. The Center Party, reportedly linked to 

Putin’s United Russia party, came second with 24.8% and 27 seats. 8 In 

the county of Ida-Viru that includes Narva, the Centre Party won 58% 

of the vote. Over 90% of Narva’s 60,000 residents, on the border with 

Russia, reportedly identify themselves as Russian-speakers. The 

liberal-centrist Reform Party and the Center Party shared a coalition 

government in the past, but the relationship was spoiled by the Center 

Party's stance on Ukraine. Party leader Edgar Savisaar stirred 

controversy when he openly backed Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In 

addition, military maneuvers conducted by Moscow on Estonia's 

border just days ahead of the elections were intended to intimidate 

voters and encourage the Russian vote. 

The main target of Russian state propaganda in Estonia is the older 

generation, whose level of education is low and whose command of 

Estonian or other languages is insufficient to benefit from the foreignlanguage 

media. However, some young and educated Estonian 

Russians have also supported Putin and Kremlin revisionism and 

demanded that Russian become the country’s second official 

language. Estonian analysts believe that the government has not 

placed sufficient emphasis on conditions among many Russianspeakers, 

leaving them little option but to immerse themselves in 

Russia’s sphere of information. The Russian media incites conflict by 

presenting a biased picture of the Western world, including the Baltic 

states, alleging that it threatens Russia. It also deliberately provokes 

Estonian nationalism to promote ethnic tensions, while claiming that 

Estonians are “Russophobes.” For instance, in April 2007, Moscow


capitalized on the government’s relocation of a bronze statue to Red 

Army “liberators” from the center of Tallinn to a nearby military 

cemetery, by fanning local demonstrations and publicizing them as 

evidence of anti-Russian repression. 

Moscow supports several local NGOs that are critical of the Estonian 

government and supportive of the Kremlin. For example, the Legal 

Information Center for Human Rights (LICHR) dispenses advice to 

ethnic minorities and produces reports condemning Estonia’s 

treatment of the Russian minority. 9 Estonia’s security services have 

classified the LICHR as a Russian agent. Its human rights reports are 

financed by the Kremlin-sponsored Fund to Support and Protect the 

Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (the Compatriot Fund, or 

Pravfond), which together with the Russkiy Mir Foundation provides 

funding for the LICHR’s operations. Other pro-Kremlin NGOs 

include Estonia Without Nazism and the Integration Media Group. A 

few radical Russian organizations and individuals are also either 

favored by Moscow or espouse support for an imperial Russia. 10 

On the cyber security front, Estonia had direct experience of cyber 

warfare in April 2007, when government and private websites came 

under massive attack from sources believed to be linked with the 

Russian government. Moscow used the pretext of the removal of the 

bronze statue, which to most citizens of Estonia represented half a 

century of Soviet occupation and repression. Since that time, the 

Estonian government has taken precautions to limit any future 

damage from cyber attacks and in 2008 opened a NATO Cooperative 

Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, in the capital Tallinn. Its goal is 

to research, educate, and help develop cyber security for the Alliance. 

Estonia’s Police and Border Guard Board have also prepared a cyber 

crime unit to take charge of Internet-related crime from the start of 

2016. 11 

In terms of national security, Estonia has no binding border treaty 

with Russia, as the current draft is awaiting the approval of President


Putin. 12 The treaty passed the first reading in the Estonian parliament 

in April 2014 and the MPs decided the second reading will be 

scheduled only once Russia has also begun proceedings. Delays in 

ratification create a climate of uncertainty in the country regarding 

potential border violations by Russia. Estonia possesses a highly 

professional police, security, and border protection force, even though 

much of the 130 kilometers of border with Russia is porous. It also has 

highly competent local-level institutions that presumably cannot be 

easily overtaken by separatists, as was the case in eastern Ukraine. In 

addition, the military displays high morale and motivation to resist 

any Russian intervention. 13 

Estonia’s energy vulnerabilities have significantly decreased in recent 

years. Even though the country remains dependent on Russian 

natural gas for 100% of its supplies, gas only constitutes 9% of the total 

energy mix. Although it has fewer energy levers, Russia can engage in 

other forms of sabotage such as interrupting or severing underwater 

fiber optic cables between Estonia and Sweden and Finland. 

Moscow also engages in periodic direct provocations against Estonia. 

For example, a Russian unit abducted Eston Kohver, an officer of 

Estonia’s Internal Security Service, near the Russian border, on 

September 5, 2014. 14 The abduction occurred shortly after President 

Obama visited Tallinn to pledge protection against Russia’s 

aggression and on the eve of the NATO summit in Wales. Kohver’s 

kidnapping was intended to signal that Moscow was capable of 

penetrating the territory of all three Baltic states and that NATO 

would not be in a position to respond. 15 On August 19, 2015, a court 

in Russia sentenced Kohver to fifteen years in prison for espionage 

and other charges. 

16 

Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas 

condemned the trial as “a clear and grave violation of international 

law.” Officials maintain that Kohver was apprehended when 

investigating smuggling operations involving Russian officials. On 

September 26, 2015, Kohver was exchanged for a Russian spy, a 

former officer in Estonia’s security police found guilty of passing


secret information to Moscow. 

Estonia’s reactions to Moscow’s subversion have involved a spectrum 

of initiatives. According to Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves 

in his Victory Day speech on June 23, 2014, Estonia has a battle-ready 

defense force with high morale. 17 Internal Affairs Minister Hanno 

Pevkur asserted that internal security spending should be raised from 

1.7% to 2% of GDP, similarly to defense spending. 18 It would focus on 

containing potential riots, buttressing rapid reaction forces, 

equipping border guards, and improving communication capabilities. 

Tallinn is also increasing its military expenditures beyond NATO 

requirements of 2% of GDP. 

Estonia has formulated a new National Defense Act to better prepare 

the country to counter modern security threats. 19 The legislation gives 

the Prime Minister a greater role in planning and managing national 

defense. It sets out different levels of nationwide preparedness, from 

general defense readiness in time of peace to martial law and 

mobilization in periods of war. It lays down a common planning 

model that identifies the duties and activities of all official agencies. 

Minister of Defense Sven Mikser underscored that the threats facing 

Estonia are much more diverse than a purely military attack. Hence, 

military defense is simply one element in the concept of 

comprehensive national defense. 

During his visit to Estonia in September 2014, Obama announced 

plans to create a US-Baltic-Nordic air force training center at Amari 

base, in addition to the NATO Baltic air policing capabilities already 

based there. 20 The government hopes to make the presence of NATO 

fighter jets at Amari a permanent fixture of the Alliance’s military 

planning system. According to Foreign Minister Urmas Paet, Estonia 

wants NATO to increase its presence in the Baltic region to become 

permanent on the sea, land, and air. 21 

President Ilves has called for a permanent NATO ground force in


Estonia, as the current Alliance contingent is a temporarily stationed 

US infantry company with only 150 soldiers. 22 Russian troops could 

reach Tallinn from the border in just four hours. By the time NATO 

would be ready to launch any significant action it would be too late. 

Estonia has a standing army of 5,300 troops and relies on NATO to 

police its airspace. Although NATO quadrupled its policing mission 

over the Baltic states from four to 16 fighter jets in 2014, this is a small 

fraction of Russia’s combat aircraft numbers. 

Various measures have been undertaken to improve Estonia’s military 

preparedness. In late April 2015, Estonia and the US held five days of 

joint military exercises. 23 The main goal was to increase combat 

readiness in a conventional war. In May 2015, the Siil 2015 exercises 

involved 13,000 conscripts, reservists, and members of the Kaitseliit 

(Estonian Defense League) paramilitary organization. Siil 2015 also 

included NATO soldiers that were already deployed in Estonia. In 

December 2014, the defense ministers of the Baltic republics agreed to 

establish a joint body for security data coordination. 24 Estonia has 

been installing mobile monitoring systems on the border with Russia 

with assistance from the EU External Borders Fund (EBF), which 

supports EU border protection. 25 As there is no border monitoring 

inside the Schengen zone, the security of external borders is a concern 

for all states. Cameras have also been installed on the Herman Fortress 

in Narva to monitor the transborder river shared with Russia. 

Surveillance systems were also renewed in Lake Peipu and several 

other key locations. 

On the minority front, in 2014 Estonia decided to create a Russianlanguage 

TV channel to counter Moscow’s propaganda. The station 

was due to begin broadcasts in the fall of 2015. Estonian Public 

Broadcasting (ERR) and Latvian Public Service Television (LTV) also 

concluded an agreement in March 2015 to cooperate in developing 

their Russian-language TV channels. 26 An increasing number of 

Russian-language broadcasts have featured on Estonian stations. For 

instance, in January 2015, Estonia’s public broadcasting company


ERR launched a weekly news magazine in Russian called “AK+” to be 

broadcast on a national television channel and a commercial 

television channel. 27 In addition, the TEDX free internet network is 

spreading to Russian-inhabited areas and enabling easier 

communication and expression of local needs and grievances to both 

local and central governments. 28 

Latvia 

Latvia has confronted an extensive Russian media campaign designed 

to discredit the country internationally. 

29 

Successive Latvian 

governments have been accused of reviving fascism and promoting 

Russophobia. Moscow was especially interested in blackening Riga’s 

reputation during its presidency of the EU Council, in the first six 

months of 2015. Officials and analysts also fear that Russia’s special 

services may conduct various destabilizing provocations to test 

NATO’s resolve in defending Latvia. Additionally, Moscow has 

engaged in divisive tactics between the Baltic states to weaken their 

common front vis-à-vis Russia. 30 This involves trying to engender 

conflicts over territory and resources. For instance, Janiz Kruzinis, a 

Latvian activist of the Association Against Nazism, which follows 

Moscow’s line, launched an Internet petition campaign to seek “the 

return of the territory of Palanga” from Lithuania along the Baltic 

coast. Within a week, 10,000 people reportedly signed the petition. 

On the energy front, Moscow’s leverage with Latvia has decreased in 

recent years, as Riga continues to diversify its sources and forms of 

energy, including Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Poland and 

Lithuania and gas interconnectors with neighbors. If Russia 

terminated all its agreements with Latvia, including energy supplies, 

Latvia's GDP would reportedly suffer a 10% contraction. However, the 

current amount of gas reserves would suffice for a year and alternative 

supplies are becoming available through the Klaipėda gas terminal in 

Lithuania. 31 The opening of the terminal in December 2014 was one


of the most important steps in strengthening security for the Baltic 

states, as demonstrated by Moscow attempting to convince a 

Norwegian company not to take part in the project. 32 

Russia can apply other economic pressures, as 10% of Latvia’s GDP is 

earned from the transit of goods to Russia, which makes up 80% of the 

total freight turnover of Latvian Railways. Moscow’s imposition of an 

embargo on EU agricultural produce, in August 2014, damaged the 

cargo transit sector. 33 Russia’s ban on food imports from the EU hit 

the Baltic countries the hardest since Russia’s share in the structure of 

their exports is larger than in other EU countries, especially in 

agriculture. 34 An additional economic tool is available through 

political corruption, as Russian state-connected money is present in 

various industries, while the absence of liberalization in the gas 

market has favored corruption. 

In order to influence Latvian politics and ensure a government in Riga 

that does not oppose Russia internationally, Moscow has supported 

the predominantly ethnic Russian Harmony Party. In the September 

17, 2011 elections, Harmony gained a majority of votes among 

Russian-speakers but was left out of the governing coalition by a 

combination of Latvian parties amidst fears that it could veer Latvia 

away from the West. Russian organizations also gathered signatures 

to hold a referendum on making Russian an official second language. 

The initiative was defeated on February 18, 2012, by over 74.8% of 

voters. Just 24.88% of citizens voted in favor, and only in the eastern 

region of Latgale did a majority vote for the constitutional change. 35 

According to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Moscow will continue 

to expand the Russian World project and this includes assistance for 

“compatriots in their struggle for political rights” in Latvia. 36 The 2011 

census showed that 62.1% of the population were Latvians (1,285,136) 

and 26.9% Russians (557,119). 37 The Russian total has dropped from 

34% since the 1989 census. Approximately 288,000 of the Russians are 

non-citizens, mostly monolingual elderly people. This figure has


significantly decreased, having stood at about 700,000 in 1994. 38 In 

October 2013, the law was amended to allow citizenship for people 

born to non-citizens. In the past two decades of independence, 

citizenship has been steadily made more inclusive as Latvians feel 

more confident about their national and state survival following half 

a century of Soviet occupation, ethnic expulsion, Russian 

colonization, and compulsory russification. Applying for citizenship 

takes about nine months and requires minimal language proficiency. 

However, even non-citizens have various benefits, and as permanent 

residents they can travel to both the EU and Russia without visas. 

Latvia lacks a common forum for inter-ethnic reconciliation, and 

there is little dialogue between the two communities regarding 

Latvia’s occupation under Tsarism and Sovietism. Russian authorities 

exploit these divisions and reportedly monitor public opinion to 

assess Latvia’s vulnerabilities. 39 One important component is support 

for a federalized Latvia and for an autonomy movement in the eastern 

region of Latgale, populated heavily by Russians. 

Latgale is vulnerable to separatist appeals, as it is less developed 

economically, conducts significant trade and business with Belarus 

and Russia, and the Russian media predominates, particularly 

television. In the language referendum in February 2012, 60% of the 

region’s population voted for Russian as a second state language. The 

move was rejected by a clear Latvian majority, which viewed the 

language proposal as threatening the use of Latvian. The danger also 

exists that too many concessions that raise the status of the Russian 

language or broader minority rights could animate Latvian nationalist 

groups, as distrust of Russia has increased since its intervention in 

Ukraine during 2014. Nationalist polarization suits Moscow and 

provides pretexts for potential intervention. 40 Nonetheless, according 

to opinion polls, the majority of Russians are loyal and integrated in 

Latvian society, especially those that have lived in the country for 

generations.


Russia’s officials have attacked the Preamble to the Latvian 

Constitution, passed by Latvia’s parliament in June 2014, claiming 

that it gives a privileged position to the titular nation over ethnic 

minorities and will facilitate further inter-ethnic splits. 41 The 

preamble states that the Republic of Latvia has been established by 

uniting the territories historically inhabited by Latvians and based on 

the Latvian nation’s desire for sovereignty and to ensure the existence 

and development of the Latvian nation, its language and culture. 

Russia’s representatives frequently complain about conditions in 

Latvia despite the wide array of minority rights in line with EU 

standards that the Russian Federation itself fails to guarantee. They 

accuse Latvian officials of neo-Nazism and xenophobia to justify 

Moscow’s interference in the country’s affairs. Despite such attacks, 

Riga grants extensive group rights to Russians, including schools, 

media, culture, and language use at the local level wherever Russians 

form over 20% of population, in addition to the full array of civic 

rights benefiting all citizens. 

Nils Ušakovs, the Mayor of Riga and leader of Harmony Center, the 

largest single party in the country, is an ethnic Russian. Harmony has 

tried to appeal to Latvian ethnics as a social democratic formation and 

downplayed its links with Putin’s party, United Russia. Nonetheless, 

many Latvians view Harmony with suspicion and consider it 

potentially disloyal to Latvian statehood. Moscow’s attack on Ukraine 

contributed to undermining Harmony’s reputation. 42 

Russian intelligence services remain active in Latvia to foster pro- 

Kremlin sentiments and operate under the cover of local 

governments, businesses, and non-governmental organizations. 43 The 

Russian embassy in Riga delivers books to Russian schools each year 

and their content is not checked. 44 The Russian Orthodox Church 

exerts an influential role, and some students travel to Russia for 

scholarships. The Russian media uses entertainment for political 

propaganda purposes, and a substantial number of Latvians who


speak Russian also watch Russian TV. Moscow is helping to develop 

a broad array of groups, including fraternities, Afghan war veterans, 

conservationists, and historical societies tied to a Russian heritage. It 

has also tried to radicalize elements of the minority through persistent 

propaganda, youth camps, and business lobbies. 

Latvia’s ruling coalition remained in power after winning a majority 

of seats in the October 4, 2014, elections. Harmony received 23.3% 

of votes, earning 25 seats in the 100-seat legislature, six fewer than in 

previous ballots. The center-right coalition led by Prime Minister 

Laimdota Straujuma’s Unity party, which includes the National 

Alliance and the Union of Greens and Farmers, totaled 61 seats after 

receiving 57% of the vote. 

A Russian Union (RU) was established in May 2014 as a more radical 

formation that could take support away from the Harmony Party. Led 

by Tatiana Zdanek, the Union declared its backing for Russia’s 

annexation of Crimea and for the pro-Kremlin separatist “people’s 

republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. The Union obtained over 5% of 

the vote in the European elections of May 22–25, 2014, and Zdanek 

became one of the eight representatives from Latvia in the European 

parliament. The RU claims that Harmony is too moderate and 

accommodating and openly supports the Russian World concept. 

Although it underperformed in Latvia’s general elections in October 

2014, gaining less than 2% of the vote and no parliamentary seats, it 

has the potential for mobilizing the most alienated and radicalized 

elements of Latvia’s Russian population. 45 It emphasizes conservative 

traditionalism against the liberal EU and seeks to exploit any 

grievances among minority groups. 

Latvian officials claim that a Ukraine-type scenario would be difficult 

for Moscow to engineer because of better intelligence, more effective 

internal security and law enforcement capabilities, and competent 

border-control mechanisms. Nonetheless, about 10% of Russian 

ethnics could be persuaded to support separatism, whether actively or


passively. 46 According to Riga political analyst Aleks Grigoryevs, after 

the events in Donbas, a majority of Russians in Latgale would not 

welcome intervention by Moscow, but a small fraction of 10–20% 

might be prepared to. If they were armed, they could create major 

problems for Latvia, particularly as the media could blow such a revolt 

out of proportion. 47 

In January 2015, pro-Moscow groups launched websites for a Latgale 

People’s Republic in southeastern Latvia and a Vilnius People’s 

Republic around the capital of Lithuania. 48 

The People’s Republic of Latgale was proclaimed on the Internet in 

late January 2015. Latvian intelligence services traced the initiators as 

provocateurs in Russia. 49 Although these messages did not represent 

real movements they created propaganda headaches for the two 

governments. If they ignore the provocation it could stimulate local 

nationalism and ethnic strife, but if they act tough against the Internet 

sites, this will undermine claims that Latvia and Lithuania are stable 

and tolerant democracies. 

Scenarios of destabilization can be outlined for Latvia. 50 They may 

include the holding of local referenda and the installation of 

autonomist or separatist local governments in Latgale, where Russians 

account for approximately 40% of the population. The goal would be 

to create trouble spots, triggering a government crackdown that 

would engender local resentments, foster ethnic division, and provide 

more pretexts for Moscow’s intervention. Alternatively, Riga may 

seek to pacify the minority by lifting all restrictions on citizenship and 

language use, thus raising the political profile of Russians in decisionmaking. 

Either reaction can encourage moves toward regional 

autonomy in Latgale and even herald the unilateral dispatch of a 

Russian “peacekeeping” operation to consolidate the new local 

governments, push out Latvian ethnics, and establish a predominantly 

Russian zone protected by Russian military units.


Moscow officials, together with some Russian activists in Latvia, have 

tried to exacerbate ethnic tensions by supporting sympathetic NGOs. 

According to Re:Baltica, a Latvian non-profit organization, the 

Russian government is massively funding NGOs in all three Baltic 

countries to influence political discussions and push Moscow’s 

political line. 51 Re:Baltica published a major study of the NGO sector 

in September 2015, entitled “Kremlin’s Millions: How Russia Funds 

NGOs in Baltics.” The study reveals that there are more than 40 such 

organizations in the region. Those in Latvia and Estonia have received 

at least €1.5 million since 2012. Two thirds of them are connected to 

pro-Moscow political parties in the Baltic states and may even be a 

mechanism for funneling money to those parties. They frequently 

present themselves as “anti-fascists” and aim to influence the public 

debate against the West and in favor of Moscow. Latvia has seven 

major pro-Moscow NGOs receiving Russian funds, 

For instance, Latvian officials suspect that the Latvian Human Rights 

Committee coordinates its actions with Moscow. 52 On March 26, 

2015, Russia’s Duma held a roundtable on the problems of noncitizens 

in Latvia and Estonia, at which Aleksander Gaponenko, head 

of the NGO Parliament of the Unrepresented or Congress of Non- 

Citizens, appealed for Moscow’s help. 53 Gaponenko was the main 

initiator of the referendum on Russian as Latvia’s second official 

language and remains under criminal investigation for inciting ethnic 

hatred. 54 

The Latvian media has reported that pro-Russian agitators have 

visited houses, schools, and public institutions in the Latgale region 

and instigated local inhabitants to seek the region’s incorporation into 

Russia. 55 They allegedly offered money to officials to join them in the 

campaign for autonomy. The Institute of European Studies, in Riga, 

receives Russian government funding. The group has conducted 

several projects with Russkiy Mir and the Compatriot Fund and 

focuses on the plight of Russians in Latvia. Solvita Āboltiņa, chairman 

of the Latvian parliament’s security committee, believes that about


100 local NGOs receive money from Moscow and conduct activities 

hostile to the state, including its independent status. 56 In March 2015, 

GVD Baltija, an NGO suspected of aiding pro-Russia separatists in 

eastern Ukraine, was banned from staging a rally in Riga. 57 In mid- 

January 2015, Latvian Security Police raided their offices and the 

home of the NGO’s founder, Stanislavs Bukains. The searches were 

conducted as part of a criminal probe into recruiting people for 

terrorist acts, as well as the illegal purchase and possession of firearms. 

Latvian commentators believe that Russian-language media 

controlled by the Russian government and NGOs connected with 

Moscow have cultivated dissatisfaction among Russian-speakers.” 58 

On July 3, 2014, Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma stated that 

Russia was waging an “information war” in Latvia. 59 To help counter 

Moscow’s disinformation, Riga sought EU funding to launch a 

Russian-language television network. The new channel is to feature 

news and entertainment programs, an advantage Russia’s television 

stations currently maintain over Western outlets, which broadcast 

only news. Latvia was prepared to have it operate under EU direction 

and to include the other two Baltic states in the endeavor. 60 

Latvian analysts believe that the most effective way to oppose 

provocative propaganda is to improve the quality of state and local 

government services in all regions, combat official corruption, and 

provide high-quality education. 61 Latvia’s public media should long 

ago have established a studio in Latgale to produce local stories, report 

on the mood of local residents, and discuss the activities of local 

government employees and private businessmen. 

According to a public opinion survey commissioned by the 

government in 2014, about 75% of non-Latvians felt that they 

belonged in Latvia, and 64% declared themselves to be patriots of 

Latvia. 62 Meanwhile, 38% of respondents also believed that Russianspeaking 

residents are more loyal toward Russia than Latvia. 

Nonetheless, Andrei Neronskiy, director of Moscow’s Center of


Latvia’s Russian Culture, claimed that events in Ukraine’s Donbas 

could be repeated in the Baltic states. 63 According to Neronskiy, 500 

militiamen would be sufficient to fracture the Latvian state into 

several enclaves. Riga is not sufficiently prepared to suppress national 

uprisings, the police do not possess the necessary skills for full-fledged 

combat actions, while the limited NATO forces based in the Baltic 

area would be unable to perform internal security functions. In 

addition, municipal police officers in Latvia’s eastern regions may 

start switching sides as they did in eastern Ukraine. 

Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov threatened that if “radical 

nationalists” came to power in Riga and if Brussels recognized them 

as it did in Ukraine in 2014, then “Latvian citizens of Russian origin 

would rise in revolt.” 64 The comments indicate that Moscow has 

worked out a crisis scenario in Latvia in which some components of 

its strategy in Ukraine could be applied. The Kremlin may portray 

various political developments in Latvia as an existential threat to the 

Russian population and necessitating direct intervention. 

General Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of NATO forces in 

Europe, has warned that Putin might try to seize NATO territory. 65 

Moreover, this could be an open invasion rather than a concealed 

occupation if Moscow calculates that NATO would be unwilling to 

escalate the conflict. Russia could capitalize on one of its frequent 

unannounced military drills near the Baltic borders to launch an 

invasion. Indeed, military exercises in 2009 and 2013 emulated the 

occupation of the territory of the Baltic states. Since the war in 

Ukraine, Russia’s military activities near Baltic borders have 

intensified dramatically. Russian warships and submarines either 

entered Latvia’s Exclusive Economic Zone or patrolled near its 

territorial waters more than forty times during 2014 alone. 

Russia has rebuilt its military base in Ostrov, only 32 kilometers from 

the Vecumi parish in Latvia; it is now home to the 15 th Army Aviation 

Brigade with one hundred new battle helicopters and attack 

helicopters. 66 Russian helicopters can reach Riga in approximately one


hour. As a result of these and other provocative moves, Latvia’s 

Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkevics called for the permanent presence 

of NATO forces in the region. 67 During a visit to the US, Latvian 

Defense Minister Raimonds Vējonis also informed officials about 

Russia’s increased military activities near the country’s borders. 68 

Aleksander Grushko, Russia’s envoy to the North Atlantic Alliance, 

condemned Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia for requesting permanent 

NATO forces, claiming that this violated key provisions of the 1997 

Russia-NATO Founding Act. 69 It purportedly displayed NATO’s 

efforts to build up its military potential along its eastern flank. 

In terms of domestic security, experts and veterans of Latvia’s 

National Guard believe that its fighting capabilities and weaponry 

need to be updated. 70 A discussion has also raged on whether to 

introduce compulsory military service to strengthen the country’s 

national defense forces. The defense ministry plans to have available 

6,000 regular army troops, 7,000 fully trained National Guards, and 

4,000 well-trained and equipped reserve soldiers by 2018. 71 

Latvian Interior Minister Ricards Kozlovskis has asserted that the 

state needed to better protect itself from intruders, as the number of 

people illegally entering Latvia was increasing. 72 Kozlovskis believes 

that strengthening the eastern border, stretching for 450 kilometers, 

is a priority by completing border demarcations and installations, 

including the construction of a 12-meter-wide border area, where 

people will not be allowed to enter. In addition, Latvia’s parliament 

introduced a bill on suspending temporary residence permits to 

Russian investors. 73 Latvia’s justice minister Dzintars Rasnačs stated 

that due to Russia's aggression in Ukraine steps should be taken to 

terminate Latvian residence permits for Russian citizens, most of 

whom have acquired expensive properties. Some pose a security 

threat, as a parallel society is emerging in several towns where wealthy 

Russians are able to corrupt local politicians. 74


In September 2014, Latvia opened a NATO-accredited Strategic 

Communications Center, in Riga, amid fears of negative Kremlin 

influences on the country’s Russian minority. 75 The Center analyzes 

information warfare and psychological operations waged by Moscow 

in order to help strengthen NATO’s strategic communications 

capabilities. Lawmakers also backed legislation that will more than 

double defense spending to the NATO-recommended minimum of 

2% GDP by 2020, from 0.91% of GDP in 2014. 

Lithuania 

Moscow focuses on several themes to weaken Lithuania’s pro- 

Western governments, particularly the military transit question to 

Kaliningrad and the position of Lithuania’s Russian-speaking 

minorities. It also targets episodes from Lithuanian history that can 

provoke territorial disputes with Russia or Belarus. 76 In the Vilnius 

region, historical ownership rights are claimed by some Russian and 

Belarusian sources, providing Moscow with opportunities to incite 

Lithuanian-Belarusian frictions. Claims that the Lithuanian capital 

was Belarusian for 600 years and illegally became Lithuanian provide 

valuable historical cover for a potential military incursion to convince 

soldiers that they were not occupying but liberating and protecting 

historic Russian-Belarusian lands. In addition, a key message of 

Russia’s propaganda is that NATO has launched an arms race and is 

seeking a confrontation with Russia. Hence, Lithuania’s membership 

of NATO allegedly poses a threat to the security of both Russia and 

Belarus. 

Kaliningrad is a brewing source of instability for Lithuania. Vilnius 

supervises all military transport to Kaliningrad across its territory and 

rejects any extra-territorial agreements with Russia. 77 However, 

Moscow may demand unilateral control of such a corridor or stage a 

provocation against a Russian convoy to justify intervention. It could 

also claim that Kaliningrad has been severed from outside supplies by


Lithuania, which allegedly does not recognize it as Russian territory, 

and then move to unblock the exclave. The military in Kaliningrad 

could itself stage a provocation against Lithuanian territory. 78 

Ominously, officials in Kaliningrad have accused participants of 

Ukraine’s Maidan revolution of infiltrating the region through Poland 

and Lithuania. 79 

Plans for a unified energy network among EU states may have serious 

consequences for Kaliningrad by breaking up the electric grid between 

Russia and the EU at its borders. 80 The unification of the electric grids 

of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the rest of the EU would exclude 

Kaliningrad from the Baltic energy system. This could lead to 

electricity shortages and may be used as a pretext for Moscow to 

pursue the construction of a nuclear power plant there opposed by EU 

neighbors or even to forcibly create a land corridor across Belarus and 

Lithuania. Indeed, exercises conducted in Kaliningrad on a regular 

basis revolve around an offensive scenario to carve out a corridor 

between Kaliningrad and Russia. 

The prospect of power shortages and territorial isolation may also 

motivate local activists seeking an independent fourth Baltic republic 

or transforming Kaliningrad into an EU-linked Euro-region. This 

could provoke a crackdown and provide additional ammunition for 

Moscow’s intervention across Lithuanian territory. Russian ultranationalist 

groups also campaign for expanding Kaliningrad’s borders 

to the prewar frontiers of Germany’s East Prussia and incorporating 

the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda. 

In recent years, Kaliningrad has witnessed intensive military activity 

with the deployment of S400 air defense systems and a powerful radar 

that covers the whole of Europe and the Northern Ocean waters and 

may be capable of paralyzing the air space over the entire Baltic Sea. 81 

Moscow has also threatened to deploy Iskander tactical missiles 

carrying nuclear warheads in the region; some reports indicate that 

they are already positioned in Kaliningrad.


Russia’s military exercises near the Lithuanian border are viewed in 

Vilnius as direct threats. For instance, the Zapad exercises in the fall 

of 2013 simulated the creation of a land link between Russia and 

Kaliningrad, thus involving the invasion of both Lithuania and Latvia 

and cutting off Lithuania from Poland. Russian forces have also 

rehearsed a nuclear strike on Warsaw. Lithuania remains under 

pressure to allow for a permanent military transit corridor under 

Moscow’s control to Kaliningrad. During 2014 and 2015 there was 

also a surge in violations of Baltic air space by Russian aircraft despite 

NATO’s reinforcing mission. 82 Most takeoffs were made by fighter 

jets to escort Russian warplanes flying from northern Russia to 

Kaliningrad. 

Russia’s navy has conducted exercises off the coast of the Baltic states 

and violated Lithuania’s exclusive economic zone. Russian naval 

vessels have ordered commercial ships to change routes and 

obstructed the laying of an undersea power connection cable between 

Sweden and Lithuania. 83 Since early 2015, the laying of the Nordbalt 

cable has been disrupted four times by the Russian navy, which claims 

that it is protecting its “military exercise zones.” 84 The incursions of a 

suspected Russian submarine inside the Stockholm archipelago, in 

October 2014, alerted Vilnius to enhance the security of its new LNG 

terminal in Klaipėda. 85 Observers noted that saboteurs could stage an 

incident near the entrance to the port in order to close it. 86 

On the economic warfare front, Moscow has consistently applied 

energy sanctions against all three Baltic states, whether by cutting off 

supplies of fossil fuels or raising prices. Vilnius is active in energy 

diversification, by opening an LNG terminal in 2014, limiting 

dependence on Russian natural gas, and constructing a gas 

interconnector with Poland. This will help meet about two thirds of 

Lithuanian energy needs. Vilnius also wants to plug into the Nordic 

market, synchronize its electricity grid with the EU and disconnect it 

from the post-Soviet zone. A lessened dependence on Russia will also 

help bring down heating prices over the next decade.


In weaning itself off Russia’s energy supplies, Vilnius has faced 

additional pressures. Plans to build a nuclear power plant in Lithuania 

caused Moscow to announce the construction of two plants – in 

Belarus and Kaliningrad. When Vilnius stopped the project, the 

Russian proposals were shelved. The Kremlin wants to block 

initiatives that enable Lithuania to break out of its remaining energy 

dependence on Russia. By raising the cost of energy imports, Moscow 

also seeks to impact on social grievances over rising fuel bills. 

Additionally, it has supported and funded environmentalist and rural 

movements opposed to shale gas exploration—a potential alternative 

to gas imported from Russia. 87 

According to Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevičius, If 

Russia completely closed all roads for goods from Lithuania, it would 

cost the country up to 4% of GDP. 88 There are also concerns that some 

business ventures in the energy field have connections with the 

Kremlin and provide Putin with political levers against Vilnius. 89 

Lithuania has direct experience of previous attempts to purchase its 

government leaders. A case of direct political subversion in which 

influence was bought by Russian businessmen tied to Kremlin 

intelligence services unseated Lithuania’s President Rolandas Paksas 

in April 2004 and placed other officials under suspicion of 

collaboration. 

Russia’s espionage activities have intensified in recent years. 

Lithuania's intelligence agencies reported that about one third of 

Russian diplomats worked for spy agencies. 90 They are increasingly 

interested in Lithuania’s military infrastructure, especially in Šiauliai, 

home to a NATO air base for policing Baltic skies, and the LNG 

terminal in Klaipėda, which opened in January 2015. 91 Russian and 

Belarusian special services have also been active along the border with 

Lithuania, reportedly trying to recruit border guards as informers. 

The spies are especially interested in Lithuania’s law enforcement 

institutions and border security infrastructure. 92 Several of Russia’s


neighbors have reported the potential threat posed by the allocation 

of land plots near military facilities to Russian companies or wealthy 

citizens who appear to be working with the Kremlin. For instance, the 

Russian company Rail Skyway Systems sought to purchase land near 

the Zokniai NATO air base but was rebuffed after the intervention of 

Lithuanian security services. 93 

Vilnius has reinstated limited conscription as anxieties have mounted 

over Russian military activities. 94 President Dalia Grybauskaitė 

unveiled a plan for 3,500 men between the ages of 19 and 26 to be 

drafted for a nine-month period every year, starting in the fall of 2015. 

Lithuania abolished conscription in favor of a professional army in 

2008, four years after it joined NATO. Conscription would help fill 

gaps in units and train extra reservists for the armed forces consisting 

of 8,000 professional soldiers. 

Grybauskaitė stated that the Baltic states must be prepared to 

independently resist a military conflict with Russia for at least three 

days until NATO allies arrive. 95 Conscription sends a clear message 

that, if attacked, Lithuania would defend itself. The authorities have 

also conducted security exercises without NATO allies in order to 

improve coordination between the country’s institutions. 96 For 

instance, the Iron Sword 2015 national exercises in May 2015 involved 

over 3,000 personnel from the Lithuanian Armed Forces and the 

Defense, Internal Affairs, and Health Ministries, as well as from 

municipal governments and the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union. 

Among other scenarios, the authorities simulated threats against the 

LNG terminal in Klaipėda. 

The Kremlin tries to spread its influence in Lithuania via public 

organizations, education institutions, television, Internet, and other 

widely accessible information channels. Vilnius created the Cyber 

Defense Law and a coordination center to help investigations by 

trained police officers. Analysts believe that informational wars 

should be viewed with the same seriousness as cyber attacks, with the


involvement of all targeted institutions, whether cultural, educational, 

economic, or political. 97 Lithuanian analysts contend that Russian 

sources spread conspiracy theories on the most varied topics and by 

involving people in discussing conspiracies it distracts them from real 

information. 98 

In its national security strategy, Lithuania has included information 

attacks as a looming threat. In a telling example of an informational 

offensive, on February 4, 2015, Lithuanian army commanders issued 

public assurances that conscripts would not be sent to international 

missions abroad, refuting rumors spread by the Russian media aimed 

at discrediting the restoration of conscription. 99 Russia’s media also 

disseminated false information that the projected Lithuanian-Polish- 

Ukrainian brigade could become a pretext for sending conscripts to 

fight in Ukraine. 

Russia’s Pravfond, which helps implement Moscow’s “compatriots 

policy,” directly finances at least three organizations in Lithuania, 

nine in Latvia, and nine in Estonia. 100 According to intelligence 

sources, they are active in spreading disinformation about the Baltic 

countries and creating a broad pro-Moscow network. One of the key 

Kremlin-funded operatives is Rafael Muksinov, who was included in 

the joint list of candidates of the Polish Electoral Action and Russian 

Alliance parties during the 2015 local government elections and was 

elected to the Vilnius City Municipality Council. He is also the leader 

of the Compatriots Council at the Russian Embassy in Vilnius. One of 

his associates is Algirdas Paleckis, head of the Lithuania Without 

Nazism association funded by Moscow and linked with the World 

Without Nazism group, registered in France with branches in all three 

Baltic countries, Moldova, Germany, the UK, and the US. Another 

suspected implant is Karlis Bilansas, funded by Pravfond to run the 

Independent Human Rights Centre. 

Russian state TV exerts influence over the older generation, while the 

youth is reached mostly through the Internet. Russia’s television


channels are viewed by almost 16% of the population, or by over 

400,000 people. 101 Social networks also exert a significant influence in 

Lithuania. Hacking of Internet portals and sites and posting false 

information has developed into a major problem. Vilnius temporarily 

closed three Russian TV channels in the summer of 2014 because they 

were broadcasting hate speech and war propaganda during the 

Russia-Ukraine war. 102 

Most of the Polish population in Lithuania, the largest minority in the 

country, also inhabits the Russian information sphere, especially older 

Sovietized and russified citizens not under Poland’s influence. The 

Polish minority numbered 200,317 people, according to the 

Lithuanian census of 2011, or 6.6% of the population. 103 It is 

concentrated in the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions in the south of the 

country. Russian ethnics totaled 176,913 people, or 5.8% of the 

population. 

The Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (EAPL), headed by 

Valdemar Tomaszevski (Waldemar Tomaszewski, in Polish), has 

demonstrated pro-Kremlin positions over Ukraine, is suspected of 

receiving funds from Moscow, and cooperates closely with leaders of 

Lithuania’s Russian minority. 104 A report leaked in November 2013 by 

Lithuania’s State Security Department revealed that representatives of 

the EAPL and the Russian Alliance had visited the Kremlin. 105 

Moscow fosters disagreements between Vilnius and the Polish 

minority, as this harms the country’s reputation in the West and 

negatively affects ties with Warsaw. During the October 2012 

parliamentary elections, the EAPL combined with the Russian 

Alliance, an arrangement fostered by the Russian embassy in Vilnius. 

The EAPL possesses eight seats in Lithuania’s parliament and is run 

as a hierarchical organization with little opposition. It also controls 

two local governments in Vilnius and Šalčininkai and periodically has 

representatives in the central government. It has focused on various 

grievances of the Polish minority such as the lack of bilingual place


names and the inability to use the Polish alphabet in the documents 

of Poles. 106 Some critics contend that making concessions to the EAPL 

will simply escalate its demands to make Polish a second state 

language. Others complain that successive Lithuanian governments 

have allowed Polish and Russian leaders to isolate their communities. 

Poles need to be better integrated into Lithuanian society and Poland 

itself needs to be more active to pull the Polish population away from 

Russia’s information sphere. Alternative Polish parties and NGOs 

need support and Lithuanian parties must be more engaged in 

minority affairs. Joint projects with Poland in the Vilnius and 

Šalčininkai regions could counterbalance Russia’s influences, and 

investments are especially needed in infrastructure and job creation. 107 

Russian minority leaders are also active thanks to Moscow’s 

assistance. Rafael Muksinov, Chairman of the Coordinating Council 

of Russian Compatriots in Lithuania, contends that the minority 

needs Russian kindergartens, schools, and universities, as well as “a 

fully-fledged information and cultural space.” 108 A more radical 

Russian movement, Be Together, spreads pro-Moscow propaganda, 

anti-Americanism, and traditionalism to try and capture support 

from other conservative movements. 109 

The Russian embassy reportedly funds several local NGOs, including 

environmentalists, groups looking after the graves of Russian soldiers, 

and several historical societies. Lithuania’s National Security and 

Defense Committee is also convinced that individuals have been sent 

to Lithuania to organize fake trade unions. Yevgeniy Sivaykin, an avid 

Putin supporter, has formed several professional unions and 

organized rallies claiming that workers are abused in Lithuania. 110 The 

incitement of ethnic or social dissatisfaction is useful for Moscow in 

unsettling the central government. 

Russia’s secret services finance historical reconstruction clubs that 

enact war games from the Tsarist period in Lithuania. Lectures on the 

greatness of the Soviet Union, the threat of NATO, and the allegedly


inane Baltic politicians are given in “international educational camps” 

in Russia attended by young people from Lithuania, Latvia, and 

Estonia. 111 Such indoctrination events have the goal of awakening the 

“Soviet spirit” among Russian-speaking young people from the 

former Soviet countries. Moscow is also suspected of encouraging 

groups among Russia’s population who actively support and collect 

funds for the proxy separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas. 112 Such activities 

can be qualified as financing terrorism and recruitment for terrorist 

activities. 

According to senior Lithuanian military officers, in response to the 

Ukrainian war Vilnius must step up its capabilities to prepare for 

unconventional challenges, such as the incitement of ethnic 

minorities or the incursion of armed persons without identification 

signs. 113 In one scenario of subversion, leaders of the Polish and 

Russian minorities could ask Moscow to support a referendum on the 

autonomy of the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions. Lithuania’s military 

and internal security units require improved equipment, means of 

communication, and transportation. Reports periodically surface that 

the Lithuanian counterintelligence service is not effective enough to 

cope with Russia’s subversion. For instance, it has failed to sufficiently 

monitor and investigate the activities of Russian agents in Lithuania's 

energy, finance, and transportation sectors. 114 

Lithuania’s Minister of the Interior Dailis Alfonsas Barakauskas was 

instrumental in establishing a pan-Baltic expert coordination 

committee to foster collaboration between institutions in charge of 

public order and internal security. The interior ministers of Lithuania, 

Latvia, and Estonia reached agreement on the establishment of such a 

committee in September 2014, amid growing concerns over Russia’s 

provocations. 115 The Ministry of Defense also prepared a brochure 

with information on how citizens should act in a war situation. 116 It 

describes the social and psychological challenges involved. In the 

event of conflict, the media would announce a state of greater


readiness and a national headquarters would provide concrete 

instructions for citizens. 

On November 1, 2014, Vilnius activated a new rapid-reaction force 

designed to resist unconventional security threats. Henceforth, 2,500 

troops would be placed on high alert to counteract attacks by 

unmarked combatants, like those in eastern Ukraine. 117 The force, 

accounting for about a third of Lithuania’s 7,000-strong military, 

would take from two to 24 hours to be fully mobilized. The core of the 

force consists of two mechanized battalions, each with 700 to 800 

members, joined by logistical support, a special operations unit, and 

an air contingent. 118 It would be activated in the initial, self-defense 

phase and allow for NATO forces to be deployed from outside the 

country. 

The defense ministry also tabled legislation that would enable the 

President to authorize the use of military force in a defined territory 

without first declaring martial law. In December 2014, the standby 

units of the army, including the rapid-response force, were placed on 

a higher state of preparedness because of the increased activities of 

Russian forces in Kaliningrad and in western parts of the Russian 

Federation. 119 

All three Baltic capitals fervently supported the creation of NATO’s 

new “spearhead force,” announced at the Alliance summit in Wales, 

in September 2014, which is to consist of 3,000 to 4,000 troops. An 

interim force was to become operational by the close of 2015, with a 

permanent force scheduled for 2016. Speed is essential in countering 

unconventional threats, as Russia’s military can move into an area 

rapidly and establish a foothold before conventional armies can react. 

A NATO command center, or force integration unit, was established 

in Lithuania in the summer of 2015, with about 40 officers. The center 

would serve to coordinate and help equip NATO’s advanced units in 

the event of war with Russia.


In addition, Lithuania earmarked military assistance for Ukraine to 

better defend itself against Russia’s ongoing attack; this included the 

supply of weapons and training. 120 Russia’s Foreign Ministry 

vigorously protested such moves. In case of a Russian assault on 

Lithuania, Polish Special Forces, which have worked closely with their 

Baltic counterparts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 

are reportedly prepared to come to the country’s assistance. 121 

Nordic Front 

The Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, are growing 

increasingly concerned by Moscow’s pressures along their borders 

and direct threats to their security, as witnessed in periodic Russian 

military penetration of their air space and territorial waters. Fears over 

Putin’s ambitions have escalated among the security services in 

Stockholm and Helsinki, as well as among NATO members Norway 

and Denmark. Swedish intelligence agencies have expressed serious 

concerns that Moscow is supplementing its spying efforts in 

Scandinavia and even preparing for war. Wilhelm Unge, the chief 

counter-intelligence analyst for the Säkerhetspolisen (Säpo) agency 

has stated that the escalating crisis in Europe’s East posed a significant 

security threat. 122 

In conducting military incursions, Moscow has several objectives. 

First, it is testing the military and political response of targeted 

countries. Second, it is sending messages to a largely pacifist public in 

Sweden and Finland that any moves toward NATO membership will 

result in heightened military risks and confrontations with Russia. 

Third, it is discouraging further military cooperation, including joint 

exercises, with NATO states in the Baltic zone. And fourth, it seeks to 

demonstrate to the entire Baltic region that NATO’s commitment to 

defend its members is merely a paper declaration that Russia could 

easily overturn.


The Kremlin wants to maintain both Sweden and Finland as neutrals 

and preclude them from assisting any NATO operations to defend the 

Baltic states. A variety of pressure points are thereby exploited: 

military threats, territorial violations, diplomatic moves, propaganda 

attacks, and disinformation campaigns to cower Finnish and Swedish 

societies. Further measures are threatened if Helsinki or Stockholm 

progress toward NATO accession, including the confiscation of 

investments, banning flights across Russia, and enabling illegal 

immigrants to cross the long Russian-Finnish border. 

In a demonstration of Russia’s military contingency plans, in March 

2015, Russian forces rehearsed the invasion of Norway, Finland, 

Sweden, and Denmark during a military exercise involving 33,000 

troops. 123 The maneuvers were based on the assumption that a 

Western-backed uprising against Putin was taking place in Moscow. 

Russia responded by launching a simulated assault on four states by 

seizing northern Norway, Finland’s Aland Islands, Sweden’s Gotland 

Island, and Denmark’s Bornholm Island. The capture of these 

territories would enable Russia to seal off shipping lanes and isolate 

the three Baltic states. The occupation of any Finnish or Swedish 

territory would also be intended to disqualify both countries from 

NATO accession. 

To protect themselves against possible attack, both Finland and 

Sweden are expanding their military cooperation. They are also 

strengthening security ties with NATO members Norway and 

Denmark through consultations and exercises. Russia’s Foreign 

Ministry warned, on April 12, 2015, that closer ties between NATO 

and Finland and Sweden were of “special concern” for Moscow. This 

was a response to a joint declaration by the defense ministers of 

Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland, on April 9, 2015, 

asserting that northern Europe must prepare for possible crises 

because of Russia’s grievous violations of international law. 124 In 

retaliation, the Kremlin complained that a new Nordic defense pact 

signified a “confrontational approach” toward Russia. 125 The defense


ministers stated that they would boost defense sector cooperation; 

share intelligence on maritime and airspace activities; take joint steps 

on cyber defense; conduct military drills; consider launching a new 

air-police mission called Northern Flag; share air bases; and explore 

their engagement in joint military acquisitions. 126 

Nonetheless, all such measures will not be sufficient to shield either 

Finland or Sweden from Russia’s pressure or to prevent their 

embroilment in a future Baltic-wide war if Putin decides to strike. 

Washington itself should not push for NATO enlargement in two 

countries that still treasure their non-alignment, as this risks 

aggravating latent anti-American sentiments. Instead, it should allow 

Moscow’s provocations to convince Helsinki and Stockholm that 

their security is best assured inside the North Atlantic Alliance and 

alongside their Nordic and Baltic compatriots. 

In the wake of its attack on Ukraine, Russia’s military activities around 

the Baltic Sea accelerated and become more unpredictable during 

2014 and 2015. In large measure, the assault on Ukraine has been a 

psychological operation in order to demonstrate Moscow’s reach and 

capabilities. 127 Finnish and Swedish airspaces are strategically 

important to NATO; hence, Russia’s military testing is designed to 

indicate how the two countries will react under pressure. An 

important military component of security in northeastern Europe is 

the closest possible integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO 

planning and deployments. It would be more difficult to defend the 

Baltic states without their help, as they possess important military 

capabilities and intelligence services. 128 

Moscow’s security threats aimed at the Nordic states may be a staged 

diversion or a ploy to test their reactions and dissuade them from 

cooperating with NATO in defense of the Baltic states. However, if 

regional stability seriously deteriorated because of Russia’s 

assertiveness toward Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, both Sweden and 

Finland could petition for NATO membership. This could increase


tensions throughout northern Europe and further widen the rupture 

between Washington and Moscow. 

Finland 

Calls to consolidate Finland’s defenses have grown since Russia’s 

attack on Ukraine and the regular violation of Finnish airspace by 

Russian aircraft. General Jarmo Lindberg, commander of Finland’s 

Defense Forces, has asserted that Europe needs to be prepared for a 

sudden deterioration along its eastern frontier, where Finland shares 

the EU’s longest border with Russia. 129 Moscow may be concerned 

that Finns would come to the aid of nearby Estonia in case the latter 

is attacked. It could offer NATO its land, air, and sea facilities to 

defend an Alliance member and supply weapons and other equipment 

to assist Tallinn. Unlike Sweden, Finland has maintained a respectable 

defense sector with a sizable conscript base army. Helsinki also has 

direct experience of Russia's aggression, having stymied attempts by 

Moscow to occupy the country during World War Two. 

To heighten Helsinki’s anxieties, Moscow announced in the fall of 

2014 that it would place its most advanced S-400 missile system in the 

Kola Peninsula adjoining Finland. The system is able to intercept 

stealth fighters and cruise missiles with a maximum range of 400 

kilometers. 130 Russia has six missile troop bases in the Kola Peninsula 

and has reopened the Alakurtti base, close to the Finnish border, as 

part of its deployment of military units along the Arctic Circle, from 

Murmansk to Chukotka. Putin announced that Russia would build a 

network of military facilities on its Arctic territories to host troops, 

advanced warships, and aircraft to protect its interests and borders. 131 

Moscow is pressing ahead to develop the Arctic territories, including 

hydrocarbon extraction and opening a Northern Sea Route, as an 

alternative to traditional passages from Europe to Asia. The region 

will become a growing source of competition with the US, Canada,


Norway, and Denmark. Indeed, Foreign Minister Lavrov claimed that 

NATO’s presence in the Arctic was unnecessary. 

Russia’s military periodically violates Finnish air space and territorial 

waters. On April 27, 2015, the Finnish navy fired warning shots at a 

suspected Russian submarine detected in waters close to the capital. 132 

In line with its pressures against any country engaged in military sales 

to Ukraine, Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry complained against 

Helsinki’s supplies of laser range-finders, accusing Helsinki of 

undermining peace and stability in Ukraine. 133 

In addition to military pressure, Helsinki’s national interests were 

harmed by serious data security breaches in the Foreign Ministry’s 

communications network. Finland’s secret services, Supo, reported in 

July 2014 that “foreign state actors” were believed to be behind the 

attacks, which were very advanced and difficult to detect. 134 In the 

second attack, investigated as “aggravated espionage,” the spyware 

software was linked to a website hosted by a foreign state. Supo 

confirmed that large amounts of material were taken from the Foreign 

Ministry and had potentially damaged national interests. 

A group of Finnish analysts published a report in March 2015 on the 

impact of Russian networks of influence in the country. 135 Lustraatio 

(Lustration) highlights the need for the establishment of a “truth 

commission” to investigate Soviet networks of influence in Finland 

during the Cold War and the importance of unmasking current 

collaborators. Another vexing question has been the purchase of land 

and real estate by Russian citizens close to military bases, radar 

stations, air traffic control systems, flight training sites, and 

ammunition dumps. 136 As a result of “systematic land acquisitions,” 

large plots of land on the Finnish coast and extensive water areas have 

been transferred to Russian ownership—mostly businessmen close to 

the Kremlin. The headquarters of the Finnish Navy in Turku is one of 

the targets of Russian companies. They have offered high prices for 

nearby land and stated that they intend to build “recreational areas.” 137


An article in December 2014 by Charly Salonius-Pasternak, a senior 

researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, caused 

consternation in Helsinki. 138 The author claimed that by occupying a 

couple of Finland’s Åland Islands, Russia could control most of the 

airspace in the Baltic Sea. The Åland Islands are an autonomous and 

demilitarized region of Finland once occupied by Tsarist Russia. 

Moscow could demand a naval base from Finland, claiming that 

saboteurs threatened to blow up the Nord Stream pipeline and 

Russian oil tankers. 139 The Russian navy can blockade the Gulf of 

Finland, thus severing the bulk of Finland’s trade. Moscow could also 

announce that it was assuming responsibility for the security of the 

Baltic Sea because terrorists were attempting to cut off its raw material 

exports. 

Officials in Moscow periodically manipulate the Karelian question to 

increase pressure on Helsinki. The Karelian region was annexed by 

Soviet Russia from Finland after World War Two and most of the 

territories form a Karelian Republic along Finland’s borders. In 

March 2015, Nikolai Patrushev, head of Russia’s Security Council, 

charged Finnish nationalists with increasing agitation in Karelia and 

recruiting local people to destabilize the republic. 140 Patrushev 

claimed that Finland’s government had also intensified its support for 

Karelian nationalists. According to local analysts, Moscow’s campaign 

against alleged nationalists was more vigorous than the latter’s 

activism. Locals feared this could be the harbinger for abrogating the 

EU-Russia agreement on border cooperation, which has brought 

funds to the northern border region but has also enabled many 

Karelians to see their impoverishment in comparison to Finns on the 

other side of the frontier. 

In a major diplomatic incident at the beginning of July 2015, Alexei 

Pushkov, head of the Russian Duma’s foreign affairs committee, 

raised the possibility of imposing sanctions against Finland for its 

denial of entry visas to Duma Speaker Sergey Naryshkin and five other


Russian citizens planning to attend an OSCE meeting in Helsinki. 141 

All six Russian citizens are on the EU sanctions list imposed after 

Moscow’s attack on Ukraine. A broad range of measures could be 

taken by Moscow against Helsinki, including a freeze on trade 

agreements and changes to customs tariffs. 

Moscow’s efforts to portray Finland as the primary loser in EU 

sanctions against Russia, most evident through its Finnish-language 

Sputnik network, has had limited impact on the public. Indeed, 

Finnish perceptions of Russia became more negative after the latter’s 

attack on Ukraine. According to an opinion poll carried out by the 

National Defense University and the Police University College in the 

fall of 2014, 74% of respondents admitted that their views of Russia 

had become more negative. 142 In another survey of Russian speakers 

living in Finland, 66% of the respondents felt that the Ukraine conflict 

had negatively impacted on Russo-Finnish relations, while 21% said 

Finnish attitudes toward Russian-speakers had changed for the 

worse. 143 Close to one third of respondents claimed they had 

experienced negative attitudes in Finland because they were Russian 

speakers. 

Moscow’s propaganda in Finland has significantly expanded and 

operates through various avenues. The Finnish authorities established 

a working group with the heads of communications from each 

ministry to pinpoint Russia’s subversive disinformation in the media 

and other outlets. 144 For example, Moscow sources claims that the 

Russian minority in Finland, numbering under 60,000 out of 5.4 

million people, is under pressure of assimilation and discrimination 

and the Russian government must take steps to protect them. 145 

In response to Moscow’s attack on Ukraine and threats against 

Finnish territory, President Sauli Niinistö urged greater defense 

spending in order to maintain a credible military deterrent. 146 In 

March 2015, the majority of Finns favored increasing the defense 

budget during the current parliamentary term: 27% strongly


supported this position and 32% “somewhat agreed.” 147 Finland 

maintains an armed force of about 30,000, but the military has 

undergone budget cuts since 2012, with reservists reduced from 

350,000 to 230,000 troops, several garrisons shuttered, and materiel 

acquisitions delayed. Defense Minister Carl Haglund warned that 

Finland would have to make “difficult and expensive” decisions about 

upgrading the country’s aging defense hardware. He also called for the 

government to develop the ability to wage cyber warfare. 148 

The Defense Ministry has been working on a feasibility study looking 

at renewing the air defense system and replacing the existing fleet of 

Hornet fighter jets. Finland remains the only Nordic country that can 

generate substantial amounts of trained combat troops, but the bulk 

of the Finnish army lacks modern equipment and only a small fraction 

of the planned eleven wartime brigades are adequately equipped. 149 In 

the context of Russia’s assertiveness along Finland’s borders, Helsinki 

has laid out plans for a Finnish “spearhead force” mirroring NATO’s 

reaction force. Additionally, Haglund announced that Helsinki would 

step up surveillance of its airspace following several violations by 

Russian aircraft. 150 In June 2015, 8,000 reservist troops underwent a 

large-scale exercise in the eastern region of Pielinen Karelia, near the 

Russian border. 151 Finland and Sweden also prepared joint submarine 

hunt exercises, the sharing of military bases, and other measures to 

tighten defense connections. 152 

Finland and Sweden are also increasing their military cooperation 

with NATO. A framework was agreed during NATO’s Wales Summit 

in September 2014. The Host Nation Support Memorandum of 

Understanding includes 50 to 60 “Mutual Objectives,” with a protocol 

under which either country could invite NATO to deploy land, naval, 

and air force assets on their territories. 153 Following this agreement 

Aleksey Pushkov, chair of the Russian Duma’s Foreign Affairs 

Committee, claimed that both countries were surrendering their 

neutrality and moving toward NATO accession. 154


Military cooperation between Finland and Estonia has steadily 

developed. 155 A radar station was opened at Toikamae near Otepaa in 

south Estonia, which Estonia bought as part of joint procurement with 

Finland. It will refine monitoring of the Pskov garrison, the training 

center of Russia’s Special Forces. Estonian soldiers will visit Finland 

for regular training, Tallinn will buy CV-90 armored infantry fighting 

vehicles from the Netherlands, and the Finns will teach Estonian 

troops how to operate them. Washington has also urged Helsinki to 

participate in Estonia’s air defenses. 

In the aftermath of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, support 

for Finland’s NATO membership expanded among citizens. The 

sense of security has been evaporating and a debate was launched on 

the pros and cons of NATO accession. 156 According to Mika Aaltola, 

of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, growing backing for 

NATO entry shows that Finns see the Alliance as a necessary 

counterweight to Russia’s hardening position, as they are unsure 

whether Finland could respond to regional crises on its own. 157 A 

quarter of respondents in August 2014 believed Finland should 

become a member of NATO, 9% higher than in November 2013. 

Although 58% of those polled continue to oppose NATO 

membership, 56% of all respondents view Russia as a threat to 

Finland, up from 39% in March 2014. 158 Supporters of the 

conservative National Coalition Party were the most strident 

supporters of NATO entry, and a further third of NATO backers 

described themselves as Finns Party voters. The Left Alliance and 

Social Democrat constituencies were the largest groups still opposing 

NATO entry. 

Prime Minister Alexander Stubb believed that Finland belongs in 

NATO, although his governing coalition officially opposed 

membership. 159 Stubb asserted that Finland should not join NATO 

simply because of Russia, but to enhance its overall security. He 

stressed that Finland no longer exists in a gray zone but is a part of the 

West. 160 The Defense Ministry strongly supports NATO membership,


calculating that this would enhance the country’s capabilities, but has 

not actively campaigned for accession. Opponents of joining NATO 

contend that this would aggravate relations with Russia and damage 

trade and energy linkages. Moscow could impose trade bans and 

customs fees with damaging economic impact, as Russia was Finland’s 

third largest importer and the biggest exporter, supplying 25% of 

Finland’s electricity. Trade figures also indicate that Finland is more 

exposed to economic losses stemming from a weaker Russian 

economy than any other euro country. Moscow could also confiscate 

Finnish investments, declare Finnish products as unsafe, cut 

transportation links, ban Finnair from using Russian airspace, mount 

cyber attacks on government sites, terminate nuclear security 

cooperation, and fan fears about the safety of Russian nuclear reactors. 

At the end of May 2015, Finland’s new center-right coalition included 

the option of applying for NATO membership “at any time” in its 

Joint Policy Position statement. 161 Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s 

administration also drafted a new foreign and security policy with a 

special segment calculating the monetary costs and implications of 

Finland’s potential NATO accession. 

Proponents of NATO entry argue that the significance of the Alliance 

for Finland’s security is evident in two ways: the economy is 

dependent on a maritime connection to Europe through the Baltic 

Sea; and in a possible crisis, the greatest challenge is to obtain 

necessary military material including missiles and spare parts. During 

a confrontation with Russia, Finland must maintain a sea connection 

with Europe through NATO, which would require a powerful navy 

and air force. In a crisis, Finland’s weapons and ammunition supplies 

would rely largely on the US, which plays a crucial role in the country’s 

security. 162 Finland cannot be militarily self-sufficient and can only be 

included in NATO decision-making through membership. 

NATO has sent signals to both Helsinki and Stockholm that they 

would be well-qualified candidates. If they decided to apply, the


negotiation stage could proceed fairly rapidly, with Finland in 

particular meeting most requirements and its military forces already 

being more NATO compatible than some member states. 

Nonetheless, membership will require majority public support, 

whereas surveys still indicate that only a third of Finns are strongly in 

favor. In contrast, based on a survey carried out in June 2014 by the 

Officers’ Union among its members, 76% of generals and colonels in 

active service are in favor of NATO membership. 163 

President Sauli Niinistö has claimed that the treaty-based post–Cold 

War arrangement was broken by Moscow, and, therefore, Finland’s 

international position has changed: “In a certain way, we are an 

opponent of Russia because we support the EU.” 164 

During the Cold War, Finland’s foreign policy avoided open 

opposition to the Soviet Union and claimed to be neutral. The most 

urgent question is how the Kremlin would react to Finland’s NATO 

membership and whether staying outside the Alliance actually 

increases or decreases Finland’s security. The new coalition 

government formed by the Center Party and the nationalist Finns 

Party after the April 19, 2015, elections has avoided the question of 

NATO membership for the near future, given Moscow’s ominous 

saber-rattling. Nonetheless, Helsinki remained committed to 

increasing its defense spending, and the question of NATO accession 

will depend on the country’s sense of security and vulnerability. 

Sweden 

Sweden has experienced increasing surveillance and military pressure 

from Moscow since the onset of the Ukrainian war. Even before this 

conflict, Stockholm was vehemently criticized by Moscow as a 

collaborator with Poland in pushing the EU’s Eastern Partnership 

program allegedly designed to tear the post-Soviet states away from 

Russia. 165 According to Russia’s ambassador to Sweden, “We are not


the ones who started the military escalation in the Baltic Sea area, it is 

a response to NATO's increased activities.” 166 According to Putin 

advisor Sergey Markov, Sweden is one of the most Russophobic 

countries in Europe, and any moves toward its NATO membership 

would aggravate security throughout the region. 

Russia’s intelligence agencies have redoubled their efforts to recruit 

spies in Sweden, and Russia’s military has increased flight exercises 

against simulated Swedish targets. Stockholm’s military leaders have 

been criticized for failing to mobilize any jets in response to Russian 

flights along the Swedish border. Moscow has engaged in numerous 

security provocations, especially in airspace and maritime incursions. 

In the most egregious incident in October 2014, a Russian submarine 

traveled close to Stockholm, prompting Sweden to mobilize its troops 

and ships. 167 Submarine and aircraft infiltrations are designed to affect 

Sweden’s population and test its air and sea defenses, which have been 

significantly weakened through budget cuts over the past twenty 

years. This presents Stockholm with a starker choice in increasing its 

defense spending and petitioning for NATO entry to enhance its 

security. 

Russia’s submarine intrusion may also have been a diversionary 

operation in order to focus Swedish attention and resources on one 

area while potentially striking in another zone. Conversely, Moscow 

simply wanted to demonstrate Swedish impotence under the newly 

installed red-green coalition government led by Prime Minister Stefan 

Löfven. 168 One litmus test for the new administration will be the Host 

Nation Support agreement, initialed with NATO prior to the elections 

in September 2014. Moscow’s threatening actions may have been 

designed to delay ratification and implementation of this NATO 

accord. 

Russia’s fleet has tripled its exercise time on the Baltic Sea in recent 

years, and its air force is more active, with fighter planes flying closer 

to Swedish borders. In June 2014, NATO held a large BALTOPS


international exercise near southern Sweden. The American fleet with 

a Swedish officer as deputy commander led the exercise, involving 30 

vessels and 52 airplanes from 14 participating countries. This largescale 

presence of NATO forces contributed to eliciting a more 

aggressive posture by Russian commanders. They have tried to 

demonstrate their strength by testing the latest fighter planes and 

cruise missiles and simulating air attacks off the island of Gotska 

Sandön. No Swedish planes were dispatched in response, thus 

indicating Stockholm’s low level of readiness for an attack. Moscow 

also conducted exercises by dropping paratroopers on the beaches of 

Kaliningrad, across the Baltic Sea from Sweden, which could be 

difficult for Russia to defend in the event of a war with NATO. 

Russia’s Air Force has simulated action inside Swedish borders in a 

possible war scenario in which Sweden belongs to an enemy bloc. In 

May 2014, the previous Swedish government decided to give priority 

to its military presence on the Baltic Sea, as Foreign Minister Carl Bildt 

emphasized how important it was for Sweden to demonstrate its 

solidarity as a NATO partner. 169 Stockholm confirmed that it would 

allow NATO to use Swedish territory in the event that the Baltic states 

were attacked by Russia. 170 

In October 2014, Sweden’s signals intelligence leaked a photo of a 

Russian fighter jet flying only about 30 feet away from a Swedish 

military intelligence plane; also, armed NATO fighter jets followed 

Russian fighters above the Swedish island of Öland. 171 Increased 

military activity in the airspace above the Baltic Sea has heightened 

the risk that a civilian passenger plane could collide with a Russian 

military plane. Such a crash between an SAS passenger aircraft and a 

Russian reconnaissance plane was narrowly averted in March 2014. 172 

The planes were only 90 meters apart and the SAS flight from 

Copenhagen to Italy had 130 passengers aboard. Russian aircraft 

frequently fly with their transponders turned off so they cannot be 

detected by radar and thereby pose a danger for commercial aviation. 

A conflict could rapidly develop if a collision with a passenger airplane


occurred and Moscow attempted to deflect blame by charging NATO 

with causing the incident. 

In the mid-1990s, Stockholm reduced its sizeable conscription-based 

military trained for territorial defense. The Army was cut by almost 

90% and the Navy by 70%; only the Air Force largely maintained its 

resources. In 2009, the center-right government decided that Sweden 

would abandon conscription and territorial defense to focus on 

limited international operations. Currently, Sweden has just over 

14,000 active duty troops plus a reserve of only 9,000 responsible for 

protecting a country the size of California. In reality, Sweden is unable 

to defend itself, and even a massive increase in military spending 

would do little to improve capabilities in the short-run as the country 

has lost a generation of combat commanders. 173 

Some analysts have posited the idea that Russia could seriously test 

and thwart NATO by occupying the Swedish island of Gotland, 

located about 50 miles from Sweden’s coast and only 80 miles from 

Latvia. 174 Given its location at the center of the Baltic Sea, Gotland 

could become critical in defending the Baltic states from a Russian 

attack. By occupying Gotland and using it for military operations, 

Moscow could prevent the Alliance from sending troop 

reinforcements and equipment to the Baltic states or using the island 

as a base to hunt Russian submarines. Although Gotland’s strategic 

importance has increased since the Baltic states joined NATO, 

Sweden has reduced its military presence and only maintained a 

Home Guard battalion there. It is also important to remember that 

the Alliance would be under no obligation to defend Gotland, as 

Sweden is not a NATO member. 

In January 2015, Sweden’s military Supreme Commander Sverker 

Göranson requested a substantial budget increase in order not to fall 

further behind Russia and other countries in the region. 175 This would 

include a greater number of full-time employees, more resources to 

conduct training, and personal equipment for soldiers. Sweden’s


defense budget in 2014 amounted to only 1% of GDP; plans were 

initiated for a steady increase by 2020, but only to 1.2% of GDP. In 

March 2015, Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist asserted that Sweden 

would raise defense spending by €677 million ($720 million) and reestablish 

a permanent military presence on Gotland. 176 Most of the 

money allocated between 2016 and 2020 would be spent on 

modernizing ships that could detect and intercept submarines. 

However, a credible deterrent would take Sweden much longer to 

achieve. According to analysts, ten to fifteen years are needed to 

construct a defense capable of protecting Sweden after a decade of 

cutbacks. According to opinion polls, 45% of Swedes think that 

defense spending should increase, while 36% believe it must remain 

the same. 177 In one important step, Stockholm brought back the 

option of using reservists to boost its military force. Defense Minister 

Hultqvist argued that the move was necessary against the backdrop of 

Russia’s rearmament. Sweden’s military also upgraded its cooperation 

with neighboring NATO member Denmark, in which the two 

countries would henceforth exchange confidential information, have 

free access to each other’s air and naval bases for refueling, enhance 

cooperation in air and maritime surveillance, and be able to use each 

other’s airspace when incidents occurred. 178 

In early May 2015, NATO held one of its largest anti-submarine 

exercises, Dynamic Mongoose, in the North Sea, with the 

participation of Sweden for the first time. NATO simulated detecting 

and attacking foreign submarines. Stockholm also decided to expand 

its role in the annual NATO Baltic exercises. 179 In June 2015, Swedish 

forces participated in antisubmarine exercises with NATO in 

connection with the naval exercise BALTOPS-2015 in the coastal 

waters off Denmark, Poland, and Sweden. The drills engaged about 40 

ships and aircraft from 15 member states and NATO partners and 

involved maneuvering, warship escorting, air defense, antiterrorism 

measures, location and neutralization of mines, and artillery fire. The 

goal was to improve the interoperability of national forces.


Sweden has also sharpened its rhetoric, with Prime Minister Loefven 

asserting after the October 2014 submarine hunt that Sweden would 

defend its “territorial integrity with all available means.” An opinion 

poll published in January 2015 found that 73% of Swedes were 

concerned about developments in Russia, compared to only 45% a 

year earlier. 180 For the first time, the annual poll also found more 

Swedes were generally in favor of NATO membership (48%) 

compared to those opposed (35%). In another poll in January 2015, 

the proportion of Swedes supporting NATO membership jumped by 

five percentage points. 181 In an April 2014 survey, 33% considered 

accession a good idea, up from 28%, while 47% were opposed, a drop 

from 56%. 

The NATO debate has intensified in Sweden, despite the fact that the 

country has traditionally sought neutrality and nonalignment. 

However, credible nonalignment necessitates the ability to defend 

oneself or to deter potential threats—the principle on which Swedish 

security policy was based during the Cold War, with sizable defense 

appropriations and a more extensive domestic defense industry. But 

after the Soviet collapse, Swedish defense capabilities were 

dramatically reduced. 

The non-socialist parties are becoming more receptive to NATO 

membership. 182 In effect, a campaign is underway for Sweden to apply 

for NATO entry: the Center Party and the Christian Democrats have 

changed their positions on NATO and the Moderate Party also started 

to push the membership issue. Nevertheless, political opinion against 

NATO remains strong within the red-green parties; the Social 

Democrats have given little indication that they are softening their 

opposition while in coalition with the pacifist Environment Party. 

Moscow endeavors to maintain contacts and influence with the leftist 

parties to undermine any pro-NATO sentiments. While opponents 

warn that tensions will increase in the region if Russia feels more 

squeezed by Swedish membership, advocates point out that NATO


membership will make Sweden’s defense more 

credible. Paradoxically, the pacifist opponents of NATO entry will 

need to support greater defense spending to justify staying outside the 

Alliance, unless they intend to surrender to Moscow’s demands. 

Proponents of Alliance membership argue that Sweden was never 

neutral during the Cold War, as all previous Social Democrat 

governments cooperated with the US, and defense planning was based 

on defense against the Soviet Union. 183 Moreover, Sweden has been a 

member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace for twenty years, 

participated in NATO missions from Kosova to Afghanistan, and has 

hosted NATO exercises. The government has stated that Sweden 

would not remain passive if an EU or Nordic country were attacked 

militarily and that Stockholm expected the same assistance. In 

addition, Sweden and Finland view themselves as a tandem, whereby 

NATO accession by one would mean membership for both. While 

Stockholm debates its options, Russia’s ambassador to Sweden, Viktor 

Tatarintsev, tried to frighten its politicians and public by declaring 

that NATO membership would precipitate a military response by 

Moscow. 184 

Norway and Denmark 

In February 2015, Norway’s Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide 

asserted that the West’s attitude toward Russia would never be the 

same after the war in Ukraine and there was no way back to a 

normalized relationship. 185 Relations between Oslo and Moscow grew 

frosty after Putin’s seizure of Crimea. Norway cut military and 

political communications with the Kremlin and started modernizing 

its airbases. 

The Barents Sea, which borders both countries, is strategically 

important to the Kremlin, providing its only direct ice-free access to 

the Atlantic. 186 A large proportion of Russia’s submarines—of which


at least 22 are nuclear-powered—are based close to the Norwegian 

border. Norway’s continuing military vulnerability was acknowledged 

in September 2014, when Søreide announced that defense will have to 

be radically upgraded as a direct result of increased concern over 

Russia’s actions. 187 

According to Lieutenant-General Kjell Grandhagen, Norway’s 

military intelligence chief, Putin’s Russia is more aggressive and 

unpredictable, including in areas close to Norway. 188 In 2014, Norway 

intercepted 74 Russian warplanes off its coast, 27% more than in 2013, 

scrambling F-16 fighters from a military air base in Bodo. 189 The US 

pledged to pre-position Abrams M1A1 main battle tanks and other 

armored vehicles in Norway to boost the country’s security. Oslo was 

also tasked with providing facilities for a NATO detachment and 

deployment of airborne early warning systems at the Air Force Base 

in Ørland. 

Norway’s defense minister stated that Oslo would increase military 

spending in 2015 by 3.3% and the military was being restructured to 

deal more effectively with the new risks. Russia has also sharply 

increased snap military exercises near Norwegian territory, in 

violation of established procedure, either announced at the last 

minute or kept fully secret. Russia is particularly focused on Svalbard, 

demilitarized Norwegian-controlled islands in the high Arctic that 

Moscow believes serve as a platform for eavesdropping and other 

covert NATO activities. 

The bulk of Russia’s strategic nuclear capacities are deployed close to 

Norway’s borders; hence, Moscow could seek to secure its nuclear 

weapons by directly intervening on Norwegian territory. The Kola 

Peninsula bordering Norway is particularly important for stationing 

a large proportion of its nuclear weapons that would be used in a 

conflict with the US. According to Norwegian intelligence, Russia’s 

upgrades in areas near Norway consist primarily of new submarines 

and surface vessels, an extra brigade, a new air defense system and


nuclear missiles, and a renewal of air force planes with upgraded 

weapons systems. Norwegian fighter jets are dispatched weekly to 

identify Russian military aircraft flying close to Norway’s territorial 

borders, some of which appear to be armed. 190 Russia’s strategic air 

force capable of carrying missiles with nuclear weapons has been more 

active since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. 

Neighboring Denmark, another NATO member, has also been subject 

to Moscow’s threats. Mikhail Vanin, Russia's ambassador to Denmark 

stated on March 21, 2015, that Moscow’s nuclear missiles could target 

the country’s navy if it joins NATO’s anti-missile defense shield. 191 

The threat sparked an angry reaction among Danish officials. NATO’s 

missile shield is due to be fully operational in parts of Central Europe 

by 2025. Copenhagen has pledged to supply frigates equipped with 

advanced radar to track incoming missiles. It was also reported that, 

in June 2014, Russian jets simulated a nuclear attack on Denmark’s 

Bornholm Island, timed to coincide with an annual festival involving 

the country’s entire political leadership. 192 

As the Arctic or High North has grown in importance for future 

resource extraction and shipping, Russia has declared the region as its 

largest sphere of economic investment. Undiscovered reserves 

of crude oil and natural gas in the Arctic are estimated at 13% 

and 30% of the world’s total, respectively. Russia is vying for control 

of the region’s fossil fuels and rare metals with other “polar 

nations,” thus making the region a potential flashpoint. Moscow is 

constructing new military bases in the Arctic and intends to restore 

the region’s Soviet defense infrastructure. Russia’s Federal Agency for 

Special Construction (Spetsstroy) is installing air defense bases and 

combat aviation guidance posts along the Arctic Ocean coastline. 193 

The stage is set for confrontation, as the West does not recognize a 

large portion of the Arctic shelf as Russian, while Moscow claims that 

NATO seeks to advance its interests with military force. 

The Kremlin is developing a unified command structure


to coordinate military operations in the Arctic and has established 

a new government entity to execute Russia’s policy in the region. 194 It 

is constructing a combined naval, air, ground, and nuclear defense in 

the Arctic in anticipation of a future NATO threat and to project its 

claimed economic and strategic interests. 

However, during 2014 and 2015, further exploration in the Arctic 

became problematic for Moscow because US and EU sanctions 

curbed the sale of equipment for oil and gas drilling. A poll taken in 

August 2014 indicated that 63.3% of Norwegians backed the 

economic measures against Moscow, while only 17.5% 

disapproved. 195 Putin’s special envoy to the High North, Artur 

Tsjilingarov, visited Norway in December 2014 and asserted that the 

country risked major financial losses by following EU policy of 

sanctions against Russia. 196 Norwegian oil companies were evidently 

in danger of losing the competition for major contracts in the High 

North. Moscow has also threatened to scale down its cooperation with 

the eight-member Arctic Council, claiming that the Nordic countries 

were acting provocatively toward Russia. 197 While Moscow’s feuds 

with the three Baltic states intensify conflicts with the Nordic 

countries, disputes over the Arctic will further exacerbate tensions 

with northern Europe and North America. 

Endnotes 

1 

Stefan Forss and Pekka Holopainen, “Breaking the Nordic Defense 

Deadlock,” February 2015, Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War 

College Press, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. 

2 

Agnia Grigas, “Anatomy of Russia’s Information Warfare in Baltic States,” 

Vilnius, Delfi.lt, December 29, 2014, http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/foreignaffairs/russias-information-warfare-in-the-baltic-states-ii.d?id=66778660. 

Moscow’s armed occupation of the Baltic countries after World War Two is


depicted in official statements as a voluntary act of joining the Soviet 

Union. 

3 

Interfax, Moscow, June 4, 2015, www.interfax.com. 

4 

“Population and Housing Census 2011,” Estonia.eu, 

http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/country/population-census-2011.html. 

5 

Kristina Kallas, “Dangerously Forgotten Ida-Viru,” Tallinn, Eesti 

Paevaleht, March 12, 2015, http://epl.delfi.ee. 

6 

Katja Koort, “The Russians of Estonia: Twenty Years After,” World Affairs, 

July-August 2014, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/russiansestonia-twenty-years-after. 

7 

Paul Goble, “Leningrad Governor Attacks Finno-Ugric Groups as Threats 

to Russia’s Territorial Integrity,” Window on Eurasia -- New Series, March 

4, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/leningrad-governorattacks-finno-ugric.html. 

8 

Kristopher Rikken, “Ruling Reform Party Wins Estonian Election, 

Fending Off Challenge From Archrival Center,” Tallinn, ERR News, March 

1, 2015, http://news.err.ee. 

9 

Elisabeth Braw, “The Kremlin’s Influence Game,” World Affairs, March 

10, 2015, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabethbraw/kremlin%E2%80%99s-influence-game. 

10 

For a diatribe by a “Holy Russia” fanatic see the interview with Yiriy 

Zhuravlev, head of the Russians in Estonia Movement by Mariya Solnceva, 

“Russians in Estonia: Estonia is in Deep NATO, as They Say.” According to 

Zhuravlev, the Russian people will never tolerate “Western liberal fascism.” 

Evidently, “true Russians, genuine patriots of Russia, today, as always, are 

on all the battlefields of the Holy Liberation Battle. 2007 in Estonia. 2008 in 

South Ossetia, Abkhazia. 2013, 2014, 2015 in Crimea, Luhansk, Donbas, 

Novorossiya… Ahead are 2016, 2020,” 

Tallinn, Baltija Online, April 20, 2015, www.baltija.eu.


11 

“Estonian Police to Create Cyber Crime Unit,” Tallinn, BNS, July 14, 2015, 

www.bns.ee. 

12 

“Border Treaty Waiting for Putin’s Decision, MP Says,” Tallinn, Estonian 

Public Broadcasting, ERR News, June 25, 2014, http://news.err.ee. 

13 

Based on the author’s discussions with Estonian government officials and 

independent analysts in Tallinn in September 2014. 

14 

CNN, September 5, 2014, 

http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/estoniarussiaabduction/index.html?hpt=hp_t2. 

15 

Sarunas Cerniauskas: “Linkevicius: Abduction in Estonia Is a Reminder 

to Baltic Countries,” Delfi, Vilnius, September 5, 2014, www.delfi.lt. 

16 

“Russia Jails Estonia Security Official Eston Kohver,” BBC News, August 

19, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33986733. 

17 

“President: Estonia's Freedom Deserves Defending, Preserving,” Tallinn, 

Baltic News Service, June 25, 2014, http://www.bns.ee. 

18 

“Internal Security Expenditure Should Also Reach 2% of GDP, Says 

Minister" Tallinn, Estonian Public Broadcasting, ERR News, July 14, 2014,” 

http://news.err.ee. 

19 

“New Estonian Bill to Replace National Defense in Estonia,” Tallinn, 

Baltic News Service, July 22, 2014, http://www.bns.ee. 

20 

“Amari Sees Fulfillment of Obama Promise,” Tallinn, Postimees.ee, 

December 22, 2014, http://news.postimees.ee. 

21 

“Estonia Wants NATO Fighters to be Permanently Stationed at Amari 

Air Base,” Tallinn, Baltic News Service, June 25, 2014, www.bns.ee. 

22 

“Estonia President Toomas Ilves Seeks Permanent NATO Force,” April 

12, 2015, BBC News,


http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32274170. 

23 

Interfax, Tallinn, April 20, 2015, www.interfax.com. 

24 

“Baltic Armies to Create Coordination Network,” Interfax. Tallinn, 

December 12, 2014, http://www.interfax.com. 

25 

“EU to Help Install Mobile Monitoring Systems on Estonian-Russian 

Border,” Interfax, Tallinn, December 20, 2014, http://www.interfax.com. 

The EBF allotted €1.9 billion in 2007–2013, including €27 million for 

programs in Estonia. 

26 

“Estonian, Latvian Russian-Language TV Channels Plan Cooperation,” 

Tallinn, ERR News, March 31, 2015, www.news.err.ee. 

27 

“Estonian Public Broadcaster To Launch Weekly News Magazine in 

Russian,” Tallinn, BNS, December 23, 2014, http://www.bns.ee. 

28 

Based on discussions by the authors with Estonian government officials 

and analysts in Tallinn in September 2014. 

29 

Paul Goble, “Russia Seen Expanding Active Measures and Media 

Campaign Against Latvia in 2015,” January 5, 2015, Window on Eurasia – 

New Series, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/01/window-on-eurasiarussia-seen-expanding.html. 

30 

Paul Goble, “Moscow Brings Its Traditional Divide-and-Rule Approach 

Back to the Three Baltic Countries,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, July 

4, 2015, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/07/moscow-bringsits-traditional-divide.html. 

31 

“Latvia’s GDP Would Suffer 10% Reduction if Russia Terminated All 

Agreements With Latvia,” Leta, Riga, August 18, 2014, http://www.leta.lv. 

32 

Uldis Smits, “Lithuania Stronger,” Riga, Latvijas Avize, November 3, 

2014.


33 

Aleksandr Nosovich: “Where Will Dreams Lead If Russian Business 

Leaves Baltic Countries?” 

Kaliningrad, July 16, 2014, www.rubaltic.ru. 

34 

“Analyst: Russia’s Sanctions to Hit Baltic Countries Hardest,” Tallinn, 

BNS, August 7, 2014, www.bns.ee. 

35 

“Latvian Constitutional Referendum, 2012,” 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latvian_constitutional_referendum,_2012. 

36 

Gundars Reders, “Russian World Project Bound to Expand,” Riga, 

LSM.lv, January 12, 2015, http://www.lsm.lv. 

37 

Population Census 2011 - Key Indicators, October 3, 2013, 

http://www.csb.gov.lv/en/statistikas-temas/population-census-2011-keyindicators-33613.html. 

38 

Artis Pabriks, a former foreign and defense minister, noted that by 2014 

the number of Latvian residents without citizenship had dropped to 12% 

from 36% in the early 1990s. See Alison Smale, “Latvia’s Tensions With 

Russians at Home Persist in Shadow of Ukraine Conflict,” New York Times, 

August 23, 2014. 

39 

Based on discussions by the authors with Latvian government officials 

and analysts in Riga in September 2014. 

40 

Ibid. 

41 

“Preamble to Latvian Constitution will Facilitate Ethnic Split - Russian 

ForMin,” Moscow/Riga, Baltic News Service, June 21, 2014. 

42 

Bens Latkovskis, “What To Do With Harmony?” Neatkariga, Riga, 

August 15, 2014. 

43 

Linda Bagone, “Partners of Latgale Municipalities—NGOs Linked With 

Russian Intelligence Services,” Riga, LSM.lv, December 14, 2014. According 

to Latvian intelligence services, four non-governmental organizations in 

Russia—Russkaya Baltika in Kaliningrad, the St. Petersburg-based


International and Regional Policy Center, the Russian-Baltic Media Center, 

and the Russian Strategic Study Centre—are used as platforms for the 

activities of Russia’s special services in Latvia. 

44 



45 

Interview with Miroslav Mitrofanov, co-chair of the Russia Union by 

Aleksandra Rybakova, “Is Russian Issue Still Actual in Latvia?” Kaliningrad, 

rubaltic.ru, October 8, 2014, www.rubaltic.ru. 

46 



47 

Paul Goble, “A Small Number of Russians in Latgale Can Create Big 

Problems for Riga, Grigoryevs Says,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, 

February 23, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/02/a-small-number-ofrussians-in-latgale.html. 

48 

Paul Goble, “Pro-Moscow Groups Launch Websites for ‘Peoples 

Republics’ in Latvia and Lithuania,” January 30, 2015, Window on Eurasia – 

New Series, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/01/pro-moscow-groupslaunch-websites-for.html. 

49 

Carol J. Williams, “Latvia, With a Large Minority of Russians, Worries 

About Putin's Goals,” Los Angeles Times, May 2, 2015, 

http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-latvia-russia-next-20150502- 

story.html#page=1. 

50 

“On Findings As For Special Operation Planned in Latgale,” Situation 

Reports, December 12, 2014, Center for Eurasian Strategic Intelligence, 

http://eurasianintelligence.org/news.php?new=213&num. 

51 

Paul Goble, “Moscow Massively Funding Pro-Russian NGOs in Baltic 

Countries,” Blog on Russia and Eurasia, The Jamestown Foundation, 

September 11, 2015, http://www.jamestown.org/blog.


52 

Elisabeth Braw, “The Kremlin’s Influence Game,” World Affairs, March 

10, 2015, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabethbraw/kremlin%E2%80%99s-influence-game. 

53 

Paul Goble, “Moscow Faces Obstacles in Deepening its Involvement with 

Ethnic Russians in Latvia,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, March 27, 

2015, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/moscow-facesobstacles-in-deepening-its.html. 

54 

“Latvia’s Russian Rights Activist Was Detained as Part of Probe Into Ethnic 

Incitement,” BNS, Tallinn, May 27, 2015, http://www.bns.ee. 

55 

Dovydas Pancerovas, “Latvia is Concerned With Activities of Pro-Russian 

Agitators, What Is the Situation in Lithuania?” Vilnius 15min.lt, November 

25, 2014, http://www.15min.lt. 

56 

Paul Goble, “Moscow Using Russian Organizations to Destabilize Latvia, 

Riga Officials Say,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, March 9, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/moscow-using-russianorganizations-to.html. 

57 

“Pro-Russia NGO Banned From Staging Multiday Rally in Riga,” Tallinn, 

BNS, March 5, 2015, http://www.bns.ee. 

58 

Paul Goble, “Moscow Has Already Begun Hybrid War Against Latvia, 

Riga Journalist Says,” 

Window on Eurasia – New Series, March 3, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/moscow-has-alreadybegun-hybrid-war.html. 

59 

“Latvian NATO Center to Counter Russia ‘Propaganda,’ ” Riga, AFP, 

North European Service, July 3, 2014, http://www.afp.com/en/home. 

60 

Paul Goble, “Latvia Seeks EU Funding for Full Service Russian-Language 

TV Channel,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, December 29, 2014, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/12/window-on-eurasia-latviaseeks-eu.html.


61 

Juris Vilums, “Informational (In)security in Latgale,” Riga, Delfi, 

December 17, 2014, http://www.delfi.lv. 

62 

Voldemars Krustins, “When Morality Not Present,” Riga, Latvijas Avize, 

September 2, 2014. 

63 

“Expert: 500 Russian Militiamen Enough to Stop Existence of Latvia,” 

Kaliningrad, newsbalt.ru, July 2014. Neronsky asserted that the 

preconditions for division were in place, as “discrimination against the 

Russian community is intensifying… The West is closing its eyes to this, the 

patience of Russians is not unlimited, and the example of Crimea and the 

Donbas may push them to decisive actions.” See also Paul Goble, “500 

Donetsk-Type Militants Could End Latvia’s Existence as Unified State, 

Moscow Expert Says,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, July 15, 2014, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/07/window-on-eurasia-500- 

donetsk-type.html. 

64 

Paul Goble, “Peskov Says Ethnic Russians in Latvia Would Revolt if 

Radical Nationalists Came to Power in Riga,” Window on Eurasia – New 

Series, November 21, 2014, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/11/window-on-eurasiapeskov-says-ethnic.html. 

65 

Aivars Ozolins, “Putin's Next Target - Baltic States,” Riga, TVNET, 

February 26, 2015, http://www.tvnet.lv. 

66 

Gunars Nagels, “National Security,” Riga, Latvijas Avize, July 15, 2014. 

67 

“Latvian Formin Calls for Decision on Lasting Presence of Allied NATO 

Forces in Baltic,” Tallinn, Baltic News Service, June 25, 2014, www.bns.ee. 

68 

“Latvian Def Min Urges US To Support Permanent Presence of Allied 

Forces in Baltics,” Tallinn, Baltic News Service, July 7, 2014, www.bns.ee. US 

forces maintain a rotational presence in the region. For instance, in October 

2014, soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division were deployed to Latvia to replace 

members of the US Army Europe’s 173 rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team.


See “Latvia Highly Appreciates US Troops’ Presence—Military Official,” 

Tallinn, BNS, October 14, 2014, www.bns.ee. 

69 

Interfax, Moscow, June 2, 2015, www.interfax.com. 

70 

Ugis Libietis, “Latvian Security Challenges—Unfulfilled Homework and 

‘Sprats Value,’ ” Riga, LSM.lv, September 2, 2014, www.lsm.lv. 

71 

Aidis Tomsons, "Experts Discuss Need To Introduce Compulsory 

Military Service," Riga, Latvijas Radio Online, March 9, 2015, 

http://www.latvijasradio.lv. 

72 

“Ricards Kozlovskis, ‘Latvian Eastern Border Should Be Strengthened,’ ” 

Riga, Radio Latvijas, August 14, 2014. 

73 

“Latvian Parliament To Continue Discussing Ban on Residence Permits 

to Russian Investors,” Tallinn, BNS, November 20, 2014, http://www.bns.ee. 

74 

Uldis Smits, “Green, Black,” Latvijas Avize, Riga, October 14, 2014, p. 3, 

http://www.la.lv. 

75 

“NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence in Riga 

Accredited,” Tallinn, BNS, September 2, 2014, http://www.bns.ee. 

76 

Dovydas Pancerovas, “Five Targets in Lithuania: Which of Them is 

Russian Propaganda Going to Target This Year?” Vilnius, 15min.lt, January 

5, 2015, http://www.15min.lt. 

77 

Based on discussions by the authors with Lithuanian government officials 

and analysts in Vilnius in September 2014. 

78 

Ibid. 

79 

“Accusations Against Lithuania From Lips of Russian Official,” Vilnius, 

July 3, 2014, www.lrytas.lt. 

80 

Paul Goble, “EU Energy Plan Puts Kaliningrad at Risk, Moscow Paper 

Says,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, April 20, 2015,


http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/04/eu-energy-plan-putskaliningrad-at-risk.html. 

81 

Jevgenijus Bardauskas and Joana Lapėnienė, “Defense Expert: We Cannot 

Rule Out the Possibility That Russia Is Planning a Corridor From 

Kaliningrad to Belarus Through Lithuania,” LRT.lt, August 31, 2014, 

http://www.lrt.lt. 

82 

“Polish Airmen Guarding Baltic Skies: Russian Activity Growing With 

Every Year” Šiauliai, Vilnius, Lithuania, July 28, 2014, Baltic News Service, 

www.bns.ee. 

83 



84 

“Russian Warships Disrupt Swedish Cable Laying,” Stockholm, The Local, 

May 2, 2015, www.thelocal.se. The 400-kilometer-long (250 miles) cable 

runs from Klaipeda, Lithuania, to Nybro, on Sweden’s east coast. Its 

purpose is to improve Lithuanian and Scandinavian trading on electricity 

markets and to increase the security of power supplies to Lithuania. 

85 

“Reserve Officer: Situation Near Swedish Coast Might Be Repeated Near 

Lithuanian Coast,” alfa.lt, Vilnius, October 20, 2014, www.alfa.lt. 

86 

Vaidas Saldžiūnas and Gediminas Pilaitis, “Is Lithuania Capable of 

Defending Itself Against Underwater Guests?” lrytas.lt, Vilnius, October 21, 

2014, www.lrytas.lt. 

87 



88 

“Russian Blockade of Lithuanian Goods, Services Could Cost up to 4 

Percent of GDP - Lithuanian Prime Minister,” Vilnius, Elta, November 27, 

2014, www.elta.lt. 

89 

Rūta Janutienė, “Finnish Goodness With Strong Russian Smell,” Vilnius, 

16 June 2014, www.lrytas.lt. One such company is the Finnish Fortum. 

Arturas Paulauskas, head of parliament’s National Security and Defense


Committee claimed possible ties between Fortum and the Kremlin. A 

portion of Lithuania’s heating sector has to be given to private business, 

where Fortum is the sixth largest investor in this field in Europe. It is linked 

with oligarch Genadyi Timchenko, who has Putin’s patronage and Finnish 

citizenship, and was on a list of individuals sanctioned by the West after 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. 

90 

“Lithuania Claims One-Third of Russian Diplomats Are Spies,” Paris, 

March 30, 2015, AFP (North European Service), 

http://www.afp.com/en/home. 

91 

“Lithuania Detains Military Officer Suspected of Spying,” Vilnius, 

December 31, 2014, AFP (North European Service), 


92 

Dovydas Pancerovas, “Lithuanian Officers’ Reports Show Russian, 

Belarusian Spies’ Attempts To Recruit Them,” Vilnius, 15min.lt, April 17, 

2015, http://www.15min.lt. 

93 

Paulius Gritėnas, “Why Are Russian-Capital Companies Interested in 

Land Plots Surrounding Military Bases?” lrytas.lt, Vilnius, October 16, 2014, 

www.lrytas.lt. 

94 

“Lithuania to Reinstate Army Conscription Amid Russia Fears,” February 

24, 2015, Vilnius, AFP (North European Service), 


95 

“Baltics Facing Real Threat - Lithuanian President,” Vilnius, March 4, 

2015, BNS, http://www.bns.ee. 

96 

”Lithuanian Military Will Carry Out Exercises Without NATO Allies,” 

Iruytas.lt, Vilnius, April 21, 2015, www.lrytas.lt. 

97 

Artūras Paulauskas, Head of Parliamentary National Security, Defense 

Committee: “What Will We Do Next in Fight Against Information War?” 

Vilnius, Delfi, July 22, 2014, www.delfi.lt.


98 

Monika Garbaciauskaite Budriene, “Interview With Journalist Peter 

Pomerantsev: How Russian Collective Consciousness Formed: Fear, 

Conspiracy Theories, Tearing of Wounds,” Vilnius, Delfi, February 9, 2015, 

www.delfi.lt. 

99 

“Conscripts Not To Be Sent to Foreign Missions - Lithuanian Defense 

Chief,” Vilnius, BNS, March 4, 2015, www.bns.ee. 

100 

Sarunas Cerniauskas, Dovydas Pancerovas, “Special Investigation: 

Money From Kremlin's Fund Are Going Into Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian 

Pockets,” Vilnius, 15min.lt, June 8, 2015, www.15min.lt. 

101 

Rasa Pakalniene, “Propaganda: New Level, Greater Influence,” Vilnius, 

December 10, 2014, Lietuvos Zinios. 

102 

Based on discussions by the authors with Lithuanian government 

officials and analysts in Vilnius in September 2014. 

103 

For Lithuania’s 2011 census figures see http://osp.stat.gov.lt/en/2011-m.- 

surasymas. 

104 


officials and analysts in Vilnius in September 2014. 

105 

Valdas Tamosaitis, “Polish Knot of Russia,” Vilnius, July 17, 2014, 

www.bernardinai.lt. 

106 

Karolis Jovaisas, “Do Not Ask Who Helped Valdemar Tomasevski To 

Become Popular. We Did,” Vilnius, Delfi, June 19, 2014, http://www.delfi.lt. 

107 

Romualdas Bakutis, “How To Save Lithuanian Poles From Tomasevski’s 

‘Patronage,’ ” Vilnius, November 19, 2014, www.alfa.lt. A significant 

portion of Poles evidently do not want to vote for the LLRA but are being 

pushed away by radicals in several Lithuanian parties. 

108 

Marija Larisceva, “Conference Platform,” Vilnius, Litovskiy Kuryer, July 

9, 2014, www.kurier.lt.


109 


officials and analysts in Vilnius in September 2014. Lithuanian officials 

consider it important to defend local conservatism and traditionalism from 

Putin’s attempts to appropriate these values. 

110 

Evelina Valiuškevičiūtė, “Mission To Find Weak Spots of Lithuanian 

State,” Vilnius, lrytas.lt, February 23, 2015, www.lrytas.lt. 

111 

Sarunas Cerniauskas, “What Are ‘Cadets’ From Lithuania Being Taught 

in Russian Military Camp?” Vilnius, Delfi, September 9, 2014, www.delfi.lt. 

112 

Dovydas Pancerovas, “Latvia Is Concerned With Activities of Pro- 

Russian Agitators, What Is the Situation in Lithuania?” Vilnius, 15min.lt , 

November 25, 2014, www.15min.lt. 

113 

“It Is Important To Train Army Units, Prepare for Unconventional 

Challenges - General Zukas,” Vilnius, Baltic News Service, June 19, 2014, 

www.bns.ee. 

114 

Kastytis Braziulis, “Yakunin: Task Has Been Completed, Your Excellency 

Mr. President,” alfa.lt, August 20, 2014, www.alfa.lt. 

115 

“Baltics To Cooperate on Dealing With Threats to Internal Security,” 

Vilnius, BNS, October 2014, www.bns.ee. 

116 

Dovydas Pancerovas, “What Should We Do, if Weight of Russian 

Aggression Fell on Lithuania?” lrytas.lt, Vilnius, September 29, 2014, 

www.lrytas.lt. 

117 

“Lithuania Creates Response Force to Prevent Ukraine Scenario," AFP, 

North European Service, Paris, October 13, 2014, www.afp.com. 

118 

Rick Lyman, “Ukraine Crisis in Mind, Lithuania Establishes a Rapid 

Reaction Force,” December 19, 2014, The New York Times, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/world/europe/lithuania-assembles-aforce-as-it-readies-for-whatever-russia-may-bring.html?_r=0.


119 

“Lithuania's Standby Army Units Put on Higher State of Preparedness - 

Media,” Vilnius, December 8, 2014, www.bns.ee. 

120 

“Kiev - Lithuania Pledges Military Aid for Ukraine,” Kyiv, November 24, 

2014, AFP (North European Service), www.afp.com. 

121 

Interview with Roman Polko, former commander of the Polish Army’s 

GROM Special Forces, “Former Polish Special Forces Commander: Polish 

Soldiers Would Defend Lithuania,” Vilnius, Delfi, March 16, 2015, 

www.ru.delfi.lt. 

122 

Adam Withnall, “Russia’s ‘Preparations for War on Sweden’ Lead to 

Security Service Concerns,” The Independent, April 8, 2014, 

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russias-preparationsfor-war-on-sweden-lead-to-security-service-concerns-9246749.html. 

123 

Edward Lucas, The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report, CEPA, 

June 2015, p. 9, 

http://www.cepa.org//sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Se 

curity%20Report-%20%282%29.compressed.pdf. 

124 

EurActiv, April 13, 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global- 

europe/russia-concerned-finland-and-swedens-nato-rapprochement- 

313709. 

125 

Andrew Rettman, “Russia Concerned by Finland and Sweden’s NATO 

Rapprochement,” EU Observer, Brussels, April 13, 2015, 

https://euobserver.com/foreign/128297. 

126 

Sveinung Berg Bentzrod, “Russian Aggression: Nordic States Extend 

Their Military Cooperation,” Oslo, Aftenposten.no, April 9, 2015, 

www.aftenposten.no. 

127 

“Saber Rattling? The Fact is that to Russia the Baltic Opens a Way out to 

the World,” Helsinki, Suomen Kuvalehti Online, December 22, 2014, 

www.suomenkuvalehti.fi. 

128 

Written testimony to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs


Committee, September 3, 2014, by Edward Lucas, Senior Fellow, Center for 

European Policy Analysis, Washington, DC, and 

Senior Editor, The Economist, 

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1nLdiU4jRMYlVgtrX6JXs4L8vxwlN2 

NpVh8ndUgbYH94/mobilebasic?pli=1. 

129 

Kati Pohjanpalo, “Finland Says NATO an Option After Russia ‘Violates’ 

Border Laws,” August 26, 2014, 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-26/finland-says-nato-anoption-after-russia-violates-border-laws.html. 

130 

Jarmo Huhtanen, “Russia Will Bring Its Most Advanced Missile System 

to Kola Peninsula Near Finland,” Helsinki, HS.fi, November 21, 2014, 

www.hs.fi. 

131 

RIA Novosti, Moscow, October 21, 2014, http://ria.ru. 

132 

“It Is Necessary To be Prepared for Surprises Also in Finland's Territorial 

Waters,” Helsinki, HS.fi, April 29, 2015. 

133 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, March 2, 

2015, www.mid.ru. 

134 

“Secret Services: Cyber Spies Twice Penetrated Foreign Ministry,” 

Helsinki, YLE.fi, July 3, 2014, www.yle.fi. 

135 

“Russia Experts Call for Lustration in Finland,” March 2, 2015, 

http://lustraatio.fi/lustration. 

136 

Tuula Malin, “Welcome of Coffee and Biscuits for Putin,” Iltalehti, April 

7, 2015. Some analysts believe these Russian citizens could jam radars and 

communications systems during an inter-state conflict. 

137 

Paulius Gritėnas, “Why Are Russian-Capital Companies Interested in 

Land Plots Surrounding Military Bases?” lrytas.lt, Vilnius, October 16, 2014, 

www.lrytas.lt.


138 

Laura Halminen, “Tuomioja: Researcher Wrote With ‘Ulterior Motive,’ ” 

Helsinki, HS.fi, December 30, 2014, www.hs.fi. 

139 

Charly Salonius-Pasternak, James Mashiri, Michael Moberg, “Could This 

Happen?” Helsinki, Suomen Kuvalehti Online, February 27, 2015. 

140 

Paul Goble, “Patrushev Says Helsinki Stirring Up Nationalists in 

Karelia,” Window on Eurasia - New Series, March 20, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/patrushev-says-helsinkistirring-up.html. 

141 

“Russian Politicians Raise Possibility of Sanctions Against Finland,” 

YLE.fi, Helsinki, July 3, 2015, www.yle.fi. 

142 

Laura Halminen, “Opinion Poll: Russia’s Reputation Collapsed in 

Finland -- Still Few in Favor of NATO Membership,” Helsinki HS.fi, 

October 10, 2014, www.hs.fi. 

143 

“Yle Survey: Russian-Finnish Relations Significantly Weakened by 

Ukraine Crisis,” Helsinki, YLE.fi, January 4, 2015, www.yle.fi. 

144 

Information from meetings by the authors with officials and analysts in 

Helsinki, April 27–28, 2015. 

145 


Helsinki, April 27–28, 2015. 

146 

“President Emphasizes Western Outlook in New Year Speech,” Helsinki 

YLE.fi, January 1, 2015, www.yle.fi. 

147 

Juha-Pekka Raeste, “HS Poll: Majority in Favor of Increasing Defense 

Budget,” Helsinki, HS.fi March 16, 2015, www.hs.fi. 

148 

“Defence Minister Wants Finland Cyber Warfare-Ready,” Helsinki, 

YLE.fi, February 11, 2015, www.yle.fi.


149 

Stefan Forss and Pekka Holopainen, Breaking the Nordic Defense 

Deadlock, Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 

February 2015, p. 39, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil. 

150 

“Haglund Toughens Stance on Russian Airspace Violations,” Helsinki, 

YLE.fi, August 29, 2014, www.yle.fi. 

151 

“Finland Plans Large-Scale Military Exercise on Russian Border,” 

Helsinki, YLE.fi, August 30, 2014, www.yle.fi. 

152 

Elina Kervinen, “Finland and Sweden Plan to Have Joint Submarine 

Hunt Exercises,” Helsinki, HS.fi, January 12, 2015, www.hs.fi. 

153 

Gerard O’Dwyer, “Sweden And Finland Pursue ‘Special Relationship’ 

With NATO,” Defense News, October 10, 2014, 

http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014310100032. 

154 

“Russian Politico: Finland and Sweden No Longer NATO-Neutral 

Countries,” Helsinki, YLE.fi, August 28, 2014, www.yle.fi. 

155 

Kaja Kunnas, “Finland Does Not Shy Away From Cooperation With 

NATO-Member Estonia,’ Helsinki HS.fi, February 8, 2015, www.hs.fi. 

156 

Wolfgang Hansson, “Putin’s Scare Tactics Backfired Completely,” 

Stockholm, Aftonbladet Online, June 10, 2014, www.aftonbladet.se. 

157 

“Analyst: ’Finns Right To Be Concerned About Russia,’ ” Helsinki, 

YLE.fi, August 9, 2014, www.yle.fi. 

158 

“Poll: Ukraine Crisis Fuelling Support for Joining NATO,” YLE.fi, 

Helsinki, August 9, 2014, www.yle.fi. 

159 

Interview with Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, “Stubb Wants 

to Step up Pressure on Russia,” Stockholm, DN.se, July 5, 2014, www.dn.se. 

160 

“PM Stubb: NATO Is Like the EU, Membership Is Long Term,” Helsinki, 

YLE.fi, August 9, 2014, www.yle.fi.


161 

Gerard O’Dwyer, “New Finnish Government Raises NATO Stakes,” May 

24, 2015, Defense News, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policybudget/warfare/2015/05/24/finland-new-government-nato-membershiprussia-sweden-tension-ukraine-baltic/27710113. 

162 

Kari Huhta, “Ukrainian Crisis Emphasizes Finland's Relationship With 

the United States,” Helsinki HS.fi, June 23, 2014. 

163 

Petri Valkki, “Finnish Debate on NATO Membership Benefits, 

Disadvantages Summarized,” Suomen Sotilas, June 26, 2014. 

164 

Ville Pernaa, “Russia Has Returned to Power Politics and Spheres of 

Interest,” Helsinki, Suomen Kuvalehti Online, June 19, 2014. President Sauli 

Niinistö warned that Western countries confront a new Cold War with 

Russia but demonstrate a consistent softness when dealing with Moscow’s 

actions. See Simon Tisdall, “Finland Warns of New Cold War over Failure 

to Grasp Situation in Russia,” November 5, 2014, The Guardian, 

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/05/finland-warns-cold-warrussia-eu. 

165 


Stockholm, April 29–30, 2015. 

166 

Interview with Viktor Tatarintsev, Russia’s ambassador to Sweden, by 

Michael Winiarski, “People Cannot Treat Us Like Infants,” Stockholm, June 

14, 2014, www.dn.se. 

167 

“Russian Submarine Reportedly Found Within 31 Miles Of Stockholm, 

Sweden Mobilizes Troops,” News/Inquisitor, October 19, 2014, 

http://www.inquisitr.com/1548959/russian-submarine-reportedly-foundwithin-31-miles-of-stockholm-sweden-mobilizestroops/#OhGIeScyh6UrcZyt.99. 

168 

Claes Arvidsson, “Government's First Crisis Is Here,” Svenska Dagbladet 

Online, Stockholm, October 20, 2014, www.svd.se. 

169 

Mattias Carlsson and Josefin Sköld, “Power Game in Baltic Sea,” 

Stockholm, June 14, 2014, www.dn.se.


170 


Stockholm, April 29–30, 2015. 

171 

Hugo Anderholm, “Why is Russia Getting so Aggressive Toward 

Sweden?” October 20, 2014, 

http://www.vice.com/read/why-is-russian-military-hanging-out-onswedish-territory. 

172 

Tomas Augustsson, “Sweden May Start Following Russian Planes,” 

Stockholm, Svenska Dagbladet Online, July 14, 2014, www.svd.se. 

173 

Elisabeth Braw, “Bully in the Baltics: The Kremlin’s Provocations,” 

World Affairs, March/April 2015, 

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/bully-balticskremlin%E2%80%99s-provocations. 

174 

Elisabeth Braw, “Gotland Island, the Baltic Sea's Weak Link,” January 14, 

2015, World Affairs, In the Blogs, 

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabeth-braw/gotland-islandbaltic-seas-weak-link. 

175 

“Supreme Commander: Defense Needs Several Billion,” Stockholm, 

DN.se, January 12, 2015, Dagens Nyheter, http://www.dn.se. 

176 

“Sweden Raises Military Spending Amid Concerns Over Russia,” 

Stockholm, March 12, 2015, AFP (North European Service), www.afp.com. 

177 

“Assertive Russia Causes Military Rethink in Sweden,” December 12, 

2014, Stockholm, AFP, www.afp.com. 

178 

Olle Nygards, “SvD Reveals: Sweden in Military Cooperation With 

Denmark,” Stockholm, Svenska Dagbladet Online, February 27, 2015, 

www.svd.se. 

179 

Jonas Gummesson, “Armed Force Heavily Involved in NATO Exercise,” 

Stockholm, Svenska Dagbladet Online, May 13, 2015, www.svd.se.


180 

“Sweden Confirms Second ‘Submarine’ Sighting,” Stockholm, January 

11, 2015, AFP (North European Service), www.afp.com. 

181 

“More Swedes Show Support for NATO,” Stockholm, The Local, January 

9, 2015, www.thelocal.se. 

182 

Ewa Stenberg, “Social Democratic Party Holds Key to Membership,” 

Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm, DN.se, January 9, 2015, www.dn.se. 

183 

“With the Alliance for Freedom,” DN.se, Stockholm, October 20, 2014, 

www.dn.se. 

184 

“Russia Warns Of ‘Risks’ Should Sweden Join NATO,” Dagens Nyheter, 

Stockholm, June 18, 2015, http://www.thelocal.se/20150618/russia-warnsof-risks-should-sweden-join-nato. 

185 

Ole Ask, “Defense Minister Sharpens Tone Toward Russia,” Oslo, 

Aftenposten.no, February 26, 2015, www.aftenposten.no. 

186 

Louise Callaghan, “Norway on Alert as Putin Prowls,” London, Sunday 

TimesOnline, April 19, 2015, www.thesundaytimes.co.uk. 

187 

Stefan Forss and Pekka Holopainen, Breaking the Nordic Defense 

Deadlock, Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 

February 2015, p. 23, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil. 

188 

Interview by Rune Thomas Ege with Norwegian military intelligence 

chief Lieutenant-General Kjell Grandhagen, "The Norwegian Intelligence 

Service Chief in a Major ‘VG’ Interview: Russia is More Unpredictable,” 

Oslo, VG Nett, December 6, 2014, www.vg.no. 

189 

Andrew Higgins, “Norway Reverts to Cold War Mode as Russian Air 

Patrols Spike,”April 1, 2015, New York Times, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/world/europe/a-newly-assertiverussia-jolts-norways-air-defenses-into-action.html?_r=0. 

190 

Nina Berglund, “Russian Jets Signal ‘Return to Arctic,’ ” Views and News 

from Norway, October 14, 2014, Oslo, www.newsinenglish.no.


191 

“Denmark Could Face Nuclear Attack if Joins Missile Shield: Russian 

Ambassador,” Copenhagen, March 21, 2015, Paris, AFP (North European 

Service), http://www.afp.com/en/home. NATO’s European missile defense 

system was headquartered in Ramstein, Germany, in 2012. It includes US 

missile destroying warships in Spain, Patriot anti-missile systems in Turkey, 

ship-borne radar systems deployed by several member countries, and 

planned missile interceptors in Romania. 

192 

David Blair, “Russian Forces 'Practiced Invasion of Norway, Finland, 

Denmark and Sweden,” June 26, 2015, The Telegraph, 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11702328/Russ 

ian-forces-practised-invasion-of-Norway-Finland-Denmark-and- 

Sweden.html. 

193 

For details on Moscow’s military plans in the Arctic see Aleksey 

Krivoruchek, “Russia Will Reestablish Air Defense Systems and Airfields in 

the Arctic: Reestablishment of Discarded Aviation Infrastructure Will Cost 

R6 Billion,” Moscow, Izvestiya Online, July 2, 2014, www.izvestia.ru. 

194 

Matthew Bodner and Alexey Eremenko, “Russia Starts Building Military 

Bases in the Arctic,” The Moscow Times Online, Moscow, September 8, 

2014, www.themoscowtimes.com. 

195 

Kirsten Karlsen, “The Russians Will Feel the Economic Sanctions,” 

Dagbladet.no, Oslo, August 31, 2014, www.dagbladet.no. 

196 

“Russia Warns Norway Over Sanctions,” The Norway Post, December 22, 

2014, www.norwaypost.no. 

197 

Adam Hannestad, “Ukraine Casting Shadow Over Arctic Conference,” 

Copenhagen, Politiken.dk, April 17, 2015, www.politiken.dk.

3. Western Flank: East Central Europe 

Russia’s Western flank includes a broad swath of territory that can be 

divided into two regions: East Central Europe (ECE) and South East 

Europe (SEE). However, both politically and geographically, it is 

difficult to demarcate precise boundaries between them. East Central 

Europe includes two sets of countries, in terms of their recent national 

developments: the Visegrad Group in Central Europe and the 

neighboring Intermarium zone between the Baltic Sea and the Black 

Sea. 

The Visegrad Group was based on an agreement forged between three 

states in February 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc and 

the Warsaw Pact. After the splintering of Czechoslovakia in January 

1993, it became known as the Visegrad Four (V4), consisting of the 

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The fundamental 

idea behind the Visegrad initiative was for the four re-emerging ECE 

democracies to coordinate their policies in striving for NATO and EU 

accession. Government officials believed that by speaking with one 

voice in various multi-national formats they were more likely to be 

heard and no country would fall behind in its membership 

aspirations. All four countries qualified for entry into NATO and the 

EU between 1999 and 2004. Subsequently, the diversities among the 

four capitals grew more evident—and became particularly blatant 

during Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014. 

The Intermarium region encompasses three states, Belarus, Ukraine, 

and Moldova, which formed part of the Soviet Union and whose


sovereignty and international alliances continue to be directly 

challenged by a revisionist and expansionist Moscow. East Central 

Europe also includes Romania, which was part of the Soviet bloc but 

maintained some leeway in its foreign policy. It is included in this 

chapter because of its close links with both sub-regions. Romania has 

close historical, cultural, and political connections with Moldova, a 

state directly confronting Moscow’s neo-imperial restoration. And as 

a NATO and EU member, Romania has significant commonalities 

with Poland and the other Visegrad states. 

Visegrad Front 

East Central Europe provides opportunities for Russian inroads 

toward pan-European and transatlantic institutions through 

economic, political, and intelligence penetration. Russia’s officials 

focus on influencing political decisions in each capital through a 

combination of diplomatic pressure, personal and professional 

contacts, economic enticements, and energy dependence. Reports 

regularly surface in Slovakia, Hungary, and other states that old 

comrade networks continue to operate between local politicians and 

Moscow. These are based on financial benefits rather than ideological 

or political convictions. It enables the Kremlin to exert political 

influence over certain officials and governments, challenges unified 

EU and NATO positions, and assists Moscow’s international 

aspirations. Lucrative business contracts, donations to political 

campaigns, and various forms of financial corruption allow Moscow 

to exert political leverage and convince key politicians to favor 

Russian investments. 

Moscow also endeavors to benefit from political, ethnic, religious, and 

social turbulence in ECE in order to keep governments off balance. 

Putin’s Kremlin appeals to both the leftist old guard and the ultranationalist 

hyper-conservative Euroskeptics. Any democratic 

regression in ECE combined with the growth of nationalism and

WESTERN FLANK | 141 

populism can favor Russia’s regional objectives by weakening 

democratic institutions, engendering EU divisions, and undermining 

NATO’s effectiveness. 

The ECE region does not form a unified bloc. Differences have been 

evident between Poland and its Visegrad neighbors in terms of their 

Eastern policy and reactions to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Warsaw is 

more assertive in focusing EU and NATO policy on the Intermarium 

zone, and has viewed transatlantic relations as paramount. In 

contrast, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are more 

circumspect. During the Russia-Ukraine war, all three governments 

were hesitant in supporting sanctions against Moscow partly for 

economic reasons, especially where there is high dependence on 

Russia’s energy supplies. In some cases, political leaders may either 

benefit from corrupt Russian business deals, have some sympathy 

toward a more authoritarian political model, or view Russia as a 

potential source of assistance in their foreign policy and national 

ambitions, as the case of Hungary demonstrated. 

Some Visegrad governments focus on their immediate national 

interests rather than on more significant longer-term strategic 

calculations. Pacifying Moscow through opposition to EU sanctions 

may result in reciprocal economic favors from the Kremlin, but it also 

encourages Putin to be more ambitious in restoring Russia’s 

hegemony in East Central Europe. Russia’s attack on Ukraine did not 

convince Hungary to terminate the contract with Rosatom for the 

modernization and extension of the nuclear power plant in Paks, as 

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán studiously avoided any confrontation 

with Moscow. The same principle held true for the Czech Republic. 

Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka declared that the Czech Republic 

had not called for strengthening NATO forces in Europe. 1 Slovakia 

also adopted a weak stance on the Ukrainian crisis. Slovak Prime 

Minister Robert Fico even protested against the idea of America’s 

stronger military presence in Central Europe.


As a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Visegrad Group has been 

weakened, as has the Weimar Triangle, established as a consulting 

mechanism between Germany, France, and Poland. Warsaw has been 

largely sidelined, while Berlin and Paris pursue their own attempts 

with Moscow to resolve the conflict over Ukraine by, in effect, freezing 

the conflict in Donbas. In addition, the informal creation of a new 

ECE regional grouping may benefit Putin and further undermine 

Visegrad. Prague is tightening its ties with Austria and a Slavkov 

Triangle has emerged that also includes Slovakia. 2 

The Slavkov Triangle is intended to better coordinate infrastructure, 

transport, and energy security between the three countries. Moreover, 

in contrast with the V4, the Slavkov Triangle will become 

institutionalized, with a permanent tripartite working group on the 

level of deputy foreign ministers. 3 This model of cooperation may 

become an incentive to include other countries, such as Slovenia and 

Croatia in regional economic projects. On January 30, 2015, Czech 

Prime Minister Sobotka, Slovak Prime Minister Fico, and Austrian 

Chancellor Werner Faymann met at Slavkov, near Brno, in the Czech 

Republic. They adopted a joint position against tightening sanctions 

on Moscow, claiming that all sanctions are ineffective and should be 

lifted. The Slavkov initiative is a tactical victory for Putin, because a 

new crack has appeared in EU policy toward Russia that cuts across 

Central Europe. 

Poland 

The strategic rivalry between Poland and Russia revolves around two 

core questions: Poland’s international alliances and the position of 

intermediate territories that have been a part of either Russia or 

Poland in various historical periods. 4 Moscow lost Poland and the rest 

of East Central Europe as satellite states when Communism and 

Sovietism collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, under 

the Putin administration, Russia has tried to restrict the impact of


Poland’s NATO membership by periodically threatening the country 

with military attack and thereby challenging NATO’s defense 

guarantees. It has also sought to undermine Poland’s influence among 

countries that were once part of the Soviet Union and which Moscow 

seeks to assimilate in a new Russo-centered dominion, especially 

Ukraine and Belarus. 

For Poland, NATO and EU membership and a strategic partnership 

with the US are viewed as cornerstones for the defense of its 

independence. In order to deepen this protective cover, each Polish 

government has endeavored to build a strategic buffer along its 

eastern borders by helping its immediate neighbors move closer 

toward the EU and NATO, or at the very least to curtail Moscow’s 

dominant position on these territories. 

In recent years, a confluence of factors toned down the Russo-Polish 

geostrategic conflict: NATO’s enlargement momentum waned, 

Washington relegated Europe in its order of national security 

priorities, Ukraine declared itself neutral, and Georgia lost a war and 

two of its regions to Russia. During 2007, the Donald Tusk 

government altered Warsaw’s geotactics cognizant of Poland’s 

vulnerability in ECE as a consequence of lessened US engagement. 

Foreign policy was redesigned to improve relations with both Russia 

and Germany. Officials argued that this would make Poland more 

secure than at any time in its history by consolidating its position 

inside the EU and NATO and lessening prospective conflicts with 

Moscow. Cordial ties with Russia also boosted Poland’s stature inside 

the EU, as Warsaw was no longer perceived as a “Russophobic” 

troublemaker, an image promoted by Moscow in order to reduce 

Polish influence. 

However, the sources of bilateral competition between Russia and 

Poland were not resolved and flared on several occasions. The death 

of President Lech Kaczyński and 95 other people in a plane crash in 

Russia, on April 10, 2010, contributed to souring relations between


Warsaw and Moscow when Russian investigators failed to return the 

fuselage to Poland and issued a tendentious report on the causes of 

the crash. In the wake of a popular revolution in Ukraine in February 

2014 that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, Warsaw was at the 

forefront in condemning Moscow’s aggressive reaction. Russian 

forces invaded Ukraine, annexed the Crimean peninsula, and 

manufactured a separatist conflict in the Donbas region. Moscow was 

intent on destabilizing Ukraine to prevent its Western integration. 

Poland intensified its role as the primary campaigner within the EU 

and NATO for Ukraine’s national interests and territorial integrity. 

This repositioned Warsaw in its long-term geostrategic competition 

with Moscow, as Poland faced the destabilizing prospect of the 

collapse of the Ukrainian state. Even though Berlin and Paris 

subsequently sidelined the Polish authorities in negotiations with 

Russia over the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, Warsaw continued 

to play a supportive role for Kyiv in international institutions. 

The ongoing conflict with Moscow could provoke a more assertive 

Polish foreign policy following the country’s recent parliamentary 

elections. The victory of the rightist Law and Justice (PiS) party on 

October 25, 2015, may inject a stronger nationalist element in dealing 

with Moscow. On the positive side, this could be manifest in a more 

activist role in support of Ukraine and other states threatened by 

Russia’s subversion. This can include more visible diplomatic activity, 

increased funding and involvement in strengthening Ukraine’s 

institutions, and closer military cooperation. 

On the negative side, a more forceful Polish policy toward Russia that 

is not coordinated with the larger EU states could prove beneficial for 

the Kremlin in its attempts to preclude a common Union strategy 

toward its “eastern partners.” Moreover, a more conservative 

Euroskeptic stance by the PiS government could contribute to 

isolating Poland and disabling a more assertive approach toward 

Russia. An upsurge of nationalist passions in Warsaw would likely 

create rifts with Germany, as the latter painstakingly avoids being


drawn into open conflicts with Russia. PiS could also contribute to 

Kremlin attempts to expand fissures in Central Europe if it more 

vehemently supports the collective rights of Polish minorities in 

Lithuania and Ukraine and criticizes the governments in Vilnius and 

Kyiv. 

Poland has no sizable Russian-speaking population, and Moscow 

cannot invade on the pretext of defending its compatriots. Small 

autonomist movements among Silesian and Kaszubian regionalists 

have no partiality toward Russia, Poland’s Ukrainians would not 

follow Moscow’s script, and the only option for the Kremlin are 

Belarusians living in a contiguous area of Podlasie in eastern Poland. 5 

Moscow could claim it was defending them as part of the Russian and 

Orthodox world, but the support of Minsk would be needed. This 

seems unlikely, as President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is himself 

concerned about Russian-sponsored separatism in Belarus. 

Another possibility for conflict is a manufactured territorial dispute 

along the border with Kaliningrad oblast. Three-quarters of 

Germany’s former East Prussia is in Poland, with the remainder 

belonging to Russia. The division of these lands after World War Two 

can be used as a provocation on grounds of retrospective illegitimacy. 

Moscow could claim some of the territory in Poland as historically 

part of Kaliningrad and stage a provocation involving Russianspeakers 

sent into the region or engineer the demolition of border 

crossings that would provoke a Polish reaction and a direct conflict 

with Russia. 

The Kremlin has cultivated peripheral but noisy pro-Russian 

groupings in Poland, as it has in most other states. Although these 

have marginal public support and limited political prospects, their 

very existence is beneficial for Moscow’s propaganda of deception, 

and they perform a vocal nuisance role against the Polish 

administration. In 2015, Mateusz Piskorski, a former parliamentary 

deputy for the populist agrarian Self-Defense party, created a new


formation titled Zmiana (Change). It called for close cooperation with 

Russia and is reportedly funded by Moscow. 6 Piskorski formerly 

served as a commentator for the Kremlin-funded television station 

Russia Today (today rebranded as RT), defending Moscow’s policies, 

and he appears regularly on Sputnik-Poland to criticize the Warsaw 

government and assert that Polish and Russian national interest must 

be fully aligned. 

Piskorski also monitored the illegitimate Crimean referendum on 

March 16, 2014, organized by Russian proxies and special services. His 

party advocates Poland remaining in the EU but limiting cooperation 

with the US and orienting itself toward Moscow and Beijing. It is likely 

to appeal to a narrow group of ultra-rightists espousing a pan-Slavic 

nationalist heritage whose strands date back to the pre–World War 

Two National Democrats. In a script that appeared to be written in 

the Kremlin, Piskorski called for Poland’s exit from NATO, refused to 

live in a Europe controlled by the US, favored a “pragmatic” 

relationship with Moscow, looked back with nostalgia at the Soviet 

bloc, and yearned for a Eurasian pole of power that would compete 

with the US and China. 7 

Another Putin advocate in Poland, Konrad Rękas, deputy leader of 

Zmiana, launched a campaign for property restitution or 

compensation payments by the government in Kyiv for Poles 

formerly resident in Ukraine. 8 The aim was to sour relations between 

Poles and Ukrainians and isolate Kyiv. The Russian media praised the 

initiative and afforded it substantial publicity. Moscow has also 

supported some Polish policy NGOs. For instance, the European 

Center of Geopolitical Analysis (ECGA), a think tank based in 

Szczecin and co-founded by Piskorski, is under suspicion of working 

for the Kremlin. 9 It publishes pro-Russian analyses, including 

interviews with members of the Donetsk People’s Republic. Following 

the launch, in February 2015, of the Polish-language version of the 

Sputnik Russian news agency over radio airwaves in Warsaw and via 

its website, Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna asserted that pro-


Russian propaganda in Poland was a new phenomenon that needed 

to be closely monitored. 10 

According to an April 2015 government report on cyber security, 

Poland experienced a record number of hacker and cyber attacks in 

2014: 7,498 compared to 5,670 in 2013 and 457 in 2012. 11 In addition, 

their level of sophistication significantly increased, indicating the 

backing of a state. They included a series of high-profile hacking and 

denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against key state and financial 

websites, including the homepage of Poland’s President and the 

Warsaw stock exchange. An online group calling itself Cyber Berkut 

claimed responsibility and asserted that they were retaliating against 

Warsaw’s support for Kyiv. The information war against Poland via 

the Internet includes the dissemination of disinformation by bloggers 

and contributors to online discussion forums. 

One objective of Moscow’s information offensive is to exacerbate 

tensions between Poland and its neighbors. In early 2015, the now 

customary “people’s republics” were announced on Facebook—for 

Lithuania’s Vilnius and Ukraine’s Lviv regions. The instigators called 

for referenda to separate these heavily Polish-populated areas that 

were part of Poland before World War Two. Such “cyber states” may 

not pose a threat to either country targeted by the Kremlin, but they 

are components of a propaganda exercise to stir anxiety and suspicion 

and create frictions between Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians. 

The revival of Polish-Russian political confrontations over Ukraine 

contains a strong security dimension. During 2014 and 2015, Russian 

military aircraft significantly increased their approaches toward 

Polish airspace to signal Moscow’s displeasure with Warsaw in 

assisting Ukraine. 12 Incidents of espionage have also risen: in one such 

example, four Russian diplomats were expelled following the arrest of 

two Poles, including a military colonel charged with collaborating 

with a foreign intelligence service. 13 The officer had access to NATO 

secrets. The Russian nationals included two military intelligence


officers from the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) who handled 

the suspected spies. For the Kremlin, Poland is an intelligence priority, 

as a NATO member sharing a border with Russia and Belarus. 

According to Polish counter-intelligence, aside from traditional 

intelligence work, Russian spies are also involved in “lobbying 

activities” and economic espionage. 14 

There was a significant shift in Poland’s strategic thinking during 

2014, illustrated in the new National Security Strategy approved in 

October 2014. For the first time in more than 20 years, it stated that 

Poland was threatened by war and named Russia as an aggressor in 

Ukraine. 15 The document called for higher military spending, more 

reservists, the reinforcement and modernization of garrisons in 

eastern Poland, and the preparation of uniformed services and the 

public administration to operate in crisis situations. The government 

drafted a bill calling for increasing military spending from 1.95% to at 

least 2% of GDP, starting in 2016. 

In March 2015, General Stanisław Koziej, Head of the National 

Security Bureau, warned that Poland must be ready for the possibility 

of a “hybrid” war, similar to the one in eastern Ukraine. 16 Apart from 

military forces, various sectors of Polish society would be needed in 

the event of such a conflict, including the police and firefighters. In 

January 2015, the Polish Ministry of National Defense announced that 

it would provide military training to any civilian who volunteered. 

Tomasz Siemoniak, Poland’s Defense Minister also planned to 

establish a Territorial Defense Force to include the best recruits from 

paramilitary associations and other volunteers to create a force 

resembling the US National Guard. 17 A territorial defense unit would 

be stationed in every voivodship within the framework of the existing 

National Reserve Force (NSR). 

Operational forces would need the support of these local units in the 

event of a conventional war. The Polish military numbers 120,000 

troops, with about half this number combat capable. The primary task


of the territorial defense force is to slow the enemy’s advances. 

NATO’s rapid response force could not reach Warsaw within the two 

to three days that it would take Russia’s military. As Polish troops 

would be unable to hold the front line, a fast retreat would be essential 

to avoid being surrounded and eradicated. Many Polish brigades 

require up to three months to achieve full mobilization, while Russian 

forces have become more mobile and deployable. In such demanding 

conditions, the speed of a Russian invasion could be limited by 

territorial defense units, which would engage the enemy in irregular 

warfare, allowing military forces more time to deploy. These troops 

would need modern equipment, including communications devices 

in order to coordinate their actions with operational forces, as well as 

night vision devices and anti-tank weapons. 

Poland’s military plans to purchase attack helicopters and drones, 

strengthen the navy with submarines armed with cruise missiles, and 

build a medium-range missile defense shield styled as Wisla. Poland’s 

selection of the Patriot air defense system for its missile defense 

program will strengthen defense cooperation with the US. 18 The 

Patriot selection is the core of Poland’s military modernization. 

Approximately $10 billion will be spent on upgrading air and missile 

defense systems, with about half allocated to missile defense. In sum, 

Warsaw intends to spend $37 billion on military modernization by 

2022, making it the leading NATO spender in the ECE area. Poland’s 

projected expenditures are equivalent to that of all other states that 

joined NATO after 1999. 

Warsaw is also seeking to enhance regional security by bolstering its 

domestic weapons industry and selling weapons to nearby allies, with 

credit offered for buyers. 19 The hardware will include GROM 

antiaircraft systems, radar, transporters, firearms, radio transmitters, 

and drones. The Defense Ministry is also developing a system to 

defend virtual space with the construction of a cybernetic operations 

center. Increased spending is intended to provide the military with the 

power of “defensive deterrence.” 20 Poland is also urging NATO to


press ahead with a broader missile shield system that is due to be 

completed in 2020, with significant elements in Poland and 

Romania. 21 

Sizable military exercises, codenamed Anakonda 2014, were held at 

several military training grounds in Poland during September and 

October 2014. They involved 12,500 soldiers, including 750 troops 

from allied military forces. The core of the Polish units consisted of 

mechanized forces, plus chemical and reconnaissance regiments, a 

fleet of ships, and a tactical and transport air squadron. Soldiers 

practiced scenarios in which NATO’s rapid response forces are 

deployed to Poland following an attack from the East. 22 In an 

unprecedented contribution, 2,000 German soldiers took part in 

NATO’s “Saber Strike” exercises on Polish soil in Drawsko Pomorskie 

in June 2015. 23 A total of 10,000 soldiers participated. Berlin’s 

initiative is part of a broader plan for tightening military cooperation 

with Poland in the face of threats from Russia. Work was also 

underway to incorporate one German battalion (500–1,000 men) in a 

Polish brigade and a Polish battalion in a German brigade. This 

arrangement is modeled on the French-German brigade, established 

in 1987 by President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut 

Kohl, while a Polish-German division might be formed in the future. 

Despite Washington’s reassurances, a poll conducted in March 2015 

revealed that 49% of Poles believed that NATO allies would not 

respond if Russia invaded Poland. 24 The opposition of the German 

and French governments to establishing permanent NATO bases in 

Poland for fear of antagonizing Putin reinforced the distrust of Poles. 

The number of skeptical citizens has increased since the 2014 figure 

of 45%. Following President Obama’s “European Reassurance 

Initiative,” announced in June 2014, NATO planned to pre-position 

hardware along its eastern flank and establish bases or storage 

locations for military hardware, ammunition, and fuel. 25 At a meeting 

of NATO defense ministers in Brussels on February 5, 2015, a decision 

was made to emplace such depots in Poland, Romania, Lithuania,


Latvia, Estonia, and Bulgaria, staffed by about 40 officers at each site. 

In the event of armed conflict, these units would become NATO’s 

rapid reaction force command centers. Currently, NATO reaction 

forces have a 30-day readiness period, whereas by 2016 the new units 

would be able to respond within three days. 

NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VHRJTF) will involve 

a brigade task group with about 5,000 soldiers plus an aviation 

regiment, assault helicopters, and special-forces elements. Poland will 

host the new force’s command-and-control center at NATO’s 

Multinational Corps Northeast headquarters, in Szczecin, on the 

Baltic Sea. This spearhead force, earmarked to defend Poland and the 

Baltic states, is planned to be ready by 2016. However, because of 

Russia’s aggressive stance, NATO foreign ministers decided that more 

immediate response units with a few hundred soldiers would also be 

readied. 26 This would enable the US to deploy troops more quickly to 

act as a tripwire to deter any impending Russian invasion. 27 

By establishing depots of ammunition, fuel, and equipment, Poland 

would not have to wait six months for the deployment of US hardware 

to Europe. 28 While Washington has talked about a “permanent 

rotational presence” of American troops in Poland, officials in 

Warsaw want to transform this into a permanent presence. President 

Andrzej Duda, elected on May 24, 2015, has strongly supported direct 

US military engagement and NATO infrastructure and harbors no 

illusions about Moscow’s ambitions. He declared that he would focus 

his presidency on enhancing relations with states across Central and 

Eastern Europe that view Putin’s Russia as a common threat. 

To assist Ukraine in its Western aspirations, Warsaw, Kyiv, and 

Vilnius signed an agreement in July 2015 on the creation of a 

Ukrainian-Polish-Lithuanian military brigade. Its predecessor, the 

UkrPolBat (Ukrainian-Polish Peace Force Battalion), was formed in 

1998 as part of NATO's peacekeeping missions and was mostly 

composed of mechanized units. The 4,500 strong LitPolUkrBrig


brigade will have its headquarters in Lublin, in southeast Poland, and 

each country will contribute four battalions. 29 Warsaw and Kyiv 

intend to use the new brigade in crisis situations and peacekeeping 

missions conducted by the EU. This initiative will contribute to 

Ukraine’s adaptation to western military standards and strengthen its 

military potential. 

On the information front, Poland’s authorities have confronted 

Moscow in a sensitive domain—the interpretation of history. 

President Bronisław Komorowski decided to make Westerplatte, 

where World War Two began with the German invasion of Poland on 

September 1, 1939, the location for celebrating the 70th anniversary 

of the end of the war on May 8, 2015. 30 Komorowski underscored that 

the victory of the Allies, in May 1945, did not bring freedom to all the 

European nations, as the eastern part of the continent fell under Soviet 

Communism. This is a direct blow to Russia’s self-assertions about its 

allegedly liberating role during and after World War Two. The war 

culminated in a clash between two totalitarian powers, Germany and 

the Soviet Union, which first collaborated to subjugate Central 

Europe. Subsequently, the Soviets cooperated with the West to defeat 

Nazi Germany and to seize territories in Europe’s East. 

Czech Republic 

The Visegrad administrations have been divided in their response to 

the Russia-Ukraine war. Czech and Slovak center-left government 

leaders have proved timid in their reactions, although several 

government and opposition politicians called Russia's intervention an 

act of aggression. Their primary concern was to maintain cordial 

relations with Moscow and not damage economic and energy 

connections and other material interests. The prominent Czech 

analyst Jiri Pehe believes that Putin found his Trojan horse in a region 

with parochial horizons. 31 The gap between Poland and the other 

Central European countries visibly widened during the Ukrainian


crisis, and the three smaller V4 states found a common language with 

a traditionally opportunistic Vienna. In addition, Pehe believes that 

influential “fifth columns” still exist in these countries 25 years after 

the fall of Communism, while Russia’s intelligence and criminal 

networks intensively operate on their territories. 32 

Policy makers advocating close cooperation with Poland are 

reportedly losing influence in Prague and are being replaced by 

officials who want to reorient the country closer to Austria. 33 The 

"special bond" between Prague and Warsaw was based primarily on 

personal contacts between Presidents Václav Havel and Aleksander 

Kwaśniewski and efforts made by Prime Ministers Mirek Topolánek 

and Donald Tusk, who pushed for the installation of a US missile 

defense shield in the region. In addition, the founders of the Eastern 

Partnership—Sweden, Poland, and the Czech Republic—worked 

together to bring the post-Soviet states closer to the EU, but Prague 

has largely withdrawn from this process since 2014. The Czech 

government increasingly emphasizes the Vienna-Bratislava-Prague 

triangle when coordinating Eastern policy with respect to Ukraine and 

Russia. 

After assuming office in March 2013, Czech President Miloš Zeman 

pledged to promote closer political and economic ties with Russia. 

During 2014, he condemned the EU’s sanctions against Moscow and 

dismissed the Ukrainian conflict as a “civil war.” 34 One of Zeman’s 

closest friends and confidants is an ex-KGB officer blacklisted by the 

US, and some reports indicated that the President was susceptible to 

political influence after receiving financing for his election campaign 

from Martin Nejedlý, head of the Czech Lukoil office. Zeman’s 

pronouncements provoked a conflict between the Czech Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs and the presidency, undermining the country's 

foreign policy. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also summoned 

the Czech ambassador on November 20, 2014, to inform him that the 

President’s statements were unacceptable to Kyiv.


Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka, leader of the Czech Social 

Democratic Party (CSDP), who assumed office in January 2014, also 

rejected Zeman’s proposal for the “Finlandization” of Ukrainian 

foreign policy, or its subordination to Moscow’s interests. 35 He 

asserted that the term “Finlandization” was connected with the Cold 

War era and its spheres of influence, which deprived countries of free 

decisions and the term should not be used in contemporary 

international politics. 

The political opposition has challenged presidential appeasement of 

Russia. Senators from the Christian Democratic Union–Czechoslovak 

People’s Party (KDU-CS) criticized Zeman for his accommodating 

stance and his refusal to perceive Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine 

and other neighbors, which was “weakening and threatening vital 

relations with our allies in the EU and the US.” 36 They issued a 

statement claiming that Zeman was devaluing the paramount 

importance of human rights in the name of alleged economic interests 

of Czech companies. Zeman broke with the EU and attended the 

Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 9, 2015. He was received 

by Putin in the Kremlin who thanked him for his “independent 

position” in opposing Western sanctions. 37 

Czech left-wing politicians are normally more prone to cooperate 

with Russia, in contrast with center-right governments critical of 

Putin, including former Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek. Premier 

Sobotka stated that the Czech Republic could not cut its trade ties with 

Russia over Ukraine, although Czech exports to Russia amount to less 

than 4% of its total, compared with some 80% to the EU. Moscow has 

steadily courted Prague and offered investments for Czech companies 

in engineering, construction, energy, agriculture, and other sectors. 

The opposition parties TOP 09 and the Civic Democrats have 

criticized Sobotka for questioning the effectiveness of EU sanctions 

against Moscow. 38 Karel Schwarzenberg, TOP 09 chairman and 

former Minister of Foreign Affairs, asserted that Russia was at war


with the EU because it intervened in Ukraine when Kyiv prepared to 

sign an Association Agreement with the Union. According to 

Schwarzenberg, the war in Ukraine requires sacrifices and the Czech 

Republic should stand in the front line of countries resisting Russia’s 

aggression. Despite or possibly because of Prague’s lukewarm 

approach toward sanctioning Moscow, the Czech Republic was 

viewed as a soft target for Russian espionage. For instance, in March 

2015, three Russian diplomats were expelled as spies, while Moscow 

responded by expelling four Czech diplomats. 39 

Moscow’s actions in Ukraine raised public concerns about Czech 

security. According to a STEM opinion poll conducted in October 

2014, 65% of Czechs stated that Russia may prove a future threat to 

their country. 40 At the same time, 80% agreed that the war in Ukraine 

endangered European peace, while 71% supported the territorial 

integrity of Ukraine. According to an extensive poll conducted in 

April 2015, 68% of Czechs were afraid of Russian secret service 

activities, 61% feared a military attack on the Baltic states, and 63% 

did not support President Zeman’s stance on Russia. 41 Of those polled, 

62% believed that the Czech Republic should strengthen its relations 

with NATO allies. In reaction to Moscow’s threatening posture, the 

Czech military decided to establish a new special unit to include 

combat commandos and IT and psychological experts. 42 The unit’s 

task will be to reinforce Czech special forces in offensive operations: 

it will be deployed in 2017 and contain 200 specialists. 

Slovakia 

Moscow considers Slovakia to be another weak link in Central Europe 

and makes intensive efforts to sway public opinion and the political 

elite in its favor. 43 It has sponsored a number of public events in 

Bratislava and issues voluminous material with a pro-Kremlin content 

on various websites. It capitalizes on lingering pan-Slavic sentiments 

among some Slovak politicians and intellectuals. The pro-Kremlin


camp includes orthodox communists, euroskeptics, radical 

nationalists, populist extremists, and various anti-Westerners. In the 

wake of rising anti-immigrant sentiments, many ardent nationalists 

declared themselves as Putin supporters. 

When it assumed office in April 2012, Robert Fico’s government 

promised to improve relations with Russia, a policy sharply criticized 

by the opposition. The center-right parties consider Fico pro-Russian 

because of his close relations with officials in Moscow and positive 

expressions about Putin. Both Prime Minister Fico and outgoing 

President Ivan Gašparovič were lukewarm on applying EU sanctions 

against Russia. Fico dismissed sanctions as gestures with no real 

impact, but also failed to support stronger measures. He reserved the 

right to veto further EU sanctions if it harmed Slovakia’s economic 

interests. Both leaders expressed worries that a tough stance toward 

Moscow could damage Slovak business, including energy imports and 

car exports. 

The opposition and mass media harshly criticized Fico after he 

claimed, on a visit to the Kremlin in June 2015, that there were no 

disputes between Slovakia and Russia. 

44 

Underlying Fico’s 

accommodating position was his fear that Russia’s planned Turkish 

Stream gas pipeline would circumvent Ukraine and strip Slovakia of 

sizable revenues from gas transit to Europe. 

President Andrej Kiska, elected in March 2014, at the outset of the 

Ukraine-Russia war, differed with Fico and considered sanctions 

against Moscow as necessary and effective. 45 He also supported closer 

military cooperation with the other Visegrad countries. 

46 

Additionally, Kiska underscored that Slovakia had to meet its pledge 

to spend 2% of GDP on defense. Between 2009 and 2014, defense 

spending had been reduced by 27%, no major military hardware was 

modernized, and Slovakia’s air-defense system remained dependent 

on the delivery of spare parts from Russia. 47 Critics also berated 

serious shortcomings in strategic and defense planning, the absence


of comprehensive projects for armaments, and long-term instability 

in personnel. 48 As a result, Slovakia lagged behind most allies in 

military preparedness as well as in the quality of its equipment. 

Premier Fico, in contrast to his Polish and Baltic counterparts, has 

been opposed to the permanent stationing of a multi-national NATO 

force on Slovak territory, evidently fearing that this would be 

provocative for Moscow. 49 He even compared NATO, a voluntary 

alliance, with Czechoslovakia’s enforced occupation by Soviet forces 

by claiming that: “Slovakia has historical experience with the presence 

of foreign armies on its territory.” 50 Not surprisingly, he came under 

vociferous attack from the opposition for acting like a Russian stooge 

and defending Moscow’s interests above those of the EU. According 

to Pavol Frešo, leader of the opposition Slovak Democratic and 

Christian Union–Democratic Party (SDKU-DS), Fico’s approach 

undermined Slovakia’s trustworthiness for both the EU and NATO. 51 

Yet, the Fico government agreed to build a logistics base that could be 

used by NATO in Poprad, in the Presov region in eastern Slovakia. 52 

According to Defense Minister Martin Glvac, ammunition could be 

stored at the facilities if required by a NATO operation. Bratislava also 

offered for Alliance use an airport in Sliac and a training facility in 

Lest, both in the Banska Bystrica region of central Slovakia. The V4 

countries had also previously agreed to form a battle group of 3,000 to 

4,000 soldiers that Slovakia evidently remained committed to. 

In the energy sector, Slovakia is fully dependent on natural gas 

supplies from Russia, which constitute about a quarter of its total 

energy mix. Major Russian investments in Slovakia were undertaken 

under the center-right government of Mikuláš Dzurinda in 2002– 

2006. These included the privatization of the oil pipeline company 

Transpetrol by Russia’s Yukos and the privatization of Cargo Slovakia 

by other Russian investors. The opposition has been sharply critical of 

the most controversial Slovak-Russian joint project, a broad-gauge 

railway. The SDKU has also issued warnings about growing Russian


influence in the energy sector, particularly in Slovenske Elektrarne 

(Slovak Power Plants) and extraordinary loans provided by a Russian 

bank to a major Slovak energy company. 

Former Slovak Prime Minister Iveta Radičová believes that Czech 

President Miloš Zeman and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico make 

pro-Russian statements in order to appeal to people who feel some 

nostalgia for communist times. 53 Nonetheless, the majority of the 

public is supportive of Ukraine. In a survey carried out by the Focus 

agency for the Institute for Public Issues (IVO) and the daily Sme in 

June 2014, 83% of Slovak citizens responded that Ukrainians should 

democratically elect their future for themselves and Moscow should 

not interfere. 54 More than 60% disagreed that Ukraine formed part of 

the Russian sphere of influence. 

Hungary 

The government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has become the 

most accommodating of the four Visegrad states toward Moscow. Its 

pro-Russian foreign policy orientation followed controversial 

legislative changes by the ruling Fidesz party since its election in April 

2010. These changes spurred confrontation with EU institutions, 

which charged Orbán with backtracking on democracy. Closer ties 

with Russia were evidently intended to balance Budapest’s Western 

orientation and help protect it from criticism. Paradoxically, while in 

opposition between 2002 and 2010, Fidesz accused the Socialist 

government of pursuing pro-Russian policies, when former Socialist 

Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány was criticized for signing on to the 

South Stream pipeline project. 

In domestic politics, Orbán has claimed that he intends to abandon 

liberal democracy in favor of an “illiberal state,” citing Russia and 

Turkey as examples. According to one prominent critic, Orbán has 

openly renounced Western-style democracy for the nationalist


authoritarianism of Putin’s Russia. Orbán’s speech on July 26, 2014, 

about the terminal decline of liberal democracies declared his 

preference for an “illiberal state" in which he was prepared to “stand 

up” to Hungary’s enemies, such as the EU and Western banks. 55 The 

fact that the speech was delivered to Hungarians in Romania may also 

indicate that Orbán was fantasizing about leaving a legacy in 

reconstructing the historical Hungary state. Punitive measures by the 

EU could even prompt Budapest to exchange full EU membership for 

a limited partnership. Orbán would then be hailed among 

Euroskeptics of various political stripes as the first leader to effectively 

resist Brussels. This could also earn him hero status among officials in 

Moscow. 

Orbán’s party was re-elected, in April 2014, for a second consecutive 

four-year term. The Prime Minister has repeatedly clashed with EU 

officials for replacing the heads of independent institutions, including 

the country’s courts, with allies, for tightening control over the media, 

and changing election rules to help Fidesz retain a constitutional 

majority in parliament. Orbán claimed that more centralized control 

was needed to confront multinational companies such as banks and 

energy firms in order to protect Hungarians from becoming an EU 

“colony.” 56 

Orbán has declared the liberal, welfare-based systems to be obsolete 

and a new labor-based “non-liberal” model was supposedly needed. 

However, it remains unclear exactly what sort of a state he wants to 

construct, thus enabling his critics to level an assortment of charges 

against him. Opposition parties have expressed concern about the 

“Putinization of Hungary,” in which Orbán would turn the country 

into Russia’s mirror image and puppet state. 57 Orbán’s policies toward 

Moscow have also alienated Hungary from its traditionally close ally 

Poland. 58 Relations markedly deteriorated during Russia’s annexation 

of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine, when Budapest 

raised the issue of granting autonomy to the Hungarian minority in 

Transcarpathia, in western Ukraine. Putin’s February 17, 2015, visit


to Budapest underscored Orbán’s divorce from Warsaw, and the 

dispute has made Prague and Bratislava uncertain with regard to the 

future of the V4. 

In response to Washington’s criticisms of Orbán’s policies and the 

imposition of an entry ban on six Hungarian officials, including the 

head of the national tax office over alleged corruption, anti-US 

statements became commonplace in Budapest and relished in the 

Kremlin. 59 On December 23, 2014, Orbán accused Washington of 

meddling in the internal affairs of Central European countries, 

claiming that its allegations of corruption among Hungarian officials 

were simply a “cover story.” Orbán also asserted that Cold War–like 

conditions were developing between the US and Russia over the 

conflict in Ukraine and that Budapest wanted to remain neutral. The 

Prime Minister was parroting the Kremlin line that Washington was 

seeking to draw ECE into a conflict with Russia. 

Orbán’s government was hesitant to criticize Russia following its 

covert attack on Ukraine in early 2014. Although Hungary signed on 

to the EU position regarding Russia’s aggression, Orbán’s focus has 

been on the security of the Magyar minority in Ukraine rather than 

on the fate of Ukraine itself. Relations between President Putin and 

Premier Orbán have remained close throughout the Ukrainian crisis. 

Putin has declared Hungary one of Russia’s most important political, 

trade and economic partners, while Foreign Minister Lavrov praised 

Hungary as an EU and NATO state behaving responsibly by favoring 

dialogue rather than political pressure. 60 In opposing the EU sanctions 

against the Kremlin, Orbán is intent on forming a pro-Russia bloc 

inside the Union to prevent it pulling away from Russia over the crisis 

in Ukraine. Evidently, his biggest concern was that isolating Russia 

would damage the Hungarian economy. 61 

Putin’s visit to Budapest on February 17, 2015, gave Orbán the 

opportunity to reiterate that sanctions against Russia were not in 

anyone’s interest. He underlined Hungary’s need to renew a gas


supply contract with Moscow, which was expiring in 2015. Russia’s 

nuclear giant Rosatom indicated that it was following through on a 

contract signed in January 2014 to build two new nuclear reactors in 

Hungary and would loan Budapest €10 billion despite Russia’s 

financial problems. 

Russia is Hungary’s largest trading partner outside the EU and 

Moscow has enticed Budapest with the prospect of becoming a 

Central European hub for natural gas distribution. Budapest relies on 

Russia for 80% of its gas and oil needs and has also expanded 

Moscow’s energy interests in the region. Hungary’s state-owned MOL 

energy company has been embroiled in a struggle with the Croatian 

government to gain control of INA (Industrija Nafte), Croatia’s main 

energy company. By early 2014, MOL had obtained 47% of the shares, 

but Zagreb refused to cede full control to Budapest. 62 MOL was also 

negotiating to sell its shares in INA to Gazprom, brushing aside 

opposition by EU and US officials. Hungary’s opposition believes that 

Orbán has also proposed to store Russian gas in Hungarian 

underground tanks. This would help Moscow undermine Ukraine’s 

status as a transit country, as it would be easier to turn off gas supplies 

for Ukraine without risking cut-offs to the EU 

In the spring of 2014, Budapest signed a €10 billion preferential loan 

deal with Moscow for Rosatom to expand Hungary’s only nuclear 

plant at Paks. Rosatom agreed to build two new power units by 2023 

and to pay for 80% of the expenses. The Paks power plant provides 

approximately 40% of Hungary’s energy usage, and by 2023 it is 

supposed to cover all of Hungary’s electric energy requirements. 

Hungary can be a major stumbling block in EU objectives to establish 

a single gas market in Central Europe. Multi-billion dollar projects 

with Russia are attractive for Orbán because they offer a way to 

distribute money domestically and cement political loyalties. 63 Orbán 

is also eager to develop economic ties with Moscow in sectors other 

than energy. Moscow demonstrated its approval of the Orbán 

government by promising to lift selected sanctions that it imposed on


all EU agricultural imports in August 2014. Hungary’s pork products 

were to be among the first exemptions. 64 

Moscow has also benefited from Hungarian sensitivities to its kindred 

residing in neighboring states, particularly in the Transcarpathian 

region of western Ukraine. The Orbán administration and Hungarian 

nationalists have manipulated the minority question to score 

domestic political points in purportedly defending their compatriots 

at a time when Ukraine was under attack from Moscow’s proxy 

separatists in Donbas after Russia annexed Crimea. 

Transcarpathia (also known as Subcarpathia) contains a population 

of 160,000 Magyars out of a regional population of 1.25 million, where 

the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Ukraine (UMDSZ) has 

protested over the partial mobilization of males to defend Ukraine’s 

integrity. It claimed that reserve officers called up were not adequately 

trained or equipped to fight against separatists in eastern Ukraine. 

Hungary’s radical nationalist Jobbik, (formally called the Movement 

for a Better Hungary), the third largest party in the National 

Assembly, demanded that Budapest clearly demonstrate its support 

for Hungarians in Ukraine, as “the war in Ukraine is not one for a 

Hungarian cause.” 65 

In seeking to depict Ukraine as a failing state, Moscow claimed that 

Kyiv was facing increasingly serious problems in Transcarpathia, 

where Ruthenians (Rusyns) and Hungarians were allegedly actively 

opposing the policies of the Ukrainian authorities. Russia’s 

propagandists propagate the notion that Ruthenians in western 

Ukraine are Russians, rather than Ukrainians or a distinct ethnic 

group. Anatoliy Sava, a member of the World Council of 

Subcarpathian Rusyns, called on Hungary to protect the people of 

Transcarpathia against possible “genocide” by Ukraine’s 

authorities. He claimed that Kyiv should recognize the results of the 

Transcarpathian autonomy referendum of December 1991 because 

otherwise the region will secede from Ukraine unilaterally. 66 In March


2015, Moscow’s media outlets spread unsubstantiated reports that 

Ruthenian organizations were demanding autonomy and quoting 

Petro Getsko, styled as the “prime minister of Subcarpathian Rus,” 

who has not been seen in the region for years. 

In reality, mainstream Ruthenian or Rusyn organizations have 

supported Ukraine’s path toward European integration. Nonetheless, 

a minority of Transcarpathian autonomists view Russia and Hungary 

as their strategic partners. A congress of Rusyns and Hungarians was 

held in Budapest at the beginning of August 2014. 67 The organizers 

established a “coordinating council” of the Rusyn and Hungarian 

communities of Transcarpathia. Its main task was to protect people 

from being recruited to fight in Kyiv’s war with separatists. 

Hungarians account for about 12% of Transcarpathia’s population, 

while Ukrainians, of which self-declared Rusyns form a small 

proportion, make up 80%. Rusyn autonomists also appealed to 

Slovakia and the Czech Republic for assistance, as both countries also 

contain Rusyn populations. 

In March 2015, Budapest announced that it distributed Hungarian 

citizenship papers to 94,000 people in Transcarpathia, an action that 

may have been coordinated with Moscow to create more headaches 

for Kyiv. 68 It clearly suits Moscow to recruit Hungary to place 

additional pressure on the Ukrainian government. Some Russian 

officials have even urged Budapest to recognize some kind of 

Transcarpathian republic similar to their Luhansk and Donetsk 

creations in Ukraine. 

Intermarium Front 

The three post-Soviet states in East Central Europe between the Baltic 

and Black Seas, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, remain especially 

vulnerable to Russia’s pressures. The reintegration of this “post-Soviet 

space” under Moscow’s dominance became a priority under President


Putin, as it gave credence to Russia’s aspirations as the pre-eminent 

Eurasian power. The Kremlin opposes any significant foreign military 

presence in these countries and any aspirations to enter NATO. It also 

obstructs the creation of regional alliances or initiatives that may 

inhibit Russian inroads and pursues the integration of its immediate 

neighbors in Eurasian organizations. Russian officials also oppose EU 

entry for these countries, viewing such a process as damaging their 

political, economic, and business interests. 

The Black Sea has become a vital arena of opportunity for Russia to 

increase pressure and leverage on littoral states and to limit and even 

reverse NATO’s presence in the region. The first stage of containing 

NATO in the Black Sea was accomplished in the summer of 2008 

following the invasion and partition of Georgia and the recognition of 

Abkhazia as a separate state. Since that time, Russian forces have 

boosted their presence in Abkhazia and constitute a constant threat to 

Georgian stability and territorial integrity, while effectively freezing 

Tbilisi's progress toward NATO accession. 

The second stage of Russia’s Black Sea policy was the Ukrainian 

operation launched in 2014, with the capture of Crimea, the 

incorporation of Sevastopol and Russia’s Black Sea fleet within Russia 

itself, the proxy insurgency in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, 

and the attempted destabilization of the pro-Western Ukrainian 

government. Such maneuvers and Russia’s militarization of the Black 

Sea have significant implications for European security and NATO 

operations. They challenge the North Atlantic Alliance’s presence in 

the Black Sea, curtail further NATO enlargement, weaken NATO’s 

extended deterrence in Europe, and present a stepping-stone 

westward for Russia toward the Balkans and Central Europe. 

Russia is using the Black Sea as a more advantageous method of 

revisionism than extensive land conquests. Control of ports and sealanes 

delivers several benefits: it threatens to choke the trade and 

energy routes of wayward states, prevents NATO from projecting


sufficient security for Black Sea members, and gives Moscow a larger 

stake in exploiting fossil fuels in maritime locations. The Black Sea 

strategy allows for a disruption of energy supplies through pipeline 

connections between the Caspian Basin and Europe and obstructs EU 

attempts to pursue energy diversity. This would further curtail US and 

European connections with Central Asia and undermine prospects for 

future natural gas deliveries from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to 

Europe. 

Moscow claims privileged interests in the broader Intermarium 

region, while asserting the right to provide “comprehensive 

protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and 

compatriots abroad.” 69 The Kremlin asserts that only Russia is entitled 

to “stabilize the post-Soviet territory.” 70 It believes that all three 

countries should have limited sovereignty under Russia’s stewardship, 

while offering incentives and imposing sanctions in order to develop 

closer asymmetrical ties. 71 The inducements include cheap energy, a 

growing market, employment for guest workers, visa-free travel, 

diplomatic support, and assistance in developing their security 

sectors. The pressures on neighboring governments involve the 

exploitation of Russian minority populations through the defense of 

their allegedly endangered interests, support for oppositionist parties 

and pro-Russian movements, energy embargoes, trade sanctions, 

political demands, security threats, covert institutional penetration, 

territorial subversion, and in some cases outright military actions. 

Another intrusive mechanism was inaugurated in May 2008 with the 

creation of the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs in Moscow. 72 It was 

attached to the foreign ministry and mandated to deal with “soft 

security” questions in Moscow’s relations with neighbors, especially 

in assisting Russian citizens resident in the post-Soviet countries, 

whose conditions serve as a primary justification for intervention. 

Russian officials also seek to enlist national elites by enticing them 

with lucrative business contracts and diplomatic support in return for 

their political loyalty. 73 The urgency of this strategy was highlighted in 

the aftermath of the “colored revolutions” in Ukraine (2004) and


Georgia (2003) that moved both countries closer to Western 

institutions. Those popular developments were perceived as direct 

confrontations with the West that could spark a similar prodemocracy 

revolution in Russia itself. 

By aiding and abetting the secessionist regions of neighboring states, 

the Kremlin keeps the national governments off balance and hinders 

their entry into Western institutions. Moscow’s ideal solution is the 

federalization or confederalization of Ukraine and Moldova, and 

potentially Georgia, Belarus, and Azerbaijan. In such an arrangement, 

the autonomous entities would maintain veto powers over the foreign 

and security policies of the central governments and indefinitely keep 

each country outside of NATO and the EU and keep the US at a 

distance. 

A new “frozen conflict” in the Donbas region of Ukraine will have 

repercussions for a much broader region. It can encourage ethnoterritorial 

secessions elsewhere in former Soviet territories, 

undermine Western security guarantees, and challenge Europe’s 

existing borders. It will also generate disputes within NATO and the 

EU on how to handle split states and quasi-independent entities from 

which Moscow will seek to profit. Moscow indefinitely maintains a 

variety of unsettled conflicts and holds in reserve the prospect of 

unfreezing them. It thereby threatens unpredictable instability 

through a renewed insurgency, further bloodshed, and potential 

direct Russian military intervention. Such a posture serves to convince 

Western governments to make political compromises to 

accommodate Moscow. 

Moscow views the EU as a strategic threat not only because it can 

divert the trade of post-Soviet states away from Russia due to its 

superior market, but also because its legal principles, democratic 

standards, and transparent business practices undermine the core 

ingredients of the Putinist system. Such fears have been evident in


Kremlin attempts to block Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia from 

signing Association Agreements with the EU. 

Russian state propaganda also claims that the entry of any post-Soviet 

country into NATO would irrevocably damage its political, economic, 

and social ties with Russia and even fracture the state. Such threats 

increased in the wake of the NATO summit in April 2008, following 

the Alliance’s declaration that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually 

become NATO members even though they had not even received 

Membership Action Plans (MAPs) to prepare them for potential 

accession. 74 Moscow has sought to develop an alternative alliance to 

NATO, designed to embrace all former Soviet republics and styled as 

the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO was 

created in 2012, but by 2015 it only included Russia, Armenia, Belarus, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, after Azerbaijan, Georgia, 

and Uzbekistan withdrew from the alliance, fearing Moscow’s 

military and political dominance. 

Ukraine 

Russia’s elites have an imperialistic and patronizing posture toward 

Ukraine, denying the existence of a separate and distinct Ukrainian 

history and national identity. Ukraine is considered to be an ethnic 

patchwork and an artificially created country that is Russia’s “younger 

brother,” destined to perpetually remain in a close union dominated 

by Moscow. When Kyiv has misbehaved by petitioning for closer links 

with NATO or the EU, officials in Moscow have employed a range of 

subversive weapons to bring Ukraine back into line. 

Moscow’s pursuit of supranational integration challenges the 

independence of neighboring states, as they are constrained from 

freely choosing their international alliances. This was clearly evident 

in the case of Ukraine. President Viktor Yanukovych sought to 

straddle Western and Eastern assimilation by reassuring Ukrainians


that he could pursue close ties with both Europe and Moscow. 

However, Putin made this precarious balancing act increasingly 

difficult through his persistent pressure on Kyiv to abandon the EU 

project and join the Moscow-centered Customs Union, the precursor 

to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Yanukovych’s withdrawal 

from signing an Association Agreement at the EU’s Eastern 

Partnership Summit in Vilnius, on November 28–29, 2013, sparked a 

popular uprising in Kyiv that led to his ouster in late February 2014 

and sparked Russia’s direct attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty and 

territorial integrity. 

In order to return Kyiv more firmly under its control, Moscow has 

engaged in various forms of pressure and subterfuge. These have 

included energy blackmail, an intensive media barrage, corrupting or 

discrediting pro-Western politicians, manipulating ethnic and 

regional grievances, and raising territorial claims. Russia’s military 

doctrine also bestows Moscow with the right to intervene in 

neighboring states containing large Russian populations. The Russian 

or Russophone minority, constituting about a third of the Ukrainian 

total, has been exploited by Moscow to apply political pressures on 

Kyiv and promote proxy separatism in the Donbas area of eastern 

Ukraine. 

The Kremlin fears Ukraine is slipping out of its grasp as the new 

government of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister 

Arseniy Yatseniuk pursues closer ties with the West. Paradoxically, 

Putin himself has intensified Ukrainian patriotism and national 

identity through his attack on the country. Such expanding 

sentiments will damage Russia’s agenda for assembling the EEU or 

any other multi-national imperium, as Ukraine will vehemently resist 

integration. This will also undermine pan-Slavism as one binding 

ideology of the Russian state. Additionally, Moscow is anxious about 

democratic contagion and a reformist model from Ukraine that could 

challenge Putin’s authoritarian regime or unseat allies in other post- 

Soviet states such as Belarus or Armenia. Hence, Kyiv’s success could


become Moscow’s failure. In allegedly defending Ukraine against a 

perceived Western-sponsored takeover, Russia’s leaders believe they 

are fighting to secure their own political survival as well as the 

integrity of Russia and its dominions. 

Despite Moscow’s insistence that the war in Ukraine was an internal 

affair, on February 24, 2015, the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta 

published an official government strategy document outlining the 

invasion of Ukraine. It was prepared weeks before the Yanukovych 

administration collapsed in February 2014. 75 The overall strategy 

included breaking Ukraine into autonomous sectors, attaching 

southeastern Ukraine to Moscow’s Customs Union, and a longerterm 

plan for annexation. Moscow would activate its agents and 

informers in the security and military services, deeply embedded 

during the Yanukovych era, in order to neutralize Ukraine’s military 

responses. The strategy document also called for a public relations 

campaign to justify Russia’s intervention. The strategy paper 

contradicted the Kremlin’s claim that it annexed Crimea as a reaction 

to its residents feeling threatened by Ukrainian nationalists. 

While Moscow’s objectives have been clear-cut, its strategies and 

tactics proved more flexible and adaptable, generally consisting of two 

simultaneous offensives since the start of the war in early 2014: 

political and territorial. The Kremlin mounted a political assault 

claiming that the government was illegitimately installed through a 

coup d’état, asserting that the general elections in October 2014 were 

only partly legitimate, and seeking a commitment to federalize 

Ukraine through constitutional amendments. For the Kremlin, 

federalization means a divided state that blocks Kyiv’s international 

ambitions and prevents Ukraine from making progress toward EU 

association. 

Ukraine’s government rejected Moscow’s demands for debilitating 

federalization. However, during the summer and fall of 2015, Kyiv was 

pressured by Washington, Berlin, and Paris to implement


constitutional amendments that would expand Ukraine’s 

decentralization. By including a provision in the constitution stating 

that Kyiv will formulate a new law governing local administrations in 

certain portions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, parliament left the 

door open to providing a special status for the occupied Donbas 

territories. 

Western leaders also sought to convince Kyiv to include the rebel-held 

areas in the October 25, 2015, local elections, even though the 

government did not control these territories and the elections would 

fall far short of any democratic standards. However, leaders of the 

non-recognized Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics indicated 

that they would organize their own local elections outside of Kyiv’s 

jurisdiction and scheduled them for February 2016. In response, 

Western mediators, led by Berlin and Paris, pressured Kyiv to validate 

the separatist elections by incorporating them in special legislation. 

The inclusion of these regions within Ukraine but without Kyiv’s 

control will reinforce Moscow’s drive to federalize the country with 

Western support by bestowing legitimacy on its proxies. As elected 

regional representatives, the rebels could be empowered to negotiate 

constitutional amendments with Kyiv to gain some form of selfdetermination. 

Instead of a military occupation of Ukraine, Russia is 

banking on concessions by the West that could contribute to 

paralyzing the central government without need for war. 76 

In its territorial offensive, Russia has partitioned and annexed Crimea, 

where just under 60% of the population are ethnic Russians, according 

to recent estimates. Moreover, Moscow has instigated proxy 

separatism in the Donbas region to test the prospects for further 

division. It dispatched its special forces and recruited assorted 

mercenaries to engineer conflict and establish secessionist 

governments in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Similar tactics in 

other cities, such as Kharkiv and Odesa, failed to spark any armed 

rebellions or a civil war. According to the 2012 census, the ethnic 

Russian population amounted to 17.3% of Ukraine’s 45.4 million


people. In addition to Crimea, the majority inhabited the eastern 

oblasts, although their share in any region other than Luhansk (39%) 

and Donetsk (38%) did not exceed 30%. 77 In the bigger picture, about 

a third of Ukraine’s population use Russian as their primary language 

and are therefore viewed as part of the “Russian World” in addition to 

Russian ethnics. 

The attempted separatist offensive to sever the bulk of southeastern 

Ukraine only registered limited success in a handful of districts in 

Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Opinion polls indicated that only a 

small minority of the Donbas population supported federalization or 

secession. In the absence of sufficient public enthusiasm for autonomy 

or partition, and given the successful Ukrainian military counteroffensive 

to reclaim occupied territories in the summer of 2014, Putin 

intervened more directly with Russian troops at the end of August 

2014 to shore up rebel gains. However, Moscow avoided a large-scale 

invasion and potentially costly occupation. 

Having decided not to annex the Donbas, as this would further drain 

a faltering Russian economy that was already supporting a bankrupt 

Crimea, the Kremlin has been pushing for a split state in Ukraine. Its 

model resembles that of Moldova or Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which 

autonomous regions not controlled by the central government either 

disqualify the country from meeting the criteria for EU or NATO 

entry or they actively block central government policymaking by 

holding veto powers. 

The Kremlin also sought to legitimize the separatist leaders by making 

them a party to various ceasefires and peace talks with Kyiv, Moscow, 

the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE). This was especially evident in the Minsk agreement, codified 

in two documents, Minsk I in September 2014, which was violated by 

Russia’s proxies, and Minsk II signed in February 2015. 78 The 

armistice negotiations included leaders of the two rebel regions—the 

Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic.


Although some voices in Kyiv calculated that surrendering the rebel 

regions to Russia could bring a lasting peace, government officials 

were convinced that this would simply encourage Moscow to push the 

war deeper into Ukraine in order to further fracture and destabilize 

the country. Such a maneuver would also entail abandoning the 

majority of citizens in the Donbas who opposed secessionism and thus 

erode the credibility of the administration. 

Putin has also favored a policy that is reminiscent of the post–Orange 

Revolution (2004) scenario: state subversion. This entails fanning 

social and regional unrest; corrupting or discrediting Ukraine’s new 

officials; making deals with local oligarchs; spreading disinformation 

to promote political divisions; inciting nationalist radicals through 

FSB penetration of their organizations; threatening military 

intervention so that Kyiv maintains a large and expensive standing 

army; and waiting for a major economic crash as Ukraine undertakes 

deep structural and budgetary reforms. The net effect would be 

another round of public unrest culminating in the overthrow of the 

pro-Western government and disqualification from Western 

integration. At the same time, the Kremlin calculated that Western 

sanctions against Moscow would be eased and Putin will be praised in 

Western capitals for not pursuing the military option and further 

dismembering Ukrainian territory. 

To preclude the Kremlin scenario of instability, it is imperative for the 

Ukrainian administration elected on October 26, 2014, to conduct 

effective structural and fiscal reforms, move closer to Western 

institutions, maintain sufficient national cohesion, and resist 

Moscow’s pressures and enticements. Russia’s attack has underscored 

the importance for all Ukrainian parties of maintaining national unity 

and steering the country away from dependence on an unreliable and 

aggressive Russia. In a key economic move, during 2015, Ukraine 

significantly reduced its dependence on Gazprom for natural gas 

supplies. 79 Kyiv is pursuing supply diversification with the backing of 

the European Commission. Ukraine’s business practices in the gas


trade are also changing. The current political leaders have no personal 

interest in the gas business or depend on interest groups linked to the 

energy sector. Talks with Moscow on gas supplies are becoming less 

political and more business oriented, handled by the Ministry of 

Energy and Naftohaz, Ukraine’s national oil and gas company. 

Nonetheless, Russia continues to exert energy pressures on Ukraine at 

a difficult financial juncture. During 2015, it demanded that Kyiv pay 

for gas bills estimated at over $5 billion, dating back to 2013, and 

threatening to cut supplies until all payments were received. Several 

EU countries have pledged to supply Ukraine with gas to cover its 

most urgent needs. From supplying nearly all of Ukraine’s gas 

imports, since mid-2014 Gazprom’s share has dropped dramatically 

and Kyiv procured the remainder through reverse flows from Europe. 

With the diversification of supplies, by mid-2015 the consumption of 

Russian gas was reduced from 28.1 bcm to 19.9 bcm and the Russian 

share of total gas imports fell from 90% to 37%. Moreover, legislation 

was adopted to establish transparency in gas contracts. 

Ukraine’s economic problems, stemming from years of 

mismanagement and corruption, have been compounded by the war 

in Donbas, whose economic production accounted for about 10% of 

Ukraine’s GDP in 2013. 80 Moscow has also imposed tough trade 

sanctions so that Kyiv’s exports to Russia have fallen by half since the 

start of the Russian offensive, equivalent to 12% of total exports. This 

caused Ukraine’s GDP (excluding Crimea) to shrink by 6.8% in 2014 

and was projected to drop by a further 9% in 2015. Unfortunately, the 

EU has failed to fully open its markets to Ukrainian exports despite 

signing an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive 

Free Trade Agreement with Kyiv; indeed, the implementation of the 

latter has been delayed under pressure from Moscow. Although the 

IMF agreed, in 2015, on a $40 billion bailout designed to keep Ukraine 

solvent it is only providing under half of that sum and Ukraine 

is experiencing problems raising the rest.


Both Moscow and Kyiv appear to be waiting for the collapse of each 

other’s economies and the subsequent impact on foreign policy. The 

fate of the separatist controlled regions has hung in the balance with 

Kyiv applying economic pressure on the rebels by cutting state 

subsidies for pensions, local authorities, health, and education, and 

withdrawing support for the banking system. Without state subsidies 

from Kyiv or Moscow, the rebels seem barely competent in governing 

territories where infrastructure has been destroyed, factories have 

closed, and revenues have shrunk. Moscow does not want these 

regions to collapse economically but cannot afford to fully subsidize 

them and seeks to place the burden on Kyiv. The local elections would 

evidently oblige Kyiv to maintain its subsidies to the occupied regions 

and support the very structures that are pulling Ukraine apart. 

On the religious front, on May 24, 2015, Moscow Patriarch Kirill 

officially declared that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the 

Moscow Patriarchate was no longer obligated to obey the “godless” 

Ukrainian authorities. 81 This pronouncement was a direct challenge 

to Ukrainian sovereignty and demonstrated that Kirill was a Kremlin 

collaborator in the offensive against Kyiv. However, since 2011, the 

number of Ukrainians who declared themselves members of 

Churches subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate has fallen from 

25.9% of the population to 20.8%. 82 In an indication of the 

strengthening of Ukrainian national identity involving religious 

affiliation, in June 2015 a merger was announced between the 

Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian 

Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, two of the three largest 

Orthodox denominations in Ukraine. This will significantly 

undermine the authority and influence of the Russian Orthodox 

Church and the Russian state inside Ukraine. 

In addition to Transcarpathia (see Hungary section), another area 

of potential separatist agitation is the Danubian basin, bound by the 

Black Sea to the east, Moldova to the west, and Romania to the south. 

Reports have circulated about the emergence there of a “Bessarabian


People’s Republic,” modeled on the Donetsk and Luhansk 

secessionists. Bessarabia is the historic name of an area comprising the 

current territory of Moldova, without the breakaway Transnistria 

region, and some territories in Ukraine’s Odesa region. Southern 

Bessarabia has a large percentage of ethnic minorities, including 

Bulgarians, Moldovans, Gagauz, and Russians. The Kremlin possesses 

the means to induce Gagauz politicians on both sides of the 

Ukrainian-Moldovan border to join forces and stir problems, while 

some residents of the Bessarabia region are susceptible to Kremlin 

propaganda and nationalist enticements. 

On April 6, 2015, a People’s Council of Bessarabia (PCB) in 

southwestern Ukraine and an Odesa People’s Republic (OPR) in the 

Black Sea port announced their existence. 83 Reportedly, the PCB was 

established to press for the status of a national-territorial autonomous 

unit within Ukraine, while the OPR declared itself fully independent 

of Kyiv. Although these moves appeared to be largely propaganda 

initiatives orchestrated by a few local activists with Kremlin support, 

they needed to be carefully monitored by Kyiv. Information about the 

creation of the PCB was posted on its website, which was registered in 

Moscow. 

84 

Dmytro Zatuliveter, chairman of the Union of 

Transnistrian Inhabitants of Ukraine, became the self-declared leader 

of the PCB. Ukrainian police reported that the “founding congress” 

took place in a restaurant with no foreign guests. 

Ukraine’s genuine minority organizations stated that they had no 

connection with the separatist initiative that was designed to 

destabilize the Bessarabian region. The Gagauz national-cultural 

society Birlik and the Association of Ukrainian Bulgars described the 

creation of the “people’s council” as a sham and a provocation. 

Nonetheless, in a region where there has been little economic 

development since independence, there is some potential in stirring 

unrest that does not require majority support. 

Another key domain of Russia’s attack on Ukraine has been


cyberspace. 85 The objective is to wear down the opponent and push 

him to change political course. Russia has employed various forms of 

cyber assaults, including but not limited to denial of service attacks 

against government institutions, monitoring of Ukrainian 

telecommunications, and infecting Ukrainian networks with various 

viruses. Cyber attacks and cyber espionage can inflict serious harm on 

a country’s defense capabilities. 

On the military front, Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine 

has necessitated deep security sector reforms by Kyiv. On April 9, 

2015, the government formulated a new security doctrine setting its 

sights on joining NATO. 86 Oleksander Turchynov, the Secretary of 

Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), concluded 

that Russian aggression was a “long-standing factor” and NATO 

membership was “the only reliable external guarantee” of the 

country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Public support for 

NATO membership has skyrocketed since Russia’s attack on the 

country, and stood at 64% by August 2015. 87 

At the end of August 2015, Ukraine’s government approved a draft of 

the new Military Doctrine that clearly defined the Russian Federation 

as the country’s main enemy and aggressor. Kyiv has also pursued 

closer bilateral military ties with individual NATO states to assist in 

the process of security modernization. For example, 300 US Army 

paratroopers were deployed to Ukraine in April 2015 to help train 900 

national guardsmen. Predictably, the initiative was condemned by 

Moscow as provoking regional instability. Ukraine also decided to 

curtail its exports of military components to Russia, including 

advanced engines and elements used in the production of numerous 

types of military equipment. Given Moscow’s dependence on 

Ukrainian supplies, this could seriously dent Russia’s military export 

earnings and even lead to a collapse of its arms industry. 

According to the deputy head of Ukraine’s anti-terrorist operation, 

Colonel Sergiy Galushko, by July 2015 Russia had massed roughly


54,000 troops along Ukraine’s border. 88 This force reportedly 

consisted of 45 battalion tactical groups and 17 company tactical 

groups. There is frequent speculation in Kyiv about a full-scale 

Russian military invasion, with evidence allegedly leaked from the 

Russian General Military Staff. It serves Moscow’s interests to 

encourage rumors about imminent invasions as this engenders fear 

and uncertainty in Ukrainian society and distracts political attention 

from vital economic and structural reforms. 

Moscow is also suspected of engaging in terrorism and sabotage 

operations to destabilize various parts of Ukraine and weaken the 

central government. In January 2015, Ukraine’s Security Service 

(SBU) extended counterterrorist measures to the Zaporizhzhya region 

after a railway bridge was blown up on the Kamysh Zarya-Rozovka 

line. 89 The number of bomb alerts and terrorist attacks has been on 

the rise, especially in regions where the public mood is more 

heterogeneous and some pro-Moscow sentiments are present. 90 The 

objective is to probe for weaknesses, undermine the local authorities, 

and intimidate the population. On February 22, 2015 a bomb was 

detonated at a rally in support of national unity in Ukraine’s secondlargest 

city of Kharkiv, causing several fatalities. 91 There have been 

other bomb attacks in Kharkiv, with Moscow-backed rebels 

threatening to expand their operations. Terrorism remains a lethal tool 

in Moscow’s arsenal of subversion and destabilization. 

Belarus 

Russia’s challenge to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity 

may push its ally Belarus westward, although Russia’s leaders are 

unlikely to remain passive if President Alyaksandr Lukashenka 

cultivates closer Western connections. Moscow may seek an 

alternative leader after the presidential elections held on October 11, 

2015: not a pro-European democrat but a pro-Russian loyalist. The 

Kremlin is capable of engineering a political coup in Minsk, as the


country is heavily penetrated by Russia’s security services, in order to 

replace Lukashenka with a more compliant figurehead. Alternatively, 

Moscow could exploit nationalists and other radicals to stage protests 

in Minsk, mimicking Ukraine’s Maidan revolution, and then 

intervene on the pretext of restoring law and order while implanting 

a new leader in Minsk. 

Conditions for such a coup may become favorable if the economy 

seriously deteriorates, with Minsk remaining heavily dependent on 

Moscow’s subsidies and bearing the consequences of Russia’s 

economic contraction. However, too much Kremlin pressure is also 

risky for Moscow, as Lukashenka may decide to move closer to the 

West for political protection. 92 For instance, the release of Nikolay 

Statkevich and five other political prisoners, in August 2015, appeared 

to be a bridging act with the West, as both Washington and Brussels 

had been calling for clemency for several years. 

In an indication of growing fears of Russia’s dominance, Aleksey 

Yanukevich, leader of the Belarusian Popular Front Party, stated that 

Lukashenka was “a lesser evil” in comparison to Kremlin 

imperialism. 93 As a result, the Belarusian Popular Front, despite its 

opposition to Lukashenka, did not intend to field a candidate against 

him in the October 2015 presidential elections. Yanukevich believed 

that anything that destabilizes Belarus, including a popular rising such 

as the Ukrainian Maidan, would only benefit the Kremlin. According 

to the opposition, Moscow’s “fifth column” in the country threatens 

the independence of Belarus and its survival far more than 

Lukashenka through his links with Russia. Vladimir Borodac, a 

former Belarusian security service officer, asserts that Moscow can 

seize the country whenever it wants because the majority of Belarusian 

siloviki are prepared to take orders from Moscow, and replacing 

Lukashenka may be easier for the Kremlin as he is relatively isolated 

in Europe. 94


Belarusian political analysts claim that Minsk expects Moscow to offer 

financial aid in exchange for an increase in Russia’s military 

presence. 95 According to Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, 

Moscow planned to increase the number of its aircraft stationed at 

Belarusian air bases. Four Su-27M3 fighter aircraft were deployed at 

the Lida air base near the Belarus-Lithuania border during 2014. 96 By 

the end of 2014, Baranovichi air base housed a regiment of 24 aircraft 

of Su-27M3 fighters. This doubled the number of Russian fighter 

aircraft stationed near the borders of Lithuania and Poland. 

Russian authorities also planned to build a separate air force base in 

Babruysk, in the Mogilev region of central Belarus, by 2016, and 

pressured Minsk to approve its construction. The location of such a 

base would be a perennial threat to Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine 

and could enable Moscow to pull Belarus into a war with a 

neighboring state. There are indications that Lukashenka has opposed 

the base, and if Moscow persists in its construction this may have the 

unintended consequence of raising resistance against Russia’s 

dominance and even weakening Lukashenka’s domestic position. 97 

Quite possibly, Moscow may intentionally seek to make him more 

pliable or even replace him with a more predictable state leader. 

Moscow is capable of rapidly turning Belarus into a forward base by 

incorporating it in Russia’s Western Military District, which would 

constitute a direct challenge to Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland. 98 The 

presence of Russian forces and bases could embroil Belarus in military 

conflicts launched by the Kremlin. Questions remain whether the 

Belarusian military is capable of resisting Russian armed forces given 

that the two militaries are closely interlinked, as evident in their joint 

anti-air defense system. To effectively resist Russia’s aggressive moves, 

Belarus would need to develop a sizable mobile national guard that 

could engage in partisan warfare. 99 

In an indication of close collaboration between security services in 

Moscow and Minsk, Lithuania’s State Security Department disclosed


that Belarus’ security services cooperate with their Russian 

counterparts against Lithuania. 100 Following the disintegration of the 

USSR, Moscow maintained its covert presence in the security agencies 

of former republics and has deployed non-Russians against third 

countries where locals are less suspicious of their actions than they 

would be of Russians. According to the Vilnius report, Belarusian 

agents in Lithuania focus primarily on the activities of the Belarusian 

opposition. However, they are also recruiting agents and collecting 

information about military and strategic civilian infrastructure sites, 

which they most probably share with Russian services. 

With regard to the crisis in Ukraine, there are contrasting 

interpretations of Minsk hosting meetings of the Contact Group, 

involving Kyiv, Moscow, the OSCE, and the two rebel groups from 

Donbas. On the one hand, it benefits Lukashenka to host senior 

European leaders and gain credit as a peacemaker. On the other hand, 

it is advantageous for Moscow to host such talks in an allied state and 

enable separatist leaders from Luhansk and Donetsk to participate as 

legitimate interlocutors. Throughout the war in Ukraine, the 

Belarusian President has avoided any actions that alienate him further 

from the West. For instance, Minsk did not back the Russian embargo 

imposed against Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which signed 

Association Agreements with the EU during 2014; and unlike Putin, 

Lukashenka viewed the new authorities in Kyiv as legitimate. 

Most Belarusians are exposed to regular Russian TV channels and 

many view Ukraine through the prism of Moscow’s interests and 

Kremlin propaganda. Moreover, government officials imply that any 

attempts at organizing demonstrations similar to Kyiv’s Maidan 

revolt would result in destabilization and possible Russian 

intervention. The war in Ukraine had an impact on public opinion in 

Belarus. While the majority of Belarusian citizens want to avoid a 

bloody Ukrainian scenario, an increasing number were also opposed 

to unification with Russia.


Analytic reports published by the Belarusian Independent Institute of 

Socioeconomic and Political Studies (IISEPS) include the results of 

national opinion polls. 101 In a poll conducted in June 2014, if a 

referendum were held on Belarus-Russia state unification, 24.8% of 

respondents would vote positively whereas 54.8% would vote against. 

In December 2007, the opponents of unification accounted for only 

31.6%. The number of citizens who think that Belarus and Russia 

should be one state with one president, government, army, flag, and 

currency only reached 9.8%. After the annexation of Crimea, many 

people evidently grew concerned that Belarus could become an object 

of Moscow’s expansionism. 

As insurance against greater Russian interference in Belarus, 

Lukashenka has emphasized Belarusian identity and language and the 

country’s distinct national interests. In January 2015, the state media 

announced a policy of “de-russification” of schools to revive the 

Belarusian language. At a press conference on January 29, 2015, 

Lukashenka underscored that Belarus was an independent state and 

not part of the Russian World. 102 To avert aggression, the Belarusian 

army was reportedly developing mobile units “that could deal a blow 

to the aggressor.” Lukashenka also publicly regretted that nuclear 

weapons were surrendered by Belarus in 1994, because “he who 

possesses brute force is right.” 

Belarus introduced legislation on martial law on February 1, 2015, and 

adjusted its definition of invasion to take account of Putin’s actions in 

Ukraine. 103 The new law specified that the appearance of military 

personnel, even if they do not wear uniforms or have designations of 

their membership in the military of another state, will be considered 

a form of attack that threatens the territorial integrity and sovereignty 

of Belarus. The new law also specifies conditions that Minsk will view 

as a military threat sufficient to introduce martial law. These include 

the concentration of military forces of another state on the Belarusian 

border with a clear indication that they are intended for an attack.


Minsk also announced its largest-ever peacetime exercises of military 

reserves, involving some 15,000 troops. 

In one potentially threatening scenario, several neo-Cossack groups 

in Belarus could be employed to stir unrest or provide an excuse for 

Russia’s military intervention. 104 A number of Cossack groups that 

emerged in the country are reportedly closely tied with Russia’s 

security services. Some members have attended special military camps 

organized by Russia’s special operations airborne troops. 

In December 2014, the Belarusian ambassador to Kyiv, Valentin 

Velichko, asserted that Minsk would never allow other countries to 

use Belarus’s territory for military intervention in Ukraine: “We 

support Ukraine as an integral unitarian state along the lines of the 

acting constitution, which rules out federalization.” 105 Lukashenka 

has, on occasion, reiterated that it was “inadmissible” for any state to 

violate the territorial integrity of another state. However, in a classic 

balancing act between Russia and Ukraine, Lukashenka also asserted 

that Crimea would not be returned to Ukraine and that the Ukrainians 

had failed to defend the territory. He pointedly stressed that Belarus 

would fight for every inch of its territory whoever the invader. Russia’s 

attempts to involve Minsk in the economic war against Ukraine also 

failed and Lukashenka attended President Poroshenko's inauguration, 

on June 7, 2014. 106 In an indication of concern over the country’s 

vulnerabilities to a Russian assault, Lukashenka has also reached out 

to NATO. In comments to the country’s military leaders on February 

19, 2015, he underscored that Belarus was open to a constructive 

dialogue with NATO. 107 

There have been several indications that Lukashenka was employing 

Belarusian defensive nationalism as protection against Moscow. To 

revive Belarusian identity, he has called for schools to devote more 

hours to Belarusian-language classes. The authorities have 

encouraged citizens to rediscover their roots by signing up for 

language courses, holding weddings in an ethnic style, and donning


national dress. By highlighting their distinct national characteristics, 

people were expressing their opposition to Russia’s chauvinism. 108 

Nationalist groups have been permitted to become more publicly 

prominent. 109 For instance, the Belarusian Congress in Defense of the 

Independence of Belarus was held on December 21, 2014, in Minsk, 

organized by representatives of the nationalist wing of the 

opposition. 110 Elena Anisim, head of the organizing committee, stated 

that the group’s goal was to declare that the Belarusian people would 

not become part of any other country. 111 She also asserted that 

Lukashenka did not oppose the congress because “today the interests 

of the nationalists and the authorities coincide.” Forum delegates 

launched a campaign to collect one million signatures in defense of 

Belarusian independence. Participants also condemned the Eurasian 

Economic Union as destructive of the Belarusian economy and 

enabling Moscow’s control. 

Shortly after the creation of the EEU, Lukashenka warned that if the 

Union’s agreements were not observed, Minsk reserved the right to 

leave. 112 Throughout 2015, Minsk was increasingly hampered by 

Russia’s fiscal and economic problems, as 40% of its exports were 

traded with Russia, and much of the rest to countries closely linked to 

Russia’s economy. The Belarusian parliament asserted that it would 

ratify the EEU agreement with reservations. 113 Lukashenka’s value as 

a political ally for Moscow grew during the Western economic boycott 

of Russia and new loans could be provided to ensure Lukashenka’s reelection 

in October 2015. 114 Conversely, as a result of economic crisis, 

Moscow may only possess limited funds to provide assistance to 

Minsk. 115 This may result in a more pronounced Western tilt by 

Belarus that would stir conflicts with the Kremlin. 

Lukashenka has been outspoken about protecting national 

sovereignty and territorial integrity given that the country contains a 

sizable Russian minority. In 2014, it was estimated at 8.3% of the 

population of 9.6 million, with an even larger share of Belarusians


using Russian as their first language. 116 The President is fearful of 

externally generated internal unrest, as witnessed in Ukraine. His 

speeches indicate anxiety that Russia might annex parts of Belarus and 

admits that the threat to independence may emerge due to economic 

pressures because of the country’s dependence on Moscow. 117 

Some Russian nationalists claim that Moscow should take back 

territory in Belarus that was once part of the Russian Republic in the 

Soviet Union, similarly to the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. 118 

Moscow could also engineer the creation of “people’s republics” in 

eastern Belarus as it had in eastern Ukraine in order to “federalize” the 

country. In 1918, Moscow handed over the Donetsk-Krivorog Soviet 

Republic to Soviet Ukraine. In the 1920s, Moscow also transferred 

from Russia to Belarus Vitebsk, Mohilev, and Gomel oblasts. The new 

law passed by the Russian Duma concerning the “illegality” of the 

transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 could be amended or extended 

to include Russian areas assigned to Belarus during Soviet times. 

The Kremlin is opposed to expressions of Belarus’s independence and 

may use its media dominance in the country to portray Lukashenka 

as a fascist or a Russophobe, similarly to Ukraine’s leaders. In response 

to Russia’s propaganda offensives and the potential threat to Belarus, 

some analysts have raised the prospect of curtailing official Russian 

television channels if the government considered them as Moscow’s 

fifth column. 119 

The Kremlin may also lend support to pro-Russian organizations that 

deny the existence of an independent Belarusian nation and language. 

Some opinion polls indicated that a sizable percentage of the 

population, especially pensioners, would favor living in a single state 

with Russia. People may welcome an invasion or a regime change if it 

were accompanied by a promise to raise salaries and pensions at a time 

when economic conditions in Belarus continue to deteriorate. On the 

other hand, there have been indications that an increasing number of 

young Belarusians were prepared to defend the country against


absorption by Russia. A sense of national distinctiveness has 

reportedly developed in Belarus since Moscow’s attack on Ukraine, 

while Russia’s economic decline will ensure that it becomes less 

attractive for ordinary Belarusians. 120 

Moldova 

Moscow has kept the Moldovan government off balance in its 

aspirations toward EU membership and threatened more intensive 

pressures if Chisinau signed and ratified the Association and Free 

Trade agreements with Brussels. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy 

Rogozin, who oversees relations with Moldova, warned that moving 

closer to the EU would prove costly while incorporation in Russia's 

Customs Union would be beneficial. 121 Russian officials push the line 

that Moldova can only preserve its independence if it joins the 

Eurasian Economic Union, otherwise it will be absorbed by Romania, 

and the separatist region of Transnistria will become independent. 

Moscow claims that “Westernizers” in the Moldovan government 

plan to change the constitution to remove the provision on neutral 

status, promote NATO membership, and enshrine EU accession 

aspirations in the document. To prevent such a scenario, Russia 

deploys four main tools of pressure: informational, political, 

economic, and territorial. 

Since the eruption of war in Ukraine in early 2014, Russian news 

channels have warned of plans for a concerted attack on Transnistria 

by Moldovan, Romanian, and Ukrainian forces supported by 

Washington. Propagandists claim that Kyiv is preparing to forcibly 

reintegrate Moldova and Transnistria and to assist Romania in 

absorbing Moldova with American involvement. 122 Anti-Romanian 

propaganda has been a constant feature of Moscow’s line on Moldova, 

claiming that Bucharest seeks to annex the country as well as pockets 

of territory in Ukraine, including northern Bukovina, southern 

Bessarabia, and several islands on the Danube. 123 In this multi-layered


game of threats, Moscow plays both Moldova and Transnistria against 

Romania, claiming at times that Transnistria supports Ukraine in its 

opposition to Romanian expansionism. 

At the same time, officials in Moscow assert that Kyiv is a threat to 

Transnistrian statehood, thus justifying Russia’s military presence in 

the territory together with a possible link between Transnistria and a 

future Novorossyia carved out of southern Ukraine, or by enabling 

Transnistria to forcefully obtain a narrow Black Sea coastline from 

Ukraine. Moscow has also supported Gagauz separatism in southern 

Moldova. The Gagauz are an ethnic Turkish, Orthodox Christian, and 

Russian-speaking population that the Kremlin considers part of the 

Russian World and which possesses an autonomous region inside 

Moldova called Gagauz Yeri (Gagauzia). 

Additionally, Moscow has threatened both Romania and Ukraine 

with territorial partition by claiming the wider Bessarabian region for 

an enlarged Moldova and backing the creation of a Budjak Republic 

in southern Moldova to include Gagauzia, Bulgarian inhabited areas 

of Moldova, and parts of Odesa oblast in Ukraine that contain 

Moldovan, Gagauz, Russian, and Bulgarian minorities. Alternatively, 

Moscow may favor the option of splitting Moldova by offering 

Romania sections of right bank Moldova and Ukraine’s Bukovina in 

exchange for Bucharest recognizing Novorossiya and Budjak hacked 

out of Ukraine. 

The Kremlin prolongs the “frozen conflict” in Transnistria and uses it 

to maintain Moldova as a split state. Transnistria is perceived in 

Moscow as part of the Russian World, where approximately 60% of 

the population of half a million are either Russian or Ukrainian and 

the majority use Russian as their first language. 124 In a meeting with 

Moldovan President Igor Voronin in January 2008, Putin proposed a 

settlement to ensure Moldova’s permanent neutrality. 125 This would 

entail transforming the country into a confederation with Transnistria 

while prolonging the presence of Russian troops cloaked as


peacekeepers until a final settlement was reached in the indefinite 

future. Although Chisinau rejected the proposal, Moscow has 

continued to maintain a de facto confederation in Moldova by aiding 

and abetting Transnistrian separatism. 

Foreign Minister Lavrov has warned that Transnistria has a right to 

independently decide on its future if Moldova changes its non-bloc 

military-political status. 126 He deliberately linked such a prospect with 

Romania’s alleged drive for unification. Transnistrian President 

Yevgeny Shevchuk has also condemned any initiative to integrate 

Moldova with Romania. 127 He claimed that he was troubled by the 

presence of Romanian advisers in Moldova’s security services. At the 

same time, Transnistrian leaders worked closely with separatists in 

Ukraine’s Donbas. For instance, in July 2014 Vladimir Antyufeyev, 

the state security minister in Transnistria, was appointed deputy 

prime minister responsible for security issues in the “Donetsk People’s 

Republic.” 128 

As Chisinau moves closer to the EU, Transnistria will have to decide 

whether to join the EU as part of Moldova or to remain an 

unrecognized region dependent on Russia. 129 Russia invests heavily in 

Transnistria’s economy, supplying free natural gas and paying the 

budget, pensions, and wages in the public sector. However, because of 

Russia’s declining revenues, subsidies have been lowered for 

Transnistria, business is leaving, revenues are depleting, welfare 

benefits and payments are being reduced, and youth and able-bodied 

citizenry are evacuating the region in increasing numbers. 

Transnistrian leaders in the region’s capital Tiraspol have claimed that 

their region is in deep economic crisis. 130 The agreement allowing 

Transnistria to trade with the EU independently of Moldova expires 

in 2015, and Chisinau can use this opportunity to tighten the screws 

on Tiraspol. The population has officially declined since 1990, from 

750,000 to 500,000, and unofficially to 300,000. If Transnistria were to 

be reabsorbed by Moldova, a quarter of a million Russian citizens and


an equivalent number of Russian speakers will be left in the country 

or may seek refuge in Russia or elsewhere. To highlight the urgency of 

Moscow’s intervention, in June 2015 the Transnistrian government 

called for the prevention of a Maidan-type revolution triggered by 

growing economic difficulties. 131 According to Tiraspol, agitators 

have appeared in several cities and villages urging the population to 

stage protests. 

Kyiv has endeavored to shield itself from further instability along its 

borders and views Transnistria as a potential springboard for further 

Russian attacks on its territory. Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior has 

reinforced police and military forces in the Odesa region bordering 

Transnistria and considered housing a National Guard brigade in the 

area. 132 Restrictions were also imposed, in 2014, on the movement of 

military-age civilians across the border from Transnistria. Russian 

officials complained about problems in the rotation of their military 

contingent in the territory and their logistical support. On June 8, 

2015, President Poroshenko terminated the agreement between Kyiv 

and Moscow on the transit of Russian military units and equipment 

to Moldova across Ukrainian territory. 133 The move was condemned 

by Moscow, which warned of imminent retaliation. 

If the threat from Transnistria becomes more blatant, Kyiv could close 

all crossing points, refuse to recognize separatist license plates, and 

allow Moldovan customs officials to monitor its checkpoints. 

Coordination between Ukraine and Moldova has been enhanced, 

particularly in the foreign ministries and intelligence services, with the 

possibility of fully isolating the secessionist entity. In June 2015, the 

new Odesa regional administrator, the former President of Georgia 

Mikheil Saakashvili, asserted that the border with Transnistria would 

be strengthened to combat smuggling. 134 Such a policy would severely 

squeeze the separatist economy. Saakashvili claimed that Transnistria 

was Europe’s black hole for smuggling and organized crime with 

tentacles in Odesa oblast and closely linked with the Kremlin.


Some voices in Russia depicted Kyiv’s measures as the first step in 

terminating Transnistrian autonomy and called on the Kremlin to 

recognize the independence of the entity and sign an agreement on 

mutual assistance. Officials in Moscow declared that they would not 

abandon the population of Transnistria or permit a blockade, and 

could intervene military to unblock it, thus threatening Ukraine with 

further military assaults. Both Chisinau and Kyiv want Russia’s 

military units in Transnistria replaced with a civilian mission led by 

Western police officers. 135 

International negotiations over Transnistria remain deadlocked. 

Moscow asserts that reunification would require its agreement, troop 

presence, and a special status enabling the region to veto Chisinau’s 

decisions. According to Lavrov, Moldova’s foreign policy must reflect 

its permanent neutrality, and this is incompatible with EU entry. 

Hence, Moscow has pressed Chisinau not to sign the EU Association 

Agreement. Transnistrian President Yevgeny Shevchuk favors 

integration with Russia and was encouraged after the Crimean 

annexation. He urged Transnistria’s residents with Russian 

citizenship to vote for Putin and supported the Eurasian Economic 

Union. Additionally, Russia has issued an estimated 150,000 passports 

to Transnistria’s inhabitants. 

Moscow has encouraged autonomist movements in other parts of 

Moldova to unsettle the Europe-oriented government. According to a 

former deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in Moldova, “little green 

men” (Russian security service personnel) are present in Moldova 

recruiting young people and training them in the use of small 

weapons. 136 According to him, in south Moldova, more than 500 

people have been recruited and trained in Transnistria, Rostov, and 

Moscow. 

According to Mihai Balan, director of Moldova’s Information and 

Security Service (SIS), the number of organizations supporting 

Moscow has been growing in Moldova with the objective of splitting


the country. 137 They bring together sportsmen, people with criminal 

records, and veterans of the Soviet security services. Some operate 

paramilitary camps training pro-Kremlin fighters or run security 

forms hiring detachments of armed fighters. For instance, Serghei 

Perciun, the deputy chairman of the Patriots of Moldova, is a former 

KGB officer, and he regularly broadcasts xenophobic statements 

against Romanians. The party calls for a Greater Moldova with the 

incorporation of territories in Romania and Ukraine, and charges that 

EU accession would result in Moldova’s absorption by Romania. 

The autonomous territory of Gagauzia has been exploited by Moscow 

to gain greater influence over Chisinau. Russian officials backed the 

unrecognized February 2, 2014, referendum in the region on inclusion 

in Russia’s Customs Union. Reportedly, 98.4% voted for integration 

with the Customs Union and 97.2% voted against closer EU 

association. 138 In addition, 98.9% of voters supported Gagauzia’s right 

to declare independence should Moldova surrender its sovereignty by 

uniting with Romania. Gagauzia has a population of about 155,000 

people, mostly ethnic Gagauz. Local activists have campaigned against 

Moldova signing an EU Association Agreement and a Deep and 

Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. 

Gagauz parties advocate Moldova’s entry to the EEU and threaten to 

cut off relations with Chisinau because of the country’s pro-EU policy. 

Some have warned about the potential for a “Donbas-2” or a 

“Transnistria-2” in Gagauzia. 139 To enhance the appeal of Russia’s 

economic alternative, the Kremlin lifted the import embargo on 

Moldova for Gagauzia’s winemakers and its fruit and vegetable 

producers. 140 Irina Vlah, a staunch supporter of Putin and openly 

backed by Moscow, was elected the governor (Başkan) of Gagauzia in 

local elections on March 22, 2015. 141 She received 53.21% of the vote 

and was endorsed by the pro-Kremlin Socialist Party, by Russian pop 

artists, and Russian Duma deputies. Vlah called for Gagauzia to follow 

a Eurasian not European direction. Her victory will enable Moscow to


exert greater influence in the country and apply pressure on the 

Moldovan administration. 

Some Gagauz activists advocate the incorporation of the 

predominantly Bulgarian district of Taraclia into Gagauzia in order to 

increase the region’s leverage vis-à-vis Chisinau. 142 Tellingly, since the 

start of the war in Ukraine, the local authorities in Taraclia have been 

seeking a “special status” for the district, which has a Bulgarian 

majority of 65% out of 44,000 people. 143 Chisinau fears that following 

the example of Gagauzia, Bulgarians from Taraclia may also demand 

their own police, courts, army, and security services. The local 

government in Taraclia has warned that they will join the Gagauz 

autonomous region if their demands are not met. 

The chairman of Moldova’s Liberal Democratic Party, Vlad Filat, 

insisted that law-enforcement agencies investigate Russia’s 

interference in the country’s domestic affairs, including local elections 

in Gagauzia. 144 Chisinau was concerned that Gagauz leaders incited by 

Moscow and encouraged by Transnistria may seek to turn the 

autonomous unit into a quasi-state with its own legal system and 

security force. 145 As a result, members of the Moldovan parliament 

want to restrict Gagauz autonomy to prevent separatism. Mihai 

Formuzal, the former governor of Gagauz Yeri accused the Moldovan 

authorities of planning to curtail the region’s status. 146 Vadim 

Yanioglo, the deputy governor of Gagauzia, even requested protection 

from the Turkish Embassy. In 1994 the law on Gagauz autonomy was 

adopted with the assistance of Turkish President Suleyman Demirel. 

The Kremlin has backed selected Moldovan politicians, parties, and 

social movements that lean in its direction or are susceptible to 

corruption or manipulation. The vulnerability of Moldova’s political 

structure, legal system, and banking sector to Russia’s corrupt 

influences was revealed in April 2014 when Moldova’s Supreme Court 

of Justice uncovered massive money laundering schemes involving


corrupt judges and Moldinconbank, which moved over $18.5 billion 

from Russia into offshore accounts during 2010–2013. 

In the parliamentary elections of November 30, 2014, the Party of 

Socialists led by Putin supporter Igor Dodon gained first place with 

20.51% of the vote and 25 parliamentary seats. 147 However, the three 

pro-European parties, the Liberal Democrats, Democrats, and 

Liberals, won 45% of the vote and secured a slim parliamentary 

majority of 55 out of 101 seats to form the new government. Another 

new formation, styled as Our Party and headed by Renato Usatii, a 

Russian businessman of Moldovan extraction, also followed a pro- 

Moscow line but was disqualified before the elections on the grounds 

of foreign financing. 148 Following the elections, pro-Moscow parties 

have capitalized on government corruption scandals and staged 

demonstrations in imitation of previous “colored revolutions,” but 

not with the intent to democratize the state and integrate it with the 

EU. 

To pressure the new administration in Chisinau, Moscow opened two 

criminal cases against Prime Minister Chiril Gaburici on charges of 

illegally crossing state borders without valid documents. 149 The 

minority coalition also faced challenges from pro-Eurasian forces 

actively backed by Moscow through its television broadcasts in 

Moldova. Gaburici resigned from office on June 12, 2015, in response 

to a brewing scandal questioning the authenticity of his school-leaving 

certificate, asserting that he no longer wanted to participate in 

political games. His resignation and the appointment of Vladimir 

Strelets as Prime Minister ignited new political battles over the 

composition and longevity of the new government and enabled 

Moscow to reinforce its influence. 

The pro-EU parties rebounded in elections for the mayorship of 

Chisinau on June 28, 2015. 150 Incumbent Dorin Chirtoaca captured 

almost 54% of the vote, while the pro-Putin candidate, Zinaida 

Greceanai, garnered under 47%. Chirtoaca’s victory boosted the pro-


EU parties holding a slender majority in parliament. At the national 

level, the four pro-EU parties gained enough seats to form majorities 

in 22 out of 32 district councils. 151 The ruling Liberal Democratic 

Party (LDP) won the largest number of votes for councilors in village 

and district councils. According to local analysts, the results reflected 

public disappointment with Moscow in failing to provide a market 

for Moldovan products. 

However, the local elections also accelerated the tendency toward 

political-territorial fragmentation of the main part of Moldova 

outside of Transnistria and Gagauzia. 152 Voting patterns closely 

followed ethnic and linguistic lines and the choice between Europe 

and Eurasia. Pro-Russia parties and politicians funded by Moscow 

have entrenched themselves in several regions. Renato Usatii won the 

mayorship of Moldova’s second largest city of Balti, and his 

organization Our Party captured at least six adjoining districts 

(raions) in Moldova’s north. 

In southern Moldova, the drive toward autonomy in Bulgarianpopulated 

Taraclia district was strengthened by election victories for 

the Socialist Party and billionaire Vlad Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party. 

And the town of Orhei in central Moldova became a virtual fiefdom 

of Moscow tycoon Ilan Shor, the newly elected mayor. Such 

developments seriously challenge the country’s unity and pro-EU 

consensus. Additionally, protest rallies have been held in Chisinau 

against President Nicolae Timofti and the current cabinet amidst 

suspicions that Moscow finances and infiltrates movements that can 

be used against the pro-EU administration, as it stands to benefit from 

a collapse of the elected government. 153 

Compounding the disarray in the government coalition, in October 

2015, Liberal-Democrat Party leader Vlad Filat, one of the most pro- 

Western officials, resigned over corruption charges and was promptly 

arrested. Filat’s supporter asserted that the case against him was 

engineered by billionaire Vlad Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party and


supported by Moldova’s pro-Russian organizations, including the 

Socialist Party. 154 On October 29, 2015, Plahotniuc orchestrated a 

parliamentary no-confidence vote that forced the resignation of 

Prime Minister Valeriu Strelet and the collapse of the government. A 

new administration under Prime Minister Pavel Filip was installed in 

January 2015 but faced mounting public protests against official 

corruption that may precipitate an early general election in which pro- 

Moscow parties stand to benefit. 

In response to Russia’s state propaganda—which contributes to 

subverting Moldova’s political system, state independence, territorial 

integrity, and foreign policy—Moldova’s Audio Visual Council, or 

media watchdog, decided to monitor Russian news and analytical 

programs rebroadcast in Moldova. 155 The Council monitors all 

programs by Russia’s television channels as a reaction to their biased 

coverage of the conflict in Ukraine and Chisinau’s foreign policy 

goals. As a result, the government suspended the broadcasts of 

Rossiya-24 on several occasions, in an attempt to curtail Moscow’s 

persistent disinformation campaigns. 156 

Moscow’s economic instruments against Chisinau have included a 

coercive energy policy through the manipulation of supplies, prices, 

and debts, as Moldova is almost fully dependent on Russian energy 

sources. It has also imposed periodic embargoes on Moldovan wine 

and other vital agricultural exports. 157 Russia’s officials complain that 

the EU Association Agreement poses a danger to the Russian market 

by flooding it with EU products and that Moscow is obliged to protect 

its interests by raising customs taxes on Moldovan products and 

imposing restrictions on labor migrants. 158 Moscow’s propaganda 

portrays Moldova to the Russian public as an example of how the 

West is deliberately pushing the neighborhood into damaging 

Russia’s interests. 

In response to Chisinau signing an Association Agreement with the 

EU on June 27, 2014, Russia stopped importing Moldovan fruit and


vegetables, seeking to worsen the country’s economic and social 

climate. According to Agriculture and Food Industry Minister Vasile 

Bumacov, Moldova’s losses could amount to $150 million per annum 

if Russia continues to ban all imports of fresh and canned fruits and 

vegetables. 159 Russia also blatantly violated its agreement on free trade 

with Moldova by applying customs taxes on Moldovan goods. 

According to Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Andrian Candu, 

Russia violates both the CIS agreement on free trade and World Trade 

Organization (WTO) rules. On August 1, 2014, Moscow imposed 

customs duties on goods imported from Moldova in line with the 

tariffs of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 160 

Moldova is also substantially dependent on financial remittances sent 

back by over 700,000 migrant laborers in Russia. Although this 

constitutes another lever of pressure against Chisinau, Moscow is 

unlikely to expel these workers, as they are potential pro-Moscow 

voters in Moldovan elections and their removal could alter their 

voting preferences. 161 

In March 2012, Prime Minister Medvedev appointed the former 

envoy to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, as Special Presidential 

Representative to Transnistria. President Putin also appointed 

Rogozin as chairman of the Russian side of the Russia-Moldova intergovernmental 

cooperation commission. The dual appointment was 

designed to treat the two parts of Moldova separately and contribute 

to institutionalizing the country’s division. Moscow intends to 

upgrade its peacekeeping forces in Transnistria over the coming years 

and may also deploy a radar system, establish a military base, and 

position Iskander missiles in an alleged response to US Missile 

Defense plans and the creation of US bases in Romania. In this way, 

Moldova can become more closely entwined in Russia’s integrationist 

agenda and its separatist regions could become a direct pretext for 

more intensive intervention, as Moscow endeavors to control the 

entire northern Black Sea coastline.


Romania 

Romania’s political elite has no illusions about or favorable historical 

memories of Russia’s policy. They view Moscow as a traditional rival 

that has revived its aspirations toward territories along Romania’s 

northern borders, whether in Moldova or Ukraine. While the struggle 

over Moldova is ever-present, Bucharest also complains that the Black 

Sea has been turned into a Russian-Turkish condominium 

increasingly dominated by Moscow. President Traian Basescu in 

particular resisted Moscow’s pressures and energy enticements, while 

the Kremlin endeavored to appeal to opposition parties to gain a 

political foothold in the country. 

In the aftermath of Russia’s offensive against Ukraine, during 2014, 

Romania intensified its support for Moldova’s EU Association 

Agreement. Basescu also underscored that rationally there was no 

danger to Romania, but Bucharest must also be prepared for the 

irrational. 162 The government has campaigned for a greater presence 

of NATO navy forces in the Black Sea because the major security 

threats were generated by differences in naval capacities between 

Russia and NATO members Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey’s 

proximity notwithstanding. Officials believe that the Monroe Treaty, 

whereby only ships of the riparian countries may station in the Black 

Sea for more than 21 days, should either be amended or there should 

be a more frequent rotation of NATO vessels. 

Moscow’s representative to NATO, Aleksandr Grushko, accused the 

US of eroding regional security by deploying a missile defense shield 

in Europe. He warned that Russia would take measures in response to 

the US army assuming command of a missile defense base in 

Deveselu, Romania. 163 US naval forces established a Naval Support 

Facility (NSF) in Deveselu, on October 10, 2014. In the words of 

Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta, the opening of a permanent


NATO military base on Romania’s territory represented a “strategic 

project.” 164 

Russia’s state propaganda conjures up convoluted schemes to foster 

disputes between neighbors in the Black Sea region. For instance, it 

claims that Kyiv is preparing to forcibly merge Moldova and the 

separatist enclave of Transnistria and will assist Romania in absorbing 

the whole of Moldova. Simultaneously, it charges that Bucharest seeks 

to annex pockets of territory in Ukraine, including northern Bukovina 

and southern Bessarabia. Hence, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine are 

all portrayed as threatening each other’s integrity and statehood. In 

addition, by asserting that Kyiv and Bucharest menace Transnistria’s 

autonomy, Putin can justify a land link between Transnistria and a 

future Novorossiya forcibly sliced away from southern Ukraine. 

Moscow may also threaten both Romania and Ukraine with territorial 

partition by claiming a broad swath of territory for an enlarged 

Moldova. Alternatively, it may back splitting both Ukraine and 

Moldova through the creation of a separate Budjak Republic to 

include Gagauzia, Taraclia, and parts of the Odesa region in Ukraine. 

Romania can then be offered the rest of Moldova and slivers of 

Ukraine in exchange for Bucharest’s recognition of Novorossiya. 

Another avenue to unsettle Romania is the Greater Moldovan 

question. Seeking to turn the tables on Romanian nationalist 

aspirations for uniting Romania and Moldova, the Moldova Mare 

People’s Patriotic Alliance was formed in Balti, Moldova, on May 5, 

2014, to openly support a Greater Moldova within its “historical 

borders” with Russia’s assistance. This would purportedly include 

parts of northern Romania. 165 The organizers stated that they were 

encouraged by Moscow regaining Crimea and claimed to have 

branches inside Romania. Moldova Mare is considered a separatist 

group by both Chisinau and Bucharest, and it has links with Gagauz 

leaders.


On the energy front, Romania was dismissive of the South Stream 

project, viewing it as a tool to deepen the region’s dependence on 

Russian energy. As an oil and gas producer, Romania has one of the 

lowest energy dependence rates in Europe. It has also diversified its 

oil imports, with Kazakhstan supplying twice as much crude oil as 

Russia. 166 Romania previously imported about a quarter of its natural 

gas from Russia, but this is decreasing. As new discoveries of gas 

reserves are registered in the Black Sea shelf, Romania plans to 

become energy self-sufficient by 2020. In April 2015, Romania 

stopped buying Russian gas for several months because its domestic 

gas production exceeded demand. However, its gas consumption is 

expected to grow again after 2020. 167 

Russian companies have sought to penetrate Romania’s energy sector. 

Oil giant Lukoil has operated in the country since 1998 and owns one 

of the largest Romanian refineries in Ploiesti (Lukoil Petrotel). In 

October 2014, Romanian prosecutors started investigating Lukoil 

Petrotel for tax evasion and money laundering, seizing the company’s 

assets. The investigators estimated that the Romanian state lost about 

€230 million due to the company’s illegal activities. As Lukoil 

threatened to permanently close the refinery, President Basescu asked 

his government to be ready to take over the Ploiesti refinery. 168 Lukoil 

planned to appeal accusations of money laundering and tax evasion 

after Romanian prosecutors seized €2 billion ($2.2 billion) worth of 

its assets. 169 

Russia’s energy companies experience greater difficulties in entering 

Romania than other countries in the region. The most recent attempts 

to establish a presence have been through proxies, such as Serbia’s oil 

company Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), in which Gazpromneft has a 

majority stake. NIS has purchased a number of petrol stations in 

Romania, as Russia’s energy companies try to close the circle of 

supply, production, and trade in Romania, similarly to Bulgaria. 170


Romanian politicians and activists have claimed that Russia was 

behind the environmental protests against shale gas exploration by the 

US company Chevron in 2012–2014. Potential shale gas discoveries in 

Central and Eastern Europe would shrink Gazprom’s European 

markets. Hard evidence of money transfers from Russian sources to 

Romanian activists is not readily available. However, the accounts of 

several witnesses point to Moldovan nationals from pro-Russian 

political parties actively agitating the population in eastern Romania 

against Chevron operations. 171 

Bulgarian activists, also suspected of being funded by Russia’s energy 

lobby, have likewise contributed to stirring non-governmental 

organizations in Romania to protest against fracking. On June 5, 2013, 

scores of Bulgarians crossed the border with Romania to join the 

protest against drilling for shale gas. Simultaneous rallies took place 

in Bucharest, Cluj, Sibiu, Mangalia, Iași, Sighisoara, and Brașov in 

Romania, and Sofia, Varna, and Dobrich in Bulgaria. 172 

Anca-Maria Cernea of the conservative Ioan Bărbuş Foundation has 

noted that “the protesters included groups that usually have nothing 

to do with one another, like radical socialists, some with ties to the 

heavily Russian influenced security apparatus in neighboring 

Moldova, and deeply conservative Orthodox priests.” The Russian 

media was extremely active in mobilizing the anti-fracking 

movement, with the newly licensed RT news channel in Romania 

carrying warnings that villagers, along with their crops and animals, 

would perish from poisoned water. 173 While Chevron was bombarded 

with demonstrations, Gazprom’s Serbian subsidiary NIS continued 

conducting shale gas exploration in western Romania. The company 

was never subjected to public protests or objections of any kind, and 

exploration has continued. 

In the metals sector, RusAl, which accounts for 75% of Russia’s 

aluminum output and 10% of global supplies, purchased Cemtrade, a 

Romanian aluminum refinery. RusAl controls an extensive network


of production outlets in several countries, including two giant 

alumina refineries in Ukraine. Russia’s efforts to acquire the 

aluminum industry were viewed with great concern by Romania’s 

intelligence service. They reported that oligarch Oleg Deripaska had 

attempted to take over the entire industry when three state-owned 

aluminum enterprises were slated for privatization. Although 

Deripaska failed to win the tenders, the Russian-Israeli magnate 

Vitaliy Machitsky, with close ties to Gazprom, subsequently acquired 

two aluminum firms, Alum Tulcea and Alro Slatina. 

Endnotes 

1 

Maciej Szymanowski, “Wary of Russia,” Do Rzeczy, Warsaw, September 8, 

2014, pp. 58–59. 

2 

Lubosz Palata, “Prague With Vienna And Closer to Moscow” Gazeta 

Wyborcza, Warsaw, February 2, 2015. 

3 

Peter G. Feher, “A Pole and a Hungarian, Two Bad Friends?” Heti Valasz, 

Budapest, March 13, 2015. 

4 

For a longer analysis see Janusz Bugajski, “Poland and Russia: Strategic 

Rivalry Deferred,” Limes: Italian Geopolitical Review, January 2014, 

http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/anteprima-di-limes-114-polonia-leuropasenza-euro/56481?photo=14. 

5 

Andrzej Talaga, “Little Green Men Polish Style,” Rzeczpospolita, Warsaw, 

February 26, 2015. 

6 

Wiktor Ferfecki, “Pro-Putin Party in Poland,” Rzeczpospolita, Warsaw, 

December 31, 2014. 

7 

Interview with Mateusz Piskorski, leader of Zmiana, by Andrey Vypolzov, 

“Poles Are Awakening,” Newsbalt, Kaliningrad, March 10, 2015, 

http://www.newsbalt.ru. Piskorski invited Aleksandr Kofman, the selfproclaimed 

foreign minister of the Donetsk People's Republic, to attend


Zmiana’s inaugural convention in March 2015. See Jakub Kowalski, “Little 

Red Men.” Rzeczpospolita, Warsaw, March 7–8, 2015. 

8 

Marcin Pienkowski, “Anti-Polish Borderland Trust,” Rzeczpospolita, 

Warsaw, April 22, 2015. Pawel Kowal from the group Poland Together, 

pointed out that in fact Russia holds legal accountability for the Soviet 

Union and any property claims should be lodged with Moscow. 

9 

Elisabeth Braw, “The Kremlin’s Influence Game,” March 10, 2015, World 

Affairs, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabethbraw/kremlin%E2%80%99s-influence-game. 

10 

“FM Schetyna: Pro-Russian Propaganda a ‘Challenge’ for Poland,” 

Warsaw, thenews.pl, February 20, 2015, http://www.thenews.pl. 

11 

Matthew Czekaj, “Russia’s Hybrid War Against Poland,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, April 29, 2015, Volume 12, Issue 80. 

12 

Interview with General Mieczyslaw Gocul, Chief of General Staff of the 

Polish Armed Forces, in Pawel Wronski: “Poland--Russia: Who Calls the 

Shots Here,” Gazeta Wyborcza, Warsaw, December 8, 2014. 

13 

“Moscow Expels Our People,” Gazeta Wyborcza, Warsaw, November 18, 

2014. 

14 

Wojciech Czuchnowski, “Quiet Departure of Spies From Poland?” Gazeta 

Wyborcza, Warsaw, October 23, 2014, p. 6, 

http://kontrowersje.net/czy_kto_wie_kim_jest_stanis_aw_szypowski_praw 

nik_z_polskim_obywatelstwem. 

15 

Marek Kozubal, “Poland Sharpens Its Claws,” Rzeczpospolita, Warsaw, 

November 26, 2014. 

16 

“Polish Security Chief: Poland Should Prepare for a Hybrid War,” 

thenews.pl, Warsaw, March 3, 2015, http://www.thenews.pl. 

17 

Cezary Bielakowski, “Invitation To Don a Uniform,” Wprost, Warsaw, 

February 17, 2015.


Poland has over 80 paramilitary organizations, which formed a federation 

in March 2015. The Ministry of Defense aims to involve these groups in a 

military training program with Poland’s Armed Forces. Such organizations 

include Strzelec (Rifleman), LOK (National Defense League), and Obrona 

Narodowa (National Defense). 

18 

Andrew A. Michta, “Poland Picks US Missile Shield,” The American 

Interest, April 21, 2015, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/byline/michta/. 

19 

Zbigniew Lentowicz, “Polish Weapons for Neighbors,” Rzeczpospolita, 

Warsaw, April 15, 2015. 

20 

For details on military equipment see Zbigniew Lentowicz, “Billions on 

Missiles, Ships, and Drones,” Rzeczpospolita, Warsaw, November 5, 2014, 

and Pawel Wronski, “Machines for Russian Phobias: Polish Army Wants 

To Buy Over 30 Attack Helicopters,” Gazeta Wyborcza, Warsaw, July 17, 

2014. 

21 

“Poland Urges NATO to Push Ahead With Missile Shield,” Warsaw, June 

10, 2014, AFP, http://www.afp.com/en/home. 

22 

Marek Kozubal, “Army To Practice Deployment of NATO Forces to 

Poland,” Warsaw, rp.pl, August 19, 2014, http://www.rp.pl. 

23 

Jedrzej Bielecki, “Germans Coming to Our Rescue,” Rzeczpospolita, 

Warsaw, February 4, 2015. 

24 

“Poles More Skeptical of NATO Alliance?” Warsaw, thenews.pl, March 3, 

2015, www.thenews.pl. 

25 

“European Reassurance Initiative and Other US Efforts in Support of 

NATO Allies and Partners,” The White House, Office of the Press 

Secretary, June 3, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-usefforts-support-.


26 

Jedrzej Bielecki, “NATO Lacks Funds To Defend Poland,” Rzeczpospolita, 

Warsaw, December 3, 2014. 

27 

“Washington Returns to a Cold War Strategy,” January 27, 2015, Stratfor, 

http://www.stratfor.com/sample/geopolitical-diary/washington-returnscold-war-strategy. 

28 

Pawel Wronski, “Waiting for NATO,” Gazeta Wyborcza, Warsaw, July 

28, 2014. 

29 

“Joint Military Brigade: Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania Sign Framework 

Agreement,” Ukraine Today, July 25, 2015, http://uatoday.tv/politics/joint- 

military-brigade-ukraine-poland-lithuania-sign-framework-agreement- 

462648.html. 

30 

Pawel Wronski, “Sanctions Against the National Pride,” Gazeta 

Wyborcza, Warsaw, January 28, 2015. 

31 

“Putin Seems to Have Found Trojan Horse in Central Europe,” CTK, 

Prague, September 3, 2014. 

32 

As an example, the Institute of Slavonic Strategic Studies (ISSTRAS) 

operates in the Czech Republic and promotes Moscow’s positions on its 

website. See “Czech ISSTRAS Institute Spreads Russian Propaganda – 

Press,” Lidove Noviny, August 10, 2014. 

33 

Lubos Palata, “Prague Is Growing Apart From Warsaw and Drifting 

East,” Gazeta Wyborcza, Warsaw, January 12, 2015, p. 12. 

34 

“Czech President Milos Zeman in War of Words Over Russia,” 

http://www.euro2day.gr/ftcom_en/article-ft-en/1302265/czech-presidentmilos-zeman-in-war-of-words-over.html. 

Zeman’s comments were in sharp 

contrast to statements by Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka and Defense 

Minister Martin Stropnicky, who asserted that about 5,000 Russian soldiers 

were fighting in eastern Ukraine. 

35 

“Czech PM Rejects Zeman’s Idea of Finlandisation of Ukraine Policy,” 

CTK, Prague, December 11, 2014.


36 

“Senators Call on Zeman To Stop Dividing Society,” Prague, December 5, 

2014, http://www.ctk.eu/. 

37 

Moscow, Interfax, May 9, 2015, www.interfax.ru. 

38 

“Sanctions Harmed Russian Economy, Did Not Change Conduct - Czech 

PM,” September 10, 2014, Prague, CTK. 

39 

Karel Hrubes, “Spies Pretended To Be Embassy Employees, But BIS Put 

its Finger on Them,” Mlada Fronta Dnes, Prague, March 13, 2015. 

40 

“Most Czechs Consider Russia Threat to Their Country – Poll,” Ceske 

Noviny, Prague, October 24, 2014, 

http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/zpravy/most-czechs-consider-russiathreat-to-their-country-poll/1139147. 

41 

“Most Czechs Are Afraid of Russia, Mainly Secret Services – Poll,” CTK, 

Prague, May 4, 2015. 

42 

“Czech Army Forms New Unit Including Combat Commando, IT 

Experts,” CTK, Prague, May 12, 2015. 

43 

Grigory Mesezhnikov, “West Should Launch Counterattack In War With 

Russia,” Charter 97, July 20, 2015, 

http://charter97.org/en/news/2015/7/20/160609. 

44 

“Fico’s Moscow Visit Sent Slovak Foreign Policy Into Chaos – Press,” 

CTK, Prague, June 8, 2015. 

45 

“Fico: No Reason for Bad Relations With President Kiska,” TASR, 

Bratislava, January 25, 2015, http://www.tasr.sk. 

46 

“Slovak President for Closer Cooperation of V4 Armed Forces,” 

Bratislava, July 7, 2014, www.ctk.cz. 

47 

Milan Suplata, “What Slovakia for NATO?” Central European Policy 

Institute, Bratislava, May 20, 2014.


48 

Jaroslav Nad, Marian Majer and Milan Suplata, “75 Solutions for 

Slovakia’s Defence,” Central European Policy Institute, Bratislava, October 

27, 2014. 

49 

Fico’s statements have been heralded in Moscow as resistance to 

American pressure. See “Fico: I Would Say No to NATO Military Base on 

Slovak Territory,” TASR, Bratislava, September 7, 2014. 

50 

Slobodan Samardzija, “NATO or Warsaw Pact,” Politika Online, 

Belgrade, June 23, 2014, www.politika.rs. 

51 

“SDKU: Fico Acting Like Russian Agent,” TASR, Bratislava, June 25, 

2014, www.tasr.sk. 

52 

“Slovakia Wants to Build Logistics Base for NATO in Poprad,” TASR, 

Bratislava, September 5, 2014, www.tasr.sk. 

53 

“Fico, Zeman Address People Nostalgic for Communism – Radicova,” 

CTK, Bratislava, January 5, 2015, www.ctk.cz. 

54 

Michal Pisko, “Slovaks Do Not Approve of Russia's Intervention in 

Ukraine,” Sme Online, Bratislava, June 23, 2014. 

55 

Charles Gati, “The Mask Is Off,” The American Interest, August 7, 2014, 

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/08/07/the-mask-isoff/. 

56 

Zoltan Simon, “Orban Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy in 

Hungary,” Bloomberg, July 28, 2014. 

57 

“E-PM Turns to Brussels Over Orban Speech,” MTI, Budapest, July 28, 

2014. 

58 

Peter G. Feher, “A Pole and a Hungarian, Two Bad Friends?” Heti Valasz, 

Budapest, March 13, 2015.


59 

“Hungary’s Orban Accuses US of Meddling in Central Europe,” AFP, 

Budapest, December 23, 2014, http://www.afp.com/en/home. 

60 

“Putin Praises Hungary,” Hungary Around the Clock, Budapest, 

November 20, 2014, http://www.hatc.hu. 

61 

“Hungary Seeks EU Alliance to Push Closer Ties With Russia,” AFP, 

Budapest, August 25, 2014, http://www.afp.com/en/home. 

62 

Maksim Samorukov, “How Russia Is Turning Hungary Into an Energy 

Power,” Slon, Moscow, August 6, 2014, http://slon.ru. 

63 

Keith Johnson, “Hungary Is Helping Putin Keep His Chokehold on 

Europe’s Energy,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014, 

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/hungary-is-helping-putin-keep-hischokehold-on-europes-energy. 

64 

“Russia To Prefer Hungary in Lifting Ban,” Hungary Around the Clock, 

Budapest, January 27, 2015, http://www.hatc.hu. 

65 

“Ukraine Hungarians Concerned About Mobilisation, Urge Peaceful 

Resolution,” MTI, Budapest, July 31, 2014. 

66 

According to Petro Hetsko, leader of the Rusyn national movement and 

prime minister of the non-recognized Republic of Subcarpathian Rus, on 

December 1, 1991, simultaneously with Ukraine’s independence 

referendum, two other referenda were held in Transcarpathia. One was an 

oblast-wide ballot where almost 80% of residents voted for Transcarpathia 

as a “special self-governing territory within Ukraine.” A referendum was 

also held on the establishment of a cultural and ethnic autonomous entity 

in Berehivskyy (Berehove) rayon, home to a sizable Hungarian community. 

The results of the vote were declared illegal by Ukraine’s government. 

67 

Svetlana Gomzikova, “March on Kyiv via Budapest; Residents of 

Transcarpathia Appeal to Hungary To Protect Them Against Genocide,” 

Svobodnaya Pressa, August 18, 2014, www.svpressa.ru.


68 

Paul Goble, “Hungary Helping Moscow Destabilize Ukraine from the 

West. Pozhivanov Says,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, March 5, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/hungary-helping-moscowdestabilize.html. 

69 

“The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” President of 

Russia, Official Web Portal, July 12, 2008, 

www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml. According to 

Thomas Graham, a prominent Western apologist for Russia’s imperial 

policies toward neighboring states, the “near abroad” occupies a “special 

place” in the “Russian psyche,” and this “emotional yearning” needs to be 

“accommodated.” See Thomas Graham, “US-Russia Relations: Facing 

Reality Pragmatically,” in Europe, Russia and the United States: Finding a 

New Balance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 

D.C., July 2008, p. 12. 

70 

Wolfgang Gerke and P.S. Zolotarev, “Russian-German Relations in the 

Context of Global Politics,” International Affairs 53, Issue 3 (2007): 90. 

71 

Moscow claims that Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors are “united by 

centuries of historical, cultural, and economic ties.” Check Tanguy de 

Wilde and Gaelle Pellon, “The Implications of the European 

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) on the EU-Russian ‘Strategic Partnership,’ ” 

Helsinki Monitor 17 (2), 127. In reality, Russia and its neighbors are mostly 

“united” by centuries of conflict, conquest, colonialism, and Russification, 

with a 20 th century veneer of communist totalitarianism and Soviet 

imperialism. Moscow flexes its neo-imperial muscle through a language 

campaign promoting Russian as the lingua franca throughout the CIS and 

undermining governments focused on reviving national identity and 

indigenous languages after years of Russification. Only Belarus currently 

recognizes Russian as a state language. 

72 

Rainer Lindner, “New Realism: The Making of Russia’s Foreign Policy in 

the Post-Soviet World,” The EU-Russia Centre Review, Issue 8, Russian 

Foreign Policy, Eurasia Centre, October 2008, p. 30. 

73 

James Sherr, “Russia and the ‘Near Abroad,’ in a Medvedev Presidency,” 

in Russia After Putin: Implications for Russia’s Politics and Neighbors,


Institute for Security and Development Policy, Policy Paper, March 2008, 

pp. 28–29. 

74 

For a summary of official threats to the territorial integrity of neighbors 

see Vladimir Socor, “Moscow Makes Furious but Empty Threats to Georgia 

and Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 14, 2008, Volume 5, Issue 70. 

75 

Matthew Schofield, “Russian News Report: Ukraine Invasion Strategy 

Existed Before Collapse,” McClatchy Foreign Staff, February 21, 2015, 

http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/67389.html?print=1 and 

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/02/21/257386/russian-news-reportukraine-invasion.html. 

76 

Vladimir Socor, “Minsk Armistice: Enforced at Ukraine’s Expense? 

Eurasian Daily Monitor, July 20, 2015, Volume 12, Issue 135. 

77 

Index Mundi, “Ukraine Country Profile, 2014,” 

http://www.indexmundi.com/ukraine. 

78 

For the full text of Minsk II see http://www.unian.info/politics/1043394- 

minsk-agreement-full-text-in-english.html. 

79 

Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine Rapidly Dismantling Gazprom’s Supply 

Monopoly,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 8, 2015, Volume 12, Issue 65. 

80 

Anders Åslund, “Ukraine Is More Important Than Greece,” Atlantic 

Council, July 6, 2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/newatlanticist/ukraine-is-more-important-than-greece. 

81 

Paul Goble, “Moscow Patriarch Says Ukrainian Faithful No Longer 

Obligated to Obey Kyiv,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 2, 2015, Volume 12, 

Issue 102. 

82 

Paul Goble, “The Two Major Non-Moscow Ukrainian Orthodox 

Churches Move Toward Unity, Window on Eurasia – New Series, June 10, 

2015, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/06/the-two-major-nonmoscow-ukrainian.html.


83 

Paul Goble, “To Moscow’s Making of Republics Inside Ukraine, There is 

Apparently No End,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, April 8, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/04/to-moscows-making-ofrepublics-inside.html; 

and Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine Defuses Pro-Russia 

Instigations in Odesa Province,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 9, 2015, 

Volume 12, Issue 66. 

84 

Nina Perstneva, "In the Quiet Besssarabian Whirlpool..." Zerkalo Nedeli 

Online, Kyiv, April 10, 2015, http://zn.ua. 

85 

Paul Goble, “Ukraine Must Organize to Fight and Win Cyberwar against 

Russia, Analyst Says,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, February 22, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/02/ukraine-must-organizeto-fight-and-win.html. 

86 

“Ukraine Sets Sights on Joining NATO,” Reuters, Kyiv, April 9, 2015. 

87 

Paul Goble, “Two-Thirds of Ukrainians Want to Join NATO and Be 

Inside ‘Borders of Civilized World,’ Portnikov Says,” Window on Eurasia – 

New Series, August 16, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/08/two-thirds-of-ukrainianswant-to-join.html. 

88 

“ATO Headquarters: Russia Continues to Concentrate Troops On 

Border With Ukraine And Donbas,” Unian Information Agency, June 26, 

2015, http://www.unian.info/war/1094127-ato-headquarters-russiacontinues-to-concentrate-troops-on-border-with-ukraine-anddonbas.html. 

89 

Interfax, Kyiv, January 20, 2015, http://www.interfax.com. 

90 

Anna Cherevko, “Battle Noise Simulator for Ukraine,” Glavkom, Kyiv, 

December 10, 2014, http://glavcom.ua. 

91 

“Ukraine Crisis: Deadly Bomb Blast Hits Rally in Kharkiv,” BBC News, 

February 22, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31575384.


92 

Alyaksandr Klaskowski, “2015 Election: Will Russia Spoil Lukashenka’s 

Mood?” Belorusskiye Novosti, Minsk, September 8, 2014, http://naviny.by. 

93 

Paul Goble, “Lukashenka Now a ‘Lesser Evil’ for Belarusians than Putin, 

Popular Front Party Leader Says,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, March 

9, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/lukashenka-now-lesserevil-for.html. 

94 

Paul Goble, “Most Belarusian Officers Ready to Take Orders from 

Moscow, Borodach Says,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, September 12, 

2014, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/09/window-on-eurasiamost-belarusian.html. 

95 

Henadz Kosaraw, “Air Warning: What Is The Threat Posed By The 

Reinforcement Of Russia's Air Base In Babruysk,” Zawtra Tvayoy Krainy, 

Minsk, December 24, 2014, www.zautra.by. 

96 

Kaarel Kaas, “Russian Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea Region,” 

Diplomaatia, Estonia, August 7, 2014, 

http://icds.ee/index.php?id=73&L=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1547&tx 

_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=71&cHash=db5c854d31. 

97 

Paul Goble, “Putin’s Plan for Military Base in Belarus Destabilizing that 

Country,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, September 29, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/09/putins-plan-for-militarybase-in.html. 

98 

Interview with Pavel Usov, head of the Center of Political Analysis and 

Forecast, by Konstantin Amelyushkin, “Analyst: Kremlin Is Capable of 

Turning Belarus Into Its Bridgehead,” Vilnius, Delfi, December 25, 2014, 

http://www.ru.delfi.lt. 

99 

Natallya Pravalinskaya and Yelena Vasilyeva, “Is Belarus Prepared For 

Challenges?” BelGazeta, Minsk, June 23, 2014. 

100 

Paul Goble, “Belarusian Spy Agencies’ Cooperation with Russian Ones in 

Lithuania Highlights Larger Problem,” Window on Eurasia – New Series,


March 31, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/belarusian-spy-agenciescooperation.html. 

101 

Belorusskiye Novosti, Minsk, July 7, 2014, http://naviny.by. 

102 

Grigory Ioffe, “Lukashenka’s Marathon Press Conference in Minsk,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 5, 2015, Volume 12, Issue 23. 

103 

Paul Goble, “Putin’s ‘Hybrid War’ Prompts Belarus to Redefine 

‘Invasion,’” Window on Eurasia – New Series, January 26, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/01/food-prices-inkaliningrad-rising-far.html. 

104 

Paul Goble, “Moscow Readying Neo-Cossacks of Belarus for Use Against 

Lukashenka,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 5, 2015, Vol. 12, Issue 84. 

105 

Grigory Ioffe, “Reasserting Belarus’s Independent Voice,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, January 23, 2015, Vol. 12, Issue 14. 

106 

A Belarusian-Ukrainian agreement on the adoption of border 

demarcation regulations was signed in Chernihiv, Ukraine, on July 30, 

2014. The agreement will make it possible to speed up the demarcation of 

the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. See Belapan, Minsk, July 30, 2014. 

107 

Minsk, Belapan, February 19, 2015. 

108 

"Ukraine Conflict Fuels Patriotism in Authoritarian Belarus," Minsk, 

October 22, 2014, AFP, North European Service, 


109 

Dzyanis Lawnikevich, “Lukashenka Trying National Costume,” 

Gazeta.ru, Moscow, December 21, 2014, http://www.gazeta.ru. A 

monument to Olgerd, a ruler of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, in which the 

ancestors of Belarusians played an important role, was unveiled in Vitebsk 

in June 2014. Vitebsk governor Alyaksandr Kasinets praised the prince’s 

historical mission in the development of Belarusian statehood. Lukashenka 

surprised everyone with his speeches in Belarusian and warnings over


threats to national unity and independence. See Alyaksandr Yarashevich, 

“Lukashenka Uses Belarusian Language As Shield Against Russian World,” 

Belorusskiye Novosti, July 9, 2014, http://naviny.by. 

110 

Leaflets calling for preparations for a guerrilla war against Russia have 

been disseminated in some cities in Belarus. Exiled Belarusian nationalist 

leader Zyanon Paznyak claimed that Putin might encroach on Belarus and 

called on Belarusians to start forming small armed groups and prepare for 

resistance. See Belorusskiy Partizan, Minsk, July 16, 2014. Some Belarusian 

volunteers also reportedly joined Ukrainian military operations against pro- 

Moscow separatists in Donbas. 

111 

Paul Goble, “Belarusian Nationalism Emerges as a Political Force,” 

Window on Eurasia – New Series, December 22, 2014, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/12/window-on-eurasiabelarusian.html. 

112 

Reid Standish, “Russia May Need to Say ‘Do Svidaniya’ to Belarus,” 

Foreign Policy, January 30, 2015, 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/30/russia-may-need-to-say-dosvidaniya-to-belarus. 

113 

Alyaksandr Klaskouski, “Minsk Congratulated Putin With Surprise Up 

Its Sleeve,” Minsk, Belorusskiye Novosti, Minsk, October 9, 2014, 

http://naviny.by/Parliamentary. Parliament expressed reservations about 

the removal of barriers in the sale of particular goods and the provision of 

certain services, particularly in the energy field. Minsk insisted on 

compensation for future losses that the Belarusian oil industry will suffer in 

re-exporting oil products. 

114 

Tatsyana Kalynowska, “Lukashenka Between Devil and Deep Blue Sea,” 

Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, August 26, 2014, www.pravda.com.ua. 

115 

Alyaksandr Klaskowski, "Lukashenka and Makey Played Up To Lavrov, 

But Had Own Things In Mind," Belorusskiye Novosti, Minsk, November 19, 

2014, http://naviny.by. The Russia sanctions initially benefited Belarus in 

such areas as transportation, agriculture, and food processing. Belarus’s 

food exports to Russia grew substantially, particularly to Kaliningrad as a


result of Moscow’s counter-sanctions on the EU. 

116 

Index Mundi, “Belarus Country Profile, 2014,” 

http://www.indexmundi.com/belarus. 

117 

Alyaksandr Klaskovski, “On The Eve of Putin's Visit, Lukashenka Spoke 

About Independence in Belarusian,” Minsk, Belorusskiye Novosti, July 2, 

2014, http://naviny.by. 

118 

Paul Goble, “Russian Nationalist Calls for Partition of Belarus to Correct 

Soviet ‘Mistakes,’” Window on Eurasia – New Series, March 16, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/russian-nationalist-callsfor-partition.html. 

119 

Alyaksandr Yurych, “Klaskowski: Moscow Once May Need Not a Little 

War, But Anschluss of Belarus,” Minsk, Zawtra Tvayoy Krainy, June 18, 

2014, www.zautra.by. 

120 

Paul Goble, “Moscow’s Pressure on Belarus Increasingly 

Counterproductive,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 69, April 14, 

2015. 

121 

Vladimir Solovyev and Yelizaveta Surnacheva, “Moldovan Voices: 

Chisinau Ahead of Parliamentary Election,” Kommersant, Moscow, 

November 24, 2014, http://kommersant.ru. 

122 

Sergey Aksenov, “Poroshenko Is Prepared to Fight in Transnistria. 

Russia Will Apparently Have To Take the Republic's Population Under Its 

Protection On An Emergency Basis And Recognize The PMR,” Svobodnaya 

Pressa, Moscow March 18, 2015, http://www.svpressa.ru. 

123 

Andrei Safonov, “Ukraine is Being Played Against Transnistria. Romania 

Is the Beneficiary!” Informatsionnyy Portal Andreya Safonova, December 

20, 2014, http://safonovpmr.com. 

124 

Index Mundi, “Moldova Country Profile, 2014,” 

http://www.indexmundi.com/moldova/population.html, and


“Demographic History of Transnistria,” Wikipeda, 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Transnistria. 

125 

Vladimir Socor, “Putin-Voronin Farewell: An Anti-Climactic Coda,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 25, 2008, Vol. 5, Issue 15. 

126 

Interfax, Moscow, October 20, 2014, http://www.interfax.com. 

127 

Interfax, Moscow, October 2, 2014, http://www.interfax.com. 

128 

Interfax, Moscow, July 10, 2014, http://www.interfax.com. 

129 

Darya Laptiyeva, “ ‘If Necessary, We Will Go In,’ Russia Promises Not 

To Abandon Transnistria,” Lenta.ru, Moscow, January 27, 2015, 

http://lenta.ru. 

130 

Paul Goble, “Encouraged By Initial Russian Moves In Ukraine, 

Transnistria Now Fears For Its Future,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 20, 

2015, Volume 12, Issue 11. 

131 

Tiras.ru June 15, 2015, http://tiras.ru. 

132 

Interfax, Kyiv, September 12, 2014, http://www.interfax.com. 

133 

Unian, Kyiv, June 8, 2015, and Dniester Channel One Television Online, 

Tiraspol, May 28, 2015, http://tv.pgtrk.ru. 

134 

Interfax, Odesa, June 9, 2015, http://www.interfax.com. 

135 

“Ukraine Intends To Have Russian Peacekeepers Leave The Dniester 

Region,” Vzglyad Online, Moscow, July 22, 2014, www.vzglyad.ru. 

136 

Unian, Kyiv, September 8, 2014, http://www.unian.net/world/960308- 

zelenyie-chelovechki-poyavilis-na-territorii-moldovyi-snbo.html. 

137 

Mariana Rata, “Hybrid-Soldiers Of Moldova,” Ziarul National Online, 

Chisinau, October 3, 2014, www.ziarulnational.md.


138 

“Gagauzia Voters Reject Closer EU Ties For Moldova,” RFE/RL's 

Moldovan Service February 3, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/moldovagagauz-referendum-counting/25251251.html. 

139 

“Andrievschi Calls Gagauzia’s Present State a Potential ‘Second 

Donbas,’ ” Gagauzinfo.MD, Comrat, January 8, 2015, http://gagauzinfo.md. 

140 

“Moscow Could Activate ‘Gagauz Component’ in Moldova Elections,” 

Gagauz.info, Comrat, October 9, 2014, http://gagauzinfo.md. 

141 

Paul Goble, “Kremlin’s Candidate Wins Race in Gagauzia, Pointing to 

More Trouble Ahead in Moldova,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, March 

23, 2015, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/kremlinscandidate-wins-race-in.html. 

142 

For a valuable analysis of autonomist and separatist opportunities 

exploited by Moscow in south Moldova and south west Ukraine see “A 

Quarrel In A Far-Away Country: The Rise Of A Budzhak People’s 

Republic?” John R. Haines, Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 2015, 

http://www.fpri.org/articles/2015/04/quarrel-far-away-country-risebudzhak-peoples-republic. 

143 

Nicolae Negru, "Bulgar-Yeri,” Ziarul National Online, Chisinau, April 6, 

2015, http://www.ziarulnational.md. 

144 

Infotag, Chisinau, March 5, 2015, http://www.infotag.md. 

145 

Nicolae Negru, “Between A Compromise And Party Interests,” Ziarul 

National Online, Chisinau, July 22, 2014, www.ziarulnational.md. 

146 

Svetlana Gamova, “Door to Russia Being Closed to Gagauz. Moldovan 

Parliament Intends to Curtail Southern Autonomy’s Rights,” Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta Online, Moscow, August 15, 2014, http://www.ng.ru/. 

147 

“Moldovans Choose Europe, Barely,” The Economist, Chisinau, 

December 1, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21635339- 

moldovans-choose-europe-barely.


148 

A helpful overview can be found in Vladimir Socor, “Moldova’s New 

Government: Daunting Challenges Ahead,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 

6, 2015, Volume 12, Issue 42. 

149 

Infotag, Chisinau, February 18, 2015, http://www.infotag.md. 

150 

Corneliu Rusnac, “Pro-European candidate leads in Moldova vote,” 

Associated Press, June 28, 2015, https://www.yahoo.com/news/moldovachooses-between-russia-europe-local-elections-051921841.html. 

151 

Ziarul National Online, Chisinau, June 16, 2015, 

http://www.ziarulnational.md. 

152 

Vladimir Socor, “Net Setback for Moldova and Its Reforms in the Latest 

Elections (Part Two),” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 2, 2015, Volume 12, 

Issue 124. 

153 

Based on discussions by the authors in Chisinau, Moldova in November 

2015. 

154 

Vladimir Socor, “Moldovan Political Leader Filat Arrested in Intra- 

Coalition Coup,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 19, 2015, Volume 12, 

Issue 188. 

155 

Infotag, Chisinau, March 4, 2015, http://www.infotag.md. 

156 

Interfax, Chisinau, May 27, 2015, http://www.interfax.com. 

157 

Chloe Bruce, “Power Resources: The Political Agenda in Russo- 

Moldovan Gas Relations,” Problems of Post-Communism, No. 54, Issue 3, 

May/June 2007, pp. 29–47. 

158 

Nicolae Negru, "Ukraineization of the Republic of Moldova,” Ziarul 

National Online, Chisinau, July 18, 2014, www.ziarulnational.md. 

159 

Infotag, Chisinau, July 22, 2014, http://www.infotag.md. 

160 

Infotag, Chisinau, September 10, 2014, http://www.infotag.md.


161 

Dumitru Minzarari, “Russia Likely to Review Its Strategy Toward 

Moldova,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 23, 2014, Volume 11, Issue 134. 

162 

“Traian Basescu: Rationally, There Is No Danger To Romania; We Have 

To Be Prepared For The Irrational,” Agerpres, Bucharest, August 29, 2014, 

http://www.agerpres.ro/. 

163 

R.C, “Russia Will Take Measures To US Missile Defense Shield 

Deployment In Romania,” 

Cotidianul Online, Bucharest, October 15, 2014, www.cotidianul.ro. 

164 

“Ponta: Desire To Have Permanent NATO Military Presence In 

Romania, A Strategic Project” Agerpres, Bucharest, August 25, 2014, 

http://www.agerpres.ro/. 

165 

Alexandru Tocarschi, “ ‘Secret’ Meeting in Balti. Beyond the Prut Pro- 

Moldavia Organizations Are in a Semi-Clandestine State,” MK Moldova 

Online, Chisinau, June 25, 2014, http://mk.kn.md. 

166 

Romania imports only 15% of its oil needs—65% from Kazakhstan, 30% 

from Russia, and smaller quantities from Azerbaijan and Iraq. See Eurostat: 

Energy Dependency 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/productsdatasets/-/TSDCC310; 

and “In-Depth Study of European Energy Security,” 

European Commission, Brussels, July 2, 2014, 

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20140528_energy_se 

curity_study_0.pdf. 

167 

“Economica: Romania Plans to Abandon Russian Gas Imports in April 

2015,” Focus News Agency, March 21, 2015; “Romania No Longer Relies on 

Russian Gas for First Time in Decades,” Ukraine Today TV, March 20, 

2015, http://uatoday.tv/business/romania-no-longer-relies-on-russian-gasfor-first-time-in-decades-416782.html. 

168 

“Romanian President: Government Should be Prepared to Take Over 

Lukoil Refinery if Russians Decide to Shut it Down,” Romania Insider, 

October 9, 2014, http://www.romania-insider.com/romanian-president-


government-should-be-prepared-to-take-over-lukoil-refinery-if-russiansdecide-to-shut-it-down/133220. 

169 

“Lukoil Set to Fight Romania Money-Laundering Case,” CNBC, July 10, 

2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/10/lukoil-set-to-fight-romaniamoney-laundering-case.html. 

170 

Based on interviews by the authors with Romanian government officials 

and energy experts in Bucharest, November 2014. 

171 

Interviews by authors in Bucharest, Romania in November 2014. 

172 

“Bulgaria, Romania Launch Wave of Anti-Fracking Protests,” 

Novite.com, June 5, 2013, 

http://www.novinite.com/articles/150993/Bulgaria,+Romania+Launch+Wa 

ve+of+Anti-Fracking+Protests#sthash.hl5z8tFR.dpuf. 

173 

Andrew Higgins, “Russian Money Suspected Behind Fracking Protests,” 

The New York Times, November 30, 2014, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/01/world/russian-money-suspectedbehind-fracking-protests.html.

4. South Western Flank: South East 

Europe 

The Balkan Peninsula is viewed by Moscow as Europe’s weakest link. 

The Western Balkans in particular are important to Moscow from a 

propagandistic vantage point vis-à-vis Washington. The fracturing of 

Yugoslavia in the 1990s is exploited as evidence of an alleged Western 

conspiracy to overthrow governments, break up states, and change 

international borders. Such actions have evidently challenged the 

international legal order and set precedents for Russia’s policies 

toward its post-Soviet neighbors. 

Despite their EU and NATO membership, Greece and Bulgaria are 

considered potentially pliable states that can, on occasion, favor 

Russia’s interests. However, the Western Balkans are viewed as 

Europe‘s “soft underbelly,” where the Kremlin can capitalize on local 

conflicts, democratic deficits, and nationalist surpluses to undermine 

Western objectives and promote its geopolitical ambitions. The 

financial crisis in Greece has also generated political radicalism 

beneficial for Moscow. Both the extreme right and radical left parties 

in Athens are anti-American and view Russia as a close ally. The 

election of the ultra-left Syriza movement in January 2015 bolstered 

Moscow’s opportunities for using Greece to undermine EU and 

NATO unity.


Balkan Front 

Since the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Russian government has 

opportunistically exploited ethno-national grievances and divisions to 

gain political leverage with favored governments. Given the stuttering 

progress of most West Balkan states toward EU and NATO accession, 

the persistence of ethnic tensions, the weakness of national 

institutions, and the susceptibility of government officials to 

corruption, the region has grown in importance as a locus of Russia’s 

interest and influence. 

Moscow pursues four main channels of entry into the region: 

nationalism, corruption, business, and propaganda. First, ethnonationalism 

is a combustible substance that can be encouraged and 

exploited by the Kremlin overtly or covertly, whether through 

diplomatic backing, international campaigning, direct or indirect 

funding of extremist groups, media exposure, or linkages with 

Russia‘s intelligence services and ultra-nationalist formations. 

Russian propagandists and pro-Kremlin academics seek to drive 

wedges between Muslims and Christians in the region and incite 

Islamophobia to stir local nationalisms. Some have claimed that 

radical Islamists will try to seize Serb-populated territories and 

conduct terrorist attacks in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, 

and other states. 1 They also claim that Albanian Muslims throughout 

the region are secretly preparing for armed conflicts against Christian 

populations. 

Moscow’s support for nationalist groups has been evident with the 

radical right Ataka movement in Bulgaria and various Serbian 

nationalist formations in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 

Montenegro. Although Syriza in Greece is not a nationalist grouping 

but an ultra-leftist formation, its deep-rooted anti-Americanism and 

resentment against Germany for imposing tough conditions to secure 

crucial bailout loans has suited Moscow. Promoting local nationalism

SOUTH WESTERN FLANK | 221 

or leftist statism can contribute to undermining support for NATO, 

the US, and the EU, it can raise sympathies for Moscow’s international 

positions, and it may stir regional rivalries that preoccupy Western 

institutions and empower the Kremlin to inject itself as a mediator. 

Second, Moscow encourages political corruption throughout Europe. 

In the Balkans, where the rule of law remains relatively weak, 

politicians are especially vulnerable to Moscow’s enticements. 

Various public figures are targeted, including national and local 

politicians, government ministers, security personnel, businessmen, 

and media heads. The objectives are both political and economic. 

Through outright bribery or opaque transactions, Balkan officials may 

favor Russian business interests and remain neutral or support 

Moscow in its foreign policy offensives. This can undermine Western 

unity whether in the NATO or EU contexts. 

Political corruption is also evident in funding for NGOs that support 

positions at odds with EU and US policy. This has been visible in the 

campaign against shale gas development in Bulgaria, which would 

reduce Russia’s preponderance as an energy supplier. Russian sources 

have reportedly funded Bulgarian and Romanian environmentalist 

groups. Similarly, some individuals involved in the protest campaign 

in Tirana in the fall of 2013 against Washington‘s request to dismantle 

chemical weapons agents from Syria inside Albania allegedly 

maintained contacts with the Russian embassy in Tirana. 2 

A third well-tested method of Russian influence is the fostering of 

energy dependence. This included tying Balkan countries into South 

Stream and other energy project led by Gazprom and gaining majority 

shares in local pipelines, refineries, and other energy facilities. Energy 

dependence can undergird diplomatic and political compliance. 

Serbia has been the most prone to Moscow’s energy inducements, 

having sold majority shares of its NIS (Naftna Industrija Srbije) oil 

and gas complex to Gazprom. Belgrade has favored Russian


investment and energy supplies partly as a form of reciprocity for 

Moscow blocking its former province of Kosova from membership in 

the United Nations. The Kremlin has also offered aid and investment 

to the Serb Republic (RS) entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a way to 

court a potential ally. 

The Kremlin promotes economic dependence by using energy 

resources, state loans, and business investments to gain political 

influence. Since the late 1990s, Russia’s energy giants such as Lukoil 

and Gazprom have made inroads in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and 

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Plans to build major energy transportation 

systems between the Black Sea and the Adriatic Sea and Central 

Europe placed the Balkans at the center of Russia’s South European 

strategy. Moscow seeks to monopolize the supply of natural gas 

passing through the region to Western Europe. Contracts and 

investments provide the Kremlin with significant inroads in a targeted 

country’s economy and substantial influence over its foreign policy. 

Planned cross-regional pipelines have been calculated to place Serbia 

and Bulgaria, in particular, at the center of Russia’s energy ambitions 

and prevent the construction of an energy network independent of 

Russia that would link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe. 

Countries with fewer alternative sources of supply are more 

vulnerable to energy blackmail, high energy prices, and political 

interference. The most illustrative examples include Bulgaria, 

Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which have been among 

the most ardent supporters of Russian energy projects such as South 

Stream but pay some of the highest prices for Russian natural gas. 3 

These countries also have a high proportion of Russian energy asset 

acquisitions and critical energy contracts. Russian economic 

penetration is much more restricted in countries that have their own 

oil and gas reserves, such as Romania and Croatia. 

Although dependence on Russian crude oil is generally higher than 

on gas, the existing alternatives to oil supplies and transportation


options make it secondary to gas when used by the Kremlin as a form 

of pressure. Russia has also focused on expanding the presence of its 

oil giants Lukoil, Gazprom Oil, and Zarubezhneft on the Balkan 

market by investing in the oil and petrochemical industry, critical 

asset acquisitions such as oil refineries (Bulgaria, Romania), gas 

stations and oil storage facilities throughout the region, and energy 

distribution companies such as NIS and Beopetrol in Serbia, Europemil 

in Croatia, and Montenegro Bonus in Montenegro. Russian oil 

companies have also engaged in geological exploration and 

development of oil fields in the Balkan countries and the Black Sea 

shelf. 

The natural gas sector in the Balkans, including Greece, Romania, 

Croatia, and Slovenia, is small, with annual consumption of 26 billion 

cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year according to data from 2013, of 

which more than half is locally produced and only 10 bcm imported 

from Russia. 4 Nevertheless, the Balkans have become a battleground 

for several gas pipeline projects, with the now defunct South Stream 

managing to involve almost all countries in the region. Promising 

large investments, high transit fees and taxes, and thousands of jobs 

to the unemployment stricken economies, Moscow succeeded in 

pitting these countries against the EU as lobbyists to exempt the 

pipeline from EU laws. 

South Stream’s main purpose was political. It aimed to bypass Ukraine 

as a transit country and eliminate the Trans-Balkan pipeline as a 

major supply line; undermine the Nabucco pipeline as an alternative 

gas route from the Caspian basin to Central Europe, and divide EU 

members over Union regulations. The main line for Russian gas to the 

Balkans is the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline, which traverses Ukraine and 

Moldova toward Greece and Turkey. Moscow has been trying to close 

this pipeline since 2006, in order to circumvent Ukraine as a transit 

country for its gas deliveries to Europe.


However, Kremlin plans to construct South Stream fell apart under 

legal pressure from Brussels as well as Russia’s worsening financial 

situation due to Western sanctions and falling oil prices. The 

proposed substitute, Turkish Stream, which is slated to come onshore 

in Turkey and bypass Bulgaria, will experience even greater financial 

troubles as Russia has lost its Western investors. Gazprom’s South 

Stream partners, the Italian ENI, German Wintershall, and French 

EDF, recuperated their investments in the cancelled project and seem 

uninterested in constructing Turkish Stream. 

Since the cancelation of South Stream in December 2014, Moscow has 

been courting Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia to recruit investors and 

build Turkish Stream. For Skopje, the pipeline is dubbed the Trans- 

Macedonian pipeline, while for Belgrade it is called Balkan Stream. 5 

Nevertheless, the project is not one of the top three priorities for 

Macedonia. Instead, Skopje announced that it intends to join the 

Azerbaijan-led Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) initiative. 6 It would 

consider joining Turkish Stream only if Brussels and Moscow reach 

an agreement, which remains a distant prospect. Serbia has expressed 

a similar position on taking the lead from Brussels rather than 

Moscow, despite its close relations with Russia. 7 The strategic purpose 

of Turkish Stream is similar to South Stream: to isolate Ukraine, 

undermine the strategic importance of the Azerbaijan-led Southern 

Gas Corridor, and create divisions among EU members. Furthermore, 

through Turkish Stream, Moscow aims to undermine Azerbaijan’s 

strategic partnership with Turkey, torpedo Baku’s budding relations 

with southeast European capitals, and stall its expanding partnership 

with the EU. 

In the fourth component of its Balkan strategy, the Russian state 

engages in propaganda offensives through the local media, Internet, 

and social networks to enhance Moscow’s position and undermine 

Western institutions or to discredit local politicians who favor NATO 

and the US. For instance, Montenegro’s Prime Minister Milo 

Đukanović has come under intense attack from Russia’s officials and


media outlets in recent years for openly petitioning for NATO 

membership. 

Strident messages are intended to appeal to anti-globalist, 

euroskeptic, anti-American, ultra-conservative, and religious 

orthodox constituencies in which Russia poses as the defender of 

traditional values and the EU and US are depicted as deviant and 

immoral. Russia’s Orthodox Church also upholds close ties with the 

Serbian and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches to coordinate their 

promulgation of ultra-conservatism and anti-liberalism. Additionally, 

Moscow has supported political leaders who have been criticized by 

Washington and Brussels for backtracking on democracy. The most 

prominent recent example is Macedonia’s Prime Minister Nikola 

Gruevski, whom Moscow has defended against allegations of 

pervasive government abuses, claiming instead that the US seeks to 

conduct another “color revolution” to install a more loyalist 

government in Skopje. 

A tepid Western reaction to Moscow’s attack on Ukraine can 

encourage separatist aspirations in parts of the Western Balkans, 

especially if these can gain Moscow’s endorsement. The Kremlin has 

signaled to Milorad Dodik, President of the Republika Srpska (RS) 

quasi-autonomous entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it may back the 

potential partition of this divided state. At the height of the Crimea 

crisis in March 2014, Moscow hosted Dodik, whose threats to secede 

from Bosnia-Herzegovina have periodically escalated tensions in the 

country. Dodik returned home with €70 million to strengthen his 

position ahead of national elections. 

The government in Serbia will need to tread a fine line between 

deepening its economic and energy ties with Russia, supporting 

Bosnia’s Serb leaders, and realizing its aspirations to join the EU. If 

Dodik pushes for a referendum on secession, then Belgrade may be 

unwittingly drawn into the ensuing dispute. Serbia will be unable to


sit on the sidelines if conflicts escalate in Bosnia between Serbs, 

Bosniaks, and Croats and if Moscow assists its “endangered Slavic 

brothers” in the RS. In a worst-case scenario, direct conflict could 

erupt between Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia over the future of Bosnia- 

Herzegovina and the position of its constituent nations, thus 

sabotaging the EU integration project in the region. 

If the West fails to prevent Ukraine’s division, several radical groups 

in the Western Balkans may be encouraged to canvas for autonomy 

or secession. These could include Bosniaks or Albanians in southern 

Serbia and Albanians in western Macedonia. Such heightened 

ambitions feeding on social and economic grievances and unresolved 

territorial disputes would heat up tensions between governments 

across the region and provide Moscow with further avenues of 

penetration. Instability in the Western Balkans has three direct 

implications for EU and US policy. First, it distracts Western attention 

from the Kremlin’s offensive in Ukraine and potentially elsewhere 

closer to Russia’s borders. Renewed disputes ensnare Western 

diplomacy and peace-making efforts and allow the Kremlin a freer 

hand to pursue its objectives in the former Soviet Union. 

Second, ethno-national conflicts in the Western Balkans help provide 

a cover and justification for the dismemberment of Ukraine, Moldova, 

Georgia, and other states that have been earmarked by the Kremlin. 

Russia’s officials can claim in international forums that they are 

simply acknowledging the will of the majority and the principles of 

self-determination that are also visible in the West Balkans and which 

have been supported by Western powers. 

And third, by encouraging nationalist disputes and corrupting the 

political leadership throughout South East Europe, Putin will hope to 

procure new allies who will be offered diplomatic support, economic 

assistance, and energy benefits. At the same time, the ultimate 

objective of Western capitals to include the entire region within the 

EU and NATO could suffer long-term setbacks.


Bulgaria 

Bulgaria has always been considered a good prospect by Moscow for 

gaining political influence if not outright state capture. Old Socialist 

networks, a selective historical memory regarding Slavic solidarity 

and Russian assistance against Ottoman occupation, elite 

susceptibility to lucrative corruption, and offers of profitable energy 

contracts have enticed Sofia closer to Moscow. Nonetheless, there is a 

struggle in Bulgaria over Russia’s influence, as some politicians realize 

that short-term benefits could be followed by long-term costs. This 

was evident in Russian investments in Montenegro that virtually 

bankrupted the country’s most important Aluminum enterprise. The 

struggle over South Stream and other energy plans highlighted how 

Moscow exploits political divisions to weaken NATO and the EU and 

uses countries such as Bulgaria as pawns in its anti-Western offensive. 

On the propaganda, disinformation, and psychological operations 

(psych-ops) fronts, Bulgarian Defense Minister Nikolay Nenchev 

stated that a Russian propaganda center operated in Bulgaria, 

designed to generate tension in the local and international 

communities over alleged war preparations. 8 Moscow aims to incite 

protests against Bulgaria’s NATO membership, warning that it could 

lead to a war between Bulgaria and Russia. The goal is to create panic 

and confusion among the Bulgarian public and to imply that NATO 

was planning to engage in a military offensive. Nenchev’s comments 

came after Voice of Russia’s Bulgarian-language website ran a report 

citing the TV station of the ultra-right Ataka party, according to which 

scores of Bulgarian men received call-up orders for the military, a 

rumor that the government flatly denied. 

According to Ataka and the Voice of Russia: “The threats to Bulgaria 

from its involvement in a dangerous adventure as a satellite of NATO 

in Eastern Europe, not too far from the borders of Ukraine and Russia, 

are very realistic.” Additional Russian disinformation topics have


included the construction of a NATO nuclear base near Varna on the 

Black Sea, the deployment of a NATO battalion nearby, and a massive 

influx of US troops. 9 Ataka has claimed that a huge quantity of US 

combat equipment and servicemen have been unloaded in Bulgaria, 

together with CIA agents who will foment ethnic and religious strife. 10 

This will then be used as a pretext for the arrival of huge numbers of 

NATO troops as peacekeepers. Such a scenario appears to be a 

projected replica of Russia’s strategies in neighboring states. 

Contrary to Russia’s disinformation, NATO planned to position a 

command-and-control center in Bulgaria and establish similar 

facilities in five other East Central European countries. The Center on 

Effective Communication, involving Bulgarian armed forces and 

NATO troops, will be located in the Ministry of Defense. It is intended 

to improve coordination between Sofia and Brussels and focus on 

planning and coordination of joint training and exercises, some of 

which will be held on Bulgarian territory. This in line with the 

commitments agreed under the Readiness Action Plan adopted at the 

NATO Wales Summit, in September 2014. NATO will also station a 

center for the command and management of ships near the Bulgarian 

Black Sea port of Varna. 11 The command center will be constructed 

with funds allocated under the NATO Security Investment Program 

(NSIP). 

In a barely veiled threat from the Kremlin conveyed through Vladimir 

Yevseyev, director of the Center on Military-Political Studies in 

Moscow, “the deployment of any NATO infrastructure in Bulgaria 

compels Russia to view those places as a target of a possible strike in 

the case of an assumed clash.” The purpose of this statement was to 

increase anxiety among the Bulgarian public and heighten pressure on 

the administration. In February 2015, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov 

answered Socialist Party questions in parliament regarding plans to 

deploy a NATO center in Bulgaria. 12 At that time, Sofia had not 

finalized any commitments regarding the deployment of heavy arms, 

even though NATO commanders explored the feasibility of storing


weapons in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and 

Latvia. In the face of a broad disinformation campaign, Bulgaria’s 

Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov felt compelled to reiterate that the 

country did not face any kind of emergency situation. Rumors about 

weapons deployments, including nuclear weapons, from other NATO 

states on Bulgarian territory were purely fabrications. 13 

Socialist Party officials have acted as Moscow’s proxies in 

melodramatically appealing to the government “to prevent dragging 

Bulgaria into a war with Russia or even enhancing tensions with 

Russia.” Socialist leader Mikhail Mikov visited Moscow in March 2015 

and returned complaining about the allegedly servile attitude of the 

Bulgarian government toward NATO and that sanctions against 

Russia hurt both Europe and Bulgaria. 14 According to Russia’s Duma 

Chairman Sergey Narishkin, the main reason why Bulgarian-Russian 

relations deteriorated were instructions from Washington and 

Brussels to downgrade ties with Moscow. Following Russia’s attack on 

Ukraine, Narishkin was placed on the list of individuals financially 

sanctioned by the West. 15 Ataka party leader Volen Siderov went a 

step further than the Socialists and echoed the far-right Hungarian 

Jobbik party by demanding the protection of Bulgarians in Ukraine, 

who were allegedly recruited forcefully by Kyiv to participate in a 

“fratricidal war.” 

Russia has deeply penetrated the Bulgarian economy. Russian 

business has sought increasing access to the energy sector, including 

the electric and nuclear industries, and aimed to use Bulgaria as a 

major transit country for gas supplies. Bulgaria is the most dependent 

country on Russian energy in Europe’s east. It imports three critical 

energy supplies from Russia: crude oil, natural gas, and nuclear fuel. 

Sofia played a central role in the South Stream project, as the pipeline 

was supposed to come onshore on its territory. The government gave 

the project the status of “national importance” and intensively lobbied 

Brussels to bend its rules for Gazprom. Bulgaria’s energy policy has


been historically entwined with the government’s foreign policy 

priorities. Socialist administrations are more likely to accommodate 

Moscow’s interests and hand strategic energy projects to Russian 

companies, because of their political and personal connections and 

opaque business interests. By contrast, center-right governments 

generally try to reduce dependence on Russia and diversify the 

country’s energy supplies. 

In January 2008, Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov, elected on the 

Socialist ticket, signed with President Putin agreements on building 

the Burgas–Alexandroupolis oil pipeline, the second Bulgarian 

nuclear power plant (Belene NPP), and the South Stream gas pipeline. 

Putin announced that €3.8 billion had been already designated in the 

Russian budget for prospective work at NPP Belene. 16 However, the 

opposition viewed the deal as a betrayal of Bulgaria’s national 

interests. One year later, the new center-right Borisov government 

pledged to review all pending Russian energy contracts signed by the 

previous Socialist government. In 2012, the Burgas-Alexandroupolis 

oil pipeline and the Belene NPP projects were cancelled and South 

Stream was sidelined by Sofia’s support for the Nabucco gas plan. 17 

Corruption has seriously affected the energy sector in Bulgaria, as a 

great number of procurement contracts with significant monetary 

value are awarded for energy projects. Some of the shady dealings with 

Russian companies were linked with South Stream and the 

construction of the second nuclear power plant at Belene. In June 

2014, the European Commission started infringement procedures 

against Bulgaria for setting up the South Stream–Bulgaria joint 

venture in violation of EU competition laws. The Commission stated 

that the government was not allowed to award such a large public 

procurement to a specially established joint entity between Gazprom 

and Bulgaria’s Energy Holding without an open tender for other 

bidders.


South Stream–Bulgaria subsequently awarded a contract for the 

construction of the Bulgarian part of the pipeline to a consortium led 

by Russia’s Stroytransgas Holding. A major shareholder in 

Stroytransgaz, with 63% ownership, is the Volga Group, owned by 

Gennady Timchenko, who was placed on the US sanctions list on 

March 20, 2014. Timchenko is a close Putin ally and Russia’s sixth 

richest man, according to Forbes Magazine. His Volga Group and 

another ten related entities, including Stroytransgaz Holding, were 

also sanctioned by the US Treasury Department on April 28, 2014. 18 

Russian oil and gas companies or their Bulgarian subsidiaries have 

heavily permeated Bulgaria’s energy sector. The largest business in the 

country is Lukoil Neftohim Burgas, a subsidiary of Lukoil, which 

acquired 58% of Bulgaria’s main refining company through a 

privatization deal in 1999. The second largest business is Lukoil- 

Bulgaria EOOD, which owns over 200 service stations, with a market 

share of about 26% on the retail market. 19 The two companies close a 

Russian-controlled circle of supply, production and trade, as the 

refinery on the Black Sea coast processes Russian oil, delivered by 

tankers across the Black Sea, while the oil products are then 

distributed and exported by Lukoil-Bulgaria. This advantage allows 

the Russian company to bid successfully for public procurement 

contracts at national and local level. 

Another Russian company, Overgas, a subsidiary of Gazprom, has 

played a lucrative intermediary role in all Russian gas supply contracts 

with Bulgaria for almost two decades. Overgas and Wintershall Erdgas 

Handelshaus Zug AG, also a Gazprom subsidiary, were finally pushed 

out as intermediaries from the long-term contract between Gazprom 

and state-owned Bulgargaz, signed on November 15, 2012. The 

Bulgarian government managed to remove the two middleman 

companies in exchange for signing an agreement on South Stream. 20 

Instructively, Alexander Medvedev was serving simultaneously as 

Gazprom’s Deputy CEO, Director-General of Gazprom Export, and


Chairman of the Board of Overgas, thereby practically signing 

contracts with himself. 21 

Overgas announced in 2010 that it would start buying gas directly 

from Gazprom for its consumers, instead of buying it from Bulgargaz. 

However, the state-owned gas transport entity Bulgartransgaz refused 

to give Overgas access to the Trans-Balkan supply pipeline entering 

from Romania. As a result, Overgas filed a complaint with the 

European Commission, which led to infringement procedures against 

Bulgarian Energy Holding and its subsidiaries Bulgargaz and 

Bulgartransgaz for violating the Third Energy Package. 22 Evidently, 

Gazprom and its subsidiaries such as Overgas only respect the EU’s 

energy market regulations when they can benefit from them. 

In July 2011, tensions between Sofia and Moscow increased over tax 

evasion by Lukoil Bulgaria. Lukoil’s license suspension came after the 

Bulgarian Customs Agency conducted a probe into its refinery, which 

confirmed gross excise duty violations. The legal saga between Lukoil 

and the Bulgarian state continued for two years, until the Russian oil 

company was ordered by Bulgaria’s Supreme Administrative Court to 

install measuring devices on its tax warehouse connected to the main 

pipeline between the Burgas refinery and Sofia. However, the 

Socialist-led coalition that replaced Borisov in February 2013 

dismissed the Customs Agency Director Vanyo Tanov. 23 

Putin’s cancelation of South Stream may prove beneficial for Bulgaria, 

as it can focus on alternative gas supplies from the Caspian and finally 

escape Gazprom’s grip. After Moscow abandoned South Stream, Sofia 

expressed an interest in participating in the Southern Gas Corridor 

from Azerbaijan. 24 Although only 10 billion cubic meters per year are 

expected to be delivered to the EU by 2019–2020, Azerbaijan possesses 

substantial gas reserves and could increase future volumes. The 

Southern Gas Corridor has the potential to meet up to 20% of the EU’s 

future gas needs, with prospective longer-term supplies from the


Caspian Region, the Middle East, and the East Mediterranean. To 

counter Sofia’s energy reorientation, Russia’s ambassador in Bulgaria 

declared that Moscow would be prepared to consider the possibility 

of diverting Turkish Stream toward Bulgaria. 25 On the broader 

economic front, Russia plays a significant role in foreign investment. 

According to the Bulgarian National Bank, the net inflow of foreign 

investment between January and October 2014 was €805 million 

($974 million). 26 Of that, some €177 million, or about 22%, came from 

Russia. 

During a visit to Sofia on January 15, 2015, as part of Washington’s 

regional reassurance initiative in the aftermath of Russia’s attack on 

Ukraine, US Secretary of State John Kerry warned Russia not to seek 

retribution against Bulgaria for opposing South Stream. 27 In meetings 

with President Rosen Plevneliev and Prime Minister Borisov, Kerry 

underscored that NATO’s Article 5 commitment to Bulgaria’s defense 

was “rock solid.” Some commentators pointed out that Kerry publicly 

declared something that no Bulgarian politician had mentioned, that 

there was a threat of Moscow seeking retribution against Sofia for the 

termination of South Stream. Kerry also pledged that the US would 

help Bulgaria reduce its dependence on Russia for energy supplies 

through investments and assistance in gaining alternative sources. 28 

Bulgaria relies on Russia for approximately 85% of its gas usage and 

100% of its nuclear fuel. Washington announced plans to work with 

officials in Sofia and Athens to establish a pipeline to Bulgaria from 

an LNG terminal in Greece. 

Moscow has endeavored to manipulate Bulgaria in the Balkan region 

by implying that it has irredentist aspirations toward Macedonia. Such 

accusations are partially punishment for Sofia’s stance on supporting 

EU energy diversity, reducing its dependence on Russian energy, 

supporting Western sanctions against Moscow, and hosting a NATO 

command-and-control center. It is also an additional way for Moscow 

to ingratiate itself with Skopje by concocting conspiracies against the 

beleaguered Gruevski government. On May 20, 2015, Bulgaria’s


Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov condemned as “extremely 

irresponsible” suggestions by Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov that a 

partition of Macedonia between Bulgaria and Albania was being 

considered. 29 

Bulgarian nationalists are also useful for the Kremlin in its multipronged 

campaign against Ukrainian statehood and territorial 

integrity. Representatives of the Ataka party attended the launching 

congress of the People’s Council of Bessarabia, formed in Odesa in 

April 2015 to campaign for the region’s national-territorial autonomy 

in Ukraine. 30 About 150,000 Bulgarians live in the region, and pro- 

Moscow groups could recruit some of their leaders to further 

undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In addition, former 

members of Ataka established another nationalist group, the United 

Bulgaria Movement (UBM), in March 2015, claiming that their goal 

was for Bulgaria to become a monolithic one-nation state. 31 Its 

chairman, Georgi Dimitrov, asserted that the movement was pro- 

Russian and wanted Bulgaria to terminate its NATO membership. 

Serbia and Kosova 

Diplomatically, Moscow is outspoken in support of Serbia, especially 

in blocking the membership of its former autonomous region of 

Kosova from major international institutions, such as the UN and the 

OSCE. Kosova gained independence from Serbia in February 2008, 

after NATO intervened in 1999 to prevent the murder and expulsion 

of the majority Albanian population by Serbian forces. Kosova’s 

statehood has been recognized by the majority of UN members and 

by all but five EU member states. Serbia remains the Kremlin’s most 

reliable political link in the region, not because of any Slavic- 

Orthodox fraternity, but as a consequence of dispassionate political 

calculation. Since the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Belgrade has 

consistently appealed to Russian solidarity, whether over preserving 

Yugoslavia’s integrity, creating a Greater Serbia, or retaining control


over Kosova, which gained independence in February 2008 and was 

recognized by the US and the majority of EU and NATO members. 

Moscow in turn exploits Serbia’s grievances against the US and NATO 

to demonstrate that Russia remains a major factor in European affairs 

protecting vulnerable states such as Serbia and resolving intra- 

European disputes. Such symbiosis has proved beneficial for both 

governments. 

Moscow is pursuing a security foothold in the Balkans that can 

challenge what it views as growing NATO hegemony. It continues to 

trumpet the charge that Serbia is a primary victim of US machinations 

to gain a dominant position in the Balkans. The creation of a Russian 

security structure in Serbia was the most significant result of thenpresident 

Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Belgrade in October 20, 2009. 32 

Russia’s Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu signed an 

agreement with Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Dacic regarding 

the establishment of a logistical center for response to natural and 

technological catastrophes. The center was located near Niš, in 

southern Serbia, and was opened under an agreement signed in 2011 

with plans for development into a larger operation to serve the entire 

Balkan region for disaster prevention and response. The Niš base is 

believed to be a cover for Moscow’s intelligence gathering operations 

in the region. 

Russia’s Emergency Situations Ministry is a fully militarized ministry 

and the agreement allows for Russian uniformed personnel and dualpurpose 

supplies to be deployed in Serbia on a long-term basis. Russia 

and Serbia together ran a military drill in the village of Nikinci, west 

of Belgrade, on November 14, 2014. Billed as an anti-terrorist exercise 

and held just thirty miles from Serbia's border with NATO-member 

Croatia, the activity was an opportunity to demonstrate Russia’s reach 

in the region. 33 In early September 2015, Serbian airborne units also 

trained with Russian and Belarusian forces near Russia’s Black Sea 

port of Novorossiysk. 34 The exercise dubbed “Slavic Brotherhood” 

included simulation drills to prevent a “Majdan scenario,” in effect a


defense of corrupt and authoritarian governments exemplified by the 

Putin administration. 

Although Serbia also participates in NATO exercises, it provides little 

publicity on its ties with the Alliance and thereby creates the 

impression that it is closer to Russia and supports Moscow’s 

campaigns to dominate its neighbors. Meanwhile, Russian officials 

and state media trumpet the notion that Serbia is one of Russia’s 

closest allies. While training with Russian troops adds little value to 

Serbia’s military development, Belgrade’s involvement in NATO’s 

Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), considered the highest 

level of cooperation with the Alliance for a non-member country, 

helps enhance the capabilities of Serbia’s armed forces. 

The depth of Russian-Serbian relations should not be exaggerated, but 

certain politicians try to use Moscow to their advantage and are, in 

turn, exploited by Moscow. Serbia’s Socialist Party is closer to Russia 

than other major Serbian formations. However, they are junior 

partners in the current government coalition led by the Progressive 

Party. In general, the government pursues a dual track approach in its 

foreign policy, with President Tomislav Nikolic displaying a strident 

pro-Moscow position while Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic is 

publicly committed to EU integration. However, in the midst of the 

escalating confrontation between the West and Russia, the Serbian 

government will find it difficult to play the role of non-aligned 

Yugoslavia during the Cold War. Either it qualifies for entry into 

Western international institutions or Serbia will remain exposed to 

diplomatic and political exploitation and anti-Western intrigues 

concocted by the Kremlin. 

In June 2015, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), originally 

founded by former Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, helped 

to establish the Patriotic Bloc as a nationalist alternative to the 

incumbent government. 35 It advocates “the strongest and closest 

possible cooperation with the Russian Federation,” is vehemently


anti-NATO and anti-EU, and does not want Serbia to become a 

“colony of Brussels.” Although the Patriotic Bloc has limited prospects 

for gaining office, it serves a useful purpose for Moscow, as a critic of 

any pro-Western Serbian government and a supporter of Russia’s 

policies. Several Serbian political parties and movements support 

Moscow's stance in various policy arenas, including the Serbian 

Radical Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia, Dveri, the Statehood 

Movement, the Serbian People’s Party, Nasi, and Third Serbia. There 

are indications that most of these formations are funded by Moscow. 36 

State-linked organizations in Moscow have been involved in various 

cultural and political events with their Serbian counterparts. Nasa 

Srbija, an organization that arranges youth activities and promotes 

Serbian culture, signed a cooperation agreement with the Russian 

Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), an analytical center closely 

linked with the Kremlin’s presidential office. 37 Its director, Leonid 

Reshetnikov, is an ex-Foreign Intelligence Service (FSB) lieutenant 

general who has also worked in Bulgaria with the leadership of the 

ultra-nationalist Ataka party and with the leadership of the ultra-leftist 

ABV party. 38 He claims that RISS provides major analytical inputs for 

Putin’s foreign and domestic policies. 39 

On the media front, some resistance to Russian influence has been 

evident in government circles in Belgrade. Moscow has been trying 

for several years to buy a Serbian TV station during the process of 

media privatization. Although Russian investors wanted to buy TV 

B92, the station was sold to a Greek investor. Similarly, three Russian 

companies failed to purchase the popular Studio B, which was sold to 

a domestic buyer. 40 According to Nikita Bondarov from the Russian 

Institute of Strategic Studies, Serbian authorities have prevented 

Russian companies from positioning themselves inside Serbia’s media 

arena. Nonetheless, pro-Kremlin positions are commonplace in the 

tabloid press and also some high-circulation dailies, such as Vecernje 

Novosti and Politika. This helps to shape public opinion, so that when


disillusionment with the prospect for EU membership increases, 

support for an alliance with Russia grows. 

On the military front, in October 2014, Russia’s Deputy Emergency 

Situations Minister Vladimir Artamonov opened the Russian-Serbian 

crisis management center in Niš. 41 Although the avowed purpose of 

the center is to collect, analyze, and exchange information to deal with 

national humanitarian emergencies, some analysts view the center as 

a Russian military base. Airborne troops and special forces from 

Russia, Serbia, and Belarus were also due to conduct joint exercises 

close to Novorossiysk in Russia in September 2015. 42 In addition, 

Serbia maintains observer status in the Moscow-led Collective 

Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In April 2015, Milovan 

Drecun, head of the Serbian parliamentary delegation to the CSTO, 

announced that Belgrade is seeking to boost its cooperation with the 

organization. 43 

President Putin visited Belgrade on October 16, 2014, to attend 

celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the liberation of 

Belgrade from Nazi occupation. The event included the largest 

military parade in Serbia in over 40 years and Serbian President 

Tomislav Nikolic bestowed Putin with the highest state award, the 

Medal of the Republic of Serbia, for “outstanding merits in 

strengthening peaceful cooperation and friendly relations between 

Serbia and Russia.” Nikolic was also one of the few European leaders 

attending the Victory Day military parade in Moscow on May 9, 

2015. 44 Bosnia’s Serb Republic President Milorad Dodik also 

participated. 

Prime Minister Vucic claimed that Serbia was not “taking sides” in the 

Ukrainian crisis and was advocating a diplomatic solution to the 

conflict. Hence, Belgrade was equating an elected Ukrainian 

government with a proxy insurgency engineered by Moscow. Russia 

was not looking for outright support in its neo-imperial policies but 

the neutrality of European states such as Serbia was sufficient.


Belgrade did not join the EU’s limited sanctions regime against 

Moscow, which ostracized Russia's leaders, businesses, and banks that 

most directly benefited from the war against Ukraine. 

Although not all EU countries have been eager on sanctioning Russia, 

Brussels seeks consensus on foreign policy principles especially from 

aspirants such as Serbia. A European Commission report released in 

October 2014 urged Belgrade to align its foreign policy with Brussels. 

Serb leaders argued that sanctions would be disastrous, especially as 

Gazprom controls most of the country’s energy sector. The Kremlin 

threatened Belgrade with a loss of preferential trade status if it adopted 

the EU-US sanctions. Officials also sounded warnings that Russia 

could drop its opposition to the independence of Kosova in the UN 

Security Council if Belgrade complied with EU policy toward 

Moscow. 

Russian officials have stated that they would maintain support for 

Serbia’s territorial integrity and described Kosova’s independence as 

reversible. To try and delegitimize Kosova’s struggle for independence 

during the 1990s, Moscow proposed establishing a special court under 

a UN Security Council mandate to try members of the Kosova 

Liberation Army (KLA) for war crimes and to depict the group as a 

terrorist organization. Moscow has also favored the “parallel 

structures” in northern Kosova’s Serb-majority municipalities that 

challenge Kosova’s administrative and territorial integrity. On August 

25, 2015, under EU supervision, an agreement was signed between 

Belgrade and Prishtina to establish an association of Serb majority 

municipalities in Kosova in order to ensure the full array of minority 

rights. Some Kosovar officials fear that this arrangement could revive 

autonomist and separatist aspirations among Serbs or hinder 

Kosova’s institutional development and Western integration, a 

scenario that Moscow would actively encourage. 45 The Kremlin will 

also seek to benefit on the propaganda front if Kosova experiences 

political instability and public unrest as a result of difficult economic 

conditions, pervasive official corruption, and slow progress toward


EU entry. It will claim that Kosova is a failed state and that NATO and 

the EU have simply created new instabilities in the region by 

recognizing its independence. In October 2015, Prishtina witnessed 

opposition protests inside parliament against Kosova’s agreement 

with Belgrade on establishing a Serbian municipalities association 

between minority regions in the new state. There were fears that 

continuing protests could ignite broader resistance to the 

government. 

In terms of conflict prolongation, Russia’s blockage of Kosova’s entry 

into the United Nations enabled Moscow to portray itself as the 

defender of international legality and the promoter of state 

sovereignty and territorial integrity. Concurrently, it condemned the 

US and NATO for allegedly partitioning Yugoslavia and Serbia and 

promulgated the thesis of a pan-Albanian Islamic fundamentalist 

menace in attempts to forge pan-Slavic Orthodox unity under Russia’s 

patronage. Russia’s Patriarch Kirill visited Serbia in November 2014 

to express inter-Church solidarity and accused Europe of abandoning 

Christian values, thereby reinforcing the Kremlin’s propaganda 

offensive against the West. 46 

Some analysts contend that Moscow’s influence in the western 

Balkans weakened after the EU initiative to establish dialogue between 

Belgrade and Prishtina culminated in the signing of the Brussels 

agreement on April 19, 2013 under the mediation of the EU’s High 

Representative for Foreign Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton. 

Nonetheless, Moscow continues to foment ethnic rivalries and 

espouses essentially anti-Albanian positions in order to pose as the 

protector of Serbia and Macedonia. For instance, the firefight in 

Kumanovo on May 9–10, 2015, between Macedonian police and a 

group of gunmen believed to be from Kosova, brought dividends to 

the Kremlin, which accused the allegedly pan-Albanian government 

in Kosova of seeking to destabilize Macedonia and the broader region.


Belgrade obtained EU candidate status in March 2012, but talks on 

membership could not be formally opened until the April 2013 

Brussels agreement was fully implemented. In one important move, 

on February 10, 2015, the Prime Ministers of Kosova and Serbia 

signed an accord on integrating law courts in four northern 

municipalities of Kosova where Serbs form a majority into the Kosova 

judicial system and agreeing on their ethnic composition. 47 

Nonetheless, the planned creation of an Association of Serbian 

Municipalities with autonomous powers, as stipulated in the initial 

agreement, had still not been fully resolved and could again raise 

tensions between Prishtina and Belgrade. In the long term, Serbia 

appeared determined to move toward EU accession regardless of 

Russia’s objectives. It was willing to withdraw support from the 

parallel structures in northern Kosova and undercut any prospects for 

Serbian secession. Some Russian official criticized Belgrade for 

surrendering too much to the EU and failing to defend the country’s 

national interests. 

Moscow has used financial loans, strategic acquisitions, trade 

agreements, energy projects, and direct business investments to 

strengthen its presence in Serbia. According to the National Bank of 

Serbia, during 2013 net foreign direct investment totaled around €769 

million. Of that, €45 million, or 9.7%, came from Russia. In April 

2013, Belgrade signed an agreement with Moscow to borrow $500 

million to support the Serbian budget and to help modernize the 

country’s infrastructure. In July 2013, $300 million was transferred, 

but Belgrade would have to wait for the remaining $200 million until 

it signed an arrangement with the IMF. 48 The remainder of this deal 

fell through when Belgrade failed to negotiate an arrangement with 

the IMF. Negative growth in 2015 and a weakened currency in Russia 

may inhibit the Kremlin’s ability to compete with the EU in allocating 

resources and extending its influence in Serbia. 49 

The crumbling of the Russian ruble, which lost almost one-half of its 

value in 2014, also slowed down the export of Serbian goods to the


Russian market, causing substantial losses for domestic exporters. 

Belgrade has a free trade agreement with Moscow, with about 7% of 

its exports destined for Russia. A weak currency and high interest 

rates will undermine Russian investments, including the operations of 

subsidiaries in Serbia. In addition, there has been a diminishing 

demand for Serbian goods; in effect sanctions imposed on Russia by 

the West harmed Serbia’s exports. 50 After a four-year average growth 

of 33%, in 2014 total exports to Russia were down by 3%. 

On the energy front, Serbia has experienced intensified Russian 

influence. 51 Belgrade was a major supporter of South Stream before its 

cancelation, but became careful in voicing support for Turkish Stream 

in the light of the EU’s strained relations with Russia. In 2014, 40% of 

the natural gas Serbia consumed (1.14 bcm of a total of 2.827 bcm) 

was imported from Russia. 52 Serbian natural gas imports from Russia 

are handled by Gazprom subsidiary JugoRosGas. In addition, in 2003 

Lukoil gained 80% of Serbia’s oil trade and product retailer Beopetrol. 

Lukoil failed to buy oil companies in Croatia, the Czech Republic, 

Greece, Lithuania, Montenegro, and Poland. 53 

On January 25, 2008, Russia and Serbia signed an energy pact, adding 

Serbia to South Stream and allowing Gazpromneft to buy the 

controlling share in Serbia's national oil and gas monopoly Naftna 

Industrija Srbije (NIS) for €400 million and €550 million in 

investments until 2012. The agreements secured Gazpromneft a 51% 

stake in NIS for an undisclosed price. Gazpromneft later obtained 

another 5.15% of the company’s shares, bringing its ownership to 

56.15%. 54 NIS dominates Serbia’s market with a monopoly on oil 

refining and a network of almost 500 petrol stations across the 

country. Estimates of its market value vary between €1.0 billion and 

€2.0 billion. 55 Gazpromneft modernized the Pancevo refinery and 

turned it into an exporter to Balkan markets. 56


NIS is currently the main proxy vehicle for Russian energy 

penetration in southeastern Europe, with the company acquiring a 

number of fuel stations in Bulgaria, Romania, and Bosnia- 

Herzegovina. However, NIS was reportedly sold at a fraction of its 

market value and spurred protests among the political opposition. In 

2009 Srbijagas and Gazprom signed a 25-year agreement to complete 

the construction of an underground gas storage facility in Banatski 

Dvor in Serbia’s northern province of Vojvodina. The deal guaranteed 

Gazprom 51% of the shares. The Banatski Dvor facility possesses the 

capacity to distribute up to five million cubic meters per day. 

Although Moscow promised to make Serbia an energy hub in the 

Balkans following the construction of South Stream, it became clear 

that its political appetite outmatched its economic capabilities. 57 

Bosnia-Herzegovina 

Moscow is especially active in countries that have no immediate 

prospect of Western institutional integration. Such “frozen states” 

enable the Kremlin to penetrate the region and to delay or derail plans 

for EU and NATO expansion. Officials have focused on Bosnia- 

Herzegovina by supporting the leaders of Republika Srpska (RS), one 

of the two autonomous entities established under the Dayton Accords 

of November 1995. Moscow has backed Banja Luka, the RS capital, in 

its resistance to streamlining the state and providing greater powers 

to the central government in Sarajevo. Officials pledged that they 

would reject any “imposed solutions” by the US and EU and 

encouraged the RS to pursue more extensive autonomy. This would 

further disqualify Bosnia from potential EU and NATO accession. 

Having recognized the independence of two separatist regions in 

Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Russia retains the option of 

recognizing Bosnia’s RS as an independent state. In acknowledging 

Putin’s support, Dodik opposed Western sanctions against Russia for 

its attack on Ukraine and visited Moscow on the eve of Bosnia’s


general elections in October 2014 to reportedly receive a donation for 

his election campaign. Prior to that, in March 2014, he also received 

an award of the International Fund for the Unity of Orthodox 

Nations, presented in Moscow by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill. 58 

However, Russian officials have indicated that they are not tied 

exclusively to Dodik and remain mindful of not restricting support to 

specific individuals who may be replaced through elections. 

On April 25, 2015, the congress of the ruling party in the RS, the 

Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (AISD), adopted a new 

statute and a resolution that underscored a free and independent RS 

as the ultimate goal. It recommended that the RS National Assembly 

make a decision on independence. Dodik, the AISD chairman, 

asserted that a referendum on the entity’s secession would be held in 

2018 unless the powers taken away from the RS by international 

agencies were returned to the entity by 2017 and institutions not 

specified under the Dayton accords, such as the High Judicial and 

Prosecutorial Council, were liquidated. 59 After the referendum, the RS 

will supposedly offer the other Bosnian entity, the Bosnia- 

Herzegovina Federation, a proposal for peaceful separation and 

mutual recognition. 

Dodik’s critics in the RS, led by Mladen Ivanic, leader of the Party of 

Democratic Progress, charged that the AISD manipulates citizens 

with promises of a referendum as a way of maintaining power. 

Growing discontent with economic conditions encourages the entity 

government to turn to nationalism and pledges of statehood to shift 

attention away from escalating social and economic problems. 

Following a deadly terrorist attack on an RS police station in Zvornik 

in April 2015, Dodik threatened that the entity could withdraw from 

Bosnian state security structures. 60 He condemned the work of the 

state intelligence agencies for failing to prevent the incident. In 

practice, the establishment of parallel security agencies would signify 

a concrete step toward Bosnia’s dissolution.


In a prescient step designed to weaken the authority of the central 

government in Sarajevo, on July 15, 2015, the RS National Assembly 

adopted a decision to hold a referendum on the authority of the statelevel 

judiciary and the Prosecutor's Office. 61 The move was 

condemned by Western governments as threatening Bosnian 

statehood but was defended by the Russian embassy, which claimed 

that international actors should not interfere in Bosnia’s internal 

disputes by pressurizing Banja Luka to cancel the plebiscite. 62 Moscow 

has also engaged in various diplomatic moves to block Bosnia’s 

progress toward the EU and NATO. For instance, at a UN Security 

Council session in November 2014, it opposed the extension of the 

European Union Force (EUFOR) peacekeeping mission, claiming 

that Bosnia was being pushed in the direction of the EU regardless of 

the will of the people. Although it abstained from vetoing the UN 

decision, the incident served as a warning that Russia could block 

future extensions of EUFOR mandates. 

Russian authorities contribute to prolonging disputes and 

uncertainties within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The calculation is that 

shortcomings in inter-ethnic reconciliation and state-building will 

slow down or terminate the region’s integration into NATO and the 

EU. Such prospects will also justify Kremlin contentions that NATO 

cannot guarantee European security and a new structure is needed in 

which Russia would play a major role. Moscow prefers a weak and 

divided Bosnia and not a country that successfully integrates with the 

West. During a potential escalation of conflict with the US and 

NATO, it reserves the option of supporting the outright secession of 

the RS. 

In its ploy to impede inter-ethnic reconciliation in Bosnia, Moscow 

has consistently supported the RS in preventing the passage of a UN 

Security Council resolution on the genocide perpetrated by Bosnian 

Serb troops against unarmed Bosniak Muslim civilians in Srebrenica 

in July 1995, when approximately 8,000 men and boys were 

exterminated. Russia’s Foreign Ministry has downplayed the role of


Bosnian Serb forces in murdering and expelling Bosniak civilians 

throughout the 1992–1995 war. It attempts to equalize responsibility 

for the massacres even though all evidence demonstrates that the 

primary victims were Muslims. 

In a further indication of close ties between Moscow and Banja Luka, 

on January 9, 2015, the official RS Day, Dodik presented Russia’s 

General Abrekovich Valiev with the Order of the Flag of Republika 

Srpska with a Silver Wreath. 63 Dodik also received an endorsement 

from indicted Serbian war criminal and Radical Party leader Vojislav 

Seselj who favors a strong pro-Moscow policy by Serbia. 64 Close 

relations are maintained between Dodik and Russia’s ambassador to 

Bosnia-Herzegovina. 65 Mladen Ivanic, the Serb chairman in the 

Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, leader of the Party of Democratic 

Progress, and a staunch opponent of Dodik, claims that the Russian 

embassy wants to lead the RS into isolation and “Asiatic integration” 

with Russia. 

Dodik has consistently backed the creation of a third entity in Bosnia- 

Herzegovina for the Croatian population. By ingratiating himself with 

Croat leaders and confirming their claims about discrimination and 

marginalization by Bosniak Muslims, the RS leader seeks to weaken 

the central government and potentially split the Bosniak-Croat 

Federation. 66 According to Dodik, without an “equal position of the 

Croats as a political nation it is impossible to maintain a multiethnic 

community. The desire of the Bosniaks for absolute domination over 

the Croats and Serbs is notorious.” He has also supported the Bosnian 

government in its border dispute with Montenegro over a small 

stretch of territory along the Sutorina River that would give Bosnia 

and the RS an outlet to the Adriatic Sea. Such disputes can be heated 

up with Russia’s encouragement to place pressure on the Montenegrin 

government and disqualify that country from entering NATO. 

On the economic front, RS leaders view Russia as a source of financial 

assistance and investment and have been seeking loans to prevent a


liquidity crisis in the entity. The prolonged political stalemate and lack 

of legislative work in Bosnia during 2015 halted foreign investments 

and blocked financial support from the IMF, the World Bank, and the 

EU. Reports indicated that Moscow would be willing to provide a loan 

of up to $794 million but with commercial interest rates and collateral 

guarantees, most probably in the form of control over the RS power 

company. Some local officials expressed concern that the Russian loan 

would place the Kremlin in a position to effectively control the RS 

government. 67 

On the energy front, Bosnia-Herzegovina is dependent on expensive 

natural gas from Russia, although its annual consumption only 

reaches 0.24 bcm. For example, it paid $515 per thousand cubic 

meters in 2014, constituting 73% of its annual consumption. 68 An 

agreement providing for a direct supply of gas by Moscow to the RS 

at a reduced price was signed on February 27, 2015. In 2007, the RS 

government sold a package of majority stakes in Bosanski Brod oil 

refinery and the Modrica and Petrol fuel retailers to Russia’s stateowned 

oil company Zarubezhneft for $1.4 billion through its 

subsidiary Neftegazinkor. Zarubezhneft eventually owned 80% of 

Brod, 75.65% of Modrica, and 80% of Petrol. Dodik expanded the 

entity’s links with Russia by signing a series of economic and cultural 

agreements in St. Petersburg in September 2007. 69 Since then, highlevel 

Russian delegations periodically visit the RS, including finance 

and economy ministers interested in purchasing energy and other 

assets slated for privatization. 

Moscow has enticed the RS with the prospect of lucrative business 

deals. It exploited the possibility of building a branch of South Stream 

to RS, a project that would have led to conflicts with EU energy 

regulations, thus endangering Sarajevo’s bid for EU candidacy. 70 The 

Bosnian Federation entity expressed support for the Trans-Adriatic 

Pipeline (TAP) and the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) projects, while 

the RS mistakenly banked on South Stream. 71 However, since 

December 2014, when Moscow scrapped South Stream and asserted


that it would build a gas hub via the Black Sea to Turkey, both the 

Federation and RS have expressed support for the Azerbaijanisponsored 

TAP/IAP network. 72 

Despite the financial unfeasibility of Moscow’s Turkish Stream plans, 

Dodik claimed that he had received promises in Moscow that the RS 

would be connected to the new gas pipeline. 73 According to Dusko 

Perovic, head of the RS representative office in Moscow, the 

interconnector will be completed by 2018 to cover the entity’s gas 

needs. 74 In the context of Kremlin pledges, Dodik declared that a law 

on natural gas imports at Bosnia’s state level was unacceptable because 

it implied a transfer of powers to Sarajevo. He claimed that the central 

government had no jurisdiction over energy, while alleging that the 

EU wanted to make the RS fully dependent on Croatia for gas supplies. 

Uncertain energy deals with Russia thereby contribute to 

undermining Bosnia’s state integrity. 

Croatia and Slovenia 

Moscow aspires to open up Croatia for its energy penetration in the 

Adriatic region. One third of all Croatia’s energy imports, including 

crude oil and natural gas, originate in Russia, and nearly all of its gas 

imports are purchased from Gazprom. 75 However, unlike Russia’s 

other regional customers, Croatia has been able to negotiate its 

purchases under conditions of spot prices rather than being locked 

into long-term contracts with Gazprom. 76 Moscow has endeavored to 

engage Zagreb in several politically charged energy deals. Gazprom 

attempted to acquire the controlling share of the Croatian energy 

champion Industrija Nafte (INA) in 2014, which demonstrated the 

symbiosis between energy, foreign policy, and official corruption. The 

Russian firm tried to buy the stake of Hungary’s MOL oil and gas 

company in INA and acquire another 5% stake on the Croatian stock 

exchange. Washington reportedly stepped in to discourage the MOL 

sale to Gazprom, but US influence over the Hungarian government


has its limitations. 77 Such a transaction would have given Moscow 

decisive energy leverage over both Hungary and Croatia. 78 

The INA consortium represents an attractive target for Russian 

energy firms, considering the experience of the Croatian energy 

company in offshore and onshore operations and production in the 

Adriatic Sea and the Pannonian basin, respectively. 79 MOL’s share in 

INA is just under 50%, while the Croatian government holds nearly 

45%. The Hungarian company acquired management rights in INA 

in 2009, in a non-transparent deal that eventually resulted in the 

imprisonment of Croatia’s Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. In 2012, 

Sanader was found guilty of corruption, accused of taking a bribe from 

MOL to ensure the Hungarian company obtained management rights 

in INA. However, in July 2015, Croatia’s constitutional court revoked 

the verdict because of procedural errors and ordered a retrial. 80 Given 

Moscow’s intervention in Ukraine and the Western sanctions on 

Russia, a potential deal with Gazprom would create problems for 

Croatia as an EU member forging long-term strategic cooperation 

with a Russian company. 81 

Croatia has the potential of developing into a strategically important 

energy transit corridor to Central Europe, especially if the proposed 

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal on the Adriatic island of Krk 

is built. This terminal would be linked with the existing Croatia– 

Hungary interconnector and continue to the Hungary-Slovakia 

border. The pipeline could also link with the planned Poland–Slovakia 

interconnector and with the existing Hungary–Romania 

interconnector. Such a project would complete an EU-backed Baltic 

Sea–Adriatic Sea–Black Sea network that would significantly reduce 

dependence on Russian gas by providing avenues of entry for diverse 

gas imports. 82 

During Soviet time, Moscow constructed an energy network in 

Europe’s east that was deliberately intended to stifle regional 

integration and maintain dependence on the Kremlin. It has


attempted to repeat this pattern under Putin’s rule. However, a major 

European energy project such as the projected North-South Corridor 

between Poland’s Baltic coast and Croatia’s Adriatic coast would 

prevent Moscow from using Croatia for its energy penetration 

throughout the region. 

The Kremlin seeks to attract Croatia into its energy sphere in order to 

obstruct EU plans to construct an energy corridor across the Balkans 

or the North-South Corridor through Central Europe. In addition, 

Croatia possesses promising offshore energy reserves that Russia 

would like to exploit. Several Russian energy companies have offered 

investments to develop domestic pipelines to connect the planned 

LNG facilities in Krk and explore oil fields in the Adriatic. For 

instance, Rosneft has shown interest in the acquisition of Croatia’s 

INA and Slovenia’s Petrol, which would support Russian expansion in 

the region. 

GazpromNeft has offered lucrative deals to Zagreb to enable it to use 

the Adria oil pipeline (JANAF) (connecting Croatia, Serbia, and 

Hungary) in reverse for Russian oil exports, instead of oil from the 

Middle East and other sources flowing into Central Europe through 

Croatia. 83 Such a reversal would cut Central Europe’s access to 

international oil markets, leaving the region more dependent on 

Russian oil from the Druzhba pipeline that crosses Ukraine and 

Belarus into the EU. By offering a pipeline extension from the South 

Stream project to Croatia, Gazprom also intended to block the Adria 

LNG terminal project on Krk, to prevent it undercutting Gazprom’s 

monopolistic ambitions. Rosneft, Lukoil, and Sibneft have also 

expressed strong interests in acquiring stakes in INA. Despite 

Moscow’s efforts, in July 2015, the Croatian government announced 

that it would construct an LNG terminal on Krk as a strategic 

investment that will contribute to the EU’s Energy Security Strategy. 

Slovenia remains highly dependent on Russia’s gas imports, but its gas 

market is among the smallest in Europe, with an annual consumption


of around 865 million cubic meters. 84 Gas constitutes only 10% of the 

country’s primary energy supply, although Ljubljana pays one of the 

highest rates for Russian gas supplies: $486 per thousand cubic meters 

in 2013. 85 

Croatia’s Social Democrat–led government has focused on generating 

business with Russia regardless of the latter’s international censure. In 

a display of Moscow’s economic enticements, over 100 Croatian 

companies attended the Russian-Croatian Economic Forum and 

Business Conference in Moscow on February 17, 2015, while the 

Croatian Chamber of Commerce (HGK) and the Moscow Association 

of Entrepreneurs signed a cooperation agreement. 86 The Croatian 

delegation was headed by Economy Minister Ivan Vrdoljak to explore 

prospects in the chemical industry, construction, shipbuilding, 

tourism, and the car industry. US Ambassador to Croatia Kenneth 

Merten criticized the business forum, held at a time when the EU and 

the US were intensifying sanctions against Moscow for its attack on 

Ukraine. 87 

Leaders of the opposition Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) 

asserted that the large business delegation sent the wrong message to 

the Kremlin that EU unity on Russian sanctions was brittle and that 

Croatia could be influenced by Moscow against Western solidarity. 

The forum took place one day after the EU broadened its sanctions 

against Russia to include an additional 19 individuals and 9 more 

companies. 88 The list subsequently included 151 individuals and 37 

companies. Under the sanctions, their EU-based assets were frozen 

and their entry to EU territory was prohibited. 

On the propaganda front, Moscow applies pressure on various states 

from where volunteers have reportedly enlisted to fight Kremlinsponsored 

separatists in Ukraine. Despite the presence of Russian 

officers, soldiers, and mercenaries on the side of rebels in Donbas, 

Moscow perversely protests the participation of volunteers from 

countries such as Croatia on the side of the legally elected Ukrainian


government. 89 Officials vehemently protested a statement from 

Croatia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Vesna Pusic confirming that a 

few Croatian volunteers were involved in combat operations on the 

side of the Ukrainian army. 

Montenegro 

Russia’s administration has viewed Montenegro as a useful target 

along the Adriatic coast, where it can profit from the country’s 

eagerness for foreign investment and thereby implant its political 

influences. While it has cultivated ties with the government, Moscow’s 

closest links are with some sectors of the Serbian political opposition. 

Suspicions also persist that Russian sources fund the Movement for 

Neutrality, an essentially anti-NATO grouping opposed to 

Montenegrin accession to the Alliance. 90 

The Kremlin was dismayed when the Montenegrin government 

petitioned for NATO membership and its officials have spent the past 

two years discouraging such a move. According to Russia’s 

Ambassador to Podgorica Andrey Nesterenko, Montenegro will be 

forced to adhere to “corporate discipline” in case it joins NATO and 

will have to deploy on its territory weapons, which will pose a threat 

to Russia’s security interests, including a missile defense shield. 91 In 

seeking to alarm the Montenegrin public, he claimed that 

preparations for a confrontation with Russia were behind the 

Alliance’s expansion. Nesterenko predicted that Montenegro’s entry 

into NATO would not bring progress or peace to the country. 92 

Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov went a step further by asserting that 

Montenegro’s planned accession into NATO and that of Macedonia 

and Bosnia-Herzegovina was a direct provocation against Russia. 93 

And according to Russia’s Permanent Representative to NATO, 

Alexander Grushko, Montenegro’s inclusion in NATO will have a 

negative impact on European security and on Russia's relations with


Podgorica. 94 Despite such threats, by the close of 2014 Montenegrin 

officials claimed that almost half of the population supported NATO 

accession. Parties endorsing NATO entry held about two-thirds of 

parliamentary seats. Nonetheless, anti-government and anti-NATO 

demonstrations have been staged in Podgorica with the evident 

backing of Moscow in a Russian version of a “colored revolution.” 

Prime Minister Đukanović accused Moscow of supporting Serbian 

nationalists in a bid to force a regime change. 95 Russia’s Foreign 

Ministry claimed in an online statement that Montenegro’s “Euro- 

Atlantic integration” would lead to “the exacerbation of socioeconomic 

problems.” In October 2015, organizers from the 

oppositionist Democratic Front assembled several hundred people in 

Podgorica and provoked clashes with the police. Suspicions grew that 

they received funding from the Russian embassy and from nationalist 

groups in Serbia in order to unseat the government, destabilize the 

country, and disqualify Montenegro from NATO entry. 96 

On the cultural front, Nesterenko stressed that Moscow was devoting 

significant attention to educating Montenegrin citizens at Russian 

universities, and the number of state scholarships for students from 

Montenegro had increased significantly. According to the Russian 

Embassy, there were between 10,000 to 20,000 Russians in 

Montenegro by 2014, among an indigenous population of some 

620,000, and some of these were real estate owners dissatisfied with 

their residence status. Under the Law on Foreigners, which came into 

force on April 1, 2015, a foreigner who owns real estate is not entitled 

to temporary residence, whereas prior Montenegrin legislation 

allowed for such a status and attracted Russian buyers. 

Russian companies gained a major position in the Montenegrin 

economy during the 2000s. In 2005, Kremlin-linked oligarch Oleg 

Deripaska and his En Plus group working through Russia’s aluminum 

giant RusAl purchased the Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica (KAP) 

aluminum factory that produced one-fifth of Montenegro’s GDP and


generated almost 80% of its exports at that time. During 2007, 

parliament blocked the sale to Deripaska of the Thermal Power Plant 

in Pljevlja, which produces one-third of Montenegro’s electricity, as 

well as the Rudnik coal mine. 97 If En Plus had gained these facilities it 

would in effect have controlled about 25% of Montenegro’s GDP and 

key parts of the economy. 

By the late 2000s, Montenegro reportedly received more foreign 

investment per capita than any other country in Europe and the bulk 

originated in Russia. 98 Russians bought-up hotels, real estate, and 

extensive stretches of the Montenegrin coastline. Among the major 

purchasers was former Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov. The European 

Commission repeatedly warned Podgorica that Russian-linked 

money laundering was a critical problem, which had to be tackled if 

Montenegro was to qualify for EU entry. In a report issued in 2007, 

the Commission complained that there was no proper monitoring of 

financial transactions, especially in real estate and "considerable room 

for corruption in land-use planning, construction and privatization." 99 

The Montenegrin government eventually realized that large-scale 

Russian investments were an impediment to EU membership, that 

they came attached by political strings regarding Montenegro’s 

national security choices, and that they ultimately damaged the 

country’s economic development and business climate. As a result, 

restrictions were placed on further large-scale Russian investments. In 

June 2014, the Podgorica Aluminum Plant, KAP, was taken over by 

local businessman Veselin Pejovic amid charges that Deripaska’s 

management team ran it into the ground and racked up more than 

$470 million in debt. Deripaska’s mismanagement threatened KAP 

with bankruptcy and closure. 100 

Montenegro also joined EU sanctions against Russia after its attack on 

Ukraine in early 2014. The authorities were committed to EU 

membership and wanted to display their harmonization in foreign 

policy. Officials in Moscow criticized Podgorica’s stance and issued


the customary warnings about serious economic repercussions. In 

seeking to discredit the Đukanović government, Kremlin-connected 

sources claimed that Podgorica was planning to push Russian 

companies out of the country and appropriate their property as one 

of the requirements for NATO entry. 101 An estimated 7,000 Russian 

nationals are permanent residents in Montenegro, and by 2015 

Russians still owned about 40% of the country’s Adriatic Sea coast 

tourist attractions. However, the numbers are likely to diminish given 

the projected decline in Russia’s economy that will affect many of the 

new rich and members of the middle class who travel or vacation in 

Europe. 

Macedonia 

Over the past few years, Macedonia has increasingly resembled a 

“frozen state,” paralyzed from entry into either NATO or the EU 

because of Greek government objections to the country’s name. 

Athens maintains veto power in both international organizations and 

asserts that Macedonia has claims on Greek territory, history, and 

identity. The charges are clearly exaggerated to appeal to Greek 

nationalism, but they prolong inter-state disputes and undermine 

regional stability. Simultaneously, the government led by the Internal 

Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) has also aggravated 

relations by claiming the ancient Macedonian heritage for the new 

state. 

While Macedonia, the EU, NATO, and the US all lose through the 

Greek-Macedonian dispute, there is one power that gains from this 

paralysis—Putin’s Russia. 102 Moscow has played both sides of the 

Greek-Macedonian dispute. By blocking further NATO enlargement 

in the Balkans, Athens has assisted Moscow’s ambitions; and the 

Kremlin was elated by the victory of the ultra-left Syriza party in the 

Greek general elections on January 25, 2015, because of its anti-NATO 

and anti-American positions.


At the same time, Moscow has pursued closer ties with Macedonian 

Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, following government charges 

against Social Democrat opposition leader Zoran Zaev for alleged 

blackmail, espionage, undermining the constitutional order, and 

planning a coup d’état. 103 The authorities in Skopje raised suspicions 

that Greek secret services sought to destabilize Macedonia by 

providing Zaev with evidence of the government’s alleged 

mismanagement, abuse of office, extensive corruption, and 

surveillance of opponents. Zaev’s charges against the government 

precipitated the official clampdown. 

Putin is hoping that Gruevski can become another Viktor Orban, the 

Hungarian Prime Minister ostracized by the EU and US for avowedly 

backtracking on democracy. Concurrently, the charges against 

Gruevski will also strengthen those in the EU who argue against 

Macedonia’s membership in either NATO or the EU. This will assist 

Moscow’s objectives even while it acts as Skopje’s supporter and 

protector on the international arena. 

To ingratiate itself with the Macedonian government, Russia’s 

officials publicly validated Skopje’s allegations of coup preparations 

by the opposition and called for a detailed investigation. 104 They were 

playing the Macedonia card to demonstrate Kremlin support for the 

legal order of all states and opposition to clandestine US support for 

political coups. Paradoxically, Moscow charged that Washington 

wanted to destabilize the Macedonian administration, even though 

Kremlin support for successive Greek governments contributed to 

blocking Macedonia from entering NATO and the EU and tested 

regional stability. When the Macedonian opposition organized antigovernment 

protests in April 2015 and increased pressure on 

Gruevski to resign, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared its 

support for the government, accusing the opposition and “Westerninspired” 

NGOs of destabilizing the country through an attempted 

“color revolution.” 105


On the religious front, Moscow has encouraged the Russian Orthodox 

Church to become more active in Macedonia, similarly to other 

majority–Orthodox Slavic states. A Russian Orthodox church was 

constructed in 2015 in the Skopje municipality of Aerodrom, funded 

by Sergei Samsonenko, a rich Russian businessman who owns 

Macedonian handball and soccer teams. 106 Archbishop Stefan, the 

head of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, blessed the site of the new 

Holy Trinity church. However, officials in Skopje have expressed 

concern that Russia may try to use the Orthodox Church to advance 

its interests in Macedonia. 

On the ethnic front, a clash between police and an unidentified armed 

group in Kumanovo, northern Macedonia, on May 9, 2015, resulted 

in 22 deaths. The gunfight precipitated assertions by Russia’s Foreign 

Minister Lavrov on a visit to Belgrade on May 15, 2015, that the region 

faced instability from Islamic extremism, pointing the finger at 

Albanians and Bosniaks. 

107 

He expressed concerns over 

“manifestations of Greater Albania pretensions” and linked them with 

various terrorist attacks in the region, thereby highlighting Russia as 

an ally against international terrorism. 

On May 15, 2015, Lavrov added that the Kumanovo “terrorist attack” 

was connected with Macedonia’s objections to anti-Russian sanctions 

and participation in the planned Turkish Stream gas pipeline. 108 

Expanding on Lavrov’s statement, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accused 

the West of masterminding the violence in Macedonia and supporting 

the opposition to oust the Gruevski government 109 Russia’s 

propaganda offensive against the West, picked up by the local 

Macedonian media, was intended to sway the public against NATO 

and EU membership. Ali Ahmeti, leader of the Democratic Union for 

Integration (DUI), the Albanian coalition partner of the IMRO 

administration, expressed concern with the increasingly frequent 

comments from Moscow that spread conspiracy theories about 

Macedonia in order to expand its influence with the administration. 110


Ethnic tensions lurk beneath the surface in Macedonia and they can 

be fueled by an assortment of radicals hoping to provoke a police 

crackdown that would precipitate inter-ethnic clashes. In the midst of 

a political crisis with blocked NATO and EU integration because of 

the Greek veto over the country’s name, simmering grievances can be 

exploited to deepen ethnic and religious divisions and raise recruits 

for militant causes. 

According to Finance Minister Zoran Stavreski, Russia remains an 

important economic partner for Macedonia. 111 Putin has observed 

that Russian companies are prepared to invest substantially in the 

country. 112 Lukoil has built several dozen filling stations and three oil 

storage bases. Itera and the Macedonian government have also signed 

agreements on investment projects in energy infrastructure. Itera and 

Macedonia’s Toplifikacija established a joint venture in 2004 to 

construct a gas thermal power plant that would generate one fifth of 

the country’s annual electricity output. 

Macedonia and Bulgaria are the most vulnerable European states to 

Russian gas supply interruptions, not only because of their 

dependence on a single gas supplier, but also for the limited 

alternatives they possess in case of another gas crisis caused by 

Russian supply disruptions in the Balkans. The completion of reverseflow 

gas interconnectors between neighboring states has been delayed 

numerous times, and gas storage facilities are insufficient. In fact, 

Macedonia lacks any gas storage facilities. 113 Macedonia’s gas market 

is very small, but the country pays the highest prices for Russian gas— 

$564 per thousand cubic meters in 2013. 114 Skopje was also among the 

South Stream project supporters, hoping that the country would be 

supplied with natural gas through a spur from the Russian pipeline. 

Currently, all gas supplies to Macedonia are delivered through 

Bulgaria via the Trans-Balkan pipeline, making the country as 

dependent on Russian gas as its neighbor.


Prime Minister Gruevski has developed a special relationship with the 

Kremlin. He personally lobbied Putin for Macedonia’s inclusion in 

South Stream. The initial route did not include Macedonia, but after 

Gruevski’s visit, Gazprom decided to build a spur to Skopje. Since the 

cancelation of South Stream in December 2014, Moscow has been 

courting Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia to recruit investors and build 

a new pipeline for gas transiting through Turkey. Playing on the 

national sensitivities of the Macedonian public, the official Russian 

media has promoted the pipeline as a Trans-Macedonian pipeline, 

while for the Serbian public the line is called Balkan Stream. 115 

The value of Russian investments in Macedonia was estimated at $400 

million in 2014, and growing. Lukoil is the largest investor with $32 

million and owning a number of petrol stations. The Russian Sintez 

Group has invested $100 million in the gas-fired thermal power 

station TE-TO. Another Russian company, Power Machines, has 

invested $56 million in the reconstruction and modernization of the 

thermal power station in Bitola. 116 In February 2015, Russian 

company Stroytransgaz launched the construction of a national gas 

pipeline between the towns of Klecovce and Stip. According to Zoran 

Stavrevski, Macedonia’s Deputy Finance Minister, this investment is 

expected to motivate other Russian companies. 117 The same company 

had been contracted to build the Macedonian spur to South Stream. 

However, Stroytransgaz and its owner Gennady Timchenko were 

placed on the US sanctions list in 2014. Macedonia refused to join the 

EU-US measures against Russian officials and companies. By 

disregarding EU policy despite its candidate status for Union entry, 

Skopje has become one of Moscow’s preferred partners in the Balkans. 

After Bulgaria stopped South Stream construction in June 2014, 

largely because of its non-compliance with EU laws, Russia has been 

courting non-EU states Macedonia and Serbia, troubled EU member 

Greece in desperate need of revenues, and Hungary, which remains 

highly dependent on Russia for gas supplies. Although Gazprom 

announced, on May 7, 2015, that gas deliveries through Turkish


Stream would start in December 2016, it remains unclear which route 

the pipeline will take from Greece to the rest of Europe. 118 Macedonia 

and Serbia are the logical choice, if Gazprom wants to reach the 

Serbian hub at Banatski Dvor and then continue to Hungary and 

Austria. 

The Kremlin seeks to entice non-EU states such as Macedonia with 

favorable agreements, including lowered customs rates for exports, 

free trade accords, and investments in various economic sectors. To 

increase its influence in the region, Moscow has proposed establishing 

a free trade zone with Macedonia and Serbia. 119 Given the economic 

difficulties faced by both states, such an arrangement may appear 

beneficial even though it would create obstacles to EU integration. 

The Kremlin has also offered to provide Macedonia with lucrative 

energy transit to Serbia from Greece and Turkey while bypassing EU 

member Bulgaria, which has grown more suspicious over the 

repercussions of Russian investments. If Turkish Stream is 

constructed, it is likely to traverse Macedonia, but prospects for the 

pipeline remain highly uncertain. 120 In a potential setback for Russia, 

according to comments by Prime Minister Gruevski in May 2015, 

Macedonia would only join Turkish Stream if the European 

Commission and Moscow reach agreement on its construction. 121 

Greece and Cyprus 

Greece has traditionally maintained cordial relations with Russia 

regardless of the political coloration of its government. A Gallup poll 

published in February 2015 reported that 35% of Greeks approved of 

Russia’s political leadership compared to just 23% support for EU 

leaders. 122 For President Putin’s reinvigorated offensive against 

NATO and EU interests in the Balkans, the victory of the Syriza 

movement in the Greek general elections on January 25, 2015, was 

especially advantageous. The leftist government could potentially 

generate two negative consequences for European security. First, it


encourages radical leftist parties across Europe to believe their 

moment in the political limelight had arrived. This may pose a direct 

challenge to the principles of liberalism and a free market and give 

greater opportunities for Moscow’s penetration. And second, the 

Syriza government, re-elected in a snap parliamentary ballot on 

September 20, 2015, may contribute to further undermining 

coherence in EU foreign policy by opposing policies that irritate 

Moscow. 

The first meeting of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras with a foreign 

ambassador was with the newly installed Russian Ambassador Andrey 

Maslov. Tsipras also visited Moscow at Putin’s invitation for the 

annual Victory Day parade on May 9, 2015. 123 Nikos Kotzias, foreign 

minister of the Syriza government, was a former Communist Party 

official who defended General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s imposition of 

martial law in Poland in 1981 in his book Poland and We: 

Observations and Prospects. 124 Kotzias is accused of having ties to 

Putin’s close advisor and Eurasian ideologist, Alexander Dugin, who 

also communicates with leaders of the Greek neo-fascist Golden 

Dawn movement. Kotzias has been outspoken that Greece must move 

away from a European Atlanticist perspective by opening up to the 

other major states, particularly Russia. 

Tsipras indicated that he may seek loans and other contributions from 

Moscow to alleviate growing hardships in Greece’s cash-strapped 

economy. 125 Russia’s Finance Minister Anton Siluanov stated that if 

Greece asked for aid, then Russia would definitely consider it. Tsipras 

was also sending a message to EU leaders negotiating over Greece’s 

monumental debt and bail out funds that Athens had alternatives in 

Russia despite the fact that in 2015 the Russian economy was sinking 

and the government in Moscow was running out of money. In a 

comment that was either based on naiveté, bravado, or ignorance, 

Tsipras added that Cyprus and Greece should be a “bridge of peace 

and co-operation between Europe and Russia.”


Although Russia has long since rejected any form of communism, it 

is still viewed among ultra-leftist and nationalist circles in Greece and 

other EU states as an anti-imperialist and anti-American older 

brother that can help undermine Europe’s neo-liberal system. 126 And 

for the Kremlin, Syriza’s anti-capitalist agenda corresponds with its 

own objectives to divide the EU and isolate Germany. Greece and 

Russia can also act in tandem to sabotage Trans-Atlanticism, 

especially if Athens begins to question its NATO commitments. 

Moscow would then exploit Greece to accelerate its Greater Russia 

project in Europe’s East. 

Russia’s state media relishes the prospect of Greece exiting the 

Eurozone currency bloc and even the EU. Some commentaries assert 

that this would be the beginning of Europe’s unraveling, with 

Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy to follow. 127 Some Russian analysts 

are even urging Greece to abandon NATO and join the Moscow-led 

Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union. At the very least, 

Moscow expects that a Greek exit from the Eurozone in the midst of 

severe economic decline will discourage several of Russia’s neighbors 

from petitioning for EU entry. Although Athens negotiated a third 

bailout package with the EU in August 2015 worth $95 billion, there 

are serious doubts whether the country will conduct essential 

structural reforms and it could be faced with an even messier financial 

collapse when the funds expire in 2018. This will provide the Kremlin 

with various avenues of subterfuge. 

While Syriza may view Moscow as a bargaining chip with EU 

creditors, some analysts believe that Athens is moving away from the 

West toward the Russian sphere hoping to obtain financial loans 

regardless of conditions. 128 Greece also seeks cheaper energy supplies 

and increased Russian investment and tourism. In return, Moscow 

would supposedly gain an ally with veto powers inside the EU. Greece 

could also paralyze NATO by vetoing any future military action 

against Moscow or in defense of new member states vulnerable to 

Russia’s subversion. Such prospects could accelerate if Greece ejects


itself from the Eurozone by defaulting on its massive debts to the EU 

and the IMF. This could exacerbate anti-EU, anti-NATO, and pro- 

Moscow sentiments among the Greek population and contribute to 

regional instability. 

On April 27, 2015, Gazprom and Greece signed a natural gas pipeline 

deal to extend the planned Turkish Stream, in which Russia would 

reportedly pay $5.4 billion in advance payment for future gas transit 

fees. However, there is broad skepticism about the alleged Russian 

offer, as well as the feasibility of the pipeline itself, which is not 

expected to come into service until 2019 while Ankara and Moscow 

struggle to reach an agreement. Under the Syriza administration, the 

Greek-Russian Joint Interministerial Committee (JIC) was reactivated 

to tighten bilateral relations. Athens could also play the Russian card 

in a snub to the EU by favoring Russian rather than European 

investment in state railways, the port of Thessaloniki, and other major 

state assets. 

In an added bonus for the Kremlin, Syriza and its successor 

government is unlikely to resolve the name dispute with Macedonia 

that would allow that country to enter NATO and the EU. Parties of 

all political stripes in Greece are unwilling to reach any compromises 

with Macedonia, as this could undermine their patriotic credentials at 

a time of economic crisis and fiscal austerity. Greece is thereby viewed 

in some quarters as Putin’s Trojan Horse inside the EU and NATO 

and may enable him to increase his influence in European politics. 

Soon after it was elected in January 2015, the Syriza government 

resisted an agreement on new sanctions against Russia by objecting to 

language in the EU Declaration concerning the Ukraine crisis. Syriza’s 

members in the European Parliament also voted against the EU- 

Ukraine Association Agreement. The open opposition of Athens to 

sanctions partially subsided during the crucial bailout negotiations 

with Eurogroup creditors in June 2015, evidently in order to placate 

Berlin and Brussels for more beneficial terms. On June 22, 2015, EU


foreign ministers prolonged the sanctions against Russia until January 

31, 2016. The Kremlin is seeking partners that can veto decisions in 

the EU and NATO that affect sanctions or other actions that punish 

Moscow. 129 It tries to achieve this through governments that either 

sympathize with Russia’s position or are economically dependent on 

Moscow. Greece is also deeply susceptible to corruption, and the 

higher the vulnerability the stronger is Moscow’s influence. 

Anti-Ukrainian rallies have been held at Greek universities, where 

attendees flew flags of the Donetsk People’s Republic, and anyone who 

supports Ukraine has been labeled a fascist. 130 According to the Pew 

Research Center in early 2015, while support for Russia has dropped 

across the world, 61% percent of Greeks hold positive views toward 

Moscow. The prevailing view in Greece is that Ukraine’s EuroMaidan 

Revolution was the result of Western intervention. There is also 

evidence of active engagement between RISS, a Russian think tank that 

provides “information support” to the Russian government, and both 

Syriza and the nationalist Independent Greeks party in the months 

preceding their election victory. 

On the security front, in early 2015, Moscow reportedly requested that 

Greece allocate land for the construction of military base on its 

territory. 131 Russian interest in acquiring naval bases in Greece and 

Cyprus is longstanding. 132 Moscow has sought a base at Paphos in 

western Cyprus since at least 2012, as well as a naval base on the 

Adriatic at Bar in Montenegro. So far, Moscow has not reached hostcountry 

agreements for any of these Mediterranean locations. Russia’s 

base plans are an important component of its attempts to increase 

influence throughout southeast Europe. To help coordinate military 

ties with Moscow, Tsipras appointed as Minister of Defense Panos 

Kammenos, leader of the Independent Greeks, which seeks closer ties 

with Russia. 133 Kammenos attended an international defense 

conference in Moscow on April 16–17, 2015.


On the economic front, Greece has a strategic interest in upholding 

cordial ties with Russia, especially as it is dependent on Russian 

natural gas and pricing is always a sensitive question. Greek shipping 

magnates also depend on Russia to maintain their quasi-monopoly on 

Black Sea trade. If Greece is forced out of the eurozone, the drachma 

would rapidly devalue, making energy imports more expensive. 

Consolidating energy ties with Russia could then become 

indispensable. In 2013, 54% of 3.86 bcm of Greek gas needs were 

imported from Russia, with Athens paying $478 per thousand cubic 

meters. 134 However, natural gas represents only 13.9% in Greece’s total 

primary energy supply, while oil has been the dominant source of 

energy, accounting for 45.9% in 2012, and coal makes up over 30%. 135 

Potential energy projects in Greece are of considerable interest to 

Russia. Since December 2014, Putin has tried to lure Greece into 

Turkish Stream. There are two reasons for this project: to bypass 

Bulgaria as an EU member that refused to bend the rules for South 

Stream, and to undermine the EU-backed and Azerbaijan-led 

Southern Gas Corridor as an alternative gas supply vehicle for the 

Balkans. 136 Athens is desperate to benefit from Turkish Stream, and in 

April 2015 it signed a deal with Gazprom to connect Turkish Stream 

with existing Greek pipelines. 137 If it is ever built, the pipeline is 

projected to have an annual capacity of 63 bcm. Around 14 billion 

bcm will be supplied to Turkey. The rest would be pumped to a 

receiving hub on the Turkish-Greek border for European customers. 

Moscow has also tried to obstruct the planned Trans-Anatolian Gas 

Pipeline (TANAP) and its connection to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 

(TAP) that would pump natural gas from Azerbaijan to Italy through 

Greece and Albania and is slated for completion by 2018. Baku’s 

attempts to buy a majority stake in the Greek gas grid operator DESFA 

has been countered by Moscow, which seeks to purchase a number of 

gas distribution networks in Europe. Overall Russian investment 

in Greece has picked up in recent years, rising from $33 million 

in 2007 to $98 million in 2013. Officials in Moscow also planned to


exempt Greek fruits from a Russian food import ban imposed on the 

EU in retaliation against Western sanctions in the summer of 2014. 

Additionally, Russia wants to participate in the potential privatization 

of the Thessaloniki Port Authority and national rail and bus service 

providers, Trainose and Esssty. 

Cyprus, another EU member, is also prone to Russia’s influences. 

The Cypriot economy is closely linked to Greece and would be 

severely affected by Athens’ potential exit from the euro. This will also 

impact on Russia, as Cyprus is one of the major destinations 

for Russian money. A banking crisis in Greece and abandonment of 

the Euro currency could undermine Cyprus as an offshore destination 

for Russian businesses. 

In February 2015, the President of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades visited 

Moscow to promote bilateral ties. The two countries signed a range 

of agreements, including intensified military cooperation that gives 

the Russian navy access to Cypriot ports and a memorandum 

of understanding between Russian and Cypriot investment agencies. 

European and Western experts criticized the military agreement as a 

political document. According to General Chuck Wald, deputy 

commander of United States European Command, the new 

agreement “is part of the bigger picture of regaining the old spheres of 

influence.” 138 It gives Moscow access to a Mediterranean port and an 

intelligence presence to observe the British Royal Air Force base at 

Akrotiri, which has been crucial in refueling allied jets participating in 

air strikes against the Islamic State (ISIS) jihadist insurgency in Iraq 

and Syria. 

Endnotes 

1 

For instance, see R.Z. Markovic, “Islamists To Attack Serbia in August?!” 

Belgrade, Nase Novine, July 9, 2015.


2 

Based on conversations by the authors with analysts in Tirana, Albania, in 

October and November 2013. 

3 

“Больше всех в Европе «Газпрому» платят македонцы и поляки,” 

(Macedonians and Poles Pay The Highest Prices to Gazprom), Izvestiya, 

February 1, 2013, http://izvestia.ru/news/544100. 

4 

Jonathan Stern, Simon Pirani and Katja Yafimava, “Does The Cancellation 

of South Stream Signal a Fundamental Reorientation of Russian Gas Export 

Policy?” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 2015, 

http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Does- 

cancellation-of-South-Stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of- 

Russian-gas-export-policy-GPC-5.pdf. 

5 

Sergey Strokan and Andrew Korybko, “South Stream: Life After Death?” 

Sputnik International, March 20, 2015, http://sptnkne.ws/aru. 

6 

“Macedonia Has Azerbaijani Gas In Its Sight,” Trend News Agency, May 

28, 2015, https://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/en/news/macedonia-hasazerbaijani-gas-its-sight. 

7 

“Serbia ‘Will Not Get Gas From Turkish Stream’,” B92, May 8, 2015, 

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/business.php?yyyy=2015&mm=05&dd=08& 

nav_id=94049. 

8 

Georgi Papakochev, “No One Wants To Fight a War Against Russia,” 

Sofia, novinite.com, February 3, 2015, www.novinite.com and DW.de, 

February 11, 2015, www.dw.de. 

9 

Panayot Angarev, “Characteristics Of Russian Information War Fishing,” 

Sega Online, Sofia, March 24, 2015, http://www.segabg.com. 

10 

“Overdosing: Siderov Has Revealed That the CIA and the Pentagon Are 

Planning Ethnic Clashes in Bulgaria,” Dnevnik Online, Sofia, April 8, 2015, 

www.dnevnik.bg. 

11 

“NATO To Station Ship Command Centre Near Bulgaria's Varna,” 

Novinite, Sofia, February 27, 2015,


http://www.novinite.com/newsletter/print.php?id=166878#sthash.x7mTW 

9t6.dpuf. 

12 

“Borisov Justifies Deployment of NATO Logistics Staff in Bulgaria,” 

Mediapool.bg, Sofia, February 5, 2015. 

13 

Interview with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov by Tsvetanka 

Rizova, “Daniel Mitov: There Is No Danger of Entering War Against 

Anyone,” Focus Online, Sofia February 2, 2015, www.focus-news.net. 

14 

“The Bulgarian Government Behaves in a Servile Manner,” Duma Online, 

Sofia, March 20, 2015, http://www.duma.bg. 

15 

Novinite.com, March 17, 2015, http://www.novinite.com. 

16 

“We Achieved a Grand Slam, Parvanov Announced,” News.bg, January 

18, 2008, http://news.ibox.bg/news/id_443771292. 

17 

“Nabucco Pipeline Secures Bulgarian Environmental Permit,” The Sofia 

Globe, May 8, 2013, http://sofiaglobe.com/2013/05/08/nabucco-pipelinesecures-bulgarian-environmental-permit. 

18 

Margarita Assenova, “Bulgaria Suspends South Stream as the Ruling 

Coalition Falls Apart,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 11 Issue: 103, June 

9, 2014, Washington, The Jamestown Foundation, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42475&no_ 

cache=1. 

19 

“Bulgaria Energy Report,” Enerdata, May 2014, 

https://estore.enerdata.net/energy-market/bulgaria-energy-report-anddata.html. 

20 

“Газова Прегръдка” (Gas Embrace), November 16, 2012, Capital 

Weekly, 

http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2012/11/16/1949092_ 

gazova_pregrudka/.


21 

Roman Kupchinsky, “Bulgaria’s Overgas, a Russian Spy in Canada, and 

Gazprom,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 30, February 13, 2009, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5 

D=34511. 

22 

“Брюксел обвини БЕХ в злоупотреба с господстващо положение на 

газовия пазар” (Brussels Accused BEH of Abusing its Dominant Position 

in the Gas Market), March 25, 2015, Capital Weekly, 

http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2015/03/23/2498171_ 

brjuksel_obvini_beh_v_zloupotreba_s_gospodstvashto/; “Overgas Snubs 

State-Owned Bulgargaz in Contract Negotiations,” Sofia News Agency, May 

27, 2010, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=116613. 

23 

“Bulgarian PM Backs Lukoil License Suspension, Says Ministers Should 

Secure Fuel,” Sofia News Agency, July 29, 2011, 

http://www.novinite.com/articles/130684/Bulgarian+PM+Backs+Lukoil+Li 

cense+Suspension%2C+Says+Ministers+Should+Secure+Fuel; “Lukoil 

Bulgaria Suffers Setback in Court,” Sofia News Agency, August 23, 2013, 

http://www.novinite.com/articles/153083/Lukoil+Bulgaria+Suffers+Setback 

+in+Court. 

24 

“Sefcovic Gives His Blessing To Southern Gas Corridor,” EurActiv.com, 

February 13, 2015, Brussels, http://www.euractiv.com. 

25 

Interview with Russian ambassador Yuriy Isakov by Evelina Branimirova 

on February 27, 2015, “Blood of Soldiers Killed in Russian-Turkish War Is 

Substance That Connects Bulgarians And Russians,” Focus Online, Sofia, 

March 3, 2015, http://www.focus-news.net. 

26 

“Russia Is Losing Ground in the Balkans,” Stratfor, January 4, 2015, 

http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/russia-losing-ground-balkans. 

27 

Ivo Indzhev, “In Sofia, the United States Warned Russia Not to Seek 

Retribution on Bulgaria” e-vestnik.bg, Sofia, January 15, 2015, http://evestnik.bg/. 

28 

Michael R. Gordon, “US to Help Bulgaria Depend Less on Russians,” The 

New York Times, January 15, 2015,


http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/world/europe/us-vows-to-helpbulgaria-reduce-energy-dependency-on-russia.html?smprod=nytcoreipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=0. 

29 

Novinite.com, Sofia, May 20, 2015, http://www.novinite.com. 

30 

Svetlana Gamova, “A Bessarabian Autonomy Could Emerge In Ukraine. 

The National Minorities of Odesa Oblast Have Formed Their Own People’s 

Rada,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, Moscow, April 8, 2015, 

http://www.ng.ru. 

31 

BTA Online, Sofia, June 2, 2015, http://www.bta.bg. 

32 

Vladimir Socor, “Medvedev Exploits Past-Oriented Nationalism in 

Belgrade,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 197, October 27, 2009, 

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=356 

54&tx_ttnews[backPid]=485&no_cache=1#.VXiDsab9p5g. 

33 

“Russia And Serbia Conducted A Spectacular Military Drill Today, Just 

Miles From NATO Ground,” Business Insider, November 15, 2014, 

http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-and-serbia-conduct-military-drill- 

2014-11#ixzz3JAdB6Mey. 

34 

“’Slavic Brotherhood Exercises Aimed at Crushing Potential Maidan 

Scenario,” Sputnik International, September 3, 2015, 

http://sputniknews.com/military/20150903/1026549545/slavicbrotherhood-russia-serbia-belarus.html#ixzz3kgd9UzBA. 

35 

Z.R, “Patriotic Bloc Calls for Strongest Possible Cooperation With 

Russia,” Danas, Belgrade, June 18, 2015, http://www.danas.rs. 

36 

“Russia’s Soft Power Expands,” Helsinki Bulletin, No. 120, October 2015, 

p. 5, http://www.helsinki.org.rs. 

37 

Elisabeth Brew, “The Kremlin’s Influence Game,” World Affairs, March 

10, 2015, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabethbraw/kremlin%E2%80%99s-influence-game.


38 

B92 Online, Belgrade, February 20, 2015, www.b92.net. 

39 

Paul Goble, “Reshetnikov Details How RISI Helps Putin Make 

Decisions,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, March 30, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/reshetnikov-details-howrisi-helps.html. 

40 

“Russia’s Soft Power Expands,” Helsinki Bulletin, No .120, October 2015, 

p. 4, http://www.helsinki.org.rs. 

41 

“Russian-Serbian Crisis Management Center Working in Nis,” Interfax, 

Belgrade, October 16, 2014, www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=544333. 

42 

“Russian Airborne Troops Will Be Conducting Joint Exercises With 

Belarusian and Serbian Paratroops,” Lenta, Moscow, June 25, 2015, 

http://lenta.ru. 

43 

B92 Online, Belgrade, April 7, 2015, www.b92.net. 

44 

Lena Gedosevic and Irena Hadziomerovic, “Nikolic Going to Putin, EU 

and United States Boycotting Him,” Blic Online, Belgrade, March 20, 2015, 

http://www.blic.rs. 

45 

For an analysis of the destabilizing threats facing the Western Balkans, 

consult Janusz Bugajski, Return of the Balkans: Challenges to European 

Integration and U.S. Disengagement, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2013. 

46 

“Patriarch Kirill Urges Europe To Return to Christian Values, Warns 

Against ‘Rewriting History,’” RT News, November 14, 2014, 

http://rt.com/news/205671-orthodox-patriarch-kirill-serbia. 

47 

Una Hajdari and Gordana Andric, “Kosovo And Serbia Reach Key Deal 

On Judiciary,” Balkan Insight, February 10, 2015, 

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/belgrade-pristina-reach-deal-onjudiciary.


48 

Gordana Bulatovic, “Nothing Without the IMF; Russian $200 Million 

Loan Falls Through,” Blic Online, Belgrade, February 6, 2015, 

http://www.blic.rs. 

49 

“Russia Is Losing Ground in the Balkans,” Stratfor, January 4, 2015, 

http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/russia-losing-ground-balkans. 

50 

Aleksandar Mikavica, “European Sanctions Against Russia Hurting Us, 

Too,” Politika Online, Belgrade, February 1, 2015, www.politika.rs. 

51 

Ebi Spahiu, “In the Balkans, Putin’s Winning Ticket Is Kosovo,” Eurasia 

Daily Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 225, The Jamestown Foundation, 

December 17, 2014, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=43211&no_cache=1 

#.VKMF_f-oAc. 

52 

“Gazprom’s Grip,” RFE/RL, December 19, 2014; “Serbia,” CIA World 

Factbook, June 20, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ri.html; 

“Delivery Statistics,” Gazprom Export, 

http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics. 

53 

Vladimir Todres and Marta Srnic, “Lukoil Wins Bid for Serbian Fuel 

Retailer,” The Moscow Times, August 26, 2003, 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/lukoil-wins-bid-forserbian-fuel-retailer/236308.html. 

54 

Gazpromneft official website, March 18, 2011, http://www.gazpromneft.com/press-center/news/3914/. 

55 

“Energetski Sporazum na Granici Ključanja: Sergej Šojgu Dolazi kod 

Tadića” (The Energy Agreement at Boiling Point: Sergey Shoygu Meets 

Tadić), Belgrade, Ekonomist, No. 429, August 11, 2008; “Serbia Could Be 

Left Out Of South Stream,” RBC Daily, August 12, 2008, http://www.focusfen.net. 

56 

“Russian Investment in Serbian Oil Business,” Voice of Russia, December 

18, 2013, http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2013_12_18/Russianinvestment-in-Serbian-oil-business-8361/.


57 

Vladimir Socor, “Gazprom, Gazpromneft, in Serbia’s Oil and Gas Sector,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 198, October 28, 2009. 

58 

“RS President Receives Award In Moscow,” B92, March 12, 2014, 

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.php?yyyy=2014&mm=03&dd=12&na 

v_id=89607. 

59 

G. Katana-E. Godinjak, “Political Manipulation and Desire for 

Power,”Oslobodjenje, Sarajevo, April 27, 2015. 

60 

Srecko Latal, “Bosnian Serbs Raise Stakes After Zvornik Terror Attack,” 

Balkan Insight.com, Sarajevo, April 28, 2015, 

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serbs-may-withdrawfrom-state-security-system-over-terrorist-attack. 

61 

“Bosnian Serb Entity Parliament's Referendum Vote Elicits Dramatic 

Warnings,” Zagreb, Hina, July 16, 2015. 

62 

“Russian Embassy: Complicated Issues Should Be Resolved Through 

Mutual Respect and Dialogue,” Sarajevo, Fena, July 14, 2015. 

63 

“Dodik: Srpska - True Aspiration For Freedom,” SRNA, Bijeljina, January 

8, 2015, http://www.srna.rs. 

64 

M. Osmovic, “What Does Seselj Have in Plan for B-H in Spring?” Dnevni 

List Online, Mostar, http://www.dnevni-list.ba. 

65 

Omer Karabeg, “Dodik – Russia’s Faithful Ally,” Radio Free Europe, 

September 29, 2014, 

http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/dodik-russiasfaithfullally/26611368.html. 

66 

Interview with Serb Republic President Milorad Dodik, by Mirjana 

R.Milenkovic, “I Support Creation Of Third Entity In B-H,” Danas.rs, 

Belgrade, January 27, 2015, http://www.danas.rs.


67 

Katarina Panic, Srecko Latal, “Bosnian Serb Leader Puts Hopes in Russian 

Loan,” Sarajevo, Balkan Insight, June 22, 2015, 

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serb-leader-places-lasthope-in-russian-loan. 

68 

“Gazprom’s Grip,” RFE/RL, December 19, 2014, 

http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/gazprom-russia-gas-leverageeurope/25441983.html. 

69 

Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 174, Part II, 


70 

Margarita Assenova, “South Stream Not Bankable After Fresh US 

Sanctions,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 130, July 17, 2014, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be 

3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=republika%20srbska&tx_ 

ttnews[tt_news]=42634&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=12cf90cb5bf597ad 

5b8a32ab1d3a3211#.VKRrFntSKHg. 

71 

The central government in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed on to the Ionian 

Adriatic Gas Pipeline (IAP) project, which will enable countries in the 

region to connect to the Southern Gas Corridor supplying Europe with gas 

from Azerbaijan through the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). See Business 

Magazine, May 13, Sarajevo, 2014, http://www.seebiz.net. 

72 

Darya Korsunskaya, “Putin Drops South Stream Gas Pipeline to EU, 

Courts Turkey,” Ankara, Reuters, December 1, 2014. 

73 

Ivana Frank, “Bosnian Serbs Sign Direct Gas Supply Deal With Russia’s 

Gazprom,” RTRS Radio Online, Banja Luka, February 19, 2015, 

http://rtrs.tv. 

74 

RTRS Radio Online, Banja Luka, April 3, 2015, http://rtrs.tv. 

75 

“How Much Europe Depends on Russian Energy,” The New York Times, 


http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/03/21/world/europe/how-mucheurope-depends-on-russian-energy.html, 

and Guy Chazan, “Europe Seeks


Alternative Gas Supplies,” The Financial Times, April 27, 2014, 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b943b2c4-b8ed-11e3-98c5- 

00144feabdc0.html#axzz3NhPi6axw. 

76 

Marta Szpala, “Russia in Serbia – Soft Power and Hard Interests,” OSW 

Commentary, Centre for Eastern Studies, October 29, 2014, 

http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-10- 

29/russia-serbia-soft-power-and-hard-interests#_ftn2. 

77 

“US Worried It Could ‘Lose’ Hungary to Russia Over MOL Gas Deal,” 

The Moscow Times, November 3, 2014, 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/u-s-worried-it-couldlose-hungary-to-russia-over-mol-gas-deal/510566.html. 

78 

Stephen Blank, “Russia’s New Greek Project: The Balkans in Russian 

Policy,” in Margarita Assenova and Zaur Shiriyev (Editors), Azerbaijan and 

the New Energy Geopolitics in Southeastern Europe, Washington DC: The 

Jamestown Foundation, June 2015. 

79 

Joseph Orovic, “Russia’s Rosneft said looking to buy INA and Petrol in the 

Balkans,” Business New Europe, February 26, 2014, 

http://www.bne.eu/content/russias-rosneft-said-looking-buy-ina-andpetrol-balkans; 

“Zarubezhneft Mulls $1.27 Billion Projects in Croatia,” 

Reuters, January 17, 2012, 

http://de.reuters.com/article/idUKL6E8CH4CD20120117. 

80 

Sven Milekic, “Croatia Court Orders Retrial for Ex-PM Sanader,” Balkan 

Insight, July 27, 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatianconstitution-court-revokes-former-pm-s-corruption-verdics. 

81 

“Russia’s Gazprom Eyes INA Stake of Hungarian MOL,” July 15, 2014, 

http://www.energynomics.ro/en/russias-gazprom-eyes-ina-stake-ofhungarian-mol. 

82 

“South Stream Demise Leads Croatia to Revive Gas Terminal Project,” 

EurActiv, December 10, 2014, 

http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/south-stream-demise-leadscroatia-revive-gas-terminal-project-310727.


83 

Vladimir Socor, “Gazprom Wooing Croatia Ahead of Putin-Kosor 

Meeting,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 9, January 14, 2010. 

84 

Geoplin, “Natural Gas in Slovenia,” http://www.geoplin.si/en/naturalgas/slovenian-market. 

85 

“Gazprom’s Grip,” RFE/RL, December 19, 2014, 


86 

“Over 350 Russian And Croatian Companies Attend Moscow Forum,” 

Hina, Zagreb, February 17, 2015. 

87 

Hina, Zagreb, February 13, 2015, 

http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/369782/Karamarko-uz-Mertena- 

Hrvatska-se-mora-znati-ponasati.html. 

88 

Sven Milekic, “Croatia-Russia Trade Forum Opens in Moscow,” Balkan 

Insight, February 17, 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/highcroatian-representation-in-moscow-despite-eu-sanctions. 

89 

Official website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 

February 12, 2015, http://www.mid.ru. 

90 

Based on conversations by the authors with analysts in Podgorica, 

Montenegro, during several visits in 2013 and 2014. 

91 

V. R, “Nesterenko: I Would Not Provoke Moscow if I Were You,” Dan 

Online, Podgorica, January 8, 2015, http://www.dan.co.me. 

92 

“Nesterenko: No Sense in NATO Expansion,” MINA, Podgorica, March 

16, 2015, www.securities.com. 

93 

“NATO’s Planned Balkan Expansion a ‘Provocation,’ Russia’s Lavrov,” 

Reuters, September 29, 2014, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/29/us-nato-balkans-russiaidUSKCN0HO11W20140929.


94 

“Moscow Opposed To Possible Entry of Montenegro Into NATO (Part 

2),” Interfax, Moscow, Jun 30, 2015, http://www.interfax.com/. 

95 

“Montenegro Says Russia Trying to Force Regime Change,” The Moscow 

Times, October 26, 2015 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/montenegro-says-russiatrying-to-force-regime-change/540359.html. 

96 

Based on the authors discussions with political analysts in Podgorica in 

October 2015. 

97 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 108, Part II, June 

13, 2007. 

98 

Estimated at over $1000 for each of Montenegro’s 650,000 citizens. See 

Oana Lungescu, “Russians Prompt Boom in Montenegro,” BBC News, 

February 21, 2008, Podgorica, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/- 

/2/hi/europe/7255240.stm. 

99 

Montenegro 2007 Progress Report, Commission of the European 

Communities, SEC 1434, Brussels, 2007, p. 42. 

100 

For a summary of the KAP dispute see “Deripaska’s CEAC Sues 

Montenegro Over Aluminum Plant Bankruptcy,” Reuters, December 3, 

2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/montenegro-ceacidUSL5N0JI2WH20131203. 

101 

Srdjan Jankovic and Robert Coalson, “As NATO Membership Gets 

Closer, Montenegro Feels the Heat From Russia,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio 

Liberty, June 12, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/montenegro-natorussia-pressure/25419459.html. 

102 

Janusz Bugajski, “Moscow Applauds Greece-Macedonia Drama,” 

Europe’s Edge, CEPA, February 17, 2015, http://cepa.org/content/moscowapplauds. 

103 

For background see Sinisa Jakov Marusic, “Macedonian ‘Coup’ Charges


Alarm US, EU,” Eurasia Review, February 2, 2015, 

http://www.eurasiareview.com/02022015-macedonian-coup-chargesalarm-us-eu/. 

104 

“Moscow Expects Thorough Investigation of Reported Coup Attempt in 

Macedonia,” Sputnik, Moscow, February 1, 2015, 

http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150201/1017615163.html. 

105 

Sinisa Jakov Marusic, “Macedonia Declares Mourning For Police Killed 

In Gunbattles,” Balkan Insight, Skopje, May 10, 2015, 

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-mourns-for-killedpolicemen-while-shootout-continues. 

106 

Elisabeth Braw, “Mixed Feelings In Macedonia As A Russian Orthodox 

Church Rises,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 25, 2015, 

http://www.rferl.org/content/macedonia-russian-orthodox-churchskopje/27093507.html. 

107 

Shoaib-ur-Rehman Siddiqu, “Russia Worried Over Deadly Macedonian 

Incidents: Lavrov,” Business Recorder, May 15, 2015, 

http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/108-pakistan-top-news/242402- 

russsia-worried-over-deadly-macedonian-incidents-lavrov.html. 

108 

“Macedonia Terrorist Raid May Be Linked to Country's Support of 

Russia – Lavrov,” Russia Today, May 16, 2015, http://rt.com/news/259245- 

machedonia-shooting-russia-support/. 

109 

Ibid. 

110 

“There is No Reason for Renewed Hostilities in Macedonia, Ahmeti Tells 

Die Presse,” MIA, Skopje, May 20, 2015. 

111 

“Stavreski: Russia is One of Macedonia's Leading Economic and Political 

Partners,” MIA, Skopje, March 25, 2015. 

112 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 118, Part II, 

June 27, 2007.


113 

Jack Sharples and Andy Judge, “Russian Gas Supplies to Europe: the 

Likelihood, and Potential Impact, of an Interruption in Gas Transit via 

Ukraine,” The European Geopolitical Forum, March 24, 2014, http://gpfeurope.com/forum/?page=post&blog=energy&id=157. 

114 

“Gazprom’s Grip,” RFE/RL, December 19, 2014; and “Delivery Statistics,” 

Gazprom Export. 

115 

Sergey Strokan and Andrew Korybko, “South Stream: Life after Death?” 

Sputnik International, March 20, 2015, http://sptnkne.ws/aru. 

116 

“Руските инвестиции земаат залет” (Russian Investments Kick Up a 

Gear), Business, August 30, 2013, https://archive.is/WaoAV. 

117 

“Macedonian Finance Minister: Russia Remains One of Most Significant 

Economic and Political Partners,” Independent.mk, March 25, 2015, 

http://www.independent.mk/articles/15742/Macedonian+Finance+Ministe 

r+Russia+Remains+One+of+Most+Significant+Economic+and+Political+ 

Partners. 

118 

“Gas to Start Flowing Through Turkish Stream in December 2016 – 

Gazprom,” novinite.com, May 7, 2015, 

http://www.novinite.com/articles/168380/Gas+to+Start+Flowing+Through 

+Turkish+Stream+in+Dec+2016+-+Gazprom. 

119 

Petrit Haliti, “Project for Russia-Serbia-Macedonia Bloc,” Gazeta 

Shqiptare, Tirana, December 14, 2014, 

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/germany-worried-aboutrussian-influence-in-the-balkans-a-1003427.html. 

120 

Dejan Azeski, “New Russian Gas Pipeline To Make Macedonia Choose 

Between East, West,” Kapital, Skopje, February 27, 2015 - March 6, 2015. 

121 

Novinite, Sofia, May 27, 2015, http://www.novinite.com. 

122 

Andrew Rettman, "Greece Equivocates On Russia Bailout Option," 

Brussels, euobserver.com, February 3, 2015, www.euobserver.com.


123 

“Greek Prime Minister Set To Visit Russia In May,” AFP (North 

European Service), Paris, February 5, 2015, http://www.afp.com/en/home. 

124 

Angelos Al. Athanasopoulos, “Nikos Kotzias: Theoretician of Party 

Leaders With Machiavelli as His ‘Weapon,’ ” To Vima, Athens, February 1, 

2015. 

125 

Andrew Rettman, “Greece Equivocates On Russia Bailout Option,” 

euobserver.com, Brussels, February 3, 2015, www.euobserver.com. 

126 

Janusz Bugajski, “Athens-Moscow Axis Endangers Europe,” Europe’s 

Edge, Center for European Policy Analysis, July 2, 2015, 

http://www.cepa.org/content/athens-moscow-axis-endangers-europe-0. 

127 

Timothy Heritage, “Russia Waits In Wings As Greek Debt Crisis 

Deepens,” Reuters, July 3, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/russia-waits-wingsgreek-debt-crisis-deepens-095531257--business.html. 

128 

Giorgos Christides, “Could Europe Lose Greece To Russia?” BBC News, 

March 11, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31837660. 

129 

Egle Samoskaite, “Just Several Putin’s Targeted Maneuvers Could Ruin 

The West,” Delfi, Vilnius, February 2, 2015, www.delfi.lt. 

130 

David Patrikarakos, “Is Greece Becoming A New Russian Satellite State?” 

The Daily Beast, February 27, 2015, 

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/27/is-greece-becoming-anew-russian-satellite-state.html. 

131 

“Russia Wants To Build A Military Base In Greece,” ZN,UA, Kyiv, 

February 3, 2015, http://mw.ua/WORLD/russia-wants-to-build-a-militarybase-in-greece-1093_.html. 

132 

Steve Blank, “Russia’s Quest For Balkan Influence And Bases,” Eurasia 

Daily Monitor, February 25, 2015, Volume 12, Issue 35. 

133 

“Greece Uses Russia To Strengthen Its Position,” Stratfor, January 31, 

2015,


https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/greece-uses-russia-strengthen-itsposition. 

134 

“Gazprom’s Grip: Russia's Leverage Over Europe,” RFE/RL, December 

19, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/gazprom-russia-gasleverage-europe/25441983.html. 

135 

“Energy Supply Security 2014: Greece,” International Energy Agency, 

https://www.iea.org/media/freepublications/security/EnergySupplySecurity 

2014_Greece.pdf. 

136 

Orhan Gafarli, “Russian Energy Proposals for Turkey Could Undermine 

Southern Gas Corridor,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 225, 



#.VKRgcntSKHg. 

137 

Kenneth Rapoza, “Washington Muscles In On Russia’s Oil Deal With 

Greece,” Forbes, April 29, 2015, 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/04/29/washington-musclesin-on-russias-oil-deal-with-greece/. 

138 

Damien Sharkov, “Cyprus Agrees Deal To Let Russian Navy Use 

Ports,” Reuters, February 26, 2015, 

http://www.newsweek.com/cyprus-agrees-deal-let-russian-navy-use-ports- 

309759.

5. Southern Flank: South Caucasus 

The strategic location of the South Caucasus makes it simultaneously 

a “land bridge” between the Black Sea and the energy rich Caspian Sea, 

a crossroads of major trade and security corridors, and an arena for 

competition between the regional powers of Russia, Turkey and Iran. 

By exporting energy resources westward and serving as Europe’s 

gateway to the landlocked Central Asia, the region is also critically 

important for the European Union and the United States. However, 

the geopolitical rivalry over the Middle East between the US, EU and 

Turkey on the one side, and Russia and Iran on the other, along with 

Russia’s expansionism in its flanks, require assigning the South 

Caucasus a much higher place among Western strategic priorities 

than it currently holds. 

Through the South Caucasus, Western influence and ideas are able to 

reach over half of the former Soviet republics—most of them with 

predominantly Muslim populations. In fact, six out of the eight 

countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia have moderate 

Muslim majorities (Shia in Azerbaijan and Sunni in Central Asia) and 

determinedly secular governments, which are seeking closer 

cooperation with the West. 

For the past two decades, Western interests in the region have been 

dominated by energy and security with the main emphasis on 1) 

channeling Caspian oil and natural gas westward to boost European 

energy independence; and 2) ensuring a safe transportation corridor 

for the international military forces in Afghanistan. Since early 1990s,

SOUTHERN FLANK | 283 

US policy toward the South Caucasus has also promoted resolution of 

the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno- 

Karabakh region, and finding solutions to the conflicts in Georgia’s 

breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, torn by civil war 

in the early 1990s and subsequently occupied by Russia since 2008. An 

essential part of Western priorities in the South Caucasus has been 

supporting the emerging new democracies, a sphere viewed by Russia 

as a direct threat to its stranglehold over the region. 

For Russia, the South Caucasus has always been a critical outpost 

where Moscow has either pursued outright colonization or, after the 

Soviet Union dissolved, sought to achieve a level of significant control 

in order to keep the region within its sphere of influence. The fact that 

Moscow became involved in or manipulated several conflicts in the 

region as soon as the Soviet empire collapsed demonstrates how 

important it has been for Russia to retain domination over its 

southern flank. 

Three of the four wars of the early 1990s that raged in the former 

Soviet Union and ultimately resulted in “frozen conflicts” took place 

in the South Caucasus: in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia. 1 Subsequently, Moscow has used them to play the countries 

and the peoples in the region against each other, weaken the newly 

independent states, pull them away from the West, and limit the 

development of strong institutions and democratic societies. For over 

25 years, Russia has maintained a constant level of security threat in 

the South Caucasus by direct occupation, incitement of hostilities, 

support for one or the other side of a conflict while arming both and, 

at the same time, positioning itself as an arbiter or indispensable 

peacemaker—all with the purpose of holding the region in its tight 

grip. Russia has expanded its military presence in the region by 

turning the conflict zones into its strongholds that any rival power 

would need to take account of. The partitioning of the South Caucasus 

has served a number of the Kremlin’s goals, with the main one being


keeping the young independent states as far away from NATO and the 

European Union as possible. 

As a result, the South Caucasus today is increasingly perceived as a 

region only geographically. Politically, it is divided, with each country 

having different security priorities and relying on diverse sources of 

security. Economically, the region is staggeringly imbalanced: while 

oil and natural gas have helped Azerbaijan’s economy thrive for a long 

time, isolated Armenia relies on Russian subsidies to survive, and 

Georgia is striving to develop a modern economy with limited natural 

resources and perpetual threats of Russian trade embargos. The 

government systems of the three countries are also divergent, ranging 

from a fledging democracy in Georgia, to a quasi-autocracy in 

Azerbaijan, and a political system that is nominally democratic, but 

heavily influenced by the Kremlin, in Armenia. 

Of the three states in the South Caucasus, only Armenia is a member 

of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 

Although Azerbaijan and Georgia initially signed the Collective 

Security Treaty in 1993, they refused to extend it five years later, along 

with Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan claims it would not participate in any 

military alliance in which Armenia takes part, while Georgia has 

pursued NATO membership, inciting Moscow’s wrath. For Russia, 

the South Caucasus is not only the “near abroad,” it is also a buffer 

zone to the south and a critical part of the north-south corridors 

connecting it with Iran and Turkey. Furthermore, Moscow treats 

these countries as a neocolonialist—it considers them inferior, views 

them as not fully sovereign, and believes in its right to dictate their 

foreign and security policies. 

As Moscow advances an expansionist agenda in its periphery, the 

divided South Caucasus has become an extremely vulnerable region. 

The little common ground between the three South Caucasus states 

prevents them from formulating a united regional approach to push 

back against an encroaching Russia. Furthermore, following the war


in Ukraine, all three governments have become more cautious in their 

rhetoric and diplomatic relations with Moscow and sometimes appear 

to be appeasing the Kremlin, although resentments against Russia’s 

policies run deep in all three capitals. 

Their fears are not without reason: being on the receiving end of 

Moscow’s instruments of subversion for decades and witnessing the 

latest Western failure to stop Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the 

governments in the South Caucasus have reasonably concluded that 

the West would not rush to help them should they become the 

Kremlin’s next target. After all, the West did not militarily defend 

Georgia when Russian forces invaded the country in 2008—despite 

the fact that Georgia’s military contingent in Iraq was at the time the 

third-largest in the coalition, after the US and Britain. 2 

The dangers of Russian intervention in the South Caucasus are greater 

than perceived by most policymakers in the US and the EU. Russia is 

likely to take advantage of every available tool to disrupt and subvert 

the region. In its attempts to undercut the region’s Western 

connections, Moscow could reignite conflict between Armenia and 

Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh or split Georgia by creating a 

military corridor across the country to link Russia with its military 

bases in Armenia. This could push Tbilisi and Baku into an enforced 

Russian orbit and embroil Turkey in a conflict close to its borders, 

especially if tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan are heightened 

or a renewed war erupts. 

Moscow’s offensive would also sever energy pipeline connections 

between the Caspian and Europe, undermine Europe’s goals of greater 

energy diversity, and curtail Western connections with Central Asia. 

In fact, disrupting the Southern Gas Corridor from Azerbaijan to 

Europe may become a major means for Moscow’s retaliation against 

Ankara after Turkey downed a Russian bomber that had encroached 

into Turkish airspace near the Syrian border in November 2015. 3


With fighting around Nagorno-Karabakh intensifying throughout 

2015, threatening to ignite another war, Moscow could use the 

opportunity to deploy Russian peacekeeping forces in the disputed 

territory, just as it did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the 1990s. 

Russia’s policy of “borderization”—aiming to separate the occupied 

provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia combined 

with the ongoing “creeping” annexation of additional Georgian 

territories around these two provinces—along with Moscow’s plans to 

restore the railway from Russia through Abkhazia and on to Armenia 

and also build a new parallel highway, all indicate that preparations 

for opening a potential Russian military corridor through Georgia are 

already under way. 

Another serious threat is a possible attempt by Moscow to turn the 

region into a corridor for its military operations in Syria. In fact, 

Russian bombers have been flying over the Caspian Sea on their way 

to Syria, just 50 miles from Azerbaijan’s territorial waters, barely 

skirting the region, while the Russian Navy has launched cruise 

missiles to Syrian targets from warships in the Caspian Sea. 4 Moscow 

might also decide to use its military base at Gyumri in Armenia as a 

“lily pad” facility to support its Syrian campaign. Located in 

northwestern Armenia, not far from the Turkish border, Gyumri is 

the closest Russian military base to the Syrian front. Yerevan fears that 

Armenia, as Russia’s strategic ally and a member of the Moscow-led 

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), may also be asked to 

contribute to the war effort. 5 

Continuous Russian operations in Syria to back Bashar al-Assad’s 

Alawite-dominated regime could result in increased support for the 

Islamist militant group Islamic State (IS) by the Sunni Muslim youth 

in the North Caucasus, northern Azerbaijan and some regions in 

Georgia, particularly the Pankisi Gorge. 6 In fact, IS is evidently 

targeting Azerbaijan not only to destabilize the strategically located 

country and recruit fighters among its Sunni minority, but also as a 

way to put pressure on Shiite Iran from the north and reach the North


Caucasus and particularly Dagestan from the south. 7 

These developments could lead to the involuntary involvement of 

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia in the complicated military 

environment in Syria and Iraq, where Russia is trying to regain 

international standing and protect its military bases in Latakia and 

Tartus by bombing the opponents of Bashar al-Assad instead of IS 

militants. 8 In fact, the Moscow-Ankara standoff after the Turkish air 

force downed a Russian Su-24 bomber in November 2015, is taking a 

heavy toll on the South Caucasus by creating further divisions within 

the region, which is pressed hard to choose sides. 9 

While Armenia has unequivocally supported Russia, having a 

perpetual dispute with Turkey over the claimed Armenian genocide 

in 1915 and over the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan is 

caught between a rock and a hard place, having to make the 

impossible choice between its valued strategic partner Turkey and its 

feared neighbor Russia. In the worsening economic situation, 

Azerbaijan cannot afford to endanger its relations with Turkey and 

the West on behalf of a declining Russia. However, Russia’s economic 

downturn may prove to be even more perilous for its neighbors, at 

least in the short run. Georgia on the other hand is split internally in 

its reaction—a public that cheers Turkey for teaching Russia a lesson 

and a government that carefully treads around Moscow, fearful of 

retribution. However, rather than retribution against any of the South 

Caucasus governments, Moscow may issue threats in order to extract 

more concessions from neighbors who refuse to condemn Turkey. 

South Caucasus Front 

Several important developments in the South Caucasus in the early 

2000s raised Western attention to the region, but also brought it 

higher on the list of strategic priorities of President Vladimir Putin 

since he was initially emplaced in power in 1999. First, following the


1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, Russia agreed to close down its 

remaining military bases in Georgia, while Azerbaijan proceeded to 

dispense with all but one Moscow-maintained military facility at 

Gabala, which was subsequently terminated in 2012. 

Second, the “Contract of the Century” for the construction of the 

Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline was signed in 1994. The oil pipeline 

and an associated gas pipeline became operational in 2006, bringing 

Caspian energy resources westward for the first time. Meanwhile, 

plans to build a major new gas pipeline from the Caspian basin to 

Europe were progressing—what started as the Nabucco natural gas 

pipeline to Central Europe eventually became the Southern Gas 

Corridor, crossing Turkey and the Balkans to Italy. 

Third, NATO increased its ties with the countries in the region 

following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US and the subsequent 

military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The South Caucasus 

countries not only became a part of the Northern Distribution 

Network, but they also contributed large numbers of troops to combat 

and support missions, particularly Georgia. 

Lastly, but probably most importantly, Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” 

in November 2003 brought to power a pro-Western government with 

a democratic agenda in Tbilisi. Both of these characteristics—pro- 

Western and democratic—were perceived by Moscow as threats to its 

strategic interests in the region. These drawbacks required a new 

strategy, and the new Russian President wasted no time to pursue it. 

The new strategy included restructuring Russia’s military power in the 

region by boosting its military bases in Armenia and increasing 

Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia before the 

2008 invasion of Georgia—which ultimately served Moscow well 

during the Russia-Georgia war. After occupying the two provinces 

and proclaiming them independent, Russia permanently stationed 

two army brigades and border troops there. In addition, it deployed a


part of its Black Sea fleet to the port of Ochamchira in Abkhazia. In 

November 2015, Moscow announced plans to expand the port of 

Ochamchira and make it an integral part of the planned transport 

corridor from the North Caucasus to Abkhazia, a resurrection of the 

Sukhumi Military Road, as it was known before 1946. Analysts argue 

that the road has little chance to be completed given Russia’s financial 

troubles, but Moscow is using the project to enlist the elites in the 

North Caucasus in convincing Abkhazia to join the Russian 

Federation. 10 If built, however, this corridor could be extended 

through Georgia to Armenia and used not only for trade and 

transportation, but also for military purposes. 

In another development, in trying to maintain the military balance in 

the South Caucasus, Russia started selling more weapons to 

Azerbaijan, while donating military equipment to Armenia, or selling 

it at preferential prices. Moscow has also increased its Navy Fleet 

capacity in the Caspian Sea by deploying more than a hundred ships 

with various dimensions and functions, including amphibious 

aircraft, anti-submarine helicopters, missile ships, and 20,000 

soldiers. 11 Russia did not miss the opportunity to demonstrate its 

military power to the world, and particularly to neighboring 

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, by firing missiles at targets in Syria 

from its warships in the Caspian Sea. However, Russia’s navy buildup, 

along with Iran’s opposition to dividing the sea into national sectors, 

has prompted Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to establish 

their own maritime forces to protect their offshore natural resources, 

leading to further militarization of the Caspian Sea. At the same time, 

Moscow pushed in 2014 for a declaration by the five littoral states 

denying any foreign military forces presence in the Caspian Sea, thus 

effectively ruling out future possible deployment of NATO forces in 

the basin. 12 

On the economic front, Russia’s goal is to become the primary trade 

and economic partner of the countries in the South Caucasus, but 

success has been achieved only in Armenia. However, while Russia


remains the biggest investor in Armenia, Yerevan’s largest trade 

partner for years has been the EU—a relationship Moscow is trying to 

change by enlisting the country in the Eurasian Economic Union. 

Azerbaijan’s principal trade partner is also the European Union and 

Georgia’s has been Turkey, with Russia taking third place after 

Azerbaijan. 13 Moscow’s trade embargo against Georgia between 2006 

and 2013, although initially hurting the country’s economy, has 

prompted Tbilisi to seek other CIS and European markets for its wine 

and mineral water. 

Russia opened its market to Georgian products again after the 

Georgian Dream coalition replaced the United National Movement 

(UNM) government in 2012 and launched trade negotiations with 

Moscow. However, Moscow periodically announces new embargo 

threats or warnings about the quality of Georgian production, every 

time Tbilisi undertakes closer cooperation with NATO and the EU. A 

new warning was issued in August 2015, immediately after Georgia’s 

defense ministry acquired the latest anti-aircraft systems, including 

radars and medium-range missiles, from France and NATO opened a 

joint military training center in Tbilisi. Previously, the Russian 

government announced the imminent suspension of the Free Trade 

Regime between the Russian Federation and Georgia in July 2014 after 

the latter country signed an association agreement with the EU. 14 

In terms of energy security and export, it became critical for Russia to 

prevent Azerbaijan from channeling its oil and gas westward, and 

particularly from reaching Europe. Putin’s political pet project, the 

South Stream natural gas pipeline across the Black Sea, was conceived 

in 2006, with three major purposes, one of which was to compete with 

and render insignificant the Nabucco pipeline project from the 

Caspian basin to Europe, which later became the Southern Gas 

Corridor. The other two goals were to bypass Ukraine and undermine 

the EU’s legal framework and unity by enticing EU member states 

with energy deals. When the project failed, Moscow substituted it with 

a modification called the Turkish Stream project. In addition to the


goals pursued with South Stream, Turkish Stream was also intended 

to undermine Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Turkey, 

particularly on the joint Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline 

(TANAP), a critical part of the Southern Gas Corridor. 15 

Turkish Stream also failed when Russia and Turkey clashed over the 

downed Russian military plane in November 2015, although from the 

very start there had been indications that the project was unlikely to 

be completed. Russia’s next steps on the energy front will involve 

expanding Gazprom’s reach in the South Caucasus, taking control of 

the electricity export lines, buying energy infrastructure, and 

obtaining major management and operation contracts. 

Politically, Moscow is using a variety of tools to influence decisionmaking 

in the three capitals. Forcing Yerevan to give up its plans for 

association with the EU and to instead join the Russian-led Customs 

Union was a glaring demonstration of the level of the Kremlin’s 

influence over the Armenian government. The decision undercut 

Yerevan’s prospects for breaking out of its isolation and strengthening 

vital economic relations with Europe. 

In Georgia, Moscow uses political agents of influence such as former 

Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, a Russian-made billionaire of 

Georgian origin and the founder of the ruling Georgian Dream 

coalition. Ivanishvili, who is still considered the man behind all of the 

government’s decisions, seems to exercise undue influence on 

Georgia’s executive power. One of the tasks of Russia’s political agents 

of influence is to pacify the Western-minded Georgian public 

regarding the Kremlin’s intentions in the country and make it more 

sympathetic toward Russia, even while Moscow deploys new 

weaponry in South Ossetia, tries to annex the strategically critical 

Abkhazia, grabs additional Georgian territory, or threatens vital 

energy export routes.


In Azerbaijan, as well as in Armenia, Russia uses the Nagorno- 

Karabakh conflict to achieve political concessions. As a member of the 

OSCE’s Minsk Group, Moscow has immense power in the 

negotiations; but unlike the other members, it has no interest to 

resolve the conflict. For as long as Nagorno-Karabakh is unresolved, 

Russia will have significant clout over the region. 

As a relatively new strategic tool, Moscow is also using its soft power 

in the South Caucasus, including Russian-funded non-governmental 

organizations, politicians with Russian citizenship or businessmen 

who made their fortunes in Russia, the clergy of the Orthodox 

Church, sympathetic or bribed media organizations for propaganda 

purposes, or individual agents of public influence. 

President Putin has vowed that Russia would never leave the “Trans- 

Caucasus” region, using the Tsarist and Soviet terminology for the 

South Caucasus. In a speech before the Russian-Armenian 

Interregional Forum held in Gyumri, Armenia, in December 2013, he 

declared: “On the contrary, we will make our place here even stronger. 

We will strengthen our position here, drawing on the best of what our 

forebears left us and with the support of good relations with all 

countries in the region, including Armenia.” 16 As Russia is using a 

number of instruments to strengthen its positions in the region, its 

good relations with the countries in the South Caucasus are clearly an 

illusion promoted by a neo-colonialist power. 

Along Russia’s southern flank, it is imperative that Washington pay 

attention to the security of the South Caucasus corridor through 

Georgia and Azerbaijan, which is crucial for energy supplies between 

the Caspian Basin and Europe. Baku is particularly worried about the 

security of its gas transportation through Georgia to Turkey, which is 

currently being expanded to become the Southern Gas Corridor. 

Without control over the South Caucasus corridor, Russia will find it 

more difficult to secure the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Moreover,


both the land and air corridor through Georgia and Azerbaijan have 

proved vital for the NATO war effort in Afghanistan. 

US President Barak Obama’s “reset” policy with Moscow had a 

negative impact in the region as relations between Washington and 

Baku and Tbilisi deteriorated, while enabling greater scope for 

Russian coercion to distance the region from the West. The Kremlin 

pressed Armenia not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU 

in November 2013 and cajoled Yerevan to join the Customs Union 

and later the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with Russia, Belarus 

and Kazakhstan. Moscow is also pressing Azerbaijan to join the EEU, 

using promises about resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 

returning to Azerbaijan the Armenian-occupied districts around the 

disputed region. 17 

In the midst of the Ukrainian crisis, the Kremlin appointed a highranking 

hardliner as its envoy for cooperation with Azerbaijan— 

Dmitriy Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of defense 

and space industry, who is one of seven persons named in the first US 

sanctions list for his role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The move 

was a clear attempt to tighten control over Azerbaijan and send a 

warning to Baku and the West to curtail their cooperation. Following 

the annexation of Crimea, the Azerbaijani government started 

actively seeking defense arrangements and security guarantees from 

NATO, pointing to the fact that its troops were serving in the ISAF 

mission in Afghanistan. 18 

Azerbaijan is threatened by Russia from at least three sides: the 

presence of about 5,000 Russian troops at two military bases in 

Armenia, a build-up of Russian forces in the captured Georgian 

provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 war, and 

Russia’s substantial naval presence in the Caspian Sea, which has been 

also used as a platform for military operations in Syria. In addition, 

both Azerbaijan and Georgia are threatened by approximately 88,000 

troops Moscow has stationed in the North Caucasus. 19 Concurrently,


Baku’s relations with Washington and Brussels significantly 

deteriorated in 2015 over concerns for human rights in Azerbaijan. 

This development was beneficial for the Kremlin, which increased its 

attention toward Azerbaijan, trying to portray it as a Russian ally. 

Neighboring Georgia continues to pursue its aspirations toward 

NATO membership, contrary to the Kremlin’s expectations after 

Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream party won the elections in October 

2012. These efforts are supported by Azerbaijan, although Baku has 

never expressed its desire to join the Alliance. Despite the 

disappointment brought about by President Obama’s statement at the 

start of the Ukrainian conflict that neither Georgia nor Ukraine are 

on the path toward NATO membership, Tbilisi is defiant in its intent 

to eventually join the Alliance. 20 

However, notwithstanding enhanced relations between NATO and 

Georgia, following the Alliance’s Wales summit in September 2014, 

Georgia was not considered for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at 

the NATO meeting of Foreign Ministers on December 1–2, 2015. In a 

positive development, the EU recommended granting Georgian 

citizens a visa-free regime starting in mid-2016, a development that 

raised hopes that residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia may apply 

to obtain Georgian passports and even seek reintegration. As 

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili commented, “This is the 

path to Georgia’s unification. Only by building a modern European 

state can we be attractive to our Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers and 

sisters.” 21 

Although Armenia remains loyal to Russia—mainly to enlist 

Moscow’s military protection against Azerbaijan and Turkey— 

Yerevan’s overwhelming dependence on Russian subsidies and the 

domineering position of Russian businesses in the country has created 

resentment among both the political elite and the public. Public 

protests in the summer of 2015 against an electricity price hike by the 

Russian monopolist Inter RAO UES, which controls Armenia’s


electricity grid, were as much a political manifestation of this 

resentment as they were an expression of economic concerns. 

With Armenia’s major infrastructure, including a pipeline to Iran, 

owned by Russian companies, with essentially all of its military 

equipment provided by Russia, and with major political decisions 

dictated by Moscow, Armenia has turned into a Russian hostage in 

the middle of a strategically important region. The ongoing conflict 

with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied 

Azerbaijani territories, along with Yerevan’s strained relations with 

Ankara, have caused Armenia’s isolation in the region. 22 Although 

Yerevan has maintained traditionally good relations with Tehran, 

Moscow has tried to preclude the development of critical joint 

projects between Armenia and Iran, after the nuclear agreement 

brokered by the West in mid-2015. Gazprom was quick to acquire 

ownership of the pipeline connecting Armenia with Iran, while 

Gazprom-Armenia obtained management rights over the prospective 

high-voltage electricity lines to be used for export to Iran. In sum, 

Moscow is acquiring controlling positions for future deals with Iran 

in both the electricity and gas sectors. 

Moscow can intensify its pressures in the South Caucasus to undercut 

the region’s Western connections, including the vital relationship of 

Azerbaijan and Georgia with Turkey. Benefiting from its substantial 

military presence in Armenia, Moscow could reignite the conflict with 

Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. It can also split Georgia 

territorially by creating a military corridor across the country to link 

Russia with Armenia. Such moves would have a lasting impact on the 

stability of governments in Azerbaijan and Georgia, and without 

Western support it could push these countries into an enforced 

Russian orbit. 

Moscow’s offensive in the South Caucasus and intensifying regional 

turmoil could either sever the energy pipeline connections between 

the Caspian and Europe or place these under Moscow’s control. Either


scenario would set back Europe’s attempts to pursue energy diversity 

and would be particularly harmful to the Southeast European states 

that are most dependent on Russian supplies. Additionally, a more 

prominent Russian role in the South Caucasus would contribute to 

curtailing US and EU connections with Central Asia. 

Armenia 

There was no surprise when Yerevan backed Moscow after the 

Turkish air forces downed a Russian fighter jet in Syria in November 

2015—Armenia is a staunch ally of Russia and has had a strained 

relationship with Turkey for decades. For many, it was also not 

surprising that Armenia voted with Russia against the UN resolution 

affirming the territorial integrity of Ukraine and rendering the Crimea 

referendum invalid. Indeed, Yerevan has regularly championed the 

principle of self-determination and the right to secession in its 

unresolved dispute with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. 

However, that support for the Kremlin contradicted some of 

Armenia’s past positions on territorial integrity: Yerevan refused to 

recognize the independence of Kosovo, and has not even recognized 

Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state, despite fighting a war 

over this separatist Azerbaijani region. The logical conclusion for this 

legal inconsistency is that Yerevan’s backing of Russia on the 

Anschluss of Crimea may have been driven by Armenia’s deep desire 

to annex Nagorno-Karabakh, after first forcing Azerbaijan to give it 

up. In any event, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is the most 

important factor in contemporary Armenian politics, both domestic 

and foreign policy related. 

Armenia is Russia’s most loyal ally among all former Soviet states, but 

this alliance is born out of Yerevan’s necessity for security protection 

from both Azerbaijan and its strategic partner, Turkey. For Russia, 

providing security to Armenia means continuing its military presence 

in the South Caucasus. Armenia’s loyalty—rooted in Moscow’s


support for Yerevan during the war over Nagorno-Karabakh—has 

gradually transformed into a complex relationship of dependency and 

resentment. As Russia demands more concessions in return for 

security protection and weapons deliveries, Armenia is becoming 

more isolated from the world while its younger generation is growing 

more aggravated. 

Although Armenia de facto controls Nagorno-Karabakh as well as 

seven Azerbaijani districts bordering the separatist territory, the 

country may have become the biggest casualty of this conflict—it 

essentially lost its political and economic sovereignty to Russia, 

became isolated from its neighbors Azerbaijan and Turkey, sank into 

international isolation for supporting the separatists in Nagorno- 

Karabakh, and poisoned international discussions about the future of 

the South Caucasus due to continuing hostilities with Azerbaijan. 

The heavy dependence on Moscow prevents Yerevan from exercising 

an independent foreign policy. Russia is Armenia’s largest investor, 

energy supplier and donor, and second largest trade partner, although 

the two countries do not even share borders. Yerevan depends on 

Georgia for transportation of goods and energy; however, Russia’s 

occupation of two Georgian regions presents a constant threat to the 

security of trade routes, and also impedes supply lines to the Russian 

military base in Gyumri and the air base at Erebuni Airport. 

Meanwhile, Armenia’s traditionally friendly southern neighbor, Iran, 

was under an international embargo for decades, and trade relations 

with Tehran were essentially barter deals—swapping electricity for 

gas, for example. Furthermore, Moscow is interfering in Yerevan’s 

prospects for deepening economic relations with Tehran in the wake 

of the nuclear agreement signed between the West and Iran in July 

2015. 

The Kremlin is aware of Armenia’s dire predicament, its growing 

resentment and desperate need to break out of isolation; this is why it 

has tried to prevent any attempt for association with Western


institutions. Under pressure from the Kremlin, Yerevan decided, in 

September 2013, to suspend its European integration process and not 

sign the long-negotiated Association Agreement with the EU, which 

was to include a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 

(AA/DCFTA)—despite the trade boost it urgently needed. Instead, 

Armenia joined the Russian-led Customs Union, which became the 

Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in January 2015, an organization 

fraught with problems and heavily affected by the declining Russian 

economy and a depreciating ruble. 

Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan stunned the EU and his own 

public when he unexpectedly ceased negotiations with the EU after 

talks in Moscow with President Putin in early September 2013. 

According to EU diplomats, Moscow had been placing pressure on all 

candidates for association with the EU (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine 

and Armenia), achieving success first with Armenia and then with 

Ukraine, on the eve of the Vilnius Summit. 23 Apparently, Armenia’s 

security concerns and obvious Russian threats to withdraw support 

for Yerevan and potentially back Baku on the Nagorno-Karabakh 

dispute played a decisive role in Sargsyan’s historic decision, which 

committed his country to continuous isolation. 

Charles Tannok, a British member of the European Parliament noted: 

“I know that Putin has been to Baku and has offered to sell up-to-date 

arms to Azerbaijan. So I can see what it is all about—it is about putting 

pressure on Yerevan to do Moscow’s bidding and, sadly, it 

succeeded.” 24 Armenia’s participation in the Eurasian Economic 

Union is a critical factor for Moscow, because no other South 

Caucasus country is likely to join this union. 

The decision to join the EEU was met with protests in Armenia, albeit 

not very large, but giving rise to a more distinct anti-Russian 

sentiment. This reaction exploded in the summer of 2015, when a 

wave of rallies engulfed Yerevan and other cities. Ostensibly, the 

public demonstrations, called in social media #ElectricYerevan, were


against increasing electricity prices by the Russian state-controlled 

company Inter RAO UES, which fully owned the electricity network 

of Armenia at the time. Nonetheless, as the protests ramped up, calls 

for abolishing the country’s dependence on Russia and ending 

Russian corrupt schemes, perceived to be supported by the 

government, became common. 

Former Armenian Minister of National Security David Shahnazaryan 

pointed out that “Armenia’s government authorities, with their 

actions, supported the interests of the Russian corrupt system in 

Armenia. A considerable part of our state’s economy is owned by 

Russian state-owned companies, for whom the business interests are 

not the number one priority, but the political presence and corrupt 

interests, and now, their main task is to squeeze Armenia financially, 

thereby increasing emigration.” 25 

The #ElectricYerevan protests in Yerevan evidently worried Moscow 

that another “colored revolution” might be under way and that it 

could lose its only faithful ally in the South Caucasus. Russian stateowned 

TV claimed the protests had the same origin as previous public 

protests leading to regime change in Georgia and Ukraine and 

accused US-funded non-governmental organizations of provoking 

the unrest. Political analyst Sergey Markov, known for his close 

Kremlin connections, alleged that the protests were not spontaneous 

and that the opposition would attempt to seize power by means of a 

“colored revolution.” He claimed that the attack on Yerevan was 

expected as a reaction to the country’s decision not to sign a “semicolonial” 

agreement for association with the EU and joining the 

Eurasian Economic Union instead. 26 

Moscow acted swiftly to pacify the Armenian public and protect the 

Sargsyan government, which already felt threatened by the recently 

formed alliance between four main opposition parties in the country. 

As a result, the Kremlin reached for the carrots. Firstly, Russia offered 

Armenia a $200 million loan for new modern weapons. The Russian


and Armenian media immediately spread the rumor that Moscow 

would provide Yerevan with the coveted Iskander-M missile system, 

which would give the country an unmatched advantage over 

Azerbaijan. Secondly, Russian Gazprom swiftly concluded the 

prolonged negotiations on gas prices, further cutting rates for 

Armenia from $189 to $165 per thousand cubic meters, effective 

January 2016. 27 The price reduction was based on an earlier agreement 

on lowering the cost of Russian gas from January 2015, after Armenia 

joined the Eurasian Economic Union, but the negotiations had 

dragged on for months. 28 

Finally, in an exceptional kind of concession, Moscow agreed to 

transfer Russian serviceman Valery Permyakov to the custody of 

Armenian law enforcement to be tried by an Armenian court for the 

January 2015 murder of an Armenian family of seven, including a sixmonth 

old boy, in Gyumri. The murders caused national outrage 

directed at the Russian military. 29 

The #ElectricYerevan protests gradually subsided after the 

government promised to subsidize electricity prices. In September 

2015, it was announced that Russian state-owned electricity company 

Inter RAO UES sold the utility company Electric Networks of 

Armenia (ENA) to Tashir Group, a Russian real estate holding owned 

by Armenian-born billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who is ranked by 

Forbes as the 26 th richest person in Russia with an estimated wealth of 

$4.4 billion. 30 The new owner said his company would share the 

burden of price increases with the government of Armenia, which has 

supported the deal, eager to reduce anti-Russia sentiment over the 

proposed electricity price rises in the summer. 31 

However, it transpired that Inter RAO UES sold only 25% of its shares 

in both ENA and the new modern gas-fired Hrazdan thermal power 

plant for $8.25 million, not 100% as it was initially reported. 32 Such 

developments are consistent with Russian policy aiming to acquire 

and control as much of the existing energy assets in the region as


possible. By advertising the sale, but not actually selling the control 

package, Moscow is deceiving the Armenian public and continuing its 

energy domination in Armenia. Inter RAO UES explained to the 

Armenian media that its assets would be sold to Tashir Group on a 

stage-by-stage basis, but this explanation does not seem credible. The 

sale price of $8.25 million also raises questions about the extent of 

ENA’s debt, considering that Inter RAO UES invested $300 million in 

the state-of-the-art Hrazdan thermal power plant. ENA is believed to 

have more than $220 million in outstanding debts to Armenian 

power-generating plants and commercial banks, with the public 

convinced that corrupt management and embezzlement played the 

main role in financial losses. 33 

Nevertheless, Russian tactics regarding Armenian protests were 

generally successful, as Moscow offered incentives instead of firm 

support for the government’s initial use of police force against the 

demonstrators, which could have alienated the public and 

strengthened anti-Russia sentiments. However, Armenia’s social 

problems are deepening with the decline of the Russian economy and 

subsequent reduction of the flow of remittances from Armenians 

working in Russia. The value of remittances in January–October 2015 

decreased by 38%, while exports to Russia fell by 29.4%. 34 In 2014, 

remittances decreased by 56% due to ruble depreciation and a 

slowdown in the Russian market. 35 

According to the World Bank, 32% of Armenians live under the 

poverty line, 18% of the state budget comes from remittances, and the 

unemployment is over 17%. 36 Yerevan can expect more social 

protests, which could eventually become political and demand policy 

changes or a change of government. Moscow apparently realizes this 

possibility, as well as the new opportunity before Yerevan to conclude 

a modified association agreement with the EU, offered by the 

European Commission at the end of 2015. Therefore, the Kremlin is 

preparing various proxies to enter Armenian politics in the future. 

Among them are Russian-grown businessmen of Armenian origin


such as Samvel Karapetyan, Ruben Vardanyan, and Ara Abrahamyan, 

who is also the president of the Union of Armenians in Russia. 

Abrahamian announced he would establish a political party to 

participate in the 2017 parliamentary election. 37 

Despite the setback with the EU Association Agreement, Armenia and 

the European Union have continued their political and trade dialogue 

in areas where this is compatible with Armenia’s new obligations to 

the EEU. They launched negotiations on a future legally binding and 

overarching agreement compatible with Armenia’s new international 

obligations on December 7, 2015. The new agreement will replace the 

current EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation agreement. 38 

On the military front, Russia’s military presence in Armenia has been 

a major element of the country’s defense doctrine. Yerevan claims it 

needs Russian troops primarily for precluding Turkey’s direct military 

intervention on Azerbaijan’s side in case of another war over 

Nagorno-Karabakh. Not surprisingly, the September 2014 drills of 

Russian and Armenian troops were based on a scenario of Turkish 

intervention in Armenia and codenamed “Ottomania.” 39 

Russia maintains in Armenia its only legally recognized military bases 

in the South Caucasus—the 102 nd military base in Gyumri and the 

3,624 th Air Base in Erebuni Airport near Yerevan—as the deployments 

in the Georgia’s breakaway provinces are considered occupation 

forces by international institutions. A successor of the Soviet military 

installations in the South Caucasus, the current Russian facilities in 

Armenia are the only remaining components of the previous 

extensive defense infrastructure in the region. This infrastructure 

comprised of a range of airfields connected with different divisions 

and installations based in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. 

Azerbaijan and Georgia gradually eliminated all Russian military 

bases on their territories. Some analysts argue that, left alone in the 

region, the Gyumri base lacks the capability to effectively guarantee 

the security of Armenia. However, its presence and potential hostile


actions against Georgia can upset the delicate balance in relations 

between Armenia and Georgia and raise more tensions between 

Russia and NATO. 40 

Although the Russian military presence serves as a deterrent to 

Azerbaijan in case it decides to retake Nagorno-Karabakh by force, 

Moscow only has the responsibility to ensure the security of Armenia, 

not that of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is legally part of Azerbaijan. 

According to the Armenian media, the bilateral agreement on the 

Russian military base states: “When deployed in the territory of 

Armenia, the Russian military base, in addition to protection 

functions of the interests of Russia, together with the Armed Forces of 

Armenia, shall ensure the security of Armenia.” 41 In addition, Russia’s 

Federal Security Service Border Guard Directorate is responsible for 

guarding Armenia’s boarders with Turkey and Iran. 

The Russian-Armenian agreement establishing the Gyumri military 

base and airfield near Yerevan was initially signed in 1995, soon after 

the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Its renewal in 2010 extended 

that presence until 2044 and upgraded the 102 nd military base to 

4,000–5,000 soldiers with heavy weaponry. Russia has also stationed 

an aviation unit at the Erebuni military airfield, numbering more than 

three dozen MiG-29 fighter jets and Mi-24 combat helicopters. 

Moscow deployed the helicopters in 2014 as part of a broader 

reinforcement of its military presence in Armenia and also 

modernized the MiG-29 jets stationed there. 42 In December 2015, 

Erebuni was reinforced with additional six modern attack Mi-24P and 

transport Mi-8MT helicopters. 43 

Among other provisions, the 2010 agreement committed Moscow to 

helping Yerevan obtain “modern and compatible weaponry and 

special military hardware.” In June 2013, media reports claimed that 

Russia had deployed in Armenia several Iskander-M ballistic missiles 

systems, supposedly stationed at the Russian military base. 44 The 

information was not confirmed, but in July 2015, in the midst of anti-


Russian protests in Yerevan, reports resurfaced that Moscow was 

poised to sign a contract with the Armenian military to provide 

Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles. However, the Russian 

company KBM, which builds the Iskander-M missile, said the systems 

would not be ready until 2016 at the earliest. 45 

Regarded as one of the most advanced missile systems of its kind in 

the world, the Iskander-M, with an operational range of at least 400 

kilometers, can overcome existing missile-defense systems, according 

to Russian military officials and experts. 46 If the Armenian army 

obtains such a cutting-edge missile system, it will change the military 

balance in the region, as Yerevan will be able to reach targets as far as 

Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea coast. According to Russian military expert 

Igor Korotcheko: “The existence of such rockets in Armenia and their 

absence in Azerbaijan may introduce into the conflict elements of a 

provocative nature, and nobody needs that.” 47 At the same time, 

Armenian Major General Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan asserted that while 

Armenia needs the missile system to maintain the military balance 

with Azerbaijan, the country simply cannot afford to buy it. He stated 

that any Iskander-M operative tactical missile systems being sent to 

Armenia, would certainly end up solely on the territory of the 102 nd 

Russian military base, as Russia keeps expanding its military presence 

in the country. 48 

After the annexation of Crimea caused tensions between Russia and 

the West, Russian military activities in Armenia have increased 

steadily, including periodic exercises and checks of combat readiness 

of the Russian 102 nd military base as well as frequent joint drills within 

the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—of which 

Armenia is the South Caucasus region’s sole member. Armenian 

analysts believe that Russia is using Armenia to demonstrate its 

military capability to NATO. One of the “sudden inspections” of 

combat readiness took place as the #ElectricYerevan protests were still 

going on and NATO was preparing a joint drill in Georgia. The deputy 

commander of the Southern Military District, Lieutenant-General


Igor Turchenyuk, personally inspected ground troops at Gyumri and 

warplanes and combat helicopters in Yerevan. The units were put on 

high alert and told to conduct unplanned exercises at two shooting 

ranges in central Armenia. 49 

Russia was clearly irritated by NATO’s “Agile Spirit 2015” drill, 

conducted at the Georgian Vaziani base with the participation of 

Georgia, the US, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, and Latvia. The 

exercise was a part of the “Substantial Package” framework offered to 

Tbilisi during the Wales Summit in 2014 in order to advance 

Georgia’s preparations toward membership in the Alliance. 50 

In November 2015, President Vladimir Putin instructed his 

government to sign an agreement with Armenia on the creation of a 

joint regional missile defense system in the Caucasus. 51 The defense 

ministers of the two countries signed the agreement in Moscow a 

month later. Russia and Armenia already have a joint integrated air 

defense system that was given a “regional” status by the CSTO in 2007. 

It was not immediately clear how the new regional system would differ 

from the old one and whether it would operate within the framework 

of the CSTO. Russia is building similar systems with Belarus and 

Kazakhstan and planning to sign agreements with Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan. 52 

Armenia also cooperates with NATO, including sending a small 

contingent to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Yerevan has signed an 

Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO and has 

completed a Strategic Defense Review in 2011. 53 However, close 

defense ties with Russia are impeding more substantial involvement 

with NATO and preventing Armenia from seeking sources of security 

elsewhere. 

On the economic and energy fronts, by joining the Customs Union 

under Kremlin pressure, Yerevan surrendered its hopes for economic 

independence from Russia. As political analyst Vladimir Socor noted,


the model of operation of the Russian-led Customs Union (which 

became the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015) replicates that of the 

defunct Comecon and Warsaw Pact, as well as that of the existing 

CSTO. By placing itself in a privileged position, Russia is conducting 

“vertical” relations with each member state, while the other members 

are not engaged in “horizontal” relations with each other. 54 Such a 

model limits the economic opportunities for EEU member states, 

except for Russia, and distinctly separates the EEU from the principles 

and structure of the EU, regardless of how much Russian President 

Vladimir Putin tries to promote it as an equal counterpart to the 

European Union. 

Armenia’s president defended his decision to join the Eurasian 

Economic Union as pragmatic, since Russia sells natural gas to 

landlocked, energy-poor Armenia “at quite a good price.” In addition, 

Armenia exports to the CIS one-third of its production, including 

agricultural products, on which the rural areas depend. 55 However, 

official statistics indicate that trade with the EU has been surpassing 

not only trade with the four other EEU members (Russia, Kazakhstan, 

Belarus, Kyrgyzstan) but also with all CIS countries—and this has 

been the case since 1999. 56 Exports to the EU in 2014 were over $437.4 

million, while those to CIS countries—$365.5 million. In 2015, the EU 

continued to be Armenia’s biggest export and import market, with a 

respective 39.4% and 26.5% share of total Armenian exports and 

imports. 57 

During his visit to Yerevan on December 2, 2013, Russian President 

Vladimir Putin dispersed a number of gifts to Armenia and obtained 

in return more assets and contracts that further cemented Russia’s 

dominant position in the country’s economy. They included reducing 

natural gas prices to $189 per thousand cubic meters (at the time 

Russia was selling gas to Eastern Europe for over $500); abolishing the 

export tax on oil and petroleum products by 30–35% as a good will 

gesture to Armenia; modernizing the country’s Metsamor Nuclear 

Power Plant; upgrading Armenia’s railroads, which are under Russian


concession and trust management for 30 years; and opening the 

Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant, in which Russian Inter RAO invested 

$300 million. 58 

In return, Gazprom increased ownership in the ArmRosGaz supply 

and distribution company to 100%, with the Armenian government 

losing its last 20% stake in the formally joint company. Rosatom and 

Russian Railways state companies received lucrative contracts for big 

reconstruction and modernization projects. Moscow also ensured 

that it would remain Armenia’s largest trade partner and biggest 

investor. 

As a result, Armenia’s energy sector is now almost entirely controlled 

by Russia. Russian state-controlled Inter RAO UES owns the 

country’s electricity network, and Gazprom has a monopoly over 

Armenia’s natural gas network for the next thirty years, according to 

the deal signed in 2013. But Moscow did not stop here. In June 2015, 

Gazprom also purchased the pipeline supplying natural gas from 

Iran—Armenia’s only alternative gas supplier—giving Moscow full 

control of the natural gas delivery routes to Armenia. 59 In a 

subsequent development, in August 2015, Gazprom Armenia was 

given the rights to operate the high-voltage transmission lines, which 

are under construction and will be used for export of electricity to Iran 

and Georgia in the future. 60 

On a positive note, in addition to starting new negotiations with the 

EU on an Association Agreement, which will not include trade clauses 

since Armenia joined the EEU, Yerevan managed to conclude a Trade 

and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with Washington, in 

May 2015. The agreement is expected to provide favorable conditions 

for investments and trade between the two countries. In October 2015, 

the American Contour Global Company acquired the Vorotan 

hydropower complex, registering one of the largest single investments 

in Armenia. The American company will invest $50 million in 

Vorotan Hydro Cascade during the next five years. 61


Armenia’s dependency on Russia does not exempt the country from 

Moscow’s “soft power” tactics of penetrating its educational 

institutions, cultural environment, non-governmental sector, or 

politics. Organizations such as RosSotrudnichestvo (Russian 

Partnership) under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the Public 

Diplomacy Fund Gorchakov, the Russian World Foundation, and 

others are particularly active in Armenia, as they are in the rest of the 

South Caucasus. They promote the Russian language and culture, 

sponsor conferences and seminars, and uphold a positive image of 

Russia abroad. 

The Armenian Institute for Strategic Development, headed by 

Andranik Nikoghosyan, has launched since 2012 over 100 centers of 

Russian language and culture in Armenia, where more than 300 

Russian-language teachers provide free-of-charge instruction. The 

Union of Russian Armenians, led by Ara Abrahamyan, organizes 

Russian cultural events throughout the country. More significantly, 

Abrahamyan apparently is not limited to cultural activities only—he 

plans to establish a political party and run for parliament in 2017. 62 

In addition, Moscow is active in establishing branches of its 

universities in Armenia. In 2015, a branch of the Moscow State 

University was opened in Yerevan, despite the fact that the Russian- 

Armenian Slavonic University and branches of seven other Russian 

universities with 3,500 students are already operating in the country. 63 

Armenian analysts observe a noticeable increase in public diplomacy 

activities as well—from visits of Russian governors to individual 

political and cultural figures—apparently tasked to strengthen 

Russian-Armenian ties within the political elites and civil society. 

Similar efforts are undertaken to promote the Eurasian Economic 

Union through the Eurasian Information League, Russian 

Partnership, and Russian World Foundation. They work to raise


public support for the EEU and promote “Eurasian values,” while also 

preaching anti-liberalism, anti-globalism, and anti-Western 

sentiments, and try to evoke nostalgia for the Soviet Union. 

Armenia is also not exempt from the global informational war waged 

by the Kremlin, with a number of Russian digital TV channels 

broadcasting in the country. In addition, individuals connected to the 

Kremlin have established numerous websites, bombarding the local 

public with Russian propaganda. They serve to promote a positive 

image of Russia and the EEU, spread anti-Western attitudes, as well 

as discredit Western-minded politicians and civil society activists. 64 

Moscow is evidently backing Russia-based loyalists and wealthy 

businessmen such Ara Abrahamyan, Ruben Vardanyan and Samvel 

Karapetyan to enter politics and serve as its proxies, in case Yerevan 

seeks to escape Russia’s control and enhance its cooperation with the 

US, EU, Georgia, or Iran, and especially if President Sargsyan decides 

to undertake steps vis-à-vis Azerbaijan that are not sanctioned by the 

Kremlin. Armenian commentators see this change as the next stage of 

“strengthening” Armenian-Russian relations, a kind of reformatting 

or recalculating of Russia’s presence in the country. In other words, 

Moscow wants to transition to a “mediated” presence in Armenia, 

shedding responsibility for economic problems and avoiding future 

waves of protests, while still controlling Yerevan. 65 

But this recalculation of policy has another purpose as well— 

managing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in a way that suits Moscow. 

The Kremlin needs the right conditions to achieve its long-pursued 

goal of dispatching Russian peacekeeping troops to Nagorno- 

Karabakh and making it a Russian-controlled territory, as it did in 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 1990s. Russia was never able to 

send its own peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh, as neither 

Armenia’s nor Azerbaijan’s governments allowed this to happen after 

the end of the war. Now Russia sees an opportunity to impose its 

military presence on what is legally Azerbaijani territory and, at the


same time, cement its political positions in Yerevan, while presenting 

itself as an indispensable peacemaker, against the background of the 

Ukrainian debacle. 

Moscow calculates that the only way to obtain Baku’s consent to 

Russian peacekeeping forces is by convincing Armenia to return the 

seven occupied regions to Azerbaijan as the first condition, and 

promise to start talks on a certain level of autonomy for Nagorno- 

Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Yerevan claims it cannot protect 

Nagorno-Karabakh without the seven surrounding regions, if it is 

returned to Azerbaijan. 

The three Russian-made Armenian tycoons, Abrahamyan, 

Vardanyan, and Karapetyan, are said to have significant interests in 

Nagorno-Karabakh, where they are implementing large-scale 

projects. They would gladly support the deployment of Russian troops 

to Nagorno-Karabakh to protect their investments, if the seven 

surrounding regions are indeed returned to Azerbaijan. As Putin’s 

loyalists, they are expected to lobby Yerevan for Moscow’s interests 

and push the government to agree to Kremlin plans. 66 

However, as the “frozen” conflict has ignited several times since 2014, 

all sides are concerned that it could accidentally turn into a full-scale 

war. Armenian sources claim that Moscow has been trying to incite 

intensified clashes along the line of contact since the war in Ukraine 

began in 2014, in order to justify the deployment of a Russian 

peacekeeping mission. 67 The Azerbaijani press also reported that 

Russia is interested in increased tensions at the contact line between 

Armenian and Azerbaijani troops in order to divert attention away 

from Ukraine and undertake the leading role in conflict mediation. 

Since Germany expressed a desire in January 2015 to be more active 

in the negotiation process and even become an OSCE Minsk Group 

co-chair, Moscow has been trying to highlight its own importance and 

political weight and show that it is not realistic for the conflict to be 

resolved without its help. 68


Azerbaijan 

The unresolved conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has been front and 

center of Azerbaijan’s foreign and security policy as well as the reason 

for its staggering military spending. Armenia’s defense budget is just 

of fraction of what Azerbaijan has been spending on arms in the past 

ten years—Azerbaijan’s 2014 military budget was $3.8 billion, up from 

$3.6 billion in 2013; in comparison, Armenia’s 2013 defense budget 

was $447 million. 69 This pushes Yerevan to take more loans from 

Moscow for military supplies in order to maintain the arms balance 

between the two hostile countries, and consequently makes Armenia 

more dependent on Russia. 

Since 2010, Azerbaijan’s defense budget has equaled 4.7–4.8% of its 

GDP, reaching a number that is higher than Armenia’s annual state 

budget of $2.9 billion in 2015. However, Armenia’s military spending 

has also remained high at around 4% of GDP. 70 The Global 

Militarization Index places Armenia and Azerbaijan among the ten 

most militarized countries in the world (third and eighth positions, 

respectively), concluding that it is a sign of a protracted arms race in 

the South Caucasus. Against the background of the ongoing Nagorno- 

Karabakh conflict, both countries are still investing their resources to 

an inordinate degree in expanding and modernizing their armed 

forces, while health expenditures remains at relatively modest levels. 71 

Azerbaijani officials say that the most important task facing the 

country’s foreign policy is to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 

and end the Armenian occupation of around 20 percent of 

Azerbaijani territory in order to ensure the sovereignty of Azerbaijani 

territory within the internationally recognized borders. 72 However, 

the conflict has intensified since August 2014, despite international 

diplomatic efforts to negotiate a solution. Baku said that in 2015 alone, 

143 Armenian servicemen were killed and over 100 were wounded, 

while 19 Azerbaijani servicemen were killed in skirmishes with


Armenians. During that year, the air defense troops of the Azerbaijani 

air forces were reported to have hit and destroyed 11 Armenian 

drones by precise strikes. 73 

Since the early 1990s, Azerbaijan has maintained a multi-vector 

foreign policy, with emphasis on developing strong ties with the 

United States and Europe, hoping that the West would help resolve 

the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Located between an 

expansionist Russia and an assertive Iran, and locked in disputes with 

Armenia, Azerbaijan needs Western allies as a counterbalance and 

security guarantee. This is the reasoning behind Baku’s Westernoriented 

energy export strategy and cooperation with the EU and 

NATO, including serving as a logistic center for the transit of cargo to 

Afghanistan. To that end, Azerbaijan’s western neighbor Turkey, a 

member of NATO and close in terms of language and culture, has 

been its most valuable strategic partner. 

However, Baku’s relations with Washington and Brussels, which were 

already strained because of Azerbaijan’s human rights record, rapidly 

deteriorated during 2015 due to the imprisonment of several activists 

and journalists by the authorities in Baku. These developments led to 

a delay in negotiating an agreement on a strategic partnership between 

Azerbaijan and the EU, after the European Parliament passed a 

motion criticizing Baku for human rights violations. 74 

The proposed Strategic Modernization Partnership agreement 

between Baku and Brussels will be significant from a geopolitical and 

geostrategic standpoint, as Azerbaijan’s role as an energy supplier 

grows in Europe. 75 Relations with Washington were damaged to the 

extent that the Helsinki Commission Chairman Congressman Chris 

Smith proposed legislation that would deny US visas to senior 

members of the Azerbaijani government and their associates and 

potentially impose financial sanctions on them. 76 These developments 

and Baku’s cautious approach to Moscow have placed Azerbaijan 

involuntarily closer to Russia, which has become more assertive after


the annexation of Crimea. As a former high-ranking Azerbaijani 

diplomat pointed out, “Azerbaijan feels quite lonely, not supported 

much by the West or even by its neighbors.” 77 

Although Baku has not publically stated its choice to definitely align 

itself with either the EU or Russia, an alliance with Russia within the 

EEU is highly unlikely as Azerbaijan’s main concern is preserving its 

independence and controlling its foreign and economic policies. 78 

When Russia and the West clashed over Ukraine, Azerbaijan was able 

to tone down its European ambitions in order not to irritate Russia, 

but it was faced with a stark choice between standing with its strategic 

partner Turkey or pacifying Russia when the two countries clashed 

over the downed Russian plane. Azerbaijan depends on Turkey for its 

European energy projects as well as on Ankara’s support for its 

territorial integrity in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

Baku’s relations with Moscow have been a balancing act, with 

intricacies that are often difficult to understand from the outside. On 

the one hand, Azerbaijan is the only country in the South Caucasus 

that successfully rid itself of Russia’s military presence and closed 

down all Russian military bases on its territory remaining after the 

unraveling of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Baku is among the 

top buyers of Russian arms and military equipment, with military 

cooperation worth $4 billion and growing. 79 Trade relations 

amounted to $4 billion in 2014, although this number declined by 

over 23% in 2015, due to economic difficulties caused by low oil 

prices. 80 

However, the two countries have differences on several critical 

matters, first and foremost regarding Russia’s military cooperation 

with Armenia and its evident reluctance to resolve the Nagorno- 

Karabakh conflict. Other differences appeared after the Russia- 

Georgia war, as Moscow’s aggression against an independent 

neighboring state shocked the Azerbaijani public and changed the 

perception of Russia from that of a pragmatic economic partner to


one of an aggressor. The war generated new sources of instability, 

which, together with the unresolved conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh 

and the significant new leverage by Moscow in the region, would have 

long-lasting negative implications for the integration of Azerbaijan 

and Georgia into Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

Azerbaijan, similarly to other former Soviet states, has had to 

reevaluate its foreign policy. Baku became more cautious with its 

ambitions for membership in either NATO or the EU. As Azerbaijani 

political scientist Anar Valiyev wrote, “Some might describe 

Azerbaijan’s policy as a kind of Finlandization, akin to the Finnish 

pursuit of neutrality after World War Two in the face of a hostile 

Soviet Union.” 81 

Although Azerbaijan contributes to NATO projects and works on 

making its army compatible with NATO standards, it has expressed a 

more reserved approach to becoming a member of the Alliance. In 

May 2011, soon after Russia’s invasion of Georgia, Baku officially 

joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), binding itself to the goal 

of non-participation in any military blocs. 

Russia was particularly concerned with the South Caucasus countries’ 

pending Association Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive 

Free Trade Area (DCFTA) deals with the EU at the close of 2013. At 

that time, Moscow was enlisting prospective members for its own 

creation, the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia and Georgia were 

ready to initial agreements at the EU Vilnius Summit in November 

2013, while Azerbaijan was making progress in negotiations for an 

Association Agreement with the EU, with the prospect to start 

negotiations on a DCFTA, following its accession to the World Trade 

Organization (WTO). 82 

In August 2013, just three months before the EU Vilnius Summit, 

President Putin made an ostentatious visit to Baku, which included 

the presence of ships from Russia’s Caspian Sea Flotilla. The high level


of the delegation suggested the importance of this diplomatic effort to 

boost Moscow’s influence after strains in the relationship with Baku 

over the Gabala radar station the previous year. Putin brought to Baku 

his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, 

and Energy Minister Alexander Novak, as well as the heads of Rosneft 

and Lukoil, Igor Sechin and Vagit Alekperov. He hailed Azerbaijan as 

“one of Russia’s long-standing, traditional and loyal partners” and as 

Russia’s “strategic partner”—although Baku is reluctant to proclaim 

this relationship as strategic until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is 

resolved. 83 

Presidents Aliyev and Putin signed a substantive agreement on 

military cooperation, allowing for the transfer of Russian weapons 

and hardware worth $4 billion, providing technical assistance to 

modernize Azerbaijan’s defense industry facilities, and permitting 

Russian defense industry companies to repair and upgrade 

Azerbaijani military hardware and weapons. Azerbaijani military 

expert Casur Sumarinli warned that the agreement could create 

serious threats to Azerbaijan's national security interests. “Azerbaijan 

will, in effect, have to halt its already weak cooperation with NATO. 

This will mean for Azerbaijan the loss of independent state policies, 

and military and political priorities,” Sumarinli told the opposition 

Yeni Musafat newspaper in Baku. 84 

Moscow’s demonstration of support for Azerbaijan and particularly 

the expansion of arms sales to Baku was not only aimed to lure the 

South Caucasus republic into Russia’s camp and discourage it from 

pursuing cooperation with NATO and the EU association, it was also 

supposed to serve as a warning to Yerevan, which had pursued its own 

integration with the EU during the previous three years. In this 

respect, although Putin was unable to secure an energy deal that 

would place Rosneft and Lukoil in a competitive position vis-à-vis 

Western companies such as BP, Statoil and Exxon Mobil in 

Azerbaijan, the visit delivered the targeted result. Three weeks later, 

Armenian President Sargsyan caved in and suspended his country’s


EU integration plans by declaring that Armenia would be joining the 

Russian-dominated Customs Union instead. 

The annexation of Crimea revealed that Russia would continue its 

expansionist agenda toward the former Soviet states and raised new 

fears in Baku. Rejecting separatism and the revision of national 

borders by an occupying power, Azerbaijan, similarly to Georgia and 

Moldova, declined to recognize the referendum in Crimea organized 

by Russia’s special forces. Azerbaijani President Ilam Aliyev stated 

that, “a country’s territorial integrity cannot be changed without its 

agreement.” A week later, Azerbaijani representative Tofig Musayev 

voted in favor of the UN resolution affirming Baku’s commitment to 

Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial 

integrity within its internationally recognized borders and rejecting 

the validity of the referendum held in Crimea on March 16, 2014. He 

reiterated Azerbaijan’s adherence to the fundamental principles of 

sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally 

recognized borders, saying they constituted the basic foundation of 

international relations and the international legal order. 85 

Two weeks later, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev 

appointed Dmitry Rogozin, deputy prime minister for the defense and 

space industry and a former Russian ambassador to NATO, as 

chairman of the Russian part of the inter-governmental commission 

on economic cooperation with Azerbaijan. As a member of Putin’s 

inner circle, Rogozin was included on the US sanctions list on March 

17, 2014, following the controversial referendum in Crimea that 

served as a pretext for Russian annexation. The new Russian envoy’s 

high-level government position was interpreted as a warning to both 

Azerbaijan and the West as tensions in eastern Ukraine continued. 86 

The appointment was also a reminder that military cooperation is a 

key element of Russian-Azerbaijani relations. In the period 2010— 

2014, Azerbaijan has imported about $3.35 billion in arms, of which 

80% has come from Russia, including two S-300 missile systems, 94


T-90S tanks, 20 Mi-35M helicopters, and 100 BMP-3 armored 

vehicles. In addition, Azerbaijan has purchased 25 Su-25 planes and 

93 T-72M1 tanks from Belarus. 87 The purchase of Russian weapons is 

mainly a tactical tool for Baku, which aims to stay on Russia’s good 

side while keeping Armenia worried about its military power. 

The annexation of Crimea prompted NATO to strengthen ties with 

partners in Central-Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. On April 

1, 2014, NATO’s Ministerial Council decided to increase cooperation 

with and expand its presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. 

The enhanced cooperation, taking place within the framework of 

existing partnerships, outlines several areas related to the changing 

security environment in Ukraine and Afghanistan: security, energy 

security, terrorism, and information technologies. As the conflict in 

Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia threaten both Europe’s 

energy supplies from Russia via Ukraine and NATO’s transportation 

routes to Afghanistan via Russia, Azerbaijan’s cooperation with 

NATO is important in light of the withdrawal of troops from 

Afghanistan, according to Sorin Ducaru, Assistant Secretary General 

for Emerging Security Challenges. 88 

Despite active collaboration with NATO within the Partnership for 

Peace program and recent plans to expand it, the mood in Baku 

remained pessimistic about possible protection by the West in case of 

Russian intervention in the region. The experience from the Russia- 

Georgia war in August 2008, and the muted Western reaction to 

Russia’s invasion of Crimea in March 2014, indicated that the South 

Caucasus countries might not be able to depend on help from the 

outside. Russia is treating the South Caucasus as a military polygon, 

with about 5,000 Russian troops stationed at its Gyumri base in 

Armenia, thousands of occupation troops and border guards in 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and a substantial military presence in the 

Caspian Sea, in addition to Russia’s domestic contingent in the North 

Caucasus.


President Obama’s remarks in Brussels, on March 26, 2014, that 

neither Ukraine nor Georgia were currently on the path to NATO 

membership and there were no immediate plans for expansion 

resonated negatively not only in Georgia, but also in Baku, although 

Azerbaijan does not have plans to join the Alliance and has 

maintained a balanced relationship with Russia and the West. 

Nevertheless, Baku is concerned about the unresolved conflict with 

Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and the threat of deterioration if 

Russia attempts to destabilize Azerbaijan. 

President Ilham Aliyev has pointed out that the West is applying 

double standards when reacting to the occupation of Crimea: it has 

enforced sanctions against Moscow, but has never considered 

sanctions against Armenia for the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh 

and seven other Azerbaijani districts. His voice was joined by the 

Conservative member of the British parliament David Davies, who 

said in a statement that “despite global recognition, Azerbaijan’s 

position in Nagorno-Karabakh is not supported enough by the 

Western states.” 89 The statement also reflected the fact that the British 

company BP is the largest investor in Azerbaijan and has much to lose 

in case of a resumption of the conflict. 

Azerbaijan is strategically important for European energy security as 

a nearby supplier of oil and prospective supplier of natural gas 

through Georgia and Turkey to Southern Europe. Azerbaijan became 

the first Caspian littoral state to export oil to European markets via 

the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline. Its State Oil Company 

(SOCAR) is currently expanding the natural gas corridor from the 

Caspian Sea through Georgia to Turkey and building the Trans- 

Anatolian natural gas pipeline (TANAP), which will connect with the 

prospective Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP) on EU territory. When 

deliveries of Azerbaijani gas start, in early 2019, this will be the first 

Caspian gas reaching European markets. Although the quantities will 

be relatively small—from 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year at the 

beginning, to 31 bcm later—they will be an important diversification


factor on the European market, which currently depends on Russia 

for up to 25 percent of its gas consumption. 

Baku is also working with the government in Ashgabat to ensure a 

transfer to Europe of much larger quantities of natural gas from 

Turkmenistan—at least 40 bcm a year. “The Azerbaijani side is always 

ready to offer its transit opportunities in the case of implementation 

of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project,” claimed SOCAR’s 

President Rovnag Abdullayev. 90 Turkmenistan and the EU have been 

negotiating the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project—a 300-kilometer 

(186-mile) pipeline along the Caspian Sea bed from Turkmenistan to 

Azerbaijan—but Russia objects to the initiative as it will fully bypass 

Russian territory. 

Soon after the annexation of Crimea, former presidential foreign 

policy adviser Vafa Guluzade claimed that Russian military 

representatives demanded that Azerbaijan stop its cooperation with 

NATO. “They warn Azerbaijan that if gas and communication grids 

are directed to the West and if it [Azerbaijan] cooperates with NATO, 

then there may be a threat to our country,” Guluzade said. He added 

that NATO must provide guarantees for Azerbaijan’s security if it 

wishes to cooperate with Baku. He also advocated closer military ties 

with Turkey, such as signing a military agreement between Ankara 

and Baku and creating a Turkish military base in the country. 91 

After the annexation of Crimea, and particularly when the war in 

eastern Ukraine erupted, Baku focused on limiting Russian attempts 

to place pressure on Azerbaijan by avoiding any actions that would 

irritate Moscow. It was a decision made out of necessity and 

consideration of the geopolitical realities. Squeezed between Russia 

and Iran, with 2,000 km of coastline in the Caspian open to Russian 

aggression and almost 20% of its territory occupied by Armenia, 

Azerbaijan had to remain careful, despite its economic 

independence. 92


Russia’s maximum objective for the countries in its southern flank is: 

1) for them to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization and 2) 

the Eurasian Economic Union; 3) the establishment of Russian 

military bases; and 4) the protection of the rights of Russian 

minorities, including promotion of the Russian language and culture. 

At a minimum, Moscow aims to prevent each country from joining 

NATO, develop extensive trade relations, as well as collaborate in 

counter-terrorism and various forms of military cooperation. 93 

While Kremlin’s optimum plan is in place in Belarus, Armenia, 

Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan is trying to fit into Russia’s 

minimum plan. Baku refused to join the CSTO because Armenia is a 

member, but it also gave up potential NATO membership by joining 

the Non-Aligned Movement in 2011—a decision provoked mainly by 

the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, as Georgia’s NATO inspirations were 

blamed for Moscow’s invasion. 

At the same time, Azerbaijan skillfully forced Russia to close down its 

last military installation in the country, the Gabala radar station, in 

2012. Although Azerbaijan still depends on Moscow for military 

equipment and technology, importing 85% of military equipment 

from Russia, Baku is pursuing contracts for arms and military 

equipment with Turkey and Israel as well. 94 In 2012, Azerbaijan 

signed contracts valued at $1.6 billion to buy advanced weapons from 

Israel, such as drones as well as anti-aircraft and missile defense 

systems and also started joint production of drones in Baku. 95 In 

addition, Azerbaijan is planning to acquire new Mbombe six-wheeldrive 

armored fighting vehicles from Kazakhstan, built on the knowhow 

of the South African Paramount Group. 96 However, Azerbaijan’s 

defense budget, which was projected at $4.8 billion in 2015, is 

expected to dramatically decrease by 40% in 2016 as a result of low oil 

prices and the devaluation of the local currency, the manat. 97 

According to the 2009 census, there are about 120,000 ethnic Russians 

in Azerbaijan, or only 1.3% of the total population. Yet, Russian-


language instruction has been preserved at all educational levels. Not 

only Russians and Russian-speakers can earn university degrees in 

Russian, but many ethnic Azerbaijanis also choose to receive 

instruction in Russian at domestic higher education institutions. 

Reportedly, around 9,000 students are currently enrolled in the 

“Russian sector” of Azerbaijani universities. 98 Having done the work 

to establish the Azerbaijani language as the official language of the 

country in early 1990s, including limiting Russian broadcasting to 

Azerbaijan, Baku is now willing to make cultural compromises to 

Russia. Such a gesture was the memorandum of understanding on 

establishing an Association of Universities of Azerbaijan and Russia, 

signed by the two countries’ ministers of education in Baku, in 

November 2015. 99 

As Russia remains an important trade partner for Azerbaijan, Baku 

has developed its most significant trade partnership with the EU. 

Considering its options after Moscow’s attack on Ukraine, and 

particularly after the EU Eastern Partnership Summit, in Riga, in May 

2015, when Russia was openly hostile and the EU appeared unable to 

confront it, Azerbaijan decided not to pursue an Association 

Agreement or a DCFTA with Brussels. However, it also declined to 

join the Eurasian Economic Union. Azerbaijan’s total non-oil exports 

amount to $1.6 billion, of which less than 30% goes to CIS countries. 

Baku believes that these trade agreements can de decided on a bilateral 

basis, which makes it unnecessary to join a collective structure such as 

the EEU. 100 

On the military front, while Baku continues military cooperation with 

Moscow, Russia’s military presence in Azerbaijan ended in December 

2012, when Baku demanded 40-times-higher lease payments from 

Moscow to host the Gabala radar station and Russia decided to close 

it instead. In 1993, Azerbaijan was the first former Soviet state to 

compel Russian troops to withdraw, except for the radar site. The 

Daryal-type radar station was built by the Soviet Union, in 1985, to 

monitor missile launches throughout the Middle East. Since 2002,


Russia had been paying Azerbaijan $7 million a year plus operational 

costs for the radar. But at the end of the ten-year contract, Baku 

reportedly demanded $300 million a year for rent and other costs to 

continue hosting the station. In addition, Baku insisted that the 

majority of the 1,500 service personnel at the radar station to be 

Azerbaijani (1,000 of them were Russian) and demanded assistance 

from Moscow to eliminate the environmental damage from the 

operation of the radar. Negotiations continued for over a year, until 

Moscow gave up and announced it was shutting down the station. 101 

Although the radar station was outdated and no longer had significant 

military value for Russia, it was politically critical for the Kremlin to 

maintain some kind of military presence on Azerbaijani territory. 

Compared to the Russian military bases in Armenia and the occupied 

Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Azerbaijan is 

currently the only country in the South Caucasus where Russian 

soldiers are not present. In addition, Gabala served as an instrument 

for Russia in negotiating with other key players, such as the US and 

Iran. In 2007, President Putin offered US President Obama to jointly 

use the Gabala radar station as part of the planned US missile defense 

system, instead of basing components in Poland and the Czech 

Republic. 102 

Some analysts argued that by kicking out the remaining Russian 

military presence, Azerbaijan also lost a tool to pressure the Kremlin 

for resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 103 Others asserted 

that it has been actually the other way around—Moscow hasd been 

using the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in negotiations with Baku as 

leverage to extract concessions and receive beneficial contractual 

terms. 104 

The Gabala case was indicative of Azerbaijan’s ability to stand its 

ground with Russia and achieve its goals—on this occasion denying 

Moscow military presence in the country. After the annexation of 

Crimea and the war in Ukraine, however, Baku seems less willing to


oppose Russia. For its part, Russia appears more determined to 

reverse its loss and is reportedly planning to build another military 

base in Azerbaijan—this time a Voronezh-DM early warning radar 

station. Russia’s Ministry of Defense broadcast channel, Zvezda-TV, 

reported on August 18, 2015, that the construction of the Voronezh- 

DM radar will start at Azerbaijan's Gabala military complex in 2017 

and will be completed during 2019. The new radar station was to be 

fully under Russian control. 105 

The Azerbaijani opposition was unhappy with the news, but also 

noted the lack of immediate response from the government in Baku, 

while the Armenian Speaker of Parliament speculated that a Russian 

military base in Azerbaijan is likely to be a missile-tracking radar 

station serving solely Russian interests, not those of the Azerbaijani 

Armed Forces. 106 However, Moscow is hardly in a position to spare 

billions of dollars on another radar installation, given its financial 

difficulties since oil prices began their sharp descent in 2014. This 

rumor seems to be part of the Russian disinformation machine, 

following the announcement of Azerbaijan’s defense ministry in July 

that it is ready to continue military cooperation with the Pentagon and 

NATO and fully restore confidence between the two countries’ 

defense agencies after a period of cold relations. The message was 

delivered to the US defense attaché by the highest-ranking military 

commander, the Army Chief of Staff Colonell General Najmaddin 

Sadikov. 107 

In the Caspian Sea, Russia’s joint naval exercises with Iran in August 

and October 2015 demonstrated a blatant disregard for the other three 

Caspian littoral states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 

Moscow not only excludes them from such joint exercises, but it even 

fails to consult with them when war ships of the two countries cross 

the Caspian Sea. Apparently, Russia has decided to divide control over 

the Caspian Sea with Iran, similarly to the division during Soviet 

times. 108


This time, however, Russia’s contempt for its neighbors backfired. 

Irritated by the launching of cruise missiles from Russia’s squadron in 

the Caspian Sea against targets in Syria, and determined to develop 

their own naval forces, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan concluded, on 

November 4, 2015, a bilateral defense cooperation agreement focused 

on joint naval exercises. This agreement clearly outlined the current 

divisions in the Caspian basin—with Russia and Iran pursuing their 

agenda in the Middle East, and the rest of the littoral states 

increasingly trying to avoid the risks of such cooperation. The rift 

between these two groups became even clearer when Turkey shot 

down a Russian jet on November 24, 2015, after which, Azerbaijan, 

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have continued to maintain strong 

relations with Turkey. 109 

At the same time, Moscow opposes its Caspian neighbors’ joint 

initiatives, such as the proposed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline between 

Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to be built under the Caspian Sea. The 

Russian foreign ministry views the energy project as a foreign 

intervention in the Caspian Sea, recalling the five littoral states’ 

decision to bar foreign militaries from the Caspian. By equating 

foreign military presence with energy projects involving foreign 

companies, Moscow clearly shows its uneasiness with any foreign 

presence in its backyard. 110 

Georgia 

Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in 2003 was the first in a series of public 

upheavals in the former Soviet Union that led to a regime change in 

several post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine in 2004 and 

Kyrgyzstan in 2005. As the pro-Western government of President 

Mikheil Saakashvili took power in 2003, Moscow became worried 

about the possibility of losing influence in its southern neighborhood. 

The new government’s determination to bring Georgia closer to the 

EU and join NATO, develop a robust relationship with Washington,


eliminate corruption, and conduct swift reforms, especially in the 

security forces, meant that Russia would lose its dominant position in 

the country. That position had been nurtured for years through its 

energy monopoly, economic supremacy, trade relations, and military 

presence in the form of “peacekeeping” forces in Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia, along with four military bases, some of which were only 

closed down in 2007. 

Although Moscow’s priority has been to influence the militarystrategic 

sphere in the region, it often used economic means and other 

instruments of pressure to coerce Tbilisi to change its pro-Western 

direction. For example, in 2007, Russia started expelling Georgian 

labor migrants from Russia, causing many families to lose their 

income from remittances. A year earlier, Moscow instituted a trade 

embargo against Georgia, closing the Russian market to Georgian 

wines, the country’s most exported commodity, and inflicting losses 

not only on agricultural workers and wine-makers, but also on the 

state budget. At the time, Georgia was sending as much as 89% of its 

wine exports to Russia. 111 This measure, however, failed to undermine 

Saakashvili’s government: Tbilisi re-oriented its exports to Europe 

and, with the help of the EU, managed to not only overcome the 

hardship, but also gain positions in the lucrative Western market. As 

a result, Moscow’s policies only reinforced Georgia’s pro-Western 

aspirations. 

However, Russia was determined to put an end to Georgia’s Western 

aspirations, particularly its application for a NATO membership. In 

his last speech before the United Nation’s General Assembly on 

September 26, 2013, President Saakashvili stated that: “The Georgian 

experience of successful reforms and the creation of a functioning 

state was therefore considered to be a virus—a virus that could and 

would contaminate the whole post-Soviet region; we became the least 

corrupt country in Europe, the world’s number one reformer 

according to the World Bank, one of the top places to do business; the 

least criminalized country in Europe after being one of the most


criminalized ones; and that was the virus that should have been 

eliminated, by every means possible. This is why the Georgian nation 

has suffered an embargo, a war, an invasion, and an occupation—all 

since 2006.” 112 

In August 2008, as Georgia was advancing its EU and NATO agenda, 

Russia invaded Georgia and established a substantial military 

presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, deploying two army brigades 

at new military bases in those separatist regions. As of early 2015, 

Russia had 7,000 troops on Georgian territory based at Gudauta in 

Abkhazia and Djava-Tskhinvali in South Ossetia. 113 Moscow 

recognized the two Georgian regions as independent states, while only 

Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and few Pacific Island nations have 

established diplomatic relations with the two entities. 

In the early 1990s, Russia had lent support and armed all sides in the 

secessionist conflicts, the Georgian government and the breakaway 

regions, thus fueling a civil war that resulted in hundreds of thousands 

of deaths, brutal atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and prolonged political 

and economic crises. Following the wars, Moscow established a 

peacekeeping presence in the two provinces and prevented 

international organizations from effectively conducting peacekeeping 

activities in the regions. The UN had a small monitoring mission and 

the OSCE’s functions were essentially taken over by Russian 

peacekeepers. In reality, Russia’s peacekeepers served their 

government, which was entrenching itself deeper into the political 

and economic life of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, pulling the regions 

further away from Georgia and even giving Russian passports to as 

many as 80 percent of their residents. 114 

After the August 2008 war with Georgia, Russia blocked the ability of 

the OSCE to function in South Ossetia and other parts of Georgia. 

Using the consensus principle of the organization, Moscow blocked 

OSCE deployments, holding the organization hostage to its 

determination to gain international recognition for the independence


of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 115 The OSCE had to leave when its 

previous mandate expired on December 31, 2008. The model was 

repeated with regard to the UN mission in Abkhazia six months 

later. 116 Thus, taking advantage of the democratic principles on which 

two of the largest international organizations are based, Moscow has 

essentially evicted them from Georgia’s conflict zones and prevented 

the internationalization of the conflict. 117 

In addition to the two Russian military brigades based in Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia after 2008, Moscow dispatched Russian border 

troops along the administrative lines with Georgia and built trenches, 

fences and minefields—actions described by Tbilisi as “borderization” 

within Georgia. Units of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet were also deployed 

to the port of Ochamchira in Abkhazia. 

Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia has increased the process of 

integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into its economic, political 

and security system. Following the signing of a treaty with Abkhazia 

in November 2014, Russia signed a treaty on “alliance and 

integration” with South Ossetia in March 2015. A month earlier, it 

signed a border agreement with South Ossetia. These agreements have 

virtually frozen the normalization talks with Georgia. While the treaty 

with Abkhazia was not ratified a year after its signing, the parliament 

of South Ossetia approved the alliance and integration treaty with 

Russia in April 2015 and the ratification was signed by the Russian 

President on June 30, 2015. 118 

The treaty effectively transferred responsibility for South Ossetia’s 

security and defense to the Russian Federation, including protection 

of its borders. South Ossetia’s armed forces and security agencies 

became part of the Russian army and security services (FSB), 

respectively. The customs regime of South Ossetia is to be integrated 

with that of the Russian Federation through legislation of the Customs 

Union and the Russian Federation. This provision opened the way for 

integration with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, a move


that the Georgian government strongly opposed. In addition, the 

treaty stated that the procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship by 

South Ossetians would be simplified and the requirement for giving 

up the original citizenship was waved for them. Furthermore, South 

Ossetia will adopt Russian regulations on education, school curricula, 

educational qualifications and health insurance. In all areas subject to 

this agreement, Russian legislation will be effective on the territory of 

South Ossetia. 119 

Calls for unification with the Russian Federation have increased in 

South Ossetia, as it is becoming clear that Tskhinvali has failed to 

develop the basic attributes of an independent state. Local economists 

admit that the region has completed only 20–30% of necessary work 

to build a viable state, despite substantial Russian subsidies. There is 

no real program for strategic development or even a comprehensive 

analysis of the local economy. Also absent are fundamental 

documents such as a foreign policy strategy and a military doctrine. 

Pointing to these failures and the new geopolitical developments 

affecting the region, mainly Russia’s involvement in Syria and the 

outreach of Islamist movements into the Caucasus, both local and 

Russian experts are advocating the unification of South Ossetia with 

Russia and possible merger with North Ossetia as its best defense 

strategy. They claim that Moscow would be far better positioned to 

defend South Ossetia if it were a part of the Russian Federation than 

if it remained outside its borders. 120 

Taking into account the demographic disaster facing South Ossetia, 

local political analyst Kosta Dzugaev warned in Tskhinvali in late 2015 

that “our only way out is to join Russia. ‘Russia or death’—that is our 

bitter reality.” As US political analyst Paul Goble concludes, it seems 

that support for unification with South Ossetia is growing in Russia as 

well, since the Russian media dedicated a lengthy publication on the 

matter. Moreover, the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church 

of the Moscow Patriarchate is openly serving as a major force pushing 

for unity. Its clergy are warning people of the dangers surrounding the


region and thus helping to convince the South Ossetians that their 

only prospects for survival are within the borders of the Russian 

Federation. 121 

The leadership of South Ossetia has advocated formal incorporation 

into Russia since before the war in 2008. In fact, campaigns for joining 

the Republic of North Ossetia within the Russian Federation had 

mounted even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 

October 2015, the President of South Ossetia Leonid Tibilov 

announced plans to hold a referendum on joining Russia. 122 He 

claimed that the result of such a referendum would be strongly in 

favor of inclusion in Russia. The announcement coincided with the 

visit of Vladislav Surkov, President Putin’s adviser who reportedly 

played a critical role in coordinating the annexation of Crimea. 

However, Moscow’s official reaction was far from enthusiastic. 

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stressed that the holding of a 

referendum on joining Russia was not discussed at the meeting 

between Tibilov and Surkov in Tskhinvali. 123 

South Ossetia’s leaders can undoubtedly see the benefits of accession 

to Russia: they not only want Moscow to guarantee the security of the 

breakaway region, but they also hope that the Kremlin will continue 

to subsidize the region. Pressured by low oil prices and international 

sanctions, the Kremlin has been reducing subsidies for breakaway 

regions outside of its territory, causing a series of protests in 

Transnistria and dissatisfaction in Abkhazia. Moreover, the potential 

annexation of South Ossetia would provoke a strong international 

reaction and could result in more sanctions against Moscow. As the 

Deputy chairman of the Duma’s foreign affairs committee, Leonid 

Kalashnikov, commented, “The pros of accession to the Russian 

Federation are quite obvious for South Ossetia. But there are not so 

many [pros] for Russia; there are too many cons for Russia of a 

diplomatic and international nature.” 124


Despite Tskhinvali’s frequent calls for joining Russia, Moscow is 

unlikely to endorse a referendum and accept the region as part of the 

Russian Federation. The benefits to Russia would be negligible, if any, 

compared to the financial cost and risk of further international 

ostracism. South Ossetia is important to Russia mostly as a method of 

destabilizing Georgia, and not as territory to be added to the 

Federation. It cannot offer the benefits of Crimea and Sevastopol, 

which brought a large section of the Black Sea, allowing Russia 

significant control over its navigation, economic zones and gas 

reserves in addition to the critical navy base at Sevastopol and 

expanded military power over the Black Sea countries. In this respect, 

Abkhazia, which is located at a critical part of the Black Sea coast, 

could offer Russia more substantial benefits than South Ossetia, 

should it want to enter the Russian Federation. But the idea of such a 

union is politically toxic among the independence-minded Abkhaz. 

More importantly, the Kremlin has no interest in resolving the 

conflict in South Ossetia by either annexing the territory or returning 

it to Georgia. In fact, South Ossetia’s potential accession to Russia 

would deprive Moscow of a major instrument of influence vis-a-vis 

Georgia and the wider region. By holding part of Georgia occupied, 

Moscow maintains a level of instability and, at the same time, uses the 

conflict to create loyalties or instill fear. It manipulates the South 

Ossetians by neither confirming nor denying their potential accession 

into Russia, while hinting to Tbilisi that it may compromise on the 

two regions and eventually return them to Georgia. More often, it uses 

the conflicts to threaten Georgia with further aggression if the country 

pursues NATO membership. 

With regard to Abkhazia, relations between Russia and Abkhazia 

deteriorated during 2015, after Moscow sharply reduced funding for 

the breakaway region. When the agreement with Sukhumi was signed 

in November 2014, President Putin promised that Moscow would 

allocate 5 billion rubles (approximately $111.5 million at the time) for 

the Abkhaz government in 2015. Putin also said that Russia had long-


term plans for Abkhazia that would be backed with generous funding. 

He claimed that Moscow planned a new “investment program” for the 

period 2015–2017, with annual funding of over 4 billion rubles (about 

$89.2 million). The Russian President thereby promised that funding 

would double to 9.2–9.3 billion rubles (about $205–207 million). 125 

But the promises soon evaporated as Russian oil sales declined in 

monetary value, reducing the Federation’s budget dramatically. The 

decrease for Abkhazia involved a dramatic 28-fold drop in subsidies. 

Instead of the promised 3.7 billion rubles ($56 million), Sukhumi was 

to receive 127 million rubles (approximately $2 million). Reportedly, 

Russia has effectively ceased financing joint social and economic 

programs in Abkhazia. 126 The Abkhazian authorities were planning to 

use the promised subsidy of $56 million to repay the credits they 

obtained from Russia in 2010 for the reconstruction of the railroad— 

the same railroad used by Russian troops deploying into Georgia in 

August 2008. Sukhumi needs this railroad to deliver trade goods to 

Russia. 

The disappointment with Moscow is gradually transforming into 

anti-Russian sentiment. Although Russia has no available money to 

attract Abkhazia, it is also putting pressure on Sukhumi to ratify the 

strategic treaty signed in November 2014. Reportedly, the Abkhazian 

parliament refuses to ratify the treaty, because this would mean giving 

up Abkhazia’s independence. The Russian Duma has already ratified 

the treaty in January 2015. Some members of Abkhazia’s parliament 

are proposing to raise money for the budget by collecting rent from 

the Russian military base in Abkhazia. 

On the energy front, Moscow’s use of its energy monopoly as an 

instrument of political subversion prompted Georgia to restructure 

and develop its energy sector, allowing the country to become almost 

self-sufficient in electricity production, mostly from hydropower. 

Tbilisi also diversified oil supplies and switched gas deliveries from 

Russia to Azerbaijan as the east-west gas corridor started shaping up.


The Kremlin, however, has not ceased its attempts to acquire energy 

assets in Georgia in the oil, natural gas and electricity sectors. In fact, 

the Russian state-controlled company Inter RAO manages or owns 

almost half of Georgia’s electricity generation plants, has a 50% share 

in the critical high-voltage transmission line used for exports, and 

holds a significant interest in Georgia’s electricity distribution. 127 

Georgia’s past dependence on Russian oil and gas supplies had made 

it vulnerable to political blackmail by the Kremlin. Capitalizing on its 

energy monopoly, Russia was employing tools such as gas price 

manipulation and supply interruption, particularly after the 

November 2003 “Rose Revolution,” in order to pressure Saakashvili’s 

pro-Western government. In January 2006, for example, after a 

dramatic gas price spike, three unexplained simultaneous explosions 

damaged both tubes of a gas pipeline on Russian territory near the 

border with Georgia and destroyed an electrical pylon, interrupting 

gas deliveries for days during a particularly cold winter. President 

Saakashvili called the blasts “outrageous blackmail” and “a serious act 

of sabotage on the part of Russia on Georgia’s energy system.” 128 

By the time of the pipeline explosions, Georgia had seen Russian gas 

prices increase by almost 500%, from $50 to $235 per thousand cubic 

meters. While Russia portrayed this enormous increase as designed to 

bring the price paid by Georgia closer to world market prices, it was 

clear that Georgia was being punished for being a pro-Western state, 

while the “friendly states” of Belarus and Armenia were treated to a 

much lower gas price. The purpose was to undermine the Saakashvili 

government by forcing it to raise gas prices for domestic consumers. 

This would have also affected consumer prices for all goods and 

caused public unrest, or placed enormous pressure on the state budget 

to subsidize gas prices. Fearing public protests, Tbilisi paid out $300 

million to Gazprom, which amounted to about 10% of the state 

budget. 129


The argument that Russia used gas price hikes to sanction Georgia, in 

the same way it punished Ukraine and Moldova later, is true in all 

three cases. However, one would not understand the complexity of 

Moscow’s utilization of gas price increases as an instrument of 

subversion unless one compares this to similar cases in other states, 

some of them friendly toward Russia. For example, countries such as 

Bulgaria and Macedonia have been paying the highest prices to 

Gazprom, regardless of traditionally cordial relations with Russia. The 

reason is that Moscow uses gas prices not only to punish or reward, 

but also to demonstrate its might, underline how much a country 

depends on Russian energy resources, and portray itself as an 

indispensable supplier and partner. 

By projecting power, Moscow aims to extract various concessions: a 

refinery purchase, a new international pipeline agreement, a 

hydropower plant acquisition, controlling stakes in electricity 

networks or major infrastructure. In the end, even friendly 

governments end up paying high prices for Russian gas and giving 

away major infrastructure deals without competitive bidding. 

Furthermore, corrupt politics and mafia-type alliances with Russia’s 

oligarchic structures help the Kremlin achieve its goal of subverting 

and controlling regions it has depicted as its “near-abroad” (Russia’s 

flanks) as well as ones that it used to consider its “near abroad” before 

the end of the Cold War (Central- Eastern Europe). 

Moscow’s attempts to expand influence in Georgia’s energy sector 

started before the “Rose Revolution,” when Russian power monopoly 

United Energy System, through its international arm Inter RAO UES, 

took control of 75% of Tbilisi’s electricity distribution company Telasi 

in the summer of 2003. Georgia’s biggest gas-fired thermal power 

plant Mtkvari was also sold to Inter RAO in 2003. 130 

The pursuit of energy assets continued after Eduard Shevardnadze 

was ousted from power in November 2003. In addition to obtaining 

management rights of two hydro power plants—Khrami I and


Khrami II—Inter RAO also operates the Enguri-Vardnili hydropower 

cascade, which produces around 40% of Georgia’s electricity. Located 

partially in Abkhazia, this massive hydro energy complex presents 

another energy security risk. Its water dam and reservoir are under the 

control of the central Georgian authorities but the turbines and 

generation equipment are located on Abkhazian territory, and de facto 

controlled by Russia. 

The Enguri hydropower plant has become another target of Russian 

strategic interest. Russia allegedly intends to register Georgia’s most 

powerful hydroelectric station in Abkhazia. In December 2014, 

Abkhazia’s de facto leader Raul Khajimba claimed “what is located on 

our territory should be owned by the Abkhaz people.” But since 

Abkhazia has secured quite favorable terms to receive 40% of the 

Enguri-produced electricity for free, under an informal agreement 

with Tbilisi, analysts believe that the question raised over the plant’s 

ownership comes from Moscow rather than Sukhumi. 131 

Inter RAO UES has 50% ownership of the critical 500 kV transmission 

line running across Georgia from west to east, which is used for 

exports of electricity to Turkey. Although electricity transmission is a 

natural monopoly protected by many countries, Georgia has opened 

most of its energy assets to privatization, of which Russian companies 

have gained the most. But Czech, Lithuanian, Swiss, British, 

Azerbaijani, Kazakhstani and Turkish companies have also taken a 

smaller part in the privatization of Georgian energy assets. At the 

same time, critical infrastructure was built and repaired by the 

Georgian government through the support of donors or international 

financial institutions, rather than solely through foreign direct 

investments. 132 

The natural gas pipeline that connects Russia with Armenia through 

Georgian territory was one of the most desirable acquisitions for 

Gazprom, but the Georgian government dropped negotiations in 

2006, under US advisement, as the White House supported the east-


west energy corridor from the Caspian basin to Europe. US Special 

Envoy for Eurasian Energy, Steven Mann, stressed that privatization 

of the pipeline “would mean that our chance to assure independent 

and alternative energy resources would be lost.” He also added that 

selling the pipeline “would impede gas development for the Shah 

Deniz project.” Georgian politicians such as former economy minister 

Vladimer Papava, have also warned that “Gazprom is a state company 

and, therefore, if it purchases the pipeline, that would mean that a 

foreign state company has bought Georgia's strategic property.” 

Moscow punished Georgia almost immediately, banning the import 

of Georgian wines and mineral waters, both of which are key export 

goods. 133 

Georgia owes its escape from heavy natural gas dependence on Russia 

largely to Azerbaijan’s national strategy centered on developing viable 

ties with the West, mainly through the export of oil and natural gas to 

Europe, and thus limiting Russian economic and political influence in 

the South Caucasus. Since the signing of the “Contract of the Century” 

in 1994, Azerbaijan has included Georgia as a transit country for its 

oil and gas exports. The critical Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline 

transports Azerbaijani oil directly westward, instead of transiting 

through Russia. In addition, another important oil pipeline, Baku– 

Supsa, was built to the Georgian Black Sea coast for delivering Caspian 

oil to Central-Eastern Europe. The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum natural gas 

pipeline, which supplies gas to Georgia and Turkey, is currently being 

expanded to become a part of the Southern Gas Corridor from 

Azerbaijan to Southern Europe. 

These energy routes have raised the international profile and 

geopolitical importance of Georgia. They have also secured alternative 

oil and gas supply sources and limited Russian influence on the 

country’s energy sector. Georgia’s authorities, political parties of 

different orientation and the majority of the public often connect the 

country’s future with the development of the Caspian energy reserves 

and their transportation via Georgian territory. Being a part of the


Trans-Caucasus energy corridor is considered a guarantee for the 

country’s economic development, foreign direct investments, 

creation of new jobs and increased budgetary revenues. 

Moscow is aware of the impact these major energy corridors have on 

boosting Georgia’s independence, and therefore tries to undermine 

investor confidence by creating additional security concerns. The 

Baku–Supsa pipeline, which skirts South Ossetia and was temporarily 

shut down during the August 2008 war, has now been affected by the 

creeping Russian annexation of Georgian territory, pursued by 

Russian occupation troops and border guards stationed in the 

breakaway region. 

In July 2015, Tbilisi reported that the administrative border of South 

Ossetia had been marked as a “state border” and moved south by 300 

m (980 ft), leaving a 1.6 km (1-mile) segment of the BP-operated 

Baku–Supsa pipeline under Russia’s effective control, thus 

threatening the interests of both Georgia and Azerbaijan. The action 

was particularly brazen because the barbwire installations left only a 

500 m (0.3-mile) distance to the main Georgian highway linking the 

Black Sea and Azerbaijan. Georgian Foreign Minister Tamar 

Beruchashvili condemned the border move as a continuation of 

“creeping Russian annexation.” 134 Such acts of political blackmail and 

potential sabotage of energy installations in Georgia, such as 

electricity lines and pipelines, can shake trust in Georgia as a reliable 

energy transit country. 

After Armenia made its historic choice to abandon EU integration 

and join the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia intensified its 

campaign to regain a monopoly position in Georgia’s energy sector. 

Moscow needs to secure energy supply and transportation corridors 

to Armenia, but it is also using this opportunity to tighten its grip on 

Georgia’s economy, particularly since the Georgian Dream 

government seems to be more accommodating than that of 

Saakashvili’s. Russia is mainly targeting oil and gas transit routes, but


also hydropower plants, electricity networks and transportation 

infrastructure. 

In December 2014, Russia’s state oil company Rosneft acquired a 49% 

stake in the Georgian company Petrocas Energy International Ltd., 

which owns a strategically important oil terminal at Georgia’s Black 

Sea port of Poti, with a capacity of 1.9 million tons per year, and the 

most extensive network of 140 gas stations branded Gulf. The offshore 

company Petrocas is owned by an influential Russian businessman of 

Georgian origin, David Iakobachvili and operates from Limassol, 

Tbilisi and Moscow. The acquisition would allow Rosneft to 

considerably expand its presence in the region, diversify supply routes 

and solidify positions in the oil products markets of Central Asia and 

the South Caucasus, two regions with a high growth potential. 135 

Georgia’s opposition parties responded to the deal with criticism, and 

economists claimed that it jeopardized national security. They 

insisted that the government should annul the acquisition for several 

reasons. First, Rosneft is developing offshore oil and gas fields along 

Abkhazia’s Black Sea coast under a 2009 agreement with Sukhumi, 

which violates Georgia’s Law on Occupied Territories. The law 

adopted in October 2008 forbids foreign companies from operating in 

the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia without 

authorization from the Georgian government. 136 However, the 

reaction of Georgian Foreign Minister Tamar Beruchashvili was 

surprising: he told reporters that since Rosneft does not conduct direct 

financial and other operations in the occupied territories, the deal 

does not fall foul of Georgian legislation. In March 2014, Georgian 

Finance Minister Nodar Khaduri stated that he saw nothing wrong 

with Rosneft’s interest in acquiring Poti as part of Russia’s efforts to 

secure gasoline deliveries to Armenia. 137 

Second, the purchase of strategic infrastructure by a Russian stateowned 

company presents a national security risk for Georgia. The 

Kremlin can use the presence of Russian state-owned companies in a


foreign country to justify the protection of its assets by either staging 

a military intervention and annexing territory or inventing a cause to 

serve as a “mediator” in any future conflict to “ensure peace and 

stability in the region.” 138 In other words, Georgia faces the possibility 

of another war or territorial expropriation should Moscow determine 

that it needs the port of Poti for its strategic corridor from the North 

Caucasus to Armenia and further to Iran. Such a scenario would 

undermine Tbilisi’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey as well as 

with Western companies such as BP, which rely on Georgia as a 

critical transit route for oil and gas. 

Third, Rosneft is under international sanctions for Russia’s 

annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine. The inaction of 

the Georgian government has undermined Western sanctions against 

Moscow, sanctions that were put in place to protect vulnerable 

countries such as Ukraine and Georgia. Tbilisi clearly lacks a legal 

mechanism to restrict private companies from divesting their stakes 

in entities of national strategic importance, or the Georgian Dream 

government has no desire to prevent such acquisitions. By allowing 

Rosneft to obtain a 49% stake of a strategically important oil terminal 

and with the prospect of a potential controlling package as Russian 

media have claimed, Tbilisi has permitted a Russian state-owned 

company, specifically included among sanctioned Russian entities, to 

evade those sanctions. 

Georgia has not joined all European sanctions against Russia, which 

puts it at odds with the EU and US. In 2014, the EU introduced 15 sets 

of sanctions against Russia in connection to its actions in Ukraine and 

Crimea. Fearing a strong backlash by Moscow, Georgia decided to 

join only one of them, banning imports from Crimea and Sevastopol. 

Nevertheless, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev was quick to 

threaten Tbilisi with “response measures” when the EU extended its 

sanctions in 2015. 139


Most recently, Gazprom has also resumed attempts to secure a share 

of the Georgian natural gas market. Tbilisi no longer imports gas from 

Russia, except for 0.3 bcm per year received as compensation for the 

transit of gas to Armenia. In September 2015, it emerged that Tbilisi 

was in talks with Gazprom for future natural gas purchases. According 

to Energy Minister Kakha Kaladze, Georgia’s commercial gas 

consumption is expected to increase by 27% in 2015 compared to 

2012. Kaladze claimed there was no possibility to import additional 

volumes from Azerbaijan, which is Georgia’s main gas supplier. The 

Energy Ministry asserted that the country may face a gap until the 

second phase of the Shah Deniz project becomes operational in 2019. 

However, Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR refuted this claim 

by announcing that production in 2015 might double that of previous 

years and reach 10 billion cubic meters. During his visit to Tbilisi in 

November 2015, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev also stressed 

that his country has huge natural gas reserves—enough not only for 

domestic consumption, but also for supplying its neighbors and 

Europe for the next hundred years. 140 

Talks with Gazprom continued toward the end of 2015, and it will not 

be a surprise if Tbilisi caves in to Gazprom pressure. Former prime 

minister and founder of the ruling Georgian Dream party, Bidzina 

Ivanishvili, publicly supported gas supply diversification through 

purchases from Gazprom (and Iran, although there is no pipeline for 

deliveries from Iran.) Although retired from politics, Ivanishvili is 

believed to still make all major government decisions. The Russianmade 

billionaire who defeated Saakashvili’s party in 2012, was and 

maybe still is the largest private shareholder of Gazprom, with a 1% 

stake in the Russian energy giant. 141 

In terms of soft power, Georgia’s own traumatic experience with the 

Russian occupation and with a strong pro-Western public have made 

traditional Russian propaganda tools largely inapplicable. Therefore, 

the Kremlin’s “politechnologists” have designed a tailored approach 

to Georgia by choosing a more subtle way of influencing society.


Instead of seeking public support for Russia’s actions in Donbas 

through anti-Ukrainian propaganda and outright lies to justify the 

war as protection of Russian-speakers, the Kremlin’s strategy is to 

increase anti-Western rhetoric among opinion-influencers in 

Georgian society and instill anti-Western sentiment. This strategy is 

additionally tailored to large urban centers and rural areas. 

In big cities, where the population is more eager to see Georgia 

associated with the EU and NATO, carriers of Moscow’s propaganda 

(usually Russian-funded NGOs or individual agents) point to the 

“unreliability” of the West, stressing that NATO and the EU do not 

really care about Georgia. If they did, Tbilisi would have already 

received a roadmap to NATO membership and the Allies would have 

helped Georgia restore its authority in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

They also claim that if Georgia joins NATO, the country will lose the 

chance to ever regain control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 

other propaganda line is that Georgia needs to decide whether to 

continue insisting on joining NATO and risk Russian aggression, or 

give up such aspirations to pacify an expanding Russia. 

In rural areas, the propaganda message is that the EU and NATO 

would not accept Georgia, because they look down on the poor and 

underdeveloped state, considering it to be a Third World country. 

Such a message acts as an insult by playing on the emotions of people 

living in poor rural areas. Georgia has a 47% rural population, but 

agricultural production contributes only 9% of the gross domestic 

product. 142 However, the rural population, which is much poorer than 

the rest, makes up the critical mass deciding every election in the 

country. Having the advantage of knowing the South Caucasus well, 

Russia is using demographics, income levels, education, culture and 

social problems when targeting specific groups to engineer their 

attitudes. 143 

Georgian observers comment that if public support for the West is 

eroded, Georgia could fall into Russia’s hands. They also say that the


Georgian government’s message concerning its policy toward 

Moscow is not consolidated; it is often contradictory and confusing to 

the public, which makes Russia’s strategy more effective. 144 

Opinion polls conducted by the Washington-based National 

Democratic Institute (NDI) in August 2015 suggest that, although 

61% of Georgians support the country’s goal to join the EU, a part of 

the Georgian public (31%) is not averse to the idea of joining the 

Eurasian Economic Union. Those Georgians approving Eurasian 

Union membership primarily cite perceived economic benefits (71%), 

not political or governance improvements. It is apparent that, in the 

midst of economic stagnation and insufficient government initiative 

to develop the economy, the message that Georgia would be better off 

economically if it were closer to its northern neighbor is finding some 

resonance. However, only 6% of the public believes that Russia should 

have high political influence in Georgia, and 13% think that this 

influence should be moderate. Nevertheless, current Russian 

influence is perceived as high: 70–80% of citizens are convinced that 

Russia has influence over Georgia, and the majority assesses this 

influence as negative. 145 

Russia’s propaganda agents in Georgia are usually Moscow-funded 

NGOs, Russian oligarchs of Georgian origin, Georgian citizens 

residing in Russia with ties to the Kremlin’s security apparatus, some 

of the Georgian Orthodox Church clergy or paid individual agents. 

Unlike in the Baltic states and Ukraine, where the Kremlin’s strategy 

has been to use Russian speakers and the Russian-language media for 

propaganda purposes, in Georgia the agents of influence are 

invariably Georgian-language speakers using Georgian-language 

media outlets, as there is virtually no possibility to influence the 

Georgian public through Russian sources. 

A widely used propaganda tool in Georgia is the claim that the 

Western decay of family values and its protection of gay rights is 

threatening to destroy the centuries-old traditions of Georgian


society—a fundamental premise on which Putin has built his strategy 

to counter the West. And similarly to Russia, members of the 

Georgian Orthodox clergy in particular are pushing the line of social 

conservatism: the often irrational but powerful message resonates 

widely with Georgian society, partly because the Church is the most 

respected institution in the country, with Patriarch Ilia II enjoying the 

highest approval rating of 87%. 146 

Georgian activists, whose anti-homophobia rally in 2013 was attacked 

by dozens of priests armed with sticks and crucifixes, believe that 

Moscow is using the Church to spread anti-Western messages in 

Georgia. Although the Georgian Orthodox Church denies being an 

instrument of Russia, local priests admit that visiting Russian clergy 

have been organizing annual religious “boot camps” in Georgia for the 

last three years, where they have claimed that “pedophile parties are 

taking over Europe.” 147 

The xenophobic and homophobic narratives of Russian propaganda, 

depicting the West as destructive of traditional Georgian family values 

and faith, aim not only to undermine Georgia’s pro-Western 

attitudes. They also aim to change the public perception of Russia 

from an enemy and occupier of two Georgian regions to a protector 

of Georgian traditions and a mighty defender of Orthodox 

Christianity. But this effort is unlikely to produce the desired result, 

according to Georgian Defense Minister Tinatin Khidasheli, because 

the Georgians are reminded of the Russian occupation every day; they 

can see the Russian tanks on their territory from the country’s main 

highway. 148 

Nevertheless, Kremlin ideologists are relentless in inventing ways to 

get in through the window when they are shown the door. A Georgian 

civil society group conducted an extensive investigation of Russian 

use of “soft power” to influence Georgian society and undermine 

Georgia’s independence. The report “Russian Influence on Georgian 

Non-Governmental Organizations and the Media” lists numerous


pro-Russian NGOs, founded in Georgia mostly after the Georgian 

Dream (GD) ruling coalition’s ascent to power in 2012. It also 

presents a detailed analysis of their makeup and modus operandi. 149 

According to the report, pro-Russian propaganda in Georgia’s civil 

sector stems from two key organizations: the Eurasian Institute and 

Eurasian Choice, which have further spawned several other 

organizations and platforms. They depict the West as Georgia’s 

enemy and emphasize the potential benefits of normalizing Russian- 

Georgian relations and restoring their “friendship,” or alternatively 

they stress the importance of Georgia’s neutrality. Interestingly, along 

with anti-Western propaganda, they are also attempting to create 

anti-Turkish sentiment in Georgia. Turkey is Georgia’s main trade 

partners and a critical actor, along with Azerbaijan, in turning the 

country into a strategically important energy corridor to Europe. 

Characteristically, these organizations are also using xenophobic and 

homophobic rhetoric. 150 

The two main organizations have branched out to form other groups 

and forge partnerships serving the same purpose. The Eurasian 

Institute has founded the Young Political Scientists Club and the 

People’s Movement of Georgian-Russian Dialogue and Cooperation. 

It is also a partner of the non-commercial organization Historical 

Legacy and the information portals Sakinformi and Iverioni, with 

connections to Russian media organizations and former Kremlin 

functionaries or Georgian oligarchs based in Russia. Sakinformi’s 

partner in Russia is Information Agency Rex with editor Modest 

Kolerov, who was the main ideologist of the Kremlin’s policy in the 

CIS when serving in the Regional and Cultural Relations Department 

of Russia’s Presidential Administration until 2007. According to the 

report’s authors, Kolerov is banned from entering Georgia and 

considered persona non-grata in Latvia and Estonia. The organization 

Historical Legacy, in turn, founded the online portal Georgia and the 

World (Geworld.ge). According to research on anti-Western 

propaganda carried out by the Georgian Media Development


Foundation, Geworld.ge is among the websites most frequently 

circulating anti-Western sentiments as well as homophobic and 

xenophobic writings. 151 The Eurasian Institute closely cooperates with 

various Russian organizations, including the Caucasian Scientific 

Society. 

Eurasian Choice serves as an umbrella for pro-Russian organizations 

such as Erekle II Society and the Internet television channel Patriot 

TV, which popularize the idea of the Eurasian Union in Georgia. 

Eurasian Choice partners with the International Eurasian Movement, 

led by prominent ideologist of the Kremlin’s expansionist policy, 

Alexander Dugin 152 Another prominent partner of Eurasian Choice is 

the Gorchakov Fund, established in 2010 by then-President of Russia 

Dmitry Medvedev with the purpose of “exerting influence in the 

international space by using [Russian] cultural, historic and political 

values.” Members of its board of trustees include Russia’s Foreign 

Minister Sergei Lavrov as well as Lukoil shareholder Vatig Alegperov, 

the sixth-richest Russian according to Forbes’ 2015 rating. 153 

Despite the flurry of activities, pro-Kremlin NGOs can only have an 

impact on Georgian society if economic conditions continue to 

deteriorate and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration stalls. Therefore, 

the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw will be critical for Georgia 

and the South Caucasus. The issuing of a NATO Membership Action 

Plan (MAP) for Tbilisi would not only re-energize pro-Western 

attitudes in Georgia and support the government’s Euro-Atlantic 

direction, it would also repair the trust toward the West that has 

eroded throughout the region. 

Furthermore, this would send a strong message to President Putin 

that the former Soviet countries will not be left alone in their efforts 

to uphold their sovereignty. In the opposite scenario, NATO’s failure 

to provide Georgia with a roadmap for NATO accession will increase 

skepticism toward the West, strengthen the influence of Russia in the 

South Caucasus, and even contribute to bringing pro-Russian political


parties for the first time into Georgia’s parliament. It will also allow 

Russia to expand its military presence in the occupied regions, 

potentially annex South Ossetia, and incorporate Abkhazia as a bridge 

between the Russian North Caucasus and Armenia. 

Turkey and Iran 

Turkey’s potential to play a major role in the South Caucasus and 

Central Asia has only been partially fulfilled, despite the high 

expectations in the early 1990s. The country’s relationship with the 

South Caucasus has been determined mainly by its partnership with 

Azerbaijan, which officially became “strategic” in 2010. It expanded 

to Georgia when the three countries started implementing large 

energy and transportation projects such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan 

oil pipeline, the Southern Gas Corridor, and the Baku–Tbilisi– 

Akhalkalaki–Kars railway. Ankara’s energy and economic 

cooperation with Baku and Tbilisi underscored and deepened 

Armenia’s regional isolation, as its borders with Turkey have 

remained closed since 1993. 

Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia formed an informal alliance in the 

South Caucasus, which for a while existed simultaneously with the 

Russia-Armenia-Iran axis. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan have had a 

difficult relationship with Iran, although for completely different 

reasons. The Sunni-Shia divisions that play a role in relations between 

Ankara and Tehran, are not a factor in Baku-Tehran relations, as the 

majority of Azerbaijan’s population is Shia. However, the fact that 

Tehran backed Armenia in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh is not 

forgotten. Iran’s support for Armenia was mostly born out of fears 

that Baku would sponsor secessionism among the large Azerbaijani 

minority in Iran. Subsequently, Baku’s military cooperation with 

Israel fueled concerns in Tehran that its northern neighbor could be 

used as a launch pad for attacks against Iran. Relations improved after


2012–2013, when prospects for regional projects emerged as Iran was 

negotiating a nuclear deal with West. 154 

Although for a while these two groupings of countries were able to 

focus on the economic aspects of their partnerships, Moscow’s 

expansionist behavior challenged Turkey and threatened its 

important economic cooperation with Russia, particularly as a critical 

energy supplier. Judging by its weak reaction to Russia’s invasion of 

Georgia in 2008, as well as to Crimea’s annexation in 2014, it was clear 

that Turkey was not willing to risk its business interests by 

confronting Russia. 

However, as Moscow’s involvement in the war in eastern Ukraine was 

continuing and Russia was becoming exceedingly assertive in the 

South Caucasus, Ankara undertook more intensive military 

cooperation with both Azerbaijan and Georgia. In June 2015, Turkish, 

Georgian and Azerbaijani military forces held a series of exercises 

codenamed “Caucasian Eagle” in eastern Turkey. Earlier, Baku hosted 

tactical drills by the armed forces of Azerbaijan and Turkey. 155 

Although some analysts claimed that Moscow began strengthening its 

military bases in Armenia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as a response 

to the military encirclement of an isolated Armenia by Turkey, 

Azerbaijan, and Georgia, it is more likely to be the other way round. 

It is Russia’s neighbors that are becoming increasingly concerned with 

its expansionist actions that have threatened Azerbaijani, Georgian, 

and Turkish energy and transportation interests along the oil and gas 

pipelines and railways from the Caspian to Turkey. 

The geopolitical alliances in the South Caucasus have changed as a 

result of the Russian-Turkish confrontation over the shooting down 

of a Russian fighter jet in November 2015. Both Russia and Turkey 

took their struggle to the neighbors, and the resonance was heard 

from the Balkans to the Caspian. Azerbaijan, in particular, found itself 

in a very difficult position, pressed to choose between Russia and 

Turkey by both sides. In the days after the Russian Su-24 was downed,


Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu traveled to Baku, 

followed by the visit of Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who 

declared that Ankara would “do everything possible to free the 

occupied territories of Nagorno-Karabakh.” But Baku’s response was 

cautious; it officially expressed regret about the conflict between its 

“two friends and neighbors,” but only offered to mediate between 

Moscow and Ankara, avoiding a clear stand on the incident. 156 Faced 

with an economic and financial crisis as a result of low oil prices, 

Azerbaijan cannot afford to alienate either of its two big neighbors. 

Reportedly, energy issues dominated the Turkish officials’ visit more 

than seeking vocal support. Anticipating Russian gas supply 

interruptions and eager to diversify energy sources, Ankara is urging 

Azerbaijan to speed up the expansion of the South Caucasus pipeline 

to Turkey and start delivering natural gas earlier than planned, 

possibly in 2018. 157 Despite the Kremlin’s pressure, Azerbaijan did not 

join Russia’s sanctions against Turkey, unlike the Georgian breakaway 

region of Abkhazia, which accepted Moscow’s demand, regardless of 

the losses to its fragile economy. 158 

The nuclear program agreement between Tehran and the P5+1 (the 

United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and 

Germany), signed in July 2015, opened new economic opportunities 

for the South Caucasus, but also exposed geopolitical difficulties and 

regional rivalries. If north-south trade and energy corridors 

predominate over current east-west connections, Russia and Iran will 

become the dominant players in the South Caucasus, diminishing the 

influence of Turkey and the US. This, in turn, may delay indefinitely 

the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia 

and Azerbaijan and prolong the occupation of South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia. 

Azerbaijan and Armenia are competing for transportation corridors 

linking them to Iran. The prospective railway project connecting 

Azerbaijan and Iran seems more feasible than the one that would link


Armenia to Iran for both technical reasons and available financing. 

Official Tehran has stated that cooperation with its neighbors is its 

first priority, with Azerbaijan taking first place. Iranian President 

Hassan Rouhani also stated in August 2015 that for Iran, Azerbaijan 

is “the gate to the Caucasus” and for Azerbaijan, Iran “can become 

Baku’s path to the Persian Gulf.” 159 

Russia will benefit directly from the railway connection between 

Azerbaijan and Iran as its goods could reach the Indian Ocean instead 

of seeking Western routes, while collecting revenues from the transit 

of Iranian goods to Russia and further to Europe. Iran also hopes to 

use the Baku–Tbilisi–Akhalkalaki–Kars railway for moving cargo 

westward. Connecting to Armenia would be a chance to bring the 

country out of regional transportation isolation. Although the 

Armenian route does not offer Russia direct benefits, unless a railway 

through Georgia is constructed and Yerevan’s relationship with 

Turkey improves, it will bring significant geopolitical advantages. 

Consequently, Moscow and Tehran are likely to press for the 

construction of north-south railway links because they will increase 

dramatically the role of Russia and Iran and reduce the influence of 

Turkey, Georgia and the United States. 160 Russia’s goal is to redirect 

trade traffic from the east-west lines to the north-south corridors in 

order to position itself as the dominant player in the South Caucasus, 

even if it has to share influence with Iran, or rather to use Iran to 

achieve dominance. 

An agreement on electricity exchanges between Russia, Georgia, 

Armenia, and Iran signed in Yerevan in December 2015 demonstrates 

that Moscow is seeking control of the region’s energy sector as well. 

According to the Armenian Ministry of Energy and Natural 

Resources, a 400/500-kilovolt (kV) power transmission line between 

Armenia and Georgia, and a 400 kV power transmission line between 

Armenia and Iran will start operating in 2018. 161 Tellingly, the highvoltage 

export lines in both Armenia and Georgia are managed by 

Russian companies—Gazprom Armenia and Inter RAO, respectively.


In August 2015, just a few weeks after the Iranian nuclear deal was 

signed, Gazprom Armenia was granted the right to operate the highvoltage 

transmission lines that will be used to export electricity to Iran 

and Georgia. 162 In addition, a 2013 deal between Armenia and Russia 

has given Gazprom a monopoly over Armenia’s gas network for 30 

years. Furthermore, Gazprom also bought a critical gas pipeline 

delivering gas from Iran, leaving Moscow in full control of natural gas 

supply routes to Armenia. 163 

While the South Caucasus can benefit substantially from the expected 

abolishment of sanctions against Iran, Moscow is carefully calculating 

how much influence it would allow Iran to have in the region. 

Evidently, the Kremlin is using the Islamic Republic to achieve several 

goals: undermine the east-west trade and energy routes, channel the 

three countries’ trade relations toward the Russian Federation and tie 

them to the Russian economy, impede diversification of energy 

supply, and expand Gazprom and other Russian companies’ market 

share, all the while restricting Iran’s outreach to its neighbors and 

particularly to European energy markets. 

Endnotes 

1 

The fourth conflict was over Moldova’s province of Transnistria. 

2 

“Iraq: As Third-Largest Contingent, Georgia Hopes to Show its Worth,” 

RFE/RL, September 10, 2007, 

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078614.html. 

3 

John Roberts, “Russia & Turkey - Aerial Combat and Energy Security,” 

Natural Gas Europe, November 25, 2015, 

http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/russia-and-turkey-aerial-combat-andenergy-security-26694. 

4 

“The Russian Military Build up Continues as Six Su-34 Fullback Attack 

Planes Arrive in Syria,” TheAviationist.com, September 29, 2015,


http://theaviationist.com/2015/09/29/su-34-have-arrived-in-syria/; “Russia 

launches missiles towards Syria from the Caspian Sea – video,” Reuters, 

October 7, 2015, Available at: 

http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/oct/07/russia-launchesmissiles-on-isis-from-caspian-sea-video. 

5 

Giorgi Lomsadze, “Turkey-Russia Conflict Divides South Caucasus,” 

EurasiaNet.org, December 2, 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76376. 

6 

Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Like Russia, Chechnya is Being Increasingly Drawn 

into Syrian Conflict,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 182, 

October 8, 2015, 

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news% 

5D=44467&cHash=760602bbff179e2cb5f467154705ab59#.VkCwuq6rSis; 

Vasili Rukhadze, “More of Georgia’s Muslims Try to Join Islamic State,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 71, April 16, 2015, 


5D=43802&cHash=1d7874f8b6ff2e14ba9d0a71c16c2023#.VltuQd-rSis. 

7 

Paul Goble, “ISIS Fighters Returning to Azerbaijan Seen Creating Serious 

Problems for Baku,” Window on Eurasia, November 7, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/isis-fighters-returning-toazerbaijan.html. 

8 

Syria is Russia’s main partner in the Middle East. For years, Russia has 

maintained a naval facility in Tartus and a Russian Air Forces deployment 

at the Bassel Al-Assad International Airport in Latakia, with an estimated 

2,000 military personnel in the country before the start of the air strikes on 

September 30, 2015. Russia’s military force in Syria has grown to 4,000 

personnel and is expected to expand further (Reuters, November 8, 2015, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/08/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russiaidUSKCN0SX0H820151108. 

9 

Giorgi Lomsadze, “Turkey-Russia Conflict Divides South Caucasus,” 

EurasiaNet.org, December 2, 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76376. 

10 

Valery Dzutsati, “Moscow Tries to Seduce the Circassians and Abkhaz 

With Plans for New Highway,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue


215, December 2, 2015, 

http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_ne 

ws%5D=44853&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=54&cHash=b73946b863f1e33 

9a50da006391624f4#.VpJL2ZMrJmA. 

11 

Huseyn Aliyev and Emil A. Souleimanov, “Russia’s Missile Launches and 

the Militarization of the Caspian Sea,” CACI Analyst, November 23, 2015, 

http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13305- 

russias-missile-launches-and-the-militarization-of-the-caspian-sea.html. 

12 

Jacopo Dettoni, “Russia and Iran lock NATO out of Caspian Sea,” The 

Diplomat, October 1, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/russia-andiran-lock-nato-out-of-caspian-sea/. 

13 

“Georgia’s 2014 Foreign Trade,” Civil Georgia, January 22, 2015, 

http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27984; European Commission, Trade by 

Countries and Regions, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-andregions/. 

14 

See: “О контроле за алкогольной продукцией из Грузии” (About the 

control of alcohol production from Georgia), Federal Consumer Protection 

Agency, August 4, 2015, 

http://rospotrebnadzor.ru/about/info/news/news_details.php?ELEMENT_I 

D=3983&sphrase_id=418252; “PM: Suspending Free Trade Agreement by 

Russia ‘Not a Tragedy,’ ” Civil Georgia, July 31, 2014, 

http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27542. 

15 

Margarita Assenova and Zaur Shiriyev (eds.), Azerbaijan and the New 

Energy Geopolitics of Southeastern Europe, Washington, DC: The 

Jamestown Foundation, 2015. 

16 

“Speech at meeting of the Russian-Armenian Interregional Forum”, 

Kremlin.ru, December 2, 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6355. 

17 

Author’s interviews in Baku, July 2015. 

18 

Margarita Assenova, “Ukrainian Crisis Sparks Worries in the South 

Caucasus,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 25, 2014, Volume 11, Issue 77,



cache=1#.Vf9tm51VhBc. 

19 

Jim Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments 

and Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, April 2, 

2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf. 

20 

Kirit Radia, “Can Obama Reassure Putin on NATO?” ABC News, March 

26, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/03/can-obamareassure-putin-on-nato/. 

21 

“Will Abkhazians and Ossetians Benefit from the EU Visa 

Liberalization?” Agenda.ge, December 19, 2015, 

http://agenda.ge/news/48700/eng. 

22 

Armenia’s Relations with Turkey are impeded mostly because of Ankara’s 

support for Baku over Nagorno-Karabakh, but also over contradictory 

positions on the Armenian genocide. 

23 

Robert Coalson, “News Analysis: Armenia's Choice Stirs Competition 

Between Moscow, EU,” RFE/RL, September 3, 2013, 

http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-russia-customs-union-euanalysys/25095948.html. 

24 

Ibid. 

25 

Emma Gabrielyan, «David Shahnazaryan. “The RA government 

authorities defended the interests of the Russian corrupted system,”Aravot, 

June 24, 2015, http://en.aravot.am/2015/06/24/170765/. 

26 

“Сергей Марков: в Ереване «наверняка среди демонстрантов много 

боевиков из Украины»!” (Sergey Markov: Probably there are many 

fighters from Ukraine among the Demonstrators in Yerevan), First 

Armenia Information Channel, June 24, 2015, 

http://ru.1in.am/1101656.html. 

27 

Gazprom reduced energy prices for Armenia by 30–35% in 2013 after the 

country joined the Customs Union—natural gas prices dropped from the


already low $270 to $189 per thousand cubic meters. Prices in Belarus in 

2013 were $166 and some Eastern European countries were paying over 

$500 of Russian gas at the time. See: “Gazprom’s Grip,” RFE/RL, 


28 

“Russia and Armenia negotiate possible cut on natural gas price, minister 

says,” Arka News Agency, March 30, 2015, 

http://arka.am/en/news/economy/russia_and_armenia_negotiate_possible_ 

cut_on_natural_gas_price_minister_says/; “Russia cuts gas price for 

Armenia by $24 to $165,” Armenian Public Radio, September 7, 2015, 

http://www.armradio.am/en/2015/09/07/russia-cuts-gas-price-for-armeniaby-24-to-165/. 

29 

“Russian Serviceman Permyakov to Be Tried by Armenian Court for 

Gyumri Killings,” The Armenian Weekly, June 30, 2015, 

http://armenianweekly.com/2015/06/30/permyakov-to-be-tried-by-anarmenian-court/. 

30 

The World’s Billionaires, 2015 Ranking, Forbes.com, 

http://www.forbes.com/profile/samvel-karapetyan/. 

31 

Inter RAO UES press release, September 30, 2015, 

http://www.interrao.ru/en/news/company/?ELEMENT_ID=5238; “Russia’s 

Inter RAO sells Armenia’s electricity network,” The Conway Bulletin, 

September 30, 2015, http://newsdesk.theconwaybulletin.com/russias-interrao-sells-armenias-electricity-network/. 

32 

“Интер РАО продала активы в Армении за $8,25 млн,” (Inter RAO 

sold assets in Armenia for $8.25 million), Rambler News Service, November 

27, 2015, https://rns.online/energy/Inter-RaO-prodala-25-dolyu-varmyanskih-dochkah-za-825-mln-news-2015-11-27/. 

33 

“Inter RAO’s assets in Armenia to be sold on a step-by-step basis,” 

Verelq.com, December 2, 2015, http://www.verelq.am/en/node/4927; 

“Russian CEO of Electric Networks of Armenia dismissed,” Arka News 

Agency, October 16, 2015,


http://arka.am/en/news/business/russian_ceo_of_electric_networks_of_ar 

menia_dismissed/; 

Matthew Czekaj, “Russia’s Bankrupting Empire,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 

Volume 12, Issue 121, June 29, 2015, 

http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bpoint 

er%5D=4&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44093&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D 

=54&cHash=1a4fd5fcb2565332e4c1c3b2dd7c0331#.Vdo1tNNViko. 

34 

“Economy in 2015: EEU membership, U.S.-Armenia Trade Agreement, 

power grid sale,” ArmeniaNow.com, December 28, 2015, 

https://www.armenianow.com/economy/69038/armenia_economy_year_2 

015. 

35 

Natalia Konarzewska, “Armenia’s Economic Woes,” CACI Analyst, 

September 15, 2015, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analyticalarticles/item/13277-armenias-economic-woes.html. 

36 

The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org. 

37 

“Russia Tightens Its Hold on Armenia,” Stratfor, November 2, 2015, 

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-tightens-its-hold-armenia; “When 

Is Next Shock and When Will Ara Abrahamyan's Party Be Dissolved?” 

Lragir.com, October 19, 2015, 

http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/34789#sthash.EOPUP8 

7g.dpuf. 

38 

European Union External Policy Website, 

http://eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_en.htm. 

39 

“Russian-Armenian Military Drill Targets ‘Ottomania’,” Asbarez.com, 

September 5, 2014, http://asbarez.com/126676/russian-armenian-militarydrill-targets-ottomania/. 

40 

Author’s interviews in Yerevan, July 2015. 

41 

Emma Gabrielyan, “Do Putin and Aliyev clear new heights?”Aravot, 

August 24, 2015, http://en.aravot.am/2015/08/24/171670/.


42 

“Russian Troops In Armenia Inspected,” Azatutyun, July 2015, 

http://www.azatutyun.mobi/a/27115077.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_m 

edium=facebook. 

43 

“Russia Reinforces Base in Armenia With Attack, Transport Helicopters,” 

Sputnik International, December 21, 2015, 

http://sputniknews.com/military/20151221/1032081119/russia-militarybase-armenia-helicopters.html#ixzz3xTb3nucr. 

44 

Sargis Harutyunyan, “Advanced Russian Missiles ‘Deployed In 

Armenia’,’’ RFE/RL, June 3, 2013, 

http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/25005647.html. 

45 

Christopher Harress, “Russia In Talks To Supply Armenia With 

Iskander-M Missiles As Battle Lines Drawn Across Europe,” International 

Business Times, July 2, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-talks-supplyarmenia-iskander-m-missiles-battle-lines-drawn-across-europe-1994731. 

46 

Sargis Harutyunyan, “Advanced Russian Missiles ‘Deployed in 

Armenia’,” RFE/RL, June 3, 2013, 


47 

“Russia Won't Sell Iskander to Everyone But Will it Sell It to Azerbaijan?” 

Lragir.am, August 10, 2015, 

http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/34506#sthash.Ku3pXEGL. 

dpuf. 

48 

David Stepanyan, “Major General Arkady-Ter-Tadevosyan: Iskander 

Systems Will Appear in Armenia… but in Territory of 102nd Russian 

Military Base,” ArmInfo, July 13, 2015, 

http://www.arminfo.info/index.cfm?objectid=DA34EF70-2921-11E5- 

BC5B0EB7C0D21663. 

49 

“Russia Checks Combat Readiness of Troops in Armenia,” AFP, July 7, 

2015, 

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/07/ 

07/russia-checks-combat-readiness-troops-armenia/29827321/.


50 

NATO Website, 

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. 

51 

“Russia and Armenia will establish a unified air-defense system in the 

Caucasus,” Sputnik International, November 11, 2015, 

more: http://sputniknews.com/military/20151111/1029906462/putinrussia-armenia-air-defense.html#ixzz3yexVBg9H. 

52 

Emil Danielyan, “Russia, Armenia Upgrade Joint Air Defense,” 

Azatutyun, December 23, 2015, 


53 

The Military Balance, Vol. 115, Issue 1, 2015, International Institute for 

Strategic Studies, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance. 

54 

Vladimir Socor, “Armenia’s Economic Dependence on Russia 

Insurmountable by the European Union,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 

10, Issue 221, December 10, 2013, 

http://www.jamestown.org/regions/russia/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5 

D=41740&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=48&cHash=408a5840473a1f08b45f6 

4b8178116ba#.Vpf2T5MrLfY. 

55 

Fred Hiatt, “Why Armenia turned to Russia instead of the West,” The 

Washington Post, May 7, 2015, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/05/07/whyarmenia-turned-to-russia-instead-of-the-west/. 

56 

Grigor Hayrapetyan and Viktoriya Hayrapetyan, Regional and 

International Trade of Armenia: Perspectives and Potentials, Kyiv: 

Economics Education and Research Consortium, 2011, 

http://www.aea.am/files/papers/w1103.pdf. 

57 

Marianna Grigoryan, “Armenia: Trying to Break Free of Economic 

Dependence on Russia?” EurasiaNet.org, May 18, 2015, 

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73486; European Commission, 

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/armenia/.


58 

Vladimir Socor, “Armenia’s Economic Dependence on Russia 

Insurmountable by the European Union,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 

10, Issue 221, December 10, 2013, 


#.VtdpC-bYHiQ. 

59 

“Armenia to sell Iran gas pipeline to Gazprom,” Press TV, June 5, 2015, 

http://217.218.67.231/Detail/2015/06/05/414428/Iran-gas-armeniapipeline-gazprom. 

60 

Armen Grigoryan, “Armenia’s Regional Energy and Transport 

Cooperation Squeezed by Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 

156, September 1, 2015, 


5D=44319&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=786&no_cache=1#.VpG_G5MrJm 

C. 

61 

“Economy in 2015: EEU membership, U.S.-Armenia Trade Agreement, 

power grid sale,” ArmeniaNow.com, December 28, 2015, 

https://www.armenianow.com/economy/69038/armenia_economy_year_2 

015. 

62 

Armen Vardanyan, “Russian Policy in Armenia and its Impact 

Tools,”Aravot, November 19, 2015, 

http://en.aravot.am/2015/11/19/173046/. 

63 

Ibid. 

64 

Author’s interviews in Yerevan in July 2015. 

65 

“When Is Next Shock and When Will Ara Abrahamyan’s Party Be 

Dissolved?” Lragiar.com, October 19, 2015, 

http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/34789#sthash.EOPUP8 

7g.dpuf. 

66 

Ibid.; Authors interviews in Yerevan, July 2015. 

67 

Author’s interviews in Yerevan, July 2015.


68 

Teymur Hasanli, “Azerbaijan on the verge of a new ‘mini-war’: 

commentary and details,” Yeni Musavat, January 24, 2015, 

http://musavat.com/. 

69 

Zulfugar Agayev, “Azeris to Boost Defense Spending Amid Risk of 

Armenia War,” Bloomberg, November 19, 2014, 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-19/azeris-to-boostdefense-spending-amid-risk-of-armenia-war. 

70 

The World Bank, Military Expenditure, 

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS/countries/all?d 

isplay=graph. 

71 

Global Militarization Index 2015, Bonn International Center for 

Conversion, https://www.bicc.de/press/press-releases/press/news/globalmilitarisation-index-2015-465/. 

72 

Victoria Panfilov, “Azerbaijan is committed to peace,” Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta, June 2, 2015, available at: 

http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/71962.html. 

73 

“Baku says 143 Armenian, 19 Azeri soldiers killed in 2015,” APA, January 

5, 2016, http://az.apa.az/. 

74 

“Azerbaijan furious over EU criticism, wants to 'revise' relations,” 

EUbusiness, September 11, 2015, http://www.eubusiness.com/newseu/azerbaijan-rights.14a2/. 

75 

Gulshan Pashayeva, “The EU-Azerbaijan Relationship: Current Status 

and Future Outlook,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 207, 

November 13, 2015, Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44598&tx_t 

tnews%5BbackPid%5D=7#.Vp4wl1MrLfY. 

76 

US Helsinki Commission press release, December 16, 2015, 

http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&Conte 

ntRecord_id=1228&ContentType=P&ContentRecordType=P.


77 


78 

Amanda Paul, “Azerbaijan and the Two EUs”, EU Observer, July 6, 2014, 

http://blogs.euobserver.com/paul/2014/07/06/azerbaijanand-the-two-eus/. 

79 

“Russia-Azerbaijan Arms Trade Worth $4Bln – Aliyev,” Sputnik 

International, August 13, 2013, 

http://sputniknews.com/russia/20130813/182748495/Russia-Azerbaijan- 

Arms-Trade-Worth-4Bln--Aliyev.html. 

80 

Orkhan Yolchuyev, “Relations with Azerbaijan meet Russia’s strategic 

interests,” Trend News Agency, October 9, 2015, 

http://en.trend.az/business/economy/2442213.html. 

81 

Anar Valiyev, “Azerbaijan-Russia Relations after the Five-Day War: 

Friendship, Enmity, or Pragmatism?” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 10 No. 

3, FALL 2011, http://turkishpolicy.com/issue/39/natos-future-in-turkeysneighborhood. 

82 

Azerbaijan started negotiations with the WTO in July 1997. The 

negotiations were accelerated in 2015, but it is not clear when they will 

conclude. 

See: 

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/acc_aze_06mar15_e.htm. 

83 



2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf; Donald N. Jensen, 

“Putin Brings Disappointment Back from Baku,” Institute for Modern 

Russia, August 23, 2013, http://imrussia.org/en/politics/538-putin-bringsdisappointment-back-from-baku. 

84 

“Azeri military expert anxious about reported defense deals with 

Russia,”Yeni Musavat, August 15, 2013. 

85 

“General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to 

Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region,” United Nations, March 27, 

2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm; “Mixed Regional


Response to Crimea Annexation,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 27, 

2014, http://www.eiu.com. 

86 

“Rogozin put in charge of Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan,” 

CommonSpace.eu, April 14, 2014, 

http://commonspace.eu/eng/news/6/id2974. 

87 

Anar Valiyev, “Azerbaijan’s Balancing Act in the Ukraine Crisis,” 

PONARS Eurasia, September 2014, 

http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/azerbaijans-balancing-act-ukrainecrisis. 

88 

Saba Aghayeva, “NATO Appreciates Azerbaijan’s contribution to 

international security,” Trend News Agency, April 11, 2014, 

http://en.trend.az/. 

89 

“The West pursues double standard policy towards Azerbaijan, British 

MP,” News.az, April 19, 2014, http://news.az/articles/politics/87869. 

90 

“Azerbaijan reaffirms readiness to transit gas from east coast of Caspian 

Sea,” Trend News Agency, April 23, 2014, 

http://en.trend.az/business/energy/2266389.html. 

91 

“NATO Official Says Ties with Azerbaijan to Develop,” BBC Monitoring 

Trans Caucasus Unit, April 15, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring. 

92 

Author’s conversation with Rasim Musabekov, member of Azerbaijan’s 

parliament, in Baku, July 2015. 

93 


94 

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/databases/armstransfer 

s. 

95 

“Israel Signs $1.6 Billion Arms Deal With Azerbaijan,” Associated Press, 

February 26, 2012, Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israelsigns-1-6-billion-arms-deal-with-azerbaijan-1.414916; 

Zulfugar Agayev,


“Israel’s Top Oil Supplier Endures Gaza as Azeri Ties Grow,” Bloomberg, 

September 28, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09- 

28/israel-s-top-oil-supplier-endures-gaza-as-azeri-ties-grow. 

96 

Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Azerbaijan To Acquire Military Vehicles From 

Kazakhstan,” Defense News, August 21, 2015, 

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/vehicles/2015/08/21/azer 

baijan-acquire-military-vehicles-kazakhstan/32088317/. 

97 

Craig Caffrey, “Azerbaijan to Cut Defense Spending by 40%,” IHS Jane's 

Defence Industry, January 26, 2016, 

http://www.janes.com/article/57500/azerbaijan-to-cut-defence-spendingby-40; 

John C. K. Daly, “Azerbaijan’s Defense Spending Hits $4.8 Billion,” 

SilkRoadReporters.com, November 25, 2014, 

http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/11/25/azerbaijan-defensespending-hits-4-8-billion/. 

98 

Population of Azerbaijan 2015, State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, 

http://www.stat.gov.az/source/demoqraphy/ap/indexen.php. 

99 

Nigar Orujova, “Azerbaijan, Russia establish Association of Universities,” 

AzerNews.com, November 20, 2015, 

http://www.azernews.az/azerbaijan/90009.html. 

100 

Author’s interviews in Baku, July 2015; “Azerbaijan’s access to Eurasian 

Economic Union not on agenda — foreign minister,” TASS, December 25, 

2014, http://tass.ru/en/economy/769271; Microeconomic Indicators 2015, 

The State Statistical Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 

http://www.stat.gov.az/macroeconomy/indexen.php. 

101 

David M. Herszenhorn, “Russia to Close Radar Station in Azerbaijan,” 

New York Times, December 11, 2012, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/europe/russia-to-shut-downradar-station-in-azerbaijan.html; 

“Russia stops lease of ‘outdated’ Gabala 

radar,” RT, December 11, 2012, http://www.rt.com/politics/gabala-radarstation-agreement-804.


102 

Richard Rousseau, “Azerbaijan Using Gabala Negotiations to Change 

Russia’s Policy,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 9, Issue 133, July 13, 2012, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d 

69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=Gabala&t 

x_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39625&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash= 

8b7001c2225bf7c84c60ed0fd105d39b#.VeOsMNNVhBc. 

103 

Arzu Geybullayeva, “Azerbaijan: Striking a Balance between Russia and 

the West,” in Anahit Shirinyan and Louisa Slavkova, Eds., Unrewarding 

Crossroads? The Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia, 

Sofia: Sofia Platform, June 2015, http://sofiaplatform.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Azerbaijan_Striking_a_Balance_between_Russia_ 

and_the_West.pdf. 

104 

Anar Valiyev, “Azerbaijan-Russia: Friendship or Else,” Turkish Policy, 

Volume 10, No.3, 2011, http://www.turkishpolicy.com/pdf/vol_10-no_3- 

valiyev.pdf. 

105 

“Russia to Build New Radar Stations in Azerbaijan, Near Arctic Circle,” 

RFE/RL, August 18, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-radarstations-azerbaijan-arctic-circle/27195189.html. 

106 

“Armenian Speaker dispels concerns over future Russian radar in 

Azerbaijan,” News.am, August 20, 2015, http://news.am/rus/. 

107 

“The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan Restores 

Relations with Pentagon,” Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, July 14, 2015, 

http://mod.gov.az/index2.php?content=news/2015/14_07_melumat_pentaq 

on. 

108 

Paul Goble, “Russia and Iran to Conduct Joint Naval Exercises on the 

Caspian Sea,” Window on Eurasia, October 19, 2015, 

http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-and-iran-to-conduct-joint-navalexercises-on-the-caspian-sea/. 

109 

“A New Military Order in the Caspian Sea?”Stratfor, November 24, 2015, 

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/new-military-order-caspian-sea; Evan 

Gotessman, “The Caspian States in Russia's Military Bind,” The Diplomat,


November 27, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/turkey-russiatensions-put-caspian-states-in-a-bind/. 

110 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, June 9, 2015, 

http://www.mid.ru; 

John C. K. Daly, “Russia Convinces ‘Caspian Five’ to Bar Foreign Militaries 

From the Caspian,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 83, May 5, 

2014, 


cache=1#.Vdte2dNViko. 

111 

Russia simultaneously suspended imports of Moldovan wines citing 

health and sanitation grounds, but observers believed it was another 

attempt by Russia to punish ex-Soviet states for severing ties with Moscow. 

“Russian wine move draws protests,” BBC, March 30, 2006, 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4860454.stm. 

112 

“Saakashvili’s Speech at the UN General Assembly – 2013,” 

Civil Georgia, September 26, 2013, 


113 

The Military Balance, Vol. 115, Issue 1, 2015, International Institute for 

Strategic Studies, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance. 

114 



2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf. 

115 

Vladimir Socor, “Moscow Wants the OSCE to Negotiate Directly With 

South Ossetia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 11, 2008, 


cache=1#.Vp6Q_lMrLfY. 

116 

Georgi Lomsadze, “Georgia: United Nations To Leave Abkhazia,” 

EurasiaNet.org, June 17, 2009, 

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav061609c.shtml. 

117 

Socor, Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 11, 2008.


118 

“Договор между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Южная 

Осетия о союзничестве и интеграции” (Treaty between the Russian 

Federation and South Ossetia on Alliance and Integration), Kavkazkiy Uzel, 

June 30, 2015, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/259096/. 

119 

Kremlin Official Website, March 18, 2015, 

http://kremlin.ru/supplement/4819. 

120 

Yana Amelina, “Russia or Death,” Russian Planet, December 4, 2015, 

http://rusplt.ru/society/rossiya-ili-smert-20078.html. 

121 

Ibid.; Paul Goble, “Is Putin about to Annex South Osetia,” Window on 

Eurasia, December 6, 2015, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/12/is-putin-about-to-annexsouth-osetia.html. 

122 

“Pursuant to today’s political realities, we should make our historic 

choice, join our brotherly Russia and guarantee security and prosperity for 

our republic for centuries,” Tibilov was quoted by his press office; see 

“Kremlin Denies Its Aide Discussed Referendum on Joining Russia with 

S.Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, October 20, 2015, 


123 

Ibid; “South Ossetian Leader Calls for Referendum on Joining Russia,” 

Economist Intelligence Unit, October 21, 2015, 

http://country.eiu.com.proxyau.wrlc.org/article.aspx?articleid=1773612161. 

124 

“Kremlin Denies Its Aide Discussed Referendum on Joining Russia with 

S. Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, October 20, 2015, 


125 

“After Signing New Treaty, Moscow Pledges over $200m for Abkhazia in 

2015,” Civil Georgia, November 24, 2014, 


126 

Shorena Marsagishvili: “Russia Refuses to Continue Financing 

Abkhazia,”Akhali Taoba in Georgian, August 12, 2015.


127 

Courtney Doggart, “Russian Investments in Georgia’s Electricity Sector: 

Causes and Consequences,” International Association for Energy Economics, 

1st Quarter 2011, 

http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/fullnewsletter.aspx?id=17. 

128 

Nick Patton Walsh, “Georgian leader attacks Russia after gas blasts,” The 

Guardian, January 2006, 

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/23/russia.georgia. 

129 

On Russia’s use of sanctions to undermine Saakashvili’s government see 

Randall E. Newnham, “Georgia on my mind? Russian sanctions and the end 

of the ‘Rose Revolution’,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, 

July 2015, Pages 161–170, 

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187936651500010X. 

130 

Inter RAO UES purchased Telasi and Mtkvari from the US company 

AES Corporation after the company’s Tbilisi office received numerous 

threats and AES-Telasi’s CFO Niko Lominadze was found murdered in his 

apartment. At the time, Inter RAO was 40% owned by the Russian nuclear 

energy giant Rosatom. Inter RAO is now controlled by the state-owned 

Rosneftgaz, the Russian Federal Grid Company, Norilsk Nickel Group (the 

world’s largest producer of nickel and palladium), the Russian Foreign 

Economic Bank, and the state-controlled RusHydro (Russia’s largest 

power-generating company). 

131 

Eka Janashia, “Russia Increases Presence in Georgia’s Energy and 

Transportation Markets,” CACI Analyst, January 22, 2014, 

http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/13125-russiaincreases-presence-in-georgias-energy-and-transportation-markets.html. 

132 

Ariela Shapiro, “The Challenges to Georgia's Energy Sector,” CACI 

Analyst, May 27, 2015, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analyticalarticles/item/13215-the-challenges-to-georgias-energy-sector.html. 

133 

Vladimer Papava, Russia’s illiberal “Liberal Empire,” Project Syndicate, 

February 28, 2007, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-silliberal--liberal-empire#xoimRtK1GCTdIlA9.99; 

Diana Petriashvili,


“Georgia: No Gas Pipeline Sale For Now,” EurasiaNet.org, March 8, 2005, 

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030905.shtml. 

134 

“EU warning over Russia ‘land grab’ in South Ossetia border row,” BBC, 

July 16, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33549462. 

135 

Rosneft Press Release, December 29, 2014, 

http://www.rosneft.com/news/pressrelease/29122014.html. 

136 

The Law on Occupied Territories, October 23, 2008, 

http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/81268/88220/F1630879580/G 

EO81268.pdf. 

137 

Joseph Alexander Smith, “Rosneft takes control of Georgia’s Black Sea oil 

Terminal,” Commonspace.eu, January 12, 2014, 

http://commonspace.eu/eng/news/6/id3157. 

138 

Thomas Kapp and Will Cathcart, “Monopolies do not stop at 49 percent 

- Rosneft Deal Jeopardizes Georgia’s Strategic Energy Transit Corridor,” 

Georgia Journal, February 5, 2015, 

http://www.georgianjournal.ge/business/29552-monopolies-do-not-stopat-49-percent-rosneft-deal-jeopardizes-georgias-strategic-energy-transitcorridor.html. 

139 

Giorgi Menabde, “Russia Threatens Georgia With Renewed Trade War,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 154, August 14, 2015, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d 

69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=Net%20as 

sessment&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44289&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D= 

7&cHash=42c882af6feeeaaf76e0365e345e6f5f#.VdoUr9NViko. 

140 

“Azerbaijani, Georgian Presidents Pledge Strategic Partnership,” Civil 

Georgia, November 5, 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28746; 

“По Oценке SOCAR Oбъем Добычи Газа в Азербайджане в 2015 г 

Удвоится,” Neftegaz.ru, October 29, 2015, 

http://neftegaz.ru/news/view/142844.


141 

Authors interviews in Tbilisi, July 2015; Tornike Sharashenidze, 

“Georgia Gazprom Mistery,” Wider Europe Forum, European Council on 

Foreign Relations, December 22, 2015, 

http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_Georgias_Gazprom_mystery5061. 

142 

World Bank Open Data for 2014, 

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS. 

143 

Author’s interviews in Tbilisi, July 2015. 

144 

Ibid. 

145 

NDI Opinion Poll, August 2015, https://www.ndi.org/August-2015- 

Public-Opinion-Poll-Georgia. 

146 

NDI Opinion Poll, April 2015, 

https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI%20Georgia_April%202015%20Poll_Public 

%20Political_ENG.pdf. 

147 

Natalia Antelava, “Georgia: Orthodoxy in the Classroom,” BBC, May 7, 

2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32595514. 

148 

CSIS, Statesman’s Forum, December 7, 2015, 

http://csis.org/multimedia/video-statesmens-forum-he-tinatin-khidashelidefense-minister-georgia. 

149 

Nata Dzvelishvili and Tazo Kupreishvili, “Russian influence on the 

Georgian non-governmental organizations and the media,” 

Damoukidebloba.com, June 2015, 

https://idfi.ge/public/upload/russanimpactongeorgianmediadaNGO.pdf; 

Eka Janashia, “Russia Enhances Soft Power in Georgia through Local 

NGOs,” CACI Analyst, June 24, 2015, 

http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/13243-rujssiaenchances-soft-power-georgia-local-ngos.html. 

150 

Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, Damoukidebloba.com, June 2015.


151 

“Anti-Western Propaganda in Georgia,” MDF, in Georgian, 

http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/Antidasavluri-GEO-web.pdf. 

152 

Eka Janashia, “Russia Enhances Soft Power in Georgia through Local 

NGOs,” CACI Analyst, June 24, 2015; International Eurasian Movement 

website, http://www.evrazia.info/article/4672. 

153 

Dzvelishvili and Kupreishvili, Damoukidebloba.com, June 2015. 

154 

Alex Vatantka, “Trangle in the Caucasus: Iran and Israel Fight for 

Influence in Azerbaijan,” Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2013, 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-01-15/tanglecaucasus. 

155 

“Turkish Military Cooperation Prompts Russian Military Moves in the 

Caucasus,” Stratfor, July 11, 2015, 

https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/turkish-military-cooperationprompts-russian-military-moves-caucasus. 

156 

Eldar Mamedov, “Turkish-Russian Tension Creates Quandary for 

Azerbaijan,” EurasiaNet.org, November 30, 2015, 

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76331. 

157 

Aynur Karimova, “Davutoglu’s Baku Visit Sets Important Messages,” 

AzerNews.az, December 8, 2015, 

http://www.azernews.az/analysis/90579.html. 

158 

“Breakaway Abkhazia Joins Russia’s Anti-Turkish Sanctions,” Agenda.ge, 

January 12, 2016, http://agenda.ge/news/50161/eng. 

159 

Sohbet Mamedov, “Азербайджан и Иран Oбъединяют Железные 

Дороги” (Azerbaijan and Iran Connect Railways), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 

August 19, 2015, http://www.ng.ru/cis/2015-08-19/1_azerbaijan.html. 

160 

Paul Goble, “North-South Railroad Competitions Reordering 

Geopolitics of the Caucasus,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Issue 156, September 

1, 2015,



5D=44318&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=786&no_cache=1#.VfCglJ1VhBd. 

161 

Armen Grigoryan, “Armenia, Georgia, Iran and Russia Plan to Expand 

Energy Cooperation,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 13, Issue 1,January 4, 

2016, 

http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_ne 

ws%5D=44939&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=54&cHash=ba8e62cb9c562ed 

3ee50948da0d33b4c#.VpGiZJMrJmA. 

162 

Armen Grigoryan, “Armenia’s Regional Energy and Transport 

Cooperation Squeezed by Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 

156, September 1, 2015, 


5D=44319&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=786&no_cache=1#.VpG_G5MrJm 

C. 

163 

“Armenia to sell Iran gas pipeline to Gazprom,” Press TV, June 5, 2015, 

http://217.218.67.231/Detail/2015/06/05/414428/Iran-gas-armeniapipeline-gazprom.

6. South Eastern Flank: Central Asia 

Russia’s annexation of Crimea reverberated throughout the five 

Central Asian states, raising fears of potential similar aggression on 

their territories. The national governments received a frightening 

reminder of their own vulnerabilities when Russian President 

Vladimir Putin justified the “Crimean Anschluss” with the need to 

protect the rights and interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking 

populations on the peninsula. Furthermore, Putin rejected 

accusations of violation of international law by stating that “Russia’s 

Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line 

with an international agreement.” 1 These statements sent a chilling 

message to the Central Asian states, which are vulnerable on both 

counts: firstly, Russian minorities are still sizeable in the area, despite 

considerable emigration since the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and 

secondly, the region hosts Russian military bases with thousands of 

soldiers, making the parallel with Crimea even more unsettling. 2 

The Central Asian leaders clearly understood that the Kremlin seized 

Crimea and Sevastopol because of the strategic military and economic 

advantage Russia would gain in the Black Sea vis-à-vis its neighbors 

and NATO. By expanding control over the northern coast of the Black 

Sea, from Crimea through the Russian-occupied Georgian region of 

Abkhazia, Moscow wants to turn this body of water into a Russiancontrolled 

strategic zone. Similar strategic targets are located in 

Central Asia—from the Caspian Sea, with the vast energy resources of 

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; to the largest space launch facility in 

the world, the Baikonur Cosmodrome, in Kazakhstan, which Moscow

SOUTH EASTERN FLANK | 371 

now is leasing from Astana; to some of the world’s most abundant 

uranium deposits in the world; as well as the strategic roads crossing 

the region from China to Europe and the Middle East. Each of these 

strategic resources could become another target of Russian 

aggression, legitimized by the excuse of protecting the interests of the 

Russian minorities in Central Asia. Moscow is also well positioned to 

use Russian military bases located in the region in addition to its navy 

in the Caspian Sea as occupation forces, just as it did in Crimea and 

Abkhazia. 

Central Asia is a vital part of the Heartland that Russia lost after the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union, but has relentlessly tried to retain 

control of since then, claiming it as a “zone of privileged interests.” 

Although the 19 th century “Great Game” is over and the Heartland has 

changed, it is still an arena of competition between the regional 

powers of Russia and China as well as Europe and the United States. 

The vast economic wealth of the landlocked region “with no available 

waterways to the ocean,” as Sir Halford Mackinder once wrote, is now 

connected to the global world not only by railways, but also by planes 

and satellites. 3 Moscow understands the strategic importance of 

Central Asia today. Russia’s leaders have always perceived the region 

as their backyard and used it as a bulwark against a potential invasion 

from the south. But in the last several years, Moscow has tried to turn 

it into a stronghold of Russian neo-imperialism, with the Eurasian 

Union being the heart of this grand political project. 

For neighboring China, however, Central Asia is far from a backyard; 

it is a gateway to Europe, offering land transportation corridors to 

deliver Chinese goods to European markets much faster than 

maritime transportation routes. With current trade volumes between 

China and the EU worth over one billion euros a day, Beijing is 

interested in rapidly building alternative railways and highways 

throughout Central Asia. 4


Consequently, Beijing’s policy in the region is dramatically different 

from that of Moscow. While Moscow attempts to dominate Central 

Asia—particularly its energy sector and the strategic/military 

sphere—by playing on the divisions between the five states and taking 

advantage of their economic weaknesses, Beijing wants to build an 

economic belt of stability and security that will help integrate Central 

Asia and connect China with global markets. 5 Thus, by developing 

Central Asia, Beijing will benefit in both trade and security, while 

tapping into the region’s massive energy resources. China’s leaders 

view a stable and prosperous Central Asia as a security factor to 

stabilize or insulate their own restless Xinjiang province, which hosts 

a sizeable Turkic-Muslim minority, the Uyghurs. In parallel with this 

domestic objective, China’s diplomacy and rigorous investment 

strategy in Central Asia aims to build regional alliances and enlist new 

international partners in order to offset both Russian and American 

influence in the region and thus secure Beijing’s geopolitical 

advantage vis-à-vis Moscow and Washington. 6 Nevertheless, “China’s 

march westward” is largely driven by economic factors, not least its 

need for diversified transport corridors to Europe so that it does not 

depend on Russia alone. After almost two decades of pursuing this 

policy on a bilateral basis with each of the Central Asian states, in 

September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled the Silk Road 

Economic Belt initiative for the region, which forms part of the One 

Belt, One Road transportation and development strategy of his 

country. 7 

Central Asia has also been an important region for the security of 

Europe and the United States. Since the terrorist attacks on the US in 

2001, American interests have revolved largely around three 

questions: the security situation in Afghanistan, stability in the wider 

region hosting supply lines to Afghanistan, and European energy 

security. Before NATO troops started withdrawing from Afghanistan 

in 2015, US interests in regional stability have been guided primarily 

by the military operation in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the US 

administration made a half-hearted attempt to remain engaged in the


region by promoting the New Silk Road vision. But this remained a 

paper initiative, lacking funding and political commitment. China 

eclipsed this idea and developed plans for not one Silk Road, but 

two—one through the landmass of Central Asia and another one 

through the Indian Ocean. 8 However, unlike the US concept, Beijing’s 

main purpose does not revolve around linking Afghanistan with the 

rest of the region through a network of roads and railways. 

Europe’s primary interests in Central Asia are vested in the enormous 

mineral resources of the Caspian basin that can provide an alternative 

to Russian oil and gas supplies. Trafficking of narcotics from 

Afghanistan via Central Asia and Russia to Europe is also a major 

concern for the European Union—as are the export of terrorism from 

the region to Europe and the recruitment of fighters for the Islamic 

State in Syria. Despite its important interests in Central Asia, EU 

engagement has lacked focus and sufficient funding. 

Since returning to the Russian presidency in 2012, Vladimir Putin has 

undertaken the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 

as a counterbalance to the European Union and NATO on the one 

hand, and as a barrier to China’s expansion in Central Asia, on the 

other. He succeeded in enlisting Kazakhstan as a founding member, 

not least because the original idea of a Eurasian Union belongs to 

Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev. But other factors 

played a more significant role in Astana’s decision to join the Customs 

Union, which preceded the EEU, such as the harsh financial and 

economic crises in 2008–2009, long negotiations on Kazakhstan’s 

accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that virtually 

stopped between 2008 and 2012, and the country’s extensive trade and 

economic ties with Russia. Ironically, Kazakhstan’s membership in 

the Customs Union and subsequently in the EEU further complicated 

its WTO accession. 9 

Kyrgyzstan joined the EEU in August 2015, and with that, the 

expansion of the Union seems to have reached its limit in Central


Asia. Tajikistan appears unwilling to join the trade bloc, while 

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan never considered the possibility. 

Ashgabat maintains official neutrality and refrains from participating 

in regional organizations, while Tashkent has been historically 

distrustful of Moscow. 

Nevertheless, Moscow managed to achieve its minimum goal, namely 

to economically seal most of the borders between China and Central 

Asia and place all trade through them under Russian control. This 

small victory was supposed to be the beginning of Russia’s economic 

pushback against China in Central Asia, but instead it might turn out 

to be Moscow’s only achievement. The EEU began to decline shortly 

after the annexation of Crimea, as Western sanctions against Russia 

affected all of its members and the economic crisis caused by 

plummeting oil prices incapacitated Moscow’s expansion to Central 

Asia. As a result, by the end of 2015, Russia began visibly withdrawing 

from Central Asia both economically and militarily: it scrapped major 

water projects in Kyrgyzstan, downgraded its military base in 

Tajikistan, and witnessed trade declining with all Central Asian 

states. 10 

The Central Asian states were hesitant to openly oppose Russia for the 

annexation of Crimea and subsequent military intervention in eastern 

Ukraine. In fact, none of them supported the UN resolution affirming 

the territorial integrity of Ukraine and rendering the Crimean 

referendum on joining Russia invalid. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 

abstained (along with China), while the representatives of Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were absent from the UN General 

Assembly session. 11 The main reason for the lack of pushback against 

Moscow’s aggressive behavior in its flanks is Central Asia’s economic 

dependence on Russia. However, precisely the strong economic ties 

with Russia became the region’s main liability and the source of 

significant economic distress. As the war in Ukraine continued 

through 2015, the Central Asian economies contracted, their 

currencies plummeted, while remittances coming from Russia


drastically declined and forced many labor migrants to return home— 

all of these factors contributed to increased social discontent across 

Central Asia. 

Another critical reason for the Central Asian capitals’ adherence to 

Moscow has been the rising threat of extremism to the stability of the 

region, stemming from the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. As 

the US and its allies withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, attacks 

by the Taliban are intensifying and the Islamic State (IS) is gaining 

more supporters. The United Nations has estimated that the IS has a 

presence in 25 out of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, while US 

intelligence sources claim that there are between 1,000 and 3,000 IS 

fighters in the country, many of them recruited from the ranks of the 

Taliban. 12 

According to the US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, 

Russia is likely to use the threat of instability in Afghanistan to 

increase its involvement in Central Asian security affairs. 13 However, 

Moscow is resorting to dangerous tactics in an attempt to prevent the 

spread of IS influence in the North Caucasus—in 2015, it began 

backing the Taliban, presumed to be a rival of the IS. The Kremlin has 

reportedly reached out to elements of the Taliban and provided them 

with training, weapons and support. In the process, Russia has 

involved neighboring Tajikistan. This assistance made possible the 

September 2015 invasion of the city of Kunduz in northern 

Afghanistan, near the Tajik border—a multi-ethnic province where 

the Taliban has not been traditionally present. On the contrary, the 

province is home to the long-time opposition of the Taliban, the 

Northern Alliance. The invasion threatened the security of Tajikistan 

and the many Central Asian minorities living in that area of 

Afghanistan—Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens. 14 Russia’s security 

gambling is more likely to exacerbate the security problems of the 

Central Asian states than help resolve them.


Central Asian Front 

Along Russia’s central-eastern flank, the Central Asian states are 

increasingly wary of Kremlin policy and fear escalating political 

interference. They are also concerned about the impact of closer 

economic integration through the EEU, where the cost already 

outweighs the benefits to their own economies. If coupled with an 

undercutting of state sovereignty and calls to “protect” Russian 

ethnics in Kazakhstan and elsewhere, this could raise nationalist 

voices in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular and precipitate 

more direct conflict with Moscow in opposition to the latter’s 

integrationist agenda. 

Kazakhstan is the most vulnerable state, where Russian nationalists 

claim territory or view unification with Russia as a potentially viable 

solution. The government in Astana is unenthusiastic about 

Moscow’s annexation of Ukrainian territory for fear that it will set a 

precedent for the fracturing of Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, under 

Kremlin pressure Astana recognized the March 16, 2014 referendum 

in Crimea as the expression of the “will of the people,” and articulated 

its understanding for Moscow’s concerns about the rights of Russian 

nationals in Ukraine. In reality, by underscoring its state policy of 

tolerance and peaceful coexistence toward various ethnic minorities, 

Astana was trying to obtain assurances from Moscow that the position 

of the Russian minority will not be a trigger for aggression against 

Kazakhstan. 

Furthermore, the Kremlin may call upon Kazakhstan to provide 

“brotherly assistance” to a Greater Russia, possibly within the 

framework of the Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty 

Organization (CSTO), or threaten political repercussions. In the most 

far-reaching scenario, if state integrity comes under increasing 

question, some Central Asian states may break with Russia and appeal 

for international protection.


Uzbekistan has maintained substantial independence from Russia and 

has so far resisted overtures to join Russian-led organizations. By 

maneuvering in and out of the CSTO, rejecting the Customs Union, 

and seeking other regional arrangements, Tashkent has remained a 

wild card for Russia in Central Asia. However, after NATO’s 

departure from the region, Uzbekistan could be threatened by the 

expected return of militant Islamist groups currently operating in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Syria and Iraq. Moscow can use 

various methods to destabilize Uzbekistan, including by undermining 

the delicate ethnic balance in the Ferghana Valley, where the densely 

populated territories of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan come 

together in a complicated mesh. In addition, Moscow could 

encourage separatism in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan, 

in Uzbekistan’s northwest. Notably, calls for joining Kazakhstan or 

Russia were made by local nationalists there shortly after the 

annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, the Kremlin could incite local 

political grievances against the authoritarian system of governance 

and inspire increased penetration of more radical forms of Islam. The 

potential destabilization of Uzbekistan would have much wider 

resonance on regional stability. 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the weakest states in the region, are also 

the most dependent on Russia. With Russian military bases stationed 

in both countries and the US Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan closed 

down under pressure from the Kremlin, their independence is 

effectively challenged by Moscow. Furthermore, Russia’s military 

installations are also a threat to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The 

Kremlin has been courting Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to join the EEU 

by applying a combination of defense assistance and economic 

pressure, including threats to change its immigration policies and 

make them less favorable for Kyrgyz and Tajik labor migrants in 

Russia. The tactic was successful in the case of Kyrgyzstan, which 

joined the EEU in August 2015, but several months later, Bishkek 

realized that the economic crisis in Russia and Kazakhstan has spread 

to Kyrgyzstan and trade with other CIS members has actually


declined. 15 Russia has also backed Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan against 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in contentious disputes over regional 

water supplies. As a non-allied country, Turkmenistan has avoided 

pressure to join the Customs Union, the EEU or the CSTO and has 

been able to develop more intense relations with China. However, 

Turkmenistan still depends on Russia for the prospective Trans- 

Caspian natural gas pipeline that will transport Turkmen gas to 

Europe. 

Potential scenarios in Central Asia may include Kazakhstan leaving 

the EEU if the arrangement becomes a threat to its sovereignty; 

particularly since Western sanctions against Russia have heavily 

affected its economy. Kazakhstan may also accelerate its relocations 

of ethnic Kazakhs to northern Kazakhstan in an effort to thwart a 

potential Crimean Anschluss. In such a scenario, Russia may stage a 

Shadow War in Northern Kazakhstan to destabilize the country and 

seize territories. 

The events in Ukraine, coupled with the US military withdrawal from 

Central Asia, may have a profound impact on the geostrategic 

orientation of the five republics. Their multi-vector foreign policy was 

challenged and tested by the Crimean precedent. While Kyrgyzstan 

and Tajikistan seem to be firmly in Moscow’s grip (although Beijing 

is competing for influence in Kyrgyzstan), Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 

and Turkmenistan are increasing their cooperation with China on a 

bilateral basis and through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO). Moreover, this cooperation is no longer limited to the 

economic sphere, but also encompasses military security. This will 

have profound implications for the US, as containing China’s 

ambitions may become more difficult once Beijing establishes a 

bridgehead in Eurasia. 16 

After 9/11, Central Asia became a strategic arena for NATO’s military 

operations in Afghanistan, offering overflight passages for NATO 

airplanes, hosting military bases, and securing land routes for supplies


to NATO troops. Three of the Central Asian republics border 

Afghanistan (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan); the other 

two (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) have been instrumental in 

providing transportation routes to Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan and 

Uzbekistan also hosted US military bases for several years. On the 

other hand, the region has benefited from the US military presence, 

which provided short-term security and economic gains from 

transport fees, supply of commodities, and rent for military bases. 

However, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan changed the region’s 

strategic position vis-à-vis Washington and, with the dramatic 

developments in the Middle East, it essentially dropped from the list 

of strategic priorities for the US administration under President 

Obama. 

The New Silk Road vision for regional stabilization and development, 

promoted by the US administration in 2011, remained largely a paper 

initiative with little financial backing or political commitment. At its 

core was the development of transport infrastructure and encouraging 

international trade in the wider Central Asian region, including 

connecting Afghanistan with the rest of Central Asia and reviving the 

old Silk Roads running through Afghanistan. These Afghanistancentered 

long-term plans, however, had a very short window of 

opportunity to make groundbreaking progress while NATO troops 

were still providing security in Afghanistan. The window was missed, 

despite the promise of then–Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that “the 

United States would continue shifting its development efforts from 

short-term stabilization projects, largely as part of the military 

strategy, to longer-term sustainable development that focuses on 

spurring growth, creating jobs, invigorating the private sector, and 

integrating Afghanistan into the South and Central Asia economy.” 17 

While the US administration continues to issue official statements 

about the New Silk Road strategy, China has actually started building 

the roads and railways that will make it a reality. Yet, Afghanistan is 

not taking a central place in the transport network envisioned by 

Beijing’s Central Asia strategy, an omission that could have a negative


impact on efforts to stabilize the country and ensure regional security. 

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has implemented a 

neo-imperial strategy of dominance over the Central Asian states 

using diplomatic, political, security, and economic means, treating the 

region as a zone of its “privileged interests.” Moscow has also used the 

Russian minorities in Central Asia as a tool of influence, pressure, and 

leverage in domestic and regional politics. Russia’s goal is to remain 

the main security actor and military equipment supplier in the region, 

continue to be a transit country for oil exports to Europe, preserve (or 

install) pro-Moscow political regimes in the five Central Asian 

capitals, and closely coordinate their foreign and security policies. 

By involving Central Asian states in administrative, security and 

economic alliances such as the CIS, the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic 

Community (Eurasec), the Customs Union, and, most recently, the 

EEU, Russia has positioned itself as the main pole of power and 

influence in the region. However, with the economic rise of China and 

the establishment of the SCO, as a largely Chinese initiative, Moscow’s 

position in the region has been challenged. In fact, Moscow is 

gradually losing ground in Central Asia and reluctantly ceding control 

to Beijing, particularly in the economic arena. 

Although the SCO was created in 2001 as an economic and security 

body including Russia, China, and the four of the Central Asian states 

(Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), Moscow wants 

to make sure that the CSTO, in which China does not participate, 

remains the key Central Asian security network. 18 A Memorandum of 

Understanding signed between the CSTO and SCO, in 2007, enabled 

Moscow to present itself as the chief security coordinator in Central 

Asia. 19 China has restrained its sales of arms to Central Asian 

militaries and limited the SCO’s defense activities to fighting 

terrorism and other unconventional security threats through 

intelligence-sharing and law enforcement partnerships. 20 However, 

the competition between Russia and China in the security domain is


likely to continue, particularly as China has become the main 

economic power in the region. 

China sees Central Asia as a critical frontier for its military defense, 

energy security, trade expansion, and ethnic stability. 21 Beijing has 

been investing billions of dollars in the region’s new energy 

infrastructure, transportation routes, and major economic 

enterprises. Its economic expansion is embracing all five Central 

Asian republics in a regional economic integration mechanism, which 

was conducted quietly and mostly on a bilateral basis until President 

Xi Jinping announced in the fall of 2013 the Silk Road Economic Belt 

development plan for Central Asia, which forms part of the grand 

Chinese development strategy One Belt, One Road. 22 

These economic bonds are changing the region’s geopolitics, although 

China has been careful not to provoke conflict with Russia by openly 

exhibiting its military or political ambitions, given Moscow’s 

determination to pose as the leading power in Central Asia. Beijing’s 

cultural outreach, however, is intensifying, not least with the opening 

of numerous Confucius Institutes to teach Mandarin throughout the 

region. China is also providing aid to the region, including regular 

technical military assistance and training to all five governments, 

among them a police training grant to Ashgabat, television receivers 

for the residents of the Batken Oblast in Kyrgyzstan, and 52 busses 

along with musical instruments to the Kyrgyz military. China has 

reportedly allocated $4.4 million for large-scale scanning equipment 

at customs posts in Uzbekistan. 23 

Central Asian leaders resent Russia’s desire for political domination, 

while they both welcome and fear China’s economic might. As the 

region desperately needs foreign investment to boost economic 

growth, locate new markets, and curb dependence on Russia, it is also 

anxious about the political price of economic dependence from an 

expansive neighbor. Kazakhstani citizens, for example, staged protests 

in 2009 against their President’s intent to rent some of the country’s


arable land to China, because of fears that large Chinese labor 

migration to the scarcely populated Kazakhstan would change the 

country’s demographic makeup. 24 

China’s massive investments in Central Asia have undermined 

Russia’s influence, forcing the Kremlin to invent new economic and 

political schemes to retain its positions in the region, with the latest 

being the EEU, initiated by Putin in October 2011. Worried that the 

US was leaving Afghanistan and may no longer be an influential factor 

in the region, the Central Asian governments are forced to play a 

careful balancing act—they are backing Russian-led integration plans 

while accepting cash from China. The two international players, 

however, are becoming increasingly uneven, with China taking the 

position of economic dominance vis-à-vis Russia. 

The global economic crisis did not visibly impact the Chinese 

economy, which continued to grow by 8.7% in 2009 and 10.3% in 

2010, while the Russian economy contracted by a record 7.8% in 2009, 

and only managed to recover to a modest 4% growth in 2010. After 

the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Western sanctions, combined with 

a sharp decline in oil prices, have put the Russian economy in a longterm 

inferior position in relation to the Chinese economy. The 

slowdown of the Chinese economy is not projected to impact Beijing 

nearly as sharply as the plummeting oil prices affected Moscow. 

China’s gross domestic product (GDP) was forecast to grow by 6.8% 

in 2015, while Russia’s economy was expected to shrink by 3.8%, 

according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 25 

Since the economies of the Central Asian republics were developed as 

an integral part of the Soviet economic system, they remained heavily 

dependent on Russia for most of the last two decades. Oil and gas from 

the region has been flowing north to Russia, with Moscow dictating 

the energy prices. Russia has effectively used the Soviet infrastructure 

to take advantage of Caspian basin resources and retain its monopoly 

in providing energy to Europe. However, with rapid Chinese


investments in Central Asia’s energy sector and particularly in 

building new pipelines leading east and south to Chinese provinces, 

Russia’s privileged access to energy sources has been curtailed. Russia 

used to buy fossil fuels at low prices from the Caspian basin and resell 

them at much higher prices in Europe. The growing competition for 

energy in Central Asia ensured that Moscow has had to buy energy 

commodities at much higher prices, which reduced the margin of 

profit from resale significantly. As a result, Gazprom and Rosneft have 

focused on developing Russia’s own energy resources in the Arctic 

region and the Okhotsk Sea, but these plans are not going without 

problems. At the end of 2014, the US and the EU applied a new round 

of sanctions specifically targeting Russia’s Arctic energy sector by 

banning EU exports of sensitive technologies to Russia related to deep 

sea drilling, Arctic exploration, and shale oil extraction. 26 

At the same time, China’s ability to gain leverage internationally is 

growing. Using its immense financial reserves, Beijing purchases 

state-owned energy companies or invests in natural resources abroad 

to ensure its energy security and gain political leverage over host 

countries. 27 Pipelines have been built between China and Central 

Asia—a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, an oil pipeline from 

Kazakhstan, and a spur of the East Siberia–East Pacific Ocean oil 

pipeline from Russia. 

The Central Asia–China pipeline begins in the gas fields in 

Turkmenistan, transits through Uzbekistan and southern 

Kazakhstan, and reaches China’s Xinjiang province where it connects 

with China's second west–east gas pipeline. The second line starts 

from the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region and ends in Hong Kong, 

with a total length of 8,704 kilometers (km). The two pipelines allow 

Central Asian gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to reach the 

South China Sea. 

The new Central Asia–China gas pipeline has broken Russia’s 

monopoly over gas transport in the region. In 2011, China and


Turkmenistan signed a deal that will allow Turkmenistan to supply 

China with 65 bcm of natural gas per year, or over 50% more than the 

initially agreed 30 bcm per annum in 2007. 28 The deal challenged 

Russia’s position as the main buyer of Turkmen gas at the time and 

subsequently pushed out Russia from Turkmenistan’s gas market. 

China's imports of Turkmen gas were boosted to 40 bcm/a in 2015, as 

high as the volume previously bought by Gazprom. 29 In 2015, Russia 

ceased buying Turkmen gas due to price disputes, Gazprom’s nonpayment 

of received volumes, and the decreased gas demand in 

Europe. With this, Moscow’s influence in Ashgabat further 

diminished. 30 

China’s energy specialists estimate that by the year 2020, China’s 

annual consumption will reach 300 bcm and the country will need to 

import 80–120 bcm/a of gas. However, due to weakening economic 

growth in China, the growth of gas consumption has also dropped 

from 17.4% in 2013 to 8.9% in 2014. In 2015, the growth rate dipped 

to 3.7% over an 11-month period, as reported by the National 

Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 31 

Nevertheless, gas supplies from Central Asia are essential for China’s 

economy, which tries to replace polluting coal usage with clean gas, 

particularly since energy cooperation between China and Russia has 

not lived up to its potential. 32 In 2006, Gazprom and China National 

Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) agreed to build two gas pipelines from 

Siberia to China—one connecting Altai with China’s Central Asia 

pipeline, and the other from Sakhalin Island to the northeast of 

China—but both remained on paper until early 2011. Gazprom and 

CNPC subsequently agreed to make the western pipeline 

commercially operational by 2015, but postponed the eastern line 

until after 2015. China is concerned whether Russia will be able to 

deliver the agreed 68 bcm per year through these two pipelines, 

because Gazprom’s production in West Siberia is declining while the 

exploration in the Russian Far East and East Siberia requires 

enormous infrastructure investments that Gazprom has difficulties


undertaking. 33 

Although, in 2014, China and Russia finally signed a $400-billion deal 

for delivering 38 bcm of Russian gas to China for 30 years via the 

eastern line, the prospective Power of Siberia pipeline, Gazprom wants 

to postpone the $55-billion pipeline project, preferring to pump gas 

from existing fields through a shorter pipeline to Xinjiang instead. 34 

Financial pressures on Russia further delayed work on the pipeline, 

and by the end of 2015, only 50 miles out of the 2,465-mile-long 

pipeline were constructed. 35 

In 2009, China provided the SCO with a $10 billion loan to shore up 

members affected by the economic downturn. Chinese President Hu 

Jintao offered the same amount of loans again in 2012. 36 Additionally, 

it provided Kazakhstan with $10 billion in financing to overcome its 

banking crisis in 2009—partly in loans and partly through the 

acquisition of the majority of shares in Kazakhstan’s fourth-largest 

state oil company MangistauMunaiGaz. 37 The existence of the oil 

pipeline connecting the two countries and enabling the transport of 

oil by land makes the acquisition of extraction assets in Kazakhstan 

particularly important and strategic for Beijing, given China's reliance 

on maritime oil supplies from the Middle East via the Strait of 

Malacca. 

Subsequently, China proposed the establishment of the SCO 

Development Bank, whereby the bank’s authorized capital would be 

formed from proportional contributions by each participating 

country. This will ultimately mean that China would dominate the 

bank, since its economy is almost five times larger than Russia’s. 

Moscow, however, insists that the SCO bank is based on the Eurasian 

Development Bank, which already operates within the EEU and is 

controlled by Russia. 38 

Russia stepped up efforts to secure its economic and political 

dominance in Central Asia after the US withdrew most of its combat


forces from Afghanistan. Putin proclaimed his grand idea of a new 

Eurasian Union in early October 2011 shortly after announcing his 

intention to return to the presidency for a third mandate. In an article 

in the Russian newspaper Izvestia, Putin called for the creation of a 

Eurasian Union as “a powerful supranational union, capable of 

becoming one of the poles in the modern world and playing the role 

of an effective link between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific 

region.” 39 Putin denied any intent to recreate the Soviet Union, 

claiming “it would be naïve to try to restore or copy something that 

belongs to the past.” Instead, he stated “pragmatic” reasons for 

regional integration based on economic interests, market protection, 

and free trade. Putin insisted that only by acting together could the 

CIS countries be included among the global economic leaders 

participating in the decision-making process. He compared his 

proposed union to “other key players and regional structures,” such 

as the EU, the US, China, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

organization. 

The EEU is developed on the foundation of the Customs Union of 

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, which became operational in 2010, 

and the three countries’ Single Economic Space launched at the start 

of 2012. Putin wrote that the next stage would involve closer 

coordination of economic and currency policy, thus the establishment 

of an economic union. In November 2011, the three countries 

formally agreed to establish the EEU by 2015 that would become open 

to all former Soviet countries. The Eurasian Union remains one of 

Putin’s key priorities. There are four reasons to launch yet another 

post-Soviet integration project after failed attempts to revive the CIS 

and make Eurasec an effective multinational regulatory body: 

 

First, the extraordinary rise of China and its rapid economic 

expansion into Central Asia threatens to oust Russia in both the 

economic and security fields. A Eurasian Union can serve as a 

defense of Russia’s strategic interests by providing a platform for 

economic and political control over the Central Asian states, not


least through a common currency. The logical defense 

component of the union is the Russian-led CSTO. 

 

 

 

Second, Moscow seeks to reinforce its positions vis-à-vis the EU 

and NATO, hoping that a Eurasian Union would provide it with 

increased negotiating powers. Before annexing Crimea and 

inciting the war in eastern Ukraine, Russia aimed to achieve a 

special status toward NATO, influence the alliance’s decisions, 

and become its partner with designated responsibilities for 

Central Asia. It also attempted to establish a free trade regime with 

the EU, and specifically obtain a visa-free status for Russian 

citizens to travel to Europe. These plans were squashed by 

Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine, following the refusal of the new 

government in Kyiv to join the Eurasian Union and instead 

associate with the EU. 

Third, the Kremlin is determined to keep the West, and 

particularly the US, out of Central Asia. By assuming 

responsibility for the region, Russia is positioning itself to handle 

any regional security problems without interference from 

Western institutions. In particular, this was a response to the New 

Silk Road strategy of the US administration, which could have 

created conditions for regional integration in Central Asia, 

including Afghanistan, and the development of continental trade 

between Asia and Europe through Central Asia. While Russia 

certainly welcomes peace and security in Afghanistan, it sees 

Western-led economic development and investment effort in 

Central Asia as a direct threat to its strategic interests. 

Fourth, by pressing ahead with the EEU, Putin is consolidating 

his control over nationalist constituencies in Russia. Well before 

the seizure of Crimea, the Russian public was becoming 

increasingly nationalistic and neo-imperial. A 2011 study by the 

Pew Research Center unveiled that roughly half of Russians (48%) 

believe it natural for their country to have an empire, while only


33% disagreed. By contrast, during the final months of the USSR, 

only 37% considered a Russian empire to be natural. Half of 

Russians in 2011 also agreed with the statement “it is a great 

misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists.” 40 After 

Crimea’s annexation, nationalist tendencies further increased in 

Russia. 

The realization of the EEU project seemed unlikely at the time it was 

announced. 41 The legacy of the Russian Tsarist empire and the Soviet 

Union left bitter memories and resentment toward any kind of 

political domination by Moscow in most of the newly independent 

post-Soviet states. Although Putin stated that the EEU would be built 

on the principles of economic cooperation, its governing institutions 

are based in Moscow. The Customs Union commission is also located 

in Moscow, and most of its employees are Russian citizens. 

Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev was the only Central 

Asian leader endorsing Putin’s proposal. He has promoted the idea of 

a Eurasian Union since the 1990s, but the Kazakhstani president has 

never envisioned a union dominated by Russia or used by Moscow to 

advance its own foreign policy and security agendas. Tensions 

between the founding members of the Customs Union and Eurasian 

Economic Union were obvious from the beginning. 42 

Cooperation has proven difficult within other regional formats, none 

of which includes all the former Soviet republics. The newly 

independent states have different foreign policy priorities, some 

preferring to develop cooperative relations with Europe and NATO, 

while others trade more with the East than with each other. The EU 

has also strengthened its eastward outreach and could offer 

considerable economic incentives to the former Soviet republics. For 

example, the current EU energy policy would benefit Turkmenistan 

both economically and politically, allowing for alternative export 

routes for Turkmen gas and furthering independence from Russian 

exports.


Most importantly, for the EEU to be successful, Moscow needs 

significant resources, which it is not in a position to provide. The 

structure of its rent-seeking economy, which relies essentially on high 

prices of energy supplies, cannot sustain an integration effort of the 

magnitude of the EU, particularly when the energy prices collapse. 

Moreover, a Russia-led grand regional integration project seems 

doomed if juxtaposed against the ongoing disintegration processes 

within the Russian Federation itself. 

Militarily, until the fall of 2015, Russia was planning to strengthen its 

military positions in Central Asia, particularly boosting its military 

presence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 43 In September 2011, Moscow 

achieved consent from Dushanbe to extend the agreement on hosting 

its military base in Tajikistan by 49 years. 44 The Russian base in 

Tajikistan was established in 2005 as the successor to the former 201 st 

Motorized Rifle Division from the Soviet period. The country hosts 

the second-largest foreign Russian military base (5,000–7,000 troops.) 

At the CIS summit in October 2015, Russia announced plans to 

increase its troops in Tajikistan to 9,000. Surprisingly however, two 

months later Moscow announced that it was planning to downgrade 

its military base in Tajikistan to a brigade. Analysts explain the 

decision with Russia’s troubled economy and tensions between 

Russian troops and the local population. 45 

Moscow wanted to install Russian border guards on the Tajikistan– 

Afghanistan border, but the Tajik government turned down the offer. 

Russia has criticized Tajikistan for its incapacity to control drug 

smuggling from Afghanistan. Reportedly, roughly 95 metric tons of 

heroin pass through Central Asia from Afghanistan annually and only 

5 metric tons are intercepted. 46 Russia is concerned about the import 

of drugs to its own territory, as most of them are sold on the Russian 

market. It is the second largest drug consumer in the world, with 

estimated annual consumption of 70 metric tons of heroin and 58 

metric tons of opium in 2008. Demand in the Russian Federation has 

not changed since then, although opium production in Afghanistan


has increased in 2014, while seized quantities in Central Asia have 

decreased. 47 

The Kremlin pressed Kyrgyzstan to sign a 49-year lease on the Kant 

airbase. Moscow also proposed to merge its five military facilities in 

Kyrgyzstan into a single base to be deployed on gratis terms for 49 

years with the possibility of a 25-year extension. Kyrgyz President 

Almazbek Atambayev agreed in exchange for a $30 million loan from 

Russia and a $256 million loan from the Eurasec anti-crisis fund, as 

well as $180 million in loan forgiveness from Russia. In 2011, 

Kyrgyzstan canceled any lease payments on the airbase in exchange 

for lower cost fuel imports from Russia. With the help of Eurasec 

money, Russia also obtained other lucrative deals. Gazprom gained 

control over Kyrgyzstan’s state gas company; a Gazprom-controlled 

joint venture was supplying 50% of the fuel needed by the US airbase 

in Manas, and Russia was given 49% of the Dastan torpedo plant. 48 

Russia’s plans to renew by 2016 the fleet of its airbase at Kant, 

Kyrgyzstan, may also be put off for financial reasons, although 

Moscow has already sent a dozen new and modified Su-25 fighter jets 

to replace older planes and has been upgrading other equipment at 

the bases—trucks, armored personnel carriers, and drones. 49 

Russia’s biggest demand was the closure of the US Transit Center at 

Manas International airport, the last large US Air Force base in 

Central Asia. Manas served as a key transit point for American troops 

and military supplies to Afghanistan. Immediately after his election 

on October 30, 2011, Atambayev declared that the US base needed to 

close by 2014, the deadline for the US troop withdrawal from 

Afghanistan. He claimed that its presence on Kyrgyz soil placed the 

country at risk of retaliatory strikes from those in conflict with 

Washington. Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov 

added that further decisions on the future of the American base would 

only be made while taking into account the interests of CSTO 

partners. A Russian government source told Kommersant newspaper


that Atambayev started fulfilling his pre-election promises to Moscow 

after the Kremlin helped him win the presidency. 50 

Both the CSTO and the SCO have been gearing up for more intensive 

involvement in Central Asia after NATO leaves Afghanistan. Notably, 

the CSTO military drills “Tsentr 2011” held in Tajikistan on 

September 19–27, 2011, focused not only on counter-terrorism, but 

also on the prevention of possible uprisings similar to those in the 

Middle East and North Africa. The Russian Chief of the General Staff 

Nikolai Makarov admitted that the exercises were designed to respond 

to mass unrest and instability similar to that seen in Libya and Syria, 

and to a potential spillover from Afghanistan. 51 The Kremlin has been 

propping up authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, mostly because 

limited democratization contributes to isolating these countries from 

the West and keeps them in a tighter orbit around Russia. In the 

aftermath of the Arab Spring and earlier colored revolutions, and 

particularly after the Euro Maidan in Kyiv, Russia is making every 

effort to stall any possibility for democratic changes in the region. 

The relationship between the CSTO and the SCO is complicated since 

the security interests of their leading countries differ on several key 

points and often compete. Russia uses both security alliances to 

achieve two principle objectives in strengthening its strategic presence 

in Central Asia: keep the US out of the region and limit China’s 

growing power. The Kremlin sees the SCO as a loose military alliance 

designed to combat any penetration of the area by Western powers, 

especially the US. Furthermore, Russia uses the SCO as a platform to 

counter NATO’s eastward expansion and block US plans for antiballistic 

missile systems in Europe and Asia. 

China’s security concerns remain focused on its restive western 

province of Xinjiang, US policy toward Taiwan, and energy security. 

China is also interested in limiting US influence in the region for fear 

of intervention in internal separatist conflicts. However, China’s 

primary concern during the last decade has been related to energy


demands for its growing economy. As Beijing worries about the 

possible disruption of its maritime energy imports from the Middle 

East, it has intensified efforts to secure access to Central Asia’s 

hydrocarbon resources. By positioning the SCO as an economic 

cooperation organization and focusing on trade and investment, 

China has used it as an instrument for economic expansion. As a 

result, Beijing has managed to achieve its major energy security 

objective and simultaneously increase its influence in the region. 

From the outside, it seems that China and Russia are balancing each 

other within the SCO since China is stronger economically, while 

Russia has greater political resources. But the rivalry for influence 

between them is escalating while disagreements have taken place on 

more than one issue. 

Even before the annexation of Crimea, the Russian invasion of 

Georgia and subsequent recognition of the independence of the 

separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was a major 

dividing point in Russia’s relations with all SCO members, but 

particularly with China. Respect for national sovereignty and noninterference 

in internal affairs of other states are two of the SCO 

principles that China firmly supports, mostly because of internal 

secessionist movements. Russia’s military intervention in support of 

the two Georgian breakaway regions was unacceptable to Beijing as is 

Moscow’s continuing military intervention in Ukraine. 52 In addition, 

Moscow has supported India for full SCO membership as a means of 

countering growing Chinese influence, while Beijing has encouraged 

its closest South Asian partner, Pakistan, to apply to join the group. 

Apart from animosities between India and Pakistan and the risks 

associated with having them both in the same organization, China 

also views India as its rival and competitor in Central Asia. Both 

countries were eventually admitted to the organization in 2015. 

The Russian diaspora is a critical factor in Moscow’s neo-imperial 

ambitions, as evidenced in Crimea and Donbas. However, Russia is


rapidly losing ground in the demographic make-up of Central Asia: 

the Russian minority has steeply declined since the collapse of the 

Soviet Union and continues to shrink. The Russian population in the 

five Central Asian countries is estimated to have dropped from 9.5 

million in 1989 to 4.7–4.8 million in 2015. Although the largest wave 

of migration to Russia took place in the first decade of independence, 

when an estimated 3.3 million Russians left Central Asia, the flow of 

emigrants has not ceased. For example, in the period 2009–2015, an 

average of 20,000 Russians have left Kazakhstan each year and about 

10,000 left Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the remaining Russian 

communities consist overwhelmingly of aging population groups 

with much higher death rates than those of the titular populations. As 

a result, Russians in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are likely to be 

extinct in the next generation. 53 

The exodus of Russians from Central Asia is shrinking the Russian 

ethnic and linguistic space in the region, directly threatening Putin’s 

“Russian world” project. Population data indicates that the Russian 

minorities are currently very small in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan 

and proportionately insignificant in Uzbekistan. However, more than 

three quarters of the region’s Russians (3.7 million) live in 

Kazakhstan, making them an important demographic, economic and 

political factor in that country. 

Although public attitudes toward Russians in Central Asia are 

generally friendly, the Russian minorities are completely excluded 

from the local clan-based patronage networks that are crucial for 

access to resources and political power. 54 In addition, legal provisions 

for greater political representation of large national minorities are 

rarely made, while knowledge of the majority language is often 

required for access to government jobs. The unwillingness of many 

Russians to learn the state languages limits their competiveness for 

public sector employment. Moscow can exploit minority grievances 

resulting from both factors—the Russian diaspora’s exclusion from 

patronage networks and its limited access to government jobs.


In fact, Moscow’s propaganda about the Ukrainian events is already 

sowing fears among the Russians in Central Asia. Both the Russian 

media and diplomatic missions are portraying the new government in 

Kyiv as nationalistic and discriminatory against minorities. Not 

surprisingly, the annexation of Crimea gave rise to anti-Russian 

sentiment in a number of Central Asian countries. Uncertain about 

political transitions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the local Russians 

are beginning to worry about their lives if more nationalistic leaders 

replace the current ones. 

Kazakhstan 

Three critical factors make the largest Central Asian country, 

Kazakhstan, acutely vulnerable to Russian pressure: the sizable 

Russian minority representing one fifth of Kazakhstan’s population 

and concentrated mostly in the northern and eastern provinces; the 

long border with Russia stretching 7,644 kilometers (4,749 miles); and 

the extensive economic connections between the two countries, 

including through the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) and the 

Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). 

However, there are also a number of elements that prevent Moscow 

from exercising decisive influence on Astana: among them, 

Kazakhstan’s enormous size and vast energy resources; extensive 

Western investments in the energy sector and other industries; the 

country’s multi-vector foreign policy and rising international profile; 

its strong relations with Turkey and the Islamic world; its liberal 

policy on minorities and minority languages, including Russian; and 

the ability of Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev to keep 

Moscow at bay for the last 25 years. 

There are many unknowns about the future political succession in 

Kazakhstan and whether the next leader will be able to balance


internal and external pressures to preserve the country’s sovereignty. 

Some Russian nationalists have speculated that a period of political 

transition and uncertainty would present a chance for Russia to seize 

territories in northern Kazakhstan. 

55 

Nevertheless, the main 

deterrence to potential aggression by Moscow remains China, which 

is expanding its economic power to Central Asia through Kazakhstan. 

Beijing needs a stable and secure Central Asia to stabilize its own 

restless Xinjiang province, which borders the region, and boost trade 

with Europe. This is why some suggestions that Beijing could be 

drawn into a potential Moscow plot to partition Kazakhstan between 

Russia and China are illogical and ungrounded. 56 On the contrary, one 

can argue that China will seek to avoid another resentful Muslim 

population in a territory next to Xinjiang. Unlike Russia, which has 

used military intervention in Ukraine and Georgia in an attempt to 

change their political direction, China has been pursuing influence in 

Central Asia primarily through economic means. 

The Kazakhstan–China border crossing point of Khorgos has become 

the grand entrance to Central Asia of China’s Silk Road Economic 

Belt. This 7 th -century stop for Silk Road merchants, called “the pearl” 

on the Silk Road Economic Belt, is hosting one of the largest free 

economic zones in the region. As China rapidly develops its side of 

the free economic zone, Kazakhstan is planning to catch up in 2016. 

Astana hurries to diversify trade relations with countries outside the 

EEU, including China, as heavy dependence on sanctions-hit Russia 

has proven economically devastating. 57 

By annexing Crimea and staging a covert military intervention in 

eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin set a precedent by violating the 1994 

Budapest Memorandum. This memorandum concerned not only 

Ukraine, but also Kazakhstan and Belarus. In 1994, Russia, the US and 

the UK provided security assurances for the territorial integrity and 

political independence of all three countries in exchange for 

surrendering their Soviet-era nuclear stockpiles. When the Soviet 

Union collapsed in December 1991, Kazakhstan found itself as the


fourth-largest nuclear arsenal country in the world after Russia, the 

US and Ukraine. It inherited 1,410 nuclear warheads and the 

Semipalatinsk nuclear weapons test site. By April 1995, Kazakhstan 

sent its nuclear warhead inventory to Russia, and by 2000, it destroyed 

the nuclear testing infrastructure at Semipalatinsk. 58 Approximately 

600 kg (1,322 pounds) of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) was removed to the US from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in 1994 

under a joint US-Kazakh operation known as Project Sapphire. 59 The 

country has prided itself for not only getting rid of its nuclear 

weapons, but also starting an international campaign to end nuclear 

testing around the world. 60 

Russia’s attack on Ukraine in March 2014 sent shock waves 

throughout Kazakhstan, stirring a discussion among the public and in 

the media whether the country is next on Russia’s hit list. 61 The initial 

official reaction was restrained out of concern that Russia could 

replicate the Crimean scenario in Kazakhstan, but it also exposed 

Astana’s hesitation to oppose its powerful northern neighbor. Official 

statements were confusing, revealing distress and indicating possible 

pressure by Kremlin. For example, in a telephone conversation on 

March 10, 2014, with US President Barak Obama, President 

Nazarbayev “agreed on the importance of upholding principles of 

sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 62 But in a subsequent phone call 

with Russian President Putin on the same day, Nazarbayev expressed 

“understanding of Russia’s position on protecting the rights of 

national minorities in Ukraine, as well as its own security.” 63 

At the Nuclear Security Summit on March 25, 2014, in The Hague, 

Nazarbayev insisted that both the West and Russia should tone down 

the confrontational rhetoric, take the threat of sanctions off the table, 

and try to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. His remarks were 

perceived as strong support for Russia, as he essentially blamed the 

new leadership in Kyiv for triggering the crisis. His statements that “a 

constitutional coup d’état” had taken place in Kyiv and there had been 

“discrimination against minority rights” in Ukraine were perceived as


justification for Moscow’s actions in Crimea and immediately 

protested by Kyiv. 64 A week earlier, the Ukrainian government 

protested the official statement of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, which also stated: “The referendum held in Crimea is seen in 

Kazakhstan as a free expression of [the] will of the Autonomous 

Republic’s population while the decision of the Russian Federation 

under the existing circumstances is regarded with understanding.” 65 

Subsequently, Kazakhstan abstained from voting on the UN 

resolution that rendered the Crimean referendum invalid on March 

28, 2014. 

Despite the impression of staunch loyalty to Moscow, Astana’s 

reaction was wrongly interpreted as an endorsement of Russia’s 

aggression in Ukraine. As Almaty-based analyst Aidos Sarym pointed 

out, Kazakhstan’s position was “dictated not so much by creed as by 

fear… Events in Crimea are a possible scenario for Kazakhstan too.” 66 

The country has the largest Russian minority in the region, estimated 

at 3.68 million in 2014, or 21.5% of the total population. 67 This figure 

is calculated to be over three quarters of the total Russian population 

remaining in the five Central Asian states. If Russia has political 

leverage through its diaspora in any Central Asian country, this is 

undoubtedly Kazakhstan. 

The fear of repetition of the Crimean events was reinforced by an 

earlier appeal of Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky 

for the creation of a “Central Asian Federal Region” within the 

Russian Federation, with its capital in “Vernyi,” the Tsarist Russian 

name of Almaty. The statement was made at a public meeting in 

Moscow, on February 23, 2014, just as Russian troops started 

appearing in Crimea. A few days earlier, controversial Russian writer 

and leader of the banned National Bolshevik Party, Eduard Limonov, 

also suggested that Russia should annex regions in eastern Ukraine 

and northern Kazakhstan: “I hope Russia will get hold of some part of 

Ukraine if we don’t waste time. And will get hold of northern regions


of Kazakhstan as well,” Limonov wrote on his Facebook page, 

provoking a diplomatic note of protest from Astana. 68 

Occasional calls by Russian nationalists for secession of the northern 

regions of Kazakhstan are not new. In 1990, former Soviet dissident 

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who became a fervent Russian nationalist 

after the Soviet collapse, called for the transfer of northern Kazakhstan 

to Russia. Almaty-born Vladimir Zhirinovsky was banned from 

entering Kazakhstan for making similar statements in 2005. There was 

also an alleged attempt by Russian separatists to seize an area in 

Kazakhstan in late 1999 and early 2000, which ended with a lengthy 

prison sentence for the main instigator, Moscow resident Victor 

Kazimirchuk. His small group called “Rus’’ is believed to have planned 

to take over the administration of Kazakhstan's northeastern city of 

Oskemen in the East Kazakhstan region, bordering Russia, declare it 

Russian territory, and appeal to Moscow to incorporate the area into 

the Russian Federation. Kazimirchuk claimed that he had support 

from both the Russian population in Kazakhstan and from the 

Russian government. Among the 22 individuals arrested and tried for 

the plot, 12 were Russian citizens. 69 

The Russian minority in Kazakhstan was the only one in Central Asia 

that managed to organize itself after independence. The local branch 

of the Russian nationalist organization “Yedinstvo” was established in 

1989 when the Kazakh language, native to only 40% of the population 

at the time, was proclaimed the state language: “the language for state 

management, legislation, legal proceedings and office work, 

functioning in all spheres of social relations in the entire territory of 

the state.” 70 Although the Russian language, spoken by more than half 

of the population at the time, was relegated to a secondary status, the 

1995 constitution stipulated that it should be officially used on an 

equal footing with Kazakh. 71 Considered the language of international 

and intercultural communication, Russian still has a special status in 

the country, where the state is obliged to promote conditions for the 

study and development of the languages of the people of Kazakhstan. 72


The language laws also require proficiency in Kazakh for all public 

sector jobs and university admissions. Candidates for elected 

positions are mandated to pass a Kazakh-language proficiency test 

before running in an election. The Russian population reacted 

negatively to losing its privileged status maintained under the Soviets, 

feeling that the new language policies would threaten the preservation 

of their culture and they would be gradually assimilated. In response 

to the language law, “Yedinstvo” campaigned for the annexation of 

Kazakhstan’s northern regions by the Russian Federation. When 

ethnic Russians started relocating to Russia en mass, another 

organization, the Association of Slavic Movements of Kazakhstan 

(LAD), urged them not to leave Kazakhstan, because the Russian 

minority would lose political relevance. 73 

The Cossacks in Kazakhstan, who consider themselves a distinct 

ethnic group, also organized and demanded territorial secession of 

Kazakhstan’s northern regions in the early 1990s, saying they did not 

recognize the border between Russia and Kazakhstan. 74 The Cossacks 

have been angered by the fact that Kazakhstan’s government 

considers them a sociopolitical grouping, denying their claim to 

separate cultural identity and national self-determination. Their 

status in Kazakhstan is unlike that of their brethren in Russia, where 

the state has supported a cultural revival of Cossack communities. 75 

However, while Russian Cossacks have taken part in most armed 

conflicts in Eurasia, including the wars in Transnistria, Abkhazia, 

South Ossetia, Chechnya and eastern Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s Cossacks 

have evidently refused to fight on the side of the separatists in eastern 

Ukraine. They adamantly refuted Russian propaganda claims that 

Cossacks from eastern Kazakhstan had volunteered to join the 

“defenders” of Russian-speakers in the Donbas. The Kazakh media 

also harshly criticized Russian entities, such as the Eurasian Youth 

Movement, for involvement in Kazakhstan’s domestic affairs. 76


Astana’s policy of supporting peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence 

during the past 20 years has proven effective in integrating the 

Cossacks in the current political system through the Assembly of 

People of Kazakhstan, a consultative body chaired by President 

Nazarbayev. The assembly is a platform for inter-ethnic dialogue and 

cooperation, which also elects nine representatives of minorities to 

serve as members of Kazakhstan’s parliament, the Majilis. In May 

2013, the Astana-based World Union of Cossack Atamans, whose aim 

is “the recognition of the genocide against the Cossacks in 

revolutionary Russia,” even suggested Nazarbayev as a candidate for 

the Nobel Peace Prize. Nazarbayev has been pronounced the 

Honorary Supreme Ataman of Kazakhstan’s Cossacks. 77 

The large Russian population has been a concern for Kazakhstan’s 

leadership, which had to balance the interests of the minorities with 

its strategy of promoting the Kazakh language and culture to reclaim 

Kazakh national identity after two centuries under Russian and Soviet 

rule. The task was extremely challenging, given that the Kazakhs were 

not a majority in their own country at the time. President Nazarbayev 

had to tread cautiously on the domestic arena while pacifying Moscow 

when problems occurred. But he did not hesitate to strongly react in 

1993 over remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev that Moscow 

would act tough if necessary to protect the rights of Russians in former 

Soviet republics. “When someone talks about the protection of 

Russians not in Russia but in Kazakhstan, I recall the times of Hitler, 

who started with protecting the Sudeten Germans,” he famously said 

in an interview with Interfax. 78 

From the start, Nazarbayev rejected two options: federalization of the 

country to provide for more minority autonomy and double 

citizenship. Both would have proven risky, especially when assessing 

these options in the light of Crimea and Donbas. Eventually, the 

Russian question did not lead to a security crisis or devastating 

destabilization of the country, despite the low starting point of interethnic 

relations back in the 1990s. The government’s inter-ethnic


policies promoting tolerance and coexistence helped protect the 

cultural and language rights not only of the Russian population, but 

also those of the remaining 130 ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. 

Furthermore, demographic numbers changed dramatically in the 

years after independence, due to Russian emigration, repatriation of 

almost one million Oralmans (ethnic Kazakhs from neighboring 

countries), and relocation of ethnic Kazakhs to the northern part of 

the country, as well as high birth rates among Kazakhs. The exodus of 

mostly urban and better-educated Russians contributed to the relative 

demobilization of the Russian community and a gradual depoliticization 

of the “Russian question.” Moreover, Moscow preferred 

not to risk upsetting its relations with Astana by adopting a more 

active position in protecting its diaspora. 79 Among the factors for 

upholding Kazakhstan’s statehood in the northern parts of the 

country was also the critical political decision of President Nazarbayev 

to move the state capital from the southern city of Almaty to Akmola 

(now Astana) in the north. 

Russians and Russian speakers have historically populated 

Kazakhstan’s northern and eastern provinces. In 2014, Russians alone 

accounted for 49.9% of the population in North Kazakhstan, 42.1% in 

Kostanay, 34.5% in Akmola, 37.2% in Pavlodar, and 38% in East 

Kazakhstan. 80 Remarkably, however, Russians are no longer a 

majority in any of Kazakhstan’s provinces and their numbers have 

dramatically declined nationwide. 

While in 1989, the ethnic Kazakhs were almost equal in numbers to 

ethnic Russians, now the Kazakh population is three times larger. The 

share of the Russian minority has dropped nationwide from 38% in 

1989 to 21.5% in 2014. The share of Kazakhs, on the other hand, has 

increased dramatically to 65.5%. These demographic changes are not 

only caused by emigration of many Russians to the Russian 

Federation, they are also due to significantly higher birth rates and 

much lower death rates among the Kazakh population. The 2009


census showed that the birth rate of the Russian population was 12.7 

per 1,000, while that of the Kazakh population was more than double, 

at 27 per 1,000. Furthermore, the death rates of the Russian minority 

were considerably higher than those of the ethnic Kazakhs—15.3 and 

6.6 per 1,000, respectively—indicating that the Russian population is 

also aging. 81 

In the long run, these demographic tendencies, combined with the 

dwindling political aspirations of the remaining Russians, make a 

Crimean or Donbas scenario less likely in Kazakhstan. The short-term 

prospects, however, are uncertain, as the Russian minority is still very 

large, at 3.7 million. A minority of 20% or more requires 

comprehensive provisions for securing adequate political 

representation, which are not as extensive in Kazakhstan as the laws 

on protecting language and culture. 82 Although Kazakhstan’s 

Russians generally recognize and appreciate the central government’s 

efforts to preserve inter-ethnic peace, many are still unhappy with 

their limited political representation due to the Kazakh-language 

proficiency requirement for access to government jobs and 

universities. The unwillingness of Russians to learn the Kazakh 

language has been attributed as the main reason for inter-ethnic 

tensions since the adoption of the language laws, but it has not been 

perceived as a serious threat to inter-ethnic peace. 

The annexation of Crimea changed the inter-ethnic discourse in the 

country. The events in Ukraine altered the mood among Kazakhs, 

giving rise to nationalist and anti-Russian sentiments. At the same 

time, the Russian minority became nervous over Russian state-media 

coverage of the conflict in Ukraine, which portrayed the new 

government in Kyiv as nationalist and even fascist. Russian state 

propaganda readily claims that bloodthirsty nationalists intent on 

killing ethnic Russians have taken over in Ukraine. Although after 

Crimea, Kazakhstan adopted stricter laws to curb nationalism of any 

kind and introduced harsher punishment for expressing separatist 

sentiment, the Russian minority feels uneasy about its future,


particularly when power is transferred from the current president to 

another leader. They are unsure whether under a different leadership 

Astana would continue its close relations with Moscow and uphold its 

current tolerant policies toward Russians. Some Russian communities 

in Kazakhstan have already turned to the Kremlin to provide 

assistance in support of Russian language and culture. 83 

Yet, even at this stage, inter-ethnic relations are unlikely to cause 

major turmoil unless Moscow stirs trouble within the Russian 

communities. Nonetheless, ethnic grievances tend to become 

politicized when economic and social conditions worsen or a major 

political breakdown occurs. In this respect, Kazakhstan is in a very 

risky position, as the country is going through major economic and 

financial crises due largely to a sharp decline in oil prices and Western 

sanctions against Russia. On the one hand, Kazakhstan’s economy is 

overwhelmingly dependent on the export of oil and other raw 

commodities; most of those prices plummeted in 2014–2015. On the 

other hand, its non-oil export market is heavily dependent on Russia 

and the Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union, whose 

purchasing ability was steeply diminished in the last two years. 

The third risk factor is potential political instability in the country as 

a result of economic and social problems, particularly as many 

Kazakhstani citizens lost their savings to currency devaluation, mainly 

caused by the crash of the Russian ruble. Although President 

Nazarbayev was reelected in 2015 and the ruling party won the general 

elections in 2016, the question of succession of the aging president will 

only become more acute with every passing year. Putin’s controversial 

remarks before the 2014 Seliger Youth Forum struck a sensitive cord 

in Kazakhstan. Answering a question about growing Kazakh 

nationalism and whether to expect a Ukrainian scenario in 

Kazakhstan if Nazarbayev leaves office, Putin said that Nazarbayev 

“created a state on a territory where no state had ever existed. The 

Kazakhs had never had statehood—he created it. In this sense, he is a 

unique person for the former Soviet space and for Kazakhstan too.” 84


The statement was perceived as condescending of Kazakhstan’s 

heritage, which has been a critical tool for nation building in the past 

two decades. Furthermore, the remarks signaled that Kazakhstan’s 

sovereignty could be challenged once Nazarbayev leaves office, as he 

has been the main factor in containing Kazakh nationalism. In 

response, Kazakhstan launched in 2015 a nationwide campaign to 

celebrate its 550 years of statehood, marking the creation of the first 

Kazakh khanate by the khans Kerey and Zhanibek. 85 

Russia’s actions in Ukraine chilled the traditionally warm relations 

between Moscow and Astana, bringing them to their lowest point in 

the summer and fall of 2014. Emboldened by its annexation of 

Crimea, Moscow became more assertive in dictating the terms of the 

impending Eurasian Economic Union. President Nazarbayev, who 

invented the idea of a Eurasian Union in 1995, has always opposed 

Russian proposals to make this union political as well as financial 

(including a common currency and bank system), fearing the loss of 

sovereignty for his country. During the Minsk Summit in October 

2013, he sharply criticized “unjustified proposals to increase the 

European Economic Commission’s mandate to form a common 

financial market and create new supra-national structures.” 86 A few 

months before the EEU came into effect, Nazarbayev reminded Russia 

that Kazakhstan could pull out of the union if its sovereignty is 

threatened. “Kazakhstan will not be part of organizations that pose a 

threat to our independence. Our independence is our dearest treasure, 

which our grandfathers fought for. First of all, we will never surrender 

it to someone, and secondly, we will do our best to protect it,” he said 

in an interview for Khabar TV. 87 This was also a message intended to 

calm down Kazakh nationalists who have taken an anti-EEU position, 

particularly in the wake of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the 

following sharp contraction of the Russian economy. 

While for Russia the EEU is mainly a geopolitical project, Kazakhstan 

seeks a purely economic merger that does not preclude alternative 

political alliances. Kazakhstani officials succeeded in including in the


operating principles of the EEU that the union will operate without 

interfering with the political systems of its member states. 88 This was 

a major victory for Astana, along with the make-up of the Eurasian 

Economic Commission that has now an equal number of 

representatives from each country and operates on a consensus 

principle. 

The first year of the EEU, however, was a rocky one. None of the 

benefits promised with the establishment of the EEU materialized in 

2015. On the contrary, internal trade between the EEU members 

actually declined by 36% in the first three months of 2015, compared 

to the same period the previous year. Trade between Kazakhstan and 

the EEU declined by 21% in the first quarter of 2015. 89 This trend 

continued and the trade shrinkage with EEU countries reached 27.7% 

during January–November 2015, according to the statistics 

department of Kazakhstan's Economics Ministry. 

In addition, a trade war unfolded between Russia and Kazakhstan 

with frequent seizures of tons of beef, poultry, milk and chocolate 

coming from Russia, and cheese and other dairy products coming 

from Kazakhstan. Behind mutual accusations of not meeting food 

standards was actually the 47% devaluation of the Russian ruble 

against the Kazakh tenge in 2014 alone. The ruble inflation made 

Russian goods extremely cheap on the Kazakh market, thus pushing 

local producers out. Kazakhstan’s exports, on the other hand, became 

expensive for the markets in Russia, Belarus and Armenia, leading to 

a sharp decline in exports. 90 

The collapse of the Russian ruble caused the devaluation of the 

Kazakhstani tenge. The first sharp devaluation of the tenge—by 19% 

in February 2014—came as a result of Russian ruble devaluation the 

previous year by 8%. Kazakhstan buys from Russia 38% of its 

imported goods. The National Bank of Kazakhstan acted without 

warning causing shock and anger among Kazakh citizens who held 

savings in tenge and loans in dollars. Although the government


announced it would spend one trillion tenge ($5.4 billion) from the 

National Welfare Fund to stimulate the economy, this measure was a 

drop in the ocean. 91 

By the end of 2014, foreign currency holdings skyrocketed in 

Kazakhstan, prompting the government to urge state companies to 

shift their holdings from dollars into the national currency. But in 

2015, some experts estimated that 90% of retail deposits were still held 

in foreign currencies. The National Bank reported in January 2015 

that non-performing loans made up 23.55% of total loans 

nationwide. 92 The share of non-performing loans had dropped from 

31.4% (worth $22.7 billion) the previous year, but this reduction failed 

to approach the National Bank’s target of cutting them by half in a 

year. 93 

Kazakhstan’s GDP growth slowed from 4.1% during the first nine 

months of 2014 to an estimated 1% during the same period in 2015, 

according to the World Bank. The scope of the crisis was comparable 

to the effects of the 2009 global economic crisis in the country—trade 

volumes shrank to the same levels as in 2009 and GDP growth 

dropped again to about 1%. In addition, foreign direct investment 

(FDI) inflows declined and the overall external balance deteriorated, 

putting downward pressure on the tenge. 94 

Kazakhstan’s economy was one of the hardest-hit in Eurasia by 

rapidly falling oil prices. According to the U.S. Energy Information 

Administration, Kazakhstan exported about 1.73 million barrels of oil 

per day in 2015, twice as much as Azerbaijan. 95 In 2014, the country’s 

oil exports accounted for 69% of total exports, while petroleum 

products and natural gas constituted 6% of exports; three quarters of 

all exports are tied in some way to oil production. Oil revenues 

accounted for 60% of Kazakhstan’s budget and made up 33% of its 

GDP. 96 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 

Kazakhstan cannot cover government spending at oil prices below $58 

per barrel, as projected in 2015. 97 As a result of the devastating effect


of declining global oil prices, Bloomberg placed Kazakhstan in the 

world’s top ten worst performing economies, with reduced growth 

forecasts that plunged to just 1.2% in mid-2015 (from 10% in 2000– 

2007). Total export revenue declined by about 35%, leading to budget 

revisions three times: in October 2014, the budget was redrawn to 

assume an oil price of $80 per barrel, then in early 2015—at $50 per 

barrel, and again at the end of 2015, when oil prices dropped to under 

$40. The World Bank projects Kazakhstan’s economy will grow by 

barely 1% in 2016, while the Economist Intelligence Unit now has the 

country falling into recession. 98 

Russia has been traditionally a major trade partner for Kazakhstan. 

Although it does not hold first place in total trade volumes (the EU 

has the largest share), Russia is the main destination for Kazakhstan’s 

non-oil exports. According to the Kazakhstani government, the 

average annual volume of trade between the two countries is about 

$21 billion. Russian companies are involved in the development of 

Kazakhstan’s largest hydrocarbon deposits, but Western oil majors 

have the leading investments in the sector. Nevertheless, more than 

5,600 enterprises in the country actively work with Russian capital. 99 

On the foreign policy front, the sharp confrontation between Russia 

and the West resulting from Moscow’s actions in Ukraine initially 

challenged Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. East-West 

polarization was again growing, undermining the well-balanced 

foreign policy approach of all Central Asian states. Astana’s attempts 

to neutralize this new polarization by restraining from taking a clear 

stand on the Ukrainian events backfired with its Western partners. 

Some observers expected Kazakhstan would be forced to make a 

choice between the West and Russia and will ultimately choose 

Russia. 100 But a few months after the annexation of Crimea, it became 

clear that Astana would seek to maintain independence in its foreign 

policy decisions. Firstly, Kazakhstan refused to implement countersanctions 

against the West, as Russia demanded; secondly, it boosted 

relations with Ukraine with mutual presidential visits and developing


an action plan for cooperation and trade; thirdly, Astana signed an 

Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, and 

sought to enhance relations with the US; and finally, Kazakhstan’s 

government refused to boycott Turkey as Moscow demanded after a 

Russian fighter jet was downed for violating Turkey’s airspace. 

Kazakhstan’s decision to uphold its multi-vector foreign policy, 

regardless of Kremlin pressure, derives from the geopolitical 

environment of a newly independent state located in a rivalry-torn 

Central Asia, between the former colonizer Russia and an 

economically strong China, lacking access to international seas. It is 

also a policy that originates in the traditions of Kazakh society, largely 

founded on clan-based patronage networks. The way the state 

leadership has managed the various competing or even acrimonious 

kinships is very similar to its approach to foreign policy: balancing 

relations with often competing or confrontational world actors, but 

without taking sides. The same approach is evident in the 

government’s dealing with ethnic minorities, where careful 

management of grievances and aspirations has thus far produced 

inter-ethnic stability domestically. 

By the fall of 2015, Kazakhstan had accelerated cooperation with 

Ukraine to the extent that the presidents of the two countries, 

Nursultan Nazarbayev and Petro Poroshenko, signed a road map for 

cooperation for the next two years. During the meeting, the two sides 

discussed ways to strengthen cooperation in trade, the coal industry, 

transport and logistics, and agriculture. They also shared views on 

urgent issues of the international agenda, including the situation in 

southeastern Ukraine and progress in the Minsk agreements. The 

Ukrainian president congratulated Nazarbayev on the 550 th 

anniversary of the Kazakh khanate, a symbol of statehood and 

Kazakhstan’s deep historical roots. 101 

Stressing that Kazakhstan maintained relations with a number of 

countries, including Turkey, China, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan,


Ukraine, Russia, Japan, as well as the US and EU, Kazakhstan’s 

Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov said at the end of 2015: “Kazakhstan 

does not adopt the position of a silent detached observer in the 

implementation of someone else’s strategy. Our country is successful 

in making its own independent way in the world. We purposefully 

build good relationships and establish strong economic contacts with 

large and small states in the East and West, North and South. We work 

closely with Russia and China. Europe is our largest trading partner, 

and the US is the second largest foreign investor after Europe.” 102 

Uzbekistan 

Uzbekistan has been the most resistant to Russian political influence 

among the Central Asia states. Even under the Soviet system, 

Tashkent enjoyed the reputation in Moscow of having a mind of its 

own: Uzbekistan was resentful of demands to increase cotton 

production and of the Kremlin’s efforts to uproot Islamic tradition. 

Moreover, it rejected attempts to appoint Russians to leading 

positions (the leader of the Uzbek Communist Party was consistently 

an Uzbek). After independence, Uzbekistan became even more 

unpredictable in its relations with Russia as well as with other 

countries in the region. Uzbekistan is critical for the regional powers 

Russia and China, but also for the US and the EU, because of its central 

geographic position, large population, and diverse natural resources. 

A doubly landlocked country, Uzbekistan is located in the heart of 

Central Asia and shares borders with all states in the region, plus 

Afghanistan. 

Although Russia remains Uzbekistan’s leading economic partner and 

an important factor in its foreign and security policy, Moscow does 

not enjoy the same leverage and political influence in Tashkent as it 

does in other Central Asian capitals. The Russian minority is 

gradually shrinking due to emigration and low birth rates, falling to 

under 3% of the total population of 31.5 million. 103 Uzbekistan is not


a member of the Russian-led security bloc, the Collective Security 

Treaty Organization (CSTO), and prefers to take part instead in the 

China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It refuses to 

join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and is cautious about 

becoming a member of the EEU’s free trade zone. Uzbekistan’s 

President Islam Karimov has criticized the EEU, warning of a loss of 

political independence for the former Soviet countries. 104 

Though President Karimov’s behavior is often seen as erratic, it tends 

to reflect well-calculated policy to preserve his country’s sovereignty, 

particularly by offsetting any Russian attempt to regain influence in 

Uzbekistan. While Tashkent evidently implements a similar approach 

regarding other international actors, such as China and the West, 

Karimov seems to view the threat from Moscow as much more 

serious. As a result, Tashkent is the Central Asian capital most courted 

by Moscow. The latest gesture by Russian President Putin was a large 

debt write-off in December 2014—Uzbekistan will pay only $25 

million of the $890 million it owes Russia. In exchange, Tashkent will 

consider taking part in a free trade agreement with the Eurasian 

Economic Union. The deal also included more Russian investments 

in strategic sectors of Uzbekistan’s economy and new lines of credit 

for Russian arms and military technology. 105 

Uzbekistan has joined some of the groupings of former Soviet states, 

such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the SCO, 

but it usually carefully observes developments before making a 

decision and sometimes changes it later. For example, Uzbekistan 

became a founding member of the SCO in 2001, but it was not part of 

its predecessor, the Shanghai Five, established in 1996. It signed the 

Collective Security Treaty (CST) in 1992 (also known as the Tashkent 

Treaty), but did not renew it in 1999. When the CST was transformed 

into CSTO in 2002, Uzbekistan refrained from joining. There was 

logic in this decision, as by that time Uzbekistan had become an ally 

of the United States and NATO, following the September 2001 

terrorist attacks in the US.


A few weeks after 9/11, Uzbekistan agreed to host the US Air Force at 

the Karshi–Khanabat Airbase (K2) to support the US-led Operation 

Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. But four years later, Tashkent 

requested the base vacated, despite continuing concerns about 

security in Afghanistan. A combination of factors contributed to this 

development; not least pressure by Russia and China, which oppose 

US military presence in Central Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization called in July 2005 for the US and its coalition partners 

in Afghanistan to set a timetable for withdrawing from several Central 

Asian countries, prompting comments by Gen. Richard B. Myers, 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Russia and China are 

bullying the Central Asian nations. The two big SCO members had 

indeed enlisted the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan to co-sign the declaration. 106 

Another factor for the US airbase closure was Tashkent’s wariness of 

American presence in the country, following the “colored 

revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which Moscow 

blamed on the West. Suspicions amplified as Washington increased 

criticism of Uzbekistan’s human rights record and, in 2004 and 2005, 

withheld $28.5 million of US military and economic aid, as a result of 

human rights concerns. 107 Tensions in bilateral relations intensified 

after the Uzbek security forces shot and killed hundreds of civilians 

during an insurgency outbreak in the city of Andijan, in 2005, when 

armed rebels, allegedly Islamists, broke into a high-security prison, 

captured the municipal building and took a number of hostages, and 

finally used civilians as human shields. 108 

While Western governments and human rights organizations 

legitimately criticized Uzbek authorities for using lethal force against 

civilians, some of them also incorrectly portrayed the incident as a 

crackdown on anti-regime protests. Russia and China, however, 

offered support to Tashkent, claiming that the Uzbek authorities’ 

reaction during the Andijan events was an internal matter. Not


surprisingly, Tashkent switched alliances again and joined the Russialed 

CSTO a year later, in 2006. 

Uzbekistan’s CSTO membership, however, remained nominal, since 

the country abstained from ratifying any agreement adopted by the 

organization or taking part in joint military exercises. In June 2012, 

Tashkent suspended its participation in the CSTO and left the 

organization by the end of the year. The departure put Uzbekistan in 

a peculiar position vis-à-vis its neighbors Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan, all of which are members of the security alliance. In case of 

a security crisis in the region, they would be able to turn to the CSTO 

for protection, while Uzbekistan would be left out. Moreover, in case 

of a conflict between Uzbekistan and a CSTO member state in Central 

Asia, the security alliance might step in to protect the member state, 

while Tashkent would have to seek allies elsewhere. At the same time, 

by maintaining strong bilateral security cooperation with the CSTO 

leader—Russia—Uzbekistan would be in a position to block CSTO 

intervention against itself in a potential regional conflict. 109 It seems, 

however, that Tashkent does not see the CSTO as a credible actor in 

Central Asia. The organization has proven ineffective after failing to 

intervene in the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan, caused by ethnic clashes 

between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the southern region of Osh. 

Meanwhile, in 2012, Tashkent adopted a new Foreign Policy Doctrine 

designed to guard the country from foreign interference. The 

document does not allow the deployment of foreign military bases on 

the territory of Uzbekistan, forbids the participation of the country in 

any military blocs or international peacekeeping missions, and rejects 

the mediation of any external power in regional conflicts in Central 

Asia. 110 

Since then, the CSTO has tried to establish a mechanism of 

cooperation with Uzbekistan and also Turkmenistan, but they have 

not responded to proposals about uniting the efforts of the special 

services to jointly fight against common threats, nor have they agreed


to discuss offers of potential aid by the CSTO collective forces in case 

it is needed. CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha concluded 

in 2015 that his organization has practically no working relationship 

with either Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. 111 Apparently, the Russian 

invasion of eastern Ukraine has alarmed these two Central Asian 

countries and made them even more cautious in their security 

relations with Moscow. 

Nevertheless, Uzbekistan’s bilateral military cooperation with other 

states continued, including with the US after a rapprochement 

between Washington and Tashkent. Since 2009, Uzbekistan has 

served as a vital part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a 

key transit corridor along which Western militaries shipped supplies 

to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and subsequently its successor, 

Operation Resolute Support. All three NDN railways lines ran through 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, making the two countries essential for 

continuing NATO operations in Afghanistan and bringing significant 

benefits to their economies. In June 2015, Russian Prime Minister 

Dmitry Medvedev shut down the “Northern Line of 

Communication,” consisting of two railway lines going through 

Russia. The southern NDN “Central Line of Communication” is still 

operational as it bypasses Russia completely, running through 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and crossing the Caspian Sea via rail 

ferries to Azerbaijan and Georgia. 112 Medvedev’s decree, although not 

seriously affecting current NATO operations in Afghanistan, which 

reverted to using exclusively the southern NDN line, had a negative 

economic impact on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These Central 

Asian republics lost a significant portion of their income from transit 

fees. 

In the beginning of 2015, the US government decided to transfer 

hundreds of armored vehicles to Uzbekistan as part of their military 

cooperation. The transfer involved some 308 Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected Vehicles (MRAP), to be used for defensive purposes as well 

as to improve border security and counter-narcotics operations.


Reportedly, the deal marked the largest transfer of US military 

equipment to a Central Asian country. 113 The Uzbekistan-NATO 

partnership was also resumed, following a decline in relations after the 

Andijan events. In 2013, Uzbekistan agreed its first Individual 

Partnership Cooperation Program with NATO, and the Alliance 

opened a NATO Liaison Office in Tashkent. 

Uzbekistan’s official reaction to the annexation of Crimea was clearly 

negative. Tashkent cited the United Nations Charter and the UN 

Declaration on the Principles of International Law, stating that it 

firmly and invariably adheres to the principles of “settling 

international disputes by peaceful means and refraining in 

international relations from the threat or use of force against the 

territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” The 

statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for immediate 

negotiations between Ukraine and Russia to resolve the conflict. 114 

The Russian public apparently disapproved of Uzbekistan’s position 

and abstention from voting on the UN resolution rendering the 

March 14 referendum in Crimea illegitimate. Many called for 

sanctions against Uzbekistan and deportation of the nearly two 

million Uzbek migrant laborers working in the Russian Federation. 115 

Labor migration is one of Uzbekistan’s major vulnerabilities to 

pressure by Moscow and a channel for the Kremlin to insert political 

leverage. 

Another serious vulnerability for Tashkent is the Republic of 

Karakalpakstan, an autonomous region in Uzbekistan’s northwest. 

Nominally, Karakalpakstan has the constitutional right to hold a 

referendum and secede, but the Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan (the 

Oliy Majlis) can veto a breakaway decision. The Russian annexation 

of Crimea underscored the volatile situation in this region, attached 

by Stalin to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in the last stages 

of national delimitation in the Soviet Union in 1936. Subsequently 

devastated by the ecological catastrophe of the Aral Sea, overrun by


poverty and neglected by the central authorities, Karakalpakstan has 

seen appeals for separation made by various local movements since 

1990. Although not expressed publically by the authorities, Tashkent 

was clearly concerned that if it recognized the result of the referendum 

in Crimea, this could foment separatist drives at home. In fact, the 

declaration of independence of Kosovo in February 2008 was followed 

by similar calls in Karakalpakstan. 116 

Soon after Russia took Crimea, leaflets started appearing in 

Karakalpakstan, signed by a previously unknown group, Alga 

Karakalpakstan Azatlyk Harakati (Forward Karakalpakstan Freedom 

Movement). The authorities detained several activists for distribution 

of leaflets calling for a referendum on Karakalpakstan’s independence. 

Analysts say that the activity was a grassroots effort, connected with 

the developments in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Alga 

Karakalpakstan posted a statement on the Facebook page of the 

Uzbek opposition movement Birdamlik: “The people of 

Karakalpakstan do not agree with the foreign and domestic policies of 

Karimov’s regime. Karakalpaks are eager to join Russia. By culture 

and language, Karakalpaks are closer to Kazakhs but will the 

[Kazakhstani] president support the freedom and independence of 

the Republic of Karakalpakstan? If we hear a good signal from the 

Kremlin, Karakalpakstan is ready to raise the Russian flag.” 117 

Although the movement reportedly emerged from below, it provides 

Moscow with a strong card to use against the Uzbek government, if 

the latter fails to comply with Russian demands. The dire social, 

economic and health predicament of Uzbekistan’s largest region, 

coupled with drastically reduced remittances from Russia and 

Kazakhstan, where many local residents have migrated for jobs, has 

created a combustible environment that could destabilize Central Asia 

at large. Just a nod of support from Russia and a bit of financial 

backing could increase demands for independence, compel people to 

protest in the streets, and prompt Tashkent to use its enormous 

security service apparatus to crush the movement. Karakalpakstan


activists have already accused Karimov’s regime of genocide against 

the people of the region for failing to address the environmental and 

health problems and promote economic development. 

Potential clashes between Karakalpakstan’s population and the police 

would not only destabilize Uzbekistan, but would also derail its 

current cooperative relationship with the US and NATO and could 

also give rise to Islamic movements calling for a Caliphate. Such a 

scenario might push Tashkent into Moscow’s hands because the 

authoritarian regime of President Karimov would need protection to 

survive. As China would be unwilling to become involved in the 

internal political problems of any of its partners, Moscow would also 

succeed in distancing Beijing from Tashkent. In fact, the ethnic card 

in Karakalpakstan, but also in the Ferghana Valley, where Uzbeks live 

alongside Kyrgyz and Tajiks, seems to be the most effective 

instrument of subversion Moscow could use in Uzbekistan, if the 

regime continues to be recalcitrant and seek stronger partners either 

eastward or westward. 

On the other hand, the Russian minority has been rarely used by 

Moscow as a political tool against Tashkent. The situation of 

Uzbekistan’s Russians has been on Moscow’s agenda only when 

relations with Tashkent deteriorate. Russians in Uzbekistan currently 

make up less than 3% of the total population, down from over 12.5% 

in the 1970s. The 1989 census found that Russians numbered 1.65 

million, or 8.3% of the population, most of them living in Tashkent 

and other urban centers. Interestingly, while the Russian minority in 

Uzbekistan had grown by only 10% (158,000) between 1970 and 1989, 

the total population of Uzbekistan had increased by 40% (7.85 

million) reaching almost 20 million. 118 There has been no official 

population census in Uzbekistan since the dissolution of the Soviet 

Union. After independence, the Russian population decreased by half 

and shrank to about 800,000 due to migration, while the total 

population of Uzbekistan swelled to over 31.5 million (a one-third 

increase in 25 years). 119


Russian out-migration started in 1989, following the pogroms against 

the Meskhetian Turks in the Ferghana Valley, which alarmed the 

minority populations. Economic reasons soon replaced the initial 

political reasons for migrating to the Russian Federation; but lately, 

discrimination is named as the main motivation for departure. The 

Russian press has claimed that the position of Russians and Russian 

speakers is rapidly deteriorating across Central Asia, but that they are 

under most intense pressure in Uzbekistan. 120 Russian minority 

representatives complain that they are often fired without cause or 

explanation, paid less than their Uzbek co-workers, lose their housing, 

and face prison if they raise the issue about the status of ethnic 

Russians in Uzbekistan. Analysts point out that the low birth rates 

among Russians are an indication of their sense of insecurity and lack 

of hope for the future of their communities in Uzbekistan. The 

Russian minority is annoyed by government actions such as changing 

street names from Russian to Uzbek, or building a museum in 

memory of the victims of communist repressions—the only one in 

Central Asia—which they perceive as a museum of Russian 

occupation. The status of the Russian language has also declined, with 

most Russian-language schools closed down. Uzbekistan’s Russians 

blame Russian President Putin for ignoring their plight and sacrificing 

their interests to maintaining good relations with Tashkent. 121 

Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine, however, changed the atmosphere 

in Uzbekistan, giving hope to local Russians and making the 

authorities fearful of a similar attack on their country. This worry 

prompted the government to introduce a peculiar requirement for all 

broadcast facilities in the country. Shortly after Moscow-backed 

separatists captured and started broadcasting from several TV stations 

in eastern Ukraine, the Uzbek government ordered that all locally 

based TV and radio stations must rig their transmitters with explosive 

devices for immediate destruction in case the station were to fall into 

hostile hands. The National Security Service of Uzbekistan introduced 

additional security measures to prevent potential invasion via


ventilation pipes and shafts. Furthermore, live programming, 

including news coverage, was also banned. 122 

On the economic front, Uzbekistan is extremely vulnerable to the 

deteriorating Russian economy. According to the Uzbek Foreign 

Ministry, Russia is Uzbekistan’s number one foreign trade partner, 

with turnover between the two countries exceeding $8.3 billion dollars 

in 2013. Russian investments worth over $600 million were channeled 

into Uzbekistan—mostly the oil and gas industry, 

telecommunications, and production engineering. 123 The Russian 

company Lukoil boosted investment in Uzbekistan by 38% in 2013, to 

$660 million. Lukoil is working on three projects in Uzbekistan: 

Kandym-Hauzak-Shady, South-West Gissar and Ustyurt. 124 During 

Putin’s visit to Tashkent in December 2014, Lukoil gave assurances 

that it would continue investing in the Kandym gas condensate field, 

in the Bukhara region, adding an additional $5 billion over the next 

25 years. 125 

Uzbekistan is a member of the CIS free trade zone since 2014, when 

Russia finally ratified the 2011 protocol. The agreement exempts 

Uzbekistan from import duties on trade with other members. 

Members of the free trade zone are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine, until Russia 

suspended the latter’s membership when Kyiv signed an association 

agreement with the EU. 126 

By the end of 2015, remittances from Russia dropped by 60%, 

compared to 2013, when the Uzbek economy was boosted by $7.88 

billion coming from migrant workers. 127 Remittances contributed 

almost 14% to the country’s gross domestic product in 2013. 128 Now 

this amount hovers around $3 billion, or under 5% of GDP. 129 The 

main reason for diminishing remittances from Russia is considered to 

be the weakening value of the Russian ruble, which, by January 201,6 

depreciated 55% compared to November 2013. As the dollar 

appreciated 121% compared to the Russian currency, the dollar value


of remittances earned in rubles dropped significantly. 130 The official 

exchange rate of the Uzbek som is down by only 25%, which does not 

fully reflect the real depreciation of the Russian ruble. 

The inadequate official devaluation of the Uzbek som makes Uzbek 

goods on the Russian market more expensive than they were before 

the war in Ukraine. Illustratively, sales in the Russian Federation 

market of cars produced by the joint GM Uzbekistan automobile plant 

dropped by 47% in 2015, threatening the American-Uzbek carmaker 

with significant losses. 131 Although Moscow’s counter-sanctions 

against the West opened opportunities for higher demand of Uzbek 

agricultural goods on the Russian market, the devaluation of the ruble 

and shrinking purchasing power of Russian consumers dashed this 

hope. 

According to the Russia’s Federal Migration Service, as of January 

2015, 2.2 million Uzbek citizens resided in Russia, down from 2.7 

million in August 2014. About 81% percent of those migrants are of 

working age. Studies have shown that over the years the typical Uzbek 

migrant has become younger, less educated, and more motivated to 

succeed in foreign countries. When they return to their home country, 

the overall level of skills will rise. 132 As Uzbekistan expects many 

migrant workers to return home from Russia, it will be very important 

to provide them with proper jobs and business opportunities. 

Despite hardship caused by the financial crisis in Russia, Uzbekistan’s 

economic growth prospects are still stable, with a high GDP growth of 

8% in 2015 and a forecasted growth in 2016 between 6.5% and 6.9%. 

Rising public investment and increased government spending are 

expected to help the economy overcome current drawbacks; the pace 

of growth may recover in 2017. 133 The Uzbek government also 

undertook a large privatization initiative that is expected to bear 

results in the next several years.


For Uzbekistan, like for the majority of Central Asia, the most 

promising alternative to economic dependence on Russia is China. In 

the wake of Russian aggression in Ukraine, Tashkent hastily began 

seeking a stronger alliance with Beijing. Criticizing international 

organizations for failing to enforce a strict observance of international 

law, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov called for support to the 

Chinese President Xi Jinping's proposals on developing a new security 

concept in Asia. 134 Uzbekistan subsequently entered into a strategic 

partnership agreement with China, which included jointly building 

the Silk Road Economic Belt. 135 

In August 2014, the two countries’ presidents signed a joint 

declaration and strategic partnership development program for 2014– 

2018. The agreement included not only economic development plans, 

but also strengthening mutual political trust and security cooperation. 

The economic development plan gave priority to line D of the China– 

Central Asia natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through 

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to China. Reportedly, 

Gazprom will abandon purchasing gas from Uzbekistan, due to 

reduced demand in Europe, and by 2021 China will become the main 

destination for Uzbek gas. The country produces around 63–65 

bcm/a, but consumes 50 bcm domestically. Its export capacity has 

been under 15 bcm/a, half of which was sold to Russia. 136 

While pursuing closer economic relations with China and other 

partners, such as South Korea, Japan, Turkey and Europe, may not be 

a triggering point for Moscow to exert pressure on Tashkent, 

developing stronger security cooperation with other major actors 

could be very risky short term. Moscow can use not only internal 

political problems against Karimov’s government, but it can also try 

to exacerbate Tashkent’s uneasy relationships with other countries in 

the region. Tensions over water between Uzbekistan and the two 

upstream states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have been among 

Moscow’s arsenal of subversion. Russia has often used the water 

conflicts to its advantage. In order to keep Tashkent in check, Moscow


has supported large hydropower projects in the two upstream, waterrich 

countries. Building large dams in the mountains will deprive 

Uzbekistan of much-needed water for agriculture downstream. More 

importantly, open conflicts over water have the potential to destabilize 

the entire region. 

Kyrgyzstan 

After two consecutive dictators were replaced through violent 

uprisings in 2005 and 2010, Kyrgyzstan succeeded in holding three 

peaceful elections—for parliament in October 2010, president in 

October 2011, and again parliament in 2015. Nevertheless, the 

country remains dangerously unstable because of internal regional 

divisions, inter-ethnic problems, a weak central government, 

corruption, and overwhelming economic and political dependence on 

Russia. 

The 2010 riots in Bishkek were followed by violent interethnic clashes 

in the country’s south, between the Kyrgyz majority and the ethnic- 

Uzbek minority, resulting in 470 deaths and 300,000 displaced ethnic 

Uzbeks. 137 Fierce competition for the spoils of the drug trafficking 

industry has resulted in political power struggle in southern 

Kyrgyzstan and became the main reason for the interethnic clashes in 

June 2010. The events in Osh demonstrated how easily the button of 

ethnic sentiment can be pushed by a powerful political figure who is 

threatened with loss of control—in Kyrgyzstan’s case, allegedly, the 

associates of the deposed president Bakiyev felt threatened with losing 

political power and access to the profits of corruption and drug 

smuggling. 

The failure of the justice system to hold the perpetrators accountable 

constituted additional proof that state institutions are weak and 

underdeveloped. The ethnic violence in 2010 gave rise to Kyrgyz


nationalism that is increasingly becoming part of politics and is 

considered a high security risk for the country and the region. 138 

Since 2014, the Russian economic recession has brought hardship to 

the mountainous Central Asian country. The last country to join the 

Eurasian Economic Union, Kyrgyzstan could be the first to leave, if 

not for its pro-Russian leadership. None of the promises for economic 

development and benefits from joining the EEU came to fruition. On 

the contrary, the Kyrgyz economy suffered heavy losses from the 

economic downturn in Russia, a drastic fall in remittances, and 

reduced trade within the EEU. More importantly, EEU membership 

negatively affected Kyrgyzstan’s trade with neighboring China, due to 

higher customs duties and increased prices of previously cheap 

Chinese goods. 

Kyrgyzstan had benefited from becoming a warehouse for the import 

and re-export of consumer goods from neighboring China to other 

CIS countries. Low import tariffs between the two WTO members 

have allowed Kyrgyz and Chinese traders to develop a profitable 

economic activity. Import and resale of “bazaar goods” is also enabled 

by a 2004 government regulation, allowing individuals to pay customs 

duties and tax based on the weight of goods, not their value. The two 

biggest markets in Central Asia are located in Kyrgyzstan, Dordoi 

outside of Bishkek and Kara-Suu near the southern city of Osh, 

reportedly employ 20% of Kyrgyzstan’s work force, directly or 

indirectly. 139 By joining the EEU, Kyrgyzstan was taking the risk of 

endangering a huge enterprise that was providing livelihood to a large 

part of the population. 

Kyrgyzstan was hesitant to join the EEU, expecting more Russian 

economic assistance as well as relaxed procedures for Kyrgyz labor 

migration to Russia. Bishkek demanded large subsidies, exemption 

from various rules, a special status for the wholesale markets as free 

trade zones, and benefits for 400 commodity items for a period of five 

to ten years, as well as other concessions from EEU members. The


authorities claimed that these measures are necessary to offset 

disadvantages caused by ceasing re-exporting goods from China. 

Taking into account Kyrgyzstan’s lower wages compared to Russia 

and Kazakhstan, Bishkek also wanted to prevent further economic 

and political instabilities in the poor and restless Central Asian 

country. 140 Nevertheless, Bishkek joined the Union in August 2015 as 

the “right step” that would bring important economic and social 

benefits, Prime Minister Joomart Otorbaev claimed. 141 

Kazakhstan and Belarus were not enthusiastic about admitting 

economically weak Kyrgyzstan to the EEU since the country has little 

to contribute, but would be a serious burden to wealthier members. 

They finally consented when Russia agreed to cover most of 

Kyrgyzstan’s accession cost, notably $200 million to upgrade its 

customs infrastructure. Moscow also promised a $1 billion financial 

injection to the newly established Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund 

(RKDF), slated to support local business development and 

compensate Kyrgyzstan for economic losses caused by its accession to 

the EEU. The fund received only $350 million of the promised funds 

and it is not clear whether there will be another tranche, causing 

frustration among the country’s leadership. 142 

Kyrgyzstan is heavily dependent on Russia, both economically and 

politically. Moscow has primarily used two tools to keep the country 

in line: threats and bribes. Convincing Bishkek to join the EEU was 

one example of how these tools work in synchrony—Moscow 

promised to accommodate Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia by 

providing registration and jobs, but when the Kyrgyz authorities still 

hesitated whether to take the plunge, the Kremlin threatened for 

Kyrgyz migrants with hardship. Naturally, the promised benefits 

seemed a better deal, regardless of the expected shut down of reexports 

of Chinese goods. 

But remittances fell by 30%, and trade within the EEU declined 

significantly by the end of 2015 compared to 2013, before the sharp


decline in oil prices and Western sanctions against Moscow 

contributed to a reduction in economic activity in Russia. 143 

According the World Bank, remittances in 2013 accounted for 31% of 

Kyrgyzstan’s gross domestic product. 144 Moreover, Kyrgyzstan is the 

second most remittances-dependent country in the world, with some 

700,000 migrant laborers working mostly in Russia and some in 

Kazakhstan. 145 

Total trade turnover between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan dropped by 

almost half, and trade with Russia also considerably declined. The 

main reason was currency devaluation in both countries, but also the 

fact that Kyrgyzstan was no longer able to re-export Chinese 

consumer goods to other EEU members. In addition, Russia’s 

conflicts with Ukraine and Turkey spoiled trade relations with these 

two countries, which were large trade partners of Kyrgyzstan. 146 

Over the years, Russia has provided significant financial assistance to 

Kyrgyzstan, including $185 million aid to support budget operations 

between 2010 and 2015, a grant of $150 million and a $300 million 

loan on terms of official development assistance in 2009, along with a 

$180 million debt write off. In 2012, Moscow agreed to forgive $489 

million of Kyrgyzstan’s sovereign debt. 147 This financial support has 

not been free, as Moscow has always calibrated its assistance toward 

achieving a particular political goal. When in 2009, in addition to 

other financial incentives, Moscow promised to subsidize the 

Karambata-1 dam on the Naryn River with $2 billion aid package, it 

had one goal in mind—to have the US air base at Manas expelled from 

Kyrgyzstan. The Russian plan failed, however, because the Americans 

agreed to the increased rent from $17.4 million to $60 million a year, 

and the base was allowed to stay. The then-President Kurmanbek 

Bakiyev decided to benefit from both, the Russian subsidies and the 

American rent payments, a large part of which was going to his 

family’s pockets, as became clear later. Allegedly, the Kremlin did not 

forgive him for this double crossing. According to some reports, the 

2010 riots in Bishkek were instigated by Moscow with the purpose of


deposing Bakiyev and installing a pro-Russian leader. A few weeks 

before the protests, Russian television stations aired scathing reports 

portraying Bakiyev as a repugnant dictator, while Moscow suspended 

the promised financial aid and eliminated subsidies on gasoline 

exports to Kyrgyzstan, causing a price hike. 148 

Russian financial support and investment plans were resumed when 

the government of Almazbek Atambayev came to power in 2011. As 

Russia fell under Western sanctions in Europe, Russian companies 

continued expanding in unaffected countries, such as Kyrgyzstan. 

Gazprom acquired the state gas company, in 2014, for the symbolic 

price of $1 and vowed to invest over $500 million to upgrade its 

infrastructure in the first five years. The Russian company also 

assumed the Kyrgyz gas company’s debt of $40 million. Gazprom also 

announced plans to start exploration of gas fields in Kyrgyzstan. 

Moreover, Russian state-owned Rosneft signed a deal in 2014 to invest 

up to $1 billion for a stake of at least 51% in Manas International 

Airport. 149 

Russia was the sole investor in two large hydropower projects: the 

Upper Naryn cascade project and the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant. 

The Upper Naryn cascade consists of four hydropower plants, 

estimated to cost $700 million, while Kambarata-1, a megahydropower 

plant fiercely objected to by neighboring Uzbekistan, is 

estimated to cost $2 billion. But at the end of 2015, President 

Atambayev announced that Russia has not made any investments, 

because of the ongoing economic stagnation. The Ministry of 

Economy confirmed that Russia is unable to secure project financing. 

Western sanctions have impacted Russia’s ability to access 

international financial markets. Therefore, such large investments are 

put on the backburner or simply scrapped. After months of 

frustration with the Russian side, Atambayev concluded that Russia 

might never have planned to actually fund these hydropower 

projects. 150 Bishkek subsequently canceled the investment agreement 

with Russia, but Kyrgyzstan was left with the bill for $40 million


already spent by RosHydro on the Upper Naryn project. 151 Other 

investment plans may also be scrapped if Russian economic problems 

continue. 

Tajikistan 

Tajikistan’s authoritarian system is extremely weak and vulnerable, 

undermined by widespread poverty, rampant corruption, sporadic 

domestic insurgency, and the growing appeal of militant Islam. In 

addition, Tajikistan has had problems with a domestic insurgency 

deriving from political rivalries dating back to the civil war of 1992– 

1997. Recent political conflicts have stemmed from the authorities’ 

crackdown on the political opposition, as President Emomali Rahmon 

managed to remove from the government and the parliament all of 

his opponents from the former United Tajik Opposition. This has led 

to armed clashes, ambushes, and whole-scale military battles between 

insurgents and government security forces in the last several years. 

Of all the Central Asian republics, Tajikistan is most exposed to 

terrorist incursions because of its 1,300-kilometer-long poorly 

protected border with Afghanistan. Much of this frontier runs 

through remote and difficult terrain, allowing smugglers, political and 

religious extremists, and terrorists to travel across it, to and from 

Afghanistan. 

Security in and around Tajikistan has become a major concern for 

Russia, particularly with the spread of Islamist ideology among the 

Tajik youth and the recently established presence of Islamic State 

militants in Afghanistan. Tajik fighters who joined the IS in Syria have 

made video message threats not only to Dushanbe, but also to 

Moscow. 152 Furthermore, drugs worth billions of dollars pass through 

Tajikistan en route to Russia and China every year. The trafficking is 

not sufficiently addressed by the authorities, ostensibly because of 

vested interests of government officials in the profits or levies of the


narcotics trade. The illicit drug trade is estimated to constitute as 

much as one-fifth of the country’s GDP. 153 

The domestic security situation started to deteriorate in 2008 and 

quickly escalated to military battles between well-trained insurgents 

and inadequately equipped government security forces. Tajik security 

forces were dealt a blow by local warlords and a small insurgency 

group in the Rasht Valley, in 2010–2011. The violence crippled the 

State Security Committee’s Alpha anti-terrorist unit and cost the 

National Guard many casualties. 154 The violence in the Badakhshan 

region in the summer of 2012 was linked to both narcotics trafficking 

and discontent among the local Pamiri population with their political 

marginalization. 155 Penetration of the Islamic State’s ideology has 

further undermined trust in the security services, particularly 

following the defection of Gen. Gulmurod Khalimov, head of the 

Special Assignment Police Unit (OMON), to the IS in Syria in April 

2015. 156 Khalimov was among the best-qualified high-ranking security 

officers in the country; he had received extensive training in the US as 

well. 

More recent security incidents included armed clashes involving 

Tajikistan’s security forces on September 4–5, 2015, which resulted in 

a number of deaths in the vicinity of Dushanbe and Dushanbe 

International Airport. The government blamed the political 

opposition for the events and declared the Islamic Renaissance Party 

of Tajikistan (IRPT) as a terrorist organization, arresting and putting 

on trial 13 of its members. Rakhmon’s crackdown on the opposition 

party had started earlier, when he effectively ousted the IRPT from 

parliament, following an election in March 2015 riddled with 

violations. The party was banned a few days before clashes broke out 

around Dushanbe. 157 

Militarily, Tajikistan is Moscow’s stronghold in Central Asia, hosting 

Russia’s largest non-naval military base in a foreign country, with an 

estimated total strength of around 7,000 soldiers. The 201 st Motorized


Rifle Division, subordinated to Russia’s Central Operational Strategic 

Command, is headquartered in Dushanbe since the end of the Soviet- 

Afghan War. During the Tajik civil war, the Russian division played a 

critical role in supporting the pro-Communist Popular Front against 

the Democratic and Muslim Opposition. Without its support, 

President Emomali Rakhmon would not have come to power. 

Subsequently, the 201 st Motorized Rifle Division became part of the 

CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan, which was unable to 

obtain a peacekeeping status under the United Nation’s jurisdiction, 

precisely because the 201 st had fought against one of the sides in the 

civil war. 

The 201 st Motorized Rifle Division is organized into three motorized 

rifle regiments: the 92 nd in Dushanbe, the 191 st in Qurghonteppa, and 

the 149 th in Kulob. The base in Kulob is expected relocate to a facility 

near Dushanbe in 2016. The Russian 670 th air group and 303 rd separate 

helicopter squadron are reportedly deployed at Ayni Airbase and 

equipped with Su-25 aircraft, Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters, although a 

formal agreement for the use of Ayni has not yet been finalized. 158 

Ayni Airbase was completely renovated by India in the period 2004– 

2010, but Tajikistan’s government, under pressure from Russia, 

refused to allow Indian or US air contingents to use the base. 159 In 

October 2013, Dushanbe ratified an agreement with Moscow to 

extend the deployment of the Russian military contingent in 

Tajikistan by three decades, until 2042. 

The Russian government does not pay Tajikistan for hosting the 201 st 

division, but Moscow promised, in 2004, to invest $2 billion in Tajik 

hydroelectric projects and infrastructure, as part of a bilateral basing 

and security accord. The promise was only partially fulfilled when 

Russian companies completed the construction of the Sangtuda–1 

Hydroelectric Power Plant, which produces 15% of Tajikistan’s 

electricity. Dushanbe has made clear that Moscow will have to pay to 

use the Ayni Airbase. 160


The Russian military used to patrol Tajikistan’s border with 

Afghanistan until 2005, when Dushanbe assumed control of its border 

security. As Moscow and the Central Asian capitals grow increasingly 

concerned about security threats stemming from Afghanistan, Russia 

has been trying to redeploy its border guards to the Tajik border. 

Although Tajik President Rahmon claims that fighting is taking place 

along 60% of the Tajik-Afghan border, and about 800 fighters from 

Tajikistan have joined the IS, Dushanbe rejects a new dispatch of 

Russian military troops to its borders. Tajikistan insists that Russia 

and the CSTO should only provide technical assistance to its border 

security service. 161 The next-best solution for Russia is the 

establishment of a rapid reaction border patrol formation within the 

CSTO that could be deployed in case of “a crisis situation on the 

external borders.” This decision was made at the CIS Kazakhstan in 

October 2015 as part of the program for cooperation in strengthening 

border security of member states 2016–2020. 162 

In 2014, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu called the 201 st 

division one of Russia’s most important bases. He vowed that the base 

would be reinforced and equipped with the latest military technology 

to be fully prepared to deal with any threat in the lead-up to the 

withdrawal of NATO forces. 163 In the wake of the Crimean 

annexation, however, the Tajik public did not seem convinced that the 

reinforcement was aimed at preventing threats from Afghanistan. In 

fact, the largest group (45%) of all survey participants believed the 

reinforcement was intended to provoke a crisis in Central Asia, and 

24% attributed the reinforcement to compensation for Russia’s losses 

in Syria and Ukraine. 164 

In January 2015, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoliy Antonov 

stressed that Russia and Tajikistan faced common challenges and 

threats. He told Tajik Defense Minister Lieutenant General Sherali 

Mirzo in Dushanbe that Tajikistan was Russia’s outpost in the fight 

against terrorism, and, by providing assistance to the armed forces of 

Tajikistan, the Russian Defense Ministry was enhancing Russia’s


security. 165 Three months later, the commander of the 201 st division 

said that Russia would increase the number of troops stationed in 

Tajikistan from 5,900 to 9,000 over the next five years, and add more 

military equipment through 2020. It also transpired that Russia was 

prepared to grant Tajikistan $1.2 billion in military aid. 166 

While the official explanation for increasing Russia’s military 

presence in Central Asia is fear of terrorism spillover from 

Afghanistan, some analysts conclude that it is rather the result of 

Moscow’s standoff with the West and competition for military 

domination in a key region such as Central Asia. 167 Such a conclusion 

is logical and consistent with Moscow’s objectives in its flanks, but it 

is only partially true. The worsening situation in Afghanistan presents 

a real concern for Russia, which remembers its defeat in the Soviet- 

Afghan war. On the one hand, Moscow wants NATO to leave the 

region as soon as possible, but on the other hand it wants the Alliance 

to succeed in securing Afghanistan—the opposite would leave Russia 

with an insurmountable problem in its back yard. Tajikistan is a key 

state in the efforts to contain militant penetration from Afghanistan. 

Thus, Moscow’s pledges to send more troops, equipment and money 

to Tajikistan are due to both genuine fear for its own security and a 

desire to portray itself as the savior of the region, the undisputed 

leader in Central Asia that trumps China and the US. 

Russia’s problem, however, is its lack of financial capabilities to 

sustain such a role in Central Asia in light of low oil prices and 

Western-imposed sanctions after its intervention in Ukraine in March 

2014. Consequently, the January 2016 announcement that Russia 

would be downsizing its 201 st division to a brigade came as no 

surprise. The news broke just three months after Russia confirmed 

plans to expand its military presence in Central Asia at the CIS 

summit in October 2015. A brigade typically consists of 3,000 to 5,000 

troops, which in the best-case scenario would be half the number of 

military personnel announced in 2015. The official line of the Russian 

Central Military District is that the reorganization of the 201 st division


will reduce its numerical strength but increase its mobility. 168 

Nonetheless, the fact that the reorganization started immediately 

leads to the conclusion that the actual reason is probably tied to the 

expected 5% cuts to the Russian defense budget in 2016. 169 

Public perception of Russian soldiers in Tajikistan has also grown 

negative following the murder of a young Tajik woman by a Russian 

officer on the territory of the military base in November 2015. A year 

earlier, a Tajik taxi driver was killed by two Russian soldiers, who were 

subsequently sentenced to lengthy prison terms. 170 

Analysts observe that, along with the drastic decrease of the Russian 

minority since the civil war, an intensive de-Russification process has 

taken place in Tajikistan. The government took down all memorials 

to Lenin and, in 2015, dismantled the 24-meter-high monument to 

Soviet power. Authorities have also renamed many streets that had 

Russian names in the capital Dushanbe, eliminated all Russianlanguage 

signs, and reduced the number of hours of Russian language 

in schools. In addition, citizens are required to use their national 

language in contacts with officials and adopt Tajik surnames without 

Slavic suffixes—for example, the president changed his name from 

Rahmonov to Rahmon. 171 

Most of these changes were determined by the fact that the Russian 

minority dramatically shrank and may be even extinct in the next two 

decades. Most of Tajikistan’s Russians have emigrated as a result of 

the violence and civil war in the 1990s. By April 1993, approximately 

300,000 or 77% of the Russian population of Tajikistan had left the 

country, according to the Russian Federal Migration Service. 172 In the 

2000 census, Russians represented only 1.1% of the total population 

of the republic, or just over 68,000 people. Today, one can estimate 

their still-falling numbers at approximately 50,000 people. 173 

While Russia has lost virtually all of its influence regarding the 

Russian population in Tajikistan, Moscow is reportedly trying to


create another line of division in the society and a potential lever 

against Dushanbe. During the 2012 violence in Gorno-Badakhshan 

Autonomous Region, the Russian media called for protecting Russian 

citizens in that region. According to the state census, there are no 

ethnic Russians in this part of the Pamir Mountains. However, Russia 

is offering citizenship to the local population to create a “Russian 

enclave” inside Tajikistan that it could take over in the future, 

according to Tajik commentators. 174 Some observers contend that up 

to 10,000 Gorno-Badakhshan residents held Russian passports at the 

time of Russian border guards’ withdrawal in 2005. 175 Tajikistan is the 

only Central Asian republic that has a dual citizenship agreement with 

Russia. Social media users claim that half of the 250,000 residents of 

Gorno-Badakhshan have Russian passports today, but this number 

seems greatly exaggerated—different sources put Tajikistanis with 

dual citizenship between 80,000 and 100,000 nationwide, with most 

of them residing in Russia. After the annexation of Crimea, some 

commentators argued that a scenario of a takeover of the Pamir region 

is particularly likely in case of a Western-supported “revolution” in 

Tajikistan that could be used by Russia to divide Tajikistan and take 

over Gorno-Badakhshan by arranging fake elections and a 

referendum similar to that in Crimea. 176 

The scarcely populated Gorno-Badakhshan makes up nearly 45% of 

Tajikistan’s territory but is home to only 3% percent of the country’s 

population. Most of the 250,000 people living there are followers of 

Ismailism, a branch of Shia Islam, while most Tajiks are Sunni 

Muslims. They speak their native Pamiri languages, along with Tajik 

and Russian. 

Russia maintained military presence in Gorno-Badakhshan since the 

late 19 th century, when the region voluntarily joined the Russian 

Empire. It ended in 2005, when Dushanbe asserted control over the 

Tajik-Afghanistan border. President Rahmon was firm in rejecting 

Russia’s offer to extend the border patrolling agreement, stating that 

“The border is a symbol of the state’s independence, it is unheard of


for the border of one nation to be protected by border guards from 

another.” 177 

The presence of Russian troops, however, was providing jobs and 

higher wages to the local population, creating a bond between the 

region and Moscow. Subsequently, unemployment in the poor 

mountainous region increased and the disconnect between the central 

government and the local population deepened, as corruption related 

to narcotics trafficking penetrated the Tajik border guard service and 

the Drug Control Agency. Violent clashes between the police and the 

local population in 2012 and 2013 led to further discontent with the 

government that could be exploited by Russia to establish control over 

the region and return its border guards to the Tajik-Afghanistan 

border. The number of Russian passport-holders can serve as a 

justification for such an intervention, particularly if confrontations 

between Tajik authorities and the population continue. 

Economically, Tajikistan is heavily dependent on Russia, mostly 

through trade and remittances from migrant labor, which reportedly 

accounted for half of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2013. 178 According to the 

World Bank, Tajikistan is the world’s most remittances-dependent 

country, with over 93% of its labor migrants working in Russia. It is 

the poorest Central Asian republic; its domestic situation is 

potentially explosive because of public dissatisfaction with low living 

standards and widespread corruption, which has impeded economic 

development and political reform. For a long time, labor migration 

played a critical role in easing unemployment and reducing poverty, 

but the economic downturn in Russia has slashed remittances and 

sent many laborers home. In 2015, remittances from Russia decreased 

by $1.966 billion, or 46%, compared to 2014. 179 Official estimates put 

labor migrants at one million, but unofficial assessments point to 

about two million people, making the country extremely vulnerable 

to both Russian economic instability and Moscow’s political 

manipulation.


Turkmenistan 

Turkmenistan has managed to limit Russian influence in domestic 

affairs and the energy trade, but it remains vulnerable to Moscow in 

the Caspian Sea, both in terms of security and energy transit. The 

country’s neutrality status allows it to avoid participation in many of 

the regional groupings established by Russia—EEU, CSTO, or SCO. 

Turkmenistan is an associate member of the CIS, but has not ratified 

the 1993 CIS charter, although it participates in meetings and held the 

chairmanship of the CIS in 2012. 

Turkmenistan’s announcement in 2011 of plans to increase deliveries 

to China, participate in the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan– 

India (TAPI) gas pipeline, and work with the EU to build a trans- 

Caspian pipeline to Europe, caused a desperate reaction by the 

Kremlin, accompanied by outright threats of a “Georgian scenario” by 

semi-official Kremlin spokespersons. 180 In October 2011, then- 

President Dmitry Medvedev tasked his Energy Minister Sergei 

Shmatko and Gazprom CEO Aleksey Miller to draft proposals to resist 

the EU’s Nabucco (now the Southern Gas Corridor) and Trans- 

Caspian gas pipeline projects. Turkmenistan’s Foreign Affairs 

Ministry expressed its “bewilderment at Russian official structures’ 

attitude toward Turkmenistan’s advancing cooperation with the EU, 

a normal cooperation between equal partners on the energy markets.” 

Turkmenistan declared that its cooperation with European energy 

partners would continue. 181 

The new Central Asia–China gas pipeline, which starts in 

Turkmenistan, has broken Russia’s monopoly over gas transport in 

the region. It has also changed drastically Ashgabat’s position vis-àvis 

Moscow. Turkmen leaders started exhibiting confidence in price 

negotiations with Russia as well as in responding to pressures from 

the Kremlin regarding Ashgabat’s cooperation with the EU on the 

trans-Caspian pipeline to Europe. 182


Turkmenistan’s largest gas field, South Yolotan, was developed with 

the help of a $4 billion loan from China provided in 2009. In 

November 2011, Beijing and Ashgabat signed a deal that will allow 

Turkmenistan to supply China with 65 bcm of natural gas per year, or 

over 50% more than the initially agreed 30 bcm per annum in 2007. 183 

The deal challenged Russia’s position as the main buyer of Turkmen 

gas at the time and subsequently pushed out Russia from 

Turkmenistan’s gas market. In 2015, Russia ceased buying Turkmen 

gas due to price disputes, Gazprom’s non-payment of received 

volumes, and the decreased demand for Russian gas in Europe. 184 

Using Beijing’s new pipelines, Ashgabat already exports as much gas 

as it used to transit through Russia—Gazprom bought 40 bcm/a of gas 

from Turkmenistan in 2008, China's imports of Turkmen gas were 

boosted to 40 bcm/a in 2015. Currently, the Turkmenistan–China 

natural gas pipeline system consists of three branches with a total 

capacity of 55 bcm a year to transfer gas from Turkmenistan as well as 

gas from other Central Asian states. Another branch of the pipeline 

will be built in 2016, increasing the total capacity to 85 bcm a year. 185 

Endnotes 

1 

President Putin’s speech before the Russian Duma, March 18, 2014, 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. 

2 

For detailed information on military activities see: Matthew Stein, 

Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity, Fort 

Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, May 22, 2015, 

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Central-Asian-Military- 

Events.pdf. 

3 

About the Hartland Theory see H. J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot 

of History,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4, April 1904, pp. 421– 

437, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1775498?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.


4 

European Commission trade statistics, 

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/; 

Simon Denyer, “In Central Asia, Chinese inroads in Russia’s back yard,” 

The Washington Post, December 27, 2015, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-advance-into- 

central-asia-ruffles-russian-feathers/2015/12/27/cfedeb22-61ff-11e5-8475- 

781cc9851652_story.html. 

5 

André Loesekrug-Pietri, “Why Europe Can’t Afford to Ignore China’s 

New Silk Road,” World Economic Forum, November 16, 2015, 

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/europe-china-new-silk-road/. 

6 

See testimony of Michael Clarke, “Looking West: China and Central Asia,” 

Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, One hundred and Fourteenth Congress, March 18, 2015, 

http://www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-looking-west-china-and-centralasia. 

7 

Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China at 

Nazarbayev University in Astana, September 7, 2013, 

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebel/eng/zxxx/t1078088.htm. 

8 

Simon Denyer, “China bypasses American ‘New Silk Road’ with Two if its 

Own,” The Washington Post, October 14, 2013, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-bypasses- 

american-new-silk-road-with-two-if-its-own/2013/10/14/49f9f60c-3284- 

11e3-ad00-ec4c6b31cbed_story.html. 

9 

Initially, the Customs Union wanted to become a collective member of 

WTO, a proposal immediately rejected by the organization. Subsequently, 

as a result of its accession to the Customs Union in 2010, Kazakhstan 

increased more than half its import tariffs that were already negotiated with 

other WTO members. In addition, WTO had to negotiate not only with 

Astana, but also with the central authority of the Russian-led trade block, 

the Eurasian Economic Commission in Moscow. Kazakhstan eventually 

became a WTO member in November 2015. See Iana Dreyer and Mike 

Collier, “Eurasian Economic Union Complicates Kazakhstan's Final WTO 

Accession Bid,”BNE IntelliNews, March 25, 2015,


http://www.intellinews.com/eurasian-economic-union-complicates- 

kazakhstan-s-final-wto-accession-bid- 

500445484/?source=belarus&archive=bne. 

10 

Stephen Blank, “Russia Losing Ground Across Central Asia,” Eurasia 

Daily Monitor Volume 13, Issue 26, February 8, 2016, 


cache=1#.Vt18wsc4lsM; Umida Hashimova, “Kyrgyzstan Determined to 

Pursue Its Hydropower Plans With or Without Russia,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Volume: 13 Issue 10, January 15, 2016, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=44990&no_c 

ache=1#.Vt19Zcc4lsN; “Правительство Кыргызстана постановило 

отказаться от межправительственного соглашения с Россией о 

строительстве Камбаратинской ГЭС и Верхне-Нарынского каскада 

ГЭС,” Kloop.kg, December 31, 2015, 

http://kloop.kg/blog/2015/12/31/kyrgyzstan-denonsiruet-soglashenie-srossiej-o-stroitelstve-ges/. 

11 

“General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to 

Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region,” United Nations, March 27, 

2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm; “Mixed Regional 

Response to Crimea Annexation,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 27, 

2014, http://www.eiu.com. 

12 

James Kitfield, “U.S. Sources: Russia Forging Alliance with Taliban,” 

Yahoo News, February 12, 2016, https://www.yahoo.com/news/u-s-- 

sources--russia-forging-alliance-with-taliban-201058133.html?ref=gs; 

“Islamic State gaining ground in Afghanistan: UN,” AFP, September 25, 

2015, https://www.yahoo.com/news/u-s--sources--russia-forging-alliancewith-taliban-201058133.html?ref=gs. 

13 

US Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee and Senate 

Armed Services Committee, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community: Hearings before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement for the 

Record by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, 114th Cong., 

February 9, 2016, p. 19, https://fas.org/irp/congress/2016_hr/020916- 

threat.pdf.


14 

Sami Yousafzai, “A Taliban-Russia Team-Up Against ISIS?” The Daily 

Beast, October 26, 2015, 

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/10/26/a-taliban-russia-teamup-against-isis.html. 

15 

Fozil Mashrab, “Eurasian Union’s Expansion Falters Amid Russia’s 

Economic Woes,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 13, Issue 42, March 2, 

2016, 


tnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=941df08ef9e8a6c42fbc27a5f39455a0#.Vt 

3DP8c4nR0. 

16 

On China’s Marching Westward concept and Grand Western 

Development Strategy see Zhang Xiaotong and Marlen Belgibayev, “China’s 

Eurasian Pivot,” The ASAN Forum, December 1, 2014, 

http://www.theasanforum.org/chinas-eurasian-pivot/. 

17 

Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the New Silk Road Ministerial Meeting,” 

New York City, New York, September 22, 2011, 

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/09/173807.htm. 

18 

Alexander Frost, “The Collective Security Organization, the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization, and Russia’s Strategic Goals in Central Asia,” 

China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly vol. 7, no. 3, Central Asia-Caucasus 

Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, October 2009, pp. 83–102. 

19 

Marcin Kaczmarski, “Russia Attempts to Limit Chinese Influence by 

Promoting CSTO-SCO Cooperation,” CACI Analyst, October 17, 2007, 


analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2007-10-17-art- 

11497.html?tmpl=component&print=1. 

20 

Richard Weitz, “Russia, China, and Central Asia: Time for Decision,” 

Ther Asan Forum, December 23, 2015, 

http://www.theasanforum.org/russia-china-and-central-asia-time-fordecision/#a42.


21 

Edward Wong, “China Quietly Extends Footprints into Central Asia,” 

New York Times, January 2, 2011, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/world/asia/03china.html?pagewanted 

=all. 

22 

Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China at 

Nazarbayev University in Astana, September 7, 2013, 

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebel/eng/zxxx/t1078088.htm. 

23 

Dmitry Gorenburg, “External Support for Central Asian Military and 

Security Forces,” SIPRI/ Open Society Foundations, January 2014, 

http://www.sipri.org/research/security/afghanistan/central-asiasecurity/publications/SIPRI-OSFno1WP.pdf. 

24 

“Kazakhs Protest Against China’s Growing Influence,” RFE/RL, January 

30, 2010, 

http://www.rferl.org/content/Kazakhs_Protest_Against_Chinas_Growing_I 

nfluence/1944085.html. 

25 

International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Caucasus and 

Central Asia, October 2015, 

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2015/mcd/eng/pdf/cca1015p.pdf; 

Holly Elliyat, “Why China’s Slowdown Should Not Worry Russia,” CNBC, 

November 3, 2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/03/chinas-slowdownshould-not-worry-russia.html. 

26 

Heather A. Conley and Caroline Rohloff, “The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s 

Strategic Reach to the Arctic,” CSIS, August 2015, 

http://csis.org/files/publication/150826_Conley_NewIceCurtain_Web.pdf. 

27 

Stephen Blank, “China Shapes a New Asian Order,” Atlantic- 

Community.org, October 2, 2009, http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/index/view/China_Shapes_a_New_Asian_Order. 

28 

Zhou Yan and Wang Qian, “Turkmenistan to Expand Natural Gas Supply 

to China,” China Daily, November 25, 2011, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011- 

11/25/content_14159921.htm.


29 

“Turkmenistan Supplied 125 bcm of Gas to China,” Natural Gas Europe, 

September 28, 2015, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkmenistansupplied-125-bcm-gas-to-china-25610. 

30 

Catherine Putz, “Russia’s Gazprom Stops Buying Gas from 

Turkmenistan,” The Diplomat, January 6, 2015, 

http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/russias-gazprom-stops-buying-gas-fromturkmenistan/. 

31 

Michael Levyveld, “China-Russia Project Stalls as Energy Prices Plunge,” 

Radio Free Asia, January 25, 2016, 

http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/china-russia- 

01252016152633.html. 

32 

Linda Jakobson, Paul Holton, Dean Knox and Jingchao Peng, China’s 

Energy and Security Relations with Russia: Hopes, Frustrations and 

Uncertainties, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute, October 2011, pp. 26–28. 

33 

Ibid, pp.29–31. 

34 

Michael Lelyveld, “Doubts Rise on Russia-China Gas Deal,” Radio Free 

Asia, April 6, 2015, 

http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/doubts-rise-onrussia-china-gas-deal-04062015110032.html. 

35 

Ibid. 

36 

“China Says to Offer $10 Billion in Loans to SCO Member States,” 

Reuters, June 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-sco-loansidUSBRE85602920120607. 

37 

John C. K. Daly, “Analysis: China Increases Stake in Kazakh Energy 

Assets,” UPI, April 28, 2009, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy- 

Industry/2009/04/28/Analysis-China-increases-stake-in-Kazakh-energyassets/51441240959501/.


38 

Chris Rickleton, “By Opposing SCO Development Bank, Is Russia Biggest 

Loser?” EurasiaNet.org, March 25, 2015, 

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72701; “Russia proposes to create SCO 

development bank,” The Caspian Times, December 1, 2015, 

http://www.thecaspiantimes.com/russia-proposes-to-create-scodevelopment-bank/. 

39 

Vladimir Putin, “New Integration Project for Eurasia – A Future Which is 

Being Born Today,” in Russian, Izvestia, October 3, 2011, 

www.izvestia.ru/news/502761. 

40 

Pew Research Center, Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in 

Former Soviet Union, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, December 5, 

2011, http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/12/05/confidence-in-democracyand-capitalism-wanes-in-former-soviet-union/. 

41 

Richard Weitz, “Putin’s Plan for Eurasia,” Analyst, CACI Analyst, Central 

Asia-Caucasus Institute, November 16, 2011, 

http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5667. 

42 

Margarita Assenova, “Kazakhstan Expands Economic Cooperation with 

Russia, but Guards Own Interests,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 10, 

Issue 207, November 18, 2013, 


cache=1#.Vt4zJMc4nVo. 

43 

Erica Marat, “Russia Seeks Long-Term Military Presence In Tajikistan 

and Kyrgyzstan’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 8, Number 174, 



5D=38436&cHash=ad2e1380973746a723ae4a92df4050e2; Abdujalil 

Abdurasulov, “CIS summit: Russia to Bolster Central Asia Military,” BBC, 

October 16, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34538051. 

44 

Evgeniya Chaykovskaya, “Russia to Extend Tajikistan Military Base Lease 

by 50 Years,” The Moscow News, September 2, 2011, 

http://themoscownews.com/international/20110902/188999237.html.


45 

Catherine Putz, “Why Is Russia Cutting Troops in Tajikistan?” Russia 

Insider, February 5, 2016, http://russia-insider.com/en/politics/why-russiacutting-troops-tajikistan/ri12652. 

46 

World Drug Report 2010, UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and 

Crime (UNODC), 

https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/1.2_The_global_heroi 

n_market.pdf. 

47 

World Drug Report 2010; World Drug Report 2015; “In-depth Mid-Term 

evaluation of the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring 

Countries 2011–2015,” UNODC, March 2015, 

http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/indepth- 

evaluations/2015/RP_Afghanistan_Neighbouring_Countries_In- 

Depth_Evaluation_Report_April_2015.pdf. 

48 

Alexander Gabuev and Kabay Karabekov, “Almazbek Atambayev Starts 

Fulfilling Promises to Russia,” in Russian, Kommersant, November 18, 

2011, http://kommersant.ru/doc/1818153. 

49 

Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “CIS summit: Russia to Bolster Central Asia 

Military,” BBC, October 16, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe- 

34538051. 

50 

Alexander Gabuev and Kabay Karabekov, “Almazbek Atambayev Starts 

Fulfilling Promises to Russia,” in Russian, Kommersant, November 18, 

2011, http://kommersant.ru/doc/1818153. 

51 

“Central Asian Armies Start Exercises to Counter Potential Arab Springstyle 

Unrest,” Telegraph, September 20, 2011, 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/tajikistan/8777123/Centr 

al-Asian-armies-start-exercises-to-counter-potential-Arab-Spring-styleunrest.html. 

52 

Ted Galen Carpenter, “Caught in the Middle: Beijing’s Reaction to US- 

Russian Tensions,” ChinaUSFocus.org, November 10, 2014, 

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/caught-in-the-middlebeijings-reaction-to-us-russian-tensions/#sthash.5cCDXe21.dpuf.


53 

See more about the Russian minorities in Central Asia in Sébastien 

Peyrouse, The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and 

Language, Occasional Paper #297, Woodrow Wilson International Center 

for Scholars, 2008, 

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/OP297.pdf; Alexander 

Shustov, “Русский Mир Средней Азии Сжимается,” Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta, February 1, 2016, http://www.ng.ru/courier/2016-02- 

01/11_asia.html; Paul Goble, “Ethnic Russians Leaving Central Asia and 

With Them, Putin’s Hopes for Influence,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 

13, Issue 22, February 2, 2016, 

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news% 

5d=45053&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=827&no_cache=1#.VuIJ-Mc4nR1. 

54 

Fabio Belafatti, “Ethnic Tensions in Central Asia: Autochthonous and 

Russian Minorities,” Geopolitika, October 3, 2014, 

http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=6569. 

55 

George Voloshin, “Russian-Kazakhstani Relations: A Return of Moscow’s 

Neo-Imperialist Rhetoric,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 38, 


http://www.jamestown.org/regions/centralasia/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bpointe 

r%5D=6&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42026&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D= 

53&cHash=13ea51189321a0e0a16cd64733c63f0f#.Vua5u5MrLfY. 

56 

Dmitry Shlapentokh, “Kazakhstan and the EEU,” CACI Analyst, March 4, 

2015, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analyticalarticles/item/13156-kazakhstan-and-the-eeu.html. 

57 

Simon Denyer, “China bypasses American ‘New Silk Road’ with Two if its 

Own,” The Washington Post, October 14, 2013, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-bypasses- 

american-new-silk-road-with-two-if-its-own/2013/10/14/49f9f60c-3284- 

11e3-ad00-ec4c6b31cbed_story.html; “Major Outcomes of the Foreign 

Policy Activities of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2015 and Priorities for 

2016,” Speech by Erlan Idrissov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 


http://www.mfa.kz/index.php/en/component/content/article/17-minister-


s-blog/5601-major-outcomes-of-the-foreign-policy-activities-of-therepublic-of-kazakhstan-in-2015-and-priorities-for-2016. 

58 

Syed Adnan and Athar Bukhari, “Cooperative threat reduction: Case 

study of Kazakhstan – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, June 13, 2011, 

http://www.eurasiareview.com/13062011-cooperative-threat-reductioncase-study-of-kazakhstan-analysis/. 

59 

David E. Hoffman, “How U.S. Removed Half a Ton of Uranium From 

Kazakhstan,” The Washington Post, September 21, 2009, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002881.html?sid=ST200909200 

2315. 

60 

ATOM Project official website, http://www.theatomproject.org/en/. 

61 

“Прецедент ‘Защиты Русскоязычных Граждан в Крыму’ Крайне 

Опасен, Поэтому в Вопросах Украины Казахстан не Может Встать на 

Сторону России - Эксперты,” CA-NEWS, March 12, 2014, http://canews.org/news:1102573. 

62 

The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/03/10/readout-president-s-call-president-nazarbayevkazakhstan. 

63 

Official website of the Kazakh President (Akorda), 

http://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/international_community/phone_calls/pa 

ge_216113_telefonnyi-razgovor-s-prezidentom-rossiiskoi-federatsiivladimirom-putinym. 

64 

“В вопросе противостояния Запада и России необходимо «остыть» и 

отойти от обвинений, угроз и санкций - Президент РК Н.Назарбаев,” 

March 25, 2014, KazInform, http://inform.kz/rus/article/2642060; Joanna 

Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Ukraine Crisis Cements Astana In Russia’s Orbit,” 

EurasiaNet, April 1, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68218. 

65 

The statement was subsequently taken off the website of Kazakhstan’s 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but remained on the website of Kazakhstan’s


embassy in Moscow. “Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 

Kazakhstan on the Referendum in Crimea,” March 18, 2014, 

http://www.kazembassy.ru/en/mpolitika/6681-2014-03-18-16-10-33; 

“MFA’s Statement on Referendum in the Crimea,” KazInform.kz, March 19, 

2014, http://mfa.gov.kz/en/#!/news/article/13803. 

66 

Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Ukraine Crisis Cements Astana In Russia’s 

Orbit,” EurasiaNet, April 1, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68218. 

67 

Committee on Statistics, Ministry of National Economy of the Republic 

of Kazakhstan, Population by Ethnicity on January 1, 2014, 

http://www.stat.gov.kz. 

68 

“Kazakh Foreign Ministry Protests Zhirinovsky Comments,” RFE/RL, 

February 24, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstanzhirinovsky/25275475.html; 

“Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry to send a note 

to Russia,” TengriNews.kz, February 20, 2014, 

http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstans-Foreign-Ministry-tosend-a-note-to-Russia-26193/; 

George Voloshin, “Russian-Kazakhstani 

Relations: A Return of Moscow’s Neo-Imperialist Rhetoric,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 38, February 27, 2014, 

http://www.jamestown.org/regions/centralasia/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bpointe 

r%5D=6&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42026&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D= 

53&cHash=13ea51189321a0e0a16cd64733c63f0f#.Vua5u5MrLfY. 

69 

Bruce Pannier, “A Tale Of Russian Separatism In Kazakhstan,” RFE/RL, 

August 3, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/qishloq-ovozi-kazakhstanrussian-separatism/25479571.html. 

70 

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Languages, Article 4, July 1997, 

http://www.usefoundation.org/view/780. 

71 

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Section I, Article 7, 

http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=256278. 

72 

Ibid.


73 

On the Russians in Kazakhstan see Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: 

Unfulfilled Promise? (Revised Edition), Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 2010; Sébastien Peyrouse, “Nationhood and the 

Minority Question in Central Asia. The Russians in Kazakhstan,” Europe- 

Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3, May, 2007, pp. 481–501; Sébastien Peyrouse, 

The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language, 

Occasional Paper 297, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for 

International Scholars, 2008, 

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/OP297.pdf; Mikhail 

Alexandrov, Uneasy Alliance: Relations Between Russia and Kazakhstan in 

the Post-Soviet Era, 1992–1997, Greenwood Press, 1999. 

74 

Ian MacWilliam, “Kazakhs Protest Cossack Border Guards,” The Moscow 

Times, April 17, 1997, 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kazakhs-protest-cossackborder-guards/308552.html. 

75 

Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise? (Revised Edition), 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, p.79–80. 

76 

Igor Rotar, “The Cossack Factor in Ukrainian War,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 149, August 13, 2014, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42747; 

George Voloshin, “Kazakhstani Cossacks in Media Spotlight Because of 

Ukraine Crisis,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 147, August 11, 

2014, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42739. 

77 

“Казаки Казахстана: Россия заплатит нам за геноцид!” (Cossacks of 

Kazakhstan: Russia Will Repay Us for the Genocide), Yvision.kz (blog), May 

30, 2013, http://yvision.kz/post/355094. 

78 

Daniel Sneider, “Russian Politicians Stump with Nationalist Rhetoric,” 

The Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 1993, 

http://www.csmonitor.com/1993/1129/29013.html. 

79 

Sébastien Peyrouse, “Nationhood and the Minority Question in Central 

Asia. The Russians in Kazakhstan,” 2007.


80 

Committee on Statistics, Ministry of National Economy of Kazakhstan, 

Population by Ethnicity on January 1, 2014, http://www.stat.gov.kz. 

81 

Committee on Statistics, Ministry of National Economy of Kazakhstan, 

Population, http://www.stat.gov.kz. 

82 

Compare with the case of Macedonia, where the Albanian minority 

represents 25% of the population. An armed insurgency in 2001 pushed the 

government to implement sweeping constitutional and legal reforms to 

provide for adequate minority rights and political representation for the 

Albanians. On the one hand, Macedonia is comparable to Kazakhstan as a 

young state that came out of the breakup of a federation (Yugoslavia). On the 

other hand, the Albanian minority in Macedonia is young, dynamic and 

growing, while the Russian minority in Kazakhstan is shrinking, aging, and 

losing the young and better-educated to emigration. However, there is a 

significant difference in the absolute numbers: the sheer size of 3.7 million 

Russians in Kazakhstan is hardly comparable to about 500,000 Albanians in 

Macedonia. Regardless of the differences, the presence of a larger than 20% 

strong minority in any nation state requires widespread provisions for 

securing adequate political representation, including access to elected 

positions, public sector jobs, proportionate inclusion in law enforcement and 

representation in the judiciary. 

83 

Michael Birnbaum, “In Kazakhstan, Fears of Becoming the Next 

Ukraine,” The Washington Post, May 2, 2015, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-kazakhstan-fears-of- 

becoming-the-next-ukraine/2015/05/01/10f7e73c-e878-11e4-8581- 

633c536add4b_story.html?tid=a_inl; “Kazakhstan Toughens Punishment 

for Separatism,” TengriNews, April 8, 2014, 

http://en.tengrinews.kz/laws_initiatives/Kazakhstan-toughens-punishmentfor-separatism-252777/; 

Catherine Putz, “Separatism Charge Lands Young 

Kazakh in Jail,” The Diplomat, November 19, 2015, 

http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/separatism-charge-lands-young-kazakhin-jail/. 

84 

Всероссийский молодёжный форум «Селигер-2014», Kremlin.ru, 

August 29, 2014, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46507.


85 

Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan Makes Geopolitical Point With Statehood 

Celebrations,” EurasiaNet, September 11, 2015, 


86 

Interfax, Tengrinews.kz, October 25, 2013. 

87 

“Kazakhstan May leave EEU if its Interests are Infringed: Nazarbayev,” 

TengriNews, August 27, 2014, 

http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-may-leave-EEU-if-itsinterests-are-infringed-255722/; 

David Trilling, “As Kazakhstan’s Leader 

Asserts Independence, Did Putin Just Say, ‘Not So Fast’?” EurasiaNet, 

August 30, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69771. 

88 

Julia Kusznir, “Russia’s borders: Moscow’s long alliance with Kazakhstan 

is strong but not unbreakable,” The Conversation, January 20, 2015, 

http://theconversation.com/russias-borders-moscows-long-alliance-withkazakhstan-is-strong-but-not-unbreakable-36457. 

89 

“Товарооборот стран ЕАЭС в I квартале упал на 21%” (Trade 

Turnover in EEU declined by 21% in the First Quarter of 2015), News.am, 

May 5, 2015, http://news.am/rus/news/266881.html. 

90 

Vladislav Vorotnikov, “Kazakhstan and Russia in Meat Dispute,” Global 

Meat News, April 30, 2015, http://www.globalmeatnews.com/Industry- 

Markets/Kazakhstan-and-Russia-in-meat-dispute; Sergei Gretsky, 

“Hanging in The Trade Balance: Is Free Trade a Curse for Kazakhstan?,” 

CACI Analyst, June 10, 2015, http://cacianalyst.org/publications/analyticalarticles/item/13228-hanging-in-the-trade-balance-is-free-trade-a-curse-forkazakhstan?.html. 

91 

Birgit Brauer, “The Cost of Black Tuesday for Kazakhstan,” CACI 

Analyst, March 19, 2014, 

http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12934-thecost-of-black-tuesday-for-kazakhstan.html. 

92 

“Bank Deposits Show Kazakhs Fear Another Devaluation,” BNE 

InteliNews, February 12, 2015, http://www.intellinews.com/bne-chart-bankdeposits-show-kazakhs-fear-another-devaluation-


500443657/?source=kazakhstan&archive=bne; Nate Schenkkan, “Impact of 

the Economic Crisis in Russia on Central Asia,” Russian Analytical Digest, 

No. 165, March 17, 2015, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-165.pdf. 

93 

Birgit Brauer, “The Cost of Black Tuesday for Kazakhstan,” CACI 

Analyst, March 19, 2014. 

94 

“Kazakhstan: Adjusting to Low Oil Prices, Challenging Times Ahead,” 

The World Bank, Fall 2015, 

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kazakhstan/publication/economicupdate-fall-2015. 

95 

U.S. Energy Information Administration, 

http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf. 

96 

Najia Badykova, “A New Era for Caspian Oil and Gas,” CSIS, February 

13, 2015, http://csis.org/publication/new-era-caspian-oil-and-gas. 

97 

“Caucasus and Central Asia: Oil Price Decline and Regional Spillovers 

Darken the Outlook,” International Monetary Fund, May 2015, 

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2015/mcd/eng/pdf/cca0515.pdf. 

98 

Nate Schenkkan, “A Perfect Storm in Central Asia,” January 22, 2016, 

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/22/a-perfect-storm-in-central-asia/. 

99 

Malika Rustem, “Putin’s State Visit Reconfirms Kazakh-Russian Strategic 

Partnership,” Eurasia & World, October 18, 2015, 

http://astanatimes.com/2015/10/putins-state-visit-reconfirms-kazakhrussian-strategic-partnership/. 

100 

Ainis Razma, “The Geopolitics of Central Asia after the Annexation of 

Crimea in 2014,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, Volume 13, Issue 1, 

Pages 125–143, December 2015, 

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/lasr.2015.13.issue-1/lasr-2015-0007/lasr- 

2015-0007.xml.


101 

“Kazakh, Ukrainian Cooperation Road Map Signed In Astana,” Interfax- 

Kazakhstan, October 9, 2015, https://www.interfax.kz. 

102 

“Major Outcomes of the Foreign Policy Activities of the Republic of 

Kazakhstan in 2015 and Priorities for 2016,” Speech by Erlan Idrissov, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, December 30, 2015, 

http://www.mfa.kz/index.php/en/component/content/article/17-ministers-blog/5601-major-outcomes-of-the-foreign-policy-activities-of-therepublic-of-kazakhstan-in-2015-and-priorities-for-2016. 

103 

“Население Узбекистана превысило 31 миллион,” (The Population of 

Uzbekistan Exceeded 31 Million), Gazeta.uz, March 16, 2015, 

https://www.gazeta.uz/2015/03/16/statistics/; Worldometers, 

http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/uzbekistan-population/; 

Sébastien Peyrouse, The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, 

Politics, and Language, Occasional Paper 297, Washington, DC: Woodrow 

Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2008, 

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/OP297.pdf. 

104 

“Uzbek President Slams Russia-led Economic Union,” AFP, May 29, 

2014, www.afp.com. 

105 

“Russia Cozies Up to Uzbekistan With $865 Million Debt Write-Off,” 

The Moscow Times, December 10, 2014, 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=513096. 

106 

Ann Scott Tyson, “Russia and China Bullying Central Asia, U.S. Says,” 

The Washington Post, July 15, 2005, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/07/14/AR200 

5071401768.html. 

107 

Jim Nichol, Uzbekistan's Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: 

Context and Implications, Congressional Research Service, October 7, 2005, 

UNT Digital Library. 

http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7519/. 

108 

Margarita Assenova, “Uzbekistan Is Running Out of Time,” 

Internationale Politik, no. 3, 2005, pp. 56–60. Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 2005, p. 52–


56; Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent 

Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 

2005, 

http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2005_akiner 

_violence-in-andijan-13-may-2005.pdf; AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing 

Andijan: The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek Relations, The Jamestown 

Foundation, June 2007, 

http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Jamestown-Andijan_01.pdf. 

109 

Farkhod Tolipov, “Uzbekistan Without the CSTO,” CACI Analyst, 



uzbekistan-without-the-csto.html. 

110 

Zabikhulla Saipov, “New Foreign Policy Strategy Paper Codifies 

Uzbekistan’s Reluctance Toward Restrictive Alliances,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Volume 9, Issue 153, August 10, 2012, 


cache=1#.VwsmHBIrLfY; Farkhod Tolipov, “Uzbekistan’s New Foreign 

Policy Concept: No Base, No Blocks but National Interests First,” CACI 

Analyst, September 5, 2012, http://cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5829. 

111 

Olga Sokolay, “Николай Бордюжа: Казахстан – генератор идей в 

сфере коллективной безопасности” (Nikolay Bordyuzha: Kazakhstan— 

Generator of Ideas in Collective Security), Vlast.kz, March 18, 2015, 

https://vlast.kz/politika/nikolaj_bordjuzha_kazahstan_generator_idej_v_sfe 

re_kollektivnoj_bezopasnosti-10203.html. 

112 

John C. K. Daly, “Russia Shutters Northern Distribution Network,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue111, June 15, 2015, 


5D=44034&cHash=a612458b880c0fa6959388e9b2380789#.VxJKgRIrLfY. 

113 

Navbahor Imamova, “US-Central Asia/Uzbekistan: Exclusive Interview 

with Daniel Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central 

Asia,” Voice of America, January 21, 2015, 

http://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/us-central-asia-dan-rosenbluminterview/2607884.html.


114 

“The Position of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Situation in Ukraine 

and the Crimean issue,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 

Uzbekistan, March 25, 2014, 

http://www.mfa.uz/en/press/news/2014/03/1529/. 

115 

Umida Hashimova, “Online Commentary in Uzbekistan Divided on 

Crimea,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 82, May 2, 2014, 


cache=1#.VwquLRIrLfY; “Узбекистан не признал Крым частью России,” 

(Uzbekistan Did Not Recognize Crimea as Part of Russia), OpenTown.org, 

March 26, 2014, https://www.opentown.org/news/30853/. 

116 

Gulnoza Saidazimova, “Uzbekistan: Shadowy Group Agitates For 'Free 

Karakalpakstan',” RFE/RL, April 5, 2008, 6 

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079744.html. 

117 

Ainis Razma, “ The Geopolitics of Central Asia after the Annexation of 

Crimea in 2014,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, Volume 13, Issue 1, 

Pages 125–143, December 2015, 

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/lasr.2015.13.issue-1/lasr-2015-0007/lasr- 

2015-0007.xml; Slavomír Horák, “Separatism in Uzbekistan? 

Karakalpakstan after Crimea,” CACI Analyst, may 21, 2014, 

http://cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12979- 

separatism-in-uzbekistan?-karakalpakstan-after-crimea.html. 

118 

All-Union Census 1970 and 1989, National Composition of the 

Population of the Republics of the USSR, Демоскоп Weekly, Demoscope.ru, 

http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=4. 

119 

Sébastien Peyrouse, The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, 

Politics, and Language, 2008; “Население Узбекистана превысило 31 

миллион,” (The Population of Uzbekistan Exceeded 31 Million), Gazeta.uz, 

March 16, 2015. 

120 

“Русские в Узбекистане: хуже некуда,” (The Russians in Uzbekistan: 

Worse than Ever), Rosbalt, April 1, 2013, 

http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2013/04/01/1112454.html.


121 

Paul Goble, “Ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan Under Pressure to Leave,” 

Window on Eurasia, April 3, 2013, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/04/window-on-eurasiaethnic-russians-in.html. 

122 

Bruce Pannier, “Uzbek Broadcasters Set to Self-Destruct,” RFE/RL, 

http://www.rferl.org/content/qishloq-ovozi-uzbekistan-broadcasters-selfdestruct/25361053.html. 

123 

“Uzbek-Russian trade hits record high in 2013 - envoy,” 12uz.com, 

March 1, 2014, http://www.12uz.com. 

124 

“Lukoil Boosts Investment in Uzbekistan 38% to $660 mln in 2013,” 

Interfax, March 11, 2014, Interfax, http://interfax.com/. 

125 

Paolo Sorbello, “Yes, Uzbekistan is Putin’s Friend,” The Diplomat, 

December 15, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/yes-uzbekistan-isputins-friend/. 

126 

“Duma Ratifies Protocol to Include Uzbekistan in CIS Free Trade Zone,” 

Interfax, Mar 21, 2014, http://www.interfax.com/. 

127 

Central Bank of Russia, Personal Remittances by CIS countries in 2011- 

2015, http://www.cbr.ru/Eng/statistics/?PrtId=svs. 

128 

TradeEconomics.com, 

http://www.tradingeconomics.com/uzbekistan/gdp. 

129 


2015. 

130 

Central Bank of Russia, Official Exchange Rates RUB/USD, 

http://www.cbr.ru/. 

131 

“Продажи GM Uzbekistan в РФ за 11 месяцев снизились на 47%” 

(Sales of GM Uzbekistan in Russia for 11 months dropped by 47%), 

Gazeta.uz, December 8, 2015, https://www.gazeta.uz/2015/12/08/gmuz/.


132 

Ziyodullo Parpiev, “Who is behind remittances? A Profile of Uzbek 

Migrants,” UNDP, March 5, 2015, 

http://www.uz.undp.org/content/uzbekistan/en/home/ourperspective/ourp 

erspectivearticles/2015/03/05/who-is-behind-remittances--a-profile-ofuzbek-migrants.html. 

133 

“Asian Development Outlook (ADO) 2016: Asia’s Potential Growth,” 

Asian Development Bank, March 2016, 

http://www.adb.org/countries/uzbekistan/economy; “Caucasus and Central 

Asia: Oil Price Decline and Regional Spillovers Darken the Outlook,” 

Internationa Monetary Fund, May 2015, 

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2015/mcd/eng/pdf/cca0515.pdf. 

134 

Demir Azizov, “Uzbek President Says Trust is Most Important Element 

in Strengthening Int’l Cooperation”, Trend, May 22, 2014, 

http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/uzbekistan/2276997.html. 

135 

“China and Uzbekistan Sign Agreement on Jointly Building the Silk 

Road Economic Belt,” Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, 

June 18, 2015, 

http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201506/2 

0150601016814.shtml. 

136 

“Узбекистан снизит поставки газа в Россию и увеличит в Китай,” 

(Uzbekistan will Reduce Gas Supplies to Russia and Increase to China), RIA 

Novosti, August 10, 2014, 

http://ria.ru/world_economy/20141008/1027447820.html#ixzz46BuRQg8E. 

137 

Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, Report of the Independent International 

Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, 

May 3, 2011, http://www.k-ic.org/en/news/364-kic-final-reportpublished.html. 

138 

Kyrgyzstan: An Uncertain Trajectory, International Crisis Group, Europe 

and Central Asia Briefing N°76, September 2015, 

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/b076- 

kyrgyzstan-an-uncertain-trajectory.aspx.


139 

Roman Mogilevskii, “Re-export Activities in Kyrgyzstan: Issues and 

Prospects,” Working Paper 9, University of Central Asia, 2012. 

140 

Richard Weitz, “The Customs Union and Eurasian Union: A Primer,” in 

S. Frederick Starr and Svante Cornell editors, Putin's Grand Strategy: The 

Eurasian Union and Its Discontents, September 2014, 

http://www.silkroadstudies.org/publications/silkroad-papers-andmonographs/item/13053-putins-grand-strategy-the-eurasian-union-andits-discontents.html; 

Victoria Panfilova, “The Customs Union is bursting 

but not expanding,” Vestnik Kavkaza, October 27, 2013, 

http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/46840.html. 

141 

“Kyrgyz PM Says Joining Customs Union Is ‘Right Step’,” RFE/RL's 

Kyrgyz Service, April 17, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyz-pmsays-joining-customs-union-is- 

right-step/25352983.html. 

142 


Economic Woes,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 13, Issue 42, March 2, 

2016, 


tnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=941df08ef9e8a6c42fbc27a5f39455a0#.V 

xWfdRIrLfY. 

143 



144 

World Bank, Personal Remittances Received, 

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS. 

145 

“Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook,” The 

World Bank, October 2015, 

http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2015/10/1027614453531 

57305/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief25.pdf. 

146 


Economic Woes,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 2, 2016.


147 

“Experts Estimate Amount of Financial Aid of Russia to Kyrgyzstan since 

2008,” 24.kg, April 2, 2016, http://www.eng.24.kg/economics/179154- 

news24.html; George Voloshin, “Looming Long-Term Economic Problems 

Stem From Kyrgyzstan’s EEU Membership,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 

Volume 13, Issue 28, February 10, 2016, 


5D=45086&cHash=01d74b039c6f72ce6e69663a6f266d19#.VxXUuxIrLfY. 

148 

Philip P. Pan, “Russia is said to have fueled unrest in Kyrgyzstan,” The 

Washington Post, April 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/11/AR2010041103827.html. 

149 

Stefanie Ott, “Russia tightens control over Kyrgyzstan,” The Guardian, 


http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/18/russia-tightens-controlover-kyrgyzstan. 

150 

Umida Hashimova, “Kyrgyzstan Determined to Pursue Its Hydropower 

Plans With or Without Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 13, Issue 

10, January 15, 2016, 


cache=1. 

151 

“Russia Gives Kyrgyzstan $30M Lifeline,” EurasiaNet, March 6, 2016, 


152 

Joanna Paraszczuk, "Tajik IS Militants Threaten 'Jihad' At Home (Or 

Even In The Kremlin)," RFE/RL, March 23, 2015, 

http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-isis-islamic-extremismthreats/26915731.html. 

153 

Jim Nichol, Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, 

Congressional Research Service, September 25, 2013, p. 19, 

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/98-594.pdf. 

154 

International Crisis Group, Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats, 

Asia Report N°205, Bishkek and Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 

24, 2011, p. 7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-


asia/tajikistan/205%20Tajikistan%20- 

%20The%20Changing%20Insurgent%20Threats.pdf. 

155 

Zohra Ismail-Beben, “Framing the conflict in Khorog,” Registan, July 27, 

2012, 

http://registan.net/2012/07/27/framing-the-conflict-in-khorog/. 

156 

Contradicting reports claimed first that Gen. Gulmurod Khalimov was 

killed during an airstrike in Syria in June 2015 and later that he was 

relocated to a training camp in Iraq to prepare jihadists for attacks in 

Europe. See: “Gulmurod Khalimov Update – His Militant Views May Not 

Be a Recent Development,” Independent Strategy and Intelligence Study 

Group, July 22, 2015, http://isisstudygroup.com/?p=7760. 

157 

“Shuttered Tajik Islamic Party Branded As Terrorist Group,” RFE/RL, 

September 29, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-islamic-partyterrorist-organization/27277385.html. 

158 

Matthew Stein, Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security 

Activity, Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, May 22, 2015, 

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Central-Asian-Military- 

Events.pdf. 

159 

Catherine Putz, "Will There Be An Indian Air Base In Tajikistan?" The 

Diplomat, July 15, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/will-there-be-anindian-air-base-in-tajikistan/. 

160 

Alexander Sodiqov, “Russia Pressed To Pay For Its Military Base In 

Tajikistan,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 9, Issue 47, March 7, 2012, 


D=39107#.V0iQUpMrJPM; John C. K. Daly, “Tajikistan Entertains Indian 

Offer For Air Base,” Silk Road Reporters, July 17, 2015, 

http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2015/07/17/tajikistan-entertains-indianoffer-for-air-base/. 

161 

“Пограничники быстрого реагирования” (Rapid Reaction Border 

Guards), Kommersant, October 16, 2015, 

http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2834943.


162 

Ibid. 

163 

“Russian 201st Military Base in Tajikistan Ready to Deal with External 

Threats,” TojNews, February 27, 2014, http://tojnews.org/taj/. 

164 

“Tajikistanis Evaluate Russian Military Base Reinforcement,” TojNews, 

March 6, 2014, http://tojnews.org/taj/. 

165 

Russian Defense Official Says His Country to Help Bolster Tajik Armed 

Forces,” ITAR-TASS, January 27, 2015. 

166 

“Overall Strength of Russian Base in Tajikistan Will Reach 9,000 

Servicemen by 2020,” Asia-Plus, April 4, 2015, 

http://news.tj/en/news/overall-strength-russian-base-tajikistan-will-reach- 

9000-servicemen-2020; “Why Russia Will Send More Troops to Central 

Asia,” Stratfor, April 11, 2015, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/whyrussia-will-send-more-troops-central-asia. 

167 

“Why Russia Will Send More Troops To Central Asia,” Stratfor, April 11, 

2015. 

168 

“Russian Military Base in Tajikistan to be Downsized,” Asia-Plus Online, 

January 30, 2016, http://www.asiaplus.tj. 

169 

“Russia Will Cut Defense Budget by 5 Percent in 2016, RIA Reports,” 

Reuters, March 6, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-defensebudget-idUSKCN0W80TL. 

170 

“Russian Officer Suspected of Killing Tajik Woman Ruled Sane,” Asia- 

Plus, February 2, 2016, http://news.tj/en/news/russian-officer-suspectedkilling-tajik-woman-ruled-sane. 

171 

Paul Goble, “Moscow’s Failure to React to Tajikistan’s De-Russification 

Said Reflection of Larger Problems,” Window on Eurasia, April 30, 2016, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/04/moscows-failure-to-reactto-tajikistans.html. 

172 

Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, London, Hurst & 

Company/ Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 198,


https://www.academia.edu/5499030/Russians_in_the_former_Soviet_repub 

lics. 

173 

All-Union Census 1970 and 1989, National Composition of the 

Population of the Republics of the USSR, Демоскоп Weekly, Demoscope.ru, 

http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=4. 

174 

“Khatlon Press Online Supports Russia’s ‘Aggressive’ Behavior Toward 

West,” Khatlon Press, March 6, 2014, http://www.khatlonpress.tj/. 

175 

Gulnora Amirshoeva, “Tajiks Alarmed by Russian Troop Withdrawal,” 

IWPR, February 21, 2005, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/tajiks-alarmedrussian-troop-withdrawal. 

176 

“Facebook Users Fear Russia Could Use ‘Ukraine Option’ in Tajikistan,” 

March 12, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/groups/platformatj/. 

177 

Gulnora Amirshoeva, “Tajiks Alarmed by Russian Troop Withdrawal,” 

IWPR, February 21, 2005. 

178 

David Trilling, “Tajikistan: Migrant Remittances Now Exceed Half of 

GDP,” EurasiaNet, April 15, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68272. 

179 



180 

Vladimir Socor, “Bluff in Substance, Brutal in Form: Moscow Warns 

Against Trans-Caspian Project,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, vo. 8, no. 217, 

November 30, 2011, 


D=38723. 

181 

“Ashgabat Not Happy with Moscow’s Attitude toward trans-Caspian 

Pipeline Project,” in Russian, Interfax-Azerbaijan, October 19, 2011, 

http://interfax.az/view/476239; Turkmenistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Press Release, Turkmenistan State News Service, October 18, 2011.


183 

Zhou Yan and Wang Qian, “Turkmenistan to Expand Natural Gas 

Supply to China,” China Daily, November 25, 2011, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011- 

11/25/content_14159921.htm. 

184 

Catherine Putz, “Russia’s Gazprom Stops Buying Gas from 

Turkmenistan,” The Diplomat, January 6, 2015, 

http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/russias-gazprom-stops-buying-gas-fromturkmenistan/. 

185 

“Turkmenistan Supplied 125 bcm of Gas to China,” Natural Gas Europe, 

September 28, 2015, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkmenistansupplied-125-bcm-gas-to-china-25610.

7. Conclusion: Russia’s Future and 

Western Responses 

This concluding chapter will consider the potential for internal 

instability in the Russian Federation that will impact on Moscow’s 

expansionist project, examine Western responses to Russia’s drive for 

regional re-imperialization, and offer several concrete policy 

recommendations for Western governments. 

Instead of confronting Russia’s mounting economic, social, ethnic, 

demographic, and regional troubles, the Putin administration has 

increasingly incited anti-Western sentiments and engaged in foreign 

policy offensives to distract and mobilize Russian society. As the 

economy continues to decline and state revenues diminish, the 

country could be faced with several domestic convulsions. However, 

such scenarios will not necessarily lessen the Kremlin’s imperial 

ambitions but could actually inflame them, as a more desperate 

regime tries to effectively pursue its foreign policy while preventing 

instability and state disintegration. 

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014, 

official Western perceptions of the Putin administration have 

changed dramatically. It is now more accurately viewed as a 

revisionist, revanchist, and aggressive regime instead of a pragmatic 

and cooperative power. Unlike during the Cold War status quo and 

the post–Cold War rapprochement, the consequences of the conflict 

between Russia and the West will be less predictable and stable. This


will have repercussions for the future of NATO and the EU, by testing 

their political unity and strategic reach, as well as their willpower and 

capabilities vis-à-vis a belligerent Russia. Washington must also 

consider the prospect of a Russian implosion if imperial overstretch is 

coupled with long-term economic decline, growing social unrest, and 

territorial fracture. This would have major consequences for nearby 

regions and for Western institutions. 

Russia’s Uncertain Future 

Moscow’s pan-regional assertiveness disguises Russia’s mounting 

domestic problems, generated by a combination of deteriorating 

economic, social, demographic, ethnic, and regional conditions. The 

official crackdown on civil society, independent organizations, and 

Western influences is part of a broader strategy to eliminate dissent 

and increase support for President Vladimir Putin at a time of alleged 

national danger in which an assortment of foreign scapegoats are 

animated by state propaganda. Russia’s propaganda camouflages the 

failings of the Putinist system and blames its problems on an 

assortment of external enemies. 

Some observers perceive creeping chaos in Russia that will 

increasingly affect its key institutions. For instance, the FSB and other 

security agencies may become less disciplined, with some elements 

not necessarily blindly implementing Kremlin policy. 1 Because of the 

fusion of state and economy, corruption has spread so deeply that it is 

reportedly factionalizing the security organs and making them more 

unpredictable and uncontrollable. This can result in spreading 

ungovernability despite the formal top-down structure of the 

Kremlin’s “vertical of power” within Russia’s “managed democracy.” 

The authoritarian system is growing brittle, as corrupt loyalists 

surround Putin without personal or ideological commitments to the 

President. 2 His ability to retain their loyalty rests above all on the

CONCLUSION | 463 

Kremlin’s control of substantial financial resources. With the 

economy contracting and oil revenues decreasing, this system could 

collapse because budgetary cuts will need to be undertaken that will 

alienate members of Putin’s inner circle. This could lead to an intense 

struggle for power and even a coup d’état by members of the elite who 

perceive a growing threat to their own security and wealth. Fissures 

may also appear between oligarchs reliant on international trade and 

investment and those who stand to gain from “import substitution” 

in the wake of the imposition of Western sanctions. 

On the hard economic front, Russia fell into recession during 2015 

and will remain so into 2016. The country has been battered by a 

combination of Western economic sanctions, the Kremlin’s ban on 

the import of agricultural products from the EU, and a plunge in the 

price of oil exports. In June 2015, Russia’s economic development 

ministry revised its GDP forecast for 2015 from a projected growth of 

1.2% to a drop of 0.8%. In July 2015, the IMF predicted that the 2015 

slump in GDP would reach 3.4%. 3 

US and EU sanctions were imposed during 2014 on dozens of Russian 

individuals and companies and several government-owned banks. As 

a result of these fiscal sanctions, state-owned banks have no access to 

credit in the West. Major Russian companies, including energy giants, 

are excluded from global capital markets and prevented from 

refinancing massive debts with Western lenders. They are now heavily 

reliant on the Russian state for dollar liquidity even though Russia’s 

central bank is trying to conserve its foreign reserves. 

The impact of Western sanctions was exacerbated significantly by a 

dramatic fall in global oil prices, from $110 a barrel in June 2014 to 

less than $50 a barrel in early 2015 and $42 a barrel by August 2015. 

In order to balance its budget, Russia needs oil prices at $80 a barrel, 

otherwise the economy will continue to contract. Indications are that 

crude prices will remain at under $60 a barrel through 2016, especially 

as Iranian supplies are likely to come on line. As a result of bad


investments, incompetent calculations, and escalating Western 

sanctions, the Kremlin’s favored company Gazprom is experiencing a 

steep decline in value. Since 2008, its market capitalization 

plummeted from $367.27 billion to $51.12 billion in August 2015. 4 

This illustrates the fate of Russia’s entire energy sector as the national 

economy shrivels. 

Capital flight from Russia has also drastically accelerated: the net 

outflow reached $32.6 billion during the first quarter of 2015. 5 In June 

2015, Russia’s Central Bank forecast that capital flight could exceed 

$131 billion by the end of the year, resulting in severe losses in tax 

revenues and domestic investment. Russia’s deteriorating market 

conditions have sparked an exodus of international investors. 

At the end of June 2015, EU foreign ministers extended the sanctions 

from the end of July 2015 until the close of January 2016, voicing 

dissatisfaction with Moscow in honoring the Minsk ceasefire 

agreement in Ukraine. 6 The core of the sanctions consisted of a ban 

on 11 Russian state-owned oil companies, banks, and defense firms 

from raising money in the EU’s capital markets or receiving loans 

from EU individuals or firms. Russia’s authorities declared that the 

import ban on EU agricultural products would also remain in effect 

while Western sanctions were maintained. Putin signed an order to 

extend Moscow’s counter-measures for a year, starting from June 24, 

2015. The Kremlin imposed its own sanctions against the EU, 

erroneously calculating that European farmers’ lobbies would 

pressure governments to rescind the sanctions against Russia. On 

September 2, 2015, the EU further extended the sanctions until March 

2016 to maintain pressure on Moscow to fully implement the Minsk 

ceasefire, including withdrawing all of its forces from Ukraine and 

returning control to Kyiv of the Ukrainian side of the border with 

Russia. 

The net effect of Putin’s domestic and international policies will 

include a prolonged economic downturn, falling investments,


diminishing living standards, rising unemployment, the withdrawal 

of migrant workers largely from Central Asia and the Caucasus, a 

decline in basic services and welfare benefits, and potential political, 

social, and regional unrest. According to the Economic Development 

Ministry, the economy contracted by 2.4% between January and April 

2015. 7 For the first time since Putin took office, real incomes have 

shrunk, with the government expecting the decline to reach 9.8% by 

the close of 2015. 

According to official statistics, more than three million Russians fell 

below the official poverty line in the first three months of 2015, as 

Russia’s economy fell into recession. 8 The number of people living 

below the poverty line rose from 19.8 million to 22.9 million in the 

course of one year, or 15.9% of the total population. While millions of 

Russians sink into destitution, in August 2015 the government burned 

hundreds of tons of EU food that evaded the Kremlin-imposed 

sanctions. Officials claim that by destroying the contraband Russia’s 

agricultural production will boom. The forbidden goods are presented 

as dangerous products designed to poison the Russian people. 

Meanwhile, the cost of living continues to soar due to inflation 

spurred by steep falls in the value of the ruble, which pushed up the 

cost of imported products and components. By August 2015, the 

Russian currency had plummeted by 44.8% against the dollar in one 

year, and with oil prices showing no signs of recovery, the ruble will 

continue to slide into 2016. 9 

The economic cul de sac is exacerbated by an aging and crumbling 

infrastructure. This includes Russia’s road and railway networks, 

electric power grid, and other energy distribution systems. The 

maintenance of this vital infrastructure is beset by problems, 

including official corruption that vastly raises costs, bureaucratic 

neglect and mismanagement, sloppy work habits, shrinking state 

funds, and the use of poor-quality materials. Budget cuts will also 

restrict Moscow’s capabilities in its planned military re-armament


program, although Putin’s great power ambitions may preclude any 

downsizing and will reverberate negatively on state spending in other 

sectors. 

On the regional front, growing public protests against declining 

economic conditions could contribute to ousting unpopular local 

governments. According to Moscow’s Institute of Social Policy, 

because of shrinking federal funds governments in many of Russia’s 

85 regions (including the illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol in 

2014) will have to impose drastic cutbacks in health, education, and 

housing, thus exacerbating social discontent. 10 In particular, several 

North Caucasus republics are almost completely dependent on 

revenues from the central government and are likely to suffer 

accordingly. 

The economic crisis and decreasing state revenues will exacerbate the 

competition for resources in a growing number of federal units. This 

can become manifest in tensions and conflicts between regions, 

ethnicities, religious and occupational groups, and challenge the 

survival of incumbent regional governments. In some regions, 

whether containing ethnic-Russian or non-Russian majorities, drastic 

financial cutbacks could spark demands for political autonomy, 

separation from the federal structure, or the creation of larger regions 

combining several federal units that would disassociate themselves 

politically and economically from Moscow. Some federal regions 

could then seek closer economic ties with neighboring states, such as 

China and Japan, or with multi-national organizations such as the EU. 

This would increase the influence of several neighboring countries, 

reduce Moscow’s leverage, and in some cases accelerate aspirations 

toward secession and statehood. 

Kaliningrad is a valuable example where long-term economic decline 

will challenge Kremlin control. 11 The three nearby Baltic countries 

plan to exit Russia’s unified energy system by 2020. Together with the 

closure of an energy plant in Kaliningrad, this could lead to the


collapse of economic activity in the Moscow-controlled exclave. 

Moreover, in 2016 Kaliningrad’s exports will no longer receive special 

treatment within the EU. As a result, some 900 enterprises in the 

region will close with 30,000 workers laid off. Putin ordered the 

government to accelerate the adoption of laws for the support of 

Kaliningrad’s hard-pressed industries, but the government has little 

money to allocate to any region. If Moscow cannot deal with the crisis, 

the Kaliningrad economy will slide into a deeper recession. This may 

activate groups that either want a special relationship for the territory 

with the EU or even complete separation, independence, and 

statehood. 

A strategy of structural reform and modernization of the Russian 

economy seems highly unlikely because of the absence of political will 

and a fear that this could dislodge the current regime. Other political 

possibilities for Russia include a popular revolt, similar to Ukraine in 

2014, culminating in the election of a democratic and internationally 

responsible administration or the installation of a more predatory 

nationalist regime. Spreading social and regional unrest could also 

paralyze the central government and lead to Russia’s fracture through 

administrative and territorial disintegration. Some Russian analysts 

are not convinced that economic deprivation will be sufficient to 

stimulate social revolt, as the public is largely passive and subservient 

to the state. Nonetheless, a combination of elite power struggles and 

regional dissatisfactions could undermine central control sufficiently 

to galvanize social protests in Moscow and other large cities in favor 

of regime change. 

External factors could also have a negative impact on Russia’s stability. 

For instance, growing criminality among the separatist leaders in the 

Donbas region of Ukraine is spilling over into Russia, with irregular 

fighters, criminal networks, and smuggled goods crossing the porous 

borders. 12 A huge spike in organized crime has been recorded in 

neighboring Russian oblasts and the security services are either in 

cahoots with the criminals or cannot control the separatists, with


some implicated in a spate of assassinations of particularly 

bothersome warlords from Donbas. 

The official encouragement of Russian ethno-nationalism, as evident 

in calls to defend Russian-speaking populations in neighboring states 

and to annex territories with sizeable ethnic-Russian populations, is 

likely to divide non-Russians from Russians and increase the appeal 

of anti-Muscovite nationalism. Furthermore, any attempts to 

transform the multi-ethnic Russian Federation into a Russian nation 

state, which could include the elimination of the 21 non-Russian 

ethno-national republics, can precipitate an escalation of ethnic and 

regionalist conflicts and provoke potential territorial fissures. In his 

comprehensive work on Eurasian polities, political scientist Henry E. 

Hale points out that seemingly strong authoritarian figures at the apex 

of the power pyramid can rapidly fall during a power struggle in the 

event of a major economic downturn or a loss in war. 13 

Mounting indignation over deteriorating economic conditions, 

coupled with the persistent denial of cultural, linguistic, and 

educational rights and the unrestrained corruption of the ruling elite, 

can also aggravate ethnic and religious conflicts. This would be 

especially explosive if Moscow turns to Russian nationalism or pan- 

Slavism to mobilize the public in the service of the regime. Russia’s 

estimated 20 million Muslims are periodically used as a domestic 

scapegoat by Kremlin propaganda, largely because of the ongoing 

insurgency in the North Caucasus. The annexation of Crimea has 

added another 300,000 Muslim Tatars who can become an additional 

source of anti-state militancy. 

About a quarter of Russia’s population of 143 million are non- 

Russians, and in many regions resentment against Moscow’s failing 

economic policies and repressive centralism is escalating. This is 

especially evident in the 21 ethnic republics, even where the titular 

ethnicity does not form a majority. In Siberia and the Far East, the 

ethnic-Russian population is steadily declining while the Chinese


proportion is growing, together with their political aspirations. Beijing 

is investing in a number of Russian border regions, including the 

North Caucasus, at a time when federal budget allocations are drying 

up. Local authorities will benefit from Chinese investments and are 

likely to pursue more intensive contacts and bypass Moscow’s 

interference. The option of sovereignty will thereby become 

increasingly attractive for several federal units. 

Russia’s financial troubles will negatively impact on its ability to 

continue supporting proxy regimes in separatist entities in Georgia, 

Moldova, and Ukraine. For instance, on June 17, 2015, the 

government of Abkhazia was informed that it would not receive a 

promised Russian aid payment of $91 million until 2016. 14 The 

legislature had passed Abkhazia’s annual budget expecting to receive 

this sum. In Transnistria, where 70% of the annual budget relies on 

subsidies from Moscow, budget revenues have dropped 30% since 

2014. Both entities may need to cut welfare payments, with the 

potential of social unrest that could destabilize them. Financial 

constraints are also reversing Russian real estate ownership in 

Bulgaria, Montenegro, and other locations, thereby reducing the 

extent of the “Russian World” in parts of Europe’s east. In the 

immediate neighborhood, Russia’s economic decline will become a 

strong disincentive for Russian-speaking populations to canvass for 

joining Russia and will undermine Putin’s empire-building 

enterprise. 

On the military front, in a display of global stature to compensate for 

its economic failures, the Putin clique is also engaged in the 

militarization of state and society. Russia’s defense budget is rapidly 

growing. In 2014, it amounted to €55.5 billion, a substantial increase 

from €30.2 billion in 2010. In total, Moscow intends to spend €404 

billion on the military between 2011 and 2020. Russian armed forces 

are also devoting significant resources to employing tactical and 

mobile nuclear missiles. This places Washington in a major dilemma 

whether to initiate a rearmament in US nuclear capacity in Europe or


risk a Russian propaganda victory concerning NATO’s 

vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, persistent Kremlin provocations and 

aggressive actions against neighbors could spark a renewed arms race 

with the West in which Russia, much like the Soviet Union, lacks the 

capacity to compete and could further bankrupt the economy. 

The Kremlin is also unnerved by the prospect of an EU-US free trade 

agreement (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership— 

TTIP) that would weaken Russia’s energy weapons as well as its 

economic stability. All EU members could ratify the accord by 2016. 15 

It will bring benefits both to producers and consumers on both sides 

of the Atlantic by reducing the price of imported goods with the lifting 

of bureaucratic barriers and tariffs. There would also be 

improvements in access to services in banking, insurance, and 

telecommunications. Moscow supports organizations in the West that 

campaign against such a free trade accord, whether leftists, greens, 

nationalist, or anti-globalists. Analogies can be made with the 

activities of “pacifist" movements in the West during the 1970s and 

1980s that were financed by Soviet intelligence agencies. The import 

of American shale gas and oil is now a major threat for Moscow, as 

the US exports these resources to states with which it has free trade 

agreements. Hence, the Americans can squeeze the Russians out of a 

sizeable portion of the European market. If US energy companies can 

operate more freely in the EU, this will further reduce Moscow’s 

revenues. 

On the neighborhood front, deteriorating economic conditions are 

also affecting Russia’s closest allies in the EEU. For instance, public 

protests in Armenia in June 2015 over the raising of electricity prices 

were symptomatic of brewing dissatisfaction with economic 

conditions and anger over corruption and unaccountability in the 

Armenian government. 16 Russian oligarchs with ties to the Kremlin 

monopolize big business in Armenia and the electricity network is 

wholly owned by Inter-RAO, a Russian energy company whose 

chairman, Igor Sechin, is a close friend of Putin.


Central Asian countries are also experiencing the effects of Russia’s 

economic decline and the fall in the value of the ruble. 17 For example, 

remittances of workers from Tajikistan laboring in Russia have 

dropped precipitously since 2014. Migrant remittances are equivalent 

to almost half of Tajikistan’s GDP. It is estimated that remittances sent 

from Russia to the CIS countries via money transfer agents in March 

2015 fell by about 42% compared to March 2014. Many migrants are 

now returning home with dim economic prospects. For instance, 

money sent home by Armenians working in Russia is a vital means of 

survival for many families; about 21% of Armenia’s economy relies on 

such remittances. 18 

Russia is also a major trading partner for the Central Asian 

economies, and exports to Russia have significantly contracted. 

Moreover, the decline of the ruble depreciates the Central Asian 

currencies, depletes their currency reserves, and raises the risks of 

inflation. In addition, the drop in global oil prices has impacted on 

Kazakhstan, a major oil producer, by significantly reducing its exports 

and tax revenues and diminishing its fiscal reserves. In the meantime, 

China is making greater inroads into Central Asia through trade and 

investment, especially in large infrastructure projects. It is also 

purchasing increasing amounts of Caspian Basin fossil fuels that will 

further divert the Central Asian economies away from Russia. 

In one of his four alternatives for Russia’s future, international 

relations scholar Richard J. Krickus outlines how the country could 

rapidly contract or even disintegrate, only in a much more violent 

manner than the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990–1991. 19 

Elaborating on this scenario, the prospects could include: violent 

power struggles between members of the ruling elite; the collapse of 

central authority; growing popular unrest because of falling living 

standards and shortages of products; regional turmoil generated by 

growing opposition to Moscow’s policies; military mutinies and the 

creation of private armies that splinter the country’s defense structure; 

gang warfare between criminal organizations that increase chaos and


ungovernability; the escalation of inter-ethnic disputes over power, 

territory, and resources; the proliferation of ethnic, religious, regional, 

and economic fiefdoms largely independent of the capital; an upsurge 

of violent jihadism among radicalized Muslims in different parts of 

the Federation, especially in the North Caucasus and the Middle 

Volga; the growth of terrorism, sabotage, and the destruction of 

Russia’s infrastructure; civil war in several parts of the country in 

escalating struggles for statehood; and the danger that weapons of 

mass destruction could fall into the hands of non-state militants. Such 

scenarios could also spill over and destabilize several countries along 

Russia’s strategic flanks. 

Western Responses 

The chill in the West’s relations with Moscow in the wake of the 

Russia-Ukraine war resembles a new Cold War, except that its results 

will be more difficult to anticipate. The Cold War was a frozen 

condition that left Europe divided between NATO and the Soviet Bloc 

while both sides avoided direct confrontation. The new epoch can be 

defined as a Shadow War in which the West and Russia are in 

perpetual competition to exert their influence and pursue their 

interests. Russia presents the most persistent security threat to the 

West because President Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperial goals 

undermine the stability of several regions from northern Europe to 

Central Asia, challenge NATO as a security provider, and undercut 

the EU project. Russia also establishes a dangerous precedent for other 

ambitious powers that may seek to test NATO and US resolve. 

There are three fundamental principles of the escalating Shadow War. 

First, Russia’s rulers no longer depict the country as a European state. 

They define Russia as a separate “Eurasian pole of power” defending 

itself against Western encroachment, proud of its anti-Americanism, 

and playing a vanguard role among all authoritarian or expansive 

governments that reject US influence.


Second, there is no longer a clear division of Europe into Western and 

Russian spheres. Instead, the stage is set for a prolonged struggle over 

states that are under pressure to join the Russian zone but whose 

populations are divided or whose governments do not possess the 

power to resist Moscow. The Kremlin even endeavors to subvert and 

suborn countries that are members of NATO and the EU, such as 

Bulgaria and Hungary. For instance, corrupt business deals with state 

officials are intended to influence the governments to adopt 

international positions favorable to Russia’s foreign policy. 

And third, various kinds of weapons are employed in the Shadow War 

to undermine the adversary, whether via energy, investment, 

propaganda, cyberspace, corruption, blackmail, or various 

paramilitary and military tools. Although US and EU officials claim 

that there is no zero-sum competition with Russia over the allegiance 

of any country, in reality the protagonists are competing over the 

future international alignments of a string of states in the Wider 

Europe and Central Asia. 

Putin’s Russia denounces Western policy as conflicting with its own 

historical and geostrategic claims that the post-Soviet countries form 

an essential part of the “Russian World” and must return under 

Moscow’s umbrella. This would not only entail a loss of national 

sovereignty, but also the adoption of a value system based on statism 

and authoritarianism. Russia is better prepared for the new Shadow 

War, as evident in its current international offensives. Unfortunately, 

the West is only emerging from its post–Cold War illusions and 

misdirected “peace dividends,” and needs to confront Moscow with 

the strength of its economic, political, cultural, social, intellectual, and 

security capacities. 

The European flank of NATO remains dependent on the US for its 

security, as its defense expenditures have been seriously depleted. 

Without American involvement, Europe would be unable to deter an 

increasingly belligerent Russia. Europe’s demilitarization over the last


decade has coincided with Russia’s military buildup. 20 The US 

provides 70% of all NATO defense spending, while Europe’s 

contribution to NATO’s military capability is at less than 25%, and the 

figure is dropping. Several countries have decimated their equipment 

to such an extent that they may be incapable of deploying more than 

a few thousand troops in the event of war. Meanwhile, Russia is 

rearming to the tune of $700 billion over the next decade and plans to 

introduce the next generation of armor, aircraft, and missiles and to 

modernize its nuclear forces. 

Two fundamentally contrasting strategies exist for US and NATO 

policy toward a resurgent Russia: imperial accommodation or trans- 

Atlantic assertiveness. In the former approach, a number of Putin 

appeasers or those urging patience and non-escalation have been 

proposing another “reset” or even a “détente” with Moscow. 21 They 

operate on the premise that Russia possesses some distinct special 

interests toward its numerous neighbors that Washington should 

acknowledge. 22 Suggestions have even been made about a “grand 

bargain” that would concede Crimea to Russia and allow Moscow to 

assert its “national interests” throughout the former Soviet Union, in 

return for Kremlin support in combating the Islamic State (IS) 

jihadists in Syria. In practice, as evident in Russia’s foreign policy since 

Putin assumed power, Russia’s “national interests” include 

determining its neighbors’ foreign and security policies, dominating 

their economies, deciding on their administrative structures, 

formulating their constitutions, regulating the extent of their 

territories, and selecting their international alliances. 

An accommodationist approach that concedes some special “national 

interests” to Russia is not only unacceptable to all independent states 

that emerged from the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, but it also 

whets Moscow’s appetite for further imperial aggrandizement. 

Paradoxically, consenting to Russia’s aggressive and asymmetrical 

“national interests” toward neighbors is more likely to result in a 

collision with NATO and the EU than a more dynamic approach. If


the Kremlin operates with the conviction that it has a relatively free 

hand to methodically undermine countries along its borders, this can 

result in serious miscalculations when it overreaches by provoking a 

regional crisis and sparking conflicts with neighbors who are Alliance 

members; this would precipitate a direct war with NATO. 

Some policymakers and analysts put forward three additional 

arguments in favor of accommodation with Moscow despite its 

aggressive neighborhood policy: business interests, problem-solving, 

and Russia’s seemingly inevitable decline. First, powerful business 

lobbies in Germany, France, and other EU states view sanctions 

imposed on Moscow for its attack on Ukraine as a temporary measure 

that will be lifted so that lucrative economic investments can be 

resumed. This has been most evident in two agreements signed by 

Berlin and Moscow in the natural gas sector at the Vladivostok 

economic forum on September 4, 2015. 23 The first involves 

construction of the Nord Stream Two pipeline along the Baltic seabed; 

the second will result in Gazprom’s full takeover of Wintershall’s gas 

marketing business and gas storages in Germany. In return, 

Wintershall will acquire a minority stake in a Siberian gas field. These 

agreements will significantly increase Germany’s reliance on Russian 

gas for consumption, transit and storage. 

In a second accomodationist argument, it is claimed that Russia is a 

valuable partner in resolving various regional crises outside Europe. 

Instructively, disclosures made in September 2015 that Moscow had 

dispatched an expeditionary force together with military aid to Syria 

demonstrated that Russia’s cooperation had limited value and could 

actually be counter-productive for US policy. In October 2015, Russia 

conducted air strikes in Syria that were not directed against the 

Islamic State (IS) jihadists but included opposition forces supported 

by the West. Putin’s primary objective was to prop up the regime of 

President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus and thereby guarantee 

Russia’s ongoing military and intelligence presence in the country.


A third position held by some Western officials and analysts simply 

dismisses Russia as a declining power toward which little action needs 

to be taken. It contends that Putin is not a strategist and will defeat 

himself without the need for any significant Western offensive against 

Moscow. Such a deterministic approach ignores the prospect that 

even during a period of economic decline Russia can create significant 

damage to its neighbors, inject itself into unstable regions such as the 

Middle East, and undermine Western security and cohesion. An 

inadequate policy response to Russia’s revanchism serves to reinforce 

Western complacency and encourages further hawkishness by 

Moscow. Moreover, the most effective way to ensure Russia’s global 

decline and retreat from its neo-imperial project is through an activist 

policy that hastens such a process. 

In contrast to an accommodationist approach, trans-Atlantic 

assertiveness toward Russia will include both tests and benefits for the 

future of the NATO alliance and the EU structure. For instance, it will 

impact directly on the role of the EU in its agenda for closer 

association in the Eastern neighborhood. It will test the political unity 

of the Union in the face of Moscow’s aggressive empire building, its 

growing pressure on vulnerable European capitals, and its blatant 

disregard of international norms. No one can be certain whether EU 

member states will bear prolonged sanctions against Russia and 

mount an effective defense of the EU’s and NATO’s eastern flank. 

Conversely, they may succumb to compromises in order to pacify 

Moscow and inadvertently encourage future Kremlin ambitions. 

At the very least, a trans-Atlantic commitment is needed to strengthen 

the state sovereignty, national institutions, and market economies of 

all former Soviet bloc countries and republics bordering Russia, 

particularly NATO partners such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and 

Azerbaijan. The strategic standoff with Moscow will also provide an 

opportunity for Washington to consolidate the defense of key allies in 

the region, including Poland, Romania, and the three Baltic States. 

Washington will need to factor in the changing security perceptions


of several Central and East European allies since the Ukrainian crisis 

erupted. A range of measures has already been initiated or 

implemented to more effectively protect the security of each NATO 

ally, but much more needs to be accomplished in the coming years. 

The overriding question in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius is whether 

NATO can respond adequately and swiftly to defend its most exposed 

members. In terms of conventional military threats, it is essential to 

have an effective tripwire by ensuring the presence of soldiers from 

various NATO members, including the US, on a permanent basis in 

these countries. Moves in this direction, through air policing units, 

regular training and military exercises, and the creation of small bases 

to accommodate the planned NATO Rapid Reaction Force, were 

taken as the war in Ukraine unfolded during 2014. But fears remained 

that these measures relied more on symbolism than substance and 

without a more permanent stationing of international NATO forces 

and equipment among the frontline states they could be quickly 

overrun by a Russian assault. At a mini-NATO summit in Bucharest 

on November 4, 2015, nine states—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 

Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and 

Slovakia—signed a joint declaration calling on NATO to maintain a 

permanent presence in the region to deter Russian aggression. 

NATO has drawn up defense plans for Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania, including guarantees of NATO’s military response to 

outside attacks. East Central Europe (ECE) and the Baltic region have 

also gained more regular NATO military exercises. Deliberations have 

also intensified over the potential hosting of US and NATO military 

infrastructure. However, at the NATO Summit on September 4–5, 

2014, Alliance leaders did not endorse the positioning of permanent 

bases in the ECE region despite the urging of Warsaw and the three 

Baltic governments. Instead, they agreed to create a spearhead 

contingent within the existing NATO Response Force (NRF)—a Very 

High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). Once formed, it would be 

capable of deploying at short notice along NATO’s periphery and


would consist of land, air, maritime, and Special Operations Force 

components. 

The VJTF is to include 4,000 troops trained to move on 48 hours’ 

notice to hotspots in any NATO member state. Nonetheless, it would 

be too small to counter the massive military might Russia has 

deployed along its western frontier. 24 The spearhead force is to be part 

of a wider NATO response force of 13,000 to 30,000 troops that could 

take weeks to deploy in a crisis. It will benefit from equipment and 

logistics facilities pre-positioned in ECE and Baltic countries, but the 

troops will not be permanently stationed in the region. 25 The force 

could evidently be used as a mobile tripwire when dispatched to a 

threatened state. However, at this early stage in its planned 

deployment, it is difficult to estimate the effectiveness of a relatively 

small VJTF contingent in deterring either the subversion or outright 

invasion of a NATO member by Russia. 

On February 5, 2015, NATO decided to establish six command 

centers in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. 26 

They will plan contingencies and organize exercises, and will be key 

for connecting national forces with NATO reinforcements. They will 

be used for logistics, reconnaissance, and planning missions, and 

contain permanent multinational staffs consisting of between 300 and 

600 persons in each center. 27 The multinational headquarters for the 

command and control centers will be located in Szczecin, on Poland’s 

Baltic coast. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, General Philip 

Breedlove, proposed that Szczecin expand its existing base to help 

NATO respond faster to any threat posed by Russia. 28 Several NATO 

allies backed the general’s plans to store weapons, ammunition, and 

ration packs to enable a sudden influx of thousands of NATO troops 

in the event of a crisis. Multinational Corps Northeast was formed in 

1999, at Szczecin, as NATO’s only multilateral corps thus far, 

consisting of Polish, German, and Danish units. 

Among other NATO measures, 600 soldiers from the US Army’s 1st


Cavalry Division deployed to Poland and the Baltic states in October 

2014 for three-month training exercises. 29 This was part of Operation 

Atlantic Resolve designed to foster interoperability through smallunit 

and leader training. In addition to ground forces, the US sent F- 

16 combat aircraft to Poland and participated in NATO air policing 

missions over the Baltic states. In June 2015, Washington decided to 

store heavy weapons, including tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, 

in Poland that could be used in training exercises and outfit one 

brigade in the event of war. Up to 5,000 NATO troops could be 

equipped with the weapons, thus enabling a rapid reaction brigade to 

deploy at short notice. This decision precipitated a furious response 

from Russian officials who claimed that NATO was moving closer to 

Russia’s borders, failing to point out that Moscow had provoked the 

build-up by significantly reinforcing its military presence close to 

NATO’s borders. 

US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced on a visit to Estonia, 

on June 23, 2015, that the US would deploy heavy weapons, including 

250 tanks, armored vehicles, and howitzer artillery guns, in Bulgaria, 

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. 30 Each set of 

equipment would be enough for a battalion of 750 soldiers. The 

equipment would be moved around the region to help in training and 

improving mobility. The positioning of military hardware without the 

presence of US troops is premised on the assumption that the local 

armed forces would be capable of defending the country for a 

sufficient period of time from a Russian assault to allow for the timely 

arrival of American and other NATO units. 

The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin 

Dempsey, has also asserted that America’s military is ready to ensure 

the deployment of high alert forces within 48 hours to NATO 

countries bordering Russia. 31 If this is insufficient to stem a Russian 

attack, then Washington will be ready to use additional force to 

protect its allies.


The increasing intensity of NATO’s Baltic airspace policing mission 

is also related to the growing activity of Russian fighter aircraft in the 

region’s airspace. Fighter jets of different NATO member states have 

been patrolling the Baltic skies since 2004, as the three Baltic nations 

do not have airplanes suitable for guarding their air space. NATO also 

increased its presence and military activities in the Black Sea in the 

wake of the Ukraine crisis. 

As part of a new strategy, more NATO countries have deployed either 

warships or surveillance vessels to the Black Sea since January 2014. 32 

NATO officials are also considering deploying a missile defense 

system to protect Europe from attacks from the Middle East and 

Russia. 33 Calls for such an expansion to the system have been growing 

in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. After Putin announced on 

June 16, 2015, that Russia would place 40 new nuclear-armed 

intercontinental ballistic missiles into service, NATO Secretary 

General Jens Stoltenberg described the move as “dangerous saberrattling.” 

Washington has accused Moscow of testing a new ground-launched 

cruise missile, breaking the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 

Treaty that Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed 

in 1987. NATO allies are to review their preparedness for a nuclear 

standoff with Russia in response to Moscow’s threats. 34 They are 

expected to hold an additional meeting of NATO’s Nuclear Planning 

Group, a body established in the 1960s to co-ordinate defense plans 

against the Soviet Union. Some NATO officials also believe that the 

alliance should resume nuclear drills to rehearse a potential 

counterattack against a threatening Russia. 

Policy Recommendations 

In the wake of the escalating confrontation between the West and 

Russia, policy recommendations for Washington and the EU capitals


need to focus on consolidating a dynamic trans-Atlantic alliance, 

repelling and deterring a belligerent Russia, implementing a 

concerted counter-subversion strategy, ensuring the security of all 

states bordering Russia, and preparing for a potential implosion of the 

Russian Federation. 

Multi-Regional Policy Agenda 

 

Develop a long-term trans-Atlantic policy toward states that were 

formerly part of the Soviet Union but are not currently NATO or 

EU members. Such an agenda should be based on the following 

principles: maintaining the independence and territorial integrity 

of all countries; preventing and deterring any single power from 

dominating the political or economic systems of neighbors or 

determining their foreign and security policies; pursuing closer 

political, economic, legal and institutional relations with Western 

states and multi-national organizations; and setting targets for 

eventual institutional integration into NATO and the EU for all 

countries that qualify for and seek membership. 

Threat Monitoring 

 

Anticipate Moscow’s actions through enhanced intelligence 

gathering and information sharing. This requires more intensive 

and extensive monitoring of threats emanating from Russia, 

especially in the use of its multi-pronged arsenal of subversion 

against neighboring states. Western intelligence services should 

also seek to determine to what extent Moscow’s operations to 

undermine and destabilize neighbors are controlled and 

coordinated by the Kremlin’s presidential administration and 

what roles are played by specific individuals. One must be careful 

not to assume that Moscow is behind every instance of 

neighborhood instability. Indeed, it serves Kremlin objectives to 

create the impression that it possesses extensive influences in all


nearby states, thus underscoring its power and omnipresence. 

Instead, it is necessary to closely monitor the precise arenas where 

Moscow is engaged in subversive actions against its targets. 

 

 

 

Map and document Russia’s propaganda resources and Moscowfinanced 

media agencies, agents of influence, and political parties 

throughout Europe that are pro-Kremlin in orientation. 35 Expose 

and publicize the links of Western organizations, foundations, 

agencies, NGOs, journalists, politicians, and academics with 

Russia’s various state agencies and Kremlin-connected 

individuals. 

Coordinate US-European counterintelligence operations, in 

which every suspected Russian agent is expelled. This would send 

a powerful political message and disrupt Russia’s intelligence 

operations, including the recruitment of spies and agents of 

influence in Western states. 

Monitor the transfer of Russian weapons to nonstate militias 

along Russia’s flanks by increasing espionage work against 

insurgent groups and disclosing their connections to Moscow. 

This should also include information concerning the support 

provided by Russia’s intelligence agencies to international 

terrorist networks. 

Informational Campaigns 

 

Bolster expertise to analyze specific cases of Moscow’s 

disinformation. 36 This will require linguistic and area expertise, 

the restoration of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) 

Title VI program, and the development of career paths in 

government that allow individuals to pursue a full career without 

shifting outside their area of expertise. It will also require the 

restoration of government translation programs such as the


Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) that 

comprehensively cover developments inside Russia and among 

countries bordering Russia. 

 

 

 

 

Invest in defensive strategic communications in order to counter 

the Kremlin’s false narratives. 37 While Russia’s propaganda 

messages are relatively simple and emotional, the West’s are often 

too complex regarding the conflict with Russia and therefore lack 

the same broad public appeal. 38 Western policy makers should 

focus on developing several key themes in their communications 

approach, such as providing a compelling narrative exposing 

Russia’s disinformation, fostering skepticism toward Russia’s 

media outlets, and exposing the Kremlin-financed support 

network in the West. The Western narrative should focus on the 

values of individual freedom, democracy and the rule of law. 

Neutralize Moscow’s disinformation campaigns through media 

channels delivering alternative messages, including international 

broadcasting to Russian-speaking audiences in all post-Soviet 

states. 39 This should include Internet and satellite television 

broadcasting. Riga and Tallinn are developing Russian-language 

media to counter Kremlin disinformation campaigns targeting 

Russian-speakers. They need a positive message that they are 

Europeans and welcome in the host states, while contrasting their 

situation with declining economic conditions inside Russia. 

Increase the availability of television from EU countries to 

Europe’s East. For example, the Nordic states plan to create a 

Russian-language TV station for Russian speakers in Estonia and 

Latvia. They possess significant experience in combining 

entertainment with news and competing with TV channels 

broadcast from Russia. Also needed are courses on media literacy 

for schools and aspiring journalists. 

Target Russia for a new international broadcasting effort, directly


to home satellite television, in Russian and other languages of the 

Russian Federation. 40 There is little coverage of domestic news 

within Russia, as Moscow's propaganda does not discuss the 

economic, demographic, and regional crises in the country. Such 

an initiative should also aim at de-imperializing the mentality of 

the Russian public that still believes the Kremlin narrative that 

Russia is a great power. Psychological de-imperialization among 

the British, French, and other empires was a long process that 

eventually brought dividends. In Russia, the process has failed to 

be undertaken since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

 

Promote use of English in all post-Soviet states to help displace 

Russian as a second language. Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan 

Nazarbayev has reportedly ruled that students will not only study 

English but also study all subjects in English in the last two years 

of their schooling. Such policies should be encouraged across the 

region, as they will undermine the assertions of Putin’s “Russian 

World” toward neighboring territories on the basis of common 

language and culture. 

International Ostracism 

Isolate the Russian government internationally through 

diplomatic, institutional, and economic measures. 

Diplomatically, US and EU leaders must consistently insist that 

by occupying any part of Ukrainian territory, together with 

portions of Georgia and Moldova, Russia violates numerous 

international accords, beginning with the UN Charter, and will 

not be treated as an equal partner or a credible international 

interlocutor. The West must focus on Russia’s vulnerabilities, 

including denying access to Western capital and assets by the pro- 

Putin Russian elite. Many more names could be added to the 

sanctions list, including government ministers, parliamentarians, 

senior state bureaucrats, regional and municipal leaders,


businessmen, journalists, and academicians with ties to the 

Kremlin. 

Economic Instruments 

 

 

 

Accelerate the development of the European Energy Union in 

order to reduce Moscow’s ability to manipulate oil and gas 

supplies as leverage against Western states. 41 Gazprom and other 

Russian companies should be competitively pushed out of 

Europe’s energy market, thus seriously depleting Kremlin export 

earnings and political influences. In an important move in this 

direction on July 10, 2015, fifteen EU and Energy Community 

countries in Central and South East Europe signed a 

Memorandum of Understanding to work together in accelerating 

the construction of missing gas infrastructure links. 42 This will 

involve resolving the remaining technical and regulatory 

obstacles that hinder the development of a fully integrated 

regional energy market. 

Avoid EU institutional engagement with the Eurasian Economic 

Union (EEU), as this would lend the organization credibility and 

legitimize Russia's empire building. 43 Instead, the EU should 

develop closer bilateral economic and political relations with 

countries that have been incorporated into the Eurasian Union— 

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia—but may seek future 

alternatives. 

Boost regional development in countries with sizable and 

compact Russian minorities that may be susceptible to Kremlininduced 

separatism. For instance, in Latvia economic 

development is mostly concentrated in the Riga region, while 

much of the rest of the country suffers chronic underdevelopment 

and high unemployment. This can increase Moscow’s subversive 

influence in the Latvian countryside. 44 Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine,


Moldova, and other states can cooperate in these endeavors and 

learn lessons from each other’s experiences. 

NATO Enhancement 

 

 

Underscore that a strong NATO alliance is the backbone of 

European security and preclude proposals for a European Army, 

which simply dilutes and distracts from the only capable multinational 

Western security organization. 45 A European Army 

would not only siphon off NATO’s already limited assets and 

resources and diminish its capabilities, but it would also trigger 

rivalries between Europe and North America over the 

deployment of military forces. It could also split Europe between 

countries committed to close security relations with the US and 

states at a safe distance from Russia that see little need for 

American security guarantees. Such an outcome would, in effect, 

grant Moscow a strategic victory over NATO. 

Amend the Washington Treaty, especially Article 5, and the 

definition of an attack on a NATO member state. This needs to 

reflect the challenges associated with contemporary warfare to 

include non-state actors, externally generated insurgencies, cyber 

attacks, information warfare, and other forms of subversion 

aimed at undermining state independence or truncating its 

territory. 

Revive NATO’s fundamental mandate and ensure that 

capabilities match commitments in defending Alliance members. 

Needed are stronger national capabilities that increase the costs of 

any Russian attack. 

46 

Europe must engage in military 

modernization and be capable of defending its border rather than 

operating with the traditional formula based on retaliation and 

the extended deterrent provided by the US. Local forces must 

possess the ability to protect their own borders and increase the


costs of aggression even if they cannot win the conflict unaided. 

In particular, NATO needs to place greater emphasis on ensuring 

the ability of frontline states to defend themselves during the 

critical, early phases of a limited war. 

 

 

 

Prepare for a wide assortment of unconventional threats among 

frontline NATO states. This must include penetrating intelligence 

gathering; detection, early warnings, and rapid preparations for a 

foreign assault; effective communications between central and 

local governments; comprehensive border controls; consolidation 

of a professional and loyal police force; and capabilities to pursue 

intensive and prolonged anti-guerrilla operations. There must 

also be a focus on conventional warfare. According to Adrian 

Bradshaw, NATO’s deputy supreme commander, the Alliance 

should prepare for a Blitzkrieg-type assault by Russia on east 

European member states and not be sidetracked by “hybrid” or 

low intensity attacks. 47 

Strengthen the defense of frontline states. Each NATO state 

bordering Russia requires three fundamental elements: adequate 

infrastructure and prepositioned equipment to allow for speedy 

deployment of indigenous and other NATO forces; early warning 

of Russian subversion and covert attack; and capable forces that 

can respond quickly to an assault on a country’s territorial 

integrity. Each state also needs the positioning of US and West 

European forces on a permanent basis as a tripwire against 

potential Russian attack. In addition to enhancing their defensive 

capabilities, front line states also need an offensive component 

that can threaten Russia’s aggressive operations by targeting the 

enemy’s staging areas, airports, radar installations, sea and river 

ports, and logistical nodes. 48 Defensive capabilities alone are 

unlikely to be sufficient to deter a military assault. 

Ensure NATO capabilities to move troops between West, Central, 

and East European states and to converge different units from


various NATO countries by improving infrastructure 

connections, such as railways. This also requires that SACEUR 

possesses the authority to make quick decisions without 

prolonged consultations. Since Moscow’s assault on Ukraine, 

NATO has taken initial steps to bolster the defense of vulnerable 

members by adding combat aircraft support to NATO’s Baltic air 

policing mission, dispatching a dozen F-16 fighters to Poland, and 

deploying AWAC reconnaissance aircraft in Poland and 

Romania. Washington needs to station Patriot missile batteries in 

the three Baltic states, conduct more regular NATO exercises, 

transfer military equipment and reposition NATO bases from 

West to Central Europe. In this equation, US forces in Europe 

must be relocated and retrained to adopt a forward presence on 

the “eastern front.” General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme 

Allied Commander for Europe, has called Moscow's conquest of 

Crimea a “paradigm shift” that requires a fundamental rethinking 

of where American forces are located and how they are trained. 

 

Demonstrate NATO’s vitality by admitting Montenegro into the 

Alliance following the membership invitation issued in December 

2015, as well as by pushing Greece to enable Macedonia to enter 

NATO under its temporary name, the Former Yugoslav Republic 

of Macedonia (FYROM). The Warsaw Summit in July 2016 will 

also be a timely occasion to offer NATO Membership Action 

Plans (MAP) to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine and 

to confirm that they will also join the Alliance at a future date. 

NATO also needs to pursue closer military cooperation with 

Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to prevent their potential 

capitulation to Russia’s incessant pressures. 

Ensuring Imperial Indigestion 

 

Provide the Ukrainian military with sufficient means to make any 

further aggression by Moscow increasingly costly. 49 The White


House and Congress must commit serious money to Ukraine’s 

defense, including $1 billion in military assistance each year until 

2017. It must also provide lethal assistance, including counterbattery 

radars and other defensive weapons. Ukraine’s 

government has so far unsuccessfully appealed for US military 

aid. An under-armed army is more likely to encourage a Russian 

invasion than a force capable of resisting military assault. 

 

 

Preclude the digestion of any occupied territories by Moscow by 

making such an operation expensive and painful. This will require 

Western defense aid to Ukraine, Georgia, and other states 

threatened by Moscow. Priorities must include intelligence 

sharing, technology for cyber defense, and secure military 

command and control. Ukraine’s army needs technical assistance 

as well as combat equipment to resist Russian military incursions, 

and Kyiv must develop a credible territorial defense force that 

would make any occupation protracted and costly. Training for 

Ukraine’s recently formed National Guard in territorial defense 

and in insurgency and counter-insurgency operations remains 

critical. In all NATO Partnership for Peace states bordering 

Russia, assistance in constructing more effective territorial 

defense forces, security services, and law enforcement bodies will 

improve their resilience to Moscow’s subversion. 

Avoid the political pitfalls of negotiating with Russia over 

territories that Moscow has carved out of neighboring states, 

whether through proxies (as in Ukraine’s Donbas) or dissatisfied 

local politicians (as in Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia). 

Washington and Brussels have been complicit in pushing Kyiv to 

amend its constitution and provide a special constitutional status 

to rebel-held areas in Donbas. Such short-sighted moves to attain 

a temporary peace will provide credibility to the separatist groups, 

legitimize Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and 

encourage the Kremlin to prepare subsequent acts of political 

subversion and territorial partition. 50 It may also stimulate ethno-


territorial secession in the broader region, undermine Western 

security guarantees, and challenge a number of European borders 

from which Moscow will profit. Simmering conflict in Donbas 

will preoccupy governments and mediators, enable Moscow to 

encroach on Ukraine’s sovereignty, and threaten to reignite a 

renewed war similarly to what has been witnessed in Georgia, 

Azerbaijan, and Moldova. 

Systemic Transformation 

 

 

Thwart Russia’s expansionist ambitions by undermining the 

Putinist regime. A strategy needs to be developed to weaken 

Kremlin control over the Russian Federation, not only through 

sanctions and isolation but also by supporting minority rights, 

regional self-determination, and national independence 

movements from Kaliningrad to Chukotka and from Karelia to 

Dagestan. Washington and Brussels must consistently assert that 

if the current administration is not replaced with a nonimperialist 

and pro-democratic successor, Russia will increasingly 

face ethnic and religious conflicts and territorial fracture. Russia’s 

numerous ethnic groups should be encouraged to preserve their 

culture, language, heritage, and history, while promoting their 

autonomy and self-determination. This is consistent with 

Western support for individual freedom, democracy, and human 

rights inside Russia. Paradoxically, Moscow’s annexation of 

Crimea means that the West does not recognize Russia’s claimed 

borders, signaling that it may no longer accept the legitimacy of 

Moscow’s “inner empire.” 

Assess the possible consequences of a chaotic end to the Putinist 

system and prepare contingencies for the conflicts that this may 

generate and the opportunities that this will provide for the 

West. 51 In particular, Russia’s neighbors must be shielded from 

the most destabilizing scenarios of civil conflict and the country’s


violent disintegration. A peaceful change of leadership or a 

bloodless dissolution of the Russian Federation would be the 

preferable alternatives to a civil war that could spill over the 

country’s borders. 

In his drive to expand Russia’s territorial possessions and zones of 

influence, Putin is likely to miscalculate. Authoritarian rulers often 

believe they are invincible when they achieve early triumphs, as with 

Moscow’s annexation of Crimea or truncation of Georgia. 

Paradoxically, Putin’s attempts to construct a new Russia-centered 

dominion will accelerate the country’s decline. An overstretched 

Russia, facing growing economic problems cannot withstand a 

prolonged conflict with the West, with a multitude of neighbors, or 

within its own borders. The turmoil engendered by Putin’s push for 

empire can have a direct impact on the stability of the Russian 

Federation. An economically and militarily overstretched Russia will 

witness escalating domestic economic, social, political, and regional 

turmoil and present even more menacing challenges for Western 

policy. The question is how can the West capitalize on Russia’s 

economic weaknesses, multi-ethnic turmoil, and regional disquiet to 

enable the Russian population to replace the Putinist system as 

peacefully and quickly as possible. 

Ultimately, the uncertainty over Russia’s future may be resolved 

through two possible scenarios: either Russia transforming itself into 

a responsible international player without neo-imperial aspirations 

toward its neighbors, or the Russian Federation fracturing with the 

emergence of a smaller and weaker Russia that can eventually co-exist 

with Europe’s democracies and multi-national institutions. Given the 

ongoing collision with Ukraine and the Kremlin’s extensive imperial 

aspirations, the first scenario seems highly unlikely for the foreseeable 

future. In light of the policies pursued during the Putin presidency at 

a time of prolonged economic decline, the latter scenario seems more 

probable, although the timescale and multi-regional impact of a 

Russia implosion remains highly unpredictable. This would be a


timely and strategically critical subject for a future in-depth study. 

Endnotes 

1 

Pavel K. Baev, “Free Rein of Special Services Makes Russia Ungovernable,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 9, 2015, Volume 12, Issue 43. 

2 

Alexander Motyl, “Goodbye, Putin, Why the President's Days Are 

Numbered,” Foreign Affairs, February 5, 2015, 

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142840/alexander-j-motyl/goodbyeputin. 

3 

Elena Popina and Ye Xie, “Investors Flee Russia as Morgan Stanley Sees 

Long Market Chill,” Bloomberg Business, July 26, 2015, 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-26/investors-flee-russiaas-morgan-stanley-sees-long-market-chill. 

4 

For data on the decline of Gazprom see “Russia: Gazprom, a Behemoth No 

More,” August 3, 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74501. 

5 

“Russia: Massive Capital Flight Continues,” The Moscow Times, May 1, 

2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/520112.html. 

6 

Laurence Norman, “EU Extends Economic Sanctions on Russia Until End 

of January,” June 22, 2015, The Wall Street Journal, 

http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-extends-economic-sanctions-on-russiauntil-end-of-january-1434960823. 

7 

Lack of Action Questions Forum’s Reform Agenda,” Johnson's Russia List, 

June 19, 2015, http://russialist.org/lack-of-action-questions-forums-reformagenda/. 

8 

The Moscow Times, June 11, 2015, www.themoscowtimes.com.


9 

Cheap Oil Drags Down Russia’s Ruble,” CNN Money, August 18, 2015, 

http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/17/investing/russia-ruble-currencyslide/index.html. 

10 

Paul Goble, “Financial Instability in Russia’s Regions Already ‘Worse 

than Default,’ Zubarevich Says,” Window on Eurasia – New Series, June 11, 

2015, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/06/financial-instabilityin-russias.html. 

11 

Paul Goble, “New East-West Tensions Leave Kaliningrad Out In The 

Cold,” Window on Eurasia - New Series, October 31, 2014, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/10/window-on-eurasia-neweast-west.html. 

12 

Adrian Karatnycky, “Putin’s Warlords Slip Out of Control,” The New 

York Times, June 9, 2015. 

13 

Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in 

Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 84. 

14 

Matthew Czekaj, “Russia’s Bankrupting Empire,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 

Volume 12, Issue 121, June 29, 2015, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=44093&tx_ttnews[b 

ackPid]=7&cHash=4943b3783c312dfa3f0b07912a293854#.VY_xY6b9qxKB 

y. 

15 

Wespazjan Wielohorski, “Moscow's Worst Nightmare Is Called TTIP,” 

Gazeta Polska, Warsaw, October 15, 2014, http://www.gazetapolska.pl/. 

16 

“Armenia Protests: Electricity Price Hike Suspended,” BBC News, June 

27, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33301689. 

17 

Alexander Kim, “It’s All About the Ruble: How to Resolve the Looming 

Regional Economic Crisis in Central Asia?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 6, 

2015, Volume 12, Issue 125.


18 

Zaur Shiriyev, “The Protests and Energy Interdependence in Armenia: 

View From Baku,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 7, 2015, Volume 12, Issue 

126. 

19 

Richard J. Krickus, “Russia After Putin,” Strategic Studies Institute and 

US Army War College, May 2014, pp. 62–66, 

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/. 

20 

Andrew A. Michta, “Europe’s Russia Denial,” Politiko, July 25, 2015, 

www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-denial-ukraine-baltics-centraleurope-attack. 

21 

For an in-depth account of Putin’s appeasers and accomplices among US 

academics and former officials see James Kirchick,” How a US Think Tank 

Fell for Putin, The Daily Beast, July 27, 2015, 

www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/27/how-a-u-s-think-tank-fell-forputin.html?via=mobile&source=email. 

22 

See for example, Leslie H. Gelb, “Russia and America: Toward a New 

Détente,” The National Interest, June 9, 2015, 

www.nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-america-toward-new-detente- 

13077?page=8. As Gelb notes, “It is totally unrealistic, however, to think 

that the West can gain desired Russian restraint and cooperation without 

dealing with Moscow as a great power that possesses real and legitimate 

interests, especially in its border areas.” According to this kind of 

explanation, all of Russia’s neighbors simply have the status of “border 

areas” rather than being independent states with their own national 

interests. 

23 

Vladimir Socor, “Nord Stream Expansion Agreed, Wintershall Swapped 

to Gazprom (Part One),” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume, 12, Issue, 162, 


24 

Mark MacKinnon, “Protect Baltic States, Not Ukraine, NATO Told 

Ahead Of Summit,” 

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/protect-baltic-states-notukraine-nato-told-ahead-of-summit/article20296698/.


25 

“NATO Response Force, At The Centre Of NATO Transformation,” 

October 2, 2014, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm. 

26 

“NATO To Unveil Strengthened Eastern Europe Defense,” AFP (North 

European Service), February 5, 2015, Brussels, 


27 

“NATO Will Set Up Five New Bases In Eastern Europe, Including One in 

Romania,” Adevarul Online, Bucharest, September 2, 2014, 

http://www.adevarul.ro. 

28 

“NATO To Expand Polish Base In Response To Russian Threat,” 

Euractiv, July 25, 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/globaleurope/nato-expand-polish-base-response-russian-threat-303713. 

29 

“US To Rotate 600 Troops, Heavy Weapons In Baltics, Poland,” Tallinn, 

August 14, 2014, http://www.bns.ee. 

30 

“US Announces New Tank and Artillery Deployment in Europe,” BBC 

News, June 23, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33238004. 

31 

“US. Army Ready To Respond To Russia In 48 Hours, In Event Of Its 

Attack On NATO,”Joinfo, June 25, 2015, 

http://joinfo.com/world/1002670_u-s-army-ready-to-respond-to-russia-in- 

48-hours-in-event-of-its-attack-on-nato.html. 

32 

“NATO Boosts Black Sea Presence Amid Ukraine Crisis,” Hurriyet Daily 

News Online, Istanbul, July 12, 2014, www.hurriyetdailynews.com. 

According to the Montreux Convention, all NATO countries taking part in 

Black Sea activities must comply with certain stipulations, including limited 

scope, non-provocation toward Russia, and confinement to the western and 

southern parts of the Black Sea. 

33 

“Baltic Fears -- NATO Debates Directing Missile Shield Against Russia,” 

Spiegel on Line, Hamburg, August 25, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de. 

34 

Matthew Holehouse, “NATO Updates Cold War Playbook as Putin Vows 

to Build Nuclear Stockpile,” The Telegraph, June 25, 2015,


www.telegraph.co.uk/news/predictions/politics/11697512/Nato-updates- 

Cold-War-playbook-as-Putin-vows-to-build-nuclear-stockpile.html. 

35 

Vitalii Usenko and Dmytro Usenko, “Russian Hybrid Warfare: What are 

Effects-Based Network Operations and How to Counteract Them,” 

http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/11/05/russian-hybrid-warfare-what-areeffect-based-network-operations-and-how-to-counteract-them/. 

36 

Paul Goble, “Hot Issue – Lies, Damned Lies and Russian 

Disinformation,” Jamestown Foundation, August 13, 2014, 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=42745#.VXi 

b4Cgx85Q. 

37 

Keir Giles, Philip Hanson, Roderic Lyne, James Nixey, James Sherr, and 

Andrew Wood, “The Russian Challenge,” June 4, 2015, Chatham House, 

London, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russianchallenge?dm_i=1TYG,3FSEV,DOYKRT,CAZM8,1#. 

38 

Ben Nimmo, “Anatomy of An Info-War: How Russia’s Propaganda 

Machine Works, And How To Counter It,” Central European Policy 

Institute, May 15, 2015, http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/anatomyinfo-war-how-russias-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-counter-it. 

39 

A new Russian-language TV news program was launched in October 

2014 to provide audiences in countries bordering Russia with a balanced 

alternative to the disinformation produced by Russia’s media outlets. See 

“New TV Show Brings ‘Facts, not Lies,’ to Russian Speakers,” Radio Free 

Europe/ Radio Liberty, Washington DC, October 14, 2014, 

http://www.rferl.org/content/release-new-tv-show-brings-facts-not-lies-torussian-speakers/26631532.html. 

“Current Time” (“Nastoyashchee 

Vremya”) is a joint production of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the 

Voice of America, undertaken in partnership with public and private 

broadcasters and Internet portals in Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Moldova and Ukraine. The project began with a 30-minute daily program, 

but plans were in place to expand programming and satellite and online 

distribution by the end of 2015.


40 

Paul Goble, “Putin is Waging War While the West is Talking Sanctions,” 

Window on Eurasia – New Series, July 27, 2014, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/07/window-on-eurasia-putinis-waging-war.html. 

41 

Mark Galeotti, “Time for a New Strategy in Russia,” Foreign Affairs, 

August 4, 2015, 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2015-08-04/time-newstrategy-russia. 

42 

Sofia, BTA Online, 10 July 10, 2015, http://www.bta.bg. EU Commission 

Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič and EU Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete 

signed the Memorandum of Understanding, together with Energy Ministers 

from Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, 

Slovenia, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Ukraine. Bosnia-Herzegovina 

and Moldova were due to sign at a later date. 

43 

Joseph Dobbs, “The Eurasian Economic Union: A Bridge to Nowhere?” 

Policy Brief, European Leadership Network, March 4, 2015, p. 6, 

http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-eurasian-economic-uniona-bridge-to-nowhere_2498.html. 

44 

Jānis Bērziņš, “Introduction,” Russia’s New Generation Warfare in 

Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, Policy Paper No.2, April 

2014, National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and 

Strategic Research, p. 10, 

http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002- 

2014.ashx. 

45 

COL Douglas Mastriano and LTC Derek O'Malley (Editors), Project 

1704: A US Army War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern 

Europe, an Appropriate US Response, and the Implications for US 

Landpower, March 26, 2015, p. 8, 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=127 

4.


46 

Jakub Grygiel and Wess Mitchell, “Limited War is Back,” The National 

Interest, August 28, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/limited-warback-11128. 

47 

“NATO Must Prepare For Russian Blitzkrieg, Warns UK General, Sam 

Jones,” The Financial Times, February 20, 2015, 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/204ecbb8-b913-11e4-a8d0- 

00144feab7de.html#axzz3T4y1NKb5. Deploying overwhelming force at 

short notice is now a hallmark of Russian military exercises. For example, 

Russia’s 2013 Zapad war games involved the rapid mobilization of 25,000 

troops in Belarus and Kaliningrad in preparation for a conflict with a 

NATO state. 

48 

Jakub Grygiel, “Arming Our Allies: The Case for Offensive Capabilities,” 

Parameters 45(3) Autumn 2015, 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Autu 

mn_2015/7_Grygiel.pdf. 

49 

Steven Pifer and Strobe Talbott, “Ukraine Needs America’s Help,” The 

Washington Post, January 29 2015, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ukraine-needs-more-help-fromthe-west/2015/01/29/462b1ea4-a71b-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440_story.html. 

50 

Janusz Bugajski, “West Legitimizes Ukraine’s Division,” Europe Edge, 

CEPA, August 18, 2015, http://rtcg.me/vijesti/svijet/101097/zapadlegitimizuje-podjelu-ukrajine.html. 

51 

Keir Giles, Philip Hanson, Roderic Lyne, James Nixey, James Sherr, and 

Andrew Wood, “The Russian Challenge,” June 4, 2015, Chatham House, 

London, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russianchallenge?dm_i=1TYG,3FSEV,DOYKRT,CAZM8,1#.

Appendix I: Maps of Vulnerable Flanks 

499

500

501

502

503

504 

Author Biographies 

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy 

Analysis (CEPA) in Washington DC and host of television shows 

broadcast in the Balkans. Bugajski has authored 20 books on Europe, 

Russia, and trans-Atlantic relations and is a columnist for several 

media outlets. His recent books include Conflict Zones: North 

Caucasus and Western Balkans Compared (2014), Return of the 

Balkans: Challenges to European Integration and U.S. Disengagement 

(2013), Georgian Lessons: Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in 

the Wider Europe (2010), Dismantling the West: Russia’s Atlantic 

Agenda (2009), America’s New European Allies (2009); and Expanding 

Eurasia: Russia’s European Ambitions (2008). Please visit his website 

at http://www.jbugajski.com/. 

Margarita Assenova is Director of Programs for the Balkans, the 

Caucasus and Central Asia at the Jamestown Foundation. She is a 

regular contributor to the Jamestown publication Eurasia Daily 

Monitor on political developments and energy security in the Balkans 

and Central Asia. Assenova is a recipient of the John Knight 

Professional Journalism Fellowship at Stanford University for her 

reporting on nationalism in the Balkans. Her articles have appeared 

in US and European newspapers, magazines, and online publications, 

including RFE/RL Newsline and Balkan Report, The Washington 

Times, The World and I, Transitions Online, Balkan Times, Capital 

Weekly and Reason Magazine (Bulgaria), Internationale Polititik 

(Germany), World Finance Review Magazine (UK), and Future 

Prospects (UAE). She authored book chapters and journal articles on 

security, energy, and democracy published by CSIS Press, Brassey’s, 

Freedom House, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, the University 

of New Haven and the Jamestown Foundation. She is the co-editor of 

Azerbaijan and the New Energy Geopolitics of Southeastern Europe, 

published by the Jamestown Foundation in June 2015.

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